Opinion ID: 2537725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Power to Empanel a Jury

Text: ¶ 15 Thomas next argues that there is no mechanism in chapter 10.95 RCW by which the trial court can empanel a jury solely to consider the existence of aggravating factors. Specifically, he asserts that since RCW 10.95.050(4) outlines the procedures for empaneling a jury to hear the death penalty phase of a criminal trial and nothing in chapter 10.95 RCW or the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (chapter 9.94A RCW) provides for empaneling a jury specifically to hear aggravating factors, the trial court has no authority to empanel a jury for such a proceeding. Pet. for Review at 16-17; Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 15. Thomas further asserts that our refusal in State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 110 P.3d 192 (2005), to create a procedure for empaneling aggravating factors juries requires us to reverse his sentence. Id. at 151-52, 110 P.3d 192 (This court will not create a procedure to empanel juries on remand to find aggravating factors because the legislature did not provide such a procedure and, instead, explicitly assigned such findings to the trial court. To create such a procedure out of whole cloth would be to usurp the power of the legislature.), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006). ¶ 16 Thomas's argument fails for two reasons. First, in Hughes this court was construing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, not the aggravated murder statutes under which Thomas was convicted. Id. at 148-49, 110 P.3d 192; see also State v. Goldberg, 149 Wash.2d 888, 894, 72 P.3d 1083 (2003) (RCW 10.95.020 defines the aggravating circumstances that make premeditated first degree murder punishable under that chapter rather than under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981.). Since even Thomas himself acknowledges that his case is not controlled by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 15), Hughes is inapplicable in this case. [7] ¶ 17 Second, the power to empanel a jury to hear aggravating factors is a court mandated component of the power to hear cases required to be tried by a jury and not a procedure crafted out of whole cloth. CrR 6.1(a). A defendant in a criminal trial has the right to have a jury determine issues of fact. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, para. 3 & amend. VI; Const. art. I, § 21; Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (`Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348)). As aggravation of penalty factors, and not elements of a crime, aggravating factors need not be charged in the information, but nevertheless must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Kincaid, 103 Wash.2d at 312, 692 P.2d 823 (The penalty for that murder [is] properly enhanced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole when the jury unanimously [finds] by a special verdict that the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance had been proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.). ¶ 18 Court rules also specify the requirements for making special findings like aggravating factors, stating, [t]he court may submit to the jury forms for such special findings which may be required or authorized by law. CrR 6.16(b). Prior arguments to this court that aggravating factors must be included in the elements instruction to the jury were rejected: where the legislature has established a statutory frame work which defines a base crime which is elevated to a greater crime if a certain fact is present, a trial court may, consistent with the guaranties of due process and trial by jury, bifurcate the elevating fact into a special verdict form. So long as the jury is instructed it must unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt ... the constitution is not offended. State v. Mills, 154 Wash.2d 1, 10, 109 P.3d 415 (2005). [8] ¶ 19 To say the trial court under this court's mandate had no power by which to empanel a jury to hear Thomas's resentencing on aggravating factors is to say the court had no power to uphold Thomas's constitutional right to a jury. This argument is without merit. The trial court properly empaneled Thomas's jury at resentencing under CrR 6.1.