Opinion ID: 1031675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Consent and Probable Cause to Search

Text: In his third assignment of error, Flores argues that he limited his consent by requesting that the troopers not damage his vehicle. Because of this, Flores asserts that Herndon could only have drilled into his axle if they had probable cause, which Flores maintains they lacked. According to Flores, although Trooper Herndon testified at length about the axles not appearing to be “factory axles,” that created nothing more than an inarticulable hunch insufficient to form probable cause. Relying on case law from other Circuits, Flores argues that, although the axles could be capable of holding contraband, the troopers did not have any additional specific facts indicating a fair probability that drugs would be found therein, thereby depriving them of probable cause. The Government responds with three justifications supporting the district court’s conclusion that the troopers did not exceed the scope of Flores’s consent. First, the Government argues that Flores did not limit the scope of his consent; he simply inquired whether the troopers would damage his vehicle in the search. When Trooper Herndon responded that the Highway Patrol would take care of any damage that occurred, Flores did not object, thereby demonstrating his satisfaction with the trooper’s answer. Second, the government maintains that, in driving his Bronco and trailer to a truck stop mechanic’s bay, 23 Flores understood the troopers would be looking for drugs in hidden areas, including the axles. By going along with this, Flores’s conduct bolsters the conclusion that the search of the axles was within the scope of his consent. Third, even if Flores limited the scope of his consent by inquiring about damage, the Government asserts that drilling the axles did not exceed the limitation, as the small drill hole did not impair the functionality of the axles in any way. Where a defendant argues that law enforcement officers exceeded his or her consent, “[t]he standard for measuring the scope of . . . consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89 (1990), Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1983), and id. at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Neely, 564 F.3d 346, 350 (4th Cir. 2009). In this case, the district court correctly concluded that a reasonable person in Flores’s position would have understood he was consenting to a search of the trailer’s axles. Flores inquired whether the search would cause any damage to his vehicle, and Trooper Herndon notified him of that possibility. Only after that notice did Flores execute the written consent to search form, thereby consenting 24 with full awareness that the troopers might look within the axles. Additionally, when Trooper Herndon asked for additional consent to move the vehicle to the Pilot station, he explicitly stated the reason he wished to do so: he wanted to conduct a “closer inspection of the trailer axles because [he] suspected they contained some kind of contraband.” At the point Flores again consented, he was conscious to both the possibility of damage and the trooper’s interest in the contents of the axles. In other words, based on the trooper’s numerous explanations, at the time Flores consented to the continued search, a reasonable person would have known what the search would entail. In addition, the district court did not err in finding that Trooper Herndon, based on his training and experience, had probable cause to search the axle. If an officer has probable cause to believe a suspect is engaged in criminal activity, the officer may search the suspect’s vehicle even absent consent or a warrant. United States v. White, 549 F.3d 946, 949 (4th Cir. 2008). Probable cause exists where “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). In evaluating whether the officer had probable cause, courts examine the totality of the circumstances. White, 549 F.3d at 949. 25 Although there does not appear to be any Fourth Circuit precedent with analogous facts, case law from other jurisdictions lends support for the district court’s finding of probable cause. For instance, in United States v. MartelMartines, the Eighth Circuit found that officers had probable cause to search a suspect’s vehicle by punching a hole in the suspect’s truck bed based on the suspect’s evasive and inconsistent responses to questions, the fact that the suspect’s vehicle’s underside had been modified, and the existence of an inaccessible hidden compartment in the suspect’s truck. 988 F.2d 855, 858-59 (8th Cir. 1993). Likewise, in United States v. Arango, the Tenth Circuit held that the existence of a secreted compartment in the defendant’s truck, coupled with the fact that the defendant did not have adequate luggage for his reported two-week vacation, supplied probable cause. 912 F.2d 441, 447 (10th Cir. 1990). In United States v. Price, where burn marks on the bed of a truck drew the attention of officers, who then discovered a secret compartment within the bed, the Fifth Circuit determined the officers had probable cause to search the compartment itself. 869 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1989). Although customization of an automobile, standing alone, is likely insufficient to support probable cause, see United States v. Orrengo-Fernandez, 78 F.3d 1497, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1996), Martel-Martines, Arango, and Price indicate that the existence 26 of a hidden compartment is much more substantial, especially when coupled with other factors, see Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d at 858-59; Arango, 912 F.2d at 447; Price, 869 F.2d at 804. Additionally, circumstances indicating that an auto part is meant to conceal contraband can provide added support to an officer’s belief in the existence of probable cause. In United States v. Strickland, an officer noticed an uncharacteristically large, incongruently worn tire in the defendant’s trunk. 902 F.2d 937, 939, 943 (11th Cir. 1990). The tire was made by a different manufacturer than the other tires on the vehicle, had a bent rim, and was extremely heavy. Id. at 943. When the officer moved the tire, he noticed a flopping sound within. Id. These factors, coupled with the officer’s specialized knowledge based on training and experience in drug concealment methods, convinced the Eleventh Circuit that the officer had probable cause to cut the tire open and search inside. Id.; see also United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[C]onduct innocent in the eyes of the untrained may carry entirely different ‘messages’ to the experienced or trained observer.” (internal quotation omitted)). In this case, Trooper Herndon noticed the axles on the small, lightweight, two-wheel trailer were extremely large, especially considering the fact that the trailer bed was not reinforced to carry great weights. Upon examining the axles, he 27 and Trooper Hicks reached the conclusion--based on the numerous greasy smudges and handprints, the shiny, worn-down bolts, and other signs of removal--that the axles had been taken off and put on numerous times, even though such axles usually require little maintenance. Because of his eleven years of Highway Patrol and drug interdiction experience, Trooper Herndon was aware that vehicle axles are a common place for smugglers to hide drugs due to the fact that they are just hollow tubes, and the unusual size of these axles indicated they contained contraband. Moreover, both Flores and Mendez exhibited signs of extreme nervousness beyond that normally shown by traffic offenders in routine stops. The nervousness was not alleviated when the Trooper notified Flores he would only receive a warning. Flores and Mendez offered differing accounts of where they were going and what they were doing. In fact, Flores could not identify Mendez’s name, despite claiming she was his longtime girlfriend, and neither Mendez nor Flores could provide the name of the cousin or uncle they were out to help. According to Trooper Herndon, the trailer affixed to Flores’s Bronco was clearly insufficient to move all the property Flores alleged they would transport, and, despite Flores and Mendez’s story that they were traveling across the country, the troopers found no luggage consistent with such a voyage. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court was correct in 28 concluding that Trooper Herndon had a fair probability of discovering contraband in Flores’s trailer axles, and the search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Flores’s argument that the search was not within the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception due to the fact that the vehicle was not “readily mobile” after Flores exited is without merit. Numerous cases clarify that the ready mobility requirement is meant to distinguish a movable vehicle-- which can easily be relocated to prevent a search for contraband--from something that would more appropriately be described as a stationary home. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985); United States v. Brookins, 345 F.3d 231, 237 n.7 (4th Cir. 2003). In other words, the ready mobility element centers on “the nature of the use of the vehicle” and is more appropriate for consideration where the thing searched was being used as a house or exhibited the characteristics of a fixed dwelling rather than a functioning vehicle. Brookins, 345 F.3d at 237 n.7; see also Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93. Since Trooper Herndon observed Flores’s Bronco traveling on a public highway immediately prior to the search, this case satisfies the ready mobility requirement, and Flores’s objection is unavailing. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93. 29