Opinion ID: 1223959
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Separate Trial Court for Sentencing

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it refused to assign two separate sentencing courts to sentence defendant as a result of his convictions in the two trials, Lee I and Lee II. He contends that in sentencing for the convictions related to the Drury murder and robbery, the court in the instant case may have been prejudiced by evidence relating to the Reynolds and Lacey murders, and that had the court known only of the previous death sentences, without the details of the murders, the court may have considered the mitigating circumstances more favorably. Defendant shows no evidence that he was denied an impartial sentencer, nor does he cite persuasive authority. Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3057, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 519, 898 P.2d 454, 468 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 787, 133 L.Ed.2d 737 (1996). The fact that a trial judge presides at a resentencing hearing for a case in which he presided at the original sentencing is not evidence of bias or prejudice. State v. Rossi, 154 Ariz. 245, 248, 741 P.2d 1223, 1226 (1987), appeal after remand, 171 Ariz. 276, 830 P.2d 797 (1992). Defendant argues that his young age, deprived childhood, and compliant follower personality call for leniency in spite of the aggravating circumstances and that fresh consideration of the mitigating circumstances may not have resulted in a death sentence. Defendant has not, however, shown actual bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge. Further, our independent review of aggravating and mitigating circumstances corroborates the trial judge's findings. Therefore, the trial court did not err by refusing to assign separate sentencing courts to sentence defendant.