Opinion ID: 1560524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Operation or Use

Text: The TNRCC also argues that, even if the pump is motor-driven equipment, White's injury was not caused by the pump's operation or use. White, the TNRCC submits, contends only that the TNRCC's failure to use the pump caused the fire. Such non-use, the TNRCC argues, is outside the meaning of section 101.021's operation or use. White responds that the TNRCC's operation and removal of the pump was negligent use rather than non-use. She argues that there is a difference between negligently ceasing use of equipment and never using it in the first place, and that the TNRCC's operation and subsequent removal of the pump was negligent use. Section 101.021 provides that a governmental unit is liable for property damage arising from the operation or use of ... motor-driven equipment. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 101.021(1)(A). Use means to put or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose. Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.1989); see also LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex.1992). In addition, the equipment's use must have actually caused the injury. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Tex.1998). Therefore, to invoke the Tort Claims Act's waiver of immunity, White's injury must have been caused by the TNRCC's actual use of the pump, not the TNRCC's failure to use it. See Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 923 S.W.2d 582, 584-85 (Tex. 1996). This Court has never held that non-use of property can support a claim under the Texas Tort Claims Act. [2] Id. at 584; Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4, 14 (Tex.1994). We have refused to broaden section 101.021's waiver provision to include both use and non-use because doing so would be tantamount to abolishing governmental immunity, contrary to the limited waiver the Legislature clearly intended. Kerrville, 923 S.W.2d at 585. White contends that: (1) the TNRCC installed a motor-driven pump on her property to dissipate gasoline vapors; (2) the TNRCC later removed the pump; and (3) after the pump was removed, gasoline vapors ignited on White's property and caused a fire that destroyed her store. Even if true, these contentions do not assert that the pump's operation or use caused the fire. White argues that the TRNCC should have continued to use the pump, and that its failure to do so caused her injury. The pump was not in usenor was it even presenton her property when the fire began. Accordingly, White asserts only non-use, which does not meet section 101.021's use requirement. See id. at 584-85; Kassen, 887 S.W.2d at 14. Alternatively, White argues in her briefs to this Court that the pump's use or operation caused an aggregation of fumes on her property and, but for this aggregation, there would never have been enough fumes to cause the fire. In other words, she contends that the pump's operation or userather than its removal from use caused her property damage, and there was simply a delay between the pump's fire-causing use and the fire itself. This argument is not supported by the factual allegations in the pleadings or by extrinsic evidence in the record. Moreover, White raised this argument for the first time in her briefs here. Consequently, we will not consider it because it relies on factual assertions that appear solely in briefs to this Court and were not before the trial court. See Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex.1998). Thus, White has not asserted that the TNRCC's use of motor-driven equipment proximately caused her injury. Accordingly, the TNRCC's sovereign immunity is not waived and the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.