Opinion ID: 203163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Procedural Objection.

Text: The appellants claim that the August IEP was incomplete and that the December IEP was so tardy as to constitute a per se denial of Stephanie's right to a FAPE. In mounting this argument, they emphasize the IDEA's requirement that [a]t the beginning of each school year, each local educational agency . . . shall have in effect, for each child with a disability in its jurisdiction, an individualized education program. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A). This assault depends entirely on the alleged incompleteness of the August IEP. That allegation is grounded on two perceived shortcomings in that document: the truncated transition plan and the absence of a behavioral plan. The appellants contend that these shortcomings eloquently attest that the August IEP offered Stephanie only a fraction of what she was entitled to receive. This contention substantially misconceives what the IDEA requires. The transition plan contained in the August IEP consists solely of background information and performance goals, and suddenly ends mid-sentence. That is hardly a full-fledged transition plan. The rub, however, is that the IDEA does not require a stand-alone transition plan as part of an IEP. Sections 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii)(I) and (II), reproduced in the margin, [3] require that IEPs contain statements of transition services. But neither section requires that those statements be articulated in a separate component of the IEP. In fact, section 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii)(I) specifically contemplates the inclusion of statements of transition services under the applicable components of the child's IEP. Thus, merely pointing to the absence of a stand-alone transition plan cannot form the basis for a founded claim of procedural error. To be sure, the statutory provisions quoted in the margin implicitly acknowledge that transition services must be provided to disabled children who need them, in accordance with the Rowley standard. See, e.g., Browell v. Lemahieu, 127 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1126 (D.Haw.2000). Here, however, the appellants have made no claim that the August IEP lacks sufficient transition services (which, in fact, are integrated throughout the IEP's various components). We thus reject the transition plan claim of error. An even more egregious misunderstanding of the IDEA's requirements undermines the claim of procedural error based on a missing behavioral plan. The IDEA only requires a behavioral plan when certain disciplinary actions are taken against a disabled child. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(k)(1)(A) & (B); see also Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir.2004). The appellants make no claim that the necessary disciplinary predicate had transpired in this instance. The other statutory provision cited by the appellants  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i)  also falls short of requiring a behavioral plan as an ubiquitous feature in every IEP. That statute, in terms, directs IEP teams to consider, when appropriate, formulating such plans. The record is pellucid that, by the time the August IEP was prepared, the IEP team already had considered and formulated a behavioral plan but had opted not to include it in the IEP pending Crotched Mountain's approval. In a last-ditch effort to turn the tide, the appellants call our attention to a federal regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(c) (2000), which states: If . . . the IEP team determines that a child needs a particular device or service (including an intervention, accommodation, or other program modification) in order for the child to receive FAPE, the IEP team must include a statement to that effect in the child's IEP. Although such a regulation is entitled to judicial deference, see Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 161 (1st Cir.2004), this regulation did not require the August IEP to encompass a behavioral plan, merely to consider formulating one. Here, the IEP team mulled the matter and determined that a behavioral plan was not necessary in order to afford Stephanie a FAPE. No more was exigible. That effectively ends this aspect of the matter. We conclude, without serious question, that the district court did not err in finding that the absence of either a transition or behavioral plan did not constitute a procedural defect within the meaning of the IDEA. Once it is determined that the August IEP was complete, the appellants' argument quickly unravels. All that remains is the lack of a signed IEP at the start of the school year. But even in a regime in which parental assent is required before an IEP can become effective, it cannot be that a school system transgresses the IDEA whenever a parent  for whatever reason  refuses to sign a completed IEP before the school year commences. Otherwise, school systems would be at the mercy of obdurate parents  a result plainly at odds with the collaborative relationship fostered by the IDEA framework. See, e.g., Five Town, 513 F.3d at 285 (The development of an IEP is meant to be a collaborative project.); MM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523, 535 (4th Cir.2002) (explaining that it would be improper to hold [a] School District liable for the procedural violation of failing to have the IEP completed and signed, when that failure was the result of [the parents'] lack of cooperation) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, a parent's obstruction of the IEP process, caused by his or her unreasonable delay in acting upon a completed IEP, can relieve a school system from its obligation to have an assented-to IEP in place at the start of the school year. See Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1189 (6th Cir.1990); see also Roland M., 910 F.2d at 995 (The law ought not to abet parties who block assembly of the required team and then, dissatisfied with the ensuing IEP, attempt to jettison it because of problems created by their own obstructionism.). The case at bar presents a paradigmatic example of a situation in which a delay in having a signed IEP in place is fairly laid at the parents' doorstep. On August 16, the School District presented Stephanie's mother with a completed IEP that covered every essential component. From that point forward, the record discloses a consistent pattern in which the School District would strive to identify the parents' specific concerns and the parents would refuse to say more than that they wanted further meetings. The School District made numerous attempts to arrange such meetings and succeeded in holding two extended sessions with Stephanie's mother. These meetings proved fruitless: the most that could be gleaned from Mrs. Lessard was her opinion that the proffered IEP was, for some unexplained reason, still in the developing stage. Given this mise-en-scène, we can discern no clear error in the district court's conclusion that whatever delays plagued the signing of Stephanie's 2004-2005 IEP were the product of her mother's own intransigence. [4] See Lessard, 2007 WL 1221103, at . Those delays, in turn, justified the court in exonerating the School District with respect to the IEP's late implementation. The interactive process constructed by Congress was not intended to deal a trump card to parents bent on prolonging IEP negotiations indefinitely. See MM, 303 F.3d at 535. The appellants object to this finding, citing our remonstrances in Mr. & Mrs. R. There, we cautioned that [i]n mounting a challenge to a current or proposed IEP, the most that parents can be expected to do is to point out areas in which the IEP is deficient. 321 F.3d at 20. The appellants suggest that, under this precept, they cannot be faulted for having failed to respond to the School District's requests for insight. This suggestion is baseless. Line-drawing is often difficult, and in the IEP context it is impossible to draw a precise line separating healthy requests for parental input from impermissible demands that parents do the school system's work. Here the record leaves no doubt as to where along that continuum the present case falls. When the School District contacted Stephanie's mother following her rejection of the August IEP, it asked her to state specifically what you agree or disagree with. Such an entreaty, which the School District essentially repeated in letters of inquiry sent to her on August 25, October 24, November 16, and November 30, respectively, strikes us as the functional equivalent of a request to point out deficiencies in an IEP.