Opinion ID: 1182164
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Heading: rights of adjoining landowners

Text: The nature of the right of an adjoining landowner to bring suit to enjoin the violation of a zoning ordinance has been variously described by the courts, but all seem to reflect the policy consideration expressed in 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning 636, § 23.11 (1968), where the author states: Since many municipalities lack sufficient personnel to carry out an effective program of zoning inspection and enforcement, actions commenced by private persons to enjoin violation of the zoning ordinance are an important part of the enforcement program. In these actions, which are more numerous than those commenced by taxpayers or by municipalities, the person who institutes the proceedings acts in his private capacity, not as a taxpayer seeking to vindicate a taxpayer's interest in law enforcement.    Four theories have been advanced: (1) that a zoning ordinance is similar to a third party beneficiary contract; (2) that the zoning ordinance is similar to a covenant running with the land; (3) that the cause of action is similar to a nuisance action; and (4) that a zoning ordinance creates rights in favor of individuals as well as public authorities which are enforceable in a civil suit. One of the theories underlying a suit by an adjoining landowner is that expressed in Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925), where the Ohio Supreme Court drew an analogy between rights accruing to a third party beneficiary under a contract and the rights of adjoining landowners under a zoning ordinance. This theory was characterized as:    We have here an application for injunction under a zoning ordinance which zones the entire city for the benefit of the community. The benefit to be derived from the observance of these zoning regulations accrues, not only to the municipality, but to the abutting property owner. The plaintiff, therefore, as to her capacity to bring this suit, is in a position analogous to that of one for whose benefit a contract has been made by another party. Having a substantial interest in the enforcement of the zoning restrictions, she is a proper party to enforce their observance by a suit for injunction. 149 N.E. at 32. A variant of this approach would analogize a covenant running with the land in a deed with a zoning ordinance. In DeBlasiis v. Bartell, 143 Pa.Super. 485, 18 A.2d 478 (1941), the court said:    [T]he benefits flowing from the enactment of zoning regulations, in return for the restrictions imposed by them, accrue not only to the municipality, representing the general public, but also to the abutting property owners; and while their rights are not strictly contractual    they are, to a degree analogous to building restrictions, running with the land, imposed in a deed for the benefit of adjoining or adjacent property owners.    (Emphasis in text.) 18 A.2d at 481. Another approach is identified in Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 106 Conn. 475, 138 A. 483 (1927). There, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut used the analogy of nuisance. Recognizing that the structure built in violation of the zoning ordinance was not a nuisance per se, the court held that a sufficient similarity existed between a nuisance per accidens [10] and the violation of the ordinance to permit injunctive relief to lie in the plaintiff's favor. In so holding the court stated:    The erection of a structure, though it is not in itself a nuisance, becomes such when it is located in a place forbidden by law.    138 A. at 486. See also McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App.2d 247, 172 P.2d 758 (1946). A fourth theory is expressed in Sapiro v. Frisbie, 93 Cal. App. 299, 270 P. 280 (1928), where the California District Court of Appeals for the Third District held that a private cause of action accrues to injured landowners from the violation of a zoning ordinance. There, the defendants converted a residence into a funeral parlor in violation of a city ordinance and the plaintiffs, adjoining property owners, sued to recover for past damages to their property and to enjoin the defendants from future use of the premises in that manner. In so holding, the court said: The right of the plaintiffs to claim and recover damages for any injuries which they may have sustained, and may sustain pending the final disposition of this litigation, by reason of any depreciation in the value of their real property caused by the acts with the commission of which the complaint charges the defendants, seems to us to be a proposition which is not subject to serious controversy. It is a well-established and commonly recognized general rule that, where a right is given by statute or municipal ordinance to a particular class of persons and for their special protection, and not merely for the protection of the public at large, a liability is thereby created in favor of any such particular class as against any person who violates such right, and as a result injures the person or property of the former, which liability may be enforced by means of a civil action or civil remedy appropriate to the circumstances peculiar to the particular case.    270 P. at 282. See also Cook v. Normac Corp., 176 Md. 394, 4 A.2d 747 (1939); 58 Am.Jur. 1044, Zoning § 191; 50 Am.Jur. 578, Statutes § 584; compare Smith v. Home Echo Club et al, 69 N.E.2d 414 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943). This concept also takes the form of the maxim, Ubi jus, ibi remedium. (Where there is a right, there is a remedy.) Finally, in Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal.3d 920, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480, 493 (1972), the California Supreme Court said:    In general the concept is long-standing that a private person who suffers identifiable harm by reason of a violation of a municipal zoning law may sue the violator for compensatory damages and may also seek injunctive relief when applicable.    This statement reflects the recognition that, regardless of the theory used, it is well recognized that adjoining landowners may sue to enjoin the violation of a zoning ordinance. See also 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 487, § 25.153 (3d ed. 1965); 3 Anderson, supra at 566, § 21.10; 3 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 66-19, § 9; 3 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice 14, § 22-5 (3d ed 1967). It is not necessary for us to decide which theory is appropriate as the defendants recognize the ability of adjoining landowners to bring such a suit and have not contended otherwise.