Opinion ID: 2087919
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sentences Imposed on Sweet and Poulin

Text: [¶ 16] Sweet and Poulin argue that the court erred in determining that the sentences for the Class A gross sexual assaults fall in the upper tier of sentences, allowing sentences of up to 40 years. They argue that the court misapplied the provisions of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251(2)(A) by considering more than the nature of the crimes and the criminal histories of the defendants in its analysis, and more generally, that the court erred in concluding that these crimes were among the most heinous ways that a gross sexual assault can be committed. We disagree. [¶ 17] We first address the court's application of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251(2)(A). At sentencing, the court clearly articulated the factors to be considered in determining whether the upper or lower tier was applicable to the crimes before it: So we can consider prior record in addition to the heinousness or lack of heinousness of any particular crime in deciding whether the matter is tipped over into the second tier. The court then discussed the nature and seriousness of the crimes and the criminal histories of the defendants. Although the court did not pause and announce explicitly that the second tier was appropriate in sentencing both defendants on the gross sexual assault charges, its conclusion was unmistakable. Moreover, when it reached the determination of maximum sentences, the court considered the full panoply of aggravating and mitigating factors, see 17-A 17 M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(2), and reiterated the specific factors it had considered in reaching the second tier. [4] Although defendants' confusion from reading the cold record of the sentencing is understandable, on close review of the court's articulation of its decisions, we discern no error in the application of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251(2)(A). [¶ 18] We next address the defendants' contention that the court engaged in a misapplication of principle when it found that the sentences met the criteria for the upper tier. Primarily, Sweet and Poulin argue that their conduct leading to the gross sexual assault charges was not violent, and therefore enhanced sentences were inappropriate. They are correct that their conduct did not include forced, precipitously violent, or injury-producing conduct. Rather, their method of obtaining victims had as its center point coercion, not physical violence. Stripped to its essence, their goal was to create willing and eager sexual partners of children. By their actions, they exposed their victims to an environment of sex, alcohol, and pornography. They undertook these actions with boys whose ages placed them at the cusp of sexual development. Their actions in this regard may well have created greater long-term damage to their victims than a violent one-time assault could have done. [5] In addition, the young victims were subjected to anal penetration, attempted penetration, and a variety of other physically intrusive sexual activities. We conclude, as did the sentencing court, that such conduct is sufficiently heinous that the absence of precipitous violence does not preclude a sentence in the upper tier.
[¶ 19] Sweet and Poulin next challenge the court's imposition of consecutive sentences. In Sweet's case, a five-year sentence was added consecutively to the 35-year sentence on the gross sexual assault sentence. In Poulin's case, the imposition of consecutive sentences had a greater impact. He was sentenced to 30 years on each of the gross sexual assault charges. Because the charges related to different victims, the court ordered the two 30-year sentences to be served consecutively. Added to the consecutive five year sexual abuse of a minor sentence on the third victim, these sentences result in the 65-year term that Poulin will have to serve. We review the sentencing court's decision to impose consecutive sentences for abuse of discretion. See Shulikov, 1998 ME 111, ¶ 28, 712 A.2d at 511-12; Prewara, 687 A.2d at 954. [¶ 20] We recognize that the action of imposing consecutive sentences has resulted in final sentences, particularly in Poulin's case, that are at the high end of sentencing, even for such heinous crimes. The Legislature has, however, approved consecutive sentences in certain circumstances. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2) (1983 & Supp.1999). Specifically, section 1256(2) provides that consecutive sentences are proper if: (1) the convictions are for offenses ... arising from different criminal episodes; (2) the defendant was... on probation ... at the time the person committed a subsequent offense; or (3) the seriousness of the criminal conduct involved ... or the seriousness of the criminal record of the convicted person, or both, require a sentence of imprisonment in excess of the maximum available for the most serious offense. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2)(A), (B), & (D); see also Shulikov, 1998 ME 111, ¶ 12, 712 A.2d at 512. [¶ 21] Most, if not all, of those factors were present as to each defendant. Both Sweet and Poulin were on probation during part or all of the time during which these offenses were committed. [6] The charges arose from different criminal episodes, involving the victimization of two boys in Sweet's case and three boys in Poulin's case. The serious nature of the crimes against these children cannot be disputed. In each instance, the defendants groomed the boys for sexual encounters. This included giving them drugs or alcohol, exposing them to man/boy pornography, and encouraging the boys to engage in sexual activities with each other. Both defendants were aware that their actions were criminal and that they were at grave risk of lengthy incarceration for those acts. Nonetheless, they continued their pursuit of children as sexual partners. They chose their victims for their vulnerability and naiveté. They destroyed or badly damaged the natural sexual and emotional development of these boys. On these facts, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion when it determined that consecutive sentences were necessary and appropriate.
[¶ 22] Finally, both Sweet and Poulin urge the court to conclude that the sentences are simply too long. Once we have determined that each individual step in the Hewey process was correctly applied, we review the sentence in its entirety for abuse of discretion. Because of the difference in final sentence lengths, we address each separately.
[¶ 23] Sweet was sentenced to a total of 40 years in prison. Using current good time calculations, he may be released in approximately 35 years. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1253 (1983 & Supp.1999). The length of this sentence reflects both the serious nature of Sweet's crimes and his criminal history. Sweet had previously served a ten-year sentence for his earlier sexual activities with children. He was convicted of threatening one of those victims after his release. He was on probation at the time of these new offenses. He was aware of his counseling options and aware of the dire consequences awaiting him should he abuse more children. [¶ 24] Nonetheless, Sweet sought out and assaulted two more children. The court was justified in concluding that because Sweet was not deterred by his previous sentence or willing to take advantage of the services available to him through probation, the risks he posed to children were grave. Moreover, it was clear that Sweet was not a good candidate for further probation. The court's decision to impose a lengthy unsuspended sentence reflects the sentencing goals of restraining the convicted person in the interest of public safety as well as recognizing the gravity of the offenses. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1151(1), (8) (1983 & Supp.1999). We conclude that the court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in sentencing Sweet to 40 years in prison.
[¶ 25] Poulin was sentenced to a total of 65 years. Assuming that he obtains the benefit of current good time calculations, he will be eligible for release in approximately 54 years. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1253. This sentence in total is significantly longer than most sentences meted out in Maine. Poulin will not be released until he is into his eighties. It is clear from the discussion at sentencing that the judge intended to prevent Poulin from gaining access to any more children for many years. [¶ 26] We must determine whether, on the facts of this case, the sentence is simply too long. In particular, we review the court's decision not to suspend any portion of the sentences imposed for abuse of discretion. See Pfeil, 1998 ME 245, ¶ 19, 720 A.2d at 578. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the sentencing justice and unless the justice has exceeded the bounds of his discretion or made a positive error of law, we will not disturb the sentence imposed. See id. [¶ 27] Poulin's sentencing was unusual in that the court had before it Poulin's personal journal chronicling in detail his thoughts, desires, and actions relating to the sexual abuse of children. The lengthy journal, which Poulin does not dispute contains his own writings, was written during 1994 and 1995. The charges on which Poulin was sentenced alleged dates of crimes during 1996 and 1997. The journal therefore provided the court with significant and rare insights into the events that led to Poulin's convictions. [¶ 28] The journal unquestionably played a significant part in the court's decision. It contains a disturbing record of Poulin's efforts and successes in obtaining sex from children. It also sets out Poulin's involvement with N.A.M.B.L.A. and his belief that sexual relationships between adult men and young boys are acceptable no matter what the moral majority believes. The journal openly addresses his intention to ignore the laws criminalizing this behavior and to continue to practice this activity regardless of the possible consequences. During a period of incarceration he wrote a novel of man/boy love, but threw it away before he was released because I had heard that they search all your belongings before they let you go. Discussing Sweet, Poulin wrote: Richard was a boy lover but the years he spent in jail, I believe, scared him away from the practice. His honest desire for boys is greatly suppressed, which is not good. I believe there is no such thing as a reformed boy lover. Sooner or later, Richard is going to be attracted to a boy and he's going to cross that line that society and the judicial system has put between men and boys. (Emphasis in original.) [¶ 29] In a chilling passage, Poulin demonstrated his understanding of the vulnerability of certain boys. Ahh, the boys of Water Street. They are usually from broken homes or troubled ones at least. Alcohol is almost always a factor. They are despondent and need love .... These are the boys I love. The journal also contains graphic passages of Poulin's sexual activities with several boys and frequently discusses possibilities of new contacts with other boys. As one relationship with a boy came to an end, Poulin wrote: In the meantime, I must have him introduce me to one of his friends. I have to have another link before the chain falls apart and I have to start anew. It is significant that the journal disclosed Poulin's understanding of when to disclose his penchant for sex with children and when to hide it or to give the I Look But Don't Touch speech. [¶ 30] During the sentencing hearing, the court indicated that it had reviewed both Poulin's journal and his statement submitted in support of sentencing. The court gave particular weight to Poulin's own statement that there is no such thing as a `reformed boy lover.' The court noted that Poulin had inflicted physical pain, through anal intercourse, on one of his victims at the same time that he acknowledged in his journal how much pain he had suffered himself when he was first penetrated anally. [¶ 31] The court also had before it the victim impact statements gathered by the victim witness advocates regarding the three boys victimized by Poulin's assaults. Those statements spoke volumes about the destruction left in the wake of Poulin's activities. Dr. James Jacobs completed an evaluation of Poulin for sentencing and concluded that Poulin has difficulty understanding the effects of his victimization on the children and that empathy, lacking in Poulin, is felt to be one component in reducing risk of recidivism. He further opined that Poulin probably does not have a good prognosis in sexual offender treatment due to the underlying personality disorder components. [¶ 32] We conclude that the court did not err in determining that Poulin is not a good candidate for probation. Control of his activities could be attempted only through intense supervision and conduct management. Even with such resources in place, resources that are scarce in our current system, Poulin's well-documented ability to fool those around him and still gain access to vulnerable children is amply demonstrated in this record. [¶ 33] Finally, we conclude that the sentence, although extraordinary in length, is sufficiently supported by the facts in the record that it must be affirmed. We note that a sentence of this length will be appropriate only in the most unusual cases and would not be appropriate in the absence of the multiple aggravating factors present here. Indeed, in his sentencing argument to the court, the prosecutor indicated that on only one prior occasion in a 25-year history had his office recommended a sentence as severe as the one recommended here. In that case, involving a defendant named Elwood Twist, the defendant was sentenced to 85 years (reduced after appeal to 68 years as a result of a defective indictment) for multiple unrepented acts of sexual assaults on children. See State v. Twist, 528 A.2d 1250 (Me.1987). [¶ 34] Here, the number of victims, the length of time during which the activities continued, the nature of the sexual activities, the dire effects on the victims, the defendant's own statements to the effect that a boy lover never changes, and the extremely significant risk of his reoffending upon release have all combined to warrant a sentence of significant length. We cannot say that the sentence structured by the court in this case exceeded the bounds of the court's discretion or reflected any error of law or principle. The entry is: The sentence imposed on Richard Sweet is affirmed. The sentence imposed on Paul Poulin is affirmed. CALKINS, J., with whom DANA, J., joins, concurs in part and dissents in part and files opinion. CALKINS, J., with whom DANA, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. [¶ 35] I respectfully dissent to that portion of the opinion affirming Poulin's sentences. I do not fault the manner in which the sentences were imposed. I agree that the heinousness of the commission of the offenses and the prior criminal record were sufficient to warrant sentencing in excess of 20 years. [7] I cannot disagree, at least in the abstract, with the discussion of consecutive sentences. [¶ 36] I dissent because the totality of Poulin's sentences is excessive. [8] Although a court follows the established sentencing procedures and principles, a sentence which is excessive will be vacated. See State v. Frechette, 645 A.2d 1128, 1129 (Me.1994) (vacating four sentences of 20 years each imposed consecutively). In reviewing the propriety of a sentence, see 15 M.R.S.A. § 2155(1) (Supp.1999), excessiveness is considered. See Daniel E. Wathen, Disparity and the Need for Sentencing Guidelines in Maine: A Proposal for Enhanced Appellate Review, 40 ME. L. REV. 1, 11 n. 32 (1988) (quoting State v. Carter, No. AD-76-824 (Me.App.Div. Jan. 2, 1979)). [¶ 37] A measure of excessiveness is the range of sentences for similar offenses. I am not aware of any gross sexual assault cases, in which the sentences were reviewed by us or the former Appellate Division of the Supreme Judicial Court, where the sentences imposed upon a single defendant approximated the 65 years imposed on Poulin. The longest such sentence I have found in the reported cases is 40 years. See State v. Lobozzo, 1998 ME 228, ¶ 6, 719 A.2d 108, 110 (affirming sentences of 40 years on kidnapping and gross sexual assault and lesser sentences on unlawful sexual contact and assault, all to be served concurrently). [9] [¶ 38] In my view Poulin's sentence of 65 years is outside the reasonable bounds of discretion. The total length of his sentences, combined with the court's refusal to suspend even a few years, is excessive in light of the totality of circumstances, which include, in addition to those mentioned by the sentencing court, Poulin's relatively young age and his age at the release point. I fear that the affirmance of this sentence will substantially raise the bar of sentences generally.