Opinion ID: 1110208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Keith Jackson's Testimony Regarding Six Year Old Victim

Text: Pagan argues that the trial court reversibly erred in failing to grant a mistrial when Keith Jackson testified that he was motivated to cooperate with the police because a six-year-old child was murdered. When the prosecutor asked Jackson a question concerning his reaction and thoughts on the death of the child, defense counsel objected. The trial court sustained the objection, and defense counsel moved for a mistrial. A mistrial was denied. Pagan has not demonstrated that the trial court's ruling on the motion was error. A motion for a mistrial should only be granted when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial. See Snipes v. State, 733 So.2d 1000 (Fla.1999); Buenoano v. State, 527 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1988). It has been long established and continuously adhered to that the power to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury should be exercised with great care and caution and should be done only in cases of absolute necessity. Thomas v. State, 748 So.2d 970, 980 (Fla.1999). In this case, there was no necessity for a mistrial. The witness had been examined and cross-examined concerning his varying statements and his motivation for testifying and cooperating with the police. The fact of the matter is that one of the murder victims was a six-year-old child. Such a fact may be relevant to a witness's motivations. It was an issue for the jury to decide.