Opinion ID: 505504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Facial Validity of PSP Administrative Regulation 4-6.03A

Text: 14 A news reporter interviewed Rode during non-work hours and questioned her concerning her employment problems at the PSP. The resulting news article criticized the PSP and stirred controversy allegedly leading to staff demoralization in the bureau. After a departmental hearing, Rode was suspended under the AR's which, in part, prohibited conduct bringing discredit upon the PSP. AR 4-6.0. 15 In count III of her complaint, Rode challenged the validity of the administrative regulations under which she had received her suspension. The district court found that several of the regulations were unconstitutional and this determination has not been appealed. The court nonetheless sustained Rode's suspension, holding AR 4-6.03A to be constitutional. Section 4-6.03A provides: 16 Employees of the Pennsylvania State Police shall conduct themselves at all times in such a manner as to reflect most favorably on the Department and the Commonwealth thereby promoting good public relations. Undesirable conduct shall include immorality or any conduct not specifically mentioned in these rules which tends to bring the Department and/or Commonwealth into disrepute or reflects discredit upon the individual employee. 17 Rode challenged this provision on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. 18 A statute or regulation governing conduct is unconstitutionally vague when it  'either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.'  Aiello v. City of Wilmington, Delaware, 623 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir.1980) (quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). Such a regulation violates the first essential of due process of law because it neither affords fair notice to potential violators nor provides standards for enforcement. Id. Statutory vagueness is especially problematic when it may chill the exercise of protected first amendment rights. Id.; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372-73, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 1322-23, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964). 19 An individual has standing to challenge a provision on vagueness grounds only if it is vague as applied to that person. Thus, when a litigant's conduct clearly falls within the permissible purview of a statute, such an individual lacks standing to challenge the statute for vagueness, even though the statute may well be vague as applied to others. Aiello, 623 F.2d at 850; see also Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-56, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2561, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (one to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness). The district court did not address Rode's standing to assert a vagueness challenge as the issue had not been addressed by the defendants. This court may raise issues of standing sua sponte. 20 Rode does not have standing to challenge the vagueness of AR 4-6.03A because the provision clearly applies to her conduct. The regulation prohibits acts bringing discredit upon the PSP or the Commonwealth. Rode's suggestion to the news reporter that she was being harassed because of racial animus in the PSP is conduct likely to bring the PSP into disrepute. See Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 835 (D.C.Cir.1968), mod'd on diff grds, 425 F.2d 469 (D.C.Cir.1968), aff'd en banc, 425 F.2d 472 (D.C.Cir.1969). Rode therefore did not have standing to challenge the vagueness of the statute and the court should not have addressed the question. 21 Rode also challenged the regulation on overbreadth grounds. The district court, however, did not consider this issue. A statute or, in this instance, a regulation, is overbroad if it does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 742, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940). Such regulations which readily lend themselves to harsh and discriminatory enforcement, id., against an individual can deter the exercise of first amendment rights. 22 Overbreadth challenges may be brought even by claimants whose conduct was not constitutionally protected where hypothetical third parties might be chilled in the exercise of their first amendment rights by the statute. Aiello, 623 F.2d at 860. The Supreme Court, however, has narrowed the scope of such challenges where the statute or regulation applies to both conduct and speech, holding that overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). It would appear that AR 4-6.03A legitimately prohibits a wide range of constitutionally unprotected conduct. In such circumstances it would be imprudent to invalidate the regulation on its face. Instead, any overbreadth should be cured through a case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied. Id. at 615-616, 93 S.Ct. at 2918.