Opinion ID: 1783903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Was the total effect of all judgments taken together oppressive, unreasonable and inequitable?

Text: The principle is elementary that an award of alimony and child support is a matter within the discretion of the Chancellor and that this appellate court will not reverse unless the Chancellor was manifestly in error in his finding of fact and manifestly abused his discretion. Powers v. Powers, 568 So.2d 255, 258 (Miss. 1990). See Gregg v. Montgomery, 587 So.2d 928, 931 (Miss. 1991); Massey v. Massey, 475 So.2d 802, 803 (Miss. 1985); Hopton v. Hopton, 342 So.2d 1298, 1300 (Miss. 1977). Along the same lines this Court has explained that the process of weighing evidence and arriving at an award of child support is essentially an exercise in fact-finding. Our review, therefore, is significantly constrained. Cupit v. Cupit, 559 So.2d 1035, 1036-37 (Miss. 1990). The chancellor found Martin had ample assets with which he could have complied with the court's previous orders and, in fact, told Martin, you can't pick and choose assets ... [i]f assets are available, they are available. Much of Martin's argument involves court action taken in the original divorce decree. Martin could have appealed the original divorce decree after his motion for reconsideration was adjudicated, but he did not. Instead, he did absolutely nothing and ignored all court orders. No detriment to Martin has occurred since the original decrees to establish material changes in which a modification might be granted. Martin claims that a great injustice has been purported upon him and that although he could have made the payments, it would be manifestly unjust. With our limited standard of review and the fact that Martin did indeed have valuable assets but just did not pay, no error exists.