Opinion ID: 77938
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the EPA's Supplemental Late Production of 160 Documents Was Reasonable

Text: Next, the Tribe points to the 160 additional documents that, were found after Dominy and Pearce had averred that all responsive documents had been produced or properly withheld under a FOIA exception as evidence that the search was inadequate. On two occasions after this litigation ensued, the EPA provided additional documents to the Tribe130 documents previously withheld from production for a claimed privilege that the EPA later reconsidered [18] and thirty additional documents produced after Scheidt's deposition which included e-mail messages and copies of presentations in addition to handwritten notes. [19] The Tribe notes both the significant number of supplemental documents (especially when compared to the two and one-half boxes initially provided) and the timing of the productions as indicative of the search's inadequacy. It is true that the first supplemental production of 130 documents occurred nearly twenty months after the Tribe's initial FOIA request, and almost five months after litigation ensued. Nonetheless, the Tribe has not specifically argued that any of the 130 documents (released at the discretion of the EPA OGC and Assistant Regional Administrator Wright) fail to qualify for a privilege. Instead, the Tribe asserts only generally that those documents should have been produced with the EPA's initial disclosure, and focuses on the timing of the EPA's determination that the 130 documents are privileged. [20] It is true, of course, that an agency generally has discretion to disclose exempt information if it sees fit to do so. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293-94, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979). The Tribe has not challenged the basis for that claim of exemption, but insteadironicallycriticizes the EPA for changing its mind about the claimed exemption at such a late date. This does not change the fact, however, that the decision to assert or withdraw a proper claim of exemption is solely within an agency's discretion. With respect to his production of the thirty documents, Scheidt testified that he genuinely believed that the Tribe said it had no desire to have EPA produce voluminous publicly released documents and therefore, when the Tribe indicated in Scheidt's deposition that it was interested in his personal notes on public documents, mostly ERC public meeting handouts, Scheidt searched for them. Although the Tribe complains that the Scheidt supplemental production contained e-mails that were not personal notes, the EPA maintains that the fact that some de minimus number of documents were overlooked in the initial FOIA search does not prove that the search was in bad faith or inadequate. This Circuit has not established a rule regarding the inference to be drawn from the late discovery and late release of additional documents responsive to a FOIA request. Relying on Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 370 (D.C.Cir.1978), the Tribe contends that the `[d]iscovery of additional documents is more probative that the search was not thorough than if no other documents were found to exist.' The Tribe further contends that a requestor may support an allegation of bad faith by presenting evidence that additional, reasonable documents exist. See Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C.Cir.1981). Citing a different case from a district court in the D.C. Circuit, the EPA casts a different light on the late document productions, theorizing that the further search and additional release are not an indication of the inadequacy of its search but further evidence of the agency's dedication to fully complying with its FOIA obligations. See Western Center For Journalism v. I.R.S, 116 F.Supp.2d 1, 10 (D.D.C.2000) (finding that an agency's release of additional responsive records mistakenly omitted from its initial response did not demonstrate bad faith since it is unreasonable to expect even the most exhaustive search to uncover every responsive file; what is expected of a law-abiding agency is that the agency admit and correct error when error is revealed). The EPA also reiterates that FOIA requires an agency to conduct a reasonable search, but that search need not be perfect in order to be reasonable. See Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 956 (D.C.Cir.1986) ([A] search need not be perfect, only adequate, and adequacy is measured by the reasonableness of the effort in light of the specific request.). [21] Thus, a valid question before this court is what inference, if any, can be or should be drawn from the late production or disclosure of FOIA documents. We are not certain that a one size fits all answer to that question exists. Rather than announcing that a certain inference can always be drawn from such a late production, we believe that the better course is to evaluate the reasoning behind the delay. In this case, because the EPA has offered a reasonable explanation for the late production of the two categories of documents in this case, the court finds that the district court did not err when it failed to draw any adverse interest against the EPA due to its late disclosure of the documents in question.