Opinion ID: 1265119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pre-termination hearing

Text: The first issue presented by this case is whether Mr. Wirt was entitled to a pre-termination hearing before the Board of Education under W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8. In essence, the ALJ concluded Mr. Wirt was entitled to a pre-termination hearing. Furthermore, the ALJ determined Mr. Wirt not only was denied a proper hearing, but he also was denied proper notice containing sufficient information for him to defend himself against the allegations presented to the Board of Education. For the reasons stated below, we agree, and we hold due process generally requires some form of a pre-termination hearing under W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8. W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8, establishes the procedure by which a Board of Education may suspend or dismiss a school employee, and it covers the right of an employee to appeal such a decision. This statute was amended in 1985 and 1990. Prior to 1985, W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8 (1969), in relevant part, explicitly provided an employee is entitled to written charges and shall be given an opportunity to be heard by the board upon not less than ten days' written notice, which charges and notice shall be served upon the employee within five days of the presentation of the charges to the board. In 1985, the legislature removed from the statute an employee's right to be heard by the board[.] The statute again was amended in 1990, but the legislature did not reinstate this language. [5] The 1990 version of the statute applies to this case. The 1990 version of W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8, provides, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, a board may suspend or dismiss any person in its employment at any time for: Immorality.... The charges shall be stated in writing served upon the employee within two days of presentation of said charges to the board. The employee so affected shall be given an opportunity, within five days of receiving such written notice, to request, in writing, a level four hearing and appeals pursuant to provisions of article twenty-nine [§ 18-29-1 et seq.] chapter eighteen of the code of West Virginia, one thousand nine hundred thirty-one, as amended[.] Thus, in the current version of W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8, the statute is silent as to whether an employee has a right to receive notice and have a hearing prior to dismissal by the Board of Education. Although the specific language in the statute was removed, this Court, nevertheless, is required to protect any due process rights employees may have who are dismissed under the statute. In determining employees' due process rights, the first inquiry by this Court must be whether the employees have property or liberty interests in their employment protected by Section 10 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In making this determination in the present case, it is helpful to examine W.Va.Code, 18A-2-6 (1989). This statute states, in relevant part, [a]fter three years of acceptable employment, each service personnel employee who enters into a new contract of employment with the board shall be granted continuing contract status.... The continuing contract ... shall remain in full force and effect ... unless and until terminated with written notice, stating cause or causes[.] [6] In Syllabus Point 4 of Bonnell v. Carr, 170 W.Va. 493, 294 S.E.2d 910 (1982), we determined: The Legislature by enacting W.Va. Code, 18A-2-6 (1973), which gives auxiliary and service personnel continuing contract status after three years of acceptable employment and providing that their employment could be terminated upon cause intended to extend a tenure status to such employees. (Emphasis added). [7] In other words, a person who has a continuing contract status is a tenured employee. In the present case, Mr. Wirt worked for the Board of Education from 1977 until his termination, and the ALJ found he was a tenured employee. There can be little doubt tenured employees have property and liberty interests in their employment. In State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 162 W.Va. 431, 444, 249 S.E.2d 919, 926 (1978), we stated, with regard to teachers, that tenure is both a substantial right and a valuable property interest. We find such a right and an interest is equally applicable to other school employees whom the legislature has granted tenured status. See also Duruttya v. Bd. of Educ., 181 W.Va. 203, 205, 382 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1989) (a tenured teacher was entitled to procedural safeguards). [8] If employees have property and liberty interests in their employment, the next determination is what due process protection the employees must be afforded. In Syllabus Point 4 of McLendon, we said: `The extent of due process protection affordable for a property interest requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.' Syllabus Point 5, Waite v. Civil Service Commission, [161] W.Va. [154], 241 S.E.2d 164 (1977). See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976); Syllabus Point 5, Major v. DeFrench, 169 W.Va. 241, 286 S.E.2d 688 (1982). In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed substantially the same factors with regard to the right of a pre-termination hearing. In the case, two employees, a security guard and a bus mechanic, were terminated by the Cleveland Board of Education without pre-termination hearings. Although under the law of Ohio employees were provided a full post-termination hearing, the employees challenged their termination for violating their due process rights. After concluding the employees had a property interest in their jobs, the Supreme Court said some opportunity for the employee to present his side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching an accurate decision. Dismissals for cause will often involve factual disputes. 470 U.S. at 543, 105 S.Ct. at 1494, 84 L.Ed.2d at 504. (Citation omitted). As to the government's interest in immediately terminating the employees, the Supreme Court stated: [A]ffording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable delays. Furthermore, the employer shares the employee's interest in avoiding disruption and erroneous decisions; and until the matter is settled, the employer would continue to receive the benefit of the employee's labors. It is preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a new one. A governmental employer also has an interest in keeping citizens usefully employed rather than taking the possibly erroneous and counterproductive step of forcing its employees onto the welfare rolls. 470 U.S. at 544, 105 S.Ct. at 1494-95, 84 L.Ed.2d at 505. After determining due process required a pre-termination hearing in the case before it, the Supreme Court explicitly said such a hearing need not be a full adversarial evidentiary hearing, but [i]t should be an initial check against mistaken decisionsessentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. 470 U.S. at 545-46, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d at 506. (Citation omitted). Specifically, the Supreme Court said a tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d at 506. The Supreme Court reasoned [t]o require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d at 506. We agree with the Supreme Court's analysis in Loudermill. Therefore, we hold under W.Va.Code, 18A-2-8, due process requires a pre-termination hearing of a tenured employee under W.Va.Code, 18A-2-6. It is not necessary for a pre-termination hearing to be a full adversarial evidentiary hearing; however, an employee is entitled to a written notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to respond prior to a Board of Education's decision to terminate the employee. If an employee presents a danger to students or others at work and there is no reasonable way to abate the danger, a pre-termination hearing is not required. [9] See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 n. 10, 105 S.Ct. at 1495 n. 10, 84 L.Ed.2d at 505 n. 10. [10] Given that W.Va. Code, 18A-2-8, requires the Board of Education to serve a written copy of the charges within two days of them being presented, we find it is not an unreasonable governmental burden to require written notice of the charges, instead of oral notice, prior to them being presented to the Board of Education. Applying the preceding principles to the present case, we determine Mr. Wirt was denied due process as the result of not being provided adequate written notice of the charges against him and an explanation of the evidence prior to the Board of Education's meeting. Thus, even though the Board of Education asserts Mr. Wirt and his counsel appeared before it, without sufficient notice of the charges against him, his opportunity to address the Board was meaningless. [11] We find it unnecessary to address Mr. Wirt's remedy for the due process violations because the issue is moot as the result of our conclusion in Section III, infra, that the ALJ's decision to reinstate Mr. Wirt is not clearly erroneous.