Opinion ID: 4192155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the panel’s opinion on remand

Text: As the panel summarized, the following standard governs the harmlessness question before us: MCL 769.26 “presumes that a preserved, nonconstitutional error is not a ground for reversal unless after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.[”] Lukity, 460 Mich at 495-496 (quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the burden is on defendant to “demonstrate that after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error asserted has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 495 (quotation omitted). “In making this determination, the reviewing court should focus on the nature of the error in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence.” People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 474; 620 NW2d 13 (2000), quoting People v Elston, 462 Mich 751, 766; 614 NW2d 595 (2000). See also People v Mitchell, 301 Mich App 282, 286; 835 NW2d 615 (2013). “The object of this inquiry is to determine if it affirmatively appears that the error asserted undermines the reliability of the verdict.” Lukity, 460 Mich at 495 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “In other words, the effect of the error is evaluated by assessing it in the context of the untainted evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the error.” Id. [People v Lyles (On Remand), unpublished per curiam opinion 3 of the Court of Appeals, issued December 22, 2015 (Docket No. 315323), p 3.] The majority does not take issue with this articulation of the Lukity standard. Nor is there any reason to do so. Instead, the majority seems concerned that the panel went astray in its application of this standard, “purport[ing]” to apply it but, once again, not actually doing so. More specifically, the majority posits that the panel’s “critical error was focusing on the importance of the good-character instruction to defendant’s defense strategy instead of evaluating the likelihood of defendant’s prevailing on that strategy”— that is, “focusing on the instruction’s importance to defendant’s defense rather than focusing on its importance to the verdict.” In support, the majority repeatedly points to the panel’s conclusion that the trial court’s instructional error “eviscerated the significance of defendant’s character evidence, which was crucial to his defense, and wholly undermined his effort to establish that he was a peaceful person who could not have committed such a vicious murder”—at one point holding it right up against Lukity’s fully stated harmlessness standard, as if to better expose its inadequacy. It is true: the panel did evaluate how the court’s misinstruction to the jury interacted with the defense presented by the defendant at his trial. To the extent the majority suggests this was itself a legal error, I can’t agree. A (properly instructed) jury arrives at its verdict only after assessing both the prosecution’s proofs and the defendant’s defense to those proofs; the importance of an error to that defense is thus quite relevant to its importance to the ensuing verdict. I do not read Lukity or any other 4 case to suggest otherwise, nor has the majority cited any authority to that effect. 2 To the contrary, assessing just how big an impact an error has had on a defendant’s defense falls comfortably within Lukity’s mandate that the reviewing court “focus[] on the nature of the error . . . .” Lukity, 460 Mich at 495 (citation and quotation marks omitted). That is precisely what the panel did here. To read the majority’s opinion, you’d think that’s all the panel did—that it simply looked at “the nature of the error,” found it very significant to the defendant’s defense, and called it a day. Were that the case, then the panel’s analysis might very well have fallen short of the requirement that it “assess[] [the error] in the context of the untainted evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the error.” Id. But that’s not what the panel did. Rather, immediately after summarizing the “eviscerat[ing]” effect of the court’s error on the defendant’s character evidence and defense, the panel went on to explain that, 2 The majority criticizes the panel for citing, in support of this portion of its analysis, two cases from this Court: People v Silver, 466 Mich 386; 646 NW2d 150 (2002), and People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466, 474; 620 NW2d 13 (2000). The panel, however, merely cited these cases as general support for its conclusion that “the nature of the error” in this case was significant because, “[b]y failing to give the key part of the instruction requested by defendant, the trial court prevented the jury from having the opportunity to properly weigh defendant’s character evidence.” Lyles (On Remand), unpub op at 4. Both Silver and Rodriguez strike me as fairly read to provide such general support (and although, as the majority notes, Silver was a fractured decision, I do not see, with respect to the point for which the panel cited it here, disagreement among the two Justices who joined the opinion and the two who concurred). While both cases may be distinguishable in other respects from the instant case, the panel—by signaling its citation to them with a “Cf.”—did not purport to suggest otherwise. Simply put, I fail to see any error in the panel’s limited reliance on these cases, or in the more general point it cited them to support. 5 “considering the nature of this error in the context of the evidence presented by the prosecution, we are persuaded that defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the error.” Lyles (On Remand), unpub op at 3-4. The panel then detailed at length why that was the case, evaluating over multiple paragraphs the very same proofs the majority summarizes here and concluding that, “[u]ltimately, considering the entire cause, we are persuaded that the trial court’s failure to give the requested character evidence instruction eviscerated the effect of defendant’s proffered character evidence and that such an error cannot be considered harmless in light of the evidence relied upon by the prosecution,” and thus “defendant has met his burden of establishing that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” Id. at 4-6. The majority does not engage with, or even acknowledge, this substantial portion of the panel’s harmlessness analysis, and so it is difficult to discern what exactly they might think is so wrong with it: what critical evidence the panel clearly neglected or misstated, or what fatal mistake of law it made in carrying out its fact-intensive application of Lukity’s settled standard. From my own review, I can’t find any such thing, or any reason why this Court should reverse the panel’s analysis and conclusion. We gave the panel a job to do. It did that job, and showed its work. That work was deliberate and thorough, well beyond what we ourselves are often asked to review. And as “an examination of the entire cause” confirms, it was correct. 6