Opinion ID: 1664197
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Relevant Time Period

Text: The landowners' nuisance, negligence, and trespass claims are based on the presence of methane and garbage on their properties allegedly caused by the City's negligent maintenance of the landfill. The original complaint states that [t]he [City's] maintenance operation of the landfill and the escapage [sic] of methane gas constitutes a continuing nuisance. Additionally the second amended complaint, which added the negligence claim, states that [t]he City knew, or should have known, it was unlawfully maintaining waste materials at the Landfill and in its vicinity, in a manner that caused, and will continue to cause, the generation, discharge migration and escape of potentially explosive gases. The landowners' trespass claims are based on (1) the disposal of waste and landfill material on their properties as recently as November 2005, and (2) the presence of landfill gases, including methane, on their properties. The City argues that the landowners' tort claims are barred by two separate statutes of limitations because, it says, the claims accrued, if at all, more than eight years before the landowners notified the City of their claims. First, the City argues that the nuisance and negligence claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims in § 6-2-38, Ala.Code 1975, and that the trespass claims are barred by the six-year statute of limitations in § 6-2-34, Ala.Code 1975. The City further contends that all the tort claims are barred by the municipal non-claim statute, § 11-47-23, Ala.Code 1975, which provides that tort claims seeking damages from a municipality must be presented to the City within six months from the accrual thereof or shall be barred. Applying this six-month limitation to the date on which the landowners notified the City of their claims  March 19, 2002  the City contends that all the landowners' claims that accrued before September 19, 2001, are time-barred. The City further argues that the tort claims based on the presence of methane are time-barred because, it argues, the claims accrued no later than 1994 when methane was detected on all the landowners' properties. The City notes that under Alabama law, a `statute [of limitations] begins to run whether or not the full amount of damages is apparent at the time of the first legal injury.' Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516, 519 (Ala.1979) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Stuart-McCorkle, Inc., 291 Ala. 601, 608, 285 So.2d 468, 473 (1973)). Thus, the City contends that a new statute of limitations did not begin to run when additional levels of methane were detected later. However, Garrett dealt with an alleged wrongful act, toxic exposure, that was not ongoing when the action commenced. In this case, we deal with the continuous and ongoing migration of methane from the landfill, which the landowners assert does not continue solely because of the previously completed activity of the City in depositing waste, but because of the City's negligent maintenance of the landfill site in the years after it had ceased to deposit waste at the landfill. Because it is undisputed that methane was detected by no later than 1994 and it is further undisputed that methane continues to be present on the landowners' property, the issue as to the bar of limitations turns on whether the continuing emission of methane gas within the period on and after September 19, 2001, constituted a violation of a legal duty owed the landowners by the City. If a duty exists, the claims accruing after that date are actionable.