Opinion ID: 852590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Soon After the Death of a Loved One

Text: The issue presented is whether the proximity determination from Groves  whether a plaintiff came on the scene soon after the death of a loved one  is a matter of time alone or also of circumstances. This Court has yet to expound on this requirement under Groves. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the proximity requirement under Groves is both a matter of time and circumstances. As stated earlier, Groves essentially followed Bowen in adopting a relative bystander rule for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Bowen expressed the limitations as permitting recovery only by claimants who witnessed the accident or experienced the gruesome aftermath of the accident minutes after the accident occurred with the victim at the scene. 517 N.W.2d at 445. Bowen explained that drawing a line was necessary because witnessing such an incident was distinct from learning of a victim's death or injury indirectly. [3] Id. Subsequent cases discussing this Bowen requirement noted that emotional trauma arising from learning of a loved one's death through indirect means could be devastating but also observed that every person could be expected at some point to learn of the death or serious injury of a loved one through indirect means. Bystander claims are not meant to compensate every emotional trauma. Rather they are limited to those that arise from the shock of experiencing the traumatic event. Finnegan ex. rel . Skoglind v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 263 Wis.2d 574, 666 N.W.2d 797, 805 (2003); Rosin v. Fort Howard Corp., 222 Wis.2d 365, 588 N.W.2d 58, 61-62 (Wis.Ct.App.1998). These cases pointed out that this temporal requirement guaranteed the genuineness of the claim and assured that recovery would not unreasonably burden the defendant  the two major public policy concerns of bystander claims set forth in Bowen. Finnegan, 666 N.W.2d at 802-03; Rosin, 588 N.W.2d at 61. In Groves the facts were such that one who arrived soon after the accident necessarily viewed the gruesome aftermath. But we think the requirement of bystander recovery is both temporal  at or immediately following the incident  and also circumstantial. The scene viewed by the claimant must be essentially as it was at the time of the incident, the victim must be in essentially the same condition as immediately following the incident, and the claimant must not have been informed of the incident before coming upon the scene.