Opinion ID: 856641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consideration of Mitigating Evidence

Text: Byrom also claims that the trial court erred when it failed to consider all of the mitigating evidence she presented at sentencing. Specifically, Byrom urged the court to consider (1) that she had no significant criminal history; (2) that she committed the crime under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbances; (3) that Edward was a participant in the crime since his abuse provoked the crime; and (4) that her ability to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or conform it to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. At sentencing, the court made the following oral statement: The Court, likewise, considered the mitigating factors, specifically, that the defendant had no prior criminal record of any kind, so far as the record indicates. And, further, the Court has considered the assertion that the defendant was acting while under the influence of some extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Parenthetically, the Court would observe that these factors are the only factors suggested which would appear and bear consideration by this Court. Byrom claims that this portion of the trial court’s colloquy indicates that the court failed to consider some of Byrom’s mitigating evidence, thereby undermining her death sentence. She argues that the trial court conceded its failure to fully consider Byrom’s mitiating evidence when it noted that only two of her mitigating claims “bear consideration.” The Mississippi Supreme Court subsequently denied Byrom’s claim, finding that the trial court in fact considered all mitigating circumstances. See Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836, 881–82 (Miss. 25 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 26 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 2003). For the reasons that follow, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not misapply clearly established federal law when it denied Byrom’s claim. In capital cases, the sentencer may not refuse to consider mitigating evidence. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 (1987). The exclusion of mitigating evidence can invalidate a death sentence. Id. at 399. “The sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114–15 (1982). Byrom’s claim fails for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the trial court did in fact consider all of Byrom’s mitigating evidence. The trial court’s sentencing determination was not limited to the oral statements made in court. The court also entered a formal written sentencing order. In that order, the trial court’s sentencing determination was prefaced by the following language, which clearly establishes that the court considered all mitigating evidence: The court, having considered each of the mitigating factors suggested by the Defendant and all other mitigating circumstances concerning the Defendant’s character and history and the circumstance[s] of the offense which might be considered mitigating on behalf of the Defendant, and having weighed the aggravating factor[s] against the mitigating factors finds that the mitigating factors do not outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstances and that the death penalty should be imposed. (emphasis added) As this text makes clear, the trial court considered all of Byrom’s mitigating evidence and simply determined that it did not overcome the aggravating circumstances also deemed present. Second, to the extent Byrom claims that the court’s colloquy conflicts with the written sentencing order, the language cited by Byrom does not actually demonstrate that the trial court refused to consider mitigating evidence. When the trial court stated that only two of Byrom’s proposed mitigating factors “bear 26 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 27 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 consideration,” the court was not refusing to consider the other two factors. Rather, the court used the verb “bear” in the sense of “to call for” or “to have relevance.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 161 (3d ed. 1996). As the court clarified in its written sentencing order, two of Byrom’s proposed mitigating factors lacked merit. That is, the trial court evaluated all of the mitigation factors proposed by Byrom, but found two had little relevance to the final sentencing determination. In that sense, they did not “bear consideration.” Fair minded jurists could not disagree. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Therefore, we deny Byrom’s claim. E. Ineffective Counsel Regarding Mitigating Evidence Byrom’s last claim alleges that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial attorneys failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the trial. In order to make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Byrom must show that her attorneys’ performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the deficient performance prejudiced her case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). The attorneys’ representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness such that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Feldman v. Thaler, 695 F.3d 372, 377–78 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Byrom “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 378 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Further, under AEDPA, the crucial question is whether the state court unreasonably applied Strickland. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011); Williams v. Thaler, 684 F.3d 597, 604 (5th Cir. 2012). When considering a habeas petition, our inquiry focuses on “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 131 27 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 28 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 S. Ct. at 788. “[A] habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. at 786. Prejudice is shown when there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the sentencing context, Byrom must establish “a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of [the mitigating evidence available], would have introduced it at sentencing,” and that there is a reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different as a result. Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 386 (2009) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535, 536 (2003)) (alteration in original). “[T]he question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1408 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). Byrom claims that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial attorneys failed to adequately investigate potential mitigating evidence before sentencing and failed to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. Counsel interviewed a number of Byrom’s family members, but Byrom claims counsel should have pursued further leads after uncovering evidence of persistent abuse in Byrom’s childhood and adult life. Moreover, at sentencing, Byrom’s trial counsel only offered psychiatric reports and medical evaluations detailing Byrom’s abuse and the numerous mental and physical ailments she has suffered from. As the record makes clear, Byrom suffered a childhood of mental, physical, and sexual abuse at the hands of her stepfather, and yet more abuse at the hands of Edward. Despite the availability of at least six family 28 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 29 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 members able and willing to personally attest to the violence Byrom was subjected to, trial counsel did not present a single live witness at sentencing. Instead, trial counsel relied on psychiatric reports and medical records, supposedly because of a tactical decision to withhold witness testimony in anticipation of a new trial. Byrom has pressed these ineffective assistance of counsel claims at each stage of review. Because the Supreme Court of Mississippi issued a reasoned opinion on point, it is that decision we review in applying the standard of review provided by AEDPA. Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 641, 651 (5th Cir. 1999). A divided Mississippi Supreme Court decided that Byrom had not received ineffective assistance of counsel at her sentencing. Despite finding that Byrom’s trial counsel made a “perplexing” choice by not presenting live mitigating evidence, the majority opinion nevertheless held as “speculative” the proposition that testimony already known to the trial judge would have “been any more convincing or persuasive if presented through witness testimony.” Byrom v. State, 927 So. 2d 709, 720–21 (Miss. 2006). On the other hand, the dissent struggled to find “a more egregious case of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of a capital case.” Id. at 732 (Dickinson, J., dissenting). For the reasons that follow, applying § 2254(d)(1), the Mississippi Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland to Byrom’s claim of failure to investigate or to her claim of failure to present mitigating evidence.
Byrom claims that her trial counsel were aware of her extensive history as a victim of abuse, but that they entirely failed to investigate potential evidence on point. However, trial counsel clearly stated that they interviewed potential witnesses, including members of Byrom’s family. In fact, counsel went so far as to make arrangements so that out-of-state family members could be in Iuka, Mississippi for Byrom’s trial. Indeed, in October 2000, one of Byrom’s 29 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 30 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 attorneys furnished a list of nine witnesses for trial, most of whom were family members who could confirm Byrom’s history as a victim of abuse. In support of her claim, Byrom primarily relies on the fact that her trial attorneys could not recall the specific names of which family members they interviewed in anticipation of trial. She also points to statements from family members claiming that they were not contacted by trial counsel. Nevertheless, other family members capable of providing further corroboration of abuse suffered were both interviewed by counsel and present in Iuka for the trial. Byrom has not identified what additional information would have been uncovered had her trial counsel interviewed additional family members. While those who were interviewed presented a picture of abuse, their accounts largely overlap and cover nearly identical details. Such claims thus do not demonstrate that the state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable or contrary to established federal law. Fairminded jurists could not disagree with the Mississippi Supreme Court’s determination that Byrom’s attorney conducted a reasonable investigation under Strickland. Accordingly, we deny Byrom’s claim. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
At sentencing, Byrom’s attorneys declined to present witness testimony regarding Byrom’s history of abuse, and instead opted to present two psychiatric reports detailing Byrom’s claims of abuse and the various maladies diagnosed, as well as a medical evaluation detailing Byrom’s many other illnesses. There are at least six family members Byrom’s attorneys could have presented at sentencing, some of whom had directly witnessed the abuse Byrom suffered at the hands of both her stepfather and husband. These witnesses would have substantiated claims regarding the alcoholism of Edward and Byrom’s stepfather, as well as both men’s verbal, physical, and sexual abuse of Byrom. The psychiatric reports presented at sentencing nevertheless covered much of 30 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 31 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 the same information; and Byrom’s history as a victim of abuse was addressed at trial as well. Despite acknowledging that Byrom’s attorneys made a “perplexing” decision in their refusal to present witness testimony at sentencing, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the witnesses’ potential testimony, of which the trial judge was already aware, would not likely have been any more persuasive if presented through live witness testimony. Byrom v. State, 927 So. 2d 709, 721 (Miss. 2006). The state court viewed this decision as a strategic one; Byrom’s attorneys sought to reserve the family members’ testimony in the event of a new trial. Further, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that Byrom’s claim of prejudice was speculative at best. Id. As explained below, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland. “[E]vidence about a defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989). The right to have mitigating evidence presented means little, however, if counsel fails to present a case for mitigation at sentencing. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1544, 1549 (1983)). That said, Strickland does not “require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003). A petitioner challenging the adequacy of counsel’s conduct must show that counsel’s conduct fell below the standard guarantee by the Sixth Amendment, as well as prejudice: a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different. Id. at 534. 31 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 32 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 Here, Byrom’s counsel made the unusual decision to withhold mitigating witness testimony at sentencing in hopes of reserving said testimony for an anticipated retrial. Counsel instead elected to rely on a series of medical reports detailing Byrom’s abuse and the various illnesses she suffered as a result of the abuse. However, even assuming arguendo that counsel’s strategic decision fell below the standard required by Strickland, it cannot be said that Byrom was prejudiced. In order to find prejudice here, there must exist a reasonable probability that Byrom would not have received a death sentence had counsel introduced the live testimony of Byrom’s family members. The Supreme Court has instructed that “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In Wiggins, the Supreme Court found prejudice where the petitioner’s attorney had failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence at the petitioner’s jury sentencing. 539 U.S. at 534–36. The omitted mitigating evidence included would-be accounts of substantial abuse and neglect at the hands of the petitioner’s mother and repeated instances of abuse, molestation, and rape suffered at various foster homes throughout Wiggins’s childhood. Id. at 516–17. However, while Wiggins and Byrom each suffered substantial abuse prior to committing their respective crimes, their cases are otherwise distinguishable. Wiggins’s counsel failed to present to the sentencing jury substantial mitigating evidence that the jury had no other access to. On that basis, the Supreme Court found that at least one juror would have voted differently had the jury been presented with Wiggins’s “excruciating life history.” Id. at 537. Byrom, on the other hand, was sentenced by the same judge that conducted her trial, and the mitigating evidence at issue was substantively addressed both at trial and sentencing. In other words, to the extent the judge that sentenced Byrom was not already aware of Byrom’s mitigating evidence from trial, he was 32 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 33 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 certainly made aware of Byrom’s history of abuse by virtue of the mitigating evidence presented at sentencing. The trial judge reviewed Byrom’s medical records, which included details of the abuse Byrom had suffered, before closing arguments at sentencing. The live testimony withheld by counsel would thus