Opinion ID: 6104167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard

Text: There is a further wrinkle to rulemaking under the “lookback” provision. All parties now agree the Secretary is not authorized to establish a more stringent efficiency standard for commercial packaged boilers under the “lookback” provision unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the standard would result in significant additional conservation of energy, would be technologically feasible, and is economically justified. See § 6313(a)(6)(C)(i)(I)-(II) (incorporating the criteria set forth in § 6313(a)(6)(A)-(B) for the Secretary’s review occasioned by an amendment by the ASHRAE to Standard 90.1). The requirement of “clear and convincing evidence” as a prerequisite to informal rulemaking is unusual, perhaps unique; we are aware of no other authorization for rulemaking subject to this heightened evidentiary standard. The standard is familiar, however, from other areas of the law: clear and convincing evidence requires a factfinder (in this case the Secretary) to have an “abiding conviction” that her findings (in this case that a more stringent standard would result in significant additional conservation of energy, would be technologically feasible, and is economically justified) are “highly probable” to be true. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984). 11 This unusual framework creates an unusually strong bias in favor of the status quo: The DOE may not establish a more stringent standard unless it clears the heightened evidentiary hurdle established by the Congress. The statute, it is true, requires the Secretary to consider a list of factors only “to the maximum extent practicable” when determining whether a more stringent standard is “economically justified,” 42 U.S.C. § 6313(a)(6)(B)(i), but the phrase “to the maximum extent practicable” does not modify the clear and convincing evidence requirement; it modifies only the requirement to consider specific factors. What it means, therefore, is that if it is impracticable for the DOE to consider further one or more of the enumerated factors, but there is clear and convincing evidence based upon the other factors, then the Secretary may promulgate a more stringent standard. The Respondent-Intervenors argue instead that “the agency is required to … conclude whether the standards are economically justified by clear and convincing evidence but only to the maximum extent practicable.” Oral Argument at 1:09:01. This conflates the nonnegotiable evidentiary standard with the specific factors DOE must consider in determining whether that standard has been met. Difficulty in satisfying the clear and convincing standard is not a justification for ignoring it. Even where clear and convincing evidence is required before an agency can act, however, judicial review of agency action remains deferential. The court asks itself only whether it was reasonable for the agency to determine it met the standard. Sea Island Broad. Corp. of S.C. v. F.C.C., 627 F.2d, 240, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 864 F.3d 589, 590 n.1 (Millett, J., concurring). 12