Opinion ID: 2046389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Good-Faith Effort

Text: The good-faith-effort exception to the requirement that summons timely issue is established, but narrow. This court has emphasized that section 3-103 of the Act requires that an action for administrative review be commenced `by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days ` of receipt of the decision being appealed. (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 3-103.) Lockett, 133 Ill.2d at 354, 140 Ill.Dec. 394, 549 N.E.2d 1266. This court has distinguished the requirement of a timely filed complaint, which is jurisdictional, from the requirement of summons timely issued: The 35-day period for the issuance of summons, on the other hand, is mandatory, not jurisdictional, and failure to comply with that requirement will not deprive the court of jurisdiction. ( City National Bank & Trust Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1983), 97 Ill.2d 378, 382 [73 Ill.Dec. 555, 454 N.E.2d 652]; Cox v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1983), 96 Ill.2d 399, 403-04 [71 Ill.Dec. 688, 451 N.E.2d 842].) However, as the 35-day period is intended to `hasten the procedure' of administrative review and avoid undue delay, a litigant must show a good-faith effort to file the complaint and secure issuance of summons within the 35 days in order to avoid dismissal. ( City National Bank & Trust Co., 97 Ill.2d at 382 [73 Ill.Dec. 555, 454 N.E.2d 652]; Cox, 96 Ill.2d at 404 [71 Ill.Dec. 688, 451 N.E.2d 842].) In cases where the 35-day requirement has been relaxed, the plaintiffs had made a good-faith effort to issue summons within the statutory period. Nevertheless, due to some circumstance beyond their control, summons was not issued within the statutory period. See City National Bank & Trust Co., 97 Ill.2d at 382 [73 Ill.Dec. 555, 454 N.E.2d 652]; Cox, 96 Ill.2d at 404 [71 Ill.Dec. 688, 451 N.E.2d 842] (cases in which the plaintiffs had filed their complaints for administrative review and summons with the clerk of the circuit court within the 35-day period but, due to problems at the clerk's office which were beyond the plaintiff's control, the summonses were not issued until after the 35-day period). Lockett, 133 Ill.2d at 355, 140 Ill.Dec. 394, 549 N.E.2d 1266. Carver argues, as she did in the appellate court, that her attorney's assumption that the circuit court clerk would issue summons constitutes a good-faith effort to comply with the Act. We agree with the appellate court that such an assumption, by itself, does not constitute a good-faith effort. 299 Ill. App.3d at 814, 233 Ill.Dec. 906, 701 N.E.2d 1180. This case does not resemble those cases where plaintiffs made efforts to secure issuance of summons, but, due to some circumstance beyond their control, summons was not issued within the statutory period. (Emphasis added.) Lockett, 133 Ill.2d at 355, 140 Ill.Dec. 394, 549 N.E.2d 1266 (and cases cited therein). Rather, this case more closely resembles those cases where plaintiffs did not diligently seek issuance of summons in accordance with the Act. See, e.g., Johnson v. Department of Public Aid, 251 Ill.App.3d 604, 190 Ill.Dec. 640, 622 N.E.2d 50 (1993); Moretti v. Department of Labor, 119 Ill. App.3d 740, 75 Ill.Dec. 324, 457 N.E.2d 114 (1983). This case is distinguishable from Azim v. Department of Central Management Services, 164 Ill.App.3d 298, 115 Ill.Dec. 307, 517 N.E.2d 718 (1987), upon which Carver relies. In that case, plaintiff's attorney told an employee in the circuit court clerk's office via telephone that the complaint needed to be file-stamped and served that day. However, the employee did not indicate that the plaintiff needed to prepare the summonses before they would be issued. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the action, concluding: [T]he record before us supports a finding that the plaintiffs, in good faith, exercised due diligence in seeking issuance of summons in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the statute. The delay in the issuance of summonses was caused solely by errors committed by personnel in the clerk's office.    [W]e find that the errors of ministerial officers whom the plaintiffs cannot control should not serve to deprive them of their right to appeal. Azim, 164 Ill.App.3d at 303, 115 Ill.Dec. 307, 517 N.E.2d 718. In this case, however, Carver did nothing but assume that the clerk's office would issue summons. She did not ask the clerk to issue summons, or even provide the clerk with the addresses of Commission members. Regarding the issuance of summons, she made no efforts whatsoever, much less those that could be considered diligent or made in good faith. We conclude that the good-faith effort exception to this timeliness requirement does not apply to this case.