Opinion ID: 4021909
Heading Depth: 2
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Heading: Statutory Basis for the Condition

Text: Following a defendant’s conviction of a crime, the sentencing court may choose among a variety of dispositional options. One option is to release the offender on probation. “Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public safety and promotes rehabilitation.” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120 (Carbajal).) A grant of probation is “qualitatively different from such traditional forms of punishment as fines or imprisonment. Probation is neither ‘punishment’ (see § 15) nor a criminal ‘judgment’ (see § 1445). Instead, courts deem probation an act of clemency in lieu of punishment [citation], and its primary purpose is rehabilitative in nature [citation].” (People v. Howard (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1092.) Accordingly, we have explained that a grant of probation is an act of grace or clemency, and an offender has no right or privilege to be granted such release. (People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 32.) Stated differently, “[p]robation is not a right, but a privilege.” (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 608.) Although the Legislature has directed in some circumstances that probation be unavailable3 or limited,4 in most circumstances the trial court has broad discretion to choose probation when sentencing a criminal offender. A reviewing court will defer to such choice absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. (People 3 See, e.g., section 667, subdivision (c)(2) (probation is prohibited in Three Strikes cases); section 667.61, subdivision (h) (probation is prohibited in One Strike sex offense cases); section 12022.53, subdivision (g) (probation is prohibited for crimes committed with a firearm within the meaning of the “10-20life” enhancement). 4 See section 186.22, subdivision (c) (grant of probation in a case involving a crime or enhancement involving street gangs requires a minimum of 180 days in jail as a condition of probation). 3 v. Franco (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 342, 348; People v. Goodson (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 290, 295.) When an offender chooses probation, thereby avoiding incarceration, state law authorizes the sentencing court to impose conditions on such release that are “fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and . . . for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) Accordingly, we have recognized a sentencing court has “broad discretion to impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1.” (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1120.) But such discretion is not unlimited: “[A] condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute,” and conditions regulating noncriminal conduct must be “ ‘reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.’ ” (Id. at p. 1121.) “If the defendant finds the conditions of probation more onerous than the sentence he would otherwise face, he may refuse probation” (People v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 32) and simply “choose to serve the sentence” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin)).5 5 Irrespective of whether a defendant accepts or declines the terms of probation, he or she may, on appeal following an objection in the trial court, challenge a condition as unreasonable or unconstitutional. Even absent an objection, a defendant may, on appeal, argue a condition is unconstitutional if the claim presents a “ ‘ “pure question[] of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889, quoting People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 235.) In the usual case, however, probationers are well advised to object at sentencing to conditions they find improper or unjustified, thereby ensuring they have preserved the issue for appeal. 4 On appeal, “[w]e review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.) That is, a reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable. (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1121.) As noted, ante, the types of conditions a court may impose on a probationer are not unlimited. We first recognized the limits on probation conditions in the seminal case of People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent).6 “Generally, ‘[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it “(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.” (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 379–380, quoting Lent, supra, at p. 486.) Applying this test, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion under state law when it imposed the Home Depot “stay away” condition on defendant’s probation. Indeed, the condition fails Lent’s first factor for invalidity: Because defendant stole from a Home Depot store, the condition that he stay away from all such stores is reasonably related to his crime. He was not, after all, 6 Lent’s subsidiary holding concerning the use of misdemeanors for impeachment was superseded by Proposition 8 in 1982. (See People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290–291.) 5 prohibited from entering all retail establishments nor even all home improvement, hardware, or big box stores. The condition simply prevented him from entering the stores (and adjacent parking lots) of the company he victimized. As the test is one of reasonableness and deference to the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we find sufficient grounds to uphold the trial court’s choice in this regard. Were more support needed for our conclusion, we observe that the condition also fails Lent’s third factor for invalidity, because prohibiting defendant from entering Home Depot stores is reasonably directed at curbing his future criminality by preventing him from returning to the scene of his past transgression and thus helping him avoid any temptation of repeating his socially undesirable behavior. (See § 1203.1, subd. (j)) [probation conditions should be aimed at “the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer”] Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Sentencing courts often condition a grant of probation on the offender’s agreement to avoid future contact with his or her victim. (See, e.g., People v. Armas (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1176, fn. 2 [defendant ordered to stay away from his victim]; People v. Hall (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1104, fn. 2 [defendant ordered to stay 100 yards from victim’s residence].) Indeed, such socalled stay-away orders are common in domestic violence cases. (See § 1203.097, subd. (a)(2) [authorizing protective orders that may include stay away conditions].) Defendant asserts Home Depot has 232 stores in California (including 14 such stores within 20 miles of his home ZIP code) and argues that when considered with those stores’ respective parking lots, the stay-away probation condition sweeps much too broadly.7 But that defendant’s crime was confined to 7 As noted, defendant did not object to the condition at the time of sentencing. As a rule, failure to object to a probation condition in the trial court on (Footnote continued on next page.) 6 a single Home Depot store in San Jose and not the entire chain of stores does not fatally undermine the trial court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a more wideranging stay-away condition, for conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime. For example, in Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1114, this court upheld a condition of probation requiring an offender to pay the victim restitution notwithstanding the victim’s losses (from damage to his parked car) were not technically caused by defendant’s actual crime (felony hit and run). (Id. at p. 1124.) And in People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, the Court of Appeal upheld a condition of the defendant’s probation that he avoid gang activities, known gang symbols, and persons known to be gang members, even though his crime of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle had not been shown to have been specifically gang related. The Court of Appeal properly upheld the condition because the defendant was an admitted gang member with tattoos identifying him as allied with the Norteños. In defendant’s case, although the sentencing court could reasonably have limited the geographic reach of the Home Depot stay-away condition, the condition’s statewide scope does not render it improper within the meaning of Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481. Such wide scope recognizes the possibility that defendant specifically targeted Home Depot because of a common feature of the (Footnote continued from previous page.) standard state law or reasonableness grounds forfeits the claim for appeal. (People v. Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 237.) We need not decide whether defendant forfeited his state law based challenge because the Attorney General does not urge forfeiture on this ground. But we observe that had he brought these facts to the attention of the sentencing court, that court would have had the opportunity, if it chose, to tailor the condition of probation by limiting the areas from which defendant was prohibited. (People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698, 702.) 7 company’s stores, such as their layout, the difficulty in monitoring such a large facility, the easy access to multiple exits, companywide security methods or practices, or some other factor that influenced defendant to choose Home Depot as his victim rather than some other retail establishment. We thus conclude the probation condition prohibiting defendant from entering the premises or adjacent parking lot of any Home Depot store in California is reasonably related both to his crime and to helping him avoid future criminality. Having found the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion under state law by imposing such a condition on defendant’s probation, we turn to whether that condition violates defendant’s constitutional rights.