Opinion ID: 2595475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Difficulty of Proving Mental State

Text: We previously noted the seriousness of the public safety threat the Legislature perceived and sought to alleviate by the AWCA and the corresponding unsuitability, to the legislative intent, of any statutory construction that would likely impair the law's effective enforcement. It follows we should not read section 12280(b) as containing any mental state requirement that the prosecution would foreseeably and routinely have special difficulty proving. An actual knowledge element has significant potential to impair effective enforcement. Although knowledge may be proven circumstantially (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Circumstantial Evidence, § 408, pp. 381-382), in many instances a defendant's direct testimony or prior statement that he or she was actually ignorant of the weapon's salient characteristics will be sufficient to create reasonable doubt. Although the People could rebut a claim of actual ignorance by evidence of the defendant's long and close acquaintance with the particular weapon or familiarity with firearms in general, production of such evidence would predictably constitute a heavy burden for the prosecution. A scienter requirement satisfied by proof the defendant should have known the characteristics of the weapon bringing it within the AWCA, however, would have little or no potential to impede effective enforcement. In most instances the fact a firearm is of a make and model listed in section 12276, or added pursuant to section 12276.5, can be expected to be sufficiently plain on examination of the weapon so that evidence of the markings, together with evidence the accused possessor had sufficient opportunity to examine the firearm, will satisfy a knew-or-should-have-known requirement. (See, e.g., Identification Guide, supra, at pp. 3 [Norinco 86S identifiable by marking 86S located on left side of receiver near the rear], 4 [Uzi usually located on the left side of the receiver near the rear], 5 [Galil usually found on the left side of the receiver above the pistol grip], 6 [AR 70 on the left side of the receiver near the top], 7 [CETME 'Sport' usually found on left side of the magazine well].) [9] Furthermore, because of the general principle that all persons are obligated to learn of and comply with the law, in many circumstances a trier of fact properly could find that a person who knowingly possesses a semiautomatic firearm reasonably should have investigated and determined the gun's characteristics. The exceptional cases in which the salient characteristics of the firearm are extraordinarily obscure, or the defendant's possession of the gun was so fleeting or attenuated as not to afford an opportunity for examination, would appear to be instances of largely innocent possession that, as discussed above, the Legislature presumably did not intend to be subject to felony punishment. The Attorney General suggests that if section 12280(b) is construed to require some mens rea, it should be knowledge simply of possession of the firearm. We agree section 12280(b), like criminal possession laws generally, requires knowledge of the object's existence and of one's control over it. (See People v. Gory (1946) 28 Cal.2d 450, 455, 170 P.2d 433.) But we believe the Legislature intended section 12280(b) to require, as well, a degree of scienter regarding the character of the firearm; without such a scienter element, the possibility of severely punishing innocent possession is too great. A group of amici curiae argues for a required mens rea even greater than knowledge of the weapon's characteristics: actual knowledge by defendants that a firearm they possessed is one that is covered by the Act. According to their brief, such an extraordinary level of scienter is needed here because the ordinary citizenry does not have the esoteric fire arms knowledge necessary to follow what this complex and confusing Act allows, and what it prohibits. Amici curiae's prime concrete example of this complexity and confusion consists of the fact that the Attorney General's office has inconsistently interpreted section 12276, subdivision (a)(11), listing SKS with detachable magazine, as to whether that designation includes certain SKS models originally manufactured with a fixed magazine but adapted to accept a detachable magazine. (See Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 48 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 18, 1998, pp. 4-8.) [10] That a criminal statute contains one or more ambiguities requiring interpretation does not make the statute unconstitutionally vague on its face (see People v. Askey (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 381, 386-387, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 782), nor does it imply the statute cannot, in general, be fairly applied without proving knowledge of its terms. In cases where the information reasonably available to a gun possessor is too scant to prove he or she should have known the firearm had the characteristics making it a defined assault weapon, the possessor will not be subject to section 12280(b) as construed here. This is sufficient to protect against any significant possibility of punishing innocent possession. To require moreespecially to require knowledge of the law as the amici curiae proposewould seriously impede effective enforcement of the AWCA, contrary to the legislative intent. Nothing in the language or history of the AWCA suggests the Legislature intended to create, in section 12280, an exception to the fundamental principle that all persons are obligated to learn of and comply with applicable laws.