Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Denial of Request for Further Removal

Text: Because of what he perceived as extensive publicity surrounding his case, Grandison requested an additional removal; lacking this, he wanted a continuance; and in the absence of either, he moved to have the jury sequestered. He also sought the impaneling of a new group of jurors. The trial judge denied all of these requests. Grandison now complains that he was denied a fair trial. We disagree. In Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985), we had occasion to address this identical issue when Evans raised it in the Circuit Court for Worcester County where he was being tried. The reasons cited by Evans are the same, basically, as those cited by Grandison. What Judge Eldridge wrote for the Court there is equally applicable to Grandison's argument here and is dispositive of his contention. Judge Eldridge stated in part: We hold that the record supports the decision of the trial judge to deny the request for further removal. We have consistently taken the position that this question is one which rests within the trial court's discretion, reviewable on appeal only to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. at 511-12, 499 A.2d at 1273-74 (citations omitted). Accordingly, we herein conclude that the denial of the request for further removal did not amount to an abuse of discretion under Maryland law. The same can be said of the trial court's denial of a continuance. It is beyond dispute that the determination of whether to grant a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 514, 499 A.2d at 1275. Here, we find no evidence of abuse of that discretion. Similarly, the determination to have the jury sequestered throughout the trial is discretionary. Former Md. Rule 751 e (now Md.Rule 4-311(c)); Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, § 8-304; see Evans, 304 Md. 487, 499 A.2d 1261 (1985). Here, too, Grandison has failed to provide us with any indication that there was an abuse of discretion. There is no proof of juror prejudice. To the contrary, the jurors received daily admonitions against exposure to publicity. Finally, Grandison's contention that a new jury should have been impanelled due to alleged discussions connecting him to the Mafia is completely without merit and foundation in the record. Any possibility of prejudice resulting from those rumors was adequately cured by the trial court's individual questioning of the prospective jurors. Consequently, there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion here.