Opinion ID: 1193874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Ongoing Nature of Workers' Compensation Cases

Text: Claimant argues that the independent rights or independent benefits approach adopted by New Jersey and Maryland is the sounder approach for determining the appealability of workers' compensation decisions. The Colorado legislature was apparently of the same view when it changed the law in 1983 to allow an immediate appeal of an order awarding or denying a benefit, instead of delaying appellate review until all matters in the workers' compensation case had been finally determined. We long ago adopted a similar independent rights approach for determining the appealability of decisions in divorce proceedings. In Cleveland v. Cleveland, 57 Haw. 519, 559 P.2d 744 (1977), we were required to determine at what time or times, in the ongoing process of disposition of a divorce proceeding by the family court, the orders of the court with respect to the various issues customarily dealt with in such proceedings become final [and appealable]. Id. at 520, 559 P.2d at 746. Noting that HRS §§ 571-54 (1976) and 641-1(a) (1976) authorize appeals only from final judgments of the family court, we determined that the test for appealability is `whether the decree or order appealed from determines the ultimate rights of the parties, with respect to distinct matters which have no bearing on other matters left for further consideration.' Id. at 522, 559 P.2d at 747 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we held that a decree that dissolves a marriage and divides the parties' property is final and appealable with respect to the dissolution of the marriage and the division of property, even though the decree expressly reserved questions of child custody and support for future determination. In our view, such a conclusion was consistent with the rationale of the collateral order doctrine, which makes appealable orders which do not dispose of the entire litigation, but `finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.' Id. at 523, 559 P.2d at 747 (citation omitted). We employ a similar approach in determining the appealability of family court orders in child custody proceedings under HRS Chapter 587. In In the Interest of Jane Doe, 77 Hawai`i 109, 883 P.2d 30 (1994), we held that an order awarding foster custody of a child was an appealable final order under HRS § 641-1(a), even though the order determined only one phase of the child custody proceeding and the question of permanent custody had yet to be decided. We concluded that such an order met the requisite degree of finality of an appealable order because of a parent's fundamental right to custody and control of one's child. We also recognized that child custody cases are ongoing proceedings, in which foster custody could potentially continue for a considerable length of time, leaving parents without the possibility of appellate review until such time as permanent custody is established or foster custody is terminated. A workers' compensation case, like a divorce or a child custody case, is an ongoing proceeding. We agree with claimant's position that an inherent and unique characteristic of a workers' compensation case is its piecemeal nature. Workers' compensation cases, of necessity, are taken up piecemeal. A workers' compensation case requires this treatment because the various entitlements of the claimant ... mature at different times as the course of the claimant's physical recovery progresses. A workers' compensation case, unlike other personal injury litigation, can engender successive issues as to medical treatment, the entitlement to temporary disability benefits, the entitlement to permanent disability benefits, as well as ancillary issues of penalties, costs, attorney's fees and some other rather exotic issues. These can result in successive hearings and successive orders[.] Hunt v. International Minerals and Chemical Corp., 410 So.2d 640, 641 (Fla.App.1982). See also Bickham v. Department of Mental Health, 592 So.2d 96, 98-99 (Miss.1991) (Robertson, J., dissenting) (The realities of the phenomena the [Workers' Compensation] Act regulates render [piecemeal] appeals a practical necessity.... The reason this is and must be so is that maximum medical recovery, permanent disability, and related issues may not be susceptible of resolution for several years.). Claimant's case is illustrative of the abovedescribed characteristics of a workers' compensation case. Claimant suffered her work injury on July 25, 1986. On February 22, 1989, she was awarded medical care, services, and supplies, including treatment for her injuries, and was awarded temporary total disability benefits for a 50-week period ending August 27, 1987. On September 21, 1992, she was awarded further medical benefits in the form of travel reimbursement for her physician visits. On May 23, 1997, when she sought appellate review of the LIRAB's decision, she was still undergoing treatment for her injuries. At that time, the matter of permanent disability or disfigurement had not been determined, and it remained undetermined as of October 21, 1998 when claimant sought review of the ICA's decision. Unless an industrial injury is the form of loss of limb, paralysis, or the like, permanent disability is usually not determined until an injured worker's medical condition has stabilized. Claimant contends that medical stabilization of her TMJ condition could take years. She argues that the award of medical and TTD benefits is a matter that has been fully adjudicated by the director and the LIRAB and is completely separate from the matter of permanent disability benefits. Accordingly, claimant argues that there is no sound reason why she should not be afforded appellate review of the medical and TTD benefits award at this time and that requiring her to await determination of the permanent disability matter at some distant time is contrary to the legislative scheme of timely determination of workers' compensation benefits. We agree. One of the primary purposes of the Hawai`i workers' compensation law is the prompt determination and disposition of claims for compensation. Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 82 Hawai`i 1, 8, 919 P.2d 263, 270 (1996). Under the law, claimants are entitled to: (1) medical care, services, and supplies immediately after a work injury and so long as reasonably needed, HRS § 386-21 (Supp. 1998); (2) weekly wages for temporary disability, HRS §§ 386-31(b) (1993) and 386-32(b) (Supp.1998); and (3) weekly wages for permanent disability, HRS §§ 386-31(a) (1993) and 386-32(a) (Supp.1998). These medical and wage benefits are independent benefits, separate and distinct from one another. An award of medical benefits and temporary disability wage benefits determines a claimant's rights to those benefits. An award of such benefits has no bearing on any future award for permanent disability wage benefits. Given that the matter of permanent disability benefits may be left undetermined for a considerable length of time, an injured worker or an employer must be allowed to seek appellate review of a medical benefits or temporary disability issue, even if the matter of permanent disability has been left for later determination. To delay appellate review of a medical benefits or temporary disability issue until permanent disability, if any, has been determined, would be entirely contrary to the legislative purpose of prompt determination of workers' compensation claims, which, of necessity, entails a prompt determination of each of the independent benefits afforded under the law. Accordingly, we hold that a decision that finally adjudicates the matter of medical and temporary disability benefits is an appealable final order under HRS § 91-14(a), even though the matter of permanent disability has been left for later determination. We take judicial notice, based on other workers' compensation cases that have been before us, that it is the standard practice of the director of labor in any decision awarding temporary disability benefits, regardless of the nature or extent of the injury, to state that the matter of permanent disability and/or disfigurement, if any, shall be reserved for later determination. Such a blanket reservation clause, apparently made for the protection of the injured worker, should not be used to prevent timely appellate review of an otherwise final decision on the matters of medical and temporary disability benefits.