Opinion ID: 1874688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred by denying the motion to bifurcate the trial.

Text: ¶ 8. Both Wicker Logging and Capital City argue that the trial court erred by denying a motion to bifurcate the trial. On the morning of the trial, the trial judge heard arguments on this motion. [Capital City]: We have another matter we need to bring up then. Your Honor, in light of the complicated issue involved here and the fact that we are going to have to present matters of law and fact to the jury and call witnesses, the issue regarding coverage is premature at this point because there has been no determination as who would be the, Covered party under the policy. For that reason we think in an attempt to avoid confusing issues to the jury, to avoid prejudice to any party in the lawsuit, we should bifurcate these issues and let the liability issue be decided first as between Boots Smith and Wicker by mention of the fact that there is an existence of an insurance company or policy may or may not be available to satisfy the judgment. As to that point  The Court: What is your response Mr. Melvin? Mr. Melvin [2] : Court, please, again this matter has been filed for some length of time. The Lewis case provided that that could be  the declaratory judgment could be joined in this type of suit. It also stated that it could be called up and disposed of prior to the hearing. This was not done. There has been more than an abundant length of time. There are the problems in bifurcating the trial. It is that the testimony in  I have not been replying to the issues in the declaratory judgments because there are issues that are also complicated. And the same issues involved. And not having a position, the only thing I know to do is put a jury in the box and try all the issues in front of the jury. The Court: Motion overruled. ¶ 9. The court papers do not reflect that a motion to bifurcate was filed with the Jones County Circuit Court by either Wicker Logging or Capital City. Both Wicker Logging and Capital City claim to have joined in a motion to bifurcate. Capital City's counsel argued this motion before the trial judge on the morning of the trial. [3] We cannot find where Wicker Logging allegedly joined in this motion with Capital City. However, it is clear from the record that Capital City argued the motion; and therefore, the issue is properly before this Court. Capital City argues that the trial court should have been bifurcated to first determine whether Wicker Logging had any liability before reaching the issues of coverage and damages. ¶ 10. Capital City relied upon M.R.C.P. 42(b) and M.R.E. 411 for authority. M.R.C.P. 42(b) states: The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by Section 31 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. The Comment to M.R.C.P. 42(b) states in part: The provision for separate trials in Rule 42(b) is intended to further convenience, avoid delay and prejudice, and serve the ends of justice. It is the interest of efficient judicial administration that is to be controlling, rather than the wishes of the parties. The piecemeal trial of separate issues in a single suit is not to be the usual course. It should be resorted to only in the exercise of informed discretion when the court believes that separation will achieve the purposes of the rule. If a single issue could be dispositive of the case, and resolution of it might make it unnecessary to try the other issues, separate trial of that issue may be desirable to save the time of the court and reduce the expenses of the parties. If, however, the preliminary and separate trial of an issue will involve extensive proof and substantially the same facts as the other issues, or if any saving in time and expense is wholly speculative, a separate trial should be denied. A separate trial may also be ordered to avoid prejudice, as where evidence admissible only on a certain issue may prejudice a party in the minds of the jury on other issues. For example, this principle may be applied, and a separate trial ordered though a single trial would otherwise be preferable, because in a single trial the jury would learn that defendant is insured. The possibility of such prejudice, however remote, justifies a separate trial if the issues are so unrelated that there is no advantage in trying them together. But if the issues are related, there is considerable authority to the effect that jurors today assume the presence of insurance, that knowledge of the fact of insurance is therefore not prejudicial, and that a separate trial should not be ordered. Ultimately the question of separate trials should be, and is, within the discretion of the trial court. It must weigh whether one trial or separate trials will best serve the convenience of the parties and court, avoid prejudice, and minimize expense and delay. The major consideration, of course, must be which procedure is more likely to result in a just, final disposition of the litigation. (emphasis added). M.R.E. 411 states: Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. The Comment to M.R.E. 411 states: One of the primary reasons for excluding evidence of insurance or the lack of it is to prevent the jury from deciding the case on improper grounds. Rule 411 reflects existing Mississippi practice. Evidence of the existence of defendant's insurance is irrelevant as to his negligence and admission of such evidence may be grounds for a mistrial. See Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Whitehead, 357 So.2d 122 (Miss.1978); Petermann v. Gary, 210 Miss. 438, 49 So.2d 828 (1951). Evidence of liability insurance may be relevant for other purposes, such as proof of agency, ownership, or bias. ¶ 11. In Lewis v. Allstate Insurance Co., 730 So.2d 65, 67-68 (Miss.1998), the insurance company filed a complaint for declaratory judgment claiming that the exclusionary provisions of the policy precluded coverage. This Court reviewed a trial court decision that granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and affirmed the ruling. Id. at 68. This Court further held: We take this opportunity to state that if an insurance company can conduct a declaratory action regarding coverage prior to resolution of an underlying wrongful death trial, then the insureds and third party beneficiaries should be able to raise the coverage question in the underlying lawsuit as well. Pursuant to our rules of civil procedure, a hearing to determine coverage may be conducted if necessary. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 57 cmt. (recognizing that a plaintiff may ask for a declaratory judgment either as his sole relief or in addition or auxiliary to other relief). Such reviews of insurance contracts do not involve the jury and are often cursory. Accordingly, if a question of insurance coverage exists, a party should be able to bring the insurer into a lawsuit and have the coverage question resolved by the judge. Lewis, 730 So.2d at 71(emphasis added). In terms of placing the fact that insurance exists before a jury, this Court held that [i]t should be noted that this does not mean that a party can mention insurance before a jury, as that rule still holds in this state. Id. (citing West Cash & Carry Bldg. Materials of McComb, Inc. v. Palumbo, 371 So.2d 873, 876 (Miss.1979))(emphasis added). ¶ 12. In Jackson v. Daley, 739 So.2d 1031, 1039 (Miss.1999), this Court held: It is well established in this state that evidence of insurance or lack thereof may not be presented at a trial to show who would have to pay the judgment. Morris v. Huff, 238 Miss. 111, 118-19, 117 So.2d 800, 802-03 (1960); Snowden v. Webb, 217 Miss. 664, 675-76, 64 So.2d 745, 750 (1953). This Court has stated, ... it may not be conveyed to the jury that the defendant in the case has no protection by insurance, and if the verdict is against him, he, not the insurance company, must pay it.... It would be manifestly unfair to permit a defendant in a damage suit to show that he carried no insurance and whatever verdict rendered would be enforced upon him personally. Snowden, 217 Miss. at 675-76, 64 So.2d at 750 (quoting Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 225, 194 So. 596, 602 (1940)). In Toche v. Killebrew, 734 So.2d 276, 283 (Miss.Ct.App.1999), Toche sought to question two expert witnesses of Killebrew concerning the fact that their medical malpractice insurer was the same as Killebrew. Toche argued that the two experts might have been biased because they could have expected increased premiums in the event that the jury verdict was against Killebrew. Id. The Court of Appeals held: There is a long-standing principle of law in this State that gratuitously informing the jury, or even intimating to the jury, that any verdict returned by them will be satisfied by the defendant's liability insurance provider so interferes with the jury's ability to fairly deliberate the true issues of the case as to constitute reversible error. Snowden v. Skipper, 230 Miss. 684, 696, 93 So.2d 834, 839 (1957); Odom v. Walker, 193 Miss. 862, 871-72, 11 So.2d 452, 455 (1943); Herrin v. Daly, 80 Miss. 340, 342, 31 So. 790, 791 (1902). The Mississippi Rules of Evidence specifically prohibit such evidence if its sole purpose relates to the question of the negligent or otherwise wrongful conduct of the defendant. M.R.E. 411. Toche, 734 So.2d at 283. ¶ 13. Boots Smith sued Capital City, its insurer. In addition, Boots Smith acquired the insurance through its working relationship with Wicker Logging. Boots Smith claims that not revealing these facts to the jury would have prejudiced its rights to pursue protections and entitlements offered by the insurance policy. In addition, Boots Smith claims that both Wicker Logging and Capital City ignore the fact that Boots Smith sued Capital City in its capacity as a separate insured. Further, Boots Smith argues that with the timing of the motion (on the day of the trial), the litigation of the coverage issue would not have disposed of the case and was not in the interest of judicial economy. Since the jury only decided the issue of damages, Boots Smith claims that the inclusion of the policy information about Capital City did not affect the jury and the verdict was easily linked to the testimony. ¶ 14. The Court finds that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to bifurcate the trial. During the trial, Boots Smith put on evidence that Wicker Logging was insured without objection. Evidence such as the insurance certificates, showing that Boots Smith was an additional insured under Wicker Logging's policy, and the insurance policy was admitted into evidence. However, the trial court prior to seating the jury had overruled Capital City's motion for declaratory judgment and motion to bifurcate the trial. Since the judge already ruled to deny the motion to bifurcate the insurance issues from the liability and damage issues, Capital City was forced to proceed and participate in the trial from the beginning and any insurance issue under that ruling would be before the jury. ¶ 15. An ore tenus motion to bifurcate the trial was denied by the trial court prior to trial. As clearly acknowledged in the above opinion, Wicker Logging and Capital City did not file a written motion to bifurcate before the trial, but rather Capital City waited until the morning of trial to bring this issue to the attention of the trial court. ¶ 16. Considering the facts of this case, the trial court should have bifurcated the trial as a matter of law. In other words, Capital City did not have to shoulder the burden of either filing or bringing an ore tenus motion to bifurcate the trial in this instance. M.R.C.P. 42 and M.R.E. 411 both address the issue of potential prejudice and the difficulties when insurance coverage is a factor in a lawsuit. M.R.C.P. 42 concerns the separation or consolidation of trials, and the rule specifically mentions prejudice whereas the comments mention prejudice and the impact of insurance in a case. Pursuant to M.R.C.P. 42 and its comments, the wishes of a party are not controlling, and a trial judge has discretion to bifurcate trials for convenience, avoidance of delays and prejudice and for justice. M.R.C.P. 42 states in part: A separate trial may also be ordered to avoid prejudice, as where evidence admissible only on a certain issue may prejudice a party in the minds of the jury on other issues. For example, this principle may be applied, and a separate trial ordered though a single trial would otherwise be preferable, because in a single trial the jury would learn that defendant is insured. The possibility of such prejudice, however remote, justifies a separate trial if the issues are so unrelated that there is no advantage in trying them together. (emphasis added). This portion of the comment, authorizes a separate trial to avoid prejudice such as when a jury would learn that the defendant is insured. Critical to the analysis is the punctuation contained within comment. The comment states that a separate trial may be ordered to avoid prejudice such as when evidence on one issue is heard by a jury and may prejudice a party on another issue. The comment immediately follows with the example of a jury learning that a defendant is insured. In effect, the comment states that, while a single trial would ordinarily be preferable, the jury would be aware that a defendant is insured. Therefore, a separate trial should be ordered to protect against prejudice. Granted, the comments place a restriction on the application of this principle to situations where the issues are unrelated. If the issues are determined to be related, the comment notes there is some authority to suggest that today's juror assumes there is insurance. Therefore, a party is not prejudiced and separate trials are not needed. ¶ 17. In the case sub judice, the issue of the amount of damages Boots Smith or Wicker Logging may owe one another is completely unrelated to the issues of whether there is insurance coverage provided by Capital City. Even though the court, not the jury, ultimately decided the issue of liability between Boots Smith and Wicker Logging, that issue also is completely unrelated to the issue of whether Capital City must provide insurance coverage for either of its insureds. Damages and liability in this case are issues solely involving Boots Smith and Wicker Logging, not Capital City. ¶ 18. The trial court denied the motion to bifurcate and did not make a determination on the declaratory judgment issue until after Boots Smith and Wicker Logging rested their cases. The case law and M.R.C.P. 42 and M.R.E. 411 generally prohibit mentioning insurance to a jury to avoid prejudice and deciding a case on improper grounds. As M.R.E. 411 states in part [e]vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue of whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. In addition, M.R.E. 411 set out a number of exceptions such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. None of these exceptions were asserted during the trial. M.R.C.P. 42(b) and its comments concern whether a trial should be separated, and the comments suggest that a separate trial may be applied to avoid prejudice such as when a jury would learn that the defendant is insured. ¶ 19. This Court finds that the trial judge should have bifurcated the trial and first determined the extent of liability, if any, that Wicker Logging had to Boots Smith. If the jury found Wicker Logging liable to Boots Smith, then the trial court could have conducted a hearing on the declaratory judgment and determined whether the Capital City insurance policy covered the acts of Wicker Logging. The other issues of liability and damages are unrelated to the issue of whether Capital City must provide insurance coverage to cover any potential damages to either Boots Smith or Wicker Logging assessed by the jury. Capital City should not have had the burden of arguing the issue of bifurcation. If the trial judge had granted the bifurcation, then the trial judge would have avoided any potential for prejudice and would have ensured that the jury decided the case for the proper reasons. Accordingly, we find that the trial judge abused his discretion, and this case must be reversed and remanded on this issue.