Opinion ID: 884118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standards regarding mistrial motions

Text: We recently clarified the standard to be applied by a district court in determining whether to grant a motion for a mistrial. Observing that we had not consistently stated that standard in earlier cases, we held that a district court should grant a motion for a mistrial when there is either a demonstration of a manifest necessity, or where the defendant has been denied a fair and impartial trial. State v. Ford (1996), 278 Mont. 353, 359-60, 926 P.2d 245, 249; see also State v. Walker (1996), 280 Mont. 346, 352, 930 P.2d 60, 63-64; and State v. Romero (1996), 279 Mont. 58, 75, 926 P.2d 717, 728. We have not previously determined when a district court should apply the manifest necessity standard as opposed to the denial of a fair and impartial trial standard. That subissue was addressed, however, in a special concurring opinion in Romero, 926 P.2d at 730 (Leaphart, J., concurring), in which three other justices joined. Justice Leaphart noted, at the outset, that United States v. Perez (1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 165-66, was the source of the manifest necessity component of the standard and that, in Perez, the mistrial was declared by the court, not requested by the defendant. Romero, 926 P.2d at 730. He observed that, in United States v. Dinitz (1976), 424 U.S. 600, 606-607, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 273, the United States Supreme Court limited the application of the manifest necessity standard to situations where a court declares a mistrial without the consent of the defendant. The rationale for limiting application of the heightened manifest necessity standard is that double jeopardy implications arise in the context of a mistrial declared without the defendant's request or consent. Romero, 926 P.2d at 730-31. In the context of a defendant's motion for a mistrial, however, Justice Leaphart relied on Oregon v. Kennedy (1982), 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416, in reasoning that double jeopardy considerations do not arise when a defendant has chosen to terminate the proceedings against him. Romero, 926 P.2d at 730-31. Thus, Justice Leaphart concluded that, where the defendant moves for a mistrial, the motion should be granted where the ends of public justice so require or where the defendant will be denied a fair and impartial trial. Romero, 926 P.2d at 731. Other courts are in accord with Justice Leaphart's reasoning, applying the manifest necessity standard when the trial court declares a mistrial without the defendant's consent and the denial of a fair trial standard when the defendant moves for a mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Ardolino (1997), 1997 ME 141, 697 A.2d 73, 79; State v. Friel (Me. 1985), 500 A.2d 631, 634; Smith v. State (1994), 263 Ga. 782, 439 S.E.2d 483, 485; Byrd v. State (1992), 262 Ga. 426, 420 S.E.2d 748, 749; State v. Sonen (S.D.1992), 492 N.W.2d 303, 306; State v. Delfs (S.D.1986), 396 N.W.2d 749, 751. We adopt the rationale set forth in Justice Leaphart's special concurring opinion in Romero and conclude that the more stringent manifest necessity standard applies when a trial court considers declaring a mistrial without the defendant's request or consent. We further conclude that the denial of a fair and impartial trial standard applies when a trial court determines whether to grant a mistrial either moved foror consented toby the defendant. Thus, the fair and impartial trial standard applies to the District Court's ruling on Partin's motion for a mistrial based on inadmissible testimony which violated the order in limine. With regard to this Court's standard of review of a district court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial, the parties advance different positions based on two separate lines of authority. The State relies on recent language in Ford, 926 P.2d at 248-49 (citing State v. Greytak (1993), 262 Mont. 401, 404, 865 P.2d 1096, 1098)reiterated in Walker, 930 P.2d at 63, and Romero, 926 P.2d at 728that, in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial, we determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the court's ruling is erroneous. In contrast, Partin urges us to apply the standard of review set forth in State v. Seaman (1989), 236 Mont. 466, 475, 771 P.2d 950, 956 (citing State v. Scheffelman (1987), 225 Mont. 408, 411, 733 P.2d 348, 350), which is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Thus, before addressing the merits of the present appeal, we must resolve the threshold issue of our standard of review. The problem with the Ford standard whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the trial court's ruling is erroneousis that clear and convincing evidence is an evidentiary standard. Indeed, we recently defined clear and convincing evidence as: [c]lear and convincing proof is simply a requirement that a preponderance of the evidence be definite, clear, and convincing, or that a particular issue must be clearly established by a preponderance of the evidence or by a clear preponderance of proof. This requirement does not call for unanswerable or conclusive evidence. The quality of proof, to be clear and convincing, is somewhere between the rule in ordinary civil cases and the requirement of criminal procedurethat is, it must be more than a mere preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt. Matter of J.L. (1996), 277 Mont. 284, 289, 922 P.2d 459, 462 (quoting In Interest of S.M.Q. (1990), 247 Kan. 231, 796 P.2d 543, 545); see also Wareing v. Schreckendgust (1996), 280 Mont. 196, 206, 930 P.2d 37, 43 (citation omitted). Such an evidentiary standard relating to a party's burden of proof in the district court is not a proper standard for this Court's review of a district court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial. As a result, we will no longer use the clear and convincing evidence that the trial court's ruling is erroneous standard of review applied in Ford, Walker, Romero, and earlier cases. In accordance with the Seaman and Scheffelman line of cases, we will review a district court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial to determine whether the court abused its discretion.