Opinion ID: 781824
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 9 This court directly reviews petitions under 38 U.S.C. § 502 in accordance with the standard of review in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 314 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2003). The APA requires the reviewing court to decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); Liesegang v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 312 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2002). Where a finding of fact or a discretionary action is involved, the APA requires the reviewing court to set aside agency actions that are: 10 (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 11 (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 12 (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; [or] 13 (D) without observance of procedure required by law.... 14 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D). This review is `highly deferential' to the actions of the agency. See Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 691 (Fed.Cir.2000) (quoting LeFevre v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 66 F.3d 1191, 1199 (Fed.Cir.1995) (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C.Cir.1976))), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 973, 121 S.Ct. 1605, 149 L.Ed.2d 471 (2001). 15 The first inquiry under 5 U.S.C. § 706, in which we interpret the meaning of relevant statutes, is governed by the standards established by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In Regions Hospital v. Shalala, the Supreme Court explained: 16 Under the formulation now familiar, when we examine the Secretary's rule interpreting a statute, we ask first whether the intent of Congress is clear as to the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If, by employing traditional tools of statutory construction, id. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778, we determine that Congress' intent is clear, that is the end of the matter, id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. But if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If the agency's reading fills a gap or defines a term in a reasonable way in light of the Legislature's design, we give that reading controlling weight, even if it is not the answer the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. Id. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778. 17 522 U.S. 448, 457, 118 S.Ct. 909, 139 L.Ed.2d 895 (1998) (citations abbreviated). Thus, Chevron deference applies if Congress is either silent or ambiguous on a particular issue. However, when interpreting statutes relating to veterans, interpretative doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's favor. Nat'l Org. of Veterans' Advocates, Inc. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994)).