Opinion ID: 1829477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Business-Records Exception

Text: The State contends that the DOC release-date letter is admissible as a business record. However, by itself, the letter is not admissible under the business-records exception. Out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted are inadmissible unless the statements fall under a recognized exception to the rule against hearsay. See § 90.802, Fla. Stat. (2004). [5] Here, the DOC release-date letter read as follows: I, JOYCE HOBBS, CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR, CENTRAL RECORDS OFFICE, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS SEAL IS THE OFFICIAL SEAL OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. I ALSO CERTIFY THAT THE LAST RELEASE DATE FOR INMATE EUGENE LUMSDEN [A/K/A ABRAHAM YISRAEL], DC# 647647, B/M, DOB: 4/1/1963, WAS APRIL 08, 1998, FOR CASE # 89-20161, 89-20162  BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA. GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL, THIS FEBRUARY 04, 2004. [SIGNATURE] JOYCE HOBBS, CORRECTIONAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR (Emphasis supplied.) Neither party disputes the fact that the State offered the DOC release-date letter to prove Mr. Yisrael's release date for his predicate felonies, which were convictions for arson and robbery. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the letter constituted a statement under section 90.801(1)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (2004). See id. (A `statement' is: 1. An oral or written assertion....). Finally, neither party claims that Ms. Hobbs made this statement in court, while relying upon appropriately admitted and authenticated State records. Therefore, the DOC release-date letter is a classic example of hearsay: Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Banks v. State, 790 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla.2001) (citing § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997)). In its attempt to prove Yisrael's release date, the State, as the evidentiary proponent, thus had the burden of supplying a proper predicate to admit this evidence under an exception to the rule against hearsay. See § 90.802, Fla. Stat. (2004) (Except as provided by statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.); Lowenthal v. State, 699 So.2d 319, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ([T]he state must furnish proof of ... the date that the defendant was released from prison imposed for the last felony conviction....); § 775.084(3)(a)(4), Fla. Stat. (2001) (mandating a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard). Florida's business-records exception appears in section 90.803(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). [6] To secure admissibility under this exception, the proponent must show that (1) the record was made at or near the time of the event; (2) was made by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) was kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity; and (4) that it was a regular practice of that business to make such a record. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 738 So.2d 382, 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Additionally, the proponent is required to present this information in one of three formats. First, the proponent may take the traditional route, which requires that a records custodian take the stand and testify under oath to the predicate requirements. See § 90.803(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Second, the parties may stipulate to the admissibility of a document as a business record. See, e.g., Kelly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 720 So.2d 1145, 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (holding that the parties stipulated to the admissibility of medical records under the business-records exception); but see Gordon v. State, 787 So.2d 892, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that the State and defense counsel's stipulation regarding the defendant's release date was not sufficient to relieve the State of its burden to prove the defendant's release date by a preponderance of the evidence). Third and finally, since July 1, 2003, the proponent has been able to establish the business-records predicate through a certification or declaration that complies with sections 90.803(6)(c) and 90.902(11), Florida Statutes (2004). The certificationunder penalty of perjury must state that the record: (a) Was made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person having knowledge of those matters; (b) Was kept in the course of the regularly conducted activity; and (c) Was made as a regular practice in the course of the regularly conducted activity[.] § 90.902(11)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2004). Here, a records custodian did not appear as a witness, the parties did not stipulate to admissibility, and the State did not provide a certification under section 90.902(11). Even if the State had attempted to satisfy the business-records predicate exclusively with regard to the release-date letter it would have failed. If evidence is to be admitted under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, it must be offered in strict compliance with the requirements of the particular exception. Johnson v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 546 So.2d 741, 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). The DOC release-date letter, standing alone, falls short of each predicate requirement. First, the letter was not made at or near the time of Mr. Yisrael's predicate-felony release dateApril 8, 1998. Instead, Ms. Hobbs certified that she drafted the letter on February 4, 2004nearly six years after the fact. Second, Ms. Hobbs drafted the letter upon the prosecutor's request, exclusively for the purpose of the instant prosecution, not as part of a regularly conducted activity. When a document is made for something other than a regular business purpose, it does not fall within the business record exception, and [w]henever a record is made for the purpose of preparing for litigation, its trustworthiness is suspect and should be closely scrutinized. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 803.6, at 876 n. 3, 877 (2007 ed.) (citing, e.g., United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 760-64 (D.C.Cir.1979) (rejecting an argument that a document created solely for litigation purposes was admissible as a business-records summary of otherwise admissible records, which were not produced)). [7] Similar to the telefax at issue in Kim, the release-date letter cannot be admitted as a summary of otherwise admissible records, which were not produced. See also Thompson v. State, 705 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ([T]he business-records exception to the hearsay rule ... does not authorize hearsay testimony concerning the contents of business records which have not been admitted into evidence.); United States v. Marshall, 762 F.2d 419, 423-28 (5th Cir.1985) (substantially similar). The letter itself is not a record; rather, as the First District observed in Gray, [the DOC letter] constituted hearsay, and the State proved no proper predicate for its admission under any exception to the rule excluding hearsay. The document fails to identify the official records on which it relied, if any, does not state that it is a true and correct representation of any record, and does not say where or in whose custody any original official or business records are kept. ... [The] statement is essentially a (defective) affidavit devoid of any reference to records the DOC maintains.... Gray, 910 So.2d at 869-70 (emphasis supplied). See also Desue, 908 So.2d at 1116-18 (holding the DOC's Crime & Time Reports admissible as business records, and commenting that we [are not] concerned here with an affidavit prepared for use in a particular case masquerading as a business record.  (emphasis supplied)). Third, the DOC letter does not state that it was drafted [b]y or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge. § 90.803(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Fourth and finally, the DOC produces its Crime and Time Reports as a regular practice in the ordinary course of its businessi.e., its statutorily mandated duty [8] to keep track of its inmate population. See Desue, 908 So.2d at 1117. Conversely, the DOC produces release-date letters at the request of prosecutors, exclusively for the purpose of litigation, not as part of its regularly conducted activities. See, e.g., Gray, 910 So.2d at 869-70. In Yisrael, the State could have secured the admission of the attached Crime and Time Report as a business record if it had supplied the authentication required by sections 90.803(6) and 90.902(11). See, e.g., Parker v. State, 973 So.2d 1167, 1168-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that a DOC Crime and Time Report is admissible as a business record where a DOC records custodian supplies a certification that strictly complies with sections 90.803(6) and 90.902(11), Florida Statutes), notice invoking discretionary jurisdiction filed, No. SC07-1847 (Fla. Oct.2, 2007). However, the State did not provide a section 90.902(11) certification in this case; instead, it contends that the release-date letter alone is admissible as a business record. We do not agree with this contention. We therefore hold that a DOC release-date letter is not a business record because it was not (1) made at or near the time of the defendant's release date; (2) made by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge; (3) kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted business activity; or (4) created as a regular practice.