Opinion ID: 2018781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Partial Veto.

Text: The governor's authority to partially veto legislation in this state is found in § 80 of the Constitution of North Dakota, which provides as follows: Section 80. The governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items or part or parts of any bill making appropriations of money or property embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items and part or parts disapproved shall be void, unless enacted in the following manner: . . . [Emphasis added.] If the bill is not one making appropriations of money or property embracing distinct items, the bill must be approved or disapproved in total. State v. Olson, 65 N.D. 561, 260 N.W. 586 (1935). An appropriation is the setting apart from the public revenue of a definite sum of money for the specified object in such a manner that the officials of the government are authorized to use the amount so set apart, and no more, for that object. State v. Holmes, 19 N.D. 286, 123 N.W. 884, 886-887 (1909); Campbell v. Towner County, 71 N.D. 616, 3 N.W.2d 822, 825 (1942). Oklahoma's constitution, which authorizes a partial veto where the bill makes appropriations of money embracing distinct items, [emphasis added] has been interpreted to apply only to those bills where more than one item of appropriation was made. Regents of State University v. Trapp, 28 Okl. 83, 113 P. 910 (1911). The Idaho court has similarly interpreted its constitution: The language of the section says that the power of partial veto applies to `any bill making appropriations of money embracing distinct items. ' This language seemingly excludes bills making only one appropriation embracing one item. Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 99 Idaho 404, 582 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1978). [Emphasis added.] We follow the above decisions of Oklahoma and Idaho and conclude that § 80 applies to any bill whenever more than one item of appropriation is made. Senate Bill 2460 qualifies as a bill appropriating money for more than one distinct item. Sections 21 and 22 of SB 2460 make appropriations for the federal aid coordinator office and for the natural resources council, and both sections make appropriations for distinct items within those offices. [3] Governor Link's veto message applied to § 1 of SB 2460 in its entirety. The attorney general argues that § 1 does not constitute an item or items or part or parts of a bill so as to make it the subject of a partial veto. The governor, on the other hand, contends that the inclusion of the terms part or parts broadens his partial veto power beyond item or items of appropriations to cover substantive provisions in appropriation bills. The question we must answer is: Does § 1 constitute an `item or items or part or parts' within the intent of § 80 of our constitution? In a 1965 case this court, relying upon State v. Hall, 35 N.D. 34, 159 N.W. 281 (1916), said: The questions must be answered, if possible, from the language of the constitutional provision itself but, if the language is ambiguous or the answer doubtful, then the field of inquiry is widened and rules applicable to construction of statutes are to be resorted to. In fact, a wider field of inquiry for information is proper where needed in construing constitutional provisions than legislative enactments. Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549, 556 (N.D.1965). For general canons of construction of a constitutional provision see State v. Robinson, 35 N.D. 417, 160 N.W. 514 (1916). When an ambiguity exists in a statute, we are authorized to consider the consequences of a particular construction. Section 1-02-39, NDCC. We may do the same here where the ambiguity is in the constitution. The North Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Olson, supra , stated that the purpose of § 80 of the North Dakota Constitution is to prevent logrolling, the practice of attaching riders of objectionable legislation to general appropriation bills in order to force the governor to veto the entire bill or approve the act with the objectionable parts intact. With the enactment of § 80, the governor could disapprove an item that was obnoxious and yet permit the proper items to stand. When the court included the word provisions in saying that Section 80 merely extends the power of the Governor over legislation by giving him the right to pick out items and provisions in an appropriation bill which he disapproves, that was mere dictum. State v. Olson, supra, 260 N.W. at 589. The North Dakota Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to interpret the extent of the governor's veto power under § 80. In this case it is helpful to look at case law from other states with similar partial veto language to see how these courts interpreted the extent of the veto power of their governors. The language of the New Mexico Constitution on partial veto power is almost identical to North Dakota's. Article IV, Section 22, Constitution of New Mexico, provides as follows: The governor may in like manner approve or disapprove any part or parts, item or items, of any bill appropriating money, and such parts or items approved shall become a law, and such as are disapproved shall be void unless passed over his veto, as herein provided. [Emphasis added.] The New Mexico Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975, 981 (1974), concluded that the inclusion of such words, part or parts, item or items, was to enlarge the governor's veto power to cover: (1) bills of general legislation, which contain incidental items of appropriation, as well as general appropriation bills, and (2) to `items or parts' thereof, in addition to `items of appropriation,' . . . However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa. 161, 48 A. 976, 55 L.R.A. 882 (1901), said that item or items and part or parts are synonyms. This has been followed by Arizona in Callaghan v. Boyce, 17 Ariz. 433, 153 P. 773 (1915), and California in Wood v. Riley, 192 Cal. 293, 219 P. 966 (1923). See also Erskine v. Pyle, 51 S.D. 262, 213 N.W. 500 (1927). The court in Kirkpatrick, supra, concluded that there were definite limitations on the governor's partial veto power: The power of partial veto is the power to disapprove. This is a negative power, or a power to delete or destroy a part or item, and is not a positive power, or a power to alter, enlarge or increase the effect of the remaining parts or items. It is not the power to enact or create new legislation by selective deletions. [Citations omitted.] Thus, a partial veto must be so exercised that it eliminates or destroys the whole of an item or part and does not distort the legislative intent, and in effect create legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the Legislature, by the careful striking of words, phrases, clauses or sentences. 524 P.2d at 981. The Governor may not distort, frustrate or defeat the legislative purpose by a veto of proper legislative conditions, restrictions, limitations or contingencies placed upon an appropriation and permit the appropriation to stand. 524 P.2d at 982. In Iowa, the governor may approve appropriation bills in whole or in part, and may disapprove any item of any appropriation bill; and the part approved shall become a law. Article 3, Section 16, Constitution of Iowa. The Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the governor may use partial vetoes only in appropriation bills, but is not limited to matters therein which appropriate money. However, the provision vetoed must be separate and severable, and not a condition on an appropriation. State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Com'n, 186 N.W.2d 141 (Iowa 1971). The governor cannot veto integral parts of an appropriation, which parts act as a qualification or condition upon the appropriation without vetoing the entire appropriation itself. Welden v. Ray, 229 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1975). In Ohio, the governor may disapprove any item or items in any bill making an appropriation of money . . . . Section 16, Article II, Ohio Constitution. Even though Ohio's partial veto provision does not include the words part or parts, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that it does not prevent the governor from vetoing only money appropriations in appropriation bills. Rather, we conclude that those provisions in an appropriation bill which are separate and distinct from other provisions in the same bill, insofar as the subject, purpose, or amount of the appropriation is concerned, are items within the meaning of Section 16, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. State ex rel. Brown v. Ferguson, 32 Ohio St.2d 245, 291 N.E.2d 434, 438 (1972). In Virginia, the governor shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill . . . . Art. 5, § 6, Virginia Constitution. The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the term item refers to something which may be taken out of a bill without affecting its other purposes or provisions. Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1940). We think it is plain that the veto power does not carry with it power to strike out conditions or restrictions. 11 S.E.2d at 127. The view expressed in the above cases is that the governor may veto items or parts in appropriation bills that are substantive, if the provisions are related to the vetoed appropriation and are so separate and distinct that removing them does not affect the bill's primary purpose. A corollary to this is that one may not veto conditions or restrictions on appropriations without vetoing the appropriation itself, as this would distort the legislature's intent. In contrast to this limitation placed on the governor's veto power in these states, Wisconsin has interpreted its partial veto provision much more liberally. Article V, Section 10, of the Wisconsin Constitution provides as follows: Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by the Governor. . . . [Emphasis added.] In State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis.2d 118, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976), the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the governor's partial veto power may be utilized to veto any portion of an appropriation bill, even if the result effectuates a change in legislative purpose, as long as the portion vetoed is separable and the remaining provisions constitute a complete and workable law. We note that Wisconsin's partial veto provision is not worded like North Dakota's, and that this interpretation would allow the governor to use his veto power to, in essence, legislate. We conclude that § 80 does not contemplate such a liberal interpretation. Furthermore, we have found no cases interpreting a state constitutional provision to permit a partial veto which would render the remaining law incomplete and unworkable. Senate Bill 2460 is not a complete and workable act without § 1. We hold that the governor, in exercising his partial veto power, may only veto items or parts in appropriation bills that are related to the vetoed appropriation and are so separate and distinct that, after removing them, the bill can stand as workable legislation which comports with the fundamental purpose the legislature intended to effect when the whole was enacted. He may not veto conditions or restrictions on appropriations without vetoing the appropriation itself. This interpretation of the governor's veto power comports with the practical construction North Dakota governors have placed on § 80 of our constitution. The first partial vetoes of bills were in 1903. The governor approved SB 103 except as to the part or parts appropriating money for the purchase of pure bred stock. . . , and approved SB 22 except the item appropriating four thousand dollars for beds, bedding and furniture . . . . Chapters 10 and 17, Session Laws, 1903. There were partial vetoes of money items in bills throughout many of the following legislative sessions. In 1965, Governor Guy vetoed a section of an appropriation bill which was substantive. Section 4 of SB 1 was vetoed, which section permitted the Board of Higher Education to authorize the expenditure of funds included within any line item of the total operating budget for any purpose authorized by any other line item. See Chapter 1, Session Laws, 1965. This section was separate and distinct from the rest, and deleting it did not affect the bill's purpose or other provisions. In 1971, Governor Guy vetoed § 11 of HB 1063, which provided: The advisory board of the Bank of North Dakota shall constitute the mortgage insurance fund board. . . . Governor Guy stated that he was vetoing this provision using the authority given me in the North Dakota Constitution under Section 80, and as substantiated by a New Mexico Supreme Court decision in 1957. [4] Chapter 612, Session Laws, 1971. Section 11 appears to be a separate and distinct provision which can be removed from the act without affecting the remaining provisions or the fundamental purpose of the legislation. We note, however, that neither of Governor Guy's 1965 and 1971 vetoes were challenged. In 1977 Governor Link vetoed the line item appropriation for the REAP computer facilities, and vetoed § 5 of HB 1002, which directed how the line item appropriation should be expended. The remainder of the bill was not affected by this veto. See Chapters 2 and 582, Session Laws, 1977. We can see from these examples that governors have, in the past, vetoed provisions in bills other than merely money items of appropriation when substantive provisions were commingled with line items of appropriation in one bill. In the instant case, Governor Link, in vetoing § 1 in its entirety, vetoed the language which created the federal aid coordinator office, as well as the language which placed the position of federal aid coordinator in the office of the lieutenant governor. We are left with a bill which refers to a nonexistent office, as the federal aid coordinator office is not created by legislative enactment in any of the remaining sections. Section 1 is not a separate and distinct provision which can be removed without affecting the others, as the bill which remains is not workable legislation and the primary purpose of the bill to create a federal aid coordinator office is destroyed. Consequently, we hold that the governor's veto of § 1 was not authorized by § 80 of the North Dakota Constitution. What is the effect of the governor's unauthorized veto of § 1? We are influenced by the reasoning used by courts of other states which have discussed the scope and effect of judicial review of executive vetoes. The New Mexico Supreme Court in State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, supra , stated: The final matter to be considered in these proceedings is respondent's contention that `a finding that the governor's veto authority has been unconstitutionally applied nullifies the Appropriation Bill [House Bill 300] as a whole' . . . An unconstitutional veto must be disregarded and the bill given the effect intended by the Legislature. [Citations omitted.] 524 P.2d at 987. The Iowa Supreme Court in Welden v. Ray, supra , stated: The attempted vetoes by the Governor are beyond the scope of the item-veto amendment and are of no effect. 229 N.W.2d at 715. The Virginia Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Dodson, supra , held that the unconstitutional vetoes did not invalidate the budget bill as a whole, and discussed the effect that the holding that an invalid veto destroys the whole bill would have: If this be true, then no attack on a veto, however patently unconstitutional, can succeed, for the restoration of the vetoed item would of itself invalidate the bill to which it was restored. Few would assail a veto in an appropriation bill when they must fail if they fail and fail if they succeed. 11 S.E.2d at 134. Other courts have held that invalid partial vetoes do not invalidate the whole bill, based upon their constitutional provisions which, like North Dakota's, permit a bill to become a law without the governor's approval. See Porter v. Hughes, 4 Ariz. 1, 32 P. 165 (1893); Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915); Fulmore v. Lane, 104 Tex. 499, 140 S.W. 405 (1911). The Wyoming Supreme Court in State v. Forsyth, 21 Wyo. 359, 133 P. 521, 531 (1913), stated: . . . under our Constitution, which provides that a bill received too late to be returned to the Legislature within the specified time will become a law unless disapproved within the period limited for that purpose after adjournment, an unauthorized disapproval would not defeat the bill. In Regents of State University v. Trapp, supra , the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that as their constitution required that the governor give his affirmative approval before a bill could become law, his approval of the bill except as to certain items amounted to a qualified approval which was not permitted, and resulted in the failure of the bill in its entirety. Section 79 of the North Dakota Constitution provides that every bill passed by the legislative assembly shall be presented to the governor. He may approve the bill, disapprove it and return it with his objections, or he may choose not to act on the bill, in which case it is considered approved if not returned within three days. No affirmative action on his part is required. If the legislative assembly adjourns so that the bill cannot be returned, it is considered approved unless he files the bill with his objections to it in the office of the secretary of state within fifteen days after adjournment. Section 79 applies equally to appropriation bills. Where the governor considers an appropriation bill after adjournment, the bill is considered approved unless he disapproves any item therein and files his objections in the secretary of state's office. State v. Olson, supra . In the instant case, the governor vetoed only § 1 of SB 2460. He made no comment on the other 23 sections as he apparently had no intention of disapproving them. No affirmative action on his part is necessary for these sections to become law as § 79 provides that after adjournment a bill shall be a law unless he shall file the same with his objections . . .. He made no objections to §§ 2 through 24. As to § 1, we have determined that the attempted veto was unauthorized and we therefore hold that the veto has no effect. Section 1 remains a part of SB 2460. We similarly declared an attempted partial veto void in State v. Dewing, 131 N.W.2d 434 (N.D.1964).