Opinion ID: 723924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Circumstances Supporting Inference of Discrimination

Text: 46 To complete her prima facie case, Chertkova only needed to show that her termination occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff maintains the evidence was sufficient to permit such an inference. Defendant, relying on its argument that a Title VII case must include proof that the employer continued to seek other applicants, does not deny that plaintiff's proof is otherwise sufficient for a prima facie case. Instead, defendant maintains plaintiff cannot carry her ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of whether the employer's proffered reason was pretextual. 47 In our view, defendant has waived any argument that summary judgment was properly granted to it because the circumstances to which plaintiff points did not raise an inference of discrimination. In any event, our resolution of the remaining question--whether plaintiff can carry her ultimate burden of persuasion--means that she successfully made the de minimis showing required to establish a prima facie case. III Pretext 48 The employer articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination: her performance was deficient. Plaintiff does not dispute the district court's ruling that defendant satisfied its burden with respect to the second part of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry. Instead, she contends the district court erred in holding she would be unable, as a matter of law, to prove her employer's proffered motive was pretextual. [T]o defeat a defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must show that there is a material issue of fact as to whether (1) the employer's asserted reason for discharge is false or unworthy of belief and (2) more likely than not the [unlawful basis] was the real reason for the discharge. Woroski, 31 F.3d at 108-09 (citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. at 2751-52). 49 The district court reasoned that plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue regarding pretext because a disagreement with the employer's performance appraisal is insufficient to show pretext, Connecticut General advanced substantial evidence of plaintiff's deficiencies, the employer had told plaintiff of her performance problems and had given her a chance to improve, and plaintiff's allegations of discrimination were conclusory. We think this rationale fails to draw the proper inferences and impermissibly resolves disputed factual issues. 50 Although plaintiff did advance some conclusory allegations, she also presented concrete evidence sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude she was discharged because of her sex. To begin with, accepting as true plaintiff's description of May's interactions with her, a jury could conclude that his assessment of plaintiff was derived primarily from her being a woman rather than her professional abilities. Plaintiff charged that May consistently refused to discuss work-related matters with her, telling her stories of his personal dealings with women instead. And, while defendant insists these words and actions are gender neutral, we cannot agree. Although recounting one's personal life--or even using a term like clotheshorse--might under some circumstances be neutral, in this case such conduct might support an inference of gender bias. A factfinder could properly find that a department manager who avoids discussing business and limits his interactions with a female employee to discussions of his personal exploits--adding only a demeaning comment on her manner of dress--is likely to discriminate on the basis of that employee's gender. 51 Next, there is evidence that Patricia Endweiss, another competent woman in the department, was discharged in part because of poor communication skills, a reason similar to the one proffered by defendant for plaintiff's discharge. Connecticut General counters that Endweiss herself was not prepared to say in her deposition that her discharge resulted from her gender. This does not resolve the matter in defendant's favor because May's similar treatment of Endweiss may still bolster the conclusion that he treated women differently than men. Nor can the employer deny that Chertkova and Endweiss, along with one other woman, were the only people terminated in the department between the time May assumed control in mid-1990 and early 1993, after plaintiff was gone. Although (as the employer asserts) it may be unlikely that May later terminated male employees simply to avoid the consequences of a discrimination suit, a jury could find that the sequence of the discharges, along with the reasons given and the other circumstances, evidenced gender bias. 52 Further, Cocolla had an opportunity to observe O'Neil's dealings with Chertkova directly, and apparently concluded that gender contributed to the failure of his coaching and to the offensive work conditions experienced by plaintiff, as shown by her sending plaintiff a copy of the book You Just Don't Understand: Men and Women in Conversation. Such evidence supports a finding that Chertkova's discharge resulted from her gender. Defendant's only response--that the book itself is not in the record--is inapposite. 53 Moreover, while O'Neil claims to have met with Chertkova on September 20, 1990 to discuss her purported deficiencies, and created a document memorializing such a meeting, Chertkova denies any such meeting ever took place. Accepting as true plaintiff's version, it is plausible that O'Neil was creating a record aimed at rationalizing plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff acknowledges that later meetings, reprimands, and coaching sessions were indeed held, but she presented enough evidence to justify the belief that her performance--including her conduct vis-a-vis management and her relations with customers--was wholly adequate or even superior. This evidence includes not only her own affidavit, but also affidavits and deposition testimony of other employees. That the proffered motive was a pretext is further supported by O'Neil's alleged threats at the coaching sessions, Quirk's rewrite at May's instigation of a formerly excellent evaluation, and the denial of plaintiff's request to attend a course on communication which she claims was available to all other employees. 54 The facts here are different from the conclusory allegations of discrimination relied upon in Meiri, 759 F.2d at 998 (referring to allegations that supervisor sought to eliminate plaintiff, that supervisor's view of plaintiff's work habits was infected by prejudice concerning her religion, and that plaintiff heard disparaging remarks, where plaintiff admittedly could not pinpoint people, times, or places). Nor is this case like Woroski, 31 F.3d at 109, in which the totality of the evidence overwhelmingly established a nondiscriminatory motive. Taken together, the proof of bias is much stronger in the present case, and it precluded summary judgment. The evidence amply supports our view that a factfinder could believe Chertkova lost her job because she is a woman. 55 In addition, contrary to defendant's suggestion that the evidence of performance deficiencies was overwhelming, a jury could reasonably conclude that this proffered reason was pretextual. Chertkova was concededly professionally and technically highly competent. She presented proof that documenting a pattern to get rid of an unwanted employee was a recognized practice at the company and the evidence suggests May, O'Neil, and Quirk may have done exactly that in her case.