Opinion ID: 2546870
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Duncan Affidavit

Text: ¶ 39 We next turn to Tremco's claim that the district court erred in granting BYU's motion to strike the affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan, an officer of Tremco, SoftSolutions, and STC. [6] The Duncan affidavit, however, does not appear in either the abbreviated record designated by the parties or the addenda to any of the briefs. While the record contains an affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan, that affidavit does not match by date or content the affidavit discussed in the briefs. ¶ 40 The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically require appellants to include, in an addendum to their briefs, those portions of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal. Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(11)(C). In an appeal such as this, where we are asked to reverse the district court's order striking a particular affidavit, we deem the affidavit at issue of central importance to the determination of the appeal and require that it be included in the addendum to the appellant's brief. Tremco's failure to include the Duncan affidavit in the addendum, as well as the affidavit's absence from the abbreviated record before us, renders it impossible for us to adequately consider Tremco's claim that the district court erred in striking the affidavit. We accordingly decline to address it. ¶ 41 Even if the affidavit were included in the addendum, however, we would find it unnecessary to decide whether it is admissible. Tremco relied on the Duncan affidavit in opposing BYU's motion for summary judgment. Because we have reversed on legal grounds the summary judgment entered in favor of BYU, Tremco's arguments regarding the admissibility of Mr. Duncan's testimony are not determinative of that issue. ¶ 42 Tremco's briefing suggests that the admissibility of the Duncan affidavit is also germane to its motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim against BYU, which the district court denied. Nowhere in its briefs, however, does Tremco provide a reasoned explanation for why our reversal of the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of BYU requires us to likewise reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment in favor of Tremco on the same claim. Instead, Tremco merely requests, almost in passing, that we grant summary judgment in its favor. Because this court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research, State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d 820 (internal quotations omitted), we decline to grant Tremco's request. Tremco is, of course, free to renew its motion for summary judgment in the district court in light of the legal conclusions expressed in this opinion.