Opinion ID: 2451115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Majority's Analysis is Inconsistent with Our Decision in City of Seattle v. McKenna

Text: ¶ 39 This case was heard on the same day as a similar case, City of Seattle v. McKenna, ___ Wash.2d at ___, 259 P.3d 1087. There, the City of Seattle sought a writ of mandamus to compel the attorney general to withdraw from federal litigation in Florida. We refused to grant the writ in light of the broad authority of the attorney general as the chief legal officer of the state. We traced this authority from its constitutional roots to some of the same statutes defining the attorney general's authority that are at issue in this case. See McKenna, ___ Wash.2d at ___, 259 P.3d 1087 (noting that RCW 43.10.030 confers broader authority than the plain text indicates). Rejecting the argument that the attorney general was required to withdraw Washington from the federal litigation, we stated, The people of the state of Washington have, by statute, vested the attorney general with broad authority. Id. at ___, 259 P.3d 1087. Moreover, relying on Boe and Berge, we recognized that [w]here the attorney general possesses authority to initiate litigation, that authority is generally discretionary. Id. at ___, 259 P.3d 1087. ¶ 40 I find it impossible to reconcile the majority's analysis here with our decision in McKenna. First, the majority here reads the statutes defining the attorney general's authority, which speak in terms of what the attorney general shall do, as mandatory and nondiscretionary. The McKenna decision, by contrast, acknowledges that the term shall has been construed to impose only a discretionary duty. Id. at ___ n.3, 259 P.3d 1087. Recognizing this inconsistency, the McKenna decision suggests that while the term `shall' generally creates a mandatory duty, case law has established that, in the context of RCW 43.10.030, the use of `shall' creates only a discretionary duty. Id. (citation omitted). This distinction is artificial. If the attorney general truly has discretion as the chief legal officer of the State despite what RCW 43.10.030 says he shall do, then the attorney general must likewise have discretion in the face of similar statutes that purport to limit his discretion. Statutes cannot be read in isolation. ¶ 41 Second, while the majority here places the attorney general in a traditional attorney-client relationship with the state officers he represents, the McKenna decision rejects this framework. We say in McKenna that the attorney general has discretionary authority to act in any court, state or federal, trial or appellate, on `a matter of public concern,' provided that there is a `cognizable common law or statutory cause of action.' McKenna, ___ Wash.2d at ___, 259 P.3d 1087 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, the McKenna decision rejects the argument that where the governor and attorney general disagree, the attorney general may not proceed in the name of the State. Id. at ___, 259 P.3d 1087. This view is at odds with the majority's analysis. Reading the two cases together, it is unclear why a writ of mandamus is appropriate to force the attorney general to follow the commissioner's wishes in this litigation but is inappropriate in McKenna. [2] ¶ 42 Consistent with our decision in McKenna, I would recognize that the attorney general's duty to represent state officers in litigation is generally not subject to a writ of mandamus. While the attorney general's role to provide legal counsel is mandated by statute, it fundamentally involves discretion and legal judgment entrusted to an independently elected official. The statutory duty is for the attorney general to exercise discretion. This is no mere ministerial task subject to the extraordinary writ of mandamus. ¶ 43 I respectfully dissent. WE CONCUR: RICHARD B. SANDERS, Justice Pro Tem.