Opinion ID: 77338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Glass Replacement Damages

Text: 47 Reichhold claims the district court erred by denying its Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law as to damages for Glasslam's lost profit and replacement of the college's glass. Fed. R.Civ.P. 50 provides a vehicle for defendants to challenge the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence at and after the close of the case: 48 (a)(1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue. 49 Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) (emphasis added). We review a Rule 50 motion de novo and apply the same standard as the district court. Telecom Technical Servs. Inc. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 830 (11th Cir.2004). In doing so, we draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and affirm the jury verdict unless there is no legal basis upon which the jury could have found for [the plaintiff]. Id. Although we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-movant must put forth more than a mere scintilla of evidence suggesting that reasonable minds could reach differing verdicts. Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.2000)). Elsewhere, we have explained that [t]he court should deny [a motion for judgment as a matter of law] if the plaintiff presents enough evidence to create a substantial conflict in the evidence on an essential element of the plaintiff's case. Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 420 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir.2005); Bogle v. Orange County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 F.3d 653, 659 (11th Cir.1998) ([I]n order to survive a defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law . . . the plaintiff must present evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in the plaintiff's favor on each and every element of the claim.). 50 Reichhold's appeal of the $12.3 million in damages awarded for future replacement of the college's glass offers two errors made by the district court: first, the court improvidently reversed its own partial summary judgment order and prejudiced Reichhold when, late in the trial, it allowed Glasslam to seek damages for replacement of the Pensacola Christian College glass; and, second, Reichhold says the replacement damages sought for the college's glass were speculative and, therefore, improper as a matter of law. We are unpersuaded. 51 Reichhold's first argument fails because the district court's trial ruling reasonably construed its own summary judgment order as having allowed recovery of damages for future replacement of the Pensacola Christian College's glass, and this determination was well within the district court's discretion. 52 The relevant portion of the district court's April 27, 2004 order granting partial summary judgment as to speculative damages claims provided: 53 Although the Court does not treat the possibility of safety risks lightly, Glasslam has failed to come forward with affirmative evidence supporting any potential damages claims. Other than the specific complaints identified in Glasslam's Answers to Interrogatories (provided by Reichhold), Glasslam has not provided any evidence of other claims it will have to address in the future. 54 .... 55 Accordingly, the Court finds that Glasslam's claims for potential exposure for faulty glass could only be deemed conjectural or hypothetical at best. Glasslam has not set forth any evidence demonstrating any type of actual or imminent injury with respect to potential claims .... Accordingly, Reichhold's Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue is granted as to potential claims for exposure for faulty glass. 56 (emphasis added). 57 The order distinguishes between speculative claims — those based on replacement of glass for which Glasslam received no complaints and produced no evidence indicating that the glass would have to be replaced — and permissible, non-speculative claims — those based on replacement of glass for which Glasslam had received specific complaints and identified those complaints in its interrogatory answers. It seems evident to us that the district court's partial summary judgment order barred the former but not the latter. 58 Glasslam's claim for replacement of the college's glass falls into the latter category of claims not barred by the partial summary judgment order. Glasslam's interrogatory answers identified a specific complaint received from Norman Foxworth, Dependable Glass Works, Covington, LA 70434, and explained that Dependable Glass Works experienced problems with resin sold by Glasslam and manufactured by Reichhold. Glasslam's interrogatory answers also specifically identified unknown damages at a college in Pensacola in which $5.9 million was spent on laminated glass and installation. These references to problems encountered at Pensacola Christian College are specific enough to bring the claim within the ambit of non-speculative future replacement claims as defined by the district court. 59 When Reichhold raised the same argument before the district court, the court construed its partial summary judgment order in the same way: 60 THE COURT: Didn't I rule on that? Didn't I say that speculative claims that haven't even been made are out of the lawsuit? But I don't think I excluded legitimate claims that were made that just haven't been paid yet by Glasslam. 61 .... 62 [I]t's just a question of time before Glasslam is going to have to pay it, then it seems to me that non-speculative future damages are legitimate. 63 (emphasis added). When a district court interprets its own order, we are obliged to review that interpretation for abuse of discretion and accord its interpretation deference so long as it is reasonable. Cave v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (11th Cir.1996); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 918 F.2d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 1990). See also In re Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. Co., 865 F.2d 807, 810-11 (7th Cir.1988) (The district court is in the best position to interpret its own orders.). Here, Reichhold has shown, at most, only that the summary judgment order may have been ambiguous. But identifying a potential ambiguity does not render the district court's construction of its own order unreasonable. Indeed, the district court's interpretation was altogether reasonable. There was no abuse of discretion in allowing Glasslam to present the claim for replacement of the college's glass to the jury. 64 Reichhold also argues that the replacement damages for the college's glass were speculative because the evidence was insufficient to establish that Glasslam would ever have to replace the college's windows, and if no replacement is ever required, this damage award would amount to a windfall recovery for Glasslam. We disagree. The record evidence presented at trial, when construed in a light most favorable to Glasslam, was sufficient to enable the jury to find it was reasonably certain Glasslam would have to replace the glass at the college. 65 We are Erie-bound by Florida law in deciding this diversity case, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), and the Florida Supreme Court's recent decision in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tompkins, 651 So.2d 89 (Fla.1995), is a useful starting point. There, the plaintiff was injured in a motor-vehicle accident. Id. at 90. Liability was admitted, so only the question of damages went to the jury. The Florida Supreme Court explained that future economic damages were recoverable if they were established with reasonable certainty. Id. at 90-91. Under the certainty rule, which applies in both contract and tort actions, recovery is denied where the fact of damages and the extent of damages cannot be established within a reasonable degree of certainty. Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So.2d 24, 27-28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (emphasis added) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 (1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 (1982)); McCall v. Sherbill, 68 So.2d 362 (Fla.1953); accord Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 64:8 (The amount of damages must be established with reasonable, not absolute, certainty .... It is sufficient if a reasonable basis for computation of damages is afforded, even though the result will only be approximate. (footnotes omitted)). 66 Reichhold argues nonetheless that two contingencies make the replacement damages for the Pensacola Christian College's glass wholly speculative: (1) the college's glass had not yet failed, and may never do so; and (2) Dependable Glass, the contractor that manufactured and installed the college's glass with the defective resin Glasslam supplied, had not yet made, and may never make a replacement claim. We disagree, because Glasslam presented sufficient evidence at trial that, if construed in a light most favorable to Glasslam, established with reasonable certainty both that the College's glass will fail and that Dependable Glass will seek replacement costs. 67 As we have already noted, Glasslam introduced the testimony of Dr. Willard, an organic chemist, who explained that the resin Reichhold supplied to Glasslam was defective because it was undercooked, meaning the chemical reaction in the reactor ha[dn't] been ... cooked to completion, and that it contained either too little Tinuvin or a different UV absorber altogether. Willard also testified that all of the glass containing the defective resin — which includes the College's glass — would fail one to five years after installation. Moreover, Norman Foxworth of Dependable Glass explained that the college's glass began to fail less than one year after it was installed, and that it failed on at least three separate occasions. Finally, Reichhold's own glass expert testified that he observed delaminating glass when he inspected the college. 68 Although it is a close question, after thorough review we are satisfied the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that the college's glass was reasonably certain to fail within five years of installation. And, once the jury reached this conclusion, there was sufficient additional evidence from which the jury could also find that Pensacola Christian College and/or Dependable Glass were reasonably certain to seek replacement costs from Glasslam. Indeed, Foxworth's testimony left little doubt on this point when he explained that it appears I have no choice [but to file a claim for replacement of the college's glass] unless Glasslam can assure me how I am going to get the money to replace the glass. Foxworth further testified that the college had already required him to replace pieces of faulty glass on three separate occasions. Moreover, common sense alone strongly suggests (and the jury could find) that Dependable Glass would seek compensation for $12.3 million in replacement costs. Reichhold points to no evidence undermining this inference. Under Florida law, future damages need only be reasonably certain, not absolutely certain. See Tompkins, 651 So.2d at 91; Miller, 573 So.2d at 27-28. The possibility that the college and Dependable Glass would fail to seek recovery from Glasslam for replacement of the defective glass is, indeed, remote. At all events, there was sufficient evidence that Glasslam was reasonably certain to incur damages for replacing the college's glass. The district court properly denied Reichhold's motion for judgment as a matter of law.