Opinion ID: 1190999
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court abused its discretion in awarding arco $8,400 in attorney fees.

Text: ARCO, as the prevailing party below, requested an award of 100% of its actual attorney fees in defending the claims of Thorstenson and Fagan, approximately $15,000. The court estimated that approximately 75% of the work would have had to have been done had [ARCO] been opposing but a single plaintiff ($15,000 X.75 = $11,250). The court awarded ARCO 75% of this figure, or $8,437.50. [4] Thorstenson's fellow plaintiff, William Fagan, was dismissed from the action by stipulation two days before oral argument was heard on ARCO's motion for summary judgment. Because ARCO's attorneys would, by the court's estimation, have had to perform about 75% of the work actually performed had it been defending against a single plaintiff, there was, so to speak, an overlap of 50% in the work performed in defense of each plaintiff's claim. The court charged Thorstenson with the overlap. Its reason for doing so is unclear. Thorstenson argues that he and Fagan should each have been charged with half of the overlap; thus, the court should have calculated ARCO's fees on the basis of one-half of its total fees. [5] The decision to award attorney fees rests in the discretion of the trial judge and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Cooper v. Carlson, 511 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Alaska 1973). An award constitutes an abuse of discretion only when it is manifestly unreasonable. Haskins v. Shelden, 558 P.2d 487, 495 (Alaska 1976). It could be argued that the court could reasonably have charged Fagan with the overlap: since ARCO agreed to bear the cost of defending against Fagan, and since the cost of defending against Fagan would be 75% of the cost of defending against both, ARCO might have to bear 75% and Thorstenson only 25%. In support of the trial court's conclusion, it could be argued that ARCO, in agreeing to bear the cost of defending against Fagan, essentially agreed not to pursue a claim against Fagan for attorney fees. This agreement should not impair ARCO's right to pursue compensation for any fees reasonably incurred in defending Thorstenson's claim. Neither of these arguments is persuasive. We rest our decision instead on the practical implications of the trial court's ruling. If both plaintiffs had remained in the case until after judgment, the trial court would clearly have been required to charge each with an equal share of ARCO's attorney fees. Likewise, if they had dismissed their claims simultaneously, ARCO would have had an equal right to fees from each one. To charge the last remaining plaintiff with a grossly disproportionate share of a defendant's attorney fees, though he may have lingered only a few days longer, creates perverse incentives. Each plaintiff should be charged with his proportional share of fees incurred prior to the resolution of his claim. The trial court abused its discretion in charging Thorstenson with 75% of ARCO's attorney fees. On remand the trial court should allocate to each plaintiff equal portions of those fees incurred by ARCO prior to the dismissal of Fagan's claim. [6]