Opinion ID: 1776668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of flight and granting a flight instruction.

Text: ¶ 55. Randolph next complains that the trial court erred in giving flight instructions to the jury. Randolph contends that the facts of his case are similar to Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (1985). As such, the submission of the jury instruction S-10 and S-11 was prejudicial and resulted in his conviction. Randolph requests a reversal of the jury verdict. ¶ 56. In regard to flight instructions, this Court has held that flight is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn and considered along with all the other facts and circumstances connected with the case. Hubbard v. State, 187 So.2d 885, 886 (Miss.1966). In Brown v. State, 690 So.2d 276, 294 (Miss. 1996), this Court held: [A]n instruction that flight may be considered as a circumstance of guilt or guilty knowledge is appropriate only where that flight is unexplained and somehow probative of guilt or guilty knowledge. Reynolds v. State, 658 So.2d 852, 856 (Miss.1995) (quoting Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 57 (Miss. 1985)). When determining whether a flight instruction is appropriate, we further have explained that two considerations are paramount: 1. Only unexplained flight merits a flight instruction. 2. Flight instructions are to be given only in cases where that circumstance has considerable probative value. Banks v. State, 631 So.2d 748, 751 (Miss.1994) (quoting Pannell v. State, 455 So.2d 785, 788 (Miss.1984)). See also M.R.E. 404(b). However, the evidence of flight is inadmissible if there is an independent reason for flight known by the court which cannot be explained to the jury because of its prejudicial effect upon the defendant. Fuselier v. State, 702 So.2d 388, 390 (Miss.1997). ¶ 57. In Fuselier, this Court reversed and remanded the conviction and sentence based upon the improper admission of flight evidence and flight instructions. Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d at 57. Fuselier was a prison escapee at the time of his flight from law enforcement and his arrest for murder. He claimed that as an escapee, he had an independent reason for fleeing from authorities other than the murder of Gunter. Id. The Court acknowledged that Fuselier was in a no-win situation be either being required to explain his flight and the fact that he was a prison escapee or not explaining the flight and subjecting himself to a flight instruction. Id. On a later appeal, this Court again reversed and remanded the conviction and sentence. Fuselier v. State, 702 So.2d 388 (Miss. 1997). In the later trial, flight evidence was admitted but no flight instruction was given to the jury. Id. ¶ 58. In Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1310 (Miss.1994), a prison escapee was driving a stolen car at the time of arrest and this Court found that allowing flight evidence was error but that admission was harmless. This Court held that the flight evidence pale[d] in comparison to more direct evidence of guilt. Id. Among the evidence cited was the fact that his two companions stated that Mack killed Fulton. Some of the other evidence presented at trial placed Mack at the crime scene by other witnesses, blood was on the vehicle that Mack drove, and Mack threatened to kill a teenager if he revealed what he had seen. Id.; but see Tavares v. State 725 So.2d 803 (Miss.1998)(defendant did not appear on the day of her trial, bond was revoked and a warrant was issued for arrest at the time she was apprehended, however defendant denied the flight occurred and the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting evidence and flight instructions). ¶ 59. Randolph claims that by allowing the flight instructions, S-10 and S-11, his flight to Arizona was probative of his guilt and similar to Fuselier. The basis for this argument by Randolph turns on the fact that when he was arrested in Arizona for the murder charge he was also subject to the jurisdiction of the trial court because of a warrant for possession of a controlled substance and auto burglary. Randolph argues that the other charges pending against him act as an independent reason to explain his flight and were known by the trial court. He asserts that he is in the same position as Fuselier of either testifying or remaining silent and subjecting himself to a cloud of guilt. ¶ 60. A review of the record reveals that Investigator Clark testified in a proffer before the court that Randolph was in custody on April 30, 1998, for two warrants for murder and a warrant for possession of a controlled substance. There was an apparent indictment for auto burglary, however, Clark testified that he was not aware of that allegation. Nevertheless, the case sub judice is distinguishable from Fuselier. First, in Fuselier, the defendant was a prison escapee at the time of his flight and under those circumstances he would logically run from authorities. While Randolph had a possession warrant and an alleged indictment for auto burglary at the time of his flight, it is not known whether he even knew of the warrant or indictment for these crimes. In other words, Randolph, unlike Fuselier, was not eluding a current prison sentence and detention period, which an escapee would be fully aware of and have full knowledge, at the time of his flight from Hattiesburg. Second, in Fuselier, the case relied mainly on circumstantial evidence, whereas the case before this Court more closely resembles Mack. There is sufficient direct evidence of Randolph's guilt apart from any inference regarding his flight. Any error that may have occurred in granting the flight instruction does not rise to the level of reversible error. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the flight evidence and instructions, or to the extent that any error was committed, it was harmless error, consistent with our holding in Mack. This issue is without merit.