Opinion ID: 2621198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: How the Court's Opinion Resolves the Case

Text: The core of my disagreement with the court's opinion lies in the Alaska policies and interests that it identifies and relies on to resolve the choice-of-law issue. It first identifies three Alaska interests: (1) enforcing uniform standards for commencing litigation in Alaska's courts; (2) ensuring Alaska personal injury victims reasonable access to the Alaska legal system; and (3) promoting public safety. [3] It reasons that these three interests are materially greater than Washington's, satisfying the second requirement of Restatement § 187(2)(b). [4] It then reasons that § 187(2)(b)'s third requirement is satisfied because enforcing Washington law would offend the fundamental policies underlying these same three interests. [5] It asserts that [u]niform application of our statutes of limitations involves fundamental policy concerns. [6] It also asserts that statutes of limitations serve the dual policies of (1) protecting against prejudice from stale claims; and (2) ensuring an adequate opportunity for filing a claim prior to the statutory bar. [7] Having already concluded that the first requirement of § 187(2)(b)Alaska law would apply absent an effective choicewas met, [8] the opinion holds that the parties' choice of law is ineffective as to the issue of the enforceability of the time limit. Applying Alaska law, the court's opinion then concludes that because Holland America had disproportionate bargaining power, the time limit is not enforceable as written. [9] It further reasons that enforcement would be unfair because Holland America overreached. [10] It nonetheless does not preclude Holland America from attempting on remand to enforce the filing deadline by showing that it was prejudiced by Long's delay in bringing suit. [11]