Opinion ID: 1670469
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: fahlk incorrectly required force or violence in all circumstances involving obstruction of government operations by physical act

Text: In Fahlk, the defendant was a high school superintendent. A jury convicted him of obstructing government operations because he supplied an investigator with a falsified checkout sheet for supplies from a school. The checkout sheet purported to show that he had informed school officials when he checked out a computer printer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction under the third component of § 28-901, which prohibits obstruction through any other unlawful act. Citing Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-922 (Reissue 1995) (tampering with evidence), the Court of Appeals concluded that a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant presented false evidence to the investigator when [the defendant] realized that an official proceeding was about to be instituted. [10] This court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We concluded that the evidence was insufficient under any component of § 28-901. Regarding the physical act component, we stated that the defendant's actions surpass failing to volunteer information but lack the element of force or violence contemplated by § 28-901. [11] In Fahlk, we also rejected the Court of Appeals' reliance on the other unlawful act component of § 28-901. We recognized that the evidence might have supported a conviction for tampering with evidence under § 28-922. But we concluded that the Court of Appeals erred when it relied on a violation of § 28-922 because the State had not charged that offense and it was not an issue before the jury. [5] In this case, the Court of Appeals distinguished Fahlk. It concluded that Fahlk had not provided guidance on the force or violence necessary to constitute physical interference. It further stated that Fahlk did not address the `physical interference' or `obstacle' component of the statute. [12] Although we disagree with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Fahlk, upon reexamination of the decision, we conclude that we were wrong. We determine that Fahlk incorrectly requires force or violence in all circumstances alleging obstruction of government operations under the physical act component of § 28-901. [6-8] In our reexamination of Fahlk, we conclude that we failed to focus on the statutory language of § 28-901. The physical act component of § 28-901 consists of disjunctive, or independent, elements: force, violence, physical interference or obstacle. In construing statutory language, we attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute and avoid rejecting as superfluous or meaningless any word, clause, or sentence. [13] Although the use of and and or can be interchangeable, [14] here, the Legislature had no reason to include physical interference as a means of committing obstruction if it intended to equate physical interference to the physical acts of using force or violence. Thus, a disjunctive reading of the elements is consistent with the plain meaning of the statute. It is also consistent with comments to the Model Penal Code and the way other courts have interpreted similar statutes. For example, under a similar statute, [15] New York courts have held that physical force was not required when the defendant physically interjected himself into ongoing undercover police operations to purposefully disrupt the operation or warned others involved in criminal activity of the officers' presence. [16] Similarly, courts have concluded that physical interference does not require the use of force or violence when the defendants committed the following acts: (1) Defendants surrounded an officer attempting to arrest a person and allowed that person to flee custody and escape [17] ; (2) defendants entered an abortion clinic and chained themselves together with bicycle locks so that police could not transfer them to a jail until a locksmith removed the locks [18] ; (3) defendant refused to remove a crutch wedging a door closed so that officers could serve eviction papers [19] ; or (4) defendant placed a tractor and dump truck in front of a mobile home to prevent officers from executing a replevin order to take possession. [20] Although the inquiries are fact-specific, these cases mirror the intent of § 28-901 as reflected in the comments to Model Penal Code § 242.1. Those comments show that the offense was intended as a gap-filler, to broadly cover conduct that could not be adequately anticipated by more specific offenses against public administration. [21] Therefore, we overrule Fahlk to the extent it holds that in every circumstance in which the State charges obstruction by a physical act, the evidence must show force or violence. Our concern in Fahlk about the potential breadth of this statute had been expressed by other courts. [22] But we conclude that this concern is better addressed by focusing on the statute's requirement of affirmative interference.