Opinion ID: 2318666
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dickey v. Vermette

Text: [¶ 18] In 2008, we decided a factually similar case without resolving whether to adopt the continuing negligent treatment doctrine. See Dickey, 2008 ME 179, 960 A.2d 1178. In Dickey, a dental hygienist noticed a spot on a female patient's dental x-ray in 2000. Id. ¶ 2, 960 A.2d at 1179. A dentist viewed the x-ray at the patient's subsequent routine visits, which occurred every three to five months over the next five years. Id. In 2005, a second x-ray showed that the spot had grown, and the dentist referred the patient to an oral surgeon, who diagnosed her with oral cancer. Id. In 2006, the patient filed a notice of claim for professional negligence. Id. ¶ 3, 960 A.2d at 1179. On partial summary judgment, the court ruled that her claims arising from acts or omissions occurring more than three years prior to her notice of claim were time-barred pursuant to section 2902. Id. ¶ 4, 960 A.2d at 1179. Instead of pursuing claims that were not time-barred, the patient appealed to us with the stipulation that no act or omission occurring within three years of her notice of claim was a proximate cause of her injury. Id. ¶ 4, 960 A.2d at 1179-80. [¶ 19] We determined that the continuing course of treatment doctrine, pursuant to which the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the doctor-patient relationship, could not be applied to toll the statute of limitations because, by explicitly defining when a cause of action accrues in section 2902, the Legislature had foreclosed our ability to create an exception to that definition. Id. ¶ 7, 960 A.2d at 1180. [¶ 20] We also addressed the continuing negligent treatment doctrine, pursuant to which the limitations period of section 2902 would not begin to run until the date of the last act of negligence. Id. ¶ 9, 960 A.2d at 1180. Because every claim for negligence requires proof of duty, breach, proximate causation, and harm, we concluded that the parties' stipulationthat no act occurring within the limitations period proximately caused her harmprecluded the patient from proving that the last act of negligence occurred within the limitations period. Id. ¶ 9 & n. 2, 960 A.2d at 1180-81. As a result, we declined to consider adoption of the continuing negligent treatment doctrine, and we affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the dentist based on the limitations period of section 2902. Id. ¶ 9, 960 A.2d at 1180. But see id. ¶¶ 25-34, 960 A.2d at 1184-86 (Silver, J., dissenting) (discussing the continuing negligent treatment doctrine in detail).