Opinion ID: 400070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the Approach and Direction of a Question a Seizure?

Text: 32 As noted above, a seizure occurs when a police officer, by force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen. Whether a restraint has occurred is determined, in turn, by reference to the mind of a reasonable person. Combining the two standards, the ultimate issue is not merely whether a reasonable person confronted by an inquisitive police officer would not feel free to walk away, but more precisely whether such conduct constitutes a show of authority that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he is not free to go. 33 As a threshold matter, we must recognize that a reasonable person is willing, on occasion, to cooperate with the police. A reasonable person is aware, we believe, of the duties of law enforcement officers not only to apprehend criminals, but to keep the peace and, where possible, to prevent the commission of crime. This awareness, coupled with feelings of civic duty, 12 moral obligation, or simply proper etiquette, will often lead a reasonable person to cooperate with law enforcement officers. 13 Because a variety of factors may contribute to a person's decision to acquiesce to an officer's request, we are unwilling to impute to the reasonable person, as his sole motivation, a fear of official sanction engendered by the mere presence of an authority figure. 34 It is not argued that an officer's request for the time of day or for information concerning the identity of a lost child would constitute a show of authority sufficient to result in a seizure. Nor is it suggested that in emergency situations an officer may not request aid or information from a pedestrian without seizing him. Even appellees concede that an officer may approach and question a potential witness without a seizure occurring. 14 In all the foregoing circumstances, there is a police-initiated encounter where a reasonable person stops and answers questions, not out of fear of the police, but in a spirit of cooperation. 35 The need for questioning as a tool for the effective performance of law enforcement duties is undisputed. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2046, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Indeed, even a person who has been detained by the police is not presumed to be unwilling to cooperate. The Supreme Court has so held in the context of consent searches. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1879, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. at 2058. 36 Accordingly, the presence of the officer as a figure of governmental authority does not, by itself, constitute the show of authority necessary to make a reasonable person feel unfree to leave. There must be some additional conduct by the officer to overcome the presumption that a reasonable person is willing to cooperate with a law enforcement officer. 15 The approach and direction of a question by a police officer cannot be, as a matter of fact or of law, a seizure of the person so approached. 37 B. Is a Police Request for Identification a Show of Authority that Restrains a Pedestrian? 38 The more difficult question we confront in this case is whether the nature of the identification question itself, combined with the fact that the questioner is a police officer, cumulatively creates a sufficient show of authority to constitute a seizure. We hold that the nature of this question alone, without reference to the demeanor of the officer, the tone of voice used, or any other circumstance, cannot convert an otherwise inoffensive encounter into a seizure. 39 That a request for identification does not, in all cases, constitute a seizure follows from our analysis in the preceding section. It cannot be disputed that in the course of interviewing potential witnesses police routinely request identification information as well as information concerning when and where a potential witness was at a particular time-often at the time a crime was committed or shortly thereafter. Appellees have not suggested that they, as mere pedestrians, possess a greater right to be free from police questions concerning identification than a person on the street who may have happened to witness a crime. 40 Moreover, in Wylie this court found that no seizure occurred when an officer approached a person and asked questions, including a request for identification. Although that decision is not dispositive of the case at hand because Wylie involved the application of the seizure test to specific facts, it must be accorded substantial precedential value. Appellees' argument that this court did not pass upon the constitutionality of a contact or the facial validity of that portion of General Order 304.10 in Wylie is disingenuous. As noted above, the finding that the officer's initial conduct did not constitute a seizure was necessary to our holding in Wylie. See page 140, supra. That finding, in turn, necessarily implied that the contact portion of General Order 304.10 was not facially invalid. See Wylie, 569 F.2d at 67-68. 41 Appellees attempt to distinguish the contacts of which they complain from other police-citizen encounters by contending that when an officer's questions focus on the pedestrian -when the officer approaches a pedestrian on the public street, asks for identification or an account of behavior and records the response on a police form-the pedestrian does not feel free to leave and therefore has been seized. Brief for Appellees at 14 (emphasis added). Whether a seizure occurs when a question focus(es) on the pedestrian and the officer records the response is, of course, not the issue in this case. The recording of responses adds a factual circumstance not encompassed by the district court's order. 16 Moreover, the distinction that appellees attempt to make does not withstand analysis. 42 Whether the question asked focuses on the pedestrian cannot be raised to the level of a legal standard, for a request for identification surely focuses on the person asked whether it be a witness to a crime, a person in distress, or a mere pedestrian. The nature of the question becomes relevant only when viewed in the context of surrounding circumstances. Appellees' true concern appears to be with the officer's subjective focus on the pedestrian. In order to provide a workable rule, this court applies an objective standard; accordingly, the intent of the officer or the reason behind his decision to approach a pedestrian cannot be the basis upon which we determine whether a seizure has occurred. 17 This is not to say, however, that a reasonable person will not feel more intimidated when it appears that he is the subject of a police inquiry. 43 The nature of the question asked is a proper factor to be considered in determining whether a seizure has occurred. Nonetheless, we are unwilling to state a categorical rule that a request for identification always constitutes a seizure. 18 Such a rule would prevent an officer from legitimately seeking citizen cooperation, particularly from potential witnesses. 44 An officer's request for identification, phrased in precatory terms and standing alone, simply is not a show of authority. It may be that such a request, coupled with other factors, could amount to a seizure-this we cannot determine until presented with a factual background sufficient to render such a judgment. All the facts and circumstances surrounding a police-citizen encounter must be considered-not merely a single question. 45 It is inevitable that in the future both the district court and this court will be called upon to determine whether a particular police-citizen encounter involved an arrest, a stop, or a contact. As we have stressed, such a determination must be considered on the basis of all the circumstances surrounding the encounter. In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart suggested that a show of authority might include the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. (Opinion of Stewart, J.). In assessing whether a particular police-citizen contact results in a seizure, we believe that the demeanor of the approaching officer, the tone of voice used, the nature of the questions asked, and the time and place of the encounter are among the factors to be considered. The reviewing court must examine the totality of the circumstances and apply its informed judgment to the situation. 46 On this score, we note that resolution of the seizure question would be a far easier task if the approaching officer clearly informed the subject that he was free to leave and need not answer any questions or produce identification. Such a warning or statement is not, of course, constitutionally required. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Although in many cases no single factor can be considered determinative, such a statement would add substantial weight to the argument that a reasonable person, so informed by the police, would have felt free to leave. In view of the persistent problems and continuing litigation police contacts with citizens in the District of Columbia have caused, we strongly recommend that the MPD include this statement in its contact procedure and policy. 47 In sum, we hold that a request for identification cannot constitute, as a matter of law, a show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter into a seizure. The contact portion of General Order 304.10, which authorizes no more, is not facially invalid. 48 C. Does the MPD Practice Warrant the Injunction? 49 Final resolution of this appeal requires us to determine whether the injunction entered by the district court is justified notwithstanding our decision on the seizure issue. In order for the injunction to stand, we must find that the record before the district court was sufficient to support a finding that the practice of MPD contacts is carried out in violation of the fourth amendment. Appellees alleged before the district court that the MPD stopped pedestrians under the guise of contacting them and that stops were effected without a reasonable articulable basis for suspecting criminal conduct. The Chief of Police denied both allegations. Because this issue concerns material facts which are vehemently disputed, the issue is not an appropriate one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Accordingly, we must vacate the order and remand the case to the district court. 50 On remand the district court is directed to hold further proceedings to determine whether the MPD practice of contacting pedestrians is carried out in disregard of their fourth amendment rights. The affidavits filed in support of appellees' motion for summary judgment show that at least some MPD officers engage in conduct that travels far beyond asking a simple question. 19 Moreover, we find other aspects of the contact practice disturbing. Among our concerns is the use of PD Form 76 cards during contacts. The district court should consider whether the recording of detailed personal information 20 during a police-initiated encounter, coupled with the officer's presence and the nature of the questions involved, may constitute a show of authority sufficient to transform the encounter into a seizure. 51 Although the contact portion of the General Order provides that (i)f they refuse to cooperate, (pedestrians) must be permitted to go on their way, General Order at 2; J.A. at 485 (emphasis in the original), we are also concerned with the extent to which MPD officers may use a pedestrian's silence or refusal to cooperate during a contact as the sole basis for finding reasonable suspicion to stop that person. If an officer can detain a person, by force if necessary, simply because that person exercises his right to refuse to cooperate or answer questions, his freedom to walk away is indeed no freedom at all. This is not to say, of course, that officers may not consider a pedestrian's answers or reactions during a contact, in conjunction with other factors, as an element contributing to the conclusion that there is a reasonable suspicion that the pedestrian has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. 21 Accordingly, on remand the district court should also consider whether the MPD impermissibly uses a pedestrian's silence or refusal to cooperate during a contact as the sole justification for seizing that person. 22 52 If it is found that the MPD engages in conduct, masquerading as contacts, that results in the seizure of pedestrians without an articulable basis, the court shall determine whether there exists in the District of Columbia a pervasive pattern of such unconstitutional conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). If such a pattern exists, the court must determine what relief is warranted by the scope of the violation. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 378; Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (1974). The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). Some limited prophylactic measures might suffice to cure whatever unconstitutional practice may exist, with less intrusion into legitimate police functions than a blanket injunction of the type issued below. Before imposing another judicial remedy, the court should also consider the effectiveness of any official corrective actions taken as a result of this opinion. See Washington Mobilization Committee v. Cullinane, 566 F.2d 107, 130 (D.C.Cir.1977) (statement of Leventhal, J.).