Opinion ID: 2976009
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sadistic or Masochistic Conduct

Text: First, Quinn claims that the district court erred in applying the four-level enhancement of USSG § 2G2.2(b)(4) for material portraying sadistic or masochistic conduct. He argues that this 4 Court should apply the rule of lenity because the Guidelines do not define what constitutes “sadistic” or “masochistic” conduct. Quinn also argues that this sentencing factor is not particularly useful because “sex between adults and children is inherently sadistic.” Def.’s Br. at 13. Quinn does not create a factual dispute concerning the depictions at issue nor does he present a controverted matter concerning the application of this enhancement. His claim is without merit. We held in United States v. Fuller, No. 02-3303, 2003 WL 22331999 (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2003) (unpublished disposition), that because the Guidelines do not define sadistic or masochistic, courts must look to the common meaning of those terms to determine their application. Id. at . Accordingly, we found “the enhancement is warranted when the offense involves the depiction of a sexual act that is ‘likely to cause pain in one so young.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 238-39 (5th Cir. 2000)). We agree with Quinn that penetrative sex between adults and prepubescent children is inherently sadistic. “[I]mages displaying vaginal or anal penetration of a prepubescent minor by either an adult male or foreign object is likely to be painful and constitutes sadistic conduct that justifies the enhancement.” Id. (citing United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1261-63 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Parker, 267 F.3d 839, 847 (8th Cir. 2001); Lyckman, 235 F.3d at 238-39; United States v. Canada, 110 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Caldwell, No. 97-5618, 1999 WL 238655, at  (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 1999)). Quinn does not dispute the fact that the images he possessed and distributed depicted the sexual penetration of prepubescent children by adult males. Quinn also does not dispute that a video file he sent to Detective Smith depicted the bondage and sexual abuse of a young girl. These images display sadistic conduct. The district court properly applied the four-point enhancement. B. Pattern of Activity Involving Sexual Abuse of a Minor 5 Second, Quinn argues that the district court erred in applying the five-point enhancement under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(5) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse of a minor. A “pattern of activity” exists when the defendant commits two or more separate instances of sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor. USSG § 2G2.2, cmt. n. 1; see also United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2002). The abuse need not to have occurred during the course of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced. Id. The abuse may involve the same or different victims. Id. The abuse also need not have resulted in a conviction for such conduct for the court to find the existence of a pattern of activity. Id. During the sentencing hearing, the United States presented the testimony of Quinn’s two former stepdaughters to establish that Quinn repeatedly sexually molested them over a period of several years when they were between the ages of four and six and six and eight. Quinn does not contest the district court’s finding that he had sexually abused his stepdaughters as minors; rather, he argues only that the conduct is too remote in time to be considered.2 Quinn argues that because these acts allegedly took place more than thirty years ago, they cannot be used to show a pattern of activity. Quinn notes that if he had been convicted of these acts, the conviction would have occurred too long ago to be considered as part of his criminal history calculation. We find that “[n]othing in § 2G2.2(b)(4) or its current commentary requires a temporal nexus between any instances of sexual abuse” and the crime of conviction. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d at 414. We have previously affirmed application of the enhancement when the prior acts occurred eleven 2 Quinn also argues that he was denied due process because the prosecutor did not disclose in advance the identities of witnesses who would be testifying at his sentencing hearing regarding his past sexual abuse of minors. We find that this claim has no merit. Disclosure of witness identities is not required at sentencing hearings. United States v. Moore, 225 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir. 2000). 6 years earlier. Id. at 413-14. Other circuits have affirmed the enhancement when the sexual abuse took place twenty to twenty-three years earlier, United States v. Woodward, 277 F.3d 87, 89-91 (1st Cir. 2002), and even thirty-five years earlier, United States v. Garner, 490 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, we find that Quinn’s sexual molestation of his former stepdaughters thirty years ago was appropriately considered as part of a pattern of activity. The district court properly applied the fivepoint enhancement. C. Distribution to Induce a Minor to Travel to Engage in Sexual Conduct Third, Quinn objects to the district court’s application of the seven-point enhancement under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(3)(E) for distribution with intent to induce the travel of a minor to engage in sexual conduct. He argues that the enhancement is inapplicable because he was communicating with an undercover officer, not an underage child. Application Note 1 to USSG § 2G2.2, however, provides that a “minor” includes “an undercover law enforcement officer who represented to a participant that the officer had not attained the age of 18 years.” Quinn cites United States v. Chriswell, 401 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2005), in support of his objection. Our decision in Chriswell, however, is not applicable to the present case. The issue in Chriswell was whether an enhancement for “unduly influencing a minor,” under USSG § 2A3.2(b)(2)(B), could be applied when the victim was an undercover police officer. As directed by the commentary to USSG § 2A3.2(b)(2)(B), we focused our inquiry on whether the defendant “compromised the voluntariness of the victim's behavior.” Chriswell, 401 F.3d at 469. Consequently, we held that this enhancement should not apply where the victim is an undercover agent, because there is no true victim upon whom the effect of the defendant's conduct can be measured. Id. 7 Unlike the enhancement at issue in Chriswell, USSG § 2G2.2(b)(3)(E) focuses on the defendant’s conduct, not the impact of such conduct on the voluntariness of the victim. The appropriate inquiry here is whether Quinn distributed the material in a manner that was intended to induce the minor to engage in sexual conduct. Quinn distributed numerous images of child pornography to Detective Smith, whom he believed to be a minor, while encouraging the “minor” to meet him and travel to another place to engage in sexual activity. We find that the district court properly applied the seven-point enhancement. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in calculating Quinn’s Sentencing Guidelines range.