Opinion ID: 381814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: An Evidentiary Ruling

Text: 231 ADM urges reversal because the District Judge excluded a portion of the testimony of Kenton Harris, its expert entomologist. Harris was excepted from the rule excluding witnesses from the courtroom, F.R.Evid. 615, and prior to his testimony heard substantial portions of the testimony presented by Stevenson and ADM. The overwhelming majority of Harris' admitted testimony concerned the source of the infestation. He testified as an expert that the flour mills used effective procedures and that the rail cars were properly prepared. He also described more as a factual witness than an expert what he had found in an earlier inspection of the State Docks warehouses. But when he attempted to testify to the condition of the Nedon and its cargo on his December 14, 1974, inspection, the District Judge ruled that the testimony would not be admitted. ADM did not offer the substance of Harris' testimony at that time, however. Only after trial, on motion for rehearing, did ADM offer the proof by means of affidavit. 232 The District Judge was probably required to permit Harris to be present during trial, since much of his testimony was expert opinion. F.R.Evid. 703; Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1978). But the fact that Harris also testified or attempted to testify as a factual, not merely expert, witness concerning his inspections does not automatically warrant exclusion of that factual testimony. ADM may have indicated at the beginning of trial that Harris would testify only as an expert, not a factual, witness. Even so, we do not normally permit exclusion of testimony simply because a witness violated the sequestration rule, or, in this case, an agreed exception to the rule. United States v. Suarez, 487 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 981, 94 S.Ct. 1572, 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1076 n.16 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Notwithstanding the District Judge's broad discretion in evidentiary matters, it no doubt would have been error to exclude Harris' testimony concerning the Nedon if that ruling was based solely on Harris' presence during prior testimony. Harris' testimony, though concerned with the Nedon's condition fully two months after loading, had some relevance to the condition of the Nedon prior to loading and hence to establishing the source of the infestation and to Stevenson's care of the cargo. See F.R.Evid. 402. 233 We have no doubt, however, that the District Judge was within his discretion in excluding that marginally relevant testimony. First, prior to the testimony of Harris, ADM had presented its marine surveyor, who had inspected the Nedon at the earlier, more probative dates of December 2 and 3, 1974. That witness' testimony was substantially the same as Harris' testimony would have been (as set out in his post-trial affidavit). ADM also presented the testimony of two other witnesses who had inspected the Nedon. Because of the testimony of these witnesses, the District Judge was entitled to exclude Harris' testimony as cumulative. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). For much the same reasons, and without deciding whether ADM's untimely offer of proof would alone have justified the District Judge's ruling, we are convinced that even if the evidence was erroneously excluded ADM's substantial rights were not affected. F.R.Evid. 103; Adamson v. Home Life Insurance Co., 508 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1975). ADM was not prejudiced by the ruling. The District Judge's evidentiary ruling therefore does not warrant reversal.