Opinion ID: 535710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: motion to suppress evidence obtained in warrantless search

Text: 30 Appellant Leigh Ritch also claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating evidence obtained by the government in a warrantless search of the vehicle he was driving. He argues that the search was made without probable cause, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 31 We review the district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence as a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406 (11th Cir.1988). The district court's findings of fact are viewed under the clearly erroneous standard; its application of the law to those facts is subject to de novo review. Id. at 1408. In considering the ruling on the suppression motion, we construe the facts in the light most favorable the party who prevailed below--in this case, the government. Id. 32 Although a search undertaken without a warrant based upon probable cause generally constitutes a per se Fourth Amendment violation, government agents may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile if (1) there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence which is subject to seizure under law, and (2) exigent circumstances necessitate a search or seizure. Id. at 1409. 33 We thus initially consider whether probable cause existed to search appellant Ritch's vehicle for evidence of illicit drug activities.  '[W]hen the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent [person] to believe that the vehicle contains contraband,'  probable cause exists. Id. (quoting United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969, 98 S.Ct. 516, 54 L.Ed.2d 457 (1977)). We focus not on each fact in isolation but  'the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observe as trained officers.'  Clark, 559 F.2d at 424 (quoting Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 833, 837 (D.C.Cir.1966)). Moreover, when a group of officers is conducting an operation and there exists at least minimal communication between them, their collective knowledge is determinative of probable cause. United States v. Esle, 743 F.2d 1465, 1476 (11th Cir.1984). 34 The totality of circumstances in this case indicates that the detectives had probable cause to search Ritch's vehicle. Ritch and Landis were accompanying Kalish when Kalish was arrested, just one and one half hours before the search took place. After his arrest, detectives from the county sheriff's department were dispatched to Kalish's residence to secure it while officials obtained a search warrant for the residence. Upon their arrival at the residence, they noticed that a Chevrolet Blazer was in the garage and that the garage door was being lowered. Shortly thereafter, the door opened and the Blazer began to depart from the scene. The detectives at the scene relayed these observations to their supervisor, who was in contact with the government attorney handling the case, and were instructed to stop the vehicle. Upon stopping the vehicle, they discovered that Ritch and Landis were inside, and that several suitcases and a computer were in plain view. 10 They again relayed this information to their superior. Based on the information which formed the basis of the probable cause for the search warrant of Kalish's residence, 11 the government attorney advised them to search the vehicle. Under these circumstances and considering the collective knowledge of the officials conducting the investigation, there was probable cause to believe that the Blazer contained some evidence of narcotics trafficking. 35 We also agree with the court below that the government satisfied the exigency prong of the automobile exception. The vehicle was departing from the residence, and vital evidence could be lost or destroyed if it were not searched immediately. 12 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Ritch's motion to suppress.