Opinion ID: 1238237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: re-enactment of monetary limits

Text: Department contends the trial judge erred in denying its motion for a new trial nisi remittitur, in which it asked the judge to reduce the verdicts for Steinke and Nash to $250,000 each under the Tort Claims Act. Department relies on a provision of the 1997 budget act. The provision re-enacted (or more accurately, restated) the then-existing limits on liability found in S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-120 (Supp.1998), and clarified any ambiguity in the General Assembly's intent that there remain reasonable limits upon recovery against the government for tort actions. Act No. 155, 1997 Acts 1567. The provision also increased the statutory limits. The higher limits took effect June 1, 1998, and are not at issue in this case. The provision states that, [e]xcept where otherwise provided, this section takes effect [June 14, 1997] and applies to claims or actions pending on that date or thereafter filed, except where final judgment has been entered before that date. Id. at 1571-72, 1611. In focusing solely on whether the final judgment occurred before June 14, 1997, both parties have overlooked a crucial threshold issue: May the Legislature by a retroactive amendment overrule this Court's prior interpretation of a statute? We conclude the Legislature may not. In 1994, the Court held the Legislature impliedly had repealed two subsections of the Tort Claims Act, which limit damages and call for apportioned liability, by enacting inconsistent provisions in the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act (Uniform Contribution Act), which call for unlimited, pro rata liability. Southeastern Freight Lines v. City of Hartsville, 313 S.C. 466, 443 S.E.2d 395 (1994). The Legislature quickly responded by providing that the Uniform Contribution Act did not apply to governmental entities and by reinstating the statutory limits, except for causes of action that have been filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before July 1, 1994. Act No. 497, 1994 Acts 5793 (effective July 1, 1994). Thus, any case filed before July 1, 1994, is not subject to the $250,000 cap for individual claims contained in the Tort Claims Act. [10] Respondents filed their original complaint June 29, 1994two days before the reinstatement of the limits. This issue implicates the doctrine of separation of powers. See S.C. Const. art. 1, § 8. The Court has stated that construction of a statute is a judicial function and responsibility. Subject to constitutional limitations, the legislature has plenary power to amend a statute. However, a judicial [interpretation] of a statute is determinative of its meaning and effect, and any subsequent legislative amendment to the contrary will only be effective from the date of its enactment and cannot be applied retroactively. Lindsay v. Nat'l Old Line Ins. Co., 262 S.C. 621, 628-29, 207 S.E.2d 75, 78 (1974) (citation omitted). The Court held that the Legislature's attempt to declare by a retroactive amendment that insurance companies were entitled to certain investment creditsafter the Court had interpreted statutes to say the companies were not entitled to the creditsviolated the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government. Quoting the trial court with approval, the Court recognized the Legislature essentially was telling the Court, We reverse. The Legislature, however, lacks such authority. Lindsay, 262 S.C. at 628, 207 S.E.2d at 77-78. [11] We hold that this case, filed before the Legislature reinstated the statutory caps, is controlled by the principles outlined in Lindsay, supra . The Legislature may not retroactively overrule this Court's interpretation of the statutes in Southeastern Freight Lines. The Legislature may, of course, do what it did in 1994, which was to resolve the statutory conflict and reinstate the statutory caps in future cases. We may resolve the issue on this ground even though the parties and trial judge did not. See Weir v. Citicorp Nat'l Services, Inc., 312 S.C. 511, 435 S.E.2d 864 (1993) ([a] correct decision of the trial court on the wrong ground will be affirmed on appeal); Rule 220(c), SCACR (appellate court may affirm judgment upon any ground appearing in the record). It is unnecessary to address the parties' arguments about the 1997 provision because Lindsay is dispositive.