Opinion ID: 185263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Unit Determination

Text: 15 The National Labor Relations Act delegates to the National Labor Relations Board the power to determine what constitutes an appropriate employee unit for collective bargaining purposes. Under section 9(a) of the Act, union elections are held by a unit appropriate for such purposes. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Section 9(b) provides that [t]he Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the[ir] rights ... the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.29 U.S.C. § 159(b). Once a unit is selected, a majority vote of the employees in that unit can designate a union as the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees within the unit. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). 16 This court will uphold an NLRB bargaining unit determination unless it is arbitrary or not supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 44 F.3d 1010, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In reviewing the record, [w]e owe substantial deference to inferences drawn from the facts as well as to the reasoned exercise of [the Board's] expert judgment. Avecor, Inc. v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotes omitted). Determining what constitutes an appropriate unit involves of necessity a large measure of informed discretion, and the decision of the Board, if not final, is rarely to be disturbed. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947). The Board is entitled to deference on its selection of an appropriate unit.Cleveland Constr., 44 F.3d at 1014. 17 Petitioner's primary claim is that the Board erred in its unit determination because other potential units, such as a pure craft unit of service technicians or a broader unit encompassing all parts and service department employees at both facilities, would have been more appropriate. However, the existence of alternative units which are 'appropriate' will not alone warrant reversal if the Board has chosen some other unit which is also appropriate. Local 1325, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1194, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1969). It is well established that [m]ore than one appropriate bargaining unit logically can be defined in any particular factual setting. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The NLRA does not establish an absolute rule of law as to what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. Packard Motor Car, 330 U.S. at 491. Rather, it delegates to the Board the responsibility to make a reasonable determination supported by its own precedent and evidence in the record. That this Court, or other reasonable people, may prefer a bargaining unit with different contours is immaterial as a reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for a rationally supported position adopted by the Board. Local 627, 595 F.2d at 848. Only those unit determinations that are truly inappropriate will be struck down. 18 Petitioner argues that the NLRB's Regional Director erred by combining service technicians and lube workers into a single craft unit. Petitioner notes the Board has approved units consisting of craft technicians and their helpers, trainees, or apprentices. In such cases a single craft unit is appropriate because the helpers, trainees, or apprentices interface with the technicians and may themselves receive training to become skilled craft technicians over time. See, e.g., Fletcher Jones Chevrolet, 300 N.L.R.B. 875, 876 (1990).The lube workers at Country Ford, on the other hand, have limited responsibilities and do not receive technician training. While these are reasonable arguments for excluding the lube workers from a bargaining unit of service technicians, there is no binding precedent from this Court or the NLRB itself that dictates such a conclusion. 19 In deciding that the lube workers were akin to the sorts of helpers or trainees included in craft units in prior cases, the Board's Regional Director noted that the lube workers, unlike other parts and service employees in the main facility, engaged in mechanical work alongside the service technicians. This finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. For example, while Country Ford claims that lube workers only perform lube jobs, oil and filter changes, and the like, there is testimony in the record indicating that lube workers also install hitches and assist technicians with other repairs. There is also testimony in the record indicating that whatever assistance or interaction the service technicians have with other employees, such as the service advisors, the lube workers are the only employees in the service department that provide hands-on, manual assistance with repairs and service. Petitioner is unable to identify any evidence in the record demonstrating that other workers perform equivalent assistance to the service technicians. 20 The Regional Director's unit determination was also consistent with prior NLRB precedent in which lube workers or other helpers were included in a bargaining unit along with skilled technicians. In Fletcher Jones Chevrolet, for example, the NLRB included lube workers (there labeled quick service technicians) in a craft unit of service technicians because they performed simple repairs and worked closely with the other technicians in the unit. 300 N.L.R.B. at 876. Similarly, in Dodge City of Wauwatosa, Inc., the Board recognized a unit of auto mechanics, including technicians that specialized in oil and lube work, as appropriate under the NLRA. 282 N.L.R.B. 459-60 (1986). 21 Petitioner cites language in Worthington Chevrolet, Inc., indicating that a broader bargaining unit would be more appropriate. 271 N.L.R.B. 365, 366 (1984) (Where as here all employees in the service and parts department of an automobile sales and service establishment perform functions related to the service and repair of automobiles, the Board has long held that a unit of all employees in the service department is appropriate.). However, the Board has explicitly disavowed such statements as overbroad and not entirely accurate, Dodge City of Wauwatosa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 460 n.6. In Dodge City, the Board distinguished between cases in which all employees in the service and parts department perform similar functions and those in which the mechanics form a distinct and homogenous group. Id. at 460. 22 NLRB concedes that there are other cases in which it found a broader unit of service department employees to constitute an appropriate unit. Yet this fact does not compel a different result, as there is no need to harmonize all NLRB decisions into a uniform pattern. NLRB v. DMR Corp., 795 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1986) (internal quotes omitted).At bottom, the cases cited by the Company do not form precedent so inconsistent with the Board's decision as to mandate reversal. Local 627, 595 F.2d at 850. 23 While the company contends that the unit should include all other parts and service employees, including those at the Annex, it offers no convincing reason why the Board was required to reach that conclusion under the law or precedents. The workers at the Annex perform different functions than the technicians and lube workers and are required to have different skills. They also do not share work hours (i.e., they lack a night shift) or compensation (i.e., they do not receive any commissions). Other factors, such as those considered in Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966), do not mandate a different result. There is no hard and fast definition or an inclusive or exclusive listing of the factors to consider. Id. at 398. Rather, unit determinations must be made only after weighing ... all relevantfactors on a case-by-case basis. Id. Based upon the record of this case, consideration of all relevant factors reinforces our judgment that the NLRB's Regional Director reached a reasonable conclusion. 24 Petitioner also charges that the Regional Director's decision was too deferential to the Union's proposed unit determination. Even if proven, this charge would be irrelevant. As the Supreme Court made clear in NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the language and legislative history of S 9(c)(5) demonstrate that the provision was not intended to prohibit the Board from considering the extent of organization as one factor, though not the controlling factor, in its union determination. 380 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1965) (footnotes omitted). Indeed, the NLRB may simply look at the Union's proposed unit and, if it is an appropriate unit, accept that unit determination without any further inquiry. See Cleveland Constr., 44 F.3d at 1013. 25 NLRB is expected to make unit determinations on a caseby-case basis. The Board's unit determinations are upheld so long as the identified unit is appropriate and the decision is consistent with precedent and is supported by substantial evidence. The Board's unit determination meets this deferential test. That other potential unit determinations appear equally or more appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal.