Opinion ID: 1698885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether judge willard should be removed from office and taxed with all costs of this proceeding pursuant to section 177a of the mississippi constitution of 1890, as amended?

Text: ¶ 31. The Commission found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Willard's conduct was actionable under Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as amended, because it constituted willful misconduct in office (subsection b), willful and persistent failure to perform the duties of his duties (subsection c), and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute .... (subsection e). ¶ 32. Willful misconduct has been defined as the improper or wrongful use of power that involves more than an error of judgment or a mere lack of diligence. This may occur through negligence or ignorance not amounting to bad faith. Russell, 691 So.2d at 936-37 (quoting Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Milling, 651 So.2d 531, 538 (Miss.1995)). See also Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Fletcher, 686 So.2d 1075, 1077 (Miss.1996). ¶ 33. The Commission recommended that Judge Ellis Willard be removed from office and pay all costs associated with the prosecution of the complaint, totaling $9,084.66. Sanctions available to the Court include removal from office, suspension, fine and public censure or reprimand. The sanction imposed should be consistent with other like cases. Id. This Court notes the Commission's exceedingly strong language on this point in making its recommendation to remove Willard from office: We would like to say that this sanction is consistent with like cases, fits the offence and satisfies the purpose of sanctions; there are however no cases of record in the state which in any way compare to Willard's continuous pattern of egregious behavior. A review of other cases warranting the removal of a judicial officer for judicial misconduct reflects that the Respondent's outrageous conduct far exceeds that of most any other judge who has been before this honorable Court. Removal and costs therefore certainly fit the offenses of the Respondent and adhere to the purpose of sanction. In re Kneifl, 217 Neb. 472, 351 N.W.2d 693 (1984); The Mississippi Bar v. Hall, 612 So.2d 1075 (Miss.1992); Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Gunn, supra; Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Underwood, 644 So.2d 458 (Miss.1994). A review of recent cases in which judges were removed from office gives credence to the Commission's position. See Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Spencer, 725 So.2d 171 (Miss.1998); Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds; 680 So.2d 180 (Miss.1996); Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Milling, 651 So.2d 531 (Miss.1995); Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Chinn, 611 So.2d 849 (Miss.1992); Mississippi Judicial Performance Comm'n v. Hopkins, 590 So.2d 857 (Miss. 1991); Mississippi Judicial Performance Comm'n v. Coleman, 553 So.2d 513 (Miss. 1989); In re Hearn, 542 So.2d 901 (Miss. 1989); In re Quick, 553 So.2d 522 (Miss. 1989); In re Stewart, 490 So.2d 882 (Miss. 1986); In re Garner, 466 So.2d 884 (Miss. 1985); In re [William] Anderson, 451 So.2d 232 (Miss.1984); In re Brown, 458 So.2d 681 (Miss.1984); In re [Lloyd] Anderson, 412 So.2d 743 (Miss.1982). ¶ 34. Judges are called upon to exemplify the highest standards of conduct in a variety of situations and have a duty to conduct themselves with respect for those they serve, including the court staff and the litigants that come before them. Spencer, 725 So.2d at 178. ¶ 35. Claim of ignorance of the duties of his office or negligence in carrying out those duties as a defense to judicial misconduct is tantamount to an admission by an accused judge that he does not possess the qualifications necessary to hold the office to which he has been elected. In re Collins, 524 So.2d 553, 557 (Miss.1987). Willard's conduct seems to have resulted from both ignorance of the law and a steadfast refusal to become more knowledgeable of the law and of the office to which he had been entrusted. ¶ 36. This Court is not bound by the Commission's recommendations, but we give them great weight since the Commission was able to observe the witness during the hearing and had the benefit of personal observation of the demeanor and attitude of the judge. In re Bailey, 541 So.2d at 1037. This Court, in upholding the standards as set out in the judicial canons, recognizes that we require our judges to be: patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction and control. Miss.Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3.