Opinion ID: 3061884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Monitored Telephone Conversation

Text: Garcia argues that the district court improperly permitted Detective Lamprou to testify that he was the individual on the controlled call who negotiated the terms of the drug transaction with the CI. He argues that the government failed to authenticate Garcia’s voice before seeking to admit Detective Lamprou’s testimony identifying the unidentified individual as Garcia, as required by Fed. R. Evid. 901, and that the district court erred in allowing the detective to testify in that respect. Id. at 22-23. Garcia argues that Detective Lamprou’s testimony about the monitored conversation “was classic hearsay in that [he] was purporting to testify about the truth of statements that took place outside the courtroom,” and that, because the detective could not identify Garcia as the speaker, the statements were not admissible as an admission by a party-opponent under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) or as statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Appellant’s Brief at 23-24. Garcia argues for the first time that under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 13 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause bars the admission of the CI’s testimonial statements because the CI was not subjected to cross-examination. Finally, Garcia argues that Detective Lamprou’s testimony violated Fed. R. Evid. 1002, which provides that the original of a recording is required to prove the contents thereof. Because the recording was not played at the hearing, Garcia argues that the only evidence of the conversation was the detective’s second-hand summary, which violated the “best evidence” rule of Rule 1002. Garcia acknowledges that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation proceedings, but argues that the court failed to conduct the required balancing test or make a finding of reliability before admitting hearsay testimony, as required by United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994). He asserts that the court’s errors in this regard substantially prejudiced his rights because the court relied upon the improper testimony. He argues that because, absent the improper statements, the government did not prove a supervised release violation by a preponderance of the evidence, we should reverse the judgment revoking his supervised release. Id. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation proceedings, the Supreme Court has held that “[d]efendants involved in 14 revocation proceedings are entitled to certain minimal due process requirements,” including “the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114 (citations omitted). Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Detective Lamprou’s testimony was not hearsay. He directly monitored the controlled call and heard both ends of the conversation himself. This is not a situation of a CI repeating to a detective what the defendant told the CI out of the detective’s earshot. Detective Lamprou’s testimony about statements he heard on the monitored phone call was not hearsay. The utterances that the unidentified individual made to the CI (and assuming there was evidence to tie Garcia to that individual) were admissible under Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(2), which excludes admissions by a party opponent from the hearsay rule. Those statements were offered to prove only that Garcia was somehow involved in the conspiracy. Because no hearsay was involved, the district court did not have to assess the reliability of such hearsay or conduct the balancing test before considering the same under Frazier. Any errors were harmless. Other information, summarized above, independently showed more than mere presence at the scene of a crime – it showed 15 that Garcia participated in the alleged drug conspiracy. Specifically, he drove Quadra to a place where a drug transaction was to occur, he was found with a Taser and pepper spray in his lap, and authorities located a gun on the front floor of the car and duffle bags in the trunk containing duct tape and flex cuffs. Moreover, he violated supervised release by committing state crimes previously, and had knowledge and intent necessary to commit a drug offense, as indicated by his underlying federal conviction in 2000. Finally, he made a taped confession, which the government summarized in its opening statement. Thus, given this information supporting a finding of guilt, it was irrelevant to the court’s ultimate findings whether or not Garcia participated in the controlled call monitored by Detective Lamprou, or whether the detective’s testimony or the recording itself were properly considered. Finally, Garcia’s argument that Crawford, which defines protections guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause, should extend to testimonial hearsay evidence in a supervised release revocation hearing fails. The Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses is guaranteed only in “criminal prosecutions.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has held that a parole revocation hearing does not constitute a “criminal prosecution.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1972), and our court has found “no significant 16 conceptual difference between the revocation of probation or parole and the revocation of supervised release.” Frazier, 26 F.3d at 113-14.