Opinion ID: 2023046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Testimony of Counsel.

Text: Roeder asserts that the testimony of her counsel should not have been allowed at the hearing on her motion to withdraw her pleas because such testimony breached the lawyer-client privilege embodied in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-503 (Reissue 1995). Roeder recognizes that § 27-503(4)(c) excepts from the lawyer-client privilege a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his client or by the client to his lawyer, but argues that she did not allege a breach of duty by counsel and therefore any communications between her and her lawyer were within the scope of the lawyer-client privilege. In response, the State argues, inter alia, that although Roeder did not per se allege a breach of duty by counsel, she waived lawyer-client privilege by putting into issue communications she had had with her counsel. We agree with the State. In her motion to withdraw pleas, Roeder asserted that withdrawal would be fair and just because at the time she entered her pleas, she felt she was left with no alternative but to accept the plea and that therefore she was coerced into accepting the plea and subjected to duress because of the same. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw pleas, Roeder testified that counsel told her that if she did not accept the plea agreement offered by the State, she would be held in jail with no bond until trial because of her failure to timely appear. Roeder's testimony at the hearing made clear that the allegations of coercion and duress she asserted to justify withdrawal of her pleas were in material part the result of communications by counsel. By alleging such basis for withdrawal, Roeder made such communications an issue in the hearings, thus impliedly waiving the lawyer-client privilege as to these communications. In League v. Vanice, 221 Neb. 34, 374 N.W.2d 849 (1985), we found no error by the trial court in admitting into evidence certain communications between the plaintiff and his attorney. League involved a suit by a minority shareholder against a corporate president alleging that the president had breached a duty to the plaintiff with respect to various corporate transactions. To avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the president had concealed certain facts, thus putting the plaintiff's knowledge of such facts in issue. Over objection, the plaintiff's attorney was permitted to testify regarding conversations he had had with the plaintiff regarding the allegedly concealed facts. We stated in League that a party is not permitted to thrust his lack of knowledge into the litigation as a foundation or condition necessary to sustain his claim ... while simultaneously retaining the lawyer-client privilege to frustrate proof of knowledge negating the very foundation or condition necessary to prevail on the claim. 221 Neb. at 45, 374 N.W.2d at 856. In League, this court addressed the issue whether a party had waived the lawyer-client privilege by placing communications between lawyer and client into issue and noted, Fairness is an important and fundamental consideration in assessing the issue of whether there has been a waiver of the lawyer-client privilege. 221 Neb. at 44, 374 N.W.2d at 856. We further noted that in cases where an exception to the privilege existed, `in each instance, the party asserting the privilege placed information protected by it in issue through some affirmative act for his own benefit, and to allow the privilege to protect against disclosure of such information would have been manifestly unfair to the opposing party. The factors common to each exception may be summarized as follows: (1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to his defense. Thus, where these three conditions exist, a court should find that the party asserting a privilege has impliedly waived it through his own affirmative conduct.' Id. (quoting Connell v. Bernstein-Macaulay, Inc., 407 F.Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y.1976), citing and quoting Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D.Wash.1975)). Similarly, in the present case, Roeder impliedly waived the lawyer-client privilege as to relevant communications when she affirmatively made such communications a crucial issue to the resolution of her motion. Analyzing the present case in light of the three factors outlined in League, supra, we note that (1) Roeder's assertion of the privilege was the result of her affirmative act of filing the motion to withdraw her pleas; (2) by filing the motion to withdraw her pleas, Roeder put at issue communications between herself and counsel which were relevant to the basis she alleged to support her motion to withdraw the pleas; and (3) the application of the lawyer-client privilege would have denied the State access to information vital to its opposition to Roeder's motion to withdraw pleas. As is evident from the record on the motion to withdraw the pleas, Roeder claimed that she should be allowed to withdraw her pleas because at the time she entered the pleas, she felt coercion and duress as a result of what counsel had told her regarding what would happen if she did not accept the plea agreement. Roeder put the communications with counsel regarding the plea agreement and their impact upon her at issue, and the State would have been denied access to information vital to that issue if it had not been allowed to question counsel as to such communications and counsel's perceptions of Roeder's reactions. Roeder therefore impliedly waived the lawyer-client privilege as to the communications relative to entry of her guilty pleas. Our review of the record of the hearing indicates that the substance of the testimony of counsel which the district court allowed into evidence did not go beyond that which was relevant to the issues raised by Roeder. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in allowing Roeder's counsel to testify at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas, and we reject Roeder's first assignment of error.