Opinion ID: 788147
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brady Violation Concerning the Pink Bag and Sneaker

Text: 345 Again, to make out a Brady violation Lambert must show that (1) the government withheld evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable, either because it was exculpatory or of impeachment value; and (3) the withheld evidence was material. See Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1272. The PCRA Court found that the pink bag was not exculpatory and that, in any case, the police did not withhold the pink bag's discovery from Lambert. With respect to the sneaker, the Court found that it was not exculpatory. Once again, the PCRA Court's determinations were reasonable. 43 346 The edited version of the videotape provided to Lambert shows an empty pink bag embedded in ice. Indeed, Lambert's counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that he saw the pink bag in the videotape but did not question police witnesses about it at trial because he assumed it was a bag that had nothing to do with this case. App. 6461, 6637. The pink bag was therefore disclosed to Lambert. Needless to say (though apparently we must), Brady does not require the government to inform a defendant about information that the defendant possesses. See United States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir.1992); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 686 (4th Cir.2002) (Certainly ... information that is not merely available to the defendant but is actually known by the defendant would fall outside of the Brady rule.). Put differently, evidence is not suppressed if the defendant knows about it and has it in her possession. 347 Detective Ronald Barley testified about the sneaker. He estimated that it was approximately a size six or seven sneaker, and it was a white old type hightop sneaker with the laces. Appellate App. 1157. More importantly, however, he testified: 348 The sneaker was stained brown from being in the mud. And around the sides of the sneakers it had what I would call black rot and threads in that area of black rot were beginning to rot away from the material and I felt that the sneaker was in there for a lot longer than three days to get in that condition. 349 App. 3466-67. The government need not provide a blanket disclosure to a defendant regarding all evidence found during an investigation. [T]here is `no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case.' Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1992)). If the police had found a rusty Swiss army knife during the river search, for example, it certainly would not have violated Brady if they failed to disclose the find to Lambert. The state does not have an `obligation to communicate ... speculative information.' Id. at 110 n. 16 (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). 350 Lambert argues that it was unreasonable for the PCRA Court to credit Barley's PCRA testimony because he lied about not finding a sneaker or pink bag in 1992 and Lambert did not have the opportunity to cross-examine him at the PCRA hearing. Lambert Br. 89. As we describe below, however, the PCRA Court reasonably found that Barley did not lie. And, as we explained above, we do not believe that Lambert's inability to ask Barley leading questions obviates the probative value of his testimony. 351