Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: use of victim impact statements.

Text: Defendant raises two separate but related complaints in respect of the State's use of victim impact statements. First, defendant argues that [t]he State presented victim impact evidence that far exceeded the bounds set by the Court for such evidence, in terms of length, content, and emotional and inflammatory nature. Second, defendant asserts that the State's victim impact evidence was bolstered by a deliberate and improper demonstration by members of the victims' family group. In defendant's view, the aggregate of these failings require that defendant's death sentence be vacated and a new penalty trial held. The State responds that the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion when it made extensive revisions to the statements and determined that the final versions were admissible under State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 678 A. 2d 164 (1996). The State also noted that the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion when, at defense counsel's request, it issued a curative instruction and ameliorated any possible prejudice that could have resulted from the spectators' departure from the courtroom.
The admissibility of victim impact statements in a capital case is of both constitutional and statutory dimension. N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 22 (Victim's Rights Amendment); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6) (victim impact statement statute). See also N.J.S.A. 52:4B-34 to -49 (Crime Victim's Bill of Rights). Acknowledging, however, a potential for abuse, we have taken great care in defining the proper scope of admissible victim impact statements. See generally State v. Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. at 47-48, 54-55, 678 A. 2d 164 (explaining requirements for admissibility of victim impact statements, and setting procedural limitations for their use). See also State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 497-99, 776 A. 2d 144 (2001) (explaining application of Victim's Rights Amendment and victim impact statement statute). The trial court scrupulously followed Muhammad's guidelines. Once defendant asserted reliance on the catch-all mitigating factor set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) ([a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.), but before the start of the penalty phase trial, the State notified defendant of the prosecution's intention to use victim impact statements. Defense counsel were provided the names of the victim impact witnesses the State intended to call so as to afford defendant the opportunity to interview the witnesses prior to their testimony. Further, only one survivor per victim was permitted to testify in respect of each victim's uniqueness as a human being and to help the jurors make an informed assessment of the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness. The proposed victim impact statements were reduced to writings. The trial court then conducted a Rule 104 hearing and, after three separate efforts, the proposed victim impact statements were substantially redacted so that each was factual, not emotional, and . . . free of inflammatory comments or references[ ] and to ensure that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice or misleading the jury. [19] As an additional prophylactic step, the trial court required that the victim impact statements be read first outside the presence of the jury so the trial court could gauge both the content and the delivery of the statements. Also, the trial court provided the required limiting instructions to the victims' family. Finally, the trial court ruled that any comments about the victim impact evidence in . . . summation should be strictly limited to the previously approved testimony of the witness. In light of the foregoing, we reject defendant's assertions on appeal and we hold that, in each instance, the trial court's admission of the victim impact evidence and the State's use of that victim impact evidence was proper.
Defendant raises a related issue in respect of the victim impact evidence at the penalty phase trial. As noted earlier, supra, 190 N.J. at 453-55, 921 A. 2d at 988-90 (2007), defendant contends that the State improperly interrupted defendant's presentation of mitigation evidence from defendant's cousin, a contention we have rejected. In the context of his cousin's direct testimony, defendant interposes an additional, separate objection based on the following. Immediately after her direct testimony was concluded, defense counsel noted on the record, albeit after the fact, that during the last portion of defendant's cousin's testimony, several members of the victims' family rose from their seats and left the courtroom. Defense counsel, conceding that no restrictions had been placed on the comings and goings of members of the public, requested that the trial court instruct all present that they were to remain seated until the witness's testimony was completed or a recess was called by the trial court. Defense counsel also requested that the jury be instructed that the victims' family's exodus from the courtroom was inappropriate and that no regard should be given to that event. The trial court agreed in both respects and immediately instructed the jury as follows: Members of the jury, three persons just got up and walked out of the courtroom. I don't know whether you saw that or didn't see it, certainly I did and others did. Whatever their motive for getting up and walking out should play no role in your deliberation and should have no impact on your evaluation of this witness's testimony, if that was intended as some form of nonverbal comment on the witness's testimony, that would be inappropriate nonverbal comment and should be disregarded. The cross-examination of defendant's cousin commenced following that instruction. Once that cross-examination was completed and the jury had left the courtroom, the trial court addressed the persons in the audience and instructed them as follows: Let me just say this to the persons who were spectators in the courtroom: an issue arose about a group of you getting up and leaving during the course of that witness's testimony. I haven't walked a mile in your shoes; I'm not, through God's grace, a family member of a victim, so I'm not sitting there in your shoes, but I have a job to do and the attorneys have a job to do. And my job is to see that things are fair to both sides. And any type of nonverbal comment, if that was intended as nonverbal comment, it is inappropriate during the course of any witness's testimony. So what I'm going to direct  obviously, it is a public courtroom, you have a right to be here and are welcomed to be here, but absent some kind of emergency, I'm going to direct that persons remain until a recess or until there is a break. After that instruction was given to the public, the prosecutor spoke with members of the victims' family and later addressed the trial court: [The Prosecutor]: I want to put something on the record, what was talked about right before [your Honor] went off the bench. In speaking with the family, they had been told by members of the office and myself that if something got too upsetting, instead of making a scene in court which we didn't want to do, taint the jury, that they should probably leave. In the courtroom it probably wouldn't have been a problem, they could have slipped out the back door, but here where they are seated and went all the way through  The Court: So it was an upsetment issue? Is that what you are saying after you discussed it? [The Prosecutor]: Yes, Judge. [Defense Counsel # 1]: Well, I can certainly be sympathetic to that. I would ask then that the prosecutor let the family know what it is that they can anticipate relating to testimony because I think the timing of that was really problematic. She had testified for the whole time and it was kind of our conclusion and our one opportunity to plead for [defendant's] life, and to have people walk out in the middle of it is problematic so. . . . The Court: Well, it is emotional for all concerned. It is emotional for the witness. It is emotional for the family who are here, so you have to have some understanding of that. So all I will do is direct that to the extent you are able to acquaint the family members with the anticipated testimony, and if they perceive there is [a] problem  [The Prosecutor]: Judge, I wasn't aware that [defendant's cousin] was going to plead for [defendant's] life. The Court: Fair enough. All right. Although defendant requested and received an immediate curative instruction to the jury and a separate instruction to the victims' family  and interposed no contemporaneous objection to either  defendant now claims that the fact that several members of the victims' family left the courtroom during defendant's cousin's testimony was a deliberate and improper demonstration by members of the victims' family group that bolstered the victim impact evidence adduced by the State. In response, the State notes that, for the first time on appeal, defendant seeks to causally relate the victim impact evidence with the instance of three members of the victims' family exiting the courtroom while defendant's cousin pleaded for defendant's life. The State notes that the event involving defendant's cousin's testimony occurred more than one week before the State presented its victim impact evidence, and that defendant did not so object when the State presented its victim impact evidence. Central to the obligations of a trial court is the responsibility to insure that the jury remain fair and impartial throughout the proceedings. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 75 [548 A. 2d 846] (1988) ( Bey I ). The jury's impartiality is significantly threatened by extraneous influences arising from contact with non-record facts. Id. at 74-76 [548 A. 2d 846] (citation omitted). The determination of whether the appropriate response is a curative instruction, as well as the language and detail of the instruction, is within the discretion of the trial judge who has the feel of the case and is best equipped to gauge the effect of a prejudicial comment on the jury in the overall setting. State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 647 [477 A. 2d 323] (1984) (citations omitted). [ State v. Loftin (I), 146 N.J. 295, 365-66, 680 A. 2d 677 (1996).] In State v. Loftin (I ), we rejected a claim that a spectator's outburst amounted to victim impact evidence[.] Id. at 366, 680 A. 2d 677. Here, in contrast, there was no outburst. Instead, the record discloses only the fact of three members of the victims' family simply walking out of the courtroom during the testimony of a defense witness. Upon defendant's application, the trial court immediately cautioned both the jury and the spectators. The record explains that these events were not intended as a form of silent protest, but to avoid an outburst if something got too upsetting[.] In this context, defendant's claim that these events were intended to bolster the State's victim impact evidence via a deliberate and improper demonstration lacks any support in the record and, hence, we reject it.