Opinion ID: 1775386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: prejudicial evidence and prosecutorial misconduct

Text: Over strong objection and protest by defense counsel the State's attorney cross-examined Hosford about his physical abuse of Mrs. Hosford, and complaints made in Youth Court and with the county welfare department about his mistreatment of his stepchildren and Mrs. Hosford. Mrs. Hosford was also asked if Hosford had physically abused her, and about her complaints to the welfare department of physical abuse by her husband to her and the children. Then, in rebuttal the State offered Reece McCoy, an employee of the county welfare department who investigated child abuse matters. Over defense objection he was permitted to testify that his office had investigated and made two reports on violence in the Hosford family. The circuit judge did, however, refuse to permit the State to ask McCoy the details of the reports. This particular line of questioning dealt with alleged acts of violence of Hosford towards his wife and stepchildren, none intimating sexual conduct. Again, over the objection of the defense, the State asked the following series of questions of Hosford: A. I haven't fooled with nobody. Q. You haven't fooled with nobody? A. No, sir. Q. You haven't fooled with Tabitha? A. No, sir. Q. You haven't fooled with Richard? A. No, sir. Q. You haven't fooled with Crystal? A. No, sir. Q. You haven't fooled with Angela? A. No, sir. Q. You have never made Tabitha place her mouth on your penis? A. No, sir. Q. Never? A. Never. Q. So if she were to come in this courtroom and tell this jury that you made her do it, that would be a lie, too? The State had made no effort during the presentation of its case in chief to present evidence of Hosford's violence toward his own family, or acts of sexual, deviant conduct with his stepchildren. We first note that the State was obligated to present all relevant evidence bearing upon Hosford's guilt as part of its case in chief, not initially through cross-examination of the defendant and his witnesses, and then offering evidence of such conduct in rebuttal. In Roney v. State, 167 Miss. 827, 150 So. 774 (1933), we held: [I]t is the general rule in this state, as elsewhere, that the party who has the burden of proof, and the duty to open the case, must in his opening, and before he rests in his proof, introduce all the substantive evidence upon which he relies to establish his demand, and the extent of that demand.... 167 Miss. at 830, 150 So. at 775. We further stated that it was only when it was necessary that justice may be done, that the rule be relaxed. We then laid down the following rule: [S]o it is that appellate courts do not attempt to lay down precise rules for the control of the discretion of the trial courts in this matter, else the discretion would be unduly limited and hampered; but there is a rule which will be found of substantial aid in this connection, and while obviously not at all inclusive of all cases, it will cover most cases. That rule is that when the question is not free from doubt whether the evidence offered in rebuttal is that which belongs to the evidence in chief, or whether it is rebuttal evidence proper, the court should resolve the doubt in favor of the reception in rebuttal where (1) its reception will not consume so much additional time as to give an undue weight in practical probative force to the evidence so received in rebuttal, and (2) the opposite party would be substantially as well prepared to meet it by surrebuttal as if the testimony had been offered in chief, and (3) the opposite party upon request therefor is given the opportunity to reply by surrebuttal. [Emphasis added] 167 Miss. at 831-32, 150 So. at 775-76. Clearly, this rule requires that there be some doubt as to whether the proposed evidence is properly a part of the case in chief or rebuttal. It is only in such doubtful cases that it should be permitted. Manifestly, no party should be permitted as a deliberate trial tactic to decide in advance of trial to withhold a part of his case in chief, but instead attempt to suggest such evidence in cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing side, and then offer the evidence in rebuttal. See: People v. Crump, 5 Ill.2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615, 623 (1955). Moreover, evidence of Hosford's physical abuse of his wife or stepchildren was not simply procedural error, but was also manifestly incompetent at any stage of the trial proceedings. It was evidence of other misconduct which had no probative value on the issue before the jury, and which was inflammatory and extremely prejudicial. Neither at trial nor on appeal has the State suggested a plausible excuse for this line of questioning. [2] Turning to the State's cross-examination of Hosford about acts of deviant, sexual conduct with his stepchildren, we again note that if the State had possessed any evidence of such misconduct and deemed it relevant to the issue of his guilt, it was under a duty to make profert of it as part of its case in chief. Roney v. State, supra . At that time its competency, which we do not deem necessary to address on this appeal, could have been tested. Profert could have been made to the court in chambers without inflaming the jury. If the court had determined such evidence admissible, it would have been proper for the State to offer what proof it had, and when Hosford and other defense witnesses took the stand, to cross-examine them fully and at length as to any such conduct. This salutary procedure was ignored. In the absence of some showing of necessity under the guidelines of Roney v. State, supra , it was reversible error to permit the State to present its case in this manner. The error was egregiously compounded by the fact that the State, insofar as this record shows, had no evidentiary basis to ask such questions. Wide latitude should be given in the cross-examination of witnesses, but basic fairness requires that before the State asks questions to the accused directed to whether he is guilty of a series of totally different crimes, it have some basis in fact to ask them. This would be the case even if commission of such crimes were admissible evidence before a jury. Even though the defense objection was sustained, the State's conduct in asking these questions constituted reversible error. The prosecuting attorney as a representative of the State has an obligation to be fair in his prosecution. This is an obligation he can fulfill without relaxing his solemn duty to vigorously prosecute. In Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So.2d 593 (1947), we stated: The very nature of his functions as a prosecutor necessitates that the district attorney be a partisan in the case. Zeal in the prosecution of criminal cases is a praiseworthy and commendable trait in such an officer, and not to be condemned by anyone. A fearless and earnest prosecuting attorney, within the limitations upon his powers and prerogatives, is a bulwark to the peace, safety and happiness of the people. If convinced of the defendant's guilt, he should, in an honorable way, use every power that he has to secure his conviction. At the same time, it is the duty of the prosecuting attorney, who represents all the people and has no responsibility except fairly to discharge his duty, to hold himself under proper restraint and avoid violent partisanship, partiality, and misconduct which may tend to deprive the defendant of the fair trial to which he is entitled,    It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury ;    42 Am.Jur., Sec. 20, p. 255. [Emphasis added] 202 Miss. at 75, 30 So.2d at 596. We also stated in that case: In conducting a criminal case, the prosecuting attorney must be fair and impartial, and see that defendant is not deprived of any constitutional or statutory right.  [Emphasis original] 202 Miss. at 75; 30 So.2d at 596. In DeGesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 432, 364 P.2d 374, 86 A.L.R.2nd 1435 (1961), the Colorado Supreme Court stated: A district attorney, although in a sense a partisan, is a judicial officer sworn to uphold the constitution and obligated to refrain from invalid conduct creating an atmosphere prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant. This and corollary principles governing his conduct have been reiterated repeatedly in numerous of our decisions. 86 A.L.R.2nd at 1441. In Bennett v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 333, 28 S.W.2d 24 (1930), the Kentucky Court of Appeals noted: It has been often written that a prosecuting attorney should act impartially and see that justice is fairly meted out, which requires fair dealing with an accused in calling him to account for his crime. It is his duty to see that the legal rights of the accused, as well as those of the commonwealth, are fully protected; to prosecute and not persecute; to conduct himself with due regard to the proprieties of the office. He represents the people of the state, and in a degree should look after the rights of a person accused of a crime by endeavoring to protect the innocent and seeing that truth and right shall prevail. 234 Ky. 336, 28 S.W.2d at 26. And, in People v. Zimmer, 51 N.Y.2d 390, 434 N.Y.S.2d 206, 414 N.E.2d 705 (1980), the New York Court of Appeals held: [U]nlike other participants in the traditional common-law adversarial process, whose more singular function is to protect and advance the rights of one side, a District Attorney carries an additional and more sensitive burden. It is not enough for him to be intent on the prosecution of his case. Granted that his paramount obligation is to the public, he must never lose sight of the fact that a defendant, as an integral member of the body politic, is entitled to a full measure of fairness. Put another way, his mission is not so much to convict as it is to achieve a just result [citations omitted]. These are more than noble sentiments. In large part to enable a public prosecutor to carry out his heavy responsibility in a fair and impartial manner, we and, increasingly, other nations (see Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three Inquisitorial Systems: France, Italy and Germany, 87 Yale L.J. 240), have come to grant the office wide latitude in the allocation of its resources. Not the least feature of this flexibility is a discretion to investigate, initiate, prosecute and discontinue broad enough, conceptually and practically, to merit the observation that, overall, more control over individuals' liberty and reputation may thus be vested [in him] than in perhaps any other public official [citations omitted]. 434 N.Y.S.2d at 207-208, 414 N.E.2d at 707. In Nickolizak v. State, 75 Neb. 27, 105 N.W. 895 (1905), the Nebraska Supreme Court stated of the prosecuting attorney: He should never let his zeal, or the temptation to obtain the glittering bauble of success, lead him to the employment of questionable or unfair methods for the purpose of securing a conviction. 105 N.W. at 897. Regardless of the manner in which it comes about, prosecutorial misconduct which deprives an accused of a fair and impartial trial mandates reversal. See also: People v. Tufts, 167 Ca. 266, 139 P. 78 (1914); State v. Berry, 526 S.W.2d 92, 102 (Mo. App. 1975); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1081; 63A Am.Jur.2nd, Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 26, 27; and cases cited; 45 A.L.R.2nd 299; 48 A.L.R.2nd 999; 52 A.L.R.2nd 834; 3 A.L.R.3rd 1448. In State v. Dawson, 48 N.C. App. 99, 268 S.E.2d 572 (1980), the North Carolina court of appeals, while recognizing a rule in that state permitting cross-examination of a witness concerning collateral matters relating to his criminal and degrading conduct, nevertheless held, in reversing a conviction, that the question must be asked in good faith. The court then defined good faith: [T]his means simply that the questions must be grounded in fact. The prosecutor may not inject . .. to the prejudice of the accused by argument or by insinuating questions supposed facts of which there is no evidence [citation omitted]. [Emphasis added] 258 S.E.2d at 576. The witness in that case was the defendant's mother, and a crucial witness in his defense. See also: People v. Perez, 58 Cal.2d 229, 23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617, 3 A.L.R.3rd 946 (1962). It is highly improper for a prosecuting attorney in an opening statement to refer to matters incompetent as evidence, or which he does not attempt to prove. State v. Browner, 587 S.W.2d 948, 16 A.L.R.4th 795 (1979), and cases therein cited; State v. Berry, supra . It follows that it is error to cross-examine the accused as to collateral matters which are inadmissible as evidence, or not part of the record. Nickolizak v. State, supra ; People v. Crump, 5 Ill.2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615, 624 (1955); People v. Santa Maria, 207 Cal. App.2d 306, 24 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1962); Brown v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 67, 323 S.W.2d 954, 957 (1959); Hager v. State, 133 P. 263, 264 (Okla. Ct. App. 1913); as well as to accuse or insinuate that the accused is guilty of other crimes which he denies, and then make no attempt to prove them, State v. Glazer, 223 N.W. 769 (Minn. 1929) (reversing a conviction); State v. Beard, 74 Wash.2d 335, 444 P.2d 651 (1968). The Texas court of criminal appeals in Brown v. State, supra , in reversing, stated: In the language of a Kentucky court, a litigant is entitled to at least one tolerably fair trial regardless of the nature of his offense, ... and to this end we have made our ruling. Shawhan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 318 S.W.2d 541, 544. 323 S.W.2d at 957. In Hager v. State, supra, the Oklahoma criminal court of appeals held: It is true that great latitude should be allowed attorneys in cross-examining witnesses, but their questions should not contain insulting insinuations and intimations that a defendant is guilty of some other crime... . The cross-examination in the case at bar is full of insinuations and intimations that appellant was guilty of a number of offenses, which could not be otherwise than prejudicial to appellant, and upon this ground alone the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. This court stands squarely for the doctrine of harmless error, but it is equally committed to the doctrine that fairness must prevail in the trial of criminal cases. We will not tolerate police court methods in courts of record. Trial courts should confine the cross-examination of witnesses to legitimate subjects of inquiry, and should not permit a witness to be brow-beaten or asked insulting questions. 133 P. 263 at 264. In State v. Beard, supra , the Supreme Court of Washington, following a line of cases in that state, condemned an examination of the accused about prior convictions which the prosecution was unable or unwilling to prove upon the witness's denial. Nevertheless, because the defense had failed to interpose an objection at any time, and also because the proof of guilt of the defendants was conclusive, the Supreme Court affirmed. We must hold in a case of this nature, where the proof was by no means conclusive, that it was reversible error to ask Hosford about other odious conduct which insofar as this record reveals, had no basis in fact. It could have had no effect other than inflaming the jury. [3]