Opinion ID: 395207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence Regarding Scott's Willfulness

Text: 67 The final element necessary to the government's case against Scott is evidence of Scott's wilfulness in underreporting his adjusted gross income for 1972. 68 (Willfulness) may be inferred from conduct such as ... making false entries or alterations, or false invoices or documents, ... concealment of assets or covering up sources of income, handling one's affairs to avoid making the records used in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or conceal. 69 Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499, 63 S.Ct. 364, 368, 87 L.Ed. 418 (1943). 70 In this case, the government argued that wilfulness could be inferred from the manner in which Scott handled his financial affairs. Scott, a lawyer and an experienced banker who was once Treasurer of Illinois, invested almost all of his money derived from ordinary and legitimate sources, such as his paychecks or his state travel reimbursements, in high yield interest bearing securities or certificates of deposit. All of these funds were perfectly traceable, and from the evidence, it is obvious that Scott seldom let such funds remain idle, without earning any interest. 71 The very fact that Scott kept any money, regardless of its source, in safe deposit boxes seems out of character for a man who so carefully invested and earned interest on his other funds. The secreting of large amounts of cash in safe deposit boxes can itself be evidence that the cash did not come from legitimate sources simply because of the evident motivation to avoid records. This fact, coupled with his lack of records for living and travel expenses, as well as the unreported but taxable sources the jury could properly find, provides a sufficient basis from which the jury could infer that Scott was wilfully concealing his income. Scott's original defenses to the charges against him, as evidenced by the leads he submitted to the Tax Division of the Department of Justice on March 30, 1979, see Part I-B-4, supra, are further evidence of wilfulness, as the jury could have believed these to be false exculpatory statements, evidencing an intent to mislead or conceal. Id.