Opinion ID: 3027618
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Political Affiliation as a Job Requirement

Text: As just noted, Galli must first show that she works in a position that does not require political affiliation. This burden of proof shifts to the government if it claims to have properly discharged an employee because political affiliation is central to the job itself. See, e.g., Armour, 271 F.3d at 420. While permitted political patronage lies in a gray area, employers are allowed to make employment decisions based on political affiliation when “policymaking” positions are at issue; however, “[n]o clear line can be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions.” Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367. In Brown v. Trench, our Court clarified this line by setting out several factors that should be considered when determining whether political affiliation is an appropriate precondition for a government position. 787 F.2d 167, 169 (3d Cir. 1986). These factors include whether the employee has duties that are nondiscretionary or non-technical, participates in discussions or other meetings, prepares budgets, possesses the authority to hire and fire other employees, has a high salary, retains power over others, and can speak in the name of policymakers. Id. The “key factor seems to be not whether the employee was a supervisor or had a great deal of responsibility[,] but whether [she] has meaningful input into decisionmaking concerning the nature and scope of a major [] program.” Armour, 271 F.3d at 11 429 (citations and quotations omitted). The parties, of course, disagree as to whether Galli’s position with the Commission was policymaking. She alleges her job was not under the Brown factors because: (1) she did not enjoy decisionmaking authority with respect to personnel decisions (for though she was responsible for issuing performance evaluations for three employees under her direct supervision, she retained no power to hire, fire, or discipline staff); (2) her budget role was that of a low-level drone, preparing no more than informational forms that were subject to review by the Commission’s Chief Financial Officer and to ultimate approval by its Board; (3) she could not enter into contracts for goods or services and was required to obtain prior approval from the Executive Director and the Board before implementing any policies or plans; and (4) execution and implementation of policy decisions rested with the Board, with her role allowing only the offer of information to her superiors. The Commission maintains that Galli’s responsibilities included: supervising and managing a thirteen-person staff; developing, sponsoring, and presenting resolutions to the Commission to be adopted as policy; developing and implementing environmental education programs for school groups and the general public; preparing a budget; recommending the hiring, promoting, and terminating of employees (along with preparing the evaluations that accompany these tasks); managing the construction of an 12 environmental museum; and communicating with government officials, as well as public and private organizations, regarding the Commission and its programs. Given these responsibilities, the Commission alleges that Galli had significant authority in managing the Environmental Education Division and contributed to policy development; therefore, her job was a policymaking position for which a political affiliation requirement was appropriate. In deciding whether Galli established a prima facie case at the summary judgment stage, the District Court must draw all factual inferences in favor of her. See, e.g., Hugh, 418 F.3d at 267. With respect to the central issue under Brown—namely, whether Galli had meaningful input into decisionmaking—the scope of her actual influence and authority in this area is in dispute. As such, the District Court was correct in concluding that, with regard to the first prong of her political discrimination claim, Galli sustained her burden of putting forward evidence that political affiliation was not a requirement for her position sufficient to defeat summary judgment on this element.