Opinion ID: 1444915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of USPs

Text: USPs as mandated by the ICA are rebuttable presumptions. They undeniably restrict the exercise of the family court's wide discretion. Such restriction is apparent where the ICA has declared that uniform starting points preclude the use of non-uniform starting points, Malek v. Malek, 7 Haw.App. 377, 381, 768 P.2d 243, 247 (1989), and that family courts  must start at the applicable USPs and `then ... must exercise its equitable discretion under applicable case law and [HRS] § 580-47(a) (1985).' Bennett, 8 Haw.App. at 424, 807 P.2d at 602 (emphasis added and citation omitted). Additionally, [t]he party who wants the family court to deviate from USPs has the burden of proof. Gussin, ___ Haw.App. at ___, 836 P.2d at 503. According to the ICA, the need for USPs is obvious. Hashimoto, 6 Haw.App. at 426-27, 725 P.2d at 522. The ICA reasons that [i]f different family court judges commence deciding in what proportion to equitably divide the value of the property from different starting points, which could range from a 100-0 split to a 0-100 split, then their awards will be equally diverse.4 There will be no uniformity, stability, clarity, or predictability. The ultimate decision will depend less on the facts and the law and more on who is the judge assigned to hear and decide the case. Id. In footnote 4 above, the ICA illustrates its concern with potentially diverse decisions if USPs are not utilized: Suppose a case where the only facts proved are the marriage and the existence of jointly owned property. In the absence of a uniform starting point, one judge might award all of the property to the wife. Another might award it all to the husband. On appeal, both decisions would have to be affirmed as not being an abuse of discretion. Id. at 427 n. 4, 725 P.2d at 522 n. 4. We disagree. This court has accepted the time honored proposition that marriage is a partnership to which both partners bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts. Cassiday v. Cassiday, 68 Haw. at 387, 716 P.2d at 1136 (citing Kastely, supra, at 390-91). The ICA has also acknowledged that, in divorce proceedings regarding division and distribution of the parties' estate, partnership principles guide and limit the range of the family court's choices. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. at 423, 807 P.2d at 602. Under general partnership law, each partner is entitled to be repaid his contributions to the partnership property, whether made by way of capital or advances. 59A Am.Jur.2d Partnership § 476 (1987) (footnotes omitted). Absent a legally permissible and binding partnership agreement to the contrary, partners share equally in the profits of their partnership, even though they may have contributed unequally to capital or services. Id. § 469 (footnotes omitted). Hawaii partnership law provides in relevant part as follows: Rules determining rights and duties of partners. The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules: (a) Each partner shall be repaid the partner's contributions, whether by way of capital or advances to the partnership property and share equally in the profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; and must contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to the partner's share in the profits. Gardner v. Gardner, 8 Haw.App. 461, 464-65, 810 P.2d 239, 242 (1991) (quoting HRS § 425-118(a) (1985)). Thus, in the absence of any agreement between husband and wife in the ICA's Hashimoto illustration, partnership principles of law require an equal division of the marital property where the only facts proved are the marriage and the existence of jointly owned property. Hashimoto, 6 Haw.App. at 427 n. 4, 725 P.2d at 522 n. 4. Clearly, it is the court's ending point, and not its starting point, which bears on whether the court has abused its discretion. However, the ICA requires that the family court specify the factual considerations upon which the deviation or the refusal to deviate from [a] USP is based, [to] make the question [whether there is abuse of discretion] much more specific. Hatayama v. Hatayama, 9 Haw.App. 1, 9, 818 P.2d 277, 281 (1991) (citation omitted). The ICA's concern that, without USPs, appellate review for abuse of discretion will be impeded and will be confined merely to consideration of the family court's ending point is reflected by the following: The USP applicable to the Category 5 NMV is 50% to each spouse. In the absence of a USP, each family court judge will have the discretion to start at a different Category 5 starting point in each divorce case. The family court judge will have the discretion to apply a Category 5 starting point of 100% to the husband and 0% to the wife in one case and a Category 5 starting point of 100% to the wife and 0% to the husband in another case. On appeal, only the family court judge's ending point will be reviewed and it will be reviewed only under the abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. at 10 n. 2, 818 P.2d at 281 n. 2. We adopt ICA Judge Heen's salient response to the above statement in his concurring opinion wherein he reiterated his rejection of USPs, which he first expressed in Bennett: [6] The statement is entirely correct and is in complete consonance with [HRS § 580-47(a)]. It is our function to review the trial court's decision to determine whether it leaves the parties in a position that satisfies the factors outlined in the statute. It is not our function to determine if the court started from a point which is not mandated by the statute. Hatayama, 9 Haw.App. at 14, 818 P.2d at 284 (Heen, J., concurring). Admittedly, the ICA's purpose and goals in promulgating USPs are commendable. However, they are unrealistic because each case is factually and circumstantially unique, and therefore outcomes will necessarily be diverse. To the extent that a certain degree of uniformity, stability, clarity or predictability of family court decisions can be attained, while at the same time preserving the wide discretion mandated by HRS § 580-47, judges are compelled to apply the appropriate law to the facts of each case and be guided by reason and conscience to attain a just result. Moreover, we conclude that our acceptance of the partnership model of marriage [7] provides the necessary guidance to the family courts in exercising their discretion and to facilitate appellate review. We therefore hold that USPs, as mandated by the ICA, are violative of HRS § 580-47 because they restrict the family courts' discretion in the equitable division and distribution of parties' estates.