Opinion ID: 2581377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: making false information

Text: Jenkins argues that the State improperly charged him with the general crime of making false information in light of the more specific crime under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-260(a)(5). When there is a conflict between a statute dealing generally with a subject and another statute dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the specific statute controls unless the legislature intended to make the general act controlling. [Citation omitted.] State v. Kraushaar, 264 Kan. 667, 671, 957 P.2d 1106 (1998). The general rule is that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, which simply means that words are given their ordinary meaning. Any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal statute. [Citation omitted.] State v. Donlay, 253 Kan. 132, 134, 853 P.2d 680 (1993). Jenkins contends he should have been charged with a violation of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-260(a)(5), which provides: (a) It shall be unlawful for any person, for any purpose, to: .... (5) Use a false or fictitious name in any application for a driver's license, or any renewal or replacement thereof, or knowingly conceal a material fact, or otherwise commit a fraud in any such application. Jenkins was actually convicted of making false information, which is proscribed by K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-3711: Making false information is making, generating, distributing or drawing, or causing to be made, generated, distributed or drawn, any written instrument, electronic data or entry in a book of account with knowledge that such information falsely states or represents some material matter or is not what it purports to be, and with intent to defraud, obstruct the detection of a theft or felony offense or induce official action. The State argues that Jenkins' conduct could not have been prosecuted under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-260(a)(5) because the medical forms he completed were not an application, renewal, or replacement thereof ` as used in that subsection. Instead, the State claims Jenkins completed the forms in connection with a restriction on his driver's license, for which authority is found at K.S.A. 8-245(a). K.S.A. 8-245(a) provides: The division, upon issuing a driver's license shall have authority, whenever good cause appears, to impose reasonable restrictions suitable to the licensee's driving ability with respect to the type of, or special mechanical control devices required on, a motor vehicle which the licensee may operate, or such other restrictions applicable to the licensee as the division may determine to be appropriate to assure the safe operation of a motor vehicle by the licensee. Jenkins also argues the annual medical reports he was required to provide must have been applications or renewals based upon an interpretation of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-247(e)(7), which provides that [s]eizure disorders which are controlled shall not be considered a disability. Jenkins quoted the statutory definition of controlled, leaving out a key phrase which is shown as follows by the emphasized text: For the purpose of this paragraph, seizure disorders which are controlled means that the licensee has not sustained a seizure involving a loss of consciousness in the waking state within six months preceding the application or renewal of a driver's license or whenever a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery in this state makes a written report to the division stating that the licensee's seizures are controlled. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-247(e)(7). Thus, Jenkins' argument fails. The definition of controlled is not limited to an inquiry of whether there has been a seizure within 6 months of the application or renewal. On the contrary, controlled is also defined with reference to a physician's reporta seizure can be the basis for a restriction under K.S.A. 8-245 if not controlled. The italicized language above provides further evidence that the annual medical reports do not fall within the definition of application or renewal, thus making the allegedly more specific crime inapplicable to Jenkins' actions. Since a charge under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-260 would be inappropriate for this case, it was not error to convict Jenkins of making false information under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-3711.