Opinion ID: 506313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discussion Of Legal Issues

Text: 21 After conducting an evidentiary hearing in this cause, the magistrate initially concluded that the appellant's plea of guilty to the charge of first degree murder was neither knowing, intelligent, nor voluntary, and he recommended that habeas relief be granted on that ground. That recommendation was rejected by the district court in its order of April 8, 1987. Thereafter, the district court conducted a separate evidentiary hearing at which it heard the testimony of the appellant and attorney Grinsted. The focus of the evidentiary hearing were the dual assertions by the appellant that, first, his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent and, second, that influence and coercion exerted upon him made it involuntary. LoConte argued that, because of his below normal I.Q. and the failure of his attorney to discuss the elements and substance of the charge against him, his entry of the plea was not knowing and intelligent. He contends that at the time of the plea hearing he did not understand the elements of first degree murder or that his lack of active participation in the killing may have been a defense. Parallel to this argument was LoConte's contention that he was coerced into making the guilty plea because of the pressure exerted upon him by his co-defendant, Ignazio, and by Louisiana authorities who were investigating an unrelated first degree murder charge against appellant's wife. 22 Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court found that petitioner's claim that attorney Grinsted never discussed with him the elements and substance of the charge was not credible. The court specifically found that the nature of the charges were conveyed to and understood by the appellant before and at the time of the entry of his guilty plea. Furthermore, based upon the testimony of a clinical psychiatrist, Jan Maurer, and the transcript of the plea hearing colloquy between the appellant and the state trial court, the court found that LoConte was of below average intelligence but was competent to and did in fact understand the nature and consequence of the plea he was entering and the rights and protections he was giving up. Having reviewed the record on this appeal, this court cannot conclude that the district court erred. 23 In order for a guilty plea to be entered knowingly and intelligently, the defendant must have not only the mental competence to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his plea but he also must be reasonably informed of the nature of the charges against him, the factual basis underlying those charges, and the legal options and alternatives that are available. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935 (11th Cir.1986). A defendant must receive real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, rather than a rote recitation of the elements of the offense. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); Gaddy v. Linahan, supra. Although the defendant must be informed about the nature of the offense and the elements of the crime, he need not receive this information at the plea hearing itself. Rather, a guilty plea may be knowingly and intelligently made on the basis of detailed information received on occasions before the plea hearing. See Gaddy v. Linahan, supra; Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S.Ct. 1456, 79 L.Ed.2d 773 (1984). 24 Appellant argues that the combination of his sub-average intelligence and the failure of his court-appointed attorney to adequately confer and consult with him prior to the plea hearing deprived him of a fair and reasonable understanding of the nature of the charges against him and of the options that were available to him. But the district court found that, despite his below average intelligence and illiteracy, the petitioner was competent to understand the nature of the charges and the consequences of his plea. A mere lack of average intelligence without more does not necessitate the conclusion that a criminal defendant did not know and understand the nature and factual bases of a charge against him. Additional care must be taken, however, to assure that such a defendant does have a clear understanding of the consequences of his act. See Gaddy v. Linahan, supra. 25 There is sufficient evidence in the record before this court to more than adequately support the district court's conclusion that the appellant was competent to enter his plea and had a reasonably intelligent understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea. Moreover, this court cannot say that the district court was clearly erroneous when it found that the appellant had consulted with attorney Grinsted on several occasions prior to the plea hearing, and that through those consultations, appellant had been reasonably informed about the nature of the charge against him, its essential elements, and the factual basis underlying it. 26 Appellant argues that his plea could not be knowing and intelligent because his attorney had not adequately investigated the charges against him. Without such investigation and preparation, appellant argues, counsel was unable to assist the appellant in understanding the charges and the consequences of a plea. This argument overlooks the fact, however, that appellant entered this guilty plea against the advice and despite the protest of his attorney. Plainly, counsel's advice against the guilty plea indicates some investigation and preparation on his part that revealed the possibility of a defense at trial. Indeed, attorney Grinsted testified before both the magistrate and district court that he felt the state's case against LoConte was weak, lacking any physical evidence tying him to the killing and based solely upon the inconsistent and conflicting statements of Creel and Ignazio. Moreover, the district court found that trial counsel had consulted with appellant on a number of occasions about the defense of this charge, and twice during the plea hearing counsel attempted to persuade appellant not to go through with the entry of a guilty plea. LoConte's adamance in the face of this resistance by his attorney makes it difficult for this court to conclude that he did not know what he was doing. 27 Petitioner also argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because of coercion exerted upon him by his co-defendant, Frank Ignazio, and by Louisiana authorities. He contends that Ignazio used every influence available to him to persuade appellant to enter a guilty plea in order to save Ignazio from the electric chair and to secure the release of Ignazio's wife. He also asserts that Louisiana police authorities informed him that his wife had been arrested and was being held in Louisiana on a first degree murder charge and, if he pled guilty in this case, the charges against his wife would be dropped. The combination of these pressures, plus the stress of being in jail under a first degree murder charge, made his guilty plea coerced and involuntary. 28 Although the district court found as fact that appellant was under pressure from these two sources, it concluded that the pressure was not so great as to make the appellant's guilty plea involuntary. The district court reasoned that the pressure exerted by Louisiana police officials caused the appellant to do no more than enter a guilty plea out of a desire to protect his wife from further prosecution. The decision to enter a plea of guilty in order to protect his wife from prosecution does not mandate the conclusion that the plea was involuntary. See Allen v. Rodriguez, 372 F.2d 116 (10th Cir.1967). There is no evidence to indicate that the representations made by the Louisiana officials were false; indeed, there was independent evidence in the form of letters from appellant's wife confirming the statements made by these officials. The fact that the appellant chose to enter a guilty plea in order to protect his wife does not undermine the voluntariness of the plea entered here. See Martin v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244 (11th Cir.1985). 29 The district court also found that, although Frank Ignazio handled the plea agreement negotiations with an assistant state's attorney, there was no evidence to support the conclusion that the state participated in any pressure or coercion exerted by Ignazio against the appellant. The district court found that Ignazio undertook for his own reasons--to save himself from a possible death sentence and to secure the release of his wife--to persuade appellant to enter a guilty plea as part of a package by which all three of the male co-defendants would plead guilty to the charge. Ignazio convinced the appellant that the guilty pleas could be challenged and set aside later as coerced. The district court found that there was no evidentiary ground upon which to conclude that the state's attorney with whom Ignazio was negotiating had any knowledge of the pressures being exerted by Ignazio upon the appellant. 30 Simply because the appellant was subjected to pressure from sources not associated with the state or prosecutors does not mean that his plea was necessarily involuntary. It is not an uncommon occurrence that a criminal defendant is pressured to some extent by co-defendants, friends, and relatives. These types of influences are inevitable and unavoidable. Short of absolute isolation of a pretrial detainee, the state has no practicable ability to prevent the exertion of such pressures upon a criminal defendant by his co-defendants and family members. It is only where the plea is coerced by conduct fairly attributable to the state that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is offended. Such private coercion may be said to be fairly attributable to the state if it is procured and sanctioned by prosecutors or the state trial court. Additionally, it is at least arguable that such coercion may be attributable to the state if, at the time a defendant offers his guilty plea, the prosecutors or the trial court either know or reasonably should know the existence of such coercions. In the instant case, however, the plea colloquy contains nothing that would reveal to the state trial court that the plea being offered by appellant was the product of improper influences or duress. The state trial court conducted an extensive colloquy, inquiring into the appellant's understanding with respect to the waiver of rights inherent in a guilty plea and the consequences of that plea. At the plea hearing, appellant expressly stated that he had not been coerced into his plea. Moreover, after hearing the evidence in this case, the district court found that there was no reason to believe that the state prosecutor was aware of the pressure being exerted by Ignazio on the appellant. 31 In the final analysis, the appellant chose voluntarily to enter a guilty plea for his own personal reasons. Not only was he seeking his own wife's release in Louisiana, he believed that the biker's code required him to help Ignazio and Ignazio's wife. Furthermore, appellant benefited himself with the plea by avoiding a possible death sentence. Appellant was convinced by Ignazio's ill-conceived notion that the guilty pleas could be subsequently attacked and set aside on the basis of coercion and, therefore, knowingly and voluntarily entered into this plan by Ignazio to gain the immediate release of their wives while reserving a later attack upon their own guilty pleas. The fact that the plan was foolish and stupid does not mean that the guilty pleas entered pursuant to it were involuntary in a constitutional sense. Whether the appellant chose to enter this plea out of a desire to help his friends, his wife, and himself, or out of a mistaken notion that he could escape its consequences at a later time, we agree with the district court's conclusion that appellant chose to do so out of his own free and voluntary will.
32 Appellant also contends that his guilty plea should be set aside because he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment because his court-appointed attorney labored under an actual conflict of interest while representing both appellant and Frank and Susan Ignazio. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Appellant argues that the interests of appellant and the Ignazios, at least at the point in time of the plea agreement, were in irreconcilable conflict. By entering his plea of guilty and subjecting himself to life imprisonment, petitioner secured the release of Susan Ignazio and saved Frank Ignazio from a potential date with the electric chair. Thus, he asserts, the Ignazios had every reason to hope for fulfillment of the plea agreement despite the fact that it stripped the appellant of a potential defense on the merits. This conflict of interest, appellant argues, caused his attorney to acquiesce in the appellant's guilty plea, thereby depriving him of effective assistance of counsel. 33 In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the Supreme Court held that an actual conflict of interest by a retained attorney violates the defendant's rights to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Several years later, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-prong test for determining whether the actual performance of an attorney was so inadequate as to violate the Sixth Amendment: first, did counsel commit an unprofessional error; and second, did the error prejudice the defense. Each of those cases seem to state that an actual conflict of interest creates a presumption of prejudice to the defendant; however, the cases are not entirely consistent. See Chadwick v. Green, 740 F.2d 897 n. 5 (11th Cir.1984). Inasmuch as neither case dealt with the services of an attorney laboring under an actual conflict of interest, it is not clear how the standards of those cases impact upon the presumed prejudice analysis of Cuyler v. Sullivan. The clearest statement, however, is found in Strickland v. Washington. There, the court wrote as follows: 34 One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar, though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S., at 345-350, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 100 S.Ct. 1708, the court held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. In those circumstances, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interest. Given the obligation of counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, ..., it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. Even so, the rule is not quite the per se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims mentioned above. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 350, 348, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (footnote omitted). (Emphasis Added). 35 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696-697 (1984). The Supreme Court plainly indicates in that passage that an actual conflict of interest does not carry a per se presumption of prejudice, but a limited presumption. The defendant must establish two elements of the claim: first, an actual conflict of interest and, second, that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's representation. See, also, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). 36 Unlike most other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, where the defendant is required to prove that his attorney's errors actually prejudiced the defense to the extent of undermining confidence in the outcome of the proceedings, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, the limited presumption of prejudice implied by a conflict of interest requires only a showing of an adverse effect. Where an actual conflict of interest exists, the defendant is not required to go so far as to prove that the outcome of his trial would have been different, see Washington v. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; rather, he need only show that the actual conflict of interest had an adverse effect on his defense. Plainly, that is a somewhat lesser burden of proof than is necessary when there is no limited presumption of prejudice. 37 Turning to this case, we need not decide whether or not there was an actual conflict of interest. Even if the district court concluded that attorney Grinsted labored under an actual conflict of interest in his representation of the appellant and the Ignazios, it is equally clear that that conflict of interest had no impact whatsoever upon the appellant's decision to plead guilty. Indeed, as noted above, appellant was intent on entering this plea against the advice of his attorney and despite two attempts by his attorney during the plea hearing to dissuade him from entering the plea. Plainly, appellant did not enter his guilty plea based on any advice given to him by his attorney and, therefore, any error or omission the attorney may have made played no part whatsoever in appellant's decision to enter the plea. The recognized danger of conflicting representation lies in the inability of an attorney to offer full and candid advice to one client where the attorney knows that advice will cause harm to another client. Under the facts of the instant case, however, attorney Grinsted vigorously attempted to persuade appellant to insist upon his not guilty plea and to go to trial, despite the obvious adverse consequences that would have for the Ignazios. 2 Plainly, Grinsted's duty of zealous representation of appellant, in fact, was not compromised here because of the multiple representation. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 92 S.Ct. 1551, 32 L.Ed.2d 45 (1972). 38 Appellant argues that had the conflict of interest not existed, attorney Grinsted could have concentrated on appellant's case solely and could have shielded him from the influences exercised by Frank Ignazio. Whether this is true obviously is speculation. The evidence before the district court indicated a strong bond of friendship between appellant and the Ignazios, which there is no reason to believe would not have existed even if appellant had separate representation. Furthermore, appellant had his own distinct reasons for pleading guilty, including his desire to help his own wife with her Louisiana problems and, possibly, his own fear that he could receive a death sentence. It is obvious that separate representation would not have eliminated these influences acting upon appellant. The clear evidence leaves this court with the fixed conclusion that appellant chose to enter his guilty plea despite everything his attorney attempted to the contrary. Thus, even if an actual conflict of interest existed, it did not adversely affect appellant's decision to enter this guilty plea. 3 39 We agree with the district court that the appellant entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that defense counsel's conflict of interest did not adversely affect appellant's decision to enter a plea. Accordingly, the district court's order denying the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.