Opinion ID: 545263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 7 At trial, Cohen denied during cross-examination that he intended to defraud the ICBM investors. Gill contends that since Cohen lacked fraudulent intent, he was legally incapable of being a conspirator. Since the crime of conspiracy requires a meeting of the minds, Gill argues there was insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict as to the conspiracy count. 8 The government contends Gill waived this argument by not raising it at the trial level. In the district court, Gill's counsel simply argued that Cohen denied he and Gill agreed to a scheme to defraud--since there was no agreement, there was no conspiracy. Gill's counsel never argued that Cohen's alleged lack of intent to defraud meant Gill could not be party to a conspiracy. Therefore, that argument cannot be considered by this court absent plain error. United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3221, 110 L.Ed.2d 668 (1990); United States v. Fuesting, 845 F.2d 664, 670 (7th Cir.1988). Plain error requires  'a miscarriage of justice,' which 'implies the conviction of one who but for the error would have been acquitted.'  United States v. Field, 875 F.2d 130, 135 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 356 (7th Cir.1989) (other citations omitted)). We find no plain error in this case. The argument is waived. 9 Even if the argument has not been waived, it has no merit. Cohen's testimony was inconsistent on the issue of intent. He flatly denied intent to conspire and defraud, but thoroughly described events that were overwhelmingly probative of criminal intent. These events included preparation of the phony financial statement and guaranty. When Heine asked for FCC's financial statement, Gill and Cohen together revised a false financial statement and produced a new document. The financial statement they sent to Heine claimed that FCC had net assets of over $10 million, including cash reserves of $500,000. At the time, FCC not only lacked assets and income, but could not even meet its payroll. The day Heine received the FCC financial statement, FCC had a balance of $1,317.50 in its bank account. That day, after embellishing the financial statement further during a telephone conversation with Heine, Gill told Cohen that Heine wanted a corporate guaranty. When Cohen questioned the guaranty, Gill told him it didn't matter because it was all blue sky. Cohen prepared the guaranty and both men signed it. After obtaining Heine's and the other investors' money, Gill and Cohen together spent it. But, despite prior representations to the contrary, they did not spend the money on ICBM. 10 The district judge, having heard this and other evidence, denied Gill's motion for judgment of acquittal. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), sets forth the standard of review for a trial court's denial of judgment of acquittal: 11 [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.... [A]ll of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 12 Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (citations omitted). We find that a rational trier of fact could conclude that both Cohen and Gill had fraudulent intent and were conspirators.
13 Gill also argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the August 1, 1983, wire transfer of $165,000 from Damrow's account in Wisconsin to FCC's Huntington National Bank account in California (Count IV). Gill claims that because he was not directly involved in the decision to transfer the money by wire, he could not have caused the transfer. The issue is whether any rational trier of fact could have concluded that Gill caused the wire transfer as charged. 14 In United States v. Bonansinga, 773 F.2d 166 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1160, 106 S.Ct. 2281, 90 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986), this court upheld mail fraud convictions 2 based upon the mailings of invoices and checks in which defendant Bonansinga was uninvolved, and which were between innocent parties. Bonansinga's accomplices took automotive supplies intended for Bonansinga's employer and delivered them to Bonansinga, who converted the supplies to his own use. The charged mailings were based on bills for the supplies and payment checks between Bonansinga's employer and the supplier of automotive goods. Though Bonansinga was not directly involved in the mailings, the court held he nevertheless caused them. Where one does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or when such use can be reasonably foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he 'causes' the mails to be used. Id. at 168 (quoting Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 363, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954)). 15 There is reason to believe that Gill knew of the wire transfers. Damrow had transferred funds by wire: $50,000 on June 20; $15,000 on July 7; $50,000 on July 14; and $65,000 on July 26. Cohen testified that he and Gill daily spoke with Damrow and that he daily discussed FCC's financial trouble with Gill. Cohen had discussed the wire transfer of Heine's investment with Gill, and believed Gill made the initial arrangements with Damrow to wire-transfer other funds. We find a rational trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Gill could foresee the August 1, 1983 wire transfer. 16 III. The District Court Judge's Questioning of Witnesses 17 Gill challenges the trial judge's questioning of government witnesses. Rule 614(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party. In United States v. Kwiat, 817 F.2d 440 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924, 108 S.Ct. 284, 98 L.Ed.2d 245 (1987), where the trial court asked 60 questions during an eight-day trial, this court noted: The judge took an active role in this trial, which we do not seek to discourage. Passive presiding may contribute to long, unmanageable trials. Id. at 448. The critical inquiry is whether by its conduct the court conveyed to the jury a bias or belief regarding the defendant's guilt. United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, 1249 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 456, 62 L.Ed.2d 380 (1979). 18 During the government's direct examination of Cohen, the trial court intervened, questioning Cohen about FCC, its size, its number of employees, and the routing of money obtained from Wisconsin investors. Alluding to the FCC's questionable accounting practices which Cohen recounted in answer to the court's questions, the court remarked: 19 Court: If a lawyer did that, he would be in big trouble, wouldn't [he]? 20 Cohen: Yes, he would. 21