Opinion ID: 1942312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Racial Discrimination Alleged

Text: The defendants all contend that the State exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the impartial jury clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 997 (1985). One year before the seminal case of Batson, this Court set out in general terms a procedure for trial courts to follow ... when they are fairly presented with a claim that peremptory challenges have been exercised on discriminatory grounds. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1012-13. The procedures outlined by this Court in Riley, pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution, [4] are consistent with the procedures enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Batson. Feddiman v. State, Del.Supr., 558 A.2d 278 (1989). We have concluded that, in this case, an examination of the application of the Batson procedures is dispositive. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court established a tripartite analysis for evaluating claims that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race.... Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question.... Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.... Hernandez v. New York, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The defendant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the State purposefully exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, ... and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. ... Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the ... jury on account of their race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In these proceedings, the defendants claimed that the prosecutor had used a disproportionate number of peremptory challenges to remove venire members who, like the defendants, were black. It was unnecessary for the Superior Court to determine whether the defendants had carried their initial burden of making a prima facie case, because the prosecutor responded by denying a race-based removal motive and offering a race-neutral explanation for his exercise of the State's peremptory challenges. Feddiman v. State, 558 A.2d at 285-86; Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d at 687-88; Hernandez v. New York, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1866.