Opinion ID: 1129462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trial court's division of jointly acquired property, award of support alimony and attorney fees.

Text: Husband challenges the division of property between the parties, the support alimony award to the wife, and the order to husband to pay wife's attorney fee as made and determined by the trial court. In Carpenter v. Carpenter [7] (651) we said: The exigencies of a particular case can be best determined by the trial court, and unless the division of jointly acquired property made by the trial court in a divorce action is against the weight of the evidence and is inequitable, it will not be reversed or modified on appeal. And we further said with reference to a trial court determination as to payment of attorney fees in a divorce case (653):  Phillips v. Phillips (Okl., 556 P.2d 607 (1976)) is a case factually similar to the case at bar. There we said: `In McCoy v. McCoy, Okl., 429 P.2d 999 (1967) this court said the trial court was vested with wide discretion. It should consider the parties, and all of the circumstances in the case, including the means and property of the respective parties under the property division. Before such an order will be reversed, it must clearly appear that the trial court abused its discretion.' In the case at bar, husband was 59 years of age and wife was 58. The parties had been married to each other for 37 years. The three children born of the marriage are grown. Both parties are in good health. Husband is a practicing attorney with 33 years experience. Wife was a homemaker during most of the marriage, but has worked for a travel agency since 1977. While there was a considerable dispute as to the value of much of the property, the trial court awarded the jointly acquired property as follows: TO HUSBAND 1969 Mustang $ 1,000. Oklahoma City Golf & Country Club Stock 8,000. Professional Corporation Stock 1,700. Pension & Profit Sharing Plan ($106,000) discounted 50% 53,000. First National Bank checking 1,700. Liberty National Bank savings 113. Continental Federal S & L account 100. American Heritage stock 768. Globe Life stock 18,081. O.G.&E. stock 14,225. All Standard stock 0. Neveen Bond Fund 5,000. Prudential Ins. policy 0. TO HUSBAND Fidelity Bank checking $ 58. Liberty National Commercial Paper 24,826. Fidelity Corp. stock 9,963. Liberty Owens Ford stock 2,007. Puget Sound Power stock 4,081. Grand River Dam Auth. Bond 5,000. Total awarded to Husband $149,690. TO WIFE Unimproved lots $ 750. 1976 Cadillac Eldorado 2,000. Nichols Hills Bank checking 3,300. Continental Federal S & L savings 7,700. American First Commercial Paper 1,703. Bache Commercial Paper 27,861. First National Money Market Cert. 21,279. American Electric stock 2,981. Insilco stock 1,452. Union Electric stock 1,275. Bestaur stock 2,147. O.G.&E. stock 1,337. New York Life Insurance policy 750. Personal Retirement fund 550. The home and contents 140,000. Total awarded to Wife: $215,085. The court awarded the husband a judgment against the wife for $32,700 to become due upon sale of the home or upon the wife's becoming 65 years of age. That judgment was made a lien upon the home. The total awarded to the wife was thus reduced by $32,700 making the total to the wife $188,385, as compared with the total awarded husband (including the $32,700 money judgment), the sum of $182,390. Wife was further awarded support alimony of $65,000 payable at $500 per month for the next 121 months, and husband was ordered to pay wife's attorney fee in the sum of $12,000 with $1,000 credit being allowed for previous payment made by order of court. Upon consideration of the entire record before us, we do not find that the division of jointly acquired property made by the trial court to be so against the weight of the evidence nor so inequitable as to justify reversal on appeal. Neither do we find that the trial court determination as to payment of attorney fees upon consideration of all of the circumstances in the case, including the means and property of the respective parties to be a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.