Opinion ID: 2143146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: May Have a Court Order Entered

Text: The question before the court turns on the meaning of statutory language providing that, if a petitioner meets certain requirements, he may have a court order entered expunging the record of arrest. I believe that the statute means exactly what it says. The majority disagrees, concluding that the meaning of the above language is not what it says, but rather that, if a defendant meets the statutory requirements, he may seek to have a court order entered expunging the record of arrest. How does one arrive at this conclusion? There are at least three improper ways, each of which involves defining words incorrectly, violating grammatical rules, or both. If there is a valid way, no one has yet made that argument. The three improper ways are: (1) the State's position that both mays in the statute must be given effect, with one referring to the petitioner and one referring to the trial court; (2) the dissent's position in Howard, which was to use the wrong definition of the word may (see Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 509, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472 (Fitzgerald Smith, P.J., dissenting)); and (3) the majority's hybrid of the above two approaches, which is to first state that there is only one may in the statute, but then to conclude that there are actually two mays, each with a different definition (233 Ill.2d at 219-20, 330 Ill.Dec. at 707, 909 N.E.2d at 729). Let us consider each of these positions in turn. We need not dwell on the State's argument because the majority correctly rejects it. The second may in the statute is redundant and is an obvious grammatical mistake. It cannot be read as referring to the trial court because, as Howard correctly stated, [c]ourts `enter' orders; they are the actors; they do not `have' another actor enter an order for them. Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 498, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472. Accordingly, there is only one may in the statute, and it refers not to the circuit court but to the petitioner. 233 Ill.2d at 220, 330 Ill.Dec. at 706, 909 N.E.2d at 728. So far so good. Next, let us consider the dissent in Howard, which was later adopted by the majority in Holland (see Holland, 374 Ill.App.3d at 127, 312 Ill.Dec. 560, 870 N.E.2d 1004 (we must respectfully disagree with the majority in Howard and agree with the dissent by Justice Fitzgerald Smith in that case)). The dissent in Howard concluded that the phrase may have a court order entered grants discretion to the trial court because the definition of may is `possibility, probability or contingency,' while the definition of shall is `a word of command' and is `imperative or mandatory.'  Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 509, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472 (Fitzgerald Smith, P.J., dissenting), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 883, 1233 (5th ed.1979). The Howard dissent then stated that the difference between may and shall is undeniable. Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 509, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472 (Fitzgerald Smith, P.J., dissenting). Accordingly, the Howard dissent concluded that, had the legislature intended to require courts to grant proper petitions under this subsection, it would have used the phrase shall have an order entered, which would clearly indicate the mandate the majority wants to impose here. Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 509, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472 (Fitzgerald Smith, P.J., dissenting). However, because the legislature used the word may, which means possibility, all the legislature was saying was that the defendant may have a court order enteredif he is successful. Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 510, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472 (Fitzgerald Smith, P.J., dissenting). Beginning with an incorrect premise often leads to the wrong conclusion, and I fear that this is what happened with the Howard dissent. Although it is correct that one meaning of may is possibility, another is permission. See Black's Law Dictionary 1000 (8th ed.2004) (defining may as 1. To be permitted to    2. To be a possibility); see also Webster's New World Dictionary 373 (1983) (defining may as an auxiliary expressing 1. possibility [it may rain]; 2. permission [you may go] (emphasis in original)). It is quite clear that in section 5(c) the legislature is using may to mean permission not possibility. If we accept the position of the Howard dissent, section 5(c) is simply a narrative in which the legislature is describing things that might happen, but the legislature really has no opinion on the matter. In other words, all that the legislature is saying is that if a defendant receives a pardon that specifically authorizes expungement, and if he files a verified petition in the circuit court setting this forth, then there is a possibility that he will have a court order entered expunging his record of arrest, but there is also a possibility that he might not. This reading of the statute cannot be correct. Statutes do many things: confer rights, prohibit conduct, etc., but conceiving hypotheticals is not one of them. Clearly, the legislature did not use the term may to mean possibility, but rather permission. Moreover, it is obvious that the legislature does have an opinion on this matter. In other words, the statute clearly means that if a petitioner receives a pardon that specifically authorizes expungement, and if the petitioner establishes this in a verified petition in the circuit court, then he has permission to have a court order entered expunging the record of arrest. This is entirely a matter of statute, and the legislature has given a petitioner express permission to have an expungement order entered if he meets the statutory requirements. This is not a grant of permission to seek to have a court order entered or to request that a court order be entered; it is a grant of permission to have a court order entered. Thus, the majority is flat out wrong when it states that the legislature's use of the term may merely allows the petitioner to act. 233 Ill.2d at 219, 330 Ill.Dec. at 706, 909 N.E.2d at 728. The legislature has not simply given the petitioner permission to act; it has given the petitioner permission to have a court order entered if he meets the statutory requirements. The majority is similarly mistaken when it states that subsection (c) does not require the entry of an order. 233 Ill.2d at 220, 330 Ill.Dec. at 707, 909 N.E.2d at 729. If the legislature grants someone express permission to have an order entered if he meets certain requirements, then the trial court must enter that order if the requirements are met. Another problem with the Howard dissent is its assertion that, had the legislature intended to deny the court discretion to deny proper petitions under the Act, it would have used the phrase shall have an order entered. Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 509, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472 (Fitzgerald Smith, P.J., dissenting). The problem with this position is that, if the statute used that phrase, it would mean that the petitioner was required to have an expungement order entered. Obviously, the legislature did not intend to require any such thing. Rather, it gives a petitioner permission to have a court order entered if he so chooses. The majority reaches its determination that section 5(c) confers discretion on the trial court by combining the above two approaches. After correctly determining that there is only one may in the statute that refers to the petitioner (233 Ill.2d at 219, 330 Ill.Dec. at 706, 909 N.E.2d at 728), the majority inexplicably concludes two paragraphs later that there are actually two mays in the statute, with each one having a different definition. According to the majority, the phrase may have a court order entered means that the defendant may [permission] submit a petition, from which he may [possibility] get a court order. (Emphasis in original.) 233 Ill.2d at 220, 330 Ill.Dec. at 707, 909 N.E.2d at 729. Of course, this cannot be the meaning of may have a court order entered. There is only one may; it refers to the petitioner, and it is used to grant permission. And the permission is not merely to submit a petition; the permission is to have a court order entered if the petitioner meets the statutory requirements. Thus, while I agree with the majority that the surest and most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the statute's language given its plain and ordinary meaning (233 Ill.2d at 218, 330 Ill.Dec. at 705, 909 N.E.2d at 727), I fail to see how taking a critical statutory term, putting it in the wrong place in the statute, and then giving it two distinct meanings at the same time, is being faithful to the plain language of the statute. The State, the Howard dissent, and the majority have all failed to come up with a legitimate way to read section 5(c) as conferring discretion on the trial court to deny a proper petition.