Opinion ID: 783064
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Customs Agents Were Statutorily Authorized to Conduct the Export Search.

Text: 14 Contrary to Boumelhem's arguments, here the Government agents had statutory authority to conduct the search of the cargo container. 1 Section 1581 of Title 19 of the United States Code, in pertinent part, reads: 15 Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States ... without as well as within his district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance. 16 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). This statute has been interpreted as granting general authorization for border searches. See United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 279 F.3d 709, 712 n. 4 (9th Cir.2002) (The border search exception is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)....); United States v. 1903 Obscene Magazines, 907 F.2d 1338, 1341 (2d Cir.1990) (citing § 1581 for the proposition that Customs has plenary power to safeguard the United States borders, which includes the power to inspect any person or thing that presents itself at a border seeking entrance); United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1204 (3d Cir.1984) (finding that § 1581 is the general border search statute and that it authorizes the search of vessels or vehicles without cause); United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 836 n. 7 (2d Cir.1980) (citing § 1581 for the proposition that customs officials have statutory authority to conduct inspections at a point of embarkation of cargo being shipped abroad); United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1308 (5th Cir.1979) (noting that [r]ead literally, that statute grants extremely broad authority to Customs officials). Given the statute's broad definition of vehicle 2 and the authorization to search any place in the United States, we conclude that the statute authorizes the search of a cargo container in a railroad yard, the situation here. Having concluded that the search was authorized by statute, we must next consider whether the search was proper under traditional Fourth Amendment principles. 17 2. The Border Search Exception Applies to Persons and Articles Leaving the Country, and Not Only to Those Entering the Country. 18 Boumelhem also argues that the Supreme Court decisions that deal with the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment do not by their own logic apply to exit searches. Boumelhem adds that, although other circuits have concluded that warrantless exit searches are constitutionally permissible, such searches have generally been limited to situations involving the smuggling of currency. Boumelhem weaves these two threads together to argue that the border search exception should not apply to the present situation. Notwithstanding Boumelhem's arguments, the border search exception applies to the search of the outgoing cargo container here. 19 A search without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); see also United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir.1996). The border search exception generally provides that routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-619, 97 S.Ct. 1972; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-273, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596(1973); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, (1925). Such searches may be conducted at an international border checkpoint or its functional equivalent. See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-73, 93 S.Ct. 2535. 3 Further, every circuit that has considered the question has concluded, at least with regard to the circumstances before it, that the border search exception applies to exit searches as well as searches of incoming persons and materials. See, e.g., United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296 (4th Cir.1995) (noting, in following other circuits, that every other circuit addressing the issue has held that the exception applies regardless of whether the person or items searched are entering or exiting the United States). 4 Moreover, a Supreme Court chambers opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, as well as dicta in a Supreme Court majority opinion, also support the applicability of the border search exception to persons or articles leaving the country. Julian v. United States, 463 U.S. 1308, 103 S.Ct. 3522, 77 L.Ed.2d 1290 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1983); Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974). 20 Boumelhem notes that many of the cases from other circuits have only dealt with exit searches in the context of currency smuggling, and contends that the special national interest in protecting currency is not implicated by the search here. In support of this argument, Boumelhem cites cases from the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits that have expressly declined to consider the exit border exception outside the context of currency smuggling. See United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 795 n. 8 (5th Cir.1991) (We express no opinion, however, on the fourth amendment implications of routine, suspicionless searches for exportation of articles other than monetary instruments.); United States v. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d 1126, 1138 (11th Cir.1987) (Although we need not decide here whether the `border exception' applies equally in all respects to incoming and outgoing searches at the border, we conclude that Congress may ... authorize ... warrantless searches of persons and property departing the United States on the basis of reasonable suspicion that a currency reporting violation is occurring.). But see United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1297 (4th Cir.1995) ([W]e join the several other circuit courts which have held that the Ramsey border search exception extends to all routine searches at the nation's borders.); United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136, 143 (3d Cir.1991) ([T]he traditional rationale for the border search exception applies as well in the outgoing border search context.); United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir.1982) (Since this was a search at a `border', of a person leaving the country, there is no need for probable cause, warrants or even suspicion). 21 In Ramsey, the Supreme Court detailed the rationale that undergirds the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment, noting that border searches, pursuant to the power of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616, 97 S.Ct. 1972. 5 In extending the border search exception to exports, the Fourth Circuit has concluded that the power of the sovereign to protect itself also applies in the context of exit searches. See, e.g., Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1296-97. In addition, other circuits, in keeping with the notion that [t]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests, Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537, 105 S.Ct. 3304, have employed a balancing approach when analyzing the application of the border search exception to articles or persons leaving the country, see e.g., United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir.1976). 22 We conclude that each of the above rationales supports the application of the Ramsey border search exception to the search of the outgoing cargo container here. While most cases that have dealt with this issue previously have involved the protection of the sovereign's interests in its currency, e.g. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1297, the United States's interest in preventing the export of weapons to other countries also implicates the sovereign's interest in protecting itself. See id. at 1297 (From the sovereign's power to protect itself is derived its power to ... prohibit the export of its currency, national treasures, and other assets.... As important [as the sovereign's interest in excluding undesirable outside influences] is the sovereign's interest in regulating foreign commerce.). Further, this interest also weighs heavily when balanced against the individual's Fourth Amendment interest in being free from the search at issue. The government's control and regulation of the export of weapons implicates significant government interests in the realms of national security and relations with other nations. On the other side of the scales, travellers (or exporters) undoubtedly have a lesser expectation of privacy when they (or their goods) leave the country if for no other reason than the departure from the United States is almost invariably followed by an entry into another country which will likely conduct its own border search. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1302 (Phillips, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 6 Thus, the warrantless search of the cargo container was permitted under the Ramsey border search exception. 23 C. The Search Was Not Tainted by the Participation or Direction of the FBI. 24 The search in this case was, moreover, not tainted by the participation or direction of the FBI. Boumelhem contends that the search was unconstitutional because the FBI used Customs as a means of circumventing the warrant requirement that would apply if the FBI were acting on its own and therefore lacked the statutory authority that Customs has to conduct warrantless border searches. 7 25 The contention lacks merit because, while Customs was acting in conjunction with the FBI, the record demonstrates that Customs was pursuing its own law enforcement objectives. In doing so, Customs was acting as a separate law enforcement agency subject to the Fourth Amendment restrictions that apply to Custom's authorized jurisdiction, which jurisdiction was implicated when the container arrived at the railroad yard for shipment to another country. In addition, it would serve no underlying interest of the Fourth Amendment to permit one arm of the government to search for no reason, while forbidding another arm of the government from searching under suspicious circumstances. As the Supreme Court has explained in similar circumstances: 26 Respondents, however, contend in the alternative that because the Customs officers were accompanied by a Louisiana State Policeman, and were following an informant's tip that ... they may not rely on the statute authorizing boarding for inspection of the vessel's documentation. This line of reasoning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135-139, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), and we again reject it. Acceptance of respondent's argument would lead to the incongruous result criticized by Judge Campbell in his opinion in United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 846 (C.A.1 1980): We would see little logic in sanctioning such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding them in the case of suspected smugglers. 27 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983). A contrary view, moreover, would ignore the reasonable law enforcement practice that has arisen to address situations in which criminal enterprises span the jurisdictions of numerous law enforcement agencies. In short, Customs may properly exercise its statutory authority at the behest of the FBI. 28 In arguing that the search was unconstitutional due to the FBI's circumvention of the warrant requirement, Boumelhem relies upon a Ninth Circuit case that, assuming it was correctly decided, 8 clearly is distinguishable. In United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.1979), an FBI agent, acting alone, stopped and searched a truck that was entering the United States from Mexico. Id. at 546. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the FBI agent did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, and that the stop, therefore, violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 547. In rejecting the Government's assertion that the search was justified by the border exception, the court noted that the FBI agent, unlike Customs agents or border patrol agents, was not authorized by Congress to conduct border searches. Id. at 548-50. The court also noted that the FBI agent was not cooperating with Customs officials. Id. at 550. The court concluded that the search was, therefore, not an authorized border search under 19 U.S.C. § 482. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d at 550; see also United States v. Fogelman, 586 F.2d 337, 344 (5th Cir.1978)(suggesting, in dictum, that the Fogelman court might have found a violation of the Fourth Amendment had pretext or bad faith on the part[] of local officers in having the Customs agents participate as a `portable search warrant' been demonstrated). 29 Unlike in Soto-Soto, here the district court concluded that the FBI had been cooperating with Customs as a part of a joint task force. The record also reflects that Customs agents initially caused the container to be taken to a Customs facility and that a number of Customs agents, approximately twenty, participated in the search. Customs agents were the ones who discovered every piece of evidence, and the evidence was logged by Customs agents. Thus, the record amply supports the district court's determination that Customs actively cooperated in the search. In addition, Customs had its own interest in the suspected export of weapons as a possible violation of laws that it is charged with enforcing, and was acting in good faith in pursuing this interest. See generally The Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751- § 2799aa. 9 30 Boumelhem also relies by analogy on cases in which Fourth Amendment protections have been held to apply to searches conducted by private individuals who were directed by law enforcement agencies. Boumelhem correctly notes that when a private individual, who is not subject to the restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment, acts at the direction of law enforcement agents, the private search must comport with the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir.1985). In such an instance, the private individual acts like an agent of the law enforcement agency, and is, therefore, subjected to the same restrictions as the law enforcement agency. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (The question presented here is whether the conduct of the police officers at the Coolidge house was such as to make [the private individual's] actions their actions for purposes of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments....). These cases are entirely inapposite. The Fourth Amendment does not apply at all to individuals, and permitting the government to circumvent the limits of the Fourth Amendment by directing individuals to conduct searches that the government cannot, would totally undermine the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In contrast, permitting one government agency to search, where an individual has every reason to expect that another agency may search the same place, has little if any adverse effect on the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment. 31 The cooperation between the FBI and Customs in this case did not render the warrantless search of the cargo container unconstitutional. 32