Opinion ID: 2219142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: anaysis of issue five

Text: ś 135. This court employs a two-part test in reviewing an order to suppress evidence. First, as to the circuit court's findings of fact, this court will uphold the trial court's findings . . . unless they are clearly erroneous. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d at 249-50. See Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2). Second, issues of constitutional reasonableness are reviewed independently. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 541. [19-21] ś 136. A search of property, conducted without a search warrant and probable cause, is constitutionally valid if based upon proper voluntary consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Where consent is relied upon prior to a warrantless search, the State must prove by clear and positive evidence that the search was the result of a free, intelligent, unequivocal and specific consent without any duress or coercion, actual or implied. State v. Johnson, 177 Wis. 2d 224, 233, 501 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1993). The court must make that determination based upon the totality of the circumstances. Id. [22, 23] ś 137. Permission to search the premises of a target individual may be obtained from a third party who possesses common authority over the subject premises. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); State v. McGovern, 77 Wis. 2d 203, 211, 252 N.W.2d 365 (1977). [O]ne who possesses common authority over premises or effects with another may give valid consent to the authorities to search those premises or effects, even though the other person does not consent. State v. West, 185 Wis. 2d 68, 93, 517 N.W.2d 482 (1994). [24] ś 138. The determination of common authority is not predicated upon a technical application of property law. Rather, practical considerations are more appropriate in this analysis. The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (citations omitted). ś 139. In this case there is no dispute as to George's voluntary consent. He voluntarily consentedâ in writing and after being advised him of his right to withhold consent (R. 101:33)â to a search of the apartment. (R. 101:35). There is no evidence that the consent was made under coercion or duress. Thus, the only question that remains for us to determine is whether George had authority to consent to a search of Knapp's bedroom. ś 140. The State argues that George was legally empowered to consent to a search of the apartment, including Knapp's bedroom, and that he voluntarily consented to the search. In support of that position, the State relies on State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-71). ś 141. In Matejka, the prosecution intended to use evidence obtained from the defendant's jacket during a consensual search of a car in which she was a passenger. Id., ś 11. This court held that it was constitutionally reasonable for the police to search and seize the property of a non-consenting passenger when the driver/owner has consented to a search of the car in which the property is found. Id., ś 20. This court held as a prerequisite, however, that there be common authority by the two parties over the premises to be searched. Id. ś 142. The State contends that it is clear from the facts of the case that George had a superior authority over the entire apartment, and at very least, a common authority with the defendant over the bedroom in which the defendant only occasionally stayed. ś 143. Knapp disagrees and asks this court to uphold the ruling of the circuit court. Knapp maintains that the circuit court correctly suppressed the evidence seized during the second search of Knapp's bedroom on December 13, 1987, because George did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to the search. ś 144. The circuit court found as a matter of fact that Knapp paid rent. Therefore, Knapp argues that this case is similar to Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531. In Kieffer, the circuit court found that Kieffer and his wife, unlike the defendant, paid no rent but did help pay utility bills on occasion. Id. ś 145. Based upon these facts, the Kieffer court stated: This testimony is indicative of a respect for the expectations of privacy held by the defendant and his wife, and not a mere `habit' of the property owner. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 546. The testimony in Kieffer allowed that court to distinguish it from United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992). ś 146. Contrary to the State's position that Knapp's residency was loose and transitory, the circuit court found that . . . the defendant lived there. (R. 107:22; Def. App. 268). The testimony established a clear expectation of privacy on the part of Knapp in the bedroom: (1) Knapp had his own key to the apartment. (R. 101:24; Def. App. 324). (2) He was given that bedroom because it had a door with a lock and was the most private bedroom. (R. 101:21, 30; Def. App. 321, 327). (3) Knapp kept the door closed when he was not home and left it open occasionally when present. (R. 11:30-31; Def. App. 327-28). (4) Knapp brought with him a television, personal papers, clothing and effects, a dresser, and pretty much everything he owned. (R. 101:22-23, 29; Def. App. 322-23, 329; R. 104:9; Def. App. 412). (5) George testified that he would have no need to enter the room to retrieve hunting rifles because during the time Knapp lived there hunting season was over. (R. 101:31; Def. App. 328). (6) The circuit court found that the presence of the guns in the room was simple continued storage of items in [Knapp's] bedroom. (R. 107:22; Def. App. 268). (7) George and Knapp had an understanding that George would not go into that room without asking Knapp first. (R. 101:23, 32; Def. App. 323, 329; R. 104:10; Def. App. 413). (8) Knapp moved there specifically because he wanted more privacy than he could expect at his parents' house. (R. 104:154; Def. App. 424). (9) George tried to respect Knapp's privacy as much as possible. (R. 101:23; Def. App. 323). (10) George would not have entered the room even to retrieve his belongings while Knapp was not home. (R. 107:22; Def. App. 268). Based upon the facts above, there was no mutual use of the bedroom or joint access for most purposes as required by Matlock, 415 U.S. 164. [25] ś 147. We agree with Knapp's assertion that George did not have actual authority to consent to a search of Knapp's bedroom. Knapp and George did not have mutual use for most purposes. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 172. For Knapp the room was his place of residence; for George it was, at most, a place where he and his wife incidentally continued to store some hunting equipment and other personal property. ś 148. In reaching that conclusion, we note that this case is substantially similar to Kieffer in that Knapp's expectation of privacy in the bedroom was superior to George's, thus obviating George's authority to consent to the search. [26] ś 149. Additionally, Knapp's plans to continue to reside at George's apartment and pay rent for his use of the bedroom were sufficiently open-ended to establish that he was a permanent resident. This sufficiently distinguished this case from State v. Fountain, 534 N.W.2d 859 (S.D. 1995), and United States v. Buckles, 495 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1974), both of which were about overnight guests. The argument that Knapp had only been staying in the bedroom for about two weeks is also not persuasive. One's constitutionally guaranteed rights do not attach only after some specified length of time, but rather attach once one establishes a right to privacy that reasonable people are willing to recognize. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J. concurring); West, 185 Wis. 2d at 89 (citing State v. Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d 461, 467, 501 N.W.2d 442 (1993)). ś 150. The State's reliance on Matejka does not persuade us to admit the evidence seized during the second search. First, the facts of Matejka are distinguishable. Matejka involved a jacket left in the passenger compartment of a car, not a separate room within the living quarters. Second, the court in Matejka still required common authority over the premises. Matejka, 241 Wis. 2d 52, ś 20. We have already determined that common authority did not exist in this case. [27-29] ś 151. As for the State's alternate claim that if George did not have actual authority to consent, he had apparent authority to do so, we agree. When the police execute a search based on consent from someone they reasonably believe to have the authority to consent, the search may be held valid and the evidence thereby derived may be admitted. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89. The determination of consent to enter must `be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the consenting party had authority over the premises? Id. at 188-89 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). When insufficient information exists for police to make a determination as to the consenting party's authority, they are to inquire further until they can establish the presence or lack of authority. See Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 550-51. The officers in Kieffer made no such inquiries, and the court thus held their reliance on the third party's consent unreasonable, even though the consenting party owned the premises. Id. [30] ś 152. In this case the police officers that obtained the consent and conducted the second search acted upon a reasonable belief that George and Knapp had at least common authority over the room, and they proceeded with the consensual search on the basis of the consent given by George. Here the officers determined that George and his financée were the persons who rented the apartment from the landlord, and they paid the rent. They certainly had access to the bedroom since they kept personal property there, including two hunting rifles, two shotguns, a couch, a bed, and a dresser. The record seems somewhat unclear as to whether the officers learned all of this information before, during, or after the consent search. George expounded further about the personal property in his testimony at a hearing on the motion to suppress: Q. So in the approximate two years that you were staying there, you were living there before the Defendant came to stay with you, what was the second bedroom used for? A. Storage Q. Ofâ A. Ofâ Q. â what sortâ ? A. Of extra clothes, my hunting, fishing stuff. You know, just items like that. Q. Was it also the guest room then; say, when your daughter came to visit, that's where she would stay? A. Yes. And then that's exactly where my daughter would stay, yes. Q. And the, the bed that's shown in the pictures there, â A. (Reviewing photograph.) Mmâ hmm. Q. â that was the bed that was in the room? A. Yes. Q. And that was yours or Helen's? A. That was Helen's. Q. As well as the dresser? A. The whiteâ the white dresser was. ś 153. Prior to giving his written consent George had come to the police department voluntarily. Roets testified that he told George of the nature of the investigation involving Knapp, and he told George that he was interested in looking into his trash cans or areas of his apartment where Knapp may have placed clothing. He also testified that he knew Knapp stayed at the apartment, but didn't know for certain the length of time that Knapp had been staying there. George testified that Knapp had been staying there for a couple of weeks at the time of his arrest. George also testified that Roets explained to him that he didn't have to consent to a search of the apartment, and that he was given the opportunity to confer with Knapp before signing the consent form. Nevertheless, George consented to the officers' search of the entire premises. During his testimony regarding his signing of the consent form George stated the following: Q. And Detective Roets went over this with you before you signed it, correct? A. Yes. He said he wanted to search my house. Q. And you agreed to let him? A. To search the house, yes. Q. And you read through this before you signed it, right? A. Correct. Q. And you read that you agreed to consent to a search of the â A. There was theâ to take any letters, papers materials or other property which they may desire. Q. From, from the premises at South Fifth Street? A. From my house, yes. Q. And that includes the room Matt was staying in, correct? A. There was no conversation about specifically searching that room, no. Q. Wellâ A. He said, the house. Q. Wellâ A. And when we walked in the front door, he went directly to Matt's bedroom. Q. When he said the house, you didn't say, Yes, but not Matt's bedroom, did you? A. No, I did not. Q. And your house included Matt's bedroom; did it not? A. Correct. Q. And this form doesn't say anything about the premises except the bedroom where the Defendant was staying,â A. Right. It seems quite clear that George did not limit his consent to search in any way. From the time George orally agreed to the search, to the time he talked with Knapp and then met with Detective Roets once again to sign the consent form, George never constricted his consent, and he permitted the officers to search his entire home. ś 154. Moreover, once the officers were in his residence, George escorted them to Matt's room, as is evidenced by his testimony. George testified: Q. And you took them right into Matt's bedroom, and said, This is his room, didn't you? A. I showed them where the room was at, yes. Q. It would be fair to say, Mr. Knapp, that that was yoursâ yours and Helen's house, correct? A. Correct. Q. You were, you were the keepers of thatâ A. Correct. Q. â residence? Thus, it appeared to the officers that George was in control of the premises and could make decisions whether or not to allow the police to search his residence. ś 155. Under the essential facts of this case, which appear to be undisputed, and applying the objective standard set forth in Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, we hold that an officer of reasonable caution could reasonably conclude that George apparently had authority over the entire apartment. We are satisfied that the State met its burden of proof in that regard. The majority in Rodriguez stated: The Constitution is no more violated when officers enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when they enter without a warrant because they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is about to escape. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (citation omitted). Here, of course, the person who consented was a resident, and it was reasonable to conclude that he had full authority to consent to the search. To sum up, at the time of the search of the apartment, George was paying the rent for my house, and he and his financée were keeping several items of their personal property in the bedroom Knapp was using. Before signing the consent form, George was told of the nature of the search, he had the opportunity to confer with Knapp, and he made no attempt to limit the scope of the search by the officers. George and Helen were the keepers of that residence. That is enough to establish apparent authority under the Rodriguez objective standard. ś 156. In the alternative, the State argues that the evidence found during the second search should be admitted under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Since we have held that there was apparent authority to consent, there is no need to address this argument.