Opinion ID: 1676576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Lay Appeal

Text: In his appeal, Mr. Lay asserts that the trial court erred in awarding medical expenses because the terms of the separation agreement between the parties were not set forth in full in the dissolution decree. Alternatively, he contends that the terms of the separation agreement regarding medical expenses were overly vague and indefinite such that the court was without jurisdiction to enforce it. Mr. Lay first maintains that the trial court erred by enforcing the extraordinary medical expense provision of the separation agreement because the terms of the agreement were not fully incorporated into the dissolution decree. The argument is without merit. In 1974, the General Assembly specifically authorized the use of separation agreements as part of the Dissolution of Marriage Act. Section 452.325, RSMo 1994, which governs the terms required in an agreement and the enforcement of such agreements, reads in pertinent part: 4. If the court finds that the separation agreement is not unconscionable as to support, maintenance, and property: (1) Unless the separation agreement provides to the contrary, its terms shall be set forth in the decree of dissolution or legal separation and the parties shall be ordered to perform them; or (2) If the separation agreement provides that its terms shall not be set forth in the decree, only those terms concerning child support, custody and visitation shall be set forth in the decree, and the decree shall state that the court has found the remaining terms not unconscionable. Prior to the enactment of the Dissolution of Marriage Act, a separation agreement to provide support such as the one in this case was enforceable only in a separate action under traditional contractual remedies. In contrast, under the statute and absent an expressed intent to the contrary, [u]nless the court finds the terms of the agreement to be unconscionable, they are binding on the court ... [and] are to be incorporated into the court's decree. Haggard v. Haggard, 585 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Mo. banc 1979). Neither the agreement nor the decree in this case provides an expressed intention to prevent the agreement from being incorporated into the decree. The trial court at dissolution found the agreement was not unconscionable and specifically ordered Mr. Lay and Ms. Grace to perform, execute and do each and all of those things required in the Separation Agreement. The terms of the agreement were, therefore, enforceable by all remedies available for the enforcement of a judgment.... § 452.325.5, RSMo 1994. Mr. Lay alternatively contends that the language of the separation agreement regarding his obligations for the children's extraordinary medical expenses is overly vague and incapable of ascertainment. The provisions in the incorporated agreement regarding medical expenses are as follows: 6. Medical Insurance and Expenses. The Non-Custodial Parent shall maintain, either through his place of employment or independently, a hospitalization insurance policy covering the minor children of the parties during the period of his support obligation. The Non-Custodial Parent shall further be responsible for all extraordinary medical, dental and hospital expense required for said minor children. Extraordinary for the purposes of this Agreement shall be defined as anything not covered by the Non-Custodial Parent's hospital insurance and, in addition, any medical expenses incurred on behalf of the minor children which exceed twenty dollars ($20.00) per month, per child, per illness. The Custodial Parent agrees to confer with the Non-Custodial Parent before incurring orthodontist expenses. Mr. Lay argues that, because the phrase medical, dental and hospital expense was not defined in either the agreement or the decree, the provision is indiscernibly broad and the trial court's judgment is, therefore, unenforceable. In support of his contention, Mr. Lay cites to Rodden v. Rodden, 527 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App.1975), which holds that a judgment, to be enforceable, must be sufficiently definite to be determined precisely by ministerial officers, without a hearing or the consideration of extrinsic evidence. In Rodden the court held as unenforceable a divorce decree provision requiring that the noncustodial parent pay all extraordinary medical expenses. Rodden, 527 S.W.2d at 43. Noting the general rule that a money judgment must specify with certainty and definiteness the amount for which it is rendered without necessitating external proof, the court held that the provision was too indefinite to be enforced. [The] plaintiff would be required to bring in external proof of specific extraordinary medical expenses, thereby making the provision void. Id. at 44; see also Brolinson v. Brolinson, 564 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Mo.App.1978) overruled in part by Payne v. Payne, 635 S.W.2d 18, 22 (Mo. banc 1982) ([Dissolution decree] must be in such form that the clerk may issue an execution upon which an officer is able to execute ... without requiring external proof and another hearing.). The rationale of Rodden has been undermined and discredited by subsequent case law. This Court, in Payne v. Payne, 635 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. banc 1982), rejected a similar argument in the context of a maintenance and support provision within a separation agreement, which was subsequently incorporated into a dissolution decree. The decree in Payne incorporated by reference a settlement agreement between the parties requiring that the husband pay $120.00 weekly to wife for support and maintenance, plus 15% of the sum of husband's total income for the preceding year.... Id. at 20. The wife received a contempt judgment against her former husband for failure to comply with the dissolution decree. On appeal, the husband argued that the judgment was void and unenforceable for the reason that the original decree was based on a contingency and no execution on the judgment could proceed without external proof of the exact amount due. Id. at 21. Although the terms of the agreement in Payne were uncertain on its face, this Court found that the Dissolution of Marriage Act permitted a trial court to consider external evidence to determine the exact amount due, expressly adopting the reasoning of Bryson v. Bryson, 624 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo.App.1981). Payne, 635 S.W.2d at 22. In upholding as enforceable a facially uncertain maintenance provision, Bryson rejected the line of cases holding a dissolution decree void and unenforceable if it is indefinite or uncertain. Bryson, 624 S.W.2d at 96. Instead, the Bryson court held that, if a maintenance provision is part of a decree, it is a valid judgment enforceable under the Dissolution of Marriage Act by all the remedies available for enforcement of a judgment. Id. at 96, (citing § 452.325.5, RSMo 1994). By having the parties present evidence of the exact amounts due under the terms of the incorporated agreement, [t]he trial court may upon motion determine the exact amount due in accordance with the agreement of the parties, and then, upon proper application proceed to enforce the judgment. Payne, 635 S.W.2d at 22, (quoting Bryson, 624 S.W.2d at 98). Although Bryson involved a maintenance decree, this Court later specifically extended its rationale to child support awards. Toomey v. Toomey, 636 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Mo. banc 1982). Under Toomey and Payne , if a dissolution decree's terms are uncertain or lack specificity on their face and either a settlement agreement is incorporated into the decree, such that a motion and hearing would determine the exact amount due, or the decree itself can be made certain through evidence adduced after a motion and hearing, the decree is sufficiently certain so as to be enforceable. Echele v. Echele, 782 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Mo.App.1989). It is clear that the law of this state no longer requires that support and maintenance provisions of dissolution decrees be so definite in amount that extrinsic evidence is absolutely unnecessary. The rationale in Rodden upon which Mr. Lay would have this Court rely is outdated and has been overruled. See Payne, 635 S.W.2d at 22 ( overruling in part Brolinson v. Brolinson, 564 S.W.2d 911 (Mo.App. 1978)). Applying the principles set forth above, this Court must examine the order presently at issue. The term extraordinary is defined within the agreement itself. Disposition of the issue, then, turns upon whether the term medical expenses as used in the dissolution decree provides sufficient definiteness and certainty so as to allow the decree's enforcement. So long as the provision contains criteria from which the court, upon a hearing, can determine without difficulty the obligations of the respective parties, the provision is enforceable. Graf v. Bacon, 800 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Mo.App.1990). When the court of appeals has had occasion to apply the Bryson test to the term medical expenses in a dissolution decree, it has generally held the term too vague and indefinite to be enforced. See, e.g., Hatch v. Hooten, 851 S.W.2d 103, 108 (Mo.App.1993); Rogers v. Rogers, 803 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo.App. 1990). But see Witzke v. Witzke, 662 S.W.2d 873, 874 (Mo.App.1983) (holding provision to pay all medical and dental bills ... not covered by said insurance as clear and neither ambiguous nor uncertain). In Hatch , the court expressed strong reservations about the uncertainty of the nature and scope of the obligation expressed merely by the term medical expenses. Hatch, 851 S.W.2d at 108 (holding under Payne that all medical expenses in a dissolution decree provides no limiting criteria whatsoever.). This Court disagrees with the holdings of the cases finding that the term medical expenses is too vague to be enforced. The term medical expenses in a dissolution decree is subject only to a plain and unambiguous definition, a solution which, under the rationale of Bryson and Payne , is more reasonable and practicable. As the court of appeals stated in this case in the unpublished opinion authored by the Honorable Patricia Breckenridge: Thousands of reasonable average persons have used the words medical expenses in their separation agreements and dissolution decrees, with the intention that it embody the phrase's common meaning. The expectation of such persons in utilizing the words medical expenses in a dissolution decree is not to have conceptualized each particular medical item to be covered, but rather to have generally incorporated items falling within the limiting criteria of such a definition. Inherent in the common understanding of the meaning of medical expenses are logical parameters, namely that they are of, relating to, or concerned with the practice of medicine. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1402 (1966). Medicine is further defined as the science and art dealing with the maintenance of health and the prevention, alleviation, or cure of disease. Id. Everyday usage of the term medical expenses is not the only available standard. The Internal Revenue Code defines medical care in the context of tax deductions for medical or dental expenses: (d) Definitions.For purposes of [section 213] (1) The term medical care means amounts paid (A) for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body, (B) for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care referred to in subparagraph (A), or (C) for insurance ... covering medical care referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B). I.R.C. § 213(d) (1988). The Code excludes from its definition cosmetic surgery directed solely to the improvement of the patient's appearance that does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease. I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Similarly, this Court would construe the term medical expenses to carry with it the implied qualification that the term covers only that conduct that is reasonable and necessary to diagnose, treat, or prevent any ailment or disease that affects the body or a function of the body. Of course, parties are free to define further their medical expense provisions in order to fit more precisely their situations. This Court is confident, however, that everyday usage of the term, supplemented by the Internal Revenue Code's definitions, will sufficiently guide parties on this issue in the future. To require that every dissolution decree set out with precision each and every affliction, injury, procedure, or emergency medical expense needed to be covered by the agreement is unreasonable. Counsel and the trial court should not be required to draft dissolution documents to anticipate and reduce to writing each and every possible childhood ailment or medical procedure that might arise in the future. The nature of the need for medical care is that it is in most instances unpredictable. Neither the parties nor the trial court should be required to incorporate whole medical texts within their dissolution agreements and decrees. This Court holds, therefore, that the term medical expenses provides limiting criteria sufficient for the trial court to determine the parties' obligations, such that the decree is valid and enforceable. To the extent Rodden and its progeny may be read to require more specificity in a medical expense provision within a separation agreement that has been incorporated into a dissolution decree subsequent to the Dissolution of Marriage Act, they are overruled. To the extent Hatch v. Hooten, 851 S.W.2d 103 (Mo.App.1993), and its progeny may be read to conflict with this opinion, they are overruled. [1] The trial court properly applied the plain and ordinary meaning of the decree's language in finding that the expenses claimed by Ms. Grace were in fact extraordinary medical expenses under the separation agreement. The parties' agreement sufficiently complied with enforceable standards.