Opinion ID: 2120717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: good cause for violation

Text: ¶ 119. Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23 does not automatically exclude witnesses or evidence in the wake of a prosecutor's failure to comply with a discovery demand. The prosecutor may show the court good cause . . . for failure to comply. Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7m)(a). The statute also explores several alternatives to the exclusion of evidence. ¶ 120. The good cause provision constitutes additional proof that the legislature intended the statute be given a reasonable interpretation. If this court expands the scope of the prosecutor's obligation to search for materials and information and makes more absolute and objective the prosecutor's duty to disclose such information, it must balance these expanded duties against the prosecutor's good cause, or run the risk of creating a completely unworkable statute. ¶ 121. The majority opinion takes the view that the prosecutor did not have good cause for failing to disclose the Prioletta-DeLao interview before trial. The opinion asserts that DeLao's theory of defense was coercion. Majority op. at ¶ 10. It further asserts that the State's characterization of DeLao's theory of defense as materializing on the day her trial began is not supported by the facts. Majority op. at ¶ 37. In essence, the majority contends that as early as the night of the shooting, DeLao admitted to lying to the police, but explained that she was afraid and that Stalsberg was acting crazy. ¶ 122. The defense of coercion is based upon Wis. Stat. § 939.46, which provides that: (1) a threat by a person . . . which causes the actor reasonably to believe that . . . her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes [her] so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act. . . . The jury instruction related to Wis. Stat. § 939.46 explains that [t]he law allows the defendant to act under the defense of coercion only if a threat by another person . . . caused the defendant to believe that [her] act was the only means of preventing [imminent death or great bodily harm to herself or to others] and which pressure caused [her] to act as [she] did. Wis JI Criminal 790. [T]he defendant's beliefs must have been reasonable. Id. In determining whether the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the standard is what a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant's position under the circumstances that existed at the time of the alleged offense. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 123. Applying the coercion defense to the five crimes originally charged, DeLao would have to argue that she obstructed an officer (Chaussee); aided a felon (Stalsberg) by destroying, altering, hiding, or disguising physical evidence, with intent to prevent the apprehension and subsequent prosecution of Stalsberg; and possessed a short-barreled shotgun, a short-barreled rifle, and drug paraphernalia, because she reasonably believed these acts were the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to herself or another. [22] ¶ 124. The majority opinion contends that the record shows that DeLao's coercion defense was known to the State from the time of Chaussee's second interview with DeLao on the evening of June 7. Judge Flynn concluded otherwise, saying that nothing has been presented to the court that indicates the parties were aware of any theory of defense in terms of the State being aware of it before opening statement was made. ¶ 125. In an effort to overcome this finding, the majority opinion attempts to show that Judge Flynn's determination was clearly erroneous. It turns to defense counsel's opening statement, partially quoted in ¶¶ 38-39 of the majority opinion, for its evidence, and it attaches significance to the fact that the prosecutor did not interrupt the opening statement to object to counsel's argument. ¶ 126. In the opening statement, defense counsel argued that DeLao was afraid because Desmond Stalsberg was acting crazy. This reference must be put in context. At trial, the defense attorney questioned DeLao about getting into Stalsberg's car after he had fled her house following the shooting and then come back: DEFENSE ATTORNEY: After you got in the car with Desmond, what happened then? DELAO: Wehe took off driving real fast, and I told him to slow down, where were we going, and he kind of said he didn't know, that we were just leaving and I was going with him, and I said where are we going, and he didn't really know. He was just driving real crazy, and I told him to slow down because I thought we were gonna get in a car accident. Then we drove past my mom's and I told him that I wanted to stay there, but he turned off, and then we ended up going down past Mitchell and towards Drexel, and then he would tell me that we're just going to go pick up the kids and that we were just going to leave, and I told him no, we weren't gonna go get my kids. DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Why did you tell him you weren't going to get the kids? DELAO: Because I didn't want my kids to be in the car with him or me at that time. I felt like I was in danger and I didn't want my kids to get hurt either. DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Okay, and after you told him that you weren't going to go anywhere with him, what happened? DELAO: Hewe kind of argued about it and then he dropped me off behind my house by the mobile homes, and that was it, and then when I got there the police were already at my house (emphasis added). ¶ 127. This exchange was part of the defense case. Earlier, in the State's case-in-chief, Chaussee was asked to recount DeLao's comments about this same incident: PROSECUTOR: Did she indicate whether she left with Desmond Stalsberg? CHAUSSEE: Yes, she did. PROSECUTOR: And did she indicate why? CHAUSSEE: No, she said she got into the car with him and drove away from the scene. They argued a little bit in the car, and she subsequently got out of the car; I believe she said near St. Lucy's Church on Drexel Avenue west of her residence. PROSECUTOR: Did she indicate whether Desmond had ordered her to get in the car with him, or had forced her to get into the car with him, or was holding her at gunpoint or anything like that? CHAUSSEE: No. PROSECUTOR: Did she indicate whether she was afraid of him at that point in time? CHAUSSEE: She did say in her statement that she was afraid, and I believe her quote was that Desmond was acting crazy (emphasis added). ¶ 128. Placing DeLao's quote in the proper context gives it a very different perspective. The defense strategy was to transform an isolated comment into a full-blown defense. The majority does not supply evidence that DeLao explained in her second interview with Chaussee why she lied to him in her first interview. Such an explanation purportedly serves as the notice of her defense theory. ¶ 129. DeLao's own testimony at trial severely undercuts her theory. She testified that she screamed at Stalsberg to stop shooting, refused to clean up the porch as he asked, refused to get her kids, refused to run away with Stalsberg, argued with him in his car, and prevailed on him to let her out. Yet, when she was in Chaussee's car a short time later, she lied to Chaussee and obstructed his investigation. ¶ 130. DeLao's testimony at trial supports Chaussee's testimony at the preliminary hearing that DeLao did not emphasize fear of Stalsberg: DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And then she indicated to you that she had picked up some gun shells, is that correct? CHAUSSEE: Shotgun shells, correct. DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And that shedid she indicate to you that she was afraid at the point that she was picking up those shells? CHAUSSEE: She said she was told to pick them up by Desmond. DEFENSE ATTORNEY: And did she indicate that he had a gun at the time he was telling her to do it? CHAUSSEE: He was in possession of a firearm, that's correct. DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Did she indicate she was afraid at the time she was doing it? CHAUSSEE: I don't recall her specifically saying that. DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Did she indicate to you when you talked with her that basically all she wanted to do was to get Desmond out of her house? CHAUSSEE: At what point? DEFENSE ATTORNEY: At the point that you were talking to her the second time and she was telling you that she had picked up the gun shellsthe shotgun shells, did she indicate to you the reason she had picked them up was to basically get Desmond out of her house? CHAUSSEE: I don't believe it was ever put in that context, no. ¶ 131. There is no evidence that Stalsberg ever threatened DeLao. There is no evidence before trial that DeLao used her alleged fear of Stalsberg to explain picking up the shotgun shells or obstructing Chaussee. ¶ 132. The majority opinion also relies upon a comment by defense counsel at DeLao's initial appearance on June 9, 1999. Majority op. at ¶ 40. This comment was part of counsel's argument on bail, not an announcement of the defense theory. Neither the district attorney who tried the case nor Chaussee was present at the hearing. Moreover, a transcript of the hearing was not prepared until five months after the trial. This offhand comment does not establish that the circuit judge who made his decision after reading the relevant documents and listening to the testimony was clearly erroneous. ¶ 133. In rejecting the argument that the prosecutor had good cause for not turning over information about the DeLao-Prioletta interview before trial, the majority makes certain assumptions: (1) Chaussee was an arm of the prosecution and any information he had must be imputed to the prosecutor; (2) by July 25, 1999, Chaussee had in his possession oral statements the defendant made to Prioletta, even though he did not have them in writing; (3) Chaussee knew or should have known the defense theory as of June 7, 1999; (4) Chaussee's failure to see the significance of the DeLao-Prioletta interview in relation to the defense theory is irrelevant, because any reasonable law enforcement officer would have understood that any reasonable prosecutor would plan to use the interview statements even though they would only be used for impeachment or rebuttal if the defendant testified; (5) no reasonable prosecutor who knew about the DeLao interview statements could have relied upon the language of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(b) and the relevant paragraph in the Larsen case as a basis for concluding that a prosecutor's subjective intent made a difference in the duty to disclose; (6) no reasonable prosecutor could have relied upon the impeachment/rebuttal exception in paragraph (d) as a basis for withholding information; and (7) the good faith of the prosecutor has little effect in determining whether the prosecutor has shown good cause. [23] ¶ 134. I disagree. In my view, the State has shown good cause. The facts and circumstances establish that the prosecutor had no intent to surprise or disadvantage the defendant by withholding information required to be disclosed. There is not even a whisper of prosecutorial bad faith. The prosecutor had no obligation to find the information at issue when it was in the possession of the Racine Police. She had no obligation to disclose the information at the moment it came into Chaussee's possession because it was not in writing and because neither the officer nor the prosecutor had any intent to use the information and did not see the value of the information until July 28. The prosecutor disclosed the information as soon as its relevance and its potential use were recognized, demonstrating her good faith; and she used the evidence only in impeachment and rebuttal, not in the case-in-chief.