Opinion ID: 1058136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Alternative Treatment

Text: Citing Peyton v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 503, 604 S.E.2d 17 (2004), Carroll argues that [u]nder the circumstances of this case, the revocation of [his] probation in lieu of an alternative treatment modality, and then the requirement for successful completion of the same program, are unreasonable and are not an appropriate exercise of conscientious judgment by the trial court. In Peyton, the defendant was convicted of a drug offense, given a suspended sentence, and placed on probation conditioned upon his entry into and successful completion of his participation in the Detention Center Incarceration Program pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2. Id. at 506, 604 S.E.2d at 18. When Peyton was within one month of completing his participation in the program, he became ill, was hospitalized, and was removed from the program for medical/psychological reasons. Id. at 507, 604 S.E.2d at 18. The trial court held a show cause hearing, revoked the suspended sentence, and ordered Peyton to serve the original sentence. The trial judge stated he did not question the sincerity of Peyton's desire to complete the program, but said there was not anything I can do. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, and this Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We held that the circuit court abused its discretion in revoking the suspended sentence, and we stated as follows: There is surely a distinction between the willful failure of an inmate to comply with the requirements of the detention center program and the conditions of his suspended sentence permitting his participation in that program and the subsequent inability of the inmate to do so resulting from an unforeseen medical condition. 268 Va. at 511, 604 S.E.2d at 21. Carroll can hardly equate himself with Peyton or his situation with Peyton's. Carroll did not refuse to admit his guilt during sex offender treatment because of some inability resulting from an unforeseen condition that arose. Rather, his refusal was an out-and-out willful failure ... to comply with the requirements of his probation officer. Id. The revocation of a suspended sentence lies in the discretion of the trial court and ... this discretion is quite broad, but [t]he cause deemed ... sufficient for revoking a suspension must be a reasonable cause. Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326-27, 228 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The same discretion applied when the circuit court was called upon here to decide whether Carroll should be allowed to receive alternative treatment and what penalty should be imposed for his earlier failure to successfully complete sex offender treatment. We certainly cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion or acted unreasonably in refusing to allow Carroll to be treated in some unsupervised situation by someone not versed in the treatment of sex offenders. Nor can we say that the circuit court abused its discretion or acted unreasonably in ordering Carroll to participate in the same program he was discharged from earlier. The circuit court merely gave Carroll a second chance to avoid imprisonment, which is one of the reasons a defendant enters an Alford plea in the first place.