Opinion ID: 4530604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: [3] Although Hochstein makes four assignments of error, all ultimately rest upon a single contention—that the Goedens’ new residence was not a “farm residence,” or stated conversely, that it was a “non-farm residence.” At oral argument, all of the parties characterized the question before us as one of law. We agree. The interpretation of a zoning ordinance presents a question of law. 4 1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018). 2 Rodehorst Bros. v. City of Norfolk Bd. of Adjustment, 287 Neb. 779, 844 N.W.2d 755 (2014). 3 Drought v. Marsh, 304 Neb. 860, 937 N.W.2d 229 (2020). 4 Kaiser v. Western R/C Flyers, 239 Neb. 624, 477 N.W.2d 557 (1991). - 329 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HOCHSTEIN v. CEDAR CTY. BD. OF ADJUSTMENT Cite as 305 Neb. 321 Before turning to Hochstein’s points of emphasis and the Goedens’ and the board’s respective responses, we recall governing principles of law. Governing Principles of Law [4-6] One principle establishes a framework for interpretation: When interpreting zoning regulations, an appellate court applies the same rules utilized in statutory interpretation. 5 Just as statutes relating to the same subject are in pari materia and should be construed together, 6 a county’s zoning regulations should be read and construed together. Zoning laws should be given a fair and reasonable construction in light of the manifest intention of the legislative body, the objects sought to be attained, the natural import of the words used in common and accepted usage, the setting in which they are employed, and the general structure of the law as a whole. 7 Nebraska’s appellate courts have long followed this principle. 8 [7] Another principle guides our understanding of specific words: Where the provisions of a zoning ordinance are expressed in common words of everyday use, without enlargement, restriction, or definition, they are to be interpreted and enforced according to their generally accepted meaning. 9 The rule also enjoys a long pedigree. 10 5 See Premium Farms v. County of Holt, 263 Neb. 415, 640 N.W.2d 633 (2002). 6 See Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 283 Neb. 340, 808 N.W.2d 875 (2012). 7 Rodehorst Bros. v. City of Norfolk Bd. of Adjustment, supra note 2. 8 See, Mossman v. City of Columbus, 234 Neb. 78, 449 N.W.2d 214 (1989); City of Lincoln v. Bruce, 221 Neb. 61, 375 N.W.2d 118 (1985); City of Beatrice v. Goodenkauf, 219 Neb. 756, 366 N.W.2d 411 (1985); Beckman v. City of Grand Island, 182 Neb. 840, 157 N.W.2d 769 (1968); Thieman v. Cedar Valley Feeding Co., 18 Neb. App. 302, 789 N.W.2d 714 (2010). 9 Rodehorst Bros. v. City of Norfolk Bd. of Adjustment, supra note 2. 10 See, Mossman v. City of Columbus, supra note 8; City of Lincoln v. Bruce, supra note 8; City of Beatrice v. Goodenkauf, supra note 8; State v. Smiley, 182 Neb. 211, 153 N.W.2d 906 (1967); Henke v. Zimmer, 158 Neb. 697, 64 N.W.2d 458 (1954); Thieman v. Cedar Valley Feeding Co., supra note 8. - 330 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HOCHSTEIN v. CEDAR CTY. BD. OF ADJUSTMENT Cite as 305 Neb. 321 [8-10] Several principles naturally follow. Restrictions in zoning ordinances and regulations should not be extended by implication to cases not clearly within the scope of the purpose and intent manifest in their language. 11 In interpreting definitions in zoning statutes or ordinances, the court cannot supply what the municipal legislative body might have provided but which the court cannot by reasonable construction say that it did provide. 12 Thus, in interpreting the language of an ordinance to determine the extent of the restriction upon use of the property, the language must be interpreted, where doubt exists as to the intention of the legislative body, in favor of the property owner and against any implied extension of the restriction. 13 Application Three things are indisputable: The Goedens’ proposed building site is located on a “farm,” they are the owners of that farm, and that farm constitutes an “agricultural operation[].” As we quoted more fully above, the regulations define “farm” as an “are[a] containing at least forty (40) acres or more which is used for growing of the usual farm products such as . . . grain.” Hochstein does not dispute that the Goedens own the tract of land, that it is at least 40 acres in size, and that it is used for the growing of corn and soybeans, which are “grain[s].” Thus, it is a farm. Similarly, the farm fits the definition of an “agricultural operation[],” as it is a farmstead of 40 acres or more that produces $1,000 or more of farm products annually. From an affidavit the Goedens submitted to the board, Hochstein draws a conclusion and emphasizes a fact. First, 11 Beckman v. City of Grand Island, supra note 8. 12 Id. 13 Mossman v. City of Columbus, supra note 8; Beckman v. City of Grand Island, supra note 8; Dowd Grain Co. v. County of Sarpy Bd. of Adj., No. A-06-681, 2008 WL 2511150 (Neb. App. June 24, 2008) (selected for posting to court website). - 331 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HOCHSTEIN v. CEDAR CTY. BD. OF ADJUSTMENT Cite as 305 Neb. 321 Hochstein asserts, since 2007, “the Goedens have not farmed this tract,” but instead have “cash leased” it to another corporate entity. 14 In the affidavit, the Goedens assert continuing involvement in the production of grain on the 240-acre farm. Specifically, they state: “In 2007, [they] engaged the services of [a corporate entity] to produce agricultural products on the Farm on a year to year basis. [The Goedens] maintain a supervisory role in the active production of the crops associated with the Farm.” Second, Hochstein emphasizes that the Goedens’ personal care and raising of pheasants and 11 head of livestock takes place on another site located approximately 3 miles east of the 240-acre farm. As the board points out, Hochstein at least implicitly argues that because the definition of “agricultural and farm buildings and structures” includes the phrase “residence of the operator,” an owner’s residence is excluded. But this argument ignores the words “but not limited to” following the word “including.” Hochstein explicitly argues, quoting from the definition of “agricultural and farm buildings and structures,” that the proposed residence is not “necessary or incidental to the normal conduct o[f] a farm.” According to Hochstein, building a new residence is not “necessary” for the Goedens to “sign a lease or cash a rent check.” 15 Likewise, Hochstein asserts, it is not “necessary” for the Goedens to construct a residence “over three miles east” of the location where they raise pheasants and 11 head of livestock. 16 But Hochstein’s initial brief ignored the words “incidental to”—the regulation’s disjunctive alternative to “necessary.” The definition required the board to consider whether the Goedens’ proposed residence was “necessary or incidental to the normal conduct o[f] a farm.” (Emphasis supplied.) In ordinary usage, 14 Brief for appellant at 10 (emphasis supplied). 15 Id. 16 Id. - 332 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HOCHSTEIN v. CEDAR CTY. BD. OF ADJUSTMENT Cite as 305 Neb. 321 “incidental to” means “liable to happen to” or “to which a thing is liable or exposed.” 17 A definition of “incidental” is “being likely to ensue as a chance or minor consequence.” 18 Both the Goedens and the board point to the A-1 District permitted principal uses, emphasizing that the regulations endorse the “residence of the owners” as a permitted use. The Goedens’ proposed residence falls within both of the permitted principal uses quoted above. It is difficult to understand how a permitted principal use in the A-1 District is not at least a use “incidental to” the normal conduct of a farm. And Hochstein’s reply brief merely proclaims that “the use of the [Goedens’] residence is not in any way incidental to agricultural operations.” 19 Hochstein does not explain why this is so. Presumably, this argument rests upon the characterization of the Goedens’ relationship with the other corporate entity as a cash lease and the Goedens’ use of their other farm approximately 3 miles east of the 240-acre farm. Neither is dispositive. We reject Hochstein’s notion that the Goedens’ residence would not be “incidental to” their 240-acre farm. To bolster the argument, Hochstein relies upon snippets from the section explaining the intent and purpose of the A-1 District regulations. Those snippets are emphasized in the full quotation of the section above. But we agree with the Goedens and the board that the zoning regulations must be read and construed together. In doing so, we give them a fair and reasonable construction in light of the manifest intention of the legislative body, the objects sought to be attained, the natural import of the words used in common and accepted usage, the setting in which they are employed, and the general structure of the law as a whole. The regulations define “agriculture” as “the use of a tract of land for the growing of crops, . . . 17 “Incidental to,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com/ view/Entry/93467 (last visited Mar. 16, 2020). 18 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 629 (11th ed. 2014). 19 Reply brief for appellant at 2. - 333 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HOCHSTEIN v. CEDAR CTY. BD. OF ADJUSTMENT Cite as 305 Neb. 321 including the structures necessary for carrying out farming operations, the residence or residences of those owning or operating the premises, a member of the family thereof, or persons employed thereon, and the family thereof.” The Goedens own the 240-acre tract, and their proposed residence falls within that definition.