Opinion ID: 3149118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing to Challenge the Assignments.

Text: Standing is a threshold question in every case. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The existence of standing is a legal question and, therefore, engenders de novo review. Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 708 F.3d 282, 289 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Me. People's All. & Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 283 (1st Cir. 2006)). A plaintiff suing in federal court normally must shoulder the burden of establishing standing. Id. With respect to this issue, we do not write on a pristine page. In Lister v. Bank of America, N.A., 790 F.3d 20, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2015), we explicated the nature of a mortgage under Rhode Island law. Rhode Island is a title-theory state, in which 'a mortgagee not only obtains a lien upon the real estate by virtue of the grant of the mortgage deed but also obtains legal title to the property subject to defeasance upon payment of the debt.' Id. (quoting Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069, 1078 (R.I. 2013)). A reverse mortgage fits within this construct. We have ruled that a mortgagor has standing to challenge the assignment of a mortgage on her home to the extent that such a challenge is necessary to contest a foreclosing entity's status qua mortgagee. Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291. This means that a - 7 - mortgagor (or a party standing in the mortgagor's shoes) only has standing to challenge an invalid, ineffective, or otherwise void mortgage. See Wilson v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., 744 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2014); Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 733 F.3d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 2013); Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291; Mruk v. MERS, 82 A.3d 527, 536 (R.I. 2013). The flip side of this proposition is that a mortgagor does not have standing to challenge shortcomings in [a mortgage] assignment that render it merely voidable at the election of one party but otherwise effective to pass legal title. Culhane, 708 F.3d at 291. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has embraced this void/voidable distinction with respect to real estate mortgages. See Inventach v. Superior Fire Ins. Co., 138 A. 39, 42 (R.I. 1927); Bishop v. Kent & Stanley Co., 41 A. 255, 257 (R.I. 1898); see also Clark v. MERS, 7 F. Supp. 3d 169, 175 (D.R.I. 2014). In the first instance, then, we must determine whether the challenged mortgage assignments are void or voidable. In Rhode Island, a valid mortgage or any of its assignments must be signed, acknowledged by notarization, delivered, and recorded. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-11-1. It is not necessary that the mortgage and the note that it secures be held by the same entity. See Bucci, 68 A.3d at 1088. In the case at hand, two assignments of the mortgage took place. The summary judgment record shows that each assignment - 8 - complied with the necessary formalities: the relevant documents were distinguished by signature, notarization, delivery, and recordation. The record is equally clear that the parties to the assignments treated them as valid. Although the appellant questions whether the assignors possessed the requisite authority to execute the assignments, the summary judgment record contains no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact in this regard. Unsupported allegations are not enough. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (requiring significantly probative evidence to defeat a properly documented summary judgment motion). That ends this aspect of the matter. On this record, the assignments are not void but, at worst, merely voidable. It follows that the district court did not err in concluding that the appellant lacked standing to challenge them. The appellant demurs, suggesting that the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Chhun v. MERS, 84 A.3d 419 (R.I. 2014), requires a different result. We think not. In Chhun, the court, reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, allowed a challenge to the assignment of a mortgage to go forward. See id. at 423. Chhun is easily distinguishable from the case at hand. First, this case was heard on summary judgment, not on a motion to dismiss — and the burden on the appellant was correspondingly - 9 - heavier. See García-Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013) (distinguishing between standard for surviving motion to dismiss and standard for surviving summary judgment); Palazzo v. Big G Supermkts., Inc., 292 A.2d 235, 237 (R.I. 1972) (same, applying Rhode Island law). Second, the record here — unlike in Chhun, 84 A.3d at 423 — fails to delineate particular facts tending to show the invalidity of the challenged assignments.