Opinion ID: 2268712
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: request for a new trial

Text: Although we have not been persuaded by any of the appellant's arguments urging dismissal of either the Dugan charges or all of the charges, we are compelled by the weight of recent decisions of this Court to reverse the decision of the trial court and to remand the matter for a new trial. [12] We conclude that appellant, 17 years of age at the time of his confession, was denied the benefit of parental or interested adult guidance prior to giving his confession, in direct contravention of the rule of Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407, 350 A.2d 829 (1975); Commonwealth v. Smith, 465 Pa. 310, 350 A.2d 410 (1975); Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975); Commonwealth v. Starkes, 461 Pa. 178, 335 A.2d 698 (1975); Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974). For this reason, appellant's confession should have been suppressed. The circumstances surrounding the confession of appellant are as follows: After appellant was arrested, he was taken to the Police Administration Building and arrived there at approximately 11:00 P.M. on May 31, 1973. After spending approximately 55 minutes by himself in an interrogation room, appellant was given his Miranda warnings and questioned by a juvenile division officer assigned to assist in homicide cases. This questioning session which lasted until approximately 12:40 A.M., June 1, 1973, produced only an exculpatory statement. Appellant was then given a polygraph examination and further interrogated by the same juvenile officer. At approximately 2:20 A.M., appellant made an oral inculpatory statement in the presence of the juvenile officer and a homicide detective who had joined in the interrogation. This inculpatory statement was reduced to writing during a period which ended at 3:25 A.M. At 4:45 A.M., six hours after his arrest, appellant began a formal written inculpatory statement. During this period the appellant's father arrived at the Police Administration Building and was lead into the room in which his son was preparing the formal confession. The father witnessed the conclusion of the statement. At 6:45 A.M., in the presence of his father, appellant read the confession in its entirety into a tape recorder and signed each page as he completed reading it. The thrust of our decisions in the Chaney and McCutchen line of cases requires that before a juvenile may waive his fundamental constitutional rights and respond to police custodial interrogation, it must be established that he has at least been afforded access to counsel or parental or interested adult guidance. [13] The burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, a valid waiver of a constitutional right is on the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 460 Pa. 516, 333 A. 2d 892 (1975); Commonwealth v. Fogan, 449 Pa. 552, 296 A.2d 755 (1972). The two requisite elements of proof of such a waiver on the part of a minor defendant are a showing that, 1) the accused had access to the advice of an attorney, parent or interested adult before an effective waiver may be established, see Commonwealth v. McCutchen, supra, 463 Pa. at 92-93, 343 A.2d at 670, [14] and 2) that the consulted adult was informed as to the constitutional rights available to the minor. See Commonwealth v. Starkes, supra, 461 Pa. at 188, 335 A.2d at 703. It is uncontradicted in the record that at the crucial moment when appellant offered his first inculpatory oral and written statement he did not have access to the advice of a parent, attorney, or other adult who was primarily interested in his welfare. It is undisputed that appellant's first access to the advice of an interested adult was provided only after six hours of questioning during which period he had already incriminated himself. Further, the Commonwealth did not establish that the father, at the time of his belated entrance, was in fact provided an opportunity to confer alone with his son or that he, the father, was in fact aware of the options available to appellant. On such a record, it is manifest that the Commonwealth has failed to establish that appellant executed an effective waiver of his rights. We therefore reverse the judgments of sentence and award the grant of a new trial. ROBERTS, J., joins Part I and Part III. MANDERINO, J., concurs in the result in Part I and Part II and joins Part III. POMEROY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which JONES, C.J. and EAGEN, J., joined.