Opinion ID: 2972770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Small Group Speech

Text: The Ordinance defines a special event as “any walkathon, bikeathon, or jogging group or other organized group having a common purpose or goal, proceeding along a public street or other public right-of-way in the City of Dearborn.” The plaintiffs contend that this provision is breathtaking in its sweep, because virtually any group of two or more persons walking on a public right of way with a common purpose or goal would presumably be required to possess a permit under the Ordinance. As such, the plaintiffs argue that because the Ordinance applies to small groups, it is overly broad and not narrowly tailored. We agree. Permit schemes and advance notice requirements that potentially apply to small groups are nearly always overly broad and lack narrow tailoring. The Ordinance is overly broad because under the Ordinance as written, any procession of people with a common purpose or goal, whether it be a small group of protestors or a group of senior citizens walking together to religious services, are conceivably required to obtain a permit from the city of Dearborn. See Burk v. Augusta-Richmond County, 365 F.3d 1247, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, C.J., concurring) (finding public demonstrations striking down an ordinance not narrowly tailored because it applied to “small intimate groups”). There are myriad circumstances in which an organized group travels on a public right of way with a common purpose or goal. The language of the Ordinance applies the permit requirement to any group of people traveling in such a manner on the public rights of way. 4 The fact that the city of Dearborn regularly allows exemptions to its own requirement provides more support for our conclusion that the Ordinance’s thirty-day notice provision is not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. See Young v. Am. Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 n.27 (1976) (“If some groups are exempted from a prohibition on parades and pickets, the rationale for regulation is fatally impeached.”) (citation omitted); Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 997 F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Because the City is so willing to disregard the traffic problems [by making exceptions to the ordinance], we cannot accept the contention that traffic control is a substantial interest.”) (citation omitted). 5 It is more common to consider as-applied challenges to statutes before considering facial challenges, so that courts may decide constitutional issues on the narrowest possible grounds. However, because of the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims in this case – alleging that the Ordinance violates the First Amendment by being overly broad and not narrowly tailored – it is more expedient to address the facial claims exclusively. Considering the facial claims exclusively is appropriate where, as here, an “attempt to enforce [the Ordinance] would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.” City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 797-98 (1984) (“In cases of this character a holding of facial invalidity expresses the conclusion that the statute could never be applied in a valid manner.”). No. 04-1433 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Page 7 Committee, et al. v. City of Dearborn Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 1994). Because the Ordinance would include almost any imaginable procession on Dearborn’s streets or sidewalks, the Ordinance, as written, is hopelessly overbroad. For the same reason, the Ordinance lacks narrow tailoring. The city of Dearborn’s significant interest in crowd and traffic control, property maintenance, and protection of the public welfare is not advanced by the application of the Ordinance to small groups. Burk, 365 F.3d at 1258-59; see Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1207 (stating that “we simply cannot agree that six to eight people carrying signs in a public park constituted enough of a threat to the safety and convenience of park users . . . to justify the restriction imposed on their speech”). In most circumstances, the activity of a few people peaceably using a public right of way for a common purpose or goal does not trigger the city of Dearborn’s interest in safety and traffic control. Accordingly, in addition to the lack of narrow tailoring in its thirty-day notice provision, the Ordinance lacks narrow tailoring on a second score. Because its language applies to small groups, sweeping too broadly and improperly defining the type of public processions which fall within the city’s significant interests, Section 2 of the Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face.