Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Prosecution's Intentional Destruction of a Tape Recording Prepared by the Defense

Text: After the jury had been selected, but before opening statements were given, Assistant District Attorney Steven Plumer stated at a conference conducted outside the presence of the jury that an audio tape recording belonging to defense counsel had been discovered inadvertently by one of the prosecutors, Deputy District Attorney Gary Van Camp, and his chief investigating officer, Detective Sergeant Harry Heidt, and had been destroyed intentionally by Heidt. Two days after this disclosure, a hearing commenced outside the presence of the jury, revealing the following: On October 4, 1986, after jury selection had begun, Van Camp and Heidt, while traveling in a county car, discovered a sealed envelope bearing the name of Assistant Public Defender Bill Davis, the defense attorney in the present case, and a return address of the Santa Barbara Public Defender's Office. From the shape of the envelope, it appeared to contain an audio cassette tape. According to Sergeant Heidt, he suggested to Van Camp that Heidt prepare a found property report for the envelope and its contents, which would be standard procedure under such circumstances. Instead, Van Camp opined that the tape might relate to the present case and asked Heidt to listen to it and report to him what was on the tape. Heidt testified that instead of listening to the tape recording, he threw the sealed envelope into a trash dumpster approximately 15 minutes after the envelope was discovered. Two days later, Heidt spoke to Van Camp, who inquired whether Heidt had anything to report from listening to the tape recording. Heidt told Van Camp he had not listened to it and expressed [his] feelings about being placed in that position, explaining at the hearing that Heidt felt it would have been unethical for him to have listened to the tape recording. Heidt stated to Van Camp that, as far as Heidt was concerned, the tape was never found. Nearly three weeks later, on October 24, 1986, R.O. Hebert, the chief of the Lompoc Police Department, summoned Sergeant Heidt to determine whether Heidt had knowledge of a heated argument alleged to have occurred between Van Camp and a member of the Lompoc Police Department. Heidt knew nothing of that incident. Chief Hebert then inquired whether there were any problems between Heidt and Van Camp. Heidt responded that he did have some problems and, without further inquiry by Chief Hebert, volunteered the information concerning the discovery and destruction of the tape recording. Heidt testified his destruction of the envelope had bothered him, and he felt it was important to disclose the incident before the evidentiary phase of the trial began [s]o the court and the defense was aware of what happened. Chief Hebert informed Assistant District Attorney Plumer who, on October 27, 1986, the day before opening statements were to begin at the guilt phase of the trial, notified defense counsel of the incident. Van Camp's recollection of the discovery of the envelope coincided with Sergeant Heidt's, except that Van Camp denied instructing Heidt to listen to the tape recording, testifying instead that he gave the envelope to Heidt, stating: I don't want it. You take it and you decide what to do with it. Assistant Public Defender Bill Davis represented that he had dictated the tape recording in question, which revealed his perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, in preparation for a meeting at which trial strategy was to be discussed with experienced members of his office. The contents of the tape recording had been transcribed for his use at the meeting. Davis last saw the tape recording after sealing it in an envelope and placing it in a county automobile on September 26, 1986. A sealed copy of the transcription was introduced by defense counsel and was reviewed by the trial court in camera. Prior to any ruling by the court, the District Attorney of Santa Barbara County, Thomas Sneddon, assumed the role of trial prosecutor, replacing Van Camp. Sneddon later represented to the court that Van Camp had been demoted, resulting in a decrease in salary from $52,000 per year to approximately $27,000 per year. The trial court found that Van Camp, despite his denial, had instructed Sergeant Heidt to listen to the tape recording but further found that Heidt had not done so and instead had disposed of the recording without listening to it. In light of the foregoing incident, defendant moved for (1) dismissal of the charges, or other appropriate sanctions, (2) recusal of the entire Santa Barbara County District Attorney's Office, and (3) a continuance to conduct further research and investigation. The trial court denied each of the motions. We shall consider separately whether the trial court erred in each instance, but first we address defendant's contention that the trial court's finding โ that neither Sergeant Heidt nor Van Camp had listened to the tape recording โ was legally erroneous.
Defendant urged the trial court to dismiss the case because the prosecution had invad[ed] the defense camp by listening to the tape recording. (See Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742, 756 [157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 598 P.2d 818].) The trial court declined to dismiss the case, or impose some other sanction, because it found the prosecution had not listened to the tape recording. At oral argument before us, defendant's counsel conceded that if the prosecution did not listen to the tape, no sanction should be imposed. (13a) Defendant contends, however, that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution had not listened to the tape recording because, as a sanction for Sergeant Heidt's destruction of the tape recording, the trial court was required to reject Heidt's denial that he had listened to the recording, and to find instead that the prosecution had listened to it. Defendant claims that Heidt's destruction of the tape cassette itself (as distinguished from the contents of the recording) and destruction of the envelope containing the tape cassette deprived the defense of the only physical evidence it could use to impeach Heidt and Van Camp regarding whether they unsealed the envelope and listened to the tape. In support of this claim, an expert in forensic acoustics testified for the defense that in many instances he could determine from an examination of a tape recording, and the known machines upon which it had been recorded and played, whether it had been played upon any machine other than those known machines. Using the known machines, the expert would prepare a test tape and compare it to the tape recording at issue. Any differences between the test tape and the tape recording at issue would indicate that the latter had been played on a machine different from the known machines. In order for such testing to be productive, it is critical that the cassette tape used to make the recording at issue be new; if it is not new, differences between it and the test tape might be attributable to prior use of the tape. Defense counsel Davis testified the tape he used was new. An expert in fingerprint identification also testified that it is possible to detect fingerprints on an envelope, on a cassette tape holder, and on the cassette tape itself. Defendant does not assert he was harmed by the destruction of the contents of the tape recording, nor could he. Defense counsel had dictated the contents of the recording, and a transcription had been prepared, thus preserving the contents of the recording despite the destruction of the cassette tape. It is beyond dispute that it was highly improper for Heidt to discard the envelope, knowing it belonged to defense counsel and might contain material pertinent to the present case. Citing the decisions in People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641 [117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361] and People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88 [167 Cal. Rptr. 573, 615 P.2d 1361], defendant contends the trial court was required, as a sanction for Heidt's destruction of the envelope and the cassette tape, to find that Heidt and Van Camp had listened to the recording. We conclude, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining it would be inappropriate to impose such a sanction. (14) The applicable law is no longer found in Hitch, supra, 12 Cal.3d 641, but in two subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions. In California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488-489 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 422, 104 S.Ct. 2528], the high court held: `Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.' (Fn. omitted.) [ถ] More recently, in Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 58 [102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289, 109 S.Ct. 333], the court held that `unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.' ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 810-811 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865].) This court has expressly adopted the high court's holdings in Trombetta and Youngblood. ( Ibid. ) (13b) The present case is different from Trombetta and its progeny in that the envelope and cassette tape were not relevant to defendant's guilt or innocence, but related solely to whether the prosecution had engaged in misconduct. But the People do not assert that the rule announced in Trombetta is inapplicable, and we perceive no reason why this rule โ formulated in the context of a destruction of exculpatory evidence โ should not apply with equal force to the destruction of evidence of official wrongdoing. In the present case, defendant urges that, had the envelope and the cassette tape it contained been preserved, they could have been tested to determine whether the envelope had been opened and the tape recording had been played. But this exculpatory value of the envelope and the cassette tape it contained (as opposed to the contents of the tape recording) was not apparent at the time Sergeant Heidt disposed of them. Although Heidt certainly had reason to suspect that the contents of the tape recording might possess exculpatory value, the destruction of the contents of the tape recording did not lessen defendant's ability to challenge Heidt's testimony that the prosecution did not listen to the tape. Therefore, the destruction of the contents of the tape recording affords no basis for imposition of the sanction that the trial court be required to reject Heidt's testimony and find that the prosecution listened to the tape recording. Neither does the destruction of the envelope and the cassette tape themselves, apart from the destruction of the contents of the tape recording, afford a basis for imposing the requested sanction. The record before us supports the trial court's implied finding that the allegedly exculpatory value of the envelope and the cassette themselves was not apparent at the time Heidt threw them away. (See People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 893 [274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282] [no sanction for destruction of a bottle bearing a fingerprint, because the officer who destroyed the bottle could not know at the time the prints were taken whether, or to what extent, the Perrier bottle's print matched defendant's prints].) It was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Heidt had destroyed the envelope and the cassette tape without being aware that they later would assume evidentiary significance on the issue whether Heidt had listened to the recording. In other words, the record supports the conclusion that, at the time the envelope and the cassette were discovered and destroyed, Sergeant Heidt had no reason to believe that the envelope and the cassette themselves (apart from the contents of the tape recording) would play a significant role in the suspect's defense. ( California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 488 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 422, 104 S.Ct. 2528].) Heidt clearly acted wrongly in disposing of the envelope and its contents, but under the circumstances of the present case, this improper act did not deprive defendant of due process of law or otherwise deny defendant a fair trial. The high court has made it clear that the destruction of evidence by law enforcement officials deprives the defendant of due process of law only if the exculpatory value of the evidence was apparent ` before the evidence was destroyed.' [Citation.] ( Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 56-57, fn. [] [102 L.Ed.2d 281, 288, 109 S.Ct. 333], italics in original.) In California v. Trombetta , the high court found no constitutional violation where [t]he record contain[ed] no allegation of official animus towards respondents or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence. ( California v. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479, 488 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 422].) We have observed that in the present case, the trial court reasonably found that the exculpatory value of the envelope and the cassette themselves (as so characterized by defendant) was not apparent at the time Heidt disposed of them. The record supports the conclusion that, although it was highly improper for Heidt to destroy the cassette, he did not intend to deprive defendant of exculpatory evidence or to otherwise harm defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in believing Heidt's testimony that he had discarded the envelope without opening it and, accordingly, in declining to sanction the prosecution by making an adverse finding that the prosecution had listened to the tape recording. (15) Defendant also contends it was improper for the trial judge, in assessing Heidt's credibility, to consider the personal opinion of Heidt that the judge had formed prior to his appointment to the bench. In announcing his finding that Sergeant Heidt did not listen to the tape recording, the trial judge stated: [F]rom the evidence before me now, being the deputy public defender here for a couple of years and knew [ sic ] Sergeant Heidt then, and as a deputy district attorney I knew Sergeant Heidt then, and it would not have surprised me that he would have done what he said he did. And that's not listen to it. Defendant voiced no objection at trial to this statement by the trial judge. We agree with the Attorney General that defendant's failure to raise this issue in the trial court precludes his present claim of error. ( Guadalupe A. v. Superior Court (1991) 234 Cal. App.3d 100, 108 [285 Cal. Rptr. 570]; Gimbel v. Laramie (1960) 181 Cal. App.2d 77, 85-86 [5 Cal. Rptr. 88].) Had defendant raised the issue in a timely fashion, the trial judge would have had an opportunity to disclose the extent to which his prior contacts with Sergeant Heidt had affected his ruling and, if the trial judge was unable to act impartially and defendant had so requested, the trial judge then could have transferred the determination of Heidt's credibility to another judge. Defendant therefore may not raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Having concluded the trial court did not err in finding that the prosecution did not listen to the tape, we turn to defendant's contention that the trial court should have dismissed the case as a sanction for Heidt's intentional destruction of the tape recording.
(16a) Citing a number of grounds, defendant asserts the case must be dismissed. Defendant contends that dismissal is an appropriate sanction because Sergeant Heidt destroyed the contents of the tape recording without knowing whether they were essential to the defense case. To be sure, this is the primary reason that Heidt's destruction of the cassette was improper, and we do not condone his conduct. But even though Heidt's destruction of the tape recording clearly was improper, the imposition of sanctions is warranted only if defendant suffered prejudice as a result of Heidt's misconduct. As the United States Supreme Court explained in a related context: [T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. [Fn. and citations omitted.] ( Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443 [81 L.Ed.2d 377, 387, 104 S.Ct. 2501].) As noted above, the destruction of the contents of the tape recording did not prejudice defendant, because the contents of the tape recording had been preserved by transcription. It would have been inappropriate, therefore, for the trial court to impose sanctions for the destruction of the contents of the tape recording, particularly the severe sanction of dismissal. [A]bsent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation [of the defendant's right to counsel] may have been deliberate. [Fn.] ( United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361, 365 [66 L.Ed.2d 564, 569, 101 S.Ct. 665].) (17) Where it appears that the state has engaged in misconduct, the burden falls upon the People to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that sanctions are not warranted because the defendant was not prejudiced by the misconduct. ( Nix v. Williams, supra, 467 U.S. 431, 444 [81 L.Ed.2d 366, 387-388]; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n (1964) 378 U.S. 52, 79, fn. 18 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 695, 84 S.Ct. 1594].) (16b) The People met that burden here. The evidence established that the prosecution did not listen to the tape recording and that a transcription of the tape recording had been made and was in the possession of defense counsel. The prosecution gained nothing by the destruction of the tape, and defendant lost nothing. Defendant also contends dismissal is an appropriate sanction because the prosecution may have listened to the tape recording. We have concluded, however, that the trial court properly held to the contrary. In denying defendant's motion for dismissal, the court invited defendant to reopen the issue in the event the manner in which the prosecution presented its case reflected an awareness of the contents of the tape recording. Defendant did not move to reopen the issue and made no showing of such awareness on the part of the prosecution. In light of the breadth of discovery common in capital cases, a substantial change in the prosecution's strategy resulting from access to the tape recording most likely would have been apparent to the defense. Thus the record before us affords no basis for the imposition of any sanction based upon the premise that the prosecution listened to the tape recording. Defendant finally contends the case should have been dismissed because of the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct consisting of Van Camp's instruction to Sergeant Heidt to listen to the tape recording, Van Camp's allegedly unethical method of interviewing prosecution witnesses, his copying of a list of defense witnesses from the court file, and his lying under oath in denying that he had instructed Heidt to listen to the tape recording. Defendant has failed to demonstrate, however, that these instances of alleged misconduct, either singly or cumulatively, prejudiced his case. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to impose sanctions on the prosecution. ( United States v. Morrison, supra, 449 U.S. 361, 365 [66 L.Ed.2d 564, 568-569].)
The District Attorney of Santa Barbara County, Thomas Sneddon, personally prosecuted this case from its inception until shortly before the preliminary hearing, when he assigned it to Deputy District Attorney Martinez for the preliminary hearing. Later, Sneddon reassigned the case to Deputy District Attorney Van Camp for trial. As previously noted, when Van Camp's participation in the destruction of the tape recording came to light, Sneddon removed Van Camp from the case and personally assumed the role of trial prosecutor. Defendant subsequently moved to have District Attorney Sneddon recused. The trial court denied the motion. (18) Section 1424 states that a motion to recuse a district attorney shall not be granted unless it is shown by the evidence that a conflict of interest exists such as would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. [A] `conflict,' within the meaning of section 1424, exists whenever the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the DA's office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner. ( People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148 [193 Cal. Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5].) In determining whether a ruling on a motion to recuse was proper, a reviewing court applies the abuse-of-discretion standard. [Citations.] ( People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 140 [249 Cal. Rptr. 320, 756 P.2d 1348].) (19) Defendant contends District Attorney Sneddon should have been recused because (1) he prematurely terminated his investigation of Van Camp's misconduct, (2) he filed a Vehicle Code section 10851 charge against defendant, knowing it was not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) he had a personal interest in obtaining a conviction in order to protect himself and his office from negative publicity. The trial court concluded there was no evidence Van Camp's misconduct regarding the tape recording would prevent defendant from receiving a fair trial, once Van Camp had been removed from the case. The trial court further found that Inez Blanco's denial that she gave defendant permission to take her automobile constituted a reasonable basis for the filing of a Vehicle Code section 10851 charge but that, even if it was improper for that charge to have been filed, any error was cured when the charge was dismissed. Nothing suggested defendant could not receive a fair trial on the remaining charges. Finally, the trial court ruled that the remaining allegations of misconduct, considered singly or cumulatively, did not create a reasonable possibility that defendant could not receive a fair trial. In urging that the trial court erred in denying the recusal motion, defendant points to a letter to Van Camp in which Sneddon condemned Van Camp's actions. We fail to perceive how this letter supports defendant's claim that Sneddon should have been recused. Sneddon's condemnation of Van Camp's unethical conduct was entirely appropriate. The letter apparently was an initial step in the imposition of administrative discipline. To the contrary, there would have been cause for concern had Sneddon failed to take such action, or had he otherwise appeared to condone Van Camp's misconduct. Defendant also asserts Sneddon terminated his internal investigation into Van Camp's misconduct when the trial court required the prosecution to disclose to the defense any information uncovered by that inquiry. Assistant District Attorney Steven Plumer testified that when Van Camp's involvement with the tape recording was disclosed on October 27, 1986, Sneddon instructed Plumer to inform defense counsel and to have district attorney investigator Charles Watkins interview Van Camp, Heidt, and others who might possess relevant information. On October 28, 1986, Plumer appeared before the trial court and related the information he had received concerning the discovery and destruction of the envelope containing the cassette. The trial court scheduled a hearing for the following day. At the hearing on October 29, 1986, Plumer brought investigator Watkins's handwritten notes of his interviews and provided copies to the defense at its request. The court advised Sergeant Heidt that the hearing would be continued to the next day in order to allow him an opportunity to consult with an attorney. Defense counsel then requested that the district attorney's office be restrained from conducting any further investigation of the destruction of the tape recording or, in the alternative, be required to reveal to the defense any information received from that investigation. The trial court ordered that any such information obtained by the district attorney's office be disclosed to the defense. On that same day, Plumer advised Sneddon of the information he had received from Watkins. Sneddon directed that the investigator prepare a summary of his investigation. On October 30, 1986, a hearing was held at which Deputy District Attorney Van Camp, Sergeant Heidt, Chief of Police Hebert, investigator Watkins, and others testified. Following this hearing, Sneddon instructed Plumer that no further investigation be conducted by the district attorney's office, and the matter subsequently was referred to the Attorney General's office. On October 31, 1986, Plumer relieved Van Camp of his duties relating to this case and placed him on administrative suspension. As noted above, Sneddon represented to the court that Van Camp subsequently was demoted, resulting in a decrease in salary from $52,000 per year to approximately $27,000 per year. Nothing in the record before us suggests the district attorney had an improper motive in discontinuing the investigation that was being conducted by his office. An evidentiary hearing had been held regarding the destruction of the tape recording, and the matter later was referred to the Attorney General's office. (Cal. Const., art. V, ง 13; Gov. Code, ง 12550.) Defendant does not explain what purpose would have been served had the district attorney's office continued its own investigation. The trial court rejected defendant's additional claim that Sneddon acted unethically in filing the Vehicle Code section 10851 charge, knowing it was not supported by substantial evidence, the court instead finding that Inez Blanco's denial that she had given defendant permission to take her automobile constituted a reasonable basis for the filing of the charge. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. The circumstances that Sneddon filed the Vehicle Code section 10851 charge at a time when Inez Blanco's degree of participation in the crimes was unclear, and later moved to dismiss that charge following further investigation, does not constitute unethical conduct or demonstrate that Sneddon had an improper motive in prosecuting the case. Defendant asserts that Sneddon had a personal stake in avoiding negative publicity, and thus was led to attempt to obtain a conviction at all costs. This improper motive is demonstrated, according to defendant, by Sneddon's introduction of the multiple-hearsay statements of Perez, Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony, and other evidence which would not have been introduced by other prosecutors. We have held that the trial court properly admitted the multiple-hearsay statements of Perez as well as Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony. We find unpersuasive defendant's unsupported claim that these and other unspecified items of evidence would not have been introduced by other prosecutors. Defendant also makes reference to the fact that on October 31, 1986, the day following the initial evidentiary hearing concerning the destruction of the tape recording, the district attorney's office made a plea bargain offer to defendant of a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole in the event he were to enter a plea of guilty. It was stated this offer would be withdrawn if not accepted that day. This circumstance was not raised as a ground for recusal, and was brought to the trial court's attention only in another context and more than one month after the court had denied the recusal motion. Defendant is therefore precluded from now arguing on this basis that the trial court erred in denying the recusal motion. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to recuse District Attorney Sneddon.
On Thursday, December 4, 1986, the day after the trial court denied defendant's motion to recuse the district attorney (which was also the day scheduled for opening statements), defendant filed a motion for discovery seeking a list of the names and addresses of all witnesses interviewed by former trial prosecutor Van Camp and of all persons present during those interviews. The motion included a request for [a] sufficient continuance for the purpose of conducting ... independent interviews. That same morning, the prosecution provided the defense with a list of between 50 and 60 persons Van Camp had interviewed. The defense stated it wished to interview 24 of those persons. Following further discussions and proceedings, the case was continued to Monday, December 8. When trial resumed on December 8, defendant filed a motion for mistrial on the ground that, because Van Camp's misconduct was not revealed until after the jury had been sworn, defendant had been denied an opportunity to ask many critical questions on voir dire. The motion did not specify the nature of these questions. In a declaration in support of the motion for mistrial, defense counsel stated that interviews of some of the 24 witnesses (on the list of witnesses interviewed by Van Camp) disclosed at least four more instances of apparent prosecutorial misconduct. Defense counsel estimated that the type of inquiry needed to look into all the areas of potential prosecutorial misconduct will take a minimum of thirty to sixty days. In arguing in support of a mistrial, the defense stated it basically was seeking a continuance. The trial court denied both the motion for mistrial and the motion for continuance, stating further: I will entertain a continuing motion for continuance ... upon a proper showing you need one to investigate certain other witnesses. And we will โ I will be sympathetic to your needs. But I don't have enough before me right now to grant the continuance. Following a recess, trial resumed with the prosecutor's and defense counsel's opening statements. On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial, but only its denial of the motion for continuance. (20) The granting or denial of a motion for continuance in the midst of a trial traditionally rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge who must consider not only the benefit which the moving party anticipates but also the likelihood that such benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors and the court and, above all, whether substantial justice will be accomplished or defeated by a granting of the motion. In the lack of a showing of an abuse of discretion or of prejudice to the defendant, a denial of his motion for a continuance cannot result in a reversal of a judgment of conviction. [Citations.] ( People v. Laursen (1972) 8 Cal.3d 192, 204 [104 Cal. Rptr. 425, 501 P.2d 1145]; see also People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1030 [248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017].) (21) In the present case the trial court did not abuse its discretion. It expressed sympathy for defendant's desire to investigate the possibility of additional instances of misconduct by Van Camp, and granted a brief delay from December 4 to December 8, 1986. The court, however, denied defendant's request for an additional midtrial continuance of a minimum of thirty to sixty days because of the burden such a delay would inflict upon the jurors, other witnesses, and the court. But the court invited defendant to renew his motion for continuance upon a showing relating to specific witnesses, noting: I will be sympathetic to your needs. Defendant has not cited any portion of the record establishing that he ever renewed his request. Defendant also has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion for continuance. Although defense counsel represented that initial interviews had disclosed additional instances of misconduct, the record does not reflect that such alleged misconduct had any bearing upon evidence to be introduced at trial, or otherwise deprived defendant of a fair trial. We have no basis to conclude, therefore, that the additional investigation defense counsel wished to conduct would have produced relevant evidence.