Opinion ID: 3177417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Harlan’s Tribal-Court Conviction

Text: Section 117(a)(1) provides in relevant part, Any person who commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian country and who has a final conviction on at least 2 separate prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings for offenses that would be, if subject to Federal jurisdiction . . . any assault, sexual abuse, or serious violent felony against a spouse or intimate partner . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for a term of not more than 5 years, or both. (Emphasis added). Over Harlan’s objection, the district court admitted evidence that in 2002, Harlan pled guilty in tribal court to assaulting Delilah in Indian country 4 Harlan suffers from a number of health problems, including diabetes, hypertension, end-stage renal disease, coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure, cerebral palsy, and anemia chronic disease. He needs dialysis several times per week and takes a long list of medications. -7- while they were in an intimate relationship. The district court concluded the phrase “any assault” in § 117(a)(1) unquestionably included Harlan’s simple-assault conviction under the tribal code. Harlan argues the district court erred in admitting his 2002 tribal-court conviction based on an erroneous interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1).5 We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. Woodard, 694 F.3d 950, 953 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2009). “We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings, including its rulings on motions in limine, for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Parish, 606 F.3d 480, 486 (8th Cir. 2010). Harlan contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion in limine and admitting evidence of his 2002 simple-assault conviction as a predicate offense for § 117(a)(1) because, in Harlan’s view, a closer examination of the charging documents reveals Harlan pled guilty to a charge of “Attempt and not [actual] Assault.” Pointing to language in the criminal complaint stating he “attempt[ed] to cause bodily injury” to Delilah Freemont, Harlan asserts “prior convictions for Attempt cannot be used as predicate offenses to fulfill the necessary elements to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 117.” Harlan misunderstands the nature of criminal assault. 5 On December 14, 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider “whether reliance on valid uncounseled tribal-court misdemeanor convictions to prove Section 117(a)’s predicate-offense element violates the Constitution.” See United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, No. 15-420, 2015 WL 5822186 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2015). We have held it does not. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011); accord United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit recently decided it does. See Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673. That issue is not before us because Harlan did not raise the issue on appeal. -8- In construing § 117(a), we start with “the language employed by Congress.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979). Neither § 117 nor any other provision of the chapter where § 117 resides defines the term “assault.” See 18 U.S.C. ch. 7. “[W]here a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common-law meaning.” United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957). “‘Common law assault embraces two different crimes: [(1)] attempted battery, that is, an intended effort to cause bodily harm to another which falls short of success . . . regardless of whether the intended victim knows of the attempt,’” and (2) any “act which is intended to, and reasonably does, cause the victim to fear immediate bodily harm; such ‘menacing’ constitutes assault even if no physical harm is attempted, achieved, or intended.” United States v. Olson, 646 F.3d 569, 573-74 (8th Cir. 2011) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 199 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1999)). The offense underlying Harlan’s 2002 tribal-court conviction for simple-assault readily fits the first part of the common-law definition. See Anderson v. Crawford, 265 F. 504, 507 (8th Cir. 1920) (“While a battery always included an assault, assaults often fall short of a battery. An assault is an attempt, which, if consummated, would result in a battery.”). The district court did not err in denying Harlan’s motion in limine and in allowing the government to use his simple-assault conviction as a predicate offense under § 117(a).