Opinion ID: 206467
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Heading: Whether Exceedances at Mass-Emission Stations Constitute Permit Violations

Text: The Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters, prohibiting their discharge unless certain statutory exceptions apply. Russian River Watershed Protection Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). One such exception is for discharges by entities or individuals who hold NPDES permits. Id. The NPDES permitting program is the centerpiece of the Clean Water Act and the primary method for enforcing the effluent and water-quality standards established by the EPA and state governments. Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 990 (D.C.Cir.1997); see also Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 986-90 (9th Cir.1995) (Citizen suits to enforce water quality standards effectuate complementary provisions of the CWA and the underlying purpose of the statute as a whole.); Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1225 (11th Cir.2009) (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175-76 (D.C.Cir.1982) (There is indeed some basis in the legislative history for the position that Congress viewed the NPDES program as its most effective weapon against pollution.)). To decipher the meaning and enforceability of NPDES permit terms, we interpret the unambiguous language contained in the permit. Russian River, 142 F.3d at 1141. We review a permit's provisions and meaning as we would any contract or legal document. See Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 982. As described supra, the Permit prohibits MS4 discharges into receiving waters that exceed the Water Quality Standards established in the Basin Plan and elsewhere. Specifically, Section 2.1 provides: [D]ischarges from the MS4 that cause or contribute to the violation of Water Quality Standards or water quality objectives are prohibited. Section 2.2 of the Permit reads: Discharges from the MS4 of storm water, or non-storm water, for which a Permittee is responsible for, shall not cause or contribute to a condition of nuisance. Nevertheless, Defendants contend that exceedances observed at mass-emissions stations cannot establish liability on behalf of any individual Permittee. Their argument in this respect, as we discuss more thoroughly infra, relies heavily on their belief that the record is bereft of evidence connecting Defendants to the water-quality exceedances. Defendants also assert that the mass-emissions stations are neither designed nor intended to measure the compliance of any Permittee and, therefore, cannot form the basis for a Permit violation. Defendants also argue that municipal compliance with an NPDES stormwater permit cannot be reviewed under the same regulatory framework as a private entity or individual. In support of this contention, Defendants cite to a 1990 EPA rule: When enacting this provision, Congress was aware of the difficulties in regulating discharges from municipal separate storm sewers solely through traditional end-of-pipe treatment and intended for EPA and NPDES States to develop permit requirements that were much broader in nature than requirements which are traditionally found in NPDES permits for industrial process discharges or POTWs. The legislative history indicates, municipal storm sewer system permits will not necessarily be like industrial discharge permits. Often, an end-of-the-pipe treatment technology is not appropriate for this type of discharge. Brief of Appellees 33 (quoting National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed.Reg. 47,990, 48,037-38 (Nov. 16, 1990)). As we detail infra, neither the statutory development of the Clean Water Act nor the plain language of EPA regulations supports Defendants' arguments that NPDES permit violations are less enforceable or unenforceable in the municipal-stormwater context. In fact, since the inception of the NPDES, Congress has expanded NPDES permitting to bring municipal dischargers within the Clean Water Act's coverage.
The NPDES permitting program originated in the 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act. Pub.L. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 88, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342). At the time, the NPDES program was viewed as the primary means of enforcing the Act's effluent limitations. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1371 (D.C.Cir.1977); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir.1992) (examining statutory history of 1972 amendments to the Clean Water Act) (hereafter NRDC v. EPA ). The permitting program is codified at Section 402 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. In 1973, the EPA promulgated regulations categorically exempting discharges from a number of classes of point sources ... including ... separate storm sewers containing only storm runoff uncontaminated by any industrial or commercial activity. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1372 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 125.4 (1975)). The EPA's exemption of certain point sources, including ms4s, from Section 402's blanket requirement was invalidated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Costle. Id. at 1376-77. The Costle court highlighted that [t]he wording of the [CWA], legislative history, and precedents are clear: the EPA Administrator does not have authority to exempt categories of point sources from the permit requirements of § 402. Id. at 1377. In the ten-year period following the Costle decision, the EPA did not promulgate regulations addressing discharges by ms4 operators. See NRDC v. EPA, 966 F.2d at 1296 (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Discharges; Application Deadlines, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,548 (1991)). In 1987, after continued nonfeasance by the EPA, Congress enacted the Water Quality Act amendments to the Clean Water Act to regulate stormwater discharges from, inter alia, ms4s. See Defenders of Wildlife, 191 F.3d at 1163 (Ultimately, in 1987, Congress enacted the Water Quality Act amendments to the CWA.); NRDC v. EPA, 966 F.2d at 1296 (Recognizing both the environmental threat posed by storm water runoff and EPA's problems in implementing regulations, Congress passed the Water Quality Act of 1987[.]) (internal citations omitted); see also 55 Fed.Reg. 47,994 ([P]ermits for discharges from municipal separate storm sewer systems must require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable, and where necessary water quality-based controls, and must include a requirement to effectively prohibit non-storm water discharges into the storm sewers. Furthermore, EPA in consultation with State and local officials must develop a comprehensive program to designate and regulate other storm water discharges to protect water quality.). The principal effect of the 1987 amendments was to expand the coverage of Section 402's permitting requirements. NRDC v. EPA, 966 F.2d at 1296. Section 402(p) established a phased and tiered approach for NPDES permitting. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 617 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir.2010) (citing 33 U.S. § 1342(p)(2)). The purpose of this approach was to allow EPA and the states to focus their attention on the most serious problems first. NRDC v. EPA, 966 F.2d at 1296. Phase I included five categories of stormwater discharges, deemed the most significant sources of stormwater pollution, who were required to obtain an NPDES permit for their stormwater discharge by 1990. Brown, 617 F.3d at 1193 (citing 33 U.S. § 1342(p)(2)). The five categories of the most serious discharge were: (p) Municipal and industrial stormwater discharges ... (2) ... ... (A) A discharge with respect to which a permit has been issued under this section before February 4, 1987. (B) A discharge associated with industrial activity. (C) A discharge from a municipal separate storm sewer system serving a population of 250,000 or more. (D) A discharge from a municipal separate storm sewer system serving a population of 100,000 or more but less than 250,000. (E) A discharge for which the Administrator or the State, as the case may be, determines that the stormwater discharge contributes to a violation of a water quality standard or is a significant contributor of pollutants to waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2) (emphases added). Of the five categories of Phase I dischargers required to obtain the first permits, two are ms4 operators: municipalities with populations over 250,000, and municipalities with populations between 100,000 and 250,000. Id. § 1342(p)(2)(C)-(D). Indeed, as noted supra, the Permit at issue here was first authorized in 1990 pursuant to the 1987 amendments. Rather than regulate individual sources of runoff, such as churches, schools and residential property (which one Congressman described as a potential nightmare), [6] and as regulations prior to 1987 theoretically required, Congress put the NPDES permitting requirement at the municipal level to ease the burden of administering the program. Brown, 617 F.3d at 1193. That assumption of municipal control is found in the Permit at issue herePart 3.G.2 of the Permit states that Permittees shall posses adequate legal authority to ... [r]equire persons within their jurisdiction to comply with conditions in Permittee's ordinances, permits, contracts, model programs, or orders (i.e. hold dischargers to its MS4 accountable for their contributions of pollutants and flows.)[.] Defendants' position that they are subject to a less rigorous or unenforceable regulatory scheme for their storm-water discharges cannot be reconciled with the significant legislative history showing Congress's intent to bring ms4 operators under the NPDES-permitting system. Even the selectively excerpted regulatory language Defendants present to usCongress was aware of the difficulties in regulating discharges from municipal separate storm sewers ... [and] intended for EPA and NPDES States to develop permit requirements that were much broader in nature than requirements which are traditionally found in NPDES permitsdoes not support Defendants' view. Indeed, this excerpt is but one paragraph from a longer section titled, Site-Specific Storm Water Quality Management Programs for Municipal Systems. 55 Fed.Reg. 48,037-38. The quoted language follows a paragraph which reads: Section 402(p)(3)(iii) of the CWA mandates that permits for discharges from municipal separate storm sewers shall require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable (MEP), including management practices, control techniques and systems, design and engineering methods, and such other provisions as the Director determines appropriate for the control of such pollutants. 55 Fed.Reg. 48,038 (emphasis added). The use of such languageemploying mandates and commands to regulate hardly supports Defendants' notion that NPDES permits are unenforceable against municipalities for their stormwater discharges. Moreover, the paragraphs that follow the excerpt explain why developing system-wide controls to manage municipal stormwater is preferable to controlling pollution through end-of-pipe effluent technologies. Id. The regulations highlight that Congress recognized that permit requirements for municipal separate storm sewer systems should be developed in a flexible manner to allow site-specific permit conditions to reflect the wide range of impacts that can be associated with these discharges. Id. Rather than evincing any intent to treat permitting differently for municipalities, the EPA merely explains why state authorities that issue permits should draft site-specific rules, as the Regional Board did here, and why water-quality standards may be preferable over more-difficult-to-enforce effluent limitations. Avoiding wooden permitting requirements and granting states flexibility in setting forth requirements is not equivalent to immunizing municipalities for stormwater discharges that violate the provisions of a permit.
Part and parcel with Defendants' argument that they are subject to a relaxed regulatory structure is their view that the Permit's language indicates that mass-emissions monitoring is not intended to be enforced against municipal dischargers. Defendants claim that measuring water-quality serves only an hortatory purpose as Defendants state, the mass emission monitoring program ... neither measures nor was designed to measure any individual permittee's compliance with the Permit. This proposition, which if accepted would emasculate the Permit, is unsupported by either our case law or the plain language of the Permit conditions. The plain language of CWA § 505 authorizes citizens to enforce all permit conditions. Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 986 (emphasis in original). We used these words, and emphasized all permit conditions, because the language of the Clean Water Act is clear in its intent to guard against all sources and superintendents of water pollution and clearly contemplates citizen suits to enforce `a permit or condition thereof.' Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(2), (f)(6)); see also W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Huffman, 625 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir.2010) (In other words, the statute takes the water's point of view: water is indifferent about who initially polluted it so long as pollution continues to occur.). We have previously addressed, and rejected, municipal attempts to avoid NPDES permit enforcement. In Northwest Environmental Advocates, we considered a citizen-suit challenging the City of Portland's operation of a combined sewer system which periodically overflowed and discharged raw sewage into two rivers. 56 F.3d at 981-82. The plaintiffs brought suit on the basis of an NPDES permit condition which prohibit[ed] any discharges that would violate Oregon water quality standards. Id. at 985. Reviewing the history of the 1972 amendments and the Supreme Court's decision in PUD No.1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 114 S.Ct. 1900, 128 L.Ed.2d 716 (1994), we recognized that Congress had authorized enforcement of state water-quality standards, lest municipalities be immunized on the technicality that not all water standards can be expressed as effluent limitations. Id. at 988-89. The overflows from the Portland sewer system were caused primarily by uncontrollable events i.e., the amount of stormwater entering the system[.] Id. at 989. Because the total amount of water entering and leaving the sewer system was unknown, it was impossible to articulate effluent standards which would ensure that the gross amount of pollution discharged [would] not violate water quality standards. Id. Only by enforcing the water-quality standards themselves as the limits could the purpose of the CWA and the NPDES system be effectuated. Id. at 988-90. Indeed, we noted that prior to the 1972 incorporation of effluent limitations, the Clean Water Act depended entirely on enforcement based on water-quality standards. Id. at 986. However, troubled by the `almost total lack of enforcement' under the old system, Congress added the effluent limitation standards not to supplant the old system but to improve enforcement. Id. at 986 (quoting S.Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3671). Moreover, the plain language of the Permit countenances enforcement of the water-quality standards when exceedances are detected by the various compliance mechanisms, including mass-emissions monitoring. First, the Permit incorporates and adopts the Basin Plan, which sets the water-quality standards for bacteria and contaminants for the receiving waters of Southern California, including the Watershed Rivers. The Permit then sets out a multi-part monitoring program for those standards, the goals of which explicitly include [a]ssessing compliance with this Order[.] Compliance under the Clean Water Act primarily means adhering to the terms and conditions of an NPDES permit. EPA v. Calif., 426 U.S. at 223, 96 S.Ct. 2022 (Thus, the principal means of enforcing the pollution control and abatement provisions of the Amendments is to enforce compliance with a permit.). The first monitoring program listed in the Permit is Mass Emissions. While Defendants are correct in noting that mass-emissions monitoring has as one of its goals estimat[ing] the mass emissions from the MS4, Defendants fail to mention that another goal, listed just below estimating, is [d]etermin[ing] if the MS4 is contributing to exceedances of Water Quality Standards. Part 6.D of the Permit, titled Duty to Comply, lays any doubts about municipal compliance to rest: Each Permittee must comply with all terms, requirements, and conditions of this Order. Any violation of this order constitutes a violation of the Clean Water Act ... and is grounds for enforcement action, Order termination, Order revocation and reissuance, denial of an application for reissuance; or a combination thereof[.] This unequivocal language is unsurprising given that all NPDES permits must include monitoring provisions ensuring that permit conditions are satisfied. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A) ([T]he Administrator [of the EPA] shall require the owner or operator of any point source to (i) establish and maintain such records, (ii) make such reports, (iii) install, use, and maintain such monitoring equipment or methods (including where appropriate, biological monitoring methods), [and] (iv) sample such effluents (in accordance with such methods, at such locations, at such intervals, and in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe)[.]); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(i)(1) (specifying the monitoring requirements for compliance, mass ... for each pollutant limited in the permit, and volume of effluent discharged); Ackels v. EPA, 7 F.3d 862, 866 (9th Cir.1993) ([T]he Act grants EPA broad authority to require NPDES permitees to monitor, at such intervals as the Administrator shall prescribe, whenever it is required to carry out the objectives of the Act.). Our prior case law emphasizes that NPDES permit enforcement is not scattershoteach permit term is simply enforced as written. See Union Oil, 813 F.2d at 1491 (It is unclear whether the court intended to excuse these violations under the upset defense or under a de minimis theory. In either event, the district court erred. The Clean Water Act and the regulations promulgated under it make no provision for `rare' violations.); see also United States v. CPS Chem. Co., 779 F.Supp. 437, 442 (D.Ark.1991) (For enforcement purposes, a permittee's [Discharge Monitoring Reports] constitute admissions regarding the levels of effluents that the permittee has discharged.). As we explained in Union Oil, Congress structured the CWA to function by self-monitoring and self-reporting of violations to `avoid the necessity of lengthy fact finding, investigations, and negotiations at the time of enforcement.' 813 F.2d at 1492 (quoting S.Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 64, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730). When self-reported exceedances of an NPDES permit occur, the Clean Water Act allows citizens to bring suit to enforce the terms of the Permit. In sum, the Permit's provisions plainly specify that the mass-emissions monitoring is intended to measure compliance and that [a]ny violation of this Order is a Clean Water Act violation. The Permit is available for public inspection to aid this purpose. Accordingly, we agree with the district court's determination that an exceedance detected through mass-emissions monitoring is a Permit violation that gives rise to liability for contributing dischargers.