Opinion ID: 2469544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: DNA Matching and Probability testimony.

Text: Prior to trial, the State advised the appellant that it intended to introduce test results conducted by the FBI laboratory which indicated a match in the DNA of semen found in the victim and the DNA of the blood drawn from the appellant. The State further announced plans to introduce, by population frequency statistics, the likelihood of the match being someone other than the appellant. Amending his motion to suppress, appellant requested a preliminary hearing to determine whether the results of any DNA testing was admissible pursuant to the requirements of Prater v. State, 307 Ark. 180, 820 S.W.2d 429 (1991). The trial court determined that the preliminary hearing was not necessary and took judicial notice of the reliability of DNA profiling. The order denying the preliminary hearing provided in pertinent part: Since the filing of the motion and the request for a hearing, the court and the parties have reviewed current decisions regarding the DNA issue including, but not limited to U.S. v. Martinez , [3] F.3d [1191] 62 USLW 2199, (8th Circuit September 2, 1993), U.S. v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Circuit), Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786,] 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (June 28, 1993). The Court has also reviewed a twenty-one page affidavit with exhibits attached of Audrey Grace Lynch. Supervisory Special Agent, DNA Analysis Unit II, FBI, who conducted the forensic analysis of the DNA evidence involved in this cause. The affidavit indicates how the laboratory work was done and what analysis and assumptions underlie the probability calculations. The defendant, through his attorney, has advised the Court that his DNA expert witnesses have reviewed the laboratory notes of the FBI and if asked, would testify that the laboratory protocol was appropriate. The Court is aware that Prater v. State infra directed that a preliminary hearing or inquiry be conducted when novel scientific evidence coupled with evidence of mathematical probabilities is offered. The evidence offered is no longer new or unusual, there having been over 50 appellate court decisions which support the admissibility of forensic DNA-RFLP profiling. DNA Evidence and Massachusetts, Crime Laboratory Digest, Vol. 19, No. 3 July, 1993. Based on the above, the Court concludes that the DNA profiling was derived from the application of reliable methodology or principle and that according to the affidavit of the affiant finds she properly performed protocol involved in DNA profiling. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that no preliminary hearing is necessary. The Court therefore takes judicial notice of the general theory and reliability as well as the techniques of DNA profiling. Based upon the affidavit of Audrey Grace Lynch and the statement of defendant's counsel that he has no evidence attacking the methodology of the FBI laboratory procedures, the Court further finds that the proposed testimony by the FBI witnesses is relevant and will be admitted. This court adopted in Prater a relevancy standard in determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. The relevancy approach requires: that the trial court conduct a preliminary inquiry which must focus on (1) the reliability of the novel process used to generate the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would overwhelm, confuse or mislead the jury, and (3) the connection between the novel process evidence to be offered and the disputed factual issues in the particular case. Id. at 186, 820 S.W.2d 429. Under this relevancy approach, reliability is the critical element. However, as the trial court correctly noted, since we decided Prater in 1991, there have been significant developments regarding the admissibility of DNA profiling; a number of appellate courts have recognized the reliability of this process, and no longer consider it novel scientific evidence. Two of the cases relied upon by the trial court, U.S. v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2nd Cir.1992), and U.S. v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir.1993), warrant our consideration. Both hold that trial courts may take judicial notice of the reliability of DNA profiling. In Jakobetz , the court undertook an exhaustive analysis and discussion of the scientific background of DNA profiling and the legal standard of admissibility for novel scientific evidence, before concluding that the general theories of genetics which support DNA profiling are unanimously accepted in the scientific community and that the specific techniques used by the FBI laboratory in DNA analysis are commonly used by scientists in microbiology and genetics research. In Martinez, supra , the court relied heavily on the Jakobetz decision, stating, We conclude that the Second Circuit's conclusions as to the reliability of the general theories and techniques of DNA profiling are valid under the Supreme Court's holding in Daubert , and hold that future courts can take judicial notice of their reliability. However, the Martinez court further stated that its holding does not mean that expert testimony concerning DNA profiling would be automatically admissible without preliminary inquiry to determine if the expert properly performed a reliable methodology in arriving at his opinion, and further provided that the testifying expert should be required to submit affidavits attesting that he properly performed the protocols involved in DNA profiling. Since Prater , we have on three occasions considered whether a scientific procedure should be considered novel scientific evidence, thus warranting a preliminary hearing or inquiry. We determined that the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test used to determine the presence of alcohol by observing the involuntary jerking of the eyeball, is not novel scientific evidence. Whitson v. State, 314 Ark. 458, 863 S.W.2d 794 (1993). We reached the same conclusion with regard to human bite mark identification. Verdict v. State, 315 Ark. 436, 868 S.W.2d 443 (1993). However, we held that luminol testing for the presence of blood is novel evidence of that requires a preliminary hearing to determine admissibility. Houston v. State, 321 Ark. 598, 906 S.W.2d 286 (1995). In light of the developments in the treatment of DNA evidence, we believe that we should revisit our now four-year-old holding in Prater , that DNA profiling is novel scientific evidence. We first observe that in Prater , we rejected the majority approach for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence as set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). The Frye standard relies solely on the general acceptance of this theory upon which the evidence is based in the relevant scientific community. We instead adopted the more liberal standard of admissibility, based upon the relevancy approach of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, in particular Rules 401, 402 and 702. In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), held that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the Frye test and that the admissibility of expert opinion testimony concerning novel scientific evidence would no longer be limited solely to knowledge or evidence generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. The Court stated that, under the Rules of Evidence, the trial court must ensure that scientific evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. Daubert, supra . Although Jakobetz was decided prior to Daubert , both courts adopted a reliability approach to Rule 702, comparable to the relevancy approach of Prater in which reliability is the critical element. It remains for us to determine whether the trial judge was correct in his findings that DNA profiling is no longer novel scientific evidence requiring a preliminary inquiry to determine its reliability. We agree with his findings and hold that DNA profiling evidence should no longer be viewed as novel scientific evidence requiring a preliminary inquiry beyond the showing that the expert properly performed a reliable methodology in creating the DNA profiles. The trial court conducted this inquiry in the instant case. Indeed, the trial court noted that the appellant's experts conceded that the laboratory protocol employed by the FBI expert was appropriate, in determining that the evidence was relevant and would be admitted at trial. The trial court also correctly determined that any challenge to the conclusions reached by the state's expert, including the statistical probability of whether the test results constituted a match, would appropriately be made at trial, by cross-examination of the state's experts and presentation by the defendant of his own experts to express differing opinions about the results of the FBI tests and statistical probability of a match. We note that at trial, appellant's counsel conducted an extensive cross examination of the FBI agent who performed the DNA profiling and the two other prosecution experts who confirmed the DNA matched that of the appellant. During the cross examination of the FBI agent, the following testimony was brought forth: [Defense Counsel] Q. and the DNA in the semen that came from Mrs. Cannon, when you compare them or look at them, and you say it is a match, you are not saying absolutely that that is Oscar Moore's semen that was found in Mrs. Cannon, are you? A. Correct. I am not saying absolutely. Q. And you can't say that and be telling the truth, can you? A. No. Again, I cannot individualize to the point to say that it came absolutely from one person. . . . . . Q. [Y]ou are not saying that these results established absolutely that the DNA found in the semen in the victim is the DNA of Oscar Moore? You're not saying that at all, are you? A. I am not saying that absolutely without any question. That's correct. . . . . . Q. ... it's either [appellant's], or it's somebody who has a DNA profile similar to him? That is your opinion, is it not? A. That is correct. In addition, appellant presented two experts who disputed the testimony of the prosecution experts and testified that the probability of a match with appellant's DNA was actually 1 in 2662 and 1 in 355, as opposed to 1 in 500,000, as concluded by the FBI agent. Appellant was thus able to challenge the reliability of the DNA evidence by cross examination and with his own experts at trial.