Opinion ID: 2614599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court Abuse Its Discretion by Failing to Grant a New Trial on Damages?

Text: In November 1994 McCubbins filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude the State from introducing evidence of his health insurance in any way. The trial court granted the motion to the extent outlined at AS 09.17.070. [2] McCubbins argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant him a new trial because the State improperly elicited testimony that his medical expenses were covered by insurance in violation of the collateral source rule. The exchange that McCubbins complains of took place during the State's cross-examination of Dr. Dorey. [3] McCubbins asserts that the jury evidently believed that [his] past medical expenses had been paid for by his Teamsters' insurance, but that he would need money for future expenses. McCubbins notes that the trial court recognized that an improper reference was made to a collateral source. Relying on Williams v. Utility Equipment, Inc., 837 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1992), the State argues that McCubbins has waived this argument because he did not make specific objections when Dr. Dorey mentioned McCubbins's medical coverage during his cross-examination by the State. We agree. In Williams, the plaintiff, Williams, filed a motion asking the trial court to prohibit the defendant from using evidence of Williams's prior drug use. Id. at 1114. This motion was apparently granted. However, at trial the defense did introduce such evidence and Williams failed to object to it. On appeal, Williams argued that the trial court erred in violating its own protective order. We disagreed, holding that Williams waived his objections, despite the protective order, when he did not make specific objections as the testimony [about his drug use] was presented. Id. at 1116-17. Similarly, in the present case, although McCubbins's motion in limine preventing the State from introducing evidence of his health insurance was granted, McCubbins never objected to the portion of the State's cross-examination of Dr. Dorey which had effectively elicited information about McCubbins's health insurance. Accordingly, because he did not make specific objections to the introduction of this evidence, McCubbins has waived the issue on appeal. [4]
McCubbins asserts that the State improperly argued that subsequent medical negligence by Drs. Dorey and Swift caused or exacerbated McCubbins's injuries, thus relieving the State of responsibility for these damages. Specifically, McCubbins points to the State's closing argument and its cross-examination of Dr. Dorey, which both suggested that Dr. Dorey negligently recommended McCubbins undergo the fusion surgery. [5] However, McCubbins never objected to any of the State's allegedly improper arguments or questions of which he now complains. As such, he failed to preserve this alleged error on appeal. In Clary Insurance Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194 (Alaska 1980), we held that appellants waived their claim about improper closing argument because they failed to raise their objection in the trial court until the hearing on their motion for a new trial, long after the jury had reached its verdict. Id. at 204. We explained that [o]bjections to statements made during closing argument must be given prior to the time the jury is instructed so that the court has an opportunity to instruct the jury to ignore the statement or to submit a corrective instruction. Id.; see also 58 Am.Jur.2d New Trial § 164 (1989) (Generally, in order that a party may seek a new trial on the ground that counsel for the opposing party has made improper remarks or comments, the complaining party must have made a proper and timely objection to the statements, and sought to have the harmful effect thereof removed by an instruction to the jury.). Because he did not timely object to these statements, McCubbins has waived his arguments regarding subsequent medical negligence.
McCubbins argues that the verdict is logically inconsistent because the jury awarded damages in some categories but failed to award them in corresponding categories. We agree that the jury's verdict awarding damages for future medical expenses but not for diminished earning capacity was inconsistent. We will not disturb a jury verdict if there is a theory which reconciles the apparent inconsistencies. Yang v. Yoo, 812 P.2d 210, 215 (Alaska 1991). No logical theory exists for the jury's award of $28,800 for future medical expenses, but its failure to award anything for diminished future earning capacity. The jury's award of $28,800 for future medical expenses closely approximated the $28,600 cost for McCubbins's treatment at a pain management clinic, as estimated by his expert. Thus, it is very likely that the jury's award for future medical expenses was intended to cover the costs of McCubbins attending a pain management clinic, especially since one of the State's main arguments at trial was that McCubbins suffered from chronic pain syndrome. The State acknowledges this but argues that the jury could have reasonably concluded that attendance and participation in a pain management clinic would enable McCubbins to resolve his chronic pain problems without impairing his future earning capacity. This argument fails to address the inconsistencies in the jury's verdict. The State's own witness, Dr. Smith, testified that pain clinic programs generally are at least five days a week, eight hours a day, lasting for four to eight weeks. Thus, by traveling to and attending such a clinic, McCubbins will necessarily miss at least four to eight weeks of work. His future earning capacity is diminished by at least the amount of money he would have made in the time necessary to complete a pain management clinic. The jury's failure to award any amount for loss of future earning capacity is therefore internally inconsistent with its award of $28,800 for future medical expenses. Thus, the superior court abused its discretion by not ordering a new trial on the issue of damages. [6] Cf. State v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 24, 26-27 (Alaska 1990) (superior court abused its discretion in refusing to order a new trial given that the jury's verdict about the amount of just compensation owed to plaintiff was internally inconsistent). We have held that when an issue requiring reversal is fairly separable from the other issues involved in the case, we may grant a partial new trial, setting aside only so much of the judgment as is affected by error. Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 275 (Alaska 1975). The most typically separable issues are those of liability and damages. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 795 (Alaska 1981) (citations omitted). Those issues are separable in the present case and therefore we order a new trial on the issue of damages only. Cf. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 615 P.2d 621, 624 (Alaska 1980) (in this case the evidence on liability is almost entirely separate from the evidence on damages ... [therefore,] [i]n order to limit the time and expenditure required by a new trial, we direct that there shall be a partial new trial on the issue of liability).