Opinion ID: 245693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusiveness of Jurisdiction.

Text: 18 The second ground of defense presents the question of whether parties to a collective bargaining agreement may contract to submit matters involving unfair labor practices 12 to private arbitrators with such contract enforceable by the federal courts under section 301 of the Act, or whether all controversies concerning unfair labor practices are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board which pre-empts the federal courts from acquiring jurisdiction over a contract violation which happens also to be an unfair labor practice. This question has not been raised previously in this Court, nor has it been decided by the Supreme Court. 19 The appellee asserts that, since the discharges were made because of union activity — protected or unprotected — which presents the question of unfair labor practice vel non, 13 and since the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board pre-empts state courts and agencies from deciding issues involving such unfair labor practices, 14 certainly the parties cannot by contract give to private arbitrators more jurisdiction than is afforded to state courts. However, the appellee overlooks the obvious distinction between contract provisions and matters committed exclusively to the Board. If an arbitrable contract violation encompasses an unfair labor practice, the majority of the courts have held that arbitration is proper to decide all matters not included in the pre-emptive area. Likewise, the better-reasoned cases hold that even where the aggrieved incident or act constitutes both a contract violation and an unfair labor practice, particularly concerning a substantive contract right such as employment or pay, the federal district courts will not be deprived of jurisdiction to grant relief as to the breach of contract, the other aspect being left to the Board. 15 20 However, in this case, we must go one step further because substantially the same conduct here involved would constitute a violation of the contract and an unfair labor practice. The distinguishing point is that, while an act may be both an arbitrable contract violation and an unfair labor practice, a breach of contract is not an unfair labor practice; the former is enforced by the courts, the latter by the Board; 16 the former gives to private parties a remedy, the latter uses a private right to effectuate the declared policies of the Act; 17 the former gives a certainty of decision, the latter leaves decision discretionary. 18 Section 10(a) of the Act 19 states that the power of the Board over unfair labor practices shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise. Will the submission of a contract violation, which is also an unfair labor practice, to arbitration affect this power of the Board? Certainly not. Since the Board's power is plenary in all respects, neither the existence of an agreement to arbitrate nor a rendered award can preclude the Board from exercising its statutory jurisdiction. 20 But certainly an award or an agreement to arbitrate may serve to temporarily assuage the aggrieved party and afford validity to contract terms (even including unfair labor practices) until a final disposition of the matter of unfair labor practice be made by the Board. Even though the Board is not bound by an arbitration award, it may find that compliance with the award is not violative of the Act, 21 or it may even, in the exercise of its discretionary power, decline action because an award has been made or arbitration is possible. 22 21 Such a practice may be at least a partial answer to the commonly known fact that the National Labor Relations Board has presented to it such a multitude of complaints and grievances that decisions are slow in forthcoming and many cases are refused review. 23 State tribunals have no jurisdiction in many areas of unfair labor practices even though the Board, because of its overflowing docket, has voluntarily relinquished jurisdiction but failed to cede jurisdiction to a state agency. 24 But we cannot believe that Congress intended to create a no man's land where voluntary arbitration is barred and the national labor relations board may be too overburdened to enter. 25 Certainly, if an otherwise arbitrable controversy happens also to be an unfair labor practice, the parties should not be forced to abandon their contract right and be relegated to the slow and creaking procedure which, like a wounded snake, has dragged its slow length along, sans bargaining, sans labor peace, sans everything but pride of opinion, ill temper and frustration. 26 We think it too technical and obtrusive to attempt a division of the present controversy into a contract part and an unfair labor part. Such a division is merely a play on words. It is better to call the spade and say that enforcement of a contract to arbitrate grievances is different from an adjudication of an unfair labor practice by the National Labor Relations Board. This will prevent the nebulous determination of what part is contract and what part is unfair labor practice when the one part constitutes both. 22 We believe that this decision is required by the teaching of the recent Lincoln Mills cases. 27 While these cases did not concern an issue which was both contracted to be arbitrable and concerned unfair labor practice, they did establish two broad principles: first, that the United States district courts have the unequivocal statutory power to decree specific performance of collective bargaining contracts to arbitrate; and, second, that private arbitration in the labor-management field is to be afforded broad liberalities. In this connection, the Supreme Court stated at 353 U.S. 455, 456, 457, 77 S.Ct. 917: 23 Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way. 24