Opinion ID: 1148242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Batson Challenges.

Text: With our review so focused, we turn to the present facts to assess whether the trial court erred in deciding that the prosecutor did not discriminate in his use of peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used five of his first seven challenges to eliminate all black jurors from the venire. The defendant objected to the use of these challenges during voir dire and expressed the opinion that the reasons stated for the challenges were insufficient to overcome his theory of racial bias. As noted, we consider this question ripe for review. The following black jurors were struck with the corresponding reasons given: 1 1) A single, 22-year-old laborer with an eleventh-grade education was stricken because his youth, marital and educational level appeared to the prosecutor to indicate instability. 2) A 49-year-old minister/bus driver who was married and had an eleventh-grade education was stricken because he was a preacher. 3) A 35-year-old housewife who finished the 12th grade was removed because she did not reveal her brother's conviction of armed robbery. 4) A 38-year-old married cafeteria hostess with a 12th-grade education was challenged because of her concerns about sequestration, due to her having to care for an invalid mother. 5) A single, 25-year-old who went through the 12th grade and was stricken from the panel because he wore a hat into the courtroom, and because his general demeanor suggested to the prosecutor that he was unstable, unconcerned, and had no respect for the proceedings. During later voir dire, the trial court made the following comments relative to defendant's objection to the exclusion of the five blacks from the jury: Well, of course, as we all know, we need some substantial guidelines on this issue about what are proper reasons and not. I can say that were I a prosecutor I would not want if I were seeking a death penalty a young, twenty-five year old, single male if I had the availability of older, more settled potential jurors. It wouldn't matter to me what race they were. I would not want a young, single juror with a marginal educational background. All I can say about the exclusion of the group here that has been challenged, especially insofar as there are some blacks, is that I cannot say that the reasons that the prosecutor has enunciated are not reasonable. I couldn't seize on any one reason on any particular juror and say that they weren't reasonable. Each one of the reasons that have been announced seems to be plausible. Nobody seeking a death penaly in good judgment would leave a preacher on a jury. We all know that by and large preachers are jurors who are not prone to that sort of thing, and I seldom see preachers left on any jury. I find that even in plaintiff's cases they won't leave them on a jury because people are concerned that the preacher would be too forgiving of someone who runs a stoplight and hits somebody and that he won't be prone to bring back any kind of judgment. I never see preachers left. No sensible prosecutor leaves someone with a prior criminal conviction on the jury. I cannot just categorically say that any of the reasons that the prosecutor has announced are strictly nothing but showing a discrimination against blacks. I can't say that. If we had a black here who was thirty-five years old, with some education, and with some showing of a responsible job background and that juror was struck, I would say that clearly showed an effort absent some specific thing to exclude blacks, but I can't take it that far to say that Mr. Craft is in essence telling the Court an untruth when he says these are the real reasons for striking these people. The trial court addressed the issue again during the hearing on the motion for a new trial, where he stated: [I]f I had a venire where there was a reasonably well-educated, reasonably responsible black who appeared to meet most criterion for jury service, and there was no reasonable reason given to exclude that person, I would disallow the prosecution a challenge on that juror. I heard in this case the reasons that the State announced for challenging those jurors; and I came away from that convinced that those were reasons that an intelligent prosecutor would have challenged each one of those jurors whether he had been black, white, or Chinese. We cannot say that the trial judge erred when he found that the reasons articulated by the prosecutor were racially neutral. The minister was removed because of the perceived sympathy of ministers toward the accused in a criminal prosecution. This is most assuredly a race-neutral explanation. The juror whose brother was convicted of armed robbery can easily be seen as being potentially prejudiced against the prosecution. The reasons for striking the other three jurors are perhaps less quantifiable than the two already discussed; however, they are not necessarily suspect. One juror who was struck cared for her invalid mother. When denied excusal for this reason, she rolled her eyes to express her disapproval and thereafter became unresponsive to the voir dire. The Fifth Circuit, when recently faced with a similar reason, explained why such reason is legitimate: He [the prosecutor] sensed by her posture and demeanor that she [juror] was hostile to being in court and feared that she might respond negatively to the prosecution simply because the government was responsible for calling her to jury duty. United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1987). Borrowing the rationale of Forbes, we conclude that this juror's prejudice against the state was so obvious as to constitute a race-neutral reason for her removal. The juror who was struck because he wore a hat into the courtroom and appeared contemptuous of the proceedings is likewise controlled by our borrowed rationale of Forbes. An expression of contempt or hostility may reasonably be assumed to spell trouble for the prosecution. Such demeanor is a legitimate reason, related to any case, for a prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge. In so finding, we join other state courts who have found that demeanor may constitute a racially-neutral reason. See, e.g., Taitano v. State, 4 Va. App. 342, 358 S.E.2d 590 (1987) (dress and demeanor); Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (body english); Yarbough v. State, 732 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (demeanor); Smith v. State, 734 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (slouched, wore gold chains, rings and watch); Grady v. State, 730 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (demeanor); State v. Brown, No. 51,279 (Mo. Ct. App., July 23, 1987) (counsel must rely upon demeanor ...). The final black juror was challenged because of his youth, marital status and educational level. While it is true that the prosecutor allowed persons with less education to serve on the jury, none of the white jurors chosen possessed this combination of characteristics of being young, uneducated and unmarried. This combination of characteristics produced a potential juror who could reasonably have been seen by the prosecutor as unstable. Instability is a racially neutral criterion which would be relevant to the prosecution of any case as it would tend to produce a juror unsympathetic to the state. Another recent Fifth Circuit decision also involved a peremptory challenge of a black juror on the basis of this combination of characteristics; the court of appeals found that this was an articulable and specific racially neutral reason. United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.1987). Other state courts have likewise held youth, marital status, and employment background, in various combinations, to be racially-neutral reasons. Taitano v. State, 4 Va. App. 342, 358 S.E.2d 590 (1987) (age); Chambers v. State, 724 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (age, marital status combined); Townsend v. State, 730 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (short term employment, single with children combined); People v. Cartagena, 128 A.D.2d 797, 513 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (1987) (educational background, employment history combined); Yarbough v. State, 732 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (young and single combined); Smith v. State, 734 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1987) (unemployed with no roots in community). While we have taken great pains to review the reasons articulated by the prosecutor in this case for his use of peremptory strikes to exclude five black potential jurors, and while we find that in this case these reasons are racially neutral, our opinion should not be construed to limit legitimate, racially neutral reasons to the reasons in this case or to hold these reasons to be automatically race-neutral in any other case. We emphasize what the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Batson, that `[t]here are any number of bases' on which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a juror who is not excusable for cause ... however, the prosecutor must give a `clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his `legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, n. 20. We, too, recognize that there are any number of reasons to strike a juror that are legitimate and race-neutral. We point these out today as illustrative examples, reiterating that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level of justifying exercise of a challenge for cause, Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, but may not include the prosecutor's assumption  or intuitive judgment  that they [black jurors] would be partial to the defendant because of their share race. Id. See also, Williams v. State, 507 So.2d 50, 52 (Miss. 1987). We place our trust in the trial judges to determine whether or not a discriminatory motive underlies the prosecutor's articulated reasons. On a separate but related point, Appellant contends that no racially neutral reason may be given by the prosecutor, at the time that he would be dictating those into the record out of the presence of the jury, unless the prospective jurors are questioned about those particular aspects in the courtroom in the presence of other jurors and a record made. We reject this approach. The Supreme Court in Batson declined to express any views on the techniques used by lawyers seeking to obtain information about the community in which the case is to be tried, or more particularly about the age, education, employment, and economic status of prospective jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, n. 12, 106 S.Ct. at 1718, n. 12, 90 L.Ed.2d at 82, n. 12. We decline to set any limits on the prosecutor's use of any legitimate informational source heretofore or hereafter available as to jurors. Furthermore, the prosecutor does not have to question a juror in open court about such information before using it as a racially neutral ground to make a peremptory strike, as long as the source of the information and the practice itself are not racially discriminatory. We offer in Appendix I racially neutral reasons upheld by other courts in an effort to provide some guidance to our trial courts. Again, we emphasize that these are merely illustrative examples. In conclusion, we find the jury selection to have been properly conducted and affirm the trial judge's finding that jurors were not excluded on the basis of their race.