Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Failure to Instruct the Jury as to Its Ability to Consider Sympathy Evidence

Text: Defendant proposed, but the trial court did not give, a special instruction which would have explicitly informed the jury that it could consider nonstatutory mitigating factors and that any one mitigating factor, standing alone, might suffice to find death was not the appropriate penalty. [34] The court gave instead CALJIC No. 8.84.1 which at the time included, as factor (k), a provision that the jury could consider: Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. (38a) Defendant argues that the unexpanded factor (k) instruction may have misled the jury into believing it could not consider mitigating factors relating to the defendant rather than the crime. As his penalty phase evidence was almost exclusively directed at mitigating factors relating to his character and background and designed to elicit sympathy from the jury, he urges that this instruction essentially precluded the jury from considering the bulk of his evidence. The trial in this case occurred prior to our decision in People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], which reaffirmed that a jury may not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of defendant's character and recognized that CALJIC No. 8.84.1 was subject to such a misconstruction. It therefore indicated that trial courts in the future should inform the jury it could consider anything mitigating the gravity of the crime and any other aspect of defendant's character or record that defendant offers as mitigating. ( Id. at p. 878, fn. 10; and see People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 536-537 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440]; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954].) (39) Where an unexpanded factor (k) instruction has been given, compounded by giving the antisympathy instruction of CALJIC No. 1.00 at the penalty phase, a new penalty trial might be required. ( Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 875-880; see also People v. Lanphear (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 165-169 [203 Cal. Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081].) But even where an antisympathy instruction has not been given at the penalty phase, the ambiguity of the unexpanded factor (k) instruction might require, in a particular case, a new penalty trial. ( Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 282-284.) (38b) Even Davenport, on which defendant relies, however, does not depart from the principle that factor (k) error must be viewed in the context of any other instructions and the evidence and arguments presented to determine whether the jury may have been misled as to its ability to consider sympathy. ( Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 285-286; see also Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 712; Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777; Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1276; Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 786; Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17; and see Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, ___ [100 L.Ed.2d 384, 393-396, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1865-1867]; California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 546 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 943, 107 S.Ct. 837], O'Connor, J., cone.) We conclude from an examination of this record that there was no possibility the jury was misled into believing it could not consider the mitigating evidence as to sympathy that defendant presented at the penalty phase. As the Attorney General notes, a no-sympathy instruction was not given at the penalty phase. He fails to mention that a no-sympathy instruction under CALJIC No. 1.00 [35] was given at the guilt phase. As we have recently noted, however, this does not necessarily mean the jury at the penalty phase was misled. ( Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 718; Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 102.) They were not told, for example, to consider guilt phase instructions. As noted above, what the jury was presented with at the penalty phase was exclusively defendant's mitigating evidence, and while the prosecutor contested whether that evidence merited the lesser penalty of life without possibility of parole, he never contested the jury's right or duty to consider it. (See People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1200-1201.) The prosecutor discussed the testimony of the relatives, indicating that one might expect such witnesses to speak of love for defendant. He noted defendant's statements of remorse, suggesting that in light of his full testimony this was obviously not sincere and defendant must certainly have remembered bizarre details he now claimed not to recall. He addressed defendant's intoxication which, even if true, did not excuse his conduct. [36] The prosecutor discussed defendant's difficult childhood and the testimony of psychologists, again urging that this did not justify a lesser penalty than death. Never did he suggest to the jury that defendant's evidence was irrelevant, only that it was insubstantial in light of the gravity of these crimes. Indeed the prosecutor specifically told the jury to consider all of the evidence and continued: Now, the evidence in this trial is the evidence that you were given both during the guilt phase and the penalty phase. Certainly defense counsel's arguments attempted to elicit the sympathy of the jury, addressing the minor cost of imprisonment and the harsh conditions to which defendant would be subject even if his life were spared. (But cf. Spaziano v. Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447, 461-462 [82 L.Ed.2d 340, 353, 104 S.Ct. 3154].) He pleaded that defendant was severely and substantially emotionally and mentally impaired, and that what we don't do in this country is we don't kill people who are sick people. We just don't do it. While in light of Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 558, and its progeny we may now say an expanded factor (k) instruction should have been given or that it would have been desirable to specifically inform the jury it could consider any mitigating factor relating to defendant's character or other evidence justifying sympathy for him, we conclude the jury presented with this mitigating evidence was not misled by any ambiguity in the instructions into believing that mitigating evidence should be disregarded.