Opinion ID: 870427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Need for the Evidence

Text: According to the majority, there was a strong need for the evidence to explain complainant's failure to report her first sexual contact with Petitioner while sister slept nearby and to explain why Petitioner would suddenly engage in sexual acts with complainant. Id. at ___ - ___, 237 P.3d at 1172-73. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies in part on the testimony of Dr. Bivens, to the effect that child sexual offenders establish a relationship by a process of seduction and testing. Id. at ___, 237 P.3d at 1170. [9] The majority refers to Dr. Bivens's testimony that sexual abusers slowly acclimate their victims to increasing sexual contact prior to obtaining their submission. Id. at ___ - ___, 237 P.3d at 1170-71. According to the majority, evidence of prior bad acts was needed to demonstrate this pattern. Id. at ___ - ___, 237 P.3d at 1172-73. The majority asserts that if evidence of Petitioner's first sexual act with complainant in Hawai'i were presented without the context of their prior relationship, it would have been inexplicable and not fit the pattern explained by Dr. Bivens. Id. However, Dr. Bivens testified only to general patterns and was not aware of the specific facts of the case, nor had he heard any evidence regarding what had been alleged against Petitioner. As a result, he was not in a position to explain Petitioner's actions, the nature of his relationship to complainant, or to discuss why complainant might have consented to Petitioner's first advances in Hawai'i, much less the necessity for prior act evidence. Nevertheless, Dr. Bivens did testify as to the tendency of victims to refrain from informing others about abuse. Dr. Bivens reported that approximately two-thirds of those who were sexually abused do not disclose the abuse until after they are eighteen years old, and that most of those who do disclose abuse, do so to a parent. According to Dr. Bivens, studies concluded that some of the primary reasons for delayed reporting were shame, repression, the belief that telling would not help, and fear of the impact that the disclosure would have on the family. It is evident from Dr. Bivens's testimony that evidence of prior bad acts was not necessary to explain complainant's situation. Dr. Bivens's testimony provided support for the proposition that complainant's conduct was typical of many victims inasmuch they often do not report incidents of sexual abuse. As the majority's own recitation of facts discloses, complainant's relationship with Petitioner was one in which he was a loved and trusted authority figure whom she relied on for support. Id. at ___ - ___, 237 P.3d at 1172. Similarly, the discussion supra of Petitioner's efforts to exert influence over complainant account for her acquiescence. Viewed in the context of her relationship with Petitioner, complainant's failure to report the incidents of sexual intercourse in Hawai'i is entirely understandable and consistent with Dr. Bivens's testimony. Dr. Bivens's explanation of the reasons most child victims do not report provides a clear context for complainant's and sister's testimony on that subject. Complainant's age, her level of dependence on Petitioner, and the fear that Petitioner would go to jail, would explain how it was possible for Petitioner to engage in the acts and avoid being reported. Again, assuming the relevance of the prior bad acts to prove opportunity, there was no need for prior acts evidence to explain sudden sexual acts with complainant. Petitioner's opportunity to commit the acts alleged in Hawai'i was shown by his physical proximity to complainant and his relationship with her, proof of which was supplied by considerable evidence regarding the acts in Hawai'i. On the other hand, the prior act evidence would only result in an undue tendency to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis[.] St. Clair, 101 Hawai'i at 289, 67 P.3d at 788.
The majority relies on this court's decision in Iaukea to support its conclusion that the need for the evidence in this case outweighed the prejudice of its admission. Majority opinion at ___, 237 P.3d at 1173. In Iaukea, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, rape in the first degree [and] sodomy in the first degree[.] 56 Haw. at 345, 537 P.2d at 727. The complaining witness was a social worker who first came into contact with the defendant when the complaining witness worked on the defendant's previous rape case. Id. at 346, 537 P.2d at 727-28. In the course of assisting the defendant, the complaining witness became familiar with the defendant's criminal record, including past assaults and the rape charge, and obtained a great deal of information about[ ] his family background and social problems. Id. at 346, 537 P.2d at 728. Iaukea concluded that the complaining witness's testimony regarding the defendant's prior bad acts was essential to help explain the complaining witness's calm manner and lack of screaming as well as why the complaining witness offered to drive the defendant to his aunt's house, so as not to draw the erroneous conclusion that she was his voluntary social companion. Id. at 352, 537 P.2d at 731. In Iaukea, the erroneous conclusion that the testimony of prior bad acts was intended to dispel was that the complaining witness's actions in giving the defendant a ride and not screaming or struggling was the result of her consenting to have sexual relations. Id. In contrast, the instant case does not present the need to admit evidence of prior conduct. Complainant's submission to Petitioner's sexual conduct was entirely comprehensible in light of their relationship. As already recounted, consent was not at issue inasmuch as Petitioner denied having sexual intercourse or sexual contact with complainant, and complainant's testimony indicated that the incidents occurring in Hawai'i were consensual. [10] Moreover, evidence of consent would have no probative value inasmuch as consent would not have negated any of the elements necessary to convict in Petitioner's case. On the other hand, the offenses in Iaukea required proof of forcible compulsion to convict, which could be negated by consent. Id. at 348 n. 2, 537 P.2d at 729 n. 2. Thus, there was no need for the evidence of Petitioner's prior bad acts that would outweigh the prejudice of its admission.