Opinion ID: 1500978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of the Dietitian and the Nurse.

Text: A part of the application for this insurance is dated August 10, 1932, and therein the insured stated that he was then in good health and free from every disease and infirmity. Another part of the application contained declarations made to the medical examiner of insurer, was signed by the insured, and dated September 27, 1932. This contained his statement, in effect, that except for a skin infection he had not consulted or been treated by any physician for any ailment or disease. In support of its proof of actual fraud, appellee placed several witnesses on the stand for the purpose of showing that insured had been treated for diabetes at the Mayo Clinic at various times during 1932 and before his application was sent to the company. Among these witnesses was Dr. Pollock, who testified from the Clinic records that insured was there on the 23d of March, the 5th of April, 5th of May, 14th of June, 9th of August, 30th of August, all in 1932. An objection to a question asking the diagnosis made as to the insured was sustained, beyond permitting the witness to state that a diagnosis had been made and that at that time the insured had a disease. An offer to prove by this witness what the disease was was excluded. Appellee also introduced the testimony of a dietitian and of a professional nurse, both employed at the Kohler Hospital, which was one of the institutions apparently not owned by the Mayo Clinic but where its patients were treated under instructions given by physicians belonging to the Clinic. The dietitian testified that she carried out the instructions of the Mayo Clinic physicians in regard to diet and in 1932 was taking care of diabetic patients. She testified that in 1932 insured was a member of her diabetic class and, as such, his diet was regulated under her supervision and insulin was given to him from one to three times a day during the time he was under her charge. Also, she testified that insured had consulted with her concerning his diet. This treatment was from March 28, 1932, to April 5, 1932. The nurse testified that, during this same period, she was working in the diabetic kitchen at the hospital; it being her duty to help with the preparation of specific foods for diabetics and to give insulin to such patients. During that period she administered insulin to the insured two or three times a day. She identified a record made by her showing the amounts of insulin so administered. This evidence of the dietitian and of the nurse is objected to as privileged under the state statute (Mason's Minn. St. 1927, § 9814, subd. 4) which reads as follows: A licensed physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of his patient, be allowed to disclose any information or any opinion based thereon which he acquired in attending the patient in a professional capacity and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. At common law, communications between physician and patient were not privileged. O'Brien v. General A., F. & L. Assur. Corp., 42 F.(2d) 48, 51 (C. C. A. 8); Culver v. Union Pac. R. Co., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N. W. 794, 796; Myers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N. E. 547, 549, 550, 24 A. L. R. 1196. In so far as such privilege exists it does so in accordance with statutory requirement and the statute involved is that of the state where the action is tried (Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U. S. 250, 253-256, 5 S. Ct. 119, 28 L. Ed. 708; Mutual Benefit L. Ins. Co. v. Robison, 58 F. 723, 730-732, 22 L. R. A. 325 [C. C. A. 8])  in this instance the above section of the Minnesota statutes. This section, by its language, confines the privilege to a licensed physician or surgeon and does not expressly include nurses or others who administer treatment under direction of such physician or surgeon. The contention of appellants is that the statute should be construed to include such persons in order to give it full effect to protect the privilege intended by the statute. We are thus asked to construe the legislative intent as including not only the specific persons designated in the statute but also those so associated with them in regard to the privileged matter as to give them at least some knowledge of the ailment under treatment. If the question, as thus presented by appellants, were all there were to the matter, there would be considerable force in this contention and statutes of other states upon this same subject have been held to cover nurses, at least in so far as their knowledge was gained from the physician or while attending in the immediate presence of the physician (Culver v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 112 Neb. 441, 199 N. W. 794; Meyer v. Russell, 55 N. D. 546, 214 N. W. 857, and Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Jordan, 164 Miss. 174, 143 So. 483), atlhough there is some authority to the contrary (Wills v. Nat. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 28 Ohio App. 497, 162 N. E. 822, 824). But this subsection of this statute is a part of a section generally treating of competency of witnesses and must be construed as affected by other provisions of the section. This section (section 9814) reads: Every person of sufficient understanding, including a party, may testify in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence, except as follows, which is followed by six subdivisions relating to different matters. The first subdivision deals with husband and wife and names them alone. The third subdivision (amended by Laws 1931, c. 206, § 1) deals with clergymen and names them alone. The fourth subdivision (the one here involved) deals with licensed physician or surgeon and names them alone. The fifth subdivision deals with a public officer and names him alone. The sixth subdivision has to do with persons incapacitated by insanity, intoxication, or otherwise. The second subdivision deals with attorneys, but is not confined to them alone, containing the language nor can any employee of such attorney be examined as to such communication or advice, without the client's consent. Consideration of this entire section, which was enacted as a whole, reveals that persons are to be witnesses in all cases except as therein set forth. Among these exceptions are five where the exception is based upon a privileged relation. In all of these except that dealing with attorneys the privilege is definitely limited to husband and wife, clergyman and parishioner, physician and surgeon and patient, and public officer; while as to attorney and client, it is specifically stated that the privilege shall be extended to cover any employee. It is significant that subdivision 2 (as to attorney and client) is the only one in which there is an extension of the privilege to those outside the privileged relation who might normally acquire knowledge in connection therewith, and also it is significant that as to physicians and surgeons there is no such extension to similar persons such as nurses. Appellee argues, and it seems with telling force, that when the entire section is considered it should not be said that the Legislature overlooked an express extension of subdivision four to cover nurses, dietitians, and others connected with the treatment of a patient under the supervision of a doctor, or that it intended such an extension by the language used. In the only case determined upon a like statutory situation, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit held it would be judicial legislation to construe such a provision in the California Code to cover nurses. Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez, 4 F.(2d) 215, 39 A. L. R. 1416. The well-reasoned opinion of Judge Rudkin in that case is convincing. Appellants contend that the Gomez Case has been virtually overruled by an expression in Wolfle v. United States, 291 U. S. 7, at page 16, 54 S. Ct. 279, 78 L. Ed. 617; but the expression there used was employed merely as an illustration and the case itself involved no such statutory provisions as subdivision 2 of this section 9814. In the Wolfle Case the question involved was whether the testimony of a stenographer who had taken dictation of a letter from a husband to his wife would come within the privileged status. In passing thereon, the court made casual observation about the relation of physician and nurse. This contention must be ruled against appellants.