Opinion ID: 702508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the district court commit pretrial error and allow government misconduct?

Text: 89 Garza raises a number of issues concerning the manner in which the district court managed discovery and scheduling. Garza first contends that the district court deprived him of his right to effective counsel by refusing to grant him an additional one month's continuance. Garza was indicted on January 5, 1993 and was given several continuances over the following months. On May 28, Garza filed a motion asking the court to continue his trial date thirty days after the already rescheduled June 30 trial date. The court instead gave Garza an additional week and jury selection commenced on July 6, 1993. 90 We will find that the district court abused its discretion in refusing a continuance only if Garza can show that he was seriously prejudiced by the denial. United States v. Ross, 58 F.3d 154, 159 (5th Cir.1995). When he moved for this continuance, Garza emphasized the vast amount of evidence that the government produced, the number of aggravating murders that the government alleged and that much of the documentary evidence of the Mexican murders was written in Spanish; on appeal he reiterates these same factors. However, even after this motion, Garza had over one month in which to prepare for trial. Garza makes no effort to explain what he was unable to accomplish in this time or what more he would have done had he been given the extra three weeks. In short, Garza has not shown that he was prejudiced. For this reason, we find that the court did not err in limiting its continuance to one week. 91 Garza next argues that the government purposefully inflated its witness list in order to prevent him from preparing for trial. Approximately one week before jury selection, the government gave Garza a list containing more than 400 names. Garza complained that the government could not honestly expect to call this number of witnesses and the court asked the government to provide a list of witnesses which the government would call for certain. Four days before the government began presenting evidence, the government gave Garza a revised list of approximately 200 witnesses. At trial, the government called approximately 60-70 of these witnesses. 25 92 We see no error in the manner in which the district court handled this issue. When Garza brought his objection to the court's attention, the court appropriately directed the government to submit a more limited list. The government readily complied and Garza did not renew his complaint after receiving the revised list. Garza has not shown that the court's remedy was insufficient to protect his rights or that it affected the outcome of his trial. United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1049 (5th Cir.1994). 93 Garza also complains that the government did not provide him with the criminal records of Trooper Castillo's confidential informant who testified as part of the government's case, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). However, the record shows that Garza discovered the witness' criminal record. He was able to impeach this witness on cross-examination with the information that she had been convicted of helping her husband steal a truck. Therefore, we find no Brady violation. Lawrence v. Lensing, 42 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir.1994) (when defendant is able to take advantage of essential information, no violation). 94 Additionally, Garza complains that the government gave him insufficient notice of the facts and information underlying the aggravating factors in general and of two of the alleged aggravating homicides in particular. However, Garza does not point to any failure of the government to comply with the district court's discovery orders and does not argue that the court erred by failing to order discovery of aggravating evidence. Garza has shown no error. 95 Next, Garza complains that the government did not specify which people on its witness list were confidential informants. There is no merit to this point, given that the record demonstrates that prior to trial, Garza's attorney informed the court that the defense knew who the confidential informant was. 26 96 3. Did the court err by denying Garza's request for Jencks Act and Brady material? 97 Garza contends that the government withheld the statements of three witnesses to which he was entitled under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500, and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). These witnesses were cooperating co-conspirators who had been debriefed by government agents prior to their plea negotiations. None of these witnesses had made formal statements, but government agents had taken notes during their interviews. Garza maintains that he is entitled to these notes. 98
99 A Jencks Act statement is either (1) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness, or (2) a 'substantially verbatim recital' of an oral statement made by the witness. United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1861, 128 L.Ed.2d 483 (1994). When an agent takes notes while interviewing a witness, those notes are not statements unless the witness 'signed, read, or heard the entire document read.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669, 675 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 621, 121 L.Ed.2d 554 (1992)). The record supports the district court's conclusion that the government had not obtained a statement from any of these witnesses. 100
101 Garza also asserts that these notes should have been disclosed to him as Brady material. However, Garza never made a specific Brady request for these notes and, until his appeal, never suggested that these notes might contain Brady material. In these circumstances, the district court did not err in accepting the government's representation that it has furnished the defendant with all Brady materials. The district court was under no duty to make an independent sua sponte inquiry to determine whether these notes might contain exculpatory information. See United States v. Gaston, 608 F.2d 607, 614 (5th Cir.1979). 102 4. Did the court err by admitting a statement not disclosed in discovery? 103 Garza contends that the district court erred by admitting a statement of his that the government had not disclosed during pretrial discovery. Because Garza was not entitled to this statement under the discovery rules, the court did not err in admitting the statement. 104 Garza made this statement after Trooper Castillo came to his house to ask him about the money that troopers had discovered in the Toronado driven by Israel Flores. Garza first denied that the money was his, then reconsidered and said that since he owned the car and the money was inside it, he figured the money should belong to him. 27 Just as the troopers were leaving the house, Israel Flores arrived. Garza flew off the handle and yelled at Flores in Spanish, What happened, fool?, an inculpatory statement suggesting that Garza knew that the money was in the car all along. 105 Before trial, the district court ordered the government to produce any statements that Garza had made. The government disclosed everything that Garza had said to the troopers but did not reveal Garza's angry exclamation to Flores. When Trooper Castillo testified about this incident, the court overruled Garza's objection that the statement should have been produced during discovery. 106 Relying on United States v. Alvarez, 987 F.2d 77, 84-86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 147, 126 L.Ed.2d 109 (1993), Garza contends that the district court erred by not suppressing this statement. However, the statement in Alvarez was covered under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a), which, among other things, requires the government to disclose those oral statements it plans to use at trial that the defendant made in response to interrogation by any person then known to the defendant to be a government agent. 107 Garza's statement is different because Garza did not make his statement to Trooper Castillo or any other government agent; he made it to Israel Flores in Trooper Castillo's presence. Not only was this not a statement made to a government agent, it was also not made in response to interrogation. See United States v. Kusek, 844 F.2d 942, 947 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 860, 109 S.Ct. 157, 102 L.Ed.2d 128 (1988) (voluntary outbursts not covered by rule). Thus, Rule 16(a) does not apply and the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of this statement. 108 5. Did the court err by allowing the government to object during Garza's closing argument? 109 Garza argues next that the government objected so often during his closing argument that he was deprived of his procedural rights to rebut the government's accusations. The record does not support this argument. Garza was given 1.5 hours to close, which occupied 60 pages of transcript. During Garza's argument, the government objected eight times on the grounds that Garza mischaracterized either the law or the evidence. On most occasions, the court instructed the jury to disregard any statements of law made by the attorneys that were inconsistent with the court's charge or to consider the evidence as the jury remembered it. Our review shows that while these objections were not entirely fruitful, they were also not frivolous. As the record reveals, the district court did not err, plain or otherwise, by failing to curb the government's objections. 110 Garza complains in more detail that through one of these objections, the government commented on his failure to testify. This objection occurred during the following exchange: 111 ATTORNEY FOR GARZA: Now, Mr. Garza did not testify. And the reason he didn't testify, ladies and gentlemen, is because that decision was mine. He doesn't have-- 112 GOVT: Objection, Your Honor. That is a misstatement of the law. The individual-- 113 COURT: The objection is overruled. 114 It is obvious to us that the government did not manifestly intend to comment on Garza's silence by this objection, when Garza's silence had already been raised by Garza's counsel. The government was objecting to what it perceived as Garza's implication that the decision not to testify is made solely by the defendant's attorney. Additionally, the jury would most naturally construe this objection as a comment on Garza's closing argument, rather than on his choice not to testify. Garza's contention that the government's brief objection highlighted his decision to remain silent after he undertook to raise the issue and explain his silence is meritless. United States v. Mackay, 33 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir.1994).