Opinion ID: 764076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Capital Murder Instruction

Text: 68 In his final claim of error, Johnson argues that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of the offense of murder violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, Johnson contends that the instruction describing the offense of murder to the jury relieved the state of its burden to prove intent on Johnson's part, as required by Mississippi Code § 97-3-19. 69 The jury instruction at issued provided that [t]he defendant, Samuel Johnson, has been charged by an indictment with the crime of capital murder for having wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, of his malice aforethought and without authority kill[ed] and murder[ed] Billy Morris Langham, a human being.... The second part of the instruction was composed of six requirements for a guilty verdict, including the following two: 70 1) The defendant, Samuel Johnson, aided and commanded Charles Montgomery to commit capital murder by stabbing Officer Billy Morris Langham with a knife and ordering Charles Montgomery to shoot Officer Billy Langham; and 71 2) That Charles Montgomery wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and of his malice aforethought and without authority of law kill[ed] and murder[ed] Billy Morris Langham.... 72 Johnson argues that the jury instruction failed to instruct the jury that they must find that Johnson intended to kill Officer Langham, and instead allowed the jury to impute the intentions of Montgomery to Johnson. 73 The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected this argument on Johnson's direct appeal. See Johnson, 477 So.2d at 212. According to the state court, [i]t can be readily observed that the first part of [the instruction] requires intent on the part of Johnson to kill Langham, and the second part of the instruction clearly define[s] the acts necessary to come within the capital murder framework. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that [t]he jury could not have been misled by this instruction. Id. 74 As we stated in Kinnamon v. Scott, 33 F.3d 462 (5th Cir.1994), [a]s a federal habeas court, our question is whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process, not merely whether the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned. Id. at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977)); see Livingston v. Johnson, 107 F.3d 297, 312 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 204, 139 L.Ed.2d 141 (1997). We agree with the district court's conclusion that [a]lthough the instruction could have been made clearer, its problematic portions regarding intent were not so egregious as to violate due process. Considering the charge as a whole, the testimony adduced at trial, and the arguments of counsel, we are not persuaded that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in a constitutionally impermissible way. Kinnamon, 33 F.3d at 465. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of collateral relief on this issue.