Opinion ID: 2345444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Stipulation Waived Severance Issue

Text: Johnson contends that the Superior Court erred by not, sua sponte, severing the two charges of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (PDWBPP) from the remainder of the indictment. However, Johnson never filed a motion to sever the PDWBPP charges. In fact, at trial the defense stipulated that Johnson was a person prohibited pursuant to title 11, section 1448 of the Delaware Code. Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) permits multiple offenses to be charged in the same indictment, if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or ... connected together.... [62] Superior Court Criminal Rule 14 allows for severance [i]f it appears that a [party] is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses.... [63] Reading these rules in pari materia, this Court has held that severance of charges may be appropriate when: (1) The jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilty when, if considered separately, it would not so find; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes to infer a general criminal disposition of the defendant in order to find guilt of the other crime or crimes; and (3) the defendant may be subject to embarrassment or confusion in presenting difference and separate defenses to different charges. [64] An additional factor to be considered is whether the evidence of the crime sought to be severed would be admissible in a trial of the remaining charges. [65] The decision to grant or deny severance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. [66] Since no motion to sever was made, however, Johnson's severance claim is waived on appeal unless he can demonstrate plain error. [67] This Court recently reiterated that plain error is predicated upon oversight, as opposed to a tactical decision, of counsel. [68] The record reflects that defense counsel made a tactical decision to stipulate that Johnson was prohibited from possessing a firearm. Johnson was a person prohibited as result of his 2003 conviction for Rape in the Fourth Degree. By stipulation, Johnson avoided the jury learning about the nature of his prior conviction. Nevertheless, the stipulation did not provide the reason for Johnson's prohibited status. Instead, the stipulation simply stated that the parties agreed Johnson was prohibited from owning or possession a firearm. Superior Court Criminal Rule 14 allows a trial judge to order severance even if no request has been made. [69] In Johnson's case, the trial judge did not, sua sponte, sever the two PDWBPP charges. In Bell v. State, this Court rejected a claim that the trial judge erred by failing sua sponte to sever a PDWBPP charge, where defense counsel stipulated to the person prohibited status. [70] We held that the defendant's claim was waived by reason of the stipulation, [71] and reach the same conclusion here. Johnson has the burden to show how he was prejudiced by the charges not being severed. [72] The agreement to stipulate that Johnson was a person prohibited, without disclosing the reason, was a tactical decision by defense counsel to minimize any prejudice that may have been resulted from not severing the charges. Johnson has failed to demonstrate that any error occurred. [73]