Opinion ID: 2109923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Third Party Perpetrator Evidence.

Text: With a backdrop of admitting that she killed her daughter, appellant contends that a third party could conceivably have killed her little girl. Notwithstanding, we address this argument in legal merit. The trial court excluded third party perpetrator evidence proffered by Debra, granting a pretrial motion in limine on such evidence until Debra made a showing that such evidence satisfied a balancing test set out in State v. Luna, 378 N.W.2d 229 (S.D. 1985). In Luna, at 234, this Court adopted a position based upon Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, at 1452 (9th Cir.1983) (quoted in Luna, at 234): When the State interest is strong, only the exclusion of article, reliable and highly probative evidence will violate due process. When the State interest is weaker, less significant evidence is protected.... [T]he court must balance the importance of the evidence against the state interest in exclusion. Appellant stresses that Perry was based upon a line of California caselaw which has since been modified. See, People v. Hall, 41 Cal.3d 826, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99 (Cal.1986): We reject [ People v. ] Arline, 13 Cal. App.3d 200, 91 Cal.Rptr. 520 [ (1970) ] to the extent that it creates a distinct and elevated standard for admitting this kind of exculpatory evidence. Rather than speaking in terms of a [ People v. ] Mendez [193 Cal. 39, 223 P. 65 (1924)]- Arline rule, courts should simply treat third-party culpability evidence like any other evidence: if relevant it is admissible (note omitted) unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion. (note omitted). The extreme position overruled in Hall, however, was not adopted in Luna. We observed, in Luna, at 233, that State evidentiary rules may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. The rule expressed in Luna does not infringe upon Debra's right to due process for the reason that the evidence, in her case, is so weak in probative value and presents such an opportunity to confuse the jury and to waste time (See SDCL 19-12-3 and F.R.E. 403) to a far greater degree than in Luna. The evidence excluded by the trial court is as follows: 1. Debra's neighbor secured restraining orders against her ex-husband to avoid physical abuse; 2. A woman telephoned the neighbor's house at 1:50 a.m. on the night Abby died, asking for Russell (the ex-husband's name was Russell); 3. A guest at the neighbor's party on the night Abby died saw a man she did not know walking near the Jenner home at 11:30 p.m.; and, 4. A man was seen in the graveyard where Abby was buried eight days after she died, who dressed similarly to the man seen walking near the Jenner home. We deem this evidence has no relevance, and the trial court was correct to exclude it under SDCL 19-12-3, of which Luna is simply an illustration. [3] We find no error here.