Opinion ID: 2360649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mitigating and Victim Impact Evidence

Text: For his first issue, Greene contends that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence offered by defense counsel as mitigating evidence or victim-impact evidence. The pertinent facts are that while on death row, Greene received a letter from Edna Burnett, the victim's wife, expressing her forgiveness of Greene for the murder and her desire that he be given a life sentence rather than the death penalty. At the resentencing hearing in July 1999, defense counsel sought to introduce this testimony, either by actual letter or through the live testimony of Edna Burnett. The trial court ruled that the letter was inadmissible. The court also ruled that Mrs. Burnett could not testify in person that in her opinion Greene should be sentenced to life in prison or about her forgiveness of him for his crime. a. Mitigating Evidence Greene first urges that the State cannot prevent a jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence offered in support of a sentence less than death and cites us to Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), for that principle. He further argues that his right to present relevant evidence to the jury, which could cause the jury not to impose the death penalty, is constitutionally guaranteed. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). He emphasizes that the venire persons were asked in voir dire if forgiveness by the family would make a difference to them in determining the appropriate punishment, and four members of the panel, including two who became jurors, said that the victim's family's forgiveness would either be important or might matter to them. Finally, Greene directs our attention to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-605 (Repl. 1997), for the proposition that the listed mitigating circumstances are not meant to be exclusive. He points us to our language in a recent case where we said there are virtually no limits placed on the relevant mitigating evidence that a defendant may introduce. Lee v. State, 327 Ark. 692, 703, 942 S.W.2d 231, 236 (1997). We are not persuaded that Edna Burnett's forgiveness and her opinion that life imprisonment is the appropriate penalty constitute relevant mitigating evidence. Lee v. State, supra . The apposite statute requires that [M]itigation evidence must be relevant to the issue of punishment. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl.1997); see also Simpson v. State, 339 Ark. 467, 6 S.W.3d 104 (1999). This court has observed that Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602 does not totally open the door to any and all matters simply because they might conceivably relate to mitigation[.] McGehee v. State, 338 Ark. 152, 174, 992 S.W.2d 110, 123 (1999) (quoting Johnson v. State, 308 Ark. 7, 27, 823 S.W.2d 800, 811, cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1225, 112 S.Ct. 3043, 120 L.Ed.2d 911 (1992)). This court has held that relevant mitigating evidence is limited to evidence that concerns the character or history of the offender or the circumstances of the offense. See Camargo v. State, 337 Ark. 105, 113, 987 S.W.2d 680, 685 (1999) (quoting Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993)); see also Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl.1997). More on point, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has spoken precisely on the issue of personal opinions of the appropriate sentence. See Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir.1987). In Robison , the court stated: An individual's personal opinion of how the sentencing jury should acquit its responsibility, even though supported by reasons, relates to neither the character or record of the defendant nor to the circumstances of the offense. Such testimony, at best, would be a gossamer veil which would blur the jury's focus on the issue it must decide. Moreover, allowing any person to opine whether the death penalty should be invoked would interfere with the jury's performance of its duty to exercise the conscience of the community.... In short, we cannot agree with Petitioner's contention that any testimony a defendant believes would make the jury less likely to return a death verdict must be allowed to satisfy the dictates of federal due process. The broad range of facts admissible under the Eddings delineation of mitigating evidence must focus on the persona of the defendant or on the fabric of the crime of which he has been convicted. 829 F.2d at 1505. (Emphasis added). In 1994, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals considered an issue very similar to the issue raised in the case at hand. See Barbour v. State, 673 So.2d 461 (Ala. Crim.App.1994). In Barbour , the victim's brother wrote a letter to the trial court requesting that the defendant be sentenced to life in prison rather than death. The prosecutor argued that the holding by the United States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), prohibited the admission of this letter. The trial court concluded that the prosecutor was essentially correct and stated that the Payne court did not address the issue of whether a request for leniency by the victim's family can properly be considered as a mitigating circumstance. The trial court further noted that the United States Supreme Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra , held that a jury in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor touching the defendant's character and record. Barbour, 673 So.2d at 468. The trial court then adduced Robison v. Maynard, supra , and two other cases that hold that evidence of a victim's family member's opinion regarding an appropriate or desirable sentence is not admissible as relevant mitigating evidence. See Floyd v. State, 497 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 1986) (court refused to allow testimony of murder victim's daughter that she and the victim opposed capital punishment as mitigating evidence; the Florida Supreme Court affirmed); Ex Parte McWilliams, 640 So.2d 1015 (Ala. 1993) (defendant's Eighth Amendment rights were violated if trial court considered victim's family members' characterizations or opinions of the appropriate punishment). The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court and cited with approval McWilliams v. State, 640 So.2d 1015, 1017 (Ala. 1993), which stated that victim impact statements do not include characterizations or opinions about a defendant. We conclude that Robison v. Maynard, supra , and its progeny are persuasive. Opinions on the appropriate sentence from family members of the victim would be confusing to the jury and interfere with its role. There is, too, the danger that opinions from family members of the victim would be calculated to incite an arbitrary response from the jury. Furthermore, it would fail the test of evidence relating either to the character of the defendant or to the circumstances of the offense. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl.1997); Camargo v. State, supra . We affirm the trial court on this point. b. Victim Impact Evidence Greene next contends that Edna Burnett's forgiveness testimony and recommended sentence constitute victim-impact evidence under Payne v. Tennessee, supra , where the Court considered previous decisions on the admissibility of victim-impact evidence and concluded that this testimony was admissible. This court adopted the same view in Noel v. State, 331 Ark. 79, 960 S.W.2d 439 (1998), where we held that the impact of a murder on the victim's family is admissible. Greene emphasizes, however, that there is no language by this court or by the United States Supreme Court that limits victim impact to testimony that will increase the likely sentence. Because of this, he urges that he should be allowed to introduce evidence from a victim's family member that may decrease a sentence as well. Again, the issue comes down to whether the proffered evidence from Edna Burnett is relevant. We agree that the seminal case in the area of victim-impact evidence is Payne v. Tennessee, supra , where the United States Supreme Court overruled past precedent and held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not erect a per se bar against states providing for the admission of victim-impact evidence. Arkansas followed suit and enacted legislation permitting victim-impact evidence as relevant evidence. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl.1997). This court has said that proposed victim-impact evidence passes the test of relevancy if it counteracts mitigating evidence and shows that the victim's death represented a unique loss to society and exacted a human toll on the victim's family. Noel v. State, supra (citing Payne v. Tennessee, supra ). This court further explained in Kemp v. State, 335 Ark. 139, 983 S.W.2d 383 (1998), that the jury could consider victim-impact evidence at the same time it considers mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant during the sentencing phase of the trial. Id. at 141, 983 S.W.2d 383 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, supra ). In recognizing that there were virtually no limits placed on relevant mitigating evidence that a defendant may introduce on his behalf, we noted that the State could legitimately conclude that the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether the death sentence should be imposed. Id. at 142, 983 S.W.2d 383, (citing Payne v. Tennessee, supra ). Yet, this court has never sanctioned introduction of opinions from the victim's family about their feelings or what the appropriate penalty should be as victim-impact evidence. And we are aware that other jurisdictions have not found such evidence to be admissible. See, e.g., United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1217 (10th Cir.1998) (information concerning victim's family member's opinions about crime, defendant, and appropriate sentence inadmissible). We conclude that penalty recommendations from family members of the victim are not relevant as victim-impact evidence. Certainly, the penalty recommendation from Edna Burnett that Greene proposes would not counteract mitigating evidence or show the human cost of the murder on the victim's family. But in addition, if this court permitted forgiveness and penalty recommendations as victim-impact evidence, then it stands to reason that it must also allow any evidence of nonforgiveness by the victim's family and any recommendation of a harsher sentence such as death. We cannot condone either brand of testimony as both would interfere with and be irrelevant to a jury's decision on punishment. Indeed, such testimony would have the potential or reducing a trial to a contest of irrelevant opinions. See Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d at 1504. We affirm the trial court on this point.