Opinion ID: 182352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Black argues that the District Court’s sentence of 24 months with no term of supervised release was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Regarding procedure, Black argues that the District Court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors and articulate its reasons for rejecting the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statements. The sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a) for the court to consider include, among others: “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (4) the need to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (5) the need to provide the defendant with appropriate treatment.” United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 893 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(e)). In this case, the District Court, aware of its statutory obligations, considered, but rejected, the Chapter 7 policy statements. The District Court articulated its reasoning for imposing the 24-month term of imprisonment, in full compliance with the 3553(a) factors, in part as follows: I’m not confident that I or anybody can understand whether you’re a part of the problem in Wilmington, or if you’re really trying to remove yourself from the problem. I have some indicators, the fact that you had some cash money on you. I understand the explanation, it was from your mom. 6 Somebody decides to shoot you sitting in a McDonald’s. My experience tells me all those kinds of things contend either way. Either you’re in or trying to get back in, or you’re out and trying to get further out. I don’t know whether to protect you from what’s going [sic] in our city or to protect the city from you. It’s a very difficult decision. As I thought about it long and hard, I think the answer for you at this time is further incarceration and then no supervised release. If I’m protecting you, I’ll feel good about it. If I’m protecting the community, I’ll feel good about that. It’s going to be an extensive period of incarceration. I hope you’ll take advantage of any programs that will be made available to you. When you get out, you’ll have no obligation to the government. You’ll be able to go to North Carolina and do what you want to do . . . .... I don’t think you’re a risk while incarcerated. . . .... In order to do what I am doing, I have to reject the recommended policy statements. I’m stating that on the record. I understand the policy statements, and that pursuant [sic] pursuant to Title 18, Section 3553(a)(5), I’m going to sentence you on this violation to 24 months of incarceration. (App. at 34-35.) 7 Based on the record, we find that the District Court sufficiently articulated its reasons for imposing the sentence consistent with § 3553(a). The Court considered the nature and circumstances of the violation, the history and characteristics of the defendant, appropriate treatment for the defendant, and his danger to the community. After “th[inking] about it long and hard,” (id. at 34), the Court decided that a longer term of imprisonment with no supervised release was warranted, in part, due to Black’s history of failing to adhere to the mandates of supervised release. Following sentence, Black would have no obligation to the government. The District Court’s discussion of these factors reflects its basis and reasoning for rejecting the policy statements. United States v. Kononchuk, 485 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he district court need not discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear that the court took the factors into account in sentencing[.]”). We also find the District Court’s sentence to be substantively reasonable. Prior to absconding from supervision, Black failed to comply with the special conditions of his supervised release of mental health counseling and random urine/drug screening. Six months into his three-year term of supervised release, Black absconded from supervision. Black’s probation officer was unable to make contact with him from February 1, 2010 through April 2, 2010, and Black did not surrender on the District Court’s arrest warrant, after his relatives had been contacted by law enforcement. Additionally, the District Court emphasized its concern for protecting the community. The Court concluded that the circumstances of Black’s violation and his 8 extensive criminal record as well as his prior failures to comply with terms of supervised release and probation were sufficient cause for upwardly departing and fashioning an appropriate individualized sentence. The Court’s careful consideration is not diluted by its discussion of “protecting” the defendant, which Black claims was an improper and unreasonable consideration.