Opinion ID: 70788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retrial.

Text: 9 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1941 n. 1, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (citation omitted). Appellant has not been convicted, nor has punishment been imposed. Therefore, the issue is whether retrial of the August 12, 1994, possession would constitute a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. 10 Appellant contends that he has been charged with a continuous and uninterrupted possession of the same weapon and that a finding of not guilty as to the February 5, 1995, date constitutes a finding of not guilty as to the continuing offense. We agree that generally, possession is a course of conduct; by prohibiting possession Congress intended to punish as one offense all of the acts of dominion which demonstrate a continuing possessory interest in a firearm. United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d 1387, 1391 (6th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 964, 97 S.Ct. 2919, 53 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1977); see also United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191, 193 (9th Cir.1993) (finding the possession in that case to be one uninterrupted course of conduct, and therefore one conviction was appropriate). Where there is no proof that possession of the same weapon is interrupted, the Government may not arbitrarily carve a possession into separate offenses. See Jones, 533 F.2d at 1391. Such a rule, however, does not compel the result argued by Appellant. 11 Although the indictment charges two dates of possession in the conjunctive, the Government is not required to prove possession on both dates to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 12 The general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged. 13 Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 654, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Griffin, 705 F.2d 434, 436 (11th Cir.1983) (citing United States v. Haymes, 610 F.2d 309, 310-11 (5th Cir.1980)); United States v. England, 480 F.2d 1266, 1269 (5th Cir.) ([T]he Government need not prove all facts charged in the indictment as long as it proves other facts charged in the indictment which do satisfy the essential elements of the crime.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1041, 94 S.Ct. 543, 38 L.Ed.2d 332 (1973). 3 Proof of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon on one day within an alleged continuous possession is sufficient to support a conviction. 14 The protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3086, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (citations omitted). Appellant has been found not guilty as to one of the dates charged. The jury's finding that the defendant was not guilty of the charge of possessing the shotgun on February 5, 1995, was merely a finding that the Government had not demonstrated possession on this date beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not, however, constitute an acquittal of the charged possession as a whole because proof of possession on February 5, 1995, is not necessary to support a conviction for the charged offense. When the jury deadlocked as to the August 12, 1994, date, and the district court declared a mistrial, jeopardy did not fully terminate. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a second prosecution as to the alleged August 12, 1994, possession. See Id. at 325-26, 104 S.Ct. at 3086 (declaration of mistrial following hung jury does not terminate the original jeopardy). 15 Collateral estoppel also does not bar a second prosecution in this case. Collateral estoppel will completely bar prosecution if a fact necessarily determined in a former trial is an essential element of a conviction. United States v. Bennett, 836 F.2d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir.) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1205, 108 S.Ct. 2847, 101 L.Ed.2d 884 (1988). The finding of fact must be inconsistent with a finding of guilt in a second trial. Id. (citing United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381, 1387 (11th Cir.1981)). Possession on February 5, 1995, is not a required element of a conviction supported by possession on August 12, 1994. Nor is a finding of not guilty for February 5, 1995, inconsistent with a finding of guilt of possession on August 12, 1994. Therefore, collateral estoppel does not bar a second trial as to the August 12, 1994, date. 16 Finally, Appellant contends that the conjunctive indictment was so duplicitous as to violate the Fifth Amendment. Appellant cannot have it both ways. We agree that the possession as charged was a continuous course of conduct. It was therefore appropriate, and indeed, necessary, that the acts be charged in one count. 4 To charge the separate dates in separate counts would result in a multiplicitous indictment, creating the risk of multiple convictions and punishments for a single offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Further, it was proper to charge the separate dates in the conjunctive because it served to fully notify Appellant of the charge against him. 5 17