Opinion ID: 1690639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of schofield's guilt

Text: The most important issue before us concerns the admissibility of the enormous amount of evidence that has been disclosed since Jones' trial indicating that Glen Schofield actually committed the murder. [15] I cannot accept the majority's restrictive interpretation of Chambers and the majority's conclusion that the evidence of Schofield's guilt cannot be considered as substantive evidence in Jones' defense. [16] In Chambers, a case remarkably similar to this and also involving the shooting death of a police officer, the Supreme Court held that an accused's fundamental right to present evidence in his own behalf required a state court to admit the testimony of several witnesses that a third party had made oral confessions of guilt to the same crime. The Supreme Court emphasized that [t]he sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each. In explaining its decision, the Supreme Court declared: The hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability. First, each of McDonald's confessions was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder had occurred. Second, each one was corroborated by some other evidence in the case McDonald's sworn confession, the testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, the testimony that McDonald was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, and proof of his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and subsequent purchase of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each. Third, whatever may be the parameters of the penal-interest rationale, each confession here was in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S., at 89, 91 S.Ct., at 219. McDonald stood to benefit nothing by disclosing his role in the shooting to any of his three friends and he must have been aware of the possibility that disclosure would lead to criminal prosecution. Indeed, after telling Turner of his involvement, he subsequently urged Turner not to mess him up. Finally, if there was any question about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial statements, McDonald was present in the courtroom and was under oath. He could have been cross-examined by the State, and his demeanor and responses weighed by the jury. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). The availability of McDonald significantly distinguishes this case from the prior Mississippi precedent, Brown v. State[, 99 Miss 719, 55 So. 961 (1911) ], supra, and from the Donnelly -type [ Donnelly v. U.S., 228 U.S. 243, 33 S.Ct. 449, 57 L.Ed. 820 (1913)] situation, since in both cases the declarant was unavailable at the time of trial. 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-49 (footnote omitted). This case is very similar to Chambers, if not stronger on its facts. All of the hot button factors considered by the Court in Chambers are implicated, and, of course, we have the additional factor of the misconduct of the important police witnesses, a factor not present in Chambers. Further, here we have many times the number of confessions by the third party as was involved in Chambers. There is an almost endless list of witnesses to whom Schofield has confessed. In addition to the numerous confessions, there is extensive evidence of Schofield's guilt established by various witnesses who saw him at the scene of the murder. The overwhelming volume of this evidence clearly serves to corroborate its individual components. And, as in Chambers, Schofield was actually called as a witness and subject to examination by both sides in the most recent evidentiary hearing. True, some of the witnesses to whom Schofield confessed are convicted felons and prison inmates whose credibility will have to be closely scrutinized. However, we cannot ignore the fact that the State routinely relies on jailhouse confessions to secure convictions in criminal cases, including many murder cases. Obviously, the State would have a powerful case against Schofield with the evidence that has been presented against him in this case. [17] As in Chambers, we cannot ignore the sheer number of witnesses and evidence that has now been accumulated and presented implicating Schofield. That evidence now, in fact, far exceeds the evidence considered by the Supreme Court in Chambers. Under these circumstances, we cannot simply ignore the observation of the United States Supreme Court: [W]here constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049. Finally, and that word has special meaning here, Chambers was not a death penalty case. This is.