Opinion ID: 1424906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the eatons' claims

Text: [¶ 10] Cormier contends that the court erred by treating the violation of the Ordinance as negligence per se. We have stated that the violation of a safety statute is not negligence per se, but only evidence of negligence. French v. Willman, 599 A.2d 1151, 1152 (Me.1991) (quoting Dongo v. Banks, 448 A.2d 885, 889 (Me.1982)). There is no language suggesting that the court treated the violation of the Ordinance as negligence per se. Rather, the court explicitly referred to the violations of the Ordinance as evidence of negligence.
[¶ 11] Cormier contends that the court erred in awarding the Eatons damages for NIED because there is no evidence that the Eatons suffered serious [2] emotional distress. Serious emotional distress exists `where a reasonable person normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the event.' Gayer v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 687 A.2d 617, 622 (Me. 1996) (quoting Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 805 (Me.1986)). The distress does not have to be manifested by objective symptomatology. Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp. of Maine, Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1284 (Me.1987) (quoting Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me.1982)). [¶ 12] Competent evidence supports the court's finding that the Eatons suffered from serious emotional distress. Mr. Eaton testified that he suffered from throbbing headaches and depression. Mrs. Eaton testified that the noise has caused her neck muscles to tighten. As a result, she was given muscle relaxants and a collar. Given this testimony, the court did not err in finding that the Eatons suffered serious emotional distress. See Gammon, 534 A.2d at 1283 (holding that the evidence supported plaintiff's NIED claim where plaintiff had nightmares, his personality was affected and his relationship with his family deteriorated).
[¶ 13] The Eatons contend that the trial court erred in concluding that their nuisance claim was not properly before the court. We agree. [¶ 14] Modern notice pleading practice requires a short and plain statement of the claim to provide fair notice of the cause of action, M.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), but use of any particular magic words are not required to state a particular claim. We construe the pleadings in favor of the pleader and in the interests of substantial justice. Chiappetta v. LeBlond, 505 A.2d 783, 785 (Me.1986); M.R. Civ. P. 8(f). `The function of the complaint is to provide fair notice of a claim.'... It must sufficiently apprise defendants of the nature of the action against them. Bolton v. Caine, 584 A.2d 615, 617 (Me.1990) (quoting Rubin v. Josephson, 478 A.2d 665, 669 n. 4 (Me.1984)). [¶ 15] The essence of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of land. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 87, at 619 (5th ed.1984). In their complaint, the Eatons state that the defendants' operation of the quarry generated noise, dust and interfered with Plaintiffs' possession and use of their property and residence, and that the defendants' cutting and burning ... deprived Plaintiffs of the safe and quite enjoyment of their home. By echoing language that describes the essence of a private nuisance complaint, the Eatons' complaint provided Cormier and the Temple fair notice of a claim that the operation of the quarry resulted in a nuisance. [3] [¶ 16] The Eatons requested both injunctive and monetary relief as remedies for their nuisance claim.
[¶ 17] The Eatons contend that the court erred in awarding them only $5,000 for NIED. The amount of damages to be awarded is a factual matter generally within the sole province of the [factfinder]. Lawrence v. Saunders, 539 A.2d 1102, 1103 (Me.1988) (citation omitted). We will not disturb an award of damages unless it is plain that there is no rational basis upon which the amount of the award may be supported ... or the jury acted under some bias, prejudice, or improper influence, or reached its verdict by compromise. Id. (citations omitted). No error is indicated in the court's award of $5,000 on the Eatons' NIED claim.
[¶ 18] Finally, the Eatons argue that the trial court erred in treating Cormier as the primary defendant rather than holding Cormier and the Temple jointly and severally liable. We disagree. [¶ 19] Proximate cause is a question of fact, Searles v. Trustees of St. Joseph's College, 1997 ME 128, ¶ 8, 695 A.2d 1206, 1209, which we will set aside only if clearly erroneous, McGraw v. S.D. Warren Co., 656 A.2d 1222, 1224 (Me.1995). A factual determination is clearly erroneous only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it. Id. [¶ 20] The Temple owns the land, but Cormier operates the quarry. Given that Cormier was directly responsible for the complained of conductstone burningthere was competent evidence in the record to support a finding that Cormier was the primary defendant. [¶ 21] On remand, the court must determine whether Cormier and the Temple are jointly and severally liable for causing a nuisance. An owner of land that consents to an activity on his or her land that causes a nuisance is subject to liability for the nuisance if the possessor knows or has reason to know that the activity is being carried on and that it is causing or will involve an unreasonable risk of causing the nuisance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 838 (1979).