Opinion ID: 1747984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim to Recover Real Property.

Text: A. Applicable statute of limitations. In count I, the Meisters sought to recover their real property, alleging there was no valid written contract and an at-will tenancy existed. They contend this claim is subject to the ten-year statute of limitations for the recovery of real property. See Iowa Code § 614.1(5). Hallett argues that because fraud is the basis for the Meisters' claim there was no contract, resulting in a tenancy at will, and because the fraud claim is time barred, the Meisters' claim to recover their real property is also necessarily time barred. Looking to the nature of the claim asserted in count I, we think the ten-year statute of limitations for the recovery of real property applies. See id. This court has said, If the purpose and object of the action is the recovery of real property, it is entirely immaterial on what ground the relief is sought. Tilton v. Bader, 181 Iowa 473, 480-81, 164 N.W. 871, 874 (1917). We held in Tilton that [t]he mere fact that a litigant alleges and must prove fraud in order to establish his title does not render the action other than one for the recovery of real property. Id. at 478, 164 N.W. at 873. In such cases, evidence of fraud is merely incidental to the relief granted. Id. That is the case here. The relief sought is the recovery of real property; evidence of fraud is simply part of the proof that no valid contract transferring an interest in the property exists. Therefore, the claim stated in count I is governed by a ten-year limitations period. We do not agree with Hallett's contention that because an independent claim for damages based on fraud is time barred, the Meisters may not use Hallett's alleged fraud to establish that Hallett's tenancy was at will. If that were the case, any claim for recovery of real property that had some component of fraud would be unprovable after five years, a result contrary to our test for determining the applicable statute of limitations. In other words, although the Meisters cannot sue for compensatory damages resulting from Hallett's alleged alteration of the lease because the five-year statute of limitations for fraud expired before they filed their claims, they may seek to recover possession of their property under the ten-year statute of limitations for recovery of real property, provided this claim accrued within ten years of their claim being filed in 2003. B. Accrual of claim. The Meisters argue the statute of limitations did not commence to run on their claim to recover their property until December 18, 2002, when they terminated Hallett's permissive, at-will tenancy. Hallett, focusing on the fraud aspects of this claim, asserts the claim accrued at the time lease 2 was executed. We think the Meisters have the better argument. This court has noted the doctrine of adverse possession, which requires a ten-year period of possession adverse to the owner, is based on the ten-year statute of limitations for recovery of real property. Carpenter v. Ruperto, 315 N.W.2d 782, 784 (Iowa 1982). Here, until the occupancy by Hallett became adverse rather than permissive, the Meisters had no claim for the recovery of the property: it was not being held adversely to them. A claim clearly arose, however, when they terminated the tenancy in 2002, and Hallett refused to vacate the property. Thus, the Meisters' claim for recovery of real property accrued on December 18, 2002. Consequently, the present suit, filed within ten years of this date, is timely. The district court erred in granting Hallett summary judgment on count I based on the statute of limitations.