Opinion ID: 1165515
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Disclose Full Purpose and Effect

Text: Petitioners contend that the draftsmen of Proposition 8 failed to disclose on [the] face [of the initiative] the full purpose and effect of its provisions, as required by article IV, section 9. Their arguments are founded upon the last two sentences of that section. These sentences set forth a pair of rules: (1) A statute may not be amended by reference to its title; and (2) A section of a statute may not be amended unless the section is re-enacted as amended. [13] Petitioners allege that the first rule was violated by that portion of Proposition 8 which repealed the law relating to mentally disordered sex offenders (M.D.S.O.). (Prop. 8, § 9.) They further contend that the Truth-in-Evidence provision amended by implication nearly all of the Evidence Code. Since none of the Evidence Code was re-enacted as amended, they contend a violation of the second rule resulted. The first of these arguments lacks merit. The attempt by the draftsmen of Proposition 8 to repeal the M.D.S.O. laws was mooted by legislative enactment in 1981. The voters were twice informed of this fact in the ballot pamphlet. (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 8, 1982), analysis by Legislative Analyst, p. 55, and rebuttal to argument in favor of Prop. 8, p. 34.) Indeed, the voters were explicitly advised that the initiative measure's attempt to repeal the M.D.S.O. laws has no effect. ( Id., at p. 55.) It would be too severe a rule to hold that the entire proposition should be invalidated for such a technical violation of the prohibition against repeal by reference to a law's title. In all probability, no voter confusion was caused by this violation. Petitioners' second contention  that numerous statutes relating to the admissibility of evidence were implicitly amended without being re-enacted as amended  poses a more difficult question. The purpose of such a constitutional provision is clear. It is to compel [a proposed law] to disclose on its face something of its purpose and effect.... ( Myers v. Stringham (1925) 195 Cal. 672, 675 [235 P. 448]; see also Brosnahan v. Eu, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 12 (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) There is no case which directly decides whether amendments proposed by statewide initiative are subject to the constitutional requirement of article IV, section 9, regarding reenactment of amended statutes. [14] However, in Myers v. Stringham, supra, 195 Cal. 672, a substantially similar requirement in a city charter was held to apply to an attempt to amend a city ordinance by the initiative process. No reason has been suggested why a statewide initiative should be treated differently from a local initiative or a legislatively enacted statutory amendment in this regard. The purpose of the requirement is equally applicable to statewide initiatives. An amendment by initiative should disclose on its face something of its purpose and effect.... (See Myers, supra, 195 Cal. at p. 675.) Indeed, that purpose would seem to be even more important in the context of initiatives since they are frequently drafted by a small group of people ( Wallace, supra, 200 Cal. at p. 592), without the opportunity for inquiry, explanation, and critical analysis that is available for amendments considered by the Legislature. It is true that the requirement for reenactment of amended statutes is found in article IV, which deals with Legislative matters. However, this fact does not justify the conclusion that the application of the requirement is limited to amendments passed by the Legislature, since the initiative power reserved to the people is itself a reserved legislative power. (See art. IV, § 1.) As this court has noted on several occasions, `By the enactment of initiative and referendum laws the people have simply ... reserved to themselves the right to exercise a part of their inherent legislative power.' ( Hays v. Wood, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 786, fn. 3, quoting Dwyer v. City Council (1927) 200 Cal. 505, 513 [253 P. 932], italics added in Hays. ) That the effect of Proposition 8 was to alter a substantial number of statutes is undeniable. Petitioners list more than two dozen statutes the provisions of which have, by necessary implication, been amended by the Truth-in-Evidence provision alone. (Prop. 8, § 3; see also ante, at pp. 278-279.) None of these statutes was set forth or reenacted in the initiative measure. Nor were they detailed in the analysis or the arguments in favor of the proposition. Thus, the voters could not have had a realistic idea as to the scope of the statutory changes which would result from the enactment of the measure. Further, the voters could not possibly have known what existing evidentiary provisions were being preserved. As presented to the electorate, the initiative mandated that relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding. However, it also provided exceptions to this rule for any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352, 782 or 1103. Nowhere were the people even given a hint as to what these exceptions to the relevant evidence rule entailed. Such information was not contained within the four corners of the proposition. Sections 352, 782, and 1103 of the Evidence Code were neither set forth in the initiative, nor were their contents alluded to in the ballot pamphlet. The same is true for the existing statutory rule[s] of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay and for the rules governing the press. Thus, not only was the electorate unable to determine what statutes were being altered, it also could not determine what statutes were not being changed. In short, the voters had no way of knowing what the law relating to admissibility of evidence would be following the enactment of Proposition 8. Respondents cite cases which hold that article IV, section 9 does not apply to independent enactments which amend existing statutes by implication, rather than by explicit terms. (See Evans v. Superior Court, supra, 215 Cal. at pp. 65-66; Hellman v. Shoulters (1896) 114 Cal. 136, 150-153 [44 P. 915, 45 P. 1057].) One such case, Hellman, involved a purported amendment to the Vrooman Act of 1885, which set forth certain procedures for the enactment of local ordinances for street improvements. In 1891, the Legislature adopted an act which professed to amend the Vrooman Act by adding thereto an additional part, providing for an alternative street ordinance procedure. This court held that since the 1891 act added new sections which leave in full operation all the language of the [existing law] which it purports to amend, there was no amendment of that law within the meaning of former article IV, section 24 (now § 9). (114 Cal. at p. 151, italics added.) Further, even if the 1891 act were viewed as amending the Vrooman Act, it would amend only by implication. ( Id., at p. 152.) Former article IV, section 24 does not apply to amendments by implication, the court concluded. ( Id., at p. 153.) To say that every statute which [by implication] affects the operation of another is therefore an amendment of it would introduce into the law an element of uncertainty which no one can estimate. It is impossible for the wisest legislator to know in advance how every statute proposed would affect the operation of existing laws.... `The mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of statutes in terms so blind that ... the public, from the difficulty of making the necessary examination and comparison, failed to become appraised of the changes made in the laws.... But an act complete in itself is not within the mischief designed to be remedied by this provision, and cannot be held to be prohibited by it without violating its plain intent.' ( Id., at pp. 152-153, italics added.) The Hellman discussion of amendments by implication was picked up in Evans, supra, 215 Cal. 58. Under attack in Evans was the initial codification by the Legislature of the Probate Code. This court noted that some provisions of the new Code were inconsistent with existing statutes, but held nevertheless that compliance with the requirement that amended statutes be reenacted was not necessary. The Constitution, it was reasoned, `does not apply to an independent act' [nor] `... to amendments by implication.' ( Id., at pp. 65-66, quoting Pennie v. Reis (1889) 80 Cal. 266, 269 [22 P. 176], and Hellman, supra, 114 Cal. at p. 153.) The holdings of both Hellman and Evans involved amendatory laws enacted by the Legislature. They did not involve amendments adopted through the initiative process. Sound reasons exist for treating initiative amendments with even more care. It is the very essence of the legislative process to deal with and become immersed in laws, existing and proposed. A legislator's professional life is one of passing and amending laws. This daily involvement with the law, combined with ready access to extensive professional research staffs and legal libraries, creates an expertise in the Legislature that is impossible to duplicate, or even approximate, among the electorate at large. As the late Justice Wiley Manuel noted, Voters have neither the time nor the resources to mount an in depth investigation of a proposed initiative. ( Schmitz v. Younger, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 99 (dis. opn.); see also Wallace, supra, 200 Cal. at pp. 592-593.) This is not true of legislators. Thus, it makes eminently good sense to attribute to legislators knowledge of the primary purpose and effects of a proposed statutory amendment, even if not explicitly set forth. However, the same cannot be said for the voting public. Further, the problems posed by Proposition 8 far exceed those addressed in Hellman or Evans. Unlike the amendatory enactments in Hellman and Evans, the initiative measure now before this court is not complete in itself. It is not a wholly independent act. This is immediately apparent from the fact that the voters could not have determined  either from the initiative measure itself or from the official ballot pamphlet  what the effect of its adoption would be.... (See Myers, supra, 195 Cal. at p. 675.) All that the voters would have been able to ascertain, without spending tedious hours in a law library, was that the initiative measure would create both a rule admitting relevant evidence and several exceptions of undisclosed magnitude. In the language of Hellman, Proposition 8 fails to inform the voter of the changes made in the laws. In this regard, the present case is similar to Myers v. Stringham, supra, 195 Cal. 672. (See Brosnahan v. Eu, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 12-13 (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In Myers, a proposed local initiative measure sought to amend a city's general zoning ordinance by (1) adding a new subsection, describing the boundaries of a plot of land and (2) repealing another subsection, identified only by number. The city charter contained a provision regarding reenactment of amended laws which closely resembled the corresponding portion of former article IV, section 24. This court found that the initiative measure violated the charter requirement. The purpose of the charter provision is plain. It is to compel an ordinance to disclose on its face something of its purpose and effect as a legislative enactment. The wisdom of the requirement is at once apparent from an inspection of the proposed ordinance. The new subsection sought to be added to the section by amendment is no more than a description of certain real property. It does not purport to disclose what the effect of its adoption would be either on the status of the particular property described or on its relation to the general zoning classifications in the city. Considered in and by itself it is unintelligible and meaningless. It cannot be determined from its inspection what is sought to be accomplished. (195 Cal. at p. 675.) Like the initiative in Myers, the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8 does not disclose on its face something of its purpose and effect. It gives the voters little inkling as to what changes are being made in the current law. The provision purports to impose new rules of evidence throughout the criminal justice system of this state. The voters, when called upon to approve or reject the initiative, could not determine the meaning of those new rules no matter how extensive their inspection of the measure or the ballot pamphlet. They were informed only as to the section numbers, not the content of the statutes being incorporated into the Constitution. In short, the draftsmen of Proposition 8 failed to disclose to the people the purpose and effect of its provisions. As a result, they violated the constitutional standard set forth in article IV, section 9. There is an additional defect of the measure which has apparently escaped the notice of the draftsmen of the initiative as well as those who challenged the measure's validity. The draftsmen of Proposition 8 sought to use this one initiative measure to make changes in both our Constitution and our codified laws. Such a combination of statutory and constitutional alterations is unusual. To our knowledge, only once in this state's long history has an attempt been made to join both statutory and constitutional changes in a single initiative. Although this court upheld that initiative against a one-subject attack in Perry v. Jordan, supra, 34 Cal.2d 87, the court did not consider the propriety of combining statutory and constitutional changes in a single initiative. Indeed, the court did not appear to recognize that the initiative before it contained proposals for statutory change. Perry preceded by nearly two decades the most recent comprehensive revision of our Constitution in 1966. That revision clearly sought to perpetuate the distinction between the use of the initiative process to effect constitutional change and its use to bring about statutory changes. (See, e.g., Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision of Cal. Const. (1966) pp. 43-44; see also Wallace v. Zinman, supra, 200 Cal. at p. 593 [Throughout section 1 of article IV of the constitution [predecessor to current art. II, §§ 8-11, and art. IV, § 1] a distinct line of demarcation is kept between a law or an act and a constitutional amendment.].) Subdivision (b) of section 8 of article II states that [a]n initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution.... (Italics added.) The use of the disjunctive is indicative of this differentiation. Unfortunately, the majority ignores the issue of combining statutory and constitutional changes in a single initiative, giving no guidance to drafters of future initiatives other than a green light to go and violate the Constitution with impunity.