Opinion ID: 1389170
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ohio Supreme Court's Application of Strickland to These Facts

Text: In addition to showing that his counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficiency, Awkal has show[n] that the [Ohio Supreme Court] applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. Cone, 535 U.S.at 699, 122 S.Ct. 1843. After considering Awkal's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Awkal was not deprived of a fair trial by his trial counsel. Given the evidence supporting his conviction, he was not prejudiced by what occurred at trial. Awkal, 667 N.E.2d at 971. The Ohio Supreme Court explained its holding as follows: Counsel also called Dr. Rizk to testify during the guilt phase. Dr. Rizk is adequately qualified and has testified in numerous other similar circumstances. However, Dr. Rizk testified that Awkal was sane at the time of the murders. This testimony obviously damaged Awkal's affirmative defense that he was not sane when he committed the murders. Yet, portions of Dr. Rizk's testimony assisted the defense, including testimony about religion as a basis for Awkal's marital problems, his medication levels, and his hallucinations. Counsel concluded Awkal's affirmative defense by calling Dr. McGee, a psychiatrist. Dr. McGee was not yet board certified in psychiatry, had no experience in forensic psychiatry, and had been practicing psychiatry for only one year. Dr. McGee testified that Awkal, as evidenced by his hallucinations involving his wife in his cell in Dayton, had broken with reality at the time of the murders. This break with reality impaired his ability to know right from wrong at the time of the murders. Although her opinion may have been diminished by her lack of certification and inexperience, Dr. McGee supported Awkal's affirmative defense. Thus, of the three doctors called to testify for the defense, the testimony of one was stricken from the record, one gave an opinion contradicting Awkal's affirmative defense but also gave other evidence that assisted that defense, and one testified that Awkal was not mentally responsible for his acts. However, Drs. McGee and Hewitt were called to testify and did testify during the penalty phase of the trial, giving pro-defense opinions. Dr. Samy also gave a pro-defense opinion in the penalty phase. Awkal's counsel obviously had some plan in mind. Dr. Hewitt conceivably could have been allowed to testify as an expert witness, and Dr. Rizk did make an earlier finding that Awkal was incompetent to stand trial. In hindsight it appears that Awkal may have been better served to call only Dr. McGee during the guilt phase, and call her and the other defense doctors during the penalty phase, if the trial would reach that stage. However, the end result of tactical trial decisions need not be positive in order for counsel to be considered effective. We do not believe the record establishes that Awkal's attorneys were ineffective at trial. Awkal, 667 N.E.2d at 971-72 (citation omitted). This analysis and conclusion are objectively unreasonable applications of Strickland because they fail to recognize the extent of the obvious harm caused by trial counsel's decision to call Rizk. The analysis also mischaracterizes Rizk's testimony as helpful to Awkal. Though Rizk did testify regarding Awkal's family and psychiatric history, these facts were irrelevant at the guilt phase. As discussed above, the only relevant question at the guilt phase was whether Awkal was sane at the time of the crime. Ohio Rev.Code § 2901.01(N). Accordingly, anything else that Rizk said at the guilt phase was irrelevant and did not assist Awkal's defense. Nor did it matter that Rizk had previously found Awkal incompetent to stand trial, because that incompetency was unrelated to Awkal's mental state at the time of the crime. Rizk's relevant guilt-phase testimony obviously eviscerated Awkal's sole defense, a fact that the Ohio Supreme Court ignored when it assumed that Rizk's testimony was simply one part of an overall strategy. Once the jury heard one of Awkal's own witnesses state that Awkal was sane at the time of the crime, no strategy could have saved his sole defense. Because the Ohio Supreme Court's application of Strickland was objectively unreasonable, and because we conclude that Awkal received ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of trial, we REVERSE the district court's judgment denying habeas relief.