Opinion ID: 2526547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to Megan's Law

Text: {¶ 32} We have considered several challenges to the constitutionality of Megan's Law involving retroactivity, ex post facto, and due-process concerns, and in each case, our analysis addressed whether the requirements the law enacted were punitive or civil in nature. {¶ 33} In State v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570, we considered the constitutionality of Megan's Law as applied to offenders who committed sexually oriented offenses before the effective date of the statute. We held that the law did not violate Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, the Retroactivity Clause, because the registration requirements provided in the act were necessary to achieve the legislature's remedial purpose of protecting the public from sexual offenders. Id. at 412, 700 N.E.2d 570. Although we recognized that Megan's Law increased the frequency and duration of reporting beyond that required by prior law, id. at 411, 700 N.E.2d 570, we determined that these provisions only us[ed] past events to establish current status and constituted  de minimis procedural requirements necessary to achieve the purpose of the act, id. at 412, 700 N.E.2d 570. {¶ 34} Additionally, in Cook, we rejected an ex post facto challenge to Megan's Law, explaining that the statute did not contain any language expressing an intent to punish sex offenders for prior conduct, id. at 417, 700 N.E.2d 570. Nor could it be considered punitive in practical effect, id. at 423, 700 N.E.2d 570. Rather, the statutory scheme furthered the stated legislative purpose of protecting the public from sexual offenders. Id. While weighing the seven nonexhaustive guideposts set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963), 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, [1] we determined that the act did not impose a new affirmative disability or further the traditional aims of punishment, but imposed an inconvenience comparable to the renewal of a driver's license. Cook at 418, 420, 700 N.E.2d 570. Because we concluded that the registration requirements were not punitive, but remedial, in nature, we held that the retrospective application of Megan's Law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 423, 700 N.E.2d 570. {¶ 35} In State v. Williams (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 528, 728 N.E.2d 342, we relied upon our decision in Cook and held that because Megan's Law did not impose punishment, it necessarily did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Constitutions of the United States and the state of Ohio. {¶ 36} In State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d 502, we considered whether Megan's Law violated an offender's right to procedural due process afforded by the United States and Ohio Constitutions by imposing a sex-offender-classification-and-registration requirement without first conducting a hearing. Adhering to our holdings in Cook and Williams, we determined that an offender suffers neither bodily restraint nor punishment as a result of the de minimis registration requirements imposed by Megan's Law; thus, classification did not interfere with a protected liberty or property interest, and due process did not require a court to conduct a hearing before finding a defendant to be a sexually oriented offender. Id. at ¶ 14-15, 18.