Opinion ID: 1273597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: As expressed in 77 C.J.S., at 551-552, said is:

Text: A relative, well-defined word, with a definite and well-understood meaning. It is a word of reference to what has already been spoken of or specified, and, as employed in various instruments and documents, it refers to some antecedent provision, person, or object; something which has been mentioned above in the document. If there is a question as to which of the antecedent things or propositions specified is referred to, it is generally held to refer to the last of such antecedent propositions or things or to the next antecedent. However, the word `said' refers to the next antecedent only when the plain meaning requires it, and in every case the reference of the term is to be determined by the sense in which it is employed, and the rule will not be strictly applied where it would result in destroying or materially altering the intention expressed in the whole context of the language under consideration, and the word will be referred to the proper antecedent. In legal terminology, `said' means aforementioned; aforesaid; already spoken of; before mentioned; previously mentioned or named. Although the word said ordinarily refers to the last antecedent object, it still remains we must look to the sense in which it is employed in light of all language used. Noticeably, the words said property do not instantly stand alone. Rather, testator expressed an intention that Raymond be permitted to purchase the remaining half of the farm, not bequeathed to him, for a price equal to one-half of the value placed on said property in my estate . Under existing circumstances, we are persuaded testator's use of the qualifying phrase in my estate means he intended said property be that included in the estate as a whole, or Dickey Place, here the appropriate antecedent object. If a contrary view were to be adopted the words in my estate would, in effect, be excised as meaningless surplusage contrary to the rule expressed in Estate of Spencer, supra . See also In re Estate of Hoagland, 203 N.W.2d 577, 580-581 (Iowa 1973); In re Estate of Lamp, 172 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Iowa 1969). Briefly stated, this is not a case where the word said is used or to be applied in the ordinary sense. We now hold testator manifested an intention that as a purchase option condition Raymond pay a price equal to one-half the total value of the Dickey Place. Although not alone determinative, the above holding is to some degree buttressed by the fact that after testator had expressed himself as aforesaid he directed the option purchase price payable by Raymond be one-half the value as determined for Federal Estate Tax or Iowa Inheritance Tax purposes, whichever is higher . These italicized words indicate testator intended that Raymond, having been accorded half the Dickey Place by specific bequest, be required to pay the determined full value of the other half if he elected to exercise his given purchase option. AFFIRMED.