Opinion ID: 186950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Threat to Beall's

Text: 21 The Union argues that because Beall's neither established a reserved gate nor notified the Union that it intended to do so, the Union ha[d] no duty to assume that such a system would be in place, and no duty to propose a reserved gate system on its own. Moreover, the Union cannot have broken the law, it maintains, by failing to promise it would not break the law. The Board responds that its rule requiring a union to indicate it will abide by Moore Dry Dock is consistent with its own precedents, that is, Board law, see, e.g., State Elec., 342 NLRB No. 74 (2004). 22 The Union relies upon three propositions, all of which we find persuasive: (1) the Ninth Circuit in Local 32 has squarely rejected the Board's rule in a reasoned opinion; (2) though we have not ruled upon the issue, this circuit's precedents are consistent with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit; and (3) the Board's rule violates what the Union calls the canon of federal labor law that if a course of action is lawful, advance notice of it is also lawful, for which it refers us to NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 57, 84 S.Ct. 1098, 12 L.Ed.2d 121 (1964), where the Court stated that protection of lawful conduct would be undermined if a threat to engage in protected conduct were not itself protected. The Board's failure even to mention Local 32 in its brief is of a piece with its apparent refusal generally to recognize the existence of that case, in which the Ninth Circuit held the Board could not presume that a union's threat to picket the job was a threat to picket contrary to the law, when picketing at the job could be done in a lawful manner, and said such a presumption is without foundation in the Act, relevant case law or any general legal principles. 912 F.2d at 1110. The ALJ acknowledged Local 32, but noted that the Board accepted [it] only as the law of the case and continues to require a union to indicate that its picketing will conform to Moore Dry Dock standards. In short, the Board continued to adhere to its preferred rule, see generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L.J. 679 (1989), and in its decision did not deign to acknowledge the contrary holding of the Ninth Circuit. 23 The Ninth Circuit's decision is not binding upon this court, of course, but it is considerably more persuasive than the Board's conclusory claim that its rule is a reasonable interpretation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The Board offers us no reason to believe it can make an unfair labor practice out of a union's failure to assure an employer the union will abide by the law. 24 In addition to Local 32 the Union points to this court's decision in J.F. Hoff Electric Co. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1266 (1980). There we explained that under Moore Dry Dock neutral employers may insulate themselves from ... picketing only if the reserved gate practice is faithfully observed. Id. at 1271. This proposition, the Union reasons, necessarily implies that [w]here a site owner like Beall's fails to set up a reserved gate at all ... the Union cannot be held liable for threatening primary picketing at the site. This is also consistent, the Union argues, with our decision suggesting it is an employer's role to inform a union of, and not the union's obligation to ferret out, business information relevant to the lawfulness of any self-help in which the union might engage, see, e.g., United Scenic Artists, Local 829 v. NLRB, 762 F.2d 1027, 1031 (1985) (burden on employer to inform union about its business plans regarding use of non-union labor or control of materials); by parity of reasoning, the burden of informing a union about the existence of or plan to erect a reserved gate should be on the neutral employer. 25 The Board's response is that J.F. Hoff merely affirmed that the Union must target the primary employer as exclusively as possible, and that unlike the business information at issue in United Scenic Artists and J.F. Hoff itself, the existence or lack of a reserved gate ... is apparent to the casual observer. True enough if the observer, including a would-be picket, shows up at a common situs with a proper reserved gate in place. See, e.g., Local Union No. 501, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 888, 890 n. 1 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (detailing signs that adequately identify a reserved gate). The Board does not, however, explain why this distinction between what is and what is not apparent at the job site should turn a letter about picketing a site that lacks a reserved gate into a threat to picket that site in a manner that would violate the rules of engagement applicable if it did have a reserved gate. 26 We therefore adopt the Ninth Circuit's straightforward reasoning that the Board could not presume that a union's threat to picket the job was a threat to picket contrary to the law, when picketing at the job could be done in a lawful manner; we agree that such a presumption is without foundation in the Act, relevant case law or any general legal principles, Local 32, 912 F.2d at 1110. Because the Union's letter to Beall's made no suggestion it intended to do anything that would violate the Act and the Board may not presume the letter was a threat to picket contrary to the law, when picketing ... could be done in a lawful manner, id., we vacate the Board's Decision and Order to the extent it holds the Union's letter violated the Act and orders the Union to cease unqualifiedly threatening to picket.