Opinion ID: 1788387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Psychological Examination in Presence of Law Enforcement

Text: ¶ 9. Jordan first alleges that he was denied his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when Deputy Sheriff Todd Kemp was allowed to testify as to a comment he made during his mental evaluation by Dr. Reginald White. This claim was not raised at trial or on direct appeal to this Court and is, therefore, barred by the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1). This Court has noted that: Post-conviction relief is not granted upon facts and issues which could or should have been litigated at trial and on appeal. The doctrine of res judicata shall apply to all issues, both factual and legal, decided at trial and on direct appeal. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Supp.1994). We must caution that other issues which were either presented through direct appeal or could have been presented on direct appeal or at trial are procedurally barred and cannot be relitigated under the guise of poor representation by counsel. Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1129 (Miss. 1996). See also Bishop v. State, 882 So.2d 135, 149 (Miss.2004); Grayson v. State, 879 So.2d 1008, 1020 (Miss.2004); Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193, 1208 (Miss.1999). ¶ 10. Prior to trial, the defense obtained permission to have Jordan examined by a psychiatric expert. Dr. Reginald White testified in the sentencing phase that after examining Jordan, he had determined that Jordan appeared to be a person who would be easily influenced or dominated by a stronger person such as Frontrell Edwards. He also testified that Jordan appeared to have low-average intelligence. During the State's rebuttal, the State called Deputy Sheriff Todd Kemp who testified that he had transported Jordan to Dr. White's office and that he had been present during Jordan's interview. Deputy Kemp testified that Jordan had stated during the examination that he had not been influenced by Edwards and that both of them had done what they wanted to do. ¶ 11. Jordan now maintains that allowing Deputy Kemp to listen in on the examination violated his constitutional rights. Jordan relies on the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), which reversed the death sentence of a capital petitioner after a state psychiatrist testified in rebuttal at the sentencing hearing regarding comments made to him by the petitioner during a court-ordered competency evaluation. There the Court stated: The Court has held that the availability of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). In this case, the ultimate penalty of death was a potential consequence of what respondent told the examining psychiatrist. Just as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant from being made `the deluded instrument of his own conviction,' Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1867, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)(quoting 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 595 (8th ed. 1824)), it protects him as well from being made the deluded instrument of his own execution. 451 U.S. at 462, 101 S.Ct. at 1873. Estelle is distinguishable from the case sub judice because in Estelle, the statement made by the psychiatristthat the petitioner posed a future risk to the communitywas directly used by the jury to sentence the petitioner to death. [1] In the case sub judice, the statement made by the deputy refuted the psychiatrist's testimony that Jordan was easily influenced. There is nothing in the record to indicate that law enforcement surreptitiously placed Deputy Kemp in the room with Dr. White and Jordan during the examination for the sinister motive of eavesdropping to obtain incriminating evidence against Jordan for later use at trial. Additionally, similar testimony was allowed into evidence through Jordan's mother and was not directly rebutted by the State. ¶ 12. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21 (Rev.2000), the failure to raise a claim shall constitute a waiver thereof and shall be procedurally barred, but the court may upon a showing of cause and actual prejudice grant relief from the waiver. The section defines cause as those cases where the legal foundation upon which the claim for relief is based could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence at the time of trial or direct appeal. Actual prejudice is defined as those errors which would have actually adversely affected the ultimate outcome of the conviction or sentence. The petition must allege the necessary facts to prove cause and actual prejudice in order to overcome the procedural bar. ¶ 13. Even if this Court were to find that the testimony elicited from Deputy Sheriff Kemp was improper, Jordan fails to meet the requirements of section 99-39-21. This claim could have been raised before the trial court through an objection to Kemp's testimony, and this claim could have been raised before this Court on direct appeal. Because Jordan could have discovered this error with reasonable diligence at the time of trial or direct appeal, Jordan fails to meet the cause requirement of the statute. Jordan also fails to show any actual prejudice from this testimony. His mother testified that he was easily influenced, especially by his cousin, Frontrell Edwards. The State did not directly rebut this testimony, as it did the testimony of Dr. White. Because Jordan fails to meet both requirements of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21, the procedural bar is not waived, and he is not entitled to relief on this issue. ¶ 14. Jordan also claims that the deputy's actions violated his right to independent expert assistance. He cites Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires that the defense be given access to an independent psychiatric expert when the defendant's competency is in question. The trial judge here did grant Jordan permission to hire an independent expert, and the defense retained the services of Dr. White. Jordan claims that the presence of Deputy Kemp compromised the independence of the psychiatrist hired by the defense. We agree that the better practice would have been for the doctor to examine Jordan in the absence of any law enforcement officers after taking adequate security measures. However, we find that Jordan was given the opportunity to be examined by an independent psychiatrist of his choosing at State expense. The expert testified in accordance with the defense's mitigation theory that Jordan had been led to participate in the crimes by the stronger-willed Edwards. We find no constitutional deprivation requiring post-conviction relief. For the reasons stated, we find this issue to be without merit.