Opinion ID: 76388
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Juror Replacement

Text: 49 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24, the district court has discretion to replace with alternates any jurors who are unable to perform or who are disqualified from performing their duties. Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c). See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1512 (11th Cir.1990). We review the exercise of this discretion to ensure that the District Court did not discharge the juror without factual support, or for a legally irrelevant reason so as to amount to a showing of bias or prejudice to the defendant. Id. Where the juror's disability is `less certain or obvious, however, some hearing or inquiry... is appropriate to the proper exercise of judicial discretion.' United States v. Fajardo, 787 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir.1986) (citation omitted). 50 This issue follows from the district court's replacement of one juror (Lau) who had complained that she was sick with severe cramps and had scheduled a doctor's appointment. The court interviewed Lau in chambers and concluded that she was unable to hang on for the rest of the afternoon. The court then notified the parties of Lau's situation, her excusal from further jury service, and her replacement by an alternate juror. Defendants challenge the replacement on grounds that the court failed to contact counsel so that defendants could have been present during the juror's interview, that the court failed to have the interview recorded, and that the court's inquiry into Lau's situation was deficient. 51 In the court's opinion, the juror was too ill to continue. This is not legally irrelevant, nor does it appear to be without any factual support. Hence, defendants have not shown bias or prejudice. This Court has affirmed juror excusals in far less obvious situations, such as in Fajardo, where the juror in question was well enough to continue but excused over defense counsel's objections after further inquiry because his sinus problems were a distraction to the proceedings. See 787 F.2d at 1525. Defendants rely on United States v. Spence, 163 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.1998), where this Court reversed a conviction because of the district court's insufficient inquiry before excusing a juror. In Spence, the district court excused a juror after deliberations had already begun and then continued with only eleven jurors. See id. at 1282-84. Here, the court dismissed the juror before the commencement of jury deliberations. Moreover, defendants only speculate as to whether the replaced juror may have been more favorably disposed to them than the alternate, and hence have not shown a reasonable possibility that the District Court's violation of Rule 24(c) actually prejudiced the [defendants] by tainting the jury's final verdict. United States v. Brewer, 199 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2000). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing juror Lau.