Opinion ID: 792262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petit's First Amendment Claim

Text: 70 I disagree with the majority's view that the District Court properly dismissed Petit's claim under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). 17 Heck extended the common law principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments ... to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement. Id. at 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364. 71 Like the District Court, the majority assumes that the favorable termination rule in Heck applies to Petit's claim. But because Petit was not in custody when he filed his § 1983 action, Heck does not apply to his claims. Under the best reading of Heck and Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), the favorable termination rule does not apply where habeas relief is unavailable. 72 Justice Souter explained this construction of the rule in his concurrence in Heck: 73 [T]he alternative would needlessly place at risk the rights of those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas statute, individuals not `in custody' for habeas purposes. If these individuals (people who were merely fined, for example, or who have completed short terms of imprisonment, probation, or parole, or who discover (through no fault of their own) a constitutional violation after full expiration of their sentences), like state prisoners, were required to show the prior invalidation of their convictions or sentences in order to obtain § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, the result would be to deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights to those who cannot first obtain a favorable state ruling. The reason, of course, is that individual not `in custody' cannot invoke federal habeas jurisdiction, the only statutory mechanism besides § 1983 by which individuals may sue state officials in federal court for violating federal rights. That would be an untoward result. 74 Id. at 500, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (Souter, J., concurring). 75 Justice Souter pointed out that courts lack authority to subvert the plain language of § 1983 on the basis of a common law principle limiting collateral attack, especially where it would run counter to § 1983's history and defeat the statute's purpose. Id. at 501, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal quotation omitted). 76 Justice Souter reiterated in his concurrence in Spencer that  Heck did not hold that a released prisoner in Spencer's circumstances is out of court on a § 1983 claim, and ... it would be unsound to read either Heck or the habeas statute as requiring any such result. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 19, 118 S.Ct. at 979 (Souter, J., concurring). He concluded instead that under a better reading of Heck, a prisoner who was no longer in custody, or who had never entered custody, may bring a § 1983 action establishing the unconstitutionality of a conviction or confinement without being bound to satisfy a favorable termination requirement that it would be impossible as a matter of law for him to satisfy. Id. at 21, 118 S.Ct. at 990 (Souter, J., concurring). 77 Justice Souter's concurrence in Spencer was joined by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Stevens dissented but indicated that it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that [a petitioner who does not have a remedy under the habeas statute] may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 25, 118 S.Ct. at 992 n. 8 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, a majority of the Spencer Court favored Justice Souter's reading of Heck. 18 78 This Court addressed a related issue in Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir.2002). In Torres, we held that the favorable termination rule does not apply to claims that implicate only the conditions, and not the fact or duration, of a prisoner's incarceration. Id. at 143. We observed that Torres' § 1983 claim was cognizable unless the favorable termination applies to prison disciplinary sanctions that do not affect the fact or length of a prisoner's confinement, and, more generally ... persons who cannot seek habeas relief. Id. at 145. Because the Court found that the rule does not apply to sanctions that affect only the conditions of confinement, we did not reach the broader question of whether all those who cannot seek habeas relief are exempt from the favorable termination rule. Id. However, in a lengthy footnote, this Court pointed out that, after Spencer, a majority of the Supreme Court appears to support the broader exemption and, in a shorter footnote, we approvingly cited Justice Souter's reading of Heck. Torres, 292 F.3d at 145 n. 5, 147 n. 8. 79 Other circuits, too, lean toward the more narrow construction of the favorable termination rule. In Jenkins v. Haubert, the Second Circuit held that a prisoner may bring a § 1983 claim challenging the conditions of his confinement where the prisoner is unable to challenge the conditions through a petition for federal habeas corpus. 179 F.3d 19, 21 (2d Cir.1999); see also Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that favorable termination rule did not apply to a defendant who is not and never was in the custody of the State because he ... has no remedy in habeas corpus). The Seventh Circuit agreed, indicating that it too is hesitant to apply the Heck rule in such a way as would contravene the pronouncement of five sitting Justices. DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 616-17 (7th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Finally, the Ninth Circuit also has indicated it will apply the narrower favorable termination rule. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir.2003) (holding Heck does not apply to § 1983 suits challenging constitutional errors which do[ ] not affect the overall length of the prisoner's confinement because even if successful they would not necessarily result in an earlier release from incarceration, and hence, do[] not intrude upon the `heart of habeas jurisdiction.'). 19 80 Justice Souter's interpretation of the favorable termination rule is thus not only the better view, but also was the majority view of the Spencer Court and is the view among several courts of appeal. Accordingly, I believe the District Court erred when it applied Heck without considering whether Petit could have brought his claim under habeas, and if not, whether that placed him outside the scope of the favorable termination rule. 81 The majority bases its reasoning on three cases, two of which pre-date Heck. See Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453 (5th Cir.1994); Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850 (2d Cir.1992); Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.1980). In all three cases, however, the favorable termination rule arose only because plaintiffs brought suits for malicious prosecution. Favorable termination was an element of the common law tort of malicious prosecution long before Heck extended it to certain other § 1983 claims. See 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. 2364. Accordingly, the favorable termination rule indisputably applies to all claims of malicious prosecution regardless of whether habeas relief is available. But that fact clearly does not imply that the rule applies to all other § 1983 claims. Heck applies the rule to only those cases which, if successful, would render invalid a conviction or sentence. Id. at 486, 114 S.Ct. 2364. While Heck extended the scope of the favorable termination rule in order to reconcile § 1983 with the federal habeas statute, § 1983 claims which cannot otherwise be pursued in a habeas petition are not subject to the rule. The cases on which the majority relies do not suggest otherwise. 82 I now turn to the critical question on this point: whether Petit could have brought a habeas petition instead of the present § 1983 action. The duration of Petit's ARD program is not on record, but it could not have exceeded two years. See Pa. R.Crim. P. 316(B). Since Petit filed suit about one and a half years after his arrest, his ARD program was likely completed before he brought this suit. Thus, Petit could not have pursued habeas relief. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238-40, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (holding that in making a custody determination, a court looks to the date that the habeas petition was filed). 83 Even if the ARD program was not complete when Petit initiated the instant action, based on my review of the record, I conclude that the ARD program never placed Petit in custody for habeas purposes. ARD is a pre-trial diversionary program, the purpose of which is to attempt to rehabilitate the defendant without resort to a trial and ensuing conviction. Commonwealth v. Feagley, 371 Pa.Super. 593, 538 A.2d 895, 897 (1988) (refusing to hear appeal from order terminating participation in ARD). [A]cceptance of ARD does not constitute a conviction and is not the equivalent of a conviction. Id. at 897. 84 Although we do not know the precise conditions imposed upon Petit, they do not appear to have required Petit to report anywhere in Pennsylvania since his stated reason for entering ARD was to enable his return to Kentucky as quickly as possible for work. Cf. Dow v. Cir. Ct. of First Cir. Through Huddy, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir.1993) (holding alcohol rehabilitation program that required defendant's physical presence at a particular place significantly restrained his liberty and could be characterized as custody for habeas purposes). While Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 316 provides that [t]he condition of [the ARD program] may be such as may be imposed with respect to probation after conviction of a crime, the conditions of Petit's ARD program did not approach the normal conditions of parole. Cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963) (holding individual confined by parole order to particular community, house, and job at the sufferance of his parole officer, who is under constant threat of reincarceration, qualified as in custody for habeas purposes). 85 I therefore conclude that, even in the unlikely event that Petit was still in ARD at the time that he filed the present suit, his ARD program was not sufficiently burdensome to render him in custody for habeas purposes. Accordingly, the favorable termination rule does not apply to his claims and the dismissal of his claim on that basis was error. Notes: 15 I join in the majority's opinion with respect to Gilles' challenge of the Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP) permit policy. I merely wish to add that Gilles has no standing to bring his challenge because the permit policy is a reasonable, content-neutral policy that regulates commercial solicitation only, and therefore Gilles raises no issue with respect to whether the permit policy may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). 16 Speech that results in violence is not necessarily inherently provocative, but in the absence of violence or any sign of impending violence it is especially difficult to show that certain words `inherently' arouse listeners to violence 17 Because Petit's claims are not barred under Heck, the District Court should have addressed the merits of his First Amendment claim and engaged in a qualified immunity analysis with respect to his arrest. As the majority points out, the District Court was wrong to suggest that Petit's claim would fail merely because he did not literally speak; videotaping can constitute protected expression. See Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.2000) (The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.). 18 The opinions of the Court in both Heck and Spencer do suggest in passing that Justice Scalia would not similarly limit the application of the favorable termination rule. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 9, 118 S.Ct. 978; Heck, 512 U.S. at 490 n. 10, 114 S.Ct. 2364. 19 Two circuits have rejected the more narrow reading of the favorable termination rule See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir.2000); Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77, 81 n. 3 (1st Cir.1998). For the reasons given, I think their reading of Heck and Spencer is not persuasive.