Opinion ID: 852108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the White Lick Creek Aquifer a Watercourse?

Text: All parties agree that a critical determination in this case is whether the White Lick Creek Aquifer is a watercourse for the purposes of Indiana law. Some time back, we defined a watercourse to mean a channel cut through the turf by the erosion of running water, with well-defined banks and bottom, and through which water flows, and has flowed immemorially, not necessarily all the time, but ordinarily, and permanently for substantial periods of each year. N.J., Ind. & Ill. R.R. Co. v. Tutt, 168 Ind. 205, 211, 80 N.E. 420, 422-23 (1907). The Court of Appeals has observed that the determination of whether a particular body of water is a watercourse is based on the applicable facts. See, e.g., Birdwell v. Moore, 439 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982). No particular fact is immediately conclusive in the determination, including whether the watercourse has a defined bed and banks. See id. What we examine most closely is the substantial existence, unity, regularity, and dependability of the water's flow along a distinguishable course. See Long v. IVC Indus. Coatings, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 697 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). The Indiana Code does provide that the term watercourse includes lakes, rivers, streams, and any other body of water. Ind.Code § 36-9-1-10 (2007). The parties disagree as to whether an aquifer may be properly categorized as any other body of water under this definition. Avon contends that the word any dictates an expansive scope for this provision, and the provision applies to `each,' `every,' and `all' bodies of water, wherever located. (Appellant's Br. at 12.) If true, this definition would include all aquifers. The Township and WCCD, on the other hand, urge that we apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis in interpreting this provision. (Appellee Township's Br. at 20-21; Appellee WCCD's Br. at 21.) For example, WCCD argues that any other body of water means only those bodies of water that `are of like kind . . . to those designated by the specific words,' that is, bodies of water that, like lakes, rivers, and streams, have defined banks, a bottom, and a channelsuch as, for example, brooks or creeks. (Appellee WCCD's Br. at 23.) We think that Avon's suggested interpretation paints with too broad a brush. This interpretation would blur, and possibly wash away, the legal line between watercourses and bodies of surface watera line to which Indiana courts have consistently held. See, e.g., Tutt, 168 Ind. at 210-11, 80 N.E. at 423 (comparing mere surface water, even when gathered in channels and conveyed away, with a watercourse); see also Birdwell, 439 N.E.2d at 721 (common enemy doctrine applies to surface water but not water in a watercourse). We therefore concur with the analytical approach taken by the Township and WCCD, although we think it leads to a different conclusion. A proper application of ejusdem generis would interpret any other body of water as including things as are of like kind or class to those designated by the specific words. Drake v. Mitchell Cmty. Sch., 649 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ind.1995) (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 259 Ind. 266, 275-76, 286 N.E.2d 657, 662-63 (1972)). Here, that class is watercourses. Those watercourses specifically designated by the statute are lakes, rivers, [and] streams. Ind.Code § 36-9-1-10. For questions such as the one before us, we think this leads to examination of the characteristics (like defined boundaries, flow, and historic existence) of the listed items as compared to those of the Aquifer. As we discussed above, our state's common-law definition of watercourse has consistently held that whether a body of water has defined banks, bottom, and channel is not conclusive in determining if that body of water is a watercourse. We hold that the phrase any other body of water in Indiana Code § 36-9-1-10 refers to any other body of water satisfying our common-law definition of a watercourse. While that body of water's similarity to a lake, stream, or river would be informative, it would not be dispositive. This interpretation reflects the fact-specific nature of the inquiry and comports with our presumption that when the Legislature appears to modify the common law by statute, it is aware of the common law and that its intention is to not change the common law beyond what the express terms of its enactments and fair implications allow. Midtown Chiropractic v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 847 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ind.2006). We turn then to the White Lick Creek Aquifer. Nothing in the common-law definition of a watercourse presumptively excludes subterranean water merely because it is subterranean. See Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687, 696, 72 N.E. 849, 851-52 (1904); see also Wiggins v. Brazil Coal & Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958, 963 (Ind.1983) (addressing lost water that percolates the soil below the surface of the earth, in hidden recesses, without a known channel or course  (emphasis added)); Bump v. Sellers, 54 Ind.App. 146, 150, 102 N.E. 875, 877 (1913) (Counsel for appellee have contended that the waters sought to be drained were underground or percolating waters and not governed by the law relating to natural water courses. It is mainly a question of fact and a matter of proof as to whether the waters drained were a natural water course.). The distinction between the lost water of Wiggins and an underground watercourse is no different than the distinction between surface water and a surface watercourse. To begin, we note that the Indiana Code defines an aquifer, for purposes of its Water Resource Management Statutes, as an underground geologic formation that: (1) is consolidated or unconsolidated; and (2) has the ability to receive, store, and transmit water in amounts sufficient for the satisfaction of any beneficial use. Ind.Code § 14-25-7-1 (2004). This definition seems to indicate some of the characteristics we might look for in a watercourse. We thus examine the particular characteristics of the White Lick Creek Aquifer. First, the evidence shows that the Aquifer has definable boundaries and depth based on the composition of the soil in which the water percolates. (Appellant's App. at 297, 300, 565, 566.) [6] The thick outwash valley deposits abruptly change to clay rich or bedrock deposits at the margin of the valley resulting in a distinct boundary between the outwash aquifer and the valley walls. (Appellant's App. at 565) (emphasis added). The Aquifer has been determined to be between forty and sixty-five feet below ground level, with a thickness ranging from fifteen to fifty feet, depending on the topography of the bedrock beneath it. (Appellant's App. at 297, 300.) The Aquifer measures up to 2000 feet at its widest point and notably thins as the valley around it narrows. (Appellant's App. at 300.) It is also relatively continuous along the length of White Lick Creek. . . . (Appellant's App. at 300.) The Aquifer is sufficiently well defined that the City of Indianapolis's Department of Waterworks can map its location with startling precision. (Appellant's App. at 566.) In sum, while the hydrogeologic studies do not speak in terms of the Aquifer's banks, beds, and bottom, they do clearly speak in terms of well-defined boundaries. This difference is one of linguistics, not of law. Second, the evidence does not explicitly state the age of the Aquifer, so it is hard to determine if it has existed immemorially. However, it does note that the Aquifer is composed of sand and gravel deposited by receding glaciers. (Appellant's App. at 297, 565.) Additionally, it seems apparent that all parties accept that the Aquifer is a regular and dependable source of water, containing water within the same boundaries ordinarily and permanently for substantial periods of each year. If this were not the case, then any attempt to draw water from the Aquifer for commercial purposes would seem to be an unsound proposition. Finally, we address the issue of the Aquifer's flow. [7] Here, the evidence does not indicate a particular directional flow of water in the Aquifer. Although its boundaries generally follow the course of the White Lick Creek, it is not clear if that means the water flows within the Aquifer. (Appellant's App. at 300.) Of course, lakes and ponds also lack a flow, unless they are connected to, or fed by, an additional flowing water source. That the body of water is self-contained, and so the water lacks internal movement, does not mean the water is not contained within a watercourse. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the Aquifer is regionally connected to other aquifers and surface streams, leading to a reasonable inference that the water within the aquifer flows. (Appellant's App. at 297, 565-66.) Under the facts of this case, there is sufficient evidence to distinguish the groundwater within the White Lick Creek Aquifer from the lost water referred to in Wiggins. While we stop short of declaring a bright-line rule that all aquifers are watercourses, we must reject the demand for a bright-line rule to the contrary. [8] Given the evidence presented, we conclude that the facts demonstrate that the White Lick Creek Aquifer is a watercourse under Indiana law.