Opinion ID: 3047130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of Woods’s Statements

Text: Woods argues that his statements during the May 12, 2009 and July 16, 2009 interviews should have been suppressed because the waiver form, which Agent Eversman read and Woods signed, was “confusing, misleading and constitutionally deficient.” Specifically, Woods claims that the waiver form, instead of simply stating that he had the right to have an attorney present during questioning, drew a confusing distinction between a retained civilian attorney and an appointed military attorney. Further, Woods argues that the waiver form’s distinction was incorrect because if Woods faced civilian charges, he would be entitled to an appointed civilian attorney if he could not afford one.7 7 “[W]here there is no factual dispute as to whether Miranda warnings were given, what questions were asked and what answers given, we review the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress de novo.” United States v. Kerr, 120 F.3d 239, 241 (11th Cir. 1997). 15 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Under the Fifth Amendment, statements a defendant makes during a custodial interrogation may not be used against him in court unless the government first advises the defendant of his rights as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630 (1966). United States v. Adams, 1 F.3d 1566, 1575 (11th Cir. 1993). These rights include the right to silence, the right to have an attorney present during interrogation, and if the defendant is indigent, the right to have a lawyer appointed for him. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S. Ct at 1630. The Miranda warnings need not be perfect; rather, the warnings need only “reasonably convey[]” the defendant’s rights. Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1205 (2010); see California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 2809 (1981) (explaining the Supreme Court “has never indicated that the rigidity of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant. . . . Quite the contrary, Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, Miranda applies only to situations of custodial interrogation. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011). The district court never reached the issue of custody, and neither do we. 16 Even assuming arguendo that Woods was in custody on both May 12 and July 16, 2009, and therefore was entitled to Miranda warnings, the waiver forms that Agent Eversman read aloud and Woods signed and initialed reasonably and adequately conveyed Woods’s Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda. As noted above, the waiver forms stated, in relevant part: (3) I have the right to consult with a lawyer prior to any questioning. This lawyer may be a civilian lawyer retained by me at no cost to the United States, a military lawyer appointed to act as my counsel at no cost to me, or both; (4) I have the right to have my retained civilian lawyer and/or appointed military lawyer present during this interview . . . . These warnings expressly apprised Woods of his right to have a lawyer appointed at no cost to him, to consult that lawyer before questioning, and to have the lawyer present during questioning. These statements are consistent with Miranda, which protects a person’s right to “a” lawyer or “an” attorney, but not a lawyer or attorney of any particular type. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 470, 86 S. Ct. at 1216, 1626. Woods cites no case suggesting that Miranda requires more. Although Woods was entitled to a lawyer before and during questioning, he was not entitled to a particular kind of lawyer, whether military or civilian.8 8 As the magistrate judge correctly observed, Woods’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached because formal judicial proceedings had not been instituted against Woods at the time of either the May 12, 2009 or the July 16, 2009 interviews. See United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1569 (11th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we need not discuss whether Woods would have been entitled to the appointment of a particular type of lawyer after he was charged 17 Further, the waiver forms’ statement—that his lawyer may be a civilian lawyer retained by him “at no cost to the United States”—did not make the warnings “confusing” or “misleading.” The forms made it clear that before any questioning took place, Woods could retain his own lawyer or a military lawyer would be provided at no cost to him. See Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1204–05 (holding that warnings “reasonably conveyed” defendant’s right to have an attorney present at all times). In sum, the language of the waiver forms reasonably, clearly and accurately conveyed Woods’s Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda, and the waiver forms’ qualification of Woods’s entitlement to a civilian lawyer does not invalidate the otherwise adequate statements of Woods’s rights.