Opinion ID: 2479914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Foundational Challenge

Text: The defendant argues generally before this court that the trial court committed reversible error when it permitted Lambatos to testify that the defendant's DNA profile matched the male DNA profile of the semen in L.J.'s vaginal swabs. The defendant specifically argues that the trial court erred in admitting Lambatos' testimony regarding the match because a sufficient foundation was not established. The defendant additionally argues that Lambatos' testimony violated his sixth amendment confrontation right under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). We begin with the foundational argument. We apply the abuse of discretion standard to the defendant's foundational challenge to the trial court's admission of Lambatos' expert testimony. People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill.2d 97, 141, 335 Ill.Dec. 818, 919 N.E.2d 843 (2009); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 281, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006). The defendant contends that the trial court should not have permitted the State's forensic analyst to testify because of a lack of sufficient testimony that the Cellmark report was reliable. According to the defendant, when expert testimony relies upon data obtained from electronic or mechanical equipment, the proponent of the testimony must offer foundational proof that the equipment was calibrated and functioning properly at the time the data was presented in order to establish that the expert's testimony is reliable. The State responds that Lambatos' testimony that Cellmark's testing was done according to valid scientific theory and reliable methodology provided a sound basis upon which Lambatos could formulate her opinion. Therefore, the State asserts that it was not obliged to present additional testimony regarding the calibration and functioning of Cellmark's equipment to admit Lambatos' expert opinion pursuant to Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill.2d 186, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981). We agree with the State. In Wilson v. Clark , this court adopted Rules 703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning an expert's testimony at trial. Wilson, 84 Ill.2d at 196, 49 Ill. Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322. Former Rule 703 states in part: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Fed.R.Evid. 703 (amended 2000). The court in Wilson noted that, in a trial context, [b]oth Federal and State courts have interpreted Federal Rule 703 to allow opinions based on facts not in evidence. Wilson, 84 Ill.2d at 193, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322. Rule 705 states: The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. Fed.R.Evid. 705. Following Rule 705, we held in Wilson that, at trial, an expert may give an opinion without disclosing the facts underlying that opinion. Wilson, 84 Ill.2d at 194, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322. Under Rule 705 the burden is placed upon the adverse party during cross-examination to elicit the facts underlying the expert opinion. Wilson, 84 Ill.2d at 194, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322. Thus, an expert testifying at trial may offer an opinion based on facts not in evidence, and the expert is not required on direct examination to disclose the facts underlying the expert's opinion. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill.2d 324, 334, 266 Ill.Dec. 915, 775 N.E.2d 987 (2002). This court applied Wilson v. Clark to DNA evidence in People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006). There, the defendant filed a motion during trial to bar testimony from Terry Melton, the president of Mitotyping Technologies, concerning human mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). Melton did not complete the actual laboratory bench work on the evidence. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 281, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178. The defendant argued that, without the lab technician's testimony, Melton's testimony regarding the mtDNA results was improper. We rejected that argument, holding that it was enough that Melton relied upon data reasonably relied upon by other experts in her field. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 282, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178. Here, the trial court correctly denied defense counsel's objection to the foundation for Lambatos' expert opinion. It is undisputed that Lambatos was qualified as an expert in forensic biology and DNA analysis; Lambatos testified that it is the commonly accepted practice in the scientific community for a forensic DNA analyst to rely on the work of other analysts to complete her own work; and Lambatos based her opinion on information reasonably relied upon by experts in her field. As in Sutherland, Lambatos testified that Cellmark's work on the vaginal swabs in this case and the results of the PCR analysis conducted by Kooi are the types of data reasonably relied upon by experts in her field. Lambatos testified that, because Cellmark was an accredited laboratory, calibrations, internal proficiencies, and controls had to be in place for the DNA analysis to be completed in this case. These internal controls were, according to Lambatos' testimony, ones that she personally developed. Lambatos herself reviewed Cellmark's data, including the electropherogram, and did not have any question about the match. Rather, she used her own expertise to compare the two profiles before her. She also did not observe any problems in the chain of custody or any signs of contamination or degradation of the evidence. Lambatos ultimately agreed with Cellmark's results regarding the male DNA profile, and then made her own visual and interpretive comparisons of the peaks on the electropherogram and the table of alleles to conclude there was a match to the defendant's genetic profile. See P. Gianelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 18.04(b), at 54 (4th ed. 2009) (in STR testing, the analyst can visually compare the two electropherograms or rely on a computerized comparison). We also reject the defendant's specific complaint that there was no testimony that the instruments used by Cellmark were calibrated and functioning properly. The defendant principally relies on People v. Raney, 324 Ill.App.3d 703, 258 Ill.Dec. 356, 756 N.E.2d 338 (2001). Raney held that where the expert testimony is based upon an electronic or mechanical device, the expert must provide some foundational proof that the device was functioning properly at the time it was used. Raney, 324 Ill. App.3d at 710, 258 Ill.Dec. 356, 756 N.E.2d 338. The defendant there argued that the State failed to establish a proper foundation for the admission of scientific results from the gas chromotography mass spectrometer (GCMS) machine. The court agreed, finding that the record contained no evidence regarding whether the GCMS machine was functioning properly at the time it was used to analyze the substance. Further, the Raney court stated an expert should be able to explain how the GCMS machine was calibrated or why she knew the results were accurate. Raney, 324 Ill.App.3d at 710, 258 Ill.Dec. 356, 756 N.E.2d 338, citing People v. Bynum, 257 Ill.App.3d 502, 196 Ill.Dec. 179, 629 N.E.2d 724 (1994). Finding a lack of such an explanation, the court concluded that the State failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because of the lack of foundation. Raney, 324 Ill.App.3d at 711, 258 Ill.Dec. 356, 756 N.E.2d 338. The Raney court acknowledged, however, that [i]t may not be feasible for each expert to personally test the instrument relied upon for purposes of determining what is a suspected controlled substance. Raney, 324 Ill.App.3d at 710, 258 Ill.Dec. 356, 756 N.E.2d 338. We find that the testing of narcotics using a GCMS machine is not comparable to the scientific process at issue in this case. At the defendant's bench trial, Lambatos did not merely regurgitate results generated by a machine, as the witness in Raney did. Lambatos conducted an independent evaluation of data related to samples of genetic material, including items processed at both Cellmark and the ISP Crime Lab. Lambatos used her expertise and professional judgment to compare the DNA profiles. Her examination of the different alleles from the blood sample and from the semen sample indicated a match with the defendant. She also determined the statistical probability of the match by examining the alleles and entering them into a frequency database to determine how common they are in the general population. Further, this case is distinguishable from Raney because Lambatos maintained that Cellmark necessarily met the threshold of proper DNA analysis because Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and followed guidelines that she had personally developed. We therefore do not accept the defendant's invitation to broadly interpret Raney to find an insufficient foundation where an analyst merely relies upon data obtained from electronic or mechanical equipment. Finally, under Wilson, the burden is placed upon the adverse party during cross-examination to elicit facts underlying the expert opinion. Wilson, 84 Ill.2d at 194, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322, citing Fed.R.Evid. 705. The record reveals substantial cross-examination of Lambatos' comparison of the DNA profile from the database to the DNA profile from the sexual assault kit. The record also reveals that the trial court, sitting as a fact finder, appropriately weighed the testimony. It stated: The DNA expert that testified, the last witness, was in my view the best DNA witness I have ever heard. Under detail [ sic ], lengthy complex cross-examination by the defense on every single part of her report she explains, she told what was the basis of her opinion, she was an outstanding witness in every respect. There is the issue of she didn't do the actual test. The testing is farmed out to other labs. Some did the testing, some are an accredited lab. That was part of the playback you might say of the Illinois state police forensic division at that time, and I agree with the State that there is no misidentification here. This is a match, this is 1 in 8.7 quadrillion, 50 times the population for the last 2000 years. It's an absolute match. Accordingly, the issue of Lambatos' reliance on Cellmark's report went to the weight of her opinion and not its admissibility. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___, ___ n. 1, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2532 n. 1, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, 322 n. 1 (2009) (stating that it was not the case that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case). The trial court assessed the weight of Lambatos' testimony and found it convincing. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a sufficient foundation for Lambatos' testimony and therefore turn to the defendant's Crawford argument.