Opinion ID: 1419944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The City's Police Power

Text: Are the alleged damages to Wal-Mart's property the result of a reasonable and noncompensable exercise of the City's police power? The question of whether the regulation of traffic flow to and from Wal-Mart's property was a compensable taking was a question of law for the district court. Hudson v. City of Shawnee, 246 Kan. at 403. This court's standard of review is de novo. We last visited similar takings issues in Garrett, 259 Kan. 897. Garrett required a balancing test to determine whether the City's use of the police power action was reasonable. A reasonable regulation imposed to protect the public is not a taking in the constitutional sense because the public use is paramount and public safety is the desideratum. Ray, 196 Kan. at 23. Thus, the question here is one of reasonableness. If Wichita's rerouting of traffic by closing the eastbound exit at Dugan and converting the Kellogg frontage roads to one-way streets was a reasonable exercise of police power, Wal-Mart cannot recover for any diminution in value to its property. The burden of proof is on Wal-Mart. See Hudson, 246 Kan. at 403-04. Wal-Mart relies primarily on three cases in support of its argument that the changes in access are unreasonable: Garrett, 259 Kan. 897; McCall, 215 Kan. 390; and Teachers Insurance, 221 Kan. 325. In McCall, the landowner was compensated for a lost right of access and not changes in traffic flow. One entrance to McCall's gas station was permanently removed. Thus, McCall is not applicable. In Teachers Insurance, the landowners were damaged both by loss of access and changes in traffic flow when the City of Wichita moved Highway 54 (Kellogg) altogether. The landowners directly abutted Kellogg and had direct access to the street. When the highway move was completed, the landowners lost direct access and were left with only a tortuous and circuitous route to Kellogg. 221 Kan. at 328. Motorists had to travel from 1.34 to 2 additional miles to reach the landowner's property. The City stipulated that travel to and from the property was not practical. The landowners were compensated. In Garrett, the landowner was compensated when the City took a portion of her land (actually the owner deeded it to the City in exchange for the cost of some improvements, but that is immaterial here) and rerouted traffic as well. A divided court held that [w]here the government's exercise of its police power has an economic impact on private property, a balancing test is applied to determine if the regulation of private land is too unfair or goes too far. 259 Kan. at 910. The district court here was not required to follow the dictates of Garrett as Wal-Mart contends. Garrett is distinguishable. The economic impact analysis espoused by Garrett is new to condemnation cases in Kansas. 259 Kan. at 910. Wal-Mart presented evidence of economic impact. According to Wal-Mart, the sales for Sam's between February 1, 1995 and October 20, 1995 were down 2.41% as compared to 1994. Customer counts were down as well. We hold the district court did not err by refusing to consider the economic impact of the regulation of traffic flow on Wal-Mart's property. The test has always been one of reasonableness. We restrict the application of Garrett's economic impact analysis to the Garrett facts. Garrett found that the City failed to complete the ring road and in failing to do so diminished the commercial value of her property. Since this was an economic taking, the applicable test is weighing the public benefit against the economic burden to the landowner. (Emphasis added.) 259 Kan. at 916. Here we have no failed road construction which diminished the value of Wal-Mart's property. Garrett is not to be read as changing the rationale developed by our longstanding case law that a compensable taking occurs only if the police power is unreasonable. Initially, the district court is to make a determination of reasonableness. If exercise of police power is unreasonable, a taking has occurred and a compensation award is appropriate. In conclusion, we turn to the evidentiary complaints raised by Wal-Mart in its reply brief. Wal-Mart argues we should not consider affidavits and council proceedings submitted by the City because they contain hearsay. A reply brief is an inappropriate vehicle for raising additional issues. Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Metropolitan Topeka Airport Authority, 23 Kan. App.2d 1038, 1044, 940 P.2d 84 (1997). However, a reply brief is appropriate to rebut new material. Rule 6.05 (1998 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 36). We resolve the ambiguous character of the reply brief's assertions in Wal-Mart's favor and address the hearsay contention. A certified copy of the city council proceedings discussing the Kellogg and Dugan interchange appears in the record. The testimony of various persons present at that meeting is not required for our determination of whether the City's actions under its police power were reasonable. Wal-Mart complains that no exit ramp was provided for Dugan itself. The council proceedings reference exit ramps for other streets. The City also submitted two affidavits from Carl Gipson, Special Projects Engineer for the City of Wichita. The portion of the Design Concept Study attached to the second Gipson affidavit provides direct evidence of significant savings to the City and motorists as a result of the Kellogg highway project. Gipson stated from his own personal knowledge as projects manager for the Kellogg improvement that [t]he fundamental reason for the reconstruction of Kellogg at this location was to improve safety and traffic efficiency. Further, the record reflects that one of the primary objectives for undertaking the Kellogg highway project was to provide nonstop travel from the central business district to the airport. Prior to the project, the Dugan Street intersection was the only impediment to such travel. The City has made a sufficient showing that the exercise of its police power in rerouting traffic on Kellogg was reasonable. See McCall, 215 Kan. at 397. Affirmed. ABBOTT, J., not participating. MARION CHIPMAN, Senior Judge, assigned. [1]