Opinion ID: 2052708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State's Alleged Failure to Disclose Potentially Exculpatory Evidence

Text: Dawson contends that the Superior Court erred in concluding that his Brady [5] claim was procedurally barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3). Dawson contends that the State withheld potentially exculpatory evidence in contravention of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Brady. Specifically, Dawson argues that the State failed to disclose in a timely manner the fact that the testimony to be offered by Nave's sister, Kathy Spence, had changed dramatically since her initial police interview. The changed testimony, Dawson asserts, substantially undermined his defense, and the State's failure to disclose this change of testimony severely impeded his ability to cross-examine Spence. The Superior Court concluded, however, that Dawson's claim was procedurally barred because Dawson failed to demonstrate either cause or prejudice. We find Dawson's claim of error to be without merit and hold that the Superior Court neither erred as a matter of law nor abused its discretion. The Superior Court first analyzed Dawson's claim to determine whether the procedural bar of Rule 61 was rebutted. In conducting this analysis, the court determined that the only means of demonstrating cause for failure to raise this claim on direct appeal was the alleged ineffective assistance of Dawson's counsel. The court concluded that, if Dawson showed that his counsel had been ineffective, cause was shown for failure to state the claim on direct appeal. Therefore, the court reasoned, if no Brady violation exists on these facts, counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue the claim, and the claim would be procedurally barred. The starting point for review of this claim is a determination of whether a Brady violation actually exists. The United States Supreme Court in Brady laid down a three-part test to determine whether particular evidence should have been released to the accused in a criminal case. Evidence must be released if: (1) the evidence is requested by the accused but production is withheld by the State (or barred by the court); (2) the information is favorable to the accused's case; and (3) the evidence is material either to the determination of guilt or to the determination of the appropriate sentence. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196. Additionally, the Court has made clear that Brady applies to impeachment evidence as well as to exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The fact of Spence's changed testimony was disclosed to the defense immediately prior to Spence's testimony. The question presented here is whether the information should have been disclosed at an earlier date. The trial court concluded that the defense was not entitled to prior disclosure, citing McBride v. State, Del.Supr., 477 A.2d 174, 181 (1984). McBride, however, deals only with the scope of discovery available pursuant to Rule 17(c). It does not address the timing of disclosure of Brady materials. Thus, this citation is not dispositive. Assuming, arguendo, that the disputed information should have been disclosed sooner, Dawson fails to meet the showing required to establish a Brady violation. The information sought was not favorable to Dawson's case, as required by the second prong of the Brady test. In fact, Spence's testimony was quite damaging to Dawson's defense theory. Arguably, the information would have allowed defense counsel to prepare better for cross-examination and this enhanced preparation would have been favorable to the defense. This is not, however, the type of situation envisioned by the United States Supreme Court in Bagley, 473 U.S. at 667, 105 S.Ct. at 3375, where the scope of Brady was enlarged to include impeachment evidence. Bagley contemplates a situation where the impeachment evidence is directly favorable to the accused, rather than simply providing a basis for investigation. Nevertheless, Dawson's claim fails on the last prong of Brady, viz., that the evidence be material to the determination of guilt. In the Brady context, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383. Here there is no indication that an earlier disclosure of Spence's changed testimony would have brought about a different outcome. Substantial physical evidence was presented to link Dawson to the murder and significant circumstantial evidence tended to disprove Dawson's theory that McCoy, Nave and Irwin were the perpetrators. Further, defense counsel were able to conduct a full cross-examination of Spence which included: playing the tape of Spence's earlier, inconsistent statement; pointing out the inconsistencies to the jury; and questioning the motive of the witness in changing her statement. On these facts, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the changed testimony had been disclosed sooner. Dawson showed neither cause nor prejudice. [6] The Superior Court did not err in holding Dawson's Brady claim to be procedurally barred.