Opinion ID: 2507480
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural

Text: The State argues that the 2008 amendment is procedural because it sets forth the circumstances in which an individual with a pardon is required to register as a sex offender. However, a procedural law sets out a mode of procedure for a court to follow, or prescribes a method of enforcing rights. Black's Law Dictionary 1083 (1979). Moreover, a statute that limits a right is generally not procedural. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 277 S.C. 604, 608, 291 S.E.2d 667, 669 (1982). In Wiesart v. Stewart , the court of appeals addressed whether amendments to the sex offender registry statute were remedial or procedural. 379 S.C. 300, 665 S.E.2d 187 (Ct.App. 2009). In 1979, a Maryland court convicted Wiesart of indecent exposure, and in 1995 he pled guilty in Horry County to a controlled substance offense. Id. at 302, 665 S.E.2d at 188. Wiesart received probation, and his probation agent informed him that he would have to register as a sex offender because of his prior indecent exposure conviction. Id. at 302, 665 S.E.2d at 188. Prior to 1996, section 23-3-430 of the South Carolina Code required any person convicted of indecent exposure to register annually as a sex offender. Id. In 1996, the General Assembly amended the statute to include a person convicted of indecent exposure only if the court makes a specific finding on the record based on the circumstances of the case the convicted person should register as a sex offender. Id. Wiesart brought a declaratory judgment action asserting that he was entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether he was required to register as a sex offender. Id. The circuit court ruled that the statute was not retroactive. Wiesart, 379 S.C. at 302, 665 S.E.2d at 188. The court of appeals disagreed finding that the amendment was procedural because it set a mode of procedure for the trial court to follow. Id. at 303, 665 S.E.2d at 188. In State v. Frey, 362 S.C. 511, 608 S.E.2d 874 (Ct.App.2005), the court of appeals reviewed a circuit court's decision to admit evidence of blood-alcohol analysis test results. Id. at 515, 608 S.E.2d at 877. Frey objected, arguing that the State did not present evidence that the blood sample was drawn by a qualified individual as required by the implied consent statute. Id. at 517-18, 608 S.E.2d at 877-78. The State countered that even if Frey's assertion was correct, suppression would not be warranted because Frey was not prejudiced by the failure to comply with the statute. Id. at 518, 608 S.E.2d at 878. The General Assembly revised the statute shortly after Frey's trial by adding subsection (e): [T]he failure to follow any of these policies, procedures, and regulations, or the provisions of this section, shall result in the exclusion from evidence any test results, if the trial judge or hearing officer finds that such failure materially affected the accuracy or reliability of the tests results or the fairness of the testing procedure. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(e) (2006) (emphasis added). The court of appeals noted that although the revision above became effective shortly after the trial of the case, the revision addressed procedural rather than substantive rights, and was therefore retroactive. Frey, 362 S.C. at 518 n. 3, 608 S.E.2d at 878 n. 3. The court of appeals found that the State failed to establish that Frey's blood sample was obtained in accordance with the statute. Id. at 519, 608 S.E.2d at 879. Thus, the court remanded the case to the circuit court for a determination of whether such failure materially affected the accuracy or reliability of the test results or the fairness of the testing procedure. Id. The amendments to section 23-3-430 do not provide a procedure for a court to follow, or prescribe a method for enforcing rights. Thus, the amendments are not procedural and cannot be applied retroactively to Respondent's case.