Opinion ID: 3036234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Persecution in Fiji

Text: [4] To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that he is a “refugee,” i.e., an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his country of origin “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003). To give rise to refugee status, the persecution must be “on account of” one of the five statutorily-specified grounds. Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001). The IJ found that Mr. Kumar’s experiences in Fiji did not rise to the level of persecution. We agree; substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that the Kumars failed to establish past persecution on account of any of the five statutorily-specified grounds. See Elias-Zacarias v. INS, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Following the incident at the Kumars’ home in 1987, Mr. Kumar left Fiji and lived in New Zealand for approximately two years. He then voluntarily returned to Fiji because he was lonely and depressed in New Zealand. The IJ stated that Mr. Kumar’s voluntary return to Fiji was indicative of Kumar’s own belief that it would be safe and appropriate for him to 2 Furthermore, there is nothing to be gained by remanding the case to the BIA so that it can excise the footnote and send the case back to us without it. 1714 KUMAR v. GONZALES live in Fiji. In addition, following his return to Fiji in 1989, Mr. Kumar no longer had any association with the Labor Party. To the extent that the Fijian military targeted Mr. Kumar in 1987 because of his activities with the Labor Party, as Mr. Kumar testified, his two-year absence from the country and distance from the party upon his return weaken his claim of persecution. The IJ found that the 1994 incident was a traffic accident and was not related to any of the five statutory grounds for asylum. Moreover, the IJ concluded that the accident was brief and did not result in any serious problems with the military. The Kumars presented no evidence to the contrary. Finally, the IJ noted that the Kumars both testified that practicing their religion at home is “comfortable, acceptable, and routine to them.” The single incident in 1991 at Mr. Kumar’s temple is not sufficient to establish that the Kumars suffered religious persecution in Fiji. Even considering the cumulative effect of the Kumars’ experiences, this case is not one in which the evidence presented compels a finding contrary to that of the IJ.3 3 Compare with Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-340 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that an attack committed by a group of ethnic Fijians and the military, detention by the police, physical abuse while in police custody, and coercive questioning by the police regarding political affiliations were insufficient to establish past persecution); Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 968-69 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that an Indo-Fijian’s claims of ethnic tension, including the stoning of her house by ethnic Fijians, burglary of her home and property, governmental outlawing of Hindu, and refusal of police assistance, did not compel a finding of persecution). We have defined persecution as “an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Discrimination on the basis of race or religion, as morally rephrensive as it may be, does not ordinarily amount to persecution within the meaning of the Act.” Id. To obtain reversal of an IJ’s decision, a petitioner must show that the evidence not only supports reversal, but compels it. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1. While the ethnic slurs and physical confrontations the Kumars endured are regrettable, the evidence presented here does not compel reversal. KUMAR v. GONZALES 1715 [5] Mr. Kumar’s testimony also fails to establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution. See Meza-Manay v. INS, 139 F.3d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, the alien must demonstrate both an objectively reasonable and subjectively genuine fear of persecution). [6] Because the Kumars have not established eligibility for asylum, they have not met the higher burden of proving that they are entitled to withholding of removal. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that an applicant who has not satisfied the lesser standard of proof required to establish eligibility for asylum necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent standard required to establish eligibility for withholding of removal).