Opinion ID: 3010384
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Professor Halpin

Text: The limitations period under the ADEA generally begins when the employer has established its official position and made that position apparent to the employee by explicit notice. Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co. , 935 F.2d 1407, 1416-17 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam); Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980). Halpin was aware long before February 2, 1991 (which was 300 days before his charge was filed) that he would be required to retire at the end of the 1990-1991 school year. The mandatory retirement policy had been in place for over twenty years; the specific policy he challenges was adopted in 1982. The 1988 correspondence between Halpin and La Salle told him that he would have to retire in 1991; his 1990 state court complaint showed that he understood exactly what La Salle meant. Halpin's claim is therefore barred unless (1) it was tolled by equitable estoppel or, (2) under the continuing violation theory, the last date of accrual was when the mandatory retirement policy was applied to him.
Halpin's first contention is that La Salle affirmatively misled him into believing that its retirement policy was lawful. In Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994), we held that where a defendant actively misleads the plaintiff regarding the reason for the plaintiff 's dismissal the limitations period will be tolled until the facts which would support the plaintiff 's cause of action are apparent, or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person. 10 Halpin argues that he was led to believe that LaSalle's retirement policy was exempt under the ADEA: that he was at an institution of higher learning and serving under a contract (or similar arrangement) of unlimited tenure, see supra pp. 6-8. For this reason, he claims, he did not know that he had an ADEA claim. Halpin asserts that it was not until October 1991 that he learned, from the position taken by LaSalle in the state court litigation, that he had a contract for a one-year term only. This revelation, he says, prompted the filing of his charge with the EEOC in November. Halpin has the burden of establishing the equitable tolling exception. Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 648, 661 (11th Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs have burden of establishing equitable tolling in Title VII case). But Halpin presented no evidence showing that he in fact believed that La Salle's mandatory retirement policy was lawful and delayed filing his charge for that reason. To the contrary, in his deposition Halpin testified that filing was delayed because he hoped the state court contract action would prompt a settlement. Moreover, the employment contracts, which Halpin now asserts show that he did not have a contract of unlimited tenure (taking him out of the ADEA exemption), were signed by him annually for many years. La Salle's 1988 letter to Halpin clearly disclosed its position that his contract was for a one-year term only. On these facts, no reasonable fact-finder could find the facts to support equitable tolling.
The district court held that Halpin's claim based on LaSalle's mandatory retirement policy accrued and the 300 day filing period began to run when La Salle informed him that he would be involuntarily retired under the policy. Halpin had notice of the mandatory retirement policy, and its prospective application to him, by the time hefiled the state court action in May 1990, well outside the 300 day period. Halpin contends, however, that under the continuing violation theory his charge was timelyfiled. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the theory did not apply in the absence of a pattern or practice 11 of discrimination. The court reasoned that there was no continuing violation because the application of the mandatory retirement policy . . . happened once. The district court based its ruling on Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), holding that a plaintiff may not rely on the continuing violation theory to advance claims about isolated instances of discrimination concluded in the past, even though the effects persist into the present. E.E.O.C. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211, 218 (3d Cir. 1983) (describing holding in Ricks) (emphasis in original). In Westinghouse, we recognized that where the challenge is to a continuing discriminatory policy --in this case, the age-based mandatory retirement policy-- each application of that policy to an employee constitutes a discrete act of discrimination. Id. at 219-20; see also Webb v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 931 F.2d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1991) (Ordinarily, in the case of a continuing unlawful practice, every day that the practice continues is a fresh wrong for purposes of the statute of limitations. . . . Ricks [did not] abolish this principle. . . . We adopt the distinction made in . . . EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. , between the present consequence of a one-time violation and the continuation of the violation into the present.) (citations omitted); O'Malley v. GTE Serv. Corp., 758 F.2d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1985); West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. , 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying the continuing violation theory to a claim of disciminatory pattern and practice). Application of the continuing violation theory requires proof of the existence of a discriminatory policy and of its application to plaintiff; both elements are present here. The time for filing a charge runs from the most recent application of the policy to plaintiff, regardless of when he received notice of the policy and its prospective effect on him. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d at 219. Situations like Ricks and Chardon are distinguishable; there the alleged unlawful practice occur[s] when the discriminatory decision, e.g., to deny tenure, or to terminate the employee, is made based on an impermissible factor. In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), the Supreme Court limited the application of the continuing violation theory to policies that are facially 12 discriminatory. Id. at 912 n.5. The court reasoned that where a policy is facially nondiscriminatory and neutrally applied, its invalidity is wholly dependent on the alleged illegality of [its adoption]. Id. at 911. In contrast, when the employer has an express policy of terminating employees based on their age, the policy by definition discriminates each time it is applied. Id. at 912 n.5. The timeliness of a challenge to a mandatory retirement provision is therefore determined with reference to the earlier of either the last day of employment, or, if applicable, the date on which the employer eliminates the unlawful provision. See O'Malley, 758 F.2d at 821 (quoting EEOC v. Home Ins. Co. , 553 F.Supp. 704, 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)); accord EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dep't, 80 F.3d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir.) (mandatory retirement statute facially discriminates between troopers younger than fifty-five years of age and those older than fifty-five years of age; thus, a claim becomes ripe when the statute is applied, [i.e.,] when the trooper is mandatorily retired.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 385 (1996); but cf. Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that notice, rather than retirement, begins the 300 day limitations period to challenge mandatory retirement policy). La Salle concedes that its mandatory retirement policy discriminates among its professors on the basis of age and that it applied this policy to Halpin within the 300 day charge-filing period. But it contends that its policy was not subject to the continuing violation theory because it was facially legal, i.e., that on its face it complied with the statutory exemption for tenured professors.4 Lorance draws a distinction between facially neutral and facially discriminatory policies. It provides no support for the argument that a policy that discriminates on the basis of otherwise prohibited characteristics should be treated as though it were facially neutral because it appears on its face (though not in fact, see supra, p. 12-13) to fall within _________________________________________________________________ 4. The La Salle policy states: Beginning June 30, 1982, retirement from full-time teaching shall be mandatory for ranked, tenured faculty as of the last day of the fiscal year in which the faculty member reaches the age of seventy. 13 a statutory exemption. Indeed the court's articulation of the distinction is inconsistent with such a theory: With a facially neutral system the discriminatory act occurs only at the time of adoption, for each application is nondiscriminatory (seniority accrues for men and women on an identical basis). But a facially discriminatory system (e.g., one that assigns men twice the seniority that women receive for the same amount of time served) by definition discriminates each time it is applied. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912 n.5. Here too we have a facially discriminatory policy, i.e., one that on its face sorts employees according to age. That La Salle may have a defense does not make it less discriminatory. La Salle's argument ignores the distinction underlying Lorance, between policies that can be attacked only on the basis of the discriminatory intent that motivated their adoption and those whose legality turns not on the sponsor's intent but on the prohibited effect of their application. There is no issue in this case over whether La Salle adopted its policy with a discriminatory intent; the question is solely whether it violates the ADEA when it is applied.5 Halpin's EEOC charge was timely because he filed within 300 days of the date that the alleged unlawful practice occurred, i.e., the date on which La Salle mandatorily retired him from full-time employment.