Opinion ID: 529988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Single vs. Multiple Claim Issue

Text: 18 In support of its argument that multiple claims are presented, Midland cites a number of cases holding that a single injury or death can generate multiple claims. 1 We have no quarrel with this proposition, but it is not the issue before this court. In the district court, Judge Johnstone resolved this issue by looking to the policy behind the Limitation Act. He concluded that at least part of the policy was to provide one federal forum for the resolution of competing claims. Judge Johnstone then concluded that a mother and children bringing a claim for damages growing out of the death of the husband and father does not present a situation involving competing claims. Although we do not disagree with this conclusion, we prefer to resolve the issue by way of a somewhat different analysis. 19 We first note that the wrongful death action here involves a widow and two minor children. We limit our analysis to the specific factual situation. Whether the analysis might differ, for example, if the claim was made by a widow and two emancipated children, we leave for another day. 20 We next note that we did not have, as a part of this record, the complaint filed in state court as a result of the lifting of the restraining order by the district court. Therefore, the precise contours of the claim were not ascertainable as of the time of oral argument. 2 The claim filed in the limitation proceeding is brief and quite general, and does not indicate the details of the recovery sought--other than it being for a wrongful death. Such is not always the case. In many Limitation Act cases, the claimant has already filed a state court action before the Limitation Act proceeding is instituted. Indeed, the Act speaks in terms of the limitation proceeding being filed after receipt of a written notice of a claim. 21 Not knowing the precise nature of the state action would be less troubling if it were clearer what form the state action must take. Relevant to this issue we stated in In re Cambria S.S. Co., 505 F.2d 517 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied sub nom. Gordon v. Dahl, 420 U.S. 975, 95 S.Ct. 1399, 43 L.Ed.2d 655 (1975): 22 In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970), the Supreme Court overruled The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358 (1886) to create for the first time a non-statutory cause of action for wrongful death based upon unseaworthiness. Moragne deliberately left the shaping of the new action to further sifting through the lower courts in future litigation. 398 U.S. at 408, 90 S.Ct. at 1792. Specifically, the Court in Moragne left unanswered the question of who were to be the beneficiaries of the newly created maritime right and what elements of damages were to be recoverable, but suggested that the court would not be without persuasive analogy in the general maritime law as well as state and federal wrongful death acts, as they endeavored to resolve the subsidiary issues left open by Moragne. 23 505 F.2d at 519 (footnote omitted). 24 One of the most significant occurrences of the shaping of the new action was a decision of the Supreme Court issued just prior to our decision in Cambria, in which the Court fleshed out the nature of the recovery permitted in a Moragne-type wrongful death action. In Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 591, 94 S.Ct. 806, 818, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974), the Court, over a strong dissent, made it clear that claimants in a wrongful death action, in addition to damages for pecuniary loss, could recover for loss of support, services, and society [as well as for] funeral expenses. 3 25 The relevance of Gaudet to the instant case is that Midland, in making its multiple claim argument, relies primarily on cases which hold that where a seaman sues for his injuries and his wife sues for loss of consortium--multiple claims are presented since, pursuant to Gaudet, the claim for loss of consortium is cognizable. See, e.g., Dammers & Vanderheide v. Corona, 836 F.2d 750, 756 (2d Cir.1988); S & E Shipping, 678 F.2d at 644. 4 Midland thus argues that since a claim for loss of society is recognized as a separate claim, then the claims of the widow and the two minor children for loss of society are, in effect, three claims. We disagree for two reasons. 26 First, the only person who can bring a Moragne-type wrongful death action is the personal representative of the deceased. Futch v. Midland Enters., Inc., 471 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.1973). Since there is only one claim, that of the personal representative, by definition we do not have competing claims. There can only be one judgment rendered on this claim. It is true that this judgment may have to be split among beneficiaries but this does not turn the claim into multiple claims. In accord with this conclusion are two cases relied on by claimant--In re Mucho K, Inc., 578 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.1978), and Baltimore Sports & Recreation, Inc. v. Riley, 1987 A.M.C. 1099, 1986 WL 15672 (D.Md.1986). Although both of these cases provide little by way of rationale for this conclusion, we find them nonetheless more persuasive authority than the loss of consortium cases relied upon by Midland. 27 The second reason why we conclude there is only one claim is that this action by the widow is undertaken pursuant to her appointment as personal representative of the estate under the applicable Tennessee statute. In Moragne, the Court stated that in fashioning the contours of the new maritime wrongful death remedy, the courts would find persuasive analogy for guidance in the accumulated experiences under state wrongful death statutes and the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 761, et seq. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 408, 90 S.Ct. at 1792. We therefore find it appropriate to look to the Tennessee wrongful death statute which gives a single cause of action to the personal representative of the decedent. 5 In Jamison v. Memphis Transit Management Co., 381 F.2d 670 (6th Cir.1967), we had occasion to construe the Tennessee wrongful death statute and stated: 28 The district court correctly held that the Tennessee wrongful death statute creates one, and only one, right of action in the survivors of decedent, no matter how many persons may be entitled to share therein. Wilson v. Barton, 153 Tenn. 250, 254, 283 S.W. 71. 29 Jamison, 381 F.2d at 673; see also Williams v. Baxter, 536 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.Tenn.1981). 6