Opinion ID: 2979723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Jones’s plea agreement

Text: As Jones’s attorney acknowledges, the two additional challenges to the validity of Jones’s plea agreement were not raised below and are therefore reviewed under the plain-error standard. See United States v. Mobley, 618 F.3d 539, 544 (6th Cir. 2010). The first such claim is that the district court violated Rule 11(b)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to ensure that Jones understood the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty. -8- No. 08-1658, United States v. Jones “A guilty plea is valid if it is entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently by the defendant. Rule 11 is meant to ensure that the district court is satisfied that the defendant’s plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” United State v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). This rule requires, among other things, that before a court accepts a defendant’s guilty plea, “the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). “Because a guilty plea involves the admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, the accused must have knowledge of all those elements.” United States v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903, 908 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “At a minimum, the defendant must understand the critical or essential elements of the offense to which he or she pleads guilty.” Id. at 909 (internal quotation marks omitted). Jones contends that the district court did not ensure that he understood the way in which the charge against him was based on the murders of Grice and Carruthers. He also argues, pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3), that there is no factual basis in the record to support his offense being based on these murders. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”). Jones specifically argues that his offense level was erroneously based on first-degree rather than second-degree murder. He further claims that “there was insufficient evidence connecting him to any of the two homicides — that were not committed in furtherance of [the continuing criminal enterprise].” These arguments are all connected because “Rule 11(b)(1)(G)’s requirement that a defendant understand the essential -9- No. 08-1658, United States v. Jones elements of the crime is integrally related to Rule 11(b)(3)’s requirement that the district court determine that the plea has a factual basis.” See Valdez, 362 F.3d at 909. But Jones’s challenge to the validity of his plea agreement based on the murders is without merit because the murders were not part of the ultimate charge against him. Under the plea agreement, the government dropped the homicide charges against Jones. He instead pled guilty to engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, which carries a statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment. And Jones’s attorney agreed at the plea hearing that life imprisonment was the statutory-maximum sentence for Jones’s continuing-criminal-enterprise offense. Jones’s continuing-criminal-enterprise charge includes his violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, based on the Dog Pound’s distribution of narcotics, as an element of his offense. Murder can, under some circumstances, be an element of a continuing-criminal-enterprise violation under § 848 or of a narcotics violation under § 841, but the statutes also allow for sentences of life imprisonment even where murder is not an element of the offense. The parties in the present case agreed, both in the plea agreement and at the plea hearing, that Jones’s continuing-criminal-enterprise charge is based on the Dog Pound’s distribution of drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and § 846. This charge specifically excludes the element of murder. Although the murders were relevant to Jones’s Guidelines calculation, they are not an element of his continuing-criminal-enterprise charge. The court thus properly asked Jones at his plea hearing: “[D]o you understand that with regard to this [Guidelines] calculation, I must have the probation department’s presentence report before finally -10- No. 08-1658, United States v. Jones determining how those guidelines [calculations] might come out” in the present case, to which Jones responded: “Yes, sir.” Moreover, Jones admitted at his plea hearing that he reasonably foresaw that his coconspirators’ activities could lead to the homicides. The statement of facts in Jones’s plea agreement, which was referenced at his plea hearing, goes even further, acknowledging that he “and at least 5 other participants . . . plan[ned] the robberies, kidnaping and intentional killings of rival drug traffickers and their associates,” including the murders of Grice and Carruthers. These murders also factored into the Guidelines calculation that Jones agreed to in his plea agreement. In addition, Jones claims that he did not admit and that the government and the district court did not establish that he acted “in concert” with five or more other people or that he was an organizer, manager, or supervisor of these other people, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A). But Jones admitted at his plea hearing that he “direct[ed] the activities of at least five other individuals from 1995 through 1998 with regard to these various drug-related activities.” He then proceeded to answer affirmatively a series of questions regarding the activities of people that he worked with in the Dog Pound. Jones also admitted in his plea agreement that he “directed the activities of at least 5 other participants in the distribution of cocaine, heroin and marijuana” and that he agreed with nine of the coconspirators to distribute these drugs. These challenges to the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of Jones’s plea agreement are unfounded and certainly do not survive plain-error review. Moreover, on this record, Jones’s acknowledgments in his plea agreement and at his plea hearing that he understood the various terms -11- No. 08-1658, United States v. Jones of his plea bargain leave no room for doubt that his agreement was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.