Opinion ID: 508427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 19 Given the absence of any eleventh amendment obstacle to our assertion of jurisdiction in this case, we now turn our attention to the merits of Farid's appeal. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Where, as here, the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the non-moving party (Farid), the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy his burden of production under Rule 56 in either of two ways: (1) by submitting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim, or (2) by demonstrating that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2557, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). We conclude that summary judgment was appropriate in the present case only if appellee either negated an essential element of Farid's due process and first amendment claims, or demonstrated that the evidence submitted by Farid was insufficient as a matter of law.
20 To resolve a procedural due process claim, a court must determine whether the plaintiff was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process he was due. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1153, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). To determine the nature of the process due a court must consider (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Jones & Laughlin Pension Plan v. LTV Corp., 824 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir.1987). 21 Turning first to the element of deprivation, we note that mere negligence does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the fourteenth amendment. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664-65, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). In the present case, however, Farid is challenging the policy that gave him the choice of having his property sent away pending the filing of a grievance complaint, or having it destroyed. Since the promulgation of this policy was an intentional act, it seems evident that Farid has suffered a deprivation. Similarly, there can be no dispute that Farid had a property interest in the items confiscated, even if some of them were of minimal value. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) (hobby kit worth $23.50, lost in a prison mailroom before reaching inmate, fell within definition of property for fourteenth amendment purposes), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662. 22 Turning next to the element of process, we note that Farid has submitted evidence indicating (1) that package room officials forced him to choose almost immediately whether certain items alleged to be contraband should be sent away, donated to charity, or destroyed; and (2) that subsequent to each incident Farid filed post-deprivation grievance petitions which were routinely denied. Therefore, the issue before the district court was whether a rational jury could infer from this evidence that Farid was accorded insufficient process under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. The district court did not address this issue, but rather held that Farid was accorded due process because Attica's regulations give inmates thirty days to decide how to dispose of alleged contraband items. However, the only evidence that Attica has such a policy is to be found in the addendum to appellee's memorandum of law in support of his motion for summary judgment. Without addressing whether this addendum was properly before the district court, it suffices to note that the addendum only describes prison policy as of November 28, 1984. As a result, the only evidence of Attica's mailroom policy during the earlier time period at issue in this case was the evidence submitted by Farid, as described above. We realize, of course, that prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Nevertheless, given the current state of the record, we are constrained to remand with instructions that the district court consider whether the evidence submitted by Farid on the issue of due process is sufficient under Mathews v. Eldridge to withstand Smith's motion for summary judgment.
23 Although prison inmates retain some protections afforded by the first amendment, prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977)). Therefore, a prison regulation that impinges on inmates' constitutional rights may be valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Id. In the present case, however, Smith has yet to articulate with record evidence a legitimate penological interest in denying Farid the Tarot books and the cassette tape. The district court reasoned that the deprivation of the cassette tape was justified because (1) the tape was not commercially made, sealed, or received directly from the company; and (2) unsealed tapes might contain information relating to proposed escapes. This justification may very well be true, but the superintendent has not yet produced any evidence that the tape did not conform to regulations; his memorandum of law in support of summary judgment states that the tape did not conform, and sought to have the district court accept this unsworn statement as true, which it did. In absence of any evidence that the tapes were nonconforming, the court could not have concluded that the deprivation of the books and cassette was permissible under the first amendment. 24 On appeal, Farid also claims that the deprivation of the Tarot cards violated his first amendment right to freedom of religion. We do not believe, however, that Farid has properly pleaded or presented any evidence that the deprivation of the Tarot cards violated such a first amendment right. To assess a free exercise claim, a court must determine (1) whether the practice asserted is religious in the person's scheme of beliefs, and whether the belief is sincerely held; (2) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials infringes upon the religious belief; and (3) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials furthers some legitimate penological objective. Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (6th Cir.1987); Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d 338, 342-43 (8th Cir.1985). Because Farid has neither alleged nor submitted any proof that he sincerely holds to any religious belief that mandates the use of Tarot cards, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate on the free exercise claim.
25 As a general rule, state officials are shielded from liability for civil damages in Sec. 1983 actions insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In the present case, the district court ruled, in the alternative, that Smith was protected from liability because he had acted in good faith. It is not clear, however, whether the court meant that Smith had demonstrated objective good faith, in the sense that he did not violate clearly established law, or subjective good faith, which is not relevant to the issue of qualified immunity. On remand, the court should consider whether Smith violated clearly established law. The court should consider, among other things, the extent to which, if at all, the article 78 judgment reflected law that was already clearly established, or itself clearly established the law relating to inmates' due process rights. We express no opinion on this matter.