Opinion ID: 741804
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hastings's Forfeiture, Restitution, and Fine

Text: 60 The district court entered a forfeiture judgment against Hastings for $1,325,910.60. Hastings argues that this forfeiture order violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and we agree. 61 Criminal forfeitures are monetary punishments subject to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558-59, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 2775-76, 125 L.Ed.2d 441 (1993). Whether a forfeiture is grossly disproportionate and thus violates the Eighth Amendment is a fact-sensitive inquiry that depends on a number of factors. United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir.1994). These factors include, but are not limited to: the seriousness of the offense; an assessment of the personal benefit reaped by the particular defendant; the defendant's motive and culpability; and the extent that the defendant's interest and the enterprise itself are tainted by criminal conduct. Id. at 1236-37 (quoting United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir.1993)). 62 While Hastings's convictions for money laundering and bank fraud constitute serious offenses, the facts of this case indicate that a $1.3 million forfeiture order is grossly disproportionate. Although Hastings abused her position of trust as a high-ranking bank official, she was clearly a secondary figure in the crimes. Furthermore, her motive appears to have been a misguided loyalty to Van Brocklin, rather than a direct interest in the success of the scheme. As the district court noted at sentencing, Ms. Hastings' situation provides special difficulty for the Court in [that] much of her conduct was pressed upon her by Mr. Van Brocklin. Sentencing Tr. 164. 11 Hastings reaped little benefit: while the scheme earned Van Brocklin, Atterberry, and Pyatt millions of dollars, Hastings received no direct share of the proceeds. 12 Despite this, Hastings's forfeiture judgment is only marginally less than Van Brocklin's. 13 In view of these facts, we hold that the forfeiture judgment against Hastings was an excessive fine. 63 The district court also entered a $250,000 restitution order against Hastings. In light of the facts described above, we are troubled that this steep restitution order may also be disproportionate. In any event, sentencing courts are to consider a number of factors in determining whether to order restitution, see 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a), and should in most cases make specific findings of fact in regard to these factors. Kok v. United States, 17 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir.1994). In this case, the district court made no findings that show it considered these factors, including whether Hastings has the ability to pay restitution. A failure to make such a finding before ordering restitution is an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mitchell, 893 F.2d 935, 936 (8th Cir.1990). Similarly, the district court did not make required findings of fact showing that it considered the relevant Guideline factors, including ability to pay, in imposing a $10,000 fine against Hastings. See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2. Such findings are mandatory. United States v. Miller, 995 F.2d 865, 869 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Walker, 900 F.2d 1201, 1205-06 (8th Cir.1990). We therefore vacate Hastings's restitution order and fine, subject to new determinations by the district court based on the required findings.