Opinion ID: 197477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Captain Jeftimiades

Text: 90 Captain Jeftimiades, asserting a maritime lien for unpaid seaman's wages, moved to intervene a day before the start of trial. The district judge denied Jeftimiades's motion from the bench on the first day of trial after learning that neither the captain nor his attorney were present in the courtroom. Unlike the motions of Coastal and Motor-Services, the captain's motion was not denied on timeliness grounds; indeed, the judge indicated that he probably would have allowed intervention had the captain or his attorney been present at the start of trial. 91 The judge carefully determined that the captain's attorney had been duly informed of the trial date before announcing that he was denying the motion. Jeftimiades does not argue on appeal that his counsel had not been informed of the May 23 trial date; he simply states that counsel erroneously thought the trial date was May 30th and that he was in New Jersey on May 23 and could not have appeared. 92 Jeftimiades argues that his counsel's associate was available to represent the captain and that the court should have requested that this associate appear on the captain's behalf. However, the judge was not told that counsel was out of the Commonwealth, and, while the judge certainly could have inquired further into the matter if he wished, he was not obliged to do so. 93 Captain Jeftimiades also argues that, as a seaman, he is a ward of the court who is entitled to greater protection than the average intervenor. Courts have allowed seamen to avoid rules of common law which affect them particularly harshly because of their vocation. This is true where a rule of law has especially harsh results on a seaman because he is a seaman. For instance, in Socony-Vacuum Oil Company v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 430-31, 59 S.Ct. 262, 266-67, 83 L.Ed. 265 (1939), the leading case cited by Jeftimiades, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether a seaman who had used a dangerous appliance on board could have his claim barred by the doctrine of assumption of risk. The Court cautioned against the application of the doctrine in admiralty cases because seamen often have fewer alternatives than do land-based workers, and are often in less of a position to avoid dangerous situations. Id. This case is easily distinguishable. Captain Jeftimiades's failure to appear at trial through counsel is not explained by any special disabilities attendant to his status as a sailor. 94 Jeftimiades does not address the issue of whether there would be any prejudice to the existing plaintiffs if he were allowed now to intervene. Clearly, there would be prejudice in light of the Coast Guard citation, which described Jeftimiades as drunk at the time the vessel was detained. Vasilia or some of the claimants might have attempted at trial to prove that the captain forfeited his maritime lien for wages. Cf. Johnston v. M/V Dieu Si Bon, 1996 WL 866112 (W.D.Wa.1996) (question of fact whether seaman forfeited lien for wages by deserting ship). Of course, no one made this argument at trial because the captain's attempted intervention was denied. Allowing Jeftimiades to intervene now would necessitate ordering new proceedings in which the parties could attempt to make this claim. We recognize that the prejudice to Jeftimiades is also severe, 26 but he had the opportunity to make his case and did not take advantage of this chance. There was no abuse of discretion.