Opinion ID: 2629109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Suppression as a remedy for illegally seized evidence

Text: Our state and federal Constitutions protect citizens from unlawful searches and seizures. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at ___, 173 L.Ed.2d at 493; see State v. Ransom, 289 Kan. 373, 380, 212 P.3d 203 (2009). Warrantless searches are considered unreasonable and invalid unless they fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Henning, 289 Kan. at 148, 209 P.3d 711; Thompson, 284 Kan. at 776, 166 P.3d 1015. The State bears the burden to demonstrate a challenged search was lawful. Henning, 289 Kan. at 148, 209 P.3d 711; State v. Ibarra, 282 Kan. 530, 533, 147 P.3d 842 (2006). In this case, it is undisputed there was no warrant authorizing the search of Daniel's car, and the State agrees the search was unlawful under Gant and Henning. The only remaining inquiry is whether the appropriate remedy is to suppress the evidence seized. This is a question of law. Neither the Fourth Amendment nor § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights expressly prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of their respective protections. Instead a judicially created remedy exists to prevent the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search. Krull, 480 U.S. at 347, 107 S.Ct. 1160; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, reh. denied 368 U.S. 871, 82 S.Ct. 23, 7 L.Ed.2d 72 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 640, 176 P.3d 938 (2008). This exclusionary rule operates to protect Fourth Amendment rights through deterrence, and it is not the defendant's personal constitutional right. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); Martin, 285 Kan. at 640, 176 P.3d 938; State v. Turner, 257 Kan. 19, 21, 891 P.2d 317 (1995). In creating exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the United States Supreme Court in Krull explained the rule only applies when deterrence can be achieved: As with any remedial device, application of the exclusionary rule properly has been restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced. Thus, in various circumstances, the Court has examined whether the rule's deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process. [Citations omitted.] (Emphasis added.) 480 U.S. at 347, 107 S.Ct. 1160. As indicated in this quotation, questions regarding whether evidence should be excluded as a sanction for a Fourth Amendment violation should be answered by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the prosecution's use of the illegally obtained evidence. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 907, 104 S.Ct. 3405. In Leon, the Supreme Court held the use of evidence that was unlawfully obtained was allowed if officers acted in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, even if it was determined later the magistrate erred and probable cause did not support the warrant. 468 U.S. at 913, 922-26, 104 S.Ct. 3405. In so holding, the Supreme Court considered whether the deterrent effect that normally justified the exclusionary rule was likely to be realized under the particular factual circumstances found in the case. The Supreme Court concluded that suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. 468 U.S. at 918, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The result in Leon was a determination that when a search occurred based upon a warrant, the exclusionary rule applied only if: (1) the magistrate was deliberately misled by false information when issuing the warrant; (2) the magistrate wholly abandoned the detached and neutral role required; (3) there was so little indicia of probable cause in the affidavit that it would be entirely unreasonable for an officer to believe the warrant was valid; or (4) the warrant so lacked specificity that officers could not determine the place to be searched or the items to be seized. 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. This court has repeatedly accepted the underlying principle in Leon, i.e., that a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule might be applicable if a search was conducted pursuant to a warrant that was later to be found lacking in probable cause, even though we have disagreed how to apply Leon 's stated criteria. See Hoeck, 284 Kan. at 455-65, 163 P.3d 252; State v. Longbine, 257 Kan. 713, 720-22, 896 P.2d 367 (1995), disapproved on other grounds State v. Hicks, 282 Kan. 599, 147 P.3d 1076 (2006); State v. Ratzlaff, 255 Kan. 738, 751-55, 877 P.2d 397 (1994); State v. Doile, 244 Kan. 493, 501-03, 769 P.2d 666 (1989), overruled on other grounds Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). After Leon, the United States Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in other circumstances. See Herring, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at ___ - ___, 172 L.Ed.2d at 507-09 (negligently maintained police records); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14-16, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (inaccurate court records); Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50, 107 S.Ct. 1160 (statute). In each extension, the Supreme Court has continued to focus on whether the remedial purpose of the exclusionary rule would be fulfilled if the illegally obtained evidence was suppressed. Our court has not had occasion to consider these other exceptions.