Opinion ID: 416888
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicability of Feres to Plaintiff's Cause of Action

Text: 30 Although decisions interpreting Feres have reached widely varying results, it is possible to isolate four factors that most courts have considered important. Although the factors are conceptually different, each bears on what is in our view the most important line of inquiry: the nature of the plaintiff's activities at the time of the government's tortious action. While rigid rules derived from these four factors may sometimes be relevant, they cannot be blindly applied to determine whether an injury occurred in the course of activity incident to service. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. The only way to decide whether an injury is incident to service is to consider the facts of each individual case. Here the facts are not in dispute. We must determine whether plaintiff's admitted activities at the time of the negligence are of the sort that would directly implicate the interests that the Feres doctrine was designed to protect. See, e.g., Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir.1979) (whether a service member is engaged in an activity incident to service is a question of fact ... to be determined from the circumstances of each case.); Schwager v. United States, 279 F.Supp. 262, 263 (E.D.Pa.1968). The facts of this case, viewed in light of the Feres doctrine's underlying disciplinary rationale, lead us to conclude that the FTCA does permit Johnson's cause of action.
31 The location of the negligent act is undoubtedly an important indicator of the status of the injured service member. See generally Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 132-33 (9th Cir.1981) (the proper focus in applying the Feres doctrine is not the time of injury, but the time of the negligent act.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2269, 73 L.Ed.2d 1284 (1982); Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d at 507. 32 Here the place on the base where the negligent act was found by the trial court to have occurred must be distinguished from the place where the accident occurred. Some courts have held that the situs of the negligence is dispositive: if a member of the armed forces is injured by a negligent act occurring on base, Feres is automatically triggered and recovery is barred. See discussion in Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir.1979). We reject this myopic view of the on-base/off-base distinction. Such an absolute position is often merely a substitute for analysis of whether the serviceman was injured in an activity incident to his service in the military, Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d at 1338. Moreover, the absolute view emphasizes the location of the negligence to the exclusion of other more important factors. 33 The better view is that the occurrence of government negligence on a military base should not automatically bar recovery. Even when the negligence occurred on-base, the court is obligated to explore the nature of the function the soldier was performing at the time of the injury in order to ascertain the totality of the circumstances. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1014 (5th Cir.1980). See also Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir.1981) (situs of negligence alone is not dispositive; courts must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the injury); Avasthi v. United States, 608 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.1979) (FECA liability); Bryson v. United States, 463 F.Supp. 908, 913-14 (E.D.Pa.1978). Many courts have permitted military personnel to recover under the FTCA even though the negligent acts occurred on military bases. See, e.g., Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d at 1339 (accident on government-owned road adjacent to military base); Bryson v. United States, 463 F.Supp. 908, 914 (E.D.Pa.1978) (serviceman on pass injured on-base can sue under FTCA because the location of the incident bears no significant causal relationship to the injury); Downes v. United States, 249 F.Supp. 626 (E.D.N.C.1965) (plaintiff on-base but on a pass pursuing his personal affairs.); Hand v. United States, 260 F.Supp. 38, 42 (M.D.Ga.1966) (although accident occurred on-base, relevant question is what plaintiff was doing when injured); Rich v. United States, 144 F.Supp. 791, 792 (E.D.Pa.1956) (The determinative fact in each case is not where the plaintiff was at the time he was injured ... but whether what he was doing at the time was 'in the course of activity incident to service.' ); Nowotny v. Turner, 203 F.Supp. 802 (M.D.N.C.1962)) (Feres does not bar suit merely because accident occurred on military base); Brown v. United States, 99 F.Supp. 685 (S.D.W.Va.1951) (government liable for injuries occurring in on-base swimming pool to Navy enlisted man on shore leave). 34 Although the negligent act in this case--permitting the NCO Club to remain open in violation of both Montana law and Air Force regulations--occurred on-base, the connection between the situs of the negligence and Johnson's military service is so tenuous that location is not an important factor. See, e.g., Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d at 1339 (because the connection between location of the accident and military service is so weak, the court must further inquir[e] into the extent of the connection between the plaintiff's activities and his military service.). Johnson's work as a bartender in the NCO Club had no relevant relationship to his on-base military activities. The location of the NCO Club should not obscure the fact that Johnson was performing a non-military job in what was essentially a civilian context. In short, we insist on distinguishing between those cases involving activities arising from life on the military reservation, and those in which presence on the base has little to do with the soldier's military service. Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d at 1015. See also Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d at 1151. When such a distinction is drawn in this case, it becomes clear that recovery cannot be barred merely because the NCO Club was located on a military base. 35
36 The duty status of the plaintiff, while not dispositive, is often taken into account when deciding whether an activity is truly incident to service. See, e.g., Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d at 142; Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d at 1339; Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d at 132. Once again, however, the duty status distinction cannot be mechanically applied to answer the incident to service question. On the contrary, Johnson's duty status is relevant only insofar as it bears on the relationship between the activity leading to the injury and his military service. 37 Johnson was undeniably an active member of the Air Force at the time of the accident and thus on active duty status. In and of itself, however, his active duty status is not relevant to our inquiry. Rather, the fact that he was on active duty merely proves that he was not an inactive reservist or a discharged veteran. Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d at 1339. The important question is whether the service member on active duty status was engaging in an activity that is related in some relevant way to his military duties. In this case, Johnson's off-duty work as a bartender bears no such relevant relationship to the military disciplinary structure that the Feres doctrine was meant to safeguard. See supra at 1436. On the contrary, Johnson's work was similar to the sort of second job in the civilian sector that any off-duty service member might undertake. In short, he was in the same position that any civilian employee of the NCO Club might have been in at the time of the government's negligence. The fact that Johnson was off-duty for the day is, under the circumstances presented here, sufficient to eliminate any relevant links between his activities and his military service. 3 38
39 Several courts have held that the Feres doctrine bars suits by service members injured while engaging in on-base or government-sponsored recreational activities. See, e.g., Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d at 142 (Air Force-sponsored flying club); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 229 (8th Cir.1966) (on-base swimming pool used for personal recreation while not on leave or furlough); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1141-42 (4th Cir.1975) (riding horse rented from military riding stable); Knight v. United States, 361 F.Supp. 708 (W.D.Tenn.1972), aff'd, 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir.1973) (on-base swimming pool); Degentesh v. United States, 230 F.Supp. 763, 765 (N.D.Ill.1964) (riding in Navy bus to official military recreation party). Moreover, active duty service members injured by the medical malpractice of military doctors have usually been barred from suing under the FTCA. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950); Martin v. United States, 404 F.Supp. 1240 (E.D.Pa.1975); Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363, 1364 (10th Cir.1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 963, 95 S.Ct. 1354, 43 L.Ed.2d 441 (1979); Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605, 606 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879, 94 S.Ct. 50, 38 L.Ed.2d 124 (1973); Shults v. United States, 421 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir.1969); Buer v. United States, 241 F.2d 3 (7th Cir.1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 974, 77 S.Ct. 1059, 1 L.Ed.2d 1136 (1957). The one factor that best explains the results in these cases is that the plaintiffs had access to the various recreational and medical benefits only because of their status as military personnel. Consequently, the injuries suffered were incident to service because the plaintiffs would not have been privileged to take advantage of the benefits but for their military status. See, e.g., Bryson v. United States, 463 F.Supp. at 913. 40 This factor does not preclude recovery in the case at hand. Johnson's employment at the NCO Club during his off-duty hours can hardly be characterized as a privilege or benefit incident to his military service. Unlike the soldiers using military medical facilities or participating in recreational activities sponsored by the military, Johnson held a paying job at the NCO Club. The job is identified with those routinely performed by civilian bartenders. Indeed, Johnson's after-hours employment at the NCO Club cannot logically be distinguished from second jobs held by other off-duty military personnel. See, e.g., Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.1974) (Navy petty officer can sue government under FTCA for injuries sustained on military road while returning to base from his off-duty job as a cook). Thus, to characterize Johnson's moonlighting during his off-duty hours as a benefit incident to military service would distort both precedent and the rationale underlying Feres. 41
42 The fundamental goal of the Feres doctrine is to safeguard the military disciplinary structure from disruptive civil suits. See supra at 1436. In our view, then, the most relevant line of inquiry is whether or not the service member's activities at the time of injury are of the sort that could harm the disciplinary system if litigated in a civil action. 43 Courts interpreting Feres have identified two distinct ways in which military discipline could be impeded by the possibility of civil suits concerning activities bearing a strong relationship to military affairs. First, military decision-makers subject to civil suit might not be willing to act as quickly and forcefully as is necessary, especially during battlefield conditions, if their actions could be second-guessed in a civilian court. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d at 1232. See also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2059. Second, encouraging military personnel to question decisions by their superiors might have some effect on the willingness of such personnel to follow orders. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d at 1232; Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d at 599. In light of these concerns, we find that the civil litigation of negligence claims such as Johnson's could not possibly have any effect whatsoever on military discipline. We reach this conclusion for three reasons. 44 First, at the time the government's negligence occurred, Johnson was not subject in any real way to the compulsion of military orders or performing any sort of military mission. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d at 1014 (recovery under FTCA allowed because serviceman was not directly subject to military control; he was not under compulsion of military orders; he was not performing any military mission.); Bryson v. United States, 463 F.Supp. at 914 (recovery permissible because serviceman was not acting under compulsion of orders or duty and he was not on a military mission.); Knecht v. United States, 144 F.Supp. 786, 789 (E.D.Pa.1956) (recovery allowed when serviceman's activities were not controlled by his military status.), aff'd 242 F.2d 929 (3d Cir.1957). On the contrary, Johnson stands in exactly the same position as a civilian employee of a privately owned nightclub. In short, Johnson could just as easily have been injured had [he] never worn a uniform at all. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 114, 75 S.Ct. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting). 45 The fact that Johnson was not under military control easily distinguishes the other cases that have concluded that activities in NCO clubs are incident to military service. In Mariano v. United States, 605 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.1979), for example, the plaintiff was employed during his off-duty hours as night manager of a Club. Plaintiff was injured while attempting to break up a fight between two patrons. In holding that the Feres doctrine barred plaintiff's suit, the court emphasized that official military regulations made the night manager responsible for maintaining order in the Club. Thus, the plaintiff in Mariano was subject to direct military control and was assigned specific duties as night manager by military regulations. Conversely, Johnson was not subject to any such direct control at the time the negligent act occurred. Indeed, Johnson was injured because the NCO Club remained open in clear violation of Air Force regulations and state law. See also Richardson v. United States, 226 F.Supp. 49, 50 (E.D.Va.1964) (NCO Club rules provide that any service member may be called on to enforce the rules of the Club). 46 Second, at the time of the government's negligence, Johnson was subject to military discipline only in the very remotest sense. Because Johnson was off-duty and working at a non-military second job, his activities were purely personal. Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d at 1340. See also Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d at 1013 (even though the accident occurred on-base, a suit by one leaving the base to attend to his personal affairs, while under no military supervision, will not interfere with military discipline.); Knecht v. United States, 144 F.Supp. at 789 (because serviceman was on a pass, his time was his own and his activities were not controlled by his military status.). In fact, Johnson's status at the time of the negligence was quite similar to that of the serviceman in Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.1974). There, a Navy petty officer had a second job during his off-duty hours as a cook at an off-base restaurant. After finishing his day's work as a cook, the serviceman was on his way back to his on-base quarters to attend his son's birthday party when he was involved in a fatal accident. The accident occurred on a road maintained by the military adjacent to the base. Under these circumstances, we held that the serviceman could sue under the FTCA because at the time of the negligence he was only in the remotest sense subject to military discipline. Id. at 867. Because Johnson's activities were no more closely controlled by the military disciplinary structure, a civil suit should also be permitted in this case. 47 Third, Johnson's activities do not involve the sort of close military judgment calls that the Feres doctrine was designed to insulate from judicial review. See supra at 1439. We are not dealing with a case where the government's negligence occurred because of a decision requiring military expertise or judgment. Rather, the government is negligent precisely because it failed to follow established military rules and procedures governing the operation of its NCO Club. 4 A civilian patron of the Club could certainly recover for such negligence. 5 Because there is simply no connection between off-duty work as a bartender and the kind of military interests that the Supreme Court intended to protect in Feres, Johnson too should be allowed to recover. 48 In sum, where there is no relevant relationship between the service member's behavior and the military interests that might be jeopardized by civil suits, the Feres doctrine cannot bar recovery. See, e.g., Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d at 141, 142 (Feres requires that there be some proximate relationship between the service member's activities and the Armed Forces.... [W]here the soldier demonstrates that the activity has no significant link to the Armed Forces and is remote to his military service, suit under the Act has been allowed.); Camassar v. United States, 400 F.Supp. 894, 897 (D.Conn.1975) (the more realistically critical test of whether Feres should apply is the existence or absence of meaningful causal connection between the injury occurrence and the injured person's military service.) aff'd, 531 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir.1976); Schwager v. United States, 279 F.Supp. 262, 263 (E.D.Pa.1968) (application of Feres depends on the relevant links between the military and the service member's activity and requires a measuring of the degree to which the activity is divorced from or related to military service.); Downes v. United States, 249 F.Supp. at 628 (Feres should only be applied when the service member is performing duties of such a character so that a civil suit would undermine the traditional concepts of military discipline.).