Opinion ID: 831634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of `qualified privilege'

Text: When these legal principles are applied to the instant case, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to instruct the jury that defendant's statements were entitled to a `qualified privilege.' To begin with, applying a qualified privilege in these circumstances is altogether consistent with the doctrine's underlying purpose of protecting communications that have social value and in which there are significant speech interests. Indeed, the occasions here at which defendant spoke are prototypical occasions to which the qualified privilege was intended to apply. The instant circumstances  a pastor communicating with his flock about a lawsuit that questioned the integrity of a religious practice, threatened to harm the church financially, and damaged the pastor's professional reputation  implicate multiple important social values, any one of which might well support the application of the privilege. First, there is social value and a significant speech interest in communications made by a pastor to his congregation. Specifically, there is value in a pastor's passionate communications about his faith both from the pulpit and in a letter to those under his spiritual direction who similarly care deeply about their faith. The importance of this type of religious expression justifies a modification . . . of the protection normally afforded an individual. Lawrence, 357 Mich. at 138, 97 N.W.2d 719. This is not because the individual's interests are not significant, but because the stakes for society are so consequential. That is, the public has an interest in ensuring that its religious leaders can express their spiritual convictions within the context of the church organization freely and vigorously without [f]ear of large verdicts in damage suits for innocent or merely negligent misstatement, [or] even fear of the expense involved in their defense. . . . Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389, 87 S.Ct. 534, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967). The United States Supreme Court has often referred to this danger of self-censorship as a chilling effect. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 683, 123 S.Ct. 2554, 156 L.Ed.2d 580 (2003) (Breyer, J, dissenting). Religious leaders are entitled to feel passionately about the values and practices of their churches, and they are entitled to communicate these sentiments to those within their churches who are also passionately committed about these values and practices. Defendant testified to the spiritual implications of plaintiff's lawsuit, explaining that plaintiff was accusing the Holy Spirit of slaying her, bringing her injury, and she was accusing the members of our church of not showing her care and concern. That, that would be an issue to the church. While there is no absolute privilege for anything that might be said in this environment, there is a qualified privilege for statements made on such an occasion, and defendant was entitled to have this privilege clearly communicated and explained to the jury. Second, there is social value and a significant speech interest in communications made in the context of litigation. Defendant was not just a pastor speaking about matters of significance to his church and his faith, but he, along with his church, had been named as a defendant in a lawsuit. Civil defendants, like the pastor here, are entitled to respond passionately to litigation directed toward them and toward institutions to which they are deeply attached. They are entitled to be offended by such litigation and to be offended by persons who bring such litigation, and they are also entitled to communicate these sentiments within appropriate channels and on appropriate occasions. They are not limited in their responses to finely-crafted, lawyer-like statements. Concomitantly, a civil plaintiff, by undertaking a lawsuit against another, must expect that a defendant's response will be harsh and critical. They must expect that a defendant will take such lawsuit personally. The legal backdrop of this case is an important factor in the balancing of interests that shapes the `qualified privilege' because everything defendant said was directly and exclusively related to plaintiffs lawsuit, and it was in communicating about this lawsuit in his own idiom that defendant was subjected to even greater liability. The public has an interest in ensuring that parties to litigation can express views about the merits of a lawsuit in good faith and on a proper occasion without fear of exposure to additional liability. Moreover, the particular lawsuit in this case carried substantial financial implications for defendant's church, and presumably for defendant's continued association with that church. Defendant was in a position analogous to a CEO of a company subject to a lawsuit, who not only has a legal duty to report liabilities to his shareholders, including exposure to damage awards, but also, to the extent he believes appropriate, to explain and justify his management. See Hollowell v. Career Decisions, Inc., 100 Mich.App. 561, 575-576, 298 N.W.2d 915 (1980) (defendant-corporate officer was entitled to a `qualified privilege' in the statement made at the board meeting regarding the performance of [the company]). Once again, while there is no absolute privilege for anything that might be said in this environment, there is a qualified privilege for statements made on such an occasion, and defendant was entitled to have this privilege clearly communicated and explained to the jury. Third, there is social value and significant speech interests in communications meant to defend one's professional reputation. This is particularly true for a member of a profession, such as is defendant, which is dependent on a person's moral standing and integrity within the community. Plaintiff's lawsuit directly called into question defendant's professional prerequisites to be the pastor of his church. Thus, it seems entirely appropriate for defendant to try to defend his reputation by forcefully presenting his side of the story to those in the church who are essentially his employers. Yet again, while there is no absolute privilege for anything that might be said in this environment, there is a qualified privilege for statements made on such an occasion, and defendant was entitled to have this privilege clearly communicated and explained to the jury. I emphasize that the two occasions on which the statements in controversy were made here are exactly those contemplated as justifying the `qualified privilege' in the first place. On the first of these occasions, defendant spoke from the pulpit at a leadership rally that was a regularly scheduled event attended by the lay leadership of his church. On the second occasion, he wrote a letter to a church prayer group for the purpose of eliciting prayers for the church. These occasions consisted of regular and ordinary occurrences in the life of the church. Defendant did not invent these forums for the purpose of making defamatory statements about plaintiff, and there is nothing surrounding these circumstances to suggest that his statements were not sincerely-felt and made in good faith. Moreover, at these occasions, the interests of the speaker and of the audience were perfectly aligned. That is, defendant did not make his statements to passers-by on the street, or to the Lansing State Journal, or a television program watched by people having no direct interest in the lawsuit. Rather, he communicated only with people who shared a deep commitment to the church's religious practices, its financial well-being, and its standing in the community. When we apply the governing rule that the privilege is determined by the occasion and not the language used, Westerhouse, 215 Mich. at 299, 183 N.W. 711, it is incomprehensible how these two events could not be deemed occasions subject to a `qualified privilege.' The trial court did not reach this same conclusion because it did not engage in a proper analysis of whether the occasions at issue were privileged by considering the totality of the circumstances, the whole stage as it were. Lawrence, 357 Mich. at 139, 97 N.W.2d 719. Instead, it was distracted by inquiries concerning the audience, specifically treating as dispositive whether the audience included only church members, and whether these members were all truly decision makers. While the nature of the audience constitutes an important consideration in determining the existence of a `qualified privilege,' none of the cases in which this privilege has been recognized in a church-related setting has engaged in these kind of inquiries. See e.g., Van Vliet, 290 Mich. at 367, 287 N.W. 564 (statements subject to `qualified privilege' even though they were disseminated beyond local church members and beyond church decision makers). I respectfully believe the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the privilege did not apply and in failing to instruct the jury on this defense.