Opinion ID: 1724022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Anti-Sympathy Instruction

Text: By assignment of error number three, defendant argues that it was error for the trial court to allow the prosecutor to tell potential jurors during voir dire that they must not permit the testimony of defendant's daughter to be the sole reason for not voting for the death penalty. Defendant asserts that this error was compounded when the court improperly issued an anti-sympathy instruction to the jury prior to deliberations: Now you are not to be influenced by sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public opinion. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the record reveals that the prosecutor was simply inquiring during voir dire whether knowledge that the defendant had a loving daughter would preclude the jurors from being able to consider the death penalty. The voir dire also reveals that the defendant like wise pursued the same line of questioning regarding the victim's mother and family, inquiring whether sympathy for the victim's family alone would cause a juror to conclude that the death penalty was warranted. This Court has upheld identical instructions that the jury remain uninfluenced by sympathy, even during the penalty phase. State v. Brogdon, 457 So.2d 616, 629 (La. 1984). As we concluded in Brogdon, the instruction does not direct the jury to eschew sympathy specifically for the defendant; but rather to eschew sympathy altogether. Here, as in Brogdon, the judge instructed the jury that they must also consider any other relevant mitigating circumstances in favor of the defendant. We are unpersuaded by defendant's attempt to twist this established proper jury instruction into one by which jurors would be instructed to remain uninfluenced by sympathy for the victim only, when the proper instruction cautions jurors from being influenced by sympathy for either the defendant or the victim. The prosecutor's voir dire questioning was likewise proper. This assignment lacks merit. Character and Propensity Testimony Defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of witnesses Jennifer Beyer, Maria Olivier, and Tina Horn. The defendant complains that the State failed to timely provide notification of statements made by defendant to which witnesses Breyer and Olivier testified. Initially, because Tina Horn did not testify at all, we find no error in regards to that portion of defendant's argument. On October 5, 1994, Maria Olivier and Jennifer Beyer both testified regarding a January 17, 1990 incident that occurred in the lobby of the law office where the victim worked at the time. Both witnesses testified to the defendant's use of extremely derogatory language toward the victim and Ms. Beyer. The testimony was not offered as evidence of other crimes nor was it offered as an inculpatory statement. Rather, the testimony went to the character and propensities of the defendant, an area clearly relevant and within the proper scope of a capital sentencing hearing. La.Code Crim.P. art. 905.2. On October 2, 1994, six days after the sentencing proceedings began, the State provided written notice of their intent to use the statements. The defendant objected on October 3, 1994 and during the ensuing arguments which continued intermittently until just prior to opening arguments, the State provided written notice of intent to introduce the defendant's statements as evidence of true character and propensity. Although the trial court initially ruled that the State would not be allowed to introduce the statements during their case-in-chief, he later requested argument on the issue. Following the subsequent hearing, the defendant sought additional time and the court granted both sides until the following morning and requested memoranda. Then, after a forty-five minute recess, the proceedings continued until 4:20 PM. The following morning, counsel resumed argument as to the admissibility of the defendant's statements made in the presence of witnesses Beyer and Olivier. In response to defendant's complaint that he was mid-trial without benefit of co-counsel, the State suggested as an appropriate remedy a recess or a delay in order to allow the defendant time to interview the witnesses and prepare. The State also offered to make the witnesses available for such interviews. However, the defendant insisted on continuing the proceedings and countered by requesting that the court consider the other alternative remedy of excluding the testimony. The court ruled that he would allow the testimony. In so ruling, the court expressly acknowledged the notice requirements of La.Code Crim.P. 716(B). La.Code Crim.P. 716(B) requires the district attorney, upon motion by the defendant, to inform the defendant of the existence, but not the contents, of any statement made by the defendant which the prosecutor intends to offer at trial. La.Code Crim.P. 729.5 provides an array of possible sanctions available to the court where a party has failed to comply with discovery. Among the listed remedies are the granting of a continuance, exclusion of the evidence, or any appropriate order. It is within the trial court's discretion to exclude the evidence or enter any appropriate order to remedy a party's violation of a discovery right. State v. Seals, 684 So.2d 368, 378 (La.1996). Here, defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the State's delayed notice because he was unable to adequately prepare to defend against the information presented. However, the State suggested a recess or delay for the defendant to have time to interview the witnesses at issue and prepare for his examination. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial judge would have refused to accept the State's suggestion had the defendant not adamantly insisted on proceeding. Further, we believe that such a recess would have been amply sufficient to remedy any possible prejudice caused by the State's late notice. When considered in light of defendant's insistence on all or nothing as to exclusion of the evidence or no remedy at all, despite the State's suggestions, the defendant's argument that he was prejudiced by the State's late notice fails. Though a defendant need not object to preserve error during a capital sentencing hearing, a defendant may not cause the error which he later asserts as prejudicial. For the foregoing reasons, we find assignments of error one, two, seventeen, and eighteen to be without merit.