Opinion ID: 2358472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ICWA Issues

Text: ICWA applies to any proceeding that might result in the termination of a parent-child relationship involving an Indian child. [17] ICWA applies to termination proceedings [even] when a party other than the state seeks the termination of parental rights, [18] and adoption without consent terminates parental rights. [19] The trial court concluded that there was no credible evidence that [Timothy] qualifies as an `Indian child' under ICWA. But until the trial court issued its decision, whether Timothy is an Indian child was never in dispute. The Eberts' first and second verified adoption petitions stated that Timothy is an `Indian Child' based on his eligibility for membership in the Tribe. The Eberts' attorney acknowledged during the November 14, 2007 hearing on the initial adoption petition that Timothy is an Indian child under ICWA. Bruce had counsel appointed in the first and second adoption cases based on ICWA. The Eberts referred to the initial adoption petition as an ICWA adoption in their reply to Bruce's conditional non-opposition to their motion to dismiss. In their trial memorandum for the second adoption case the Eberts wrote that they concede[d] in their adoption petition that [Timothy] is an Indian Child as a result of [Connie's] affiliation with the [Tribe]. Connie testified at trial that she is a member of the Tribe, and the Eberts introduced BIA certification that Timothy's bloodline is 25/64 Eskimo. Finally, the Eberts stated in their closing argument and closing brief that ICWA applied as to Connie's parental rights. It is therefore understandable that in Bruce's trial memorandum regarding the application of ICWA's remedial services clause, he observed [t]here appears to be no dispute that [Timothy] is an Indian child. It is not clear why the trial court ignored the parties' position that the child is an Indian child and relied on the absence of evidence to decide that Timothy was not an Indian child without giving the parties prior notice and an opportunity to present additional relevant evidence on this issue. Bruce argues it was clear error to conclude that Timothy is not an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA, noting that the petitioners repeatedly conceded that [Timothy] was an Indian Child and was eligible for membership in an Alaska Native Village in their second adoption petition and pretrial memorandum. The Eberts stand by the trial court's conclusion, characterize the evidence concerning the Tribe as scant, and now explain they brought the petition under ICWA only because it[']s better to be safe than sorry. Bruce's argument raises two issues. Were the Eberts' concessions that Timothy is an Indian child binding judicial admissions of fact? [20] If not, given that the parties tried the case on the understanding that Timothy is an Indian child, should the trial court have given the parties notice that it would rely on a proof deficiency to conclude otherwise? The first issue raises difficult questions about the nature of the elements underlying a conclusion that a child is an Indian child and what may be the subject of a judicial admission. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) defines an Indian child as any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. Some of the elements contained in that definition are undeniably factual: whether the person is unmarried, whether the person is under age 18, and whether the person is a parent's biological child. As such, they generally would be susceptible to judicial admission. [21] Whether a child or either biological parent is a member of a tribe, and whether a child is eligible for membership in a tribe, are more difficult questions to categorize. A statement regarding membership or eligibility for membership might be factual if it refers to an actual determination by the tribe, and thus may be susceptible to judicial admission. [22] But in the absence of an actual determination by the tribe (or perhaps by the BIA) about membership or eligibility for membership, any generalized statement about membership or eligibility for membership might be a statement of mixed fact and law not susceptible to judicial admission: Absent a determination by the tribe as to a child's membership or eligibility for membership, the burden falls on the state court to make an independent determination with the evidence it has before it. . . . Such a review may require the acquisition of the tribe's organic documents, including the tribal constitution and ordinances governing membership.[ [23] ] Whether Indian child status might be susceptible to judicial admission arose in our 1982 decision A.B.M. v. M.H. [24] In that case the biological mother arranged to give her child up for adoption to her sister and brother-in-law. [25] Because the adoptive parents indicated in an adoption questionnaire that the child was an Indian child, the superior court treated the adoption as an ICWA adoption and provided the mother with relevant ICWA protections. [26] A decree of adoption was entered. [27] Two months later the State became aware of the adoption and discovered that it had not been notified as required by state statute and had been deprived of its opportunity to conduct appropriate home studies. [28] On the State's motion the superior court vacated the adoption decree and ordered the [State] to conduct [the] home studies. [29] The biological mother then changed her mind about the adoption and petitioned for the child's return to her under ICWA. [30] During later custody proceedings the biological mother moved to summarily establish that ICWA controlled the outcome of the custody dispute. [31] The superior court denied the motion, not on the ground that the child was not an Indian child, but on the ground that ICWA does not apply to private, extended family adoptions; the court then determined, under state law, that the biological mother would not be allowed to withdraw her consent to the adoption. [32] The primary issue in the biological mother's appeal was whether ICWA applies to private adoptions of Indian children within the extended family, as opposed to the removal of Indian children from their homes by non-family public and private agencies. [33] But during the appeal the adoptive parents also sought affirmance on an alternative ground, asserting for the first time that the child was not an Indian child because there was nothing in the record to indicate that [the child] is a member of or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe or that [the biological] mother is a member of an Indian tribe. [34] On this issue, we held that in light of the adoptive parents' concessions in the adoption questionnaire that the child was an Indian child affiliated with a specific tribe and that ICWA applied, they became bound by their judicial admissions in the superior court. [35] At first blush A.B.M. seems to mandate a reversal of the trial court's determination that Timothy is not an Indian child because the Eberts' concessions to the contrary throughout the proceedings should constitute judicial admissions. But given our subsequent case law defining the limitation of judicial admissions to purely factual matters [36] and our discussion here regarding the nature of membership or eligibility for membership in a tribe, we clarify that the holding of A.B.M. is limited to precluding the adoptive parents from arguing a new position on appeal contrary to a position they had taken in the superior court on an issue not raised to or decided by that court. In this light A.B.M. should be seen more as applying judicial estoppel or waiver rather than judicial admission. [37] Here there was no dispute between the parties regarding Timothy's status as an Indian child. But although there was evidence to establish that Timothy was under the age of 18 and unmarried, there was no evidence nor specific concession by the Eberts that the Tribe had determined Timothy was a member or eligible for membership in the Tribe. Thus it does not appear that there was a binding judicial admission of Timothy's Indian child status in this case. This then leads us to the issue of the fairness of trial court procedures with respect to determining that Timothy was not an Indian child. Had it been clear to the parties that Timothy's Indian child status was at issue, then it would have been Bruce's burden to produce the necessary evidence to establish that Timothy was a member of or eligible for membership in the Tribe. [38] Other courts have held that if the requisite party does not come forward with evidence that ICWA applies, it is not error to ignore ICWA's mandates. [39] But given the facts of this case, where the parties did not dispute Timothy's status as an Indian child, it was fundamentally unfair to find Timothy was not an Indian child without first informing the parties that his status was at issue and allowing for presentation of relevant evidence regarding tribal membership issues. In Frost v. Spencer we held that [b]ecause basic fairness requires an opportunity to present relevant evidence, applying an unanticipated body of law could be an abuse of discretion if doing so were to make different outcome-determinative facts relevant. [40] In Frost we determined a party made a plausible showing that if she had known before the trial that the case was to be decided under [different] principles, her evidentiary presentation would have been different. [41] We held it was an abuse of discretion to deny her request for a supplemental evidentiary hearing after the trial court announced post-trial that it would apply a body of law other than that under which the parties had agreed to resolve the case. [42] The reasoning of Frost applies here. Because the parties consistently treated Timothy as an Indian child throughout the litigation, we vacate the trial court's determination that he is not, and remand for further proceedings on the sole, unproven factor underlying Timothy's status as an Indian child: whether Timothy is a member or is eligible for membership in the Tribe.