Opinion ID: 525569
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Original Dismissal and the Decisions in Sanchez I and II

Text: 4 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the authority of Feres and Bozeman v. United States, 780 F.2d 198, 200 (2d Cir.1985) (Bozeman ). The Feres doctrine generally prohibits FTCA suits against the government by members of the armed services for injuries that arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. Its three rationales are (1) the distinctively federal character of the relationship between the government and the members of its armed forces, (2) the existence of generous statutory disability and death benefits for servicemen, and (3) the general propensity of claims against the government by service members for injuries incurred incident to service to involve the judiciary in sensitive military matters at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness. In Bozeman, we ruled that military personnel who are on liberty or on leave are generally still on active duty status and that their suits against the government are barred by the Feres doctrine unless they were also on furlough at the time they were injured. The district court noted that Sanchez did not show he had been on furlough, and it concluded that the Feres factors required dismissal of his complaint. 5 Sanchez appealed, contending that, because his injury occurred off the marine base and while he was on liberty, the Feres doctrine did not apply. In Sanchez I, we reversed, noting that over the years the Feres doctrine had been much criticized and the rationale for its application had been substantially narrowed. We concluded that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), the key questions are 'whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions ... and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline.'  Sanchez I, 813 F.2d at 595 (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57, 105 S.Ct. at 3043). Though the government urged us to affirm on the basis of Bozeman, we noted that in that case 6 the service-member's injury arose out of his participation in a social activity along with another serviceman who became drunk and caused an accident. The activity was related to their membership in the United States Army.... More significantly, in order for the plaintiff to succeed in her suit in Bozeman, it was necessary for her to establish that the Army owed a duty of care to her husband as a member of the service and failed to meet it by allowing a fellow service member to drink to excess at a Non-Commissioned Officers' (NCO) club.... In Bozeman, the plaintiff clearly was questioning Army policies in staffing, operating and supervising its NCO clubs and whether the policies were followed by superior officers. Herein, it does not appear on the present record that the district court will find it inevitably necessary to inquire into Marine Corps policies for staffing and operating its auto repair facilities. 7 Sanchez I, 813 F.2d at 596. We concluded that the dismissal here had been premature: 8 At this early stage of the case, it is difficult to predict the specifics of plaintiff's theory in this litigation; consequently, it does not seem inevitable to us, on the basis of the record thus far, that military decisions will be questioned. 9 Id. at 595. We therefore remanded to the district court for further proceedings, though we noted that it was not our intention to foreclose the applicability of the Feres doctrine herein if the court found it necessary to inquire into military decisionmaking in any significant way. Id. at 596. 10 Some months later, in Sanchez II, we recalled our mandate for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's then-recent decisions in United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 107 S.Ct., 2063 95 L.Ed.2d 648 (1987), and United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987), which undercut the rationale of Sanchez I by ruling that the military discipline rationale should not be the only focus of inquiry. The Supreme Court in Johnson held that a suit involving injuries that were incident to service was barred by the Feres doctrine even if the complaint alleged negligence by the government's civilian employees rather than military employees, and it reaffirmed the vitality of the three broad rationales underlying the Feres decision. United States v. Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 2064-69. Accordingly, we revised our remand to the district court as follows: 11 In light of Johnson and Stanley, we find that a clarification of our prior opinion is in order. We withdraw the conclusion in our prior opinion that the military discipline rationale has come to be considered the primary rationale of the Feres doctrine. Nonetheless, we adhere to our view that, at this preliminary stage in the proceedings, it remains to be seen whether Sanchez's injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. Accordingly, we grant the motion to recall our prior mandate, reverse the decision of the district court, and remand this action for further proceedings in light of the three broad rationales underlying Feres, and to determine whether the appellant's injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. 12 Sanchez II, 839 F.2d at 42.