Opinion ID: 77840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Availability of an Official Capacity Suit for Damages Under RLUIPA

Text: Having concluded that RLUIPA does not provide for a suit for damages against government officials in their individual capacitiessince such an action would be incongruent with the reach of Congress' Spending Powerwe now must address whether the statute permits an action for damages against the defendant-appellees in their official capacities. A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but is rather a suit against the official's office. LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1542 (11th Cir.1993) (citation, alteration, and quotations omitted). Such actions are not a suit against the officer personally, since the real party in interest remains the state entity, and a favorable monetary judgment ultimately imposes liability on the entity that state officer represents. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3105. So long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, however, the official-capacity suit will in all respects other than name, [] be treated as a suit against the entity. Id. at 166, 105 S.Ct. at 3105 (citation omitted). In this case, we conclude that Smith may pursue an official capacity suit against the defendant-appellees for appropriate relief. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2. RLUIPA allows for a plaintiff to seek relief in the event there is a violation by a government, which term is defined in the statute as including, inter alia, any person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii). Having already concluded that the phrase appropriate relief includes an award of monetary damagesalbeit, in Smith's case, an award limited to nominal damageswe find that nothing in the plain language of RLUIPA prohibits an action for damages against these defendants-appellees in their official capacities, that is, as officers acting under color of state law. See id. Although it is true that these officers were sued in their official capacities in name onlyas monetary liability in the event of a successful suit will ultimately be imposed on the entity that they represent, the ADOCit is undisputed that the ADOC received notice of the action and had ample opportunity to respond to it. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S.Ct. at 3105. Accordingly, consistent with Graham, we hold that Smith may pursue a RLUIPA action for appropriate relief against these defendants-appellees, in their official capacities as officers of the ADOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2. [12] Thus, in addressing Smith's appeal, we must consider both Smith's claims for injunctive relief, and his official capacity claims for nominal damages, in evaluating whether the ADOC defendants-appellees were entitled to summary judgment. We now turn to the merits of those claims.