Opinion ID: 586864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ineffective assistance at resentencing.

Text: 42 The petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing. He does not, however, allege that he was resentenced illegally, and he admits that he cannot show prejudice. The district court therefore held that under Strickland, Tucker's claim must fail. 43 We disagree. Tucker alleges that the counsel appointed to represent him at the resentencing did not consult with him, had no knowledge of the facts, and acted as a mere spectator. If the transcript of the resentencing is accurate, appointed counsel failed to make any comment. Tucker alleges that the transcript is incomplete. He states that at one point he asked, out loud, Do I have counsel here? According to Tucker, his appointed counsel answered Oh, I am just standing in for this one. 44 The district court found that Tucker was not prejudiced by the failure of his appointed counsel to allocute at sentencing because the sentencing judge was familiar with the case and based his resentencing entirely upon the first sentencing hearing at which Tucker's counsel performed effectively. The effectiveness of representation at the first sentencing hearing, however, does not fulfill the Constitutional requirement that Tucker be assisted by counsel at his resentencing hearing. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument would permit the state to deny counsel to Tucker at the resentencing hearing. 45 The Sixth Amendment entitles a defendant to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, and sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. 13 The Supreme Court has written that [t]he Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment. 14 The Supreme Court has recognized that there are some circumstances in which, although counsel is present,  'the performance of counsel may be so inadequate that, in effect, no assistance of counsel is provided.'  15 In this case, Tucker was unaware of the presence of counsel, counsel did not confer with Tucker whatsoever, and as far as the transcript is concerned, counsel made no attempt to represent his client's interests. We hold that the failure of Tucker's counsel to provide any assistance was a constructive denial of his right to counsel. Because [a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel is legally presumed to result in prejudice 16 the district court erred in dismissing this aspect of Tucker's petition.