Opinion ID: 202707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MICSA's Text

Text: 36 Maine relies on MICSA's language to support its argument that MICSA subjected the Aroostook Band to state employment law. Specifically, MICSA declares that 37 all Indians, Indian nations, or tribes or bands of Indians in the State of Maine, other than the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and their members, and any lands or natural resources owned by any such Indian, Indian nation, tribe or band of Indians and any lands or natural resources held in trust by the United States, or by any other person or entity, for any such Indian, Indian nation, tribe, or band of Indians shall be subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State, the laws of the State, and the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the State, to the same extent as any other person or land therein. 38 25 U.S.C. § 1725(a). By its clear terms, § 1725(a) makes all Maine tribes, other than the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation, subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State, the laws of the State, and the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the State. 7 39 The Aroostook Band argues that even while MICSA made it subject to . . . the laws of the State, the statute did not go so far as to subject the internal tribal matters of the Aroostook Band to state law. 8 It contends that it retains authority over these matters as part of its inherent tribal sovereignty. We discuss in a later section why Congress's intent in MICSA to ratify the state Settlement Act, grouped with that state statute's treatment of internal tribal matters, defeats this claim. But in this section we also provide several other reasons to reject the argument. 40
41 The Aroostook Band relies on rules of statutory construction that obligate us to construe `acts diminishing the sovereign rights of Indian tribes . . . strictly,' `with ambiguous provisions interpreted to the [Indians'] benefit.' Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 709 (ellipsis and alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 702 (1st Cir.1994); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985)). The Aroostook Band asserts that prior to MICSA's enactment, it had the power to control all of its own employment matters as part of its inherent sovereignty. It contends that, judged against a backdrop of federal common law protecting Indian sovereignty, see Rhode Island, 19 F.3d at 701, MICSA was not clear enough to subjugate this aspect of the tribe's sovereignty to Maine law. 42 We disagree. Whatever powers are included within inherent tribal authority, Congress may abrogate those powers by statute. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004); Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470-71, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). Although Congress must do so clearly, there is no requirement that talismanic phrases be employed. Thus, an effective limitation . . . need not use magic words. Narragansett, 449 F.3d at 25. 9 43 MICSA is clear. In § 1725(a) it not only made Maine Indians subject to . . . the laws of the State, and subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State, but it expressly added the emphasizing phrase to the same extent as any other person. And § 1725(a) not only applies to Indians, but also to the Indian nations, . . . tribes[, and] bands of Indians themselves. Short of using magic words, it is hard to imagine how § 1725(a) could have been clearer. There is no internal tribal matters exception in the statute. 44 The Aroostook Band tries to interpret this clear statement by Congress as nevertheless exempting specific units of tribal government. Aided by the Houlton Band as amicus, the Aroostook Band sees significance in the fact that § 1725(a) does not apply state law to governing bodies like the Aroostook Micmac Council or the Houlton Band Council. Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 1722(a) (stating that the Houlton Band is represented by the Houlton Band Council); ABMSA § 3(1) (stating that the Aroostook Band is represented by the Aroostook Micmac Council). The inference we are asked to draw is that § 1725(a) applies state law to Maine tribes as polities but not to their governments. 45 This argument lacks merit. It is not a natural reading of the language and it creates an artificial distinction merely to suit tribal purposes. Further, MICSA recognizes that a governing Council exists as a representative of a tribe. See 25 U.S.C. § 1722(a). It is the tribe itself, as a legal entity, whose interest in sovereignty is really at issue. 10 See Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir.2000) (explaining that a tribal housing authority had sovereign immunity because it was an arm of the [t]ribe); Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th Cir.1997) (holding that the members of a tribal government, sued in their official capacities, were protected by sovereign immunity because any relief would run against the [t]ribe itself). Under MICSA, § 1725(a) applies state law to Indian nations, . . . tribes[,] or bands. That is what matters. See Narragansett, 449 F.3d at 30 (holding that tribal officers have no sovereign immunity when they engage in activities that the tribe itself cannot lawfully authorize). 46 Amicus presents another argument why § 1725(a) was not clear in its abrogation of either Houlton or Aroostook tribal sovereignty. 11 Under 25 U.S.C. § 1727(a), the Passamaquoddy and the Penobscots have the opportunity to petition for exclusive jurisdiction over certain child custody matters. Amicus contends that the use of exclusive jurisdiction here, in contrast with the use of the sole word jurisdiction in § 1725(a), means that § 1725(a) merely grants the state nonexclusive authority and concurrent jurisdiction to apply [s]tate law to tribes like the Houlton Band and Aroostook Band. 47 But amicus ignores the fact that elsewhere in MICSA, the Passamaquoddy and the Penobscots were authorized to exercise jurisdiction, separate and distinct from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State of Maine, to the extent authorized by the [state Settlement Act]. Id. § 1725(f). No such jurisdictional authorization was provided to the other Maine tribes, and thus we think it would clearly defeat congressional intent to nevertheless imply one. The language about exclusive jurisdiction in § 1727(a) is plainly nothing more than a helpful clarification in light of the peculiar jurisdictional status of the Penobscots and Passamaquoddy. It does not turn § 1725(a) into a mere grant of concurrent jurisdiction. The meaning of MICSA's § 1725(a) is clear: Maine law applies to this situation. 48
49 The Aroostook Band attempts to undercut the clarity of MICSA by comparing it to statutes—most notably Public Law 280 and the Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954—examined in several Supreme Court cases. 50 MICSA stands in stark contrast to Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360). Public Law 280 is the statute discussed in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710 (1976), a case on which the Aroostook Band relies. Bryan addressed the part of the statute that gave certain states 51 jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in . . . Indian country . . . to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State. 52 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). The Court found this statute did not clearly give states civil regulatory jurisdiction over Indians, and it interpreted the ambiguity for the Indians' benefit by precluding the application of a state property tax. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 392-93, 96 S.Ct. 2102. 53 In finding Public Law 280 ambiguous, the Court relied on reasons that are inapplicable to MICSA's § 1725(a). First, the Court examined Public Law 280's legislative history and concluded that its civil law provisions were primarily designed to address the lack of adequate Indian forums for resolving private legal disputes. Id. at 383, 96 S.Ct. 2102; see also id. at 379-87, 96 S.Ct. 2102. Viewed in this light, when Public Law 280 gave force to the civil laws of [the] State pertaining to private persons or private property, 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a), it was merely providing state rules of decision and a state forum for private disputes, and it was not attempting to infringe more deeply on tribal sovereignty. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 383-84, 96 S.Ct. 2102. MICSA has no such legislative history, nor does it contain similar language specifically addressed to private legal disputes. Cf. Narragansett, 449 F.3d at 28 (noting the narrowness of Public Law 280). 54 More importantly, the Court in Bryan stressed that Public Law 280 lacked any conferral of state jurisdiction over the tribes themselves. 426 U.S. at 389, 96 S.Ct. 2102. In contrast, § 1725(a) expressly does apply to Indian tribes in addition to their members. 55 The Aroostook Band also cites to Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 20 L.Ed.2d 697 (1968), but Menominee does not assist the tribe. Menominee involved a federal statute, the Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed 1973), which stated that the laws of the several States shall apply to the [Menominee] tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction. 391 U.S. at 410, 88 S.Ct. 1705 (internal quotation marks omited) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 899 (repealed 1973)). The Supreme Court refused to read this language as abrogating certain hunting and fishing rights that the Menominee Tribe had obtained in an 1854 treaty. Id. at 412-13, 88 S.Ct. 1705. The Aroostook Band asks us to reach a comparable result here as it contends that the language in the Termination Act is similar to the language in MICSA. 56 We disagree and find Menominee not only easily distinguishable, but in fact supportive of our reading of MICSA. Menominee's holding is not that the Termination Act alone was too unclear to abrogate aspects of tribal sovereignty. Instead, Menominee held that the Termination Act needed to be considered in pari materia with Public Law 280, which was contemporaneously passed and which explicitly said it was not interfering with Indian hunting and fishing rights granted by treaty. Id. at 410-11. The combination of these two statutes created enough ambiguity to favor preservation of Indian rights. With MICSA there is no similar federal statute, passed roughly contemporaneously, that could create a comparable ambiguity. To the contrary, the federal statutory scheme is a consistent whole on the issue in question. 57 Nor is this the sole fact that distinguishes Menominee. For instance, the Termination Act was abrogating a treaty right, which meant that rules of statutory construction favoring Indians were bolstered by the rule that the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to . . . Congress. Id. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 1705 (quoting Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160, 54 S.Ct. 361, 78 L.Ed. 695 (1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, this case does not involve any treaty. Additionally, the Menominee Court drew support from statements by the Termination Act's chief sponsor; he had declared that the act `in no way violates any treaty obligation with this tribe.' Id. (quoting 100 Cong. Rec. 8537, 8538 (1954) (statement of Sen. Watkins)). The Aroostook Band has pointed to no legislative history for MICSA that is similarly so on point. 58 The Supreme Court's decision in South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 106 S.Ct. 2039, 90 L.Ed.2d 490 (1986), puts Menominee in context and further confirms our reading of MICSA. Catawba interpreted a statute virtually identical to the Termination Act in Menominee. See Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act, Pub.L. No. 86-622, 73 Stat. 592 (1959) (repealed 1993). That Catawba statute declared: [T]he [Catawba] tribe and its members shall not be entitled to [certain federal services] . . ., and the laws of the several States shall apply to them in the same manner they apply to other persons or citizens within their jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 935 (repealed 1993); see also Catawba, 476 U.S. at 505, 106 S.Ct. 2039. Without a contemporaneously passed statute like Public Law 280 to add ambiguity, the Supreme Court found it unmistakably clear that state laws apply to the Catawba Tribe and its members in precisely the same fashion that they apply to others. Catawba, 476 U.S. at 505-06, 106 S.Ct. 2039; see also id. at 509 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 2039 (distinguishing Menominee on this basis). MICSA is similarly clear. 59
60 Despite the statutory clarity, and the Supreme Court case law reinforcing this clarity, the Aroostook Band urges us to apply what it calls the Tribal Employment Rule. What it means by this is that there are a number of cases, all from other jurisdictions and involving differently situated tribes, 12 holding that general federal employment statutes do not apply to tribal employers despite these statutes' silence on that issue. See, e.g., Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2004) (tribal employer exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act); Taylor v. Ala. Intertribal Council Title IV J.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 1032, 1035-36 (11th Cir.2001) (tribal employer insulated from employment discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 280 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir.2000) (tribal employer not covered by National Labor Relations Act); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (explicitly providing that for purposes of Title VII, the term employer does not include an Indian tribe). 61 These cases are inapposite. The fact that a tribe may be exempt from federal employment laws says little regarding that tribe's status under state employment laws, particularly where Congress has enacted settlement acts. None of these cases say that tribal employment decisions are somehow insulated from state law in the face of a federal statute that specifically applies state laws to tribes. 13 We think the Tribal Employment Rule is inapplicable in the face of MICSA's clarity. 62