Opinion ID: 484315
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Purpose and Legislative History of the EAJA

Text: 22 The EAJA grew out of a concern for the unequal position of the individual vis a vis an insensitive and ever-expanding governmental bureaucracy. The House Report expresses concern about the fact that, at the present time, the government with its greater resources and expertise can in effect coerce compliance with its position. H.R.Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., Statement, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4984, 4988. 23 Through the EAJA, Congress intended to provide individuals with additional means for protecting fundamental rights. But Congress also envisioned the Act as an instrument to enforce and perfect public policy. The House Report elaborates: 24 The bill rests on the premise that a party who chooses to litigate an issue against the Government is not only representing his or her own vested interest but is also refining and formulating public policy. An adjudication or civil action provides a concrete, adversarial test of Government regulation and thereby insures the legitimacy and fairness of the law. 25 H.R.Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 10, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980 at 4988. The ventilation of well-founded claims, the framers of the Act believed, would force the authorities to interpret and apply the law correctly. 26 The EAJA, thus, seeks to modify the incentive structure underlying individual challenges of the governmental administrative apparatus. Under the act, courts and administrative agencies may award prevailing parties attorney's fees, expert witness fees and other expenses against the United States. Individuals with strong claims against unreasonable governmental action--i.e., with a high probability of prevailing--end up, at least in theory, with lower expected litigation costs. Such individuals will supposedly have a greater incentive to stand firm on their rights and thereby advance public policy. 27 The House Report on the bill explains that the decision to limit the coverage of section 504(a)(1) to adversary adjudications under section 554 of the APA 28 reflects a desire to limit the award of fees to situations where participants have a concrete interest at stake but nevertheless may be deterred from asserting or defending that interest because of the time and expense involved in pursuing administrative remedies. In these situations, in order to insure that individuals will actively seek to protect their rights vis-a-vis the government, they must have the opportunity to recover the costs of litigating. An administrative remedy in these circumstances cannot be fairly effective unless a prevailing party is made whole. 29 H.Rep. No. 1418, supra, at 14, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1980, at 4993. With the reference to adjudications under section 554, hence, the framers of the EAJA intended to identify a time-consuming and expensive set of proceedings which tend to discourage many legitimate claimants. It is consistent with that purpose to have the EAJA apply only to proceedings of the type referred to in section 554. For, ceteris paribus, adjudications determined on the record after an agency hearing require a greater investment of time and money than other proceedings. 30 On the other hand, the fact that a proceeding is technically conducted directly under section 554 does not make the adjudication any more or less burdensome on individuals with valid claims than other adjudications that are conducted in the same manner. Limiting the EAJA's coverage to adjudications directly subject to section 554, consequently, would be less consonant with the Congressional intent than including all proceedings of the type described in that section. 6 31