Opinion ID: 1470295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ms. Murphy's request for counsel fees should be reconsidered to determine if counsel fees would be proper at this juncture.

Text: Finally, Ms. Murphy argues that the trial court erred in denying her request for counsel fees. If the trial court has good cause to believe that the respondent has committed an intrafamily offense, the judge may issue a protective order, inter alia, awarding costs and counsel fees. D.C.Code § 16-1005(c)(8) (2001). In considering whether the court erred in its rulings on the motions for attorney[ ] fees, our scope of review is a limited one because disposition of such motions is firmly committed to the informed discretion of the trial court. Steadman v. Steadman, 514 A.2d 1196, 1200 (D.C.1986); see also Johnson, supra, 398 A.2d at 365 (citation omitted). When concluding whether to award counsel fees to either party in this case the trial court noted: The general rule in our law in attorney[ ] fees is that you first have to determine whether one side, the litigation for one side has been burdensome or oppressive and you also have to factor in the motivation of the litigants. And if I determine as a result of that, that an award is appropriate, to then determine the amount of the award which goes to the quality and the nature of the services, the necessity of the services, and results obtained. After laying out the proper standard, the court found that the litigation was neither burdensome nor oppressive, and Ms. Murphy was not entitled to counsel fees because she did not achieve in this case . . . any more than was achieved in the criminal case, and the trial judge did not think the services were necessary. The trial court, however, also said as a general comment to the parties as he stated his findings of fact with regard to all pending claims: I must tell you . . . I consider this case . . . as troubling . . . there are two seemingly intelligent and talented people who, in my view, each have significant personality defects. . . . And they have wasted time, effort, money, lawyers' time, Court time and have both, in my view, at various times testified incredibl[y] about some things. I don't find either one . . . terribly believable overall. And it's just amazing to me that our community has to entertain this sort of thing that could have been easily avoided by either one of them. But that's where we are. It appears that, based upon a fair reading of the entire transcript, the trial judge believed, at least in part, that each party was litigating senselessly, and he left the parties in the same financial position as he found them because each filed a petition for a CPO against the other, which he granted. In light of our reversal of the CPO against Ms. Murphy, we have a situation where only one party was successful in obtaining a CPO, and under D.C.Code § 16-1005(c)(8) counsel fees may be an appropriate remedy for the trial judge to reconsider. In addition, while determining counsel fees based upon results obtained is a proper factor for consideration, we do not agree with the trial court's rationale that it was unnecessary for Ms. Murphy to pursue the CPO because the criminal prosecution achieved the same goals. Civil remedies were designed to be independent of any criminal prosecution. The Intrafamily Offense Act makes clear that the institution of criminal charges by the United States attorney shall be in addition to, and shall not affect the rights of the complainant to seek relief under this subchapter. D.C.Code § 16-1002(c); see also Report of the Council of the District of Columbia on the Judiciary on Bill 4-195, the Proceedings Regarding Intrafamily Offenses Amendment Act of 1982, at 8 (May 12, 1982) (criminal sanctions should not be the only avenue for such abuses among family members). Furthermore, the trial court should take into account the important policy consideration that awarding counsel fees helps domestic violence victims to overcome the financial barrier of high legal costs and to assert their right to bring action against their aggressors. Otherwise, some victims might be dissuaded or prevented from filing a CPO petition. The civil proceeding, in fact, yielded different results for Ms. Murphy than the criminal proceeding. She was protected from Mr. Okeke by extensions of the TPO from July 3, 2003 through April 23, 2004, which was well beyond the October criminal trial. Moreover, Ms. Murphy had no control over the criminal proceedings  appearing only as a witness  and any resulting stay-away order would only be enforced at the direction of the United States attorney. Lastly, in light of our reversal of the CPO entered against Ms. Murphy, she successfully defended against the entry of a CPO. We therefore remand for the trial court to reconsider Ms. Murphy's request for counsel fees and to determine whether counsel fees may be appropriate at this juncture.