Opinion ID: 204153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right of Integrity

Text: VARA's right of integrity, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A), provides that an artist shall have the right to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of [his or her] work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and [that] any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right. It thus allows artists to protect their works against intentional modifications that would be prejudicial to their honor or reputations. House Report at 6, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6915. [13] There is arguably some uncertainty about the plaintiff's burden of proof in a case such as this because the second part of section (a)(3)(A)stating that any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of th[e] work is a violation of the right of integritydoes not explicitly require a showing of prejudice when the alteration already has occurred and damages, rather than injunctive relief, would be the appropriate remedy. See 5 Patry, supra, § 16:22 (noting the ambiguity). Because those VARA cases that make it to court are generally ... decided on threshold questions such as whether the artist's work is a work of visual art within the scope of the Act, Pa & Robinson, supra, at 26, courts have had little occasion to give content to the rights that VARA guarantees. See Wu, supra, at 159 ([C]ourts avoid construing the extent of VARA protection by finding that works do not meet the threshold requirements for `visual art' protected by VARA.). Unsurprisingly, therefore, we have found no case law discussing a possible difference in the showing required for injunctive relief and damages for right-of-integrity claims. Some courts, however, have assumed without analysis that the prejudice showing is necessary for both injunctive relief and damages. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 2:97-CV-7470, 1998 WL 34369997, at  (C.D.Cal. June 3, 1998) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F.Supp. 303, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y.1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and rev'd in part by Carter, 71 F.3d at 77. At least one commentator likewise accepts, without discussion, that the damages remedy requires a showing of prejudice. See Melville B. Nimmer, 3-8D Nimmer on Copyright § 8D.06[C][1] (noting that an intentional and prejudicial mutilation is an integrity violation, remediable through not only an injunction, but damages as well). Interestingly, Nimmer raises, and dismisses, a different imprecision in section (a)(3)(A): The statutory languagedistortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputationis susceptible of a reading whereby the requisite prejudice applies only to modification, not to the antecedents of distortion or mutilation. Though not without ambiguity, the better view under the Berne Convention, from which this language is drawn, is that prejudice applies in all three instances. Id. We agree with Nimmer's view of the provision, including the application of the prejudice requirement to a claim for damages, and consider that construction soundly grounded in VARA's legislative history. Under the heading Purpose of the Legislation, the House Report notes that the right of integrity allows artists to protect their works against modifications and destructions that are prejudicial to their honor or reputations. House Report at 6, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6915. The Report also notes that the rights provided by VARA are analogous to those protected by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, id., which in turn describes the right of integrity as applicable to certain modifications and other derogatory actions that would be prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation. [14] Given the stated purpose of the legislation and the similar depiction of the integrity right in the Berne Convention, we conclude that Congress intended the prejudice requirement to apply to the right of integrity whether the remedy sought is injunctive relief or damages. [15] Although VARA does not define the terms prejudicial, honor, or reputation, the House Report recommended that the prejudice inquiry focus on the artistic or professional honor or reputation of the individual as embodied in the work that is protected, and examine the way in which a work has been modified and the professional reputation of the author of the work. House Report at 15, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6925-26 (footnotes omitted). Relying on dictionary definitions of prejudice, honor and reputation, the district court in Carter concluded that it should consider whether [the proposed] alteration would cause injury or damage to plaintiffs' good name, public esteem, or reputation in the artistic community. 861 F.Supp. at 323. We think this a useful approach, but emphasize that the focus is on the artist's reputation in relation to the altered work of art; the artist need not have public stature beyond the context of the creation at issue. See House Report at 15, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6925 ([A]n author need not prove a preexisting standing in the artistic community.).