Opinion ID: 1741039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural posture of this case

Text: ¶ 80 In this case, Reserve Judge Radcliffe presided over Lackershire's plea hearing, which occurred March 16, 2004. At the plea hearing, Lackershire pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child. ¶ 81 Five months after Lackershire's plea hearing, Judge Morey presided over Lackershire's sentencing hearing. According to the sentencing hearing transcript, Lackershire was sentenced to nine years and zero months. That is three years and zero months confinement in prison, and six years and zero months is the extended supervision time. ¶ 82 Over six months after Lackershire's sentencing hearing she filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Lackershire's motion to withdraw her plea listed three separate grounds: She stated that there had not been a specific recitation of the elements of the crime to which she had pleaded. She also posited, based on a review of the [Pre-Sentence Investigation], that the dismissed charges had been treated as read-ins at sentencing, and that she had not understood that they would be treated that way. Further, she argued that her fear of harm to her pregnancy caused by the stress of trial served to coerce her into pleading guilty. Majority op., ¶ 17. (Note that the majority's own summary of the grounds raised in Lackershire's motion does not include a reference to the factual basis requirement.) ¶ 83 During the motion hearing, Lackershire's attorney focused on the grounds raised in the motion. Judge Morey asked, do you wish to supplement your brief with anything? Lackershire's attorney responded, Yes. Briefly, Judge. I set out most of the authorities in the actual motion. The attorney then went on to describe the grounds on which Lackershire's motion was based. During the motion hearing, the attorney made no reference to the factual basis requirement; nor did the district attorney or Judge Morey make any reference to it. ¶ 84 At the outset of oral argument before this court, Lackershire's attorney framed the issues of this case as follows: There are three sets of issues concerning her plea that are being raised today. There are issues related to the existence of read-in charges, issues related to the elements of the crime to which she pled and the issues related to her pregnancy. The State recapped the issues being addressed in a similar way: The Defendant seeks to withdraw her guilty plea on three grounds: the read-in charges, the elements, and her pregnancy. Neither attorney mentioned any issue related to the factual basis requirement. ¶ 85 The way that the parties framed the issues tracks the issues presented in Lackershire's petition for review. These were as follows: 1. Should the longstanding rule that read-in offenses that are part of a plea agreement must be set forth on the record at the time of the plea-taking procedure be reversed? 2. If read-in offenses are made part of a plea agreement, must the defendant have actual knowledge and understanding of those offenses and the consequences of the read-in procedure? 3. When a defendant has moved to withdraw a plea, and testified as to the confusion and/or misunderstanding about the elements or nature of the charge, must the state produce affirmative evidence in order to prevail? 4. Where the uncontroverted evidence shows that a pregnant defendant entered a plea with the understanding that she could not medically endure a trial without risking her health or the health of the unborn baby and that she believed she could not get an adjournment of the trial date, has the defendant shown that her plea was not voluntary, thereby entitling her to withdraw the plea? Again, there was no mention of the factual basis requirement in Lackershire's petition for review. Given the procedural posture of the case, it is understandable that the factual basis requirement was not mentioned during oral argument by either party or any of the justices. ¶ 86 It was not until a supplemental brief, after this court heard oral argument on the questions presented, that Lackershire even mentioned the factual basis requirement. In an order seeking additional briefing in the case, we posed three questions. The second question asked the following: If the phrase either by the defendant or upon the defendant's instruction provides an affirmative defense for the sexual assault crime to which Lackershire pleaded guilty, does the failure, during the plea colloquy, to discuss the claim by the defendant that she was raped, since that issue was raised in the probable cause portion of the criminal complaint and in the preliminary hearing transcript presented to support her plea, mean that her plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently? In her supplemental brief responding to the question, she stated the following: Lackershire submits that it is almost irrelevant under the facts of this case whether the issue is viewed as a defective colloquy on the elements, or as the failure to find an adequate factual basis, or even under the manifest injustice test requiring her to show a lack of knowledge or understanding of a material element. Under any view, at the time of the plea Lackershire was not advised and did not understand that she was not guilty of any crime if, indeed, she was the victim of the boy's assault, as she claimed. In essence, Lackershire invited the court to decide her case based on the grounds of the elements being misunderstood, the factual basis requirement not being satisfied, or the manifest injustice test. The grounds the court chose was almost irrelevant. ¶ 87 There is a problem with Lackershire's invitation: she never moved the circuit court to withdraw her plea because of a failure to satisfy the factual basis requirement. According to the well-established procedure for plea withdrawal, Lackershire would have had to include her claim that Judge Radcliffe failed to satisfy the factual basis requirement in her motion to the circuit court. Judge Morey then could have assessed whether she had made a prima facie showing and the requisite allegations to satisfy her burden. However, Lackershire never made such a motion. The issue was not reviewed by the circuit court and should not be reviewed by any appellate courts.