Opinion ID: 4527002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Swift’s Representation

Text: Jackson also argues that Swift failed to conduct an adequate factual investigation and, specifically, asserts that Swift provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to subpoena Jackson’s witnesses, Jamison and Hudson. Although strategic choices made after investigation are virtually unchallengeable, choices “resulting from lack of diligence in preparation and investigation are not protected by the presumption in favor of counsel.” Armstrong v. Kemna, 534 F.3d 857, 864 (8th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). For example, in Armstrong, the habeas petitioner succeeded because he showed that his counsel fell below the reasonably competent standard. In that case, counsel failed to subpoena witnesses even though counsel was skeptical that the witnesses would even show up because the witnesses would not answer phone calls. Id. at 865. Similar to Armstrong, Swift did fail to subpoena both witnesses, but unlike Armstrong, Swift regularly communicated with both witnesses, and Jamison attended the majority of Jackson’s trial. No evidence has shown that counsel had knowledge either witness would not appear. However, even assuming that Swift’s performance was deficient, Jackson fails to show how Swift’s failure to have these two witnesses testify prejudiced him. In Armstrong, this court had to remand for the district court to determine what testimony the witnesses would have given at trial. Id. at 866–68. But, in the current case, Swift explained the testimony that would have been presented by both Jamison and Hudson. Through Jamison and Hudson’s testimonies, Jackson hoped to prove that the money found in his house was for a food truck instead of a drug conspiracy and that McKenzie had been using Jackson’s phone to make drug deals. Further, Jackson believed the testimonies would show that he only collected drug money to help McKenzie’s family after McKenzie’s death. -7- We agree with the district court: “The case against Jackson was formidable.” Order at 11, Jackson v. United States, No. 4:18-cv-00267-SMR (S.D. Iowa Nov. 14, 2018), ECF No. 5. Dawson and several other witnesses linked Jackson to the drug conspiracy. In addition, phone records and text messages showed contact between Jackson and Dawson many times, and Jackson identified himself in some of these conversations. Officers also found the phones at Jackson’s residence during a search of the residence and found Jackson hiding in the closet during the same search. As to McKenzie, the messages from Jackson’s phone continued after McKenzie’s death in December 2014. And, testimony about the food truck would easily have been rebutted by the government’s evidence showing that the money found in Jackson’s house was connected to a drug transaction a few days earlier. The quantity of evidence against Jackson shows that he was not prejudiced by Swift’s failure to subpoena the two witnesses. Swift’s failure to subpoena the witnesses was not ineffective assistance of counsel because Jackson has failed to show “a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the alleged deficiency of counsel’s performance.” United States v. Robinson, 301 F.3d 923, 925–26 (8th Cir. 2002).
Next, Jackson alleges that Swift convinced him not to testify and thus provided ineffective assistance. “[W]e consistently have affirmed that a defense counsel’s decision not to call a witness is a virtually unchallengeable decision of trial strategy.” Orr, 636 F.3d at 955 (internal quotations omitted). Jackson certainly knew he could testify because the trial record reveals the district court discussed with Jackson his right to testify or to refuse to testify. To be sure, Swift did discourage Jackson from testifying. He did so, however, based on its enabling of the government to cross-examine Jackson. Jackson told the district court at one point that he planned to testify, showing that Swift did not prevent Jackson from testifying. In fact, Jackson himself later told the district court that he decided not to testify. Accordingly, Swift -8- did not render ineffective assistance of counsel when he advised Jackson not to testify.
Jackson also argues that Swift provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to object to or appeal the district court’s answer to a jury question. Specifically, he alleges that the district court improperly issued an irregular Allen2 charge when the jury asked if it could have a hung jury. “An Allen charge is a supplemental jury instruction that advises deadlocked jurors to reconsider their positions.” United States v. Ybarra, 580 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Walrath, 324 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 2003)). Here, the jury did not express it was deadlocked, and the district court simply explained the definition of a hung jury and asked the jury to keep deliberating. Therefore, the district court’s answer was not a standard Allen charge. However, even if the district court’s answer were characterized as an Allen charge, the district court’s answer is allowed as long as it “is not impermissibly coercive.” Walrath, 324 F.3d at 970 (quoting United States v. Washington, 255 F.3d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 2001)). “Jury coercion is determined by (1) the content of the instruction, (2) the length of the deliberation after the instruction, (3) the total length of deliberations, and (4) any indicia in the record of coercion.” Id. (quoting Washington, 255 F.3d at 485–86). First, unlike a standard Allen instruction, the court did not direct the jurors to reconsider their positions. In addition, almost two hours passed between the answer and the jury’s guilty verdict, and, in total, the jury deliberated almost all day. See id. at 970–71 (finding no coercion where the jury deliberated a total of eight hours and 2 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). -9- returned a guilty verdict one hour after the Allen charge). Finally, there is no evidence in the record of any coercion. Therefore, the district court did not err in answering the jury’s question. Because the district court did not err in instructing the jury, it was not ineffective for Swift to fail to object. See Toledo, 581 F.3d at 681 (“It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to withdraw objections that have no support in the law.”).
Finally, Jackson argues that Swift provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the district court’s designation of Jackson as a career offender. As the district court explained, Jackson twice pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver controlled substances, in violation of 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 570/407(b)(1). This gave him two prior controlled-substance felony convictions. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b); see also United States v. Jones, 882 F.3d 1169, 1171 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding that prior Illinois convictions under 720 Ill. Comp. State 570/401 qualify as controlled substance offenses). In addition, he was convicted when he was at least 18 years old of conspiracy to distribute heroin, which is a controlled-substance offense. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). The district court did not err in sentencing him as a career offender. Swift simply did not make an objection lacking legal support. This is not ineffective assistance of counsel. See Toledo, 581 F.3d at 681. Further, the district court explained that, absent career-offender status, Jackson would have faced a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Jackson to 188 months’ imprisonment. Given this Guidelines range, even if the -10- district court had erred, the error would have been harmless.3 Thus, Jackson cannot show prejudice.