Opinion ID: 162966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The majority concludes that the record does suggest that a rational juror certainly could conclude that Mr. Torres had the requisite intent to kill. Op. at 1155. In support of that conclusion, the majority relies on the following evidence: (1) Mr. Torres and Mr. Ochoa were seen carrying guns near the murder scene; (2) the door of the Yanez/Morales residence had been kicked down; (3) the children of the murder victims identified Mr. Torres and Mr. Ochoa as the two men who broke into the residence; (4) the victims were shot repeatedly; (5) [a]lthough there was time to rob the victims after the homicides, Mr. Torres (and Mr. Ochoa) walked back and forth in the house; op. at 1156; (6) Ms. Yanez's purse was taken, but money and personal property were found on the victims, suggesting an intent to kill, rather than merely to rob, id.; (7) Mr. Torres and Mr. Ochoa conversed in whispers after the murders, rather than indicating surprise or taking more property; id.; (8) when observed by police after the murders, Mr. Torres had blood on his shirt; (9) Mr. Torres was well acquainted with Mr. Ochoa. Id. Although I agree that this evidence provides support for the prosecution's contention that Mr. Torres intended to kill the victims, I do not believe that this evidence allows a rational juror to reach a subjective state of near certitude, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (defining the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard), on that issue. In my view, there are two key gaps in the prosecution's case against Mr. Torres for malice murder. First, there is no direct evidence of Mr. Torres's motive. Second, the prosecution did not present any direct evidence of Mr. Torres's role in the shooting. In light of the testimony of Mr. Morales's son — that he saw a man in a dark shirt shooting his father — the prosecution's theory was that Mr. Ochoa was the shooter. The prosecution was unable to present testimony as to the conduct of another person inside the residence before or during the shooting. Although the evidence cited by the majority does support the conclusion that Mr. Torres broke into the residence and fled after Mr. Ochoa shot the victims, those two key gaps in the prosecution's case foreclose a rational juror's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Torres intended to kill the victims. In this regard, I note that a number of courts have deemed evidence resembling that on which the majority here relies insufficient to establish an intent to kill. 1 In spite of this deficiency in the evidence, however, Mr. Torres faces an extremely high hurdle in seeking habeas relief on his sufficiency of the evidence claim: he must establish not merely that the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion is incorrect but also that the court's conclusion constitutes an unreasonable application of the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (stating that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law) (emphasis in original). Although there is not an extensive body of case law distinguishing an unreasonable application of Jackson from one that is merely incorrect, several recent circuit decisions have identified factors relevant to this inquiry. First, the failure of the state court to consider at all a key argument of the defendant may indicate that [the state court's] conclusion is objectively unreasonable. Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir.2001). [T]he failure ... to give appropriate weight to all of the evidence may also indicate an unreasonable decision. Id.; see also Piaskowski v. Bett, 256 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir.2001) (concluding that the state court unreasonably applied Jackson because the court found that the defendant kicked and beat [the murder victim] despite the fact that the record was devoid of any direct evidence of such an act and because the available circumstantial evidence at most cast[] suspicion on [the defendant]). Finally, the reasoning used by the state court is ... pertinent. Hurtado, 245 F.3d at 20 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-98, 120 S.Ct. 1495). However, the paucity of reasoning employed by the state court does not itself establish that its result is objectively unreasonable. Hurtado, 245 F.3d at 18. The ultimate question ... is ... whether the outcome is reasonable. Id. at 20. Here, in considering Mr. Torres's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he intended to kill the victims, the Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the evidence presented by the prosecution, see Torres, 962 P.2d at 15-16, and then rejected Mr. Torres's argument that the facts of his case were analogous to two cases in which the evidence of intent to kill the victim was insufficient. See id. at 16 n. 40 (citing Sanders/Miller, 710 F.2d at 646-47 (10th Cir.1983), and Anderson v. State, 66 Okla.Crim. 291, 91 P.2d 794 (Okla.Crim.App.1939), and stating that in [those cases] the courts found there was no evidence to support premeditated design to kill). The court then stated: Here, [Mr.] Torres' actions can support a finding of intent as discussed in Johnson v. State, 928 P.2d 309, 315 (Okla.Crim.App.1996). To me, the court's reliance on Johnson is troubling. That case contains the very kind of evidence of announced intention that we discussed in Wingfield v. Massie, 122 F.3d 1329, 1332-34 (10th Cir.1997). See maj. op. at 1152-53 (discussing Wingfield ); Wingfield, 122 F.3d at 1333 (stating that a jury may infer that the defendant intends those consequences which he announces a desire to accomplish). In Johnson, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that, [i]n the space of three days [, the defendant] foretold how and why [the victim] would be killed, [the defendant] told tenants he could take care of the problems [the victim] caused, and, while [the victim] was being attacked [, the defendant] or [his accomplice] told [the victim] the precise reason, articulated earlier by [the defendant,] for the attack. Johnson, 928 P.2d at 315. Characterizing this evidence, the court continued:  There is no doubt whatsoever that this [defendant] personally intended that [the victim] die.  Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the record in Johnson also contained evidence concerning the manner in which the defendant assisted in the homicide. The victim, who lived for seventeen hours after the attack, told police officers that the defendant hit him over the head with a baseball bat while another man poured gasoline on him from a plastic jug and set him on fire. See id. at 313. Here, the evidence that Mr. Torres intended the death of the victims is not nearly as strong as the evidence against the defendant in Johnson, particularly since the prosecution did not present direct evidence that Mr. Torres assisted in the homicides. Nevertheless, I cannot conclude under our deferential standard of review that the Court of Criminal Appeals application of the Jackson standard is unreasonable. Sufficiency of the evidence determinations are made by assessing the totality of the circumstances in the individual case. As a result, Mr. Torres cannot point to a body of case law clearly establishing that the particular set of facts presented by the prosecution here is insufficient to establish an intent to kill. As the majority notes, there is considerable evidence suggesting that Mr. Torres was involved in the killings. Although under a de novo standard of review, I would not conclude that this evidence is sufficient, I am convinced that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals's conclusion to the contrary was not unreasonable.