Opinion ID: 2054559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Declaration Against Penal Interest

Text: At trial, petitioner called Gatton to testify. When Gatton invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify, petitioner called Johnson and sought to introduce through her several exculpatory statements purportedly made to her by Gatton against his penal interest. See maj. op. at 699-701 (detailing the several exculpatory statements that petitioner wished to introduce through Johnson's testimony). Gatton's statements were offered by petitioner as a declaration against penal interest, an exception to the hearsay rule under Maryland Rule 804(b)(3). The primary hearsay issue in this case is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to admit into evidence Johnson's testimony that Gatton had admitted to killing Bonnie Gray. The controversy between the parties as to the corroboration requirement is whether the trial judge may take into consideration the credibility of the in-court witness. The State argues that the statements do not fit within Rule 804(b)(3) because a reasonable person in Gatton's position would have made the statements even though they were not true. The State argues that, based on the language of Matusky, 343 Md. at 481 n. 7, 682 A.2d at 700 n. 7 (citing Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 702), a trial court should consider any facts or circumstances that would cut against the presumption of the reliability of a statement against interest, including, but not limited to, the credibility of the in-court witness. The dissent agrees with the State. [1] Petitioner argues that statements against penal interest are simply exceptions to the prohibition against hearsay, that corroborating circumstances do not include consideration of the credibility of the in-court witness, and that consideration of credibility usurps the jury's role as fact finder. A declaration against penal interest is one that is contrary to the declarant's penal interest at the time that it was made, such that a reasonable person would not have made the statement unless that person believed it to be true. A declaration against penal interest is admissible in evidence as an exception to the rule precluding hearsay so long as the declarant is unavailable. To be contrary to a person's penal interest, the statement must tend to subject the person to criminal liability. The theory underlying this exception is that persons ordinarily do not make statements against their interest unless they are true. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's notes; Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126-27, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1895, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1047-48, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)) (noting that the exception is founded on the assumption that a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the time it is made); State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 17, 526 A.2d 955, 962 (1987). [2] Before a statement may be admitted in evidence as a statement against interest, the court must find it to be reliable. Professor Capowski sets forth what appears to me to be an appropriate approach to resolving statement-against-interest and Confrontation Clause issues, suggesting that it would be [more appropriate] to recognize the distinct stages or steps involved in the decisions and avoid the conflation of exception and constitutional analysis. Capowski, supra, at 510. He writes: After deciding the unavailability of the declarant, a court needs to discern if any portion of a statement is against interest and, if so, which parts of the statement are against interest, which portions are self-serving, and whether there are any portions that are neither against interest nor self-serving.... ... In civil cases, the analysis should end here with the court admitting those portions that are against interest and the neutral portions that are closely related. At this stage in criminal cases, the court should begin its Confrontation Clause analysis. The court should decide whether the statement has sufficient reliability or `indicia of reliability' to be admitted absent confrontation. Id. at 510-511. In assessing reliability, Professor Capowski identifies three forms of reliability and different standards for applying each one, noting: First, there is the standard for reliability that is to be applied in establishing an [hearsay] exception. This standard, `exception reliability,' requires that the type of statement have some general underpinning of reliability in logic and human experience. For example, in the case of a statement against interest, persons are unlikely to say things against their interest unless they are true. Once an exception is established, individual statements have to be tested to see if they fit the requirements of the exception and thus have sufficient reliability to be admissible. This form of reliability, `admission reliability,' involves a specific application of reliability in the case being tried or decided on appeal. In a criminal case, a third form of reliability analysis is required because of the application of Confrontation Clause principles to the potential introduction of evidence that cannot be cross-examined.... `[I]ndicia of reliability' or `Confrontation Clause reliability' requires a higher standard of reliability analysis than `admission reliability.' A major subpart of `Confrontation Clause reliability' is `firmly rooted exception reliability.' `No independent inquiry into reliability is required when evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.' Id. at 483-84. When the Confrontation Clause is not implicated, as in the case before us, step three does not come into play. In this regard, the Supreme Court noted that: because hearsay statements of this sort are, by definition, offered by the accused, the admission of such statements does not implicate Confrontation Clause concerns. Thus, there is no need to decide whether the reliability of such statements is so inherently dependable that they would constitute a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 130, 119 S.Ct. at 1897, 144 L.Ed.2d 117. Statements against penal interest ordinarily are offered in evidence, in criminal trials, in three circumstances: (1) as voluntary admissions against the declarant, (2) as exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant to establish that the declarant committed the offense, and (3) as evidence offered by the prosecution to establish the guilt of an accomplice of the declarant. See id. at 128, 119 S.Ct. at 1895, 144 L.Ed.2d 117. In the instant case, we are concerned with the second situation. Under Maryland Rule 5-802, hearsay is not admissible except as provided by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes. Rule 5-804(b) outlines exceptions to the hearsay rule that apply when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. One such exception is for statements against interest, which are defined as follows: A statement which was at the time of its making so contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest,so tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or so tended to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3). Thus, under Rule 5-804(b)(3), a codification of the common law hearsay exception for declarations against interest, a hearsay statement exculpating the defendant may be admitted in evidence if (1) the declarant is unavailable, (2) the statement is genuinely adverse to the declarant's penal interest, and (3) corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. The Circuit Court, in the case sub judice, found that the statements failed the second and third parts of the test: that the statements would not be made by a reasonable man understanding that he was making a statement against penal interest and that the statements were not trustworthy. Accordingly, the judge refused to admit the statements into evidence. In this case, the threshold requirement of unavailability under the rule is not disputed and has been satisfied. Gatton, having asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify, was not available. See Green, 399 U.S. at 168 n. 17, 90 S.Ct. at 1940 n. 17, 26 L.Ed.2d 489; United States v. Harrell, 788 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.1986); Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 572, 629 A.2d 633, 645 (1993). The next inquiry under the Rule, then, is whether Gatton's statements were against his penal interest. The statements I took care of her, he would take care of me just like had took care of Bonnie, and this is what I killed her with amounted to admissions that he had killed the victim, Bonnie Gray. The State does not contend otherwise. The trial court held that the statements do not fit within Rule 804(b)(3) because a reasonable person in Gatton's position would have made the statements even though they were not true. The trial court found that Gatton in no way expected any harm from his statements because he was high and drunk he was speaking to his crack-companion's wife, a woman he had already physically attacked whom he has so far successfully cowed into silence, and he probably could have expected a benefit from the statementEvelyn's silence. Gatton's alleged statements sufficiently tended to subject him to criminal liability that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statements unless he believed them to be true. Some of his remarks amounted to a clear admission that he killed Bonnie Gray, and others amounted to statements incriminating him in her murder. A reasonable person in Gatton's position would have realized that comments attributed to him implicating him in Bonnie Gray's murder would have tended to subject him to criminal liability. Even though he may have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol, his statements would be important evidence against him if he were on trial for the murder, and he had to realize the detrimental character of the statements. The trial court erred, therefore, in finding that they did not pose the sort of threat to his interest that the hearsay exception contemplates. I am not unmindful of the circumstances under which the proffered statements were made and that Gatton may not have so readily expected his remarks to have been repeated to the police. However, the rule does not require that the witness actually be speaking to someone who could cause him to be prosecuted. See Harrell, 788 F.2d at 1527. Furthermore, the contextual circumstances do not so far impugn the reliability presumed from the remarks' disserving character as to take them outside the first part of the Rule. United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1976). See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300, 93 S.Ct. at 1048, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (holding that a confession made spontaneously to a close acquaintance was sufficiently reliable); United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.1976) (finding that a reasonable man would not falsely admit to the commission of serious crime to a cellmate knowing that there was a chance, even if slight, that it could lead to his conviction). Since the statements were against Gatton's penal interest, they were admissible if corroborating circumstances clearly indicated the trustworthiness of the statements. As I have noted, the requirement of corroborating circumstances was designed to protect against the possibility that a statement, offered by the defense, would be fabricated to exculpate the defendant. I think that the factors relied upon by the trial court are better considered under the part of the rule requiring an evaluation of whether, overall, there is sufficient corroboration clearly to indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Professor McCormick notes: Both the proper role for, and definition of, corroboration for statements against interest is almost hopelessly confused.... Turning first to statements that exculpate the defendant, the federal courts have disagreed on whether the corroboration requirement applies to the veracity of the in-court witness testifying that the statement was made in addition to the clearly required showing that the statement itself is trustworthy. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 319 (John Strong, ed., 5th ed.1999). Courts have recognized that the nature of the corroboration required by Federal Rule 804(b)(3) is not precisely delineated, although some courts have identified several factors deemed relevant to determining whether sufficient corroboration exists to allow the declarations into evidence under the rule. See United States v. Bumpass, 60 F.3d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir.1995). [3] In considering the identified factors, courts must be vigilant in evaluating the context in which a statement is offeredin particular, by whom and under what circumstances. For example, if offered by the State against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause may be implicated, triggering additional and often different considerations than when a statement is offered by the defendant as a hearsay exception. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822-23, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3150, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (holding that courts cannot rely on corroborating evidence to conclude that a hearsay statement is trustworthy for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause). [4] It is important to note that Alvarez involved the admissibility of a hearsay statement that was inculpatory as to the accused and, as such, was a Confrontation Clause case. That issue, however, is not before us today. [5] Professor McCormick sets out what I believe should be the rule when the defendant offers a statement against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule: As a matter of standard hearsay analysis, the credibility of the in-court witness regarding the fact that the statement was made is not an appropriate inquiry. MCCORMICK, supra, at § 319. See United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 777 (2nd Cir.1983) (disapproving of Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 702, and noting that to require a preliminary assessment of the in court witness' credibility would, in our judgment, be a usurpation of the jury function); United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir.1977) (rejecting the credibility of an in-court witness as a consideration in whether to exclude evidence under Rule 804(b)(3) and stating that [r]ule 804(b)(3) directs the court to the trustworthiness of the declarant, not of the witness); United States v. Goodlow, 500 F.2d 954, 958 (8th Cir.1974) (noting, in considering the admissibility of a statement as a declaration against penal interest hearsay exception, that [t]o reason that the credibility of these [in-court] witnesses is such that their testimony would not be believed attempts to substitute judicial discretion in an area where fact-finding prerogatives control); People v. Cudjo, 6 Cal.4th 585, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635, 649 (1993) (holding that the credibility of an in-court witness was not a proper consideration in the context of the admissibility of evidence offered under the declaration-against-interest hearsay exception). As a basic hearsay matter, the witness is present in court, can be fully cross-examined as to whether the statement was actually made, and the fact-finder can and should fully evaluate the witness's credibility. Unlike the hearsay declarant who is necessarily unavailable to testify, the in court witness is present in the courtroom and is subject to cross-examination, enabling the jury to assess credibility as with any other witness. The admissibility of the statement should be determined under the ordinary rules of evidence and should be controlled by Rule 5-104. [6] The rules require only that the corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement; they need not remove all doubt with respect to the hearsay statement. See Bumpass, 60 F.3d at 1102 (citing United States v. Brainard, 690 F.2d 1117, 1124 (4th Cir.1982)). Judge Moylan, writing for the Court of Special Appeals, in Jacobs v. State, 45 Md.App. 634, 415 A.2d 590 (1980), succinctly expressed the same view as follows: The trustworthiness in issue in this regard is the trustworthiness of the declaration, assuming it to have been made and to have been made in the form recounted from the witness stand. The trustworthiness of the witness who serves as the mere conduit for the out-of-court declaration is, on the other hand, tested by other devices such as the oath and cross-examination at the trial itself. All too frequently, we allow our distrust of the witness on the stand to be transmuted into a mistrust of the out-of-court declaration, and this frequently subconscious transfer serves only to blur analysis. Id. at 643 n. 2, 415 A.2d at 595 n. 2. As Judge Niemeyer said in Bumpass, the level of corroboration therefore must be sufficient that cross-examination would add little to test the hearsay's reliability. Bumpass, 60 F.3d at 1102. Judge Cathell, writing for the Court, has set out the circumstances that provide an assurance of reliability to justify the admissibility of the statements. I agree. Gatton surely was unavailable, and his statements were against his penal interest. The trial judge erred in considering Johnson's credibility beyond the ordinary witness considerations under Rule 5-104. The statements were sufficiently corroborated to establish their trustworthiness. The jury should have been permitted to hear Johnson's testimony with respect to Gatton's statements.