Opinion ID: 2999185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deference to the EEOC

Text: Smith’s final argument on appeal borders on frivolous, but for the sake of completeness we will discuss it briefly. Essentially, Smith claims that “the district court should have deferred to the EEOC’s determination that [her] claim was timely.” Smith refers, of course, to the EEOC’s September 12, 2002 decision reversing the EEO and holding that her filing was timely under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). See supra p. 7. Nevertheless, there is a very fundamental reason why the district court properly refused to accord the EEOC’s decision any deference whatsoever and why this court should not follow suit. When a federal employee files a Title VII suit in federal court, the district court charged with deciding that action is No. 04-3531 21 required to preform a de novo review of the record, including administrative agency proceedings. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 861 (1976); Kontos v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, 826 F.2d 573, 575 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that “we explicitly uphold the long-presumed position that all agency decisions involving federal employee discrimination claims are entitled to de novo review in the federal courts). Likewise, our review of the district court’s decision is de novo. See Evans, 434 F.3d at 924. Thus, neither this court, nor a district court, is under any obligation to defer to the determination of an administrative agency in an action which falls under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. Indeed, to do otherwise would be grounds for reversal.