Opinion ID: 4543684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hollie’s Conviction

Text: Hollie argues for the first time on appeal that his indictment and the jury instructions improperly omitted an element of the offense—that he knew he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed the firearm. The Supreme Court recently confirmed that a defendant’s knowledge of his status prohibiting him under § 922 from possessing a firearm is an element of a § 922 offense. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200 (“[I]n a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.”). Hollie contends that the indictment failed to state this Id. at 715-16. Here, the parties stipulated that the firearm traveled in interstate commerce. We therefore reject this challenge. Hollie also argues that his ACCA enhancement violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because his indictment did not allege, and the jury did not find, that his prior convictions qualified as serious drug offenses and were committed on different occasions. We previously have rejected this same argument. See United States v. Deshazior, 882 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1350 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257-58 (2013). Finally, Hollie argues that his 2005 conviction for delivery of cocaine does not qualify as an ACCA predicate offense because the statute under which he was convicted, Florida Statutes § 893.101, does not require knowledge of the illicit nature of a substance and ACCA is not intended to cover strict liability offenses. He suggests that federal drug trafficking statutes, which require such knowledge, are generic analogues and that a state offense must match the generic analogue as to mens rea to qualify. Binding precedent forecloses this challenge. See United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the argument that ACCA only encompasses convictions that require knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance). We held this case pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020), which had the potential to affect Smith’s viability, but as Hollie acknowledges Shular did not undermine Smith. 7 Case: 18-13060 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 8 of 14 essential element of the offense, violating his Fifth Amendment right that a grand jury find probable cause to support each element of an offense and Sixth Amendment right that he be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 4 Relatedly, Hollie argues that the jury was not properly instructed that he could only be found guilty if he knew at the time of the possession that he was a convicted felon. We reject both arguments. As to his indictment, Hollie has established an error that Rehaif made plain. “Rehaif made clear that the government must prove that a defendant knew of his prohibited status when he possessed a firearm or ammunition.” United States v. Reed, 941 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 2019). Hollie’s indictment did not allege that he knew he was a convicted felon. He therefore has established plain error. Id. He has not, however, established that the error affected his substantial rights. In Reed, we held that the defendant could not prove the Rehaif error affected his substantial rights because he could not show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had the error not occurred. Id. at 1021-22. Reed, who had been convicted of eight prior felonies, admitted that he 4 Hollie contends that an indictment’s Rehaif-based defect is jurisdictional. He argues that Rehaif made clear that a § 922(g) offense must be charged alongside § 924(a)(2), which provides: “Whoever knowingly violates subsection . . . (g) . . . of section 922 shall be fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.” An indictment that does not charge both, Hollie says, does not vest the district court with subject matter jurisdiction. We recently rejected this argument. See United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2020). We are bound by Moore. See Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. 8 Case: 18-13060 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 9 of 14 had served 18 years in prison before his arrest; stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony offense and had not had his civil rights restored, including the right to possess and bear arms; and testified at trial that he was not allowed to have a firearm. Id. at 1020-22. We concluded that the record established that Reed knew he was a felon, and so he could not prove that the errors affected his substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his proceedings. Id. at 1022; see also United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d 1322, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2020) (concluding that the defendants had failed to show a reasonable probability that the Rehaif error affected the outcome of their trial, reasoning that they had both “previously served lengthy sentences for felony convictions” and emphasizing that both “stipulated to their prior felonies, presumably to keep the jury from hearing any details of those convictions”). Like in Reed, Hollie cannot establish that his substantial rights were affected. “As the reviewing court, we may consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on [Hollie’s] substantial rights.” Reed, 941 F.3d at 1021 (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a whole, the record shows that Hollie had been convicted of multiple prior felony offenses, had actually served several sentences of more than 12 months’ imprisonment, and had stipulated that he had been convicted of a felony and had not had his civil rights restored. Further, with respect to the instant offense, Hollie had attempted to hide 9 Case: 18-13060 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 10 of 14 the firearm as the police approached him—evidencing his knowledge that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm. There is ample evidence in the record showing that Hollie knew of his status as a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm in this case. Thus, he has failed to show a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the error in the indictment and cannot establish that his substantial rights were affected. See Reed, 941 F.3d at 1022. As to Hollie’s challenge to the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the knowledge of status element, we note that Hollie proposed jury instructions jointly with the government. By specifically requesting these jury instructions, he has invited any error and has waived his right to challenge the district court’s failure to use a different instruction. See United Sates v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1240 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Fulford, 267 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001). For these reasons, we affirm Hollie’s conviction.