Opinion ID: 2621432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instruction on the Defense of Consent

Text: ś 52 In the rape case, Gregory pleaded not guilty and before trial he changed his defense from denial to consent; he admitted to having had sex with R.S., but claimed the encounter was consensual. The jury was instructed that to convict Gregory of any one of the three counts of first degree rape, it had to conclude that the sexual intercourse occurred as the result of forcible compulsion. RCP at 480-82. The jury was also instructed that [t]he burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sexual intercourse was consensual. RCP at 483. This instruction defined consent to mean at the time of the act of sexual intercourse there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse. RCP at 483; see also RCW 9A.44.010(7). The defense requested an instruction that defined consent but did not impose a separate burden apart from the burden on the prosecution to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. [20] ś 53 Any instruction on the burden of proof must comply with the requirement that the State must bear the burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Camara, 113 Wash.2d at 638, 781 P.2d 483 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). Gregory now argues that requiring him to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence violated due process because the jury could have become confused, thinking that it could acquit only if consent is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, even if a reasonable doubt may have been raised with regard to the element of forcible compulsion. See State v. Riker, 123 Wash.2d 351, 366-67, 869 P.2d 43 (1994) (describing a similar potential problem with regard to the defense of duress). While Gregory admits that this court resolved this issue in Camara, 113 Wash.2d at 640, 781 P.2d 483, he contends that Camara should be overruled. ś 54 In holding that due process permits an instruction requiring the defendant to prove consent, the Camara court relied on Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). In Martin, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant could be required to prove self-defense even where the evidence necessary to prove self-defense would often tend to negate an Ohio element of aggravated first degree murder, purposeful killing by prior calculation and design. Id. at 234, 107 S.Ct. 1098. The Martin Court noted that there are two distinct questions that a jury must answer. The jury must determine whether each element of the crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury must determine whether the elements of the defense have been met. Even if a defendant could not prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury nevertheless could acquit if it believed there was reasonable doubt as to any fact necessary to support the elements of the crime. Id. at 234, 107 S.Ct. 1098. Therefore, while evidence offered to support a defense may also tend to negate an element of the crime, that does not necessarily shift to the defendant the burden of disproving any element of the State's case. See id. The Martin dissent doubted that a jury could reliably grasp this distinction, arguing that a jury would become confused and shift the burden to the defendant. See id. at 237-38, 107 S.Ct. 1098 (Powell, J., dissenting). However, the Martin majority refused to harbor the dissent's mistrust of the jury and concluded that the instructions were sufficiently clear to convey that the State's burden did not shift. Id. at 234 n. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1098, n. 1. ś 55 After Martin, the Camara court expressed substantial doubt as to the continued viability of the so-called negates analysis (asking only whether a defense negates an element of the crime), and the court declined to apply the negates analysis to the consent defense. Camara, 113 Wash.2d at 639, 781 P.2d 483. Following Martin, the Camara court held that while there is a conceptual overlap between the consent defense to rape and the rape crime's element of forcible compulsion, we cannot hold that for that reason alone the burden of proof on consent must rest with the State. Id. at 640, 781 P.2d 483. The burden to prove consent properly lies with the defendant. Id. Even so, the instructions must reflect the State's unalterable burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. ś 56 Then, in Riker, this court noted that self-defense and alibi defenses could negate elements of a crime. 123 Wash.2d at 367-68, 869 P.2d 43. The Riker court distinguished the defense of duress because it condones the defendant's admittedly unlawful conduct. Id. at 368, 869 P.2d 43. Yet the Riker court included the consent defense to rape in its list of defenses that did not negate an element of the crime, and the Riker court did not question the Camara holding. Id. at 366-67, 869 P.2d 43. ś 57 Gregory concedes that the instructions read to the jury in his rape case provide a correct statement of current law but claims that the Camara court incorrectly analyzed the Martin decision. We disagree; the Martin analysis clearly supports the Camara court's conclusion. The jury in a first degree rape case must be convinced that none of the evidence presented raises a reasonable doubt that sexual intercourse occurred as the result of forcible compulsion. See Martin, 480 U.S. at 233, 107 S.Ct. 1098. Therefore, so long as the jury instructions allow the jury to consider all of the evidence, including evidence presented in the hopes of establishing consent, to determine whether a reasonable doubt exists as to the element of forcible compulsion, the conceptual overlap between the consent defense and the forcible compulsion element does not relieve the State of its burden to prove forcible compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt. [21] We decline to overrule Camara and conclude that the jury instructions here complied with due process. [22]