Opinion ID: 1891198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Provisions and Standard of Review

Text: The issues in this case require us to construe sections 776.051(1), 784.07, and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005). Section 776.051(1) provides: A person is not justified in the use of force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, or reasonably appears, to be a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07 enhances the penalties for crimes against law enforcement officers and other enumerated classes of public servants by reclassifying the crimes of assault and battery committed against these persons. The reclassification from misdemeanor to felony or from a lower degree of felony to a higher degree increases the authorized sentences for the crimes. Section 784.07 provides in pertinent part: (2) Whenever any person is charged with knowingly committing an assault or battery upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, a traffic accident investigation officer ..., a traffic infraction enforcement officer ..., a parking enforcement specialist ..., or a security officer employed by the board of trustees of a community college, while the officer, firefighter, emergency medical care provider, intake officer, traffic accident investigation officer, traffic infraction enforcement officer, parking enforcement specialist, public transit employee or agent, or security officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties, the offense for which the person is charged shall be reclassified as follows: .... (d) In the case of aggravated battery, from a felony of the second degree to a felony of the first degree. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 843.01 defines the crime of resisting an officer with violence as follows: Whoever knowingly and willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer ... in the execution of legal process or in the lawful execution of any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer . . . is guilty of a felony of the third degree .... (Emphasis supplied.) The crime has sometimes been described inaccurately as resisting arrest with violence. See, e.g., State v. Espinosa, 686 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 1996). However, neither the title of the statute, Resisting an officer with violence to his or her person, nor its explicit terms limit it to arrest scenarios. Cf. N.H. v. State, 890 So.2d 514, 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (noting that title of section 843.02, which defines crime of resisting without violence, is `resisting [an] officer,' not `resisting arrest'). The facts of this case and Taylor demonstrate that section 843.01 encompasses resistance to actions by law enforcement officers other than arrests. Because the issues we decide are exclusively matters of statutory construction, our review is de novo. Clines v. State, 912 So.2d 550, 555 (Fla.2005). In construing statutes, we first consider the plain meaning of the language used. Id.; State v. Ruiz, 863 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 2003). When the language is unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, that meaning controls unless it leads to a result that is either unreasonable or clearly contrary to legislative intent. State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004).