Opinion ID: 2571613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Contingency Review Board

Text: ¶ 22 The CRB consists of three voting members, the Governor, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and one non-voting member, the Director of State Finance. 74 O.S.2001, § 3605(A). The Legislature created the CRB as a mechanism to deal with agency needs regarding increases in personnel or expenditures in emergency situations, which could not have been foreseen during the preceding Legislative Session. 74 O.S.2001, § 3603(A)-(C). Subsequently, it injected the CRB in the process for approving bonds and notes to fund the highway improvement and expansion plan. The specific statutory language at issue is the last sentence of 69 O.S.2001, § 2001(E)(2): Such bond issue or issues shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the Contingency Review Board. ¶ 23 While our analysis in deciding the separation of powers issue regarding the CRB is in many respects similar to our analysis with respect to the LBOC, there are some significant differences. The degree of control sought by the Legislature in injecting the CRB in the note-approval process is not quite as clear as that sought by requiring approval of the LBOC. Because the Governor sits on the CRB, he can exercise some control over the decisions of the CRB, especially since the board's approval must be unanimous. However, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives can exercise an equal amount of control over the Governor, because their votes carry the same weight as his due to the unanimity requirement. In terms of blocking the approval of the notes, the unanimity requirement allows the Governor to defeat obligations he does not want approved. At the same time the unanimity requirement may prevent the Governor from securing obligations he would like approved, because the Pro Tempore or the Speaker can veto as well. While the legislative members of the CRB do not have the absolute control over the approval process as do the members of the LBOC, they still possess a significant degree of control over an executive function. ¶ 24 The motive of the Legislature in injecting the CRB into the approval process might be viewed as suspect. The Legislature has gone beyond the justifications and original policy declarations underlying the creation of the CRB. 74 O.S.2001, §§ 3603 & 3605. The CRB was created to provide a stop-gap measure to deal with unexpected personnel and expenditure needs of various agencies when the Legislature was not in session. Implanting the CRB in the midst of the execution of the highway improvement and expansion plan goes far beyond the Legislature's original policy declarations for the CRB. It suggests that the Legislature injected the CRB in the note-approval process in an attempt to assert more legislative control in that process. By injecting the CRB in the approval process, the Legislature has in effect placed two potential legislative obstacles, namely the Pro Tempore and the Speaker, in the path of the note-approval process. ¶ 25 While the Legislature included the Governor as a member of the CRB, his inclusion on the board is redundant, because the Governor's participation in the approval process is already provided for by virtue of his presence on the EBOC. 62 O.S.2001, § 695.5(A)(1). As a result, the only practical effect of the CRB's participation in the highway improvement statute is the addition of the Pro Tempore and the Speaker. This redundancy would further support the argument that the CRB is but an effort to maintain more legislative control of the process. ¶ 26 Our analysis leads us to conclude that the power wielded by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives is potentially coercive and may constitute a significant interference with the executive branch in the approval of grant anticipation notes. We find that the challenged arrangement, the approval of the CRB in the note-approval process, constitutes a usurpation by the Legislature of the powers of the executive branch and violates Oklahoma's constitutional separation of powers provision. [13]