Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Failure to instruct on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence

Text: Defendant contends the trial court failed to instruct on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.01, an omission that prejudiced him in relation to the Benintende count. [30] The trial court did give CALJIC No. 2.02 on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence of specific intent or mental state. An instruction on the principles contained in CALJIC No. 2.01 must be given sua sponte when the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to prove guilt. ( People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 174 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881]; People v. Yrigoyen (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1].) ( People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 577, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418.) The instruction should not be given `when the problem of inferring guilt from a pattern of incriminating circumstances is not present.' ( People v. Wiley, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 174, 133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881.) Here, the prosecution's case regarding the identity of Benintende's killer rested principally on two items of circumstantial evidence  defendant's possession of the murder weapon and his admitted killing of Clark (like Benintende, a prostitute) a year later. There was no direct evidence linking defendant to Benintende; no witnesses saw defendant with her and defendant did not confess to killing her. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.01. The giving of CALJIC No. 2.02 did not cure the error, for that instruction by its terms applied only to circumstantial evidence of specific intent or mental state. [31] The jury first had to determine the identity of Benintende's killer, and CALJIC No. 2.02 did not speak to that issue. The error, however, was harmless. Because CALJIC No. 2.02 was given, the failure to give CALJIC No. 2.01 could have affected only the issue of identity. On that issue, the evidence supporting the jury's determination that defendant killed Benintende, while circumstantial, was strong. Both women were killed with the same gun. Defendant had obtained that weapon in 1982, and there was no evidence any other person had access to it. Further, defendant's admission to the Clark killing provided strong circumstantial evidence he also killed Benintende. Both women were prostitutes who frequented Union Avenue; defendant admitted to an affinity for prostitutes. Both women were shot multiple times, and their bodies were recovered from the same canal (although several miles apart). The similarities between the two crimes pointed strongly toward defendant as Benintende's killer. Indeed, the circumstantial evidence was not susceptible of [a] reasonable interpretation[] ... which points to the defendant's ... innocence. (CALJIC No. 2.01.) Moreover, the direct evidence pointing toward innocence was weak. Defendant presented no evidence related to the Benintende killing. The prosecution presented evidence that in his confession defendant first denied, then said he could not remember, killing Benintende. On the stand, defendant testified I have no memory of the Benintende homicide. Defendant's testimony that he could not remember was not inconsistent with the evidence of guilt. The only direct evidence that defendant did not kill Benintende was his denial in his confession. Defendant did not repeat that denial in his testimony before the jury. Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable probability ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243) that had the jury been given the circumstantial evidence instruction, it would have found defendant did not kill Benintende. Defendant contends the error violated several of his federal constitutional rights. Insofar as the federal Constitution itself does not require courts to instruct on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence where, as here, the jury properly was instructed on reasonable doubt ( Holland v. United States (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150; see also Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 7-17, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 [approving California's pattern instruction on reasonable doubt]), defendant's claim necessarily rests on the asserted arbitrary denial of a state-created liberty interest. (See Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175.) We doubt the common law right to a circumstantial evidence instruction rises to the level of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. (Cf. People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 170-172, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 [right under state law to lesser-included-offense instruction does not create liberty interest under Hicks ].) In any event, any federal constitutional error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the reasons expressed above.