Opinion ID: 702351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government

Text: 23 The government submits that the district court erred in suppressing D.F.'s confessions. It contends that her statements were voluntary because they were not coerced by any government conduct. A statement is voluntary, the government asserts, unless the defendant's will was overborne at the time of confession by coercive police activity. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). To determine whether that standard has been met, a court must assess the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 875, 111 S.Ct. 203, 112 L.Ed.2d 164 (1990). In this regard, continues the government, the record does not support the claim that Center personnel were agents of law enforcement. The government insists that the district court clearly erred in finding that Center staff (1) worked closely with law enforcement, and (2) reported immediately D.F.'s confession to Protective Services. It points out that B.K. discussed the confession at a team meeting, but that another member of the team reported it to Protective Services. It also contends that D.F. made eight confessions to staffers before there was any contact with the F.B.I. The government insists that the Center staff questioned D.F. for therapeutic reasons only, not to induce her to incriminate herself. The staff did not view itself as an arm of law enforcement, eliciting a confession. B.K. said: 24 [W]e wanted to give her a vehicle for being able to talk about these things so that she could get past this very difficult time in her life and proceed in treatment. But we had to find a way to do that without setting it up so that she would have to tell us and we would have to tell the authorities. 25 Tr. at 42. According to the government, only B.K. had conversations with the F.B.I., and only after being advised that it was appropriate for her to do so. She confirmed the information about D.F.'s initial confession provided to the F.B.I. by the county Department of Social Services, and discussed the possibility of setting up a meeting between the F.B.I. and D.F. It is the government's view that the district court incorrectly characterized the staff as surrogate investigators. 857 F.Supp. at 1325. 26 Turning to the other elements of coercion, the government argues that D.F.'s decision to confess was her own and was spontaneous. She interjected her confession in a group therapy session, taking her social worker completely by surprise. Tr. at 46-47. She told another staffer that night. Several days later, she assured therapist R.M. that she understood there would be consequences to her confession. There was no official coercion; she confessed in response to internal pressure. In fact, Center staff were seeking ways to prevent D.F. from having to face any legal consequences for her acts. There is no evidence that the Center used highly coercive techniques to encourage her to admit to crimes, as the district court claimed. 857 F.Supp. at 1325. D.F. was encouraged to talk about her problems, but was not coerced. 27 The government also submits that the court erred in finding that D.F.'s placement at the Center was influenced ... by a pending court order. 857 F.Supp. at 1314. In the government's view, D.F.'s aunt, desperate to get help for D.F., chose the Center without the help of the juvenile courts. The decision to defer prosecution of D.F. for abuse was [redacted] County's, not a negotiated outcome with Protective Services, as the district court asserted. 28 The government also criticizes the district court for ignoring the ten subsequent consistent confessions made by D.F. The court found that they were the product of staff pressure on her to expand upon the confession, and did not analyze them individually. This, says the government, was clear error. Subsequent confessions following a coerced confession can be voluntary where circumstances change. 9 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310-11, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1293-94, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). In the government's view, D.F. had a clear ability to resist pressure; she finally confessed because of her own conscience, not official coercion. Her will was not overborne. She made a deliberate choice to speak her mind. The Constitution has not yet been interpreted to protect people against themselves. Johnson v. Trigg, 28 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir.1994). 29