Opinion ID: 1177446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Election of Counts

Text: Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion for election of counts as to the murder charges, seeking a designation by the district attorney of the theory upon which he would rely at trial. The motion was denied. At the close of all evidence, the motion was renewed and again denied. The defendant argues that denial of the motion was error under sections 18-1-408(3) and 18-1-408(1)(c), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). We disagree. In prosecutions that join several offenses, section 18-1-408(3) provides that the defendant may request that the court require the prosecution, at the close of all the evidence, to elect the count upon which to proceed if the evidence presented has been identical as to multiple counts. The trial court has discretion to require either election of counts or, in the alternative, to impose concurrent sentences if more than one guilty verdict is returned on offenses supported by identical evidence. People v. Hardin, 199 Colo. 229, 235, 607 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1980); People v. Anderson, 187 Colo. 171, 529 P.2d 310 (1974). Section 18-1-408(3), however, applies only to cases charging several different offenses. In People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261, 1265-71 (Colo.1983), we held that first degree murder is one offense and the different subsections of section 18-3-102 describe the various ways in which that offense may be committed. The trial court does not have discretion to require the prosecution to elect among the first degree murder theories after the evidence is closed. Id. at 1271. Therefore, section 18-1-408(3) does not apply to the various theories of first degree murder. The defendant argues that section 18-1-408(1)(c) requires the prosecution to elect counts under the circumstances of this case. That section provides only that the defendant may not be convicted of more than one offense if inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of such offenses. Since murder is only one offense, that statute is inapposite. Moreover, the jury could conclude without inconsistent reasoning that the defendant's actions manifested extreme indifference toward human life, caused death in connection with a knowing perpetration of the felony of arson, and constituted the taking of human life after deliberation. However, for other reasons expressed in our recent opinion in People v. Lowe, supra at 1265-71, we agree with the defendant that only one conviction for first degree murder for each victim may be imposed.