Opinion ID: 2181670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Were George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., Servants of Bridgeview?

Text: Section 317 requires a master-servant relationship between the actor and the party whose conduct is to be controlled. The Restatement uses the term servant in a particular fashion, drawing a distinction between the general term agent and the more specific term servant. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 1, 2 (1958); see also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 50.10 (3d ed. 1995) (The term `agent' is broader than either `servant' or `employee.' A servant or employee is an agent, but one may be an agent although he is neither servant nor employee). The Restatement defines a servant as a type of agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the master. (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(2), at 12 (1958). Although the right to control the physical conduct of the person giving services most often determines whether the relationship of master and servant exists, the right to control may be attenuated. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, Comment d, at 487 (1958). In addition, a number of other factors may play a role in establishing the master-servant relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958). Ultimately, [t]he relation of master and servant is one not capable of exact definition (Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, Comment c, at 486 (1958)), and it is generally left to the trier of fact to determine whether the relationship exists (Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, Comment c, at 486-87 (1958)). See also Merlo v. Public Service Co., 381 Ill. 300, 319-20, 45 N.E.2d 665 (1942) (The question as to whether or not the relationship of master and servant exists is dependent upon certain facts and circumstances. These facts include the question of the hiring, the right to discharge, the manner of direction of the servant, the right to terminate the relationship, and the character of the supervision of the work done. Unless these facts clearly appear, the relationship cannot become purely a question of law). In the circuit court in the case at bar, plaintiffs did not argue that George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were servants of Bridgeview, as that term is used in the Restatement. Plaintiffs did assert, however, that the assistant coaches were agents of Bridgeview and that, as such, Bridgeview had a duty to control their actions. Bridgeview disputed this assertion and argued before the jury that the assistant coaches were not its agents. At the close of evidence, the jury was given Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 50.05, which states, in pertinent part, that [i]f you find that one person has the right to control the actions of another at a given time, you may find that the relation of principal and agent exists, even though the right to control may not have been exercised. (Emphasis added.) Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 50.05 (3d ed. 1995) (hereinafter IPI Civil 3d). By returning a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, the jury implicitly determined that George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., met this definition of agency. On appeal, Bridgeview does not argue that the evidence offered at trial was insufficient to support the jury's finding of agency. Nor does it argue that the jury's finding of agency, as defined in IPI Civil 3d No. 50.05, is insufficient to establish a master-servant relationship. Accordingly, any such argument is waived. 155 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7) (Points not argued are waived). Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, we will assume that George Loy, Sr., and George Loy, Jr., were servants of Bridgeview.