Opinion ID: 2525464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failing to challenge the competency of a young witness to testify

Text: Evans contends that his counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge the competency of Adriana Ventura to testify. The district court concluded that the voir dire of Adriana and her subsequent testimony demonstrated she was competent. Adriana Ventura was four at the time of the murders and six when she testified. At trial, the prosecutor first questioned Adriana about her family, the difference between the truth and lies, and the need to tell the truth. Adriana then testified regarding the murders. According to Evans, before her trial testimony Adriana testified at a preliminary hearing, a grand jury hearing, and a federal sentencing hearing and was questioned repeatedly about the crimes by her mother, neighbors, a detective, a child psychologist, and the media. Her grandfather allowed reporters to tape her telling her story on several occasions. Evans argues that there was great potential that the child's testimony was contaminated, particularly by her mother. Evans also asserts that Adriana's testimony shows that she was not competent to testify. For example, she was unable to remember whether she lived in a house or an apartment at the time of the murders or the name of the other child who was present. Evans also claims that Adriana could not remember whether the murderers left through the door or jumped out of a window, but this claim is mistaken. Adriana actually said they could have done either, but she did not know because she did not watch them leave. Our review of Adriana's trial testimony shows that she readily admitted whenever she did not know or could not remember something and did not appear to make up information just to answer a question. For example, she had apparently told defense counsel before trial that each killer had shot a specific victim. She acknowledged this on cross-examination but maintained, as she had on direct examination, that she actually did not know who shot whom. The material facts which Adriana did remember and provide, such as where each victim was when shot, were consistent with the evidence at the crime scene. A child is competent to testify if he or she is able to receive just impressions and relate them truthfully. [13] Courts must evaluate a child's competency on a case-by-case basis, but relevant considerations include: (1) the child's ability to receive and communicate information; (2) the spontaneity of the child's statements; (3) indications of coaching and rehearsing; (4) the child's ability to remember; (5) the child's ability to distinguish between truth and falsehood; and (6) the likelihood that the child will give inherently improbable or incoherent testimony. [14] This court will not disturb a finding of competency absent a clear abuse of discretion. [15] A child's testimony supports a finding of competency if it is clear, relevant, and coherent. [16] Inconsistencies in the testimony go to the weight of the evidence. [17] We conclude that Adriana's testimony indicates that she was competent. Her basic account of the crimes remained coherent and consistent, even under cross-examination. Her testimony reflected none of the serious problemsinability to differentiate between fact and fantasy, confusion between truth and falsehood, inherently improbable testimony, suggestions of coaching, inability to recall recent eventswhich in other cases have prompted this court to overturn the district court's finding of competency. [18] Evans also contends that the district court violated this court's directive requiring trial courts to examine a child under ten years of age before permitting her to testify. He cites this court's decision in Felix v. State, [19] which stands for this rule. However, at least part of the foundation for the rule no longer exists. Felix followed a line of authority that relied on former NRS 48.030(2), which provided that children under ten years of age could not be witnesses if they appeared incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts ... or of relating them truly. [20] Nevada's statutes no longer treat the competency of witnesses younger than ten as a special case. Even assuming the rule still retains its full force, the district court's failure to examine Adriana before she testified was prejudicial only if she indeed lacked competency. We conclude that her testimony shows she was competent. Nevertheless, Evans's allegations regarding possible contamination of Adriana's testimony arguably warranted an evidentiary hearing. Roughly two years had passed since the crimes occurred, and she had apparently talked with a number of people about the murders. On the other hand, the mere fact that Adriana spoke with people about her experience does not establish that her testimony was improperly influenced. Evans has not pointed to any particular behavior by Adriana or to inconsistencies in her statementsor to any words or conduct by anyone elsethat indicate her testimony was deliberately or inadvertently tainted. Evans stresses that a detective suspected that Adriana's mother, Ventura, knew that Scotti was going to be murdered, but he does not explain why this suggests that Ventura manipulated her daughter's account of the crimes. We conclude that the district court could have reasonably found that Evans's allegations on this issue were insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Adriana was competent to testify; therefore, counsel's failure to challenge her competency was not deficient or prejudicial.