Opinion ID: 1487028
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Special Circumstances Warranting Review

Text: Before we can address appellants' contentions on the merits, we must determine first whether this court's previous decision in the direct appeal precludes further reconsideration. In Sousa, supra, this court already rejected the appellants' core constitutional claim in their collateral attack, their challenge to the court's restriction on cross-examination, in a one-sentence footnote, stating that [w]e have examined the multitude of other contentions made by appellants and find them to be without merit. 400 A.2d at 1038 n. 1. The government argues that we are precluded from considering the current appeal because where an appellate court has disposed of an issue on appeal, it will not be considered afresh on a collateral attack in a trial court of the same judicial system, absent special circumstances. Doepel v. United States, 510 A.2d 1044, 1045-46 (D.C.1986). The government argues that affirmance of the direct appeal in 1979 forecloses further review by this court and that any further review would be in derogation of M.A.P., supra . [18] Appellants concede that the unconstitutionality of the trial court's restriction on cross-examination was raised on direct appeal, but argue that this court may consider their claim because this case presents the kind of special circumstances reserved under Doepel, supra . According to appellants, the special circumstances warranting reconsideration in this case include; (1) the constitutional importance of the issue, (2) the significance to the constitutional issue of new evidence not considered by the trial court or by this court on direct appeal, (3) the claimed actual innocence of the appellants, and (4) that the issue was not expressly addressed by this court in the opinion issued in the direct appeal. Analysis of § 23-110 must begin with the statutory language, which expressly provides that a motion may be made at any time. D.C.Code § 23-110(b). We also must recognize that the equitable nature of habeas corpus preclude[s] application of strict rules of res judicata.  Schlup, supra at 319, 115 S.Ct. 851. [19] Thus, in Doepel, where we considered an appeal from an order denying a § 23-110 motion which raised issues that already had been presented and decided on direct appeal, we declined to revisit the issue absent special circumstances. Doepel, supra, 510 A.2d at 1045-46. In denying the appeal, we stated that no further review was necessary, expressing confidence that when the prior appellate opinion concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the first-degree murder conviction, we had of necessity fully considered and rejected the precise issue raised in the subsequent new trial motion, whether there was sufficient evidence of the required elements of deliberation and premeditation in light of Doepel's intoxication and of forcible intercourse. See id. at 1047-48. Although Doepel did not define the special circumstances that would permit renewed appellate review, in Peoples, supra note 18, we indicated that special circumstances might consist of an intervening change in the relevant law. Id. at 702 n. 5. (citing Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974)). The proposition in Doepel and Peoples that a collateral attack may lie in certain limited circumstances even with respect to a claim already decided on direct appeal finds support in federal case law construing 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [20] In denying a federal prisoner's habeas petition under § 2255, the court in United States v. Palumbo, 608 F.2d 529, 533 (3d Cir.1979), held that in the absence of newly discovered evidence that could not reasonably have been presented at the original trial, a change in applicable law, incompetent prior representation by counsel, or other circumstances indicating that an accused did not receive full and fair consideration of his federal constitutional and statutory claims, a § 2255 petitioner may not relitigate issues that were adjudicated at his original trial and on direct appeal. (internal footnotes omitted); see also Davis, supra, 417 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298 (intervening change in the law); English v. United States, 998 F.2d 609, 613 (8th Cir.1993) (intervening change in the law or newly-discovered evidence); Morgan v. United States, 438 F.2d 291, 292-93 (5th Cir.1971) (newly-discovered evidence). Also instructive is case law interpreting the availability of federal habeas relief from state convictions. As the Supreme Court summarized in Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992): Unless a habeas petitioner shows cause and prejudice, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), a court may not reach the merits of: (a) successive claims that raise grounds identical to grounds heard and decided on the merits in a previous petition, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); (b) new claims, not previously raised, which constitute an abuse of the writ, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991); or (c) procedurally defaulted claims in which the petitioner failed to follow applicable state procedural rules in raising the claims, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 [106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397] (1986). These cases are premised on our concerns for the finality of state judgments of conviction and the significant costs of federal habeas review. McCleskey, supra, at 490-491, 111 S.Ct. 1454; see, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-128, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Id. at 338, 112 S.Ct. 2514. The limitation on successive, abusive or defaulted claims is subject, however, to a narrow fundamental miscarriage of justice exception that allows consideration of otherwise barred constitutional claims if they are coupled with a claim of actual innocence. See id. at 339, 112 S.Ct. 2514; Kuhlmann, supra, 477 U.S. at 452, 106 S.Ct. 2616; Murray, supra, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639; Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). [21] In Sawyer, the Court established the evidentiary standard required to meet this exception as requiring the petitioner to show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have convicted the defendant, or, as in that case, sentenced the petitioner to death. See 505 U.S. at 336, 112 S.Ct. 2514. More recently, in Schlup, supra, recognizing that habeas corpus is an equitable inquiry that provides a remedy when required by the ends of justice, see 513 U.S. at 319, 115 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963)), the Court relaxed the Sawyer test for avoiding a procedural bar to a previously considered constitutional claim when it is augmented by a claim of actual innocence. [22] Balancing the state's interest in finality and judicial economy against the individual's interest in relitigating constitutional claims previously held meritless, the Court established that in order to avoid a procedural bar by coming within the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, a petitioner is required to show that a constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851 (quoting Carrier, supra, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639). The requisite probability is met by a showing that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence. Schlup, supra, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. This is a stronger showing than required to meet the prejudice prong under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (requiring a reasonable probability), but less than the clear and convincing standard that had originally been required by the Court in Sawyer, supra . See Schlup, supra, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. The standard is intended to be high enough to ensure[] that petitioner's claim is truly `extraordinary,' while still providing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a manifest injustice. Id. (quoting McCleskey, supra, 499 U.S. at 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454). [23] We have the same interest as the federal courts in the finality of judgments and the conservation of judicial resources. See Doepel, supra, 510 A.2d at 1045; Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985) (requiring a showing of cause and prejudice before a collateral attack will be considered where defendant has failed to raise available challenge on direct appeal). We do not, however, within a unitary court system, have the federalism concerns that cabin the scope of the federal courts' consideration of state claims. We also do not, unlike the federal courts, have legislative restrictions on our authority to hear or rehear habeas petitions. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b) and 2255 (1998) (imposing limitations on consideration of initial, second and successive habeas petitions, see supra note 23), with D.C.Code § 23-110(e) (The court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.). Although we are not confronted with the quintessential miscarriage of justice, execution of one who is innocent, see Schlup, supra, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851, appellants come before us convicted of the most serious offense in our jurisdiction, first-degree murder, and in a particularly heinous racial context. Cf. Burks, supra, 55 F.3d at 717, (applying Schlup standard to non-capital case); Cornell v. Nix, 119 F.3d 1329, 1334 (8th Cir.1997) (applying Herrera standard to non-capital case). Finally, in light of the limitation on federal review of judgments of conviction of prisoners sentenced by Superior Court unless § 23-110 relief is deemed to be inadequate or ineffective, see D.C.Code § 23-110(g) (1996), [24] we should construe the scope of collateral relief in our courts to be adequate and effective, that is, at a minimum coextensive with the right to habeas relief in the federal courts. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977); Garris v. Lindsay, 254 U.S.App. D.C. 13, 18, 794 F.2d 722, 727 (1986); Perkins, supra note 24, 881 F.Supp. at 59. Recognizing the concerns that underlie restrictions on collateral attacks, yet cognizant also of the need to maintain § 23-110 relief available as a procedural vehicle for the very purpose of enabl[ing] convicted prisoners to escape the shackles of res judicata when constitutional rights have been violated, Kirk, supra, 510 A.2d at 503, I would hold that the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Schlup constitutes special circumstances under Doepel sufficient to permit a collateral attack under our law even if the collateral attack is premised on an issue previously raised beforeand decided bythis court. [25] The record before us supports, as a threshold matter, that appellants' case presents a prima facie case of special circumstances as thus defined: a claim of serious constitutional error, supplemented by a compelling claim of actual innocence. Both claims are supported by the presentation of new exculpatory evidence which, if believed, shows it is at least more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted Diamen, Sousa and Eastridge of first-degree murder. See Schlup, supra, 513 U.S. at 327, 115 S.Ct. 851. [26] Thus, if appellants meet their burden, they would come within the narrow special circumstances window recognized in Doepel so that the constitutional claims in their current § 23-110 motion should be addressed even though they already were considered and decided on direct appeal. The issue is not to be decided by us at this juncture; it is a matter to be addressed by the trial court in the first instance after an evidentiary hearing which, for the reasons described in the following section, is necessary for a proper evaluation of the probative value of the newly proffered evidence, in the context of the government's overall case at trial.