Opinion ID: 2085404
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scales's Other Common Law Claims

Text: Our effort here is to clarify whatever Young may have left ambiguous. The questions of whether Officer Young had a qualified privilege to act as he did or an affirmative defense with respect to any of the remaining common law claims must be remanded because the answers to those questions turn in part upon fact-based analyses under each of his various claims and their applicable tests, and there were not enough findings below to create a sufficient record. To see why such findings were needed, a short discussion of two of Scales's common law claims  assault and battery, and negligence  and their relationship to a police officer's qualified privilege or affirmative defenses is instructive.
A police officer may have a qualified privilege in an assault and battery case. A police officer has a qualified privilege to use reasonable force to effect an arrest, provided that the means employed are not in excess of those which the actor reasonably believes to be necessary. Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930, 937 (D.C.2007) (citing Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d 948, 955 (D.C.1980) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965))). The officer's judgment is to be reviewed `from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,' with allowance for the officer's need to make quick decisions under potentially dangerous circumstances. Rogala v. District of Columbia, 333 U.S.App. D.C. 145, 158, 161 F.3d 44, 57 (1998) (quoting Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 916 (D.C.1993)). Thus, the test for qualified privilege in an assault and battery suit is both subjective and objective: the officer must subjectively believe that he or she used no more force than necessary, but the officer's judgment is compared to that of a hypothetical reasonable police officer placed in the same situation. No such findings, one way or the other, are in the record here.
In Young we noted that, although Officer Young was entitled to qualified immunity as to Scales's § 1983 suit, a municipality may choose to hold its officers to a stricter standard than the Constitution requires.... Young, supra, 873 A.2d at 345. [5] Thus, even though the officer did not violate Scales's constitutional rights, id., he could still be liable under a different standard. In order to prevail on a negligence cause of action, the plaintiff must prove the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury. Evans-Reid, supra, 930 A.2d at 937 n. 6 (citing on p. ___ Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 917 (quoting Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.1988) (quoting Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984)))). The applicable standard of care is that of a reasonably prudent police officer. Smith v. District of Columbia, 882 A.2d 778, 788 (D.C.2005). Expert testimony is required to prove the standard of care because [t]he applicable standard of care in cases of this kind is `beyond the ken' of the average lay juror.... Etheredge, supra, 635 A.2d at 917. The police department policies discussed in Young may be relevant to a determination of whether Officer Young conducted himself in accordance with the standard of care because, although internal guidelines cannot themselves embody the standard of care, the `procedures may properly be received in evidence as bearing on the standard of care.' Snowder v. District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 590, 603 (D.C.2008) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 598 n. 13 (D.C.1998)). Nonetheless, difficulties can arise when, as here, a plaintiff alleges multiple tort claims in connection with the use of force by an arresting police officer. In Smith, supra, the plaintiff's suit alleged, inter alia, negligence and assault and battery. 882 A.2d at 780. The negligence and assault and battery claims were both based on alleged use of excessive force by police officers. Id. at 790-91. There, the court reiterated that if, in a case involving the intentional use of force by police officers, a negligence count is to be submitted to a jury, that negligence must be distinctly pled and based upon at least one factual scenario that presents an aspect of negligence apart from the use of excessive force itself and violative of a distinct standard of care. Id. at 792 (quoting District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 711 (D.C.2003)). Thus, if Scales does not present a basis independent of excessive force to support his negligence count, then his negligence claim will not be allowed to go to the jury. [6] Id. at 793. This caveat is especially important to note in light of the fact that Young held that the force used in this case was not excessive as a matter of constitutional law even when the facts were taken in the light most favorable to Scales. Young, supra, 873 A.2d at 344 (We are not persuaded... that it was either unreasonable or unnecessary for [Officer] Young to fire at Scales to prevent his escape.).
As noted above, the record is currently insufficiently developed for us to decide whether summary judgment should have been granted on Scales's remaining common law claims following Young. Although Young precludes Scales's Fourth Amendment-based § 1983 suit and his suit for false arrest, see Part II.B, supra, the record lacks the findings needed to support disposition of Scales's remaining claims, including the claims we have not specifically discussed in this opinion. For example, at the very least, it is entirely unclear from the record what motivated Officer Young to shoot Scales. We decline to address whether Officer Young's motivation is a fact in genuine dispute, and leave that question for the trial court to decide in the first instance. See New 3145 Deauville, L.L.C. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 881 A.2d 624, 630 (D.C.2005) (holding that the preferable course of action is to permit the trial court to address in the first instance these further arguments). Indeed, we are certain that on remand the trial court will give due consideration to all of Scales's remaining claims and their applicable tests.