Opinion ID: 6105748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 560C Denial of Automatic Motion to Modify Death Verdict

Text: 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at pages 412 through 414, 396 P.3d at pages 547 through 550, ante , we agreed with defendant that the jury's request to hear from him was misconduct because it contravened the court's instruction not to discuss defendant's failure to testify. We concluded nonetheless that the presumption of prejudice has been rebutted because no adverse inferences can be drawn from the jury's request for testimony by defendant at the penalty phase. ( Ibid .) In reaching that conclusion, we disagreed with defendant's argument that certain comments made by the court when it denied the automatic motion for modification of the death verdict supported his argument that he was prejudiced by the jury's misconduct.  Relying on the same comments by the trial court, defendant has reframed his argument as a challenge to the court's denial of the automatic motion to modify his sentence. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) Specifically, defendant argues that the death judgment must be reversed because the court erroneously considered defendant's  failure to testify when deciding not to modify the death verdict. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant's claim of error was not preserved for appeal and that, in any event, it lacks merit on this record.
The court conducted a hearing on the automatic motion to modify the death verdict. Before announcing its ruling, the court summarized the nature of its inquiry and heard argument by the parties. Defense counsel reviewed the evidence relating to the various sentencing factors, arguing that the evidence in aggravation was limited and weak. In this regard, counsel expressed the view that the jurors did not follow the court's instruction that each of them must find that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. (See CALJIC No. 8.88.) Counsel also repeated his earlier argument that, after reporting a deadlock, the jurors' request to hear from defendant ignored the court's instruction not to consider defendant's failure to testify and was therefore misconduct. After hearing argument by the prosecutor, the court announced its ruling finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and denying the motion to modify sentence. In explaining the reasons for its ruling, the court described the aggravating and mitigating evidence the court had independently reweighed as it related to each of the 11 sentencing factors provided in section 190.3, including the circumstances of the crime, defendant's prior violent conduct, whether defendant was acting under extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and other circumstances that extenuated the gravity of the crime or aspects of defendant's character on which a sentence less than death could be based. (See § 190.3, factors (a), (b), (d), (k).) After having discussed the evidence the court had independently considered and reweighed in light of each of the sentencing factors, the court made the following comments, which we set out in some detail. In response to my inquiry of the jury if there was anything else we could do to assist them when they were reporting being deadlocked in the penalty phase ..., [¶] [o]ne of the things they said was 'we'd like to hear from the defendant.' [¶] I did not go into any great length to explain to them that the defendant has a right not to testify and he chose to exercise that right .... But I can guarantee you that  what the jury wanted to know was what was the defendant's motivation when he set that car on fire. Was he finishing the job? Was she in the backseat moaning and groaning even though in a semiconscious state, or did he think she was dead and was just destroying the evidence? The court continued, I think the answer to that question could very clearly have changed the jury's thinking about this case. And indeed, I've thought long and hard about it. I can't make up an answer to that question. I cannot speculate or conjecture. That evidence is not before this court to be reweighed. It was not before the jury to be considered. [¶] What the jury did decide, based upon the evidence, was that she was killed by thermal injury. So I've often  thought that if we knew the answer to my question, it might be a very difficult situation with which we are all now confronted, but as I've indicated, I cannot fill in the blanks. I can only reweigh the evidence that was presented, and I have carefully considered and weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as previously stated.  2. Discussion As a preliminary matter, we agree with the People that defendant has forfeited his challenge to the court's ruling on the automatic motion for modification of the death verdict because counsel did not raise in the trial court the error he asserts here. ( People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547 , 588, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 458 , 236 P.3d 312 ; People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101 , 1141, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 614 , 189 P.3d 880 [a defendant must bring to the trial court's attention any deficiency in its ruling on the automatic motion to modify so that the court has an opportunity to correct any asserted error].) Defendant argues that defense counsel was excused from objecting because counsel reasonably would have believed that an objection would have been futile, given that the court had already denied the defense motion for mistrial based on the jury's request to hear from defendant. (See ante , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 412, 396 P.3d at pp. 547-548.) What appears more likely, however, is that counsel viewed the court's comments simply as a response to his argument at the hearing that the jury had violated the court's instruction not to consider defendant's failure to testify, and not as an indication that the court had considered defendant's failure to testify when ruling on the motion to modify the death verdict, as defendant now argues. In any event, defendant's claim of error is unsupported by the record. Fairly read, the court's comments demonstrate that the court did not base its denial of the automatic motion to modify the death verdict, even in part, on defendant's failure to testify. Likely in response to defense counsel's argument, the court offered its view as to why the jury wanted to hear from  defendant, that is, the jury wanted to know defendant's motivation when he set the car on fire-whether it was to finish the job or, in the belief that Kerr was already dead, to destroy evidence of the killing. The court was of the opinion that the answer to that question could have changed the outcome of the case, or have affected the motion to modify. But as shown above, the court emphasized, repeatedly, that it could not speculate as to the answer to that question, and that such evidence was neither presented to the jury for its consideration nor was it before the court for reweighing. Defendant's argument that the court gave impermissible weight to his failure to testify misreads the court's remarks. Contrary to defendant's assertion, nothing in the record suggests the court viewed defendant's failure to testify as having left an evidentiary gap concerning why he set Kerr and the car on fire. Nor does defendant point to anything supporting his argument that the court, like the jury, relied on defendant's failure to testify to assume that he must have known Kerr was alive when he set the fire. The court concluded its comments at the hearing by reiterating that it had carefully considered and weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The record bears out the court's observation, and establishes furthermore that the court fully complied with its obligation to (1) independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, (2) determine whether the weight of the evidence supports the jury's death verdict, and (3) explain on the record the reasons for its ruling. ( People v. Brady, supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 588, 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 458 , 236 P.3d 312 ; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027 , 1079, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230 , 824 P.2d 1277 .) The court's belief that the jury asked to hear from defendant because it wanted to know whether defendant's motivation in setting fire to Kerr's car was to finish the job is a questionable assertion,  given the jury's earlier verdicts finding true the kidnapping-murder and torture-murder special-circumstance allegations, both of which require a live victim. Nonetheless, the record belies defendant's argument that the court erroneously considered his failure to testify in denying the  automatic motion for modification of the death verdict.