Opinion ID: 2639799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Counsel During a Critical Stage in the Proceedings

Text: ¶ 24 Heddrick argues that he lacked the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the litigation. Under both the Washington and United States Constitutions, a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at critical stages in the litigation. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22; State v. Everybodytalksabout, 161 Wash.2d 702, 708, 166 P.3d 693 (2007). A critical stage is one in which a defendant's rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or in which the outcome of the case is otherwise substantially affected. State v. Agtuca, 12 Wash.App. 402, 404, 529 P.2d 1159 (1974). A complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings is presumptively prejudicial and calls for automatic reversal. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59, 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, [8] 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). [9] The Court of Appeals below recognized that competency hearings are a critical stage in the litigation but reasoned that no actual competency hearing was held in the custodial assault case necessitating the presence of counsel. Heddrick, 140 Wash.App. 1019, 2007 WL 2411354, at -7. We do not agree with this analysis. [10] ¶ 25 Rather, a separate proceeding requiring the assistance of counsel arose because competency in the custodial assault case became an issue when the trial judge decided to track the proceedings in the felony harassment case. When Judge Yu signed the order before Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Jennifer Miller and Lapps, significant consequences for Heddrick hung in the balance, cf. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002), because, as we have stated above, his rights to further procedures could be waived at this stage. However, we are not persuaded that Heddrick was denied counsel at this stage. ¶ 26 However, Lapps' presence at the signing of the order, with the apparent blessing of Naylor, militates against a finding of complete denial of counsel. As Miller describes before Judge Yu, Naylor was fully apprised of Lapps' intention to withdraw the competency challenge. RP (Oct. 10, 2005) at 3-4. Lapps' reluctance to sign the order did not stem from her concerns regarding Naylor's agreement; rather she expressed more concern over scheduling. Id. at 4. Though no transcript of the Friday conversation exists, Naylor's agreement is evident from the statements by both Miller and Lapps. On the particular facts of this case, Naylor and Lapps appear to have coordinated their efforts, including the withdrawal of Heddrick's competency challenge. Thus, Heddrick was not denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings. ¶ 27 Justice Stephens correctly ascribes great importance to the out-of-court discussion between Miller, Naylor, and Lapps, but goes too far in describing the event as a critical stage in the proceedings. By definition, a critical stage is one during a criminal proceeding, such as arraignment, that holds significant consequences for the accused. Bell, 535 U.S. at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843. Moreover, [e]ach [of the United States Supreme Court cases dealing with complete denial of counsel at a critical stage] involved criminal defendants who had actually or constructively been denied counsel by government action. Id. at 696 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 1843. The court could not and did not have any effect on the discussion and agreement between the attorneys. The discussion was informal and not on the record. We decline to refer to such an event as a critical stage in the proceedings.