Opinion ID: 447842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Cross-Appeal of the Abeshouses

Text: 20 In their cross-appeal, Tevin & Matthew Abeshouse seek to overturn the jury's failure to find either Calio or Feist liable for copyright infringement. First, the Abeshouses claim that the district court erred in refusing to grant them summary judgment on the issue of the liability of Calio and Feist. However, the district judge's denial of the Abeshouses' motion was based upon the court's acceptance and approval of a recommended ruling issued by Magistrate F. Owen Eagan. Since appellees-cross-appellants failed to file specific, written objections to this recommendation, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), they must be deemed to have waived their right to challenge the court's ruling on appeal. See McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir.1983). 21 Appellees-cross-appellants also assign error in the district court's denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the liability of Calio and Feist. The district court's ruling was grounded exclusively upon appellees' failure to have earlier moved in timely fashion for a directed verdict. The court's insistence upon adherence to this procedural requirement was fully in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). Although in the interest of justice this court has mitigated the harshness of this default rule on occasions where it operated to deprive a deserving litigant of any form of relief, Oliveras v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 431 F.2d 814, 817 (2d Cir.1970); see Sojak v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 590 F.2d 53, 54-55 (2d Cir.1978), we decline to do so here, where appellees have hardly been left without compensation for their injury. We therefore affirm the district court's refusal to grant appellees judgment n.o.v. on this issue. We also find that the district court acted within its discretion in denying appellees' motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) that the judgment be altered or amended with respect to the liability of Calio and Feist. A Rule 59(e) motion may not be granted where to do so would undermine the jury's fact-finding role and trample on the defendant's seventh amendment right to a jury trial. Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, 685 F.2d 729, 742 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 728, 74 L.Ed.2d 953 (1983); 6A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice p 59.12, at 59-288 (1983). 22 Finally, we find that the district court did not abuse the discretion given to it by 17 U.S.C. Sec. 505 when it refused to award attorney's fees against D & M. The court reasoned that D & M had acted at the direction of Ultragraphics, had made only a small profit from the infringement and had diligently pursued settlement. We cannot say that the court should not have been swayed by these considerations.