Opinion ID: 465182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Effect of 1975 Order

Text: 37 In 1975, the district court in Beckett found that the Norfolk school system had satisfied its affirmative duty to desegregate, that racial discrimination through official action [had] been eliminated from the system and that the Norfolk School System [was] 'unitary'. That holding marked the culmination of almost two decades of desegregation litigation in Norfolk. The Beckett litigation was effectively completed in 1971 when a busing order was entered. Following its entry, the district court monitored the school system for four years and became satisfied that the system had ridded itself of racial discrimination. Being satisfied that the plan had succeeded in eradicating segregation, the court dismissed the suit. 38 Plaintiffs contend that the 1975 order is no more than a consent order entered by the parties and therefore is not binding upon them. While the plaintiffs are correct in stating that, as a general rule, all consent orders do not necessarily have collateral estoppel effect, United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 73 S.Ct. 807, 97 L.Ed. 1182 (1953), we believe that the 1975 order was not a compromise judgment. Id. at 506, 73 S.Ct. at 809. 10 As previously noted, that order culminated a lengthy and hotly contested lawsuit which resulted in the ending of segregated schools in Norfolk. The court monitored the desegregation plan for several years and, after finding that all of the claims raised in the complaint had been disposed of, dismissed the case. Because the court made findings on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims for relief, the order is not a consent order in settlement of a suit but is an order on the merits of the same. The fact that the parties agreed to the order does not alter that conclusion. International Bldg. Co., supra, at 506, 73 S.Ct. at 809. Unlike an order compromising a claim by agreement, the district court in the order now contested ruled on the questions of law and fact in dispute. Because the order represents the court's findings on the issues raised and not a compromise entered into by the parties, the consent order exception to application of collateral estoppel principles is inapplicable here. 39 Such a conclusion is consistent with the duty placed upon district courts in disposing of school desegregation cases. A district court is under an obligation to retain jurisdiction over the school system under a proposed integration plan to determine its effectiveness in achieving desegregation. Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 21, 91 S.Ct. at 1278; Green, supra, 391 U.S. at 439, 88 S.Ct. at 1695; Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443, 449, 88 S.Ct. 1697, 1700, 20 L.Ed.2d 727 (1968). It is required to retain jurisdiction until it determines that the school system has become unitary. United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 647 F.2d 504, 508 (5th Cir.1981). Such a determination should only occur after the district court has retained jurisdiction over the school system to make certain that it is operated in a constitutionally permissible fashion so that the goal of a desegregated, non-racially operated school system is rapidly and finally achieved. Raney, supra, 391 U.S. at 449, 88 S.Ct. at 1700; Felder v. Harnett Co. Board of Education, 409 F.2d 1070, 1075 (4th Cir.1969). The district court followed the monitoring procedure as it was required to do. It did not end the litigation until it was satisfied that the school system was free from racial segregation. Such active participation by the court belies any argument that the 1975 order is anything less than a judgment on the merits. 40 Plaintiffs next contend that the 1975 order should be given no effect here because the United States, a party to the prior action, was not given notice of, nor consented to, that order. Plaintiffs have no standing to raise such a claim, especially since the United States does not challenge the 1975 order. See generally the government's brief 12-15. 41 We likewise reject plaintiffs' argument that the 1975 order is not to be given effect here because it was not a final order. That contention derives from language in the order that the action is dismissed, with leave to any party to reinstate this action for good cause shown. If we consider that only final orders are to be given preclusive effect, Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Engineering & Mach., 575 F.2d 530, 537-8 (5th Cir.1978), 11 we find no violation of that maxim here. The 1975 order concluded a complex legal battle of almost twenty years' duration in which all parties had ample opportunity to be heard. That order could have been appealed under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 if the parties so chose. They did not. The order finally disposed of all remaining issues in the litigation, and it could have been appealed. As such, preclusion principles attach. 42 The fact that the district court gave the parties an opportunity to reinstate the cause upon the docket with a showing of good cause does not alter our holding. That language is not dissimilar to the language in Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 60(b) which allows parties to seek relief from a judgment under certain prescribed circumstances. Rule 60(b) specifically provides, however, that such opportunity to seek relief from judgment does not affect the finality of an order. We believe that the same reasoning should apply here. 43 Plaintiffs further argue that the 1975 order should not be binding on them because the district court did not comply with Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 23(e) by giving notice to members of the class prior to dismissal or compromise of the class action. We have found that the 1975 order is not a voluntary dismissal or compromise but instead represents an adjudication on the merits. Thus, such an order is not subject to 23(e)'s notice requirements. See Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1300 n. 1 (4th Cir.1978); Hutchinson v. Fidelity Inv. Assoc., 106 F.2d 431 (4th Cir.1939); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 1972, Sec. 1797, p. 235-236. 44 Once a court decides an issue of law or fact necessary to its judgment, that decision can be binding upon a party to it if the party was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate [the] issue in the earlier case. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-5, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414-15, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). The Court has summarized its thoughts in Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-4, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973-74, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979): 45 A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies....' Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 [18 S.Ct. 18, 27, 42 L.Ed. 355] (1897). Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. (Citations omitted) Under collateral estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. (Citation omitted) Application of both doctrines is central to the purpose for which civil courts have been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within the jurisdictions. (Citation omitted) To preclude parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions. (Footnote omitted) 46 The principles of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion are applicable to school desegregation cases. Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. L.A. Unified School Dist., 750 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.1985); Bronson v. Board of Education of City School Dist., 687 F.2d 836 (6th Cir.1982); 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir.1975). 47 Plaintiffs' final claim on this point is that they have not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the unitary finding. The Beckett plaintiff class represented black school students in the Norfolk school system. It litigated for almost twenty years. Norfolk's black school children are the plaintiffs here. While the actual makeup of class members may be different because of the passage of time (as it is bound to have been at the beginning and ending of Beckett ), we believe that the two classes are in sufficient privity for the principles of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion to apply. Bell v. Board of Educ. Akron Public Schools, 683 F.2d 963 (6th Cir.1982); Bronson, supra, 525 F.2d at 349. The Beckett plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to contest the district court's 1975 unitary finding. These plaintiffs cannot now relitigate that issue here. Los Angeles Branch NAACP, supra; Bronson, supra; see Azalea Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Hanft, 540 F.2d 713 (4th Cir.1976), cert. den. 430 U.S. 941 (1977). 48 Mindful of the Court's admonition in Montana, 440 U.S. p. 163, 99 S.Ct. p. 978, that [un]reflective invocation of collateral estoppel against parties with an ongoing interest in constitutional issues could freeze doctrine in areas of the law when responsiveness to changing patterns of conduct or social mores is critical, we nevertheless conclude that the district court did not err in finding that its 1975 order was binding upon these parties.