Opinion ID: 524119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: claim i: newly discovered evidence of an exculpatory nature

Text: 14 Petitioner contends that the State violated the rule in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) by failing to produce allegedly exculpatory evidence when requested by defense counsel. Defendant was convicted of the murder of Susie Sanders who was found dead, nude, physically abused and apparently strangled in her home by her father shortly after 5:00 p.m. on the afternoon of January 29, 1978.
15 The evidence at trial from Ms. Wheeler was that around 4:00 p.m. on the afternoon of January 29, she called the victim on the telephone. After a brief conversation the victim Susie Sanders told Ms. Wheeler that she was going to talk with her cousin Bobo and she would call Ms. Wheeler right back. Ms. Wheeler testified that if Ms. Sanders had company when she called, Ms. Sanders would usually tell you she would talk to you later. (Tr. 223) 16 Petitioner suggests that because a police report used the name Bozo rather than Bobo, failure to produce this record was a violation of the Brady rule. But the transcribed notes of the police officer who took Ms. Wheeler's statement on January 29 reported the name as Bobo. It was in the typed reproduction that the name Bozo appeared. Ms. Wheeler testified at the trial and before the grand jury that the name was Bobo. 17 Mrs. Sanders, the mother of the victim, testified that she had a nephew who called himself Bobo, and she had heard her daughter call him Bobo. Others also had heard the defendant called Bobo. Petitioner is entitled to no relief because in one typed police report, the word is typed Bozo. 18 In his brief, petitioner also suggests that if his trial counsel had been aware that Ms. Wheeler had given a statement to the police that in their afternoon telephone conversation the victim had said she was going to talk to her cousin Bobo, this would have allowed reasonable jurors to conclude that Bobo was not at her house but that she was going to meet him elsewhere (Petr's brief R. 25). Petitioner, therefore, argued that Brady was violated when this report was not furnished. But Ms. Wheeler's trial testimony was precisely along the line of the alleged newly discovered exculpatory evidence. She testified that Ms. Sanders said: Let me go talk to my cousin Bobo and I'll call you right back. (Tr. 223) 19 The Court finds nothing in Ms. Wheeler's testimony that would be exculpatory or that was different than the trial testimony by Ms. Wheeler.
20 A young man, William Gray, Jr., who was a high school student at the time of the murder, testified that he had seen a car which in some particulars answered the description of a car driven by petitioner on the date of the murder. Gray placed the car at the victim's house about 5:10 or 5:15 p.m. Petitioner had that day borrowed a car from his cousin, Willie Clayton, after petitioner was released from prison on a pass. Petitioner had inquired of Mr. Clayton about Susie Sanders before Clayton lent petitioner his car. Clayton testified that petitioner had his car from 3:30 p.m. to 6:25 p.m. 21 Petitioner argues that there was a failure to disclose to the defense that Gray, when initially questioned by the police, gave a false name and address. Gray testified at trial that he left home to take his sister to work at about 4:50 or 4:55 p.m. on the day of the murder. He picked up some food at a drive-through restaurant, and on returning home saw a car parked in front of the victim's house. He identified the car from a photograph as the one which was the borrowed car driven that day by defendant. 22 The initial interview with Gray took place when Gray was stopped for speeding while driving his sister's car. Officer Helton who stopped Gray made a report of the conversation the next day. In the report he described Gray's traffic violation and reported that Gray explained his speeding by referring to the fact that his cousin had just been strangled. Gray reportedly apologized for the speeding and told the officer that he had passed the victim's house that afternoon and had seen a car there that he had never seen there before. He reportedly said the car was in the driveway but that he did not want anything to come back on him because he had told me about this. He then gave the officer a false name and address. Gray described the car reportedly in the driveway as a Ford LTD about a '68 model with a cloth top that had colors of green, white and gold in it. 23 The following day Officer Helton went to the Gray home with Officer Duncan who filed a report stating that the officers talked to William Gray, Jr. in his father's presence. At this occasion there is no mention in the report of Gray making any reference of seeing the car. He described taking his girl friend home the previous afternoon and returning directly to his house. After the officers left the house, Officer Helton told Officer Duncan that he was sure Gray was the same person whom he had stopped for speeding the previous day. 24 At a follow-up interview on January 31 at Carver High School, police officers again interviewed Gray, Jr. On this occasion, a report in the police files states that Gray, Jr. told the officers: 25 On this date we went to Carver High School and contacted Det. Davis School Relations Officer at that location, and in the presence of Det. Davis, we did talk with William Gray, Jr., b/m, age 16, 3125 Mobile Dr., 265-1861. After talking to him at some length he finally advised us that on the day of this incident that he had took his sister, Linda to work at Hardee's on Fairview and dropped her off approx. 10 minutes until 5:00. He stated from there he went to McDonald's on Fairview and ordered a hamburger to go and after getting hamburger he departed McDonald's and drove the back way back to his home. He described this back way as taking him past the victim's house in this case. He stated it was probably 5:00 or 5:10 PM when he went by the victim's house and that he drove by her house he did see a Ford sedan somewhere between 1967-1971 model, green in color with plaid top. He stated the top of the car looked odd because it was kinda light green, yellow and white looking color. He stated the car was parked on the side of the street that Susie's house was on and that car was parked facing the oncoming traffic. Going into more detail he stated that on the previous Sunday he had observed the car drive past his house from direction of victim's house and that a black male had been driving the car. He described the black male and when given a series of black and white photographs in which the defendant's picture was included, he looked through photographs and picked the defendant as being individual who had been driving the car on previous Sunday. He did report that car he saw on the previous Sunday was the same car he had seen parked in front of the victim's house on the date of this incident. 26 At the time we talked with him he did not give us a written statement and later on in the day we went to his house on Mobile Dr. and his mother and father brought him to the Detective Office where he did give us a written signed statement in the presence of his parents concerning the above incident.... 27 This Court has read Gray's trial testimony, and it is substantially as reported in the police file in the January 31 interview (R. 59-66). 28 Petitioner argues that the prosecutor was required to produce all the reported interviews of Mr. Gray because in one of the interviews he gave a false name and address and falsely reported that it was his cousin who was strangled (Gray is no relation to the victim) and in another interview did not mention seeing the car which was later identified as having been driven by defendant on that afternoon. Moreover, one report stated that Gray had placed the car in a driveway rather than on the street. 29 The Court is of the opinion that the furnishing of all the reported interviews with Mr. Gray was required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Brady requires that evidence that is both favorable to the defendant and material to either guilt or punishment must be produced. 30 On analysis of all the reported interviews, the Court is of the opinion that defense counsel could have made some use of the three or four interview reports. Defense counsel could have argued the unreliability of the testimony of one who gave a false identification and address to the police, even though the statement of false identity was next to the reported statement that Gray did not want to become involved in the strangulation death of his cousin. 31 Clearly in the opinion of this Judge, the better practice for the prosecutor would have been to produce the reported interviews, and the Court will treat such production as being required by Brady. However, although this Court would have compelled production of these documents at the trial level, their suppression does not necessarily warrant an automatic grant of the writ. A court may order a new trial on the ground of suppression of Brady material only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3382, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). 32 Evidence that the defendant was at the victim's home on the afternoon of her death also came from a statement by defendant, although defendant placed the time he was at the house earlier in the afternoon than the time Mr. Gray's testimony placed him there. 33 As the Court of Appeals stated in its 1988 opinion in an earlier habeas petition of this petitioner: Although the evidence convicting Julius was all circumstantial, it was overwhelming. Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533, 1541 (11th Cir.1988). This Court has read the trial transcript with the significance of the withheld testimony in mind, and such reading confirms the contention of the State that there is no reasonable probability that had this evidence been disclosed, the result would have been different. 34
35 On the night of the murder, the police sought any information which might give them a lead on any individual who might have committed the crime. They did have reports which showed that the victim had received phone calls with heavy breathing and harassing phone calls during the period of a week or more prior to her death. There was in the reports that she had other boy friends than her fiancee. There was a reported statement that the father of the victim's daughter was unhappy about the victim's proposed marriage. As with the Gray reported interviews the Court is of the opinion that these reports should have been produced under the Brady rule. As with the Gray reports, however, the Court concludes that there is not a reasonable probability that the disclosure of the evidence would have altered the result. 36 D. Broken Eyeglasses and Evidence that Mr. Sanders Did Not Know of Bobo Nickname Exculpatory Evidence 37 Petitioner also contends that a statement in the police files that the victim's father did not know anyone named Bobo and that a pair of broken glasses were found at the murder scene would have been exculpatory. The Court fails to see the materiality of the glasses. As for the father not knowing the defendant by the name of Bobo, there was evidence at the trial from a friend of the victim that when she was in the presence of the victim and defendant on two occasions, she never heard him called Bobo (Tr. 263). On the other hand, in addition to Ms. Wheeler's statement that Susie was going to talk with her cousin Bobo, Susie's mother and Jessie Bullard had heard Susie refer to defendant as Bobo, although Ms. Bullard was not clear as to whether the name was Bobo, Lobo, Jabbo, or something similar. Defense counsel made an issue at the trial as to whether persons knew defendant as Bobo. Defense counsel knew even before the first trial that the victim's father would be a witness. If the defense deemed his testimony on this point as critical, it certainly could have made inquiry. The Court does not deem his testimony as anything more than cumulative of the fact established by the defense without dispute that certain friends of the victim had never known of the nickname Bobo. The Court does not deem the failure to produce Mr. Sanders' statement as justifying the issuance of a writ. United States v. Bagley, supra. E. Inventory List Exculpatory Evidence 38 Petitioner told Mr. Clayton on the day Mr. Clayton lent petitioner his car that petitioner only had eight cents. When Mr. Clayton met petitioner about 6:30 p.m. on the afternoon of the murder, petitioner had money. He had bought gas for the car and offered to give some money to Mr. Clayton. He told Mr. Clayton that a girl had given him the money when they went to a motel together. 39 The State showed that the victim's fiancee had given her thirty dollars the morning of her death. This created a basis for believing that petitioner had taken this sum from the victim. Among the documents delivered to defense counsel in December, 1988, was a property inventory reflecting that a twenty-dollar and a ten-dollar bill were recovered by the police from the victim's residence. 40 The Montgomery County Circuit Court found that petitioner failed to show that the basis of this claim was unknown to him or that his counsel could not have ascertained this information through reasonable diligence at least by the time of petitioner's second trial, or at the time of the first coram nobis proceeding in 1985. The Circuit Court pointed out that defense counsel never sought the property inventory. The knowledgeable Circuit Judge expressed the opinion with which this Court has no basis for disagreeing that had it been sought it would have been produced. Finally, the Circuit Judge referred to the testimony of petitioner's present counsel that if he had read the trial transcript from the 1978 and 1982 trials, and had exercised reasonable diligence in tracking the chain of custody of the currency, he would have discovered the property inventory. Since defense counsel must concede that due diligence would have enabled him to obtain the information on the property inventory, procedural default appears to be correct. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). 41 The presence of the money in the house does not rule out the contention of the State that the defendant took money from the house after strangling the victim. Petitioner's relative, Mr. Clayton, testified as to defendant's implausible explanation relative to the money. The Court is not of the opinion that the property inventory would have been of such materiality as to justify granting the writ. 42 F. Exculpatory Evidence and Procedural Default 43 Judge Gordon, who conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing on the instant petition on January 21, 1989, concluded that the claims based on allegedly newly discovered exculpatory evidence were procedurally barred because the petitioner or his counsel knew of the material or through the exercise of reasonable diligence could have secured the material. In part Judge Gordon may have logically based this opinion on the fact that as soon as petitioner's counsel in December of 1988 asked attorneys at the Attorney General's office if there was any Brady material in the police reports, the attorneys immediately set about to collect all the materials in the files of the Montgomery Police Department and made the files available to counsel for petitioner. This surely could have been done on petitioner's appeal or on his 1985 habeas petition. In both of these proceedings, the State was also represented by the Office of the State Attorney General. 44 Petitioner's attorneys assert that they did not ask earlier for the police files because they had assumed the Montgomery district attorney's office had provided the Brady material. They state that they had cause to suspect this might not be true when the Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex Parte Clarance Womack, 541 So.2d 47 (Ala.1988), reversed a conviction because of failure of the Montgomery district attorney's office to provide clearly exculpatory materials in violation of Brady. 45 This Court is unwilling to hold on the facts of this case that, if the prosecutor failed to produce evidence which was required to be produced under Brady and which failure was unknown to defendant's counsel, the claim is procedurally barred because defense counsel did not ferret out the violation. Such a ruling would reward the wrongdoer because he was not timely found out. This Court feels strongly that the repeated delays and appeals which take many years of almost endless litigation are serious and flagrant flaws in our judicial system. The rule that invokes a procedural bar in most instances is a much needed and salutary rule, but not if it is to be applied because the defendant's counsel was too trusting and accepted the representations of the prosecutor. Defense counsel should be able to rely on a belief that prosecutors will comply with the Constitution and will produce Brady material on request. 2 46 Although concluding that a procedural bar is not appropriate, this Court nevertheless has denied the writ because it has found that, even if such reports should have been produced it is not reasonably probable that they would have caused a different result. Because the state courts have not considered this newly produced evidence on the merits, viewing such issue as procedurally barred, this Judge is the only judge who has considered petitioner's claims with respect to this evidence. The Court believes that in this capital case another court should review this Court's conclusion as to whether such evidence requires an issuance of the writ under Bagley. For this reason, this Court has found probable cause for the appeal and has stayed petitioner's execution until such review has been effected. 47