Opinion ID: 3030204
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Corporate Status

Text: [12] “The final Mitchell factor is concerned with the extent to which . . . an entity [is] distinct from the state.” Holz, 347 F.3d at 1188. Here, California law defines an air pollution control district as “a body corporate and politic and a public agency of the State.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40700. On the one hand, the characterization of a district as a body corporate implies that the District has a corporate status separate from the State of California. See Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1427 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a state law defining a community development authority as “body corporate operating as a state instrumentality” indicated that it had “its own independent corporate identity”). On the other hand, the designation of a district as “a public agency of the State” suggests that it may not have a separate identity. Nonetheless, as noted above, under the California Government Code, a “district” is included in the definition of a “local public entity,” and a “local public entity” is specifically distinguished from “the State.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 900.4 (providing that a “local public entity” includes “a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the State, but does not include the State”); see also id. § 900.6 (defining “State” as “the State and any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the State claims against which are paid by warrants drawn by the Comptroller”).11 11 See also Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 719-21 (1973) (noting that provisions of California law designating a county as a “body corporate and politic” and defining a county as a “local public entity” in contrast to the State were “persuasive indicia of the independent status” of counties relative to the State, leading to the conclusion that Alameda County had a “sufficiently independent corporate character” to warrant its treatment as a citizen of the state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). 1560 BEENTJES v. PLACER COUNTY AIR POLLUTION CONTROL The District’s independent corporate status is also evident in its system of governance. California law provides that the governing board of any air pollution control district shall be comprised of mayors, city council members, and county supervisors — as jointly determined by member counties and cities — and shall reflect the geographic diversity of the region. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 40704.5; cf. Aguon, 316 F.3d at 903-04 (noting that the Commonwealth Ports Authority had a Commonwealth-appointed board of directors and a governor-appointed director); Alaska Cargo, 5 F.3d at 381-82 (noting that the governor appointed all seven members of the railroad’s board); Wojcik, 300 F.3d at 101 (noting that the governor had power of approval over the Lottery Commission’s director and power of appointment over the Commission’s governing officials). [13] In terms of day-to-day governance, the District’s governing board determines the number of personnel it employs and how much it pays employees. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 40705, 40706. County officers and employees are expected to work ex officio for the district, as they would for the county, without additional compensation. Id. § 40120. As the district court properly noted, “the State exercises little control over the structure and operation of the districts, which suggests that districts function independently from the State”; see also Williams, 242 F.3d at 321 (refusing to extend sovereign immunity to a regional transportation authority whose executive committee consisted of members appointed by municipalities and whose “day-to-day operations . . . fall under purely local control”). Therefore, this fifth factor also favors a finding that the District is not an arm of the state.