Opinion ID: 2785103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: CPR’s Challenge

Text: CPR contends that § 403 is void for vagueness because it is not clear what conduct is subject to the criminal penalties of § 403 and what conduct is covered by § 18340 and thus CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 9 excluded from the reach of § 403. Section 18340 refers to “public meetings for the consideration of public questions,” a category of meetings that, argues CPR, appears from the face of the statute to encompass the type of meeting at issue in this case. Electors, similarly, by the statutory definition, include anyone over 18 who resides in any election precinct. That is a vast group of potential participants that, again, encompasses the participants in the meeting at issue here. This is significant, argues CPR, because § 18340 sets forth a standard for a misdemeanor that is different from, and higher than, the standard for a misdemeanor under § 403. While a person is subject to criminal penalties under § 403 if he “willfully disturbs or breaks up” a meeting, under § 18340 he is subject to penalties only if he uses “threats, intimidations, or unlawful violence”—more egregious conduct—to hinder or prevent the meeting in question from assembling. Thus, knowing what type of meeting is covered by § 18340, and therefore excluded from coverage under § 403, is critical to understanding what type of conduct exposes a person to criminal penalties under § 403. A penal statute must “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). An insufficiently definite statute is void for vagueness. Id. “[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963). “Laws that are insufficiently clear are void for three reasons: (1) To avoid punishing people for behavior that they could not have known was illegal; (2) to avoid subjective enforcement of the laws based on arbitrary or discriminatory 10 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES interpretations by government officers; and (3) to avoid any chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.” United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 1996). “[W]here a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and alterations omitted). That § 403 “abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms” is evident in the facts of this case and in every available case involving the statute, all of which involve not merely speech or expressive conduct but core political speech. See, e.g., In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 936 (1970) (rhythmic clapping during a congressman’s speech); McMahon v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1280–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (dumping gallons of garbage on the floor during a school board meeting as part of a speech about the problem of litter in the area of the high school); Saraceni v. City of Roseville, No. C041085, 2003 WL 21363458, at  (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2003) (attempting to address the city council and city attorney at a city council meeting after the public comment period had ended); Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (giving a silent Nazi salute and whispering to another meeting attendee in city council meetings); Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 07–5132 GHK (JC), 2011 WL 6951822, at  (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2011) (attending a city council meeting with a pillow case, attached to a shirt, that read “CRA Destroys Communities”). CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 11 “[A] plaintiff seeking to vindicate his own constitutional rights may argue that an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague or impermissibly restricts a protected activity.” Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, plaintiffs make a facial constitutional challenge to a state law, “a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.” Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982). The California Supreme Court has interpreted § 403 only once. In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 936–37 (1970), concerned the arrest and conviction of four people for engaging in “rhythmical clapping” and “some shouting for about five or ten minutes” during the speech of a congressman in a public park at an Independence Day celebration. The California Supreme Court noted that § 403 could be read to cover speech protected by the First Amendment. Applying the common presumption that the legislature intended to enact a valid statute, however, it interpreted the statute more narrowly to render it constitutional. It held that § 403 requires “that the defendant substantially impair[] the conduct of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man should have known.” Id. at 943. The court specified that criminal sanctions could be imposed “only when the defendant’s activity itself—and not the content of the activity’s expression—substantially impairs the effective conduct of a meeting.” Id. at 942. 12 CPR FOR SKID ROW V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES In so construing § 403, the California Supreme Court did not consider the statute’s exceptions for political meetings and religious meetings. In fact, the court omitted all reference to the exceptions when citing the statute and in its discussion of the statute’s origins.2 Nonetheless, the court set aside the criminal conviction at issue, concluding that the defendants’ rhythmical clapping did not rise to the level of a misdemeanor under § 403.