Opinion ID: 421212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Default and Partial Default Judgment

Text: 22 If a party fails to obey an order to compel discovery, the court may impose a judgment by default against the disobedient party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C). On appeal, we must uphold a sanction imposed under Rule 37(b) unless the district court abused its discretion. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (per curiam); United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir.1978); Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Commission, 442 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir.1971). In G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency, 577 F.2d 645, 647-48 (9th Cir.1978), we encouraged district courts to impose such a sanction for willful failure to comply with court orders enforcing discovery rules. 23 The district court found that the appellants failed to comply with the discovery order without any credible explanation or excuse and despite repeated requests.... The court also found 24 that the conduct of [appellants] was willful and unjustifiable, and the cause of substantial delays in the case which were prejudicial to the [appellees'] interests and detrimental to the expeditious conclusion of this case. The objections raised ... to the ... interrogatories were patently frivolous and interposed unjustifiably for delaying purposes. No response was ever made to [appellees'] Request for Production of Documents. 25 Appellants offer two excuses for their failure to produce documents. First, they contend that the magistrate's order was unreasonable, and therefore invalid, because it required them to produce documents in Hawaii even though many were kept in Nevada. However, in the court below, counsel announced that it would be no problem to produce the documents as ordered. They may not raise this objection for the first time on appeal. See G-K Properties v. Redevelopment Agency, supra (objection to dismissal of complaint for failure to comply with a discovery order may not be raised for the first time on appeal). 26 Second, appellants assert that their sworn statements show that their failure to produce documents was not willful or in bad faith. But these sworn statements were filed after they filed notices of appeal and were not part of the record at the time the district court made its ruling. In Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 289 F.2d 569, 570 (9th Cir.1961), we announced: 27 [O]ur action on appeal can properly be based only upon a record considered by the trial court. It would be inappropriate for us to reverse the trial court on the basis of facts not incorporated in the record which the trial court considered at the time of its decision. 28 On the basis of the record made in the district court, appellants' contention that they acted in good faith is not supported by any evidence and their failure to produce was unexcused. 29 The appellants contend that the district court's finding that they failed to comply with the order requiring them to answer interrogatories is clearly erroneous. They assert that they failed to answer only two interrogatories, and that they objected to these but offered to make their records available. 30 The two interrogatories which appellants failed to answer went to the core of the dispute, the amount of money diverted. The district court found the objections frivolous, and the appellants do not challenge that finding. Instead, they contend they properly answered by offering to make their records available. 31 A party may answer an interrogatory by specifying records from which the answers may be obtained and by making the records available for inspection. Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(c). But the records must be specified in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating party to locate and identify, as readily as the party served, the records from which the answer may be obtained. The appellants did not comply with Rule 33(c). Their response did not specify where in the records the answers could be found. They merely recited that the answers could be found in partnership books of accounts, banking accounts, records, computer printouts, ledgers and other documents..... Rule 33(c) was amended in 1980 to prevent abuse of the business records option. The amendment was to make it clear that a responding party has the duty to specify, by category and location, the records from which answers to interrogatories can be derived. Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(c) Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules (1980 Amendment to Subdivision (c)). We hold that appellants' response does not comply with Rule 33(c). In addition, appellants did not make the records available even after the court ordered them to do it. 32 Appellants also cite Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 505 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 744, 54 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978) for the proposition that the district court must state its reasons before it enters a default judgment for failure to comply with a discovery order. Although we doubt that findings are required, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) and Brunswick Corp. v. Doff, 638 F.2d 108 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862, 102 S.Ct. 319, 70 L.Ed.2d 161 (1981), we need not decide that issue because the district court did make findings that are adequate even under Wilson. 33 We carefully reviewed the record and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the appellants' actions were willful and unjustifiable and in concluding that the sanctions imposed were appropriate. We therefore affirm the district court's order of default and partial default judgment. 34 The orders and judgments of the district court are 35 AFFIRMED.