Opinion ID: 1925492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Point 1(c) (Duplicity)

Text: Appellant properly raised the issue of duplicity by filing the motion to dismiss. A duplicitous indictment is subject to dismissal provided a motion is seasonably filed in accordance with Rule 12(b) (2), M.R.Crim.P. State v. Dalphonse, 276 A.2d 605, 607 (Me.1971); Glassman, Maine Practice, Commentary 12.1. Appellant's position basically is that the indictment effectively charges the violation of two statutes, namely, Section 710 and 34 M.R.S.A. § 527. [4] In support of this position he urges that because the indictment alleges did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to return to the Maine State Prison, it sufficiently charges a violation of Section 527. He then contends that the additional language, namely, from and out of said Maine State Prison did escape and go at large is an effective allegation of a violation of Section 710. Thus, he urges, conjoining this language in one count results in duplicity. In testing the duplicity argument we must assume the validity of paragraph four of Section 527 as an enforceable criminal statute. [5] This is true because duplicity can only result from a second criminal offense being sufficiently averred, State v. Kerr, 117 Me. 254, 258, 103 A. 585, 587 (1918), in a single count and this obviously requires underlying support from a viable criminal statute. Section 527 allows the head of an institution to which an inmate has been sentenced to permit his furloughed release under certain specified conditions, provided the Bureau of Corrections has established appropriate regulations. These outside furloughs may include such activities as training and employment, visits to dying relatives, obtaining medical services or contacting prospective employers. Any indictment for Escape from Furlough must minimally aver an appropriate and authorized release from the penal institution for at least one of the statutory purposes and an escape therefrom. Absent such an averment, the indictment would be defective. It is clear that the language of the indictment before us in merely stating did. . . fail to return to the Maine State Prison, fails to allege a violation of Section 527 and, therefore, cannot be said to be duplicitous. State v. Franks, 21 Okl. Crim. 213, 206 P. 258 (1922). We are supported in this position by the decision in Boyce v. State, 250 A.2d 200 (Me.1969). In Boyce the escape was alleged to have been from a crew working outside the institution but was followed by the ultimate allegation that Boyce did out of said Reformatory for Men, escape and go at large. We there recognized the common law principle that a prisoner who escapes while employed outside the walls of the institution of confinement is considered to have escaped from the institution. 250 A.2d at 202. Adopting this rationale, it is immaterial that at the time of the escape the inmate was engaged in an authorized, or even unauthorized activity requiring his absence from the physical confines of the institution because we reach the identical conclusion, namely, his escape was from the Maine State Prison to which he had been committed by the Court. If the words did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to return to the Maine State Prison were not included in the indictment, we would have no hesitancy in saying that the remaining allegations properly pleaded the elements of escape under Section 710. The indictment would meet the standards approved in Hamner v. State, 223 A.2d 532 (Me.1966). See also Duncan v. State, 158 Me. 265, 183 A.2d 209 (1962). Thus, since it is not duplicitous, the quoted language has no effect on the validity of the indictment and should be treated as harmless surplusage. Eaton v. State, 302 A.2d 588 (Me.1973); State v. Mihill, 299 A.2d 557 (Me.1973); Outz v. State, 154 Ga. 542, 114 S.E. 707 (1922). We hold that the indictment is not duplicitous. We now deal with the argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove a violation of Section 710.