Opinion ID: 844274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony of Lavette Gilmore

Text: Defendant complains the trial court made several errors in regard to the testimony of Lavette Gilmore, the hair stylist who identified defendant as having been in the doughnut shop shortly before the murder. We find no prejudicial error.
During direct examination, after Gilmore described the man she saw sitting alone at one of the doughnut shop tables, the prosecutor asked what drew her attention to this person. She responded that he gave her a funny feeling and his sitting there [j]ust didn't feel right. Defense counsel asked the court to strike the phrase funny feeling because Gilmore's suspicions or feelings were not relevant. The court overruled the objection and noted that Gilmore's remark explain[ed] why she paid attention to the man in the shop. Gilmore also testified, without objection, that defendant's appearance drew her suspicion because [h]e looked like he shouldn't have been there. He looked rugged. He was thin, needed a haircut, and didn't look clean at all. When the prosecutor asked Gilmore to identify defendant, in court, as the man she saw in the doughnut shop, she responded, He looks so clean and nice now and healthy. She could not say he was the same person. The prosecutor then questioned Gilmore about the 1993 photographic lineup in which she identified defendant's profile photo. Asked how she expressed her identification to the officer, Gilmore replied that she remembered the man's eyes, nose, cap, facial hair, and the way he tried to hide his face. She explained that she focused her attention on the man in the shop because she had a lot of money in [her] back pocket from having worked a full day at the salon. Defense counsel interrupted, objecting to testimony about money in Gilmore's pocket and her inchoate fears. The court responded by directing the prosecutor to ask his next question. Defense counsel did not request a ruling on his objection or move to strike Gilmore's testimony as nonresponsive. Defendant now claims the court erred in failing to strike Gilmore's testimony sua sponte because it was nonresponsive and more prejudicial than probative. Specifically, defendant contends the testimony asked the jury to infer that he had a predisposition to commit robbery. He also argues Gilmore's testimony was inadmissible as a lay opinion about whether the man she saw in the doughnut shop intended to commit a robbery. (16) Defendant forfeited these claims by failing to obtain a ruling on his objection and failing to move that Gilmore's testimony be stricken. `In the absence of an erroneous ruling on an objection or request that a nonresponsive answer be stricken and the jury instructed to disregard it, there is no error.' ( People v. Harris [(1989)] 47 Cal.3d [1047,] 1089 [255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619].) ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1214 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254].) Defense counsel's vague objection to what he characterized as Gilmore's inchoate fears was not sufficient to preserve a claim of error for appeal. A nonresponsive answer is properly the subject of a motion to strike (Evid. Code, § 766), not an objection. ( People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 611, fn. 11 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292].) (17) In any event, defendant's claims fail on the merits. Gilmore did not express an opinion about whether the man was a potential robber. She gave no character evidence about defendant's propensity to act in a particular way. She merely described her state of mind upon seeing a rugged-looking man sitting alone in the shop. The testimony was relevant to show that she paid particular attention to the man and explain why she did so. As to defendant's challenge under Evidence Code section 352, the evidence was not unduly prejudicial, meaning it did not `uniquely tend[] to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual' while having little bearing on disputed issues. ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) `In applying section 352, prejudicial is not synonymous with damaging.' [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) The trial court did not err in permitting the testimony.
After she identified defendant's profile in August 1993 from a photographic lineup, Gilmore was asked to attend a live lineup that October. At trial, Gilmore explained that she did not identify defendant in the live lineup, even though she recognized him among the suspects, because she was frightened. Because his appearance had changed so much by the time of trial, she also could not identify defendant in court as the man she saw in the doughnut shop. During Gilmore's direct examination, the prosecutor sought to reconstruct the live lineup by showing her photographs of that lineup. Defense counsel objected to the questioning because Gilmore did not identify defendant at the live lineup. When pressed to state the legal grounds for his objection, defense counsel argued that, given the passage of time, there was no foundation Gilmore had the ability to make an in-court identification from photographs of the lineup. The court overruled the objection, noting that counsel could explore the subject on cross-examination. When questioning resumed, the prosecutor showed Gilmore three photographs from the live lineup. She selected defendant's photograph and said it depicted the person she had recognized at the lineup but failed to identify. Defense counsel interrupted and asked that the record reflect that the exhibit shown to Gilmore also contained a large single photograph of defendant, mounted below two pictures of the live lineup. He raised no objection to use of the exhibit, however. (18) On appeal, defendant claims the ruling permitting this line of questioning abridged various constitutional rights, including his right to counsel. No constitutional violation occurred. Defendant was represented by counsel when the live lineup was conducted and, of course, at trial. Moreover, there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a photographic lineup. ( United States v. Ash (1973) 413 U.S. 300, 321 [37 L.Ed.2d 619, 93 S.Ct. 2568].) (19) Defendant also argues for the first time in his reply brief that the identification procedure violated due process because the photographic exhibit shown to Gilmore was overly suggestive. The exhibit in question displayed two pictures of the live lineup and a third, of the same size, showing only defendant's head and shoulders. Because counsel did not object or seek to prevent questioning on this exhibit on the ground that it was unduly suggestive, this claim is forfeited on appeal. In any event, defendant has not established error. [F]or a witness identification procedure to violate the due process clauses, the state must, at the threshold, improperly suggest something to the witness  i.e., it must, wittingly or unwittingly, initiate an unduly suggestive procedure. ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 413 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].) Defendant's complaint that the exhibit was unduly suggestive misses the point because the exhibit was not used as part of a witness identification procedure. The prosecutor did not use the challenged exhibit to obtain an identification from Gilmore. He did not ask her to identify which picture depicted the man she saw in the doughnut shop. Rather, the prosecutor asked Gilmore whether the photos showed the lineup she attended. He then asked her to point out the man she had recognized but declined to identify. For this purpose, it did not matter whether the exhibit displayed defendant prominently. The witness testified she had recognized defendant when she saw him in person. Her testimony reflected that, at trial, she remained able to identify the same man. There is no indication that her trial testimony was influenced by the additional photo of defendant mounted on the exhibit.
(20) `[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby, to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' ( Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 106 S.Ct. 1431] ..., quoting Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318 [39 L.Ed.2d 347, 94 S.Ct. 1105].) However, not every restriction on a defendant's desired method of cross-examination is a constitutional violation. Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance. [Citations.] California law is in accord. [Citation.] Thus, unless the defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced `a significantly different impression of [the witnesses'] credibility' ( Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680), the trial court's exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment. [Citation.] ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 946 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183], disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.) Defendant complains the court improperly restricted his cross-examination of Gilmore by sustaining objections to three areas of questioning. There was no error. Defense counsel began his cross-examination of Gilmore by challenging her intentional identification of the wrong person at the live lineup. Counsel asked, without objection, What if that man was convicted and was put in the gas chamber? Gilmore responded that she wasn't thinking like that at the time. After further probing, counsel asked whether Gilmore had put down something that wasn't true in something as crucial as a capital murder case. The court sustained the prosecutor's objection that the question assumed Gilmore knew the proceedings would be prosecuted as a capital case. This objection was well taken. Defendant was not even arraigned on the final charges until November 19, 1993, a month after the live lineup. Gilmore testified she knew someone had been murdered, but there is no support for defendant's overly broad assertion that it is common knowledge that convicted murderers are subject to the death penalty in California. [9] Indeed, if there were such common knowledge, the jurors would have held it too, and presumably could have weighed that factor in assessing Gilmore's credibility. Defense counsel's point, although not properly presented, would nonetheless have been made. Next, defendant challenges rulings sustaining two objections to argumentative questions. In probing Gilmore about her intentional misidentification at the live lineup, defense counsel asked how she would have felt if she had been the person who was wrongly identified. The trial court sustained an objection to the question as argumentative. This ruling was proper. Gilmore's state of mind about how she would have felt to be misidentified was not relevant to any disputed issue in the trial or to her credibility as a witness. The question was also cumulative, because Gilmore was asked many questions about the circumstances surrounding the misidentification and her lack of candor in making it. Later, defense counsel questioned Gilmore about the description she gave to Officer Nick Pepper at the crime scene. Counsel read a description and asked if Gilmore recalled describing the man in the doughnut shop as clean-shaven. She responded, No. He wasn't no clean-shaved person [ sic ]. Defense counsel prefaced his next question with the statement, Yeah, I know, all these pictures you have looked at , and the prosecutor interrupted to object. (21) The trial court properly sustained the objection because counsel's statement was clearly argumentative. An argumentative question is a speech to the jury masquerading as a question. The questioner is not seeking to elicit relevant testimony. Often it is apparent that the questioner does not even expect an answer. ( People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 384 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 621, 133 P.3d 534].) Counsel was not asking a question; he was telling the jury his own explanation for why Gilmore's description had changed. The court's rulings sustaining objections to argumentative questions did not infringe defendant's constitutional rights. `[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.' [Citation.] ( Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 679.)