Opinion ID: 1972310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Sequester

Text: Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion when it denied his unopposed motion to sequester the jury because it failed to consider the circumstances in light of State v. Brisson, 124 Vt. 211, 201 A.2d 881 (1964). In Brisson, we stated: When dealing with the integrity of the jury [defendant] has only to show the existence of circumstances capable of prejudicing the deliberative function of the jury. He is not required to prove that they actually did so. (citation omitted). Events or circumstances which might not be of concern where a jury is under the control and scrutiny of the court itself during trial, might be factors of greater weight when their effect on a jury at large in the community is considered. Id. at 215, 201 A.2d at 883 (emphasis added). Defendant contends that he merely needed to present circumstances capable of prejudicing the jury. In support of his motion, defendant argued that there were parties who may as the trial progresses seek to put a spin on any media coverage so as to change the public opinion. Defendant's counsel also noted that it was his experience that television coverage of criminal trials results in a carnival atmosphere and that the power of television entices jurors to cheat a bit on their oath. Counsel also contended that the only way to ensure the absence of juror taint was sequestration. Defendant pointed to substantial pretrial publicity, the novel theory of criminal liability and the presence of television cameras in the courtroom as circumstances capable of prejudicing the jury. While Brisson is the correct standard under which defendant's motion should be reviewed, defendant misconstrues that standard. Brisson requires that a defendant demonstrate a nexus between the events or circumstances and juror taint. Brisson, 124 Vt. at 214, 201 A.2d at 883 (motion for jury sequestration properly denied because defendant made no showing that any untoward event occurred in connection with any part of the panel, so as to cloud their impartiality); State v. Dragon, 135 Vt. 168, 170, 376 A.2d 12, 13 (1977) (a demonstrable showing of prejudice required, mere speculation of juror prejudice insufficient). Here, defense counsel relied on his own experience and belief that publicity caused taint. The only evidence that he presented was that there had been extensive media coverage of both the Cifarellis' deaths and the trial. Extensive publicity and the presence of media are not enough to establish this nexus. If it were, practically all juries assigned to high profile cases would require sequestration. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 251, 31 S.Ct. 2, 5, 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910) (if mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption raises presumption that they exist, it would be hard to maintain a jury trial under the conditions of the present day); State v. Piskorski, 177 Conn. 677, 419 A.2d 866, 876 (1979) (extensive pretrial publicity does not itself demonstrate danger of juror prejudice). Moreover, defendant has not demonstrated any resulting prejudice. During voir dire, members of the panel were extensively questioned regarding their exposure to the media and their predispositions to the case based on that exposure. The judge systematically warned them about the media when they recessed. Upon their return, he systematically questioned the panel. Finally, notwithstanding the continued publicity, defendant did not renew his objections regarding possible juror taint. The trial court properly denied the motion to sequester. Affirmed.