Opinion ID: 76584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause for Traffic Stop

Text: 19 Draper sues Reynolds for stopping his truck in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Draper contends that Reynolds's reason for stopping Draper — that the tag light on Draper's truck was not adequately illuminated — was pretextual. According to Draper, Reynolds stopped his truck because Draper was African American and Reynolds wanted to search vehicles for drugs with the hope of having vehicles forfeited to the Sheriff of Coweta County. 20 As the district court correctly noted, the Supreme Court and this Court previously rejected the use of such pretextual-stop analysis and concluded that ulterior motives will not invalidate police conduct based on probable cause to believe a violation of the law occurred. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 194 (11th Cir.1997). Indeed, this Court in Holloman rejected a very similar pretextual-stop argument. 113 F.3d at 194. In Holloman, a St. Petersburg, Florida detective stopped Holloman's pickup truck because the truck's tag light was not properly illuminated under Florida law. Id. at 193. Under the St. Petersburg police department's drug interdiction operation, after a vehicle was stopped for a traffic violation, the detectives either would conduct a consensual search of the vehicle or would summon a narcotics detection canine to sniff the exterior of the vehicle. Id. After Holloman refused to consent to a search, a narcotics canine sniffed his vehicle and alerted to drugs, which were found in the vehicle. Id. Holloman was indicted with possession and intent to distribute narcotics. Id. at 193-94. Holloman moved to suppress the evidence of drugs, arguing that the traffic stop was `unreasonably pretextual and unconstitutional.' Id. at 194. 21 This Court in Holloman noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Whren squarely rejected the pretextual stop analysis that had prevailed previously in the Eleventh Circuit. Id. This Court explained that, under Whren, the constitutional `reasonableness' of a traffic stop must be determined irrespective of `intent,' whether of the particular officer involved or of the theoretical `reasonable officer.' Id. (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-16, 116 S.Ct. at 1773-76). We further explained that Whren conclusively refutes the notion that ulterior motives may invalidate police conduct that is justified on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. Id. at 194. In Holloman, this Court concluded that because the detectives possessed probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred, the stop complied with the Fourth Amendment regardless of their desire to intercept drugs. 22 Thus, the only question for purposes of examining the constitutionality of Reynolds' stop is: Did Reynolds have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred? Under Georgia law, a tag must be illuminated with a white light so that it is legible from fifty feet to the rear. Ga. Code Ann. § 40-8-23. 6 At his deposition, Reynolds testified that he stopped Draper because he observed that Draper's tag light was out. At his deposition, Draper testified that he picked up his truck at the wrecker yard between eleven a.m. and noon the next day and that his tag light was working. That the tag light was working to an unknown extent during daylight does not directly contradict Reynolds's position that the registration plate was not clearly legible from fifty feet away on the night of the stop and is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact in this record. We thus conclude that Reynolds had probable cause to stop Draper's truck. 7