Opinion ID: 1484856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Issues Pertaining to Dr. Greer's Testimony

Text: The respondent next argues that the trial justice abused her discretion when she refused to allow Dr. Greer to testify. He contends that the proffered evidence was material to whether Miguel was likely to commit sexual abuse. According to defense counsel, Dr. Greer would testify that Miguel had no history of being sexually abused, and that there has never been any evidence he either suffered any sexual or physical abuse or any form of abuse, or a history which suggested he has a history of inappropriate sexual behavior. The trial justice found that his testimony would be irrelevant, stating that, [t]his Court [will] not entertain an expert's testimony that is his belief that [Miguel], or anybody, has not committed any act of sexual inappropriateness. I don't know how the doctor can say that with a reasonable degree of certainty. We agree with this ruling. On appeal, respondent argues that the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72 (1st Cir.2009), is controlling on whether it is reversible error for a trial justice to bar testimony of a key witness in light of the availability of less severe sanctions. The case at bar, however, easily can be distinguished from Esposito. The First Circuit held that the judge's decision to preclude the expert witness from testifying effectively amounted to a dismissal of the plaintiff's case because the plaintiff had a great need for the witness. Id. at 78-79 (recognizing that [b]oth of the parties acknowledge that the decision to exclude the [p]laintiff's expert as a result of missing the discovery deadlines will, without much doubt, effectively dispose of the case). In the case at bar, however, the proffered testimony of the expert witness, Dr. Greer, was wholly irrelevant. It would by no means be dispositive to the outcome of the case; in fact, it is our opinion that it would have had no evidentiary value whatsoever. Additionally, we reject respondent's contention that Dr. Greer's testimony falls within the provisions of Rule 404(a)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. That rule provides that evidence of a person's character, in certain circumstances, may be admissible to prove the existence of a pertinent character trait. In State v. Benoit, 697 A.2d 329, 331 (R.I.1997), this Court held that excluding evidence of good character in respect to a pertinent trait cannot generally be considered harmless [error]. Here, however, the proffered testimony would not serve to prove a pertinent character trait; it would not serve to prove any character trait. Indeed, it is difficult for this Court to fathom what evidentiary purpose this opinion would further. Thus, we cannot state that the trial justice abused her discretion, nor that there would have been a different outcome had the testimony been allowed.