Opinion ID: 1670189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Predicate

Text: There is a further problem with the admission of Dr. Galvez' exposition on necrophilia. It lacks the required evidentiary predicate connecting it to West's behavior at issue. Dr. Galvez gave a free floating lecture on necrophilia from its very mild form to the most severe. Neither he nor any other prosecution witness offered an opinion that Othie Lee West was suffering from necrophilia on June 5, 1983, nor did the prosecution in any other way tell the jury that the psychosexual disorder Dr. Galvez' labeled necrophilia explained West's behavior on that day, except to say that in the most severe form of necrophilia the disturbed person wants to maintain total control of his victim, that killing the victim is the ultimate form of control and that Brim had been totally incapacitated by her assailant (in response to a rather suggestive question from the prosecution, i.e., whether after that gunshot wound was inflicted to Mary Ann Brim's body whether or not she was totally incapacitated, Dr. Galvez stated, Yes, she was.) In a variety of contexts our law has long required that before it becomes admissible the opinion of an expert witness must be stated with reasonable certainty, given the state of knowledge in the field in which the expert is qualified. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 786 (Miss. 1987); Stratton v. Webb, 513 So.2d 587, 590 (Miss. 1987); Pittman v. Hodges, 462 So.2d 330, 333-34 (Miss. 1984); Magnolia Hospital v. Moore, 320 So.2d 793, 799 (Miss. 1975). Where the insanity defense is raised, psychiatrists and psychologists are held as well to the reasonable certainty standard before their opinions may be admitted. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 361 So.2d 333, 336 (Miss. 1978); Baker v. State, 327 So.2d 288, 294-95 (Miss. 1976). Conversely, our law has precluded expert opinions which are indefinite or are expressed in terms of mere possibilities. Scott County Co-op v. Brown, 187 So.2d 321, 325-26 (Miss. 1966); General Benevolent Assoc. v. Fowler, 210 Miss. 578, 589, 50 So.2d 137, 142 (1951). The Mississippi Rules of Evidence effective January 1, 1986, have enlarged upon these views but retained their essentials. Where a party offers expert opinion testimony, the case as a whole  as distinguished from that of each individual expert witness who testifies  must satisfy the predicate and reasonable probability standards. Rule 702 provides, if an expert's opinion is otherwise admissible, the witness may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Explaining the phrase or otherwise, the Official Comment says Rule 702 permits an expert to testify by giving an opinion or any other form of testimony, such as an exposition. That Dr. Galvez' testimony was expository in nature affords no per se objection to admissibility. But nothing in Rule 702 relieved the prosecution of its obligation, if it wished to pursue a necrophilia theory, to provide a competent evidentiary predicate that West suffered from necrophilia reasonably explaining and, more important, producing the behavior for which he has been charged. The common form of such a predicate would be testimony from an expert that he had examined, tested, and obtained a history from or regarding West. A more cumbersome form, of course, is a hypothetical question incorporating the essential facts otherwise in evidence. See Rule 703, Miss.R.Ev. The point is that, while Rule 702 may have relieved Dr. Galvez of the duty to supply this predicate, the prosecution was obligated somehow to supply it, probably through another expert. The Rules afford a measure of flexibility regarding the order of such proof. See Rules 104(b) and 611(a), Miss.R.Ev. Our law commanded in the end that the prosecution's aggregate expert presentation establish, both a Rule 703 predicate and a Rule 702 opinion stated with reasonable certainty, given the state of knowledge in the field, that West's necrophilia explained his behavior on the evening of June 5, 1983. By these standards the prosecution's necrophilia presentation was woefully inadequate. The admissibility of testimony legally analogous to that before us today was considered by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Clements, 770 P.2d 447 (Kan. 1989). There the prosecution had, over defense objection, introduced extensive expert testimony with respect to the psychology of the child sexual abuser. The psychiatric testimony related to the psychosexual disorder termed pedophilia and was presented in an objective and abstract manner. 770 P.2d at 451-52. On appeal the state contended that the testimony was properly admitted to assist the jury in understanding the nature of child sexual abuse generally (a matter allegedly outside the ken of the average juror) and that it was not presented in a manner which directly reflected upon the guilt of the accused. In reversing, the court held: that (1) evidence which only describes the characteristics of the typical offender has no relevance to whether the defendant committed the crime in question; and (2) the only inference which can be drawn from such evidence, namely that a defendant who matches the profile must be guilty, is an impermissible one. Clements, 770 P.2d at 454-55. A decision to the same effect relating to a prosecution expert's discussion of the motivations of the typical pedophile is Haakanson v. State, 760 P.2d 1030, 1035-38 (Alaska App. 1988). Generally speaking, evidence is admissible if it goes to the proof or rebuttal of an element of the offense charged, including whether the accused may be guilty of some lesser included offense (only), or some legally recognized defense, justification or excuse. Expert opinion evidence requires scrutiny under the same relevancy rule. To be admissible, however, such testimony must be grounded upon predicates adequate under Rule 703. Expert opinion testimony not tied to the individual whose behavior is at issue and not stated with reasonable certainty flunks the test. The Circuit Court erred when it overruled West's objection to Dr. Galvez' necrophilia testimony. The error is of such proportions that we must reverse. Rule 103(a), Miss.R.Ev.