Opinion ID: 2042260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Whether Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim for Conversion

Text: Under its analysis of the Moorman issue, the appellate court considered both the negligence count and the conversion count. With respect to the conversion count (which was dismissed by the circuit court on other grounds), the appellate court reasoned that defendant's duty to refrain from operating on the horse's right stifle did not arise exclusively from the service contract. 375 Ill.App.3d at 457, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542. Because defendant performed the surgery in violation of an express instruction from the plaintiffs, it was outside the scope of the parties' contract and, therefore, not barred by Moorman. The appellate court concluded that: Contract or no contract, if one cuts, carves, lacerates, incises, or otherwise alters someone else's property except as authorized by that person, one commits a classic tort: either trespass to chattels or conversion, depending on the extent of the alteration. 375 Ill.App.3d at 458, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542. As noted above, defendant has forfeited consideration of the Moorman issue before this court, so we turn to the question whether plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for conversion. To prove conversion, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he has a right to the property; (2) he has an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate possession of the property; (3) he made a demand for possession; and (4) the defendant wrongfully and without authorization assumed control, dominion, or ownership over the property. Cirrincione v. Johnson, 184 Ill.2d 109, 114, 234 Ill.Dec. 455, 703 N.E.2d 67 (1998). In count II of their amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners of the horse with the absolute and unconditional right to immediate possession of the horse, and that a demand for possession of the horse would have been useless because the defendant could not have returned their personal property to them in its unaltered state. With regard to the element of assumption of control, dominion, or ownership, the plaintiffs alleged that defendant's performing unauthorized surgery, in violation of their express instructions, constituted an unauthorized assumption of the right to possession or ownership of the horse. Defendant's motion to dismiss argued that count II failed to plead a cause of action for conversion because plaintiffs did not allege that he had permanently deprived them of possession of the horse. The circuit court granted the motion, dismissing the conversion claim with prejudice. The appellate court reversed, relying on section 226 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides: `One who intentionally destroys a chattel or so materially alters its physical condition as to change its identity or character is subject to liability for conversion to another who is in possession of the chattel or entitled to its immediate possession.' 375 Ill.App.3d at 458, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 226, at 439 (1965). Comment d to this section suggests that a claim for conversion of a horse on the basis of physical injury to the animal is not unheard of and that one may indeed be liable for the conversion of a horse without permanently depriving the owner of possession: `If a horse is permanently lamed, it remains a horse, the owner may still be in possession, and the horse may have value to a glue works, but it has become useless for the ordinary purposes of a horse. In such a case there is a conversion.' 375 Ill.App.3d at 458, 314 Ill.Dec. 446, 874 N.E.2d 542, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 226, Comment d, at 440-41 (1965). Thus, the appellate court concluded, the claim for conversion was properly pleaded. In the portion of their brief addressing the Moorman issue, plaintiffs argue that the doctrine does not bar a claim for the intentional tort of conversion. They argue, further, that the appellate court was correct that their amended complaint did state a claim for conversion. They also point out that defendant failed to raise any issues related to the conversion claim in his petition for leave to appeal. Nevertheless, we have a duty to consider sua sponte whether the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the conversion claim. Eastern v. Canty, 75 Ill.2d 566, 570, 27 Ill.Dec. 752, 389 N.E.2d 1160 (1979) (explaining that a court has a duty to examine its jurisdiction, even if no question is raised by the parties). Section 8(d) of the Act confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims in cases sounding in tort. 705 ILCS 505/8(d) (West 2004). This provision is not limited to claims of negligence. By its plain language, this section applies to all tort claims, including intentional torts such as trespass to chattel and conversion. We noted in Healy, 133 Ill.2d at 309, 140 Ill.Dec. 368, 549 N.E.2d 1240, that an action is against the state when there is `no allegation[ ] that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts.' The essence of a claim for conversion is an allegation that the defendant engaged in an intentional, wrongful act. Further, regarding the relief sought, holding the defendant liable for the intentional tort of conversion cannot operate to control the actions of the state because the University simply cannot have a policy requiring its employees to commit the intentional tort of conversion. Further, as noted above, the State's indemnification of defendant, should he be found liable for conversion, will not operate to control the actions of the State. We therefore, conclude, that plaintiffs' claim for conversion should not have been dismissed by the circuit court.