Opinion ID: 203944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Legal Errors

Text: The majority's opinion attempts to draw too certain a connection between the lack of supervision and the exercise of discretion. The government makes the same error in its brief, suggesting that the section 3B1.3 enhancement was appropriate because of Sicher's lack of supervision and her close relationship with Dr. Walton and the families who visited his office. It is true that lack of supervision often characterizes positions that require the exercise of managerial discretion. The guideline commentary makes that very point: [p]ersons holding such positions ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in nature. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n. 1. It does not follow from that observation, however, that lack of supervision of an employee means that the employee is necessarily authorized or expected to exercise professional or managerial discretion. In some circumstances, the ministerial nature of the task may not justify much supervision. Although the guideline requires the exercise of managerial or professional discretion to apply the enhancement, it only suggests that lack of supervision is one way to detect whether that discretion exists. The majority asserts the opposite, concluding that Sicher in fact exercised considerable authority and discretion as to CGF; this is necessarily so, as she was unsupervised in a number of tasks as to receipt and disbursement of funds. Likewise, the majority makes the error of equating simple trust with a section 3B1.3 position of trust, a link long rejected by this circuit. See Reccko, 151 F.3d at 31. The majority states that, [w]ith growing trust by an employer, and/or victim, an employee may be in fact given increasing levels of responsibility and discretion over time [] such that the position becomes one `characterized by professional or managerial discretion' without any change in title.' That observation may be apt in some circumstances, but the record does not support it here. Sicher had access to the finances of the CGF and the medical office because she was trusted, but she was not permitted to exercise her discretion over those finances. [16] The majority also embraces the government's argument that our decision in O'Connell, 252 F.3d 524, supports its contention that Sicher's close relationships with Dr. Walton and the families of his patients transformed her role into a position of trust within the meaning of section 3B1.3. The majority describes O'Connell as holding that the closeness of the relationship between the defendant and the victim supported the district court's finding that the defendant occupied a position of trust. While that is true, our decision in that case critically depended on the trusted relationship in combination with the defendant's unfettered access to an $850,000 line of credit which he had authority to transfer... to the checking account. Id. at 529. We stated that the authority to draw off the account suggests significant managerial discretion, a conclusion that was bolstered by the district court's finding that the defendant had a close personal relationship that led to more autonomy for O'Connell. Id. We can accept that Sicher's close, trusted relationships with Dr. Walton and the families of his patients were comparable to the family-like relationship of O'Connell with his employer, and that this closeness gave Sicher access to money that she could embezzle. However, unlike O'Connell, appellant had no ability to exercise decision-making authority in her position as administrative assistant to the CGF. [17] III. There is no question that appellant committed a terrible betrayal of trust within the colloquial understanding of that phrase. Dr. Walton trusted her to deposit income into the medical office's account, and his young patients and their families trusted that the CGF would benefit from the donations they gave to her for safekeeping and deposit. At sentencing, Dr. Walton and parents of his patients described the detrimental effect of appellant's betrayal on their ability to trust others. The district court described her breach of trust as egregious and an amazing violation of trust, and I agree. The sentencing guidelines, however, create their own vocabularyand the guidelines sometimes define terms in ways that might strike lay persons as peculiar. So it is here: in the idiom of the sentencing guidelines, the term `position of public or private trust' has a special meaning. Reccko, 151 F.3d at 31. As the application notes explain, the position-of-trust enhancement applies only to those positions characterized by professional or managerial discretion ( i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference). U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n. 1. Even accepting all of the objective facts set forth in the PSR and elsewhere in the record as true (as the district court was entitled to do in the absence of any challenge to them), the facts are insufficient to support the imposition of the position of trust enhancement because they do not indicate that appellant had a position that afforded her discretion. If one looks beyond the PSR's conclusory assertion that appellant had discretion to run the financial and administrative affairs of the office, and the district court's unexplained application of the position of trust enhancement, the record does not reveal any tasks requiring the exercise of judgment and the decisionmaking authority that are the essence of managerial discretion within the meaning of the guideline. See Tiojanco, 286 F.3d at 1021. Instead, one finds only ministerial tasks and the exercise of social skills. Unfortunately, in an effort to affirm the district court, the majority has significantly diluted the guidelines' concept of professional and managerial discretion. Moreover, contrary to our precedent, the majority comes perilously close to equating lack of supervision with the exercise of discretion. Thus, the majority's conclusion that the application of the position of trust enhancement was proper in this case represents a sharp departure from our precedent and the once coherent body of law that applied to this issue. I respectfully dissent.