Opinion ID: 2736698
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Public Duty Doctrine

Text: In order to establish a special relationship, or ―special duty,‖ that falls under an exception to the public duty doctrine, ―a plaintiff must allege and prove two things: (1) a direct or continuing contact between the injured party and a governmental agency or official, and (2) a justifiable reliance on the part of the injured party.‖ Klahr v. District of Columbia, 576 A.2d 718, 720 (D.C. 1990) (citing Turner, supra, 532 A.2d at 667). The Superior Court observed that the main dispute between the parties was whether Allen had a special relationship with the District. The court acknowledged some direct contacts in that Allen had communicated with FEMS throughout the application process, and some reliance on FEMS‘s representations about the PAT, but nevertheless held that appellants had not established more than a duty of the FEMS to assist the general public, which was insufficient to show that the District created a special relationship with Allen. For the court, it was important that appellants had not claimed that the District specifically recruited 17 Allen or any candidate and that any individual could apply to be a firefighter and the District would have corresponded with them to the same extent. Thus, simply ―because a person ‗emerges‘ from the general public to the attention of the government does not establish a special relationship.‖ The presence of EMS at the PAT was ―no different than a city stationing an ambulance at a high school football game to assist the players if they become injured.‖ It was simply a gratuitous promise like the one in Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1983) (en banc).
Here, appellants contend that the District established direct and continuous contact with appellants sufficient to establish a special relationship because it recruited and evaluated prospective firefighters. Specifically, appellants urge, much as they did in the Superior Court, that Allen (1) had direct and continuing contacts with the District because he applied to FEMS in March of 2006, approximately eighteen months before the PAT test, (2) signed a ―Letter of Intent‖ in April of 2006 to participate in the entry-level Firefighter Written Examination, (3) completed and passed the examination the following month, (4) was provided 18 an ―Initial Notice‖ by the District in September of 2007, and (5) was invited to participate in the PAT test on October 14, 2007. As noted above, as many as two dozen applicants were assembled for physical screening. All were subjected to the same scrutiny before the PAT began, and then Allen suffered pain and difficulty breathing. Medical aid was summoned, just as if he had been overcome with pain on a nearby street. It is from this that we are asked to declare an exception to the public duty doctrine by virtue of a special relationship between Allen, his nearly two dozen peers, the more than 100 prospective firefighters that participate in the PAT every year, and the medics onscene performing the screening. In order to establish a special relationship, appellants have the burden to show direct or continuing contact between Allen and FEMS. Klahr, supra, 576 A.2d at 720. Appellants attempt to show that Allen established a special relationship for his emergency situation by his repeated contacts with the District more than a year (and up to a year-and-a-half) earlier. As the trial court here observed, ―any individual could have applied to be a firefighter and the District would have corresponded with that person to the same extent that it corresponded with Eric Allen.‖ See Nealon v. District of Columbia, 669 A.2d 685, 693 (D.C. 19 1995) (―A party must show that such contact was different from the type of contact that the District has with the general public‖ (citing Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1130 (D.C. 1992)). If the District had effectively made a promise to protect Allen, that promise would have applied equally to the more than one hundred other contenders who participate in the PAT every year, and the two dozen PAT participants that day. This would require either having over two dozen special relationships that day and more than one hundred over the course of the year, as to each applicant being screened (which is not practical or possible), or holding that the response to the sudden disability by the ones initially called upon created that relationship. By definition of a special relationship, that is not practicable or legally possible. Hines, supra, 580 A.2d at 136 (―Our case law makes it clear that the mere fact that an individual has emerged from the general public and become an object of the special attention of public employees does not create a relationship which imposes a special legal duty.‖); cf. Varner, supra, 891 A.2d 260, 276 (D.C. 2006) (police presence on campus of Gallaudet University, and promise to protect some 2,000 students could not create 2,000 special relationships without ―nullify[ing] the [public duty] doctrine itself‖). A government functions through people, usually its citizens. Thus, the primary task for its leaders (after they are chosen) is to recruit and evaluate those 20 potentially available to facilitate the governmental role of providing public services. An emergency resulting thereafter from the provision of emergency services is insufficient to engender a special relationship. More specifically, appellants‘ claim that Allen established direct or continuing contact with the District through his actions as a prospective employee must also fail. See Flemmings v. District of Columbia, 719 A.2d 963, 964 (D.C. 1998) (rejecting, in a case involving a police officer who was shot by his girlfriend, who was also a police officer, the argument that employment by the District created a special relationship with the District). Appellants cannot, without more, show direct or continuous contact by relying on what Allen did several months, or more than a year earlier, to show that there was a special relationship. As we stated in Wanzer, supra: Even a series of contacts over a period of time between a public agency and an injured or endangered person is not enough to establish a special relationship, absent some showing that the agency assumed a greater duty to that person than the duty owed to the public at large. If it were otherwise, then the city would be potentially liable for ‗every oversight, omission, or blunder‘ of its officials — a liability which potentially could so deplete the resources necessary to provide police protection, fire protection, and ambulance service as to result in the elimination of those services altogether. 21 580 A.2d at 132 (citation omitted); accord Powell, supra, 602 A.2d at 1130-31 (―[M]ere contacts are insufficient in the absence of evidence of a special duty . . . [We] require[] . . . proof of a type of contact different from that of the District with the general public, . . . [and] proof of justifiable reliance.‖). Thus, appellants‘ proffer of such remote contacts fails to show how EMTs responding to Allen‘s emergency had somehow established a special relationship with him. Even assuming arguendo that appellants could claim that a special relationship was established between himself and the District (specifically, FEMS recruitment personnel) while he was acting as a prospective FEMS employee, that special relationship would not also encompass the alleged EMT errors during Allen‘s medical emergency. Cf. Stoddard v. District of Columbia, 623 A.2d 1152, 1153-54 (D.C. 1993) (concluding that even though some parents could prove that they justifiably relied on presence of school crossing-guards, child without parent who crossed street some two football fields from crosswalk could not claim special relationship); Forsman, supra, 580 A.2d at 1318 (concluding that even if government agent‘s assistance in one matter was sufficient to create special relationship in that matter, it was not sufficient to create special relationship in entirely different matter). Nor do appellants claim in their brief that the EMTs 22 responsible for transporting Allen in the basic life-support unit were the source of a special relationship between Allen and the District. Finally, appellants argue forcefully that Allen‘s emergency was not a ―911 emergency call case.‖ As appellants state in their brief, and as the record reflects, despite any on-scene assessment of Allen by EMTs, FEMS personnel had to radio for a basic-life support unit to transport Allen to a hospital, which did not arrive until several minutes later, much like a regular emergency situation. Despite the presence of EMTs Mason and Johnson on scene at the PAT, we are not prepared to distinguish this case from ―emergency services cases‖ strictly because FEMS personnel radioed for a basic life support unit rather than dialing 911 for emergency services like a regular citizen. See Hines, supra, 580 A.2d at 136 (concluding ―actions that are a necessary part of the on-scene responsibility of government agents subject to the public duty doctrine add[] nothing to the general duty owed the public and fail[] to create a relationship which imposes a special legal duty.‖) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wanzer, supra, 580 A.2d at 132 (―A one-time call to 911 for help does not establish a special relationship.‖). In an emergency context, we explicitly deny the jury the opportunity to judge the actions of EMTs in hindsight in the absence of affirmative negligence (i.e., affirmative action that worsens the condition of the 23 individual receiving emergency services). See Johnson, supra, 580 A.2d at 142, 143.
Even assuming arguendo that appellants did establish direct or continuing contacts (and they have not done so here), appellants fail to demonstrate justifiable reliance. See Snowder v. District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 590, 604 n.12 (D.C. 2008). On this point, the trial court concluded that appellants had not shown that Allen acted or refrained from acting in reliance on the EMTs. The court reasoned that appellants essentially claimed that the EMTs were inadequate and untimely in their response to Allen‘s emergency, and this court rejected such a claim in Johnson, supra, 580 A.2d 140. Appellants contend that the District‘s requirement that firefighters pass the PAT significantly raised the ―quotient of risk‖ above that assumed by the general public. Additionally, Allen justifiably relied on the District, appellants argue, because FEMS provided monitors for each candidate participating in the PAT, and told them to speak with FEMS personnel in charge of the PAT if they experienced problems while completing the components. From the combination of those facts, 24 appellants contend, ―it can be reasonably inferred‖ that Allen justifiably relied on [FEMS] and the PAT safety precautions. To show justifiable reliance, a ―plaintiff [or person allegedly in privity with the District] must specifically act, or refrain from acting, in such a way as to exhibit particular reliance upon the actions of the [EMTs] . . . . Liability is established, therefore, if the [EMTs] [have] specifically undertaken [action on behalf of] a particular individual and the individual has specifically relied upon the undertaking.‖ Morgan, supra, 468 A.2d at 1315 (citations omitted); see Taylor, supra, 776 A.2d at 1218 (citing Morgan, supra). As we have stated, despite what a jury could ―reasonably infer‖ with respect to justifiable reliance, such an argument ―cannot substitute for evidence of ‗justifiable reliance.‘‖ Taylor, supra, 776 A.2d at 1220 (emphasis added). Here, appellants have not shown justifiable reliance in order to establish a special relationship. Despite their conclusory allegations to the contrary, appellants have failed to show that Allen acted or failed to act in any way, because of the presence of EMTs, PAT monitors, or any other safety personnel at the test. Indeed, a conclusion that there was a special relationship between Allen and the District, relying overwhelmingly on the fact that EMTs were present at the PAT, 25 would be the impetus toward perverse incentives such as the avoidance of safety precautions. Cf. Varner, supra, 891 A.2d at 272 (holding that operational manuals do not establish standard of care because, to hold otherwise, ―would create the perverse incentive . . . to write [manuals] in such a manner as to impose minimal duties . . . in order to limit civil liability.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Additionally, Allen‘s decision to sign the liability waiver that FEMS required him to sign before he could participate in the PAT, regardless of its legal value otherwise, is indicative of Allen‘s assent to the District‘s claim that it could not be held liable for any injuries or death as a result of the PAT and undermines any claim that the District was on notice that Allen would rely FEMS to ensure that no harm befell him.14 Even assuming appellants could claim justifiable reliance based on the deposition testimony (e.g., BFC Douglas‘s testimony that FEMS ―assume[d] the obligation to be responsible for [firefighter candidates] when they‘re in the [PAT]‖), without direct or continuous contact (which does not exist here), appellants‘ claim of a special relationship fails, and the public duty doctrine applies. See Snowder, supra, 949 A.2d at 604 n.12.15 14 As the waiver explicitly states, Allen agreed to ―assume any and all risk and liability for . . . death which [he] might suffer or sustain while [o]n any . . . property or premises owned or operated by [FEMS] or the [District].‖ 15 Appellants also claim that the District was affirmatively negligent in providing emergency services care for Allen and that the District did not (continued…) 26 Finally, appellants‘ focus on Mason‘s classification of Allen as a ―priority 3,‖ requiring Mason to ―br[ing] in‖ a basic life support unit during the emergency rather than a better equipped vehicle, is unpersuasive. The claim, in essence, is one attacking the adequacy and timeliness of emergency services, which this court foreclosed more than two decades ago. See Hines, supra, 580 A.2d at 136, 139-40 (―[C]hallenges to the adequacy and timeliness of the dispatch of emergency equipment . . . are simply not actionable under the public duty doctrine.‖); see also Allison Gas Turbine, supra, 642 A.2d at 843-44 (citing, inter alia, Hines, supra, for the same proposition). (…continued) adequately screen candidates for (and exclude those with) ―Sickle Cell Trait.‖ As the trial court observed, appellants argued in its response to the District‘s motion to dismiss that it did not need to prove affirmative negligence, made no effort to prove it, and changed course in a last minute supplemental brief on appellants‘ motion for reconsideration (of the Court‘s summary judgment for the District), more than a month after its initial brief in its motion for reconsideration. We decline to consider appellants‘ argument of affirmative negligence on appeal because it is contrary to the position appellants took prior to summary judgment. See, e.g., Duk Hea Oh v. National Capital Revitalization Corp., 7 A.3d 997, 1010 (D.C. 2010) (―[A] defendant may not take one position at trial and a contradictory position on appeal.‖) (quoting Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 508 (D.C. 1993)). We also decline to consider appellants‘ ―Sickle Cell trait‖ argument because it was not adequately raised below. See In re D.A.J., 694 A.2d 860, 864 (D.C. 1997) (―Questions not properly raised and preserved during the proceedings under examination, and points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party’s thesis, will normally be spurned on appeal.‖ (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 27 Appellants would have this court look to possible negligence in the sequence of events before Allen‘s death and his reliance on government actors. We cannot do so because such factors are relevant only if potential liability is, by the special relationship exception to governmental immunity, established in the instance. In light of the foregoing considerations, we conclude that the public duty doctrine protects the actions of the District and its employees in connection with the provision of emergency services here. The grant of summary judgment in favor of the District is Affirmed. EASTERLY, Associate Judge, dissenting: This is not a public duty doctrine case—at least not as the public duty doctrine has ever been conceived by this court. As its name suggests, the ostensible goal in applying this doctrine, at least at first, was to discern whether the District had an actionable duty of care when its agents were alleged to have acted negligently. But there should be no question that the District owed a duty of care to Eric Allen. The District, through its FEMS agents, screened Mr. Allen and invited him to the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services (FEMS) Training Academy to take FEMS‘s Physical 28 Ability Test (PAT). FEMS agents knew the PAT created the risk of injury and illness, and for that reason among others had medical staff on hand during the test. And if that were not enough, the FEMS medical staff at the PAT actually undertook care of Mr. Allen when he fell ill, just as they were supposed to (although presumably they were supposed to provide competent care). The application of the public duty doctrine to these facts—to uphold a grant of summary judgment no less—demonstrates that this doctrine is analytically bankrupt. It applies whenever this court says it does, and we seem to be willing to apply it to an ever-expanding set of circumstances, including cases where, as here, District employees help specific individuals and then perform negligently. We have now completely departed from the traditional common law of negligence from which our public duty doctrine was purportedly derived. In light of this, I do not know what logic, if any, drives or contains our public duty doctrine. From the majority opinion‘s focus on the identity and function of the FEMS staff who provided Mr. Allen medical care, it appears to have morphed into a form of immunity, at least for certain categories of District employees. Indeed, in its final paragraph, the majority opinion uses the words ―governmental immunity‖ to refer to the public duty doctrine. But if this is how 29 the court is now employing our public duty doctrine, we have a problem: This public duty doctrine ―immunity‖ conflicts with our sovereign immunity jurisprudence that currently defines when the District government may be sued for the harm done by its agents. It is time for this court to explain what we are doing and why. Of the states that still have some iteration of this doctrine (many have rejected it), the District stands alone in interpreting it the way that we do. We should take note of our outlier status. We should acknowledge both that there are other more coherent mechanisms for protecting the District from suit where holding the government liable may be truly counterproductive, and that, in some cases, we will actually better promote public safety and responsible government by holding the District accountable for the negligent actions of its employees in an open court of law. FEMS, for example, has now enjoyed the protection of the public duty doctrine for decades. But news reports of FEMS‘ multiple failures to provide competent emergency services to individuals in the District (detailed below) indicate that, by shielding FEMS from the scrutiny of being sued, we have allowed dysfunction to fester. 30 As illustrated by this case, this court‘s public duty doctrine has lost any coherence, logic, or sense of rightness that it ever may have had. I dissent from the majority opinion‘s extension of the public duty doctrine to the facts presented, and I renew the call to this court to reconsider the doctrine it created and has allowed to run amok.