Opinion ID: 2572638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Correctness of attorney's fees rulings; ability to litigate fairly

Text: Review of the underlying facts shows that the superior court's rulings concerning interim and final attorney's fees were clearly within the court's discretion and that Michael's behavior did not prevent Christina from fairly litigating her case. First, some context is in order. The parties had been married for thirty-one months at the time they separated. Following the filing of the complaint for divorce, a trial setting order was issued in December 2001; trial was set for April 23, 2002. Christina moved for an award of interim attorney's fees on March 14, 2002, five weeks before trial. She stated that she had paid fees of $3,942.54 and had incurred another $2,000. Anticipating a two-day trial, she estimated that at least an additional $10,000 in fees would be incurred. She sought $15,000 in fees. On April 1, the court ordered the payment of $5,000 and added, Father must pay Mother's counsel an equivalent amount that he pays his own counsel during the course of the proceedings. The court will review all attorney's fees at the end of the case. At that point, trial was to begin in twenty-two days. Four days later, Christina moved to continue the trial. Although opposed by Michael, the continuance was apparently granted, for trial took place on May 28-30. In the motion to continue, Christina again argued for additional attorney's fees. But, contrary to the suggestion in today's Opinion, she did not definitively indicate an intention to seek a business valuation. What she said was, [Christina] has the option, theoretically, of undertaking a business evaluation. But an evaluation of five business[es] would cost at least $15,000, and [Christina] cannot know whether it is even necessary, because she does not know Mike's position on the value of the businesses. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Christina argued for a business valuation not to pursue a claim of active appreciation, but because the value of the businesses was substantial and because [e]ven if they were, as Mike apparently believes, entirely separate, the Court must be able to determine their value in order to determine what an equitable distribution of marital property requires. The court denied further interim fees, noting [i]f necessary the court will make an adjustment of attorney fees awards at the end of the case. As it turned out, the trial took place less than six weeks after the renewed interim attorney's fees request became ripe. After trial, the court awarded almost $18,000 additional attorney's fees to Christina: another $10,000 in cash and credit of $7,975 in cash proceeds from the sale of two cars. In short, in a case in which Christina estimated on March 14 that attorney's fees would be about $16,000, and in which trial was completed on May 30 in three days, the court awarded her a total of $22,975 in fees. [26] With this background, the court's conclusionthat Michael's failure to pay his attorney's fees during the brief interim between the court's order and the trial is a sufficient basis to remand the caseis puzzling. Judge Weeks's order, that Michael match any payment to his attorney by a payment to Christina's attorney, was obviously designed to force counsel for both parties into identical positions. [27] And it did just that. The parties were litigating on an even plane. Neither attorney, for a period of about six weeks, received payment. And the judge did what he said he would do: review the question of fees after the trial and make an award if necessary. After that review, he awarded an additional $17,975 to Christina. Moreover, it is difficult to determine from the evidence in this case that Michael had any particular intent in not opening his attorney's billings, much less the intent to avoid paying Christina's legal fees and thus impede her ability to gather information about the value of his businesses. As Michael explained to Christina's counsel, in response to her question about not opening his attorney's billings: II am just tired of the whole thing. I don't want to look at it. II was hoping we could get this settled a long time ago. And I'm justI haven't looked at anything. In any event, there is simply no basis for the court's conclusion that Michael did not pay his bills to avoid having to pay Christina's counsel. [28] Finally, the court's conclusion that Michael's failure to pay his attorney's bill in the brief interim significantly affected Christina's ability to litigate her case depends on a series of unproven assumptions. The first is that the bills were of a sufficient amount to have made any difference. The record is silent in this regard. The second is that, had Christina's attorney received a payment during the period in question, she would have commissioned the evaluation that she earlier had spoken of only in theoretical terms. The last is that any such evaluation would have been used to try to show active appreciationa claim never raised by Christinarather than merely to give the court sufficient information so as to determine what an equitable distribution of marital property requiresthe purpose that Christina did cite in her memorandum of law. Judge Weeks was fully aware of Christina's claim that she was entitled to greater interim fees and that she had not received interim payments beyond the $5,000 ordered in April. Christina's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration on May 20 and alerted the court to these facts. But there is nothing to suggest that the court abused its discretion in declining to order additional interim fees, or in making a final award of almost $23,000. [29] In conclusion, the record shows that Christina failed to raise the claim of active appreciation in the trial court and that she therefore waived the issue. It also shows that the superior court acted well within its discretion in awarding interim and final fees. The record does not show that Michael's failure to pay his attorney for a period of about six weeks prevented Christina from raising a claim based on active appreciation. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.