Opinion ID: 203259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Decision to reopen to permit plaintiff to present evidence of lost wages

Text: After the close of evidence the district court allowed the plaintiffs to reopen and present evidence of the amounts of their lost wages. Although the plaintiffs had a witness available, Hodgson stipulated to the amounts but objected to the court's decision to reopen. A district court's decision to reopen the record to permit the introduction of additional evidence is reviewable for abuse of discretion. United States v. Santana, 175 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 1999); Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1113 (1st Cir.1995). While the court's decision turns on flexible and case-specific criteria, among the factors the district court should consider are whether (1) the evidence sought to be introduced is especially important and probative; (2) the moving party's explanation for failing to introduce the evidence earlier is bona fide; and (3) reopening will cause no undue prejudice to the non-moving party. Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 64 F.3d 742, 746 (1st Cir. 1995)(citing Joseph v. Terminix Int'l Co., 17 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir.1994)). There was no abuse of discretion in allowing the additional evidence. First, the plaintiffs' evidence on lost wages was highly probative, as it was the only evidence of the precise amount of compensatory damages. Compare Joseph, 17 F.3d at 1285 (noting that new evidence would have been cumulative). Second, the plaintiffs appeared to have a bona fide explanation for failing to introduce the evidence, namely reasonably genuine surprise. See Rivera-Flores, 64 F.3d at 747 (explaining that it may amount to an abuse of discretion for a trial court to decline to reopen in circumstances where the movant has demonstrated `reasonably genuine surprise')(emphasis added)(internal citation omitted). The plaintiffs appear to have been operating under the assumption that they could introduce damages at a later stage and expressed genuine surprise once faced with the prospect of losing such an opportunity. Compare Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 49, 52-53 (2d Cir.1986)(affirming lower court's denial of motion to re-open where lower court repeatedly warned that moving party would need to present evidence on key issue). Finally, because the plaintiff had a readily available witness who would testify as to lost wages, see Rivera-Flores, 64 F.3d at 749 (noting defendant not unduly prejudiced where introduction of [ ] readily obtainable documentary evidence could have entailed but minimal delay), and because Hodgson would have the opportunity to cross-examine this witness, the reopening did not cause undue prejudice.