Opinion ID: 1135777
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The facts and factual issues

Text: The opinion contains a number of factual errors. It begins by stating that Gomez claims to have remembered the sexual abuse incidents for the first time in 1990. Op. at 524, 917 P.2d at 253. In fact, Gomez generally admits that he always recalled these incidents. Op. at 527, 917 P.2d at 256. This is not a case of recovered memory. Such cases raise issues of accrual, not tolling. Cf. Ulibarri, 178 Ariz. at 158, 871 P.2d at 705. The present case, rather, involves a tolling question raising the unsound mind disability of A.R.S. § 12-502. It presents a very simple issue: Is there evidence from which a jury could conclude that the abuse, remembered all too well, caused Gomez or Moonshadow to have an unsound mind? The majority concedes that Gomez supported his opposition to Florez' motion for summary judgment with the affidavits of two experts indicating that he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, sexual identity problems, and other problems indicating an unsound mind. Op. at 524, 917 P.2d at 253 (emphasis added). The opinion puts it much too mildly. Gomez submitted affidavits of two highly qualified psychologists listing the diagnosed mental illnesses and problems mentioned in the opinion  and many more  and not merely indicating but explicitly stating the factual conclusion that Gomez was unable to manage his affairs or understand his legal rights or liabilities. See Affidavit of Francis Enos, Ph.D., at 2, ¶ 8, a copy of which is attached as Appendix A; Affidavit of Stuart Litvak, Ph.D., at 4-5, ¶ 8, a copy of which is attached as Appendix B. This, of course, fits the exact legal test laid down in Allen v. Powell's Int'l, Inc., 21 Ariz. App. 269, 270, 518 P.2d 588, 589 (1974). An unsound mind under the disability statute exists when the plaintiff is unable to manage his affairs or understand his legal rights or liabilities. Id. If, as the majority purports to do, we adopt the test traditionally followed in Arizona in Allen and in Nelson v. Nelson, 137 Ariz. 213, 215-16, 669 P.2d 990, 992-93 (App. 1983), one wonders just what record a plaintiff must present to raise a question of fact for trial on the tolling defense of unsound mind. These plaintiffs did, indeed, present detailed facts to support the ultimate conclusion. The opinion neglects to describe those details, simply stating that the facts set forth are not relevant or material to the issue of unsound mind under the Allen test. Op. at 527, 917 P.2d at 256. That conclusion incorrectly characterizes the record. For instance, Gomez submitted an affidavit from Dr. Francis Enos, a clinical and consulting psychologist who had interviewed Gomez and his family, tested Gomez, and studied his social history. The expert not only stated that Gomez suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, sexual identity and other problems, Op. at 524, 917 P.2d at 253, but also said much more. He believed these conditions were caused by sexual abuse. He stated that Gomez had been unable to manage his affairs or understand his legal rights or liabilities since the abuse occurred. In reports attached to his affidavit, Dr. Enos set forth the foundation and basis for his opinion. See Appendix A. Dr. Stuart Litvak, also a psychologist, made a thorough evaluation of Gomez and his case. He diagnosed Gomez as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, including major depression with recurrent severe and psychotic features. Doctor Litvak also concluded that since and as a result of the sexual abuse, Gomez had been unable to manage [his] affairs or to understand [his] legal rights or liabilities and was of unsound mind. Dr. Litvak's affidavit went on to list the evidentiary facts supporting his opinion. See Appendix B, paragraphs (a) through (x). Defendants in Gomez offered nothing to contradict these affidavits. Ignoring the abundance of evidence provided by Gomez, the opinion attempts to draw and argue adverse factual inferences. It states that it is thus absolutely undisputed that more than two years before [Gomez] filed his civil complaint, Gomez was not of `unsound mind.' Op. at 526-527, 917 P.2d at 255-256. However, even accepting the inferences the defendants and the majority draw, they do not establish the defendants' case as a matter of law. The majority asserts, for example, that Gomez has been able to work. Op. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. Gomez' work experience consisted almost exclusively of many short-term stints at fast food restaurants, although he also worked as an assistant to an x-ray technician and in physical therapy. Gomez' highest position, which the defendants refer to as supervisory, was at a Burger King at age 25, where he was responsible for counting his cash drawer and opening the store in the morning. He worked at these jobs only sporadically, in intervals ranging from two months to one year at the longest, and had periods of time for up to a year with no employment. Gomez lived off and on with his parents or with friends, had over 100 residences, and for several years could afford neither his own residence nor any form of transportation. Gomez also worked the streets, making money as a stripper and prostitute. Thus, although Gomez has been able to work sporadically, this work experience does not establish a sound mind as a matter of law. Rather, it is evidence that could be introduced to establish Gomez' mental state, and that evidence in this case cuts both ways. A jury, not this court, should decide what the evidence proves. See Davidson v. Baker-Vander Veen Constr. Co., 35 Mich. App. 293, 192 N.W.2d 312, 316 (1971) (Although [plaintiff] was able to work regularly for various employers over a period of years and was able to perform sufficiently well to earn good wages, it does not inevitably follow that he is not insane.) Gomez' history does not even present a case of regular employment. The majority also cites Gomez' statement that he was able to deal with the abuse as undisputed evidence that Gomez was not of unsound mind. Op. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. This is both factually erroneous and legally incorrect. The statement was made during a taped interview in December 1990, when Gomez met for the first time with the lawyer for the Diocese and one of its priests. Gomez was not represented by counsel. During the interview, counsel for the Diocese asked Gomez if he had thought about it (the abuse), when it was happening; Gomez replied, No, it was there. I had problems with it. I couldn't deal with it. Only later did Gomez clarify: Alot of people ask [me] this one question. It may be floating through your mind as well. You asked me why did you take so long to come up and say something else. Well, I'll tell you this: I couldn't deal with it. I didn't have no one to turn to. I wasn't ready to come up and talk about it, now I am. Now I'm able to deal with it. Now my whole family knows about it. That was a big mistake.... Interview at 11. Reading the statement in its entirety in the context of the interview, we cannot conclude, as the majority apparently does, that the statement is, as a matter of law, a concession by Gomez that he had regained the capacity to manage his affairs and understand his legal rights. Moreover, the statement was not taken under oath; nor is the transcript of the taped interview verified as being true and accurate. In fact, it was transcribed by a priest investigating the matter for the Diocese. The statement is evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of Gomez' state of mind. See Davidson, 192 N.W.2d at 316. However, even if we were to entertain the majority's assertion that the selected portion of Gomez' statement constitutes an admission, the analysis is not over. Gomez presented an abundance of other evidence that would contradict this admission, including affidavits and uncontroverted expert medical testimony amounting to a direct and unequivocal denial ... that he possessed the requisite mental capacity.... [Thus] a question of credibility remains. Tri-Cities Hospital Authority v. Sheats, 156 Ga. App. 28, 273 S.E.2d 903 (1980), aff'd, 247 Ga. 713, 279 S.E.2d 210 (1981): [H]ere the issue is evidentiary whether [plaintiff's] allegations of mental incompetency have been effectively pierced and summary judgment erroneously denied to appellants. While it is clear that at trial on the merits the burden would be on [plaintiff] to prove his mental incapacity, the burden here is on appellants, as movants for summary judgment, to demonstrate that no material issue of fact remains with reference to the tolling of the statute. Thus, the burden was on appellants to prove a negative that [plaintiff] was not mentally incompetent as alleged. Id. 273 S.E.2d at 905 (citations omitted). The majority also argues that because Gomez had spoken with an attorney about the abuse more than two years prior to filing suit, he could not be of unsound mind. Op. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. Even if Gomez' meeting with an attorney was prompted by a desire to seek legal redress, other courts have confronted the exact issue and held: We are not prepared to say that ability to retain a lawyer is conclusive evidence of mental competence for the purposes of this tolling provision ... The fact that [plaintiff] retained counsel is some evidence that he was not mentally deranged, but it does not conclusively establish that fact. Davidson, 35 Mich. App. 293, 192 N.W.2d 312, 315 (emphasis added); see also Collins v. Dunifon, 163 Ind. App. 201, 323 N.E.2d 264, 270 (1975); Hill v. Clark Equipment Co., 42 Mich. App. 405, 202 N.W.2d 530 (1972). This is a straightforward application of our Rule 56(c), Ariz.R.Civ.Pro., that disputed issues of material fact will foreclose a motion for summary judgment. Counsel for Florez can, and surely will, present evidence to the jury regarding Gomez' work, lifestyle, and legal experience. However, it is for the jury to determine if those facts preclude Gomez' tolling on the statute of limitations, not this court. On this record, when the majority draws the ultimate factual inference that it is [] absolutely undisputed that more than two years before he filed his civil complaint, Gomez was not of `unsound mind,' Op. at 526-527, 917 P.2d at 255-256, it incorrectly characterizes the evidence, usurps the function of the jury and ignores the applicable law.
Moonshadow submitted two affidavits from her treating mental health expert, Dr. Lynne Morrow, another well-qualified psychologist. In the first, Dr. Morrow stated as follows: The symptoms of PTSD which prevented her from confronting her father regarding the sexual abuse, and in particular confronting him through litigation, include persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with her trauma, efforts to avoid thoughts or feelings associated with the trauma, efforts to avoid activities or situations that arouse recollections of the trauma. Morrow Affidavit at ¶ 7. In the second affidavit, in support of other allegations contained in the complaint, Dr. Morrow repeated the above analysis and added: I believe that [by attempting confrontation through litigation] she would become increasingly dysfunctional and depressed, thereby making it very difficult for her to conduct her life normally, to maintain or pursue employment and, most important, creating the real danger of possible suicide. Supplemental Morrow Affidavit at ¶ 6. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that [t]here was no evidence to suggest Moonshadow was of `unsound mind' within the meaning of Allen. Op. at 527, 917 P.2d at 256 (emphasis added). The basis for this conclusion appears to be in the deposition of Dr. Morrow. (Moonshadow's therapist, the court says, admitted that she could function on a day-to-day basis, could support herself, and that she understood the nature of her legal rights. Op. at 527, 917 P.2d at 256. Although statements to this effect may have been made in the deposition, in part in response to a question posed by defendants concerning Moonshadow's ability to handle a hypothetical car accident, Dr. Morrow's two affidavits indicate to the contrary. Thus, although Dr. Morrow may have made seemingly contradictory statements regarding Moonshadow's competence in different situations, whether [the witness'] deposition testimony is entitled to be given more weight than the words of denial in [her] affidavit is not a question which can be answered on summary judgment. Tri-Cities, 273 S.E.2d at 906. Moonshadow also submitted her own affidavit and one from her sister  both of which detailed the abuse and alleged that its effects rendered Moonshadow incapable of confronting her father through litigation. Moonshadow's response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment alleged that the Allen definition of unsound mind surely applies to Plaintiff, who was literally incapable, emotionally, of taking even the most basic steps necessary to file a civil lawsuit. Clearly, Moonshadow has submitted enough evidence that she was unable to pursue her legal rights against her abusive father to defeat summary judgment on this issue. See Modern Roofing & Metal Works, Inc. v. Owen, 174 Ga. App. 875, 332 S.E.2d 14, 15-16 (1985) (plaintiff's admittedly weak allegation that he was unable to manage the ordinary affairs of his life due to depression resulting from the defendant's acts sufficient to invoke tolling provision) (emphasis added); See also Lowe v. Pue, 150 Ga. App. 234, 257 S.E.2d 209, 210, 212 (1979). In reaching the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to provide factual support for their contentions, the majority clearly ignores the detailed and voluminous reports attached to the affidavits  over thirty single-spaced pages of facts, test results, observations, clinical notes, history from various sources, and medical diagnoses. Thus, the court's statement that the affidavits fail to reveal any facts to support the doctors' opinions, Op. at 527, 917 P.2d at 256, is patently, plainly wrong. A cursory reading of some of the reports, which were attached to the affidavits, demonstrate just how incorrect is the court's premise. The reports referred to in the affidavits are replete with both factual conclusions and supporting evidentiary facts.