Opinion ID: 3055077
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hector Cornillot’s testimony

Text: 2 Although the district court initially expressed skepticism that Joerg’s intended testimony was relevant, the court ultimately excluded the evidence on the ground that Joerg was not the proper witness to testify to the criminal history of a person who “is not here, that we don’t know about.” Thus, Perez’s argument that the testimony was indeed relevant is immaterial. 7 Case: 12-12094 Date Filed: 06/25/2013 Page: 8 of 11 Perez also argues the district court erred in excluding testimony from desk clerk Hector Cornillot about the potential bias of RogerArteaga. During Perez’s case-in-chief, counsel sought to ask Cornillot whether he knew of “a situation” between Perez and Arteaga. The court interrupted and asked whether Cornillot’s answer would involve hearsay. Counsel explained that Cornillot knew Perez “caught Mr. Arteaga stealing and confronted him,” and indicated the testimony would undermine the credibility of Arteaga’s testimony. The court excluded the testimony as hearsay and as barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b). Perez contends the admissibility of evidence regarding witness bias is not subject to Rule 608 and is limited only by Rule 402’s relevance requirement and Rule 403’s unfair-prejudice test. According to Perez, the testimony satisfies these two requirements. Even assuming, however, that the district court erred in excluding Cornillot’s testimony, any error was harmless. As we explain below, the government presented sufficient evidence to convict Perez even in the absence of Arteaga’s testimony. See Gamory, 635 F.3d at 492.3 D. 3 Although we “review the record de novo when conducting a harmless error analysis, unlike our review of sufficiency of the evidence challenges, in which we view witness credibility in the light most favorable to the government,” United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1224 (11th Cir. 2005), that distinction in the standard is immaterial to the outcome here because adequate evidence supported Perez’s conviction absent Arteaga’s testimony under either standard. 8 Case: 12-12094 Date Filed: 06/25/2013 Page: 9 of 11 Finally, Perez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him on Counts 2 and 3. 4 We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on sufficiency grounds, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and resolving all reasonable inferences and credibility evaluations in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211, 1219 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1723-24 (2013); see also United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). To sustain a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (Count 2), the government must establish “(1) knowledge (of one’s possession); (2) possession of a controlled substance; and (3) intent to distribute that substance.” United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “All three elements can be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (11th Cir. 1989). At trial, Perez disputed all three elements. On appeal, however, he disputes only the third. That is, he concedes he knowingly possessed the cocaine but argues the amount he possessed was too small to evidence his intent to distribute. But the cases Perez cites are distinguishable from his because, in those cases, the amount of drugs was the only evidence of the defendants’ intent to distribute them. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1970) 4 He does not dispute the sufficiency of evidence against him on Count 1. 9 Case: 12-12094 Date Filed: 06/25/2013 Page: 10 of 11 (doubting whether the jury would “automatically and unequivocally know” the defendant “was distributing cocaine simply from the fact that he had” 14.68 grams (emphasis added)). Here, additional circumstantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Perez had intent to distribute. The cocaine was separated into 10 small baggies with a specific logo on them, which Detective Gonzalez testified was consistent with distribution rather than personal use. And, on several occasions on November 9 and 16, Gonzalez saw Perez leave Room 306, where the cocaine was located, before returning to the front desk. This too permitted the jury to infer Perez was selling the drugs he kept in that room. 5 The evidence was sufficient to sustain Perez’s conviction on Count 2. Perez’s challenge of his Count 3 conviction – for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense – hinges on the sufficiency of evidence with respect to Count 2. He argues the government presented insufficient evidence of a drug-trafficking offense, but he does not contest his firearm possession. Because, as we discussed above, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict on Count 2, sufficient evidence also necessarily supports the jury’s finding on Count 3 that Perez engaged in drug-trafficking. 5 Perez also argues that, because the government presented insufficient evidence on Count 2, the jury must have improperly relied on Perez’s prior convictions to find the requisite intent to distribute. But the district court gave a limiting instruction to the jury regarding this evidence, and we presume a jury followed instructions the district court provided. United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1145 (11th Cir. 1997). Because we conclude the government did in fact present sufficient evidence, and without anything evidencing the jury’s confusion, we cannot agree with Perez’s contention that the jury necessarily improperly considered his prior convictions. 10 Case: 12-12094 Date Filed: 06/25/2013 Page: 11 of 11