Opinion ID: 2389521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contested Findings

Text: The standard of appellate review in VOSHA cases is expressly set out in the Act itself: The findings of the review board with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. [21 V.S.A. § 227(a)]. The somewhat imprecise substantial evidence standard has received elucidation in several United States Supreme Court cases. `[S]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. . . . [It] must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.. . . it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.' Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 459, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). It differs little, if at all, from the clearly erroneous test of V.R.C.P. 52(a). See Seaway Shopping Center Corp. v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 132 Vt. 111, 117, 315 A.2d 483 (1974). With that standard and its definition in mind, we proceed to appellee's claim that findings 38 and 39 are unsupported by the evidence. Finding 38 states: The foreman on the job was aware of the fact that the pole did not have sufficient protective covering to permit an employee to remove the jumper without assistance. It is clear from the record that the foreman was aware of the fact that the pole did not have sufficient protective covering to permit an employee to remove the entire jumper, i. e. both ends of the jumper. It is equally clear, however, that the foreman felt there was adequate protective covering to de-energize the old wire, i. e. to remove only one end of the jumper. By remove the jumper did the Review Board mean removal of both ends of the jumper or removal of one end of the jumper? The Court is of the view that the plain and ordinary meaning of finding 38 is that the foreman was aware of the fact that the pole did not have sufficient protective covering to permit an employee to remove the jumper in its entirety without assistance. This construction is buttressed by the fact that the Review Board coupled the words remove the jumper with the words without assistance, since there was considerable testimony to the effect that the foreman felt Bagalio could not have removed both ends of the jumper safely without assistance. Read as such, finding 38 is amply supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. Finding 39 reads as follows: The respondent's safety policy on the job site is that all safety determinations in reference to protective covering are to be made by the first class lineman even when such lineman is under the immediate supervision of a foreman. A careful review of the record reveals no error as to this finding. GMP's chief safety officer, in response to the question of who has responsibility for determining which wires should be covered, testified that, The employee himself has, when he reaches a first class lineman's level, this responsibility. And the foreman on the job site at the time of the accident, responding to the question of whether it was Bagalio's responsibility to carry out the company safety policy of covering all wires, testified, It was his responsibility to cover everything, he should have, yes. Although the business manager for the local electrical workers union testified that he felt there is a joint responsibility between the foreman and the lineman for covering wires, the testimony of GMP's chief safety officer and foreman, who presumably are in a better position to know the company's safety policy, is more than adequate to support finding 39.