Opinion ID: 4539940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: eeoa

Text: Third, Appellant brought a claim under the EEOA, arguing that Appellees made no effort to overcome language barriers “which might exist” for A.M. and N.M. 7 and, instead, removed A.M. and N.M. from the third grade and denied them the opportunity to take the third-grade STAAR test. It is not clear what relief, if any, would be available to Appellant if an EEOA violation were shown. Regardless, Appellant has effectively forfeited her EEOA claim. Under the EEOA, “[a]n individual denied an equal educational opportunity . . . may institute a civil action in an appropriate [federal] district court . . . against such parties, and for such relief, as may be appropriate.” 20 7This argument is in tension with Appellant’s statement that A.M. and N.M. were “doing fine in their classes” at the time they were removed from the third grade. 9 Case: 19-10832 Document: 00515444897 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/08/2020 No. 19-10832 U.S.C. § 1706. The relevant portion of the EEOA states, “No state shall deny equal opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by—[among other things—]the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs.” Id. § 1703. A local school district is an “educational agency” under § 1703. See United States v. Texas, 601 F.3d 354, 364–65 (5th Cir. 2010). “In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity[,] . . . a court . . . shall seek or impose only such remedies as are essential to correct particular denials of equal educational opportunity[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1712. Here, Appellant’s operative complaint generally seeks, for each of her claims, “damages, as well as . . . interest on all damages and equitable and other relief that the court deems appropriate for which claim is hereby made.” The complaint also seeks “liquidated/exemplary damages” and “attorneys[’] fees and costs[.]” 8 As explained by the Eighth Circuit in Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High School, monetary damages are unavailable under the EEOA. 618 F.3d 789, 797–99 (8th Cir. 2010). And Appellant does not affirmatively seek compensatory education generally, 9 specific relief that could be classified as 8 The complaint summarizes the relief requested: “actual and liquidated/punitive damages, equitable relief, prejudgment and post-judgment interest . . . , attorneys[’] fees, costs . . . and such other and further relief to which [Appellant] may be justly entitled[.]” Notably, in this summary, Appellant specifically requests equitable relief. In her previouslyquoted statement, however, she requests “equitable and other relief that the court deems appropriate[.]” In other words, in her previously-quoted statement, Appellant leaves it to the court’s discretion to award equitable relief. But in her summary of requested relief, Appellant affirmatively seeks equitable relief. Nowhere does the complaint explain what specific equitable relief is sought, if any. 9 Compensatory education is an equitable remedy commonly sought in cases involving alleged violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). See, e.g., G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg Dependent Sch., 343 F.3d 295, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). It provides “services prospectively to compensate for a past deficient program.” Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. O.W., 938 F.3d 695, 712 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2008)). Compensatory education “should 10 Case: 19-10832 Document: 00515444897 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/08/2020 No. 19-10832 compensatory education, or other specific types of equitable relief. 10 Nonetheless, the district court could craft an equitable remedy if an EEOA violation is shown. 11 See § 1712; Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”). But Appellant has effectively forfeited her EEOA claim. place children in the position they would have been in but for the violation[.]” Id. In the IDEA context, compensatory education can include “reimbursement for the cost of private special-education services,” id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and “tutoring, after-school classes, or academic summer camps” where a school failed to provide a sufficient educational program. Kevin Golembiewski, Compensatory Education Is Available to English Language Learners Under the EEOA, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 57, 62 (2018). In this way, compensatory education is tailored to an individual child’s needs and does not require a school district to reform its general programming. Here, Appellant’s operative complaint does not affirmatively seek compensatory education or otherwise request relief that could be categorized as compensatory education. Further, the parties do not cite any case—and we are unaware of one—that has decided whether the EEOA permits awards of compensatory education. Id. at 78 (“No court has ruled on whether the EEOA permits awards of compensatory education[.]”); cf. Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 126 n.2 (3d Cir. 2017) (recognizing that compensatory education “might in other circumstances sustain a live claim” but holding that the claim for relief was moot) (emphasis added). Nor do the parties otherwise brief the issue, further indicating that Appellant never intended to seek compensatory education in her catchall request for “equitable relief.” 10 In the typical EEOA case, several plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in the form of district-wide reforms. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). Appellant does not seek this type of relief. 11 In response to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment below, Appellant clarified her EEOA theory, stating that she is not “generally challeng[ing] the entirety of [Appellees’ English as a Second Language] program” but instead “argu[ing] that [Appellees] specifically denied educational opportunities to AM and NM individually by failing to make efforts to overcome their particular language barriers before demoting them an entire grade level and by refusing to give them a chance to take the third grade STAAR test[.]” Appellant argues the same on appeal. In other words, it seems the only relief possibly available to Appellant is compensatory education—an as-of-yet untested theory of relief in EEOA jurisprudence. But it is not clear that Appellant would even want this type of relief, which would possibly require something akin to this: after-school tutoring, summer classes, or other extra studying so that A.M. and N.M. could take and pass an exam to receive credit to advance to the grade above them, thereby correcting any denial of equal educational opportunity. It is undisputed that Appellant did not want her children accelerated to a higher grade at the time that she met with LISD officials about A.M. and N.M.’s removal. 11 Case: 19-10832 Document: 00515444897 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/08/2020 No. 19-10832 “To find a violation of, and order a remedy under, the EEOA, [Appellant] must establish (1) a violation of a student’s rights under the EEOA, (2) that the violation stemmed from a failure to take appropriate action on the part of the defendants, and (3) that any remedial order is essential to correct the particular denials of EEOA rights found.” Texas, 601 F.3d at 365 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). “To determine the appropriateness of an educational agency’s action” in particular, this court has instituted a three-prong test: (1) whether the program is based on sound educational theory, (2) whether reasonable efforts are being made to implement the theory (implementation prong), and (3) whether the program, over a legitimate period of time, has achieved some success in overcoming language barriers (results prong). Id. at 366. Here, Appellant represented to the district court that she does not take issue with Appellees’ English as a Second Language program. Nor does Appellant argue differently on appeal. Cf. United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000) (“It has long been the rule in this circuit that any issues not briefed on appeal are waived.”). Instead, on appeal, Appellant essentially argues that—once A.M. and N.M. started the third grade— Appellees failed to take appropriate action to overcome any language barriers so that A.M. and N.M. could remain in the third grade. What Appellant implies is that once A.M. and N.M. were placed in the third grade, they were entitled to remain in it. But as new out-of-country transfer students, A.M. and N.M. had to be appropriately placed in a grade in accordance with 19 Texas Administrative Code § 74.26, which states: A school district must ensure that the records or transcripts of an out-of-state or out-of-country transfer student (including foreign exchange students) or a transfer student from a Texas nonpublic school are evaluated and that the student is placed in appropriate classes promptly. The district may use a variety of methods to 12 Case: 19-10832 Document: 00515444897 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/08/2020 No. 19-10832 verify the content of courses for which a transfer student has earned credit. § 74.26(a)(2). Appellant neither cites this statute nor argues in relation to her EEOA claim that Appellees in any way violated the statute. Cf. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d at 912. To show that Appellees failed to take appropriate action to overcome any language barriers so that A.M. and N.M. could remain in the third grade, Appellant must show that the third grade was the appropriate placement for A.M. and N.M. in the first place or, in other words, that Appellees violated § 74.26(a)(2). 12 But because Appellant does not engage § 74.26(a)(2), she has effectively forfeited her EEOA claim.