Opinion ID: 720952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Preliminary Injunction and Younger Abstention

Text: 6 We review de novo whether Younger abstention was required. Weiner v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir.1994); Partington v. Gedan, 880 F.2d 116, 120 (9th Cir.1989) (reviewing de novo even though we are reviewing the action of a district court in granting or denying an injunction), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038, and cert. granted and vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1020 (1990). 7 We find that Dr. Flowers has demonstrated that the RICO defendants are prosecuting him in bad faith and, therefore, that Younger abstention was not appropriate. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 429. A prosecution is brought in bad faith if, inter alia, it is brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction. Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n. 6 (1973). The district court found that the prosecution was brought with rather weak evidence, and without a strong basis to expect to prevail. Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 16. In addition, the court found that while the RICO defendants made little effort to rebut plaintiff's allegations, 8 Dr. Flowers presented evidence that (1) he is a distinguished and renowned plastic surgeon; (2) that defendant Seki, the attorney in charge of the RICO investigation, breached a promise to allow plaintiff to respond to potential charges before a disciplinary petition was prepared; (3) that Mr. Harada, the Board investigator, conducted the investigation in a biased and slanderous manner; (4) that the petition against [Dr. Flowers] is replete with false allegations and factual inaccuracies; (5) that the charges brought against [Dr. Flowers] are without merit; and (6) that leading physicians in the community, after review of the petition and the underlying facts, roundly condemn the petition as unwarranted. 9 Further, the district court found that the RICO defendants conducted their investigation in a lackluster and unprofessional manner and the tactics of their investigator are highly questionable, to say the least. We agree with the district court's analysis of the evidence. 10 We disagree, however, with the court's conclusion that Dr. Flowers failed to demonstrate bad faith because the state has offered some evidence for its case. Dr. Flowers has introduced undisputed evidence that effectively negates each charge leveled against him by RICO. We are persuaded that the RICO defendants have no reasonable expectation of success. 11 Moreover, evidence alone, even if it rises to the level of probable cause, will not bar a finding of bad faith. See, e.g., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 118 n. 11 (1971) (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103-104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 480 (1994); United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 853 (10th Cir.1992); Fitzgerald v. Peek, 636 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981). The RICO defendants have demonstrated in their brief a substantial bias against both Dr. Flowers and his profession. They assert speculative claims for which they have failed to demonstrate any basis regarding the motives for his professional activities, his income, the psychological profiles of his patients, and the social value of cosmetic surgery among other declarations for which there is no support in the record. For example, the RICO defendants declare, Dr. Robert S. Flowers, M.D., is a cosmetic plastic surgeon who resides in Honolulu, Hawaii, and who makes millions of dollars performing breast enlargement, facelift, and other forms of socially questionable cosmetic plastic surgery, Appellees' Br. at 2, and, [a]lthough he professes to a busy professional schedule of lectures, teaching and other 'good works,' most of these have occurred at such popular resort or travel destinations as ... New York, Marseille [sic], Paris, Tokyo, Miami, Bankgok [sic], Puerto Villarta, and various resort communities on the outer Hawaiian Islands and elsewhere, Id. at 4. The RICO defendants also argue that their prosecution of Dr. Flowers should be afforded great deference because cosmetic surgery has been the object of societal derision: 12 Society has long frowned on cosmetic surgery of the type typically practiced by Dr. Flowers, not only because it drains millions if not billions of dollars of government and private subsidies from medical procedures that demonstrably save lives, but because that surgery is 'sold' to the [sic] some of the most psychologically vulnerable individuals in our society.... 13 Id. at 25. Finally, they contend that society could lawfully proscribe the practice of cosmetic surgery entirely: Society would be wholly within its rights to outlaw what Dr. Flowers does as a crime. Id. (emphasis in original). These bald assertions suggest a harassing motivation irrespective of the evidence and belie defendants' claim of good faith. 14 Consistent with our finding of bad faith and conclusion that Younger abstention was inappropriate, we direct the district court to issue a preliminary injunction barring the RICO defendants from pursuing the disciplinary action against Dr. Flowers. We therefore vacate the order staying federal proceedings.