Opinion ID: 1955212
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant Webster

Text: Defendant Webster had two prior convictions for simple burglary and his latest conviction was for purse snatching, defined as a crime of violence under La. R.S. 14:2(13). As such the trial court found him to be a third felony offender and sentenced him under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A) 1(b)(ii) to life imprisonment without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. In imposing this sentence, the trial court stated: The [c]ourt further finds that the Dorthey rule, D-O-R-T-H-E-Y, would not be triggered in this case as the [c]ourt is not aware of any circumstances that would cause the [c]ourt to deviate from the mandatory sentence. The appellate majority disagreed with the trial court's determination under Dorthey, concluding: The life sentence imposed in the instant case is clearly excessive. Although purse snatching, La.Rev.Stat. 14:55.1, is regarded as a violent felony, thus triggering the three strikes provision of La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii), it appears the least heinous of those enumerated in La.Rev.Stat. 14:2(13), which defines violent felony for the purpose of the multiple offender statute. Furthermore, the defendant committed the underlying crime in the least reprehensible manner. He was unarmed, the criminal act was limited to reaching out to snatch the purse, the victim was not harmed, and her property was recovered immediately following the offense. Finally, the defendant's prior convictions for simple burglary were nearly ten years old when he committed the instant offense. In view of the circumstances, we find the life sentence imposed by the trial court to be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. 746 So.2d at 801-02. However, the court of appeal failed to analyze this case under the test we enunciated in Johnson, and, in fact, did not even mention Johnson. Because Johnson contains the governing law for determining whether or not the mandatory penalty of life imprisonment dictated by the Habitual Offender Statute is excessive, we remand this case to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of Johnson.