Opinion ID: 490521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tape

Text: 31 Giraldo makes several attacks on the government's use at trial of the answering machine tape recordings seized from his apartment. They include the contentions that (1) the tape should have been excluded pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 because the government had not given defense counsel copies of the tape as requested prior to trial; (2) the tape should have been excluded pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) as inadmissible evidence of other crimes or pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 802 as hearsay; and (3) in its summation, the government could not properly suggest that the tape's contents were orders for narcotics because it had presented no expert testimony to support such an interpretation. We reject each of these contentions.
32 Rule 16(a)(1)(C) requires the government, upon request, to disclose to the defendant documents and tangible objects that the government intends to use as evidence in chief at the trial. Rule 16(d)(2) provides that if a defendant calls to the court's attention that such a discovery request has not been complied with, the court 33 may order [the government] to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the [government] from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 34 Thus, under this Rule, the court may allow previously undisclosed tapes to be introduced after a delay of a few days to permit counsel in the interim to inspect them and fashion a challenge to them. See, e.g., United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427, 442 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973, 88 S.Ct. 472, 19 L.Ed.2d 465 (1967). Given the permissive language of Rule 16(d)(2) and the wide latitude given the trial court by that Rule, an order under Rule 16(d)(2) will not be set aside except for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 977 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170, 103 S.Ct. 815, 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983); Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 Advisory Committee Note. 35 Though it is unclear from the record whether or not the answering machine tape had been given to defense counsel before the trial began, we see no abuse of the trial court's discretion in receiving the tape in evidence. When counsel advised the court at trial that they had not received the tape, the court did not pursue further the government's representation that disclosure had in fact been made previously, but ordered the government immediately to play the tape for counsel outside the presence of the jury. Pursuant to this order the contents of the tape were disclosed to counsel on September 30, 1986; the tape then was not offered into evidence until October 8. Defense counsel did not seek a continuance or any further delay of the introduction of the tape, but merely argued that it should not be received because it had not been produced prior to trial. In all the circumstances, it was well within the trial court's discretion to receive the tape in evidence after more than a week had elapsed since defendants' inspection of it. 36
37 Giraldo also contends that the court should have excluded the answering machine tape on the ground that the statements recorded on it were hearsay inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 802 or were evidence of other crimes inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Neither argument was made at trial, and hence both have been waived. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2456, 2457, 77 L.Ed.2d 1335 (1983); United States v. DeFillipo, 590 F.2d 1228, 1236-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 2844, 61 L.Ed.2d 288 (1979). Even if timely objections had been made on these grounds, however, we would find them without merit. 38 The contention that the tape-recorded statements were evidence of other crimes ignores the fact that one of the offenses with which Giraldo was charged was conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it. This charge was not limited to the aborted attempt to sell cocaine to Johnson, and statements that could be interpreted as orders for cocaine were evidence supporting an element of the very crime with which Giraldo was charged, irrespective of whether they might have been evidence of other crimes as well. The evidence was thus not excludable under Rule 404(b). 39 Nor were the tape-recorded statements hearsay, for they presumably were not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein and were admissible to prove that the statements were in fact made, in order to show that it was more likely than not that the cocaine possessed by Giraldo was possessed for purposes of distribution. Thus, the statements fell outside the definition of hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c).
40 Giraldo's final challenge with respect to the tape-recorded statements is that the government could not properly argue that they were coded orders for cocaine without having introduced evidence to that effect. We disagree. 41 The recorded statements purported to be orders for chicken and bread; but two of these statements ordered a quantity--one piece of bread--that themselves cast doubt on the straightforwardness of the statements. Further, there is no indication in the record that there was any type of food distribution business going on in Giraldo's apartment. There was, however, ample evidence of a large-scale narcotics operation, as nearly two kilograms of cocaine and $72,000 in cash, along with narcotics equipment, were found in the apartment. Further, the evidence revealed surreptitiousness on the part of Giraldo, who had rented the apartment under an alias and who possessed documents containing numbers recorded cryptically. In light of all the evidence, it was permissible for the government to argue that the jury should infer that the recorded statements were coded orders not for bread and chicken but rather for the inventory Giraldo had on hand, namely cocaine. Cf. United States v. Washington, 677 F.2d 394, 396 (4th Cir.) (prosecutor entitled to argue plausible inferences as to narcotics business operations, without need for expert testimony), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854, 103 S.Ct. 120, 74 L.Ed.2d 105 (1982). 42 The district court properly instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel are not evidence and that it was the job of the jury to decide what inferences to draw. We see no error with respect to the challenged portion of the summation.