Opinion ID: 3134224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill App. 3d 775 (1996). In applying these principles to the case

Text: at bar, it is clear that the commissioners' and corporation counsel's self-dealing was committed solely for their personal benefit and had no relation to their positions as elected officials. Although the commissioners had authority to negotiate a settlement of the voting rights lawsuit, utilizing the negotiations to illegally advance their own personal interests by preserving their employment were actions obviously different from those they were authorized to perform. No elected official can be authorized to act in a manner that violates official misconduct and conflict of interest statutes. Hall v. Thompson, 283 Ark. 26, 28-29, 669 S.W.2d 905, 906-07 (1984) (official duties of a public official never require him to participate in criminal activities). Moreover, this court has already determined that the commissioners' and corporation counsel's acts were unauthorized. Scharlau, 141 Ill. 2d at 196. Additionally, the group's actions, which resulted in their convictions of official misconduct and conflict of interest charges, were clearly committed for their own interests. A conviction for corrupt practices establishes that a public official exploited his fiduciary position for his personal benefit. City of Chicago ex rel. Cohen v. Keane, 64 Ill. 2d 559, 565 (1976). Furthermore, the essence of a violation of the statute is that a public official has attempted to personally enrich himself or another by an act exceeding his `lawful authority' as a public servant. People v. Samel, 115 Ill. App. 3d 905, 909 (1983). The official misconduct statutes are intended to punish the activities of public officials who have exploited their official positions to the detriment of the public good. People v. Steinmann, 57 Ill. App. 3d 887, 897 (1978). The commissioners and corporation counsel admitted that they would not have settled the voting rights action without the provisions ensuring their continued employment for a fixed term and the right to set their own salaries. In addition, the group knew that they were not legally entitled to these provisions. Such self-dealing can be nothing more than acting purely in one's own interests. See Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington v. Conda, 164 N.J. Super. 386, 390 396
expense cannot be said to benefit the public). While the commissioners' and corporation counsel's public employment provided the opportunity for their misconduct, by no stretch of the imagination could their actions be deemed an extension of their legitimate functions as elected officials. Therefore, their conduct neither arose out of nor was incidental to the performance of their duties and, thus, was not within the scope of their employment. See Bowling v. Brown, 57 Md. App. 248, 258, 469 A.2d 896, 901 (1984); Valerius v. City of Newark, 84 N.J. 591, 596, 423 A.2d 988, 990-91 (1980) (criminal conviction for misuse of office constitutes a perversion and prostitution of duties and establishes that the acts were not within scope of employment); Powers v. Union City Board of Education, 124 N.J. Super. 590, 596, 308 A.2d 71, 75 (1973) (criminal misconduct originating out of performance of duties was not act occurring within the scope of those duties). In this case, the record clearly reveals that the commissioners and corporation counsel stepped aside from their duties as officers of the City of Danville and acted for the sole, unlawful, independent, and personal purpose of promoting their own interests. As a matter of law, their actions were outside the scope of their employment such that the city owed no statutory duty to defend or indemnify them in the criminal action.