Opinion ID: 783523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Low density residential lands.

Text: (Emphasis added.) 3 Federal regulations require lighting for structures that exceed 199 feet. This alternative height, therefore, would not require lighting 4 Section 704(a)(7) of the TCA, codified as 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7), provides, in pertinent part: (A) General authority Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities. (B) Limitations (i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof... (II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services ... (iii) Any decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.... 5 For ease of reference, the relevant sections of the TCA will also be referred to by their subsections. Thus, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) will be referred to as a(B)(i)(II) and 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) will be referred to as (B)(iii) 6 The Second and Third Circuits have developed a less stringent test for prohibition of service claims. Under this test, the denial of a permit would violate the TCA if the proposed facility is the least intrusive means to close a significant gap in service. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir.1999); APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P'ship v. Penn Township, 196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir.1999). In Albemarle County, however, we specifically declined to adopt this approach, noting that it would unnecessarily interfere with the fact-specific nature of the inquiry and would effectively create a presumption, shifting the burden to the local government to explain its actions. Albemarle County, 211 F.3d at 87. 7 We note that while the substantial evidence inquiry should focus on the denial of a particular application, the approval of an alternative tower is a relevant consideration for a reviewing court insofar as it demonstrates that a local government is not acting out of an anti-tower motivation and, hence, lacks substantial evidence for its decision. Here, the approval of the shorter tower, although it is by no means dispositive, strengthens the Board's argument that its decision was based upon substantial evidence rather than upon a general hostility to the construction of new towers 8 U.S. Cellular argues that the Board's decision cannot be justified in light of the scientific evidence that was presented in support of the proposed tower and the virtually unanimous community support for the tower. U.S. Cellular's arguments are without merit. While there is no question that this evidence strongly supports U.S. Cellular's application and would in its own right qualify as substantial evidence, the Board may still deny the application based upon other evidence, as long as it amounts to more than a mere scintilla. See AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 431 (explaining that although there was more than sufficient evidence for the city council to approve the application for a telecommunications tower, which may even have amounted to a preponderance of the evidence, the council's rejection of the application was nevertheless supported by substantial evidence). Upon review of the evidence relied upon by U.S. Cellular, we cannot say that it is so overwhelming as to wholly obliterate the evidentiary value of the proposed tower's incompatibility with local zoning law, which as we have determined was properly relied upon by the Board. Moreover, public opinion does not mandate local zoning decisions under the TCA. To be sure, we have held that widespread public opposition to the construction of a telecommunications tower provides substantial evidence to support a local government's denial of a permit. See AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 431 (4th Cir.1998). See also Petersburg Cellular P'ship v. Board of Supervisors of Nottoway County, 205 F.3d 688, 695-696 (4th Cir.2000)(noting that public opposition, if based upon rational concerns, provides substantial evidence to deny a permit); 360 °o Communications Co. v. Board of Supervisors of Albemarle County, 211 F.3d 79, 83-84 (4th Cir.2000)(determining that public opposition was a factor that contributed to a finding of substantial evidence); AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem Zoning Board of Adjustment, 172 F.3d 307, 315-316 (4th Cir. 1999)(same). In Virginia Beach, for example, we determined that widespread public opposition to the proposed towers, based upon their visual impact on the surrounding residential area, provided the city council with substantial evidence to reject the application. We did not hold in Virginia Beach, however, nor have we ever held, that public opinion mandated that the city council reject the application.