Opinion ID: 703958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: deposition of defense counsel

Text: 19 The lower court issued a protective order prohibiting the plaintiffs from taking the deposition of Edward McGrath, outside counsel representing the defendants in this matter. The plaintiffs appeal that decision. The decision of a trial judge to enter a protective order under Rule 26(c) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Florida v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 669 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir.1982). 20 The plaintiffs argue that Mr. McGrath should have been deposed because of his role as spokesperson for Cotter Corporation before regulatory agencies and the press and because of his involvement in helping Cotter prepare its various license applications and giving business advice to Cotter on the location of a new mill on the site of the old one. The plaintiffs in their motion for leave to take McGrath's deposition gave four areas of inquiry for which the deposition was sought:(1) [T]he decision to construct a new uranium mill in the mid-1970's; 21 (2) the construction and licensing of the new mill in the 1975-1979 time frame; 22 (3) Cotter's environmental program during that same period; and 23 (4) the basis of the statements Mr. McGrath made to the public, the media, and various governmental agencies with regard to the construction, licensing, operation and environmental impact of the new mill. 24 Aplt.App. 707. 25 Notwithstanding plaintiffs' claims that McGrath had other roles, the lower court treated McGrath as an attorney for Cotter subject to the protection of Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.1986). The record supported the lower court's treatment of McGrath's status. David P. Marcott, who was executive vice president and general manager of Cotter from February 1956 until February 1980, said, Mr. McGrath operated solely as an attorney. He made no operating decisions. 5 George Rifakes, the president of Cotter after May of 1974, said, Mr. McGrath was working as a lawyer, intermediary. He was not authorized to make commitments on behalf of the company without prior approval from management. He was a spokesperson like most lawyers are. 6 26 Both sides cite the rule of Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327 (8th Cir.1986). 7 The Shelton court held that depositions of opposing counsel should be limited to where the party seeking to take the deposition has shown that: (1) no other means exist to obtain the information than to depose opposing counsel; (2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the case. 8 The court gave the following as reasons for its decision to restrict the circumstances under which opposing counsel may be deposed: 27 Taking the deposition of opposing counsel not only disrupts the adversarial system and lowers the standards of the profession, but it also adds to the already burdensome time and costs of litigation. It is not hard to imagine additional pretrial delays to resolve work-product and attorney-client objections, as well as delays to resolve collateral issues raised by the attorney's testimony. Finally, the practice of deposing counsel detracts from the quality of client representation. Counsel should be free to devote his or her time and efforts to preparing the client's case without fear of being interrogated by his or her opponent. 28 Id., at 1327. 29 FED.R.CIV.P. Sec. 26(c) provides that a court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including ... that the disclosure or discovery not be had. Rule 26(c) is broader in scope than the attorney work product rule, attorney-client privilege and other evidentiary privileges because it is designed to prevent discovery from causing annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden or expense not just to protect confidential communications. Accordingly, in the context of this case, the critical issue is not whether the plaintiffs sought privileged information or how such a privilege should be asserted, the question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in attempting to protect the defendants from an unnecessary burden. Viewed in this light we approve of the criteria set forth in Shelton v. American Motors, supra, but at this time we need only make the more limited holding that ordinarily the trial court at least has the discretion under Rule 26(c) to issue a protective order against the deposition of opposing counsel when any one or more of the three Shelton criteria for deposition listed above are not met. 9 30 The defendants have argued that the Shelton criteria were not met in this case because the plaintiffs failed to seek the information they desired from other sources. The plaintiffs argue in response that they should not be required to question many witnesses who may not possess the necessary information and that, in any event, no one other than the lawyer himself can explain what he meant by what he said. 31 The record indicates, however, that the plaintiffs did not even fully explore those matters upon which they wished to inquire of defendant's counsel with the witnesses they did depose. 10 It is certainly not too much to expect the plaintiffs to make a reasonable effort to seek information from the sources they chose to pursue. The only information for which Mr. McGrath was likely to be the exclusive source is McGrath's own reasons for making certain statements as a spokesperson for Cotter. Nevertheless, even this is not clear because it is possible that the testimony of some of the officers and directors regarding statements McGrath made to them in private might have a bearing on McGrath's state of mind and be admissible evidence under the state of mind or admissions exceptions to the rule against hearsay. 11 In any event, the plaintiffs have not established that inquiry into these matters was crucial to their case. 32 The plaintiffs argue that McGrath's testimony was essential to their claims for punitive damages. Even assuming that proof of a fraud by McGrath acting as an agent is relevant to punitive damages claims against the principal corporation in what the plaintiffs have characterized as a nuisance/trespass case, in order to demonstrate that McGrath's state of mind was crucial to their case the plaintiffs would first have to establish as many other elements of the fraud as possible, including the nature of the statements made, through alternative sources. The failure of the plaintiffs to make a substantial effort to establish as many elements of the alleged wrongs as was possible through alternative sources before seeking the testimony of defendants' counsel not only undermines the argument that all the information sought from him was exclusively within his possession, it also undermines the argument that the particular information (if there was any) that was exclusively within his possession would be proof of a crucial link or corroborative of a weak link in a chain of proven elements to establish punitive damages. Inquiry could at least have been directed to the officers and directors first; knowledge or fraudulent intent on their part would be more directly probative of the corporation's liability for punitive damages and during their questioning they could also have been asked about any nonprivileged statements McGrath may have made regarding his intentions and knowledge. Only after such questioning would the district court have been fully able to assess whether McGrath's deposition was crucial to their case. Accordingly, we affirm the decision to grant the protective order. 12 33