Opinion ID: 2633378
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

Text: A decision to deny a new trial will be reversed only if the evidence supporting the verdict was so completely lacking or slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. [25] Glamann first argues that a new trial should have been allowed because the jury award of $8,000 for past economic damages, $2,000 for past non-economic damages, and nothing for future damages, was internally inconsistent. While Kirk concedes that the initial jury verdict was inconsistent, she argues that the inconsistency was corrected by resubmitting the question of past economic and non-economic loss to the jury. We agree. We discussed internal inconsistency of a jury award in McCubbins v. State, Department of Natural Resources, Division of Parks and Recreation, [26] a case in which a swimmer sued a landowner for neck injuries incurred when he dove into water and struck his head on a submerged rock. The jury awarded future medical expenses, but failed to award anything for loss of future earning capacity. [27] We held that the award was inconsistent and that reversal of the verdict and a new trial on the issue of damages were therefore required. [28] This case is distinguishable. It is not disputed that the first jury verdict was internally inconsistent because the jury awarded past economic damages but no past non-economic damages. But any inconsistency was cured when Judge Hopwood instructed the jury to reconsider its verdict and award past non-economic damages if its conclusion was that Glamann suffered past economic loss. The final jury verdict awarded both past economic and non-economic damages and made no award for either future economic or non-economic loss. The jury apparently concluded that Kirk was not responsible for the full extent of Glamann's injuries. This decision could have been based on its determination as to duration, or extent, of his injuries. Regardless of its basis, the award is internally consistent and is therefore not a basis for a new trial. Glamann next argues that the verdict is facially inadequate because he asked for economic damages ranging from $88,000 to $396,386 plus non-economic damages, but was only awarded $10,000. He contends that Pugliese v. Perdue [29] supports his contention that an inadequate verdict is enough to support reversal of the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial in this case. He argues that the references to malingering and other factors affecting his injuries apparently had an effect on the jury because the award did not even begin to compensate David for his past wage loss and compensated [him] only through March of 1997. Inadequacy of a jury verdict is grounds for a new trial in cases where negligence is conceded or proved, but no damages are awarded. For example, in Grant v. Stoyer , the defendant admitted negligence in a personal injury case stemming from an automobile accident, but the parties disputed the scope and extent of plaintiff's injury. [30] We reversed a jury verdict of no causation and no award of damages because the evidence was uncontroverted that the accident injured the plaintiff. [31] We held that where negligence and causation of compensable physical injury are conceded or proved, and where evidence of at least some pain and suffering is substantial and uncontroverted, some damages ordinarily must be awarded. [32] And in Pugliese, we observed that [t]he undisputed facts establish[ed] that Perdue negligently drove his pickup truck into Pugliese, a collision involving direct bodily impact and injury to Pugliese. [33] Because the jury failed to award Pugliese any recovery, we concluded that the verdict was unreasonable and unjust, and remanded for a new trial. [34] But where the jury makes some award in cases where negligence is conceded or proved, we have not reversed that award as inadequate. For example, in another automobile accident case, Hayes v. Xerox Corporation , a jury returned a lump sum general verdict. [35] We allowed that verdict to stand, even though there was no specific award for pain and suffering, observing that the lump sum indicated that the jury had not ruled out non-economic damages. [36] We noted that [t]he jury could believe that [the plaintiff] exaggerated the extent of his injuries and pain and suffering. [37] And in Hutchins v. Schwartz, another automobile accident case, we affirmed the superior court's denial of a motion for a new trial in part because reasonable minds could have differed as to the causal connection between Hutchins's back injury incurred in the accident and subsequent diagnosis of a hiatal hernia. [38] We stated that jurors make credibility choices and determine the weight to be given the evidence and that they could have concluded that Hutchins had not suffered any substantial losses, given the significant evidence of malingering, exaggeration, and fraud presented at trial. [39] Glamann's reliance on Pugliese for his contention that the verdict is inadequate and not supported by the evidence is misplaced. In this case, the jury did not fail to return a verdict in his favor. The jury made a considered choice as to what it believed Kirk owed for losses to Glamann: $8,000 for past economic damages and $2,000 for past non-economic damages. We cannot say that this is an unreasonable award. And, as in Hutchins, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's determination: Glamann had been injured in a prior accident; he worked a full schedule in the eleven weeks immediately following the accident; his recurring headaches began after he engaged in other activities; he had numerous stressors in his life, both before and after the accident; and medical experts testified to his possible conversion disorder and inappropriate use of narcotics. Glamann argues that the award only compensates him through March 1997. But this is not a basis to find the jury award inadequate; the jury could have decided that he suffered no injuries from the accident after that date. Because there is evidentiary support for the verdict we conclude that the superior court did not err in denying the motion for new trial.