Opinion ID: 4514882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Lastly, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. To prevail upon his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant must prove that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Vincelette, 172 N.H. 350, 354 (2019). Because challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence raise a claim of legal error, our standard of review is de novo. State v. Lisasuain, 167 N.H. 719, 722 (2015). As to the defendant’s conspiracy conviction, RSA 629:3, I, provides: A person is guilty of conspiracy if, with a purpose that a crime defined by statute be committed, he agrees with one or more persons to commit or cause the commission of such crime, and an overt act is committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. RSA 629:3, I. Conspiracy punishes the agreement to commit or cause the commission of a crime. State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 24 (1983). “[A] tacit understanding between the parties to cooperate in an illegal course of conduct will warrant a conviction for conspiracy,” so long as one of the co-conspirators commits an overt act in furtherance thereof. State v. Kilgus, 128 N.H. 577, 586 (1986) (quotation omitted). Here, the State charged the defendant with conspiring to commit first degree murder. See RSA 630:1-a, I(a) (defining first degree murder, in part, as “[p]urposely caus[ing] the death of another”). The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of an agreement to cause M.P.’s death to support his conviction for conspiracy because “[t]here was no meeting of the minds to kill [M.P.] on November 3, 2015.” This argument misconstrues the State’s burden in proving the defendant’s guilt. As an initial matter, the State was not required to prove that an agreement to commit murder occurred on the same day that said murder was in fact committed because “[c]onspiracy is an inchoate crime that does not require the commission of the substantive offense that is the object of the conspiracy . . . .” State v. Donohue, 150 N.H. 180, 185 (2003). Furthermore, the defendant’s indictment did not allege that the defendant participated in an agreement to murder M.P. on November 3. The defendant’s indictment for conspiracy to commit murder alleged in pertinent part: 14 [O]n or between October 8, 2015, and November 3, 2015, . . . with the purpose that the crime of murder be committed, a crime defined by RSA 630, Paulson Papillon agreed with Michael Younge, Adrien Stillwell, [and/or] Nathaniel Smith . . . to cause the death of [M.P.], and that one or more of the co-conspirators committed one or more of the following overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy: [alleging nineteen distinct overt acts.] (Emphasis added.) Thus, even assuming that no rational jury could have found that a “meeting of the minds” occurred on November 3, the defendant’s argument is unavailing. The defendant also attempts to import the contractual principles of “offer” and “reject[ion]” into the agreement element of the conspiracy statute, arguing that the evidence as to that element was insufficient because Stillwell, Smith, and Younge “expressly rejected the means and mode that [the defendant] proposed to carry out his intended plot” — namely, killing M.P. on Halloween while wearing costumes that the defendant had provided. This argument presumes that the jury was compelled to adopt the defendant’s characterization of Stillwell, Smith, and Younge’s behavior. It was not. See State v. Woodbury, 172 N.H. 358, 364 (2019) (“[M]atters such as weighing evidence, determining witness credibility, and resolving conflicts in witness testimony are left to the jury.”); State v. Demond-Surace, 162 N.H. 17, 29 (2011) (“[T]he jury was free to weigh and draw inferences from all of th[e] evidence . . . .”). There was sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found that the defendant had, at a minimum, a “tacit understanding” with Stillwell, Smith, and Younge to cause M.P.’s death as alleged in the indictment. Kilgus, 128 N.H. at 586 (quotation omitted). At trial, the State presented evidence that, after the defendant was released on bail on October 26, the defendant had several conversations with Stillwell, Smith, and Younge regarding his desire to have M.P. killed and his willingness to work toward that end. The State presented evidence that the defendant urged Stillwell, Smith, and Younge to kill M.P., promised them money and drugs, and pushed them to kill M.P. on Halloween. After the aborted Halloween attempt, the defendant reiterated his need to have M.P. killed, and cell phone records showed that the defendant was in contact with his associates shortly before and after M.P. was shot on November 3. There was evidence that Stillwell and Younge took steps to report M.P.’s death to the defendant, that the defendant rewarded his associates with drugs and money the night of the murder, and that he had A.D. confirm that M.P. was dead. The State presented evidence that the defendant took steps to establish alibis for himself and attempted to cover up his involvement in the murder by taking Stillwell and Younge to Connecticut, coordinating with his sister while he was in prison to deliver drugs to Younge and money to Stillwell, and even planning to kill his co-conspirators to keep them quiet. The jury also 15 heard witness testimony that, after M.P.’s killing, the defendant told an associate, “There’s where I killed my fking rat,” and told L.M. in prison that he, the defendant, “had to have it done” because M.P. was going to inform on him “for some drugs.” Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement between the defendant and Younge, Stillwell, and/or Smith to purposely cause the death of M.P.3 We accordingly uphold the defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder. We next consider whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder. See RSA 626:8; RSA 630:1-b, I(b). His indictment for second degree murder alleged that: “Paulson Papillon, acting in concert with Michael Younge, Adrien Stillwell and/or Nathaniel Smith, caused the death of [M.P.] recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life, in that Younge, Stillwell and/or Smith shot [M.P.] in the torso.” The defendant makes several arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder, including multiple legal arguments regarding the interpretation of the accomplice liability statute. We are not persuaded by the defendant’s arguments and conclude there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty as an accomplice to the murder of M.P. The defendant first suggests that his conviction as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder is inconsistent with his conspiracy conviction because the evidence cannot demonstrate a reckless intent and a purposeful intent simultaneously, and “[o]ne cannot solicit, conspire or plan . . . a reckless homicide.” See RSA 626:8; RSA 630:1-b, I(b). The State avers that the verdicts are not inconsistent, and alternatively, any such inconsistency does not entitle the defendant to relief. Inconsistency, in the context of this argument, means “[a]n alleged or actual lack of rational compatibility between the verdicts.” State v. Chapin, 128 N.H. 355, 357 (1986). There is no reversible inconsistency between verdicts if, upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the jury’s conclusions can be reconciled on a rational basis. Id. We agree with the State that no reversible inconsistency exists. The fact that the jury concluded that M.P.’s death was ultimately caused “recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life,” RSA 630:1-b, I(b), is not inconsistent with the defendant’s 3 The defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on his conspiracy conviction is limited to the “agreement” element. He does not argue that there was insufficient evidence of an overt act committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. We therefore do not consider whether the evidence was sufficient as to the unchallenged element. 16 conspiracy conviction because “conspiring to commit a crime and actually committing it are two separate offenses.” State v. Sanchez, 152 N.H. 625, 630 (2005); see Chaisson, 123 N.H. at 24 (explaining that conspiracy to receive stolen property is a separate and distinct crime from the crime of receiving stolen property); see also Donohue, 150 N.H. at 185. The jury was free to consider all of the evidence separately in each indictment. State v. King, 151 N.H. 59, 64 (2004). Contrary to the defendant’s argument, our decision in Donohue does not render his conviction for conspiracy to commit murder inconsistent with his conviction as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder. In Donohue, we concluded that the defendant’s indictment, which charged him with “conspiracy to commit second-degree assault,” was flawed, and we reversed his conspiracy conviction for the reason that “a person cannot agree, in advance, to commit a reckless assault, because, by definition, a reckless assault only arises once a future harm results from reckless behavior.” Donohue, 150 N.H. at 182, 186 (emphasis added). Here, however, the defendant’s indictment for conspiracy charged that, “with the purpose that the crime of murder be committed,” as defined by the first degree murder statute, RSA 630:1-a, I(a), he agreed with Stillwell, Smith, and/or Younge to cause M.P.’s death. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, no reversible inconsistency exists. The defendant also raises multiple legal arguments interpreting the accomplice liability statute itself, which we understand to underlie his argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict him as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder. The plain language of RSA 626:8 and our case law on accomplice liability do not support the defendant’s interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Rivera, 162 N.H. 182, 185 (2011). In matters of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Id. We construe provisions of the Criminal Code according to the fair import of their terms and to promote justice. RSA 625:3 (2016). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Rivera, 162 N.H. at 185. Further, we interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language it did not see fit to include. Id. Finally, we interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. RSA 626:8 provides in pertinent part: III. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (a) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 17 offense, he solicits such other person in committing it, or aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; . . . .... IV. Notwithstanding the requirement of a purpose as set forth in paragraph III(a), when causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. In other words, to establish accomplice liability under this section, it shall not be necessary that the accomplice act with a purpose to promote or facilitate the offense. An accomplice in conduct can be found criminally liable for causing a prohibited result, provided the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct and the accomplice acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to that result, as required for the commission of the offense. RSA 626:8. Here, the statute implicated by paragraph IV underlying the defendant’s accomplice charge was the second degree murder statute, RSA 630:1-b, I(b) (defining second degree murder as “caus[ing] such death recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life”). The defendant argues that “[p]roof of criminal solicitation [under RSA 629:2] requires evidence that the defendant acted purposely, the highest mens rea in the criminal code,” and again asserts that evidence of purposeful behavior cannot simultaneously demonstrate a reckless intent. The defendant improperly conflates the crime of criminal solicitation, see RSA 629:2 (2016), with the requirements of paragraph III of the accomplice liability statute. The State must prove the elements of both paragraph III and paragraph IV of RSA 626:8. State v. Duran, 158 N.H. 146, 151 (2008); see State v. Anthony, 151 N.H. 492, 493-95 (2004). “[Paragraph] III contains dual requirements that the defendant act with the purpose of promoting the commission of the offense and that he actually solicit or aid or attempt to aid another in its commission.” Id. “[T]he standard interpretation of the phrase ‘intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense’ is that it requires proof of the accomplice’s intent to promote or facilitate another person’s conduct that constitutes the actus reus of the offense.” Anthony, 151 N.H. at 494 (quotation and emphasis omitted). Paragraph IV ensures that when causing a prohibited result is an element of the underlying offense, as with reckless second-degree murder, the State does not need to prove a higher mental state with respect to the result of the underlying crime to convict an accomplice under RSA 626:8 than to convict a principal of the same crime. See Rivera, 162 N.H. at 188 (explaining that “when causing a prohibited result is 18 an element of an offense, paragraph IV modifies the formulation stated in paragraph III,” such that “it shall not be necessary that the accomplice act with a purpose to promote or facilitate the offense” (quotation omitted)); Anthony, 151 N.H. at 494-95. In Anthony, we stated that when the legislature amended the language of paragraph IV to its current form, it did not intend to repeal the requirement that the accomplice “‘have as his conscious objective the bringing about of conduct that the . . . [underlying criminal statute] has declared to be criminal.’” Anthony, 151 N.H. at 495 (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. 6(b), at 310 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)). Accordingly, the language of paragraph IV does not alter the requirements or applicability of paragraph III with respect to the actus reus constituting the underlying offense. See id. at 494-95. Thus, to establish accomplice liability, the State must prove that: (1) the accomplice had the purpose to make the crime succeed; (2) the accomplice’s acts solicited, aided, or attempted to aid another in committing the offense; and (3) under paragraph IV, the accomplice shared the requisite mental state for the offense. See State v. Winward, 161 N.H. 533, 543 (2011). Consistent with our interpretation of paragraph III in Anthony, the term “solicits” in RSA 626:8, III refers solely to the actus reus of soliciting. RSA 626:8, III; see Petition of State of N.H. (State v. Laporte), 157 N.H. 229, 231-32 (2008). The plain language of RSA 626:8, III does not incorporate the elements of criminal solicitation in RSA 629:2, which “encompass[ ] both the actus reus of ‘soliciting’ and the mens rea of having the ‘purpose that another engage in conduct constituting a crime.’” Laporte, 157 N.H. at 232 (quoting RSA 629:2, I) (explaining that “the terms ‘criminal solicitation’ and ‘solicitation’ are not synonymous”). Paragraph IV sets forth the mens rea required for the State to prove accomplice liability under RSA 626:8 as, “the culpable mental state specified in the underlying statute with respect to the result.” Anthony, 151 N.H. at 495 (quotation omitted); see RSA 626:8, IV; Rivera, 162 N.H. at 187-88; Winward, 161 N.H. at 543. Here, the defendant was charged under paragraph I(b) of the second degree murder statute, which requires the State to prove that he acted “recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.” RSA 630:1-b, I(b). The defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to show he was an “accomplice in conduct” under paragraph IV of the accomplice liability statute. He contends that the term “accomplice in conduct” only encompasses behavior that constitutes “direct conduct . . . without a purpose or even knowledge of the probable result,” and even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, his purposeful behavior in the form of “speech acts and performative gestures” only implicates paragraph III of the statute. Based upon this interpretation of RSA 626:8, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he “was not present at the time of the murder,” “had no ability to directly control or influence th[e] event,” 19 and “played no role in the actual commission of the offense.” Our case law interpreting RSA 626:8 contradicts these arguments. The language of paragraph IV does not alter the requirements or applicability of paragraph III, nor does it create a distinction between the paragraphs based on, as the defendant here argues, “[t]he means of acting as an accomplice.” See Anthony, 151 N.H. at 494-95 (explaining that the legislature’s intent to preserve the requirements of paragraph III “is implicit in paragraph IV’s reference to an “‘accomplice in conduct’” (quoting RSA 626:8, IV)); see also Rivera, 162 N.H. at 187, 190 (including “planning an armed burglary,” “discuss[ing] the possibility that [another accomplice] would shoot [the victim] if there was a stand-off” and the fact that “the men had agreed” an accomplice would hold the victim at gun point when describing evidence supporting defendant’s conviction as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder). Moreover, the State is not required to prove that an alleged accomplice’s conduct directly caused the criminal result. See RSA 626:8, IV; Rivera, 162 N.H. at 187. “Paragraph IV plainly states that accomplice liability can flow from conduct ‘provided the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct.’” Rivera, 162 N.H. at 187 (quoting RSA 626:8, IV). Independent of his legal arguments, we also understand the defendant to argue that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder. We disagree. There was ample evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder. The State presented evidence that the defendant believed his October 2015 arrest resulted from M.P. informing to the police, that he wanted M.P. killed because of his suspected role as an informant, and had, on multiple occasions, urged Stillwell, Smith, and Younge to kill M.P. In addition, the jury heard evidence that the defendant offered Stillwell, Smith, and Younge incentives to kill the victim, supplied the gun used in the murder, provided costumes in an attempt to aid them in the murder, established alibis for himself, and tried to cover up his involvement in the murder. See, e.g., State v. Laudarowicz, 142 N.H. 1, 5-6 (1997). The State also presented evidence of the defendant’s own inculpatory statements, including his statements to L.M. in prison that he, the defendant, “knew it was done” and “had to have it done” because M.P. was going to inform on him “for some drugs.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State met its burden to convict the defendant as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder. See RSA 626:8; RSA 630:1-b, I(b). In conclusion, we hold that: (1) the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (2) the challenged statements from J.M.’s testimony were evidence of other acts governed by Rule 404(b) and 20 admitted in error, but this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and as an accomplice to reckless second-degree murder. Affirmed.