Opinion ID: 318171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: present adverse effect and present discrimination

Text: 36 Appellants assert that the consequence of the past intentional exclusion and of the illegal testing and educational standards is currently carried forward by: (1) the neutral practices of the departmental seniority and the bidding and posting procedure which determine promotion; (2) the age requirement for entry into the apprentice program, which black employees who were denied this opportunity in the past cannot now meet; and (3) the departmental bidding utilized for the selection of on-the-job trainees. In addition, the continued educational prerequisite for entry into the apprentice program and the purely subjective criteria to be applied by allwhite department superintendents for selection of supervisory personnel are challenged as present discriminatory practices. 37 A. Promotion-- The Seniority System and Posting and Bidding Procedure 38 1. Effect of present neutral practices. Beginning January 1, 1971, the company instituted a policy of posting vacancies above pay group 3 and adopted a bidding procedure for filling these vacancies. 27 The job vacancies are first posted for bidding for three days within the department. Basic qualifications, i.e. ability, and departmental seniority control the selection from the bidders. If no qualified employee within the department bids, then the company posts the vacancy plant-wide. A transferring employee retains his former seniority for purposes of returning to his former department in case of lay-off within the new department. But he does not carry over any of his accumulated seniority for purposes of departmental promotion-- a basic unit or job seniority type. 28 See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1260, 1263-66 (1967). 39 Because of the company's wage progression structure, a transferring employee may move from a higher to a lower paying position. 29 In fact, an employee who has progressed substantially within pay groups in one department and then transfers to a different department to enhance his chances for eventual advancement, higher pay, or better working conditions will usually be required to endure a loss of seniority and a wage cut as a condition of transfer. 40 Appellants assert that invidious discrimination prior to 1963, and the illegal testing and educational requirements from 1964 through 1971, have resulted in racial stratification between departments and jobs within departments (and consequently in salary). This stratification is a manifestation of these past practices which have (1) excluded the majority of black workers from positions in predominantly white departments thereby absolutely preventing their obtaining of seniority there; and (2) if not excluded, deferred initial entry into these departments, thereby curtailing the seniority of black employees in these departments and hampering their promotion to higher paying positions. Therefore, appellants' argument is that this stratification of black employees into the lower paying departments and jobs, caused by past discriminatory practices, is presently effectuated through the departmental seniority system and bidding and posting procedure. 41 The departmental seniority system has this locking-in effect because the black transferee would have to forfeit seniority and pay rate 30 in order to transfer and because the black transferee to a predominantly white department would be unable to compete equally for promotion based on departmental seniority with a white employee, in the department at the time of the transfer, of equal or less plant seniority. Black employees within predominantly white departments, who were unable to gain entry into the department prior to 1971, because of their race, as swiftly as white workers, would also be harmed in greater proportion by lay-offs or reductions in force. 31 42 Under the bidding and posting procedure, only if no qualified employee within a department bids after three days is a vacancy posted plant-wide. This process continues to freeze in the stratification in two ways. First, those black employees previously excluded from the higher paying departments because of their race will be denied these promotion opportunities in favor of those white employees in the department; Secondly, those black workers, who, although deterred because of their race, have obtained a foothold in a predominantly white department cannot compete equally on the basis of departmental seniority with white employees, who were able to gain entrance to the department earlier. 43 Therefore, conclude appellants, the departmental seniority system deters black employees from transferring because of the inhibitors of losing seniority and pay grade while the bidding and posting procedure most often prevents even the consideration of the majority of black workers for a position within a predominantly white department. And both practices operate to handicap black employees in intra-departmental promotion for the higher paying, skilled jobs. 32 We agree with appellants that if past discriminatory employment practices have resulted in racial stratification in pay, jobs, and departments, the present effect is to lock in, as discussed above, black employees. 33 44 2. Effect of past discriminatory practices. The next step is to determine whether there was racial segregation along pay, job, and department lines. While there was substantial viva voce evidence on the issue of the impact of past discriminatory practices, the appellants primarily relied on statistical evidence. Introducing black/white comparative employment statistics from 1963, 1965, 1969, and 1971, dealing with salary, jobs, and departments, the appellants demonstrated a pattern of racial stratification between departments and within departments by the derogation of black employees into the lower paying, non-skilled pay groups. This statistical pattern considered in light of the past intentional discrimination and the illegal testing requirement, coupled with the hurdles to black employees presented by the departmental seniority system and the handicaps under the bidding procedure, present a prima facie case of present effect of past discrimination in the company's promotion and transfer process. 34 Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-807, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). In relying on this method of statistical proof, we first examine the total black/ white employment figures for the years 1963, 1965 through 1971. Between 1965 and 1969, the period when the testing and educational requirements were prerequisites for all pay groups, the number of black workers decreased from approximately one-half to one-third of the company's work force, correspondingly the number of white employees increased. The company admitted and the district court 35 found that this decrease resulted Chart A; Employment Totals by Race 45 YEAR BLACK WHITE ---- ----- ----- 1963 878 797 1965 869 923 1966 845 1606 1967 820 1766 1968 798 1878 1969 781 2162 1970 1121 2115 1971 927 1624 46 from the impact of the testing and educational requirements. 36 It was not until 1969-70, when the company dropped its testing and educational requirements for jobs in the 1-8 pay groups, that the percentage of black employees for the company began to increase. By 1970, 1971 the company's work force again was approximately 50% Black. 47 Testimony by company officials and a finding by the district court establish what the empirical proof clearly reveals, a substantial disparity in the number of blacks hired between 1964 and 1969 when testing and educational standards were required for all pay grades. Since the same test, California Test of Mental Maturity, was employed both in the determination for hiring and for promotion, its adverse impact on black applicants is highly relevant in weighing its adverse impact on the promotional opportunities of black employees. 48 Hiring statistics indicate that black applicants fared substantially worse than white applicants on the testing. So too the actual achievement of black workers on the mental maturity test reveal lower scoring than white employees of the company as of September, 1971. For example, in the five departments 37 containing 80% Of the black workers, the black employees' scores averaged in the 0-9, 10-19, or 20-29 percentile while white employees' scores averaged in either the 40-49 or 50-100 percentile in every department. 49 Having observed that black employees performed less well on the tests than white employees, we must make a comparison of the black/white employment data by departments and within departments by pay rate to discover if the impact of the illegal testing (scoring lower) was to lock black workers into lower paying, non-skill departments and lower paying jobs in all departments. The statistics from 1963 to 1965 indicate almost complete stratification of black employees within the non-craft departments, mono-cast, fittings foundry melting, bolt, shipping, steel foundry, and general yards, and white employees in the more craft oriented, highly skilled departments, maintenance, machine shop, electrical, inspection, and steel pipe. Within departments, black employees occupied predominantly the 1-8 pay groups and white employees the 9-15 pay groups. 38 Chart B: Employees By Department 50 And Race 1/1/63 1/27/65 9/19/69 8/15/71 --------------- -------------- ---------------- --------- Department B W B W B W B W ---------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- Mono-Cast 359 104 311 138 343 338 369 310 Fittings Foundry 234 185 242 234 222 344 245 296 Melting 60 26 67 70 74 107 77 108 Maintenance 9 67 9 74 6 87 9 90 Technical 6 25 6 51 6 60 - - Division Bolt Department 30 21 24 13 27 33 29 37 Shipping Department 35 21 40 19 22 31 30 34 General Yards 15 12 14 13 17 18 19 20 Construction 20 25 19 33 26 42 27 56 Steel Foundry 35 28 34 65 32 58 36 51 Plant Protection 0 13 0 13 1 15 - - Engineering 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 2 Finance Division 4 16 4 6 3 5 3 4 Personnel 19 2 20 2 19 7 13 23 Storage 0 5 0 6 1 17 2 21 Medical 5 0 Research 2 6 Lab 4 9 Shopping Center 2 4 1 3 0 1 - - Machine Shop 39 201 - - 38 318 49 379 Electrical 1 41 1 47 1 54 4 73 Inspection 1 34 Steel Pipe 2 41 1 69 1 35 Production Control 0 8 Purchasing 0 2 Chart C: Employees By Race Within Each Pay Group as of August 15, 1971 % of Total Pay No. of % of In No. of % of Total Group Blacks Blacks Plant Whites Whites In Plant ----------------- ------ ------- ------ ------ ------- ------- 1 34 (3.68) (1.35) 134 (8.42) (5.33) 2 36 (3.89) (1.43) 22 (1.37) (.875) 3 336 (36.31) (13.3- 185 (11.64) (7.36) 6) 4 122 (13.19) (4.85) 44 (2.76) (1.75) 5 84 (9.09) (3.34) 26 (1.63) (1.03) 6 125 (13.51) (4.96) 55 (3.46) (2.19) 7 110 (11.89) (4.37) 55 (3.46) (2.19) 8 35 (3.79) (1.39) 52 (3.27) (2.07) 9 23 (2.49) (.904) 278 (17.49) (11.06) 10 2 (.216) (.079) 49 (3.07) (1.95) 11 9 (.971) (.358) 104 (6.67) (4.13) 12 7 (.757) (.278) 436 (28.43) (17.38) 13 0 24 (1.51) (.959) 14 0 60 (3.77) (2.39) 15 0 61 (3.81) (2.42) 16 0 1 (.039) 17 (other) 2 (.216) (.079) 3 (.186) TOTAL 925 1,589 Chart D: Segregation By Types Of Jobs # # Department Year All B All W # B/W Total ------------- ---- ----- ----- ----- ----- Foundry 1963 38 34 0 72 1965 37 30 6 73 1969 18 29 21 68 1971 19 24 22 65 Melting 1963 20 13 0 33 1965 11 16 11 38 1969 9 17 16 42 1971 6 14 18 38 Steel Foundry 1963 18 19 0 37 1965 14 22 4 40 1969 9 23 11 43 1971 9 20 12 41 Machine Shop 1963 5 19 0 24 1965 - - - - 1969 5 11 4 20 1971 5 26 4 36 Construction 1963 2 9 0 11 1965 3 11 0 14 1969 6 15 0 21 1971 7 21 0 28 Shipping 1963 6 6 0 12 1965 9 6 0 15 1969 7 10 3 20 1971 8 11 3 22 Personnel 1963 9 2 0 11 1965 9 2 0 11 1969 8 4 0 12 1971 - - - - Technical 1963 4 0 0 13 1965 3 10 0 13 1969 3 3 0 6 1971 1 1 0 2 51 Chart E: The Racial Distribution and Salary of Employees 52 By Department As Of August 12, 1971  53 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Blacks Whites ------------------------------- ------------------------- Accumulating Accumulating Avg. Avg. % Avg. % Wage % B. Wage Of Blacks Wage Of Whites In In Of In Work Of In Work Department Dept. # Dept. Blacks Force # Whites Force ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Inspection $3.83 1 2.9% $2.78 0.1% 34 $3.86 2.1% Maintenance 3.79 9 8.8 3.29 1.1 93 3.84 7.8 Machine Shop 3.65 50 11.7 3.08 6.5 379 3.72 31.1 Electrical 3.63 4 5.1 2.98 6.9 74 3.67 35.6 Steel Pipe 3.63 1 2.9 3.23 7.0 33 3.64 37.6 General Stores 3.57 2 8.7 3.38 7.2 21 3.59 38.9 Construciton 3.43 27 31.8 3.01 10.1 58 3.63 42.5 General Yards 3.38 19 47.5 3.22 12.2 21 3.52 43.8 Shipping 3.36 30 46.9 3.06 15.5 34 3.63 45.9 Steel Foundry 3.32 36 39.6 3.16 19.4 55 3.43 49.3 Foundry 3.28 247 44.7 3.03 46.2 305 3.48 68.0 Melting 3.27 75 39.9 3.14 54.4 113 3.35 74.9 Monocast 3.16 371 54.2 3.08 94.7 314 3.26 94.2 Bolt 3.11 20 34.5 2.91 96.9 38 3.22 96.5 Personnel, 3.04 13 38.1 2.95 98.4 23 3.09 97.9 Gen. Plant ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total 905 1595 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------  All of ACIPCO's departments are included in this chart except those departmeents having less than 15 employees: Industrial Engineering, Production Control,, Medical, Research, Laboratory, Purchasing, Finance and Engineering departmeent. In total, 33 whites and 15 blacks are employed in these departmeents. 54 Between 1965 and 1969, the data indicates less black/white stratification, but the district court found that this was not due to advancement by black into previously predominant white employee positions. Rather, as the total black/white hiring figures indicated, the increased hiring of whites and decrease in the number of blacks led to the placement of whites into the previous lower paying, predominantly black departments and positions. The district court further pointed out that the black employees during this period could not qualify under the testing for transfer or promotion. 55 Between 1969 and 1971, the statistics demonstrate a rise in the number of black employees in the pay groups 1-8. It was in February, 1968 that the testing requirement for positions in these pay ranges was removed; and in March, 1971 testing for all purposes was halted by the company. 56 These statistical showings are corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Phelps, the Employment Manager and Administrator of the tests, who stated: 39 57 Q. I said are you familiar with the fact that in taking the tests blacks score less favorably than whites? 58 A. Yes. 59 Q. In all departments, is that correct? 60 A. I can't answer that positively. 61 Q. What is your best judgment? 62 A. Yes. 63 This historical, statistical summary indicates a discriminatory pattern against black employees-- (1) assignment to lower paying non-skill departments and (2) assignment to lower paying jobs within all departments. As of August 15, 1971 the traditional predominantly black departments, monocast, fittings foundry, melting, bolt, shipping, steel foundry, and general yards, contained approximately 81% Of the black workers of the company. 40 The higher paying, traditionally white departments, maintenance, machine shop, electrical, inspection, and steel pipe, contained only 7% Of the black employees although 37.6% Of the total white work force was employed in these departments. 64 While the extreme stratification by pay rate along racial lines of 1963 41 was blurred by the influx of large number of white employees into the traditionally lower paying black positions from 1965 to 1969, there was no sign of movement of blacks into higher paying jobs. 42 The district court's findings reflect this fact. The district court examined eight key departments to demonstrate that job types were segregated with blacks occupying the lower paying positions. The court concluded: 65 The number of all black jobs decreased through 1969 as the number of mixed jobs increased due to the movement of whites into lower paying black jobs. From 1963 through 1969, the number of all white jobs remained approximately constant. Promotion of blacks to the higher paying white jobs, for reasons suggested above (testing and educational requirements), was not being accomplished. 66 The chart drawn up by the court reflects that in 1963 not a single type of job in any of the eight key departments was held by both white and black employees; 213 positions were totally segregated. The data from 1969 indicates that there were fifty-five racially mixed positions and 177 all white or all black positions. But the pertinent indicium for the period 1965-1969 is that the previous all black positions were being integrated by the influx of white personnel rather than any upward movement by black employees. In 1965 there were eighty-six all black jobs; in 1969 these were reduced to sixty jobs. 43 A total of thirtyfour positions were integrated during this period. In other words, twenty-six of the thirty-four jobs were integrated by the movement of white employees or applicants into previously all black jobs. As late as 1971, only fifty-nine of 232 jobs were integrated-only 25% Of the total. 67 The district court had earlier pointed out that black employees were placed into positions in the lower paid groups: 68 Although there were and continued to be blacks in substantially all the departments, the overwhelming majority of the black employees historically 69 (CHART E OMITTED) were and continued to be employed in the Pay Group 1-8 jobs in the various departments and particularly in the Mono-Cast 1, 2 and 3, Foundry. 70 This finding coupled with plaintiff's chart comparing the average wage of blacks and average wage of whites in all the departments firmly establish that black workers were forced into lower paying positions within the company. For example, just in terms of gross comparisons, 95.35% Of the black employees and 36.03% Of the white employees were in pay groups 1-8, while 63.94% Of the white employees and only 4.65% Of the black employees were in pay groups 9-16. 71 The district court, while agreeing that appellants' statistics revealed racial stratification, found that this resulted from factors other than past discriminatory employment practices. 44 The district court sifted out the following variables which were held to undermine appellants' empirical conclusions that black employees were locked in the lower paying jobs and departments: 45 72 (1) Voluntary refusal of training opportunities which are prerequisite to promotion; 73 (2) Voluntary refusal of promotions; 74 (3) Lack of requisite qualifications; 75 (4) The failure to request promotions; 76 (5) Poor job performances which have defeated promotion or resulted in demotion; 77 (6) Voluntary transfers to lower job classifications; 78 (7) Availability or a lack of job vacancies; and 79 (8) Lack of motivation. 80 The variables suggested by the district court, when examined in light of our own and the appellants' critical analysis, do not, however, weigh heavily enough to lessen the appellants' empirical conclusions. The district court points to the refusal of 573 black employees to accept promotions from 1965 to 1971. But 554 black employees accepted offered promotions. 46 In addition, the testimony concerning the promotions offered indicated that these positions were often less desirable than the employee's current position, being more physically menial and paying little more with limited future advancement opportunities. Also, for employees who had substantial seniority, and had consequently reached the top of their pay groups, a promotion involving transfer to a higher paying department would result in a cut in pay and beginning as a new man in the department. See United States v. N.L. Industries, supra, 479 F.2d at 362. 81 For the court to state that the black employees were unqualified is inconsistent with its conclusion that the testing was illegal under Griggs. For the testing and seniority were the only objective criterion utilized for promotion and transfer. Before January 1, 1971 (the date of the initiation of the posting and bidding procedure), the department superintendents utilized their subjective judgment in determining which qualified (testing and departmental seniority) employees filled job vacancies. We note that these supervisory positions are held by all-white employees. 82 We considered this type of subjective evaluation in Rowe v. General Motors Corp., supra, 457 F.2d at 359, stating: 83 All we do today is recognize that promotion/transfer procedures which depend almost entirely upon the subjective evaluation and favorable recommendation of the immediate foreman are a ready mechanism for discrimination against Blacks . . .. We and others have expressed a skepticism that Black persons dependent directly on decisive recommendations from Whites can expect non-discriminatory action. 84 A similar view to the trial court's was put forward by the district court in United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., supra, 451 F.2d 418, which had rejected the government's statistics because of their failure to evaluate competing black and white employees upon individual qualifications and accepted unadorned statements by the employer that they hired or promoted the best qualified persons available. We stated: 85 The trial judge's pronouncement cannot function as a general rule. It becomes valid only when the employer or union evidentially demonstrates that objective criteria pertinent to the particular job are the determinants of who is 'best qualified.' Id. at 442. 86 The employee make up of the steel pipe department also belies this conclusion. It is the highest paying primary production department (mono-cast, foundry, steel foundry, melting, and steel pipe) but has very few black workers, one as compared to thirty-five white employees. (See chart B, supra at 227). Since there are only a few craft positions in this department, the logical conclusion is that black workers were excluded by discriminatory practices. 87 The court cites a lack of requests for promotions, and yet, until January 1, 1971 when the formal posting and bidding procedure was initiated, there was no method by which black employees (or any employee) could request promotion. 47 During this period, promotion was, in effect, determined by all white supervisors; a practice we noted in Rowe which could have racial emphasis. This is particularly of importance considering the testimony reflecting a number of promotion requests by black employees which were never acted upon by the white foremen and department superintendents. Moreover, we deem appropriate the court's holding in United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., supra, 479 F.2d 354: 88 National Lead's contention that the reason black employees were not promoted to supervisory positions was because they did not 'ask' to be promoted is without merit. Nothing in the record indicates that white employees were required to make such a request. In any case, a black employee with knowledge of the nominal number of black foremen, the Company's past discriminatory policies, and the current practice of promotion via the recommendation of an incumbent foreman could hardly be expected to make a meaningless request indicating his willingness to be promoted. Sheet Metal Workers (United States v. Sheet Metal Workers), supra (8 Cir.), 416 F.2d (123) at 132; Carter, supra, 452 F.2d at 331; see Parham, supra, 433 F.2d at 427. Id. at 369. 89 Further, there was testimony at trial by a department superintendent 48 that after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) the company received a 'flood' of requests from black employees for more skilled positions. Of course, most were rebuffed by their failure to qualify under the illegal testing. In addition, during the first ten months in which the formal posting and bidding procedure operated, the testing and educational requirements having been terminated for the last six of these months, 41% (107) of the 251 jobs bid for departmentally and plant-wide were won by black employees. 49 90 The single foundation for the district court's conclusion that black employees were performing poorly on the job is the figures that from July 5, 1965 through October 1, 1971, seventy-six black employees were demoted. But during the same period 143 white employees were demoted. 50 In addition, the testimony at trial indicates that demotions were often due to work cut backs rather than poor job performance. 51 This demotion statistic concerning black employees is at the least nebulous and at the most engative in support of the court's conclusion. 91 The only mention in the record of a voluntary transfer to a lower job classification was in reference to physical disabilities which required the employee to request a less physically wearing job. It was stated, however, that the company had a practice of allowing older employees, black and white, to accept lower paying, less physically demanding positions without a reduction in pay rate. 92 As to the unavailability of job vacancies contention, the district court, itself, pointed out that between 1965 and 1970 employment at the company increased by 1,444 jobs, not including turnovers. Advancement opportunities were correspondingly increased during this period of rapid economic development. 93 The sole ground for the district court's conclusion of lack of motivation on the part of black workers appears to be lack of black enrollment in classes conducted by the company to aid in achieving higher scores in the testing. 52 Chart F: Class Enrollment By Race 94 White Black Employees Employees _________ _________ 1964  116 134 1965 32 22 1966  -- -- 1967 134 12 1968 92 19 1969 109 10  In 1964 the classes were conducted on a segregated basis.  The district court did not provide statistics for 1966. 95 In 1964 the classes were conducted on a segregated basis. 96 The district court did not provide statistics for 1966. 97 But the statistics for these classes indicate that it was not until 1967 that black enrollment began to fall off. In light of the discriminatory impact of this illegal testing, it may be that blacks simply realized that the testing was stacked against them. This lack of motivation conclusion also comes in the face of the testimony by a company management employee concerning the 'flood' of black applicants for more skilled jobs after the passage of Title VII. Further, the intense organization of black employees 53 and continued interest in this and past litigation 54 demonstrates that the black employees of the company are interested in opportunities for better pay and more highly skilled jobs. 98 In brief, the district court held that the statistical demonstration of the derogation of black employees to lower paying jobs and departments resulted from black employees' refusal of promotion and training opportunities, lack of qualifications, failure to request promotions, poor job performance, transfer to lower pay groups, lack of job vacancies, and lack of motivation. We find that this holding was 'clearly erroneous.' Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 5 Cir., 488 F.2d 691 (1974). Not only are these variable too numerally diminutive to rebut the distinct disparity in the black/white employment data, 55 but analysis and the evidence have disclosed that these variables have no substantial validity. 56 99 3. Conclusion concerning the promotion procedure. The statistical picture drawn here is similar to that which this Court found persuasive in United States v. Jacksonville Terminal, supra, 451 F.2d 418. Under attack by the government there was a promotion system with a bidding procedure based on a rigid craft or class seniority similar to the bidding and departmental seniority systems at issue here. 57 This Court stated: 100 . . . They (statistics) do prove that employment at the facility is approximately equally divided between whites and blacks, that whites generally occupy the higher paying positions, and that blacks hold the lower paying jobs. Id. at 441. 101 Similarly, the work force here is approximately 50% Black with the black employees occupying the lower paying jobs and departments. Likewise, the jobs and departments here and in Jacksonville Terminal have been segregated both by prior formal discrimination and present effect. 102 The statistics also show that almost all Terminal jobs were held exclusively either by whites or by blacks before July 2, 1965, and that this division has continued, with few exceptions, after that date . . .. Terminal records disclosed that the persistence of 'black' and 'white' jobs-- whatever their formal denotation-- has not been caused by failure to hire new personnel . . .. Moreover, as noted earlier, all blacks hired during this period, have become Porters. Promotions too have occurred. Blacks have gained a few supervisory positions in the Baggage and Mail Department and two Helper jobs in other departments. 'In racial discrimination cases, statistics often demonstrate more than the testimony of many witnesses, and they should be given proper effect by the courts.' Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., supra, 431 F.2d at 247; accord, Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 5 Cir. 1971, 444 F.2d 687 (1971); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., M.D.N.C.1969, 301 F.Supp. 97, 102 aff'd., 4 Cir. 1971, 438 F.2d 86. Id. at 442. 103 The district court there also rejected the statistical showing, finding that the employer had simply 'hired or promoted the best qualified persons available for the particular jobs.' This Court reversed: 104 We cannot accept the assumption that the Government's statistics have no probative force: i.e., 'the Government's failure or refusal to undertake a comparative evaluation of the entitlement to job vacancies of competing Negroes and whites, upon the basis of individual qualifications, leaves the record without probative evidence to support (the contention that black employees were not even considered for jobs to which whites were promoted or for which they were hired).' 316 F.Supp. at 581. The trial judge's pronouncement cannot function as a general rule. It becomes valid only when the employer or union evidentially demonstrates that objective criteria pertinent to the particular job or the determinants of who is 'best qualified.' Id. at 442. 105 This Court then went on to strike down the craft and seniority system because it restricted the 'transfer and promotion opportunities of incumbent black employees.' Id. at 453. 106 We have condemned similar promotion systems based on job seniority which operated to perpetuate past discrimination in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 491 F.2d at 1373-1374; United States v. Georgia Power Co., supra, 474 F.2d 906; Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., supra, 450 F.2d 557; Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, supra, 416 F.2d 980. Lekewise, other courts have found tainted departmental or job-type seniority systems, utilized for promotion purposes, which effectuated discrimination. United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., supra, 479 F.2d at 358-360; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., supra, 444 F.2d at 795-800; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1236-1237 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Company, supra, 327 F.Supp. 1037; Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F.Supp. 603 (E.D.La.1969). 107 The appellants have made a strong showing (1) that the company had a formal policy of discrimination prior to 1961 which lingered until 1963; (2) that the company maintained illegal testing and educational requirements from 1964 to 1971; and (3) that the employment statistics from 1963 until 1971 reflect that black employees have been derogated to the lower paying, non-skill departments and to the lower paying positions in all departments because of these past discriminatory employment practices. As we demonstrated above these variables cited by the trial court to explain the statistics, do not, on analysis, undermine the large statistical disparity between black/white employees' departments, positions, and pay rate. We have observed that the departmental seniority system deters black employees, by their loss of seniority and pay rate, from transferring and that the posting and bidding procedure, requiring initial consideration of persons within the department, often may prevent even the application of the majority of black employees for a job vacancy in the higher paying, predominantly white departments. In addition, both practices operate to handicap black employees in intradepartmental promotion because past discrimination was an impediment to black employees acquisition of seniority in these departments. Therefore, the neutral practices of the departmental seniority system and the posting and bidding procedure carry forward into the present the stratification of black employees into lower paying, non-skill departments and jobs resulting from past discrimination. Neutral employment practices perpetuating past discrimination were condemned by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 430. Affirmative relief is mandated by our decisions in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 491 F.2d at 1371, n. 34; United States v. Georgia Power Co., supra, 474 F.2d at 927; and Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, supra, 416 F.2d at 990-991. 58 108 B. Apprentice Program and On-The-Job Training 109 The company provides its employees an opportunity to train for the highly skilled, higher paying craft jobs through an apprentice program or on-the-job training (journeymen). The company maintains these programs for the following crafts: mechanic, machinist, electrician, carpenter, molder, pattern maker, welder, scale mechanic, brick layer, plumber, and tinsmith. The departments in which most of the craft jobs are located are the machine shop, electrical department, construction department, and maintenance department. 110 1. Apprenticeship. Only incumbent employees are eligible for the apprentice program. Applicants are required to have the following qualifications: (1) a high school education or its equivalent, (2) employment in the same department and/or trade for a minimum of six months, (3) prior to March 31, 1971, achievement of the fiftieth percentile on the California Test of Mental Maturity and a passing score on all aptitude tests for the particular skill or craft, (4) under twenty-six years of age or under thirty years of age for those applicants having served in the military. Once selected for an apprenticeship, the trainee has to complete an 8,000 hour course, approximately three and one-half to four years. During this time, the employee receives a starting salary at a pay rate 3, but works up to the higher rate of 11. After finishing the apprenticeship and after being placed into a craft position, the employee is eligible for a pay rate 12 or 13. 111 Appellants assert (1) that the continued high school education or its equivalent requirement constitutes a present discriminatory practice and (2) that the past intentional exclusion of black employees from craft jobs and the illegal testing has a continuing adverse impact under current neutral practices. Concerning the apprentice program, the district court declared: 'Defendant has practiced no invidious racial discrimination in the administration of its apprenticeship and journeyman programs.' We reverse this finding as 'clearly erroneous.' 59 112 We agree with appellants that the educational requirement is not neutral. This standard, itself, is a present discriminatory practice if it has a disproportionate impact on black applicants. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra; United States v. Georgia Power Co., supra, 474 F.2d at 918-919; United States v. Inspirational Consolidated Copper Co., supra, 6 EPD P8918. 113 From 1915 until the time of the trial, only one black employee had ever participated in the apprentice program, while 208 white employees have done so. Moreover, from 1915 until 1961, the total exclusion of black employees from craft jobs was a culpable company policy. We have previously discussed the district court's finding that the large majority of black employees have historically and continue to be within the lowest pay groups, 1-8. This educational criterion must continue to have an adverse impact on black employees because 56% Do not have a high school diploma. 60 Because of this disproportionate impact, the burden shifts to the company to demonstrate that their high school education or equivalent requirement for entry into the apprentice program is 'job related.' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra; United States v. Georgia Power Co., supra; United States v. Inspirational Consolidated Copper, supra. 61 114 The company's response was that their educational standard was not a high school diploma or its equivalent, rather a criterion used to select applicants who had obtained a sufficient educational level to successfully complete the International Correspondence courses relating to the craft for which they were entering an apprenticeship. The district court's finding that a high school education or its equivalent was a prerequisite for the apprentice program rebuts this assertion. Moreover, the company's own policy statement defining their apprentice program states as a qualification-- 'high school graduate or equivalent.' We do, however, construe this argument as both an attempt to show 'job relatedness' and 'business necessity.' 62 115 In order to show job relatedness, Griggs stated that a requirement must 'bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.' 401 U.S. at 431. Here, we understand the company to mean that a certain reading level and familiarity with study techniques is necessary to participate in the course work of the apprentice program. This cannot be equated with a requirement for a high school education or its equivalent. This Court, in fact, affirmed a district court's condemnation of a similar rationale for a high school educational criterion in Georgia Power: 116 The justification offered at trial for the requirement was very weak. As the district court observed: 'At best, the only justification for this requirement is the obvious eventual need for above-average ability to read and comprehend the increasingly technical maintenance manuals, the training bulletins, operating instructions, Forms and the like demanded by the sophisticated industry . . .. In such a context, the high school education requirement cannot be said to be reasonably related to job performance. This is not to say that such requirements are not desirable . . . it simply means that the 'diploma test' cannot be used to measure the qualities. Many high school courses needed for a diploma (history, literature, physical education, etc.) are not necessary for these abilities. A new reading and comprehension test . . . might legitimately be used for this job need.' 474 F.2d at 918. 117 Here just as in Georgia Power, there are employees who have had substantial job success and advancement without a high school education. 63 For example, there are seventy-five white employees, 64 without a high school education, receiving over $4,00 an hour. Of the approximate fifty foremen and forty to fifty leadmen in the plant, twelve foremen and eight leadmen are among this seventy-five. Sixteen of this group are machinists in the machine shop, a highly skilled, craft department; and two are electricians. The high proficiency level established by this standard not only precludes qualified employees but also is not refined sufficiently to measure the ability sought by the company. As the Supreme Court promulgated in Griggs and this Court stated in Georgia Power, 'the use of a high school requirement which has a disproportionate racial impact and has not been proven to be a predictor of ultimate job success controverts the congressional mandate of Title VII.' 65 474 F.2d at 918. 118 Assuming past discrimination has illegally denied present employees training opportunities, the question becomes: do present neutral prerequisites for entry into and completion of the apprentice program continue to deny these injured employees rightful benefits. The neutral prerequisites challenged by appellants are the age requirement and the length of the apprenticeship. 66 Appellants argue that the application of the age requirement has the consequence of continuing to exclude from the apprentice program all black employees who are employed and reached the age of twenty-five or twenty-nine before the company ceased its official segregation in 1961. Additionally excluded are those blacks barred by the testing program, who reached the age of twenty-five or twenty-nine before the company ceased its testing program in 1971. Therefore, appellants conclude that this age requirement perpetuates into the present effects of past discrimination and is unlawful. 67 119 Appellants deduce that the impact of past discriminatory practices in the apprentice program is blatant from the historical and statistical showing, recited above. In addition, appellants point to the testimony by company officials, stating that the effect of the tests and educational requirement was to screen out blacks from the apprentice program. The historical formal exclusion and the statistical and testimonial evidence demonstrating disproportionate exclusion of blacks by the testing and educational requirements, when combined with the continuing use of the high school education or its equivalent standard and the present age requirement and lengthy apprenticeship term, constitutes not merely a prima facie case, but conclusive proof 68 of present effect from past discrimination. 69 120 2. On-the-job training. Prior to March, 1971, to qualify for on-the-job training for journeyman status in a craft position, an applicant had to (1) meet the specified testing requirements, the same mental maturity test and aptitude test required for the apprentice program, (2) have three year's experience in a craft department or related craft job, and (3) be selected by the (all-white) supervisory employee group for the program. The company currently relies on a bid system for entry into the on-the-job training program. Under this procedure bids are taken within the craft department and the senior qualified man is selected. Only if no bids from qualified men are received from within the departments are employees from outside the department allowed to compete. In either case the final selection is determined by the all-white supervisory group. After the trainee has had six years' experience and if his departmental superintendent recommends him to the apprentice committee, the trainee is eligible for the intermediate craft salary rate. After an additional year's experience, the trainee is eligible for the craft rate (pay group 12 or 13). 121 Appellants argue that the present bidding system and the length of the training program lock in black employees derogated to lower paying, unskilled jobs by past discrimination. The district court, as quoted above, held that the defendant had not violated Title VII or section 1981 in administering its journeyman program. We reverse this holding as 'clearly erroneous.' 70 122 We accepted, supra II(A), the court's and appellants' statistical conclusion that black employees had been restricted to jobs in non-craft departments and in the 1-8 pay groups containing no craft or craft related positions, first by the formal exclusion prior to 1961 and then by the testing requirement from 1964 until 1971. To focus even further on this finding, appellants cite the employment data for pay groups 12 and 13, encompassing craft and technical positions. This data compiled two months before trial indicated only seven blacks, .76% Of black employees, had reached pay group 12; none had obtained a group 13 position. At this time, 436 white employees, 28.4% Of the total, occupied group 12 jobs, and twenty-four, 1.5% Of the total, held group 13 jobs. An additional factor relied on by appellants is the selection on the subjective evaluation by the all-white supervisory force, both a past and a present prerequisite to entry into the training program. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., supra, 457 F.2d at 359 ('we and others have expressed a skepticism that Black persons dependent directly on decisive recommendations from Whites can expect non-discriminatory action.') 71 123 The intentional discrimination by the company from 1915 until 1961 totally excluded black employees from the on-the-job training program. From 1964 until 1971, the testing continued to restrict black employees from craft departments and from craft jobs and craft related positions. We also recognize the discriminatory potential of subjective evaluation of blacks by the all-white supervisory groups. 72 Therefore, we are compelled again to find that past discrimination has had an adverse impact upon black employees' employment opportunities which is carried forward by neutral, current practices. The bidding procedure presently in effect would require black employees long denied this training opportunity in the past, to suffer a loss of seniority and cut in salary for admittance and participation in this training program. The requirement that bids from within the craft departments be given initial, primary consideration must fail in light of the proof demonstrating that a large majority of black employees have been excluded from these departments. In addition, a lengthy training program of six years will continue to exclude black employees from craft positions for an unnecessarily longer period. Appellants have presented prima facie evidence of the present effect of past discrimination, thus requiring affirmative relief. 73 Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. at 800-807. C. Supervisory Positions 124 The appellants question the absence of black employees from the supervisory positions of leadmen and foremen. The district court made the following finding of fact concerning this absence: 125 Out of approximately fifty leadmen, only three have been black. Defendant has never had a black foreman. 126 However, the court drew no specific conclusion of law on the issue of discrimination, other than a general recital at the end of its opinion 74 that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any other relief. 127 The leadman is the worker who sets the pace for his unit of workers. The general practice is to choose the foreman from the ranks of the leadmen. Prior to March, 1971, there were two qualifications for the positions of leadmen and foremen. First, the candidate had to have obtained the requisite testing achievement. Secondly, the department superintendents, who have always been white, then selected the 'best qualified' of these individuals. This selection was based on their subjective judgment rather than objective criteria. The testimony at trail indicated that there were approximately forty to fifty leadmen, of which one was black. Of the approximate fifty foremen none were black. 128 The statistical disparity presented in this case combined with the illegal testing and a subjective standard applied by all-white department supervisors would normally present a conclusive showing of present discrimination. The company, however, terminated their testing requirement for these positions in March, 1971, which was six months prior to the trial in October, 1971. The question for us is whether selection on the basis of subjective judgment of all-white superintendents operates independently of the testing to discriminate and helped produce this disparity. 129 In Rowe v. General Motors Corp., supra, 457 F.2d 340, this Court admonished an employer for allowing possible discriminatory subjective evaluation by all-white supervisors in the promotion of black employees. This Court cautioned: 130 . . . Had to acknowledge that the methods for promotion/transfer at GMAD would enable an individual foreman, if he were so inclined, to exercise racial discrimination in his selection of candidates for promotion/transfer, and that, under the social structure of the times and place, Blacks may very well have been hindered in obtaining recommendations from their foremen since there is no familial or social association between these two groups. All we do today is recognize that promotion/transfer procedures which depend almost entirely upon the subjective evaluation and favorable recommendation of the immediate foreman are a ready mechanism for discrimination against Blacks much of which can be covertly concealed and, for that matter, not really known to management. We and others have expressed a skepticism that Black persons dependent directly on decisive recommendations from Whites can expect non-discriminatory action. 457 F.2d at 359. 131 In the past, this Court has ordered the development of objective criteria in order to eliminate the possible discrimination inherent within subjective employment determinations. 75 Local 53 of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). In caswes involving similarly alleged racial discrimination for promotions to supervisory positions, courts have acted on a showing equal to that made by the appellants here. 76 In United States v. N.L. Industries, supra, 479 F.2d 354, the court stated: 132 The inference of discrimination provided by the statistics is reinforced by the Company's method of selecting foremen. The Company's promotional plan is very similar to that used by General Motors Corporation in Rowe, supra, 457 F.2d 348. In that plan the foreman's recommendation was the indispensible, single most important element in the promotional process; there were no written instructions to foremen as to the qualifications desired; standards that were set were vague and subjective; hourly employees were not notified of promotional opportunities; and there were no safeguards in the procedure to prevent discrimination. 133