Opinion ID: 553325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Thirty-Day Duration of Wiretap Authorization

Text: 39 If a wiretap order authorizes electronic surveillance to continue after the first interception of a communication of the type sought, the application must contain a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter. Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 934.09(1)(d) (West Supp.1990); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(1)(d). 40 The initial wiretaps on the Plasencias' phones were authorized to continue beyond interception of the first incriminating conversations up to a period of thirty days. The appellants contend that this portion of the order was based on the affiants' conclusory allegation that the nature of this investigation is such that the court's authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the type of communications described [above] have first been obtained. According to the appellants, the affiants failed to make the necessary showing of a particular description of facts establishing probable cause. 41 Contrary to the appellants' assertions, given the complexity of the case as fully set forth in the affidavit, we find abundant probable cause existed to justify the thirty-day duration of the initial wiretap authorization. The affidavit alleged the existence of a complex, continuing narcotics conspiracy involving many persons, each performing specialized tasks within the criminal organization. The expressed objectives of the investigation were to assemble evidence of this wrongdoing. Probable cause existed to lead one to believe that more than a single relevant conversation would take place or even a limited and discrete series of relevant conversations. See, e.g., United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F.Supp. 296, 306-07 (S.D.Fla.1971), aff'd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874, 96 S.Ct. 142, 46 L.Ed.2d 105 (1975).