Opinion ID: 787092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State Defendants' Claims of Absolute Immunity

Text: 65 We also conclude that the district court should have rejected the State Defendants' contention that they were entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity on Mitchell's claims against them for damages. A private actor may be afforded the absolute immunity ordinarily accorded judges acting within the scope of their jurisdictions if his role is `functionally comparable' to that of a judge, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), or if the private actor's acts are integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding, Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 111-12 (2d Cir.1998); Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 136-38 (2d Cir.1987). We cannot see that the State Defendants fit into either category. 66 In deciding whether an actor is entitled to absolute immunity on the basis that his role is analogous to that of a judge, we evaluate the challenged proceedings in light of the characteristics of the judicial process set forth in Butz v. Economou. See DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 297-98 (2d Cir.2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2018, 158 L.Ed.2d 492 (2004). 67 [I]n Butz the Court mentioned the following factors, among others, as characteristic of the judicial process and to be considered in determining absolute as contrasted with qualified immunity: [1] the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; [2] the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; [3] insulation from political influence; [4] the importance of precedent; [5] the adversary nature of the process; and [6] the correctability of error on appeal. 68 Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201-02, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894). Of these six factors, the second, fourth, fifth and sixth are those most peculiar to the functioning of the judicial process — as contrasted with, for example, the prosecutorial function — and none of them suggests that the Screening Committee's proceedings are similar to those of a judicial tribunal. Aside from a rule that an attorney is not to be denied recertification unless the application has been reviewed by at least five attorneys, with a majority recommending against recertification, Screening Committee Recertification Procedures art. V, the State Defendants have not called our attention to any procedural safeguards akin to those in judicial proceedings. For example, they have pointed to nothing that would show that the Committee need abide by precedent, or that there is any separation of its investigative and decisionmaking functions, or any recordation of statements by witnesses or the applicant, or any requirement that the Committee reveal the reasons for its decisions. There is no requirement for a formal hearing; and although the Committee bylaws provide that [a] panel member who is the subject of a complaint shall receive notice of the substance of the complaint, Screening Committee Bylaw 3.4, Mitchell asserts that he was removed from the panel without notice of the reasons for his removal and without the opportunity to challenge any accusations lodged against him. (Affirmation of Stephen T. Mitchell dated March 27, 2002, at 9.) Indeed, the State Defendants take the position that an attorney need not be apprised of the details of an accusation against him or even of the identity of his accuser. The State Defendants maintain that the work of committees like the Screening Committee can be of real assistance only if the sources of its information are kept confidential. Those who respond to the Committee's inquiries can be helpful only if they feel free to say what they know without concern about embarrassment or retaliation.... Consequently, the extent to which any candidate is advised of the details and the source of information relevant to [attorney] fitness must be left to the discretion of the Committee.  (Defendants-Appellees' supplemental letter brief on appeal dated February 27, 2004, at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emendations in brief) (emphasis ours).) 69 In addition, as discussed in Part II.A.1. above, the Rules make no provision for judicial review, and the Committee's own bylaws state that there is no right of appeal, see Screening Committee Bylaw 2.7. And although the Committee's determinations may, to an extent, be reviewable in an Article 78 proceeding, in the context of determining whether absolute immunity is appropriate[ ] Article 78 proceedings are generally not considered adequate avenues for `appeal.' DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d at 299; see, e.g., Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1102, 115 S.Ct. 1837, 131 L.Ed.2d 756 (1995). 70 Given the unavailability of an adequate avenue for judicial review, along with the lack of any requirement for a formal hearing, and the Committee's claimed unfettered discretion to withhold from the attorney the details and source of accusations against him, we think it plain that the Committee's function is not analogous to that of a judge. 71 Nor can we conclude that the State Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity on the ground that the Committee's decisions are integrally related to a judicial proceeding. In order to be entitled to absolute immunity under this test, the official must be engaged in acts that are integrally related not simply to the judicial process in general but to a concrete judicial case or controversy. See generally Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980). Functions that might be deemed integrally related to the judicial process when undertaken in the context of a particular case may be viewed as administrative when they are undertaken outside that context, and [a]dministrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the very functioning of the courts, have not ... been regarded as judicial acts, Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). For example, a judge has been held to have absolute immunity from a claim of conspiracy to empanel an all-white jury in a particular criminal trial, see White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276, 279-80 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 995, 101 S.Ct. 533, 66 L.Ed.2d 292 (1980), but to have no such immunity from a claim of racial discrimination in the preparation of general jury lists to affect all future trials, a job that was ministerial, see Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339, 348, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1879). In the latter case, the judge had the responsibility of prepar[ing] annually a list of such inhabitants of the county ... `as he shall think well qualified to serve as jurors, being persons of sound judgment and free from legal exception,' id. at 349 (Field, J., dissenting), a task that might as well have been committed to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge, id. at 348 (majority opinion). 72 The Committee's job of formulating a list of attorneys deemed qualified to represent indigent defendants accused of crimes, and its additions to or deletions from that list, bear a marked similarity to the Ex parte Virginia judge's responsibility for compiling a list of qualified jurors. The Committee's decisions are not related to any particular criminal prosecution. The 18-B Panel exists so that judges may select attorneys from the list who will both provide future representation to indigent defendants and receive compensation for those services. But, as discussed above, in any given case, the court may appoint an attorney who is not on the 18-B Panel. Further, even the Committee's rejection of Mitchell's individual application did not affect any particular case, for the Committee's letter of rejection stated that Mitchell was to continue to handle to conclusion any matter to which he was then assigned. (Committee Letter to Mitchell.) 73 In sum, the Committee's functions are neither comparable to those of a judge nor integrally related to any specific judicial proceeding. We conclude that the State Defendants are not entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity from Mitchell's claims for damages. 74 By the same token, the provision in § 1983 conditionally prohibiting the granting of injunctive relief against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is inapplicable to the State Defendants, who plainly are not judicial officers and do not act in a judicial capacity.