Opinion ID: 1749749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Civil Penalties May Be Different From Crimes

Text: The State proceeded in this case under section 16(b) of article 911b, not under section 16(a). The legislature manifested an intent that a violation of the Motor Carrier Act could be either a crime or a civil offense or both. If that be not the legislative intent, we attribute to them a useless piece of legislation. Section 16(a) is couched in terms of crime. It states that one who violates the proscribed act or failure to act will be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine, and that each day's violation will be a separate offense. In contrast with that language, section 16(b) states that a violation will subject one to a penalty for each day of violation. Our statutes are honeycombed with provisions for civil penalties. Depending upon particular legislative history and the wording of the statute, knowledge and intent may be required. See State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.1966). Ordinarily, however, a civil penalty statute makes no provision for knowledge or intent, and thus does not include culpability as an element. Imposing the requirements of scienter from the criminal law upon such regulatory statutes can undermine their purposes. That is the rule as to minor crimes, as we have already seen; a fortiori, it would be the rule for the lesser offense of civil penalties. Knowledge and intent were not required in a suit by the State seeking civil penalties against one who violated the Water Well Drillers Act, article 7621e. See Williams v. State, 514 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Civ.App.Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n. r. e.). This court again addressed the contention that knowledge or intent was necessary in a case to establish the State's right to recover civil penalties for violations of the deceptive trade practices act, article 5069, section 10.02, [6] in State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.1975). We there followed the established construction of the Federal Trade Commission Act [7] and held: We disapprove the holding of the court of civil appeals that the State has the burden to prove that Credit Bureau knowingly violated the injunction. Section 10.01 of article 5069 is the relevant statute, and it does not contain the word knowingly or any synonym of that word. State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., supra at 293. See also Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 689-90 (Tex.1980). The civil penalties imposed by the Texas usury statutes are severe, but intent to charge usury is not an element of the proof because the statute does not require it. This court in Cochran v. American Savings and Loan Association of Houston, 586 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Tex.1979), wrote: The subjective intent of the lender is irrelevant if, in fact, the lender has contracted for, charged or received interest on a loan in excess of the maximum permitted by law. The Motor Carrier Act is a comprehensive act that regulates the equipment used and those who haul for hire over the highways of Texas between two incorporated cities. [8] Oil Field Haulers Ass'n v. Railroad Commission, 381 S.W.2d 183, 194 (Tex.1964); Great National Life Insurance Co. v. Chapa, 377 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.1964); New Way Lumber Co. v. Smith, 128 Tex. 173, 96 S.W.2d 282, 285-86 (1936). Those holding certificates or permits must display them in a conspicuous place on each side of the vehicle in plainly legible print which shows the number of the certificate or permit, the name of the carrier and the unit number of the vehicle. Letters and numbers must be at least two inches high. Article 911b, section 18. The evidence of the certificate or permit must therefore be plainly visible to shippers and the public. One who hires a shipper can at once know whether it is lawfully authorized to haul goods for hire. To hire means to procure. In Mason Feed Store v. Starks, 398 S.W.2d 392 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1966, writ dism'd), a venue case over which this court lacked jurisdiction to review, Mason Feed Store had hired an uncertificated trucker to haul grain. The court held that the Feed Store by so doing, procured, aided and abetted in the violation of article 911b. Accord: U. S. v. Gunn, 97 F.Supp. 476 (W.D.Ark.1950); U. S. v. J and J Truck Leasing, Inc., 258 F.Supp. 105 (D.Kan.1966). The court of civil appeals in this case held that knowledge or intent were required to prove a violation of section 16(a), the criminal part of section 16, and that this court had so ruled in Carter v. William Sommerville and Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1979). This is not a correct reading of Sommerville. Sommerville, unlike this case, was not a suit to recover civil penalties under section 16(b). That was a death case in which the plaintiff, Carter, relied upon a breach of section 16(a) as a basis for negligence per se. This court in Sommerville held that section 16(a) was not the kind of a crime that states a standard for negligence cases, and it was exclusively upon that basis that it disposed of the case. It disapproved the prior holding in Mason Feed Store v. Starks, supra , which treated a violation of section 16(a) as negligence per se. Instead of holding that knowledge and intent were required to prove a violation of section 16(a), this court expressly reserved that question because it did not reach it. Carter v. William Sommerville and Son, Inc., supra at 279 n.4. The courts below were in error in granting and approving the summary judgment for the defendant Houdaille. Knowledge or intent are not essential elements to the offense stated in section 16(b), article 911b. The judgments of the courts below are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court. DENTON, J., dissents in an opinion in which GREENHILL, C. J., and BARROW and CAMPBELL, JJ., join. DENTON, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I am convinced the majority opinion has not correctly construed article 911b, section 16(b). [1] Following the entry of an agreed judgment for $3,500.00 against L & L Trucking Company for its violation of the Texas Motor Carrier Act, the State filed suit against Houdaille Industries seeking some $6,600.00 in civil penalties under section 16(b). The State alleged that Houdaille was guilty of procuring, aiding, or abetting L & L's violation of the Act because it had hired the uncertified motor carrier to transport its products between incorporated Texas cities over public highways. Whether allegations and proof of intent and knowledge on the part of a purported procurer, aider, or abettor are required to recover civil penalties pursuant to section 16(b) of the Texas Motor Carrier Act is the issue presented to this Court. This precise question has never been considered by the Court. [2] However, whether knowledge and intent must be established upon the part of a defendant prior to assessing civil penalties has been considered by this Court in connection with several other statutes. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966); Bloom v. Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 390 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.1965). In Bloom v. Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 390 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.1965), we held that article 4542a, § 12(h) requires the state to allege and prove a pharmacist knowingly or intentionally substituted a prescribed drug without authorization before canceling, revoking, or suspending his license despite the absence of any such requirement within the statute's express language. Id. at 256-57. The Court noted the previous holding in Garner v. Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 304 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1957, writ ref'd), wherein it was held that section 12(f) of article 4542a, which provides that the board can revoke a pharmacist's license if he directly or indirectly aids or abets in the practice of pharmacy any person not duly licensed to practice under this Act, was determined to require proof of knowledge on the pharmacist's part. Id. at 534; see Bloom, supra, at 256. We concluded in Bloom that if Garner was not subject to the civil penalties of section 12(f) in the absence of knowledge which he could have easily obtained, then despite the absence of any specific requirement within the statute's provisions, proof of knowledge or intent was required to impose civil penalties pursuant to section 12(h). Bloom, supra, at 256-57. In Harrington v. State, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.1966), we held that proof of knowledge and intent was not a prerequisite to the imposition of the civil penalties provided for by article 6036. Like article 4542a, § 12(h), the language of article 6036 did not specifically require proof of knowledge or intent at the time of the Harrington decision. Distinguishing article 6036 from article 4542a, § 12(h) on the basis of legislative history, we held that article 6036 did not require proof of knowledge or intent. See Harrington, supra, at 478. Unlike article 4542a, § 12(h), article 6036 contained an express knowledge requirement at one time. As originally enacted, article 6036 did not contain words of culpability; however, the words knowingly and willfully violating were added to the statute by amendment. In a subsequent amendment the words were deleted, thereby manifesting the Legislature's intent to render knowledge and intent immaterial to the application of article 6036. See Harrington, supra, at 478. As in Harrington, the court of civil appeals in City of Galveston v. State, 518 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ), used legislative history to determine that proof of knowledge and intent was not necessary to the imposition of civil penalties under Tex.Water Code Ann. § 21.252. In Williams v. State, 514 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Civ.App.Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n. r. e.), which was cited in City of Galveston, supra, the court of civil appeals purported to follow our decision in Harrington in holding that article 7621e did not require proof of knowledge and intent. The William's court, however, failed to examine or acknowledge the statute's legislative history in its reasoning, as we had done in Harrington. Instead, as the majority has done here, the court of civil appeals concluded that Harrington controlled on the ground that because article 7621e only assessed civil penalties, proof of knowledge and intent was unnecessary. Williams, supra, at 777. Assuming arguendo that proof of knowledge and intent was required, the court also noted that Williams' admissions that he had never had a license or certificate of registration from the Texas Well Drillers Board and that despite the fact he was familiar with the application forms he had never applied for one because he knew he could not qualify for a license had satisfied these elements as a matter of law. Id. These cases demonstrate, as the majority's opinion notes, that depending upon particular legislative history and intent, and the wording of the statute, knowledge and intent may be required. See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.1966); Bloom v. Texas State Bd. of Pharmacy, 390 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.1965). The Motor Carrier Act was enacted in Texas by the Forty-First Legislature in 1929. See 1929 Tex.Gen.Laws, ch. 314, at 698-710. Although we are only concerned with section 16(b), section 16(a) is relevant to our discussion as an aid to section 16(b)'s construction. The record reveals that the State recognizes section 16(a), which provides that a violation constitutes a misdemeanor, as the penal provision of article 911b. See State's response to Houdaille's Motion for Summary Judgment, Transcript, at 46. The State contends that unlike section 16(a), section 16(b) is not penal and should not require proof of knowledge and intent. These contentions are based upon the fact that section 16(b) assesses a civil penalty, rather than a criminal sanction for the violation of its provisions. The language of subsections (a) and (b) is identical wherein they set out conduct constituting a violation of the respective provisions. The exact conduct required to violate section 16(a) is necessary for a violation of section 16(b). Moreover, the portion of section 16(b) describing conduct which violates its provisions provides that a party who is guilty of violating section 16(b) who would be simultaneously guilty of violating section 16(a) shall in addition be subject to and shall pay a penalty. Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 911b, § 16(b) (emphasis added). Section 16(b)'s civil penalty is cumulative of the criminal penalty assessed in section 16(a); it does not penalize a different offense. As the court wrote in Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.1979): Section 16(a) of the Act declares that any person or corporation who `procures, aids, or abets in the violation of any provision of this Act' is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by fine. Section 16(b) creates a civil penalty, ..., for the same offense. Id. at 277 (emphasis added). The majority's opinion correctly states that the Texas Motor Carrier Act is a comprehensive Act designed to regulate the equipment used and those who haul for hire over Texas highways between incorporated cities. See Oil Field Haulers Ass'n v. Railroad Comm'n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 194 (Tex. 1964); Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Chapa, 377 S.W.2d 632, 634-35 (Tex.1964); New Way Lumber Co. v. Smith, 128 Tex. 173, 96 S.W.2d 282, 285-86 (1936). When construing such a statute the Court must use diligence to effectuate the Legislature's intent as gleaned from the language of the entire statute and, if available, from an express statement of legislative intent within the statute. Section 22b of the Texas Motor Carrier Act contains such an expression of legislative intent. [3] Benefiting public welfare through regulations which, inter alia, render highways safer by minimizing traffic congestion, reducing wear to roadways, and eliminating potential rate discrimination by carriers is the stated policy of the Motor Carrier Act. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 911b, § 22b; see Oil Field Haulers, supra, at 194; Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co.; supra, at 634-35. In Tarry Moving & Storage Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 367 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.1963), we stated that the paramount consideration in state regulations controlling common carriers is that of the public interest. Id. at 324. This is not a case involving a manufacturer or distributor of an adulterated product intended for human consumption, nor does it involve a greedy lender or an unscrupulous merchant. Instead, this case involves a shipper, a member of the class intended to be protected rather than regulated by the Texas Motor Carrier Act. See New Way Lumber Co., supra, at 285-86. I fail to see how the State's infliction of civil penalties upon a shipper using an uncertificated carrier, in the absence of requiring that the State plead and prove knowledge and intent on the shipper's part to procure, aid, or abet a violation of the Act, facilitates the furtherance of the Legislature's goals. Prosecuting shippers on a strict liability basis will do little to curb carrier abuses. Imposing a burden to prove a shipper's knowledge and intent upon the state would seem unlikely to hinder its effectiveness in prosecuting truly culpable shippers who knowingly and intentionally hire unlicensed carriers for such illicit purposes as receiving kickbacks, reduced tariffs, or to ship contraband. Although Houdaille is a commercial shipper which of necessity employs common carriers with some regularity, the construction of section 16(b) announced by this Court is to be equally applicable to the casual, even one-time, private shipper. Thus, anyone who naively hires a moving company, selected from the phone book's yellow pages or newspaper's classified section, to transport their worldly possessions without ascertaining whether the carrier in fact possesses a Railroad Commission Motor Carrier permit, will be subject to section 16(b)'s civil penalties if the carrier lacks the requisite certificate. Regardless of whether they inquire if the carrier possessed a permit and are lied to, [4] and irrespective of whether they know that a carrier is required to have a certificate of convenience and necessity, such an unenlightened individual can be the target of enforcement by the Attorney General's Office under the majority's holding. As shippers constitute that portion of the Act's protected class primarily intended to be guarded against carrier abuses, the imposition of no fault liability will unreasonably penalize them. Shippers should be entitled to presume that one who holds himself out to the public as being a bona fide carrier is in compliance with the applicable statutes. This favorable presumption should persist until the carrier's conduct indicates to the contrary or the shipper receives some knowledge which would put him on notice of the carrier's noncompliance. The rippling effect of the harsh construction given section 16(b) by the majority will go beyond affecting uninformed shippers. The statute expressly states that  [e]very officer, agent, servant or employee of any corporation and every other person who ... aids ... in the violation ... shall pay a penalty.... Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 911b, § 16(b) (emphasis added). Thus, service station attendants and mechanics, as well as anyone else who unsuspectingly facilitates the continued progress of an unlicensed carrier down the Texas highways, are liable for civil penalties under the majority's interpretation of section 16(b). Although termed a civil penalty, section 16(b)'s sanctions are of a punitive nature and should not be construed to create liability without fault. Contrary to the majority's holding, allegations and proof of knowledge and intent on the part of the purported procurer, aider, or abettor should be required of the State. To construe section 16(b) as imposing strict liability will subject innocent, albeit unwitting shippers to broad and wideranging liability not reasonably contemplated by the Legislature in its efforts to regulate motor carrier traffic. I believe that the court of civil appeals correctly concluded that the duty to supervise and regulate the transportation of property for compensation or hire by motor vehicle on any public highway in [Texas] is imposed upon the Railroad Commission, rather than shippers. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 911b, § 4. I would affirm the judgment of the court of civil appeals. GREENHILL, C. J., and BARROW and CAMPBELL, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.