Opinion ID: 874119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Defendants' Use of the Property Violate the Agreement?

Text: The Agreement is a restriction upon the use of the real property purchased by KL Properties. Covenants that restrict the uses of land are valid and enforceable. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 434, 437 (1996). However, [b]ecause restrictive covenants are in derogation of the common law right of a person to use land for all lawful purposes, covenants are not to be construed to extend by implication any restriction not clearly expressed in the covenants. Id. Rather, [a]ll doubts and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the free use of land. Id. Therefore, while clearly expressed restrictions will be upheld, restrictions that are not clearly expressed will be resolved in favor of the free use of land. Id. KL Properties does not dispute that it is bound by the terms of the Agreement. The district court held that Defendants violated parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of the Agreement. Part (i) of the Agreement requires the owner of the seventeen lots to construct and maintain upon said Purchased Property, a first class shopping center which shall be in compliance with all state and local building codes and ordinances. Jacklin does not assert that the existing shopping center constructed on the property is not first class, nor is there any contention that such shopping center has not been maintained as a first class shopping center. What Jacklin contended and the district court held is that only a first class shopping center can be on any portion of the property purchased by KL Properties. If the four undeveloped lots do not have a first class shopping center on them, they must remain vacant. That is not a restriction clearly expressed in the Agreement. It provides that the purchaser shall construct  a [singular] first class shopping center on the property purchased. (Emphasis added.) There is nothing in the Agreement expressly stating that the shopping center shall cover all seventeen lots, nor is there anything expressly stating that only a first class shopping center can be constructed upon or occupy any portion of the property. In fact, the Agreement incorporates by reference Article 6.2, which states, A wide variety of business, commercial and light industrial uses are intended. Jacklin argues on appeal that Blue Dog's business violates Article 6.3 of the CC & R's which prohibits a [s]torage yard. The words storage yard are not defined. Construing ambiguities in favor of the free use of land, they could not reasonably be interpreted to include the display of recreational vehicles for sale. Because a first class shopping center has been constructed and maintained upon the property, there is no violation of this provision in the Agreement. The district court erred in holding that the Agreement prevents anything but a first class shopping center from being located on the undeveloped lots. Part (ii) of the Agreement requires the owner of the seventeen lots to work together with Seller to achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for the shopping center so that it shall be aesthetically pleasing and compatible with other uses within Riverbend Commerce Park. Jacklin contended and the district court agreed that Defendants violated this provision of the Agreement because KL Properties did not achieve a mutually acceptable design and appearance for Blue Dog's business operated on the four undeveloped lots. This provision of the Agreement only expressly applies to the design and appearance of the shopping center. There is no shopping center located on the undeveloped lots. This provision has no application to those lots. The Agreement does contain a provision applicable to undeveloped lots. Article 2.1 of the CC & R's, which is incorporated by reference into the Agreement, states, Undeveloped and screened areas proposed for future expansion or current storage shall be maintained in a weed-free and dust controlled condition and shall be landscaped if required by Declarant. However, there is no contention that Defendants violated this provision. Because part (ii) of the Agreement does not apply to the four undeveloped lots, the district court erred in holding that using those lots for Blue Dog's business violated this provision. Finally, Part (iii) of the Agreement provides that despite its removal of record as to the Purchased Property, [the owner of the seventeen lots] agrees to comply and conform to Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 contained in those Declarations of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions recorded November 28, 1988 [and the amendments recorded on July 26 and 27, 1989]. . . . These Articles of the CC & R's impose requirements regarding landscaping (Article 2), parking (Article 3), signs (Article 4), design and construction limitations (Article 5), and uses and operation (Article 6). The district court held that Defendants violated Articles 3 and 4 of the CC & R's. Article 3 of the CC & R's applies to parking, but it does not define what constitutes parking. The district court held that the display of recreational vehicles for sale constitutes parking. Article 3 clearly deals with requirements for parking lots that would be used by retail customers, not the display of recreational vehicles for sale. Article 3.1 states: There shall be no on-street parking. Property Owners must provide sufficient off-street parking. Article 3.2 requires, Parking space shall be within three hundred feet (300') of the building to be served. Article 3.4 provides, The required number of parking and loading spaces, together with driveways, aisles and other circulation areas, shall be improved with asphalt and/or concrete surface. Article 3.6 requires the [p]arking area to be illuminated, and Article 3.7 requires that [a]ll parking areas shall be designed so that any vehicle leaving or entering the parking area to street or from street shall be traveling in a forward motion. Article 3.8 provides, All parking areas shall be striped with lines between stalls to facilitate the movement into and out of the parking stalls, and Article 3.10 provides, Number and design of parking stalls shall be regulated by parking restrictions of the City of Post Falls. Because restrictions on the use of property must be clearly expressed and any ambiguities resolved in favor of the free use of land, the district court erred in holding that Article 3 applies to the display of recreational vehicles for sale. Article 4 of the CC & R's applies to signs. It is not, by its terms, limited to signs advertising the shopping center or located on lots upon which the shopping center was constructed. Article 4.1 states: Signs: General Requirements. Signs should be unobtrusive, conservative, and harmonize with the development. Signs shall be restricted to advertising only the person, products sold, departments, services rendered, firm, company or corporation operating at the location where the sign is placed and the product or service offered by property Owner, except identification of Declarant (or its associated business entities). Backs of all single sided signs shall be screened, or covered and maintained in a neutral color or colors that blend with the environment. All signs shall be properly maintained and kept in a neat and proper state of repair. To assure sign quality and design format, all signs shall be submitted and approved by the Owner's Corporation. The district court found that Blue Dog's signs violated the last sentence of this provision because it did not submit its signs for approval by Jacklin. In their opening brief, Defendants did not challenge this finding. In their reply brief, they argued that Jacklin had failed to show any violation of this article. [T]his Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004). A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented because those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). Therefore, the district court did not err in holding that Defendants violated Article 4.1 of the CC & R's.