Opinion ID: 2551235
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Pretrial Production of Medical Literature

Text: Many of plaintiff's appellate contentions pertain to defendant's defense of comparative negligence because Ms. Dawkins continued to smoke after her physician allegedly told her to stop. The plaintiff argues that the trial justice made both pretrial errors and erred during the case-in-chief when he allowed evidence of plaintiffs smoking and by subsequently failing to limit the reach of such evidence. Although plaintiff's cigarette smoking may have clouded the issues in this case, we are satisfied that the jury was able to push through the haze and reach a decision based on the evidence before it. Additionally, we are of the opinion that any errors with respect to the failure of the trial justice properly to instruct the jury on the issue of smoking was not preserved for appellate review because plaintiff failed to object. See State v. Marsich, 10 A.3d 435, 441 (R.I.2010) (discussing the well settled raise-or-waive rule that precludes us from considering issues at the appellate level that were not properly presented at the trial court). Shortly before trial, plaintiff filed a motion in limine, seeking a DiPetrillo hearing to exclude defendant's expert testimony on smoking. The plaintiffs argument centered, in part, on her contention that defendant had failed to produce any medical or scientific literature that his experts would rely on at trial, which, plaintiff asserts, amounts to a complete lack of scientific evidence to support defendant's purported theory. The plaintiff argues that this expert testimony should have been excluded for lack of any medical or scientific literature. The defendant countered that medical literature existed but that his experts were not intending to rely on any specific literature, which is the reason defendant never produced any during the discovery phase. The trial justice declined to rule on the motion in limine, electing instead to conduct a voir dire of defendant's experts during trial; however, to decide whether a DiPetrillo hearing was required and decide what defendant was permitted to say about smoking during jury selection, the trial justice directed defendant to produce medical literature on this issue. The trial justice ordered defendant to produce the facts and circumstances underlying the opinion that would be discussed by defendant's two medical experts. Consequently, defendant submitted substantial material, consisting of studies related to scaphoid fractures and smoking. The plaintiff argues that it was error for the trial justice to allow defendant to supplement his answers to plaintiff's interrogatories because it violated the court's previous scheduling order and because it was ordered less than thirty days prior to the scheduled start date of trial, in violation of Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. [10] The defendant responds that plaintiff misconceived the purpose of the trial justice's order; he argues that the only reason defendant produced any medical literature was in response to the trial justice's request for materials to assist him in deciding whether a DiPetrillo hearing concerning the scientific reliability of the smoking evidence was necessary. After a careful reading of the record before us, we are satisfied that the material the trial justice ordered produced was not an attempt by defendant to supplement interrogatories, but rather was provided in compliance with the court's directive. Significantly, the record discloses that defendant's experts did not rely upon any medical or scientific literature during their testimony. Rule 33(c) serves to prevent trial by ambush. Neri v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 719 A.2d 1150, 1152 (R.I.1998). It is designed to enable litigants to prepare for trial free from the elements of surprise and concealment so that judgments can rest upon the merits of the case rather than the skill and maneuvering of counsel. Id. (quoting Gormley v. Vartian, 121 R.I. 770, 775, 403 A.2d 256, 259 (1979)). We do not discern a Rule 33 violation in this case, nor are we of the opinion that plaintiff was ambushed days before trial. The purpose and use of the materials ordered produced by the court was to aid the trial justice in making his pretrial determination. Because defendant's experts did not rely on those materials or testify about those materials during trial, Rule 33 was not violated in this case.