Opinion ID: 3032771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bad Faith Representation

Text: Medical Protective contests the finding of liability, contending the jury’s verdict could have been based on a finding of bad faith in the representation of Dr. Marcincin and not on a finding of bad faith failure to settle. See Carden v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 850 19 F.2d 996, 1000–06 (3d Cir. 1988) (requiring support for both grounds when a jury verdict could be based on either of two theories). Medical Protective objects to the bad faith representation ground by way of three challenges to the relevancy of expert Griffith’s testimony about the conflict of interest: First, it argues an attorney conflict of interest cannot support a claim under the Pennsylvania bad faith statute, and accordingly, the expert testimony about the conflict of interest is irrelevant. Second, it contends no causal connection exists between the conflict of interest and harm to Dr. Marcincin. Finally, it asserts no evidence attributed Kilcoyne’s conduct to the insurer. Although Medical Protective contested the relevancy of Griffith’s testimony in limine, its arguments have changed during the course of the litigation, and we address whether they were properly preserved. A party failing to raise issues at trial cannot complain about them after trial. Wilson v. Vt. Castings, Inc., 170 F.3d 391, 395 (3d Cir. 1999); Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 571–72 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 cmt. (2006) (“[T]he Rule 50(b) motion . . . can be granted only on grounds advanced in the preverdict motion); Carden, 850 F.2d at 1001 n.5 (noting an objection at trial, preserving the issue for appeal). This requirement “ensure[s] that both parties are aware of and can raise dispositive issues earlier in the proceeding rather than later, so that the district court can resolve these issues correctly and without delay.” Runyon, 130 F.3d at 572. Exceptions to this rule exist only to protect against “fundamental and highly prejudicial error resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” Wilson, 170 F.3d at 395–96 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Medical Protective’s motions before and during the trial did not raise the first11 or second12 of the arguments it presses on appeal. Medical Protective did raise the third argument, but the District Court resolved it correctly: Alff’s trial testimony provided evidence from which the jury could find the insurer knew of and endorsed the conflict. It may be disputed whether an attorney conflict of interest can support a claim against an insurer under § 8371 — either as a matter of law or as a matter of fact in particular cases — but the parties proceeded through trial assuming § 8371 provides a cause of action for the conduct at issue here. Because Medical Protective did not contest these issues in the District Court, we will not second guess the jury’s verdict on these grounds. To do so would deprive Plaintiffs of timely, fair notice of the challenges to their case, and it could require the expenditure of judicial resources that might have been avoided by the presentation of additional evidence at trial, for example, or the use of a 11 Whatever its intent, Medical Protective did not raise the validity of § 8371 claims based on attorney conflicts of interest with sufficient specificity: the District Court only recognized an argument concerning relevancy conditioned on fact, not an argument contesting the cognizability of the claim. Medical Protective could have raised the issue again in its motion for judgment as a matter of law, but in that motion, it contested only the sufficiency of the evidence for bad faith, and only for bad faith failure to tender policy limits, not bad faith representation. 12 Both the motion in limine and the argument on appeal objected to Griffith’s testimony, contending its relevancy was conditioned on facts not established. The motion in limine, however, only purported to identify a lack of evidence establishing the insurer’s knowledge or endorsement of the conflict of interest, not the lack of an evidentiary basis establishing a causal connection between the conflict and harm to Dr. Marcincin. This distinction is significant because evidence attributing knowledge of the conflict to the insurer would differ from evidence establishing any harm the conflict caused. 21 special verdict form. See Runyon, 130 F.3d at 571–72. Moreover, we do not believe the waiver results in a miscarriage of justice. Because Alff’s testimony established the factual condition to which Medical Protective objected — the knowledge and endorsement of the insurer — and because no other objections were properly raised, Griffith’s testimony about the conflict of interest was relevant to the bad faith claim, as it was litigated, against Medical Protective. Accordingly, we will affirm the jury’s finding of bad faith.