Opinion ID: 2967845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: adequacy of slayton

Text: A state procedural rule is adequate if it is consistently or regularly applied. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988). Consistent or regular application of a state rule of procedural default does not mean undeviating adherence to such rule admitting of no exception. Meadows v. Legursky, 904 F.2d 903, 907 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). Rather, despite some deviations, a general rule[ ] that ha[s] been applied in the vast majority of cases must be considered adequate. Plath v. Moore, 130 F.3d 595, 602 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing whether a state has consistently applied a procedural rule, we consider only those instances in which the state advanced the procedural rule as a basis for a decision adverse to the petitioner, because we cannot say that a state court inconsistently applied a procedural rule that was not presented for its consideration. See Meadows, 904 F.2d at 907. Furthermore, we necessarily look only to the period prior to the time the defendant violated the state procedural rule; decisions applying or declining to apply a state rule after that time are irrelevant in determining whether the rule was consistently applied at the critical time. See id. at 907 & n.3. We have previously determined that Slayton is an adequate state procedural rule, see Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 159-60 (4th 20 REID v. TRUE Cir. 1998), and we are not at liberty to revisit that ruling, see Etheridge v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 9 F.3d 1087, 1090 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the fact that a state procedural rule is adequate in general does not answer the question of whether the rule is adequate as applied in a particular case. See Brown v. Lee, 319 F.3d 162, 170 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a procedural rule is inadequate when it has not been regularly or consistently applied to a particular type of federal constitutional claim). Answering that question requires us to determine whether Slayton is regularly and consistently applied to claims of the type raised by Reid. The relevant inquiry concerns the procedural posture of the defaulted claim: The question we must ask . . . is whether the particular procedural bar is applied consistently to cases that are procedurally analogous—here, cases in which the particular claim raised could have been raised previously but was not. McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 589 (4th Cir. 2000). In order to demonstrate that Slayton is inadequate in this particular instance, Reid would need to cite a non-negligible number of cases in which [involuntary plea] claims could have been brought on direct review but were not, and in which the collateral review court nonetheless failed to bar the claim under [Slayton]. Id. Reid offers three cases purportedly demonstrating that the Slayton rule is not regularly or consistently applied in this particular context. See Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2626 (2003); Chapman v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 628, 1999 WL 511062 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision); Gardner v. Warden, 281 S.E.2d 876 (Va. 1981). As Reid notes, all of these cases involved claims that a guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, and in none of them did the Virginia Supreme Court bar the claim under Slayton. Nevertheless, these cases do not establish the inadequacy of Slayton. In Walton, the challenge to the guilty plea was defaulted on the basis of the procedural rule found in Anderson v. Warden, 281 S.E.2d 885, 888 (Va. 1981) (holding that a defendant is bound by representations made during a guilty plea absent a valid reason for controverting those statements). See Walton, 321 F.3d at 451 & n.6. We are aware of no requirement that a state court identify every potential basis for a procedural default, and Reid does not claim such a requirement exists. Moreover, there is no logical reason why the Virginia Supreme Court would need to invoke the Slayton bar to a claim ruled barred by the more specific rule in Anderson. REID v. TRUE 21 In Chapman, the state asserted that the petitioner’s challenge to his guilty plea was defaulted under Anderson, and the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis of Anderson. See Chapman, 1999 WL 511062, at . However, the court did not rule at all, either procedurally or on the merits, on the petitioner’s related claim that his guilty plea was not involuntary due to counsel’s ineffectiveness. See id. Chapman thus does not help Reid. In Gardner, the Virginia Supreme Court did not default a challenge to a guilty plea on the basis of Anderson, and in fact considered the merits of the claim on habeas review. Even so, this case does not provide the support that Reid needs to establish the inadequacy of Slayton. There is no indication anywhere in Gardner that the State asserted the Slayton bar. Therefore, it goes too far to read Gardner as rejecting application of Slayton. Even if this were a supportable reading of Gardner, a single failure to apply Slayton would not establish the inadequacy of the rule. See McCarver, 221 F.3d at 589.