Opinion ID: 1135631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether Stoecklein acted in good faith.

Text: Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or definition and encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice, and the absence of design to defraud. Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259-60 (Sup.Ct.1954). In common usage the term is used to describe a state of mind denoting honesty of purpose and freedom from intent to defraud. Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249 Cal.App.2d 187, 57 Cal.Rptr. 248, 251 (1967). Although the underlying action against Stoecklein was based on fraud, there is no evidence that Stoecklein committed fraud in the proceedings before the district court. Johnson contends that Stoecklein's assertion that he had no notice of the trial date is not made in good faith as his attorney received notice of the trial date. Notice or knowledge of an attorney, acquired during the time he is acting within the scope of employment, is imputed to the client. Armstrong v. Ashley, 204 U.S. 272, 283, 27 S.Ct. 270, 274, 51 L.Ed. 482 (1906). However, the only evidence in the record suggesting Stoecklein received actual or constructive notice is an affidavit filed by Johnson's attorney, Mark Gibbons, that it was his belief that Stoecklein's attorney told him of the trial date. Additionally, there is nothing in the record indicating that notice of the trial date was sent to counsel for Stoecklein. In deciding cases, an appellate court must confine its consideration to the facts reflected in the record and the necessary and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Lindauer v. Allen, 85 Nev. 430, 433, 456 P.2d 851, 852-53 (1969). Statements made by counsel portraying what purportedly occurred will generally not be considered on appeal. Wichinsky v. Mosa, 109 Nev. ___, ___, 847 P.2d 727, 731 (1993). Accordingly, we do not assign any weight to the testimony contained in the affidavit. Stoecklein unquestionably had full notice of the claim against him. He also undoubtedly knew a trial in the matter would be forthcoming. Perhaps the district court suspected that Stoecklein had actual notice of the trial date through some source. However, there is no evidence in the record to refute Stoecklein's contention that he did not receive notice of the trial date. There is similarly no indication in the record that notice of the trial date was ever mailed to Stoecklein, at any address, correct or incorrect. There is also nothing in the record to indicate that Stoecklein did not act in good faith. Stoecklein presented adequate cause for failing to appear at the trial on January 15, 1992. His co-defendant in the case similarly failed to appear at trial, claiming lack of notice. Additionally, Stoecklein had filed an answer which, if true, would establish a meritorious defense. The tendering of a responsive pleading in good faith which would tend to establish a meritorious defense to all or part of the claim for relief is a factor the court will consider when ruling on an NRCP 60(b)(1) motion. Kahn v. Orme, 108 Nev. 510, 835 P.2d 790, 793 (1992). Stoecklein has shown excusable neglect and therefore should be allowed his day in court, given that [t]he salutary purpose of Rule 60(b) is to redress any injustices that may have resulted because of excusable neglect or the wrongs of an opposing party, Nevada Industrial Dev. v. Benedetti, 103 Nev. 360, 364, 741 P.2d 802, 805 (1987) (citation omitted), and in light of the state's sound basic policy of resolving cases on their merits whenever possible. Kahn, 108 Nev. at 510, 835 P.2d at 793. We have carefully considered all of the other issues raised by the parties and conclude that they either lack merit or need not be addressed given our disposition of this appeal.