Opinion ID: 1477292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determining the Applicable Standard of Review

Text: In Burning Tree I, Stewart Bainum, in his role as taxpayer, [5] and Barbara Renschler, a taxpayer and a woman seeking membership in the Burning Tree Club, a private country club that excluded women, sued the State, the Department of Assessments and Taxation, and the Club, seeking a declaratory judgment that the primary purpose exception found in Section 19(e)(4)(i) of Article 81, Maryland Code (1957, 1980 Repl.Vol.), [6] violated the ERA. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 59-60, 501 A.2d at 820. The Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the State from extending preferential tax treatment to the Club, and sought a mandate that the Club entertain applications for female membership. [7] Id. at 60, 501 A.2d at 820. Section 19 (e) authorized the Department to make agreements with private country clubs such as Burning Tree whereby, in exchange for an agreement to preserve open spaces from development for a term of years, the club would receive a reduced real property tax rate. Id. at 56-57, 501 A.2d at 818-19. The statute established a dual system of assessments, one calculated under the ordinary assumption of best use, the other, lower assessment, calculated under the assumption that the land remain undeveloped. Id. at 57, 501 A.2d at 818-19. So long as the agreement was in effect, the State collected property tax only on the lower assessed value. In case the country club breached the agreement, the State could collect taxes prospectively on the higher assessed value; moreover, a portion of the tax that would have been due based on the difference between the lower and higher assessed values would have been accelerated and become payable immediately. In 1974, the General Assembly amended Section 19(e) to add an anti-discrimination provision, which conditioned the tax benefit on an agreement not to discriminate on account of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin, unless the clubs were operated with the primary purpose, as determined by the Attorney General, to serve or benefit members of a particular sex. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 57, 501 A.2d at 819 (emphasis added); 1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 870. The amended statute also contained a so-called periodic discrimination clause, exempting from the anti-discrimination provision those clubs which exclude certain sexes only on certain days and at certain times. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 57, 501 A.2d at 819; 1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 870. There were several issues [8] before the Court in Burning Tree I: whether the roles of the State and the Department under Section 19(e) of Article 81 in conjunction with the Club's participation in the open space program, amounted to state action, [9] Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 85, 501 A.2d at 833; whether the primary purpose clause violated the ERA; and whether the primary purpose clause was severable from the statute's overall prohibition against discrimination. [10] Id. at 80, 501 A.2d at 830-31. The Court issued three separate opinions. Id. at 56, 501 A.2d at 818 (Chief Judge Murphy, joined by Judges Smith and Orth); id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 833 (Judge Rodowsky, concurring); id. at 88, 501 A.2d at 835 (Judge Eldridge, joined by Judges Cole and Bloom). Chief Judge Murphy, joined by Judges Charles E. Orth, Jr. and Marvin H. Smith, took the position that the involvement of the State and the Department in the open space program did not constitute state action. Id. at 64-65, 501 A.2d at 822-23. In Chief Judge Murphy's opinion, Section 19(e)(4)(i) was facially neutral, id. at 71, 501 A.2d at 826, and the State bore no responsibility for the Club's discrimination, because the State did not initiate the Club's discriminatory membership policy, the State did not cause the Club to implement those policies through coercion or inducement, and the statutory purpose [11] bore no relationship to sex discrimination. Id. at 75-76, 501 A.2d at 828-29. Judge Lawrence F. Rodowsky agreed only to the extent that the actions of the Attorney General and the Department in certifying compliance with the terms of Section 19(e)(4)(i), did not, in his view, become state action as a result of the Club's participation in the open space program, id. at 85-86, 501 A.2d at 833-34, although he maintained that the statute itself constituted state action, because the statute drew sex-based distinctions on its face. Id. at 85-86, 501 A.2d at 833-34. Judge John C. Eldridge, joined by Judges Harry A. Cole and Theodore G. Bloom, totally disagree[d] with Chief Judge Murphy's view that the statute and its administration by the State were gender neutral, id. at 91, 501 A.2d at 836; furthermore, Judge Eldridge believed there clearly [was] state action, id. at 91, 501 A.2d at 836, because Section 19(e)(4)(i) drew a distinction between sex-based discrimination and other forms of discrimination, and because the administrative mechanism set up by the statute clearly involve[d] the State in the discrimination by the Club. Id. at 91-93, 501 A.2d at 836-37. A majority of the Court, consisting of Judge Rodowsky, id. at 88, 501 A.2d at 834-35, and Judges Eldridge, Cole and Bloom, id. at 91, 501 A.2d at 836, held that the primary purpose clause on its face violated the ERA. Because Judge Rodowsky disagreed with Judge Eldridge about severability, id. at 91 & n. 5, 501 A.2d at 836 & n. 5, a different majority consisting of Chief Judge Murphy, and Judges Orth and Smith, id. at 84, 501 A.2d at 832-33, agreed with Judge Rodowsky, id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 833, holding that the primary purpose clause was not severable from Section 19(e)(4)(i), thereby invalidating the entire anti-discrimination provision (and rendering the periodic discrimination clause moot). On the ERA issue, Chief Judge Murphy, writing for himself and two other judges, concluded that the primary purpose clause did not implicate the ERA and therefore, was not subject to strict scrutiny, because the clause benefitted and burdened both sexes equally, id. at 71, 501 A.2d at 826, and because the ERA was essentially limited in its scope to unequal treatment imposed by law as between the sexes. Id. at 65, 501 A.2d at 823 (emphasis added). According to Chief Judge Murphy, enactment and administration of Section 19(e)(4) constituted action by the State, id. at 70, 501 A.2d at 826; nevertheless, the statute [did] not apportion or distribute benefits or burdens unequally among the sexes, but rather [made] the tax benefit equally available to all single sex country clubs agreeing to participate in the State's open space program. Id. at 71, 501 A.2d at 826. Furthermore, [t]he only burden [was] that imposed on the public treasury as a result of the preferential tax assessment afforded to qualifying country clubs, a burden born equally by all Maryland citizens, men and women alike. Id. Likewise, the public benefits which accrue[d] from the preservation of open spaces [were] shared equally by each sex. Id. Although acknowledging that separate but equal facilities for men and women may be subject to strict scrutiny because of inherent inequality of treatment for one sex or the other in the separation process itself, id. at 79, 501 A.2d at 830, Chief Judge Murphy determined that heightened scrutiny was not implicated under the facts of Burning Tree I because the primary purpose clause was permissive, not mandatory. [12] Id. Judge Eldridge, writing for himself and two other judges, rejected the Chief Judge's gender neutral analysis, warning that Chief Judge Murphy's opinion seems to embrace a type of `separate but equal' doctrine for purposes of the E.R.A. Id. at 91, 501 A.2d at 836. Judge Eldridge stated that regardless of whether the sexes are benefitted or burdened equally, any statute that implicates gender classifications on its face must be subject to strict scrutiny, id. at 99, 501 A.2d at 840, and explained the scope of the ERA: While it is true that many of our prior cases have involved government action directly imposing a burden or conferring a benefit entirely upon either males or females, we have never held that the E.R.A. is narrowly limited to such situations. On the contrary, we have viewed the E.R.A. more broadly, in accordance with its language and purpose. Id. at 95, 501 A.2d at 838 (emphasis added). He then looked to our jurisprudence in Rand, in which we stated that the language of the ERA was `unambiguous' and `can only mean that sex is not a factor', id. at 95, 501 A.2d at 838, quoting Rand, 280 Md. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903 (emphasis added), and also in Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973), in which the Court took the position that under the E.R.A. classifications based on sex were `suspect classifications' subject to `stricter scrutiny.' Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 95, 501 A.2d at 838, quoting Kuhn, 270 Md. at 506-07, 312 A.2d at 222. In a concurring opinion, Judge Rodowsky agreed with Judge Eldridge that the primary purpose clause on its face violated the ERA, which represented the holding of the case. Id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 833. Indeed, in Judge Rodowsky's view, not only was the primary purpose clause constitutionally infirm, but the periodic discrimination provision failed for exactly the same reasons. Id. at 86-87, 501 A.2d at 834. Judges Eldridge and Rodowsky differed on the severability issue; Judge Rodowsky agreed with the Chief Judge that the primary purpose clause was nonseverable, and hence, the entire anti-discrimination provision was void. Id. at 85, 501 A.2d at 833. A principal point of contention in Burning Tree I was the particular level of application of the disputed anti-discrimination provision. The Chief Judge regarded Section 19(e)(4)(i) as neutral, because in principle an all-female club could operate as a mirror-image of Burning Tree and enjoy the state tax benefit, so that the universe of consideration was the set of all eligible country clubs. Id. at 71, 501 A.2d at 826. According to this view, all country clubs were situated equally with respect to the open space program; all-female clubs and all-male clubs were free to discriminate equally, and hence, there was no ERA violation. The fact that a single all-male club just happened to be the only eligible entity under Section 19(e)(4)(i) was, in this view, an irrelevant coincidence. A majority of the Court, however, held that the universe of consideration was each particular participating club. Judge Rodowsky stated this proposition explicitly: It is not an answer to the subject argument of the appellees to say that at the elevated level of the statewide open space program established by § 19(e) the program is neutral with respect to sex, in the sense that an all female or an all male country club is eligible to participate. The ostensible prohibition against sex discrimination applies to each individual country club participating in the open space program. The universe of consideration for the particular problem created by this antidiscrimination law is any participating country club, in and of itself. Id. at 87, 501 A.2d at 834 (emphasis added), and Judge Eldridge agreed, because he directly refuted the position of the Chief Judge. Id. at 95, 501 A.2d at 838 ([T]he three apparently do not view the express sanctioning of single sex clubs as imposing a burden upon the excluded sex, as long as the governmental action in theory equally sanctions discrimination by single sex facilities against persons of the other sex.). Ironically, the positions set out by Judges Eldridge and Rodowsky find support in an article by Barbara A. Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871, 889-93 (1971), cited at several points as support in the minority opinion of Chief Judge Murphy. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 64 & n. 3, 70, 79, 501 A.2d at 822 & n. 3, 825, 830. The Brown article defines why the separate but equal theory implicit in the Chief Judge's opinion ultimately subverts the meaning and purpose of the ERA. Because the basic principle of the ERA is that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women and men, it follows that the treatment of any person [13] under the law may not be based on the circumstance of a particular person's sex. Brown, supra at 889 (emphasis added). Accord Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 64, 71, 501 A.2d at 822, 825; Rand, 280 Md. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903. To summarize, in Burning Tree I a majority of this Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate an ostensibly neutral statute that drew sex-based classifications. The analysis focused on the individual level to determine whether the State had granted a benefit or imposed a burden on the basis of sex. Four Judges of this Court rejected the separate but equal approach suggested in Chief Judge Murphy's minority opinion.
Because I disagree with the majority about the meaning and purpose of the ERA, and because the legislative history of the ERA is so sparse, [14] I set out in some detail the principal cases interpreting the ERA decided by this Court before Burning Tree I, in the period between 1972 and 1985, because they afford better guidance regarding the interpretation of the ERA than any other extant source. That case law provides the backdrop for the opinions in Burning Tree I and supports the position that strict scrutiny applies in the instant case. In Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. at 498, 312 A.2d at 217-18, a group of cosmetologists mounted a constitutional challenge to a statutory scheme that prohibited them from cutting and shampooing men's hair on the same basis as women's. One of the statutes at issue, Section 529(a) of Article 43, Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Supp.), defined the professional services performed by cosmetologists as work . . . for the embellishment, cleanliness and beautification of women's hair. [15] A different statute, Section 323 of Article 43, Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Supp.), defined the corresponding services performed by barbers without limitation to the sex of the client. [16] Under this scheme, cosmetologists who applied to men's hair the same techniques they customarily used on women's hair, risked the loss of their licenses and even criminal prosecution. Kuhn, 270 Md. at 500-01, 312 A.2d at 218-19. In holding that Article 46 was inapplicable, id. at 505-06, 312 A.2d at 221-22, this Court said that the statute [did] not discriminate against cosmetologists of either sex; nor, for that matter, [was] there discrimination based on sex between barbers. Id. at 505, 312 A.2d at 221. The Court conceded that if a group of males, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, were complaining that because of their sex, they were being denied the services of cosmetologists, the result would have been different. Id. at 505-06, 312 A.2d at 221. Rather, Article 46 was inapplicable because the statute at issue treated every cosmetologist and barber exactly the same, and because the victims of discrimination were not parties to the case. Therefore, Kuhn stands for the proposition that sex-based classifications trigger the ERA if the challenging party is the target of discrimination. [17] In Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. at 510-11, 374 A.2d at 902, this Court considered whether the common law duty of paternal support of minor children survived the enactment of the ERA. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held: The words of the E.R.A. are clear and unambiguous; they say without equivocation that Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex. This language mandating equality of rights can only mean that sex is not a factor. Id. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03. Therefore, the ERA mandated that the parental duty of child support was shared jointly by both parents, in derogation of the common law rule. Id. at 517, 374 A.2d at 905. In its interpretation of the Maryland ERA, the Rand Court examined cases from a number of other states construing similar provisions in their own constitutions. Id. at 512-16, 374 A.2d at 903-05. At the conclusion of its analysis, a unanimous Court stated: It is thus clear that the tests employed under constitutional provisions dealing with equality of rights range from absolute to permissive. Like the Supreme Court of Washington, however, we believe that the broad, sweeping, mandatory language of the amendment is cogent evidence that the people of Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men and women. The adoption of the E.R.A. in this [S]tate was intended to, and did, drastically alter traditional views of the validity of sex-based classifications. Id. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-05. Because the Supreme Court of Washington did not consider whether the sex-based classification at issue . . . satisfied the rational relationship or strict scrutiny test, but instead found an `overriding compelling state interest' intrinsic to the ERA, id. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903, [18] the clear implication is that this Court endorsed a near-absolute level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications. Other cases prior to Burning Tree I invalidated sex-based classifications on the basis of Article 46. For example, in Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980), this Court considered whether the common law cause of action for criminal conversation remained viable in light of the ERA. At common law, the cause of action for criminal conversation was available only to a man. The gravamen of this action was adultery. Its elements consisted of a valid marriage and an act of sexual intercourse between a married woman and a man other than her husband. The fact that the wife consented, that she was the aggressor, that she represented herself as single, that she was mistreated or neglected by her husband, that she and her husband were separated through no fault of her own, or that her husband was impotent, were not valid defenses. Id. at 586-87, 414 A.2d at 930 (citations omitted). The Court applied Article 46, as construed in Rand, to abrogate the cause of action for criminal conversation. Id. at 593, 414 A.2d at 933. In the present case, the majority interprets Kline to buttress its view that the ERA must be applied under a benefits/burdens analysis. See op. at 258-59 & n. 24, 932 A.2d at 594 & n. 24; Kline, 287 Md. at 592, 414 A.2d at 932 (explicating this Court's holding that it would be unconstitutional to impose a burden on fathers which was not equally imposed on mothers); id. at 593, 414 A.2d at 933 (Thus, Maryland's law provides different benefits for and imposes different burdens upon its citizens based solely upon their sex. Such a result violates the ERA.). That view is simply a consequence of the particular issue posed in Kline, where the common law rule, like most sex-based classification schemes, drew categorical distinctions between males and females as classes. A more accurate interpretation of Kline results from a comparison of the rights and obligations of the husband and wife in that case. Because the elements of the tort of criminal conversation were a valid marriage and an act of sexual intercourse between the wife and a man other than her husband, it is obvious that the wife lacked a legally cognizable cause of action against the (hypothetical) mistress of her husband, whereas, at common law, the husband had a valid cause of action against the paramour of his wife. Kline, 287 Md. at 586-87, 414 A.2d at 930. But for the fact that the husband was male, he would have been unable to sustain the cause of action. It was obvious to the Court that the unequal rights under the law enjoyed by the wife, compared to the husband, could not survive the scrutiny mandated by the ERA. Id. at 593, 414 A.2d at 933 (A man has a cause of action for criminal conversation, but a woman does not.). The same conclusion results from a comparison of the legal obligations of the paramour and a hypothetical female mistress of the husband. At common law as it existed in this State up to 1980, for the act of engaging in sexual relations with the wife, the paramour was liable for damages to the husband. But for the fact he was male, the paramour would have suffered no liability. The hypothetical female mistress in our example could not have been sued for criminal conversation if she had engaged in sexual relations with the husband, even though she had engaged in the same conduct as the paramour. Clearly, such a sex-based classification scheme could not withstand the scrutiny mandated by the ERA. Id. (The common law cause of action for criminal conversation . . . cannot be reconciled with our commitment to equality of the sexes.). Therefore, the conclusion drawn from Kline is that analysis of sex-based classifications focuses on the rights and obligations of the particular person affected by the classification. See also Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 70, 501 A.2d at 825 (opinion of Murphy, C.J.) (The equality between the sexes mandated by the Maryland E.R.A. is of `rights' of individuals `under the law.')(emphasis added). Assuming other personal characteristics are held constant, the appropriate analysis under the ERA should compare the person affected by the challenged classification with a similarly situated person of the opposite sex, and then determine whether her rights or obligations have been altered. Viewed through this lens, it becomes clear that every sex-based classification that fails the benefits/burdens test must necessarily fail strict scrutiny at the individual level. This Court applied that analysis in the time span from 1972 until Burning Tree I. See Kline, 287 Md. at 591, 414 A.2d at 932, where the Court quoted approvingly from Rand's language that [t]he adoption of the E.R.A. in this state was intended to, and did, drastically alter traditional views of the validity of sex-based classifications. Rand, 280 Md. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 905. It is also noteworthy that the Kline Court examined the legislative history surrounding criminal conversation and determined that, standing alone, history would have supported the inference that the General Assembly had intended to leave the common law doctrine in place. 287 Md. at 590-91, 414 A.2d at 931-32. In 1945, the General Assembly had abolished the closely related cause of action for alienation of affections, [19] but left standing the cause of action for criminal conversation. Id. at 590, 414 A.2d at 931-32. The crucial intervening fact during that time was the adoption of Article 46, which additional factor was of sufficient significance to persuade us that the action for criminal conversation [was] no longer viable. Id. at 591, 414 A.2d at 932. In Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981), this Court considered whether the common law doctrine of necessaries survived the enactment of the ERA. The majority determined that the ERA abrogated the doctrine, under which the husband had a legal duty to supply his wife with necessaries suitable to their station in life, but the wife had no corresponding obligation to support her husband, or supply him with necessaries, even if she had the financial means to do so. Id. at 520, 425 A.2d at 1013. The Court agreed unanimously that the ERA mandated sex-neutrality for the doctrine of necessaries. Compare id. at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019 ([E]xtend[ing] the common law necessaries doctrine to impose liability upon wives, or eliminating the necessaries doctrine in its entirety, both would satisfy the general purpose of the ERA to proscribe sex-based classifications.), with id. at 533, 425 A.2d at 1019 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting) (I agree that this Court has the power to decide, based on the ERA . . . that the necessaries doctrine applies alike to both sexes.). The majority relied on Rand in its determination that the words of the ERA clearly and unambiguously mandated equality of rights between men and women and `canonly mean that sex is not a factor.' Id. at 524, 425 A.2d at 1015, quoting Rand, 280 Md. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903. The dissenters likewise believed the ERA and acts of the General Assembly have made it plain beyond doubt that family support obligations are no longer exclusively imposed on the male. Id. at 533, 425 A.2d at 1020. Nowhere did the Court invoke comparisons of men and women as classes. See op. at 254, 932 A.2d at 591. To summarize, in the years prior to Burning Tree I, our cases construing the ERA consistently applied strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications. This Court repeatedly affirmed its commitment to uphold the will of the People of Maryland to eradicate state sanctioned unequal treatment based on the happenstance of a particular person's sex.
In Burning Tree I, Judge Eldridge also examined cases from other jurisdictions interpreting state constitutional amendments similar to Maryland's ERA, Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 96-98, 501 A.2d at 839-40, and recognized that courts in Massachusetts, Washington and Illinois interpreted ERA provisions in their own constitutions to require strict scrutiny of sex classifications. [20] Id. That body of case law helped shape our own interpretation of the ERA, and supports the idea that strict scrutiny should apply here. [21] See, e.g., Rand, 280 Md. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903 (Cases from other state jurisdictions interpreting the breadth and meaning of their equal rights amendments are instructive in ascertaining the reach of Maryland's E.R.A.). For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted the Massachusetts ERA [22] to require application of the strict scrutiny-compelling State interest test to assess  any governmental classification based solely on sex. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 374 Mass. 836, 371 N.E.2d 426, 428 (1977) (emphasis added). The court considered whether a proposed statute, House No. 6723, barring girls from participation with boys in football and wrestling, was permitted by the ERA. [23] The court compared decisions from a number of states that had adopted equal rights amendments, and held that the purpose of the ERA was to require, when evaluating sex-based equal protection claims, strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny, [24] the standard applied by federal and state courts to sex-based equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Opinion of the Justices, 371 N.E.2d at 428 (To use a standard in applying the Commonwealth's equal rights amendment which requires any less than the strict scrutiny test would negate the purpose of the equal rights amendment and the intention of the people in adopting it.). Application of strict scrutiny led the court to conclude that the proposed legislation would be unconstitutional: The enactment of House No. 6723 would violate [the Massachusetts ERA]. The absolute prohibition in the proposed legislation cannot survive the close scrutiny to which a statutory classification based solely on sex must be subjected. A prohibition of all females from voluntary participation in a particular sport under every possible circumstance serves no compelling State interest. Id. at 429-30. Judge Eldridge also relied upon Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash.2d 859, 540 P.2d 882, 893 (1975), in which the Supreme Court of Washington invalidated a ban on girls' participation on high school football teams. A school district in Washington had prohibited two sisters from playing on a football team because their participation was barred by a rule of the Washington Interscholastic Activities Association (WIAA), a statewide association of high schools. Id. at 883-84. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed the applicable standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its State counterpart, Article I, Section 12 of the Washington Constitution. [25] Having held less than two years previously, in a case where the ERA [26] was inapplicable, [27] that under Washington law, sex would be regarded as an inherently suspect classification triggering strict scrutiny, Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash.2d 195, 517 P.2d 599, 603 (1973), [28] the court held that adoption of the ERA required an even more stringent standard than strict scrutiny. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash.2d 859, 540 P.2d 882, 889 (1975) (Presumably the people in adopting Const. art. 31 intended to do more than repeat what was already contained in the otherwise governing constitutional provisions, federal and state, by which discrimination based on sex was permissible under the rational relationship and strict scrutiny tests.). Henceforth, in Washington, [t]he overriding compelling state interest as adopted by the people of this state in 1972 is that: Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Id. at 893. Because the involvement of public high schools in the WIAA implicated the state action doctrine, id. at 891, the court applied the overriding compelling state interest embodied in the ERA to invalidate the statewide ban on girls' participation in high school interscholastic football. Id. at 893. A third case relied upon by Judge Eldridge in Burning Tree I was People v. Ellis, 57 Ill.2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98, 101 (1974), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois interpreted the ERA [29] to require that classifications based on sex be regarded as suspect, and therefore, require `strict judicial scrutiny.' From the plain language of the ERA and its legislative history, the court found inescapable the conclusion that the purpose of the ERA was to supplement and expand the guaranties of the equal protection provision of the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution. Id. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the court held that a statute permitting 17-year-old boys to be charged as adults for certain crimes, but requiring 17-year-old girls to be tried as juveniles, violated the Illinois ERA. [30] Id. at 99, 101.
On the basis of Rand and its progeny, and cases in sister states interpreting similar constitutional provisions, Judge Eldridge in Burning Tree I concluded that the E.R.A. renders sex-based classifications suspect and subject to at least strict scrutiny, with the burden of persuasion being upon those attempting to justify the classifications. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840 (emphasis in original). Therefore, [i]n this respect, the E.R.A. makes sex classifications subject to at least the same scrutiny as racial classifications. Id. (emphasis added). Even a facially neutral statute can implicate strict scrutiny if the purpose and effect of the classification are discriminatory, Judge Eldridge concluded. Id. at 100, 501 A.2d at 841. Indeed, [i]f the purpose and effect of the primary purpose provision had related to single race rather than single sex clubs, the provision, regardless of any alleged neutrality in the language, would clearly fall under the principles of Hunter v. Underwood [ [31] ]; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. [ [32] ]; Gomillion v. Lightfoot [ [33] ], and similar cases. Id. at 102, 501 A.2d at 842 (emphasis added). In Judge Eldridge's view, Section 19(e)(4)(1), which prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin, but permitted sexual discrimination when the country club's primary purpose was to serve or benefit members of a particular sex, was unconstitutional both on its face and in its effect. Id. at 99-102, 501 A.2d at 840-42. Because at all times from the enactment of the primary purpose anti-discrimination provision, until the time the case was litigated, Burning Tree was the only entity to which the provision applied, id. at 100, 501 A.2d at 841, it was undisputed that the purpose and effect of Section 19(e)(4)(1) were to permit one country club to maintain its discriminatory policy while continuing to receive a substantial state benefit. Id. at 101, 501 A.2d at 841. In that respect, Burning Tree I was indistinguishable from a line of Supreme Court cases that invalidated ostensibly neutral laws the effects of which were patently discriminatory on grounds of race. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 1919-20, 1923, 85 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28, 231 (1985) (facially neutral state constitutional provision disenfranchising disproportionate numbers of African-Americans held in violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823-24, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1017-18 (1967) (facially neutral anti-miscegenation statutes held in violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42, 81 S.Ct. 125, 127, 5 L.Ed.2d 110, 113 (1960) (local law altering municipal boundary to exclude nearly all African-American voters constitutionally suspect). To summarize, in Burning Tree I, a majority of this Court interpreted our prior cases to mandate a robust interpretation of the ERA. Henceforth, government action resulting in sex-based classifications would be subject to strict scrutiny, with the burden placed on the proponents of the classifications to demonstrate they were narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. This Court took special care to look beneath ostensibly neutral classifications to their underlying purpose and effect, in order to ferret out state sanctioned discrimination masquerading as facially neutral law.
In Burning Tree II, this Court adopted Judge Eldridge's rationale in Burning Tree I and rejected the benefits/burdens analysis of Chief Judge Murphy, invalidating what was termed a sex neutral law. In response to the decision of this Court in Burning Tree I, the effect of which was to remove the anti-discrimination provision in its entirety from Section 19(e), the General Assembly enacted 1986 Maryland Laws, Chapter 334, which attempted to reenact the periodic discrimination provision. [34] Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 260-61, 554 A.2d at 370. We held that any enactment of legislation which on its face draws classifications based on sex is state action sufficient to invoke the E.R.A.  Id. at 293, 554 A.2d at 386 (emphasis added). For the precise reasons the primary purpose clause failed under Article 46, Chapter 334 failed as well. Id. at 294-95, 554 A.2d at 386-87. Exactly like Section 19(e), Chapter 334 drew sex-based classifications: first, Chapter 334 distinguished sex-based discrimination from other types of discrimination; second, Chapter 334 permitted some types of sex discrimination (periodic), but proscribed others (total). Id. In addressing the State's contention that physical differences between the sexes justified the contested provision, this Court said: In order to justify a racially or sexually discriminatory statute, it is not enough for the State to claim legitimate interests which it seeks to further. Under strict scrutiny, legislation must be narrowly tailored and precisely limited to achieving those legitimate ends. Id. at 296, 554 A.2d at 387. We held [35] that the State had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Chapter 334 was narrowly tailored to achieving its purposes, id. (Nothing in the statute narrowly confines the permitted sex discrimination to [single-sex golf tournaments].), regardless of whether those purposes were substantial, id. at 295, 554 A.2d at 387, or legitimate. [36] Id. at 296, 554 A.2d at 387. The majority in the present case fails to recognize that Burning Tree II clearly adopted strict scrutiny as the standard in ERA cases. Regardless of whether ostensibly the sexes are benefitted or burdened equally by a statutory classification, that statute must withstand strict scrutiny under the ERA or else be invalidated. Id. at 293-96, 554 A.2d at 386-87. In order to justify a racially or sexually discriminatory statute, it is not enough for the State to claim legitimate interests which it seeks to further. Id. at 296, 554 A.2d at 387. Rather, the State must shoulder the heavy burden of demonstrating that the means chosen are the most restrictive possible consistent with achieving a compelling state interest. Furthermore, the holding of Burning Tree II on the ERA issue relied on the analytically indistinguishable [ Burning Tree I ] case, Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 294, 554 A.2d at 386, which, as I have demonstrated, traces its reasoning back to Rand and ultimately, to the enactment of Article 46 itself. Therefore, the majority in the present case errs fundamentally in its assertion that [v]irtually every Maryland case applying Article 46 has dealt with situations where the distinction drawn by a particular governmental enaction or action singled-out for disparate treatment men and women as discrete classes. See op. at 258-59, 932 A.2d at 594.
Contrary to the assertion of the majority in the present case, our cases subsequent to Burning Tree II have held that state action effecting classifications solely on the basis of sex is subject to strict scrutiny under the ERA. Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993), was an appeal of a murder conviction in which the defendants contested the State's use of peremptory challenges to strike women from the jury pool. This Court extended Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 82-83 (1986) (race-based peremptory strikes presumptively invalid under equal protection analysis), in light of Articles 24 and 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, to hold that sex-based peremptory strikes are prohibited. In the words of Judge Orth, speaking for the majority: The equality of rights under law, without regard to gender, bestowed by Art. 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, flowing through the equal protection guarantees of Art. 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), prohibits the State in a criminal prosecution from using peremptory challenges so as to exclude a person from service as a juror because of that person's sex. Tyler, 330 Md. at 270, 623 A.2d at 653 (emphasis added). Because the Supreme Court had not yet [37] addressed the applicability of Batson to sex-based peremptory strikes, and because this Court had specifically reserved the question, Tolbert v. State, 315 Md. 13, 23 n. 7, 553 A.2d 228, 232 n. 7 (1989), it was necessary that we construe the ERA to require `substantial justification' for `state action providing for segregation based upon sex', just as the Fourteenth Amendment applies to segregation based upon race. Tyler, 330 Md. at 265, 623 A.2d at 651. Indeed, the ERA was outcome determinative; we reversed the Court of Special Appeals, which had declined to extend Batson on the grounds that under Maryland common law, the peremptory challenge historically was regarded as conclusive and hence, unchallengeable, Eiland v. State, 92 Md.App. 56, 94, 607 A.2d 42, 61 (1992), rev'd sub nom Tyler, 330 Md. at 261, 623 A.2d at 648, and because the Supreme Court had not yet evinced a clear intent effectively to destroy the peremptory challenge through consistent application of the heavy artillery of the Equal Protection Clause. Eiland, 92 Md.App. at 88, 90, 607 A.2d at 58, 59. It is noteworthy that in extending Batson to sex-based peremptory strikes, we applied strict scrutiny to vindicate the right of an individual stricken juror not to suffer state sanctioned discrimination, rejecting a separate but equal approach. See Tyler, 330 Md. at 263, 623 A.2d at 649 (`[T]he State's privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.'), quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d at 82. Compare Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222, 85 S.Ct. 824, 837, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 773 (1965) ([W]e cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case.), with Batson, 476 U.S. at 92 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 1721 n. 17, 90 L.Ed.2d at 85 n. 17 (In overruling Swain, the Court noted the practical difficulties faced by the defendant who must demonstrate a systematic use of peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans over a number of cases.). Whereas Swain burdened the defendant with the virtually impossible task of demonstrating a pervasive discriminatory pattern over the course of many trials, Batson reduced the defendant's evidentiary burden by focusing on a single trial, and then shifting the burden of persuasion to the State upon satisfaction of a greatly diminished burden of production by the defendant. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88. Moreover, the Batson Court noted the application of equal protection principles to the excluded jurors, not merely to the defendant. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. Ultimately, the Supreme Court recognized explicitly the equal protection right of an individual juror not to be excluded from [a petit jury] on account of race in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 424 (1991), where the Court extended Batson to cover instances of peremptory strikes exercised against potential jurors of a different race than that of a criminal defendant and repudiated the doctrine of separate but equal in the context of peremptory challenges. The Court consciously reject[ed] . . . the view that race-based peremptory challenges survive equal protection scrutiny because members of all races are subject to like treatment, which is to say that white jurors are subject to the same risk of peremptory challenges based on race as are all other jurors. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410, 111 S.Ct. at 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d at 424-25. See also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 159, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1437, 128 L.Ed.2d 89, 116 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for focusing unrealistically upon individual exercises of the peremptory challenge, and arguing unsuccessfully in favor of a group-based equal protection analysis of sex-based peremptory strikes). Thus, in adopting the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis under Batson and its progeny and applying that reasoning in light of the ERA, our holding in Tyler flatly contradicts the equal application approach espoused by the majority in the instant case. Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. at 133, 716 A.2d at 1029, likewise was entirely consistent with the interpretation of the ERA as applicable to individuals. In Giffin, this Court faced the question whether Article 46 permitted a judge to weigh, as a relevant factor in a child custody proceeding, the sex of either parent in awarding physical custody. Id. at 143, 716 A.2d at 1034. We noted that, under the best interest of the child standard, the trial judge exercises broad discretion. Id. at 144-45, 716 A.2d at 1035. That discretion is not unlimited, however; the judge cannot, consistent with the clear, unambiguous and unequivocal language of Article 46, id. at 148, 716 A.2d at 1037, assume that a parent will be a better custodian of her child solely because she is of the same sex. Id. at 155, 716 A.2d at 1040. We said that this Court has interpreted the Amendment's `broad, sweeping mandatory language,' as the expression of Maryland's commitment to equal rights for men and women and the statement of its intention to alter traditional attitudes with respect to such rights. Id. at 151, 716 A.2d at 1038, quoting Rand, 280 Md. at 515, 374 A.2d at 905 (citation omitted). Furthermore, the equality between the sexes demanded by the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment focuses on `rights' of individuals `under the law,' which encompasses all forms of privileges, immunities, benefits and responsibilities of citizens. Id. at 149, 716 A.2d at 1037, quoting Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 70, 501 A.2d at 825 (emphasis added). We applied this understanding of the ERA to invalidate a custody award based on whether a parent and the child were of the same or opposite sex, despite the fact that a sex-matched custody determination would satisfy the equal application approach. In Blount v. Boston, 351 Md. 360, 718 A.2d 1111 (1998), a candidate running for Maryland State Senate filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to strike the name of his opponent from the ballot on the basis of an alleged failure to satisfy the residency requirements. At issue was whether the incumbent, Senator Clarence W. Blount, could run for re-election in a district entirely in Baltimore City despite the fact that he spent some 90 percent of his nights at a condominium maintained by his wife in Pikesville, Baltimore County. Id. at 375, 718 A.2d at 1119. This Court conducted a thorough analysis of the law of domicile in light of Article III, Section 9 of the Maryland Constitution, [38] because our case law has construed resided to mean domiciled. Blount, 351 Md. at 365, 718 A.2d at 1113. Although the domicile of Mrs. Blount was not directly at issue, this Court noted that [i]t is obvious that the general rule [that a married woman's domicile was determined by that of her husband regardless of her domiciliary intent] . . . was overruled by Article 46. Id. at 385 n. 5, 718 A.2d at 1124 n. 5. Other cases have affirmed that strict scrutiny is the rule applied to state action that draws classifications on the basis of sex. See Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 717 n. 10, 908 A.2d 1220, 1236 n. 10 (2006) (`[B]ecause of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Maryland Constitution . . ., classifications based on gender are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.'); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 357 n. 7, 601 A.2d 102, 109 n. 7 (1992) (same); Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 366, 597 A.2d 432, 443 (1991) (sex-based discharge of State employee clearly not permitted by Article 46); Briscoe v. Prince George's County Health Dept., 323 Md. 439, 452 n. 7, 593 A.2d 1109, 1115 n. 7 (1991) ([B]ecause of Article 46 . . ., gender-based classifications are suspect and are subject to strict scrutiny. Consequently, a classification based on gender is in no way comparable to an employment classification based on different occupations.) (citations omitted).
Because it is settled law in Maryland that sex-based classifications implicate strict scrutiny under the ERA, Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 293-96, 554 A.2d at 386-87, the majority must look, as it does, to cases from our sister states that refuse to acknowledge the sex-based classifications inherent in their same-sex marriage prohibitions, thereby avoiding ERA scrutiny altogether. See op. at 265-67, 932 A.2d at 598-99. Several cases cited by the majority, however, were decided on grounds other than the ERA, and thus, are completely irrelevant to the question of the applicable standard of review under our ERA. Among these are In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.2004) (decided under federal law); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1 (2006) (no state ERA); Baker v. Vermont, 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864 (1999) (same); and Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971) (same). In cases that actually applied some version of the ERA to sex-based classifications, courts have consistently adopted strict scrutiny as the proper analytical framework. For example, the Supreme Court of New Mexico considered whether the Secretary of the New Mexico Human Services Department could implement a regulation, Rule 766, [39] restricting state reimbursement to abortion providers under the Medicaid program. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 126 N.M. 788, 975 P.2d 841 (1998). In 1995, the Department amended Rule 766 to restrict state funding of abortions to cases certified by a physician as necessary to save the life of the mother, to terminate an ectopic pregnancy, [40] or in cases of rape or incest, id. at 846, whereas the previous version of the rule permitted state funding under a much broader definition of medical necessity that included any pregnancy having a profound negative impact upon the physical or mental health of an individual. Id. at 845. Because federal law prohibits reimbursement except in cases of rape or incest, or to save the life of the mother, but permits states, at their own expense, to reimburse all medically necessary abortions, id., the plaintiffs argued that the New Mexico Constitution afforded greater protection than the federal law. Id. at 850. The court interpreted the New Mexico ERA [41] as providing that enhanced protection, and that Rule 766 did not escape heightened scrutiny merely because it was based on a physical characteristic, the ability to become pregnant and bear children, unique to females. Id. at 851, 854-55. Because Rule 766 did not apply the same standard of medical necessity to both males and females, the rule was presumptively unconstitutional under the ERA, and the court found no compelling justification for the rule. Id. at 857. The court based its reasoning on the intent behind the enactment of the ERA; it cited Ellis, 311 N.E.2d at 101, and Darrin, 540 P.2d at 889, and adopted the same analysis, that the intent of the ERA was to provid[e] something beyond that already afforded by the general language of the Equal Protection Clause. N.M. Right to Choose, 975 P.2d at 851-52. The court said: Based on our review of the text and history of our state constitution, we conclude that New Mexico's Equal Rights Amendment is a specific prohibition that provides a legal remedy for the invidious consequences of the gender-based discrimination that prevailed under the common law and civil law traditions that preceded it. As such, the Equal Rights Amendment requires a searching judicial inquiry concerning state laws that employ gender-based classifications. This inquiry must begin from the premise that such classifications are presumptively unconstitutional, and it is the State's burden to rebut this presumption. Id. at 853. The Department argued that Rule 766 should not have been subjected to strict scrutiny because the classification at issue was based on a physical condition unique to one sex, and thus, males and females could not possibly be situated similarly with respect to that condition. Id. at 854. The court conceded that not all classifications based on physical characteristics unique to one sex are instances of invidious discrimination, and thus, the presumptive unconstitutionality of such classifications is rebuttable. Id. See Brown, supra at 893. The court emphasized, however, that similarly situated cannot mean simply that every member of the class possesses the classifying trait, because under that test, every classification would be reasonable. N.M. Right to Choose, 975 P.2d at 854. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L.Rev. 341, 345 (1949). Instead, the court looked `beyond the classification to the purpose of the law.' N.M. Right to Choose, 975 P.2d at 854, quoting Tussman & tenBrock, supra, at 346. Accord Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 100, 501 A.2d at 841 ([A]n inquiry into the actual facts, to determine the existence of a discriminatory purpose and impact, is appropriate.). Because the statutory purpose was to provide qualified persons with necessary medical care, the court found that men and women who met a general need-based test for Medicaid eligibility were similarly situated, N.M. Right to Choose, 975 P.2d at 855, but that Rule 766 applied a different standard of medical necessity to women than to men. Id. at 856. The Department alleged two compelling interests, cost reduction and the protection of potential life, but the court found them self-contradictory and inadequate, id. at 856-57, and that Rule 766 was not narrowly tailored to achieving those interests. Id. at 857. In Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash.2d 660, 940 P.2d 642 (1997), the Supreme Court of Washington addressed the constitutionality of a wrongful death statute [42] that required a father to have provided regular contributions to the support of a deceased, illegitimate child as a prerequisite to have standing, but imposed no such requirement on the mother. The court applied the ERA to invalidate the statute, and to sever the support provision, affirming the decision of the intermediate appellate court. Id. at 645, aff'g Guard v. Jackson, 83 Wash.App. 325, 921 P.2d 544 (1996). The court contrasted its standard of review of sex-based classifications with the more lenient federal equal protection standard, [43] id. at 643, and noted that under Darrin and the ERA, `the equal protection/suspect classification test is replaced by the single criterion: Is the classification by sex discriminatory?' Id. at 644. Noting there had been few exceptions to the ERA-mandated prohibition of sex-based classifications, id., the court held that the sex-based classification in the wrongful death statute did not bear even a rational relationship to the statutory purpose of excluding as plaintiffs those parents who fail to support their children. Id. at 645. The Supreme Court of Colorado applied the closest judicial scrutiny under that state's ERA [44] to a sex-based classification in Colorado Civil Rights Commission v. Travelers Insurance Co., 759 P.2d 1358, 1363 (Colo.1988). The case involved statutory and administrative prohibitions against sex discrimination, allegedly violated by an employer whose group health insurance excluded coverage for expenses incurred for normal pregnancy and childbirth. Id. at 1359. The insurer argued that the exclusion did not discriminate against women, because there was no risk from which men were protected but women were not; however, the court disagreed. Id. at 1363. Instead, the court found discrimination because the insurance plan provided full coverage for men, including conditions for which men were uniquely susceptible, but did not cover pregnancy, a condition unique to women. Id. The court rejected the argument that the health plan treated all pregnant people alike, and held that the definition of the recipient class was inherently discriminatory, because the classification excluded all women from reimbursement for the expenses associated with a physiological condition that affects only women. Id. at 1364.
The majority in the present case considers a number of cases from our sister states as persuasive authority. See op. at 265-67, 932 A.2d at 598-99. As I have pointed out, many of these cases did not address the application of equal rights amendments. Of those that did, two are most significant: Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash.2d 1, 138 P.3d 963 (2006), and Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). Because there have been close parallels between ERA jurisprudence in Maryland and Washington State, Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 95-96, 501 A.2d at 838-39; Rand, 280 Md. at 512-15, 374 A.2d at 903-04, and because that State has interpreted its ERA to be inapplicable to same-sex marriage, it is important to examine Washington case law in this area. Unlike in Maryland, there was a legal challenge to the statutory ban on same-sex marriages in Washington shortly after that State adopted its ERA. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1187. Two men who had been denied a marriage license sought a court order to compel a county official to issue the license, and when the trial court denied their motion to show cause why the license should not be issued, the men appealed on several grounds: first, they alleged the trial court erred in construing the statute to prohibit same-sex marriage; second, the appellants claimed that the marriage statute as applied violated the ERA; and third, the appellants claimed violations of the Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1188-89. During the relevant time period, the marriage statute stated as follows: Marriage is a civil contract which may be entered into by persons of the age of eighteen years, who are otherwise capable: Provided, That every marriage entered into in which either party shall not have attained the age of seventeen years shall be void except where this section has been waived by a superior court judge of the county in which the female resides on a showing of necessity. Id. at 1189 n. 2; Wash. Rev.Code Section 26.04.010 (1970). The Court of Appeals of Washington interpreted the statute to prohibit same-sex marriage, relying in part on the plain language of the statute, which used the word female in singular form, thereby implying that a male was contemplated as the other marriage partner, and relying also on the context provided by closely related statutes, [45] which at several points referred explicitly to male and female. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1189 & n. 3. The appellate court then rejected the contention that the statute as applied violated the ERA. Id. at 1190-95. The appellants argued that to construe state law to permit a man to marry a woman but at the same time to deny him the right to marry another man is to construct an unconstitutional classification `on account of sex,' but the court agreed with the State's contention that so long as marriage licenses are denied equally to both male and female pairs, there was no ERA violation. Id. at 1190-91. The court determined that the definition of marriage was the legal union of one man and one woman, and that, in previous cases, this definition was deemed by the court in each case to be so obvious as not to require recitation. Id. at 1191-92. The court then concluded that the appellants had been denied a marriage license because of the recognized definition of that relationship as one which may be entered into only by two persons who are members of the opposite sex, not because of their sex; thus, there was no sex-based classification. Id. at 1192. Therefore, in the court's view, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 1, 87 S.Ct. at 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1010, and Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), the seminal cases invalidating anti-miscegenation statutes, were inapplicable. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1192 n. 8 (maintaining that Loving and Perez did not change the basic definition of marriage as the legal union of one man and one woman). Finally, the court applied rational basis review to affirm the trial court ruling on the federal constitutional issues. Id. at 1195-97. More recently, the Supreme Court of Washington was faced with the same question addressed in Singer. In Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d at 963, a challenge to the Washington Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), [46] the court considered the constitutionality of the same-sex marriage prohibition. The court followed the ERA analysis of the Singer court, stating: Men and women are treated identically under DOMA; neither may marry a person of the same sex. DOMA therefore does not make any classification by sex, and it does not discriminate on account of sex. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 988, citing Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195. In this respect, the Andersen court echoes the opinion of the majority in the instant case. See op. at 265-66, 932 A.2d at 599. The difficulty lies in the inability of the Andersen court to recognize the true nature of the classification at issue; by failing to distinguish between sex-based classifications and those grounded in sexual orientation, the court avoids application of the ERA at the outset. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 988 (denial of marriage license not based on their sex but upon the fact they were both of the same sex), citing Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195. Cf. op. at 277, 932 A.2d at 605 (While Family Law § 2-201 does not draw a distinction based on sex, the legislation does differentiate implicitly on the basis of sexual preference.). In all significant respects, the Andersen court adopted the ERA analysis of Singer, and thus, makes the same errors. Furthermore, the majority in the present case adopts the analysis of Singer and Andersen, and therefore, adopts those errors as well. In my view, the Singer court erred in two significant respects: first, the court misconstrued the nature of the classification established by the same-sex marriage prohibition; second, the court analyzed the impact of the classification scheme as it applied to couples, rather than to individuals, and cited no authority for so doing. The Washington same-sex marriage prohibition did classify on grounds of sex, because a homosexual was permitted to marry a partner of the opposite sex, but was prohibited from marrying a partner of the same sex. Indeed, Wash. Rev.Code Section 26.04.010 (1970) as construed by the Singer court effected a classification scheme identical to that contained in Family Law Section 2-201 in the instant case. Therefore, the Singer court avoided the ERA question though an analytical error whereby the court failed to recognize that the definition of marriage itself was part of a sex-based classification scheme, and thus, the court analyzed the issue under an incorrect standard of review under its own state law. An interesting distinction may be drawn between Singer and the present case. Whereas the Singer court defined marriage as the legal union of one man and one woman on the basis of case law and the overall context of the statutory scheme, 522 P.2d at 1191, the present case differs because the plain language of Section 2-201 draws a distinction between a marriage between a man and a woman, and marriages between two men or two women. Furthermore, Section 2-201 clearly contemplates the possibility of marriages between two men or two women, because it singles out for special treatment only those marriages between a man and a woman. Therefore, the language of Section 2-201 itself refutes the notion that the definition of marriage necessarily does not include same-sex marriages. [47] In its analysis of the impact of the same-sex marriage prohibition on the appellants, the Singer court implicitly adopted the separate but equal theory relied upon by the majority in the instant case. Compare id. ([T]he state suggests that appellants are not entitled to relief under the ERA because they have failed to make a showing that they are somehow being treated differently by the state than they would be if they were females. Appellants suggest, however, that the holdings in [ Loving, Perez ] and J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Lacey , [ [48] ] are contrary to the position taken by the state. We disagree.), with op. at 264, 932 A.2d at 598 ([Family Law Section 2-201] prohibits equally both men and women from the same conduct.). Thus, the majority in the present case commits the same error as the Singer court: in order to find no sex-based classification in the same-sex marriage prohibition, both analyses compare the rights of a male couple to those of a female couple. The majority offers no principled basis for applying equal protection analysis to couples rather than to individuals, for the simple reason that there is no principled basis for the distinction. In order to get around this obstacle, the majority posits the notion that Family Law Section 2-201 is facially neutral, and hence, the proper test for evaluating whether sex discrimination has occurred is to search for a discriminatory purpose. See op. at 270-71, 932 A.2d at 601-02. Having determined, mistakenly in my view, that Section 2-201 does not classify on the basis of sex, the majority then reaches the conclusion that the purpose of the same-sex marriage prohibition cannot be linked to a `design[ ] to subordinate either men to women or women to men as a class.' See op. at 270, 932 A.2d at 601, quoting [49] Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1, 11 (2006). Having avoided the sex-based classification at issue, and having found no invidious purpose, the majority in the present case retreats to rational basis review. See op. at 260-65, 932 A.2d at 595-98. In reaching this result, the majority breathes life into the corpse of separate but equal that this Court laid to rest in Burning Tree II. It saddens me to say that Judge Eldridge's worst fears have now come to fruition: The principal purpose of this opinion is to respond to the positions taken in Parts VI-IX of Chief Judge Murphy's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, even though that opinion is not an opinion of the Court. If the views set forth in Parts VI-VIII of Chief Judge Murphy's opinion were in the future to be adopted by a majority of this Court, the effectiveness of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Maryland Constitution would be substantially impaired. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 88, 501 A.2d at 835.
Our cases stand for the proposition that all state action that draws sex-based distinctions, regardless of whether such action directly impos[es] a burden or confer[s] a benefit entirely upon either males or females, id. at 95, 501 A.2d at 838 (opinion of Eldridge, J.), implicates the ERA and must be subjected to strict scrutiny. See In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. 267, 279 n. 13, 923 A.2d 115, 122 n. 13 (2007) (This Court has applied a strict scrutiny standard when reviewing gender-based discrimination claims.); Murphy, 325 Md. at 357 n. 7, 601 A.2d at 109 n. 7 (In Maryland, because of the Equal Rights Amendment to the Maryland Constitution . . ., classifications based on gender are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.); Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 293, 554 A.2d at 386 (In [Burning Tree I], . . . a majority of this Court took the position that the enactment of legislation which on its face draws classifications based on sex is state action sufficient to invoke the E.R.A.). Until today, this Court has never shied away from that standard when applying the ERA. See Giffin, 351 Md. at 148, 716 A.2d at 1037 ([T]he [Equal Rights] Amendment can only mean that sex is not, and can not be, a factor in the enjoyment or the determination of legal rights.); id. at 149, 716 A.2d at 1037 ([T]he Equal Rights Amendment flatly prohibits gender-based classifications, absent substantial justification, whether contained in legislative enactments, governmental policies, or by application of common law rules.); Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 295, 554 A.2d at 387 (Plainly, under prior holdings of this Court, state action providing for segregation based upon sex, absent substantial justification, violates the E.R.A., just as segregation based upon race violates the Fourteenth Amendment.); Rand, 280 Md. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03 (The words of the E.R.A. are clear and unambiguous; they say without equivocation that `Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.' This language mandating equality of rights can only mean that sex is not a factor.). In a recent case we reviewed the constitutionality of a statutory scheme [50] permitting challenges to paternity, and applied strict scrutiny, In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 279 n. 13, 923 A.2d at 122 n. 13, to hold that the statutes must be construed in a sex-neutral fashion. Id. at 283, 923 A.2d at 124. On its face, Title 5, Subtitle 10 of the Family Law Article contemplated only the right of a man, found not genetically linked to a child, to petition a court to set aside a declaration of paternity. [51] We applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to infer a judicial gloss to a statutory scheme that was silent to the possibility that a gestational mother could challenge maternity. Id. at 278-79, 283-84, 923 A.2d at 121-22, 124-25. Our analysis focused on the unequal application of Subtitle 10 to a particular woman, and was not predicated on a group-by-group comparison. We held that the ERA mandated a focus on the unequal treatment of an individual under the law; just as the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to state-sanctioned discrimination against persons of all races on a purportedly equal basis, Powers, 499 U.S. at 410, 111 S.Ct. at 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d at 425; Loving, 388 U.S. at 8, 87 S.Ct. at 1822, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1016, [52] so too have we held that the equal application of discriminatory laws does not preclude strict scrutiny under Article 46. In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 282-84, 923 A.2d at 124-25; Giffin, 351 Md. at 148-49, 716 A.2d at 1037; Burning Tree II, 315 Md. at 293-95, 554 A.2d at 386-87; Rand, 280 Md. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-05. In the instant case, the State argues on the basis of the equal application theory of the ERA that Section 2-201 does not implicate Article 46. In its brief, the State points to the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Murphy in Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 64, 501 A.2d at 822, to support its view that Section 2-201 passes muster because its prohibitions burden both sexes equally. To bolster its argument, the State quotes from Giffin, 351 Md. at 149, 716 A.2d at 1037, which in turn cites the opinion of Chief Judge Murphy in Burning Tree I. The State omits the following key portion from Giffin: [T]he equality between the sexes demanded by the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment focuses on `rights' of individuals `under the law,' which encompasses all forms of privileges, immunities, benefits and responsibilities of citizens. Id. Thus, the passage from Giffin does not support the State's argument; neither does the Court's holding in the case, as I explained previously. Furthermore, as I have explained in great detail, the opinion of Chief Judge Murphy in Burning Tree I was a minority view insofar as its theory of the scope and effect of the ERA was concerned. Therefore, the State's argument is fundamentally misplaced. Likewise, the State's reliance on Cannon v. Cannon, 384 Md. 537, 572 n. 19, 865 A.2d 563, 583 n. 19 (2005), is unpersuasive. Although Cannon was correct about the inapplicability of the ERA to the confidential relationship and concomitant duty to disclose inhering in antenuptial agreements, the reason for the legally imposed duty arises out of fundamental principles of contract law. Id. at 556 n. 8, 570-71, 865 A.2d at 573 n. 8, 582-83 (contrasting antenuptial and post-marital agreements, and noting that the ERA invalidated gender-based classification only in the latter case). To summarize, in a long line of cases extending back to Giffin, Burning Tree I and II, Condore, Kline and Rand, we have consistently interpreted the ERA to require that the rights of any person cannot depend on sex-based classifications, unless the State demonstrates a compelling governmental interest, and then only if the classification is narrowly tailored and precisely limited to achieving that compelling interest. Today this Court denies the commitment to equal rights made by the General Assembly and ratified by the People of this State in 1972. As we said in Giffin, 351 Md. at 148-49, 716 A.2d at 1037, and iterated in In re Roberto d.B., 399 Md. at 281, 923 A.2d at 123-24: The basic principle of the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment, thus, is that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal rights of women, or men, so that the treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the circumstance that such person is of one sex or the other[;] that amendment generally invalidates governmental action which imposes a burden on, or grants a benefit to, one sex but not the other one. (emphasis added). Clearly, this language means that the analysis must focus on the individual whose rights are infringed by the sex-based classification, because rights accrue to the individual, not to couples, or to some abstract group entity. We emphasized that equal rights between the sexes are personal, not group, rights: [T]he equality between the sexes demanded by the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment focuses on `rights' of individuals `under the law,' which encompasses all forms of privileges, immunities, benefits and responsibilities of citizens. As to these, the Maryland E.R.A. absolutely forbids the determination of such `rights,' as may be accorded by law, solely on the basis of one's sex, i.e., sex is an impermissible factor in making any such determination. Id. at 281-82, 923 A.2d at 124, quoting Giffin, 351 Md. at 149, 716 A.2d at 1037 (alteration in original). The majority in the present case deliberately misconstrues the passage quoted above through selective quotation, conveniently omitting the second sentence, to support its narrowly constrained view of the ERA as somehow permitting separate but equal in matters of sex discrimination. See op. at 258-59, 932 A.2d at 594-95. Its strained interpretation ignores what until today had been well-settled in Maryland: the ERA is intended to address the rights of individuals, not the rights of men and women as classes.  See op. at 259, 932 A.2d at 595 (emphasis in original). Our predecessors stated a similar idea in Rand, 280 Md. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03: The words of the E.R.A. are clear and unambiguous; they say without equivocation that Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex. I repeat: the words of the ERA are clear and unambiguous and can only mean that the rights of any person under the law cannot be abridged because of sex. The majority today pursues a results-based jurisprudence that distorts our case law construing the ERA, and in so doing, dilutes its effect.