Opinion ID: 1909364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lack of Expert Witnesses

Text: At trial, Nelson testified that Lewis's conduct caused a deterioration in Barbara's health. He detailed each physical symptom including nervousness, shaking and a worsening speech impediment. Nelson and Barbara did not present expert testimony from their physicians to corroborate Nelson's testimony. [5] On appeal, Lewis contends that the court erred in denying his request for a missing witness instruction that would have allowed the jury to draw an adverse inference from the plaintiffs' failure to present corroborating testimony from their physicians. This court has held that the failure of a party to call a witness does not permit the opposing party to argue, or the fact-finder to draw, any inference as to whether the witness's testimony would be favorable or unfavorable to either party. State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 777 (Me.1985). In Twin Island Development Corp. v. Winchester, 512 A.2d 319, 326 (Me.1986), we held that the Brewer rule does not apply when the missing witness is a party and in the best position to testify as to a material fact in issue. In Twin Island, the defendant chose, without explanation, not to testify or even appear at the trial even though there were material facts in issue that were solely within her own knowledge. Under those circumstances, we held that the defendant's unexplained failure to testify to a matter raised by the adverse party was a proper matter for the jury's consideration and concluded that the trial court did not commit reversible error by giving a missing party instruction. Twin Island Development Corp. v. Winchester, 512 A.2d at 326. The present case does not present a situation where the missing witness was in the best position to testify about a material fact or was a party to the action. Nelson was competent to testify about the changes he noticed in his wife's health. Indeed, Barbara's physician was not in a better position than Nelson to testify as to the changes in Barbara's health. Lewis was not entitled to a missing witness instruction. Of greater concern to this court is whether the evidence of severe emotional suffering was sufficient, as a matter of law, in the absence of corroborating testimony from a physician. Under the circumstances of this case, we find no requirement that the plaintiffs' testimony must be corroborated by the testimony of an expert. Cf. Blais v. Davis, 358 A.2d 552 (Me.1976) (medical expert testimony not necessary to corroborate plaintiff's testimony establishing a causal relationship between medical bills produced at trial and her injuries). In Vicnire we noted that [a]lthough `severe' emotional distress is usually manifested by `shock, illness or other bodily harm,' such objective symptomatology is not an absolute prerequisite for recovery of damages for intentional, as opposed to negligent, infliction of emotional distress. In appropriate cases, `severe' emotional distress may be inferred from the `extreme and outrageous' nature of the defendant's conduct alone. Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d at 154; Restatement (Second) of Torts 46, Comment K; accord Gammon v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, 534 A.2d 1282, 1284-85 (Me.1987). We find that the issue of the plaintiffs' injuries was properly submitted to and decided by the jury. And, because it is supported by credible evidence, the jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal. Gurski v. Culpovich, 540 A.2d at 767.