Opinion ID: 216354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: SFPS's Counterclaims

Text: In her amended and supplemental complaint, McDonald-Cuba raised a claim that SFPS retaliated against her by filing its counterclaims in this action. She did not file a new or amended charge of discrimination with the EEOC prior to asserting this claim. In Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210-11 (10th Cir.2003), we held that conduct occurring after the filing of an employee's Title VII complaint in federal court involving discrete and independent [retaliatory] actions requires the filing of a new EEOC charge. The employee in that case was fired after he filed his Title VII complaint in district court, complaining of prior acts of alleged retaliation. He attempted to add a claim for retaliation based on the firing by including it in his summary judgment brief, but he did not exhaust this new claim before the EEOC and did not move to amend his complaint to include it. We upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment, reasoning that the firing was a discrete and independent action[] that should have been exhausted, even though it occurred after the filing of the judicial complaint. Id. at 1211 (applying exhaustion requirement for discrete and independent retaliatory acts expounded in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-14, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)). The question here is whether the rule in Martinez applies when the alleged retaliatory act occurs as part of the federal court proceedings themselves. [1] It is undeniable that a principal purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to permit the parties to resolve their dispute without resort to litigation. [R]equiring exhaustion of administrative remedies serves to put an employer on notice of a violation prior to the commencement of judicial proceedings. This in turn serves to facilitate internal resolution of the issue rather than promoting costly and time-consuming litigation.  Martinez, 347 F.3d at 1211 (emphasis added). Martinez nevertheless applied the exhaustion requirement to alleged retaliation that occurred after the plaintiff had commenced judicial proceedings. See id. The fact that the plaintiff had already resorted to litigation did not excuse the exhaustion requirement for later, discrete acts of retaliation. The only significant difference between Martinez which we are required to follow as binding circuit precedentand this case is that here the alleged retaliatory act involves an action taken in connection with federal proceedings themselves. McDonald-Cuba fails to supply a convincing rationale for distinguishing Martinez on this basis, however. We conclude that a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies as to discrete acts of alleged retaliation that involve the filing of a counterclaim in federal court. McDonald-Cuba's post-termination retaliation claim based on SFPS's filing of a counterclaim, then, falls within our general rule that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit. Shikles v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir. 2005). Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review Title VII claims that are not part of a timely-filed EEOC charge. Annett v. Univ. of Ks., 371 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir.2004). Accordingly, we remand with instructions to the district court to dismiss this claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.