Opinion ID: 2632550
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brass' conduct rendered the post-conviction proceedings unreliable, thereby prejudicing Menzies' case

Text: ¶ 97 Our second inquiry under the Strickland test is whether Brass' actions prejudiced Menzies' case. Under this portion of the analysis, a litigant is required to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Judicial proceedings are normally entitled to a strong presumption of reliability, and therefore a litigant must overcome this presumption by demonstrating that counsel's errors rendered the proceeding unreliable. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 482, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 98 However, if a litigant is constructively denied the assistance of counsel in a proceeding in which he or she is entitled to counsel, the adversary process itself is rendered inherently unreliable, and prejudice is legally presumed. See id. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A litigant can be constructively denied counsel in several ways. For example, a constructive denial of counsel occurs if counsel completely fails to subject the opposition's case to meaningful adversarial testing. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843; Collins, 430 F.3d at 1265; Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1208 (10th Cir.2004). In Turrentine, the Tenth Circuit stated this occurs where the evidence overwhelmingly establishe[s] that [the] attorney abandoned the required duty of loyalty to his client, and where counsel acted with reckless disregard for his client's best interests and, at times, apparently with the intention to weaken his client's case. 390 F.3d at 1208 (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Collins, the Tenth Circuit expanded upon this reasoning and held that an attorney failed to subject the opposition's case to meaningful adversarial testingdespite not recklessly disregarding his client's interestsbecause he did not argue his client's position at a competency hearing due to a pending motion to withdraw. 430 F.3d at 1265. The court noted that the proceeding was inherently unreliable because counsel had not engage[d] his legal skills in advocating [his client's] position. Id. at 1266. ¶ 99 Constructive denials of counsel have also been found where, due to counsel's deficient performance, a proceeding itself is forfeited. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483-84, 120 S.Ct. 1029. A denial of the entire judicial proceeding itself, which a [litigant] wanted at the time and to which he had a right, . . . demands a presumption of prejudice because the litigant has been entirely denied the adversary process. Id. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029. Because no presumption of reliability can be accorded to judicial proceedings that never took place, a forfeiture due to counsel's deficient representation renders the proceedings inherently unreliable. Id. ¶ 100 Whether a litigant is required to show actual prejudice or whether prejudice is instead presumed turns on the magnitude of the deprivation of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 482, 120 S.Ct. 1029. In this case, Brass' abdication of his duties was of sufficient magnitude to presume prejudice and meets both of the exceptions discussed above. First, Brass completely failed to provide meaningful adversarial testing because he took no actions to develop Menzies' case and did not respond to any of the State's various motions. Brass not only acted with reckless disregard for Menzies' case, but he willfully disregarded nearly every aspect of it. Second, Brass' actions effectively forfeited the entire post-conviction proceeding itself. Brass never responded to the State's repeated discovery requests and never informed Menzies or the court of his failures or the reasons for them. The result is that discovery sanctions were imposed preventing Menzies from doing anything to establish his grounds for relief. After the discovery sanctions were imposed, there were no disputed issues of material fact because no facts had been introduced to support Menzies' claims, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. In summary, Brass' performance not only failed to subject the State's case to the crucible of meaningful adversary testing but also resulted in the denial of the post-conviction proceeding itself. Under these circumstances, Brass' actions were clearly prejudicial. Accordingly, Menzies is entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(6).