Opinion ID: 2638876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 22 Whitney asserts that the WSBA  and, by implication, this court  is without jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct which is alleged to have occurred while he was acting as a GAL and not as an attorney. He, thus, asks this court to dismiss the complaint against him. [3] ¶ 23 We begin our analysis of this issue by taking note of the oath of attorney that all attorneys admitted to the practice of law in Washington must recite and sign. It contains a promise by the attorney to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct approved by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Admission to Practice Rule 5(d). The preamble to the RPCs indicates that [i]n fulfilling professional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles that require the performance of many difficult tasks .... but fundamental ethical principles are always present as guidelines. (Emphasis added.) The RPCs are mandatory in character, and they create the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. RPC Preliminary Statement. ¶ 24 It is well settled that this court is charged with the duty of imposing discipline upon attorneys who are licensed to practice law in Washington and who violate the RPCs. As we have observed long ago, membership in the state bar association and authorization to continue in the practice of law coexist under the aegis of one authority, the Supreme Court. State ex rel. Schwab v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, 80 Wash.2d 266, 269, 493 P.2d 1237 (1972). And we have made it clear that Washington attorneys can be sanctioned for misconduct occurring outside the [traditional] practice of law. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Huddleston, 137 Wash.2d 560, 577, 974 P.2d 325 (1999). Indeed, we have said that [a]ttorneys in Washington are subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct at all times, regardless of whether they are acting as an attorney at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id.; see also In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Plumb, 126 Wash.2d 334, 892 P.2d 739 (1995) (attorney disciplined for theft); Curran, 115 Wash.2d 747, 801 P.2d 962 (attorney disciplined for vehicular homicide). ¶ 25 Whitney's contention, that the grievance procedure outlined in Local Rule 80(b) of the Kitsap County Superior Court provides the sole remedy for resolving grievances against a GAL, fails in light of the aforementioned principles. The fact that Whitney's misconduct happened while he was acting as a GAL and that he could have been suspended or removed from Kitsap County's GAL registry for violating a local rule is as irrelevant in an attorney disciplinary proceeding as is the fact that an attorney may suffer a criminal penalty for an act that subjects him or her to attorney discipline. The plain fact is that how one conducts himself or herself as a GAL reflects on their ability to practice law, and we have not hesitated to impose appropriate sanctions upon attorneys engaging in misconduct outside the practice of law, provided that such conduct reflected adversely upon that attorney's ability to practice law. Huddleston, 137 Wash.2d at 578, 974 P.2d 325. In sum, although Whitney was acting as a GAL when he testified in Kitsap County Superior Court and at a deposition, he was not relieved of the ethical obligations of his chosen profession. Attorneys, like Whitney, who fail to uphold their ethical duties when acting as a GAL are, consequently, subject to discipline. We conclude, therefore, that the WSBA had jurisdiction to seek discipline of Whitney for violating the RPCs and that this court has jurisdiction to impose it.