Opinion ID: 164589
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retaliation and Harassment as a Result of the Exercise of Freedom of Speech

Text: 51 Mr. Montgomery appears to challenge the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City on his claims regarding retaliation, hostile work environment, and First Amendment violations. Aplt's Br. at 40. Other than generic references to a Second Circuit case, counsel provides no caselaw supporting these arguments. 52 Mr. Montgomery identifies his protected speech as (1) co-authoring the May 11, 1997 letter to the editor of Ardmore's local newspaper voicing support of Chief Snelson; (2) being a member of the FOP; and (3) abstaining from the vote of no-confidence. The letter encouraged readers to look at the many changes and improvements Chief Snelson had accomplished during his tenure. Aplt's App. vol. II, at 531. The letter encouraged the public to allow[] [the chief] ... to tell his side of the story [so that] we will have a complete picture upon which to make an informed decision. Id. 53 To evaluate Mr. Montgomery's claim, we employ the four-part balancing test for determining whether a public employer's actions impermissibly infringe on free speech rights of employees as set out in Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). We balance the public employee's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern against the government's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Id. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. 54 First, the court must decide whether the speech at issue touches on a matter of public concern. If it does, the court must balance the interest of the employee in making the statement against the employer's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Third, if the preceding prerequisites are met, the speech is protected, and plaintiff must show h[is] expression was a motivating factor in the detrimental employment decision. Finally, if the plaintiff sustains this burden, the employer can still prevail if it shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision regardless of the protected speech. 55 Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 494-95 (10th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 56 Thus, [s]peech that pertains to a public agency's discharging its governmental responsibilities ordinarily will be regarded as speech on a matter of public concern. David v. City and County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1355 (10th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (holding that speech on a matter of public concern is that which may be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community); Wilson v. City of Littleton, 732 F.2d 765, 768 (10th Cir.1984) (holding the speech must `sufficiently inform the issue as to be helpful to the public in evaluating the conduct of [the] government'). In contrast, speech relating to internal personnel disputes and working conditions ordinarily will not be viewed as addressing matters of public concern. Id. 57 Here, by its voicing support of Chief Snelson during a time of public scrutiny and a criminal investigation, the letter to the editor addresses a matter of public concern. However, we agree with the district court that the record is devoid of ... a connection, Aplt's App. vol. II, at 773, between the publication of the letter and termination of Mr. Montgomery's employment or any other adverse employment action. In particular, we note that Mr. Montgomery's employment was terminated more than a year after the letter was published, and Mr. Montgomery has offered no evidence that the reasons stated for the termination — the expiration of his long-term disability benefits — was pretextual. 58 Similarly, we agree with the district court that Mr. Montgomery has presented no evidence that the City took action against him because of his membership in the FOP. Finally, Mr. Montgomery cannot show that the City took an adverse employment action against him because of not voting in the no-confidence vote. 59 Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the City is entitled to summary judgment on this First Amendment retaliation claim. 60