Opinion ID: 2181505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DCHRA Claim

Text: Ms. Chang alleges that she was terminated from her job because her employer regarded her as having a disability. [9] The trial court granted summary judgment on her disability discrimination claim because it found that Ms. Chang had presented no evidence to suggest that her employer regarded her as having a disability. The trial court credited the defendants' testimony that they did not know about Ms. Chang's diagnosis at the time they made the decision to terminate her, and as a result, found that defendants could not have fired her because they regarded her as disabled. On appeal, Ms. Chang contends that the trial court improperly resolved this genuine issue of material fact in favor of the defendants, in spite of her circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive. Because we find, however, that Ms. Chang's circumstantial evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on a perceived disability, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The DCHRA makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to discharge an employee wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon [a]. . . disability. . . . D.C.Code § 1-2512(a) (1999), recodified at D.C.Code § 2-1402.11(a) (2001). The DCHRA then defines disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual having a record of such an impairment or being regarded as having such an impairment.  D.C.Code § 1-2502(5A) (1999), recodified at D.C.Code § 2-1401.02(5A) (2001) (emphasis added). Because the DCHRA definition of disability closely resembles the definition of disability found in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000), [w]e have considered decisions construing the ADA as persuasive in our decisions construing comparable sections of [the] DCHRA. Grant, 786 A.2d at 583-84; see also Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 45 (D.C.1994); Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 367-68 (D.C. 1993). Similar to an ADA wrongful discharge case, Ms. Chang needed to establish four elements to make out a prima facie case of wrongful termination on the basis of a perceived disability: (1) that she was regarded as having a disability as defined in the DCHRA; (2) that she was discharged; (3) that at the time of her discharge, she was performing her job at a level that met her employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) that the discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. See Haulbrook v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 696, 702 (4th Cir.2001); see also Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1997). We address first  and dispositively  whether Ms. Chang has made a sufficient showing that IP3 regarded her as disabled. The Supreme Court has held that a person is `regarded as' disabled within the meaning of the ADA if a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (referring to its holding in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999)). Major life activities include functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. Grant, 786 A.2d at 584 (citing Croley v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 759 A.2d 682, 700 n. 18 (D.C.2000)) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Ms. Chang appears to argue that she was regarded as disabled because IP3 believed that her hypertension substantially limited her ability to work. Specifically, Ms. Chang has alleged that IP3 was aware of [her] condition, presumed that she was damaged goods and would not be able to return fully to work, and then fired her based on that presumption and perception. Initially, we note that even if IP3 knew that Ms. Chang had hypertension when it fired her, the mere fact that an employer is aware of an employee's impairment is insufficient to demonstrate either that the employer regarded the employee as disabled or that that perception caused the adverse employment action. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir.1996). To say otherwise would effectively forbid an employer from taking any adverse employment action against a person it knew to be a member of a protected class, regardless of whether that employer had a legitimate reason for taking action against the employee. See id. In order to prevail, Ms. Chang must show that IP3 believed her to be `significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.' Murphy, 527 U.S. at 523, 119 S.Ct. 2133 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630(j)(3)(i) (1998)); see also Grant, 786 A.2d at 584. Although Ms. Chang suggests that the timing of her termination  just days after she told her employer that she had been diagnosed with hypertension  gives rise to an inference that her employer regarded her as disabled, a jury would have to engage in pure speculation to conclude, on these facts, that IP3 believed she was unable to perform a class of jobs. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 525, 119 S.Ct. 2133 (although petitioner was fired specifically because he had hypertension, he was unable to show that his employer regarded him as limited in the major life activity of working). Because Ms. Chang cannot show that IP3 regarded her as disabled, we need not address the other three elements of her prima facie case.