Opinion ID: 1191667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence at Trial

Text: Hinkson also contends the district court violated his constitutional rights to present a defense, to confront witnesses against him, and to a fair trial because the district court incorrectly refused to admit into evidence the Dowling letter (which stated Swisher's Replacement DD-214 form was not in Swisher's official military file) and Swisher's official military file itself, which the district court found to be unauthenticated and indecipherable. The district court found this evidence inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 608(b). Because we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the evidence under Rule 403, we need not reach the issue raised under Rule 608(b). Hinkson contends the district court erred by excluding the Dowling letter and Swisher's military file from evidence under Rule 403. A district court's Rule 403 determination is subject to great deference, because the considerations arising under Rule 403 are `susceptible only to case-by-case determinations, requiring examination of the surrounding facts, circumstances, and issues.' R.B. Matthews, Inc. v. Transamerica Transp. Serv., Inc., 945 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, the district court weighed the limited probative value of the evidenceto impeach testimony by Swisher about his Purple Heart medal, which testimony the jury had already been instructed to disregardagainst the time it would take to authenticate and explain the military file (which the court found facially indecipherable) and the risk of confusing the jury with the tangential evidence. The court concluded the risk substantially outweighed the reward, and this conclusion, which was not illogical nor implausible based on the record, did not exceed the bounds of the district court's discretion in applying Rule 403.