Opinion ID: 164278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Albert's ADA claim

Text: 24 This court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1159 (10th Cir.1999)(en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1160. 25 To establish her claim under the ADA, Albert must show: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is able to perform the essential job functions with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) Smith's discriminated against her because of her disability. Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir.1997). The district court concluded that Albert is not disabled. 26 The relevant language of the ADA defines a disability as (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Smith's concedes that breathing is a major life activity. 4 27 When inquiring whether Albert's asthma substantially limits her ability to breathe, we must examine the extent of the limitation caused by her impairment in terms of her own experience. 5 Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). The relevant regulations state: 28 (1) The term substantially limits means: 29 (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or 30 (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 31 (2) The following factors should be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity: (i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) the permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. 32 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). 33 Smith's does not contest that Albert has a physical impairment, asthma, but argues that Albert has failed to raise a genuine question of material fact about whether her asthma substantially limits her breathing. An examination of the evidence in relation to the above factors, however, suggests otherwise. 34 As noted above, Albert's asthma requires her to avoid a wide variety of everyday situations. She must avoid crowds, night-time or outdoor activities, cigarette smoke, and perfumes. Her asthma is activated by an array of common substances including pollen, mold, dust, cat dander, dog hair, strong-smelling paint, aftershave, certain kinds of foods, cleaning agents, and chemicals. Her asthma can also be activated by such things as exposure to cold air or stress. Moreover, her asthma is not completely controlled by her daily use of multiple medications. This evidence suggests that the condition and manner under which Albert is able to breathe freely may be significantly restricted. 35 The testimony of Albert's health care providers supports the contention that her asthma substantially limits her ability to breathe. Albert's nurse practitioner, Trisch Van Sciver, testified that Albert's asthma is difficult to control and that Albert is symptomatic most of the time. Van Sciver also testified that even when not having an episode Albert experiences chest tightness, wheezing, coughing, and shortness of breath. In addition, Van Sciver noted Albert's asthma is not curable. 36 Smith's argues that Albert has relied only on generalized evidence and her diagnosis of severe persistent asthma to support her claim of disability. Smith's relies on Albert's deposition testimony to argue that Albert suffered asthma attacks only when exposed to a wide variety of allergens all at once. Smith's also argues that Albert's asthma substantially limits her breathing only when she is having an attack. The evidence cited above, however, demonstrates Smith's view of the evidence is in dispute. Nothing more is required for the issue to survive summary judgment. 37 Relying on Pack v. Kmart Corp., Smith's argues that Albert was required to present evidence comparing her ability to breathe to that of the general public. 166 F.3d 1300, 1306 n. 7 (10th Cir.1999). Assuming Pack stated a requirement which applies to this case, 6 Albert has presented sufficient evidence that her condition differentiates her from the general populace. The affidavit of Dr. James Poliner noted both that Albert has severe, persistent asthma and that she was probably susceptible to many common trigger substances. He then noted that asthmatics can have difficulty breathing after exposure to everyday substances that do not affect most people. Van Sciver confirmed that Albert suffers from the most serious form of asthma, a condition that by definition could not be shared by the general populace. While we recognize that [i]t is insufficient for individuals attempting to prove disability status ... to merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis, Albert's diagnosis does indicate that her ability to breathe is different from that of an average individual. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681. 38 The evidence concerning Albert's reactions to common substances, the limitations on her activities, her multiple hospitalizations, and her frequent trips to the emergency room all support Albert's contention that she does not breathe as well as [other people]. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Albert, we conclude that summary judgment for Smith's was inappropriate on the question of whether Albert was disabled because Albert has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her asthma substantially limits her breathing and thus a major life activity.