Opinion ID: 2241940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alternatives to Closure

Text: Waller requires the trial court to consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded that this imposes an affirmative duty on trial courts to raise alternatives sua sponte and place their consideration of them on the record ( see , Ayala v Speckard , 89 F.3d 91, adhered to on reh 102 F.3d 649, cert denied ___ US ___, 117 S Ct 1838 [May 19, 1997], reh en banc granted No. 95-2463 [2d Cir May 19, 1997]). [2] Because this conflicts with our conclusion in Pearson (82 NY2d at 443-444, supra ), decided more than two years before Ayala , we reexamine the relevant precedent. Waller derived from the standards articulated 13 years ago by the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Ct. of Cal. (464 US 501 [1984]) ( Press-Enterprise I ) for closing courtrooms under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. [3] In Press-Enterprise I , the court in a rape trial denied the media's request to open the voir dire to the press and public, closing all but three days of the six-week proceeding. The State, in opposing access, argued that closure was necessary to protect sensitive information related by prospective jurors and encourage candor. The court also refused to release the transcript, even though most of the recorded questioning was of little moment ( see , id. , at 503-504). On review, the Supreme Court set forth the following guidelines: The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered ( id. , at 510). The Court further explained that [a]bsent consideration of alternatives to closure, the trial court could not constitutionally close the voir dire  ( id. , at 511). Specifically, the trial court could have minimize[d] the risk of unnecessary closure by keeping the proceedings open but allowing jurors to request in camera questioning for sensitive subject matter ( id. , at 512-513). Likewise, before suppressing the entire transcript, the court could have consider[ed] whether [it] could disclose the substance of the sensitive answers while preserving the anonymity of the jurors involved ( id. , at 513). Under these circumstances, closure violated the First Amendment. Four months after Press-Enterprise I , the Supreme Court concluded in Waller that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public (467 US at 46, supra ). It thus held that the Press-Enterprise I rules applied to closure under the Sixth Amendment, articulating the oft-cited four-part test for closure ( id. , at 47-48). Applying that test, the Court deemed the closure in Waller improper. The People had sought to exclude the public from the defendant's hearing on his motion to suppress wiretaps and other seized evidence, because the wiretap information would become inadmissible under State statute if published. The Supreme Court explained that the trial court's findings did not justify its decision to close all seven days of the hearing, when the wiretap tapes lasted only two and one-half hours. In particular, [t]he court did not consider alternatives to immediate closure of the entire hearing such as directing the government to provide more detail about its need for closure    and closing only those parts of the hearing that jeopardized the interests advanced  ( id. , at 48-49 [emphasis added]). Just two years later, in Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Ct. (478 US 1 [1986], supra ) ( Press-Enterprise II ), the Supreme Court again addressed the reasonable alternatives requirement in the First Amendment context. In a highly publicized murder prosecution, the Magistrate granted the defendant's unopposed motion to close the preliminary hearing in order to protect his interest in a fair trial; it then refused to release the transcript of the 41-day proceeding. The Supreme Court found this denial of access improper, pointing out that [i]f the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed only if specific findings are made demonstrating that    reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights ( id. , at 14). Relying on these precedents, the Second Circuit recently held in Ayala v Speckard (89 F.3d 91, supra ) that it is error for trial courts to close their courtrooms during testimony by the undercover officer in buy-and-bust cases without explicitly addressing possible alternatives, such as the use of a screen or disguise. Where neither party proposes such measures, moreover, courts are obligated to raise and consider the possible use of such alternative devices on their own ( see also , Pearson v James , 105 F.3d 828, supra ; Okonkwo v Lacy , 104 F.3d 21, supra ; United States v Peters , 754 F.2d 753, 761 [7th Cir 1985] [involving exclusion of media from voir dire proceedings, in violation of the First Amendment]). On rehearing in Ayala , the court emphasized the presumption of openness and that closure was to be no broader than necessary ( see , 102 F.3d 649 [2d Cir Dec. 11, 1996], supra ). We agree that these principles require trial courts, before excluding the public, to consider whether something short of complete closure would protect the overriding interest at stake. Indeed, Waller itself mandates that the trial court  must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding (467 US at 48 [emphasis added]). Waller , however, does not hold that the trial court must explicitly consider alternatives on the record. Nor does it address who has the burden of suggesting possible alternatives. Rather, Waller merely requires factual findings adequate to support the closure ( id. ). Tellingly, in Waller itself the record patently lacked facts sufficient to justify closing the entire seven-day suppression hearing. Only a small portion of the hearing involved the sensitive information that the government  the proponent of closure  sought to shield from the public, and no link whatsoever was made between the government's interest in confidentiality and the remainder of the proceeding. In light of this facial record deficiency, the trial court's overly broad closure order could not be upheld without some explanation for its failure to limit closure to the sensitive portions of the proceeding. Likewise, in Press-Enterprise I , the proponent of closure (the government) failed to adduce adequate record facts to support the conclusion that the entire voir dire proceeding would involve sensitive juror questioning. The trial court nonetheless made no effort to limit closure to those portions of the proceeding comprising sensitive subject matter. And in Press-Enterprise II , as well, the Supreme Court indicated that it was concerned about the excessive breadth of the closure, noting that closure of an entire 41-day proceeding would rarely be warranted and that the trial court had failed to consider alternatives short of complete closure (478 US at 14, 15, supra ). Thus, in Press-Enterprise I , Waller and Press-Enterprise II , the records lacked minimally sufficient facts to establish that the portions of the proceedings subject to closure would even implicate the interests sought to be protected. Because only those parts of the proceedings that compromised the interests advanced could be closed, the need to restrict closure further was apparent from the record. The obligation to consider alternatives to accomplish this was inherent in the courts' duty to ensure that closure be narrowly tailored. Importantly, these cases did not address application of the Waller test where the record makes no mention of alternatives but is otherwise sufficient to establish the need to close the particular proceeding ( see also , Matter of Associated Press v Bell , 70 N.Y.2d 32, 39 [closure improper, where no findings that defendant's rights would be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent or that reasonable alternatives could not adequately protect those rights, and such findings would not have had support in the record]). We conclude that, under the circumstances now presented, it can be implied that the trial court, in ordering closure, determined that no lesser alternative would protect the articulated interest ( see , People v Bamberg , 51 N.Y.2d 868, 870 [trial court's disposition of suppression motion may sufficiently imply its findings]; People v Alfinito , 16 N.Y.2d 181, 186). Furthermore, the question as to who is responsible for enumerating desirable alternatives to closure was not before the Waller Court. Squarely faced with that question now, we conclude that, where the factual record permits closure and the closure is not facially overbroad, the party opposed to closing the proceeding must alert the court to any alternative procedures that allegedly would equally preserve the interest ( see , Gannett Co. v DePasquale , 443 US 368, 401 [Powell, J., concurring], supra [members of the press and public who object to closure have the responsibility of showing to the court's satisfaction that alternative procedures are available that would eliminate the dangers shown]). This comports with our holding in Pearson , where we rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in failing to consider, on its own, certain alternatives to closing the courtroom during the undercover officer's testimony, such as stationing a guard at the door to screen spectators, asking the defendant for particular family members he would like present or having the officer testify from behind a screen ( see , 82 NY2d at 444, supra ). In Pearson , the facts sufficed to establish the requisite likelihood that the undercover officer's safety  the interest advanced there to support closure  would be compromised by her testifying openly in the defendant's case. The People's closure application, moreover, was limited to that particular witness and, therefore, already narrowly tailored to the portion of the trial that would jeopardize the safety interest ( compare , Waller v Georgia , 467 US at 48, supra ). We concluded that, on the present record, the court did not err in failing to explore alternatives to closure explicitly (82 NY2d at 444). There were findings adequate to support the closure during the entirety of the undercover witness's testimony, as Waller requires (467 US at 48), and it could therefore be implied from the court's granting the People's motion that it considered excluding the public during that discrete part of the trial to be the least restrictive alternative that would ensure the officer's safety. If, at that point, the defendant had alternative measures in mind that he wished the court to consider, he had the responsibility of showing to the court's satisfaction that [they] would eliminate the dangers shown ( Gannett Co. v DePasquale , 443 US at 401, supra [Powell, J., concurring]). Any other rule would place an impractical  if not impossible  burden on trial courts, particularly in buy-and-bust cases. Even if the court were to hold a separate hearing on the issue, or itself consider and reject some alternatives to closing the proceeding, a defendant on appeal could likely always conjure up yet another method of concealing the witness's identity that the court overlooked. Under these circumstances, placing the onus wholly on trial courts would provide an incentive for defendants to remain silent ( see , Pearson v James , 105 F3d at 832, supra [Jacobs and Cabranes, JJ., concurring]). This is especially true where, as in Pearson and buy-and-bust cases generally, the alternative measures suggested by defendants for the first time on appeal  a disguise, a partition, a guard stationed at the door to screen each prospective spectator  are potentially prejudicial to the defendant. Any device used to conceal the witness's appearance threatens defendant's confrontation rights and also suggests to the jury that the defendant (or the defendant's family) is dangerous, while conducting a hearing with regard to each individual who seeks to enter the courtroom could become unduly disruptive. These procedures, therefore, might not be considered reasonable by the trial court or the particular defendant, and their imposition sua sponte could raise other fair trial concerns. In light of these considerations, we adhere to our holding in Pearson and conclude that the trial courts in the instant cases did not breach their duty to consider reasonable alternatives to closing the courtroom. Both records were sufficient to establish that any open-court testimony by the undercover officers would jeopardize their safety and effectiveness, and the closure did not extend beyond the live testimony of the witnesses at risk. Neither defendant, moreover, mentioned particular alternatives he was willing to adopt. To the contrary, when the court in Ramos suggested, on its own, alternative methods of concealing the witness's identity, counsel voiced immediate concern. Finally, no mention was made of specific individuals the defendants wished to attend ( see , People v Nieves , 90 N.Y.2d 426 [decided today]). Our holding today, however, by no means constitutes a green light for closing courtrooms in all buy-and-bust cases, and we condemn the allegedly routine practice of closing the courtroom during the testimony of undercover officers ( see , Ayala v Speckard , 102 F3d at 650, 651, n 1 [2d Cir Dec. 11, 1996], supra ). This practice flies in the face of directives by the United States Supreme Court and this Court regarding courtroom closure. We therefore stress that defendants' Sixth Amendment rights must not be lightly cast aside simply because the People claim that an undercover officer's safety or effectiveness is at risk, and trial courts must vigilantly ensure that Waller 's demanding first prong is satisfied before closing a courtroom. Furthermore, because the undercover officer generally constitutes the primary witness against the defendant in buy-and-bust cases, we reiterate that it is surely the better practice for trial courts to explore the feasibility of possible alternatives to closing the courtroom with counsel on the record, even where it is not mandated ( People v Martinez , 82 NY2d at 444, supra ). Indeed, we agree with the Second Circuit that some alternatives appear to have been worth considering and might in certain cases be appropriately substituted for closure ( Pearson v James , 105 F3d at 830, supra ). Accordingly, in each case the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. In People v Ramos : On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order affirmed. In People v Ayala : Order affirmed.