Opinion ID: 2756768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: All of the defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to convict them beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §846. In making this argument, the defendants face a “formidable hurdle.” United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 405 (7th Cir. 2012). We construe the record “in the light most favorable to the prosecution, making all reasonable inferences in its favor, and affirm the conviction so long as any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant to have committed the essential elements of the crime.” United States v. Mota, 685 F.3d 644, 650 (7th Cir. 2012). “Overturning a guilty verdict for lack of evidence is serious business; we are essentially asked to take the case out of the jury’s hands, something we will do ‘only if the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Kindle, 698 F.3d at 406 (quoting Mota, 685 F.3d at 650) (emphasis added in Kindle). To obtain convictions under §846, the government needed to prove that the defendants “agreed to acquire cocaine for distribution.” United States v. Walker, 673 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2012). Carwell was very clear in explaining his goals—to rob the stash house, divide the cocaine among his co-conspirators, and then “flood the city” with cocaine. The other defendants were not so explicit, but the evidence supporting their guilt was overwhelming nonetheless. The day before the robbery, all of the defendants discussed how to execute the robbery. Specifically, the defendants confirmed that the only way to get 18 Nos. 11-3519, 11-3627, 12-1016, and 12-1290 all fifteen kilograms of cocaine was to jointly invade the stash house. A jury could “reasonably believe that no sane person would rob a stash house guarded by armed gang members to score some recreational drugs for personal use. For a jury to reach such a conclusion hardly requires the impermissible piling of inference upon inference, but rather is the sort of rational result from circumstantial evidence we ask juries to determine every day.” United States v. Lewis, 641 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Spagnola, 632 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The evidence was sufficient to show that [the defendants] conspired to obtain the cocaine for re-distribution; any uncertainty as to precisely how they would sell the drugs does not upset the verdict”). Because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendants agreed to commit a drug trafficking crime, there was also sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendants were carrying firearms in connection with that crime. 18 U.S.C. §924(c). For similar reasons, the district court correctly rejected the defendants’ proposed non-pattern jury instruction: “A planned robbery of a drug stash house, without more, does not constitute a conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to distribute them.” To repeat, a properly instructed jury is entitled to draw the inference that a plan to rob fifteen kilograms of cocaine from a house protected by armed criminals amounts to an agreement to acquire cocaine for distribution. In that respect, the proposed instruction was an incorrect statement of law. It was also confusing and unnecessary. “Unless it is necessary to give an instruction, it is necessary not to give it, so that the Nos. 11-3519, 11-3627, 12-1016, and 12-1290 19 important instructions stand out and are remembered.” United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2001).