Opinion ID: 853063
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identifying General or Special Legislation

Text: It is now clear that although the reasonableness of a population classification remains relevant under Article I, neither the per se nor reasonableness view of population categories is determinative of constitutionality under Article IV. Rather, the text of Article IV, Section 23 is controlling here. The terms general law and special law have widely understood meanings. A statute is general if it applies to all persons or places of a specified class throughout the state. Black's Law Dictionary 890 (7th ed. 1999). A statute is special if it pertains to and affects a particular case, person, place, or thing, as opposed to the general public. Id. Most recently, in Williams v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1070, 1085 (Ind.2000), this Court reiterated the view that the text of Article IV, Section 23 requires a two-step test that addresses concerns unique to that section: In analyzing a law under [Article IV,] Section 23, we must first determine whether the law is general or special. If the law is general, we must then determine whether it is applied generally throughout the State. If it is special, we must decide whether it is constitutionally permissible. Williams followed Ind. Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 299-301 (Ind.1994), and State v. Hoovler, 668 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind.1996), on this point. [7] Williams found that the specific needs of Lake Countya large county with a larger case docketsupported special legislation providing for the appointment of magistrates only in Lake County courts. Moseley upheld a statute that applied only to counties eligible to vote to adopt riverboat gambling, and provided for city-by-city voting in counties bordering Lake Michigan with more than 400,000 people, i.e., in Lake County, while other counties eligible to adopt dockside gambling did so on a countywide basis. 643 N.E.2d at 301. This Court found this different treatment for Lake County to be justified: In Lake County, the whole of the waterfront is covered by substantial cities, whose residents have the greatest interest in how the shore is used. In all other counties, however, the shore contains both incorporated and unincorporated territory. It thus seems sensible to stage a vote of all persons in the county. Id. In Hoovler, this Court followed Moseley and pierced the claim that a population criteria based statute was general legislation, but again nevertheless found the statute valid. Hoovler dealt with the legislature's attempt to help Tippecanoe County handle the financial burden of cleanup costs at a Superfund landfill site. 668 N.E.2d at 1234. The statute permitted the county council of a qualifying county to impose a higher county income tax rate than was permitted in other counties in the state. Only Tippecanoe County qualified under the legislation, but the statute did not identify Tippecanoe County by name. Rather, it applied only to counties having a population of more than one hundred twenty-nine thousand (129,000) but less than one hundred thirty-thousand six hundred (130,600). Id. at 1231. Rather than validating this legislation on the ground that population categories per se create general statutes, this Court examined the circumstances surrounding [the Act], including language in the Act itself. Id. at 1234. The Court held that because the legislature intended the statute in that case to apply exclusively to Tippecanoe County, the statute was indeed special legislation governed by Article IV. Id. at 1235. In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed to the narrow population range in the statute, the fact that Tippecanoe County was the only Indiana county with a Superfund site for which local government entities were designated Potentially Responsible Parties by the EPA, and the statute's intent to provide relief to Tippecanoe County from its potential Superfund liability, reflected in its requirement that the county council find that money is needed to fund substance removal and remedial action. Id. at 1234-35. All of these factors were signs that the legislature had indeed enacted a special law authorizing Tippecanoe County to enact and administer a special tax rate increase not available to any other county. Id. at 1235.