Opinion ID: 2013848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: February 28, 1994, to February 2, 1995

Text: When the United States Supreme Court denied the State's petition for certiorari on February 28, 1994, the appeal process was completed. The appellate court's mandate should have been reissued within a reasonable time. However, for no apparent reason, the mandate was not reissued until February 5, 199511 months later. The State claims the reason for this 11-month delay was administrative error. Defendant does not dispute this explanation or contend that the delay was intentional. There can be no doubt that the failure of the clerk's office to fulfill its duty to forward the mandate in a prompt and expeditious manner constitutes negligence, which is neither reasonable nor an acceptable cause for delay. Furthermore, since the State bears the burden of bringing a defendant to trial, this delay cannot be attributed to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. at 2190, 33 L.Ed.2d at 115. Consequently, as the Court proclaimed in Doggett, [a]lthough negligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense, it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d at 531-32. We do not determine at this juncture, however, what weight should be given this period of unjustified delay. [T]oleration of    negligence varies inversely with its protractedness    and its consequent threat to the fairness of the accused's trial. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. at 2693, 120 L.Ed.2d at 532. This period of delay must be viewed in conjunction with the other Barker factors before a determination can be made about its importance to the speedy-trial analysis. 3. February 2, 1995, to July 31, 1995 The last segment of delay consists of the six months between the time the mandate reissued and when defendant moved for dismissal. During this time both the State and the defendant were preparing for trial. When the appellate court reviewed this period of delay it found, The prosecution admits its responsibility for three months of the remaining six-month delay, but the prosecution provided an acceptable explanation for those three months. The defendant shares responsibility for about three months of the    delay. 307 Ill. App.3d at 819, 241 Ill.Dec. 277, 719 N.E.2d 138. In his brief before this court, defendant accepts responsibility for the delay from March 15, 1995, until May 31, 1995. The defendant does not challenge the appellate court's ruling that the State adequately explained the remaining period of delay. Consequently, we accept the appellate court's finding that this period of delay was justified. Having considered the reasons for the delay, we consider the third Barker factordefendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial. In the present case, defendant did not demand trial until May 199524 months after the reversal of his first conviction. He moved for dismissal of the indictment two months later. Defendant has made no attempt to explain his apparent acquiescence to the State's inaction during the 24 months preceding his demand for trial. Instead, he contends only that his own inaction is not evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his speedy-trial right and that waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record. Defendant's argument is misplaced. Although it is true that courts may not presume a defendant's waiver of a fundamental right from his inaction, this does not mean a defendant will be completely absolved from all responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 525-30, 92 S.Ct. at 2189-92, 33 L.Ed.2d at 114-16. Separate from any consideration of waiver, the Barker Court held that a defendant's conduct in asserting, or failing to assert, his rights was a factor to be weighed in the balancing test and that failure to assert the right [would] make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. Consequently, when assessing defendant's constitutional speedy-trial claim, his assertion of the right may be factored into the balancing test. In the case at bar, defendant was aware of the charges of murder and arson which were pending against him. He had already been tried and found guilty on these charges and, although his convictions had been reversed, a new trial had been ordered. Furthermore, since defendant remained incarcerated following the reversal of his convictions, he had to be aware that the State intended to retry him on those charges. Yet, defendant never demanded trial until 24 months had passed. The appellate court dismissed defendant's inaction, speculating that until the trial court regained jurisdiction, with the issuance of the mandate, defendant may not have recognized any obvious forum in which he could assert his right to a speedy trial. However, defendant's delay may be attributable to other reasons. It is conceivable that defendant's strategy was to forgo his right to a speedy trial in the hope that witnesses necessary to the prosecution would be lost and the State would choose not to retry him. Such was the case in Jackson v. State, 69 Md.App. 645, 519 A.2d 751 (1987). We conclude, then, that defendant's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial should not be viewed as a completely neutral factor. Had defendant asserted his right during the 11 months his case was lost due to administrative error, the oversight would have been discovered and corrected. Defendant's failure to make any demand for trial in 24 months subsequent to the reversal of his convictions may be considered together with the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether a constitutional speedy-trial violation has been shown. The fourth and final consideration is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. Those interests are: the prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, the minimization of defendant's anxiety and concern about the pending charge, and the limitation of the possibility that the defense will be impaired by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118; People v. Moore, 263 Ill.App.3d 1, 200 Ill.Dec. 168, 635 N.E.2d 507 (1994). In this case, defendant has produced no particularized evidence that his defense was impaired by the delay. Defendant, however, remained incarcerated through the 26 month period. The impairment of defendant's liberty is an element of prejudice which cannot be ignored. Detention prior to a proper adjudication is exactly the type of prejudice that the speedy-trial clause was intended to protect against. This prejudice weighs heavily against the State.