Opinion ID: 667154
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the defendant's income, earning capacity, and financial resources;

Text: 20 (2) the burden that the fine will impose upon the defendant, any person who is financially dependent on the defendant, or any other person (including a government) that would be responsible for the welfare of any person financially dependent on the defendant, relative to the burden that alternative punishments would impose; 21 (3) any pecuniary loss inflicted upon others as a result of the offense; 22 (4) whether restitution is ordered or made and the amount of such restitution; [and] 23 (5) the need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains from the offense.... 24 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3572(a) (quoting only those factors applicable to individual rather than corporate defendants) (emphasis added). Cf. Guidelines Sec. 5E1.2(d)(2) ([i]n determining the amount of the fine, the court shall consider ... any evidence presented as to the defendant's ability to pay ... in light of his earning capacity and financial resources). Future earning capacity is obviously an appropriate factor to consider. The possession of specialized skills or an advanced degree which might enable one to acquire a well-paying job upon release from prison are factors which courts have considered in determining ability to pay. See United States v. Blackman, 950 F.2d 420, 425 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Ruth, 946 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir.1991) (both affirming courts' reliance on potential earning capacity in imposing a fine). Similarly, the potential of the sale of story rights in the future has been held to be an appropriate factor on which to base an award of restitution. See United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 802-03 (7th Cir.1985). We see no reason why it is not an appropriate factor to consider in deciding whether to impose a fine. 25 The statute and the Guidelines speak in terms of ability to pay and whether a defendant is likely to become able to pay. Guidelines Sec. 5E1.2(a). They do not invite consideration of whether a defendant actually intends to do that which would enable him or her to pay. The distinction here is significant; Irene Seale's disclaimer of any interest in capitalizing on her story in no way diminishes her capability of doing so. A court could not, for example, relieve a defendant of an obligation to pay a fine from the proceeds he or she would receive upon cashing in a presently held winning lottery ticket merely because the defendant chose not to redeem it. We recognize that consideration of Mrs. Seale's ability to sell her story as her sole possible future source of income could create the anomalous result of encouraging her to do so (which is clearly what the district court sought to prevent) in order to pay her fine. This was, however, a proper consideration under Guidelines Sec. 5E1.2(a). At least in cases such as this, when it is a near certainty that the literary and other media rights to the story of a crime are marketable, possible future sales of those rights may be considered when determining whether a defendant is able to pay a fine. 7