Opinion ID: 523618
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Drinking Companions

Text: 29 In turning to the arguments that Gorman's drinking companions had a duty to restrain him from driving, we first observe that the base regulation just discussed is inapplicable to the analysis of their duty in this case. The mere existence of the base regulation does not in itself create a duty, it only defines the proper standard of care if a duty is determined to exist as a matter of state law. Lutz, 685 F.2d at 1184. The regulation was relevant in assessing the duty of the security guard because the guard's function is analogous to that of a municipal police officer and an employee of a public entity is under a statutory obligation in California to comply with the enactments of that entity. Cal.Gov't Code Sec. 815.6. Gorman's drinking companions are not functionally equivalent to a public entity under California law and thus the base regulation cannot be the source of any duty to control Gorman for Doggett's protection. 30 Doggett advances several alternative theories to support his argument that California law imposes a duty on Gorman's companions to control his conduct. Two of these require comment. 6 First is the theory that Doggett's companions had a duty to control his conduct because of their special relationship to him as fellow Naval members and, in two instances, as his superior officers. 31
32 This court has already determined that the military relationship does not constitute a special relationship merely because of the military command's general right to control the conduct of military personnel. Hartzell v. United States, 786 F.2d 964, 968 (9th Cir.1986)(citing Louie, 776 F.2d at 826). As the Louie court explained, plaintiffs may not create a cause of action based on a military relationship where liability would not lie under state law. 776 F.2d at 826. 33 Doggett therefore attempts to bring his contention that a special relationship exists within the ambit of Tarasoff v. Regents, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976), in which the California Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist stands in a special relationship to his patient and to the foreseeable victims of his patient's violent behavior which creates a duty to warn or otherwise protect the potential victims. This doctrine was applied in Myers v. Quesenberry, 144 Cal.App.3d 888, 894, 193 Cal.Rptr. 733, 736 (1983) in which the court held that a doctor might be liable in negligence for telling a woman with uncontrolled diabetes to go immediately to a hospital for tests preliminary to aborting her dead fetus, and failing to warn her not to drive in her condition. We fail to see any similarity between the doctor-patient relationships in these cases and that between Gorman and the enlisted men or officers with whom he was drinking. These individuals did not stand with Gorman in a relationship similar to the medical or psychiatric relationship that would have given them a responsibility to warn him he had had too much to drink to drive safely. 34
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