Opinion ID: 4363970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enumerated clause

Text: We have not adopted a definition for generic murder. After surveying the Model Penal Code, dictionary definitions, and state laws, the Third Circuit defined generic UNITED STATES V. VEDEROFF 15 murder as “causing the death of another person either intentionally, during the commission of a dangerous felony, or through conduct evincing reckless and depraved indifference to serious dangers posed to human life.” United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389, 401 (3d Cir. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); see also United States v. CastroGomez, 792 F.3d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing approvingly to Marrero). We adopt that definition here. The least culpable means of committing second-degree murder in Washington is under the felony murder provision, so we must determine whether generic murder also covers such conduct. Under Washington law, the underlying felony can be any felony—unlike felony murder in the Third Circuit’s definition of generic murder, it is not limited to dangerous felonies. Washington’s felony murder provision is an outlier among the states: seven do not impose felony murder liability at all. Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 403, 440 (2011) (citing to Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Vermont). In the jurisdictions that do impose felony murder liability, unlike Washington, a majority enumerate the predicate felonies in their statute. See id. at 450 n.262 (citing to 18 U.S.C. § 1111 and Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). In the jurisdictions without exhaustively enumerated predicate felonies, almost all require that the predicate offense be a dangerous felony. See id. at 466–82 (discussing Alabama, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, 16 UNITED STATES V. VEDEROFF Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia). Only three states (including Washington) allow felony murder to be predicated on non-enumerated offenses lacking a dangerousness requirement. See id. at 478 (explaining that Florida and Mississippi are the two other jurisdictions). Furthermore, the Model Penal Code limits felony murder to deaths resulting from conduct involving certain specified dangerous offenses. Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b). The government insists that any concerns regarding the breadth of the statute are hypothetical. See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (requiring “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime”). Facial overbreadth like that here, however, is a basis for finding a statute overbroad. See United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that where “a state statute explicitly defines a crime more broadly than the generic definition, no ‘legal imagination,’ is required to hold that a realistic probability exists that the state will apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of the crime” (citing Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193)). Washington’s second-degree murder statute is therefore overbroad when compared with the definition of generic murder, as well as the Model Penal Code and the laws of other jurisdictions. We next turn to whether this statute is divisible. Because the plain language of the statute does not resolve this question, we look to state decisional law. Robinson, 869 F.3d at 938. Washington courts have concluded that the statute is indivisible, and we adopt their interpretation here. See, e.g., State v. Berlin, 947 P.2d 700, 705–06 (Wash. 1997) (holding that this statute defines a UNITED STATES V. VEDEROFF 17 “single crime, which can be committed by alternative means” and therefore, “the State is not required to elect between the alternative means of committing second degree murder”); see also State v. Lizarraga, 364 P.3d 810, 828 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that this statute contains alternative means, not alternative elements). As above, we cannot apply the modified categorical approach. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the district court, second-degree murder under Washington law is not a crime of violence under the enumerated clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).