Opinion ID: 1372970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: INAPPLICABILITY OF BILL HODGES TRUCK CO. v. GILLUM

Text: In Bill Hodges Truck Co. v. Gillum, 774 P.2d 1063 (Okla. 1989), a worker suffered a job-related heart attack for which he claimed workers' compensation benefits. Three years after he was adjudged permanently, totally disabled, the worker sought approval of a heart transplant with incidental medical care. The Workers' Compensation Court determined that a heart transplant procedure was within the category of reasonable and necessary medical expenses to be born by the employer. This Court reversed on appeal, observing first that no proceeding to reopen the claim had been brought in the Workers' Compensation Court. We then held that the worker failed to prove that there was a causal nexus between the heart transplant and the compensable harm attributable to the accidental injury. The Court further stated: A permanent disability award constitutes a solemn adjudication that the worker's healing period has come to an end and his condition or state of health has reached the very optimum that is then medically attainable... . The moment permanent disability begins, the right to receive medical treatment ceases by operation of law except, of course, for certain limited, tightly structured and explicitly authorized situations... . Once adjudged to have permanent disability, a worker is entitled to medical attention only upon establishing recurrence of the postaward healing period in a reopening proceeding under 85 O.S. 1981 § 28. Id. at 1065-66 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). In the present case, the Court of Appeals relied exclusively on Gillum as support for upholding the order of the Workers' Compensation Court. The appellate court held that under Gillum, Hospital's attempt to recover the post-Joint Petition charges was precluded by the lower court's determination that Savage was totally and permanently disabled. [2] In disposing of Hospital's due process argument, the Court of Appeals concluded that Hospital's rights were not violated because Savage was not entitled to have post-award medical expenses paid by respondents. Although we reaffirm the statement of law set forth in Gillum, we find that the appellate court's absolute and unconditional reliance upon it resulted in an over-broad application of that case to the present facts. We first note that, unlike Gillum, there was a reopening of the worker's compensation claim in the present case. Second, the decisive issue in Gillum was whether the worker presented sufficient evidence to establish a causal link between his accident and subsequent condition. There is no such issue in the case at bar. It is undisputed that Savage suffered a change of condition for the worse which necessitated further medical treatment. Finally, Gillum does not address the right of a medical care provider to receive payment for services rendered after an adjudication of permanent disability has been made, nor does it address the due process rights of such party when its statutory right to receive payment has been terminated without notice. On the basis of these distinctions, we hold that Gillum is inapplicable to the present case.