Opinion ID: 1201607
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Smoking and Comparative Fault

Text: In this case, all four plaintiffs were long-time cigarette smokers. Cigarette smoke evidently contains 40,000 to 60,000 parts per billion (ppb) of benzene  more than 2,500 times the concentration detected in plaintiffs' contaminated water. [29] We now consider what effect, if any, should be given to the evidence that plaintiffs, on their own, voluntarily ingested this toxic substance. In its statement of decision, the trial court commented: Defendant points out that plaintiffs have made themselves more susceptible to illness from smoking cigarettes. Although this is no doubt true, it does not relieve defendant from accountability for burdening plaintiffs with a significantly greater vulnerability to serious disease through the ingestion of defendant's toxins. (17) On appeal, Firestone argued that under comparative fault principles, plaintiffs' smoking should reduce or entirely preclude their recovery for fear of cancer. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, reasoning: Comparative fault is applicable only if the plaintiff's negligence is a proximate cause of the injury. `Negligence unrelated to the cause or causes of the accident is not a bar.' [Citations.] In this case, the fact that [plaintiffs] smoked cigarettes is wholly unrelated to the circumstances which caused [plaintiffs'] water supply to be contaminated with toxics. For comparative fault principles to apply, [plaintiffs'] conduct would have had to contribute, in some manner, to this contamination. We agree with Firestone that the Court of Appeal erred in its reasoning. Under comparative fault principles, damages are apportioned based upon the various causes contributing to a plaintiff's harm, as opposed to a particular defendant's negligence. ( Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 813 [119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393] [hereafter Li ] [liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault]; see Garcia v. Estate of Norton (1986) 183 Cal. App.3d 413, 421 [228 Cal. Rptr. 108] [recognizing that in actions founded on strict products liability, a plaintiff's recovery must be reduced to the extent that his own lack of reasonable care contributed to his injury].) Therefore, the fact that plaintiffs' smoking did not contribute to the contamination of their well water is not determinative. Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of Appeal's ultimate conclusion that comparative fault principles were not properly invoked in this case. Firestone failed to establish a causal link between plaintiffs' smoking and the harm they suffered, i.e., their fear of a significantly increased risk of cancer. As plaintiffs point out, Firestone apparently introduced no evidence at trial suggesting that any portion of plaintiffs' fear was attributable to their own smoking. [30] (18) In other cases, however, when a defendant demonstrates that a plaintiff's smoking is negligent and that a portion of the plaintiff's fear of developing cancer is attributable to the smoking, comparative fault principles may be applied in determining the extent to which the plaintiff's emotional distress damages for such fear should be reduced to reflect the proportion of such damages for which the plaintiff should properly bear the responsibility. (See Li, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 813.) Finally, we also observe that evidence of smoking by a plaintiff is relevant to whether the plaintiff's fear is reasonable and genuine. Thus, if a plaintiff had smoked heavily for 20 years without fearing cancer, the trier of fact may consider that evidence in assessing the legitimacy of the plaintiff's fear of cancer claim. [31]