Opinion ID: 1043112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Cat’s Paw”

Text: To survive summary judgment on a subordinate bias theory, commonly known as a “cat’s paw” case, the plaintiff must establish two things: (1) “a genuine issue of material fact concerning the bias of the subordinate” and (2) “genuine issues of material fact as to whether the proffered reason for the employment action is pretextual, which . . . requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a causal relationship between the subordinate’s actions and the employment decision.” EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 488 (10th Cir. 2006). As the “party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment [Dr. Frederick] may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the district court that Dr. Frederick presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment as to bias. As the court noted, there was evidence of “tensions between Dr. Frederick and Dean Cochran as reflected in a[n] [unsent] memorandum he drafted on June 9, 2004” in which he wrote that the issues she “ha[d] chosen to champion . . . have been disruptive and counterproductive to the smooth operations of the school,” Aplt. App. at 1446. There was also evidence that Dean Cochran declined to meet with Dr. Frederick in 2004 about the findings from a - 12 - task force study in which she perceived inequities in the pay of women and minorities. Instead of taking the meeting, Dean Cochran said that anyone who felt aggrieved should raise the issue with Metro’s Equal Employment Office. As thin as this evidence might be, we conclude that a reasonable jury could infer discriminatory intent. But as to the second element, Dr. Frederick could not survive summary judgment because there was no evidence of a causal relationship between Dean Cochran’s recommendation and President Jordan’s decision. Most recently in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189 (2011), the Supreme Court addressed “the circumstances under which an employer may be held liable for employment discrimination based on the discriminatory animus of an employee who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment decision.” The court held “that if a supervisor performs an act motivated by [discriminatory] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under [antidiscrimination statutes].” Id. at 1194 (footnote omitted). See Jaramillo v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. 14, 680 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying Staub to employment discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Crowe v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 649 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying Staub to Title VII claim). - 13 - While there was some evidence that Dean Cochran may have been in a position to influence the lower levels of review, Dr. Frederick did not produce any evidence that he was in a position to, or did influence the upper levels of review. For example, in response to Metro’s motion for summary judgment, Dr. Frederick argued that “the [Faculty] Senate Committee was influenced by Dr. Cochran’s false and derogatory [promotion recommendation],” Aplt. App. at 299, citing opportunities for the Dean to have communicated with the Committee, but no evidence that he did so. Further, she came forward with no facts to rebut President Jordan’s affidavit, which stated that he “did not rely exclusively on Dean Cochran’s comments – or anyone else’s,” id. at 1400, and “independently review[ed] [Dr. Frederick’s] dossier and [] ma[de] [his] own assessment and decision regarding the merit of [her] application,” id. at 1401. In response, Dr. Frederick mustered arguments and theories – not facts. For example, she called President Jordan’s affidavit “suspect,” and accused him of undertaking “only a cursory review, if any,” of her dossier, and “ma[king] his determination, in whole or in part, based upon [Dean] Cochran’s negative comments,” id. at 301, but failed to submit evidence to support her arguments.