Opinion ID: 1959339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: date of accrual

Text: The initial question which must be decided is which statute of limitations applies to the plaintiff's cause of action in the present case. This decision is dependent upon a determination of the date upon which the plaintiff's cause of action accrued because the applicable statute of limitations is that statute in effect at the time the cause of action accrued. Stewart v. Darrow, 141 Vt. 248, 253, 448 A.2d 788, 790 (1982). Vermont law has recognized two different definitions of the term accrue. Under current statutory law, 12 V.S.A. § 512(4) (Supp.1984) (amended by 1975, No. 248 (Adj.Sess.)), [1] a cause of action in a personal injury case shall be deemed to accrue as of the date of the discovery of the injury. Under this definition of accrue, the plaintiff's cause of action would have accrued on May 1, 1979, the date upon which she discovered she was suffering from cancer. As discussed in Part I-D infra, the applicable statute of limitations in effect on that date does not bar the plaintiff's cause of action. The second definition of the term accrue is that definition recognized by case law prior to the enactment of the statutory definition in 12 V.S.A. § 512(4) (Supp.1984). Prior to the enactment of that statute, the definition of accrue was set forth in Murray v. Allen, supra . In that case, this Court held that a cause of action in tort accrued at the time of the last negligent act attributable to the defendant. Id. 103 Vt. at 376, 154 A. at 679. Were we to apply that rule in the present case, the plaintiff's cause of action would be barred. The date of the last negligent act attributable to the defendants is March 16, 1957, plaintiff's date of birth, the last day on which ingestion of DES by the plaintiff's mother could have had any deleterious effect on the plaintiff. Thus, the date of accrual would be March 16, 1957, and the applicable statute of limitations in effect on that date was 12 V.S.A. § 512 (1959). [2] Pursuant to that statute, a three-year statute of limitations would have been applicable to the plaintiff's cause of action in the present case. However, the three-year statute of limitations would have been tolled until such time as the plaintiff had reached her age of majority. 12 V.S.A. § 551. If the plaintiff's age of majority is deemed to be her twenty-first birthday, the latest possible date for her to have initiated a cause of action in Vermont, without it being barred by an applicable statute of limitations, would have been March 16, 1981three years after her twenty-first birthday and more than one year prior to the actual date upon which she commenced this action. As discussed in Parts I-B and I-C infra, this Court has decided that the rule of Murray v. Allen, supra , should be overruled, and that the term accrue should be given a uniform meaning, regardless of when any particular cause of action actually arose. Thus this Court has decided that the statutory definition of the term accrue, as set out in 12 V.S.A. § 512(4) (Supp.1984), shall apply to all causes of action arising before the enactment of that statute. Defendants, however, argue that such a decision is proscribed by 1 V.S.A. § 214(b), [3] which prohibits the retroactive application of statutes affecting rights and liabilities. However, the definition of accrue which the defendants would have us apply in the present case was the result of a judicial determination as set forth in case law, and was not, therefore, the result of any specific legislative enactment. While the provisions of 1 V.S.A. § 214(b) provide that statutory changes will not generally be given retroactive application, the provisions of this statute do not prevent this Court from reconsidering the continued application of judge-made law. Having decided to overrule the rule in Murray v. Allen, supra , we are not foreclosed by 1 V.S.A. § 214(b) from applying any new rule that we decide to adopt in place of the pre-existing rule.