Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: application of the rational basis standard

Text: Having concluded that Connecticut's statutory definition of marriage does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect [or quasi-suspect] class; (internal quotation marks omitted) Contractor's Supply of Waterbury, LLC v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 283 Conn. 86, 93, 925 A.2d 1071 (2007); I also conclude that our marriage statutes survive rational basis review. The paradigm of a rational basis upon which challenged legislation may be sustained is that the legislature is not required to solve all aspects of a social problem, or address all aspects of a social issue, at once. It is entitled to take things one step at a time. Id., at 105, 925 A.2d 1071 (the legislature has the freedom to craft legislation to accomplish its purpose in gradual steps). That is precisely the basis on which our marriage and civil union statutes are premised. The legislature has, since 1971, consistently been enacting legislation beneficial to and protective of gay persons. It has been considering the claims of gay persons to secure the right to marry for eleven years, according to Representative Lawlor, who should know. It took a major step, in 2005, by enacting the civil union law, which afforded parties to civil unions all of the rights and obligations of marriage, except the name of the institution. It then had before it a gay marriage bill in 2007, with great political support, on which it deferred action solely to permit public opinion to continue to mount in its favor until, in the opinion of its sponsors, it would pass within a year or two, with even greater political support. It is entirely rational for the legislature to address the issue of gay marriage step-by-step, rather than all at once. I therefore dissent, and would affirm the judgment of the trial court. VERTEFEUILLE, J., dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the majority that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification for equal protection purposes under our state constitution and that our marriage statute barring same sex marriage therefore is subject to heightened or intermediate scrutiny. I agree, instead, with the dissenting opinion of Justice Borden and join in that opinion. In a highly persuasive opinion, Justice Borden concludes, in pertinent part, that sexual orientation does not constitute either a quasi-suspect or suspect classification under our state constitution, and that our marriage and civil union statutes satisfy the state constitution when analyzed under the traditional rational basis test. I cannot improve upon Justice Borden's analysis, and I therefore write separately simply to emphasize two points. First, [i]t is well established that a validly enacted statute carries with it a strong presumption of constitutionality.... The court will indulge in every presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality.... Therefore, [w]hen a question of constitutionality is raised, courts must approach it with caution, examine it with care, and sustain the legislation unless its invalidity is clear. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McKenzie-Adams, 281 Conn. 486, 500, 915 A.2d 822, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 248, 169 L.Ed.2d 148(2007). Moreover, because of this strong presumption favoring a statute's constitutionality, those who challenge its constitutionality must sustain the heavy burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Our jurisprudence thus requires the highest possible standard of proof in order to sustain a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute validly enacted by our legislature. In my view, Justice Borden's compelling opinion respects both of these fundamental, time-honored principles. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. ZARELLA, J., dissenting. The majority concludes that the marriage laws, [1] which define marriage as the union of one man and one woman, [2] classify on the basis of sexual orientation, that this classification is subject to intermediate scrutiny under article first, §§ 1 and 20, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended by articles five and twenty-one of the amendments, [3] and that, under this heightened level of review, the state has failed to provide sufficient justification for limiting marriage to one man and one woman. The latter conclusion is based primarily on the majority's unsupported assumptions that the essence of marriage is a loving, committed relationship between two adults and that the sole reason that marriage has been limited to one man and one woman is society's moral disapproval of or irrational animus toward gay persons. Indeed, the majority fails, during the entire course of its page opinion, even to identify, much less to discuss, the actual purpose of the marriage laws, even though this is the first, critical step in any equal protection analysis. I conclude, to the contrary, that, because the long-standing, fundamental purpose of our marriage laws is to privilege and regulate procreative conduct, those laws do not classify on the basis of sexual orientation and that persons who wish to enter into a same sex marriage are not similarly situated to persons who wish to enter into a traditional marriage. The ancient definition of marriage as the union of one man and one woman has its basis in biology, not bigotry. If the state no longer has an interest in the regulation of procreation, then that is a decision for the legislature or the people of the state and not this court. Therefore, I conclude that the equal protection provisions of the state constitution are not triggered. I further conclude that there is no fundamental right to same sex marriage. Accordingly, I dissent.