Opinion ID: 202454
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jury Instructions and Special Verdict Form

Text: The essence of González's and Ramos' appeals as to the jury instructions and special verdict form can be boiled down to two arguments. First, González and Ramos argue that to be found guilty of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, the jury instructions and the special verdict form should have required the jury to make individualized findings of the amount of cocaine attributable to each defendant rather than to the conspiracy as a whole. Second, González and Ramos argue that the Supreme Court's holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), required individualized findings as to drug quantity for the purposes of sentencing. We find both claims to be meritless. In order to determine whether all factual issues essential to the judgment . . . were fairly presented to the jury, we review properly preserved objections to the trial court's jury instructions and verdict forms de novo. Sánchez-López v. FuentesPujols, 375 F.3d 121, 134 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks -10- and citation omitted). If the objection to jury instructions or verdict forms has not been properly preserved by the defendants, we review newly raised objections using a plain error standard.7 Id. To satisfy the plain error standard, a criminal defendant must show: (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). This standard is exceedingly difficult to satisfy in jury instruction cases: [T]he plain error hurdle, high in all events, nowhere looms larger than in the context of alleged instructional errors. United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 251 F.3d 242, 246 (1st Cir. 2001).
Neither González nor Ramos entered any objections to the jury instructions. Thus, we will look to see if the instructions constituted plain error. Our examination of jury instructions focuses on whether they adequately explained the law or whether 7 The Government suggests that by failing to raise their objections at the time the jury was charged, González and Ramos have waived, rather than forfeited their objections and that we may not review their claims. However, as we noted in United States v. Nelson-Rodríguez, for an objection based on Apprendi, [W]e think it sufficient if the defendant raises the issue at sentencing. 319 F.3d 12, 47 (1st Cir. 2003). Although there is some discrepancy between the parties as to whether the objection was raised by either or both parties during sentencing, we prefer to assume rather than decide that the issue was preserved in these circumstances. Id. at 48. -11- they tended to confuse or mislead the jury on the controlling issues. Federico v. Order of Saint Benedict, 64 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995). González and Ramos were charged with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 846. The elements of a conspiracy are the existence of a conspiracy, the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy, and the defendant's voluntary participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Gómez-Pabón, 911 F.2d 847, 852 (1st Cir. 1990). The quantity of drugs is not an element of conspiracy under § 846, nor is it an element of the underlying controlled substances offense under § 841 (a)(2). See United States v. Lindia, 82 F.3d 1154, 1160 (1st Cir. 1996).8 The district court's instructions plainly instructed the jury to consider the aforementioned elements of conspiracy for each defendant, explicitly stating that, [T]he evidence pertaining to each defendant should be considered separately and individually. 8 Some courts have suggested that, post-Apprendi, distinctions between sentencing factors and substantive elements of § 841 are somewhat untenable. See, e.g., United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 632 (7th Cir. 2001) (In light of Apprendi, we could no longer look to the clear demarcation between the elements of the crime defined by § 841 and the penalty provisions of that section as a means of avoiding the constitutional issues raised by the placement of drug quantity determination in the hands of the sentencing judge.). However, as we emphasize throughout this opinion, regardless of whether drug quantity is a sentencing factor or a substantive element, the drug quantity that determines the maximum sentence for a drug conspiracy charge under § 846 is the conspiracy-wide quantity, which the jury did determine in the present case. -12- It was only after each defendant's culpability was determined individually that the jury was asked to find the conspiracy-wide drug quantity--a finding that the court would need for sentencing. As we have stated, the maximum statutory penalty available to the district court at sentencing for a defendant convicted of a drug conspiracy is based on the drug quantity and amount reflected in the jury verdict attributable to the conspiracy as a whole. United States v. Irizarry, 404 F.3d 497, 504 (1st Cir. 2005).9 Because the jury was instructed to consider the charges against each defendant individually, the instructions did not constitute error as to the finding of guilt. Furthermore, the jury instructions did not constitute error under Apprendi or Blakely, which require a jury to make a factual finding for any element which increases a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum penalty. 530 U.S. at 490; 542 U.S. at 301. The district court instructed the jury to find the amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy as a whole.10 The 9 This is also clear from the language of the statute, which, without any reference to an individual's role in a conspiracy, says that [a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit [a controlled substance offense] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). 10 We do not see any merit to Ramos' claim that the instructions were flawed because they make reference only to cocaine. Participation in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine alone would be sufficient to sustain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846, and much evidence regarding to Ramos' involvement in the processing and selling of cocaine was presented at trial. The fact that Ramos was -13- amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy sets the statutory maximum penalty for § 846. Irizarry, 404 F.3d at 504. Thus, the instructions to determine only the conspiracy-wide amount of cocaine posed no risk that the jury would fail to find an element of the offense that increased the statutory maximum penalty. Accordingly, the jury instructions did not constitute error as to sentencing.
Because Ramos made a timely objection to the verdict form, we will review the verdict form de novo as to his claims. González made no such objection; his claims will be reviewed for plain error. The purpose of a special verdict form is to allow juries to specifically identify the predicates for the general verdict. United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 91 (1st Cir. 2004). In the present case, the verdict form asked the jury to make a finding of guilty or not guilty as to each defendant for each charge and then, if either defendant was found guilty, asked the jury to determine the amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy. As we have already stated, neither the offense of conspiracy, Lindia, 82 F.3d at 1160, nor the determination of the maximum penalty for conspiracy, Irizarry, 404 F.3d at 504, requires an individualized finding of the amount of drugs attributable to a also involved in trafficking of heroin and marijuana would not change the outcome of the case. -14- specific defendant. Rather, the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy as a whole is a predicate for sentencing purposes. See id. Because the special verdict form provided for individualized findings of guilt on each charge, the special verdict form would not have misled or confused the jury as to their determination of guilt. Thus, the special verdict form did not constitute error as to the finding of guilt. Furthermore, there were no Apprendi or Blakely errors in the special verdict form. The jury used the special verdict form to make a finding of conspiracy-wide drug quantity. The quantity of drugs in the conspiracy determines the statutory maximum sentence.11 See Irizarry, 404 F.3d at 504. Thus, because the statutory maximum was determined by the conspiracy-wide drug quantity, there was no need under Apprendi or Blakely for the special verdict form to allow jurors to make an individualized determination of drug quantity for each defendant. Accordingly, the special verdict form did not constitute error as to sentencing. 11 González suggests that jurors were puzzled at the special interrogatories asking them to determine artificial floors corresponding to the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy. These floors determine the maximum sentences prescribed in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Given the extensive testimony in the case regarding the quantity of drugs flowing through the Malvinas drug point, we think the jury was up to the task of determining whether the conspiracy involved more or less than five kilograms of cocaine. -15-