Opinion ID: 1301216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of Ordinance

Text: The SCSPA argues that County's Resolution and Ordinance are inconsistent with the Constitution and general law of this state. We disagree, but find the SCSPA's eminent domain power is superior to County's power. Where an ordinance is not preempted by state law, the ordinance is valid if there is no conflict with State law. Bugsy's Inc., 340 S.C. at 95, 530 S.E.2d at 894. A conflict between a state statute and a county ordinance exists when both contain either express or implied conditions which are inconsistent with each other.... If either is silent where the other speaks, there can be no conflict between them. Where no conflict exists, both laws stand. Fine Liquors, 302 S.C. at 553, 397 S.E.2d at 664. First, the SCSPA contends that County's Resolution and Ordinance conflict with Article VIII, § 14 of the South Carolina Constitution. Section 14 prohibits local governments from set[ting] aside ... the structure and the administration of any governmental service or function, responsibility for which rests with the State government or which requires statewide uniformity. County's Ordinance and Resolution do not set aside the structure or administration of developing ports or terminals because as previously explained, that function does not rest exclusively with the state government and does not require statewide uniformity. Cf. Town of Hilton Head Island v. Coalition of Expressway Opponents, 307 S.C. 449, 456, 415 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1992) (an ordinance is defective under Article VIII, 14 because it attempted to limit the authority granted to the Department of Highways by state law). Second, the SCSPA argues that County's Resolution and Ordinance are inconsistent with the S.C.Code Ann. §§ 54-3-110 through -140. We conclude the statutory provisions and the ordinance are consistent because the provisions are silent on the issue of whether public entities may develop a terminal on the Savannah River. We discern no conflict between these provisions and County's Resolution and Ordinance. Third, the SCSPA argues that County's Resolution and Ordinance are inconsistent with the general law of the state because the SCSPA claims to have a superior eminent domain power with regard to developing a port or terminal and thus a superior development power. The SCSPA argues that § 54-3-150 gives it a super power of condemnation, so that even if County had the power to condemn the Proposed Site and develop a terminal, the SCSPA would have an overriding authority to condemn the previously condemned land and hence has a superior right to develop a port or terminal. We conclude the statutory provision and the ordinance are consistent because the provision is silent on the issue of whether the SCSPA can prevent other entities from port or terminal development. Yet, we address the issue of priority of eminent domain rights between the SCSPA and County because there are ripening seeds of a controversy. See Sunset Cay v. City of Folly Beach, 357 S.C. 414, 593 S.E.2d 462 (2004). Eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty. Because condemnation by a state agency is on behalf of the State, a state agency's power of eminent domain is superior to that of a political subdivision. Riley v. S.C. Hwy. Dept., 238 S.C. 19, 118 S.E.2d 809 (1961). We conclude the SCSPA's right of condemnation regarding the Proposed Site is superior to County's condemnation right.