Opinion ID: 2999722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Secondary Effects/Content Neutrality

Text: The plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance does not regulate the secondary effects of speech, but, rather, directly regulates speech.2 This determination is crucial, because if the Ordinance only combats secondary effects of otherwise protected speech, then it is considered the equivalent of content neutral, and, therefore, need only survive intermediate scrutiny. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 448 (Kennedy, J. concurring); R.V.S., 361 F.3d at 408. Cf. Pap’s A.M. 529 U.S. at 289 (plurality opinion) (explaining that restrictions on public nudity are content neutral and should be analyzed under O’Brien intermediate scrutiny). Our inquiry in this regard “is best conceived as [one] into the purpose behind an ordinance.” R.V.S., 361 F.3d at 40708 (citations omitted). Our task is “to verify that the ‘predominant concerns’ motivating the ordinance ‘were with the secondary effects of the adult [speech], and not with the content of adult [speech].’ ” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 44041 (plurality opinion) (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 47). “Federal courts evaluating the ‘predominant concerns’ 1 (...continued) Ordinance. Kramer v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 355 F.3d 961, 964 n.1 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We have repeatedly made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived (even where those arguments raise constitutional issues).”) (quoting United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991)). 2 The plaintiffs concede that the Ordinance passes the first step of the Alameda Books/Renton analysis in that it does not ban all speech. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434-35. Nos. 05-2225, 05-2287 & 05-2288 7 behind the enactment of a[n] . . . ordinance . . . may do so by examining a wide variety of materials including, but not limited to, the text of the . . . ordinance . . ., any preamble or express legislative findings associated with it, and studies and information of which legislators were clearly aware.” R.V.S., 361 F.3d 409 n.5 (citing Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d 702, 723 n.28). A review of those materials makes clear that the Ordinance is directed toward secondary effects. The Ordinance emphasizes that its purpose is to control the “adverse effects” of sexually oriented businesses and the reports before the council primarily addressed secondary effects. Plaintiffs provide nothing of relevance in response. One argument they do make is that the Ordinance contains a shocking admission that it is not concerned with secondary effects—the City’s belief that sexually oriented businesses, because of their very nature, downgrade the quality of life. There is no such admission in the Ordinance; plaintiffs merely infer that this must be the City’s thought process. More importantly, plaintiffs fail to grasp that the concept of “secondary effects,” as developed in Renton and Alameda Books, assumes that the properly regulated externalities are caused by protected speech. See Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 445-48 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (explaining that an ordinance is content neutral and addresses secondary effects “even if [it] identifies the [secondary effects] by reference to the speech . . . that is, even if the measure is in that sense content based”). Plaintiffs also posit that a city council cannot rely on reports and studies when creating an ordinance because such things are hearsay, or, it might be that the argument is a city council can rely on these documents in creating an ordinance, but cannot later use the fact of its reliance on such reports in warding off a constitutional challenge in court because such reports are hearsay. Plaintiffs finish this argument by telling us we cannot look to the 8 Nos. 05-2225, 05-2287 & 05-2288 preamble of the ordinance because it is hearsay. Nevertheless, we feel comfortable relying on the findings and preamble of the statute and the reports cited therein to determine that the Ordinance is content neutral. See, e.g., Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-97 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the city could “reasonably rely on the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton,” as well as examining the findings and preamble of the city’s ordinance to determine content neutrality); Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 723-24 (examining the preamble and findings of the challenged statute to determine whether the challenged statute should be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny).