Opinion ID: 2794537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discussion of Lawfulness of Stop.

Text: A. Iowa Code Section 321.388. In this case, law enforcement stopped Lyon’s vehicle based upon the belief that it did not have a properly illuminated license plate. The relevant Code provision is Iowa Code section 321.388, which provides in pertinent part, “Either the rear lamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to 6 illuminate with a white light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear.” B. Positions of the Parties. 1. Lyon. Lyon argues police “seized” him within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980) (noting that under the Fourth Amendment, a person is “seized” when, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave”); Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d at 100. He asserts that in order to engage in a roadside detention, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that “criminal activity [is] afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968); State v. Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d 792, 794–95 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008). From this familiar formulation, Lyon argues that, in this case, Deputy Tart lacked reasonable suspicion to make the stop. He asserts that when Deputy Tart was questioned about the stop at the hearing on Lyon’s motion to suppress, the deputy testified the license plate was not visible, even outside fifty feet. Lyon asserts, however, that the fact Deputy Tart did not see illumination on the license plate from a distance outside fifty feet was irrelevant, as the statute requires only that the license plate be illuminated for legibility from a distance of fifty feet. According to Lyon, Deputy Tart further testified that when his vehicle was within one hundred feet or so of Lyon’s vehicle, his own headlights illuminated the rear plates, making it impossible to tell whether the license plate was properly illuminated at that distance. As a result, Lyon 7 argues there was no evidence to establish that Deputy Tart observed his license plate “in a non-illuminated state around or inside of fifty feet.” In support of his argument, Lyon cites Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d at 794–95, in which the court of appeals held that an officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based upon Iowa Code section 321.388 when the officer was traveling at a distance of one hundred feet or more behind the vehicle. Lyon cites a passage in Reisetter in which the court of appeals stated that “[w]ithout the facts that would support reasonable suspicion . . . the statutory requirement of fifty feet was being violated, an officer could claim at any distance[] that a license plate was not illuminated and therefore justify a stop.” Id. at 795. In order to have reasonable suspicion under the statute, the Reisetter court believed the officer must be at a distance within fifty feet or some distance that reasonably approximates fifty feet when making observations about a potential infraction. Id. at 794–95. Lyon claims the video footage of the stop demonstrates that it was not possible to determine whether at a distance of fifty feet the license plate was sufficiently illuminated to be legible. Because Deputy Tart had not observed Lyon’s license plate at a distance approximating fifty feet without the spoiling feature of reflection from his own vehicle’s headlights, Lyon argues the district court’s conclusion that there was reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make the stop must be reversed. 2. The State. The State disagrees. It asserts Iowa Code section 321.388 establishes two separate requirements: (1) a license plate must be illuminated with a white light, and (2) the resulting illumination must “render [the license plate] clearly legible from a distance of fifty feet to the rear.” Iowa Code § 321.388; see also State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 295 8 (Iowa 2013); State v. Gustafson, No. 08-1429, 2009 WL 4842474, at