Opinion ID: 155737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: National Crime Information Center Evidence

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a National Crime Information Center record indicating that the Browning shotgun had been stolen from a Louisiana man in 1987. The defendant argues that the record was hearsay evidence not admissible under any exception. During the trial, the defendant’s aunts and his mother testified that the gun had been a family heirloom. The government offered the NCIC report to rebut that testimony. The NCIC report was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in it. Thus, it is hearsay evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). It is unnecessary to determine whether the NCIC report falls into the business records exception to the hearsay rule, however, because even if the trial court erred in admitting the record, that error was harmless. Where a party objects to evidence on hearsay grounds, we apply the harmless error standard from Kotteakos v. Untied States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. -9- 1995). “[W]e must discern whether the statement, in light of the whole record, substantially influenced the outcome of the trial, or whether we are left in grave doubt as to whether it had such an effect.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The only contested issue at trial was whether the defendant possessed the Browning shotgun. Uncontroverted evidence showed that the gun first arrived at the Dillon Avenue home after the death of the defendant’s father. The dispute revolved around the defendant’s relationship to the gun after it arrived at Dillon Avenue, and especially after the death of his grandmother in 1995. How the gun came to Dillon Avenue--as a family heirloom or a stolen good--did not have any bearing on the question of whether the defendant “possessed” the gun for the purpose of the statute. The trial court’s instructions, in fact, recognized the irrelevancy of the evidence. The court told the jury that the evidence “is not offered and cannot be considered by you as evidence of guilt by this defendant for the crime for which he now stands tried.” Tr. at 404. The evidence merely contradicted the account of the aunts and stepmother regarding a peripheral and insignificant issue, and therefore did not impact the verdict. Cf. Cannady v. United States, 351 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965 ) (“If the hearsay evidence had been used to impeach - 10 - appellant’s credibility by showing a contradiction on some insignificant matter, we would hesitate to reverse his conviction.”). 1 The evidence of guilt at trial, especially the testimony of Agent Bray and Detective Jackson, was substantial. Because the NCIC report concerned an insignificant issue in the trial and was not relevant to the issue of whether the defendant possessed the gun, and because there was ample independent evidence in support of the jury’s verdict, there is no risk that the NCIC evidence substantially influenced the trial.