Opinion ID: 2629109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Objective and Reasonable Reliance on K.S.A. 22-2501(c)

Text: K.S.A. 22-2501 states: When a lawful arrest is effected a law enforcement officer may reasonably search the person arrested and the area within such person's immediate presence for the purpose of (a) Protecting the officer from attack; (b) Preventing the person from escaping; or (c) Discovering the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime. As readily seen, the statute authorizes a search incident to arrest, but it expressly limits both the physical scope and purpose of that search. See State v. Conn, 278 Kan. 387, 391, 99 P.3d 1108 (2004); State v. Anderson, 259 Kan. 16, 22, 910 P.2d 180 (1996). The physical scope is specified to be the arrestee's immediate presence and the limited purposes are set out in the subsections. Conforming to the Krull rationale, our task is to determine whether a law enforcement officer should have known K.S.A. 22-2501(c) was unconstitutional. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160. That inquiry must focus on both the search's scope and purpose as stated in the statute, while also considering the factual circumstances of the search itself. In Daniel's case, the challenged search began in the passenger compartment of a parked vehicle after Daniel was handcuffed and secured inside a patrol car. It ended when the officer searched Daniel's purse after transporting it and Daniel to the police station. Officer safety and escape from custody do not justify the search, so subsections (a) and (b) are not to be considered. The officer admitted he was not looking for evidence to support the crime of the arrest (driving with a suspended license) and had no probable cause to believe any other crime had been committed. When the search occurred, Daniel already had been handcuffed and secured inside a patrol vehicle, so the passenger compartment was not within her reach. As to the physical scope of Daniel's search, we consider whether the officer could have objectively and reasonably believed K.S.A. 22-2501(c) was unconstitutional before he searched the passenger compartment when Daniel was no longer in her vehicle. Daniel does not argue the car and purse were outside Daniel's immediate vicinity at the time of the search. Daniel argues only that the search's scope was invalid based upon Gant 's holdings under the Fourth Amendment. This inquiry is premised solely on the constitutionality of the statute. Compare State v. Davison, 41 Kan.App.2d 140, 144-48, 202 P.3d 44 (2009), pet. for rev. filed March 2, 2009 (pending) (arguing once a defendant is handcuffed and secured within a patrol car, the defendant's vehicle is no longer within the immediate presence limitation imposed by K.S.A. 22-2501). Our second inquiry is whether the officer could have objectively and reasonably believed the statute was clearly unconstitutional in authorizing a warrantless search incident to arrest for evidence of any crime. Finally, we will consider whether there is any indication the legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws when it enacted K.S.A. 22-2501(c). See Krull, 480 U.S. at 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160. The answer to what the officer could objectively and reasonably believe about the Kansas statute from both the constitutional scope and purpose of his search is readily found in Gant. The Court's decision details the lower courts' interpretation (and ultimate misinterpretations) of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding warrantless automobile searches incident to arrest since New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, reh. denied 453 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 26, 69 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1981). The Court observed: [O]ur opinion [in Belton ] has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.  (Emphasis added.) Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1718, 173 L.Ed.2d at 495. The Court's opinion also collects numerous lower court decisions upholding wide ranging warrantless police searches of vehicles incident to arrest, including those that upheld searches even when the handcuffed arrestee had left the scene. See 129 S.Ct. at 1718-19 & n. 2-3, 173 L.Ed.2d at 495-96 & n. 2-3. Indeed, it was this broad application of Belton by a predominate number of lower courts that was the catalyst for the Court to consider Gant. After Belton, in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004), a majority of the Court held that Belton allowed a warrantless search of a person's car, even when the officer did not make contact until the person arrested had left the vehicle. In doing so, the Court found a need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates of what items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated. Once an officer determines that there is probable cause to make an arrest, it is reasonable to allow officers to ensure their safety and to preserve evidence by searching the entire passenger compartment.  (Emphasis added.) 541 U.S. at 623, 124 S.Ct. 2127. In concurring in part in Thornton, Justice O'Connor observed that since Belton: [L]ower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception. ... (Emphasis added.) Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624, 124 S.Ct. 2127. Justice Scalia similarly noted: Reported cases involving this precise factual scenarioa motorist handcuffed and secured in the back of a squad carare legion. [Citations omitted.] Some courts uphold such searches even when the squad car carrying the handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene. [Citation omitted.] 541 U.S. at 628, 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which is the federal circuit court with jurisdiction to hear Fourth Amendment controversies arising from Kansas, recently conceded that it too had frequently interpreted Belton far beyond the underlying justifications for warrantless vehicle searches incident to arrest, even if there was no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. See United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1041-42 (10th Cir.2009) (The [warrantless vehicle] search in this case was wholly consistent with and supported by this court's precedent prior to Gant. ); United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1201-02 (10th Cir.2000); United States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1148-50 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Murphy, 221 Fed.Appx. 715 (10th Cir.2007) (unpublished opinion). Prior to Gant, our court had not had occasion to consider and approve a factual scenario similar to Daniel's search, but we had addressed Belton and its application in rather broad terms. In State v. McClain, 258 Kan. 176, 183, 899 P.2d 993 (1995), we described Belton as creating a bright-line rule that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest, the officer may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. We went on to explain that the search could include examining the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment. This court added: Since its filing in 1981, Kansas courts have consistently applied Belton to allow an officer to search the passenger compartment of an automobile when its occupant is arrested. McClain, 258 Kan. at 184, 899 P.2d 993; see State v. White, 230 Kan. 679, 680, 640 P.2d 1231 (1982); State v. Press, 9 Kan.App.2d 589, Syl. ¶ 3, 685 P.2d 887, rev. denied 236 Kan. 877 (1984). Against this backdrop from the case law precedent, we add a decision from our Court of Appeals released approximately 6 weeks before Daniel's arrest. In State v. Henning, 38 Kan.App.2d 706, 722-23, 171 P.3d 660 (2007), rev'd 289 Kan. 136, 209 P.3d 711 (2009), that court said: We hold that when the Kansas Legislature amended [K.S.A.] 22-2501(c), it adopted a constitutional statute which expanded the scope of the permissible purpose of a search incident to a lawful arrest in Kansas consistent with Belton.  (Emphasis added.) Granted, this court later reversed the Court of Appeals in light of Gant, see 289 Kan. at 147-49, 209 P.3d 711, but that does not matter because we are concerned only with the officer's objectively reasonable reliance on the statute's constitutionality at the time the officer acted. We find that a Court of Appeals decision only 6 weeks earlier upholding the constitutionality of the very statute the officer was acting under in searching Daniel's vehicle and purse is a strong indicator of the officer's objectively reasonable reliance on that statute. Coupled with the predominate federal and state case law noted above that preceded the Court of Appeal's decision, a belief that the statute was valid was objectively reasonable. Finally, we consider the available legislative history of K.S.A. 22-2501(c) to determine whether there is any suggestion the legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws in its passage of the statute. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160. In this endeavor, we are aided by two thorough reviews of the legislative history behind this provision made by this court and the Court of Appeals. See Henning, 289 Kan. at 142-45, 209 P.3d 711; Henning, 38 Kan.App.2d at 714-16, 171 P.3d 660. It is not necessary to burden this opinion with the same detailed recitation of the statute's legislative deliberations and history that is contained in those two opinions. It is sufficient to simply state that neither opinion expresses any suspicion that the debate over the statute's provisions reflected an abandonment of the legislature's responsibility to enact constitutional laws. In fact, the Court of Appeals specifically found based on its review of this history that the legislature's intent in passing the statute was to allow searches incident to arrest to extend to any crime as constitutionally allowed by Belton. See Henning, 38 Kan.App.2d 706, Syl., 171 P.3d 660. Following the precedent set by Krull, we find that at the time of the search of Daniel's vehicle and purse that a reasonable officer would not have known that K.S.A. 22-2501(c) was unconstitutional. The officer's objectively reasonable reliance on K.S.A. 22-2501(c) is demonstrated by (a) the substantial case law precedent across the country upholding similar searches, which lends added facial validity to the statute; (b) an appellate court decision directly on point that was valid at the time of Daniel's search; and (c) the statute's legislative history. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of Daniel's motions to suppress. Affirmed. DAVIS, C.J., not participating. JOHNSON, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority makes a facially seductive case for expanding the scope of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in this state to permit the admission of illegally obtained evidence where the law enforcement officer is deemed to have reasonably relied on a statutory provision. However, I do not believe that we are bound to make such an exception for statutory reliance, simply because the United States Supreme Court has recognized it, and I would not do so. Further, under the facts of this case, I submit that the law enforcement officer was not relying on a statutory provision but rather the justification for the search emanated from certain cases interpreting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, reh. denied 453 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 26, 69 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1981). The majority acknowledges that, to date, this state has only recognized the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule which derived from United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, reh. denied 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S.Ct. 52, 82 L.Ed.2d 942 (1984). The Leon exception can be applied where the law enforcement officer reasonably and in good faith relied upon a search warrant which was issued and signed by a judge, notwithstanding a later determination that the warrant was defective and the search unlawful. 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405. However, the majority notes that, after Leon, the United States Supreme Court also applied the good-faith exception where the unlawful search resulted from a law enforcement officer's objectively reasonable reliance on a statute. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). Then, the majority opines that because our case law has interpreted § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights as providing the same protections as the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, this court is compelled to recognize the good-faith exception articulated in Krull. I do not accept that constraint. The disconnect in the majority's compulsion analysis, in my view, can be found in the majority's characterization of the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy, rather than as a constitutional right. Op. at 1190. Even if one accepts the debatable premise that the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment functions as a concurrent interpretation of § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, the exclusionary rule is not a product of that interpretation because the rule does not emanate from either Constitution. Accordingly, this court should be free to judicially create its own remedy for the victims of an illegal search in this state, i.e., to set the parameters of the exclusionary rule that will be enforced in Kansas. In my view, the Leon exception involves a critical element distinguishing it from the Krull exception. A condition precedent to the Leon exception is a search warrant issued by a judge. In that situation, there has been a judicial interpretation of the law and application of that law to the facts of the particular case. Accordingly, the law enforcement officer, a member of the executive branch of government, has a legal opinion from a member of the judicial branch of government upon which the officer can then rely. In contrast, the majority would permit a law enforcement officer to perform the judicial function of interpreting a statute and applying the statutory provisions to the facts as they are being encountered by the officer. As a practical matter, the officer must necessarily rely on his or her own understanding of the statute's meaning and appropriate application, notwithstanding the majority's suggestion that the officer is simply relying on the legislature's good faith in adopting constitutional laws. I do not believe that it is appropriate to delegate to an executive branch officer the clearly judicial function of interpreting and applying the law, and I would not extend the good-faith exception in this state to include a law enforcement officer's reliance on a statute. Even if I were to accept the majority's newly adopted reliance-on-a-statute exception, I would not find that it was applicable in this case. The statutory provision upon which the majority believes the officer was entitled to rely was the amendment to K.S.A. 22-2501(c), which changed the crime to a crime. Cf. State v. Anderson, 259 Kan. 16, 22, 910 P.2d 180 (1996) (vehicle search for purpose of discovering evidence of crime unrelated to arrest violated preamendment version of K.S.A. 22-2501). Curiously, the legislature did not choose to be more explicit in its amendment by employing the words any crime. Nevertheless, as the majority notes, the legislative history suggests and the Court of Appeals found that the amendment was intended to expand the scope of the permissible purpose of a search incident to a lawful arrest in Kansas consistent with Belton.  Op. at 1195; see State v. Henning, 38 Kan. App.2d 706, 722-23, 171 P.3d 660 (2007), rev. denied 289 Kan. 136, 209 P.3d 711 (2009). Accordingly, the officer was not relying solely on the new text of K.S.A. 22-2501(c). Rather, to give context to the statutory amendment, the officer had to rely on the case law which had broadly interpreted and applied Belton. In effect, then, the majority has created a new exclusionary rule exception based upon a good-faith reliance on lower court decisions. The United States Supreme Court has not gone that far, even when presented the opportunity in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). The Gant majority acknowledged that cases interpreting Belton to allow a vehicle search incident to arrest when the recent occupant of the vehicle had been handcuffed and secured in a patrol car are legion. 129 S.Ct. at 1718, 173 L.Ed.2d at 495-96. Yet, the Gant majority rejected the notion that its result should be dictated by law enforcement's reliance on that multitude of case precedent. Specifically, the majority said: We do not agree with the contention in Justice Alito's dissent ... that consideration of police reliance interests requires a different result. Although it appears that the State's reading of Belton has been widely taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers have relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years, many of these searches were not justified by the reasons underlying the Chimel [ v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) ] exception. Countless individuals guilty of nothing more serious than a traffic violation have had their constitutional right to the security of their private effects violated as a result. The fact that the law enforcement community may view the State's version of the Belton rule as an entitlement does not establish the sort of reliance interest that could outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals' interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement `entitlement' to its persistence. 129 S.Ct. at 1722-23, 173 L.Ed.2d at 500. In a footnote to the foregoing passage, the Gant majority apparently felt compelled to address what impact reliance may have in another context, stating: Because a broad reading of Belton has been widely accepted, the doctrine of qualified immunity will shield officers from liability for searches conducted in reasonable reliance on that understanding. 129 S.Ct. at 1722 n. 11, 173 L.Ed.2d at 500 n. 11. Conspicuously, the Court did not also note that the same reasonable reliance on case precedent would shield the state from the exclusionary rule. I would not invent such a rule in this state. For the multiple reasons stated above, I would reject the State's first-time-on-appeal argument that the unlawfully obtained evidence was admissible under a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in this state. Accordingly, I would find the admission of the illegal evidence was reversible error.