Opinion ID: 2364609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remaining Issues in the Pro Se Motion

Text: McDaris alleges in the pro se motion that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to accept his plea because a motion to change judge had been filed, and wrongly denied. The motion court apparently found this allegation not cognizable in a proceeding under Rule 24.035. A change of judge is mandatory only if filed within thirty days after arraignment or designation of the trial judge, whichever is later. See Rule 32.07(c). The rules of the 31st Circuit Court assign cases to judges shortly after filing. See Local Rules 6.2.3(b), 6.5.3. Arraignment occurred on April 13, 1990. The motion to disqualify was not filed until December 31, 1990, and thus was not mandatory. McDaris also alleges that the plea judge was biased and should have recused himself. Even if there were a possible ground for recusal, the court itself decides if the bias threatens fundamental fairness (subject to review for abuse of discretion). See State v. Frederickson, 739 S.W.2d 708, 710-11 (Mo. banc 1987); State v. Cooper, 811 S.W.2d 786, 790-91 (Mo. App.1991); Callahan v. State, 712 S.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Mo.App.1986). A guilty plea especially where a plea agreement controls sentencewaives such errors. Tygart v. State, 752 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo.App.1988) (appeal of guilty plea limited to jurisdiction over the case and sufficiency of the indictment or information). Such errors are not cognizable under Rule 24.035; the motion court did not clearly err in dismissing this claim.
McDaris alleges, in the pro se motion, prejudice from the failure of Dean Pricethe original defense counselto file certain motions and otherwise actively defend the case. The motion court found this allegation refuted by the record, as were claims that Price admitted an inability to adequately represent McDaris. All other claims were characterized as conclusory and unsupported by factual allegations. The record does indicate that Price did file some motions. As for unfiled motions, the pro se motion does not show any grounds for believing they had merit. These statements are, as noted by the motion court, conclusory. In addition, any ineffectiveness by Price is irrelevant due to his replacement by Saulter. None of the motionswhich Price should have supposedly filedhad to be filed before trial, and thus could have been filed after the appointment of Saulter. Rule 24.05. McDaris additionally alleges ineffectiveness in connection with some motion for a speedy trial, which should have been filedan allegation found conclusory by the motion court. As the trial was set for January 8, 1991about five months after the last docket entry showing Price's actsand McDaris pled guilty on that date, nothing in the pro se motion shows that McDaris would not have pled guilty if the trial had been set earlier. As such, McDaris failed to state a claim of prejudice from Price's behavior and is not entitled to relief. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
The motion court found that the claim of double jeopardy was not cognizable in a Rule 24.035 motion. A double jeopardy claim can be raised in a Rule 24.035 proceeding, if the face of the record shows that the conviction or sentence violates double jeopardy. Hagan v. State, 836 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Mo. banc 1992). McDaris's claim of double jeopardy in his pro se motion alleges that Counts V and VI are the same offense. These two counts allege separate violations for his sale of two different drug packets to two officersone packet to each officer with the sale of each packet negotiated separatelyat the same meeting. Because there were two separate quantities sold to two individuals and two separate negotiations for these two sales, Counts V and VI are not the same offense. See State v. Woodfin, 559 S.W.2d 273, 275-77 (Mo.App. 1977); State v. Gordon, 536 S.W.2d 811, 818-21 (Mo.App.1976); cf. Parker v. State, 608 S.W.2d 543, 546-47 (Mo.App.1980) (emphasizing that it is the number of sales and not the number of individuals which determines the number of offenses). Thus, conviction and punishment for both counts does not constitute a double jeopardy violation.
McDaris alleges that § 195.214 violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the United States and Missouri Constitutions. McDaris notes that some of the sales occurred in his home near a school, but when students were not in the area. McDaris recognizes that § 195.214 has some rational basisa state interest in drug-free zones around schoolsbut argues that the circumstances of his offense make the statute unconstitutional as applied to him. The motion court found that this issue was not cognizable in a Rule 24.035 motion. The State argues that this issue was not preserved (even if cognizable) because not raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Assuming arguendo that the issue is properly before this Court, it is meritless. A similar argumentalleging that § 195.214 was overbroadhas been previously rejected. State v. Prowell, 834 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Mo.App.1992). Likewise, every federal court to face the issue has rejected similar challenges to the federal statute on drug sales near schools, 21 U.S.C. § 860. See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 911 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.1990) (rejecting argument that application of statute to sales between two adults violated due process and equal protection). [3] McDaris assumes that the State, after deciding to clear an area of drugs, may only keep that area clear of drugs at a particular time and in a particular way. Having a rational basis for a drug-free zone, the State may preserve the zone at all times.