Opinion ID: 1906016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: effect of la barge v. state.

Text: In La Barge v. State, supra , the legislative history of sec. 939.22(14), Stats., was reviewed. As a result La Barge overruled the ejusdem generis rationale of Bronston and held that the phrase or other serious bodily injury was intentionally added to the statute to broaden its scope to include injuries which did not fall within the enumerated types. Under the facts of La Barge it was also held that the issue of great bodily harm was one of fact for the jury and found that the jury there could reasonably have concluded that multiple cuts and stab wounds which required 100 inches of suture material and six days' hospitalization constituted serious bodily injury even though there was no probability of death. Clearly, if the jury here had viewed the evidence in light of this broader interpretation of the definition it could reasonably have concluded that the victim's injury constituted great bodily harm. On this review the defendant, for the first time, urges the court to find that the La Barge interpretation of sec. 939.22(14), Stats., has rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague. It is contended that the phrase or other serious bodily injury, as interpreted by La Barge, lacks ascertainable standards for determining guilt. No argument is advanced asserting the proposition that the statute is unconstitutionally vague for failure to give fair notice of the prohibited conduct. Any attempt to advance such an argument would be without merit. It would appear that the defendant cannot be faulted for failing to raise the issue in the trial court since the issue as the defendant states it did not arise until the La Barge decision was rendered subsequent to the defendant's trial. However, if the statute is vague as interpreted by La Barge without the ejusdem generis rule, it would also be vague, on its face, as it was submitted to the jury. The jury instruction given by the trial judge did not explain the rule of ejusdem generis or suggest any meaning for the phrase or other serious injury. The jury was free to, and may have, interpreted the statute in the same manner as the La Barge court. We have repeatedly held that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be raised, as a matter of right, for the first time on appeal or review. See, e.g., Binder v. Madison, 72 Wis.2d 613, 620, 241 N.W.2d 613 (1976); State v. Weso, 60 Wis.2d 404, 413, 210 N.W.2d 442 (1973); State v. Weidner, 47 Wis.2d 321, 323, 177 N.W.2d 69 (1970). There have been occasions when, in the exercise of our discretion, we have considered constitutional issues when raised for the first time on appeal. In those cases there were no unresolved issues of fact and we concluded it was in the interest of justice to reach the issue. See e.g.: Binder, supra, at 621; Hortonville Educational Asso. v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 66 Wis.2d 469, 479, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975). In the case before us there are no undisputed facts, both parties have briefed and argued the issue and we believe the issue is one of fundamental importance and that it is in the interest of justice to consider the issue. The defendant argues that the phrase or other serious bodily injury fails to give the judge and jury sufficient standards or guidelines with which to adjudicate guilt. In State v. Courtney, 74 Wis.2d 705, 711, 247 N.W.2d 714 (1976), we said: . . . Before a statute or rule may be invalidated for vagueness, there must appear some ambiguity or uncertainty in the gross outlines of the duty imposed or conduct prohibited such that one bent on obedience may not discern when the region of proscribed conduct is neared, or such that the trier of fact in ascertaining guilt or innocence is relegated to creating and applying its own standards of culpability rather than applying standards prescribed in the statute or rule. The defendant directs our attention to State v. Givens, 28 Wis.2d 109, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965), for the proposition that a catchall phrase such as other serious bodily injury can only be saved from unconstitutionality by an interpretation that rests on ejusdem generis to give meaning to the phrase. In Givens the defendant was involved in a sit-in demonstration on the floor of the waiting room and corridor leading to the office of the Milwaukee County Board of Supervisors located in the Milwaukee County court house. Givens and others were charged with disorderly conduct contrary to sec. 947.01, Stats. The court there held that if the phrase or otherwise disorderly conduct meant conduct similar to the conduct enumerated, the statute identified the prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity. It must be recognized that Givens required such an interpretation in order to identify the prohibited conduct precisely enough to avoid infringement on first amendment rights. [1] No such problem exists in the instant case. The issue posed is whether the phrase or other serious bodily injury, without being restricted by the rule of ejusdem generis to the enumerated types of injury, sufficiently identifies the degree of injury necessary for a jury to convict a defendant of a violation of sec. 940.23, Stats. Both parties cite this frequently used test for vagueness: . . . If the statute is so obscure that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applicability, it is unconstitutional . . . Jones v. State, 55 Wis.2d 742, 746, 200 N.W.2d 587 (1972); State v. Mahaney, 55 Wis.2d 443, 447, 448, 198 N.W.2d 373 (1972). The test has also been stated: . . . A fair degree of definiteness is all that is required. It is sufficient if the standard of guilt is reasonably ascertainable by men of common intelligence without guessing at its meaning. . . . Ministers Life & Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 362, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966). In determining the meaning of a statute nontechnical words and phrases are to be defined in accord with common usage and understanding. This meaning can be established using the dictionary definition. Milwaukee County v. DILHR, 80 Wis.2d 445, 450, 259 N.W.2d 118 (1977); State v. Killory, 73 Wis.2d 400, 407, 243 N.W.2d 475 (1976). The word serious is defined as having important or dangerous possible consequences such as in a serious injury. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. Serious also means [i]mportant; weighty; momentous; grave, great, as in the phrases `serious bodily harm,' `serious personal injury,' etc. Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th ed., 1968). Courts have defined serious bodily harm to mean high in degree as contradistinguished from trifling, Lawlor v. People, 74 Ill. 228, 231 (1874), and `serious bodily injury' as one which . . . gives rise to apprehension an injury which is attended with danger. . . . George v. State, 21 Tex. App. 315, 317, 17 S.W. 351 (1886). The Arkansas Supreme Court said that The phrase [great bodily injury] is difficult to define, for the reason that it well defines itself. . . . Rogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 82, 29 S.W. 894, 895 (1894). [5] In La Barge this court quoted an Arizona Court of Appeals statement that `. . . serious bodily injury . . .' is a phrase of `. . . ordinary significance, . . . which the trial court need not define in its instructions since the words' . . . are well understood by any jury of ordinary intelligence.' La Barge, supra, at 335. This court has, therefore, recognized that a jury is capable of ascribing a specific meaning to the phrase serious bodily injury. [2] Presented with an instruction containing the entire statutory definition of great bodily harm a jury could reasonably interpret the phrase other serious bodily injury in that context, particularly so because of the preceeding phrases which describe severe injuries. Even though the general phrase is not restricted to the meaning of the enumerated injuries, it acquires sufficient definition because of the nature of the injuries enumerated. General and specific words in a statute which are associated together and which are capable of an analogous meaning, take color from each other, so that the general words are restricted to a sense analagous to the less general. . . . 73 Am. Jur.2d, Statutes, p. 407, sec. 214. Defendant's contention that the La Barge interpretation eliminates the distinction between the great bodily harm required for a violation of sec. 940.23, Stats., and the bodily harm required for a violation of the battery statute, sec. 940.20, is without merit. Great bodily harm still requires serious injury, something greater than mere bodily harm. Although the line between the two is not mathematically precise, it is one a jury is capable of drawing. In Flores v. State, 76 Wis.2d 50, 250 N.W.2d 720 (1977), although the court did not consider the constitutional issue, it said, at 58-59: . . . We do note that where that is the issue raised it is not easy as a matter of law to draw the line of demarcation between `great bodily harm,' meaning `serious injury,' and `bodily harm,' meaning `physical injury' or `impairment of physical condition.' In another situation, where there was no factual dispute as to the relatively minor injury inflicted upon a victim, our court held as a matter of law that such minor injuries were not sufficient to constitute the crime of aggravated battery as then defined by statute. Conversely, there certainly are situations where under no reasonable view of the evidence could the undisputed injuries sustained by a victim fall below the level of `great bodily harm' required for conviction of aggravated battery. However, in many cases the situation will fall into a twilight zone. That is, whether the resultant injury constituted `bodily harm' or `great bodily harm' becomes as it was in La Barge an issue of fact for the jury to resolve. . . . Although we do not believe this is such a case, this court has recognized that although the question might be a difficult one, it was nonetheless one within the abilities of a jury. [6] Sec. 939.22(14), Stats., either on its face or as construed by this court in La Barge v. State is not unconstitutionally vague because of failure to give fair notice of prohibited conduct or set forth adequate standards for adjudication. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. By the Court. Judgment affirmed.