Opinion ID: 2823835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Totality of the Circumstances Analysis Determines Voluntariness.

Text: Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth stated that the determination of whether the police overbore a defendantâs will and rendered his consent involuntary is based on the totality of the circumstances. 412 U.S. at 226. The Supreme Court rejected the notion that voluntariness hinges on a defendantâs understanding that he may refuse consent to a search. Id. at 234, 248â49. Rather, the Supreme Court reasoned that, while the defendantâs knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor in the determination, it is not âa prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.â Id. at 249. Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Eight years later, we adopted the rationale from Schneckloth in Helm. Helm, 633 P.2d at 1073, 1076â77 (concerning the suppression of evidence from a roadside sobrietyÂ test and a blood alcohol test). The lower courts in that case reasoned that the defendantâs consent was involuntary unless he gave consent intelligently and with information from the officer about his right to refuse. Id. at 1075. We reversed and, citing Schneckloth, stated that courts must look at the totality of the circumstances to determine voluntariness; a defendantâs knowledge of the right to refuse is only a factor in that determination. Id. at 1076; see also Licea, 918 P.2d at 1111â13 (stating that voluntary consent is determined based on the totality of the circumstances, and there is a âdifference between a voluntary act and an act that is done knowingly and intelligentlyâ). Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In addition to clarifying that voluntary consent need not be given with knowledge of the right to refuse, in Helm we articulated important factors in the totality of the circumstances analysis, namely: the age, education, and intelligence of the defendant; the duration, location, and circumstances of the search; the consenting personâs state of mind; and anything else that could have affected the defendantâs free and unconstrained choice in consenting to the search. 633 P.2d at 1077; see also People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1984). We also reasoned that police officers do not have an affirmative duty to warn parties of their right to refuse consent because other evidence may adequately demonstrate voluntary consent. 633 P.2d at 1077. Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Later, in People v. Castro, 159 P.3d 597, 600 (Colo. 2007), we expressed that a language barrier between police officers and the defendant is relevant to the totality of the circumstances analysis. In Castro, the trial court suppressed cocaine evidence found in the defendantâs car because it could not determine whether the defendant spokeÂ sufficient English to validly consent. Id. at 598â99. We reversed because the evidence showed that the defendant spoke English well enough to communicate with the officers and validly consent to the search. Id. at 600â01. The record demonstrated that the defendant responded appropriately to the officersâ questions, and critically, the record contained no evidence of police coercion. Id.