Opinion ID: 1764331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Allen case distinguishable on its facts.

Text: The Allen case, even if authority for the holding here, is distinguishable on its facts. The Allen Court looked at all the provisions of the proposed act it was considering and concluded that the act was invalid. The Court noted the changes made in the act, as follows: The points of difference are as follows: In the published draft the judge of the Third division of the municipal court was named as the judge of the new court, and his successors were to be elected by the judges of the circuit court (as the judges of the municipal court are selected); he was not required to be learned in the law, nor was an age limit prescribed; and the Third division of the municipal court was to be abolished, and its records transferred to the Second division (which itself had been abolished). Whereas the act as passed provided that the judge and his successors shall be appointed by the Governor; the Third division of the municipal court was left intact, and not abolished; the judge must be learned in the law, and not less than 25 years of age. In the published draft, the jurisdiction of the court was to embrace all suits at law where the amount involved did not exceed $300; whereas the act as passed conferred jurisdiction of all such suits where the amount exceeds $100 and does not exceed $300. In the published draft the salary of the clerk was fixed at $2,100 per annum and that of the bailiff at $60 per month; the constables of certain precincts should have authority to execute its process. Whereas in the act as passed the salary of the clerk was fixed at $3,000 per annum, and of the bailiff at $100 per month; the constables were not given power to serve its process, but the sheriff was given such authority. The question presented, therefore, is whether the substantial features of the published proposed act were materially changed in its passage. 219 Ala. at 591, 123 So. 36. The trial judge in this instance stated in his opinion that he considered the proposed bill as a whole, and after applying all the law, which I assume included the rule of the Allen case, concluded that the changes were not material. After a similar review of the act as published and as enacted, I come to the same conclusion. Former Governor O'Neal and the Justices of this Court, even in Allen, were concerned whether the public might be misled. I cannot believe that the published bill, which provided for the election of members of the board of the Civic Center Authority by the Jefferson County legislative delegation as a whole voting jointly, was misleading because the enacted version provides that the senate delegation would appoint five and the house delegation would appoint four. In fact, a liberal construction of voting jointly would uphold the act, because the same delegation does vote jointly in the enacted version. [1] If we construed the words voting jointly liberally, we would hold that the change did not change the fact that the legislative delegation still was voting jointly. The manner of the voting jointly was changed, but the number of Board members to be elected and the persons voting remained the same. That was not true in Allen. In Allen, not only was the appointing authority changed, but several other changes were made. I read Allen, at most, to speak to the cumulative effect of so many changes in so many different areas of the proposed bill. Amicus curiae argues: The substance of the subject bill as published was not set out in general terms but instead, contained the specific details of obtaining membership to the Board by providing for a legislative electoral college consisting of all Senators and all Representatives of Jefferson County voting collectively. Accordingly, the statement of the substance is `narrow and restrictive' and, given such details, `the public need not pursue the inquiry further in respect to such details and has the constitutional right to assume that such details will not be materially changed.' Act No. 80-383 as passed materially changed such details. The details of the legislative electoral college consisting of all Senators and Representatives voting collectively was removed and other details providing for Senators to elect five members separately and House members to elect four members separately was substituted. From the published notice the public had the right to assume that each of its Senators would have a vote on all nine Board members and that each of its Representatives would have a vote on all nine Board members. Instead, the Senators were permitted to vote on only five Board members and the Representatives were permitted to vote on only four Board members. The result is disenfranchisement of the Senators as to four members and disenfranchisement of the Representatives as to five members. The further result is that the Representatives are prevented from voting on a majority of the nine member Board, i.e., the Senators have voting control over a majority of the Board. Certainly, there is no way the public could be held to have anticipated this result from the details published. Accordingly, the variances between the details of the bill as published and the details of the Act as passed are of substance, and do amount to material changes and contradictions and cannot constitute mere shaping up and working out of details. This argument ignores the statement made by this Court in Calhoun County v. Morgan, 258 Ala. 352, 62 So.2d 457 (1952): The publication of the act in extenso does not serve to cause every feature of it to be matter of substance which would otherwise be considered mere matter of detail.... The essence of the inquiry is whether the change from the proposal as published in extenso is material. This principle does not prohibit changes which are not material. It must be remembered that the Jefferson County delegation, because of its size, necessarily may not be able to shape up and work out details of local legislation as is true of counties with a single representative and a shared senator. The citizens of Jefferson County must know that compromises sometimes must be made to accommodate the varying interests in local legislation affecting Jefferson County. Does this decision mean that the Jefferson County delegation, and other large local delegations, must work out their differences before they advertise their bills? Apparently so. Then what need is there of legislative debate, and what about the concerns of the whole legislature of Alabama, which must vote on local legislation? Is the legislature so strapped that it cannot amend a detail of legislation which a majority of the public it represents might desire? Apparently so. I recognize the concept of local courtesy. It was mentioned in the constitutional debates, but since the whole legislature voted on the amendments which are now declared illegal, I must assume that the legislature knew what was published and knew that a change had been made. In any event, I cannot presume that the legislature was consciously trying to mislead the people of Jefferson County by making the changes it did. The evils of local legislation which concerned the Constitutional Convention are not even hinted at in this record. The Attorney General, in brief, asked some of the same questions I asked: If the change made in this piece of local legislation is a material change such as would bring the act into violation of § 106, then what minor changes may the legislature make in local legislation? Is the legislature tied to accepting or rejecting a local bill as published? Certainly it was not the intent of the framers of the Constitution and it has not been the intent of this Court that § 106 be given such a narrow interpretation. We submit that the changes in Act 80-383 were insubstantial and immaterial, and that the Trial Court properly found that in the total context of the Act the change made from the published bill to the adopted Act was not a material one. In summary, my study of the debates on Section 106 in the Constitutional Convention convinces me that the majority, ostensibly following precedent, has failed to carry out the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The majority takes one detail from one paragraph in a bill which covers 20 pages of the volume of 1980 legislative acts and applies a narrow and literal construction to Section 106. In McGehee v. State, ex rel. Tate, 199 Ala. 287, 290, 74 So. 374 (1916), the Court opined: `The Constitution does not proceed upon the theory that all the details of every proposed law will be worked out in advance and without the aid of legislative wisdom. It requires only that the local public shall be advised of the substance of the proposed law, of its characteristic and essential provisions, of its most important features.' Christian v. State, 171 Ala. 52, 54 So. 1001. A narrow and literal construction would destroy all power of amendment in the legislative process, so that the Legislature would be required to accept, if at all, every local bill in the exact terms of its proposal. Not being inclined to hamper legislation unnecessarily, this court has held that the Constitution was not intended to interfere with the right of the Legislature to shape up and work out the details of local legislation. Ensley v. Cohn, 149 Ala. 316, 42 So. 827; State v. Williams, 143 Ala. 501, 39 So. 276; State ex rel. Hanna v. Tunstall, 145 Ala. 477, 40 So. 135. The effect of the decision insofar as this case is concerned can be easily remedied during the current session by advertising the act just like it passed originally, but it will take a long time to undo the legal principle that publication of a detail automatically makes that detail a matter of substance. The press of time does not permit me to set out in minute detail all the illustrations from our cases which support my view that the change here was not one of substance, but I refer the reader to Skinner's Alabama Constitution Annotated, pp. 518-534, where these cases are annotated. I am painfully aware that I stand alone in this matter, but I believe the effect of this opinion will unduly affect the public's right, after having been notified of pending local legislation, to seek amendments to that legislation. I was always under the impression that the whole purpose of a notice requirement was to give the public an opportunity to lobby for or against the proposed legislation. Since I think the Court frustrates this principle, I must respectfully dissent.