Opinion ID: 1695079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Statements to Officer Wood

Text: ś 88. The record reflects that following Snow's apprehension by authorities, Officer Tim Wood of the Mississippi Highway Patrol (MHP) arrived at the parking lot behind the Mendenhall Jitney Jungle grocery store, where Snow was in custody and sitting in the backseat on the passenger side of a marked patrol car of another agency. [9] The car had a partition separating the front and back seats. Wood had been told to take charge of Snow, and was awaiting instruction as to whether Snow would be moved to a MHP vehicle. He stood near the rear passenger door in order to prevent the door from being opened. When it was determined that Snow would be taken into MHP custody, he was moved to an unmarked MHP vehicle completely naked, except for the restraints on his hands and legs. As soon as Snow was placed in the backseat of the driver's side of the MHP car, Wood walked around to the passenger side of the car and entered the backseat with Snow. Wood closed the door, and he and Snow were alone in the car. Approximately one to two minutes after Wood got in the car, Snow said, What are they going to do to me for this? According to Wood's testimony, the following exchange then occurred: Q: And then what did you do? A: Iâ I advised him of his Miranda rights. Q. And what are those rights for the jury, please? A. You have a right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have a right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you at no cost. Do you understand your rights? And the prisoner applied [sic] Yeah. Okay then. Q: Then what happened? A: And at that timeâ I said, Shooting those deputies sure was stupid thing for you to do. He said, It sure was, `and shook his head yes.' ś 89. The statements, What are they going to do me for this? and It sure was should have been suppressed, Snow argues. While Officer Wood did not initiate questioning, clearly he was in custody at that point and Officer Wood should have given him his Miranda rights as soon as the two of them were alone in the patrol vehicle. This situation was designed to pressure Snow because there was no other purpose for Officer Wood to sit in the backseat alone with Snow, who except for a pair of boots, remained nude. Even assuming that Snow's first statement was admissible, he maintains his second statement, It sure was, should have been suppressed. Although the Officer had given him his Miranda warnings, he did not waive his rights. Officer Wood, he argues, simply gave the Miranda warnings and then proceeded to question Snow without inquiring as to whether he agreed to waive those rights, citing Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015 (Miss.1992); Powell v. State, 540 So.2d 13, 16 (Miss.1989). ś 90. The State insists that Wood had no intent to question Snow but simply intended to safely transport him to the Rankin County Correctional Facility. He only got in the back seat with him, because unlike the car of the other agency, no partition separated the front and back seats of the MHP car. With regard to Snow's second statement, the State insists it's not error to use statements against a defendant who does not heed his Miranda warnings. ś 91. An officer's subjective intent in making the comment, as emphasized by the State here, is not the issue. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (This portion of the definition of interrogation focuses primarily upon the perception of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.). See Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 527, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 1935, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987); Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 7. It is a factor, at best, simply to be considered. United States v. Soto, 953 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir.1992) (noting that the [a]bsence of intent to interrogate, while not irrelevant, is not determinative of whether police conduct constitutes interrogation). The question is, rather, whether the officer should have known his actions or statements were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1690. ś 92. Snow was clearly in custody when Officer Wood arrived at the scene. Because there were no questions asked, the issue is whether Wood's conduct was the functional equivalent of interrogation. Arguably, it was. Although Snow initiated the conversation with his first statement to the officer, an argument could be made that the officer should have known that his actions-getting in the car alone, into the backseat, with a handcuffed and completely naked Snow and recent manhunt target, and then remaining silent for one to two minutes is conduct creating an atmosphere which might compel Snow to make an incriminating statement. This is a factual issue however, and the trial court's finding to the contrary that his first statement because it was voluntary and the officer's conduct was not interrogation, is not clearly erroneous. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. ś 93. With regard to the second statement, it is certainly reasonable, that the officer should have known that commenting to Snow that Shooting those deputies sure was a stupid thing for you to do [10] would likely elicit a response, as Innis not only prohibited express but implied questioning as well. Whether he intended or anticipated that Snow would respond, as the State emphasizes, again is not dispositive. The primary focus is upon Snow's perceptions of Wood's statement, not Wood's intent in making the statement. Id. at 291, 100 S.Ct. at 1685. Further, the second statement was clearly not in response to routine investigatory questions as in Greenlee v. State, 725 So.2d 816, 825 (Miss.1998), cited by the State where an officer asked a 15-year-old defendant where he was staying and where his parents were, and Snow did not approach Officer Wood at the scene and confess to the shooting as in Luster v. State, 515 So.2d 1177 (Miss.1987), also cited by the State. Though, in attempting to establish an implicit waiver, the State makes much of the fact that the defendant initiated the conversation, that fact alone, does not end the inquiry ... The `totality of the circumstances' must still be considered in determining whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent. The burden is a heavy one and on the government. United States v. Montgomery, 714 F.2d 201-203 (1st Cir.1983) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (the right to remain silent may be voluntarily waived, provided that waiver is made knowingly and intelligently)). ś 94. To determine whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent, we must consider the suspect's (1) age, education, and intelligence, (2) the extent of his previous experience with the police, (3) the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, (4) the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question, (5) the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, (6) whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention, and (7) whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1624-25. ś 95. The record reflects that Snow was twenty years old at the time of the incident, and had completed an eleventh grade education. Conflicting testimony was put on concerning his competency, but in evaluations to determine his intelligence, he was generally uncooperative with both defense and state experts. He did, however, demonstrate an understanding of legal proceedings and, obviously, he had previous experience as he was a previous offender and was on his way to jail when the incident happened. There is no evidence concerning the remaining factors. ś 96. The record supports the conclusion that Snow voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights when he making the statement It sure was.