Opinion ID: 201372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application to the Yacht Policy

Text: 13 The Acadia yacht policy itself contains no definition of the word criminally. Dictionary definitions, while not controlling, are of some value ... to the extent they inform us of the common understanding of terms. Hudson v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 142 N.H. 144, 697 A.2d 501, 503 (1997); see Coakley, 618 A.2d at 786 (turning to dictionary [t]o determine the plain and ordinary meaning of [a] word... as understood by a layperson of average intelligence). The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.2000) defines the adjective criminal as, simply, [o]f, involving, or having the nature of crime. Crime, in turn, is defined as [a]n act committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it and for which punishment is imposed upon conviction. Id. Whether or not a particular offense is a crime in common parlance thus depends on the existence of some legal duty or prohibition, not the mental state of the actor. 8 14 The exclusion provision thus unambiguously excludes coverage for liability incurred by an insured person, such as Littlefield, through the commission of a crime for which he has been convicted — here, a felony — without regard to the requisite mental state of the crime. 9 A reasonable layperson in the position of the insured based on more than a casual reading of the policy as a whole, Brouillard, 693 A.2d at 66 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), would understand that proposition. Because we can conceive of no other reasonable interpretation of the provision at issue, we find no ambiguity in the policy provision that warrants its being construed against the insurer. Fed. Bake Shop, 736 A.2d at 460. 15 Nevertheless, in an effort to find ambiguity in the policy exclusion for willfully, intentionally or criminally caused or incurred loss or liability, Littlefield first invokes the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which provides that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. State v. Beckert, 144 N.H. 315, 741 A.2d 63, 65 (1999) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 517 (6th ed.1990)). In Littlefield's view, the first two words in the list in the Section B exclusion provision, willfully and intentionally, are words of a particular and specific meaning because they require a higher level of intent than negligence. By contrast, the word criminally, which encompasses a broad spectrum of culpable states of mind, is a general word that should not be construed in [its] widest extent, but [should] be held as applying only to crimes of the same kind or class as the acts encompassed by the preceding two words. That is to say, criminally should be read as limited by the same high threshold of intent as the words willfully and intentionally. 16 We do not agree. Criminally, when read after the words willfully and intentionally, is neither more general nor more specific than the two preceding words; it is merely different. Each of the three terms is general in the sense that each encompasses a broad range of specific acts. There is some overlap in the conduct excluded by these general terms. However, criminally encompasses both unintentional and intentional crimes, while willfully and intentionally encompass both non-criminal and criminal acts. Only criminally includes un intentional acts committed with a criminally culpable state of mind. Criminal negligence is such an act under the New Hampshire Criminal Code. N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 626:2(d) (2004). To read the word criminally to incorporate the limitations Littlefield seeks would render the word extraneous. Loss or liability caused through intentional crimes is already excluded as intentionally caused loss or liability. We decline to ignore the plain meaning of criminally in favor of a reading that would render the word superfluous. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(a) (1981) (an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect); 2 Lee R. Russ, Couch on Insurance § 22:43 (3d ed. 1995) (Since it must be assumed that each word contained in an insurance policy is intended to serve a purpose, every term will be given effect if that can be done by any reasonable construction.). More importantly, where a policy provision is unambiguous and the contracting parties' intent is thus clearly manifested in the plain language of that provision, resort to canons of interpretation is simply unwarranted. See Eric Mills Holmes & Mark S. Rhodes, Holmes's Appleman on Insurance § 5.1 (2d ed.1996) (courts may not resort to ... aids of construction where contract language is unambiguous. The intent of the parties and meaning of the contract are to be determined by the language alone.). 17 As a last-ditch effort, Littlefield urges us to adopt the reasoning and result of Young v. Brown, 658 So.2d 750 (La.Ct.App.1995), in which a Louisiana appellate court interpreting a homeowner's liability insurance policy held that criminally caused injury must be at least intentional or willful in order to be excluded from coverage. In that case, the insurance policy purported to exclude coverage for injury which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or which is in fact intended by an insured person. Id. at 752. The Young court stated that, 18 [n]estled between exclusions for injuries resulting from intentional acts and for intentionally inflicted injuries, a reasonable purchaser could have understood the basis of the exclusion to be intentional misconduct or intentional criminal acts, thereby allowing coverage for damages resulting from criminal negligence. 19 Id. at 754. 20 To the extent that the Young decision rests on a finding of ambiguity in the challenged exclusion provision, we believe that case was wrongly decided. 10 We are not alone. A multitude of jurisdictions have reached a contrary result, finding as a matter of law that similar provisions unambiguously exclude loss or liability caused through the commission of a crime without regard to an insured's intent to act, much less to cause harm. See, e.g., Hooper v. Allstate Ins. Co., 571 So.2d 1001, 1002-03 (Ala.1990) (finding criminal acts exclusion clause unambiguous and noting that [a] number of other jurisdictions have held that the same exclusion was unambiguous and excluded coverage for injuries resulting from criminal acts by the insured, regardless of whether the insured intended to commit the act or to cause the harm); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. White, 204 Ariz. 500, 65 P.3d 449, 452 & n. 1 (Ariz.Ct.App.2003) (finding that the phrase `any criminal law' plainly includes all criminal laws, not just those in which `intent' is an essential element, and collecting fifteen cases from thirteen jurisdictions similarly finding on the facts before them, as contrasted with the sole outlier, Young v. Brown, 658 So.2d 750 (La.Ct.App.1995)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Peasley, 131 Wash.2d 420, 932 P.2d 1244, 1249 (1997) (As used in [policy] exclusionary clause, the phrase `criminal acts' does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional crimes. The language is unambiguous, and it clearly encompasses [the] criminal act of reckless endangerment.). Accordingly, we reject Littlefield's attempts to inject ambiguity into the yacht policy's provision excluding coverage for any loss, damage or liability willfully, intentionally or criminally caused or incurred by an insured person.