Opinion ID: 2548249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Costs associated with hearings triggered by compulsory suspensions and mandatory expulsion recommendations

Text: We address first the issue that we asked the parties to brief: Does Education Code section 48915, former subdivision (b) (current subds. (c) & (d)), which mandated suspension and an expulsion recommendation for those students who possess a firearm at school or at a school activity off school grounds, and which also required a school board, if it found the charge proved, either to expel or to refer such a student to an alternative educational program housed at a separate school site, constitute a new program or higher level of service under article XIII B, section 6 of the state Constitution, and under Government Code section 17514? We addressed the meaning of the Constitution's phrase new program or higher level of service in County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202 ( County of Los Angeles ). That case concerned whether local governments are entitled to reimbursement for costs incurred in complying with legislation that required local agencies to provide the same increased level of workers' compensation benefits for their employees as private individuals or organizations were required to provide for their employees. We stated: Looking at the language of [article XIII B, section 6] then, it seems clear that by itself the term `higher level of service' is meaningless. It must be read in conjunction with the predecessor phrase `new program' to give it meaning. Thus read, it is apparent that the subvention requirement for increased or higher level of service is directed to state mandated increases in the services provided by local agencies in existing `programs.' But the term `program' itself is not defined in article XIII B. What programs then did the electorate have in mind when section 6 was adopted? We conclude that the drafters and the electorate had in mind the commonly understood meanings of the term  [(1)] programs that carry out the governmental function of providing services to the public, or [(2)] laws which, to implement a state policy, impose unique requirements on local governments and do not apply generally to all residents and entities in the state. ( County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56, 233 Cal. Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202.) We continued in County of Los Angeles: The concern which prompted the inclusion of section 6 in article XIII B was the perceived attempt by the state to enact legislation or adopt administrative orders creating programs to be administered by local agencies, thereby transferring to those agencies the fiscal responsibility for providing services which the state believed should be extended to the public. In their ballot arguments, the proponents of article XIII B explained section 6 to the voters: `Additionally, this measure: (1) Will not allow the state government to force programs on local governments without the state paying for them.' (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amend. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Spec. Statewide Elec. (Nov. 6, 1979) p. 18. Italics added.) In this context the phrase `to force programs on local governments' confirms that the intent underlying section 6 was to require reimbursement to local agencies for the costs involved in carrying out functions peculiar to government, not for expenses incurred by local agencies as an incidental impact of laws that apply generally to all state residents and entities.  ( County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56-57, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202, italics added.) It was clear in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202, that the law at issue did not meet the second test for a program or higher level of service  it did not implement a state policy by imposing unique requirements upon local governments, but instead applied workers' compensation contribution rules generally to all employers in the state. Nor, we held, did the law requiring local agencies to shoulder a general increase in workers' compensation benefits amount to a reimbursable program or higher level of service under the first test described above. ( Id., at pp. 57-58, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202.) The law increased the cost of employing public servants, but it did not in any tangible manner increase the level of service provided by those employees to the public. We reaffirmed and applied the test set out in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202, in Lucia Mar Unified School District v. Honig (1988) 44 Cal.3d 830, 244 Cal.Rptr. 677, 750 P.2d 318 ( Lucia Mar ). The state law at issue in Lucia Mar required local school districts to pay a portion of the cost of educating pupils in state schools for the severely handicapped  costs that the state previously had paid in full. We determined that the contributions called for under the law were used to fund a program within both definitions of that term set forth in County of Los Angeles. ( Lucia Mar, supra, 44 Cal.3d 830, 835, 244 Cal.Rptr. 677, 750 P.2d 318.) We stated: [T]he education of handicapped children is clearly a governmental function providing a service to the public, and the [state law] imposes requirements on school districts not imposed on all the states residents. Nor can there be any doubt that although the schools for the handicapped have been operated by the state for many years, the program was new insofar as plaintiffs are concerned, since at the time [the state law] became effective they were not required to contribute to the education of students from their districts at such schools. [] ... To hold, under the circumstances of this case, that a shift in funding of an existing program from the state to a local entity is not a new program as to the local agency would, we think, violate the intent underlying section 6 of article XIII B.... Section 6 was intended to preclude the state from shifting to local agencies the financial responsibility for providing public services in view of ... restrictions on the taxing and spending power of the local entities. ( Lucia Mar, supra, 44 Cal.3d 830, 835-836, 244 Cal. Rptr. 677, 750 P.2d 318; see also County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 98, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 134, 931 P.2d 312 [legislation excluding indigents from Medi-Cal coverage transferred obligation for such costs from state to counties, and constituted a reimbursable new program or higher level of service].) We again applied the alternative tests set forth in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202, in City of Sacramento v. State of California (1990) 50 Cal.3d 51, 266 Cal. Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522 ( City of Sacramento ). In that case we considered whether a state law implementing federal incentives that encouraged states to extend unemployment insurance coverage to all public employees constituted a program or higher level of service under article XIII B, section 6. We concluded that it did not because, as in County of Los Angeles, (1) providing unemployment compensation protection to a city's own employees was not a service to the public; and (2) the statute did not apply uniquely to local governments  indeed, the same requirements previously had been applied to most employers, and extension of the requirement (by eliminating a prior exemption for local governments) merely placed local government employers on the same footing as most private employers. ( City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 67-68, 266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522.) Subsequently, the Court of Appeal in City of Richmond v. Commission on State Mandates (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1190, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 ( City of Richmond ), following County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202, and City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, 266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522, concluded that requiring local governments to provide death benefits to local safety officers, under both the Public Employees Retirement System and the workers' compensation system, did not constitute a higher level of service to the public. The Court of Appeal arrived at that determination even though  as might also have been argued in County of Los Angeles and City of Sacramento  such benefits may generate a higher quality of local safety officers and thereby, in a general and indirect sense, provide the public with a higher level of service by its employees. ( City of Richmond, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1195, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 754.) Viewed together, these cases ( County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 233 Cal. Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202, City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, 266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522, and City of Richmond, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1190, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 754) illustrate the circumstance that simply because a state law or order may increase the costs borne by local government in providing services, this does not necessarily establish that the law or order constitutes an increased or higher level of the resulting service to the public under article XIII B, section 6, and Government Code section 17514. [12] By contrast, Courts of Appeal have found a reimbursable higher level of service concerning an existing program when a state law or executive order mandates not merely some change that increases the cost of providing services, but an increase in the actual level or quality of governmental services provided. In Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 537-538, 234 Cal.Rptr. 795 ( Carmel Valley ), for example, an executive order required that county firefighters be provided with protective clothing and safety equipment. Because this increased safety equipment apparently was designed to result in more effective fire protection, the mandate evidently was intended to produce a higher level of service to the public, thereby satisfying the first alternative test set out in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202. Similarly, in Long Beach Unified School District v. State of California (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 173, 275 Cal.Rptr. 449 ( Long Beach ), an executive order required school districts to take specific steps to measure and address racial segregation in local public schools. The appellate court held that this constituted a higher level of service to the extent the order's requirements exceeded federal constitutional and case law requirements by mandating school districts to undertake defined remedial actions and measures that were merely advisory under prior governing law. The District and the Commission assert that the mandatory aspect of Education Code section 48915, insofar as it compels suspension and mandates an expulsion recommendation for firearm possession (and thereafter restricts the board's options to expulsion or referral to an off-site alternative school), carries out a governmental function of providing services to the public and hence constitutes an increased or higher level of service concerning an existing program under the first alternative test of County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56, 233 Cal. Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202. They argue, in essence, that the present matter is more analogous to the latter cases ( Carmel Valley, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 521, 234 Cal. Rptr. 795, and Long Beach, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 155, 275 Cal.Rptr. 449)both of which involved measures designed to increase the level of governmental service provided to the public  than to the former cases ( County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202, City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, 266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522, and City of Richmond, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 1190, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 754)  in which the cost of employment was increased but the resulting governmental services themselves were not directly enhanced or increased. As we shall explain, we agree with the District and the Commission. The statutory requirements here at issue  immediate suspension and mandatory recommendation of expulsion for students who possess a firearm, and the limitation upon the ensuing options of the school board (expulsion or referral)  reasonably are viewed as providing a higher level of service to the public under the commonly understood sense of that term: (i) the requirements are new in comparison with the preexisting scheme in view of the circumstance that they did not exist prior to the enactment of Statutes of 1993, chapters 1255 (Assem. Bill No. 342 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 342)) and 1256 (Senate Bill No. 1198 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1198)); and (ii) the requirements were intended to provide an enhanced service to the public  safer schools for the vast majority of students (that is, those who are not expelled or referred to other school sites). In other words, the legislation was premised upon the idea that by removing potentially violent students from the general school population, the safety of those students who remain thereby is increased. (See, e.g., Stats. 1993, ch. 1255, § 4, pp. 7285-7286 [In order to ensure public safety on school campuses ... it is necessary that this act take effect immediately]; Sen. Com. on Ed. (Apr. 28, 1993), Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 342, p. 2 [noting legislative purpose to enhance public safety]; see also Assem. Com. on Ed. (July 14, 1993), Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1198, p. 1 [noting legislative purpose to remove those who possess firearms from the general school population by increasing the frequency of expulsion for such conduct].) In challenging this conclusion, the Department relies upon County of Los Angeles v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1538, 263 Cal.Rptr. 351 ( Department of Industrial Relations ). In that case, the state enacted enhanced statewide safety regulations that governed all public and private elevators, and thereafter the County of Los Angeles sought reimbursement for the costs of complying with the new regulations. The Court of Appeal found that the regulations constituted neither a new program nor a higher level of service concerning an existing program under either of the two alternative tests set out in County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d 46, 56, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202. The court concluded that the elevator regulations did not meet the first alternative test, because the regulations did not carry out a governmental function of providing services to the public; the court found instead that [p]roviding elevators equipped with fire and earthquake safety features simply is not a `government function of providing services to the public.' ( Department of Industrial Relations, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1546, 263 Cal.Rptr. 351.) Moreover, the court found, the second (uniqueness) test was not met  the regulation applied to all elevators, not only those owned or operated by local governments. The Department asserts that Department of Industrial Relations, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 1538, 263 Cal.Rptr. 351, is analogous, and argues that the service afforded by mandatory suspensions followed by a required expulsion recommendation, etc., is not qualitatively different from the safety regulations at issue in [ Department of Industrial Relations ]. School districts carrying out such expulsions are not providing a service to the public.... We disagree. Providing public schooling clearly constitutes a governmental function, and enhancing the safety of those who attend such schools constitutes a service to the public. Moreover, here, unlike the situation in Department of Industrial Relations, the law implementing this state policy applies uniquely to local public schools. We conclude that Department of Industrial Relations does not conflict with the conclusion that the mandatory suspension and expulsion recommendation requirements, together with restrictions placed upon a district's resolution of such a case, constitute an increased or higher level of service to the public under the constitutional provision and the implementing statutes. Of course, even if, as we have concluded above, a statute effectuates an increased or higher level of governmental service to the public concerning an existing program, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the program is a state mandate under California Constitution, article XIII B, section 6. ( County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 805, 818, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304, italics added ( County of Los Angeles II ).) We turn to the question whether the hearing costs at issue, flowing from compulsory suspensions and mandatory expulsion recommendations, are mandated by the state.
As noted above, a compulsory suspension and a mandatory recommendation of expulsion under Education Code section 48915 in turn trigger a mandatory expulsion hearing. All parties agree that any such resulting expulsion hearing must comply with basic federal due process requirements, such as notice of charges, a right to representation by counsel, an explanation of the evidence supporting the charges, and an opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses and to present evidence. (See ante, fn. 5.) But as also noted above, article XIII B, section 6, and the implementing statutes (Gov. Code, § 17500 et seq.), by their terms, provide for reimbursement only of state -mandated costs, not federally mandated costs. The Commission and the Department assert that this circumstance raises the question: Do all or some of a district's costs in complying with the mandatory expulsion provision of Education Code section 48915 constitute a nonreimbursable federal mandate? In the absence of the operation of Education Code section 48915's mandatory provision (specifically, compulsory immediate suspension and a mandatory expulsion recommendation), a school district would not automatically incur the due process hearing costs that are mandated by federal law pursuant to Goss, supra, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725, and related cases, and codified in Education Code section 48918. Instead, a district would incur such hearing costs only if a school principal first were to exercise discretion to recommend expulsion. Accordingly, in its mandatory aspect, Education Code section 48915 appears to constitute a state mandate, in that it establishes conditions under which the state, rather than local officials, has made the decision requiring a school district to incur the costs of an expulsion hearing. The Department and the Commission agree to a point, but argue that a district's costs incurred in complying with this state mandate are reimbursable only if, and to the extent that, hearing procedures set forth in Education Code section 48918 exceed the requirements of federal due process. In support, they rely upon Government Code section 17556, which  in setting forth circumstances in which the Commission shall not find costs to be mandated by the state  provides that [t]he commission shall not find costs mandated by the state, as defined in Section 17514, in any claim submitted by a local agency or school district, if, after a hearing, the commission finds that: ... (c) The statute or executive order implemented a federal law or regulation and resulted in costs mandated by the federal government, unless the statute or executive order mandates costs which exceed the mandate in that federal law or regulation. [13] We agree with the District and the Court of Appeal below that, as applied to the present case, it cannot be said that Education Code section 48915's mandatory expulsion provision  implemented a federal law or regulation.  (Italics added.) Education Code section 48915, at the time relevant here, did not implement any federal law; as explained below, federal law did not then mandate an expulsion recommendation  or expulsion  for firearm possession. [14] Moreover, although the Department argues that in this context Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c)'s phrase the statute should be viewed as referring not to Education Code section 48915's mandatory expulsion recommendation requirement, but instead to the mandatory due process hearing under Education Code section 48918 that is triggered by such an expulsion recommendation, it still cannot be said that section 48918 itself required the District to incur any costs. As noted above, Education Code section 48918 sets out requirements for expulsion hearings that must be held when a district seeks to expel a student  but neither section 48918 nor federal law requires that any such expulsion recommendation be made in the first place, and hence section 48918 does not implement any federal mandate that school districts hold such hearings and incur such costs whenever a student is found in possession of a firearm. Accordingly, we conclude that the so-called exception to reimbursement described in Government Code section 17556, subdivision (c), is inapplicable in this context. Because it is state law (Education Code section 48915's mandatory expulsion provision), and not federal due process law, that requires the District to take steps that in turn require it to incur hearing costs, it follows, contrary to the view of the Commission and the Department, that we cannot characterize any of the hearing costs incurred by the District, triggered by the mandatory provision of Education Code section 48915, as constituting a federal mandate (and hence being nonreimbursable). We conclude that under the statutes existing at the time of the test claim in this case (state legislation in effect through mid-1994), all such hearing costs  those designed to satisfy the minimum requirements of federal due process, and those that may exceed those requirements  are, with respect to the mandatory expulsion provision of section 48915, state mandated costs, fully reimbursable by the state. [15] Against this conclusion, the Department, in its supplemental briefing, offers a wholly new theory, not advanced in any of the proceedings below, in support of its belated claim that all hearing costs triggered by Education Code section 48915's mandatory expulsion provision are in fact non-reimbursable federal mandates, and not, as we have concluded above, reimbursable state mandates. As we shall explain, we reject the Department's contention, as applied to the test case here at issue (involving state statutes in effect through mid-1994). The Department cites 20 United States Code section 7151, part of the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, which provides, as relevant here: Each State receiving Federal funds under any subchapter of this chapter shall have in effect a State law requiring local educational agencies to expel from school for a period of not less than 1 year a student who is determined to have brought a firearm to a school, or to have possessed a firearm at a school, under the jurisdiction of local educational agencies in that State, except that such State law shall allow the chief administering officer of a local educational agency to modify such expulsion requirement for a student on a case-by-case basis if such modification is in writing. [16] The Department further asserts that more than $2.8 billion in federal funds under the No Child Left Behind Act are included for local use in the 2003-04 state budget. (Cal. State Budget, 2003-04, Budget Highlights, p. 4.) The Department argues that in light of the requirements set forth in 20 United States Code section 7151, and the amount of federal program funds at issue under the No Child Left Behind Act, the financial consequences to the state and to the school districts of failing to comply with 20 United States Code section 7151 are such that as a practical matter, Education Code section 48915's mandatory expulsion provision in reality constitutes an implementation of federal law, and hence resulting costs are nonreimbursable except to the extent they exceed the requirements of federal law. (See Govt.Code, § 17556, subd. (c); see also Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, 749-751, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203; City of Sacramento, supra, 50 Cal.3d 51, 70-76, 266 Cal.Rptr. 139, 785 P.2d 522.) Moreover, the Department asserts, to the extent school districts are compelled by federal law, through Education Code section 48915's mandatory expulsion provision, to hold hearings pursuant to section 48918 in cases of firearm possession on school grounds, under 20 United States Code section 7164 (defining prohibited uses of program funds), all costs of such hearings properly may be paid out of federal program funds, and hence we should view the ... provision of program funding as satisfying, in advance, any reimbursement requirement. ( Kern High School Dist., supra, 30 Cal.4th 727, 747, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 237, 68 P.3d 1203.) Although the Department asserts that this federal law and program existed at the time relevant in this matter (that is, through mid-1994), our review of the statutes and relevant history suggests otherwise. Title 20 of the United States Code, section 7151, and the remainder of the No Child Left Behind Act, became effective on January 8, 2002. The predecessor legislation cited by the Department  the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 (former 20 U.S.C. § 8921(a)), although containing a substantially identical mandatory expulsion provision ( id., § 8921(b)(1)) [17]  was not effective until July 1, 1995 (108 Stat. 3518, § 3). In turn, the predecessor legislation to that Act cited by the Department, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (former 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.)  as it existed at the time relevant here (July 1, 1993, through June 30, 1994)  contained no such mandatory expulsion provision. Accordingly, it appears that despite the Department's late discovery of 20 United States Code section 7151, at the time relevant here (regarding legislation in effect through mid-1994), neither 20 United States Code section 7151, nor either of its predecessors, compelled states to enact a law such as Education Code section 48915's mandatory expulsion provision. Therefore, we reject the Department's assertion that, during the time period at issue in this case, Education Code section 48915's mandatory expulsion provision constituted an implementation of a federal, rather than a state, mandate. Although we conclude that all hearing costs triggered by Education Code section 48915's mandatory expulsion provision constitute reimbursable state-mandated expenses under the statutes as they existed during the period covered by the District's present test claim, we do not foreclose the possibility that 20 United States Code section 7151 or its predecessor, 20 United States Code section 8921, may lead to a different conclusion when applied to versions of Education Code section 48915 effective in years 1995 and thereafter. Indeed, we note that at least one subsequent test claim that has been filed with the Commission may raise the federal statutory issue advanced by the Department. [18]