Opinion ID: 2329815
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In Balancing Interests, The Court Must Consider The Totality Of The Circumstances.

Text: All four of the Judges to consider Pratt's case have agreed that once a criminal defendant satisfies the three-prong showing required by Hanapi, there remains a balancing test before the defendant's assertion of the native Hawaiian privilege negates any possible criminal conviction. They have, however, differed in their views of what factors the test should consider. The trial court reached the following conclusions of law in its articulation of the balancing test: [COL] 9. Case and statutory law all suggest that even with such a showing (under Hanapi ), the Court must reconcile competing interests, or stated another way accommodate competing ... interests and only uphold such rights and privileges reasonably exercised and to the extent feasible and subject to the right of the State to regulate such rights. See Article XII, section 7, Hawaii Constitution; Public Access Shoreline Hawai`i v. Hawaii County Planning Commission, 79 Hawai`i 425 [903 P.2d 1246] (1995). [COL] 10. The Court must balance the competing interests of Mr. Pratt's attempts to exercise certain Hawaiian native [sic] rights by setting up a residence and [heiau] in the Kalalau Valley with the State's interest in keeping this a wilderness area for all to enjoy and be safe in. [COL] 11. The Court finds that the State has a valid interest in protecting and preserving this valuable asset, which means, among other things, controlling the amount of traffic, the length of stay for any one person, and the types of activities that are consistent with this stewardship. This interest when balanced against the rights expounded by Mr. Pratt weigh in favor of the State. Thus, it appears that the trial court considered the defendant's stated intention, balanced against the State's offered legislative prerogatives. At the ICA, Judge Leonard's opinion concluded that the balancing test in this case weighed in favor of the State, in part because there was no evidence that the State's regulation was unreasonable. Pratt at 356, 243 P.3d at 316. This articulation of the balancing test necessarily places a burden of proof on the defendant to show unreasonableness of the regulation. Judge Fujise likewise placed the burden of proof on the defendant, but articulated the test as requiring the defendant to show the reasonableness of his conduct under the circumstances. Id. at 357, 243 P.3d at 317. Chief Judge Nakamura contended that the State carries the burden of proof to show that the defendant's conduct resulted in actual harm. Id. at 363-64, 243 P.3d at 323-24. We respectfully decline Chief Judge Nakamura's articulation of the test, finding the test to be too narrow. The facts of this case provide apt illustration. The harm against which the park's regulation seeks to protect is the harm caused by too many visitors in Kalalau Valley; by definition, one person could never cause that harm. But this does not mean that the government may not seek to protect against overuse. In fact, user permits are a common and effective government tool in situations where outlawing the threatening activity is not necessary, but where the government seeks to control against overuse of a limited resource. We likewise reject the other ICA Judges' articulations of the test because of this court's practice of applying totality of the circumstances tests, as opposed to legal presumptions, in the context of native Hawaiian rights. For example, in Kalipi, the plaintiff asserted that HRS § 1-1 established certain native Hawaiian customary rights as the law of the State. Kalipi at 9, 656 P.2d at 750. In response, the defendants contended that any rights that may have been retained had been abrogated by an early case suggesting that HRS § 7-1 contained an exhaustive list of native Hawaiian rights, and that all other customary practices could be freely regulated by the State. Id. Finding the plaintiff's contention too broad and the defendants' too narrow, this court rejected both views, stating, [r]ather, we believe that the retention of a Hawaiian tradition should in each case be determined by balancing the respective interests and harm once it is established that the application of the custom has continued in a particular area. Id. at 10, 656 P.2d at 751 (emphasis added). This court has since interpreted Kalipi as informing us that the balance of interests and harms clearly favors a right of exclusion for private property owners as against persons pursuing non-traditional practices or exercising otherwise valid customary rights in an unreasonable manner. PASH, 79 Hawai`i at 442, 903 P.2d at 1263. Likewise, in PDF, the court acknowledged the balancing requirement implicit in the constitutional language, writing that the provision both reaffirm[ed] customarily and traditionally exercised rights of native Hawaiians, while giving the State the power to regulate these rights.  PDF at 619, 837 P.2d at 1271 (emphasis added). Then, after determining that non-residence was not a bar to plaintiffs' claims of a native Hawaiian right, the court wrote, If it can be shown that Wao Kele `O Puna was a traditional gathering area utilized by the tenants of the abutting ahupua'a, and that the other requirements of Kalipi -are met in this case, then PDF members such as Ms. Naeole may have a right to enter the undeveloped areas of the exchanged lands to exercise their traditional practices. Id. at 621, 837 P.2d at 1272 (emphasis added). In using the word mayas opposed to mustthe court left room for the courts to implement the constitutional language by considering all the circumstances of the case on remand. The importance of considering the totality of circumstances is also reflected in this court's discussion of developed and undeveloped lands in Hanapi. There, the court reiterated PASH 's holding that it is  always `inconsistent' to permit the practice of traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights on such [developed] property. In accordance with PASH, however, we reserve the question as to the status of native Hawaiian rights on property that is `less than fully developed.' Hanapi at 187, 970 P.2d at 495 (quoting PASH at 450, 903 P.2d at 1271). The court refused to validate a bright-line test whereby native Hawaiian practices on undeveloped lands are always permitted. The dissent argues against utilizing a totality of the circumstances test in this context, in part because settled criteria already exist. Dissent at 229, 277 P.3d at 323. It further argues that a totality of the circumstances test is imprecise and invites consideration of matters beyond the benchmarks. Dissent at 229, 277 P.3d at 323. We disagree with each of these points. First, as explained above, we read the cases cited in this opinion as underscoring the importance of the court's careful judgment in resolving cases involving traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights; we do not read them as providing a limited set of settled criteria to evaluate in every case. Second, we do not share the dissent's concerns that the court should avoid utilizing a totality of the circumstances test because it is imprecise. Rather, we note that it is the very flexibility ensured by this test that makes it appropriate to use in this context. Review of this jurisdiction's cases involving native Hawaiian practices shows how varied the scenarios are in which native Hawaiian rights arise. Because the constitutional provision at issue applies in several contexts, and because we cannot anticipate which factors may be relevant in all contexts, we decline to articulate a test that could preclude consideration of important factors. In applying the totality of the circumstances test to the facts of this case, the balancing of interests weighs in favor of permitting the park to regulate Pratt's activity, his argument of privilege notwithstanding. Souza testified that the regulation serves several important purposes. The DLNR manages the park so people can have a wilderness type of experience. He described the Kalalau Valley as one of the most scenic areas, and noted that it is rich in cultural resources, including native plant communities and native sea birds. He testified that the DLNR requires visitors to obtain permits in an effort to limit visitors for health and safety reasons, and to protect park resources. One concern is that the self-composting toilets fail when they are overused, another is that they must keep the area low density to protect the fragile ecosystem. The record also shows that Pratt has an interest in going to Kalalau Valley. As the ICA wrote, Pratt clearly cares for and feels a spiritual connection to Kalalau and the ancient Hawaiians that once occupied the valley. Pratt at 351, 243 P.3d at 311. Pratt is a kahu; he has studied native Hawaiian practices and goes to the valley as part of his practice. However, according to his testimony, his actions in Kalalau Valley go beyond stewardship. Pratt testified that he took care of some of the heiau, but also that he established a residence in Kalalau Valley, and cleared entire areas of the valley in order to replant them with other species. He undertook this work without consultation with the DLNR, and without an effort to comply with the DLNR's permit requirements. Aside from an unsuccessful application to work with the DLNR in the 1990s, Pratt did not show any attempts to engage in his native Hawaiian practice within the limits of state law. In this case, the trial court did not err in considering all of the facts and circumstances surrounding Pratt's activities, and then balancing the parties' interests. While Pratt has a strong interest in visiting Kalalau Valley, he did not attempt to visit in accordance with the laws of the State. Those laws serve important purposes, including maintaining the park for public use and preserving the environment of the park. The outcome of this case should not be seen as preventing Pratt from going to the Kalalau Valley; Pratt may go and stay overnight whenever he obtains the proper permit. He may also apply to the curatorship program to work together with the DLNR to take care of the heiau in the Kalalau Valley. The trial court did not err in determining that Pratt's interest in conducting his activities without a permit did not outweigh the State's interest in limiting the number of visitors to Kalalau Valley; Pratt's activities, therefore, do not fall under constitutional protection. As always in a criminal case, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant guilty of the charged offense. In this case, Pratt admitted to violating the regulation at issue: he stipulated that he was in a closed area of Kalalau State Park on the three dates of his citations. Therefore, this court must affirm Pratt's convictions for violating HAR § 13-146-4.