Opinion ID: 767661
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miller's pre-December 12, 1995 claim and the statute of limitations.

Text: 20 The 300-day time period for Miller to file her discrimination claim excluded any alleged discriminatory acts that occurred before December 12, 1995. To get around the statute of limitations, Miller seeks use of the continuing violation doctrine, under which a plaintiff may get relief for a time-barred act by linking it with an act that is within the limitations period. Speer v. Rand McNally, 123 F.3d 658,663 (7th Cir. 1997). Miller argues this doctrine applies to her because American Family continued to discriminate against her in terms of her salary after December 12, 1995. As a result, she contends, it engaged in a continuing violation within the limitations period which she can link to American Family's pre-December 12, 1995 discrimination to bring this otherwise time- barred activity within the limitations period. See id. (For purposes of the limitations period, courts treat such a combination as one continuous act that ends within the limitations period.). 21 Relying on our decision in Jones v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 42 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 1994), the district court rejected Miller's argument. It noted that we have recognized three variations of the continuing violation doctrine and put forth the covert continuing violation theory as the variant which best fit Miller's case. Id. at 1058. Under this variation, the plaintiff can only realize that she is a victim of discrimination after a series of discrete acts has occurred. The limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff gains such insight. Id. But if the plaintiff knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence would have known after each act that it was discriminatory and had harmed her, she must sue over that act within the relevant statute of limitations. Id. 22 The district court noted Miller admitted that by January 1995, she knew she was the lowest-paid person in her unit and suspected it was because of her pregnancies. Miller, by her own account, then directly confronted Ann Knapstein (then her immediate supervisor) with this suspicion. According to Miller, Knapstein responded by simply turn[ing] around, mad, and slamm[ing] one of the drawers on her desk. The district court reasoned that because Knapstein did not deny Miller's charge, her response (or lack thereof) was ambiguous. If Miller was bothered by that response, she had a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to inquire further whether American Family was in fact discriminating against her. Miller, however, did not do so. Instead, she continued working as if nothing had happened; she did not act at that point and exercise reasonable diligence to root out an actual answer. Because Miller was alerted to a possible problem at the time of the encounter with Knapstein and yet did nothing, the district court held that Miller could not avail herself of the continuing violation theory to bring time- barred activity within the limitations period. See Jones, 42 F.3d at 1058. 23 On appeal, Miller argues that Knapstein's response was not ambiguous, but was clearly a denial that the pregnancies were a problem. We agree with the district court, however, about the ambiguity of Knapstein's response. Knapstein did not say no or shake her head negatively. On the one hand Knapstein's reaction could be attributed to her being angry that she got caught in alleged discriminatory behavior (a tacit admission of discrimination). On the other hand, it could be attributed to her frustration at what she perceived as Miller's ingratitude--the body language equivalent of after all I've done for you (promotions, raises, four maternity leaves totaling 30 weeks), this is the thanks I get (an implicit denial of discrimination). While the latter interpretation may be the more likely one, it is certainly not conclusive that this was the meaning of Knapstein's reaction. In short, Knapstein's reaction was ambiguous, and as a result, Miller should have pressed the issue of the discrimination she apparently suspected. Because she did not, she cannot invoke the continuing violation doctrine to save her time- barred claims. 24