Opinion ID: 179811
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Resisting and Obstructing an Officer

Text: On remand, the government argued that defendant's conviction for resisting and obstructing an officer may be counted as a second crime of violence. Defendant pleaded guilty to resisting and obstructing an officer in violation of former Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.479 (2001), which made it unlawful to: knowingly and willfully obstruct, resist or oppose any sheriff, ... or other officer or person duly authorized, in serving, or attempting to serve or execute any process, rule or order made or issued by lawful authority, or who shall resist any officer in the execution of any ordinance, by law, or any rule, order or resolution made, issued, or passed ... or who shall assault, beat or wound any sheriff, ... or other officer duly authorized, while serving, or attempting to serve or execute any such process, rule or order, or for having served, or attempted to serve or execute the same, or who shall so obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound any of the above named officers, or any other person or persons authorized by law to maintain and preserve the peace, in their lawful acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the peace[.] This court has concluded, in reliance on Chambers, that a conviction for resisting and obstructing an officer under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81d, a related Michigan statute, is not categorically a crime of violence. United States v. Mosley, 575 F.3d 603, 606-07 (6th Cir.2009). As we explained in Mosley, the first and often key analytical step is determining whether the state-law definition of the offense involves just one category or two or more categories of crimes and that sometimes that choice requires the federal courts to draw distinctions that the state law on its face does not draw. Id. at 606 (citing Chambers, 129 S.Ct. at 690). Identifying at least one obvious fault line, we found that the Michigan resisting-and-obstructing statute contained at least two categoriesthose violations, on the one hand, involving an individual who physically injures an officer because he `assaults, batters, [or] wounds' the officer, and those, on the other hand, involving an individual who `obstructs' an officer through a `knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.' Id. at 607 (citations omitted). Moreover, we quickly concluded that a typical failure-to-comply obstruction offense would not qualify as a crime of violence because it does not involve comparable `purposeful, violent, and aggressive' conduct or create the same degree of risk of physical injury as the enumerated offenses. Id. (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 144, 128 S.Ct. 1581). The analysis in Mosley applies equally to defendant's conviction because the resisting and obstructing statute at issue likewise involves at least two categories of crimes, one of which is not categorically a crime of violence. See United States v. Blomquist, 356 Fed.Appx. 822, 827 (6th Cir.2009) (applying Mosley to conviction under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.479). Mosley dictates the answer to the Taylor question in this casethat the conviction does not categorically qualify as a crime of violencebut does not resolve the Shepard question. That is, in Mosley, we remanded for the government to have an opportunity to make a showing from reliable documents that the conviction necessarily constituted a crime of violence. 575 F.3d at 608. [8] Here, in contrast, the record already includes the charging document, the judgment of conviction, and the plea colloquy from which we may determine the nature of the offense. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254. In particular, during the plea colloquy, defendant explained that he had been a passenger in a car that was the subject of a traffic stop and had run away from the officer to avoid being arrested on outstanding warrants. These records show, and the government does not dispute, that defendant's conviction was for violation of the knowing-failure-to-comply portion of the resisting and obstructing statute. Accord United States v. Love, 364 Fed.Appx. 955, 958-59 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that defendant who ran away from police in handcuffs committed the offense of obstruction through a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command). Thus, defendant's conviction for resisting and obstructing an officer does not qualify as a crime of violence.