Opinion ID: 165060
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: causes bodily injury to the victim;

Text: (b) uses or threatens the victim with use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; -10- (c) compels, or attempts to compel, the victim to submit to rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, or forcible sexual abuse, by threat of kidnapping, death, or serious bodily injury to be inflicted imminently on any person; or (d) is aided or abetted by one or more persons. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405(1) (1995). Thus, for rape or forcible sodomy to constitute aggravated sexual assault, the assailant must (1) injure the victim, (2) threaten the victim with a dangerous weapon, (3) threaten the victim with kidnaping, death, or serious injury, or (4) have a confederate. The Utah Supreme Court focused on statements made by Mr. Randolph’s standby counsel during closing arguments at the first trial. According to the court, counsel attacked the State’s proof on the aggravating-circumstances element of the aggravated-sexual-assault charge: First, he [standby counsel] asserted that when Rudolph entered the shower, he no longer had the knife with him; it was sitting on the counter. Second, he pointed out that there was no evidence that Rudolph threatened to kill or harm the victim while he was in the shower with her or during intercourse in the bedroom. Finally, he maintained that the evidence did not show that Rudolph caused bodily injury or harm to the victim during the sexual acts. Rudolph, 970 P.2d at 1232. Hence, the court held, “Rudolph cannot show that the jury necessarily acquitted him of aggravated sexual assault on the basis that he lacked the requisite intent. The acquittal may have been based on the lack of . . . aggravating circumstances. Collateral estoppel therefore did not preclude his aggravated burglary conviction.” Id. -11- Mr. Rudolph’s appointed counsel now contends that the district court could not adequately review the Utah Supreme Court’s application of federal law to the facts of the case without having the complete record from the first trial before it. He argues, “Given that the parties disagreed on the arguments made in the summation, the federal court could not possibly say that the Utah Supreme Court’s conclusion that the summation belied Mr. Rudolph’s argument was objectively reasonable.” Aplt. Supp. Br. at 24-25. Appointed counsel asserts that the district court should have ordered the record from the first trial sua sponte, and that because it did not, this court should remand the case for reconsideration in light of the entire record. We disagree. Mr. Rudolph provided no reason for the district court to view the record. If the Utah Supreme Court accurately described the closing arguments by Mr. Rudolph’s trial counsel, then the collateral-estoppel argument has no merit. Yet Mr. Rudolph did not challenge that description in district court, nor did he challenge in his reply brief on direct appeal of his conviction a virtually identical description of standby counsel’s closing arguments set forth in the State’s answer brief. We have no reason to doubt the Utah Supreme Court’s finding that standby counsel attacked the aggravating-circumstances element. Mr. Rudolph has not even begun to show by clear and convincing evidence, as -12- required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), that the Utah Supreme Court erred in its recitation of facts. According to the rules governing habeas applications under § 2254, it is within the district court’s discretion whether to order transcripts not provided by the respondent. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 5 (“The court on its own motion or upon request of the petitioner may order that further portions of the existing transcripts be furnished . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Simental v. Matrisciano, 363 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2004) (“While the review of a state court transcript is occasionally necessary in habeas cases, it is certainly not required and is, in fact, quite rare.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion here. We conclude, as did the federal district court, that Mr. Rudolph has not demonstrated that the Utah Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law in rejecting his collateral-estoppel argument.