Opinion ID: 2639270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: CID as a whole

Text: Tesoro contends that the superior court erred by failing to modify the CID because the CID, which Tesoro calls sweeping in scope, contains twenty-five pages, covers broad subject matter, and is unreasonable and oppressive under Rule 45(b)(1). Such a demand, argues Tesoro, is insupportable because it is out of proportion to the end sought. [43] Because the court applied the correct deferential reasonable relevance standard of review, we review the superior court's application of that standard to the facts in the case for an abuse of discretion. [44] Given the superior court's extensive factual and legal inquiry, as well as the substantial modifications it made to the CID, we conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion. In the attorney general's opposition to Tesoro's petition to modify the CID, the State explained the purpose of the investigation: Why are prices so high when sizeable volumes of gasoline and other petroleum products are refined here in Alaska? Are prices higher due to higher labor or refining costs in Alaska? Are prices higher due to increased transportation costs to Alaska? If gasoline prices are so high, why aren't traditional market forces attracting other companies to Alaska to compete for these abnormally large margins? With such high prices, why has gasoline actually been shipped out of Alaska, instead of being sold to Alaskans for the highest retail price in the nation? Are there agreements in place between the companies not to compete thus altering competition and other natural market forces? Have the companies volumetrically divided the Alaska gasoline market amongst themselves? Are there illegal barriers to entry in the market? Or, are there economic factors that can be identified and explained that are driving Alaska's gasoline prices through the roof? Because it gave appropriate deference to the State's definition of the investigation, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the CID, while broad, was not unreasonable or oppressive in light of the breadth of the investigation. That the court modified the CID in substantial ways also speaks to the court's proper use of its discretion. The court modified Instruction No. 1, which originally covered all Tesoro personnel, to apply only to personnel with decision making authority, significant control over operations, marketing, acquisition or disposition of materials, pricing and sale of gasoline in Alaska, or strategy, or any other personnel that might assist, through research and drafting of memoranda or reports. Additionally, the court struck two vague and confusing requests in accordance with the requirement that demands be adequately specific, [45] and excluded Tesoro's operations in the Far East from the scope of the CID. We disagree with Tesoro's contentions that the court's amendments were superficial. The superior court's modifications show that it balanced the wide scope of the investigation with the burden of compliance to Tesoro. [46] Furthermore, Tesoro's citation of Williams v. City of Dallas [47] is unpersuasive. In Williams, the court did not defer to the issuer of a subpoena duces tecum on the question of relevance, but in that case the issuer was a private civil rights litigant. [48] As described above, questions of reasonableness and relevance of administrative subpoenas duces tecum must be analyzed showing appropriate deference to the administrative entity issuing the document demand. That this case involves possible antitrust violations also militates toward holding that the superior court's findings regarding the CID are not clearly erroneous. In general, there is a policy of allowing liberal discovery in antitrust cases. [49] Particularly where allegations of conspiracy or monopolization are involved, as in this case, broad discovery may be needed to uncover evidence of invidious design, pattern or intent. [50]