Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the state failed to take evans before a committing magistrate in violation of his fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights.

Text: ś 75. Evans next argues that the failure of the State to take him before a judicial officer in a timely manner undermines the voluntariness of his confessions. Evans argues that at the time he made his statements to law enforcement he was unaware that he would be facing state murder charges. ś 76. Evans was arrested on August 5, 1991, in Louisiana on federal kidnapping charges. At that point, authorities were not aware that Beatrice had been murdered. Five hours after his arrest, Evans was taken before a United States Magistrate in New Orleans, advised of his rights and formally charged with kidnapping. Counsel was appointed and Evans waived extradition proceedings after which he was transported to Harrison County on August 7, 1991. ś 77. On August 8, 1991, Evans was given an initial appearance before U.S. Magistrate Judge Roper in Biloxi. Judge Roper advised Evans of his rights and appointed attorney Fred Lusk to represent Evans on the federal kidnapping charge. Evans, represented by counsel, later confessed to the kidnapping and murder of Beatrice. ś 78. At the time of Evans' confessions, he had been arrested on federal kidnapping charges. On August 2, 1991, a warrant was issued against Evans on state kidnapping charges. However, at the time of Evans' statements, he had not been arrested on state kidnapping charges. An arrest warrant for capital murder was not issued until August 20, 1991. Evans was arrested for capital murder at 10:30 a.m. on August 20, 1991, at the Harrison County Jail and was soon given an initial appearance. ś 79. At the time of Evans' arrest, Unif. Crim. R. Cir. C.P. 1.04 [2] governed initial appearances and required that every arrested person be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. Here, however, Evans had not been arrested on any state charges at the time of his statements. Rather, Evans had only been charged with federal kidnapping charges for which he did receive an initial appearance. ś 80. In Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015 (Miss.1992), this Court held that [t]he importance of this first appearance is that the accused is advised of his right to remain silent, his right to appointment of counsel, his right to communicate with counsel and family, his right to preliminary hearing, and the conditions under which he may obtain release, if at all. Id. at 1029. In Abram, this Court held that [b]ecause the `major purpose' of the initial appearance `is to secure to the accused prompt ... advice of his right to counsel by a judicial officer ... who [presumably] has no professional duty nor personal inclination to try to exact a waiver of that right,' it is imperative that the initial appearance be given `without unnecessary delay' as the rule commands. Id. (quoting Nicholson v. State, 523 So.2d 68 (Miss.1988)). `Without unnecessary delay' means as soon as `custody, booking, administrative and security needs have been met.' Id. ś 81. Abram was arrested without a warrant on August 12, 1982. Questioning began and Abram eventually gave a full confession. Despite the fact that a judge was available at all times, Abram was not given an initial appearance until August 15, 1982, immediately after his uncounseled confession was obtained by law enforcement. This Court held: The failure to provide Abram with an initial appearance sooner had devastating consequences for the defense, clearly derogating his right to a fair trial. Common sense suggests that law enforcement authorities would never have obtained an uncounseled confession from Abram had he been given an initial appearance, and consequently, access to counsel, without unnecessary delay. See cf., Nicholson, 523 So.2d at 77. We hold the failure to provide the initial appearance reversible since, as a consequence, Abram gave a full confession in the absence of, and in violation of, his right to counsel. Such an error could hardly be deemed harmless since the conviction of Abram for capital murder was based entirely on his confession. Id. at 1029. ś 82. The facts in the case sub judice are clearly distinguishable from those present in Abram, The most glaring distinction is that Evans did not make an uncounseled confession. Rather, Evans, in spite of advice from his attorney and U.S. Magistrate Judge Roper, made three separate statements. Prior to each statement, Evans was counseled and warned by his attorney against making any statements. Moreover, Evans memorialized his acknowledgment that he had been advised of his right to remain silent by Judge Roper and his attorney. Also unlike Abram, the conviction in the case sub judice was not based entirely on his confession. ś 83. In Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 757 (Miss.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098, 105 S.Ct. 607, 83 L.Ed.2d 716 (1984), this Court held that [r]epeated Miranda warnings coupled with the passage of enough time to allow an accused to become acclimated to his surroundings followed thereafter by a voluntary waiver are generally more than sufficient to remove from a subsequent confession the taint, if any, of delay in taking the accused before a committing magistrate. Evans had been in custody for four days prior to making his first statement. Moreover, Evans was repeatedly advised by his attorney, Detective Carvin, and Agent Holder of his right to remain silent. ś 84. Evans, however, argues that he did not understand that his statements could be used in a subsequent state murder prosecution. Evans' attorney testified that he advised Evans that his statements could be used against him in both state and federal court. Lusk testified that he instructed Evans not to give a statement because there was no body. Specifically, Lusk advised Evans that I did not believe there was enough evidence unless he incriminated himself to bring about any state charges. ś 85. Perhaps the most conclusive evidence which demonstrates that Evans was fully aware that state capital murder charges would be pursued is Defense Ex. 12 to the Motion to Suppress wherein Evans' housing and visitation requests were listed. These requests focus solely on his desire to be housed in a federal facility despite a state capital murder conviction. Evans' awareness is illustrated by the fact that at one point, Evans inserted into the document the word capital before murder. Moreover, Evans, in this document, contemplates the fact that his execution may take place. ś 86. Evans was aware of the possibility and the probability of state murder charges if he made incriminating statements. However, acting in direct conflict to the advice given by his counsel, Evans chose to confess. There is simply no indication that the appointment of state counsel, who would have presumably counseled Evans as did Lusk, would have deterred Evans from confessing. ś 87. In Wright v. State, 512 So.2d 679, 681 (Miss.1987), this Court held: Under our law Wright was entitled to counsel without unnecessary delay following his arrest, and nothing turns on whether that law be labeled constitutional or procedural or both. Denial of that entitlement will result in reversal of a subsequent conviction, however, only where it is shown that the accused experienced some untoward consequences flowing directly from denial of counsel. ś 88. At all times during and prior to making statements, Evans was represented by an attorney. He was advised by his attorney and a federal judge not to make incriminating statements. Evans was aware that federal kidnapping charges were pending. Moreover, Evans was advised by his attorney that if a body was discovered, state murder charges would follow. Evans chose not to follow this advice. There is simply nothing in this record which demonstrates that the trial judge erred in finding that Evans' confessions were voluntary and admissible. This issue is without merit.