Opinion ID: 76395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dual Sentencing Enhancements as Captain and Organizer or Leader

Text: 32 At sentencing, over Rendon's objections, the district judge adjusted Rendon's sentence upward by imposing a two-level increase for being a captain of the go-fast boat under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) (Nov.2001) and a four-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) as an organizer or leader. Rendon challenges the applicability of each enhancement individually, and alternatively, contends that these separate enhancements are for the same conduct and, therefore, constitute impermissible double counting. We review a district court's findings of fact for clear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Jackson, 276 F.3d 1231, 1233 (11th Cir.2001).
33 Rendon contends that he was not a captain within the meaning of § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) because the go-fast vessel was nothing more than a speedboat, and the term captain refers to an individual listed on a ship's manifest as the captain. Because he was only the person in charge of a small boat, he argues that the adjustment does not apply to him. Rendon, however, cites no authority supporting his definition of captain. 34 The circuits that have decisions on point have declined to adopt a rigid definition of the term captain. See, e.g., United States v. Senn, 129 F.3d 886, 896-97 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a defendant need only act as a captain to warrant sentence enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) and that no particular training or licensure is required to justify the designation); United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332, 346 (1st Cir.1997) (rejecting defendant's assertion that § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) applies only to offense participants possessing special navigational rank or skills). In this case, Rendon identified himself as the captain to boarding Coast Guard personnel. Additionally, Rendon's codefendants testified that they considered him to be the captain because he not only navigated the boat directly or indirectly and was the only crew member who knew its course, but also he had hired the crew and directed their operations on board. 35 At the sentencing hearing, the district judge described Rendon's navigation and use of the go-fast boat: 36 True, this was a go-fast boat ... and, true, the other one was a fishing boat, although it was a fishing boat not being used to fish, but being used to transport drugs, this was a fast boat being used to transport drugs. In both cases[,] the principle was to transport drugs, not to use them ... in a manner consistent with its most wholesome purpose for which it was intended. 37 ... [S]omeone asked whether Mr. Castro, or ... Mr. Pineda [Torres] ... [thought that] Mr. Quintero Rendon behaved different than any other captain that he had been with on any other vessel. The answer to that question is revealing, is yes, he did, because instead of leading them to fish, he led them to a cocaine rendezvous. 38 Therefore, the facts of this case evidence that Rendon was the captain in an employment, navigational, and operational sense. He has provided no authority for his technical definition of captain, and we will not depart from the sound reasoning of other circuits by creating one. 39 Rendon also contends that, under § 2D1.1(b)(2), 6 a controlled substance must actually be imported for the upward adjustment to apply. He argues that because there was no actual importation into the United States and no evidence that the cocaine was destined to be delivered to the United States, the enhancement cannot be applied to him. 40 Section 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) imposes the enhancement based on the role of the defendant in the importation or exportation of a controlled substance: the defendant acted as a pilot, copilot, captain, navigator, flight officer, or any other operation officer aboard any craft or vessel carrying a controlled substance. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Rendon emphasizes that the introductory phrase of the guideline states, [i]f the defendant unlawfully imported or exported a controlled substance, which is in the past tense and appears to apply to both subsections 2D1.1(b)(2)(A) and 2D1.1(b)(2)(B). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2). However, the general heading of § 2D1.1 provides that the adjustments in § 2D1.1 apply to not only substantive drug offenses, but also to attempt and conspiracy offenses. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Further, addressing a similar situation concerning the application of § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) where an appellant contended that the enhancement would only have been appropriate if he had actually carried out the act of transporting drugs, but is not appropriate for mere conspiracy and attempt, the First Circuit concluded the appellant's argument was frivolous. United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110, 124 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 996, 121 S.Ct. 1658, 149 L.Ed.2d 640 (2001). Using U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(a), the First Circuit reasoned: 41 The offense level for the crimes of conspiracy and attempt is [t]he base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty. USSG § 2X1.1(a) (Nov.1998) (emphasis added). The adjustment in § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) plainly is to be applied to convictions for conspiracy and attempt, so long as the necessary factual predicate for the enhancement exists.... [Appellant's] argument is simply that the substantive crime was not committed. It simply does not matter whether he actually carried the controlled substance; his conspiring and his attempt to do so warrant the application of the enhancement. 42 Id. We adopt the reasoning of the First Circuit and conclude that when the factual predicate in § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) is satisfied, the enhancement is appropriate. In this case, there was sufficient evidence that Rendon was captain of a vessel carrying a controlled substance and that he conspired to unlawfully import a controlled substance. It simply does not matter that his go-fast boat was stopped before the actual importation was completed. Therefore, we conclude that the two-level captain enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) was applied appropriately in calculating Rendon's sentence. 7 See Rodriguez, 215 F.3d at 124; United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332, 345-46 (1st Cir.1997) (applying 2-level enhancement in § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) where defendant was pilot aboard a vessel carrying a controlled substance on the high seas off Columbia, South America).
43 Rendon also argues that the four-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for being an organizer or leader of the conspiracy was improper. 8 Rendon contends that he did not negotiate the transaction, did not have decision-making authority and did not exercise a high degree of participation. Rather, according to Rendon, he was merely a delivery man. Furthermore, Rendon argues that he did not exercise control over five individuals in the conspiracy as required by § 3B1.1(a). Finally, Rendon argues that if this Court determines that the district court improperly concluded that he was a leader or organizer of the conspiracy, he is entitled to an opportunity to qualify for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. 44 A district court's enhancement of a defendant's offense level based on his role as an organizer or leader is a finding of fact reviewed for clear error. United States v. Phillips, 287 F.3d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir.2002). The factors that a sentencing court considers in determining if this enhancement applies are: (1) exercise of decision-making authority, (2) nature of participation in the commission of the offense, (3) recruitment of accomplices, (4) claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, (5) degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, (6) nature and scope of the illegal activity, and (7) degree of control and authority exercised over others. United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154, 1169 (11th Cir.2002) (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1096, 123 S.Ct. 694, 154 L.Ed.2d 646 (2002). The enhancement requires that the convicted defendant be a leader or organizer of criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). A `participant' is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.1. We have recognized that [t]he defendant does not have to be the sole leader or kingpin of the conspiracy in order to be considered an organizer or leader within the meaning of the Guidelines and that `[b]ecause the district court must interpret the factors stated in the commentary, and must exercise its best judgment as to the application of the facts to these standards, its decision is entitled to one of deference on appeal.' Vallejo, 297 F.3d at 1169 (citation omitted) (alteration in original); see United States v. Suarez, 313 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (§ 3B1.1(a) aggravating role adjustment warranted where defendant had decision-making authority and exercised control), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 968, 123 S.Ct. 1765, 155 L.Ed.2d 524 (2003). 45 The evidence in this case showed that: codefendants Castro and Torres testified that Rendon hired them for the trafficking trip; Castro testified that Rendon operated the go-fast boat until it met two other boats from which Rendon received the cocaine shipment; while Castro and Torres were operating the go-fast boat, Rendon instructed them where to go; Rendon was the only person who knew where the cocaine was to be delivered; and Rendon instructed Castro and Torres to throw the cocaine overboard when the Navy plane was spotted overhead. Regarding the number of people involved in the conspiracy, Castro testified that there were two people on each of the two boats from which Rendon acquired the cocaine, and Rendon's crew consisted of himself and three coconspirators in his boat. Thus, there were at least eight people involved with the conspiracy over whom Rendon exercised leader and organizational control. 46 At the sentencing hearing, the district judge explained that the evidence supported the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement: 47 [W]e can count more than five participants; again, not more than five defendants, but more than five participants. And in any event, even if we could not, when someone departs Colombia in a vessel with the objective of rendezvousing with another vessel with the objective of transporting a multi-million dollar quantity of contraband from one part of the world to another, that plot, precisely as is this plot, is certainly extensive. 48 Consequently, the district judge had the authority to impose a four-level enhancement because the conspiracy involved five or more participants as well as being part of an extensive, multi-million-dollar plot dealing in contraband. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Section 3B1.1(a) does not require that five people were convicted, or even charged, in connection with the conspiracy. See id. & cmt. n.1. It only requires that the conspiracy involved five or more criminally responsible people. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.1. Castro testified that two people each on two different boats loaded the cocaine onto Rendon's boat under his instruction and direction, and Rendon's crew consisted of him and his three codefendants. Based on the uncontroverted testimony, the district court's determination that Rendon acted as an organizer and leader within the meaning of 3B1.1(a) was not clearly erroneous. It necessarily follows that he was not entitled to safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, because this relief is not available to a convicted defendant who receives the organizer/leader enhancement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(4); United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1304-05 (11th Cir.2000).
49 Rendon argues that the district judge's imposing both the captain enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) and the organizer/leader enhancement under § 3B1.1(a) was improper double counting because it resulted in his being punished twice for the same conduct. We review contentions alleging impermissible double counting de novo. United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir.1999). 50 `Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant's punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines.' Id. at 1309 (citation omitted). Double counting is permissible at sentencing (1) `if the Sentencing Commission intended the result,' and (2) `if the result is permissible because each [guideline] section concerns conceptually separate notions related [sic] to sentencing.' Id. at 1310 (quoting United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1161 (11th Cir.1992)). This Court presumes the Sentencing Commission intended to apply separate guideline sections cumulatively, unless specifically directed otherwise. Id. at 1310. 51 After hearing argument on adjusting Rendon's sentence upward for being both captain of the vessel and a leader or organizer, the district judge explained his reasoning for giving both enhancements: 52 In this particular case it appears that Mr. Quintero Rendon had both the functional responsibilities of a captain within the meaning of 2D1.1(b)(2) and, based on his recruitment and other activities, was also an organizer and leader within the meaning of 3B1.1(a). 53 . . . . 54 ... [I]n this particular case this individual qualifies, it seems, both as captain, for the specific offense characteristic of captain or any other operational officer, and then based on a separate set of activities, that is his organizer and leadership role, qualifies under 3B1.1(a). 55 . . . . 56 He both did everything presumably that a captain would do and then did something else. He did those things that the leader/organizer of an extensive criminal conspiracy would do. So he qualified on both hands. I found that — the question and the answer to be fairly graphic for the reason that this defendant qualifies here. 57 In this case, neither of the two sentencing factors is a subset of the other. A defendant may captain a craft or vessel without serving as an organizer or leader in the overall conspiracy. See Guerrero, 114 F.3d at 346 (recognizing the § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) enhancement does not require evidence of leadership). Likewise, a defendant may be an organizer or leader of a drug conspiracy without having anything to do with the actual operation of the vessel used to transport the drugs. Absent an instruction to the contrary, the adjustments from different guideline sections are applied cumulatively (added together). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.4; United States v. Naves, 252 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir.2001) (Absent a specific direction to the contrary, we presume that the Sentencing Commission intended to apply separate guideline sections cumulatively.); Jackson, 276 F.3d at 1236. Neither of the challenged guidelines includes any language or commentary that suggests that they may not be applied cumulatively. To the contrary, the two enhancements embody conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing because they are designed for two different purposes. Jackson, 276 F.3d at 1235 (internal quotation omitted). 58 Section 3B1.1 requires the court to enhance a defendant's sentence based on his relative culpability within a criminal organization. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. background (The Commission's intent is that this adjustment should increase with both the size of the organization and the degree of the defendant's responsibility.). In contrast, § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) addresses those who facilitate a drug smuggling operation by filling a critical position without which the operation likely would fail. See Guerrero, 114 F.3d at 346 (While the guideline may speak to a defendant's control over some mechanical aspect of a vessel's operation, it does not address the defendant's authority over other individuals involved in a criminal venture.). Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in concluding that Rendon qualified for enhancements under both § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B) and § 3B1.1(a), which are not mutually exclusive enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines.