Opinion ID: 2994307
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Justification for Disparity

Text: McMutuary and Grier contend that the sentencing disparity of which they complain arose from the district court’s decision to sentence their co- conspirator Brown to a twelve-month period of home detention and probation, while they received sentences within the applicable Guidelines range. McMutuary and Grier claim that Brown’s sentence did not result from a proper application of the Guidelines. As such the disparity between the sentences of the co-defendants is unjustified, and they contend that the sentencing court should have considered this unjustified disparity in determining whether to depart from the applicable Guidelines range. We turn first to an examination of Brown’s sentence.
Brown pleaded guilty to the same charges for which McMutuary and Grier were convicted: conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 371; armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 2113(a) and (d); and use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 924(c). The district court concluded that Brown’s plea of guilty to these charges resulted in a total offense level of twenty-four and a criminal history category of II under the Guidelines. This calculation resulted in a sentencing range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months, with an additional consecutive sixty-month sentence imposed on Brown as a result of the violation of sec. 924(c)./2 As a result of Brown’s cooperation with the government, the government included a paragraph in Brown’s plea agreement providing that at the time of Brown’s sentencing, the government would move the court pursuant to U.S.S.G. sec. 5K1.1 to depart from the applicable Guidelines range and the statutory minimum sentence, and to impose a sentence of imprisonment . . . of 66% of the low end of the combined sentencing range that results from the aggregation of the five-year mandatory minimum prison term for carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence with the low end of the applicable guideline range for the remaining offenses. Prior to sentencing, Brown also moved for a downward departure based on extraordinary family circumstances, and at his sentencing, he presented testimony of family members in support of his claim that he was needed at home to care for his parents and his eleven year-old niece. The government opposed this motion, but at sentencing moved pursuant to the plea agreement for departure under U.S.S.G. sec. 5K1.1. After considering both the government’s and Brown’s motions, the district court departed downward to an offense level of ten and sentenced Brown to a period of twelve months of home detention and probation. In imposing that sentence, the court cited both Brown’s cooperation and his family circumstances, but failed to assign either ground to any particular aspect of its departure. In sentencing Brown, the district court departed below both the applicable Guidelines range and the statutory minimum mandatory five-year sentence required by the count charging Brown with violating sec. 924(c). While a court may impose a sentence below a defendant’s Guidelines range based on a substantial assistance motion, imposition of a sentence below a statutory minimum (such as the one required by sec. 924(c)) requires a motion by the government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 3553(e)./3 In this case, sec. 3553(e) provides for only one basis for departure below a statutory minimum mandatory--upon motion by the government for substantial assistance provided by the defendant. See United States v. DeMaio, 28 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1994) ([T]he district court may only depart below a statutory mandatory minimum sentence to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance to the authorities.); United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 732, 736-37 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that departures from minimum mandatory sentences allowed only for assistance to the government). Absent a sec. 3553(e) motion by the government, the sentencing court may not depart below the statutory minimum mandatory except in limited circumstances not relevant to this case.
McMutuary and Grier contend that the district court’s decision to depart below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence resulted from an improper reliance on Brown’s family circumstances. They assert that the government did not move pursuant to sec. 3553(e) for a departure below the statutory mandatory minimum required by the sec. 924(c) count, and, therefore, the district court must have necessarily relied on Brown’s family circumstances. Although the government submits that it moved pursuant to sec. 3553(e) for a departure below the mandatory minimum, the government concedes that it seems impossible to say that the district court did not incorrectly base its decision to depart below the five-year minimum, at least in part, on Brown’s family circumstances. The defendants believe the erroneous nature of Brown’s sentence resulted in a sentencing disparity that cannot be justified by a proper application of the Guidelines. Therefore, they argue that the district court should have considered this disparity when examining their motions for a downward departure. The government’s contention that it moved pursuant to sec. 3553(e) for a downward departure below the statutory mandatory minimum with respect to Brown’s sentence is, at the very least, disingenuous. While an explicit reference to sec. 3553(e) is not necessarily required before a sentencing court may depart below a statutory minimum, the Government must in some way indicate its desire or consent that the court depart below the statutory minimum before the court may do so. Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 n.5 (1996). The government bases its argument that it communicated its consent to a departure below the statutory mandatory minimum on certain language in the plea agreement. A paragraph in the plea agreement specified that at the time of Brown’s sentencing the government would request that the district court depart downward pursuant to U.S.S.G. sec. 5K1.1 from the applicable sentencing guidelines range and the statutory minimum sentence. However, when the language of the plea agreement is juxtaposed with other language in the plea agreement and the government’s oral motion for departure made at the time of Brown’s sentencing, it is clear that the government did not desire or consent to a departure below the statutory mandatory minimum. The terms of the plea agreement stated that the government would request that the district court reduce by one- third the combined sentencing range that resulted from the aggregation of the five year mandatory prison term for the sec. 924(c) violation with the applicable Guidelines range for the remaining offenses. The request for a one-third departure was reiterated at Brown’s sentencing hearing. However, no mention was made of a departure below the statutory mandatory minimum. At best, Brown could have received a sentence of seventy-eight months pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. We recognize that the district court would not have been bound by the government’s request for a one-third reduction. Nevertheless, our examination of the agreement and the government’s motion at Brown’s sentencing hearing belies any suggestion that the government desired or consented to a departure below the statutory mandatory minimum. It necessarily follows that the district court was without power to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum to reflect a defendant’s cooperation when the Government has not authorized such a sentence, but has instead moved for a departure only from the applicable Guidelines range. Melendez, 518 U.S. at 126. The fact that the government passed up the opportunity to appeal the error in Brown’s sentence has no impact on this conclusion. It is clear then that the district court erred in departing below the statutory mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment when it imposed a sentence of probation and home confinement upon Brown. Because Brown would not have received this sentence in the absence of the district court’s error, the error contributed, at least in part, to the disparity in the sentences imposed. This disparity is not the result of a proper application of the Guidelines to the particular circumstances of [this] case. Meza, 127 F.3d at 550./4 Rather, it is the result of the district court’s error in departing below the statutory mandatory minimum when sentencing Brown. For this reason, the disparity in the present case can only be described as unjustified disparity between the sentences of co- conspirators. McMutuary and Grier rely on this error to contend that the sentencing court should have considered the disparity between their sentences and Brown’s sentence in determining their sentences.