Opinion ID: 884966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Claim for Relief

Text: ¶ 32 Gollehon argues in his Second Claim for Relief that there was overwhelming post-trial evidence that Armstrong perjured himself at trial. This, according to the Petitioner, resulted in the deliberate deception of the court and jurors by the presentation of false evidence, resulting in a violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. ¶ 33 To prevail on this claim, Gollehon must establish that: (1) the witness's testimony was actually false; (2) the testimony was material to the verdict; and (3) the prosecutor knew or believed the testimony to be false. See Fuller v. Johnson, (5th Cir.1997), 114 F.3d 491, 496, (5th Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963, 118 S.Ct. 399, 139 L.Ed.2d 312 (1997). False evidence is material only if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury's verdict. See Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 726 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1094, 117 S.Ct. 773, 136 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). ¶ 34 Gollehon argues that Armstrong's post-trial behavior never changed, therefore, Armstrong must have lied at trial about his reasons for coming forward. Holton, on the other hand, testified that she believed that Armstrong had made efforts to change his life and Connor believed that Armstrong was sincere in his rehabilitation efforts and that he provided truthful testimony at the Pileggi trial. The fact that Armstrong failed at rehabilitation is not sufficient to demonstrate that he lied at trial. ¶ 35 Gollehon obtained an affidavit from Monty Carrillo stating that Armstrong immediately violated his parole conditions. However, Carrillo does not state that Armstrong's testimony at trial was false. Carrillo merely speculates and draws inferences from Armstrong's subsequent conduct on parole. Gollehon also refers to information contained in an affidavit by Montana State Senator Thomas Keating. However, Keating concedes that he does not know the details of Armstrong's trial testimony or whether it was true or not. ¶ 36 Gollehon has not sustained his burden to establish that Armstrong's trial testimony was actually false or that the prosecutor knew or believed it to be false. The Petitioner infers that Armstrong must have lied at trial about his reasons for coming forward. The fact that Armstrong's efforts at rehabilitation were not successful is not sufficient to demonstrate that he lied at trial. ¶ 37 The Second Claim for Relief is denied.