Opinion ID: 1387356
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exceeding the Scope of the Indictment

Text: Yet, while we find no error under Apprendi, we do conclude that the district court erred in applying subparagraph (iii) under the particular language of the indictment. Courts have long understood that a criminal indictment holds a central place under the U.S. Constitution. It protects three constitutional due process rights, namely: the Sixth Amendment's right to fair notice of the criminal charges against which one will need to defend; and the Fifth Amendment's dual protections against twice placing a defendant in jeopardy for the same offense, and holding the defendant to answer for crimes not presented to or indicted by a grand jury. United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 935 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.1975)). The grand jury is vested with the exclusive authority of setting the criminal charges in an indictment. The grand jury charged both Thompson and Jones with violating § 924(c)(1)(A). Specifically, the indictment reads in relevant part: COUNT THREE THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES:. On or about April 26, 2005, in the Middle District of Tennessee, KENNETH L. JONES, knowingly used, carried, and discharged a firearm, to-wit: a Glock, Model 21, .45 caliber, semi-automatic pistol, during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to-wit: a violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846 and 841(a)(1). In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. COUNT FOUR THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES: On or about April 26, 2005, in the Middle District of Tennessee, THOMAS M. THOMPSON, knowingly used and carried a firearm, to-wit: a Ruger, Model P94, .40 caliber, semi-automatic pistol, during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, to-wit: a violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846 and 841(a)(1). In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. By the terms of Count 4, the grand jury charged Thompson with using and carrying the Ruger during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and aiding and abetting the same under 18 U.S.C. § 2. Though evidence during the sentencing hearing did not establish that the Ruger was discharged during the course of the drug trafficking crime, the district court sentenced Thompson to the 10-year mandatory minimum under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) based on evidence that Jones had discharged the Glock. We recognize that, as a general matter, Thompson may indeed be held liable for Jones' conduct. As the Government points out, aiding and abetting liability is available under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and Pinkerton liability is available for co-conspirators. Nevertheless, the question here is not whether Thompson may be held liable for Jones' actions generally, but rather whether, under the specific language of § 924(c) and the indictment, the district court appropriately sentenced Thompson to the 10-year mandatory minimum. There are two fundamental problems with the district court's sentence. First, by the terms of the indictment, the grand jury charged Thompson with using and carrying a Ruger in connection with drug trafficking, and aiding and abetting the same under 18 U.S.C. § 2. Under a plain reading of the indictment, the Ruger, being a firearm for purposes of § 924(c)(1)(A), would be the firearm for purposes of Thompson's sentence. Second, the indictment charged Thompson not only with respect to a particular make and model of firearm, it also charged him with respect to specific criminal activity us[ing] and carr[ying] a firearm. In contrast, it charged his co-defendant with us[ing], carrlyingl, and discharg[ing] a firearm. Thus, the indictment not only failed to provide Thompson notice that the Glock could serve as the firearm for purposes of the § 924(c)(1)(A) enhancements, it also failed to put him on notice that he could be held responsible for the discharge of a firearm. [2] Had the grand jury expressly incorporated Count 3 into Count 4, then Thompson would have had clear notice that by pleading guilty to Count 4, including the reference to the aiding and abetting statute, he was also potentially liable for the actions of his co-defendant spelled out in Count 3. Alternatively, the grand jury could have dispensed with listing any of the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) in either Count 3 or 4i.e., it could have omitted any references to the particular make and model of firearm or the term discharge in Count 3, and simply referred to § 924(c)(1)(A) in both counts. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (An indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges. But it need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime.); United States v. Perez-Olalde, 328 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir.2003) (explaining that sentencing factors need not be included in the grand-jury indictment); Buckley v. Butler, 825 F.2d 895, 903 (5th Cir.1987) ([T]here is no Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment on the sentencing facts.). Instead, by charging Jones specifically with using, carrying and discharging a Glock and charging Thompson only with using and carrying a Ruger, the grand jury narrowed the indictment vis-à-vis Thompson in a material way. Cf. United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 379-81 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that the Government's decision to limit indictment to a particular weapon constituted a material narrowing of indictment); see also United Mates v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 901-04 (10th Cir.2006) (same). Because the indictment did not give Thompson fair notice that he could be held responsible for discharge of the Glock, the district court impermissibly exceeded the scope of the indictment at the sentencing stage. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate Thompson's ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). We note for clarification that our holding today does not limit the district court on remand to consider only whether Thompson should receive a mandatory minimum of five years under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Subparagraph (ii) of that section provides a seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing a firearm. Neither Count 3 nor Count 4 specifically reference brandishing or subparagraph (ii). As the grand jury did not narrow' the indictment with respect to brandishing as it did with respect to discharging, the district court is free to consider whether Thompson should receive a sentence for brandishing the Ruger.