Opinion ID: 603521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Extent of Defendant's Duty Under Pennsylvania Law

Text: 11 Under Pennsylvania law, [t]he standard of care a possessor of land owes to one who enters upon the land depends upon whether the person entering is a trespassor [sic], licensee, or invitee. Carrender v. Fitterer, 503 Pa. 178, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (1983). It is undisputed that plaintiff was a trespasser. It is also undisputed that, in general, under Pennsylvania law a landowner owes a trespasser a duty only to refrain from wilful or wanton misconduct. See, e.g., Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440, 442 (1965) (The legal obligation to trespassers is the avoidance of wilful or wanton misconduct. (emphasis omitted)). Plaintiff argues, however, that he fell within an exception to the general rule. 12 As set forth in his brief, plaintiff asserts that he was a foreseeable trespasser under Pennsylvania law. 2 He then makes a further broad assertion that [w]ith respect to foreseeable trespassers, the landowner has a duty to exercise reasonable care. For purposes of the remainder of our analysis we shall assume, without deciding, that plaintiff was a foreseeable trespasser. We turn to a review of the cases that plaintiff relies on to support his argument that, as a foreseeable trespasser, he was owed a duty of reasonable care.
13 In his brief, plaintiff relies on four cases to support his argument that defendant owed him a duty of reasonable care. See Cummings v. Borough of Nazareth, 427 Pa. 14, 233 A.2d 874, 877 (1967); Cheslock v. Pittsburgh Rys., 363 Pa. 157, 69 A.2d 108, 111 (1949); Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576, 578 (1940); Bethay v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 271 Pa.Super. 366, 413 A.2d 710, 716 (1979). In two of these cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cites Section 334 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) with apparent approval. See Cheslock, 69 A.2d at 111; Frederick, 10 A.2d at 578. Section 334 is entitled Activities Highly Dangerous to Constant Trespassers on Limited Area. It states: 14 § 334 Activities Highly Dangerous to Constant Trespassers on Limited Area 15 A possessor of land who knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area thereof, is subject to liability for bodily harm there caused to them by his failure to carry on an activity involving a risk of death or serious bodily harm with reasonable care for their safety. 16 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 334 (1965). 17 We note that Section 334 speaks in terms of activities carried on by a landowner. Plaintiff was injured when trespassing at defendant's closed and winterized swimming pool. We do not believe that by merely having such a pool on its premises defendant was carry[ing] on an activity under Section 334. Rather, we conclude that, under the Restatement, defendant's swimming pool was an artificial condition. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 335, 339 (1965). 18 Our conclusion that a pool is an artificial condition rather than an activity is supported by the numerous swimming pool cases brought under the attractive nuisance doctrine--Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). See, e.g., Fletcher v. Hale, 548 So.2d 135, 136 (Ala.1989) (The swimming pool was an artificial condition upon [defendant's] land.). Section 339 is entitled Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children. (emphasis added). Accordingly, neither Cheslock nor Frederick, which involve activities rather than artificial conditions, supports plaintiff's argument. 19 The third case plaintiff relies upon to support his argument that defendant owed him a duty of reasonable care involves the duty of care owed by a landowner under Section 339 of the Restatement. See Bethay, 413 A.2d at 715 (citing Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)). As we noted earlier, Section 339 does apply to artificial conditions such as swimming pools. In any event, Section 339 only applies if the trespasser is a child. It has no application to this case because plaintiff was an adult on the date of his accident. Accordingly, Bethay does not support plaintiff's argument. 20 Finally, plaintiff relies upon a case involving a landowner's duty to an invitee for injuries caused by a design defect in a swimming pool. See Cummings, 233 A.2d at 877. Because Cummings did not involve a trespasser, it does not support plaintiff's argument that defendant owed him a duty of reasonable care. 21 We have reviewed the cases cited by plaintiff and conclude that they do not support plaintiff's argument. When considered in context, the language plaintiff quotes from these cases is, at best, dicta regarding our issue--the duty owed by a landowner to a foreseeable adult trespasser for injuries caused by an artificial condition created or maintained by the landowner. Accordingly, we turn to a review of Pennsylvania cases on this issue. We begin our analysis with decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania because we must predict how that court would decide this issue. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 58 S.Ct. at 822.
22 In the most recent case on this issue decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a trespasser jumped to her death from the roof of an apartment building. See Engel v. Friend's Hospital, 439 Pa. 559, 266 A.2d 685 (1970). The decedent's husband alleged that the landowner maintained a dangerous condition: 1) by not locking the door to the roof; 2) by not limiting access to the roof to tenants; and 3) by not fencing in the roof. Id., 266 A.2d at 686. He also alleged that his wife's trespass was foreseeable because the landowner knew that the roof had been the site of prior suicides and attempted suicides. Id. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint after concluding that the complaint failed to aver wilful or wanton negligence. Id., 266 A.2d at 687. It stated: Plaintiff was a trespasser who could recover only if defendant was guilty of willful or wanton negligence or misconduct. Id.; see also Costanza v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 276 Pa. 90, 119 A. 819, 820 (1923) (recognizing in dicta that a landowner would owe an adult trespasser no duty except that of refraining from willfully or wantonly inflicting injury from an electrical transformer maintained by the landowner). 23 We recognize that Engel was decided over twenty years ago. Nevertheless, more recent decisions of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania convince us that Engel's statement of the duty of care is still good law. Over ten years after Engel was decided, the Superior Court considered this issue. See Antonace v. Ferri Contracting Co., 320 Pa.Super. 519, 467 A.2d 833 (1983). In Antonace, a trespasser was killed while riding his dirt bike when he struck a steel cable that a landowner had strung across a roadway. The landowner did not dispute that it knew that dirt bikers frequently rode over its property. Id., 467 A.2d at 836. The court relied on Engel in concluding that the duty the landowner owed the trespasser was only to refrain from wilful or wanton misconduct even though a jury could conclude that [the landowner] knew that dirt bike riders such as the decedent were using the property. Id., 467 A.2d at 837. 24 More recently, the Superior Court expressly rejected the argument that a landowner owes a foreseeable adult trespasser a duty of reasonable care to prevent injuries from artificial conditions. See Graham v. Sky Haven Coal, Inc., 386 Pa.Super. 598, 563 A.2d 891, 896 n. 8 (1989), allocatur granted, 525 Pa. 600, 603, 575 A.2d 566, 568 (1990), appeal discontinued, June 27, 1990. In Graham, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that plaintiff was owed a duty of reasonable care as set forth in Section 335 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). 3 In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the Superior Court stated: Section 335 [has] not been adopted by [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and] it is contrary to the long recognized rule in this Commonwealth, i.e., that a plaintiff who is a trespasser can recover only if the defendant is guilty of wanton or wilful misconduct. Graham, 563 A.2d at 897 n. 8 (quoting Franc v. Pennsylvania R.R., 424 Pa. 99, 225 A.2d 528, 531 (1967) (Jones, J., dissenting)). 25 Although it might be expected that a court that arguably recognizes a heightened duty to foreseeable trespassers for activities would also recognize a heightened duty for artificial conditions, such is not always the case. Instead, [c]ourts are far readier to invoke the duty of care and the concept of negligence where they find active conduct than where they find a mere condition of the premises. Fowler V. Harper, et al., The Law of Torts § 27.6, at 188 (1986). Accordingly, Pennsylvania courts have traditionally been much more willing to hold a landowner liable to a trespasser for activities than for artificial conditions. See Laurence H. Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 Temp. L.Q. 32, 32 (1937) (discussing Pennsylvania law; [T]he liability of a possessor [of land] for harm caused by his active conduct on the land must be sharply distinguished from the liability arising out of conditions existing upon the land.); Note, Those Weasel Words--Wilful and Wanton, 92 U.Pa.L.Rev. 431, 435-36 (1944) (recognizing that a proper understanding of Pennsylvania law requires that one keep in mind ... the distinction between the liability arising from active conduct on land and that arising out of conditions upon the land). 26 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly recognizes this same distinction between liability for activities as opposed to liability for artificial conditions in the closely analogous situation of gratuitous licensees. See Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515, 519 (1983) ([A]ppellant's injuries at most would seem to have resulted from 'existent conditions upon the premises' ... as opposed to 'any affirmative or active negligence on [the defendant's] part.' In such a case a possessor of land is not liable to a licensee in the absence of willful and wanton injury. (quoting Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 80 A.2d 76, 79 (1951))).
27 After a review of the cases cited by plaintiff and an extensive review of Pennsylvania caselaw, we believe that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would conclude that defendant owed the plaintiff a duty only to refrain from wilful and wanton misconduct. In what is undoubtedly the most famous case involving the standard of care owed to trespassers under Pennsylvania law, the United States Supreme Court instructed that we are bound to follow state law on the duty of care, even though we might believe that a different rule would be preferable. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822-824, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938); accord West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236, 61 S.Ct. 179, 183, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940) (stating that federal courts are bound to follow state law even though they believe that the rule is unsound in principle or that another is preferable.). 28 The district court concluded that defendant's actions did not rise to the level of wilful or wanton misconduct as a matter of law. We turn to a review of that conclusion. 29