Opinion ID: 1650355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the alimony award in excess of petitioner's proven needs and therefore punitive in nature?

Text: Respondent argues although fault has been inextricably involved in our alimony decisions since Dupont v. Dupont, 10 Iowa 112 (1859), this consideration was never intended by the legislature. More important, he contends, alimony fixed in excess of proven needs is necessarily punitive and clearly violative of the legislative intent (in the Dissolution of Marriage Act, chapter 598, Code, 1971) to banish fault from the marriage dissolution arena. Section 598.21, Code, 1971, pertinently provides: When a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the parties as shall be justified. This is a reenactment of § 598.14, Code, 1966, except for the inconsequential substitution of justified for the word right. There is nothing in this statute limiting the court's consideration of alimony solely to the element of petitioner's basic needs. Trial court made no finding of fault, nor do we. While the question whether that element should be considered in fixing alimony is not before us here, it is not contended other determinative factors, identified in our decisions under the prior statute, should not be considered. Yansky v. Yansky, 172 N.W.2d 114 (Iowa 1969); Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398 (Iowa 1968). Fault was never more than one of the criteria to be weighed, and was seldom controlling. Sherrard v. Sherrard, 175 N. W.2d 411 (Iowa 1970). What respondent states was evidence of cost of petitioner's basic needs$5750was only a partial itemization of certain recurring taxes, utilities, insurance premiums and like costs. It did not include expense for food, repair and replacement of auto, and household furniture and equipment, home repair and maintenance, medical and dental expense, cosmetics, hairdresser, personal items, church support, gifts, charities, vacations and recreation. In addition, petitioner will be required to pay income tax on her alimony payments, which are deductible by respondent. Int. Rev.Code of 1954, §§ 71, 215. Important among those criteria ordinarily considered, and important here, is petitioner's age, the earning capacity of both parties, and their accustomed standard of living. These parties, although married a total of about thirty years, had a net worth of less than one year's income. The record indicates they lived in a three bedroom home worth $36,000, complete with new furniture and equipment. Each drove a Cadillac. Obviously, these parties enjoyed a high standard of living. Where trial court was not persuaded respondent's income would be significantly diminished, it might rightly decide under this record that during the interim period petitioner should not be compelled to lead a more austere life simply because of the marriage dissolution. Tallarico v. Tallarico, 164 N. W.2d 805 (Iowa 1969). We find nothing in the record to indicate the interim alimony provided in the decree was in excess of petitioner's current needs, considering the customary living standard of these parties. Trial court found no more than a temporary reduction in respondent's ability to pay. The alimony therefore may not be termed punitive, and no element of fault is implied. Respondent's first proposition relied on for reversal is without merit.