Opinion ID: 1225840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review and Proof of Conspiracy

Text: We review the district court's judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict de novo.  United States v. Espaillet, 380 F.3d 713, 718 (2d Cir.2004). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that was the basis of his conviction at trial bears a heavy burden. United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 225 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1320, 170 L.Ed.2d 133 (2008). On such a challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the government's favor and deferring to the jury's assessments of the witnesses' credibility. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We will sustain the jury's verdict so long as ` any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. at 225-26 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In the application of this Rule to the conspiracy conviction challenged here, we note that `[i]n cases of conspiracy, deference to the jury's findings is especially important ... because a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeon's scalpel.' United States v. Wexler, 522 F.3d 194, 207 (2d Cir.2008) (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir.2004) (ellipsis in original)). We further note that our sufficiency of the evidence test must consider the [g]overnment's case in its totality rather than in its parts, and may be satisfied by circumstantial evidence alone. Id. (citations omitted). Nevertheless, specious inferences are not indulged because it would not satisfy the Constitution to have a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty. United States v. Lorenzo, 534 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir.2008) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). [I]f the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, then a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt. United States v. Glenn, 312 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be guilty of conspiracy, there must be some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it. United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 68 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1022, 166 L.Ed.2d 770 (2007). An individual defendant's membership in a conspiracy may not be established simply by his presence at the scene of a crime, nor by the fact he knows that a crime is being committed. United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 874, 119 S.Ct. 174, 142 L.Ed.2d 142 (1998). Nor is a defendant's mere association with those implicated in an unlawful undertaking [sufficient] to prove knowing involvement. United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 764 (2d Cir.1989). Evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is also needed, i.e., facts sufficient to draw a logical and convincing connection between circumstantial evidence of an agreement, and the inference that an agreement was in fact made. United States v. Jones, 393 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Desimone, 119 F.3d at 223([M]embership requires proof of purposeful behavior aimed at furthering the goals of the conspiracy.). Nevertheless, [t]he government need not prove that the defendant[] knew the details of the conspiratorial scheme or the identities of all of the conspirators. United States v. Downing, 297 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir.2002). The defendant's participation in the conspiracy with the requisite criminal intent may be established through circumstantial evidence. Wexler, 522 F.3d at 208.