Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the dissent's position on the burden of proof

Text: 149 Since Decoster has been wholly unable to show that he was prejudiced as a result of his lawyer's alleged inadequacies, the dissent is forced to argue that the burden of proof is on the government to show that Decoster was not prejudiced. 42 In addition to DeCoster I 43 and the dissenting opinion in Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), 44 which are obviously not controlling, my dissenting colleagues rely primarily on three cases: Geders v. United States, 45 Holloway v. Arkansas, 46 and Chapman v. California. 47 They conclude, on the basis of these decisions, that (r)ecent Supreme Court decisions affirm that a distinct showing of prejudice is unnecessary to establish a Sixth Amendment violation. 48 That conclusion is unwarranted in the context of a claim based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
150 Geders is easily distinguished from this case. It was not based on ineffectiveness. In that case the defendant was not permitted to consult with his attorney during the overnight recess between his direct- and cross-examination. This prevented the accused from having the actual assistance of counsel during a critical stage of his trial. When a person is actually denied counsel at an important point in his trial, his constitutional right is violated without any further showing of prejudice. This case, which involves an alleged constructive denial of counsel because of the defense lawyer's ineffectiveness, involves different considerations. 49 Accordingly, Geders is not controlling here.
151 In Holloway, three defendants were charged in connection with a rape and robbery incident. The public defender who was appointed to represent all three defendants informed the court that his clients had conflicting interests, but the trial court insisted on joint representation. The Supreme Court reversed the defendants' convictions, holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic. 50 152 The facts in Holloway have a superficial similarity to those involved here. In both cases the defendants were actually represented by counsel throughout their trials. Nevertheless, the two reasons why the Supreme Court presumed that there was prejudice in Holloway, and dispensed with the requirement that the defendant show it, are plainly inapplicable here. 153 First, the Supreme Court noted that a defense counsel's statement that his clients have conflicting interests is extremely strong evidence that joint representation will prejudice them by preventing their counsel from being able to fully represent one of them at all stages of the trial. Chief Justice Burger wrote: 154 (M)ost courts have held that an attorney's request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted. . . . An attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial. State v. Davis (110 Ariz. 29, 31, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973)). Second, defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise the court at once of the problem. Ibid. Finally, attorneys are officers of the court, and  'when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath.'  State v. Brazile (226 La. 254, 266, 75 So.2d 856, 860-61 (1954)). We find these considerations persuasive. 155 435 U.S. at 485-86, 98 S.Ct. at 1179-1180 (footnotes omitted). In effect, the Court was able to determine from counsel's statement that the accused had been denied full representation by his counsel because of the lawyer's conflicting loyalties. Since the conflict of interest creates a presumption of prejudice, a further showing of prejudice was not required. 51 156 In addition, the Supreme Court recognized that it would be virtually impossible for an accused to show prejudice in the joint representation context. 157 (A) rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of interests which he and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections to the joint representation prejudiced him in some specific fashion would not be susceptible of intelligent, even handed application. In the normal case where a harmless error rule is applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury. Compare Chapman v. California, supra, (386 U.S.) at 24-26 (87 S.Ct. 824, at 828-829), with Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (94 S.Ct. 2887, 2902, 41 L.Ed.2d 590) (1974), and United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 914-917 (CA9 1977). But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil it bears repeating is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation. 158 435 U.S. at 490-91, 98 S.Ct. at 1182. 159 These two reasons do not support a presumption of prejudice in cases that, like this one, involve allegations that defense counsel was ineffective. Unlike the joint representation cases, there is no showing that a defense lawyer's mistakes usually cause prejudice to an accused. This case is a good example in which a defendant was not even slightly harmed as a result of his counsel's alleged errors. 160 Perhaps more important, in cases involving alleged inadequacy of representation, it will not be as difficult for the defendant to prove prejudice. For example, if (as the dissent asserts) an attorney fails to undertake a thorough investigation, the defendant could readily prove prejudice simply by showing that the evidence that would have been found was exculpatory. Unlike the joint representation cases, the defendant would not be forced to engage in unguided speculation. 52 161 In short, while the facts in Holloway (the trial court ignored counsel's warning that his clients had conflicting interests) establish inherent prejudice so that a distinct showing of prejudice (was) unnecessary, 53 that ruling does not constitute a precedent for presuming prejudice from a defendant's allegations that his counsel provided ineffective representation.
162 According to the dissent, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) establishes that the burden in each case rests squarely on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (the) error was harmless. 54 I have no quarrel with that interpretation of Chapman : once a constitutional error is proven the burden of proceeding does shift to the government to prove that the error is harmless. But it begs the question for the dissent to rely on Chapman here because Chapman does not address who has the burden of proof with respect to whether a constitutional error has been committed. 163 Before the burden of proof shifts to the government under Chapman, whatever prejudice the constitutional error involves must first be established by the claimant. Thus, in Chapman itself, the Government was not required to show that the error was harmless until the defendants had shown that a prejudicial error had been committed. Mr. Justice Black wrote: 164 Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. 165 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 (emphasis added). Chapman, therefore, only supports the dissent's position if one assumes that counsel's alleged breach of duty alone constitutes a constitutional violation. Since that is the question at issue in this case, such an assumption is obviously inappropriate.
166 While neither Geders, Holloway, nor Chapman is precedent for the view adopted by the dissent, another Supreme Court opinion, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), is strong authority for the rule that the burden of proving prejudice rests on the accused. 55 In Chambers, the defendant asserted that he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel because his new counsel at his second trial 56 did not confer with (him) until a few minutes before the second trial began. 399 U.S. at 53, 90 S.Ct. at 1982. The defendant contended that because his lawyer was unprepared, he failed to make an adequate effort to have (certain) guns and ammunition excluded from evidence. 399 U.S. at 54, 90 S.Ct. at 1982. The district court rejected petitioner's claim without a hearing and the court of appeals affirmed, noting that the guns and other materials seized from the car were admissible evidence. Id. In light of the defendant's inability to show that he was prejudiced, the Supreme Court (7-1) affirmed the conviction. Mr. Justice White wrote for the Court: 167 Unquestionably, the court should make every effort to effect early appointments of counsel in all cases. But we are not disposed to fashion a per se rule requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy appointment of counsel or to hold that, whenever a habeas corpus petition alleges a belated appointment, an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine whether the defendant has been denied his constitutional right to counsel. 168 399 U.S. at 54, 90 S.Ct. at 1982-1983. From the foregoing it is obvious that a mere breach of duty to an accused is not a constitutional violation unless the defendant proves that he was prejudiced. If the principles advocated in the dissent had been applied in Chambers, then the failure of counsel to confer with the accused before trial (a violation of the American Bar Association guidelines) would have been sufficient to establish a constitutional error, thereby forcing the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced. Thus, Chambers is contrary to the basic contention of the dissent. 57