Opinion ID: 1219392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Refusal to Grant a New Trial

Text: The only claim relating to the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial which we see as requiring discussion in this appeal is Hilton's contention that the trial court erred in the manner in which it instructed the jury on the law relating to breach of contract. We conclude that the trial court instructed the jury properly in this regard. The written contract is far from being a model of clarity. Dynamic Duo insists throughout this appeal that, if Hilton had wished to obligate Dynamic Duo to have Michael Spinks fight in all of the Hilton events, it should have included a provision to this effect in the written contract. It did not. From the jury's verdict we must conclude that the jury did not believe that the parties had expressly or impliedly agreed that Dynamic Duo was contractually obligated to produce Michael Spinks as a contestant in the four prize fights that were covered by the contract. Hilton argues in its opening brief that had the jury been properly instructed, the outcome of the trial may have been different. This contention is unpersuasive because the trial court instructed the jury correctly and in terms that covered quite adequately the position taken by Hilton in this case, which, briefly put, is this: Even if Dynamic Duo did not expressly agree to provide Spinks in the Hilton events, it impliedly so agreed and violated this implied agreement by failing to produce Spinks. To advance its position that the true agreement of the parties was that Spinks himself must be the IBF champion who was going to fight under the terms of the contract, Hilton offered proposed instruction P-1, which stated that a breach may occur with regard to either an express or implied provision of the contract. The proposed instruction then went on to read that an implied provision is one that is recognized by the parties to exist and bind them in their actions despite the fact that it was not specifically spelled out or agreed to by the parties to the contract. The trial court refused to give this instruction; but, as pointed out below, the subject of Hilton's requested instruction was covered by other instructions of the court. [1] The quoted proposed instruction does offer a broad interpretation of contract law that is consistent with modern contract theory. Although some courts still follow traditional bargain theory and refuse to delve beyond the express terms of a written contract, the better approach [2] is for the courts to examine the circumstances surrounding the parties' agreement in order to determine the true mutual intentions of the parties. Courts today tend to be willing to look beyond the written document to find the true understanding of the parties. Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir.1981). We favor the above-stated approach to contract interpretation, despite Dynamic Duo's insistence that the court limit itself to the four corners of the contract. [3] The trial court followed the preferred approach to contract interpretation and took great care to instruct the jury in a manner that clearly permitted the jury to accept Hilton's vision of the contract of the parties if it chose to do so. As indicated above, the trial court clearly and properly advised the jury of the parties' two opposing contentions: (1) Hilton's claim that the written contract should be read to mean that Spinks must participate in the Hilton events until he won or lost, and (2) Dynamic Duo's claim that it had only to produce an IBF champion, whoever that might be. The court instructed the jury that in this case it was required to determine what the intention of the parties was and that in doing so it was to determine (Instruction No. 29) what the parties agreed to by the words used in the written contract and all of the circumstances leading to the contract, such as negotiations and statements of the parties before the contract and the object, nature, and subject matter of the contract.  (Emphasis supplied.) The emphasized wording clearly tells the jury that under the circumstances of this case it was not bound by the express terms of the contract and that it was free to go beyond the literal wordage of the written document. Under the court's instructions as given, the jury could have come to the conclusion that, although it was (as put in Hilton's proposed instruction) not specifically spelled out or agreed to by the parties, the parties had in fact mutually agreed to Hilton's interpretation of the contract, namely, that Dynamic Duo must produce Spinks, not just any old IBF champion. The jury rejected this conclusion and found against Hilton. When the trial court instructed the jury in effect that it could, if it chose, go beyond the written language in the contract and find that the parties had in fact impliedly agreed that Spinks and only Spinks was required to fight as the IBF champion, the court was as much as telling the jury that it was not bound strictly by the written terms of the contract and that it could in this case give credence to the true understandings and intentions and justified expectations of the parties; therefore, Hilton cannot be heard to complain about the district court's instructions in this case. The jury was given a clear opportunity to find that Hilton was correct in its contention that Dynamic Duo was bound to produce Spinks for the Hilton events; it did not so find. The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the verdict is that the jury believed that there was no contract obligation on the part of Dynamic Duo to produce Spinks and hence no breach of contract by Dynamic Duo. There was no error committed by the trial court with respect to the manner in which it instructed the jury relative to the breach of contract action. The trial court properly denied the motion for new trial on this ground.