Opinion ID: 1102154
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the circuit court abused its discretion on evidentiary rulings.

Text: ¶ 25. Haggerty next asserts as error the trial judge's rulings on various evidentiary issues. Our standard of review for the admission of or refusal to admit evidence is well settled. `[A]dmission or suppression of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.' Broadhead v. Bonita Lakes Mall, Ltd. P'ship, 702 So.2d 92, 102 (Miss. 1997) (quoting Sumrall v. Miss. Power Co., 693 So.2d 359, 365 (Miss.1997)); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So.2d 310, 314 (Miss.1992); Walker v. Graham, 582 So.2d 431, 432 (Miss.1991). Demonstrative evidence may be admitted at the trial court's discretion, if such evidence was reasonably necessary and material, Murriel v. State, 515 So.2d 952, 956 (Miss.1987), and appropriate and relevant. Gandy v. State, 373 So.2d 1042, 1047 (Miss.1979). Furthermore, where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party. In re Estate of Mask, 703 So.2d 852, 859 (Miss. 1997); Terrain Enters., Inc. v. Mockbee, 654 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Miss.1995). With this precedent in mind, each of Haggerty's alleged evidentiary errors are discussed below. (A) Whether Haggerty should have been allowed to show the jury empty pill bottles which held the medications she was required to take as a result of the accident. ¶ 26. Haggerty attempted to use approximately one hundred empty pill bottles to demonstrate to the jury how much medication she was required to take. Haggerty did not intend to introduce the bottles into evidence. Foster objected on the grounds that the pill bottles were not disclosed in discovery and that they had no relevance since the medications were not an issue at trial. He argued they were only to be used to inflame the jury or garner the sympathy of the jury. The trial judge sustained Foster's objection and refused to allow Haggerty to use the pill bottles. Haggerty asserts this as error, citing numerous cases for the proposition that demonstrative evidence is often admitted for the purpose of bringing the jury to a better understanding of the case. ¶ 27. Haggerty was allowed to introduce a list of the prescriptions she was required to take after the accident. The amount of medication she was required to take was the point Haggerty sought to make through the display of the pill bottles. We conclude that the point was sufficiently, if not as persuasively or dramatically, demonstrated to the jury through the prescription list. Therefore, Haggerty has failed to show that she was prejudiced by the judge's ruling or that his decision was an abuse of discretion. Thus, this assignment is without merit. (B) Whether Haggerty should have been allowed to use a spine model as a demonstrative device during trial to assist the jury in better understanding the nature and location of her injuries. ¶ 28. Haggerty attempted to use a model of a spine to point out the parts of the spine as her doctor witness testified about them. Foster's attorney objected on the grounds that the model was not disclosed in discovery and that Haggerty's counsel was not trained in medicine and did not have the experience necessary to explain the model to the jury. The trial judge sustained the objection. Haggerty argues this was error, citing Hall v. State, 691 So.2d 415 (Miss.1997). ¶ 29. In Hall, a photograph was held admissible in conjunction with a doctor's testimony because the doctor testified it was difficult to simply describe things without some form of visual aid because most people don't understand anatomy. Hall, 691 So.2d at 418-19. Haggerty asserts that her counsel intended to use the spine model just like the photograph in Hall, pointing out the parts of the spine as the doctor testified about them. ¶ 30. This Court has developed strict discovery rules in order to avoid trial by ambush and to insure each party has a reasonable time to prepare for trial. It is committed to the discovery rules because they promote fair trials. Once an opponent requests discoverable material, an attorney has a duty to comply with the request regardless of the advantage a surprise may bring. Harris v. General Host Corp., 503 So.2d 795, 797 (Miss.1986); Tolbert v. State, 441 So.2d 1374, 1375 (Miss. 1983). We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow introduction of the model. Haggerty was not prejudiced by the refusal since the doctor's testimony was allowed, [2] use of the model was not essential for the jury's understanding of her injury, and the model was not disclosed to the defense during discovery. (C) Whether Haggerty was improperly prohibited from testifying about her impression and understanding of her MRI results. ¶ 31. At trial, Haggerty was asked to give her impression after the visit to her doctor about the MRI results. Foster's counsel objected and the trial judge inquired whether she would have to have gotten these impressions based upon what the doctor told her. When Haggerty responded in the affirmative, the judge sustained the objection. Haggerty cites this as error, relying on Mississippi Rules of Evidence 602 and 701 for the proposition that she can give her impression about her injuries. Haggerty also cites the recent Court of Appeals case of Kroger Co. v. Scott, 809 So.2d 679, 688 (Miss.Ct.App. 2001). In Kroger, the plaintiff's opinion as to why she [wanted] 74,000 in damages was ruled to be admissible under Rules 602 and 701 since the testimony was rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful on the issue of pain and suffering. However, it is well established law that a plaintiff is clearly incompetent to testify regarding his or her own medical prognosis and treatment. Graves v. Graves, 531 So.2d 817, 822 (Miss.1988) (citing Temple Constr. Co. v. Naylor, 351 So.2d 1350, 1352 (Miss.1977)). ¶ 32. Kroger is distinguishable from the case at bar in that here Haggerty was not prohibited from testifying about her perception of her injuries, but only her impression of the MRI. Any impression of the MRI was outside the understanding of Haggerty and her knowledge of it was only gleaned through conversations with her doctor. Allowing Haggerty to testify as to those conversations would be to introduce hearsay into the proceedings. Moreover, this testimony from Haggerty was unnecessary, as the deposition of her doctor explaining the MRI results was later read to the jury. [3] Although she was not allowed to testify regarding the MRI, Haggerty was not denied an opportunity to describe her physical problems, pain, and suffering to the jury. Therefore, any error committed by not allowing her to testify to the results of her MRI was harmless. (D) Whether the trial court properly excluded the medical report of Dr. Richardson and testimony regarding his treatment. ¶ 33. Haggerty asserts as error the trial court's sustaining an objection to her introduction of evidence regarding her visit with a plastic surgeon, Daniel Richardson, M.D. Dr. Richardson advised Haggerty that nothing could be done to remove the scar on her neck which resulted from neck surgery following the accident. Haggerty alleges refusal of this evidence was error because she withdrew the cost of the visit as an element of her damages, therefore, she argues no prejudice could result to Foster from its introduction. She argues that her visit with Dr. Richardson is relevant within the meaning of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401 as it is both (1) material or of consequence (relates to the injury element of the prima facie case), and (2) contains probative value as it makes the existence of her neck injury and scar more probable. ¶ 34. Foster's counsel objected on the grounds that they requested a copy of all doctor reports during discovery and did not receive a copy of Dr. Richardson's report, had no knowledge of the report, and had not been advised during discovery that Haggerty had visited a plastic surgeon. Foster claimed admission of the report would prejudice his case because they did not have an opportunity to review the report prior to trial, interview and/or depose Dr. Richardson, and Dr. Richardson was not scheduled to testify at trial. The trial court sustained the objection and refused introduction of the report or any testimony concerning it. [4] ¶ 35. This Court has developed strict discovery rules to avoid trial by ambush and to insure each party had a reasonable time to prepare for trial. These discovery rules promote fair trials. Once discoverable material is requested, an attorney has a duty to comply with the request regardless of the advantage a surprise may bring. Williams v. Dixie Elec. Power Ass'n, 514 So.2d 332, 335 (Miss. 1987) (citing Harris v. Gen. Host Corp., 503 So.2d 795, 797 (Miss.1986); Tolbert v. State, 441 So.2d 1374, 1375 (Miss.1983)). See also K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 986(34) (Miss.1999); State Highway Comm'n of Miss. v. Jones, 649 So.2d 201, 203 (Miss.1995). As mentioned, Dr. Richardson's report was not disclosed prior to the point in trial when Haggerty sought to introduce it. This Court has stated [t]he standard of review regarding admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. Where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party. Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113(12) (Miss.1999). In regard to matters relating to discovery, the trial court has considerable discretion. The discovery orders of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607 So.2d 1232, 1235 (Miss.1992). ¶ 36. In Robert v. Colson, 729 So.2d 1243, 1246 (Miss.1999), this Court found that Rule 26 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides for seasonable supplementation of answers. This Court has held seasonable supplementation to mean soon after new information is known and far enough in advance of trial for the other side to prepare. Decisions addressing what constitutes a seasonable supplementation focus on the necessity to avoid unfair surprise at trial. See, e.g., Foster v. Noel, 715 So.2d 174, 182-83 (Miss.1998) (stating Rule 26 requires strict compliance to avoid unfair surprise); West v. Sanders Clinic for Women, P.A., 661 So.2d 714, 721 (Miss.1995) (affirming trial court's exclusion of certain expert testimony elicited at trial but not found in answers to interrogatories and stating seasonable supplementation requires supplementation when new information renders initial response inadequate); Motorola Communications & Elecs., Inc., v. Wilkerson, 555 So.2d 713, 717-18 (Miss.1989) (requiring seasonable disclosure give enough time to prepare for trial); Jones v. Hatchett, 504 So.2d 198 (Miss.1987) (stating purpose of our civil discovery procedures is to prevent trial by ambush). ¶ 37. The trial court inquired and Haggerty's counsel admitted that they had inadvertently failed to disclose to Foster's counsel any information regarding Haggerty's visit to Dr. Richardson, despite Foster's request for all information regarding doctor visits. The jury viewed Haggerty's scar and was able to determine for themselves the extent of permanent disfigurement. Therefore, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to allow the evidence regarding Dr. Richardson. Haggerty was not prejudiced by its exclusion; the jury still got the information she wished to convey through the doctor's report. Conversely, had the report been admitted into evidence, Foster would have been prejudiced. He would have been unable to depose or cross-examine Dr. Richardson regarding the contents of the report. In addition, though Foster did not object on this ground, the trial judge noted that Dr. Richardson would not be testifying at trial and any rendition of what he told Haggerty would have been hearsay. ¶ 38. This assignment is without merit.