Opinion ID: 1383505
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tsolis's Younger Sales Force Statement

Text: Blair also asserts that Tsolis's statement that Duncum overheard in the summer of 2003 constitutes direct evidence of discrimination. Specifically, Tsolis stated that he needed to set up a younger sales force. J.A. at 194 (Duncum Dep. at 28:17-18). Again, we consider whether this statement is admissible before considering whether it is direct evidence of age discrimination. We conclude that this statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, for whether Tsolis actually needed a younger sales force is not at issue. Instead, the statement is being offered as evidence that this perceived need fueled Henry Filters's decision to terminate Blair. Even if we deemed this purpose as truth of the matter asserted, however, the statement still would not be hearsay. If a statement is offered against a party and is a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, FED.R.EVID. 801(d)(2)(D), it is properly attributed to the employer under FED. R.EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) and consequently is not hearsay. See, e.g., Grizzell v. City of Columbus Div. of Police, 461 F.3d 711, 722 (6th Cir.2006) (statements of a deputy police chief regarding promotion eligibility were admissible nonhearsay because deputy chief was charged with managing the promotional process); Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 349 F.3d 269, 276 (6th Cir.2003) (statements of university's vice provost regarding potential racial prejudice within university's College of Education were admissible nonhearsay; because of vice provost's oversight of the affirmative action process at the University, . . . his statements concerning the racial composition of the workforce [was] within the ambit of his authority.); Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1081 (6th Cir.1999) (supervisor's statement was not hearsay because of his supervisory position); but see Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 928 (6th Cir.1999) (statement of supervisor did not concern a matter within scope of supervisor's employment and therefore was inadmissible hearsay because supervisor was not involved in the actions that plaintiff claims led to her constructive discharge). Accordingly, to decide whether Tsolis's younger sales force statement is admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), we must determine whether personnel matters were a matter within the scope of Tsolis's employment. To ascertain the scope of Tsolis's employment, we must make a preliminary determination, under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), whether Tsolis had the authority to hire and fire salespeople. In this inquiry, we generally are not bound by the rules of evidence, FED.R.EVID. 104(a), and accordingly may consider the statement itself, FED.R.EVID. 801(d)(2). Also, we apply the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for the burden of persuasion in this analysis. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). Substantial evidence indicates that hiring and firing salespeople was within Tsolis's realm of responsibility. For instance, Jackson's former secretary stated that Tsolis had a high degree of influence over personnel matters and that in the spring of 2003, he threatened to terminate salespeople. J.A. at 219 (Ciszewski Aff. ¶¶ 5-6). She further stated that although Jackson was dismayed by these threats, he never indicated that Tsolis lacked the authority to terminate salespeople. Id. (¶ 5). Roger Brodeur, a former Durr Automation employee, echoed this sentiment. J.A. at 224-25 (Brodeur Aff. ¶ 9). Brodeur also stated that he was personally involved in some discussions with Tsolis and Jackson regarding whether particular salespeople should be terminated. Based upon these discussions, Brodeur stated that Tsolis was consulted by Mark Jackson and participated in the decisions of who would be fired and who would be hired at Henry Filters and Durr Automation. J.A. at 221 (Brodeur Aff. ¶ 4). Additionally, Tsolis directly told Duncum that he (Tsolis) had made the decision to terminate Roger Brodeur, as well as others. Henry Filters offers evidence to the contrary in the form of affidavits and deposition testimony from Tsolis, Jackson, and Zinger. But this self-serving evidence does not outweigh the evidence indicating that personnel matters within the sales force were within the scope of Tsolis's employment. Accordingly, we conclude that the preponderance of evidence indicates that Tsolis had the authority to hire and fire salespeople, and therefore, Tsolis's younger sales force statement concerned a matter within the scope of his employment. Having concluded that Tsolis's statement regarding a younger sales force is admissible, we turn to whether it is direct evidence of age discrimination. The statement certainly reflects animus against, and a desire to terminate, older workers. However, neither the statement itself nor the context in which it was uttered directly indicates that Tsolis was speaking of Blair specifically. Instead, Duncum testified in his deposition that he could not recall any mention of Blair's name. Because an inference is needed to connect Tsolis's professed general desire for a younger workforce with Blair's termination (specifically, that Tsolis intended to fire Blair because of this desire), we conclude that this statement is not direct evidence of discrimination.