Opinion ID: 400169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Payment of Investigator Fees

Text: 12 Appellant argues that the district court erred in refusing to certify payment of the investigator fees and costs. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) 4 provided in relevant part: 13 (e) Services other than counsel. 14 (1) Upon request.-Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court, or the United States magistrate if the services are required in connection with a matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel to obtain the services. 15 (2) Without prior request.-Counsel appointed under this section may obtain, subject to later review, investigative, expert, or other services without prior authorization if necessary for an adequate defense. The total cost of services obtained without prior authorization may not exceed $150 and expenses reasonably incurred. 16 (3) Maximum amounts.-Compensation to be paid to a person for services rendered by him to a person under this subsection, or to be paid to an organization for services rendered by an employee thereof, shall not exceed $300, exclusive of reimbursement for expenses reasonably incurred, unless payment in excess of that limit is certified by the court, or by the United States magistrate if the services were rendered in connection with a case disposed of entirely before him, as necessary to provide fair compensation for services of an unusual character or duration, and the amount of the excess payment is approved by the chief judge of the circuit. (Emphasis added.) 17 Appellant appears to argue that once the judge approved the $1,000 to Investigator Zurkey he was in fact finding that payments in excess of the $300 limit would be necessary to provide fair compensation for services of an unusual character or duration. Therefore all additional charges did not require prior authorization and the judge was compelled to approve the additional expenditures subject only to a finding that the charges provide fair compensation. We disagree. 18 At the time Mangan requested the additional authorization of $10,000, the district court told him that he wanted to discuss the request; however, no discussion of the request ever occurred. Mangan asserts that instead he talked to one of the district judge's law clerks, who told him that the request had to be more specific. Mangan claims that he had the clerk talk to the investigator himself, and when Mangan heard nothing else from the court he states that he assumed that authorization had been implicitly granted. Even though no formal authorization was granted, Mangan told the investigator to proceed. 19 Judge Conti stated that he never heard from Mangan again after the court proceeding where he advised Mangan that further discussion was necessary until the voucher was submitted for payment. 20 The record indicates that Mangan was aware of Judge Conti's desire to approve requests for investigator fees in advance. The fact that he submitted an advance request supports the assumption. In addition, the record shows that Judge Conti stated in open court that he wanted counsel to obtain authorization for investigators' expenses prior to incurring the expenses. Although the statement was directed to counsel for a co-defendant, it was further indication to Mangan, who was present at the time, that such authorization was needed. In addition, the first bill submitted by the investigator totaled $1,111.65 but only $1,000 was authorized for payment. This should have alerted Mangan that Judge Conti intended to abide by the amount authorized in advance. We also note that the investigation totaled approximately $4,000 in additional fees before Mangan's December 14, 1979 request for additional fee authorization which disputes his contention that he attempted to obtain prior authorization. 21 This is an unsettled area of the law. There has been very little judicial interpretation of § 3006A(e). The parties do not cite and we are unable to find any controlling authority. 22 The courts have interpreted the Criminal Justice Act to the effect that control over its administration should be with the judiciary rather than private counsel. See United States v. Oddo, 474 F.2d 978 (2nd Cir. 1973); Christian v. United States, 398 F.2d 517, 519 (10th Cir. 1968). 5 A reading of the Criminal Justice Act convinces us that Congress intended the courts to control large expenditures for indigent defendants. This is emphasized by the advance authorization requirement and the low amount of the stated limit. In fact, it is not clear from a reading of § 3006A(e) that a judge has the power to approve an expenditure of more than $150 when such expenditure was made without advance authorization. 6 In the House Report on the bill to amend § 3006A concerning subpart (e), it stated: 23 Section 1(e)(2) changes corresponding provisions of the 1964 act by allowing appointing counsel to obtain these services without prior authorization in an amount not exceeding $150, plus reasonable expenses, if the services and expenses are necessary for an adequate defense and circumstances prevent him from securing prior authorization from the court. Payment, however, is subject to later review and approval by the court. (Emphasis added.) 24 H.R.Rep. 91-1546, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970), reprinted in (1970) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3982, 3991. We are convinced that Congress intended the courts to control expenditures for indigent defendants. 7 25 A review of the record in this case, somewhat similar cases, and the legislative history of the Criminal Justice Act and § 3006A(e) convinces us that Judge Conti acted well within his discretion in denying payment of the investigator's bill. We decline to accept appellant's contention that the judge's approval of the $1,000 payment constituted implied consent to future expenses subject only to a fair compensation requirement. This would remove much of the court's control over the expenses incurred by appointed counsel and be contrary to the wishes of Congress as expressed in § 3006A(e). 26 Mangan's assertion that Judge Conti never informed him that the request had not been granted does not change the result. It is not unreasonable to put on counsel the burden of determining whether motions have been acted upon. Counsel should not assume requests have been granted simply because he has not been informed that they have been denied. In addition, Judge Conti's expressed desire to discuss the request with Mangan should have alerted him to the possibility of a problem. 27 We find the other arguments made by appellant and amicus to be unpersuasive. 8