Opinion ID: 2168806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Venue of the Hearings

Text: The record indicates that this case was filed in Newport County and was, for the most part, heard in that county. Apparently however, some of the hearings were held in Providence County. The respondent contends that it was error to hear any of the case in Providence because the provisions of § 15-5-13 were not complied with. He raises this objection for the first time here on appeal. Section 15-5-13 is entitled Venue and states that divorce petitions shall be filed, heard and tried in the county in which the petitioner resides (with some exceptions not relevant here). The section provides that in the interest of convenience, the court may with the consent of the chief judge or any associated justice designated by him and the parties, order any such action transferred to another county. The respondent argues that the requisite consent does not appear on the record and that all actions taken in this case should therefore be vacated. We find respondent's contention to be without merit. Both parties in the litigation gave their implied consent to the change of venue by appearing generally in the proceedings, participating fully in the hearings, and failing to raise an objection to the change. Fiorino v. Fiorino, 35 N.J.Super. 463, 468, 114 A.2d 480, 483 (Juv. & Dom.Rel.Ct.1955); see also Mateer v. Mateer, 105 R.I. 735, 742, 254 A.2d 417, 421 (1969). Although there is no specific order in the record showing consent by the court itself, we believe it is clear that when the trial justice moved to Providence on his usual rotation, everyone involved agreed that the case should follow him so that continuity could be maintained. Considering the confusion that would have ensued if a different judge had tried to step into the middle of this case, we believe the most convenient way to handle the matter was to have one judge preside over it even when he was sitting in Providence. We do not read § 15-5-13 as preventing a case from following a judge when he moves to another county on his usual rotation and when both of the parties implicitly consent to the change. The respondent relies on Salters v. Salters, 72 R.I. 81, 48 A.2d 359 (1946). In that case, a divorce action was filed in the wrong county and we held that it could not be heard in that court. Here, however, the case was filed in the proper court so that the judge at Newport County had authority to hear it. We will not vacate any of the court's actions on this ground.