Opinion ID: 323055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECTION 201(g) TO SECTION 201(c)(1)

Text: 19 There are two subsections of 18 U.S.C. 201 involved here. Under section 201(c)(1) defendant Brewster was indicted; under section 201(g) he was convicted. The relationship between the two subsections, identifying the three clauses on which the parties' legal arguments turn, is best set forth graphically. 20 Bribery Section (c) (1) Gratuity Section (g) ----------------------- -------------------- (c) Whoever, being a public (g) Whoever, being a public official ( ) or person official. (former public selected to be public official,) or person selected official, to be a public official, directly or indirectly, (A) corruptly (A) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly asks, demands, exacts, asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives or agrees to receive or agrees to receive anything anything of value for himself of value for himself (B) or for any other person or entity, (C) in return for: (C) for or because of any official (1) being influenced in his act performed or to be performance of any official performed by him; act; 21 To anticipate our conclusions a bit, after the above graphical analysis of the statute, one conclusion of which we are certain from the face of this statute is that it is quite a task for the trial judge to explain to the jury the differences between the greater and the lesser offense on which conviction or acquittal turns. However, even if the statute makes no clear distinction between the offenses defined in sections (c) and (g), this is no ground for holding the statute unconstitutional for vagueness or overbreadth, so long as each section defines an offense with sufficient clarity. Or, if it be thought that the statute on its face defines clearly in the abstract two separate offenses in sections (c) and (g), but that on the facts of a particular case there appears no discernible distinction between the two offenses, then again there is no constitutional invalidity. What is essential in a given case is that the trial judge be able to define for the jury with indisputable clarity the line between guilt and innocence, and, if a verdict under a greater and lesser included offense charge is sought, a second equally bright line between the two posible offenses. It was in attempting to draw both lines that the trial judge here had his difficulties, and we do not think he surmounted them. 22 III. THE GRATUITY SECTION 201(g) AS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE BRIBERY SECTION 201(c)(1) 23
24 In support of his argument that there is no greater and lesser included offense relationship between the statute section on which defendant was indicted and the section on which he was convicted, 11 defendant Brewster points to four differences in language between the bribery section 201(c)(1) and the gratuity section 201(g): 25 1. The bribery section (c) is broader in that it refers to the receipt of anything of value 'for himself or for any other person or entity,' while the gratuity section (g) is limited to the receipt of 'anything of value for himself.' (Comparative Clause B, p. 67 supra.) 26 2. As to the requisite criminal intent, the bribery section (c) calls for the thing of value to be received 'corruptly,' while the gratuity section (g) merely refers to the acceptance or receipt of a thing of value 'otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty.' (Comparative Clauses A.) 27 3. The bribery section (c)(1) prohibits the receipt of anything of value 'in return for: (1) being influenced in his performance of any official act,' while the gratuity section (g) prohibits the receipt of anything of value 'for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him.' (Comparative Clauses C.) 28 4. The gratuity section (g), unlike the bribery section (c), applies to past official acts as well as future ones. (Comparative Clauses C.) 29 Taking these in reverse order, defendant agrees that the fourth difference is irrelevant in the light of the District Judge's dismissal of the only indictment count which related to a past act. As to the second and third (clauses A and C comparatively) defendant states that the offense defined by the gratuity section (g) is necessarily included within the offense defined by the bribery section (c)(1). 12 It therefore follows that these two differences do not preclude a charge based on the gratuity section being a lesser included offense within the bribery section. These two differences in comparative clauses A and C are, however, important later (Part V) in our analysis of the adequacy of the court's instructions. 30 It is on the difference in clause B, the inclusion in the bribery section of the phrase 'or for any other person or entity' with no equivalent in the gratuity section, that the defendant inveighs most heavily. He asserts that 'the offense defined by 201(g) (gratuity) is narrower than that defined by 201(c)(1) (bribery) and thus is by no means necessarily included within a violation of the latter statute.' 13 And, 'Violation of 201(g) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received something of value 'for himself.' Violation of 201(c)(1) on the other hand requires proof only that the defendant received something of value 'for himself or for any other person or entity. 14 31 First, as a matter of semantics, without recourse to our analysis in United States v. Whitaker, 15 we would think that if the gratuity offense is narrower than the bribery offense (and it is), then the narrower could fit within the greater, i.e., the gratuity offense is a lesser included offense of bribery. However, as defendant Brewster later developed his argument in brief and before the court orally, it appears that what defendant really means is that the bribery charge, being broader, is easier to prove and correspondingly harder to defend against. Therefore, defendant argues, the bribery cannot be a greater offense including the lesser gratuity offense, if the bribery charge is easier to prove and harder to defend. 16 Defendant couples this with a claim that, because the greater bribery charge was the more difficult to defend, he was not called upon the focus on the lesser gratuity charge, as he otherwise might have done successfully since it is easier to defend, and therefore lacked the proper notice we have held essential to the prosecution invoking a lesser included offense charge. 17 32 Second, directly pertinent to the above and dispositive of defendant's argument quoted at note 14 supra, the provision in section 201(c)(1) relating to use of payments received is phrased in the disjunctive, and defendant's analysis proceeds entirely on the face of the two subsections of section 201. However, defendant's argument fails to consider how the indictment must be drawn to be valid, and how the counts were in fact articulated as to defendant Brewster. These further considerations, to which we now turn, dispose of both the theoretical argument that an offense under the gratuity section cannot be a lesser included offense within the bribery section, and also of the argument that the defendant received no notice of the lesser included offense charge. 33
34 Each of the three counts ultimately considered by the jury charged that Brewster had received money from Anderson for himself. Count 1 charged only that Brewster received the money for himself, while Counts 3 and 5 charged in the conjunctive, that Brewster had received the money 'for himself and for an entity, that is, the 'D.C. Committee for Maryland Education. 35 It thus is immaterial that the bribery statute, as it naturally would be, is phrased in the disjunctive, i.e., the offense prohibited is the acceptance of the bribe 'for himself or for any other person or entity'; what is material is that Brewster was charged specifically in Counts 3 and 5 with receiving bribes both for himself and the Committee. Clearly, indisputably, Brewster was on notice to defend a charge that he himself received the funds constituting a bribe under each of the three counts. 36 That is exactly the notice he would have had, had he been charged under the lesser included offense gratuity section, which is limited to the receipt of 'anything of value for himself' only. When Brewster made his defense against the charges under the bribery section, under Count 1 he was concerned only with an alleged receipt of payments for himself; under Counts 3 and 5 he was concerned with alleged receipts both for himself and the Committee; the defense of the greater necessarily embraced the defense of the lesser under Counts 3 and 5. 37 As to the proof offered, which, under our analysis in Whitaker and earlier cases, bears on the propriety of the lesser included offense charge: 38 Count 1. With respect to this count it is conceded that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under 201(g) (gratuity). Mr. Sullivan testified that Mr. Anderson delivered $5,000 in cash to the Senator and that the money was put in the office safe. There was no testimony concerning what happened to the money. Senator Brewster and Mr. Anderson denied that any such transaction took place. 18 Count 3. There was also a fundamental dispute as to the payment involved. Presumably the jury accepted the prosecution's version, i.e., 'Mr. Sullivan testified that Mr. Anderson and a man identified as Morris Spiegel, at a meeting with Sullivan and the Senator in the Senator's office, gave the Senator an envelope containing $4,500 in cash, which the Senator then gave to Mr. Sullivan with instructions to deposit it in the Committee's account.' 19 Further prosecution testimony showed that the next day a $3,000 check was drawn on the Committee account, the cash given to Brewster, then deposited in Brewster's personal account. The evidence thus supported Count 3 of the indictment drawn in the conjunctive, i.e., 'for himself and for an entity'; it also supported the lesser included offense charge under section 201(g) that defendant Brewster received the money 'for himself.' As defendant states, 'it is at least arguable that upon the Sullivan version of the facts the jury could have found that the payment was made directly to the Senator.' 20 Count 5. A $5,000 check was dilivered by Anderson to Sullivan, who then transmitted it to Brewster. Brewster admitted receiving the check. The payee's name had been left blank. Sullivan filled in the Committee's name as payee and deposited the check in the Committee's account. Immediately thereafter four checks payable to cash, totalling $5,000 were drawn. Brewster received $3,000 and sent $1,000 as a personal campaign contribution to a Maryland candidate. As under Count 3, the evidence under Count 5 supports the indictment drawn in the conjunctive, and the lesser included offense that Brewster received the funds 'for himself,' the latter charge being the one for which he was convicted. 39
40 'Both sides agree that United States v. Whitaker, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 447 F.2d 314 (D.C.Cir. 1971) sets forth the controlling standards for applying the lesser included offense doctrine.' 21 For that reason we shall apply, but not repeat in toto, the analysis of Whitaker to Brewster's case. 41 In interpreting Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c), which provides that 'the defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged,' and our previous decisions relating thereto, we 'held that for the defense (or prosecution) to be entitled to a lesser included offense charge five conditions must be met. First, . . . a proper request . . .. Second, the elements of the lesser offense must be identical to part of the elements of the greater offense . . .. Third, . . . some evidence which would justify conviction of the lesser offense. Fourth, the proof on the element or elements differentiating the two crimes must be sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense. Fifth, 'in general the chargeability of lesser included offenses rests on a principle of mutuality . . .. 22 42 That the first condition has been met here is undisputed. As to the second condition, the language of the two sections of the statute, embracing the elements of the two offenses, has been discussed graphically and in detail under II. and III.A., supra, and our discussion demonstrates that the elements of section 201(g) are in part identical to the elements of section 201(c)(1). 23 The third is virtually undisputed, as discussed under III.B., supra. The fifth, mutuality, is not in issue, as the right of the defense to such a charge was never asserted and is unchallenged, and the prosecution wisely did not and does not rest its right to a lesser included offense charge on a claim that the defense would have been entitled to the same. 43 What remains to be analyzed is the fourth, the element differentiating the two crimes of accepting a bribe and accepting a gratuity. As in Whitaker, the additional element involves intent; in Whitaker, an intent to commit a crime after entry; in Brewster's case, a higher degree of criminal intent to constitute accepting a bribe under section (c)(1) than to constitute accepting a gratuity under section (g). 44 We thus turn to those clauses of the two statutory sections which we have labelled 'A' and 'C' (see p. 67 supra). 45 The requisite intent to constitute accepting a bribe is to accept a thing of value 'corruptly' under section (c)(1); the comparable intent under the gratuity section (g) is to accept a thing of value 'otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty.' On the face of the statute the two comparative clauses are not equivalents. Congress did not use the same language in defining criminal intent for the two offenses. 'Corruptly' bespeaks a higher degree of criminal knowledge and purpose than does 'otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty.' It appears entirely possible that a public official could accept a thing of value 'otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty,' and at the same time not do it 'corruptly.' Congress obviously wished to prohibit public officials accepting things of value with either degree of criminal intent; it did so, but it legislated a difference in the requisite criminal intent and correspondingly in the penalties attached. 46 There is more, on the face of the statute itself, relevant to criminal intent. What we have labelled as comparative clause 'C' relates to clause 'A' and to criminal intent. To accept a thing of value 'in return for: (1) being influenced in (the) performance of any official act' (section (c)(1)), appears to us to imply a higher degree of criminal intent than to accept the same thing of value 'for or because of any official act performed or to be performed' (section (g)). Perhaps the difference in meaning is slight, but Congress chose different language in which to express comparable ideas. The bribery section makes necessary an explicit quid pro quo which need not exist if only an illegal gratuity is involved; the briber is the mover or producer of the official act, but the official act for which the gratuity is given might have been done without the gratuity, although the gratuity was produced because of the official act. 47 Our conclusion is reinforced when the two clauses 'A' and 'C' and transposed in each section to be read consecutively. To accept a thing of value 'corruptly . . . in return for being influenced in his performance of any official act' evidences a higher degree of criminal intent than to accept the same thing of value 'otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty . . . for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him.' When clauses 'A' and 'C' are thus considered together in each section, the bribery section (c)(1) obviously prescribes a criminal intent different from and of a higher degree than that specified in the illegal gratuity section (g). 48 The different and higher requisite degree of criminal intent, then, is the additional element which is essential to make the offense of bribery under section 201(c)(1) the greater offense in relation to the lesser included offense of accepting an illegal gratuity under section 201(g). 49 Although neigher party made in brief or oral orgument the same analysis based on Whitaker as we have above, yet both defense and prosecution seem to agree that the element of criminal intent, however differentiated, is the vital distinction between the bribery and gratuity sections. 'Under 201(c), the Senator's defense necessarily focused upon the question whether the payments were accepted 'corruptly . . . in return for being influenced in the performance of an official act.' This defense was successful.' 24 'Both of these defenses were directed solely to the critical issue in the bribery case, namely corrupt intent . . .. In defending the charge under 201(c) it was irrelevant whether or not the payments were for Brewster or another entity; the entire defense was aimed at the element of corrupt intent.' 25 The prosecution agrees: 'The sections are distinguished in one vital regard, that of intent. Section 201(c)(1), defining the more severe of the two offenses, requires the recipient of the bribe to have the specific intent of 'being influenced in his performance of any official act. 26 50 We turn now to defendant's agrument that, even though the gratuity offense under (g) may be embraced in the bribery offense under (c)(1), yet on our rationale in Whitaker 'the prosecutor's right to a lesser included offense instruction (is) governed by a more meticulous test, circumscribed by 'stringent constitutional limits.' . . . Those limits relate to the fundamental due process requirement of notice and the long-standing constitutional prohibition against alterations in the charging part of the indictment.' 27 51 In Whitaker we identified two important factors relevant to these points. First, Whitaker established that 'the idea that the simple mechanistic test of all theoretical elements of the included offense being present in the greater offense charged in the indictment . . . has not always been followed in this Circuit.' 28 Instead, we expressed the essential requisite as 'there must . . . be an 'inherent' relationship between the greater and lesser offenses, i.e., they must relate to the protection of the same interests, and must be so related that in the general nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably, proof of the lesser offense is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the commission of the greater offense.' 29 52 In addition to close identity of the elements of the lesser offense to those of the greater, in Whitaker we did establish a second requirement, i.e., there must be sufficient notice to the defendant when the indictment charges only the greater offense, to enable him to know that he may face a charge of the lesser offense as well. The right of the prosecutor is limited to the offense of which defendant has been given notice by the indictment. 30 'This stricture' on the options of the prosecutor is to prevent him from changing 'the charging part of the indictment to the jeopardy of the defendant.' 31 53 So far as a requirement of notice to defendant Brewster that at trial he would have to meet a charge based on the illegal gratuity section 201(g), we observe that any trial counsel is always on notice of Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c), permitting an instruction to the jury and conviction on a lesser included offense, even though not specifically charged in the indictment. In Brewster's case specifically, trial counsel undeniably was also on notice of the similar language, textual proximity, and logical relationship of sections 201(c)(1) and (g), all of which raised the reasonable prospect that accepting an illegal gratuity under section (g) would be construed as a lesser offense included within accepting a bribe under section (c)(1). Given Rule 31(c), defendant therefore had ample notice of his need to prepare a defense against an unlawful gratuity charge. 32 54 To support his contention that he was deprived of proper constitutional notice of the charges he was to meet, defendant Brewster again points to two of the differences between the bribery and gratuity sections (which we have identified as comparative clauses 'A' and 'B'). Specifically defendant claims that the element of intent in the bribery section (c), 'corruptly,' which would not need to be proved in a charge under the lesser included gratuity section (g) offense, misled the defendant to center his defense principally on disproving the necessary element of intent embraced in the word 'corruptly.' If he had realized he was also charged or would be charged under the gratuity section (g), which does not contain the word 'corruptly,' he would have adopted a different emphasis in the presentation of his defense. Likewise, defendant claims he was diverted by the words 'or for any other person or entity' under the bribery section (c), because, if his defense had been directed to the gratuity section (g), he would have wasted little time on this part of the offense charged, because gratuity section (g) is limited to a receipt of funds 'for himself.' 55 We think there was no lack of notice, nor any misleading prejudice to the defendant here. It is always true that the greater offense contains an element which the lesser included offense does not; this is one of the reasons for the use of the terms 'greater' and 'lesser' to describe the two offenses, and why the lesser is thought to be included in the greater. It will nearly always be true that the defendant will strive mightily to disprove the extra element in the greater offense, to escape the usually greater punishment attached to the greater crime. Ordinarily, this would simply be good trial strategy. 56 It is also frequently true that the defendant is successful in making a defense to the extra element necessary to prove the greater offense, in this case the criminal intent defined by 'corruptly,' as the defendant did here. 33 But it is precisely the defendant's usual trial strategy of concentrating on the additional element or elements involved in the greater offense, and the likelihood of his success in this strategy, that induces the prosecution to ask for the lesser included offense charge, as the prosecution did here. So this should constitute no surprise to the defense, nor do we think it did in the case at bar. 57 We say this the more confidently because, even though defendant's trial strategy placed great emphasis on his defense against the charge under the bribery section (c)(1), he did not entirely overlook a defense against a charge under the gratuity section (g). The defense offered evidence that the Committee was a lawful entity acting normally as a compaign fund-raising organization, which was relevant as a defense to a charge under the gratuity section, but would have been completely irrelevant evidence as a defense to a charge under the bribery section. Under the language of the bribery section alone, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the 'other entity' to which the payment was purportedly made would have been irrelevant and immaterial. However, evidence that the D.C. Committee was the alter ego of the defendant Brewster would have been highly relevant to a charge brought under the gratuity section. A contribution to an alter ego committee of the defendant could have been considered as having been 'for himself' under the more limited language of the gratuity section. Defendant Brewster's strategy was to cover this possible vulnerability by showing the legitimacy and separateness of the D.C. Committee, demonstrating that the defense did not ignore the possibility of a conviction under the lesser included offense of gratuity section (g). 58