Opinion ID: 2621432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Jury Selection-Juror 1

Text: ś 79 Gregory argues that juror 1 was improperly dismissed for cause. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantee a defendant the right to an impartial jury. State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 593, 940 P.2d 546 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007, 118 S.Ct. 1192, 140 L.Ed.2d 322 (1998). In order to protect a defendant's right to a fair sentencing hearing, as well as the State's ability to present its arguments to an impartial tribunal, the trial court in a death penalty case must death qualify the jury. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 593, 940 P.2d 546; see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). ś 80 Death qualification is the process whereby the trial court may dismiss prospective jurors for cause if the juror's philosophical views against the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)); State v. Davis, 141 Wash.2d 798, 856-57, 10 P.3d 977 (2000). The juror's bias need not be `unmistakably clear' before dismissal is allowed. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-25, 105 S.Ct. 844 (rejecting the Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) test). Instead the trial judge can dismiss a juror when left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Witt, 469 U.S. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. 844. Deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. at 426, 105 S.Ct. 844. [26] ś 81 Under the Witt test, a juror may express scruples about capital punishment, or even personal opposition to the death penalty, so long as he or she can ultimately defer to the rule of law. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). Whether a juror can set aside personal feelings about the death penalty involves a credibility determination that is necessarily factual in nature. Witt, 469 U.S. at 429, 105 S.Ct. 844. A trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause is reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 601-02, 940 P.2d 546. ś 82 In this case, juror 1 indicated seven times that if the alternative was life with no chance of release, then she could not vote for the death penalty. In contrast, she later testified that she thought she could follow the court's instructions and impose the death penalty if the State proved death was warranted beyond a reasonable doubt. Significantly, she said that she could tell which answers counsel were looking for and she was not comfortable in disagreeing with the attorneys. She explained the inconsistencies in her answers by stating that she had had time to think about the issue. The State challenged juror 1 for cause, and the defense objected. After argument, the trial court concluded: This juror repeated approximately three times according to my notes, when asked if she could vote for the death penalty if she knew a person could get life in prison without parole, she said probably not at least three times. I know that on her questionnaire and during some of her other answers, she stated that she could if it was a serial murder type of case. I believe it's very clear from her answers that she probably is not capable of voting for the death penalty, knowing the alternative is life in prison. So I will grant the state's challenge for cause. MRP at 2224. ś 83 Given juror 1's initial answers to questions regarding the death penalty and the suggestion that she changed her answers to please the attorneys, it is not surprising that the trial judge had the definite impression that juror 1 could not faithfully and impartially apply the law. Witt, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. 844. [D]eference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. We find there is ample evidence in the record to support the dismissal for cause and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.