Opinion ID: 186544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Entry into Thomas' Apartment

Text: 8 An arrest warrant founded on probable cause that the suspect has committed a crime gives law enforcement officers the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). As explicated by five other circuits, the reason to believe standard is satisfied by something less than would be required for a finding of probable cause. See Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (5th Cir.1997); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir.1995). That is consistent with our decision in United States v. May, 68 F.3d 515 (1995) (Fourth Amendment permits search of suspect's dwelling if officers have reason to believe the suspect is there), where we upheld entry into a dwelling based upon an address found in police records and upon testimony that the suspect had slept there on the night of the murder, some two days before the search. Id. at 516. The Ninth Circuit alone has held that reason to believe embodies the same standard of reasonableness inherent in probable cause. See United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir.2002). We think it more likely, however, that the Supreme Court in Payton used a phrase other than probable cause because it meant something other than probable cause. 9 Accordingly, we expressly hold that an officer executing an arrest warrant may enter a dwelling if he has only a reasonable belief, falling short of probable cause to believe, the suspect lives there and is present at the time. Applying this standard, the entry into Thomas' apartment was lawful. 10 Thomas argues the Government's evidence is insufficient to establish the officers had even a reasonable belief he lived, and was then present, in the apartment. Deputy Martin, however, testified the marshals learned Thomas' address after an investigation was done. Thomas objects that Martin gave no details of the investigation. Although the Government's evidence was succinct, to say the least, the word investigation, even without details, denotes something at least akin to, as the Government puts it, a systematic official inquiry, and in any event more than a mere hunch, surmise, or suspicion. 11 That Thomas was a parolee and the marshals were executing an arrest warrant for a parole violation lends support to the Government's view. As a condition of his parole, Thomas was required to keep his current address on file with his parole supervision officer. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.85(a) & 2.204(a)(3), (4)(ii). Therefore, we do not think the absence of testimony about where the marshals got Thomas' address is fatal to the Government's claim of reason to believe Thomas lived in his apartment. Nor did Thomas' counsel think the matter insufficiently obvious to bother questioning Deputy Martin about the details of his investigation. 12 As for whether the officers had reason to believe Thomas would be at home when they executed the warrant, the early morning hour was reason enough. See, e.g., May, 68 F.3d at 516 ([T]he logical place one would expect to find [defendant] on that ... morning was at his home); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 319 (2d Cir.1983) (agents reasonably concluded suspect would be home on a Sunday morning at 8:45). Accordingly, we hold the officers' entry into Thomas' apartment was in all respects lawful.