Opinion ID: 2545369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instructing with regard to the presumption of intent.

Text: The defendant's final argument is that the trial court erred in giving PIK Crim.3d 54.01 regarding presumption of intent. The defendant contends that the giving of this instruction operated to shift the burden of proof to the defendant under the facts. The court's jury instruction No. 4 followed PIK Crim.3d 54.01, which states: Ordinarily, a person intends all of the usual consequences of (his) (her) voluntary acts. This inference may be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case. You may accept or reject it in determining whether the State has met its burden to prove the required criminal intent of the defendant. This burden never shifts to the defendant. PIK Crim.3d 54.01 explicitly instructs the jury that it may infer that a person intends all the natural and probable consequences of his or her ordinary acts but that the jury may also reject that inference. It further clearly informs the jury that the burden of proof does not shift to the defendant. Thus, the express language of the instruction given undermines the defendant's argument. Under the circumstances in this case, the jury could infer from the defendant's conduct that he intended the natural consequences of his voluntary act. This instruction did not tell the jury, however, that it could infer intent from the defendant's pointing the barrel of the gun inside the truck unless the jury believed that the natural and probable consequence of that act was the shooting of the defendant or unless the jury refused to believe that the defendant's shooting was an accident. The defendant also argues that the State, in its closing argument, informed the jury that it could find the defendant intended to kill Bornholdt because he admitted to pointing the barrel of the gun inside the truck. However, the record reveals that the State, in commenting on the instruction, informed the jury: Instruction Number 4, it's exactly the way it reads. It says, ordinarily a person intendsintends all of the usual consequences of their voluntary acts. It's the law's inference that you can assume that he intended the consequences of what he did. And it goes on, you can consider that, and that's the law. Although not artfully phrased by the prosecutor, the statement does not instruct the jury to find that the defendant intended to kill Bornholdt simply because he pointed the gun inside Bornholdt's truck. We conclude that neither PIK Crim.3d 54.01 nor the State's closing argument regarding the instruction shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. Affirmed.