Opinion ID: 2448973
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualified Immunity And Claims Of Excessive Force

Text: Qualified immunity shields public officials from civil liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. [12] The purpose of qualified immunity is to balance[ ] two important intereststhe need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. [13] Whether officials perform their duties reasonably is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful. [14] Qualified immunity is intended to protect all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. [15] Alaska statutes provide that a police officer may not subject a person arrested to greater restraint than is necessary and proper for the arrest and detention of the person [16] and allows an officer to use nondeadly force and [ ] threaten to use deadly force when and to the extent the officer reasonably believes it necessary to make an arrest, to terminate an escape or attempted escape from custody, or to make a lawful stop. [17] The use of excessive force is thus a statutory violation and may also run afoul of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution, both of which grant citizens a right to be secure in their persons and protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. Pursuant to federal law, whether a police officer uses excessive force in making an arrest depends on the gravity of the intrusion (the type and amount of force inflicted) balanced against the government's need for that intrusion (as measured by the severity of the crime, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officer's or the public's safety, and whether the suspect was resisting arrest or attempting to escape). [18] The standard for excessive force in Alaska is nearly identicalthe three considerations that frame the excessive force inquiry are the severity of the crime, whether the suspect immediately threatens the safety of the police or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or fleeing arrest. [19] Police officers, like other public officials, are protected by qualified immunity when they exercise discretionary functions. [20] Alaska Statute 09.65.070(d) provides for statutory immunity: An action for damages may not be brought against a municipality or any of its agents, officers, or employees if the claim . . . (2) is based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty by a municipality or its agents, officers, or employees. We have added that Alaska usually follows federal case law in the area of qualified immunity. [21] In 2001 the United States Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz announced a new federal qualified immunity standard. [22] The Court clarified that a decision on qualified immunity should be made early in the proceedings [23] because it is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. [24] Saucier set out a two-part test for determining entitlement to qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts alleged show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established, meaning that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. [25] A later United States Supreme Court decision held that courts have the discretion to address either of the Saucier prongs first. [26] In 2008, partially in response to Saucier, we reexamine[d] our previous decisions on qualified immunity and [ ] clarif[ied] the standard for granting immunity to police officers accused of using excessive force. [27] We held that an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the officer's conduct was an objectively reasonable use of force or the officer reasonably believed that the conduct was lawful. [28] We have explained that [t]his test recognizes that there may be behavior that is objectively unreasonable but that nonetheless an officer might have reasonably believed was reasonable. If this is the case, then the officer should be entitled to qualified immunity for his behavior. [29] Under the second part of the inquiry, the reasonableness of an officer's belief that his conduct was lawful depends on whether a reasonable officer would have been on notice that his particular use of force would be unlawful. [30] An officer may be on notice that his particular use of force was unlawful either because closely analogous cases, laws, or regulations suggest that the conduct is unlawful, or because the conduct was so egregious that any reasonable officer would have known that it was unlawful. [31] In considering whether an officer could have reasonably believed that his conduct was lawful because he was not on notice that his particular use of force was excessive, we have directed trial courts to look to our own jurisdiction and other jurisdictions to see if there are any cases, laws, or regulations which would suggest that the type of action taken by the officer is considered unlawful. [32] We explained in Sheldon that these cases, laws, and regulations must be relevant to specific actions taken in specific circumstances, [33] following the United States Supreme Court's direction in Saucier that the question whether a reasonable officer would have been on notice that his conduct was unlawful must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. [34] But we cautioned in Sheldon against extremes, directing that trial courts should neither rely solely on the broad, general use of force statutes nor require that prior case law, statutes, or regulations discuss the appropriate use of force in an identical factual scenario. [35] We recognized that trial courts should not go[ ] too far by determining that each situation, in its particularity, could not have been anticipated by any law or regulation, so an officer could never be on notice that this use of force in this set of circumstances could be unlawful. [36] We added in Sheldon that some conduct is so egregious, so excessive that any reasonable officer would have known that it was unlawful even in the absence of closely analogous case law. [37] Cautioning that [o]ne should not let the lack of explicit law in an area be a substitute for the reasonable officer's common sense, we explained that some conduct is so shocking that the nature of the act [gives] sufficient warning that [the conduct is] excessive. [38] Federal courts have agreed that certain conduct is so egregious that any reasonable person would have recognized a constitutional violation [39] and that even if there is no closely analogous case law, a right can be clearly established on the basis of common sense. [40] As stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, qualified immunity should be denied even without identifying a closely analogous case if . . . the force used was so plainly excessive that the police officers should have been on notice that they were violating the Fourth Amendment because police officers should not be shielded from liability just because their excessive use of force happens to be original. [41]