Opinion ID: 1453508
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Defendant's Presence

Text: At the outset of the guilt trial, defendant expressed the desire to be absent during jury selection. After being fully admonished of his right to be present, and with his attorney's approval, defendant personally waived the right both in writing and orally. The court accepted the waiver after finding defendant knowingly and willingly waived his rights. It informed defendant that if he changed his mind, he could come back into court at any time. Defendant then absented himself during jury selection. A week after the waiver, another hearing was held to determine whether defendant still wanted to be absent. He did. Defendant was present during the evidence portion of trial. (4a) Defendant contends the right to be present during jury selection cannot be waived. In essence, he argues that a defendant who does not want to be present during jury selection can achieve his wish only if he engages in disruptive behavior. A defendant who behaves himself but merely desires to be absent cannot, he claims, be accommodated. We disagree. This right, like other more fundamental rights (e.g., against self-incrimination, to testify, to have an attorney, to confront witnesses, and to have a jury trial at all), may be waived. A defendant need not be disruptive before a court may grant his request and excuse him from attending jury selection. People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109] is closely on point. In Robertson, the defendant filed a written waiver adapted from the form set out in section 977, subdivision (b) [3] waiving his right to be present at the sentence-modification hearing and imposition of sentence. As in this case, defendant argued that his presence at any critical phase of a capital trial may not be waived. Based in part on the solicitude shown by modern jurisprudence to the defendant's prerogative to waive the most crucial of rights (48 Cal.3d at p. 61), we disagreed, and held that a capital defendant may waive his right to be present even at critical stages of the proceeding. ( Id. at pp. 59-62.) This holding applies equally to jury selection. It would be anomalous to force a defendant to misbehave before he could fulfill his wish to be absent from the proceedings. Defendant argues that such a waiver should not be allowed in capital cases. However, as noted in Robertson, Our statutes governing waiver make no distinction between capital and other felony defendants.... (48 Cal.3d at pp. 61-62.) In Robertson, we cited sections 977 and 1193. The applicable statutes here are sections 977 and 1043. The latter generally provides that the defendant in a felony case shall be personally present at the trial. (§ 1043, subd. (a).) Exceptions include when the defendant is disruptive (§ 1043, subd. (b)(1)) and Any prosecution for an offense which is not punishable by death in which the defendant is voluntarily absent. (§ 1043, subd. (b)(2).) Section 1043, subdivision (d), also states, Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not limit the right of a defendant to waive his right to be present in accordance with Section 977. In combination, sections 977 and 1043 provide that although mere voluntary absence is not sufficient in a capital case to hold the trial without the defendant's personal presence, such presence may be waived (at least as to those proceedings not specifically listed in section 977, subdivision (b)). Defendant argues that the legislative history of these sections discloses no intent to allow such waiver in capital cases. Nothing in that history, however, suffices to overcome the plain language of the statutes. (5) When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it. ( People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884 [157 Cal. Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473].) We thus adhere to Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18. (4b) A capital defendant may waive his right to be present even at critical stages of trial. (We do not here decide whether a defendant may waive his presence as to those proceedings specifically listed in section 977, subdivision (b); see People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1237-1240 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].) Defendant also argues the public and state have an independent interest in compelling him to be present during jury selection. The Legislature, however, has deemed otherwise. (Cf. People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 745-755 [170 Cal. Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837] [upholding § 1018, which prohibits a capital defendant from pleading guilty without the consent of counsel]; and People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 833-834 [80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889] [applying the automatic appeal provisions of § 1239, subd. (b)].) Defendant cites People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 362-368 [222 Cal. Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925] ( Deere I ), where we held that a defendant may not bar his attorney from presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Subsequent decisions, however, have largely undermined this holding. ( People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 716 [280 Cal. Rptr. 424, 808 P.2d 1181] ( Deere II ); see People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1030 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228, fn. 9 [259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698].) In any event, even Deere I allowed the defendant to completely waive a penalty phase jury. (41 Cal.3d at pp. 359-360.) A capital defendant who has stated an intention to seek a death verdict may waive his right to counsel. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1223.) Waiver of presence during jury selection by no means ensure[s] the return of a death verdict. ( Ibid. ) Indeed, defendant, through counsel, vigorously defended himself at both the guilt and penalty phases. (6) Defendant also argues that even if he may legally waive his right to be present, he did not validly do so. Although the written waiver was substantially in the prescribed form, defendant argues it was not execute[d] in open court as required by section 977, subdivision (b). The form was apparently executed between two court sessions held the same day. It was filed at the latter session accompanied by a full oral waiver. This was sufficient compliance with the statute. ( People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 62.) Defendant finally asserts he was suicidally depressed. Nothing in the record, however, suggests defendant was unable to understand and waive his right to be present. Counsel concurred in the waiver. The court found it was knowing and voluntary. It is not irrational for a defendant represented by experienced counsel to not want to physically endure the lengthy jury selection process. Defendant validly waived his right to be present during jury selection.