Opinion ID: 2625630
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Asserted juror misconduct

Text: Defendant contends that prejudicial juror misconduct occurred at the penalty phase of the trial. His principal argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning the issue of juror misconduct. He also claims the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial. He contends the error violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments to the federal Constitution. On November 5, 1995, following the jury's verdict of death, defendant submitted a motion for new trial based upon asserted prosecutorial misconduct. Attached to the motion were reports prepared by the defense investigator concerning postverdict interviews with several jurors. The trial court granted defense counsel's request for additional time in which to prepare a written motion for new trial based upon the allegation of juror misconduct. On November 30, 1995, defense counsel filed the anticipated motion for new trial based upon his claim of juror misconduct. The motion alleged that three separate claims of jury error must be addressed. [¶] First ... did the jury discuss the opinion that death did not mean death, despite the court['s] instructions. Second, did the jury discuss the defendant['s] lack of remorse as a factor in aggravation. Third, did the jury discuss that `life does not mean life.' Based upon these facts, it would appear that the jury discussed, and hence may have considered information that was improper. (Fns. omitted.) Attached to the motion were unsworn reports, prepared for defense counsel by the defense investigator, concerning interviews with several jurors. The motion was based exclusively on the three enumerated claims and concluded with a request for an evidentiary hearing after which, the motion asserted, the parties can discuss [the] impact, if any of the record. The motion added that since the error goes only to the penalty phase, if the court were to reduce the sentence to [life in prison without possibility of parole], the issue becomes [moot]. In his opposition, filed December 11, 1995, the prosecutor contended that the unsworn hearsay reports prepared by the investigator were not a competent basis upon which to grant a motion for new trial and that, in any event, prejudicial juror misconduct had not been demonstrated. More than one week later, the trial court conducted a hearing, advising counsel that it had considered with care defendant's motion and the People's opposition. The court inquired whether the parties wished to comment, and defense counsel responded that the next logical step would be the submission of affidavits. Defense counsel claimed he had not submitted affidavits in support of the motion, because he understood from the court that it first would make a threshold decision concerning the truth of the allegations, in order to avoid bothering the jury. The prosecutor objected that the court had not suggested such a bifurcated proceeding. More significantly, the court emphatically denied it had done so. The court also denied having instructed defense counsel concerning how to approach the jurors. The court concluded that the investigator's unsworn reports to defense counsel were not admissible to impeach the verdict. It added that, even if the investigator's hearsay reports were considered, defendant's allegations lacked merit. Finally, the court determined that the motion did not provide a sufficient basis for conducting an evidentiary hearing. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of asserted juror misconduct and in denying the motion for new trial. He renews the claims he made in the trial court based on statements allegedly made by Jurors R.A., S.L., and F.C. to the defense investigator. According to defendant, Juror R.A. recalled a discussion that a death sentence did not mean the defendant actually would be executed. As we read the record, when the investigator asked the juror whether she remembered anyone discussing the topic that the Death Penalty does not necessarily mean that someone will be put to death, in light of the fact that there have been very few executions in recent history, R.A. responded that she remembered that there was some opinion stated along that topic and that a few people commented on that topic. She added that she did not think it influenced anyone's opinion nor their decision to vote for the death penalty. Defendant claims Juror S.L.'s misconduct appears from her comment to the defense investigator that `to be honest, if we thought he would actually get death, we probably wouldn't put him to death.' [20] Defendant claims that Juror F.C.'s misconduct is evident because, according to defendant, she informed the investigator that she had relayed to other jurors that she had `worked for a lawyer in the Fresno courthouse' and had seen many people get sentenced to life without possibility of parole, but nonetheless be released from prison. The record, however, reflects the circumstance that F.C. told the investigator about her work experience. The investigator's report does not relate that F.C. stated she conveyed her supposed work experiencewhich occurred between 1973 and 1974, more than 20 years prior to the trial and prior to the enactment of the current death penalty statuteto other jurors as the source of her belief that persons sentenced to life in prison without parole may be released from prison. [21] According to the investigator, F.C. also stated that the jurors felt that their concerns about his getting out of prison were not considered to be reasons to give the death penalty. She informed the investigator that she told other jurors who wondered whether a death sentence would be carried out that the speculation was not appropriate and that they should consider the death penalty as something that for all their knowledge they might give a verdict out and he might be executed the next week. [22] (26) The trial court is vested with broad discretion to act upon a motion for new trial. (See People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1260 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 302, 95 P.3d 523].) When the motion is based upon juror misconduct, the reviewing court should accept the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence, but must exercise its independent judgment to determine whether any misconduct was prejudicial. ( People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 192 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 164 P.3d 590]; see also People v. Ault, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1263-1265.) A juror's receipt or discussion of evidence not submitted at trial constitutes misconduct. ( People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 650 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509].) Juror misconduct raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice; a trial court presented with competent evidence of juror misconduct must consider whether the evidence suggests a substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were biased by the misconduct. ( People v. Tafoya, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 192.) (27) The trial court has discretion to determine whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual disputes raised by a claim of juror misconduct. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 604 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076].) Defendant is not, however, entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right. Such a hearing should be held only when the court concludes an evidentiary hearing is `necessary to resolve material, disputed issues of fact.' [Citation.] `The hearing ... should be held only when the defense has come forward with evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred. [23] Even upon such a showing, an evidentiary hearing will generally be unnecessary unless the parties' evidence presents a material conflict that can only be resolved at such a hearing.' [Citations.] ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 604.) The trial court's decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct will be reversed only if the defendant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion. ( Ibid. ; People v. Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1216; People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 317; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 686 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752]; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 694 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351], disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.) Contrary to defendant's assertion, ordinarily a trial court does not abuse its discretion in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of juror misconduct when the evidence proffered in support constitutes hearsay. ( People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1256 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645] [Normally, hearsay is not sufficient to trigger the court's duty to make further inquiries into a claim of juror misconduct.]; see also People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 605; People v. Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1217.) Moreover, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for new trial based upon juror misconduct when the evidence in support constitutes unsworn hearsay. ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 697 [the defense presented the unsworn statement of a juror and an affidavit by an investigator recounting the juror's statement to him, but the evidence was not competent, and this court's decision in People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260] is not to the contrary]; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1318 [248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221] [The sole evidence of the alleged misconduct was the declaration of a defense investigator that purports to relate a conversation with [a] juror. It is settled, however, that `a jury verdict may not be impeached by hearsay affidavits.'].) Defendant does not offer a persuasive basis for deviating from the general rule governing unsworn hearsay as a basis for a motion for new trial or for a request to hold an evidentiary hearing on an allegation of juror misconduct. The trial court afforded defense counsel approximately one month to amend or supplement his original motion for new trial to include the juror misconduct claim. We accept as true the trial court's assertion that it did not suggest to defense counsel in off-the-record conversations that counsel was not obliged to support the motion for new trial with affidavits or declarations from jurors. Defendant does not point to any discussion on the record in which the court made such a suggestion. The prosecution's written opposition to the motionfiled almost two weeks prior to the hearing on the motion relied in part upon the failure of defense counsel to submit juror affidavits, citing governing decisions by this court, yet defense counsel did not respond by submitting such affidavits prior to or at the hearing. Defense counsel evidently had full access to the jurors, and there is no indication that the defense could not have obtained juror affidavits. We note, too, that the defense motion was not even supported by a declaration from the investigator, but merely by his unsworn reports to defense counsel. Defense counsel did not seek to call the investigator to testify. In addition, defense counsel did not request a continuance for the purpose of securing juror affidavits. Defendant contends the investigator's reports did not constitute hearsay, because they were not offered for their truth. In other words, according to defendant, it was immaterial whether the jurors' statements to the investigator were true. Rather, according to defendant, they constituted objective evidence that improper matters had been discussed during deliberations. We are not persuaded. The investigator's report itself interposed a level of hearsay (see, e.g., People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1318), and the investigator's assertions concerning juror statements were probative only if the investigator's assertionsthat the jurors had made the commentswere true. Finally, we disagree with defendant that his motion alleged such serious misconduct that the court abused its discretion by declining to order an evidentiary hearing. The purported statements by jurors concerning the effect on them of the possibility of defendant's release from prison and the probability of an execution constituted indications of juror mental processes that are made inadmissible by Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a). (See People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1261 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225] [statements of jurors regarding their understanding of the meaning of a life sentence and what they would have done had they believed differently come squarely within the prohibition against impeaching a verdict with evidence of the juror's mental processes].) To the extent the comments reflected speculation concerning punishment, in People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1230, and other decisions, we have accepted similar discussions as an inevitable feature of the jury system. (See id. at pp. 1264-1265; see also People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 307 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451] [no misconduct in jury's discussion of a television talk show program concerning a prisoner who was released although he had been sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, or in jurors' speculation concerning the defendant's possible release]; People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1219 [no misconduct when a juror who had been employed at the county jail expressed the opinion that the court would reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment]; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 267-268 [jurors discussed a recent escape from Vacaville prison, and a juror known to have served as an employee at that prison suggested that a life prisoner has a far greater opportunity to escape than a prisoner condemned to death]; People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 696 [juror who referred to former Chief Justice Rose Bird, and asserted that the death penalty had not been carried out since the 1960's, did not commit misconduct].) (28) With respect to defendant's claim that Juror F.C. committed misconduct by informing the jury that she had knowledge concerning the release of prisoners based upon her work with a lawyer in the Fresno County courthouse, the investigator's reports did not state that Juror F.C. said she had conveyed outside information to other jurors in the form of her asserted experience in the Fresno County courts. (See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1219 [a juror who suggested the court would commute a death sentence had been employed at a county jail, but there was no indication she did anything but express a personal opinion to other jurors].) The circumstance that the juror herself may have considered this asserted experience goes in large part to her internal thought processes and, in any event, does not constitute misconduct. ( Ibid. [`Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and experience.'].) Under all the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the investigator's unsworn reports did not constitute a basis for holding an evidentiary hearing. For the same reasons, the court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial. No error under state law or federal constitutional law occurred.