Opinion ID: 2980755
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sanders’s Advocacy

Text: Howell briefly claims that Sanders’s conduct cannot be deemed advocacy if he was not the attorney who prosecuted her at trial. She offers no case in support of this statement, and we reject this claim. See, e.g., Brodnicki, 75 F.3d at 1267 (rejecting 5 And it is not entirely clear Sanders did that. If the polygrapher called off the exam himself and Sanders did not care or insist that it go forward, such conduct is simply not an “act” on which § 1983 liability could be premised. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). As noted earlier, on summary judgment we must view the facts from Howell’s perspective. 6 The district court did not address the competing facts regarding whether Sanders was the one who cancelled the polygraph, but evaluated the claim from the perspective that Sanders “proceed[ed] with the prosecution without giving plaintiff the opportunity to take a polygraph test.” Howell, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 796. The dispute is also ultimately not relevant because Howell never claims any constitutional violation on the basis of the cancelled polygraph. R. 1 (Compl.); see infra note 7. No. 10-5797 Howell v. Sanders Page 10 argument that prosecutor who did not try case was not entitled to absolute immunity for his actions on the case).