Opinion ID: 668541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: References to the Company

Text: 49 A prosecutor's statements during summation, if improper, will result in a denial of due process rights only if, in the context of the entire summation, they cause the defendant substantial prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1189 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1136 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1139, 107 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1990). The determination of whether there was such prejudice depends largely on an analysis of the severity of the misconduct, the curative measures taken by the court, and the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. See, e.g., Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 440 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 158, 116 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1136. If the defendant failed to make timely objection to a statement contained in the prosecutor's summation, the statement will not be deemed a ground for reversal unless it amounts to a flagrant abuse. United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1070, 109 S.Ct. 1352, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989); see United States v. Perez, 702 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2457, 77 L.Ed.2d 1336 (1983). 50 Aponte-Vega contends that since he was charged with running a continuing criminal enterprise, the repeated use by the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) of the term company when referring to the organization run by Aponte-Vega and Rivera was tantamount to unsworn testimony by the AUSA that such an organization existed. Notwithstanding Aponte-Vega's contention that the AUSA used the word company more than 75 times in her summation, Aponte-Vega made no objection at trial. 51 We cannot conclude that the AUSA's use of the term company was impermissible, much less a flagrant abuse warranting reversal in the absence of any objection at trial, for that term was used by one coconspirator witness, and the other coconspirator witness testified in analogous terms. Victor Alvarez, a bookkeeper in the organization, introduced the term, stating that [a]fter I was arrested, well, my family bailed me out and the company paid for my lawyer. (Tr. 440.) Alvarez explained that by company, he meant the suppliers of the drugs, i.e., Aponte-Vega. (Id. 451.) He thereafter repeatedly referred to the Aponte-Vega organization as the company. (E.g., id. 459, 464, 467, 468.) Further, Rodriguez, while not using the term company, described the organization's operations in a way that made it clear that it was run as a business. For example, she testified that she worked for Aponte-Vega in the heroin business (id. 748); that Aponte-Vega g[o]t a job for me (id. 765); and that at one point she had been laid off (id. 780), or fired due to [l]ack of work (id. 819). She described payroll records that were kept showing employee salaries and vacations; she testified to the organization's six-day work week, the holidays allowed, and the policy of giving employees bonuses for certain holidays; and she explained its absenteeism policy: [i]f they miss one day without notifying the day before, it's possible that they lose their position or their jobs (id. 828-29). Given the testimony of Alvarez and Rodriguez, it is plain that neither the concept nor the characterization of the organization as a company originated with the AUSA, and there was little risk that the jury would interpret the summation references to company as testimony of the AUSA. We see no error, much less plain error.