Opinion ID: 779439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of the Term Credit

Text: 46 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), entitled Credit for prior custody, states: A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences — 47 (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or 48 (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; 49 that has not been credited against another sentence. 50 As we have noted previously, § 3585(b) uses the term credit as a term of art. See Rios, 201 F.3d at 269. This type of credit, awarded for time served in detention for the same offense for which the defendant is ultimately sentenced, may only be calculated by the BOP. The sentencing (district) court has no authority to award credit as that term is used in § 3585(b). United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992). 51 The type of credit awarded by the sentencing court to Ruggiano, however, was completely different from the type of credit discussed in § 3585(b). While the latter is within the exclusive authority of the BOP to award, credit for time served on a pre-existing state sentence is within the exclusive power of the sentencing court. Indeed, as quoted above, § 3585(b) specifically prohibits the BOP from awarding credit for time that has been credited against another sentence. As was ably explained by our colleague Judge Stapleton in his concurring opinion in United States v. Dorsey, 166 F.3d 558 (1999): 52 [M]uch of th[is] conflict ... is attributable to [the] use of the word credit to refer to two distinct benefits that a convicted defendant may receive[:] 53 [1.] A sentencing judge is charged with determining the length of any sentence of incarceration to be served. In the course of doing so, it may impose a lesser sentence than it otherwise would have because of any number of relevant factors in the case. 54 [2.] After a defendant has been sentenced to a term of incarceration, the custodian must determine when the sentence imposed will have been satisfied. In the course of doing so, the custodian may give credit against the sentence for such things as presentence detention, good behavior, etc. 55 Id. at 564. 56 The BOP argues that even if credit can be used to refer to two distinct benefits, one which is within the sentencing court's authority and one which is not, it was the second of the two benefits described by Judge Stapleton to which the sentencing court was referring when it sentenced Ruggiano. We find this argument implausible in light of the fact that the court's oral sentence granted the credit immediately after referring to Ruggiano's state sentence: 57 It doesn't sound as if he has much time to go on the state sentence. But I think it makes sense to go ahead and recommend that ... he receive credit for the amount of time that he has served there. 58 The written sentence evinces a similar intent when it states, Sentence imposed to run concurrent with State sentence. Defendant to receive credit for time served. 59 It is clear to us, therefore, that the sentencing court intended to award Ruggiano the first of the two benefits described by Judge Stapleton, which was well within its authority, and not credit as that term is used in § 3585(b), for, as we noted in Rios, the mere fact that an application of section 5G1.3(b) or (c) and the commentary by the sentencing court, and the award of sentencing credit by the BOP under section 3585(b), may result in the same benefit to the defendant ... does not alter the fact that the two benefits bestowed are distinct, and the Supreme Court's opinion in Wilson only meant to refer to the award of sentencing credit under section 3585(b) when it determined that the power to award that credit was entrusted exclusively to the BOP. 201 F.3d at 270. All that happened here is that, just as in Rios and Dorsey, the sentencing court simply used th[e] term [`credit'] slightly imprecisely, which ... cannot be considered an unprecedented occurrence. Id. at 269. 60 While we think that the sentencing court's intentions were clear enough, we encourage sentencing courts in the future to avoid using the term credit to refer to § 5G1.3 adjustments so as not to engender any unnecessary confusion. We admit that our court has not always been consistent in how we have referred to § 5G1.3 adjustments. In Brannan, 74 F.3d at 454, we termed the recognition of time served on a state sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3 a downward departure, while noting that using the term departure in this sense var[ied] slightly from the concept [of `departure'] elsewhere in the Guidelines, id. at 452 n. 6. However, in Dorsey, 166 F.3d at 560, we appeared to refer to § 5G1.3 departures as credits (which is what prompted Judge Stapleton to write his aforementioned concurrence); and later, in Rios. (2000), we dubbed a § 5G1.3 departure an adjustment. 201 F.3d at 266. 61 Because the term departure is, as we acknowledged in Brannan, imprecise, and because the term credit raises the confusion with § 3585(b) described above, we prefer the term adjustment to describe the kind of benefit being awarded a defendant by a sentencing court under § 5G1.3. See United States v. Zapata, 1996 WL 673866, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 30301 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1996) (not precedential) (In general, courts do not have authority to calculate credits, ... [but] the district court can make an adjustment to the second sentence in order to assure that it is fully concurrent with the first one.) (emphasis added). We therefore urge sentencing courts in the future to state something to the effect of I hereby adjust the defendant's federal sentence under § 5G1.3(c) so as to be fully concurrent with his state sentence, in order to avoid much of the confusion that this case, and many others, have presented.