Opinion ID: 2594892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cleveland's Complaints About Counsel

Text: Cleveland was arrested in this matter long after the other two defendants. He first appeared in municipal court on March 13, 1991, and Lee Coleman was appointed to represent him. After the preliminary hearing, he was arraigned in superior court on May 13, 1991, and Coleman was appointed to represent him in that court. On May 16, 1991, Cleveland stated that he was opposed to going beyond the statutory time period for trial. The court set the matter for hearing on June 12, 1991. On that date, the district attorney said the prosecution would be ready for trial on July 1, 1991. Counsel for both Veasley and Charan said they would not be ready for trial so soon. Coleman said that he, too, would not be ready for trial by then, explaining, We have tremendous volume [of discovery], close to 3,000 pages of documents and approximately an additional hundred that we received yesterday, the 26 video tapes and 8 audio tapes, quite extensive preparation required in this case because of the complexity of the case, and I will not be ready on the 1st of July. Coleman said he would ask Cleveland to waive time until September. The court asked Cleveland if he would waive time. Cleveland asked if he could say something besides the question that you asked me. The court agreed. Cleveland then said, I would like to file for a 1387 under section 3, 4 and 5. A 1040 change of venue on the grounds that I feel that he's had ample amount of time to get everything. We have been gone a month, and he just got the tapes yesterday, and just like I feel he's not  he's isn't representing me to his fullest ability. The court asked whether it was his desire not to waive time. Cleveland said it was. Accordingly, because Cleveland did not waive time, the court maintained the July 1 trial date. The next hearing was held on June 20, 1991. Charan moved to continue the trial. Coleman also requested a continuance on behalf of Cleveland. Cleveland, however, stated he objected to a continuance. When the court asked why, he responded: Well, like I stated last week, ... my attorney  I mean, I don't know nothing. He never tells me what's going on in the case and what he's doing and how far he's gone. So I don't know where we're at, anyway. I know the complexity of the case, but that's it, because I just know the charges. The court asked Coleman to comment. Coleman said, I discussed with my client facts of the case. I've also indicated to him how far I am in the papers that we have. I think I've indicated to him before that I've covered approximately 500 pages of the additional information that's come in, and I've asked him to cooperate and give us additional time to work on the case. Cleveland responded that Coleman told me he went 700 pages last week, and that was it. As I've stressed last week, under Penal Code 1387  The court then ascertained that both Veasley and Charan had no objection to continuing the case. It then found good cause for a continuance due to the nature of the charges, the amount of discovery, and the investigation the case warranted. Over Cleveland's objection, it granted a continuance until September. The case was assigned for trial on September 11, 1991. During Charan and Cleveland's penalty phase, Cleveland told the court he wanted to say something in his defense. The court cautioned Cleveland that it would hear any statement he wanted to make, but he should first discuss it with Coleman. Cleveland responded, How can I discuss something with someone that doesn't listen to me? The court reiterated that it would entertain a statement, but it put the matter over so Cleveland could think about it and talk to Coleman. In Cleveland's absence, the court told Coleman there may be a potential  Marsden motion ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44), and that he may wish to discuss the matter with Cleveland. Coleman responded, I will. Just the difficulty in paying attention to what's happening in the case and trying to have an interview with Mr. Cleveland here at the counsel table, and it doesn't work out too well. At the next hearing, the court asked Cleveland whether he had had further discussions with Coleman. Cleveland said, I talked to my counsel during lunch break and feel I don't want to drop the issue completely. The court asked if Cleveland wanted to exclude the prosecutor from the hearing and said it would do so if requested. Cleveland said he would like to reserve the right until a later time. The court explained to Cleveland that if there were any conflict between him and Coleman, Cleveland had the right to inform the court with the prosecutor and maybe even the other defendants excluded, and that he could also reserve the matter until later. Cleveland said he would reserve it. After the death verdict, when the court was scheduling the hearing on the automatic motion to modify the verdict, Coleman stated that Cleveland did not wish to waive time. The court told Cleveland it would give him another opportunity to discuss the matter with Coleman because these were important issues. Cleveland said, My life was important too, and I feel I was crossed, so no, he don't know how to represent me. He said, I don't even wish to have him [a] long time ago. Accordingly, the court set the hearing on the modification motion within the statutory time period. At the outset of that hearing, the court, anticipating a possible Marsden motion, explained to Cleveland that he had the right to be heard in reference to any issue that you want to bring to my attention regarding either conflicts that exist between you and Mr. Coleman or your belief that you have been denied effective representation.... It further explained that if Cleveland wanted to make a  Marsden motion it would exclude the prosecutor, and Cleveland could tell me your specific reasons as to why you think a conflict exists or why you're not receiving effective representation. It asked if Cleveland wanted to be heard. Cleveland responded, I waive. When the court again asked if he wanted to be heard in reference to that, he said, No. Cleveland now argues the court violated its duty to inquire into the reasons for his complaints that Coleman's performance was inadequate. The record does not support the contention. If a defendant seeks new counsel on the basis that his appointed counsel is providing inadequate representation, the court must permit him to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate performance. ( People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 603, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) But Cleveland never asked for new counsel even though the court invited him to do so. A defendant need not make a formal motion, but he must provide some clear indication that he wants a substitute attorney. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 157, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) It is true that early in the pretrial proceedings, Cleveland complained that his attorney had not taken certain steps, and he refused to waive time. But he did not indicate he wanted a new attorney so soon in the process. The court listened to and accepted his refusal to waive time, although it ultimately exercised its discretion to continue the matter at the request of Cleveland's attorney and both of the codefendants due to the nature of the case. The fact that Coleman, in common with counsel for the codefendants, believed he needed more than 60 days to prepare to defend a capital case gives no reason to suspect his performance was or would be inadequate, and Cleveland's complaint in this regard is no substitute for stating in some way that he wanted a new attorney.