Opinion ID: 654622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admission of Evidence of McCarthur's Prior Arrest

Text: 28 McCarthur also challenges the district court's decision to permit Abbott to recount during the government's case-in-chief her statement that she previously had been arrested in New York state for possession of a small amount of cocaine. 4 The district court allowed this testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to demonstrate McCarthur's intent and absence of mistake. (Trial Tr. at 99-100.) McCarthur contends that the introduction of this statement was contrary to Rule 404(b) because its underlying purpose was to cast McCarthur in a bad light--i.e., to establish her propensity to commit drug offenses. McCarthur further contends that any probative value this evidence may have had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and that the district court deprived her of a fair trial by admitting it. 29 Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Such evidence may be admitted for some other purpose, however, such as to prove the defendant's intent, knowledge or absence of mistake or accident. Id. In determining whether to admit evidence of prior bad acts under this rule, the district court must consider whether 30 (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar act, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 31 United States v. Levy, 955 F.2d 1098, 1102 (7th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir.1989)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 102, 121 L.Ed.2d 62 (1992). We will sustain the admission of such evidence unless the court committed a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Sanders, 979 F.2d 87, 90 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2367, 124 L.Ed.2d 273 (1993); United States v. Cox, 923 F.2d 519, 523 (7th Cir.1991). The overall, governing criterion of our analysis ... is that there must have been a principled exercise of discretion by the district court. Sanders, 979 F.2d at 90 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 32 We find that the district court abused its discretion in this case. Although the evidence was admitted to show McCarthur's intent and the absence of mistake, Abbott's testimony recounting McCarthur's statement established nothing more than the fact of a prior arrest. Abbott knew nothing about the circumstances of that arrest or the disposition of any charge. The arrest, standing alone, does not establish conduct on McCarthur's part that sheds any light on her intent or the absence of mistake with respect to the offense charged in this case. As the Tenth Circuit recently explained: 33 Rule 404(b) concerns the admission of evidence concerning particular acts and circumstances that would tend to indicate intent, knowledge, motive or similar permissible purposes. The mere fact that an arrest was made is not, in and of itself, a prior bad act which the prosecution may introduce into evidence. Evidence of a prior arrest or the lodging of charges should not itself be admitted under Rule 404(b), since neither has been traditionally viewed as sufficiently probative of the basic question of whether the underlying act occurred. 2 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence Sec. 140 at 177 (1985) (noting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482, 69 S.Ct. 213, 221, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948) wherein the Court concluded that [a]rrest without more does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or impair the credibility of a witness. It happens to the innocent as well as the guilty.). Rule 404(b) pertains only to evidence of acts extrinsic to the charged crime. [United States v.] Orr, 864 F.2d [1505] at 1510 [ (10th Cir.1988) ]. Thus, the evidence of mere arrest, ... without any evidence of the particular act or circumstance that would tend to show intent or knowledge, should not have been admitted as an other crime[ ], wrong[ ], or act[ ] under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) allows evidence concerning the prior activity of a particular defendant, not simply testimony that records indicate an arrest took place. 34 United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1559-60 (10th Cir.1992) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1855, 2938, 123 L.Ed.2d 478, 687 (1993). Thus, the relevance, if any, of McCarthur's prior arrest for possession lay in the circumstances culminating in the arrest, not the arrest per se. Again, the government had nothing to offer in this regard; indeed, Abbott conceded on cross-examination that he and Bobko had been unable to confirm even the fact of McCarthur's arrest. See supra n. 4. Ironically, it was McCarthur herself who testified as to the circumstances surrounding the arrest, but she did so only after the government was permitted to broach the subject over her objection in its case-in-chief. See n. 4. The government cannot now rely on her explanatory testimony to justify the admission of evidence that should have been excluded in the first instance. 35 Although the district court erred in admitting this evidence, we conclude that the error was harmless. The balance of the evidence against McCarthur was overwhelming. She was caught red-handed with three kilograms of cocaine in her tote bag--a large quantity clearly meant for distribution rather than personal use. Although at trial McCarthur claimed not to have known that the cocaine was in the bag, she had admitted to Bobko before the cocaine was discovered that she was familiar with everything in the bag and that it contained her personal belongings. She also admitted at trial that she had periodically opened the bag to retrieve various items in the course of her two-day trip from Los Angeles. In view of the substantial weight of the cocaine and the observation of Bobko and Abbott that it caused the bag to tilt noticeably, it strains credulity to think that McCarthur truly did not know that the cocaine was present. On the contrary, her evasive, contradictory, and false answers to the questions Bobko and Abbott posed during the initial questioning at the train station evinced a culpable knowledge of the bag's illegal contents. Thus, we are confident that even if the district court had excluded the testimony recounting McCarthur's statement about her prior arrest, the jury would have convicted her. SeeKotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.2d 528, 539 (7th Cir.1988). 5 Thus, the error did not affect McCarthur's substantial rights, see Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 52(a), nor did it deprive McCarthur of a fundamentally fair trial.