Opinion ID: 1920466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Acceptance

Text: The mutual assent which is the essential feature of every contract is crystallized when there is a knowing and sufficient acceptance to a certain and definite offer. Peer v. First Fed. S. & L. Ass'n, supra, 273 Md. at 614. Supreme urges that even if it made a certain and definite offer, there was no valid acceptance by Blake so as to give rise to a binding contract. It puts the issue in the context of Maryland Rule 886 and asserts that the judgment of the lower court on the evidence that there was an acceptance was clearly erroneous and should be set aside. We have no difficulty in determining that the lower court was not clearly wrong in ruling that Blake accepted Supreme's offer. As we have indicated, what is involved here is the sale of goods within the contemplation of the UCC. We start, therefore, with the basic principles that the contract may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract, and that an agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined. UCC § 2-204 (1) and (2). The Official Comment to subsection (1) states that appropriate conduct by the parties may be sufficient to establish an agreement. We also note that unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by language or circumstances, [a]n offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances. UCC § 2-206 (1) (a). The Official Comment to § 2-206 observes: Any reasonable manner of acceptance is intended to be regarded as available unless the offeror has made quite clear that it will not be acceptable. Former technical rules as to acceptance ... are rejected and a criterion that the acceptance be in any manner and by any medium reasonable under the circumstances, is substituted. The trial court found as a fact that Blake promptly notified Supreme of its successful bid, and verbally accepted Supreme's offer, that Blake began ordering as concrete was needed, and continued to do so until it received a letter from Supreme dated October 24, 1975 [raising the price], and that Supreme and Blake had several times done business before, and ... that the procedure in this case was as it had always been before. There was credible evidence to support these findings. Applying the applicable statutory provisions of the UCC to these facts leads to the conclusion that the verbal acceptance by Blake of Supreme's offer was reasonable in the circumstances, that Blake did so accept it, and that the conduct of the parties, particularly that of Supreme in delivering concrete and that of Blake in accepting and paying for it, recognized the existence of a contract. There being legally sufficient evidence for the court as the trier of fact to find that Blake in Supreme's offer, that judgment on the evidence was not clearly erroneous. Delmarva Drill Co. v. Tuckahoe, 268 Md. 417, 424, 302 A.2d 37 (1973); Knowles v. Binford, 268 Md. 2, 10-12, 298 A.2d 862 (1973).