Opinion ID: 3176573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Prong: Intellectual Functioning

Text: The assessment of an individual’s intellectual functioning requires the administration of standardized intelligence testing. “The ‘significant limitations in intellectual functioning’ criterion for a diagnosis of intellectual disability is an IQ score that is approximately two standard deviations below the mean, considering the standard error of measurement for the specific instruments used.” Green Book, supra, at 31; accord Red Book, supra, at 58 (“[T]he ‘intellectual functioning’ criterion for diagnosis of [intellectual disability] is approximately two standard deviations below the mean, considering the [standard error of measurement] for the specific assessment instruments used.”). As Greenspan explained, IQ tests are normalized so that the mean score is 100 and the standard deviation is 15; thus, two standard deviations below the mean equates to a score of 70. This is consistent with the assessment of Louisiana law by the Supreme Court of the United States, as it explained that, “[t]o qualify as ‘significantly subaverage in general intellectual 29 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 30 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 functioning’ in Louisiana, ‘one must be more than two standard deviations below the mean for the test of intellectual functioning.’” Brumfield (S. Ct.), 135 S. Ct. at 2277 (quoting Williams, 831 So. 2d at 853). Although a score of 70 is two standard deviations below the mean score, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Louisiana Supreme Court have rejected a bright-line numerical cutoff for intellectual disability. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1996; Williams, 22 So. 3d at 888. As the Supreme Court of the United States explained in Hall, “[t]he concept of standard deviation describes how scores are dispersed in a population,” but “[s]tandard deviation is distinct from standard error of measurement, a concept which describes the reliability of a test.” 134 S. Ct. at 1994. The Court further explained that the standard error of measurement “reflects the reality that an individual’s intellectual functioning cannot be reduced to a single numerical score.” Id. at 1995. Therefore, “an individual’s score is best understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score.” Id. Thus, scores higher than 70 can satisfy the first prong of the intellectual disability test. The Supreme Court in Hall explicitly rejected the contention that an IQ score of 75 precludes the possibility of an intellectual disability diagnosis. Id. at 1996. Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Dunn (Dunn III), 41 So. 3d 454, 470 (La. 2010), stated that “[t]he ranges associated with the two scores of 75 brush the threshold score for [an intellectual disability] diagnosis.” Moreover, the AAIDD recognizes that a score of 75 is consistent with an intellectual disability. Red Book, supra, at 59; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra, at 41–42. In this case, the district court concluded that Brumfield satisfied the first prong of the intellectual disability test based on his IQ scores. As found by the district court, Brumfield’s IQ test scores were as follows: 30 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 31 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 — In a 1995 WAIS–R test administered by then-defense expert Dr. Bolter, he scored a 75, with a 95% confidence interval of 70–80. — In a 2007 Stanford–Binet V test administered by petitioner’s expert, Dr. Weinstein, he scored a 72, with a 95% confidence interval of 69–77. — In a 2007 C–TONI test administered by Dr. Weinstein, he scored a 70, with a 95% confidence interval of 65–75. — In a 2009 WAIS–IV test administered by the State’s expert, Dr. Hoppe, he scored a 70, with a 95% confidence interval of 67–75. Brumfield II, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 389–90. All four of the confidence intervals (the range of scores calculated from the standard error of measurement) surrounding Brumfield’s full-scale IQ scores include scores of 70 or below, and therefore satisfy the first prong of the intellectual disability test based on how both the Supreme Court and Supreme Court of Louisiana have analyzed IQ scores in the past. 26 Even ignoring the confidence intervals, no score exceeds 75, and the Supreme Court noted in Atkins, Hall, and Brumfield (S. Ct.), that a score of 75 can satisfy the first prong of the intellectual disability test. Brumfield (S. Ct.), 135 S. Ct. at 2278; Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1996; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5. Moreover, every single expert agreed that Brumfield’s scores satisfied the first prong of the intellectual disability test. 27 As this court noted 26 Weinstein explained that as long as the lower bound of the confidence interval includes a score of 70 or less, an individual can satisfy the first prong of the intellectual disability test. 27 The district court, experts, and parties discussed the import of the “Flynn effect,” which describes the phenomenon whereby the American public’s score on any given IQ test increases by approximately three points per decade. Brumfield II, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 391. “Thus, when an older test is used to measure a test subject, the subject’s IQ score may be artificially inflated because that test was normalized using a past sample of Americans.” Id. at 391. To correct for the Flynn effect, a test subject’s score may be adjusted downward by 0.30–0.33 for every year that has elapsed since the test was normalized. Id. The State correctly points out that the Fifth Circuit has not recognized the Flynn effect. In re Salazar, 443 F.3d 430, 433 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006); see also In re Mathis, 483 F.3d 395, 398 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007). It is not necessary to decide whether to recognize the Flynn effect in this case, however, as Brumfield’s scores satisfy the first prong of the intellectual disability test without a Flynn effect adjustment. 31 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 32 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 in Rivera, 505 F.3d at 361, “[a] finding is clearly erroneous only if it is implausible in the light of the record considered as a whole.” Given that all of Brumfield’s reported IQ scores fell at or below 75 and that the experts’ conclusions were based on these scores, the district court’s conclusion that Brumfield met the first criterion for an intellectual disability diagnosis is not implausible and therefore is not clearly erroneous. The State argues that “assessments consistently demonstrated that Brumfield had an IQ in the 70-85 range.” However, the State does not point to specific IQ scores which demonstrate that Brumfield’s IQ fell within this range. Presumably, it refers to the tests administered to Brumfield in the 1980s. As Weinstein explained, no actual IQ scores from these tests were reported anywhere in Brumfield’s records; instead, the reports based on these IQ tests provided only descriptions of the ranges into which Brumfield’s scores fell. For example, Weinstein explained that one report described Brumfield’s IQ score as falling into the “dull normal” range, which Weinstein further explained corresponded to a score between 80 and 89. The district court’s discrediting of this range of scores in favor of reported, full-scale IQ scores was not clear error, as the Supreme Court similarly disregarded supposedly higher IQ scores when no actual score was provided. See Brumfield (S. Ct.), 135 S. Ct. at 2278–79. Moreover, multiple expert witnesses discredited this range of scores in favor of the reported scores, and this court “cannot second guess the district court’s decision to believe one witness’ testimony over another’s or to discount a witness’ testimony.” Canal Barge, 220 F.3d at 375. The State also argues that Brumfield’s scores may be explained by his low effort on the IQ tests. However, the experts in this case—including the State’s expert who administered IQ tests—also administered tests for malingering and found that Brumfield was, in fact, not malingering. Moreover, Greenspan explained that Brumfield’s consistent scores across multiple tests 32 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 33 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 over multiple years ruled out malingering. We decline the State’s invitation to second guess the district court’s decision to believe the multiple experts who stated that Brumfield’s scores were not a product of malingering. Accordingly, we find no clear error in the district court’s finding that Brumfield satisfied the first prong of the intellectual disability test.