Opinion ID: 1911139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of Statute

Text: In response to certified question four, we first note that Iowa Code section 614.8A applies to action[s] for damages for injur[ies] suffered as a result of sexual abuse. Iowa Code § 614.8A. In Doe v. Cherwitz, 518 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 1994), we analyzed the meaning of the words child and sexual abuse as used in the statute. In deciding that the meaning was to be found by reference to the criminal code, we quoted Iowa Code section 709.1 which defines sexual abuse and stated, We believe the 1990 Act makes it clear that the terms `sexual abuse' and `child' are to be defined by the criminal code and that `child' for these purposes means one under the age of fourteen. Id. at 364. We have also said that a statute of limitations should not be extended or applied to cases not clearly within the provisions of the statute. Welp v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 333 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Iowa 1983). In Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Iowa 1995), we addressed issues arising under section 614.1(9), the statute of limitations on medical malpractice. That statute applies to injuries to the person arising out of patient care. Iowa Code § 614.1(9) (1989). The petition by plaintiff Langner had alleged six claims against defendant Simpson. The claims included psychiatric malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander per se, slander, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract. We said We agree with Simpson that Iowa Code section 614.1(9)the malpractice statute of limitationsapplies to all of the claims the Langners assert against him and the hospital. The italicized language makes clear that all injuries arising out of patient care are covered by the statute. All of the claims in the Langners' petition arose out of injuries allegedly suffered while Kathy was under the care of Simpson and the hospital. Langner, 533 N.W.2d at 516. The conclusion we reached in Langner of the meaning of arising out of patient care bears on the scope of application of the language as a result of sexual abuse as used in section 614.8A. We believe the language of section 614.8A applies to claims causally connected to sexual abuse. Therefore, in order for the tolling provisions of section 614.8A to apply to a cause of action, sexual abuse as defined in section 709.1 must have been the cause of the injuries in question. The following additional claims brought by plaintiff clearly withstand this scrutiny: The claims alleged to have been the result of sexual abuse founded on assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count XVII, the claim for loss of spousal consortium brought by the husband of Linda Frideres is not included within the realm of section 614.8A. In Claus v. Whyle, 526 N.W.2d at 527, we affirmed our view that no cause of action will be recognized for loss of spousal consortium when the underlying acts occurred prior to the marriage. Without a marital relationship at the time of the alleged sexual abuse, a spouse has no right to bring a cause of action for loss of consortium. Under these circumstances, the discovery rule is not applicable. In the present case, because the alleged sexual abuse occurred before the marriage of plaintiff, there is no loss of consortium available to her husband under section 614.8A. See Beeck v. Aquaslide `N' Dive Corp., 350 N.W.2d 149, 167 (Iowa 1984). The concepts of failure to protect, either intentionally or negligently, and premises liability, as they relate to a claim of sexual abuse, are discussed in divisions VII and IX. Thus, in answer to certified question number four, section 614.8A applies to claims arising from an act of sexual abuse. Therefore, it applies to any of Linda Frideres' theories of liability recognized in law to the extent she seeks recovery for injuries resulting from sexual abuse.