Opinion ID: 2296365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Section 772(1) and Construction of the 1925 Deed

Text: [¶ 17] Tarason argues that, had the court properly applied section 772(1), it could not have concluded that the 1925 deed granted only an easement in gross rather than an appurtenant easement based on a lack of the inclusion of technical words of inheritance. He contends that, when the 1925 deed granted the property (as opposed to the easement) to Leon Benoit, his Heirs and Assigns forever, the deed effectively defined Grantee to mean Benoit as well as his heirs and assigns. Accordingly, Tarason argues that, when the deed subsequently conveys the easement to this Grantee, it must be read to mean that the easement was granted to Benoit and his heirs and assigns, thereby implicitly containing words of inheritance that created an appurtenant easement. To support this point, Tarason asserts that the habendum clause in the 1925 deed may properly be interpreted to enlarge the estate to include heirs and assigns in the easement grant, creating an appurtenant easement that benefits Tarason. [¶ 18] Pursuant to 33 M.R.S. § 772(1), the grant of the easement in the 1925 deed must be construed as conveying an appurtenant easement, whether or not technical words of inheritance are included in the 1925 deed, unless a different intention clearly appears in the deed. [8] The issue, then, is whether the 1925 deed demonstrates a clear intention to not convey an appurtenant easement. We review the construction of a deed de novo as a question of law. Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 2009 ME 29, ¶ 24, 967 A.2d 690. [¶ 19] The 1925 deed states that it conveyed to Leon Benoit, his Heirs and Assigns forever, a certain lot or parcel of field land.... After describing the parcel conveyed, the deed then states, Also granting and conveying to this Grantee a right of way from Scott's Court, so-called, to the above conveyed premises, as the way now exists near the house on land of Abbie Tyler. (Emphasis added). For two reasons, we conclude that this sentence demonstrates a clear intent to create an easement in gross, not an appurtenant easement. [¶ 20] First, the language that is contained in the easement clause affirmatively demonstrates the parties' intent to create an easement that is personal to  this Grantee, Leon Benoit, rather than an easement to Benoit and any and all future heirs and assignees. Given the presence of the word, this, before Grantee, we cannot construe Grantee in this context to mean Benoit and his heirs and assigns. [¶ 21] Second, in contrast to the language that created the easement, the language in the 1925 deed that conveyed the parcel of land conveyed that parcel to Leon Benoit, his Heirs and Assigns forever. That language demonstrates that the parties knew how to, and were likely to, include words of inheritance in order to convey a perpetual interest. See Wentworth, 2003 ME 97, ¶ 17, 829 A.2d 520 (observing that [i]n this context, we cannot assume that the grantor intended to indefinitely burden his land and convey anything other than a life estate in the easement). As the trial court also observed, the fact that similar language is not included in the conveyance of the easement is evidence that the parties intended not to create an easement of perpetual duration. [¶ 22] The language of the habendum clause does not alter our conclusion. The habendum clause can enlarge an estate conveyed, but only if it is not repugnant to the premises of the deed. Id. ¶ 21. That is, when the premises contains no express limitation on the estate granted, the premises is considered merely descriptive, the premises and the habendum are not repugnant, and the habendum can enlarge the estate. Id. However, when the habendum and the premises in the deed conflict, the habendum cannot enlarge the estate. Id. [¶ 23] The premises in the 1925 deed contains an express limitation on the estate grantedthe easement was conveyed only to  this Grantee, Leon Benoit. Therefore, references to Leon Benoit, his heirs and assigns in the habendum conflict with the premises and cannot enlarge the easement to create an appurtenant easement. [¶ 24] In sum, although the trial court erred in concluding that 33 M.R.S. § 772(1) does not apply to this case, we affirm the judgment because the trial court properly concluded that the language of the 1925 deed demonstrates a clear intention to create an easement in gross that terminated upon the death of the grantee, Leon Benoit, rather than to create an appurtenant easement. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. LEVY, J., with whom SILVER, J., joins, dissenting. [¶ 25] I agree with the majority opinion that section 772 of the Short Form Deeds Act, 33 M.R.S. §§ 761-775 (2011), applies in this case, but part company from the Court's ultimate conclusion that the habendum clause of the 1925 deed does not operate to create an easement appurtenant. I therefore respectfully dissent. [¶ 26] The grant of the easement in the 1925 deed must be construed as conveying an appurtenant easement, whether or not technical words of inheritance are included in the deed, unless a different intention clearly appears in the deed. Id. § 772(1). The majority opinion concludes that the deed's specific grant of the right-of-way to this Grantee, as distinguished from the deed's more general conveyance of the parcel to Leon Benoit, his Heirs and Assigns forever, establishes a different intention clearly appearing in the deed. This conclusion cannot be reconciled with (A) the language of the deed itself, (B) settled precedent, and (C) the Short Form Deeds Act.