Opinion ID: 73339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brand's Sentence

Text: In 1992, the state circuit judge found that Brand had a net worth in excess of $8 million before ordering him to pay the $3.935 million lump sum and $2,500 per month in child support. Under the express language of the order, the lump sum served three purposes: (1) alimony; (2) maintenance and support of [Margrethe]; and (3) security for the minor children[.] An individual convicted for violating the CSRA is required to pay restitution in an amount equal to the past due support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.A. § 228(c). The CSRA defines past due support obligation broadly to include amounts due either for the support and maintenance of a child[,] or for support and maintenance of a child and the parent with whom the child is living. 18 U.S.C.A. § 228(d)(1)(A). Applying the foregoing statutory language to the financial obligations set forth in the state court's 1992 dissolution order, the magistrate judge found that Brand's past due support obligation under the CSRA included his unpaid monthly child support in addition to the entire $3.935 million lump sum. Accordingly, the magistrate judge ordered Brand to pay $4.05 million in restitution. Brand claims that the restitution order should be set aside because the magistrate judge calculated the restitution amount improperly and, alternatively, because he is unable to pay. 1. Inclusion of Multi-Purpose Lump Sum Obligation in Restitution Order Brand contends that the magistrate judge erred in using the entire lump sum obligation to calculate the amount of his restitution payment. He emphasizes that the state circuit judge intended for the $3.935 million to serve several purposes that were unrelated to child support, making total inclusion of the lump sum improper. Brand claims that he should be held accountable only for what the state circuit judge specifically intended to be the overall child support obligation, without regard to whatever sum was intended as support and maintenance for Margrethe. Brand's argument for excluding Margrethe from the equation, at least as we understand it, is this: the custodial parent clause after the disjunctive or in the CSRA's definition of a past due support obligation is inapplicable to the facts of this case because Florida law has clear delineations for child support, alimony and equitable distribution. In other words, Brand suggests that the language Congress used to define a past due support obligation is not as broad as it appears because, in a state such as Florida where courts have the capacity to earmark specific portions of lump sums for purposes related to child support, the issue of support and maintenance for a custodial parent becomes irrelevant. For the reasons that follow, we reject Brand's contentions and affirm the magistrate judge's $4.05 million restitution order. While the CSRA charge was pending against him in federal court, Brand filed a petition in state court for clarification of the underlying support order in an effort to determine what percentage of the lump sum constituted his CSRA support obligation. In June 1996, the state circuit judge held a hearing wherein she attempted to elaborate upon the reasons why she structured the financial distribution portion of the dissolution order as she did. At the hearing, the judge explained that the $3.935 million was meant to serve several inextricably combined purposes, including (1) lump sum alimony in the sense of distribution, (2) lump sum alimony [that was] not distribution, (3) spousal support and (4) security for the [future] support of the children. The judge also explained that the lump sum was meant in part to enable Margrethe to bear some of the costs of the maintenance of the[ ] children. The judge also stated that, because all of these purposes were interrelated, she was unable to designate precisely how much of the lump sum constituted Brand's support obligation. Moreover, the state circuit judge indicated that she structured Brand's overall obligation in such a way as to use the large lump sum to offset the relatively low monthly child support figure. Thus, Brand's failure to pay the $3.935 million lump sum could have given rise to an increase in his monthly child support obligation, and some percentage of the lump sum constituted security for the children's future support. The judge could not, however, specify with any particularity how much of the lump sum secured future child support or offset the $2,500 monthly obligation. In challenging the restitution order, Brand relies upon the inability to determine specifically what portion of the lump sum constitutes his support obligation. This lack of specificity did not require the magistrate judge to exclude the lump sum from consideration in calculating the amount of Brand's restitution. The CSRA required the magistrate judge to set restitution in an amount equal to Brand's past due support obligation. We hold that the $3.935 million lump sum fell within the CSRA's definition of this phrase. Brand's lump sum obligation served a variety of purposes relating to Margrethe and the children. As for Margrethe, the $3.935 million constituted lump sum alimony in the sense of both distribution of assets and spousal support. We note that, in the ordinary case imposing restitution under the CSRA, it is unlikely that a past due support obligation would encompass monetary obligations that served these types of purposes. As for the children, however, the state circuit judge intended for the $3.935 million lump sum to serve as security for future child support, and to enable Margrethe to contribute her share of support for the children. Whatever percentage of the lump sum was meant to serve these purposes falls well within the ambit of the CSRA's definition of a past due support obligation. We look to the CSRA's plain language to resolve this issue. Although Brand makes much of the title Child Support Recovery Act, it is significant that the Act's definition of a past due support obligation does not limit itself to child support as that term is commonly understood. The CSRA defines a past due support obligation as any amount due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living [.] 18 U.S.C.A. § 228(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The definition therefore makes obvious that Congress intended for a past due support obligation to mean something broader than merely child support. For this reason, the Act clearly contemplates that support for a custodial parent may be included within a past due support obligation under certain circumstances. We think that the circumstances present in this case are of the type that Congress seems to have envisioned in drafting the definition of a past due support obligation to encompass support for a custodial parent. We find particularly persuasive the fact that the purposes that the lump sum served with respect to Margrethe were, according to the state judge, inextricably intertwined with the purposes that the lump sum served with respect to the children. Because the multiple purposes were so interrelated, it was impossible for the state circuit judge to attribute any specific dollar amount to any specific purpose. Moreover, the state circuit judge uniquely configured the dissolution order so as to offset Brand's monthly child support obligation with the large lump sum. These factors greatly diminish the significance of the fact that the $4.05 million restitution order ultimately included some indefinite figure representing lump sum alimony for Margrethe. Whatever this figure was, it became enmeshed with the support-related purposes of the remainder of the lump sum obligation, and thus became relevant to the magistrate judge's calculation of Brand's restitution for his past due support obligation under the CSRA. The issue in this case, as the parties have framed it, ultimately requires us to determine not whether any portion of the lump sum may properly be included in calculating Brand's restitution, but rather the extent to which the lump sum should be used in that calculation. Notably, Brand concedes that his past due obligation of child support consists of more than merely his $2,500 per month arrearage. This is because, as the state circuit judge explained, part of the $3.935 million was intended to assist Margrethe in contributing her financial share of the children's support. Brand construes this to mean that the judge implicitly intended for $5,000 per month to constitute the total child support obligation between both parents. Accordingly, Brand would have this court vacate his sentence and order the district court to set his restitution in the amount of $250,000-the figure obtained when multiplying the combined monthly child support contributions for he and Margrethe ($5,000) by the number of months Brand failed to pay support (50). As we have already explained, this course of action is unnecessary given the inextricably combined purposes that the judge intended for the lump sum to serve. We point this out only to emphasize that it is conceptually irrelevant whether we accept Brand's restitution calculation of $250,000 or affirm the magistrate judge's order of $4.05 million. Either of these results requires us to go behind the language of the underlying support order. Brand merely objects to our doing so in a manner that works to his detriment. We address one final point. In affirming the magistrate judge's restitution order, we consider the definition of past due support obligation in its entirety and rely upon the clause following the disjunctive or, which authorizes the inclusion of sums for maintenance and support of a custodial parent. Again, the definition of a past due support obligation is any amount due for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living[.] 18 U.S.C.A. § 228(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Brand contends that Florida law eliminates the need for us to resort to the latter, custodial parent clause. He suggests that in a state such as Florida, where the magistrate judge could have designated with specificity what portion of the lump sum was related to child support, it is only necessary for us to consider the language preceding the disjunctive or, which refers to maintenance and support of a child without reference to the custodial parent. Accordingly, Brand argues, we should construe the Act so as to limit his restitution to the amount specifically intended as child support in the state circuit judge's order, without considering what portion of the lump sum was meant as maintenance and support for Margrethe. For us to reach this result would be to interpret the Act so as to require federal courts to delve into the vagaries of state marital dissolution law in order to arrive at appropriate restitution orders for CSRA offenders. Congress chose to create its own definition of a support obligation-independent of analogous state law concepts-for purposes of federal prosecutions under the CSRA. We will therefore follow the plain language of the Act broadly defining past due support obligation to include support for custodial parents, and we will interpret this language without regard to the potential interplay of state law. The foregoing rationale compels our conclusion that Brand's past due support obligation under the CSRA encompasses both the $2,500 per month arrearage, plus the entire $3.935 million lump sum. We therefore hold that the magistrate judge properly calculated the amount of Brand's restitution. 2. Brand's Ability to Pay The CSRA provides that upon conviction the court shall order restitution under [18 U.S.C. § ] 3663 in an amount equal to the past due support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.A. § 228(c). Under section 3663, a court has the discretion to order ... that the defendant make restitution to any victim after considering, among other things, the financial resources of the defendant[.] 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B)(i)(II) (West Supp.1998). After calculating Brand's past due support obligation, the magistrate judge considered the evidence adduced at trial and assessed Brand's ability to pay before setting restitution at $4.05 million.10 Brand contends that the restitution order should be set aside because the evidence did not demonstrate that he had the ability to pay $4.05 million. At the sentencing hearing, Brand submitted a financial affidavit stating that his monthly gross income was $1,200, his monthly expenses totaled $1,730, and that his net worth was $2,200. Addressing the court through allocution, Brand said that his net worth was never ever what they said it was and that the estimates used in the state court proceedings were based upon real estate valuations that were at best optimistic. The magistrate judge offered to hold an evidentiary hearing in order to afford Brand the opportunity to present evidence in support of his contention that he was unable to pay. Brand's counsel, however, told the magistrate judge that Brand was of the opinion that his financial affidavit [wa]s sufficient on its face, and for that reason he ha[d] completed ... his presentation. Accordingly, Brand chose not [to] ask[ ] the court to conduct an[ ] evidentiary hearing[ ] on the 10 The government suggests that the CSRA's reference to section 3663 simply provides a procedure for imposing restitution and does not necessarily mean that the Act incorporates section 3663's requirement that a defendant's ability to pay be consider[ed]. Relying upon the language used in section 228(c), as well as the statute's legislative history, the government argues that restitution under the CSRA is mandatory and a defendant's ability to pay is irrelevant. We think that the government's position is well-taken, especially given that the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 228 contained in the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998 replaced the prior reference to section 3663's discretionary restitution provision with a reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (providing for [m]andatory restitution to victims of certain crimes; effective April 1996). Nonetheless, we need not reach this issue because, in this case, the magistrate judge did consider Brand's ability to pay, and did not err in concluding that he had assets sufficient to satisfy the $4.05 million restitution order. ability to pay issue. Although section 3663(a)(1)(B)(i) requires a court to consider a defendant's ability to pay in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court need not make specific factual findings in this regard. United States v. Davis, 117 F.3d 459, 463 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 355, 139 L.Ed.2d 276 (1997). A defendant who disputes his ability to pay restitution bears the burden of demonstrating his financial resources by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482,1494 n. 14 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 253, 139 L.Ed.2d 181 (1997). We will not overturn the magistrate judge's restitution order in this case unless the record is devoid of any evidence that [Brand] is able to satisfy [it]. Davis, 117 F.3d at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to support the magistrate judge's finding that Brand-whose financial dealings were plainly suspect-had the ability to pay $4.05 million in restitution to Margrethe.