Opinion ID: 1954195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial limited to medical causation and damages and in denying costs to the parties for the first arm-raising trial.

Text: Defendants assert the trial court erred when it limited the scope of the new trial. In ordering the new trial, the trial court: Ordered that Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial in the arm raising (battery trial) as to medical causation, damages and punitive damages be, and the same hereby is, granted and It is further Ordered that the car accident case against Defendant Hamond and arm raising (battery) case against Defendant State Farm Insurance and Mona Drolc shall hereafter be tried together, with the only issues being the medical causation of Plaintiff's reflex sympathetic dystrophy and resulting damages plus whatever punitive damages, if any, should be awarded against Defendant State Farm Insurance and Defendant Drolc; and It is further Ordered that neither Plaintiff nor Defendants State Farm Insurance or Mona Drolc shall be awarded any cost for the arm-raising or battery trial. During the course of the battery trial Fullmer made a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a directed verdict on the issue of whether Drolc was acting within her scope of employment. The motions were not granted as the trial court said it was leaving the determination of this issue to the jury. However, because the jury found Fullmer had not been damaged by Drolc's actions, the jury never reached the scope of employment issue. Defendants assert that as a result of the court's order, the trial judge in effect determined Drolc was acting within the course and scope of her employment and that such a determination is erroneous. Fullmer asserts that the trial court acted correctly as the court has the authority to re-visit her motion for a directed verdict on the issue of scope of employment after the jury submitted its verdict: Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. SDCL 15-6-50(b). Fullmer argues that by excluding the scope of employment issue in the new battery trial, the trial judge merely made a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Id. Generally, it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether an employee's actions are within the scope of their employment. Deuchar v. Foland Ranch, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 177, 181 (S.D. 1987); Lovejoy v. Campbell, 16 S.D. 231, 237, 92 N.W. 24, 26 (1902). However, this determination may be made as a matter of law where an employee's deviation is slight and not unusual [or] ... is very marked and unusual. Id. See Ross v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Madison, 49 S.D. 491, 207 N.W. 446 (1926). The case before us appears to fall between those extremes and should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions. Lovejoy, 16 S.D. at 238, 92 N.W. at 26. The trial court erred in its limitation of the scope of the new trial. We therefore reverse and direct that the issue of whether Drolc was acting within the course and scope of her employment be included in the new battery trial. State Farm and Drolc assert the issue of punitive damages was erroneously submitted to the jury over their motions to dismiss. Defendants assert there was no showing of malice by Drolc. State Farm also argues that under the complicity rule, there is no evidence to warrant instructing the jury on punitive damages against them. The complicity rule was set out in Dahl v. Sittner, 474 N.W.2d 897 (S.D. 1991), which was decided after the completion of the battery trial. This rule requires an element of knowledge on behalf of the principal before imposing liability [on the employer.] [6] Id. at 903. Fullmer's strategy at the battery trial was to show Drolc was frustrated with Fullmer and under pressure from State Farm to settle her claim quickly by making things happen. It appears from the record that there is a sufficient basis from which the jury could find malice by Drolc and support submitting the punitive damages claim against State Farm to the jury. The trial court did not err when it included the issue of punitive damages in the new trial. State Farm and Drolc, though not Fullmer, also assert the trial court erred when it denied all parties an award of costs in the first battery trial. The award of costs in civil actions is discretionary with the court unless otherwise stated by law. SDCL 15-17-1 & 16. We are not persuaded the trial court abused its discretion. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Fullmer's motion to set aside the automobile collision judgment, nor when it granted Fullmer's motion for a new trial, nor when it denied costs to the parties. The new trial is to include the issue of whether Drolc was acting within the scope of her employment and otherwise as outlined in the trial court's order. [7] WUEST, HENDERSON, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur.