Opinion ID: 4538432
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maes’s June 22, 2016 arrest

Text: On June 22, 2016, an officer of the Oakland Housing Authority Police Department arrested Maes after the officer found three pounds of marijuana in Maes’s rental vehicle. When Maes was being cross-examined at trial, the prosecutor asked several questions about this arrest. Q [Prosecutor]. In 2016, in June of 2016 when you were arrested by the Oakland [Housing Authority] Police Department, you were in possession of marijuana then, weren’t you? A [Maes]. Yes. Q. Three pounds of marijuana, in fact; correct? A. Yes. Q. And you were arrested for that? A. Yes. Q. Because that was illegal? 7 Case: 18-60881 Document: 00515438067 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 No. 18-60881 A. I’m not sure if it was like a probation thing or what the exact situation was. Q. You don’t know what the penalty for it was, but you know it’s illegal; right? A. That it’s illegal to -- Q. In 2016 to possess three pounds of marijuana in the State of California? A. It’s illegal to -- it’s illegal to sell it. It’s illegal to sell it. I could vend it to clubs. I could vend it to businesses. You would have -- you have to have a vending license, but you can’t just sell in the streets before 2016. As of now, it’s recreational where I could give you marijuana. I can give my friends marijuana. But as far as before that, yes, you’re right, you needed a vending license to vend. MR. CROSBY [Maes’s trial counsel]: I’m going to object to questions regarding arrests without convictions. That would be improper, and I object. The district court overruled the objection. It ruled that Maes had opened the door to a discussion about the arrest when he testified on direct that he was a marijuana dealer and did not believe there was anything illegal about his dealings. Maes now argues that the district court reversibly erred in overruling this objection. He cites Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) to support this argument. We review preserved errors of this type for abuse of discretion subject to a harmless error analysis. 8 See United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides: Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, 8 The Government argues that plain error review should apply because Maes’s arrest was briefly mentioned earlier in the trial, and Maes’s counsel failed to object at that time. We disagree. Maes’s counsel raised the precise error below when the arrest was fully discussed, and this objection was “sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the nature of the alleged error and to provide an opportunity for correction.” Johnson, 943 F.3d at 221 (quoting Neal, 578 F.3d at 272). 8 Case: 18-60881 Document: 00515438067 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 No. 18-60881 extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:

being cross-examined has testified about. On direct examination, Maes was asked: “You’re not trying to say that because [marijuana is] legal in California it makes it legal here, you’re not trying to make that argument‚ are you?” Maes answered: “I’m not trying to dispute that.” Additionally, Maes testified at length about his experiences growing and selling marijuana in California. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to ask a few pointed questions about Maes’s arrest for possessing marijuana in California when he had essentially testified that he believed his dealings in California were entirely legal. See United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 154 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Government to inquire on redirect about a specific instance of prior conduct when on cross the defendant had opened the door to the issue). Regardless, any error would have been harmless. The thrust of Maes’s defense at trial was that he dealt exclusively in marijuana, not methamphetamine. To the extent these questions focused the jury’s attention on Maes’s arrest for marijuana possession, it did not seriously prejudice him. Accordingly, any error in allowing this testimony did not affect his substantial rights, and it therefore would have been harmless.
Maes further argues that the district court compounded its error in allowing the Government to cross-examine him about the arrest when the 9 Case: 18-60881 Document: 00515438067 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 No. 18-60881 court failed to immediately issue a limiting instruction explaining that the arrest could only be applied to his credibility, not his culpability. “Where, as here, the defendant did not request a limiting instruction at trial, we review challenges to the sufficiency of a limiting instruction for plain error.” United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 2005). “Plain error appears only when the impeaching testimony is extremely damaging, the need for the instruction is obvious, and the failure to give it is so prejudicial as to affect the substantial rights of the accused.” United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 623 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 530 F.2d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 1976)). Here, the “impeaching” testimony detailing Maes’s arrest for marijuana possession was not extremely damaging; the need for the limiting instruction was not obvious; and the failure to give one did not affect Maes’s substantial rights. It was not damaging because it simply reinforced Maes’s assertions that he was in the marijuana business. The need for the instruction was not obvious because of—in the district court’s words—“the nature of [Maes’s] direct testimony[.]” 9 And it did not affect Maes’s substantial rights for two reasons. First, the court actually did sua sponte issue a limiting instruction after Ufland finished testifying earlier in the trial. At that time, the court stated: Also, you’ve heard some testimony and references to the fact that Mr. Maes may have sold marijuana or may have been a marijuana dealer. He is not charged with being a marijuana dealer. So the fact that he may or may not have been a dealer of marijuana is not evidence that he is guilty of the crime charged, or the crimes charged in this case, and you may not arrive at a guilty verdict by relying on the fact that he may have sold marijuana or been a marijuana dealer. All right? 9 In other words, because Maes’s testimony in defense to the methamphetamine charges was, in part, that he was a marijuana dealer—a largely irrelevant fact—the need for a limiting instruction on the marijuana arrest discussion was not obvious. 10 Case: 18-60881 Document: 00515438067 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 No. 18-60881 Please keep those rules in mind. Second, and more importantly—in the context of this multi-day trial—a few questions about Maes’s arrest for marijuana possession were not likely to prejudice him in any meaningful way. To the extent the stop that led to the arrest came up at other points during the trial, those mentions were for the entirely relevant purpose of discussing a postal receipt found in Maes’s backpack during a search of the vehicle. Denham testified that he had texted Maes an address in Slidell, Louisiana several days earlier so Maes could send a shipment of methamphetamine to the address. It was the same address that appeared on the postal receipt. The package was delivered. For all of these reasons, the court did not plainly err by failing to immediately issue a limiting instruction about Maes’s arrest during his crossexamination.