Opinion ID: 2519658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: competing statutory provisions

Text: ¶ 10 To determine whether the loan agreement in this case is valid and binding on the LLC, it must first be determined whether this case is governed by section 48-2b-127(2), which makes certain kinds of documents binding on a limited liability company when executed by a manager, or section 48-2b-125(2)(b), which provides that a manager's authority to bind a limited liability company can be limited or eliminated by an operating agreement. ¶ 11 When two statutory provisions purport to cover the same subject, the legislature's intent must be considered in determining which provision applies. Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 331 (Utah 1997). To determine that intent, our rules of statutory construction provide that when two statutory provisions conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the more general provision. Hall v. State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958; see also Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ¶ 14, 993 P.2d 875. ¶ 12 In this case, the Utah Court of Appeals, affirming the trial court, concluded that section 48-2b-127(2) was more specific than section 48-2b-125(2)(b), and therefore took precedence over it. Taghipour, 2001 UT App 139 at ¶ 13, 26 P.3d 885. However, Taghipour contends that in determining which of the two provisions is more specific, the more restrictive clause is more specific because it is more limiting and would require authority in all situations. Accordingly, Taghipour contends that section 48-2b-125(2)(b) is the more restrictive, and consequently, the more specific, provision. ¶ 13 The question of which statute the legislature intended to apply in this case is determined by looking to the plain language of the statutes that purport to cover the same subject. Biddle, 1999 UT 110 at ¶ 14, 993 P.2d 875; Jensen, 944 P.2d at 331. Section 48-2b-125(2)(b) provides in relevant part: If the management of the limited liability company is vested in a manager or managers, any manager has authority to bind the limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-125(2)(b) (1998). In contrast, section 48-2b-127(2) provides: Instruments and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage, or disposition of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and binding upon the limited liability company if they are executed by one or more managers of a limited liability company having a manager or managers or if they are executed by one or more members of a limited liability company in which management has been retained by the members. Id. § 48-2b-127(2). ¶ 14 Section 48-2b-127(2) is the more specific statute because it applies only to documents explicitly enumerated in the statute, i.e., the section expressly addresses [i]nstruments and documents that provide for the acquisition, mortgage, or disposition of property of the limited liability company. Id.; see also Jensen, 944 P.2d at 332 (stating that statute was more specific because statute applied only to wrongful death actions arising out of medical malpractice); De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp., 913 P.2d 743, 747 (Utah 1996) ([S]ince the Governmental Immunity Act specifically addresses public improvements, it is the law most specific....). Thus, this section is tailored precisely to address the documents and instruments Jerez executed, e.g., the trust deed and trust deed note. For example, a trust deed is similar to a mortgage in that it secures an obligation relating to real property, Capital Assets Fin. Servs. v. Maxwell, 2000 UT 9, ¶ 11, 994 P.2d 201; First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Utah 1989), and a trust deed is a conveyance of title to real property, First Sec. Bank, N.A., 780 P.2d at 1256; see also Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-20 (2000), which is a disposition of property as contemplated by the statutory provision. Conversely, section 48-2b-125(2)(b) is more general because it addresses every situation in which a manager can bind a limited liability company. ¶ 15 Further, a statute is more specific according to the content of the statute, not according to how restrictive the statute is in application. Indeed, a specific statute may be either more or less restrictive than the statute more general in application, depending upon the intent of the legislature in enacting a more specific statute. ¶ 16 Moreover, if we were to hold that section 48-2b-125(2)(b) is the more specific provision, we would essentially render section 48-2b-127(2) superfluous and inoperative, Hall, 2001 UT 34 at ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958, because section 48-2b-127(2) would simply restate section 48-2b-125(2)(b) and would therefore be subsumed by section 48-2b-125(2)(b). Accordingly, the court of appeals correctly concluded that section 48-2b-127(2) is more specific, and therefore, the applicable statute in this case.