Opinion ID: 2818185
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Maley's Threats

Text: Finally, Wyndham contends, and the district court found, that Maley's threats toward Planadeball after she returned from medical leave in April 2011 were not a material adverse action. Maley criticized Planadeball about her work performance, screamed at her in front of her colleagues, and made multiple threats to fire her. Planadeball argues that Maley's conduct should be considered a material adverse action, because, as the Supreme Court stated in Burlington Northern, material adverse actions are not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment, nor are they restricted to ultimate employment decisio[ns] . . . such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating. 548 U.S. at 60, 64 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, they include all actions that could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Id. at 57. This standard is phrased in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context matters. Id. at 69. We agree with Planadeball that a juror could reasonably conclude that Maley's multiple threats to fire her constitute a -17- material adverse action. Construing all facts in Planadeball's favor, Maley told her to step up or [] step out, told her coworker Saliceti that she was the next one who's going to be fired, and sent a text message to Saliceti stating, [y]ou better tell [Planadeball] that either she steps up or steps out. In our view, a reasonable juror could thus infer that these multiple, consecutive threats, stated to an employee directly and to her co-worker who passed the message to that employee, could dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. See Billings, 515 F.3d at 54-55 (An employee who knows that, by [making a charge of discrimination], she risks . . . a threat of further, more serious discipline for deficiencies at work might well choose not to proceed with [such a charge] in the first place. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 26 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a reasonable juror could conclude that threatening an employee with the loss of his job constitutes a material adverse action). We also find that Planadeball has established a causal link between Maley's threats and protected conduct. The threats occurred in April 2011, at most two months after Planadeball complained to Maley and Wieczerzak about Maley's discriminatory comments. This two-month gap between protected activity and a material adverse action is sufficiently short to establish a prima -18- facie case of retaliation. See, e.g., Mariani-Colón v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 511 F.3d 216, 224 (1st Cir. 2007) (We conclude that the 'temporal proximity' between appellant's allegations of discrimination in June 2002 and his termination in August 2002 is sufficient to meet the relatively light burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.); Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation where approximately three months had transpired between the protected conduct and the material adverse action). Because Planadeball has made a prima facie case of retaliation based on Maley's threats, the burden shifts to Wyndham to show that it had a non-retaliatory reason for the threats. See Mariani-Colón, 511 F.3d at 221, 223. We find that Wyndham has satisfied this burden. Maley's threats to fire Planadeball were made in response to her bad sales performance. In fact, Planadeball acknowledges that Maley threatened to fire her in the context of discussing her work performance, and admits that, when the threats were made, her sales numbers were not very good. The burden thus shifts back to Planadeball to show that Wyndham's reason was merely pretextual. See id. To defeat summary judgment in a retaliation case, 'a plaintiff must point to some evidence of retaliation by a pertinent decisionmaker.' Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 15 (quoting Randlett v. Shalala, 118 -19- F.3d 857, 862 (1st Cir. 1997)). Here, Planadeball points only to the temporal proximity between her complaints and Maley's threats. However, this two-month period is not sufficient, by itself, to raise an inference of pretext. The timing of Maley's threats makes sense because they occurred soon after Planadeball returned to work from surgery, and at a time when her sales numbers were low. See Mariani-Colón, 511 F.3d at 224 (holding that the temporal proximity between a plaintiff's complaints of discrimination and his discharge failed to raise an inference of pretext where the timing made sense, as plaintiff was fired a few weeks after he voluntarily took unpaid leave); Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 15. Because Planadeball has not pointed to any other evidence to establish pretext, her retaliation claim fails.