Opinion ID: 2318671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Rehabilitative Efforts

Text: The defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trial justice erred in concluding that defendant's work at the ACI was irrelevant. Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial justice erred in making the following statement: [The defendant] has done some work learning a little bit about the law, being a helper, involved in the laundry and housekeeping, cleaning up, now doing legal research, perhaps organizing the library and helping other inmates, as well as himself, learn about the law. All of that is commendable but isn't that exactly what we expect of every person that is sentenced, that they will rehabilitate themselves[?] To support this contention of error, defendant maintains that his affirmative rehabilitative efforts are distinctly different from general good behavior while incarcerated and are subject to consideration, albeit not dispositive, on a motion to reduce sentence. In imposing sentence, a trial justice may consider numerous factors, including the severity of the crime; the defendant's personal, educational, and employment background; the defendant's potential for rehabilitation; societal deterrence; and the appropriateness of the punishment. State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1044 (R.I.2002); see also State v. Mollicone, 746 A.2d 135, 137-38 (R.I. 2000). The trial justice, however, is not limited to these factors; the trial justice is bound only by the statutory parameters established by the Legislature. Thornton, 800 A.2d at 1044. This Court repeatedly has held that it is within a trial justice's discretion to reserve consideration of a defendant's good behavior and rehabilitative efforts while in prison to the parole board. State v. Ruffner, 5 A.3d 864, 868 (R.I.2010); see also Thornton, 800 A.2d at 1045; State v. Guzman, 794 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I.2002) (Appropriate prison behavior is expected of all inmates and is irrelevant to the factors considered by a trial justice when he or she initially imposes a sentence.). Consequently, a trial justice is not required to consider or lend credit to a defendant's prison behavior when making a Rule 35 determination. Ruffner, 5 A.3d at 866, 868. In this case, the trial justice acknowledged defendant's commendable rehabilitative work efforts; however, he was not persuaded that they amounted to any substantial change in circumstances warranting a reduction in defendant's sentence. Instead, the trial justice properly focused on the severity of defendant's crime, which he referred to as a truly    horrific, unforgivable criminal act and as vile an act as [he could] envision, ultimately warranting the harsh sentence imposed. We discern no error in this determination. We previously have held, and will further emphasize, that defendant's general arguments about his commendable behavior during his incarceration can bear no fruit for the purposes of Rule 35   . Dyer, 14 A.3d at 228. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in failing to afford much, if any, weight to defendant's prison behavior or rehabilitative efforts.