Opinion ID: 2125095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The motions for mistrial.

Text: Jury selection was completed on the second day of trial. That night an article on the trial appeared in the Dubuque Telegraph Herald which contained, as the State later conceded, numerous [factual] errors, to put it mildly . . . as well as prejudicial material. In part the article disclosed, in a closing paragraph, that the defendant had been discharged from a halfway house in Iowa City last September after serving four-and-one-half years at the Iowa Men's Reformatory in Amamosa. The next morning defense counsel moved for a mistrial. [1] Following the procedures set forth in State v. Bigley, 202 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Iowa 1972), the trial court, assisted by counsel, conducted individual examinations of three jurors who admitted reading the article. The first juror stated that he had read only the first couple of paragraphs of the article, that all he could remember was its discussion of the jury selection, and that his ability to remain impartial was unaffected by his exposure to it. The second and third jurors, who had read the article in its entirety, made similar statements and reaffirmations regarding their recollection and impartiality. The trial court did not discharge the jurors; rather, he carefully directed them not to disclose the substance of the interviews to the other jury members. When the State's evidence was completed that day, the court denied the defendant's motion for mistrial. The next morning the defendant moved for mistrial again, based upon . . . the voir dire testimony of the three jurors in the court's chambers yesterday morning. Again the motion was denied. The defendant now claims the court erred in permitting the trial to continue in the absence of an impartial jury. General principles relating to pretrial publicity apply to the circumstances of this case, and are succinctly summarized in United States v. Garza, 664 F.2d 135, 138 & n.1 (7th Cir. 1981): Due process . . . requires that an accused be tried by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Impartiality, however, does not mean complete juror ignorance of issues and events. If a juror can put aside his impressions gained from pretrial publicity and render a fair verdict based upon the evidence, the impartiality requirement is satisfied. Where juror exposure to pretrial publicity can be shown, defendants must still demonstrate that actual prejudice resulted. Prejudice is presumed in rare cases where pretrial publicity is pervasive and inflammatory. But more often trials are deemed fair in spite of widespread publicity. (Citations omitted.) See Smith v. Phillips, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78, 86 (1982). Although on appeal the defendant argues that mere jury exposure to a prejudicial newspaper article automatically requires the granting of a motion for mistrial, this court has consistently rejected such a per se rule. See State v. Frank, 298 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Iowa 1980); State v. Sallis, 262 N.W.2d 240, 246, 247 (Iowa 1978); Bigley, 202 N.W.2d at 57; State v. Sefcheck, 261 Iowa 1159, 1173, 157 N.W.2d 128, 136 (1968); State v. Clough, 259 Iowa 1351, 1361, 147 N.W.2d 847, 853 (1967). We decline to depart from our reasoning in those cases. Accordingly, we must determine whether the defendant has satisfied his burden of proving actual prejudice, see Smith, ___ U.S. at ___, 102 S.Ct. at 946, 71 L.Ed.2d at 86; Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573-575, 101 S.Ct. 802, 809-10, 66 L.Ed.2d 740, 751-52 (1981); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2035-36, 44 L.Ed.2d 589, 595 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-43, 6 L.Ed.2d 751, 756 (1961), or whether, under the circumstances, the publicity of the trial was so pervasive and inflammatory that prejudice must be presumed, see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, 621 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1632-33, 14 L.Ed.2d 543, 550 (1968). As a general rule, this court will not reverse a trial court's ruling on a mistrial motion based on juror exposure to potentially prejudicial materials absent error amounting to an abuse of discretion. Frank, 298 N.W.2d at 327. We find no such abuse here. The defendant argues only that it is unrealistic to assume the exposed jurors could effectively and totally delete [the] highly prejudicial information [in the article] from consideration in their decision-making process. The record, however, belies this argument. Each juror exposed to the article only recalled its reporting of the jury selection; [2] none testified about its reference to the defendant's past incarceration [3] or its factual errors. And, although not dispositive, Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 351, 86 S.Ct. at 1516, 16 L.Ed.2d at 614, each juror emphasized his willingness to decide the defendant's fate on the basis of the evidence produced at trial. Under this record we cannot conclude the defendant has satisfied his burden of proving actual prejudice. Moreover, the circumstances of this case are not so rare as to warrant a presumption of prejudice. Although the article was factually inaccurate and contained prejudicial material, it alone does not rise to the level of pervasive and inflammatory publicity denying the defendant due process. See Smith, ___ U.S. at ___, 102 S.Ct. at 948, 71 L.Ed.2d at 89 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Bigley, 202 N.W.2d at 57; Clough, 259 Iowa at 1360, 147 N.W.2d at 853. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for mistrial. We reverse the judgment on kidnapping in the first degree, and affirm it on sexual abuse in the second degree. REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.