Opinion ID: 2103701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue I: J.M.'s Out-of-Court Statements

Text: J.M. was three years of age at the time he made the statements. He was four years of age at the time of trial. Appellant was seventy-two years old. J.M. did not testify at trial. At trial, Sharon testified: [J.M.] jumped out of the tub and was running through the house saying that his butt hurt him... . I said, Why is your butt hurting you? And I said, Did  Did somebody touch you there? ... and he said yes... . I asked him who had touched him there and he said Greasy Jim, which is Jim Arndt... . I started asking him, Where did he touch you? ... I asked him if he touched him, you know, down there around his private parts, you know, his wee-wee, and he said yes... . [H]e told me and my mother that Jim Arndt had stuck his finger up his rear end. Appellant's counsel objected to the introduction of J.M.'s accusatory statements in the following manner: [I]f these statements are being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, that is as substantive evidence, in this case then we would object to the hearsay statements of [J.M.] on the basis of the time, content and circumstances of these hearsay statements do not demonstrate their reliability and also that Mr. Arndt has been denied the opportunity to confront, his right to confrontation, because it was impossible to thoroughly cross examine [J.M.] concerning any of these statements that he had previously made. The trial court overruled this objection. The trial court also overruled a hearsay objection to J.M.'s accusatory statements as offered by the father, Leopoldo. Hearsay is a statement made out-of-court that is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the fact or facts asserted in the statement itself. Ind.Evidence Rule 801(c); [1] Craig v. State (1994) Ind., 630 N.E.2d 207. In the present case, J.M.'s accusatory statements fall within this definition of hearsay. They were made out-of-court and both parents repeated the statements at trial, for the purpose of proving the facts asserted in the out-of-court statements, namely that appellant had molested J.M. Such hearsay is not admissible at trial unless it fits within some exception to the hearsay rule. Evid.R. 802 and 803; Craig, 630 N.E.2d 207. Exceptions to the hearsay rule exist, because the manner in which certain out-of-court statements are made virtually guarantee their reliability. The trial court admitted this testimony pursuant to I.C. § 35-37-4-6. In essence, this statute recognizes an exception to the hearsay rule. These statements are arguably admissible under the excited utterance exception, presently Evid.R. 803(2), and physical sensation exception, presently Evid.R. 803(3). This appeal does not consider those possibilities, but deals with the statutory exception the trial court applied. The history, purpose, and constitutionality of this statute, first enacted in 1984, has been given extensive consideration. Miller v. State (1987), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 64 ( Miller I ); Miller v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 466 ( Miller II ). Miller I dealt with a videotaped statement of a non-testifying five-year-old, taken under questioning by investigating officers, without the presence of the defense, and where the child was unavailable to testify at trial, due to the potential for injury from trial participation. Miller II dealt with an audiotaped statement of a non-testifying three-year-old, taken under questioning by investigating officers and workers, without the presence of the defense, and where the child was unavailable to testify at trial, due to incompetence as a witness under the then existing statute. Here, although J.M. did not testify at trial and was unavailable due to incompetence as a witness (as in Miller II ), J.M.'s statement was made under entirely different circumstances than in either Miller case, and was followed, before trial, by a hearing of special character. At the immediate point at which J.M. made these statements, he was naked and wet, in the process of being bathed by his mother, and expressing pain, both in words and by body language. The first who question was answered at this point and the second followed shortly. The trial court noted these circumstances, and the fact that J.M. and appellant had been friendly to this point, in making its findings of reliability per the statute. Between arrest and trial, the admissibility hearing was conducted by the court in the full trial mode. The hearing did not take place in front of the jury. J.M. did not, of course, feel the compunction of the oath. He did, however, with difficulty, with variation, and with some body language, repeat his former accusations. There was full physical face-to-face confrontation between appellant and J.M., and defense counsel conducted an untrammeled cross-examination. This questioning produced little direct response. The hearing was audiotaped. We conclude that the statutory procedure was scrupulously followed, and that the application of the statutory exception in these circumstances, leading to the admission of J.M.'s bath-time statements, was consistent with our hearsay rule. Appellant claims that the use of this statement at trial was contrary to the guarantees of the federal constitutional confrontation rights. Absent from the circumstances are (1) confrontation with a declarant at the time competent as a witness, and (2) confrontation that is observable by the trier of fact. In order for hearsay exceptions not to offend the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the hearsay evidence must possess substantial indicia of reliability. Sumpter v. State (1974) 261 Ind. 471, 306 N.E.2d 95 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)). Reliability can be inferred in cases where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, or where there is a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3146, 111 L.Ed.2d 638, 652 (1990). These guarantees of trustworthiness must be drawn from the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. Id. at 820, 110 S.Ct. at 3149, 111 L.Ed.2d at 656. In the present case, the out-of-court statement statute itself required that the trial court look at the time the statement was made, the specific content of the statement, and the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement in order to test the reliability of the victim's statements. In its docket entry, the trial court listed its reasons for declaring the statements sufficiently reliable: 1. J.M. had no motive to falsify ... J.M. and the defendant got along well and were friendly ...; 2. J.M. made the statements during bath time while .. . crying and in pain; 3. J.M. used language ... appropriate to ... a three year old child; 4. J.M. repeated these statement to more than one person he trusts... . These findings strongly support reliability. However, allaying these findings is the finding that J.M. was not able to understand the nature and obligation of an oath and was therefore unavailable for trial. This lack of ability is in the low range in the consideration of whether the bath time statements should be deemed sufficiently reliable to meet federal muster. We conclude that no federal constitutional error occurred in the admission of the statements. Appellant next claims that the use of this statement was a violation of the right of confrontation guaranteed by Article 1, § 13 of the Indiana Constitution. Despite the admissibility of hearsay pursuant to an exception, [e]xceptions to the hearsay exclusionary rule are not per se consistent with the State constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face, but must be separately tested. Brady v. State (1991), Ind., 575 N.E.2d 981, 987. The state paradigm for full confrontation differs from the federal one in that it contemplates a face-to-face meeting in which the accused and the witness can see and recognize one another. Id. Here, a meeting of that character did occur between appellant and J.M. at the pre-trial hearing, which was recorded and transcribed. During that meeting, J.M. repeated the accusations. In this case, we find that applying the statutory exception to the hearsay rule to the bath time statements was consistent with Article 1, § 13, as well as its federal counterpart. The surrogate here for cross-examination of a sworn witness, observable by the trier of fact, is satisfied.