Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on Intent to Kill as to the Felony-murder Special Circumstances

Text: (27) In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 138-154 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], we held that intent to kill was an element of the felony-murder special circumstance, and that the trial court was obligated to so instruct. In People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pages 1138-1147, we overruled Carlos and held that intent to kill was required for an aider and abettor but not for the actual killer, and that the court was under a duty to instruct accordingly. When the felony-murder special circumstance is alleged to have occurred after Carlos and before Anderson, the former governs. (E.g., People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 973, fn. 4 [281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131], citing In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 514 [252 Cal. Rptr. 418] (per Arabian, J.).) This is such a case. (28) Defendant contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as it did on intent to kill. He argues that its instructions on the issue were ambiguous and, as such, were inadequate. In considering defendant's claim, we must address the following crucial question: Did the instructions adequately inform the jury of the requirement of intent to kill? To resolve this issue, as stated above, we must determine how a hypothetical reasonable juror would have, or at least could have, understood the charge. In our view, the instructions more than adequately informed the jury of the requirement of intent to kill. A reasonable juror would have understood the charge as containing that requirement, and could not have construed it otherwise. The trial court declared in words whose meaning could hardly have been plainer: To find that the special circumstances referred to in these instructions are true, it must be proved That the defendant intended to kill a human being; and, in each of the three special circumstances ..., a necessary element is the existence in the mind of the defendant of the specific intent to unlawfully kill a human being.... Defendant argues to the contrary. But nothing to which he points in the record  including the charge as a whole and the arguments of counsel  is sufficient to undermine our conclusion. Certainly, nothing obscures the plain meaning of the words quoted above.