Opinion ID: 787477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Massiah Violations

Text: 26 Randolph further contends that the incriminating statements he made to Moore should be excluded because they were obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Once a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, the government is forbidden from deliberately eliciting incriminating statements from the defendant. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). This prohibition has been extended to the use of jailhouse informants who relay incriminating statements from a prisoner to the government. In United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), the government used a paid informant, who was serving time for forgery, to obtain information about Henry. The government admonished him to be alert to any statements made by federal prisoners [including Henry, with whom the informant was housed in the same cellblock], but not to initiate any conversation with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery [for which he had been previously indicted]. Id. at 266, 100 S.Ct. 2183. As a result of conversations the informant had with Henry, the government obtained incriminating evidence, which was used at trial to convict him. 27 The central question in Henry was whether under the facts of this case a Government agent `deliberately elicited' incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah.  Id. at 270, 100 S.Ct. 2183. In concluding that a government agent had elicited such statements, the Court relied on three factors. First, the informant was acting under instructions from the government and was paid for his services. Second, the informant was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate of Henry, which caused Henry to trust him and thus be more likely to make incriminating statements. Id. Finally, Henry was in custody and under indictment at the time the informant conversed with him. The Court found it irrelevant that government officials had cautioned the informant not to ask Henry any questions: Even if the agent's statement that he did not intend that Nichols would take affirmative steps to secure incriminating information is accepted, he must have known that such propinquity likely would lead to that result. Id. at 271. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the government agent's conversation with Henry amounted to deliberate elicitation under Massiah. 28 In contrast to Henry, the Supreme Court found no Sixth Amendment violation in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986). In that case, the trial court concluded that the statements made by the defendant to the informant were unsolicited and spontaneous. Id. at 440, 106 S.Ct. 2616. As a result, Kuhlmann fit squarely into the type of case explicitly left open in Henry, where an informant is placed in close proximity but makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged. Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2183. 29 Thus, to show that the state violated his Sixth Amendment rights by obtaining and using Moore's testimony, Randolph must show that Moore was acting as an agent of the State when he obtained the information from Randolph and that Moore made some effort to stimulate conversations about the crime charged. See id. Notably, stimulation of conversation falls far short of interrogation. See Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, ___-___, 124 S.Ct. 1019, 1022-23, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016 (2004) (finding that implicit questions and discussion about defendant's methamphetamine use constituted a Sixth Amendment violation) (internal quotation marks and brackets removed). Any statements, however, made by Randolph before Moore met with the prosecution team cannot be the basis of a Massiah violation. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ([T]he Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever — by luck or happenstance — the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached.)
30 In order for a Massiah violation to have occurred, Moore must have been acting on behalf of the State. After Moore met with Deputy District Attorney Oppliger and Detective Chavez, he was returned to the cell he shared with Randolph. Unlike in Henry, there was no explicit deal under which Moore was promised compensation in exchange for his testimony. For purposes of our holding, we accept as true the State's contention that Moore was told not to expect a deal in exchange for his testimony. However, Henry makes clear that it is not the government's intent or overt acts that are important; rather, it is the likely ... result of the government's acts. Henry, 447 U.S. at 271, 100 S.Ct. 2183. It is clear that Moore hoped to receive leniency and that, acting on that hope, he cooperated with the State. Oppliger and Chavez either knew or should have known that Moore hoped that he would be given leniency if he provided useful testimony against Randolph. (Indeed, that is precisely what happened. After providing useful testimony against Randolph, Moore received a sentence of probation instead of a prison term.) 31 We have not previously considered whether a jailhouse informant can be considered a government agent if there is no express agreement between the informant and the government that the informant will be compensated for his services. In the circumstances of this case, we hold that an explicit agreement to compensate Moore is not necessary to a finding that Moore acted as an agent of the State. There is sufficient undisputed evidence to show that the State made a conscious decision to obtain Moore's cooperation and that Moore consciously decided to provide that cooperation. That cooperation rendered Moore an agent of the State. We recognize that agreed-upon compensation is often relevant evidence in determining whether an informant is acting as an agent of the State. But it is the relationship between the informant and the State, not the compensation the informant receives, that is the central and determinative issue.
32 We thus conclude that Moore was acting as an agent of the State when he was placed in Randolph's cell after meeting with Deputy District Attorney Oppliger and Detective Chavez. But we are unable to determine whether a Massiah violation occurred because two critical factual issues have not been resolved or properly considered by the district court. The first issue relates to timing: When did Moore meet with the prosecution team, and when, in relation to that meeting or those meetings, did Moore obtain incriminating information from Randolph? The second issue relates to Moore's behavior: What, if anything, did Moore do to stimulate conversations with Randolph about the crime with which Randolph was charged? 33 We address timing first. According to Moore, he had two early meetings with Oppliger and Chavez, and the first of those two meetings took place before he obtained incriminating information from Randolph. According to Oppliger and Chavez, there was only one early meeting, and that meeting took place after Moore had obtained the incriminating information. 34 Moore testified before the magistrate judge that he first met with Deputy Oppliger and Chavez on August 17, 1989, the day he gave his letter requesting leniency to his defense attorney. Moore further testified that it was only after he was placed back in the jail cell, after that meeting, that Randolph made many of the incriminating statements to which Moore later testified at Randolph's trial. Moore testified that he relayed those statements to prosecutors at a second meeting on August 24. Oppliger and Chavez, however, testified that there was only one early meeting. According to their testimony, that meeting took place on August 24. 35 The district court did not resolve whether Moore first met with Oppliger and Chavez on August 17 or 24. The magistrate judge's report, which the district court adopted, stated that  although it is not clear, there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that petitioner's admission was made to Moore prior to Moore's first meeting with Oppliger and Chavez, whether that meeting occurred on August 17, 1989 or on August 24, 1989. (emphasis added). A statement that there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding is not the same thing as a finding. That is, the magistrate judge did not recommend, and the district court did not make, a finding that Randolph's admission was made to Moore prior to Moore's first meeting with Oppliger and Chavez. 36 There is substantial evidence that would support the opposite finding — that there were two early meetings, and that the first occurred on August 17, before Randolph made damaging admissions to Moore. Moore testified consistently and repeatedly that he met with Oppliger and Chavez on both August 17 and 24. Moore testified that at the first meeting on August 17 he had little to offer Oppliger and Chavez in the way of incriminating statements and that he only told them of Randolph's incriminating statements at the second meeting. Moore also testified that Randolph did not make incriminating statements until after the trial judge declared a mistrial in the first trial. According to Moore, the mistrial was declared before Moore was placed back in the jail cell with Randolph after his first meeting with Oppliger and Chavez on August 17. 37 Moore testified that he was asked only general, introductory questions at the initial meeting on August 17 but was asked more pointed, detailed questions at the second meeting on August 24. Finally, Moore specifically described two different rooms in which each of the meetings occurred. According to Moore, the first meeting took place in an empty courtroom, and the second took place in a large conference room with a large table. 38 Chavez and Oppliger each testified that only one meeting occurred, but they described differently the room in which this meeting took place. Chavez testified that the meeting was in an empty courtroom. Oppliger testified that it was in a jury room with a large table. These two rooms, as described by Chavez and Oppliger, appear to correspond to the rooms Moore described in which his two meetings took place. Moreover, Oppliger did not have any independent recollection of whether there were one or two meetings; he relied solely on a report written by Chavez to conclude that only one meeting took place. 39 We do not recount the foregoing to usurp the factfinding role of the district court. Rather, we recount it to make clear the necessity for such factfinding. It is true, as the magistrate judge wrote, that there is substantial evidence to support a finding that there was only one early meeting, and that that meeting took place before Moore obtained incriminating information from Randolph. But it is also true that there is substantial evidence for the opposite finding, that there were two meetings and that Moore obtained incriminating evidence between the first and second meetings. Depending on which alternative is true, Randolph's Sixth Amendment rights may or may not have been violated. 40 We next address Moore's behavior. At the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate judge Moore testified that, at the first meeting with Oppliger and Chavez, I told them what I knew, but I don't think I knew that much then. Nevertheless, Moore left the meeting feeling that if they're asking me questions about this guy, then if I give him information about him, then they have to do something for me. Asked whether he was able to get any more information for Mr. Oppliger between the first and second meetings, Moore responded affirmatively. Moore testified that if [Randolph] was to be on a subject about something that was in the area [of the crime] .... if it was along the line of that, and I figured that he wasn't suspicious in me asking him about it, then I asked him about it. According to Moore's testimony, he further encouraged Randolph to provide information by being friendly and talkative. Just, I guess, act like being-I was being on his side. In response to the question, Did you lead [Randolph] on to provide you with information? Moore testified, Of course. Yes. 41 The magistrate judge wrote that there is no evidence to support a finding that ... Moore in fact took action to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from petitioner. (Emphasis added.) This statement is incorrect. Moore's testimony, just recounted, is first-person evidence supporting precisely that finding — that Moore took action ... to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from[Randolph].
42 If, in fact, the State placed Moore in a cell with Randolph after he indicated his willingness to cooperate with the prosecution, the State intentionally create[d] a situation likely to induce [Randolph] to make incriminating statements without counsel's assistance. United States v. Kimball, 884 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir.1989). If that is true, Oppliger and Chavez took the risk that Moore might deliberately elicit information from Randolph within the meaning of Massiah and Henry and that such information would be excluded at trial. According to Moore's testimony, that is exactly what happened. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 271, 100 S.Ct. 2183. Therefore, subject to factual determinations to be made by the district court, Randolph has potentially established a Massiah violation. 43 Our decision in Brooks v. Kincheloe, 848 F.2d 940 (9th Cir.1988), is consistent with our conclusion in this case. In Brooks, the defendant was indicted for the murder of a young boy. While he was in custody awaiting trial, he shared a cell with Kee, to whom he admitted killing the boy. When detectives found out that the defendant had confided that information to Kee, they asked Kee to tell them what Brooks had been saying and to remember anything further Brooks might tell [Kee], but promised nothing in return. Id. at 943. Kee said that he wanted to talk to his attorney first and was returned to his cell, which he shared with the defendant. A few days later, Kee provided prosecutors a written statement detailing what the defendant had said to him. The statement included information that the defendant had revealed to Kee after the initial meeting with prosecutors. After Kee provided prosecutors with the statement, he was moved to another jail and given $100. Id. at 942. 44 We concluded that all of the defendant's incriminating statements could be used at trial, including those made to Kee after he met with detectives. The court found that Brooks had confessed his responsibility for the murder to Kee before Kee met with detectives, that the detectives did not request Kee to elicit any information from defendant, and that Kee was not used by the police to carry out any deliberate and surreptitious investigation of defendant. Id. at 944-45. We refused to disturb the state court findings of fact that Kee was not a government agent at the time that Brooks made the incriminating statements concerning the murder.... While these findings indicate that Kee did take action beyond mere listening, they also clearly demonstrate that he did this before the detectives talked to him. Id. at 945. 45 In this case, however, there is substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Oppliger and Chavez knew or should have known that Moore believed that he would receive leniency if he elicited incriminating statements from Randolph, circumstances sufficient to make Moore a government agent. Further, there is substantial evidence that, after meeting with Oppliger and Chavez, Moore took affirmative steps to elicit information from Randolph. This evidence of government action designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks removes this case from the purview of Brooks.
46 We conclude that Moore was acting on behalf of the State when he was put back in the cell with Randolph after his first meeting with Oppliger and Chavez. Because it is within the district court's province as factfinder, we do not determine when the first meeting between Moore and Opplinger and Chavez took place and when in relation to that meeting Moore obtained incriminating information from Randolph. Nor do we determine precisely what Moore did to obtain the incriminating information from Randolph. We vacate the district court's decision that Randolph's Sixth Amendment rights under Massiah were not violated, and we remand to the district court for further factfinding.