Opinion ID: 1009453
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims under Brady v. Maryland

Text: Suppression by the government of evidence favorable to the defense that is material to the outcome of a trial or sentencing proceeding violates due process, irrespective of the motive of the prosecutor. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In addition to the disclosure of materially exculpatory evidence, due process requires the government to disclose material evidence affecting the credibility of prosecution witnesses. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). Undisclosed evidence is material when its cumulative effect is such that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 436-37 (explaining that suppressed evidence [must be] considered collectively, not item by item). A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence that does not meet the prejudice threshold weight that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror with knowledge of Turner’s perjury would have convicted Bramblett. See id. at 327. Additionally, we note that with respect to virtually every defaulted claim, Bramblett argues that the district court applied the wrong standard in determining prejudice. Because this court reviews the ruling of the district court de novo, effectively standing in its shoes to consider the issues anew, such errors, even if they occurred, do not warrant reversal. 13 There is some dispute between the parties regarding the nature of the showing required to demonstrate actual prejudice. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that Bramblett is correct that the standard for actual prejudice is the prejudice standard from the underlying constitutional claim. BRAMBLETT v. TRUE 17 for a Brady claim necessarily fails to satisfy the prejudice prong of procedural default analysis. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999).
Turner testified that Bramblett made several incriminating statements about the Hodges murders. These statements came to light during a series of meetings between Turner and Agent Barry Keesee of the Virginia State Police. During state habeas proceedings, the State for the first time disclosed notes that Agent Keesee had taken of his first conversation with Turner. Bramblett claims that these notes were materially exculpatory and should have been disclosed prior to trial. Bramblett also contends, based on a post-trial affidavit by Turner, that an agreement existed between Turner and the State regarding the benefits Turner would obtain by testifying against Bramblett.14 Even if Bramblett can establish cause to excuse his default of this claim, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense. Id. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Keesee notes pertain to incriminating statements made to Turner by Bramblett, and are thus not exculpatory—much less materially so —in and of themselves. And, while Bramblett maintains that the notes are valuable for impeachment purposes because there are inconsistencies between the Keesee notes, Turner’s testimony, and Turner’s notes, he fails to explain what these inconsistencies are and how they are material to the issue of guilt or innocence. Further, the alleged agreement between Turner and the State—assuming for purposes of decision that it actually existed—is not material in light of the weakness of Turner’s testimony. Even without evidence of the agreement, the jury knew that Turner had been convicted of numerous offenses involving dishonesty and that Turner’s testimony was inconsistent 14 Additionally, Bramblett complains that the State did not timely disclose Turner’s criminal history, transcripts of taped conversations between Turner and Agent Keesee, and Turner’s notes of his conversations with Bramblett. However, the record establishes—and Bramblett does not dispute—that counsel received these materials in time to use them at trial. That is all that Brady requires. 18 BRAMBLETT v. TRUE with the medical evidence regarding the order in which the Hodgeses were killed. And, on cross-examination defense counsel raised the possibility that Turner was testifying against Bramblett in hopes of regaining his status as a prison trustee. Although this attack would certainly have carried more weight if counsel had known about the existence of an agreement between Turner and the State, there is no reasonable probability that such additional weight would have persuaded the jury to reach a different result.
Michael Fulcher is Theresa Hodges’ half-brother. Fulcher, a drug dealer, worked as an informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) during the 1980s and continued to offer information to the DEA after his incarceration in 1991. At trial, Bramblett argued that the Hodgeses were killed in retaliation for Fulcher’s activities. In his state habeas petition, Bramblett claimed that the State had withheld materially exculpatory information regarding Fulcher. In support of this claim, Bramblett submitted an affidavit from defense investigator David Williams, who claimed that subsequent to trial he had learned that: (1) the Virginia State Police were investigating Fulcher for drug dealing and money laundering (crimes of which he was later convicted) contemporaneously with the investigation of the Hodges murders; and (2) Fulcher, who was incarcerated, was placed in protective segregation during this time frame. J.A. 28. Bramblett cannot demonstrate prejudice for his default of this claim because the failure to disclose this information did not violate Brady. Even assuming that the facts that Fulcher committed other crimes and that he was segregated for his own protection support Bramblett’s theory that the Hodgeses were killed in retaliation for Fulcher’s activities as an informant, this evidence is clearly not material to Bramblett’s guilt or innocence. Simply put, Bramblett offers nothing more than the barest speculation to connect Fulcher’s activities to the murders.
For the first time in his federal habeas petition, Bramblett claimed that the State withheld information regarding the possible involveBRAMBLETT v. TRUE 19 ment of Benjamin Carr in the murders. In support of this claim, Bramblett submitted affidavits from Robert and Judith Stinnett, longtime friends of Carr’s. According to Judith’s affidavit, Carr contacted her in 1995 or 1996 and offered to ‘ice [Robert’s former employer] like the family on Virginia Avenue.’ J.A. 36, 37. Judith took this statement to mean that Carr claimed responsibility for the Hodges murders; she made this connection because Carr had told her that he had had an argument with Blaine Hodges during a period when both worked for the post office. Judith mentioned her conversation with Carr to a friend who was a Vinton Police officer. On the assumption that Carr’s statement to Judith was exculpatory, the State’s failure to disclose it constitutes cause for Bramblett’s default of this claim.15 There was no prejudice, however. Carr’s statement is, at best, equivocal, and is thus inculpatory of himself (and exculpatory of Bramblett) only by inference. In light of the strong evidence against Bramblett, it is highly unlikely that any reasonable jury would draw such an inference, much less use it as a basis to acquit Bramblett. Cf. Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (per curiam) (stating that, in light of overwhelming case against defendant, Brady violation could not be established by mere supposition).16
Finally, Bramblett argues that even if he has failed to establish that any of the individual pieces of withheld evidence is material, materiality is present when the individual pieces are viewed cumulatively. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-37 (explaining that assessment of material15 Neither Judith’s interpretation of the statement, nor her further speculation that Carr was capable of murdering children, is admissible; hence, it is not subject to disclosure under Brady. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that inadmissible materials that are not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible exculpatory evidence are not subject to disclosure under Brady). 16 Bramblett also maintains that timely disclosure of the information from Judith Stinnett could have led to further exculpatory information. This claim rests on little more than speculation, however, and there is no basis on which we can conclude that further investigation would have led to materially exculpatory information. 20 BRAMBLETT v. TRUE ity under Brady requires that evidence be considered collectively, not item by item). To the contrary, even when viewed collectively, the suppressed items—none of which is related to the others—do not place the evidence actually presented at trial in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.