Opinion ID: 574870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Du Pont's Chloride-Ilmenite Process

Text: 109 In the course of rulemaking, EPA twice discussed application of the Bevill Amendment to wastes generated by titanium dioxide production using a chloride process. See 54 Fed.Reg. 39,298, 39.304 (9/89 NPRM); 54 Fed.Reg. 36,592, 36,621 (9/89 Rule). On both occasions, petitioner Du Pont commented, asserting that its proprietary chloride-ilmenite process is different from the chloride process described by the Agency and that the waste it produces comes within the Bevill exclusion. Responding to these comments in the preamble to its 1/90 Rule, EPA acknowledged that Du Pont's proprietary process is somewhat different but denied the Bevill exclusion to the waste it yields. 110 There are four sequential steps in Du Pont's chloride-ilmenite process, the first two of which occur within the same vessel: (1) iron is leached from ilmenite ore to form iron chloride gas; (2) titanium is chlorinated from the ilmenite ore to form titanium tetrachloride gas; (3) the iron chloride is condensed and separated to form iron chloride acid; and finally (4) the titanium tetrachloride is condensed and processed to form titanium oxide pigment, the saleable product. Step (1) is a beneficiation, step (2) a processing step. In EPA's view, the iron chloride acid waste, which is produced in gaseous form at step (1) but removed from the vessel at step (3), is a mineral processing waste that does not qualify for the Bevill exclusion. In Du Pont's view, it is waste from the beneficiation step, and thus is covered by the Bevill exclusion. See Comments of Du Pont on EPA RCRA Proposal at 5 (Nov. 8, 1989) (In our process, we generate first, the gaseous [form of the waste]. This step, we submit, is our 'beneficiation' process. After this conversion, the [mineral processing occurs].). 111 EPA argues that because steps (1) and (2) occur within the same vessel, and were occasionally described by Du Pont as occurring in the same process step, see id. at 3, it may reasonably classify the operation as mineral processing. While EPA agrees that, in part, the chloride-ilmenite process involves beneficiation of ores or minerals, it emphasizes the similarities between Du Pont's process and conventional chloride processes: each destroys the identity of the mineral, produces a saleable mineral product, and generates a functionally identical waste. 55 Fed.Reg. at 2329. 112 Because the Agency never explains why those similarities are in any way significant, it seems that the critical reason for the Agency's treating Du Pont's operation as mineral processing rather than beneficiation is that the 'beneficiation' wastes and the 'processing' wastes generated by the chloride-ilmenite process are inseparable. Id. This is true in the sense that the wastes are physically in the same vessel; temporally, however, they are separate and distinct in that the beneficiation waste preexists the processing waste. EPA has offered no reason for thinking that the former point is more significant than the latter. 113 The Du Pont operation may not fit neatly into either one of the somewhat artificial categories--beneficiation and mineral processing--into which EPA has divided the universe of wastes for regulatory purposes. Compare EDF I, 852 F.2d 1309 (upholding Bevill status of all beneficiation wastes), with EDF II, 852 F.2d 1316 (EPA to determine which mineral processing wastes qualify for Bevill exclusion). That would hardly be surprising. The regulatory world is replete with imperfect distinctions; the Agency's task is to apply them rationally in light of their imperfections. The Agency's choice between two less than perfect alternatives cannot be accepted by the court uncritically, merely because the Agency acknowledges that each category is indeed an imperfect fit for the activity in question. Rather, EPA must articulate a reasonable justification for its choice on the basis of some policy ground or other. In this case, it simply has not done so. Therefore, the question whether to treat Du Pont's proprietary chloride-ilmenite process as mineral processing or as beneficiation is remanded to EPA for an adequate explanation or, failing that, reconsideration. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. at 2873 (agency must offer [a] rational connection between facts and judgment [in order] to pass muster under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard). 114 Petitioner SCM claims that its sulfate process is sufficiently similar to Du Pont's chloride-ilmenite process that if this Court grants relief to Du Pont ... SCM should be accorded the same relief. Having failed to make its case for similar treatment before the Agency, however, SCM will not now be heard in the first instance. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C.Cir.1973) (To entertain comments made for the first time before this court would be destructive of a meaningful administrative process.). Nor is SCM's process so obviously similar to Du Pont's that SCM can rest upon Du Pont's having put its argument before the Agency. Cf. NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1151 (D.C.Cir.1987) (en banc) (exhaustion requirement waived where agency considered the identical issues or the very argument pressed by petitioner) (citations omitted). Accordingly SCM's petition is denied. J. Chrome Tailings 1. Background 115 Chrome tailings are waste from the processing of chrome ore. The ore is pulverized, then mixed with lime and soda ash. That mixture is roasted, making the chromium water-soluble. Water is poured over the mixture, leaching out the chromium. The resulting liquid, sodium chromate liquor, is then drained, and constitutes the valuable product from the process. The remaining solids (chrome tailings) contain residual amounts of chrome capable of leaching out over time. At some plants tailings are released directly into the environment (untreated tailings). At other plants, the mixture is chemically treated to reduce the level of residual chrome, and only then released into the environment (treated tailings). 116 In the 9/89 NPRM, EPA proposed denying chrome tailings Bevill status because the tailings failed the low hazard criterion. 54 Fed.Reg. at 39,309. In response, American Chrome and Chemicals Inc. submitted a comment bringing to EPA's attention the distinction between treated and untreated tailings. American Chrome pointed out that EPA had relied on tests of untreated tailings for its conclusions in the 9/89 NPRM. The company asserted that its (treated) tailings met the low hazard criterion and were the only tailings released into the environment at its plant. Accordingly, the company reasoned, waste from its facilities should qualify for the Bevill exclusion. 117 EPA agreed. In the 1/90 Rule, the Agency stated that treated tailings qualified for Bevill coverage. 55 Fed.Reg. 2353, 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(7)(xiv). EPA stressed, however, that untreated tailings did not qualify, so that the on-site activity of treating the tailings was itself subject to Subtitle C. 55 Fed.Reg. at 2330. 118 While all this was happening, other, related issues were working their way through the rulemaking process. Petitioners Allied Signal and the City of Baltimore (collectively Allied) possess landfills that contain, among other things, untreated tailings previously deposited by now-defunct chrome processing plants. In comments to all three NPRMs, Allied directed EPA's attention to the issue of landfill tailings. Allied argued that if currently-generated tailings received Bevill status, landfill tailings should too. Allied also argued, however, that if current tailings were denied Bevill status, landfill tailings should qualify for Bevill coverage as a separate category. In the 4/89 NPRM, the Agency declined to broaden[ ] the definition of chrome tailings in any way. 54 Fed.Reg. at 15,336. In the 1/90 Rule, EPA again declined to treat landfill tailings as a separate, discrete mineral processing waste, stating that, like other untreated tailings, this material would not be classified as waste covered by the Bevill Amendment. 55 Fed.Reg. at 2335. EPA explained that such landfill tailings were probably combined with non-mineral waste and other materials, and that untreated tailings were not low hazard. Id. 119 Additionally, in the 4/89 NPRM and the 9/89 Rule, the Agency clarified the application of its regeneration rule to this rulemaking. EPA stated that if, as a result of this rulemaking, a waste stream became subjected to Subtitle C of RCRA for the first time, wastes disposed of prior to the effective date of the Rule would not be subject to direct Subtitle C controls. 54 Fed.Reg. at 15,338. Pursuant to the regeneration rule, this safe harbor from Subtitle C would last unless and until such pre-disposed waste was actively managed. Id. Active management was defined as physically disturbing the accumulated wastes ... or disposing additional non-Bevill hazardous wastes into the landfill after the effective date of the Rule. Id. at 36,597. Against this backdrop, petitioners seek judicial review of EPA's determination that chrome wastes in landfill did not qualify for the Bevill exemption. 2. Analysis 120 Petitioners first challenge EPA's decision not to include landfill waste within the Bevill exclusion on procedural grounds. They argue that EPA's conclusion that treated chrome wastes satisfied the high volume/low hazard criteria established in the 1/90 Rule a new, narrowed category of wastes. Jt. Brief at 73. The result, petitioners charge, is that landfill wastes were in effect retroactively dropped from the scope of the September 1989 Rule. Id. at 73-74. This, they allege, violated the Agency's notice and comment obligations under the APA. 121 It generally is not a violation of notice and comment requirements to amend a proposed rule in response to a comment. NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1988) (citing International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 n. 51 (D.C.Cir.1973)). EPA determined that treated chrome waste satisfied the Bevill requirements in response to submitted comments. 55 Fed.Reg. at 2353. Petitioners had the opportunity to argue to the Agency that their waste similarly satisfied the Bevill requirements; their arguments were unsuccessful. EPA's refusal to provide further opportunity to comment on the fact that others' arguments were successful and petitioners' were not does not violate the APA. 122 Petitioners' substantive arguments on this issue are no more persuasive. They argue first that Congress intended the inherent qualities of a waste to dictate its Bevill status. Jt. Brief at 78. The difference in hazardousness between treated and untreated chrome tailings, which guided EPA's decision here, seems to be such an inherent quality. Petitioners next argue that EPA should have measured the volume of the waste stream when it was produced in this industry sector. Id. at 79. As we explained supra in Part B, we give great deference to EPA's formulation and application of its high volume criteria. Since we conclude infra in Part K, that EPA reasonably decided to evaluate waste streams on an as generated basis, we see no reason to disturb its judgment here. 123 Finally, petitioners complain that EPA has persistently excluded chrome ore wastes in landfill from the relevant universe of chrome ore residues, and that this exclusion is arbitrary and capricious. Jt. Brief at 80. We conclude that while the former may be true, the latter is not. First, there was no contention that the chrome wastes in landfill were treated wastes; therefore, EPA reasonably concluded that landfill wastes would not be low hazard. 55 Fed.Reg. at 2335. Even petitioners admit, in comments to the 9/89 NPRM, that certain of the fill may test EP toxic for chromium. Comments of Baltimore City (Nov. 9, 1989), reproduced in JA at 438. Second, no chrome ore wastes in landfills had been generated during the years studied by EPA; petitioners' challenge concerns waste that might be regenerated at some point in the future. Combining the regeneration rule with EPA's interpretation of the Bevill Amendment as a one-time, snapshot inquiry, see supra, pp. 491-92, EPA reasonably maintains that landfill wastes do not satisfy the high volume criteria. The regeneration rule has been upheld. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1536-37 (D.C.Cir.1989). EPA's determination that chrome ore wastes in landfill did not qualify for the Bevill exemption was thus the result of the Agency's interpretation and application of its own rules, and the interpretation was far from plainly wrong. Id. at 1539. K. Lead Process Wastewater 1. Background 124 Large amounts of water come into contact with lead during the refining process, for instance, when molten lead is cooled by spraying water on it. This process wastewater is one waste stream from the lead industry. Lead processing also generates hazardous air emissions, which contain (among other stuff) sulfur oxides. Some lead plants process these emissions at on-site acid plants, which produce marketable sulfuric acid from the lead plant emissions. These acid plants, in turn, produce wastewater, referred to in the industry as acid plant blowdown. See Preamble, Nonferrous Metals Manufacturing Point Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 49 Fed.Reg. at 8742, 8748. 125 In the 4/89 NPRM, EPA indicated that it would treat process wastewater and acid plant blowdown as separate waste streams. 54 Fed.Reg. at 15,327. EPA proposed retaining process wastewater for further study, but removing acid plant blowdown from the Bevill exclusion. Id. at 15,342. The 9/89 Rule removed acid plant blowdown from the Bevill exemption based on EPA's conclusion that the waste did not satisfy the high volume criterion. Id. at 36,631. Process wastewater, however, remained a candidate for Bevill coverage. Id. 126 In the 9/89 NPRM, EPA revised its volume estimate for lead process wastewater. New figures showed that the waste did not satisfy the high volume criterion. 54 Fed.Reg. at 39,305. EPA also stated that its hazard data showed process wastewater contained arsenic, cadmium and lead at unacceptable levels. Id. at 39,308. Those findings did not change in the 1/90 Rule. 55 Fed.Reg. at 2341. The Agency did revise its volume figures upward to correct for one facility that had operated on only an intermittent basis. However, process wastewater still did not satisfy the volume criterion. Id. at 2340. Having met neither of the two threshold criteria, lead process wastewater did not qualify for Bevill coverage. 2. Analysis 127 Petitioners' volume objections reduce to the complaint that EPA did not aggregate the volumes of process wastewater and acid plant blowdown into one waste stream. They assert that because these two wastewaters are generated and managed at the same facilities, Jt. Brief at 67, it would be more logical to measure them as one generic category. Id. at 65 n. 85. Perhaps so, but as noted in Part II.A, supra, the question we must ask in reviewing the Agency's choice is not whether we can posit a more logical alternative. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801-802, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). Indeed, when Congress has not addressed the precise question at issue, and that question is whether to adopt a plantwide or more narrow definition of a waste source, the Supreme Court has expressly instructed us to defer to permissible agency definitions. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 858, 104 S.Ct. at 2781, 2789. In this case the Agency chose to measure waste streams on an as generated rather than an as managed basis. 54 Fed.Reg. at 15,327. It did so to ensure that the high volume criteria would include those wastes not amenable to Subtitle C regulation under current [or] alternative management strategies. Id. (emphasis added). In light of our decision sustaining the high volume criteria, which reflect Congress' central concern with technical feasibility, the choice to measure waste streams as generated is reasonable. 128 All but one of petitioners' low hazard objections do nothing but restate their general objections to the low hazard criteria. In Part II.C, supra, we upheld those criteria. The only hazard objection specific to lead is that EPA applied its low hazard criteria to data from only two lead processing facilities. Jt. Brief at 69. There are only five lead processing facilities in the industry, however, and so EPA's data demonstrate that at least 40 percent of plants in the industry failed to meet the low hazard criteria. We cannot say that such a determination is unreasonable. Cf. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 984-85 (D.C.Cir.1991) (per curiam). 129 L. Lightweight Aggregate Air Pollution Control Dust/Sludge 1. Background 130 Lightweight aggregate (LWA) is a combination of materials that is itself an ingredient in certain types of concrete and asphalt. LWA is produced in a rotary kiln by heating certain minerals to very high temperatures. Some kiln furnaces burn hazardous wastes as fuels for this heating process. The furnaces employ either wet or dry air pollution control (APC) devices. The dry devices produce dust, the wet devices, sludge. 131 In the 9/89 NPRM, EPA announced that it estimated the average, per facility volume of LWA APC dust/sludge as 134,000 metric tons/year--nearly three times the 45,000 mt/yr needed to qualify as high volume. 54 Fed.Reg. at 39,305. EPA based its estimate on industry responses to questions 2.11 and 2.14 on the 1989 National Survey of Solid Wastes from Mineral Processing Facilities (SWMPF Survey). 11 Based on this volume estimate, and the fact that the waste met the low hazard criteria, EPA proposed retaining LWA APC dust/sludge within the Bevill amendment. 132 In comments about the 9/89 NPRM, submitted on November 9, 1989, the Audubon Society pointed out that while 28 facilities generated LWA APC dust/sludge, only six submitted usable data in response to questions 2.11 and 2.14 of the SWMPF Survey. Urging that six facilities out of 28 provided an inadequate statistical base for EPA's conclusions, Audubon suggested that the Agency undertake additional data collection activities. Comments of National Audubon Society (Nov. 9, 1989), reproduced in JA at 503. EPA did not attempt to gather more data in response to this comment. EPA instead developed a new methodology. Using responses to other questions on the SWMPF Survey EPA recalculated, making a series of inferences, the total per facility volume. 12 Based on the new data and new calculations, the average per-facility volume of LWA APC dust/sludge was 15,813 mt/yr, well below the high volume cutoff. 55 Fed.Reg. at 2340. 133 The Agency attempted to apprise industry of these changes before promulgating its 1/90 Rule. It sent petitioners a memo detailing the new calculations on January 9, 1990. Solite received the memorandum on January 11, 1990, only one day before the Administrator signed the Final Rule on January 12, 1990. Petitioners complain that EPA did not provide the public with adequate notice of, or opportunity to comment on, its revised methodology for calculating the volume of LWA APC dust/sludge. 13 2. Analysis 134 Section 553 of the APA requires an agency to give interested parties an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of ... arguments. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). An agency contemplating a change between its proposed and final rules cannot deny commenters ... their first occasion to offer new and different criticisms which the Agency might find convincing. BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637 (1st Cir.1979), cited in United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1225 (D.C.Cir.1980) and Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303 (D.C.Cir.1991). We find that EPA's change in the volume determination for LWA APC dust/sludge denied petitioners just such an opportunity here. 135 The focus of the 9/89 NPRM, and of the 1/90 Rule, was to be application of the low hazard criteria, not the high volume criteria. See 54 Fed.Reg. at 36,59 3 (9/89 Rule, indicating that Agency lacked hazard information for wastes whose status was not resolved in that rule). The 9/89 NPRM itself solicited comments on the data used to make the proposed Bevill waste exclusion decisions outlined below. Id. at 39,300 (emphasis added). The Agency listed LWA APC dust/sludge as a candidate for retention, id. at 39,303, and not among the wastes proposed for exclusion. Id. at 39,309. Nothing, in short, indicated that EPA was going to reconsider its determination of the volume of LWA APC dust/sludge. Based on responses to SWMPF Survey questions not previously considered, and using methodology not previously explained, however, the Agency did just that. 55 Fed.Reg. at 2327. EPA asserts that the changes in the January 1990 Rule were a logical outgrowth of the 9/89 NPRM, EPA Brief at 109, and that the results it reached were substantively reasonable. Our resolution of the first point precludes our reaching the second. 136 A strikingly similar agency action has previously been considered and reversed by this court. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C.Cir.1978). There, EPA had to calculate, based on limited data, the amount of waste produced by sulfite mills. In its penultimate pronouncement, the Agency estimated the weight to be 487 pounds per ton of product. Before issuing its final rule, however, EPA secured new data and incorporated calculations of two new factors it had not previously considered. Because neither the new data nor the calculations of the new factors had been opened for public comment, the court remanded the regulation to the Agency. Id. at 1028-31. 137 EPA asserts that its informal notification of petitioners by memorandum, prior to publication of the 1/90 Rule, provided actual notice, EPA Brief at 109-10 & n. 77, 14 and cites NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1243 (D.C.Cir.1988), for support. That decision, in which the opinion admits stretch[ing] notice and comment law to its limits, id., admits of one key distinction. EPA's letter there was sent two weeks before promulgation and resulted in submission of actual comments. Id. Here, by contrast, the memorandum reached petitioners one day before the regulation was signed; not surprisingly, comments were not forthcoming. 138 EPA's determination that LWA APC dust/sludge does not satisfy the high volume criteria is based upon a complex mix of controversial and uncommented upon data and calculations[;] we cannot be sure that further and ultimately convincing public criticism of [the] changes would not have been forthcoming had it been invited. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1031. We hold that EPA's determination that lightweight aggregate air pollution control dust/sludge does not meet the high volume criteria violated notice and comment requirements. Accordingly, we direct the Agency to reconsider, after providing notice and soliciting comments, whether LWA APC dust/sludge in fact satisfies the high volume criteria.