Opinion ID: 1873573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: nature of alimony

Text: In Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 21 S.Ct. 735, 45 L.Ed. 1009, the Supreme Court held: Alimony does not arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of marriage. It is not founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support the wife. The general obligation to support is made specific by the decree of the court of appropriate jurisdiction.    In Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N.W. 379, 5 L.R.A.,N.S., 767, 14 Ann.Cas. 883, the court, in holding that the state is a party in interest in dealing with the husband's duty to his family, held:    While our law defines marriage as a civil contract   , it differs from all other contracts in its far-reaching consequences to the body politic itself, and for that reason, in dealing with it or the status resulting therefrom, the state never stands indifferent, but is always a party whose interest must be taken into account.    In State ex rel. Cook v. Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566, 64 N.E. 567, 58 L.R.A. 625, it was stated: [Alimony] arises from a duty which the husband owes as well to the public as to the wife, but it is not upon any specific contract.    In Schooley v. Schooley, 184 Iowa 835, 169 N.W. 56, 11 A.L.R. 110, it was held: The decree is an admeasurement by which the court makes specific a general duty to support created by the marital relation and by public policy. The basis of a decree awarding alimony or support money, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, is an obligation imposed by law requiring the husband to do what in equity and good conscience he ought to do under the circumstances. Unlike judgments and decrees for money or property growing out of other actions, alimony and support money may have no foundation other than the public policy which requires the husband to pay what he ought to pay, and the wife's right to receive is not to be treated as waived except when the circumstances clearly require such conclusion. In the absence of other intervening or controlling equities, when the husband is not injured or prejudiced in any way by the wife receiving the money, there is no waiver or estoppel in merely the payment or receipt of the alimony pursuant to order of court. The district court in dismissing the appeal stated that its dismissal of the appeal rested on the wife having accepted a lump sum award of alimony. The award of $100.00 per month for six months in our jurisprudence would be classified as alimony, but it was not a lump sum award. It was six different sums; it was not a substantial award; it was go-way money like severance pay to aid in the reorientation of the recipient. The support money was for the children's support and not the wife's benefit; the wife was only the conduit. In Carter v. Carter, supra, the trial court's final decree confirmed a personal and property agreement entered into between the parties in event of a divorce. The husband fully performed, and the wife accepted all benefits, then she sought to take from the husband his benefits, the divorce, by an appeal seeking only a reversal of the decree granting the divorce. The court held she was estopped to maintain the appeal. In Weatherford v. Weatherford, supra, the court recognized that an appeal may be severable and that an estoppel as to one element of the decree appealed would not be visited on the parts of the decree as to which there was no estoppel, since success on appeal would not require the vacating of the decree as a whole. From time to time courts have seemed to place undue emphasis on the fact that appellant-wife failed to make application to the lower court for alimony or support money pending appeal, as permitted by Appellate Rule 3.8(b), 31 F.S.A. The purpose of this rule is to permit the lower court to shoulder what would otherwise likely be the exclusive burden of the appellate court; the rule is remedial in purpose and does not limit the rights of the parties. When it is not utilized, its non-use in nowise affects the rights of anyone. Its mere non-use cannot be used as a weapon. We find that the wife was not estopped to prosecute her appeal; certiorari is granted and The decision of the District Court is quashed. THOMAS, DREW and O'CONNELL, JJ., concur. THORNAL, C.J., and CALDWELL and ERVIN, JJ., dissent.