Opinion ID: 2604170
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: does senate district e violate the equal protection clause of either the united states or alaska constitution?

Text: Appellant Jim Crawford argues that a reapportionment may be invalid under our decision in Groh if it is improperly motivated or has an impermissible effect. See 526 P.2d at 877. Crawford argues that Senate District E resulted from improper motivation because the reapportionment plan as a whole was specifically directed against members of the Republican party. He urges this court to implement his proposed remedy of creating a two-member senate district composed of House Districts 5, 6, and 7, and a single-member senate district for House District 16. Kenai also argues that the Board had impermissible motives in designing Senate District E, contending that the Board included South Anchorage within the district in order to produce a rural constituency and to dilute the political power of Anchorage voters. [22] Kenai asserts that such a dissipation of voting strength is invalid because it disfavors voters from a particular geographic area. In the context of voting rights in redistricting and reapportionment litigation, there are two basic principles of equal protection, namely that of one person, one vote  the right to an equally weighted vote  and of fair and effective representation  the right to group effectiveness or an equally powerful vote. See Note, The Constitutional Imperative of Proportional Representation, 94 Yale L.J. 163, 163-64 (1984); Davis v. Bandemer, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 2828, 92 L.Ed.2d 85, 127-28 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 13-2, 13-3, and 13-7 (1978); infra text accompanying notes 27-32. We will consider Senate District E with respect to each of these principles in turn.
Under a one person, one vote theory, minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 2327, 37 L.Ed.2d 298, 307 (1973). As noted above, as a general matter an apportionment plan containing a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 2696, 77 L.Ed.2d 214, 222 (1983). The state must provide justification for any greater deviation. [23] Although seeking to attain a balance between rural and urban power will not justify denying voters an equally weighted vote, Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 692, 84 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 12 L.Ed.2d 609, 618 (1964), the record in the instant case contains no suggestion that Senate District E denies either Republicans or voters of urban Anchorage their right to an equally weighted vote. Kenai relies on Justice Brennan's concurrence in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320, modified, 411 U.S. 922, 93 S.Ct. 1475, 36 L.Ed.2d 316 (1973), in suggesting that the mere motive of favoring one geographic area over another in terms of voting effectiveness violates the equal protection clause. In his opinion Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that the apportionment process must be free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination and concluded that the lower court's finding that the apportionment in issue included a built-in bias tending to favor a particular area required invalidation of the apportionment without regard to the state's purported justification for the districts. Id. at 344, 93 S.Ct. at 995, 35 L.Ed.2d at 341-42. However, the plan which he found arbitrary resulted in pervasive underrepresentation. [24] Thus, even under Justice Brennan's view, the impermissible built-in bias was one which actually denied voters of an area an equally weighted vote. [25] Here, without the excessive deviation caused by the Southeastern districts, the reapportionment plan would be prima facie constitutional. [26] To sustain a claim of political discrimination against Republicans or urban Anchorage voters merely because of impermissible motives would be inconsistent with the quantitative, one person, one vote prong of equal protection in the context of legislative reapportionment. For appellants to prevail on such a claim, they must prove a qualitative violation  that is, a denial of fair and effective representation.
That the equal protection clause protects the rights of voters to an equally meaningful vote has been inferred from Reynolds in which the Supreme Court said that the achieving of fair and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative apportionment. [27] 377 U.S. at 565-66, 84 S.Ct. at 1383, 12 L.Ed.2d at 529. While the Reynolds court stated that the overriding objective [of apportionment] must be substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State, id. at 579, 84 S.Ct. at 1390, 12 L.Ed.2d at 537, it subsequently acknowledged that multi-member districts may be vulnerable, if racial or political groups have been fenced out of the political process and their voting strength invidiously minimized. [28] Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. at 754, 93 S.Ct. at 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d at 312 (1973). Redistricting intended to achieve a rough approximation of the strengths of political groups in state legislatures, rather than fencing out such groups, is permissible. Id. at 752, 754, 93 S.Ct. at 2331, 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d at 311, 313. [29] Employing a multi-member district to achieve a rough sort of proportional representation for rural areas in the legislature would thus be permissible under the equal protection clause in light of Gaffney. If, however, the creation of such a district instead was purposefully used to exclude a certain group from political participation, it is more suspect. [30] In Bandemer, the Supreme Court addressed a claim that Indiana's 1981 legislative apportionment plan unconstitutionally diluted the votes of Indiana Democrats. [31] The Bandemer Court rejected the claim, with a plurality of four justices taking the position that plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group. ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2808, 92 L.Ed.2d at 102. The plurality explained in part: In cases involving individual multi-member districts, we have required a substantially greater showing of adverse effects than a mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution. Only where there is evidence that excluded groups have less opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice have we refused to approve the use of multi-member districts. In these cases, we have also noted the lack of responsiveness by those elected to the concerns of the relevant groups. ... . As with individual districts, where unconstitutional vote dilution is alleged in the form of statewide political gerrymandering, the mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination. Again, without specific supporting evidence, a court cannot presume in such a case that those who are elected will disregard the disproportionately underrepresented group. Rather, unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a whole. Although this is a somewhat different formulation than we have previously used in describing unconstitutional vote dilution in an individual district, the focus of both of these inquiries is essentially the same. In both contexts, the question is whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process. In a challenge to an individual district, this inquiry focuses on the opportunity of members of the group to participate in party deliberations in the slating and nomination of candidates, their opportunity to register and vote, and hence their chance to directly influence the election returns and to secure the attention of the winning candidate. Statewide, however, the inquiry centers on the voters' direct or indirect influence on the elections of the state legislature as a whole. And, as in individual district cases, an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively. In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2810, 92 L.Ed.2d at 104-06 (emphasis added and citations omitted). Thus, under the plurality's view, a showing of purposeful disproportionality alone can not support a challenge to a legislative apportionment plan; a consistent degradation of a minority's voting power must be demonstrated. Moreover, [r]elying on a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination does not satisfy this threshold condition in stating and proving a cause of action. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2799, 92 L.Ed.2d at 107. Both the one person, one vote and the fair and effective representation prongs of equal protection necessitate the use of neutral and legitimate criteria in redistricting. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2828, 92 L.Ed.2d at 127-28 (Powell, J., dissenting). As observed by Justice Powell in his Bandemer dissent, exclusive or primary reliance on `one person, one vote' can betray the constitutional promise of fair and effective representation by enabling a legislature to engage intentionally in clearly discriminatory gerrymandering. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2829, 92 L.Ed.2d at 129. Justice Powell would test the constitutionality of an apportionment plan according to a number of neutral criteria, [t]he most important of [which] ... are the shapes of voting districts and adherence to established political subdivision boundaries. Other relevant considerations include the nature of the legislative procedures by which the apportionment law was adopted and legislative history reflecting contemporaneous legislative goals. To make out a case of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the plaintiff should be required to offer proof concerning these factors, which bear directly on the fairness of a redistricting plan, as well as evidence concerning population disparities and statistics tending to show vote dilution. No one factor should be dispositive. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2831-32, 92 L.Ed.2d at 131-32 (Powell, J., dissenting, citing with approval Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 753-61, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 2671-75, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)). [32] In summation, proof of purposeful discrimination alone is insufficient to state a cause of action for political gerrymandering. The plurality in Bandemer would require additional proof that the group has been consistently and substantially excluded from the political process, denied political effectiveness over a period of more than one election, in order to raise a constitutional claim. With these principles in mind, we turn to the specific allegations made by Crawford and Kenai in this case. We can summarily dispose of Crawford's claim that the Board's improper motivation in discriminating against the Republican Party renders the apportionment plan unconstitutional. Crawford conceded in his reply brief that [r]eferences to identifiable political groups, and any adverse impact on any group's ability to effectively participate in the political process, are references to a gerrymandering claim, which is not involved in this case. In light of the constitutional doctrine just outlined, Crawford obviously has not stated a claim for violation of the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. [33] In regard to Kenai's claim of impermissible discrimination against Anchorage voters, we find that Kenai has not made the requisite demonstration under Bandemer that the Board attempted to consistently and substantially deny them representation. Although the Board did seek to prevent another Anchorage senate seat, proportionality was the Board's expressed goal in redistricting: the suggested purpose for the creation of Senate District E was to insure that there would be a far better balance of interests in the legislature. Moreover, at least eleven of the twenty state senators represent urban areas, and of these, eight are from Anchorage. If senate representation were mathematically proportional to population, Anchorage would be entitled to 8.51 senators. [34] Anchorage has a population as calculated for apportionment purposes of 42.6% of the state's total population and has received 40% of the state's senate seats; given an additional senator, for a total of nine, it would then have 42.6% of the population and 45% of the senate seats. (Kenai itself argues that the facts show another Anchorage seat would not be created by severing Senate District E into two districts.) We think the effect of this disproportionality is de minimus in a traditional system of winner-take-all representation. Therefore, we hold that Senate District E does not violate the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.
We have explained the equal protection analysis that we apply under the Alaska Constitution in Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984). There we said: Alaska's own equal protection analysis was engendered in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976), and State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978). Erickson articulated an adjustable uniform-balancing test which placed a greater or lesser burden on the state to justify a classification depending on the importance of the individual right involved. Id. at 12. In effect, Erickson created a continuum of available levels of scrutiny, beginning with the rational basis test described in Isakson, 550 P.2d at 362-63, and ending with the functional equivalent of the federal compelling state interest test at the highest level of review. In Erickson we looked first to the legitimacy of the state purposes behind challenged legislation, second to the relationship between the chosen means and the asserted goals of the statute, and third to the state's interest in the means chosen as balanced against the nature of the constitutional right infringed. 574 P.2d at 12. Our recent opinion in State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983), formally revised the order of the analytic stages of Erickson. First, it must be determined at the outset what weight should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment. The nature of this interest is the most important variable in fixing the appropriate level of review. Thus, the initial inquiry under article I, section 1 of Alaska's constitution goes to the level of scrutiny. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1192-93 & n. 14. Depending upon the primacy of the interest involved, the state will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its legislation. Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes served by a challenged statute. Depending on the level of review determined, the state may be required to show only that its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or, at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest. Third, an evaluation of the state's interest in the particular means employed to further its goals must be undertake. Once again, the state's burden will differ in accordance with the determination of the level of scrutiny under the first stage of analysis. At the low end of the sliding scale we have held that a substantial relationship between means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher end of the scale, the fit between means and ends must be much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated. Id. at 269-70 (footnote omitted). On several occasions we have further explained that where there is no fundamental right at stake, the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution imposes a stricter standard than its federal counterpart. [35] While the applicable federal equal protection standard in reapportionment cases has not been clearly established, see L. Tribe, supra § 13-6 at 748, we will continue to use our stricter equal protection standard when assessing the constitutionality of a reapportionment plan. Because we conclude that the effect of the Board's intentional geographic discrimination in creating Senate District E tends toward disproportionality of representation and its purpose is therefore illegitimate, we hold the district unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution.
While it is clear that the right to vote is fundamental, Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1982), the constitutional interest allegedly impaired here is not the right to vote per se, but the interest of individual members of a geographic group or community in having their votes protected from disproportionate dilution by the votes of another geographic group or community. That is, the interest asserted is the right to an equally powerful and geographically effective vote in the state legislature. In this connection we note that it is implicit in our constitutional structure that similarly situated communities be treated in a similar manner. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. II, § 19 (prohibiting local or special acts if a general act can be made applicable); Abrams v. State, 534 P.2d 91, 94 (Alaska 1975) (act is local or special if not reasonably related to a matter of common interest to the whole state). We consider a voter's right to an equally geographically effective or powerful vote, while not a fundamental right, to represent a significant constitutional interest.
Expressing its concern that a single-member senate district composed of House Districts 6 and 7 would result in the district's domination by the South Anchorage area and the creation of an additional Anchorage senate seat, the Board deliberately fashioned Senate District E to retain the balance between regional and Anchorage senate representation. The legitimacy of this purpose hinges on whether the Board intentionally sought to dilute the voting power of Anchorage voters disproportionately. Thus, if the Board sought to denigrate the voting power of Anchorage voters systematically by reducing their senate representation below their relative strength in the state's population, then such a purpose would be illegitimate. We are of the view that a neutral factors test, similar to that proposed by Justice Powell in Bandemer, ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2832, 92 L.Ed.2d at 131-32 (Powell, J., dissenting), should be employed to assess the legitimacy of the Board's purpose in designing Senate District E. [36] Under such a test we look both to the process followed by the Board in formulating its decision and to the substance of the Board's decision in order to ascertain whether the Board intentionally discriminated against a particular geographic area. Wholesale exclusion of any geographic area from the reapportionment process and the use of any secretive procedures suggest an illegitimate purpose. District boundaries which meander and selectively ignore political subdivisions and communities of interest, and evidence of regional partisanship are also suggestive. The presentation of evidence that indicates, when considered with the totality of the circumstances, that the Board acted intentionally to discriminate against the voters of a geographic area will serve to compel the Board to demonstrate that its acts aimed to effectuate proportional representation. That is, the Board will have the burden of proving that any intentional discrimination against voters of a particular area will lead to more proportional representation. Because our equal protection clause is more stringent than the federal equal protection clause, a showing of a consistent degradation of voting power in more than one election will not be required; rather once the Board's discriminatory intent is evident, its purpose in redistricting will be held illegitimate unless that redistricting effects a greater proportionality of representation. Moreover, because of our stricter constitutional standard, we will not consider any effect of disproportionality de minimus when determining the legitimacy of the Board's purpose. A totality of the circumstances assessment of the Board's reapportionment process is unnecessary here because the Board's intent was discriminatory on its face. Cf. Bandemer, at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2833-35, 92 L.Ed.2d at 133-36. It is evident that the Board sought to prevent another Anchorage senate seat in the state legislature, and normally the Board would thus be required to demonstrate that this intentional discrimination resulted in increased proportionality of geographic representation in the state legislature. We will not remand this aspect of the case, however, since we are able to decide the issue based on the statistical evidence of disproportionality developed in the record below. As noted above, Anchorage has a population for apportionment purposes of 42.6% of the state's total population and has received 40% of the state's senate seats; with an additional senate seat, it would have approximately 45% of the senate seats. [37] Thus, Anchorage will either remain underrepresented by 2.6% or become overrepresented by 2.4%, depending on whether Anchorage voters can in fact win the additional seat. Put another way, strict proportionality would give Anchorage voters 8.51 senate seats, and a redistricting toward proportionality would allow them the potential to win a ninth senate seat. Because it is clear that the Board intended to discriminate against the voters of Anchorage, [38] the Board has the burden of proving that it intentionally discriminated in order to increase the proportionality of geographic representation in the legislature. Since the record demonstrates that the action of the Board tends toward disproportionality  2.6% or .51 senate seat underrepresentation is more disproportionate than 2.4% or .49 senate seat overrepresentation  we conclude that the Board's purpose in creating Senate District E was illegitimate. [39] We therefore hold the district unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. [40] Nevertheless, although we will not consider any effect of disproportionality de minimus in determining whether the Board's purpose is illegitimate, the degree of disproportionality will be considered in determining the appropriate relief to be granted. Here the effect of the Board's discriminatory intent is de minimus. Given this circumstance we conclude that a declaration that the Board's purpose in fashioning Senate District E was illegitimate under Alaska's equal protection clause is an adequate remedy, and we will not require the Board to redraw Senate District E. In contrast with federal apportionment decisions which have not held unconstitutional an insubstantial disadvantagement of groups of voters, e.g., Bandemer, at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 2810, 92 L.Ed.2d at 106, or a minor deviation from ideal district size, e.g., Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-43, 103 S.Ct. at 2695-96, 77 L.Ed.2d at 221-22, we are of the view that declaratory relief in this instance promotes scrupulous observance of the law and at the same time adheres to the principle that the relief fashioned remedies the actual injury. [41] The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part. MOORE, J., not participating. COMPTON, J., dissents.