Opinion ID: 2978028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Evidence at the First Hearing

Text: Myrtaj claims that admission of certain evidence violated his due process rights. He claims that the IJ should not have admitted the reports of the officers who questioned him on the day of the incident at the border because of discrepancies as to when the reports were written, and because the officers questioned him in English. This claim is quite doubtful. We noted in Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 406-07 (6th Cir. 2005), that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to immigration proceedings, so appellate courts review IJ evidentiary rulings only to ensure that IJs do not violate due process. Admission of the challenged evidence was not fundamentally unfair because the statements petitioner reportedly made were substantially the same as the statements petitioner made in the interview that was conducted with the aid of an interpreter. C. Myrtaj Admitted Facts Establishing His Offense To make its case, the Government had to prove that Myrtaj “knowingly [had] encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in -7- No. 08-3884 Myrtaj v. Holder violation of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i). Myrtaj argues that the Government’s evidence was not sufficient to prove this. But his own admissions at the hearing show otherwise. Myrtaj testified at the hearing that he knew that his brother could not legally enter the United States. Myrtaj also knew that his brother wanted to enter the United States illegally before Myrtaj went to Canada to meet his brother. Myrtaj admitted that he drove his brother to the border knowing that the brother was going to try to enter the United States illegally. And Myrtaj admitted that if his brother had phoned him after illegally crossing the border, Myrtaj would have picked his brother up. Even though Myrtaj refused to give further aid to his brother, Myrtaj gave sufficient “aid” and “assist[ance]” to fall within the proscription of the statute. Transporting someone to and from the border can facilitate illegal entry even if the alien smuggler keeps his distance during the actual crossing. Tupucu, the case on which Myrtaj mainly relies, is not to the contrary. There we held that “openly presenting an alien to border officials with accurate identification and citizenship papers” did not amount to a violation of the anti-smuggling statute. 399 F.3d at 737. The IJ had attempted to exclude the alien in that case because the alien was driving the van in which the would-be illegal immigrant was riding, the alien knew the attempted immigrant had been living in the United States, and the alien did not correct the attempted immigrant’s misstatement to border officers. Id. at 738. We vacated and remanded because the alien thought the attempted immigrant could legally reenter the United States. Id. at 739. We noted that the group made “no effort to cross the border at a place -8- No. 08-3884 Myrtaj v. Holder where there were no border guards.” Id. Myrtaj’s brother, on the other hand, did attempt a secretive crossing. Myrtaj’s complaint that the IJ did not make a credibility finding with regard to his testimony is thus largely irrelevant. His testimony, if fully credited, supports the Government’s position. The evidence supporting Myrtaj’s removability for alien smuggling is sufficient. D. Asylum Claim—Past Persecution, Future Persecution, and Changed Country Conditions Myrtaj argues that the 1991 arrests and beatings by the Albanian government amount to past persecution. Assuming for the sake of argument that Myrtaj had established past persecution based on the 1991 arrests/beatings (contrary to the findings of the IJ and BIA), Mytraj’s claim for relief nonetheless fails because the Government showed that conditions have changed in Albania. A showing of past persecution creates a presumption that Myrtaj would be subject to future persecution in Albania. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). However, a showing of changed country conditions rebuts that presumption. Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). The record supports the IJ’s findings that conditions have changed in Albania since 1991. A Department of State report released in 2006 noted that the 2005 elections “did not fully comply with international standards . . . but were generally considered a step forward in the country’s democratic development.” While that report notes allegations of police beating of detainees, none of the alleged incidents appears to involve police targeting of former democratic party members. Moreover, “[t]here were no reports of political detainees” and “no reports of political prisoners.” In addition, “[i]ndividuals could freely criticize the government and its actions in print and -9- No. 08-3884 Myrtaj v. Holder broadcasts.” “The law provides for freedom of assembly, and the government generally respected this right in practice.” Myrtaj submitted this report with his application for asylum, and the IJ was entitled to consider it in concluding that country conditions had changed. The IJ could reasonably find that the Government rebutted the presumption of future persecution applicable due to 1991 communist government persecution since the evidence suggested that the democratic government did not engage in or tacitly approve such persecution, particularly of its supporters. For similar reasons, the IJ permissibly found that Myrtaj did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution. The democratic government had taken power, and Myrtaj gave little reason to believe that after a decade out of the country he would be subject to persecution upon his return. Moreover, Myrtaj voluntarily returned to Albania for three weeks in 1999, casting considerable doubt on his supposed fear of returning. Myrtaj’s complaint that the BIA did not allow him to respond to the 2007 State Department report on Albania that it cited in its opinion shows harmless error at most. The cited portions of the 2007 report do not differ materially from the 2005 report that Myrtaj himself entered into evidence. Myrtaj does not explain what aspects of the report he believes to be inaccurate, or how he would have contested them if the BIA had given him a chance to respond. A formalistic remand to allow the BIA to revise its opinion or to give Myrtaj a chance to respond before reissuing the same opinion would serve little purpose. For these reasons, relief with respect to the asylum claim is not warranted. - 10 - No. 08-3884 Myrtaj v. Holder E. Discretionary Asylum Myrtaj also argues for discretionary asylum should he lose “on the removal issue.” He does not explain under what provision of the law he makes this argument. He may be arguing under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11), which gives the Attorney General discretion to waive the application of the anti-smuggling provision that Myrtaj violated, but that provision is only applicable for aliens who hoped to help a “spouse, parent, son, or daughter (and no other individual)” illegally enter the United States. In any event, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes review of this type of denial of discretionary relief. F. Withholding of Removal Myrtaj’s failure to establish eligibility for asylum necessarily means he has failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. See Liti v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 631, 641 (6th Cir. 2005). G. Convention Against Torture Myrtaj’s Torture Convention claim fails largely for the same reasons his claim to fear future persecution fails—he does not establish any reasonable probability that the current government of Albania has any interest in torturing him based on his support of the democratic party in Albania over a decade ago. See Sarr v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 354, 362 (6th Cir. 2007); Ramaj v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir. 2006). The BIA’s finding that Myrtaj did not carry his burden on this issue does not warrant reversal. - 11 - No. 08-3884 Myrtaj v. Holder