Opinion ID: 2742257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Rulings (Multiple Claims)

Text: This Court “may not consider the correctness of the evidentiary rulings of the Texas courts” under state law, but only “whether there has been a constitutional infraction of [petitioner’s] due process rights which would render the trial as a whole ‘fundamentally unfair.’” Trussell v. Estelle, 699 F.2d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Nelson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[a] state court’s 13 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 14 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 evidentiary rulings present cognizable habeas claims only if they run afoul of a specific constitutional right or render the petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair.” Johnson v. Puckett, 176 F.3d 809, 820 (5th Cir. 1999). Demonstrating fundamental unfairness presents a high burden for the petitioner to meet: Due process is implicated only for rulings “of such a magnitude” or “so egregious” that they “render the trial fundamentally unfair.” It offers no authority to federal habeas courts to review the mine run of evidentiary rulings of state trial courts. Relief will be warranted only when the challenged evidence “played a crucial, critical, and highly significant role in the trial.” The due process inquiry must consider the significance of the challenged evidence “in the context of the entire trial.” We have held that the Due Process Clause does not afford relief where the challenged evidence was not the principal focus at trial and the errors were not “‘so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” This is a high hurdle, even without AEDPA’s added level of deference. Gonzales v. Thaler, 643 F.3d 425, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Put differently, the evidentiary ruling, even if in error, “is still subject to the doctrine of harmless error.” United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). To demonstrate actual prejudice, a petitioner must show that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The error will not require reversal if ‘beyond a reasonable doubt the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Hall, 500 F.3d at 443 (citation omitted). In determining whether the error was harmless, this Court considers “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of 14 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 15 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 cross-examination otherwise permitted, and of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606, 623 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
At issue in claims 3 and 4 is the trial court’s admission of testimony from Nurse Jane Riley (“Nurse Riley”) regarding certain out-of-court statements by Tierra. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of “testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had . . . a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). “A statement that is not testimonial cannot violate the Confrontation Clause.” Brown v. Epps, 686 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (alteration and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has clarified that a “statement is not testimonial if it is procured for the primary purpose of allowing police to assist in an ongoing emergency or if it is procured under other circumstances where the primary purpose is not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Id. at 287 (citation omitted). In determining whether such circumstances exist, courts consider whether the individual “was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than ‘describ[ing] past events’”; whether the statements enabled police to resolve an ongoing emergency; and whether the statements were made in a formal setting. The Court has emphasized that “[a]n objective analysis of the circumstances of an encounter and the statements and actions of the parties to it provides the most accurate assessment of the ‘primary purpose of the interrogation.’” Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis and citations omitted). Moreover, we have previously held that “statements made for the purposes of obtaining medical treatment during an ongoing emergency are not testimonial under Crawford.” United States v. Santos, 589 F.3d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 2009). Conversely, “[statements] are testimonial when the circumstances objectively 15 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 16 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Here, upon suspicion that Tierra was sexually assaulted, Wilkerson took Tierra to see Dr. Ali Al-Himyary (“Dr. Al-Himyary”), who contacted Child Protective Services (“CPS”). Nurse Riley later examined Tierra on a referral from CPS. At trial, Nurse Riley testified about Tierra’s statements during this examination. In relevant part: The State: Now, what you can remember or what you can recall from reviewing your notes, please use—please tell the jury what you said to the child and what the child said to you as you were doing this medical history. .... Nurse Riley: I asked her if she knew why she was there with me and she said no. And then I asked her if she knew why there was blood in her panties and she said no. And then I asked her if something had happened to her and she said yes. And then I asked her if anyone was with her when something happened and she stated my step daddy. I then asked her—I told her it was important for her to tell me what happened to her so that I could make sure she was okay. At that point she put her head down and she didn’t say anything else. And then I asked her if someone had told her not to tell and she said yes, my step daddy. And then I asked her what he had said and she said that he said if I told anybody he would get in a lot of trouble. Holiday argues that Nurse Riley’s testimony about the out-of-court statements from Tierra violated the Confrontation Clause under Crawford because the circumstances show that Tierra’s out-of-court statements to Nurse Riley were testimonial in nature. According to Holiday, the interview occurred three days after Tierra had been examined by Dr. Al-Himyary, who already determined that she was sexually assaulted. Nevertheless, Holiday continues, 16 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 17 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 either the Madisonville Police Department or CPS referred Tierra to Nurse Riley, who worked with a forensic interviewer. Further, the questions themselves—who Tierra was with and whether or not that person asked her to not tell anyone—did not serve the purpose of diagnosis and treatment but investigation. Holiday contends in the alternative that, even if the statements were not testimonial, they lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and were hearsay because the interview was not recorded, consisted of leading questions, and was inconsistent with the recorded interview of the defense’s rebuttal witness, Dr. Fred Fason, a psychiatrist. Holiday also raises these same claims as a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments Due Process rights. Whatever the alleged error, Holiday argues that it was harmful because Nurse Riley’s testimony was the only evidence implicating him as the one who sexually assaulted Tierra. The TCCA proceeded directly to a harmless error analysis and found that any purported error was harmless: Wilkerson testified that she suspected Holiday when she discovered the bloody panties. [Dr. Al-Himyary, the first doctor to examine Tierra after the alleged sexual assault,] testified that Wilkerson informed him that she suspected Holiday of abusing Tierra. Wilkerson testified that she filed charges against Holiday, that she received a protective order against him, that he was evicted from her home, and that he was indicted for sexually assaulting Tierra. There was testimony from several witnesses referring to the pending charges. TCCA Direct App. at –25. From this, the TCCA reasonably concluded that “[t]he statements did not inject any new facts or embellish the facts to any extent beyond that testified to by other witnesses.” Id. at . Holiday does not argue that the TCCA unreasonably determined these facts, which squarely rebuts his argument that Nurse Riley’s testimony was the only evidence that 17 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 18 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 he sexually assaulted Tierra. Accordingly, Holiday has not demonstrated that fairminded jurists could debate the district court’s denial of this claim. ii. Expert Testimony from Dr. DeHaan (Claims 10 and 40–53) In numerous claims, Holiday challenges the admission of Dr. John DeHaan’s (“Dr. DeHaan”) testimony, and contends that the testimony was false or misleading and that the State withheld related evidence. “To establish a due process violation based on the government’s use of false or misleading testimony, the defendant must show (1) that the witness’s testimony was actually false, (2) that the testimony was material, and (3) that the prosecution knew the witness’s testimony was false.” Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 496 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). And to prevail on a claim that the state withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the petitioner must prove: “(1) that the ‘evidence at issue [is] favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching;’ (2) that the ‘evidence [has] been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently;’ and (3) that ‘prejudice [has] ensued.’” Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 874 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281– 82 (1999)). Here, the State retained Dr. DeHaan to investigate the ignition and course of the flames that burned down Wilkerson’s house. Dist. Ct. Op. at . Dr. DeHaan was a forensic scientist who had worked as a criminologist for thirty-three years; “for the past twenty years his focus had been on fire and explosion investigations or laboratory analysis.” TCCA Direct App. at . “[He] testified that in twenty-five years of conducting such research and analysis, he had orchestrated and set about five hundred structure fires, one hundred and twenty vehicle fires, and about two hundred small-scale tests involving furniture and fuels.” Id. at . The district court noted that: 18 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 19 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 Dr. DeHaan’s testimony was especially important to the State because (1) he excluded appliances as [a possible] ignition source; (2) he opined that burns on Holiday’s hands were consistent with the State’s theory that he bent down to light the gasoline; and (3) he suggested that Holiday himself may have spread additional gasoline unobserved by Ms. Mitchell, bolstering the State’s argument that Holiday intended to kill the children. Dist. Ct. Op. at . Holiday alleges that Dr. DeHaan’s testimony was false and misleading, constituted unreliable scientific testimony, and that the State withheld evidence to the extent it knew of these deficiencies. In essence, Holiday argues that Dr. DeHaan’s testimony was based on “junk science” because he “did not try to recreate the factors involved in this fire by modeling [or] rely on any known scientific principles that relate to the diffusion of gasoline molecules in a room to determine what possible concentrations might exist at any location in that room.” Holiday also argues that Dr. DeHaan disregarded certain data contrary to his hypothesis and misleadingly testified that Holiday’s injuries were “consistent with” Dr. DeHaan’s theory. These flaws, according to Holiday, amounted to false or misleading testimony in violation of his Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He further asserts that the court should have excluded DeHaan’s testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and that there was a Brady violation “[t]o the extent” that the State was aware of the contradictory data. As to his first claim, Holiday makes no attempt to show that the prosecution knew Dr. DeHaan’s testimony was false. Indeed, under his third claim, Holiday argues that there was a Brady violation only “[t]o the extent that the [State was] actually aware 2 of [these] deficiencies.” Because Holiday 2 We note that a Brady violation is not limited to instances where the prosecutor had actual knowledge, as Holiday assumes. Rather, “Brady requires the ‘individual prosecutor [] to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in 19 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 20 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 makes no effort to show, as he must, that the State knew of the alleged falsity, see Fuller, 114 F.3d at 496, or that the State either willfully or inadvertently suppressed such evidence, Summers, 431 F.3d at 874, Holiday’s application for a COA on his first (false or misleading testimony) and third (Brady) claims fails. Holiday also requests a COA as to the admissibility of Dr. DeHaan’s testimony, but this too fails. As the TCCA found: [Dr. DeHaan] explained that the process of gathering information and assessing evidence during a fire investigation begins with observations from witnesses. He also testified that it includes: (1) gathering information from the scene, such as the amount of damage, the time frames of detection, suppression, and extinguishment; (2) testing various possibilities as to manner and location of ignition; (3) assessing the way the fire spread and its time frames; (4) studying the physical evidence; and (5) testing and retesting the possibilities to establish the reliability of the various indicators to arrive at a conclusion about the ignition. DeHaan testified that this method of gathering information, reviewing the physical evidence, and testing possibilities is used in a “very high percentage” of fire investigations and is a valid process that has been verified through numerous tests, training exercises, and demonstration fires. DeHaan testified that he properly applied these established and verified techniques in making his determination in the instant case. TCCA Direct App. at –48. Holiday simply points to what Dr. DeHaan did not do, but Holiday does not explain why those omissions rendered this methodology scientifically unreliable. To the extent there existed evidence contradicting Dr. DeHaan’s findings, “[c]ommon sense dictates that some speculation is involved in attempting to reconstruct a scene that was destroyed by fire, or in assessing a the case, including the police.’” Pitonyak v. Stephens, 732 F.3d 525, 533 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)). This clarification does not affect our holding. 20 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 21 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 burn injury based upon numerous variables.” Id. at . “That a factfinder will have to assess how much those matters bear upon evaluating DeHaan’s overall conclusions in light of the expertise he brings to the issues goes to the weight of DeHaan’s testimony and not its admissibility.” Id. We do not find the TCCA’s approach here unreasonable or that the admission of Dr. DeHaan’s testimony rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Story v. Collins, 920 F.2d 1247, 1255–56 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding admission of allegedly inadmissible expert testimony not fundamentally unfair because “[petitioner’s] attorney had ample opportunity to cross-examine [the expert] on her testimony; and in light of [the expert’s] professional status, education, and experience, [petitioner had] not shown that the admission of [the expert’s] testimony rendered his trial fundamentally unfair”). Reasonable jurists could not debate otherwise. iii. Evidence of Rape Offense (Claim 11) In this claim, Holiday disputes the trial court’s admission of evidence pertaining to the sexual assault of Tierra and claims that its admission was unfairly prejudicial. In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the Supreme Court noted “the familiar, standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, or, more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.” Id. at 186–87. The Court described this rule as “unquestionably true as a general matter.” Id. at 187. But the rule has “virtually no application when the point at issue is a defendant’s legal status, dependent on some judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against him.” Id. at 190. Thus, the Court held that if the purpose of the evidence is to prove the defendant’s status as a convict (to satisfy a prior-conviction element of the 21 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 22 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 offense), then a court abuses its discretion by denying a defendant’s offer to stipulate to that status. Id. at 191–92; see also United States v. Hollis, 506 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2007) (“As recognized in Old Chief v. United States, a defendant has the right to admit or stipulate to the fact of a prior felony conviction for purposes of proof of felon status.” (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190–91)). Holiday argues that the State should have been required, under Old Chief, to accept his stipulation to the sexual assault of Tierra because “offering detailed evidence” of the assault “went far beyond establishing motive and fundamentally deprived Holiday of a fair trial.” Holiday, however, does not elaborate why Old Chief should apply to this case. We hold it does not. The Supreme Court expressly stated in Old Chief that its holding “is limited to cases involving proof of felon status.” 519 U.S. at 183 n.7. As the Court described: What we have said shows why this will be the general rule when proof of convict status is at issue, just as the prosecutor’s choice will generally survive a Rule 403 analysis when a defendant seeks to force the substitution of an admission for evidence creating a coherent narrative of his thoughts and actions in perpetrating the offense for which he is being tried. Id. at 191–92. We reject Holiday’s attempt to fit this case under the former scenario—his legal status is simply not a point of issue here. Rather, this case falls squarely under the latter scenario. Indeed, the district court found that “Holiday’s sexual assault of Tierra set into motion a series of circumstances leading to his actions on the night of the murder. In connecting a line from the extraneous sexual assault to the murders, the State did not cross an impermissible boundary that violated fundamental fairness.” Dist. Ct. Op. at . In other words, the evidence “creat[ed] a coherent narrative of [Holiday’s] thoughts and actions in perpetrating the offense.” See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 22 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 23 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 192. Presenting such evidence was the State’s choice to make, and to require the State “[t]o substitute for such a picture a naked admission might have the effect to rob the evidence of much of its fair and legitimate weight.” See id. at 187 (quoting Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Holiday does not dispute the high probative value of the challenged evidence that he sexually assaulted Tierra. Nor does he cite any authority requiring, as a constitutional right, the State to accept his stipulation to the same effect. Holiday’s only cited authority in support of his argument, Old Chief, does not apply to this case. Accordingly, Holiday has not demonstrated that the admission of the evidence was so prejudicial that it ran afoul of a specific constitutional right or rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Reasonable jurists could not find this debatable. iv. Expert Testimony of Dr. Gripon (Claims 14 and 15) In claims 14 and 15, Holiday challenges the trial court’s admission of the expert testimony of Dr. Edward B. Gripon (“Dr. Gripon”). The district court summarized Dr. Gripon’s testimony: During the penalty phase of trial, the prosecution called Dr. Edward B. Gripon, a board-certified psychiatrist, as a rebuttal witness to testify to Holiday’s future threat to society. Dr. Gripon did not interview or examine Holiday, but reviewed information that included offense reports, school records, and historical information. Before Dr. Gripon testified before the jury, the trial court held a Daubert hearing regarding his opinions. Dr. Gripon detailed his extensive experience evaluating criminal defendants. With specific relevance to his role at this trial, Dr. Gripon testified that the psychological community recognizes several scientifically valid methods of assessing future dangerousness, including: (1) a pure clinical model; (2) a clinical approach that includes consideration of certain demographic and actuarial information; and (3) a pure actuarial model. Dr. Gripon explained that his evaluations generally followed the second approach, allowing for mental-health history, past behavior, and demographics to 23 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 24 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 influence his assessment. Dr. Gripon specifically rejected the use of the actuarial approach because it lacked adequate controls and involved immeasurable variables. Dist. Ct. Op. at –85 (footnote omitted). Holiday generally argues that the American Psychiatric Association finds future dangerousness predictions to be unreliable in capital trials. Additionally, Holiday contends that Gripon used an “unstructured clinical approach” as he “intuitively selected factors he believed were likely to predict future violence, [age and education,] rather than relying on factors that have been empirically demonstrated to relate to the risk of future violence among individuals in a particular context.” The Supreme Court, however, has already rejected general challenges— like Holiday’s—to the use of future dangerousness predictions. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court explained that “[t]he suggestion that no psychiatrist’s testimony may be presented with respect to a defendant’s future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel.” Id. at 896. In this regard, “it makes little sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject that they should not be permitted to testify.” Id. at 897. Holiday’s passing suggestion that such testimony would not “satisfy ordinary Daubert-like evidentiary standards” is unavailing. Granted, the viability of this holding in Barefoot has been questioned in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert. See, e.g., Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 463–65 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring). But even if questionable, Holiday’s suggestion does not show that the state trial court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In fact, we 24 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 25 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 have held that “Daubert does not apply to the standards governing the admissibility of expert evidence at a capital sentencing hearing.” Williams v. Stephens, — F.3d –––, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14816,  (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2014) (citing United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 341–46 (5th Cir. 2007)). As to the reliability of Dr. Gripon’s testimony, the TCCA found that, “[a]s a board-certified psychiatrist with years of experience and specializing in forensic psychology, Gripon was shown to be qualified. . . . Gripon testified that his method of assessing future-dangerousness was considered valid.” TCCA Direct App. at –75. Holiday, at best, points us to his own expert’s testimony that “explained in detail the deficiencies of the methodology used by Dr. Gripon.” But, “[w]hile Holiday points to issues that were legitimate areas for cross-examination, his objections went to the weight and not the admissibility of Gripon’s testimony.” TCCA Direct App. at . Indeed, Holiday’s counsel had ample opportunity to cross-examine Gripon, and Holiday does not challenge Gripon’s qualifications. See, e.g., Fields, 483 F.3d at 345 (“[A]s Barefoot noted, the adversarial system reduces any prejudicial unreliability in future dangerousness expert testimony because it can expose the flaws in such testimony.”); Story v. Collins, 920 F.2d 1247, 1255–56 (5th Cir. 1991). Holiday therefore fails to show that the trial court’s admission of Dr. Gripon’s testimony rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, much less that the TCCA’s assessment was unreasonable. Reasonable jurists could not debate otherwise. v. Expert Testimony of Reverend Pickett (Claims 16–19) In these claims, Holiday contends that the trial court erred when it excluded the expert testimony of Reverend Carol Pickett (“Rev. Pickett”). Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a sentencer may “not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 25 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 26 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Jackson v. Dretke, 450 F.3d 614, 616–17 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)). Holiday argues that Lockett v. Ohio permits the sentencer to “consider . . . and base a decision to impose a life sentence upon any relevant mitigating factor.” On this ground, Holiday sought to introduce Rev. Pickett to testify on what Holiday alleges to be mitigating factors: the negative effect on prison employees carrying out the execution, the lack of positive effect on victim’s family, and the positive changes that an inmate can make during incarceration. The district court denied these claims and we do not find that outcome debatable. To be sure, Lockett stated that the “Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” 438 U.S. at 604. In turn, Holiday premises his argument upon the broad notion that “any relevant mitigating factor” must be permitted. But the quoted language from Lockett does not exist in a vacuum. Holiday ignores the footnote appended to that quoted language: “Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.” Id. at 604 n.12. This traditional authority is precisely what the state trial court exercised here. 3 3 By the same token, we reject Holiday’s contention that these claims should be reviewed wholly de novo. He argues that the TCCA denied these claims on state law grounds without addressing the merits of his constitutional claims. But we must afford deference to the “traditional authority” the state court exercised under Lockett. 26 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 27 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 In this regard, the TCCA held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Rev. Pickett’s testimony as irrelevant. The TCCA reasoned that “Pickett’s testimony was not offered to provide the jury with information regarding Holiday or the circumstances of his case in particular.” TCCA Direct App. at . “Even if Pickett’s testimony could be viewed as marginally relevant,” the TCCA continued, “the trial court was within its discretion to exclude it under Rule 403.” Id. Thus, “[b]ecause the evidence was not particularized to the defendant, the trial court might reasonably conclude that the risk of confusing and distracting the jury substantially outweighed any probative value such evidence might have.” Id. We find nothing unreasonable in the TCCA’s analysis. In fact, this Court has previously held that “[e]vidence of impact on friends and family does not reflect on [petitioner’s] background or character or the circumstances of his crime, so [petitioner’s] proffer of that evidence does not satisfy the second avenue available to him to obtain habeas relief.” Jackson, 450 F.3d at 618. In a similar vein, it was reasonable for the TCCA to find minimal probative value in generalized testimony concerning the positive changes inmates can make— such testimony says nothing about Holiday’s character and his propensity to rehabilitate. The district court’s denial of these claims is beyond debate. vi. Cross-Examination of Mitchell During the Penalty Phase (Claims 20–22) Claims 20–22 concern Holiday’s counsel’s attempt to cross-examine Mitchell during the penalty phase. Because the State does not dispute Holiday’s contention that this claim be reviewed de novo, we assume without deciding that de novo review applies. In Holland v. Anderson, 583 F.3d 267, 273–80 (5th Cir. 2009), we distinguished between innocence-related evidence and evidence of the circumstances of the offense: 27 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 28 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 The only testimony and evidence that the court prohibited [during the penalty phase] was [evidence] related to an element of the crime: the commission of a rape. As explained above, rape was an essential element of the original jury’s capital murder conviction. Without finding rape, the jury could not have found Holland guilty of capital murder; rape was therefore not a circumstance of the crime. . . . The fact that Holland sought to introduce evidence to dispute an actual element of his crime of conviction—not merely evidence to explain the crime or to describe the circumstances of the crime—distinguishes this case from Lockett [v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion)], Eddings [v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)], and their progeny. Id. at 275–76 (footnote omitted). Based on this distinction, this Court held that a state was constitutionally permitted to “prohibit the introduction of new evidence of innocence at resentencing.” Id. at 278. We reasoned that “sentencing traditionally concerns how, not whether, a defendant committed the crime.” Id. (quoting Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 526 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “‘the parties previously litigated the issue to which the evidence [petitioner sought to introduce at sentencing] is relevant—whether [he] committed the basic crime,’ which is ‘a previously determined matter.’” Id. (quoting Guzek, 546 U.S. at 526). Holiday argues that during the guilt–innocence phase of the trial, Mitchell “was the only person to testify that Holiday took affirmative steps to light the house on fire.” Holiday recounts that his “lawyer impeached [Mitchell] with prior statements and testimony she made, asserting that she did not see Holiday do anything to start the fire, and never before mentioned observing Holiday bending down at the moment the fire started.” In closing argument at the guilt–innocence phase, the State attempted to explain away any inconsistency. Consequently, Holiday contends, he should have been permitted to then additionally cross-examine Mitchell during the penalty phase because he is “entitled to present evidence relevant to the mitigation 28 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 29 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 issue that would reduce his moral blameworthiness.” In Holiday’s view, evidence that Mitchell was not as certain about her testimony reduces his moral blameworthiness. This is, he maintains, “precisely the type of exonerating defense to which a defendant has a due process right to under Holmes [v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006),] and Crane [v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986)].” Holiday concludes that if the jury were allowed to hear of such inconsistency, then “at least one juror may have concluded that Holiday did not bend over and ignite the fire and, therefore, a sentence of less than death imposed.” By Holiday’s own words, he contends that he should have been permitted to introduce innocence-related evidence—i.e., “exonerating” evidence that would show he “did not bend over and ignite the fire”—during the penalty phase of his trial. But as the TCCA found, “Mitchell had already responded to numerous pointed questions from defense counsel regarding the context in which her earlier statement and testimony were made.” TCCA Direct App. at . Indeed, Holiday noted in briefing that his trial counsel impeached Mitchell. Moreover, Holiday does not cite any authority that a second opportunity to present innocence-related evidence during the penalty phase is constitutionally mandated. Thus, as the TCCA held, “[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting continued questioning of Mitchell on an issue on which there had already been considerable testimony.” TCCA Direct App. at . We do not find this conclusion unreasonable and hold that fairminded jurists could not debate otherwise.