Opinion ID: 1547852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Red Dog's Competence

Text: The motion for a stay of execution, which was filed with the Superior Court on February 24, 1993, alleged that defense counsel have a serious concern as to the defendant's present mental competency, and a related concern as to the voluntariness of his alleged waiver of his postconviction rights in this case. That motion was signed by two public defenders, Nancy Jane Perillo and J. Dallas Winslow. Mr. Winslow's signature stated that it was for Edward C. Pankowski, the public defender who has been representing Red Dog continuously since February, 1991. An affidavit of Dr. Stephen Mechanick dated February 24, 1993 was filed in support of the motion for a stay of execution. Mr. Pankowski appeared before the Superior Court to argue the merits of the motion for a stay of execution. Although Mr. Pankowski did not advise the Superior Court that the motion was filed without Mr. Pankowski's consent, the record reflects that Mr. Pankowski does not question and has not, at any relevant time, questioned Red Dog's mental competency. The only question of Red Dog's competency was raised by Ms. Perillo, another public defender, who had visited Red Dog for the first time within the last week. Prior to the entry of Red Dog's nolo contendere pleas and sentencing hearing, Dr. Mechanick had opined that Red Dog was mentally competent. In his recent affidavit, Dr. Mechanick stated that he would be willing to examine Red Dog further. However, according to Dr. Mechanick's affidavit, a determination of Red Dog's present mental competency would require time. In ruling upon the merits of the motion to stay Red Dog's execution, which were all related to the issue of Red Dog's present mental competency, the Superior Court carefully reviewed the record. In doing so, the Superior Court began by noting that Mr. Pankowski has represented Red Dog since February of 1991, while Ms. Perillo has been in contact with Red Dog only within this past week. The Superior Court also noted that Red Dog's mental competency had never been in dispute. On March 28, 1991, Mr. Pankowski filed a motion to have Red Dog examined to determine if Red Dog suffered from a mental illness or mental defect and to determine if Red Dog was competent to stand trial. The Superior Court granted the motion. On April 30, 1991, Dr. Kutas Kavlan-Dogan, a forensic psychiatrist at the Delaware State Hospital, examined Red Dog. Based on her examination of Red Dog, in a report to the Superior Court dated July 29, 1991, she found that Red Dog was fully oriented; speech was spontaneous, coherent and relevant. He displayed excellent verbal skills and also intellectually came across as being higher than average intelligence.... Insight and judgment appeared intact. In her report, Dr. Kavlan-Dogan also opined that she did not find any evidence of any mental illness in the form of either a psychosis or major affective disorder, there was no evidence in [the] interview of organicity or impairment in cognitive functioning and that Mr. Red Dog would not have any problems and would effectively assist his counsel. Notwithstanding Dr. Kavlan-Dogan's unequivocal determination of Red Dog's mental competency, in early August 1991, the Superior Court sua sponte ordered Red Dog to be examined by Dr. Mechanick, a psychiatrist. Dr. Mechanick found that Red Dog's thought processes showed no disorganization. After the examination, Dr. Mechanick reviewed a number of records that the Superior Court had provided to him. Based on his interview of Red Dog and the various records, Dr. Mechanick concluded that Red Dog was competent to stand trial. Dr. Kavlan-Dogan interviewed Red Dog again in late August 1991 and filed a supplemental report. Her conclusions paralleled her earlier findings. Despite the suggestion by others of an anxiety disorder or a bipolar disorder, Dr. Kavlan-Dogan did not elicit anything that would suggest the presence of either a generalized anxiety disorder or major affective disorder. Red Dog was also examined in late August 1991 by Dr. S.M. Iqbal, a staff psychologist at the Delaware State Hospital. Magnetic resonance imaging and an electroencephalogram were performed at Dr. Iqbal's request. Those tests revealed no neurological impairment. On the basis of those electronic tests, an interview, and a series of psychological tests, Dr. Iqbal concluded that Red Dog showed no symptoms of mental illness or acute distress. In considering the merits of the motion for a stay of execution, the Superior Court specifically noted that when Red Dog entered his nolo contendere pleas on March 12, 1992, Mr. Pankowski had advised the Superior Court as follows: As far as I know, Mr. Red Dog has been examined by numerous psychiatrists, psychologists as part of the pretrial process in normal prosecution. There has been no indication from any of those reports that he's laboring under any mental disability. I found him to be a very, very intelligent individual with a sufficient amount of schooling and understanding of the criminal justice system in this State and other states to realize his current situation, and he's decided this, for his own personal reasons, is the way he wants to handle this particular matter. Of all those psychiatric reports and evaluations that were conducted, including some MRI examinations and what they call EEG, examinations consisting of being on the lookout for any mental illness type problems or any organic brain functions, the only thing that was indicated was a slight sinus problem. So there's absolutely no question here at least from all the experts that looked at Mr. Red Dog that he's laboring under any mental illness or defect. The Superior Court also noted that it accepted Red Dog's pleas of nolo contendere only after an extensive plea colloquy with Red Dog and its finding that those pleas had been offered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. During the penalty hearing, Red Dog's attorney presented evidence in mitigation from Dr. Fred Lahvis, a family practitioner, who was not a psychiatrist, a psychologist, or a neurologist. The Superior Court, though finding that Red Dog had an antisocial personality disorder, explicitly rejected the contention that Red Dog had an organic brain disorder or suffered from a bipolar disorder. According to the Superior Court, There was no objective evidence supporting [Dr. Lahvis'] view. While the defendant may have had head injuries in the past, none required hospitalization. Tests for organic brain damage were within normal limits. The doctor's opinions were based on the statements of the defendant given to health care providers, statements which were more often than not contradictory or inconsistent. The Court also does not believe that sufficient evidence was presented supportive of Bipolar Disorder. At most, on January 16, 1991, Dr. Alan M. Seltzer diagnosed the defendant as suffering from `Bipolar Disorder, in remission, provisional.' Dr. Lahvis' conclusions were at odds with the conclusions reached by other health care providers with expertise in psychiatry. In brief, the Court finds that Dr. Lahvis' testimony lacked sufficient foundation for the Court to accept his conclusions. And, even if the Court were to accept his conclusions, the result herein reached would not be different. This Court specifically noted, during our mandatory review of Red Dog's death sentence, that the Superior Court had considered and rejected Dr. Lahvis' testimony. See Red Dog v. State, Del.Supr., 616 A.2d 298, 309 n. 15 (1992). Following the penalty hearing, the Superior Court sentenced Red Dog to death by lethal injection. Thereafter, Red Dog personally sought to have that sentence imposed and directed his attorney, Mr. Pankowski, not to file a direct appeal. Red Dog v. State, Del.Supr., 616 A.2d 298, 300 (1992). Mr. Pankowski adhered to Red Dog's instructions, but did represent him in the mandatory appeal to this Court, which is required by the Delaware Death Penalty Statute. Id. 11 Del.C. § 4209(g). In ruling upon the recent motion to stay Red Dog's execution, the Superior Court noted that during the oral argument before this Court on September 29, 1992, Mr. Pankowski stated that there was no claim concerning [Red Dog's] competence. The Superior Court also noted that as recently as January 26, 1993, a mental health worker with the Correctional Medical Systems reported that Red Dog was alert, oriented, and in good control with no evidence of any discernible mood or thought disorder or psychosis. At argument on February 24, 1993, the Superior Court asked Mr. Pankowski how Red Dog appeared on January 29, 1993 when Mr. Pankowski went to the prison to have Red Dog execute his Last Will and Testament. Mr. Pankowski replied that Red Dog was no different. The Superior Court concluded that the fact that Mr. Pankowski, a trained lawyer with twenty (20) years of experience, would permit Red Dog to sign his will says much about his view concerning his client's competence. The Superior Court then held: Taking into account the opinions of the experts who examined the defendant, Pankowski's assessments, my own perceptions, and the defendant's conduct during the plea colloquy and during the penalty hearing, Red Dog's competency is sufficiently clear as not to raise any question much less a serious question before this Court. On the basis of the objective facts before the State courts,... no reasonable judge ... could have a substantial doubt about the defendant's competence. The State may, therefore, properly presume that Red Dog remains competent to forego postconviction review of his conviction and sentence, and, in turn, the State may require a substantial threshold showing of incompetence merely to trigger the hearing process.... Here, the defense attorneys' assertions do not meet that standard. No substantial evidence has been offered. Surely more than a litany of may's, could's and might's is necessary before the hearing process will be triggered. (footnote and citations omitted). The Superior Court has made factual determinations that (1) Red Dog's competency has never been an issue and (2) that no substantial evidence of incompetence has been presented, in support of the motion for a stay of execution, to trigger a hearing on the subject of Red Dog's present competency. Moreover, the Superior Court specifically found that, based upon the evidence which had been presented in support of the motion for a stay, no reasonable judge could have a substantial doubt about Red Dog's present mental competence. The parties agree that there is no allegation in this appeal that the Superior Court's decision involved any error of law. The only issues in this appeal are the Superior Court's factual determinations. This Court will not set such a factual finding aside unless it was clearly erroneous. The Superior Court decided not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of Red Dog's present mental competency. Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 736-37, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 2226, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990). The record supports the Superior Court's decision that there was no evidentiary basis presented to support the holding of such a hearing. Id. The only basis for any factual allegation of current or recent incompetency of Red Dog is the following statement in the motion for stay of execution: The Court also gave little weight to defense counsel's recent observation of symptoms in the defendant's thinking and feeling which are consistent with a bipolar and/or organic brain disorder. At oral argument, Mr. Pankowski, Red Dog's attorney, categorically denied that he has ever contended that Red Dog is or was incompetent. Mr. Pankowski further stated that the quoted statement is only attributable to another member of the Public Defender's office, attorney Ms. Perillo, who first spoke to Red Dog on February 17, 1993, and whom Red Dog does not wish to represent him. Accordingly, the Superior Court's determination that no substantial evidence was presented to warrant holding a hearing on the issue of Red Dog's present mental competency is affirmed.