Opinion ID: 2815842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preserved Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: [¶33] We review the preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct for harmless error. See M.R. Crim. P. 52(a) (providing that any error “which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded”). Pursuant to this standard of review, “[w]hen an objection has been made to a prosecutor’s statements at trial, we review to determine whether there was actual misconduct, and, if so, whether the trial court’s response remedied any prejudice resulting from the misconduct.” State v. Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 32, 58 A.3d 1032 (citations omitted). We will “generally defer to the determination of a presiding Justice, who has the immediate feel of what is transpiring, that a curative instruction will adequately protect against the jury’s giving consideration to matters which have been heard but have been stricken as evidence.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “Any concern created by improper statements made by a prosecutor is likely to be cured by a prompt and appropriate curative instruction, especially when such an instruction is specifically addressed to the prosecutor’s misconduct.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶34] The prosecutor made several arguments in closing that either suggested to the jury it should protect the community through its verdict or pandered to sympathy, bias, or prejudice. See United States v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 43, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[A] prosecutor may not ask jurors to find a defendant guilty as a means of promoting community values, maintaining order, or 18 discouraging future crime.”); Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 42, 58 A.3d 1032. Nonetheless, after Fahnley objected to the prosecutor’s argument, the court provided a thorough curative instruction informing the jury that it was the jury’s responsibility to find the facts in the particular case, that the jury was not responsible for protecting the community, and that it could not allow emotions or feelings of prejudice or sympathy to affect the verdict. Thus, “[a]ny concern created by improper statements made by [the] prosecutor” was cured by the court’s “prompt and appropriate curative instruction,” which was “specifically addressed to the prosecutor’s misconduct.” Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 32, 58 A.3d 1032 (quotation marks omitted). To the extent that Fahnley argues that the prosecutor’s reference to anal sex was designed to evoke juror sympathy, that comment was made only after Fahnley himself introduced evidence and argument on that subject, and the curative instruction regarding juror sympathy directly responded to any resulting concern. 2. Unpreserved Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct [¶35] “[W]hen a defendant has not objected to statements made by the prosecutor at trial, and subsequently asserts on appeal that those statements constituted prosecutorial misconduct that deprived her of a fair trial, we review for obvious error.” Id. ¶ 35 (citing M.R. Crim. P. 52(b)). If a defendant demonstrates on appeal that there was prosecutorial misconduct that went unaddressed by the 19 court, we will consider whether the error is plain—that is, whether the error is so clear under existing law that the court and the prosecutor were required to address the matter even in the absence of a timely objection. See id. ¶ 36. If there is error that is plain, we will then “consider whether the defendant has demonstrated a reasonable probability that the error affected her substantial rights,” meaning that “the error was sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. ¶ 37 (quotation marks omitted). “When a prosecutor’s statement is not sufficient to draw an objection, particularly when viewed in the overall context of the trial, that statement will rarely be found to have created a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. ¶ 38. [¶36] Here, the prosecutor argued, “[The victim] is the only one who holds the evidence to this case, other than John Fahnley, they’re the only two people who were in the house in Madrid, Maine, in August, 2008, when these events occurred.” He then argued that believing the victim is “all that it takes to convict John Fahnley of these charges.” [¶37] Fahnley did not object to the prosecutor’s arguments, but he now contends that they violated the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides, “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits comment by a 20 prosecutor on a defendant’s decision not to testify. See State v. Libby, 410 A.2d 562, 563 (Me. 1980). [¶38] Although the prosecutor did not comment directly on the absence of testimony from Fahnley, he did indirectly alert the jury to the absence of that testimony by arguing that, of the two people in the house at the time of the alleged crime—Fahnley and the victim—only the victim provided testimony. Even if this argument suggested that the absence of Fahnley’s testimony was probative of his guilt, however, we cannot conclude that the error was plain because any defect was not so clear under existing law that the court and the prosecutor were required to address the matter even in the absence of a timely objection. See Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 36, 58 A.3d 1032. [¶39] Given the nuances of trial strategy and Fahnley’s overarching argument that the victim—the only person who testified about the events—was unreliable, the trial court was not bound to act sua sponte to address a prosecutorial comment indicating the absence of other witnesses from Fahnley’s house during the relevant time. Especially when the court delivered an instruction before the closing arguments that the jury was not to consider the defendant’s choice not to testify as evidence of guilt, see State v. Lewis, 1998 ME 83, ¶ 7, 711 A.2d 119, we do not discern obvious error. 21 [¶40] The prosecutor also argued in closing, “[The victim’s] testimony was very strong. And I suggest that when you recall how he testified here on the stand you will agree that his testimony was very strong.” A prosecutor may not use “the authority or prestige of the prosecutor’s office to shore up the credibility of a witness, sometimes called ‘vouching.’” Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 42, 58 A.3d 1032. Although the prosecutor’s statements may constitute vouching, the error is not plain because the error is not so clear under existing law that the court and prosecutor were required to address the matter even in the absence of a timely objection. See id. ¶ 36. Moreover, given the court’s instructions regarding the jury’s role in determining the facts, any error did not affect Fahnley’s substantial rights. See id. ¶ 35. 3. Cumulative Effect of Prosecutorial Statements [¶41] Finally, the record does not demonstrate that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s closing arguments resulted in an unfair trial depriving Fahnley of due process. See Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 74, 58 A.3d 1032. The court provided thorough initial instructions to the jury and offered additional instructions in response to Fahnley’s objections to the prosecutor’s closing arguments. On this record, we do not conclude that Fahnley was deprived of a fair trial. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 22 On the briefs and at oral argument: Timothy E. Zerillo, Esq., Zerillo Law, LLC, Portland, for appellant John A. Fahnley Joshua W. Robbins, Asst. Dist. Atty., Farmington, for appellee State of Maine Franklin County Superior Court docket number CR-2012-228 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY