Opinion ID: 2318093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mistrial Required

Text: Gomez argues that the trial judge committed reversible error in denying his mistrial motion after S.C.'s mother referred to Gomez's commission of a similar sexual offense against Gomez's other niece (S.C.'s cousin). Gomez argues that the infection of the process with [the] suggestion that [he] had molested still another niece gave rise to a probability that this was a factor of significance in the jury reaching a [guilty] verdict. We review a trial judge's denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. [6] We have explained that a prompt curative instruction that does not overemphasize an improper remark is often an appropriate meaningful and practical alternative to a mistrial. [7] It is well established in Delaware that a trial judge's prompt curative instruction is presumed adequate to direct the jury to disregard improper statements and cure any error. [8] But, in cases where there is no meaningful and practical alternative, a mistrial is required. [9] We have recognized that a trial judge should grant a mistrial only where there is a manifest necessity or the ends of public justice would be otherwise defeated. [10] This Court's holding in Ashley v. State [11] is instructive. There, the defendant was charged with murder for the stabbing death of a fellow inmate. The defendant testified in his own defense at trial. The defendant admitted that he had previously been convicted of a similar offenseassault in a detention facility. The trial judge excluded the details of that prior convictionnamely, that the defendant had stabbed another inmate with a shankon the ground that it was prejudicial because the jury would likely infer that if the defendant had committed a similar crime in the past, he likely committed the offense for which he was being tried. Immediately after defense counsel's closing argument in the guilt phase, a courtroom spectatorlater identified as the victim of the prior convictionstood up and yelled to the jurors: Don't think he's not guilty, he stabbed me in the back 14 times. Don't think he's not guilty. He's nothing but a coward. Stabbed me in the back. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but the trial judge denied it and instead issued a curative instruction. The jury convicted the defendant of murder the next day. Defense counsel then renewed his mistrial motion, but the trial judge again denied it and explained that the curative instruction cured any prejudice. [12] On appeal, the defendant in Ashley argued that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the mistrial motion. This Court agreed, explaining that the spectator's outburst injected into the trial the assertion of a prior bad act that was patently and squarely on point with the very type of crime for which [the defendant] was on trial. [13] Although the trial judge had excluded the details of the prior conviction for fear of prejudicing the defendant, this Court held that a mistrial was required because the content of the spectator's outburst was so closely related to the evidence that had been excluded from [the defendant]'s trial that the prejudice from the outburst far exceed[ed] the threshold where a curative instruction [could have] remed[ied] the prejudice suffered. [14] Here, the trial judge determined that Gomez's prior conviction for a similar sexual offense against Gomez's other niece (S.C.'s cousin) was inadmissible. Yet, S.C.'s mother testified about Gomez's prior sex crime against a similarly situated individual (Gomez's other niece). That testimony injected into the trial the assertion of a prior bad act that was patently and squarely on point with the very type of crime for which [Gomez] was on trial. [15] When the jury heard that Gomez had committed a similar sexual offense against Gomez's other niece (S.C.'s cousin), which was not the subject of the current proceeding, that testimony created an impermissible inference that he had committed the offense for which he was being tried. In these circumstances, a mistrial was required because the content of the [witness]'s [testimony] was so closely related to the evidence that had been excluded from [Gomez]'s trial that the prejudice from the [testimony] far exceed[ed] the threshold where a curative instruction [could have] remed[ied] the prejudice suffered. [16] Because a mistrial was required, we must reverse the convictions and remand this case for a new trial. To provide guidance at that new trial and in other cases, we next comment on additional arguments made by Gomez.