Opinion ID: 2041031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Roadblock Procedures

Text: If, as this Court announces, the procedure used in the roadblock in the immediate case is a good example of constitutionally valid roadblock operation, it is important to identify the specific procedures which the majority deems to be adequate under the Fourth Amendment. All the federal cases cited above are helpful in outlining practices which might comply with the Fourth Amendment. As the only case holding a seizure constitutional, Martinez is the most useful an defining appropriate procedures: (1) Advance warning of roadblock. In Martinez-Fuerte, approaching motorists were notified, by a sign with flashing lights, one mile preceding the roadblock, that all vehicles must stop in one mile. Another sign warned motorists at 3/4 mile preceding the roadblock to WATCH FOR BRAKE LIGHTS. At the checkpoint, there were two large signs with flashing lights, STOP HERE, U.S. OFFICERS. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545, 546, 96 S.Ct. at 3077. (2) Safety considerations. The checkpoint was situated on flat terrain where there was a permanent building and floodlights. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546, 96 S.Ct. at 3077. (3) Seizure. All vehicles [5] were brought to a virtual, if not a complete, halt and were screened by the Border Patrol agents. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546, 96 S.Ct. at 3078. (4) Minimal interference with lawful traffic. The public had knowledge of the exact location of the checkpoint and knew they would not be stopped elsewhere and could avoid the roadblock. There was no discretionary enforcement because only cars passing through the checkpoint could be stopped. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3083. (5) Location based upon effectiveness. The location of the checkpoint was made by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources, not the field officers. Moreover, the location was a reasonable decision based upon criteria designed to ensure effectiveness: avoid interference with traffic in populated areas near border, close to significant roads leading away from border, situated in terrain that restricts vehicle passage around checkpoint, on a stretch of highway compatible with safe operation, and beyond zone where border passes are valid. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 553, 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3080, 3083. (6) Discretion limited. A seizure not based upon reasonable suspicion should be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 [99 S.Ct. at 2640]. Standards, guidelines, or procedures promulgated by either his department or the state attorney general would assure proper action. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650 [99 S.Ct. at 1394]. The stop and inquiry must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881 [95 S.Ct. at 2580]. A thorough examination of the record indicates that the roadblock procedures used in this case, which the Court holds to be constitutional, are: (1) Knowledge of roadblock location. The State police released prior publicity through the newspapers of the plan to conduct roadblocks, but did not indicate particular locations. (2) Selection of location. Several possible roadblock locations were selected by a sergeant who supervises the State Police troopers in Hendricks County. He then conferred with a lieutenant and another officer of the Hendricks County sheriff's department and the participating field officers; a joint decision was made on the roadblock location. They chose this location because it was on print outs that our department has, it shows that the road generates a lot of driving accidents involving alcohol percentage wise on the road. None of this data is part of the record. As noted above, the effectiveness of this roadblock in detecting drunk drivers is essentially unknown. (3) Guidelines. The sergeant who was ordered to do the roadblock received nothing in writing about methodology. He did have some information from Marion County and Morgan County. Guidelines they had set down. The record does not contain any written plan or indicate what the supervisor on site conveyed to those working the roadblock. Basically, it is just common sense about the way you do things, he testified. (4) Roadblock operation. Westbound traffic on U.S. 40 was stopped by 11 uniformed officers. The left lane was funnelled into the right westbound lane using flares and the red flashing lights of two police cars; one car parked in the passing lane and the second car parked on the shoulder. A State Police sergeant was in charge of the participating State Police and a lieutenant with the sheriff's department supervised the county officers. Cars were stopped in groups of five, while the officers were investigating one group the remaining traffic passed through the roadblock without questioning, then another group of five would be questioned after the officers had finished with the preceding group. [6] If a person was suspected of drunk driving then the driver would be further detained at a secondary location adjacent to the roadblock. (5) Safety considerations. Approaching motorists were not warned that a roadblock was ahead. Moreover, an approaching motorist would not see the flares until he was within two to four tenths of a mile. It is reasonably easy to see how these procedures fall short under Supreme Court case law. First, while the general public who read the newspaper accounts of the intended roadblocks may have been forewarned, approaching motorists did not have notice of the impending congestion until they were 2/10 to 4/10 of a mile away. The State Police sergeant testified that motorists might have assumed the congestion was an accident. Indeed, there is no indication in the record that detained motorists were advised of the roadblock's purpose. This absence of notice not only affects safety, but also increases the subjective intrusion experienced by the public. Public safety was also implicated by the decision to locate the roadblock at a spot where curves in the road before it and after it limited visibility. Second, allowing field officers to decide where to stop motorists raises the risk of arbitrary or oppressive action. A sergeant of the State Police assigned to the county along with Sheriff's officers and field deputies determined the location. A commander responsible for making decisions based upon the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources was not involved. Third, the location decision should be based on empirical data designed to ensure effectiveness. In this case, the record does not include the data upon which the decision was made. This Court's approval of a decision for which there is no evidence in the record is tantamount to declaring that the unsubstantiated conclusions of the field officers are adequate under the Fourth Amendment. This clearly is not so. While the rate of apprehension is one measure of effectiveness of the mechanism used, there is nothing substantial in the record to indicate the apprehension rate for this roadblock. As for its effectiveness compared to other methods, we have no evidence at all. Finally, the participating officers should act pursuant to guidelines. In this case, not even the supervising officer received any written guidelines from his superiors. While common sense is an excellent prescription, it does not provide any basis upon which this Court can determine whether the decisions were indeed neutral and explicit. In effect, the field officers' discretion was unlimited. Among the neutral criteria for selecting vehicles, according to the testimony, was luck. The majority indicates that State v. McLaughlin (1984), Ind. App., 471 N.E.2d 1125, is overruled to the extent it conflicts with this decision. The Court of Appeals held the roadblock in McLaughlin unconstitutional. The operation and procedure of the McLaughlin roadblock were as follows: (1) Roadblock location. The roadblock was held on a flat stretch of straight road. An Indiana State Police squad sergeant decided the location of the roadblock based upon his knowledge and experience as a State Police officer and consideration of studies which were an accumulation of accidents that have occurred maybe on that road over a given period of time, which could be a year. However, the sergeant did not know the base years of the study, the number of accidents or their nature; he was aware of one multiple fatality which was an alcohol-related accident during the preceding two years. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d at 1137, 1139. (2) Knowledge of roadblock. There were flares and police cars with flashing red lights located one-quarter mile ahead of the roadblock. There was no warning sign or notice why vehicles were being stopped. Moreover, the record indicated that the public did not have advance notice of this roadblock or of the decision to establish roadblocks in the area. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d at 1138-39. (3) Roadblock procedure. Every car was stopped. (4) Discretion exercised by officers. The squad sergeant had complete discretion to decide the location, duration and frequency of the roadblocks. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d at 1140. The actual conduct of the roadblock (which cars to stop, how to conduct the questioning of drivers, and how to handle those suspected of violating the law) was prescribed by Marion County prosecutor's office guidelines. These guidelines were given to the squad sergeant. A participating field officer testified that he had not read these guidelines prior to his participation in the roadblock, but rather acted upon the squad sergeant's oral instructions. Reading McLaughlin as good law only to the extent it conforms to today's decision helps clarify what the majority regards as a permissible seizure under the Fourth Amendment. A roadblock need not stop all vehicles ( McLaughlin ), only some, and the detainees may be chosen at random ( Garcia ). The seizure may by supervised by a field officer with rank. He may do so without any written, reviewable plan. The decision to stop motorists at a given location may be shared by individual troopers and ranking officers (in today's case) rather that by a single ranking State Police officer ( McLaughlin ). Furthermore, the decision to locate a roadblock at a given place is apparently not reviewable by the judiciary. In the case at bar, the location was based generally upon accident data collected by the State Police, but there is no specific information which served as the basis for this decision. In McLaughlin, the decision was based upon a squad sergeant's own experience and knowledge, and unidentified studies. Reading today's decision and what remains of McLaughlin, it appears that roadblocks are constitutional under a Gresham's Law theory of the Fourth Amendment. 1. Roadblocks may be used to find perpetrators of any crime deemed grave by society. 2. The Fourth Amendment rule of probable cause or articulable suspicion may be suspended without any demonstration that the roadblock is more effective than traditional methods of apprehending such offenders. 3. Roadblocks may be carried out according to any plan field officers regard as reasonable and the plan need not be available for judicial review. 4. The decision about location of the roadblock may be made by field officers and it is not necessary to establish why a given site was chosen by providing any reviewable evidence. 5. Decisions about where to locate the roadblock and who to stop may be made by field officers. It is not necessary that anyone in the headquarters command structure take part. I submit that a roadblock carried out under these conditions cannot be distinguished from virtually any random stop made by law enforcement officers searching for various types of felons. Among our duties is to articulate the constitutional principles which separate America as a free society from those which are not so free. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). I dissent today largely because what the Court says about the Fourth Amendment is too little. Lastly, while the Court has rejected Garcia's Fourth Amendment claim, it has not so much as mentioned, much less purported to decide, the rights assured under Art. I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution. I take it that question is to be decided another day. DeBRULER, J., joins in this dissent.