Opinion ID: 1470023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Attorney General's Lawsuit

Text: On October 12, 1999, the Attorney General, on behalf of the state filed a ten-count complaint against eight former lead pigment manufacturers, John Doe corporations, and the LIA. [7] The manufacturers were: NL, Sherwin-Williams, ARCO, The Glidden Company, [8] The O'Brien Corporation, [9] SCM Chemicals (SCM), American Cyanamid Company, [10] and E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company. [11] The state later amended its complaint to include the ConAgra Grocery Products Company. [12] A second-amended complaint added Cytec Industries, Inc. [13] and substituted Millennium Inorganic Chemicals, Inc. for SCM. [14] The state alleged that the manufacturers or their predecessors-in-interest had manufactured, promoted, distributed, and sold lead pigment for use in residential paint, despite that they knew or should have known, since the early 1900s, that lead is hazardous to human health. The state also contended that the LIA was, in essence, a coconspirator or aider and abettor of one or more of the manufacturers from at least 1928 to the present. The state asserted that defendants failed to warn Rhode Islanders of the hazardous nature of lead and failed to adequately test lead pigment. In addition, the state maintained that defendants concealed these hazards from the public or misrepresented that they were safe. The state further alleged that defendants' actions caused it to incur substantial damages. As such, the state asserted, defendants were liable for public nuisance, violations of Rhode Island's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, strict liability, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and indemnity. The state also requested equitable relief to protect children in Rhode Island. [15] The state sought compensatory and punitive damages, in addition to an order requiring defendants to (1) abate lead pigment in all Rhode Island buildings accessible to children and (2) fund educational and lead-poisoning prevention programs. In January 2000, defendants moved to dismiss all counts of the state's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. With respect to the public nuisance claim, defendants asserted that they did not control the lead pigment at the time it caused harm to Rhode Island children and that, therefore, they cannot be held liable for public nuisance. The defendants also argued that there was no interference with a public right, as that term has been recognized under public nuisance law. For its part, however, the state countered that the public nuisance claim was proper because defendants could be held liable regardless of whether they currently control the lead-poisoned properties. The state urged that defendants' participation in the creation of the nuisance should subject them to liability. The trial justice, agreeing with the state, denied defendants' motion. The trial justice dismissed several other counts and ordered that the case be tried in three phases. Eventually, only the state's public nuisance claim proceeded to trial. After a seven-week trial, however, the jury was deadlocked and the trial justice declared a mistrial. Before a second trial commenced, the state moved to strike defendants' demand for a jury trial, contending that its public nuisance claim was equitable in nature and that defendants had no right to a jury trial on that issue. At that time, the state voluntarily dismissed with prejudice all other non-equitable claims remaining in the case, including the following counts: strict liability, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial justice, however, denied the state's motion to strike the jury demand, concluding that the existence of a nuisance was a factual issue to be resolved by a jury and, further, that the state's demand for compensatory and punitive damages entitled defendants to a jury trial. Before trial, the state moved in limine to exclude all evidence and testimony with respect to the presence or absence of lead paint in any individual Rhode Island property; the trial justice granted this motion. In so ruling, the trial justice noted that property specific evidence is irrelevant in connection with the issue of whether the cumulative effect of such pigment in all such buildings    was a public nuisance   . The defendants then moved for summary judgment with respect to the civil conspiracy count of the state's complaint. The trial justice granted defendants' motion, concluding that civil conspiracy cannot stand in isolation, but rather, must be accompanied by an underlying intentional tort theory. Because all the intentional tort theories had been dismissed, the trial justice concluded that it was proper to dismiss the civil conspiracy count as well. The defendants also moved for summary judgment on the basis that the state could not identify any specific defendant whose lead pigment is present in any Rhode Island property. To support their motion, defendants relied primarily on this Court's decision in Gorman v. Abbott Laboratories, 599 A.2d 1364, 1364 (R.I.1991) (mem.), in which this Court rejected the market-share theory of products liability that the California Supreme Court had adopted. The trial justice denied defendants' motion, stating that product identification is not a necessary element in a public nuisance suit. Rather, the trial justice ruled that the state need only show that each defendant (or such defendants as it seeks to hold liable for the public nuisance here claimed) has engaged in activities which were a substantial factor in bringing about the alleged public nuisance and the injuries and harm found to have been proximately caused thereby. After these and other motions were dealt with, the second trial proceeded, this time against only four manufacturers  Millennium, NL, Sherwin-Williams, and ARCO. At trial, the state presented witnesses who offered historical evidence about the use of lead pigment in paint, the impact of childhood lead poisoning on Rhode Island, and defendants' conduct concerning lead pigment in paint. After the state rested, defendants moved immediately for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Their primary contention was that the state had failed to prove a sufficient nexus between defendants' activities and the presence of lead pigment in Rhode Island. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial justice granted defendants' motion with respect to the state's indemnification and unjust enrichment claims and its request for compensatory damages. The court reserved judgment, however, on whether the state had proven a sufficient nexus between defendants' activities and the presence of lead pigment in Rhode Island. The trial justice provided the jury with the law applicable to the case and instructed the jury to apply that law to the facts as it found them based on the evidence presented. First, the trial justice explained that the jury was being asked to determine whether the cumulative presence of lead pigment in paints and coatings in or on buildings throughout the state of Rhode Island constitutes a public nuisance. He defined public nuisance as something that unreasonably interferes with a right common to the general public. It is something that unreasonably interferes with the health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the general community. He further explained that the right common to the general public is collective in nature and belongs to the community at large. The trial justice then clarified that an interference is an injury, invasion, disruption, or obstruction of a right held by the general public. He added that an interference is unreasonable when persons have suffered harm or are threatened with injuries that they ought not have to bear. After providing the jury with a definition of public nuisance and detailing the elements, the trial justice also told the jury that if it found that a public nuisance exists, it then must determine whether defendants' actions were the proximate cause of the nuisance. He defined proximate cause as a cause that in a natural, continuous, and unbroken sequence produces an event or injury and without which the event or injury would not have occurred. Lastly, the trial justice instructed the jury that if it concluded that the cumulative presence of lead pigment in paint is a public nuisance and that defendants are liable, it then must decide whether any defendants should abate the public nuisance. The trial justice provided the jury with written copies of the instructions. The jury began deliberations on February 14, 2006, and returned its verdict on February 22, 2006; it found that the cumulative presence of lead pigment in paints and coatings on buildings throughout the State of Rhode Island constituted a public nuisance. The jury further found that defendants, Millennium, NL, and Sherwin-Williams, were liable for causing or substantially contributing to the creation of the public nuisance. Lastly, the jury concluded that those three defendants should be ordered to abate the public nuisance. The jury found that a fourth defendant, ARCO, was not liable. After the verdict, defendants renewed their motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 and moved alternatively for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial justice denied both these motions. While these motions were pending, defendant Sherwin-Williams filed with the Superior Court supplemental motions pursuant to Rules 26(e), 59, 60(b)(2), and 60(b)(3) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure; defendants Millennium and NL joined in these motions. Again, the trial justice denied all of these motions. On March 16, 2007, the court entered a judgment of abatement in favor of the state against defendants, Millennium, NL, and Sherwin-Williams, from which they appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.