Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lyons' Lie Detector Testimony

Text: As do most jurisdictions, Delaware has a long-standing, and quite proper, prohibition against admission of the results of lie detector tests. Such a prohibition is warranted because the results of a lie detector examination are inherently unreliable, and their apparent scientific nature has the potential to mislead jurors into giving the results undue weight. Admission of results of lie detector tests, therefore, may constitute reversible error. [559] The testimony in this case concerning a potential lie detector test, however, is quite different. Here, there was no evidence presented to the jury that a lie detector test was ever administered to Gerry Capano, let alone what the results of such a test might have been. Rather, the testimony in this case indicated that Gerry believed that he was subject to a lie detector test. This was offered to explain to the jury why Gerry changed his statement to investigators in the case. As the trial judge properly instructed the jury, in his limiting instruction, this evidence was provided to them so that they could perform their most basic function: evaluation of the reliability of evidence from which they could draw conclusions of fact. Given the trial judge's adequate and explicit limiting instruction, and given the nature of the evidence presented, this is not a case in which the unduly persuasive value of the results of a pseudo-scientific lie detector test tainted the jury's deliberations. Because the majority appears to impose unnecessarily restrictive standards on the admission of relevant testimony that happens to include the words lie detector, I cannot join in the majority's finding of error. I do join in the majority's ultimate conclusion that any error (had there been one) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting Lyons' testimony because it amounted to a subtle and indirect version of vouching for Gerry's credibility. [560] Relying upon Graves v. State, [561] the majority views Lyons' admonitions to Gerry to make full disclosure and Gerry's possible exposure to a lie detector test, together with Lyons' status as an experienced lawyer and former federal prosecutor, as the subtle equivalent of Lyons' vouching for Gerry's truthfulness in his disclosures to federal prosecutors. I confess that the majority's rationale is too subtle for me to grasp. First, Lyons never testified explicitly, or implicitly, that he thought Gerry was being truthful, either before or after Gerry changed his story with the prosecutors. Second, none of the reputational boasting that occurred in Graves occurred here. Third, I think the majority has confused two distinct concepts. It is unproblematic for a jury to be provided information that may assist them in assessing the credibility of a witness. That is what occurred here. Lyons explained how he urged Gerry to not hold anything back. The jury was entitled to consider that fact in its effort to assess whether Gerry was, at trial, telling the whole truth and whether the story he told to federal agents was the whole truth. What the majority then finds troubling is that Lyons' testimony might have been persuasive, that is, that the jury could have found that his advice had actually caused Gerry to have spoken truthfully to federal agents. But that conclusion is also unproblematic. The jury quite properly could consider whether a witness's testimony had changed because that witness had been advised to not hold anything back. Similarly, the jury quite properly could consider testimony that a witness's story had changed because the witness had been warned that he faced perjury charges if he did not testify fully about what had happened. I find nothing problematic about a jury having the right to consider and assess whether information of this kind is helpful in determining whether a particular witness is credible or not. The majority finds it implicit in Lyons' testimony that Lyons believed his own admonitions to have been effective ... [and] [t]hus a subtle and indirect version of vouching for Gerry's credibility. [562] If I found such vouching were implicit (or explicit) in Lyons' testimony, I also would be concerned. The danger then would be that the jury would evaluate Gerry's credibility not on the facts (including, permissibly, the fact of Lyons' admonitions) but rather based on Lyons' presumably expert opinion (that he, Lyons, believed Gerry had followed his advice), thus impermissibly abdicating the jury's role as fact finder. The problem, in my view, with the majority opinion is that I see no such implicit vouching. The majority conflates legitimate factual testimony (I told Gerry to make full disclosure) with illegitimate opining (I am sure he did make full disclosure). Nothing in the record indicates that the latter belief or opinion was expressed to the jury, either implicitly or explicitly. In my opinion, it is not necessarily problematic for a lawyer to testify as a fact witness in the manner that occurred here. In this day and age, I think it highly unlikely that jurors would accord greater weight to a lawyer's testimony than to anyone else's, and certainly nothing in this bizarre case, where a lawyer was on trial for murder, would lead a juror to think that lawyers are trusted professionals to whom deference is owed. [563] In any event, even if it was error to admit Lyons' testimony, I agree that it was harmless error.