Opinion ID: 563252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Evidence Concerning the Prior Smuggling Attempt

Text: 42 Gonzalez argues that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow the testimony concerning the truck he had previously owned, particularly to the extent that such testimony linked Gonzalez to a crime for which he was never indicted or charged, much less convicted. The Government contends that the decision to admit the testimony was correct on both grounds relied upon by the trial judge: first, that the evidence was relevant to the issues of Gonzalez' intent and knowledge, and was therefore admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), and second, that the defendant opened the door to the evidence by inquiring into the thoroughness of the officer's investigation of the case.
43 Rule 404(b) is a rule that both excludes and admits evidence. 2 It excludes evidence of a defendant's character when that evidence is introduced solely for the purpose of showing that the defendant had a bad character and that he acted in conformity with it. On the other hand, Rule 404(b) admits evidence of prior bad acts by the defendant introduced to prove things unrelated to character, such as the defendant's state of mind. 44 The basic test for deciding whether Rule 404(b) authorizes the admission of evidence of prior acts is well settled. In order to be admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts must meet two criteria: 1) it must be relevant to some issue other than the defendant's character, and 2) its probative value must be greater than its potential to unfairly prejudice the jury. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979). For instance, Rule 404(b) permits the prosecution to introduce evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts if that evidence tends to establish the defendant's knowledge or intent, or a particular modus operandi of the defendant. United States v. Brookins, 919 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir.1990). 45 The admission of evidence under Rule 404(b), however, carries with it certain well-recognized dangers. As this Court warned in Beechum, 46 [o]ne of the dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic offense evidence is that the jury may convict the defendant not for the offense charged but for the extrinsic offense. 47 582 F.2d at 914. The Beechum court added, in language applicable to this case, that 48 [t]his danger is particularly great where, as here, the extrinsic activity was not the subject of a conviction; the jury may feel that the defendant should be punished for that activity even if he is not guilty of the offense charged. 49 Id. It is for this fear, the court added, ... that extrinsic offense evidence is excluded when it is relevant solely to the issue of the defendant's character. Id. 50 In order to minimize the particularly great danger presented by admission of evidence of a prior bad act which did not result in a conviction, this Court has insisted that evidence proffered under Rule 404(b) meet certain minimum criteria. In particular, before the trial court even begins to assess the probative value and potential prejudice of evidence of prior bad acts, that evidence must first have crossed a threshold requirement of relevancy: the prior bad acts to be laid before the jury must be shown to be relevant to the defendant. That is, there must be some proof that it was the defendant who committed those acts. In the absence of such proof, the evidence of those acts is of no help to the jury, as it is not possible to say that those acts reflect anything at all about the defendant. As this Court has previously put it, [t]he predicate to relevance of an extrinsic offense is proof that the defendant actually committed the offense. United States v. Jimenez, 613 F.2d 1373, 1376 (5th Cir.1980) (citing Beechum). 51 The Government is not required to show that the defendant was convicted as a result of the prior bad acts; by its terms, Rule 404(b) encompasses wrongs and acts in addition to crimes. Also, there is no requirement that the prior conduct even have resulted in an indictment or a formal charge. See United States v. Fowler, 735 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir.1984) (in prosecution for conspiracy to defraud government procurement office, prosecution properly allowed to introduce evidence that defendants had previously engaged in similar scheme, even though they had not been indicted for that scheme). However, the Government must at least provide some evidence that the defendant committed the prior bad act. In the language of our prior cases, the Government must provide evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that the defendant committed the act. See, e.g., United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d 526, 528 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 213 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1008, 104 S.Ct. 1003, 79 L.Ed.2d 235 (1984). 3 52 Viewed even against this generous standard, however, it is clear that the Government did not establish a proper basis under Rule 404(b) for admission of the testimony concerning the prior smuggling attempt. The Government presented no evidence at all that it was Gonzalez who committed that offense. Because there was no showing that the prior acts to be laid before the jury were the acts of Gonzalez, the evidence was not shown to meet the threshold relevancy requirements of Rule 404(b). Thus, as this Court put it in Jimenez, the extrinsic offense evidence los[t] the race toward admissibility before even reaching the starting mark. 613 F.2d at 1376.
53 The fact that the testimony regarding the prior smuggling attempt may not have been admissible as a prior act of Gonzalez under Rule 404(b) does not end the inquiry. As noted, the problem under Rule 404(b) was that the Government failed to establish the relevancy of the evidence of the prior smuggling attempt by failing to make any showing that Gonzalez played any role in that offense. The fact that the evidence was not shown to be relevant for purposes of Rule 404(b), however, does not mean that the evidence is not relevant. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, [r]elevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case. Fed.R.Evid. 401, Advisory Committee Note. 4 Thus, although the evidence may not be relevant as evidence of a prior bad act, it may well be relevant on other grounds, and admissible under other rules of evidence. 54 Indeed, the district court found that the evidence that Gonzalez had owned a tractor-trailer rig which had been used in a prior smuggling attempt was relevant to several issues in the case. As the trial judge pointed out in his ruling admitting the evidence, that evidence tends to show at least four things: 1) the thoroughness of the Government's investigation, 2) the defendant's awareness that tractor-trailer rigs are used to smuggle large quantities of marijuana across the border, 3) the defendant's awareness that his own tractor-trailer rig had been used to smuggle marijuana across the border at the Falfurrias checkpoint, and 4) the source of the funds used to purchase the tractor involved in this case. 5 Given that this evidence was relevant to so many issues, the only question is whether it should nonetheless have been withheld from the jury. 55 As a general matter, all relevant evidence is admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 402. Of course, relevancy has its limits: the rules of evidence provide that even if it is relevant, evidence may be excluded if it is cumulative of other evidence, will confuse or mislead the jury, or presents a danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Fed.R.Evid. 403. Gonzalez contends that the evidence relating to the prior smuggling attempt was prejudicial, and therefore should have been excluded. In support of his contention he cites the language quoted above from the Beechum case, pointing out the danger that the jury may have convicted Gonzalez for a crime he did not commit. 56 While the Court agrees that there may have been some danger of unfair prejudice to Gonzalez, the Court is also persuaded that that danger was greatly reduced by two factors. First, defense counsel was entitled to--and did--cross-examine the investigating officer, bringing out the fact that there was never any evidence developed against Gonzalez with respect to the prior smuggling attempt. 2 R. 93-94. Such an admission by the Government's own witness undoubtedly reduced the chance that the jury would convict Gonzalez for the prior smuggling attempt. Second, the trial judge explicitly instructed the jury that they were to use the evidence only for the limited purposes of deciding how thoroughly the Government had investigated the crime and what Gonzalez' state of mind was when he was stopped at the border. These limiting instructions were entirely proper. Combined with the defense's ability to bring out the truth on cross-examination, this Court is confident that the introduction of the evidence relating to the prior smuggling attempt would not lead the jury to convict Gonzalez for that prior crime. 57 In the end, though, the question before this Court is not whether the evidence relating to the prior smuggling attempt was prejudicial, or even whether it was admissible; the question on review is whether the district court abused its discretion when it decided to admit the evidence. When confronted with a question of whether to admit relevant evidence pursuant to Rules 401 and 402, or to exclude it on one of the grounds set forth in Rule 403, the trial court must weigh the probative value of the evidence against its potential to do the harms set out in Rule 403. Situations in this area call for balancing the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from its admission. Fed.R.Evid. 403, Advisory Committee Note. This balancing depends greatly on the trial judge's perception of the positions of the parties, the exigencies of the case, and the likely effect of the contested evidence on the jury. Accordingly, the weighing conducted by the trial judge is given great deference on review: the court of appeals will reverse the decision only upon a clear showing that the trial judge has abused his considerable discretion. E.g., Jon-T Chem., Inc. v. Freeport Chem. Co., 704 F.2d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir.1983); Wright v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 580 F.2d 809, 810 (5th Cir.1978). 58 Gonzalez has not shown a clear abuse of discretion by the district court. The probative value of evidence here was substantial. It tended to show, quite strongly, not only that the Government had engaged in a thorough investigation, but also that Gonzalez knew that marijuana was smuggled across the border in tractor-trailer rigs, and indeed that it had been smuggled in his own tractor-trailer. The evidence thus allowed the jury to infer that Gonzalez knew what was in the trailer when he attempted to bring it across the border. While the evidence regarding the prior smuggling certainly carried some risk of prejudice--it may have linked Gonzalez to criminal activity of which he was innocent--that danger was sufficiently reduced by the trial judge's limiting instruction to the jury, 6 and the defense counsel's cross-examination of the investigating officer. On the whole, this Court simply cannot say that the trial judge's weighing of the evidence and decision to admit it amounted to a clear abuse of discretion.