Opinion ID: 609180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Daniel R.R. test

Text: 61 In Part II of this opinion, we outlined three factors that should be considered by a court in determining whether a child with disabilities can be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom (the first part of the Daniel R.R. test): (1) whether the school district has made reasonable efforts to accommodate the child in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services; (2) a comparison of the educational benefits available in a regular class and the benefits provided in a special education class; and (3) the possible negative effects of inclusion on the other students in the class. We now consider each of these factors, looking to the relevant fact findings of the district court to determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous, and if not, whether they support the district court's ultimate legal conclusion that the School District violated the mainstreaming requirement of IDEA. 62 As to the first factor, the district court found that the School District made only negligible efforts to include Rafael in a regular classroom. Specifically, the court found that during the 1989-90 school year, the only period during which the School District mainstreamed Rafael in a regular classroom, the School District placed Rafael in the developmental kindergarten class without a curriculum plan, without a behavior management plan, and without providing adequate special education support to the teacher. Oberti II, 801 F.Supp. at 1402; see also id. at 1396, 1398. Further, the court found that the School District has since refused to include Rafael in a regular classroom largely based on the behavioral problems experienced by Rafael in the kindergarten class during the 1989-90 school year. Id. at 1396, 1403. For the 1990-91 year, the court found that Rafael was placed in a segregated class with no meaningful mainstreaming opportunities, id. at 1397, and that [t]he School District's consideration of less restrictive alternatives for the 1990-91 school year was perfunctory. Id. at 1396. 63 There is very little evidence in the record that conflicts with these findings. The School District produced some evidence that the kindergarten teacher and the school psychologist attempted to modify the curriculum in that class and to come up with methods of controlling Rafael's behavior problems. See supra n. 7. However, the record reflects that the School District had access to information and expertise about specific methods and services to enable children with disabilities like Rafael to be included in a regular classroom, see supra at 1211, but that the School District did not provide such supplementary aids and services for Rafael in the kindergarten class. 27 64 Rafael's IEP for the 1989-90 school year included no provisions for supplementary aids and services in the kindergarten class aside from stating that there will be modification of regular class expectations to reflect Rafael's disability. The only goal provided for the regular kindergarten teacher was to facilitate Rafael's adjustment to the kindergarten classroom. After reviewing this IEP along with the rest of Rafael's education records, Dr. McGregor testified that no supplementary aids and services were provided for Rafael in the 1989-90 kindergarten class. See supra n. 9. 65 Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the School District gave any serious consideration to including Rafael in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services after the 1989-90 school year; and the School District does not appear to dispute this fact. Further, Nancy Leech, the Winslow speech therapist (and one of the School District's witnesses) admitted that Rafael had not been included in any school programs with nondisabled children at Winslow, apart from attending lunch and school assemblies. 66 In view of the foregoing, the district court's finding that the School District has not taken meaningful steps to try to include Rafael in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services is not clearly erroneous. We also note that the district court did not fail to give due weight to the agency proceedings on this issue since the ALJ did not even consider whether the School District had made efforts to include Rafael in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services, as is required by IDEA. See Greer, 950 F.2d at 698 (school district's determination that child with Down's syndrome would receive more benefit in a segregated special education class is due no deference because school officials failed to consider what benefits she would receive from education in a regular classroom with appropriate supplemental aids and services.) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the School District's failure to give adequate consideration to including Rafael in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services supports the district court's legal conclusion that the School District violated IDEA. 67 As to the second factor--a comparison of the educational benefits of the segregated placement in Winslow with the benefits Rafael could obtain from placement in a regular classroom--the district court found that [v]arious experts who testified on Rafael's behalf have convincingly refuted the School District's assertion that such services could not be delivered within the matrix of a regular education class without disrupting the class or converting it into a special education class. Oberti II, 801 F.Supp. at 1403 n. 17. The court also found that Rafael would benefit academically and socially from inclusion in a regular classroom. Id. at 1404. Moreover, the district court found, based on expert testimony, that nondisabled children in the class will likewise benefit from the inclusion of Rafael in a regular classroom. Id. at 1404; see also supra n. 24. 68 The School District points to some evidence in the record that conflicts with these findings. Specifically, Dr. Urban testified for the School District that, in his opinion, a regular teacher would not be able to communicate with Rafael and that a regular curriculum would have to be modified beyond recognition to accommodate Rafael. See supra Part I.C. However, the Obertis' experts, Drs. Brown and McGregor, described various commonly applied methods that could be used to educate Rafael in a regular classroom and testified that, although Rafael has severe intellectual disabilities, a regular teacher with appropriate training would be able to communicate effectively with Rafael. See supra Parts I.B & C. They testified that many of the special education techniques used in the segregated Winslow class could be imported successfully into a regular classroom and that the regular teacher could be trained to apply these techniques. Id. Further, the Obertis' experts testified at length that inclusion in a classroom with nondisabled students would benefit Rafael substantially. Id. In addition, Amy Goldman testified that speech and language therapy not only could be provided in a regular classroom, but would be more effective for Rafael in an integrated setting. See supra Part I.C. 69 In short, the parties' experts disagreed on the respective benefits of a segregated versus an integrated placement for Rafael, and the district court was in a better position than we are to evaluate their testimony. We therefore defer to that court's findings, which, at all events, are not clearly erroneous. We note also that the district court did not fail to give due weight to the agency proceedings on this factor since the court's findings were based largely on new expert testimony that was not before the ALJ. Additionally, we agree with the district court's legal conclusion that, although including Rafael in a regular classroom would require the School District to modify the curriculum, the need for such modification is not a legitimate basis upon which to justify excluding a child from the regular classroom unless the education of other students is significantly impaired. Oberti II, 801 F.Supp. at 1403; see also 34 C.F.R. Part 300, App.C Question 48 (school must set forth in the IEP any modifications of the regular education program necessary to accommodate a disabled child). Thus, a comparison of the educational benefits of a segregated versus an integrated placement for Rafael supports the district court's conclusion that the School District's selection of a segregated placement did not comply with IDEA. 70 As to the third factor--the potentially disruptive effect of Rafael's presence on the other children in a regular classroom--the record again contains conflicting evidence. The School District presented numerous witnesses before both the ALJ and the district court who testified to Rafael's extremely disruptive behavior in the 1989-90 kindergarten class and in several other teaching environments. See supra Parts I.B & C. In contrast, the Obertis' experts Drs. McGregor and Brown evaluated Rafael and testified that in their opinion he would not at that point in time (nearly two years after Rafael's experience in the kindergarten class) cause any significant disruption in a regular classroom if provided with adequate supplementary aids and services, such as the assistance of an itinerant instructor with special education training, special education training for the regular teacher, modification of some of the academic curriculum to accommodate Rafael's disabilities, parallel instruction to allow him to learn at his academic level, and use of a resource room. 71 After evaluating the evidence on both sides, the district court found that [t]here is nothing in the record which would suggest that at this point in time Rafael would present similar behavior problems if provided with an adequate level of supplementary aids and related services within the matrix of a regular education class. In fact, the record supports the opposite conclusion. Oberti II, 801 F.Supp. at 1403 (emphasis added). The court found that the behavioral problems Rafael experienced during the 1989-90 school year in the developmental kindergarten class were exacerbated and remained uncontained due to the inadequate level of services provided there, that Rafael's behavioral problems were diminished in settings where an adequate level of supplementary aids and services were provided, and that both the School District and the ALJ improperly justified Rafael's exclusion from less restrictive placements in subsequent years based upon those behavior problems. Id. 72 Although the School District presented ample evidence of Rafael's disruptive behavior in the 1989-90 kindergarten class, the Obertis' evidence supports the district court's finding that Rafael would not have had such severe behavior problems had he been provided with adequate supplementary aids and services in that kindergarten class, and that Rafael (who at the time of the district court trial was two years older than when he attended the kindergarten class) would most likely not present such problems if he were included in a regular class at that time. We therefore conclude that the district court's findings on this issue are not clearly erroneous, and, accordingly, that consideration of the possible negative effects of Rafael's presence on the regular classroom environment does not support the School District's decision to exclude him from the regular classroom. 73 We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to defer to the findings of the ALJ on the issue of whether Rafael would significantly disrupt a regular classroom. As the court noted, the ALJ's findings were largely and improperly based upon Rafael's behavior problems in the developmental kindergarten, as well as upon his intellectual limitations, without proper consideration of the inadequate level of supplementary aids and services provided by the School District. Oberti II, 801 F.Supp. at 1404 (emphasis added). 28 74 For all of these reasons, we agree with the district court's conclusion that the School District did not meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Rafael could not be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services. We will therefore affirm the district court's decision that the School District has violated the mainstreaming requirement of IDEA. Because we have come to this conclusion based on application of the first part of the Daniel R.R. two-part test, we need not apply the second part of the test (whether the child has been included in programs with nondisabled children whenever possible). 29 We note, however, that in the event that the Child Study Team were to determine in designing an IEP for Rafael in the future that education in a regular classroom with supplementary aids and services could not be achieved satisfactorily at that time and therefore would not be required under IDEA, the Team would then have to satisfy the second part of the Daniel R.R. test, ensuring that Rafael is included in regular school programs with nondisabled students whenever possible. 30 75 Finally, in affirming the district court's order that the School District develop a more inclusive program for Rafael in compliance with IDEA for the upcoming school year, we emphasize that neither this court nor the district court is mandating a specific IEP for Rafael. 31 The development of Rafael's IEP, and the specific nature of his placement, is, of course, the job of the Child Study Team. 76 The order of the district court will be affirmed.