Opinion ID: 2982177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competency to Enter Guilty Plea

Text: Abdulmutallab argues that the district court erred in not conducting a competency hearing prior to accepting his guilty plea. Abdulmutallab contends that the district court should have ordered a competency examination when standby counsel filed a motion which raised a doubt as to his competency. The Government responds by stating that the district court did not abuse its discretion, as the district court had no reason to question Abdulmutallab’s competency to stand trial, as neither Abdulmutallab’s behavior in court nor standby counsel’s motion for a competency hearing raised suspicions as to Abdulmutallab’s competency. A criminal defendant may not plead guilty unless he does so competently and intelligently. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). A criminal defendant’s dueprocess right to a fair trial is violated by a court’s failure to hold a proper competency No. 12-1207 United States v. Abdulmutallab Page 9 hearing where there is substantial evidence of a defendant’s incompetency. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385–86 (1966). The test for competency1 to stand trial is whether the defendant has (1) sufficient present ability to consult with a lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and (2) a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. at 399 (stating that the Dusky standard applies to defendants who plead guilty). On appeal, we review under an abuse of discretion standard a district court’s determination whether there is “reasonable cause” to believe that a defendant is incompetent and whether to hold a competency hearing. United States v. Jones, 495 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In order for a court to determine whether a competency hearing was required, the court should consider “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial . . . .” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). No one factor is determinative of whether further inquiry into a defendant’s competency is warranted, “but . . . even one of these factors standing alone, may, in some circumstances,” be sufficient to warrant further inquiry. Id. We find that the district court did not err in not holding a competency hearing prior to allowing Abdulmutallab to proceed to trial and ultimately enter a guilty plea. To begin, this is not a case where the defendant’s behavior in the courtroom raised the district court’s suspicions of incompetency. The defendants in Drope and Pate exhibited 1 The standards for competency to stand trial are codified in 18 U.S.C. § 4241, which provides: (a) Motion to determine competency of defendant.—At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant, or at any time after the commencement of probation or supervised release and prior to the completion of the sentence, the defendant or the attorney for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. (b) Psychiatric or psychological examination and report.—Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be conducted, and that a psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the court, pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(b) and (c). No. 12-1207 United States v. Abdulmutallab Page 10 behavior both in the courtroom and outside the courtroom which would make a reasonable judge question their competency to stand trial. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 180;2 Pate, 383 U.S. at 385.3 In stark contrast to the defendants in Drope and Pate, Abdulmutallab did not exhibit irrational behavior in the courtroom that raised suspicions as to his competency. Rather, Abdulmutallab was an active participant in the proceedings, filing and arguing motions, and assisting Chambers in preparing his defense. Abdulmutallab directly and articulately addressed the district judge on multiple occasions and demonstrated his ability to make comprehensible legal arguments and his clear understanding of the nature of the proceedings. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399 (stating the one factor to determine whether a defendant is competent is whether he can make comprehensible legal arguments).4 Abdulmutallab is not a defendant who had a long 2 In Drope, the defendant’s counsel filed a motion for a continuance so the defendant could see a psychiatrist and receive treatment. Drope, 420 U.S. at 164. Attached to the motion was a psychiatrist’s report. Id. The trial judge dismissed the motion because it was not filed in the proper form. Id. at 165. During the trial, the defendant’s wife testified against him and stated her belief that her husband needed psychiatric care and that the day before the trial, the defendant tried to choke and kill her. Id. at 166. The defendant later attempted suicide during trial to avoid prosecution. Id. at 166–67. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed “to give proper weight to the information suggesting incompetence which came to light during trial.” Id. at 179. The Court stated that the defendant’s attempted murder of his wife and attempted suicide “hardly could be regarded as rational conduct” and “created a sufficient doubt of his competence to stand trial.” Id. at 179–80. 3 In Pate, the defendant’s counsel admitted that the defendant had murdered his second wife, but counsel alleged that the defendant was insane at the time of the murder. Pate, 383 U.S. at 376. The defense introduced the uncontradicted testimony of four witnesses who showed that the defendant had a long history of disturbed behavior. Id. at 378. The defendant had several erratic episodes: he believed someone was trying to shoot him or come after him; he heard voices; and he threw all of his first wife’s clothes in the yard after she had fled the house due to his erratic behavior. Id. at 378–81. The defendant was also previously hospitalized in a psychiatric facility and had served a four-year prison sentence for the murder of his infant son. Id. at 381. Immediately after murdering his son, the defendant also attempted suicide several times. Id. The Supreme Court held that in light of the defense testimony and the defense counsel’s insistence throughout the proceedings that his client’s sanity was an issue, the defendant was entitled to a competency hearing. Id. at 384–85. Depriving him of this hearing was a violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Id. at 385. The Court noted that “it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently waive his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial.” Id. at 384 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court also recognized that while a defendant’s “demeanor at trial might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on that very issue.” Id. at 386. 4 An example of this understanding is at a motions hearing before trial when Abdulmutallab responded to a Government motion seeking to preclude his reliance on a duress defense. The following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Now, we have quite a few motions, some of which do not seem to be contested, but some obviously are. The first is the Government’s motion to preclude expert testimony on the defendant’s mental condition and to preclude the defense of duress. I don’t think that’s a contested issue, is it, Mr. Chambers? MR. CHAMBERS: I believe that Mr. Abdulmutallab is going to address these motions, all of them, is my understanding. No. 12-1207 United States v. Abdulmutallab Page 11 history of psychological problems but rather exhibited an ability to adequately conduct his defense. But see Drope, 420 U.S. at 169; Pate, 383 U.S. at 378; Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169 (2008) (identifying a defendant’s significant history of mental illness as the common denominator in Supreme Court cases where the Court found error for failing to hold a competency hearing). Furthermore, Chambers’ motion requesting a competency hearing contained scant allegations of behavior that would cause a court to question Abdulmutallab’s competency. Chambers stated that Abdulmutallab had begun exhibiting “spontaneously erratic behavior,” namely that he would be “engaged and cooperative then minutes later the Defendant will become disengaged, irrational, and uncooperative.” R. 60, Mot. Requesting Competency Examination, Sealed Dist. Ct. Docs. at 2. At times, Abdulmutallab worried about “mounting a defense” and then later within the same meeting would indicate that he had no desire to prepare a defense. Id. Chambers stated that Abdulmutallab’s behavior had risen to “unprecedented levels,” but provided no suggestion as to what “level” he was referring. Chambers motion did not provide sufficient factual details that would cause the district court to question Abdulmutallab’s competency. Furthermore, Abdulmutallab’s apparent waiver between desiring to mount a defense and pleading guilty is not indicative of incompetence, but is indicative of the complicated decision of trial strategy of a defendant proceeding pro se. THE COURT: All of them. All right. Mr. Abdulmutallab. THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, with regards to that motion, I do not intend to use those defenses, but I also feel it’s not for the Government to say what I can and can’t do during trial. THE COURT: No, it’s for me to say what you can and can’t do during trial, but the Government needs to be able to, and they are able to, raise these issues ahead of time so that we don’t have mistrial, we don’t have things presented in front of the jury that are inappropriate. So if you’re telling me now that you do not intend to raise the defense of duress or your mental condition at the time as a defense, then I’ll grant the Government’s motion and I will instruct you that you are not to raise those issues in front of the jury. If something comes up, you need to bring it to my attention before anything happens with the jury in the courtroom. THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, understood. R. 148, 09-27-11 Mot. Hearing Tr. at 52–53, PageID # 1976–77. No. 12-1207 United States v. Abdulmutallab Page 12 The facts before the court show that Abdulmutallab is an educated and adept individual. See R. 114, 10-12-11 Guilty Plea Tr. at 8, PageID # 677. In order for Abdulmutallab to accomplish his goal of blowing up an aircraft over United States soil, Abdulmutallab had to make numerous calculated decisions. A brief overview of the steps that Abdulmutallab took in preparation for his mission is instructive: • Abdulmutallab studied the teachings of the radical Imam Anwar Awlaki, which prompted his decision to travel to Yemen for the purpose of meeting Awlaki. • While in Yemen, Abdulmutallab agreed to carry out the martyrdom mission. • In order to conceal his time in Yemen, Abdulmutallab decided to travel to Ghana before departing to Amsterdam. • Abdulmutallab had to come up with clever reasons for traveling to the United States when an airport screener in Amsterdam questioned his reasons for travel. These actions show the deliberate, conscious, and complicated path Abdulmutallab chose to pursue in the name of martyrdom. Unlike the defendants in Pate and Drope, Abdulmutallab not only acted rationally, but was (nearly) able to execute a complex martyrdom mission. The complexity behind Abdulmutallab’s mission indicates the exact opposite of incompetence. Although Abdulmutallab raised some uncognizable arguments (for example that the United States had no jurisdiction to prosecute him because he is a Muslim),5this 5 Abdulmutallab makes much of the fact that when the district court asked him questions on his position regarding a competency hearing, he stated both that he believed that he was competent, but also expressed that he thought it would be a good idea to “prove” his competency. R. 116, 08-17-11 Motions Hearing Tr. at 15–16, PageID # 762–63. When asked by the trial court whether he would comply with a competency hearing, Abdulmutallab responded by saying: THE DEFENDANT: Well, one thing was, as I—as he, Mr. Chambers said when—because when we discussed about the motion is initially my idea was perhaps I would even—that would be a good thing to prove my competency to proceed standby, but then when he put it to me that, you know, the kind of—the reasons why, or the arguments that have to be put forward before even someone has that type of examination, and I said that’s counter productive to what I even want, so I don’t want the examination. Id. To the contrary, Abdulmutallab’s statements to the court do not constitute “rambling” but rather constitute a coherent statement regarding his attitude toward a competency hearing. As the Government states, Abdulmutallab was explaining that at first he was willing to have the examination because he wanted to demonstrate the ability to represent himself, but when he understood the threshold for ordering No. 12-1207 United States v. Abdulmutallab Page 13 behavior alone does not indicate that the district court abused its discretion regarding Abdulmutallab’s competency.6Accordingly, the district court did not err in not holding a competency hearing. Jones, 495 F.3d at 277.