Opinion ID: 4215154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant contends that the State failed to prove that he was guilty of the underlying felony of aggravated robbery to support a conviction for capital murder. He concedes that his intent to commit theft was established by his admission that he went into the store to steal beer. But he contends that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he was an accomplice to the crimes because there is no proof that he knew of Wade’s plan to use deadly force on the victim. 3 Cite as 2017 Ark. 287 On appeal, we treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. E.g., Starling v. State, 2016 Ark. 20, 480 S.W.3d 158. The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. E.g., Wells v. State, 2013 Ark. 389, 430 S.W.3d 65. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or the other and pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. E.g., Ross v. State, 346 Ark. 225, 57 S.W.3d 152 (2001). The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. E.g., Starling, 2016 Ark. 20, 480 S.W.3d 158. In this case, appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and capital murder. In relevant part, a person commits aggravated robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft,2 he employs or threatens to employ physical force upon another person, and he “[i]s armed with a deadly weapon” or “[i]nflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical injury upon another person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-103 (Repl. 2013); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 5-12-102. To convict appellant of capital murder in this case, the State had to prove that appellant, acting alone or with one or more other persons, committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery and in the course of and in furtherance of that crime or in the immediate flight therefrom, appellant or an accomplice caused the death of the victim under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(1)(A)(vi), (B). 2 The theft alleged in this case is that the defendant knowingly took the property of another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(1). 4 Cite as 2017 Ark. 287 The State alleged that appellant acted as an accomplice to the crimes. “A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, the person . . . [s]olicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other person to commit the offense” or “[a]ids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing the offense.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403(a)(1)–(2). When two or more persons assist one another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable for the conduct of all. See, e.g., Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991); see also Jefferson v. State, 359 Ark. 454, 198 S.W.3d 527 (2004) (explaining that, under the accomplice-liability statute, a defendant may be found guilty not only of his own conduct, but also the conduct of his accomplice). A participant cannot disclaim responsibility because he or she did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime. See Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). Relevant factors in determining the connection of an alleged accomplice to a crime include the presence of the accused in proximity of a crime, the opportunity to commit the crime, and an association with a person involved in the crime in a manner suggestive of joint participation. See Britt v. State, 334 Ark. 142, 974 S.W.2d 436 (1998). Finally, we have held that concert of action to commit an unlawful act may be shown by circumstantial evidence, without direct proof of a conspiracy agreement. Purifoy, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374. We first consider appellant’s contention that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he acted as an accomplice. A review of the testimony and evidence presented at trial reveals that, at the time of the crimes, appellant, Wade, and Gray had been together for 5 Cite as 2017 Ark. 287 many hours. They needed money to purchase gas so they could drive back to Pine Bluff. The three men made two trips to the Shell station. First, appellant and Wade went inside the store and bought a package of gum while Gray waited in the car. The three men left, and then, minutes later, they returned to the Shell station together. Appellant admitted that they sat in the car planning the theft for several minutes before going inside the store. Surveillance videos show that appellant and Wade rushed into the store together; that Wade shot the victim; and that appellant attempted to open the cash register, appeared to look around for something to steal, stepped over the victim’s body, and searched the victim’s pockets. Having viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that it was reasonable for the jury to infer from the circumstances that appellant acted as an accomplice to the crimes. Moreover, the jury was not obligated to believe appellant’s testimony that he did not know that Wade had a gun, that he was “shocked” when Wade shot the victim, and that he proceeded with the robbery for fear that Wade would shoot him. It was within the jury’s province to assess witness credibility and decide whether to believe the State’s or the defendant’s version of events. See, e.g., Smoak v. State, 2011 Ark. 529, 385 S.W.3d 257. In this case, it is evident that the jury did not give credence to appellant’s story. Finally, appellant appears to suggest that his conviction for capital murder cannot stand because the State failed to prove that he acted with the intent of causing the victim’s death. A capital-felony-murder conviction requires proof that “a death [was] caused in the course of committing a felony such as rape, kidnapping, or robbery.” Jones v. State, 336 Ark. 191, 204, 984 S.W.2d 432, 438 (1999). The State need only prove that the defendant, 6 Cite as 2017 Ark. 287 whether he acted alone or as an accomplice, had the requisite intent to commit the underlying felony, not the murder. See Britt, 334 Ark. 142, 974 S.W.2d 436. Because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that appellant was an accomplice to the crimes, we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying appellant’s motions for directed verdict.