Opinion ID: 2231413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Should Defendant's Procedural Default Be Excused?

Text: Having concluded that the trial court committed reversible error, we must next determine whether the evidence presented at defendant's trial was closely balanced. When error occurs in a close case, we will opt to `err on the side of fairness, so as not to convict an innocent person.' Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d at 566, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403, quoting Herron, 215 Ill.2d at 193, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467. Following closing arguments, the trial court reviewed the evidence presented. After recounting the testimony of the two police officers, the court recounted defendant's testimony in toto as follows: The defense argues that though [ sic ] the confusion here the officers didn't make the purchase from [defendant]. [Defendant] has testified he just came out of his house walking downstairs or running the [ sic ] down the stairs and he is maced. He doesn't say who maces him, where the mace was at, but that's all he remembers. I believe he used the term `All I can remember' at least six times. He testifies that the next thing he remembers really is being downstairs being separated intofrom the paddy wagon into a squada car he said. He does know Kohler Parks, but he doesn't remember seeing that individual. The appellate court agreed with defendant that the evidence was closely balanced and that the admission of the evidence of his prior conviction for impeachment may have influenced the trial court's credibility determination. 372 Ill.App.3d at 6, 309 Ill.Dec. 477, 864 N.E.2d 718. Before this court, the State assigns error to the appellate court's conclusion that the evidence at defendant's trial was closely balanced. In its reply brief, the State argues: Defendant's trial did not boil down to a credibility contest between the police officers and defendant.    Defendant overlooks the fact that two police officers testified that defendant sold drugs to them, that the marked funds used to buy the drugs were returned to the purchasing officers by the arresting officer, and that defendant stipulated that the substance in the tinfoil packets inventoried by the two police officers tested positive for heroin. Thus, this case is not a mere credibility determination. (Emphases in original.) The State misapprehends the nature of the evidence presented at defendant's trial. The trial in the present case was indeed a contest of credibility. On one side, the two officers testified that defendant sold them heroin. On the other side, defendant testified that he had left his apartment to pick up his son from school when he was mistakenly swept up in a drug raid. Defendant's testimony is credible in that it is consistent with much of the officers' testimony and the circumstances of his arrest. Both defendant and the officers were relating their respective versions of the same underlying incidenta drug raid in a residential housing complex. Given these opposing versions of events, and the fact that no extrinsic evidence was presented to corroborate or contradict either version, the trial court's finding of guilty necessarily involved the court's assessment of the credibility of the two officers against that of defendant. Indeed, in its appellant's brief, after quoting a portion of the trial court's recitation of defendant's testimony, the State argues: Based on these statements by the trial court, it is clear that it believed the testimony of the officers and rejected defendant's testimony   . More importantly, it is evident that the trial judge did not find defendant's account of what happened credible because defendant could not remember what happened or who allegedly sprayed mace at him. (Emphases added.) Thus, the State apparently acknowledges that defendant's convictions turned on the trial court's assessment of defendant's credibility. The State's emphasis that two police officers testified against defendant does not make the State's case overwhelming. The State presented only the testimony of the two officers regarding the sale of the heroin. Each officer admitted that he never saw Officer McKenna recover the prerecorded currency from defendant. For whatever reason, the State did not call Officer McKenna to testify. Arguably, defendant's erroneously admitted incompetent prior conviction was the State's only successful attack on defendant's testimony. Therefore, at the close of the testimony in this case, the trial court was faced with two different versions of events, both of which were credible. Moments after erroneously admitting incompetent evidence for the purpose of impeaching defendant's credibility, the court concluded that it believed the officers' version of events. [4] Based on this record, we opt to `err on the side of fairness' ( Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d at 566, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403, quoting Herron, 215 Ill.2d at 193, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467), and reverse defendant's convictions and remand the cause for a new trial. Despite the occurrence of reversible error, our dissenting colleagues are of the opinion that defendant should not receive a new trial because the evidence adduced at defendant's trial was not closely balanced. The dissent characterizes this court as improperly substituting our judgment for that of the trier of fact and reweighing the evidence. 229 Ill.2d at 614, 323 Ill.Dec. at 399-400, 893 N.E.2d at 671-72 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting, joined by Garman and Karmeier, JJ.). After repeating the testimony adduced at trial and the trial court's findings, the dissent concludes: [I]t is clear that the trial court could find that defendant was not a credible witness even absent the admission of his prior conviction. 229 Ill.2d at 614, 323 Ill.Dec. at 400, 893 N.E.2d at 672 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting, joined by Garman and Karmeier, JJ.). We disagree. Of course this evidence was closely balanced. The evidence boiled down to the testimony of the two police officers against that of defendant. Further, no additional evidence was introduced to contradict or corroborate either version of events. Thus, credibility was the only basis upon which defendant's innocence or guilt could be decided. See, e.g., People v. Agee, 307 Ill.App.3d 902, 906, 241 Ill.Dec. 390, 719 N.E.2d 251 (1999); People v. Gagliani, 210 Ill.App.3d 617, 627, 155 Ill.Dec. 353, 569 N.E.2d 534 (1991). Also, the dissent warns that this court has created a rule holding that if the evidence at trial involves a contest of credibility, and the defendant testifies contrary to the prosecution's witnesses, the evidence will always be closely balanced. 229 Ill.2d at 615-16, 323 Ill.Dec. at 401, 893 N.E.2d at 673 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting, joined by Garman and Karmeier, JJ.). This fear is unreasonable. It is axiomatic that whether the evidence in a criminal trial is closely balanced depends solely on the evidence adduced in that particular case. Accordingly, our holding in this case in no way creates any legal rule that will always produce a particular result. Rather, in this case, the essential task of the trial court, as the trier of fact, was to determine whose version of events to believe. The evidence of defendant's prior conviction, which the trial court erroneously considered, may have played an unacceptable part in the trial court's decision. Under the circumstances of this particular case, we cannot say that the improper impeachment did not prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial. See, e.g., People v. Schuning, 106 Ill.2d 41, 48-49, 86 Ill.Dec. 922, 476 N.E.2d 423 (1985); Norwood, 164 Ill.App.3d at 703, 115 Ill.Dec. 721, 518 N.E.2d 246 (viewing evidence as not overwhelming and holding that erroneously admitted prior conviction may have played an important role in the credibility determination of the trier of fact; That possibility requires that defendant be given a new trial), citing Schuning, 106 Ill.2d at 48-49, 86 Ill.Dec. 922, 476 N.E.2d 423; Whirl, 351 Ill.App.3d at 467-68, 286 Ill.Dec. 646, 814 N.E.2d 872 (holding that Montgomery violation in that case adversely affect[ed] the integrity of the criminal process); Parsons, 88 Ill.App.3d at 47, 43 Ill.Dec. 524, 410 N.E.2d 524 (holding that [u]nder the circumstances of the instant case we cannot agree that the error [ Montgomery violation] was harmless); People v. Luna, 81 Ill.App.3d 246, 250, 36 Ill.Dec. 821, 401 N.E.2d 662 (1980) (given the importance of the credibility issue in this case, we cannot say that the admission of defendant's prior conviction did not have effect upon the jury's verdict). The dissent fails to apprehend the serious nature of the trial court's reversible error, which this court explained 37 years ago in Montgomery. Defendant's prior conviction came into this case only because he took the witness stand to testify in his own defense. The sole purpose of admitting defendant's prior conviction was to damage his credibility as a witness. The probative value of that prior conviction is based on the assumption that one who was convicted of aggravated battery 13 years ago will more likely than not testify falsely today. The prejudicial effect of this evidence is unmistakable. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d at 514, 268 N.E.2d 695. Montgomery rendered defendant's prior conviction, being over 10 years old, legally incompetent. However, the trial court erroneously considered this incompetent evidence. A court has no right to override the rules of evidence at trial merely because the case is tried to the court sitting without a jury. People v. Reichert, 352 Ill. 358, 361, 185 N.E. 585 (1933). This court explained long ago: A defendant charged with crime has a right to a fair and impartial trial according to the rules of law requiring the exclusion of incompetent and prejudicial evidence. Regardless of his depravity of character or how full of crime his past life may have been, he is entitled to be tried only upon competent evidence and to stand before the jury unprejudiced by improper reference to his former crimes. The law does not provide one method for trying innocent persons and another for trying guilty persons. All persons are presumed to be innocent of the crime with which they are charged until they have been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt according to the established methods of procedure. People v. Lund, 382 Ill. 213, 217, 46 N.E.2d 929 (1943). Defendant deserved no less at his trial. Although we conclude that the evidence is closely balanced, we nevertheless find, after carefully reviewing the record, that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore find that there is no double jeopardy impediment to a new trial. By this finding, however, we reach no conclusion as to defendant's guilt that would be binding on retrial. See, e.g., Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d at 566-67, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403; People v. Tenney, 205 Ill.2d 411, 442, 275 Ill.Dec. 800, 793 N.E.2d 571 (2002); People v. Nelson, 193 Ill.2d 216, 228, 250 Ill.Dec. 10, 737 N.E.2d 632 (2000). Due to our disposition of this cause, we need not address the parties' alternative arguments.