Opinion ID: 3013382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Implications of Winklespecht

Text: Since oral argument in this matter, the Board has called to our attention the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Winklespecht v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, ___ A.2d ___, 2002 WL 31898105 (Pa. 2002). The Board cites this case in support of the proposition that S 331.1’s concern with protect[ing] the safety of the public, added nothing new to the parole process and[has] always been [an] underlying concern[ ]. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that S 331.1 does not change Pennsylvania policy as to the criteria for parole[n]or did the addition of this (new) language create a new offense or increase the penalty for an existing offense. Focusing on the added language to S 331.1 concerning protect[ing] the safety of the public and assist[ing] in the fair administration of justice, the court concluded that these concepts have always been underlying concerns. 27 This decision, made after the Board’s actions on Thomas’s parole, came too late to alter the Board’s view of the statutory amendment on the outcome of this case. Not having the benefit of the Supreme Court decision, the evidence before us shows that the Board interpreted S 331.1 to mandate foremost the consideration of public safety. The Board mistakenly construed the 1996 statutory change to signify a substantive change in its parole function. See Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 304 (6th Cir. 2000). As we noted previously, a public statement of the Board chairman and Board policy declaration confirm this substantive change in Board policy. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court too understood the 1996 amendment to enact a substantive change in Board policy. See Stewart, 714 A.2d at 508; Myers, 712 A.2d at 799. The Board’s actions and policy pronouncements demonstrate a marked added weight on public safety concerns, uninfluenced by the subsequent Court interpretation of the statute. E. Adverse Impact of Retrospective Policy on Thomas As to the second Ex Post Facto criterion, that the change must adversely affect the offender, the Board argues that Thomas, having been sentenced to life, had no legitimate expectation of ever being paroled. Board Brief at 10-11. It notes that, during the 1970s, only 10% of life sentences were commuted and paroled. That figure diminished to less than half a percent in the 1990s. The Governor’s power to grant commutation was in his absolute discretion, and thus, according to the Board, Thomas’s eligibility for parole was entirely speculative. The Board does not dispute that the possibility of parole at sentencing based on some explicit criteria gave rise to a liberty interest. Hence, the procedures for reviewing parole applications must be constitutionally sound. Garner held that the Ex Post Facto clause prohibited the application of post-conviction laws to prisoners that would result in a significant increase in the chances of prolonged incarceration. 529 U.S. at 251. Prisoners are entitled to know the range of punishments available at the time of sentencing, and during the adjudication of their case, so that they can plea bargain and strategize effectively: The Ex 28 Post Facto clause (1) . . . prevents legislatures from interfering with the executive and judicial roles of prosecution and punishment; and (2) it assures that legislative acts give fair warning of what actions will be punished and the degree to which they will be punished. Coady, 251 F.3d at 487-88. Therefore, an offender, prior to his conviction and sentencing, is entitled to know not only his maximum possible punishment, but also his or her chances of receiving early release, since this too is a relevant factor in the plea bargaining calculus. An adverse change in one’s prospects for release disadvantages a prisoner just as surely as an upward change in the minimum duration of sentence. The possibility of commutation existed at the time of Thomas’s conviction and sentence. The relevant criterion for determining the applicability of ex post facto analysis is the effect of new policies on eligibility for reduced imprisonment, rather than any fixed guarantee of release. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 445 (1997) (emphasis added). Therefore, a sentence that contained the right to parole consideration would give rise to a constitutional expectation that the parole guidelines extant at the time of the crime would be applied. See Garner, 529 U.S. at 250. Eligibility for a commutation of a life sentence entails the possibility of parole, albeit a more distant possibility than for sentences that carry the possibility of parole ab initio. It also gives rise to the expectation that the parole criteria in effect at the time of the crime will be applied. The Board contends that there was never a significant possibility, given the unlikelihood of commutation, that Thomas would ever be paroled. Garner, 529 U.S. at 256. Indeed, as the Board contends, in most cases of life sentences in Pennsylvania, parole will never be an option as commutations are quite rare. However, as unlikely as these initial prospects for parole might have been, the application of the new parole policies in Thomas’s case rendered them even more remote. The new policy substantially increased the period of incarceration; it reduced the possibilities of ever obtaining release. The Board’s reliance on California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 508-09 (1995) is misplaced. 29 Although the parole policy change in Morales wrought a small change in the average duration of a prison sentence, the change was held to be too minuscule to rise to a constitutional violation. Morales considered the effect of a procedural change in parole law, which provided for a greater wait-period between first and second hearings. Id. at 507. Here the substantive criteria for parole release have changed. Lynce v. Mathis set forth a key distinction between the Morales case and this petition. In Lynce, a law in effect at the time of conviction provided that if a prison population reached approximately 98% of its capacity, good conduct credits needed for early release could be acquired at an accelerated pace. The law was changed during the prisoner’s sentence, and his accelerated credits, earned during a time of over-98% prison capacity, were cancelled and parole denied. 519 U.S. at 438-39. The Lynce prison officials argued that, at the time of conviction, it was entirely speculative whether the prison would become overcrowded during the petitioner’s incarceration, and thus he was excluded from ex post facto protection under the holding in Morales. However, Lynce distinguished Morales, because there was no evidence in Morales that the change affected the petitioner’s own sentence detrimentally. Lynce, 519 U.S. at 447. In Lynce, the population did exceed 98% during petitioner’s incarceration, and by his own conduct the prisoner achieved enough credits for good behavior, so that he became eligible for release under the old rules. The change in policy had the effect of increasing the punishment in his individual case and thus violated ex post facto. Id. Thus, under Lynce’s reasoning, the parole change substantially impacted Thomas in violation of the Ex Post Facto clause. Moreover, Thomas is entitled to the benefits of his good behavior in prison; the opportunity to reduce his sentence through commutation, no matter how speculative, existed at the time of Thomas’s crime. Thomas successfully attained a commutation of his sentence; he was entitled to corresponding reduction in sentence. We, therefore, hold that to retroactively apply changes in the parole laws made after conviction for a life sentence in 30 Pennsylvania that adversely affect the release of prisoners whose sentences have been commuted, violates the Ex Post Facto clause.