Opinion ID: 2981051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: currier’s claims

Text: A. Sentencing Based on Fifteen to Fifty Grams of Cocaine The district court found Currier responsible for fifteen to fifty kilograms of cocaine, and sentenced him according to the Guidelines range for that amount. Currier challenges this calculation and alleges that the district court erred in attributing this quantity of cocaine to his offense because it was not supported by the trial record. In calculating drug quantity for sentencing purposes, we have noted that “an estimate will suffice so long as it errs on the side of caution and likely underestimates the quantity of drugs actually attributable to the defendant.” United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 326 (6th Cir. 2008). “In reviewing a district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, this Court will accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and [will] give due deference to the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts.” United States v. Moon, -3- Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III 513 F.3d 527, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). The district court based its factual determination on the trial testimony of witnesses Mandi Elliot, Jackie Miller, Brett Cummings, and Stacey Harvey as well as statements O’Neal made to law enforcement officers. Elliot testified that Currier traveled to both Tennessee and Texas two or three times a month to purchase cocaine, and that she had observed freezer bags of cocaine, stacks of money, and a safe in Currier’s bedroom. She further testified that in 2002 and 2003 she saw at least four kilograms of cocaine in Currier’s possession. Miller testified that, in December 2007, Currier recruited her to travel to Tennessee to pick up a kilogram of cocaine. She also testified that Currier told her that in 2007, he purchased a kilogram of cocaine in Texas. Cummings testified that, in 2007, he began selling cocaine he purchased from Currier, and that he had observed a kilogram of cocaine in Currier’s apartment. Harvey testified that for ten years she sold drugs that Currier supplied, and that she had observed Currier use a “kilo press” to compress a brick of cocaine as well as freezer bags of cocaine in Currier’s apartment at least two or three times per week. The court also noted that O’Neal informed law enforcement officers that Currier purchased four ounces of cocaine per day for the length of the conspiracy, totaling roughly eighty-two to eightyfour kilograms. Currier alleges that the district court’s consideration of O’Neal’s out-of-court statement was an improper use of hearsay and a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The sentencing court is not, however, bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence, United States v. -4- Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2007), nor does the Confrontation Clause apply to sentencing proceedings, id. at 665. Rather, the Guidelines require that evidence introduced at sentencing meet a “minimum indicia-of-reliability.” Id. at 658-59; see United States Sentencing Manuel § 6A1.3(a). Currier has not identified any unreliability in O’Neal’s statement and, in fact, Currier’s own statements to law enforcement officers in 2003 and 2008 corroborate the allegation that Currier regularly purchased cocaine from O’Neal. Currier objected to the admission of O’Neal’s statement on the basis that it was made by a co-conspirator. We have expressly rejected the contention that “co-conspirator hearsay [is] inherently unreliable, . . . render[ing it] presumptively inadmissible at sentencing.” Moncivais, 492 F.3d at 660. Therefore, after reviewing the evidence properly before the district court at sentencing, it cannot be said that the district court was clearly erroneous in attributing fifteen to fifty kilograms of cocaine to Currier’s offense and sentencing him accordingly. B. District Court’s Application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) Currier contends that the district court erred in its application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for the possession of “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm)” in connection with a drug offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The “district court’s determination that the defendant possessed a firearm during a drug offense is a factual finding that this court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003)). The government bears the initial burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant actually or constructively possessed a firearm. Id. Once the government meets this burden, it shifts to the defendant to -5- Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III establish that it was “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the crime.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hough, 276 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir. 2002)). In applying the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, the district court considered testimony from Elliot, Miller, Harvey, and Cummings regarding Currier’s possession of a firearm. Elliot testified at trial that Currier kept several firearms in the bedroom where he stored cocaine. Miller testified that Currier had a pistol under his car seat during their trip to Tennessee to buy a kilogram of cocaine. Harvey testified that he observed various firearms in Currier’s Fox Lake apartment. Cummings testified that he saw a firearm on Currier’s night stand a couple of times. In light of this trial testimony and Currier’s lack of evidence to disprove possession of a firearm during the drug offense, we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction,” U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395, that the district court committed a mistake. Therefore, we do not find the district court’s use of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) sentencing enhancement to be clearly erroneous. C. District Court’s Application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 The district court applied a four-level enhancement to Currier’s sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 based on his role as an “organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). “A district court’s legal conclusions are generally reviewed de novo, and its factual findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 473 (6th Cir. 2009). However, “[t]he standard that governs [this Court’s] review of a sentencing enhancement for a leadership role under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is not altogether clear,” id., because Burford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 66 (2001), urges appellate courts to review a district court’s application of the Guidelines “deferentially rather than de novo ‘in light of the fact- -6- Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III bound nature of the legal decision.’” Vazquez, 560 F.3d at 473 (quoting Burford, 532 U.S. at 66.)) Nevertheless, we need not resolve which standard applies because we conclude that the leadership adjustment was appropriate under either standard of review. To qualify for this enhancement, the defendant need only organize, supervise, or lead one other participant. Id. at cmt. n.2. Because the § 3B1.1 enhancement distinguishes between defendants who are an “organizer or leader,” who receive a four-level enhancement and defendants who are “a manager or supervisor,” who receive a three-level enhancement, the sentencing court reviews a number of factors to determine which enhancement applies: Factors the court should consider include the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruit of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. Id. at cmt. n.4. The district court reviewed these factors and concluded that Currier qualified for the fourlevel enhancement as an “organizer or leader.” In doing so, the district court relied on trial testimony indicating that Currier recruited at least one new member, directed Michelle Huskey to rent vehicles in her name for his out-of-state trips to purchase drugs, fronted large quantities of cocaine to Miller and Cummings for resale, and would receive the proceeds of the cocaine Cummings sold. Viewing all of these facts together, the district court correctly concluded that Currier acted as an organizer or leader in the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. -7- Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III D. Admission of the July 2010 Recorded Telephone Conversation Currier argues that the district court erred in denying his motion in limine to suppress his recorded telephone conversation with O’Neal. The recorded conversation at issue arose from Currier’s visit to the Blount County Detention Center to speak with O’Neal following his arrest. It is undisputed that any statements Currier made during the conversation were admissible as an admission by a party opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). The sole issue is whether the district court properly admitted portions of the conversation containing O’Neal’s statements. The district court denied the motion in limine, finding O’Neal’s statements admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as statements made by a co-conspirator as well as admissible as non-hearsay statements to provide context to Currier’s admissions admitted under Rule 801(d)(2). We review the district court’s denial of a motion in limine for abuse of discretion, United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 508 (6th Cir. 2011), and will “overturn a [district court’s] ruling only if [we] find[] that the ruling was arbitrary, unjustifiable or clearly erroneous,” Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1148 (6th Cir. 1986). Currier alleges that O’Neal’s statements cannot be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) because the statements were not made “during and in furtherance of the conspiracy,” as the conversation occurred after the conclusion of the conspiracy. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Currier further alleges that the district court erred in admitting O’Neal’s statements, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to provide context to Currier’s admissions. Cf. United States v. Townsend, 206 F. App’x 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stines, 313 F.3d 912 (unpub. app’x) (6th Cir. 2002). This Court need not address the district court’s Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and -8- Nos. 11-5388/11-5777 United States of America v. Michael Currier/Ralph T. O’Neal, III 801(d)(2)(A) analysis, as even if the admission of O’Neal’s statements had been in error, that error would be harmless. We find harmless error when, “with fair assurance . . . [we conclude that] the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error . . . .” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946); cf. United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 724 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying this harmless error standard in a criminal case). A review of the recorded conversation reveals that the content of O’Neal’s statements was not prejudicial to Currier, particularly in light of the substantial evidence of his guilt presented at trial. O’Neal’s statements did not present novel information regarding the drug conspiracy that was not already admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), such as Currier’s own statements to law enforcement in 2003 and 2008 regarding his involvement with O’Neal and the resale of cocaine, or other witness and co-conspirator testimony. As the introduction of O’Neal’s statements would be harmless error, if error at all, relief is not merited on this claim.