Opinion ID: 1801790
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of 911 Tape As Victim Impact Evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Kristian's 911 tape as victim impact evidence during the penalty phase. After defendant shot Kristian and her mother in the head and left the residence, Kristian called 911 for help. Initially, afraid that defendant might still be present, Kristian whispered that two Black males had shot her and her mother in the back of the head. Kristian described the assailants and their clothing, and gave her address. While talking to the dispatcher, her mother's friend Jerold Smith arrived at the house and took the telephone from Kristian. Kristian told Smith that someone had shot her and her mother. As Smith spoke with the 911 dispatcher, Kristian went into her mother's bedroom and began screaming when she discovered her injured mother. Kristian's screaming is heard in the background of the tape. Smith urged the dispatcher to send paramedics quickly because Kristian was becoming a hysterical teenager. Over defendant's objection, the trial court admitted the 911 tape as relevant victim impact evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) and further determined that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect (Evid. Code, § 352). The prosecution played the 911 tape for the jury during Kristian's testimony. On defendant's request, the trial court then admonished the jury as follows, To the extent that your reaction may be emotional to the 911 tape, you are permitted and it's admissible for your consideration as part of the circumstances of the crime, but I do want to caution you with respect to if you have [an] emotional reaction, that your emotion doesn't wipe out your evaluation of all the evidence. You are to weigh all the factors, including the circumstances of the crime, but emotion doesn't control. You are judges. Your reactions are as human beings. That is why we have human beings sitting on juries instead of computers. But it's not presented in order to have emotion control and weigh out all the other factors presented to you. The prosecution replayed the 911 tape at the end of its rebuttal argument. Defendant claims that admission of the 911 tape was error because (1) it was nonstatutory aggravating evidence, (2) its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value (Evid. Code, § 352), and (3) it was so inflammatory that it rendered his trial unreliable and unfair under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We conclude that the trial court properly admitted the 911 tape as victim impact evidence. (13) `In a capital trial, evidence showing the direct impact of the defendant's acts on the victims' friends and family is not barred by the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment[] to the federal Constitution. [Citation.]' [Citation.] `The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. [Citation.] State law is consistent with these principles. Unless it invites a purely irrational response from the jury, the devastating effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the community is relevant and admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).' [Citations.] ( People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 364.) Victim impact evidence is admissible under California law provided it is not so inflammatory as to elicit from the jury an irrational or emotional response untethered to the facts of the case. ( People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1180 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353]; see also People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 793 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548].) In People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1063 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277], the defendant shot and killed a jewelry store owner during a robbery and shot an employee, who survived. At the penalty phase of the capital trial, the surviving employee described the psychological and emotional trauma she suffered as a direct result of the defendant's homicidal conduct, as related to the nature and circumstances of the capital offense. We held that the impact of the offense on the surviving victim constituted a circumstance of the crime and was relevant under factor (a) of section 190.3. Here, the 911 tape clearly showed the immediate impact and harm caused by defendant's criminal conduct on the surviving victim and was relevant because it `could provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to ... impose the ultimate sanction.' ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 836 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].) The 911 tape here was relevant under factor (a) of section 190.3. ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1063; see People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 515-517 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521] [husband's 911 tape after discovery of wife's body admissible as relevant to guilt phase issues].) Defendant argues that, because the 911 tape was cumulative of Kristian's testimony at the guilt and penalty phases, the sole purpose of the 911 tape was to inflame the jury. However, the trial court found otherwise. In weighing the probative value and the prejudicial effect, the court agreed with defense counsel that Kristian's hysteria is clear on the tape. On the other hand, the court determined that the tape showed the impact of the crimes on Kristian that was not evident from the other evidence at trial. The court noted that on the tape Kristian sounded extremely calm in the beginning, but allow[ed] herself to let go and became hysterical only after someone safe had entered the house. The trial court reasoned, It's not like the defendant is there and she has to keep that lock on her emotions. I think it is relevant to the circumstances of the crime to the extent that the trial itself reflected that she was the one that kept trying to calm her mother down. I think it is consistent with the attempt on her part to remain calm in spite of what was happening. The trial itself I think was very sanitized and clinical. Her recitation was extremely clinical. And I think for the benefit of [defendant] she did not display any emotion whatsoever. And I think to the extent that the People have a right to show the real horror and the impact on her, they theoretically could have had that presented at the trial itself, and I think they restrained themselves by not. It does show the hysteria. I think the tape does indicate the impact on the victim which is not reflected in the trial itself. The record supports the trial court's finding that the 911 tape was not cumulative of other evidence. Although Kristian testified about defendant's and his accomplice's commission of the crimes during the guilt phase, and about the longer term impact of those crimes on her during the penalty phase, only the tape conveyed the more immediate impact of the crimes on her. Although the 911 tape would naturally have tended to arouse emotion and evoke strong feelings of sympathy for [Kristian's] condition, it was not so inflammatory as to have diverted the jury's attention from its proper role or invited an irrational response. ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1063; see also People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 133-134 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400] [relevant though emotional victim impact testimony did not surpass constitutional limits].) Indeed, the trial court admonished the jurors not to let any emotional response subvert their reasoned evaluation of the evidence. Nothing suggests the jury did not follow the court's instruction. Moreover, the jury did not ask to hear the 911 tape during deliberations, reflecting it did not place undue emphasis on it. Given the relevance of the 911 tape, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in concluding the 911 tape was more probative than prejudicial. ( People v. Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 515-517 [admission of 911 tape showing husband's distress in finding dead wife's body not an abuse of discretion under Evid. Code, § 352].) Having concluded there was no error and no prejudice, we also reject the claims that admission of the 911 tape deprived defendant of his federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable and nonarbitrary penalty determination. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 445.)