Opinion ID: 2103748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: February 25, 1991, Statements in Boone County

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the State to place into evidence the defendant's recorded statement of February 25, asserting that it was involuntary because made under an unkept promise of leniency. After being transported from the Indiana State Police Post in Lafayette to the Boone County Jail, the defendant was allowed to consult with attorney Michael Gross, who had been appointed to represent him. The inculpatory portion of the recorded statement was preceded with the following express and recorded acknowledgement by the defendant: The above statement of my rights has been read to me and I am fully aware of those rights. I do fully understand those rights. I hereby acknowledge that I have, I at one time requested a lawyer and now have an attorney present. I further acknowledge that I have initiated this interview and that I have requested to make a statement. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. This waiver of my rights has been knowingly and voluntarily made by me without any promises or threats having been made to me and further without any pressure or coercion having been used against me. Record at 3566-67. Thereafter, the recorded interview contains the following statement by the prosecutor: And I would first specify that this agreement is being entered into after Mr. Bivins has already confessed in a non-recorded or non-recorded [sic] confession, which took place earlier this evening. And this agreement is being, has been negotiated only after that admission was made. In exchange for the cooperation of Mr. Bivins, and like I said, his agreement to cooperate fully in the prosecution of this case and providing truthful information relating to both a robbery at the Holiday Inn which occurred on January 16, 1991, here in Lebanon, Boone County, and also to a murder that occurred at a rest stop on I-65, north, here in Boone County, Indiana, that: Mr. Bivins will be charged with robbery as a Class B felony as it relates to the Holiday Inn in Lebanon. That he will plead guilty straight up. In other words, that he will plead guilty with both defense and the State reserving the right to argue sentencing.    I, the Prosecutor, will talk if at all possible tomorrow with the Prosecutors in both Tippecanoe and Carroll County. I can do no more than represent that I will ask that they run concurrent any time for charges that Mr. Bivins may face there, which I understand to relate to forgeries in both of those counties. That's the agreement as I understand it to be. Record at 3568-69. The recorded statement later includes the defendant's statement that he participated in the Holiday Inn robbery, that he was at the interstate highway rest stop but outside the restroom when Reverend Radcliffe was murdered, and that it was Weyls who actually shot Radcliffe. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the State made an offer of immunity and leniency to obtain Bivins' confession to having been a participant in the murder of Reverend Radcliffe. Brief of Appellant at 105. [3] He contends that the confession must be deemed involuntary and therefore not admissible because it was obtained by promises of immunity or mitigation of punishment. In resolving this issue, the relevant inquiry is whether the State's promise induced a confession which was not freely self-determined. Fowler v. State (1985), Ind., 483 N.E.2d 739, 744 quoted with approval in Drew v. State (1987), Ind., 503 N.E.2d 613, 617. The trial court must determine whether the State's behavior was such as to overbear the defendant's will to resist and to bring about a confession not freely self-determined. Smith v. State (1989), Ind., 543 N.E.2d 634, 637. On appeal, we consider any uncontroverted evidence and, in the case of conflicting evidence, that which supports the trial court's decision. Id. Further, where a promise of immunity or leniency was not initiated by the State but rather solicited by a defendant as a precondition for making a statement, a defendant manifests the propensity and willingness to make a freely self-determined, voluntary statement not induced by prosecutorial misconduct. Drew, 503 N.E.2d at 617. Where a promise of leniency results from a defendant's specific request for it as a precondition for making a statement, rather than being initiated by the State, its voluntariness is not impaired thereby. Collins v. State (1987), Ind., 509 N.E.2d 827, 830; Drew, 503 N.E.2d at 617. We find that this statement by the defendant was voluntary. The State's offer of leniency was precipitated by the defendant's specific request. It was the defendant who sought contact with the prosecutor. As in Drew, the defendant had already manifested a propensity and willingness to make a voluntary statement before the State offered leniency. Thus, the defendant's resulting statement was freely determined and not induced by State action.