Opinion ID: 877547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: reasons why the judgment must be vacated and the case tried again

Text: This case took no more than an hour to try. Attorneys for both sides stipulated that three depositions (that of the plaintiff, Rad Lee Payne, that of his father, Carl Payne, and that of the defendant, Billie Buechler) be admitted in evidence. The only exception was that plaintiff's attorney reserved an objection to a part of the defendant's deposition testimony on her claim that she had a listing agreement with plaintiff with the word nonexclusive written on it in the defendant's handwriting. Plaintiff's attorney claimed that this testimony was barred by the parol evidence rule. In addition to the depositions, the parties agreed that all pretrial interrogatories and their answers be admitted in evidence. The record does not disclose the answer, but I surmise that the parties were pressured into speeding up the trial  but it was hurried up so much that it was hardly a trial at all. The trial transcript of testimony covers a total of sixteen pages. The plaintiff did not testify to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the listing agreement. He only testified to the amount of work he put in trying to sell the defendant's property after he had obtained the listing. Nothing in the record discloses why he did not testify on the circumstances surrounding the execution of the listing agreement on July 5, 1977. In effect, plaintiff's case-in-chief on the main legal question was based entirely on depositions. Defendant's case was not much longer. Defendant was called to the witness stand and her counsel asked her if she understood that your deposition has been introduced into evidence in lieu of a great deal of your testimony ... and she replied yes. She then identified another listing agreement that was in existence and still in effect when she signed the listing agreement with plaintiff on July 5, and this listing agreement was introduced into evidence with no objection from the plaintiff. She then testified that she refused to sign an exclusive listing agreement with the plaintiff. She testified that Mr. Van Lueschene was present when she signed the listing agreement with plaintiff. Next, she testified that she sold the property on her own and that plaintiff did nothing to find the buyer. Her testimony on direct examination covers four pages. Plaintiff's attorney then cross-examined her by asking her if she had found her copy of the listing agreement that she had with the plaintiff, and she again explained how her copy was destroyed as a result of vandalism. This cross-examination covers one-and-a-half pages of trial transcript. Next, defendant called Mr. Van Lueschene as a witness, and he testified that he was present when plaintiff and defendant signed the listing agreement, that he had seen the plaintiff filling out the listing agreement and that he had seen the word nonexclusive written on the defendant's copy of the listing agreement. Before Van Lueschene testified to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the listing agreement, plaintiff's attorney asked for a continuing objection on the ground that this testimony should be barred by the parol evidence rule. The entire testimony (direct and cross) covers five pages of the trial transcript. In rebuttal, plaintiff called the defendant as an adverse witness. She was asked if she agreed with Van Lueschene's testimony to the effect that the word nonexclusive was written on the front of her copy of the listing agreement, and she replied yes. He then attempted to impeach her by revealing that at her deposition, she had testified that the word nonexclusive was handwritten on the back side of her copy of the listing agreement. Both sides then rested. Plaintiff then submitted proposed findings and conclusions to the court and the defendant, who did not have any prepared, was given time to get them submitted. Later, the court adopted verbatim the defendant's proposed findings and conclusions, and entered judgment for the defendant. These findings and conclusions are absolutely inadequate, and I could not put the stamp of approval on a judgment based on them. The findings and conclusions contain no reference to the claimed nonexclusive listing agreement. The findings are absolutely silent as to whether plaintiff knew that defendant had one or more listing agreements in effect when the listing agreement was signed on July 5, 1977. In fact, there is no finding which covers the main issue of this appeal  whether parol evidence of the claimed nonexclusive listing agreement should be admitted. The only finding which remotely bears on this issue, finding no. 3 states: That the contract was not intended by the defendant to be an exclusive right of the plaintiff to sell her property; that she had at least two other listing agreements with other real estate agencies in effect on July 5, 1977, whereby they also had the right to sell the property. This finding is in essence, the entire basis for the trial court's decision, for the question of consideration and the question of the letter of termination are not dispositive of this case. The only way that the judgment should be affirmed on the basis of the findings and conclusions is to invoke the doctrine of implied findings, and I am not about to do so. Too often it is used to get trial courts off the hook who have simply not done their job. If the case was well-tried and there was a good evidentiary record in existence, I would remand only for further findings. But here, because there was hardly a trial at all, I would order a new trial. I add that neither the parties nor the trial court have pointed out a glaring discrepancy as to who was present on July 5, 1977, when the listing agreement was signed. In their depositions, the plaintiff, Rad Lee Payne, and his father, Carl Payne, testified that both of them were with the defendant when they discussed the listing agreement and when it was signed. Both of them also testified that Mr. Van Lueschene was not present on July 5. On the other hand, the defendant and Van Lueschene testified that only the defendant, the plaintiff, and Van Lueschene were present on July 5 when the listing agreement was signed. Both of them unequivocally testified that Carl Payne was not there. Someone is not telling the truth, and who was present is vital to the question of whether plaintiff wrote nonexclusive on defendant's copy of the listing agreement. For these reasons, I would vacate the judgment and remand for a full trial  before a different judge. I turn now to a discussion of why the majority is wrong in reversing the case and ordering judgment to be entered for the plaintiff. Before proceeding to an analysis of the applicable rules, I think it necessary to expand on the facts stated in the majority opinion, and also to put this case in a procedural perspective as to how it was tried. The procedural question will be considered first. As previously indicated, the depositions of plaintiff, of defendant, and of Carl Payne, were admitted in evidence. Plaintiff did reserve an objection, however, to defendant's claim that she had a nonexclusive listing  the objection was apparently aimed at keeping out of evidence her discussions with the plaintiff where she claims to have insisted on a nonexclusive listing. The fact is, however, that the depositions of plaintiff and of Carl Payne, cover their version of discussions they had with defendant as to whether the listing was to be exclusive or nonexclusive, and as to whether plaintiff or anyone else had written nonexclusive on defendant's copy of the listing agreement. Their deposition testimony also covers their claim that they believed that defendant did not have the property listed with anyone else at the time she signed their listing agreement, even though they knew she had previously had listing agreements in effect with other real estate agencies. For reasons of fairness alone, the trial court should also have been allowed to consider the testimony of the plaintiff and of Van Lueschene on their version of the signing of the listing agreement. See Rule 32(a)(4), M.R.Civ.P. But aside from this, the majority has missed the point in applying the parol evidence rule to bar the evidence. The evidence clearly falls within the exceptions to the parol evidence rule (set out in the statute itself, section 28-2-905, MCA), but unfortunately, the majority opinion does not discuss the exceptions other than to state that the evidence does not fall within any recognized exception permitting its admission in evidence ... The exceptions, however, clearly apply to this case.