Opinion ID: 12484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sykes's Resignation Letter

Text: C&G contends that Sykes's letter of resignation waived his reemployment rights under the VRRA. In support of its argument, C&G cites Hilliard v. New Jersey Army Nat'l Guard, 527 F.Supp. 405 (D.N.J.1981). Hilliard involved a Teaneck, New Jersey police officer who was also an officer in the New Jersey National Guard. When Hilliard's repeated requests for leave to complete a special training course were denied by the Township of Teaneck,7 he formed a sham corporation, named himself director, and, although still employed by the Teaneck police force, reapplied listing himself as self-employed. Id. at 407. When Hilliard's ruse was later discovered, senior officers with the New Jersey Army National Guard offered him the choice of immediately returning to his employment with the Teaneck police or resigning his position and continuing on active duty. Id. Hilliard signed and sent a resignation letter. 7 The New Jersey Army National Guard required public employees to obtain permission prior to entering active duty to promote comity between the Guard and local government. Id. at 406. 21 Id. & n. 2. When Hilliard subsequently presented a claim for reemployment, the district court, observing that the general rule under the VRRA is that a resignation from civilian employment to enter military service does not deprive a veteran of reemployment rights, nevertheless held that the special circumstances present here require a contrary result. Id. at 410. Sykes correctly argues that the special circumstances presented in Hilliard—fraud—are not present in this case. It is beyond dispute that a resignation from a civilian job, whether verbal or written, does not waive reemployment rights under the VRRA. See Green v. Oktibbeha County Hosp., 526 F.Supp. 49, 54 (N.D.Miss.1981); Bottger v. Doss Aeronautical Servs., Inc., 609 F.Supp. 583, (D.Ala.1985); see also Winders v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 595 F.Supp. 1512, 1518 (D.N.J.1984) (stating that where an employee communicates that he is entering active military duty even the word resign in a communication sent to the employer cannot waive reemployment rights). Without addressing the issue of whether a veteran has the ability to waive statutory reemployment rights prospectively by contract, we note only that Sykes's resignation letter, prepared by C & G and ostensibly addressing seniority and contractual rights, did not even purport to do so. We see no reason to imply a waiver of Sykes's statutory reemployment rights when there is no record evidence to support such a waiver.