Opinion ID: 1119242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: instructions on the defense of apparent authority

Text: At trial, appellant introduced much evidence pertaining to his past informant activities with various law-enforcement agencies in support of his theory that he had the apparent authority to devise a scheme to rid himself of the threat of the Mexican drug dealer. At the end of the trial, the court rejected appellant's proposed instructions setting forth this theory; appellant now claims error in that rejection. Appellant cites United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir.1976), in support of his apparent authority defense. Barker, a case which arose out of the Watergate scandal, carved out a very limited exception to the general rule that a mistake of law will not excuse the commission of an offense. The Barker defendants successfully argued on appeal that they be allowed a defense based upon their good faith, reasonable reliance on E. Howard Hunt's apparent authority to break into a room and steal copies of medical records. We have held that it is no defense that a person did not know his act was unlawful or that he believed it to be lawful. State v. Morse, 127 Ariz. 25, 617 P.2d 1141 (1980). A.R.S. § 13-204(B). The facts of this case do not compel us to create an exception to this rule. Unlike Barker, Celaya was not ordered by anyone to meet Walker at the Tucson airport to take his money, nor does he so contend. Celaya admits he devised the scheme on his own. His personal belief that it was proper to bend the law when engaged in narcotics enforcement is not analogous to Barker wherein that court recognized that in certain situations there is an overriding societal interest in having individuals rely on the authoritative pronouncements of officials whose decisions we wish to see respected. United States v. Barker, supra, 546 F.2d at 947.