Opinion ID: 1752011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: requirements for extraordinary relief

Text: Although we agree with the majority that the Diocese must satisfy the usual and strict requirements for justifying relief by prohibition or mandamus, [9] we disagree with the result reached by the majority because a proper application of those requirements leads (in our minds, inexorably) to the conclusion that we need not, and in fact cannot, reach the merits of the Diocese's petition. With regard to the requirement that the Diocese demonstrate that it has no adequate remedy by appeal, the majority: (1) erroneously states that the trial court determined that the stricken allegations were impertinent and scandalous; and (2) concludes, without any citation to authority, that post hoc appellate procedures afford the Diocese no adequate remedy because publication of the stricken allegations could affect the Diocese's right to a fair trial. In fact, while the trial court's written order notes that the stricken allegations would be impertinent and scandalous if untrue  (emphasis added), the trial court recognized that it had no basis to determine the veracity of those allegations [10] and thus the trial court's order identifies only the allegations' alleged immateriality as a basis for its ruling. In addition, the majority's conclusionwhich, contrary to all authority on the question, appears to treat the pretrial publicity claim as a fait accompliignores both: (1) the fact that there is no evidence in this record to support the notion that publication of the stricken allegations would prejudice the Diocese's right to a fair trial in a manner that could not be remedied through extensive voir dire, [11] a change of venue, or other means; [12] and (2) the intersection of its Part VII conclusion that subsequent actions by the Courier-Journal have diminished the force of the argument in favor of sealing the material [13] and its Part II conclusion that a real possibility exists that access would impair the Diocese's right to a fair trial. More significantly, however, we find no authority that supports the majority's suggestion that appellate procedures are inadequate to address due process concerns involving pretrial publicity. To the contrary, we believe the majority has overlooked Bentley v. Moore, [14] in which our predecessor held that a criminal defendant seeking extraordinary relief to prohibit a trial court from trying him in a jurisdiction where the defendant maintained he could not receive a fair trial had an adequate remedy through appeal and thus was not entitled to a writ. [15] As such, we see no basis for the majority's conclusion that traditional appellate procedures are inadequate, and that reason, standing alone, supports the denial of extraordinary relief. However, the inappropriateness of extraordinary relief is further demonstrated by the lengths to which the majority goes to justify extraordinary relief despite the Diocese's complete failure to demonstrate that a great and irreparable injury will result if relief is not granted. In fact, the majority admits that the Diocese cannot demonstrate irreparable injury, and instead argues that, because this case involves important issues concerning the inherent authority of the trial courts of the Commonwealth, [16] the Court is free to consider the merits of the petition under Bender v. Eaton 's [17] exception to the normal requirements for writs. That exception, however, requires the Court to conclude both a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration. [18] Although the majority quotes this exact languageand observes that Bender itself emphasized the conjunction between the two conditionsthe majority only addresses the second condition, and gives no indication of what substantial miscarriage of justice it believes will result in this case if relief is not granted. It thus appears that, in order to justify reaching the merits of this action, the majority has applied a new, and less-stringent, exception to the irreparable injury requirement than the one set forth in Bender v. Eaton , and in so doing, has, in effect, deleted the irreparable injury requirement entirely. The no adequate remedy by appeal and great and irreparable injury procedural requirements serve an important functionthey reserve extraordinary relief for extraordinary cases. [19] As the Diocese has failed to meet either requirement for the relief it seeks, the Court of Appeals properly denied the Diocese's petition. Accordingly, we would affirm the Court of Appeals on this basis without reaching the merits of the action. Because the majority reaches a different conclusion as to the Diocese's entitlement to a writ of mandamus, however, we will briefly outline our views regarding the relief granted by the majority.