Opinion ID: 853872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Public Defender System

Text: The defendant challenges the post-conviction court's denial of his claim that systemic defects existed in the Marion County public defender system that rendered trial and appellate counsel ineffective. He asserts that the public defenders could not have adequately represented defendants because the judges hired public defenders for their own courts, the hiring was done by political affiliation, and the system was seriously deprived of trained staff and resources. Citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-660, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668 (1984), the defendant contends that [the] manifested defects [were] so fundamental and pervasive that a presumption of ineffective assistance should attach, Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 104, and that the likelihood of effective assistance was so small as to justify a presumption of prejudice, Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 111. The post-conviction court found that the defendant failed to show that systemic defects in the Marion County Superior Court public defender system rendered his trial and appellate counsel ineffective. P.C.R. Record at 322. The post-conviction court specifically concluded that political considerations did not hamper or constrain trial counsel, that trial counsel received funds to hire an investigator and a psychological expert, and that no evidence demonstrated that trial counsel failed to pursue any aspect of the defense because of pressure or lack of funds from the trial court. The post-conviction court also concluded that there were not systemic defects in the Marion County Public Defender system in 1988 which would have rendered trial counsel or appellate counsel ineffective. P.C.R. Record at 325. Cronic established, in effect, a narrow exception to the two-pronged Strickland test, which requires defendants to demonstrate specific errors of counsel leading to deficient performance and actual prejudice in order to obtain reversal on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. In Cronic, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel but did suggest that, in limited circumstances of extreme magnitude, a presumption of ineffectiveness may be justified and that such circumstances are, in and of themselves, sufficient [to establish a claim of ineffective assistance] without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662, 104 S.Ct. at 2048, 80 L.Ed.2d at 670. If the Cronic exception does not apply, the defendant must fulfill the individualized requirements of Strickland. See id. at 659 n. 26, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 n. 26, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668 n. 26. The Cronic Court identified three situations that would justify this presumption: (1) when counsel is completely denied; (2) when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) when surrounding circumstances are such that, although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. Id. at 659-60, 104 S.Ct. at 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668. The Cronic Court further explained that only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial. Id. at 662, 104 S.Ct. at 2048, 80 L.Ed.2d at 670. Justice Powell explained that, under the circumstances described in the third situation, the defendant is in effect deprived of counsel altogether, and thereby deprived of any meaningful opportunity to subject the State's evidence to adversarial testing. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 395 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2593-94 n. 2, 91 L.Ed.2d 305, 332-33 n. 2 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). Recently, we reiterated that, with regard to this third situation, the  `burden under Cronic is extremely heavy.' Coleman, 703 N.E.2d at 1039 (quoting Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 481 (Ind.1997)). See also Coleman, 703 N.E.2d at 1039 (stating that such a presumption is justified only in cases involving circumstances of similar character and magnitude as those cited as examples in Cronic ). In this case, the defendant argues that the third Cronic situation applies. The defendant presented the testimony of several lawyers or experts acquainted with the system as it existed at the time of the defendant's trial. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Bob Hill, a public defender who tried capital cases roughly contemporaneous with the defendant's trial, if indigent clients in Marion County did not receive effective assistance of counsel in any circumstances because of the nature of the agency. P.C.R. Record at 1012. Hill replied, No. I don't think you can phrase that statement in the absolute.... I think these defects resulted in some people not receiving adequate representation. P.C.R. Record at 1012-13 (emphasis added). Robert Spangenberg, an expert for the defendant who has conducted studies of court systems throughout the nation and who testified that a strong presumption existed that lawyers would be ineffective, admitted that he did not know of a single lawyer being fired for political reasons. Spangenberg also testified that investigative and expert resources were often not available in non-capital cases but that this testimony does not apply to capital cases. He also stated that, in death penalty cases, the public defenders could receive resources in the way of information and training from the Indiana Public Defender's office. Additionally, trial and appellate counsel for the defendant testified that they did not feel that a lack of funding and resources or conflicts of interest inhibited their representation of the defendant. We have discussed and rejected similar claims that systemic defects in the county indigent defense systems, including that of Marion County, create a presumption of prejudice and ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Coleman, 703 N.E.2d at 1036-41 (Lake County's system); Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1132, 1145 (Ind.1998) (Lake County's system); Johnson v. State, 693 N.E.2d 941, 952-53 (Ind.1998) (Madison County's system); Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1135 (Ind.1997) (Lake County's system); Games, 684 N.E.2d at 478-81 (Marion County's system). While this Court recognizes the less than ideal conditions in the Marion County public defender system in the 1980s and appreciates the necessity of competent defense for indigent defendants, theoretical imperfections alone will not satisfy the extremely heavy Cronic burden and force us to find a Cronic exception to the Strickland analysis and to reverse the defendant's conviction. We conclude that the evidence is not without conflict and, as a whole, does not lead unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite the post-conviction court's finding that the defendant failed to establish a Cronic claim. The post-conviction court did not err in concluding that the defendant failed to establish his claim that systemic defects in the Marion County public defender system made it impossible for counsel properly to represent the defendant and rendered the defendant's counsel ineffective.