Opinion ID: 848996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: development of the law

Text: From its inception in 1912, Michigan's worker's compensation system has provided benefits for employees who are injured in the course of their employment. The initial worker's compensation act, however, did not expressly provide compensation for employees who suffered mental disabilities. [1] Despite this, our Court determined that coverage existed for mental disability injuries because such injuries were merely a variant of personal injury within the scope of the act. See, e.g., Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922). [2] Thus, if the mental disability arose out of, and in the course of, an employee's employment, that employee would be covered under the act. This can first be seen in Klein where the employee died as a result of severe emotional shock experienced after he accidentally dropped a radiator on the head of a co-worker. Id. at 487, 187 N.W. 400. The decedent believed, erroneously, that he had killed the other worker, and this belief caused him such mental strain that he lapsed into delirium and died. Id. at 488, 187 N.W. 400. This Court held that the shock received by the decedent from witnessing this injury constituted an accidental personal injury within the meaning of the worker's compensation act and that the claimant, the decedent's wife, therefore was entitled to compensation for his death. Id. at 494, 187 N.W. 400. The next significant case in the development of compensable mental disabilities is Rainko v. Webster-Eisenlohr, Inc., 306 Mich. 328, 332, 10 N.W.2d 903 (1943). In Rainko, this Court expanded the scope of compensability to cases in which no outward physical injury occurred to either the employee or to another employee as in Klein. Specifically, this Court stated that [i]t is not necessary to establish physical injury (resulting in) outward evidence of violence or trauma to justify an award of compensation. Id. at 332, 10 N.W.2d 903. In Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960), this Court again extended the scope of mental disability coverage. In Carter, the employee suffered an emotional collapse, later diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia, resulting from accumulated stress he experienced in trying to perform his tasks on an assembly line. Upon review, this Court held that compensation could be awarded for a mental disability injury that arose out of and in the course of employment as a result merely of the effects of work place stresses on a preexisting mental weakness. In 1978, worker's compensation coverage for mental disabilities was again broadened. In Deziel v. Difco Laboratories, Inc. (After Remand), 403 Mich. 1, 26, 268 N.W.2d 1 (1978), this Court adopted the subjective causal nexus standard to determine the compensability of a mental disability claim: We hold, as a matter of law, that in cases involving mental ... injuries, once a plaintiff is found disabled and a personal injury is established, it is sufficient that a strictly subjective causal nexus be utilized by referees and the WCAB to determine compensability. Under a strictly subjective causal nexus standard, a claimant is entitled to compensation if it is factually established that the claimant honestly perceives some personal injury incurred during the ordinary work of his employment caused his disability. This standard applies where the plaintiff alleges a disability resulting from either a physical or mental stimulus and honestly, even though mistakenly, believes that he is disabled due to that work-related injury and therefore cannot resume his normal employment. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Coleman criticized the majority's holding. [3] Id. at 46, 268 N.W.2d 1. Justice Coleman believed that the subjective causal nexus standard, in application, afforded no standard at all. Id. at 48, 268 N.W.2d 1. In her view, the majority's test for causal nexus would result in an award of compensation for virtually all, if not all, claims based on mental disorders. Id. That was so because, [i]f the claimant perceived that the job caused the problem, even if this were not true, the employer would be liable. [4] Id. (emphasis added). Thus, following Deziel, the controlling law was that compensation for a mental disability claim would be permitted if the claimant honestly, even though mistakenly perceived that a disability was related to a precipitating work event. Apparently, the Legislature was also dissatisfied with Deziel's subjective causal nexus standard. In 1980, it reacted to Deziel by enacting, the statutory provision currently at issue, M.C.L. § 418.301(2). Hurd v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Mich. 531, 534, 377 N.W.2d 300 (1985). Section 301(2) provides: Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof. Section 301(2) constituted a direct response to the articulation in Deziel of an extraordinarily broad standard for determining compensability for mental disability claims, a standard that was the culmination of more than sixty years of judicial expansion of such claims. The Legislature's swift action in this realm following Deziel reflected an unequivocal desire to address such expansion. As Farrington v. Total Petroleum Inc, 442 Mich. 201, 216, n. 16, 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993), observed, the reason that the Legislature enacted M.C.L. § 418.301(2) was to overturn or modify expansive interpretations placed upon the act by this Court.