Opinion ID: 203904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Meadows's Status as a Felon

Text: Meadows objects to the extent to which his status as a felon was put before the jury. Though Meadows's trial counsel requested that the district court not tell the jury that Meadows was a felon at all, Meadows concedes on appeal that the district court's explanation of Meadows's felon status did appear to be in conformity with the holding in Old Chief,  which bars evidence of the name or nature of a prior offense where the defendant seeks to stipulate to his status as a felon. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 185, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). Though the district court did not allow evidence of the name or nature of his prior offenses, Meadows contends that prejudicial information about his criminal history nonetheless came before the jury. Specifically, Meadows complains that Gaucher, Norman, and White all testified that Meadows told them he did not want to go back to jail. He also complains about testimony elicited by his own counsel in cross-examination that the police decided not to use Meadows as an informant because his record was too extensive. Meadows did not object to any of this evidence, so we review for plain error. United States v. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d 411, 427 (1st Cir.2009). `We will not find plain error unless (1) an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected [the defendant's] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. (quoting United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir.2005)). Here, this test is clearly not met. We see no reason to believe that Meadows was unfairly prejudiced by testimony that Meadows said he did not want to go back to jail. Meadows's status as a felon was clearly known to the jury, and the fact that he spent time in jail adds little risk of prejudice and does not provide facts about the name or nature of his prior crime, as barred by Old Chief. This conclusion is only bolstered by the fact that Meadows used his prior jail time in his own closing arguments to explain his flight. Testimony that Meadows's record was too extensive for use as an informant does add more prejudicial information in that it suggests to the jury that Meadows had more than one prior felony conviction. But, Meadows cannot persuasively complain about the admission of this evidence, given that it was the defensenot the governmentwhich elicited it in the course of its cross-examination. United States v. Rivera-Rivera, 477 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir.2007). Thus, even though the government may not have been allowed to bring out such testimony, we see no unfair and substantially prejudicial impingement of Meadows's substantial rights in this case.