Opinion ID: 2747893
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Entrapment-by-Estoppel Instruction

Text: Bradley claims government agents misled her into believing the change of her Home of Record was proper. After all, she says, her monthly vouchers for lodging and per diem were continuously reviewed and approved by multiple employees of the Comptroller Unit. Moreover, Armstrong knew her Home of Record was Chandler, Arizona, yet did nothing to correct it.11 10 This sentence was a downward variance from the guideline range of 12 to 18 months. We know the variance was based on the judge’s consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a). We do not know, however, the specific reasons for the variance because the sentencing transcript was not provided. 11 Bradley violated a military regulation by changing her Home of Record while under orders. At trial, Armstrong erroneously testified that the pertinent military regulation did not go into effect until 2011. On re-direct examination (after a noon recess) she corrected herself, saying the regulation was in effect when Bradley changed her Home of Record in April 2009. Bradley attempts to capitalize on Armstrong’s temporary memory lapse, arguing “[that] the person overseeing the very office in charge of such matters believed the regulation didn’t go into effect until much later is evidence that shows the procedures followed by Ms. Bradley were not just allowed, but were the standard operating procedures . . . . As such, Ms. Bradley should have been allowed her theory of defense instruction of entrapment by estoppel.” (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 16.) Bradley reads too much into Armstrong’s testimony. That Armstrong could not recall at trial, four years after the fact, the effective date of the regulation does not mean she or the Comptroller Unit waived the regulation at the time. In any event, assuming, arguendo, that the regulation was not followed in April 2009, a physical move of belongings was required in order to justify a change of address and the evidence clearly demonstrated Bradley’s knowledge of the requirement. Bradley does not argue Armstrong actively misled her as to the physical move requirement—something Bradley did not satisfy when she changed her Home of Record. -8- “A defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in her favor.” United States v. Rampton, 762 F.3d 1152, 1156 (10th Cir. 2014). Ordinarily, we review for abuse of discretion a district court’s refusal to give a requested theory-of-defense instruction. Id. However, where, as here, the district judge concludes there was insufficient evidence to justify the instruction, our review is de novo. Id. “The defense of entrapment by estoppel is implicated where an agent of the government affirmatively misleads a party as to the state of the law and that party proceeds to act on the misrepresentation so that criminal prosecution of the actor implicates due process concerns under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Rampton, 762 F.3d at 1157 (“A claim of entrapment by estoppel is at heart a due process challenge. To convict a person for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him would be to dispense with the basic requirement that citizens receive fair warning of what actions are criminal.”) (citation and quotations omitted). “To establish [the] defense, a defendant must show (1) an active misleading by a government agent who is responsible for interpreting, administering, or enforcing the law defining the offense; and (2) actual reliance by the defendant, which is reasonable in light of the identity of the agent, the point of law misrepresented, and the substance of the misrepresentation.” Rampton, 762 F.3d at 1157 (quotations omitted). In this case, Bradley claims to have requested and proposed an entrapment-byestoppel instruction. Not exactly. As defense counsel admitted to the district judge, the -9- proposed instruction modified the first element of the defense. While our case law requires an active misleading by the government agent, the proposed instruction merely required an “affirmative[] assent” or “acquiescence.” (R. Vol. 1 at 14.) Bradley could not then, nor does she now, point to any case law supporting such modification and we have found none. For that reason alone, the district judge properly denied her proposed instruction. See United States v. McKinney, 822 F.2d 946, 949 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[R]equested instructions that are misstatements of the law . . . are correctly refused.”). Assuming, arguendo, she had proposed a proper instruction, the district judge correctly concluded there was insufficient evidence to support its submission to the jury. That is because the evidence did not establish either (1) an “active misleading” by a government agent or (2) reasonable reliance. We have yet to define the exact contours of the “active misleading” element of the defense. But we do know that inaction alone is insufficient. See United States v. Westover, 107 F. App’x 840, 844 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished).12 The Supreme Court cases from which the defense originated involved government agents explicitly misadvising defendants as to the law. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39 (1959) (convictions for failure to answer questions of a state commission violated due process because chairman of commission informed defendants they could decline to answer by invoking their Fifth Amendment rights); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 570-71 12 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent. 10th Cir. R. App. P. 32.1(A). We mention Westover because of its persuasive and reasoned analysis. - 10 - (1965) (reversing conviction of a protestor for demonstrating “near” a courthouse because police had advised the protestor where he could demonstrate but then arrested him for demonstrating in that area). This case does not come close to meeting the demanding elements of the asserted defense. See United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We have held that the courts invoke the doctrine of estoppel against the government with great reluctance.”) (quotations omitted). Neither Armstrong nor the employees of the Comptroller Unit explicitly informed Bradley she could change her Home of Record without a physical move of her belongings in order to receive increased benefits. There was no active misleading as to the law. Armstrong’s conduct amounts to nothing more than inaction—she inquired about the Home of Record and accepted Bradley’s explanation that she had moved her belongings to her father’s home in Arizona.13 Armstrong’s misplaced trust hardly amounts to active misleading. And there is another compelling reason why the evidence did not support an entrapment-by-estoppel instruction—any reliance by Bradley on the “approval” of her Home of Record by Armstrong or others in the Comptroller Unit was not reasonable. “[A] defendant’s reliance [is] unreasonable if the defendant obtained the government’s inaccurate guidance by providing false information or omitting relevant information.” Rampton, 762 F.3d at 1157. For instance, in Rampton, the defendant claimed she reasonably believed her conduct concerning the filing of certain tax forms was lawful 13 See supra n.7. - 11 - because the Internal Revenue Service sent her a refund check. Id. at 1158. We concluded such reliance was unreasonable because the forms she filed falsely reported certain income had been withheld. Id. “Obviously the government took the [tax] forms as true, and no one could reasonably infer that the government’s response implied that she was entitled to a refund even if the information reported on the . . . forms was false.” Id. Similarly, in Gutierrez-Gonzalez, the defendant argued a clerk with the Immigration and Nationalization Service affirmatively misled him into believing he was lawfully in the United States by issuing him a work authorization permit even though he told her he was in the country illegally. 184 F.3d at 1168. We concluded his reliance on the issuance of the work permit was unreasonable because it was based on his “fraudulent application that affirmatively stated that he had never been deported.” Id. at 1168-69. Here, any “approval” by Armstrong was based on Bradley falsely informing her that she had moved her belongings to her father’s address in Chandler, Arizona. As Armstrong testified, she did not question Bradley further because “when [a guard member] tells me they’re going to live somewhere, the core values of the Air Force are integrity first, service before self and excellence in all we do. I shouldn’t have to question an E4’s integrity.”14 (R. Vol. 3 at 214.) Likewise, the approval of her vouchers by various employees of the Comptroller Unit was based on the same false premise that her Home of Record was her father’s address in Chandler, Arizona, as Bradley had 14 Again, Bradley’s rank was E4. See supra n.6. - 12 - reported. Bradley cannot now claim she reasonably relied on the “approval” of these government agents when that “approval” was based on her lies.