Opinion ID: 196562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the 1984 Offense Was a Felony

Text: 20 Even were one to assume that the disposition of Cuevas' 1986 cocaine offense was not a conviction, his challenge to the application of § 2L1.2(b)(2) would fail, because his 1984 conviction for cocaine possession was itself for an aggravated felony. As to his 1984 cocaine offense, Cuevas does not dispute that he was convicted. Rather, he argues that, while the offense was a felony under Rhode Island law, it would have been punishable only as a misdemeanor if prosecuted under federal law, and therefore could not be a felony, nor a drug trafficking crime, nor an aggravated felony for purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(2). We recently rejected precisely this argument, however, in United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361 (1st Cir.1996). Thus, even apart from Cuevas' 1986 cocaine possession offense, the district court properly enhanced defendant's sentence by 16 levels in view of his 1984 offense, which was itself an aggravated felony under § 2L1.2(b)(2). Criminal History Category Computation 21 Cuevas argues that the district court erroneously added two points to his Guidelines criminal history computation based on a finding that defendant had committed his federal offense of conviction while under a sentence of probation imposed by the Rhode Island state court for a 1994 state drug offense. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (Nov.1994) (Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation....). Defendant contends that because he illegally reentered the United States in 1990, he could not have committed that offense while under his 1994 state probationary sentence. This argument has no more than superficial appeal. 22 The unambiguous terms of the statute under which Cuevas was convicted establish that a deported alien who illegally reenters and remains in the United States can violate the statute at three different points in time: when he enters, attempts to enter, or when he is at any time found in this country. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). As was said in United States v. Rodriguez, 26 F.3d 4 (1st Cir.1994), we think it plain that 'enters,' 'attempts to enter' and 'is at any time found in' describe three distinct occasions on which a deported alien can violate Section 1326. Id. at 8. 23 Cuevas was indicted specifically for the offense of being found in the United States in violation of § 1326(a). That was the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Thus, even though defendant illegally reentered the United States in 1990, he committed his § 1326(a) offense in 1995, when he was found. Rodriguez, 26 F.3d at 8. He was unquestionably serving a criminal probationary sentence for his 1994 state drug conviction at that time. There was no error in the district court's application of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). 24 Affirmed.