Opinion ID: 2219911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of the Prosecutor's Closing Argument

Text: Having found the evidence in this case sufficient to convict, we still must analyze defendant's claim that the prosecutor's closing statements violated his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial, thus entitling him to a new trial. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; People v. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d 53, 64, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405 (2003). Defendant asserts that reversal of his conviction is required because of what he contends was the prosecutor's repeated and intentional misconduct. In his brief before this court, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for police credibility, attacked the integrity, tactics, and number of defense counsel, and disparaged defendant's former counsel. In his motion for a new trial, defendant also argued that the prosecutor improperly persisted in stating that he was representing the victims. Whether statements made by a prosecutor at closing argument were so egregious that they warrant a new trial is a legal issue this court reviews de novo. People v. Graham, 206 Ill.2d 465, 474, 276 Ill.Dec. 878, 795 N.E.2d 231 (2003). This court has expressed concern with the problem of prosecutorial misconduct several times in recent years. See, e.g., Johnson, 208 Ill.2d at 64-67, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405 (describing the problem of prosecutorial misconduct in great detail); see also People v. Blue, 189 Ill.2d 99, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920 (2000); People v. Moss, 205 Ill.2d 139, 191, 275 Ill.Dec. 444, 792 N.E.2d 1217 (2001) (Freeman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Kilbride, J.). We have pointed out that a criminal defendant, regardless of guilt or innocence, is entitled to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial. Blue, 189 Ill.2d at 138, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920. Further, we have noted an intolerance of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct that deliberately undermines the process by which we determine a defendant's guilt or innocence. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d at 66, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405. Additionally, we have noted that threats of reversal, and words of condemnation and disapproval, have been less than effective in curbing prosecutorial misconduct. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d at 66-67, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405. With this case, we reaffirm our intolerance of prosecutorial misconduct. As an initial matter, we address the State's contention that many of the prosecutor's statements to which defendant now objects are forfeited. To preserve claimed improper statements during closing argument for review, a defendant must object to the offending statements both at trial and in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988) ( Both a trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are required for alleged errors that could have been raised during trial (emphases in original)). Defendant failed to properly observe the above rule regarding certain specific statements, including all of the prosecutor's statements concerning the credibility of the police officers, the prosecutor's sole champion statement concerning his representation of the victim, and the prosecutor's brainwashing statement concerning the integrity, tactics, and number of defense counsel. Additionally, defendant failed to properly object to the cumulative effect of the closing argument. Considering the above we will focus our attention on the statements properly objected to. We note, however, that closing arguments must be viewed in their entirety, and the challenged remarks must be viewed in context. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d 52, 131, 275 Ill.Dec. 390, 792 N.E.2d 1163 (2001), citing People v. Macri, 185 Ill.2d 1, 62, 235 Ill.Dec. 589, 705 N.E.2d 772 (1998) (and cases cited therein). Accordingly, the simple fact that defendant did not properly object to a statement does not render that statement as if it never existed. Indeed, all statements must be considered as part of the entirety of a prosecutor's closing argument, and even statements not properly objected to may add to the context of a remark properly objected to. Prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d at 131, 275 Ill.Dec. 390, 792 N.E.2d 1163. In reviewing comments made at closing arguments, this court asks whether or not the comments engender substantial prejudice against a defendant such that it is impossible to say whether or not a verdict of guilt resulted from them. People v. Nieves, 193 Ill.2d 513, 533, 251 Ill.Dec. 155, 739 N.E.2d 1277 (2000). Misconduct in closing argument is substantial and warrants reversal and a new trial if the improper remarks constituted a material factor in a defendant's conviction. People v. Linscott, 142 Ill.2d 22, 28, 153 Ill.Dec. 249, 566 N.E.2d 1355 (1991). If the jury could have reached a contrary verdict had the improper remarks not been made, or the reviewing court cannot say that the prosecutor's improper remarks did not contribute to the defendant's conviction, a new trial should be granted. Linscott, 142 Ill.2d at 28, 153 Ill.Dec. 249, 566 N.E.2d 1355. Defendant argues that the prosecutor in this case improperly attempted to gain sympathy from the jury by implying that the State was disadvantaged considering that each defendant had two attorneys working together, seeking to trick and deceive the jury. The prosecutor pointed out that contrary to representations made to you during the jury selection or voir dire, you have seen with your own eyes, these are not two completely different independent teams of lawyers. The prosecutor further asked the jurors to watch with your own eyes as they converse frequently. One will go back and ask another for assistance; one will talk to another attorney; then go back and start asking the same questions or different questions. Defendant points out that while the prosecutor made the above arguments, he also opposed severance and sought the death penalty, entitling defendant and Hunter to two attorneys each by supreme court rule. See 188 Ill.2d R. 416(d) (In all cases wherein the State has given notice of its intention to seek the death penalty    the trial judge shall appoint an indigent defendant two qualified counsel). Later in his closing, the prosecutor noted that the four defense attorneys had in excess of 100 years of legal practice and 75 years of school grilling Shane Brandel. The defense objected, the court sustained the objection, and the prosecutor rephrased his statement, asking the jurors to consider who was questioning Officers Brandel and Street. Again the defense objected. This time the court overruled the objection. Still later, the prosecutor analogized the defense lawyers to Monday morning quarterbacks, who can dissect, bisect, and magnify any past action, all with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight and all with the benefit of time and numbers. But, in the final analysis, the attorneys weren't there risking their lives on March [12, 1999]. They were not in the arena. After the court overruled an objection by the defense, the prosecutor continued, noting that [t]he policemen were in the arena. He stated that the rules of the game at which attorneys defend, operate, and go under seem to require a complete perfection on the part of a witness. He argued that these rules allow attorneys to reveal an imperfect witness to be a liar, the witness to be stupid, or the witness to be confused. When another objection was overruled, the prosecutor noted that this render[ed] the witness unworthy of belief. But, in the everyday real life world in which we all live, there is no perfection. In the real world, we judge each other by a less exacting standard. The prosecutor asked the jurors to think of any 2 minutes in your life in which you could withstand a full day of cross-examination by a four-lawyer team. Following a brief exchange, the prosecutor noted that the defense attacked the police reports completed by Officers Brandel and Street and then pointed out that as a citizen, when you call the police, you expect an instant response. Even sooner if your life is at stake. At this point, the prosecutor argued that you do not want to call 911 only to be told by dispatch that the police officers are busy typing reports, will not be sent out to the street until the reports are finished, and `for your information, most of these officers just came in from a murder case, and we know how exacting[ly] the defense attorneys will cross-examine them.' The court sustained a defense objection and informed the jury to disregard the comment. In his very next statement, however, the prosecutor continued with his performance as a dispatcher stating: ` We know how closely their words will be examined; so, you can expect an additional 4 or 5 hours before the officers will be available so they can make sure that every word i[s] perfect, all syntaxes. ' (Emphasis in original). This time the court overruled the defense objection and allowed the prosecutor to continue. The prosecutor obliged, stating, ` Every word is perfect, all syntaxes are acceptable, and all paragraphs are sufficiently long enough to gain approbation from anyone. ' (Emphasis in original.) Sometime after the above comments, the prosecutor took issue with defendant's former counsel, who testified at trial that she had an idea that Forrest would be a witness against defendant in a separate murder trial, but did not know this to be the case. The prosecutor characterized her testimony as conducted at the behest of Jacoby Wheeler's attorney and revolting to any person who values the truth. After the court sustained an objection to that characterization and instructed the jury to disregard the comment, the prosecutor continued, comparing the testimony of defendant's former counsel to that of former President Clinton in regards to the Monica Lewinsky affair. Still later, the prosecutor brought up photographs introduced by the defense and showing the alley where Brandel claimed to have chased the suspects. During trial, the prosecutor had objected to the photographs on the ground that the foliage was different. Defense counsel responded that the photos were offered only to show physical structures and layout and offered to stipulate that the pictures did not fairly and accurately portray the vegetation around the alley in March 1999. The court found defendant's argument persuasive and noted that the photos were not admitted to show the vegetation around the alley. In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that over two years later somebody decides, well, it might be nice to have some pictures and it might be nicer if we took them in the summertime which is completely different from the winter as far as foliage and growth and, maybe, the Jury will fall for it. After a defense objection was overruled, the prosecutor rhetorically asked, How serious are they about giving you accurate and fair information? Defendant asserts that these statements constituted personal attacks upon the defense attorneys, beyond the limits of propriety, and were calculated solely to inflame the passions and prejudice of the jurors. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's strategy was to attack the honesty, integrity, and intelligence of those who opposed or inconvenienced his efforts to win a conviction. The jury could either rely on the testimony of the testifying police officers or face a situation where no officers were available to respond to 911 calls because they were too busy wasting their time writing painstakingly complete and accurate police reports. Defense counsel, like defendant's former attorney, were dishonest because they parsed words like former President Clinton and introduced evidence that inaccurately portrayed the facts. Defendant argues that in a closely balanced case such as this, where no forensic evidence tied defendant directly to the crime, and the credibility of police testimony was key, the improper tactics used by the prosecutor amounted to a material factor in the conviction. Without the prosecutor's use of personal attacks, undermining defense counsel's efforts to question police credibility, the jury could have acquitted the defendant. Supporting his position defendant points to People v. Beringer, 151 Ill.App.3d 558, 104 Ill.Dec. 916, 503 N.E.2d 778 (1987). In that case, the defendant, Joseph Beringer, was tried for murder jointly with his brother. Though the court believed the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction, it reversed because [t]he State's brazen misconduct insured that the defendant would not receive a fair trial. Beringer, 151 Ill.App.3d at 564, 104 Ill.Dec. 916, 503 N.E.2d 778. Evaluating various challenged remarks made by the prosecution, the Beringer court noted that [a]ccusations of deceptions between the defense counsels and personal attacks on defendant's attorney served no purpose except to prejudice the jury. Beringer, 151 Ill.App.3d at 564, 104 Ill.Dec. 916, 503 N.E.2d 778. The State argues that the portions of the prosecutor's closing argument that were preserved for review, even if viewed as improper, were not so egregious that they created an unfair trial or were a material factor in the verdict. According to the State, the jury's verdict was based upon the fact that defendant had a strong motive to kill Forrest, fled from the police leaving a trail of evidence, and was eventually caught hiding in a bush. The prosecutor's rhetoric, the State asserts, had nothing to do with the verdict. Additionally, the State argues that defendant's reliance on People v. Beringer is misplaced. In Beringer, the prosecutor personally attacked a defense attorney, stating he thought her `incapable of courtesy to other people.' Beringer, 151 Ill. App.3d at 563, 104 Ill.Dec. 916, 503 N.E.2d 778. Moreover, the prosecutor in Beringer violated this court's decision in People v. Nuccio, 43 Ill.2d 375, 381, 253 N.E.2d 353 (1969), by suggesting through cross-examination that a witness solicited payment for his testimony without presenting rebuttal evidence to support the charge. Beringer, 151 Ill.App.3d at 559-60, 104 Ill.Dec. 916, 503 N.E.2d 778. Here, the State points out, the prosecutor's conduct did not amount to a direct personal attack on defense attorneys, the prosecutor did not commit a Nuccio violation, and the prosecutor did not argue that defense counsel suborned perjury. Further, the State asserts that the trial court acted to reduce any chance of prejudice by sustaining several of defendant's objections, instructing the jury to disregard some of the prosecutor's comments, and by instructing the jury on the proper view of attorney arguments. The State points out that in People v. Moore, 171 Ill.2d 74, 105-06, 215 Ill.Dec. 75, 662 N.E.2d 1215 (1996), this court held that [t]he act of sustaining an objection and properly admonishing the jury is usually viewed as sufficient to cure any prejudice. We agree with the State that there are significant differences between this case and Beringer. Further, we acknowledge and reaffirm the proposition that the act of sustaining an objection and properly admonishing a jury is generally sufficient to cure prejudice engendered by improper closing argument. We do not believe that ends the analysis, however. Closing argument must serve a purpose beyond inflaming the emotions of the jury. People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill.2d 104, 121, 299 Ill.Dec. 637, 842 N.E.2d 674 (2005); Johnson, 208 Ill.2d at 87-88, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405 (Our system of justice requires that a defendant's guilt or innocence be determined based upon relevant evidence and legal principles, upon the application of reason and deliberation by a jury, not the expression of misdirected emotion or outrage by a mob). A prosecutor cannot use closing argument simply to inflame the passions or develop the prejudices of the jury without throwing any light upon the issues. People v. Halteman, 10 Ill.2d 74, 84, 139 N.E.2d 286 (1956). Moreover, it is improper for a prosecutor to utilize closing argument to forge an us-versus-them mentality that is inconsistent with the criminal trial principle that a jury fulfills a nonpartisan role, under the presumption that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d at 80, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405. The prosecutor's closing argument in this case, considered in its entirety, appears deliberately designed to forge just the sort of us-versus-them mentality decried by this court in Johnson and foster a situation where jurors might feel compelled to side with the State and its witnesses in order to ensure their own safety. At the very outset of his remarks, the prosecutor suggested that he was the lone and solitary figure left to champion the deceased while bearing the burden of avenging another's death. Later, he proposed that he was outnumbered by the defense attorneys, who were not interested in presenting the jury with accurate information but only strove to prove the police witnesses as liars. Moreover, through his mock presentation of a 911 call, he suggested that if the jurors felt that previously completed written police reports had to precisely corroborate police testimony at trial, police officers will no longer be able to effectively respond to emergencies, and the jurors might, in effect, compromise their own safety in the future. This strategy flows throughout the prosecutor's closing and is particularly evident when the statements properly objected to are considered in view of the rest of his closing argument and in context. The prosecutor told the jurors that they lived sheltered lives but a different dangerous world existed, full of dangerous people and mean streets. He argued that while Shane Brandel and Dan Street, the new breed of policeman, men who are educated, intelligent, and well-spoken, formed the thin blue line to protect the jurors, witnesses called by the defense would not be called when someone is breaking into their house or assaulting them. The prosecutor stated that his opinion of a witness who testified unfavorably to the State was that his elevator doesn't run all the way to the top floor. Finally, in wrapping up his argument on rebuttal, the prosecutor cautioned the jury away from being brainwashed by the fact that you hear everything twice from the defense while it only gets the chance to hear the prosecution's story once. We acknowledge that the trial court sustained some of defendant's objections during the prosecutor's closing arguments and instructed the jury that closing arguments are not evidence and any statements or arguments made at closing that are not based on the evidence should be disregarded. We point out, however, that we have previously held that [i]nstructing the jury that arguments are not evidence will not, in every instance, cure the defect caused by introduction of such evidence. Blue, 189 Ill.2d at 132, 244 Ill.Dec. 32, 724 N.E.2d 920. Further, we have held that the salutary effect of sustaining an objection is eliminated where a prosecutor persists in continuing that improper argument. People v. Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d 467, 471, 220 N.E.2d 432 (1966). In this case, while some of defendant's objections were sustained, in certain situations, the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to continue the same line of argument unchecked. This situation is clearly evident in the exchange between defense counsel, the court, and the prosecutor regarding the mock 911 call. Considering the above, we find that a chief goal of the prosecutor's closing argument in this case was to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury, uniting the interests of the jurors in their own safety with that of the interests of the State in convicting defendant. Such a goal is improper. The prosecutor in this case was not content to rely upon the strength of the State's evidence. He did not make a few solitary improper remarks. Instead, he utilized improper remarks, some unsupported by the evidence, to advance an us-versus-them theme. This theme was built piece by piece and is evident from the very beginning as the prosecutor launched his closing by portraying himself as a lone avenging champion. The theme continued throughout the prosecutor's argument and was advanced over objection and in spite of admonishment. The prosecutor suggested that police efficiency and expedience were more important than accuracy, and thereby urged the jurors to consider their own safety in deliberation rather than deliberating only on the actual guilt or innocence of defendant. See People v. Erickson, 117 Ill.2d 271, 290, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367 (1987) (where this court noted that the jury serves a truth-seeking role and is impaneled to decide a defendant's guilt or innocence). We believe that in a case like this, relying heavily on the credibility of the testifying police witnesses, the prosecutor's utilization of closing arguments to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury constituted a material factor in defendant's conviction. Without those arguments, a contrary verdict could have been reached. We cannot say with confidence that the prosecutor's improper remarks did not contribute to defendant's conviction. Accordingly, a new trial should be granted. This finding makes it unnecessary for this court to address defendant's arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and trial error in refusing to excuse juror Brian Thomas. We still must consider, however, defendant's arguments regarding the offers of proof concerning William Ellzey.