Opinion ID: 2381416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Should This Court Read the Rhode Island Constitution's Right-to-Counsel Provision More Broadly than the Supreme Court Has Read the Sixth Amendment?

Text: Although certain amici have argued that the protections afforded by the Federal Constitution establish only a minimum level of protection for criminal defendants, [t]he decision to depart from minimum standards and to increase the level of protection should be made guardedly and should be supported by a principled rationale. State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980). We are presented with no such rationale here. In Benoit we held that the warrantless search of an automobile four hours after its seizure by police was invalid under article I, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution. In so holding, we interpreted that provision more broadly than the Supreme Court had interpreted nearly identical language in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). In 1992, however, we overruled our decision in Benoit and held that the protection afforded against unlawful automobile searches by article I, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution was identical in scope to that guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992). We noted that our departure from Chambers in Benoit was motivated by the apparent inconsistency in Supreme Court case law at the time we decided Benoit. Id. at 1012. This Court concluded that [Wecause the federal case law that guided our departure from Chambers in 1980 has since been stabilized by the Supreme Court, we now believe that it is time to revisit Benoit. Werner, 615 A.2d at 1013. Cf. Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc. 612 A.2d 734, 740 (R.I.1992) (construing equal-protection guarantee of article I, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution to provide protections similar to that of Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution); State v. Diaz, 521 A.2d 129, 133 (R.I.1987) (interpreting article I, section 7, of the Rhode Island Constitution to provide protection against double jeopardy of identical scope to that provided by Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution). Similarly, our decision in Holliday was rendered at a time when no decisive Supreme Court authority was available to guide our interpretation of article I, section 10. This vacuum was filled when the Supreme Court issued the Argersinger and Scott decisions. We are of the opinion that it is timely that we revisit the Holliday holding and interpret article I, section 10, in a manner consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Scott. Our opinion in this case has firm grounding in this Court's constitutional jurisprudence. In Diaz, 521 A.2d at 133, we expressed our belief that the balance achieved by the Supreme Court of the United States is as favorable to the perceived rights of defendants as should rationally be applied in criminal cases. We are unwilling to interpret article 1, section 7 of the Rhode Island Constitution in such fashion as further to subordinate societal interests in effective prosecution of the guilty. Similar considerations of public policy motivate us to conform our reading of article I, section 10, to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, this Court has recognized the validity of considering budgetary limitations in determining the extent of state-funded benefits for indigents. Roe v. Affleck, 120 R.I. 679, 390 A.2d 361 (1978). In Roe, we upheld the denial of medical-assistance benefits under the Services for Emotionally Disturbed Children Law, G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) §§ 40.1-7-1 to 40.1-7-9, even though the Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals (MHRH) had found the applicant eligible for such assistance. Roe was denied assistance by MHRH because the Legislature had not provided appropriations sufficient to provide aid to all eligible applicants. We determined that the director of MHRH is not authorized to incur any debt which would bind the state except insofar as his action creating such a debt is authorized by law, and we concluded that the director had no duty to contract for the care of eligible emotionally disturbed children in an amount that exceeds statutory appropriations. Id. at 690-91, 390 A.2d at 367. Certain of the amici would have this Court provide heightened constitutional protection to indigent criminal defendants who, although they may face no threat of imprisonment, may suffer such consequences as denial of public housing and loss of professional licenses. It is well settled, however, that the full panoply of due-process protections attaches only when loss of a fundamental liberty results from state action. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641 (R.I.1989). In Morrissey the Supreme Court refused to require that the full range of due-process protections be afforded in parole-revocation proceedings because the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply. 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d at 494. Although loss of a license or permit and denial of public housing are grave occurrences, they do not rise to the level of deprivation characterized by incarceration. An automobile driver, for instance, is not entitled to confer with counsel when asked to submit to a breathalyzer test, even though submission to or refusal of that test may result in loss of that driver's license, Dunn v. Petit, 120 R.I. 486, 388 A.2d 809 (1978), because there is no fundamental constitutional right to operate a motor vehicle. State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843, 850 (R.I. 1980). Therefore, we disagree with amici that counsel must be provided in a criminal proceeding simply because an indigent defendant may subsequently lose a comparable property right. In Holliday, we stated: We think it is entirely reasonable to conclude that the state has a legitimate interest in the efficient and inexpensive disposition of petty criminal cases and that the constitutional provision contained in our state constitution, art. I, sec. 10, does not contemplate imposing upon the state an unreasonable and onerous burden in accomplishing the disposition of such petty offense cases. 109 R.I. at 100, 280 A.2d at 337. We conclude that it is (1) within the authority of the General Assembly to determine that the public interest would be served by increasing appropriations to provide counsel in situations not constitutionally required and (2) not the province of this Court to impose upon the state obligations that have no constitutional or statutory basis. We therefore advise Your Excellency that the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment as a guarantee of a criminal defendant's right to counsel only when imprisonment is actually imposed represents the appropriate standard that should be applied under article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution. In conclusion, therefore, we respond to Your Excellency's question in the negative. JOSEPH R. WEISBERGER, Chief Justice VICTORIA LEDERBERG JOHN P. BOURCIER DONALD F. SHEA Justices