Opinion ID: 2793603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Aggravated Felony Determination

Text: The Government first argues that Baboolall waived his challenge to the IJ’s aggravated felony determination because he failed to explicitly raise it before the BIA. In his appeal to the BIA, Baboolall stated that the IJ “erred in determining that [his] 1998 conviction was a removable conviction in that the statutory listing for the offense includes conduct which is both an aggravated felony and not an aggravated felony.” (App. at 19.) Although not an explicit challenge to the aggravated felony determination, this assertion was sufficient to avoid waiver of the issue. As we have explained, “so long as an immigration petitioner makes some effort, however insufficient, to place the Board on notice of a straightforward issue being raised on appeal, a petitioner is deemed to have exhausted her administrative remedies.” Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, the BIA was placed on notice that the aggravated felony determination was at issue. 8 We now turn to the merits of Baboolall’s claim. As both parties note, Baboolall’s removability hinges on whether his 1998 New York conviction is an “aggravated felony” under the INA. An “aggravated felony” is defined as “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) defines “drug trafficking crime” to mean “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act.” Thus, Baboolall’s 1998 conviction constitutes an aggravated felony if the state-court offense of conviction is equivalent to a felony conviction under the CSA. Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 2008). Baboolall contends that the IJ and the BIA erred in applying the modified categorical approach by going beyond the record of conviction. Asserting that “the specific substance underlying a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) is not an element of the crime,” (Appellant’s Br. at 17), and that the federal and New York schedule of controlled substances were found by the IJ to not be identical, Baboolall argues that in the absence of knowing what substance was involved in his conviction, “the IJ would have had to conclude that that a conviction under N.Y. Pen. Law §220.39(1) is categorically not a conviction for an ‘aggravated felony’ as defined in the INA.” (Id. at 18.) In support of this argument, Baboolall relies upon Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). In Moncrieffe, the Court held that if the state statute of conviction covers conduct that would not qualify as a drug trafficking felony under federal law, the alien’s conviction cannot qualify as an aggravated felony. Id. at 1686– 9 87. Specifically, the Court ruled that “[i]f a noncitizen's conviction for a marijuana distribution offense fails to establish that the offense involved either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, the conviction is not for an aggravated felony under the INA.” Id. at 1693–94. Moncrieffe affords Baboolall no relief because the definition of “narcotic drug” in N. Y. Penal Law § 220.00(7) specifically excludes marijuana, and Baboolall has not shown that N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) criminalizes conduct that would not be a felony under federal law. Baboolall further argues that the IJ and BIA were limited to considering only the statute of conviction under our en banc opinion in Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 728 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). In Rojas, the petitioner was convicted under a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited “[t]he use of, or possession with intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the purpose of . . . introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this act.” 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(32). The petitioner’s guilty plea colloquy did not identify the precise controlled substance involved, Rojas, 728 F.3d at 206, and the Pennsylvania statute was similarly silent, see 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(32). We held that the categorical approach was inapplicable because there was no analogous federal statute “against which Pennsylvania's paraphernalia statute can be compared.” Rojas, 728 F.3d at 215. As the modified categorical approach is “merely a ‘tool for implementing the categorical approach,’” we concluded that it too did not apply. Id. at 216 (quoting Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013)). 10 Contrary to Baboolall’s assertions, Rojas did not discard the modified categorical approach in drug possession and distribution cases. Rather, we held that neither the categorical nor the modified categorical approach was in play because there was no comparable federal statute and the record was silent as to the precise drug involved. Rojas, 728 F.3d at 215–16. In this case, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39 is analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See Pascual v. Holder, 707 F.3d 403, 405 (2d Cir. 2013) adhered to on reh'g, 723 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a conviction under § 220.39 for attempted sale of cocaine qualifies as an aggravated felony). As the IJ recognized, because there are analogous state and federal statutes, the formal categorical approach presumptively applies. Evanson, 550 F.3d at 290. However, where a statute lists alternative elements that implicate the same criminal behavior, an IJ may use the modified categorical approach and review a limited set of documents, including “the criminal information,” to determine what underlying conduct supported the finding of guilt. Id. at 291–93. Similar to a statute that includes alternative elements, the New York drug schedules delineate the various controlled substances that satisfy the “narcotic drug” requirement for purposes of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1). The IJ noted that the New York schedules differ from their federal counterparts, warranting a limited review of the record of conviction to determine whether Baboolall’s criminal conduct would be prosecutable as a felony under the CSA. Compare N.Y. Public Health Law § 3306, with 21 U.S.C. § 812. It may have been unnecessary for the IJ to examine the criminal information in this case because there has been no showing that the New York schedule 11 of controlled substances includes substances that are not on the federal schedule. That is, a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) may necessarily involve a substance classified as a controlled substance under federal law. See Pascual 707 F.3d at 405 (holding that a conviction under § 220.39 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach). In any event, we conclude that the IJ properly employed the modified categorical approach in consulting the criminal information to determine the precise drug involved in Baboolall’s 1998 conviction. See Garcia v. Att’y. Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that “we may appropriately examine [the criminal] complaint if departure from the formal categorical approach is appropriate”). Baboolall argues that the record of conviction is ambiguous as to the actual drug he attempted to sell, noting that the “Certificate of Disposition Indictment” does not identify “the specific drug involved in the conviction. . . .” (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) The failure of this particular document to name the drug involved in Baboolall’s crime did not preclude the IJ and BIA from looking to the criminal information as a reliable source for determining the precise controlled substance involved in Baboolall’s criminal conduct. See Garcia, 462 F.3d at 293. Accordingly, we conclude that the Baboolall’s conviction was appropriately classified as an “aggravated felony.” B. The “Particularly Serious Crime” Determination Baboolall additionally contends “that his 199[8] conviction is not for a ‘particularly serious crime’” under Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, and therefore the IJ erred in denying his petition for withholding of removal. (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) As noted 12 above, the IJ applied the holding of Y-L- that all six elements of the exceptional circumstances test must be met to justify consideration of discretionary withholding of removal when an alien has been convicted of a drug trafficking offense. Id. at 276–77. Baboolall has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to such relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (“If the evidence indicates the applicability of one or more of the grounds for denial of withholding enumerated in the Act, the applicant shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.”). Baboolall was convicted of attempting to sell heroin, making him an active and willful participant in a serious drug transaction. We conclude that Baboolall failed to meet his burden of showing that his involvement was “merely peripheral” and, thus, the IJ properly denied his petition for withholding. C. Denial of Relief under CAT Baboolall next asserts that the IJ erred in denying him relief under CAT. Baboolall’s challenge on this point is purely factual, as he criticizes the IJ’s evaluation of the evidence. (Appellant’s Br. at 22–26.) As the Government points out and we previously noted, our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D). Indeed, in his reply brief, Baboolall states that he is essentially challenging the IJ’s “finding regarding what is likely to happen if Petitioner’s [sic] is removed.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 11.) A conclusion as to what will happen to him upon his return to Guyana is a finding of fact and, thus, outside our 13 jurisdiction. See Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 271 (“what is likely to happen to the petitioner if removed” is a finding of fact). We nonetheless retain jurisdiction to resolve whether the undisputed factual record supports the BIA’s legal conclusions concerning CAT. Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 409, 412 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006).2 Baboolall carries the burden of establishing “‘that it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’” Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 268 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). “Torture” is the deliberate infliction of “severe pain or suffering . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). As the IJ and the BIA noted, the evidence established that attitudes toward homosexuals in Guyana are mixed, laws against homosexual activity go largely unenforced, and the occasional police harassment of homosexuals is not condoned, propagated, or supported by the Guyanese government. Accordingly, the BIA had ample grounds for finding that Baboolall failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not he would be tortured.