Opinion ID: 2675558
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Taint on Mock's Reputation

Text: Mock additionally contends that she was severely prejudiced by the taint she received when the government produced evidence of Young's sordid sexual exploits -26- to show Young's disdain for Griesbauer, as well as her motivation to save her farm by collecting life insurance proceeds. We have affirmed rulings permitting evidence far more inculpatory than Young's sexual misbehavior. For example, in United States v. Kuenstler, this court determined that severance was not required despite introduction of evidence involving a codefendant's criminal record, his greater involvement in the crimes charged, his participation in other attempts and schemes to make methamphetamine, and his threats to witnesses. 325 F.3d 1015, 1024 (8th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, we have noted that proper limiting instructions can alleviate or minimize any potential harm that codefendants contract from evidence that reflects poorly on them. See United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 895 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Crouch, 46 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 1995). Here, the court twice instructed the jury to consider the evidence in question against Young only. Additionally, this court has determined that district courts did not err by refusing to sever the trials of codefendants in situations where the stain created by evidence used against one defendant was far more inculpatory than the evidence presented here. See Kuenstler, 325 F.3d at 1024. As a result, we hold that Mock has not shown that the testimony introduced against Young prejudiced her such that reversal on severance grounds is warranted.