Opinion ID: 1255112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntariness of Miranda Waivers and Confessions

Text: The appellant claims that the statements he made while in custody in West Virginia were involuntary under the totality of the circumstances, which he contends included unlawful coercion and prolonged interrogation in an unduly restrictive custodial setting, and that these statements should have been excluded from the evidence at trial. In accordance with the mandatory duty to determine voluntariness set out in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Fortner, 150 W.Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966), over-ruled in part, State ex rel. White v. Mohn, 168 W.Va. 211, 283 S.E.2d 914 (1981), the trial court held in camera suppression hearings to consider evidence of the voluntariness of the appellant's waiver of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and of the resulting confessions. [11] After considering the testimony at the suppression hearings, the trial court admitted the appellant's inculpatory statements into evidence. We find no error in the trial court's voluntariness determination. Because the appellant was over the age of sixteen years of age when his extrajudicial statements were made to the police, the voluntariness of those statements are tested by the totality of the circumstances under which they were taken. Syl.Pt. 1 and Syl.Pt. 2, Matter of Mark E.P., ___ W.Va. ___, 331 S.E.2d 813 (1985); see W.Va.Code § 49-5-1(d). [12] The State must prove, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that confessions or statements of an accused which amount to admissions of part or all of an offense were voluntary before such may be admitted into the evidence of a criminal case. Syl.Pt. 5, State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905, 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975). In Syllabus Point 7 of State v. Plantz, 155 W.Va. 24, 180 S.E.2d 614 (1971), we emphasized that the prosecution must also demonstrate that the accused has knowingly and intelligently relinquished his Miranda rights: A statement freely and voluntarily made by an accused while in custody or deprived of his freedom by the authorities and subjected to questioning is admissible in evidence against him if it clearly appears that such statement was freely and voluntarily made after the accused had been advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and if he can not afford an attorney one will be appointed for him, and that, after he has been so advised, he knowingly and intelligently waives such rights. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). In support of his contention that he did not voluntarily waive his rights, the appellant cites State v. Mollohan, 166 W.Va. 60, 272 S.E.2d 454 (1980). The totality of the circumstances in the present case, however, are distinguishable from the circumstances of Mollohan. The Mollohan confession was taken in its entirety solely within the confines of a patrol car, during a two-day journey from New Hampshire to West Virginia. In Mollohan, the accused had a defective level of intelligence and was deeply religious, characteristics which the investigating officers played upon in securing a waiver and confession from the accused. We concluded from the totality of these circumstances that the waiver in Mollohan was coerced. Id. at 64, 272 S.E. 2d at 457. The totality of the circumstances in the present case lead us to a different conclusion. The two officers who took the appellant into custody at the Ohio State Reformatory on October 28, 1980, testified at the pretrial suppression hearing. Trooper Smith testified that on the return trip to Kanawha County, prior to discussing the appellant's involvement in any crimes committed in West Virginia, he advised the appellant of his constitutional rights by reading the standard Miranda warnings, and that the appellant acknowledged that he understood his rights. Trooper Smith testified that he then inquired as to whether the appellant would agree to talk about the serious crime in West Virginia. The appellant at first suggested that he did not know anything about the crime, but after being asked by Trooper Smith, Why do you think we took your blood?, the appellant indicated his willingness to talk. [13] Trooper Smith testified that he then told the appellant that they should wait until they arrived at the state police detachment in Parkersburg before discussing the matter. Trooper Williams corroborated Trooper Smith's testimony that the appellant was advised of and indicated that he understood his rights prior to the discussion in the police car. Both troopers testified that the appellant at no time requested a lawyer or conditioned his willingness to talk on the presence of a lawyer, and that the appellant voluntarily signed two separate Miranda waiver forms at the Parkersburg state police detachment. The Miranda warnings printed on the first form was read to the appellant by Trooper Williams beginning at 6:50 p.m. The appellant affixed his signature to the form in the presence of both troopers at 6:57 p.m. [14] A question and answer interrogation, lasting about two hours, followed, during which the appellant confessed to the murders. At 9:22 p.m. the appellant signed another waiver of rights form in the presence of Trooper Williams and another officer from the Parkersburg detachment. Subsequent to the signing of this waiver of his rights, the appellant made a tape recorded confession, which lasted until about 11:00 p.m. The appellant was then transported to Kanawha County, where he remained until October 30, 1980, when he was returned to the Ohio State Reformatory by two other members of the Department of Public Safety, Troopers Woodyard and Allen. At a second in camera suppression hearing Trooper Allen testified that during the return trip he advised the appellant of his Miranda rights; that the appellant indicated he understood those rights; and that the appellant indicated his willingness to talk about the murders without the presence of an attorney. Trooper Woodyard testified that he overheard the exchange between the appellant and Trooper Allen, and vouched for the accuracy of Trooper Allen's testimony. The troopers testified that they questioned the appellant about the murders for about forty-five minutes to an hour, and that the appellant's inculpatory responses included the statement that he wore gloves while at the scene of the murders. The trial court thereupon ruled that a third oral confession had been voluntarily made by the appellant during the return trip to Ohio after a knowing and intelligent waiver of the appellant's constitutional rights. Upon consideration of the relevant testimony adduced at the suppression hearings, we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that the three confessions now in question were voluntarily made after knowing and intelligent waivers by the appellant of his constitutional rights. The appellant was eighteen years of age when he waived his rights and gave the confessions, and there is no evidence that he had a defective level of intelligence. The evidence also shows that the appellant was given Miranda warnings prior to each discussion with the police, and that he signed two written waivers of his rights at the Parkersburg detachment. The officers involved testified that he never requested the presence of an attorney, and they adequately refuted his claims that unlawful coercion was involved in obtaining the confessions. [15] Based on all of the foregoing, we find that there was a sufficient showing of voluntariness to support the trial court's rulings. It is well established that [a] trial court's decision regarding the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or clearly against the weight of the evidence. Syl.Pt. 3, State v. Vance, 162 W.Va. 467, 250 S.E.2d 146 (1978). [16]