Opinion ID: 670838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relief from Judgment

Text: 24 The Pattons also appeal from the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims denying their motion under Rule 60 requesting that the court amend its judgment of September 29, 1992 and award compensation for pain and suffering. However, before we review the trial court's ruling, we must first address the question whether the court had jurisdiction to rule on the Pattons' Rule 60 motion in the absence of a timely motion for review. We have plenary authority to consider whether the lower tribunal's assertion of jurisdiction was correct, see Galloway Farms, Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1000 (Fed.Cir.1987), and we may address this issue sua sponte, see Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1175, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979). 25 We considered the jurisdictional implications of the failure to comply with the 30-day time limit to file a motion for review under section 300aa-12(e)(1) in Widdoss v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 989 F.2d 1170 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 381, 126 L.Ed.2d 331 (1993). In Widdoss, the petitioner filed her petition for review 31 days after issuance of the special master's decision denying compensation. Because the petition was untimely under section 300aa-12(e)(1), final judgment was entered in accordance with the special master's decision pursuant to section 300aa-12(e)(3). The petitioner moved for relief under Rule 60(b), urging that the Claims Court vacate the judgment and review the merits of the case. Id. at 1174. The trial court granted the motion and reversed the special master's decision. 26 On appeal, we held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain and rule on the merits of the petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion. In so holding, we concluded that the 30-day time period in which to file a motion for review under section 300aa-12(e)(1) is jurisdictional, id. at 1177, and that the trial court erred in employing [Rule] 60(b) to create jurisdiction to review the merits of the petition, id. at 1178. 27 In the instant case, the trial court did not consider Widdoss as barring it from considering the Pattons' Rule 60 motion, despite the fact that neither party filed a motion for review within the 30-day time limit. It concluded that [w]hile the court recognizes that it cannot invoke RCFC 60(b) to review the merits of a special master's decision in the absence of a timely motion for review, Widdoss v. Secretary DHHS, [989 F.2d 1170 (Fed.Cir.1993) ], the court does not interpret the Widdoss decision or the Vaccine Act as precluding the court from invoking RCFC 60(b) to relieve a party from a judgment for the limited purposes listed in this rule. 28 Fed.Cl. at 539-40 n. 13. 28 Our holding in Widdoss that Rule 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent the Vaccine Act's express procedure for seeking review of the merits of a special master's decision is consistent with the settled principle that the rule is not to be used as a substitute for an appeal. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198-99, 71 S.Ct. 209, 211-12, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950). A petitioner may not attempt to do indirectly through Rule 60(b) that which it is prohibited from doing directly under the appeals process prescribed by the Act. However, we agree with the trial court that the 30-day time limit of section 300aa-12(e)(1) presents no jurisdictional bar to the court's consideration of a Rule 60 motion where the movant does not seek review of the merits of the special master's decision, but rather requests correction of an error of the court. Although the failure to file a timely motion seeking review of a special master's decision deprives the Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction to review the merits of that decision, it does not prohibit the court from granting relief from the judgment where the relief sought does not involve consideration of the merits of the case, but comes within the requirements of Rule 60. 29 Unlike the petitioner in Widdoss, the Pattons do not challenge the findings or conclusions underlying the special master's decision to award compensation for a vaccine-related injury and attorneys' fees and costs. Instead, they request that the court amend the final judgment to reflect the special master's actual stated intent to award compensation for pain and suffering, which was not realized due to the special master's acknowledged inadvertence and error. Thus, the error from which the Pattons seek relief is not one regarding the merits of the special master's decision, but simply the failure of the special master to effectuate her intent to award compensation for pain and suffering. Because the Pattons did not attempt to appeal the merits of the special master's decision in a manner inconsistent with the carefully circumscribed appellate process under the Vaccine Act, Widdoss, 989 F.2d at 1178, we conclude that the court did not impermissibly extend its jurisdiction beyond that prescribed by Congress in considering the Rule 60 motion. 30 Having concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction over the Rule 60 motion, we now address the propriety of the trial court's denial of the motion. As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute the appropriate standard of review applicable to this issue. The Pattons argue that we should review the court's decision de novo, see Dehne v. United States, 970 F.2d 890, 892 (Fed.Cir.1992), because it was apparently based upon a finding of a lack of jurisdiction. The government, on the other hand, contends that the decision whether to grant or deny Rule 60 relief is within the discretion of the trial court, which we should review for abuse of discretion. See Information Sys., 994 F.2d at 794. 31 We agree with the government that the trial court's ruling should be reviewed on an abuse of discretion basis. As discussed above, it is clear from the court's reasoning that the denial of the Pattons' motion for relief from judgment was based not on a lack of jurisdiction but on the court's conclusion that the Pattons were not entitled to such relief for failure to pursue pre-judgment remedies. 32 An abuse of discretion exists when, inter alia, the lower court's decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law or on a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1083 (Fed.Cir.1993). A court's misinterpretation or misapplication of its own rules is an error of law. See id. at 1087; Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 589-90, 61 S.Ct. at 771. 33 Rule 60(a) affords relief from minor clerical mistakes or errors arising from simple oversight or omission. See 6A James W. Moore and Jo Desha Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice p 60.06 (2d ed. 1993); see also United States v. Bealey, 978 F.2d 696, 699 (Fed.Cir.1992). It is intended to allow the judgment to speak the truth, but not to substantially alter the rights of the parties thereto. See Wright & Miller, supra, Sec. 2854. Errors of a more substantial nature are more appropriately correctable under subdivision (b). 10 See Moore, supra, p 60.06. The failure of the special master to rule on the Pattons' claims for compensation for pain and suffering was more than a mere clerical error or oversight. Awarding compensation for pain and suffering is a discretionary matter and does not follow as of right when an award of compensation for vaccine-related injuries is made. Nor does an award for pain and suffering necessarily follow when the special master allows an award for attorneys' fees in a deferred ruling pursuant to Vaccine Rule 10(b). Thus, if relief from judgment is to be had in this case, it must be obtained under Rule 60(b). See Scola v. Boat Frances, R., Inc., 618 F.2d 147, 153 (1st Cir.1980) (subdivision (a) covers those omissions or mistakes resulting from a court's failure to perform a ministerial duty, as opposed to a deliberative or discretionary act addressable by subdivision (b)). 34 In denying the motion, the trial court concluded that [r]elief from judgment is not merited in the instant case ... where the error that petitioners allege as a legal basis for relief that they requested was capable of being raised before judgment was entered. 28 Fed.Cl. at 540 n. 13. Thus, despite acknowledging that the absence of a timely motion for review did not divest it of authority to grant Rule 60 relief, the trial court nevertheless concluded that the Pattons were not entitled to such relief because a timely motion for review was not filed. 35 The practical effect of the trial court's circular reasoning is to preclude access to the post-judgment remedies of Rule 60(b) whenever pre-judgment remedies are not pursued. Consequently, according to the trial court, the only means available to correct a mistake by the special master is to file a timely motion for review under section 300aa-12(e)(1). That restrictive view of the availability of Rule 60(b) relief renders the rule a legal nullity and is inconsistent with its purposes. 36 As a remedial provision, Rule 60(b) is to be liberally construed for the purpose of doing substantial justice. 7 Moore, supra, pp 60.18, 60.19; see also Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 609, 69 S.Ct. 384, 387, 93 L.Ed. 266, modified, 336 U.S. 942, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1949). Under Rule 60(b)(1), relief may be granted from judicial error when inadvertence is shown and the motion is made within a reasonable time. See CRI, Inc. v. Watson, 608 F.2d 1137, 1143 (8th Cir.1979). That the problems encountered by the Pattons may have been avoided had they sought correction before judgment was entered is not itself a sufficient basis to preclude relief under Rule 60(b). The exhaustion of pre-judgment remedies is not a mandatory condition precedent for obtaining post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b). 11 The rule, by its very nature, affords relief within a reasonable time after a final judgment is entered and cannot be invoked before the entry of judgment on the special master's decision. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 advisory committee's note to 1946 amendment (60(b) applies only to final judgments). 37 It is undisputed, and the special master's Order to Amend makes abundantly clear, that it was the intention of the special master to award compensation for pain and suffering and that [t]he omission of such award was inadvertently and mistakenly overlooked. Congress has specifically provided that pain and suffering associated with a vaccine-related injury should be adequately compensated for by means of a monetary award. 38 Nonetheless, while we hold that the court erred in concluding that the exhaustion of pre-judgment remedies is a prerequisite to seeking relief under Rule 60(b), and while it is not apparent to us that reasons otherwise exist here for denying such relief in view of the admission by the special master that an award of compensation for pain and suffering was inadvertently omitted, we are reluctant to decide a matter which has not been fully developed by the trial court and which is committed to its discretion. The trial court's order denying the motion for relief provides no findings of fact or conclusions of law other than that contained in footnote 13 of its June 4, 1993 opinion, which we hold inadequate as a matter of law to sustain denial of Rule 60(b) relief. Where no adequate basis exists upon which to review the appealed judgment due to insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, the judgment should be vacated and the action remanded for further consideration. See ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1984). Accordingly, we vacate the court's judgment of August 5, 1993 denying the Pattons' Rule 60 motion and remand the case to the trial court to reconsider whether the Pattons are entitled to relief under Rule 60(b).