Opinion ID: 6357816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grounds for Termination and Best Interests of the Children

Text: [¶ 9] We review for clear error the court's findings in support of the bases for the parents' unfitness and the best interests of the children, and for an abuse of discretion the ultimate determination that termination is in the children's best interests. See In re Child of James R. , 2018 ME 50 , ¶¶ 11, 14, 182 A.3d 1252 . [I]n order to terminate parental rights[,] the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the four statutory grounds of parental unfitness. Id. ¶ 11 (citing 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B) (2017) ). We will vacate a finding of unfitness only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it, if the fact-finder clearly misapprehends the meaning of the evidence, or if the finding is so contrary to the credible evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case. Id. (quotation marks omitted); In re Cameron B. , 2017 ME 18 , ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199 . Further,  as the court properly recited, see supra ¶ 2, the statutory definitions of jeopardy to health or welfare include the deprivation of adequate ... shelter, given the ages of the children. 22 M.R.S. § 4002(6)(B) (2017). [¶ 10] The parents contend that the court's findings regarding parental unfitness and the best interests of the children are unsupported by sufficient competent evidence in the record. The parents assert that the court failed to properly consider the alleged impact that the Department's efforts to promote family reunification had on the parents' ability to secure and maintain adequate housing. The mother further argues that the only competent evidence received by the court at the December 2017 termination proceeding, which concerns [t]he limited events that occurred following the [July termination hearing,] do[es] not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence to justify a termination of parental rights. We disagree. [¶ 11] Contrary to the parents' contentions, competent evidence in the record supports, to the clear and convincing standard, the court's findings concerning each of the bases of parental unfitness and the children's best interests. See In re Child of James R. , 2018 ME 50 , ¶¶ 11, 22-23, 182 A.3d 1252 . The effort by the Department towards family reunification is not by itself a basis for the court to deny a termination petition, although it is a factor, Id. ¶ 21 -one that the court explicitly considered here. And, in any event, the failure of reunification efforts occurred as a result of the parents' opposition to the Department's efforts and an abject refusal to engage with services that would facilitate reunification. [¶ 12] The court's July 2017 order gave the parents an additional period of time to secure adequate housing, but they focused their efforts during that time on imped[ing] proper reunification efforts due to [the mother's] distrust of DHHS and the GAL. The mother asserted at trial [in December of 2017] that she and [the father] ... located another place to live. However, despite the court keeping the evidentiary record open for four days following the hearing, the parents failed to provide a copy of the lease or to even advise the court or the Department of the address at the new residence. The evidence supports, therefore, the court's findings that it is highly likely that these parents did not obtain that new housing, and that as a result they remain unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy or take responsibility for them in a reasonable time, and have failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2), (b)(i)-(ii), (iv). [¶ 13] As for the best interests of the children, the clear preference of the Legislature, as evinced by 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2017), is to [e]liminate the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions which prevent their return to the family and to [p]romote the adoption of children into stable families. The children have been in foster care since October of 2016 after experiencing a longer period of impermanence due to the parents' lack of housing. The current foster placement is in a loving, stable, and child-centered home where the children have progressed with therapy and services. Because these children need the permanence that adoption can afford them, the court did not abuse its discretion by deeming that termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests. See In re Child of James R. , 2018 ME 50 , ¶¶ 11, 14, 22-23, 182 A.3d 1252 ; In re Child of Heather W. , 2018 ME 31 , ¶ 11, 180 A.3d 661 .