Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury inquiry whether death or life without parole is the more severe punishment.

Text: On February 2, 1993, the fourth day of penalty deliberations, the jury foreperson sent out a note stating, We need to talk to you. We seem to be irrevocably deadlocked. Once counsel were present, the foreperson asked if the jury could get further instructions. The court indicated it could reread particular instructions if that would help, and asked whether the issue was about deciding the penalty, about the circumstances and the weighing of the aggravating and mitigating [evidence]. The foreperson responded in the affirmative, then indicated that the other thing to clarify for us, when you're weighing the severity of the punishment was whether death [was] the more severe punishment, or [was] life without chance of parole. The court said I can't tell you that, and stated the issue was not which penalty was more severe, but rather which is the most appropriate punishment in this case based upon the evidence. The court then reread CALJIC No. 8.88, the standard instruction which explains, among other things, that, in order to reach a death verdict, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. Following this, the court began to reread CALJIC No. 8.85, which sets forth the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors. Halfway through this instruction, the jurors indicated that no further rereading was necessary. The court then readmonished the jury that we are not talking about which is the worst penalty, but, instead, which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. Again, the court stressed that the issue was whether the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. Out of the jury's presence, defense counsel asserted that, during voir dire, several prospective jurors had indicated they thought life without parole was worse than death. In such cases, the court had responded by admonishing that jurors should not rely on this belief to impose the death penalty as an act of mercy. Counsel now requested that the sitting jurors be similarly admonished. The court declined, noting, among other things, that it did not like to give off-the-cuff instructions, and that the so substantial in comparison instruction reread by the court takes care of the problem. On appeal, defendant asserts that in light of the jury request, the trial court had a duty, both under state law (see § 1138 [court must give jury requested information on point of law]) and pursuant to the Eighth Amendment guarantee of a capital jury suitably instructed to avoid an arbitrary and capricious death verdict, to clarify for the jury that death is the more severe punishment. However, we find no abuse of the court's sound discretion in handling the matter. (See, e.g., People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311] ( Beardslee ); People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1213 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159] ( Gonzalez ).) In People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545], we upheld, as within the trial court's discretion, its decision to instruct, pursuant to a jury request, that death is the more severe penalty. This instruction was clearly a correct statement of the law, we explained, because the principle [t]hat death is considered to be a more severe punishment than life [without parole] is explicit in California law : CALJIC No. 8.88 . . . states in pertinent part, `To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.' ( Harris, supra, at p. 361, italics added.) Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that CALJIC No. 8.88 itself, by stressing that death is warranted only where aggravation so substantial[ly] outweighs mitigation as to call for that penalty, makes the greater severity of the death penalty explicit. It follows that the trial court adequately conveyed this principle by reinstructing the jury with CALJIC No. 8.88. Indeed, by indicating that no further rereading was necessary, the jury appeared to signal that the court's approach had clarified the issue. We find no basis for reversal. [41]