Opinion ID: 4587326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The offense was committed by means of torture.

Text: First Degree Murder Sentencing Verdict Slip at 1. (R.R. 265). Additionally, on a section of the jury verdict slip titled “SENTENCING VERDICT AND FINDINGS,” under a pre-printed line which read, “The aggravating circumstance(s) unanimously found (is) (are):” the jury hand-wrote the following: (1) The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony (kidnapping). (2) The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony (aggravated assault) (3) The offense was committed by means of torture. Id. at 2. Further, when the trial court requested the jury foreperson to read aloud the aggravating circumstances that the jury found unanimously, the jury foreperson stated: The aggravating circumstances unanimously are. [J-24-2020] - 17 1. The Defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony kidnapping. 2. The Defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony aggravated assault. 3. The offense was committed by means of torture. N.T. 11/15/18, at 1200-01. Appellant suggests that the jury foreperson’s reference to two separate felonies − kidnapping and aggravated assault − in addition to the torture aggravator, indicates that the jury improperly found two Section 9711(d)(6) aggravators, even though the prosecutor sought only one, and/or that the jury improperly considered the (d)(6) aggravator twice when balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We conclude that Appellant has waived this issue for two reasons. First, Appellant did not raise the issue in his Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal filed pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and, second, Appellant failed to lodge an objection to the jury verdict form with the trial court. As noted above, the verdict slip specifically set forth the aggravating circumstances the Commonwealth submitted to the jury, including whether the killing was committed during the course of felony kidnapping, felony rape, felony aggravated assault, and by means of torture. After the trial court charged the jury and provided its instructions regarding the verdict slip, the court asked defense counsel if he had anything to add, and defense counsel did not raise an objection. See N.T. Trial, 11/15/18, at 1188. As we have explained repeatedly, in order to preserve a claim for appellate review, an appellant must comply whenever the trial court orders him to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, and any issue not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived. Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011). Further, Rule 647(C) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “No portions of the charge nor omissions therefrom may be assigned as error, [J-24-2020] - 18 unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C). As Appellant did not challenge the trial court’s jury instructions or the verdict slip before the jury retired to deliberate, he has waived his challenge for this reason as well. See Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 956 A.2d 926, 935 (Pa. 2008) (appellant’s challenge to the submission of the (d)(6) aggravator to the jury was waived because he did not raise an objection thereto). Appellant maintains that the “apparent error by the jury was not discovered by the defense until a review of the trial transcript [was] provided to the undersigned in preparation for this brief.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. However, Appellant and his trial counsel were present in court at the time the trial court instructed the jury, and when the jury verdict was returned. Thus, we reject Appellant’s purported explanation as a basis to avoid a finding of waiver. D. Prohibition on Reading Expert Report During Closing Argument Appellant next contends, in an argument comprising less than one-half page, that the trial court abused its discretion and committed an error of law when it refused to allow defense counsel, in his closing argument to the jury, to “read the opinions of Dr. Nezu from her expert report,” which had been admitted into evidence, and instead limited counsel to “summarizing said opinions.” Appellant’s Brief at 22. Appellant asserts that there is “no rule of evidence or procedure that prohibits the reading of portions of an expert report . . . during closing arguments.” Id. He further suggests that the jury’s purported request during its deliberations to see Dr. Nezu’s report demonstrates that the jury “obviously needed clarification as to her expert opinions on intellectual disability and adaptive functioning.” Id.8 8 In addressing this claim, the trial court noted that, while the jury, during its deliberations, asked, “Could the jury read from the testimony of Dr. Nezu?,” the jury did not, contrary to Appellant’s characterization of the request, ask “for the report, per se, but [rather] the testimony that was elicited during trial.” Trial Court Opinion at 35. [J-24-2020] - 19 A review of the trial transcript reveals the following exchange during the defendant’s closing argument: Defense counsel: The Defendant also introduced the testimony of Christine Nezu. Unfortunately I have to read you some more of her testimony, but she is a professor. She’s not a hired gun. . . . She’s the pure expert in this case, a clinical psychologist. These are psychological issues. What did she tell you in regard to mitigators? I’m reading from page 28 of her report. Please bear with me with regard to the criteria. Prosecutor: Judge, I’m going to object to the report. He can summarize. Court: Slow down a little bit. Defense counsel: I knew that when I started. I’m just going to summarize her report. Prosecutor: Judge, I object to the report. He can summarize her testimony. Court: Okay. Defense counsel: Her testimony -- Court: First of all, Mr. Dawson, the jury will not be getting the expert’s report, but you may summarize her testimony rather than her report. The testimony came from her report. Defense counsel: Thank you, Your Honor. To summarize her testimony which came from the report, Dr. Nezu addressed the mitigators. She told you in her opinion that they were related to the mental deficits that are evident in Melvin Knight during February 2010. Dr. Bruce Wright would have you believe that these mental health issues just went away, were suspended, just weren’t evident in February 2020. Use your common sense. That didn’t happen. Melvin Knight has proven to you by his expert testimony, by a psychological clinician mitigators two, three, four and five. [J-24-2020] - 20 N.T. Trial, 11/15/18, at 1142-44. The trial court, in addressing Appellant’s claim, observed that Appellant did not explain how the court’s requirement that he summarize the expert’s testimony instead of reading the report verbatim prejudiced him, nor did Appellant indicate what information he was unable to communicate to the jury. Trial Court Opinion at 34. The court further noted that Appellant “was not barred from describing Dr. Nezu’s findings, or discussing the ways that Dr. Nezu testified that [Appellant’s] mental deficiencies related to certain mitigating circumstances. Moreover, after the Commonwealth objected, defense counsel plainly stated that his intention was only to summarize the report.” Id. Upon review, we find that Appellant has waived this claim for two reasons. First, Appellant failed to lodge an objection with the trial court with respect to its ruling that he could summarize Dr. Nezu’s testimony, but not read verbatim from her report, and, indeed, as noted by the court below, counsel specifically stated that he only intended to summarize Dr. Nezu’s report. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/28/19, at 34; N.T. Trial, 11/15/18, at 1143 (Defense counsel: “I knew that when I started. I’m just going to summarize her report.”). Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467, 474 (Pa. 2015) (same). Moreover, Appellant fails to explain what evidence he was prevented from conveying to the jury as a result of the trial court’s limitation; thus, he has failed to properly develop his argument, and his claim is waived on this basis as well. See Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1255 n.16 (2013) (undeveloped claim that is not explained factually nor supported by citations to law is unreviewable and waived); Briggs, 12 A.3d at 326 n.34 (undeveloped claim waived). E. Allen Instruction [J-24-2020] - 21 Appellant’s next claim, as set forth in his Statement of the Questions Involved, is that the trial court abused its discretion “in not providing an Allen instruction to the jury” when, after four hours of deliberation, which included approximately one hour during which Appellant’s confession was replayed for the jury, it reported that it was deadlocked. Appellant’s Brief at 3. An Allen9 instruction, which has also been referred to as a “dynamite charge,” is designed to “blast loose a deadlocked jury.” Commonwealth v. Greer, 951 A.2d 346, 376 n.2 (Pa. 2008). In Pennsylvania, these types of instructions are referred to as Spencer10 instructions, and we have described them as “instructions to a deadlocked jury to continue to deliberate, with an open mind to reconsideration of views, without giving up firmly held convictions.” Greer, 951 A.2d at 376. Preliminarily, it appears that Appellant misapprehends the nature of an Allen charge. Indeed, the trial court, upon receiving a note from the jury, instructed the jury as follows: The Court: [Y]ou’re indicating to me that you’re unable at this time to reach a unanimous verdict. Members of the jury, you went out at approximately 1:10 p.m., however you did come back in and listen to testimony, which lasted about an hour, so although you’ve been deliberating for about three hours I’m just wondering if perhaps a little more time would help you? You’ve had the case since 1:10. Obviously, you’re having some difficulty resolving the issues raised in the case. On the one hand, that difficulty is an indication of the sincerity and objectivity with which you have approached your duties. On the other hand, it may be the result of confusion in your minds about the instruction I gave you on the law and about its application to the facts of this case. Mr. Wallace, does the jury require any additional or clarification instructions on the law as it applies to this case? 9 Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). 10 Commonwealth v. Spencer, 275 A.2d 299 (Pa. 1971). [J-24-2020] - 22 Jury Foreperson: Nobody has indicated that, Your Honor. The Court: Okay. You realize, of course, that any verdict you return must be a unanimous verdict. That you have a duty to consult with one another and deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to your individual judgment. Each juror must decide the case for him or herself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors. A juror should not hesitate to reexamine his or her own views and to change his or her opinion if he or she thinks it erroneous. No juror should surrender an honest conviction to the weight or the effect of the evidence because of the opinion of fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. And again, ladies and gentlemen, I know that you have been working hard on this. I’m going to request that you try for at least little longer. It’s important to the Defendant, to the county, to the attorneys, to everyone involved. And again, if it can be done without doing any harm to your honest convictions. Sometimes people can reexamine their views and see it from a different point. Keeping these instructions in mind, I’m going to send you back to the deliberation room and I’m going to ask you to give some further consideration to the evidence and to the charge of the court to see if you can arrive at a verdict. If the court can be of any assistance to you in the effort, I would certainly be happy to oblige. I appreciate if you would put [in] some more effort. N.T. Trial, 11/15/18, at 1196-97. Thus, it appears that Appellant’s true complaint is not that the trial court failed to issue an Allen charge, but, rather, that it erred in doing so. Regardless, we find Appellant’s claim is waived for several reasons. First, although Appellant included this claim in his Statement of the Questions Involved, and makes a one-sentence reference thereto in his Summary of Argument, there is no separate section for this claim in the Argument portion of his brief. As the Commonwealth points out, the Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to divide an argument [J-24-2020] - 23 section of a brief into as many parts as there are to be argued, with each part including a discussion and citation of authorities for the issue raised. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). When an appellant fails to present an argument in support of an issue, the issue is waived. Id. Nevertheless, we note that Appellant’s Brief contains a two-paragraph discussion titled “Questions and Notes during deliberations” immediately following the conclusion of his argument regarding the reading of Dr. Nezu’s expert report. Appellant’s Brief at 22. In the middle of the first paragraph, Appellant asserts that, “[a]fter some four plus hours of deliberation (including the replaying of Defendant’s confession) Defendant requested and was denied that a question be posed to the foreperson whether they were hopelessly deadlocked. This might have resulted in a deadlocked jury and a life sentence.” Id. (citation omitted and emphasis added). Although Appellant maintains, both in the excerpt of his brief quoted above and in his Summary of Argument, that defense counsel asked the trial court to inquire whether the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, and that the trial court denied his request, this Court has reviewed the transcript, and it reveals no such request by defense counsel. Thus, Appellant’s claim is waived because he failed to raise it before the trial court. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); Smith, 131 A.3d at 474 (same). F. Voir Dire Appellant next argues that the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion seeking to employ the Colorado method of voir dire in capital cases constituted an abuse of discretion that warrants a new trial. According to Appellant, [t]he Colorado Method of capital voir dire is a structured approach to capital jury selection that is being widely used in [J-24-2020] - 24 state and federal jurisdictions across the United States. Colorado Method capital voir dire follows several simple principles: (1) jurors are selected based on their life and death views only; (2) pro-life (jurors who will only vote for life) and pro-death jurors (jurors who will only vote for a death sentence) are removed utilizing cause challenges, and attempts are made by both parties to retain potential deathgiving and life-giving jurors; (3) pro-death and pro-life jurors are questioned about their ability to respect the decisions of the other jurors; and (4) preemptory challenges are prioritized based on the prospective jurors’ views on punishment. The Colorado Method of capital voir dire works to create a nonjudgmental respectful atmosphere during jury selection that facilitates juror candor and allows defense counsel to then learn the prospective jurors’ views about punishment for a person guilty of capital murder and eligible for imposition of a death sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 24. In a pre-trial motion, Appellant sought to pose to the jury 18 specific questions, which he asserted were consistent with the Colorado Method of voir dire, in order to “determine their ability to meaningfully consider and evaluate mitigating evidence.” Id. Notably, Appellant does not set forth those questions in his brief to this Court, but simply claims that he “sought Court approval to ask questions of individual jurors” for this purpose, and “should have been able to cite the mitigators he sought in this remanded penalty trial and inquire whether any prospective juror would consider and give meaningful effect to them.” Id. at 24-25. He argues that the trial court’s denial of his request to utilize the Colorado Method of voir dire denied him a “life qualified”11 jury and a fair penalty trial. Id. at 25. In response, the Commonwealth first opines that it is unclear whether Appellant’s pre-trial motion “was a request that the trial court replace entirely any existing voir dire 11 The term “life-qualify” refers to the process of identifying prospective jurors who have a fixed opinion that a sentence of death should always be imposed for a conviction of first-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Smith, 131 A.3d 467, 477 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Le, 208 A.3d 960, 973 n.15 (Pa. 2019). [J-24-2020] - 25 system with the Colorado Method, or whether the motion was a request that the court’s voir dire questions include some variation of each [of] the questions enumerated in the motion.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 22. In any event, the Commonwealth observes that “the trial court ruled on each of the Appellant’s proposed questions individually rather than ruling on the entire motion to employ a particular voir dire method.” Id. In addressing Appellant’s issue in its opinion denying Appellant’s post-sentence motions, the trial court observed that Appellant “does not challenge the denial of any specific voir dire questions, so it cannot engage in a meaningful analysis of why any certain question was granted or denied.” Trial Court Opinion, at 44. The court further noted that Pennsylvania law does not require that a defendant be permitted to utilize the Colorado Method of voir dire. Id. It is beyond cavil that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a defendant the right to, inter alia, an impartial jury, and this right extends to both the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727-28 (1992). In a capital proceeding, “the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment . . . is whether the juror's views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Id. at 728 (citations omitted). The high Court explained: A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror who maintains such views. [J-24-2020] - 26 Id. at 729. In accordance with the above, this Court has expounded: To enable a capital defendant to enforce his [constitutional] right to an impartial jury, he must be afforded an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors: “Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his right to an impartial jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire, the trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.” [Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 729-30]. While this Court has explained that the scope of voir dire is within the sound discretion of the trial court, see Commonwealth v. Bridges, [757 A.2d 859, 872 (Pa. 2000)], the United States Supreme Court has stated that the exercise of the trial court's discretion, and the restriction upon inquiries at the request of counsel, are “subject to the essential demands of fairness.” Morgan, [504 U.S. at 730] (citation omitted). The high Court further held that, particularly in capital cases, “certain inquires must be made to effectuate constitutional protections,” including questions regarding racial prejudice, and questions as to whether a juror's views on the death penalty would disqualify him from sitting, either because the juror's opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent the juror from ever imposing the same, or because the juror would always impose the death penalty following a conviction. Id. at 730-33. Commonwealth v. Le, 208 A.3d 960, 972-73 (Pa. 2019) (footnote omitted). In his brief, Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s denial of any particular voir dire question, but, rather, asserts that he should have been able to cite the mitigators he intended to introduce at his sentencing trial and inquire whether the jurors would “consider and give meaningful effect to them.” Appellant’s Brief at 25. We first note that, at the beginning of jury selection, the trial court went through the voir dire questionnaire with the prospective jurors, question by question. Question 30 provided: [J-24-2020] - 27 In the penalty trial, the decision of whether the Defendant must be sentenced to life or death depends on your weighing any aggravated circumstances proved by the Commonwealth against any mitigating circumstances proven by the defense. Are you confident that you will be able to participate with your fellow jurors in weighing these factors against each other? N.T. Jury Selection, 10/29/18, at 19. Furthermore, the record reveals that counsel was afforded and exercised the opportunity to question the prospective jurors regarding their ability to consider the evidence of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and weigh these factors fairly when determining whether to impose a sentence of life in prison without parole or death. See e.g. id. at 33-34 (“Do you think that you would be able to listen to all the evidence in this case, consider the aggravating circumstances, any mitigating circumstances, and based on that would you be able to render a fair verdict? . . . And would it be possible for you to render a verdict of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole?”); id. at 41 (“During the course of this trial on behalf of Mr. Knight we will be presenting several mitigators that are listed by law. Are you willing to consider those mitigating factors and determine a verdict in his case?”); id. at 113 (“We will be presenting mitigating evidence, the Commonwealth presents aggravating, in favor of a life sentence. Would you be able to consider mitigating evidence fairly?”); id. at 254 (“And you were asked whether you can impose the death penalty. What I would like to ask you is, could you listen to all the evidence of both aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, and if warranted, would it be possible for you to impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.”). To the extent Appellant argues that he should have been permitted to ask jurors whether they would give effect to the specific mitigating circumstances he intended to introduce, this Court previously has rejected this argument. In Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003), the appellant was sentenced to death following his conviction [J-24-2020] - 28 of first-degree murder, rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse. On appeal, the appellant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court denied him the opportunity to “life qualify” the jury during voir dire by restricting him from “questioning potential jurors about specific aggravating circumstances which might cause them to impose a death sentence and specific mitigating circumstances which might cause them to return a sentence of life imprisonment.” Id. at 847. Observing that the appellant failed to identify any instance in which he sought to question potential jurors regarding a specific aggravating circumstance, this Court addressed the three occasions on which the appellant claimed he was precluded from questioning potential jurors concerning specific potential mitigating circumstances, including the appellant's childhood, his character and record of “good deeds,” and “circumstances about [the appellant].” Id. at 847-48. In holding that the trial court did not err in prohibiting the appellant from posing those questions to the potential jury, we explained: The purpose of voir dire is solely to ensure the empanelling of a competent, fair, impartial, and unprejudiced jury capable of following the instructions of the trial court. Neither counsel for the defendant nor the Commonwealth should be permitted to ask direct or hypothetical questions designed to disclose what a juror's present impression or opinion as to what his decision will likely be under certain facts which may be developed in the trial of a case. “Voir dire is not to be utilized as a tool for the attorneys to ascertain the effectiveness of potential trial strategies.” Id. at 849 (citations omitted). We concluded in Bomar that the questions the appellant sought to ask prospective jurors: were intended to elicit what the jurors' reactions might be when and if appellant presented certain specific types of mitigating evidence. The questions were simply not relevant in seeking to determine whether the jurors would be competent, fair, impartial and unprejudiced. Rather, the queries at issue sought to gauge the efficacy of potential [J-24-2020] - 29 mitigation strategies. Moreover, in the face of these inappropriate questions, the trial court asked appropriate general questions which revealed that the jurors in question would consider all the evidence, both aggravating and mitigating, and follow the court's instructions. Id. Thus, we reject Appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to utilize the Colorado Method of voir dire in this case. G. Photos In his next issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to view “several inflammatory graphic color photos of the victim’s bloodied and battered body” during its deliberations. Appellant’s Brief at 25. Appellant argues that the photographs were “irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial,” in that he had “already pleaded guilty to stabbing the victim in the heart” and the photos’ “evidentiary value did not outweigh the likelihood they would inflame the minds and passions of the jurors.” Id. Appellant also alleges that, in denying his request that the photos shown at trial be in black and white instead of color, the trial court failed to comply with this Court’s prior opinion, wherein we vacated his first sentence of death and remanded for a new penalty trial.12 Appellant asserts that the trial court’s admission of color photos at trial 12Specifically, Appellant points to the following language from the majority opinion in Knight, which was authored by Justice Dougherty and joined in full by Chief Justice Saylor