Opinion ID: 1405352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Statutory exceptions to relinquishment

Text: Under RCW 90.14, a water right is subject to relinquishment in whole or in part if, without sufficient cause, the holder voluntarily fails to beneficially use the right or a portion of the right for a period of five years. RCW 90.14.130; RCW 90.14.160.180. RCW 90.14.140 defines sufficient cause for nonuse. R.D. Merrill relies upon two statutory exceptions to relinquishment, arguing that [t]he operation of legal proceedings is sufficient cause for nonuse, RCW 90.14.140(1)(d), and that no relinquishment occurred, notwithstanding RCW 90.14.130 through .180, because its rights were claimed for a determined future development to take place either within fifteen years of July 1, 1967 [the effective date of the relinquishment statutes], or the most recent beneficial use of the water right, whichever date is later[,] RCW 90.14.140(2)(c). Material issues of fact remain regarding applicability of the exceptions in RCW 90.14.140. In addressing the exceptions to relinquishment, it is important to bear in mind that generally exceptions to statutory provisions are narrowly construed in order to give effect to legislative intent underlying the general provisions. State v. Williams, 94 Wash.2d 531, 548, 617 P.2d 1012, 24 A.L.R.4th 1191 (1980); Olson v. University of Washington, 89 Wash.2d 558, 562, 573 P.2d 1308 (1978); Hall v. Corporation of Catholic Archbishop, 80 Wash.2d 797, 801, 498 P.2d 844 (1972). The purpose of the relinquishment statutes is to cause a return to the state of any water rights which are no longer exercised by putting said waters to beneficial use. RCW 90.14.010. RCW 90.14.020(3) provides that [a] strong beneficial use requirement as a condition precedent to the continued ownership of a right to withdraw or divert water is essential to the orderly development of the state.... RCW 90.14.160 through .180 state that where water rights have not been beneficially used for five continuous years, or have been abandoned, said right or portion thereof shall revert to the state, and the waters affected by said right shall become available for appropriation.... Given these purpose and policy statements, and the express provisions of RCW 90.14.160 through .180, the Legislature intended that water be beneficially used, and, if not, that water rights be returned to the state so that the water will be available for appropriation by others who will put the water to beneficial use. It is also important to keep in mind that while the party asserting abandonment of a water right or statutory relinquishment of the right has the burden of proving abandonment or nonuse, R.D. Merrill, as the party claiming sufficient cause for nonuse, has the burden of showing how its nonuse falls under one of the narrow categories in RCW 90.14.140. Department of Ecology v. Acquavella, 131 Wash.2d 746, 758, 935 P.2d 595 (1997); see Hall, 80 Wash.2d at 801-02, 498 P.2d 844 (burden of proof of facts essential to invocation of a statutory exception is on the proponent); In re Petition of North Laramie Land Co., 605 P.2d 367 (Wyo.1980) (burden of proof of applicability of exception excusing nonuse for purposes of statutory forfeiture of water right on party claiming exception); In re Water Appropriation No. 442A, 210 Neb. 161, 313 N.W.2d 271 (1981) (same). Thus, regardless of plaintiff's burden of proof on abandonment or relinquishment, R.D. Merrill has the burden of proving that nonuse of the water rights is excused by a statutory exception. The first exception claimed by R.D. Merrill is that the operation of legal proceedings excused any nonuse of the water rights. RCW 90.14.140(1)(d) provides that sufficient cause exists for nonuse of all or part of the water by the owner of a water right for five consecutive years as a result of ... [t]he operation of legal proceedings. R.D. Merrill argues that litigation involving the ability to develop a ski area on federal land adjacent to its land tied up its development plans and constitutes sufficient cause for nonuse. R.D. Merrill points out that the Board has construed legal proceedings to mean all proceedings authorized or sanctioned by law and brought or instituted in a court or legal tribunal for the acquiring of a right or the enforcement of a remedy. Pollution Control Hr'gs Board Second Partial Summ. J. Order, Vol. 4, at 4 (Feb. 3, 1995) ( Knight v. Ecology, PCHB No. 94-61, at 4) (citing Attwood v. Department of Ecology, PCHB No. 82-58, 1983 WL 197279 (Mar. 24, 1983)). While this may be a correct definition of what constitutes a legal proceeding, the fact that a legal proceeding exists involving a water right holder's land or development plans does not in itself compel application of the exception. RCW 90.14.140(1)(d) requires that nonuse of the water be the result of the legal proceedings. As plaintiffs and the Department argue, the operation of legal proceedings exception thus requires more than involvement in legal proceedings. Read narrowly to preserve the general statutory provisions, the exception requires that the nonuse of water be attributable to the legal proceedings, i.e., that the legal proceedings prevent the use of the water. This approach is in keeping with the general provisions favoring beneficial use of water unless there is some legitimate reason why the water cannot be used. Here, while development plans may have been delayed as a result of the litigation, it is not clear whether beneficial use of the water for other purposes was prevented while the litigation was pending. Because the Board applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether the operation of legal proceedings excused any nonuse of the water, remand for further factual determinations is necessary on this question. The second claimed exception is that nonuse does not require relinquishment because the rights were claimed for a determined future development to take place either within fifteen years of July 1, 1967, or the most recent beneficial use of the water right, whichever date is later.... RCW 90.14.140(2)(c). The statute does not define determined future development. The Board has interpreted determined in accord with the dictionary definition, i.e., `to fix conclusively or authoritatively.' E.g., Cocking Farms v. Department of Ecology, PCHB No. 93-251, 1994 WL 905549, at  (Conclusion of Law 3) (Feb. 14, 1994) (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 616 (1971)). [9] In accord with the Board's interpretation, the Department reasons that the water right holder must have a firm definitive plan in order to fall within the exception. The Board has also interpreted the exception to mean that in order to be fixed conclusively or authoritatively, the future development must, at the least, be fixed prior to the end of the five year period of nonuse. Georgia Manor Water Ass'n v. Department of Ecology, PCHB No. 93-68, 1994 WL 905585 (Nov. 9, 1994). Under the error of law standard of RCW 34.05.570(3)(d), a court may substitute its interpretation of the law for that of the agency. Pasco Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 132 Wash.2d 450, 458, 938 P.2d 827 (1997). However, the agency's interpretation accords with the ordinary dictionary definition of the term and, therefore, correctly states the law. See State v. Chester, 133 Wash.2d 15, 22, 940 P.2d 1374 (1997) ([i]n the absence of a specific statutory definition, words in a statute are given their common law or ordinary meaning; [a] nontechnical word may be given its dictionary definition.) The Board's prior interpretation of the statute as requiring that the future development be determined before the expiration of five years of nonuse also comports with the relinquishment statutes. RCW 90.14.140(2)(c) refers to a determined future development to take place ... within fifteen years[,] thus contemplating (1) a fixed determinationa firm definitive plan (2) of a future development which will take place within 15 yearsencompassing the possibility of future development which may occur after the 5 years nonuse period. While the actual development need not occur within the five years nonuse period, there must be fixed development plans within that period. First, the statute refers to a plan which is already determined (determin ed ). Second, any other reading of the provision would defeat the general relinquishment provisions, because a water right holder whose rights are subject to relinquishment for five years nonuse could otherwise decide after five continuous years of nonuse to plan a future development in order to avoid relinquishment. Such a result is at odds with the obvious purpose of the statutory provision to avoid relinquishment only where fixed development plans will take longer than five years to come to fruition. Here, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was any conclusively or authoritatively fixed development plans within five years of July 1, 1967. R.D. Merrill points to evidence of feasibility studies in 1970. However, investigation of whether development is feasible is not a fixed, definitive plan. Instead it is preliminary to a fixed development plan. Other evidence to the effect that property purchases were made in 1972 is also insufficient to hold that a determined future development was planned as of July 1, 1972, because the evidence does not disclose when in 1972 any purchases were made. If purchases were later than June 30, 1972, then five years had already passed. If, as plaintiffs contend, those were years of continuous nonuse (in whole or in part), relinquishment had already occurred. Further, while the Department claims the evidence shows that the water rights were beneficially used later than July 1, 1972, thus making last beneficial use the relevant time period from which the 5 and 15 year periods ran, plaintiff Burkhart quite correctly points out that the Department relies on evidence produced during the hearing before the Board after the issues of abandonment and statutory relinquishment had already been foreclosed by the Board's summary judgment. At the time of the hearing, plaintiffs were not put to the burden of proving abandonment or statutory relinquishment, and in fact were not allowed to pursue the issues, and nonuse for purposes of the relinquishment statute was not at issue. Disputed material issues of fact are raised by materials submitted on the issue of nonuse when plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the second partial summary judgment (after the Board ruled on the issue despite the fact it was not raised by the partial summary judgment motion). (The Board denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the second order granting partial summary judgment.) Thus, whether the time of last beneficial use is the relevant time depends upon resolution of material disputed facts. We hold that there remain disputed issues of material fact as to whether five years of nonuse occurred before any conclusively or authoritatively fixed development plans were made. Therefore, partial summary judgment on the determined future development exception was improper. As the Department and plaintiff Burkhart contend, the determined future development exception additionally requires that the development plan be effected within 15 years (either of July 1, 1967, or the latest beneficial use of water). The provision states the right must be claimed for a determined future development to take place within 15 years. RCW 90.14.140(2)(c). A legal issue is raised as to what is required within the 15 year period. Completion of development within 15 years should not be required because some large-scale projects will require a lengthy development period, particularly where extensive environmental review and construction are involved, and RCW 90.14.140(2)(c) is clearly not intended to provide an exception only for small projects. However, there must be some development within the 15 year period in order for the right to remain valid. Burkhart maintains the development must be actual physical development. R.D. Merrill points, in contrast, to Sheep Mountain Cattle Co. v. Department of Ecology, 45 Wash.App. 427, 726 P.2d 55 (1986), where the court listed certain facts as supporting application of the future development exception. The facts listed, with the exception of the fact that some irrigation pipe had been laid on a portion of the land, relate to planning and investigation, rather than actual physical development. For two reasons, Sheep Mountain provides little guidance. First, the issue there was whether the water right holder had been provided due process before the Department issued an order declaring the right had reverted to the state under the relinquishment statutes. The court held that the holder had been deprived of notice and the opportunity to be heard. The discussion of whether the determined future development exception might apply was dicta. Second, the facts the court recited in Sheep Mountain clearly supported finding that a conclusively or authoritatively fixed development plan was in place, which was all that was necessary at the time because 15 years from July 1, 1967, had not yet passedthe relinquishment order was dated May 21, 1981and the holder would still have had time to commence physical development if that were required. We conclude that some affirmative steps toward realization of the fixed development plans must occur within the 15-year period. Among factors which may serve as objective evidence indicating actual implementation are: applying for necessary county and other permits, notifying the Department of plans to use the water right in connection with a future development, actual physical development consistent with the fixed development plans such as clearing land or commencing construction, and acquiring additional lands, rights, or materials needed to implement the determined development plan. We do not intend an exhaustive list, nor to suggest that any of these factors are dispositive in a given case. However, whatever steps are taken to implement the development plans, the water right holder must proceed in the exercise of reasonable due diligence within the 15-year period.