Opinion ID: 2120717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: scope of prosecutor's obligation to find information

Text: ¶ 71. The first issue in applying Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) is the scope of the prosecutor's obligation under the statute to seek and find evidence concerning the accused. See majority op. at ¶ 16. The introductory sentence of subsection (1) directs the prosecutor to disclose materials and information requested under the subsection if the materials are within the possession, custody or control of the state. The statute does not define possession, custody or control of the state, nor does it spell out the prosecutor's duty to locate materials and information so that they come within the possession, custody or control of the state. Hence, the statute requires interpretation. ¶ 72. Over the years, Wisconsin courts have delineated the prosecutor's duty to seek out information for discovery. In Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 349, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973), a case in which the facts predated the statute, the court tracked the commentary to the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards and stated an IDEAL: [I]t is the prosecutor's duty to acquire all relevant evidence. The duty rests upon the prosecution to obtain all evidence in the possession of investigative agencies of the state. Wold, 57 Wis. 2d at 349 (citing American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, sec. 3.11(c) at 100, 102 (Approved Draft, 1971)). Then, recognizing the difficulty of achieving this IDEAL, the court drew back, formulating a due diligence test for the prosecutor: that is, whether by the exercise of due diligence the prosecutor should have discovered the materials or information at issue. Wold, 57 Wis. 2d at 350. ¶ 73. Due diligence is defined as the diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation.Also termed reasonable diligence. Black's Law Dictionary 468 (7th ed. 1999). ¶ 74. Several Wisconsin decisions have applied the due diligence test to fact situations under the statute. In Jones v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 337, 230 N.W.2d 677 (1975), the defendant claimed a violation of the statute because the prosecutor failed to produce the arrest record of a key witness until the fourth day of trial. The court repeated the due diligence test, then quoted from the ABA Standards: The prosecuting attorney's obligations under this section extend to material and information in the possession or control of members of his staff and of any others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or with reference to the particular case have reported to his office. Id. at 349 (emphasis added) (quoting American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, sec. 2.1(d) at 14 (Approved Draft, 1970)). ¶ 75. The Jones court seized upon the phrase participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case to exclude two law enforcement agenciesthe FBI and the Los Angeles Police Departmentfrom the scope of the prosecutor's search, because these agencies had not participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case. Therefore, the court said, the prosecutor had no duty of his own accord, in response to a general discovery motion, to seek [a prosecution witness's] arrest record from these sources. Jones, 69 Wis. 2d at 349. The court added that [t]o impose such a duty would create significant practical difficulties since to exercise `due diligence' the prosecutor arguably could thus be required to routinely check for possible conviction records in all 50 states. Id. Under the Jones formulation, the prosecutor is not required to obtain information that is not discoverable by due diligence from the agencies investigating or evaluating the case, unless the defendant has designated the information and pointed to its source. Id. at 349-50. ¶ 76. Today, the advent of the computer may have rendered the Jones analysis outdated with respect to criminal records. Today, a prosecutor may not reasonably argue that there is no obligation to search for the criminal records of the defendant and prosecution witnesses beyond the specific law enforcement agencies investigating or evaluating the case. Due diligence requires more. Criminal records constitute finite designated evidence that can often be obtained through a computer search. The prosecutor is expected to make a thorough effort, using the ordinary channels, to obtain this information. ¶ 77. The Jones case is still valid, however, in limiting the scope of the search for information less specific and finite than criminal records. The prosecutor must examine the files and records of the agencies investigating or evaluating the case to find the information listed in Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1). But the prosecutor has no obligation to locate information that is not discoverable by due diligenceprimarily from these agenciesparticularly if the defendant has not designated the whereabouts of specific information. An openended search for information beyond the investigative agency is not reasonable because of significant practical difficulties. ¶ 78. The analysis in State v. Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d 250, 479 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1991), helps to explain the term investigative agency. The court said: For purposes of the criminal discovery statutes, we view an investigative police agency which holds relevant evidence as an arm of the prosecution. In most criminal cases, the evidence against the accused is garnered, stored and controlled by the investigating police agency. [2] Id. at 260. ¶ 79. Like Jones, Martinez linked due diligence to the agency investigating the crime. This principle underlaid the decision in State v. Maass, 178 Wis. 2d 63, 502 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1993). In Maass, the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department was the investigative agency in a homicide that occurred in that county. Two days before trial, a part-time Town of Ixonia police officer advised the district attorney of an inculpatory statement that the defendant had made two months before the homicide. Id. at 65-66. The district attorney immediately informed defense counsel. Id. at 66. Maass claimed that the part-time officer's failure to disclose the statement earlier should be imputed to the district attorney because the district attorney's duty to disclose information extend[ed] to material and information possessed by the district attorney's staff or others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case. Id. at 69. The state replied that the district attorney's duty to discover evidence did not extend to information possessed by the part-time officer because the officer was not involved in the investigation or evaluation of the case and did not regularly report to the district attorney or report to the district attorney in that case. The court of appeals said: We conclude that the discovery statute does not impose on the district attorney the undifferentiated duty to consult every law enforcement officer who conceivably could have information respecting a case under investigation by the district attorney and the district attorney's investigating agency, which in this case was the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department. Id. at 71. ¶ 80. The majority opinion misapplies the broad principles of Wold, Jones, Martinez, and Maass because it blurs the distinction between agencies that investigate or evaluate the case and agencies that do not, thereby unreasonably enlarging the scope of the prosecutor's obligation to search for information. The opinion implies that due diligence requires a prosecutor to go beyond the agencies that investigate or evaluate the case to find materials and information that have not been designated by their nature and source. Put in specific terms, the opinion implies that the prosecutor here had a duty to seek out potential evidence in the possession of the Racine Police Department, even though the crimes involved in the case against Media DeLao did not occur in Racine and even though the Racine police never investigated her case. This expansion of due diligence will create an unreasonable burden for prosecutors in the future. ¶ 81. To justify this result, the majority opinion summarizes the court of appeals decision as concluding that the investigation of the robbery [in Racine] and the investigation of the shooting [in the Town of Mount Pleasant] were `hopelessly intertwined' with respect to DeLao. [3] Majority op. at ¶ 35. ¶ 82. The record does not support this factual finding by the court of appeals. [4] The record shows that on May 31, 1999, a grocery store was robbed in the City of Racine. The robbery was investigated by the Racine Police Department, whose lead investigator was Detective James Prioletta. On June 7, 1999, a shooting occurred in the Town of Mount Pleasant. Media DeLao heard shots and, thereafter, she allegedly engaged in certain crimes in Mount Pleasant to obstruct the investigation. The shooting and DeLao's alleged crimes were investigated by Investigator Doug Chaussee of the Mount Pleasant Police Department. There is no evidence that Prioletta ever investigated the Mount Pleasant shooting or DeLao's alleged crimes, and no evidence that Chaussee ever investigated the Racine robbery. There is no evidence that anyone in the majority's cast of characters has ever been charged in the Racine robbery. There is no reference to the Racine robbery in the DeLao criminal complaint, in the transcripts of DeLao's preliminary examination, or the transcripts of any other proceeding before DeLao's trial. Circuit Judge Dennis Flynn described the Racine robbery as a crime separate from what is alleged against the defendant here [in DeLao's case]. ¶ 83. In short, while the time frame of the investigations overlapped and the cast of characters overlapped, the investigations of the separate crimes did not. Chaussee did tell Prioletta that DeLao might have information about the robbery, and he did make the guns seized at DeLao's home available to the Racine Police Department for testing. But the two cases were distinct and separate, and it is an enormous stretch to declare that the two investigations were hopelessly intertwined. If Desmond Stalsberg, DeLao's boyfriend, had been charged with the Racine robbery and if Prioletta had submitted his interview with DeLao concerning Stalsberg to the district attorney to support a Stalsberg robbery charge, the situation would be different. But neither of those things happened. ¶ 84. The majority opinion asserts that Investigator Chaussee dispatched Detective Prioletta to interview DeLao after she had been charged with the Mount Pleasant crimes. Majority op. at ¶ 44. Use of the verb dispatched insinuates that Prioletta was a stalking horse for Chaussee. This hint of improper police conduct [5] is contrary to the record. The majority elsewhere admits that the focus of Prioletta's inquiry was the robbery, not DeLao's alleged crimes. Majority op. at ¶ 6. The most telling evidence that Prioletta was not Chaussee's agent is that Prioletta did not tell Chaussee about his interview with DeLao until 27 days after it had occurred. ¶ 85. The majority opinion also sidesteps the second prong of the two-prong test for determining a prosecutor's duty to secure information. As quoted above, the ABA Standards direct the prosecutor to seek out information from others, including law enforcement agencies, who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who either regularly report or with reference to the particular case have reported to his office. American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, sec. 2.1(d) at 14 (Approved Draft, 1970). ¶ 86. Here the majority concentrates on the alleged investigation prong and whisks past the reporting prong. The Racine Police Department did not regularly report to the prosecutor and did not report with reference to the DeLao case until the middle of trial. Majority op. at ¶ 24. ¶ 87. To sum up, the answer to the first question under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) is that the prosecutor was not required by due diligence to seek out information from the Racine Police Department because neither Prioletta nor his agency ever investigated or evaluated the DeLao case. Moreover, the Racine Police Department did not report regularly to the district attorney and did not file a report about the DeLao case with the district attorney until July 28, 1999, the second day of trial. Any implication that the prosecutor here should have sought information from the Racine Police Department will alter the standard for due diligence, forcing prosecutors to search for cumulative materials and information that is neither exculpatory nor necessary to prosecute a case.