Opinion ID: 778482
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Severance of the Managers and Reloaders

Text: 22 Both Managers and Reloaders argue that they were so prejudiced from trial with each other that the district court should have granted severance. Defendants collectively offer three arguments in support of this claim. First, they argue that certain evidence was admitted against all six of them that would have been admissible against only one of the two groups had the groups been tried separately. Second, they claim that Managers and Reloaders, as groups, adopted mutually antagonistic defenses. Finally, Defendants argue that the size of the case, the number of parties, and the number of instructions made the trial too confusing to allow the jury to compartmentalize the evidence, claims, and instructions that applied to each of the defendants. 5 23
24 Each group cites to a piece of evidence that they claim would have been admissible against only the other had they been tried separately, and which was prejudicial to the inadmissible group. Managers point to Rashada's testimony that, prior to working at AEA, he and Reloaders were employed by a telemarketing company called HBO, which apparently had also engaged in fraud. Reloaders, on the other hand, point to Rashada's testimony regarding his theft and sale of leads to Rudisill prior to his employment at AEA. 25 For each of the objectionable pieces of evidence cited above, the district court took steps to minimize any potential spillover effect. As to Rashada's testimony about HBO, before trial the district court made it clear that Rashada was not to suggest that the operation at HBO was fraudulent. The record reflects that this instruction was heeded, as at no point did Rashada mention that he and Reloaders engaged in fraud while working at HBO. 6 Regarding Rashada's comments about stealing leads for Rudisill, the district court granted a motion to strike when this testimony was introduced and instructed the jury to ignore the answer. Shortly thereafter, the district court also directed the jury not to assume that any of the defendants knew that the leads ... were stolen. In light of these steps by the district court, which Defendants do not claim were insufficient to cure any prejudice, we conclude that any spillover of evidence did not prejudice Defendants enough to warrant a severance. 26
27 Defendants argue that joinder was prejudicial because each group's defense essentially amounted to a second prosecution of the other group — a so-called mutually antagonistic defense claim. In advancing their mutually antagonistic defense claim, Defendants rely on the following simple assertion. Managers' and Reloaders' defenses were mutually antagonistic because Managers defended their case by arguing that any criminal activity at AEA was due to the unknown activities of AEA employees engaged in fraudulent freelance telemarketing, while Reloaders defended their position by arguing that any scheme at AEA must have been perpetrated at the top levels, and that they were innocent victims of deliberate misinformation and deception. 28 It is difficult to obtain severance on the basis of a mutually antagonistic defense claim. We have previously stated that [a]ntagonism between defenses or the desire of one defendant to exculpate himself by inculpating a codefendant ... is insufficient to require severance. United States v. Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir.1996). To demonstrate that competing defenses amounted to manifest prejudice in a joint trial, a defendant must show the core of the co-defendant's defense is so irreconcilable with the core of his own defense that the acceptance of the co-defendant's theory by the jury precludes acquittal of the defendant. Hanley, 190 F.3d at 1028 (internal quotation marks omitted). We hold that Defendants cannot meet this burden. 29 The principle flaw in Defendants' argument is that upon close inspection, it is obvious that their defenses at trial were not really in conflict. It is true that Managers attempted to deflect blame by impugning the character of less senior AEA employees. In particular, Managers suggested to the jury, during opening argument and cross-examination, that nonmanagement employees, possibly in Phoenix or Atlanta, probably engaged in fraudulent telemarketing, and that former AEA telemarketers had stolen leads from the company and held themselves out as still working for the company. However, Managers provided no evidence to suggest that Reloaders were in fact these employees. Indeed, our combing of the record indicates that Managers never even suggested that Reloaders were the guilty parties. Considering that AEA had numerous telemarketers working in both Atlanta and Phoenix, it is clear that nothing in Managers' defense was in conflict with the core of Reloaders' defense. The jury could reasonably have concluded that Managers were hoodwinked by their employees without finding that Reloaders were the culprits. 7 30 Similarly, nothing in Reloaders' defense conflicted with the core defense of Managers. Reloaders provided virtually no evidence to support their claim that they were deceived by some cabal at the upper echelons of AEA, and certainly never pointed the finger directly at Eames or Rudisill. In light of the fact that other management personnel were implicated in the scheme (like Ms. Eames, Rashada, and AEA's corporate secretary/treasurer, Rebecca Setzer), the jury could have accepted Reloaders' theory of a conspiracy at the top without necessarily concluding that Eames and Rudisill were to blame. 31 Because the jury could have easily accepted either group's defense without convicting the other group, the defenses in this case were not mutually antagonistic. As such, severance was not required on the basis of Defendants' mutually antagonistic defense claim. 32
33 Defendants' final argument in favor of severance is that the sheer size of the trial was manifestly prejudicial because it left the jury unable to compartmentalize the evidence — that is, to determine which evidence applied to which defendant, and thereby return a reliable verdict of guilt or innocence. In support of this argument, Defendants point to the length of the trial (17 weeks); the multiplicity of parties and counts; the large number of limiting instructions that were used to designate which pieces of evidence were applicable to which defendants; and, perhaps most importantly, the fact that the jury brought back guilty verdicts on all counts against all six of them. See United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1374 (9th Cir.1987) (stating that [t]he best evidence of [a] jury's ability to compartmentalize the evidence is its failure to convict all defendants on all counts). 34 It is beyond dispute that the proceedings in this case were lengthy and complex. However, any prejudice that might have stemmed from the complexity of the trial was avoided by the district court's skillful handling of the case. Throughout the trial, the district court regularly conducted hearings and bench conferences to efficiently regulate the flow of evidence to the jury. Whenever requested and appropriate, limiting instructions were provided to focus the jury's attention on the defendant(s) to which a particular piece of evidence applied. At the end of the trial, the court lifted the vast majority of these instructions (principally those relating to trial exhibits), and clearly identified for the jury those instructions that remained. 8 In addition, during the jury charge, the district court provided clear guidance on the government's burden of proof, and stressed to the jury that it was to give separate consideration as to each defendant and that it must determine what the evidence in the case shows with respect to each defendant, leaving out of consideration any evidence admitted solely against some other defendants. Finally, the court reminded the jury that [t]he fact that you may find one of the defendants guilty or not guilty should not control your verdict as to any other defendants. Under these circumstances, that the jury returned a guilty verdict as to each defendant does not suggest to us a failure to compartmentalize. Rather, it suggests that the jury found sufficient evidence to convict each defendant. 9 35 On the basis of the district court's instructions, and basic conduct of the trial, we reject Defendants' claim that the complexity arising out of their joint trial was manifestly prejudicial. Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of their motions to sever.