Opinion ID: 2566097
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coverage for Permissive Users

Text: ¶31 The Nationwide policy at issue provided liability coverage for Fricke, her household, and anyone who used her car with her permission. [3] Auto insurance policies must cover permissive users pursuant to section 31A-22-303(1)(a)(ii) of the Utah Code. [4] The parties dispute whether Hiatt's actions were covered under the policy provision protecting a person who is legally responsible for the use of your auto and uses it with your permission. ¶32 The default judgment against Hiatt established that he was legally responsible for damages occurring as a result of his use of Fricke's vehicle. Accordingly, the coverage issue turns on whether the term permission contemplates coverage for the actions of a person permitted to use a car generally, or rather is limited to those persons who have permission to take the particular actions immediately giving rise to liability. ¶33 Hiatt accepted Fricke's offer for a ride and therefore had permission to use the car in the sense that he was invited to sit in the passenger seat while Fricke drove him from the nightclub to his home. On the other hand, Fricke never gave Hiatt permission to reach over and grab the steering wheel. Nationwide urges us to conclude that grabbing and turning the steering wheel disqualified Hiatt from permissive user status under the terms of the policy. We decline to do so. ¶34 We hold that Hiatt was using [Fricke's car] with [her] permission despite his sudden action that caused Fricke's car to veer into oncoming traffic. This interpretation is dictated by the statutory language mandating coverage of permissive users and is also supported by practical considerations of efficiency and predictability in resolving insurance claims. ¶35 The controlling statutory language does not limit permissive users to those who are given permission to drive or operate a vehicle. Operator is a defined term under the statute. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-301(5), 41-12a-103(8) (2003). However, the legislature chose not to use this term to describe the mandatory coverage at issue here. While the legislature could have required liability policies to cover permissive operators, it chose instead to mandate coverage for permissive users. We are persuaded that the legislature selected the term user advisedly and with the intention that it apply more broadly than the term operator. See In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, ¶ 25, 71 P.3d 589 (In construing a statute, we assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly . . . . (quotation and citation omitted)). ¶36 Our interpretation of permissive user is also supported by a related provision of the insurance code. The code prevents an insurer from withdrawing the coverage it is required to extend to permissive users on the basis that the permissive user was at fault in causing an accident. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(a)(iii)(A) (2003). Our interpretation prevents insurers from frustrating this provision by categorizing as unauthorized those actions giving rise to fault. ¶37 Practical considerations also support our reading of the statutory language. The construction proposed by Nationwide would give rise to circumstances where a person using someone else's vehicle could move in and out of the zone of permissiveness from moment to moment. Such an interpretation would spawn fact-dependent disputes over whether, at the relevant moment(s), a user had permission to undertake the particular action(s) that caused an accident. For example, the typical automobile owner does not authorize permissive users to exceed speed limits, run red lights, drive recklessly, or engage in any negligent or ill-advised actions. Under the interpretation urged by Nationwide, a person driving someone else's automobile with permission, but without permission to act negligently, would find himself without liability coverage. Other potential scenarios giving rise to coverage disputes under Nationwide's proposed interpretation could involve passengers who inadvertently bump the driver's arm, open a door at an inopportune moment, or startle the driver. ¶38 We find no support for an interpretation that would create additional coverage disputes and inject increased uncertainty into the evaluation of coverage determinations for permissive users. The many fact-dependent issues inherent in such disputes would likely subject both accident victims and the insurance industry not only to more uncertainty, but to increased litigation as well. ¶39 We are cognizant that other courts confronted with the issue of whether a steering-wheel-grabber disqualifies himself from permissive user status have decided the issue differently. [5] However, none of these decisions relied on the language of a statutory scheme like ours, which defines the term operator but mandates coverage of permissive users. Moreover, none of these decisions analyzed the problems inherent in an interpretation that renders coverage dependent on the factual complexities presented by a construct where would-be permissive users frequently enter and exit the scope of permission. ¶40 Because Hiatt had permission to ride in Fricke's car as a passenger, we hold that he was covered as a permissive user under Fricke's policy with Nationwide for the duration of the ride. We further hold that Hiatt's actions in grabbing and turning the steering wheel did not disqualify him from permissive user status.