Opinion ID: 1223914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State v. Hughes

Text: Before our adoption of the Rules of Evidence, preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of other act evidence were resolved under the following standard: the proof both as to the commission of another crime and its commission by the defendant, must be by `substantial evidence sufficient to take the case to a jury.' Hughes, 102 Ariz. at 123, 426 P.2d at 391 (quoting State v. Hyde, 234 Mo. 200, 136 S.W. 316, 331 (1911)). The meaning of this language remains uncertain over three decades later. The trial judge in the present case applied a standard closer to the preponderance standard. Ante, at 581, 944 P.2d at 1195. The defendant argued that the Hughes standard requires only enough evidence of the prior bad act or wrong to survive a directed verdict. Id. A directed verdict requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence but substantially less than clear and convincing evidence. A motion for directed verdict should be granted if the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense. Orme School v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). In adopting the clear and convincing standard for the admission of other act evidence, the majority purports to adopt and clarify the Hughes standard. But Hughes provides as follows: While in some jurisdictions it has been held that evidence of a prior crime must be such that the jury would believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed it, the overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions is that proof of a prior purported crime, and the defendant's connection with it, must be clear, or clear and convincing, or that there must be substantial proof that the other crime has been committed by the defendant. Regardless of whether the words clear, clear and convincing or substantial proof are used, the test appears to be that the proof both as to the commission of another crime and its commission by the defendant, must be by substantial evidence sufficient to take the case to a jury. 102 Ariz. at 122-23, 426 P.2d at 390-91 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Two critical admissibility issues are addressed in Hughes. First, Hughes speaks in terms of whether a jury could conclude that the other act was committed and that it was committed by the defendant. Hughes does not require the judge to conclude that the crime was committed and that it was committed by the defendant. Hughes does not support the majority's position that  the judge [must] find the conditional fact by `substantial evidence sufficient to take the case to a jury.' Ante, at 582, 940 P.2d at 1196 (emphasis added). The judge decides only whether a jury could find that the defendant committed the other act. Second, Hughes does not adopt the clear and convincing standard. It appears to adopt the substantial evidence standard. No case cited by the majority supports the proposition that Hughes requires clear and convincing evidence. See State v. Valles, 162 Ariz. 1, 5, 780 P.2d 1049, 1053 (1989); State v. McGann, 132 Ariz. 296, 298, 645 P.2d 811, 813 (1982); State v. Woods, 121 Ariz. 187, 190, 589 P.2d 430, 433 (1979); State ex rel. LaSota v. Corcoran, 119 Ariz. 573, 576, 583 P.2d 229, 232 (1978). In fact, no such case exists. Every case in which this court has determined admissibility under Hughes has required substantial evidence sufficient to take the case to a jury. See e.g., State v. Marahrens, 114 Ariz. 304, 307, 560 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1977); State v. Mitchell, 112 Ariz. 592, 594, 545 P.2d 49, 51 (1976). If we are to assume that Hughes means what it says, the defendant in the present case is correct in asserting that Hughes requires only enough evidence to defeat a motion for directed verdict. But whatever Hughes means, it addressed the admissibility of other act evidence under the common law. Arizona adopted the Rules of Evidence in 1977. The Rules control over any conflict between them and our prior cases. State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 51 n. 2, 859 P.2d 156, 161 n. 2 (1993). Thus, our focus should be on the admission of other act evidence under the Arizona Rules of Evidence.