Opinion ID: 70572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Determination of State Law Predomination

Text: Because Congress did not explain explicitly how to determine when state law predominates over federal question jurisdiction where pleadings invoke both state and federal law, a value judgment by the federal court is required. Martin, 756 F.Supp. at 527; accord Moore, 766 F.Supp. at 1319. State law predominates  [i]f the federal court finds that the federal claim, while plausible, is not really the plaintiff's main mission; that it is only an incident or adjunct of the state claim and that the state claim is the crux of the action....'  Moore, 766 F.Supp. at 1319 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 Commentary (West Supp.1991)); see Burnett, 861 F.Supp. at 1038 (Employing the routinely accepted proposition that removal statutes are always to be construed against removal, the language of § 1441(c) cannot be interpreted to recognize an exception for all state cases which simply contain a claim invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to which state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.). A district court decides whether state law predominates by examining the nature of the claims as set forth in the pleading and by determining whether the state law claims are more complex or require more judicial resources to adjudicate or are more salient in the case as a whole than the federal law claims. Moore, 766 F.Supp. at 1319 (footnote omitted). Thus, Congress accorded district courts  broad discretion  in determining whether to retain a removed case or to remand it entirely to state court. Id. (emphasis added). The district court analyzed its reasons for concluding that state law predominates in the underlying case, although in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).9 See Bodenner v. Graves, 828 F.Supp. 516, 518 (W.D.Mich.1993) (noting that the language of section 1441(c) relating to the discretion of the district court to remand  all matters in which State law predominates'.... closely mirrors that of § 1367(c)(2)). (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)). Irrespective of whether section 1441(c) or section 1367(c)(2) is 9 Recognizing that determining that state law predominates is not merely a numerical count of the respective claims, the district court in the underlying case used the Gibbs standard for comparing the state and federal claims in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. As to type and amount of damages available under the federal and state claims, the district judge determined that there is little difference because there are no liability caps under either federal or state claims as to the five named defendants other than the City of Mobile. Thornton v. Kahalley, No. 95-0509-CB-C, slip op. at 9-10 (S.D.Ala. Sept. 20, 1995) (order granting plaintiffs' motion to remand the entire case to state court) [hereinafter Remand Order]. In contrast, the district judge found pervasive differences in both the standards and elements of proof for the state versus the federal claims. Id. at 10. Under the Alabama Dram Shop Act, the district judge explained that the relevant defendants could be strictly liable for their actions, and that the remaining state common law claims permit recovery on a showing of negligence or wantonness. Under section 1983, the district judge recognized that a plaintiff is required to show gross negligence or deliberate indifference resulting from an official policy or custom. Thus, the district judge concluded that the standard of proof for the section 1983 claim was substantially higher than that for the various state law claims. Id. Additionally, the district judge found that there are marked differences in the means available to a plaintiff to establish his case under § 1983 and the state law claims. Id. While Alabama law allows a municipality to be liable for negligence under respondeat superior, the district judge contrasted section 1983, which prohibits liability under that theory. Because the state causes of action require lower standards and elements of proof than does the federal civil rights claim, the district judge concluded, as a matter of law, that the state law claims substantially predominated in the underlying case. Id. at 11; see Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 (Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.). applied, the claims and facts are the same. Finally, the underlying case has been proceeding in state court for two years through discovery, and it was scheduled for trial before addition of the section 1983 claim and its removal to federal court; clearly, the state court is in a better position to adjudicate the issues in the underlying case. 10 The district court acted within its discretion accorded by section 1441(c), as amended in 1990, in remanding the entire underlying case after determining that state law predominated. III. CONCLUSION I conclude that the majority errs in limiting its discussion to supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and in failing to analyze the district court's remand of the entire underlying case under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), as amended. The legislative history behind the 1990 amendment of section 1441(c) reveals that separate and independent claim does not mean that the federal claim is unrelated to the state law claims in a federal question case. Separate and independent claim refers to a legitimate federal jurisdictional basis. In a case involving both 10 In its remand order for the underlying case, the district court explained: The state judiciary has already invested substantial resources in this case, has resolved numerous discovery and other preliminary matters, and has developed familiarity and expertise over the factual and legal issues in this cause of action which this court presently lacks. It would be neither an economical nor a convenient allocation of judicial resources for this court to seize jurisdiction over this entire action at the eleventh hour of the state litigation. Remand Order at 12. valid federal and state law claims, the district court must determine that state law claims predominate if it decides to remand the entire case. I believe that the district court correctly remanded the entire underlying case to state court based on the predomination of state law claims, although I do not endorse its statutory authority for the remand under section 1367(c), concerning supplemental jurisdiction. Apparently, the majority sees the dilemma of trial of federal claims in federal court and trial of related state claims in state court presenting the problems of conflicting federal and state adjudications, race to judgment and res judicata; hence the implicit suggestion to the district court that it adjudicate all claims, state and federal. Because the majority's interpretation of separate and independent claim in section 1441(c) as well as its resolution makes the ability of district judges to remand all matters to state court under the statute devoid of meaning, I cannot accept it. The majority's interpretation and resolution is particularly unsatisfactory in this underlying case where the district judge, as factfinder, has determined that state claims predominate, and that it is appropriate to adjudicate the single, lately added federal claim in state court. Because I would have dismissed the mandamus petition for the reasons explained herein and upheld the district court's remand of the entire underlying case to state court, I respectfully dissent.