Opinion ID: 52436
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendants Joe Barbat, Jack Barbat and Ebner

Text: We uphold the district court’s dismissal of Joe Barbat, Jack Barbat and Ebner because General Retail failed to demonstrate that they purposefully directed any activities into the forum state. While it is true that a single act can confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant if that act gives rise to the claim being asserted, Lewis, 252 F.3d at 359 (citation omitted), General Retail has not carried its burden to show that these individuals could reasonably expect to be hailed into court in Texas, see Wilson, 20 F.3d at 649-48. The First Amended 29 No. 06-20395 Complaint merely identifies who Joe and Jack Barbat are. While it mentions Ebner one more time, the allegation merely states that the Ebner “met” Wiley. There is nothing in the First Amended Complaint that ascribes specific conduct or statements to these individuals. Contrary to General Retail’s argument, it is not enough to simply rest on the use of the collective term, “Defendants,” in the allegations. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1980) (holding that aggregating the defendant into a collective of “defending parties” did not satisfy federal due process). Moreover, the uncontroverted affidavits submitted by these individuals demonstrate that not one of them traveled to Texas, or directed any communications to Texas, in connection with the sale of a Wireless Toyz franchise to Wiley. The only individual out of this group who ever communicated with Wiley before he signed the Franchise Agreement was Ebner. That meeting occurred in Michigan after Wiley had received the Offering Circular and marketing materials from Simtob. Since General Retail’s claims against the individuals are premised upon pre-contract misrepresentations, the lack of communications with Wiley pre-contract is significant. Lastly, the affidavits and deposition testimony General Retail relies upon do not demonstrate a prima facie case of jurisdiction. At most, they prove that Ebner helped prepare the Offering Circular and Joe Barbat approved it. The evidence does not establish that Joe Barbat or Ebner “purposefully directed” the Offering Circular or marketing materials into Texas or to General Retail. See Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding no personal jurisdiction where there was no evidence that the individuals aimed their allegedly tortious activities at Texas or knew that the brunt of the plaintiff’s injuries would be felt in Texas). Rather, the testimony establishes that by the time all three individuals met Wiley he had already received the marketing materials and the Offering Circular. While Ebner and 30 No. 06-20395 Joe Barbat, at least, might have “foreseen” that they would be sued in Texas, the individuals could not “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in Texas. Wilson, 20 F.3d at 648-49 (holding that communication into the forum state was not purposefully directed into the state); compare Lewis, 252 F.3d at 359 (permitting the exercise of jurisdiction based on communications that were knowingly made in Texas).