Opinion ID: 2584893
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted Violation of Doyle v. Ohio

Text: Defendant asserts the prosecutor violated the prohibition against commenting on a defendant's postarrest silence under Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 618 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240] ( Doyle ), when he asked Inspector Pina whether, during his first interview with the police after his arrest, defendant provide[d] any statements that were of evidentiary significance to your investigation, and Pina answered, No, not at that time. Defendant did not object to the question or request an admonition concerning the exchange. Only after the trial court noted the possibility that the question and answer might be interpreted as a reference to defendant's assertion of his Miranda rights at the first interview did defendant agree with the court's proposed admonition to the jury to disregard the reference to the first interview. He therefore has forfeited this claim. Even if defendant had not forfeited this claim, we would conclude it is without merit. It is evident from the record that when viewed in context, the prosecutor's question was not designed to impeach defendant's later statements to the police by reference to his earlier decision not to talk with them, which is the harm the holding of Doyle seeks to prevent. Indeed, the prosecutor did not actually ask whether defendant had invoked his right to silence or even had been silent, but rather whether the first interview yielded any valuable information for Pina's investigation. The prosecutor's question, it appears, was intended simply to dispel in an innocuous manner any confusion why Pina's testimony about the interviews started with the second time he spoke with defendant. We doubt that any member of the jury would have understood this oblique reference to the first interview as a comment on defendant's assertion of his right to remain silent during police questioning, and certainly there was no overt attempt by the prosecution to rely on any inconsistency between those interviews as a means of impeaching him. Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the prosecutor had violated Doyle, the trial court's admonition to disregard any mention of the first interview was adequate to eliminate any possible prejudice because we assume the jury followed the admonishment and that prejudice was therefore avoided. ( People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 168 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960] ( Jones ); see also People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 867-868 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981].)