Opinion ID: 2350798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was the petitioner denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel's failure to object to testimony and argument regarding the arrest and incarceration of both the petitioner and his brother?

Text: [¶ 7] The petitioner's first ineffective assistance claim involves his trial counsel's failure to keep out of evidence comments about his arrest and his brother's incarceration. Regarding his arrest, the petitioner complains that several witnesses his mother, L.N., and the Livestock Board investigatorall mentioned his arrest in some form during their testimony. L.N. testified, When [the petitioner] showed up to take the horse, he and his significant other, I guess you'd call it, they showed up with a pickup and a trailer, and he showed up to pick them up. Well, he wound up getting handcuffed, arrested and hauled off. The Livestock Board investigator testified: Q. So did you as part of your investigation make any attempt to contact [the petitioner]? A. Yes, we did find out where he was where he was at. Q. And did you go to that location and speak with him? A. Yes, sir. Q. You and [another investigator]? A. Yes. Q. Okay. Where was that? A. The detention center at Goshen County Sheriff's Office. The prosecutor, after questioning the investigator about the contents of his interview with the petitioner, stated, All right. Did that fairly conclude what you spoke of in your interview at the jail with [the petitioner]? Also, the prosecutor referred to the Livestock Board investigator's interview with the petitioner during his opening statement, So once [L.N.] notified the sheriff's office, the animal was taken to the veterinarian, then the Livestock Board was notified, and they conducted an investigation. As part of their investigation they interviewed the defendant while he was incarcerated at the Goshen County Detention Facility. . . . The petitioner's mother, when being questioned about the order of events stated, I didn't. Wait a minute. I don't think I saw him, not till he was arrested. Finally, the prosecutor mentioned the petitioner's incarceration in his closing argument when he said, When did [the petitioner's] brother Pete thing come about? I think the first mention of [it] was when [the Animal Board investigators] went down and interviewed on the 21st, came up here rather and interviewed him in the jail, then all of a sudden there's talk of brother Pete. . . . . Did [the petitioner] simply make up this story of Pete supposedly taking care of the horses? Well, we heard him change one story. When [the Animal Board investigators] talked totalked to him in the jail, they said, How long did you have the halter on there? [¶ 8] Citing W.R.E. 402 [2] , the petitioner asserts that his trial counsel should have objected to the above-quoted testimony because it was irrelevant. The relevance and admissibility of the statements, however, are immaterial inasmuch as we can discern no material prejudice arising from the statements. Dettloff, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 19, 152 P.3d at 382 (An ineffectiveness claim may be disposed of solely on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice.). Indeed, `if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.' Martinez v. State, 2006 WY 20, ¶ 23, 128 P.3d 652, 663 (Wyo.2006) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). To show prejudice, Appellant must prove that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [appellant] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. [ Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, ¶ 20, 180 P.3d 212, 219 (Wyo.2008)]. Stated differently, prejudice means that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the deficiency in counsel's performance, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at ¶ 21, 180 P.3d at 219. Montez v. State, 2009 WY 17, ¶ 3, 201 P.3d 434, 436 (Wyo.2009). As noted above, it is the petitioner's burden to show prejudice. See supra ¶ 6. [¶ 9] The petitioner points to no specific prejudicial effect arising from these statements, but only makes this general assertion: Instead of a fair assessment of [the petitioner], however the jury was presented with the idea of [sic] that he was the kind of person who was `hauled off in handcuffs' and that he came from a family of the same ilk. This vague assertion, without more, is simply inadequate to show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different if not for the admission of those statements. In Foster v. State, 2010 WY 8, 224 P.3d 1 (Wyo.2010), finding no prejudice arising from testimony that the defendant was currently an inmate in jail, we said: By the nature of the case, the jury was aware that the appellant was charged with eleven drug-related crimes. Surely, it was not a big surprise to the jury to find that the appellant had been in jail as a result. We will not presume prejudice, and we therefore cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony. Id. at ¶ 25, at 12. [¶ 10] In the present case, it is apparent that the references to the petitioner's arrest and incarceration were made in passing and as a means of providing context and foundation for other testimony. There was no undue emphasis placed on the petitioner's arrest or incarceration, and there is no indication that the prosecution elicited or attempted to use the testimony for any substantive purpose, such as to impeach the petitioner's credibility or for another purpose impermissible under W.R.E. 404(b). [3] As discussed in Foster, it is doubtful that the jury would have been surprised to hear that the petitioner was arrested for the crime for which he was being tried, and that he was interviewed about that crime while in a detention facility. Finally, we find that any prejudice that might have resulted would have been mitigated by the instruction advising the jury that: Citation in this case is only a formal charge and is not to be considered evidence of guilt on the part of the [petitioner]. Nothing is to be taken by implication against him. We conclude that the petitioner failed to show material prejudice, and as a result failed to show ineffective assistance. [¶ 11] We will briefly discuss the petitioner's claim that ineffective assistance was rendered when his trial counsel failed to object to his brother testifying in a striped prison suit. The petitioner's brother was called to the stand and the following colloquy occurred: Q. . . . . Could you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury your name, please. A. My name is Paul A. Jenkins. Q. And you were a resident at one time of Goshen County? A. Yes. Q. Did you grow up here? A. Yes. Q. Are you brother to [the petitioner]? A. Yes. Q. And, of course, you're Patsy Shimic's son? A. Yes. Q. I understand that you're in a striped jumpsuit there because you didn't pay a fine in Goshen County or A. No, I'm inI'm in Sterling, Colorado now. Q. Okay. A. And I got arrested for domestic violence. Q. Okay. Speak up so everybody can hear you. You said domestic violence? A. Yes. Q. Okay. When was the last time prior to now that you were in Goshen County, Pete? [¶ 12] The petitioner's sole defense at trial was that he had asked his brother to care for the horses. The petitioner's brother testified on behalf of the State and directly denied the petitioner's contention that the brother had agreed to care for the petitioner's horse. Inasmuch as the brother's testimony was directly adverse to the petitioner's defense, we find it to be a reasonable tactical choice not to object to the brother's prison attire and allow any resulting adverse inferences about the brother's credibility. We have said that [t]he burden is upon the defendant to overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the challenged action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial strategy. Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Wyo.1998) (quoting Johnson v. State, 936 P.2d 458, 467 (Wyo. 1997)). The petitioner fails to show how allowing an adverse witness to testify in prison attire is not sound trial strategy, or how he was prejudiced by such.