Opinion ID: 1830222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: REINSTATEMENT OF McCRACKEN'S DIRECT APPEAL

Text: Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. State v. Johnson, 259 Neb. 942, 613 N.W.2d 459 (2000). The State contends that under the provisions of §§ 29-3001 through 29-3004, neither the district court nor this court has jurisdiction to grant or consider a new direct appeal from McCracken's August 15, 1994, sentence of life imprisonment. On February 3, 2000, however, this court issued an interlocutory order in which we determined that the district court properly granted McCracken a new direct appeal and that this court therefore had jurisdiction over the instant appeal. See State v. McCracken, 615 N.W.2d 882 (published order). We ordered further briefing on the merits of this appeal and heard additional oral arguments regarding the issues on May 2, 2000. For the following reasons, we conclude, again, that we have jurisdiction to consider McCracken's instant appeal. Section 29-3001 empowers the district court to vacate and set aside the judgment and ... discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial as may appear appropriate in the event that the court determines there has been such a denial or infringement of a prisoner's rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Nebraska Constitution or the Constitution of the United States. The State contends that the foregoing language of § 29-3001 provides that the only postconviction relief available to a prisoner who can establish that there has been a denial of his or her constitutional rights is that the prisoner is to be discharged of the offense for which he or she was convicted or is to be granted a new trial. As we have stated in the past, however, [w]e do not believe the Legislature intended any such restriction on the jurisdiction of the court, nor on its power to grant relief. State v. Blunt, 197 Neb. 82, 92, 246 N.W.2d 727, 733 (1976). The Legislature specifically provided the district court the power to set aside a judgment if the court finds there has been a denial or infringement of the prisoner's constitutional rights sufficient to render the judgment void or voidable. See § 29-3001. That power, which obviously includes the power to void the entire criminal proceeding, including judgments on trial and on appeal, is not restricted to an all or nothing situation, as the State contends. See State v. Blunt, supra . On the contrary, we have consistently held: Where the evidence establishes a denial or infringement of the right to counsel which occurred only at the appeal stage of the former criminal proceedings, the District Court has jurisdiction and power, in a post conviction proceeding, to grant a new direct appeal without granting a new trial or setting aside the original conviction and sentence. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 92-93, 246 N.W.2d at 734. In other words, in addition to the district court's express power to void the entire criminal proceedings, the power to grant a new direct appeal is implicit in the provisions of § 29-3001. This court has consistently construed § 29-3001 as implicitly providing district courts the power to grant a new direct appeal since at least 1976. See State v. Blunt, supra . See, also, State v. Trotter, 259 Neb. 212, 609 N.W.2d 33 (2000); State v. Jones, 241 Neb. 740, 491 N.W.2d 30 (1992); State v. Carter, 236 Neb. 656, 463 N.W.2d 332 (1990); State v. Chipps, 203 Neb. 715, 279 N.W.2d 874 (1979). Notably, § 29-3001 has not been amended in light of this court's construction of the statute as tacitly providing the power to grant a new direct appeal. When judicial interpretation of a statute has not evoked a legislative amendment, it is presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court's interpretation. Sheldon-Zimbelman v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., 258 Neb. 568, 604 N.W.2d 396 (2000). We therefore determine that the power to grant a new direct appeal is implicit in § 29-3001 and that the district court has jurisdiction to exercise such a power where the evidence establishes a denial or infringement of the right to effective assistance of counsel at the direct appeal stage of the criminal proceedings. Having concluded that a district court may properly reinstate a direct appeal as postconviction relief, the question remains, and is presented in this case, as to how a reinstated direct appeal should proceed in the appellate court once it has been granted as postconviction relief by the district court. Aware that this court has never delineated how an appellant is to proceed when a district court grants a new direct appeal as postconviction relief, we deem it appropriate to provide guidance to the bench and bar for future cases. The confusion in a case such as this may have resulted from language in past cases, see, e.g., State v. Jones, supra , which indicated that district courts may properly reinstate a defendant's direct appeal when the court finds that a defendant was prejudiced by ineffective appellate counsel in his or her prior criminal proceedings. Based on State v. Blunt, 197 Neb. 82, 246 N.W.2d 727 (1976), we conclude that a district court should more properly grant a new direct appeal rather than reinstate a past one. A defendant obtaining such postconviction relief must then appeal from his or her original conviction and sentence based on the grant of the postconviction relief. The 30-day limit within which the defendant must file his or her new direct appeal commences on the day that such postconviction relief is granted in the district court. Such a procedure allows the appellate court to obtain jurisdiction over the new direct appeal (assuming that the appeal is properly docketed in the appellate court within 30 days of the grant of postconviction relief), while still authorizing district courts to grant appropriate relief when the constitutional defect in the prior proceedings occurred only at the direct appeal stage. The State, of course, maintains its right to appeal the postconviction judgment of the district court. When a defendant appeals, as a result of being granted a new direct appeal in the postconviction proceedings, the record before the appellate court would necessarily contain the same record as if the new direct appeal were the original direct appeal. Additionally, the record would contain evidence that the defendant had been awarded a new direct appeal as postconviction relief. See State v. Jones, 241 Neb. 740, 745, 491 N.W.2d 30, 33 (1992) (stating that the postconviction record is necessarily before the court as a prerequisite to this court's jurisdiction). Notwithstanding the fact that there must be some evidence of a district court's grant of a new direct appeal as postconviction relief for jurisdictional purposes, an appellate court considering such an appeal must recall that [t]ypically, only the conviction and sentencing records [are] created in the district court prior to an original direct appeal. Id. Consequently, only the conviction and sentencing records created in the district court are properly reviewable in a new direct appeal. Id. An appellate court shall be precluded from considering any portion of the record that would not have been included in the record on the original direct appeal when considering the merits of the new direct appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court had the power to grant McCracken a new direct appeal based upon its findings that the failure of McCracken's trial counsel to timely prosecute McCracken's original direct appeal infringed upon McCracken's right to effective assistance of counsel. Because McCracken has timely appealed pursuant to the order granting him postconviction relief in the form of a new direct appeal, this court may properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant appeal, and the State's contention to the contrary is without merit. We therefore proceed to consider the merits of McCracken's assignments of error.