Opinion ID: 3055301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: disclosure of codefendants’ plea agreements

Text: This Court reviews de novo alleged Brady/Giglio violations. See United States v. Jones, 601 F.3d 1247, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010).
Carson’s fifth argument on appeal is that the government violated Brady12 and Giglio 13 by failing to disclose that the government had agreed with cooperating codefendants that the government would not disclose evidence of certain drug quantities at the codefendants’ sentencings. While Carson concedes that he had the codefendants’ plea agreements and knew the attribution amounts agreed to by 12 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). 13 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972). 40 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 41 of 53 each codefendant, Carson points out that statements in the government’s sentencing memorandum demonstrate another component of those plea agreements was not disclosed to him. Specifically, he says the government alludes to this component in his sentencing memorandum when the government states that “the Government agreed not to present additional evidence of drug quantities at [the] sentencing” of the codefendants. Had he known the government agreed with his codefendants not to present evidence of higher quantity amounts, Carson says, “this additional information would have been a sharp tool to use in the crossexamination of the government witnesses.” Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196–97. In order to establish a Brady claim, the defendant must show that: (1) “the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant”; (2) “the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence”; (3) “the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence”; and (4) “had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (internal 41 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 42 of 53 quotation marks omitted). In Giglio, the Supreme Court applied Brady to hold that, where a witness’s credibility is at issue, the government is required to disclose evidence bearing on the witness’s credibility. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55, 92 S. Ct. 763, 766 (1972). “Impeachment evidence should be disclosed in time to permit defense counsel to use it effectively in cross-examining the witness.” United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003). But the delayed disclosure of Brady/Giglio material compels reversal only when the defendant demonstrates prejudice. United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1426 (11th Cir. 1991). Specifically in the context of the government’s failure to disclose impeachment evidence, a defendant is prejudiced where there is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). Carson does not contest that the government disclosed the plea agreements of the codefendants. Carson’s entire Brady/Giglio argument is premised on the idea that the government’s statements in his sentencing memorandum—that the government agreed it would not argue the cooperating codefendants were responsible for higher quantities of drugs at the codefendants’ sentencings— 42 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 43 of 53 demonstrate undisclosed “side agreements” favorable to the defense. A threshold question is whether this is favorable evidence the government failed to disclose. As the government argues, the plea agreements contained, and the government disclosed, the agreed-upon amounts of drugs attributable to each codefendant for sentencing purposes. The government says, and it seems inherently logical, that the agreed-to attribution amounts and the “undisclosed” side agreements that the government would not introduce additional drug quantities at sentencing are the same agreements. Moreover, at trial Carson had the opportunity and indeed did vigorously cross-examine the codefendants about the plea agreements. Defense counsel questioned Carlos Riggs about the plea agreement and the fact that he admitted to agents that he was supplied with “a thousand pills at a time” to sell on McDonald Street. Through Special Agent Gerhardt’s testimony in the government’s case-inchief, defense counsel knew (and the jury heard) that the 17 codefendants agreeing to guilty pleas had actually admitted the conspiracy involved the sale of over 60,000 Oxycontin pills. Defense counsel asked several of the codefendants whether they were attributed this greater amount or a smaller amount. For instance, in cross-examining Cameron White, defense counsel asked: [Defense Counsel:] And you and the Government negotiated an amount of drugs to be attributed to you, correct? [Cameron White:] Yes. [Defense Counsel:] Now, did the Government attribute to you 60,000 43 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 44 of 53 pills? [White:] No. [Defense Counsel:] They attributed to you how many pills, do you remember? [White:] I think— [Defense Counsel:] Just a minute. Let me just . . . at least 20, but less than 50? [White:] Yes. [Defense Counsel:] Plus 100 grams of heroin, but less than 400 grams of heroin? [White:] Yes. Similarly, defense counsel questioned Gavin Walker about his plea agreement and the applicability of the sentencing guidelines, and noted that his sentence would be “determined in large part by the amount of drugs attributed to you.” Defense counsel then confirmed that in his plea agreement with the government: (1) Walker did not agree to an attribution amount of 60,000 Oxycontin pills; and (2) Walker agreed to an attribution amount of 20,000 to 50,000 pills and 100 to 400 grams of heroin. In sum, there is no favorable evidence that the government suppressed. Carson knew the attribution amounts agreed to by the government and his codefendants, and Carson knew that these amounts were less than that thought to have been attributable to the entire conspiracy. Implicit in those agreed-to attribution amounts was that the government would only seek to show the codefendants were responsible for those amounts. And in any event, Carson cannot show prejudice; this information, even if it was not disclosed, would not 44 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 45 of 53 have altered the proceedings. Accordingly, Carson’s claim fails.