Opinion ID: 805640
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: IRS Employees

Text: Gordon attempted to call four (4) IRS employees from whom he sought to elicit testimony as to what representations to the IRS, or lack thereof, would be material. The district court excluded the witnesses and/or restricted their testimony on two grounds: First, that Gordon failed to comply 6 Stansfield said that Mynatt procured some of the documents from a subpoena to LMHA. While this statement was not based on personal knowledge, Gordon did not object on this ground, and in any event, the record demonstrates that this was invited error. 16 with the disclosure requirements of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(c);7 second, that it was the role of the jury to apply the law to the facts and decide whether the statements were material. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 141. The testimony elicited from the IRS witnesses would have fallen into two categories, both properly excluded. To the extent that Gordon essentially sought to introduce legal conclusions about materiality in the guise of expert testimony, that testimony was properly excluded. “Generally, an expert may not state his or her opinion as to legal standards nor may he or she state legal conclusions drawn by applying the law to the facts.” Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1328 (10th Cir. 1998). “Expert testimony on the law is excluded because the trial judge does not need the judgment of witnesses.”8 United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Second, to the extent that Gordon sought to elicit testimony as to whether the IRS would have issued a lien subordination certificate for Beach Rd., that testimony is not probative of whether Gordon’s statements were material.9 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the IRS witnesses. We do not reach the district court’s other ground for excluding the evidence.