Opinion ID: 1150904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: One or more homicides committed during the offense.

Text: The last aggravating factor found by the trial judge was that the defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides as defined in A.R.S. § 13-1101, which were committed during the commission of the offense. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(8). The trial judge found that this factor applied to both of the first degree murder counts. Defendant concedes that A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(8) may apply to one of the counts, but not to both. Defendant argues that finding this factor as to each count amounts to double-counting. We disagree. When construing a statute, we look at the plain meaning of the words used in the statute unless their context suggests otherwise. Bianco v. Patterson, 159 Ariz. 472, 473, 768 P.2d 204, 205 (Ct. App. 1989). See also O'Malley Lumber Co. v. Riley, 126 Ariz. 167, 169, 613 P.2d 629, 631 (Ct.App. 1980) (when language of statute is plain, there's no need to resort to rules of statutory interpretation). Furthermore, [p]enal statutes shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect their object and to promote justice. A.R.S. § 1-211(C). Words and phrases contained in a statute are to be construed according to the common and approved use of the language. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(8) provides that an aggravating factor exists when [t]he defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, as defined in A.R.S. § 13-1101, which were committed during the commission of the offense. A.R.S. § 1-213. The plain meaning of the statute reads that if a defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, and this conviction arose out of the commission of the offense, the homicide conviction is an aggravating factor that the State could allege and the trial judge may find. In this case, defendant was convicted of count one, the murder of Lili, and during the commission of this offense defendant killed Mindy, for which he was also convicted. Likewise, for count two, defendant was convicted of the murder of Mindy, and during the commission of this offense defendant killed Lili, for which he was also convicted. The murder convictions were completely separate from each other and, therefore, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(8) applies to each and every first degree murder conviction. Thus, the trial court did not err in applying this factor to each of the first degree murder convictions. No Arizona case discusses whether the application of this aggravating factor to both of two murders amounts to double jeopardy. [4] However, other jurisdictions that have similar provisions, see, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 413(d)(9) ([t]he defendant committed more than one offense of murder in the first degree arising out of the same incident); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 565.035.3 and 565.032.2(2) (1990 Cumm.Supp.) (murder in the first degree offense ... was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of another unlawful homicide), apply the aggravating factor to each and every first degree murder conviction. In Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 538, 499 A.2d 1261, 1288 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 722 (1986), the Maryland Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the jury could find Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 413(d)(9) as an aggravating factor to each and every charge of first degree murder when more than one person was murdered. The defendant was charged with two separate counts of first degree murder and the State alleged as an aggravating factor to each count that the defendant committed more than one offense of murder in the first degree arising out of the same incident. Id. The defendant argued that it was error to allow the jury to find ... this aggravating circumstance in each instance, because the Legislature intended that only one death sentence could be imposed where more than one person was murdered. Id. The court stated: Each murder was clearly a separate offense. The readily apparent intent of the Legislature in the enactment of the capital punishment statute was to permit consideration of the death penalty under the egregious circumstances of multiple first degree murders. There is no indication of an intent to allow the imposition ... for one but not all of the offenses. Id.; cf. State v. Murray, 744 S.W.2d 762, 775 (Mo.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 181, 102 L.Ed.2d 150 (1988) ([e]vidence that Jackson and Stewart were both taken into the kitchen by the defendant and his accomplices shortly before their lifeless bodies were found there leaves no doubt that each of the murders was committed while the killer was engaged in the commission of another unlawful homicide) (emphasis added). But see Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 624, 284 S.E.2d 422, 430 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919, 102 S.Ct. 1778, 72 L.Ed.2d 180 (1982) (where each murder conviction was aggravated by the other murder conviction, the court found them mutually supporting, and arbitrarily eliminated one of the death sentences). We believe our legislature, like the Maryland legislature, enacted A.R.S. § 13-107(F)(8) to allow consideration of the death penalty under the egregious circumstances of multiple first degree murders. Evans, 304 Md. at 538, 499 A.2d at 1288 (emphasis added).