Opinion ID: 1193421
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unconstitutionality of the Act When a General Law Is, or Can Be Made, Applicable.

Text: Article 4, section 21, of the Nevada Constitution, provides: In all cases ... where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the State. The City first contends that general laws providing for municipal and county ownership and administration of airports (NRS chs. 495, 496) are applicable, since they cover the general subject matter to which the Act refers and in some instances directly conflict with the provisions of the Act. ( E.g., NRS 495.010, subsection 1, and 496.020, subsection 5, authorize acquisition and control of airports by cities, while Ch. 474, section 31, paragraph 3, specifically prohibits the exercise of such powers by the cities of Reno and Sparks.) This contention is unsound. Any conflict between special and general laws must, if the general law is constitutional, be resolved in favor of the special law. Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 57 Nev. 332, 65 P.2d 133 (1937). The existence of a general law covering the basic subject matter does not necessarily establish that such a law is applicable for purposes of section 21. Washoe County Water Conserv'n Dist. v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935). As Mr. Justice Hawley observed in Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, 336 (1873): If we adopt the views so earnestly contended for by appellant it would be impossible for the legislature to pass any local or special law, because all subjects of legislation are more or less general; and to say that when the subject of the law was general a general law would be applicable would prohibit the legislature from passing any local or special law. The test of whether a general law is, or can be made, applicable, for purposes of section 21, has been articulated in various ways. In State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111, 122 (1869), this court held: A law, to be applicable in the sense in which the words are evidently used, and their only proper sense in such connection, must answer the just purposes of the legislation; that is best subserve the interests of the people of the state, or such class or portion as the particular legislation is intended to affect.... Almost 80 years later, the court observed: This court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of special or local acts of the legislature, passed, in some instances, because the general legislation existing was insufficient to meet the peculiar needs of a particular situation, and, in other instances, for the reason that facts and circumstances existed, in relation to a particular situation, amounting to an emergency which required more speedy action and relief than could be had by proceeding under the existing general law... . Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 96, 177 P.2d 677, 686 (1947). In this instance, the Legislature has expressly determined that [b]ecause of special circumstances and conditions a general law cannot be made applicable. Ch. 474, § 2, ¶ 1(g), at 968. The Legislature found that the airport originally served primarily the city residents, but is now serving the inhabitants of a large geographical area and ever-increasing numbers of tourists, and therefore has become a regional airport. Ch. 474, § 2, ¶ 1(a), (b), (c), at 968. The Legislature further determined that [t]he City of Reno is unable to operate the airport effectively within the traditional framework of local government and that [d]evelopment of the modern airport requires the expenditure of vast sums of money ... not available to the City of Reno. Ch. 474, § 2, ¶ 1(e), (f), at 968. The Act would allow the tax burden [of the airport] to spread over Washoe County. Ch. 474, § 2, ¶ 1(g), at 968. And, finally, the Act would accommodate the expanding urban population patterns, provide adequate funding and establish the administrative machinery necessary to insure adequate air service to the region. Ch. 474, § 2, ¶ 1(h), at 968. Anchoring his ruling on those legislative findings, the district judge, in his written decision, concluded that the Act was constitutional. [2] We agree. As early as 1869, this court enunciated the rule in State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, 5 Nev. 111, 120 (1869): The leading rule in regard to the judicial construction of constitutional provisions ... declares that in cases of doubt every possible presumption and intendment will be made in favor of the constitutionality of the act in question, and that the courts will only interfere in cases of clear and unquestioned violation of the fundamental law. It has been repeatedly said that the presumption is that every state statute, the objects and provisions of which are among the acknowledged powers of legislation, is valid and constitutional, and such presumption is not to be overcome unless the contrary is clearly demonstrated. ... Later, this court, in Western Realty Co. v. City of Reno, 63 Nev. 330, 349-50, 172 P.2d 158, 167 (1946), reiterated: Municipal administration is especially local in its nature, and local features peculiar to a municipality naturally call for special legislation... . Special legislation to meet the wants, requirements and special needs of each municipality, rather than general laws exclusively, is consonant with the fundamental principles and policy of local self-government and home rule, and in our judgment the true remedy is not absolutely and sweepingly to prohibit such legislation, but to safeguard it from legislative abuse... . (quoting 1 J. Dillon, Municipal Corporations, § 141, at 256 (5th ed. 1911)) (emphasis in original). We conclude that the Act does not offend article 4, section 21, of the Nevada Constitution.