Opinion ID: 1836433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State v. Ward and Wis JICriminal SM-34A

Text: ¶ 50 In the present case, Johnson is not relying on the plain language of the statute because, as demonstrated, he cannot satisfy its requirements for sentence credit. Instead, he is relying on an alternative test: whether a defendant received concurrent sentences and whether those concurrent sentences were imposed at the same time. If this two-part test is satisfied, he argues, any time in presentence custody credited toward one of the concurrent sentences must be credited toward all the concurrent sentences imposed at that time. To support this alternative test, Johnson relies heavily on Ward, the cases following Ward, and Wis JICriminal SM-34A. ¶ 51 The Ward case requires close examination because the facts of the case do not support Johnson's position. The court of appeals stated the facts as follows: Following the revocation of his probation, Houston Ward was sentenced to indeterminate terms of three years incarceration on each of three convictions for delivery of marijuana. The trial court directed that each sentence be concurrent with the others and with a three-year sentence imposed by a different judge in an unrelated case.... The trial court granted Ward 233 days of credit as the result of Ward's pre-sentence incarceration, but applied the credit only to the first of the three concurrent sentences. Ward argues that he is entitled to have the credit applied to each of the concurrent terms.... The state concedes error. We agree, and reverse. Ward, 153 Wis.2d at 744, 452 N.W.2d 158 (internal citation and footnote omitted). ¶ 52 The Ward court thereafter explained that applying pre-sentence credit against only one of the concurrent three-year terms defeats the concurrent nature of the sentence because the first term is reduced to two years and 132 days, while the remaining two terms stand at three full years. Id. at 745, 452 N.W.2d 158. The court then noted that its result was consistent with the conclusion of the Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee, which opined that `When concurrent sentences are imposed at the same time or for offenses arising from the same course of conduct, sentence credit is to be determined as a total number of days and is to be credited against each sentence imposed.' Id. at 746, 452 N.W.2d 158 (quoting Wis JICriminal SM-34A at 11 (1982) (emphasis added)). ¶ 53 Confronted with Johnson's reliance on Ward, the court of appeals went to the briefs in Ward to obtain a more complete statement of the facts. The briefs revealed the following: Houston Ward was arrested on September 19, 1988. At that time, he was on probation for a 1984 conviction for three counts of delivering marijuana. Following his arrest, Ward was charged with delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. On September 20, 1988, a probation hold was placed on Ward. Later his probation on the 1984 conviction was revoked. As a result, Ward was in custody in connection with both the three 1984 marijuana charges and the two 1988 cocaine charges from his arrest until he was sentenced in each of the two cases. ¶ 54 The cocaine sentences came first. On February 7, 1989, Ward pleaded guilty to the cocaine charges, and on each of the two counts, he received a three-year term. The sentences were concurrent with each other, and on both sentences, Ward received credit for 142 days of presentence custody, representing the time he was in custody from September 19, 1988, to February 7, 1989. ¶ 55 On February 9, 1989, Ward was sentenced on the marijuana charges. On each of the three charges, he was sentenced to a term of three years in prison, but the court determined that the three sentences should be concurrent with each other and also with the sentences previously imposed on the cocaine charges. ¶ 56 Ward had spent 91 days in jail before he was placed on probation for the three marijuana charges in 1984. Thus, he was entitled to 91 days of credit on each marijuana sentence. He also was in custody on the probation hold from September 20, 1988, until February 9, 1989, when he was sentenced. All parties agreed that Ward had spent 233 days in custody prior to the sentences on the three marijuana charges. However, the circuit court awarded credit on only one of those sentences. Ward contended that he should have received full credit on all three marijuana sentences. ¶ 57 As noted, the State conceded error. It conceded that Ward was entitled to 233 days of credit on all three marijuana sentences. There was no dispute that Ward was entitled to 142 days of credit on all five sentences in the two cases, but the full 233 days of credit applied only to the marijuana sentences. In his brief, Ward's attorney, Michael Hicks, explained as follows: [I]f the sentence credit were properly allowed on [the concurrent sentences] for the marijuana convictions, then the sentences imposed [in the cocaine case] would control, as they would be the longest concurrent sentences since only 142 days of credit applies on those sentences. Under this computation, Ward still loses the 91 days that he spent in jail in connection with the marijuana cases. However, that is the penalty he must suffer for violating his probation by committing a new crime. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 58 This solid analysis was undercut by the court of appeals when it relied on a passage in the special materials from the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee: When concurrent sentences are imposed at the same time or for offenses arising from the same course of conduct, sentence credit is to be determined as a total number of days and is to be credited against each sentence imposed. Credit against each sentence is required because credit against only one sentence would be negated by the concurrent sentence. Thus, if the credit was not awarded against both sentences, the offender would not receive the credit to which he is entitled. Wis JICriminal SM-34A at 11 (1982) (emphasis added). ¶ 59 This whole paragraph is unfortunate because it is too broad. The Criminal Jury Instructions Committee's use of the word or in the first sentence of the paragraph implicitly creates two distinct theories of sentence credit, only one of which is grounded in Wis. Stat. § 973.155. If the first theory (standing alone) were valid, it would wipe out the need to adhere to the language of the statute. ¶ 60 In Tuescher, the court of appeals referenced Ward's use of this suspect paragraph: The application of the statute is ... relatively straightforward when multiple sentences are imposed at the same time. If the sentences are concurrent, time spent in presentence custody is credited toward each sentence. See State v. Ward .... Tuescher, 226 Wis.2d at 469, 595 N.W.2d 443. This reliance continued in Yanick, 299 Wis.2d 456, ¶¶ 16-18, 728 N.W.2d 365. ¶ 61 The unfortunate paragraph, read in context, is understandable, if not totally accurate. It is followed by an example in which the language about concurrent sentences makes sense: 1. Multiple counts in a single judgment Example Smith was arrested for two burglaries, charged in a two count information, and convicted of both charges on the same day. He spent one year in jail awaiting disposition. He was sentenced to serve five years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently with one another. The judgment of conviction should order that credit is due for 365 days pursuant to § 973.155. When the judgment reaches the prison, the registrar will credit each of the concurrent sentences with 365 days, thus computing the sentences as though they had begun 365 days earlier. Wis JICriminal SM-34A at 9. ¶ 62 This example fully satisfies the statutory requirement that a convicted offender be given credit for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed. Wis. Stat. § 973.155. ¶ 63 Taking the suspect paragraph out of this factual context ignores other explanations and examples in the special materials. To wit: III. Determining the Number of Days for Which Credit is Due Section 973.155(1)(a) requires two determinations: first, whether the offender was in custody; second, whether the custody was in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed. Wis JICriminal SM-34A at 4. 4. Concurrent sentences on unrelated charges for which different amounts of credit are due[.] There will also be situations where the periods of time for which credit is due on unrelated concurrent sentences will not line up with each other. Some credit will be due on one sentence and a different amount of credit will be due on another. If different judges are involved, it will be unlikely that each judge will be aware of the sentence credit situation in the other case when completing his or her own judgment, but the judge imposing the second sentence should try to become informed of the credit awarded against the first sentence. In such cases, the registrars shall properly compute the credit ordered against each sentence. If a defendant is entitled to 10 days of credit on one two-year sentence and 150 days of credit on a concurrent two-year sentence, the registrar will compute each sentence separately and the defendant's controlling sentence will be the two-year sentence with the lesser amount of credit. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). ¶ 64 Properly interpreted, neither Ward nor the special materials leads to the result sought by Johnson. Both the facts in Ward and the examples in the special materials provide support for the court of appeals' interpretation of the statute in this case. ¶ 65 Ward demonstrates that when a defendant spends time in presentence custody and the reason for that presentence custody is in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed, then the time spent in presentence custody must be credited against the ultimate sentence imposed. See Ward, 153 Wis.2d at 744-45, 452 N.W.2d 158 (crediting each marijuana sentence imposed with the same amount of time because those sentences were in connection with the [same] course of conduct). ¶ 66 However, Ward also demonstrates that, in order for time in presentence custody to be credited to the sentence imposed, there must be a factual connection between the presentence custody and the sentence. See id. at 744, 452 N.W.2d 158 (crediting each marijuana sentence with 233 days for time spent in presentence custody, but not crediting the unrelated cocaine sentences with the same 233 days because not all 233 days of presentence custody were spent in connection with the cocaine sentences). Although Ward's cocaine sentences and his marijuana sentences were equal in length, concurrent with each other, and imposed at nearly the same time, Ward's 91 days of presentence custody from his 1984 marijuana arrest were effectively erased because, at the time Ward's marijuana sentences were complete, he still had 91 days remaining on his cocaine sentences. Ward lost out on those 91 days of credit since those days were in connection with only the marijuana cases, not the cocaine cases. [19] ¶ 67 In sum, neither Ward nor the special materials displace the in connection with requirement under Wis. Stat. § 973.155. ¶ 68 It must be acknowledged that, like Houston Ward, Johnson loses credit for 46 days he spent in presentence custody. But he loses this time because he benefits from being given concurrent sentences, thereby reducing the overall amount of time that he might have been required to spend in post-sentence custody. He cannot complain that his unrelated concurrent sentences do not line up perfectly to avoid this loss. The result upholds the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) and ensures that Johnson spends the requisite 365 days in custody for each unrelated sentence imposed. ¶ 69 If we were to decide otherwise and credit each of Johnson's sentences with 54 days, we would be allowing Johnson to spend less than 365 days in custody for each sentence imposed. ¶ 70 While we must ensure that a person not serve more time than that for which he is sentenced, Beets, 124 Wis.2d at 379, 369 N.W.2d 382, we must also ensure that a person actually serves the requisite number of days to which he was sentenced. Our ruling today accomplishes that result.