Opinion ID: 2307424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disciplinary record.

Text: Richardson asserts that the probate court's references to his disciplinary record in its order granting appellees' 12(b)(6) motion demonstrate that the court erred in considering matters outside the pleading, thereby converting the motion into a request for summary judgment without allowing him to supplement the complaint. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b) states in pertinent part: If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. In the order dismissing Richardson's complaint, the trial court recognized appellees' reference, contained in their 12(b)(6) motion, to Richardson's suspension from the practice of law in the District of Columbia and Florida, and queried whether Richardson was practicing law without a license. These references to Richardson's disciplinary record suggest that the court was concerned about his unauthorized practice of law, as evidenced by its subsequent referral of Richardson to Bar Counsel. [7] It is clear from the order, however, that the probate court did not rely on this disciplinary information in granting the 12(b)(6) motion, as it fully resolved that matter on the pleadings before address[ing] another issue that has been illuminated by [appellees], whether Richardson was practicing law in contempt of the Court of Appeals suspension order. [8] Moreover, there is nothing in the order to suggest that the court's knowledge of Richardson's disciplinary history in any way tainted its consideration of appellees' 12(b)(6) motion. At the beginning of its analysis, the probate court states the proper 12(b)(6) standard, indicating that a complaint must be dismissed if it fails to set forth facts which, if credited, would entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded. See Fraser, supra, 636 A.2d at 432 (explaining that a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted only if `it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief') (quoting McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C.1979)) (alteration in original). The probate court then applied this standard to Richardson's complaint and found it lacking, not because appellant appeared to be advocating for a client, but because he failed to allege facts sufficient to establish either his own standing or the existence of a will. Because the probate court did not err in considering information outside the pleadings, it properly proceeded under Rule 12(b)(6), and did not need to provide Richardson an opportunity to present additional material under Rule 56 before deciding to dismiss the complaint.