Opinion ID: 2351964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mere Encounter

Text: Mere encounters, unlike custodial or investigative detentions, need not be supported by either probable cause or a reasonable suspicion. A mere encounter occurs where an officer approaches another person, but the person has no official obligation to stop or to respond to police questions or remarks. Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 541 Pa. at 292-294, 662 A.2d at 1047. [6] Accord Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 340, 263 A.2d 342, 343 (1970) (police may legally stop and question a person without probable cause or reasonable suspicion). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-1879, n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (not every encounter between police officers and citizens amounts to a seizure; there is nothing in the [federal] constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.) Here, police were not even afforded the opportunity for a mere encounter to address questions to appellants since appellants left the area immediately upon their detection of police approaching. Police, without stopping, questioning, or otherwise interfering with appellants' course of behavior, simply followed appellants along the public highway at a pace set by appellants themselves. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 475 Pa. 482, 488, 380 A.2d 1238, 1242 (1977), quoting, Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 370, 378 A.2d 835, 838 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947, 98 S.Ct. 1533, 55 L.Ed.2d 546 (1978) (there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a police officer from approaching a person on the street in order to make inquiries of that person) (citations omitted). Under these circumstances, the action of the police did not even rise to the minimal intrusion which constitutes a mere encounter. Therefore, I would hold that the police did not need probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion to follow each of the appellants as they took flight. The mere approach of a police officer is not the type of showing of authority which invokes the protection of the search and seizure laws of this Commonwealth. Having been lawfully on the public highway, police should be able to lawfully seize the discarded contraband which was in plain view and in a public location. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993-994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968) (items appearing within the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in that position are subject to seizure); Commonwealth v. Harris, 479 Pa. 131, 387 A.2d 869 (1978) (where police have a lawful right to be in the position of observation, they can lawfully seize objects in plain view). Obviously, once police observed and seized the abandoned contraband, police then had sufficient probable to arrest each appellant. The majority's reliance upon United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), in reaching the majority's conclusion that such circumstances sub judice give rise to a seizure, is wholly misplaced. As the majority states, the test is whether, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. Here, each defendant clearly believed he was free to leave as each was indeed exercising this belief by leaving the respective locations when police officers approached. The police did not physically stop the defendants from leaving, did not order the defendants to stop and, indeed, did not interfere with their freedom in any manner. The officers here were in a public place attending to their assigned duties. Appellants chose to flee rather than confront the officers. They should not now be able to complain if the officers chose to give pursuit, as is their lawful authority. To hold that a police officer cannot pursue an individual in the situations described here is to give to the interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, an absurdity that was never meant by its framers. The Constitutional provision at issue was designed to punish or deter improper police conduct. The officers' unintrusive conduct here cannot be said to be improper. Logically, the holding by the majority may be extended to prevent police officers from pursuing vehicles on the highway or from following suspicious individuals on the public streets unless the police possess probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe a crime has occurred. Evidence voluntarily abandoned during these situations would most likely be suppressed under the majority's opinion. Part of a police officer's duty is to investigate crime before it occurs, not simply stand by idly and wait for an offense to be committed before taking action. A visible police presence is essential to satisfy this duty. That a person voluntarily chooses to flee from the mere presence of a police officer should not immunize that person when he abandons contraband, weapons, or any other evidence during the course of his flight and a police officer's pursuit. In sum, there is but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous. (Attributed to Napoleon I, after his retreat from Russia, December, 1812). Such step has now been taken by the majority which inexplicably affords to criminals in Pennsylvania greater protection for their deviant conduct than that afforded criminals in our sister states and which now greatly restricts police officers' effectiveness in ferreting out criminal conduct. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the orders of the Superior Court.