Opinion ID: 2629223
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Heading: Gunwall Factor Three

Text: Factor three of the Gunwall analysis instructs us to consider the constitutional history of the provision to determine whether the framers of the Washington constitution intended to confer different protection than is offered by the federal constitution. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 61, 720 P.2d 808. Article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution was modeled after article I, section 20 of the Oregon State Constitution. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at 501 n.20 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1999). Thus, we may look to interpretations of the Oregon privileges and immunities clause for guidance. See State v. Smith, 117 Wash.2d 263, 287, 814 P.2d 652 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring). The Oregon court interprets its privileges and immunities clause independently from the federal constitution, holding that the state provision is triggered whenever a person is denied a privilege to which he would be entitled but for government interference. State v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 369-70, 667 P.2d 509 (1983). The Washington provision differs from that of the Oregon provision only in that the Washington provision added a reference to corporations, which our framers perceived as manipulating the lawmaking process. Thompson, 69 TEMP. L.REV. at 1253. Washington's addition of the reference to corporations demonstrates that our framers were concerned with undue political influence exercised by those with large concentrations of wealth, which they feared more than they feared oppression by the majority. Brian Snure, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles: Individuals Rights, Free Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67 WASH. L.REV. 669, 671-72 (1992); Thompson, 69 TEMP. L.REV. at 1253 (alteration of Oregon model reflected the contemporary populist suspicion of the political influence accompanying large concentrations of wealth). Our framers' concern with avoiding favoritism toward the wealthy clearly differs from the main goal of the equal protection clause, which was primarily concerned with preventing discrimination against former slaves. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1872).