Opinion ID: 1348989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the trial court err in appointing counsel for the first 60-1507 hearing after Taylor filed two motions for self-representation?

Text: After Taylor filed the 60-1507 motion, he filed a motion for self-representation. Taylor acknowledged the dangers and disadvantages of representing himself and requested the appointment of advisory counsel. The district court appointed a public defender to represent Taylor. At the behest of Taylor, the public defender moved that Taylor be allowed to represent himself. The district court denied the motion, concluding that, because of the nature of the issues to be resolved, i.e., constitutional and legal issues, as well as factual issues, it was required to appoint counsel to represent Taylor at the 60-1507 hearing. Taylor contends the trial court erred in requiring him to be represented by appointed counsel at the first 60-1507 hearing. Numerous cases have held there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 41 L.Ed.2d 341, 94 S.Ct. 2437 (1974). The United States Supreme Court in Ross, however, stated that it did not discourage the states from making counsel available to convicted defendants at all stages of judicial review. 417 U.S. at 618. A 60-1507 hearing is a civil proceeding and the rules of civil procedure govern. Robinson v. State, 13 Kan. App.2d 244, 246, 767 P.2d 851, rev. denied 244 Kan. 738 (1989). Habeas corpus proceedings and motions under 60-1507 are civil in nature and are not controlled by the constitutional or statutory requirements applicable to criminal cases. State v. Andrews, 228 Kan. 368, 375, 614 P.2d 447 (1980). Although there is no constitutional right to counsel in a 60-1507 proceeding, the Kansas Legislature has made counsel available if the motion presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact. K.S.A. 22-4506(b). Under existing statutes and case law, Taylor is entitled to appointment of counsel if his motion presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact. K.S.A. 22-4506(b). Although it is clear that Taylor could have proceeded pro se, did the district court abuse its discretion by appointing counsel? At the first K.S.A. 60-1507 hearing, in addition to the evidence presented by his court-appointed attorney, Taylor states he would have shown (1) the romantic involvement of his wife with two other men; (2) a neighbor had seen someone in the Taylor home after the victim was allegedly dead and Taylor was in Topeka; (3) the police had failed to disclose knowledge of the neighbor's statement; (4) he had been under police surveillance after his wife was reported missing; (5) prior to his arrest, the police had locked him in a holding cell on June 2 and 3, 1982; (6) the police questioned him before there was probable cause; and (7) he was improperly questioned by the police after requesting counsel. The district court found Taylor was well represented at both 60-1507 hearings. It is important to note that Taylor had counsel of his own choice during the second 60-1507 hearing. Each of the issues which Taylor claimed he was precluded from raising in the first hearing could have been raised at the second hearing. Taylor's failure to present the evidence and raise the issues at the second hearing causes the claims to now be without validity on appeal. Taylor was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to allow him to proceed pro se; such refusal was harmless error and is no basis for the reversal of the judgment of conviction. See Hagedorn v. Stormont-Vail Regional Med. Center, 238 Kan. 691, 701, 715 P.2d 2 (1986).