Opinion ID: 2962733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Calhoun County Sheriff Tatum

Text: The District Court correctly dismissed Ms. Hartzell’s § 1983 claim as to Calhoun County Sheriff Tatum, but it erred in dismissing Ms. Rudd’s and Ms. Franklin’s claims. The same facts apply to all plaintiffs—only the timing of events divides their eligibility for relief. As explained above, a causal connection between a supervisor’s actions and a claimant’s harm can be shown if “a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights” or if there are “facts support[ing] an inference that the supervisor . . . knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Mathews, 480 F.3d at 1270.8 Ms. Rudd and Ms. Franklin have established a genuine issue of material fact on both points. 8 A third way to show a causal connection is by pointing to a history of widespread abuse. Keith v. Dekalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs have pointed to no history of widespread abuse because there is no evidence that Sheriff Tatum was on notice of any continued duration of obvious, flagrant, or rampant abuse. He knew only from a single warning that Mr. Strawn was misbehaving. See Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official 10 Case: 14-14753 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 Page: 11 of 18 Sheriff Tatum’s lack of policies regarding the housing and transfer of female inmates, along with his custom of not using or enforcing the Calhoun County cross-gender transport policy, could support a finding of deliberate indifference.9 Liberty County’s inmate housing policies were extremely lax, and Sheriff Tatum did not act to supplement those policies to protect his inmates. Calhoun County did not receive any ongoing reports about its inmates, and there was no agreement about how officers from Calhoun County would be able to access their inmates housed at the Liberty County jail. Calhoun County did not train Mr. Strawn about cross-gender transport. Even though Calhoun County had a policy that mileage should be called in at the beginning and end of a cross-gender transport, the county did not effectively log or record the calls. Sheriff Tatum also did not have a policy of monitoring whether the call procedures were enforced. Mr. Strawn admits that he complied with the policy only some of the time. must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” (quotation omitted)). 9 Plaintiffs claim that the 2004 joyriding incident put Sheriff Tatum on notice of a risk. Even though there was some indication that the joyriding incident was connected to sexual favors, there is no evidence that the sheriff knew about any sexual undertones of that incident. Mr. Strawn’s conduct showed poor judgment, but it did not make known a substantial risk that he would sexually assault plaintiffs years later. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1391 (1997) (holding that a sheriff’s decision to hire an officer with a prior criminal record was insufficient to support § 1983 municipal liability for an excessive force arrest because the criminal record did not put the sheriff on notice that the specific harm would occur years later). 11 Case: 14-14753 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 Page: 12 of 18 Most critically, in December 2007, former inmate Dana Fritz notified Sheriff Tatum that he needed to get Mr. Strawn “in check” because he was “making sexual advances” to the inmates. But Sheriff Tatum made no changes to how he approached the inmate transfers and did not investigate the allegation of sexual misconduct. Four months later, he even gave Mr. Strawn permission to take Ms. Rudd and Ms. Franklin out of Liberty County jail to work clean-up duty at an event lasting past 10:00 p.m. Mr. Strawn assaulted both women after this event. This evidence suggests that Sheriff Tatum was grossly negligent when structuring the inmate housing arrangement with Liberty County. But “[a] claim of deliberate indifference requires proof of more than gross negligence.” Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1158. For a period of time, Sheriff Tatum had no notice of the risk posed by Mr. Strawn nor any reason to question the arrangement. But once Ms. Fritz notified Sheriff Tatum about Mr. Strawn’s concerning behavior, his failure to intervene could be the basis for a finding of deliberate indifference. 10 See Brown, 520 U.S. at 410, 117 S. Ct. at 1391. The District Court was not persuaded that Ms. Fritz’s warning put the sheriff on notice because: 10 For this reason, the District Court correctly dismissed Ms. Hartzell’s § 1983 claim, which was based solely on conduct before Ms. Fritz’s warning. Cf. Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1335 (holding that a facially constitutional policy could not support supervisory liability when officer had no notice that violation of policy was widespread, and no evidence that the policy would have actually caused plaintiff’s injuries). 12 Case: 14-14753 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 Page: 13 of 18 the information provided was vague, Fritz did not indicate that Strawn was raping (or even touching) inmates, or committing any crimes at all. Fritz only indicated to Sheriff Tatum that Strawn was making sexual advances towards inmates. The phrase ‘sexual advances’ does not convey that Strawn was committing illegal acts and certainly does not indicate that Strawn was sexually assaulting inmates. Perhaps a reasonable jury could agree with the District Court’s interpretation of Ms. Fritz’s statement. But a reasonable jury could also conclude that her statement communicated much more to Sheriff Tatum. A supervisor’s knowledge may be shown through circumstantial evidence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (1994). Ms. Fritz’s statement did not specify that Mr. Strawn was having sex with inmates, but a reasonable jury could conclude that Sheriff Tatum was on notice of the risk that he would sexually assault the plaintiffs. A reasonable jury could find that an officer who is “making sexual advances” toward inmates was taking, or threatening to take, actions beyond mere words. From Ms. Fritz’s statement, Mr. Strawn’s conduct could be escalating, and the sheriff was warned that he needed to take action to “get [Strawn] in check.” This is enough for a reasonable jury to conclude that he should have changed the county’s lax policies. See Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that absence of a policy can support a finding of deliberate indifference). The plaintiffs also challenge Sheriff Tatum’s failure to investigate or supervise Mr. Strawn. “Where the proper response . . . is obvious to all without 13 Case: 14-14753 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 Page: 14 of 18 training or supervision, then the failure to train or supervise is generally not ‘so likely’ to produce a wrong decision as to support an inference of deliberate indifference . . . .” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 490 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). Sexual assault on a prisoner is so beyond the conduct that a reasonable officer would consider acceptable that we know of no requirement that a sheriff train his officers against it. Sheriff Tatum testified that he had no reason to suspect Mr. Strawn, so he took no actions to monitor Strawn’s transportation of female inmates. This inaction alone would not support a § 1983 claim. However, our cases have also explained that a supervisor’s reliance on common sense can rise to the level of deliberate indifference if the supervisor is on notice that misconduct is occurring. Sewell, 117 F.3d at 490. And failing to act on that notice supports a finding of deliberate indifference. Cf. West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (finding no deliberate indifference where a sheriff changed his policies after receiving notice of misconduct). This record provides a sufficient basis for a jury to find that Sheriff Tatum’s behavior shifted from negligent to deliberately indifferent after Ms. Fritz gave him reason to 14 Case: 14-14753 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 Page: 15 of 18 suspect that Mr. Strawn was breaking the law, not to mention violating the code of conduct required of all Florida officers.11 Sheriff Tatum did not make a single change after Ms. Fritz’s warning. He did not supervise Mr. Strawn more closely; did not speak with the Liberty County Sheriff about what may have been occurring; and did not ensure that Mr. Strawn was in compliance with the existing Calhoun County jail procedures to protect inmates during cross-gender transfers. Any one of those actions could have prevented Mr. Strawn’s assaults on Ms. Rudd and Ms. Franklin. A jury must decide whether Sheriff Tatum’s failure to implement policies, enforce existing policies, or investigate the allegations against Mr. Strawn (all after he had a warning that such actions were necessary) combined to cause an obvious and predictable consequence—the sexual assaults against Ms. Rudd and Ms. Franklin. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 409–410, 117 S. Ct. at 1391. Alternatively, a reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiffs showed a causal connection because Sheriff Tatum was on notice that Mr. Strawn would act 11 Section 4.4 of Florida’s Law Enforcement Officer Ethical Standards of Conduct states that: Police officers, while on duty, shall not commit any act which, as defined under Florida law, constitutes sexual harassment, including but not limited to, making unwelcome sexual advances, requesting sexual favors, engaging in sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature. Officer Requirements, Florida Dept. of Law Enforcement, https://www.fdle.state.fl.us. 15 Case: 14-14753 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 Page: 16 of 18 unlawfully and failed to stop him from doing so.12 Mathews, 480 F.3d at 1270. Mr. Strawn committed the crime of sexual misconduct the minute he had sex with an inmate. See Fla. Stat. § 951.221 (making sexual misconduct between detention facility employees and inmates a third-degree felony); id. § 944.35 (defining “sexual misconduct”). It is reasonable for a jury to conclude that an officer who is “making sexual advances” toward female inmates would escalate to engaging in sexual misconduct, putting Sheriff Tatum on notice that Mr. Strawn would act unlawfully.