Opinion ID: 1266137
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Imputation of a Parent's Physical Presence for Purposes of NACARA Relief

Text: Ramos would satisfy the physical presence requirement if his father's physical presence in the United States were imputable to him for purposes of NACARA relief. For the reasons explained below, we hold that it is not.
We must first consider the level of deference, if any, owed to the IJ's determination and the BIA's adoption of the rule disallowing imputation. A single-member BIA panel affirmed the IJ's decision in an unpublished, nonprecedential decision. [12] Such decisions are entitled to only Skidmore, [13] rather than Chevron, deference. See Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1013-15 (9th Cir.2006). In Skidmore, the Supreme Court held that a nonbinding administrative interpretation carries a weight depend[ent] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237-38, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (holding that Skidmore remained intact after Chevron and that Skidmore deference applies when Chevron deference does not). If the reasons provided by the BIA to support its conclusion are not persuasive, then we must review de novo the question before us. Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1015. The BIA did not even address Ramos's imputation argument, nor did it provide any reasoning for its determination that Ramos failed to meet the physical presence requirement. Moreover, it did not cite any precedent of the BIA or our circuit. That the BIA adopted the IJ's decision does not strengthen the BIA's basis for rejecting Ramos's argument. The IJ merely noted that he was unaware of any precedent that had directly allowed such imputation, but did not address the cases Ramos cited to support his argument. Therefore, we review de novo the remaining question presented by Ramos's petition: Should a minor who applies for NACARA relief as a derivative of his parent be permitted to impute his parent's physical presence for purposes of satisfying the seven-year requirement?
While we have not previously addressed whether a parent's physical presence can be imputed to his minor child for purposes of NACARA relief, we have interpreted analogous immigration statutes. In Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1022 (9th Cir.1994), we addressed the concept of imputation in the context of a discretionary waiver of deportation under the now-repealed Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 212(c), [14] 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), which required, inter alia, seven years of lawful unrelinquished domicile. We held that a parent's lawful unrelinquished domicile can be imputed to his minor child. Lepe-Guitron, 16 F.3d at 1022. The petitioner, a minor, had legally entered the United States with his parents, was always legally within the country, was domiciled here, but acquired permanent resident status ... many years after his parents achieved it because of a processing error attributable to the INS. Id. at 1024. We first observed that section 212(c) was enacted to alleviate the harsh effects of deportation on those aliens who have lawfully established substantial ties to the United States. Id. at 1023. We then reasoned that, [b]ecause children naturally form the strongest of ties to the place where their parents are domiciled and they with them, section 212(c)'s core policy concerns would be directly frustrated by the government's proposal to ignore the parent's domicile in determining that of the child. Id. at 1025. We found further support for our analysis in Congress's use of the term domicile. Id. Adopting the common law definition of domicile  that aliens must not only be physically present [in the United States], but must intend to remain  we reached the unremarkable conclusion that a child's domicile follows that of his or her parents. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We explained that because children are, legally speaking, incapable of forming the necessary intent to remain indefinitely in a particular place, they cannot determine their own domicile. Id. Finally, we noted that other sections of the INA giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children strengthened our analysis. Id. Two years after we decided Lepe-Guitron, Congress replaced section 212(c) with INA section 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which governs cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents. [15] See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Because section 240A(a) modified section 212(c) in several key respects, our holding in Lepe-Guitron came into question. In Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.2005), we reaffirmed Lepe-Guitron 's viability and extended its holding to § 1229b(a)'s requirement of seven years of continuous residence in the United States. Cuevas-Gaspar had lived in the United States since he was one year old, but he did not attain lawful permanent residence until he was approximately thirteen. Id. at 1016. He sought cancellation of removal less than seven years later. Id. Both the IJ and the BIA concluded that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he failed to satisfy § 1229b(a)'s requirement of seven years of continuous residence after admission. Id. at 1016-17; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2). Applying the two-step Chevron inquiry and determining that deference to the BIA was not warranted, Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1026, we held that for purposes of satisfying the seven-years of continuous residence `after having been admitted in any status' required for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), a parent's admission for permanent resident status is imputed to the parent's unemancipated minor children residing with the parent, id. at 1029. Instructed by Lepe-Guitron, we reasoned that the difference between lawful unrelinquished domicile and residence after having been admitted in any status was not so great as to be dispositive and [did] not justify a departure from the INA's policy of putting a high priority on relations between permanent legal residents and their children. Id. at 1026. We also cited specific examples to demonstrate that both the BIA and this court repeatedly have held that a parent's status, intent, or state of mind is imputed to the parent's unemancipated minor child in many areas of immigration law, including asylum, grounds of inadmissibility, and legal residency status. Id. at 1024. We first discussed Vang v. INS, 146 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.1998), in which we applied the principles articulated in Lepe-Guitron to the question of whether aminor has firmly resettled in another country. Id. at 1116. We noted in Vang that, under INS regulations, the child of a refugee or asylee is generally entitled to the same legal status as her parent. Id. Because it would be unreasonable to hold an adolescent responsible for arranging or failing to arrange permanent resettlement, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), we concluded that we must look to whether the minor's parents have firmly resettled in a foreign country before coming to the United States, and then derivatively attribute the parents' status to the minor, id. at 1116-17. Next, we addressed Senica v. INS, 16 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.1994), in which we agreed with the BIA that a parent's knowledge of ineligibility for admission to the United States should be imputed to her children. Id. at 1015-16. We concluded in Senica that [t]he BIA's decision here was not a departure from its previous practice of imputing a parent's state of mind, or failure to reasonably investigate, to an unemancipated minor child. Id. at 1016. Finally, we observed in Cuevas-Gaspar that the BIA has commonly imputed a parent's abandonment of permanent legal resident status to the parent's minor children. 430 F.3d at 1025 (citing, for example, Matter of Zamora, 17 I. & N. Dec. 395, 396 (BIA 1980) (holding that the voluntary and intended abandonment of lawful permanent resident status by the parent of an unemancipated minor child is imputed to the child); Matter of Winkens, 15 I. & N. Dec. 451, 452 (BIA 1975) (holding that parents' abandonment of lawful permanent resident status was imputed to their minor child who was subject to their custody and control)). We then turned to Congress's intent in enacting § 1229b. Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1026-27. Relying on the relevant legislative history, we determined that Congress had replaced section 212(c) with section 240A(a) to resolve the conflicting interpretations of unrelinquished lawful domicile, not to narrow the continuous residency rule. Id. at 1028. We left open the question of whether a parent's permanent resident status may be imputed to his child for purposes of § 1229b(a)'s five-year residency requirement. Id. at 1021 n. 5; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1) (requiring a showing that an alien has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years). We recently answered this question in Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d. 1102, 2009 WL 2857197 (9th Cir. 2009). Relying on our reasoning in Lepe-Guitron and Cuevas-Gaspar, we held that, for purposes of satisfying the five years of lawful permanent residence required under... § 1229b(a)(1), a parent's status as a lawful permanent resident is imputed to the unemancipated minor children residing with that parent. Id. at 1112-14, 2009 WL 2857197, .
We reject Ramos's argument that we should extend our reasoning in Lepe-Guitron and Cuevas-Gaspar [16] to impute a parent's physical presence in the United States to his minor child for purposes of satisfying NACARA's seven-year physical presence requirement. The meaning of physical presence is quite distinct from the requirements we have previously held to be imputable. Indeed, the difference in meaning is so great as to be dispositive, Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1026. Moreover, neither NACARA's legislative history nor its underlying policy compels a different conclusion. Our precedent demonstrates that we impute a parent's status, intent, or state of mind to satisfy immigration criteria that an unemancipated minor child must meet. The requirements at issue in Lepe-Guitron (lawful unrelinquished domicile), Cuevas-Gaspar (admitted in any status), Mercado-Zazueta (lawfully admitted for permanent residence), Vang (firmly resettled), Senica (knowledge of ineligibility), and Matter of Zamora (abandonment of lawful permanent resident status) are all terms of art that include an element of status, intent, or state of mind. We have allowed imputation precisely because the minor either was legally incapable of satisfying one of these criteria or could not reasonably be expected to satisfy it independent of his parents. In Lepe-Guitron, for example, we used a definition of domicile consonant with its common law meaning: that aliens must not only be physically present here, but must intend to remain. 16 F.3d at 1025 (internal quotation marks omitted). We explained that a child's domicile follows that of his or her parents because children are, legally speaking, incapable of forming the necessary intent to remain indefinitely in a particular place. Id. Accordingly, we imputed to the petitioner his parents' years of lawful unrelinquished domicile in the United States. In Cuevas-Gaspar, our decision to impute turned on the meaning of admitted, which is defined as the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Although the petitioner had lived in the United States with his lawfully admitted mother since he was one, he was not admitted until he was thirteen. Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1016. Analogizing to our precedent and that of the BIA, we suggested that it would be unreasonable to hold a minor, who was subject to his mother's custody and control, responsible for failing to satisfy this administrative procedure. Id. at 1024-25. Because policy considerations and the legislative history of § 1229b added support to our statutory analysis, see id. at 1026-29, we imputed to the petitioner his mother's admitted status for purposes of satisfying the seven years of continuous residence after having been admitted in any status required for cancellation of removal, id. at 1029. Mercado-Zazueta followed directly from Lepe-Guitron and Cuevas-Gaspar. Addressing § 1229b(a)'s requirement that an alien have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence  defined as the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed [17]  for not less than five years, we reasoned that the difference between lawful unrelinquished domicile and lawfully admitted for permanent residence was no greater than the difference between lawful unrelinquished domicile and lawfully admitted, Mercado-Zazueta, 580 F.3d at 1108-10, 2009 WL 2857197, -6. We thus concluded that the BIA's interpretation of § 1229b(a) was unreasonable and that  Cuevas-Gaspar compels the conclusion[ ] that imputation .. . is appropriate. Id. at 1112-13, 2009 WL 2857197, ; see also Vang, 146 F.3d at 1116-17 (discussing whether the petitioner had firmly resettled, as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15). By contrast, the definition of physical presence does not require a specific status, intent, or state of mind. Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024. Because physically present is not defined in section 203, in 8 U.S.C. § 1101, or in any of the relevant regulations, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.60, .61, .66, we give it its ordinary meaning. United States v. Santos, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2024, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008). The relevant dictionary definition of physically/present is corporeally/being in the place in question or under consideration. Oxford English Dictionary XI:746, XII:395 (2d ed.1989). Our case law generally relies on this meaning of physically present. For example, in Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.1997), where we examined the transitional rules of IIRIRA, we explained that [t]he first eligibility requirement, continuous physical presence, must be determined from the facts, not through an exercise of discretion. Either the petitioner has been continuously present in the United States for seven years or the petitioner has not. Id. at 1151. In other words, the definition of physical presence is a state of being, not a state of mind; it is not conferred by an immigration officer or a governmental agency; it depends on no legal construct. [18] Therefore, it can be attained as readily by a minor as by his parent. The distinction between physical presence, on the one hand, and status, intent, state of mind, and analogous concepts, on the other, is readily observed here. Unlike the petitioners in Lepe-Guitron, Cuevas-Gaspar, and Mercado-Zazueta, Ramos had not lived in the United States for almost his entire life when he applied for relief; he had only just arrived. Ramos necessarily would have satisfied the physical presence requirement had he been in the custody of his father (who was physically present in the United States for more than a decade before Ramos arrived). In other words, unlike the petitioners in our prior decisions, Ramos had no additional legal or administrative hurdles to clear beyond mere presence. [19] Ramos was either corporeally within the borders of the United States or he was not. Because he was not, he cannot meet the physical presence requirement, and there is no legal basis for imputing his father's physical presence. Nor does NACARA's legislative history support Ramos's argument that Congress intended to allow minors to impute their parents' physical presence for purposes of relief under the Act. The legislative history does not mention imputation, which Ramos does not dispute. Rather, he argues that, because [t]he law was passed to assist individuals to gain legal status in the United States, allowing imputation would be consistent with the spirit of NACARA. While we agree that Congress's primary goal in enacting NACARA was to decrease obstacles to asylum relief for qualified individuals, [20] we disagree that this goal justifies imputing a parent's physical presence under section 203. An individual must first be deemed qualified before he can reap the benefits of NACARA relief. Statements made by the INS around the time NACARA went into effect also undercut Ramos's argument: [S]ection 203 of NACARA ... allow[s] children and spouses to apply for relief under NACARA, even if they had not been continuously physically present in the United States for 7 years at the time NACARA was enacted or implemented. To meet the physical presence requirement, the spouse or child must have 7 years of continuous physical presence in the United States ... as of the date the application for relief was filed. Rules and Regulations, at 27861 (emphasis added). Although the INS was not directly addressing the question before us, its statements necessarily assume that the spouse or child must independently satisfy the seven-year requirement. Particularly in light of Congress's silence on imputation in the legislative history, these statements support the conclusion we reach through our statutory interpretation  that Congress did not intend to allow imputation in this context. Ramos also makes three policy arguments for allowing imputation of his father's physical presence: (1) that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions `giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children,' Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 (quoting Lepe-Guitron, 16 F.3d at 1025); (2) that he would suffer a peculiar or unusual hardship if we refuse to impute his father's physical presence to him, Lepe-Guitron, 16 F.3d at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted); and (3) that we adhere to the general canon of construction that resolves ambiguities in favor of the alien, Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1029; see also Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 840 (9th Cir.2003). None of these general considerations persuades us that imputation is appropriate here. Although we have allowed imputation for purposes of satisfying a number of requirements in immigration statutes, we have not done so when neither the statutory language nor the legislative history supported that result. Moreover, as already discussed, the key fact supporting the policy rationales articulated in Lepe-Guitron, Cuevas-Gaspar, and Mercado-Zazueta  that the minor resided with his or her family in the United States  is absent here. Not only has Ramos lived in Guatemala nearly all his life, but most of his family still lives there. Thus, he has not formed strong ties to the United States. Lepe-Guitron, 16 F.3d at 1025. Because disallowing imputation in this context does not sever the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the United States for the better part of their lives, id., it does not frustrate the just and humane goal of providing relief to those for whom deportation would result in peculiar or unusual hardship, id. at 1024 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, while the text of NACARA does not explicitly prohibit imputation, neither is it ambiguous, as our statutory analysis makes clear. Therefore, we need not read it in the light most favorable to Ramos. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Ramos is ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, CAT relief, or special rule cancellation of removal. Accordingly, we deny his petition for review. PETITION DENIED.