Opinion ID: 852417
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of the Property Settlement Agreement

Text: When dissolving a marriage, the parties are free to craft an agreement providing for the maintenance of either party, the custody and support of the parties' children, and the disposition of property. Ind.Code § 31-15-2-17 (2004). Settlement agreements become binding contracts when incorporated into the dissolution decree and are interpreted according to the general rules for contract construction. Shorter v. Shorter, 851 N.E.2d 378, 382-83 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citing Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ind.1990); White v. White, 819 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind.Ct.App.2004)). Unless the terms of the agreement are ambiguous, they will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Shorter, 851 N.E.2d at 383. Interpretation of a settlement agreement, as with any other contract, presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Id. (citing S.C. Nestel, Inc. v. Future Constr., Inc., 836 N.E.2d 445, 449 (Ind.Ct.App.2005)). Here, neither party suggests that the Property Settlement Agreement is ambiguous. Rather, the parties dispute what is required to give full force and effect to the terms and spirit of this Agreement. The husband argues that the provision that the wife shall take as her separate assets requires the wife to remove the husband's name from the lease, and that the parties would not have intended to bootstrap themselves together after the dissolution was finalized. The wife responds that the language Pontiac G-6 (subject to the lease thereon) and joint debt made clear that she was assuming the obligation under the existing lease in both names, rather than promising to refinance in her name alone. She contends that she is giving full force and effect to the terms and spirit of the Agreement by making the monthly payments. We agree with the wife and Judge Kirsch. The Property Settlement Agreement requires the wife to make payments on the lease, but does not require her to refinance or remove the husband's name from the lease. The husband is correct that the agreement provides the wife with separate assets. However, the term separate is used generally to describe all assets, and the phrases subject to the lease thereon and joint debt specifically modify the Pontiac G-6. As Judge Kirsch pointed out, the husband was free to negotiate a provision explicitly requiring the wife to remove his name from the lease. In fact, property settlement agreements frequently cover refinancing and removal of one party's name from a joint debt. E.g., Phillips v. Delks, 880 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (Husband shall have three (3) years ... to either refinance or sell the properties and remove Wife's name from the indebtedness.); White, 819 N.E.2d at 69 (requiring husband to subordinate his judgment lien so as to facilitate Wife's efforts to refinance the marital residence for an amount not to exceed Fifty-Five Thousand and 00/100); Dawson v. Dawson, 800 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (Ind.Ct. App.2003) (requiring husband to refinance or otherwise satisfy the second mortgage). For several reasons, notably the desire to avoid refinancing costs, one or both of the parties may have agreed to leave both names on the lease or omitted to address the issue. We therefore do not find a requirement to remove the husband's name to be an inevitable inference from an award of the vehicle to the wife. In the event the wife fails to make payments, the trial court may find her in contempt and award the husband monetary damages for injury to his credit, as well as for any inconvenience and frustration he may have suffered. Phillips, 880 N.E.2d at 720 (citing City of Gary v. Major, 822 N.E.2d 165, 172 (Ind.2005)). We summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals on the issue of the wife's attorney fees. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).