Opinion ID: 901352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearsay Testimony of J.H. Right to Confrontation

Text: [¶ 17.] Pursuant to SDCL 19-16-38, [5] J.H.s hearsay statements to Colleen Brazil were admitted at trial. McKinney contends that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), applies to his case. [6] McKinney contends that under Crawford, his motion for a new trial should have been granted because he did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine J.H. McKinney argues that he was denied this opportunity because J.H. could not or did not answer certain questions during cross-examination and was, therefore, unavailable. [¶ 18.] Both the United States Constitution and the South Dakota Constitution provide the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against a criminal defendant. U.S. Const. amend. VI; S.D. Const. art. VI, 7. [A]n alleged violation of [this] constitutionally protected right is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Carothers, 2005 SD 16, ¶ 7, 692 N.W.2d 544, 546 (citations omitted). [¶ 19.] Crawford overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), which had previously allowed the admission of hearsay statements if they fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Although Crawford changed these rules and generally prohibited the use of such statements, Crawford did permit the admission of hearsay if the witness was available for cross-examination at trial. [7] Id. at 59, 124 S.Ct. at 1369, 158 L.Ed.2d at ___, n. 9; Carothers, 2005 SD 16, 692 N.W.2d 544. [¶ 20.] The trial court concluded that, because J.[ ]H. was available for cross-examination at the trial regarding both her trial testimony and the statements made to Brazil (the forensic interviewer) at Child's Voice, McKinney's right to confront his accusers was not denied at the trial. In reviewing this ruling, we assume without deciding that the statements to Brazil were testimonial. [8] We, therefore, must determine whether J.H. was available for cross-examination at trial. [¶ 21.] In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 497 (1970), the Supreme Court indicated that for this type of hearsay to be admitted, there must be a full and effective cross-examination at trial. In addressing the meaning of a full and effective cross-examination, the Supreme Court stated the question is whether subsequent cross-examination at the defendant's trial will still afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. Id. at 160-61, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1936, 26 L.Ed.2d at 498. However, this does not mean that the cross-examination must be exactly as a defendant wants it. [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only `an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 L.Ed.2d 631, 643 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19 (1985)) (emphasis in original). [¶ 22.] McKinney argues that his cross-examination was not full and effective because on approximately twenty occasions J.H. answered his questions indicating that she did not know or could not remember certain facts. A detailed review of J.H.'s testimony reflects that these answers were in response to five types of questions. One type involved questions that were withdrawn. Another dealt with questions that were irrelevant to the crimes at issue. The third involved questions that J.H. later answered. The fourth involved less relevant inquiries concerning her memory of things that she may have previously said to Brazil or the prosecuting attorney (during the grand jury proceeding). The last type involved questions about the sexual abuse that J.H. did not remember or could not answer. [¶ 23.] Of the twenty non-responsive answers, we observe that one question was withdrawn. Another was irrelevant to McKinney's conduct. Eight questions were rephrased and answered later. And, six involved questions concerning her recollection of what she may have previously said to other people. Thus, on only four occasions during cross-examination did J.H. actually fail to respond to a relevant question about the abuse. Moreover, to the extent that she did not respond to questions asking about her prior statements to Brazil, that information was depicted on the videotape that was played to the jury. [¶ 24.] We also observe that J.H.'s entire testimony spans almost 60 pages and she affirmatively answered 403 questions (including 122 questions on cross and recross-examination). In contrast, J.H. only failed to provide answers to relevant questions on a handful of occasions. Because this record of responses is really no different than most witnesses' courtroom performance, we conclude that the jury was afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statements. Consequently, McKinney was not deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine J.H., and McKinney's motion for a new trial was properly denied.