Opinion ID: 711029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Privacy Act and Hollis' Interpretation of Disclose

Text: 3 The Privacy Act of 1974 (the Act) establishes conditions under which certain kinds of agency documents must be kept private and may be disclosed only to authorized individuals. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(b) (1994). The Act provides: 4 No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a [Privacy Act] system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains.... 5 Id. (emphasis added). Not every disclosure gives rise to liability, however; the Act itself sets out several exceptions that allow agencies to utilize protected records for their legitimate needs. For example, agencies may lawfully disclose a Privacy Act record both to employees who have a need for the record in the performance of their duties, id. Sec. 552a(b)(1), and for routine use[s] that are compatible with the purpose for which it was collected, id. Sec. 552a(b)(3), 552a(a)(7). If no such exception applies, however, an agency is liable for an intentional or willful disclosure that has some adverse effect upon the subject of the record. Id. Sec. 552a(g)(1)(D), 552a(g)(4). 6 Hardly a model of legislative precision and tailoring, the Act was passed as a result of a late-session congressional compromise, with several of its central terms lacking express definition. See generally 2 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE Sec. 20.01 (2d ed. 1990). The courts thus have been required to engage in substantial interpretative efforts, as government agencies have sought to accommodate their recordkeeping operations to the constraints that a literal reading of its terms might impose. See, e.g., infra note 7 and accompanying text (citing cases). 7 Perhaps the most critical term left undefined by the Act is disclose, and among the interpretative questions that term raises is whether it encompasses the release of an otherwise protected record to an individual who is already familiar with its contents. Several federal courts have concluded, in a variety of diverse circumstances, that such a release of information does not give rise to liability under the Act, averring the common sense notion that it is not possible to disclose something to someone who already knows it. See, e.g., Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 134 (3d Cir.1992); Kline v. Department of H.H.S., 927 F.2d 522, 524 (10th Cir.1991); Hollis, 856 F.2d at 1545; Reyes v. Supervisor of D.E.A., 834 F.2d 1093, 1096 n. 1 (1st Cir.1987); Pellerin v. Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir.1986); F.D.I.C. v. Dye, 642 F.2d 833, 836 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). 8 This restricted interpretation of disclose was applied by this circuit in Hollis v. United States Department of the Army, 856 F.2d 1541 (D.C.Cir.1988). In that case, Phyllis Hollis requested and received from the Army a summary of individual child-support payments previously deducted from her ex-husband's salary and sent directly to her. She needed the summary to establish in court that her ex-husband was in arrears in furnishing child support. Mr. Hollis then filed suit against the Army, arguing that the summary was a protected record that had been unlawfully disclosed under the Privacy Act. The district court granted the Army summary judgment, and we affirmed, reasoning that Phyllis Hollis, as the direct recipient of the child-support payments, already knew what had been remitted to her. Id. at 1543.