Opinion ID: 2182224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: respondent's misappropriation of the pip money

Text: This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent misappropriated the entire PIP money ($537.70) received on behalf of his client, Jefferson.
It is undisputed that he failed to pay Mercy Hospital its bill of $107.70. Respondent admits this. He has no explanation for why he so failed to pay. Suddenly, he announces, in his Post Trial Memorandum (filed on July 22, 1983) that he had paid the hospital by his money order dated July 8, 1983. It is undisputed that he received the PIP draft on February 22, 1979, endorsed it, cashed it and failed to pay the hospital bill. He kept the hospital's $107.70 from February 22, 1979 through the time that he was brought before the Inquiry Panel, through the time that the AGC petitioned the Court of Appeals on April 4, 1983, charging him with violation of various Disciplinary Rules as the result of his failure to pay the hospital, and through the time that the Court of Appeals designated, on April 8, 1983, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to hear and determine the charge, and through the hearing by the undersigned on July 6, 1983. It was not until two days after this last hearing that he finally paid the hospital. Thus he kept improperly the PIP money for his own use from February 22, 1979 until July 6, 1983  a period of almost three and one-half years.
This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent never ever paid Dr. Holt his medical bill of $430. The doctor testified that he had not been so paid. The testimony of the Respondent is that he did pay the doctor by virtue of an agreement with the doctor that resulted in the Respondent setting-off a part of the money due him (Respondent) in unrelated legal matters where the doctor was the Respondent's client. I find this to be totally untrue. Moreover, the evidence that the Respondent paid $100 to the doctor (on February 23, 1979) I find to be totally false and indeed, fabricated. First, as to the agreement to offset. The only evidence of an agreement comes from the testimony of the Respondent. The doctor, in his testimony, never mentioned anything whatsoever about any such agreement. He testified that he had not been paid. Significantly the Respondent never asked the doctor any questions about such agreement. Nor did he question him about payments to him. In fact, he never asked the doctor any questions at all. Nor did he call the doctor as his witness. As to the so-called offset the Respondent did not even know how much the doctor's bill was with respect to the Second Case. At first, he testified that it was $235 but he had previously admitted that it was $430. He later admitted it was $430. The Respondent could produce no writing to evidence the agreement. As to what the doctor owed him for the unrelated work that he had done for the doctor, the Respondent had no bills whatsoever. Nor could he even tell what his (unwritten) bills were to the doctor. He testified that at different times, we would agree on how much he could afford to pay me. As to the so-called payment of $100 to the doctor, I find that it simply did not exist. The Respondent testified that he paid $100 to the doctor for Jefferson's case (the Second Case) on February 23, 1979 and proved it by Respondent's Exhibit 23, a paper which purports to be a copy of a letter under date of February 23, 1979, sent by Respondent to the doctor. I find that no such letter was ever sent. I find that there was no such letter written. I find it to be a complete fabrication. The letter mentions that the Respondent encloses a check in the amount of $300 to be distributed as follows: ... $100 on fee for Stanley Jefferson. However the date of the check is not mentioned, nor the check number, nor the bank upon which it was drawn, and most significantly, the cancelled check was never produced by the Respondent. The Respondent never asked the doctor whether or not he had received any such check. The copy of the letter allegedly sent by the Respondent is typed but it bears no indication of the initials of the secretary who typed it. It may not have been typed by any secretary  it may have been typed by the Respondent himself  but the Respondent conceded that he had a secretary at the time in question  in fact he blamed her for mistakes as to other typings emanating from his office (for example, his assigning a mistake to his secretary when faced with a question as to why he failed to put both accident dates on his Respondent's Exhibit 7). Finally, the Respondent testified that the source of the $100 used to pay the doctor came out of my pocket, that is out of my pants. This court finds that Dr. Holt was never ever paid anything.
The Respondent testified that he held two-thirds of the PIP money ($537.70) to protect the medical amount and that Jefferson received the other third. Jefferson testified that he (Jefferson) had indeed received $179.23 from the Respondent but he also testified that he returned that sum (or rather $178.23  a one dollar mistake on his part that he freely admitted) one day later, on February 23, 1979. His reason was that by this time he was not satisfied with the Respondent's services, did not trust him and wanted to give all of the PIP money back so that when the (Second Case) got settled, I could see everything at one time and I know that I was being treated fairly. Unlike the Respondent's method of doing business, Jefferson paid for and procured a written money order payable to himself dated February 23, 1979 and endorsed it over to the Respondent. The Respondent admits that he endorsed it. So I find by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has had that sum of money ($178.23) from February 23, 1979 to the present. The Respondent seeks to avoid this fact by saying that he (Respondent) returned this $178.23 (in cash) to the Respondent because he (Jefferson) was out of work. This testimony simply does not make sense and this court does not believe the Respondent. What would be the sense of a man paying $178.23 over to another man and then the other man repaying it immediately to the original man? There is documentation for the payment of this sum by Jefferson (the money order) to the Respondent (Respondent's admission that he endorsed it) but there is no documentation that the Respondent paid it back to Jefferson  only the testimony of the Respondent that he paid it (in cash). There was no letter of confirmation by the Respondent, no receipt by Jefferson, nothing in writing whatsoever. The Respondent testified that he merely assisted Jefferson in cashing the money order. However, when asked why Jefferson would buy a money order just to ask the Respondent to cash it, the Respondent testified that Spell influenced Jefferson to do so. At first, he testified that Jefferson and Spell came in together to return their PIP monies to him but later he testified that they were not together. When confronted with the fact that the money orders were numbered consecutively (Jefferson's money order was XXXXXXXXX and Spell's was XXXXXXXXX. Petitioner testified that Spell did not negotiate his money order at the same time Jefferson did because Spell carried (his) money order around for quite a time. However, he also testified that both Jefferson and Spell came in and that he accommodated them by cashing these money orders and giving them his money, both of them. He testified that he gave Jefferson back his money because Jefferson was out of work. What was his reason for giving Spell back his money? He did not testify as to any need on Spell's part. This sort of testimony is unbelievable.
The Respondent admitted that he never deposited the PIP money into a separate bank account. He simply cashed the PIP check and I find by clear and convincing evidence that he kept all of the cash ($537.70) for himself despite his testimony to the contrary.
Hence this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has violated: Disciplinary Rule 9-102(A) and Article 10, Sec. 44 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, See AGC v. Garson, 287 Md. 502 [413 A.2d 564] (1980); AGC v. Bailey, 286 Md. 630 [408 A.2d 1330] (1979) [Failure to place funds into a separate account]. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3)(4)(5) and (6), Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(3), Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(8) and Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B)(3) [the Respondent illegally and fraudulently converted all the PIP monies to his own use thereby prejudicing his client, Jefferson  these monies were not held in escrow]. See AGC v. Bonnin, 294 Md. 507 [451 A.2d 326] (1982); AGC v. Boehm, 293 Md. 476 [446 A.2d 52] (1982) [Respondent provided Jefferson with no records nor accounting of Jefferson's money. In fact, when the Respondent settled the Second Case with Jefferson, he retained improperly the $179.23 by subtracting it from the amount properly due Jefferson. This amounts to a misappropriation. See AGC v. Pattison, 292 Md. 599 [441 A.2d 328] (1982); AGC v. Cooper, 279 Md. 605 [369 A.2d 1059] (1977); Bar Association v. Marshall , [269] 264 Md. 510 [307 A.2d 677] (1973)]. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3)(4)(5) and (6), Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(1), Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(8) and Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B)(3) and (4) [Illegally failed to distribute all the funds to which Jefferson was entitled; See Marshall and Boehm, supra; AGC v. McIntire, 286 Md. 87 [405 A.2d 273] (1979) [failure to seek Jefferson's lawful objectives through reasonably available means permitted by law; failure to keep complete records of funds of Jefferson coming into the Respondent's possession and render appropriate accounting to Jefferson].