Opinion ID: 3038866
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invalid Time, Place, and Manner Restriction

Text: Challenge [2] To determine the proper analysis for Plaintiffs’ claims, the threshold question is the nature of the forum in which the ordinance limits speech. The level of restriction that can be placed on speech depends on whether the forum is a traditional public forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic 3 The district court found, and neither party disputes on appeal, that Plaintiffs have standing to bring a facial challenge to the statute. Because “the plaintiff[s] ha[ve] alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder,” we agree with the district court that they have standing to bring their claims. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). 11466 KLEIN v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY forum. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). [3] The Supreme Court noted in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), that public streets are “the archetype of a traditional public forum.” Id. at 480. “ ‘Time out of mind’ public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly and debate, the hallmark of a traditional public forum.” Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Moreover, Frisby held that a street does not lose its status as a public forum “simply because it runs through a residential neighborhood.” Id. It is well-settled, then, that the residential streets and sidewalks covered by the County’s ordinance are public fora. [4] The proper analysis for a challenge to an ordinance that restricts speech in a public forum is whether the restriction is a valid time, place, and manner restriction on speech. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. A time, place, and manner restriction on speech is valid if it: (a) is content neutral, (b) is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (c) leaves open ample alternative channels for communication. Id. Again, because Plaintiffs raise a facial challenge, we cannot strike down the ordinance unless it is “unconstitutional in every conceivable application.” See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796.
[5] Plaintiffs concede, as they must, that the ordinance is content neutral on its face; the ordinance prohibits residential picketing within a certain zone no matter what the topic of the protest or the viewpoint of the protester. As such, this first prong is not disputed. 2. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest KLEIN v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY 11467 [6] It is not disputed that the government has an interest in protecting residential tranquility. In Frisby, the Supreme Court considered a Brookfield, Wisconsin residential picketing ordinance that prohibited picketing directly in front of a targeted residence. See 487 U.S. at 483. The Court discussed the nature of the right to residential privacy in broad terms: The State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society. Our prior decisions have often remarked on the unique nature of the home, the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick, and have recognized that pre- serving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value. Id. at 484 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). At the same time, the Court recognized the “careful scrutiny” given to restrictions on public issue picketing, given the importance of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues.” Id. at 479 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Accordingly, it defined more specifically the “evil” to be prevented by residential picketing ordinances: that such picketing might render the targeted resident a captive audience to unwanted speech. See id. at 484-85, 487 (“[I]ndividuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and . . . the government may protect this freedom.”). Having defined the right this way, the Court upheld a facial challenge to the Brookfield ordinance, because picketing directly in front of the home would make the targeted resident captive in the residence. See id. at 487 (“The target of the focused picketing banned by the Brookfield ordinance is just such a ‘captive.’ The resident is figuratively, and perhaps literally, trapped within the home, and 11468 KLEIN v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY because of the unique and subtle impact of such picketing is left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech.”). This narrowed definition of the right to residential privacy was reiterated in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). In Madsen, the Court considered an injunction that prohibited picketing within 300 feet of the residence of abortion clinic employees. See id. at 774. The Court noted, again, that the house is the “last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.” Id. at 775 (quoting Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484). It found, however, that the 300-foot prohibition was “much larger” than the zone of protection provided in Frisby. It held that the ordinance burdened more speech than necessary to protect the government’s interest because “limitation[s] on the time, duration of picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could have accomplished the desired result.” Id. Such measures would both protect residents from being a captive audience in the home and protect picketers’ First Amendment rights.4 Thus, the Court found this provision of the injunction to be unconstitutional. The combined teaching of Frisby and Madsen is that the government’s interest in residential privacy does not trump all other rights. The government certainly has a significant interest in preventing picketing that renders the targeted resident a captive audience to the picketers’ message. But the right to residential privacy does not encompass a right to remain blissfully unaware of the presence of picketers. See Murray v. Lawson, 649 A.2d 1253, 1267 (N.J. 1994) (“[K]eeping [pick- 4 Madsen does not necessarily foreclose the County’s argument that its 300-foot zone is proper. In Madsen, the Court was reviewing the constitutionality of an injunction, which must be “no more burdensome . . . than necessary” to protect the government interest. Id. at 765. In contrast, a generally applicable ordinance must be “narrowly tailored” to the government’s interest. Id. at 764. The standard governing ordinances is less stringent than the standard governing injunctions, see id., although neither the Supreme Court nor this court has articulated a practical distinction between the two standards. KLEIN v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY 11469 eters] at such a great distance, thereby rending [the resident’s] awareness of the picketing most unlikely as a practical matter, is unnecessary to protect [the resident’s] residential-privacy interest”). [7] Thus the district court erred when it stated that residential occupants are entitled to “an unencumbered enjoyment of the tranquility and privacy of their homes.” Instead, residential picketing ordinances must carefully balance two valid and competing interests: the right of residents not to be captive audiences to unwanted speech and the right of picketers to convey their message. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487. Residential picketing ordinances require a more nuanced approach than the one implied by the district court’s formulation of the right to residential privacy. Even though we disagree with the district court on this point, we nonetheless affirm its conclusion that Plaintiffs cannot state a valid facial challenge to the County’s ordinance. The ordinance is problematic in several aspects: The 300-foot ban imposed by the County will, in many cases, put picketers farther away from the targeted residence than they would be under those ordinances that have been deemed constitutional by other courts. See Thorburn v. Austin, 231 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding an ordinance that prohibited picketing within fifty feet of the targeted resident’s property line, but that allowed picketing on the sidewalk across the street from the targeted residence); Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1520-21 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding an ordinance that banned picketing in front of the targeted house and one house on either side, but that permitted picketing on the sidewalk across the street from the targeted residence); see also Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655, 660 (8th Cir. 1996) (striking down an ordinance that banned picketing within 200 feet of a targeted residence); Murray, 649 A.2d at 1267-68 (striking down an injunction that banned picketing within 300 feet of the targeted residence).5 In addition, the ordinance imposes a 5 In defending its ordinance, the County points to the California Court of Appeal’s decision in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. Rptr. 11470 KLEIN v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY one-size-fits-all approach to residential picketing, which in some cases will allow picketing directly in front of the targeted home if the home is situated on a large lot, but will put the picketers several lots away from the targeted audience if the residence is situated on a small lot. Moreover, as in Madsen, the ordinance does not consider more limited restrictions, such as limitations on the number of picketers, the time of day, or the duration of picketing. [8] Despite the problematic aspects of the ordinance, we cannot say that the ordinance is unconstitutional in every application, primarily because the ordinance did not have an unconstitutional effect in the test case that led to the instant suit. A correct interpretation of the ordinance would have allowed Plaintiffs to picket on the sidewalk or street directly in front of Caires’s home, or anywhere else in the neighborhood, because Caires’s home was set back more than 300 feet from the street. Thus, for all practical purposes, had the officers correctly interpreted the ordinance, the ordinance would have had no impact on the Plaintiffs’ right to picket at Caires’s residence. Had a Frisby ordinance been in place in the County, Plaintiffs would have been pushed farther away 2d 205 (Ct. App. 1995), which upheld an ordinance banning picketing within 300 feet of a targeted residence. We believe City of San Jose wrongly characterized the right at issue — it concluded that residential picketing is “highly offensive conduct,” a “disfavored activity not entitled to a high level of First Amendment protection.” Id. at 209, 210. Contrary to the California court’s characterization, the United States Supreme Court has called public issue picketing on streets and sidewalks “an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form.” Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 (1980) (alteration in original) (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)). Moreover, Frisby and Madsen make clear that residential picketing enjoys First Amendment protection. While Frisby noted that targeted picketing is inherently intrusive on residential privacy, it did not suggest that, where the two clash, the right to residential privacy necessarily trumps the rights of picketers. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486. That is to say, residential picketing is not the black sheep of the First Amendment family. KLEIN v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY 11471 from the residence than they were under the County’s ordinance. Courts have accepted ordinances that prohibit picketing directly in front of the targeted resident’s home. See, e.g., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483 (“[O]nly focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence is prohibited.”); Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington, 43 F.3d 1100, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that “any linear extension beyond the area ‘solely in front of a particular residence’ is at best suspect, if not prohibited outright”). Because the ordinance functions as a more narrow prohibition than the one at issue in Frisby in some circumstances, we cannot say that the ordinance is unconstitutional in every application. Plaintiffs’ claim is therefore not appropriate for a facial challenge.6 3. Leaves Open Ample Alternatives for Communication In the alternative, Plaintiffs claim that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it does not leave open adequate alternatives to communicate to the targeted resident and to the resident’s neighbors. The County contends that the ordinance leaves open the opportunity for general dissemination of the picketer’s message, including picketing in other neighborhoods, direct mail and telephone contact with those in the neighborhood, and, of course, picketing more than 300 feet from the targeted residence. [9] A valid time, place, and manner restriction must leave open alternative methods of communication. An alternative method of communication is “constitutionally inadequate if 6 Plaintiffs urge us to ignore their technical failure to violate the ordinance in their test case, because the district court created a thorough record regarding the effect of the residential picketing ordinance. We appreciate the district court’s extensive efforts to study the effect of the ordinance. Its careful study gave us a fuller picture of the ordinance’s impact. But we cannot ignore the circumstances giving rise to this suit because they clearly show that the ordinance is not unconstitutional in every application. 11472 KLEIN v. SAN DIEGO COUNTY the speaker’s ability to communicate effectively is threatened.” Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citations and quotations omitted). While a picketer has no right to force speech on those who do not want to hear it, see Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487, “the First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.” Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (emphasis added, internal citations and quotations omitted). An alternative is inadequate if it precludes the speaker from getting the attention of willing listeners in a specific intended audience. Bay Area Peace Navy, 914 F.2d at 1229. [10] While we admit that Plaintiffs may, in some cases, have a special interest in reaching willing listeners in the target resident’s neighborhood, we must deny Plaintiffs’ claim for the same reason that we deny their narrowly tailored challenge. That is, Plaintiffs have not shown that the ordinance impacts their ability to communicate with willing listeners in every case. In some cases, as was the case in Caires’s neighborhood, the ordinance would have no impact on Plaintiffs’ ability to communicate their message to Caires or Caires’s neighbors. Without violating the ordinance, Plaintiffs could demonstrate directly in front of Caires’s home or could picket throughout the neighborhood to educate Caires’s neighbors about the actions of the water district. Because the ordinance leaves ample alternatives for communication in at least some cases, including the test case before us, we cannot say that the ordinance is unconstitutional in every application. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ facial challenge fails.