Opinion ID: 617962
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Witness-Tampering Conviction (Count 2)

Text: Mr. Irving next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for witness tampering. In order to establish Mr. Irving's guilt under the witness-tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that [he] knowingly attempted to kill [Lt. Stark] and (2) that he did so with the intent to prevent [Lt. Stark's] attendance or testimony at an official proceeding. Washington, 653 F.3d at 1264 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Rose, 362 F.3d 1059, 1067 (8th Cir.2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A). An attempt requires both (1) an intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) the commission of an act which constitutes a substantial step towards commission of the substantive offense. Vigil, 523 F.3d at 1267 (quoting United States v. Smith, 264 F.3d 1012, 1015 (10th Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A highly fact-specific inquiry is necessary to properly assess whether a defendant's actions amount to an attempt, and, in particular, whether his actions qualify as a substantial step. See United States v. DeSantiago-Flores, 107 F.3d 1472, 1479 (10th Cir.1997) (The dividing line between preparation and attempt is not clear and depends to a high degree on the surrounding factual circumstances.), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Holland, 116 F.3d 1353, 1359 n. 4 (10th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901, 906 (4th Cir. 1996) (Whether conduct represents a substantial step depends on the `surrounding factual circumstances' and, therefore, such determinations are necessarily fact specific.); United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 869 (1st Cir.1983) (noting the supreme importance of the facts in any attempt case). As courts invariably and correctly state, the question of when preparation ends and attempt begins is exceedingly difficult. United States v. Prichard, 781 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir.1986); see also Neal, 78 F.3d at 906 (The decisions are too numerous to cite and would not help much anyway, for there is, and obviously can be, no definite line [between preparation and attempt]) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir.1950) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A substantial step must be something more than mere preparation, Vigil, 523 F.3d at 1267, yet may be less than the last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive crime, United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1298 (10th Cir.1988) (noting that [t]he realistic emphasis on what had been done, rather than dwelling on what remained to be done is consistent with our case law); Prichard, 781 F.2d at 182 ([M]odern `attempt' law allows criminal liability to attach at some point prior to the last proximate act.). The fact that further, major steps remain before the crime can be completed does not preclude a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial. Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1297 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 5.01 cmt. 6(a), at 329 (1985) [hereinafter MPC & Commentaries] ([T]his formulation shifts the emphasis from what remains to be done, the chief concern of the proximity tests, to what the actor has already done. That further major steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial. (emphasis added)). [13] As the drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) have noted, under such an approach apprehension of dangerous persons will be facilitated and law enforcement officials and others will be able to stop the criminal effort at an earlier stage, thereby minimizing the risk of substantive harm, but without providing immunity for the offender. MPC & Commentaries, supra, § 5.01 cmt. 6(a), at 331; see United States v. Morris, 549 F.3d 548, 550 (7th Cir. 2008) (The purpose of the law of attempt is to nail a person who by his conduct has shown that had the attempt not been interrupted he would very likely have completed the crime that he attempted.); MPC & Commentaries, supra, § 5.01 cmt. 1, at 298 (suggesting that the proper focus is on the dangerousness of the actor). Importantly, the act or acts must be strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent. United States v. Bunney, 705 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see MPC & Commentaries, supra, § 5.01 cmt. 1, at 298-99 (Needless to say, the law must be concerned with conduct, not with evil thoughts alone. . . . [T]he judgment is that conduct that does not itself strongly corroborate the actor's criminal objective should be excluded from liability.). On appeal, Mr. Irving does not appear to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his intent to kill Lt. Stark. Rather, he attacks the evidence as to the second element, maintaining that no reasonable juror could have found that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that a substantial step toward murder had been committed. Aplt. Opening Br. at 20. More specifically, he claims that he took [n]o overt act toward . . . murdering Lieutenant Stark, and notes that no money exchanged hands and [he] never knew or spoke with Mr. Washington. [14] Id. As he sees it, there was no evidence of any actual attempt to kill Lt. Stark, and a conspiracy or discussion cannot. . . substitute for the requirement that there be an overt act [i.e., substantial step] to convict for attempt to tamper with a witness. Id. at 22. In making his argument, Mr. Irving relies heavily on United States v. Monholland, supra . In Monholland, we concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for attempting to receive an explosive in interstate commerce because there was nothing more than preliminary discussion about the purchase of some dynamite. 607 F.2d at 1317. The attempt charge was one of several lodged against the defendants in prosecuting them for a scheme to kill a state trial judge by blowing up his vehicle. Id. at 1312. As relevant here, one defendant had asked an undercover government agent what the price of a box of dynamite would be, while viewing a stick of simulated dynamite, id. at 1313, and then later another defendant had asked the agent what [he] would . . . take for the dynamite that the agent possessed, id. at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted). A price was never discussed, as the undercover agent told them the dynamite was not for sale, and there was no suggestion that the defendants actually had the money to pay for the explosives. Id. at 1313. We concluded, therefore, that this evidence, consisting as it does of mere abstract talk,  could not show a substantial step towards completion of the crime. Id. at 1318 (emphasis added). We reasoned that mere acts of preparation, not proximately leading to the consummation of the intended crime, will not suffice to establish an attempt to commit it, especially when made at a distance from the place where the substantive offense is to be committed, for there must be some act moving directly toward the commission of the offense after the preparations are made. Id. In Monholland, while we held that mere abstract talk was not a substantial step, we also observed that [i]f the activity had proceeded to a further length, that is, if a tangible act which constituted proximate and tangible evidence of a real effort had emerged, the government's [charge] would be more tenable. Id. at 1317. The government contends that this is just such a case. It claims that Mr. Irving progressed over the course of three years from a general solicitation in 2006 to specific plans with Collins and his hitman in 2009. Aplee. Br. at 30-31. The government emphasizes that Mr. Irving's communications were increasingly specific and were buttressed by his providing bail money to Collins, and concludes that [Mr. Irving's] words were no offhand comments[they] strongly indicated his intent to end an officer's life. Id. at 31. We agree that Monholland 's holding does not bar a conclusion that Mr. Irving's conduct amounted to a substantial step. At the outset of our analysis, however, we must identify the factual universe that is relevant to our decision. In its briefing, the government relies in part on the acts of Mr. Washington to provide the predicate substantial step beyond mere preparation. See, e.g., Aplee. Br. at 28-29 (Here . . . the hitman[,] who was stopped after traveling 45 minutes away from his home in Tulsa to Muskogee where Stark lives, was literally `moving directly toward the commission of the crime.'). We note, however, that Mr. Irving was not charged with a conspiracy offense for his participation in the murder-for-hire plan with Mr. Washington, nor did the district court instruct the jury that it could rest Mr. Irving's conviction on an aiding-and-abetting theory. Therefore, it is at least open to question whether Mr. Washington's conduct could permissibly be attributed to Mr. Irving for purposes of determining whether there is sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Irving's guilt of the witness-tampering offense. Compare Wardell, 591 F.3d at 1306 n.16 (noting the fact that conspirators can be held responsible for overt acts of their coconspirators undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy has long been settled law), and United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 929 n. 2 (9th Cir.1992) (If such an individual is convicted of participating in a conspiracy to possess illegal narcotics, he may, of course, be convicted of an attempt offense based on the conduct of his co-conspirators.), with United States v. Bowen, 527 F.3d 1065, 1078 (10th Cir.2008) ([A]iding and abetting liability allows a jury to hold an aider and abetter responsible for a substantive offens[e] to the same extent as a principal, even though his act was not the cause of the substantive harm.), and Smith, 962 F.2d at 930 n. 3 (We note that the evidence also might be sufficient to support Smith's conviction of attempted possession on an aiding and abetting theory. The record reveals that the district court gave the jury an aiding and abetting instruction.), and United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1515 n. 3 (10th Cir.1990) (The[] instructions are therefore the law of this case, and the evidence must conform to them to support the conviction.). We need not (and do not) answer that question in this case, however. Because even if we assume, arguendo, that we may look only to Mr. Irving's conduct in assessing whether there was sufficient evidence to find him guilty of witness tamperingthat is, even if we adopt the position favorable to Mr. Irving that his conduct, alone, fully comprises the factual universe relevant to our inquiryMr. Irving cannot prevail on his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. [15] Turning now to Monholland, we conclude that it is clearly distinguishable. As we characterized the evidence: All that you have here is the evidence quoted above that the stick of simulated dynamite was held by one of the defendants and seen by the other and an inquiry about whether or not it could be sold. This is a far cry from transporting or receiving or attempting to transport or receive in commerce any explosive with knowledge that it will be used to kill or destroy. Monholland, 607 F.2d at 1317-18. More specifically, [o]ne problem [wa]s that the evidence d[id] not disclose anything approximating actual explosives or blasting materials. Id. at 1317. Furthermore, as noted, there was no discussion of a specific price for the explosives or indication that the defendants had the present ability to pay for them. Id. Indeed, as to the latter point, there was some reason to doubt that they did: in discussing the payment for the proposed hit on the judge with the undercover agent, one defendant noted that he was trying to get the money and the other said that he did not have the money on hand and would have to borrow it or rustle some cattle to get it. Id. at 1313. In short, there was no evidence in Monholland that made the subject matter of the discussions between the defendants and the undercover agent concrete and specific, such that the evidence could be considered strongly corroborative of the defendants' intent to commit the attempted-receipt crime. In other words, there was no evidence that took the discussions between the defendants and the undercover agent beyond the realm of mere abstract talk. Id. at 1318. Here, in contrast, not only did Mr. Irving and Mr. Collins have a series of discussions about the possible hit on Lt. Stark, they reached a concrete agreement for the hit and settled on a definite price ($50,000) and the form of the payment (i.e., cash, with one-half up front). Furthermore, in multiple conversations, they made their deal more specific and definite, among other things, confirming the payment terms and discussing who was responsible for getting the murder weapon. And, unlike Monholland, there was evidence that Mr. Irving took tangible act[s] that displayed a real effort to ensure the success of the hit, id. at 1317, including when he made the arrangements to get Mr. Collins (who would coordinate the hit) bonded out of jail and put up the money for the bond. Thus, Monholland is distinguishable and does not suggest that Mr. Irving's conduct could not amount to a substantial step toward the consummation of the witness-tampering crime, which would involve a hit on Lt. Stark. See United States v. Mims, 812 F.2d 1068, 1078 (8th Cir.1987) ([I]n the present case we have more than `general conversation' or `mere abstract talk.' [Defendant] repeatedly contacted [a narcotics supplier] and offered definite sums of money for some quantity of heroin. He further indicated that he had taken action to secure the money. [Defendant's] acts were directly aimed at the commission of the offense of attempting to possess heroin.). We affirmatively conclude that three aspects of Mr. Irving's conduct, viewed in the aggregate, constitute a substantial step that is strongly corroborative of Mr. Irving's intent that the witness-tampering offense be completed (i.e., that Lt. Stark be killed). Specifically, we point to (1) Mr. Irving's active solicitation of someone to kill Lt. Stark (i.e., his active solicitation of Mr. Collins to implement Mr. Irving's plan to kill Lt. Stark, with the aid of the trigger-man, Mr. Washington); (2) his actual consummation of a murder-for-hire contract with Messrs. Collins and Washington; and (3) his concrete actions to facilitate the completion of the contract, such as bonding Mr. Collins out of jail. Our conclusion is entirely consistent with the purposes of modern attempt law, which puts [t]he realistic emphasis on what had been done, rather than dwelling on what remained to be done, Savaiano, 843 F.2d at 1298, and makes the proper focus of attention [] the actor's disposition, that is, the dangerousness of the actor, MPC & Commentaries, supra, § 5.01 cmt. 1, at 298; see United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1988) (noting that the MPC's focus on the actor's dangerousness furthers one of the animating purposes of the [MPC]to develop a legal basis for dealing with individuals whose conduct indicates that they are disposed toward future criminal activity); cf. Smith, 962 F.2d at 930-31 ([E]ach participant in the joint venture did all that he could do to ensure the deal's completion. . . . In fact, [the defendant charged with attempt] committed all the steps necessary on his part to the completion of the substantive offense. (emphasis added)). In sum, Mr. Irving had negotiated and secured a contract for the murder of a witness (i.e., Lt. Stark), and had taken concrete and necessary steps to ensure that the crime was committed, which were strongly corroborative of his criminal intent. The law of attempt was intended to address such wrongdoing. The drafters of the MPC make the point well: When a person is seriously dedicated to commission of a crime, a firm legal basis is needed for the intervention of the agencies of law enforcement to prevent its consummation. . . . [L]ines should not be drawn so rigidly that the police confront insoluble dilemmas in deciding when to intervene, facing the risk that if they wait the crime may be committed while if they act they may not yet have any valid charge. MPC & Commentaries, supra, art. 5 intro., at 294. [16] Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, we find useful guidance in the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809 (7th Cir.1985). In Rovetuso, the defendants were charged with attempting to interfere with the testimony of a government witness, based upon evidence that they solicited an FBI informant to murder the witness and had taken concrete steps to ensure the success of the criminal endeavor. Id. at 813, 822-23. The evidence established that the defendants had solicited the informant to kill a witness who was cooperating with the Federal government, id. at 813-14, had actually hired him to do the job and agreed not only on the price to be paid to [the informant] for the murder of [the witness] but also as to the nature of the execution of [the witness] as well as the manner of disposing of his body, id. at 822. Furthermore, the defendants and the informant engaged in planning concerning the crime and, in that regard, the informant was given information concerning [the witness's] place of employment, his residence, a description of his car and his license plate identification number. Id. at 823. The only reason that the defendants withdrew the order to kill was their suspicion that [the informant] was a government agent. Id. at 822. The Rovetuso court concluded that the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict on the attempt charge, id., and that it was strongly corroborative of the intent to murder because it went beyond mere asking in that it clearly revealed an arrangement between the defendants and [the informant] to complete the final act of murder, id. at 823. Relatedly, the court concluded that it need not reach the issue of whether the jury might conclude from the jury instruction that merely seeking to obtain a hit man is sufficient in and of itself to constitute a substantial step. Id. (emphasis added). That was because the jury's reference to  securing a hit man in a note to the trial judge, according to the Rovetuso court, made it obvious that the jury was satisfied that the defendants and [the informant] had agreed on murdering [the witness] and, due to the jury's note, the court was likewise satisfie[d] [] that the jury considered all of the defendants['] actions. Id. Like the Rovetuso court, we need not decide whether Mr. Irving's active solicitation of someone to kill Lt. Stark would be sufficient in itself to establish a substantial step under the law of attempt, such that Mr. Irving could be convicted of witness tampering. [17] As in Rovetuso, the arrangement between Mr. Irving and Messrs. Collins and Washington went far beyond merely `seeking' to obtain the services of a hit man. Id. Mr. Irving actually hired (i.e., secured) the two men to kill Lt. Stark and agreed on a price for the killing (i.e., $50,000) and a form of payment (i.e., one-half of the cash payment up-front). Furthermore, similar to Rovetuso, Mr. Irving and Mr. Collins engaged in planning discussions relating to where the killing would take place (i.e., Muskogee) and how it would be accomplished (i.e., with a gun supplied by Mr. Collins), and Mr. Irving took concrete action to facilitate the achievement of the criminal objective, including arranging for Mr. Collins's release from jail on bond and paying for the bond. While the evidence here is not as overwhelming as in Rovetuso and arguably was not more than sufficient  to sustain the jury's verdict, id. at 822 (emphasis added), we are confident that the evidence of Mr. Irving's conductspecifically, the three aspects identified above relating to his solicitation and hiring of a hit man to kill Lt. Stark and his concrete conduct to complete the final act of murder, id. at 823when viewed in the aggregate, clearly was sufficient to constitute a substantial step, strongly corroborative of his criminal intent, and thus legally sound under the law of attempt. [18] Moreover, although it arises in the context of an objection to an obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1, the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Wahlstrom, 588 F.3d 538 (8th Cir.2009), is also instructive. The obstruction enhancement was based on evidence that while Wahlstrom was in custody awaiting disposition of his charges, he attempted to hire someone to murder the wife of the Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting his case. Id. at 541. Mr. Wahlstrom argued that his scheme was mere talk and did not amount to a substantial step that would warrant a § 3C1.1 enhancement for attempted obstruction of justice. Id. at 543. The evidence indicated that Mr. Wahlstrom had approached another inmate and inquired whether he knew anyone who would carry out a hit on the prosecutor's wife. Id. at 541. The inmate told Mr. Wahlstrom that his brother would do it in return for a large sum of money. Mr. Wahlstrom indicated that he did not have enough cash, but would discuss giving [the inmate's] brother vehicles as payment. Id. Unbeknownst to Mr. Wahlstrom, the inmate elected to cooperate with law enforcement. The inmate arranged for a telephone call between Mr. Wahlstrom and a deputy sheriff posing as [the inmate's] brother, ostensibly to discuss payment for the hit. Id. During the call, Mr. Wahlstrom discussed with the undercover deputy (posing as the inmate's brother) the idea of paying him with a $70,000 vehicle. When the deputy expressed interest in getting some cash, Mr. Wahlstrom indicated that he would work that out with the inmate. Id. at 542 (internal quotation marks omitted). When the deputy pressed Mr. Wahlstrom to indicate when he want[ed] that thing done, id. at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted), Mr. Wahlstrom indicated that the deputy could play it by ear, id. at 542 (internal quotation marks omitted), and expressed concern about discussing the matter on the phone. In light of these facts, the Eighth Circuit rejected Mr. Wahlstrom's contention that his actions amounted to mere talk, not rising to the level of a substantial step. Id. at 543. The court noted that Mr. Wahlstrom had contacted a fellow inmate for assistance in getting someone to do the hit and then discussed payment in a telephone conversation with the ostensibly willing assassin and that [t]hese actions were both necessary to the consummation of the scheme and strongly corroborative of Wahlstrom's criminal intent. Id. The reasoning and outcome in Wahlstrom should apply with even greater force here. Mr. Irving took similar steps as those of Mr. Wahlstrom: he solicited Mr. Collins to find a willing assassin to kill Lt. Stark (i.e., Mr. Washington) and he offered a definite price for the job (i.e., $50,000) in a conversation to Mr. Collins. But there was much more here. Although the facts of Wahlstrom permit some uncertainty as to whether Mr. Wahlstrom actually finalized the murder-for-hire contract with the faux assassingiven Mr. Wahlstrom's comment, in response to the assassin's stated desire for some cash, that he would need to work that out with the inmate (the assassin's pretend brother)there was no such uncertainty here. Mr. Irving and Mr. Collins reached an agreement for the hit and settled on a price and the form of the payment (i.e., cash, with one-half up front). Moreover, Mr. Irving did not just have one telephone conversation with those who would carry out the hit, like Mr. Wahlstrom. Instead, Mr. Irving had multiple conversations with Collins, among other things, to confirm the payment terms, to discuss who was responsible for getting the murder weapon, and to urge Mr. Collins to move forward with the plan (i.e., Shit, come on!, Aplee. Addendum of Exs., Ex. 34). Furthermore, Mr. Irving took a concrete step that was necessary to the consummation of the scheme and strongly corroborative of [his] criminal intent, Wahlstrom, 588 F.3d at 543, when he arranged for Mr. Collins to be bonded out of jail. Thus, as the reasoning of Wahlstrom strongly indicates, a rational jury could find that Mr. Irving's conduct amounted to a substantial step. In sum, based upon the foregoing reasoning, we conclude that Mr. Irving's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his witness-tampering conviction must fail.