Opinion ID: 2598779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Involving Evidence from One of the Rape Victims

Text: Before the beginning of the penalty phase, defense counsel, citing Payne, sought and obtained from the court a protective order prohibiting the prosecution from asking victim witnesses what the appropriate punishment should be. (See Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 830, fn. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720.) Later the district attorney informed the court that one of the rape victims, Mary G., the victim of the December 8, 1988, incident, was opposed to the death penalty. He requested a ruling that, like the prosecution, the defense could not ask Mary G. what punishment she thought defendant should receive. Defense counsel urged that she be allowed to testify what impact this has on her. The court ruled that impact evidence was admissible, but her opinion on penalty was not. Later still, the district attorney informed the court that Mary G. refused to testify, and a hearing was held as to her availability as a witness. Mary G. was present and represented by an attorney, who explained her rights and obligations to her. Through counsel, she stated she would not testify unless she could express her views on the punishment defendant should receive. Defense counsel argued she should be allowed to present a victim impact statement, because the information that she wants to provide to this Court is the information as to how this incident affected her. The fact that she also has feelings for or against the death penalty are part of her feelings, and they should be allowed to come before the court because that's what she's going to explain. The court reiterated that Mary G. could testify about the impact the crime had on her, but not about what punishment defendant should receive. The court questioned Mary G. personally under oath. She said, I cannot in good conscience testify, and that potential sanctions, including sanctions for criminal contempt under section 166, would not cause her to testify. Neither more time nor anything the court said or did would cause her to change her mind. Defense counsel was permitted to question her but chose not to do so. The court then found her unavailable as a witness. Defense counsel objected to introducing her preliminary hearing testimony, arguing that the defense purpose in cross-examining the witness at the preliminary hearing differed from that at the penalty phase. The court ruled that the testimony is simply like any other testimony that's limited, and this testimony will be limited to the acts alleged to have occurred or been perpetrated by the defendant; and that if the witness refuses to testify ... regarding victim impact, which she has the ability to testify within the rules of the court, that is an issue which we will address if she were so to testify. But she's indicated she refuses to testify, so that issue is not before me. The transcript of Mary G.'s preliminary hearing testimony was then read to the jury. Defendant contends the court committed two distinct errors. He first argues the court erred in not permitting Mary G. to testify about what punishment she believed he should receive. He argues the limitation violated the federal constitutional rule that the `sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.` Skipper v. Smith Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1.) He also argues the testimony was admissible under section 190.3, factor (k), which requires the trier of fact to consider [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. The court's ruling was correct. Although victim impact testimony is admissible, the victim's view as to the proper punishment is not. It is clear that the prosecution may not elicit the views of a victim or victim's family as to the proper punishment. ( Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 508-509, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440.) The high court overruled Booth in part, but it left intact its holding that the admission of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. ( Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 830, fn. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2597.) That court has never suggested that the defendant must be permitted to do what the prosecution may not do. The views of a crime victim, especially, as here, of the victim of one of the noncapital crimes, regarding the proper punishment has no bearing on the defendant's character or record or any circumstance of the offense. ( Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669.) Hence, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not compel admission of those views. ( Robison v. Maynard (10th Cir.1991) 943 F.2d 1216, 1216-1217 [even after Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, testimony from a victim's relative that she did not want the jury to impose the death penalty was improper mitigating evidence and inadmissible at the penalty phase hearing].) Citing section 190.3 and the United States Constitution, we have held that testimony from somebody with whom defendant assertedly had a significant relationship, that defendant deserves to live, is proper mitigating evidence as `indirect evidence of the defendant's character.' ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 102, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; see also People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 194, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 194, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) This evidence is admitted, not because the person's opinion is itself significant, but because it provides insights into the defendant's character. ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 456, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) The only relationship Mary G. had with defendant was as his rape victim. The trial court made clear it would permit Mary G. to provide relevant mitigating evidence, but defendant made no offer to prove that her experience as his victim caused her to provide testimonyโ direct or indirectโabout his good character. (Evid.Code, ง 354.) Defendant sought to prove that Mary G. did not want defendant to receive the death penalty, and perhaps also that she held this opinion even though she was one of his victims. This latter point may have demonstrated the strength of her views, but no more. Neither defendant nor Mary G. suggested that her opinion was based on defendant's character, or, indeed, on anything involving defendant personally, rather than her general views on the death penalty. Her personal views on the death penalty, however, were no more relevant to this proceeding than the personal views of defendant's many other victims. The court properly precluded Mary G. from expressing her view on the correct punishment while permitting her to provide any mitigating evidence she may have had to give. [9] Defendant also argues that, for two reasons, the court erred in admitting Mary G.'s preliminary hearing testimony. As we have explained (134 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 23, 26, 68 P.3d pp. at 320, 322, ante ), a witness's previous testimony against a criminal defendant may be admitted at trial if the witness is unavailable, and the defendant had the opportunity at the previous hearing to cross-examine the witness with an interest and motive similar to that at trial. Defendant contends the court erred both in finding that Mary G. was unavailable and that his interests and motives in cross-examining her were similar on both occasions. Again, we disagree. The circumstance that Mary G. was physically present in the courtroom and merely refused to testify does not preclude a finding of unavailability. Evidence Code section 240, which defines when a witness is unavailable, does not specifically describe this situation, but that statute does not state the exclusive or exact circumstances under which a witness may be deemed legally unavailable for purposes of Evidence Code section 1291. ( People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 228, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 914 P.2d 184.) Courts have admitted former testimony of a witness who is physically available but who refuses to testify (without making a claim of privilege) if the court makes a finding of unavailability only after taking reasonable steps to induce the witness to testify unless it is obvious that such steps would be unavailing. ( People v. Sul (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 355, 364-365, 175 Cal.Rptr. 893 (plur.opn.), citing Mason v. United States (10th Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 903; accord, People v. Francis (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 579, 584, 245 Cal.Rptr. 923; People v. Walker (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 886, 894, 193 Cal.Rptr. 812.) The court's efforts to induce Mary G. to testify were reasonable under the unusual circumstances of this case. The court questioned her under oath and asked whether additional time or prosecution for criminal contempt would change her mind. It had no power to incarcerate this victim of a sexual assault for refusing to testify concerning that assault. (Code Civ. Proc., ง 1219, subd. (b).) But defendant argues the court should at least have fined her for contempt of court. We disagree. Trial courts do not have to take extreme actions before making a finding of unavailability. ( People v. Sul, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 369, 175 Cal.Rptr. 893 (cone. opn. of Zenovich, Acting P.J.).) Defendant did not ask the court to take stronger action against her, which was understandable. Because Mary G. was clearly trying to help defendant in refusing to testify against him, he could reasonably not have actually wanted to force her to testify by threat of contempt charges. Under the circumstances, the court did not actually have to fine Mary G. While we find no error in these unusual circumstances, we add that witnesses have no right to make demands of the court like those Mary G. made, and no right to act as a 13th juror. Witnesses under subpoena and present in court have a duty to testify in accordance with the rules of evidence, a duty trial courts have the power to enforce. Witnesses may not condition their testimony on being allowed to state their personal, irrelevant, opinions. Defendant finally argues that his motive and interest in cross-examining Mary G. at the preliminary hearing were different from those at the penalty phase because the sole question at the preliminary hearing was his guilt of the assault on Mary G., but at the penalty phase the question was the proper punishment for his crimes. Hence, he argues, at the preliminary hearing he had no interest in eliciting mitigating evidence, his sole interest at the penalty phase. However, the prosecution offered the testimony at the penalty phase only to prove defendant's guilt of criminal activity involving force or violence under section 190.3, factor (b). Defendant had full opportunity, interest, and motive to cross-examine the witness on this point at the preliminary hearing. He made no apparent attempt to call Mary G. as his own witness at the penalty phase. The record presents no reason to suppose she would have refused to testify on defendant's behalf if defendant had wanted to call her. Defendant's motive and interest in cross-examining Mary G. regarding his guilt of the crimes against her warranted the court's admission of her preliminary hearing testimony. Any error in admitting the preliminary hearing testimony was also harmless. We doubt that defendant would have benefited from the jury's seeing and hearing Mary G.'s live testimony rather than merely hearing the transcript of her earlier testimony. Moreover, the prosecution presented evidence of 14 separate criminal incidents on 13 different dates, not counting the crimes proven at the guilt phase and the jail incidents. The crimes against Mary G, although serious, did not particularly stand out in this long criminal history. She was, for example, an adult and not one of defendant's numerous juvenile victims. The crimes against Mary G. were less serious than the near-fatal stabbing of Cynthia B. The penalty decision in this case did not turn on whether defendant had engaged in 13 rather than 14 other violent criminal episodes.