Opinion ID: 1060893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: open and obvious doctrine

Text: In premises liability cases, application of duty principles resulted in imposing a duty on an owner or possessor or premises to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to a guest (licensee) or business invitee. [7] The duty includes the responsibility of either removing or warning against any latent or hidden dangerous condition on the premises of which one was aware or should have been aware through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 594 (Tenn. 1994); Smith v. Inman Realty Co., 846 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tenn. App. 1992). Because the rationale for the imposition of this duty was partly the owner's superior knowledge of a perilous condition on his premises, a rule of no-liability also was derived: that a premises owner has no liability for injuries sustained from dangers that were obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well known to the invitee [or licensee] as to the owner. Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne, 41 Tenn. App. 201, 293 S.W.2d 40, 42 (1955); see also McCormick v. Waters, 594 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tenn. 1980). In many jurisdictions, this so-called open and obvious rule was frequently explained in terms of duty, that is, a defendant has no duty to warn or protect against a known or obvious danger. Other jurisdictions analogized the open and obvious rule to contributory negligence or assumption of risk, doctrines that also barred a plaintiff's recovery for negligence. See Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting From Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. Pa. L.Rev. 629 (1952). Regardless of the terminology, the result was the same: no recovery. Despite its traditional application by many courts, the open and obvious doctrine was widely criticized for producing arbitrary results and being wrong in policy. James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 Yale L.J. 605, 628 (1954). As one commentator said: [T]here is perhaps no condition the danger of which is so obvious that all [persons] under all circumstances would necessarily see and realize the danger in the absence of contributory negligence, and this is particularly true if the further principle so often repeated is accepted that the customer or business invitee is entitled to assume that the premises are reasonably safe for his use. Keeton, supra, 100 U. Pa. L.Rev. at 642. Another writer observed that the open and obvious rule failed to consider all the relevant circumstances: An undeniable legal error is committed every time a court bars recovery to an injured person based solely on the fact that the perilous nature of the alleged cause of harm was `apparent to all,' without any consideration of the multitude of other factors which may justify or excuse the plaintiff's conduct. Phillips, Assumption of the Risk Returns in Disguise as the Open and Obvious Doctrine Defense, 30 ISBA Tort Trends 4 at 10 (1995). In addition to these criticisms, the adoption of comparative fault principles led numerous jurisdictions to reconsider the open and obvious rule and to conclude that it should not automatically preclude recovery. [8] As the Mississippi Supreme Court observed: Emerging from other jurisdictions is a modern trend toward holding that the obviousness of a danger does not necessarily relieve the owner's duty of care. Moreover, many states have limited the use of this doctrine by holding that a plaintiff's knowledge or the obviousness of a dangerous condition does not preclude recovery, and, some instances, states have expressly abolished the open and obvious doctrine after the adoption of comparative negligence. Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So.2d at 24. The Illinois Supreme Court agrees that [t]he manifest trend of the courts in this country is away from the traditional rule absolving, ipso facto, owners and occupiers of land from liability for injuries resulting from known or obvious conditions... . Ward v. K mart Corp., 143 Ill.Dec. at 296, 554 N.E.2d at 231. Nearly every jurisdiction has also relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A, which states the rule as follows: (1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. (Emphasis added). The word `known' denotes not only knowledge of the existence of the condition or activity itself, but also appreciation of the danger it involves, and the word `obvious' means that both the condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man, in the position of the visitor, exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A (comment b). The restatement further provides that the premises owner's duty exists if the harm can or should be anticipated notwithstanding the known or obvious danger: Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee's attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it. Such reason may also arise where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A (comment f). As the Michigan Supreme Court has said: If the risk of harm remains unreasonable, despite its obviousness or despite knowledge of it by the invitee, then the circumstances may be such that the [defendant] is required to undertake reasonable precautions [and] the issue then ... is for the jury to decide. Bertrand v. Alan Ford, Inc., 537 N.W.2d at 187. Although a few courts have held that comparative fault principles abrogate the open and obvious rule entirely, [9] the majority follow the Restatement position and recognize that duty remains a necessary part of the analysis. In Ward v. K mart, supra , for example, the Illinois Supreme Court explained: [W]e recognize that the Restatement speaks to the more general question of liability, and not specifically to the existence of a duty. But we think the principles expressed there are consistent with the general duty of reasonable care owed to invitees and licensees, and they are relevant to the resolution of whether an injury was reasonably foreseeable. We emphasize, however, that since the existence of a duty turns in large part on public policy considerations, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden upon the defendant, as well as the likelihood of injury and the possible serious nature of such an injury must also be taken into account. 143 Ill.Dec. at 297, 554 N.E.2d at 232 (emphasis added). The analysis, therefore, as in any negligence case, is first upon duty in accordance with the foreseeability and gravity of harm, and the feasibility and availability of alternatives; if a duty is imposed, then the surrounding circumstances are analyzed under the principles of comparative fault. [10]