Opinion ID: 1545753
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First-degree murder as the sole available offense

Text: Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could find Appellant guilty of a lesser offense than first-degree murder. He relies on Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), which held that, where the prosecution seeks a conviction for a capital offense, the jury must be instructed concerning a third option between conviction on such charge and full acquittal, whereby the defendant can still be found guilty of a violent felony, but one that is not capital in nature. The Court reasoned that failing to provide such an option may enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. See id. at 637, 100 S.Ct. at 2389. The present case, however, is readily distinguishable from Beck. First, the Commonwealth lacked authority to retry Appellant for second-or third-degree murder, as his convictions for those offenses were left undisturbed. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 455, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3159, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984) (clarifying that, where no lesser-included offense is available, the Beck rule does not apply because an instruction on such an offense would detract from, rather than enhance, the rationality of the process). Also, the trial court in the present case informed the jury that an acquittal would not result in Appellant being placed at liberty. The court instructed: The only issue that you'll have to decide during this trial is whether [Appellant] is guilty of first degree murder. If you decide that he is not guilty of first degree murder, [Appellant] will not be released from custody. He will receive a life sentence from this Court for another degree of murder in connection with the death of Anthony Milano.... In this case everyone agrees or it is conceded that Anthony Milano is dead and that [Appellant] killed him. The sole issue for your determination is whether [Appellant] did so with the specific intent to kill and with malice. N.T. Feb. 7, 2007, at 23-24. [7] Thus, unlike in Beck, the jury was aware that an acquittal of first-degree murder would result in Appellant's continued incarceration for a lower degree of murder. Even if a Beck issue were present, moreover, it is waived because Appellant specifically requested that the court instruct the jury in the precise manner that he now challenges. See id. at 11-12. Still, Appellant posits that, because the above instruction was provided at the beginning of a week-long trial, by the time the jurors retired to deliberate they might have forgotten that Appellant would remain incarcerated even if they returned a not-guilty verdict. See Brief for Appellant at 24-25. It is settled law that, absent evidence to the contrary, the jury is presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions, see Commonwealth v. O'Hannon, 557 Pa. 256, 262, 732 A.2d 1193, 1196 (1999), and Appellant does not point to any evidence to the contrary. In suggesting that the jurors might have forgotten the substance of the above charge, moreover, Appellant overlooks that his attorney, in the guilt-phase summation, reiterated to the jury that [t]he defendant is guilty of murder. He along with Frank Chester killed Anthony Milano. There's no question about it. There's no issue about it. He will spend the rest of his life in jail regardless of your decision in this case.  N.T. Feb. 9, 2007, at 6 (emphasis added). This undermines the factual basis for any assertion predicated upon possible juror forgetfulness.