Opinion ID: 2057185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: how the foregoing principles ought to apply to the present case

Text: Section 12-106(b)(3) of the SG Article states generally that a claim against the State will be barred unless the action is filed within 3 years after the cause of action arises. The Majority opinion reasons that this provision creates a uniform three-year statute of limitations for all tort claims brought against the State. I disagree and would hold instead that the plain language of § 12-106(b)(3) operates merely as a condition precedent to the State's waiver of sovereign immunity, rather than as a statute of limitations applicable to all claims brought against the State. A condition precedent is a condition attached to the right to sue at all and operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone. Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127, 872 A.2d 1, 14 (2005). [W]here a limitation period is stipulated in a statute creating a cause of action, it is not to be considered as an ordinary statute of limitations, but is to be considered as a limitation upon the right as well as the remedy. Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 60, 626 A.2d 353, 357 (1993); Sharafeldin, 382 Md. at 148, 854 A.2d at 1219. Unlike a statute of limitations, a condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied. Rios, 386 Md. at 127, 872 A.2d at 14. We consistently have found that SG § 12-202, [6] the equivalent of SG § 12-106(b)(3) applicable to contract suits against the State, is not a mere statute of limitations [which can be waived] but sets forth a condition to the action itself. Magnetti, 402 Md. at 565, 568, 937 A.2d at 229, 231 (noting that § 12-202 is the applicable condition precedent to the bringing of a contract-based cause of action against the State). If the condition is not fulfilled because a claimant fails to bring his or her action within the specified period of time, the State's sovereign immunity is not waived and the plaintiff loses his or her right to maintain a claim against the State. Id. at 565, 937 A.2d at 229. In Sharafeldin, we noted that SG § 12-202 is not worded like the traditional statutes of limitation, which normally state only that an action `shall be filed within' the allowable period. Sharafeldin, 382 Md. at 140, 854 A.2d at 1214. The traditional statutes of limitation, such as CJ §§ 5-101 and 5-105, generally say nothing about an untimely action being `barred' and are subject to waiver if not raised by a defendant as an affirmative defense. Id. at 141, 854 A.2d at 1214. We reasoned that: [i]n contrast, SG § 12-202 states that a claim under the subtitle `is barred' unless suit is filed within one year. That, we believe, was intended to preserve the effect of sovereign immunity itself, which barred the action entirely. In using that language, the Legislature could not have intended to permit subordinate agencies, or counsel for those agencies, to be able to permit an action that the Legislature expressly declared `barred' to proceed nonetheless, by simply omitting to raise the defense. That would effectively allow sovereign immunity to be waived by subordinate agencies or the attorneys who represent them which, as noted, we have consistently held they are not empowered to do. Id. As such, we concluded that SG § 12-202 is not a mere statute of limitations, but instead is a condition to the action itself. Id. at 148, 854 A.2d at 1219. Similarly, Maryland's appellate courts repeatedly have opined that the notice-of-claim requirement contained in SG § 12-106(b)(1) is a condition precedent to filing suit, i.e., an act that must be fulfilled for immunity from suit to be waived, and thereby creating an otherwise non-existent right to sue, not a statute of limitations that places a time-bar on an already-existing right to sue. State v. Copes, 175 Md.App. 351, 372, 927 A.2d 426, 438 (2007); Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 290, 628 A.2d 162, 164 (1993) (finding that the Tort Claims Act's administrative claim requirement is not a statute of limitations but rather a condition precedent to the initiation of an action under the Act); Harris, 327 Md. at 41, 607 A.2d at 556-57 (finding the MTCA's notice of claim requirement to be a condition precedent to the waiver of the State's sovereign immunity). I submit that SG § 12-106(b)(3), like its counterpart in SG § 12-202, is a condition precedent to bringing suit against the State, rather than a statute of limitations. [7] The MTCA created both the right to sue the State in tort and the potential remedy of a damage award against the State. As declaimed in Waddell and Sharafeldin, where a statute containing a limitation period creates both the right and the remedy, the limitation period constitutes a condition precedent to maintaining suit, not merely a statute of limitations subject to waiver if not raised by the defendant as an affirmative defense. As such, SG § 12-106(b)(3) mandates that a failure to bring suit against the State within three years eliminates both the right to sue and the remedy for the injury caused. It is not subject to waiver, and a failure to fulfill the condition precedent may be raised by the State at any time. In this manner, SG § 12-106(b)(3) constitutes a condition precedent to the waiver of the State's sovereign immunity, distinct from any statute of limitations governing the asserted claims. In addition, SG § 12-106(b)(3) uses similar language to that of SG § 12-202, stating that a claimant may not institute an action under this subtitle unless the conditions are fulfilled. As observed in Sharafeldin, this type of language differs significantly from that of standard statutes of limitation, such as CJ § 5-105, which generally provide only that an action shall be filed within a certain period of time. This linguistic difference signals a condition precedent, not a statute of limitations. Based on this distinction, SG § 12-106(b)(3) is a condition precedent, rather than a statute of limitations, and provides an additional limitation on the right to sue the State. The condition precedent of SG § 12-106(b)(3) works in concert with the statute of limitations period for defamation suits contained in CJ § 5-105, rather than supplanting it entirely. It is our duty, noted supra, to harmonize seemingly contradictory provisions and avoid illogical or absurd results. We must recall the importance of the State's sovereign immunity and prevent the dilution of the doctrine by judicial fiat. Under the Majority opinion's interpretation of SG § 12-106(b)(3), a plaintiff asserting a defamation claim may sue the State at any point within a three-year period, whereas that same plaintiff bringing the same cause of action against a private defendant must do so within one year. Such a result is contrary to common sense and undermines significantly the State's sovereign immunity. By understanding SG § 12-106(b)(3) as a condition precedent to the State's waiver of sovereign immunity, rather than a uniform statute of limitations for all claims brought against the State, SG § 12-106(b)(3) and CJ § 5-105 may be harmonized, thus avoiding dilution of the State's sovereign immunity protection. Under this interpretation, SG § 12-106(b) provides three conditions precedent that must be fulfilled by a plaintiff before the State consents to waive its sovereign immunity. A prospective plaintiff must demonstrate fulfillment of those conditions before he or she may maintain an action against the State. If he or she meets those conditions, the claim remains subject to the statutes of limitations contained in CJ § 5-101, et seq., including the one-year statute of limitations for defamation actions provided by CJ § 5-105. This reading allows both the conditions precedent of SG § 12-106(b) and the statutes of limitation contained in CJ § 5-101, et seq., to exist together harmoniously and provide separate restrictions on defamation actions against the State. Additionally, this reading recognizes the important protections of sovereign immunity because, unlike a plaintiff suing a private party in defamation, a plaintiff seeking to sue the State in defamation must face the additional hurdle of demonstrating compliance with the conditions of SG § 12-106(b) before the State may be said to have waived sovereign immunity. Otherwise, under the Majority opinion, the State enjoys less protection from defamation suits than a private defendant, a conclusion that undermines significantly the doctrine of sovereign immunity and, I submit, defies common sense. Therefore, I decline to read SG § 12-106(b)(3) to reach such a strange and facially illogical result, absent clearer evidence of a legislative intent to abrogate the one-year statute of limitations on defamation actions contained in CJ § 5-105 and replace it with a longer three-year statute of limitations for actions brought only against the State.