Opinion ID: 1931123
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Determination of reasonableness.

Text: Having determined that the contract required settlement within a reasonable time after the Tenants Association ceased its efforts to purchase the Property, we now address the question whether, under the circumstances, the trial judge erred in finding that 60 to 70 days was a reasonable time. Considering the trial judge's vantage point close to the action, while we are confined to a paper record, we owe a substantial measure of deference to the judge's determination of what was reasonable. [I]n reviewing bench trials, this court will not reverse unless an appellant has established that the trial court's findings are plainly wrong or without evidentiary support. Vaas v. United States, 852 A.2d 44, 47 (D.C.2004). We conclude that there was ample evidence supporting the trial judge's finding that sixty to seventy days was a reasonable time period for settlement. The original contract contemplated settlement within fifty-five to seventy days. Because, for the reasons we have stated, A & S was not required to stand perpetually ready to close, the judge could reasonably find that after A & S was notified that the contract with the Tenants Association had been terminated, A & S would need a comparable period of time to become ready for settlement. IMC points to the time is of the essence clause contained in Paragraph 20 of the contract. It argues that because time was of the essence, sixty to seventy days was too long, and therefore unreasonable. Even assuming, arguendo, that Paragraph 20 was an effective time is of the essence clause germane to the present dispute, [10] IMC is hard-pressed to invoke it under the circumstances. IMC did not demand performance from A & S until three weeks after its contract with the Tenants Association had been terminated. Moreover, this demand was made only after A & S had learned, from a source other than IMC, that IMC's contract with the Tenants Association had fallen through. Furthermore, when A & S repeatedly proposed a sixty-day closing schedule, IMC did not respond at all, and certainly never suggested that the contract provided for a far shorter period. IMC's conduct was not consistent with the approach that time was truly of the essence. Accordingly, Paragraph 20 does not at all undermine the trial judge's determination that sixty to seventy days constituted a reasonable time under the contract.