Opinion ID: 813898
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count 8: Husband Caring for Alpacas

Text: After hearing Pinchak testify that Bagshaw cared for the alpacas 75 percent of the time and that Jim Bagshaw “rarely” cared for them, and after viewing the pole camera footage and home movie clips, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Bagshaw misrepresented her involvement in the alpaca business. A reasonable juror could also have concluded that this misrepresentation was material. e. Count 9: No Physical Involvement with the Alpacas After viewing the pole camera footage and home movie clips and hearing Pinchak testify that Bagshaw cared for the alpacas 75 percent of the time, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Bagshaw misrepresented her physical involvement with the alpaca farm. A reasonable juror could also have concluded that this misrepresentation was material. f. Count 10: No Income from Business or Investment Activities After hearing evidence about Bagshaw’s receipt of funds from the YLEO checks and the sale of an alpaca, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Bagshaw misrepresented her receipt of income from any business or investment activities. Although the $243.46 received as YLEO commissions was minimal, the $1,200 received from the 2005 alpaca sale was more significant. Also, testimony indicated that the OWC was interested primarily in the work capability represented by the receipt of funds, not the amount of funds received. - 39 - No. 12-3074 United States v. Bagshaw g. Count 11: No Volunteer Activities After hearing evidence about Bagshaw’s volunteering at the alpaca show, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Bagshaw misrepresented her lack of volunteer activities. Testimony indicated that any volunteer work would indicate to the OWC that the applicant was able to perform some type of work. h. Count 12: No Driving for Alpaca Business After hearing testimony that Bagshaw transported an alpaca, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Bagshaw falsely stated that she was not driving for her alpaca business. A reasonable juror could have viewed this false statement as material, since if Bagshaw had stated that she drove in connection with the alpaca business, she would have undercut her other statements about being only passively involved.
After hearing evidence that Bagshaw traveled to Salt Lake City, Los Angeles, and Erie, Pennsylvania, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Bagshaw falsely represented that she only traveled to Las Vegas. A reasonable juror could also have concluded that this misrepresentation was material. Disclosure of this significant amount of traveling would have indicated that Bagshaw’s pain was not as consuming as she indicated. j. Count 14: No Ability to Work Limited Duty or Limited Hours After hearing evidence of Bagshaw’s farm work, volunteering, conference attendance, and traveling, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Bagshaw falsely stated that she was unable - 40 - No. 12-3074 United States v. Bagshaw to work limited duty or limited hours. Had Bagshaw stated that she thought she was able to return to limited duty, that statement almost certainly would have influenced Agent Dancer’s actions. In sum, the government presented evidence to support each element of the counts charged. Although the evidence was somewhat scarce, a reasonable juror could have found Bagshaw guilty of each one of the counts. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Bagshaw’s motion for judgment of acquittal.