Opinion ID: 564947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner's Response to Order Requesting All Supporting Law and Facts.

Text: 7 Because the Petition for Rehearing and the original application both failed to present the necessary legal or factual support for his fee request, the court by its order of March 2, 1991 directed petitioner to submit for the court's review his 8 [ (1) ] proposed schedule of attorneys' fees that [allegedly] would not have been incurred but for the requirements of the Independent Counsel Act, (and the contract therefor), and [ (2) ] all additional material facts and legal authority he considers may be necessary to demonstrate that all or any part of his attorneys' fee application satisfies the statutory test. 9 Order of March 2, 1991 (emphasis added). 10 In response to the court's order, petitioner has submitted extensive material with respect to his attorneys' fees, their reasonableness, the nature of the services, time spent, etc., but has failed to prove compliance with the but for requirement. Thus, even after the opinion in In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d 428 (D.C.Cir.1991), petitioner maintains that all that remains for him to do to prove entitlement is to submit his attorneys' fees, show they are reasonable and were rendered in connection with the independent counsel investigation. In this respect petitioner is in error. He misconstrues what Congress required by the but for requirement. 11 The court's opinion In re Franklyn C. Nofziger, supra, prescribes the standard a subject must meet if he is to satisfy the but for requirement. Petitioner must first satisfy the statutory requirement that the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by that individual during that investigation ... would not have been incurred but for the requirements of this chapter . 28 U.S.C. Sec. 593(f) (emphasis added). See supra note 1. Under the statute, as clarified by its legislative history, the first requirement a subject must meet is to submit legal and factual authority proving that he was subjected to an investigation and prosecution that satisfy the but for requirement, i.e., an investigation that subjected him to different standards of the criminal law than are applied to private citizens, or by another congressional formulation, that constituted a more rigorous application of the criminal law than is applied to private citizens. Since petitioner did not submit legal authority or facts demonstrating compliance with that requirement, a reading of the entire transcript and record was necessary in order to rule on petitioner's request. Tr.Vol. 1 and 880-4170. Such review failed to disclose any support for petitioner's claim that his investigation satisfied the but for standard. See In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d at 450. 12 The standard for compliance with the but for requirement is outlined at length in the court's Nofziger opinion, which sets forth much of the relevant legislative history of the Ethics in Government Act to which reference is directed. That opinion points out that Congress indicated in its legislative history that the but for standard requires a showing that petitioner was subjected to a more rigorous [or stricter] application of criminal law or to the application of different standards of criminal law in [his] investigation  than is applied to persons not covered by the Act. 925 F.2d at 444 (emphasis added). The congressional objective in adopting section 593(f) was to free covered officials from being investigated or prosecuted for alleged criminal activity which is not or is rarely prosecuted by the Department of Justice. See In re Jordan, 745 F.2d 1574 (D.C.Cir.1984). In other words, Congress sought to prevent the investigation or prosecution of covered public officials for alleged offenses under a different standard of criminal law than is applied to those not covered by the Act. 13 The court also defined the term requirements in section 593(f) to include 14 the special limitations and procedures established by the Act, for example, the two-step investigatory procedure by the Attorney General which includes the threshold determination whether grounds to investigate exist and the determination whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted and the investigatory, evidentiary, and time restrictions on the Attorney General in complying with that procedure. 15 Nofziger, 925 F.2d at 445. 16 Furthermore, the court held that Congress did not intend for it to reimburse a nonindicted subject of an investigation for those costs he may have incurred which are inherent in every independent counsel investigation. 17 Congress was aware of such contention [that the appointment of independent counsel necessarily increases the costs to a subject]. Nevertheless, Congress refused to authorize reimbursement for such alleged inherent costs of subjects. If Congress had so intended it would have allowed for the reimbursement of some attorneys' fees in every independent counsel investigation in which no indictment was brought. It did not do so. 18 Id. See also id. at 444-46. The legislative history of the attorneys' fees provision confirms this interpretation that most investigations would not satisfy the but for requirement. The Senate Report stated that because of the changes made to the standards used to trigger the preliminary investigation and independent counsel appointment, reimbursement of attorneys' fees would be warranted, if at all, in only rare instances. S.Rep.No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, 3537, 3555. 19 Lastly, the court laid out three circumstances in which the nonindicted subjects of independent counsel investigations have satisfied the but for requirement: 20 First, the court has awarded fees in cases in which the subject is prejudiced by the Department of Justices's failure to comply with the substantial protective features of the Act.... Second, fees have been awarded because independent counsel's investigation constituted a substantial duplication of prior investigations.... Third, the court has awarded fees in two cases in which if the requirements of the Act, restricting the Attorney General's preliminary investigation, did not exist, the case could have been disposed of at an early stage of the investigation without seeking appointment of independent counsel. 21 Id. at 438. See id. at 438-39 & 445-46. 22 After reviewing all legal and factual material submitted by Nofziger and reading the entire trial transcript, the court held that the investigation and prosecution of Nofziger did not satisfy the but for requirement. There is nothing in the entire record to indicate that Nofziger would not have been similarly investigated and prosecuted by the Department of Justice if he were not a covered high official. In fact, the Deputy Attorney General in his application for appointment of independent counsel relied both on section 591(b)(8), 2 which covers high government officials, and upon section 591(c) which authorizes the investigation of any person other than a person described in subsection (b) (high government officials) and necessarily includes private citizens. 3 Section 591(b) requires the Attorney General to investigate whenever he receives sufficient evidence of the violation of federal laws; whereas section 591(c) is discretionary whenever evidence of a federal offense is received and investigation by the Department of Justice may result in a personal, financial, or political conflict of interest. The fact that the Deputy Attorney General exercised his discretion to investigate Nofziger on the information received, which led to the appointment of an independent counsel, indicates the wholehearted support of the Department of Justice for the investigation and prosecution. The Attorney General's reliance on section 591(c) indicates that Nofziger was also investigated and prosecuted as a person other than a high government official, i.e., in effect as a private citizen who had been employed by the government. And there is nothing in the record of the investigation and prosecution of Nofziger that indicates the application of any federal criminal law not equally applicable to private citizens. 23 Thus, since the entire record demonstrated that in the absence of the Ethics in Government Act Nofziger would nevertheless have been investigated and prosecuted by the Department of Justice for the same offenses and no special circumstances existed that would justify an award of fees, we held in In re Nofziger, supra, that Nofziger's application did not satisfy the but for requirement. In other words, Nofziger was investigated and prosecuted for offenses involving the same standard of criminal law as is regularly applied to private individuals not covered by the Ethics in Government Act. 24