Opinion ID: 466079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ferc's statutory authority

Text: 8 We first consider whether the Commission had statutory authority to grant the relief here requested--a retroactive abandonment authorization. We hold that Section 16 of the NGA, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 717o, does grant FERC such authority, and that Section 7(b) does not bar such relief. 9 Section 16 provides in pertinent part: The Commission shall have power to perform any and all acts, and to ... make ... such orders ... as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this [Act]. This provision gives the Commission broad authority so as to do equity consistent with the public interest, Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 750 F.2d 105, 109 (D.C.Cir.1984), and to use means of regulation not spelled out in detail, provided the agency's action conforms with the purposes and policies of Congress and does not contravene any terms of the Act. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 158 (D.C.Cir.1967). 10 Section 16 unquestionably gives FERC the authority, in fashioning remedies, to consider equitable principles, one of which is to regard as being done that which should have been done. See id. at 160. We therefore hold that in appropriate circumstances, the Commission's authority under Section 16 extends to the granting of retroactive abandonment authorizations so as to carry out the provisions of the NGA. Cf. Consolidated Gas Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 771 F.2d 1536, 1551 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Sec. 16 gives authority to order retroactive refunds when a gas company had improperly collected money under a tariff); Niagara Mohawk, 379 F.2d at 157 (predecessor of Sec. 16 gives authority retroactively to issue hydroelectric project licenses). 11 FERC, however, urges the court to defer to the Commission's conclusion, allegedly indicated in its orders here and elsewhere, that Section 7(b) bars retroactive abandonment authorization; thus, the Commission suggests, such relief would contravene [one of the] terms of the Act. Id. at 158. It is not at all clear, we note initially, that the Commission has ever drawn such a conclusion in any of its orders. The initial Order in this case expressed no such opinion. The Order on Rehearing announced, without elaboration, FERC's determination that Section 7(b) does not provide for retroactive abandonment authorizations. Order on Rehearing at 61,489. This cryptic statement could mean merely that Section 7(b) provides no affirmative authority for retroactive authorizations; or, FERC might have intended to say that the section positively prohibits them. The latter interpretation is rendered less likely by the fact that the Order on Rehearing rests not only on the prospective nature of Section 7 authorization but also on the failure of the parties to resolve their differences expeditiously, id., thus suggesting that a retroactive authorization might have been appropriate if the parties had behaved better. 12 FERC's other considerations of this issue are similarly unenlightening, and none unambiguously reaches the conclusion FERC now urges this court to adopt. 1 Indeed, a recent FERC order, Trunkline Gas Company, 33 F.E.R.C. p 61,224 at 61,470 (Nov. 15, 1985), actually granted a retroactive abandonment authorization without any Commission statement accounting for the retroactivity. FERC now highlights, however, that this recent authorization was made effective as of a date after the Section 7 filing. At oral argument, counsel for the Commission represented that FERC acted to approve retroactivity in Trunkline Gas Company under authority supplied by Section 16. 13 Noting this unhelpful record of Commission considerations of this issue, we today hold as a matter of law that Section 7(b) does not prohibit retroactive abandonment authorizations. That section provides in pertinent part: No natural-gas company shall abandon ... any service rendered by means of [its] facilities, without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained. This language, FERC maintains, seems to contemplate that Section 7(b) authorizations will be available only prospectively, that the natural gas company must first obtain authorization and only then abandon services. The Commission also refers us to United Gas Pipe Line v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529, 99 S.Ct. 2461, 61 L.Ed.2d 54 (1979). In that case, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide whether Section 7(b) authorizes FERC to grant retroactive authorizations because the Commission, in any event, was within its discretion to deny the particular application in question. In the context of this disposition, the Court commented on the negative policy implications of [f]requent retroactive action. Id. at 540-41, 99 S.Ct. at 2468-69. 2 14 These Commission arguments, however, address only whether the language or purpose of Section 7(b) positively authorizes retroactive authorizations, not whether the section prohibits them. Even if Section 7(b)'s language granting affirmative authority is unambiguously and exclusively prospective, the provision simply does not speak to the question whether the Commission is forbidden to take retroactive action under other provisions. And however grave the policy implications of [f]requent retroactive action by the Commission on filings under Section 7, those implications do not attend infrequent remedial actions taken with reasoned discretion under Section 16 to carry out the policies and purposes of the NGA.