Opinion ID: 1325644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to Allow Questions on Voir Dire.

Text: Mueller next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow certain questions on voir dire which he contends were necessary to determine whether any prospective jurors were predisposed toward imposing the death penalty. Mueller asserts that he should have been allowed to ask these questions because the Commonwealth was entitled to conduct the opposite line of questioning, viz., whether certain prospective jurors were unalterably opposed to the death penalty. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45-46, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526-27, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). A total of 47 persons comprised the venire. From this group, 23 persons were struck for cause. Mueller objected to the trial court's qualification of ten of the remaining 24 members. However, he objected to only two members, Ruby Moschler and Max Zoeckler, on the grounds that they were death prone. An examination of Mueller's voir dire of Ruby Moschler reveals that the trial court did not reject any question regarding Moschler's ability to impose a life sentence. [3] Since Mueller did not proffer any such question which was rejected by the trial court, he may not claim on appeal that his right to question this prospective juror was violated. See Morgan v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992); LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 585, 304 S.E.2d at 655. During his voir dire of Max Zoeckler, Mueller sought to ask, [I]f in sitting in the guilt phase of the trial you conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mueller has raped and killed a 10 year old child, don't you think that death is the only appropriate punishment for that? The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to this question. Counsel for Mueller then attempted to ask Mr. Zoeckler, [I]f you sit in the guilt phase of the trial and you determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mueller raped and abducted and killed a 10 year old girl, and then you sit in the sentencing phase and listen to the evidence in aggravation and the evidence in mitigation, aren't you going to think the only appropriate sentence is death? The trial court also sustained the prosecutor's objection to this question. We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing both of these questions since they were argumentative and provided the prospective juror with no basis upon which to express an opinion. See Buchanan, 238 Va. at 402, 384 S.E.2d at 765; Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 659 n., 283 S.E.2d 212, 216 n. (1981). Further, even if we disregard the argumentative nature of these questions, we still find that the trial court's ruling did not violate Mueller's right to a fair and impartial jury. This Court has held that where the voir dire questioning conducted by the trial court otherwise assure[s] the removal of those who would invariably impose capital punishment, it is not reversible error for the trial court to deny defense counsel additional questions on this subject. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 523, 273 S.E.2d 36, 42-43 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1011, 101 S.Ct. 2347, 68 L.Ed.2d 863 (1981). This approach is in accord with the holding of the United States Supreme Court set forth in Morgan, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-33. In Morgan, the Court held that the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury was violated by the trial court's refusal to inquire whether prospective jurors would vote automatically for imposition of the death penalty. The defendant had requested that the trial court ask the jurors: If you found [the defendant] guilty, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are? ___ U.S. at___, 112 S.Ct. at 2226. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the trial court had not asked any questions on this subject. Instead, it had only posed general questions regarding the prospective jurors' ability to be fair and impartial and follow the instructions of the court. The Supreme Court held that such general questions were inadequate because a prospective juror could, in good conscience, respond affirmatively and yet be unaware that certain beliefs about the death penalty would impede his or her performance as a juror. ___ U.S. at___, 112 S.Ct. at 2226, 2232-33. In the case before us, the trial court did ask questions which probed whether prospective juror Zoeckler would automatically vote for the death penalty. At the beginning of Zoeckler's individual voir dire, the following dialogue took place: THE COURT: Do you have any moral or religious convictions that would prevent you from voting for the death penalty? MR. ZOECKLER: No. THE COURT: On the other hand of that if the Court instructed you also, and I will instruct you that one of the other penalties, a lesser penalty that you could consider is life imprisonment, could you fairly consider the lesser penalty in deciding on what penalties the defendant should receive, by punishment what he should receive? MR. ZOECKLER: I could consider it, yes. THE COURT: If the Court instructed you that it was death or life imprisonment, would you fairly consider life imprisonment as well as the death penalty? MR. ZOECKLER: I don't know, no. THE COURT: Let me see if I have got you right. First, if I instructed you that there are two penalties that you could punish the defendant for, one is the death penalty, you say you have no moral or religious convictions that would prevent you from voting for the death penalty? MR. ZOECKLER: Right. THE COURT: Also, if the Court instructed you that the life imprisonment was a lesser penalty, would you consider the lesser punishment? MR. ZOECKLER: Yes, I would consider it. In responding to the prosecutor's questions, Zoeckler reiterated this position, stating that he would not vote automatically to impose either sentence. In response to questions from Mueller's counsel, Zoeckler stated that he would wait to hear the evidence in the penalty phase before deciding which penalty to impose. Viewing Zoeckler's voir dire as a whole, we find that he was questioned sufficiently to determine whether he would automatically impose the death penalty. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow further questions which Mueller proposed. See Morgan, ___ U.S. at___, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-33; Turner, 221 Va. at 523, 273 S.E.2d at 43; LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 584, 304 S.E.2d at 655. [4]