Opinion ID: 567439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Refusal to Deviate From the Guidelines Violates Defendants' Constitutional Rights

Text: 30 Both defendants claim that the Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional as applied in this case. They assert first that the Guidelines provide a harsher penalty for cocaine base (crack) than for powder cocaine, even though the two chemicals are scientifically equivalent and readily interchangeable. As a result, they maintain, the sentencing level assigned is grossly disproportionate to the offense, in violation of the eighth amendment and principles of fundamental fairness, and the district court should have departed downward from the Guidelines to the statutory minimum of five years. They further suggest that this inequity violates the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution because it unfairly prejudices lower income individuals, who are the primary users of crack cocaine. 31 As the district court accurately noted, this court has clearly rejected the eighth amendment argument that the penalty for crack is unconstitutionally disproportionate in comparison with that for cocaine powder. 32 [W]e must grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishment for crimes. Salem v. Helm, 436 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). In United States v. Solomon, 848 F.2d 156 (11th Cir.1988) (per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit held that the mandatory five year sentence for possession of five grams of crack under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) did not violate the prohibition of disproportionate sentencing under the eighth amendment. In Solomon, the Court implicitly held that a one to one hundred ratio was not disproportionate, because the Court found the case indistinguishable from the previous Eleventh Circuit approval of a mandatory five year term for possession of 500 grams of simple cocaine in United States v. Holmes, 838 F.2d 1175 (11th Cir.1988) (upholding 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) under the eighth amendment). 848 F.2d at 157. In enacting stiffer sentences for crack cocaine, Congress apparently intended to combat what it perceived to be the greater danger of crack cocaine. Brown, 859 F.2d at 977; 132 Cong.Rec. 8091 (comments of Senators Mattingly and D'Amato) (June 20, 1986); see also United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 609 (3d Cir.1989) (stating that Congress passed the Act in order to severely penalize possession of crack as a particularly insidious and dangerous drug). The sentence ... while severe[ ] is not cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment. 33 United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d 623, 627 (6th Cir.1990). See also United States v. Pickett, --- F.2d ---- (6th Cir.1991), No. 90-3594 (Filed August __, 1991). We have stated further that [t]his argument is baseless. There have been only three recognized instances of disproportionality rising to the level of an eighth amendment violation.... A ten-year sentence for drug possession simply does not approach the same level of gross inequity. United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 974 (1991) (quoting United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C.Cir.1989)). Moreover, as the Eighth Circuit stated in United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.1990), a case cited approvingly by this court in Levy: 34 To a substantial degree, our perceptions of crimes, their heinousness, and the dangers they pose to society dictate the punishment we impose.... [W]e are cognizant of the message Congress intended to send to society by creating comparably stiff penalties for offenses involving cocaine base. By these penalties Congress sought to reshape society's perceptions about the seriousness of particular drug offenses. It hoped to convey the message that drug use was malign, not benign. It also sought to show that cocaine base posed a threat to individuals and to the very fabric of our society. 35 To accomplish this end, Congress explicitly selected a higher penalty for crimes involving cocaine base than previously might have appeared appropriate. 36 Id. at 980. We find no merit in defendants' purported distinction between Levy, which dealt with the constitutionality of the sentencing provisions, and the instant case, which deals with a request for deviation from the Guidelines. The Guidelines were enacted pursuant to the statute and are in conformity in purpose and structure. 37 We also find no support for defendants' claim that the harsher penalty for crack violates the equal protection or due process guarantees of the Constitution. Defendants claim that the differing penalties for crack and powder cocaine unfairly impact the poor, who are more predominant users of crack. As we noted in Avant, the Act, a federal statute, does not violate equal protection because the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to state action. Avant, 907 F.2d at 627. 38 We review acts of Congress with considerable deference. Acts do not offend principles of substantive due process if they bear a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 ... (1934). Appellate courts should not and do not try to determine whether [the statute] was the correct judgment or whether it best accomplishes Congressional objectives; rather, [courts] determine [only] whether Congress' judgment was rational. 39 Buckner, 894 F.2d at 978 (footnote omitted). 40 In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Congress amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) to provide longer sentences for offenses involving mixtures weighing 500 grams or more that contain cocaine hydrochloride (powder) or mixtures weighing 5 grams or more that contain cocaine base. It is undisputed that Congress amended the statute out of concern that cocaine base is more dangerous to society than cocaine [powder] because of crack's potency, its highly addictive nature, its affordability, and its increasing prevalence. 41 Levy, 904 F.2d at 1032 (quoting Buckner, 894 F.2d at 978). This court recently elaborated on this point: 42 We believe for two reasons that Congress's act was sufficiently rational to meet the demands of substantive due process. First, presuming as [defendant] does that Congress's sole purpose in enacting the ratio was to discourage drug addiction, then the ratio can stand only if it is plausible to believe that the likelihood of becoming addicted to crack is greater than that of becoming addicted to cocaine. We believe that there is sufficient difference of opinion in the scientific community regarding the different likelihoods of becoming addicted to crack or cocaine to justify the Congressional distinction between the two. The government offered evidence at [defendant's] sentencing hearing that experts believe that the speed with which crack gets to the brain produces a significantly different effect that increases the likelihood of addiction. There was also evidence produced that crack is usually a purer drug than is cocaine. Such evidence was presented at the Congressional hearings. See Buckner, 894 F.2d at 978 n. 9 (quotes from the Congressional testimony of Dr. Robert Byck). The mere fact that Nittskoff has a competing theory that addiction levels vary more with dosage and purity than with method of ingestion does not preclude Congress from disagreeing with him. 43 Congress could also have had another purpose behind the ratio than the simple suppression of drug addiction. Congress was clearly concerned that the special attributes of crack--its small size and cheap price per dose--could create other societal problems that required remedying. Senators noted that because crack is sold in small doses (called rocks) it is easier to transport and use, thereby increasing the difficulty of suppressing addiction. The cheap price of each rock also permits children to afford cocaine for the first time, thereby exposing another segment of American society to drug addiction. See Buckner, 894 F.2d at 978 n. 9 (citing statements of Senators Bumpers and Kennedy, 132 Con.Rec. S14282, 14293). Given these problems caused by the special qualities of crack, it was not irrational for Congress to determine that sharply stiffer penalties for the sale and distribution of crack were necessary to counterbalance the lure of profit that would otherwise attract persons into the crack trade. 44 Pickett, --- F.2d at ----, No. 90-3594 (Filed August __, 1991). This language clearly demonstrates that Congress had a rational basis for passing this law that was reasonably related to its objective of protecting the public from the popular and potent new form of cocaine--crack. 45 Finally, defendant Abrams suggests that his mandatory minimum sentence under the Guidelines is more than twice that which he would have faced if subject to state prosecution. He cites United States v. Williams, 746 F.Supp. 1076 (D.Utah 1990), as support for the proposition that the manner in which the defendants were referred for federal prosecution violated his due process rights. 46 At issue in Williams was the legitimacy of the referral for federal prosecution by a local narcotics strike force, an intergovernmental law enforcement group composed of state and federal agencies. The strike force referred its cases to federal prosecutors, although no federal prosecutor was a member of the governing board or had any part in the determination to refer the cases to federal prosecution. The Utah district court held that the referral policy fosters an atmosphere where this decision can be based upon inappropriate and capricious factors, violative of these defendants' Constitutional rights to due process of law. Id. at 1083. 47 When an individual violates a law for which there are prohibitions at both the state and federal levels, we know of no constitutional protection which allows him to choose prosecution under one or the other of the systems, depending on which provides the lesser penalty. In today's overcrowded court system it is not uncommon for drug cases, which could be prosecuted under either federal or state law, to be adjudicated in federal court. This Court has long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979). Although the Court in Batchelder was addressing possible prosecution under two federal statutes, the principle enunciated applies to prosecutive choices made between state and federal laws as well. 48 Although the [existence of both] statutes create uncertainty as to which crime may be charged and therefore what penalties may be imposed, they do so to no greater extent than would a single statute authorizing various alternative punishments. So long as overlapping criminal provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited and the punishment authorized, the notice requirement of the Due Process Clause are satisfied. 49 Id. at 123. 50 Similarly, we find no evidence in this referral for federal prosecution of the kind of abuse discussed in recent district court decisions from the District of Columbia which are cited by the defendant. 3 51 D. The Court's Enhancement of Greene's Sentence and its Refusal to Adopt a Reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility 52 Defendant Greene contends that pursuant to section 3E1.1. of the Sentencing Guidelines he is entitled to a two-point reduction in the computation of his sentence for acceptance of responsibility. He asserts that the presentence report, in effect, recommended such a downward departure when it stated that the defendant acknowledged possessing the weapons and possessing drugs for his own use and selling them only to finance such usage. 53 Great deference is given to the trial court with regard to acceptance of responsibility determinations, and the sentencing judge's decision should be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Wilson, 878 F.2d 921, 923 (6th Cir.1989); see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n. 5). 54 Whether or not a defendant has accepted responsibility for his crime is a factual question. The Sixth Circuit has held that when a defendant seeks to establish facts which would lead to a sentence reduction under the Guidelines, he shoulders the burden of proving those facts by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Rodriguez, 896 F.2d 1031, 1032 (6th Cir.1990). 55 In denying the two-point reduction, the district judge stated: 56 I do note that the probation officer did recommend the granting of two points for acceptance of responsibility. I feel, with all due respect, that that is not appropriate here since the Defendant indicates that the drugs in the house at 39 Oberlin were for his own use and not for sale and that while the guns belonged to him and Abrams--or they were with him--they were not used to facilitate or during a drug-trafficking offense. Accordingly I simply do not find that that equates to an acceptance of responsibility. 57 We are unable to say that the district court's conclusion that Greene did not accept responsibility is clearly erroneous. 58 Greene also argues that the trial court's enhancement of his base offense level for obstruction of justice because he suborned perjury was in error. The district court concluded Jenkins's perjured testimony to have been within defendant Greene's knowledge. In sentencing the defendants, the court stated: 59 This Court has previously set forth its firm conviction and conclusion that there was perjury in this case through the testimony of the Witness John Jenkins, and this Court advised the Defendants' Counsel about a week or two ago that it intended to apply to each Defendant a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. And the Court based its feeling that--withdraw that. 60 Obstruction of justice can be defined in many different ways, but one of the ways set forth in Title 18 United States Code, Section 1512, states that obstruction of justice occurs whenever one knowingly uses or engages in--withdraw that--whenever one knowingly uses or corruptly persuades another person with intent to influence the testimony of any person in an official proceeding. 61 The Defendants have written what I think to be excellent memoranda against the two-point enhancement, and they point out that the perjury, if in fact there was perjury, occurred on cross examination. I don't accept that basic premise for this reason: The perjury might not have become obvious until cross examination, but the cross examination revealed sufficient defects in the credibility of Mr. Jenkins to not only cast doubt on the credibility of his direct testimony but also leave the Court with the firm conviction that perjured testimony was offered. 62 ............................................................. 63 ................... 64