Opinion ID: 2567556
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Superior Court Correctly Considered the Trial Date as the Appropriate Date for Valuation of the Properties.

Text: Wade argues that the superior court erred in failing to determine an appropriate date for valuation of the properties; he also appears to argue that the trial date (February 2006) is the appropriate date. He argues that if February 2006 was selected as the date for valuation, then no owelty should have been assessed because he alleges that the parties agreed that the lots were each worth $260,000 as of the time of trial. [18] Keenan responds that the trial court accepted valuations as of the date of trial. Keenan is correct that the court valued the property as of the time of trial. In its Order Granting Motion to Establish Law of the Case, the superior court explained that the amount due to the plaintiff would be based on the present FMV [fair market value] of each lot. The superior court stated in its order that [t]he best evidence provided at trial establishes the value of [Wade's property, including the cabin] at $260,000. The finding that Keenan's lot was worth $150,000 was also based on trial testimony about the value of the lot at the time of trial. Thus, although the superior court did not explicitly state the date of valuation, it is clear that the values were determined as of the time of trial. The superior court did not err by using the time of trial as the valuation date. C. Wade Waived His Argument that the Superior Court Used an Improper Formula To Determine the Appropriate Amount of Owelty Because He Failed To Raise the Issue Before the Superior Court. Wade argues that the superior court adopted an improper formula to determine owelty. He argues that the formula was simplistic and not supported by authority or precedent. Specifically, Wade argues that the formula is improper because it credited Keenan with one hundred percent of the value of the improvements which had been made on his lot regardless of the source and because it did not require any accounting by Mr. Keenan of the joint funds which he controlled and which were expended on his cabin during the five-year period from 1994 to 1999. Keenan responds that the superior court did not err in adopting a formula for resolution which excluded the value of Keenan's improvements. Specifically, Keenan argues that the superior court credited Wade with one-half of the amount of partnership funds that had been expended on the Keenan cabin and that the court possesses the power to enter any order necessary to accomplish a just and equitable partition. Wade failed to oppose the formula at issue when it was introduced by Keenan's pre-trial motion to establish the law of the case. The court's order on that motion determined that Wade would not share in the value of the improvements to Keenan's lot and that Wade's improvements to his own cabin would not entitle him to a credit. Wade did not object to the order or seek reconsideration in a timely manner. Generally, a party's failure to file a timely opposition to a motion results in waiver of the right to object on appeal unless there is plain error. [19] Plain error exists where an obvious mistake has been made which creates a high likelihood that injustice has resulted. [20] Here, Wade failed to file any opposition to the motion to establish the law of the case. Further, the formula the court adopted took into account both the credit [Wade] would be entitled to as a result of contribution of partnership funds to [Keenan]'s cabin and the amount of personal funds expended by the plaintiff for partnership expenses. Thus, the superior court did not make an obvious mistake in adopting the formula. Wade's argument that the formula is improper is therefore waived. D. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Entering a Money Judgment Against Wade. The superior court accepted Keenan's proposed amended final judgment and entered an order on the judgment on August 23, 2006. The amended final judgment ordered the parties to engage the services of a title insurance company for the purpose of conducting a real estate closing, to execute grants of easement and a water rights agreement in the form submitted by the plaintiff attached to his opposition to the defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, and to execute the appropriate conveyancing documents. The judgment also ordered the defendant to deposit the total amount of judgment ($66,405.13) in escrow before all the documents were recorded. After recordation, the funds were to be disbursed to the plaintiff. Wade argues that the form and substance of the judgment are fatally flawed. Specifically, he argues that the judgment does not partition the property, but rather improperly directs the parties to engage a title insurance company and create an escrow of funds. Wade also argues that the judgment fails to confirm the agreement regarding easements and utilities and constitutes a money judgment, which he alleges is improper. Keenan responds that partition was performed by the parties' agreement, that the cases cited by Wade do not support his argument for an alternative to a money judgment, that there was already agreement on the easements and utilities issue, and that Wade's argument against use of an escrow agent is left unexplained. Wade's argument that the superior court failed to partition the property ignores the court's Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment of March 24, 2005. In that order, the court partitioned the property in accordance with Plat 2004-6, awarding the plaintiff Lot 3A-2 and awarding the defendant Lot 3A-1. Thus, transfer of title was the only remaining act that had to be completed in order to effectuate the partition. The use of a title insurance company assists with the title transfer process (conducting a real estate closing). Wade fails to indicate why the use of a title insurance company is improper, so we do not consider this argument. [21] Wade's argument that a money judgment is inappropriate in this case presents an issue of first impression in Alaska. There is no definitive rule as to whether a money judgment can be granted for owelty or whether owelty may only be awarded by charging a lien on the share of greater value. [22] To support his argument that a money judgment is inappropriate, Wade cites Updike v. Adams [23] and Pino v. Sanchez. [24] In Updike, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that payment of owelty may not be so imposed upon a party as to be unreasonably burdensome, considering both the condition of the property and the party. [25] The Updike court also stated, [w]here one is unable to make payment at the time of division, it should be a charge or lien upon his share, and a reasonable time should be given for the payment. [26] In Pino, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the trial court had erred in allowing a deferral of owelty payment until an indeterminate future date, and explained that a reasonable time for payment must be set by the trial court. [27] The rule in Updike provides a sound approach to the issue of whether owelty should be imposed as a money judgment or a lien on the property of greater value because it takes into account the difficulty co-owners may have in satisfying large money judgments. The Pino rule is also wise because it ensures that co-owners who are entitled to owelty will receive their fair share within a reasonable time. Here, Wade filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and attached an affidavit in which he described why he believed it would be unreasonably burdensome to impose owelty as a money judgment. He stated: The existing judgment orders immediate payment of [$49,454.09]. The ten day stay of execution will expire on June 30, 2006 and comes at a time when I am short of liquid assets. I recently bought a new condominium and have just moved to it. My former residence, a condo is listed for sale, but has been on the market for just a few days. I have no mortgage on either condo, and also have no mortgage on the subject property in Seldovia. However, I did just negotiate an unsecured bridge loan from FNBA to purchase the new condo and I do not expect that the bank will loan me addition [sic] money on an unsecured basis at this time. . . . I can and will, if necessary, draw money to pay the owelty from a retirement account, but that will have adverse tax consequences. I think that, under the appropriate authority the court should fix a time for payment not less than six months from this date, or should provide for terms such as I have suggested in my proposed form of judgment. Wade's affidavit fails to show that it is unreasonably burdensome, considering the condition of the property and the party, to impose owelty as a money judgment. Wade appears to have various assets, including real property and a retirement account that could be used to satisfy the judgment. It is not unreasonably burdensome to require him to make a one-time payment. Thus, the superior court did not err by entering a money judgment against Wade. [28] Finally, Wade argues that the superior court erred by failing to confirm the agreement regarding easements and utilities. Aside from this cursory statement, Wade provides no argument on this point in his brief. Thus, we do not consider the argument on appeal. [29] Even if we did consider the argument, it has no merit because Wade and Keenan already agreed to an access easement, view easement, and shared water rights, and the court had no duty to confirm their agreement. E. The Superior Court Correctly Determined that Keenan Was the Prevailing Party for Purposes of Alaska Civil Rule 82 Attorney's Fees. Wade argues that the superior court erred by determining that Keenan was the prevailing party for purposes of attorney's fees. Wade argues that he should have been designated as the prevailing party because he prevailed on what he considers the most important issue at trial: valuation of the property. He also reasons that Keenan cannot be designated as the prevailing party because the judgment he was awarded is substantially less than the amount of his Alaska Civil Rule 68 settlement offer. Alaska Civil Rule 82(a) provides that the prevailing party shall receive attorney's fees. [30] The trial judge has wide discretion as to whether attorney's fees should be awarded. [31] We may find an abuse of discretion only if the trial court's determination as to attorney's fees was manifestly unreasonable. [32] The prevailing party is the party who has successfully prosecuted or defended against the action, the one who is successful on the main issue of the action and in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered. The determination of who is the `prevailing' party is within the broad discretion of the trial court. [33] Furthermore, a plaintiff can be the `prevailing party' though not receiving the full recovery sought if the `plaintiff prevailed on the basic liability question and received an affirmative recovery based on its successful litigation of that question, which was substantial in amount.' [34] The superior court's decision to award Keenan attorney's fees in the amount of $8,243.67 [35] is not manifestly unreasonable. The main issues in this action were the amount of owelty owing to Keenan and the property values considered in the owelty calculation. As the superior court stated in its order of May 22, 2006, [t]he heart of the parties' dispute is whether Mr. Wade is to share in the value [of] the structure built as the `guest cabin' [Keenan's cabin]. Keenan was successful on this issue because the court determined that Wade would not share in the value of the improvements to Keenan's lot. Although Keenan did not receive the full recovery he sought, [36] he still prevailed on the issue that was the heart of the parties' dispute and received a substantial recovery of $57,436.61 (including pre-judgment interest). Thus, it was well within the superior court's wide discretion to determine that Keenan was the prevailing party and award him Rule 82 attorney's fees.