Opinion ID: 1190417
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Joy Mundy-Neal

Text: In the penalty phase of appellant's trial, Joy Mundy-Neal, an employee of the Nevada Department of Parole and Probation, testified for the state. Mundy-Neal had prepared the presentence reports on appellant for his previous convictions. [4] In her testimony, she commented both on offenses appellant had committed before the murder of Evans and on those he had committed after the murder. Mundy-Neal also recounted, over appellant's objection, statements made to her by appellant during two presentence investigation interviews. According to Mundy-Neal, appellant stated during those interviews that he supported himself by burglarizing an average of ten homes per week and that during December 1986, he and some cohorts burglarized approximately three homes per day. Appellant argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing her to testify about his statements. According to appellant, under NRS 176.156, these statements may only be used in sentencing appellant in the cases for which the corresponding presentence reports were prepared. [5] As a corollary, appellant submits that these statements may not be used during the penalty phase of a subsequent, unrelated trial. Appellant's position here is untenable. Under NRS 175.552, the trial court has broad discretion on questions concerning admissibility of evidence at a penalty phase. Pellegrini v. State, 104 Nev. 625, 764 P.2d 484 (1988). Moreover, NRS 175.552 establishes broad parameters as to what constitutes admissible evidence at a penalty phase. For example, though the statements recounted by Mundy-Neal appear to be hearsay, NRS 175.552 specifically allows admission, at the penalty hearing, of hearsay evidence that relates to the character and record of the defendant. Rogers v. State, 101 Nev. 457, 705 P.2d 664 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130 (1986). It is also true that evidence of uncharged crimes may be admitted during the penalty hearing once any aggravating circumstance has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Robins v. State, 106 Nev. 611, 798 P.2d 558 (1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1608 (1991). Prior to Mundy-Neal's testimony, the state had established beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance that appellant had committed the murder of Evans while appellant was under sentence of imprisonment.