Opinion ID: 4032952
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the victim was particularly

Text: susceptible or vulnerable to the criminal conduct; (2) the defendant knew or should have known of this susceptibility or vulnerability; and (3) this vulnerability or susceptibility facilitated the defendant’s crime in some manner; that is, there was “a nexus between the victim’s vulnerability and the crime’s ultimate success.” Zats, 298 F.3d at 186 (quoting Iannone, 184 F.3d at 220). The enhancement does not define the word “victim,” but a victim is commonly understood to be someone who is “taken advantage of.” Victim, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993). This definition is consistent with our prior interpretation of the vulnerable victim enhancement. In United States v. Monostra, we held that “the use of the words ‘susceptible’ and ‘vulnerable’ in § 3A1.1 indicates that the enhancement is to be applied when the defendant has taken advantage of the victim’s weakness.” 125 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 1997). To determine whether a defendant has taken advantage of a vulnerable victim, we examine whether “there was ‘a nexus between the victim’s vulnerability and the crime’s ultimate success.’” Iannone, 184 F.3d at 220 (quoting Monostra, 125 F.3d at 190). By requiring a “nexus” between the victim’s vulnerability and the defendant’s scheme, we assess whether a victim has been “taken advantage of” in a manner that facilitates the defendant’s scheme. As such, an analysis of “actual” harm is inconsequential. Any issue regarding the victim’s harm is already encompassed within our analysis of the nexus between a victim’s vulnerability and the crime’s success. Indeed, “the purpose of § 3A1.1, as we see it, is simply to acknowledge that, while most crimes are committed for other motives, in many instances defendants know or should know of their victim’s particular vulnerability and are therefore more blameworthy for knowingly or even 6 negligently harming them.” United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1134, 1139 (3d Cir. 1997). But a defendant is not more or less blameworthy for the purposes of this enhancement based on the amount of harm that a victim experiences. Applying the enhancement in such a manner would create a disparity in the punishments for defendants who are more successful (and cause more harm) and those who are less successful, despite displaying similar depravity. As the Second Circuit has explained, the interest in punishing a defendant’s depravity “is present regardless of whether a defendant who targets a vulnerable victim is ultimately successful; the ‘choice of victim demonstrates an extra measure of criminal depravity’ in either case.” Kimber, 777 F.3d at 564 (quoting United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1505 (2d Cir. 1992)). A contrary result would fail to punish a defendant’s reprehensible conduct and fail to protect vulnerable members of society by deterring future criminal conduct. See Zats, 298 F.3d at 188 (“Our objective is to provide extra deterrence for defendants who are especially likely to succeed in their criminal activities because of the vulnerability of their prey.”); Kimber, 777 F.3d at 564 (“The adjustment ‘reflect[s] the public interest in more severely punishing those whose choice of victim demonstrates an extra measure of criminal depravity.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d at 1505)); United States v. Dupre, 462 F.3d 131, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A] sentencing judge should ‘focus not on the likelihood or extent of harm to the individual if the crime is successful, but on the extent of the individual’s ability to protect himself from the crime.’” (quoting United States v. O’Neil, 118 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 1997))). In light of these policy considerations and our existing test requiring a “nexus” between the victim’s vulnerability and the defendant’s scheme, there is no need to require a separate showing of “actual” harm.6 See, e.g., United States 6 The application notes for the vulnerable victim enhancement also support our holding that a separate showing of actual harm is not required. The application notes explain that “[t]he adjustment would apply, for example, in a fraud case in which the defendant marketed an ineffective cancer cure or in a robbery in which the defendant selected a handicapped victim.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt. n.2. Although 7 v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 419, 423-25 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that reimbursed accountholders were not “victims” under the fraud enhancement because they suffered no financial loss, but affirming the application of the “vulnerable victim” enhancement without an explicit analysis of whether the accountholders experienced harm). Therefore, we will continue to apply Iannone’s three-part test to determine the applicability of this enhancement.