Opinion ID: 867236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Hybrid Representation

Text: ¶ 38 When Dixon elected before trial to represent himself, the judge warned him that he would have sole responsibility for his defense, including examining and cross-examining witnesses. Dixon nonetheless later requested that advisory counsel cross-examine the State's DNA experts. Dixon sought, however, to continue to represent himself in all other respects. The trial court rejected hybrid representation, stating that Dixon could elect to have counsel represent him at any point in the trial, but would not then be allowed to revert to self-representation. We review the decision to deny hybrid representation for abuse of discretion. State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 325, 878 P.2d 1352, 1363 (1994). ¶ 39 There is no constitutional right to hybrid representation. Id.; see also State v. Roscoe, 184 Ariz. 484, 498, 910 P.2d 635, 649 (1996) (characterizing hybrid representation as disfavored). In Cornell, the defendant sought to have advisory counsel cross-examine an expert. 179 Ariz. at 324-25, 878 P.2d at 1362-63. As here, the trial judge gave the defendant the option of continuing to represent himself or having counsel take over completely. Id. at 325, 878 P.2d at 1363. The defendant chose self-representation and we upheld the trial judge's order, noting that a request to resume pro per status during trial is uniformly held untimely, and that the denial of an untimely motion is not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 326, 878 P.2d at 1364. Similarly, the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in denying Dixon's motion for hybrid representation.