Opinion ID: 1254971
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Heading: the implied eligibility requirement

Text: AS 16.43.250(d) provides that an individual may cumulate points from two or more fisheries only if the individual has applied for permits from the fisheries. Nash urges us to reject the Commission's interpretation of this language which would require that the individual be eligible to apply. Because the interpretation of this statutory language does not involve the particularized expertise of the administrative agency, we will exercise independent review. See State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Templeton, 598 P.2d 77, 80-81 (Alaska 1979); Union Oil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 560 P.2d 21, 23-24 (Alaska 1977). Subsection 250(d), if considered in isolation, could be read to support Nash's interpretation. However, statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read together as a whole in order that a total scheme evolves which maintains the integrity of each act and avoids ignoring one or the other. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union of Pacific, 585 P.2d 870, 878 (Alaska 1978). Thus, we must consider other provisions of the Limited Entry Act dealing with permit applications in interpreting the applied for language of § 250(d). AS 16.43.260(a) provides that an individual must have participated in the fishery in question as the holder of a gear license before the relevant qualification date in order to submit an acceptable application for a limited entry permit. [4] Thus, in previous cases, we have stated that individuals who do not meet the requirements of this section are precluded from submitting applications. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Alaska 1980); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 361 (Alaska 1976). We conclude therefore that applied for as used in § 250(d) must be read in conjunction with the rest of the Limited Entry Act to mean apply for permits within the eligibility requirements of § 260(a). Any other interpretation would lead to absurd results. It is illogical to suppose that the legislature in enacting § 250(d) intended to reward persons who ignored the threshhold eligibility requirements and filed an application in spite of them. Such an intention would result in favoring those who had ignored the law in preference to others who had followed it. No reason why the legislature might have wished to make such a distinction has been suggested, nor can we think of any.