Opinion ID: 1189045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Patterson's Plea

Text: Patterson argues that, even aside from his request for an evidentiary hearing, the district court should have vacated his guilty plea because his plea agreement was based on the parties' mutual mistake regarding the application of the career offender guideline, or, in an alternative reading of the same events, because the government breached the agreement. The government maintains that Patterson's underestimat[ion of] his sentence at the time he entered his plea is not a valid reason to permit him to withdraw his plea. Because, as discussed above, Patterson never properly requested that the district court vacate his guilty plea, we review for plain error. Puckett v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (finding that Rule 52(b)'s plain-error test applies to a forfeited claim that the government failed to meet its obligations under a plea agreement). Under plain error review, the defendant must establish (1) an error (2) that was plain, (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, and (4) seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. at 1429; United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir.2005). Our precedent establishes that plea agreements are governed by ordinary contract principles. United States v. Barnes, 83 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.1996). In Barnes, we stated that there must be a meeting of the minds on all essential elements of a guilty plea in order for the plea to be valid, and that, [a]t least in theory, ambiguity in an essential term or a mutual mistake about the meaning of such a term can invalidate [a plea]. Id. As in the instant case, in Barnes, the defendant argued that his plea was invalid because neither he, the prosecutor, nor the court realized at the time of the plea colloquy that he would be sentenced as a career offender. Id. Though the Barnes court acknowledged that there must be a meeting of the minds regarding the agreement's essential terms, it found that the defendant's guilty plea, which was made pursuant to then-Rule 11(e)(1)(B), did not contemplate the actual punishment as an essential term of the agreement. Id. Rather, the parties left the determination of a sentence to the discretion of the district court, as guided by the sentencing guidelines and by the applicable criminal statutes. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the plea agreement was valid and enforceable. This case is similar to Barnes. While it is true that Patterson's plea agreement anticipated a sentence lower than the one he ultimately received, the agreement stated several times that it did not ultimately control the sentence imposed by the district court. Specifically, the agreement stated that its Guidelines calculations were non-binding predictions upon which neither party is entitled to rely and also that the defendant could not withdraw his plea if the district court rejected the agreement's Guidelines calculations. Moreover, the agreement explicitly stated that it is not a Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea, in which the district court is bound by the sentencing recommendations contained in the agreement. See Barnes, 83 F.3d at 938 (noting that agreements made under Rule 11(e)(1)(C)  a previous version of Rule 11(c)(1)(C)  would include the defendant's punishment as an essential term). It is thus clear here, as in Barnes, that the defendant's actual sentence was not an essential term of the agreement, so the agreement cannot be voided because of mutual mistake with regard to the sentence imposed. Patterson also argues that the government breached the agreement by arguing for a higher sentence after it learned that Patterson was possibly eligible for sentencing as a career offender. However, the government never agreed to not argue for a different sentence. The plea agreement specifically stated that [d]efendant understands that further review of the facts or the applicable legal principles may lead the government to conclude that different or additional Guideline provisions apply in this case. While Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B) and (C) allow formation of an agreement that binds the government, Patterson's agreement was not made pursuant to these provisions. Accordingly, the government did not breach the terms of the plea agreement. See United States v. Linder, 530 F.3d 556, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting argument that government breached the plea agreement by advocating for an enhancement where agreement was not made pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B) and (C)).