Opinion ID: 73812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: C. of this opinion.

Text: 5 Cooper also argues that docking pilots make assignments when they order a tug to leave one ship and go to another; when they assign one tug the task of picking up and dropping off the docking pilot; or when the docking pilots instruct the tugs to look at construction in the port or the position of pipelines and dredges in the port. These tasks all flow from the initial assignment determinations based on the schedule for the day and do not require separate analysis under the statute. drivers were not supervisors because neither the determination of the most efficient route, nor the assignment of jobs as they come in during the day, requires [the employee] to exercise independent discretion where dispatchers have no control over the number of employees the company has and assigns employees to overtime off of a company list); Highland Superstores, Inc. v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 918, 921 (6th Cir.1991) (leadmen warehouse workers were not supervisors partially because, although they assigned work to other employees every day, their assignment authority was limited by their supervisor's schedule of incoming and outgoing trucks to be unloaded). More specifically, for an assignment function to involve independent judgment, the putative supervisor must select employees to perform specific tasks on the basis of a judgment about the individual employee's skills. See NLRB v. KDFW-TV, Inc., 790 F.2d 1273, 1279 (5th Cir.1986) (assignment editors were not supervisors when they served primarily as a conduit for decisions already made by manager); cf. American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 893, 896 (7th Cir.1981) (fast food shift manager responsible for assigning fast food workers to particular tasks on a shift held to be supervisor because shift manager exercised independent judgment based on requirements of job and his opinion of individual employee's capabilities); Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 228, 231-32 (9th Cir.1971) (employee was supervisor where he had power to choose which lineman are to work, when and where). Cooper has not shown that docking pilots make assignments of tugs based on the skills and experiences of the crews manning the tugs, but rather only on the schedule provided by Cooper and the power of the tugs in relation to the dimension of the ship to be docked. The docking pilots thus do not exercise independent judgment when assigning tugboats and do not satisfy the requirements of a section 2(11) supervisor in this function. C. Responsible Direction of Employees During Docking Process Responsibility is defined as being answerable for the discharge of a duty or obligation. Responsibility includes judgment, skill, ability, capacity and is implied by power. Meredith Corp. v. NLRB, 679 F.2d 1332, 1336 (10th Cir.1982) (internal quotations omitted). The words  'responsibility to direct' are not weak or jejune but import active vigor and potential vitality. Security Guard Serv., 384 F.2d at 147. Cooper contends that docking pilots fulfill the function of responsibly directing others because they give commands during the docking and undocking process using their extensive knowledge of local conditions to determine how the tugs and lines should be placed for safety and efficiency. The Board, although recognizing the expertise and responsibility of the pilots, found that such maneuvering orders, while based on years of experience, are routine in nature and do not require the exercise of independent discretion necessary to establish supervisory authority. R3-502. Cooper argues that the complexity and inherent dangers of the docking procedure preclude a finding that the direction of the docking pilots is routine. Cooper cites Sun Refining & Marketing Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 642, 649 (1991), where the Administrative Law Judge held that ship's officers on oil supertankers were supervisors. The ALJ based his decision, in part, on the fact that operation of a supertanker could not be routine due to the dangerous nature of the work and disastrous consequences that could result from mistakes. Drawing a line between routine direction and that which exercises independent judgment, as required by the NLRA, is particularly difficult when evaluating highly trained employees. We have determined previously, however, that directing others in work that may be complex and potentially dangerous is not enough to elevate an employee to supervisory status. See Exxon Pipeline Co. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 704 (5th Cir.1979). In Exxon, we held that oil movement supervisors, who monitored the flow of oil through the company's pipelines, were not supervisors even though they held highly responsible positions. Id. at 705. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir.1981) (pilot was not supervisor because authority to ensure safety of plane is intrinsic part of any pilot's job and not enough to elevate pilot to supervisory status). Risk of the undertaking alone, then, is not enough to transform an employee into a supervisor. We must determine, rather, whether the docking pilots direction function encompasses any managerial prerogative. Congress, in enacting § 2(11), sought to distinguish between true supervisors, those vested with 'genuine management prerogatives,' and other employees. NLRB v. GranCare, Inc., 170 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir.1999) (en banc ) (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 281, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974)). See also Ross Porta-Plant, Inc. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1180, 1182 (5th Cir.1968) (In enacting § 2(11) of the Act Congress did not intend to exclude from its protection any individuals except those who possess true managerial powers.); NLRB v. Griggs Equip., Inc., 307 F.2d 275, 279 (5th Cir.1962) (same). The Supreme Court has noted that: The Board has recognized that employees whose decision-making is limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union membership arguably may involve some divided loyalty. Only if an employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned with management. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690, 100 S.Ct. at 866 (footnote omitted). As a result, the Board, at times, reaches results reflecting a distinction between authority arising from professional knowledge and authority encompassing front-line management prerogatives. HCR, 511 U.S. at 583, 114 S.Ct. at 1785. In the present case, the docking pilots use their expertise to guide the tugboats. The expertise is not, however, exercised with a management prerogative, but rather as an experienced employee. Simply being a more experienced employee does not make the docking pilot a supervisor. See e.g., Providence Alaska Med. Ctr., 121 F.3d at 554 (By exercising her professional judgment in this routine manner while working alongside and guiding less experienced employees, the charge nurse is not transformed into a supervisor.); Adco Elec., 6 F.3d at 1117 (employee was not a supervisor because his status was that of a skilled craftsman guiding less experienced employees). In GranCare, Inc., the Seventh Circuit observed that supervision exercised in accordance with professional rather than business norms is not supervision within the meaning of the supervisor provision, for no issue of divided loyalties is raised when supervision is required to conform to professional standards rather than to the company's profit-maximizing objectives. 170 F.3d at 666-67 (citation omitted). We also must consider to whom the docking pilots are giving direction during the docking and undocking process. The docking pilot communicates only with the tugboat captain during this procedure. The tugboat captain then determines how his crew will follow the instructions of the pilot. In this situation, telling an employee that a certain result must be reached is not responsibly directing within the meaning of the NLRA. In Exxon, we rejected the company's argument that because an oil movement supervisor (OMS) makes an independent judgment whether a problem must be corrected immediately, even to the extent that field employees must work overtime, or whether a problem is minor and may be attended to later, the OMS is a supervisor. 596 F.2d at 706. We determined, instead, that the OMS does little more than notify the field that a certain problem has occurred and request assistance in remedying it. He has no further authority or responsibility to direct the field personnel in the manner of performing their remedial duties. The field personnel are in a wholly separate department of the company and thus function in a different supervisory hierarchy from that of the OMS. Id. Likewise, in the present case, the docking pilot does not always tell the tugboat captain how to do his job. The docking pilot relays to the tug captain his instructions and the tug captain then ensures that the instruction is carried out effectively by the crew. The docking pilots do not direct the individual crew members on the tug,6 and the parties agree the tugboat captains are themselves supervisors.7 Spentonbush/Red Star Cos. v. NLRB, 106 F.3d 484 (2d Cir.1997) is inapposite. There, the Second Circuit, reversing the Board, determined that tugboat and barge captains were supervisors within the meaning of the NLRA. The court based its decision on the great deal of authority tug captains exert over boat and crew, such as the authority to take disciplinary action, as well as to dismiss any officer or crew member. Id. at 488. A docking pilot does not have such authority over a crew. In fact, he has no crew. While the Spentonbush court also considered the risks involved in the tug's duties, we have determined already that such 6 Cooper asserts that because one of its docking pilots was fined $1000 by the Coast Guard for a bumping incident, the docking pilots are responsible for the docking procedure and therefore are supervisors. Again, Coast Guard monitoring of pilots' performances is a function of the nature of the docking pilot job itself and has no relation to the pilots' position within the Cooper organization. 7 Furthermore, under the NLRA, for an employee to be a supervisor, he must responsibly direct employees of the employer. See Mourning v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 768, 770 (D.C.Cir.1977) (we would be inclined to agree ... that a person generally may not be considered a 'supervisor' unless he exercises Section 2(11) authority over an 'employee' as defined by Section 2(3), which expressly excludes 'any individual employed as a supervisor.' ), accord McDonnell Douglas, 655 F.2d at 936. The docking pilots communicate only with the tugboat captain, who is a supervisor. Supervisors are statutorily excluded from the category of employees under the NLRA. As a result, if an employee directs only a supervisor, he cannot be directing an employee of the employer and cannot satisfy the terms of responsibly direct under section 2(11). risks cannot elevate a highly trained employee to that of a supervisor. Finally, we note that the Spentonbush court undertook its analysis with a reduced level of deference to the Board's conclusion, a standard of review we have declined to adopt.8 Cooper argues that the docking pilots are supervisors because they exercise authority in making effective recommendations on hirings and promotions, assign work to employees, and responsibly direct employees during the docking process. We conclude, however, that the Board's determination that the docking pilots are not supervisors is supported by substantial evidence because the docking pilots do not use independent judgment when exercising the three functions posited by the Employer.