Opinion ID: 2581959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: photograph of victim at scene

Text: [¶ 75] The appellant argues that the district court erred in admitting into evidence State's Exhibit 5 (the photograph), a photograph of the deceased victim at the crime scene. The appellant did not object to the photograph's admission into evidence at trial. On appeal, it is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to demonstrate plain error in that the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 (Wyo.1997). [¶ 76] The record clearly reflects what occurred at trial regarding the photograph's admission into evidence. Officer Brackin testified that he arrived at the crime scene almost immediately after the minivan came to rest, and as the appellant was fleeing the scene. Officer Brackin then described the minivan's location, and its extensive physical damage. State's Exhibit 4, a photograph of the minivan's front end, was admitted into evidence without objection. The vehicle's condition, including the physical damage described by Officer Brackin, is evident in Exhibit 4. The following colloquy then ensued: [PROSECUTOR]: Officer Brackin, did you notice any passengers in that minivan at the time you first walked up? A. Yes, sir, I did.[ [24] ] Q. What position was that passenger in? A. As I walked to the front of the vehicle, I looked through the  the hole in the front windshield and I saw that there was a male that was in the van in a position where his face  the right side of his face and head was laying in the passenger seat. His body was  essentially looked to be suspended in the air, with his pant leg or legs, ankle, caught on the broken glass. Q. Did you observe any obvious injuries to the passenger in the van? A. I did. When I looked at him, of course, his  his body was somewhat in an unnatural state. His head and neck were bent further than what is normally allowed. I also noticed that he was missing, about mid calf, his foot. There was an obvious, of course, fracture of the lower leg. And there was muscle tissue hanging from the bottom of the pant leg. Q. Did you check to see if this person was alive? A. I saw that from the obvious injury of the lower portion of the leg, there was actually no blood flow, either venous or arterial blood flow. There was some blood in the seat where his face was on the seat, but not too  not a large amount. I checked. There was no pulse. . . . Q. Officer Brackin, I'm handing you what I have marked as State's Exhibit 5 for identification. Can you tell me what that is? A. That is the person that I saw when I looked in the van, in the position in which I found him. I later identified him as  as Mr. Donald Walker. Q. How are you able to identify that person? A. He  I saw that he had a wallet in his back pocket. I removed the wallet. Went through the wallet. Found a driver's license with his name. . . . [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I would offer State's Exhibit 5 for  [APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: No objection, your Honor. [¶ 77] Trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence are subject to our well-known review standard: Such decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Story v. State, 2001 WY 3, ¶ 9, 15 P.3d 1066, 1068 (Wyo.2001); Blumhagen v. State, 11 P.3d 889, 892 (Wyo.2000). Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo.2000) ( quoting Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1999)). A trial court's evidentiary rulings `are entitled to considerable deference,' and will not be reversed on appeal so long as `there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling....' Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S.Ct. 1620, 149 L.Ed.2d 483 (2001) ( quoting Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Wyo.1997)). The appellant bears the burden of proving an abuse of discretion. Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶¶ 11-12, 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo.2002). [¶ 78] Generally, photographs are admissible if they correctly portray the subject matter, do not convey a false impression, and if their probative value is such as to outweigh the possibility of undue prejudice from such circumstances as their gruesome character. Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 973 (Wyo.1973). Reversal is required for the admission of a photograph only if the photograph has little or no probative value and is extremely inflammatory or introduced merely to inflame the jury. Shaffer v. State, 640 P.2d 88, 97, 31 A.L.R.4th 166 (Wyo.1982). Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062, 1071 (Wyo. 1992). [25] Relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. W.R.E. 401. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. W.R.E. 402. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. W.R.E. 403. [¶ 79] The appellant first contends that the photograph was not probative of any fact in dispute. We find that the photograph was probative of the victim's identity, the fact of the victim's death (including the condition in which Officer Brackin found the victim upon arriving at the scene), and the jury's understanding of the cause of the victim's death (to the extent it coincided with several witnesses' specific testimony regarding the crime scene and what occurred between the point the minivan left the road and ultimately came to rest). In this respect, we note the following: (1) In every homicide case the state must establish the identity of the person killed and Officer Brackin used the photograph at trial in identifying the deceased victim. Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 13, 49 P.3d 975, 983 (Wyo. 2002); (2) The State was also required to prove that the appellant operated a vehicle in violation of [Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (driving while under the influence)], caused the death of another person, and that the violation [of Wyo. Stat. Ann § 31-5-233 was] the proximate cause of the [victim's] death. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b); (3) Generally, photographs `are properly received into evidence to enable the jury as the trier of facts to better understand that which the photo represents.' Mayer v. State, 618 P.2d 127, 130 (Wyo.1980) ( quoting Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo.1973)); see also Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 528 (Wyo. 1993); and (4) Generally, it `is well-established that photographs may be used to graphically portray, among other things, the scene of a crime, the identification of a victim, the appearance and condition of the deceased, and the location, nature and extent of the wounds or injuries, all of which matters are relevant.' People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 746-47 (Colo.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 893, 120 S.Ct. 221, 145 L.Ed.2d 186 (1999) ( quoting Young v. People, 175 Colo. 461, 488 P.2d 567, 574 (1971)). [¶ 80] According to the appellant, the victim's identity and the victim's physical condition at the scene were not disputed issues at trial and Officer Brackin was capable of testifying to these matters in the absence of the disputed photograph. The appellant's contention is essentially that the photograph was irrelevant or unnecessary in light of the disputed issues at trial and Officer Brackin's testimony regarding what he observed at the crime scene. We have previously rejected similar arguments, even when the defense has conceded or stipulated to elements of a crime. In Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 13, 49 P.3d at 983, we stated that [s]ince the prosecution has the burden of proving all the elements of a crime, relevant photographs do not become inadmissible because the defendant concedes the fact and cause of the victim's death. See also Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Wyo.1978). Similarly, in Barnes, 858 P.2d at 526-28, after stating that relevant photographs do not become inadmissible because the defendant concedes the fact and cause of the victim's death, we said: Following defendant's stipulation, it was argued that the photographs were cumulative and unnecessary. Such claim does not deal with relevancy but concerns the quantum and sufficiency of evidence. Evidence has never been held irrelevant because there was other evidence that may prove the same facts. Rather, the test of relevancy, found in W.R.E. 401, is one of reasonableness and common sense and is to be liberally applied to favor admissibility rather than exclusion of evidence.... ... Appellant's position is that, conceding the nature, extent and severity of the injuries as necessary and relevant, the pathologist could orally testify to facts that would describe the injuries sufficiently for the jury to comprehend their magnitude. We trust juries to decide cases involving gory, gruesome killings and decide questions of life and death. It is inconsistent that we must sanitize the case by withholding fair evidence of the crime and its results. [¶ 81] The appellant also argues that the photograph was unduly prejudicial. According to the appellant, the photograph was gruesome because blood is visible around the victim's face, the victim's empty pant leg is dangling, and it graphically portrayed the victim, lodged in the vehicle, with the amputation of the foot obvious from the dangling pant leg. The appellant further argues that the photograph was introduced solely to inflame the jury because it appears that the photograph may have been used pointedly during closing argument. [¶ 82] The photograph depicts the position of the victim's body (fully clothed) in the minivan, with the victim's head near the crease of the passenger's seat and his legs on the dashboard near the minivan's shattered windshield. The victim's body is facing away from the camera, a small amount of blood is visible on the passenger seat near the victim's face, and a portion of the victim's apparently empty pant leg is also visible. [26] However, considering the nature of the severe impact between the minivan and the victim, and the victim's resulting injuries as described in the coroner's report [27] and by Officer Brackin, the photograph was likely less gruesome than would be expected under the circumstances and certainly was not extremely inflammatory on its face. [¶ 83] Contrary to the appellant's argument, the record does not clearly show that the prosecutor referred to the photograph during his closing argument. The relevant portion of the prosecutor's closing argument follows: As the minivan approaches the intersection of Wasatch and Harrison Drive, the driver fails to make the turn. He fails to make this turn. He basically  in a timely manner. He does try to turn, but he doesn't start his turn until he gets up on the sidewalk. His reactions are slow because of  because of his intoxication. At Point A, at this point, on the sidewalk where he comes up over the curb, a minimum speed of 70 mile an hour. So he's going at least 70. He follows along at Point C, where the officers were able to determine was the area of impact. This is not exactly where Donald Walker was. Nobody knows exactly where he was. But he was in this area. Because of the damage to the vehicle and the mark on the sidewalk were consistent, that is the area that he was at. At that point, the vehicle  this point where there's a little scuff mark, there is an estimated speed, a minimum speed, of 63 mile an hour when he hit Donald Walker. When he hit Mr. Walker and he did this to him. (Indicating all the while.). The only place that they got a definite speed for the green minivan that Mr. Whitney was driving was here at Point F. The points to which the prosecutor referred (Point A, Point C, and Point F) coincide with locations depicted in State's Exhibits 17 and 17A. Exhibit 17 is a scale diagram of the crime scene, and Exhibit 17A is a legend for the various points depicted in Exhibit 17. [28] According to the record, the prosecutor was [i]ndicating all the while during this portion of his closing argument; however, given the context of the prosecutor's argument, Exhibit 17 is the only ascertainable exhibit to which the prosecutor might have been indicating. [¶ 84] Accordingly, the appellant has failed to establish a clear abuse of discretion (and thereby an error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law) by the district court in admitting this single photograph into evidence. See generally also People v. Viduya, 703 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Colo. 1985); Munden v. State, 698 P.2d 621, 626 (Wyo.1985); Collins v. State, 589 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Wyo.1979); and Seyle, 584 P.2d at 1084.