Opinion ID: 177081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speedy Trial Challenge

Text: Saenz was indicted on September 26, 2007. His trial began on May 11, 2009, about twenty months after he was indicted, and he maintains that this delay infringed on his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial....). Although Saenz raised his constitutional speedy trial argument in his opening brief, he did not argue a violation of the Speedy Trial Act until his reply brief. It was too late to raise the statutory challenge then. United States v. Stevens, 380 F.3d 1021, 1025 (7th Cir.2004); United States v. Elizalde-Adame, 262 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir.2001). We therefore consider only his constitutional speedy trial argument, although we note that it is unlikely that a statutory claim would fare any better. Following the Supreme Court's guidance in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we evaluate constitutional speedy trial claims by assessing several factors: (1) whether the delay was uncommonly long; (2) whether the government or the defendant is more to blame for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182; see United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.2007). The first factor, the length of delay, acts as a triggering mechanism; unless a presumptively prejudicial amount of time elapsed in the district court, it is unnecessary to conduct a searching analysis of all the factors. Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 597. We have found that delays of one year are presumptively prejudicial. See id.; United States v. White, 443 F.3d 582, 589 (7th Cir.2006). In this case, twenty months passed between the original indictment and the beginning of the trial. This length of time is therefore sufficient to trigger our review of the other Barker factors. Before turning to the other considerations, we point out that this was a large-scale, complex conspiracy case with nineteen co-defendants. That is relevant because the length of delay that can be tolerated for such a case is longer than it is for prosecutions of simple street crimes. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182; United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408, 1413 (7th Cir.1992). The second factor, the reason for the delay, weighs in the government's favor. The government moved for the first continuance in the case, from November 8, 2007 through January 28, 2008. The reason it did so, though, is that Saenz's first appearance in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana was less than thirty days before the scheduled trial date, and Saenz had not waived his statutory right to a trial more than thirty days after his initial appearance. The government filed another motion to continue in December 2008 for similar reasons after a co-defendant was apprehended. The bulk of the continuance requests, however, came from defense counsel. Saenz's counsel twice filed his own motions to continue. He filed the first motion on September 12, 2008, asserting that plea negotiations had been complicated and additional time was needed to finalize the terms of a plea agreement. The court granted the request and rescheduled the trial for December 15, 2008. Saenz's counsel filed another request for a continuance on January 15, 2009, stating that he had another trial that conflicted with this case's scheduled trial date. The court granted the motion and rescheduled the trial for May 11. In addition, Saenz twice joined motions to continue filed by a co-defendant on behalf of Saenz and the other defendants. And on three other occasions, a co-defendant filed a request for a continuance, and neither Saenz nor any other defendant objected. The continuance requests made solely by his co-defendants are at best neutral in our analysis and are not the fault of the government. See Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 599. The third factor is whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. The failure to assert the right makes it hard for a defendant to establish that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Saenz's counsel never filed any papers complaining about the lack of a speedy trial. On his own, Saenz sent a motion to the district court on October 24, 2008 requesting trial within 70 days pursuant to Amendment VI. The court entered the motion in the record but stated it would not act upon a pro se motion filed by a defendant with legal representation. Saenz also wrote a letter to the court on March 13, 2009 complaining about the continuances in his trial and the lack of contact with his attorney. The final Barker factor assesses the prejudice to the defendant. The Supreme Court has instructed that prejudice should be assessed in light of interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect, namely: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and the concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Saenz spent the time before trial in custody. We have stated that [s]ignificant pretrial incarceration may support a presumption of prejudice, but this prejudice `unenhanced by tangible impairment of the defense function and unsupported by a better showing on the other factors than was made here, does not alone make out a deprivation of the right to [a] speedy trial.' White, 443 F.3d at 591 (quotations omitted). There is no claim that any of Saenz's witnesses became unavailable because of the delay, or that any witnesses' memories had faded or that his defense was otherwise tangibly impaired. Taking these factors together, we conclude that Saenz's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has not been violated. The length of the delay was not extreme for a complex multi-defendant conspiracy case. Although we recognize that Saenz attempted to assert his right to a speedy trial, that does not outweigh the significant fact that Saenz and his co-defendants were responsible for nearly all of the delay in this case. Moreover, Saenz did not suffer any tangible impairment of his defense. The balance of the Barker factors leads us to reject his speedy trial argument.