Opinion ID: 1924721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Propriety of the Compensatory Damages Award

Text: Our review of the following issues begins with a presumption that a jury verdict is correct. White v. Fridge, 461 So.2d 793, 794 (Ala.1984); Alpine Bay Resorts, Inc. v. Wyatt, 539 So.2d 160, 162 (Ala. 1988). The strength of the jury verdict is based upon the right to trial by jury. White v. Fridge, supra. This presumption of correctness is strengthened by the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial. This Court has noted the following regarding this presumption: A jury's verdict is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust. This presumption of correctness is further strengthened when a motion for new trial is denied by the trial judge.... In reviewing the correctness of a jury verdict, this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the appellee. Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 567 So.2d 1208, 1211 (Ala.1990) (quoting Pate v. Sunset Funeral Home, 465 So.2d 347, 350 (Ala.1984)). The jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $122,240, including $10,000 specified as compensation for mental anguish. CEC contends that the jury's compensatory damages award is void and contrary to the law and evidence because, it says, the award was based on Mokrzycki's wages lost as a result of his on-the-job injury rather than on his wages lost as a result of his alleged termination. CEC argues that wages lost as a result of a decrease in earnings capacity due to an injury are not compensable under § 25-5-11.1, under which section Mokrzycki sued CEC. Although § 25-5-11.1 does not refer to the damages available for violation of its provisions, this Court has construed that section to permit a recovery of damages in accord with the general law of torts. Caraway v. Franklin Ferguson Mfg. Co., 507 So.2d 925, 926 (Ala.1987). General tort law permits recovery of all damages proximately caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant. C. Gamble, Alabama Law of Damages, § 36-1 (2d ed. 1988). Mokrzycki contends that both his mental anguish and loss of wages were proximately caused by CEC's wrongful termination of his employment. Both of these items are compensable under the general law of torts and, thus, under Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1. M. Roberts, Alabama Tort Law Handbook, § 16.3.4 (1990) (noting that because of Caraway `s holding that the general tort law of damages applies to retaliatory discharge claims, the natural and proximate compensatory damages, such as lost wages and mental distress, may be recoverable (emphasis added)). CEC argues that Mokrzycki's loss of wages was not a proximate result of his termination but was caused by his back injury. CEC attempted to reconstruct the jury verdict to demonstrate that the jury improperly calculated the amount of lost wages to compensate for Mokrzycki's back injury, rather than for his termination. The record indicates that even after his back surgery, Mokrzycki could have worked for CEC at the same rate of pay he was making before he injured his back and that he could have done so for 13 more years, until the age of 65. Mokrzycki argues that he thus sustained no decrease in earnings due to his back injury. The record further establishes that after CEC terminated Mokrzycki, his earnings decreased from $9 an hour at CEC to approximately $5 an hour. Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to Mokrzycki, as we are required to do, we conclude that the evidence supports an inference that Mokrzycki's loss in earnings capacity was proximately caused by CEC's wrongful termination of Mokrzycki. CEC's attempted reconstruction of the verdict based on its assumption that the jury compensated Mokrzycki improperly is misplaced. In addition, CEC's reconstruction fails to take into account the jury's apportionment of the damages: $112,240 for lost wages and $10,000 for mental anguish. Therefore, this argument is without merit. Mokrzycki is entitled to recover lost wages to the extent that he has not been compensated for this loss pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act. Although Mokrzycki was paid temporary disability benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he was not compensated for the full value of his lost wages until the parties settled his claim for worker's compensation benefits. The parties reached this settlement after the jury had returned its verdict on the retaliatory discharge claim. Therefore, when the jury returned its verdict, Mokrzycki was entitled to compensation for wages lost as a result of CEC's wrongful termination. CEC's allegations as to the effect of any additional recovery that resulted from settlement of the worker's compensation claim after the trial and judgment are simply not reviewable on this appeal. In light of the strong presumption of correctness that attaches to a jury verdict and the evidence in support of that verdict, we conclude that this verdict is not plainly erroneous or manifestly unjust. The evidence supports the jury verdict awarding Mokrzycki $122,240 in compensatory damages.