Opinion ID: 1530538
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Heading: Confrontation Clause United States Constitution Excited Utterance Exception

Text: The second question presented by Gannon in this appeal is whether the admission of a spontaneous declaration, that qualified as an excited utterance, violated his right of confrontation guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has frequently considered the historical origins of the Confrontation Clause and the law of evidence on hearsay that was extant when the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted in 1791. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895); Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 7.29 (3d ed.1996) (The Confrontation Clause: Historical Context). In its examination of those subjects, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). It has also recognized that both of those principles of jurisprudence stem from the same roots. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86, 91 S.Ct. 210, 218, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). The United States Supreme Court has concluded that [t]he right of confrontation did not originate with the provision in the Sixth Amendment, but was a common-law right having recognized [hearsay] exceptions. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548, 47 S.Ct. 173, 175, 71 L.Ed. 398 (1926). Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has been careful not to equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay statements. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3146, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352, 112 S.Ct. 736, 740, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992). The historical evidence leaves little doubt, however, that the [Confrontation] Clause was intended to exclude some hearsay. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). The courts in the United States, as in England, have adopted the general rule that hearsay evidence is inadmissible. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 356, 112 S.Ct. at 742; Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 6.1 (3d ed.1996) (General Principle and Rationale). The general preference for live testimony is attributable to the importance of cross-examination, which has been characterized as the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. at 1935. See Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 7.30 (3d ed.1996) (Early Construction of the Confrontation Clause). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that a statement that qualifies for admission under a `firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing can be expected to add little to its reliability. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 357, 112 S.Ct. at 743. See Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence § 7.31 (3d ed.1996) (Recent Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause). Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has held that where proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 356, 112 S.Ct. at 743. Therefore, statements that qualify as a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule are admissible into evidence without a demonstration that the declarant is unavailable. Id. at 357, 112 S.Ct. at 743. The hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations, or excited utterances, is firmly rooted in Anglo-American jurisprudence. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 355 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 743 n. 8. This exception to the general hearsay rule is currently recognized by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) and the rules of evidence in almost every state. Id. It was recognized almost three centuries ago in Thompson v. Trevanion, Skinner 402 (1693). 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1747, at 196 (Chadbourn rev.1976). [T]he evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding spontaneous declarations ... is that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 355, 112 S.Ct. at 742. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not require that the prosecution either produce the declarant at trial or have the trial court find that the declarant is unavailable, before a trial court may admit testimonial evidence under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 356-57, 112 S.Ct. at 742-43. The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment, as construed by the United States Supreme Court, is applicable to state criminal proceedings by virtue of the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1067, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). See Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1986). Therefore, Gannon's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution were not violated by the admission into evidence of a spontaneous declaration that properly qualified as an excited utterance. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 357, 112 S.Ct. at 743.