Opinion ID: 1801790
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-examination of defendant's mother

Text: On direct examination, defense counsel questioned Brenda Sampson, defendant's mother, about defendant's behavior and progress in school. Sampson testified that, during elementary school, defendant was not really a bad child. When asked if some problems had been brought to her attention, Sampson replied, A little. Not much to really complain about. When asked if defendant had been disruptive and would cause trouble in school, she responded, Not really. Instead, she blamed his problems in school on the other children who had picked on him. When asked if defendant's problems continued in junior high school, Sampson stated, A little, but I think they had put him in special education. Although it had been recommended that defendant undergo psychological counseling, Sampson could only afford two or three counseling sessions. When asked about the appropriate punishment for her son, Sampson testified that she wanted him to live. She explained, I don't feel that he did it and I don't feel that he has no anger or nothing in his heart like he would want to hurt anyone. I never had any problem with him, you know, wanting to hurt me or none of my children or anyone that I know. Out of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor asked permission of the court to question Sampson about defendant's prior violent conduct. The prosecutor sought to impeach Sampson by asking if she knew about the adult robbery conviction and the juvenile robbery adjudication that the prosecution had presented in aggravation. She also sought to use his admitted gang activity and a nondetained petition for a robbery defendant was alleged to have committed at age 12evidence which had not been presented by the prosecution in aggravation. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor could not question Sampson about the gang activity or about the nondetained juvenile petition. In addition, the prosecution sought to question Sampson about her knowledge of defendant's involvement in the juvenile system since the age of 11, having had a 90-day CYA diagnostic evaluation for petty theft. The prosecutor argued that, although defendant had been in the juvenile justice system, Sampson makes it sound like he had some problems at school and that was it. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to question Sampson about the 90-day diagnostic examination for petty theft. It explained, I don't think that is that damaging, but it does show there are problems. On cross-examination of Sampson, the prosecutor referred to her testimony on direct that defendant had not been involved in any trouble to complain of and asked if she was aware of the 90-day CYA diagnostic evaluation. Initially, Sampson stated she did not remember, but then recalled the incident after being reminded that defendant had been gone from home for 90 days. The prosecutor then questioned Sampson about her knowledge of the two robbery convictions that the prosecution had presented in aggravation. Defendant does not contest the cross-examination regarding the robbery convictions. Rather, he argues that, by questioning Sampson about the 90-day diagnostic examination, the prosecutor committed misconduct because the questioning exceeded the scope of direct examination and constituted inadmissible nonstatutory aggravating evidence of which he did not receive proper notice. We disagree. A prosecutor may impeach evidence of the defendant's good character with rebuttal evidence of bad character, and is not bound by the statutory aggravating factors or by the prosecutor's statutory pretrial notice of aggravating evidence. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 237 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302].) Here, the challenged cross-examination was not offered as evidence in aggravation, but to impeach the evidence presented in mitigation. Because Sampson characterized defendant as not really a bad child and minimized any problems with defendant, the prosecutor was entitled to impeach that testimony by questioning her about her knowledge of defendant's 90-day CYA diagnostic evaluation. ( People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1066 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 839 P.2d 1035]; People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 238-239.) Moreover, we reject defendant's claim that the trial court abdicated its duty to control the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence under Evidence Code section 352. In allowing questioning, the trial court commented that evidence about the diagnostic evaluation was not that damaging. Also, by excluding evidence about defendant's nondetained petition for robbery and his gang involvement, and by allowing questioning on the robberies of which the jury was already aware, the trial court clearly engaged in the required weighing process. Because we find no error, the related claim of prosecutorial misconduct necessarily fails.