Opinion ID: 1700511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Failure to Object to Evidence of Aggravating Circumstances

Text: In issue 25, Ryan alleges that his trial counsel unreasonably failed to object to evidence offered by the State to support aggravating circumstances (1)(a) and (1)(d), and failed to prepare to confront or rebut such evidence. The gist of Ryan's argument in his brief appears to be that his attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of whether evidence of other crimes, admitted for a limited purpose at trial, could properly be considered by the sentencing court. According to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2522 (Reissue 1989), when a court imposes the death penalty, it is required to make its determination in writing, and such determination shall be supported by written findings of fact based upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceeding, and referring to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances involved in its determination. (Emphasis supplied.) Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2521 (Reissue 1989) states that [i]n the proceeding for determination of sentence, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence .... Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the sentencing court, in imposing the death penalty, has not only the statutory authority to consider the trial record, but is statutorily required to make written findings of fact based upon that record. Moreover, we have held that the sentencing phase ... is separate and apart from the trial phase and the traditional rules of evidence may be relaxed following conviction so that the sentencing authority can receive all information pertinent to the imposition of sentence. State v. Anderson and Hochstein, 207 Neb. 51, 72, 296 N.W.2d 440, 453 (1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 1025, 101 S.Ct. 1731, 68 L.Ed.2d 219 (1981). A sentencing court has broad discretion as to the source and type of evidence and information which may be used in determining the kind and extent of the punishment to be imposed. See, e.g., State v. Hoffman, 246 Neb. 265, 517 N.W.2d 618 (1994); State v. Dean, 237 Neb. 65, 464 N.W.2d 782 (1991); State v. Clear, 236 Neb. 648, 463 N.W.2d 581 (1990). Even though the evidence of prior crimes and bad acts on the part of Ryan had been admitted for a limited purpose at the time of trial, the sentencing court was entitled, in its discretion, to consider and use such evidence in determining Ryan's sentence. That being the case, Ryan has suffered no prejudice from any failure of counsel to object to the use of such evidence in sentencing. Ryan is not entitled to postconviction relief on this issue.