Opinion ID: 1388553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Instruct Sua Sponte on Attempt

Text: The jury was instructed that defendant could be found guilty of first degree felony murder if the killing occurred during the  commission of or attempt to commit a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14. (Italics added.) However, the information, instructions, and written verdict form stated that the jury could find the special circumstance to be true if the killing occurred while defendant was engaged in the commission of  a lewd act. (Italics added.) The jury received an instruction defining lewd and lascivious conduct under section 288, subdivision (a) (section 288(a)). No instruction defining attempt was given. As mentioned earlier, defendant was convicted of first degree murder and arson, and the special circumstance was found true. (9) Defendant insists the trial court erred prejudicially by failing to instruct sua sponte on the elements of attempt. He argues that absent such an instruction, the jury was left to speculate that some act other than an attempt was sufficient to satisfy the first degree felony-murder charge. Defendant also claims the omission might have misled jurors to believe that they could apply the same erroneous attempt theory to the special circumstance allegation. Even if the attempt instructions were incomplete, no prejudice occurred. The prosecutor argued at the close of the guilt phase that defendant unlawfully committed two lewd acts upon Lashan shortly before the murder, namely, compulsory disrobing and forcible rape. (See People v. Austin (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 110, 114-115 [168 Cal. Rptr. 401] ( Austin ), and discussion, post. ) No attempt theory was urged. Similarly, the information, instructions, and verdict form spoke only in terms of a completed lewd act at the special circumstance phase. Because jurors found the special circumstance to be true, they necessarily found such a completed act, and thereby foreclosed any speculation that they based either the first degree murder verdict or the special circumstance finding on some unknown, incorrect theory of attempt. (See People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].) Defendant suggests the special circumstance finding does not conclusively resolve the attempt question. He argues that because jurors were instructed to reach a verdict on the murder charge before turning to the special circumstance allegation, they might have been thinking in terms of an attempt for each offense. We are not persuaded. The instructions on all charges were read at the same time. We assume the jury followed the special circumstance instruction and found actual commission of a lewd and lascivious act.