Opinion ID: 2344429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Partial Benefit

Text: [¶ 12] Messer contends that pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, it is not required to reimburse Brady for any portion of the ongoing partial benefit because Trottier's current earnings exceed the average weekly wage he earned at Messer in 1991. [¶ 13] Generally, compensation for partial incapacity is determined by taking a percentage of the difference between the average weekly wage before the injury, and the average weekly wage the employee is capable of earning after the injury. The partial incapacity provision in effect at the time of the 2002 injury provides, in relevant part: While the incapacity for work is partial, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to 80% of the difference between the injured employee's after-tax average weekly wage before the personal injury and the after-tax average weekly wage that the injured employee is able to earn after the injury, but not more than the maximum benefit under section 211. 39-A M.R.S. § 213(1) (2006). When determining Trottier's rights and benefits for the portion of the resulting disability that is attributable to the prior injury the hearing officer must apply the law in effect at the time of the 1991 injury. 39-A M.R.S. § 201(6) (2006); accord Dunson v. S. Portland Hous. Auth., 2003 ME 16, ¶ 6, 814 A.2d 972, 976. The partial incapacity statute in effect at the time of the 1991 injury provided, in relevant part: While the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to 2/3 the difference, due to the injury, between his average gross weekly wages, earning or salary before the injury and the weekly wages, earnings or salary which he is able to earn after the injury. . . . 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-B (Supp.1989) repealed by P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A-7 (effective Jan. 1, 1993). [¶ 14] In a multiple injury case, workers' compensation benefits are calculated based on a single average weekly wage  the average weekly wage that best reflects the employee's uninjured work capacity. Dunson, 2003 ME 16, ¶ 11 n. 7, 814 A.2d at 978. The most recent insurer initially pays the entire benefit to the employee, then is subrogated to the employee's rights for any amounts that other employers or insurers are liable to the employee. 39-A M.R.S. § 354. [1] The employee's rights as against an earlier employer are determined with reference to the average weekly wage at the time of the prior injury. Johnson v. S.D. Warren, 432 A.2d 431, 436 (Me.1981). While an insurer liable for an injury accepts the risk that an employee may suffer a subsequent injury in future employment, the insurer does not accept the risk of paying benefits for that injury based on a higher average weekly wage. Dunson, 2003 ME 16, ¶ 12, 814 A.2d at 978; accord Johnson, 432 A.2d at 435-36. [¶ 15] In this case, the hearing officer determined that Trottier is entitled to ongoing partial incapacity benefits in the amount of $44.97 per week. This represents 80% of the difference between the 2002/Brady after-tax average weekly wage and the after-tax average weekly wage Trottier earns at Lavalley. [2] The hearing officer apportioned liability for Trottier's incapacity 80% to Messer, and 20% to Brady, and determined that Brady is entitled to be reimbursed by Messer for 80% of the partial benefit, or $35.98. We agree with Messer that this constitutes error because the hearing officer did not calculate the portion Messer owes with reference to the 1991 average weekly wage or 1991 law. [¶ 16] The formula for calculating the portion of the benefit that an earlier insurer must pay is illustrated in Johnson. In that case, the employee suffered a low-back injury in 1975, and a second injury in 1978, both while working for S.D. Warren. 432 A.2d at 433. S.D. Warren was insured by Wausau at the time of the first injury, and was self-insured at the time of the second. Id. The commissioner apportioned responsibility for the employee's incapacity equally to both injuries, and ordered Wausau to pay 50% of the benefit based on the 1975 average weekly wage, and Warren/self-insured, to pay 50% of the benefit based on the 1977 average weekly wage. Id. This resulted in the employee being paid less than the full benefit as calculated pursuant to the 1977 average weekly wage. Id. at 434. We vacated the decision, and held that (1) the employee is entitled to the full benefit based on the 1977 average weekly wage; (2) Wausau was obligated to pay its 50% share based on the 1975 average weekly wage; and (3) S.D. Warren/self-insured was obligated to make up the difference. Id. at 434-36, 438. [¶ 17] Brady contends that Johnson is distinguishable on the ground that it involved an equal apportionment between the insurers. Brady asserts that it would be inequitable to require it to pay the entire benefit when the 1991 injury is responsible for 80% of Trottier's current incapacity. As long as the percentage apportioned to Messer does not exceed the 1991 average weekly wage, Brady contends that Messer should be required to pay it. We disagree. [¶ 18] We recognize that in some cases, the most recent insurer may be required to pay more than its proportionate share of the benefit because the reimbursement it receives from a previous employer will be based on a lower average weekly wage. Johnson, 432 A.2d at 436. As we have stated numerous times, however, our apportionment statute is based on the principle of subrogation. See, e.g., Juliano v. Ameri-Cana Transp., 2007 ME 9, ¶ 10, 912 A.2d 1244, 1248. The most recent insurer has the initial responsibility to pay the employee and then is subrogated to the employee's rights as against other insurers. 39-A M.R.S. § 354(2), (3) (2006). The most recent insurer has no right to reimbursement from other insurers unless the employee has that right. Arsenault v. Thurston Co., 2004 ME 83, ¶ 9, 853 A.2d 217, 221. This statutory scheme was designed to encourage prompt payment of benefits, while still providing the most recent payor with the potential ability to recover a portion of those payments from other responsible employers and insurers. Id. (emphasis added). [¶ 19] Thus, in this case, Brady/Peerless's rights as against Messer/One Beacon are limited to Trottier's rights against Messer  which must be determined with reference to the law and average weekly wage at the time of the 1991 injury. As we stated in Johnson, [i]t was never the purpose of our apportionment doctrine in the second or successive injury context to compound the risk already inherent in the first insurer's obligations by importing into that doctrine the uncertainties of a changing average weekly wage. 432 A.2d at 436. We also noted in Johnson that the most recent insurer still receives a substantial financial benefit as a result of apportionment, because, without apportionment, the most recent insurer could be liable for 100% of the compensation due. Id.; accord Dunson, 2003 ME 16, ¶ 12, 814 A.2d at 978 (noting employer at time of second work injury was required to pay a benefit calculated using the controlling average weekly wage, but prior employer would be required to reimburse second employer for benefits calculated using the average weekly wage at the time of the prior injury); Juliano, 2007 ME 9, ¶ 17, 912 A.2d at 1249-50 (holding Maine Insurance Guaranty Association is not obligated to reimburse the most recent insurer for amount apportioned to an earlier, insolvent insurer because a right of subrogation is not a claim covered by MIGA). [¶ 20] Accordingly, Messer could be required to repay Brady 80% of the 1991 partial compensation rate calculated using the 1991 average weekly wage. However, applying 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-B, Messer owes nothing because Trottier's earning capacity exceeds the 1991 average weekly wage. Pursuant to section 354(2), Brady remains responsible for paying the entire benefit.