Opinion ID: 2219269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative History and Context

Text: [21] ถ 75. We turn now to the legislative history and context of Wis. Stat. ง 939.66(2m). Both parties and the court of appeals agree that subsection (2m) was created in response to this court's decision in State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985). We think it is useful, however, to examine the full history of Wis. Stat. ง 939.66. ถ 76. Wisconsin Stat. ง 939.66 was created in two steps in the early 1950s as part of the revision of the state criminal code. Chapter 623, Laws of 1953; ch. 696, Laws of 1955. The new text was accompanied by extensive comments. The comment for the section at issue provides in part: This section permits conviction of a crime included within the crime charged and states what crimes are included crimes. The reason behind the rule of this section is the state's difficulty in determining before a trial exactly what crime or degree of the crime it will be able upon the trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no disadvantage to the defendant in such a rule, for he is apprised of the charges against him by reason of the fact that the crime charged is broader than the included crime. An example of an included crime under subsection (1) is the crime of burglary when the crime charged is aggravated burglary. An example of an included crime under subsection (2) is homicide by reckless conduct when the crime charged is first-degree murder. An example of an included crime under subsection (3) is injury by reckless conduct when the crime charged is battery. 1953 A.B. 100, at 53 (emphasis added). ถ 77. The clear implication of the comment is that a defendant may be charged with one crime but ultimately convicted of an included crimeโa lesser included crime that is not charged โwhen the State is unable to prove the more serious crime. In these circumstances, the defendant has no complaint by reason of the fact that the crime charged is broader than the included crime. Id. ถ 78. In 1985 this court decided State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 365 N.W.2d 7 (1985). The question presented in Richards was whether simple battery and intermediate battery, as proscribed by the version of Wis. Stat. ง 940.19 applicable at that time, [23] were lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery. Id. at 2. The court applied the elements-only test articulated in ง 939.66(1) and concluded that simple battery and intermediate battery were not included offenses of aggravated battery, because the two lesser crimes had different elements, requiring proof of nonconsent, whereas aggravated battery did not. Id. at 4, 6. As a result, we affirmed the circuit court's decision refusing to submit either simple battery or intermediate battery to the jury as lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery. Id. at 4. ถ 79. While the Richards court felt bound by the statutory elements laid out in ง 940.19, it nevertheless agreed with the defendant that common sense dictated that the two lower degrees of battery be lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery. Id. at 12. Therefore, the court explained how the legislature could rectify the situation: Simply because the legislature could, and arguably should, have delineated the statutory elements differently does not permit this court to rewrite the elements of the crime by judicial fiat. It is up to the legislature, if it concludes that the lower battery offenses should be lesser included offenses, to do so within the statutory framework of sec. 939.66 and sec. 940.19, Stats. The legislature could remedy the situation by adding a subsection to sec. 939.66, analogous to sec. 939.66(2), to provide that an included crime may be a crime which is a less serious type of battery than the one charged. Alternately, the legislature could remove victim nonconsent as an element of simple and intermediate battery and make consent a defense to sec. 940.19(1) and (1m) but not (2). Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted). The alternatives presented by the Court offered the legislature two options to eliminate the peculiarity of simple and intermediate battery not being lesser-included offenses of aggravated battery. The court made no mention of the effect these proposals might have on cumulative punishments for batteries prosecuted under both ง 940.19 and one of the special circumstances battery offenses defined elsewhere in Chapter 940. ถ 80. Two months after our decision in Richards, the Assembly introduced 1985 Assembly Bill 359, which ultimately became 1985 Wisconsin Act 144 and created ง 939.66(2m). See Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1985 Wis. Act 144. The original bill was drafted to follow the Richards option of removing victim nonconsent as an element of simple and intermediate battery and making consent a defense to งง 940.19(1) and (1m) but not to aggravated battery under ง 940.19(2). Id. This revision would have affected only ง 940.19. ถ 81. The Legislative Reference Bureau's original analysis of 1985 Assembly Bill 359 explains that the bill's focus was on the degrees of general battery contained in ง 940.19, not the special circumstances batteries located in Chapter 940. According to the Legislative Reference Bureau: Under present law, Wisconsin prohibits battery (intentionally causing bodily harm) under a number of different statutes. The potential penalties vary depending on the circumstances surrounding the act, the actor, the victim and the harm suffered by the victim. This bill affects the first 2 levels of battery. Under present law, the first level of battery (ordinary battery) involves intentionally causing bodily harm to a victim without the victim's consent. The 2nd level of battery involves causing great bodily harm by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm without the consent of the victim. The bill removes the element of no consent from both of these crimes. Legislative Reference Bureau Drafting File for 1985 Wis. Act 144, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 1985 A.B. 359 (emphasis added). [24] While alluding to the existence of special circumstances batteries, the bill analysis specifically stated that the bill would only affect the first two levels of battery, meaning simple and intermediate battery in ง 940.19. ถ 82. In the end, the legislature approved the other option proposed by the Richards court. It created subsection (2m) and declared a less serious type of battery than the one charged to be an included offense. Although this option did not unambiguously limit the scope of change to ง 940.19, there is nothing in the legislative history of ง 939.66(2m) to indicate that this second option was intended to achieve different policy objectives from the first option. Rather, it appears that the two options were anticipated to have the same narrow substantive effect. This court has previously recognized that the purpose of ง 939.66(2m) was to rectify the ง 940.19 problem highlighted in Richards. See State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 338 n.8, 579 N.W.2d 35 (1998). We find no public record in the amendment revealing an intent to apply ง 939.66(2m) beyond ง 940.19. [25] ถ 83. In 1994 the legislature added the phrase or equally serious to subsection (2m). 1993 Wis. Act 441, ง 2. The history of this addition also is instructive. ถ 84. 1993 Assembly Bill 879, relating to battery and providing penalties, was introduced originally to make several changes to ง 940.19. The bill passed the Assembly with no change to ง 939.66(2m). According to a February 16, 1994, memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Sally Wellman to Andy Cohn, Executive Assistant to Attorney General James Doyle, a survey of state prosecutors did not like the Assembly bill. [26] Wellman wrote: Some questioned whether a middle form of battery is really needed. They also made some valid suggestions regarding my draft, questioning which batteries will now be lesser included offenses, whether my proposed middle form will encompass too much of what is arguably only battery, whether some parts of the definition are too vague (i.e. multiple bruising) and raising the issue of which if any degrees of battery should have a without consent element. Given the difficulty of the issue and the number of subissues it raises, my preference would be [ ] to take some more time with this. If we can get it pulled out of this session so that we can get input from a wider range of people on a second draft, we will end up with a better product. If that is not possible, and we still need to amend AB 879 now, I suggest the following revisions: ถ 85. Wellman then (1) proposed a new definition of substantial bodily harm, (2) rewrote ง 940.19, and (3) proposed an amendment to ง 939.66(2m) to read: A crime which is a less serious or equally serious type of battery than the one charged. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). With only grammatical modifications to the definition, all these changes were adopted by the legislature. ถ 86. In truth, then, all critical language in the 1994 legislation was drafted by the Wisconsin Department of Justice, with no indication that the language was intended to interact with any statute beyond ง 940.19. Rather, the new language in (2m) appears to reflect the changes proposed for ง 940.19. ถ 87. Under the Department's 1994 proposal, ง 940.19 was projected to contain one Class C felony, three Class D felonies, one Class E felony, and one Class A misdemeanor. Without the Wellman amendment, ง 939.66(2m) would not have prohibited simultaneous convictions of three Class D felonies under subsections (3), (4), and (6) of proposed ง 940.19. ถ 88. We acknowledge that the legislature could have had a different view. The original bill analysis, before the amendment, begins with the statement that: Under current law, battery is punishable by a range of crime classifications that vary from Class A misdemeanor to Class C felony depending on the type of harm the victim suffers, the type of harm the offender intends to inflict and special circumstances such as when the victim is a peace officer. [27] Bill Analysis to 1993 Assembly Bill 879. ถ 89. This identical statement appears in two Legislative Council Staff memoranda written respectively to the chairs of the Assembly and Senate legislative committees that considered Assembly Bill 879. See Staff Memorandum to Representative Wayne W. Wood from Shaun Haas, Senior Staff Attorney, Wisconsin Legislative Council, February 2, 1994, at 1; Staff Memorandum to Senator Joanne Huelsman, from Don Salm, Senior Staff Attorney, Legislative Council, March 14, 1994, at 1. The two memoranda were accompanied by the texts of both งง 940.19 and 940.20. ถ 90. Nonetheless, we believe the stronger inference to be drawn from the legislative history is that the legislature intended to apply subsection (2m) only to ง 940.19 and did not intend to prevent cumulative punishments for a special circumstances battery.