Opinion ID: 1112397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Celotex's Reimbursement Recovery

Text: At the time of Cosse's 1984 accident, La. R.S. 23:1101 provided in pertinent part: Any person having paid or having become obligated to pay compensation under the provisions of this Chapter may bring suit against such third person to recover any amount which he has paid or become obligated to pay as compensation to such employee or his dependents. [emphasis added]. In 1985, La.R.S. 23:1101 was amended to read, in pertinent part: B. Any person having paid or having become obligated to pay compensation under the provisions of this Chapter may bring suit against such third person to recover any amount which he has paid or becomes obligated to pay as compensation to such employee or his dependents. The recovery allowed herein shall be identical in percentage to the recovery of the employee or his dependents against the third person and, where the recovery of the employee is decreased as a result of comparative negligence, the recovery of the person who has paid compensation or has become obligated to pay compensation shall be reduced by the same percentage. The courts of appeal have split on the issue of whether the 1985 amendment to La.R.S. 23:1101 should be applied to accidents arising before its effective date. Some courts have taken the view that the amendment is substantive in nature and may not be applied retroactively. [5] The court of appeal in the present case adopted that view. By contrast, other courts have concluded that the 1985 amendment did not change the law, reasoning that when comparative negligence was adopted, the doctrine was equally applicable to the worker's compensation recovery under La.R.S. 23:1101. [6] Cosse urges us to adopt this view and hold that the 1985 amendment is not a substantive change, but merely restates a pre-existing rule that the compensation carrier can only recover to the extent the injured employee can recover. This court has not addressed the effect of comparative fault on the right of reimbursement granted to the compensation carrier. However, an analogous situation was presented under the system of contributory negligence in Vidrine v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 263 La. 300, 268 So.2d 233 (1972) (on rehearing). In Vidrine, the precise issue before the court was whether an employer to whom fault was attributed was prevented from recovering against the third-party joint tortfeasor the compensation payments made by the employer to its non-negligent employee. On original hearing, the court struggled with the question of whether the general tort law of contributory negligence served to modify the statutory right granted under La.R.S. 23:1101, ultimately concluding that the employer's negligence could bar his right to recovery of reimbursement. Justice Barham dissented, reasoning that the statutory right was absolute: Nothing contained in these statutes qualifies the employer's right to obtain indemnification. Unless that statutory right is abridged by other statute or is against public policy, it is absolute. The right is not dependent on absence of negligence. Id. at 239. On rehearing, the majority adopted the position of the dissent, holding the right is an absolute one and is not limited by the statute. Id. at 246. The court further noted that while its original holding may have been based on considerations of equity, any change in the law was a matter for the legislature: As we read the original majority opinion, that holding is not based on the language of the statute or on our jurisprudence, but instead, on concepts of equity and/or socio-economic reasons. If the views expressed are valid, a change in the law is essential so as to have it comport therewith. But this is not a matter for the Court; it addresses itself solely to the legislative department of our government. Id. Applying the reasoning of Vidrine to the present case, we find the language of La.R.S. 23:1101 in effect at the time of Cosse's accident is clear and unambiguous. It provides that the party paying compensation may bring suit against a third party tortfeasor to recover any amount which he has paid or become obligated to pay as compensation. (emphasis added). The language of the statute does not qualify the compensation carrier's right to reimbursement, nor does application of comparative fault principles serve to modify the absolute right granted by this statute. [7] The court of appeal decisions reaching a contrary conclusion have attempted to achieve a measure of equity in favor of the employee. [8] However, as we stated in Vidrine, such considerations are the concern of the legislature, not the courts. In the present case, the legislature acted in 1985 to remedy any inequity. Having concluded that the 1985 amendment to La.R.S. 23:1101 is a substantive change in the law, it is clear that it may not be retroactively applied to this 1984 accident. [9] La.Civ.Code art. 6. Accordingly, we find the court of appeal correctly reversed the judgment of the trial court reducing Celotex's recovery by Cosse's 5% fault.