Opinion ID: 1392780
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the superior court properly declined to remand the case for further evidentiary proceedings

Text: The superior court did not err in reversing the Board, rather than remanding the case to the Board for further evidentiary proceedings. The Board argues that the superior court had misgivings over the sufficiency of the Board's inquiry into the work relatedness of Ms. Coffey's disability. It claims that the superior court erred in deciding the issue in the face of such uncertainties. The Board asserts that where the superior court finds that an administrative agency failed to consider an important factual issue, that issue is not to be decided by the superior court, but rather the case should be remanded to the agency for further fact finding. The Board advances a series of cases in which this court held that remand was necessary because the factual record was inadequate and further evidentiary hearings were needed: Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. State, 665 P.2d 544 (Alaska 1983); Arkanakyak v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 759 P.2d 513 (Alaska 1988); City of Nome v. Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska, 707 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1985). The Board correctly articulates the circumstances under which remand to an agency is appropriate. However, it fails to note that the case at bar is distinguishable from these cases. In each of the cases cited, this court clarified which interpretation of an agency rule or regulation should be applied to the given case. Remand was necessary for evidentiary hearings which applied the new rule. These further evidentiary proceedings were required because the agency had an incomplete record or had made insufficient findings of fact with regard to the newly settled law. In City of Nome, we held that the superior court had properly remanded the case to the relevant administrative agency because equity required additional investigation. 707 P.2d at 877. The court concluded that the Board had made incomplete findings of fact because the Board awaited judicial clarification of the legal mess involved in the case. Id. In Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, we held that the superior court could have remanded to the agency if it found that the decisional document issued by the agency contained an inadequately reasoned explanation. 665 P.2d at 549. Similarly, in Phillips v. Houston Contracting, Inc., 732 P.2d 544 (Alaska 1987), a case not discussed by the Board, we remanded the case after we determined how to interpret a rule. The Board had not made all of the findings of fact which were necessary to apply the new interpretation of this rule. See Phillips, 732 P.2d at 547. Likewise, in Arkanakyak, we remanded the case because we determined that an exception not previously considered by the court might be applicable. 759 P.2d at 517. In the case at bar the superior court did not reverse due to the Board's failure to consider a factual issue, or because it found that the record needed to be supplemented with further fact finding. Instead, the superior court reversed the Board because even presuming that all of the inferences made by the Board were accurate, there was still not substantial evidence to justify the Board's determination that Appellant's permanent disability was not caused by the work-related injury she suffered on January 1, 1990. The Board contends that the following statement, which appears in a footnote to the superior court's order, demonstrates that the superior court found the fact finding incomplete, and therefore, should have remanded: Perhaps the lack of substantial evidence to support the Board's decision is a consequence of the fact that the focus of the hearing was the permanence of the injury rather than the cause of injury. The Board's decision on an issue that was not the focus of the dispute shifted the decision from what Appellant had successfully proved to what neither party had focused on and which was not really an issue. The court recognizes that the Board was free to review all aspects of appellant's claim. Though it may not technically violate due process for an agency to rule on a matter parties don't view as primary, one can see how a sense of fairness in the proceeding might be jeopardized. Although this language emphasizes that the occupational relatedness of Ms. Coffey's injury was not the focus of the Board's hearing, the superior court does not assert that the Board did not make sufficient findings of fact as to this issue. It is disingenuous for the Board to argue that this case should be remanded. This is not a case where necessary findings of fact were not made. The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law include a section specifically noting the Board's ruling on the occupational nature of Ms. Coffey's injury: The Board finds that the Applicant failed to meet her burden of proof that her disability arises out of an occupational injury. After weighing the evidence presented by the Applicant and the Staff, the Board finds that the evidence does not preponderate in favor of finding the disability is occupational. Additionally, the Board itself argues that all four elements of a disability claim were presented and argued at the hearing. [10] While making another point the Board even emphasizes that the counsel for the Board spent a substantial amount of his argument pointing out the pre-existence of the very complaints which Coffey states originated on January 1, 1990. There is further evidence in the record that although the main focus of the hearing was on the permanency of Ms. Coffey's injury, the Board addressed questions about the etiology of Ms. Coffey's disorder to the different doctors who testified.