Opinion ID: 2352091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: lesser-included criminal homicide offenses

Text: In describing his conduct that caused Buchter's death, Appellant consistently denied that he intended to kill Buchter. In his alleged statement to Anderson, Appellant specifically stated that he did not intend to kill Buchter. In his videotaped statement, Appellant first stated: I started panicking. I started swinging the tire tool up and down ... the weapon that I had. I think I hit him more than I thought I did. And later stated: I don't know how many times I hit him. I was drinking and I got scared ... nervous, uh, you know. Like he was gonna hit me or something, so I just started swinging the pipe. Didn't mean to hit him with it. Although the jury was certainly free to infer from the circumstances that Appellant intended to cause Buchter's death, we hold that the Appellant's statements quoted above also permitted reasonable doubts as to his state of mind at the time he allegedly killed Buchter, and thus required the trial court to instruct the jury as to First and Second-Degree Manslaughter. [46] Again, Appellant specifically denied any intent to kill in his alleged statement to Anderson. And, in his videotaped confession, Appellant stated, I think I hit him more than I thought I did. These statements, considered in the context of Appellant's explanation that he began hitting Buchter only after the man began screaming, reasonably permits the inference that Appellant struck Buchter not with the intention of killing him, but with the intention of incapacitating him to stop his screamingi.e. under circumstances that could constitute either First or Second-Degree Manslaughter. A finding of First-Degree Manslaughter would be proper if the jury found that Appellant caused Buchter's death while intending only to cause him serious physical injury. [47] A finding of Second-Degree Manslaughter would be proper if the jury believed that Appellant unintentionally caused Buchter's death while consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [death] [would] occur [48] when he struck him repeatedly with the weapon. Although we believe the jury could reasonably have returned a verdict for either First or Second-Degree Manslaughter, we do not believe it reasonably could have concluded that Appellant failed to appreciate the risk that his repeated blows to Buchter's head would cause Buchter's death, [49] and thus the trial court properly denied Appellant's request for a Reckless Homicide instruction.