Opinion ID: 398580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: allowance of costs for expert witness fees

Text: 62 On the last point in issue, appellant contends that the District Court had no authority to tax costs for compensation of plaintiffs' expert witness in excess of the statutory per diem, mileage and subsistence allowances. Appellant's Brief at 7. Because we are in substantial agreement with appellant's position on this point, we reverse and remand for a recalculation by the District Court of the costs to be awarded for the fees paid to appellees' expert on Vietnamese law. 10 63 This court has never squarely considered the question of whether costs incurred for expert witness fees are recoverable if in excess of the amounts set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (Supp. II 1978). In Postow v. OBA Federal Savings & Loan Association, 627 F.2d 1370, 1388 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court noted that it could find no abuse of discretion in a District Court decision disallowing costs for expert witness fees where there were less expensive alternatives that could have been utilized to present the evidence given by the expert. The District Court opinion in Postow had noted that: 64 Generally, costs for expert witnesses are limited to the statutory fee for witnesses rather than the actual fees charged by the witness.... An exception is sometimes made when the proponent of the expert witness has secured the prior approval of the Court. 65 Postow v. Oriental Building Association, 455 F.Supp. 781, 792 (D.D.C.1978). However, this court had no occasion to pass upon the validity of the stated exception because we found that the disputed costs had been properly disallowed. 66 Confronting the question head-on, as we do here, we hold that, except possibly in a case involving exceptional circumstances, 11 allowable witness costs must be limited pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. II 1978). We recognize that at least one circuit has expressly adopted a different rule with respect to costs allowable for fees paid to expert witnesses; 12 however, we find that the prevailing view among the circuits is consistent with the holding that we announce here today. 13 We are persuaded to follow the majority view because it is plainly more faithful to the explicit statutory mandates covering the award of costs for witness fees. 67 The Supreme Court has never had occasion to construe the current versions of 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920; however, the decision of the Court in Henkel v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minn. & Omaha Ry., 284 U.S. 444, 52 S.Ct. 223, 76 L.Ed. 386 (1932), construing the statutory predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1821, gives significant guidance on the question here at issue. 68 In Henkel, the Court rejected a claim for fees for expert witnesses who had testified at trial, holding that: 69 (W)hen the Congress has prescribed the amount to be allowed as costs, its enactment controls.... 70 Specific provision as to the amounts payable and taxable as witness fees was made by the Congress as early as the Act of February 28, 1799.... The statute now applicable is the Act of April 26, 1926 (the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 1821).... Under these provisions, additional amounts paid as compensation, or fees, to expert witnesses cannot be allowed or taxed as costs in cases in the federal courts. 71 Id. 284 U.S. at 446, 52 S.Ct. at 224. 14 The decision in Henkel added the following telling point: 72 The Congress has dealt with the subject comprehensively and has made no exception of the fees of expert witnesses. Its legislation must be deemed controlling and excludes the application in the federal courts of any different state practice. 73 Id. at 447, 52 S.Ct. at 225. 74 Given the decision in Henkel and the explicit provisions in Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d), 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and 28 U.S.C. § 1821, we can find no basis in this case for an award of costs based upon a special fee (over and above the statutory allowance) for an expert witness. The reasons for our holding are succinctly stated in Illinois v. Sangamo Construction Co., 657 F.2d 855, 1981-2 Trade Reg.Rep. (CCH) P 64,204, at 73,741-42 (7th Cir. 1981), as follows: 75 Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants the district court, in the absence of other statutory authority, discretionary authority to award costs to the prevailing party. But not all expenses incurred by a party in connection with a lawsuit constitute recoverable costs. Indeed, major expenses such as attorneys' fees, investigatory services, and most travel and subsistence expenses generally are not recoverable costs. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice P 54.70(1) at 1301-02; Wahl v. Carrier Mfg. Co., Inc., 511 F.2d 209, 216-18 (7th Cir. 1975). Courts are to award, except in limited exceptional situations, only those expenses specifically recognized by statute. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice P 54.77(1) at 1701-02. 76 Courts applying Rule 54(d) look first to the general taxation of costs statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Wahl, 511 F.2d at 215. Among the expenses allowable under § 1920 are (f)ees and disbursements for ... witnesses. The majority of courts interpreting the provision for witness fees in § 1920 ... hold that recovery of fees paid to expert witnesses is limited to the statutory costs specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1821.... 77 We believe that limiting witness costs to those specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 is the correct approach. Congress stated in § 1920 that costs of suit include fees and disbursements for witnesses. Congress also enacted § 1821, which specifies allowable fees and disbursements for witnesses. In enacting this statutory scheme, Congress made no special provision for a private party's witnesses who are classified as expert witnesses. But Congress did specify that costs include the expense of court-appointed expert witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6). We conclude that the congressional silence regarding privately retained expert witnesses means that expenses incurred by private parties to retain expert witnesses are recoverable as costs under § 1920 only to the extent specified in § 1821. We confirm, therefore, that under Rule 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 a party may recover as costs of suit for expert witnesses only the amounts specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1821. 78 (footnotes omitted). Because we find the opinion in Illinois v. Sangamo Construction Co. to be unassailable on the points noted, we embrace the holdings of the Seventh Circuit with respect to allowable cost awards for expert witnesses. 79 In the instant case, appellees have maintained that their expert witness on Vietnamese law testified at the direction of Judge Green. Appellants deny this claim and we can find no evidence in the record to support appellees' assertion. See notes 7 and 8 supra, and accompanying text. 80 Furthermore, although Judge Green did find that appellees' expert was necessary, see note 8 supra, there is nothing in the District Court's Order Approving Additional Costs to justify a finding of exceptional circumstances. See note 11 supra. It may be true that the information furnished by appellees' expert was necessary to the ultimate resolution of certain legal issues; however the record is devoid of anything to suggest that the information given in the testimony of the expert was not otherwise reasonably accessible to the court and the parties. 15 There is certainly nothing to indicate that Nguyen Quoc Dai, the particular witness in question (as distinguished from the information that he furnished), was somehow indispensable to the court. 81 For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the District Court on the claim for costs for fees paid to the expert witness. The recovery of fees paid to the expert witness in this case is limited to the statutory cost amounts specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (Supp. II 1978). We shall therefore remand to allow the District Court to recalculate the appropriate cost amount due on this item.