Opinion ID: 788833
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of Probative Similarity

Text: 21 PBT first argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury with respect to the definition of probative similarity. The court instructed that: Probative similarity means that the songs, when compared as a whole, demonstrate that Juvenile or CMR appropriated Jubilee's song. PBT avers that this definition is misleading because, by including the phrase when compared as a whole, it suggests that the jury, when deciding whether factual copying occurred, must look to see whether Back That Ass Up, as a whole, is sufficiently similar to Back That Azz Up, as a whole. As PBT points out, however, probative similarity requires only that certain parts of the two works are similar, such that the jury may infer factual copying in light of the defendant's access to the plaintiff's work. Regardless, PBT's claim fails for at least three reasons. 22 First, we cannot say that the jury instruction on probative similarity is an obviously incorrect statement of law. Hernandez, 321 F.3d at 531. The definition of probative similarity in the jury instruction is taken directly from a Fifth Circuit case. See Peel & Co., 238 F.3d at 397 (The second step in deciding whether Peel has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding factual copying ... requires determining whether the rugs, when compared as a whole, are adequately similar to establish appropriation. (emphasis added)). Accordingly, PBT did not show plain error because the definition of probative similarity was not obviously incorrect. Hernandez, 321 F.3d at 531. 23 We note that the district court's reliance on Peel to define probative similarity is understandable given that other Fifth Circuit opinions offer little additional guidance on the question. Peel is undoubtedly correct inasmuch as it instructs that the ultimate issue with respect to probative similarity is whether the similarities between the two works suggest that the later-created work was factually copied. Peel should not be read to suggest that a jury may draw an inference of factual copying only if the whole of the defendant's work largely replicates the whole of the allegedly-copied work. 8 Rather, the when compared as a whole language in Peel regarding probative similarity means that the jury must consider the whole of the first work (including both copyrightable and non-copyrightable parts) and the whole of the second work and then compare the two works, looking for any similarities between their constituent parts. This reading of Peel is not inconsistent with any Fifth Circuit precedent and is consistent with other courts' conceptualizations of probative similarity. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 832 n.7 (10th Cir.1993); O.P. Solutions, Inc. v. Intellectual Prop. Network, Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 7952, 1999 WL 47191, at  (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1999). 9 24 In order to avoid confusion, a district court should explain that the purpose of the probative similarity inquiry is to determine whether factual copying may be inferred and that this inquiry is not the same as the question of substantial similarity, which dictates whether the factual copying, once established, is legally actionable. See Eng'g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1340 & n. 4 (5th Cir.1994) (adopting the term probative similarity) (citing Alan Latman, Probative Similarity as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990)); see also Bridgmon, 325 F.3d at 576 & n. 7, 577 (noting that probative and substantial similarity are analytically distinct concepts). Along these lines, a jury may find that two works are probatively similar if it finds any similarities between the two works (whether substantial or not) that, in the normal course of events, would not be expected to arise independently in the two works and that therefore might suggest that the defendant copied part of the plaintiff's work. See Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir.1997) ([P]robative similarity [] requires only the fact that the infringing work copies something from the copyrighted work; ... substantial similarity[] requires that the copying is quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to support the legal conclusion that infringement (actionable copying) has occurred.); 4 NIMMER § 13.01[B], at 13-12 ([W]hen the question is copying as a factual matter, then similarities that, in the normal course of events, would not be expected to arise independently in the two works are probative of defendant's having copied as a factual matter from plaintiff's work.); Latman, 90 COLUM. L. REV. at 1214 (noting that probative similarities are such similarities between the works which, under all the circumstances, make independent creation unlikely [;][s]uch similarities may or may not be substantial.... Rather, they are offered as probative of the act of copying....). 25 The second reason PBT's claim — that the language when compared as a whole in the instruction on probative similarity constituted reversible error — fails is because the district court offered guidance to the jury that a finding of factual copying only requires similarity between portions of the plaintiff's work, not overall similarity. For example, when the court first introduced the element of factual copying (about ten sentences before giving the instruction defining probative similarity), the court stated, [t]he first question, factual copying, asks whether Juvenile and CMR actually copied constituent elements of D.J. Jubilee's song in Juvenile's song Back That Ass Up.  (emphasis added). The court also instructed the jury that: If you conclude that factual copying did occur, that is that Juvenile/CMR copied parts of Jubilee's song Back That Ass Up, [the defendants may still prevail if they demonstrate independent creation]. (emphasis added). Given these instructions, we cannot agree that the definition of probative similarity of which PBT complains was misleading in this particular instance. 26 Third, the jury's findings on independent creation and substantial similarity negate any reasonable possibility that the probative similarity instruction was probably responsible for an incorrect verdict. Tompkins, 202 F.3d at 784 (citing ARA Auto. Group v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 124 F.3d 720, 730 (5th Cir.1997)). Even if the jury misunderstood its task in evaluating probative similarity as a result of the instruction, it found that Juvenile independently created Back That Azz Up and that the two songs are not substantially similar. Those findings prevent PBT from recovering, regardless of the extent to which it proved factual copying occurred. 27