Opinion ID: 2540510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the courts have a duty to determine the constitutionality of house bill 1's redistricting plan.

Text: Kentucky legislative reapportionment plans are governed by both the federal and state constitutions. Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution and equal protection principles under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution require that every citizen's vote carries the same voting power. [7] This is referred to in federal law as the one person, one vote principle. Constituencies must include approximately equal numbers of voters to avoid diluting the weight of individual votes in larger districts, which would infringe upon that citizen's right to fair and effective representation. [8] [A] claim asserted under the Equal Protection Clause challenging the constitutionality of a [s]tate's apportionment of seats in its legislature ... [is] a justiciable controversy subject to adjudication by federal courts. [9] But while federal decisions require virtual perfection in the apportionment of [c]ongressional districts, [10] state legislative reapportionment plans need only achieve substantial population equality. [11] State law is preempted to the extent it conflicts with this federal requirement. Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution, in relevant part, requires that every 10 years [t]he ... General Assembly ... shall divide the [s]tate into thirty-eight [s]enatorial [d]istricts[] and one hundred [r]epresentative [d]istricts, as nearly equal in population as may be without dividing any county[;] ... and the counties forming a district shall be contiguous. Well before federal one person, one vote principles were applied to the states, Kentucky's highest court interpreted Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution to prioritize substantial equality of representation over county integrity. [12] This avoided eventual conflict with, and preemption by, the federal Equal Protection Clause. Independent of the federal standard under the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 33 imposes a dual mandate that Kentucky's state legislative districts be substantially equal in population and preserve county integrity. A reapportionment plan satisfies these two requirements by (1) maintaining a population variation that does not exceed the ideal legislative district by -5 percent to +5 percent and (2) dividing the fewest number of counties possible. [13] Our holding that House Bill 1 is unconstitutional is based not upon federal law, but upon Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution. We do not violate the separation of powers doctrine by finding House Bill 1 unconstitutional. Our only role in this process is to ascertain whether a particular redistricting plan passes constitutional muster[.] [14] And no matter how distasteful it may be for the judiciary to review the acts of a [coordinate] branch of the government[.] their duty under their oath of office is imperative. [15] By finding House Bill 1 unconstitutional, we are not selecting a better legislative redistricting plan but simply upholding our duty faithfully to interpret the Kentucky Constitution. If the legislature is displeased with our interpretation, it is, of course, free to pursue a constitutional amendment to Section 33 with the people of the Commonwealth.
Fischer II requires division of the fewest number of counties mathematically possible in reapportionment plans. [16] The LRC contends this is a judge-made standard not mandated by the Kentucky Constitution and that this standard should be replaced with a good faith requirement to divide only the fewest number of counties as is politically possible. [17] We disagree. The text of Section 33 is clear that as between the competing concepts of population equality and county integrity, the latter is of at least equal importance. The probability of population inequality is acknowledged, but the command with respect to the division of any county is absolute. [18] And complying with Section 33's prohibition against split counties would violate equal protection principles. [19] So we recognized in Fischer II that Kentucky avoided federal preemption because our earlier decisions [20] construed Section 33 to give primacy to population equality. [21] But we firmly stated that total destruction of county integrity is not required and should be balanced with population equality to accommodate both. [22] We reaffirm this assertion today. Contrary to the LRC's argument, this Court did not retreat from the importance of county integrity in Jensen. [23] The appellant in that case asked the Court to place an even greater emphasis on the preservation of county integrity by permitting slightly greater population variations than plus-or-minus 5 [percent.] [24] In rejecting the appellant's contention, we recognized that the requirement of approximate equality of population must control when it is incompatible with the goals of maintaining county integrity. [25] But this does not represent a relaxation of the county integrity principle. The Jensen Court explained that population equality cannot be disregarded in order to maintain county integrity. Rather, after satisfying the requirement of approximate equality of population, the next priority of a reapportionment plan is the preservation of county integrity, which is accomplished by dividing the fewest possible number of counties. [26] Although the concern for population equality overrides the maintenance of county integrity, Section 33 of the Constitution mandates county integrity. The LRC is correct that Section 33 does not require division of the fewest number of counties possible; it actually prohibits the division of any county. Although we cannot uphold the mandate of Section 33 without violating equal protection, we also cannot ignore the drafters' goal of preserving county integrity. [27] It is a cardinal rule of construction that the different sections of the Constitution shall be construed as a whole so as to harmonize the various provisions and not to produce a conflict between them. [28] Another rule of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the instrument and of the people adopting it. The Constitution should not be construed so as to defeat the obvious intent of its framers if another interpretation may be adopted equally in accordance with the words and sense which will carry out the intent. The intent must be gathered both from the letter and the spirit of the document. [29] Applying these principles, we are not free to disregard the drafters' intent to preserve county integrity by striking the provision from Section 33. [30] We must harmonize the dual mandates to the greatest extent possible while achieving the overarching goal of population equality. The Fischer II Court appropriately balanced these goals by requiring reapportionment plans divide the mathematically fewest number of counties possible. House Bill 1 violates Section 33 of the Constitution because it fails to divide the fewest number of counties possible. The record demonstrates that alternative plans were proposed in both chambers to divide as few as 24 counties in the House districts and 4 counties in the Senate districts. [31] But House Bill 1 divides 28 counties in the House districts and 5 counties in the Senate districts. The trial court correctly found that these reapportionment plans violate Section 33.
The LRC asks us to relax the plus-or-minus 5 percent rule and adopt a federal standard, which generally finds an overall population deviation of less than 10 percent so insignificant that a court may overlook it when assaying redistricting issues. [32] And it argues House Bill 1 is constitutional as measured by the federal standard because the overall population deviation of the House districts is 10.0013287 percent and of the Senate districts is 9.84 percent. In support of this argument, the LRC suggests the Fischer II Court meant to adopt this federal standard but erroneously articulated it as plus-or-minus 5 percent deviation from the ideal district. The LRC also argues that the 5 percent deviation rule is flawed because it requires reapportionment plans to make full use of the maximum population deviation to calculate the fewest number of counties possible. We disagree. This Court did not intend to adopt the federal standard for population deviation as the test under the Kentucky Constitution. The Fischer II Court stated, [I]t is safe to say that so long as the maximum population deviation does not exceed -5 [percent] to +5 [percent], and provided any such deviation is in furtherance of state policy, no violation of the Constitution of the United States will be found. [33] This assertion merely recognizes that the 5 percent deviation rule can be reconciled with federal law, which considers overall deviations of less than 10 percent as constitutionally insignificant and which acknowledges the integrity of political subdivisions as a rational state policy. [34] As a general rule, federal courts find a state reapportionment plan presumptively constitutional when it achieves less than a 10 percent overall population deviation between the least and most populous districts. [35] We decline the LRC's invitation to embrace the federal standard for Kentucky because the 5 percent rule appropriately ensures population equality. For purposes of Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution, the 5 percent rule remains the standard to judge the constitutionality of population deviation in redistricting plans. But recognizing that great difficulty and delicacy attends the performance of the duties imposed upon the General Assembly by [S]ection 33 of the Constitution, [36] our decisions have long held that Section 33 does not demand mathematical perfection from the General Assembly. As Kentucky's highest court expressed in Stiglitz, Exactitude is not to be expected. Approximation is the rule erected by the Constitution, but the [l]egislature may not escape the duty of approximation imposed by the Constitution on the ground that mathematical precision is not attainable. [37] To achieve approximate population equality, the Fischer II Court established that population equality under Section 33 may be satisfied by a variation which does not exceed -5 [percent] to +5 [percent] from an ideal legislative district. [38] This remains an appropriate test to determine whether a legislative redistricting plan achieves approximate population equality. [39] We take this opportunity to explain that the 5 percent rule is not an absolute mandate by which any population deviation greater than 5 percent from the ideal district is automatically unconstitutional. Rather, complying with the 5 percent deviation rule presumptively satisfies the population equality requirement of Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution. A population variance of plus-or-minus 5 percent from the ideal is a minor deviation from mathematical equality, which enjoys a presumption of population equality. So a population deviation within this range alone is insufficient to make out a prima facie case of unconstitutionality. The legislature will not be required to justify the disparity in its reapportionment plan on this evidence alone. That is not to say it is impossible to prove a reapportionment plan is unconstitutional if it complies with the 5 percent rule. Staying within a 5 percent deviation from the ideal district is not a safe harbor. But the burden is on the plan's challenger to show it is arbitrary or discriminatory. When a reapportionment plan exceeds the plus-or-minus 5 percent variance, the legislature has the burden of proving that the plan consistently advances a rational state policy. The Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Thomson, [40] The consistency of application and the neutrality of effect of the nonpopulation criteria must be considered along with the size of the population disparities in determining whether a state legislative apportionment plan contravenes the Equal Protection Clause. [41] This is equally true with regard to Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution. A rational state policy only justifies a population variance greater than 5 percent if it is both consistently applied throughout the redistricting plan and has a neutral effect. There are also limitations to acceptable population variance. Redistricting plans cannot pursue other rational policies at the total expense of population equality. This would violate Section 33 of our Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, a redistricting plan that divides no counties but results in large population inequality would be unconstitutional. When districts exceed plus-or-minus 5 percent population variance from the ideal district, the ultimate question is whether the plan consistently advances a rational state policy and, if so, whether the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits. We find that House Bill 1 does not comply with the Fischer II 5 percent rule because at least one district in both the House and Senate exceeds 5 percent population deviation from the ideal district. So the appellees have made a prima facie case that the Bill is unconstitutional, and the burden lies with the LRC to show the reapportionment plan consistently advances a rational state policy. The LRC argues that the House reapportionment plan exceeds the federal 10 percent rule in order to prevent division of LaRue County. [42] Aside from the fact that the 5 percent rule applies, the policy of preserving county integrity is not consistently applied throughout the reapportionment plan as a whole. Neither the House nor the Senate reapportionment plan divides the fewest number of counties mathematically possible. Other plans in the record achieve greater population equality than House Bill 1 while dividing the fewest number of counties. The existence of alternative conforming plans is not sufficient to establish that House Bill 1 is unconstitutional. But their existence does show that the greater population inequality in the present plan is not a necessary consequence of pursuing county integrity. So the population deviations of 5.38 percent and 5.52 percent in House Bill 1 cannot reasonably be said to advance the policy of maintaining county integrity. Because the LRC has advanced no other rational state policy, it fails to overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality. So House Bill 1 violates Section 33 because it does not achieve sufficient population equality. Finally, the LRC argues the 5 percent rule of Fischer II is flawed because it requires every Kentucky reapportionment plan to begin the decade at the maximum population deviation permitted by federal constitutional law. It complains that by starting out with a variance of -5 percent to +5 percent, the population among the districts quickly becomes malapportioned. [43] We do not read the Fischer II Court's interpretation so strictly. In Fischer II, the challenged Senate redistricting plan divided 19 counties and achieved a population deviation range of -3.26 percent to +3.09 percent. [44] An alternative plan in evidence divided fourteen fewer counties by increasing the population deviation range by 3.18 percent. [45] The increase would have resulted in a population deviation of -4.74 percent to +4.79 percent, which complies with the plus-or-minus 5 percent rule. [46] Similarly, the challenged House districts contained a population deviation range within plus-or-minus 5 percent of the ideal district but divided 48 counties. [47] An alternative House redistricting plan would have increased the population deviation range by.04 percent [48] but divided 19 fewer counties. [49] Under these circumstances, we held that [t]he mandate of Section 33 is to make full use of the maximum constitutional population variation as set forth herein and divide the fewest possible number of counties. [50] Redistricting plans need not start at the maximum population deviation of 5 percent as long as they divide the fewest number of counties possible. The General Assembly must divide the smallest number of counties necessary to comply with the 5 percent rule. But dividing the fewest number of counties while achieving greater population equality fully complies with Section 33 of the Kentucky Constitution.