Opinion ID: 658352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Systematic Pattern of Violence

Text: 153 Count 1 of the superseding indictment, the CCE count, alleged that the defendants 154 engaged in a systematic pattern of violence in support of its drug-based criminal enterprise, with its members using force, fear, violence and intimidation to guarantee discipline, loyalty and control among its members, to maintain, expand and protect its drug distribution territories, and to protect their various clandestine laboratories established for the illicit production of methamphetamine. 155 Counts 2 and 3, the conspiracy counts, used the identical language under the heading of Overt Acts. Appellants argue that the systematic pattern of violence alleged in the indictment was either an element of the offenses in question, requiring a jury instruction, or prejudicial surplusage that injected a false issue into the trial. This argument was not raised at trial. Appellants further contend that evidence of the Company's violent acts should have been excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 403 and 404(b).
156 Because a CCE charge is based solely on Title 21 offenses, the systematic pattern of violence alleged in the CCE count was not an element of that offense. It was therefore surplusage and need not have been proved. Gawne v. United States, 409 F.2d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943, 90 S.Ct. 956, 25 L.Ed.2d 123 (1970). There is no reason to believe, however, that this allegation interfered with the jury's consideration of the essential elements of a CCE conviction. Id. at 1404. All of the 35 predicate acts alleged in the CCE count were Title 21 violations; not one was an act of violence. In any event, individual violent acts were relevant to the CCE count insofar as they constituted overt acts in furtherance of the two charged conspiracies, which in turn were alleged as predicate CCE offenses.
157 The systematic pattern of violence alleged in the two conspiracy counts appeared in the context of overt acts, and a significant number of the overt acts listed in the superseding indictment were acts of violence. An overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy is not a substantive charge requiring instruction on essential elements, but is itself an element of the charged offense. 22 As for Appellants' Rule 403 argument, much of the testimony about violent acts was admitted without objection from the defense. The record shows that the district court balanced relevance against prejudicial effect under Rule 403 when objections were raised. The district court's Rule 403 decisions will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir.1989). We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1504-05 (9th Cir.1987) (evidence of shooting charged as overt act in drug conspiracy was not unfairly prejudicial and was relevant because shooting incident was an example of pattern of violence alleged in indictment). 158 Appellants' argument that the acts of violence were inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) as other crimes, wrongs, or acts is misguided. Rule 404(b) precludes the use of such evidence to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. The overt acts of violence in this case were not used to prove the defendants' character or violent propensity, but as substantive evidence of the charged conspiracies. See Patterson, 819 F.2d at 1504 n. 3; United States v. Soliman, 813 F.2d 277, 278-79 (9th Cir.1987).
159 One of the overt acts alleged in furtherance of the methamphetamine and marijuana conspiracies was that on August 16, 1983, Dominic Cavallaro attempted to kill Mary Bacon, an employee of the United States Forest Service, by shooting at her five times with a large caliber firearm while Bacon was on official duty in a remote part of California's Shasta National Forest. Witness Dale Richmond testified that Cavallaro had admitted to shooting at Bacon to scare her away from the Squaw Creek marijuana growing area. The district court admitted the evidence over defense objection and subsequently denied a defense motion to strike this overt act from counts 2 and 3 on the grounds that the incident had not been tied to the charged conspiracies. On appeal, Cavallaro vehemently argues that he did not commit the shooting, that the act was not connected to the conspiracies and was therefore irrelevant, and that, even if relevant, the district court should have excluded the evidence under Rule 403. 160 Prior to Richmond's testimony, the district court determined that Cavallaro's admission was made in furtherance of the conspiracy under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) and conducted a Rule 403 analysis. In denying the motion to strike the overt act from the indictment, the court stated that it found sufficient evidence that the shooting was in furtherance of the two conspiracies. The admission of the evidence was not an abuse of the district court's discretion. As to Cavallaro's culpability, the defense thoroughly cross-examined Richmond and presented exculpatory witnesses. It was for the jury to decide whether Cavallaro was responsible for the shooting.