Opinion ID: 1887865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Whether the lower court judge erred in admitting evidence from an illegal search warrant and wrongfully admitted the audiotape and illegal substance into evidence?

Text: ¶ 33. Jones next argues that the chain of custody was incomplete for the large package of crack cocaine admitted in this case. Jones further argues that the audiotape was not properly authenticated, prior to being admitted in this case. His arguments are primarily based on his contention that the testimony of the informant should be wholly disregarded as unreliable. The admissibility of the informant's testimony has already been addressed. ¶ 34. Neither the transcript from the suppression hearing nor the actual exhibits are included in the record on appeal. However, the record reflects that both these items were admitted over defense counsel's objection. ¶ 35. With regard to the chain of custody on the cocaine, Jones' basic argument is that no one saw him give the cocaine to the informant. Therefore, Jones contends that no one can prove that the cocaine did not come from the informant, or, that the informant did not tamper with the cocaine. This Court has held that the test of whether there has been a proper showing of the chain of possession of evidence is whether there is any indication or reasonable inference of probable tampering with the evidence or substitution of the evidence. Gibson v. State, 503 So.2d 230, 234 (Miss.1987); Barnette v. State, 478 So.2d 800, 804 (Miss.1985); Lambert v. State, 462 So.2d 308, 312 (Miss.1984); Morris v. State, 436 So.2d 1381, 1388 (Miss.1983); Harrison v. State, 307 So.2d 557, 561 (Miss.1975); Nix v. State, 276 So.2d 652, 653 (Miss. 1973); Grady v. State, 274 So.2d 141, 143 (Miss.1973). The State produced the witnesses to sufficiently satisfy the chain of custody. However, the burden to produce evidence of a broken chain of custody (i.e., tampering) is on the defendant. Hemphill v. State, 566 So.2d 207, 208 (Miss.1990) (citing Nix, 276 So.2d at 653) (emphasis added). Additionally, [m]atters regarding the chain of custody of evidence are largely left to the discretion of the trial judge, and `unless this judicial discretion has been so abused as to be prejudicial to the defendant, this Court will not reverse the ruling of the trial court.' Doby v. State, 532 So.2d 584, 588 (Miss.1988) (quoting Morris, 436 So.2d at 1388). White v. State, 722 So.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Miss.1998). ¶ 36. The informant testified that he removed the foil from around the package and placed its contents in a plastic bag. However, the informant testified that he did not tamper with the contents of the bag (forty-five rocks cocaine). ¶ 37. Furthermore, the defendant was recorded asking the informant if all the drugs were sold. The defendant also paid the informant for selling the drugs. Therefore, any argument with regard to the chain of custody of the drugs would appear to be specious. Thus, Jones has failed to meet his burden of proving that tampering occurred, such that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the cocaine. ¶ 38. Jones also argues that the audiotape that was admitted in this case was not properly authenticated. Basically, Jones contends that the failure to properly identify the voices on the tape renders the tape inadmissible. This argument is contradictory to the record. The informant identified the four people on the tape: himself, Jones, Jones' wife, and Robert Little Robert Allen. In addition, both officers Oster and Vanderslice identified the voices of the informant and the appellant. For this reason, Jones' argument on this point is specious. As [a] condition precedent to admissibility, the recording must be proven authentic pursuant to Miss. R. Evid. 901. Rule 901 is satisfied if evidence is introduced which is sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.    Whether the evidence presented satisfies... [Rule] 901 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge. Miss. R. Evid. 104(a). His decision will be upheld unless it can be shown that he abused his discretion. Stromas, 618 So.2d at 119 (citing Butler, 592 So.2d at 986). Ragin v. State, 724 So.2d 901, 903 (Miss. 1998). Based on the testimony of the informant and the investigating officers, there was sufficient evidence to show that the recording was what the State claimed it to be. For this reason, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the audiotape.