Opinion ID: 197576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: staples: the first amendment and state defamation law

Text: 11 For many years, states enacted statutes and applied common law tort principles in the area of defamation with no more than a passing nod to the First Amendment's free speech guaranty. This era of constitutional non-interference ended when the Justices proclaimed a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721. Faithful to this ideal, the Court announced that the First Amendment precludes recovery by a public official under state defamation law unless the official shows that the speaker acted with actual malice, that is, with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of the statement. See id. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 725-26. 12 The seeds sown in New York Times have blossomed over the years, giving rise to a crop of checks on the sweep of state defamation law. We harvest four points. 13
14 First, the deference traditionally shown by courts toward factfinders' determinations is muted when defamation issues implicate free speech concerns. In such circumstances, appellate judges must conduct a whole-record review and examine for [them]selves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see ... whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment protect. Id. at 285, 84 S.Ct. at 728-29 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This requirement of independent appellate review is not a procedural directive, but, rather, a rule of federal constitutional law that reflects a deeply held conviction that judges ... must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1965, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). Indeed, when the imperative of independent review conflicts with a standard procedural dictate (such as Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)), the constitutional mandate controls. See id. at 514, 104 S.Ct. at 1967. 15 As a practical matter, this requirement means that federal courts engage in de novo review when mulling defamation issues that are tinged with constitutional implications. See, e.g., id. at 511, 514, 104 S.Ct. at 1965, 1967; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 & n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690-91 & n. 7, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953 F.2d 724, 727 (1st Cir.1992); Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 937 (1st Cir.1989). Maine courts follow the same course. See Rippett v. Bemis, 672 A.2d 82, 86 (Me.1996); Caron v. Bangor Publishing Co., 470 A.2d 782, 784 (Me.1984). 16
17 The First Amendment does not inoculate all opinions against the ravages of defamation suits. A statement couched as an opinion that presents or implies the existence of facts which are capable of being proven true or false can be actionable. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2705-06, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977) (A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.). 2 Thus, a statement normally is not actionable unless it contains an objectively verifiable assertion. 3 Chief Judge Posner has captured the distinction between statements that are actionable and those that are not: 18 A statement of fact is not shielded from an action for defamation by being prefaced with the words 'in my opinion,' but if it is plain that the speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable. 19 Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir.1993). 20 The Milkovich Court was careful not to discard the baby with the bath water: while leaving some statements of opinion exposed, the Court reaffirmed the protection long afforded to imaginative expression and rhetorical hyperbole. 497 U.S. at 17, 20, 110 S.Ct. at 2704-05, 2706-07. Thus, the First Amendment prohibits defamation actions based on loose, figurative language that no reasonable person would believe presented facts. See, e.g., Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 2781-82, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974) (holding that use of the word traitor to define a worker who crossed a picket line was not actionable); Greenbelt Co-op. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 1541-42, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970) (holding that a newspaper's characterization of a developer's negotiating position as blackmail was not defamatory; the word was simply an epithet and, under the circumstances, did not suggest commission of a crime); Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 728 (calling a play a rip-off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job was mere hyperbole and, thus, constitutionally protected). 21 The First Amendment's shielding of figurative language reflects the reality that exaggeration and non-literal commentary have become an integral part of social discourse. For better or worse, our society has long since passed the stage at which the use of the word bastard would occasion an investigation into the target's lineage or the cry you pig would prompt a probe for a porcine pedigree. Hyperbole is very much the coin of the modern realm. In extending full constitutional protection to this category of speech, the Milkovich Court recognized the need to segregate casually used words, no matter how tastelessly couched, from fact-based accusations. 22
23 The Supreme Court has ruled that the First Amendment not only restricts the types of actionable statements, but also limits the kinds of recoverable damages. Of particular relevance here is the Court's holding that a private individual who seeks damages for a defamatory statement involving a matter of public concern cannot recover presumed or punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 751, 756-57, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2941, 2943-44, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3011-12, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). Determining whether an allegedly defamatory statement involves a matter of public concern requires a court to assess the statement's content, form and context ... as revealed by the whole record. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761, 105 S.Ct. at 2946 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690). Withal, locating particular statements along the public/private continuum is sometimes a surpassingly difficult task. 24
25 The fourth principle that must be understood before we embark on our odyssey through the record is a restriction on defamation that Maine's jurisprudence hallows, though its constitutional credentials remain inscrutable. 4 Simply put, Maine defamation law does not recognize liability without fault; rather, as a predicate to recovery, Maine requires a defamation plaintiff to show that the defendant acted at least negligently. See Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me.1991).