Opinion ID: 2708559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Samuel Gutierrez

Text: Gutierrez was another Inca. He too pleaded guilty to the RICO conspiracy count and the drug conspiracy count. At his plea hearing, Gutierrez admitted to participating in drug distribution and extortion as predicate acts to the RICO conspiracy. He conceded that he participated in four instances of receiving cocaine to sell and that he was involved with extorting the Miqueros from December 2006 to December 2007. He was sentenced to 210 months on the RICO count and 60 months on the drug count, to run concurrently. Nos. 11-3179 et al. 45 The only argument on appeal that Gutierrez advances is that the district court erroneously denied him credit for acceptance of responsibility under sentencing guideline § 3E1.1. The district court rejected his request because, although Gutierrez admitted to drug dealing, extortion, and acts of violence, and through counsel admitted to participating in the planning stages of murder, it found “hardly any reference to what he did over this extended period of time [a]nd certainly there is no acknowledgment, from his lips in any event, that this conspiracy involved murder.” The court recognized that Gutierrez admitted that the RICO conspiracy involved “numerous weapons and violent actions,” but it found that his apology “totally ignores the … victims of the activities” other than his family and friends. Gutierrez, the court concluded, had gone only “half the distance” needed to accept true responsibility for what the Latin Kings had done. In order to qualify for the acceptance reduction, a defendant must “(1) demonstrate sincere remorse or contrition, (2) truthfully admit the conduct comprising the offense, and (3) neither falsely deny nor frivolously contest relevant conduct.” United States v. Eschman, 227 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2000). In Eschman, we found clear error in the district court’s decision to deny any discount for acceptance of responsibility. The defendant there had demonstrated his acceptance promptly and consistently, shown remorse, and did not actively deny any relevant conduct, although he did contest the manner in which the government had calculated the amount of drugs underlying his offense. Id. We agreed with the defendant’s position on the drug-quantity point. Because it appeared that the district court based its denial primarily on the defendant’s objection to the calculation of quantity, 46 Nos. 11-3179 et al. which had been made in good faith, was non-frivolous, and did not negate his acceptance, we remanded for re- sentencing. Id. at 891–92. The district court’s explanation for its decision on Gutierrez’s request for the adjustment is hard to follow. It appeared to find that Gutierrez was sincerely remorseful, saying that “there is no doubt that he is sorry and that he would apologize.” There is no indication that the court thought that Gutierrez was being untruthful about the offense conduct. Instead, the court appeared to be troubled that Gutierrez’s admissions did not go far enough: (1) he did not, the court thought, explicitly admit participation in the conspiracy insofar as it involved murder; (2) on a more general level, the court thought that he did not “accept true responsibility” for the full scope of the gang’s activities; (3) the court understood his apology to extend only to his family and friends, not to the entire community; and (4) the court was reluctant to find acceptance for someone who was a leader in such a bad organization. None of these reasons, we conclude, holds up under examination. The court’s concern with the scope of Gutierrez’s factual admissions (reason 1) must be assessed in light of what Gutierrez actually said at sentencing. It appears that Gutierrez’s proficiency in English was limited, and so the statement is somewhat uneven. Gutierrez openly stated that “[w]e used violence to get what I get what we want.” The transcript also reflects that he said that he knew violence “surely happens and I knew that would happen” in the Latin Kings. But there is more evidence: a transcript of the note from which he was reading when he made that statement reveals that he meant to say “I knew … that shootings hapNos. 11-3179 et al. 47 pened and would happen.” Even if the court had heard him the same way the court reporter did, his admissions placed no limitation on the kind of violence that the gang was prepared to use. The court’s insistence on something “from his lips” was somewhat unrealistic, given his language difficulties. More importantly, Gutierrez was not charged directly with conspiracy to commit murder; that offense was just relevant conduct for sentencing. The guidelines require only that a defendant “truthfully admit[] the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admit[] or not falsely deny[] any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(A). If there had been any doubt, Gutierrez’s attorney removed it when he said that Gutierrez “admits that in pleading guilty to the racketeering conspiracy that murder conspiracy was a reasonably foreseeable consequence.” Finally, unlike Luis Garcia, Gutierrez did not contest the application of the guideline for conspiracy to commit murder, § 2A1.5. All told, the district court’s first reason for denying the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment does not withstand scrutiny. The second reason—that Gutierrez did not accept true responsibility for the full scope of the gang’s activities—fares no better. The problem here is that there is no evidence to back up this conclusion; we cannot tell what the district court thought was missing from Gutierrez’s statement. Gutierrez admitted all of the particular details of his offense. Perhaps he could have said more about what an awful group the Latin Kings were and how sorry he was to have participated in the gang for so long, but that relates more to remorse than particular acts, and the court seemed to be satisfied that he was remorseful. We have the same concern 48 Nos. 11-3179 et al. about the court’s third reason—that the apology did not mention the community at large. And we are not sure what the court was getting at with its fourth point. It is unlikely that it meant that acceptance of responsibility is unavailable to leaders of large RICO and drug conspiracies; that would be wrong as a matter of law, but we would not infer that kind of error on the district court’s part. Perhaps the court did not mean to place separate weight on the fourth point, and was just editorializing. We cannot be sure. We do not mean to imply that Gutierrez was entitled to this adjustment as a matter of law. A district court, exercising its discretion, could go either way. But the court’s explanation for its decision to deny the reduction is insufficient. We therefore will vacate Gutierrez’s sentence and remand for resentencing.