Opinion ID: 891699
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: due process right to confrontation in probation proceedings

Text: {10} The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). Morrissey emphasized that revocation hearings are informal. 408 U.S. at 487, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Revocation of probation `deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.' Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593). Because loss of probation is loss of only conditional liberty, the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a [criminal trial] do[] not apply. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593; accord State v. Mendoza, 91 N.M. 688, 690, 579 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1978). {11} Morrissey instructs that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands and  not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.  408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (emphasis added). Given that inherent flexibility, Morrissey established minimum due process requirements for probation revocation proceedings, including an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a [probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee's behavior. Id. at 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593. The hearing must lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation. The parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation. Id. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (emphasis added). {12} Within that basic framework, the U.S. Supreme Court detailed six components of due process in Gagnon: `(a) written notice of the claimed violations of (probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the (probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a `neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking (probation or) parole.' 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (emphasis added) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593). Significantly, live testimony of adverse witnesses, such as a probation officer, is not always required during probation revocation hearings. We also observe that the purpose of the hearing is to evaluate contested relevant facts, Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (emphasis added), not every assertion the state may put forward as part of its case for revocation. The right protected in probation revocations is not the sixth amendment right to confrontation, guaranteed every accused in a criminal trial, but rather the more generally worded right to due process of law secured by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 472, 497, 92 S.Ct. 2593. {13} In Gagnon, the Supreme Court subsequently addressed the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from perhaps thousands of miles away, and emphasized that alternatives to live testimony are available during probation revocation hearings. 411 U.S. at 782 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1756. While in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the States . . . from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirements. Id. (emphasis added). The requirements were not meant to impose a great burden on any State's [probation or] parole system. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Today we focus on what Morrissey means when it entitles a probationer to confront adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation. 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593. {14} Until now, this Court has not had occasion to apply the Morrissey requirements to probation. Even before Morrissey, however, we recognized that the right to due process in a probation revocation hearing means, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Ex parte Lucero, 23 N.M. 433, 438-39, 168 P. 713, 715 (1917), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Holland, 78 N.M. 324, 431 P.2d 57 (1967). Our Court of Appeals later adopted reasonable certainty as the proper standard of proof in a probation revocation hearing. State v. Brusenhan, 78 N.M. 764, 766, 438 P.2d 174, 176 (Ct.App.1968) (`[A] violation of the conditions of probation must be established with such reasonable certainty as to satisfy the conscience of the court of the truth of the violation. It does not have to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.' (quoting and adopting language from Sparks v. State, 77 Ga.App. 22, 47 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1948))). {15} Our Court of Appeals has previously applied several of the Morrissey due process factors. See, e.g., State v. Orquiz, 2003-NMCA-089, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 157, 74 P.3d 91 (written notice); State v. Sanchez, 94 N.M. 521, 523, 612 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Ct.App.1980) (due process in light of revocation hearing delay); State v. Montoya, 93 N.M. 84, 85-86, 596 P.2d 527, 528-29 (Ct.App.1979) (right to be heard). In addition, the Court of Appeals has outlined certain limitations on those rights and related rights. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-060, ¶¶ 11-18, 130 N.M. 602, 28 P.3d 1143 (establishing due process standards for admitting lab test results in probation revocation hearing and not requiring live testimony); State v. DeBorde, 1996-NMCA-042, ¶ 13, 121 N.M. 601, 915 P.2d 906 (To require full discovery . . . would interfere with the State's strong `interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial.' (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483, 92 S.Ct. 2593)). In State v. Vigil, 97 N.M. 749, 751, 643 P.2d 618, 620 (Ct.App.1982), our Court of Appeals first applied the Morrissey right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) {16} In Vigil, a confidential informant gave sworn, out-of-court statements accusing probationer Vigil of having committed a new crimepossessing stolen propertywhile on probation. 97 N.M. at 750, 643 P.2d at 619. The informant, however, refused to testify against Vigil, leaving Vigil unable to cross-examine his accuser. Id. at 750-51, 643 P.2d at 619-20. On appeal from a revocation order, our Court of Appeals correctly held that the right to confrontation was violated to the extent the trial court relied on the informant's sealed answers in revoking probation. [1] Id. at 751, 643 P.2d at 620. We agree with the result in Vigil. {17} After Vigil, our Court of Appeals next applied Morrissey 's good-cause exception in Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, ¶¶ 11-16, 138 N.M. 730, 126 P.3d 546 and, most recently, in the present case Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 14-21, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d 1271. The Guthrie and Phillips proceedings share similar facts. First, probation officers who had not personally supervised the probationers presented the only live testimony in support of revocation. Compare Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, ¶¶ 4-7, 138 N.M. 730, 126 P.3d 546, with Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 3-4, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d 1271. In both cases, the probation officer relied exclusively on documents in the probation file, about which he had no personal knowledge, to testify about a probationer's failure to complete a required treatment program. Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 3-4, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d 1271; Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, ¶¶ 4-7, 138 N.M. 730, 126 P.3d 546. Phillips was further complicated in that the probation had been transferred to Arizona and some documents to which the officer made reference in his testimony were from that state. 2006-NMCA-001, ¶¶ 1, 6-7, 138 N.M. 730, 126 P.3d 546. In both cases, the state failed to enter the contents of the probation files into evidence or submit sworn affidavits. Important to this Opinion, however, the accused probationers in both Guthrie and Phillips never disputed the substance of the state's evidence; namely, a failure to complete a mandatory treatment program. In addition, neither probationer attempted to show how he could have contested the charge of failure to complete treatment, if only he had been offered an opportunity to cross examine the absent witness. See generally Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-036, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d 1271; Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, 138 N.M. 730, 126 P.3d 546. {18} In each proceeding, the district court revoked probation without requiring testimony from the probation officer having personal knowledge of the contents of the file. In Phillips, the judge appropriately emphasized that the state's evidence about failure to complete the treatment program had not been rebutted and was essentially uncontested: it was a verified fact that [the d]efendant. . . had been in his program for less than the requisite six months. 2006-NMCA-001, ¶ 8, 138 N.M. 730, 126 P.3d 546. As the district judge observed, Phillips was returned to custody during the time he was supposed to be in treatment. Id.; but see id., ¶ 18 (criticizing the district judge's knowledge of the actual time line). {19} Similarly in Guthrie, the district court noted that the probationer (Defendant in this case) was arrested in Quay County at the very time he was supposed to be in treatment in another locale. In addition to that verifiable fact, the State's in-court testimony concerning the fax from the treatment center was `probative of the fact' that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation by not successfully completing the residential treatment program. Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-036, ¶ 6, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d 1271. Since Defendant had not challenged the substance of the State's evidence or provided any contrary evidence or an explanation for his absence from the program, the court concluded that Defendant had failed to complete the program and had violated his probation. Id. A revocation order followed. {20} Notwithstanding the explanations by the trial judges for their findings of probation violation, in each case the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the probationers were denied due process. According to Phillips, if the state had attempted to obtain the testimony of the out-of-state witnesses but could not, or if there were another reason on the record for the district court to accept the documents . . . as true, then that might have constituted good cause. 2006-NMCA-001, ¶ 13, 138 N.M. 730, 126 P.3d 546. In the present case, the Court of Appeals looked to Phillips to conclude that Defendant was not afforded due process, explaining that a district court can make the necessary finding of good cause for not requiring live testimony by either (1) specifically addressing the State's problems in securing the presence of the absent witness, or (2) specifically stating the reasons that the hearsay evidence offered has particular indicia of accuracy and reliability such that it has probative value. Guthrie, 2009-NMCA-036, ¶ 14, 145 N.M. 761, 204 P.3d 1271 (citing Phillips, 2006-NMCA-001, ¶¶ 16-17, 138 N.M. 730, 126 P.3d 546). {21} In both cases, our Court of Appeals interpreted good cause to mean, in large part, a sufficient explanation for the absence of live testimony. In neither case did the Court of Appeals consider the necessity for, and utility of, confrontation with respect to the truth-finding process in the specific case before it. And in neither case did the Court of Appeals attempt to assess the utility of confrontation in light of these straightforward and routine chargesthe simple, objective, and uncontroverted fact that probationer either did or did not successfully complete the program, Bailey v. State, 327 Md. 689, 612 A.2d 288, 295 (1992).