Opinion ID: 1372628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Effect of Cumulative Errors.

Text: (49) Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the penalty phase errors was great enough to require reversal of the judgment. The only properly preserved claims of error we have found meritorious are the prosecutor's mistake in telling the jury to disregard sympathy, the jury's consideration of a duplicative special circumstance of multiple murder, and isolated misstatements of the law in discussing defendant's motion to modify the verdict. These flaws are insufficient to persuade us that, had they not occurred, there exists a reasonable possibility that defendant would have been sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

While his appeal was pending, Demetrie Ladon Mayfield filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We issued an order to show cause, appointed a referee, and directed the referee to take evidence and make findings of fact regarding petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty trials. [9] The referee's findings are summarized at length below. (50)(See fn. 10.) In brief, the referee found that counsel failed to fully investigate a defense of lack of intent by reason of intoxication or disease or to interview witnesses who in theory might have aided the defense at both the guilt and penalty trials. [10] The defense had limited funds for investigation; moreover, the referee concluded that counsel's pretrial preparation was scanty and that counsel failed to try to associate a second attorney who might have helped prepare and try the defense case. After review of the record and consideration of the referee's report, we conclude that the petition must be denied. The gravamen of petitioner's claim is that competent counsel would have further investigated and pursued solely or in part a mental state defense, based on petitioner's poorly controlled diabetes or his drug use on the night of the killings, or both. In petitioner's view, competent counsel would have used such a defense to try to persuade the jury that petitioner actually lacked the mental state for first degree murder, and, at the penalty trial, that petitioner's mental state should be considered in mitigation. Petitioner raises two other significant claims. First, he maintains that before trial competent counsel would have pursued an exhaustive inquiry into his mental state at the time of his postarrest statements to try to persuade the court that they should be excluded as given involuntarily. Second, he contends that competent counsel would have striven to obtain much more evidence of his good character and difficult upbringing and would have presented the same to the jury to further humanize him.
(51a) As we have explained in numerous cases following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington [, supra, ] 466 U.S. 668 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052]: `There are two components to a claim by a defendant that his counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence.... First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. ... This requires a showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. ... In evaluating a defendant's [claim] of incompetence, we accord great deference to the tactical decisions of trial counsel. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. ... [¶] The second component requires that the defendant show prejudice resulting from counsel's alleged deficiencies. It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.... [¶] The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' ( In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 601 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371], quoting In re Marquez, supra, 1 Cal.4th 584, 602-603.) The defendant must make the showings of deficient performance and resulting prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 449.) The defendant need not, however, show that it is more likely than not that he or she would have obtained a better result. ( In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 956 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222].) (52) The referee's findings of fact are entitled to deference when, as we have generally concluded to be the case here, there is substantial evidence to support them. ( In re Jackson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 585.) This is so because the referee can observe the witnesses' demeanor, but this court cannot. ( Ibid. ) On questions of mixed law and fact or of a purely legal nature, however, we reach our conclusions on the basis of an independent review of the record and the law. ( Ibid. ) (51b) Both any deficiency in counsel's performance and any prejudice occasioned thereby are mixed questions of law and fact. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 698 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 700].)
After considering the referee's report and reviewing the reference hearing transcript and the original trial proceedings, we deny the petition because we conclude that, whatever trial counsel's deficiencies, petitioner has not shown prejudice. We reach this conclusion with regard to both the guilt and penalty trials. (53) Our discussion is therefore somewhat truncated, for we need not give weight to deficiency when we conclude that there was no prejudice. ( In re Jackson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 604.) Nevertheless, we summarize at some length the referee's findings, embellishing them where we believe that a fuller statement of the record's contents is required. [11] The referee found, among other things, that counsel failed to obtain various medical records, including records from the time of petitioner's arrest that would have revealed an elevated blood-sugar level of 387. Counsel did not consult an endocrinologist, a toxicologist, or a psychiatrist regarding the effect of diabetes or intoxicants on mental state. As the referee found and the record reflects, an endocrinologist could have testified that when blood sugar exceeds 300, a diabetic may experience blurred vision, impaired reasoning, dehydration, headaches, and confused thinking, and might be clumsier than normal  a possible factor in a defense of accident. But the endocrinologist who testified at the reference hearing, Dr. Clinton Young, also testified that although an individual with petitioner's blood-sugar level might not feel well, he could still plan, premeditate, and form the intent to kill. Such a blood-sugar level would not have caused petitioner to do anything he would not otherwise have done. A toxicologist could have testified that a chronic PCP user may store the substance in fatty tissue and it may later discharge, causing a psychotic reaction. Diabetes can enhance this effect. A psychiatrist could have testified that petitioner suffered from mental disorders that might have affected the voluntariness of petitioner's Miranda waivers  indeed, the psychiatrist retained by petitioner's appellate counsel opined that petitioner's waiver was involuntary. The defense did not interview some of petitioner's friends and relatives. Tommy Wydrmyr could possibly have told the defense that he saw petitioner use PCP at 6 p.m. February 1, 1983, about a day and a half before the shootings. But cross-examination suggested that Wydrmyr chose at the time of trial not to come forward to aid in the defense. There was thus evidence that he would not have been a particularly cooperative witness. Byron Pope could have told the defense he smelled alcohol on petitioner's breath the night of the shootings, but also could have testified that petitioner demonstated no sign of being under the influence of PCP, such as lack of coordination. Pope could also have testified that his mother could become agitated and irritable when drunk, waving her hands in the air or striking out. Patricia Harper was interviewed by the defense investigator, but apparently he failed to learn from her that petitioner drank alcohol and smoked PCP the night of the killings. There was evidence, however, that she was reluctant after the killings to reveal information regarding petitioner's drug use. Counsel's contact with his own client was superficial; counsel testified that his only significant interview with petitioner was at the courthouse on the morning of trial. Counsel never retested, for PCP or alcohol, a sample of petitioner's blood, drawn shortly after the crimes' commission, which had tested negative for PCP. He made no effort to have a urine sample tested for PCP or alcohol and wrongly stipulated the urine sample had tested negative for PCP. Counsel had difficulty persuading the San Bernardino County trial court system to advance funds for his investigator and apparently, as we read the record, did not believe he could obtain more than the $1,000 he was granted. Counsel failed to try to associate the assistant counsel to which petitioner was possibly entitled under Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424 [180 Cal. Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108]; thus, petitioner had only one lawyer to represent him rather than two. A second attorney could have devoted his or her entire time to defending the penalty case should petitioner be found death-eligible, or could at least do legal research or act as a foil for the primary attorney behind the scenes if the latter preferred not to distract the jury with another attorney's in-court presence. Counsel may not have anticipated that a penalty phase might occur, even though, as we conclude, the evidence of defendant's guilt was so strong that a penalty phase should have appeared all but inevitable. He put all of his energy into the guilt phase. The referee, without questioning counsel's veracity, nevertheless doubted that counsel could have spent the 200 hours he claimed he devoted to preparing the defense case. Counsel may have spent time thinking about his strategy. But his files contained no handwritten notes, no legal research, and no handwritten indications of out-of-court preparation. On the other hand, there was testimony that an attorney whose style is less focused on extremely methodical preparation can be effective before a jury. The referee found that counsel put all his energy into attempting to prove that the killing of Ora Pope was accidental. He apparently made the tactical decision not to confuse or prejudice the jury by introducing additional[,] diminished capacity [i.e., lack of intent] issues.... But the referee had no basis to conclude that such failure [to present a lack-of-intent defense at the guilt phase] was part of a strategy or plan. It will be recalled that at the penalty phase the sole defense witness was a psychologist, Dr. Rath, who gave evidence of petitioner's background, medical difficulties, character, and remorse. Dr. Rath testified about the contents of a report a neurologist, Dr. Guy Hunt, had prepared. If summoned, Dr. Hunt could have testified that petitioner said he thought he was mentally impaired as a result of a combination of his diabetes and his having consumed a large amount of PCP and beer on the day of the killings. The neurologist could also have testified that the crimes were out of character for petitioner and could be explained only by mental impairment. The original record reminds us, however, that Dr. Rath did provide the jury with Dr. Hunt's opinion on that point at the penalty trial. Various friends and relatives of petitioner's could also have spoken on his behalf at the penalty phase. Counsel testified at the reference hearing that he chose to avoid such people because he believed the psychologist's professional demeanor would make him a more persuasive witness, and he could introduce some of the relatives' information about petitioner into evidence through the psychologist with less risk than the relatives might pose.
The referee correctly decided that this court reserved for itself the determination whether counsel was ineffective. Nevertheless, in answer to our question 3(c) (see fn. 9, ante )  whether counsel should have discovered the identities of and/or called various potential witnesses  the referee stated with reference to the guilt trial, While it is obvious that, in the best of all worlds, Mr. Ames should have undertaken a lot of investigation which he omitted to do, it is hard to fault his conclusion that the best defense of the guilt phase was based on [the] accidental shooting of Ora Pope, followed by an intentional shooting of [Edward] John Moreno. If he had succeeded in establishing the first shooting as manslaughter, there would never have been a penalty phase. (54)(See fn. 12.) Focusing for now just on the guilt phase, all the discussion about endocrinologists and toxicologists makes sense only if one concludes it would have been advantageous to suppress petitioner's statements.[ [12] ] But looking at the case, as Mr. Ames saw it before the fact, it is not clear that it would have been helpful to petitioner to suppress the statements. The prosecution could easily have proven that petitioner inflicted the fatal shots. It easily could have proven, and at the trial the prosecution did prove through the testimony of Michael Taylor, petitioner's cousin, that on the day of the shootings, petitioner stated he was going to kill Ora Pope. The prosecution also proved through Glen Brooks that on the day of the shooting, petitioner told Brooks that he was going to kill Ora Pope. The best evidence, and the only evidence, Mr. Ames had of the first shooting being accidental, was petitioner's statements to the police, made, as Mr. Ames pointed out to the jury, shortly after the shooting and long before he had any opportunity to contact counsel. [See ante, p. 166.] [¶] ... As to the guilt phase ... this court has a difficult time concluding that such exploration [of a mental state defense] would have led to anything of value. Anyone who listens to the audio tape or views the video tape is struck with how composed and rational petitioner seems to be. Even considering all the testimony produced by petitioner's experts at the reference hearing, it is very difficult for this court to conclude that any judge would have suppressed the confessions or that any jury would have accepted a diminished capacity [i.e., a lack-of-intent] defense. (55a), (56a) Petitioner objects to these statements, maintaining that they amount to recommendations and exceed the scope of our reference order. Whatever the technical merits of petitioner's claim (see In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 170, fn. 1 [249 Cal. Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370]), our own review of the record of the trial and the evidentiary hearing confirms the sagacity of the referee's observations, and we independently reach the same conclusions. In particular, however deficient counsel may have been in failing to more fully explore a defense of lack of intent to kill or of lack of ability to waive his right to remain silent, we agree with the referee that it is very difficult to believe that such a defense would have been of use to petitioner. (Cf. In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247 [259 Cal. Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164].) The question of mental state arises in two contexts: the voluntariness of petitioner's confession and reenactment, and the presentation of a lack-of-intent defense because of mental impairment at trial. We turn to the confession issue first. (55b) The law is clear that to have suppressed the statements, petitioner would have had to show that his reasoning was in fact so impaired that he was incapable of free or rational choice. ( In re Cameron, supra, 68 Cal.2d 487, 498; see People v. Hernandez (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 639, 648 [251 Cal. Rptr. 393]; see also Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 166-167 [93 L.Ed.2d 473, 483-484, 107 S.Ct. 515] [coercive police activity necessary predicate to finding of federal constitutional violation in obtaining confession; otherwise question of a defendant's state of mind is matter of state law].) We do not believe petitioner could have made such a showing. As we described ante, part II.A., petitioner told his interrogator at the beginning of the audiotaped session that he felt up to the task of talking with him. Moreover, our own review of the tape confirms the referee's findings regarding the very dubious effect of a mental state defense. Throughout the lengthy interview, including his comments immediately following the waiver, petitioner spoke clearly if somewhat slowly. At times he engaged in animated, jocular, prideful, indignant or defiant conversation with the interviewing detectives. Despite a relaxed quality to his speech, petitioner sounds lucid, much as he does on the videotape, by which time his medication evidently was not an issue, for petitioner does not contend he was deprived of insulin before the videotaping. Nor did petitioner ever inform his interviewers that he did not feel well, or ask them for medication. As far as the referee could or we can discern, defendant was not mentally impaired when he made his audiotaped statement. And the reference hearing produced scant evidence to the contrary. With one exception, at the reference hearing petitioner's panel of experts could only surmise  with varying degrees of confidence  that petitioner may have been under the influence of drugs or his diabetic condition so as to impair his capacity for judgment when he agreed to be taped. The exception, Dr. Rita Hargrave, a psychiatrist, opined that I do not believe that that was a voluntary waiver of [petitioner's] right to remain silent. She based that conclusion on an opinion that petitioner's speech was more slurred and slow on the audiotape than on the videotape, and on the combined effect of him coming down off the PCP, plus the nature of his metabolic imbalance from his diabetes being out of control. But Dr. Hargrave was effectively impeached on cross-examination, agreeing she could not be sure that either petitioner's diabetes or petitioner himself was out of control. We are unpersuaded that a court, hearing petitioner's remark that he felt capable of talking to his interrogator before his audiotaped confession, listening to petitioner's demeanor on that tape, and hearing expert testimony on the subject of voluntariness, would have suppressed the evidence. Therefore, we do not perceive that counsel's failure to pursue other avenues to suppress the statements was prejudicial. There is no reasonable probability that the proceeding's outcome would have differed. [13] (56b) We turn next to the issue of petitioner's mental state at the time he committed the crimes. Normally, merely showing that the defendant had consumed alcohol or used drugs before the offense, without any showing of their effect on him, is not enough to warrant an instruction on diminished capacity. [Citations.] ( People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1241 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899] [considering the diminished capacity defense when the same was available under California law].) We see no reason for a different rule for a defense of lack of intent. The guilt phase evidence showed considerable evidence of the planning and premeditation of Ora Mae Pope's killing, and no witness at trial testified that petitioner was under the influence of either his diabetes or an intoxicating substance. At the reference hearing, as we have already stated, none of petitioner's expert witnesses could state unequivocally that his consumption of food, drugs or alcohol had altered his mental state in a definite or predictable manner. Therefore, we agree with the referee that it is very difficult to conclude that a jury would have accepted a defense of lack of intent by reason of disease or intoxication. On this point, too, petitioner has failed to show prejudice. Two other items require discussion. (57) First, the most significant evidence in favor of an accident defense, other than petitioner's own taped confession, would have been if the shotgun used to kill Ora Mae Pope and Edward Moreno had a hair trigger or was otherwise defective. Petitioner urges that the reference hearing established that the shotgun was abnormal; therefore trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a criminalist to examine the gun. We are of a different view. Petitioner's expert conceded on cross-examination that there was nothing unusually dangerous about the shotgun. Indeed, our reading of the expert's testimony convinces us that if testimonal evidence similar to his had been introduced at trial it might have strengthened the case for premeditation and deliberation. The criminalist testified that when he pulled the hammer to full cocked position, the shotgun had a normal, even slightly heavy pull of seven pounds, but that if the gun were positioned as if it ha[d] been fired, it would have a very light pull of two pounds. As the referee found, there was no evidence petitioner handled or fired the weapon in the latter fashion, and if he had done so it might have shown more purposeful, intentional behavior, not less. (Italics by the referee.) (58a) Second, petitioner raises a claim in supplemental briefing that counsel's loyalty to him was tainted by a desire not to jeopardize his standing with the San Bernardino courts by seeking proper funding for petitioner's defense. He emphasized this contention at oral argument. (59) To be sure, when `counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed....' ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 135, quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 692 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696].) A claim that counsel's loyalty was divided by virtue of his own conflicting interests is a claim of such a conflict. ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 135-136.) `... [T]he presumption arises, however, only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'' ( Id. at p. 135, quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 692 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696].) (58b) Our reading of the record leads us to conclude there is no merit to petitioner's claim, for there was no divided loyalty. Petitioner's counsel, S. Donald Ames, testified that it was difficult to obtain county funds for defense investigation at the time. For example, it required considerable effort for Ames to persuade a judge to grant funds to retain a neurologist at county expense, though the effort eventually succeeded. Ames conceded that in 1983 counsel could acquire a bad reputation, or jacket, among the judges for asking for large amounts of funds for expert and attorney fees. But he stated, I don't think that I made a conscious effort not to attain a jacket with the judges. If I did, so be it. [14] [¶] But I don't think that I either did or did not do any particular thing to avoid getting a jacket. Questioned further, Ames conceded he tried to avoid getting a reputation for asking for excessive attorney fees, but would not let that goal interfere with his representation of a client. On this record we conclude that petitioner has not met his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 449), because he has not shown by that standard that an actual conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance.
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty trial is more difficult for us. Counsel's efforts to secure life imprisonment for his client appear perfunctory, and the referee was moved to say during the hearing, On the guilt phase, it sure sounds like Ames picked the only thing to talk about.... [¶] On the penalty phase, it sounds like Ames didn't do much of anything.... [¶] Whether the penalty phase should have turned out different, whether it would have made a difference, that is a whole different question. But just from the established point of decency and fairness, one tends to think that when it comes down to somebody's life being at stake, attorneys should at least call some witnesses, make some effort. (60a) We now turn to answer the referee's question. As will appear, we are satisfied that as a matter of constitutional law the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase must fail for want of prejudice. We are aided by the superb presentation both parties made at the reference hearing. In essence, the case was retried to the referee after an exhaustive discovery of all possible evidence that favored petitioner, including evidence relating to his background and character (§ 190.3). As mentioned above, petitioner maintains counsel failed to locate, interview and summon friends and relatives on his behalf. Petitioner argues that had counsel done so, the witnesses could have presented favorable evidence of his background and character  evidence, for instance, of acts of kindness he had performed and of the difficulties his poverty and diabetes created for him in adolescence. We are unpersuaded that prejudice could have resulted. Respondent's treatment of the parade of friends and relatives who testified at the reference hearing showed the risks of having them testify at trial, for on cross-examination the witnesses were asked devastating questions about the basis for their opinion that petitioner's character was good. Those questions, if asked at trial, would have revealed to the jury specific instances of petitioner's uncharged violent criminal acts, one of which was of a disturbing sexual nature and might well have been heard by the jury even though petitioner was a minor when the incident purportedly occurred. ( People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th 870, 906-909.) Counsel's investigator learned about the sexual incident in June 1983 while investigating the case before trial and told counsel about it. There is no reason to believe the prosecution would necessarily have overlooked it. Thus, not only was the referee's conclusion that some of the witnesses would have provided negative as well as positive information correct, but the record also establishes that the cross-examination of the witnesses could have done severe damage to the penalty defense, and that counsel was aware of that risk. [15] (61a) Nor are we persuaded that if the jury had heard more evidence of the effects of petitioner's drug use or diabetes on his mental state, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed. As we have explained, petitioner's experts could only surmise that his mental state was abnormal when he committed the murders; there was strong evidence to the contrary. [16] As already mentioned, petitioner called a psychiatrist, Dr. Rita Hargrave, to give a professional evaluation of his background and character at the reference hearing. In describing petitioner's life, Dr. Hargrave provided layers of complexity and nuance that trial counsel did not elicit in his examination of Dr. Rath. But there was nothing deficient in counsel's presentation of penalty phase evidence via Dr. Rath's testimony  in our view Dr. Rath adequately set forth evidence of petitioner's background and character. (60b), (61b) We are unable to conclude that, if trial counsel had undertaken the exhaustive and laborious efforts his appellate counsel have for the reference hearing, there is a reasonable probability the result would have been different. The jury had evidently accepted the prosecution's theory of the case: that petitioner killed Ora Mae Pope to avenge his punishment for the theft of the Popes' automobile and killed Edward Moreno to silence a witness. There was evidence that petitioner dragged Ms. Pope off to a shed to die and hosed the victims' blood off the pavement. Petitioner thus must have stood, in the jury's eyes, blameworthy for two cold, calculated killings  and the jury was aware of the possibility that petitioner, having lain in wait and with knife at the ready, was preparing to kill Byron Pope. The evidence of the circumstances of the crimes was compelling. As counsel for petitioner stated at the reference hearing with regard to the guilt trial, Watching the jurors' faces when they were shown the videotaped reenactment, where Mr. Mayfield pulled bodies out of the house and put them into a woodshed and stacked them like cordwood  I had seen that videotape a number of [times] and didn't have to look at it except as to what the jury's reaction to it was. [¶] ... And my view of the jurors' reaction was not a favorable view to my client. It is fair to say that before petitioner ever saw a lawyer, he had done much damage to his defense, both with regard to guilt and to penalty. The fact that his lawyer's efforts at the penalty phase were somewhat perfunctory disturbs us, but we discern no reasonable probability that additional evidence of background, character, or mental impairment  subject as the first two would have been to potentially devastating cross-examination and the third to the forceful contrary evidence the tapes provided  would have affected the outcome.