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Text: As already noted, the Court of Appeals did not rely upon the District Court's imputation of bias. Indeed, it did not even reach the question of juror bias, holding instead that the prosecutors' failure to disclose Smith's application, without more, violated respondent's right to due process of law. Respondent contends that the Court of Appeals thereby correctly preserved "the appearance of justice." Brief for Respondent 7. This contention, too, runs contrary to our decided cases.

Past decisions of this Court demonstrate that the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), for example, the prosecutor failed to disclose an admission by a participant in the murder which corroborated the defendant's version of the crime. The Court held that a prosecutor's suppression of requested evidence "violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id., at 87. Applying this standard, the Court found the undisclosed admission to be relevant to punishment and thus ordered that the defendant be resentenced. Since the admission was not material to guilt, however, the Court concluded that the trial itself complied with the requirements of due process despite the prosecutor's wrongful suppression.[9] The Court thus recognized that the aim of due process "is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Ibid.

This principle was reaffirmed in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). There, we held that a prosecutor must disclose unrequested evidence which would create a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not otherwise exist. Consistent with Brady, we focused not upon the prosecutor's failure to disclose, but upon the effect of nondisclosure on the trial:

"Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation [to disclose unrequested information] is measured by the moral culpability, or willfulness, of the prosecutor. If evidence highly probative of innocence is in his file, he should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked it. Conversely, if evidence actually has no probative significance at all, no purpose would be served by requiring a new trial simply because an inept prosecutor incorrectly believed he was suppressing a fact that would be vital to the defense. If the suppression of the evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor." 427 U.S., at 110 (footnote and citation omitted).[10]
In light of this principle, it is evident that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that prosecutorial misconduct alone requires a new trial. We do not condone the conduct of the prosecutors in this case. Nonetheless, as demonstrated in Part II of this opinion, Smith's conduct did not impair his ability to render an impartial verdict. The trial judge expressly so found. 87 Misc. 2d, at 627, 384 N. Y. S. 2d, at 915.

Therefore, the prosecutors' failure to disclose Smith's job application, although requiring a post-trial hearing on juror bias, did not deprive respondent of the fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.