Opinion ID: 734206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Employment as a Nude Dancer

Text: 16 Judd contends that evidence of her prior employment as a nude dancer should have been excluded under Rule 412(a)(2) because it was offered to prove her sexual predisposition. Judd objected to the admission of this evidence both in a motion in limine and at trial and, thus, preserved the issue for appeal. She fails, however, to show that a substantial right was affected by the admission of the evidence. 17 As discussed above, the district court could have admitted evidence of Judd's nude dancing upon a finding that the probative value substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect. The determination under such a balancing test is necessarily highly fact specific. Judd testified that she felt dirty after she contracted herpes. The court determined that Judd's employment as a nude dancer before and after she contracted herpes was probative as to damages for emotional distress because it suggested an absence of change in her body image following the herpes infection. Thus, although we recognize the potentially prejudicial nature of the evidence of Judd's nude dancing, we find that, given the specific facts of this case and the considerable evidence of sexual history and predisposition which were appropriately admitted, the district court could have decided, within its discretion, that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we resolve that Judd has not shown that the court's admission of this evidence constituted reversible error.