Opinion ID: 4548417
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contacts with the Forum State

Text: In addition to the site of the injury, subsection (A)(4) also imposes requirements about the extent to which a defendant does business in Ohio. At the district court, the Malones acknowledged that they had not established precisely how much revenue Rexon earns from Ohio consumers, or how regular Rexon’s business is, but they insisted that these deficits are precisely why they should be allowed to engage in limited discovery. The district court agreed that because of Rexon’s “high volume of business activity” in Ohio, the Malones “could plausibly show, with additional discovery, that Rexon derived ‘substantial revenue’ from table saw sales in Ohio.” The court declined to allow that discovery, however, because it believed the Due Process Clause prohibited the suit regardless. Neither party challenges the district court’s conclusion as to the substantial revenue part of the long-arm statute and instead they both focus on the related requirements of the Due Process Clause. We will do the same.2 2 Rexon does briefly argue that the Malones failed to meet subsection (C)’s requirements because the Malones’ causes of action did not “arise from” Rexon’s derivation of revenue from saws that ended up in Ohio. That is a misreading of the statute. Subsection (C) states simply, “When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.” No. 19-3880 Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. Page 5 The overriding question before us is whether Rexon “possesses such minimum contacts with [Ohio] that the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Beydoun v. Wataniya Rests. Holding, Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2014) (relying on Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316). Normally we consider three prongs in answering that question: (1) whether Rexon purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio, (2) whether Rexon’s activities in Ohio proximately caused the Malones’ injuries, and (3) whether the consequences caused by Rexon’s actions were sufficiently connected to Ohio to make its courts’ jurisdiction reasonable. See id. at 507–08. At the district court, Rexon admitted, for the purposes of its motion to dismiss, that the Malones “can satisfy the ‘purposeful availment’ prong of the specific jurisdiction test.” Rexon’s concession was based on its belief that the motion was “more easily decided under the second prong of the specific jurisdiction test.” The company takes the same approach now. Rexon’s approach, however, makes our task harder, not easier. That is because the first and second prongs are related. Id. at 507 (“the analysis on the first prong . . . involves some overlap with the analysis on the second prong”). We must first know how Rexon purposefully availed itself of Ohio’s markets before we can determine whether its activities there proximately caused the Malones’ injuries. And the concession about the first prong was vague. Rexon conceded that its “[c]ontacts with Ohio” satisfy the purposeful-availment requirement, but failed to say what those contacts were or why they were satisfactory. In the later discussion on the causation prong, Rexon admitted that it manufactured, sold, and shipped the saw to Sears in California, but was quick to point out that none of those actions was directed at Ohio. If Rexon’s relevant actions were making, selling, and shipping the saw, and such activities were insufficiently connected to Ohio, then the first prong, not the second, would be left unmet. In contrast, making, selling, and shipping a defective saw would seem to qualify as the proximate cause of the alleged injuries, thus satisfying the second prong. On the other hand, if Rexon purposefully availed itself of Ohio in some other unmentioned way, then it would be impossible to analyze the second prong. The causes of action here arose from Rexon’s design and manufacturing of the allegedly defective saw. And Rexon is amenable to suit if it derived substantial revenue from saws subsequently used in Ohio. If the complaint satisfies (A)(4), then it satisfies (C), too. No. 19-3880 Malone v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc. Page 6 The district court spotted the problem. It concluded that Rexon had “confused the different aspects of the Due Process Clause personal jurisdiction test and intended to rest its arguments on the purposeful availment prong, instead of the ‘arising out of’ requirement.” Consequently, the court analyzed the motion under the first prong and determined that because Rexon “did not direct its sales to Ohio” specifically, the court lacked personal jurisdiction. The court therefore dismissed the case. As we will explain, this was error.