Opinion ID: 733438
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Costs to Appoint an Expert

Text: 35 Ledford contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it reasoned that no funds existed to pay an expert. Rule 706(b) states: In other civil actions and proceedings, the compensation [of an expert] shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such times as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs. Fed.R.Evid. 706(b). A number of circuits have recognized that Rule 706(b) grants a district court the discretion to apportion all the costs of an expert to one side. See, e.g., Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir.1996) (remanding the case because the lower court failed to exercise its discretion to appoint and compensate an expert if the plaintiff was in fact indigent); McKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1511 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 502 U.S. 903, 112 S.Ct. 291, 116 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991) (finding that the phrase such proportion as the court directs, in an appropriate case, permits the district court to apportion all costs to one side); Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1038-39 (6th Cir.1988) (stating that [a] District Court has authority to apportion costs under this rule [706(b) ], including excusing impecunious parties from their share); United States Marshals Serv. v. Means, 741 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir.1984) (stating that discretionary power to advance fees of expert witnesses should be exercised only under compelling circumstances). 36 In this case, when the district court stated that no funds existed to pay for the appointment of an expert, it failed to recognize that it had the discretion to apportion all the costs to one side. We caution against reading Rule 706(b) in such a narrow fashion that the rule would allow for court-appointed experts only when both sides are able to pay their respective shares. Read in such a restrictive way, Rule 706(b) would hinder a district court from appointing an expert witness whenever one of the parties is indigent, even when that expert's testimony would substantially aid the court. See McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1511. However, in this case, the trial court also stated, and we agree, that appointing an expert was unnecessary. The district court therefore exercised the discretion conferred upon it by Rule 706(b). 37 In light of the discretionary authority vested in the court under Rule 706 and the facts raised by Ledford's deliberate indifference claim, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision not to appoint an expert.