Opinion ID: 314814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Effect of the Prior Consensus Standard

Text: 30 An additional point must be considered before we reach the merits. Both petitioner and respondents devote a great deal of time to the questions whether the 1971 consensus standard-which was no less severe with regard to industrial buildings than the 1973 standard-was properly adopted and if not, whether it can be attacked at this late date. In its own terms, this debate started by petitioner is inapposite, since the 1973 regulations and not those of 1971 are here at issue. However, at one point respondents seem to seek to support the 1973 standards on the basis that the 1971 regulations were promulgated without objection and have been in effect for two years. This argument presumably would be that the 60-day time limitation of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(f) would bar petitioner from challenging the same standard that has governed its members since May 1971. 10 Indeed, two later passages of respondents' brief, appearing in surprisingly unrelated contexts, hint with increasing boldness at some argument that petitioner cannot at this date attack the regulation; in the second passage, the argument takes a somewhat new form, more or less to the effect that the apparent noncompliance of some of petitioner's members with the 1971 standard affects their right to attack those now adopted. 31 If in fact respondents mean to suggest any affirmative argument in defense of the 1973 regulations based on the promulgation without objection of consensus standards two years ago and on their having been in effect in the interim, such an argument must be rejected. Congress imposed a 60-day limitation on attacks that were relevant to a particular set of standards. Petitioner's failure to attack the 1971 national consensus standard within 60 days does not preclude it from making a timely attack on a standard adopted by the Department as a matter of judgment after rulemaking proceedings under Sec. 655(b). Similarly, we know of no principle that would warrant a denial of review because, as one gathers, many of petitioner's members did not comply with the 1971 standard in regard to the number of lavatories in industrial establishments. The Secretary had his remedy for this, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 659; the record is silent how far he availed himself of it.