Opinion ID: 1364537
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Summary Judgment Inappropriate on the Question of AML's Negligence?

Text: From the record, it appears the grounds for the grant of summary judgment in favor of AML were that AML owed Saddler no duty and that AML committed no negligent act which caused Saddler's injuries. In Swenson Trucking, this court restated its position that As a general rule, issues of negligence are generally not susceptible to summary determination, but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner. The reason for this rule is: [B]ecause of the elusive nature of the concept of negligence, the determination of the existence of which requires the forming of a judgment as to the reasonableness of the conduct of the parties in the light of all the circumstances of the case. If reasonable minds could draw different inferences and reach different conclusions from the fact the issue must be reserved for trial. 604 P.2d at 1118 (quoting Webb v. City & Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731, 735 (Alaska 1977)). Saddler advances three theories to support his position that AML owed him a duty of care. The first is the duty owed by bulk suppliers under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965) and case law. The second is the duty owed under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965) by one who negligently performs an assumed duty. The third is a duty of care based on policy considerations, using the factors set forth in D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981).
Saddler argues that AML owed him the duty owed by bulk suppliers, either under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388, Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use, [6] or case law. [7] Saddler argues this duty should exist for policy reasons even if we determine that AML is not a bulk supplier. Saddler's arguments are unpersuasive. As he notes in his brief, supplier already is defined quite broadly. It includes lessors, bailors, repairers, donors and lenders. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 cmt. c (1965). AML is none of these; it is a common carrier hired to perform a service. Common carriers should not be subjected to strict products liability; nor should they be included within the definition of bulk suppliers. We therefore conclude that AML does not owe Saddler the duty owed by bulk suppliers.
Saddler next alleges AML owes him the duty of care set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking (1965). It reads: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1313 n. 4 (Alaska 1985) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965)). AML argues that it did not undertake to perform any services for the protection of Saddler. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Saddler, as we must in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, Swenson Trucking, 604 P.2d at 1116, AML is incorrect. It is reasonable to infer that AML undertook to perform several services for Knik which AML should have recognized were necessary to protect Saddler. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Saddler, AML undertook to pump only AC-5 into square tanks. [8] AML also undertook to label tank 03, the square tank that contained CSS-1, labelling two sides of that tank. One reasonably could infer that such labelling was inadequate, especially if AML undertook to pump only AC-5 into the square tanks. [9] Finally, AML undertook to note the contents of the tanks on the bill of lading which accompanied the shipment; however, AML mistakenly noted on the bill of lading that tank 03 contained AC-5. [10] One reasonably could infer that the bill of lading error compounded the pumping and labelling errors, causing Saddler's injuries. [11] Because material issues of fact exist concerning AML's duty under Restatement (Second) § 324A, summary judgment in favor of AML was inappropriate. We reverse and remand for the determination of the duty and causation factual issues.
Saddler finally argues that AML owed him a duty based on the policy considerations set forth in D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981). [12] Because we decide that material issues of fact exist concerning whether AML had a duty under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A, we need not consider whether a duty also exists based on policy considerations.