Opinion ID: 204125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of Guidelines Terms

Text: Dyer's main argument on appeal is that the facts of his case supported only the application of the guidelines pertaining to possession of child pornography, and not trafficking. The district court's interpretation of the meaning of an intent to traffic under § 2G2.4(c)(2) and of the cross-reference are questions of law, which we review de novo. See United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 541 F.3d 19, 32 (1st Cir. 2008). We review the district judge's findings of fact for clear error, and the government must prove facts essential to sentencing enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 31 & n.8. The issue before us is not whether mere use of LimeWire by one who possesses child pornography shows an intent to traffic simply because LimeWire is a file-sharing program. The government has withdrawn that argument and the district court did not adopt it. Rather, the outcome of this case depends upon the particular facts and not on a per se rule. Dyer's challenge raises issues of -9- interpretation of both intent and traffic, but ultimately turns on the facts. The Guidelines set forth a distinction between possession of and trafficking in child pornography as those terms are used in U.S.S.G. §§ 2G2.4 and 2G2.4(c)(2). Dyer suggests a series of limitations on the definition of trafficking, which we reject. To define the kind of acts that constitute trafficking as opposed to mere possession, we employ ordinary rules of statutory construction. See United States v. Luna-Diaz, 222 F.3d 1, 3-6 (1st Cir. 2000) (looking to the text, guideline commentary, statutory context, and use of similar language in criminal statutes to interpret the meaning of a term in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2); United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines should be interpreted according to principles of statutory construction). The text of the 2003 Sentencing Guidelines separated sentencing for the possession and trafficking of child pornography into two distinct subsections. Sentencing judges were to apply U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 to defendants convicted of trafficking in child pornography; receiving, transporting, shipping, or advertising such material; or possessing such material with an intent to traffic. This guideline carried a base offense level of 17. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2. By contrast, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4 prescribed a base level of -10- 15 for defendants convicted only of possessing child pornography. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4, subject to the condition we describe next. The condition is that a cross-reference in the possession guideline, § 2G2.4(c)(2), mandated that [i]f the offense involved trafficking in material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor (including receiving, transporting, shipping, advertising, or possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor with intent to traffic), then the sentencing judge was to use § 2G2.2, the trafficking guideline, instead. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.4(c)(2).4 As a result, the plain language of § 2G2.4(c)(2) unambiguously extended the trafficking cross-reference both to defendants who actually trafficked in child pornography and to defendants who possessed child pornography with the intent of trafficking but had not yet completed the act. In other words, this trafficking cross-reference, by its terms, could be imposed even absent evidence that others received child pornography from the defendant. 4 Subsequent amendments to the Guidelines consolidated these offenses into a single subsection, with provisions for sentencing enhancements and reductions depending upon the extent to which a defendant's conduct went beyond mere possession. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 (2004) (Trafficking in Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Receiving, Transporting, Shipping, Soliciting, or Advertising Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with Intent to Traffic; Possessing Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor). -11- The government needs only to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant possessed the requisite intent to traffic. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 111 F. App'x 65, 68 (2d Cir. 2004). Dyer unsuccessfully advances limitations, not in the text, on what intent means and on what traffic means. We, like the Second Circuit in Jordan, reject Dyer's argument that the cross-reference in § 2G2.4(c)(2) governed only when the government proved that the defendant actually engaged in trafficking and did not merely intend to do so.5 We also reject Dyer's argument that the government must show that third parties actually retrieved and downloaded images from defendant's computer to show that the defendant had an intent to traffic. First we address the legal arguments about the meaning of the terms traffic and intent; we then turn to whether, in light of those meanings, the facts sufficed to meet those definitions.
Because the 2003 Guidelines do not define the term traffic, we interpret this word by looking to its commonly accepted meaning. See DeLuca, 17 F.3d at 9. To traffic in something commonly means [t]o trade or deal in (goods, esp. 5 While Jordan was an unpublished Second Circuit opinion, we consider it to be persuasive authority since it squarely addressed the same argument made by the defendant in the present appeal. See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 201, 203 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (treating Second Circuit unpublished opinions at least equivalent in authority to law review notes). -12- illicit drugs or other contraband), Black's Law Dictionary 1634 (9th ed. 2009), or to engage in the activity of exchanging commodities by bartering or buying and selling, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2422 (1993). At oral argument, defendant argued that mere trading or bartering of child pornography is not trafficking. We reject the argument. We also reject the argument that a defendant must expect some financial gain from trafficking. In the context of § 2G2.4(c)(2), a defendant traffics in child pornography if he engaged or intended to engage in an exchange or trade of such images. No financial gain or expectation of financial gain is necessarily required. See United States v. Todd, 100 F. App'x 248, 250 (5th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1108 (2005) (noting that trafficking ordinarily means both buying and selling commodities for money and exchanging commodities by barter); United States v. Parmelee, 319 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2003) (observing that trafficking under § 2G2.2 includes bartering); United States v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 791 (8th Cir. 1999) (Section 2G2.2 and the cross reference in § 2G2.4(c)(2) apply when the offense involved the exchange or barter of [child pornography], and not only . . . when this material was offered for sale.). These cases confirm that the crucial acts separating mere -13- possession from trafficking involve the intent to share images of child pornography with others, irrespective of financial motive. This interpretation is also borne out by the legislative history of the 1977 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act (Act), which was amended in 1996 to include 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 to 3009-4 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 2251, 2252-2252A, 2256 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa); see also United States v. Sromalski, 318 F.3d 748, 75152 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that § 2G2.2 and related guidelines should be interpreted in relation to the harms Congress identified when passing this Act). Section 2252A includes separate subsections prohibiting the distribution, sale, and possession of child pornography, with a further section prohibiting the distribution of child pornography to minors with the intent of inducing them to participate in illegal activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)-(6). For purposes of punishment, § 2252A(b) distinguishes between possession and all other offenses, mandating a maximum sentence of 10 years for possession and a sentence between five and twenty years for all other offenses. See id. § 2252(b)(1)-(2). The rationale underpinning the 1996 amendments, Congress said, was that the dissemination and production of child pornography differs from possession because active participation in -14- the market for child exploitation encourages further exploitation of children to an even greater degree. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-863, at 28-29 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F.3d 321, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2000) (footnote omitted) (It is clear that Congress established a series of distinctly separate offenses respecting child pornography, with higher sentences for offenses involving conduct more likely to be, or more directly, harmful to minors than the mere possession offense. Similarly, the guidelines clearly reflect consideration of whether and the degree to which harm to minors is or has been involved.). Congress further found that child pornography victimizes children not only at the time of actual abuse but each time the image is accessed and distributed anew, since its continued existence causes the child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those children in future years. H.R. Rep. No. 104863, at 28. By this metric, trafficking is qualitatively different from mere possession--and warrants heavier sanctions. It makes these images available to new viewers and keeps an image of exploitation in circulation, and thus may encourage the growth of a market leading to further exploitation. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-59 & n.10 (1982); United States v. Hoey, 508 F.3d 687, 692-93 (1st Cir. 2007). -15- Second, the legislative history unequivocally shows that trafficking in child pornography means bartering these materials even when no financial stake is involved. In 1984, Congress expressly found that the child pornography market was dominated by collectors who bartered pornographic images to expand their collections and had little interest in trading for profit. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-536, at 16-17 (1984); see also United States v. Morales-De Jesús, 372 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that Congress eliminated the commercial purpose requirement because of the prevalence of child pornography distributors who shared images with each other with no pecuniary motivation). Concerned that the Act was being under-enforced, Congress amended the statute specifically to ensure that it extended to these collectors. See Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252, 2253); see also H.R. Rep. 98-536 at 2 (1983). Because the harm to the child exists whether or not those who initiate or carry out the schemes are motivated by profit, Congress deliberately broadened the scope of the Act to better serve its purpose. H.R. Rep. 98-536, at 2-3.6 6 As we observed in Morales-De Jesús, we consider the legislative history and the congressional findings of prior iterations of the Act relevant to its present meaning, since when Congress previously passed related legislation accompanied by applicable findings, subsequent legislation was 'presumably based on similar findings and purposes with respect to the areas newly covered.' 372 F.3d at 10 n.2 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 190 n.13 (1968)). -16- Based on this analysis, we conclude that the district court properly interpreted the trafficking cross-reference under § 2G2.4(c)(2) to include situations in which a defendant intended to exchange child pornography without any commercial purpose.
Before the district court, Dyer never used the term specific intent to set forth the legal requirements for applying § 2G2.4(c)(2), and has waived the argument. As a result, the district court did not directly comment on the meaning of the term intent as used in § 2G2.4(c)(2). It rather concluded that in light of the specific facts concerning Dyer's use of LimeWire, the intent requirement had been met. Dyer raises for the first time on appeal the argument that § 2G2.4(c)(2) requires evidence of specific intent, but only in passing and without any legal argument to support this assertion. This argument is twice waived on appeal. We accordingly review it for plain error. We find there was no error of law, and we reject a reading of § 2G2.4(c)(2) that would require specific intent to traffic in child pornography. This court recently emphasized the challenges in defining the term intent when it is used to denote an element of a crime. See United States v. Tobin, 552 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2009) ('Few areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime.') (emphasis original) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, -17- 403 (1980)). In Tobin, we interpreted intent as used in a criminal statute prohibiting harassing phone calls by employing principles of statutory construction and looking to plain meaning, statutory structure, and legislative history. When these indicia were inconclusive, we turned to general considerations, namely the principle that for most crimes, intent ordinarily requires only that the defendant reasonably knew the proscribed result would occur (general intent), not that the defendant specifically intended such an outcome as his purpose (specific intent). Id. at 33 (citing Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404); see also United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997) (observing and applying the rule that when the text of a criminal statute is indeterminate, courts should look to context, including purpose, legislative history, and background legal principles, to discern the kind of intent Congress had in mind). We then reasoned that this principle that intent ordinarily means general intent would have less force in some situations where the consequences of the action are not necessarily wrong or harmful. Thus, when interpreting 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(D), which prohibits making repeated phone calls to the same number with an intent to harass, Tobin held that the government must prove the defendant specifically intended to harass the person at the called number because [t]here is nothing -18- inherently wicked or even suspect about multiple phone calls absent the wicked intention motivating them. Id. Intent has at least two possible ordinary meanings in the criminal context, referring either to the fact that a defendant purposefully and affirmatively desired an unlawful outcome or, alternatively, to a defendant's reasonable knowledge that his acts might result in such an outcome. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403-04. The texts of § 2G2.4 and § 2G2.2 are not explicit on what kind of scienter requirement the Commission intended. While § 2G2.2 pertains to trafficking and § 2G2.4 is predominantly concerned with possession, both guidelines penalize conduct that Congress has deemed inherently harmful. That the Guidelines enhance punishment for both actual trafficking and for intent to traffic suggests the Commission intended to enhance penalties for those whose actions support the market for child pornography and for those who should reasonably know that their conduct would do so. There is no indication that the Commission intended to depart from the ordinary meaning of the term intent. Further, there is every reason to think the Commission was, in this understanding of intent, carrying out congressional intent. Certainly, the Commission chose not to use alternate language which would have required specific intent. The dissent incorrectly argues that the phrase with intent to is a term of art that mandates the conclusion that -19- § 2G2.4(c)(2) requires proof that a defendant specifically intended to traffic in child pornography. That argument is undercut by Bailey, which noted that the word 'intent' is quite ambiguous when interpreting what the court of appeals had meant when using that precise phrase. 444 U.S. at 633. The use of the words intent to traffic does not by itself signify specific intent, as numerous other courts have found in other contexts. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 2320 punishes anyone who, inter alia, intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1). Other circuits have held that specific intent was not required for culpability, on the grounds that specific intent requirements are not ordinarily prerequisites in criminal offenses and the legislative history did not support such an interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1987). Likewise, the Second Circuit has interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 479, which makes it a crime to knowingly and with intent to defraud, utter[], pass[], or put off, in payment or negotiation, any false, forged, or counterfeited foreign bonds, only as a general intent crime. See United States v. Mucciante, 21 F.3d 1228, 1235 (2d Cir. 1994).7 7 One circuit has also held that 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), which prohibits threats of assault, kidnaping, or murder against federal officials, judges, and law enforcement officers with intent to inhibit their official duties or with intent to retaliate against them, is a general or specific intent crime. See -20- Indeed, treating such language as per se imposing a specific intent requirement runs counter to the careful, contextspecific weighing of text, structure, legislative history, and general considerations that we have long employed and is contrary to our analysis in Tobin. The legislative history, in turn, supports a reading that intent in the sense of knowledge suffices. Congress described the evils of the child pornography market by focusing on the child victims involved, not by distinguishing between the motives of purveyors. Trafficking in child pornography has an equally horrific effect upon the children involved irrespective of whether the trafficker actively desires or merely knows that his actions will likely make images of child pornography more available to others. That Congress eliminated the requirement that traffickers in child pornography could only be prosecuted if they were acting with a commercial purpose underscores Congress' understanding that such conduct is culpable regardless of the underlying motive. See H.R. Rep. 98-536, at 16-17. We also turn to the general considerations explained in Tobin. These considerations strongly confirm that § 2G2.4(c)(2) does not require specific, purposeful intent. We should instead rest upon the default assumption discussed in Bailey and elsewhere United States v. Ettinger, 344 F.3d 1149, 1156 (11th Cir. 2003); but see United States v. Veach, 455 F.3d 628, 631-32 (6th Cir. 2006) (requiring specific intent); United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2005) (same). -21- that an intent to traffic in child pornography, like most other crimes, requires only general intent. Unlike the repeated phone calls at issue in Tobin, sharing child pornography qualifies as inherently bad conduct. Indeed, Tobin itself makes this exact distinction. Another subsection of the statute at issue in Tobin prohibited making phone calls if those calls involved content that could be considered child pornography, with the intent to harass another person. Tobin stated that this subsection involve[d] suspicious or even malign conduct and concluded that unlike the provision at issue, intent in this subsection meant only mere knowledge of consequences. Tobin, 552 F.3d at 33.8 Further, courts are ordinarily concerned with the distinction between specific and general intent when defining elements of a crime in order to put defendants on notice of where the line between culpable and innocent conduct falls. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268-69 (2000). No such concern applies at sentencing. Courts routinely interpret the Sentencing Guidelines by looking at related conduct beyond the specific elements of a criminal offense, because the purpose is to 8 While we have recognized that the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute requires proof that the defendant specifically and purposefully intended to traffic in drugs, that conclusion resulted from statutory language that includes the phrase knowingly or intentionally and by concerns with overbreadth. See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 542 F.3d 968, 979 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Caseer, 399 F.3d 828, 839 (6th Cir. 2005). Both of those concerns are inapplicable in the present context. -22- assess the severity of the defendant's particular crime in light of the surrounding circumstances. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 402-03 (1995). In so doing, courts are not punishing a defendant for a distinct offense; they are instead evaluating the totality of a defendant's conduct in order to arrive at a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Amirault, 224 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a sentencing court can look to past, uncharged conduct to impose an aggravated sentence for the possession of child pornography because such conduct bears upon the gravity of the possession offense). We therefore reject the defendant's argument that the government must necessarily show the defendant actively and subjectively desired that others would get images of child pornography from him and that ordinary general intent does not suffice.