Opinion ID: 2639962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the court of appeals' three-factor test

Text: ¶8 First, we turn to the court of appeals' use of the three-factor test in its probable cause analysis. The three-factor test originated in Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). That case involved an informant who called a police dispatcher to report a drunk driver. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 233. The court addressed the question of whether the tip provided reasonable suspicion sufficient for a police officer to stop the vehicle. Id. at 234. The court gleaned from Utah cases three factors to consider in determining the reliability and sufficiency of the informant's report. Id. at 235. The three-factor test analyzed (1) the reliability of the informant, (2) whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop, and (3) whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the [information in] the informant's tip. Id. at 236. The court of appeals found that the informant's tip passed the three-factor test and, therefore, provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. Id. at 238. ¶9 Subsequently, the court of appeals interpreted Mulcahy as mandating the three-factor analysis in other Fourth Amendment contexts. See, e.g., State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, ¶ 15, 37 P.3d 260 (analyzing whether informant's tip gave rise to probable cause to arrest suspected forger); City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (analyzing whether informant's tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion to detain suspected drunk driver). In Valenzuela, the court of appeals reasoned that there was nothing to prohibit extending the use of [the Mulcahy] factors to determinations of probable cause in the context of information supplied by an informant. 2001 UT App 332 at ¶ 16. Shortly thereafter, in State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 40 P.3d 1136, the court of appeals extended the three-factor analysis to the search warrant context, stating that where information obtained from informants is the primary source for the search warrant, an analysis of the totality of the circumstances requires us to consider the three factors articulated by this court in Kaysville v. Mulcahy. Id. at ¶ 11 (emphasis added). Based on this line of cases, the court of appeals used the same three-factor test in determining that McCarthy's affidavit did not support a finding of probable cause. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82 at ¶ 9. [1] ¶10 We note that the court of appeals has developed this three-factor analysis in the absence of any direction from us. Nonetheless, we find that such an exacting analysis is ill-suited to conducting a commonsense probable cause determination for at least two reasons. First, affidavits `are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity . . . have no proper place in this area.' Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)). Additionally, given the informal, often hurried context in which it must be applied, the `built-in subtleties' of [a formal test] are particularly unlikely to assist magistrates in determining probable cause. Id. at 236 (citation omitted).