Opinion ID: 2457938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the district court apply the proper penalty range in imposing sentence?

Text: [¶ 23] The question before us is not whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing a particular sentence upon the appellant. Rather, the question before us is whether the district court sentenced the appellant under the proper statutory subsection. The latter is a question of law that we review de novo because, if the appellant was sentenced under the wrong statute, his sentence is illegal. Robison v. State, 2011 WY 4, ¶ 10, 246 P.3d 259, 263 (Wyo.2011). This is also a question of law because it involves statutory construction. Johnson v. City of Laramie, 2008 WY 73, ¶ 7, 187 P.3d 355, 356 (Wyo.2008). [¶ 24] Three statutes are relevant. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) defines the effect of an attempt to commit a crime as applicable in this case: (a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if: (i) With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission of the crime. A substantial step is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the commission of the crime[.] In turn, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-304 (LexisNexis 2011) establishes how punishment is to be determined for attempt crimes: The penalty for attempt, solicitation or conspiracy is the same as the penalty for the most serious crime which is attempted, solicited or is an object of the conspiracy except that an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit a capital crime is not punishable by the death penalty if the capital crime is not committed. Finally, the crime of kidnapping is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201 (LexisNexis 2011): (a) A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person, with the intent to: (i) Hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; (ii) Facilitate the commission of a felony; or (iii) Inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another. (b) A removal or confinement is unlawful if it is accomplished: (i) By force, threat or deception; or (ii) Without the consent of a parent, guardian or other person responsible for the general supervision of an individual who is under the age of fourteen (14) or who is adjudicated incompetent. (c) If the defendant voluntarily releases the victim substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial, kidnapping is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years. (d) If the defendant does not voluntarily release the victim substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial, kidnapping is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than twenty (20) years or for life except as provided in W.S. 6-2-101. [¶ 25] We have previously held that kidnapping is a single crime described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(a) and (b), and that subsection (c), rather than defining a lesser-included offense, describes mitigating conduct subsequent to the kidnapping that may allow for a reduced sentence. Loomer v. State, 768 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Wyo.1989). The appellant bears the burden of proving such mitigating conduct and, if competent evidence of such is produced, the question must be presented to the jury. Id. at 1047. It logically follows that, where there has not been a completed kidnapping, but instead an attempted kidnapping, the mitigating circumstances described in subsection (c) cannot occur. See, e.g., Rainwater v. State, 189 Ariz. 367, 368, 943 P.2d 727, 728 (Ariz.1997) ([A]s a matter of law, the reduction presupposes that all elements of a completed kidnapping have been established such that the victim has in fact been restrained.); and Laraby v. State, 710 P.2d 427, 428 (Alaska Ct.App.1985) (The legislature's hope of encouraging the release of kidnap victims unharmed is unnecessary in the case of attempted kidnapping.). [5] [¶ 26] We recognize the potential anomaly in the statute that a person who completes a kidnapping but releases the victim unharmed could be subject to a lesser penalty than a person who merely attempts a kidnapping, but anomalies created by statute are not to be corrected by the court. Rainwater, 943 P.2d at 728 n. 2. In regard to this statute, such judicial meddling would violate two principles. First, the legislature has exclusive authority over criminal punishment and sentencing. See, e.g., Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 416 (Wyo.1990); Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo.1986); and Stambaugh v. State, 613 P.2d 1237, 1243 (Wyo.1980). And second, it is not our role, because it violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers, to supply what appear to us to be omissions in a statute, or to correct what appear to us to be defects in a statute. See, e.g., Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 29, 86 P.3d 270, 285 (Wyo.2004); State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div. v. Mahoney, 798 P.2d 836, 838 (Wyo.1990); In re TR, 777 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Wyo.1989); State ex rel. Albany County Weed & Pest Dist. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Albany County, 592 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Wyo.1979); and In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 484-85 (Wyo.1976). [¶ 27] The district court correctly applied the sentencing provisions of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201(d) after the appellant was convicted of attempted kidnapping.