Opinion ID: 490514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the meaning of joint request

Text: 6 If, as plaintiffs argue, the joint request of a State Governor and the local governments concerned that the statute mandates for withdrawals requires unanimity among all concerned jurisdictions, then Atlanta's opposition to I-420 funds withdrawal absent the assurance that the money would not go to Georgia 400 would be fatal. It is less than plain, though, that joint request must mean unanimous agreement. On the one hand, joint might refer to the substantive result of the local decisionmaking process, describing only those requests that are joined by all relevant parties. On the other hand, joint might refer to the process itself, recognizing only requests that result from a decision in which all relevant parties participate. Or perhaps joint denotes a modified combination of these two possibilities, referring to a group decisionmaking process that yields a consensus, though not necessarily a unanimous one. Thus, although joint might mean unanimous, in the context of this law, it need not. 7 In fact, the requirement that a request be unanimous would be distinctly antidemocratic in a situation (unlike the one here) in which many local governments have jurisdiction over the area encompassing the Interstate section in question; in such a case any one government could hold out against the consensus of all the others or freely extract concessions for its consent. Highways might be built that only one of several jurisdictions wanted. There is unfortunately no indication from either the Senate or House Reports on the highway aid bill as to the intended meaning of joint request. In the interpretive vacuum created by no clearly expressed congressional intent, either in text or legislative history, we generally defer to the Department's statutory construction, if it is reasonable. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 8 Department regulations explain that [w]hile unanimous local action is not required, the withdrawal request is expected to have substantial support. 23 C.F.R. Sec. 476.304(b) (1986). This nonunanimity proposal had received some criticism during the notice and comment period, but the Department stuck with it in the final rule, noting that the statutory language [does] not requir[e] local unanimity and [is] basically judgmental in application. 45 Fed.Reg. 69,390, 69,393 (1980). In its initial proposal, the Department had explained that [w]hile it is not feasible to prescribe a numerical standard, local officials are expected to act cooperatively to develop proposed actions which will have the support of a substantial majority of those concerned. 45 Fed.Reg. 2,296, 2,299 (1980). 4 This explanation indicates that the Department views the requirement of a joint request as demanding cooperation of the relevant decisionmakers in making a decision that a substantial majority of those decisionmakers will support. This interpretation of joint request comports with one of the readings we have suggested above (the modified combination of substantive and procedural concerns), and is a reasonable one on its face. Its application in particular instances might, however, still raise questions of fidelity to the statutory design. 9 Thus, without clear contrary congressional intent, we accept as reasonable the Department's construction of a joint request as one requiring only substantial support. 5 Therefore, Atlanta's failure to support unconditionally the withdrawal of I-420 funds would not automatically preclude such a withdrawal merely because unanimity was absent. The question remains, however, whether substantial support existed in this instance under the Department's own interpretation and regulations.