Opinion ID: 2334566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Preponderance of the Evidence Standard Satisfies Due Process

Text: ¶ 10 Under the Medina analytical framework, a state law governing criminal procedures, `including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion,' does not violate `the Due Process Clause unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' 505 U.S. at 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). Both historical and contemporary practice are probative of whether such rules are fundamental. Id. at 446-48, 112 S.Ct. 2572. If the rule is not ranked as fundamental, the court must then determine whether the rule transgresses any recognized principle of `fundamental fairness' in operation. Id. at 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)). ¶ 11 As a starting point, we must precisely identify Hurst's claim of error and determine, as a matter of statutory construction, the meaning and effect of the statutory scheme. Provisions addressing defendants who are not competent to stand trial are set forth in chapter 10.77 RCW. Cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) (holding that the Due Process Clause prohibits the trial of a person who is incompetent). In brief, if the court finds that a criminal defendant charged with a felony is not competent to stand trial it must stay the criminal proceedings, RCW 10.77.084(1)(a), and may commit the defendant to a mental health treatment and restoration period, RCW 10.77.084(1)(c), of up to 90 days. RCW 10.77.086(1). By the conclusion of that 90-day period, the court must hold a hearing, RCW 10.77.086(2), and may commit the defendant to an additional mental health treatment and restoration period of up to 90 days if it or a jury determines that the defendant remains incompetent, RCW 10.77.086(3). By the expiration of the second mental health treatment and restoration period, the court must again hold a hearing. Id. At this hearing, the court may commit the defendant to a third and final mental health treatment and restoration period of up to six months if the court or jury finds that (1) the defendant remains incompetent, (2) there is a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency within a reasonable period of time, and (3) the defendant either (a) is a substantial danger to other persons or (b) presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security. [3] RCW 10.77.086(4). Hurst argues that the Due Process Clause requires that the second and third of these showings be made by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and, therefore, that the trial court erred in instructing his jury that it need only find these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. ¶ 12 By statute, the legislature has adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. Though Hurst accurately points out that the term preponderance of the evidence does not appear in RCW 10.77.086(4), it is settled that the plain meaning of a statute is determined by looking not only to the text of the statutory provision in question, but also to `the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.' State v. Ervin, 169 Wash.2d 815, 820, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). In the subsection immediately preceding RCW 10.77.086(4), the legislature expressly adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard as the appropriate standard for determining competency at the hearing following the first mental health treatment and restoration period. RCW 10.77.086(3). The absence of a contrary standard elsewhere in the statute creates an inference that the legislature intended the same standard of proof to apply to the other determinations as well. Had the legislature intended to impose a more stringent standard of proof, it knew how to do so. See, e.g., RCW 13.34.190(1)(a) (requiring clear, cogent, and convincing evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt to terminate parental rights); RCW 71.05.235(2) (requiring clear, cogent, and convincing evidence for chapter 71.05 RCW commitment). That is, by declining to expressly impose a more stringent standard of proof, the legislature has indicated its intent to impose the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. ¶ 13 The legislature's adoption of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof does not violate the Due Process Clause. As discussed above, the appropriate analytical framework is set forth in Medina. This requires consideration of historical and contemporary practice and the `fundamental fairness' of the rule in operation. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445-48, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (quoting Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352, 110 S.Ct. 668). ¶ 14 Hurst does not advance any argument that historical or contemporary practice demonstrates that imposition of a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the Due Process Clause. Because Hurst challenges the statute's constitutionality, this is his burden. Island County v. State, 135 Wash.2d 141, 146, 955 P.2d 377 (1998). Accordingly, we cannot say that requiring proof of dangerousness and likelihood of competency restoration by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence is a fundamental principle of justice. ¶ 15 Nor does application of the preponderance of the evidence standard deny any recognized principle of `fundamental fairness' in operation. Medina, 505 U.S. at 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (quoting Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352, 110 S.Ct. 668). In operation, numerous safeguards exist to ensure that no incompetent person will be compelled to stand trial and that only those persons who are likely to regain competence are committed for the additional six-month period. Among these safeguards are the right to counsel, RCW 10.77.020(1), the right to a jury, RCW 10.77.086(3), and the right to examination by an expert of the defendant's choosing, RCW 10.77.020(2). In addition, a third period of mental health treatment and restoration commitment is only permitted upon a showing that, on a more likely than not basis, there is a substantial probability that the defendant will regain competency within a reasonable period of time and that the defendant poses a substantial danger to other persons or presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security. RCW 10.77.086(4) (emphasis added). In addition, even where the requisite showings are made, this merely vests the judge with the discretion to commit the incompetent defendant to a third mental health treatment and restoration period of up to 180 days; the judge may also impose a shorter commitment or no commitment at all. Id. (In the event that the court or jury makes such a finding, the court may extend the period of commitment for up to an additional six months. (Emphasis added.)). Importantly, at any time during the proceedings, the defendant is entitled to a hearing if a mental health professional determines that the defendant has been or is unlikely to be restored to competency. RCW 10.77.084(1)(c). As a result of the many protections, we cannot say that application of the preponderance of the evidence standard results in a deprivation of fundamental fairness in operation. As a result, under the Medina framework, the preponderance of the evidence standard has not been shown to violate the Due Process Clause. ¶ 16 Our conclusion that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof does not violate the Due Process Clause is further bolstered by the United States Supreme Court decisions in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), and Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996). In Jackson, the Court approved of the detention of a criminal defendant deemed incompetent, but limited that detention to the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. [4] 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845. In Medina, the Court held that a state may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, impose on the defendant the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a lack of competency. 505 U.S. at 439, 450-51, 112 S.Ct. 2572; cf. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 363, 116 S.Ct. 1373 (holding that the Due Process Clause prohibits states from requiring defendants to prove their incompetency by clear and convincing evidence). Thus, the Supreme Court has, at least implicitly, approved of commitment of criminal defendants upon the mere showing of incompetence under a preponderance of the evidence standard.