Opinion ID: 3040425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appointments clause claim

Text: [8] Stanley’s second constitutional claim is similarly without support. Stanley argues that the Attorney General violated the Appointments Clause when he removed her, but her brief provides no legal or factual discussion to support this assertion. In any event, any reliance on the Appointments Clause to challenge Stanley’s removal is misplaced. The Appoint530 STANLEY v. GONZALES ments Clause provides that the President must seek the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint principal officers. United States Const. art. II, § 2; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-71 (1988). Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. United States Const. art. II, § 2. [9] Assuming without deciding that Stanley is an “officer” within the meaning of the Clause, the statute allowing the Attorney General to remove her at his discretion would violate the Appointments Clause only if she were a principal officer. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-71 (noting that only principal officers need be selected by the President and confirmed by the Senate). [10] Stanley nowhere contends that she is a principal officer for the purposes of the Clause. Nor could she. Under Morrison, we examine several factors to determine whether an officer is a principal or an inferior officer. First, we inquire whether the officer is subject to removal by a higher Executive Branch official. Id. at 671. Second, we look at whether the officer is empowered to perform only certain, limited duties. Id. Finally, we look at whether an officer’s duties are limited in jurisdiction. Id. at 672. Generally, if an officer is limited in “tenure, duration, [and] . . . duties,” those findings lead to the conclusion that she is an inferior officer. Id. Stanley was the United States Trustee for Region 17 of the United States (including the Northern and Eastern Districts of California and the District of Nevada), and she was initially appointed to a five-year term. Her position was limited geographically, temporally, and topically. If she was an officer at all, she was most certainly an inferior officer. It is well established that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the Department of Justice. See id. at 674 (“It is no doubt usual and proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department of the government, executive or STANLEY v. GONZALES 531 judicial, or in that particular executive department to which the duties of such officers appertain.”).