Opinion ID: 47622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The district court's admission of expert testimony

Text: 32 This court reviews for abuse of discretion a decision to admit or exclude evidence. United States v. Cantu, 167 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir.1999). A decision to admit expert testimony is governed by the standards in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 274 (5th Cir.1998) (en banc). Expert testimony is admissible `if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact.' Id. at 274 n. 5 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). The `inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method ... [and] supported by appropriate validation.' Id. at 275 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90, 113 S.Ct. 2786). 33 Hitt argues that the government's expert witness, Dr. Seiden, should not have been allowed to testify about the grooming process. Hitt argues that fact testimony was all that was needed to determine whether the actions of Hitt and Causey were genuinely charitable or were consistent with an illicit purpose. The government argues that Dr. Seiden's testimony regarding the methods by which sexual abusers of children typically operate is testimony regarding modus operandi and was properly admitted expert testimony. 34 This court has allowed, without discussion, the use of expert testimony to explain the behavior of those accused of sexual offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1338-39 (5th Cir.1994) (discussing experts' testimony that the behavior of the defendant indicated that he had pedophilic motivation). Moreover, as noted by the government, other circuits have allowed expert testimony that explains the modus operandi of sexual predators. See United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 585 (7th Cir.1999) (allowing expert testimony regarding the modus operandi of modern child molesters); see also United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 636-37 (3d Cir.2004) (allowing expert testimony regarding the general patterns of behavior exhibited by child molesters). We hold that the admission of the testimony regarding typical behavior of child molesters was not an abuse of discretion. 35 Hitt also argues that there was not an adequate scientific basis for Dr. Seiden's testimony regarding sexual abuse victims returning to their abusers. Hitt, however, cites no authority for this proposition; instead, he argues that (1) Dr. Seiden referenced only two studies regarding return of victims to their abusers, (2) Dr. Seiden gave no details about the sample size in the first study, and (3) a defense expert criticized the second study as not excluding an alternative reason for the victims' behavior. 36 The government counters, arguing that Dr. Seiden relied on more than merely two studies and that even a defense expert conceded that return-to-the-abuser behavior can occur. Given that the district court is afforded deference in gate-keeping scientific evidence and that the application of Daubert should be flexible, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony regarding return-to-the-abuser behavior. See United States v. Rubio, 321 F.3d 517, 525-26 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert testimony despite extensive cross-examination on the validity of the scientific data).