Opinion ID: 204007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: De León-Martínez

Text: We apply the same Teeter analysis to the contentions of De León. De León does not dispute that the first two Teeter factors are met in his case. Rather, he argues that enforcing the waiver would be a miscarriage of justice, because the district court impermissibly inserted itself into the plea bargaining process, in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c). De León points to three such incidents that ostensibly violate the Rule, but none withstands close scrutiny. First, during a status conference, the court inquired into the likelihood of a plea bargain and then stated, I'm available to discuss the case any time. You just let me know. We fail to see how such an innocuous comment constitutes impermissible intervention in the plea bargaining process, and in any event, a single brief remark during negotiations [has] been held not to constitute impermissible judicial participation in plea discussions. United States v. Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 462 (4th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Uribe-Londono, 409 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2005) (holding there was no error when court simply inquired about the status of any plea negotiations). Second, at the change of plea hearing, after the parties had reached a plea agreement, De León's counsel voiced his concern that, notwithstanding the plea agreement's recommendation of a 30-month minimum sentence, an impending change to the Guidelines might yield a lower sentencing calculation. In response, the court reiterated that it had final authority over the sentence, and indicated it would schedule the sentencing hearing for November 15, 2007, after any change to the Guidelines had taken effect. Informing the defendant about the court's authority and calendaring options after a plea agreement had been reached does not constitute participation in the plea bargaining process in any way. Because the plea negotiations between the parties had come to an end and the parties had signed a written plea agreement before the district judge was involved, it is hard to characterize the judge's comments as participation in any [plea] discussions. United States v. Cannady, 283 F.3d 641, 644 (4th Cir.2002). Finally, at a hearing on De León's motion for new counsel conducted a week prior to sentencing, the court questioned the defendant about his dissatisfaction with counsel, reiterated that the court had ultimate sentencing authority over the defendant, and praised the defendant's counsel. Nothing forbids a court from questioning the defendant regarding the terms, consequences, and acceptance of the plea agreement or from providing the defendant with information relating to these matters, and we perceive no error here. See United States v. Carver, 160 F.3d 1266, 1269 (10th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 49, 53-54 (1st Cir.2008) (court's assurances about counsel's competence did not amount to judicial participation in plea negotiations). Thus, we conclude that there is no miscarriage of justice, and we enforce the appeal waiver agreed to by the parties.