Opinion ID: 1388423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The majority opinion will have adverse practical effects.

Text: The theoretical and practical ramifications of the majority's holding are sweeping. At a minimum, the majority opinion will permit imposition of vicarious liability whenever an on-duty police officer commits rape or some other sexual assault against a citizen the officer has detained by invoking his official authority. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 221.) It is difficult to see how a jury could find, consistent with the majority opinion, that a uniformed officer who detains and sexually assaults a motorist was not acting in the course and scope of his employment. The majority purports to limit its holding to cases in which an officer exercises or misuses his authority. Indeed, the opinion stresses that vicarious liability is appropriate here because Office Schroyer committed his criminal act while on duty and in uniform. But the majority's underlying logic extends far beyond these limited circumstances. Once the majority's fundamental premise is accepted, its efforts to limit its ruling are largely illusory. The majority's conclusions rest on the principle that a police officer's special power and authority allow him to impose his will on citizens. But this power and authority are limited neither to uniformed officers, nor to on-duty hours. Officers have law enforcement responsibility even when off duty, and their jurisdiction in certain situations is statewide. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, ง 830.1, subd. (a)(3).) Moreover, an officer's special power to intimidate, if any, does not depend on whether he is actually on duty or in full uniform. If the officer acts in uniform, or displays his badge, or brandishes a regulation firearm, or even mentions his or her status, the officer implicitly uses state-conferred power and ability to subjugate the victim. Under the majority's reasoning, a jury would be hard pressed to find that misconduct committed under such circumstances was outside the scope of ... employment. (See, e.g., Silver, Police Civil Liability (1991) ง 6.07, p. 6-12 [[T]he issue of `off' vs. `on' duty is usually not critical where, for instance, the officer identifies himself or uses a weapon.].) Rather than consider or even acknowledge this consequence of its holding, the majority contends that cases in which courts have refused to impose vicarious liability for sexual misconduct are distinguishable because the officers were off duty. However, examination of these decisions discloses no such dispositive distinction. In Gambling v. Cornish (N.D.Ill. 1977) 426 F. Supp. 1153, the court did not decide whether the raping officers were on or off duty. Rather, the court stated that, even assuming they were on duty, there was no vicarious liability. ( Id., at p. 1155.) Similarly, in Bates v. Doria (1986) 150 Ill. App.3d 1025 [502 N.E.2d 454], the court rejected liability, not because the officer was off duty, but because the rape was outrageous and therefore beyond the scope of his employment. The logical consequence of the majority's holding is demonstrated by one of the out-of-state cases on which it relies. In Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge (La. Ct. App. 1979) 380 So.2d 119, the court upheld vicarious liability for a rape committed by an on-duty police officer. The significance for our case is that, in support of its conclusion, the court relied on prior Louisiana decisions that imposed vicarious liability for torts committed by off-duty officers. ( Id., at pp. 121-122, citing Cheatham v. Lee (La. Ct. App. 1973) 277 So.2d 513; Borque v. Lohr (La. Ct. App. 1971) 248 So.2d 901.) The majority's reliance on Applewhite, supra, is curious because the case refutes the majority's attempted distinction between on-duty and off-duty misconduct. The majority's logic will also extend beyond police officers. Part 2, title 2, chapter 4.5 of the Penal Code grants peace officer status to a wide variety of law enforcement officers. They include sheriffs, marshals, constables, and inspectors for district attorneys. Under appropriate circumstances, peace officer status is conferred on dental examiners, voluntary fire wardens, horse racing board investigators, and many other persons. (Pen. Code, ง 830.3.) Like police, some of these officers are authorized to carry firearms. ( Ibid. ) If one of these types of officers uses his weapon or asserts his authority in order to facilitate a rape, it is difficult to see how vicarious liability could be denied under the majority opinion. The majority opinion is also unlimited in terms of the types of misconduct that will give rise to liability. Rape, robbery, and murder serve no public or police function. Yet the majority's holding seems to permit imposition of vicarious liability for all these crimes if the perpetrator made any use of official trappings or weapons or if the victim had knowledge of the attacker's connection to law enforcement and submitted accordingly. The implications of that conclusion are daunting. In sum, the principles espoused by the majority have the potential to convert blameless public agencies into liability insurers for much, if not all, of the intentional misconduct committed by peace officers in their employ. Unlike commercial insurers, the innocent agencies can neither define the limits of their coverage nor collect premiums to finance it. Moreover, as we have seen, they may be both legally and practically barred from transferring their exposure to a commercial insurer. The majority fails to persuade me that law or public policy warrants such a result.