Opinion ID: 1726271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: whether the trial court erred by allowing turner's former attorney, kelly collins, to testify at trial.

Text: ¶ 26. Turner asserts that the trial court erred by allowing Kelly Collins to testify for the State because Collins' testimony was highly prejudicial to Turner since Collins was his former attorney and had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding Turner's case. ¶ 27. Again, Turner's argument in support of this assignment of error is without cited authority, and this Court treats the failure to cite any authority as a procedural bar. McClain, 625 So.2d at 781. Despite the procedural bar, this assignment of error fails on its merits. ¶ 28. In the case sub judice, after the defense rested its case, the State called Kelly Collins as a rebuttal witness. Collins did not testify to the facts and circumstances regarding the actual charges against Turner. The only purpose of Collins' testimony as a rebuttal witness was to testify that the defense's witness, Tammy Porter, was related to Turner's mother. However, on cross examination, the defense attempted to elicit testimony from Collins that he represented Turner at Turner's preliminary hearing, but the trial court sustained the State's objection to anything that happened at the preliminary hearing. Thus, if Turner was in anyway prejudiced by Collins, as his former attorney, testifying adverse to his interest, knowledge of Collins' former representation of Turner was presented by the defense itself, and the trial court cannot be held in error where any prejudice was the result of the defense's own action. ¶ 29. At the end of all the evidence, the defense, outside the presence of the jury, made a motion to exclude the testimony of Collins pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. Although Turner does not claim in his brief on appeal that the attorney-client privilege was violated, we find that the attorney-client privilege was not violated. This Court has held that the attorney-client privilege covers all information regarding the client received by the attorney in his professional capacity and in the course of his representation of the client. Barnes v. State, 460 So.2d 126, 131 (Miss.1984). The record reflects that the testimony given by Collins was not covered by the attorney-client privilege. Collins testified to the relationship between Porter and Turner's mother not as a result of information received by Collins from Turner in his professional capacity but as a result of his own personal knowledge of living in Yazoo County for over fifty-seven years. However, Collins was never identified as Turner's former lawyer during testimony. ¶ 30. Nevertheless, we find Collins' testimony appears unseemly in this case. Prosecutors should refrain from using a prior attorney for a defendant as a witness against the defendant, regardless of the circumstances, so as to avoid any possible appearance or claim of impropriety. The prosecutor using a prior attorney of the defendant as a witness against the defendant also helps to curtail any possible public criticism, distrust of the judicial system, and particularly helps to avoid any subsequent criticism or bar complaint against the attorney. This type of procedure is fraught with danger especially for the attorney so testifying and should always be avoided. ¶ 31. As a result, although we condemn the procedure, we hold that this assignment of error is both procedurally barred and, alternatively under the facts here, without merit.