Opinion ID: 853002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The School District

Text: The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District, finding the District owed a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of students under its authority. Id. at 833, 840-41. The District concedes that it had this general duty, but contends that the District is protected by governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act and a common law doctrine that there is no duty to protect against criminal activity of others. In the alternative, the District argues that even if it is not immune, there is no breach of duty because the District took reasonable steps for the safety of its students.
For an interesting account of the origins of sovereign immunity at common law, see Peavler v. Board of Commissioners of Monroe County, 528 N.E.2d 40, 41-42 (Ind.1988). For these purposes, it is sufficient to note that Indiana, like many jurisdictions, over the years found the doctrine increasingly unsatisfactory. In 1972, in Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733, 736-37 (1972), this Court concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was an outmoded concept in today's society, and suggested that the proper forum for any debate over governmental immunity was the legislature. Accordingly, Campbell held that governmental units would generally no longer be shielded by sovereign immunity. Id. However, Campbell cited three situations where a governmental unit would remain immune from liability for acts or omissions that result in personal injuries. These were: (1) where a city or state fails to provide adequate police protection to prevent crime; (2) where a state official makes an appointment of an individual whose incompetent performance gives rise to a suit alleging negligence on the part of the state official for making such an appointment; and (3) where judicial decision-making is challenged. Id. at 737. In response to Campbell, in 1974 the Indiana legislature enacted the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) which identified a list of governmental activities, now twenty-two in number, that are immunized from tort liability. See Ind.Code § 34-13-3-3. After a number of detours since that time, Campbell was largely reaffirmed in Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.1999). Thus, some common law immunity doctrines remain despite the ITCA's codification of much of Indiana's governmental immunity law. Benton held that a municipality could be held liable for failure to warn of a dangerous condition in a municipally operated swimming facility. Benton did away altogether with a malfeasance/nonfeasance test of immunity. It also expressly limited a public/private duty test of immunity to claims for failure to provide emergency services. [1] Id. at 233. King's claim here is therefore not governed by either doctrine. Benton spoke in terms of duty rather than immunity: We hold that Campbell is properly applied by presuming that a governmental unit is bound by the same duty of care as a non-governmental unit except where the duty alleged to have been breached is so closely akin to one of the limited exceptions (prevent crime, appoint competent officials, or make correct judicial decisions) that it should be treated as one as well. Id. at 230. To say the governmental entity is immune for acts or omissions in described areas is the functional equivalent of asserting the entity has no duty to anyone in carrying out those activities. Benton held that under common law, governmental units have the same duty of care as non-governmental entities, with the exception of the three Campbell areas. In immunity terms, the governmental unit is immune under the common law only if it is engaged in an activity closely related to one of the three areas identified in Campbell. Based on precedent establishing a duty to operate public facilities, Benton rejected common law immunity for negligent operation of a municipal swimming facility. Id. at 233-34. Precedent is also against the District's claim of immunity from King's claim. We have held repeatedly that school districts can be held liable for failure to take reasonable steps to provide security for their students. Mangold v. Ind. Dep't of Natural Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ind.2001); Beckett v. Clinton Prairie Sch. Corp., 504 N.E.2d 552, 553 (Ind.1987); Norman v. Turkey Run Cmty. Sch. Corp., 274 Ind. 310, 411 N.E.2d 614, 617 (1980); Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind. 604, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 (1974). In Benton duty terms, the school district has a duty to take reasonable steps for the protection of its students. In immunity terms, failure to take reasonable safety precautions is not within the common law immunity for failure to prevent crime. The District relies on Simpson's Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871 (1971), for its claim of common law immunity. In that case, city police were held immune from liability for failing to prevent crime in a store located in a high crime area. The District contends that if immunity is not granted for a school's failure to prevent crime, then schools, school administrators, and school boards will be second-guessed by juries for the measures they should have or could have taken to prevent criminal conduct of any student. Appellee's Br. in Supp. of Pet. to Trans. at 5. It is a matter for the legislature to the extent that school districts or other governmental agencies whose mission is not law enforcement are exposed to undesired liability. To the extent the District asserts common law immunity, we think the school's activities here are more closely akin to those of landowners or businesses generally that must provide reasonable security for their patrons and guests. See Delta Tau Delta, Beta Alpha Chapter v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 974 (Ind.1999). Indeed, there is specific precedent on this point. See Miller, 308 N.E.2d at 706 (recognizing that school authorities must exercise reasonable care and supervision for the safety of the children under their control). Finally, the Court of Appeals in this case concluded that Benton applies only in the context of a governmental unit's duty to maintain a public recreational facility in a reasonably safe manner. King, 732 N.E.2d at 833. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on Serviss v. Indiana Department of Natural Resources, 721 N.E.2d 234 (Ind.1999). In that case we observed that Benton ultimately held that the city was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the issue of its `long-recognized duty to maintain a public recreational facility in a reasonably safe manner.' Id. at 236 (quoting Benton, 721 N.E.2d at 233). This passage merely describes the result in Benton; it does not limit Benton's application to its factual setting. Rather, Benton stands for the general proposition that common law immunity with respect to all governmental activities is limited to activities closely akin to the three Campbell areas. In sum, we do not think the common law confers blanket immunity for every school and every other governmental entity that fails to take reasonable precautions for the safety of persons or their facilities. If the Campbell exception extended as far as the District proposes, it would grant immunity to any and all governmental units that fail to arrange reasonable security. Like many governmental units, and unlike the police who were immune in Simpson's Food Fair, the District's principal mission is not to prevent crime. Indeed, Campbell itself appears to limit its law enforcement immunity to cities and states that understand their role as providing general police protection throughout the jurisdiction. Campbell, 284 N.E.2d at 737.
The District argues that the Court of Appeals failed to address its claim of immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. I.C. § 34-13-3-3. Specifically, the District contends that both section 3(9) and 3(7) [2] of the ITCA shield the District from liability for negligence. The party seeking immunity bears the burden of establishing its conduct comes within the Act. Mullin, 639 N.E.2d at 281.
The District is a governmental entity within the meaning of the ITCA [3] and therefore enjoys the immunity conferred by the statute pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-6-2-49. Section 3(9) provides, A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from ... [t]he act or omission of anyone other than the governmental entity or the governmental entity's employee. Section 9 immunity applies in actions seeking to impose vicarious liability by reason of conduct of third parties other than governmental employees acting within the scope of their employment. Hinshaw v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Jay County, 611 N.E.2d 637, 640-41 (Ind.1993). Under such circumstances, the alleged basis of governmental entity liability is the act or omission of a third person not within the scope of employment as a government employee. Id. at 641. The District is correct that a principal is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor. Bagley v. Insight Communications Co., L.P., 658 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ind.1995). And the District is also correct that the statute does more for governmental entities than the common law does for others. Thus, the District contends that it is immune to the extent liability is predicated on the act or omission of Northeast or Northeast's employees. However, there is a dispute of fact over whether the injuries King suffered were caused by an act or omission of Northeast or by the District itself. One of King's allegations is that the District was negligent because the Assistant Vice Principal Bart Austin, who normally stayed outside the school building to personally monitor the students' departure, was absent the day of King's incident and did not find a replacement. The District has not shown as a matter of law that its conduct comes within the Act. Accordingly, summary judgment for the District on the basis of section 3(9) is inappropriate.
The District also relies on section 3(7) of the ITCA for its claim of immunity. That section provides: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from ... [t]he adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment. I.C. § 34-13-3-3(7). The District argues it is immune pursuant to section 3(7) because the [District] failed to prevent an assault or battery, or failed to enforce a rule or regulation (student misconduct, substantial disobedience or unlawful activity). Appellee's Br. in Supp. of Pet. to Trans. at 13. In Quakenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284, 1288-91 (Ind.1993), this Court discussed at some length the meaning of enforcement as used in section 3(7). [4] We concluded first that section 3(7) was intended to codify the common law of immunity in this area as that law existed at the time the ITCA was passed. Second, under that common law regime, governments and their employees were subject to liability for the breach of private duties owed to individuals, but were immune from liability for the breach of public duties owed to the public at large. Id. at 1291. Subsequent Indiana decisions relied on this public/private duty test in applying section 3(7), [5] but others have concluded Benton eliminated the test. [6] As explained in Part I.A., Benton addressed only the common law presence or absence of duty of a governmental unit. It did not deal with statutory immunity under the ITCA. Indeed, Benton expressly observed, In general, it is only after a determination is made that a governmental defendant is not immune under the ITCA that a court undertakes the analysis of whether a common law duty exists under the circumstances. Benton, 721 N.E.2d at 232. Although Benton did not expressly disavow Quakenbush's public/private duty test under section 3(7), we believe it implicitly achieved this result. Quakenbush held that section 3(7) adopted the common law of immunity for law enforcement activities, and concluded that the public/private duty test was the common law approach to law enforcement immunity at the time the ITCA was enacted. We do not believe the public/private duty test was frozen by statutory adoption. It is a tool for applying the adopting or enforcing of a law language, but as Benton pointed out, this test is frequently not susceptible to ready application. Id. For that reason, Benton overruled the public/private duty test at common law. We think the courts remain free to interpret the statutory language without referring to the public/private duty analysis when appropriate. We think the statute itself provides the key to resolution of the immunity issue in this case. Section 3(7) confers immunity on governmental units for the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law. We think this language restricts the immunity to the adoption and enforcement of laws that are within the assignment of the governmental unit. First, it is clear that laws include rules and regulations. Thus, a variety of administrative and executive functions engage in some immunized activities. But not all actions are immunized. The statute refers to immunity for the adoption and enforcement of a law. Only a unit charged with regulating the areas of law involved can adopt a law. Similarly, the enforcement of a law is an activity assigned to specific units of government: the police, the Board of Health, etc. The immunity for failure to adopt or enforce is similarly limited. We think this interpretation is supported by the language of section 3(7) and is also consistent with other provisions of the ITCA and existing case law. An employee is protected under the terms of section 3 of the ITCA only if acting within the scope of the employee's employment. I.C. § 34-13-3-3. Similarly, case law has held that the ITCA expresses a legislative policy to protect the State's finances and also to ensure `that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.' Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind.2000) (quoting Ind. Dep't of Corr. v. Stagg, 556 N.E.2d 1338, 1343 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), trans. denied ). See also Martin v. Heffelfinger, 744 N.E.2d 555, 559 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); Ind. State Police Dep't v. Swaggerty, 507 N.E.2d 649, 651-52 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), trans. denied; Bd. of Comm'rs of Hendricks County v. King, 481 N.E.2d 1327, 1330 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). An employee's scope of employment consists of activities involving the pursuit of the governmental entity's purpose. Similarly, we think the legislature intended that a governmental entity be immune only for failing to adopt or enforce a law that falls within the scope of the entity's purpose or operational power. Case law supports the notion that section 3(7) is limited to those laws, rules, or regulations that fall within the realm of the governmental entity. Stagg, 556 N.E.2d at 1342 (The defendants were acting within the scope of their employment in enforcing laws, rules or regulations pertaining to the standards and procedures for the operation of the correctional facilities pursuant to [the Indiana statute].); City of Seymour v. Onyx Paving Co., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 951, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) ([T]he zoning ordinance at issue here is part of the municipal code of Seymour [and] adopted in accordance with [the Indiana act] delegating to local legislative bodies the authority to enact zoning ordinances and amendments thereto.), trans. denied; Ind. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Taylor, 419 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (Insomuch as this action was undertaken by the Department pursuant to a duty entrusted to it by statute, it qualifies for immunity under [subsections (5), (6), or (7)].). We do not think a school district is enforcing a law when it provides for school security, even if the action taken may deter or prevent acts that would violate a law adopted and enforced by other units of government. It is correct, as the District points out, that schools are authorized to promulgate rules for school discipline. [7] But preventing crime is not an activity schools are expected to carry out pursuant to a school's operational purpose. Put another way, even though the school must reasonably supervise the students for safety reasons, it is not the mission of the school to prevent crime. Indeed, the statutes the Indiana legislature enacted on behalf of the elementary and secondary schools providing for student discipline authorize disciplinary rules reasonably necessary to carry out the school purposes. I.C. § 20-8.1-5.1-7(c). Schools have the power to expel or suspend students for student misconduct or unlawful activity and can claim immunity for doing so or failing to do so. But we think a school has no immunity for failing to prevent an assault and battery. It has the obligation to take reasonable steps to provide security on its premises, even if it has not adopted any rules or regulations prohibiting assaults. As the District stated in its brief, Law enforcement is not a traditional responsibility of the School. Appellee's Br. in Supp. of Pet. to Trans. at 16. Accordingly, immunity for enforcement of laws prohibiting an assault and battery is reserved to governmental units with police powersnot schools. The District relies on Klobuchar v. Purdue Univ., 553 N.E.2d 169 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990), in claiming it is immune under section 3(7). In Klobuchar, the plaintiff, a part-time student at Purdue University, was seriously injured when attacked by her estranged husband after class. When the plaintiff was attacked, she was parked in a campus parking lot that required vehicles to exhibit a school parking ticket. The campus police routinely checked vehicles in the lot for permits. The plaintiff claimed her injuries were proximately caused by the University's failure to provide adequate security for the school's parking lot. The University moved for summary judgment claiming it was immune under the ITCA. Id. at 170. The court found that the University was given the authority to provide campus security by statute, and the decision to provide security or to patrol the parking lot for permit violators is a decision on whether or not to enforce the law. Id. at 173. Relying in part on the public/private duty test, the court concluded that the police duty is one owed to the general public and does not give rise to an individual action. As a result, the University was immune from liability for failing to enforce the law. Id. Assuming Klobuchar was correctly decided, it does not extend immunity to the District in King's case. Purdue University, pursuant to statute, provided campus security for the safety of the general public. [8] Id. Here, although the school must exercise reasonable care and supervision for the safety of the children under its control, it is not charged with general law enforcement on its premises. See Miller, 308 N.E.2d at 706.
In order to prevail on a claim of negligence the plaintiff must show: (1) duty owed to plaintiff by defendant; (2) breach of duty by allowing conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care; and (3) compensable injury proximately caused by defendant's breach of duty. Ashcraft v. Northeast Sullivan County Sch. Corp., 706 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). This jurisdiction has long recognized that school authorities owe a duty ... `to exercise reasonable care and supervision for the safety of the children under their control.' Mangold, 756 N.E.2d at 974 (quoting Miller, 308 N.E.2d at 706). Although the existence of duty is a matter of law for the courts to decide, a breach of duty is usually a matter left to the trier of fact. Stephenson v. Ledbetter, 596 N.E.2d 1369, 1371-72 (Ind.1992). Only where the facts are undisputed and lead to but a single inference or conclusion may the court as a matter of law determine whether a breach of duty has occurred. Id. at 1372. King alleges the District failed to exercise reasonable care in part because Assistant Vice Principal Bart Austin, who normally stayed outside the school building to personally monitor the students' departure, was absent the day of King's incident and did not find a replacement. King contends that he would not have been injured if Austin had been present at his regular post to observe and deter criminal activity in the parking lot. The District essentially responds that it discharged any duty owed to students by entering into a contract with Northeast to provide services for North Central High School. Essentially, the District takes the position that it has breached no duty owed to its students. Summary judgment is inappropriate in this case because there is a discrepancy in the evidence bearing on the extent of control retained by the District, and also how it was exercised. The contract between Northeast and the District required Northeast officers to be outside from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. [9] We also have the incomplete testimony that District officials were, on some occasions, present in the parking lot at 3:00 p.m., but at least Austin, the senior person among them, was absent on April 18. Further, whether merely entering a contract is all the District should have done or was required to do in discharging its duty of care and supervision for the safety of its students is a matter for the jury to decide and is not appropriate for summary disposition.