Opinion ID: 2831358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relevance of Other Incidents

Text: In Armstrong, we held that evidence of other incidents involving a product may be relevant in a products-liability case if the incidents “occurred under reasonably similar (though not necessarily identical) conditions.” 145 S.W.3d at 138. We further noted that the relevance of other incidents “depends upon the purpose for offering them.” Id. Kia argues that none of the warranty claims were sufficiently similar to the underlying case to be admissible. The Ruizes effectively concede that the claims not involving a code 56 were not relevant, arguing only that any error in admitting those claims was harmless. This concession is significant; it is undisputed that almost 25 eighty-five percent of the claims on the admitted spreadsheet are irrelevant to the underlying proceedings. As to the code-56 claims, we agree with Kia to an extent and hold that some, but not all, of the code-56 claims described in the spreadsheet are sufficiently similar to be relevant to the Ruizes’ claims. Given that the alleged defect here involves the design of the connectors at the clock spring and air-bag module, a particular code-56 warranty claim must at least implicate one of those connectors as the source of the open circuit. In Armstrong, for example, the plaintiff sued Nissan under various products liability theories, alleging that her vehicle accelerated on its own because of a defective throttle cable. 145 S.W.3d at 135–36. In analyzing the admissibility of other incidents of unintended acceleration, we held that such reports were irrelevant to the extent that they made no mention of the throttle cable and instead indicated “an unknown or some other cause.” Id. at 142. By comparison, in this case, to the extent the descriptions of the code-56 claims reflect a problem with one of the two pertinent connectors, they are sufficiently similar to be probative of the design defect alleged by the Ruizes.16 However, with respect to the code-56 claims that reflect an unknown cause, do not address the cause, or reflect a cause unrelated to one of the two pertinent connectors, those incidents are not admissible to prove Kia’s negligence in this case.17 16 For example, the notes for one of the code 56 claims describe an “intermittent connection problem at steering column connector” that was corrected by “tighten[ing] and clean[ing] terminal.” The notes for another code 56 claim state: “R&R [presumably meaning repaired and replaced] connector to drivers side air bag module, and chkd [sic] connec[ti]ons. Pin fit connectors and applied stabilant onto connector when reassembled.” 17 For example, the notes for one of the code 56 claims states only: “checked all pin connectors to module, replaced air bag module.” The notes on another claim state that the wiring and air bag were replaced, but say nothing about the connectors. 26 The nature of the Ruizes’ products liability suit against Kia affects our relevance analysis. To be successful on a defective-product claim, a plaintiff must identify “a specific defect . . . by competent evidence.” Id. at 137. In Armstrong, the database of other incidents involving unintended acceleration was inadmissible because there was “nothing in the database to suggest that the defect, if any, causing those . . . incidents was similar to any of the defects alleged” in the case. Id. at 141. Here, the Ruizes identified certain aspects of the design of the module and clock-spring connectors as the “specific defect” in the Spectra’s air-bag system that caused the open circuit. For the code-56 warranty claims reflected on the spreadsheet to be relevant and admissible, then, some indication must exist that the module and clock-spring connectors contributed to the open circuits in those other incidents.18 The Ruizes, however, insist that they “were not relying on [those] claims to show a defect (although the claims certainly corroborated the other evidence of a defect),” but instead offered them for the limited purposes of (1) showing Kia’s notice of open circuits and conscious indifference to the problem, and (2) rebutting Kia’s contention that Lawrence Ruiz’s replacement of the radio caused the open circuit. In turn, the Ruizes contend that Kia’s failure to request a limiting instruction rendered the claims admissible for all purposes. See TEX. R. EVID. 105(a). We fail to see how warranty claims involving open circuits not tied to the alleged defect are relevant to “notice” in a meaningful way. As discussed above, such claims are not reasonably similar to the incident in question and thus are not relevant to show Kia’s negligence. In turn, notice 18 We note that there is no indication that any of the warranty claims involved incidents in which an air bag actually failed to deploy under circumstances in which it should have deployed. 27 of incidents that are not reasonably similar to the one at issue has no bearing on Kia’s gross negligence in this particular case. See Gen. Chem. Corp. v. De La Lastra, 852 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex. 1993) (prior incident “involv[ing] facts nearly identical to this one” was relevant to claim of gross negligence related to manufacturer’s failure to warn); see also E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Terry, 794 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1990, writ denied) (in store employee’s suit claiming that employer’s negligence caused his back injury suffered while lifting a heavy box at work, evidence of other lawsuits involving back injuries suffered at employer’s store was not admissible to show store’s prior notice of such injuries where employee failed to show that other incidents occurred under reasonably similar circumstances). The reasonable-similarity requirement does not disappear simply because other incidents are being offered to show notice rather than negligence. Further, the Ruizes’ argument that the spreadsheet was admissible to rebut Kia’s assertion that the radio replacement caused the open circuit is specious. Had Kia contended that open circuits caused by radio replacements were common, the claims may have been admissible to rebut that contention. See Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d at 142 (reports of other incidents suggesting that a deteriorated boot could and did jam the throttle cable were admissible to rebut Nissan’s claim that the possibility of such an occurrence “was about as likely as ‘being struck by lightning’”). But Kia never made this argument, and evidence that radio replacements did not cause other occurrences of open circuits simply has no bearing on whether a radio replacement caused this open circuit. Further, Cameron testified that, because the spreadsheet only listed paid warranty claims, it did not include claims that were excluded from warranty coverage because the repairs stemmed from 28 alterations or modifications to the vehicle. Thus, an open circuit caused by a radio replacement would not have been covered and would not have been included on the spreadsheet. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting the spreadsheet. Both the claims not involving a code 56 and the code-56 claims that did not at least implicate the module connector or clock-spring connector were irrelevant to the issues in the case. Because those claims were not admissible for any purpose, Kia did not waive error by failing to request a limiting instruction under Rule 105.