Opinion ID: 3000965
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Writ of Execution

Text: Although lack of proper notice is enough to dispose of the present appeal, we deem it useful to address Integral’s alternative arguments, as these points could conceivably arise on remand. The first one we discuss is whether the writ of execution is valid. We review the questions of immunity from execution under the FSIA de novo. See AfCap, Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2007). Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, the United States gave absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns from the execution of judgments. This rule required plaintiffs who successfully obtained a judgment against a foreign sovereign to rely on voluntary repayment by that State. Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 252 (5th Cir. 2002). The FSIA codified this practice by establishing a general principle of immunity for foreign sovereigns from execution of judgments: “[T]he property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment[,] arrest[,] and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1609. This immunity extends to the instrumentalities of a foreign state. Em Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 472 (2d Cir. 2007). On the other hand, in keeping with its general pattern, the FSIA also recognizes exceptions to this immunity, “modif[ying] the rule barring execution against a foreign state’s property by ‘partially lowering the barrier of immunity from execution so as to make this immunity conform more closely with the provisions on jurisdictional immunity in the bill.’ ” Connecticut Bank of Commerce, 309 F.3d at 252 (quoting H.R. REP. 94-1487 at 27 (1976) (emphasis added)). Although there is some overlap between the exceptions to jurisdictional immunity and those for immunity from execution and attachment, there is no escaping the fact that the No. 06-1718 21 latter are more narrowly drawn. See De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1984). Subsections 1610(a) and (d) provide general exceptions to the immunity of a foreign state from execution of a judgment, while subsection 1610(b) adds additional exceptions for instrumentalities of a foreign state. See Connecticut Bank of Commerce, 309 F.3d at 253. In keeping with the FSIA’s overall design, “[t]he protections applicable to assets of instrumentalities vary from those applicable to the assets of the foreign states themselves.” Em Ltd., 473 F.3d at 472. As the Second Circuit explained the difference: Under subsections 1610(a) and (d), assets of a foreign state can be attached only if the assets sought to be attached are “used for a commercial activity in the United States.” But under subsection 1610(b), which concerns agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states, creditors may attach “any property in the United States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b) (emphasis added). Em Ltd., 473 F.3d at 472-73; see also Connecticut Bank of Commerce, 309 F.3d at 252. Even if the theoretical power to attach assets of Integral that are found within the United States exists (which is all that § 1610 promises), that is not enough to win the day for Autotech. Its effort to secure payment fell short on much more basic points. First is the question whether it identified any specific property on which it wished to execute its judgment. The FSIA says that immunity from execution is waived only for specific “property.” As a result, in order to determine whether immunity from execution or attachment has been waived, the plaintiff must identify specific property upon which it is trying to act. E.g., AfCap, Inc., 383 F.3d at 367. A court cannot give a party a 22 No. 06-1718 blank check when a foreign sovereign is involved: property belonging to the sovereign itself, or a different instrumentality, may still enjoy immunity while property of the instrumentality that is in the case may not. The only way the court can decide whether it is proper to issue the writ is if it knows which property is targeted. It is also of no small moment that the FSIA authorizes execution only against properties “in the United States.” See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It is true that section 1610 does not empower United States courts to levy on assets located outside the United States.”); Fidelity Partners, Inc. v. Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp., 921 F.Supp. 1113, 1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Under the FSIA, assets of foreign states located outside the United States retain their traditional immunity from execution to satisfy judgments entered in United States courts.”); see also Af-Cap, Inc., 383 F.3d at 367 (“[U]nder § 1610(a) of the FSIA, a court is prohibited from executing against the property of a foreign state unless that property is: (1) in the United States; and (2) used for commercial activity in the United States.”). The FSIA did not purport to authorize execution against a foreign sovereign’s property, or that of its instrumentality, wherever that property is located around the world. We would need some hint from Congress before we felt justified in adopting such a breathtaking assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89 (2005) (noting “the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application”). As cases like Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005), illustrate, the presumption against extraterritorial effect is not absolute or rigid. Nor, as Small acknowledged, is there some kind of “clear statement” rule under which extraterritorial No. 06-1718 23 application follows only if Congress says so in no uncertain terms. If, however, as here, there is an absence of “statutory language, context, history, or purpose” indicating that Congress was legislating with the world in mind, the presumption is sound. Small, 544 U.S. at 391. This is undoubtedly why, when considering whether the tax and royalty obligations owned by the Republic of Congo were exempt from immunity from execution under § 1610(a), the Fifth Circuit tried to identify whether the situs of those obligations was in the United States. Af-Cap Inc., 383 F.3d at 371-73. In our case, Autotech frankly admitted that it intended to use the writ to levy against assets outside the United States. There is a procedure for doing so, but Autotech did not use it. If assets exist in another country, the person seeking to reach them must try to obtain recognition and enforcement of the U.S. judgment in the courts of that country. If that effort is successful, then those courts can use their powers to assure enforcement of the judgment. Here, not only did Autotech fail to identify any assets in the United States that Integral had, it freely admitted that it was not trying to reach any such assets. Under the circumstances, we must conclude that there was nothing that the writ of execution could validly reach.