Opinion ID: 851995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hawkins’s Trial In Absentia

Text: Hawkins presents three specific contentions that his trial in absentia denied him due process of law—all of which revolve around his right to counsel, not his right to be present at trial. First, Hawkins asserts that he never received actual notice that his public defender’s 2 In Sanjari, we held that an aggregate child support debt in excess of $15,000 serves as an enhancement to the crime of non-support of a dependent, raising it from a class D felony to a class C felony. Sanjari, 961 N.E.2d at 1007–08. However, a defendant’s single lump-sum debt could not enhance two class D felonies to two class C felonies—it could only enhance one such charge. Id. at 1008–09. 4 motion to withdraw had been granted. Second, he claims that the record does not reflect that he was properly advised of his right to an attorney. Finally, he claims that the record does not reflect a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of that right.3 Because we find it dispositive, we address only the last of these contentions and assume arguendo that Hawkins received constructive notice of his counsel’s withdrawal and that the advisements he received during earlier proceedings concerning his right to counsel were still sufficient after his counsel actually withdrew. The right to counsel is one protected by both the U.S. and Indiana constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13. It can be relinquished only by knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. Jackson, 868 N.E.2d at 499. Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right, and likewise will not presume the defendant’s acquiescence in its loss. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see also Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1125–26 (Ind. 2001). Moreover, “[t]he constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused— whose life or liberty is at stake—is without counsel.” Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465. “This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.” Id. “[I]t would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.” Id. In Jackson, we pointed out that “a defendant’s absence from trial does not constitute a waiver of the right to counsel in every case.” Jackson, 868 N.E.2d at 499. Nevertheless, we found waiver because the defendant’s absence was “intentional and inexecusable.” Id. at 496. Jackson had been charged with several drug and firearm offenses, appeared at his initial hearing, and hired an attorney. A second attorney was admitted pro hac vice as counsel for Jackson, and 3 In his brief, Hawkins styles these last two arguments under one heading, but the failure to properly advise of the right to an attorney and the validity of a subsequent waiver of that right are two distinct issues. 5 both attorneys then attended some pretrial conferences, whereas Jackson attended others by himself. Eventually, the second attorney’s pro hac vice status was revoked and Jackson was ordered to appear with an attorney licensed in Indiana. No change was made to Jackson’s trial date, which had been scheduled for some time. At a final status conference a week before trial, Jackson and his first attorney appeared and informed the trial court that Jackson intended to retain new counsel and discharge both his prior attorneys. The trial court continued the trial date for roughly three months so that Jackson could retain new counsel and that counsel could prepare, with several intervening pretrial conferences scheduled as well. Jackson was to have new counsel by the first of those pretrial conferences. Neither Jackson nor counsel appeared at either of the two intervening pretrial conferences, nor did anyone appear at his trial. The trial court found that Jackson had been notified in writing and orally of the trial date, and held that Jackson’s failure to appear was willful, voluntary, and knowing. Id. at 497. Jackson was then tried and convicted in absentia. This Court rejected Jackson’s claim that his failure to appear at trial did not constitute a waiver of his right to counsel. Instead, we concluded that “the record support[ed] the trial court’s specific finding that Jackson’s absence from trial was a ‘willful, knowing and voluntary act.’” Id. at 499. He “repeatedly disregarded scheduled events.” Id. His final pretrial conference concluded with “an order setting a third and final trial date and directing Jackson to retain new counsel . . . . He then failed to appear, failed to notify the court of his inability to retain counsel, and failed to request a continuance.” Id. Therefore, we held that “this unexplained disregard of specific directions by the court and his own undertakings was sufficient to establish an intentional and inexcusable absence from trial and serves as a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel.” Id. In no way, shape, or form, should our opinion today be taken as approval for Hawkins’s actions as a defendant facing criminal charges. Nor should it be taken as an invitation for 6 defendants to “game the system.” It is well known that trial courts face tremendous challenges in terms of case loads and staffing limitations, and every delay (intentional or not) necessarily has a carry-over effect to every other person’s access to the courtroom—and by extension, their