Opinion ID: 151921
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Appropriate Batson Inquiry.

Text: The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror solely on account of race. Holloway, 355 F.3d at 719 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 1712). As in any equal protection case, the burden is ... on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, a Batson challenge is not defeated merely because the prosecutor purports to offer a race-neutral reason for striking the juror. Rather, the rule in Batson ... requires the judge to assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 251-52, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (emphasis added). Thus, Batson, establish[ed] a three-step inquiry for determining the constitutionality of challenged peremptory strikes. Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 255 (citing Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir.2001)). When a Batson challenge is raised, [f]irst, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 969, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006). Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). Thus, in considering a Batson objection... all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008). [5] A trial court should look to all of the evidence and surrounding circumstances, including the context in which strikes were exercised, to determine whether the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking a juror are pretextual and whether the defendant has shown that the prosecutor had a discriminatory intent. See Riley, 277 F.3d at 283 (stating that evidence pertaining to a Batson challenge should not be reviewed in isolation). As the Court explained in Snyder, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted. 552 U.S. at 478, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (citing Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317) (finding a Batson challenge had merit where the trial judge simply allowed the challenge without explanation). Thus, the prosecutor's questions and statements ... may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose, Holloway, 355 F.3d at 727 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712), and the three-step inquiry for resolving Batson claims allows the trial court to respond to a Batson challenge in a meaningful, rather than a pro forma, manner. Trial courts fail to engage in the required analysis when they fail[ ] to examine all of the evidence to determine whether the State's proffered race-neutral explanations [a]re pretextual. Riley, 277 F.3d at 286. The prosecutor's strike rate when compared to the final composition of the jury is particularly relevant. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317. More powerful ... are side-by-side comparisons of some [B]lack venire panelists who were struck and [W]hite panelists allowed to serve. If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a [B]lack panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar non[B]lack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step.  Id. (emphasis added). See also Riley, 277 F.3d at 282 (finding that this comparison is relevant to determining whether the prosecution's asserted justification for striking the black juror is pretextual). [T]he requirement that the state courts faced with a Batson challenge engage in the critical step three analysis is not a product of our own creativity but an accepted element of a habeas court's obligation to examine whether a defendant's constitutional right to a race-neutral jury has been infringed. Riley, 277 F.3d at 290 (internal citations omitted). Although a judge considering a Batson challenge is not required to comment explicitly on every piece of evidence in the record, some engagement with the evidence considered is necessary as part of step three of the Batson inquiry. Id. at 289. See also Holloway, 355 F.3d at 712 (remanding where the trial court rendered no express or otherwise articulated ruling on [the defendant's] objections; instead, it implicitly rejected the Batson challenge by letting the matter proceed to trial). [6] In Hardcastle, after examining the record, we stated that we cannot conclude... that the [state courts'] resolution of [the defendant's] claim amounted to an objectively reasonable application of Batson ... [because the state court] failed to conduct a full and complete step three analysis. 368 F.3d at 255. [7] Where the state court fails to undertake a full step three analysis, as required by Batson, we will remand for the district court to engage in independent fact-finding. Id. Here, as in Hardcastle, the trial court failed to conduct a full and complete Batson step three analysis. In Hardcastle, the prosecutor wanted to provide the trial court with relevant information regarding her reasons for exercising twelve peremptory strikes against Black venire persons but the trial court refused to hear the evidence. Id. at 251. Hardcastle's counsel moved for a mistrial and the following exchange occurred: The Court: I'm not going to argue the point. There's no need to. I'm going to deny your motion. Your record is correct, and we now proceed. Is there any other motion? Prosecutor: May I put something on the record with regard to the issue? The Court: No. Prosecutor: Not in defense. The Court: No. Prosecutor: Okay. The Court: Now that gets rid of the problem. Id. at n. 1. Here, as in Hardcastle, it is clear from the record that the court effectively omitted the third step of the Batson inquiry by unreasonably limiting the defendant's opportunity to prove that the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking Black jurors were pretextual, thereby improperly restricting the defendant's ability to prove discriminatory intent. Moreover, the court did not make the findings required under Batson. Rather, it appears to have dismissed Coombs' Batson claim because it believed the defense attorney and the prosecutor were much too good lawyers to do something like that. Relying upon its view of counsel's competence and/or professionalism, the court failed to inquire into whether the prosecutor's purported reasons for striking the jurors were pretextual, a crucial part of the third step of Batson. [8] Even more troubling is the fact that the court did not examine the prosecutor's statements that he struck Juror No. 1 because he just didn't like the juror and because the juror was giving him bad looks. Although the prosecutor did explain that the juror didn't check off many boxes [on the jury questionnaire], the court's insistence that the trial proceed (let's go) foreclosed any inquiry into whether the prosecutor accepted White jurors who checked off a similar number of boxes. That would have been an essential part of any meaningful inquiry into the prosecutor's explanation. As we have just noted, side-by-side comparisons of Black jurors who were struck and White jurors who were allowed to serve can often be particularly powerful in a Batson inquiry. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317. As also noted earlier, the prosecutor's response to defense counsel's challenge to the dismissal of Juror No. 1 also included the concession that: I don't really have a sound reason. On this record, there is no way of knowing if the prosecutor's action was motivated by a genuine concern for Juror No. 1's impartiality, or whether the prosecutor's misgivings arose from the fact that the juror was Black. We do not intend to suggest an answer to that question. We do, however, require that an appropriate inquiry be undertaken by the court in response to a Batson challenge; particularly given the prosecutor's vague and elusive explanation and the apparent concession that he was not sure why he stuck Juror No. 1. Like anyone else, trial attorneys possess those human frailties that make each of us far too susceptible to social conditioning and the subliminal bias that may result. Thus, although we do not suggest this happened here, we are reminded of Justice Marshall's observation in Batson that [an attorney's] own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is `sullen,' or `distant,' a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically. 476 U.S. at 106, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (Marshall, J. concurring). Accordingly, outright prevarication by [attorneys is not] the only danger... It is even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are legal. Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted). Although we again stress that we are not suggesting what this prosecutor's motivation was, trial court's must be particularly vigilant when Black jurors are struck because an attorney is acting on a hunch. This means that a trial court must be exceedingly careful about rejecting a Batson challenge merely because the prosecutor explains that s/he did not like the way a juror looked at her/him. Although counsel's discomfort with real or perceived looks from a prospective juror may arise from factors that would readily survive a Batson challenge after an appropriate inquiry, Justice Marshall's admonition in Batson cautions that such discomfort may not similarly arise if a White juror looks at counsel the same way. Therefore, courts should not allow nebulous expressions of discomfort to justify striking a juror. Batson requires an appropriately tailored inquiry, an opportunity for opposing counsel to argue that the proffered reasons are pretextual, and a finding by the trial court. If it were otherwiseand an unexamined explanation were allowed to survive a Batson challenge, Batson inquires would quickly be reduced to a meaningless procedural ritual. We realize that it may be uncomfortable and unpleasant for a trial judge to undertake such a difficult and subtle inquiry with the precision and persistence that may be required to determine counsel's true reasons for striking a juror. No judge wants to be in the position of suggesting that a fellow professionalwhom the judge may have known for yearsis exercising peremptory challenges based on forbidden racial considerations. However, we also realize that if Batson is to be given its full effect, trial courts must make precise and difficult inquiries to determine if the proffered reasons for a peremptory strike are the race-neutral reasons they purport to be, or if they are merely a pretext for that which Batson forbids. Nor is it relevant that the prosecutor appears to have offered race-neutral explanations for all but one peremptory challenge. [A] prosecutor's purposeful discrimination in excluding even a single juror on account of race cannot be tolerated as consistent with the guarantee of equal protection under the law. Holloway, 355 F.3d at 720 (citing Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir.1990)). Although we are not suggesting that the district court should only consider the prosecutor's strike of Juror No. 1 on remand, we do note that if Juror No. 1, and only Juror No. 1, was struck because of his race, then the Batson challenge should have been sustained. The error here is compounded by the court's refusal to allow evidence of the alleged conversations between the prosecutor and defense counsel that could have supported the defense counsel's claim of bias. That evidence, if accepted, could have established that the prosecutor believed that he failed to get a conviction in Coombs' first trial only because of a sympathetic Black juror. Such evidence, viewed against the prosecutor's explanation that he just didn't like one of the prospective jurors (who he conceded he had no good reason to strike) may well have caused an objective fact finder to conclude that Coombs' Batson challenge should have been sustained. We realize, of course, that defense counsel was able to put the alleged out of court statement of the prosecutor before the court in an affidavit. However, that is a woefully inadequate substitute for a hearing under these circumstances. Moreover, it is obvious that the court had already determined that the Batson challenge was more irritating than meritorious. It had already explained that the proffered evidence was not relevant to anything even though it went directly to the prosecutor's frame of mind in exercising peremptory challenges during the selection of the second jury. Thus, we cannot say that merely allowing defense counsel a pro forma opportunity to submit an affidavit is consistent with the kind of serious inquiry required under Batson's third step. [9]