Opinion ID: 813403
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Witness Statement

Text: At trial, the Government asked Officer Morris why he had drawn his gun on the night Mr. Race was arrested. He responded that he recognized Mr. Race. Mr. Race argues that the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury to disregard the question and statement rather than declaring a mistrial. The district court, according to Mr. Race, made a mistake of law because it believed it could grant a mistrial only if there -4- had been prosecutorial misconduct, and not for a prejudicial statement by a government witness.
On August 31, 2011, Mr. Race filed a notice of intent to plead guilty to Count Three. The Government’s evidence to prove Count Three would have revealed that he was a convicted felon and a parolee. Mr. Race feared this evidence would influence the jury to convict him of Counts One and Two. He also filed an objection to the Government’s introduction of evidence of his status as a felon. On September 12, 2011, the first day of trial, he changed his plea on Count Three to guilty. He also chose not to testify so that his prior offenses could not be used to impeach him. At trial, the Government asked Officer Morris why he had his firearm drawn. He responded, “Because I recognized Mr. Race.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 323. Mr. Race objected and requested a mistrial. At a meeting between counsel and the court, Mr. Race’s counsel argued that Mr. Race’s status as a felon and parolee was inadmissible and that Officer Morris’s testimony “suggested to the jury that Mr. Race is a known bad guy who is on his list of bad guys in the Department of Corrections.” Id. at 323-24. Mr. Race’s counsel also stated that she was “very concerned . . . [n]ot only because of the answer, but because of the question. The question itself really was inviting . . . an answer which is inflammatory.” Id. at 325. During a recess, the court reviewed “the law applicable to mistrials.” Id. at 336. After the recess, the judge told the parties that “prosecutorial misconduct may so infect -5- the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id.; see Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). “[W]hether to grant a mistrial . . . turns on . . . whether the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial was impaired.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 336 (quoting United States v. Gabaldon, 91 F.3d 91, 93 (10th Cir. 1996)). In examining whether the prejudice in this case “is harmless,” the court stated, “it very well may be that the Government’s question . . . was improper, if the Government knew what the witness’s answer would be.” Id. at 337. The court continued, “But the real question is whether, in taking this in the full context of all the evidence in the case and based on what the jury heard, it’s so prejudicial that the prosecutorial misconduct has so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting convictions a denial of due process.” Id. at 337-38. The court concluded that what happened had not reached this point because the jury did not hear why the witness recognized Mr. Race. When the jury returned, the court explained that the question and answer had been improper and instructed the jurors to disregard them.
“We review a district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Taylor, 514 F.3d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 2008). “The district court has discretion to grant a mistrial only when a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial has been impaired.” Meridyth, 364 F.3d at 1183. Moreover, “‘motions for mistrial . . . call for an examination of the prejudicial impact of an error or errors when viewed in the context of -6- an entire case.’” Id. (quoting Gabaldon, 91 F.3d at 93-94). Mr. Race attempts to draw a distinction between prosecution questions and witness statements giving rise to motions for a mistrial. We have applied the same standards for reviewing denials of motions for a mistrial in both types of cases, including those Mr. Race has cited for support. See, e.g., Taylor, 514 F.3d 1092; Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181. The district court did not err in referring to the cases on prosecutorial misconduct or in referring to the term in its analysis. The district court also did not err in evaluating whether the witness’s statement was prompted by an improper question by counsel. See Meridyth, 364 F.3d at 1183 (“where the prosecutor asked a question her witness answered in a potentially improper way, a similar analysis” to that for prosecutorial misconduct “is appropriate,” including consideration of “whether the prosecutor acted in bad faith.”). Indeed, although he now objects to the district court’s consideration of the prosecutor’s question, Mr. Race expressed concern about the question at the time of his objection at trial, stating that the question had invited an inflammatory answer. The district court analyzed both the prosecutor’s question and the witness’s response. The court stated that “it very well may be that the Government’s question . . . was improper,” but then moved on to what it considered to be the core question of the mistrial analysis: “[I]n taking [the question and invited response] in the full context of all the evidence in the case and based on what the jury heard, it’s so prejudicial that the prosecutorial misconduct has so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting -7- convictions a denial of due process.” ROA, Vol. 2 at 337-38. The court correctly cited precedent governing mistrial and then examined whether Mr. Morris’s testimony had so infected the trial as to make it unfair. It concluded that “on the totality of the record before [it] . . . this one answer do[es] not make this an unfair trial.” Id. at 339; see Meridyth, 364 F.3d at 1183 (courts should examine prejudicial impact of an error in the context of the entire case to see if the defendant’s right to a fair trial was impaired). Finally, in deciding whether to grant a motion for a mistrial, “[t]he general rule is that the effect of improper evidence may be remedied by admonishing the jury to disregard and by withdrawing the evidence.” United States v. Laymon, 621 F.2d 1051, 1053 (10th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Oles, 994 F.2d 1519, 1524 (10th Cir. 1993). “Absent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that juries follow the trial court’s instructions.” United States v. Santiago, 977 F.2d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 1992). The court instructed the jury to ignore both the question and the statement. No evidence has been presented that the jury was unable to follow this instruction. Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.