Opinion ID: 1727617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Survival of Wrongful Death Claim Upon Death of the Claimant

Text: ¶ 30 Lornson's claim as Joseph Sanders' personal representative is more difficult to assess because Wis. Stat. § 655.007 clearly allows a spouse to bring a wrongful death claim, and the chapter is silent as to what happens to that claim when the spouse dies before judgment. If Chapter 655 spoke to the survival of an eligible claimant's claim, this court would have its marching orders. The chapter's silence requires interpretation. ¶ 31 Because Chapter 655 is silent regarding the survival of a spouse's medical malpractice wrongful death claim, we refer to the general wrongful death provisions in Chapter 895 to determine whether the spouse's claim survives. We rely on statutory provisions, rather than common law, to determine survivability because a wrongful death action is a purely statutory creation unknown to common law, and thus its survivability depends solely on a statutory provision. Kranz v. Wis. Trust Co., 155 Wis. 40, 42, 143 N.W. 1049 (1913); Brown v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 140, 77 N.W. 748 (1899). ¶ 32 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.01(1) is the general survival statute, and paragraph ( o ) addresses the survival of a wrongful death claim. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.01(1)( o ) provides: (1) In addition to the causes of action that survive at common law, all of the following also survive: . . . . ( o ) Causes of action for wrongful death, which shall survive the death of the wrongdoer whether or not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or after the death of the injured person. Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o). ¶ 33 Lornson argues that the language of Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) is unambiguous. She argues that paragraph (o) assures that causes of action for wrongful death survive the death of the claimant as well as the death of the wrongdoer. She describes the clause beginning with which as a nonrestrictive, relative pronoun clause, meaning that this language about the death of the wrongdoer simply provides additional, but not essential, information about the phrase that it modifies. ¶ 34 Though arguing that Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)( o ) is unambiguous, Lornson fails to explain why the legislature would include additional information about the death of the wrongdoer if such information were not essential to the meaning of the statute. Courts are to construe statutes so as to avoid rendering any of the statutory language superfluous. Robin K. v. Lamanda M., 2006 WI 68, ¶ 16, 291 Wis.2d 333, 718 N.W.2d 38. ¶ 35 If the legislature intended for the wrongful death cause of action to survive the death of both the claimant and the wrongdoer, why did it include specific language about the death of the wrongdoer but not include language about the death of the claimant? If the legislature intended for the wrongful death cause of action to survive the death of both the claimant and the wrongdoer, why did the legislature not write paragraph ( o ) consistent with the other paragraphs in the survival statute by stopping after the words wrongful death? In all the other paragraphs under Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), the legislature provides simply that a particular cause of action survives, and does not add any nonrestrictive, relative pronoun clauses about the death of the wrongdoer. [4] ¶ 36 Lornson's interpretation, while a strict adherence to the rules of grammar, is not the only possible interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)( o ). Another reasonable interpretation of the statute is that, by specifically including the language about the death of the wrongdoer in paragraph ( o ), the legislature intended that the wrongful death cause of action survive only the death of the wrongdoer, and not the claimant. ¶ 37 Thus, Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)( o ) is ambiguous because it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 47, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. This ambiguity is fortified after reading Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)( o ) in the context of Chapter 895. As we stated in Kalal, Context is important to meaning. So, too, is the structure of the statute in which the operative language appears. Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. When we read Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)( o ) in the context of surrounding or closely related statutes in the chapter, we conclude that § 895.01(1)( o ) conflicts with the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2). Ambiguity may be created by the interaction of two conflicting statutes. Morrissette v. DeZonia, 63 Wis.2d 429, 436, 217 N.W.2d 377 (1974). ¶ 38 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) provides a hierarchy of eligible claimants in a general wrongful death action. As we noted above, under the statute, the spouse and minor children are first in line to make a wrongful death claim; if there are no minor children, the claim belongs to the spouse; if no spouse survives, the claim belongs to the lineal heirs (as determined by Wis. Stat. § 852.01); if no lineal heirs survive, the claim belongs to the deceased's brothers and sisters. See Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2). ¶ 39 This statute specifically provides that [i]f any such relative dies before judgment in the action, the relative next in order shall be entitled to recover for the wrongful death. Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) (emphasis added). It is implicit in this provision that a claimant's cause of action does not survive the claimant's death before judgment; rather, a new cause of action is available to the next relative in line. This was the interpretation given by this court in Eleason v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 254 Wis. 134, 139, 35 N.W.2d 301 (1948), and it has never been changed. To interpret a wrongful death claim as surviving the death of the claimant would render this provision in § 895.04(2) meaningless and superfluous because no causes of action would pass to the next relative in line but would be assumed by the claimant's personal representative. Statutory construction requires that a law be construed so that no word or clause is surplusage. See Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. ¶ 40 Therefore, because Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)( o ) is inconsistent in its drafting with the other paragraphs in Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), contains superfluous language if the language about the death of the wrongdoer is stripped of all significance, and directly conflicts with Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)(o) is ambiguous. We therefore refer to the legislative history of Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1)( o ) and 895.04(2) to discern their meaning. See Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶¶ 50-51, 681 N.W.2d 110. ¶ 41 We begin with historical context. Actions for wrongful death are created by statute and did not survive at common law. Thus, [u]nless some statute can be found providing for survival, the action abates. Kranz, 155 Wis. at 42, 143 N.W. 1049. This principle has been part of Wisconsin law since statehood. ¶ 42 The first case to discuss this principle was Woodward v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 23 Wis. 400 (June Term, 1868). Julia Woodward was allegedly killed by negligence. A complaint was filed by her husband, claiming special damages. Before judgment, the husband died and the defendant claimed that the wrongful death cause of action had abated. Id. at 400. The court said: In this case, the deceased, who was a married woman, left a husband, who survived until some time after this action was commenced. Upon her death, therefore, the right of action, by the statute, vested solely and exclusively for the benefit of her husband. He alone was entitled to the amount to be recovered, and could hold and dispose of the same at pleasure. The lineal descendants and ancestors of the deceased had no interest whatever in the action. . . . The question then arises as to the effect of the death of the husband: Did the action abate thereby, or does it survive, so that it may still be prosecuted for the benefit of the infant child . . . ? [Being] an action of tort, and the sole party in interest having died, the next inquiry is, whether it falls within the general rule of the common law, that such an action does not survive the death of the party in whose favor it existed. It is very clear to our minds that it is not distinguishable in this particular from other actions of tort, and that the common law must govern, unless it has been taken out of the operation of that rule by some express provision of statute. We know of no such provision. . . . . . . . It appears that the person so entitled died, and that the right of action expired with him. . . . Id. at 404-06. ¶ 43 The principle that a wrongful death claim does not survive the death of the claimant was affirmed in Schmidt v. Menasha Woodenware Co., 99 Wis. 300, 303, 74 N.W. 797 (1898). It was reaffirmed in 1948 in Eleason. However, the Eleason court noted that the legislature changed and ameliorated the law in 1931, ch. 263, Laws of 1931, adding the following sentence to Wis. Stat. § 331.04 (the forerunner of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2)): If any of the foregoing relatives shall die at any time after such cause of action shall have accrued, the relative or relatives next in order named above shall be entitled to recover for the wrongful death of the deceased. [5] The court explained: By that clause, when the widow [of the deceased] died, a cause of action for the wrongful death [of the deceased] vested in the deceased's lineal descendants. It was not her cause of action, but a new one given the lineal descendants by the statute. Eleason, 254 Wis. at 139, 35 N.W.2d 301; see also Herro v. Steidl, 255 Wis. 65, 68, 37 N.W.2d 874 (1949); Arendt v. Kratz, 258 Wis. 437, 441, 46 N.W.2d 219 (1951); Murray v. Dewar, 6 Wis.2d 411, 94 N.W.2d 635 (1959); Collins v. Gee, 82 Wis.2d 376, 382-83, 263 N.W.2d 158 (1978) ([I]t is clearly the law of Wisconsin that a cause of action of a particular beneficiary under the wrongful death statute terminates upon the death of the beneficiary where no judgment has been entered.). [6] ¶ 44 To sum up, the legislature has historically used the wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.04, to delineate the eligibility and priority of claimants. The statute is hierarchical. Thus, a claimant's personal claim does not survive his death; it is succeeded by a new claim for someone lower in the hierarchy. ¶ 45 Wrongful death claims also abated at common law upon the death of the wrongdoer. See Kranz, 155 Wis. 40, 143 N.W. 1049; Layton v. Rowland, 197 Wis. 535, 222 N.W. 811 (1929). ¶ 46 In Kranz, the court held that based on the survival statute at the time, a widow's claim for wrongful death of her husband did not survive the death of the wrongdoer. Kranz, 155 Wis. at 43, 143 N.W. 1049. In that case, the wrongdoer died after the husband died but before the widow of the deceased obtained judgment in the action. Id. at 41, 143 N.W. 1049. The court noted that if the legislature intended a different rule, it could easily provide one. Id. at 44, 143 N.W. 1049. ¶ 47 Sixteen years later, the Layton court upheld Kranz, noting that the legislature had taken no action in response to Kranz, and therefore the court did not deem it proper to reconsider the matter. Layton, 197 Wis. at 537, 222 N.W. 811. ¶ 48 In 1933 the legislature responded to the court's suggestions that the survival statute, Wis. Stat. § 331.01, be changed. It added this sentence: Actions for wrongful death shall survive the death of the wrongdoer. [7] ¶ 49 A problem surfaced almost immediately. In Hegel v. George, 218 Wis. 327, 259 N.W. 862 (1935), the court concluded that the cause of action for wrongful death did not survive the death of the wrongdoer when the wrongdoer died prior to the death of the injured person. Id. at 329, 259 N.W. 862. The court said that where the wrongdoer died before the injured person, the cause of action for wrongful deathwhich is a separate and distinct action from any personal injury action had not arisen or accrued when the wrongdoer died. Id. at 330, 259 N.W. 862. Hence, the court found that the 1933 amendment to the survival statute operate[d] only upon causes of action which ha[d] come into existence during the lifetime of the [wrongdoer]. Id. at 329, 259 N.W. 862. ¶ 50 In response to Hegel, the legislature amended the survival statute in 1937 and added the following underlined language: Actions for wrongful death shall survive the death of the wrongdoer whether or not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or after the death of the injured person.  § 1, ch. 189, Laws of 1937; see also drafting records, § 1, ch. 189, Laws of 1937 (located at the Legislative Reference Bureau in Madison, Wisconsin). ¶ 51 Although the survival statute was amended several times thereafter, [8] the pertinent language concerning the survival of a wrongful death claim upon the death of the wrongdoer remained unchanged until 1999 when the legislature amended the statute again. See 1999 Wis. Act 85, § 171. In 1999 the legislature reorganized Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), outlining all the causes of action that survive in individual lettered paragraphs. The provision on wrongful death was placed in paragraph ( o ) and changed as indicated by the strikethrough and underline: (1) In addition to the causes of action that survive at common law, all of the following shall also survive: causes . . . . ( o ) Causes of action for wrongful death, which shall survive the death of the wrongdoer whether or not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or after the death of the injured person. Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1)( o ). ¶ 52 The 1999 amendment made ambiguous the wrongful death survival provision. As described earlier, the addition of the comma and the which created a nonrestrictive clause, making all language about the death of the wrongdoer arguably nonessential and superfluous. Where the survival statute once provided that a wrongful death claim survived only the death of the wrongdoer, the 1999 amendment to the survival statute made ambiguous whether a wrongful death claim survived both the death of the wrongdoer and the claimant. ¶ 53 Before the 1999 legislation, Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1) and 895.04(2) did not conflict. The first dealt with wrongdoers; the second dealt with claimants. After the 1999 amendment, it became unclear whether the legislature intended to substantively change Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1) by extending its scope to a new class of wrongful death cases, beyond its historical limit. ¶ 54 After analyzing the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1), we conclude that the legislature did not intend to make any substantive change when it amended the law in 1999. Five pieces of evidence lead us to this conclusion. ¶ 55 The first piece of evidence that the legislature intended merely to reorganize the statute with no substantive change is the fact that the assembly bill that led to 1999 Wis. Act 85 (codified in part at Wis. Stat. § 895.01) is a Revisor's Correction Bill. 1999 A.B. 925. This fact is significant because the Revisor's duties are mainly ministerial and editorial; the Revisor rarely proposes any substantive changes in the law, and if it does, the changes are very minor. See Wis. Stat. § 13.93(2)(j). Wisconsin Stat. § 13.93(2) spells out the duties of the Revisor of Statutes. It provides in part: The revisor of statutes shall: . . . . (j) In cooperation with the law revision committee, systematically examine and identify for revision by the legislature the statutes and session laws to eliminate defects, anachronisms, conflicts, ambiguities, and unconstitutional or obsolete provisions. The revisor shall prepare and, at each session of the legislature, present to the law revision committee bills that eliminate identified defects, anachronisms, conflicts, ambiguities, and unconstitutional or obsolete provisions. These bills may include minor substantive changes in the statutes and session laws necessary to accomplish the purposes of this paragraph. Wis. Stat. § 13.93(2)(j). ¶ 56 The second piece of evidence that the legislature intended no substantive change in the section is the relating clause, which provides that 1999 Wis. Act 85 is an act relating to: repealing, consolidating, renumbering, amending and revising various provisions of the statutes for the purpose of correcting errors, supplying omissions, correcting and clarifying references, eliminating defects, anachronisms, conflicts, ambiguities and obsolete provisions, reconciling conflicts and repelling unintended repeals. This descriptive language, which mirrors the Revisor's duties in Wis. Stat. § 13.93, reflects the legislature's lack of intent to make any substantive change to Wis. Stat. § 895.01. ¶ 57 The third piece of evidence that the legislature intended no substantive change in the section is the legislative note to the revision of Wis. Stat. § 895.01. It provides the following: Subdivides long provision in outline form to break up long sentence, consistent with current style. Note, 1999 Wis. Act 85, § 171. ¶ 58 The fourth piece of evidence that the legislature did not intend to make any substantive change to Wis. Stat. § 895.01 is the length of the assembly bill that promulgated 1999 Wis. Act 85 and the lack of amendments to it. The assembly bill is 95 pages long with 202 sections. 1999 A.B. 925. For a bill this long, one would expect at least some amendments if the bill were intended to make substantive changes to the law. Instead, no amendments were proposed, and the bill passed with unanimous consent. Bulletin of the Proceedings of the Wisconsin Legislature 1999-2000 Session, Part 4, Assembly, at 292. The lack of amendments to this bill illustrates the legislature's lack of intent to make any substantive change to § 895.01. ¶ 59 The fifth piece of evidence that the legislature did not intend to make any substantive change to Wis. Stat. § 895.01 is that the assembly bill has no amendment or cross-reference to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2). The Revisor of Statutes Bureau works to correct problems, not to create problems. It would not have proposed a change that would have significantly altered the application of § 895.04(2) without addressing that subsection. ¶ 60 Based on this evidence, we hold that the legislature did not intend to make any substantive change to Wis. Stat. § 895.01 when it amended the statute in 1999 and organized it into outline form. We therefore uphold the body of case law that has been interpreting § 895.01(1) and Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) harmoniously and conclude that a wrongful death claim does not survive the death of the claimant. ¶ 61 This holding applies equally to medical malpractice claims and non-medical malpractice claims. We decline to entertain arguments that the survival rule should be applied more expansively to medical malpractice wrongful death actions. Lornson argues that because this court has held that the succession rule in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) does not apply to medical malpractice actions, see Rineck, 155 Wis.2d at 671, 456 N.W.2d 336, this court should rely on its decision in City of Milwaukee v. Boynton Cab Co., 201 Wis. 581, 231 N.W. 597 (1930), which was decided before the enactment of the relevant language in § 895.04(2), to find that a cause of action for wrongful death does not abate upon the death of the claimant in medical malpractice actions. ¶ 62 Lornson's argument is without merit. First, Boynton is not applicable because it involved a worker's compensation statute that specifically allowed the widow's wrongful death claim to be assigned. See Boynton, 201 Wis. at 588-89, 231 N.W. 597. This case involves no statute allowing for the assignment of Joseph Sanders' claim. Second, and more important, the entire premise for looking outside the provisions of Chapter 655 is to apply general provisions of law to medical malpractice actions when they complement the chapter and are not in conflict with it. To apply general provisions differently in medical malpractice actions would essentially create a whole new set of statutes governing medical malpractice. ¶ 63 We also decline to entertain notions that the wrongful death claim could survive under other Wis. Stat. § 895.01(1) provisions, such as damage to the person, § 895.01(1)(g), or damage done to the property rights or interests of another, § 895.01(1)(h). This court rejected a widow's argument in Kranz that her claim should survive the death of the wrongdoer under the damage done to the property rights or interests of another provision. Kranz, 155 Wis. at 42, 143 N.W. 1049. The court held that this provision did not apply and responded with the following: `[F]or all damage done to the property rights or interests of another' meant for all damage done to the property rights or interests of the deceased, and not to the property rights or interests of a relative or beneficiary named under the statute. . . . Id. at 42-43, 143 N.W. 1049. ¶ 64 The court in Schmidt held that a widow's wrongful death claim could not survive her death under the or other damage to the person provision. Schmidt, 99 Wis. at 303, 74 N.W. 797. The court stated: It will be observed that this action is not prosecuted to recover for damages to the person of the deceased [the husband]. As already stated, it can only be maintained for the recovery of such pecuniary loss as the widow sustained, and cannot, by the broadest latitude of construction, be held to fall under the clause or other damage to the person. . . .  Id. ¶ 65 In addition, the long line of cases interpreting the survivability of the wrongful death claim has never applied either of these survival provisions to preserve a wrongful death claim. To apply these general provisions when a more specific wrongful death provision exists in paragraph ( o ) would be contrary to the canon of statutory construction that where two conflicting statutes apply to the same subject, the more specific statute controls. State v. Anthony D.B., 2000 WI 94, ¶ 11, 237 Wis.2d 1, 614 N.W.2d 435. ¶ 66 Because Joseph Sanders' wrongful death claim does not survive his death, his estate's claim for damages for loss of society, companionship, and consortium of his wife and of her services of pecuniary value, together with medical, funeral, and burial expenses, must be dismissed. The case must be remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings on the separate claim of the estate of Janice M. Sanders. The circuit court is authorized to permit an amendment of that claim to include Janice Sanders' medical, funeral, and burial expenses. See Schwab v. Nelson, 249 Wis. 563, 25 N.W.2d 445 (1946); Hegel, 218 Wis. at 335, 259 N.W. 862.