Opinion ID: 864448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether there was an implied contract between

Text: WALLER AND SNOW AND HARRELL FOR THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES. ¶33. Snow and Harrell’s next argument for reversal is that after the November 1999 order was entered allowing them to participate in the lawsuit, Waller’s acquiescence in the arrangement by allowing them to assume the majority of the work in getting the case prepared for trial created an implied contract. ¶34. When a party accepts and uses the services of an attorney knowing that compensation is expected, a contract will be implied for the payment of attorneys fees. See, e.g., In re Estate of Stewart, 732 So. 2d 255, 259 (Miss. 1999); West Ctr. Apartments Ltd. v. Keyes, 371 So. 2d 854, 858 (Miss. 1979); Collins v. Schneider, 187 Miss. 1, 192 So. 20, 23 (1939); Jones Bayou Drainage Dist. v. Sillers, Clark & Sillers, 129 Miss. 13, 91 So. 693, 694 (1922). A contract that arises from the conduct of the parties, also known as a contract implied in fact, has the same legal effect as an express contract. It carries as much weight as, and is as binding as an express contract. Magnolia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Randal Craft Realty Co., 342 So.2d 1308, 1312 (Miss. 1977); Ahern v. South Buffalo Ry., 104 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 1952), aff’d, 344 U.S.367, 735. Ct. 340, 97 L. Ed. 395 (1953); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § § 4 cmt. ¶35. In Old Men’s Home, Inc. v. Lee’s Estate, 191 Miss. 669, 4 So.2d 235, 236 (1941), this Court pointed out that a quasi or constructive contract rests on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another. It is an obligation created by law, in the absence of an agreement, when and because the acts of the 18 parties or others have placed in the possession of one person money under circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain and which in justice and fairness belong to another. Furthermore, in Cooke v. Adams, 183 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1966), this Court held that any conduct of one party from which the other party may draw the inference of a promise is effective as such and the conduct of the parties is viewed as a reasonable man would to determine the existence or not of the contract implied in fact. To collect under an unjust enrichment or quasi-contract theory, the claimant must show “there is no legal contract but . . . the person sought to be charged is in possession of money or property which in good conscience and justice he should not retain, but should deliver to another.” Estate of Johnson v. Adkins, 513 So.2d 922, 926 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Hans v. Hans, 482 So.2d 1117, 1122 (Miss. 1986)). ¶36. Waller objected to Judge Kitchens’s November 1999 order allowing Snow and Harrell to participate, and subsequently asked the court to reconsider. However, he took no further steps to voice his disapproval until it was time to split the attorney fees. Had Waller wanted to preserve his objection to Snow and Harrell’s participation and avoid the appearance of acquiescence, he should have advised Snow, Harrell, and Judge Kitchens that at the end of the case he would again dispute any claim for attorney fees and, more importantly, he should have undertaken to prepare the case for trial. However, as the previous discussion makes clear, Waller allowed Snow to do virtually all of the work. One cannot knowingly accept the services of an attorney and object for the first time when the bill comes due. Stoner v. Yandell, 188 So. 564 (Miss. 1939). Waller knew that Snow and 19 Harrell did the work expecting to be paid when the recovery was received. Under these circumstances, the law will imply a contract.