Opinion ID: 163305
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Can a Discretionary Act Be Required By Law?

Text: 33 Alternatively, Plaintiffs contend that the required-by-law element of the catalyst test can be established even in the absence of a mandatory duty. They argue that under this court's decision in J & J Anderson Inc., 767 F.2d at 1475, a defendant's conduct was required by law for purposes of the catalyst test when it was not a `wholly gratuitous response to an action that in itself was frivolous or groundless.' Aplt. Br. at 26. 34 Plaintiffs' argument points to an apparent inconsistency in this circuit's formulation of the second element of the catalyst test. The great majority of our opinions simply recite the rule that the defendant's conduct in response to the plaintiff's suit must be required by law. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 262 F.3d at 1081; Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1486 (10th Cir.1995); City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1048 (10th Cir.1994); Am. Council of the Blind of Colo., Inc. v. Romer, 962 F.2d 1501, 1504 (10th Cir. 1992); O'Connor v. City and County of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 1990); Lopez v. Sullivan, 882 F.2d 1533, 1536 (10th Cir.1989); Luethje v. Peavine Sch. Dist. of Adair County, 872 F.2d 352, 354 (10th Cir.1989); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 962 (10th Cir.1986); Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, AFL-CIO v. Bohn, 737 F.2d 860, 863 (10th Cir.1984); cf. Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir.1989) (plaintiff must show that he would have prevailed on the merits). 35 In J & J Anderson, 767 F.2d at 1475, however, we followed our recitation of the two-part test with the following quotation from Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir.1982): Indeed, a defendant may unilaterally undertake action that moots the suit. In such a case, a plaintiff may still recover attorney's fees if he can show both a causal connection between the filing of the suit and the defendant's action[,] and that the defendant's conduct was required by law, i.e., not a wholly gratuitous response to an action that in itself was frivolous or groundless.  Some subsequent opinions have repeated the emphasized language. See Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1199 (10th Cir.1998); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 953 (10th Cir.1994); Collins v. Romer, 962 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1992). 36 On several occasions we have sought to reconcile what appear to be two separate tests. In our most recent attempt we explained: The essential part of that language is `that the defendants' conduct was required by law. ' The court's reference to `a wholly gratuitous response to an action that in itself was frivolous or groundless' is obviously intended as only one example of the type of conduct referred to by the court. Kan. Health Care Ass'n, Inc. v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1052, 1055 (10th Cir.1994). See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d at 964 (Seth, J., concurring) (the term `gratuitous conduct' [has] acquired a definition by our cases ... as an action not required by law); accord Goichman v. City of Aspen, 859 F.2d 1466, 1471 (10th Cir.1988). 37 Regardless of the formulation adopted in the opinion, however, our decisions are generally consistent. All but one case that recites the required-by-law element either (1) found the second prong of the catalyst test was met because the plaintiff demonstrated (or the defendant did not contest) that it would have prevailed on the merits, see Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 262 F.3d at 1081; Beard, 31 F.3d at 953; Collins, 962 F.2d at 1514, 1517; Luethje, 872 F.2d at 354-56; Foremaster, 882 F.2d at 1489; (2) found an award of attorney fees inappropriate because the plaintiff would not have prevailed, see Kan. Health Care Ass'n, 31 F.3d at 1055; City of Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1049-50; O'Connor, 894 F.2d at 1226-27; Goichman, 859 F.2d at 1471; Supre, 792 F.2d at 963; J & J Anderson, 767 F.2d at 1477-78; (3) did not need to address the second prong because no causal connection was established, see Am. Council of the Blind, 962 F.2d at 1505-08; Operating Eng'rs, 737 F.2d at 863-64; or (4) remanded on other grounds, see Powder River Basin Res. Council, 54 F.3d at 1486-87; Lopez, 882 F.2d at 1536-37. The sole exception is Ellis, 163 F.3d 1186. In Ellis the plaintiff brought race discrimination and retaliation claims against the hospital where she worked and several of its employees. Our opinion recited in some detail the evidence supporting the plaintiff's claims. To determine whether she would actually have prevailed, however, would have required an assessment of the credibility of the pertinent witnesses. We ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of attorney fees under the catalyst test, observing that [the plaintiff's] action against the individual defendants was not frivolous or groundless.... Id. at 1199. 38 Ellis can be reconciled with our other precedents on the ground that in Ellis we could not determine whether the defendants' actions were required by law without `conducting the very trial mooted by a defendant's voluntary compliance.' Morris v. City of W. Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1210 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 17 F.3d 260, 263 n. 1 (8th Cir.1994)). When a full-scale evidentiary hearing would be required to determine whether the plaintiff would have prevailed, it is worth keeping in mind the Supreme Court's admonition that a request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). 39 That is not, however, the situation presented by this case. We can readily determine on the record before us that the action taken by the EPA was not a legally mandated response to Plaintiffs' lawsuit. Accordingly, even if the catalyst theory still applies to attorney fee requests under § 505(d) of the CWA, Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover their fees here. 40 It certainly appears that Plaintiffs performed a significant public service in bringing this pollution problem to the attention of the EPA and holding its feet to the fire. For that, they can derive satisfaction from the fruit of [their] labors. Goichman, 859 F.2d at 1471. But there is no legal authority for us to order further compensation. 41 We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.