Opinion ID: 6331827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The third issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the petitioner conspired “or acted in concert with” Ms. Westfall, the drug dealer. 20 This Court examines issues pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence challenges under the following standards of review: The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. .... A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate court must review all the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save that of guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for a jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set aside only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 The petitioner appears to conflate sufficiency of the evidence to support conspiracy to commit a felony, which was the delivery of a controlled substance, with sufficiency of the evidence to show that he acted in concert with Ms. Westfall to carry out the remaining criminal acts with which he was charged. For discussion purposes, we separate the two. 25 Syl. Pt. 1 and Syl. Pt. 3, in part, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995). In regard to conspiracy, the petitioner contends that “[t]he State repeatedly asserted that without Petitioner’s car, the dealer could not have delivered drugs. But without Petitioner’s agreement or even complicity, he is a bystander—not a conspirator.” He argues that the State failed to show an agreement between him and Ms. Westfall to sell drugs. He also claims the evidence failed to show a pre-arranged plan for him to accompany Ms. Westfall to the victim’s home and that his visit to the home was “unconnected with any plan to sell drugs.” The petitioner contends he was “unconscious and nearly himself a victim” due to a “non-lethal Fentanyl overdose” when Ms. Westfall decided to sell the drugs to the victim. In discussing conspiracy under West Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(b) 21 this Court has held that the statute requires proof of “overt acts” that are in furtherance of the 21 West Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(b) (2020) provides: (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, any person who willfully conspires with one or more persons to manufacture, deliver or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver one kilogram or more of heroin, five kilograms or more of cocaine or cocaine base, one hundred grams or more of phencyclidine, ten grams or more of lysergic acid diethylamide, or fifty grams or more of methamphetamine or five hundred grams of a substance or material containing a measurable amount of methamphetamine, if one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, 26 conspiracy. Syl. Pt. 5, in part, State v. Legg, 243 W. Va. 372, 844 S.E.2d 143 (2020). 22 In reaching this decision the Court relied upon its earlier decision in State v. Less, 170 W. Va. 259, 294 S.E.2d 62 (1981), involving the general conspiracy statute. See W. Va. Code § 61-10-31(2020); see also Legg, 243 W. Va. at 379, 844 S.E.2d at 379. In Less, we held that for general conspiracy the State must prove that a defendant “agreed with others to is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in a state correctional facility for a determinate sentence of not less than two nor more than thirty years. We note that the petitioner was indicted for violating West Virginia Code § 60A-4-414(a) (2020), which provides: (a) Any person who willfully conspires with one or more persons to commit a felony violation of section four hundred one [§ 60A-4-401] of this article, if one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in a state correctional facility for a determinate sentence of not less than two nor more than ten years: Provided, That the provisions of this subsection are inapplicable to felony violations of section four hundred one of this article prohibiting the manufacture, delivery or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver marijuana. 22 The entirety of syllabus point five of Legg reads: “For purposes of a crime under W. Va. Code § 60A-4- 414(b), W. Va. Code § 60A-4-414(f) requires that overt acts have to be in furtherance of the conspiracy before the trier of fact can attribute to the defendant ‘all of the controlled substances manufactured, delivered or possessed with intent to deliver or manufacture by other participants or members of the conspiracy.’” 243 W. Va. at 373, 844 S.E.2d at 144. 27 commit an offense against the State and that some overt act was taken by a member of the conspiracy to effect the object of that conspiracy.” 170 W. Va. at 261, 294 S.E.2d at 63, Syl. Pt. 4, in part (emphasis added). Applying the foregoing law to the facts of this case, the evidence showed that the petitioner was a knowing participant in the drug deal that killed the victim. The evidence demonstrated that the petitioner knew Ms. Westfall was a drug dealer because she had given him drugs more than once in exchange for him allowing her to use his vehicle. Further, Ms. Westfall testified that she told the petitioner about the pending drug exchange with Ms. Russell. Moreover, the petitioner overlooks the testimony of both Ms. Westfall and Ms. Russell in regard to the overt acts of the petitioner providing his vehicle for use in the drug transaction and accompanying Ms. Westfall into Ms. Russell’s trailer after Ms. Westfall had retrieved her scales from the petitioner’s car. Once inside the trailer, the petitioner was present when Ms. Russell weighed the drugs and sold them to the victim. The petitioner offered no evidence that either Ms. Westfall or Ms. Russell was lying, nor did he present any evidence to show that he was unaware of the impending drug deal when he allowed Ms. Westfall to use his car and accompanied her to the delivery. Accordingly, his challenge that there was insufficient evidence to support this conviction for conspiracy is unavailing. See Guthrie, 194 W. Va. at 663, 461 S.E.2d at 169, Syl. Pt.3, in part. Second, in regard to the concerted action principle relied upon by the State to prove its case against the petitioner, he argues that he was unconscious from a “non28 lethal Fentanyl overdose” when Ms. Westfall decided to drive to Ms. Russell’s to sell the drugs and did not awaken until after they arrived at the trailer. Further, he argues that his visit was unconnected with any plan to sell drugs, because “[h]e arrived spontaneously to socialize and did not even own a cell phone with which to plan any deal.” Thus, the petitioner contends that he “did nothing that meaningfully and intentionally ‘contribute[d] to the criminal act.’” See Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Foster, 221 W. Va. 629, 656 S.E.2d 74 (2007). In Foster, we held: “Proof that the defendant was present at the time and place the crime was committed is a factor to be considered by the jury in determining guilt, along with other circumstances, such as the defendant’s association with or relation to the perpetrator and his conduct before and after the commission of the crime.” Syllabus Point 10, State v. Fortner, 182 W.Va. 345, 387 S.E.2d 812 (1989). “Under the concerted action principle, a defendant who is present at the scene of a crime and, by acting with another, contributes to the criminal act, is criminally liable for such offense as if he were the sole perpetrator.” Syllabus Point 11, State v. Fortner, 182 W.Va. 345, 387 S.E.2d 812 (1989). 221 W. Va. at 632-33, 656 S.E.2d 77-78, Syl. Pts. 6 &7. The evidence showed that the petitioner willingly contributed to the criminal acts charged in this case. See id. He allowed a known drug dealer, Ms. Westfall, to use his car in exchange for drugs. He then accompanied Ms. Westfall to Ms. Russell’s trailer in the car that he provided. When Ms. Westfall returned to the petitioner’s car to retrieve her scales in order to finalize the drug sale, the petitioner willingly accompanied her back 29 into the trailer and was present at the time the drug deal occurred. The evidence established that the petitioner was much more that the unwitting participant that he now claims he was. Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on all counts.