Opinion ID: 2590391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Mitigating Factor of Self-Suspension

Text: ¶17 Kinsey contends that she is self-suspended because she has not worked outside the home since her resignation from the Paul Law Firm on January 31, 2008. Kinsey argues that lawyers who self-suspend either in anticipation of a disciplinary proceeding or because the circumstances merit a break from the practice of law will be unfairly penalized if this Court does not recognize and allow credit for self-suspension. Kinsey's self-suspension argument is grounded in the parties' stipulation that Kinsey has imposed a `self-suspension' upon herself since February of 2008 to reflect upon her actions, the demands of her personal life and a professional life. ¶18 The Bar Association recommends, in its brief in chief filed December 15, 2008, that Kinsey be suspended from the practice of law for no less than six months and no more than one year and that the suspension be applied retroactively to January 31, 2008. Kinsey responded, in her brief filed December 29, 2008, that a six month suspension retroactive to her self-suspension date is the most severe discipline that should be imposed. However, neither party offers any legal authority to support such discipline. ¶19 The term self-suspension, as used here, is a misnomer. Ordinarily suspension occurs when this Court so orders. Under our rules, suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law is a discipline to be imposed by this Court, [9] and a lawyer suspended by this Court is required to give notices to clients and file affidavits. [10] Kinsey may have refrained from practicing law, but she provided no proof that she was suspended from the practice of law or that she complied with Rule 9.1 of the RGDP by giving notice to the Paul Law Firm's clients that she was suspended from the practice of law and filing her required affidavits. The record shows only that Kinsey resigned from the Paul Law Firm on January 31, 2008. ¶20 Our independent research reveals that this Court has referred to a lawyer being self-suspended in five of our recent opinions. These opinions, however, did not squarely decide that a lawyer may self-suspend under our disciplinary rules nor do they recognize a lawyer's self-suspension as a substitute for Court-imposed discipline in a Rule 6 proceeding as the Bar Association and Kinsey implicitly ask us to do. Further, these opinions dealt with extenuating circumstances that render them of little value here. ¶21 The first opinion is State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Maddox, 2006 OK 95, 152 P.3d 204. The one count complaint against Maddox resulted from a guilty plea on a charge of embezzlement by a public official for charging gas on the state credit card and claiming mileage reimbursement in the total amount of $17,404.01. The extenuating circumstance in Maddox was the seven years it took for the disciplinary proceeding to come before this Court. The Maddox opinion noted it was unclear when Maddox began a self-imposed suspension from the practice of law in anticipation of a hearing before the PRT scheduled for March 22, 2005, but the hearing never happened. 2006 OK 95 at n. 5, 152 P.3d at 207, n. 5. The hearing before the PRT on the Rule 6 complaint against Maddox was had on February 22, 2006. This Court imposed a two-year suspension beginning on March 22, 2005, the date in which respondent began a self-imposed suspension from practicing law, which was the date the PRT hearing should have occurred. 2006 OK 95 at ¶20, 152 P.3d at 211. ¶22 In three of the cases, the extenuating circumstance was the fact that this Court considered both reinstatement and discipline, and the opinions viewed self-suspension as reflecting on the lawyer's character for purposes of reinstatement. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Albert, 2007 OK 31, 163 P.3d 527; State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. DeBacker, 2008 OK 17, 184 P.3d 506; and State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Combs, 2008 OK 96, 202 P.3d 830. Albert was a combined proceeding on an application for reinstatement after a Rule 6 interim suspension based on his incapacity to practice law under Rule 10 and on a multiple count Rule 6 complaint. Albert abused alcohol and cocaine and there was an in-court intervention on March 9, 2006, that resulted in Albert entering into a residential treatment center on that day. Shortly thereafter, on March 26, 2006, the Bar Association filed a multiple count disciplinary complaint against Albert and an application for an interim suspension. This Court entered its interim suspension order on April 24, 2006. On Albert's request for reinstatement after interim suspension, we granted reinstatement, and on the Bar Association's multiple-count Rule 6 disciplinary complaint, we held that the attorney's misconduct warrants discipline of a retrospective suspension from the practice of law from the date he self-suspended (March 9, 2006) until the day [May 15, 2007] this opinion is issued. 2007 OK 31, at ¶23, 163 P.3d at 537 (bold added). The Rule 6 discipline in Albert included the time period he was in rehab beginning March 9, 2006, and the time period his license to practice law was suspended by this Court under Rule 10 beginning April 24, 2006, until reinstatement was granted by this Court's opinion. ¶23 DeBacker was a reinstatement proceeding. For nearly three decades DeBacker practiced corporate law in another state that recognized his Oklahoma license to practice law. DeBacker's Oklahoma bar license had been suspended for 27 years for nonpayment of his bar dues which he had neglected to pay. The DeBacker opinion recognized that when notified of his neglectful behavior, he immediately self-suspended from the practice of law and reported himself to the Ohio Supreme Court. These factors reflect on his moral character. 2008 OK 17, at ¶21, 184 P.3d at 514-515 (bold added). In recognizing DeBacker's voluntary withdrawal from the practice of law for purposes of reinstatement, this Court said: Considering that the misrepresentations were neglectful, but not intentional, and that he voluntarily withdrew from practicing law on April 10, 2007, and self-reported to the Ohio Supreme Court, his reinstatement will be deferred until April 10, 2008, which results in a one-year suspension from the practice of law. 2008 OK 17, at ¶26, 184 P.3d at 516. ¶24 Combs was a combined proceeding on Combs' application for reinstatement and a single count disciplinary complaint against Combs for failure to follow the mandated procedures for reinstatement after suspension for two years or less. In Combs, the ninety-day suspension, imposed by this Court in a Rule 6 disciplinary proceeding, ended December 30, 2007, and Combs returned to practicing law in January of 2008. In February of 2008, a trial judge informed Combs that his name was on the list of suspended attorneys, whereupon Combs opted to `self-suspend' himself and did not engage in any further practice of law. 2008 OK 96, at ¶4, 202 P.3d at 833-834 (bold added). This Court determined the appropriate discipline for Combs' failure to comply with the reinstatement procedures to be a six-month suspension from the date he filed the application for reinstatement on March 5, 2008. [11] Even though we used the term self-suspend, Combs' license to practice law remained in a suspended status when he opted to self-suspend until the Combs opinion issued on October 28, 2008. ¶25 The fifth opinion to use the term self-suspend is State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Whitworth, 2008 OK 22,183 P.3d 984. Whitworth was a Rule 6 proceeding in which this Court sua sponte invoked Rule 10. In discussing the Albert opinion, Whitworth said Albert received a retroactive suspension of approximately fourteen months `from the date he self-suspended' for treatment of his addiction until the opinion of this Court was adopted. 2008 OK 22, at ¶41, 183 P.3d at 993 (bold added). Although the Whitworth opinion appears to say that this Court allowed Albert credit for a fourteen month self-suspension against the suspension ordered by this Court, this is imprecise. The Whitworth opinion does not make clear that Albert's license to practice law was suspended by this Court's interim suspension order of April 24, 2006, so that the period of the so-called self-suspension could have been no more than the few weeks from March 9, 2006 until April 24, 2006. ¶26 Although we have used the term self-suspension to communicate the fact that a lawyer stopped practicing law when confronted with possible professional misconduct or incapacity to practice law, we have not accepted self-suspension in lieu of discipline to be imposed by this Court. Kinsey's suggested three month but no more than six month maximum suspension retroactive to January 31, 2008, and the Bar Association's suggested six months to twelve months suspension retroactive to January 31, 2008, would have this Court treat the stipulated self-suspension as a substitute for discipline. To do so would seriously deflate the Court-imposed discipline for Kinsey's intentional misrepresentations, false billings, and pattern of deceitful conduct that deprived clients of the use of their money and discredited the legal profession. This Court may consider the lawyer's withdrawal from the practice of law in its total consideration of mitigating evidence, but calling it self-suspension is not an accurate description. Only this Court suspends a lawyer from the practice of law and determines the effective date of the suspension. Calling it self-suspension gives the phrase more weight than it is entitled. At most, it is simply a lawyer deciding to withdraw from or to discontinue the practice of law and nothing more. A precedent of deducting self-suspension time from any Court-imposed suspension has the potential to excuse the professional misconduct rather than to deter professional misconduct. Accordingly, we reject and will not consider the stipulation relating to Kinsey's self-suspension in determining the appropriate discipline.