Opinion ID: 178830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudice From the Failure to Present the Evidence

Text: In Skipper, the Supreme Court reversed a South Carolina court's decision to exclude testimony from two jailers and a regular jail visitor regarding the behavior of a capital defendant during the seven-and-a-half months he spent in pretrial detention awaiting his trial. Significantly, the Supreme Court specifically distinguished the testimony of the two jailers and jailhouse visitor from testimony by Skipper himself and a family member regarding his general good character and adjustment to prison life. South Carolina argued the evidence from the jailers was merely cumulative of the evidence offered by the defendant himself and his former wife, and its exclusion was therefore harmless. 476 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The Supreme Court rejected that claim, stating: The evidence petitioner was allowed to present on the issue of his conduct in jail [i.e., from himself and a family member] was the sort of evidence that a jury naturally would tend to discount as self-serving. The testimony of more disinterested witnessesand, in particular, of jailers who would have had no particular reason to be favorably predisposed toward one of their chargeswould quite naturally be given much greater weight by the jury. Id. The Supreme Court also addressed whether the failure to present such evidence could result in prejudice, stating: Nor can we confidently conclude that credible evidence that petitioner was a good prisoner would have had no effect upon the jury's deliberations. The prosecutor himself, in closing argument, made much of the dangers petitioner would pose if sentenced to prison, and went so far as to assert that petitioner could be expected to rape other inmates. Under these circumstances, it appears reasonably likely that the exclusion of evidence bearing upon petitioner's behavior in jail (and hence, upon his likely future behavior in prison) may have affected the jury's decision to impose the death sentence. Id. Similar arguments were made by the prosecutor in this case. The prosecutor argued Cole had escalated his level of violence from one encounter with his ex-wife to the next, and thus implied the death penalty was the next step needed to stop the escalation: When you think about the culmination of things that were done to be fair to him, for this system to be fair to himhe's given probation, no more guns, for this one. How does he respond? Ex parte order violation: Unscrewing the lights to terrorize, to sneak; just like he did in this case. That explosion through the window to terrorize. No contact. How does he respond to that in 1995? Along with the guns we know what he did. He went back into [] that house. So, the Court escalates things a little. No contact provisions aren't working. He keeps goin' back. No weapons provisions aren't workin'. So he gets work release. Do you know why he gets work release? So he can pay his child support. And he still isyou know, in this case he still didn't do that. And then, he gets the jail time. That's the deterrent. Now he's got jail time. Now he'll abide by the rules. Well guess what? He didn't. Trial Transcript at 1635-36. This argument clearly suggests that a progressively punitive response is necessary to control Cole's behavior, from probation, to a no-contact order, to work release, to jail time. The next step impliedthe death penalty. In light of this argument, the failure to present evidence of Cole's exemplary behavior in jail may have affected the jury's decision to impose the death penalty. In Williams v. Taylor , the Supreme Court emphasized not only the important role evidence of good jailhouse behavior plays in a capital case, but also trial counsel's duty to conduct a thorough investigation regarding all reasonably available mitigating evidence. The Supreme Court granted habeas relief to a capital defendant based on his trial counsel's failure to thoroughly investigate and present mitigating evidence, including evidence of his jailhouse behavior while awaiting trial. The Supreme Court noted that trial counsel failed to investigate Williams's prison records, which showed he broke up a drug distribution ring in the facility, and that prison officials described him as being among the least likely to act in a violent, dangerous or provocative way. 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Similar to Cole, Williams took part in a prison ministry program. Id. He also earned a carpentry degree. Id. The Supreme Court held Williams was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to discover and present his correctional history to the jury, id. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495, despite the fact there were some negative aspects to his correctional history, i.e., he set fire to his cell while awaiting trial for the murder at hand and has repeated visions of harming other inmates. Id. at 419, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Here, the state argues the positive information about Cole's prison behavior would not have made a difference because it was negated by the unfavorable evidence, that is, Cole failing to report to jail after a work release shift. The problem with the state's argument is two-fold. First and foremost, the jury was already aware of the negative information. Cole's trial counsel failed to counter the negative information already known to the jury with positive information from William Bradford, Romel Cochrel, and Sister Judith Klump. Second, the negative information involved in Williams (setting a jail cell on fire) was much more serious than Cole's negative behavior (failure to report), and yet did not prevent the Supreme Court from finding Williams suffered prejudice from his counsel's failure to investigate and present positive jailhouse behavior. Given Skipper's distinction between jailhouse behavior testimony directly from jailers, as opposed to similar character evidence from a capital defendant or his family members, the Missouri Supreme Court's decision that Cole's good jailhouse behavior would have merely been cumulative of other evidence of Cole's good behavior is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. In addition, the emphasis the Supreme Court placed on presenting positive jailhouse behavior in Williams, despite the existence of some negative information, belies Missouri's claim that Cole did not suffer prejudice from his trial counsel's failure to discover and present evidence of his positive jailhouse behavior. II For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the court's decision to affirm the district court's denial of relief on the claim that Cole's trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence regarding Cole's exemplary prison conduct. I would grant habeas relief on that claim and require Missouri to give Cole a new penalty phase trial.