Opinion ID: 2082877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Governmental Interest

Text: As to the third Eldridge factor, concerning the State's interest, Illinois has a strong interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of children. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2501.1 (Public Policy).) Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more compelling State interest than the support of children. Illinois also has a general interest in effective enforcement of judgments. And the State has a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the costs and burdens of these procedures. The State also has a significant financial interest in obtaining payment in accordance with the court-ordered support obligations. The money collected is to repay the State for AFDC benefits which have been paid by the State to the custodial parent or child. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2515.) These facts warrant a finding that additional procedural burdens need not be imposed on the State. By law, whenever the custodial parent is a recipient of AFDC funds on behalf of a minor child or children, that parent must assign to the State his or her rights to an obligation owed by the parent who is responsible for providing support to the minor child or children. (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (Supp. III 1985); see Jahn v. Regan (E.D. Mich. 1984), 584 F. Supp. 399, 401-02 ( Jahn I).) Thus, the State has the same rights by assignment as the AFDC recipient had to the support owed or owing to the child or children. Accordingly, the State is reimbursed after it has performed the support duties that the absent or recalcitrant parent neglected. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2515.) Thus, the State has an interest in enforcing court-mandated child support obligations and recouping money spent to support children where absent parents do not fulfill their obligations. The State becomes a real party in interest. Protection of public funds becomes yet another of the State's major goals. Moreover, by permitting the State office to collect these payments, the AFDC program will continue to be funded and its integrity and purpose maintained. Jahn I, 584 F. Supp. at 402. In the instant case, the circuit court opined that: [The procedures] are so limited that protection is not afforded in the most basic questions, e.g., same name, wrong defendant, improper service, etc. It is readily forceable [ sic ] that a brick on one's check will remain while there is a long search for the file and the support order. All wage withholding and support orders as a result of a default hearing will be dormant for some period of time and some for great lengths of time where no defense will exist. These fears are unfounded. First, the order for withholding does not become effective unless the obligor becomes delinquent in support obligations or requests an earlier effective date. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2520(b).) Second, when the State proceeds under section 20(B)(2), as in the instant case, the obligor is served with copies of the support order and the order for withholding (stamped Not Valid). (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2520(B)(4).) If the obligor becomes delinquent in payment of an amount equal to one month's support obligation, or is 30 days late in payments, he or she is sent a verified notice of delinquency along with a copy of a form petition to be used by the obligor to stay service of the order for withholding. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2520(C)(1). The notice of delinquency that is sent to the obligor again informs the obligor of the terms of the order for support and contains a statement of the period of time covered and a computation of the amount of delinquency. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2520(C)(2).) That notice advises the obligor that the payor will also be sent a copy of the notice and a certified copy of the order for withholding unless the obligor pays the delinquency or files a petition to stay service. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2520(C)(2). Section 20(D) prescribes the procedures to avoid withholding of which the obligor is advised. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2520(D).) Income withholding may be avoided by filing a petition to stay service (supplied to the obligor), in which case the court conducts a hearing to resolve the matter. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, pars. 2520(D), (H).) The obligor may dispute the amount of support due and owing, the amount of the delinquency, and his or her identity. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, pars. 2520(D)(1)(a), (D)(1)(b).) Service of the order of withholding on the payor results only if all of these notices are ignored by the obligor. Thus, the defendant-obligor is provided with notice of hearings; his or her rights, obligations, and remedies; and most importantly, post-judgment opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, a determination of paternity and order for child support were sought. The defendant was properly served by substituted service (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-203(a)(2)), and therefore was advised of his opportunity to be heard (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2509.1). He failed to appear and an order of default was entered. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1301(d).) Defendant was also sent a notice of the order of default. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1302. Next, the cause was set for a prove up. Notice was sent to the defendant, and he again failed to appear. The matter proceeded ex parte and paternity was established. Plaintiff's right to child support and defendant's obligation to provide that support were then declared. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2514(f). After the duty for support was established, defendant's status changed from a prejudgment debtor to a post-judgment debtor, since a valid judgment that he owed child support was entered against him. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, pars. 2514, 2515.) That judgment has the full force, effect and attributes of any other judgment including the ability to be enforced. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2514(c).) The rights of the parties are set by the judgment. We note, parenthetically, other statutory schemes utilizing similar procedures ( e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 12-701 et seq. (garnishment); ch. 110, par. 12-801 et seq. (Illinois Wage Deduction Act)). As with garnishment proceedings, the foundation of income withholding is to reach and seize payment for what is due and owing. The brick on one's check is a consequence of the obligor's actions or rather, as in the instant case, inaction. The purpose of income withholding is to ensure future payments on an ongoing basis. It will no longer be easy to escape support obligations. Avoiding or neglecting one's obligation to pay child support will no longer be tolerated. In this case, the defendant was informed of the pending matters at all three stages of concern: paternity, establishment of his support obligation, and enforcement by wage or income withholding. The facts of this case demonstrate that it is not that the Act fails to provide notices and opportunities to be heard. It is that the defendant chose to ignore them. In sum, he voluntarily failed to avail himself of his due process rights. Therefore, we conclude that the procedures for wage withholding afford substantial protection to an obligor's interest in his or her property. Withholding does not cut off other substantive rights, as the amount of withholding may be adjusted. An obligor is not denied access to the courts. The obligor is afforded adequate notice of the opportunity to be heard at meaningful times and in a meaningful manner. The next inquiry is whether an employer or payor suffers a deprivation of due process rights. We think not. The trial court concluded that employers (or payors) are deprived of due process because a payor is a necessary party and the court was without jurisdiction to enter an order directed against any payor. The court refused to enter the requested income-withholding order in the absence of a name of a particular employer. We note that the record indicates that the defendant was employed at the time the complaint was filed. The Act provides that [t]he order for withholding shall    [d]irect any payor to withhold a dollar amount equal to the order of support. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2520(B)(3)(a). Due process requires the joinder of all indispensable parties to an action, and an order entered without jurisdiction over a necessary party is void. Feen v. Ray (1985), 109 Ill.2d 339, 344. We must first inquire into whether an employer-payor is indeed a necessary and indispensable party to the action such that failure to join it therein rendered the order void ab initio. A person is a necessary and indispensable party to the litigation when the person has an interest in the subject matter of the suit which may be materially affected by a judgment entered in the person's absence. ( Feen, 109 Ill.2d at 344; see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2-404, 2-405, 2-406(a).) The relevant inquiry is not whether the court's judgment has in fact materially affected the absent individual's interests in the subject matter in controversy. Instead, it is whether the absent person might claim a substantial and present interest which determines that the person is a necessary and indispensable party. ( Lakeview Trust & Savings Bank v. Estrada (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 792, 811 (citing Lain v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 264, 269, appeal denied (1980), 79 Ill.2d 631), appeal denied (1985), 108 Ill.2d 567.) The question thus becomes whether an employer has a present interest in the matter. Clearly, no interest of an employer is adjudicated. In AFDC cases, there are three parties to the proceedings. The State is a party because of the AFDC assignment of support rights and because the State will take the collections and use them to reimburse itself and the Federal government for benefits paid to the custodial parent. The noncustodian is a party because his or her property will be demanded in order to fulfill the imposed obligation. The custodian is also a party. Although the custodian makes an assignment to the State, it is an assignment for collection. The custodian is therefore a party to the proceeding with genuine property interests at stake. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2515.) (In non-AFDC cases, there are two parties, the custodian and the non-custodian. The State is not a party but merely a conduit for collection. (See Roberts, Expedited Processes and Child Support Enforcement: A Delicate Balance (Part I ), 19 Clearinghouse Rev. 483 (1985).)) Only the due process rights of parties need be protected. The employer-payor has no judgment entered against it. No court has determined that an employer owes the State any sums of money and the State does not claim so. Thus, as in garnishment proceedings, the payor is merely stakeholder or custodian of the funds sought to be reached. A payor is kept abreast of the proceedings by notices. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, pars. 2520(E)(1), (E)(3), (F)(1), (F)(2), (H)(3) through (H)(5).) And the payor's rights, penalties, and duties are set forth in the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, pars. 2520(G), (J). The entry of an order for withholding directed to any payor is consistent with the congressional mandate and our legislative scheme. It will assure prompt commencement of income withholding as soon as the delinquent obligor has income available. The Act defines income broadly. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 2520(A)(4).) Thus, the order for withholding of income to secure payment of child support must necessarily apply to numerous sources of income, not just an employer. Entry of an order for withholding directed to any payor is needed to accomplish the legislative goals. The order may be served as soon as practical, that is, when a payor is located or revealed. For these reasons, an order issued to any payor is within the court's jurisdiction. An employer-payor is not a necessary or indispensable party in this action.