Opinion ID: 2100487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proffer of Expert Testimony Pursuant to KRE 702

Text: Appellant next claims the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted Ms. Griffey to testify regarding how children store and recall memories. Additionally, Appellant claims error by the trial court in allowing the expert to testify as to her qualifications in open court, rather than conducting a review of her qualifications outside the presence of the jury. Initially, we find the issue of whether it was error to allow the expert to be qualified in open court to be unpreserved because Appellant's counsel did not request the hearing to be held outside the presence of the jury. See Maricle, supra . Nonetheless, KRE 104(c) states that hearings on preliminary matters, such as the qualification of a witness, shall be conducted outside the jury's presence when the interests of justice require. After careful review of the circumstances in this case, we find the interests of justice did not require the trial court to order, sua sponte, Ms. Griffey's qualification to be made outside the presence of the jury. Next, Appellant alleges the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that Julie Griffey was qualified to testify regarding how children store and recall memories. Ms. Griffey testified that she had a master's degree in Marriage and Family Therapy, was a licensed marriage and family therapist in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, was a member of the American Association of Marriage and Family Therapists and has twenty-seven years experience as a family therapist. She further testified that she specialized in counseling victims of child sexual abuse and was required by the Commonwealth of Kentucky to attend continuing education classes each year to maintain this specialty. She stated that knowledge regarding child memory was obtained and accumulated through education, training, and experience during her twenty-seven year career. She further testified that the topic was covered each year during her continuing education classes. Appellant alleges that such qualifications were not sufficient to establish that Ms. Griffey's testimony was reliable in the above referenced subject area pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky.1995), overruled on other grounds, Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931 (Ky.1999). In Mitchell, supra, at 101, this Court adopted the standard of review set forth in Daubert, supra . Daubert, supra , held that expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable in order to be admissible pursuant to KRE 702. Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2795, 125 L.Ed.2d at 480. The reliability of proffered expert testimony is a preliminary question of fact reserved for the trial court and accordingly, a trial court's reliability ruling in this area is reviewed for clear error. Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Ky.2004). Appellant argues that Ms. Griffey's testimony was inherently unreliable because none of the Daubert factors (whether the theory has been tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review, whether the rate of error is known, and whether the theory is generally accepted in the relevant field of study) were either considered or addressed by the trial court in this instance. We disagree. In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky. 2000), this Court stated that [t]he consideration of reliability entails an assessment into the validity of the reasoning and the methodology upon which the expert testimony is based. We emphasized that the inquiry into reliability is a flexible one, and that the factors enumerated in Daubert , while applicable to all types of knowledge, are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. Id. In Miller, this Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by relying too heavily on the Daubert factors, stating that  the factors identified in Daubert may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony. Miller, supra, at 918-919 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1175, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (emphasis in the original)). In this case, Ms. Griffey did not promote any theories or processes regarding how children store and recall memories which were susceptible to review under the factors listed in Daubert . Rather, she presented empirical evidence and basic conclusions derived therefrom which functioned to describe the manifest characteristics of how children store and recall memories. For example, Ms. Griffey testified that children's memories tend to be more simplistic and less rich in detail than the memories of adults. Ms. Griffey went on to testify that children tend to recall memories like one might view a snapshot. She explained that children do not tend to recall timeliness and dates, but rather, they will recall only scenes or certain events. In cases such as this where the testimony is merely describing the manifest characteristics of a particular subject and does not involve the application of any theories, processes, or methods of novel or controversial origin, actual experience and long observation is sufficient to qualify a person as an expert in the relevant subject area. See Farmland Mutual Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 36 S.W.3d 368, 388-389 (Ky.2000). We find Ms. Griffey's twenty-seven years of education, training, and experience in the area of counseling and talking to children about their memories to be more than sufficient to qualify her as an expert in describing the manifest characteristics of child memory. Accordingly, we find no clear error by the trial court.