Opinion ID: 3133235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compulsory school attendance

Text: B. Juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation C. Dependent, neglected and abused children D. Insanities and mental illness E. Public assistance F. Domestic relations G. Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads maintained by the county or state, or political subdivisions thereof. 3 In 1968 Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, which repealed the provision allowing states to opt-in and obtain jurisdiction in Indian country. State v. Michael, 111 Idaho 930, 932, 729 P.2d 405, 407 (1986). However, the repeal of the opt-in provision did not rescind jurisdiction that states had already assumed. Id. Thus, Idaho Code section 67-5101 remains valid law. Id. 6 Mother and Stepfather argue subsections B, C, and F could cover termination of parental rights cases. Because our analysis of subsection C is dispositive, we do not consider subsections B and F. “The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.” State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007). “Because ‘the best guide to legislative intent is the words of the statute itself,’ the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute.” Id. (quoting In re Permit No. 36–7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992)). When language is unambiguous, there is no reason for a court to consider rules of statutory construction. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184–85, 335 P.3d 25, 29–30 (2014). A statute is ambiguous when: [T]he meaning is so doubtful or obscure that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. However, ambiguity is not established merely because different possible interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case then all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered ambiguous . . . . [A] statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise more than one interpretation of it. Farmers Nat. Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 856, 318 P.3d 622, 625 (2014) (alternations in original) (quoting BHA Invs., Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 358, 63 P.3d 482, 484 (2003)). This Court has not specifically addressed subsection C, “Dependent, neglected and abused children.” In Sheppard v. Sheppard, this Court held subsection F (“Domestic relations”) conferred jurisdiction over an action for divorce and division of community property because those subjects are addressed by Title 32 of the Idaho Code, entitled “Domestic Relations.” 104 Idaho 1, 13, 655 P.2d 895, 907 (1982). Thus, in Sheppard the Court looked to the title of other code sections to determine the scope of another Idaho Code section 67-5101 subsection. Id. Doe relies on Sheppard, arguing that the legislature would have labeled subsection C “Juvenile proceedings” (the title of Idaho Code Title 16) if it meant for the subsection to confer jurisdiction over all subjects within that Title. Doe also argues that the terms “Dependent, neglected and abused children” bears more relation to the Child Protective Act (I.C. §§ 16-1601 through 16-1643) than it does to Idaho’s termination statute (I.C. §§ 16-2001 through 16-2015). However, “[c]ourts must construe statutes ‘under the assumption that the legislature knew of all legal precedent and other statutes in existence at the time the statute was passed.’ ” Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214, 218, 254 P.3d 1210, 1214 (2011) (quoting City of 7 Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 150, 879 P.2d 1078, 1083 (1994)); see also Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass’n v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 799, 154 P.2d 156, 159 (1944) (“The legislature in passing a statute is presumed to have in mind the law that exists at the time the legislature enacts the statute.”). Idaho Code section 67-5101 was approved on March 6, 1963. At that time, Chapter 16 of Title 16 of Idaho’s Code was titled “Dependent children—Powers of benevolent societies.” 4 I.C. §§ 16-1601–1623 (1948); 1963 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 58, p. 226; see also 1919 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 161, p. 519–21 (repealed 1963 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 321, p. 919). This chapter gave “[a]ny person” the power to file a petition showing that a child should “be taken from their parents, guardian or custodian and placed under the guardianship of some reputable person of good moral character or some suitable institution.” I.C. § 16-1604 (1948). Under this chapter, courts could enter an “[o]rder for commitment,” which caused the child to be taken from its parents and placed in the guardianship of another person until: (1) good cause was shown that the child should be returned to its parents; (2) or three months (which could be extended to six months) had passed, after which an “order for permanent adoption” could be made. I.C. § 16-1608 (1948). The chapter also provided: Any benevolent or charitable society incorporated under chapter 11 of title 30, all the officers and agents of said society to be residents of the state of Idaho, and having for its object the receiving, aiding, caring for, placing out for adoption and consenting to adoption or improving the condition of the orphan, homeless, neglected or abused children of this state, shall have authority to receive, control, train, educate, aid, care for, dispose of, place out for adoption and consent to the adoption of children under eighteen years of age under the following provisions:
2. When there is in the county any child under the age of eighteen years: [conditions such as abandonment, neglect, and abuse] I.C. § 16-1601 (1948). Thus, at the time that Idaho Code section 67-5101 was enacted, the portion of the Idaho Code dealing with termination of parental rights was, in part, titled “Dependent children” and provided for termination in cases of “neglected or abused children.” Id. Because Idaho Code section 67-5101(C)’s language providing for jurisdiction over 4 On March 19, 1963, the legislature adopted the forerunner of Idaho’s present statute governing termination of parental rights, to become effective on August 1, 1963. 1963 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 145, p. 420–30. On March 29, 1963, the legislature repealed the prior versions of Idaho Code sections 16-1601 through 16-1623. 1963 Idaho Sess. L. ch. 321, p. 919. 8 “Dependent, neglected and abused children” plainly references the version of the termination statute that existed at the time, we hold Idaho Code section 67-5101(C) provides the State with concurrent jurisdiction in parental rights termination cases. Our decision is buttressed by the decisions of other courts. 5 The Ninth Circuit read “Dependent, neglected and abused children” to include child dependency proceedings when referencing the statute. Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1052 n.19 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, in Comenout v. Burdman, the Supreme Court of Washington, another opt-in state, read R.C.W. 37.12.010’s subsection 7, which assumed jurisdiction over “Dependent children” to give Washington jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of tribal members residing on a reservation. 525 P.2d 217, 222 (Wash. 1974). We hold that Public Law 280 and Idaho Code section 67-5101 provide the State with concurrent jurisdiction over cases involving the termination of parental rights. D. Public Law 280 and Idaho Code section 67-5101(C) constitute an exception to ICWA’s exclusive jurisdiction mandate. On appeal, Doe argues the Tribes have exclusive jurisdiction because, under ICWA, tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over children who reside within reservation boundaries and in this case C.C. resides on the Fort Hall Reservation. Mother and Stepfather counter that Public Law 280 and the State’s assumption of jurisdiction under it constitute an exception to ICWA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision. In Matter of Baby Boy Doe this Court outlined the purpose for enacting ICWA: In 1978 Congress passed ICWA to address concerns surrounding the high incidence of removal of Indian children from their Indian families and tribes and the placement of Indian children in adoptive or foster homes outside of their extended families, tribes and cultures. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902. ICWA recognizes that cultural biases in child custody proceedings contribute to this problem. To promote the stability of Indian tribes and to counter cultural biases, Congress enacted ICWA to provide minimum procedural and substantive requirements which state courts must apply to child custody proceedings involving Indian children. 5 Doe cites Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) and Matter of Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976), arguing these two cases indicate tribes always have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving reservation-domiciled children because a contrary holding would infringe on tribal sovereignty. However, these cases are irrelevant because neither involved Public Law 280. Both cases involved tribes in Montana that were not subject to Public Law 280. 9 123 Idaho 464, 468, 849 P.2d 925, 929 (1993). Under ICWA, “An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). Idaho courts have not yet addressed whether Public Law 280 is an “existing Federal law” that vested the State with concurrent jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving Native American children. However, the Ninth Circuit has determined that the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of ICWA do not displace concurrent state court jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Mann, 415 F.3d at 1049. There, a mother challenged a California state court’s jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights to a reservation-domiciled Native American child in proceedings initiated by a state agency. Id. at 1039–40. The Ninth Circuit conducted a detailed analysis of the interplay between ICWA and Public Law 280, ultimately deciding Public Law 280 constituted an “unambiguous” exception to ICWA. Id. at 1068. The Ninth Circuit noted: From an ultimate perspective of public policy and in furtherance of the goal of tribal sovereignty over the destiny of Indian children, a transition from Public Law 280 jurisdiction to tribal jurisdiction in child custody proceedings may well be appropriate. But we believe this is a judgment for Congress to make, not the courts. Id. The Ninth Circuit’s decision was based upon the unambiguous text and structure of ICWA and bolstered by ICWA’s legislative history. Id. at 1061–66. Regarding ICWA’s text, the Ninth Circuit found ICWA referenced Public Law 280 in two places. Id. at 1061. First, the Ninth Circuit decided ICWA explicitly recognized Public Law 280 in 25 U.S.C. 1911(a), where Congress limited tribal jurisdiction “where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.” Id. Second, the Ninth Circuit discussed Congress’s recognition of Public Law 280 in 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a), which provides: Any Indian tribe which became subject to State jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by Title IV of the Act of April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78) [Public Law 280], or pursuant to any other Federal law, may reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. Before any Indian tribe may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, such tribe shall present to the Secretary for approval a petition to reassume such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdiction. 10 This provision allows tribes to reassume jurisdiction in child custody proceedings by petitioning the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a). The Ninth Circuit determined that through Congress’s use of the term “reassume,” “Congress manifested its awareness that Public Law 280 states would continue to exercise jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.” Mann, 415 F.3d at 1061. It also found: “Section 1918(a) would make little sense unless § 1911(a) permits Public Law 280 states to exercise jurisdiction over child custody proceedings.” Id. at 1062. We find this reasoning to be persuasive and determine that Public Law 280 and Idaho Code section 67-5101 constitute an exception to ICWA’s exclusive jurisdiction mandate. Thus, we reject Doe’s argument that the magistrate court erred in exercising jurisdiction in this case.