Opinion ID: 772867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gang Evidence

Text: 31 Defendants Bradford and Boswell contend that it was error to admit testimony referring to the defendants' residence as the Palmer House because references to the Palmer Block Crips gang would be prejudicial. They also argue that certain witnesses' use of their street names constituted reversible error. We do not agree. 32 Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to exclude all gang evidence as more prejudicial than probative. The district court granted the motion in part, prohibiting the government from mentioning gang membership in its opening statement or closing argument. The order, however, did not impose a blanket prohibition on all gang evidence. The district court concluded that such evidence would only be admissible to clarify the connections between the defendants. The district court cautioned the government to refrain from introducing evidence about gangs . . . not directly relevant to whether a conspiracy existed, and indicated that it would consider specific evidence as it became relevant during the trial. 33 Bradford and Boswell argue that the government violated the court order during the trial. At several points, there was testimony that a certain house, where four of the defendants used to live, was called the Palmer house. Also, Autrie Kimble testified that Harrison told him that only members of the Palmer Block could sell at C.J. Stockman's bar. The defendants contend that other witnesses referred to them using street names. 34 After a careful examination of these references, we find no abuse of discretion in their admission. To be certain, there is great potential for prejudice when evidence regarding gangs is at issue. See United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1432-34 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that generalized and repeated testimony regarding drug dealing activities of Hell's Angels motorcycle gang prejudiced defendant's trial). In this case, however, no general testimony was offered regarding the Palmer Block Crips or their activities. The Palmer remarks were admitted because they tended to show that these co-defendants conspired together. The district court did not err in admitting the evidence for this limited purpose. See United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1497 (8th Cir. 1994) ([s]pecific and circumscribed evidence of gang association may be necessary to show 'the nature and extent of [the defendant's] association') (quoting United States v. Sparks, 949 F.2d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 1991)); United States v. Sills, 120 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 1997) (same). Further, the use of the defendants' street names (witnesses referred to Bradford as Devo and to Boswell as Blue) did not prejudice them. The witnesses were describing the defendants as they knew them, and the names themselves did not carry any negative connotation. See United States v. Taylor, 554 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that use of alias in indictment was permissible where there was testimony that defendant went by that name); United States v. Skolek, 474 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (same). The use of these nicknames merely assisted in the accurate identification of the defendants.