Opinion ID: 747234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Camacho.

Text: 36 Camacho argues insufficiency of evidence, but our independent review establishes that Camacho's involvement, however slight Mares, 940 F.2d at 458, was a jury question. Nor are we able to identify an error with regard to Camacho's challenges to the jury instructions. The court's instructions sufficiently cover the defendant's theories. See Baker, 63 F.3d at 1499. 37 The district court was within its discretion in denying Camacho's motion to sever. See United States v. Cuozzo, 962 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1983). The instructions adequately protected Camacho's right to have his case considered individually. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 846 (9th Cir.1994). 38 The district court was also within its discretion in converting quantity of money into drugs for sentencing purposes under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, because there was evidence connecting the money to drug-related activities. See United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 953 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir.1992). There was evidence of the going rate for cocaine in Chicago which supported the conversion rate. There was also no serious issue regarding foreseeability as to the amount for which the court sentenced Camacho. See United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 769-70 (9th Cir.1993). As with Romo, there is no merit to Camacho's argument that he was entitled to a three level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because after being convicted at trial he said I accept responsibility.