Opinion ID: 198069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: With respect to Appellant's claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, Appellant 'faces an uphill climb,' United States v. Valle, 72 F.3d 210, 216 (1st Cir. 1995). 'If the evidence presented, taken in the light most agreeable to the government is adequate to permit a rational jury to find each essential element of the offense of conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, then [Appellant's] claim fails.' Id. United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1246 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1109 (1997). The evidence presented in this case is adequate to permit a rational jury to find that the cloned phones were manufactured outside of Puerto Rico and that they had the capacity to make long-distance interstate calls. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that the offenses affected interstate commerce. Alvelo-Ramos' sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. III. Constitutional Challenge We review de novo constitutional challenges to federal statutes. United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1030 (1st Cir. 1997). Appellant argues that if 1029(a) does not require proof of a substantial effect on interstate commerce, then the reasoning of Lopez should apply to invalidate the statute as beyond Congress' affirmative powers under the Commerce Clause. The statute under which appellant was convicted differs from the statute struck down in Lopez, however, in two important respects. First, the statute at issue in [Lopez], 18 U.S.C. 922(q), 'contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [offense] in question affects interstate commerce.' Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d at 953. Section 1029(a), by contrast, extends only to offenses that affect[] interstate or foreign commerce. Second, 1029(a) regulates the possession and sale of cloned cell phones, an activity that uses channels of interstate commerce and involves instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Lopez identified three general categories of activity that lawfully can be regulated under the Commerce Clause: (1) activities that involve use of the channels of interstate commerce, (2) activities that implicate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce (including persons or things in interstate commerce), and (3) activities that have a substantial relation to, or substantially affect, interstate commerce. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d at 1031. Because 1029 falls within the first and/or second Lopez categories, there is no additional requirement that the regulated activities be shown to substantially affect interstate commerce. See Clayton, 108 F.3d at 1117. Alvelo-Ramos' conviction and sentence are affirmed.