Opinion ID: 2623734
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: This Court's Precedent Properly Incorporates the Buckley Test

Text: ś 81 This court considered the approach that the PDC now advocates and explicitly rejected it, concluding that the context approach departs from the bright-line express advocacy test of Buckley.  WSRP, 141 Wash.2d at 269, 4 P.3d 808. The VEC depended on this court's holding when it published these ads. Under this court's decision, only specific language triggers the specter of prior government regulation. Id. Today's majority opinion substitutes a new standard for this previously well-considered protection. ś 82 Any speaker in Washington State should be able to rely on this court's precedent in exercising constitutional rights. If we approve any changing standard from that of WSRP, which was the controlling law at the time of VEC's advertisement, we are guilty of chilling speech. In the future, speakers will fear that they cannot rely on this court's decisions and that future state enforcement may be determined and applied retroactively to political speech once considered safe. 3. Washington State Constitution ś 83 Constitutional protection of individual political speech is paramount under the Washington Constitution, no matter how slight the government intrusion. Registration and disclosure requirements on political speech are, by definition, content based restrictions that are subject to a strict scrutiny review. See Collier, 121 Wash.2d at 748-49, 854 P.2d 1046. Strict scrutiny requires a statute be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. This presumption against any regulation of political speech is vitally important. Contrast the PDC's increasingly complex web of speech regulation (changing rules, forms, opinions, etc.) against the relatively simple constitutional admonition (which applies to states): Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . . U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). ś 84 The Washington State Constitution explicitly provides more protection to speech than the federal constitution. Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wash.2d 103, 116-17, 937 P.2d 154, 943 P.2d 1358 (1997). Article I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution provides that [e]very person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. Establishing protection under some sections of the Washington State Constitution often involve a Gunwall analysis [9] to show the protection differs from that of the United States Constitution. However, no such analysis is necessary here because the relevant broader protection for speech has already been established by this court. [10] See State v. Vrieling, 144 Wash.2d 489, 495, 28 P.3d 762 (2001). ś 85 Unlike its federal counterpart, article I, section 5 strictly prohibits prior restraints on free speech. Ino Ino, 132 Wash.2d at 119, 937 P.2d 154. This includes prohibition of any requirement of prior registration to engage in speech. See id. In regard to claims of overbreadth and vagueness, the text of article I, section 5 is less tolerant than the First Amendment of overbroad restrictions on expression when such restrictions rise to the level of a prior restraint. O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash.2d 796, 804, 749 P.2d 142 (1988). ś 86 The Washington Constitution absolutely forbids prior restraints against the publication or broadcast of constitutionally protected speech where the information sought to be restrained was lawfully obtained, true, and a matter of public record. State v. Coe, 101 Wash.2d 364, 375, 679 P.2d 353 (1984). In the present case, VEC's speech is clearly lawfully obtained information, it was true, and a matter of public record (it was an amalgam of public record newspaper articles). Majority at 1177-78. Thus, restricting publication through disclosure requirements becomes a prior restraint. Another indication that this vague statute operates as a prior restraint is the evidence that the speaker had no clear test to determine this particular speech required prior registration. See Coe, 101 Wash.2d at 375, 679 P.2d 353. ś 87 In order to survive strict scrutiny, the majority must show the regulation satisfies a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored. The majority argues that the government has an important interest in ferreting out corruption and influence peddling within the political process. See State v. (1972) Dan J. Evans Campaign Comm., 86 Wash.2d 503, 508, 546 P.2d 75 (1976). The majority also contends that these interests are `sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement.' Majority at 1181 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66, 96 S.Ct. 612). Distressingly, there is no evidence to support the claim that this private speech triggered any compelling state interest. There is no suggestion of corruption or influence peddling. ś 88 In contrast with the majority, I also disagree that disclosure requirements are automatically the least restrictive alternative. See majority at 1181. In some cases, even anonymous political speech may be a necessary shield to protect private speakers. Anonymity sometimes protects unpopular individuals and voices from retaliation and suppression by an intolerant majority. [11] Allowing robust anonymous speech in the political arena, encourages writers to freely express ideas without fear of retaliation. [12] Unfortunately, the majority's ruling ensures that critics of popular candidates cannot use this method of expression, and disclosure requirements will temper any advocacy of unpopular opinions. ś 89 Conversely, the majority argues that disclosure requirements imposed in this case ultimately allow the speech to continue and are therefore a narrowly tailored imposition on the VEC's constitutional right to free speech. [13] See majority at 1187. This analysis misses the crux of the issue. Buckley held that disclosure requirements can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment and that such requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny. 424 U.S. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 612. ś 90 In short, any speaker must know beforehand which speech is regulated, regardless of the penalty. Here, a speaker could choose many words which might run afoul of the support or oppose regulation as construed by the PDC. We should not let a government censor or subjectively decide which speech is penalized and which is not. 4. Attorney Fees ś 91 Pursuant to RAP 18.1, we should grant the VEC's request that the court award it reasonable attorney fees and expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.