Opinion ID: 2504293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compositions of the Grand and Traverse Juries

Text: Morrow claims that the compositions of his grand and traverse juries were unconstitutional and violated OCGA § 15-12-40 because Hispanic persons were under-represented on the lists from which those juries were drawn. The habeas court correctly concluded that it was not free to reexamine this claim on habeas corpus, because the claim was decided adversely to Morrow on direct appeal. See Hall v. Lance, 286 Ga. 365, 376(III), 687 S.E.2d 809 (2010) (holding that matters decided on direct appeal may not be re-examined by the habeas courts); Morrow, 272 Ga. at 692-695(1), 532 S.E.2d 78 (addressing Morrow's jury composition claim on direct appeal). Morrow argues that the habeas court should have re-opened this claim, arguing that the release of the 2000 Census has revealed new facts which should now be considered. See Lance, 286 Ga. at 376, 687 S.E.2d 809(III) (noting that habeas courts should not reconsider issues previously addressed by this Court where there has been no change in the law or the facts since this Court's decision); Bruce v. Smith 274 Ga. 432, 434(2), 553 S.E.2d 808 (2001) (noting that, [w]ithout a change in the facts or the law, a habeas court will not review an issue decided on direct appeal). But see Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 257(II)(A)(1), 587 S.E.2d 613 (2003) (noting that a claim based on new law may only serve as the basis for habeas corpus relief if the new law is of the type that is given retroactive effect). This Court allows claims to be revisited on habeas corpus where new facts have developed since the time of the direct appeal not because the Court intends to allow prisoners to have a second chance to prove their claims but, instead, because a claim that is based on facts that did not actually exist at the time of direct appeal is essentially a different claim. We reject Morrow's argument that his jury composition claim should be re-opened, because we find that he has pointed merely to a new means by which the relevant facts might be proven rather than to any new underlying facts. His present claim does not present a new claim. Furthermore, even if this claim were not barred by res judicata, it would lack merit in light of our holding that jury commissioners properly rely on the most-recent Decennial Census that is available at the time jury lists are constructed. See Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 735, 699 S.E.2d 25 (2010).