Opinion ID: 201924
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rejection of Defendant's Theory of Analysis

Text: 41 Before the district court, the defendant argued that if an FMLA plaintiff cannot return to work prior to the exhaustion of his FMLA leave, then ipso facto his retaliation claim fails. 4 It propounds the same theory on appeal. Defendant's theory mischaracterizes the law, and we reject it. 42 Defendant grounds its argument in the text of two regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.214(b) and 825.216(d). Neither supports its theory. The first provision deals with an employee's rights on returning to work from FMLA leave; it sets a limit on the right to reinstatement set out in 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). As such, it circumscribes only Colburn's ability to bring an interference claim. The second provision deals only with an employee who has taken workers' compensation leave concurrently with FMLA leave. Nothing in the record shows that Colburn was on workers' compensation leave at any point during October 2001 to April 2003, and thus the provision is irrelevant to Colburn's claim. 43 Our law is clear that an FMLA plaintiff may pursue a retaliation claim even if there is no claim of violation of substantive rights to leave. See Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 159-60 (describing the independent causes of action under the substantive and proscriptive provisions of the FMLA); accord Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 769 (5th Cir.2001) (The [FMLA] provides two distinct causes of action, to which courts apply different analyses.). Further, the failure of a substantive claim of denial of leave does not foreclose a retaliation claim. See Hunt, 277 F.3d at 768-69 (noting that a plaintiff need not establish a violation of the substantive, prescriptive provisions of the FMLA to allege a violation of the proscriptive provisions). 44 Nichols also proposes that even if the failure of Colburn's substantive claim does not automatically extinguish his retaliation claim, then the latter still fails because Colburn incurred no damages. This theory is also wrong. That a plaintiff cannot make out a case for damages for a substantive rights infringement claim does not mean no cause of action for retaliation can be stated. 45 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a) sets out the remedies for violations of § 2615: 46
47 Any employer who violates section 2615 of this title shall be liable to any eligible employee affected — 48 (A) for damages equal to — 49
50 (I) any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation; or 51 (II) in a case in which wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation have not been denied or lost to the employee, any actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct result of the violation, such as the cost of providing care, up to a sum equal to 12 weeks of wages or salary for the employee; (ii) the interest on the amount described in clause (i) calculated at the prevailing rate; and 52 (iii) an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to the sum of the amount described in clause (i) and the interest described in clause (ii), except that if an employer who has violated section 2615 of this title proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission which violated section 2615 of this title was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation of section 2615 of this title, such court may, in the discretion of the court, reduce the amount of the liability to the amount and interest determined under clauses (i) and (ii), respectively; and 53 (B) for such equitable relief as may be appropriate, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion. 54 .... 55 (3) Fees and costs 56 The court in such an action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable expert witness fees, and other costs of the action to be paid by the defendant. 57 As to his claim of interference with his substantive rights under the FMLA, Colburn was not entitled to any remedy because he admitted he could not return to work at the expiration of the leave. But that did not mean there was no actionable harm under a retaliation theory. In some situations, a successful retaliation claim will lead to independent damages. 58 Colburn's termination occurred on January 31, 2002. He admitted that he would not have been able to return to work until after his period of leave expired, and he thus would not have been entitled to reinstatement under 29 U.S.C. § 2614. Accordingly, with regard to his retaliation claim, he would not have been entitled to any compensation or benefits after the date he exhausted his FMLA leave. In theory, he nonetheless could have had a loss of salary in the period between the date of the alleged wrongful termination and the date his leave expired. Yet, because his leave was an unpaid leave, he had no lost income. Also theoretically, Colburn could have suffered damages in the form of lost value of employment benefits (say, health and dental insurance) in the period between his termination and the expiration of the unpaid leave. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(5) (defining employment benefits). But he proffered no evidence showing that the alleged retaliatory firing resulted in such losses. 5 59 Damages, however, are not the only remedy available under the FMLA. The FMLA also provides for equitable relief, including reinstatement, see id. § 2617(a)(1)(B); thus, a hypothetical plaintiff who proved retaliation could be reinstated once he or she is able to perform all essential functions of the position, see 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (An employee has no greater right to reinstatement ... than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA leave period.), even if he or she had no monetary damages. Indeed, counsel for Colburn made this very argument. 60 Further, the statute provides, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, for reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable expert witness fees, and other costs of the action to be paid by the defendant. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). Thus, had Colburn proven his claim of retaliation and established entitlement to some form of equitable relief, he could have been awarded attorney's fees and costs. 61 The fact that Colburn could not have returned to work before the expiration of his leave and thus cannot make out a claim for interference with his substantive rights does not necessarily preclude a retaliation claim. 6