Opinion ID: 2279271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the punitive damage instruction

Text: Finally, we address KLC's contention that the award of punitive damages must be vacated and the issue remanded for retrial because the punitive damage instruction authorized an award of punitive damages for Retaliatory Discharge under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KRS Chapter 344). We agree that the punitive damage instruction was erroneous. However, because we further believe that the error did not affect the substantial rights of the parties, we conclude the error was harmless and we therefore affirm the original judgment's award of punitive damages. The trial court instructed the jury that it could return a single award of punitive damages to each plaintiff if it found for that plaintiff under any of the three theories of liability, [13] and if it further believed that KLC acted toward that plaintiff with oppression and malice. Although KLC did not oppose the consolidation of multiple theories into a single punitive damage instruction, it objected to the inclusion of the civil rights claim on the ground that punitive damages could not be awarded for civil rights violations. At the time, we had no case directly addressing the point. Referring to the statute and to the Palmore's Kentucky Instructions to Juries, the trial court overruled KLC's objection. Since then, we decided Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. McCullough, 123 S.W.3d 130 (Ky.2003), and held that KRS Chapter 344 did not authorize punitive damages for a civil rights violation. Therefore, the inclusion of the civil rights claim in the punitive damage instruction was error. The issue having been properly preserved, our next inquiry is whether that error was harmless. Civil Rule 61.01 provides that judgments should not be disturbed for errors that do not affect a party's substantial rights. Because all of the conduct for which the jury might have awarded punitive damages for the civil rights violation was the same conduct for which such damages were properly awarded under the common law wrongful discharge claim, the instructional error was harmless. KLC relies on Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781 (Ky.2004), where jury verdicts for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and defamation were consolidated into a single damage award. On appeal, it was determined that the trial court should have dismissed the invasion of privacy and IIED claims. The only proper compensatory and punitive damages were those resulting from defamation. Damages awarded for conduct constituting invasion of privacy or IIED would have to be set aside. However, because the three claims involving separate and distinct acts of tortious conduct had been combined into a single damage instruction, we found it impossible to determine what portion, if any, of the jury's compensatory and punitive damage verdicts was attributable to actions on the part of Appellees for which they had no liability to Appellants. Id. at 801. KLC argues that the punitive damages awarded herein must be vacated for the same reason. We disagree. Unlike Stinger, where the claims for which Wal-Mart had no liability (IIED and invasion of privacy) were distinctly different in character and effect from the surviving claim (defamation), the action on the part of KLC underlying the civil rights claim is exactly the same conduct that established the common law wrongful discharge claim. Because punitive damages were proper under the common law wrongful discharge claim, it is immaterial that the same conduct was also subject to punitive damages as a civil rights violation. KLC repeatedly confirms in the brief it filed with this Court that the Hill's common law wrongful discharge claim was [b]ased upon the same facts supporting their [civil rights] claim. The record discloses that the civil rights claim was based on the allegation that KLC terminated the Hill's employment in retaliation for Kim's truthful testimony in support of Ed Gilmore at Gilmore's unemployment hearing, and that the common law wrongful discharge claim was based on the allegation that KLC terminated the Hill's employment because Kim Hill refused KLC's request that she testify falsely at that hearing. Regardless of how it is parsed, whether KLC acted as it did because Kim Hill refused to give false testimony against Mr. Gilmore, or because she gave truthful testimony in support of Mr. Gilmore, KLC's conductfiring the Hillswas the same. [14] And, the motivation for that conduct under either claim was also exactly the same  KLC's disapproval of Kim Hill's testimony. Thus, there is no possibility any part of the punitive damage award was attributable to actions on the part of KLC for which it had no punitive damage liability. [15] In this case, the retaliatory termination civil rights claim and the common law wrongful discharge claim are factually synonymous, and therefore, all of the actions of KLC covered by the punitive damage instruction were properly subject to punitive damages. The inclusion of the civil rights claim in the punitive damage instruction was error, but it could not have affected the punitive damage verdict and, therefore, it amounted to no more than harmless, excess verbiage. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment with respect to the award of punitive damages.