Opinion ID: 1194109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: correspondence between petitioners and counsel

Text: Category E consists of correspondence between petitioners and their counsel regarding claims and litigation, potential as well as pending. The documents appear to fall within the protection of the privilege. However, the district attorney contends that the documents are not privileged because they fall within the criminal purpose exception to the attorney-client privilege. [11] We agree with the district attorney in large part, and hold that only the letter dated May 1, 1972, in Exhibit B-3 and the letter dated October 15, 1974, in Exhibit B-4 are protected by the attorney-client privilege. Simply stated, the exception provides that communications between a client and his attorney will not be privileged if they are made for the purpose of aiding the commission of a future crime or of a present continuing crime. Losavio v. District Court, supra; see Annot., Attorney-client privilege as affected by wrongful or criminal character of contemplated acts or course of conduct, 125 A.L.R. 508; J. Gardner, The Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B. A.J. 708 (1961). The attorney-client privilege is rooted in the principle that candid and open discussion by the client to the attorney without fear of disclosure will promote the orderly administration of justice. Losavio v. District Court, supra. The criminal purpose exception to the privilege grows out of a competing value of our society which is manifested in the rule that the public has the right to every man's evidence, particularly in grand jury proceedings. [12] Consequently, the attorney-client privilege is not absolute. Wigmore addressed the policy underlying the exception in his treatise: It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege cannot avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime or other evil enterprise. This is for the logically sufficient reason that no such enterprise falls within the just scope of the relation between legal adviser and client. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2298. Professor McCormick also offered observations on the exception in his treatise: Since the policy of the privilege is that of promoting the administration of justice, it would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it to the client who seeks advice to aid him in carrying out an illegal ... scheme. Advice given for those purposes would not be a professional service but participation in a conspiracy. McCormick, Evidence § 95. Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes the exception with which we are here concerned. DR 4-101 states: (C) A lawyer may reveal: . . . . . . (2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order. (Emphasis added.) (3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. [13] The petitioners and intervenor do not contend that there is no such exception to the attorney-client privilege. Rather, they question the procedure followed by the court to determine whether the privilege should be dissolved under this exception. They claim that the respondent erred when he ordered the documents produced for his in camera inspection without first requiring the district attorney to make a prima facie showing that the exception applied. We recognize that before the privilege can be driven away there must be something to give colour to the charge. [14] The prima facie evidence mentioned in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 993 (1932), is not tantamount to proof of a prima facie case. It means in the present situation that there must have been some foundation in fact for the charge of conspiracy to steal confidential medical records  the very matter which the grand jury was investigating  before the documents were admitted in evidence in the grand jury proceeding. In considering the privilege which protects the arguments and ballots of a juror, Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Clark, analogized that privilege to the privilege which protects communications between an attorney and client. Several of his statements are pertinent to the point under consideration here. He said, inter alia : ... we think the privilege does not apply where the relation giving birth to it has been fraudulently begun or fraudulently continued.... The privilege takes as its postulate a genuine relation, honestly created and honestly maintained. If that condition is not satisfied, if the relation is merely a sham and a pretense, the juror may not invoke a relation dishonestly assumed as a cover and cloak for the concealment of the truth. In saying this we do not mean that a mere charge of wrongdoing will avail without more to put the privilege to flight. There must be a showing of a prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the judge that the light should be let in. A prima facie showing is not required before the judge can order a document produced for his in camera inspection to determine whether the privilege applies. The judge may order a document or documents produced when the privilege is first contested by the other party. However, there must be a prima facie showing that the exception applies to each document before the document is actually stripped of its privilege and admitted into evidence. Of course, the burden is upon the party asserting the exception. Although such a procedure requires that the secret must be told in order to determine whether it ought to be kept, Hamil & Co. v. England, 50 Mo.App. 338 (1892), is a reasonable method to reconcile the competing policies of the attorney-client privilege and the search for truth by the grand jury. In his argument to the respondent court on petitioners' motion to quash the subpoenas, counsel for petitioners asked the court to take judicial notice of the fact that on the evening before the argument the grand jury had returned an indictment to the court in which four individuals involved in this particular investigation were indicted on a number of counts. (Emphasis added.) The indictments related to alleged offenses and gave colour to the charge that a conspiracy existed to obtain hospital and medical records in an illegal manner. The documents in categories A, B, C and D are not protected from production under the subpoena duces tecum under any theory, as was shown above and will be shown below. There was evidence in these documents that gave colour to the charge of possible illegal conduct. Standing alone, the correspondence in category E is not sufficient to make out a prima facie case for the application of the exception. [15] However, the indictments, combined with the information in the other documents ordered produced, are sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of the applicability of the criminal purpose exception to each of the documents in which Factual Service Bureau was alluded to. This includes all correspondence between petitioners and their counsel in category E except for two letters: (1) the letter dated May 1, 1972, in Exhibit B-3, and (2) the letter dated October 15, 1974, in Exhibit B-4. These two documents do not mention Factual Service Bureau and, therefore, are protected by the attorney-client privilege.