Opinion ID: 2586480
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Asserted Error in Failing to Define the Special Circumstances

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to define for the penalty phase retrial jury the term special circumstance, to instruct that the special circumstances were torture and mayhem, and to define the terms torture and mayhem led the jury to believe it could double count the special circumstances under section 190.3, factor (a) (factor (a)) in violation of his rights to due process of law, a nonarbitrary and reliable penalty determination, and equal protection under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. As we conclude below, the trial court did not err in instructing the penalty retrial jury regarding its consideration of evidence under factor (a).
The trial court instructed the penalty retrial jury under CALJIC No. 8.84 that defendant had been found guilty of first degree murder and the allegation that the murder was committed under one or more special circumstances had been found true. It then explained under this instruction that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder of the first degree [is] [either] death or confinement in the state prison for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in any case in which the special circumstances alleged in this case have been specially found to be true. Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85, tracking the language of section 190.3, that, in determining penalty, it could consider under factor (a) the circumstances of the murder of which the defendant was convicted and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. The court neither identified nor defined the special circumstances. During voir dire, however, the trial court had told the jury that defendant has been convicted not only of first degree murder, that is, premeditated, deliberate[] killing, but he's also been convicted of murder by torture and mayhem. Also, the prosecutor had informed the jury during his opening statement that defendant had been convicted of first degree murder and special circumstances of torture and mayhem.
Defendant contends that the language of CALJIC No. 8.85, instructing the jury to consider the circumstances of the murder of which the defendant was convicted and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true under factor (a), misled the second penalty jury to believe it could double count the torture and mayhem special circumstances as the circumstances of the crime and the special circumstances found to be true. He further asserts that this instructional error was compounded by the trial court's failure to provide the jury definitions of the torture and mayhem special circumstances. Even though defendant failed to challenge this instruction at trial, his claim is cognizable on appeal to the extent the asserted instructional errors affected his substantial rights. (§ 1259; People v. Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 701.) We therefore consider defendant's claim on the merits. (25) This court already ha[s] determined that CALJIC No. 8.85 does not imply that the jury may `double count' evidence. ( People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 671 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509].) Moreover, we have repeatedly rejected claims that the court was obliged, on its own motion, to instruct the jury not to `double count' the same facts as circumstances of the crime and as special circumstances where the defense did not request an instruction against double counting, and there was no misleading argument by the prosecutor suggesting the same facts should be weighed twice, once under each rubric. ( People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 68 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].) Here, defendant's claim, at bottom, is substantively no different than that presented by the defendant in People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1019 [258 Cal.Rptr. 821, 773 P.2d 172], in which we rejected a claim of instructional error during a penalty retrial involving a nearly identical instruction regarding factor (a) and a multiple-murder special-circumstance finding. On appeal, the defendant argued that, because the trial court did not fully define the special circumstance, the jury could have believed the special circumstance was a separate aggravating factor in addition to the circumstances of the crime under factor (a). Alternatively, the defendant contended the jury could have understood the instruction to permit double counting the multiple-murder special circumstance as both a special circumstance finding and a circumstance of the crime under factor (a). In rejecting these arguments, we concluded the jury reasonably would have understood that the multiple-murder special-circumstance finding made the defendant eligible for the death penalty, and the facts supporting the special circumstance were relevant to its determination of the appropriate penalty. ( Murtishaw, at p. 1019; see also People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 520 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081].) We find no merit to defendant's additional claim that, during penalty phase argument, the prosecutor improperly described Laborde's murder as a purposeful and calculated killing that was committed with brutality and emphasized that defendant had numerous opportunities to abandon his plan to kill Laborde (e.g., when he first poured gasoline on her, when he ignited the gasoline, and when he poured the remaining gasoline on her), because these facts also arguably supported the special circumstances. Our review of the record reveals that each of the prosecutor's references to factor (a) evidence during argument comported with the law. The prosecutor properly explained to the jury that factor (a) concerned [t]he circumstances of the crime . . . we are talking about the crime, the murder of Kar[e]n Laborde, and the existence of any special circumstances. [¶] . . . the entire circumstances of the crime, including how horrible it was, how atrocious it was, and the impact it had on the eyewitnesses. Ultimately, he argued death was warranted because [t]he circumstances of the death of Kar[e]n Laborde under factor (a) are so cruel, so vicious, so intentional, that there is nothing in the world that can possibly mitigate it. Not his mental disorder. . . . Not his upbringing. The prosecutor's argument, therefore, did not mislead the jury into thinking that it should double count the special circumstances.