Opinion ID: 2455468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-Points in the Courts of Appeals

Text: This court has consistently held that an appellee can seek affirmative relief by cross-points against unfavorable rulings of the trial court unless the appellant has clearly and distinctly indicated his intention to limit his appeal. [1] , [2] Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Hubbard, 130 Tex. 476, 483, 109 S.W.2d 960, 963 (1937). In amending former rule 420 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941, the court affirmed the right of an appellee to bring forward cross-points against the appellant without perfecting an independent appeal. Tex.R.Civ.P. 420 general commentary1966 (Vernon 1985). This right has been recognized since the early history of this court. Dallas Elec. Supply Co. v. Branum Co., 143 Tex. 366, 370-71, 185 S.W.2d 427, 430 (1945). The requirement that an appellant must clearly and distinctly indicate his intention to limit his appeal produced gamesmanship by appellants who sought to delay and hide their intentions from appellees by varying when and how they indicated a limitation of appeals. To remedy this problem, the court amended rule 353 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to provide strict procedures for prosecuting a limited appeal. Now appearing as rule 40(a)(4) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the rule currently provides: Notice of Limitation of Appeal. No attempt to limit the scope of an appeal shall be effective as to a party adverse to the appellant unless the severable portion of the judgment from which the appeal is taken is designated in a notice served on the adverse party within fifteen days after judgment is signed, or if a motion for new trial is filed by any party, within seventy-five days after the judgment is signed. Compliance with rule 40(a)(4) is the only way that something filed by the appellant may operate to limit what an appellee may assert by cross-points. Absent the appellant's compliance with rule 40(a)(4), the court of appeals must rule on any crosspoints brought by the appellee, regardless of the relief sought. See Hernandez v. City of Fort Worth, 617 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex.1981). The court today reaffirms its approach in Hernandez and by implication disapproves the language of cases purporting to find limitations on an appellee's right to assert cross-points other than those expressly sanctioned by this court. E.g., Dallas Indep. School Dist. v. Porter, 759 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied); Speed v. Eluma Int'l, Inc., 757 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.AppDallas 1988, no writ); Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Striland Constr. Co., 753 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied); Reynolds v. Charbeneau, 744 S.W.2d 365 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied); Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 743 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); Miller v. Presswood, 743 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.App.- Beaumont 1987, writ denied); Miller v. Spencer, 732 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); Chapman Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Franks, 732 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ); City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Yates Ford, Inc. v. Benavides, 684 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Marshbank v. Austin Bridge Co., 669 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Young v. Kilroy Oil Co., 673 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stendebach v. Campbell, 665 S.W.2d 557 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). [3] Because of the growing number of decisions by the courts of appeals contrary to Hernandez, I will address this issue in detail. Most court of appeals opinions limiting the appellee's right to assert cross-points beyond what has been expressly sanctioned by this court suggest that the matter raised by the cross-points must affect the interest of the appellant or bear upon matters presented by the appeal. The quoted phrases or their equivalents have indeed appeared in opinions of this court as limitations on the appellee's right to assert cross-points. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Phil Dor Plaza Corp., 158 Tex. 262, 267, 310 S.W.2d 311, 313-14 (1958). Although rule 40(a)(4) has overruled the narrow holding of the Connell Construction case, the quoted phrases state a longstanding principle of appellate law that is unaffected by rule 40(a)(4). [4] Properly construed in the limited context in which this court has applied the language, these phrases describe a valid limitation on the right to assert cross-points. But the proper construction bears little resemblance to the broad-sweeping interpretation the lower courts have sometimes given these phrases. The phrases affect the interest of appellant or bear upon matters presented by the appeal mean only that the matters presented by the appellee's cross-points must have actually been in controversy in the suit as contested matters between the appellant and the appellee. In particular, the phrase bear upon matters presented by the appeal does not mean that the court of appeals should look to the points presented by the appellant in his brief to determine what is presented in the appeal. In the ordinary case, when there is only one plaintiff and only one defendant, everything that was in controversy in the trial court between the two parties may be raised by the appellee's cross-points on appeal, unless the appellant has properly limited his appeal by strict compliance with rule 40(a)(4). The situation is not the same when there are multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants. It is in this situation that the phrases affect the interest of appellant or bear upon matters presented by the appeal retain some significant meaning. For example, when one plaintiff recovers judgment against a first defendant, but fails in the trial court to recover judgment against the second defendant, and the first defendant appeals the judgment, the plaintiff, as appellee, may not assert by cross-points that he should have recovered judgment against the second defendant. The first defendant is the appellant and the matters in controversy between the plaintiff and the second defendant do not affect the interest of appellant. In the usual case, the plaintiff must perfect his own separate appeal against the second defendant. The matters in controversy between the plaintiff and the second defendant do not bear upon matters presented by the appeal of the first defendant. A similar situation arises if the plaintiff has sued two defendants, and the first defendant cross-claims in the trial court against the second defendant. When the plaintiff appeals a judgment that he take nothing against the first defendant, or both defendants, the first defendant may not normally assert by cross-points that the trial court failed to render judgment in his favor against his codefendant. The matters in controversy between the two defendants do not affect the interest of appellantthe plaintiffand do not bear upon matters presented by the appeal because the matters in controversy between the appellant and the particular appellee do not necessarily include what is in controversy between the two defendants. An exception exists, of course, in those instances in which the rights of a nonappealing party are so intertwined with the rights of a party entitled to relief on appeal that the whole judgment must be reversed. See Turner, Collie & Braden, Inc. v. Brookhollow, Inc., 642 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. 1982) (certain indemnity rights of nonappealing parties were so dependent or interwoven with the erroneous damages issue that the entire judgment had to be reversed); Thompson v. Kelley, 100 Tex. 536, 539, 101 S.W. 1074, 1075-76 (1907) (judgment fixing the boundaries to real estate must protect the rights of nonappealing parties). Such situations must be recognized on a case-by-case basis, and should be regarded as exceptions to the general rule. The term severability has also caused much confusion when used in connection with cross-points. Rule 40(a)(4) permits an appellant to limit his appeal to a severable portion of the trial court's judgment. The term severable means that the cause could have been brought as a separate suit. Kansas Univ. Endowment Ass'n v. King, 162 Tex. 599, 611-12, 350 S.W.2d 11, 19 (1961). Severability is not a restriction on what allegations of error can be brought by cross-points. An attempt to limit an appeal under rule 40(a)(4) may fail for lack of severability. When an appellant attempts to limit his appeal to a portion of the judgment that is not severable, even though he follows the formal requirements of rule 40(a)(4), he does not successfully limit his appeal. See Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 742-43 (Tex.1964). In this sense, severability issues may broaden the permissible scope of cross-points. Some court of appeals opinions discuss severability as if it were a component of what bears upon matters presented by the appeal or affects the interest of appellant. See, e.g., Scull v. Davis, 434 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that when an appellant appeals a severable portion of a judgment the appellee cannot use cross-points to complain of any matters falling wholly within the portion of the judgment not brought up for review by the appellant). Such discussion is error. Rule 40(a)(4) is the sole means by which an appellant may limit the appellee's right to assert cross-points in the courts of appeals. Severability may be a factor in whether the rights of nonappealing parties are so intertwined with those of an appealing party that the whole judgment must be reversed. In this sense severability is always related to the interest of the appellant. But that is really a separate question. It is not an element of what affects the interest of appellant or bears upon matters presented by the appeal for purposes of what may be presented by cross-points. If the matter was in controversy between one appellant and the appellee seeking to assert the cross-point, then it satisfies the test for being a matter presented by the appeal. If reversible error is shown between the appellant and the appellee, whether the judgment must also be set aside as to nonappealing parties is resolved under the principles set forth in Turner, Collie & Braden and the line of cases it cites.