Opinion ID: 2977285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing in Excess of the Guidelines Range

Text: Blackie argues that the district court failed to state any specific reason for the imposition of a sentence in excess of the Guidelines range in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), which states: (c) Statement of reasons for imposing a sentence. - The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence – (2) is not of the kind, or is outside the range, described in subsection (a)(4), the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment . . . . The district court must also acknowledge “the defendant’s applicable Guideline range.” United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 305 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cousins, 469 F.3d 572, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2006). A sentence imposed without complying with the requirements of § 3553(c) constitutes error. United States v. Hernandez, 213 Fed. Appx. 457, 460 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a sentence imposed without complying with § 3553(c)(2) constitutes plain error, even assuming its length is reasonable)). These requirements are more than mere administrative burdens or meaningless formalities, but rather assure that the court has properly calculated the applicable Guidelines range, and that adequate explanation is provided to allow for meaningful appellate review and the perception of a fair sentence. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597-98 (2007). In this case, the district court acknowledged at the beginning of the sentencing hearing that the PSR recommended an adjusted offense level of 25 and a criminal category of I, but failed to state the corresponding Guideline range. After hearing arguments from Blackie and the government regarding Blackie’s family responsibilities, the court considered the enhancement levels recommended in the PSR. The court found that two of the enhancements were not warranted in this case and gave its reasons for rejecting or reducing those enhancements. Unfortunately, the court was not clear as to whether it had rejected the specific enhancements or simply reduced their numerical levels. This ambiguity persisted as the district court never recalculated the new offense level or the new Guidelines range during the sentencing hearing. The district court then sentenced Blackie to a term of 42 months without indicating that the sentence was outside the Guidelines range or stating the court’s specific reasons for the variance. See Cousins, 469 F.3d at 578 (finding a sentence procedurally unreasonable when “the district judge failed to provide his reasoning for the variance or to explain how the two months that he added to the maximum Guidelines sentence were related to his stated goal of protecting the public, which No. 07-2002 United States v. Blackie Page 6 might as easily be invoked to justify a variance of one day or ten years. We therefore hold that the1 district court failed to provide sufficient explanation to permit meaningful appellate review . . .”). Because of the ambiguity during Blackie’s sentencing hearing, the exact nature of the district court’s determinations as to the new offense level and Guidelines range were not made apparent until the court issued a written judgment and commitment order, which classified the sentence as “above the advisory guideline range.” The order further clarified that the recommended four-level enhancement for masochistic content was reduced to one level and the two-level enhancement for the number of images was rejected entirely. Yet, the written judgment and commitment order also lacks the requisite level of specificity as to the reasons for sentencing above the Guideline range. The order simply checked two boxes to indicate its reasons for sentencing outside the guideline system and left blank the section of the order for facts justifying the sentence. The district court’s failure to comply with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) constitutes error. Given the clarity of § 3553(c)(2), the district court plainly erred when it did not refer to the applicable Guidelines range and failed to provide its specific reasons for an upward departure or variance at the time of sentencing or in the written judgment and commitment order. See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 389, 392 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that an error is plain when it is “clear” or “obvious”); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that “the text of [§3553(c)(2)] (‘in open court’) leaves no doubt that although [the district court] did issue written reasons, the district court committed error that is plain by failing to explain the reasons for the departure”). Having established a plain error, we must next determine if that error affected Blackie’s substantial rights, and whether that “error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-37. Defendants have a right to meaningful appellate review of their sentences and § 3553(c) facilitates such a review by requiring the district court to state its specific reasons for imposing a particular sentence. While the Sixth Circuit has not directly addressed whether a violation of § 3553(c)(2) affects a defendant’s substantial rights,2 the Second, Tenth, and District of 3Columbia Circuits have found the right to meaningful appellate review to be a “substantial” right. United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 247 1 While we review Blackie’s sentence for plain error, and not the unreasonableness standard used in Cousins, the failure of the court to comply with § 3553(c) is not only procedurally unreasonable, but it also constitutes error. 2 Cf. United States v. Hernandez, 213 Fed. Appx. 457 (6th Cir. 2007). In an unpublished opinion, this court addressed whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) amounted to plain error. There, the district court imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range, but failed to state in open court why it chose the particular sentence within that range. We held that the district court’s failure to “comply with the dictates of § 3553(c)(1)” constituted error, and this error was plain. However, because this court found that the district court articulated “its reasons by reference to the § 3553(a) factors” and gave “a generalized picture of its reasoning,” we concluded that the defendant’s substantial rights were not affected. We further distinguished the facts in Hernandez from those in Lewis, where the defendant was sentenced outside the Guidelines range in violation of § 3553(c)(2) and the district court “‘stat[ed] no reasons at all’ for its sentencing decision.” Id. at 461 (quoting Lewis, 424 F.3d at 245). The facts before us today are more similar to Lewis. 3 Other Circuits have come close to addressing this issue in unpublished opinions. See United States v. Gant, 220 Fed. Appx 588, 589-90 (9th Cir. 2007) where reviewing an alleged § 3553(c)(2) violation for plain error, the court found that it was “not necessary to decide whether either alleged error satisfies the first three conditions of the plain error test” and declined to exercise its discretion “to notice the alleged errors.” See also United States v. Robaina, 194 Fed. Appx. 735, 739 (11th Cir. 2006) where the court found the “reasons for the sentence…imposed are evident from the sentencing transcript” and therefore no plain error. But cf., United States v. Williams, 438 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (where the Eleventh Circuit “reject[ed] the government's argument that this error is subject only to plain error review. . . . We focus exclusively on the ‘sufficiency’ of the court’s conduct at sentencing, not that of the defendant: ‘Congress has specifically proclaimed that a sentencing court shall state ‘the reason for imposing a sentence [exceeding 24 months] at a particular point within the No. 07-2002 United States v. Blackie Page 7 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Section 3553(c) bestows on defendants the right to argue more effectively that – and enables us to decide more effectively whether – a sentence is ‘reasonable.’ This right seems to us clearly to be ‘substantial.’”) (followed by United States v. DeMott, 513 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2008)); In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We join the Second Circuit in holding that the failure to provide a statement of reasons as required by § 3553(c) is plain error, ‘even when the length of the resulting sentence would otherwise be reasonable.’”); United States v. Acevedo, 219 Fed. Appx. 828, 833 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the defendant “is entitled to informed appellate review of his sentence, the district court’s failure to adequately articulate its reasoning substantially affected [the defendant’s] rights”). We now join these circuits in finding that § 3553(c)(2) confers a substantial right to meaningful appellate review. Here, Blackie’s sentence in excess of the Guidelines range was imposed without the court’s acknowledgment of the applicable Guidelines range and without a statement of reasons for such a variance. Section 3553(c)(2) requires not only a statement of reasons, both stated “in open court” and written in a judgment and commitment order, but also that those statements be made with “specificity.” We do not assume that the sentence was imposed arbitrarily, but without compliance with § 3553(c)(2) we cannot meaningfully review Blackie’s sentence. Compliance with § 3553(c)(2) is important not only for the defendant, but also for the public “to learn why the defendant received a particular sentence.” In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d at 191. The absence of a statement or reasons thus seriously affects “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. See also Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (holding that a district judge “must adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . to promote the perception of fair sentencing”). Finally, the treatment of a § 3553(c) violation as plain error will help maintain its requirements as mandatory, and not some formality that can be ignored without consequence. Lewis, 424 F.3d at 249. Accordingly, we find that the district court’s violation of § 3553(c)(2) is plain error. C. Notice Requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) Blackie argues that the district court erred in failing to provide adequate notice of its intent to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines range for reasons not already on the record, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h). Rule 32 (h) requires that: “[b]efore the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure.” (emphasis added). range.’ . . . When a sentencing court fails to comply with this requirement, the sentence is imposed in violation of law . . . .” United States v. Veteto, 920 F.2d 823, 826 (11th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).”). No. 07-2002 United States v. Blackie Page 8 “‘Departure’ is a term of art under the Guidelines” and is distinct from a “variance.” Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2202 (2008). This court has succinctly described the differences between the two terms: A district court may impose a sentence outside of the applicable Guidelines range through a Guidelines or non-Guidelines departure. “Our court has previously explained that departures based on Chapter 5 of the Guidelines should be referred to as ‘Guideline departures,’ and that ‘sentences lower than the Guidelines recommendation based on section 3553(a) factors’ can be referred to as ‘NonGuideline departures.’” We often refer to Non-Guideline departures as “variances.” Cousins, 469 F.3d at 577 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has further clarified that Rule 32(h) “does not apply to § 3553 variances by its terms.” Irizarry, 128 S. Ct. at 2202. Here, the district court imposed a non-Guidelines sentence – a variance. (Judgment and Commitment Order – Statement of Reasons). Therefore, pursuant to Irizarry, Rule 32(h) does not apply to Blackie’s sentence and, accordingly, this claim is without merit.