Opinion ID: 1506719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suicides

Text: We consider the certified question upon the facts of this case, a suicide, that was characterized as constituting both contributory negligence and assumption of risk. [6] Keeping in mind the principles underlying the two doctrines, we turn to consider whether, under District of Columbia law, Ms. Johnson's suicidal intent constituted assumption of risk that barred recovery for WMATA's negligence or whether WMATA may be held liable under the doctrine of last clear chance for its failure to avoid the fatal consequences of Ms. Johnson's suicide. Our answer was anticipated by Judge Mikva in Johnson I, when he concluded that, without any indication to the contrary, he was unprepared to assume that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals would carve out a suicide exception from its long-established last clear chance doctrine. Johnson I, supra note 3, 280 U.S.App. D.C. at 59, 883 F.2d at 131. We confirm that District of Columbia law does not except suicides from the last clear chance doctrine. We come to this conclusion from two perspectives. First, as the court in Johnson I noted, there is no case law in the District of Columbia which supports a suicide exception to the last clear chance doctrine, and the D.C. courts [have not] given any indication that such an exception would be found if a case properly presented the issue. Id. at 58, 883 F.2d at 130. No case law creating a suicide exception has been cited to us by the parties. We believe that Johnson I correctly interpreted our jurisprudence and we do not choose to pursue a different course. The closest case on the facts to the present one is Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1 (D.C.1988), a wrongful death and survival action, where the plaintiffs claimed that the District had the last clear chance to save the decedent, who had hanged himself in jail. The plaintiffs alleged that the District had negligently failed to properly administer life-saving techniques and failed to have the necessary equipment. Id. at 5. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs finding that the District had the last clear chance to prevent the injury, but found for the District on the defense theories of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Id. The trial court granted the District's motion for judgment as matter of law finding, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a jury finding that the District had the last clear chance to prevent the injury or that the District's actions violated a standard of care. Id. This court affirmed, concluding that there was no showing that the District's actions violated the applicable standard of care, id. at 9, but did not address the legal issue presented in this case, whether the last clear chance doctrine applies to suicides. Id. at 2 n. 2. We now decide what was not addressed in Toy: there is no suicide exception to the District of Columbia's long-established last clear chance doctrine. Second, we are unprepared to hold that a person intending suicide, as a matter of law, always assumes the risk of death, as that defense has developed in the law to bar recovery for negligent acts. The requirements of knowledge and voluntariness, implying reasonable decision-making, that undergird the waiver and consent principles of assumption of risk do not comfortably fit a suicide, particularly on the facts of this case. Here, Ms. Johnson, the mother of a young child, chose a public venue for a most violent death. Evidence presented at trial in this case showed that Ms. Johnson had a history of serious mental illness, including seven hospitalizations. Johnson I, supra note 3, 280 U.S.App.D.C. at 55, 883 F.2d at 127. The trial court's jury instructions conflating the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk suggest that the trial court considered that in cases in which the defendant may assert that the plaintiff's actions were negligent  in other words, that he was unreasonable in encountering a known risk or a risk of which he should have been aware  the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are often used interchangeably. [7] Sinai, supra, 498 A.2d at 525 (footnote omitted). We are unpersuaded by the argument that our holding today will provide an incentive for individuals to commit suicide in the hope that their estates will benefit. That policy argument is purely speculative. No study or judicial finding has been offered in support of the proposition that suicides will be encouraged if the last clear chance doctrine is available in cases involving suicides. There is nothing in the record of the case before us indicating that Ms. Johnson sought death in order to benefit her estate. Before changing established doctrine on policy grounds, we require persuasive evidence in support of the proffered policy argument. Moreover, we believe that the burden of proving the four factors necessary to prevail under the last clear chance doctrine already provides a significant barrier to recovery. See Felton, supra, 512 A.2d at 296; Huysman, supra, 650 A.2d at 1326. [8] Therefore, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a person intending to commit suicide coolly evaluates the attendant risks and benefits, the difficulty of meeting the existing burdens already creates a legal disincentive for an individual who is disposed to commit suicide to do so for the purpose of securing financial gain for his or her estate. We believe that application of the doctrine of last clear chance to the facts before us on this certified question squares with the objective of negligence law, that one whose act unintentionally causes injury to another is generally liable to compensate the other only if the act was not reasonable under the circumstances  that is, only if the act created a foreseeable risk that could have been mitigated at a cost not disproportionate in light of the gravity and probability of the foreseeable harm. Ray v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 696 A.2d 399, 407-08 (D.C.1997). Whether or not a person intends suicide  a fact that may well be unknown to anyone other than the suicidal person at the time of the incident  should not, consistent with the principles underlying the law of negligence, excuse a person who acts unreasonably under the circumstances particularly where, as here, there was virtual certainty that the foreseeable harm would be death. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.1928) (The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed....). Therefore, it is precisely because the result of suicide is death, that we do not carve out a suicide exception to a doctrine that preserves the incentive for the last actor who has an opportunity to act to prevent the death to do so. The primary focus in applying the last clear chance doctrine is on the actions of the defendant, not the intent of the injured person, and turns on a determination whether the defendant acted reasonably under the circumstances to prevent injury to a person who has placed himself or herself in harm's way. Our holding herein means that the law does not avert that focus in the case of suicides. So ordered.