Opinion ID: 1744499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Perversity of the Verdict

Text: Cass and World assert that the verdict is illogical, perverse, and irreconcilable because the jury assessed different percentages of fault under the negligence theory and the strict liability theory. The jury assessed fault as follows: STRICT LIABILITY NEGLIGENCE World 37½% World 25% Cass 37½% Cass 25% Werner 0% Werner 15% Butz 25% Butz 35% ____ ____ 100% 100% Cass and World assert that fault is fault, and the percentages should not vary under the differing theories. Cass and World, however, are analyzing the issue from a purely factual perspective. There may be a distinction between factual fault and legal fault, depending upon the legal theory imposed. In Mauch, supra, we held that ordinary contributory negligence is not a defense in a strict liability action: We believe the better rationale, and the one we choose to follow in this case, is that the plaintiff's conduct should not be scrutinized in ordinary `contributory negligence' terminology as a defense to a products-liability claim. The focus of a products-liability action is on whether or not the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, and thus the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct under negligence concepts is not relevant to this action. The defenses which we have previously recognized in [ Olson v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D. 1977) ] of assumption of risk and unforeseeable misuse are, in our opinion, adequate to protect a seller or manufacturer from unjust liability in a case of this type. Mauch, supra, 345 N.W.2d at 347. We explained the rationale of our holding: The defenses of assumption of the risk and product misuse focus, as does the products-liability claim itself, upon the nature of the product and its use. We believe that the interjection of ordinary contributory negligence principles would only serve as a diversion from the proper focus on the product and its use in such a case without providing any needed additional protection to the defendant seller or manufacturer which the defenses of assumption of risk and unforeseeable misuse of the product do not already provide. Mauch, supra, 345 N.W.2d at 347. Thus, ordinary negligence of the plaintiff or a third party [3] which does not constitute assumption of risk or unforeseeable misuse is irrelevant in a strict liability action, and cannot be compared with the manufacturer or seller's strict liability in assessing fault. In light of Mauch, it is easily understandable how the jury in this case assessed different percentages of fault under the different legal theories. The ordinary negligence of Butz and Werner is considered for purposes of assessing fault under the negligence theory, but is wholly irrelevant in the strict liability action. This ordinary negligence, although clearly a factual fault of the accident, is not a legal fault under the strict liability theory. Thus, in the negligence action, the jury considered Butz and Werner's ordinary negligence and assessed Butz thirty-five percent fault and Werner fifteen percent fault. Under the strict liability theory Butz and Werner's conduct was relevant only to the extent it constituted assumption of risk or unforeseeable misuse. The jury assessed Butz twenty-five percent fault, apparently concluding that Butz's conduct constituted assumption of the risk. The jury assessed Werner no fault under the strict liability theory, apparently concluding that Werner's conduct did not rise to the level of unforeseeable misuse. We conclude that the verdict is not illogical, perverse, and irreconcilable. Instead, the verdict demonstrates that the jury carefully followed the trial court's instructions, which clearly and explicitly spelled out the differing considerations and defenses available under the negligence and strict liability theories.