Opinion ID: 2775518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marijuana Possession

Text: We consider first Collins’s argument that he should not have received a criminal history point for his prior conviction for minor misdemeanor possession of marijuana. As Collins points out, “[a]rrest or conviction for [this] minor misdemeanor violation . . . does not constitute a criminal record” under Ohio law. Appellant Br. at 17 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.11(D)). Thus, he argues that his conviction should fall under one of the exceptions listed in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c), rather than be considered part of his criminal history. He specifically analogizes his conviction to a minor traffic infraction, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2), or, in the alternative, to disorderly conduct, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1). Because Collins did not raise this specific objection below, we review it for plain error. See Bostic, 371 F.3d at 872–73. To demonstrate plain error, Collins must show “(1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected [his] substantial rights and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted). Collins has failed to satisfy these requirements. The Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) advises us to adopt a “common sense approach” in determining whether an offense should be considered a minor traffic infraction or a form of disorderly conduct. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.12(A). That approach “includes consideration of [a number of] relevant factors,” including: (i) a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses; (ii) the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment; (iii) the elements of the offense; (iv) the level of culpability involved; and 5 No. 13-4158 United States v. Collins (v) the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. Id. In United States v. Stubblefield, 265 F.3d 345, 346 (6th Cir. 2001), “Stubblefield filed an objection to the probation officer’s decision to assign a criminal history point to his minor misdemeanor drug abuse conviction”—a conviction, as in this case, for “possession of less than one hundred grams of marijuana.” We considered and rejected Stubblefield’s argument that his conviction fell under the purview of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). Id. at 347 (“[T]he exceptions set forth in § 4A1.2(c) do not apply.”). However, we decided Stubblefield without referring to the five factors listed above. To be sure, some of these factors—a comparison of the punishments imposed (factor i) and the perceived seriousness of the offenses as indicated by their level of punishment (factor ii)—do weigh in Collins’s favor. As Collins notes, minor misdemeanor possession of marijuana (like a minor traffic infraction) is not recorded on one’s criminal record in Ohio. On recidivism (factor v), we acknowledge that “[t]he Sentencing Commission has determined that convictions for crimes involving illegal narcotics correlate strongly to recidivism.” United States v. Foote, 705 F.3d 305, 308 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Computation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 13, 29–30 (2004)). But we have no data on whether the recidivism rate for minor traffic infractions (such as speeding) is any lower than the recidivism rate for minor misdemeanor possession of marijuana—indeed, common experience would likely suggest that it is probably just as high. Yet we think that these offenses contain different elements (factor iii) 6 No. 13-4158 United States v. Collins and carry different levels of culpability (factor iv). Ohio’s drug possession law, for instance, contains an explicit mens rea element—that “[n]o person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance”—while “[m]ost traffic violations,” on the other hand, “are strict liability crimes.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11(A); State v. Campbell, 691 N.E. 2d 711, 714 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Weitbrecht, 715 N.E. 2d 167 (Ohio 1999). Offenses which have a mens rea element typically carry with them a higher level of culpability than those that do not. See also Foote, 705 F.3d at 307–08 (rejecting argument that possession of marijuana be treated as a minor traffic infraction under § 4A1.2). In light of this discussion, we believe that the district court did not plainly err in awarding a criminal history point for Collins’s prior conviction for marijuana possession. We are mindful that at least one court has found that the district court did not commit plain error when it failed to award a criminal history point for defendant’s prior marijuana possession conviction. United States v. Ventura, 428 F. App’x 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2011). But under plain-error review, Collins must demonstrate that the district court committed an “obvious or clear” error. Collins has not done so here. Collins’s second contention—that we treat his marijuana possession as a form of disorderly conduct—is of a piece. Consistent with the reasoning above, we hold that the district court did not plainly err in rejecting this argument. See also United States v. Ruacho, 746 F.3d 850, 854–55 (8th Cir. 2014) (applying five-factor test to same argument and rejecting claim).