Opinion ID: 166426
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: real, substantial overbreadth

Text: 36 Both Faustin and the district court rely on speculation that a policy prohibiting all expression on all overpasses has an unconstitutional chilling effect because it could extend to prohibit any conversation on the overpass walkway, the distribution of literature on the walkway, signs facing away from the traffic below, and even vehicles traveling over an overpass adorned with letters, symbols, or bumper stickers. 37 Although we recognize that to some degree the conclusion that a speech restriction has a chilling effect on parties not before the court requires a bit of judicial extrapolation, in this case Faustin has presented no evidence and made no showing that Denver's policy has ever been applied to prohibit any expression on overpasses other than signs or banners facing motorists below or that Denver's policy has ever been so broadly interpreted by the public in a way that it has chilled any such speech. To the contrary, the only instances in the record of the policy's actual application relate to signs and banners — as applied to Faustin, as applied to an animal rights protestor, and in the only specific law enforcement testimony regarding specific past enforcement of the policy. 38 We are simply unsatisfied that a policy that has never been applied or threatened against anything other than signs or banners facing traffic below will have any realistic danger of chilling the expression of parties not before the court — at least not as to any expression that could not be legitimately restricted under the time, place, and manner analysis. Thus, Faustin has failed to show any realistic chilling effect. Absent any showing in this regard, Plaintiff cannot prevail at summary judgment and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we reverse the district court and grant summary judgment on this point in Denver's favor.