Opinion ID: 559043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues Raised on McGinley's Appeal

Text: 42 McGinley seeks reversal of the order denying her motion for dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the evidence shows outrageous government conduct in obtaining the evidence against her. She argues that the Government is responsible for Arman's conduct because he was motivated by his desire to get a favorable plea bargain. McGinley contends that Arman would not have induced her to traffic in cocaine had it not been for his desire to cooperate with the Government. She maintains that Arman's conduct in engaging in sexual activity with her and in introducing her to crack cocaine was outrageous. 43 The dismissal of an indictment because of outrageous government conduct may be predicated on alternative grounds: a violation of due process or the court's supervisory powers. United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 811 (9th Cir.1989). We review de novo a denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on due process grounds. United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 107 S.Ct. 233, 93 L.Ed.2d 159 (1986). A denial based on a refusal to exercise the court's supervisory power is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1465 n. 2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898, 108 S.Ct. 233, 98 L.Ed.2d 192 (1987). Factual findings upon which the decision was based are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir.1987). 44 The argument that an indictment must be dismissed because of outrageous government conduct is derived from a comment by the Supreme Court in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). In Russell, the Court stated that there may be situations in which the conduct of law enforcement officials is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the Government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction. Id. at 431-32, 93 S.Ct. at 1642-43. We have also recognized that the court may exercise its inherent, supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment because of outrageous government conduct. United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1465 n. 2. See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1975) (Powell, J. concurring). 45 A claim of outrageous government conduct differs from the defense of entrapment. The issue of entrapment focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 429, 93 S.Ct. at 1641. The concept of outrageous government conduct focuses on the Government's actions. An indictment may be set aside because of outrageous government conduct whether or not the defendant was predisposed to engage in criminal activity. United States v. Gonzalez, 539 F.2d 1238, 1239-40 (9th Cir.1976). 46 To prevent the objective standard used in outrageous conduct analysis from swallowing the subjective test used in entrapment, 47 a successful due process defense [based on outrageous government conduct] must be predicated on intolerable government conduct which goes beyond that necessary to sustain an entrapment defense.... While the lines between the objective test of entrapment favored by a minority of the Justices and the due process defense accepted by a majority of the Justices are indeed hazy, the majority of the Court has manifestly reserved for the constitutional defense only the most intolerable government conduct. 48 United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 607-8 (3rd Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106, 102 S.Ct. 2906, 73 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1982)). Thus, the defense applies only to conduct which is so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice. United States v. O'Connor, 737 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 965, 97 S.Ct. 1644, 52 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977))), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1218, 105 S.Ct. 1198, 84 L.Ed.2d 343 (1985). 49 We must first determine whether Arman was an agent of the Government at the time of the allegedly outrageous conduct. If he was not, then the defense is unavailable. 50 McGinley argues that Arman became a government agent when he began cooperating with the Government by testifying before a grand jury in April of 1988. The record does not support this argument. The record shows that Arman first became a government agent on March 7, 1989. On that date, Arman told Special Agents Jones and Couchman that he could set up a narcotics transaction. Prior to March 7, 1989, Arman was not involved in assisting the Government in gathering evidence against persons engaged in distributing controlled substances. 51 In United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.1986), we held that a person does not become a government agent until his activities are under the direction and supervision of law enforcement officers. Id. at 807. No agency relationship is created simply because the informant expects to be rewarded for his conduct. Id. 52 The fact that a person testified before a grand jury does not automatically make him or her a government agent. Every person who has information that is relevant to a grand jury investigation must testify unless he or she is protected by a constitutional privilege. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2660, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (the public ... has a right to every man's evidence) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950)). The fact that Arman may have been motivated to testify before a grand jury in April, 1988, to gain a reduction in charges pending against him did not create an ongoing agency relationship. 53 In United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir.1987) we were also presented with the issue of when an informant's activities should be attributed to the Government. In Simpson, the FBI employed Miller, a known prostitute, to befriend Simpson and inform on his activities. Miller and a friend posed as stranded travelers at LAX and enticed Simpson into giving them a ride into town. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1464. Shortly, thereafter Miller and Simpson engaged in sexual activity. The FBI became aware of the conduct, but continued to use Miller as an informant. Miller introduced Simpson to undercover FBI agents, who said they wanted to purchase heroin. After selling heroin to the FBI agents, Simpson was arrested. Id. at 1464. 54 In rejecting a claim of outrageous government conduct, we held that any outrage at Miller's deportment must be tempered by the fact that it is not as readily attributable to the Government as the conduct held to violate due process in previous cases. Id. at 1467. We noted that Miller had not been encouraged by the FBI to use sex. In fact, she had been told not to become sexually involved with Simpson. Id. We held the Government's passive tolerance here of a private informant's questionable conduct to be less egregious than the conscious direction by government agents typically present in outrageous conduct challenges. Id. at 1468. We concluded in Simpson 55 that on the unique facts before us, taking into account both our reluctance to conclude that Miller's actions were so out of step with universal contemporary sexual norms that they shocked the conscience and the FBI's diminished culpability for Miller's sexual activity, the Government's conduct was not so outrageous as to bar prosecution of the defendants. 56 Id. In the matter sub judice, Arman's sexual activities with McGinley and their joint use of cocaine occurred before he was commissioned by the Government to assist in gathering evidence against narcotics traffickers. Moreover, the officers were not aware of Arman's alleged conduct until after he became a government agent. 57 Arman's testimony before the grand jury was unrelated to his engagement on March 7, 1989, to serve as a government agent in investigating the activities of narcotics dealers. The Government did not direct or control Arman's conduct during the time in which he engaged in sexual activities with McGinley or introduced her to crack cocaine. The Government is not responsible for Arman's actions prior to March 7, 1989. No violation of due process has been demonstrated. Because Arman was not a government agent at the time of the allegedly outrageous conduct, there is no occasion for us to exercise our supervisory powers. 58 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.