Opinion ID: 2426466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bergerson's Title VII Claims

Text: Section 1981 a permits a Title VII claimant (and other claimants not at issue here) to recover compensatory damages to redress future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006). These damages may be awarded in addition to economic damages consisting of backpay ... or any other type of relief authorized under [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)]. Id. § 1981a(b)(2). An award of backpay is the rule, not the exception. Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 580 (2d Cir.1989). The decision to award backpay is measured against the purposes which inform Title VII, Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417, 95 S.Ct. 2362, which include remov[ing] the stain discrimination leaves on equality in the workplace and mak[ing] victims of discrimination whole, Carrero, 890 F.2d at 580. The Supreme Court has explained that the primary objective of Title VII is prophylactic in nature because the statutory scheme was intended to eliminate past obstacles to workplace equality. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417, 95 S.Ct. 2362. Although a trial court has discretion whether to award backpay, its reasons must be explained in the event backpay is denied. See id. at 421 n. 14, 95 S.Ct. 2362; Carrero, 890 F.2d at 580. Its explanation must be sufficient so as to make review intelligible. Carrero, 890 F.2d at 580. Front pay is awarded at the discretion of a district court where reinstatement is inappropriate and the plaintiff has been unable to find another job. Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 145. The purpose of front pay is to mak[e] victims of discrimination whole in cases where the factfinder can reasonably predict that the plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable alternative employment. Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 125-26 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). During the trial, the District Court stated that it would hold a separate inquest to determine the amount of backpay and front pay due to Bergerson only if CNYPC were found by the jury to be liable under Title VII. After finding CNYPC liable, the jury was asked to award compensatory damages for only two categories of harm: (1) emotional distress, pain, and suffering; and (2) harm to Bergerson's reputation. The jury was not asked to consider [Bergerson's] lost wages and was presented with no evidence on this issue. Post-trial, the District Court determined that the jury's damages award was supported by the evidence and accordingly denied CNYPC's motion to vacate or reduce the damages award except to the extent of reducing the award to the statutory maximum. However, at the same time and without holding a separate inquest, the court also denied Bergerson an equitable award of backpay on the ground that the jury's award was sufficient to make her whole, including for her claim of lost wages. In so finding, the court noted: [Bergerson's] substantial damages award satisfied both of the objectives of Title VII. Instead of merely having to comply with an injunctive order prohibiting racial discrimination and hostility in the work environment, [CNYPC] must pay [Bergerson] $300,000 in compensatory damages as a result of its unlawful employment practices.... Additionally, the magnitude of the jury's award ensures that [Bergerson] will be made whole for her injuries, including any lost wages, pain, suffering, or emotional distress. The court recognized that the jury had heard no evidence on backpay but nevertheless found that the award returned Bergerson to the position she would have found herself in had the violations never occurred. We are unable to adopt this view. While a primary purpose of backpay is indeed to return a victim of discrimination to the position she would have found herself in had the violations never occurred, we have never held that an award of backpay is encompassed within a jury's award of compensatory damages. Indeed, such a view has been foreclosed by § 1981a. Rather, an award of backpay includes what the employee himself would have earned had he not been discharged. Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir.1998); see also Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 144-45 (observing that, ordinarily, a plaintiff is entitled to losses suffered as a result of defendant's discrimination (i.e., from the date of termination until the date of judgment)). An award of backpay is a separate inquiry and requires a district court to make additional factual findings. See Brock v. Casey Truck Sales, Inc., 839 F.2d 872, 880 (2d Cir.1988) (These amounts [of backpay] were carefully arrived at by determining first each discharged employee's hourly wage rate and the duration of his loss period.). Because a backpay award requires a separate inquest, a district court may not deny an award of backpay because it believes that an award of compensatory damages is sufficient. Either an award includes backpay or it does not. We also note that the District Court never found the compensatory damages award to be excessive; rather, upon CNYPC's motion to vacate the jury's damages award as unsupported by the evidence, the court instead reduced the damages award to the statutory cap of $300,000. Accordingly, on remand, the court is directed to hold a separate inquest as to backpay. Of course, we are not requiring the District Court to award backpay to Bergerson; however, if the court declines to award backpay, it must carefully articulate its reasons, Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421 n. 14, 95 S.Ct. 2362, keeping in mind that [a]n award of backpay is the rule, not the exception, Carrero, 890 F.2d at 580.
Bergerson also sought an award of front pay. Front pay may be awarded pursuant to section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides a court with authority to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, including but not limited to reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006); Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 853-54, 121 S.Ct. 1946, 150 L.Ed.2d 62 (2001). An award of front pay is an alternative to reinstatement where reinstatement is inappropriate, Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1182 (2d Cir.1996), such as where there is animosity between an employer and an employee or where there is no longer a position available at the time of judgment, Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir.1984) (describing reinstatement and front pay under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). An award of front pay is discretionary, and if a district court makes a nonerroneous specific finding that a plaintiff has already been made whole, no abuse of discretion can be found in denying front pay. See Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 145. Because we hold that the District Court abused its discretion in its specific finding that Bergerson was not entitled to backpay, we cannot assume, as CNYPC would have us do, that front pay is likewise not warranted. The court thus should consider in the first instance on remand whether Bergerson is entitled to reinstatement or, in the alternative, front pay, see Thompson v. Cnty. of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that the preferred practice in this Circuit is to remand the issue for the district court to consider in the first instance), keeping in mind that front pay is excluded from the statutory cap, Pollard, 532 U.S. at 852, 121 S.Ct. 1946; accord Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 157-58 (2d Cir.2001) (citing Pollard and noting that front pay is an equitable remedy). In its consideration of this issue, the District Court may conduct further proceedings as necessary to determine Bergerson's employment status (i.e., probationary or permanent).