Opinion ID: 1110253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Equitable Class Action.

Text: ¶ 19. Booth's suit, seeking an equitable class action in chancery court, is not a novel concept. Even prior to the adoption of the Rules, plaintiffs have sought class treatment for monetary damages against private entities under the auspices of injunctive or equitable relief. Each time this Court has rejected that experiment. ¶ 20. In one such case, John W. Barrett brought a class action on behalf of himself and `all others similarly situated.' Barrett v. Coullet, 263 So.2d 764, 764 (Miss.1972). The action involved the Joe Frazier-Muhammad Ali championship boxing match that was being televised via closed circuit at the Mississippi Coliseum in Jackson. Id. Barrett's suit claimed breach of contract and breach of implied warranty, seeking monetary damages, because of the poor audio and video reception of the telecast. Id. We first noted that Mississippi has no statute setting forth guidelines for class actions.... However, class suits have been recognized in Mississippi as a matter of general equity jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 21. In Barrett, we warned that: A suit on behalf of a class should be closely studied, carefully analyzed and permitted only in clear cases because by its very nature such an action deprives nonappearing parties of their separate day in court, of their right to a choice of remedy, and they are bound forever by the decision rendered. Id. at 766. We then discussed the prerequisites of an equitable class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class, and (2) there must be a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. Id. Further, there must be (3) a right of recovery based upon the same essential facts, and all of those on whose behalf the suit is brought must have an interest common or identical with that of the named plaintiff, and (4) there must be the absence of an adequate and complete remedy at law. Id. In holding that Barrett was not entitled to maintain his suit as a class action, we stated: It would be virtually impossible to ascertain the class that complainant asks to represent. How many ticket purchasers retained their ticket stub? What proof would be required of actual attendance at the Mississippi Coliseum? After all, those who bought tickets but were not able to attend the actual showing for various and sundry reasons suffered no damage. Then too, even some of those attending might feel that they got their money's worth in what they did see and hear and in relaxing and enjoying a time of fellowship with sporting friends. If this class action was permitted, then they would be deprived of their right to elect not to sue. Id. ¶ 22. Two years later, this Court dealt with a situation even more closely related to the case sub judice. Four individual appellants asserted a class action purportedly representing all policyholders in Mississippi whose policies were issued by Casualty, and whose insurance premiums were financed by Budget at alleged usurious rates of interest. Evans v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 300 So.2d 149, 151 (Miss.1974). In applying the Barrett factors, we held: Each appellant and each potential member of the purported class has associated with him a different set of facts and circumstances. Treating the matter as a class suit would confront the trial court with as many different sets of facts as there were members of the class. Such a procedure would require the chancellor to make separate fact findings and calculations because each of the alleged class members was a policyholder with a separate contract of insurance and related financing.... For each of the separate and distinct claims revealed by this record, each appellant has an adequate remedy at law. This being true, and there being present no community of interest in the questions of law and fact affecting the parties appellants sought to represent, the chancellor properly dismissed the bill.... Disposition of each claim would obviously require individual proof of the transactions which took place between each of the purported class members and Casualty and Budget. In all likelihood, there would have to be a separate hearing or mini-trial for each of such class members and the chancellor would be confronted with the necessity of deciding many individual questions because there were different facts pertinent to each alleged class member. We are unable to comprehend that any court armed with all the ingenuity of man, could cope with the complexities and difficulties as would result from a class action if allowed here. Our opinion is that trial of the many claims asserted in this suit as a class action must, from a practical standpoint, be viewed as unmanageable. Id. at 152-53. ¶ 23. This Court went on to speak of the many potential problems and the possibility of abuse presented by allowing this sort of class action: Defendants faced with the awesome threat of such expensive, unwieldy, and multi-faceted litigation would logically tend to buckle under and negotiate settlements they would not otherwise consider. Windfalls would accrue. Also the ugly spectre of legalized blackmail is more than a possibility in future cases should this Court relent from the prerequisites of class suit actions ... [C]lass actions go against the grain of due process and equal protection of the law. Rules applicable to such actions must, therefore, not be broadened or relaxed but applied with consistency. [2] Id. at 153. ¶ 24. Even prior to our adoption of the Rules, this Court did not look with favor on class actions and allowed them only under rare circumstances. Guthrie T. Abbott & Pope Mallette, Complex/Mass Tort Litigation in State Courts in Mississippi, 63 Miss. L.J. 363, 393 (1994). In each case where class treatment was allowed by the Mississippi Supreme Court, plaintiffs sought injunctive or other equitable relief in chancery court against governmental entities. Id. ¶ 25. One such case was Brown v. Reeves, 129 Miss. 755, 92 So. 825 (1922), where taxpayers of Harrison County brought a bill in chancery court against members of the county board of supervisors to recover appropriations wrongly expended. Id. at 755, 92 So. at 825. The chancery court dismissed the bill, and we reversed and remanded, holding that under the law a taxpayer has the right to maintain a suit of this character. Id. ¶ 26. Another case was McKee v. Hogan, 145 Miss. 747, 110 So. 775 (1926), where a taxpayer, claiming he had no other adequate and efficient remedy, filed a bill seeking an injunction against the school district for misappropriation of public funds for an improper, unauthorized, and unlawful purpose. Id. at 747, 110 So. at 775. We held that before a private citizen can resort to injunction to litigate public questions, he should show that he has applied to the proper parties without redress, and also that he invited other citizens to join with him in the litigation. Id. at 766, 779-80. ¶ 27. In sum, even if the equitable class action had survived the adoption of the Rules, which it did not, Booth's suit would fail because it neither meets the prerequisites of Barrett and Evans, nor is his complaint a taxpayer suit seeking injunctive or other equitable relief in chancery court against governmental entities.