Opinion ID: 1309497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defeasibility of Riparian Rights Held by the United States in Reserved Lands

Text: (11) Although the Desert Land Act did not terminate the interests of the federal government in the waters of the public domain, it did subordinate those interests to the rights of subsequent appropriators recognized under state and local law. The Desert Land Act unequivocally provides that all surplus water over and above ... actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights. (Italics supplied.) As the United States concedes, this language automatically subordinates the riparian rights of the federal government in the public domain lands covered by the act to the rights of appropriators established under state law. The Court of Appeal, however, held that the Desert Land Act applied to federal reserved lands as well. Thus, while recognizing the existence of federal riparian rights in the Plumas National Forest, the Court of Appeal ruled that such rights must be regarded as secondary to all other approved uses. The Court of Appeal coined a new term to describe the United States riparian interest  a defeasible riparian water right. This holding was erroneous. The Desert Land Act of 1877 and the Supreme Court's decision in California-Oregon Power spoke of public lands. (43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323; 295 U.S. at p. 158 [79 L.Ed. at p. 1361].) As earlier noted, the term public lands (or public domain) refers to lands owned by the federal government which have remained open to settlement, public sale or other disposition, and/or are now administered by the Department of the Interior through the Bureau of Land Management. (See Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, supra, 349 U.S. 435, 443-444 [99 L.Ed. 1215, 1223-1224]; Taylor Grazing Act, June 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 1269, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq.; Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 90 Stat. 2734, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.) Public domain lands are to be distinguished from reserved lands, which are lands that have been reserved from the public domain for some predetermined purpose. ( Cappaert v. United States, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 138 [48 L.Ed. at p. 534].) (12) In Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, supra, 349 U.S. 435 (hereafter the Pelton Dam case) the United States Supreme Court held that the Desert Land Act and its predecessors, the Mining Acts of 1866 and 1870, did not apply to federal lands which have been reserved from the public domain. The purpose of the Acts of 1866 and 1870 was governmental recognition and sanction of possessory rights on public lands asserted under local laws and customs. [Citation.] The Desert Land Act severed, for purposes of private acquisition, soil and water rights on public lands .... [¶] [T]hese acts are not applicable to the reserved lands and waters here involved.... The lands before us in this case are not `public lands' but `reservations.' Even without that express restriction of the Desert Land Act to sources of water supply on public lands, these Acts would not apply to reserved lands. (349 U.S. at pp. 447-448 [99 L.Ed. at p. 1226]; original italics.) Pelton Dam was reaffirmed in Cappaert v. United States, supra, 426 U.S. 128. In that case, a private claimant asserted rights under state law to water that the federal government claimed it had reserved in connection with a national monument (Devil's Hole). The private claimants argued that the Desert Land Act had severed the nonnavigable waters from the federal lands so that Nevada's appropriation doctrine applied. (426 U.S. at p. 143 [48 L.Ed.2d at p. 537].) The Supreme Court, citing Pelton Dam, flatly rejected the contention, stating: [T]he Desert Land Act does not apply to water rights on federally reserved land. (Id. at p. 144 [48 L.Ed.2d at pp. 537-538].) Pelton Dam, supra, 349 U.S. 435, and Cappaert, supra, 426 U.S. 128, make clear that the Desert Land Act does not apply to reserved lands. [15] Thus, the act's provisions subordinating water rights in public domain lands to the vested rights of appropriators established under state law have no effect on riparian rights in federally held reserved lands. The Court of Appeal, however, apparently believed that Pelton Dam and Cappaert had been overruled in United States v. New Mexico, supra, 438 U.S. 696. Not so. In New Mexico, the Supreme Court held that Congress had intended to reserve only so much water as was necessary to accomplish the primary purposes of the national forests, and the excess was to remain free for acquisition under state law. ( Id. at p. 702 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 1058].) The court relied in part on the Organic Administration Act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat. 34, 16 U.S.C. § 473 et seq. (1976)), which carefully defined the purposes for which national forests could be reserved, and further provided: All waters within the boundaries of national forests may be used for domestic, mining, milling, or irrigation purposes, under the laws of the State wherein such national forests are situated.... ( Id. at p. 717, fn. 24 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 1067].) (6c) From the high court's holding that any water in excess of that reserved by the United States must be free for appropriation under state law, the Court of Appeal apparently inferred that any rights held or acquired by the United States must be regarded as secondary to all subsequent appropriations by the public. To the contrary, however, the court in New Mexico expressly stated that Congress had contemplated  the United States would acquire [unreserved] water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator. (438 U.S. at p. 702 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 1058], italics added.) Indeed, as the United States points out, Congress has expressly authorized the Forest Service to expend such funds as may be necessary for the investigation and establishment of water rights ... necessary or beneficial in connection with the administration and public use of the national forests. (16 U.S.C. § 526, italics added.) Furthermore, although New Mexico, supra, 438 U.S. 696, spoke only in terms of appropriation (the exclusive water doctrine in the state of New Mexico), nothing in that decision limits the United States to the acquisition of appropriative rights where riparian rights are otherwise recognized under state law. Moreover, there is no suggestion in New Mexico or in the Organic Administration Act of 1897 that Congress intended water rights, once acquired by the United States for secondary reservation purposes, to be subject to defeasance by subsequent claimants. We will not impute to Congress a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with the other ( Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp. (1947) 332 U.S. 480, 489 [92 L.Ed. 88, 94, 68 S.Ct. 174]; accord, American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (1981) 452 U.S. 490, 513 [69 L.Ed.2d 185, 204, 101 S.Ct. 2478]). Nor does the concept of a federally held defeasible riparian right find any support in the law of California. As the Board readily concedes, the concept of a defeasible riparian right is without precedent in California. Though the unexercised riparian rights of any owner  governmental or otherwise  may be limited under California law, they cannot be altogether abolished. (See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25 Cal.3d 339, 357-359 [158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 599 P.2d 656].) We therefore conclude that the riparian water rights of the United States on its reserved national forest lands in California are as fully immune from defeasance as the riparian rights of a private owner.