Opinion ID: 1624645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the voir dire process prejudiced the jury against neal and denied him a fair jury trial.

Text: ¶ 18. Neal argues that three errors occurred during the voir dire process that denied him the right to a fair and impartial jury.
¶ 19. The trial court asked the members of the venire to indicate if they had had any type of contact or relationship with Neal that would preclude them from being fair-minded jurors. Nine venire persons indicated that they could not be fair and impartial. The trial court informed each of the nine that he or she would not be required to answer any further questions. After voir dire, all nine were excluded from the jury. Neal argues that the judge's instruction of each of the nine venire persons not to answer any further questions communicated implicitly to the other panel members if they wanted to stay on the jury, they should be cautious in giving any response that might indicate pre-judgment. ¶ 20. The trial judge has a duty to ensure that a competent, fair and impartial jury is empaneled. Tighe v. Crosthwait, 665 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Miss. 1995). Mississippi Code Section 13-5-79 states that a juror shall be excluded ... if the court be of the opinion that he cannot try the case impartially, and the exclusion shall not be assignable for error. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-79 (Rev.2002). This Court will presume that the voir dire process used at trial was sufficient to ensure a fair and impartial jury. Ross v. State, 954 So.2d 968, 988 (Miss.2007). A defendant must present evidence indicating that the jury was not fair and impartial and show that prejudice resulted from the circuit court's handling of the voir dire in order to rebut that presumption. Id. (citing Manning v. State, 735 So.2d 323, 336 (Miss.1999)). A trial court's determination that the jury is impartial will not be overturned by this Court absent an abuse of discretion. This Court will treat with deference a venire person's assertions of impartiality. Id. (citing Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 336 (Miss.1997)). ¶ 21. Because Neal did not object to the trial court's statement during the voir dire process, this issue is procedurally barred. See Moody v. State, 841 So.2d 1067, 1075 (Miss.2003). Alternatively, this issue is without merit. Neal cites no authority for his proposition that the trial judge's actions were inappropriate, nor does he cite any evidence in the record that indicates the jury was prejudiced against him. Indeed, the record evinces that the trial court appropriately struck all nine venire persons due to their explicit inability to function as impartial members of the jury.
¶ 22. After the oath was administered to the jurors but before the trial began, Juror Ardis Lee Jones informed the judge that his eyesight was poor and that it had affected his ability to read. The following exchange occurred: The Court: Gentleman, I don't know what to do but to substitute an alternate juror. I asked the whole panel this morning if they could read or write. I didn't ask any of them if they couldn't see well enough to read. Mr. Barnett [counsel for Neal]: Of course, Your Honor, the instructions are going to be read to him. The Court: They will be. Mr. Barnett: By the Court, and I don't know what else he might need to read that may come into evidence but I believe he saidcan you see me? Juror Ardis Lee Jones: Yes sir, I have real bad eyesight. Mr. Barnett: I hope that he might could The Court: Let's just kind of see how the evidence flows. I don't know what the evidence is going to be other than the instructions of law. Mr. Champion [prosecuting attorney]: Your honor, we are going to have some photographs. We are going to have two videotapes that are pretty important. I don't know if he'll be able tothe juror can answer if whether or not he can see well enough. The Court: Let's start it out this way. Let's let him try and I am going to ask you at some point in time if you are seeing everything that you need to see like these videos. We have got two alternate jurors. You know, if you can't see, we'llI'll excuse you. ¶ 23. After the photographic evidence had been presented, the trial judge asked Juror Jones if he could see the photographs. Juror Jones answered in the affirmative. Immediately before giving the jury instructions, the trial judge again asked Juror Jones if he had been able to fully see all evidence presented throughout the trial. Juror Jones indicated that he had been able to see it. ¶ 24. Neal argues that he was prejudiced by the inclusion of Juror Jones on the jury, reasoning that once the juror is into the evidence, including hearing the video confession ... he will say he had no trouble seeing. However, the excerpt of the transcript above shows that Neal's attorney did not request the substitution of an alternate juror or object in any way to Juror Jones's presence on the jury. Because Neal did not object, this issue is procedurally barred. See Moody, 841 So.2d at 1075. Alternatively, we note that nothing in the record substantiates Neal's wholly speculative argument that Juror Jones misrepresented his visual abilities to the trial court.
¶ 25. Next, Neal claims that comments by the prosecutor and by his own counsel improperly defined reasonable doubt, and that the trial court should have stricken Juror Norris Dungan, who was confused by these comments. [4] Neal takes issue with the following comments by the State: Q: Now, in Mississippi, we do not give definitions of reasonable doubt and what I like to tell people, reasonable doubt is what you hear from the evidence, what law is given to you by Judge Baker, and your common sense. You take those three things and you put them all together and you can reach a decision on a case. Okay? That's what I define reasonable doubt as. But Judge Baker is not going to tell you this is the law in Mississippi on reasonable doubt. It is something that you, each, individually, must decide on your own. There are some people that say, Mr. Champion, I want to make you prove your case beyond all doubt. Is there anybody in here that's going to make me do that because if you do, you are holding me to a higher standard than the law requires. Beyond a reasonable doubt is the legal standard. Is there anybody that's going to make me prove my case beyond all doubt? Juror Dungan indicated that he would hold the State to a beyond-all-doubt standard. When another venire person asked what reasonable doubt was, the prosecutor stated: What is my definition? My definition really doesn't matter unfortunately. I bet mine and Mr. Barnett's definition is different. It is just something that you have got to decide in your own mind once you hear the evidence. And I wish I canI sometimes hesitate about asking this question because typically somebody is going to ask me what is the definition of beyond a reasonable doubt as opposed to beyond all doubt and I really can't give it to you. I always like to say, well, when you are finally convinced one way or the other is the best way I can describe it. Defense counsel told the jury pool that I've always thought a reasonable doubt, the word `reasonable' is reasonable. It is able to be arrived at through reason. That is a doubt that is able to be arrived at through reasoning. ¶ 26. Neal references the following exchange as evidence that the trial court recognized that Juror Dungan was confused about the reasonable-doubt standard, yet refused to strike him for cause: The Court: I marked on No. 185 [Dungan] about all your doubt and reasonable doubt, John [Champion]. I never know when the juror really understands the fine lines that a lawyer does. Are you going to ask that he be dismissed? Mr. Champion: Probably not. To be honest with you, if I need to get rid of him, I'll use one of my strikes. The Court: Because I was going to give Mr. Barnett a chance to rehabilitate him if you were going to strike him because oftentimes I think a juror gets confused on that reasonable doubt. Mr. Barnett: I thought John would allow him to stay on the jury just so it would be even, you know. Just sportsmanship, you know. I mean, during the trial, John could try to rehabilitate him. ¶ 27. Neal's failure to object to the prosecutor's comments during voir dire renders this issue procedurally barred. King v. State, 615 So.2d 1202, 1205 (Miss. 1993). Alternatively, this issue is without merit. This Court repeatedly has held that the general discussion of the concept of reasonable doubt by counsel during voir dire is not objectionable. See Kennedy v. State, 766 So.2d 64, 65 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (citing Thorne v. State, 348 So.2d 1011, 1013-15 (Miss.1977)). Furthermore, this Court has found similar comments to those at issue in this case to be unobjectionable so long as reasonable doubt is not defined when the trial court instructs the jury. Simon v. State, 857 So.2d 668, 696 (Miss. 2003). The jury instructions in this case properly omitted any definition of reasonable doubt. There is no indication that the presence of Juror Dungan prejudiced Neal; in fact, it appears that Neal's counsel favored Juror Dungan's presence on the jury. Nor does it appear from the record that Neal's jury was anything but the impartial and fair jury that this Court presumes was produced by the voir dire process.