Opinion ID: 536540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Resubstitution Order

Text: 32 We now reach the merits of appellant's attack on the district court's order dismissing the United States and resubstituting Carlson as defendant based upon its interpretation of the Westfall Act. 33 In its April 6 memorandum opinion, the district court correctly recognized that under the Act, the United States is substituted as defendant and the suit proceeds like any other suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act once a defendant federal employee is certified as acting within the course and scope of his or her employment. In order for plaintiff to recover from the United States, he or she must have a claim otherwise cognizable against the United States under the FTCA. 34 The FTCA, however, does not provide for recovery for assault and battery. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h). Because the government has not waived its sovereign immunity for such acts, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and was required to dismiss it. But the court erred in concluding that the case originally was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction. Carlson properly had removed the case under a statutory provision benefitting military personnel, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1442(a), one completely unrelated to the Westfall Act. 35 Based upon its own correct analysis, the district court then should have dismissed the suit entirely for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, it dismissed the United States as party defendant, resubstituted Carlson as party defendant, and remanded the case to the state court from whence it came. The court erroneously relied upon its determination that the original removal from state court was without jurisdiction and therefore required remand. The court apparently was motivated by a desire to provide plaintiff Mitchell with a possible remedy. But the mandate in Sec. 5 of the Westfall Act is clear. An action against a federal employee who has been certified as acting in the scope of her employment must proceed exclusively against the United States under the FTCA, a fact which the court itself recognized in its original substitution order of January 30, 1989. We must accept the clear mandate of the law. Since there is no remedy for assault and battery in the FTCA, Congress intended to leave a plaintiff such as Mitchell without a remedy for injuries sustained as a result of a federal employee's alleged assault and battery while in course of employment. The Westfall Act provides: 36 The remedy against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and 2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee's estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred. 37 Section 5 of the Westfall Act, amending 28 U.S.C. 2679(b) (emphasis added). The basic purpose of the Westfall Act was to protect federal employees from personal liability for common law torts committed within the scope of their employment, while providing persons injured by the common law torts of federal employees with an appropriate remedy against the United States. Sec. 2, Westfall Act. 38 Congress did provide plaintiffs with a substitute remedy against the United States, but one only within the limits of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The suit shall proceed in the same manner as any action against the United States.... and shall be subject to the limitations and exceptions applicable to those actions. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(d)(4). Assault and battery are specifically excepted. Under the Westfall Act, Mitchell cannot look elsewhere for a remedy. 39 Other federal circuit court decisions support this clear statutory mandate. In Aviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir.1989) the Tenth Circuit determined that, under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(d), a plaintiff who claimed injury due to defamation and interference with contractual rights by federal employees could seek a remedy only against the United States under the FTCA. Because the FTCA in terms precluded recovery for the specific tort claims, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h), the appellate court instructed the district court to dismiss the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit held further that plaintiff could not pursue his claims against the employees individually, that they were immune from suit, because Congress clearly intended the FTCA, with all of its exclusions and limitations, to provide the sole remedy for persons injured by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. Aviles v. Lutz, 887 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir.1989). See also Sowell v. American Cyanamid Co., 888 F.2d 802 (11th Cir.1989); Moreno v. Small Business Admin., 877 F.2d 715 (8th Cir.1989). 40 The Ninth Circuit, however, has reached a decision which is largely in conflict with these decisions. In Smith v. Marshall, 885 F.2d 650 (9th Cir.1989) 6 , a medical malpractice suit against a physician practicing in Italy, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the physician, substitution of the United States as party defendant, and subsequent dismissal of the case. The court correctly recognized that the FTCA does not provide a remedy against the United States for claims arising in foreign countries. Since the subject claim arose in Italy, the FTCA precluded the plaintiff from recovery. 41 The Court, however, then found that the Westfall Act did not provide the physician with immunity from suit in his individual capacity. The court relied on the absence in the statute of any express language that Congress intended to extend immunity to government employees committing torts in foreign countries, even though the FTCA precludes recovery for such acts. The court found this absence significant when compared to a narrow express provision included in the Westfall Act that an action against the Tennessee Valley Authority for injuries arising from the negligence of its employees is exclusive of any other civil action against the employee. See Section 9, Westfall Act. It interpreted this as an indication that, absent similar specific language, Congress intended all other federal employees to remain liable and without immunity under the remaining provisions of the Westfall Act. Smith, 885 F.2d at 655. 7 42 The Ninth Circuit also relied on a statement in a House Committee report, as well as other scattered legislative statements, that under the Westfall Act no one who previously had the right to initiate a lawsuit will lose that right. Smith, 885 F.2d at 655, citing H.R.Rep. No. 100-700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5945, 5951. Notably, the court admitted that it could not reconcile the report's promise that the rights of individual claimants would not be diminished, with the assertion [in the same House report] that 'any claim against the government that is precluded by the exceptions set forth in Section 2680 of Title 28 U.S.C. also is precluded against an employee in [sic] his or her estate.'  Smith, 885 F.2d at 656. It nonetheless concluded that the Westfall Act did not provide the physician with immunity from suit because the FTCA did not provide a remedy for his actions. 43 We decline to follow the Ninth Circuit case. The case ignores the general language of Sec. 5 of the Westfall Act, that [t]he remedy [provided by the FTCA] ... is exclusive of any other civil action ... against the employee.... Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee's estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred. Section 5, Westfall Act. In this language of general application, Congress made it clear that, once certified, federal employees remain immune from suit for their tortious actions taken within the scope of their government employment. Isolated language found scattered throughout the legislative history is insufficient persuasion that Congress intended to frustrate the very purpose of the Westfall Act, to protect its employees from the distraction and burden of litigation based upon their employment activities. If there is a policy defect in the statute, it is in a failure of Congress to have waived sovereign immunity broadly enough, not in a failure to protect employees in all of their course-of-employment activities. 44 We thus find that the district court improperly resubstituted Carlson. Once certified as acting within the scope of her employment, under the Westfall Act the district court was required to substitute the United States for Carlson, and treat the case as a claim under the FTCA. The district court complied with this requirement in its order of January 30. The subsequent resubstitution order was directly contrary to this requirement. Upon discovering the jurisdictional exclusion of liability for acts of assault and battery, the district court should have dismissed the entire case. This result may be thought to be harsh. But Congress has decided to relieve its employees of the burden of defending litigation, which is both distracting and costly, and often to the detriment of government operations. 45 We therefore reverse the district court's order of resubstitution. 46 REVERSED; CASE DISMISSED.