Opinion ID: 2634394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hicks and Babbs were prejudiced by ineffective counsel

Text: ¶ 48 The majority correctly holds Phillip Hicks's and Rashad Babbs's counsel was deficient insofar as counsel informed the jury that the case was noncapital and failed to object when the trial court and prosecution made such reference; [1] however, it finesses the error by asserting it was not prejudicial. Notwithstanding, the record demonstrates the defendants were indeed prejudiced by their attorneys' error, the proper remedy being reversal and remand for new trial. ¶ 49 The majority asserts the defendants did not establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Cienfuegos, 144 Wash.2d 222, 229, 25 P.3d 1011 (2001); see majority at 836. However, that is not the test. Rather, [a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Cienfuegos, 144 Wash.2d at 229, 25 P.3d 1011 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). ¶ 50 One cannot be confident the outcome of the trial would have been the same had the jury not been told the death penalty was not an option. As we held in Townsend, advising the jury the death penalty is off the table increase[s] the likelihood of a juror convicting the petitioner. State v. Townsend, 142 Wash.2d 838, 847, 15 P.3d 145 (2001). The majority recognizes this danger, as well as the danger jurors may be less attentive, less deliberative, and less inclined to hold out during deliberations, [2] but does not provide a remedy. ¶ 51 Rather the majority speculates defendants were not prejudiced by counsel's mistake because the jury was active in its deliberation, there was an abundance of evidence to support the conviction, and the defendants were not convicted of the most serious charges. Majority at 836-37. But none of this demonstrates the jury was not less attentive or less inclined to hold out during deliberations than they would have been if they were not informed of the noncapital nature of the case. Assuming arguendo the jury was active in its deliberation, it does not prove the deliberation might not have been more active absent counsel's error. That the defendants were convicted only of a less serious charge likewise does not demonstrate the jury might not have acquitted the defendants of all charges but for counsel's error. ¶ 52 In addition, the majority impermissibly invades the province of the jury when it rests on the alleged abundance of evidence against the defendants. [3] The majority asserts, [a] guilty verdict was likely even if the jury had not been informed that the case was noncapital; [4] yet elsewhere we have recognized, it is impossible for courts to contemplate the probabilities any evidence may have upon the minds of the jurors. State v. Robinson, 24 Wash.2d 909, 917, 167 P.2d 986 (1946). Thus judicial confidence in the verdict is undermined.