Opinion ID: 592949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: criminal purpose departure

Text: 4 (1) Legal Authority 5 Daughetee concedes that a departure is authorized under the Guidelines when a defendant commits an offense in order to facilitate the commission of another offense. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.9. 6 (2) Factual Findings 7 The district court upwardly departed under section 5K2.9 based upon its finding that Daughetee committed the bank robberies in order to facilitate the commission of other offenses; specifically, the assault on the presidents and perhaps the killing of school children. Relying on United States v. Ceja-Hernandez, 895 F.2d 544, 545 (9th Cir.1990) (per curiam), Daughetee argues that this finding is not supportable because there was no independently developed evidence that Daughetee ever attempted to assassinate a president, and no suggestion that he ever attempted to harm children. Daughetee also contends it is significant that the court did not find that Daughetee had in fact committed any other offense. 8 In Ceja-Hernandez, we held that to depart under section 5K2.9, there must be evidence to support a finding by the district court that the defendant committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the commission of another offense. Id. The record in this case is replete with evidence that would support a finding by the district court that Daughetee committed the bank robberies in order to finance his pursuit of the presidents. In addition to Daughetee's own detailed admission of his efforts to kill the presidents, certain facts recited by him were verified by the Secret Service and corroborated his account. Nor was it necessary that Daughetee actually commit the facilitated offense. See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 941 F.2d 858, 864 (9th Cir.1991) (permissible for court to depart upward under section 5K2.9 when an offense was committed in order to conceal another offense when the finding is supported by a preponderance of the evidence); see also United States v. Culver, 929 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir.1991) (upward departure permissible under section 5K2.9 when an offense was committed in order to facilitate another offense when the record supports the finding). 9 Finally, Daughetee asserts that he robbed the banks not to facilitate killing the presidents, but because voices told him to. His argument is unavailing in this context. That assertion is relevant to whether Daughetee could disprove guilt for his actions, see United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir.1988), or whether he was legally competent at the time his sentence was imposed. Daughetee is not asserting either on appeal. 10 (3) Reasonableness 11 In its sentencing statement, the district court must include a reasoned explanation of the extent of the departure founded on the structure, standards, and policies of the Act and Guidelines. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d at 751. Here, the Guideline range for Daughetee was 57-71 months, yet the upward departure resulted in a sentence for 240 months. Because Daughetee was sentenced almost a year before our decision in Lira-Barraza, it does not surprise us that the court did not explain how it arrived at the 169 month departure. We are unable to assess the reasonableness of the court's degree of departure from the record. We therefore vacate the sentence imposed and remand to the district court for resentencing. Because we otherwise find the district court's decision to depart upward under the authority of section 5K2.9 reasonable, we need not decide whether its departure under section 5K2.14 was permissible.