Opinion ID: 15647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Century’s Claim For Extra Work

Text: Century argues that the district court’s findings and conclusions are legally insufficient because the court made no express finding addressing its extra work claim, and that any implied finding by the court on the extra work issue is not supported by the evidence. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury. . ., the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. . . .” The articulation of findings of 10 fact and conclusions of law allows this court to ascertain the factual and legal bases for the district court’s decision, thereby providing a sufficiently definite predicate for appellate review. Chandler v. City of Dallas, 958 F.2d 85, 90 (5th Cir. 1992). But Rule 52(a) “exacts neither punctilious detail nor slavish tracing of the claims issue by issue and witness by witness.” Burma Navigation Corp. v. Reliant Seahorse M/V, 99 F.3d 652, 656 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2 F.3d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Northside Realty Assocs., Inc., 474 F.2d 1164, 1170 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973) (“‘Courts need not indulge in exegetics, or parse or declaim every fact and each nuance and hypothesis.’”) (quoting Gulf King Shrimp Co. v. Wirtz, 407 F.2d 508, 516 (5th Cir. 1969)). The rule is satisfied if the district court’s findings give the reviewing court a clear understanding of the basis for the decision. Burma Navigation, 99 F.3d at 656. If a trial judge fails to make a specific finding on a particular fact, the reviewing court may assume that the court impliedly made a finding consistent with its general holding so long as the implied finding is supported by the evidence. In re Texas Mortgage Servs. Corp., 761 F.2d 1068, 1075 n.12 (5th Cir. 1985); Gilbert v. Sterrett, 509 F.2d 1389, 1393 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975). According to the district court’s factual findings and conclusions of law, Century had been compensated for the ten valid delivery orders under which it performed “extra work” to repair 11 weld fractures. The court also reached the legal conclusion that “there is no valid basis for an equitable adjustment to the contract.” In rejecting Century’s general claim for equitable adjustment, which encompassed the extra work claim, the district court impliedly found that Century was not entitled to compensation for any other extra work. The district court’s 12-page findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficiently detailed to adequately state the factual and legal bases for the district court’s denial of Century’s claim for extra work, thereby providing a sufficiently definite predicate for proper appellate review. The court’s implied denial of Century’s extra work claim is fully supported by the evidence, particularly Mod 9, which sets forth the percentage of completion for unfinished delivery orders; the contracting officer’s decision, which provides detailed reasons for MARAD’s denial of Century’s claims for extra work; and the testimony of Volkmann, the contracting officer’s technical representative, who testified that he personally inspected and videotaped Century’s unfinished work and that he researched and drafted 90% of the contracting officer’s decision with the assistance of Billy Greer, another MARAD employee who testified at trial. In so doing, we reject Century’s argument that the contracting officer’s decision is a “pleading” and therefore cannot be used as evidentiary support for the trial court’s implied denial of Century’s claim for extra work. Under the Contract Disputes Act, contracting officers are not required to make specific findings of 12 fact, but, if made, they “shall not be binding in any subsequent proceeding.” 41 U.S.C. § 605(a). However, there is nothing in the Contract Disputes Act that prohibits the use of the contracting officer’s findings and conclusions as evidence in a subsequent de novo proceeding.5 Cupey Bajo Nursing Home, Inc. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 122, 130 (1996) (“[T]his court reviews the facts and law decided by a contracting officer similar to other evidence before it[.]”). Accord Lathan Co. v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 122, 125 (1990) (“This court may weigh the [contracting officer’s] findings and conclusions as it would any other evidence.”). See Wilner v. United States, 24 F.3d 1397, 1403-04 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (en banc) (expressly overruling pre-Contracts Dispute Act precedent holding that a contracting officer’s decision “constitutes a strong presumption or an evidentiary admission. . . albeit subject to rebuttal,” but cautioning that its opinion does not “suggest[] that a contracting officer’s final decision has no place in . . . litigation in the Court of Federal Claims”). Therefore, in its role as the finder-of-fact, a district court may give the contracting officer’s administrative determinations weight, not deference. Mega Constr., 29 Fed. Cl. at 414. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 493-94 (1951) (holding that the nonbinding findings of an NLRB “trial examiner” 5 The Contract Disputes Act provides that, after a contracting officer renders a decision on a claim, a contractor may bring an action directly on the claim in the United States Court of Federal Claims (formerly the United States Claims Court), 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(1), where the action “shall proceed de novo in accordance with the rules of the appropriate court.” 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(3). 13 may be considered in a subsequent appeal to establish whether an employee’s removal was supported by substantial evidence); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 864 n.39 (1976) (holding that prior administrative findings can be used as evidence of the ultimate matters at issue in a subsequent de novo proceeding). Accordingly, we conclude that the Contract Disputes Act does not preclude the use of the contracting officer’s decision as evidence of the ultimate matters at issue in a subsequent de novo proceeding, provided that it is not given deference or a rebuttable presumption of correctness.