Opinion ID: 1151766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Instructions on Remand

Text: For the instruction of the court and parties below, we must address a few remaining matters. The record reflects several additional errors that must be avoided on remand.
First, we believe that the testimony of Officer Frederick Robinson that Ellis was popular at school because of his hatred of blacks was irrelevant, inflammatory, and an impermissible comment on character. §§ 90.403, 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. (1989). This error standing alone probably would have been harmless, but the other errors in the case require reversal. The trial court accordingly shall not permit the error to occur again, harmless or not.
Second, the trial court in any penalty phase on remand is directed to expressly find, consider, and weigh in its written sentencing order all mitigating evidence urged by Ellis, both statutory and nonstatutory, apparent anywhere on the record in keeping with the analysis developed by this Court in Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988), Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1990), Santos v. State, 591 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1991), and their progeny. The State, of course, shall be provided a full opportunity to rebut the existence of mitigating factors urged by Ellis and to introduce evidence tending to diminish their weight if they cannot be rebutted.
Third, on the question of young age as a mitigating factor, we are gravely troubled by inconsistencies in Florida cases involving minors who commit murder. In such cases some courts find young age a mitigating factor and others reject the factor outright, as the court did here, based on the same or highly similar facts. On this issue, for example, the present case is indistinguishable from LeCroy v. State, 533 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925, 109 S.Ct. 3262, 106 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989), where the trial court found the factor present as to the seventeen-year-old defendant in that case. However, based on the record before it, the LeCroy trial court then proceeded to note that the weight to be accorded to the factor was diminished by other evidence of LeCroy's unusual mental and emotional maturity. [7] We believe the proper approach in cases involving murders committed by minors is that used in LeCroy. Whenever a murder is committed by one who at the time was a minor, the mitigating factor of age must be found and weighed, but the weight can be diminished by other evidence showing unusual maturity. It is the assignment of weight that falls within the trial court's discretion in such cases. The reasons for this conclusion are self-evident. If any group was intended to be included within the statutory mitigating factor of age, it must be those who were minors at the time of the commission of their crimes. § 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (1989). If minors can be excluded, then a court effectively is given unbridled discretion to exclude everyone from the category. It is a fundamental rule of construction that statutory language cannot be construed so as to render it potentially meaningless, Snively Groves, Inc. v. Mayo, 135 Fla. 300, 184 So. 839 (1938), and nothing in the statute reflects any intention that a court should have discretion to render the statute applicable to no one at all. § 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (1989). Any other holding would make the obvious mandate of the legislature subservient to the discretion of a court, leading to the inconsistent results we see in the cases on this issue, and to a violation of the separation of powers. Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. On remand, the trial court shall find the factor of age in mitigation, but may reduce the weight accorded that factor to the extent there is admissible evidence that Ellis possessed unusual maturity at the time of his alleged crimes, assuming he is again convicted as before. LeCroy.
Finally, if on remand a new instruction is given for the aggravating factor of heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the trial court shall ensure that the instruction complies with Espinosa v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), and its progeny if the defense so requests. [8]