Opinion ID: 1613814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: terms of injunction

Text: The protestors challenge several of the injunction's prohibitions as being overbroad, thus, restricting protected speech, or as being unconstitutionally vague. [1] The overarching theme of the protestors' arguments is that these restrictions upon their expressive activities are not drawn sufficiently narrowly to meet constitutional analysis. Streets, parks and sidewalks are quintessential public forums. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2709, 120 L.Ed.2d 669 (1992). While the peaceful exercise of our first amendment rights to speech and assembly are protected from government interference, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983), the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2563-64, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). Even in a public forum, a state may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions upon all expression, whether written, oral or symbolized by conduct. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). Time, place and manner restrictions are valid if they are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). See also City of Jamestown v. Beneda, 477 N.W.2d 830 (N.D.1991).
The protestors challenge the bubble-zone restriction contained in subparagraph (d) which prohibits more than two demonstrators from being within 100 feet of the clinic property lines during clinic hours. They argue that the restriction is content-based; the clinic counters that the provision is content-neutral. Governmental regulation of expressive activity is content-neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 3069 (emphasis added). A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2753-54, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). The justification offered by the clinic in its application for the injunction was the need to be protected from multiple tortious invasions of its rights and the rights of its employees and patients. The clinic supported this application with evidence of protestors entering the clinic, blocking doorways, blocking driveways, swarming pedestrians attempting to reach the clinic, and using force against those attempting to escort these pedestrians, among other things. The clinic also submitted evidence that the protestors intended a two-year campaign to close the clinic. The district court found that the clinic proved a prima facie case on its claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, private and public nuisance and interference with contract. The protestors have not challenged these findings; they, for purposes of this appeal, therefore concede that the findings provide the justification for the injunction. See Fargo Women's Health Organization Inc. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176 (N.D.1986) [in review of preliminary injunction, reviewing court bound by facts presented to district court]. The protestors' attack on the bubble-zone restriction rests on their argument that the purpose of the injunction is to silence their expression of pro-life views. In support, they cite a federal circuit court decision, Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1989), for the proposition that enjoining anti-abortion demonstrations near a clinic impermissibly restricts speech. In doing so, the protestors distort the facts and the import of McMillan. In that case, the reviewing court specifically noted that the clinic offered no evidence that the protestors physically restrained potential patients from entering the clinic. The clinic contended that the protestors had no right to create the tense and agitated atmosphere that surrounded the clinic. 866 F.2d at 791 [emphasis deleted]. The protestors created this atmosphere by distributing literature, and making noise which could be heard within the clinic. In McMillan, the conflict was between the right to have an abortion identified in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), and the right to express, peaceably, if loudly, the opinion that more is involved in abortion than the mother's choice. 866 F.2d at 791-92. The McMillan court distinguished its case from that presented in Northern Virginia Women's Medical Center v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir.1980), where the protestors embarked upon a series of actions involving entering upon the clinic's premises, blocking doors to procedure rooms and blocking access to the [clinic] in order to prevent the performing of abortions. 617 F.2d at 1048. In Balch, the record of trespasses provided a factual basis for a valid injunction. The McMillan decision, therefore, stands for the proposition that an attempt to enjoin peaceful pro-life demonstrations outside an abortion clinic is an attempt to enjoin the expression of specific ideas. It must be read in conjunction with Balch where an injunction aimed at the use of force, intimidation and violence in expressing opposition to abortion was upheld. When an injunction is based on a record of force, trespass and intimidation, the justification for the injunction is the method of communicating, not the motivating idea. The injunction is, therefore, content-neutral. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57 (3rd Cir.1991); Bering v. Share, 106 Wash.2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986); Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St.3d 56, 556 N.E.2d 157 (1990); Planned Parenthood League v. Operation Rescue, 406 Mass. 701, 550 N.E.2d 1361 (1990). The record supporting this injunction contains adequate evidence to support the court's finding that the clinic would probably prevail on its claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, private and public nuisance and interference with contract. We conclude that the justification for the injunction was not made in reference to the content of the protestors' expressive activities; the injunction is content-neutral. In addition to being content-neutral, a proper time, place or manner regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open alternative channels of communication. Perry Educ'n Ass'n., supra. The interests served by the injunction are consonant with the justification for its issuance: that trade and commerce be conducted unimpeded by breaches of the peace and that the safety of those engaged in or patronizing a lawful business, in this instance a medical clinic which performs legal abortions, be assured. In particular, the injunction is meant to prevent the protestors from occupying the clinic, blocking its doors, and blockading the driveway, roads and side walks used by vehicles and pedestrians to go to and leave from the clinic. The government's interest in protecting the clinic's legal rights by preventing or controlling the protestors' tortious conduct meets the significant government interest test. See, e.g., Bering v. Share, supra ; Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Project Jericho, supra; Planned Parenthood League v. Operation Rescue, supra ; O.B.G.Y.N. Assoc. v. Birthright of Brooklyn, 64 A.D.2d 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1978); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir.1988); National Organization For Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F.Supp 1483 (E.D.Va.1989) aff'd. 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.1990) (per curiam). The difficulty in this case is in assessing whether the injunctive provisions are narrowly tailored to protect the interest and whether alternative avenues exist for the protestors' message. The injunction limits, during the clinic's business hours, peaceful picketers to two in the area in front of the clinic; all other protestors are prohibited from coming closer than 100 feet from the clinic's property line. Given the protestors' actions as described in the affidavits, a place restriction may be an appropriate method of regulating the protestors' conduct. This record, however, contains no description of the physical layout of the clinic in relation to its property line, the property line in relation to public sidewalks and roads, or the features of the neighborhood. It gives us no way to judge the fit of this place restriction to the circumstances of this case. The court attempted to tailor a place restriction without taking any measurements. Similarly, we are not given any basis for judging the alternative methods of communication available to the protestors. Subparagraph (d) is not sufficiently narrow to satisfy constitutional requirements. We will therefore strike this provision and remand to the trial court for further fact finding on this issue, permitting the trial court to revise this portion of the injunction as to the dimensions necessary for a zone of protection in accord with the evidence to be adduced.
The protestors challenge the noise restriction contained in subparagraph (c) as being vague. A statute, or injunction, will be considered unconstitutionally vague if it either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). The purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to ensure that all be informed as to what the state commands or forbids. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 619, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939). When so informed, people have an opportunity to conform their conduct to the law, and those who enforce the law are provided with strict guidelines for their application. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). The prohibition against overly vague laws protects people from having to voluntarily curtail First Amendment activities because of a fear those activities could be characterized as illegal activities due to an unconstitutionally vague statute. Id. The protestors argue that no definition understandable to a common citizen is given for the prohibited obstructing the work of the clinic. There is little doubt that imagination can conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of these [challenged] terms will be in nice question. The applicable standard, however, is not one of wholly consistent academic definition of abstract terms. It is, rather, the practical criterion of fair notice to those to whom the statute is directed. The particular context is all important. American Comm. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412, 70 S.Ct. 674, 691, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950). The most important context for defining obstructing is the rest of the sentence in which the term appears, making it clear that the prohibited act is the making of noise that substantially interferes with the provision of medical services. In the context of this injunction, supported by evidence that the protestors' demonstrations were so loud that the noise penetrated the operating rooms, the recovery rooms, and places where staff and patients were discussing medical procedures, and based upon the district court's finding that the clinic had proved a prima facie case of nuisance, this provision can only be construed to proscribe excessive noise. The United States Supreme Court reviewed and approved a remarkably similar prohibition challenged on vagueness grounds in Grayned, supra . There, an anti-noise ordinance provided that: [N]o person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof.... 408 U.S. at 107-08, 92 S.Ct. at 2298. The Court concluded that this statute was a statute written specifically for the context, where the prohibited disturbances are easily measured by their impact on the normal activities of the school. Given this `particular context,' the ordinance gives `fair notice to those to whom [it] is directed.' Id. at 112, 92 S.Ct. at 2301. The vagueness of the prohibited noises or diversions was dispelled by requirements that (1) the `noise or diversion' be actually incompatible with normal school activity; (2) there be a demonstrated causality between the disruption that occurs and the `noise or diversion'; and (3) the acts be `willfully' done. Id. at 113-14, 92 S.Ct. at 2302. These features made the ordinance sufficiently clear to pass constitutional requirements. The noise injunction challenged by the protestors is substantially the same as the Grayned ordinance. The prohibited noise is measured by its impact on the clinic activities, and it must be incompatible with the provision of medical services. [2] There must be causality between the interference and the noise. And, because the restriction is part of an injunction, the act must be willfully done in order to support sanctions. Anchor Estate, Inc. v. State, 466 N.W.2d 111 (N.D.1991). Subparagraph (c) is not unconstitutionally vague. See also Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, Inc., supra [noise injunction not vague]; Planned Parenthood League v. Operation Rescue, supra , [obstructing-access injunction not vague].
The protestors also attack as vague subparagraph (b) which enjoins them from harassing, intimidating or physically abusing persons connected with the clinic. Again, we must consider this proscription in the context of this litigation, that is, the protestors' past conduct, the relief sought by the clinic, and the district court's findings. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, supra . The protestors blocked patients walking to the clinic and the cars of patients, trapping patients as the protestors screamed, waved signs and flashed cameras in the patients' faces, and forced leaflets on them. The protestors followed the doctor and clinic staffers and members of their families. The protestors waited in airport parking ramps to confront the doctor. The doctor and staffers described the fear and loss of sleep created by these activities and the extraordinary steps taken to assure their safety and that of their families. The district court found that the clinic had stated a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. That finding necessarily includes the finding that the protestors' intentional conduct was extreme and caused severe emotional distress, or was so outrageous that a severe emotional reaction is implied. See Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D.1989). Given this background, the protestors cannot reasonably argue that the prohibition on harassing, intimidating or physically abus[ive] conduct can be mistaken as describing their lawful expressive activities. Subparagraph (b) is not unconstitutionally vague. Subparagraphs (e) and (f) are attacked by the protestors as overbroad. These paragraphs are apparently directed at the protestors' excessive conduct. In addition to harassing and intimidating, subparagraph (e) prohibits following, photographing, videotaping, and speaking to staff and patients. We construe the trial court's order to enjoin following, photographing, and videotaping done without consent, and persistently and with the intent to harass and intimidate. To the extent that this construction is not clearly set forth in the order, we direct that on remand the trial court modify the order in accordance with our construction. In the context of this case, the order thus construed is permissible. See Chico Feminist Women's H. Ctr. v. Scully, 208 Cal.App.3d 230, 256 Cal.Rptr. 194 (3rd Dist.1989). However, speaking to staff and patients cannot be constitutionally enjoined. Cf. City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D.1981). We therefore strike that part of the injunction that prohibits speaking. Subparagraph (f) prohibits distributing literature to any person who has indicated a desire not to receive the material. Obviously, distributing literature is protected communicative activity and a complete ban violates the First Amendment. See, e.g., Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2709, 120 L.Ed.2d 669 (1992) (per curiam) [explained by International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2711, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992)]. The prohibition on physically abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic contained in subparagraph (b) offers sufficient protection from those protestors who physically force literature on passers-by. The order of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and LEVINE, MESCHKE and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.