Opinion ID: 1898380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Was defendant prejudiced by the joinder of the Compton homicide and the other related counts, primarily the Carmichael assault?

Text: Because a capital trial is bifurcated, some of the evidence that may be relevant in the guilt-phase proceeding is not relevant in a penalty-phase proceeding. Turning our attention to the guilt phase, the counts are tied together by the common thread of the same gun allegedly being used unlawfully or possessed in the commission of the distinct crimes of the Compton and Carmichael shootings. Rule 3:7-6 provides: Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or accusation    if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common plan. We have no doubt that these transactions are connected. See State v. Hardison, 204 N.J. Super. 1, 10-11, 497 A. 2d 868 (App.Div. 1983), aff'd, 99 N.J. 379, 492 A. 2d 1009 (1985). In addition, as a practical matter, had these cases been tried separately, evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible under Evidence Rule 55 in the Compton murder trial to establish either identity or the weapon used. This, then, is not a case like State v. Orlando, 101 N.J. Super. 390, 244 A. 2d 506 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 52 N.J. 500, 246 A. 2d 457 (1968), in which two entirely unrelated crimes that were not signature crimes were tied together, thus giving the State an unfair advantage in having the jury evaluate the proofs. This case is troubling, however, because it is a capital case. Something that may not prejudice a non-capital case may prejudice a capital case. A central theme of capital-punishment jurisprudence is that the jury's discretion must be channeled by objective factors to prevent the randomness or self-selection of cases for capital punishment. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed. 2d 235 (1983). Only certain aggravating factors may be considered by a jury in deciding a capital penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. Sometimes, during a penalty phase of a capital case, however, the jury will hear evidence that is not relevant to the aggravating factors. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988), illustrates the problem. A defendant who had put his good character in issue was subject to withering cross-examination about collateral aspects of his conduct, particularly his mistreatment of certain girl friends. There we held that although such evidence might be relevant for the limited purpose of testing the credibility of the defendant, a trial court would have to give careful instructions on the limited purpose for which the testimony could be considered by the jury. Id. at 508, 548 A. 2d 1058. In addition, there was evidence in Rose of racial animosity the defendant had shown on a prior occasion. Although that evidence may have been relevant to dispel his defense of an accidental discharge of the gun, it surely was not relevant to an aggravating factor. It too should have been given a limiting charge. In this case the evidence of other crimes surfaced in the guilt phase. Such evidence may relate to the question of guilt by establishing the identity of defendant as Compton's killer. After all, if the same gun was used in the Carmichael shooting by a man in a red jacket, the evidence is plainly relevant. When a court learns that such evidence will be offered, it should inform the jury of the purpose of the evidence and its relevance, not as an aggravating factor, but as part of substantive proof of murder. The court should caution the jury during the guilt phase that the purpose of such evidence is limited. Prior to the penalty phase, the court could again ask the jurors if they can consider defendant's death eligibility in light of no more and no less evidence than the Legislature has intended. We continue to repose a sound measure of discretion in our judges and juries. Obviously, if the first case were a rape or child-abuse case linked by a common event to an unrelated murder, a court could well conclude that admission into evidence of the other crimes would be too prejudicial during the penalty phase. See State v. Moore, supra, 113 N.J. at 276-77, 550 A. 2d 117; State v. Monturi, 195 N.J. Super. 317, 478 A. 2d 1266 (Law Div. 1984). Another factor complicates this case. The Gracco shooting, although not part of the State's case, must be carefully sorted out by the jury for its limited relevance. After all, the jury might well agree with the State that defendant shot Gracco too. Could that uncharged event influence the jury's penalty deliberations? We are satisfied that the joinder of the counts in this case was justified under Rule 3:7-6, and that evidence of other crimes would have been admissible as well under Evidence Rule 55 for a limited purpose in the guilt phase. Because the penalty phase must be retried, we need not decide whether the absence of a limiting instruction with respect to the evidentiary significance of the other-crimes evidence tainted the death sentence. While we are discussing this issue of limited purpose for which evidence may be introduced in penalty-phase proceedings, we note the problem posed in this case by cross-examination of one of Long's jailhouse companions about an alleged incident in which Long had thrown hot tea in the face of a guard. This sort of problem arose in State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 504, 548 A. 2d 1058, in which we ruled that prosecutors must have a sound evidential basis to pose such a question. In addition, juries must receive limiting instructions with respect to the purpose of such evidence. Id. at 506, 548 A. 2d 1058.