Opinion ID: 2363143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: independent counsel

Text: The trial court concluded that the plaintiff was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel as required by ง 46b-36g (a)(4). The court based this conclusion on findings that the plaintiff had been set up and that her execution of documents waiving any claim to [a] conflict of interest [did] not alter the fact that the attorneys of [Kristen Friezo's law firm] did have a clear conflict of interest. The trial court further found that Foley was either incredibly incompetent in his representation of the plaintiff or he was not, in fact, representing her at all. The court added that [t]he plaintiff did not have the sophistication to realize what was going on and that the most telling indication of Foley's true loyalties and obligations in connection with his lack of advice to the plaintiff was his failure to secure any retainer agreement, exact a consultation fee, or tender any bill for services. The court thus concluded that the plaintiff did not have the benefit of independent legal counsel nor a reasonable opportunity to secure such representation. We disagree with the trial court's conclusions because they are premised on a misunderstanding of the statutory requirement. General Statutes ง 46b-36g (a)(4) specifically provides that the party against whom enforcement of the prenuptial agreement is sought must prove that [s]uch party was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel. The operative terms for the purpose of this analysis are reasonable opportunity and independent counsel. Although this court has not yet had occasion to construe ง 46b-36g (a)(4), appellate courts that have interpreted identical statutory language invariably have held, consistent with the plain statutory wording, that a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel means simply that the party against whom enforcement is sought must have had sufficient time before the marriage to consult with an attorney other than the attorney representing the party's future spouse. With respect to whether the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to consult with legal counsel, there is no requirement that a party actually seek or obtain the advice of counsel, only that he or she be afforded a reasonable opportunity to do so. See, e.g., Cannon v. Cannon, supra, 384 Md. at 578, 865 A.2d 563 (upholding prenuptial agreement when wife had several days to review agreement and, therefore, sufficient time to consult counsel had she been so inclined); id. ([i]t was enough for [the husband] to demonstrate that [the wife] had the opportunity to seek counsel and that she was not discouraged to do so); Black v. Powers, 48 Va.App. 113, 141, 628 S.E.2d 546 (2006) (the fact that [the wife] may have failed to seek independent legal advice does not negate her opportunity to do so); Pajak v. Pajak, supra, 182 W.Va. at 32-33, 385 S.E.2d 384 (although advice of independent counsel at the time parties enter into a prenuptial agreement helps demonstrate that there has been no fraud, duress or misrepresentation, and that the agreement was entered into knowledgeably and voluntarily, such independent advice of counsel is not a prerequisite to enforceability when the terms of the agreement are understandable to a reasonably intelligent adult and both parties have had the opportunity to consult with independent counsel [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]). In the present case, not only did the plaintiff have a reasonable opportunity to consult with legal counsel, she did, in fact, do so. The defendant did not surprise the plaintiff with a prenuptial agreement the day before the wedding, thus precluding her, for all practical purposes, from obtaining the advice of counsel but, rather, informed the plaintiff that he wanted her to sign an agreement shortly after he proposed marriage on August 20, 1998, more than two months in advance of the anticipated ceremony. Moreover, the plaintiff subsequently contacted Kristen Friezo, who introduced her to Foley. We therefore conclude that the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel as that term is used in ง 46b-36g (a)(4). With respect to whether Foley was in fact independent of the defendant, there is absolutely nothing in the record, other than the trial court's conclusory allegations of fraudulent misconduct; see part III of this opinion; to suggest that Foley was not independent. The fact that Foley's colleague, Kristen Friezo, was the defendant's sister-in-law is insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that Foley was not independent from the defendant within the meaning of ง 46b-36g (a)(4). Rule 1.8(i) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides that [a] lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship. Moreover, the commentary to rule 1.8(i) expressly provides that the disqualification identified therein is personal and is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(i), commentary. Thus, under our rules governing the conduct of attorneys, Foley was not barred from representing the plaintiff. Moreover, even if he were prohibited from representing her, the trial court failed to explain why the waiver that the plaintiff signed was ineffective, and the record is devoid of facts to support a finding that the plaintiff's waiver, even if necessary, was invalid. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court's decision to invalidate the parties' prenuptial agreement under ง 46b-36g (a)(3) and (4) cannot stand, and that the agreement must be enforced and the assets distributed according to its terms. [29] The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.