Opinion ID: 2731237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legitimacy of the Initial Terry Stop

Text: Although he disputed this fact in his motion to suppress, Tiru's appeal does not challenge the district court's factual determination that the car's occupants were not wearing their seat belts. We agree with the district court's determination that this traffic infraction was sufficient to justify the initial stop. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) ([T]he officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . .); McGregor, 650 F.3d at 820 (An officer can stop a car if he sees a driver commit a traffic offense, even if the stop is just an excuse to investigate something else.); Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 ([T]he appellant does not question the legitimacy of the initial detention: [the officer] clearly had cause to stop him for tailgating and operating an automobile equipped with blue-tinted lights.). -17- 2. Reasonableness of the Officer's Subsequent Actions Resolution of this case rests on determining whether the officers' actions subsequent to the initial stop, which culminated in Tiru's pat-frisk, were a reasonable investigatory response intended to dispel suspicions related to the evolving circumstances of that stop. See Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d at 29 (disavowing a test that treats Terry stops like a snapshot of events frozen in time and place); Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 (allowing for officers to respond reasonably to the emerging tableau of facts observed after an initial stop). To begin, it is clear that the officers' request that Morales exit the vehicle was permissible. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (We hold only that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.); United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 102 (1st Cir. 2006) ([A] police officer may, as a matter of course, require the driver of a car lawfully stopped for a suspected traffic violation to step out of his vehicle. (citation omitted)). Similarly, the officers' request for Tiru to exit the vehicle was also permissible. Given the scope of Tiru's appeal, we appropriately focus on the events occurring subsequent to the -18- officers' request to view the engine. When Morales attempted to open the vehicle's hood, Officer Casiano noticed that Morales had a visible gun in his waistband. In light of this discovery, Officer Martínez's request that Tiru exit the vehicle was reasonable and was responsive to the needs of officer safety. Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d at 32 (When a Terry stop is effected in connection with a traffic violation and an officer's concern for his own safety is implicated, it is within the officer's authority to order a passenger out of the car as a security measure.); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997) (holding that an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop, because the motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is every bit as great as that of the driver and that danger to an officer from a traffic stop is likely to be greater when there are passengers in addition to the driver in the stopped car); McGregor, 650 F.3d at 820 (stating that an officer conducting a traffic stop can order the occupants out of the auto). Indeed, Officer Martínez testified that when Officer Casiano yelled, weapon, Martínez immediately feared for my life and for the life of my fellow officer, and for the lives of the people in the car. Tiru and the government disagree about whether the subsequent pat-frisk was undergirded by a reasonable suspicion that -19- Tiru was dangerous. See McGregor, 650 F.3d at 820 (allowing for officers to pat-frisk a car's occupants after a traffic stop when there is an articulable, reasonable suspicion that the persons stopped may be dangerous); Pontoo, 666 F.3d at 30 (In a world fraught with peril, officer safety must have a place at the forefront of police work. It follows logically that a pat-frisk may accompany an investigatory stop whenever an officer has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Tiru asserts that the district court's denial of his motion to suppress relied only on general or environmental factors -- for example, his youth and the time of night -- that lacked all bearing to Tiru specifically. In Tiru's estimation, reliance solely on these facts is an insufficient ground for a search, and it reveals a telling absence of any reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous. Tiru claims that his frisk was necessarily unreasonable, as any suspicion was based merely on his proximity to Morales. In support of this position, Tiru asks us to reject what he deems to be a theory of guilt by association, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), for the proposition that a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Id. at 91. -20- Ybarra, however, is readily distinguished from the case at bar. In Ybarra, the police officers knew nothing in particular about the defendant prior to pat-frisking him, except that he was present, along with several other customers, in a public tavern at a time when the police had reason to believe that the bartender would have heroin for sale. Id. No firearms or other weapons were found prior to the frisk of Ybarra. Id. at 87-89. Other than their mere presence in the same bar, there were no facts connecting Ybarra to the bartender suspected of selling heroin. Id. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that [t]he initial frisk of [the defendant] was simply not supported by a reasonable belief that he was armed and presently dangerous, a belief which this Court has invariably held must form the predicate to a patdown of a person for weapons. Id. at 92-93. Here, we are confronted with markedly different circumstances than those presented in Ybarra. Viewing the facts of the instant case in their totality, we are unconvinced by Tiru's argument. We recapitulate briefly: during the night, two officers found themselves having stopped four individuals in a car that the officers had some reason to believe might be stolen. The officers then discovered that the driver had a firearm concealed in his waistband. Objectively, this situation gives rise to a reasonable concern for officer safety -- the officers were outnumbered, in relative darkness, and could reasonably believe that they were -21- dealing with the volatile situation of a possible car theft. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 414 (It would seem that the possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop. And the motivation of a passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime is every bit as great as that of the driver.); see also United States v. Brake, 666 F.3d 800, 805-06 (1st Cir. 2011) (We emphasize once again the importance of police officer safety during a Terry stop . . . .). Certainly, facts like the late hour (11:00 p.m.) and number of passengers in the car (four), when each is taken alone, create no suspicion of criminal activity. But a number of innocuous facts viewed together may form the basis of reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Wright, 582 F.3d 199, 212 (1st Cir. 2009); Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d at 30. And although Morales's inability to provide the officers with a driver's license and a legible car registration could admit of several potentially innocent explanations, these facts might also reasonably give rise to a suspicion of criminal activity. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (permitting police officers to draw reasonable inferences based on their experience); Arnott, 2014 WL 2959288, at  (stating that reasonable suspicion . . . deals with degrees of likelihood, not with certainties or near certainties, and allows police officers -22- to draw upon their experience and arrive at inferences and deductions). Finally, although the discovery of a driver's dangerousness may not, in every case, create reasonable suspicion that a passenger has a gun, it would be beyond folly for our court to ask police officers to ignore the clear relevance of discovering a hidden firearm on the driver. Moreover, in this case, consideration of that discovery in no way offends the rule of Ybarra. Compare Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999) ([A] car passenger -- unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra -- will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.), with Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 93 (finding, when police officers knew nothing about the defendant beyond his presence in a tavern where the bartender was suspected of selling heroin, that the officers lacked any particular reason to suspect that he was armed and dangerous, as required to justify a frisk). Reasonable suspicion is ultimately a pragmatic inquiry -- one that must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). Assessing the totality of the circumstances in this case, the officers' decision to pat-frisk Tiru was grounded in a reasonable suspicion that he might be armed and dangerous. The circumstances of the stop, and the facts discovered during its -23- progression, sufficed to provide a specific and articulable basis for the decision to pat-frisk Tiru in order to ensure that he did not pose a direct threat. See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 490 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that the particularity requirement underlying our test for reasonableness requires that a search be 'grounded in specific and articulable facts.' (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985)). The pat-frisk surely represented a serious intrusion upon Tiru's privacy. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 17. It was limited in scope, however, only to the bare minimum needed to detect the presence of a firearm -- Officer Martínez began the pat-frisk at Tiru's waist and, upon feeling a hard object, extracted it with two fingers. See United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 72 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding a frisk reasonable under the circumstances and, thus, constitutionally appropriate, when the police had a plausible basis for suspecting that the appellant was armed and dangerous, and the subsequent frisk began at the appellant's waist and was not more invasive than necessary to determine whether the defendant had a gun). In light of the important interest in officer safety, and the facts buttressing the officers' belief that Tiru might pose a danger, we find that this significant but brief intrusion was supported by reasonable suspicion. See Sowers, 136 F.3d at 27 (requiring a balance between the quality of -24- the intrusion and the importance of the governmental interests alleged (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228)).