Opinion ID: 1451436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We review de novo the question of subject matter jurisdiction. Alexander v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr., 484 F.3d 889, 891 (7th Cir.2007). Because determining the propriety of removing to the district court an action filed in state court necessarily requires that we determine the authority of the district court to supplant the state court's jurisdiction with its own, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), we also review de novo the denial of a motion to remand the case to state court. Alexander, 484 F.3d at 891. Such a decision amounts to a decision by the district court that its assertion of jurisdiction over that of the state court was legally permissible. We also review de novo a district court's decision to decline to abstain from exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. FreeEats. com, Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir.2007).
We begin by noting that the district court properly concluded that it possessed diversity jurisdiction over the case. The parties concede, and we agree, that there is complete diversity of citizenship and that the amount in controversy requirement is met in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Village contends, however, that the district court erred in refusing to remand the case; in its view, a forum selection clause in the Consent Order reserved jurisdiction in the Circuit Court of Bureau County, Illinois. Even assuming that the Village is in a position to enforce the terms of the Consent Order between Exxon and Illinoisa proposition for which the Village has failed to offer any persuasive supportthe Village has failed to demonstrate that the Consent Order contains a reservation of jurisdiction. The Village points only to a provision in the Consent Order stating that  the venue of any action commenced in [Illinois] Circuit Court for the purposes of interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the terms and conditions of this Interim Consent Order as provided herein shall be in Bureau County, Illinois. R.1, Ex. 1 pt.1 at 28. The Village contends, without support, that this provision is a jurisdiction selection clause. We cannot agree. On its face, the provision in question does not purport to vest jurisdiction in any court. Instead, it states which venue among the various Illinois counties would be appropriate in the event that an action was commenced in an Illinois Circuit Court for the purposes of interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the terms and conditions of the Consent Order. Id. The Village offers no support for its contention that the provision is a jurisdiction selection clause and the plain text of the Consent Order reads to the contrary. The district court properly found that the Village was not entitled, on the basis of this provision in the Consent Order, to have its case remanded to the state court.
The Village next contends that the case should have been remanded to the state court because the district court was required by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), to abstain from hearing the case. As a general rule, Younger abstention requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing state proceedings. FreeEats.com, 502 F.3d at 595. The rule in Younger is designed to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by the federal courts. Id. Although originally applied to prevent interference only with criminal proceedings, today Younger applies to some civil as well as criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 595, 612, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) (applying Younger abstention to prevent interference with a quasi-criminal state nuisance suit). The rule in Younger protects the principles of equity, comity, and federalism, which have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding. Id. at 602-03, 95 S.Ct. 1200 (quotation omitted). It also is concerned with preventing duplicative legal proceedings, disruption of the state criminal justice system and the negative implication that state courts are unable to enforce constitutional principles. Id. at 604, 608, 95 S.Ct. 1200. The Village contends that removing an action from state court creates a pending state proceeding with which the removed action, then in federal court, conflicts. We cannot accept this argument. It is well established that Younger's concepts of comity and Our Federalism are inapplicable when no state proceeding was pending nor any assertion of important state interests made. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992) (Absent any pending proceeding in state tribunals, therefore, application by the lower courts of Younger abstention was clearly erroneous.). The mere fact that a case could be heard in state court is insufficient to justify Younger abstention. Cf. id. Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 simply does not leave behind a pending state proceeding that would permit Younger abstention. See In re Burns & Wilcox, Ltd., 54 F.3d 475, 477 (8th Cir.1995), limited on other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996). Cf. Kirkbride v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 933 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir.1991) (refusing to abstain on the basis of the Colorado River abstention doctrine from hearing a diversity suit merely because it had been removed from state court); Noonan S., Inc. v. County of Volusia, 841 F.2d 380, 382 (11th Cir.1988) (same). The Village's reliance on Huffman to support this argument is misplaced. Huffman does not stand for the premise that Younger abstention requires a district court to decline to hear a case merely because the case had been removed from state court. In Huffman, instead of appealing a state court's adverse decision, the plaintiff instituted a separate federal proceeding in which he attempted to enjoin the state court from carrying out its enforcement of its nuisance judgment. Had the federal court enjoined the ongoing state proceeding, that injunction would have been a great interference and an affront to comity and federalism. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 607, 95 S.Ct. 1200. Here, by contrast, the Village has failed to point to any ongoing state proceeding with which the removed federal case conflicts. Neither is the Consent Order entered by a state court in an earlier proceeding the sort of pending state proceeding with which the district court's exercise of jurisdiction could be said to implicate the constraints of the Younger doctrine. In the present action, the district court was not asked to conduct a proceeding that would interfere with the state proceeding that resulted in the consent decree. Nor was it asked to enjoin a proceeding pending in state court. The district court therefore properly refused to apply Younger abstention principles.
We next address the effect of CERCLA section 113(h). The district court concluded that the Village's claim [was] preempted by CERCLA Section 113(h) and as a result . . . [that the court] lack[ed] jurisdiction over the Village's claim. Vill. of Depue, Ill. v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 2007 WL 1438581, at  (C.D.Ill. May 15, 2007). We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Olson v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., 366 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir.2004). Section 113(h), titled Timing of review, states: No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is applicable or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating to cleanup standards) to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title.. . . 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added). The provision then lists five additional exceptions to the divestiture of jurisdiction, none of which are at issue in this case. See id. Here, the sole question is whether the district court, which had jurisdiction under section 1332 of Title 28, nevertheless was divested of jurisdiction by section 113(h). Id. Section 113(h) is a blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction, Pollack v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 507 F.3d 522, 525 (7th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted), but it is expressly limited by its own terms: It does not apply to federal courts sitting in diversity. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Thus, section 113(h) permits a federal court to hear a challenge to a federal cleanup initiated under CERCLA if the challenge arises as, for instance, a state-law nuisance action. Pollack, 507 F.3d at 525. Section 113(h) is limited additionally in that, under the express terms of the statute, it applies only to bar jurisdiction over challenges to certain cleanups authorized under CERCLA, specifically to challenges to those remedial action[s] selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). In effect, section 113(h) applies only when the EPA has selected a remedial action under section 9604 or issued an order under section 9606(a), and only then if the challenge arises under federal law. In that limited circumstance, section 113(h) removes jurisdiction over challenges to the EPA's chosen remedial effort until after the cleanup has been completed. Pollack, 507 F.3d at 525. This interpretation is consistent with the statutory purpose of section 113(h), enacted as part of SARA to ensure that, once the EPA chooses a removal or remedial action for a particular site, litigation will not delay the completion or enforcement of a cleanup action. [7] In effect, section 113(h) prevents federal-law challenges to the EPA's selected remedy from going forward until after the remedy has been completed. Id. at 525. The legislative history of SARA also lends support to this holding. The Conference Report for SARA states that the [n]ew section 113(h) is not intended to affect in any way the rights of persons to bring nuisance actions under State law. H.R.Rep. No. 99-962, at 224, 1986 U.S.Code Cong & Admin.News at pp 3276, 3317 (1986) (Conf.Rep.). Similarly, the Congressional Record of Senate Proceedings indicates that unadopted bill language would have extinguished all federal review, but the language that was adopted permitted expressly diversity jurisdiction. 132 Cong. Rec. S17212-03 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell), 132 Cong. Rec. S17136-01 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford). The two Senators who discussed the provision with regard to diversity jurisdiction both stated specifically that section 113(h) did not preempt nuisance cases that arose under state law and that federal courts were permitted to hear state-law nuisance actions if those cases arose in diversity. [8] The plain language of section 113(h) states that the bar to jurisdiction does not apply to a federal court sitting in diversity. This holding is supported by the plain language, purpose and statutory history of the statute. Here, where the district court sat in diversity, it was not divested of jurisdiction by section 113(h).