Opinion ID: 1809010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of Proof of Discrimination

Text: In this connection, Justice Maddox states: [I]t seems clear that Ex parte Jackson and Branch applied Batson to Alabama cases and did not require anything different from what Batson required. The United States Supreme Court cases decided after Batson merely refined what Batson had said initially.... Purkett ... did not change the Batson standard, but merely clarified it. 681 So.2d at 185. Actually, because Alabama's procedure is not tied to the rule adopted and applied in the federal courts, questions regarding the burden of proof of discrimination under Branch and its Alabama progeny are, for me, unconnected with questions regarding the burden of proof under Batson and its federal progeny. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity I will compare and contrast the Alabama rule with the federal rule.
The three-step procedural framework for eliminating discrimination in Alabama jury selection was succinctly described in Huntley v. State, 627 So.2d 1013 (Ala.1992), as follows: Upon the exercise of the ... first peremptory challenge of [an ethnic] veniremember, a[n opponent of the strike] is entitled to [(1) request and receive] a Batson hearing. [3] Harrell v. State, 555 So.2d 263, 267-68 (Ala.1989) (adopting a `bright line test' for determining the defendant's right to a hearing).... This hearing provides the [opponent] the opportunity to marshal all available evidence in order to construct a prima facie case of discrimination. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609, 620 (Ala.1987); Ex parte Jackson, 516 So.2d 768, 772 (Ala.1986).... If the circumstances raise an inference of discrimination, the [proponent] must attempt to justify its challenges, [(2)] the burden having shifted to the [proponent] to rebut the defendant's prima facie case. Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676, 680 (Ala.1991). Following the [proponent's] explanations, [(3)] the [opponent] may offer rebuttal evidence `showing that the reasons or explanations are merely a sham or pretext' for racial discrimination. Huntley, 627 So.2d at 1014-15. The second step of this procedure places the burden of persuasion of non discrimination upon the proponent of the strike to articulat[e] a clear, specific, and legitimate reason for the challenge which relates to the particular case to be tried, and which is nondiscriminatory. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 623 (emphasis in original). In Alabama, the proponent of a peremptory challenge must, in order to reshift the burden of persuasion of discrimination to the opponent, articulate at the second step a reason that is not only legitimate, that is, one that is not inherently discriminatory, but  clear  and  specific.  In other words, if, at the second step, the proponent fails to articulate a clear, specific, nondiscriminatory reason for every strike, the inquiry ends and discrimination has been established; the trial court may notas a matter of lawempanel the jury as selected. In Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676 (Ala.1991), for example, the prosecution attempted to justify the use of 17 of [its] 20 peremptory strikes to eliminate 17 of the 19 black veniremembers, id. at 678, on grounds that, as to two of the challenged veniremembers, this Court rejected as constitutionally deficient. Specifically, the Court held invalid the prosecution's assertions that one veniremember lived in a high crime area, id. at 682-83, and that a second veniremember was underemployed. Id. at 684-85. As to the first purported explanation, the Court stated: [T]he bald assertion by the [proponent] that a veniremember lives in a high-crime area will not rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination. Id. at 685. As to the second, the Court stated: [T]here is no showing, nor does it logically follow, how [the] use or nonuse of a degree relates to the facts or issues in this particular case. Id. at 684-85 (emphasis added). Similarly, under Alabama's procedure, the proponent's explanationseven if facially neutralare not viewed by the judiciary with credulous naivete. In Alabama, [t]he trial court cannot merely accept the specific reasons given by the prosecutor at face value.... Rather, the court must consider whether the facially neutral explanations are contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination. Ex parte Thomas, 601 So.2d 56, 58 (Ala.1992). In Thomas, the State challenged three black veniremembers on the sole basis of information contained in [a] document to which only the State had access during the defendant's Batson hearing, id. at 58, namely a document ostensibly showing that the challenged veniremembers had a large number of misdemeanor convictions and/or bad driving records. Id. at 57. The State refused the defendant's request to submit the document for examination by the trial court or for entry on the record, and the trial court did not require the State to produce it. Id. at 58. This Court held that the refusal to order its production erroneously denied Thomas an opportunity to prove that the seemingly facially neutral explanations offered by the State were a sham or pretext. Id. Another example of specific, record-based scrutiny of the proponent's explanation is Millette v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 613 So.2d 1225 (Ala.1992), in which O'Neal Steel, Inc. (O'Neal), attempted to justify two peremptory challenges on the ground that the veniremembers did not appear to be highly educated and a third challenge on the ground that during voir dire the veniremember had used two verbless sentences. Id. at 1229-30. O'Neal contended that it was important to [its] case that the jurors be able to understand documents and their modifications. Id. at 1230. Nevertheless, this Court concluded that the proffered explanations were not adequate, facially race-neutral reasons. Id. A significant consideration in the Court's conclusion was the absence of evidence that O'Neal had evaluated the first two veniremembers' educational levels on anything but their current employment status. Similarly, the record demonstrated that the third veniremember was a school teacher employed by the Jefferson County Board of Education. As to the third challenge, the Court essentially concluded that the proffered explanation was not supported by the record. See also K.S. v. Carr, 618 So.2d 707, 711 (Ala.1993) (standard was not satisfied where the explanation given for striking one of the black veniremembers [was] factually inaccurate, based on that veniremember's testimony during voir dire); Ex parte Yelder, 630 So.2d 107, 109 (Ala.1992) (standard was not satisfied where the `articulation' or `communication' difficulties cited by the State as reasons for its challenges of veniremember[s]... [were] not supported by the record).
Even at the genesis of the contemporary era of peremptory challenge oversight, the extent of similarity between the standard declared in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and the standard adopted in Alabama was questionable. The focal point was the quantity and quality of explanation required of the proponent to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, Branch declared that an effective rebuttal required the proponent to articulat[e] a clear, specific [emphasis added], and legitimate reason for the challenge which relates to the particular case to be tried [emphasis omitted]. 526 So.2d at 623. Although Branch cited Batson for this proposition, the actual language in Batson is different. Batson merely stated: The prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 (emphasis added). [4] In a footnote at the end of this sentence, Batson stated: As we explained in another context, ... the prosecutor must give a `clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his `legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. [248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)]. 476 U.S. at 98, n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, n. 20. However, the standard articulated in the text accompanying footnote 20, and, especially, the standard in the footnote itself, were eroded in subsequent cases. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), for example, the Supreme Court revisited Batson in the context of New York's challenges of Hispanic veniremembers in a criminal trial. Responding to the defendant's Batson objection, the prosecutor contended that he had struck the Spanish-speaking veniremembers because he [felt] very uncertain that they would be able to listen and follow the [court's official] interpreter. 500 U.S. at 356, 111 S.Ct. at 1864. Although this explanation may have satisfied even the Alabama standard, the Court's analysis heralded a retreat from the standard declared in Batson. It stated: In evaluating the race neutrality of an attorney's explanation, a court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.... A neutral explanation in the context of our analysis here means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. 500 U.S. at 359-60, 111 S.Ct. at 1866 (emphasis added). [5] Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justice Marshall, criticized the majority on precisely the points of distinction between Batson and Branch. Specifically, he criticized the Court's conclusion that a defendant's Batson challenge fails whenever the prosecutor advances a ... justification that is not facially discriminatory. 500 U.S. at 376, 111 S.Ct. at 1875 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He explained that focusing the entire inquiry on the subjective state of mind of the prosecutor, id. at 378, 111 S.Ct. at 1876, impose[s] on the defendant the added requirement that he generate evidence of the prosecutor's actual subjective intent to discriminate. Id. The difference between the Alabama and federal standards was even more clearly evidenced in Purkett v. Elem, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). In the trial of a defendant charged with second-degree robbery, a Missouri prosecutor struck a black veniremember because of his long hair. ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1770. The prosecution stated: He had long curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared to not be a good juror for that fact, the length, curly, unkempt hair. Id. The defendant was convicted after the trial court overruled his Batson objection and empaneled the jury. Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the `state's explanation constituted a legitimate hunch' and that `[t]he circumstances fail[ed] to raise the necessary inference of racial discrimination.' ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1770. The defendant unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court. However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the explanation `was pretextual,' and that the state trial court had `clearly erred' in finding no intentional discrimination. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed that judgment. According to the per curiam opinion, the second step of the federal peremptory challenge framework, namely, the proponent's burden of rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination, does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.  ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (emphasis in original). The Court cited with peculiar disapproval Batson 's footnote 20 containing the terms clear and specific, stating: The Court of Appeals appears to have seized on our admonition in Batson that to rebut a prima facie case, the proponent of a strike `must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges....' ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that [t]he prosecutor's proffered explanation in [that] casethat he struck [the veniremember] because he had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard[was] race-neutral and satisfie[d] the prosecution's step 2 burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike. Id. Criticizing the per curiam opinion in a dissent joined by Justice Breyer, Justice Stevens stated: Today, ... the Court replaces the Batson standard with the surprising announcement that any neutral explanation, no matter how `implausible or fantastic,' ... even if it is `silly or superstitious,' ... is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1774 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also addressed the opinion's pointed disparagement of the requirement cited with approval in the Batson footnote, stating: In my opinion, it is disrespectful to the conscientious judges on the Court of Appeals who faithfully applied an unambiguous standard articulated in one of our opinions to say that they appear `to have seized on our admonition in Batson, ... that the reason must be related to the particular case to be tried....' Of course, they `seized on' that point because we told them to. The Court of Appeals was following Batson 's clear mandate. To criticize those judges for doing their jobs is singularly inappropriate. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is not the only court to have taken our admonition in Batson seriously. Numerous courts have acted on the assumption that we meant what we said when we required the prosecutor's neutral explanation to be `related to the particular case to be tried.' ___ U.S. at ___ n.8, 115 S.Ct. at 1773-74 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). I agree with Justice Stevens's dissent as to the effect of the Purkett 's express disapproval of the clear and specific language of Batson 's footnote 20 and the requirement in its accompanying text that the explanation relate to the case at hand. The effect is to increase substantially the opponent 's burden of proving discrimination by requiring proof of the proponent's actual subjective intent to discriminate. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 378, 111 S.Ct. at 1876 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Certainly, it replace[d] the Batson standard. Purkett, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1771 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, the question whether the standard set forth in Branch differed in any material respect from the standard set forth in Batson is moot. Hernandez and Purkett abrogated whatever positive correlation may have existed between the federal standard as first declared and the standard adopted in Branch. More significantly, because Alabama still places upon the proponent of the strike the burden of articulating a clear, specific, and legitimate reason for the challenge that relates to the particular case to be tried,  Millette v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 613 So.2d 1225, 1229 (Ala.1992) (emphasis added), the Alabama peremptory challenge framework now differs substantively and substantially from the federal rule. This burden, which forms the essence of Alabama's peremptory challenge framework, exceeds the federal standard. [6] The Alabama standard, which does not center on the proponent's subjective intent, discounts whimsical, ad hoc excuses. Ex parte Yelder, 630 So.2d 107, 109 (Ala. 1992); contra, Purkett, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. Instead, it supplies the judiciary with testable, objective criteria, Ex parte Bankhead, 625 So.2d 1146, 1148 (Ala. 1993), with which to assess the constitutionality of the strike. Moreover, unlike the federal standard, the Alabama standard does not allow courts to assum[e] the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 111 S.Ct. at 1866. In summary, therefore, I disagree with Justice Maddox on both positions he takes in his special concurrence. First, Alabama's peremptory challenge framework is not based on Batson and its federal progeny, but on adequate and independent state law. [7] Second, Alabama's standard differs considerably from the one set forth in Purkett. I do, however, agree with Justice Maddox's point that many of the problems that arise with regard to the striking of jurors can be minimized by using questionnaires and by restricting the number of peremptory strikes. The number of strikes could be restricted by limiting the size of the venire from which the jury is selected.