Opinion ID: 1733790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sequence of Events

Text: On or about June 15, 1981, members of the Church met with the Supervisor of the Minneapolis Zoning Information Office, William Nordrum, and informed him of their intention to purchase the subject property and use it as both a church and a residence for a number of staff persons. Mr. Nordrum suggested they seek to have the property rezoned to R4-a zone in which rooming houses are permitted. Mr. Nordrum indicated that while churches were permitted in R1 zones, defendants would need to obtain a building permit allowing them to change the use of the subject property from a duplex to a church. Mr. Nordrum also indicated that the property would have to be inspected to determine floor-load adequacy and that off-street parking spaces and a loading area would have to be provided. No mention of a monastery or rectory use of the property was made at that time. Mr. Nordrum assumed that a rooming house was to be the predominant use. Several days later Mr. Nordrum met with defendants again and completed a rezoning petition, advising defendants that the consent of two thirds of the neighboring residents within 100 feet of the church would be required for a rezoning under Minnesota Statutes Annotated section 462.357, subd. 5. (West Supp.1983). The Church representatives then retained an attorney who advised them that churches were permitted uses in an R1 district and that monasteries were permitted accessory uses. The application for rezoning was never submitted and the property was purchased on September 15, 1981, with no rezoning contingency written into the purchase agreement. In reaction to several complaints from neighbors and an alderman, an inspector from the City of Minneapolis Housing Department, Andrew Ellis, inspected the property on September 15, the day the Church members took occupancy, and again 3 days later. Reverend King, the director of the Church at the time, subsequently informed Mr. Ellis that the subject property was to be used as a church and was to have monastery and rectory uses as well. Nonetheless, the City within the space of less than a month issued three notices of zoning violations. The first was for overoccupancy and required that the building either be reverted back to its permitted duplex occupancy or that plans and permits be submitted to convert it. The second notice was for rubbish accumulation. [5] The third notice concerned registration of the building as a let-out duplex since the City recognized the Church as the owner of the property but not as using the building itself as a church. [6] Each notice specified a 30-day period for abatement. On October 27, 1981, a meeting was held, at the instance of respondents, between city officials and church representatives. The Church representatives agreed to retain and subsequently did retain an architect who would work with City officials to assure that the subject property would conform to safety and health regulations and to outline possible parking alternatives. Written confirmation of this fact was sent to the City by the Church attorney on October 29, 1981. However, on October 28, 1981, Mr. Jacobs, Director of Inspections and Zoning Administrator for the City of Minneapolis wrote to the City Attorney requesting that he initiate legal proceedings against the Church. Past practice of the zoning department has generally been to try to conciliate any disputes, to work with the subject property owners to try to conform with the Code requirements and to hold compliance orders in abeyance when the parties are willing to try to solve the problem. There is no evidence that the Church members do not intend to cooperate with the zoning officials in ensuring that their property meets the basic requirements of the Code. However, if we accept the trial judge's findings that the subject property is being used principally as a church and accessorily, as a monastery, then the notice of Code violations for overoccupancy and registration as a let-out duplex cannot stand. There are no municipal limits on the number of people allowed to attend any type of church whether traditional or nontraditional or to reside in a monastery except those limits imposed by the requirements of health and safety. The City has not alleged any such violations. The Code clearly permits both traditional and nontraditional churches alike to establish and maintain accessory monasteries and convents within an R1 district. See Minn. Code of Ord. §§ 538.120(4); 538.120(6)(k) (1976). The crux of the dispute between the Church, the City and the Lake Harriet residents revolves around the interpretation of the term monastery as it is used in the ordinances at issue. The City argues that this court should find the teaching center does not qualify as a monastery under the Code. Alternatively the City charges that, if the building is found to be a monastery, its use is a principal not an accessory use and hence not permitted in an R1 district. Appellants admit that the residential use of the Lake Harriet property may be a monastic use in sociological terms as established by three of respondents' expert witnesses at trial. But appellants contend that a different definition of monastic life was envisioned by the land-use planners in drafting the zoning code. Appellants wish to apply the lay and Webster's dictionary meanings of a monastery as a house of religious retirement or seclusion from the world for persons under religious vows. Similarly, appellants would apply the Webster's definition of convent as an association or community of recluses devoted to a religious life under a superior: a body of monks, friars or nuns constituting one local community   . The argument concludes with the assertion that the common and dictionary understanding of the term monastery would be a community characterized by privacy or solitariness, and by seclusion from the world at large. Appellants then argue that this is the meaning necessarily incorporated into the zoning code which, according to their perceptions, permits monastery uses in the most restricted residential districts only if they conform to the goals of low population density, large yards, little traffic and close neighborhood relationships. When monasteries assume a principal use, as opposed to a use accessory to a church, appellants urge, they must be placed in a B1-I zone because they place too great a burden on the residential neighborhood. The test of principal versus accessory use then becomes one of calculating the area, extent or purpose to which the various portions of the property are committed for the residential use relative to the area devoted to the church use. Respondents quite correctly point out that the contemporary meaning of the words monastery and convent no longer necessarily indicates a reclusive lifestyle even in the most traditional and established religions. Courts in many jurisdictions have recognized that through the centuries the activities and pursuits of the occupants of convents, monasteries, parish houses and rectories have changed to bring them in closer contact with the secular world. [7] See Diakonian Society v. City of Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals, 20 Ill.Dec. 634, 63 Ill. App.3d 823, 380 N.E.2d 843 (1978); Association for Educational Development v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579 (Mo.1976). The issue of whether a lay or dictionary definition as opposed to a sociological, doctrinal definition applies to the land use planners' usage of the word monastery is a question of law for this court. All three religious experts at trial testified and the trial court found that the residents of the Lake Harriet property live monastic lifestyles as exhibited by a central religious faith, an attachment to an organized church, shared living quarters and an ordered, disciplined lifestyle. It is this definition of a monastery that we hereby adopt for interpretation of the zoning code. In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court delineated its scope of review in zoning matters. In Northwestern College v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 1979), the court repeated that it is our function to make an independent examination of an administrative agency's record and decision and arrive at our own conclusions as to the propriety of that determination without according any special deference to the same review conducted by the trial court. Id. at 868 (quoting Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 822 (Minn.1977)). The court then declared that the same scope is appropriate in reviewing the zoning decisions of local governing bodies. Id. In our review of the record we conclude that the finding that the Church Universal and Triumphant Teaching Center conforms to this definition is a finding of fact which was supported by substantial evidence at trial. [8] Appellants next assert that even if the use of the Lake Harriet property is characterized as monastic that use is still not permitted in an R1 residential neighborhood because it is a principal not a subordinate use. We disagree. Appellants' argument that there is no doctrinal compulsion and no authentic religious necessity for the Church and monastery to function together must fail because the zoning code incorporates no such test. The language of the Code is set forth in the disjunctive and reads very broadly; to be accessory a building or use must contribute to the comfort, convenience or necessity of the church. Minn.Code of Ord. § 522.40(3) (1976). There was substantial evidence at trial that the residential use served the convenience and comfort of the Church. The Church Universal and Triumphant does not contest the evidence adduced at trial that a large and perhaps equal portion of the Lake Harriet residence is used for residential purposes. But respondent accurately points out that this Code requirement is also written in the disjunctive; to be accessory a use must also be subordinate in area, extent or purpose to the church use. The factual evidence at trial substantially supported the conclusion that the purpose of the monastery is to assist the teaching mission of the individual church. The major issue then as perceived by the parties is the legal determination of which measuring rod should apply; a numerical test which counts numbers of rooms and occupants and time spent in church or monastic activities or a doctrinal test of service of purpose. The floor space, in a traditional church, that is devoted to a chapel, to church administration and to parochial school usage varies widely depending on the particular denomination and the relative maturity of the church. The same can be said for measuring the size of the congregation. Such measurements should not be determinative in deciding if a monastic or an educational or community use is an accessory or principal use. We therefore uphold the sociological, doctrinal position advanced by respondents and the trial court. The two main cases relied on by respondents and appellant are Havurah v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 177 Conn. 440, 418 A.2d 82 (1979), and Association for Educational Development v. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d 579 (Mo.1976), respectively. In Hayward, several members of the Catholic Opus Dei Society were sharing a single family residence, leading an ordered life and participating in daily worship on the premises. The court held that the men were not using the residence as a monastery or church or convent because they were laymen, not clergymen; their religious ministry was an avocation rather than a regular and primary vocation. Hayward, 533 S.W.2d at 585. But the Missouri court carefully distinguished this case from one involving a church which offered religious services to the public: The Temple Israel case concerned a church and religious school. The instant case involves neither and therefore Temple Israel is not controlling here. Id. at 587, citing Congregational Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo.1959). The court further stated: We believe it is important at this point to note that the use sought to be made of this residence by respondents is not a use necessarily incidental to that of a church   . Id. at 587. The Havurah court upheld the right of a synagogue located in a large residential home to provide overnight accommodations to its members during holidays when a religious ban on travel was in effect. The decision that such use constituted a permissible accessory use was based upon evidence adduced at trial and uncontroverted, that overnight accommodation was an essential religious practice. The trial court had found that [c]entral to this kind of religious community is the concept of shared time, during which the members come and remain together to worship in a variety of ways, praying, studying, celebrating religious festivals, and preparing meals according to religious laws. 177 Conn. at 449, 418 A.2d at 87. Similarly, the trial court found that the residential use of the Lake Harriet property was an accessory use because the occupancy of the subject property as a monastery furthers the purposes of the Church in extending its teachings and ministry to the community. The monastery serves the convenience of the Church by training and screening members for future leadership. This standard is obviously not a rigid test. But a flexible definition is in keeping with the special status that churches enjoy in our society. In a majority of jurisdictions, established churches are permitted to maintain wide-ranging uses accessory to their churches. Various parochial and community functions such as schools, playgrounds, day care centers, drug rehabilitation centers and softball fields have been found to be permitted in residential neighborhoods as accessory uses. Havurah v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 177 Conn. 440, 418 A.2d 82 (1979). Moreover, the language of the ordinances at issue is very broad and evinces no intent to keep monasteries and convents that are accessory to traditional and nontraditional churches out of residential neighborhoods. It is the contention of the City of Minneapolis that the Church is in violation of the Code requirements as to off-street parking and loading facilities. The evidence adduced at trial showed that the Church currently has six off-street parking spaces at its Lake Harriet property, a 4-car garage and two spaces to the north of the rear of the building. The zoning code requires that churches provide a minimum of 10 off-street parking spaces or one parking space for each twenty seats in the main auditorium    and one loading dock. Minn.Code of Ord. § 538.190(7)(a)(i), (ii) (1976). Currently, a maximum of 37 individuals including the residents of the property attend the Church services. There was no testimony as to the number of seats in the auditorium but we presume there is at least sufficient seating for those 37 people. The six available parking spaces therefore easily meet the Code requirements as to the number of parking spaces as well as the one loading berth required for the Church use of the property. In the case of a newly established religious group the outside membership attending the services is likely to begin with a small number. If membership does not increase, neither will the need for more parking spaces. If membership does increase to the point where a lack of adequate parking presents a safety hazard, then the housing officials may have reason to require more parking spaces. This court, in Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Svee, 303 Minn. 79, 85, 226 N.W.2d 306, 309 (1975), declared that [i]t is self-evident that any church will cause heavier vehicular traffic, but for that matter, so would residential construction. However, that is far from the creation of a traffic hazard. Code section 538.190(7)(b) states that additional parking spaces may be required for the monastery use of the property in an adequate number. This determination is left to the discretion of the zoning administrator but has apparently never been made. Nor did the appellants wait, before bringing suit, for the report of the respondent's architect as to how additional parking could be provided. Intervenors state that 7 to 12 additional spaces must be provided to accommodate the residential use. Mr. Nordrum testified that it would be departmental practice to require one parking space per three persons based on the maximum occupancy potential of the building. But Mr. Nordrum was referring to the zoning code requirements for rooming houses. The applicable Code section 538.190(7)(b) requires reference to standards incorporated in the zoning code for similar use. (Emphasis added). While the residential use of the property may resemble that of dormatories or rooming houses, the special constitutional implications invoked when a monastery is accessory to a church, demand that only religious uses be termed similar uses in calculating parking space requirements. We agree with the trial court that respondents are currently in substantial compliance with the parking requirements. The trial judge viewed the property and found that absolute compliance would create an undue burden on defendants, destroy the aesthetics of the property and produce no benefit to the surrounding property owners. Evidence adduced at trial supported these findings. Moreover, the City has not required absolute compliance by other churches and their accessory uses. The City's Zoning Administrator testified that the zoning code is not rigidly but is flexibly applied. The zoning administrator should proceed to determine the maximum occupancy potential of the monastery and the number of parking spaces necessary in the interest of safety but with the flexibility that is usually applied to such cases. [9] We note that the Code itself allows accessory off-street parking facilities to be located elsewhere than on the same zoning lot with the building or use served. Minn.Code of Ord. § 522.40(4) (1976). This approach is consistent with the approach taken by the majority of jurisdictions which hold that zoning ordinances traditionally and expressly have included churches in residential districts in order to serve the convenience of the residents and in furtherance of the public morals and general welfare. 2 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 20.01 (1978 Supp.). Facilities for religious uses cannot be excluded from any residential district nor can their application for permits to expand or modify the facilities be denied unless the City proves that such exclusion or denial is a necessary exercise of the police power in furtherance of the public health, safety and general welfare. The City has to show that the need for compliance outweighs the public policy against such restriction upon freedom of worship and public assembly. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Incorporated Village, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747, 342 N.E.2d 534 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3171, 49 L.Ed.2d 1187 (1976). These majority jurisdictions also hold that since a church cannot be legally excluded from a residential district by a zoning ordinance, the same result cannot legally be accomplished by denying special use permits [10] unless the zoning officials meet their burden of proof as to the existence of hazards to health, safety, morals or general welfare. Traffic congestion and increased hazards, insufficient off-street parking space, and insufficient lot size for the intended purposes have all been repudiated as grounds for denial of a permit in the majority of states because there was insufficient proof that congestion would be so extreme that extraordinary and unusual danger of accidents would result. 2 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 20.01 at 20-15 (4th ed. 1975). These caveats should be carefully considered in any future disputes which may arise between the parties concerning the provision of any additional parking spaces. We agree that the trial court should retain jurisdiction as to this matter. Respondent Church must apply for a permit to change the use of the property from a nonconforming duplex use, to use as a church, monastery and rectory and the City shall issue such permit if the premises meets the fire and other safety code requirements. Affirmed.