Opinion ID: 1240014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: VALIDITY OF LeGRAND'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS

Text: LeGrand alleges that the records of his two prior convictions for DUI do not affirmatively show that his guilty pleas were entered freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In order to support a finding that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere has been entered freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, the court must (1) inform the defendant concerning (a) the nature of the charge, (b) the right to assistance of counsel, (c) the right to confront witnesses against the defendant, (d) the right to a jury trial, and (e) the privilege against self-incrimination; and (2) examine the defendant to determine that he or she understands the foregoing. Additionally, the record must establish that (1) there is a factual basis for the plea and (2) the defendant knew the range of penalties for the crime with which he or she is charged. See State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 814, 394 N.W.2d 879 (1986). See State v. Tweedy, 209 Neb. 649, 309 N.W.2d 94 (1981). As to LeGrand's 1987 conviction, the record reflects that the county court apprised LeGrand of all of his rights set out in State v. Irish, supra , during the arraignment at which LeGrand pled not guilty. At the subsequent rearraignment at which LeGrand changed his plea to guilty, the record is silent as to whether LeGrand waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his rights to confront witnesses, to trial by jury, to counsel, to due process with proper notice, and to a fair and impartial hearing. The court, through a checklist, did state that LeGrand understood the nature of the charge, the possible penalties that might be imposed, and all rights available to him by law, and that his plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, with full understanding of the consequences. That the record is silent regarding certain rights in the rearraignment is irrelevant because those rights were explained to LeGrand in his prior arraignment. Once a defendant is informed of his constitutional rights, there is no requirement that the court advise the defendant on each subsequent court appearance of that same right. See State v. Green, 238 Neb. 328, 470 N.W.2d 736 (1991). LeGrand understood all the rights that he stood to lose by pleading guilty. With that in mind, he chose to change his plea from not guilty to guilty. The court, upon LeGrand's change of plea, made certain that LeGrand understood the nature of the charge, the possible penalties that might be imposed, and all rights available to him by law. LeGrand's 1987 conviction is far removed from the facts in State v. Nowicki, 239 Neb. 130, 474 N.W.2d 478 (1991), in which we held that when a record is silent as to a defendant's opportunity for counsel, the court may not presume such rights were respected. Id. In State v. Nowicki , the record was silent as to the defendant's right to counsel at the arraignment and trial. Not until sentencing did the court inform the defendant of his right to counsel. Obviously, one cannot presume that the defendant understands rights prior to being advised of those rights. In the case at bar, the record reflects that LeGrand understood his rights prior to pleading guilty in 1987. As to the 1991 prior conviction, the record reflects that at LeGrand's arraignment, at which he pled not guilty, LeGrand was advised of all of his rights set out in State v. Irish, supra . When LeGrand changed his plea to guilty, the court again covered all of the State v. Irish requirements. LeGrand's argument that he did not sign the checklist which verifies that he entered a constitutional guilty plea is immaterial. A checklist, authenticated by the signature or initials of the judge, which indicates that all constitutional requirements have been met, becomes a part of the record and may affirmatively establish an intelligent and knowing guilty plea. State v. Ziemba, 216 Neb. 612, 346 N.W.2d 208 (1984). Since we have already stated that separate proceedings under State v. Oliver, 230 Neb. 864, 434 N.W.2d 293 (1989), and State v. Wiltshire, 241 Neb. 817, 491 N.W.2d 324 (1992), are available to defendants and have not been vitiated by any federal court holdings, we do not need to address LeGrand's final assigned error in which he contends that the Legislature, through § 39-669.07(3), intended to create separate proceedings to allow collateral attacks of prior convictions.