Opinion ID: 1989271
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discriminatory Employment Action

Text: A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination in employment has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. [3] To meet this burden, plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified to hold the position; (3) she was terminated from employment or suffered another adverse employment action; and (4) the discharge or other adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ( see Ferrante v American Lung Assn. , 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]). The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of discrimination by clearly setting forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, legitimate, independent, and nondiscriminatory reasons to support its employment decision ( id. [citations omitted]). In order to nevertheless succeed on her claim, the plaintiff must prove that the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant were merely a pretext for discrimination by demonstrating both that the stated reasons were false and that discrimination was the real reason ( see id. at 629-630). To prevail on their summary judgment motion, defendants must demonstrate either plaintiff's failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether their explanations were pretextual. In that event, summary judgment would constitute a highly useful device for expediting the just disposition of a legal dispute for all parties and conserving already overburdened judicial resources ( Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. [Michael V.] v James M. , 83 NY2d 178, 182 [1994]), inasmuch as no valid purpose is served by submitting to a jury a cause of action that cannot survive as a matter of law. Defendants have satisfied their burden. The first two elements necessary to establish a claim of discrimination are not in dispute. Plaintiff is an African-American woman, qualified for the job she held at the Guild. She has, however, failed to raise a triable of issue of material fact as to whether any adverse employment action she alleges she suffered occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory motive. Preliminarily, plaintiff's proof of adverse action is in large measure wanting. She asserts three such actions: her demotion from music therapist to creative arts therapist and then to case manager; a series of interpersonal conflicts with her supervisors; and her ultimate termination. An adverse employment action requires a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. To be materially adverse, a change in working conditions must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices . . . unique to a particular situation ( Galabya v New York City Bd. of Educ. , 202 F3d 636, 640 [2d Cir 2000] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). Plaintiff has offered no evidence that her change in job title constituted a demotion. Rather, the undisputed proof is that the title of creative arts therapist was adopted as part of the Guild's 1991 restructuring in an effort to be consistent with the terminology used by its state regulatory agency, and was applied to all similarly situated employees. Later, all professionals in the CDTP were restyled case managers to reflect the holistic approach valued by the program. Plaintiff's salary and benefits were unaffected by these changes. [4] Nor does the alleged mistreatment suffered at the hands of her supervisors rise to the level of adverse action as defined by law. The snatching of a pad from her hands, the patting of a seat in an allegedly humiliating way, the shouting at her in a meeting, the circling of her name on a time sheet, the rolling of eyes when she spoke  none of these constitutes a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment ( see e.g. Fridia v Henderson , 2000 WL 1772779, , 2000 US Dist LEXIS 17295,  [SD NY, Nov. 30, 2000] [excessive work, denials of requests for leave with pay and a supervisor's general negative treatment of the plaintiff are not materially adverse changes in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment]; Katz v Beth Israel Med. Ctr. , 2001 WL 11064, , 2001 US Dist LEXIS 29,  [SD NY, Jan. 4, 2001] [Being yelled at, receiving unfair criticism, receiving unfavorable schedules or work assignments . . . do not rise to the level of adverse employment actions]). Plaintiff has, however, raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she was terminated from her employment. Clearly, termination constitutes an adverse action. Plaintiff concedes that she intended to resign from the Guild on October 22, 1994, effective immediately. But she asserts that she was nevertheless terminated because the Guild sent her a letter of discharge prior to its receipt of her resignation. Whether in these circumstances the Guild's action preempted and rendered ineffective her resignation presents a question of fact that a jury might resolve in her favor. But plaintiff still cannot avoid summary judgment for defendants because, even assuming that she has made a prima facie showing as to the fourth element, she has failed to rebut defendants' proof that the purported termination did not arise under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination  that is, that she was not terminated because of [her] race (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107 [1] [a]). Rather, the undisputed facts establish that plaintiff repeatedly failed to comply with her obligation to submit documentation in support of her family medical leave substantiating the nature of her father's serious illness. Plaintiff's lack of cooperation and failure to adhere to her commitments by themselves establish legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for ending her employment. And plaintiff's actions in traveling to Hawaii and leaving her father, without notifying the Guild of this substantial change, placed her in violation of statutory standards for entitlement to family medical leave and provided further justification for the Guild's decision. [5] In response to this showing by defendants that their actions were justified by plaintiff's conduct, plaintiff has offered no evidence that defendants' legitimate explanations were a pretext for unlawful discrimination  that is, that they were false and that racially motivated discrimination was the real reason. [6] Indeed, plaintiff fails to demonstrate any causal relationship between the racial epithets allegedly uttered in 1992 by Dersh and Adlivankina, and her purported termination from Finocchiaro's department in 1994, that could conceivably demonstrate that the termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination ( see Price Waterhouse v Hopkins , 490 US 228, 277 [1989] [O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment] [statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself, are insufficient to establish discriminatory intent]). Simply put, plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether she was discriminated against on the basis of her race. To be sure, the record establishes that there was no love lost between plaintiff and her supervisors. Indeed, as a cycle unfolded of supervisory dissatisfaction with plaintiff's work; the giving of warnings; complaints about the warnings; a perceived lack of improvement; and more warnings followed by more complaints, any number of fair inferences could be drawn from the record as to the motives underlying such events. Racial animus, however, is not among them. Plaintiff herself was hard pressed at her deposition to articulate any basis for her claim that defendants' alleged unfair treatment and harassment was race-based, other than a repeated assertion  or assumption  that she was the only one so treated: [7] only she was told that she was jeopardizing the department (but only she had such difficulties with her charts); only she and another African-American employee had the spaces next to their names circled on a time sheet (but only they had not yet signed in and so were thought to be late); only she had to sign out for breaks (but when cross-examined, she admitted that others actually signed out as well); only she was refused overtime compensation (but although her overtime request arose from having stayed late to complete her reports, plaintiff did not dispute defendants' evidence that overtime is simply not available to employees of the Guild and that compensatory time is available only for direct patient care, not paperwork). Indeed, prior to having taken her final leave from the Guild, plaintiff did not complain of racial discrimination in any forum. Although her grievances made clear that she felt harass[ed], she never alleged that the harassment was racially motivated. Rather, her union grievances for harassment alleged violations of articles IV, VII and XVII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement  pertaining to management rights over employees' job responsibilities, procedures for disciplining employees and vacation rights  not article V, which specifically prohibits discrimination, including racial discrimination. Nor did her resignation letter  thanking the Guild for the opportunity to serve, utilize my talents, and grow both professionally and personally  give any hint that she had ever been, or believed she had been, subjected to discrimination based on her race. To be sure, discrimination, when it occurs, is a serious evil to be dealt with seriously. But mere personality conflicts must not be mistaken for unlawful discrimination, lest the antidiscrimination laws become a general civility code ( Faragher v City of Boca Raton , 524 US 775, 788 [1998] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Gorley v Metro-North Commuter R.R. , 2000 WL 1876909, , 2000 US Dist LEXIS 18427, -26 [SD NY, Dec. 22, 2000] [Even if (plaintiff's supervisor) did harbor personal animosity against plaintiff . . . Title VII provides relief only for racial discrimination, not fickleness], affd 29 Fed Appx 764 [2d Cir 2002]; Gibson v Brown , 1999 WL 1129052, , 1999 US Dist LEXIS 18555,  [ED NY, Oct. 19, 1999] [Personal animosity is not the equivalent of .. . discrimination and is not proscribed by Title VII. The plaintiff cannot turn a personal feud into a . . . discrimination case by accusation (citations omitted)], affd 242 F3d 365 [table; text at 2000 WL 1843914, 2000 US App LEXIS 33119 (2d Cir 2000)]; Padob v Entex Info. Serv. , 960 F Supp 806, 813 [SD NY 1997] [It might be just as likely that Plaintiff was excluded because of her acknowledged personality conflict with (her supervisor)  but such behavior is not prohibited by (antidiscrimination laws)]). [8]