Opinion ID: 1855982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delay Claim

Text: Sardeson cites as his first assignment of error the district court's refusal to dismiss both informations for excessive delay. Sardeson was arrested on March 12, 1987; bail was set and subsequently reduced, but Sardeson nevertheless remained incarcerated thereafter. He was initially charged with forgery; the charge of burglary was brought on June 19, 1987. On September 23, 1987, the State dismissed the forgery charges; possession of stolen property was charged on October 9, 1987. On November 23, 1987, Sardeson, through his attorney, expressly waived his right to a speedy trial in both cases and requested continuance of both to the January 18, 1988, jury term. The district court accepted this waiver, granted the requested continuance, and ordered the two cases consolidated for trial. Sardeson at no time thereafter questioned the validity of this waiver nor sought to withdraw it but, on December 21, 1987, filed motions to dismiss both cases, arguing, in relevant part, that the State, by actively trying to keep him in custody, violated his rights to a speedy trial and reasonable bail guaranteed him by the sixth and eighth amendments to the U.S. Constitution and article I, §§ 9 and 11, of the Nebraska Constitution. Sardeson now characterizes his earlier abandonment of a timely disposition of the charges against him as a waiver only of his statutory right to a speedy trial, preserving his rights pursuant to constitutional guarantees. This State's statutory speedy trial guarantee is found at Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 29-1207 to 29-1209 (Reissue 1985). Section 29-1207 provides in relevant part: (1) Every person indicted or informed against for any offense shall be brought to trial within six months, and such time shall be computed as provided in this section. (2) Such six-month period shall commence to run from the date the indictment is returned or the information filed. This court has noted that [t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial and the statutory implementation of that right under section 29-1207, R.R.S. 1943 ... exist independently of each other.... Any unreasonable delay occurring prior to the filing of an information will be considered ... in determining whether or not a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial. (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Gingrich, 211 Neb. 786, 789, 320 N.W.2d 445, 447 (1982) (quoting State v. Costello, 199 Neb. 43, 256 N.W.2d 97 (1977)). See, also, State v. Lafler, 225 Neb. 362, 405 N.W.2d 576 (1987). Clearly, the theoretical distinction between statutory and constitutional rights to speedy trial is fully supported in this state's case law. It therefore seems theoretically possible for a criminal defendant to waive statutory speedy trial rights while preserving rights under constitutional speedy trial guarantees. Assuming for the purposes of analysis, but not deciding, that Sardeson's unlimited waiver of a speedy trial somehow nonetheless preserved his constitutional guarantees, the question becomes whether the time elapsing between Sardeson's arrest and filing of the informations, a period of just over 3 months in the burglary case and just under 7 months in the possessing stolen property case, impermissibly infringed upon Sardeson's constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The cases before us grew out of investigative efforts following the burglary of the Hubertus home on March 9, 1987. Pursuant to warrant, searches were conducted in Eagle and Lincoln on March 12, 1987, and Sardeson was arrested later that same day. Lincoln Police Sgt. Charles Hennessey testified that [t]here was a lot of follow-up work that was done afterwards, although in his estimation the investigation was probably pretty well wrapped up at the end of the month. As Sardeson's attorney noted in arguing another matter to the trial court, the police were investigating a number of crimes that don't have anything to do with the two Informations that we're dealing with. There were a couple of other burglaries, there was a robbery and some other things that were being investigated, forgeries.... The records in the two cases now under consideration establish that police investigations subsequent to Sardeson's arrest included attempts, ultimately successful, to locate stolen property in the hands of an innocent purchaser, and to locate the vehicle used in the burglary, which had been traded shortly thereafter to a used car dealer. Sardeson complains that his pretrial incarceration interfered with his ability to assist in the preparation of his defense by preventing him from locating potential alibi witnesses. At the hearing on his pretrial motion to dismiss, Sardeson testified: I was hired at Snyder's Industries and was supposed to start on the 12th, and I couldn't get no witnesses together for that to prove that I was hired there. Q. All right. When were you at Snyder Industries? What date? [Sardeson] On the 9th. Q. Of March? [Sardeson] Yes. Q. Of 1987? [Sardeson] Yes. Q. And do you know who you talked to there? [Sardeson] I talked to two people. One wasI guess he's the guy that hires, and then one was a foreman that showed me around. Q. But you don't know what their names were? [Sardeson] It's been a while. I don't remember what Q. All right. Had you been on bail, could you have gone out there? [Sardeson] Yes. Q. Were you anywhere else on March 9th? [Sardeson] Yes. I was at Welfare. I was receiving food stamps because I was not working at the time, and then I had toin order to receive food stamps, you have to report to a job service downstairs, which you look through a viewer and they schedule you to, you know, go for a job interview. Q. Did you see people there at the Department of Social Services or Welfare? [Sardeson] Yes, I did. Q. And do you know what their names were? [Sardeson] No, I don't. Sardeson subpoenaed Paul Kearney, operations administrator and custodian of records with the Department of Social Services, who testified that records indicated that someone named Pat Sardeson had visited that office sometime on March 9, 1987. As this court noted in State v. Brown, 214 Neb. 665, 670-71, 335 N.W.2d 542, 546 (1983), concerning constitutional guarantees of the right to a speedy trial, [ Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)] recites a balancing test which requires courts to approach each case on an ad hoc basis. This balancing test involves four factors bearing upon questions of speedy trial, namely, Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. ... As further stated in Barker ... We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. (Citations omitted.) See, also, State v. Gingrich, 211 Neb. 786, 320 N.W.2d 445 (1982). Under the provisions of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, the right to a speedy trial is relative and depends upon circumstances; it is not denied where the delay is satisfactorily explained by the government and the defendant was brought to trial as soon as was reasonably possible. State v. McNitt, 216 Neb. 837, 346 N.W.2d 259 (1984) (construing U.S. Const. amend. VI and Neb. Const. art. I, § 13). Moreover, even unexplained delay between arrest and arraignment or preliminary hearing does not demonstrate a violation of the right of speedy trial in the absence of prejudice. SapaNajin v. Johnson, 219 Neb. 40, 41-42, 360 N.W. 2d 500, 501 (1985), citing State v. Ellis, 184 Neb. 523, 169 N.W.2d 267 (1969), which, predating this State's speedy trial statute, considered the question solely in the context of constitutional guarantees. In the cases now before us, the delays complained of were neither excessive under the circumstances, unexplained, nor prejudicial. The record establishes that at least two police agencies were involved in investigating many crimes other than those charged in these cases. Given the complexity of these investigations, exploring as they did apparent forgery, burglary, and weapons crimes, the duration of the delay which resulted is clearly not so great as to constitute an infringement of Sardeson's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Moreover, the delay complained of clearly did not prejudice Sardeson in the preparation of his case. Sardeson identified the two persons he wished to contact at his prospective employer's with sufficient particularity that it would have been a simple matter to locate and interview them. Similarly, having subpoenaed the Department of Social Services records officer, it would have been a simple matter to research the records within that officer's control to discover precisely to whom Sardeson had spoken, or at least likely had spoken to, and to conduct appropriate discovery regarding the time of Sardeson's visit. Absent any showing that preindictment delay caused substantial prejudice to Sardeson's right to a fair trial or that it was an intentional device to gain a tactical advantage over him, the delay did not violate Sardeson's fifth or sixth amendment rights. United States v. Hardrich, 707 F.2d 992 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 991, 104 S.Ct. 481, 78 L.Ed.2d 679. Sardeson's first assignment of error thus is without merit.