Opinion ID: 1794896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: IBP Employees Who Heard Huegerich Was Fired For Speed.

Text: Huegerich testified that on two occasions IBP employees told him that they heard he was fired for speed. No evidence was introduced as to how, when, and from whom the individuals heard that Huegerich was terminated for possession of speed. The district court found that defamatory information was published to the employees who confronted Huegerich after he was discharged but noted that there was not much testimony regarding the extent of the publication of the defamatory information. On appeal, Huegerich contends one or both of two possible events must have occurred: 1. When Hunnel completed the test in the security office, the test kit was visible through the windows so that employees outside the security office could see the purple color of the test and they could conclude that Huegerich had been caught with illegal amphetamines; or 2. The people in the security office at the time of the search or someone in management communicated to other IBP employees that Huegerich had speed in his possession at the time of the random search. As for the first scenario, the inspection and subsequent testing were done in front of the windows with IBP personnel walking back and forth outside. Employees entering or leaving the plant could have seen the activities involving Hunnel, Henrich, and Huegerich. The district court found that other employees could observe Huegerich in the security office with his supervisor and the director of security and they would draw their own conclusions about what was going on. The court stated, however, that [a]lthough it is possible that people could have observed the purple color in the kit, it is highly improbable. The court specifically found that no one outside the security office actually saw the test results. Although the general proceedings in the security office could have been observed by other employees, the test result and ensuing conversation would have been known only to Hunnel, Huegerich, and Henrich. The courts have recognized that a defamatory communication may be published through actions or conduct as well as through spoken or written words. 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel & Slander §§ 154, 250; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 568(2) cmt. d; Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Libel or Slander: Defamation by Gestures or Acts, 46 A.L.R.4th 403 § 3 (1986). Courts have reached different results on whether the act of terminating an employee is defamatory. 46 A.L.R.4th 403 § 7; see, e.g., Davis v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir.1985) (merely stating that employee was terminated is not defamatory); O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 868 F.Supp. 1146, 1170 (N.D.Iowa 1994) (mere publication of an employee's demotion is not itself defamatory); Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F.Supp. 1359, 1371 (N.D.Ill.1990) (mere publication of an employee's termination is not itself defamatory). Likewise, different results have also been reached on whether an investigation by an employer into a suspected crime of an employee constitutes a defamatory publication. 46 A.L.R.4th 403 § 8(c); see 50 Am. Jur.2d Libel & Slander §§ 248, 329 (an employer may investigate suspected wrongdoing without being liable for defamation because others become aware of the investigation and the subsequent discharge of particular employees). We believe the actions of IBP management in conducting the random search and subsequent discharge of Huegerich are insufficient to constitute a defamatory publication. We now address the second scenario that IBP management communicated to other employees that Huegerich had speed in his possession at the time of the random search. If proven true, such a communication and subsequent repetition could constitute defamation. Huegerich offered no evidence, however, as to how or from whom the IBP employees heard that he was terminated for possession of speed. Huegerich testified that he did not know and the employees did not testify at trial. Because Huegerich failed to identify the source of these communications, he fails to meet his burden of proving the element of publication. The district court concluded from the evidence presented at trial that [t]he only other way these people would have attained this misinformation is from Hunnel, Henrich, or Jepsen, or the other IBP supervisors whom Jepsen consulted with prior to advising plaintiff that he had been discharged. We believe alternative explanations for the source of this information exist. The conclusions that other employees drew from their own observations of the activity in the security office and Huegerich's subsequent discharge could be the source of the inaccurate comments heard by the employees. We conclude that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish publication of defamatory statements by IBP management. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment. REVERSED.