Opinion ID: 785187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Incorrect Instruction

Text: 27 Sulzer first argues that the district court's instruction requiring Sulzer to show that Picanol manufactured its weaving machines according to the claims was incorrect. Sulzer also argues that the incorrect instruction was prejudicial, because Sulzer could not have anticipated that it would have to prove how Picanol manufactured its weaving machines and, therefore, only presented evidence on how the machines operated. Because no evidence was submitted on how the machines were manufactured, and because the claims recite methods of operation of the machines and not methods of manufacturing, Sulzer asserts that the jury was confused by the erroneous instruction. It offers as proof the fact that the jury returned a verdict in Picanol's favor after only a short period of deliberation. Picanol argues that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole and in the context of the trial, were not prejudicially erroneous, because the jury would have understood that the incorrect reference in the instruction to the manufacture, rather than the operation, of the accused machine, was apparent from the trial and from the rest of the instructions. We agree with Picanol. 28 The parties agree that the claims of the patents-in-suit are not directed to the process of manufacturing machines. However, it is not enough to merely show that a jury instruction is erroneous; Sulzer also must show that the erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial. Advanced Display Sys., Inc., 212 F.3d at 1281. When the error in a jury instruction could not have changed the result, the erroneous instruction is harmless. Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261, 1266-67 (Fed. Cir.2000); Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 808 (Fed.Cir.1984) (defining prejudicial error in context of jury instruction as one that is not harmless). To determine whether the erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial, the entirety of the proceedings, including the jury instructions as a whole, must be considered. See Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 415 (Fed.Cir.1993). 29 The burden of establishing prejudice falls on Sulzer. See Ecolab, 285 F.3d at 1374. Sulzer offers only the statement that it is virtually certain that the jury arrived at the verdict of non-infringement because it heard no [evidence of Picanol's manufacturing] and concluded that Sulzer failed to meet its burden. In reaching this conclusion, Sulzer places heavy reliance on the fact that the jury deliberated for only three hours. But Sulzer's argument ignores the entirety of the trial proceedings. The testimony at trial, as well as all of the jury instructions on infringement but the one erroneous instruction in question, were directed to the method of operation of Picanol's machines and the extent to which Sulzer's patent claims read on that method of operation, applying the correct standard for infringement. Specifically, the district court's jury charge correctly recited that Sulzer contends that Picanol supplies, operates, and causes the operation of Delta, Omni, and Omni-Plus air-jet weaving machines incorporating the... methods that are covered by the patents. Further, the jury was instructed correctly that [t]o determine infringement, you must compare the process carried out by [the methods used in Picanol's machines to] each claim that Sulzer asserts is infringed. The jury also was instructed correctly to examine the process carried out in these machines accused of infringement; to consider that [p]rocess claims are not infringed by the mere existence of a device; and to understand that [a] person is said to be infringing the process claim of a patent when he, without permission from the patent owner, uses the patented process as defined by the claims. Sulzer and Picanol submitted evidence throughout trial relating solely to the operation of Picanol's machines, not their manufacture. 30 We conclude that the single mistaken reference in the jury instructions to the manufacture of Picanol's machines was an error that was apparent and not prejudicial. The jury instructions, viewed in their entirety and considered in the context of the trial as a whole, presented the correct legal standard for infringement to the jury. Sulzer's speculative and conclusory argument is not sufficient to establish that, had the one misstatement not been part of the instructions, the result of the case would have been different. Therefore, we conclude that, to the extent the noted jury instruction was erroneous, the error was harmless.