Opinion ID: 6227009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Placement with Relatives

Text: In a dependency proceeding, we review a court’s decision regarding the child’s placement for an abuse of discretion. In re Dependency of A.C., 74 Wn. App. 271, 275, 873 P.2d 535 (1994). “A court abuses its discretion if the decision is manifestly unreasonable, or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” In re Dependency of M.R., 166 Wn. App. 504, 517, 270 P.3d 607 (2012). A dependency court abuses its discretion when it makes a placement decision without considering all the relevant factors. A.C., 74 Wn. App. at 279. When making placement decisions, courts “must be mindful of the statutory scheme, and particularly the legislative preference for placements that least disrupt a child’s attachments and sense of stability.” In re Dependency of J.B.S., 123 Wn.2d 1, 12, 863 P.2d 1344 (1993). “A child who has been removed from [their] home has a right to preferential placement with a relative or known suitable adult.” In re Dependency of S.K.-P., 200 Wn. App. 86, 117, 401 P.3d 442 (2017), aff’d sub nom. In re Dependency of E.H., 191 Wn.2d 872, 427 P.3d 587 (2018); see also RCW 13.34.130(3); McKinney v. State, 134 Wn.2d 388, 404, 950 P.2d 461 (1998) (“If an out of home placement is necessary, first priority for placement is given to the child’s 23 In re Dependency of K.W. No. 99301-7 relatives.” (citing RCW 13.34.130(1)(b))). Changes in custody should be minimized because of the importance of the “‘continuity of established relationships.’” J.B.S., 123 Wn.2d at 12-13 (quoting McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 312, 738 P.2d 254 (1987)). In determining an appropriate placement, the best interests of the child are “paramount.” Id. at 11. Yet, “the criteria for establishing the best interests of the child are not capable of specification” because each case is “largely dependent upon its own facts and circumstances.” In re Welfare of Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980). In J.B.S., this court reversed a juvenile court order removing a dependent child from a foster family in Washington State who facilitated visits with his mother, to place him in the custody of his father, who had been deported to Mexico after serving time in prison for drug trafficking and who had a limited relationship with the child. 123 Wn.2d at 3, 10 n.5. The mother, though young at the time of the birth of the child and the dependency, had resolved most of the issues that gave rise to the dependency. Id. at 6-7. Both parents sought return of the child; return of the child to the father would mean the child would be limited in his ability to see his mother because the father could not travel legally into the United States. Id. The trial court observed that placing the child with his estranged father in another country would likely cause the child separation anxiety and trauma, but it erroneously believed that RCW 13.34.020 required the child to be placed with an available parent regardless 24 In re Dependency of K.W. No. 99301-7 of numerous indications that such a placement would not be in the child’s best interest. Id. at 8. Although the case involved competing desires of parents who retained parental rights to the dependent child, the J.B.S. court’s guidance on the considerations that should inform placement decisions is relevant to placement decisions more generally, including when the child is placed out of the home and when relatives are afforded preference. See RCW 13.34.130(3), (6). The court explained that considerations should include “the psychological and emotional bonds” between the child and their current caregivers, “the potential harm [the child] would suffer if effectively severed from contact with these persons,” the nature of the child’s attachment to the prospective caregiver, the prospective caregiver’s history and current circumstances, “and the potential effect upon [the child] of an abrupt and substantial change in [their] environment.” J.B.S., 123 Wn.2d at 11; see also RCW 13.34.130(3) (“The court shall consider the child’s existing relationships and attachments when determining placement.”). The court also explained that while courts have discretion to consider criminal history and immigration status, neither of those factors can be dispositive. J.B.S., 123 Wn.2d at 11-12; see also M.R., 166 Wn. App. at 518-20 (abuse of discretion to remove a child from the care of relatives he had close bonds with based on their status as undocumented immigrants and the mere possibility of deportation). More than anything, though, 25 In re Dependency of K.W. No. 99301-7 J.B.S. stated that “the child’s best interests should be paramount.” 123 Wn.2d at 11 (some emphasis added). The legislature has recognized that placement with relatives will very often support the child’s best interests. RCW 13.34.130(3) (requiring the Department to place a dependent child with a relative “[u]nless there is reasonable cause to believe that the health, safety, or welfare of the child would be jeopardized” and permitting it to place a dependent child with someone other than a relative only when doing so would be in the best interests of the child). Children adjudged dependent often suffer emotional damage from the traumatic experience of being removed from their homes and placed with strangers. Recognizing this potential harm, the Legislature seeks to place a dependent child in a familiar and comfortable environment as soon as possible after a court makes a dependency determination in order to minimize any adverse effects to the child. Relatives of the dependent child can often provide such an environment, and their relationship to the child gives a preliminary assurance that the child will be safeguarded from harm. The statutory scheme, which favors placement of dependent children with relatives, clearly reflects that legislative goal. Babcock v. State, 116 Wn.2d 596, 656, 809 P.2d 143 (1991); see also LAWS OF 2021, ch. 211, § 2 (recognizing that “Black and Indigenous children are still disproportionately removed from their families and communities” and amending shelter care statutes to reduce the removal of children from their homes in the first instance and strengthen the preference for placement with relatives when out-ofhome placement is necessary). 26 In re Dependency of K.W. No. 99301-7 While relative placement will not necessarily be in the child’s best interests in every single case, ample evidence supports this legislative preference as one that will often minimize the trauma to the child, particularly when the child has existing relationships with the relatives. “[T]he vast majority of children in foster care have relative or fictive kin relationships that are of great value to them,” and nurturing and protecting those relationships increases the chances for children to achieve permanency because “[w]hen these relationships are prioritized, protective factors are increased, which promotes current and future well-being.” ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ACHIEVING PERMANENCY FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH 10 (2021), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cb/im2101.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS5T-USRG]. 10 Relational permanence is particularly critical for Black, Indigenous, and other children of Color, who are disproportionately affected by the trauma of child welfare and other legal systems. See generally J. CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM, WASH. STATE DEP’T OF CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES, 2019 WASHINGTON STATE CHILD WELFARE RACIAL DISPARITY INDICES REPORT 10 See also Jennifer Miller, Creating a Kin-First Culture in Child Welfare, 36 CHILD L. PRAC. 83, 83 (2017) (“Research confirms that children do best in kinship foster care and that family connections are critical to healthy child development and a sense of belonging. Kinship care also helps preserve children’s cultural identity and relationship to their community.” (footnote omitted)); Br. of Pet’r at 29-30 (citing numerous studies); Br. of WDA et al. Amici at 8-10 (citing numerous studies); Sixto Cancel, Guest Essay, I Will Never Forget That I Could Have Lived with People Who Loved Me, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/opinion/foster-care-children-us.html. 27 In re Dependency of K.W. No. 99301-7 (2020) (hereinafter WASHINGTON CHILD WELFARE RACIAL DISPARITY), https://www.dcyf.wa.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/reports/CWRacialDisparityIndices 2019.pdf. Yet, K.W. and amici correctly point out that the “best interests of the child” standard is susceptible to class- and race-based biases, and it is impermissible for the Department or dependency courts to rely on factors that serve as proxies for race in order to deny placements with bonded relatives. Cf. In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wn.2d 1, 20, 969 P.2d 21 (1998) (warning against interpreting the “best interests of the child” standard as permitting the State to “break up stable families and redistribute its infant population to provide each child with the ‘best family’”), aff’d sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion). Decisions in child welfare proceedings “are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias,” given that poor families and families of Color are disproportionately impacted by child welfare proceedings. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also Br. of Pet’r at 31 (citing studies); Br. of WDA et al. Amici at 3-4 (“The disparate separation of Black and Native American families [is] the result of a deeply engrained history of taking children of [C]olor from their parents in the name of furthering the child’s ‘best interests.’” (citing Leah A. Hill, Loving Lessons: White Supremacy, Loving v. Virginia, and Disproportionality in the Child Welfare 28 In re Dependency of K.W. No. 99301-7 System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2727, 2733 (2018))). For example, in King County, the Black population is approximately 14 percent of the overall population but made up 36 percent of the dependency caseload in 2020. DEPENDENT CHILDREN IN WASHINGTON STATE 2020 ANNUAL REPORT apps. B, C-71. K.W. points to GR 37 for examples of criteria that have historically been used as proxies for race or ethnicity, such as prior contact with law enforcement or not being a native English speaker. GR 37(h)(i), (vii). Although GR 37 is not directly applicable to placement decisions in child welfare cases, Washington courts have previously condemned overreliance on similar factors in placement decisions that can serve as proxies for race and class, like criminal history and immigration status. E.g., J.B.S., 123 Wn.2d at 12; M.R., 166 Wn. App. at 505. We know that like all human beings, judges and social workers hold biases, and we know that families of Color are disproportionately impacted by child welfare proceedings. Therefore, actors in child welfare proceedings must be vigilant in preventing bias from interfering in their decision-making. Factors that serve as proxies for race cannot be used to deny placement with relatives with whom the child has a relationship and is comfortable. RCW 13.34.130(3). Given the expressed statutory preference for relative placement, the empirically demonstrated value and importance of relational permanence, and the danger of improper biases about “best interests” contaminating the decision-making 29 In re Dependency of K.W. No. 99301-7 process, courts must give meaningful preference to relative placement options. Children are entitled to procedural fairness in the evaluation of potential placements. Courts must do more than give a passing acknowledgment for relative preference, as occurred in this case. Courts must actually treat relatives as preferred placement options and cannot use factors that operate as proxies for race or class to deny placement with a relative. RCW 13.34.130(3), (6).