Opinion ID: 2782886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: fifth amendment miranda claim

Text: Relying primarily on Edwards, Innis, and Roberson, Everett argues that once he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda on November 14, 2001, the police officers were totally prohibited from ever having any further communication or dealings with him without counsel present. Everett contends that this absolute prohibition requires suppression of his November 27 confession and renders his written consent to the DNA samples legally ineffective and thus invalid. As to the DNA, Everett argues this absolute prohibition applies regardless of whether the police DNA request constituted interrogation and regardless of whether the police sought testimonial evidence. Alternatively, even if the Supreme Court has not extended the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment beyond interrogation, Everett argues that the record in this case shows that the police officers did interrogate Everett in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Based largely on Innis and Roberson, Everett contends that the police subjected him to interrogation surrounding the request for DNA consent and the service of the warrant as part of a method of “indirect interrogation” that involved “psychological ploys” meant to break his will. 54 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 55 of 87 We review the relevant Supreme Court case law regarding invocation of the right to counsel, custodial interrogations, DNA requests, and the Fifth Amendment’s protection of testimonial communications. We then examine whether the Florida Supreme Court’s decision—concluding no Fifth Amendment violation occurred in Everett’s case—was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as shown in Supreme Court holdings.
Under the Fifth Amendment, no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Therefore, in Miranda, the Supreme Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612. Thus, when an individual is taken into custody and subjected to questioning, police must warn him prior to any questioning that he has the rights to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney. Id. at 478-79, 86 S. Ct. at 1630. Then, in Mosley, the Supreme Court held that “the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S. Ct. at 326. The Supreme 55 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 56 of 87 Court concluded that the defendant’s “right to cut off questioning” was fully respected in this case because police immediately ceased the initial interrogation after the defendant invoked his right to silence, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation. Id. at 104-06, 96 S. Ct. at 326-27.12
Subsequently, in Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, the Supreme Court “set forth a ‘bright-line rule’ that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98, 105 S. Ct. 490, 494 (1984). Specifically, once the accused has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,” he should not be “subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless [he] himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885. 13 Thus, the Edwards rule 12 In Mosley, a police officer advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and interrogated him concerning some robberies, but the officer promptly ceased the interrogation when the defendant said he did not wish to answer any questions. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 97, 96 S. Ct. at 323. However, several hours later, another officer advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and questioned him about a different crime, a homicide, prompting Mosely to make an incriminating statement. Id. at 97-98, 96 S. Ct. at 323-24. 13 In Edwards, the defendant requested counsel after police took him into custody and started interrogating him. 451 U.S. at 478-79, 101 S. Ct. at 1881-82. The police stopped interrogating the defendant at that point, but they reinitiated questioning the following morning, 56 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 57 of 87 involves two separate inquiries: first, “whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel”; and second, “if the accused invoked his right to counsel, courts may admit his responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.” Smith, 469 U.S. at 95, 105 S. Ct. at 492-93. With respect to the waiver inquiry, “a valid waiver . . . cannot be established by showing only that [the accused] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S. Ct. at 1884-85. Rather, for a waiver to be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, (1) “the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception”; and (2) “the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420-21, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1140-41 (1986) (discussing the waiver of a suspect’s Miranda rights to be “fully apprise[d] . . . of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, and . . . to remain silent and to have counsel prompting the defendant to confess his crime. Id. at 479, 101 S. Ct. at 1882. The defendant did not reinitiate further communications, exchanges, or interactions with the police. See id. The Supreme Court held that the admission of the defendant’s confession against him at trial violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed in Miranda. Id. at 480, 101 S. Ct. at 188283. 57 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 58 of 87 present if he so desires” (quotation omitted and alterations adopted)). For a court to conclude that a defendant waived his Miranda rights, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation must reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension. Id. “[O]ne, but not the only, measure of the voluntariness of a defendantinitiated confession is the . . . measure of whether a sufficient period of time has elapsed since the termination of police questioning for the defendant to have rationally reflected on the choice before him.” Henderson v. Singletary, 968 F.2d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 1992). Where a defendant initiated further conversation with the police, “[c]ourts must . . . satisfy themselves that the defendant-initiated confession was not the product of improper police questioning or pressure.” Id. Moreover, “even if a conversation taking place after the accused has expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is initiated by the accused, where reinterrogation follows, the burden remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation.” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 2834 (1983) (plurality) (quotation omitted). In Roberson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the bright-line Edwards rule that, after a person in custody invokes the right to counsel, the police may not subject him “to further interrogation . . . until counsel has been made available to 58 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 59 of 87 him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Roberson, 486 U.S. at 680-82, 108 S. Ct. at 209798 (emphasis added and quotation omitted).
In Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, the Supreme Court defined the meaning of “interrogation” under Miranda. In that case, police officers advised the defendant of his Miranda rights upon arresting him on the street in connection with a robbery and murder committed with a sawed-off shotgun, and the defendant stated that he wanted to speak with a lawyer. Innis, 446 U.S. at 294, 100 S. Ct. at 1686. Immediately thereafter, while transporting the defendant to the police station, three officers had a conversation among themselves concerning the possible danger posed to “handicapped” children playing in the area by the missing murder weapon. Id. at 294-95, 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87. Overhearing this, the defendant interrupted the conversation and instructed the officers to return to the scene of his arrest, where he directed them to the location of the murder weapon out of concern for “the kids in the area.” Id. at 295, 100 S. Ct. at 1687 (quotation omitted). On certiorari review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had not been “interrogated” within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 302-03, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91. The Supreme Court held that “the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda 59 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 60 of 87 refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612).14 In defining “interrogation” in Innis, the Supreme Court noted that the concern of the Miranda Court “was that the ‘interrogation environment’ created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would ‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination.” Id. at 299, 100 S. Ct. at 1688. The police “techniques of persuasion” that caused this concern extended beyond “express questioning” and included the use of “coached witnesses,” as follows: For example, one of the practices discussed in Miranda was the use of line-ups in which a coached witness would pick the defendant as the perpetrator. This was designed to establish that the defendant was in fact guilty as a predicate for further interrogation. A variation on this theme discussed in Miranda was the so-called “reverse line-up” in which a defendant would be identified by coached witnesses as the 14 In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990), the Supreme Court recognized a “routine booking exception” to Miranda’s coverage for questions to secure the defendant’s “biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services,” such as questions regarding name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600-02, 110 S. Ct. at 2649-50 (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court reasoned that, where such questions are “requested for record-keeping purposes only” and therefore “appear reasonably related to the police’s administrative concerns,” the questions “fall outside the protections of Miranda and the answers thereto need not be suppressed.” Id. at 60102, 110 S. Ct. at 2638. 60 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 61 of 87 perpetrator of a fictitious crime, with the object of inducing him to confess to the actual crime of which he was suspected in order to escape the false prosecution. The Court in Miranda also included in its survey of interrogation practices the use of psychological ploys, such as to “posi[t]” “the guilt of the subject,” to “minimize the moral seriousness of the offense,” and “to cast blame on the victim or on society.” It is clear that these techniques of persuasion, no less than express questioning, were thought, in a custodial setting, to amount to interrogation. Id. at 299, 100 S. Ct. at 1688-89 (emphasis added). Thus, in Innis the Supreme Court held, “Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Id. at 300-01, 100 S. Ct. at 1689. In concluding that the officers’ comments were not the functional equivalent of interrogation, the Supreme Court observed that nothing in the record suggested that the officers should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant. Id. at 302-03, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91. In addition to these cases discussing what constitutes “interrogation,” we must also review the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination. 3. Scope of the Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination The privilege against self-incrimination protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled “testimonial” communications. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 207, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2345 (1988) (quotation omitted and 61 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 62 of 87 emphasis added) (holding that the court-ordered signing of consent forms by the target of a grand jury investigation to authorize foreign banks to disclose records of his accounts was not testimonial). “[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself.” Id. at 210, 108 S. Ct. at 2347 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has held that certain compelled acts, though incriminating, are not within the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment because they are not testimonial or of a communicative nature, including providing a handwriting exemplar, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67, 87 S. Ct. 1951 (1967); furnishing a blood sample, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760-65, 86 S. Ct. at 1830-33;15 providing a voice exemplar, United States v. 15 Schmerber also raised a Fourth Amendment claim. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766, 86 S. Ct. at 1833. The Supreme Court held that the police officer did not violate Schmerber’s Fourth Amendment rights by taking a blood sample without a warrant because, inter alia, the diminishing alcohol in Schmerber’s blood presented an emergency and the threatened destruction of evidence. Id. at 770-71, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36. In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the majority held that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not present a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases. Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1556. Instead, the McNeely majority held, exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. A number of state courts had interpreted Schmerber as a per se rule under the Fourth Amendment, see id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 n.2, but the McNeely majority went to great lengths to interpret Schmerber as also using a “totality of the circumstances” approach. One state court has held that McNeely announced a new rule of law for purposes of state habeas petitions because it “broke new ground,” Siers v. Weber, 2014 S.D. 51, ¶ 17 (S.D. 2014), and for this reason Westlaw has Schmerber flagged as abrogated by McNeely as recognized in Siers. 62 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 63 of 87 Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7, 93 S. Ct. 764, 768 (1973); standing in a lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1930 (1967); or wearing particular clothing, Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53, 31 S. Ct. 2, 6 (1910). Similarly, “the ‘right’ to counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not absolute.” Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686 n.6, 108 S. Ct. at 2100 n.6. If police decide not to “provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S. Ct. at 1628.
Turning to Everett’s case, we address the Florida Supreme Court’s decision as to the November 19 DNA samples and then as to his November 27 confession. As to the DNA consent, Everett has not demonstrated that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision—that the request for consent to collect DNA samples did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights—“was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any However, based on the McNeely majority’s analysis and purported following of Schmerber and related precedent, we do not read McNeely as abrogating, even in part, Schmerber. In any event, Everett consented to the DNA sample, and this appeal does not involve a Fourth Amendment claim. 63 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 64 of 87 possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. First, although Everett twice invoked his right to counsel under Miranda while in custody, the Florida Supreme Court correctly concluded that the appointment of counsel was not required except for interrogation. Everett I, 893 So. 2d at 1284; see Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485-86, 101 S. Ct. at 1885 (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation. Absent such interrogation, there would have been no infringement of the right that Edwards invoked . . . .”). Simply put, the police officers were not forbidden contact with Everett that did not amount to interrogation—that is, express questioning or words or actions that the police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit a verbal incriminating response. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90; Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 380-82, 130 S. Ct. at 2259-60. Indeed, the Supreme Court excludes from the definition of “interrogation” those police communications “normally attendant to arrest and custody.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90. Second, the Florida Supreme Court also reasonably concluded that the request for DNA consent did not amount to interrogation. Everett I, 893 So. 2d at 1286. The privilege against self-incrimination extends only to compelled testimonial communications, which are those communications that relate a factual 64 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 65 of 87 assertion or disclose information. Doe, 487 U.S. at 207, 210, 108 S. Ct. at 2345, 2347. Thus, neither the furnishing of consent to collect DNA, nor the DNA evidence itself, is testimonial or communicative. See id. at 210, 108 S. Ct. at 2347. In addition, DNA collection by police is not interrogation of a suspect because it is not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating verbal response. Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the request for DNA consent— even though it followed Everett’s invocation of his right to counsel under Miranda—did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. 16 We recognize that Everett argues that once he invoked his right to counsel under Miranda the police were prohibited from having any further communication or dealings with him without counsel present. The cases relied on by Everett in support of this argument—Edwards, Mosley, Roberson, and Innis—provide no indication, and certainly do not clearly establish, that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel extends beyond interrogation or that police must cease all further communication with a detained individual in the absence of an attorney after he invokes his right to counsel. Rather, the Supreme Court in these cases consistently 16 To the extent that Everett’s contends that service of the arrest warrant constituted interrogation, we summarily conclude that the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that the service of the warrant did not amount to interrogation. Everett I, 893 So. 2d at 1286. Sergeant Tilley’s service of the arrest warrant was part of routine police procedure normally attendant to custody, and Tilley would not reasonably have expected service of the arrest warrant to elicit an incriminating response, as a response from Everett was not even required. Cf. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302, 100 S. Ct. at 1690 (reasoning that a conversation was merely “a dialogue between the two officers to which no response from the [defendant] was invited”). 65 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 66 of 87 held only that interrogation must cease in such circumstances. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 680-82, 108 S. Ct. at 2097-98; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885; Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-03, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91; Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 n.10, 96 S. Ct. at 326 n.10. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Roberson specifically noted that the police officers in that case were free to have communications with the defendant that did not constitute interrogation even after he requested counsel. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687, 108 S. Ct. at 2101. Contrary to Everett’s allegations, there is no record evidence that the police asked Everett any questions about the Bailey homicide when Officer Murphy gave Everett the DNA consent form to sign. And it was Officer Murphy in Alabama, and not Sergeant Tilley, who gave Everett the DNA consent form to sign. At oral argument, Everett’s counsel stressed that Sergeant Tilley testified in his deposition that, when Tilley asked Officer Murphy to collect Everett’s DNA samples, Murphy indicated that he was already planning “to go back and talk to [Everett]” concerning another case unrelated to the Bailey homicide investigation. However, no record evidence establishes that Murphy actually approached Everett to discuss the unrelated matter or in fact said something to Everett concerning that unrelated 66 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 67 of 87 matter. Instead, the record shows only that Murphy approached Everett simply to ask for Everett’s consent to provide DNA samples. 17 In sum, we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent in determining that a request for consent to collect DNA samples from a defendant in custody who has invoked the right to counsel was not an interrogation, did not procure any testimonial communication, and did not run afoul of Miranda and its progeny. See Everett I, 893 So. 2d at 1285-87.
The Florida Supreme Court could have also reasonably concluded that the factual circumstances surrounding Everett’s November 27 confession did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights. As noted earlier, Everett invoked his right to counsel on November 14, 2001. The record shows, however, that on both November 19 and 27 Everett did two things: (1) Everett initiated further discussions with the police officers, and (2) Everett voluntarily, knowingly, and 17 Everett also alleges that because Sergeant Tilley and Lieutenant Lindsey made parting comments to Everett on November 14, those comments should be viewed as continuing interrogation on November 19, even though only Officer Murphy gave Everett the DNA consent form and even though five days had intervened. There is no Supreme Court case remotely supporting that proposition. 67 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 68 of 87 intelligently waived his right to counsel. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 95, 105 S. Ct. at 492-93; see Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.18
Although only the November 27 confession was introduced at trial, Everett focuses on what happened on November 19 before that confession on November 27. So we do too. Everett contends that the officers’ actions between November 14 and November 27, including the request for consent to collect DNA samples, constituted an ongoing effort to coerce and indirectly interrogate him, ultimately culminating in his November 27 confession. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances leading up to his November 27 confession was before the Florida Supreme Court and thus is considered here. The record shows, as an initial matter, that Sergeant Tilley and Lieutenant Lindsey ended the November 14 interview as soon as Everett requested the presence of an attorney. Consistent with Edwards, the officers did not resume 18 Everett also contends, based on Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S. Ct. 321, that the police did not “scrupulously honor” his invocation of his right to counsel. See id. at 96, 96 S. Ct. at 326 (“We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’”). However, Mosley was a “right to silence” case, and “right to silence” and “right to counsel” cases do not involve identical inquiries. See Christopher v. Florida, 824 F.2d 836, 844 (11th Cir. 1987). The invocation of the right to counsel requires the police to cease interrogation until an attorney is present or the suspect voluntary reinitiates questioning, Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885, while invocation of the right to silence does not prevent the police from later reinitiating questioning as long as they “scrupulously honored” the suspect’s right to remain silent, Mosley, 423 U.S.at 104, 96 S. Ct. at 326. Nothing in Mosley shows the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 68 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 69 of 87 questioning of Everett until after Everett both voluntarily initiated further discussion and voluntarily waived his previously invoked right to counsel. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 95, 105 S. Ct. at 492-93. Specifically, as to Everett’s initiation of further police communications, there is no allegation (much less evidence) of improper police contact between November 14 and 19. Then, on November 19, Everett told Officer Murphy that he wished to provide a name to point Sergeant Tilley in the right direction. After Officer Murphy immediately advised Everett of his Miranda rights orally and in writing, Everett again clearly stated that he wished to offer further information and would give a statement to either Officer Murphy or Sergeant Tilley. We recognize that Officer Murphy initiated contact with Everett on November 19 to request consent for the DNA collection, but this non-interrogatory contact did not run afoul of Edwards, as discussed supra, and does not change the fact that Everett himself initiated his November 19 statement about pointing Sergeant Tilley in the right direction. And, before taking his November 19 statement in that regard, Officer Murphy again read Everett his Miranda rights, and Everett stated that he understood his rights and was willing to speak with Murphy. Moreover, during his November 19 statement, Everett clearly was attempting to point Sergeant Tilley in the direction of Bubba as the killer to exculpate himself. 69 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 70 of 87 Significantly too, Officer Murphy and Sergeant Tilley immediately ended the November 19 interview as soon as Everett requested counsel. As to Everett’s waiver of his right to counsel (right before he made the November 19 statement), the state court record amply shows that Everett both voluntarily waived this right and voluntarily made his November 19 statement. First, as detailed above, the officers repeatedly advised Everett of his Miranda rights prior to taking his November 19 statement. Second, in his November 19 statement, Everett indicated that it was a conversation with his mother, and not any pressure from police, that prompted him to make the statement to “get it off [his] chest.” Third, the fact that aspects of the November 19 statement were exculpatory, in that Everett suggested that Bubba was the killer and provided an explanation for the presence of his DNA on the victim, further suggests that Everett volunteered the statement. Cf. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S. Ct. at 1141 (holding that courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances” in determining whether a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was voluntarily (quotation omitted)). Finally, and importantly, a significant period of time, around five days, elapsed between Everett’s November 14 invocation of his right to counsel and his initiation of the November 19 statement, giving Everett time to have rationally reflected on the choice before him. Cf. id. And to repeat, in the district court, 70 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 71 of 87 Everett pointed to no evidence in the record before the Florida Supreme Court demonstrating that he was subjected to interrogation or other improper police pressure between his November 14 invocation of his right to counsel and his initiation of further communication with police on November 19. 19 In other words, the record does not show that the officers engaged in any of the “techniques of persuasion” that concerned the Miranda Court. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 299, 100 S. Ct. at 1688-89. In particular, requesting a DNA sample and service of an arrest warrant are routine police practices and not psychological ploys of persuasion.
The state court record also amply shows that Everett initiated his November 27 confession and knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel a second time. With regard to Everett’s initiation of the November 27 confession to Sergeant Tilley, Everett told Officer Murphy that he wished to speak with Sergeant Tilley before Tilley even arrived with the arrest warrant. After Sergeant Tilley served the arrest warrant on Everett, Everett confirmed that he wished to talk to 19 We decline to consider for the first time on appeal Everett’s argument, which he failed to properly raise in the district court, concerning Sergeant Tilley and Lieutenant Lindsey’s “good cop-bad cop” routine and their comments on November 14 that the murder was likely just a “burglary that went bad” and about “the State of Florida stick[ing] a needle in [his] arm.” See Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1120 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived). Although in the district court Everett raised an argument concerning Lindsey’s statement about “the State of Florida stick[ing] a needle in [his] arm” with regard to another claim not within the scope of the COA, he did not raise it in connection with the present claim. 71 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 72 of 87 Tilley. Even if Officer Murphy made the initial contact with Everett to move him to an interview room for Sergeant Tilley’s service of the arrest warrant, it was Everett who initiated further communication regarding his case. The record also demonstrates the voluntariness of Everett’s November 27 statement and waiver of his right to counsel. Most notably, Everett confirmed at the beginning of his November 27 statement that he had asked to speak to Sergeant Tilley without the presence of a lawyer. Nonetheless, Sergeant Tilley then reminded Everett again that he still had his rights under Miranda, and Everett indicated that he understood. Furthermore, more than a week had passed between Everett’s invocation of his right to counsel on November 19 and his initiation of his confession on November 27. And Everett indicated that it was his own conscience, and not any improper pressure on the part of the police, that motivated him to confess, as he stated that the victim’s death “ha[d] been going through [his] mind.” Indeed, Everett’s willingness to speak to the police was evidenced by the fact that he started confessing before Tilley even had a chance to turn on the tape recorder. We also reject Everett’s argument that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably rejected his Fifth Amendment claim because the DNA request and warrant service were “indirect interrogation” techniques that the police should have known were likely to elicit his verbal incriminating confession. The record 72 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 73 of 87 here shows just the opposite. For example, Everett told Officer Murphy he wanted to speak to Sergeant Tilley even before Tilley arrived with the arrest warrant. In any event, as noted, requesting the DNA samples and serving the arrest warrant are not police techniques designed to elicit a confession. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was a reasonable basis for the Florida Supreme Court’s decision affirming the denial of Everett’s motion to suppress as to the November 27 confession. The record established that (1) the officers did not subject Everett to interrogation prior to, or in connection with, either the request for consent to collect DNA samples or the service of the arrest warrant; (2) that Everett voluntarily initiated both interviews; and (3) that Everett knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 20 Because the Florida Supreme Court’s decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or the result of an unreasonable determination of the facts, Everett is not entitled to habeas relief on his Fifth Amendment claim. In conclusion, as to both the DNA consent and November 27 confession, Everett has not established that the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended 20 The Florida trial court made these explicit findings in denying Everett’s motion to suppress and the record fully supported them. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision discussed the DNA issues extensively but more summarily ruled on the November 27 confession issue. Instead of deferring to the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court, we ask whether there was any reasonable basis for the Florida Supreme Court’s decision as to the November 27 confession. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 73 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 74 of 87 in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. VIII. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN PENALTY PHASE A. The Strickland Standard Everett’s next claim is that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence during his penalty-phase trial. The Florida Supreme Court applied the Supreme Court’s two-pronged test announced in Strickland to this claim. Under Strickland, to establish constitutionally ineffective counsel, a defendant must show both (1) that his attorney’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003) (discussing Strickland); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Because we must view Everett’s ineffective-assistance claim—which is already governed by the deferential Strickland test—through the lens of AEDPA deference to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, our resulting standard of review is doubly deferential to that state court’s decision. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (“The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” (citations omitted)). B. Performance Prong Principles 74 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 75 of 87 The Strickland performance standard is objectively reasonable attorney conduct under prevailing professional norms. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521, 123 S. Ct. at 2535; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065 (“The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”). We look at what professional norms existed at the time that the attorney acted. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2009). To show that an attorney failed to discharge his Sixth Amendment duty, a petitioner must establish that the attorney’s conduct “amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). A petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of competent evidence, that counsel’s performance was unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 790 (“Strickland . . . calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of mind.”). Because it would be “all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable . . . a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. 75 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 76 of 87 Under the professional standards in place in 2002, when trial counsel represented Everett, a defense attorney in a capital case had a duty “to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary,” and to present at sentencing mitigating evidence uncovered during that investigation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-98, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1514-15 (2000) (counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel “did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background”). An attorney’s strategic choices “made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. However, “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690-91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. “In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation, . . . a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527, 123 S. Ct. at 2538. That said, no absolute duty exists to investigate particular facts or a certain line of defense. Instead, a court’s assessment of an attorney’s investigation hinges 76 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 77 of 87 on whether that investigation—or the decision to limit it—was reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. When assessing an attorney’s decision to limit an investigation, we must make “every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Although we must assess a decision not to investigate “for reasonableness in all the circumstances,” when doing so we apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. We keep in mind that a defense attorney preparing for the sentencing phase of a capital trial is not required “to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 382-83, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (2005). Rather, “reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think that further investigation would be a waste.” Id. at 383, 125 S. Ct. at 2463. C. Performance of Everett’s Trial Counsel After considering the state court record as a whole, we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision—that Everett had not proven that trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence were deficient performance—was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland and its progeny. In this appeal, Everett raises three main arguments concerning 77 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 78 of 87 trial counsel’s performance as to mitigation evidence, but none of these arguments shows that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland or its progeny. 1. Investigation of Mitigation Evidence Everett first contends trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable mitigation investigation because counsel delegated the task of locating mitigation evidence to his alcoholic father, Sidney; “did nothing” when Sidney passed away several months before trial; and unreasonably limited the scope of counsel’s investigation. But the Florida Supreme Court expressly determined that trial counsel did not simply rely on Sidney to develop mitigation evidence and did in fact interview potential mitigation witnesses following Sidney’s death. Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 479. Overwhelming record evidence supports the Florida Supreme Court’s determination. For example, trial counsel prepared for the possibility of a capital penalty phase from the time of his initial appointment to represent Everett. During his investigation, trial counsel and his investigator, both before and after Sidney’s death, among other tasks: (1) met with Everett multiple times to obtain Everett’s background information and the names of potential mitigation witnesses; (2) spoke with one of Everett’s sisters over the telephone about possibly testifying during the penalty phase; (3) traveled to Alabama to locate potential mitigation witnesses and 78 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 79 of 87 then interviewed all they found; (4) obtained Everett’s school and jail records; and (5) spoke with Everett’s principal and guidance counselor, his close friend growing up, one of his sisters and her husband, and another family friend. Trial counsel also had Dr. Rowan conduct a competency evaluation of Everett. Although trial counsel’s initial strategy was to rely on Sidney to find mitigation witnesses, trial counsel did not abandon his mitigation investigation after Sidney’s death. Instead, trial counsel and his investigator undertook to locate and interview all mitigation witnesses they could find, as described above. Trial counsel also did not limit his investigation to only Everett’s redeeming qualities, as Everett suggests. Rather, the record demonstrates that trial counsel reasonably stopped his investigation only after he kept running into “dead ends” and determined that no further helpful mitigation evidence was likely to be forthcoming. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383, 125 S. Ct. at 2463. It cannot be said that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was unreasonable, especially because “a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. 2. Psychological or Psychiatric Expert 79 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 80 of 87 Everett next contends that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to have a psychological or psychiatric expert conduct a mental health evaluation of him for mitigation purposes. As the Florida Supreme Court determined, Everett’s claim that trial counsel failed to consult with a psychological or psychiatric professional is factually incorrect because trial counsel had Dr. Rowan examine Everett for mental competency but decided that any further evaluation of Everett would be unfavorable to his case. See Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 482. Even if trial counsel Smith had Dr. Rowan examine Everett for competency only as a formality, as Everett insists, Smith reasonably declined to pursue additional mental health evaluation of Everett when Dr. Rowan reported that Everett showed “no signs of mental retardation or of a major illness” and advised against “a full Competence evaluation.” In addition, trial counsel Smith was a very experienced attorney in capital cases. Smith reasonably feared that additional mental health evidence actually would be unfavorable to Everett’s case, as he believed Everett had antisocial personality disorder and Dr. Rowan found that Everett exhibited a grandiosity and over-confidence that were likely a combination of immaturity, denial, and personality. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Everett’s ineffective-assistance claim about mental health evaluations was a reasonable application of Strickland. At a minimum, the Florida Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply any clearly established federal rule when it 80 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 81 of 87 concluded that trial counsel Smith’s performance was not deficient as to mental health mitigation evidence.
Finally, Everett asserts that trial counsel should have presented evidence of his drug use through a mental health expert. As an initial matter, this is not a case in which trial counsel failed to uncover or investigate drug use. Rather, the record amply supports the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that trial counsel learned of Everett’s drug use and adequately investigated it. See Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 484. Everett reported his history of drug use, both directly to trial counsel and through counsel’s investigator, and trial counsel attempted to corroborate Everett’s claim that he was “tripping on acid” at the time of the murder, including by interviewing Jared Farmer. However, trial counsel could find no evidence to corroborate Everett’s “tripping on acid” claim and reasonably found it to be inconsistent with the circumstances of the murder. Furthermore, trial counsel did in fact present evidence of Everett’s drug use in mitigation through the testimonies of Everett’s mother and sister. Most notably, Everett’s mother testified that Everett likely first turned to drugs to block out bad memories of his father and that he would never have committed the murder if not for his drug use. Thus, even though trial counsel did not present evidence of Everett’s drug use through a mental health expert, the jury heard about Everett’s 81 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 82 of 87 drug use. Given the record evidence, we cannot say that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably held that trial counsel did not perform deficiently in either his investigation or his presentation of Everett’s drug use in mitigation. Indeed, as to Everett’s drug use, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably observed that “[m]ore is not necessarily better.” Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 485 (quotation omitted).
Even assuming that trial counsel’s pre-trial investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence were deficient, we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that Everett failed to show prejudice was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. For prejudice, the standard is whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. To satisfy the prejudice prong, the “likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 792. “Counsel’s errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 787-88 (quotation omitted). Because Everett alleges ineffective assistance in the penalty phase, he must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating 82 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 83 of 87 circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. In assessing whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result, “we consider the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation.” Porter, 558 U.S. at 41, 130 S. Ct. at 453-54 (quotation omitted and alteration adopted); see also Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 26, 130 S. Ct. 383, 390 (2009) (“[T]he reviewing court must consider all the evidence—the good and the bad—when evaluating prejudice.”).
We conclude that the Florida Supreme Court also reasonably determined that Everett had failed to establish the prejudice requirement of his ineffective counsel claim. Three reasons support our conclusion.
First, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the evidence presented during Everett’s post-conviction evidentiary hearing was largely cumulative to the evidence presented during his penalty phase trial. See Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 480, 484-85; see also Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 22, 130 S. Ct. at 387 (reasoning that some of the evidence that the defendant argued his trial counsel should have presented at sentencing was “merely cumulative” of the evidence that counsel actually presented and that “adding it to what was already there would 83 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 84 of 87 have made little difference”). As to Everett’s childhood and upbringing, the testimony of his mother and sisters showed both at trial and during the postconviction phase that Everett’s father was an alcoholic and had not always acted appropriately toward Everett; Everett experienced difficulties as a result of his family’s frequent moves and his parents’ divorce, remarriage, and second divorce; and Everett was loving and non-violent as a child. Indeed, the trial court found Everett’s family background was a statutory mitigating circumstance, noting that although his childhood could not be considered a “deprived one,” his “upbringing” was not “ordinary.” Some of the post-conviction evidence of Everett’s drug use was also cumulative. During the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Everett’s mother and sister offered the same nonspecific testimony that Everett had a history of drug use that was offered during the penalty phase hearing.
As to prejudice, Everett relies heavily on Dr. Mhatre’s testimony in the postconviction phase. While some of his testimony was covered at the penalty phase, Dr. Mhatre admittedly provided more specific, detailed testimony about Everett’s drug use and the resulting paranoia at the time of the crimes than was offered at trial. Yet, to the extent that Dr. Mhatre offered non-cumulative testimony, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that Everett failed to show a reasonable probability of a different result with Dr. Mhatre’s testimony. See 84 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 85 of 87 Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 482-83. Dr. Mhatre’s testimony was speculative and unpersuasive because he conceded that he was not able to corroborate Everett’s claim that he was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the murder through police officers’ reports or other witnesses. Furthermore, drug use evidence can act as a “two-edged sword,” and additional evidence of Everett’s drug use at the time of the murder would not necessarily have been favorable to him. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410 (2011) (recognizing that evidence of addiction can be mitigating, but also can have aggravating aspects). And, in any event, even without Dr. Mhatre’s testimony, the jury heard Everett’s claim that he was “tripping on acid” at the time of the murder through the admission of Everett’s November 27 confession. Indeed, the trial court considered Everett’s claim that he committed the murder while under the influence of a hallucinogenic drug and rejected it as inconsistent with the factual circumstances of Everett’s crimes and his ability to accurately recall the details of Bailey’s house and her murder. Everett admitted he left the motel with a fish bat and went out looking for money—all intentional and controlled behavior. The Florida Supreme Court reasonably concluded that there was not a reasonable probability that Dr. Mhatre’s uncorroborated testimony would have changed the state trial court’s finding as to this mitigating circumstance. See Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 482-83.
85 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 86 of 87 Third, given the powerful strength of the aggravating factors in this case, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably decided that Everett did not show a reasonable probability that his proposed mitigation evidence would be strong enough to outweigh them. As the Florida Supreme Court reasoned, “the evidence in the record indicates that the mitigating evidence presented during the postconviction evidentiary hearing would not alter the balance of aggravation and mitigation.” Everett II, 54 So. 3d at 482. The state trial court found as statutory aggravating circumstances that the murder: (1) was committed while Everett was under a sentence of imprisonment for a previous felony conviction; (2) was committed while Everett was engaged in the commission of a sexual battery or a burglary; and (3) was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. With regard to the latter two circumstances, the evidence showed that Everett entered Bailey’s home, severely beat her and broke her neck, and raped her as she slowly lost consciousness and suffocated to death. Thus, with the strength of the aggravating circumstances and the relative weakness of the scant non-cumulative evidence presented in Everett’s post-conviction hearing, the Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that there was not a reasonable probability that Everett would have received a life sentence had his proposed additional evidence been presented. Cf. Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 20, 130 S. Ct. at 386 (“[T]o establish prejudice, [the petitioner] must show a reasonable probability that the jury would have rejected a capital sentence after it 86 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 87 of 87 weighed the entire body of mitigating evidence . . . against the entire body of aggravating evidence.”).