Opinion ID: 2514148
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Threshold Requirement

Text: This court has never previously considered how a trial court should respond when a defendant, on trial for a sexual offense, seeks to admit evidence purportedly demonstrating that the complainant has made other allegedly false statements to the effect that he or she has been the victim of a separate sexual assault. [8] Courts that have addressed the admissibility of statements by complainants of unrelated sexual assaults in which the complainant was a victim [9] have uniformly held that evidence of false statements of unrelated sex assaults are not excluded by the rape shield statute because they are not evidence of sexual conduct. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 105 Nev. 497, 779 P.2d 87, 89 (1989); Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 319, 368 S.E.2d 263, 264 (1988); cf. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. at 521, 849 P.2d at 77 (stating that evidence that a cognitively-challenged complainant fantasized about sex would not be barred by Hawaii's rape shield statute because sexual fantasizing is not sexual conduct). [F]abricated accusations of sexual abuse or sex assault are highly probative of a [complainant's] credibility concerning sexual assault charges. Miller, 779 P.2d at 89 (citing Little v. State, 413 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind.Ct.App.1980)). Under HRE Rule 608(b), evidence of specific acts, if probative of truthfulness, may be introduced for the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness. Of course, the probative value of the evidence must always be weighed against the risk of prejudice, confusion, embarrassment, or undue delay. See HRE Rule 403. Clinebell, Miller, and Little, supra, were among the cases cited by the ICA for the proposition that false allegations of unrelated sexual assaults are not excluded by the rape shield statute. See West, 95 Hawaii 494, n. 17, 24 P.3d at 690, n. 17. With this proposition, there can be no dispute. More importantly, however, and apparently overlooked by the ICA, each of these cases clearly recognizes that the admissibility of such statements is dependent upon its falsity and that, therefore, a threshold determination by the court that the statement regarding the unrelated sexual assault is false is required. See Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 266; Little, 413 N.E.2d at 643; Miller, 779 P.2d at 90. In Clinebell, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court held that [a] complaining witness' prior accusations are admissible . . . only if a court makes a threshold determination that a reasonable probability of falsity exists. 368 S.E.2d at 266 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Little, the Court of Appeals of Indiana outlined the following analysis for determining the admissibility of an allegedly false accusation of sexual misconduct: The focus is the falsity of the accusations. We believe that evidence of false accusations of similar sexual misconduct is admissible on the issue of the victim's credibility. The allegations, however, must be demonstrably false. As stated in State v. Nab [,] 245 Or. 454, 421 P.2d 388, 391 [(Ore.1966)]: It should be observed that the rule . . . does not permit the trial to stray from the central issue of the guilt or innocence of the defendant into a full-scale investigation of charges made by the prosecutrix against other persons. That would be intolerable. The rule is limited to the reception of evidence that the prosecutrix has admitted the falsity of the charges or they had been disproved. 413 N.E.2d at 643 (ellipsis in original) (emphases added). Finally, in Miller, the Nevada Supreme Court explained that, [a]s a prerequisite to admitting a complaining witness' prior sexual assault and sexual abuse accusations and corroborative extrinsic evidence proving the falsity thereof, a threshold inquiry must establish both the fact of the accusations and the falsity thereof even before defense counsel launches into cross-examination. See Covington v. Alaska, 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska [App.]1985); Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 266. Thus, if a defendant in a sexual assault case proposes to cross-examine the complaining witness about prior false sexual assault or sexual abuse allegations and introduce corroborative evidence, he must, prior to such questioning, file written notice of his intent. The trial court must then order a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to determine the propriety of such questioning and the admissibility of corroborative evidence. 779 P.2d at 90 (emphasis added). In fact, nearly every jurisdiction addressing this question has consistently required a preliminary determination of falsity prior to the admission of allegedly false statements of unrelated sexual assaults. See Peeples v. State, 681 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.1995) (reiterating the rule in Alabama that demonstrated falsity is the sine qua non of admissibility of. . . evidence [of a victim's prior false allegations of sexual misconduct].), reh'g denied, 681 So.2d 236 (1996); Covington v. State, 703 P.2d 436, 442 (Alaska App.1985) (adopting the rule from a majority of other courts that evidence of false accusations by complainant is only permitted if the defendant makes a showing out of the presence of the jury that the witness' prior allegations of sexual assault were false, as, for example, where the charges somehow had been disproved or where the witness had conceded their falsity); accord State v. Hutchinson, 141 Ariz. 583, 688 P.2d 209, 212-13 (Ariz.App.1984); State v. Sullivan, 244 Conn. 640, 712 A.2d 919, 923 (1998); People v. Mason, 219 Ill. App.3d 76, 161 Ill.Dec. 705, 578 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (1991); People v. Williams, 191 Mich. App. 269, 477 N.W.2d 877, 879 (1991); State v. Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. App.1993); State ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court of the Montana Fourth Judicial District, 277 Mont. 349, 922 P.2d 474, 479 (1996); People v. Passenger, 175 A.D.2d 944, 946, 572 N.Y.S.2d 972 (N.Y.App.Div.1991); State v. LeClair, 83 Or.App. 121, 730 P.2d 609, 615 (Or.App.1986); State v. Chamley, 568 N.W.2d 607, 616 (S.D.1997); Tinlin v. State, 983 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex.App.1998); State v. Quinn, 200 W.Va. 432, 490 S.E.2d 34, 40 (1997), cert. denied, Quinn v. West Virginia, 522 U.S. 1004, 118 S.Ct. 577, 139 L.Ed.2d 416 (1997). Furthermore, as some courts have explained, where the truth or falsity of a statement regarding an unrelated sexual assault is unknown, it falls within the purview of the rape shield statute and must be analyzed accordingly. See, e.g., Little, 413 N.E.2d at 643; Quinn, 490 S.E.2d at 40; Booker v. State, 334 Ark. 434, 976 S.W.2d 918, 920 (1998) (holding that, where no evidence was presented to show whether the allegation evidence was true or false, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it). [T]o permit reception of evidence which may be true or false would allow circumvention of the [r]ape [s]hield [statute], Little, 413 N.E.2d at 643, because the jury may be tempted to consider evidence about an alleged victim's sexual conduct in order to determine the victim's credibility. Id. A juror's consideration of an alleged victim's sexual conduct for the purpose of determining the victim's credibility is precisely the circumstance that the rape shield statutes are designed to guard against. Based on the foregoing wealth of authority, we agree with the West Virginia Supreme Court that [m]ost if not all jurisdictions which have considered the applicability of rape shield laws to other statements evidence have answered this question by concluding that rape shield laws apply to such evidence unless the defendant makes a threshold showing to the trial judge outside the presence of the jury based on substantial proof that the other statements made by the alleged victim are false. Quinn, 490 S.E.2d at 39 (emphasis added). As with any preliminary determination regarding admissibility, if an objection as to admissibility of testimony is made, counsel seeking to introduce the testimony may make a specific offer of what is expected to be proved by the testimony. See Haw.R.Civ.P.Rule 43(c) (2000). If the offer of proof is sufficient to establish falsity, the court, at an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury, should determine the threshold issue. Notwithstanding the uniformity with which the cases require a preliminary determination of falsity, courts have varied widely with respect to the standard of proof required. See, e.g., State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis.2d 774, 456 N.W.2d 600, 606-07 (1990) (requiring an offer of proof from which the jury could reasonably conclude the statement was false); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1978) (requiring some factual basis of falsity); Clinebell, 368 S.E.2d at 266 (requiring a reasonable probability of falsity); Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1981) (requiring that it be convincingly [shown] that the other charge was false); Miller, 779 P.2d at 90 (requiring that falsity be established by a preponderance of the evidence); Little, 413 N.E.2d at 643 (requiring that the prior charges be demonstrably false); Covington, 703 P.2d at 442 (requiring proof of falsity, such as disproving charges or showing witness conceded falsity). In Hawai`i, we have previously determined that, [w]here the facts necessary to admissibility are disputed, the offering party has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Gano, 92 Hawai`i at 172, 988 P.2d at 1164 (citing State v. McGriff, 76 Hawai`i 148, 157, 871 P.2d 782, 791 (1994) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987))) (ellipsis and brackets omitted). We see no reason to depart from this rule in this context. Accordingly, we hold that, where a defendant seeks to admit allegedly false statements made by a complainant regarding an unrelated sexual assault, the trial court must make a preliminary determination based on a preponderance of the evidence that the statements are false. Correlatively, where the trial court is unable to determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement is false, the defendant has failed to meet his or her burden, and the evidence may be properly excluded. We now turn to the facts of this case.