Opinion ID: 6333684
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Wilson’s Unwarned Statements

Text: The government submitted, and the district court admitted into evidence, emails between Wilson and his probation officer. Wilson argues that because his probation officer did not provide him with a Miranda warning before the email exchange, its admission into evidence violated his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. The Supreme Court has observed that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not available to a probationer in a revocation proceeding, because a probation-revocation proceeding is not a criminal proceeding. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984). We have noted that like probation-revocation proceedings, “[t]he full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal prosecution does not apply to revocation hearings for . . . supervised 17 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 18 release.” United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1187 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). And other circuits have held that a proceeding to revoke supervised release is “not a criminal case for purposes of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.” United States v. Hulen, 879 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Riley, 920 F.3d 200, 209 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding “that because supervised release revocation proceedings are not criminal proceedings, the introduction of unwarned admissions made by [the defendant] to his probation officer did not violate [the defendant’s] rights under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment”). The district court did not clearly err by admitting the emails into evidence. 3. Procedural Reasonableness of the Revocation Sentence Wilson argues the district court’s imposition of the revocation sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court did not explain the sentence, acknowledge his arguments, or consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The revocation sentence imposed by the district court was within the Sentencing Guidelines range. In such circumstances, only a “minimum level of detail [is] required to establish the procedural reasonableness” of a sentence. United States v. Henson, 9 F.4th 1258, 1291 (10th Cir. 2021), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 28, 2021) (No. 21-6736). “[W]e have made it quite clear that the sentencing court is not required to consider individually each factor listed in § 3553(a) before issuing a sentence.” United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2004). “Rather, it 18 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 19 is enough if the district court considers § 3553(a) en masse and states its reasons for imposing a given sentence.” Id. Here, the district court explained why it imposed a revocation sentence at the high end of the Guidelines range: [W]hat you are really trying to do is that you want to set the rules about what you are going to do on probation. I think you’ve acted with defiance and disrespect to the Court and that you’re playing fast and loose with what rules you will abide by and which rules you won’t abide by. And so I don’t really see any point on continuing you on home detention and allowing you to keep doing what you have been doing. . . . .... The Court believes that the sentence which I have just announced is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet all of the relevant factors of sentencing, and I have taken into account all of the factors enumerated in 18 United States Code Section 3553(a) and 18 United States Code Section 3583(d) based on the nature and circumstances of the offense, [and] your own personal history and characteristics, including your medical conditions. No. 21-1099, R., vol. IV at 163, 172. This explanation addressed most of Wilson’s arguments for leniency, which were grounded in § 3553(a). And the district court acknowledged Wilson’s remaining arguments for leniency elsewhere. See id. at 142 (acknowledging Wilson’s argument that he was “not a danger to the community,” “in terms of violen[ce]”); id. at 163 (acknowledging Wilson’s argument that the revocation petition stemmed from “a power struggle between” Wilson and his probation officer). The district court satisfied its obligation to impose a procedurally reasonable sentence. 19 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 20 4. Multiplicity of Revocation Charges Wilson argues his revocation sentence should be vacated due to the multiplicity of the revocation charges underlying it. “Multiplicity refers to multiple counts of an indictment which cover the same criminal behavior.” United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1095 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[M]ultiplicity is not fatal to an indictment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[t]he government may submit multiplicitous charges to the jury.” United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 1301 (10th Cir. 2005). But “multiplicitous sentences violate the Double Jeopardy Clause” “because they allow multiple punishments for a single criminal offense.” United States v. McCullough, 457 F.3d 1150, 1162 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Wilson’s argument misses the mark because post-revocation sanctions are “part of the penalty for the initial offense”; they are not punishment for the offenses that trigger the revocation, Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000). Thus, regardless of whether the revocation charges were multiplicitous, they did not give rise to a sentence that violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. 5. Government Misconduct
Wilson argues the government unreasonably delayed in bringing charges against him for submitting inaccurate cash-flow statements in January and February 2020. He cites a Fourth Circuit case for the proposition that “[a]fter an unreasonable time, violations of which the state is aware become stale or are waived as a basis for 20 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 21 revoking probation.” Farabee v. Clarke, 967 F.3d 380, 393 (4th Cir. 2020). But “cases considering due process claims for revocation proceedings have held that relief is not called for unless there was both unreasonable delay and prejudice.” United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 2008). Wilson has not shown either. The government sought revocation on October 5, 2020. Wilson cites no evidence indicating that the government knew his cash-flow statements were inaccurate before August 24, 2020, or any authority indicating the government’s brief delay in bringing charges was unreasonable. Cf. Farabee, 967 F.3d at 393 (finding delay of “over a decade” unreasonable). And while he argues the delay prejudiced him because it prevented him from calling Pilcher as a witness or obtaining relevant bank records, he provides no evidence or rationale to support either claim.
Wilson argues the government added count 1, which alleged Wilson violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001, to the revocation petition “to increase and maximize Wilson’s punishment [in retaliation] for exposing the [probation officer’s] fraud and his unlawful [directive to participate in therapy].” Resp. at 40. He therefore asserts count 1 should have been dismissed as an improper sentence manipulation. This court has stated that “sentencing factor manipulation” claims “should be analyzed under our established outrageous conduct standard.” United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that standard, “the relevant inquiry is whether, considering the totality of the 21 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 22 circumstances[,] . . . the government’s conduct is so shocking, outrageous and intolerable that it offends the universal sense of justice.” Id. at 964 (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted above, the district court did not clearly err in finding Wilson violated § 1001. The government’s election to bring a revocation charge based on this crime did not offend the universal sense of justice.
Wilson argues the government violated his due process rights by suppressing exculpatory evidence. “Due process requires the government to disclose ‘evidence favorable to an accused upon request where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.’” United States v. Muhtorov, 20 F.4th 558, 623 (10th Cir. 2021) (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)). “To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the accused; and (3) the evidence was material to the defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Wilson’s first allegation of evidence suppression relates to the probation officer’s and prosecutor’s supposed failure to disclose to the court that documents evincing Wilson’s correspondence with Pilcher’s attorneys did not show Wilson had directly communicated with Pilcher. But no one represented to the court that the documents showed a direct communication between Wilson and Pilcher. The probation officer instead testified the documents included “email correspondence . . . between Mr. Wilson and people that . . . Mr. Pilcher was in communication with.” 22 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 23 No. 21-1099, R., vol. IV at 39. And Wilson’s attorney cross-examined the probation officer regarding these documents. See id. at 68–71. A prosecutor does not suppress evidence by failing to highlight what proffered evidence does not show. Wilson also alleges the government suppressed impeachment evidence related to Pilcher’s former assistant. Wilson specifically alleges the government failed to disclose the former assistant was a prisoner and a drug dealer. The former assistant did not testify; instead, the probation officer testified about information she provided to him during his investigation. And on cross-examination Wilson’s attorney asked the probation officer if he knew that the former assistant was a convicted felon. The probation officer affirmed to the court that she was. The record therefore belies Wilson’s claim of suppression.
Wilson argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by presenting prejudicial evidence that (1) he did not sign the January 2020 cash-flow report he submitted to his probation officer, and (2) he did not report approximately $1,800 in wire transfers he received in January 2020 on the report. This evidence is probative of the allegation that Wilson failed to provide truthful and complete written reports to his probation officer each month. The prosecutor’s introduction of this evidence does not support reversal.
Wilson asserts that the probation officer provided perjured testimony regarding the fact that when he reviewed Wilson’s cell phone history, it showed calls to 23 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 24 MoneyGram, the company that facilitated McMillan’s wire transfers to Wilson. But Wilson provides no evidence to support this allegation. 6. Judicial Misconduct a. Delegation of the Judicial Function to the Probation Officer Wilson argues the district court improperly delegated its judicial function to a non-judicial officer in violation of Article III by soliciting the probation officer’s views and by imposing the punishment recommended by the probation officer. But “the probation officer serves as an investigative and supervisory arm of the court.” United States v. Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In that regard, “the probation officer serves as a liaison between the sentencing court, which has supervisory power over the defendant’s term of supervised release, and the defendant, who must comply with the conditions of his supervised release or run the risk of revocation.” Id. at 1306–07. Under this arrangement, “no improper delegation of judicial power occurs.” Id. at 1307. Thus, the district court did not err by considering and ultimately adopting the probation officer’s recommendation regarding punishment. b. Judicial Bias Wilson argues he did not receive a fair revocation hearing due to judicial bias. “To demonstrate a violation of due process because of judicial bias, a claimant must show either actual bias or an appearance of bias.” United States v. Scott, 529 F.3d 1290, 1297 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Judicial rulings alone are almost always insufficient to establish bias, as are mere speculation, 24 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 25 beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters.” Leatherwood v. Allbaugh, 861 F.3d 1034, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Wilson largely bases his bias arguments on the trial judge’s rulings against him, which does not suffice. He also points to the judge’s use of the plural pronouns “we” and “us” in her rulings. Wilson speculates from these pronouns that the judge “was acting as a co-prosecutor.” Resp. at 73. Such speculation establishes neither actual judicial bias nor an appearance of bias.