Opinion ID: 625316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: This case comes to us as an interlocutory appeal certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2), which provides that an interlocutory appeal may be permitted if a judge of the Claims Court, in issuing an interlocutory order, includes in the order a statement that a controlling question of law is involved with respect to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from that order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The legislative history of this exception indicates that it should only be used in exceptional cases where an intermediate appeal may avoid protracted and expensive litigation. H.R.Rep. No. 85-1667, at 2 (1958). After our 2006 holding in this case that the United States was not liable for infringement under section 1498(a), the Claims Court allowed the complaint to be amended to state an infringement claim against Lockheed and granted Zoltek's motion to transfer this claim to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Zoltek v. United States, 85 Fed.Cl. 409, 422 (2009). In connection with the transfer order, the Claims Court recognized that it could only transfer claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 if, inter alia, the transferee court would have had jurisdiction at the time the original case was filed. Id. at 413. On motion by Lockheed, the Claims Court amended its transfer order and certified as a controlling question of law for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2) the issue of whether 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) must be construed to nullify any government contractor immunity provided in § 1498(a) when a patent infringement claim `aris[es] in a foreign country.' Transfer Order, Zoltek Corp. v. United States, No. 96-166 C (Fed.Cl. May 14, 2009), ECF No. 385. The Claims Court's theory apparently was that, although the Northern District of Georgia would have jurisdiction over the claims against Lockheed, it would be more efficient to determine before transfer whether Zoltek's claim was viable. It seems clear to me that the certified order does not confer appellate jurisdiction over the earlier dismissal of the claims against the United States. The Supreme Court has stated that for interlocutory appeals under section 1292(d)(2), appellate jurisdiction applies to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996). [1] However, [t]he court of appeals may not reach beyond the certified order to address other orders made in the case, and may only address any issue fairly included within the certified order. Id. Here, the certified order was limited to transferring claims against Lockheed. The certified order does not confer appellate jurisdiction over the earlier dismissal of infringement claims against the United States. This attempt to reach beyond the certified order is nearly identical to that rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987). In Stanley, a veteran filed suit against the government in district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligence in the administration of a drug testing program in which he participated while on active duty. Id. at 672, 107 S.Ct. 3054. The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, finding that the veteran's claims were precluded by Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), because they arose out of injuries related to his service. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 672, 107 S.Ct. 3054. On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that Feres barred Stanley's FTCA claims against the government, though holding that the district court should have dismissed the claim against the government for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than disposing of the case on its merits. Id. Thereafter, the veteran filed an amended complaint, naming as defendants certain government officers and alleging constitutional claims against those individuals under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Stanley, 483 U.S. at 674, 107 S.Ct. 3054. The district court entered an order refusing to find these claims barred, but it certified the order for interlocutory appeal under section 1292(b). Id. at 675, 107 S.Ct. 3054. On appeal again, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion with respect to the individual defendants. Id. However, the court of appeals also indicated that, due to intervening precedent, the veteran might have a viable FTCA claim against the United States, and that law-of-the-case principles therefore did not require adherence to the [prior] holding that [the veteran's] FTCA claim was barred by Feres.  Id. at 675-76, 107 S.Ct. 3054. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court with instructions to allow the veteran the opportunity to again plead an FTCA claim against the government for injuries related to his service. Id. at 676, 107 S.Ct. 3054. On review, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision with respect to claims against the United States. The Court held that because the order appealed from was an order only refusing to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants, [t]he Court of Appeals . . . had no jurisdiction to enter orders relating to [the veteran's] long-dismissed FTCA claims against the United States, even though the issues involved with the two types of claims were closely parallel[]. Id. at 677, 107 S.Ct. 3054. The Court emphasized that the court of appeals decision on appeal to allow the district court to reinstate a claim against the government was particularly astonishing in light of the fact that the United States was not even a party to the appeal. Id. Here, as in Stanley, the certified order itself in no way addressed any claims against the government. This court, in accepting this certified appeal, explained that the issues before it were whether the trial court should have transferred the case and whether the court should have allowed the complaint to be amended to add Lockheed as a defendant. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, Misc. No. 903, 2009 WL 3169301, at  (Fed.Cir. Sept. 30, 2009). There was no mention in either the Claims Court order or this court's order of claims against the government. As the Court found in Stanley, it is astonishing that the majority's opinion has the effect of reinstating a cause of action against the government where the government was not even a party to the appeal. Under Stanley, this court lacks jurisdiction to order reinstatement of claims against the government when the certified order addressed only the transfer of claims against a different defendant. [2] The en banc court's action is also particularly striking insofar as it vacates the earlier Zoltek decision that the United States is not liable on a takings theory. This theory of liability is not even tangentially related to Zoltek's claims against Lockheed, and has no relationship whatsoever to the transfer order.