Opinion ID: 2768776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standards for a COA

Text: The standards for granting a COA in a death penalty case arising from a state court judgment are well-established. Beatty v. Stephens, 759 F.3d 455, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2014) (outlining procedures). A COA must be based upon a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To satisfy this standard, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that “jurists of reason” would find the district court’s decision “debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The decision at this stage is a threshold one; thus, in arriving at our decision, we must not actually Masterson argues that the state proceedings were “inadequate” because the state 1 court did not conduct a live hearing. It is unclear what relief he seeks in this regard. To the extent he contends that he was, therefore, unable to fully develop his claim, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B), he fails to cite to anything in the record showing a proper request for such a live hearing under state law. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (“Diligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.”); see Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011) (limiting review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to consideration of the state court record). 4 Case: 14-70021 Document: 00512896472 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 No. 14-70021 adjudicate the merits of the claim. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). In a death penalty case, any doubts about whether to grant a COA should be resolved in favor of granting it. Gomez v. Quarterman, 529 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, our COA analysis is guided by the deferential standards mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. Thus, “[w]e evaluate the debatability of [Masterson’s] constitutional claims through the lens of AEDPA’s highly deferential standard.” Beatty, 759 F.3d at 462. An application for a writ of habeas corpus [on a state judgment adjudicated on the merits] shall not be granted . . . unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). With these standards in mind, we turn to an analysis of Masterson’s application.