Opinion ID: 579428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Foundation

Text: 7 Montague argues that there was not a proper foundation to bring the statement within Rule 801(b). He asserts that there was no express or implied charge of recent fabrication, or improper influence or motive to be rebutted. The government rightly counters that defendant's trial counsel, during her cross examination of Rustin, questioned him concerning his guilty plea and his hope for leniency. We agree with the trial judge that this constitutes at the very least an implied charge ... of ... improper ... motive, as required by Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The record bolsters our confidence in this conclusion by disclosing that the United States offered to withhold tender of the prior statement if the trial counsel would agree not to argue in closing to the jury that Rustin hoped by his testimony to influence the sentencing judge toward leniency. Trial counsel declined the government's offer. The trial court admitted the statement. The defense did use the argument of improper motive in closing. 8 Without regard to the closing argument, we think it apparent where the defense counsel suggests to the jury by cross examination that the government's witness hopes to secure clemency by his testimony, that cross examination constitutes at least an implied charge of improper motive, and possibly also of recent fabrication. United States v. Zito, 467 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir.1972). 9 Montague argues that that reasoning should not apply in the present case because the government trial counsel had questioned Rustin about his guilty plea and motives for testifying on direct examination. Rustin testified on direct, as on cross, that he had pleaded guilty and did in fact hope that the judge would consider his truthful testimony at the time of sentencing. However, this does not affect the application of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The government may anticipate that the defense will impugn the motive of a witness on cross examination in framing its direct. It may frame its direct so as to defuse that impugning without thereby surrendering its right to rebut defense charges of recent fabrication, improper influence, or motive thereafter made by the defense. See United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 588 (2d Cir.1986) (government  'impeachment' of its own witness does not prevent the government from responding to appellant's impeachment of the same witness); United States v. Allen, 579 F.2d 531, 532-33 (9th Cir.1978) (government may rebut charge of recent fabrication even where such charge is suggested by the government's evidence, so long as the government's evidence is not introduced merely to enable the bolstering of its case with prior consistent statement). 10 In short, when a defense attorney pursues a line of questioning designed to impugn the motives of a witness, she assumes the risk that the government will introduce rebuttal evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). United States v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314, 321-22 (7th Cir.1977).