Opinion ID: 4537683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Doe’s FTCA Claims

Text: Doe brings a number of claims under the FTCA, arguing that Defendants Hagenbeck, Rapp, and other West Point officials negligently trained and supervised West Point cadets and staff concerning sexual assault; implemented inadequate sexual assault policies; “created an unreasonable risk of causing [Doe] emotional distress” by creating and maintaining inadequate policies concerning sexual assault, failing to discipline assailants, and tolerating sexually aggressive conduct, J. App’x 62–63; and failed to investigate and punish instances of sexual assault in order “to conceal the true extent of the sexual violence at West Point,” J. App’x 63. The government argues that these claims are foreclosed by our decision in Doe I. We agree. Under Feres v. United States, “the Government is not liable under the [FTCA] for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” 340 U.S. at 146. Feres requires dismissal of a suit in which “commanding officers would have to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the 4 wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions; for example, whether to overlook a particular incident or episode, whether to discharge a serviceman, and whether and how to place restraints on a soldier’s off-base conduct.” United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). In Doe I, we concluded that Doe’s Bivens claims were barred by the doctrine of intramilitary immunity because her injuries occurred “incident to service.” 870 F.3d at 45. In doing so, we concluded that her allegations “center on the implementation and supervision of allegedly inadequate and harmful training and education programs relating to sexual assault and harassment;” “the alleged failure to provide properly . . . for the report and investigation of sexual assault claims, and for the support of cadets who are assaulted;” “the alleged lack of sufficient numbers of female faculty and administrators at West Point and on the failure to recruit female cadets;” “the allegedly inadequate punishment meted out not only to perpetrators of sexual violence but also to those who engage in misogynistic chants, slurs and comments;” and, “most broadly, on the assertedly culpable tolerance of a hostile culture toward women at West Point.” Id. at 46. We determined that “[a]djudicating such a money damages claim would require a civilian court to engage in searching fact-finding about Lieutenant General Hagenbeck and Brigadier General Rapp’s ‘basic choices about the discipline, supervision, and control’ of the cadets that they were responsible for training as future officers.” Id. (quoting Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58). Doe’s FTCA claims involve the same purportedly 5 wrongful conduct and the same injuries. Accordingly, Doe’s FTCA claims are incident to service, and are therefore barred under Feres. Doe’s remaining arguments are similarly foreclosed by Doe I. For instance, Doe contends that, under Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995), her injuries were not within the scope of her military employment. But as the Court explained in Doe I, Taber did not create a new test for immunity, and Feres remains good law. Doe I, 870 F.3d at 47 n.9 (noting that “Taber could not be read to alter the reach of Feres, which was then and remains binding precedent”). And as we also noted in Doe I, “in the FTCA context, Taber itself noted . . . that the incident-to-service rule (regardless of workers’ compensation considerations) is properly invoked when adjudicating the claim of a service member would require ‘commanding officers . . . to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions.’” Id. at 48 (quoting Taber, 67 F.3d at 1049). “This is precisely the problem with Doe’s claim here.” Id. Put simply, although Doe frames her suit as related to her role as a student and not her role as a soldier, the Court in Doe I has already concluded otherwise. Id. at 48 (finding Doe’s argument that she “was not a soldier on the battlefield, but a student attending college” to be “both contrary to the case law and unsupported by the factual allegations in Doe’s Amended Complaint”). As we noted previously, Doe was a member of the military, id. at 45, subject to military command “‘at all times,’” id. at 48 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 7446(d)), who was at West Point “‘for the purpose of military instruction,’” id. at 6 48–49 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 7449(a)). Her education was “inextricably intertwined” with her “military pursuits.” Id. at 49. We see no reason to depart from these findings now. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Doe’s FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Wake v. United States, 89 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he proper vehicle for dismissing a Feres-barred FTCA claim is a dismissal for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction.”). We therefore do not reach the question of whether the district court erred in dismissing her claims under the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. See Mitchell v. City of New York, 841 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 2016) (“It is well-settled that this court may affirm on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds no[t] relied upon by the district court.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).