Opinion ID: 2995676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prima Facie Analysis of Peele’s Claims.

Text: We begin our analysis then by addressing Country Mutual’s argument that Peele failed to establish a prima facie case of sex or age discrimination. The parties do not dispute that Peele, a woman over the age of 40, is a member of two protected classes or that she suffered an adverse employment action. Country Mutual does contend, however, that Peele failed to demonstrate that she was meeting the com pany’s legitimate employment expectations at the time of her termination and that the company treated her less favorably than similarly situated male or younger employees. Country Mutual claims that the documentary evidence of Peele’s deteriorating job performance as a CR2 is overwhelming and uncontested./8 The company also argues that there is no credible evidence to support her allegations of disparate treatment. According to Country Mutual, at the time the company was documenting Peele’s declining performance, both male and younger employees were also being disciplined or terminated for similar performance deficiencies. Peele does not challenge the validity or veracity of the documentary evidence submitted by Country Mutual to demonstrate her poor job performance as a CR2. Instead, she contends that the company’s evidence is weak at best, and denies that her job performance was materially deficient. Peele claims that the company only found problems with a handful of the hundreds of files she handled in 1998. She also points to the depositions of former co-workers who testified that she was performing her job in a satisfactory manner at the time of her termination. Additionally, Peele contrasts her job performance reviews with those of allegedly similarly situated male and younger employees in an attempt to demonstrate that the company applied its legitimate employment expectations against her in a disparate manner. Finally, she argues that Country Mutual’s allegations of poor job performance are pretextual. According to Peele, she was terminated as a result of the company’s formal policy of cutting costs by eliminating older workers (through a voluntary early retirement program), and because her supervisor, Gary Hanenberger, wanted a younger, more male office.
legitimate employment expectations at the time of her termination? The first question we must consider is whether Peele was meeting Country Mutual’s legitimate employment expectations at the time of her termination. [T]he ’legitimate expectations’ element in the ubiquitous burden-shifting formula of McDonnell Douglas [is crucial]. Coco, 128 F.3d at 1179. If a plaintiff fails to demonstrate that she was meeting her employer’s legitimate employment expectations at the time of her termination, the employer may not be put to the burden of stating the reasons for [her] termination. Coco, 128 F.3d at 1179. If the plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination well and good; but if he has nothing else, and is therefore totally reliant on the McDonnell Douglas formula, he is out of luck if he can’t show that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations. Id. See also Brummett v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 284 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2002); Contreras, 237 F.3d at 761; Espo Eng’g Corp., 200 F.3d at 1090; Biolchini v. Gen. Elec. Co., 167 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1999); Plair, 105 F.3d at 347. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree with Country Mutual that the evidence of Peele’s deteriorating job performance is overwhelming. In the 18 months leading up to her termination, she was repeatedly warned by the company, both verbally and in writing, that her job performance was unacceptable. As our recitation of the facts demonstrates, Peele received no less than nine critical written evaluations of her job performance as a CR2. Time and time again, Country Mutual informed Peele of the specific deficiencies in her job performance, and she failed to correct them--despite being given numerous opportunities by the company to do so. Moreover, notwithstanding her allegations of discrimination, Peele has never challenged the veracity of any of the performance deficiencies noted in the company’s written evaluations of her job performance, including those made by Hanenberger. Furthermore, while Peele casts Hanenberger as the antagonist in this case, the record clearly shows that several of Country Mutual’s other employees also criticized her job performance as a CR2, and participated in the decision- making process that ultimately resulted in her termination. The following facts are undisputed: (1) Dennis Bates, Hanenberger’s predecessor, criticized Peele’s job performance in March 1997; (2) Donald Weber, a district training coordinator, noted several problems with Peele’s files after reviewing the findings of a 1998 supervisor’s audit; (3) Michael Kearns, a district manager, reviewed Peele’s files in June 1998, and found several performance deficiencies (e.g., calling one file a disgrace); (4) Kearns and Judy Garee, the company’s manager of compensation, along with Hanenberger, collectively made the decision to place Peele on a provisional rating; and (5) four employees were involved in the decision to terminate Peele: Kearns, Hanenberger, Garee, and Joe Painter, the company’s director of claims. This evidence shows that Hanenberger was not alone in his criticism of Peele, and that a consensus was reached by several Country Mutual employees that her failure to meet the company’s legitimate employment expectations over an 18-month period warranted her being terminated. We are unpersuaded by Peele’s argument that evidence of her poor job performance must be balanced against the favorable performance reviews, raises, and promotions she received during her eight-plus years with the company. In most cases, when a district court evaluates the question of whether an employee was meeting an employer’s legit imate employment expectations, the issue is not the employee’s past performance but whether the employee was performing well at the time of [her] termination. Karazanos v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 336 (7th Cir. 1991). See also Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 161 F.3d 1106, 1113 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, prior job performance evaluations, standing alone, [do not] create a genuine issue of triable fact when . . . there have been substantial alterations in the employee’s responsibilities and supervision in the intervening period. Fortier, 161 F.3d at 1113 (emphasis added). The bulk of the evidence documenting Peele’s performance deficiencies relates to her tenure as a CR2. Her responsibilities and work load as a CR2 were substantially different from those associated with her previous positions. The positive performance evaluations Peele received as a CR1, and, to even a lesser extent as a CSR, are therefore of no relevance. Finally, we have held that the general statements of co- workers, indicating that a plaintiff’s job performance was satisfactory, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether a plaintiff was meeting her employer’s legitimate employment expectations at the time she was terminated. See, e.g., Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1994) (Our cases . . . give little weight to statements by supervisors or co-workers that generally corroborate a plaintiff’s own perception of satisfactory job performance.). See also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1994); Kephart v. Inst. of Gas Tech., 630 F.2d 1217, 1218-19, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980). For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Peele was not meeting Country Mutual’s legitimate employment expectations at the time of her termination.
legitimate employment expectations against Peele in a discriminatory manner? Peele argues, however, that even if she was not meeting Country Mutual’s legitimate employment expectations at the time of her termination, she can still establish prima facie cases of sex and age discrimination because the company applied its expectations against her in a discriminatory manner. When a plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to raise an inference that an employer applied its legitimate employment expectations in a disparate manner (i.e., applied expectations to similarly situated male and younger employees in a more favorable manner), the second and fourth prongs of McDonnell Douglas merge--allowing the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, stave off summary judgment for the time being, and proceed to the pretext inquiry. See, e.g., Curry v. Menard, 270 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2001); Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 886- 87 (7th Cir. 2001); Oest v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 612 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001); Flores v. Preferred Tech. Group, 182 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1999); Coco, 128 F.3d at 1180. Peele claims that while the company strictly enforced the Best Practices standards against her, it did not do so with respect to similarly situated male and younger employees. A plaintiff may demonstrate that another employee issimilarly situated to her by show[ing] that there is someone who is directly comparable to her in all material respects. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Greer v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, Illinois, 267 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2001); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617- 18 (7th Cir. 2000). In determining whether employees are similarly situated, a court must look at all relevant factors, the number of which depends on the context of the case. Radue, 219 F.3d at 617. Furthermore, in disciplinary cases--in which a plaintiff claims that [she] was disciplined by [her] employer more harshly than a similarly situated employee based on some prohibited reason- -a plaintiff must show that [she] is similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct. Id. (emphasis added). This normally entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them. Id. at 617-18 (emphasis added). Specifically, Peele contends that Hanenberger was far more critical in his evaluations of female and older employees than in those he conducted for similarly situated male and younger employees. In support of her argument, Peele identifies four employees--Christopher Mason, Thomas Kyle, Matthew Smith, and Laura Dempski, who she claims are similarly situated and were treated more favorably by the company in the application of its legitimate employment expectations./9 Peele begins by comparing her situation to that of Christopher Mason, the individual Country Mutual hired to replace her. She contends that while the company criticized Mason’s job performance, it never disciplined him. The criticisms Peele references, however, are minor and quoted entirely out of context./10 The record contains four written evaluations of Mason’s job performance, and each of them is positive. Additionally, one of the evaluations, a 1998 supervisor’s audit, was conducted by Donald Weber, not Hanenberger. This demonstrates that at least one other employee at Country Mutual was of the opinion that Mason was meeting the company’s performance expectations. For virtually identical reasons, Laura Dempski is also not similarly situated to Peele./11 In any event, Country Mutual’s criticisms of Mason and Dempski pale in comparison to those lodged by the company against Peele (i.e., nine critical written evaluations in 18 months as a CR2), and therefore neither is similarly situated to her for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of sex or age discrimination./12 As for Thomas Kyle and Matthew Smith, even were we to assume that they were similarly situated to Peele,/13 the record clearly demonstrates that neither of these gentlemen was treated in a more favorable manner by Country Mutual. As the district court noted, the undisputed evidence shows that Thomas Kyle was on his way out for reasons akin to Peele, and [that] Matthew Smith was also terminated for similar reasons . . . . If a district court determines that a plaintiff has failed to identify a similarly situated co-worker outside of her protected class, or that the co- worker identified by the plaintiff, while similarly situated, was not treated in a more favorable manner, it need not address any of the underlying allegations of disparate treatment. See Patterson, 281 F.3d at 680 (holding that we cannot compare [an employer’s] treatment of [a plaintiff with that co-worker] . . . [if the plaintiff] fail[s] to meet her burden of establishing that [the co-worker] is a similarly situated employee.). See also Radue, 219 F.3d at 618; Plair, 105 F.3d at 350. Peele’s failure to offer such comparables dooms her Title VII and ADEA claims, see, e.g., Radue, 219 F.3d at 619-20, and obviates the need to address her particularized allegations of disparate treatment by Country Mutual. In this case, the record clearly demonstrates that Peele’s job performance was unsatisfactory. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Country Mutual enforced its legitimate employment expectations in a disparate manner. As such, we are unable to infer discriminatory intent under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See, e.g., Biolchini, 167 F.3d at 1154./14 Because Peele has failed to establish prima facie cases of sex and age discrimination, we need not address her pretext argument. See, e.g., Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1036 (7th Cir. 1999); Coco, 128 F.3d at 1178-79. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision to grant Country Mutual’s motion for summary judgment, but do so on the alternative ground that Peele failed to make out a prima facie case of sex or age discrimination. See, e.g., Slaney v. The Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 224 F.3d 580, 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding [a]n appellate court may affirm the district court’s [decision] on any ground supported by the Record, even if different from the grounds relied upon by the district court.).