Opinion ID: 2178000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: YATA's Standing to Challenge Zoning Commission Order 746-C

Text: GWU argues that even if we have jurisdiction, this case must nevertheless be dismissed because YATA lacks standing to maintain this petition for review of Zoning Commission Order No. 746-C, due to YATA's failure to allege any personal injury in fact to its members. We agree. To resolve issues of standing, we look to federal standing jurisprudence, both constitutional and prudential. Friends of Tilden Park v. District of Columbia, 806 A.2d 1201, 1206 (D.C.2002) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147 (D.C. 1991)). We recently summarized our basic principles of standing as follows: The sine qua non of constitutional standing to sue is an actual or imminently threatened injury that is attributable to the defendant and capable of redress by the court. The plaintiff, or those whom the plaintiff properly represents, must have suffered an injury in fact  an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. A mere interest in a problem, no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization adversely affected or aggrieved for standing purposes. Id. at 1206-07 (internal quotation marks, citations, ellipses, and brackets omitted). [U]nder the so-called prudential principles of standing, a plaintiff may assert only its own legal rights, may not attempt to litigate generalized grievances, and may assert only interests that fall within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Id. at 1207 n. 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Community Credit Union Servs., Inc. v. Federal Express Servs. Corp., 534 A.2d 331, 333 (D.C.1987)). YATA lacks standing because it has failed to allege any actual injuries suffered by its members that are not generalized grievances. The two claims raised by YATA in its original brief  (1) the Zoning Commission erred in approving GWU's modifications to the original PUD, and (2) the Zoning Commission failed to accord great weight to the recommendations and testimony of the Advisory Neighborhood Commission  amount to nothing more than an allegation of the right to have the Zoning Commission act in accordance with its rules and regulations. Such claims are insufficient to establish standing because they are generalized grievances, not personal to the petitioner. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575-76, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) ([W]e have ... held that an injury amounting only to the alleged violation of a right to have the Government act in accordance with law was not judicially cognizable because assertion of a right to a particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning.); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-55, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1983). YATA also raised the more specific allegations that the Zoning Commission's decision to grant GWU's request to modify the original PUD will result in the loss of new property tax revenue, new jobs, and new and essential housing in the Downtown area. These injuries, however, are not personal to YATA, but generalized grievances affecting the Downtown area at large; thus, they are also insufficient to establish standing. Cf. Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 574, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (discussing multiple cases in which taxpayers were found to lack standing because taxation is of general interest, common to all members of the public); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502-03, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (determining that petitioners' allegations were general grievances because they failed to show that the absence of cheaper housing in the subject neighborhood resulted in their inability to live there); Speyer, supra, 588 A.2d at 1161, 1161 n. 27 (finding that allegations of inappropriate use of tax revenues was not personal to the petitioners, but a generalized grievance, even though the petitioners were residents of the area). YATA has failed to establish that it has suffered an actual injury as a result of the Zoning Commission's decision. YATA claims that [i]ts injury stems from the fact that its residents live directly across the street from the proposed new structure, which GWU is proposing to construct not as an office/condominium structure, but as a classroom/dormitory structure, a change that they view as injurious to their rights as permanent residents interested in the quiet enjoyment of their homes and that it is challenging an agency ruling that affects what its residents see and hear out their windows, as well as the livability of their neighborhood. These statements, however, do nothing more than point to YATA's close proximity to the modified PUD and assert, without explication, that the changes approved by the Zoning Commission will interfere with YATA's members' enjoyment of their homes. While threats to non-economic interests such as use and enjoyment may constitute an injury in fact, the alleged threat to YATA's members' quiet enjoyment of their homes is merely conjectural and hypothetical; YATA fails to articulate a concrete and specific threat or injury. See Lee v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 423 A.2d 210, 217 (D.C. 1980) (citations omitted) (Petitioners must allege an injury or aggrievement which is real, perceptible, concrete, specific and immediate, rather than one that is conjectural, hypothetical or speculative.). YATA's close proximity to the E Street property alone does not make every use, or change in use, of the subject property injurious to YATA's members. There is nothing in YATA's briefs or in the record to indicate that YATA has suffered, or is in immediate danger of suffering, any direct harm as a result of Zoning Commission Order No. 746-C. Consequently, we are constrained to conclude that YATA lacks standing to maintain its petition for review. [6] Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we dismiss YATA's petition for review of Zoning Commission Order No. 746-C. So ordered.