Opinion ID: 791199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Insufficient Evidence of Money Laundering — Nichols

Text: 33 Nichols alone argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for conspiracy to commit money laundering and money laundering. We will reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, giving the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, no construction of the evidence will support the jury's verdict. United States v. Beltz, 385 F.3d 1158, 1163 (8th Cir.2004). 34 The essence of Nichols's argument is that the money transfers and expenditures were done openly and without an intent to conceal. A money laundering violation requires proof of concealment, not the absence of full disclosure. United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir.1998). Here, Nichols deposited all the funds in a single bank account registered with Nichols's name and social security number. The funds were then transferred to accounts in Nichols's name and in Gomez's name at gambling casinos with checks drawn on the account and signed by Nichols. Thus, according to Nichols, there was no proof of concealment. As such, Nichols asserts that the money laundering statute has been used to criminalize mere money spending. See Shoff, 151 F.3d at 892. 35 We have upheld money laundering convictions where there is evidence that the money transfers made it more difficult for the true owner of the money to trace what happened to it, United States v. Norman, 143 F.3d 375 (8th Cir.1998), or involved the routing of money. United States v. Vanhorn, 296 F.3d 713, 717 (8th Cir.2002). In Norman, the defendant bought a vehicle with illegally obtained money. 143 F.3d 375. He paid for the car with a check drawn on an account of a business he controlled, and the car was titled in the name of the same business. Id. Norman made no attempt to conceal from the seller of the car his own identity, or the fact that he owned the business that was to become the owner of the car. Id. We first explained that money laundering only requires that a defendant know that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. Id. Accordingly, the point is not whether the seller of the car is deceived as to who the defendant was, but rather, by changing the proceeds of unlawful activity from the form of money-through the use of undisclosed business accounts-into the form of an automobile, it made it more difficult for the true owner of the money to trace what had happened to the funds. Id. 36 We affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Norman's money laundering convictions and noted that the illegal funds were deposited into three bank accounts held in two names, neither of which was the account known to the victim. Id. In addition, we relied on the fact that the subsequent purchases were made by checks, and involved automobiles and other goods that were not matters of public record. Id. 37 Similarly, in this case, Nichols's scheme employed transactions that hampered fraud victims' efforts to discover their money's location and use. Specifically, although Nichols deposited the money into a single account, he then divided the money into multiple gambling accounts, and sent cash to Gomez, Nichols, and Baker. Nichols gave some of the money in the central account to family members and funneled some to a corporation; he also used some of the proceeds to purchase vehicles. The money in the accounts was also used to pay prior debts and purchase casino chips for gambling-matters not of public record. None of these transactions were known to the victims. 38 In Shoff, the money laundering counts were based upon two automobile purchases. Shoff, 151 F.3d at 890-91. Shoff received a $30,000 check from his cousin's wife, payable to Shoff personally. Id. He deposited the check into a newly-opened checking account in the name of Shoff Trading Limited. Four days later, he wrote a check on that account to purchase a $17,290 money order payable to a local car dealer. Id. The bank's records list Shoff as purchaser of the money order. He used the money order to purchase a 1989 Mercedes. Id. Second, after a client invested $150,000 with Shoff by wiring the money, at Shoff's direction, into a Shoff Trading checking account, Shoff wrote a check on that account to purchase a $28,400 cashier's check payable to a local car dealer. Id. The cashier's check listed Shoff as the remitter. He used the cashier's check to purchase a 1992 Mercedes. Id. 39 In Shoff we noted that the line between money spending and money laundering is often a difficult line to draw. Id. We distinguished Norman as a case where the defendant secretly converted proceeds to personal use, and explained that Shoff's victims did not care where he initially deposited their funds. Id. The victims transferred the money to Shoff personally or at his direction, relying on his representation that he would invest, not on their ability to supervise or control his use of the proceeds. Id. We held that purchasing two cars was not equivalent to money laundering. Id. 40 In this case, Nichols's victims expected proper stewardship of their funds. He told them the funds would be deposited in a non-interest bearing account for a particular future use. The victims were not relying on Nichols to invest the funds but to hold the funds until an estate closed. As such, the money was not transferred to Nichols in his individual capacity and at his discretion. Thus, we hold that Nichols's transfer of money from the central account to different persons and gambling accounts provided sufficient proof of concealment for purposes of the money laundering statute.