Opinion ID: 185822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural History and Evidentiary Rulings

Text: 14 On February 8, 2000, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging appellant with one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C); one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and one count of possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 15 At the pretrial motions hearing on April 11, 2000, defense counsel sought to question Detective Eduardo Voysest, who had spoken to witnesses on the night of the offense. The defense wanted to inquire of Voysest as to whether he knew about Officer Heinz's previous contact with appellant. The District Court sustained the Government's objection based on Officer Heinz's preliminary hearing testimony that he did not know about the complaint, as well as evidence that appellant was still inside the hospital when Officer Heinz found the gun, and evidence that Officer Heinz did not know to whom the gun or the coat belonged when he found them. Defense counsel did not seek permission to explore the relationship between Detective Voysest and Officer Heinz to establish a foundation for asking Detective Voysest about Sesay's previous complaint against Heinz. 16 Subsequently, before the pretrial conference, the Government filed a Motion to Exclude Evidence of Defendant's Complaint Against Officer. The Government argued that the evidence was irrelevant because, at the time when Officer Heinz discovered the gun, he was unaware that the person who had been in the back seat of the Chevy Tahoe was Sesay. At the pretrial conference on May 4, 2000, defense counsel argued that the defense still had not received discovery regarding the complaint against Officer Heinz, and proffered that the defense had a witness who could show that Officer Heinz was lying when he testified at the preliminary hearing that he did not know that a complaint had been filed against him. The Government responded that the complaint was not formal or written but was simply appellant's oral complaint made at the time of his arrest, which the police department was investigating. 17 The District Court addressed the Government's Motion to Exclude Evidence of Defendant's Complaint Against Officer at the pretrial conference. The court first stated that there is absolutely not a shred of evidence anywhere that Officer H[einz] knew that Mr. Sesay was the person with whom the coat was associated and consequently with whom the gun was associated when he arrived on the scene.... 5/4/00 Tr. 47. However, the District Court recognized that a broader issue of Officer Heinz's credibility had been raised. The District Court therefore left open the possibility of the defense revisiting Sesay's complaint against Officer Heinz at some appropriate juncture during trial: 18 So what the defense will be entitled to do is, at the appropriate juncture, to ask the question or to raise the point about Mr. Sesay having lodged a complaint against Officer H[einz], and in that regard whether or not Officer H[einz] spoke truthfully, if it can be shown that he has said one thing in one instance and another thing in another instance, and also with regard to how it may have colored, if at all, the testimony that he's offered in connection with the facts of this case. 19 5/4/00 Tr. 48-49. 20 During the pretrial conference, defense counsel also briefly mentioned that, in addition to cross-examining Officer Heinz regarding his potential bias based on the complaint, he would like to inquire of the other officers about their knowledge of Officer Heinz's prior contact with appellant. Defense counsel did not name those other officers or provide any basis for his assertion that the actions of the officers assisting Officer H[einz] at the time of Mr. Sesay's arrest, may in fact have been also impacted upon by the bias of Officer H[einz]. 5/4/00 Tr. 38. The District Court denied this request, because [t]here [was] nothing to suggest that anyone else's thinking has been influenced by the conflict characterized as existing between Detective H[einz] and Mr. Sesay and any other officers. 5/4/00 Tr. 49. Following this ruling, defense counsel did not ask permission to voir dire the other officers outside the jury's presence in order to establish a foundation for his proposed inquiry. 21 On May 15, 2000, a jury trial commenced. At trial, the Government indicated that Officer Heinz would not be called as a witness. Defense counsel asked that he be made available for questioning by the defense. The Government objected, arguing that Officer Heinz could not be called by the defense as a witness solely to be impeached. The trial judge ruled that the defense could not call Officer Heinz solely to impeach him, but stated that the defense could call Officer Heinz after making a proffer of his testimony. The prosecution subsequently filed a memorandum arguing more fully that the only direct evidence to be offered by Officer Heinz would be adverse to the defendant and cumulative of other testimony, and that appellant should not be permitted to use impeachment evidence concerning the complaint as a subterfuge to get otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury. The trial judge then indicated that his ruling had been made, and noted that both parties had received a transcript of the original ruling. At the start of the defense case, as the examination of Officer Heinz began, the District Court remind[ed] everyone of the limitations that I have placed on inquiries to be made during the continuation of this trial, strict limitations. 5/17/00 Tr. 50. The defense's questioning of Officer Heinz was then relatively limited and it did not cover Sesay's civilian complaint against Heinz. 22 On May 18, 2000, after the close of the evidence, the District Court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on count three (possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense). On May 22, 2000, the jury returned guilty verdicts on the two remaining counts of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On September 21, 2000, the trial judge sentenced appellant to 63 months' imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, a $1,000 fine, a $200 special assessment, and three years of supervised release. No timely notice of appeal was filed. However, on August 2, 2001, the District Court granted appellant's motion to reissue the judgment, and the judgment was reissued and entered on August 7, 2001. A timely notice of appeal was thereafter filed on August 15, 2001.