Opinion ID: 2629983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The $22,000.00 Equalization Payment

Text: [¶ 14] In Madigan's second appellate issue, he asserts that the $22,000.00 equalization payment, which the district court ordered Maas to pay to Madigan, is inconsistent with the evidence and improperly calculated. The $22,000.00 figure was based on calculations set out in Maas' written closing statement. After the close of evidence, the district court requested that the parties submit their closing arguments in writing. Maas' proposed distribution included the following figures: Figure 1: Refund of Investment $42,000 [Madigan]'s ½ of down payment [on the Belmont house] + remodeling + $ 4,000 [Madigan]'s ½ of mortgage payments [on the Belmont house] since August, 2003 - $23,000 [Maas' down payment on the John Drive house] + $ 7,000 [Madigan]'s claimed reimbursement to [Maas] - $ 8,000 [Maas'] ½ of down payment on [Monticello] house --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- $22,000 [Madigan]'s net share The district court adopted Maas' proposed property distribution. On appeal, Madigan takes exception to the district court's use of two of the above figures: the $23,000.00  representing the amount Maas paid as a down payment on the John Drive house, and the $4,000.00  representing the amount Madigan contributed to the Belmont house mortgage after Maas had filed for divorce. [¶ 15] With regard to the $23,000.00, Madigan asserts that the district court should have used $11,500.00 instead of $23,000.00. In his appellate brief, Madigan articulates his argument as follows: At the time [Maas] contributed the $23,000.00 to the down payment, she contributed her half of the down payment, which was $11,500.00, plus [Madigan]'s half of the down payment, his $11,500.00. Had [Madigan] repaid her nothing, [Maas] would have overpaid $11,500.00, not $23,000.00 as indicated [above]. Madigan claims that the $23,000.00 figure used by the district court is against all the weight of the evidence and is based on a mathematical miscalculation. However, he cites no evidence which would mandate a different result, nor does he demonstrate the mathematical error. Rather, Madigan's argument appears to reflect nothing more than his apparent belief that the down payment on the John Drive house should have been allocated equally between him and Maas. We recognize that the use of the $23,000.00 figure may not reflect an exact 50/50 distribution; nevertheless, we have stated that [a] just and equitable distribution is as likely as not to be unequal. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 2004 WY 68, ¶ 12, 91 P.3d 922, 926 (Wyo.2004); Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo.2003). The record clearly shows that Maas paid the $23,000.00 down payment on the John Drive house and that Madigan later paid Maas $7,000.00 as reimbursement for a portion of that amount. We find nothing in the record indicating that the district court abused its discretion by allocating Maas and Madigan the amounts they contributed, rather than dividing the down payment equally. Without more, Madigan's conclusory statement that the down payment should have been divided equally falls well short of providing the clear grounds necessary for us to disturb the district court's property distribution. Metz, 2004 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d at 385. [¶ 16] Madigan's objection to the $4,000.00 figure stems from his contention that he should receive credit for all mortgage payments he contributed from the time he relocated to Monticello, and not just those made after Maas filed for divorce. Madigan asserts that instead of the $4,000.00, he should be entitled to a $9,900.00 credit. As support of this argument, he points to an in-court statement made by Maas during cross examination: Q. You're willing to give [Madigan] credit for approximately 500  is it 500 or 550 he was paying toward the [Belmont] house payment? A. We can say 550. . . . Q. So 550 would be an appropriate figure times 18 months, is that what it's been? A. That would be approximately right. Q. Whatever we figured to be a number of months, you agree that number . . . times 550, he should be given credit on Belmont? A. Correct. Q. So that's approximately 9,900, if we have the numbers correct. You would be willing to give him that credit? A. Yes. Maas' statement is the only evidence Madigan cites in support of his argument on this issue. In response, Maas points out that her statement was later clarified and corrected upon redirect, and that she clearly articulated her position in her closing statement, wherein she used the $4,000.00 figure instead of $9,900.00. [¶ 17] Even if Maas had not clarified her original statement, the district court is not bound to adopt the testimony of either party. In Hoffman, 2004 WY 68, ¶ 11, 91 P.3d at 925, the wife testified that she did not think the husband should be responsible for all the parties' business debts. The district court, nevertheless, allocated those debts to husband. Id. at ¶ 13, 91 P.3d at 926. On appeal, the husband challenged the allocation of corporate debt to him claiming that because Wife must be considered a reasonable person, and she didn't think it was fair, it must meet our standard for abuse of discretion that no reasonable person could abide by the result. Id. at ¶ 16, 91 P.3d at 926. In affirming the district court's decision we stated: [I]t is the trial court that decides the equitable distribution of property. The trial court hears all the evidence, judges the credibility of the witnesses on all issues, and makes its determination regarding property distribution of all marital property after considering the statutory factors. Wife's isolated comment is but one piece of the puzzle and is not definitive for any purpose. Id. Clearly, Madigan's reliance on Maas' isolated and disputed statement is insufficient to establish that the evidence does not support the use of the $4,000.00 figure, or that the district court abused its discretion. [¶ 18] As a final point, we note that even if we were to find the district court's use of one or both of Maas' figures to be erroneous, we are required to examine the reasonableness of the district court's property division from the perspective of the overall distribution of marital assets and liabilities, rather than from a narrow focus on the effects of any particular disposition. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, ¶ 6, 72 P.3d at 278; Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo.2000). Madigan does not even attempt to show how the overall distribution is inequitable. The parties were each awarded real property, vehicles, household items, accounts, and retirement interests. To settle the equities in the parties' real property, Madigan was also awarded $22,000.00. This distribution, when viewed as a whole, does not shock the conscience of this Court nor do we find it to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people could not abide it.