Opinion ID: 1907500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 1: Disqualification of Trial and Postconviction Judge

Text: Mansfield claims that the judge in the postconviction proceeding, who also served as the trial judge, should have been disqualified at the postconviction hearing and also makes a related claim that his trial counsel was ineffective during the trial's penalty phase for failing to move to disqualify the trial judge. The basis for these related claims is a statement which the trial judge made on the record to counsel, outside the presence of the jury, during the penalty phase deliberations. The statement was made when the trial judge was told by Mansfield's attorney that the State had made a plea offer to Mansfield of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole if Mansfield would admit his guilt and waive all rights to appeal. Although Mansfield refused the offer at first, his defense counsel attempted to convince him to accept it and then told the judge about the offer. After learning of the proposed plea offer, the judge made the following comments. Now, I find it troubling, to say the least, and I'm going to tell you why. Probably one of the most serious cases that I know of is a case involving murder in the first degree where the State seeks the ultimate sanction. I can knowI do not know of any more serious crime or where the consequences are so severe. Judges are taught through their judicial schools that death is different. We are taught that these proceedings are to be conducted differently. We are taught that we must be ever mindful of the procedure, the safeguards afforded to people who are accused of crimes. We are also taught of the gravity involved in a decision. When the State of Florida seeks the ultimate sanction, I was under the impression, maybe wrongfully so, that the State of Florida looked at a case, they looked at whether or not they could prove it and made any determinations of whether or not there would be any proof problems. They looked at something that the Florida Supreme Court looks at which is called proportionality. And they would also be ever mindful of the critics who, up until today's date, I have always felt very comfortable when I would be approached by people in the community concerning the death penalty and how the death penalty was not equally applied, particularly when it dealt with people of ebony hue, people of color and people who were victims who were of color. And I have always taken the tack that we were very fortunate here in the Ninth Circuit that we had an outstanding State Attorney's Office that basically looked at the case and did an analogy that was colorless. And Iand that did not have any happenstance to it. I think that when you announced, unless something changes drastically in this caseand I've thought about it. I presided over this case. And at this time and point, I do not see any errors. And if there are any errors, I don't see any reversible errors. So I don't see any proof problems. What really concerns me is why would this Court and this jury be asked to consider the ultimate sanction in this particular case, and then at the ninth hour, it just suddenly goes away? This is an emotional drain on the victim's family. It's an emotional drain on Mr. Mansfield's family to come in here to testify, to have to bare their souls as to what occurred during their childhood and to perhaps expose family secrets that they would not otherwise expose. And we get to this particular stage which really makes me question the sincerity of the state in seeking the ultimate sanction. As I indicated to all of you, this is very, very serious business. You're asking 12 folks over there to consider sending this man to Florida's electric chair. And if they make a recommendation of death, then you're asking this court to consider looking at Mr. Mansfield and telling Mr. Mansfield he needs to die in Florida's electric chair. And besides what I call minor issues, and these are minor issues, the extra expense to the taxpayers because we had to hire two lawyers because it was a death case. If it wasn't a death case, we wouldn't be paying two lawyers. We would not need to be back here today. The disruptions in the lives of these jurors, who God only knows whether or not all of them had a good night's sleep knowing that they would have to come in here and decide whether or not they should recommend that this man die. Either a person meets the criteria to die in Florida's electric chair, and if the proof is there, we need to put them there. If the person does not meet the criteria, then so be it. And that's why we have all of these arguments now back and forth about the death penalty, because people claim that it is willy-nilly applied and that there is no rhyme or basis as to who gets it and who does not get it. If folks are going to have confidence in our system of justice, then they are going to have to know that we're going to evenly apply it to everyone. If you meet the criteria and you don't have any proof problems, then so be it, then you go to the electric chair. If there are no proof problems and the State of Florida can prove their case, thenthen the ultimate sanction can be imposed. Then we will not have the naysayers who constantly, constantly point outand one justice on the United States Supreme Court got so frustrated thatwho used to be a big supporter of capital punishment and said the he wasn't going to support it any more because it could not be evenly applied because there was no rhyme or reason. So what is it that the State of Florida wants in this case? Because he has been found guilty by a jury. He has been adjudged to be guilty and fingerprinted here in open court. Now, that stands. Now, are you saying that in exchange for waiving the death penalty, you want him to give up his, quote, appellate rights? And I'll be honest with you, I don't know how valid that is, but ... What is it the State of Florida wants? I am just confused. Based upon these comments, Mansfield argues that Judge Perry should not have further presided in this case. However, Mansfield did not file a motion to disqualify Judge Perry within the required time following Judge Perry's statements. [7] Mansfield seeks to overcome this procedural bar on two bases. The first basis is his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely move to disqualify Judge Perry. The second basis is that the statement was a basis for the disqualification of Judge Perry as the postconviction judge, and the filing of the motion to disqualify Judge Perry as the postconviction judge did not have to be filed until Mansfield knew that Judge Perry was going to be the postconviction judge. Since whether either of these two bases avoids the procedural bar becomes immaterial if we determine that Judge Perry's statement did not disqualify him from continuing as the trial judge in the penalty phase of the trial and in postconviction, we make that determination first. [8] The standard of review of a trial judge's determination on a motion to disqualify is de novo. Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1097 (Fla.2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1669, 161 L.Ed.2d 495 (2005). Whether the motion is legally sufficient is a question of law. Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836, 843 (Fla.2002). In his order denying the motion to disqualify, the trial judge found that Mansfield's motion was legally insufficient. The order stated: The standard for viewing the legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify is whether the facts alleged, which must be assumed to be true, would cause the movant to have a well-founded fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial at the hands of that judge. See Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Fla.1983). See also Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(d)(1). State v. Mansfield, No. CR95-2078 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. order filed June 17, 2002). This is the correct standard for determining this motion. In this appeal, Mansfield does not explain the basis for Judge Perry's comments causing a well-founded fear that he would not receive a fair trial. Mansfield only cites to Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Doe, 767 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). This was a case which involved comments by a trial judge concerning his personal views of the responsibilities of cruise lines in a case in which a cruise line was a defendant. We find the judge's comments in that case to be distinguishable from the statement by Judge Perry here. We read Judge Perry's statement to be a statement concerning the timing of a plea offer. We find nothing in the statement that indicated bias or prejudice against Mansfieldrather, the statement was plainly directed at the State. The statement in respect to reversible errors was a statement of the trial judge's opinion while part of the trial was still ongoing. We do not read the statement as indicating any bias or any predisposition concerning future rulings. Based upon our case law, we find no basis to reverse the trial judge's denial of the motion to disqualify. We conclude that the motion failed to provide a basis for disqualification of the trial judge on the ground that Mansfield had a well-founded fear that he would not receive a fair trial. In Jackson v. State, 599 So.2d 103, 107 (Fla.1992), the allegation was that the trial judge's comments seem to infer a predisposition by [the judge] as to the facts that are expected to be presented at his new trial. We said: A motion to disqualify must be well-founded and contain facts germane to the judge's undue bias, prejudice, or sympathy. See Gilliam v. State, 582 So.2d 610, 611 (Fla.1991); Dragovich v. State, 492 So.2d 350, 352 (Fla.1986). The fact that a judge has previously made adverse rulings is not an adequate ground for recusal. Gilliam, 582 So.2d at 611; Suarez v. State, 95 Fla. 42, 115 So. 519 (1928). Nor is the mere fact that a judge has previously heard the evidence a legally sufficient basis for recusal. Dragovich, 492 So.2d at 352. Id. Likewise, we recently pointed out that a mere `subjective fear[ ]' of bias will not be legally sufficient, rather, the fear must be objectively reasonable. Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 41 (Fla.2005) (quoting Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla.1986)). We do not find Mansfield's allegations of fear to be objectively reasonable. See also Asay v. State, 769 So.2d 974 (Fla.2000). Our cases support the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify, and we affirm the trial judge's order. Thus, the other claims which are based upon the trial judge's statements are denied as moot.