Opinion ID: 2815883
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective Alternate Juror Myra P.

Text: The prosecutor also explained that he excused Prospective Alternate Juror Myra P. because of her opposition to the death penalty. Again, the record supports his contention. In her written questionnaire, Myra P. clearly and repeatedly wrote that she did not believe in the death penalty. She rated herself a “one” on a 10-point scale concerning the strength of her support for the death penalty. She further explained that she was concerned that the death penalty might result in the death of innocent persons and that a person sentenced to life, in contrast, “might have the opportunity to prove [innocence].” On voir dire, Myra P. gave some conflicting answers, but most of them showed strong reluctance toward imposing the death penalty. She first stated that she “would always go 24 for life” and that she could not see herself voting for a death sentence because she did not believe in it. She then stated that if it was proved that death was the appropriate penalty, she “could do it.” The prosecutor later presented to Myra P. the same hypothetical he had posed to Vanessa H. — in which someone was found guilty with aggravating circumstances substantially outweighing mitigating circumstances “and the just and necessary verdict is death,” and asked whether Myra P. could return such a verdict. Myra P. responded, “That would be very difficult for me” but “[n]ot impossible” and that the circumstances would have to be “really, really aggravating.” She then explained that it was not realistic that she could return a death verdict. However, at the end of her voir dire, the prosecutor asked Myra P. whether her feelings were so strong that she would be substantially impaired in her ability to return a death verdict, and Myra P. replied that she would be “[n]ot impaired.” Even more clearly than Vanessa H., Myra P. expressed considerable doubt regarding whether she could return a verdict of death when the circumstances would otherwise warrant its application. Again, this was a valid, neutral reason for the prosecutor to excuse her. (People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 347-348 [a prospective juror‟s doubts about the death penalty can be a legitimate, race-neutral reason to exercise a peremptory challenge].) 4. A comparative analysis of prospective jurors and their views on the death penalty reflects no disparate treatment based on race Defendant argues that a comparative juror analysis indicates that Prospective Alternate Juror Vanessa H.‟s views concerning the death penalty constituted a pretextual reason for her removal because the prosecutor allegedly failed to show equal concern about several other prospective jurors who had expressed similar views and yet sat on the jury unchallenged by the prosecutor. We disagree. Defendant identifies six impanelled jurors, Juror Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 and Alternate Juror No. 1, as persons relevant to a comparative analysis because they all 25 acknowledged that returning a verdict of death would be difficult but that they thought they could make that decision.7 But none of defendant‟s comparisons support his claims because, unlike Prospective Juror Vanessa H., none of these jurors questioned his or her ability to vote for a sentence of death even when the circumstances and the law would warrant its application. At best, the comparisons show that some of the seated jurors believed that deciding whether a death verdict was appropriate would be difficult and weighty. When asked whether he could return a verdict of death in a public courtroom, Juror No. 1 recognized that it would be a “really big decision” and “difficult,” but stated, “I think I could [return such a verdict].” Juror No. 3 stated that “The church teaches that all life is sacred,” but there was nothing about his religious affiliation that would prevent him from returning a death verdict. Juror No. 4 also recognized that returning a verdict of death would be difficult, but she stated, “I think I could do that.” When asked whether she could vote for a death verdict when it appeared to her that it was “just and necessary,” Juror No. 5 said it was a hard question that is difficult to answer, but she thought she could do that. When asked a similar question, Juror No. 6 stated that it would be “probably the hardest decision I‟ve ever made,” but “I think that I could.” Finally, Alternate Juror No. 1 also said she could vote for death if such a verdict was “just and necessary.” 7 Defendant claims that Juror Nos. 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, and 12 should be compared to Vanessa H. because they each, like her, rated their support for the death penalty as “five” on a 10-point scale concerning the strength of their support for the death penalty. But this comparative circumstance is largely irrelevant because Vanessa H.‟s excusal was based, not on her support for the death penalty, but on whether she herself could actually return a verdict of death in court. None of these other jurors expressed reservations similar to Vanessa H.‟s during voir dire. 26 Accordingly, none of the instances identified by defendant supports his claim that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against Vanessa H. because of her race. Specifically, none of these compared jurors, unlike Vanessa H., expressed the reluctance to answer the question followed by the uncertainty about being able to return a verdict of death when the circumstances would otherwise warrant its application. Moreover, none of the compared jurors, unlike Vanessa H., had served on a deadlocked jury. Last, the prosecutor accepted an African-American, Juror No. 8, on the sworn jury. Although not conclusive, the fact that the jury included a member of the group allegedly discriminated against “is an indication of good faith in exercising peremptories.” (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168.)