Opinion ID: 1298515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are section 4 sanctions appropriate?

Text: Our holding does not place our imprimatur on respondent's conduct. Nor does it mean respondent's disqualification should end and he should resume acting as a judge without imposition of sanctions. Respondent's position requires him to judge and punish others, including those charged with possessing controlled substances. It is not only unseemly and hypocritical, but also violates the judicial oath of office when a judge commits the same offense for which he sits in judgment over others. Judges cannot uphold and support the laws while committing the very crimes for which they sentence others. Thus, any criminal conviction of a judge is not a matter to be treated lightly. Biggins, 153 Ariz. at 443, 737 P.2d at 1081. We hold that respondent's criminal conduct falls within the provisions of art. 6.1, § 4. [10] In Biggins we held that although a misdemeanor conviction of driving under the influence did not require that the judge be removed from office, it was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute within the meaning of art. 6.1, § 4. 153 Ariz. at 443-44, 737 P.2d at 1081-82; see also In re Whitaker, 463 So.2d 1291, 1303 (La. 1985) (personal use of marijuana in violation of criminal statute constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute). We recognize that, in isolation, overuse of alcohol may not be as serious as use of marijuana, but we believe driving while under the influence of alcohol presents greater dangers to others. Biggins, therefore, is an appropriate guidepost. Respondent claims his explanation of the circumstances leading to his arrest may foreclose the imposition of any discipline. We reject this suggestion. Although respondent contends he did not intend to or know he was in possession of marijuana, the Texas judge who heard his explanation found him guilty of intentionally and knowingly possessing marijuana. We believe he is bound by that finding and precluded from maintaining to the contrary before the Commission or this court. See Farmers Insurance Co. of Arizona v. Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz. 443, 446, 675 P.2d 703, 706 (1983) (litigated facts necessary to a prior valid judgment are binding in subsequent proceeding). [11] We hold that the established facts require imposition of sanctions under art. 6.1, § 4.