Opinion ID: 4554030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Threat Assessments

Text: The defendants also contend that several withheld threat assessments were exculpatory and that their absence caused prejudice. The government had timely provided one threat assessment, prepared in 2014 in anticipation of the MarchApril 2014 impoundment. That assessment concluded there was a moderate risk of violence from Bundy if the impound operation were undertaken. But the government withheld four additional threat assessments, all prepared in 2011 or 2012, some of which concluded that Bundy posed a lesser risk of violence. The defendants had asked for all threat assessments “in this case.” That phrase was ambiguous, and the government might reasonably have believed that it complied with defendants’ request when it provided the threat assessment prepared for this action. But, at the very least, the prior assessments became relevant when the government told the jury in its opening statement that BLM had weighed whether to impound Bundy’s cattle in 2012 and decided not to proceed “because of concern for the violence” and when a witness testified on November 16, 2017 that there had been earlier threat assessments. The first withheld threat assessment was a March 2011 FBI threat assessment of Bundy, created in anticipation of an impound operation. The assessment concluded that Bundy represented a “low to moderate risk of significant or imminent violence.” The assessment noted, inter alia, how Bundy had no criminal record, was attached to his family, and UNITED STATES V. BUNDY 33 appeared to prefer using non-violent means of channeling his frustration, such as litigation and media appearances. The second assessment was generated a year later by the Southern Nevada Counterterrorism Center. This assessment concluded that “[t]he likelihood of violence from Cliven Bundy is minimal.” It specifically highlighted his age and lack of a criminal history as indicators that he was unlikely to act violently. The third assessment was a Department of the Interior (DOI) assessment of Bundy and members of his family. It also concluded that there was moderate threat of violence. The DOI assessment compiled accounts from individuals who had interacted with Bundy or his family in the past, several of whom said that he was unlikely to act violently. Finally, the DOI conducted another assessment in anticipation of enforcement operations. This assessment concluded that the risk of violence was “moderate.” It recommended that BLM develop a media strategy with “talking points” to keep ahead of negative publicity as a means of mitigating the potential risk of backlash. The district court specifically highlighted how BLM’s failure to implement this recommended public-relations plan favored the defense because the government was not actively correcting disinformation from the Bundys. These withheld threat assessments had significant exculpatory and impeachment value. The 2011 and 2012 threat assessments would have countered the government’s opening statement. Beyond that, the earlier assessments were at least contrary to, though not necessarily inconsistent with, the 2014 assessment. The withheld threat assessments also 34 UNITED STATES V. BUNDY undermined the need for an aggressive, militarized impound operation because they suggest alternative ways of defusing emotions surrounding actions taken against the Bundys. The government asserts that the withholding of the threat assessments was not prejudicial because the March 2014 assessment contained essentially the same information as the withheld assessments. It also points to testimony by government witnesses regarding how Bundy was viewed as a minimal threat. But it is apparent the documents themselves have value that testimony alone does not necessarily carry. The assessments are reasoned, written evaluations of the danger posed by the Bundys. They were more than the bottom-line assessments offered by witness testimony. Further, even if some similar information had been produced earlier, the repeated description of Bundy as a low-to-moderate threat in several assessments is itself important to the defense and could have at least been readily deployed as impeachment evidence to any testimony regarding why a militarized impound was necessary. The withheld threat assessments also contain information that the March 2014 assessment does not include—a notable example being the DOI assessment’s summary of encounters with Bundy. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the defendants suffered prejudice by not receiving these documents.5 5 The district court also concluded that several withheld maps constituted Brady material, were willfully withheld, and created prejudice. But the maps’ withholding does not appear to have had prejudicial impact. The government had previously disclosed several maps showing the same information. The defense also asserts that the government wrongfully withheld an internal whistle-blower memorandum regarding possible bias by BLM UNITED STATES V. BUNDY 35