Opinion ID: 186658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: D.C. Scope-of-Employment Law

Text: 14 Under the Westfall Act, courts apply the respondeat superior law in the state in which the alleged tort occurred. See Stokes, 327 F.3d at 1214. District of Columbia law, which applies in this case, follows the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958) (Restatement) in defining scope of employment. Moseley v. Second New St. Paul Baptist Church, 534 A.2d 346, 348 n. 4 (D.C.1987). The Restatement provides: 15 (1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: 16 (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; 17 (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; 18 (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and 19 (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master. 20 (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. 21 Restatement § 228. [T]he test for scope of employment is an objective one, based on all the facts and circumstances. Weinberg v. Johnson, 518 A.2d 985, 991 (D.C. 1986) ( Weinberg ). Although scope of employment is generally a question for the jury, it becomes a question of law for the court, however, if there is not sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the action was within the scope of the employment. Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C.1984) (collecting cases). 22 Because CAIR does not dispute that Ballenger made the statement in question while in his office during work hours — if indeed there are such limitations on a Representative's work — and because there are no allegations of force, only the first and third of section 228(1)'s elements are at issue in this case. Consistent with the Restatement's use of the conjunctive, both remaining prongs must favor Ballenger if we are to find that he acted within the scope of employment. See Haddon 68 F.3d at 1424 (citations omitted).