Opinion ID: 3011992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are the Companies in a Substantially Identical

Text: Position to Eastern Enterprises? As noted earlier, no single rationale emerges from the decision in Eastern Enterprises. Accordingly,  ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds.’  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). The Marks rule is only applicable where one opinion can be meaningfully regarded as ‘narrower’ than another and can represent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning. Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1057 (3d Cir. 1994)(quoting King v. Palmer , 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991)(en banc). [W]here approaches differ, no particular standard is binding on an inferior court because none has received the support of a majority of the Supreme Court. Anker Energy Corp., at 170 (citing Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d at 1058). In Unity Real Estate, we stated that Justice Kennedy’s substantive due process reasoning is not a ‘narrower’ ground that we might take to constitute the controlling holding. 178 F.3d at 658. Consequently, the only binding aspect of the fragmented decision in Eastern Enterprises is its specific result, i.e., the Act is unconstitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises. Anker Energy Corp., at 170 (citing Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Or, as we said in Unity Real Estate: Eastern . . . mandates judgment for the plaintiffs only if they stand in a substantially identical position to Eastern Enterprises with respect to both the plurality and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. 7 178 F.3d at 659. Earlier, we noted that the Companies concede that under the Coal Act, they are related persons to two sets of entities, which they call the Pre-1974 Signatories and the Post-1974 Signatories. Because of theirrelated person _________________________________________________________________ 7. We also held in Unity Real Estate that because of the concurrence and dissent in Eastern Enterprises, we are bound to follow the five-four vote against the takings claim. . . . 178 F.3d at 659; see also Anker Energy Corp., at 170 n.3. 16 status to the Post-1974 Signatories, the Companies were assigned premium liability for miners employed by the Pre1974 Signatories. The Companies concede that any assignments of Coal Act liability based on their status of being related persons to Post-1974 Signatories are constitutionally valid. Companies’ Br. at 8. However, the Companies argue that theystand in a substantially identical position to Eastern [regarding the pre-1974 Signatories] because, as in Eastern , all of the disputed miners worked for signatory operators who last signed [NBCWAs] before 1974. Id. at 9. In the Companies’ view, the Pre-1974 Signatories and the Post-1974 Signatories are two discrete sets of entities that must be viewed differently under Eastern Enterprises. Therefore, according to the Companies, the constitutionality of the Coal Act as applied to any particular member of a controlled group of corporations depends upon whether the particular member signed a 1974 or later NBCWA, not upon whether any other member of the group did so. The Companies rely upon our decision in Unity Real Estate in claiming that their substantial identity to the Pre-1974 Signatories places them (the Companies) in the shoes of Eastern Enterprises, and the Commissioner’s assignments of the miners employed by the Pre-1974 Signatories was therefore unconstitutional as to them. The Companies make no other constitutional challenge to the assignments regarding the Pre-1974 Signatories. Therefore, their as applied constitutional challenge turns on whether they are in a substantially identical position to Eastern Enterprises with regard to assignments of the Pre1974 Signatories. We hold that the circumstances here are not substantially equivalent to the circumstances in Eastern Enterprises, and the Commissioner’s assignment of the Pre-1974 Signatories was therefore not a violation of the Fifth Amendment. A closer examination of Eastern Enterprises shows why. Eastern Enterprises began operations in 1929 and it mined coal in West Virginia and Pennsylvania until 1965. Eastern, 524 U.S. at 516. In that capacity, it was a signatory to each NBCWA executed between 1947 and 1964 and made contributions of over $60 million to the 1947 and 17 1950 welfare and retirement funds. Id. In 1963, Eastern decided to spin-off its coal operations to a subsidiary, Eastern Associated Coal Corp. (EACC). Id. The spin-off was completed by 1965, but Eastern retained its stock interest in EACC through a subsidiary corporation, Coal Properties Corp. (CPC) until 1987, and it received dividends of more than $100 million from EACC during that period. Id. After 1965, Eastern ceased coal mining operations and was not a signatory to the 1974 NBCWA, (which, as noted, was the first wage agreement to suggest an industry-wide commitment to funding lifetime health benefits to miners and their dependents), or to any subsequent NBCWAs. Id. at 530. EACC signed the 1974 NBCWA as well as subsequent ones. However, in 1987, Eastern sold its interest in CPC to Peabody Holding Co., Inc. Id . at 516. As a consequence of that sale to that unrelated, third party, Eastern had divested itself of all of its interests in its EACC subsidiary five years before the enactment of the Coal Act. After the enactment of the Coal Act, the Commissioner assigned Eastern the obligation for Combined Fund premiums for over 1,000 retired miners who had worked for Eastern before 1966, based on Eastern’s status as the pre- 1978 signatory operator for whom the miners had worked the longest as prescribed by S 9706(a)(3). Id. at 517. Eastern was not assigned responsibility for any miners who had been employed by EACC. Id. at 530. From this recitation of the facts in Eastern, it is obvious that the Companies are not in a substantially identical position to Eastern. Eastern was assigned premium liability under the Coal Act solely because it employed the assigned miners. Inasmuch as Eastern never signed a wage agreement committing to lifetime health benefits, it could not be charged with the cost of furnishing those benefits. See Id. at 531 (The company’s obligations under the Act depend solely on its roster of employees some 30 to 50 years before the statute’s enactment, without any regard to responsibilities that Eastern accepted under any benefit plan the company itself adopted.). Eastern did not involve liability under the Coal Act’s related person provisions. In contrast, the Companies’ liability here arises from their 18 relationship to related person subsidiaries that signed a NBCWA in 1974 or thereafter. The Commissioner concluded that the nexus between the Companies and those related parties was sufficient to assign liability for miners’ lifetime benefits even though none of the Companies signed a wage agreement obligating them to do so. The Companies attempt to find shelter under the umbrella of Eastern Enterprises by stressing that Eastern also had a subsidiary, EACC, that signed a post-1974 NBCWA, and arguing that Eastern’s relationship with EACC was not sufficient to sustain the Commissioner’s assignments of Coal Act liability to Eastern. Companies’ Br. at 15-16. However, that argument ignores a critical distinction. Eastern divested itself of EACC in 1987, five years before the enactment of the Coal Act. The Coal Act provides that where ostensibly related companies remain in business, the question of whether they are related persons within the meaning of the statute is determined with respect to their relationship as of a date shortly before the Act’s enactment -- July 20, 1992. 26 U.S.C. S 9701(c)(2)(B). Because Eastern sold EACC before that date, EACC was not a related person to Eastern under the Act. Therefore, premium liability could not have been imposed on Eastern as a related person to EACC. We have twice before held that liability based upon the Act’s related person provisions removes an assignee from the shelter of Eastern Enterprises. In Unity, we upheld the constitutionality of the Coal Act as applied to a company that was a related person to both a pre-1974 NBCWA signatory and a post-1974 signatory. At the time the Commissioner made the premium assignments, Unity Real Estate Company was a small corporation closely-held by members of the Jamison family. Unity owned only a small commercial building and a parking lot. It never mined coal and never signed a coal wage agreement. Nonetheless, the assignments to it were valid under the Coal Act because it was a related person to several, defunct coal mining companies that ultimately merged into Unity. Among those companies were South Union-PA and South Union-WVA. South Union-PA had mined coal since 1923 and signed NBCWAs from 1947 through 1961. South Union-WVA 19 began mining coal when South Union-PA stopped and it signed the 1974, 1978 and 1981 NBCWAs.8 The Commissioner assigned Combined Fund premium liability to Unity for the miners formerly employed by all of Unity’s related person entities pursuant to SS 9706(a)(1) & (2), and Unity challenged the assignment relying on Eastern. After a comprehensive analysis of the various opinions in Eastern, we upheld the Coal Act as applied to Unity and sustained all of the assignments, including assignments of those miners who had worked for South Union-PA. As noted earlier, South Union-PA had not signed a NBCWA in 1974 or thereafter. The critical distinction between Unity/the Jamison family and Eastern Enterprises was that Eastern never signed a 1974 or subsequent NBCWA and was not a related person to any entity that had. Unity, however was tethered to the commitment of lifetime benefits through South Union-WVA, its related person. That coal company had made such a commitment in the 1974, 1978 and 1981 NBCWAs. In affirming Unity’s liability we stated: [b]ecause the plaintiffs signed NBCWAs in 1974 and thereafter, they are factually distinguishable from Eastern Enterprises. Language in the plurality and the concurrence suggesting that expectations fundamentally changed after 1974 support our conclusions. 178 F.3d at 659. That distinction compell[ed] the conclusion that Eastern is not on all fours with the case before us. Id. Similarly, in Anker we upheld the Act’s application to Anker coal via a related person that was a post-1974 signatory operator. We held that Anker’s related person had agreed to the terms of the 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984 NBCWAs and that factually distinguish[ed] Anker’s situation from that of Eastern Enterprises and compell[ed] a finding that the Act [was] constitutional[as applied to Anker]. 177 F.3d at 172. There, from 1967 until 1982, Consolidation Coal had contracted with King Knob Coal for _________________________________________________________________ 8. A bankruptcy court granted it leave to reject the 1981 NBCWA. 20 King Knob to mine coal on Consolidation’s property. As part of this arrangement, King Knob agreed that its employees would be UMWA members and that it would be a signatory to the then current NBCWAs. To achieve that end, King Knob signed me too agreements in 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984.9 An affiliate of Anker acquired King Knob in 1975 and the relationship between Consolidation and King Knob continued until Consolidation canceled its contract with King Knob in 1982. In 1994 and 1995, the Commissioner informed Anker that it was a related person to King Knob and assigned premium liability to Anker for King Knob’s retired miners. Anker sued alleging that under Eastern Enterprises the Commissioner’s assignments were unconstitutional as applied to it. Relying on Unity, we upheld the assignment. We concluded that Anker’s related person had agreed to be bound by the terms of the post-1974 NBCWA’s. Accordingly, Anker’s situation [fell] outside the specific holding of Eastern Enterprises. Id . at 172. Here, not to be deterred by the wealth of precedent (seemingly on point) against them, the Companies press on and argue that Unity imposes a limitation on related person liability that precludes consideration of the bargaining history of any company other than the assigned miners’ actual employer. They argue that because the assignments in Unity were made pursuant to SS 9706(a)(1) and (2), Unity was treated as if it stood in the shoes of the signatory operators who employed the miners and who had signed all of the NBCWAs through 1978. Therefore, the Companies claim that Unity requires that we treat them as if they too _________________________________________________________________ 9. A me too agreement is an agreement between an employer who is not a member of the BCOA but who agrees with the UMWA to be bound by the terms of the NBCWA. Anker, 177 F.3d at 166-7. A me too agreement has terms identical to the terms of the respective NBCWA. There is no legal distinction between the NBCWA itself, and the corresponding me too agreement insofar as the employer’s rights and obligations are concerned. Id. at 172 n.4. Thus, the distinction between a NBCWA signatory and a me too signatory is not a difference for purposes of our Coal Act analysis. Id. 21 stand in the shoes of the signatory operators who employed the assigned miners. Based upon their insistence that they stand in the shoes of the Pre-1974 Signatories who actually employed the assigned miners, the Companies claim that premium liability assignments are unconstitutional as applied under Eastern Enterprises because the Pre-1974 Signatories neither committed to paying lifetime benefits, nor contributed to any such expectation on the part of the assigned miners. However, this argument is based upon a misreading of Unity. Unity was not treated as if it stood in the shoes of a signatory operator who signed a post-1974 NBCWA. Unity was treated as a related person to pre-1974 signatories and at least one post-1974 signatory and it was assigned liability for miners who had worked for pre-1974 signatories because of that related person status. The Companies are in exactly the same position here. The Companies also argue that because the assignments were made pursuant to 9706(a)(3), the fact that they have related persons who signed 1974 and later NBCWAs is irrelevant because only the bargaining history of the Pre1974 Signatories can be considered in determining the constitutionality of the assignments. This argument also allows them to again claim to stand in the shoes of Eastern Enterprises. It is based upon a document in the record signed by a man named Ray Worley. Worley writes: The Coal Act does not permit us to impute a related company’s signatory status to that of a signatory operator; that is, a pre-1978 signatory cannot be treated as a 1978 (or later) signatory simply because its parent or sister company is a 1978 (or later) signatory. App. at 178. In the Companies’ view, the Commissioner and the Combined Fund Trustees have violated this policy because they claim that the Commissioner’s and the Combined Fund Trustees’ theory that they are liable for the premiums of the miners employed by the Pre-1974 Signatories effectively treats the Pre-1974 Signatories as if they were Post-1974 Signatories. That is, they have imputed the signatory status of the Post-1974 Signatories 22 to the Pre-1974 Signatories. Moreover, the Companies argue this imputation of signatory status theory suggests that the assignments originally made were improper. In the Companies’ view, all miners who have been assigned under S 9706(a)(3), should have been assigned, or should be reassigned, under either SS 9706(a)(1) or (2) if the pre-1978 operator who employed them had a related person who signed a 1978 or later NBCWA. We disagree. In the first place, the Companies have never claimed that the original assignments of the miners employed by the Pre-1974 Signatories were incorrect under the S 9706(a) statutory assignment scheme. 10 Second, we reject the Companies’ claim that Worley’s memo is an admission by the Commissioner that the signatory status of one related person cannot be imputed to another. Reply Br. at 10. The Companies do not identify Worley’s position with the Social Security Administration, they do not claim that Worley was speaking for the Commissioner and they do not tell us the purpose of Worley’s memo. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Worley’s memo appears to speak to the original assignment of beneficiaries procedures under S 9706(a). It does not appear to have anything to do with the related person provisions of the Act.11 Accordingly, the Companies’ obligations must stand or fall regardless of how [it] was assigned the beneficiaries. Unity, at 655 n.2. Our rejection of the Companies’ attempt to analogize their circumstances to the facts in Eastern Enterprises does _________________________________________________________________ 10. The Coal Act provides that if an assigned operator believes that beneficiaries have erroneously been assigned to it, the operator can obtain information about the beneficiaries from the Commissioner and seek review of the assignments. 20 C.F.R. S 9706(f); see also 20 C.F.R. SS 422.601-607. The burden is on the assigned operator to make out a prima facie case that the assignments were in error. See 20 C.F.R. S 422.605. If the Commissioner finds that the assignments were in error, he or she can declare them void and reassign the beneficiaries to the appropriate signatory operator or related person. 26 U.S.C. S 9706(f)(3)(A). If the Commissioner finds that the assignments are not in error, he or she must notify the assigned operator. The Commissioner’s determination is final. 26 U.S.C. S 9706(f)(3)(B). 11. As we noted at the outset, the Companies are not challenging the constitutionality of the related person provisions. 23 not end our inquiry. In Eastern, the plurality also noted that the Court’s prior decisions have left open the possibility that legislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the parties’ experience. Eastern, at 528-529 (O’Connor, J.). In recognition of that possibility, and the possibility that Eastern embodies principles capable of broader application, we required an additional level of substantive due process analysis to determine if the assignments to the Companies are constitutional as applied in Unity.12 178 F.3d at 659. That additional level of analysis measures the extent of the gap between the coal companies’ contractual promises to the Funds and the requirements of the Coal Act. Id. In Unity, we stated that the standard of review when a due process violation is alleged is forgiving; it bars only arbitrary and irrational congressional action. Id. In Unity we began our analysis with an extensive review of the available evidence. We noted that Congress’ findings in enacting the Coal Act that the coal industry had created a reasonable expectation that miners would have lifetime benefits, and that the coal companies were responsible for the deterioration of miners’ Benefit Plans, werereasonable evaluations of the problem. Id. at 670. We next concluded that the Act’s retroactivity did not mean that the legislation was irrational or a violation of due process. Id. In reaching that conclusion we recognized that [t]he heart of retroactivity analysis is an evaluation of the extent of the burden imposed by a retroactive law in _________________________________________________________________ 12. While the Eastern Enterprise plurality’s cautionary note that legislation might be unconstitutional if it is severely retroactive and substantially disproportionate was made in the course of its Taking Clause analysis, the admonition is applicable to a substantive due process analysis because, as the plurality noted,[o]ur analysis of legislation under the Takings and Due Process Clauses is correlated to some extent. 524 U.S. at 537 (plurality) (citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 (1986)). 24 relation to the burdened parties’ prior acts[.] We held that [w]here Congress acts reasonably to redress an injury caused or to enforce an expectation created by a party, it can do so retroactively. Id. at 670, 671. In Unity, the period between the coal company’s contractual undertaking to pay for benefits to the date of the passing of the Coal Act was eleven years. Id. at 670.13 Although that period was quite long, we concluded that it was not so extensive as to violate Justice Kennedy’s standard, although Unity offers a close case. Id.14 Even though we concluded that the time frame was not unreasonably long, we were nonetheless aware of the considerable financial burden that can result from an assignment of liability under the Act.15 Finally, we addressed the proportionality issue and found sufficient proportionality to sustain the constitutionality of the Act.16 That conclusion was, in large part, driven by the underlying conclusion that the burdens imposed under the Act are justified by the industry’s past conduct and the reasonable expectations of lifetime benefits it created. We further concluded that the industry’s conduct in creating a _________________________________________________________________ 13. The Coal Act was passed in 1992 and South Union-WVA, Unity’s related person, last signed a NBCWA in 1981. 14. In Unity, we relied on Justice Kennedy’s explication of the relevant due process principles because the plurality did not reach Eastern’s due process claim. 178 F.3d at 670 n.13. 15. Eastern Enterprises’ estimated liability was between $50 and $100 million. 524 U.S. at 529. Unity alleged that its estimated Coal Act liabilities were over six times its total assets and that if the assignments were upheld, it would be bankrupted. 178 F.3d at 655. At the time Unity’s appeal was before us, Unity’s total payments were under $1 million. Id. at 671. Significantly, the Companies do not contend that the assignments will force them into bankruptcy. In fact, they have not bothered to supply us with an estimate of their total potential liability. 16. A statute will not violate substantive due process where the burden imposed is proportional to the harm legitimately addressed by the legislature. Unity, at 671. A statute is not unconstitutional if the liability actually imposed is not out of proportion to the claimant’s prior experience with the object of the legislation. Id. at 672. Prior experience can consist of conduct that creates reasonable expectations about the object of the legislation or conduct that creates the problems that impelled the legislature to act. Id. 25 benefit fund obligated to pay out more monies than the operators were required to provide, and the industry’s conduct in creating the problem of underfunding, was exacerbated by coal companies fleeing the coal industry to avoid further contributions to the fund. Id. at 673. Essentially, then, we reasoned that the Act wasCongress’ attempt to do equity. Id. at 672. Accordingly, we concluded that the Coal Act did not violate substantive due process. Congress was, after all, entitled to remedy the problems caused by the companies’ conduct. Given the importance of the coal industry, Congress could certainly respond to a benefits funding structure vulnerable to ‘dumping’ retirees when companies left the industry. Id. at 673. The Coal Act is targeted to address the problem of insufficient resources in the benefit funds and . . . it puts the burden on those who, in Congress’s reasonable judgment, should bear it. Id. at 674. At oral argument, counsel for the Companies stated that the Companies’ related person Post-1974 Signatories last signed NBCWAs in 1988. That is only four years from the time the Post-1974 Signatories’ contractual obligations to the Funds ceased as the effective date of the Act was 1992. That is significantly less time than the eleven years we found acceptable in Unity.17 Accordingly, we reject the Companies’ proportionality attack on the Commissioner’s assignments.18 B. Can the Commissioner Make Original Assignments After October 1, 1993?19 _________________________________________________________________ 17. We also applied Unity’s due process analysis in Anker and found no retroactivity problems in the eight years between the time when Anker’s related person, King Knob, last agreed in ame too agreement to be bound by an NBCWA and the passage of the Coal Act. Anker, 177 F.3d at 173. 18. After this case was argued, the Supreme Court decided Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002). The issue for adjudication in Sigmon was a question of statutory construction centering on whether the Coal Act permits the Commissioner to assign retired miners to successors in interest of out-of-business signatory operators. It has no bearing on the issues presented here. 19. The district court rejected the Companies’ argument that certain assignments should be voided because they were made after October 1, 26 The Companies argue in the alternative that, even if the Commissioner’s assignments are constitutional, some of the assignments are nevertheless invalid because they were made on or after October 1, 1993.20,21 This argument is grounded upon 26 U.S.C. S 9706(a) which states that the Commissioner shall, before October 1, 1993, assign each coal industry retiree who is an eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator which (or any related person with respect to which) remains in business. . . . (emphasis added). The Companies contend that shall means shall. Accordingly, argue the Companies, since Congress explicitly mandated the Commissioner to make all Coal Act assignments by a date certain, any initial assignments made after that October 1, 1993 are invalid.22 The Companies’ position is supported by Dixie Fuel Co. v. Commissioner of Social Security, 171 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1999). There, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the plain language of the statute, the statutory scheme for assigning beneficiaries and the legislative history all demonstrate that the intent of Congress is clearly expressed in the statute. The October 1, 1993 date is a deadline. Id. at 1064. _________________________________________________________________ 1993. The standard of review in cases of statutory construction is plenary. Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area School District, 917 F.2d 779, 781 (3d Cir. 1990). 20. The Companies’ complaint acknowledges that the assignments to Stelco Coal and Shenango were made before October 1, 1993. App. at 29, 31. Therefore, this portion of our analysis does not apply to either of those entities. 21. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two cases on this same issue. Peabody Coal Co. v. Massanari, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 857197 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted by Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 918 (2002)( No. 01-705), and Bellaire Corp. v. Massanari, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 856962 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted by Holland v. Bellaire Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 918 (2002)(No. 01-715). 22. The Companies do not challenge the Commissioner’s authority to reassign miners after September 30, 1993, i.e., to take miners who were assigned incorrectly before September 30, 1993, and correctly reassign them after September 30, 1993 as provided for in Section 9706(f)(3). Companies Br. at 23 n.4. 27 Nevertheless, we disagree. We are persuaded by the analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Holland v. Pardee Coal Co., 269 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2001). That is the only other case that has addressed the effect of the October 1, 1993 deadline, and we believe it is better reasoned than Dixie Fuel. In Pardee Coal , the Commissioner determined that Pardee was a signatory operator and assigned it premium liability for a number of retired miners and their spouses. Because several of the retired miners were assigned to Pardee after October 1, 1993, Pardee denied that it was liable to the Combined Fund for those premiums because they were made after the supposed statutory cut-off date. The district court agreed with Pardee and held that the post-October 1, 1993 assignments were void as a matter of law. However, applying well-settled principles of statutory construction, the court of appeals examined the text of the Act, the context in which it was enacted, its structure and its legislative history, and found no indication of congressional intent to establish October 1, 1993 as a jurisdictional deadline, rendering void all beneficiary assignments made by the [Commissioner] after that date. 269 F.3d 437. Our inquiry leads us to the same result. Admittedly, shall is generally mandatory when used in a statute. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto , 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989) (Congress could not have chosen stronger words [than ‘shall order forfeiture’] to express its intent that forfeiture is mandatory. . . .). However, a statutory deadline does not, by itself, establish that Congress intended to strip an agency’s authority to act after the deadline has passed. In Brock v. Pierce County , 476 U.S. 253 (1986), the Court had to decide if Congress intended to prevent the Secretary of Labor from recovering misused funds under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) after the expiration of a statutory deadline in that Act. The relevant provision of CETA stated that the Secretary shall issue a final determination regarding misuse of CETA funds within 120 days after receiving a complaint alleging misuse. Id. at 254-55. The Secretary disallowed Pierce County’s expenditure of approximately $500,000 of CETA funds after an investigation disclosed that the funds had not been used appropriately. The county 28 challenged the Secretary’s determination in court alleging that the Secretary had no authority because his determination had been made after the 120 day period had expired. A unanimous Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the mere use of the word ‘shall’ . . ., standing alone, is not enough to remove the Secretary’s power to act after 120 days. Id. at 262. The Court wasmost reluctant to conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public rights are at stake. Id. at 260. Rather, the Court concluded that the normal indicia of congressional intent should be used to determine whether an agency has authority to act despite the expiration of a statutory deadline. Therefore, we can not satisfactorily resolve that question by focusing upon a single word in a statute, even when that word appears to be as conclusive of congressional intent as shall appears to be. Id. at 262 n.9. We find the Court’s reasoning in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993), dispositive here. There, the Court addressed, inter alia, the issue of whether a civil forfeiture action, filed within the statute of limitations, but without complying with other statutory timing directives, must be dismissed. In finding that the timing did not compel dismissal so long as the action was filed within the statute of limitations, the Court noted that many statutory requisitions intended for the guide of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them . . . do not limit their power or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineffectual. Id. at 63 (quoting French v. Edwards, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 506, 511 (1872)). Consequently, if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction. 510 U. S. at 63 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). No such consequence is included in the Coal Act. Moreover, we addressed this issue of statutory interpretation in Southwestern Pennsylvania Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 106, 113-115 (3d Cir. 1997). 29 We were there concerned with whether the Environmental Protection Agency’s failure to act on a Clean Air petition within the statutory time frame deprived the agency of authority to take action on the petition. Relying heavily on Brock v. Pierce County, we held that a statute stating that an agency shall complete action by a certain time does not divest the agency of jurisdiction to act unless there is some additional indication in the statute of a congressional intent to bar further agency action. Our review of the Coal Act discloses no further indication of congressional intent to deprive the Commissioner of the authority to make original assignments after October 1, 1993. Congress’ failure to specify any consequences if the Secretary does not make assignments by the purported drop dead date is quite telling.23 Moreover, Brock v. Pierce County was decided six years before Congress passed the Coal Act. Accordingly, we must presume that Congress knew that its instruction that the Commissionershall make assignments before October 1, 1993, would not by itself divest the Commissioner of jurisdiction to act after that date. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 485 (1997) ([W]e presume that Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court’s precedents[.]). Congress would have specified consequences for failing to assign by a drop dead date or explicitly stated that the Secretary’s authority to assign terminated after that date if Congress had intended to abruptly end the Secretary’s authority to make original assignments after October 1, 1993. Congress has been this explicit in a number of other statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. S 1396n(h) (application for waiver of Medicaid requirements must be deemed approved if Secretary of Health and Human Services does not issue a decision within 90 days); 49 U.S.C. S 15910(c) (providing that Surface Transportation Board investigative proceeding is dismissed automatically if not concluded within three years). _________________________________________________________________ 23. See In re TWA, 96 F.3d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1996), referring to a statutory time bar in the Bankruptcy Code as a drop dead date. 30 The Companies argue that the Act does provide a consequence for not assigning a miner before October 1, 1993 because after that date the miner becomes an unassigned miner and is placed in the orphan retiree pool. However, that is not enough to conclude that the Secretary no longer has authority to assign after October 1, 1993. It is simply a safety net insuring that miners who are not assigned will not thereby be denied the benefits they are entitled to. We see no language in the Act, and the Companies direct us to none, that would forge a link between unassigned status and the Commissioner’s failure to complete the assignment process by October 1, 1993. In addition, the Act’s administrative review provisions suggest that Congress did not intend to limit the Commissioner’s authority to make assignments after October 1, 1993. The Coal Act gives coal companies the right to an administrative review of an assignment decision and further provides that if the Commissioner concludes that an initial decision was erroneous, the Commissioner must review the beneficiary’s record and reassign the miner accordingly. 26 U.S.C. S 9706(f)(3). Although a coal operator’s request for a review must be submitted to the Commissioner within a specified time frame, the Act does not impose any time limitations on the Commissioner’s review process.24 This strongly suggests that Congress expected that beneficiary reassignments would be made after October 1, 1993. However, if October 1, 1993 is the drop dead date the Companies claim, the Commissioner would have no authority to make a new assignment even though the initial assignment resulted from factual error, a misreading of the statute, or administrative misfeasance. Although it can be argued that the October 1, 1993 cutoff only applies to original assignments, not those made as a result of the administrative review process, nothing in the text of the Act allows us to draw such a distinction. _________________________________________________________________ 24. An assigned operator may, within 30 days of receiving notice with respect to a particular beneficiary, request information as to his work history. See 26 U.S.C. S 9706(f)(1). After receiving the information, the assigned operator has an additional 30 days in which to request review of the assignment. See 26 U.S.C. S 9706(f)(2). 31 In addition, we can infer no congressional intent to bar agency action after October 1, 1993, from the purpose and structure of the Coal Act. As we noted earlier, the Coal Act was enacted in 1992 to ensure that retired coal miners and their dependents would continue to receive the health and death benefits they had been receiving since the 1940s pursuant to a series of collective bargaining agreements. Anker, at 163-64. The Act was bottomed on Congress’ explicit finding that in order to secure the stability of interstate commerce, it is necessary to modify the current private health care benefit plan structure for retirees in the coal industry to identify persons most responsible for plan liabilities in order to stabilize plan funding and allow for the provision of health care benefits to such retirees. 26 U.S.C. S 9701 note (emphasis added). Congress was attempting to insure that every reasonable effort is made to locate a responsible party to provide the benefits before the costs are passed to other signatory companies which have never had any connection to the individual[.] 138 Cong. Rec. S17604 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992). Thus, the Conference Committee Report declared that the Act’s overriding purpose is to find and designate a specific obligor for as many beneficiaries in the [Benefit] Plans as possible. Id. The conferees further stated their inten[tion] that the largest possible number of beneficiaries in the [Benefit] Plans be assigned to a specific or designated company[,] and that the number of unassigned beneficiaries is kept to an absolute minimum. Id. at S17605. In short, the Coal Act’s key objective is to ensure that the costs of providing retirement benefits will, so far as possible, be borne by the private parties most responsible for creating retired miners’ expectations of lifetime health benefits. Consequently, the Act broadly imposes liability on original signatories and a broad class of related business entities. Cutting off the Commissioner’s authority to make assignments after October 1, 1993, would surely frustrate that objective. If the Commissioner cannot make assignments beyond that date, otherwise assignable beneficiaries would be retained in the orphan retiree pool 32 and benefits would paid from federal funds. 30 U.S.C. S 1232(h) and 26 U.S.C. S 9705(b). Moreover, if those transfers are inadequate, orphan retiree costs will be imposed on other private parties through the imposition of the unassigned beneficiary premium. See 26 U.S.C. S 9704(d).25 Those other private parties would have no substantive connection or nexus to the unassigned beneficiary, and would certainly not be responsible for creating any expectation of lifetime benefits. Thus, reading shall to invalidate post-October 1, 1993 assignments would eviscerate a program intended to impose funding burdens on the most responsible parties and shift funding burdens to the government or to other companies with no connection to the beneficiaries assigned to those companies. We are thus reminded of the situation in Brock v. Pierce County, where the Court was reluctant to find that a statutory deadline barred agency action because public rights [were] at stake and thepublic fisc was implicated. 476 U.S. at 260, 262. Such a result here would also result in a financial windfall to some operators at the expense of those operators whose assignments were completed before October 1, 1993 because the former would be relieved of paying for miners’ expectations that they or their related entities helped create. Finally, putting aside the intricacies of statutory interpretation and legislative history, we reach the same result by employing that all too often overlooked tool: practical common sense. Interpreting the October 1, 1993 date as a cutoff results in a time frame that would make the action Congress required of the Commissioner impossible. It would thereby frustrate the very congressional purpose the Act sought to further. The Coal Act became law in October of 1992. The Commissioner therefore had to review the records of, and assign premium responsibility for, roughly 65,000 miners by October 1, 1993. Holland v. Pardee Coal Co., 269 F.3d at 432 n.9. To _________________________________________________________________ 25. The government submits that these costs could amount to millions of dollars in additional liability. According to the government, nearly 10,000 beneficiary assignments were made after October 1, 1993. Government’s Br. at 48. 33 assign those miners, the agency had to search each miner’s records, and reconstruct his employment history, and then match that history against the lists of signatory coal operators. Id. This Gordian knot was significantly tightened by Congress’ failure to appropriate funds until July 2, 1993 -- less than 80 days before the statutory date of October 1, 1993. It would therefore have been as close to impossible as any administrative task can get for the Commissioner to complete the 65,000 by October 1, 1993. Accordingly, we cannot agree that the Commissioner was powerless to make original assignments after October 1, 1993.26 Thus, as the Court stated in Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 459 n.3 (1998), The Secretary’s failure to meet the deadline, a not uncommon occurrence when heavy loads are thrust on administrators, does not mean that the official lacked power to act beyond it. _________________________________________________________________ 26. The House Committee on Ways and Means, in a Committee Print issued on September 3, 1993, only four weeks before the effective date of the Coal Act reinforces this point. The Committee Print reads: SSA anticipated that checking the [employment] records would be very-time consuming. Most beneficiaries are associated with the 1950 Benefit Fund, and therefore with miners who retired before 1976. Social Security records are not computerized for work history prior to 1978. Linking an individual’s work history to a specific employer will thus require searching through microfilm records and entering the information by hand into the computer system. Preliminary estimates by the SSA suggest that it would take approximately 150 work years just to retrieve the microfilm records. This does not include the additional work involved in determining the assignment to an employer. On a routine basis, SSA has 140 technicians specially trained to work with the microfilm records, which are difficult to decipher. Extra resources would be needed to complete the assignments by the October 1, 1993 target date. Financing UMWA Coal Miner Orphan Retiree Health Benefits, House Committee of Ways and Means (Sept. 3, 1993), at 64-65 (emphasis added). However, Congress did not appropriate anyextra resources to the Commissioner between September 3, 1993 and October 1, 1993. Therefore, Congress could not possibly have intended that the Commissioner would complete the entire assignment process by October 1, 1993. 34