Opinion ID: 1575232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Medical Assurance

Text: For her final point, Nelson asserts that the circuit judge erred by prohibiting her from presenting to the jury that her case was against St. Bernards's insurance carrier, Medical Assurance, pursuant to the direct-action statuteArkansas Code Annotated § 23-79-210. Nelson originally filed suit against Dr. Stubblefield and St. Bernards. However, when St. Bernards filed an answer in which it pled that it was a nonprofit entity insured by Medical Assurance, Nelson filed an amended complaint naming Medical Assurance as a party defendant under section 23-79-210. As already noted in this opinion, St. Bernards pled charitable immunity at a later time. Prior to trial, St. Bernards moved in limine to prevent Nelson from, among other things, mentioning or soliciting testimony from any witness that Medical Assurance was its insurer. In moving as it did, St. Bernards argued that such information was irrelevant and prejudicial under the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. At a hearing on the motion in limine, Nelson responded that Medical Assurance was a named defendant. In a written order, the circuit judge ruled that Nelson could not present to the jury that Medical Assurance was St. Bernards's insurance carrier, so long as St. Bernards waived its charitable-immunity defense. At trial, before opening statements but after voir dire, Nelson objected on grounds that it was prejudicial that she would not be able to bring out that Medical Assurance was a named party in the lawsuit. The following colloquy ensued: THE COURT: [T]he reason I ruled that you are to direct your inquiries toward the hospital and not the insurance carriers is because the mere mention of insurance injects a prejudicial effect to the jury and to avoid that prejudicial effect, the court feels like it would be bettereven though the insurance carrier is the named partythat it would be avoided and any reference to the incident be directed toward the hospital rather than the insurance carrier who is an indemnifier. COUNSEL FOR ST. BERNARDS: That's correct, your honor ... with the provisal, which we've agreed to abide by, that so long as we don't try to rest on the charitable immunity status of the hospital. THE COURT: The minute you do that I'm going to let him go after the insurance company. . . . But that's the reason I've ruled that way is because it creates an unreasonable and unfair inference that you've got a deep pocket insurance company that's going to cover for the hospital so I think that's the better way to present it. In support of her argument on this point, Nelson asserts that she was entitled to establish to the jury that Medical Assurance was the defendant being sued, and would be the defendant ultimately liable should the jury find that the St. Bernards nursing staff negligently caused her injuries because St. Bernards pled charitable immunity as a defense. Nelson further claims that her inability to tell the jury that Medical Assurance, as St. Bernards's insurer, was a named defendant was prejudicial to her because she was not able to effectively explore the liability insurance issue to discover [the jurors'] potential for bias in favor of St. Bernards during voir dire. To reiterate, this court reviews a circuit judge's decision to admit or reject evidence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Hively v. Edwards, supra . We cannot say that the circuit judge abused his discretion by not allowing Nelson to present evidence that St. Bernards's insurance carrier was a named defendant. This court has long recognized the prejudice inherent in needlessly informing juries about insurance coverage. Synergy Gas Corp. v. Lindsey, 311 Ark. 265, 843 S.W.2d 825 (1992); York v. Young, 271 Ark. 266, 608 S.W.2d 20 (1980); Pickard v. Stewart, 253 Ark. 1063, 491 S.W.2d 46 (1973); Strahan v. Webb, 231 Ark. 426, 330 S.W.2d 291 (1959); Pekin Stave & Mfg. Co. v. Ramey, 104 Ark. 1, 147 S.W. 83 (1912). We have held that the injection of insurance coverage is proper only when it is relevant and pertinent to an issue in the case. See, e.g., Peters v. Pierce, 308 Ark. 60, 823 S.W.2d 820 (1992). The question is whether a reference to insurance coverage is relevant to an issue before the court or is designed to skew the jury's thinking because of the presence or absence of a deep pocket. Hacker v. Hall, 296 Ark. 571, 576, 759 S.W.2d 32, 35 (1988). Nelson has simply failed to convince this court that Medical Assurance's status as a party defendant was relevant to the issues before the court in this actionwhether she was injured as a result of the negligence of Dr. Stubblefield or the St. Bernards nursing staffparticularly where St. Bernards presented its defense in its own name and did not assert its right to immunity from suit at trial. In fact, Nelson argues in her brief that all she sought to establish to the jury was that [Medical Assurance] was the defendant being sued, and would be the defendant ultimately liable. Because this is wholly irrelevant on the issue of St. Bernards's negligence, it is clear that Nelson's only purpose was to press unnecessarily upon the jury's attention the fact that a defendant is indemnified against loss for the injury which is the subject-matter of the suit. Pekin Stave & Mfg. Co., 104 Ark. at 9, 147 S.W. at 86. This is not a proper purpose. Furthermore, Nelson cannot show that she was prejudiced by her inability to present Medical Assurance's status to the jury, and this court will not reverse in the absence of prejudice. See, e.g., Viravonga v. Samakitham, 372 Ark. 562, 279 S.W.3d 44 (2008). Nelson contends that she could not effectively voir dire because she was prohibited from establishing St. Bernards was not financially responsible in the event its employees were found to be negligent. She argues further that she was prejudiced because she was not entitled to effectively exercise her preemptory [sic] challenges since she could not explore the liability insurance issue to discover [the jurors'] potential for bias in favor of St. Bernards. And, yet, at no point did Nelson argue to the circuit judge that his decision prevented her from adequately conducting voir dire. It is elementary that this court will not consider arguments that were not presented to the circuit judge. See, e.g., Bell v. Misenheimer, 2009 Ark. 222, 308 S.W.3d 120. It is incumbent upon the parties to raise arguments initially to the circuit judge in order to give that judge an opportunity to consider them; otherwise, this court would be placed in the position of possibly reversing a circuit judge for reasons not addressed by that judge. Id. Moreover, Nelson has not established how the circuit judge's decision prevented her from discovering whether jurors were biased in favor of St. Bernards. Nelson was free to and did, in fact, explore the jurors' potential for bias in favor of St. Bernards during voir dire. We hold that the circuit judge did not abuse his discretion by prohibiting Nelson from presenting to the jury the fact that St. Bernards's insurance carrier was a named defendant. Affirmed.