Opinion ID: 1579306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Can the Sentencing Court Order a Refund of the Section 905.14 Fee?

Text: When we interpret a statute, we attempt to give effect to the general assembly's intent in enacting the law. Generally, this intent is gleaned from the language of the statute. To ascertain the meaning of the statutory language, we consider the context of the provision at issue and strive to interpret it in a manner consistent with the statute as an integrated whole. Griffin Pipe Prods. Co. v. Guarino, 663 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 2003) (citations omitted). Similarly, we interpret a statute consistently with other statutes concerning the same or a related subject. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 581 (Iowa 2000). Finally, statutes are interpreted in a manner to avoid absurd results, see Albrecht v. Gen. Motors Corp., 648 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Iowa 2002), and to avoid rendering any part of the enactment superfluous, see Am. Legion v. Cedar Rapids Bd. of Review, 646 N.W.2d 433, 439 (Iowa 2002). Our review of the district court's interpretation of a statute is for correction of errors of law. See State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 663 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Iowa 2003). With these principles in mind, we turn to an analysis of the statute. B. Applicability of section 905.14. Before we address whether a trial court can order a refund of a probation enrollment fee, we consider the defendant's claim that the trial court was not required by section 905.14(1) to assess the enrollment fee in his case. Pickett contends that because the fee was not mandatory in his case, any restrictions on the court's authority under section 905.14 do not apply. He asserts the enrollment fee was not obligatory here because his probation was not subject to supervision by a district department of correctional services. See Iowa Code § 905.14(1). He relies on the court's order placing him on  unsupervised probation under the Department of Corrections, and DCS's reference to his probation as  self -supervised. (Emphases added.) In reviewing the reality of Pickett's probation, however, we conclude that Pickett was, in fact, subject to the supervision of the sixth judicial district department of correctional services, albeit at a minimal level. Iowa Code section 901B.1 sets forth a corrections continuum that consists of five levels: (1) noncommunity-based corrections sanctions; (2) probation and parole options; (3) quasi-incarceration sanctions; (4) short-term incarceration (less than thirty days); and (5) incarceration in excess of thirty days. Id. § 901B.1(1). The probation and parole options consist of the following: (1) Monitored sanctions. Monitored sanctions are administrative supervision sanctions which are monitored for compliance by the district department of correctional services and include, but are not limited to, low-risk offender-diversion programs. (2) Supervised sanctions. Supervised sanctions are regular probation or parole supervision and any conditions established in the probation or parole agreement or by court order. (3) Intensive supervision sanctions. Intensive supervision sanctions provide levels of supervision above sanctions in subparagraph (2) but are less restrictive than sanctions under paragraph  c  [quasi-incarceration sanctions] and include electronic monitoring, day reporting, day programming, live-out programs for persons on work release or who have violated chapter 321J, and institutional work release under section 904.910. Id. § 901B.1(1)( b ) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding characterizations of the defendant's probation as unsupervised or self-supervised, we think it falls within the level two, sublevel one category of monitored sanctions, which are  administrative supervision sanctions. Id. § 901B.1(1)( b )(1) (emphasis added). See generally id. § 901B.1(3) (requiring DCS to develop [a]n intermediate criminal sanctions program [that] shall consist of only levels two, three, and sublevels one and three of level four of the corrections continuum (emphasis added)). Significantly, the court's order expressly states that the defendant's probation was under the Department of Corrections. Moreover, the DCS did, in fact, provide administrative supervision of the defendant's probation, checking for compliance and notifying the court when compliance was not forthcoming. We conclude, therefore, that the defendant's probation was subject to supervision by a district department within the contemplation of section 905.14(1). C. Authority of district court to order refund. Having rejected the defendant's argument that section 905.14(1) did not require imposition of the probation supervision fee, we next consider whether the court, having imposed the fee, can order that it be refunded upon revocation of the defendant's probation. We observe initially that when the statute is viewed in its entirety, it seems apparent that the legislature intended all defendants put on probation subject to DCS supervision to pay an enrollment fee unless DCS decided to waive collection of the fee. We agree with the State that the district court's interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with this overall statutory scheme. First, we think that ordering a refund is no different than waiving the fee. Whether it is called a refund or a waiver, the result is the same: a defendant placed on probation is relieved of the obligation to pay an enrollment fee. Thus, permitting the sentencing court to order a refund would substantially weaken the mandatory nature of the fee and the prohibition against waiving the fee. More importantly, granting this power to the court is inconsistent with the authority given by the legislature to the department of corrections  not the court  to adopt rules providing for waiving collection of the fee for persons determined to be unable to pay. Id. § 905.14(3). By ordering a refund here, the district court was in effect requiring DCS to waive collection of the previously imposed enrollment fee. But under the statute, that decision rests with DCS. Here, DCS has a policy, as stated in its letter to the district court, not to refund the statutory fee. This policy makes sense given the legislature's directive to the department to adopt rules permitting waiver of collection when the defendant is unable to pay. See id. Clearly, a defendant who has already paid the fee would not fall within this category of defendants. In ordering the refund, the district court appeared to place some importance on the fact the State had requested the court to revoke Pickett's probation, stating to the DCS representative that [y]ou can't ... have your cake and eat it too. Contrary to the implication of the court's comment, we find nothing inconsistent in the State's request for probation revocation and its insistence on collection of the enrollment fee. Regardless of whether a defendant successfully completes probation, DCS is required to exert efforts to supervise, with varying levels of intensity, the defendant's efforts. See generally State v. Oliver, 588 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Iowa 1998) (holding purpose of enrollment fee is `to offset costs of supervision,' not to punish the defendant (quoting Iowa Code section 905.14(1))). Therefore, there is no absurdity in interpreting the statute to prohibit a refund of the fee to unsuccessful defendants. Consequently, DCS's position rests on a proper interpretation of the law.