Opinion ID: 416443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE (1894) ch. 7

Text: 71 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-153, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938-940, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72, 71 S.Ct. 325, 327-328, 95 L.Ed. 267 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294, 71 S.Ct. 312, 315, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51, 58 S.Ct. 666, 668-669, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938) 72 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. at 151, 89 S.Ct. at 938 73 Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2289, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2293-2294, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980) 74 Judge Mikva chides us for ignoring the obvious alternative of revoking a demonstration's permit should its participants engage in non-sleep 'camping' activities. Mikva Op. at n. 32. It is not clear what he means by this, however, in light of his earlier acknowledgement that the activities proposed by appellants themselves constitute camping within the meaning of the new regulations. See id. at 591. His meaning is further confounded by a citation from our opinion which he says underscore[s] the potential effectiveness of permit revocation as a means of enforcing the Park Service's anti-camping regulations .... Id. at n. 32. It is precisely those regulations which Judge Mikva's opinion disables. If they can't be used to deny a permit for First Amendment camping (a category, we have explained, that cannot be given viable boundaries), then surely they can't be used to revoke a permit for that same camping 1 For a description of those requirements, see, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) 2 I refer here only to the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and press--not to other guarantees, such as freedom of religion or the right of personal autonomy or privacy which some cases have rested in part upon the First Amendment. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1247, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1680-1681, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) 3 See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 1150, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948) (Loudspeakers are today indispensable instruments of effective public speech) 4 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16, 96 S.Ct. 612, 633, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976): We cannot share the view that the present Act's contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O'Brien. The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment. 5 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939): It is argued that the circumstance that in the actual enforcement of the Milwaukee ordinance the distributor is arrested only if those who receive the literature throw it in the streets, renders it valid. But, even as thus construed, the ordinance cannot be enforced without unconstitutionally abridging the liberty of free speech. As we have pointed out, the public convenience in respect of cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the police power which invades the free communication of information and opinion secured by the Constitution. 6 See American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 231, 95 S.Ct. 409, 418, 42 L.Ed.2d 911 (1974); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1136 (1980) 7 See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1338, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563, 85 S.Ct. 476, 480, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) 8 See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 1605, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968) 9 These cases would be compatible with the analysis I have set forth, even if they were to be regarded as involving not speech-plus but purely nonspeech expressive conduct. The picketing cases, for example, do not invalidate general prohibitions against walking back and forth, or against obstructing entrances, but rather banning such activities when engaged in for the (expressive) purpose of inducing people to refrain from trading or working. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 91-92 [60 S.Ct. 736, 738-739, 84 L.Ed. 1093] (1940), where the statute forbade [a]ny person ... [to] go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business of any other person ... for the purpose, or with the intent of influencing, or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have business dealings with, or be employed by such persons .... See also Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 [60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104] (1940). The marching cases typically turn upon the use of a vague ordinance for the very purpose of suppressing only expressive activity. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 153, 89 S.Ct. 935, 940, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236, 83 S.Ct. 680, 683, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963) 10 In my view, the nude entertainment holdings do not deal with mere expressive conduct. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), struck down the challenged ordinance on overbreadth grounds, since it included all live entertainment--including spoken entertainment. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975), involved a prohibition not of nudity alone, but of the entire stage production Hair because it included nudity. It stands for the well-established principle that a spoken or written work which has serious artistic value cannot be banned simply because it includes matter which, in isolation, might be proscribable. In California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), the Court said that at least some of the performances covered by the regulation banning nudity and sexual acts are within the limits of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression (the case in any event upheld the regulation); and in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975), it said that the nude barroom dancing might be protected under some circumstances. Both these cases may have had in mind only nudity in connection with a spoken or sung performance. In any case, I find it difficult to believe that exhibitory nudity will, on the ground that it is independently communicative, be accorded greater constitutional protection than the nondemonstrative sort, such as nude bathing, see, e.g., Chapin v. Town of Southampton, 457 F.Supp. 1170 (E.D.N.Y.1978). In other words, to the extent the nude entertainment cases speak to nudity apart from spoken or sung performances they seem to me based upon the personal autonomy rather than the free speech line of cases. See note 2, supra 11 The statute in Stromberg forbade the flying of a red flag, banner or badge ... as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government .... 283 U.S. at 361, 51 S.Ct. at 532 12 The statute was deliberately and purposefully applied solely to terminate the reasonable, orderly, and limited exercise of the right to protest the unconstitutional segregation of a public facility. 383 U.S. at 142, 86 S.Ct. at 724 13 The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners. 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. at 737 14 If [Washington's interest in preserving the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country] is valid, we note that it is directly related to expression in the context of activity like that undertaken by appellant. For that reason and because no other governmental interest unrelated to expression has been advanced or can be supported on this record, the four-step analysis of United States v. O'Brien ... is inapplicable. 418 U.S. at 414 n. 8, 94 S.Ct. at 2732 n. 8 (citation omitted) 15 [B]oth the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment [banning draft card burning] are limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct. 391 U.S. at 381-82, 88 S.Ct. at 1681-1682 16 We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. 391 U.S. at 376, 88 S.Ct. at 1678 17 See the cases cited at 391 U.S. at 376-77 nn. 22-27, 88 S.Ct. at 1678-1679 nn. 22-27 18 See note 14, supra 19