Opinion ID: 163820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retention of juror.

Text: 34 We hold that Workman's right to an impartial jury was not unconstitutionally impaired by the retention of a juror who first expressed doubt about whether she could serve, and then later agreed that she could be fair. 35 The Tenth Circuit has specifically held that federal courts may only reverse state court determinations of juror impartiality upon a showing of manifest error. 3 Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1350 (10th Cir.1994); see also Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1280 (10th Cir.2001) (deferring to a trial judge's finding as to whether a potential juror is biased unless the finding is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence); accord Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002). This limited degree of review is justified by a trial judge's unique advantage in observing and evaluating the demeanor of jurors. Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1519 (10th Cir.1991)). 36 Prior to being sworn in, one of the jurors told the judge that she had seen a report about Workman's case on the television that morning and would have a difficult time believing that the child he was accused of murdering could have been fatally injured by fall[ing] from a bed onto a cocktail table as reported. One of her own children had fallen off of a couch onto the floor and suffered no injuries at all. As a result of this personal experience, the juror was afraid it would take much more to convince me that [Workman is] innocent. ROA II, Tr. at 278. 37 The prosecutor and defense counsel examined the juror about her viewing of the television report, driving home the point that the actual charges at trial might be more detailed and that Workman's defense had not yet been presented. The juror was then asked whether, if she was permitted to stay on the jury, she could disregard anything she heard outside the courtroom and base her verdict only on the evidence that she heard in court. Id. at 280. To this question, the juror replied: Yes, I can do that. Id. She reaffirmed her answer when asked again. Id. at 281 (Yeah, I can do that.). 38 The judge heard further argument from counsel and then explained that the prospective juror could probably be a fair and impartial juror. I think she's trying very hard to be absolutely fair ... I'll overrule the motion to excuse her for cause. Id. at 287. The defense attempted twice more to have her removed from the jury, but those motions were similarly denied. 39 The state court's decision to retain the juror does not appear contrary to established federal law. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically upheld cases in which jurors have been allowed to serve after giving contradictory testimony on whether they could be fair. In Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984), for example, the Supreme Court wrote that it is generally a matter for the state courts to determine whether a juror [who swears] that he could set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the cases on the evidence ... [should be] believed. Id. at 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885. 40 Workman does not carry the heavy burden of showing that the state court's judgment constituted manifest error. We are bound by prescribed deference to the decisions of state courts under AEDPA and AFFIRM the denial of a writ on this basis. 41