Opinion ID: 2338639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: lesser included offense of felony murder

Text: Finally, Perez claims the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury at trial on second-degree reckless murder as a lesser included offense of felony murder. Perez acknowledges that he did not request a lesser included offense instruction at trial. Therefore, this court reviews the district court's failure to give the instruction under the clearly erroneous standard. K.S.A. 22-3414(3). An instruction is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the trial error had not occurred. Martinez, 288 Kan. at 451-52, 204 P.3d 601. Perez was charged with felony murder arising from the shooting death of Guzman. K.S.A. 21-3401(b) defines felony murder as the killing of a human being committed . . . in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436. Here, the underlying felony predicating the felony-murder charge was criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling in violation of K.S.A. 21-4219, which constitutes an inherently dangerous felony. See K.S.A. 21-3436(a)(15) (any felony offense as provided in K.S.A. 21-4219). On appeal, Perez argues that this court should reconsider its traditional approach to lesser included offense instructions in felony-murder cases. Perez acknowledges that under longstanding precedent, lesser included offense instructions for felony murder are not required unless the evidence of the underlying felony is weak, inconclusive, or conflicting. State v. Hoffman, 288 Kan. 100, 105, 200 P.3d 1254 (2009). However, Perez argues that there is [n]o statutory or common law authority for this approach and that this court should follow the general rule under K.S.A. 22-3414(3) in determining whether jury instructions should be given for lesser included offenses. Perez contends that under this statute, the jury should have been instructed on second-degree reckless murder since firing a shotgun into an occupied house is extreme indifference to the value of human life. See K.S.A. 21-3402(b) (Murder in the second degree is the killing of a human being committed . . . unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.). Perez' argument was addressed by this court in State v. Berry, 292 Kan. 493, 254 P.3d 1276 (2011). In Berry, the defendant struck and killed another motorist during a high-speed getaway from a traffic stop. He was apprehended, and cocaine was discovered in his possession. The defendant was charged with first-degree felony murder based on the underlying felony of possession of cocaine. At trial, the defendant requested lesser included offense instructions for second-degree reckless murder, involuntary manslaughter, and vehicular homicide. Because the evidence supporting the possession of cocaine charge was substantial, the district court denied the request for lesser included offense instructions pursuant to the judicially created felony-murder instruction rule. The defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder. On appeal, this court observed that lesser included offense jury instructions are governed by K.S.A. 22-3414(3), which directs that instructions must be given when there is some evidence that would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime. 292 Kan. 493, Syl. ¶ 2, 254 P.3d 1276. This court noted that when a party claims K.S.A. 22-3414(3) requires giving an instruction on a lesser included crime, the analysis focuses on the evidence supporting the lesser offense. 292 Kan. 493, Syl. ¶ 3, 254 P.3d 1276. This court traced the history of the judicially created felony-murder instruction rule which requires lesser included offense instructions only when evidence of the underlying felony is weak, inconclusive, or conflicting and noted that the analysis under the judicially created rule focuses on the evidence supporting the underlying felony and not the evidence supporting lesser offenses. 292 Kan. 493, Syl. ¶ 4, 254 P.3d 1276. This court further observed that K.S.A. 22-3414(3) does not exclude felony murder from its mandate and makes no exception for the felony-murder instruction rule regarding lesser included offense instructions. 292 Kan. 493, Syl. ¶ 5, 254 P.3d 1276. After determining that the rationale for adopting the felony-murder instruction rule was flawed, this court concluded the rule must be abandoned. This court held that K.S.A. 22-3414(3) should be applicable to felony murder. Under this statute, instructions on the lesser degrees of homicide are proper in felony-murder cases when there is some evidence reasonably justifying a conviction of some lesser included crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 292 Kan. 493, Syl. ¶ 6, 254 P.3d 1276. Although this court has now embraced the analysis advocated by Perez, this does not mean we agree with Perez that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury at trial on second-degree reckless murder as a lesser included offense of felony murder. Under K.S.A. 22-3414(3), instructions on the lesser degrees of homicide are proper in felony-murder cases when there is some evidence reasonably justifying a conviction of some lesser included crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Perez advances a hypothetical situation and argues the jury should have been instructed on second-degree reckless murder since firing a shotgun into an occupied house is extreme indifference to the value of human life. K.S.A. 21-3402(b). However, Perez cites to no evidence presented at trial which would have reasonably justified a conviction of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The State's evidence at trial established that Perez went to Moreno's house with a shotgun and intentionally fired four or five shots into the front of the house. This act was to seek revenge for an earlier shooting at Filero's house. Perez, Gonzalez, and Filero went on a dry run of the shooting mission to make sure that Perez and Gonzalez knew where Moreno lived. Perez and Gonzalez later drove to Moreno's house in Gonzalez' car. Perez knew Moreno's house was occupied when he fired the shots. Guzman was playing in the front room of the house when she was struck in the head by one of the shots fired by Perez. Perez did not testify at trial, but his defense was that he was not the shooter and that he was being set up to take the fall for higher ranking gang members. Second-degree reckless murder is the killing of a human being committed unintentionally but recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. K.S.A. 21-3402(b). Here, there was no evidence presented at trial that Perez unintentionally but recklessly discharged his firearm at an occupied dwelling. Based on the evidence presented at trial, Perez either committed the act and was guilty of felony murder as charged or he was guilty of nothing at all. Although second-degree reckless murder may be a lesser included offense of felony murder in some situations, in this instance there was no evidence presented at trial that would have reasonably justified a conviction of second-degree reckless murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by failing to instruct the jury at trial on second-degree reckless murder as a lesser included offense of felony murder. Affirmed. MALONE, J., assigned.