Opinion ID: 1832620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: hager's testimony about interview of d.w.

Text: Archie contends that the district court erred in permitting Hager to testify, over a relevance objection, that she had no concerns during her interview of D.W. at the Center that D.W. was not telling Hager the truth. At trial, Hager testified at length about the procedures used to investigate family crimes and interview children. Hager said that as a member of the family crimes unit of the Lincoln Police Department, she had received specialized child forensic interview training. Hager explained there is a standard form for interviewing a child interviewee which begins with telling the child interviewee about the interview room and that the interviewer is a police officer, and permitting the child interviewee to ask questions about those things. Then, the interviewer moves on to discussing a nonabuse event with the child interviewee, to get the child used to the way we are going to talk. Hager said that after that, I'll move to what we call the ground rules, which include I'll say things such as if you don't understand, it's okay to say you don't understand. If I use a big word that you don't understand, just let me know. If you don't remember, it's okay to say that you don't remember. And also part of the ground rules is what we call the truth or lie ceremony. So it's a way to see if a child knows the difference and can understand the difference between the truth and a lie. And then we go into the part of the interview where we elicit information regarding the abuse event. And, after that, we close up usually with another non-abuse event . . . [s]o we end it in what we say is a positive note, to talk about something different. Hager then testified specifically regarding her interview of D.W. at the Center. Hager agreed that during the course of the interview, she did not have any concerns that D.W. did not understand the difference between the truth and a lie. Although D.W. was very energetic and couldn't sit still for very long, Hager testified that D.W. was able to provide information pertinent to the investigation. However, Hager said that she departed from the standard sequence for interviewing a child during her interview of D.W. For example, Hager said she did not go through a body part inventory with D.W., because D.W. was already using terms to describe body parts and it was unnecessary to identify what D.W.'s terms meant. Hager also said that although she discussed the difference between a truth and a lie with D.W., she did not go through the truth-or-lie ceremony. Hager was cross-examined regarding the truth-or-lie ceremony. Because it is significant to our analysis of this issue, an extensive section of defense counsel's colloquy with Hager is set forth below. Q Why do you refer to the form during your interview with the child? A Those are tools. . . . Q Okay. And the truth [or] lie portion of the form is also to go over or to determine what? A If it's age appropriate, meaning there's a certain age that I don't use that form with, that is to establish or to see if they can tell the difference between the truth and a lie. Q Okay. And you said earlier that you didn't go over this form with [D.W.] before your interview did you? A Yes. Q So you did not use the truth/lie part with her when you questioned her, is that right? A Correct. That form, I did not. . . . . Q . . . You testified earlier that you've done a series of child forensic interviews in your profession, is that right? A Yes. Q And you were specially trained to question children? A Yes. Q All right. And you mentioned something yesterday, you need to make sure, when you're questioning a child, not to mislead, is that right? A Yes. Q Because that can be a problem in these kind[s] of cases, can it not? A When interviewing children, yes, that can be a problem. . . . . Q  an idea may be planted in a child's head, inadvertently, by a questioner? A Can it be? Q Yes. A Yes. Q Okay. Or a child may give a positive response that they suspect maybe the questioner is asking for, is that right? A Yes, that's possible. Q And that's why you have the protocols to determine the truth and lie, make sure a child understands the difference between the truth and lie before you do an interview, is that right, at least part of the reason? A As part of the interview, we sometimes use that tool, yes. On redirect examination, the State revisited the subject of the truth-or-lie ceremony. Hager testified that the documents about which she had been questioned were five separate tools that might or might not be used in a particular instance. Hager explained that [i]t all depends upon the age of the child and their [sic] disposition, as far as the interview. Hager said she had spoken to D.W. about the importance of telling her the truth. Hager testified over a relevance objection that she had no concerns D.W. was not telling her the truth and agreed that it was only at times, when you have children where you may have those concerns [about telling the truth], that's when you definitely need to go through the format of the truth and lie ceremony. Archie argues, based on State v. Beermann, [29] that Hager gave improper testimony as to the credibility of another witness. In Beermann, the 10-year-old alleged victim of a sexual assault testified, at trial, regarding five sexual assaults committed by the defendant. Issues were raised regarding inconsistency between the alleged victim's trial testimony and the testimony she gave at a preliminary hearing. Following her trial testimony, the county sheriff's deputy who had investigated the allegations was asked if he had heard the alleged victim's in-court testimony, and he said he had. The deputy testified that the alleged victim's in-court testimony was consistent with what he had been told during the investigation. The deputy was then asked if, based upon his training and experience and his observations of the victim, he had an opinion whether or not the alleged victim had been sexually abused. The deputy testified it was his opinion that the alleged victim had been sexually abused. [30] On appeal, this court concluded that the testimony had been erroneously admitted, in part based on the principle that it is totally improper for one witness to testify as to the credibility of another witness. [31] We found that the testimony was precluded by Neb. Evid. R. 701 and 702, [32] because there was no evidence that the deputy was an expert on the subject of his testimony, and the subject was not proper for lay opinion testimony because `it tended to usurp the jury's role.' [33] We held that the credibility of a witness is left to the jury's judgment and that `[n]o witness, expert or otherwise, should be permitted to give an opinion that another mentally and physically competent witness is telling the truth.' [34] Archie also relies on the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Doan. [35] In Doan, an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault of a child, the State presented expert testimony from a counselor who had treated the alleged victim. The counselor testified to the characteristics typically seen in sexually abused children and that part of her function was to evaluate `whether or not I believe they've been abused or not.' [36] The counselor testified about the history she obtained from the alleged victim and described the alleged victim's physical appearance and reactions while the alleged victim described the abuse to the counselor. The counselor concluded that she had received validation of the alleged abuse. [37] The Court of Appeals, noting our holding in Beermann, concluded that the opinion testimony should have been excluded for lack of proper foundation. The court found no showing that the counselor had the underlying expertise to validate [the] account of sexual abuse, even if such testimony could be received, which it cannot. [38] The court held that in a prosecution for sexual assault of a child, an expert witness may not give testimony which directly or indirectly expresses an opinion that the child is believable, that the child is credible, or that the witness' account has been validated. [39] More recently, in In re Interest of Kyle O., [40] the Court of Appeals addressed a situation in which a 14-year-old defendant was convicted of sexual contact with a 5-year-old alleged victim. The defendant argued that the trial court erred in excluding a letter from the defendant's counselor. The Court of Appeals noted that the letter contained the opinion of the counselor that the defendant was telling the truth in denying the allegations. The Court of Appeals, citing Beermann, concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the letter, because the opinion of the counselor regarding the defendant's credibility was irrelevant. [41] The circumstances of the instant case, however, are distinguishable from those presented in Beermann, In re Interest of Kyle O., and Doan. In this case, Hager did not purport to offer an expert opinion as to D.W.'s credibility. Hager's statement consisted of one question and one answer, in which Hager agreed that she did not have any concerns that [D.W.] wasn't telling [her] the truth. The question and answer were obviously in the context of explaining on redirect examination why Hager did not utilize the truth-or-lie ceremony with this particular child witness. Nonetheless, it is improper for a prosecutor to inquire of a witness whether another person may or may not have been telling the truth in a certain instance. The proper line of inquiry, as was expressed on direct examination, is whether Hager had concerns regarding D.W.'s ability to understand the difference between the truth and a lie. Hager testified on direct examination that D.W. understood that difference. Based on our review of the entire record and the context in which the line of inquiry came about, however, we conclude that Hager's statement did not materially influence the jury in a verdict adverse to the defendant. Harmless error exists in a jury trial of a criminal case when the court makes an erroneous evidentiary ruling which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in a verdict adverse to the defendant. [42] Any error in permitting Hager's statement on redirect examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [43] In this case, Hager had been cross-examined in depth regarding her decision not to administer the truth-or-lie ceremony to D.W. The evident implication of Archie's cross-examination was that because Hager departed from established protocol, she might have misled D.W., suggested the right answers to questions, or even planted ideas in D.W.'s head. This was a legitimate line of inquiry on cross-examination, but by challenging the basis for Hager's departure from the interrogation form, the cross-examination implicated Hager's assessment of whether D.W. understood the concept of telling the truth during the interview. Here, while the form of the question posed to Hager on redirect examination was improper, we must examine the entire context of questioning when assessing prejudice. Unlike the circumstances presented in Beermann, In re Interest of Kyle O., and Doan, in this case, Hager did not testify to the substance of D.W.'s own statements or offer expert opinion testimony on the credibility of those statements. Instead, Hager answered a single question during redirect examination that was related to an issue raised by Archie during cross-examination. Read in context, the effect of Hager's single statement was not to vouch for the credibility of a witness, but simply to explain why she departed from the standard interview form in her interview of D.W. In a harmless error review, we look at the evidence upon which the jury rested its verdict; the inquiry is not whether in a trial that occurred without the error a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but, rather, whether the guilty verdict rendered in the trial was surely unattributable to the error. [44] Considering the context in which Hager's statement was made and based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that the guilty verdict rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to any error in permitting this statement on redirect and that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.