Opinion ID: 1852379
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Object to Improper Comments by the Prosecutor[13]

Text: Assuming, arguendo, that comment (1) was improper, and further assuming that defense counsel was deficient in failing to object, Waterhouse has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by this statement. The statement concerns evidence which was properly presented to the jury in support of the prior conviction of a violent felony aggravator. Moreover, given the aggravating factors which this Court has already determined to be supported by the evidence (i.e., HAC, during the commission of a sexual battery, prior conviction of a violent felony; and committed while under a sentence of lifetime parole), the lack of mitigating evidence, and the unanimous death recommendation by the jury, we find that there is no reasonable probability that had counsel objected to the statement the result of the proceedings would have been different. Because Waterhouse failed to make a showing of prejudice, the trial court appropriately denied an evidentiary hearing as to this claim. With respect to comment (2), this Court, on direct appeal, resolved the substantive issue which forms the basis for this ineffective assistance of counsel claim. More specifically, we noted that the complained-of remark is not fairly susceptible of being interpreted as a comment on silence. Waterhouse, 596 So.2d at 1017. Resultantly, defense counsel could not have been deficient in failing to object because, contrary to Waterhouse's assertions, the comment was not an improper inference on the defendant's right to remain silent. Next, Waterhouse contends that comments (3), (4) and (5) improperly diminished the jury's sense of responsibility in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (finding that jury must be fully advised of the importance of its role and neither comments nor instructions may minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death). Again, assuming that the comments were improper and that counsel was ineffective in failing to object, Waterhouse has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the jury having heard these comments. That is, Waterhouse has not established that had counsel objected to these comment and had the judge admonished the jury that they were to disregard the comments, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have recommended life imprisonment. To this end, we must again note that the jury in this case recommended death by a vote of 12 to 0 after weighing numerous aggravating factors which were established beyond a reasonable doubt against no evidence in terms of mitigation. Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that, but for the admission of these statements, the jury would have recommended life imprisonment; thus, we conclude that the trial court appropriately denied an evidentiary hearing as to the issues relating to this claim. Finally, in challenging comment (6), Waterhouse asserts that his attorney was ineffective in failing to object to a prosecutorial comment regarding sympathy toward the defendant because the comment impermissibly informed the jury that sympathy should not play a role in their determination. We have, however, on numerous occasions, decided this issue adversely to Waterhouse's position. For example, in Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.2d 1009, 1028 (Fla.1999) (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990)), we noted that a prosecutor may properly argue that sympathy towards a defendant is an inappropriate consideration. See also Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 23-4, (Fla.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 858, 121 S.Ct. 143, 148 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000); Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244, 253 (Fla. 1995); Hitchcock v. State, 578 So.2d 685, 689 (Fla.1990), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1215, 112 S.Ct. 3020, 120 L.Ed.2d 892 (1992). Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied an evidentiary hearing on this claim as it is without merit.