Opinion ID: 441999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: justification for fees

Text: 23 Plaintiffs concede that an award of fees is not authorized under EAHCA. They do not seek fees based on that statute. Instead, appellees argue that the district court's fee award should be affirmed based on the Rehabilitation Act and on Sec. 1983, statutes also allegedly violated by defendants. Attorney's fees are expressly authorized under both Sec. 1983, 42 U.S.C. 1988, as well as under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a(b). The district court based its award of fees on three specific grounds. We examine each separately.
24 The first basis for relief relied upon by the district court in granting attorney's fees was Sec. 1988, since plaintiffs alleged a violation of Sec. 1983, bottomed on a denial of rights guaranteed under EAHCA. Defendants object to any award on this basis. Defendants argue that EAHCA itself is the exclusive remedy for enforcing Diane's right to a free, appropriate public education, and that plaintiffs cannot rely on Sec. 1983 merely as a means to trigger the attorney's fees provision in Sec. 1988. 25 In support of this argument, defendants cite Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981), where the Supreme Court held that [w]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under Sec. 1983. Id. at 20, 101 S.Ct. at 2626, see also Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.1981); Ruth Ann M. v. Alvin Independent School District, 532 F.Supp. 460 (S.D.Tex.1982) (Sec. 1983 not available to redress EAHCA rights). 26 The district court considered defendants' argument but did not fully adopt their reasoning. In its order granting attorney's fees, the district court suggested that the existing case law on the issue was unsettled and that, at present, the court did not read [the cases cited in favor of defendants' argument] as mandating a total disallowance of fees in this case. 27 At the time of the district court's order, the question of whether a Sec. 1983 suit could be bottomed on EAHCA was somewhat unclear. Since the district court order, however, any confusion regarding the authority to base a 1983 lawsuit on an EAHCA claim has been settled. In Marvin H. v. Austin Independent School District, 714 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir.1983), we found that EAHCA provides the 'comprehensive enforcement scheme' envisioned in Middlesex County ..., and that 'the enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under Sec. 1983.'  Id. at 1358; see also Smith v. Robinson, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468 n. 11, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (where Supreme Court in dicta said that [c]ourts generally agree that the [EAHCA] may not be claimed as the basis for a Sec. 1983 action.) Since this Court has held that a Sec. 1983 action based on EAHCA is superfluous to plaintiffs' relief under EAHCA itself, any portion of the award of attorney's fees based on this allegation must be vacated on remand. 5
28 Plaintiffs do not base their Sec. 1983 action solely on EAHCA violations; they also employ Sec. 1983 as a means of redressing various constitutional claims. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated Diane's right to equal protection by denying her a free, appropriate public education and by conditioning her right to education on parental performance; that defendants denied Diane's right to procedural due process by violating EAHCA administrative regulations; and that defendants denied Diane's right to substantive due process by expelling Diane from educational services because of the acts or omissions of her parents. Finally, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated Diane's mother's right to privacy by conditioning Diane's education on compulsory attendance in group psychotherapy sessions by her mother. 29 The district court found that plaintiffs' constitutional claims were substantial, and that the claims were independent of the EAHCA claim. For this reason, the court concluded that even if the application of Sec. 1983 through EAHCA was limited, there was still a basis for fees under Sec. 1988, bottomed on the constitutional violations. 30 In Smith v. Robinson, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), the identical issue was presented. In addition to EAHCA claims, the plaintiffs in Smith asserted that the school district discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of his handicap in violation of the equal protection clause, and that procedures employed by state officials denied plaintiff procedural due process. Just as in the present case, the plaintiffs in Smith argued that attorney's fees were permissible under Sec. 1988, due to their independent claims of constitutional deprivations. 31 The Supreme Court held that attorney's fees were not permissible on the particular facts presented in Smith, but treated each constitutional claim separately, as do we.
32 After reviewing the legislative history of the EAHCA, the Court in Smith had little difficulty concluding that Congress intended the [EAHCA] to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed special education. Smith v. Robinson, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3468. Taking into consideration the elaborate administrative process established in EAHCA to protect the rights of handicapped children, the Court found that EAHCA would be rendered obsolete if a plaintiff could choose instead simply to go directly to federal court alleging a constitutional claim. Thus, the Court concluded that where the [EAHCA] is available to a handicapped child asserting a right to a free appropriate public education, based either on the [EAHCA] or on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the [EAHCA] is the exclusive avenue through which the child and his parents or guardian can pursue their claim. Id. at 3470. 33 Since the plaintiff in Smith alleged an equal protection claim which was virtually identical to their EAHCA claim, the Court held that attorney's fees were not recoverable under Sec. 1988. Similarly, plaintiffs in the present case allege a Fourteenth Amendment claim which could be provided for under EAHCA. Plaintiffs complain that Diane was denied a free, appropriate education. Since EAHCA itself can be employed to require defendants to grant appropriate relief from this violation, resort to Sec. 1983 based on equal protection is unnecessary, and a grant of fees pursuant to Sec. 1988 is inappropriate. Any portion of the award of fees based on this equal protection claim must be vacated on remand.
34 Plaintiffs also made a due process challenge based on defendants' failure to protect Diane's procedural rights in notice, evaluation, consent, development of individualized education plans, timing of meetings, and expulsion from services. Basically, plaintiffs' due process complaint was that defendants failed to adhere to the specific procedural safeguards provided by the Texas Education Agency pursuant to the EAHCA. The question is whether this independent procedural due process claim will support an award of attorney's fees. 35 The Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson was faced with a similar due process challenge. In Smith, plaintiffs challenged the partiality of the state hearing officer. Because of the peculiar facts in Smith, the Court actually resolved the attorney's fees claim on other grounds. But although the Court did not need to reach the issue on the facts of Smith, it nevertheless clearly expressed its view that the issue [of attorney's fees for a due process claim] is not the same as that presented by a substantive equal protection claim to a free, appropriate public education. 104 S.Ct. at 3470 n. 17. 36 The critical holding in Smith is that where EAHCA provides relief, a plaintiff cannot circumvent EAHCA's administrative restrictions by resort to another statutory remedy. The Court distinguished a due process challenge from an equal protection claim on this basis, stating that: 37 ... unlike an independent equal protection claim, maintenance of an independent due process challenge to state procedures would not be inconsistent with the [EAHCA's] comprehensive scheme. Under either the [EAHCA] or Sec. 1983, a plaintiff would be entitled to bypass the administrative process by obtaining injunctive relief only on a showing that irreparable harm otherwise would result. See Monahan v. Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 598-599 (CA8 1981). And, while Congress apparently has determined that local and state agencies should not be burdened with attorney's fees to litigants who succeed, through resort to the procedures outlined in the [EAHCA], in requiring those agencies to provide free schooling, there is no indication that agencies should be exempt from a fee award where plaintiffs have had to resort to judicial relief to force the agencies to provide them the process they were constitutionally due. 38 Id. at 3471. 39 Based on this reasoning, we conclude that attorney's fees may be appropriate in EAHCA cases where procedural due process claims are involved. We leave to the District Court on remand the issue of whether substantial procedural due process claims were effectively raised and maintained in this case.
40 Mrs. Marilyn P.'s allegation of the violation of her right to privacy also falls in the category of an independent claim. A violation of the constitutional right to privacy presents an issue wholly independent of EAHCA. While EAHCA can guarantee Diane the right to free schooling, the statute does not provide a remedy for violations of the constitutional rights of Diane's mother. Since Mrs. Marilyn P.'s claim does not overlap or interfere with EAHCA, EAHCA is no bar to any right she may have to base a Sec. 1983 suit on this asserted constitutional deprivation. We express no opinion whether she had otherwise stated a claim or whether there was any connection between the claim and the relief obtained, leaving to the district court to determine the nature of the claim and its role in the settlement. 41
42 Diane also made a substantive due process claim and another equal protection claim, different in nature from the equal protection claim discussed earlier. Diane complained that by conditioning her education upon parental performance of a requirement that parents of non-handicapped do not have to assume, defendants violated the equal protection clause. In addition, Diane complained that by expelling her from education services because of the acts or omissions of her parent, defendants violated substantive due process rights. 43 In essence, Diane complains about the fact that defendant conditioned her right to education on the requirement that her mother attend psychotherapy sessions. Through these complaints, Diane does more than merely state a right to a free, appropriate public education, as guaranteed by EAHCA. She complains additionally that her rights under EAHCA were conditioned on outside factors in an unconstitutional fashion. Maintenance of such a challenge would not be inconsistent with EAHCA. Thus, attorney's fees may be appropriate for time spent on these constitutional challenges. 44
45 Although we here hold that attorney's fees may be appropriate based on independent constitutional claims, fees are not necessarily permissible on the particular facts in this case. 46 The district court stated that it was awarding fees due to plaintiff's independent complaints. Teresa Diane alleged a violation of her right to procedural due process; Mrs. Marilyn P. complained that her right to privacy had been infringed. In Smith v. Robinson, the intervening decision discussed above, however, the Supreme Court held that mere allegation of a statutory violation will no longer suffice as a basis for attorney's fees. After Smith, in order to recover attorney's fees, a prevailing party must not only allege a cause of action independent of EAHCA but also must prevail on that independent issue. 104 S.Ct. at 3471. The Court stated that where ... petitioners have presented distinctly different claims for different relief, based on different facts and legal theories, and have prevailed only on a non-fee claim, they are not entitled to a fee award simply because the other claim was a constitutional claim that could be asserted through Sec. 1983. Ibid. The court noted that the opposite conclusion would allow any EAHCA plaintiff to secure attorney's fees merely by including in their pleadings a challenge that the administrative process was unfair. Under this scenario, even if plaintiff's procedural challenge was defeated or ignored, attorney's fees would still be recoverable. The Court considered it unlikely that Congress intended such a result. 47 With this standard in mind, the district court on remand should award attorney's fees only to the extent that plaintiffs actually prevailed on constitutional claims. 6 Any additional fees based on mere allegations of constitutional violations should be vacated.
48 Finally, plaintiffs alleged that denial of the right to a free, appropriate public education violated Diane's rights under Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons in programs receiving federal assistance, and expressly authorizes an award of attorney's fees. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794a(b). The district court stated in its order that the award of attorney's fees was at least partially based on Sec. 794a(b). 49 As the district court pointed out in its order, [t]he regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act require the provision of a free appropriate public education coextensive with the provisions of EAHCA. (emphasis added). Following the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Robinson, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), it is now clear that where the Rehabilitation Act gives no more to a plaintiff's substantive claim than does EAHCA, a plaintiff may not employ the Rehabilitation Act to circumvent the EAHCA administrative procedures, or merely as a means to collect attorney's fees. To the extent Sec. 504 would allow a plaintiff to circumvent ... state procedure, we are satisfied that the remedy conflicts with Congress' intent in the [EAHCA]. Id. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3474; see also Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3371, 82 L.Ed.2d 664 (1984) (section 504 is inapplicable when relief is available under the EAHCA). 50 In this case, plaintiffs do not suggest that Sec. 504 adds anything more to Diane's substantive right to a free public education, 7 a right which is already guaranteed by EAHCA. For this reason, any portion of the attorney's fees awarded by the district court based on Sec. 794a(b) must be vacated.