Opinion ID: 2575737
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Complete coverage

Text: Plaintiffs contend the Legislature has demonstrated its intent to preempt all local restrictions on timber harvesting by fully occupying the field of timber harvesting regulation. Plaintiffs first note the Legislature's statement of intent, when enacting the FPA, to create and maintain an effective and comprehensive system of regulation and use of all timberlands. (§ 4513.) Invoking the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, they argue that certain provisions of the FPA recognizing limited local authority to regulate timber operations indicate that local authority is otherwise preempted. [13] But as County points out, the Legislature adopted section 4513 at the same time it adopted a provision authorizing counties to adopt timber harvest rules and regulations stricter than the state's rules (Stats.1973, ch. 880, § 4, pp. 1615-1616 [adding former § 4516]), so the general statement of intent in section 4513 cannot have been intended to preempt local restrictions by occupying the field. Moreover, plaintiffs'  expressio unius  argument implicitly assumes the statutory preemption of local rules that regulate the conduct of timber operations encompasses geographic zoning restrictions on the location of such operations. But because, as demonstrated, section 4516.5(d) does not have that broad meaning, the Legislature had no need to exempt traditional county zoning power from the section's preemptive scope; hence, the presence of statutory exceptions to FPA preemption demonstrates nothing about the Legislature's intent respecting counties' exercise of that power. To summarize, general forestry law preempts local regulation of the conduct of timber operations but otherwise expressly contemplates retention of local zoning authority. [L]ocalities must designate certain lands as TPZ's. These zones are dedicated to timber growing and harvesting, and localities may not prohibit logging on them. As to other lands that may contain timber, the TPA expressly reaffirms local authority to choose appropriate zoning. Local legislative bodies retain authority to exclude from the TPZ's certain parcels when they believe exclusion is in the public interest. [Citation.] Localities also retain the authority to choose the non-TPZ zones into which excluded or removed parcels are placed. ( Big Creek v. San Mateo, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 428, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 159.) We observe, further, that California's Planning and Zoning Law (Gov.Code, § 65000 et seq.) contemplates the continuation of local government's traditional zoning authority in connection with timber resources. In adopting that law, the Legislature specified that localities should exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters ( id., § 65800), inter alia by designating the location and extent of the uses of the land ( id., § 65302, subd. (a)) and including the conservation, development, and utilization of . . . forests in their general plans ( id., subd. (d)). The Planning and Zoning Law also requires counties to adopt in their general plans land use elements that [d]esignate, in a land use category that provides for timber production those parcels of real property zoned for timberland production pursuant to the [TPA] ( id., subd. (a)(1), italics added), thus implicitly acknowledging the potential for locally designated land use categories that do not provide for timber production. In sum, this is not a case in which the subject matter [of where logging can occur] has been so fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern. ( People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 485, 204 Cal.Rptr. 897, 683 P.2d 1150.)