Opinion ID: 2516086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Communications Between Frank Brewer And His Criminal Defense Attorneys

Text: In this case, the defendant argues that any statements made by Frank Brewer at the joint meeting are not privileged because these communications were made in the presence of a third party, Cheryl Brewer. [12] Hence, the defendant contends that the subsequent disclosure of the statements made at the joint meeting did not constitute a waiver of the privilege attaching to any separate communications made between Frank Brewer and his criminal defense attorneys. The defendant argues that any confidential communications occurring between Frank Brewer and his attorneys at their private meetings, which happened outside the presence of a third party, remain privileged and protected despite the suicide letters. Wesp does not dispute the defendant's contention that the statements made at the joint meeting are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. [13] In fact, she states in her offer of proof that the subject of any communications among Frank Brewer, his attorney, and Cheryl Brewer were never privileged from disclosure. Additionally, she argues to this court that [t]here can be no denying [that] much of the information known by Prendergast and Oswald is far outside any recognized privilege [including] information about conversations with Cheryl Brewer . . . [and] information about conversations with Frank Brewer in the presence of third parties. Thus, Wesp concedes that any statements made at the joint meeting are not privileged. Wesp claims, however, that Frank Brewer expressly waived all protection of the attorney-client privilege because the suicide letters disclose communications made at the joint meeting. She argues that statements made in the Brewers' suicide letters operate as a waiver of other communications (such as those made between Frank Brewer and his attorneys at private meetings) which would have been privileged absent the suicide letters and the statements made therein. We disagree. Wesp's argument omits the necessary first step of finding that a privilege exists for communications that occurred at the joint meeting and moves directly to the second step of finding that the privilege has been waived. As a matter of logic, one may not waive a privilege when a privilege does not exist. Wesp's concession that no privilege attached to statements made at the joint meeting defeats her ultimate argument that the suicide letters operate as a waiver of privileged communications. [14] Because the communications made at the joint meeting were not privileged, it follows that those communications are discoverable. [15] Absent proof of another basis to pierce the protection of the attorney-client privilege, communications between Frank Brewer and his attorneys occurring at other times and places remain privileged so long as the party asserting the privilege can demonstrate that the requirements of the privilege are satisfied.