Opinion ID: 2265911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the tax fails strict scrutiny

Text: ¶ 81 [A] tax will trigger heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment if it discriminates on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech [or expression]. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991). Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002). And [i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). ¶ 82 Under strict scrutiny, the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987). Moreover, [i]t is of no moment that the statute does not impose a complete prohibition. The distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree. The Government's content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans. Playboy Entm't, 529 U.S. at 812. This holds especially true where [a] power to tax differentially, as opposed to a power to tax generally, gives a government a powerful weapon against the taxpayer selected. Ark. Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 228 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)). ¶ 83 The Tax fails strict scrutiny. While the State has an interest in raising revenue to fund the treatment of sex offenders, it is not in the category of government interest so compelling as to burden constitutionally protected rights. Even if it were, the Commission has failed to demonstrate any factual or empirical connection between the expressive activity taxed and the need for sex offender treatment. ¶ 84 Further, even if a compelling interest existed, the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. As noted above, the legislature failed to identify any cause and effect between sex offenders and nude performances. For example, the legislature heard the testimony of Kathy Ockey of the Department of Corrections regarding a study by Hanson and Brussiere, which demonstrated that having a paraphilia was the third top indicator of being a sex offender. A paraphilia was defined as an unusual, obsessive sexual interest, such as women's shoes or feathers. The legislature did not choose to tax women's shoes or feathers to provide funding for sex offenders. The only other testimony offered was an anecdotal report, unsupported by data, that perhaps 50 percent of sex offenders may frequent sexually explicit businesses and escort services. However, sex offenders may also frequent restaurants, hair dressers, amusement parks, tennis clubs, and gasoline stations. Attendance or use of these services does not cause individuals to become sex offenders, and no evidence was provided that attendance or use of sexually explicit businesses and escort services cause individuals to become sex offenders. In short, the legislature failed to identify any cause and effect between sex offenders and nude dancing; without doing so, it cannot narrowly tailor its regulation. ¶ 85 Raising money for sex offender treatment is a worthy goal. Nonetheless, the legislature cannot unconstitutionally tax protected speech to obtain the money. The State has not demonstrated it has a compelling reason to tax this speech. Even if it had a compelling interest, the Tax is not narrowly tailored to achieve the interest. Therefore, the Tax is an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment protections. [2]