Opinion ID: 867478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Improper Use of Moody's Videotaped Confession

Text: ¶ 169 Moody also challenges the prosecutor's substantive use in closing argument of Moody's videotaped confession. ¶ 170 During trial, defense counsel asked to play Moody's videotaped confession for the jury so the jurors could determine whether Moody was malingering. Over the State's objection, the trial court permitted the defense to play the tape, but instructed the jury to consider only Moody's demeanor and not to consider statements from the tape as substantive evidence. ¶ 171 After the videotape was played, the prosecutor requested that the State be permitted to ask the experts about the effect of the videotape on their opinions about Moody's malingering. The court agreed. On direct examination of Dr. Sullivan, the prosecutor asked if, in his review of the videotape, the doctor had noticed any inconsistencies in terms of what [Moody] remembers or what he doesn't remember. Dr. Sullivan then testified that Moody was initially told only that Patricia Magda was his next-door neighbor, but later in the interview he indicates that he is being held for murdering his next-door neighbor, despite the fact that no one had identified her as a murder victim. Four days later, the defense moved for a mistrial, arguing that Dr. Sullivan improperly considered the content of the videotape. The court denied the motion, reminding counsel that the restriction on substantive consideration applied only to the jury and that the experts could properly consider the content of the videotape. ¶ 172 In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the tape showed that Moody was malingering. He stated that Moody ke[pt] up a good story for two hours or more, but then made a significant slip. He noted that when the videotape was at 18 hours, 30 minutes, and 30 seconds, Moody told the officers that he did not know who Patricia Magda was; at 19:58:15, however, he stated that he killed his next-door neighbor. The prosecutor then said [i]f you don't think Dr. Sullivan got it right, listen to the tape. Moody now argues that the prosecutor encouraged the jury to use the videotape for the precise purpose that the trial court expressly forbade, namely, as substantive evidence of Moody's guilt. ¶ 173 Moody never objected to this argument, however, and therefore never provided the trial court the opportunity to cure any error. See Dann, 205 Ariz. at 575, ¶ 73, 74 P.3d at 249. Therefore, we review only for fundamental error. See id.; see also Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 297, 896 P.2d at 837. ¶ 174 The prosecutor's substantive use of the tape's contents in closing appears to have been error. The prosecutor directed the jury to consider the tape for its content, giving specific time references for statements he wished the jurors to hear. Although the State argues that the prosecutor eventually tied the videotape to Dr. Sullivan's testimony by saying [i]f you don't think Dr. Sullivan got it right, listen to the tape, he did so only after substantively discussing the videotape for fifteen sentences. Such use of the videotape was specifically prohibited by the trial court. However, a number of factors mitigate the impact of the prosecutor's conduct. ¶ 175 First, although the defense later objected to Dr. Sullivan's substantive reliance on the content of the video, defense counsel had originally urged that the jurors be permitted to consider the videotape evidence substantively. Second, the prosecutor did not encourage the jurors to view the entire tape substantively, but directed them to the particular point on the tape that would support his expert's testimony. Finally, the prosecutor obtained a waiver of the demeanor only ruling to allow his expert to consider the contents of the videotape and testify to it. Consequently, we conclude that the prosecutor's argument supporting Dr. Sullivan's reliance on the videotape to form his conclusion did not constitute fundamental error. 4. Arguing False Carlos Logan Information ¶ 176 Moody challenges the prosecutor's use of the false Carlos Logan evidence for substantive purposes in closing argument. ¶ 177 In its closing, defense counsel argued to the jury that the opinions of Drs. Morenz and Sullivan were unreliable because they were based in part upon the Carlos Logan evidence, which was a complete lie. Counsel implied that the information that Logan reported about Moody was fabricated and derived from newspaper articles and police reports, and suggested that Logan provided no details of the murders until he was offered a plea deal four months after his arrest. ¶ 178 On rebuttal, the prosecutor made three arguments designed to rebut these claims. First, he argued that Detective Wright did not discover that some of what Carlos Logan had said was not true until September of 1995, long after the grand jury testimony and police reports had been disseminated to the doctors. Next, he argued that some of the Carlos Logan information must be true because Logan had no way, other than a first-person report from Moody, to know that Moody stabbed [an] old woman or was featured on America's Most Wanted. Finally, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider how Moody must have met Logan  a small-time crack seller  when considering the defense's theory that Moody was not a cocaine addict and was not under the influence of cocaine at the time of the murders. ¶ 179 Moody made no contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's comments during rebuttal argument. Failure to object to a prosecutor's comments during closing argument limits our review to one for fundamental error only. See State v. Phillips, 202 Ariz. 427, 437, ¶ 48, 46 P.3d 1048, 1058 (2002). ¶ 180 Counsel is given wide latitude in closing argument to comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences from it. State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 197, 665 P.2d 70, 79 (1983). Further, [c]omments that are invited and prompted by opposing counsel's arguments are not improper if they are reasonable and pertinent to the issues raised. State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 16, 951 P.2d 869, 881 (1997). The prosecutor's comments fall into this category. ¶ 181 The State claims that telling the jury that the Carlos Logan information was given to the doctors before the State knew that it was false was intended to rebut defense counsel's claim that Carlos Logan's false statements were fed to mental health professionals to taint their opinions. The State maintains that defense counsel invited this comment by putting at issue the State's motive for supplying the Carlos Logan information to the doctors. We agree. Defense counsel's suggestion that the State intentionally tainted its experts opened the door for the prosecution to rebut the assertion. ¶ 182 The State defends the prosecutor's argument that Logan must have learned certain information from Moody because Logan had no access to any other sources containing that information. The State argues that this inference was invited by the defense's suggestion that all of Logan's evidence was false, or at least was not learned from Moody, and that none of it should have been considered by the doctors. We agree that the prosecutor's argument responded to arguments raised by defense counsel in closing. It was also pertinent to the case because Dr. Morenz testified that he relied at least in part on the information in making his determination that Moody was malingering, and an argument that he relied on false evidence harms his credibility. ¶ 183 The third comment  that Moody met with Logan, a small-time crack seller  supports the inference that Moody was a crack user. Evidence that Logan had sold crack had been introduced by Moody's counsel in his cross-examination of Detective Wright. Moody had attempted to show that Logan should not be believed because he was a criminal and a crack dealer. Thus, the evidence was before the jury and its use was not objected-to in closing. ¶ 184 The inference that Moody met Logan, a crack dealer, supported the prosecution's theory that Moody was a crack user. This reasonable inference was supported by other evidence in the record as well. For example, Moody never disputed that he had a substantial crack-cocaine habit in the months before the murders. Tucson Citizen reporter David Teibel testified that Moody told him he had spent three to four thousand dollars on massive doses of cocaine shortly before the Malone murder. Moody's ex-girlfriend also testified that, to support his substantial crack-cocaine habit, Moody had sold all of his appliances and much of his furniture and had pawned guns, jewelry, and other items to obtain money to buy crack. Dr. Morenz testified that Moody told him that aliens forced him to use massive quantities of cocaine, a claim that Moody repeated to his own expert, Dr. Lewis. Crack pipes and other paraphernalia were found in the vehicle that Moody stole from Patricia Magda after killing her. Additionally, defense counsel had already put evidence before the jury that Carlos Logan had twelve separate drug-related arrests or convictions over the previous decade, and the jury also heard evidence that Logan told authorities he sold Moody pieces of rock cocaine in the day-and-a-half before his arrest. Given the volume of evidence on this point, we conclude that the prosecutor's comment, by itself, did not constitute error or deny Moody a fair trial. 5. Increasing the Defense Burden of Proof ¶ 185 As the final act of prosecutorial misconduct, Moody challenges the prosecutor's statement in closing argument that the defense had the burden of producing evidence that makes it highly probable that Moody was insane at the time of the murders and was not malingering. The prosecutor reiterated this burden in rebuttal closing argument. Moody claims that this argument impermissibly increased his burden of proof and he argues that reversal is required as a result. We disagree. ¶ 186 A defendant is required to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence. A.R.S. § 13-502(B) (1989). [14] This court has held the clear and convincing and highly probable standards to be interchangeable. State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 423-24, 763 P.2d 239, 243-44 (1988). Thus, Moody would have a legitimate claim here only if he could demonstrate that the burden to show that he is not faking insanity somehow differed from the burden to show that he was, in fact, insane. ¶ 187 We fail to see the distinction between the two. To demonstrate that one is insane, one must demonstrate that the insanity is real and not faked or, as used in this case, malingered. Moody fails to explain how the prosecution misstated the applicable burden in this case and cites no authority supporting his position. Consequently, we do not find any error and decline to reverse Moody's convictions on this ground.