Opinion ID: 1226553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Dismiss for Pretrial Indictment Delay

Text: The record indicates that Seth was injured in September of 1981 and that Tegan died in March of 1982. The defendant's indictment for these incidents did not come until approximately 15 years later on November 12, 1996. At trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the pre-indictment delay violated her due process rights under the State and federal constitutions. [18] The trial court denied the motion after holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter. The defendant now argues that it was error for the trial court to deny the motion to dismiss. Our standard of review of a motion to dismiss an indictment is generally de novo. However, in addition to the de novo standard of review, where an evidentiary hearing is conducted upon a motion to dismiss this Court's clearly erroneous standard of review is ordinarily invoked concerning a circuit court's findings of fact. See generally, Town of Fayetteville v. Law, 201 W.Va. 205, 495 S.E.2d 843 (1997); McCormick v. Allstate Insurance Company, 197 W.Va. 415, 475 S.E.2d 507 (1996). We observe at the outset that West Virginia has no statute of limitations affecting felony prosecutions. State v. Carrico, 189 W.Va. 40, 43, 427 S.E.2d 474, 477 (1993). It was said in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310, 87 S.Ct. 408, 417, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966), that [t]here is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect.... Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction. In Syllabus Point 1 of State ex rel. Leonard v. Hey, 269 S.E.2d 394 (1980), we held: A delay of eleven years between the commission of a crime and the arrest or indictment of a defendant, his location and identification having been known throughout the period, is presumptively prejudicial to the defendant and violates his right to due process of law, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, and W.Va. Const. art. 3, § 10. The presumption is rebuttable by the government. We further ruled in Syllabus Point 2 of Leonard that [t]he effects of less gross delays upon a defendant's due process rights must be determined by a trial court by weighing the reasons for delay against the impact of the delay upon the defendant's ability to defend himself. To rebut the presumption of prejudice established in Leonard, we held in Hundley v. Ashworth, 181 W.Va. 379, 383, 382 S.E.2d 573, 576-77 (1989) that the State need only demonstrate the delay was not orchestrated to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant. If the State is able to make such a showing, the delay in obtaining the indictment does not violate federal or state due process. However, this Court pointed out in Hundley that the burden-shifting mechanism announced in Leonard is not applicable where the prosecutor was not shown to have knowledge of the identity and location of the defendant. [19] Id. at 382, 382 S.E.2d at 576. Specifically, we stated in Syllabus Point 2 of Hundley: The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution require the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the State's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice in presenting his defense. Accord, State v. Beard, 194 W.Va. 740, 461 S.E.2d 486 (1995) (thirteen-year delay between the murders and defendant's indictment did not violate due process because the State promptly charged defendant once it had the necessary grounds to secure an indictment); and State v. Carrico, 189 W.Va. 40, 427 S.E.2d 474 (1993) (holding that two-year pre-indictment delay did not violate defendant's due process rights since government promptly sought indictment upon securing sufficient evidence). [20] In the instant proceeding, the defendant contends that this case is subject to a Leonard analysis. However, we find that Hundley's analysis is the appropriate test because the defendant has not shown that the State knew the identity of the person who murdered Tegan and attempted to poison Seth prior to the new investigation in 1995. [21] Accordingly, the defendant must prove that the State's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over [her] and that it caused [her] actual prejudice in presenting [her] defense. Hundley, 181 W.Va. at 383, 382 S.E.2d at 577 (footnote omitted). [22] A review of the record indicates that the defendant failed to present any evidence at the pretrial hearing to establish that the State deliberately delayed bringing the charges against her in an effort to gain a tactical advantage. The State presented evidence to show that the initial investigating officer, Jim Childers, and prosecuting attorney, Ralph Hayes (now deceased), concluded that the evidence was insufficient to charge anyone for Tegan's murder and Seth's attempted poisoning. It appears that a primary obstacle to bringing charges was the fact that Mr. Davis had refused to talk with law enforcement officials about the incident. The evidence showed that it was not until Trooper Michael Spradlin began his investigation in 1995, that Mr. Davis decided to talk with law enforcement. According to Trooper Spradlin, Mr. Davis informed him that the defendant was alone with Seth when he became ill and that she was alone with Tegan when Tegan became ill. [23] These facts, along with subsequent inconsistent statements attributed to the Davises during their adoption of a child, provided the State with the missing pieces to bring charges against the defendant. As to the issue of prejudice caused by pre-indictment delay, the defendant presents a number of theories in her brief. However, the State correctly points out that many of these arguments were not presented to the trial court. This Court pointed out in State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 597, 476 S.E.2d 535, 544 (1996) that: Ordinarily, a defendant who has not proffered a particular claim or defense in the trial court may not unveil it on appeal. Indeed, if any principle is settled in this jurisdiction, it is that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised properly in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal. We have invoked this principle with a near religious fervor. This variant of the `raise or waive' rule cannot be dismissed lightly as a mere technicality. The rule is founded upon important considerations of fairness, judicial economy, and practical wisdom. In view of Miller, we will only pass upon those claims of prejudice argued before the trial court. In the defendant's memorandum of law to her motion to dismiss for pre-indictment delay she contended that the delay prejudiced her defense with respect to insulin testing done on Seth. It was argued by the defendant that the lab technician was not known and available for examination, lab log books were not available, and the type of machinery and protocol followed were not known. The defendant also proffered that there is a reasonable possibility that there may have existed for a reasonable period of time, a sample of the blood specimen that could be tested by independent laboratories on behalf of the defendant. [24] The defendant opined that it might have been possible to reveal flaws in the testing done on the insulin level that was found. With respect to prejudice in defending against the murder charge, the defendant contended below that samples taken from Tegan's intestinal tract were not available for independent testing to determine whether the beads found in her stomach in fact contained caffeine. [25] On the issue of prejudice, the trial court ruled as follows: There has been mention of prejudice to the defendant. There has not been any showing of prejudice. In view of the record in this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court was clearly erroneous in its factual conclusion. C.