Opinion ID: 1463528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: In re J-E-

Text: In 2002, the BIA considered the issue of whether indefinite detention, inhuman prison conditions, and police mistreatment. . . constitute torturous acts under the CAT. In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 292. There, a native and citizen of Haiti who had resided in the United States for approximately ten years and had been convicted of the sale of cocaine in Florida, was ordered removed to Haiti. Id. at 292-93. At his removal hearing, the petitioner introduced evidence showing that if he were removed to Haiti, he would be detained under deplorable conditions. [9] Id. at 293. Those conditions included prison facilities [that] are overcrowded and inadequate[,] where prisoners, many of whom are malnourished, are deprived of adequate food, water, medical care, sanitation, and exercise. Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ nevertheless found the petitioner ineligible for CAT relief. Id. On appeal, the BIA began its analysis with an examination of the ratification history of the CAT and its implementing regulations. Id. at 294-99. After noting that the regulatory definition of torture in 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a) governed its decision, the BIA summarized that definition to develop a test for CAT claims: For an act to constitute torture it must be: (1) an act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for a proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official . . .; and (5) not arising from lawful sanctions. Id. at 297. In discussing the level of intent required, the BIA noted that an act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain or suffering does not constitute torture. Id. at 298. The BIA then turned to the question of whether any of the specific state actions alleged by the petitionerindefinite detention, inhuman prison conditions, and police mistreatmentconstituted torture within the meaning of the regulations. Id. at 299. Examining first the petitioner's claim that he would be indefinitely detained by Haitian authorities, the BIA found it undisputed that the respondent will be subject to detention of an indeterminate length on his return to Haiti. Id. This detention of criminal deportees is designed by the Haitian government as a deterrent, to prevent the `bandits' from increasing the level of insecurity and crime in the country. Id. at 300 (quotation omitted). As such, the BIA found that the detention of criminal deportees did not constitute torture, because it is a lawful enforcement sanction designed . . . to protect the populace from criminal acts committed by Haitians who are forced to return to the country after having been convicted of crimes abroad. Id. Turning next to the petitioner's claim that indefinite detention, coupled with inhuman prison conditions, amounted to torture, the BIA noted that an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe pain or suffering in order to constitute torture. Id. The BIA found this to be a specific intent requirement, not a general intent requirement. Id. at 300-01. Citing the legal definition of specific intent, [10] the BIA found that Haitian authorities did not have the specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering when they imprisoned criminal deportees in harsh conditions because there is no evidence that they are intentionally and deliberately creating and maintaining such prison conditions in order to inflict torture. Id. at 301. Instead, the harsh conditions are the result of budgetary and management problems as well as the country's severe economic difficulties. Id. As such, the detention of criminal deportees did not amount to torture, despite the fact that Haitian authorities are intentionally detaining criminal deportees knowing that the detention facilities are substandard. Id. Finally, in addressing the petitioner's claim that physical mistreatment by Haitian authorities would amount to torture, [11] the BIA held that the evidence showed only isolated instances of mistreatment in Haitian prisons that rise to the level of torture. Id. at 302. This was insufficient to meet the petitioner's burden of proof of showing that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured. Id. at 303. Based on the foregoing findings, the BIA dismissed the appeal. Id. at 304.