Opinion ID: 816188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fair Sentencing Act Remand

Text: At the time the district court sentenced Neal in October 2011, under our precedent the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) did not apply to defendants such as Neal, who committed their crack offenses before the FSA became effective but were sentenced after the FSA’s effective date. See United States v. Tickles, 661 F.3d 212, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 66 (2012) and cert. granted, judgment vacated sub. nom. Gibson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 67 (2012). However, in June 2012, the Supreme Court determined that the new lower mandatory minimums of the FSA applied to such defendants, thereby abrogating Tickles. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335–36 (2012). Neal argues that his case should be remanded for resentencing in light of Dorsey. The Government asserts that the sentences should be affirmed because Neal’s sentences are within the applicable statutory ranges. Because the error was not objected to in the district court, we conduct a plain error review of his claim. See United States v. Mondragon–Santiago, 564 15 Case: 11-31045 Document: 00512126911 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/28/2013 No. 11-31045 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009). The district court’s error, though clearly not an error at the time of sentencing, is obvious at the time of appellate review and therefore satisfies the second prong of the plain error standard. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997); Escalante–Reyes, 689 F.3d at 423. To meet the requirements of the third prong and show his substantial rights were affected, Neal must demonstrate that “the error increased the term of [his] sentence, such that there is a reasonable probability of a lower sentence on remand.” Escalante–Reyes, 689 F.3d at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted). Neal cannot meet this burden. Under pre-FSA law, where the defendant was convicted of an offense involving 50 grams or more of crack (Neal’s Counts One and Two), the statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment was ten years and the statutory maximum was life. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2007). The FSA lowers the mandatory minimum sentence to five years of imprisonment and lowers the statutory maximum to 40 years. See § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).7 The 360-month (30-year) sentences Neal received on Counts One and Two do not exceed the lower statutory maximum under the FSA, and there is no indication in the record that the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence had the lower statutory minimum and maximum sentences of imprisonment been in place at the time of sentencing. Cf. United States v. Hernandez–Gonzalez, 405 F.3d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the fact that a sentence imposed under the pre-Booker mandatory guideline regime was at the bottom of the mandatory range is not enough to create a reasonable probability that the defendant would have received a different sentence upon resentencing under an advisory guidelines system). Therefore, Neal’s substantial rights were not affected by the fact that Fifth Circuit precedent required that the court use 7 The FSA has no effect on the statutory maximum or minimum for Count Three. 16 Case: 11-31045 Document: 00512126911 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/28/2013 No. 11-31045 more punitive sentencing ranges at the time of his sentencing; we decline to remand his case for resentencing on these grounds.