Opinion ID: 49096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: even ‘charged’ at them. In addition, he inten-

Text: We review de novo the denial of j.m.l., ap- tionally humiliated and embarrassed the emplying the same legal standard used by the dis- ployees.” Id. at 608-09. In holding that this trict court. Lubke v. City of Arlington, 455 conduct was extreme and outrageous, the F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2006). A j.m.l. should court relied on the regular pattern of abuse. be granted only if “there is no legally sufficient Id. at 617. “Occasional malicious and abusive evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have incidents,” on the other hand, “must often be found for that party with respect to that issue.” tolerated in our society.” Id. Id. (quotation omitted). In addition to GTE Southwest, the other In Texas, “[t]o recover damages for two cases that Cunningham relies on as au- [i.i.e.d.], a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the thority for the claim that RMC’s conduct was defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; extreme and outrageous also involved sus- (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and tained conduct, not one-time incidents. In outrageous; (3) the defendant’s actions caused Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the re- Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 613 (5th Cir. 1999), we sulting emotional distress was severe.” Hoff- reasoned that conduct was extreme and outramann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 geous in part because the “improper conduct S.W.3d 438, 445 (Tex. 2004). RMC appeals was persistent and long-standing.” In Wilson only on the basis that its conduct was not ex- v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1144treme and outrageous. “Extreme and outra- 45 (5th Cir. 1991), we stated that a substantial geous conduct is conduct ‘so outrageous in demotion following on the heels of “a yearcharacter, and so extreme in degree, as to go long campaign of harassment and abuse” was 3 extreme and outrageous. Cunningham argues guish damages under more established tort that in Wilson we held specifically that the sin- doctrines.” gle incident of demotion was extreme and outrageous. Though our opinion does state that the year of abusive conduct by itself was    insufficient under the standard, we did not say that the single act of demoting the plaintiff was We certainly understand judicial reticence sufficient on its own to constitute extreme and to dismiss claims like this one stemming outrageous conduct. Our conclusion that the from heinous acts. But except in circumdemotion was extreme and outrageous was stances bordering on serious criminal acts, linked to the year-long campaign of humilia- we repeat that such acts will rarely have tion: With the demotion, “the steep downhill merit as intentional infliction claims. push to total humiliation was complete.” Id. at 1145.2 Id. at 817-18 (footnotes containing citations omitted). Especially instructive is the recent, unani- mous decision in Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, The memorandum sent to Cunningham was 157 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2005). The court ad- a lone incident that is not actionable for i.i.e.d. dressed, inter alia, a claim of i.i.e.d. stemming under Texas law. Cunningham provides no from a post-termination eviction of the plaintiff authority that suggests this single memo meets from the house where she was living, allegedly the required exacting standard under Texas orchestrated by the defendant employer. The law, which supplies the rule of decision in this court denied the i.i.e.d. claim with the fol- case. lowing explanation: The judgment is VACATED, and this mat- Assuming all this was true, it was callous, ter is REMANDED for further proceedings as meddlesome, mean-spirited, officious, over- appropriate. bearing, and vindictiveSSbut not “so outra- geous in character, and so extreme in de- gree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized com- munity.” . . . Intentional infliction claims cannot be used “to circumvent the limita- tions placed on the recovery of mental an- 2 We are not declaring that a single incident can never constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, but only that the single memorandum in this case does not resemble the lengthy patterns of reprehensible conduct evident in GTE Southwest, Skidmore, and Wilson. Those cases do not support Cunning- ham’s position. 4