Opinion ID: 746484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Recoupment Order.

Text: 56 Following his initial indictment, Lefkowitz requested appointed counsel under the CJA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a). A hearing was held at which Lefkowitz represented that he had no assets or income because his wife owned their residences, cars, jewelry, and art work. The court ordered Lefkowitz to submit, in camera, current financial statements for himself and his wife. After some delay, he submitted a financial statement showing a personal net worth of $18,600,000 on December 31, 1990. The court then concluded he was able to pay his costs of defense and conditioned appointment of counsel on Lefkowitz or his wife depositing $250,000 with the Clerk of Court to cover those costs. When Lefkowitz reneged on his promise to deposit such assets, the court discharged appointed counsel. Lefkowitz challenged this ruling, falsely representing that the court overseeing CEG's bankruptcy had enjoined him from depositing assets for his defense. Concerned that Lefkowitz be effectively represented in the criminal case despite his intransigence, the district court reappointed counsel, but reaffirmed that Lefkowitz was responsible for his costs of defense and ordered the Federal Defender to pursue collection if he did not comply with the court's order. Lefkowitz never deposited any funds with the court. 57 After conviction and prior to sentencing, the district court held a hearing to determine whether Lefkowitz should be ordered to pay his costs of defense. The government presented evidence that he had spent several hundred thousand dollars on personal expenses and unrelated attorney's fees between June 1994 and February 1995, contrary to his repeated claims of indigence. Lefkowitz admitted the expenditures but claimed that he had no significant current assets and had been living off family loans for several months prior to his July 1995 incarceration. Unpersuaded, the district court concluded that Lefkowitz has funds available and ordered him to reimburse the government $316,693.70 for his costs of defense. Such an order is expressly authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f). 58 On appeal, Lefkowitz argues that the court's finding that he currently has funds available is clearly erroneous. We disagree. A defendant has the burden of demonstrating that he is unable to afford counsel, especially when a pretrial hearing casts doubt on his need for public assistance. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 567 F.2d 839, 840 (8th Cir.1977); United States v. Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 661 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 997, 104 S.Ct. 495, 78 L.Ed.2d 688 (1983). Because Lefkowitz never met that burden, every pretrial order appointing counsel specified that he would ultimately bear the cost of his own defense. After the trial, Lefkowitz was given an opportunity to demonstrate that he is presently unable to reimburse the government for his defense. He presented nothing more than his personal testimony. The district court found that testimony to be entirely lacking in credibility, as do we. Our earlier orders granting him leave to prosecute these appeals in forma pauperis are not to the contrary. 59