Opinion ID: 220616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remand To Board of Immigration Appeals

Text: Robertson-Dewar's second argument on appeal is that the BIA erred in holding that it did not have jurisdiction to terminate the removal proceedings to give Robertson-Dewar an opportunity to pursue his citizenship claim. We review de novo the BIA's determination as to a purely legal question, but this court gives substantial deference to an agency's construction of a statute that it administers pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Romero-Rodriguez, 488 F.3d at 675 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In In re Hidalgo, the BIA ruled that it has jurisdiction to terminate removal proceedings only where it has received some form of affirmative communication from the DHS regarding the alien's prima facie eligibility for naturalization. 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105-07 (BIA 2007). The Hidalgo decision relied on 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) which requires an alien to have established prima facie eligibility for naturalization as well as an underlying matter involving exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors in order for an immigration judge to terminate removal proceedings. In 2007, DHS issued a non-opposition to his motion to terminate removal proceedings in which it stated that it believed that Robertson-Dewar facially meets the requirements of section 322. Robertson-Dewar argues that DHS's statement meets the standard of an affirmative communication such that the BIA had authority to terminate Robertson-Dewar's removal proceeding. He contends that if removal proceedings are terminated, even though he is too old to qualify for citizenship under section 322, he may still be granted citizenship by nunc pro tunc relief. However, as the district court pointed out, no such nunc pro tunc relief can be awarded until removal proceedings are terminated because 8 U.S.C. § 1429 prohibits consideration of a naturalization application while removal proceedings are pending. This court does not have authority to grant nunc pro tunc relief for this type of error. Courts, sitting in equity, have traditionally applied nunc pro tunc to correct limited types of errors, namely clerical or other record keeping errors. Romero-Rodriguez, 488 F.3d at 677. Any error in this case, even if there is any, is not of this limited type. The petitioner is not in fact asking this court to grant him citizenship nunc pro tunc. He is instead asking the court to remand to the BIA with instructions that they do have jurisdiction to terminate removal proceedings based on DHS's affirmative representation in 2007. If removal proceedings are then terminated, Robertson-Dewar must petition to USCIS for nunc pro tunc relief that will grant him citizenship under the fiction that he is still under 18 and thus qualifies under section 322 as it was written in 1996. We hold that Robertson-Dewar has not established prima facie eligibility for naturalization and thus affirm the BIA's order. Under the BIA's interpretation of the regulations, the only way an alien can establish prima facie eligibility is through an affirmative communication regarding [the alien's] prima facie eligibility for naturalization from the DHSthe agency with exclusive jurisdiction to make such determinations. Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 108-09; see also Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir.2007) ([O]nly an affirmative communication from [DHS] may establish prima facie eligibility.) The affirmative statement in the non-opposition submitted by the DHS does indicate that the agency at that time believed Robertson-Dewar was eligible for naturalization. The agency subsequently changed its position, however. After reinitiating removal proceedings, DHS declined to represent to the Immigration Judge or to the BIA that Robertson-Dewar was prima facie eligible for naturalization. This precluded him from establishing prima facie eligibility, as that determination is the sole province of DHS. Regardless of the reason for the agency's change in positionand certainly, in this case, no reason has been offeredthe BIA did not have authority to look beneath or second-guess DHS's determination. See Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 106 (holding that the BIA does not have authority to determine . . . prima facie eligibility for naturalization in order to terminate removal proceedings). As such, we agree with the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision that it did not have jurisdiction to terminate Robertson-Dewar's removal proceedings.