Opinion ID: 2570822
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Personally motivated assaults in the workplace

Text: The Alaska Workers' Compensation Act defines compensable injuries as those arising out of and in the course of employment ... includ[ing] an injury caused by the wilful act of a third person directed against an employee because of the employment. [12] Generally, courts have found that injuries do not arise from employment where private quarrels are imported from outside of the employment. [13] Larson's Workers' Compensation Law treatise discusses fights over spouses or lovers as classic examples of imported quarrels. [14] Injuries arising from assaults or fights in such cases are almost always non-compensable. [15] Courts are especially likely to deny compensation when the sole role of employment in the assault is provid[ing] a place where the assailant can find the victim. [16] We have strongly intimated in the past that an assault motivated by a love triangle would not arise out of employment for purposes of workers' compensation. In Fireman's Fund American Insurance Cos. v. Gomes, we discussed what kind of evidence might rebut the statutory presumption of compensability for workplace injuries. [17] We noted that if the employer in that case had presented evidence that its employee's shooting was caused by his involvement in a love triangle, it would have been affirmative evidence indicating that the killing was not work-connected. [18] We have also considered a case in which a love triangle apparently arose in the workplace, Marsh v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Board. [19] Marsh, a bartender, joined a customer at her table during his break from work. He was kissing the customer when her husband, who had been in the next room, returned to the table, struck Marsh, and caused Marsh substantial injury. [20] We affirmed the Board's denial of workers' compensation benefits to Marsh, holding that he had taken himself outside the scope and duties of his employment in his encounter with [the customer] and, that it was that conduct which motivated the assault on him. [21] Assessing Marsh's claim, we quoted with favor Professor Larson's summary of the law: When it is clear that the origin of the assault was purely private and personal, and that the employment contributed nothing to the episode, whether by engendering or exacerbating the quarrel or facilitating the assault, the assault should be held noncompensable. [22] We emphasized that labeling the employee's activity as personal may not render the ensuing injury per se noncompensable. However, the activity must still be reasonably foreseeable and incidental to the employment, and not just but for the employment, as appellant contends, to entitle the employee to claim compensation. [23] In the current case, it is undisputed that Kevin Temple was assaulted when working. Unlike Marsh, he had not taken himself outside the scope and duties of his employment; his activity in approaching Callahan in the waiters' area was entirely foreseeable and incidental to the employment. [24] Under Marsh, therefore, his injuries may be compensable if Princess contributed to the episode by engendering, exacerbating, or facilitating the assault. [25] According to Temple, Princess facilitated the assault by failing to have managers on duty, security in the area, or sufficiently trained or numerous servers, any of whom might have stopped Callahan before he reached Temple. The lack of managers and trained servers, Temple claims, violated Princess's policy; the policy offered Temple's only protection against assault. Princess further facilitated the assault, Temple argues, by requiring that he approach and assist customers, such as Callahan appeared to be. Finally, Temple claims that his employment contributed to the assault because a coworker pointed Temple out to his assailant. The Board considered these claims and concluded that Princess's actions did not constitute facilitation. A review of case law convinces us that the Board correctly reached this conclusion. Although courts have, in rare cases, awarded compensation for injuries arising from personally motivated assaults in the workplace, these unusual cases involved facts dissimilar to the facts now before us. In one group of cases, compensation was awarded because an employee's performance of an employment obligation made the assault possible. These cases are not analogous to Temple's because, as the Board found and substantial evidence supports, the assault occurred on Employer's premises not because Employee was performing his duties at the time of the assault, but because he merely was there. In a second set of cases, compensation was awarded because an employer's action or inaction gave the assailant access to the victim. The Board found substantial evidence to reject compensation under this precedent as well; we affirm its conclusion that Employer's action or inaction did not facilitate the assault upon Employee, and that his injuries therefore do not arise out of his employment.
Temple argues that his performance of a workplace obligation, approaching and assisting customers, was a causal factor in the assault. He testified that company policy and common sense required that he assist customers in the employees-only staging area, and he believed Callahan was a customer.
A small number of cases have held injuries compensable where the obligations of the victim's employment created a unique opportunity for the assailant to attack. In Culpepper v. Fairfield Sapphire Valley , the claimant worked as a cocktail waitress in an isolated mountain resort. [26] The employer expected employees to help customers anywhere in the resort. Therefore, the claimant stopped on the road to assist a stranded motorist whom she recognized as a customer. He kidnapped and sexually assaulted her, and she sustained serious injuries in escaping from his moving car. The court found the injuries causally connected to her employment because the job placed her at increased risk of sexual assault and because she acted in the interests of her employer when she stopped on the roadside. [27] The California Supreme Court in California Compensation & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board also awarded compensation to an employee whose work requirements put her at special risk. [28] The claimant's employment required that she visit customers' homes to measure tables for customized pads. Her ex-husband rented an apartment and placed an order with her employer under an assumed name. When she came to the apartment, he shot and killed her. [29] The court found that the employee's work obligations contributed to her death because of the role her work duties played in her assailant's scheme. [30] These cases are analogous to Temple's in that the attacker had personal motivation and the employees' work obligations created the opportunity for assault. However, in both cases the employees' work-related actions were clear causal factors that allowed the assaults to occur. The same is not true in this case. Callahan had already found his victim when Temple approached him. Callahan did not attack Temple at work because Temple was performing his workplace obligations, but rather because the restaurant provide[d] a place where the assailant [could] find the victim. [31] Under these circumstances, as the Board correctly concluded, compensation is not appropriate.
In rare cases, courts have awarded compensation where employees' performance of work duties motivated assailants to attack them. In Ross v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, a liquor store clerk was awarded compensation after a customer's jealous husband shot him. [32] The husband's suspicions were aroused because the clerk had been seen sitting in his wife's car outside the store. Because the clerk's job involved helping customers carry purchases to their cars and acting friendly toward them, the Ross court found that claimant's work activity and ambient circumstances of his employment were a causal factor in the assault. [33] We discussed Ross in our Marsh decision, and distinguished it because Ross did not act in a personal capacity in being friendly with his assailant's wife. [34] In another case, Murphy v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, a husband shot his wife at her workplace because of a dispute over the job itself. [35] The court found that this assault was work related because the underlying dispute between the victim and her husband directly concerned her work. [36] Kevin Temple's situation is not analogous to either of these cases; Temple's performance of work duties did not anger Callahan or motivate the assault. At most, Temple's accessibility at work provided Callahan with the inspiration and the opportunity to attack. This attenuated connection does not support a finding that Princess facilitated the assault or that workers' compensation is owed.
Finally, the inherent risk of certain jobs may support a finding that injuries sustained in personal attacks are work related. Both Culpepper [37] (in which the claimant worked as a cocktail waitress in a remote location) and California Compensation [38] (in which the claimant visited customers' homes to perform her job) considered such risk when awarding compensation to the claimants. In Bryan v. Best Western/Coachman's Inn, the court held that a motel security guard's injuries, sustained in a fight with a coworker's boyfriend, were work related because employment as a guard increased risk of assault. [39] These cases do not support Temple's claim, because, as the Board noted, waiting tables is not inherently dangerous work.
Temple argues that Princess facilitated his attack because a coworker helped Callahan identify his victim and because Princess failed to enforce policies which would have kept Callahan away from him. We affirm the Board's conclusion that case law on these issues does not support Temple's claim.
Temple argues that Princess facilitated the attack because a restaurant employee helped Callahan identify his victim. Yet in several cases in which coworkers were more clearly instrumental in bringing an attacker to his victim, courts found that the resulting injuries did not arise from work. In Transactron, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, an employee hid in the women's restroom from her angry husband. [40] A coworker told the husband where to find her; he entered the restroom and shot her. The court held that compensation could not be predicated upon a coworker giving directions to an assailant. [41] Similarly, in Fair v. People's Savings Bank , a court found that an employer did not facilitate a lethal assault where a supervisor, who knew that the employee feared her boyfriend but did not know that he was armed, told the boyfriend the employee's location. [42] In light of this precedent, the Board properly concluded that a Princess staff member's action in helping Callahan identify Temple did not amount to facilitation by Princess of Callahan's attack.
In extreme cases, employers may facilitate assault by failing to protect an employee from danger. Princess's failure to protect Temple, however, is not factually comparable to the acts of the employers in cases in which compensation was awarded. In Murphy v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, the employee's husband and attacker had told the employee's supervisor the precise time and location where he intended to kill his wife. The supervisor did not warn the employee, nor did he grant her repeated requests for a leave of absence. [43] The court found that her assault and death were work related. [44] In Carter v. Penney Tire & Recapping Co., a roofer warned his employer that he expected to be attacked. [45] The employer told him to return to work, and guaranteed his safety. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that gunshot wounds subsequently sustained by the employee on the worksite arose from his employment and were compensable. [46] These cases are distinguishable from Temple's because they involved foreknowledge as well as significant misconduct or assumption of responsibility by management. Several cases have rejected claims based on employers' failure to protect employees from assault. In Epperson v. Industrial Commission, the employee had asked the security guard at work not to admit her husband to the building. [47] The husband came to the workplace in search of her, and she met with him within view of the security guard. Following a calm conversation, he shot her. Epperson argued that the assault was exacerbated by employment because she had depended on the security guard. But the court rejected this argument because Epperson did not warn the guard that her husband might be armed or violent, and she did not indicate any distress or need for assistance during their encounter. [48] Johnson v. Drummond, Woodsum, Plimpton & MacMahon , P.A. drew on Epperson in denying compensation to an employee who told the receptionist not to let her husband into the building, but told her manager that he would not harm her, and spoke calmly with her husband in the lobby before he shot her. [49] Courts also rejected claims that personally motivated assaults were facilitated by an employer who let the assailant into the workplace in Transactron [50] and Fair, [51] two cases discussed above, involving coworkers who directed assailants to their victims. Given that employers' failure to protect employees from assault did not constitute facilitation under the facts of the cases discussed above, the Board correctly concluded that Princess's inaction in this case also does not constitute facilitation.
Temple's argument that Princess facilitated the attack by failing to protect him focuses on the restaurant's policies of greeting new guests promptly in the front area, having managers on duty, and prohibiting non-employees from visiting the waiters' staging area. These policies should have shielded Temple from harm, he argues, but Princess did not uphold these policies on the morning of the attack. Very few cases address the role of workplace security policies in workers' compensation cases. A review of these few cases, along with consideration of the purpose of workers' compensation statutes and general policy concerns, convinces us that Princess's failure to enforce these policies did not facilitate Callahan's attack on Temple. We therefore affirm the Board's conclusion on this issue, as well. Employers' failure to enforce a policy has generally not provided a basis for compensating resulting injuries in the workplace. Although Professor Larson discusses liability arising from employers' failure to adhere to statutory or regulatory safety requirements, he does not treat internal employer policy as a source for special employer obligations. [52] One case which indirectly considered the question, Devault v. General Motors Corp., did not find that the employer's inadequate enforcement of security policy facilitated a personally motivated attack. [53] In Devault, the employee was assaulted at work by an off-duty coworker who was admitted to the workplace despite the fact that he had the wrong badge for the shift and only on-duty workers were supposed to be allowed inside. The court found that the injury was not work related, in part because of evidence that the employer had a flexible enforcement policy concerning admissions. [54] The dissent argued that the employer did facilitate the assault because it was negligent in admitting the assailant despite his lack of a badge for that shift. [55] In several other cases involving workplace assault, courts stated or implied that injuries were not compensable, in part because the employers did all that could reasonably be expected of them under the circumstances. [56] In Transactron, the court emphasized, without drawing a legal conclusion, that the employers' actions conformed with existing security measures. [57] None of these cases directly supports the proposition that failure to uphold security policies might be grounds for finding employer facilitation, and we decline to reach such a conclusion on the facts of this case. Temple's argument also confuses the logic of workers' compensation with that of tort law. As we have explained in the past, the workers' compensation system is based on a political compromise . . . whereby the employer bears the initial cost of injuries that arise from employment related risks, regardless of `fault,' and the employee surrenders his common-law right to sue in tort. [58] The underlying premise of this system is that liability is based upon the existence of an employment relationship, not upon a determination of culpability. [59] Temple's argument would make negligence and fault the basis for workers' compensation. This is inconsistent with the underlying logic of workers' compensation and with the rule of AS 23.30.045(b), that compensation is payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury.