Opinion ID: 615293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bucci's Right to a Public Trial

Text: We consider first Bucci's claim regarding the partial courtroom closure that took place during jury selection, summarizing existing law and then turning to the facts of this case.
The Supreme Court made clear in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984), that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a trial that is open to members of the public. This right was created for the benefit of the defendant, as openness in criminal proceedings encourages witnesses to come forward, discourages perjury, and ensure[s] that judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). Closure of a trial can be justified only by an overriding interest, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information. Id. at 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210. Such circumstances will be rare, however, and the balance of interests must be struck with special care. Id. In Waller, the Supreme Court provided a four-part standard for courts to apply prior to excluding the public from any stage of a criminal trial: [1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure. Id. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210. The situation in Waller involved a suppression hearing regarding the admissibility of wiretap evidence. Id. at 41-42, 104 S.Ct. 2210. The trial court closed the courtroom to all members of the public during the entire seven-day suppression hearing. Id. at 42, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210. The state sought to justify the closure on the grounds that a public trial would impinge upon the privacy rights of non-defendants whose conversations were also captured in the wiretap recordings, and that unnecessary publication of the evidence might render it inadmissible under state law. Id. at 41, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court reasoned that, [u]nder certain circumstances, these interests may well justify closing portions of a suppression hearing, but the trial court had not adequately justified the closure in this case. Id. at 48-49, 104 S.Ct. 2210. The Supreme Court further held that such Sixth Amendment violations constitute structural error for which the defendant should not be required to prove specific prejudice in order to obtain relief, because the benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of chance. Id. at 49 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210. [1] The Supreme Court recently made clear that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to any stage of a criminal trial, including the voir dire of prospective jurors. Presley v. Georgia, ___ U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 721, 724, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010); see also Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 66 (1st Cir.2007). In Presley, the trial judge excluded the defendant's uncle, the only spectator present at the time, from the courtroom during jury selection. Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 722. The defendant's counsel objected, but the trial court explained that, given the size of the jury pool, [t]here just isn't space for [the public] to sit in the audience, and the uncle cannot sit and intermingle with members of the jury panel. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). After Presley was convicted, he moved for a new trial and presented evidence showing that prospective jurors could have been accommodated in the jury box and one half of the courtroom, leaving the other half of the courtroom open for public seating. Id. The trial judge denied the motion, expressing concern that family members [might have] intermingle[d] with the jurors. Id. The Supreme Court reversed Presley's conviction, finding that it was well settled under the Court's precedents that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applied to jury selection. Id. at 723-24. In applying the Waller test, the Court concluded that [t]he generic risk of jurors overhearing prejudicial remarks, unsubstantiated by any specific threat or incident, is inherent whenever members of the public are present during the selection of jurors. If broad concerns of this sort were sufficient to override a defendant's constitutional right to a public trial, a court could exclude the public from jury selection almost as a matter of course. Id. at 725. The Court also concluded that the trial court did not consider all reasonable alternatives to the closure, stating: Trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials. . . . Without knowing the precise circumstances, some possibilities include reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury venire panel to reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors not to engage or interact with audience members. Id. Both Waller and Presley involved total courtroom closure situations where all members of the public were excluded during some phase of the trial. See Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 722; Waller, 467 U.S. at 42, 104 S.Ct. 2210. [2] In partial closure casesi.e., where courtroom access is restricted but some members of the public are permitted to attendthis court and several of our sister circuits have held that a substantial interest, rather than a compelling one, will justify partial closure. United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 32-35 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that requiring public spectators to present identification before entering the courtroom did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to public trial, where defendants were associated with past efforts to obstruct fair fact finding, and where members of the public actually attended). [3]
Because the circumstances regarding the alleged courtroom closure in this case are not reflected in the official trial transcript, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Bucci's claim to determine the relevant facts. During the hearing, the district court heard testimony from members of the courtroom staff, members of the appellants' families, and Bucci's trial counsel. Below, we summarize the district court's findings of fact and the record of the hearing. Jury empanelment for the Bucci-Jordan criminal trial was scheduled to take place on March 20, 2006, in courtroom 11 of the John Joseph Moakley Courthouse. Judge Lindsay presided over the trial. Courtroom 11 is the only courtroom in the building equipped with a mechanical lift, which, because he was wheelchair bound, Judge Lindsay required in order to get onto the bench. Courtroom 11 contains fourteen benches in its public seating area, each of which can comfortably seat four people for a normal capacity of fifty-six. At a maximum capacity of five per bench, the public area of courtroom 11 can seat seventy people. Because the Bucci-Jordan trial involved two defendants, one of whom was a police officer, courtroom deputy clerk Lisa Hourihan (Ms. Hourihan) arranged for a larger venire than usual. After discussing the matter with Judge Lindsay, Ms. Hourihan ordered a sixty-five juror venire. On March 20, 2006, the doors to courtroom 11 were unlocked prior to 9:00 a.m. Before the proceedings began, approximately twelve to twenty-five members of the public took seats in the public area of the courtroom. Included in this group were Bucci's mother, Rosemarie Keefe (Mrs. Keefe); Bucci's wife, Melissa Bucci (Mrs. Bucci); Jordan's wife (Mrs. Jordan); and Bucci's paralegal, Michael Kevin Dupont (Dupont). Between 9:00 a.m. and about 10:40 a.m., the courtroom staff and counsel for the government and both defendants were in the courtroom engaged in preparing for the proceedings. Judge Lindsay and the jury venire were not yet present in the courtroom during this time. When the venire was ready to enter, Ms. Hourihan realized that courtroom 11, which had a maximum capacity of seventy spectators, could not seat the entire sixty-five person jury venire if more than a dozen members of the public occupied seats. Thus, in accordance with Judge Lindsay's past practice, Ms. Hourihan left her desk in front of the judge's bench, went to the public area of the courtroom, and asked that all members of the public clear the courtroom to make way for the jury. As the members of the public exited the courtroom, Bucci's paralegal Dupont protested the courtroom closure and informed Ms. Hourihan that Bucci's family members had a right to be present during jury selection. Dupont was a well-known and frequent pro se litigant who had been hired by the Bucci family to take notes and provide insight during the trial. Dupont was not employed by Bucci's counsel. In response to Dupont's objection, Ms. Hourihan exited the courtroom through the back doors and consulted Judge Lindsay, who instructed her to accommodate Dupont's request. Ms. Hourihan accordingly went back into the courtroom and cleared a bench in the front row (which was usually kept vacant because an audio/video podium blocked it from the judge's line of sight). Ms. Hourihan then exited the courtroom through the front doors and specifically invited Mrs. Keefe, Mrs. Bucci, and Mrs. Jordan to return and sit at the newly-cleared bench in the front row. After Mrs. Keefe, Mrs. Bucci, and Mrs. Jordan took their seats, the sixty-five members of the jury venire were escorted into the courtroom and seated five to a bench at each of the remaining empty benches. At that point, the fourteen-bench courtroom consisted of thirteen benches entirely filled with prospective jurors (five per bench) and the fourteenth bench containing Mrs. Keefe, Mrs. Bucci, Mrs. Jordan, and two empty seats. Two additional members of the public thus could have been seated. Ms. Hourihan thereafter called the court to order, Judge Lindsay entered and took the bench, and the official transcript of the proceedings began at 10:40 a.m. Judge Lindsay proceeded to conduct the jury empanelment by first filling the jury box with prospective jurors starting with those seated in the first row of the public area. As those in the jury box were excused for cause, Judge Lindsay would replace the excused jurors with those next in line. This method resulted in the spectator benches being emptied sequentially from front to back. Though at least 21 seats became available as prospective jurors were excused, members of the public were not invited to fill the newly-vacated seats. One or two court security officers stood outside the courtroom's doors and denied entry to all who attempted to enter. Excluded members of the public included friends and family members of the defendants, Bucci's paralegal Dupont, and, apparently, a Malden Police internal affairs investigator and a newspaper reporter. The security officers informed at least some members of the public that the courtroom would be closed all day. The district court found that the officers believed they were carrying out Ms. Hourihan's earlier directive to clear the courtroom. At approximately 1:15 p.m., the court took a lunch recess. Jury selection resumed at approximately 2:15 p.m., and there were no further efforts by any court personnel to bar members of the public from entering the courtroom. Neither of the defendants' counsel objected at trial to the courtroom closure.
Judge Lindsay became ill and died, and a new judge was assigned to preside over the § 2255 hearings. The district court on collateral review noted that there was a very real legal question as to whether Bucci could show cause for his procedural default in failing to object to the courtroom closure, but the court declined to address the issue and went on to analyze the substance of the case on the assumption that . . . cause for [any] default has been adequately shown. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr'g at 94, Bucci v. United States, No. 04-10194-RCL (D.Mass. Oct. 22, 2009), ECF No. 442. The court concluded that, because three members of the public were present when jury empanelment began, the fact [t]hat other members of the public were not allowed into the courtroom [did] not amount to a closure implicating the Sixth Amendment, even though two seats in the courtroom initially remained available and were not permitted to be filled by members of the public. Bucci, 677 F.Supp.2d at 414. The court also found no Sixth Amendment violation in the fact that the court security officers continued to prohibit members of the public from entering the courtroom even as seats became available. Id. at 415. In the district court's view, this continued closure was within the trial judge's power to place reasonable time, place, and manner limits on trial access. Id. The court further reasoned that [t]he presence of the defendants' closest family members vindicated their public trial rights by ensuring that the defendants were `fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned' and by `keep[ing] [the defendants'] triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions. Id. at 416 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210). The district court further found that there were other justifications for the partial courtroom closure, including the risk that the public would intermingle with the prospective jurors and might block counsels' view of the venireconcerns that did not in fact initiate the closure. Accordingly, the district court denied Bucci's Sixth Amendment claim asserted in his § 2255 petition.
Bucci correctly points out that the courtroom closure here likely violated the Sixth Amendment. Because this case involves a partial, as opposed to a total, courtroom closure, the first Waller factor requires only a substantial interest justifying the courtroom closure, rather than a `compelling' interest. DeLuca, 137 F.3d at 33-34. However, even under this less stringent standard, it is difficult to see a substantial justification for the courtroom closure. While space limitations can constitute a substantial justification for limiting the number of spectators admitted, [4] the courtroom here at all times had multiple empty seats which could have been made available to the public. Two spectator seats on the benches were available when voir dire began. Also, at the outset, 12 jurors could have been seated in the jury box, thus immediately freeing up a like number of spaces for spectators. At least 21 more seats became available as prospective jurors were excused. As this court explained in Owens, once there was sufficient space in the courtroom, we see no state interestcompelling or otherwise in not permitting [the defendant's] family, friends, or other members of the public to observe the proceedings. 483 F.3d at 62 (footnote omitted). Moreover, even if the courtroom were completely filled with prospective jurors, it would likely not justify the closure in this case. The Supreme Court in Presley made clear that alternative methods of increasing the available public seating, such as splitting the venire, must be adopted if reasonable. 130 S.Ct. at 725. Nor could the § 2255 district court's alternative theories support closure. The district court found the closure justified because it lessened the risk of intermingling between potential jurors and the defendants' close family members. Bucci, 677 F.Supp.2d at 416. However, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the justification of preventing juror-public intermingling because this generic risk is inherent to every voir dire proceeding. Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 725. The district court also found that allowing spectators immediately to take the seats of the excused jurors in the first and second rows would block Judge Lindsay's and counsels' view of the venirepersons next in line to fill the jury box. Bucci, 677 F.Supp.2d at 417. The purported concern that members of the public would block Judge Lindsay's and counsels' view of the venire does not constitute a substantial justification. Nor, contrary to the government's argument, is this a case in which the denial of the public trial right could be characterized as trivial. [5] There is also a problem here with court personnel handpicking only select members of the defendants' families to remain in the courtroom while the general public was excluded. This court has recognized that the same standard [regarding courtroom closures] applies to family members as to the general public. Owens, 483 F.3d at 62 n. 12; see also Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 395 (8th Cir.1917) (It is not essential to the right of attendance that a person be a relative of the accused, an attorney, a witness, or a reporter for the press, nor can those classes be taken as the exclusive representatives of the public. ) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, we do not decide the merits of the Sixth Amendment claim. As we now discuss, we conclude that Bucci's Sixth Amendment claim has procedurally defaulted and that no cause has been shown that would excuse his default. We consider Jordan's claim later in the opinion.
Collateral relief in a § 2255 proceeding is generally unavailable if the petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claim by fail[ing] to raise [the] claim in a timely manner at trial or on [direct] appeal. Berthoff v. United States, 308 F.3d 124, 127-28 (1st Cir.2002); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). If a petitioner's claim has procedurally defaulted, collateral review under § 2255 will be available only if the petitioner can show both (1) cause for having procedurally defaulted his claim; and (2) actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error. Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68, 102 S.Ct. 1584. [6] It is undisputed that Bucci's counsel did not object at trial to the courtroom closure. Nonetheless, Bucci contends that his claim has not procedurally defaulted for several reasons. Bucci first contends that Dupont's objection at trial preserved the issue. While Dupont had been hired by Bucci's family to take notes, Dupont was not employed by Bucci's trial counsel. This court has held that, when a defendant is represented by counsel, motions and objections made by parties other than the defendant's counsel are not sufficient to preserve a claim of error on the defendant's behalf, absent a court-approved hybrid representation. See United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir.2006). Here, the district court did not approve any hybrid representation for Bucci that included Dupont. Dupont's objection therefore cannot be attributed to Bucci. Bucci next argues that his Sixth Amendment claim was nonetheless preserved when he raised the issue for the first time on his direct appeal. [7] This court noted that the issue had not been raised at trial and declined to address iteven under the plain error standardbecause the Spartan record was inadequate to permit meaningful review. Bucci, 525 F.3d at 129. This court suggested that, if Bucci should choose to file a § 2255 petition, the district court may hold an evidentiary hearing to test the merits of [his] claim. Id. Far from finding that Bucci's Sixth Amendment claim was preserved, this court in Bucci's direct appeal found that it had not been properly raised at the trial court level. Bucci contends that, even if this court on appeal did not explicitly find his Sixth Amendment claim preserved, the very act of raising the issue for the first time on his direct appeal itself preserved the claim and entitles him to plain error review on a subsequent § 2255 petition. While this court has not yet considered this issue in relation to § 2255, this court has addressed essentially the same issue in the § 2254 context relating to habeas petitions by state prisoners. In Commonwealth v. Horton, 434 Mass. 823, 753 N.E.2d 119, 127 (2001), a defendant contended for the first time on direct appeal that his right to a public trial had been violated when the state trial court conducted jury voir dire in a private jury deliberation room, excluding members of the public. Because the defendant had not objected at trial, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found the issue forfeited and considered the defendant's claim only for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, id., which is a limited standard of review akin to the federal plain error standard. After exhausting his state appeals, the defendant filed a § 2254 petition in federal district court. See Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75 (1st Cir.2004). The district court rejected [the petitioner's § 2254] claim on procedural default grounds because defense counsel did not object at trial. Id. at 80. This court affirmed, reasoning that [t]he [state supreme court] did review the claim for a `substantial miscarriage of justice,' but this sort of limited review does not work a waiver of the contemporaneous objection requirement. Id. at 81 (internal citation omitted). Thus, the defendant's failure to object at trial triggered a procedural default which could be excused only by satisfying the cause and prejudice standard. Id. This court has since applied this rule in multiple § 2254 cases, [8] and many of our sister circuits have adopted the same approach. [9] The Supreme Court made clear in Frady that procedural defaults in § 2255 cases are to be reviewed under the same cause and actual prejudice standard applied in § 2254 cases. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 164-67, 102 S.Ct. 1584; see also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542, 94 S.Ct. 1708, 48 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976); Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 344, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974). Thus, we hold that a claim asserted in a § 2255 petition is procedurally defaulted if the defendant failed to object to the alleged error at trial, even if the defendant subsequently raised the issue on direct appeal under plain error review. [10] Because we find that Bucci's Sixth Amendment claim was procedurally defaulted due to his failure to object to the courtroom closure at trial, in general Bucci would not be entitled to collateral relief under § 2255 unless he could show both (1) cause for having procedurally defaulted his claim; and (2) actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68, 102 S.Ct. 1584. Bucci argues that he need not establish prejudice because a public-trial violation is a structural error. See Owens, 483 F.3d at 64. It is an open question, however, whether a partial public trial violation like the one here constitutes structural error. See Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir.2006); Carson v. Fischer, 421 F.3d 83, 95 (2d Cir.2005). We need not decide the question because Bucci has failed to establish cause excusing his procedural default. Bucci argues that the cause prong of this test is satisfied on grounds that his counsel's failure to object to the partial courtroom closure at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court has recognized that ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause sufficient to excuse a procedural default, but only if the representation was constitutionally ineffective under the standard established in Strickland.  Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Under Strickland, the defense counsel's performance will be found constitutionally ineffective only if the defendant can show (a) that his counsel's performance was deficient; and (b) that he was prejudiced as a result of the deficient performance. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The prejudice prong here is the same as the prejudice requirement of the cause and prejudice standard. Even if the prejudice requirement were satisfied (a question we do not decide), a showing of deficient performance would still be necessary. To establish deficient performance under Strickland, the defendant must show that his counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The question is whether the counsel's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance that a competent criminal defense counsel could provide under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Surmounting Strickland 's high bar is never an easy task. Padilla v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). Judicial scrutiny of the defense counsel's performance is highly deferential, and the defendant must overcome a strong presumption . . . that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The inquiry focuses on the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind. Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 790, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011); see also Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 328 n. 10 (1st Cir.2005); Cofske v. United States, 290 F.3d 437, 444-45 (1st Cir.2002). The reviewing court is therefore required not simply to give [the] attorneys the benefit of the doubt, but to affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons . . . counsel may have had for proceeding as they did. Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1407, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Important interests are served by requiring contemporaneous objections to courtroom closures. As the Supreme Court has recognized, objecting to a procedural error at trial can often correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). Moreover, trial courts are ordinarily in the best position to determine the relevant facts and adjudicate the dispute with respect to procedural errors. Id. In the courtroom closure context, a contemporaneous objection calls the Sixth Amendment issue to the trial court's attention and facilitates the court's consideration of the Waller factors, providing an opportunity for the court to articulate its reasoning on the record regarding the closure's justification, scope, and possible alternatives. Also, the contemporaneous-objection rule prevents a litigant from `sandbagging' the courtremaining silent about his objection and belatedly raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor. Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1428. Any contrary rule could encourage defendants to take their chances on a verdict of not guilty in. . . trial court with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay off. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977); cf. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491-92, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) ([H]abeas corpus review may give litigants incentives to withhold claims for manipulative purposes and may establish disincentives to present claims when evidence is fresh.). Nonetheless, in Owens, this court held that the defense counsel's failure to object to a complete courtroom closure for an entire day of jury selection may show that [counsel's] performance fell below `an objective standard of reasonableness.' 483 F.3d at 63. And Owens concluded that given that the courtroom was closed to the public for an entire day, failure to object could not have been sound trial strategy. Id. at 64. But unlike Owens, the present case involved only a partial courtroom closure. In such situations, we cannot conclude that the absence of a sound trial strategy should be presumed. In our view, two features distinguish a partial closure from a complete closure. A complete closure has a far more severe impact on the rights of the accused than a partial closure (as reflected in the difference between the overriding interest and substantial reason standards). See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (using the overriding interest standard for a complete closure); DeLuca, 137 F.3d at 32-35 (requiring only a substantial interest for a partial closure). Moreover, a complete closure is extremely difficult to justify, and an objection by counsel is not likely to divert attention and resources from other significant issues; in contrast, a partial closure is likely to involve weighing competing considerations and creates the prospect of protracted proceedings and the concomitant diversion, as discussed below. These differences suggest that, in complete closure situations, counsel's failure to object may in general be an unsound trial strategy, whereas in partial closure situations, no such assumption is appropriate. We consider the question of ineffective assistance under the particular facts of this case, under the usual Strickland presumption of competency. Here, Bucci's trial counsel testified that he had knowledge of the partial closure. Even if reasonably competent counsel under the prevailing professional norms would have viewed the partial closure as a potential Sixth Amendment violation (an issue which we do not decide), [11] we think that, under the applicable objective standard, competent counsel could have knowingly and reasonably declined to raise the constitutional issue in this case because doing so would be a waste of the defense's time, energy, and resources. A competent defense counsel is entitled to formulate a strategy that [is] reasonable at the time and to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 789. In doing so, a competent attorney can elect to avoid activities that appear `distractive from more important duties.' Id. (quoting Bobby v. Van Hook, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 13, 19, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009) (per curiam)). In other words, the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance reflects the reality that lawyers do not enjoy the benefit of endless time, energy or financial resources. Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 387 (11th Cir.1994). Indeed, while criminal defendants are entitled to competent representation, the Constitution does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-34, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). [12] Here, we think competent defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that the presence of Bucci's family members sufficiently mitigated the risk of actual prejudice to Bucci to the point that Bucci had little or nothing to gain from opening the courtroom to additional members of the public. In other words, we think that competent defense counsel in this case could have reasonably concluded that even a successful Sixth Amendment challenge to the partial courtroom closure would have done little to increase the defense's chances of securing a not-guilty verdict. As such, an objectively reasonable defense counsel could have made the strategic decision to forego the Sixth Amendment objection in favor of conserving the defense's limited resources for other important issues. Rather than raising a complicated constitutional issue that might require briefing and a hearing while offering limited upside to the defendant, the defense counsel could have reasonably believed his client's interests would be best served by moving the trial along and focusing on the immediate task of jury selection. Under these circumstances, Bucci's counsel's failure to raise the objection at trial did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness required to establish constitutionally ineffective assistance under Strickland. Bucci thus has not shown cause that excuses his procedural default. While we find the defense counsel's actions here were reasonable where the partial courtroom closure only occurred during part of the voir dire proceeding, we note that the reasonableness of counsel failing to object under other circumstances, such as partial closure of an entire trial, might present a quite different question.
Bucci contends that the district court erred in conducting the § 2255 hearing in his absence, that his counsel was ineffective in failing to request his presence, and that he is entitled to a new § 2255 hearing. Because this issue was not raised before the district court, our review is for plain error. United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st Cir.2002). We reject these claims because we conclude that there was no error, plain or otherwise, in conducting the hearing without Bucci present. Section 2255 provides that a district court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(c). Whether the petitioner should be present at his § 2255 hearing depends upon the issues raised by the particular case, United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952), and is a matter left to the district court's sound discretion, Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 797 (1st Cir.1959); see also Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963). While Bucci was present when the courtroom closure occurred, he was not the only defense witness available to testify as to the events in question. At the § 2255 hearing, various members of the courtroom staff, Michael Natola (Bucci's trial counsel), Mrs. Keefe (Bucci's mother), and Richard Morganti (Jordan's brother-in-law) testified as to the events that occurred inside the courtroom. Bucci does not demonstrate, or even contend, that he had anything material to add to this testimony. The Supreme Court has recognized that there are times when allegations of facts outside the record can be fully investigated without requiring the personal presence of the prisoner, and that district courts have discretion to exercise their common sense as to such matters. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). Here, the court could have reasonably decided that [Bucci's] testimony. . . would add little or nothing to the testimony of other available witnesses. Chang v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir.2001). The court did not abuse its discretion, much less commit plain error, in holding the hearing without Bucci's being present.