Opinion ID: 4445408
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the enhanced sentence falls

Text: within the maximum sentence for the crime alleged in the indictment; (2) whether the enhanced sentence negates the presumption of innocence or the prosecution’s burden of proof for the crime alleged in the indictment; (3) whether the facts offered in support of the enhancement create new offenses requiring separate punishment; (4) whether the increase in sentence is based on the extent of a conspiracy; (5) whether the increase in the number of offense levels is less than or equal to four; and (6) whether the length of the UNITED STATES V. VALLE 11 enhanced sentence more than doubles the length of the sentence authorized by the initial sentencing guideline range in a case where the defendant would otherwise have received a relatively short sentence. Jordan, 256 F.3d at 928 (quotation marks omitted). Both Jordan and Valensia disregarded the first four factors, however, and focused entirely on how enhancements increased both the offense level and the length of the recommended Guidelines range. Id. at 929; Valensia, 222 F.3d at 1182. More recent cases have also relied on only these last two factors. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 492 F.3d 1031, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “[a]lthough the first four factors are either not particularly relevant or do not weigh in favor of a heightened standard, the last two factors are significant” and that “[w]e have previously invoked the clear and convincing evidence standard where only the two final factors favor its application”). 6 In United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1999), the first case to apply the clear and convincing standard in 6 As we have previously observed, “we have not been a model of clarity in deciding what analytical framework to employ when determining whether a disproportionate effect on sentencing may require the application of a heightened standard of proof.” United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1048 (9th Cir. 2009). Indeed, it is not entirely clear how the first three Valensia factors were derived from our decision in United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), which Valensia cited as their source, Valensia, 222 F.3d at 1182. We need not grapple with this question here, however, because our caselaw makes clear that we must apply the heightened clear and convincing standard based solely on the large impact on Valle’s Guidelines calculations as reflected in the fifth and sixth factors. 12 UNITED STATES V. VALLE this sentencing enhancement context, we held that a 7 level adjustment to a defendant’s offense level, which increased his sentencing range from 24 to 30 months to 63 to 78 months, satisfied the “extremely disproportionate impact test” and required clear and convincing evidence of the adjustment’s predicate facts. Id. at 833. Later, in Jordan, we held that the higher standard applied because the contested enhancements increased the offense level by 9 and more than doubled the sentencing range, raising it from 70 to 87 months to 151 to 188 months. 256 F.3d at 929. Here, counting Valle’s prior convictions led to an 11 level increase in his offense level and a recommended Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months rather than 1 to 7 months. Because the application of these enhancements raised Valle’s offense level by significantly more than 4 and far more than doubled his sentencing range, see id. at 928, the Government was required to establish Valle’s continuous presence by clear and convincing evidence, see id. The Government contends on appeal that the lower preponderance standard applies. 7 We are not persuaded that any of the cases the Government cites supports this contention. In United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 7 Arguably, the Government forfeited the argument that the lower standard applied because it conceded the higher standard in the district court. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 843 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Generally, we do not ‘entertain[] arguments on appeal that were not presented or developed before the district court.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2013))). But Valle does not make a forfeiture argument in his reply brief, and in any event we have discretion to overlook forfeiture in exceptional cases including “when the issue presented is purely one of law.” Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bolker v. Comm’r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985)). UNITED STATES V. VALLE 13 1520 (9th Cir. 1992), for example, we applied the preponderance standard but explained that we had previously “left open the possibility that if a [future] case involved a severe penalty enhancement, due process might require heightened procedural protections.” Id. at 1523–24. This eventually came to pass in Hopper, when we first applied the clear and convincing evidence standard. 177 F.3d at 833. Later, in United States v. Riley, 335 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003), we emphasized that when “the combined impact of contested sentencing enhancements is disproportionate relative to the offense of conviction, the district court must apply the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.” Id. at 925 (citing Jordan, 256 F.3d at 927–29). We upheld the application of the lower preponderance standard in Riley only because we concluded that the impact of the enhancements we considered to be at issue—which would not have more than doubled the defendant’s sentencing range—was not significant enough to apply the heightened standard. Id. at 927. 8 8 The Government argues that, under Harrison-Philpot and Riley, a fact “relat[ing] to the scope of the charged crime”—here, the length of time that Valle was continuously present—“should not be subject to a heightened standard of proof.” But we have applied these cases where a defendant has been convicted for conspiracy or as a participant in a fraudulent scheme and the extent of the conspiracy or fraudulent scheme is the basis of the enhanced sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Hymas, 780 F.3d 1285, 1290–93 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the use of the preponderance standard to determine the direct losses stemming from a wire fraud conviction involving a fraudulent loan, but requiring the use of the clear and convincing evidence standard for proof of losses that did not stem from “the loan that was the subject of the conviction”); United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1001 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Riley for the proposition that “sentencing determinations relating to the extent of a criminal conspiracy need not be established by clear and convincing evidence”); Berger, 587 F.3d at 1048–49 (affirming the use of the 14 UNITED STATES V. VALLE