Opinion ID: 2976494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability of At Least $1 Million

Text: As stated above, the district court’s failure to give a jury instruction and special interrogatories that the jury was required to find that Hammon’s tax liabilities were no less than $1 million is reviewed for abuse of discretion. “A trial court has broad discretion in drafting jury instructions and does not abuse its discretion unless the jury charge ‘fails to accurately reflect the law.’” United States v. Beaty, 245 F.3d 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 574 (6th Cir. 1999)). Indeed, a judgment will only be reversed if “the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial.” Id. at 622 (quoting United States v. Harrod, 168 F.3d 887, 892 (6th Cir. 1999)). The Government contends that the district court erred by according no preclusive effect to the 2005 plea agreement which resulted in sentencing Hammon based on an assumed tax loss of at least $1 million. In essence, the Government argues that Hammon should have been collaterally estopped from presenting evidence that he owed less than $1 million in taxes. Collateral estoppel is applicable to issues litigated in criminal cases, even if by virtue of a guilty plea. Gray v. Comm’r, No. 064607 United States of America v. David L. Hammon, Sr. Page 14 708 F.2d 243, 246 (6th Cir. 1983). “The doctrine of collateral estoppel operates when three requirements are met: (1) the issue in the current action and the prior action are identical; (2) the issue was actually litigated; and (3) the issue was necessary and essential to the judgment on the merits.” Beaty, 245 F.3d at 624. Here, collateral estoppel is inapplicable because the issue in the criminal action differed from the issue in the current suit. In Hammon’s criminal case, the question was whether Hammon avoided taxes due. The accuracy of the IRS’s assessments was not necessary and essential to the criminal case.2 In contrast, the civil case centers on the accuracy of the Government’s tax assessment, a question that was neither closely nor clearly evaluated during Hammon’s criminal proceedings. The district court’s refusal to instruct the jury that they must find Hammon’s tax liability to be at least $1 million, therefore, did not inaccurately reflect the law. Moreover, it is not evident that the Government was substantially prejudiced by the refusal to give the requested instruction, as the Government was still allowed to present evidence of Hammon’s plea agreement, along with any other evidentiary support for the accuracy of its assessment. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in refusing to issue the Government’s proposed jury instructions on Hammon’s minimum liability.