Opinion ID: 1415021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the complaint for summary possession in favor of island holidays.

Text: Fitzgerald contends that the court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of rightful possession to the leased premises. Fitzgerald argues that the court erred in disregarding his equitable defenses, which if proven, would have established that a new lease contract had been made between the parties. Fitzgerald asserts that the summary judgment order severely prejudiced its counterclaim because it limited damages to the year 1974, when in fact, Fitzgerald was asserting that major damages arose out of a breach of the old lease and a new lease. The trial court's granting of the motion for summary judgment had the effect of precluding Fitzgerald from presenting evidence of the existence of an allegedly new lease and from presenting evidence that Fitzgerald had lawful possession of the premises. The question before this court is whether or not, based on the evidence before the court at the time of the summary judgment hearing on May 12, 1975, and taking all the evidence in the light most favorable to Fitzgerald, there were material facts in issue as to the existence of a new lease contract and material facts in issue as to whether Island Holidays was entitled to summary possession of the premises, to warrant the submission of the issues to the jury. Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 57 Haw. 113, 551 P.2d 163 (1976); Gum v. Nakamura, 57 Haw. 39, 549 P.2d 471 (1976). We find, based on the record herein, taking all the evidence in the light most favorable to Fitzgerald, that the evidence is sufficient to raise disputed issues of fact as to whether the parties entered into an oral agreement to execute a new lease contract. The jury could very well believe Fitzgerald as to an oral agreement on the specific terms of the new lease and, without a doubt, Fitzgerald's substantial part performance brings the new lease, though oral, within the exception in the applicability of the Statute of Frauds. See Boteilho v. Boteilho, 58 Haw. ___, 564 P.2d 144 (1977); McIntosh v. Murphy, 52 Haw. 29, 469 P.2d 177 (1970); Perreira v. Perreira, 50 Haw. 641, 447 P.2d 667 (1968); Motonaga v. Ishimaru, 38 Haw. 158, reh. den. 38 Haw. 205 (1948); Molokai Ranch, Ltd. v. Morris, 36 Haw. 219 (1942); Vierra v. Shipman, 26 Haw. 369 (1922); Yee Hop v. Young Sak Cho, 25 Haw. 494 (1920). The record is clear that, while the existing lease was in effect, Island Holidays proceeded with its renovations of the Hotel involved herein; required Fitzgerald to remove himself from his location, at his expense, in the hotel lobby; required Fitzgerald to relocate himself into new premises at his own expense; required Fitzgerald to renovate the new but less spacious premises, at Fitzgerald's expense; and made representations, express or implied, though disputed, in the execution of a new lease contract. In our opinion, the above facts constitute an equitable defense to assert against summary possession actions. Chee Yit Tung v. Achi, 26 Haw. 642 (1922); Ching Tam Shee v. Hall, 19 Haw. 190 (1908); see Hicks v. Gentry, 104 Ga. App. 3, 120 S.E.2d 915 (1961). We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in granting Island Holidays' motion for summary judgment and remand the case for a trial on the issue of rightful possession of the leased premises. In conjunction therewith, determination must be made whether Fitzgerald is seeking specific performance, though disclaimed by Fitzgerald, rather than equitable estoppel. The record further shows that the trial court in granting summary judgment for summary possession to Island Holidays did not deal with the issues resulting from an alleged unlawful breach by Island Holidays of the old written lease as extended. A dispute of material fact exists relative to whether Island Holidays properly terminated the old written lease or not.