Opinion ID: 78298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Any Error Based on a Violation of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Detainers Act Was Harmless

Text: Knight argues that his indictment should have been dismissed with prejudice based on a violation of the speedy trial clause of the Detainers Act. That provision states that trial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 2, Art. IV(c). The ordinary remedy for a violation of the speedy trial provision is a dismissal with prejudice: [I]n the event that an action on the indictment ... is not brought to trial within the period provided in ... article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment ... has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect. Id. § 2, Art. V(c). But this ordinary rule again has the same exception when the United States is the receiving state: Notwithstanding any provision ... to the contrary, dismissal may be without prejudice. Id. § 9(1). The district court reasoned that, because courts often construe the Speedy Trial Act and Detainers Act to be consistent, the 120-day period under the Detainers Act was reset upon Knight's second indictment. The United States argues that the Detainers Act is not applicable because a detainer never was filed against Knight and because he was not serving a term of imprisonment when awaiting trial, but we disagree. The Detainers Act applies when [the United States] activates its provisions by filing a detainer against a state prisoner and then obtains his custody by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.  United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1842, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). The record establishes that a detainer was lodged against Knight before his first indictment. Agent Bess testified at a pretrial conference that a detainer had been lodged against Knight while he was in state custody. Because the dismissal of Knight's first indictment without prejudice did not produce a final resolution of the charges against him, the original detainer against Knight remained in effect: The detainer remains lodged against the prisoner until the underlying charges are finally resolved. Id. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1848. The Detainers Act also applies to a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment in any party State. 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 2, Art. IV(a). Knight had been convicted and sentenced in a state court and was in state custody serving time toward his sentence. The Act governed his transfer to federal custody even though Knight had not yet been assigned or transferred to the state prison where he was expected to serve the duration of his sentence. We agree with Knight that the United States technically violated the speedy trial clause of the Detainers Act. Knight was not returned to state custody after his first indictment was dismissed and remained in the receiving state more than 120 days after his arrival. Although Knight was in federal custody for only 28 days between the two federal indictments, the failure of the United States to return Knight to state custody, lodge a new detainer, and obtain a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum kept the 120-day period from resetting so that Knight was in federal custody for more than 120 days after his initial arrival. We disagree with the reasoning of the district court that the second indictment of Knight reset the period for measuring the 120 days. Although the United States violated the speedy trial clause of the Detainers Act, the denial of Knight's motion to dismiss was harmless for two reasons. First, the speedy trial clause allows a district court to grant a continuance for good cause, and the obtaining of a second indictment clearly would have been considered good cause by the district court. The United States, after all, was put to the burden of obtaining a second indictment because the district court had granted partial relief on Knight's motion. Second, because the United States was the receiving state, the district court also would have had the discretion to dismiss the second indictment without prejudice as the district court had done with respect to Knight's first indictment. The United States then would have been free to return Knight to state custody and obtain a third indictment against him, which would have delayed his proceeding without violating the Detainers Act. Knight argues that the Supreme Court has held that the mandatory language of the Detainers Act does not allow for a harmless, technical, or de minimis error exception, Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153-54, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 2084-85, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001), but that decision does not apply to this appeal. In Bozeman, Alabama was the receiving jurisdiction and violated the anti-shuttling provision of the Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 2, Art. IV(e), when it transported a prisoner from federal to state custody for a single day to be arraigned and then returned the prisoner to the sending state before trial. 533 U.S. at 151-52, 121 S.Ct. at 2083-84. The Court held that the language of the anti-shuttling provision was mandatory as to both the prohibited conduct and the remedy: [T]he language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception, for it is absolute. It says that when a prisoner is returned before trial, the indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Id. at 153, 121 S.Ct. at 2084-85 (quoting 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 2, Art. IV(e)) (emphasis omitted). The difference in Knight's case is that, when the United States is the receiving state, a dismissal with prejudice is not mandatory, as it was in Bozeman. Congress made explicit that the United States is treated differently under the Detainers Act because, [n]otwithstanding any provision ... to the contrary, when the United States is the receiving jurisdiction, a dismissal may be without prejudice. 18 U.S.C.App. 2 § 9(1). The stated purpose of the Detainers Act is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. Id. § 2, Art. I. That purpose was not violated when the district court did not dismiss Knight's second indictment based on a violation of the speedy trial clause of the Act. Any error was harmless.