Opinion ID: 197450
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Comparison with Summary Judgment Procedures

Text: 106 Proceeding in the way just suggested may be better, for very pragmatic reasons, than hearing and deciding a motion or cross-motions for summary judgment. See, e.g., Charlton Memorial Hosp. v. Foxboro Co., 818 F.Supp. 456 (D.Mass.1993). Summary judgment procedures were designed primarily for prompt and fair determination of factual issues of the kind that go to the merits and would be decided by the jury in a jury trial if genuinely in dispute. Under summary judgment procedure, the movant has the opportunity and burden of making a showing that no material factual issue is genuinely in dispute. The opponent has the opportunity and burden of proffering admissible evidence sufficient to support a factual finding favorable to the challenged claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Under Rule 56 and local rules implementing its mandates, a litigant who fails to take advantage of its opportunity by a timely proffer of evidence may be procedurally precluded from doing so later on grounds concerned with fair process. E.g., Mas Marques v. Digital Equip. Corp., 637 F.2d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir.1980). 107 Invoking summary judgment procedures for factual issues of the kind that do not go to the merits and would not be submitted to a jury in any event is likely to produce misunderstanding and confusion about when and how the factual dispute is to be resolved. See Charlton Memorial Hosp., 818 F.Supp. at 53-54. If the trial judge needs to hear and consider evidence to be prepared to decide the dispute over a factual issue bearing upon the record for judicial review, Rule 56 constraints do not apply, though the trial judge has discretion to invoke like procedures. Thus, no formal or procedural barrier exists to the trial judge's deciding disputed factual issues about the record, in proceedings upon a pretrial motion rather than at trial. Such a pretrial motion need not be labeled as one for summary judgment. If giving the motion that label leads trial lawyers or the trial judge to assume that the judge can never decide before trial if a finding with respect to a genuinely disputable fact must be made, this flawed assumption reflects a misunderstanding that is likely to create confusion and delay. If, in any event, the decision of a factual dispute about the record is to be made by the judge, not by a jury, the trial judge is not required to await trial. Instead, the trial judge may exercise discretion about the method of proceeding, taking advantage of the opportunity for flexibility about scheduling hearings in preparation for the decision about the record. 108