Opinion ID: 1357902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary judgment in Landlord's eviction action

Text: Tenants argue that the circuit court erred in affirming the magistrate's grant of summary judgment to Landlord because the lease agreement signed by the parties only provides for the termination of the lease by Tenants, and therefore, Landlord did not have grounds for eviction. We disagree. The purpose of the rules of contract construction is to ascertain the intention of the parties as gathered from the contents of the entire document and not from any particular provision within the contract. Litchfield Co. of S.C., Inc. v. Kiriakides, 290 S.C. 220, 223, 349 S.E.2d 344, 346 (Ct.App. 1986). Where one interpretation of a contract makes it unusual or extraordinary and another interpretation, equally consistent with the language employed, would make it reasonable, fair, and just, the latter construction prevails. Farr v. Duke Power Co., 265 S.C. 356, 362, 218 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1975). An interpretation which establishes the more reasonable and probable agreement of the parties should be adopted while an interpretation leading to an absurd result should be avoided. Id. Under Tenants' interpretation, Tenants leasehold estate essentially trumps Landlord's fee simple interest in the residence and gives Tenants a perpetual tenancy in the rental property. We find that this is an absurd result that could not have possibly been intended by Landlord when she agreed to rent the residence. Rather, under the terms of the agreement, Landlord and Tenants created a month-to-month tenancy when the term of the original year lease expired in August 2003. See also S.C.Code Ann. § 27-35-30 (2007) (providing that tenancies of real estate other than agricultural lands shall be deemed from month to month unless there otherwise agreed). A landlord or tenant may terminate a month-to-month tenancy by a written notice at least thirty days before the termination date specified in the notice. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-40-770(b). To this end, Tenants argue that they did not receive proper notice of termination from Landlord. We disagree. The Residential Landlord and Tenant Act which governs the lease agreement provides that a person gives notice to another by taking steps reasonably calculated to inform the other in ordinary course whether or not the other actually comes to know of it. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-40-240(b) (2007). A person has notice of a fact if from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists. S.C.Code Ann. § 27-40-240(a)(3) (2007). The record reveals that Landlord instituted multiple notices to Tenants, beginning at least with the February 2005 letter, expressing Landlord's desire to terminate the rental arrangement. Despite Landlord's desire to stop leasing the premises to Tenants, Landlord agreed the following month to permit Tenants to continue renting the premises until a specific date that Tenants stated was convenient for them to move. It was only after Tenants revealed their intentions to take advantage of Landlord's generosity by refusing to leave the premises on the specified date and establishing their own terms of rental that Landlord sent a final written notice of termination in January 2006 and brought the present action one month later. For these reasons, we find that the parties' lease agreement established a month-to-month tenancy for which Landlord provided proper notice of termination to Tenants and that Tenants' further occupancy after August 9, 2005, constituted proper grounds for eviction. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court properly affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Landlord.