Opinion ID: 2180376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the requisite proof of intent

Text: On appeal, Ms. Marbury's basic position, joined by Ms. Wilson-Bey, [14] is that in first-degree premeditated murder cases, the Redbook instructions on aiding and abetting are inadequate and that they understate the requisite intent. In this court, Ms. Marbury is not simply complaining, as she did in the trial court, that the criminal venture language should not have been added to Redbook instruction No. 4.02. Rather, she argues that [i]f the charge is first[-]degree murder based upon an alleged deliberate and premeditated killing, the abettor is not guilty of this degree of the crime unless he [or she] either acted upon a premeditated design to cause the death of the deceased or knew that the perpetrator was acting with such an intent....  Hackney, 389 A.2d at 1341 (emphasis added) (quoting PERKINS at 662). Further, Ms. Marbury invokes another leading commentary, as follows: To determine the kind of homicide of which the accomplice is guilty, it is necessary to look to his state of mind; it may have been different from the state of mind of the principal and they thus may be guilty of different offenses. Thus, because first-degree murder requires a deliberate and premeditated killing, an accomplice is not guilty of this degree of murder unless he acted with premeditation and deliberation. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.2(c), at 347 (2d ed.2003) (emphasis added). Further, Ms. Marbury now complains of the use in premeditated murder cases of the natural and probable consequence language contained in Redbook instruction No. 4.02 and included in the trial judge's charge to the jury in this case. Ms. Marbury again quotes Professor LaFave: [G]eneral application of the natural and probable consequence rule of accomplice liability is unwarranted. A 's guilt as an accomplice to one crime should not per se be a basis for holding A accountable for a related crime merely because the latter offense was carried out by A 's principal, for this as well would result in A 's guilt of a crime as to which he did not have the requisite mental state. Id., § 13.3(b), at 362-63. [15] In assessing appellants' contentions, we begin with D.C.Code § 22-105 (1996), now recodified in D.C.Code § 22-1805 (2001), which reads as follows: In prosecutions for any criminal offense all persons advising, inciting, or conniving at the offense, or aiding or abetting the principal offender, shall be charged as principals and not as accessories, the intent of this section being that as to all accessories before the fact the law heretofore applicable in cases of misdemeanor only shall apply to all crimes, whatever the punishment may be. The language of the statute does not appear to contemplate a variable standard for aiding and abetting depending on the nature of the offense charged. In United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.1938), Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, discussed various historical formulae addressing this elusive doctrine. Judge Hand concluded that the various articulations ... all demand that [the accessory or aider and abettor] in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. Id. at 402. This definition of aiding and abetting has subsequently been adopted by the Supreme Court, see Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949), and by this court, see Brooks v. United States, 599 A.2d 1094, 1099 (D.C.1991); Hackney, 389 A.2d at 1342, [16] and appears to be consistent with our aiding and abetting statute quoted above. More recently, in Owens v. United States, 688 A.2d 399, 403 (D.C.1996), we stated that [i]n general, one may be convicted on a theory of aiding and abetting if one knowingly associates oneself with a criminal venture and engages in conduct in furtherance of the offense. We have also made it clear that although natural and probable consequences implies some degree of foreseeability, there is no requirement that the aider and abettor have the identical intent of the principal at the time and place. Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1001-02 (D.C.1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The trial judge's instructions in this case are generally consistent with these decisions. The application of the foregoing principles to premeditated murder presents some analytical difficulty. Our statutory law provides that a person of sound memory and discretion who kills another purposely, ... [with] deliberate and premeditated malice is guilty of murder in the first degree. D.C.Code § 22-2401 (1996); D.C.Code § 22-2101 (2001). Deliberation and premeditation thus go to the very essence of the crime. Thus, if the aider and abettor must be shown to have associate[d][her]self with the venture of premeditated killing, and if the prosecution must prove that the accomplice participated in it as in something that [she] wishes to bring about and s[ought] by [her] action to make it succeed, Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402, then logic arguably requires proof that the accomplice both knew of the principal's intention to commit a premeditated murder and wanted the principal to succeed in that endeavor (by killing the decedent). Hackney, a premeditated murder case on which appellants rely, appears at first blush to support their position. There is language in the court's opinion apparently requiring the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accomplice  either acted upon a premeditated design to cause the death of the deceased or knew that the perpetrator was acting with such an intent....  Hackney, 389 A.2d at 1341 (emphasis added) (quoting PERKINS at 662). In other words, in this part of the Hackney opinion, this court evidently approved the PERKINS standard. Later in the opinion, however, the court stated that although there must exist a community of unlawful intent between the accessory and the perpetrator of the crime: [i]t is well settled ... that [the accessory] need not necessarily have intended the particular crime committed by the principal; an accessory is liable for any criminal act which in the ordinary course of things was the natural or probable consequence of the crime that he advised or commanded, although such consequence may not have been intended by him.  Hackney, 389 A.2d at 1342 (emphasis added) (quoting 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 92 at 164 (1961)). [17] The court thus approved the natural and probable consequence standard, which appellants, citing Professor LaFave, claim to be inapplicable to prosecutions for premeditated murder. In our view, the two italicized statements in Hackney are difficult to reconcile with one another. The PERKINS standard, which is consistent with the logic of Peoni, requires proof either that the accomplice had the premeditated design to kill the decedent or that she knew that the principal acted pursuant to such a design. Under the natural and probable consequence standard, on the other hand, the government need not establish that the aider and abettor acted from a premeditated design to kill, nor is it required to prove knowledge on the accessory's part that the principal had so acted; it is sufficient that the decedent's death be the natural and probable consequence of the accomplice's intentional conduct. [18] In light of the apparently inconsistent statements in the court's opinion, we do not believe that Hackney is controlling authority either in favor of the appellants or for the government. But assuming that Hackney is inconclusive, decisions of this court both before and after that decision was rendered establish that the principles governing accomplice liability in first-degree premeditated murder cases are identical to those applicable to aiders and abettors of other offenses. The earlier of the cases in which we so held, Byrd v. United States, 364 A.2d 1215 (D.C.1976), involved the armed first-degree murder of a service station attendant. In Byrd, the accomplice, Crowe, drove the principal, Byrd, first to the location where Byrd obtained a handgun, and then to the service station where Byrd shot the decedent. After the murder, Crowe drove the car as the two men sought to make their escape. Following his conviction, Crowe contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction as an aider and abettor. This court rejected Crowe's contention and affirmed his conviction. Citing D.C.Code § 22-105 (1973) and the Supreme Court's decision in Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 619, 69 S.Ct. 766 (a conspiracy to defraud case), the court found it to be well established that an individual who knowingly participates in the commission of a criminal act by assisting the principal is equally liable. 364 A.2d at 1219. The court stated that [t]he elements to establish aiding and abetting are (1) that an offense was committed by someone; (2) that the accused assisted or participated in its commission; and (3) that he did so with guilty knowledge. Id. (citations omitted). Applying these elements to the record before it, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Crowe's conviction as an aider and abettor. In support of its conclusion, the court cited United States v. Harris, 140 U.S.App. D.C. 270, 285, 435 F.2d 74, 89 (1970) (defendant charged with aiding and abetting armed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon); Thompson v. United States, 132 U.S.App. D.C. 38, 405 F.2d 1106 (1968) (aiding and abetting assault and robbery); and Long v. United States, 124 U.S.App. D.C. 14, 20-21, 360 F.2d 829, 835-36 (1966) (a prosecution for aiding and abetting felony murder). Thus, in the first-degree premeditated murder case before it, the court in Byrd relied on substantive aiding and abetting standards applied in prosecutions for criminal offenses not involving premeditation and deliberation at all. More recently, in Daniels v. United States, 738 A.2d 240 (D.C.1999), we affirmed the conviction of the defendant Campbell of armed first-degree premeditated murder on an aiding and abetting theory. The court discussed our precedents in detail, and made it plain that conventional principles from cases involving aiding and abetting other offenses were fully applicable: One who aids and abets another person in committing an offense shares the liability of the principal for all acts committed in furtherance of the common purpose, if the act done either is within the scope of that purpose, or is the natural or probable consequence of the act intended. Id. at 246 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). After describing the assistance provided by Campbell, the court concluded that [f]rom this evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that death was a natural and probable consequence of Campbell's driving two armed men to a particular place so that they could wet someone, waiting for their return after hearing gunshots, ensuring that the back seat was clear to facilitate their getaway, and then driving them away from the murder scene to complete their escape. See Byrd v. United States, 364 A.2d 1215, 1219 (D.C.1976) (affirming conviction of aider and abettor who drove the principal to the scene of the crime, waited in the car while he committed the crime, and then drove the principal away from the scene); Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App. D.C. 354, 359, 389 F.2d 305, 310 (1967) (same); Long v. United States, 124 U.S.App. D.C. 14, 20-21, 360 F.2d 829, 835-836 (1966) (same). We see no material difference between the present case and any of these three cases, and thus we find no merit in Campbell's sufficiency argument. Id. at 247 (emphasis added). Of the three cases which the court described as indistinguishable from Daniels at the conclusion of the quoted passage, one ( Byrd, which we have discussed at pages 1163-64, supra ) involved aiding and abetting premeditated murder. Bailey, however, was a robbery prosecution, and the defendant in Long was convicted of felony murder; neither case required proof of premeditation or deliberation. The conclusion is thus inescapable that, in this jurisdiction, we must apply to premeditated murder cases all of the conventional principles of aiding and abetting law, including the doctrine that the accomplice need not be shown to have the same intent as the principal and that the natural and probable consequence of the act intended standard applies. It is true that Byrd and Daniels deal with the sufficiency of the evidence, and that there is no indication in these opinions that there was any objection to the instructions of the court. In light of the legal principles articulated in these decisions, and especially in Daniels, however, any claim that premeditated murder cases require different aiding and abetting instructions for those given in other aiding and abetting cases could not logically have been sustained. We are therefore constrained to conclude that, notwithstanding the views stated in PERKINS and LAFAVE, and the apparent flirtation in Hackney with the PERKINS approach, the instructions of the trial court of which appellants now complain are consistent with our precedents, and we are duty-bound to follow them. We think it important to note, however, that so far as we are aware, the positions taken by PERKINS and LAFAVE were not presented to the court in the cases which we deem dispositive, i.e., Byrd and Daniels. The views of the two commentators are consistent with decisions in a number of other jurisdictions, and they may merit consideration by our en bane court. As we have noted, Professor La Fave takes the position that because first[-]degree murder requires a deliberate and premeditated killing, an accomplice is not guilty of this degree of murder unless he [or in this case, she ] acted with premeditation and deliberation. LA FAVE § 13.2(c), at 347. In other words, regardless of the principal's state of mind, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aider and abettor had the requisite specific intent. Professor LaFave's approach is not a novel one. In Savage v. State, 18 Fla. 909 (1882), decided well over a century ago, the Supreme Court of Florida held that it was error to charge the jury in a premeditated murder case that if the alleged accomplice was present, aiding and abetting, then he was guilty of the same offense as the principal, namely, murder in the first degree. Rather, [t]he charge should be in effect that if James was present aiding and abetting Savage, knowing or believing that Savage intended to kill Paterson, or with a premeditated design to kill Paterson, aided and abetted Savage in his act, he was equally guilty with Savage. The reason is that one who is guilty of murder in the first degree must be charged and proved to the satisfaction of the jury to have done the act charged with a formed design to effect the death, and this is the law as to the principal in the second degree as well as in the first degree. Id. at 962-63. In Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897 (1933), the court, citing Savage, stated that premeditation is an essential element of murder in the first degree where the homicide is not committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate rape, arson, robbery, etc. In order to hold one guilty of murder in the first degree who is personally present aiding and abetting a third person to commit the crime, the person present rendering such aid must be shown himself to have had a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or knew or believed that the third person who actually fired the fatal shot intended to kill the deceased. See Savage [ ] v. State, 18 Fla. 909 [1882]. ... Insofar as the instruction conveys the idea that Leavine was guilty of murder in the first degree if he was personally present aiding Palmer to commit the murder[,] it was incorrect. Id. at 904 (emphasis added). More recently, in Com. v. Bachert, 499 Pa. 398, 453 A.2d 931 (1982), the court recognized that in order to prove that an accomplice was guilty of premeditated murder, the prosecution must establish a specific intent to kill, harbored by the defendant at the time of the shooting. Id. at 935. To determine the kind of homicide of which the accomplice is guilty, it is necessary to look to his state of mind; the requisite mental state must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be one which the accomplice harbored and cannot depend upon proof of intent to kill only in the principal.  Id. (emphasis added) (citing LA FAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW (1972)). Accord, Tharp v. Com., 40 S.W.3d 356, 365 (Ky.2000) (holding that the degree of an accomplice's guilt, both at common law and under applicable statutory provisions, is determined by his or her own mens rea and not that of the principal); State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 230 (Mo.1997) (holding that in first-degree murder prosecution of accomplice, jury must find that both actors [ i.e., the principal and the aider and abettor] had the necessary mental state  deliberation; the prosecutor's argument to the contrary was improper, though reversal was not required). Whether or not these authorities are persuasive, however, a division of this court is not free to follow them in light of contrary binding precedent in this jurisdiction. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). [19] Thus, although the members of the division believe that en banc consideration of the issue may be warranted, we discern no error under current law in the instructions of the trial court challenged on this appeal.