Opinion ID: 425209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conflict with statutory law

Text: 70 In a post-submission brief, Land & Marine contends that the thirty-six-month exclusion provision of the INA policy conflicts with LSA-R.S. 22:629, which provides, in part, as follows: 71 A. No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this state and covering subjects located, resident, or to be performed in this state, shall contain any condition, stipulation, or agreement: 72 .... 73 (3) Limiting right of action against the insurer to a period of less than one year from the time when the cause of action accrues in connection with all insurances unless otherwise specifically provided in this Code. 74 B. Any such condition, stipulation, or agreement in violation of this Section shall be void, but such voiding shall not affect the validity of the other provisions of the contract. (Emphasis added.) 75 Appellees argue that the thirty-six-month exclusion provision is not within the scope of this statute. We agree. 76 Although neither the parties nor we have found any decisions expressly considering the reach of LSA-R.S. 22:629 A(3), the language of the statute itself adequately demonstrates that it is concerned only with provisions limiting the right of action against the insurer. The language of the thirty-six-month exclusion provision, on the contrary, places no time limit on the right of the insured, or of an injured party through a direct action under LSA-R.S. 22:655, to bring suit against the insurer, INA, to enforce an alleged covered liability, or to determine whether coverage exists. Rather, the exclusion provision defines the duration of the covered risks provided by the policy. There is nothing in LSA-R.S. 22:629 A(3) which limits the right of the insurer to define, and place limitations upon, the duration of the coverage afforded by its policy. Instead, the statute limits the right of an insurer to reduce the time period within which the insured (or the injured party) can bring suit against the insurer. 77 That the thirty-six-month exclusion provision, and other provisions in other policies containing similar limitations on the duration of the coverage, have not been construed to place time limits on the right of action against the insurer, is implicit in the decisions of the Louisiana appellate courts in Livingston, Oceanonics, Dee, Dement, and Breaux. The provisions contained in LSA-R.S. 22:629 A(3) have been a part of the Louisiana statutory law since 1948, well prior to any of the relevant operative facts in each of the foregoing decisions. The INA policy contains no time limit on the right of Land & Marine to bring suit against it, nor has INA urged here or below that Land & Marine's suit was time barred. Instead, INA has consistently argued that the liability sought to be enforced against it was not covered by its policy. We hold that the thirty-six-month exclusion provision of the INA policy is not within the scope of, and thus is not in conflict with, LSA-R.S. 22:629 A(3). 78 Having held that the thirty-six-month exclusion provision of the INA policy is valid and enforceable against Land & Marine, we now consider whether it was validly incorporated by reference into the excess policies issued to Land & Marine by Lloyd's and Harbor. 9