Opinion ID: 3029277
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CEPA Retaliation

Text: Muzslay also contends City officials violated the CEPA by retaliating against him because of his objections to Longo’s treatment of Yust, the City’s refusal to extend lifeguard hours and abrogation of his duties.4 To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, Muzslay must show (1) he reasonably believed his employer’s conduct was unlawful; (2) 4. Muzslay does not contend City officials violated CEPA by retaliating against him for his Tort Claims Notice filing. 8 he “blew the whistle” on the employer’s conduct; (3) his employer took adverse action against him; and (4) a causal connection exists between his whistle-blowing activity and his employer’s action. Blackburn v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1999). If the defendants offer some legitimate reason for their actions, the plaintiff must then convince the fact-finder both that the defendants’ proffered reason is false, and that retaliation was their real motivation. Id. There is no evidence that Muzslay “blew the whistle” on the City’s refusal to extend lifeguard hours. He only recommended they extend lifeguard hours, and he only made that recommendation according to his official duties, not as a private citizen. See Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960. Further, although he objected to Longo’s demotion of Yust, there is no evidence he thought this decision was unlawful. Similarly, he protested removal of some of his responsibilities, but there was no “clear mandate of public policy” that prevented Longo from reassigning his duties to others. N.J. S TAT. A NN. 34:19 – 3(c)(3) (2006).5 There is evidence, however, that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Muzslay “blew the whistle” on Longo’s interference in the pension board matter, and that Muzslay reasonably believed Longo’s actions were unlawful. The City took adverse employment action against Muzslay by deciding not to re-hire him for the 2001 season. 5. The District Court correctly pointed out that Muzslay’s authority was subject to Longo’s authority to “assign and .... modify the functions and duties of subordinates.” Ordinance 90-20, Article 4, 2-1.22 (c)(3). See Appendix at 1112. 9 Again, given the on-going antagonism between Muzslay and Longo, a reasonable jury could find a causal connection existed between these events. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment with respect to this latter claim under the CEPA.