Opinion ID: 1496754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Out of State Authorities

Text: The majority concludes that a $500,000 cap on nonmedical damages is arbitrary, and cites with approval Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976). Reliance on Wright is inappropriate and misplaced. In Wright, the defendant, relying upon case law upholding constitutional challenges to the Illinois Workman's Compensation Act, maintained there existed under that state's damages cap a societal quid pro quo: the loss of recovery potential to some plaintiffs was offset by the lower medical care and insurance costs to society in general. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this argument because any quid pro quo that existed was insufficient to save the challenged statutory provision. Id., 347 N.E.2d at 742. The crucial distinction in Wright, however, was the court's concern that under the Illinois statute, medical expenses were capped. Unlike the Workman's Compensation Act, which allowed all medical expenses and payment of compensation for the duration of ... incapacity, the medical malpractice plaintiff may be unable to recover even all the medical expenses he might incur. Id. Such is not the case in Texas. Article 4590i allows full and complete recovery of all medical expenses; only nonmedical damages are capped. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon Supp.1988). The majority places great emphasis on the fact that in some of the jurisdictions which upheld statutes imposing damages caps, alternative remedies were provided. See 757 S.W.2d 689 ( citing Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 601 (1980); Sibley v. Board of Sup'rs of Louisiana, 462 So.2d 149, 156, opinion modified, 477 So.2d 1094 (La.1985)). It should be noted, however, that both Indiana and Louisiana have medical caps of $500,000 as an absolute ceiling on all damages, thus necessitating in my view a higher level of constitutional justification. See generally, Johnson, 404 N.E.2d at 601 (existence of patient compensation fund to increase availability of medical insurance); see also Sibley, 462 So.2d at 156 (Louisiana's Act modeled on Indiana's Act). Neither court required the existence of a quid pro quo as a constitutional prerequisite. The majority's reliance on Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla.1987), is equally unconvincing. Although Smith held that a $450,000 cap on noneconomic damages violated Florida's open courts provision, it did so because no legislative showing of an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown. Id. at 1089. Such a heightened standard is not followed in Texas. As stated previously, the test to be applied in the context of a constitutional challenge under Texas' open courts provision is whether the diminution of redress is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 666. I cannot conclude that section 11.02 is constitutionally infirm under the standard enunciated in Sax . Reliance on Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D.1978) is also misplaced. North Dakota's damages cap was a total cap of $300,000 which might prevent seriously injured victims from recovering all of their medical expenses. As previously noted, such is not the case in Texas. It is true that several states have invalidated statutory provisions limiting damages in medical malpractice actions on a variety of theories. With only two exceptions, however, these invalidated statutes contained absolute ceilings on both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. [4] What distinguishes article 4590i from other statutory schemes is its full allowance of all medical costs and expenses; only nonmedical injuries are limited. The majority cites with approval the language used by the Supreme Court of Florida: [I]f the legislature may constitutionally cap recovery at $450,000 there is no discernable reason why they could not cap the recovery at some other figure, perhaps $50,000 or $1,000 or $1. At 692. This argument ignores the fact that any modification the legislature makes is subject to being stricken as unconstitutional. A reduction of nonmedical damages to a lesser cap at some point would be manifestly so insufficient as to become a denial of justice. Plaintiffs have no vested property rights in a particular measure of damages. This is without doubt since a vested right must be something more than a mere expectation based on anticipated continuance of existing law. It must become a title, legal or equitable, to present or future enjoyment of property. National Carloading Corp. v. Phoenix-El Paso Express, 142 Tex. 141, 176 S.W.2d 564 (1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 747, 64 S.Ct. 1156, 88 L.Ed. 1578 (1944). The legislature has broad powers to modify the scope and nature of such damages. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 36 Cal.3d 359, 204 Cal.Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670 (1984). I am not prepared to hold that an award of close to $1 million ($500,000 plus consumer index adjustment provided for in § 11.04 of the Act) for nonmedical damages coupled with no limitation on past and future medical expenses is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it does not pass constitutional muster. Therefore, this cap is no more a violation of the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution than the fee increase was in LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 343 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).