Opinion ID: 4524142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severity of Crime

Text: ¶8. Nash begins his proportionality challenge by asking this Court to recognize “differing degrees of transgression” under Section 47-5-193. Section 47-5-193 prohibits any offender confined to a correctional facility from possessing “any weapon, deadly weapon, unauthorized electronic device, contraband item, or cell phone or any of its components or accessories to include, but not limited to, Subscriber Information Module (SIM) cards or chargers.” Nash argues this statute creates “three categories . . . of a descending order in post-trial challenge to a sentence only. Rule 25.1 permits a trial court to vacate a judgment and grant a new trial. MRCrP 25.1. But that is not what Nash is seeking with his proportionality claim. He does not ask to set aside his judgment of conviction and have a new trial. Rather, he seeks a new, lesser sentence. The same is true of a Rule 25.2 motion to vacate judgment. The rule permits a trial court to vacate a judgment “if the indictment or charging affidavit did not charge an offense, or if the trial court was without jurisdiction.” MRCrP 25.2(a). It does not permit a defendant to move to vacate a sentence only based on alleged constitutional deficiencies. 4 But see Horne v. State, 825 So. 2d 627, 641 (Miss. 2002) (refusing to engage in proportionality analysis for the first time on appeal, because life in prison was the only sentencing option, and the defendant “never asked the circuit court to perform a proportionality review”). 4 severity.” As Nash sees it, possession of weapons is the most serious offense, possession of contraband is less serious, and possession of a cell phone—if not used in criminal activity—is the least serious. ¶9. But the statute’s language does not support his three-tiered argument. Nothing in the language of Section 47-5-193 suggests the Legislature intended to assign different levels of severity or punishment depending on whether one possessed a weapon, contraband, or a cell phone. Rather, Section 47-5-195 explicitly treats all violations of Section 47-5-193 equally. “Any person who violates any provision of Section 47-5-193 . . . shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by confinement in the Penitentiary for not less than three (3) years nor more than fifteen (15) years . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-195 (emphasis added). ¶10. What Nash dubs as the “mere possession of a cell phone” is a specified violation of Section 47-5-193. And the statute subjected him to the same potential punishment as any other violation of Section 47-5-193—imprisonment for not less than three years and not more than fifteen years. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-195. ¶11. Nash’s twelve-year sentence fell within this statutory range. And “the general rule in this state is that a sentence cannot be disturbed on appeal so long as it does not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute.” Fleming v. State, 604 So. 2d 280, 302 (Miss. 1992).