Opinion ID: 329338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: modified 61 order

Text: 31 The company argues that the board had no power to modify its order because § 10(d) of the Act, which authorizes modification, only authorizes it  until the record in a case shall have been filed in a court. Under the company's reasoning the board lost the power to modify when the record was filed with this court in the original enforcement proceeding. The general counsel argues that the board regained jurisdiction to modify when we granted leave to dismiss the enforcement proceedings without prejudice and that the purpose of exclusive vesting of jurisdiction in the court preventing conflicts of authority, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Locals 15, 17, 107, 108, and 111 v. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 342, 65 S.Ct. 1166, 89 L.Ed. 1649 (1945) would not be served by this interpretation because once the court dismissed the proceedings, the appellate court was without jurisdiction to enter orders. People ex rel. Wait v. Bristow, 391 Ill. 101, 62 N.E.2d 545 (1945). We agree with the general counsel's analysis and conclusions. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 59 S.Ct. 301, 83 L.Ed. 221 (1939), cited by the company, is not in point. In that case a petition for review had been filed so that the board could not terminate the court's jurisdiction by ending enforcement proceedings. Here the company had filed no petition for review at the time of the withdrawal, and upon the granting of the motion to withdraw without prejudice, this court's jurisdiction terminated.
32 The effect of the modification is contested by the parties. The company argues that the board is improperly trying to dictate the substantive terms of a contract by requiring payment of bonuses. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 454 (1960). The general counsel argues that the board is not trying to dictate substantive contract terms, that it is only trying to clarify the original order, and that the modification makes no substantive change in the original order. This issue was explored extensively at oral argument; the parties are much closer to agreeing to the substantive requirements of the law than they are to agreeing on appropriate language to express it. 33 Substantively, the board's position, as stated during argument, is that if an employer gives notice of a proposed decrease in compensation, which presumably would include regularly given bonuses, and bargains in good faith on the issue thus created, then the employer's action in putting the decrease into effect is not unilateral action violating the Act. The general counsel offered a caveat to this as applied to the present case: the company must bargain as though the bonus was in effect, not as if it already had been eliminated; only in this manner, it was asserted, can the status quo ante be established as it existed before the initial unfair labor practice. The company agreed with the basic principle of notice and good faith bargaining as stated above but disagreed to the extent that the general counsel seemed to say that the bargaining must reach an impasse before the decrease could be put into effect. 34 The board disclaims that in modifying the section of the 61 order it was attempting to require the company to pay all bonus installments to date. However, if this was not the intent, we have difficulty in determining just why the board felt the necessity to make the modification. 5 The original order directed the payment of only the third quarter bonus. It further ordered that the company cease and desist from refusing to bargain and from unilaterally terminating bonus payments. The order also directed that the bargaining include the Fourth quarter installment of the 1970 Christmas bonus, and any bonus installments, and to supply any information relevant and reasonably needed by the union in order for it to bargain intelligently on bonuses. 35 In our opinion, the original order needed no modification or clarification. If the company unilaterally terminated bonus payments under circumstances which would be in violation of the original order, and we will advert further to what those circumstances are, then the board can appropriately determine the matter in compliance proceedings. The determination of whether the company is obligated to make whole any employees for not receiving the bonus subsequent to the 1970 third quarter bonus was prematurely reached by the modification. If, as the board now states, it was not intended that the modification was to serve as an order that any particular quarterly bonus automatically should have been paid, then the modification was unnecessary. As it is stated, the modified section is too vague to inform the company what its obligations might be as to subsequent quarters. 36 Since we are enforcing the order in the 61 case as originally entered, we find it necessary to clarify the circumstances pertaining to the cease and desist order on unilateral terminations of the bonus payments. In enforcing that part of the order, we do so on the construction that it does not prohibit a termination of bonus payments under circumstances in which the company has given notice of discontinuance to the union and has bargained in good faith on the matter of discontinuance. As the order was originally written, it might appear overly broad because it is likely that under the circumstances outlined a discontinuance would be unilateral in the sense that it would not be bilateral, i. e., agreed upon by the company and the union. We construe the cease and desist order more narrowly, as apparently does the board. The only area of disagreement appears to be whether the bargaining must be to an impasse before the company can unilaterally terminate. We do not conceive that an impasse would be any more necessary in this area, assuming the termination is not otherwise violative of the law, than in the case of a lockout, which, of course, would terminate all wages, not merely bonuses. Lane v. NLRB, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 372, 418 F.2d 1208 (1969). 6 37 The board cites respectable authority from this circuit and elsewhere to the effect that employers may not without violating § 8(a)(5) and (1) unilaterally take action on a mandatory subject of bargaining, such as wages, unless a genuine impasse, not caused by the failure of one of the parties to bargain in good faith, has been reached. For example, United Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Palomar Corp., 465 F.2d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. U. S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610, 615 (1st Cir. 1963); and NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834, 84 S.Ct. 47, 11 L.Ed.2d 64. 38 The company counters with authorities which support the position that, if, during the course of bargaining, notice has been given of proposed unilateral action and the union has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to bargain concerning the proposed change, the company may then lawfully take the proposed action. For example, NLRB v. United Nuclear Corp., 381 F.2d 972, 976 (10th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 373 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1967); Lane v. NLRB, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 372, 418 F.2d 1208 (1969). 39 The issue before us, however, does not require the resolution presented in this area of disagreement between the parties. That resolution no doubt will be appropriate in a compliance proceedings if it is determined that such is necessary. In the 23 case, as we have previously noted, the board agreed with the ALJ that a complaint proceeding should not be utilized to determine compliance issues. Yet more than a year later by purporting to modify the original 61 order, the board, it appears to us, has done exactly that, i. e., determined that the company in the intervening years has not complied with the 61 order. Unless the company is locked-in to a perpetual payment of bonuses, irrespective of the extent of or the good faith of bargaining, which we do not understand the board to be contending, the resolution of the question of compliance with the 61 order should be determined on the basis of the history of the bargaining as developed in an appropriate due process hearing and not by the administrative modification here attempted. We therefore in the present proceeding are denying enforcement of the make-whole modification order of January 9, 1974.