Opinion ID: 2555854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The MTCPA

Text: The MTCPA is entitled Violations of certain federal laws and regulations prohibited and declares in pertinent part: A person may not violate . . . [t]he Telephone Consumer Protection Act. . . . [2] The history of the MTCPA reflects that it was enacted merely to enable a private right of action under the TCPA. . . . Worsham v. Ehrlich, 181 Md.App. 711, 730, 957 A.2d 161, 172 (2008). The federal TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, and by implication, the MTCPA, seek to discourage and prevent unsolicited advertisements over the telephone lines. See, e.g., Portuguese American Leadership Council of the United States, Inc. v. Investors' Alert, Inc., 956 A.2d 671, 674 (D.C.2008) (explaining that the federal TCPA targets the increased use of automated telephone equipment to make telephone calls in bulk and fax unsolicited advertisements that cross state lines and fall outside the regulatory jurisdiction of individual states). The unsolicited sending of faxes is among the conduct prohibited by the federal TCPA. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3) (2005) (making it unlawful, with limited exceptions, to use any telephone facsimile machine . . . to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement. . . .). The MTCPA, unlike certain other Maryland statutes, [3] does not declare a period within which an action brought under it must be filed. The limitations period for actions brought under the MTCPA, therefore, are governed by the relevant statute of limitations of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP). The parties in the case before the District Court, as we have noted, dispute the applicability to the MTCPA of the twelve-year limitations period for specialties, set forth in CJP § 5-102. In Maryland, the default rule, for limitations purposes [4] is that a civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues. CJP § 5-101. This limitations period reflects a legislative judgment of what is deemed an adequate period of time in which a person of ordinary diligence should bring his action. Philip Morris USA, Inc., v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227, 240, 905 A.2d 340, 348 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The General Assembly, however, has legislated numerous exceptions to the three-year limitations period. See, e.g., CJP §§ 5-103 (adverse possession); 5-104 (public officer's bond); 5-105 (assault, libel, or slander). The exception at issue here, set forth in CJP § 5-102, entitled Specialties, provides, in relevant part, as follows: (a) Twelve-year limitation.  An action on one of the following specialties shall be filed within 12 years after the cause of action accrues, or within 12 years from the date of the death of the last to die of the principal debtor or creditor, whichever is sooner: (1) Promissory note or other instrument under seal; (2) Bond except a public officer's bond; (3) Judgment; (4) Recognizance; (5) Contract under seal; or (6) Any other specialty. An action brought under the MTCPA is not included in CJP § 5-102(a)(1) through (5), leaving for us to decide only whether such action comes within the meaning of CJP § 5-102(a)(6), [a]ny other specialty. Absent from the CJP § 5-102 is a definition of [a]ny other specialty. [5] To resolve whether an action under the MTCPA is a specialty, however, we do not write on a clean slate. Two recent decisions, Greene Tree Home Owners Ass'n v. Greene Tree Assocs., 358 Md. 453, 749 A.2d 806 (2000), and Master Fin., Inc., v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51, 972 A.2d 864 (2009), provide the analysis. In Greene Tree, we considered whether claims brought under Maryland's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) [6] are based on a statutory specialty. The Petitioners in Greene Tree, who sought damages for alleged violations of the CPA that arose from the Respondents' defective roof construction, challenged on appeal the ruling of the Circuit Court that the claims brought under the CPA do not constitute a specialty within the purview of CJP § 5-102(a)(6). We observed that attempts to identify a statutory specialty by defining the nexus between a claim and the statute at issue have led to complexities and, arguably, conflicting results. Greene Tree, 358 Md. at 481-82, 749 A.2d at 821. [7] We refrained from announcing in that case a specific definition of [a]ny other specialty. We satisfied ourselves with the explanation that statutory specialties usually have involved an action of debt for a fixed or determinable sum. Id., 749 A.2d at 821. We noted, too, that the form of action of debt strongly indicates that a claim for unliquidated damages is not one based on a statutory specialty. Id. at 476, 749 A.2d at 818. We found significant that CL § 13-408 of the CPA [8] authorizes litigants to recover for injury or losses sustained . . . as a result of violations of the CPA. We noted that such claims are consistent with the types of claims embraced by CJP § 5-101 [the three-year limitations period], for which the fullness of time weighs heavily against the preservation of the evidence that frequently depends upon imperfect memory or informal writings. . . . Id. at 480, 749 A.2d at 820 (quoting Roland Electrical Co. v. Black, 163 F.2d 417, 424 (4th Cir.1947)). That is to say, claims brought under the CPA include the type of damages sought by the plaintiff in Greene Tree, which involve[d] the cost of cure, diminution in value, and loss of rental income[,] none of which costs is a liquidated or fixed sum. Greene Tree, 358 Md. at 477, 749 A.2d at 818. We pointed out that, [w]ere we to hold. . . that an action based upon the CPA is one based on a statutory specialty, the holding would apply to any action that might be brought under the CPA. Id. at 480, 749 A.2d at 820. We declined Petitioner's invitation to find certain CPA claims to be specialties while others not, because doing so would be inconsistent with the purpose of the distinction between the three year and the twelve year statutes of limitations. Id., 749 A.2d at 820. We recognized, therefore, that it would be bad public policy to hold that the CPA is a statutory specialty. See id., 749 A.2d at 820. We concluded that it was unnecessary to attempt to state an all-encompassing definition of a statutory specialty. In the case before us it is sufficient to hold that a statutory specialty does not lie for unliquidated damages, and we so hold. [9] Id. at 482, 749 A.2d at 821 (emphasis added). Nine years later we again addressed statutory specialties, in Crowder. In that case, we determined, among other issues, [10] whether claims based on the State Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (SMLL) [11] constitute a specialty, under CJP § 5-102(a)(6). We looked to the analysis employed in Greene Tree, emphasizing the undisputed proposition[] that, although claims based on a statute may fall within the meaning of `other specialty' under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), not all claims based in some way on rights, duties, obligations, prohibitions or remedies mentioned or provided for in a statute do fall within that category. Crowder, 409 Md. at 66, 972 A.2d at 873. We offered a workable general principle for determining when a statutory action constitutes an [a]ny other specialty. That framework has the following criteria: (1) the duty, obligation, prohibition, or right sought to be enforced is created or imposed solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not otherwise exist as a matter of common law; (2) the remedy pursued in the action is authorized solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not otherwise exist under the common law; and (3) if the action is one for civil damages or recompense in the nature of civil damages, those damages are liquidated, fixed, or, by applying clear statutory criteria, are readily ascertainable. Id. at 70, 972 A.2d at 875. When all three criteria are met, the statutory action constitutes a specialty under CJP § 5-102(a)(6). Applying that framework to the SMLL, we focused in part on the remedies available under the SMLL. We noted that § 12-413 of the SMLL, [12] which provides for civil penalties for violations of its provisions, authorizes the forfeiture of interest and unlawfully assessed fees. Crowder at 72, 972 A.2d at 876. We concluded not only that the rights, duties, obligations, and remedy were solely the product of the SMLL, but also that the damages were for a fixed, determinable amount. Id. at 72, 972 A.2d at 876. Therefore, SMLL-based claims fall within the narrow-catchall that is the [a]ny other specialty provision. See id. at 70, 972 A.2d at 876. Greene Tree and Crowder establish the guideposts for deciding whether an action under the MTCPA is, or is not, a specialty within the meaning of § 5-102(a)(6). With these cases in mind we turn to the parties' arguments. AGV argues that the MTCPA is a specialty within the purview of CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, according to AGV, the MTCPA satisfies all of the Crowder criteria. With regard to the first criterion, AGV argues that the MTCPA creates duties, obligations, prohibitions, or rights solely by the federal TCPA and the Federal Trade Commission's Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, which did not exist at common law. AGV argues that the second Crowder criterion is met because certain of the remedies provided by the Act, $500 per unsolicited fax or actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees, are authorized solely by statute. Further, according to AGV, the MTCPA satisfies the third criterion set forth in Crowder because the authorized civil damages are liquidated, fixed, or readily ascertainable by applying clear statutory criteria. Protus responds with a number of reasons why the MTCPA is not a statutory specialty. First, in the view of Protus, the specialty to which CJP § 5-102(a)(6) refers is a legal instrument under seal or a contract under seal, neither of which is present in claims brought under the MTCPA. Second, the introductory clause in CJP § 5-102 refers to a principal debtor or creditor and to the payment of principal or interest, neither of which is involved in MTCPA claims. Third, the holdings in Greene Tree and Crowder reflect that the [a]ny other specialty provision of CJP § 5-102(a) is a narrow catchall that typically involves actions of debt for a fixed or readily determinable sum. Protus also contends that the MTCPA fails the specialty criteria set forth in Crowder because the same rights protected through MTCPA suits are also vindicated under the common law actions of conversion and trespass to chattel; consequently, the MTCPA is not the exclusive source of a duty, obligation, prohibition, or right. Finally, the MTCPA authorizes actual damages and reasonable attorneys' fees, which are not liquidated nor readily ascertainable. We need not address all of the parties' arguments for and against recognizing the MTCPA as an other specialty, under CJP § 5-102(a)(6). Examination of the remedies available under the MTCPA, even without further consideration of the statute, discloses why it is not a specialty. The remedies subsection of § 14-3202 provides: Remedies.  In addition to the remedies provided in § 13-408 of this article [i.e., Maryland's Consumer Protection Act], an individual who is affected by a violation of this subtitle may bring an action against a person that violates this subtitle to recover: (1) Reasonable attorney's fees; and (2) Damages in the amount of the greater of: (i) $500 for each violation; or (ii) Actual damages sustained as a result of the violation. CL § 14-3202(b) (emphasis added). [13] The statute provides expressly that, in addition to the remedies available under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, a party affected by a violation of the MTCPA is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and, as is also provided by the federal TCPA, the greater amount of actual damages or $500 per violation. In other words, the available remedies under the MTCPA include not only non-liquidated damages available under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, which remedies, we held in Greene Tree, drove our holding that a claim brought under Maryland's CPA is not an [a]ny other specialty, but also actual damages in lieu of the $500 statutory damages. Actual damages, by definition, are not liquidated or for a fixed sum. [14] Rather, actual damages require proof of actual loss, the amount of which is determined by the fact-finder. Liquidated damages involve a fixed sum that is determined at the time of contract formation. [15] In the context of MTCPA claims, actual damages could involve, for example, the costs of the paper and ink used in processing the unsolicited faxes, diminution in the value of the facsimile machine associated with the receipt of those unsolicited faxes, and the lost employee productivity associated with the receipt, review, and disposal of the unwanted faxes, none of which is a fixed or liquidated sum. Cf. Greene Tree, 358 Md. at 476, 749 A.2d at 818 (discussing the unliquidated damages involved in CPA claims). The MTCPA is akin to the CPA, which we have held not to be an other specialty under CJP § 5-102(a)(6), because, at least insofar as a claim for actual damages is concerned, the damages involved are not fixed or readily ascertainable. The availability of actual damages distinguishes the MTCPA from the SMLL, which is a specialty under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) because, inter alia, ascertainment of [the damages] is readily ascertainable. Crowder, 409 Md. at 72, 972 A.2d at 876. We therefore conclude that, consistent with Greene Tree and the framework articulated in Crowder, claims brought under the MTCPA do not fall within the relatively narrow catchall that is § 5-102(a)(6)'s [a]ny other specialty. In addition, as Protus explained in its brief, the common law actions of trespass to chattel and conversion are oftentimes pursued in conjunction with TCPA-based claims. See Chair King v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 509 (involving plaintiff's federal TCPA and trespass to chattel claims); j2 Global Communs. v. Blue Jay, Inc., No. C 08-4254 PJH, 2009 WL 29905 (N.D.Cal. filed Jan. 5, 2009) (same); Clean Air Council v. Dragon Int'l Group, No. 1:CV-06-0430, 2008 WL 4452353 (M.D.Pa. filed Sept. 30, 2008) (involving plaintiff's federal TPCA, trespass to chattel, and conversion claims). Though we base our decision in this case on the non-liquidated damages authorized by the MTCPA, the facts that the same remedies available under the MTCPA (option of actual damages) and conduct prohibited by the MTCPA are addressed by the common law actions of trespass to chattel and conversionin light of the Crowder criteria further supports our conclusion. [16] AGV, seeking to avoid the conclusion to which we have come, contended during oral argument before us that, because virtually all claims brought under the MTCPA plead the statutory damages of $500, those claims should be afforded [a]ny other specialty treatment. AGV, however, did not provide any authority in support of that proposition, and we could find none. The only authorityalbeit dicta relevant to this proposition that we could locate is contrary to AGV's position. In Greene Tree, we rejected the argument that, based on public policy grounds, certain CPA-based actions should be afforded statutory specialty treatment while others not, explaining that [w]ere we to hold, however, that an action based upon the CPA is one based on a statutory specialty, the holding would apply to any action that might be brought under the CPA. 358 Md. at 480, 749 A.2d at 820. We appear to have suggested in Greene Tree that the answer to the question whether a statute is an [a]ny other specialty under CJP § 5-102(a)(6) cannot be based on whether some, or even most of the time, the claims brought seek a remedy that is fixed or readily ascertainable. In sum, we hold that a claim brought under the MTCPA is not a specialty within the meaning of CJP § 5-102(a)(6) [a]ny other statutory specialty. We therefore answer no to the question certified to us by the District Court. CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW ANSWERED AS SET FORTH ABOVE. COSTS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.