Opinion ID: 1172050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Absenteeism.

Text: (23) The masters and the Commission also determined that Judge Ryan committed two counts of prejudicial conduct because of his practice of leaving the courthouse after his calendars were completed, usually in the early afternoon. The evidence shows that Judge Ryan regularly left the courthouse at 2 p.m. each day. On Fridays, he often left in the morning and did not return. Numerous witnesses testified that the judge's short hours made it necessary for police and deputy district attorneys to bring warrants and other matters in the morning before the judge left. Moreover, many witnesses testified that the municipal court was in need of another judge, but that the board of supervisors refused to provide one until it was shown that all of the judges were currently working full-time. In the Fitzpatrick matter, the Commission determined that the clerk had to tell members of the public that Judge Ryan was not available because he had gone for the day. In another count, the Commission found that the judge's abbreviated hours caused the presiding judge to issue an order providing that all judges had to advise the presiding judge if they completed their judicial business and intended to leave before 3 p.m. Canon 3B(1) of the California Code of Judicial Conduct provides: Judges should diligently discharge their administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and court officials. As canon 3B(1) makes clear, administrative duties must be discharged with the same diligence as adjudicative duties. It was therefore improper for Judge Ryan to leave the moment his adjudicative duties were completed. The fact that police officers, deputy district attorneys and other members of the public could not reach the judge in the afternoons supports the conclusion that the judge failed to fulfill certain aspects of his judicial function. We therefore agree with the Commission that Judge Ryan's work routine amounted to prejudicial conduct.
(24) Aggravating and mitigating circumstances are appropriate factors to consider in determining judicial discipline. (See Furey, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1297, 1319-1320.) The record in this case does not provide evidence of aggravating circumstances. Although Judge Ryan presented mitigating evidence, such evidence is insufficient to reduce the level of discipline.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied June 30, 1988, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. (25) We conclude that Judge Ryan has committed four acts of wilful misconduct and fourteen acts of prejudicial conduct. We dismiss two charges of misconduct that have not been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The judge's conduct exhibits a pattern of personal embroilment in the cases assigned to him. He has lost his temperance and objectivity on several occasions, resulting in prejudice to the parties appearing before him or in abuse of his contempt power. He has attempted to defend his position in the courts and in the media with little regard for procedure or judicial decorum. The purpose of these proceedings is not to punish errant judges but to protect the judicial system and those subject to the awesome power that judges wield. ( Furey, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1320.) That purpose will best be served by adopting the recommendation of the Commission that Judge Ryan be removed from office. We order that Judge Richard Ryan, Municipal Court Judge of the Roseville-Rocklin Judicial District, Placer County, be removed from office. Because the misconduct for which he is removed does not amount to grounds for disbarment, he shall, if otherwise qualified, be permitted to practice law (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d); see Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 654), on condition that he pass the Professional Responsibility Examination (see Gonzalez v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 378). This order is effective upon the finality of this decision. Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied June 30, 1988, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.