Opinion ID: 2399091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Accomplice Liability Instruction

Text: [¶ 21] Cormier's final contention is that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that it could find Cormier guilty of gross sexual assault under an accomplice liability theory and that he is entitled to a new trial. We disagree. We review jury instructions as a whole, taking into consideration the total effect created by all the instructions and the potential for juror misunderstanding. State v. Cote, 462 A.2d 487, 490 (Me.1983). [¶ 22] Accomplice liability is governed by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 57 (1983) which provides: 3. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: A. With the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime, he solicits such other person to commit the crime, or aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing the crime. A person is an accomplice under this subsection to any crime the commission of which was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of his conduct. Id. § 57(3)(A). Although we have not addressed whether a person may be an accomplice to another person who commits the crime of gross sexual assault, we have previously held that [t]he definition of accomplice liability set forth in the Criminal Code . . . is unlimited so far as the crimes to which it applies. State v. Stratton, 591 A.2d 246, 247 (Me.1991) (internal citations omitted). [¶ 23] The court provided the jury with an instruction on accomplice liability that mirrored the statute, but did not instruct the jury that they could convict Cormier as an accomplice. Rather, in its instruction, the court stated that the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that [Stinchfield] knew of the intentions of [Cormier] [w]ith respect to any plans or conduct regarding [the victim] [i]n administering, at the time that he administered the drug or the alcohol. The instruction was given to explain the possible accomplice role that Stinchfield could have played in the commission of the crimes by Cormier, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(2)(A). [¶ 24] Counts I and II required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cormier or an accomplice of Cormier administer[ed] or employ[ed] drugs, intoxicants or other similar means. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(2)(A). There was substantial evidence at trial that Stinchfield aided Cormier in the commission of his crimes against the victim. Before the victim arrived at the party, Cormier and Stinchfield discussed inviting her to the party, getting her drunk, and engaging in sexual acts with her. Both Cormier and Stinchfield picked up the victim at her home and brought her to the party, knowing that alcohol would be served at the party. The jury heard testimony that Stinchfield poured the victim at least one drink while she was at the party. Given that the accomplice liability instruction was directed at Stinchfield's role, and not Cormier's role as a potential accomplice, the instruction did not deprive Cormier of a fair trial, and any error the court may have made in giving the instruction was harmless. See State v. Sullivan, 1997 ME 71, ¶ 5, 695 A.2d 115, 117 (stating that an error is harmless if it is highly probable the error did not affect the judgment). The entry is: Judgments affirmed.