Opinion ID: 3151619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Barroso’s Remaining Claims

Text: The district court applied a two-level enhancement because Barroso’s offense “involved sophisticated means.” USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). We have affirmed the application of the sophisticated means enhancement under very similar circumstances. See United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming the enhancement when the defendant “participated in a scheme that utilized straw buyers, fraudulent mortgage documents, fake title 43 Case: 13-12018 Date Filed: 11/03/2015 Page: 44 of 50 corporations, as well as the improper diversion of the U.S. mail”). Barroso recruited and duped straw buyers, received early release funds, and used those funds to make the straw buyer’s cash-to-close payments; the scheme involved false mortgage loan applications and other fraudulent mortgage documents. We therefore uphold the district court’s sophisticated means enhancement.
The district court imposed a two-level enhancement because Barroso “derived more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions as a result of the offense.” USSG § 2B1.1(b)(15)(A) (2012). The funds Barroso received were funneled primarily through his company, Two B. On appeal, Barroso correctly states the law; the Guidelines only contemplate the funds Barroso individually received, not the funds he jointly obtained with coconspirators. See USSG § 2B1.1 cmt n.11(A) (2012). He claims for the first time on appeal that his wife was a co-owner of Two B, and therefore, the district court should not have applied the gross receipts enhancement based on the money funneled through Two B. However, Barroso failed to object to the presentence investigation report, which specifically identifies Barroso as “the sole owner of Two B Investments Group.” “Without objection and in the absence of manifest injustice,” we treat conclusions contained in a presentence investigation report as binding. United States v. Norris, 50 F.3d 959, 962 (11th Cir. 1995). Moreover, 44 Case: 13-12018 Date Filed: 11/03/2015 Page: 45 of 50 Barroso has pointed to no evidence in the record that would establish that Barroso and his wife jointly owned Two B. Accordingly, there was no clear error or manifest injustice.
The Guidelines impose a two-level enhancement for obstructing justice during the “prosecution . . . of the instant offense of conviction . . . .” USSG § 3C1.1. The district court applied this enhancement to Barroso based on defense counsel’s introduction of the fraudulent check at trial to impeach Diaz. We review for clear error. United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 839, 844 (11th Cir. 2010). Barroso argues that the government failed to present any evidence connecting him––as opposed to his attorneys alone––to the introduction of the forged check. However, the district court reasonably inferred that Barroso, rather than his attorneys alone, introduced the check at trial. Barroso’s signature appears on the endorsement line of the check, and he has never disputed the authenticity of his signature. Moreover, the check first emerged in a civil suit brought by the lender against Diaz. According to Diaz’s testimony, Barroso arrived unexpectedly at Barroso’s workplace and escorted Diaz to the civil deposition, during which the check was introduced. Barroso also had hired a lawyer to represent Diaz. Barroso’s involvement in the civil suit, to which he was not a party, is also probative of his knowledge of the check. Finally, the check’s relevance on its face 45 Case: 13-12018 Date Filed: 11/03/2015 Page: 46 of 50 was not obvious, as it simply was written from Diaz to Barroso in the amount of $10,000. Without any input from Barroso, it is almost incomprehensible why Barroso’s attorneys would have introduced the check at trial. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err.
The Guidelines assign points to any “prior sentence” imposed on a defendant, and based on the total number of points a defendant has, he is placed into one of six criminal history categories. See USSG § 4A1.1. Here, based on Barroso’s 2006 conviction in which he and Diaz pleaded guilty to wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, the probation office determined that Barroso should have a criminal history category of II. Barroso objected, but the district court overruled his objection. Barroso argues that his 2006 conviction was “part of the instant offense,” and therefore should not have been included in determining his criminal history category. See USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1). The district court properly included Barroso’s 2006 “prior sentence” in calculating Barroso’s criminal history category. USSG §§ 4A1.1 & 4A1.2. “The term ‘prior sentence’ means any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt . . . for conduct not part of the instant offense.” USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1). To determine whether Barroso’s 2006 sentence was “part of the instant offense,” we look at USSG § 1B1.3. See USSG § 4A1.2 cmt. n.1. 46 Case: 13-12018 Date Filed: 11/03/2015 Page: 47 of 50 Conduct is part of the instant office when it “occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1). Here, the conduct underlying Barroso’s first conviction occurred in 2006, but the conduct in the instant case occurred between 2007 and 2008. Moreover, the only common actor in both offenses was Barroso. Finally, the instant conspiracy was much broader in degree and scope than the 2006 transaction. The 2006 transaction did not involve stolen identities, the premature release of loan proceeds, or the issuance of false title commitments, as was the case here. Accordingly, the district court did not err. Barroso also argues that the district court erred when it declined to give him a downward departure, but we lack jurisdiction to review the court’s decision on that issue. See United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005)