Opinion ID: 1198958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Finally, other than his challenge to the constitutionality of HRS § 702-230, Birdsall claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of criminal property damage in the first degree. HRS § 708-820 (1996) provides that (1) A person commits the offense of criminal property damage in the first degree if ... [t]he person intentionally damages property and thereby recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily injury[.] Birdsall asserts that he did not intend to damage Tammy's car as evidence by the fact that [he] did not strike Tammy's car directly. This argument is patently meritless. Birdsall is merely attempting to retry factual issues on appeal by asking this court to weigh the evidence and find that reasonable doubt exists. We decline to invade the province of the jury in such a manner. [E]vidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i 128, 145, 938 P.2d 559, 576 (1997) (quoting State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i 131, 135, 913 P.2d 57, 61 (1996)) (emphasis omitted). `Substantial evidence' as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i at 135, 913 P.2d at 61. In the instant case, the jury reasonably could have concluded either through Akaka's, Tammy's, or Grisham's testimony that Birdsall had intended to ram Tammy's car. [T]he mind of an alleged offender may be read from his acts, conduct and inferences fairly drawn from all the circumstances. State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 254, 831 P.2d 924, 934 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The jury had the right to discount Birdsall's protestations to the contrary, inasmuch as it is for the factfinder to assess the credibility of witnesses and to resolve all questions of fact; the [finder of fact] may accept or reject any witness's testimony in whole or in part. State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 298-99, 926 P.2d 194, 203-04 (1996) (citation omitted) (brackets in original). Accordingly, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Birdsall's conviction.