Opinion ID: 479235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: claims of double jeopardy

Text: 143 Defendant makes two arguments based on the guaranty against double jeopardy.
144 He asserts that the evidence at the first trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict of guilty. Relying on Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), he contends that retrial resulted in second jeopardy and was therefore barred. 145 Defendant's brief on the insufficiency of the evidence at the first trial is not persuasive. We are satisfied, however, that we need not examine that record. 146 More recent decisions, distinguishing Burks, make it plain that a trial court's declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy to which petitioner was subjected.... Regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence at petitioner's first trial, he has no valid double jeopardy claim to prevent his retrial. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3086, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984), quoting 104 S.Ct. at page 3085, Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (footnote omitted).
147 At the second trial the government introduced evidence not presented at the first trial. Defendant argues without citation of apposite authority, that this subjected him to double jeopardy. 148 Richardson established that retrial after a trial at which the jury could not agree was a continuation of original jeopardy, and we see no theory under which strengthening the case at the second trial changes that proposition. 149 Defendant has brought to our attention United States v. Gulledge, 739 F.2d 582 (11th Cir.1984), dismissing an interlocutory appeal based on claims that a second trial would be second jeopardy because of insufficiency of evidence at the first trial, and that the double jeopardy clause would bar additional evidence at the second trial. Defendant relies on language in Gulledge indicating that the additional evidence point could be raised on appeal from the final judgment. If the language suggests that such claim would have possible merit, we think the suggestion could not be squared with Richardson.