Opinion ID: 2037407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it restricted mitchell's surrebuttal testimony to those issues covered in the rebuttal testimony.

Text: Mitchell contends that his right to testify in his own defense was improperly restricted by the trial court. State rested its case-in-chief after calling S.D., its only witness. Mitchell then presented his defense in which he called eight witnesses. Mitchell chose not to testify. Mitchell then rested his case. Thereafter, State recalled S.D. as its only rebuttal witness. State then rested its rebuttal case. Mitchell was then called to testify in surrebuttal. At this point, State requested an in camera hearing where it requested that Mitchell's testimony be limited to those matters covered in rebuttal. Although the trial court granted State's motion, it agreed to Mitchell's request that he be allowed to specifically deny Count I and generally deny the other counts. Thereafter, Mitchell testified that he never pressured S.D. to have a sexual relationship with him. Mitchell specifically denied Counts I and II and he generally denied the other counts. Mitchell also testified that he was not guilty and that is why he did not plead guilty to the rape charges. As a general rule, a party has no right to reply to evidence given on rebuttal or to introduce evidence by way of surrebuttal, unless facts are introduced in the case for the first time on ... rebuttal. Where, under the circumstances, a party may be entitled to offer evidence in surrebuttal, he will be restricted to such evidence as will rebut the rebuttal evidence, or to the new matter introduced in rebuttal.... Moreover, surrebuttal evidence, properly so-called, is limited to refutation of the testimony of an opposing rebuttal witness, and does not spill over to include testimony directed at something other than disproving, or at least casting doubt on, what that witness has said; in other words, it is not a basis for a general attack on the overall conclusory inferences to be drawn from the opposing rebuttal witness' evidence. 71 A.L.R.Fed. 94, 96 (1985). Furthermore, SDCL 23A-24-2(2), (3) and (4) provide: After a jury has been impaneled and sworn, a trial must proceed in the following order: .... (2) The prosecuting attorney or other counsel for the state must make an opening statement and offer the evidence in support of the indictment or information; (3) The defendant or his counsel may then open his defense and offer his evidence in support thereof. However, the defendant or his counsel may make his opening statement immediately after the prosecuting attorney's opening statement; (4) The parties may then, respectively, offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good reason, in furtherance of justice or to correct an evident oversight, permits them to offer evidence upon their original case [.] Mitchell's surrebuttal testimony was not improperly restricted by the trial court. In fact, it was Mitchell, who by failing to testify in his own case-in-chief, thereby limited his later testimony to those issues raised on rebuttal. ( See State v. Forsha, 190 Mo. 296, 88 S.W. 746, 755 (1905)). We have considered the other issues raised by Mitchell, including the denial of the request for a psychological evaluation of S.D., the denial of his motion to dismiss the information grounded upon vagueness, and the length of his sentence. We find these issues are controlled by settled law and are totally lacking in merit. Affirmed. WUEST, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs specially.