Opinion ID: 537466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Migdaleck

Text: 13
14 Defendant Migdaleck contends the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury, pursuant to Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972), and United States v. Stulga, 531 F.2d 1377 (6th Cir.1976), appeal after remand, 584 F.2d 142 (6th Cir.1978), concerning evaluation of the exculpatory testimony offered by the three arsonists. 15 The testimony of arsonists Al Meridith, Jr., Willie Weems and Adar Hassan was essentially favorable to defendant Migdaleck. The three testified that the arson fires were represented to Migdaleck as legitimate losses and all three witnesses inferred that Al Meredith, Sr. operated the scheme. However, Al Meredith, Sr. testified that Migdaleck knew about the scheme, had made Sackett a public adjustor to further the scheme, paid commissions to the arsonists, and provided the funds used to purchase the materials used to start the fires. 16 On appeal, defendant Migdaleck asserts the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction which would enhance the effect of the exculpatory testimony of the three arsonists. The court instructed the jury: 17 The testimony of one who asserts by his testimony that he is an accomplice may be received in evidence and considered by the jury even though not corroborated by other evidence and given such weight as the jury feels it should have. You should always keep in mind, however, that such testimony is always to be viewed with caution and considered with great care. You should never convict a Defendant upon the unsupported testimony of an alleged accomplice unless you believe that unsupported testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 (Emphasis added.) This instruction was requested by defendant McQueen and is based on Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 3d ed, Sec. 17.06 (1977). 19 At trial, after the court finished instructing the jury, counsel for defendant Migdaleck objected to the foregoing instruction, stating that the instruction that should have been given is: 20 [I]f you believe the evidence of the accomplice, and you feel that that in and of itself is sufficient to satisfy you that it is proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may accept it. 21 On appeal, defendant contends that, based on his objection and requested single-sentence instruction, the trial court should have been alerted to its duty to instruct the jury on the standard for evaluating accomplice testimony pursuant to Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972), and United States v. Stulga, 531 F.2d 1377 (6th Cir.1976), appeal after remand, 584 F.2d 142 (6th Cir.1978). We disagree. 22 In Cool, the accomplice testified for the defense and his testimony was completely exculpatory. Over defense counsel's objection, the district court instructed the jury to consider the accomplice testimony if it found it true beyond a reasonable doubt. 409 U.S. at 102. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the instruction placed an improper burden on the defense, obstructed the defendant's sixth amendment right to present exculpatory accomplice testimony to the jury, and, in effect, reduced the government's burden of proof. 409 U.S. at 103, 104. In a footnote, the Court also found it confusing and unfair to instruct the jurors that they could convict on the basis of accomplice testimony without telling them they could also acquit on this basis. 409 U.S. at 103, n. 4. 23 In Stulga, several accomplices testified for the government. Two of them partially exculpated defendant. The defense counsel objected to the court's instruction on accomplice testimony and specifically requested that the jury be instructed that exculpatory testimony of an accomplice did not have to be believed beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance. Id. at 1380. The court declined to do so. On appeal, this court held the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the manner in which to evaluate an accomplice's exculpatory testimony in light of the virtual dirth of inculpatory testimony and the wealth of exculpatory testimony. Id. at 1380. This court concluded that the lack of precision in the charge could have confused the jury and led it to conclude that in order to consider the accomplice's exculpatory testimony at all, it had to believe the testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 1 24 Here, unlike the situation in Stulga or Cool, defense counsel's requested instruction was not a request that the jury be advised on how to evaluate exculpatory accomplice testimony (Stulga ), or a request to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony can provide the basis of acquittal (Cool ). Rather, defense counsel's objection and proposed instruction, in effect, asked the court to instruct the jury that it could accept inculpatory accomplice testimony if it believed the testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. It was essentially the same instruction as was given by the court, although the court's instruction stated the matter more understandably and more accurately. 25 We are presented then with a situation in which the defendant assigns error to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the proper manner in which to evaluate exculpatory accomplice testimony, although no timely and understandable request for such an instruction was made at trial and no objection registered to its omission. Consequently, we review this assignment of error under the plain error rule. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Where, as here, no specific objection was registered at trial, reversal is required only where a miscarriage of justice would result. United States v. Hook, 781 F.2d 1166, 1172 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). We think it is manifest that no miscarriage of justice resulted from the court's failure to instruct, sua sponte, on the manner in which the jury might have evaluated the exculpatory accomplice testimony, and defendants cite no authority to the contrary. See United States v. Vigi, 515 F.2d 290 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975). 26
27 Defendant Migdaleck also contends the trial court erred in failing to recognize that it could weigh the credibility of witnesses when reviewing a new trial motion on the ground that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. 28 The trial court's authority in deciding a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, Fed.R.Crim.P. 33, is much broader than its authority on a motion for acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence, Fed.R.Crim.P. 29. United States v. Turner, 490 F.Supp. 583, 593 (E.D.Mich.1979), aff'd (without opinion), 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484, 1485 (4th Cir.1985). In the former, the court may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses. Turner, 490 F.Supp. at 593; Arrington, 757 F.2d at 1485. 29 Motions for new trial are disfavored and they are granted only with great caution. Turner, 490 F.Supp. at 593. Ordinarily, a new trial should be granted only where the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were allowed to stand. Turner, at 593; Arrington, at 1485. A decision on a motion for new trial will not be upset on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Arrington, 757 F.2d at 1486. 30 The theory of defendant Migdaleck's motion is that the principal witness against him, Al Meredith, Sr., was completely unworthy of belief. At the hearing on the motion, defendant contended that without Meredith Sr.'s testimony, there was no proof defendant participated in the arsons, and the arsons were the whole crux of the case. The government contended that it had shown by circumstantial and direct evidence that defendant Midgaleck controlled the operation in that he paid all the participants and controlled the disbursement of insurance proceeds. 31 The trial court denied the new trial motion for two reasons: first, the court did not believe credibility questions could be raised by a new trial motion pursuant to United States v. Johnson, 2 487 F.2d 1278, 1280 (4th Cir.1973), and there was no basis to substitute the court's judgment for the jury in weighing the credibility of Al Meredith, Sr.; second, the court found the other evidence of Midgaleck's guilt was sufficient to support the verdict. The court noted that the jury was quite perceptive and found defendant failed to present anything to establish that the evidence preponderated heavily against the verdict. 32 Defendant is correct that the trial court failed to recognize that, on a motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, the court was indeed entitled to consider the credibility of the witnesses. If the sole basis for the district court's denial of the new trial motion was that credibility was not a proper subject for the court to examine, we would be inclined to remand this case to the district court to consider the credibility question. However, the court also found that the other evidence inculpating Migdaleck was sufficient to support the verdict, a conclusion well-supported in the record. Moreover, the district court commented favorably on the jury's ability to evaluate the evidence since it acquitted defendant Migdaleck on some of the charges. 33 Given the record supported alternative basis for the trial court's denial of the new trial motion, and the rule that a new trial should be granted on the ground here asserted only when the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion. 34
35 Defendants Migdaleck and Williams contend that the trial court constructively amended the indictment when it allowed Anita Sackett to testify that Migdaleck inflated the building loss portion of insurance claims by directing the adjustor to go heavy on the losses and testify that the claim for the fire at White's residence was indeed inflated. 36 At trial, counsel for defendant Migdaleck objected to Sackett's testimony on the inflation of the building loss portion of insurance claims on relevancy grounds. The objection was overruled. 37 The indictment against defendants Migdaleck and White was based on the premise that defendants were involved in a scheme to defraud insurance companies by intentionally setting fires to residential homes and using the mails to collect the insurance proceeds. The indictment did not allege that defendants inflated the building portion of the insurance claims. 38 A court may not require a defendant to be tried on charges that are not included in the indictment. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960). A constructive amendment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are, in effect, altered by the prosecutor or the court. United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 927 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987) (quoting United States v. Jones, 647 F.2d 696, 700 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981)). A variance occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are left unaltered but the evidence offered at trial proves materially different from those alleged in the indictment. Id. 39 A constructive amendment is per se prejudicial but a variance is not grounds for reversal unless the defendant's substantial rights are affected. United States v. Goldfarb, 643 F.2d 422, 433 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981). 40 To determine whether a constructive amendment occurred, the court must decide whether the elements of the crime charged were altered. Atisha, 804 F.2d at 927 (citation omitted). (Emphasis added.) 41 The elements the government is required to prove for mail fraud are a scheme to defraud and use of the mails to execute or further the scheme. United States v. Schilling, 561 F.2d 659, 661 (6th Cir.1977). 42 Defendants contend the introduction of evidence that the building loss portion of the claims were inflated, in effect, created an alternate theory for the jury to find defendants had entered into a scheme to defraud and, thus, constituted a constructive amendment of the indictment. The prosecution contends the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence to show the fraudulent nature of the scheme. The government contends the evidence did not change the fact that the scheme to defraud was based on arson but, instead, showed defendants' relationship to the scheme and how they profited by it. 43 We find that the mail fraud charge in the indictment was the same charge described to the jury and conclude that the introduction of the testimony on claim inflation did not change the basic theory of the fraudulent scheme so as to constitute a constructive amendment of the indictment. Atisha, 804 F.2d at 927. Moreover, we hold that had the introduction of the evidence constituted an impermissible variance, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless, United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d 1477, 1503 (6th Cir.1986), since the testimony at trial centered on the scheme to commit arson, the underlying basis for the mail fraud charge set forth in the indictment. 44