Opinion ID: 76798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Law Claims Against All Defendants

Text: 39 Before we address the merits of her state law claims, we reject Higdon's contention that the district court did not have jurisdiction over her state law claims after it granted summary judgment on her federal claims. Federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form a part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Although a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the court may continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction even after the federal claims are dismissed. See, e.g., Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir.1999); Baker v. Farmers Elec. Co-op., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 283 (5th Cir.1994). 40 Higdon asserts two state law claims against the defendants. She first contends that the district court erred when it dismissed her section 51-1-6 claim as duplicative of her ADA claim. She next contends that the district court erred in dismissing her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. We address each argument in turn.
41 Georgia Code section 51-1-6 states [w]hen the law requires a person to perform an act for the benefit of another or to refrain from doing an act which may injure another, although no cause of action is given in express terms, the injured party may recover for the breach of such legal duty if he suffers damage thereby. Ga.Code Ann. § 51-1-6. The section provides for recovery of damages upon breach of a legal duty and specifies that the requirement under the law to perform or refrain from doing an act must be for the benefit of the injured person. Dupree v. Keller Indus., 199 Ga.App. 138, 404 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991). To recover on a claim of breach of statutory duty, the person complaining of the breach must be within the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. See Spivey v. Sellers, 185 Ga.App. 241, 363 S.E.2d 856, 858-59 (1987). 42 Section 51-1-6 allows an individual to assert a tort claim for the violation of a legal duty where a cause of action does not otherwise exist. Higdon contends that the defendants' alleged violation of the ADA provides her a cause of action under section 51-1-6. The breach of the legal duty Higdon seeks to rely on here is one where an express cause of action already exists as part of a remedial scheme under ... the ADA. Cruet v. Emory Univ., 85 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1354 (N.D.Ga.2000). Title II of the ADA provides a cause of action for Higdon, and she asserted that claim. Section 51-1-6 does not allow her to pursue duplicative remedies for an alleged violation of federal law. See id. The district court, therefore, properly entered summary judgment against Higdon's claim under section 51-1-6. 43
44 To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Georgia law, Higdon must prove four elements: (1) that the defendants engaged in intentional or reckless conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that there is a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and Higdon's emotional distress; and (4) that her emotional distress is severe. See Yarbray v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837-38 (1991). Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness is a question of law for the court. See id. Liability has been found only where the defendant's conduct was so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Kaiser v. Tara Ford, Inc., 248 Ga.App. 481, 546 S.E.2d 861, 868 (2001). 45 Higdon complains that the following conduct was outrageous: (1) McMichael did not allow Higdon to go to the handicapped window, but made Higdon wait in the longer line for commercial title processors; (2) McMichael, Dufford, Eberhardt and Jackson allegedly knew that Higdon was suffering while waiting in line and still did not allow her to use the handicapped window; (3) McMichael allegedly ran her car into Ms. Higdon's car without so much as an apology, joked about it, and exchanged e-mails with another employee explaining that Ms. Higdon would not be invited to use the disabled window and (4) Eberhardt allegedly spoke to Higdon in a derogatory and condescending manner and twice asked Higdon if she was conducting business on the correct day. As the district court found, this conduct at its worst constitutes `tasteless and rude social conduct.' The alleged actions of the defendants do not, however, come close to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. The district court, therefore, properly entered summary judgment against Higdon's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.