Opinion ID: 1111241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: chandler's opinion

Text: Whittington argues it was error to permit Officer Chandler to express the opinion that, following his investigation at the scene of the accident, he did not think Mrs. Whittington was killed in the wreck. The basis of this assignment is that Chandler was not qualified to express such an opinion, and further, that it was an expression of the ultimate issue and invaded the province of the jury. Rules 701 and 704, of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, together with the comments, state the following: RULE 701. OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to the clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Comment The traditional rule regarding lay opinions has been, with some exceptions, to exclude them from evidence. Rule 701 is a departure from the traditional rule. It favors the admission of lay opinions when two considerations are met. The first consideration is the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation. The second consideration is that the witness' opinion must be helpful in resolving the issues. Rule 701, thus, provides flexibility when a witness has difficulty in expressing himself in language which does not reflect an opinion. Rule 701 is based on the recognition that there is often too thin a line between fact and opinion to determine which is which. [Emphasis added] RULE 704. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Comment Rule 704 abolishes the ultimate issue rule which existed in pre-rule Mississippi practice. The ultimate issue rule was often unnecessarily restrictive and generally difficult to apply. More often than not the invocation of the rule served to deprive the trier of fact of useful information. Rule 704 clarifies much of the confusion over the ultimate issue rule. An opinion is no longer objectionable solely on grounds that it invades the province of the jury. The State argues the literal language of the Rules permit a trial court discretion to allow an opinion such as that expressed by Chandler. The State is in error, however. In the first place federal courts in interpreting Rule 704 have invariably applied it to expert testimony. See: United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.1983); Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778 (8th Cir.1981), affirmed 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983); United States v. Grote, 632 F.2d 387 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1129, 102 S.Ct. 983, 71 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981); United States v. Miller, 600 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 434, 62 L.Ed.2d 327 (1979); United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345 (2nd Cir.1977), cert. denied 432 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2958, 53 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1977). Chandler was not shown to have any special qualifications to express such an opinion. Furthermore, even if Chandler had qualified as an expert, he gave no basis for this opinion, and the answer was objectionable on this ground as well. See: Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49 (D.C.N.J. 1975); United States v. Jackson, 688 F.2d 1121 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 1441, 75 L.Ed.2d 797 (1983); Simon v. St. Louis County, Mo., 656 F.2d 316 (8th Cir.1981), cert. den 455 U.S. 976, 102 S.Ct. 1485, 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982); Meder v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 637 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir.1981). Moreover, as noted in the comment to Rule 704, the abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not result in the admission of all opinions. It must be helpful to a determination of the case. Questions which would merely allow a witness to tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted. Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1983). If it were proper for Officer Chandler to express such an opinion, it would be just as proper for the defense to parade witnesses before the jury to express an opposite opinion. We nevertheless conclude the answer given by Chandler was harmless. It was no more than an expression that his suspicion was aroused following his investigation there at the scene. See: Askin v. State, 178 Ga. App. 810, 344 S.E.2d 699 (1986). Every juror already knew, of course, that the investigating officers at the scene were suspicious, or else the investigation would not have continued. A much more serious question would be presented if Chandler had been asked and permitted to testify at the trial that he did not then think she had been killed in the wreck. Finally, the testimony of the investigating officers was followed by Dr. McCormick, who in great detail set forth reasons why in his opinion Mrs. Whittington was not killed in an automobile accident. See: Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); U.S. v. Murphy, 763 F.2d 202 (6th Cir.1985); State v. Rushing, 464 So.2d 268 (La. 1985); State v. Workman, 667 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1984).