Opinion ID: 2632488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Object to Other Evidence

Text: James Bolinger's Testimony James Bolinger and Catherine Bledsoe testified that Tom attended church regularly. James further testified that, in his opinion, Tom was a good man, whom no one spoke negatively about, who obeyed the church's teachings about the separation of men and women, and who was not the kind of man who would chase women or go to bars. Floyd argues that this testimony was an inadmissible endorsement of Tom's religion or godliness, that the witnesses impermissibly vouched for Tom's credibility, and that Kurth's failure to object constituted deficient performance. We disagree. Tom's credibility was at issue in the case regardless of this testimony. As the district court noted, although Kurth did not provide a strategic reason for his failure to object to this particular testimony, he did bring in evidence to counter it: evidence that Tom had tried to have sex with a dog, that he viewed pornographic films and magazines, and that he had messed with young kids one time at a church function. In addition, evidence of Tom's church-going habits was relevant, as it tended to establish his alibi and the nature of his relationship with C.A., who also was a regularly attending member of the church. C.A. did not show up for a church meeting the Friday night of her disappearance, and Tom did. Kurth's failure to object does not constitute constitutionally deficient representation. Carreno's Testimony Floyd next alleges Kurth was ineffective in failing to object to Carreno's testimony concerning Tom's statement to the detective about telling the truth. We already addressed this testimony in Floyd's direct appeal and determined that it was not objectionable because Carreno did not vouch for Tom's credibility. The context of the testimony demonstrates the officer was referring to truth according to Tom. Thus the jury was presented with Tom's version of what happened and was left to weigh his credibility, exactly as it was expected to do. Dunnaway's Testimony Floyd also cites Kurth's failure to object to the Sheriff Dunnaway's opinion regarding whether Tom's statement was a confession. Although it is not perfectly clear to which testimony Floyd refers, the record reveals that Kurth did object to the prosecutor's initial questioning of Dunnaway regarding Tom's messages on the Bolingers' answering machine. The judge sustained the objection as it pertained to Tom's state of mind but permitted Dunnaway to testify that he did not consider the messages a confession because it just told me where the body was at and not that Tom had done anything. Dunnaway also testified that a few days after Tom was arrested, Dunnaway began to have a problem with the arrest because Tom's story wasn't panning out. Floyd argues that this testimony was impermissible, and cites our line of Elnicki cases: State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005); State v. Plaskett, 271 Kan. 995, 27 P.3d 890 (2001); and State v. Jackson, 239 Kan. 463, 721 P.2d 232 (1986). He relies on these decisions for the proposition that a witness may not express an opinion concerning the credibility of another witness. Of course, this is correct. But, there was nothing objectionable about Dunnaway's testimony on this basis. He was merely describing the statements and his reaction to them, not stating an opinion about whether they were worthy of belief. In addition, Kurth did object to portions of Dunnaway's testimony. His representation on this point is not deficient. Dunnaway also testified that, after C.A. disappeared and before her body was discovered, Floyd made statements to him: She's dead isn't she? Do you know if she's dead? When asked if these statements were consistent with the usual reaction of a person concerned with the disappearance of a 14-year-old, possibly a runaway, Dunnaway said, I think most people put them thoughts out of their mind and still have hope that she was going to be found, which I had hopes that she would be found, be, be all right [ sic ]. This to me is unusual, yes. The district court concluded that this statement was not objectionable, because it was admissible opinion testimony under K.S.A. 60-456. This statement also helped to explain the course of the investigation, which turned from Tom to Floyd. In addition, as lay-witness testimony, the statement was rationally based on the sheriff's perception; if he is regarded as an expert, it was based on data known to him and on his experience as a longtime law enforcement officer. See K.S.A. 60-456(b). We agree with the district court that Kurth's failure to object to this admissible testimony does not constitute ineffective assistance. Frost's Testimony Detective Troy Frost testified that during an interview with Floyd at the police station, Floyd got real emotional and said that he had stopped at the trailer the afternoon C.A. disappeared. Later, and on a number of other occasions, Floyd denied having stopped by the trailer that day. Floyd also told Frost that he loved C.A. The prosecutor asked Frost: When [Petitioner] said that he had gone to the trailer that day did you believe him? Frost said yes. The prosecutor then asked: What [Petitioner] was indicating to you though your questions and his statement how he felt about her was, you think he was being genuine? Frost responded: Oh yes. Kurth did not object to this questioning and testified at the 60-1507 hearing that he could not recall any strategic reason for not doing so. Floyd is correct; this was objectionable testimony that invaded the province of the jury. Suppression Issue Before trial, Kurth filed a motion to suppress certain statements made by Floyd to police concerning his interest in C.A. At trial, the State introduced the testimony of Sergeant Robert Poppa, who testified that he read Floyd his Miranda rights and that he witnessed Floyd's written waiver. Kurth stipulated that Floyd was Mirandized. Vanderbilt then questioned Poppa about Floyd's statements; Floyd had said he considered pursuing a sexual liaison with C.A. Floyd argues that Kurth's stipulation constituted deficient representation because it prevented Floyd from raising the suppression issue on appeal. Kurth recalled that he stipulated to it because he knew Floyd had been properly Mirandized. Kurth said that he didn't think there was a reason to object to the statements because they were not confessions of guilt. Floyd has not demonstrated that it was deficient for Kurth to act in this way. It is not objectively unreasonable that Kurth would avoid a frivolous objection and instead challenge the substance of the statements and minimize their import on cross-examination, which is what he did. The trial court's findings are substantially supported by the record, and its conclusion that Kurth was not ineffective is sufficiently based on those findings. Victim's Hearsay Statements Rosa Bolinger and Brandi Wampler testified that C.A. told them she was afraid to be alone at night at the trailer with Floyd. Defense counsel did not object to these hearsay statements. He testified that he did not recall a specific strategy behind his failure to object, but we note that Kurth presented evidence at trial to contradict them. The defense introduced Heidi's testimony that Floyd treated C.A. like a sister and cared for her very much. Floyd fails to show that Kurth's failure to object constituted deficient representation or prejudiced him. Moreover, Bolinger's and Wampler's statements were not inadmissible hearsay; they were statements made by an unavailable declarant pursuant to K.S.A. 60-459(g)(3). They pertained to C.A.'s recent perception made in good faith and with no reason to falsify, see K.S.A. 60-460(d), and her then existing state of mind, see K.S.A. 60-460( l ). The district judge concluded that any objection would have been overruled. This decision is substantially supported by the record and legally sound. Mitchell's Testimony Floyd next argues that Dr. Erik Mitchell was not qualified to opine regarding C.A.'s shirt, and that Kurth's failure to object to Mitchell's statement that C.A.'s shirt and bra probably were pulled up intentionally rather than accidently by dragging or sliding her body constituted ineffective assistance. This argument lacks merit. First, Mitchell is a forensic pathologist, qualified to give testimony regarding his examination of evidence relative to a dead body, including his conclusions concerning cause of a death and circumstances surrounding a death. His testimony concerning the physical evidence of abrasions indicating dragging, the location of the clothing on the body, and the placement of the gunshot holes led him to believe the placement of the clothing was not consistent with dragging, but rather with intentional positioning. This testimony was not, as Floyd argues, outside the special knowledge, skill, expertise, or training of this witness, see K.S.A. 60-456, and it is unlikely that an objection would have been sustained. Arfmann's Statements Floyd also faults Kurth's performance regarding his admission of Detective Kirk Vernon's testimony about statements he had taken from C.A.'s mother, Tommie Arfmann. Arfmann told Vernon that she had gone to look for Floyd on Friday, the night C.A. disappeared, and that Floyd was not at the dairy where he worked. Arfmann later found him at his home. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Vernon if he had talked to Arfmann since that time and if he was aware that Arfmann had told other law enforcement officers that it was actually much earlier than midnight when she went by the dairy. Vernon was not aware of this. Kurth did not object to this questioning. Floyd argues that Kurth was deficient for failing to object because Arfmann's later statements were not based on any facts in evidence at trial, and constituted inadmissible hearsay. Kurth testified in his deposition that he could not recall why he did not object but that he remembered neither he nor the prosecutor wanted to call Arfmann to testify. The State persuasively suggests that Arfmann's statements were not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The prosecutor merely inquired whether the detective was aware Arfmann had changed her story, in order to impeach the detective. Moreover, as long as the prosecutor had a good-faith basis for believing the asserted matter to be true, there was nothing objectionable about his questioning. Arfmann's son  C.A.'s brother  had previously testified that he was with his mother when they drove to the dairy about 11 p.m. that night. An objection probably would have been overruled. Catherine Bledsoe's Testimony At trial, Catherine Bledsoe related a conversation she had with Floyd shortly after he was arrested and Tom was released, in which she and Floyd agreed that Tom did not kill C.A. Floyd argues that this was inadmissible, damaging, prejudicial testimony concerning Floyd's mother's opinion of Tom's culpability. We agree with the district court's determination that Floyd fails to meet his burden to show that Kurth's representation was constitutionally deficient on this point. Prosecutor's Closing Argument Floyd also claims that Kurth was ineffective for failing to object to Vanderbilt's closing argument because Vanderbilt repeatedly made improper arguments and argued as fact matters not proven by the evidence. We agree that several of the prosecutor's statements are troubling. At one point, the prosecutor said, The physical evidence shows that Tom didn't do it. This statement was unsupported. There was no physical evidence produced at trial that excluded Tom as the killer. On the contrary, certain physical evidence linked Tom to the murder. Tom's gun was the murder weapon, and the bullets that killed C.A. were purchased by him. The prosecutor also stated: I can't tell you when [Floyd] did it. But I can tell you who was there. He wasn't alone. We know there [were] at least three people there, him and [C.A.], and he brought his son. His son sat in the vehicle and he watched Floyd Scott Bledsoe put the gun to the back of his aunt's head and [pull] the trigger. Floyd takes care of the body, gets back in the car, Cody says, `You killed Aunt [C.A.]' . . . When Floyd Scott Bledsoe convinced his two-year-old son to say Tom did it, as soon as that powerful influence of his father was out of his presence he was comfortable with telling the truth . . . when he goes to [C.A.]'s grave he explains to her, because he was there. . . . `Aunt [C.A.], I didn't kill you, my dad did.' Attributing a Daddy did it statement to Cody at C.A.'s graveside was unsupported by the evidence. Heidi testified that at C.A.'s graveside Cody said: Aunt [C.A.], I didn't shoot you, it wasn't me. The prosecutor also argued that Mom, Floyd, and Cody explained to you it was Floyd. Tom couldn't have done it. . . . [H]is wife explains to you . . . that Cody was there. . . . A psychologist, based on the information she said, Cody was there. There's only one way Cody could have been there . . . He was with [his father]. Again, a part of this statement was unsupported. No child psychologist testified that Cody was at the crime scene; no expert testimony regarding Cody was admitted at all. These statements were outside the wide latitude given a prosecutor in discussing the evidence and thus could have been subject to a sustainable objection. See State v. Dixon, 279 Kan. 563, 590-91, 112 P.3d 883 (2005); State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 93, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). Lacking any strategic explanation in the record for Kurth's failure to object, and given the repeated nature of the prosecutor's behavior, we agree that Kurth was ineffective by failing to object to these statements. Bulletproof Vest Floyd next takes issue with Kurth's failure to challenge the district court's requirement that Floyd wear a bulletproof vest for his own safety. Floyd testified at the 60-1507 hearing that the vest was bulky and obvious. Kurth agreed that the vest was somewhat bulky but testified that the question of whether it was necessary to have Floyd wear the vest in front of the jury didn't cross [his] mind. Floyd argues that requiring him to wear the vest violated his right to a fair trial, because of its prejudicial effect on the jury, and that Kurth's failure to object constituted deficient performance. He analogizes his situation to that discussed in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), where the Supreme Court questioned the fundamental fairness of hypothetical proceedings in which a defendant would be shackled or gagged. The analogy is unpersuasive. This court has held that the use of restraint devices creates the distinct possibility of communicating to the jury that a defendant is dangerous, and can compromise the presumption of innocence, but is not inevitably prejudicial. See, e.g., State v. Davidson, 264 Kan. 44, 49-50, 954 P.2d 702 (1998) (prejudicial error where, in reference to defendant's leg brace, judge told jury that sheriff wanted to prevent individual in custody from escaping); State v. Powell, 274 Kan. 618, 620-23, 56 P.3d 189 (2002) (no abuse of discretion to require defendant to wear stun belt; no prejudice shown). Here, the purpose was not to restrain the defendant, but to protect him. The record indicates that at least two individuals, including the victim's mother, had made threats against defendant. Kurth had no reason to think that his client's wearing of a bulletproof vest would be prejudicial, or even objectionable. Floyd fails to establish that the lack of an objection by Kurth was objectively unreasonable.