Opinion ID: 512395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Generator Defendants' Liability

Text: 33 The generator defendants first contend that the district court misinterpreted section 107(a)(3) because it failed to read into the statute a requirement that the governments prove a nexus between the waste they sent to the site and the resulting environmental harm. They maintain that the statutory phrase containing such hazardous substances requires proof that the specific substances they generated and sent to the site were present at the facility at the time of release. The district court held, however, that the statute was satisfied by proof that hazardous substances like those contained in the generator defendants' waste were found at the site. SCRDI, 653 F.Supp. at 991-92. We agree with the district court's interpretation. 34 Reduced of surplus language, sections 107(a)(3) and (4) impose liability on off-site waste generators who: 35 arranged for disposal ... of hazardous substances ... at any facility ... containing such hazardous substances ... from which there is a release ... of a hazardous substance. 36 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 9607(a)(3), (4) (West Supp.1987) (emphasis supplied). In our view, the plain meaning of the adjective such in the phrase containing such hazardous substances is [a]like, similar, of the like kind. Black's Law Dictionary 1284 (5th ed. 1979). As used in the statute, the phrase such hazardous substances denotes hazardous substances alike, similar, or of a like kind to those that were present in a generator defendant's waste or that could have been produced by the mixture of the defendant's waste with other waste present at the site. It does not mean that the plaintiff must trace the ownership of each generic chemical compound found at a site. Absent proof that a generator defendant's specific waste remained at a facility at the time of release, a showing of chemical similarity between hazardous substances is sufficient. 15 37 The overall structure of CERCLA'S liability provisions also militates against the generator defendants' proof of ownership argument. In Shore Realty, the Second Circuit held with respect to site-owners that requiring proof of ownership at any time later than the time of disposal would go far toward rendering the section 107(b) defenses superfluous. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044. We agree with the court's reading of the statute and conclude that its reasoning applies equally to the generator defendants' contentions. As the statute provides--[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law--liability under section 107(a) is subject only to the defenses set forth in section 107(b). 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 9607(a) (West Supp.1987) (emphasis added). Each of the three defenses 16 established in section 107(b) carves out from liability an exception based on causation. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044. Congress has, therefore, allocated the burden of disproving causation to the defendant who profited from the generation and inexpensive disposal of hazardous waste. We decline to interpret the statute in a way that would neutralize the force of Congress' intent. 17 38 Finally, the purpose underlying CERCLA's liability provisions counsels against the generator defendants' argument. Throughout the statute's legislative history, there appears the recurring theme of facilitating prompt action to remedy the environmental blight of unscrupulous waste disposal. 18 In deleting causation language from section 107(a), we assume as have many other courts, that Congress knew of the synergistic and migratory capacities of leaking chemical waste, and the technological infeasibility of tracing improperly disposed waste to its source. 19 In view of this, we will not frustrate the statute's salutary goals by engrafting a proof of ownership requirement, which in practice, would be as onerous as the language Congress saw fit to delete. See United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D.Pa.1983) (To require a plaintiff under CERCLA to 'fingerprint' wastes is to eviscerate the statute.). 39 The generator defendants next argue that the trial court ignored evidence that established genuine factual issues as to the existence of an affirmative defense to liability. They maintain that summary judgment was inappropriate because they presented some evidence that all of their waste had been removed from Bluff Road prior to cleanup. We agree with the trial court, however, that the materials on which the generator defendants rely were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 40 The generator defendants offered only conclusory allegations, principally based on information and belief, that their waste, originally deposited at Bluff Road, was at some time prior to 1979 transported from that facility to other sites operated by SCRDI. 20 To withstand summary judgment under section 107(b)(3), however, the generator defendants had to produce specific evidence creating a genuine issue that all of their waste was removed from the site prior to the release of hazardous substances there. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(b)(3). 21 In light of the uncontroverted proof that containers bearing each of the defendants' markings remained present at the site at the time of cleanup and the fact that hazardous substances chemically similar to those contained in the generators' waste were found, the generator defendants' affidavits and deposition testimony simply failed to establish complete removal as a genuine issue. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (summary judgment appropriately granted against nonmoving party who failed to produce evidence supporting an element essential to its case on which it bore burden of proof at trial).