Opinion ID: 3154798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wainwright Test: Untimely Objections

Text: Although we disagree with the trial court’s conclusions as to two of the objections in our plain error review, we agree that the statements and slides at issue do not rise to the level of plain error under the Wainwright test. As noted, under the standard, “the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the 60 Kirkley, 41 A.3d at 377 (citing White v. State, 816 A.2d 776, 779 (Del. 2003); Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 539 (Del. 2006) (“It is well-settled that prosecutors may not express their personal opinions or beliefs about the credibility of witnesses or about the truth of any testimony.”)). 61 Id. at 375. 62 Id. at 378. 25 fairness and integrity of the trial process.”63 Here, the conduct at issue was not so prejudicial to substantial rights that the fairness and integrity of the trial process was jeopardized. As explained above with regard to Spence’s timely objections, this was not a close case. We have previously suggested that a “plain error is more likely to be found in the improper vouching context where witness credibility is central in a ‘close case,’ and where the error is so egregious that the trial judge should have intervened sua sponte to correct it.”64 Accordingly, we conclude that the alleged misconduct which Spence failed to timely object to does not satisfy the Wainwright standard. As to the misstatement of the law of self-defense, the trial court did instruct the jury accurately.65 The trial court explained that “[t]he Delaware code defines, in relevant part, this defense as follows: The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting the defendant against the use of unlawful force by the other person on the present occasion.”66 The trial court also instructed that “[t]he use of deadly force is justifiable if the defendant believes that the -- believes that such force is necessary to protect the defendant against death or serious physical injury.”67 There were no objections to the instructions with respect to the law of self-defense. 63 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 (citing Dutton, 452 A.2d at 146). 64 Whittle v. State, 77 A.3d 239, 248 (Del. 2013) (citing Clayton v. State, 765 A.2d 940, 944 (Del. 2001)). 65 B289-90 (Tr. 107:1-112:3). 66 Compare B289 (Tr. 107:13-19) with 11 Del. C. § 464(a). 67 Compare B289 (Tr. 108:4-7) with 11 Del. C. § 464(c). The trial court continued, instructing the jury: 26 Further, as to the use of force to protect another, the trial court instructed the jury that “[t]his defense is available only if all -- is available only if all three of the following conditions are met: One, Mr. Spence would have been justified in using such force to protect himself against the unlawful force that he believed to be threatened against the person Mr. Spence sought to protect; and, two, Mr. Spence believed that under the circumstances, the person he sought to protect would have been justified in using such protective force; and, three, Mr. Spence believed that the intervention was necessary for the protection of the other person.”68 The trial court continued: “You may find Mr. Spence guilty only if you’re satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Spence did not believe that the force he used was immediately necessary to protect others then and there from unlawful force used by the other person.”69 Although the self-defense slides were You may find Mr. Spence guilty only if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Spence did not believe that the force -- that the force he used was immediately necessary to protect himself then and there from unlawful force used by another person -- by the other person. If you find that Mr. Spence believed that the use of deadly force upon Mr. Williams and Mr. Allen was necessary to protect himself against death or serious physical injury but that he was reckless in having such belief, which was material to justify the use of deadly force, selfdefense is unavailable for the offenses of murder in the second degree, manslaughter-reckless causation of death, and reckless endangering in the first degree. B289 (Tr. 108:19-109:11). 68 B289 (Tr. 109:20-110:8). 69 B290 (Tr. 111:6-11). The trial court also instructed the jury as follows: “If you find that Mr. Spence believed that the use of deadly force upon Mr. Williams and Mr. Allen was necessary to protect others against death or serious physical injury but that he was reckless in having such belief, which was material to justify the use of deadly force, the defense of use of force to protect others is unavailable for the offenses of murder second degree, manslaughter-reckless causation of death and reckless endangering in the first degree.” B290 (Tr. 111:12-21). 27 improper, the trial court’s instructions were accurate. We conclude that the error did not jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial.