Opinion ID: 1735004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: inapplicability of kurth ranch

Text: Stubblefield argues that the question of whether a tax assessment against an individual for possession of a controlled substance constitutes a punishment and/or a prosecution for purposes of double jeopardy has been answered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). In Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court held that a tax imposed under Montana's Dangerous Drug Tax Act after the State had imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct constituted a second punishment and was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, Nebraska's and Montana's drug tax statutes differ in material respects. Under Nebraska's statutes, a tax is levied on the possession of drugs regardless of whether the taxpayer has been arrested for criminal conduct. The tax is due immediately upon acquisition or possession of marijuana in the state. A dealer possessing 6 or more ounces is prohibited from possessing marijuana unless the tax has been paid as evidence by an official stamp or label affixed to the marijuana. In applying for a tax stamp from the Department of Revenue, a dealer is not required to give any of his or her identifying information. Information obtained in compliance with the statutes is confidential and may not be used against the dealer in any criminal proceeding except proceedings involving taxes due under the drug tax statutes. However, under Montana's act, a taxpayer had no obligation to file a return or pay any tax unless and until the taxpayer was arrested. The act did not provide any opportunity for taxpayers to purchase stamps or labels from the Montana Department of Revenue to evidence that the tax had been paid. Instead, the act expressly provided that taxpayers were required to file a return within 72 hours of arrest. Thus, the tax assessment not only hinged on the commission of a crime, it also was exacted only after the taxpayer had been arrested for the precise conduct that gave rise to the tax obligation in the first place. Persons who had been arrested for possessing marijuana constituted the entire class of taxpayers subject to the Montana tax. In Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court never addressed the issue of whether the tax assessment under Montana's act and the criminal prosecution for the drug offense constituted the same offense. However, because Montana's act required the drug offense to precede and underlie the tax assessment, it is clear that neither offense required proof of an element that the other did not. See, Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). In Kurth Ranch, the criminal charge would necessarily be a lesser-included offense of the tax assessment. Because we find that the Supreme Court's decision in Kurth Ranch is fact specific to Montana's act, and Nebraska's statutes are distinguishable from Montana's act in material respects, we conclude Kurth Ranch is inapplicable.