Opinion ID: 1497895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Background and Burden of Proof

Text: Our election statute provides in pertinent part that the court shall void an election only for fraud, mistake ... or other defect, serious enough to vitiate the election as a fair expression of the will of the registered qualified electors voting therein. D.C.Code § 1-1315(b) (1992). Before the Board, as we have seen, petitioners cast their argument in terms of fraud and claimed that Ms. Whittington's camp had tried to steal the election. In this court, petitioners claim in their brief to have found that four individuals, including two of Ms. Whittington's campaign employees, fraudulently voted. Fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Hercules & Co. v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 613 A.2d 916, 923 (D.C.1992). To sustain their case as they have framed it, petitioners were required to show that one or more of the challenged voters made a willful misrepresentation to the Board, known by that voter to be false, and that he or she did so with the intent to deceive the Board and to induce the Board to permit him or her to vote unlawfully. Id. (detailing elements of fraud). The Board having ruled against them on their allegations of fraud, petitioners must now demonstrate to this court that the Board acted unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that fraud had not been proved. Stated another way, petitioners must show that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Whittington, compelled a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the challenged voters voted fraudulently. Any objective review of the record demonstrates that petitioners have fallen short of proving that a finding of willful fraud is mandated by the evidence, or that no impartial trier of fact could reasonably find otherwise. Notwithstanding the manner in which petitioners have articulated their argument, however, the Board apparently focused on the closer question whether, short of fraud, the record reveals some other defect serious enough to vitiate the election as a fair expression of the [electorate's] will. D.C.Code § 1-1315(b). [12] We so conclude because the Board analyzed the record to determine whether petitioners had proved their case by a preponderance of the evidence. The Board's utilization of this standard, notwithstanding petitioners' focus on alleged fraud, suggests that the Board, recognizing the public interest in vindicating the will of the electorate, did not treat this case as one in which relief could be awarded only if intentional misrepresentation was established. Rather, the Board apparently examined the record to determine whether petitioners had shown that the election did not fairly express the will of the properly registered electors. No party has objected to this approach.