Opinion ID: 223445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extreme Misconduct

Text: We have recognized a number of litigation behaviors that comprise extreme misconduct warranting dismissal. For example, we have upheld dismissals for extremely protracted inaction (measured in years), disobedience of court orders, ignorance of warnings, [and] contumacious conduct. Cosme Nieves v. Deshler, 826 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1987) (citing cases). This case presents conduct that at least meets the first three of those four descriptions. Although Vázquez engaged in some discovery through October of 2007, [14] her foot-dragging began with her first filing in the district court and continued for almost three years. Vázquez's first motion filed with the court was one brought by her mother  who was not a party to the litigation  asking for more time to file an answer before this court because Vázquez had not been in Puerto Rico for months and had been out of communication with her attorneys. Vázquez's initial scheduling conference memorandum was filed ten days late and without any explanation for the delay. Although Vázquez apparently conducted some discovery from April through October 2007, her only subsequent actions with respect to the case were filing documents attempting to keep her case from being dismissed. She generally filed these late and often without seeking prior approval from the court. In particular, Vázquez's failure to serve Barbara properly was an egregious delay. The court issued a summons for Barbara on three separate occasions and only once  more than eighteen months after filing her complaint  did Vázquez even indicate an attempt at service. [15] After concluding that the UPS delivery, which Barbara did not receive, [16] did not constitute proper service, the court gave Vázquez another sixty days to effect service. The order stated that the extension would be the last one granted, and that failure to serve would warrant dismissal with prejudice. Thus, when the district court dismissed the case, it had been pending for over three years without proper service of an indispensable party. [17] Vázquez also ignored court orders and flouted the court's warnings. During the initial scheduling conference in April 2007, the court indicated that deadlines must be followed strictly. In April 2008, the court ordered Vázquez to appear for the continuation of her deposition on penalty of the harshest of sanctions, but she failed to do so. Even after that failure, the court declined to dismiss the action, finding that Vázquez's postponement of the remainder of her deposition appeared justified due to her pregnancy. The court did say that the case would not be stayed indefinitely and that Vázquez could not continue to avoid being deposed on the basis of the Fifth Amendment because not every question would implicate her right against self-incrimination. Despite the court's clear messages, Vázquez again failed to appear for a deposition on October 21, 2008. She then failed to file a timely objection to Abraham's motion to dismiss, despite two extensions of the deadline, causing Abraham to file two reiterations of his first motion and, finally, another motion to dismiss. As we have said, it is axiomatic that `a litigant who ignores a case-management deadline does so at his peril.' Young, 330 F.3d at 82 (quoting Rosario-Diaz v. Gonzalez, 140 F.3d 312, 315 (1st Cir.1998)). The court exhibited considerable patience in allowing Vázquez additional time to appear for a deposition, to serve Barbara, and to file documents with the court. Her disregard for court orders and deadlines undermined the court's authority and its ability to manage the case. See Tower Ventures, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 296 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir.2002) (Scheduling orders are essential tools in [case management]  and a party's disregard of such orders robs them of their utility.). Vázquez also ignored the court's local rules by filing Italian-language documents as purported evidence of the medical reasons preventing her from traveling to Puerto Rico. None of Vázquez's excuses for her delays and violations was sufficient to save her case below, and they are no more availing here. The court forgave her failure to appear for a deposition in May of 2008 due to her pregnancy, despite the fact that she never introduced competent evidence that her pregnancy was high-risk, that a doctor had ordered her not to travel, or even that she was pregnant at all. Even assuming that her absence from Puerto Rico was justified through September 2008, when her daughters were born, she did not arrange another date for her deposition, suggest an alternative means of being deposed, or even pay her adversary the courtesy of responding to the notice of deposition to be held in October. Vázquez's delay tactics were extreme, and the court was more than justified in refusing to countenance them. Similarly, the court correctly rejected Vázquez's argument that the specter of the related indictment against her excused her from appearing at the deposition at all. First, while she certainly had a right to refuse to answer questions on the basis of her privilege against self-incrimination, see Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973) (The [Fifth] Amendment ... privileges [an individual] not to answer official questions put to him in any ... proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.), it was improper to refuse to appear for any deposition whatsoever on that basis, rather than refuse to answer specific questions. The Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be invoked on a blanket basis. United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997). This rule makes practical sense. The trial court must be able to review whether the privilege was properly invoked. See United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 990 (1st Cir.1990) (explaining that the potential for incrimination is a determination for the court ... to make, and requires that a particularized inquiry into the reasons for the assertion of the privilege be made). Without knowing the questions to be put to Vázquez, the court could not determine whether the privilege was properly asserted. Vázquez's argument that she had fulfilled her obligation to appear by answering questions for two days in August 2007 is also unavailing. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(1) provides that a deposition is generally limited to one seven-hour day, that default provision does not apply where the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise. The record reflects that Vázquez had previously agreed to come to Puerto Rico to continue her deposition. Rule 30(d)(1)'s time limit thus did not apply. See id. advisory committee's note (The presumptive duration may be extended, or otherwise altered, by agreement.). Vázquez argues for the first time on appeal that Italy's policy of not extraditing defendants in capital cases prohibits her from going to Puerto Rico to prosecute her case. Vázquez fails to cite any authority for such a policy, however, and thus her perfunctory argument is necessarily waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990). More fundamentally, a non-extradition policy does not bear any rational relationship to Vázquez's liberty to travel to the United States of her own free will. Vázquez also repeatedly protests that her delays and noncompliance with court orders were not willful and thus could not justify dismissal. Although relevant, bad faith is not a prerequisite to employing dismissal as a sanction for misconduct. See Vallejo v. Santini-Padilla, 607 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2010).