Opinion ID: 896050
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Business-Use Limitation

Text: [¶ 21] The Hannemans claim the district court erred by adopting a red herring argument advanced by Continental. The district court concluded: It is apparent that Continental intended to insure Kurry against liability for losses occurring to vehicles owned by Kurry, those which he listed on his policy, and any which he might use in his business, whether he paid rent for the vehicle or was able to borrow it without paying rent. In the Continental policy, Symbol 9 expressly limited coverage to [o]nly those `autos' ... that are used in connection with your business. Unlike Symbol 9, Symbol 8 does not limit coverage to autos used in connection with a business. The Hannemans' declaratory action is based on Symbol 8. [¶ 22] Continental does not dispute that Symbol 8's coverage was not conditioned on Kurry's business use. Continental argues, however, the policy should be read as a commercial policy, which implies Kurry was not covered under the policy when using the autos for personal use. Continental reasons that because the policy was issued to Lee Kurry, d/b/a/ Decorators Unlimited, it covered only the use of autos for his business. [¶ 23] We construe insurance policies as a whole to give meaning to each word and phrase. Martin, 1998 ND 8, ¶ 15, 573 N.W.2d 823 (citing Symington v. Walle Mut. Ins. Co., 1997 ND 93, ¶ 17, 563 N.W.2d 400). We also consider the type of policy at issue in order to determine whether or not coverage is provided. Cf. Martin, 1998 ND 8, ¶ 15, 573 N.W.2d 823 (considering insurance contract titles as descriptive of the coverage provided in a death and dismemberment policy). We will not, however, add words to an insurance contract in order to alter the coverage. Cf. Id. at ¶ 11 (stating [a]dding words to a contract in order to create an ambiguity violates the purpose of contract interpretation). [¶ 24] Reading an insurance contract as a business or personal policy does not change the express language of the contract. Symbol 9 expressly limited coverage to only those autos Kurry did not own, lease, hire, rent or borrow that [he] used in connection with [his] business. Thus, Symbol 9 provided coverage for the nonowned autos Kurry used while on the job. The business-use limitation under Symbol 9 shows that Continental knew how to linguistically limit coverage.... See Kief Farmers Co-op. Elevator v. Farmland, 534 N.W.2d 28, 35-36 (N.D. 1995). Generally, a limitation in one section of an insurance policy and the absence of similar limiting language in another section shows the insurer intended to limit in one section but not in another. Id. In this case, the absence of a business-use limitation in Symbol 8 indicates Continental intended to cover Kurry whenever he leased, hired, rented or borrowed an auto, regardless of whether Kurry used the vehicle for business or personal use. Id. [¶ 25] Although the district court accepted this red herring argument, we affirm because the district court made other dispositive conclusions which compel judgment for Continental Western. We will not set aside a correct result merely because the trial court assigned an incorrect reason if the result is the same under the correct law and reasoning. City of Jamestown v. Leevers, 552 N.W.2d 365, 369 (N.D.1996). See also Hummel v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., 526 N.W.2d 704 (N.D.1995); Thompson v. Danner, 507 N.W.2d 550 (N.D.1993); and Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 454 N.W.2d 522 (N.D.1990).