Opinion ID: 1133490
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Heavier burden for the State

Text: {39} The majority in the case below caused some controversy with its statement that when the state does elect to move for a change of venue it carries a heavy burden to show that public sentiment is such that a fair and impartial trial is improbable. House Majority, 1998-NMCA-018, ķ 21, 124 N.M. 564, 953 P.2d 737. The majority explained that this heavy burden is a product of the State's unique position as an opposing party that must nevertheless insure that the defendant receives a fair trial. Id. ķ 21, 232 P.2d 982. Citing our early venue cases State v. Archer, 32 N.M. at 323, 255 P. at 398, and State v. Holloway, 19 N.M. at 546-47, 146 P. at 1071-72, the majority noted that the State must demonstrate . . . a high degree of prejudice against Defendant before it can successfully move to change venue for Defendant's benefit and against his wishes. House Majority 1998-NMCA-018, ķ 30, 124 N.M. 564, 953 P.2d 737. House has introduced similar arguments. {40} In this context, the majority was concerned by the State's arguments that it could not receive a fair trial in Taos while House claimed he suffered no prejudice in that venue. The majority emphasized that because the State sought a venue change over the adamant objections of the defendant, it must show strong proof to support its claim that Taos was not an impartial venue. Id. ķķ 22-23. The majority warned that the courts should guard against an abuse of the state's power when the state moves for a change of venue, implicitly evoking the almost limitless resources and power of the State to pursue prosecution that, if abused, few defendants could hope to combat. Id. ķ 21. {41} The majority has not precisely characterized the State's burden. In most circumstances, the movant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that a fair and impartial trial is unlikely in a particular venue. See Deats, 80 N.M. at 79, 451 P.2d at 984 (stating that evidence supporting a venue-change motion must be persuasive of the probability that a fair trial cannot be obtained in the county where the cause is pending (emphasis added)); Alaniz, 55 N.M. at 318-19, 232 P.2d at 986 ([I]t is sufficient to show a reasonable apprehension that the defendant will not secure a fair and impartial trial or that the jury are under an influence inimical to the accused. (emphasis added)); People v. Proctor, 4 Cal.4th 499, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100, 1113 (1992) ([The] defendant failed to carry his burden of proving there was a reasonable likelihood that jurors drawn from Shasta County would have formed such fixed opinions as a result of the pretrial publicity that they could not make the required determinations with impartiality. (emphasis added)). {42} However, when the State moves for a change of venue over the defendant's objections, the nature of the State's burden depends upon whether the venue from which it seeks a change is the constitutional vicinage in which the crime allegedly occurred. The constitutional right to a trial in the district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed rests solely with the accused. See N.M. Const. art. II, § 14. The State has no equivalent constitutional right. Thus, when the State, against the defendant's objections, exercises its statutory right under Section 38-3-3 to move the trial from this constitutional vicinage, it must demonstrate why the defendant's constitutional right should be overridden. Under these circumstances the State bears a greater burden of proof than that applicable to other venue motions. Ashley v. State, 72 Fla. 137, 72 So. 647, 648 (1916) (Where an application in a criminal prosecution for a change of venue from the county where the crime was committed is made by the prosecuting attorney, and the accused objects thereto, the matter should be tested in some way so as to make it to clearly appear that it is practically impossible to obtain an impartial jury to try the accused in that county.). The State bears a greater burden than mere probability when the vicinage is involved. See Commonwealth v. Reilly, 324 Pa. 558, 188 A. 574, 580 (1936) ([T]he prosecution's request for a change [from the constitutional vicinage] should be much more strictly scrutinized than one by the accused; before the court is moved to act, there should be the most imperative grounds.); State v. Manning, 329 S.C. 1, 495 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1997) ([B]ecause a defendant's right to be tried in the county where the alleged offense occurred is defeated when the prosecution's request for a change of venue is granted, a court should exercise great care and deliberation when changing venue at the request of the prosecution, and the state's motion and evidence supporting its motion should be strictly scrutinized to ensure the defendant's right is not abused.). {43} We conclude that, when moving, over the defendant's objections, for a change of venue from the district in which the crime allegedly occurred, the prosecution must prove with clear and convincing evidence that a fair trial in that district is a practical impossibility. Cf. Higginbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26, 101 So. 233, 239 (1924) ([A]ny attempt to deprive the accused of his right to be tried in the county where the crime was committed, except where it is practically impossible to procure an impartial jury, and this practical impracticability is established by an actual test . . . is in violation of the Constitution.); Ashley, 72 So. at 649 ([W]hen upon a counter showing it does not clearly and affirmatively appear that an impartial jury to try the accused cannot be obtained in the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed, the application to change the venue should be denied.). [C]lear and convincing evidence is something stronger than a mere preponderance and yet something less than beyond a reasonable doubt. For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder's mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true. In re Sedillo, 84 N.M. 10, 12, 498 P.2d 1353, 1355 (1972) (citation omitted, quoting In re Palmer, 72 N.M. 305, 308, 383 P.2d 264, 267 (1963)). {44} Though House argues otherwise, these principles do not apply to this case. As we discuss in detail below, Bernalillo County is the constitutional vicinage in this case. With his motion to change venue before the first trial, House waived his constitutional right to be tried in that venue. See State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 728 (Tenn. 1994) (We conclude that the change of venue motion constitutes a waiver of [the defendant's constitutional vicinage] rights.). There is no constitutional basis for House to demand a trial in Taos County. See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12, 35 (1986) (stating that the defendant waived [his constitutional vicinage] right when he requested a change of venue). Section 38-3-6 provides that a second change of venue, whether requested by the defendant or the State, shall be in the trial court's discretion. This statute makes no requirement that the State meet a heavier burden of proof than a criminal defendant. Thus, before the third trial, the State needed to provide evidence demonstrating a reasonable probability that it could not obtain a fair and impartial trial in Taos County.