Opinion ID: 2634775
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Munson's Request To Terminate the Custodial Interrogation Was Unambiguous.

Text: Was Munson's statement, Well, I'm done talkin' then, adequate to invoke the right to silence protected by the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution? On its face, Munson's statement was entirely unambiguous: He clearly indicated that he was finished talking with the police. The state argues, as it did below, that the context of Munson's comment showed that he was afraid of retaliation by Sam Camanga  not of incriminating himself. The state reasons that Munson's request was therefore equivocal and thus insufficient to trigger any duty by the police to honor Munson's right to silence. The court of appeals agreed. [20] We agree that the context of Munson's statement suggests that he wanted to terminate the interrogation because he was afraid of retaliation by Sam Camanga. But there was nothing ambiguous about the statement itself; and an otherwise unambiguous request to terminate a custodial interview does not become somehow equivocal because it might be motivated by a fear of retaliation. [21] Indeed, Detective Hoffbeck testified that he understood Munson's request as an attempt to cut off questioning entirely, but that he did not consider this statement to be an invocation of the right to silence because Munson did not express his desire in a manner which required him to cut off questioning. [22] Thus, we conclude that a reasonable officer in these circumstances would have understood Munson's statement that he was done talkin', without condition or qualification, to be an unequivocal invocation of his right to silence. Though the test is an objective one, we also note that the investigator testified at the suppression hearing that he understood that Munson wanted to stop at that point, and that his subsequent questioning (despite Munson's request) was based on an incorrect understanding of a suspect's right to silence  the investigator believed that he had no duty to stop asking questions until a suspect asks to speak with a lawyer or actually does not answer questions. Moreover, the superior court made no express finding that Munson's request was equivocal. To the contrary, the court's comments at the suppression hearing strongly imply that Munson's request was unambiguous. [23] Because we conclude that Munson's statement Well, I'm done talkin' then was an unambiguous request to terminate the interview, the question is not whether Munson's request was equivocal, but rather whether, in order for a suspect to validly invoke the right to silence, it must be clear that his reason for doing so is specifically motivated by a fear of self-incrimination. Because we find that Munson's request was unequivocal, we decline to address whether the police have an obligation to clarify an ambiguous invocation of the right to silence, and whether the dual prongs of Miranda [24] are entitled to differing levels of protection. Instead, we focus on the core issue, which is whether Munson had a right to remain silent even if his unambiguous request to do so might have been motivated by immediate fear of a co-defendant.