Opinion ID: 1057701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 37

Heading: Prosecutorial Discretion to Seek the Death Penalty

Text: Mr. Banks asserts that Tennessee's death penalty statutes are unconstitutional because they confer unlimited discretion upon Tennessee's district attorneys general to decide whether to seek the death penalty. He argues that the different values, motivations, and influences of these prosecutors, as well as an absence of clear guidelines to direct their decision-making process, renders Tennessee's death penalty statutes unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious. While Tennessee's district attorneys general have been entrusted with broad discretion in making charging decisions, it would be inaccurate to characterize their discretion as entirely unfettered. The Tennessee General Assembly has defined the elements of the offense of first degree murder and has provided that it is the only offense for which the death penalty may be sought. In addition, the General Assembly has prescribed fifteen aggravating circumstancesat least one of which must be established beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty can be considered. When deciding whether to pursue the death penalty, a district attorney general must take these statutory requirements into account. In addition to these statutory requirements, a district attorney general may not pursue the death penalty without probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense. The district attorney general must also make sure that all charging decisions fully comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996). Tennessee's district attorneys general are elected by the voters of their districts. Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5; Tenn.Code Ann. § 8-7-102 (2002). Local control over prosecutors is a core component of the American criminal justice system because prosecutors reflect the values of their local communities. The fact that they are elected by the voters of their districts assures their accountability. [54] Simply stated, no one else is in a better position to make charging decisions which reflect community values as accurately and effectively as the prosecutor. [55] Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutorial discretion provides a vehicle for individualized justice. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). District attorneys general are officers of the executive branch of government. Accordingly, in the absence of a violation of law, the courts may not interfere with the free exercise of their discretionary authority over the criminal prosecutions in their respective districts. State v. Gilliam, 901 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995). The constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty statutes is not undermined because local elected district attorneys general may make discretionary charging decisions with the statutory framework established by the General Assembly. We have repeatedly rejected the argument that such discretion raises a constitutional problem. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn.1995); State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 86; State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 268 (Tenn.1994); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 311-12, 107 S.Ct. 1756; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Mr. Banks has not provided any argument that persuades us that these decisions are in error. F.