Opinion ID: 766199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against King County

Text: 30 In addition to their claims against the Board members, the Buckles brought several claims against King County for its decision to redesignate the Buckles' property for residential use. The Buckles characterize King County's actions as illegally downzoning their property from commercial to residential, despite the fact that the Buckles' property was zoned for residential use for decades and was zoned for commercial use--in the form of a subsequently invalidated amendment to the Comprehensive Plan--for less than a year. The Buckles advance their argument through three different legal challenges: a procedural due process claim, a substantive due process claim, and a takings claim. Within both the substantive due process and takings claims, the Buckles argue that King County engaged in spot zoning, an oft-criticized theory discussed below.
31 We first consider whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for King County on the Buckles' procedural due process claim. The Buckles' alleged that, [t]o the extent the decision to change the zoning was a quasijudicial act, Plaintiffs were deprived of due process also by not having an impartial decision maker. The Buckles' briefs do not address the merits of their procedural due process claim, nor do they point to any evidence in the record that supports the complaint's conclusory assertion of partiality. The Buckles' procedural due process claim is further lacking because they have not shown that they have a legitimate claim of entitlement to the zoning for commercial use created by an independent source such as state law.  See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). The Buckles do not even attempt to argue that a lastminute amendment that was subsequently invalidated created a legitimate claim of entitlement to commercial zoning. We affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of King County on the procedural due process claim. 8
32 We next address whether the district court erred in dismissing the Buckles' substantive due process claim. Whether a general substantive due process claim is trumped by the specific provisions of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is a question falling squarely within our precedent. In what is an exception to the general rule [that a plaintiff can seek relief under multiple constitutional theories], recognized out of a well-placed reluctance to expand the concept of substantivedue process, a plaintiff is precluded from asserting a substantive due process claim instead of, or in addition to, a takings claim. Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1326 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)) (alteration in original). The en banc court in Armendariz 33 held that when an explicit textual provision of the Constitution protects against the challenged government action, the claim must be analyzed under that specific provision alone and not under the more general guarantee of substantive due process. 34 Id. at 1128 (emphasis added). 35 The Buckles contend that they do not seek to expand the substantive due process clause, but to apply the law on spot zoning. Changing the label will not change the result. A spot zoning claim 9 --that an individual piece of property was singled out for zoning incompatible with neighboring property--is variously characterized as a substantive due process violation, a taking, or even an equal protection violation; spot zoning does not neatly fit into one category. See Save Our Rural Environment v. Snohomish County, 662 P.2d 816, 819 (Wash. 1983) (When faced with a challenge to a county's rezone action on the grounds the rezone constitutes an illegal spot zone, the main inquiry is whether the zoning action bears a substantial relationship to the general welfare of the affected community.). 36 Washington courts have recognized the claim of spot zoning and defined it as follows:Spot zoning has come to mean arbitrary and unreasonable zoning action by which a smaller area is singled out of a larger area or district and specially zoned for a use classification totally different from and inconsistent with the classification of surrounding land, and not in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Spot zoning is a zoning for private gain designed to favor or benefit a particular individual or group and not the welfare of the community as a whole. 37 Smith v. Skagit County, 662 P.2d (Wash. 1983) (illegal spot zoning to rezone 470 acres of island property from residential-recreational to industrial use). 38 We affirm the dismissal of the Buckles' substantive due process claim under Armendariz and Macri because we must analyze the Buckles' land use claim under the explicit textual source of constitutional protection, the Takings Clause, not the more generalized notion of`substantive due process.'  Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1324 (internal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that the Buckles' spot zoning claim is a substantive due process claim, it must be dismissed, but to the extent that the claim--whether labeled spot zoning or otherwise--can be characterized as a Fifth Amendment claim, we will address it as a takings issue in the next section of this opinion. 39 The Buckles argue that, even if the district court appropriately dismissed the Buckles' federal substantive due process claim, the district court should have allowed them to proceed on a state substantive due process claim. The Buckles contend that the Washington Constitution provides greater substantive due process protection than the United States Constitution because the Washington Supreme Court, in a post-Macri decision, allowed a substantive due process claim to proceed in a land use case. See Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 954 P.2d 250, 257-58 (Wash. 1998). Mission Springs is not controlling, however, because the case does not address whether the Washington Constitution provides greater substantive due process protection than the United States Constitution. Further, because the Buckles did not argue and brief the six factors laid out by the Washington Supreme Court for determining whether the Washington Constitution provides broader rights than the United States Constitution, we do not consider the Buckles' argument that the state constitution offers broader protection. 10 See State of Washington v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (1986) (Recourse to our state constitution as an independent source for recognizing and protecting the individual rights of our citizens must spring not from pure intuition, but from a process that is at once articulable, reasonable and reasoned.); see also Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1993) (deciding that because the appellants have not briefed the relevant Gunwall factors necessary for determining whether an independent analysis of the state constitution is proper[,] . . . . we will analyze only the federal constitution) (internal citation omitted).
40 Finally, we turn to the Buckles' argument that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for King County on their takings claim. The Buckles' takings claim is a facial challenge to the enactment of King County Ordinance 12170, which, among other amendments to the Comprehensive Plan, designated the Buckles' property Rural Residential. The Buckles argue that the designation fails to advance a legitimate county interest and thereby takes Plaintiffs' property without payment of just compensation. . . . They also claim that the ordinance violates theTakings Clause because it changes their zoning from commercial to residential use, an example of downzoning, upon which courts look critically. This argument is a variation on their spot zoning theory which boils down to a claim that it was unfair, and hence a form of taking, to impose stricter zoning on the Buckles than on their commercial neighbors. 11 41 The Buckles' characterization of their takings claim, however, ignores the undisputed facts: the property is part of a large tract zoned as residential over two decades ago; the Buckles purchased their property over twenty years ago when it was zoned for residential use; and the Buckles actually used the property for residential purposes for years. In addition, the property was never used for commercial purposes. The 1995 designation of the property as Rural Neighborhood (for limited commercial purposes) was never a final zoning decision; the property was zoned for, but never used for, commercial purposes for less than a year before that zoning was invalidated as the product of last-minute lobbying by the Buckles and as a violation of the Growth Management Act's public participation requirement. Reliance on a void zoning designation is illusory. 42 Finally, the County's zoning of the Buckles' property was part of the adoption of a Comprehensive Plan mandated by state law. The county was required to adopt a plan designating urban growth areas, drawing a line between areas where urban growth was to be encouraged and areas where such growth would be prohibited. This policy choice included continuation of the rural residential designation not only for the Buckles' property but for the vast surrounding acreage which also was residential in character. The small neighborhood business area was retained but not expanded. 43 The circumstances of this case are unlike those considered by the Supreme Court in its most recent takings case, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1999). There the city repeatedly refused to abide by its own zoning ordinances and policies in rejecting Del Monte Dunes' nineteen different site plans in five separate decisions over a five-year period. The Del Monte Dunes property, which previously had been used for commercial purposes, was zoned for multi-family dwellings. Del Monte Dunes sought approval for development in conformance with Monterey's zoning requirements. In each of the five formal reviews, the city imposed more rigorous demands, ultimately denying the application. We decline to follow the Buckles' narrow characterization of events pertaining to their property's zoning, but instead, as the Supreme Court did in Del Monte Dunes, view their takings claim in light of the context and . . . history of the land use decisions related to their property. Id. at 1644. 44 The Buckles' claim that the zoning restricting use of their property to residential use takes their property without just compensation falls under the regulatory takings doctrine: The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulationgoes too far it will be recognized as a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added). Although the Supreme Court has not precisely delineated the elements of a regulatory takings claim, the contours have been established: a land use regulation does not constitute a taking if the regulation does not deny a landowner all economically viable use of the property and if the regulation substantially advances a legitimate government interest. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992). 45 The Buckles concede that the redesignation of their property as residential did not destroy all economically viable use of their property, 12 and they do not argue that the redesignation interfered with any investment-backed expectations. 13 Therefore, the Buckles' takings claim turns on whether the designation of Rural Residential use for their property substantially advances a legitimate state interest. The Buckles contend that this question should be decided by a jury. 46 The district court, following the not uncommon practice in takings cases prior to Del Monte Dunes, found there were no disputed facts and ruled on the takings claim as a matter properly decided on summary judgment. Del Monte Dunes requires a re-evaluation of whether summary judgment was the correct procedure. The Supreme Court addressed the allocation of liability determinations between judge and jury in regulatory takings cases and held that a property owner asserting a takings claim in an action under 42 U.S.C.S 1983 has a Seventh Amendment right, albeit not unlimited, to a jury trial. See 119 S. Ct. at 1644. 47 Under Del Monte Dunes, a plaintiff clearly has the right to a jury trial on the predominantly factual question of whether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his property. See id. This point is not dispositive, however, because although the Buckles argue diminution in value due to residential zoning, they do not seriously contend deprivation of all economically viable use. 48 On the more difficult question of who decides whether a land use decision substantially advances a legitimate government interest, in Del Monte Dunes the Supreme Court noted that [a]lthough our cases make clear that this inquiry involves an essential factual component, it no doubt has a legal aspect as well, and is probably best understood as a mixed question of fact and law. Id. (internal citation omitted). Under the circumstances present in Del Monte Dunes, the Supreme Court approved of the narrow question submitted to the jury[:] whether, when viewed in light of the context and protracted history of the development application process, the city's decision to reject a particular development plan bore a reasonable relationship to its proffered justifications. Id. at 1644. The Court viewed the mixed question of law and fact at issue in Del Monte Dunes as essentially fact-bound. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 49 The Supreme Court emphasized, however, that its holding does not establish a right to a jury on every takings claim, explicitly stating that we do not attempt a precise demarcation of the respective provinces of judge and jury in determining whether a zoning decision substantially advances legitimate government interests. Id. As examples, the Supreme Court notedthat our holding does not extend to challenging the constitutionality of the city's general landuse ordinances or policies, nor to a challenge that the city's general regulations were unreasonable as applied to[a landowner's] property. Id. at 1645. In Del Monte Dunes, by contrast, it was appropriate for a jury to determine whether the regulation substantially advanced a legitimate interest because 50 to the extent Del Monte Dunes' challenge was premised on unreasonable governmental action, the theory argued and tried to the jury was that the city'sdenial of the final development permit was inconsistent not only with the city's general ordinances and policies but even with the shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city. Del Monte Dunes' argument, in short, was not that the city had followed its zoning ordinances and policies but rather that it had not done so. 51 Id. 52 Frankly, we have some difficulty parsing the distinctions laid out by the Supreme Court concerning when a jury trial is required. We find ourselves in uncharted territory with a map for related but different waters. Indeed the acknowledgment that no precise demarcation is established and the recognition that in some cases the determination of whether the state's purposes were legitimate might well fall within the province of the judge, leaves us with the difficult task of determining where in that gap the Buckles' claims fall. The Court candidly notes the limitation of [its ] Seventh Amendment holding and cautions that the unusual posture of the case counsels against a rule for all time. With these admonitions in mind and recognizing that the facts and procedural posture in Del Monte Dunes were extreme, we conclude that the district court did not err in deciding the takings claim on summary judgment. 53 First, the Buckles' theory is sufficiently different from that argued by Del Monte Dunes to distinguish the cases. Unlike Del Monte Dunes, the Buckles' challenge is not that King County's zoning of their property was inconsistent with their general ordinances and policies, but rather that it was inconsistent with the zoning on property surrounding the Buckles' property--in essence, the spot zoning claim. To the extent such a claim is characterized as an argument that the general regulations were unreasonable as applied  to the Buckles, Del Monte Dunes did not address this issue. And, unlike Del Monte Dunes, the Buckles do not claim that King County failed to follow their zoning ordinances, but rather that it was unfair that the county chose to leave intact the established demarcation of residential versus commercial and not to expand the commercial zone by adding the Buckles' property. 54 Second, under the Buckles' theory, Del Monte Dunes would swallow long-standing summary judgment principles and always require a jury trial to determine whether the government's interests were legitimate and substantial. But Del Monte Dunes did not alter or even consider the traditional summary judgment standards. The Del Monte Dunes case was full of five years of factual disputes that went to the jury on jury instructions that were not even challenged by the city. The circumstances here are vastly different. Although identifying the alleged taking is not easy because the Buckles advance a number of variations on a single theory, two consistent arguments emerge: (1) that King County took the Buckles' property when it was redesignated as Rural Residential rather than Rural Neighborhood; and (2) the zoning is an illegal spot zone. As to the first argument, the county cannot take what the Buckles did not have. The zoning designation for limited business uses was never final and the Buckles ended up exactly where they started--residential use. The map of the Buckles' property and the surrounding area belies the validity of the second theory. As the district court held, there is no genuine issue of material fact. The zoning restrictions on property surrounding the Buckles' property is undisputed, as is the existenceof commercial zoning and nonconforming uses on surrounding property. Assuming everything the Buckles allege to be true and relying on the map of the property and the surrounding property, King County did not single out the Buckles' property for an incompatible use. 55 Finally, we note that the Buckles' S 1983 claim was not a takings claim, as in Del Monte Dunes , but rather a due process claim which was properly dismissed. The takings claim was asserted as a stand alone claim, not as a claim that the government had denied a constitutional right in acting outside the bounds of its authority. . . . Id. at 1644. 56 The net result of the distinctions between Del Monte Dunes and this case is that it was within the province of the district court to determine whether the county advanced a substantial interest. 57 Evaluating the Buckles' takings claim on the merits then, King County asserted at least four interests in designating the Buckles' property as residential: (1) complying with the Growth Management Act's limitation on urban development outside of the urban growth boundary because the Buckles' property lies outside of King County's urban growth boundary; (2) maintaining consistency with the residential use zoning designation for the majority of property surrounding the Buckles' property; (3) not bowing the presence of nonconforming uses in the vicinity of the Buckles' property to justify additional commercial zoning; and (4) not expanding the nearby Rural Neighborhood to include the Buckles' property because of the presence of a salmon-bearing stream traversing the property. 58 The Supreme Court has made clear that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting undeveloped areas from the ill effects of urbanization. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261; see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (legitimate government interest in zoning certain areas for residential use only). Agins involved a takings claim brought by a property owner who purchased five acres of unimproved land with views of San Francisco Bay for the purpose of residential development before the City of Tiburon enacted a single-family zoning ordinance that restricted building on the property to five single-family residences. TheSupreme Court rejected the takings claim because the zoning ordinance did not deny the owner all economic use of the property and serv[ed] the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential property with provision for open-space areas. Id. at 262. 59 The Buckles argue that the facts of their case are closer to Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), than Agins. Nectow involved a zoning restriction limiting commercial use of property within a city, on property surrounded on two sides by industrial use, 277 U.S. at 186, whereas in this case, the zoning at issue regulates a huge non-urban area and the overwhelming majority of the land surrounding the Buckles' property is zoned for residential use. Nectow recognized that courts should be reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the zoning authority and set out the substantial relation test that is still in currency. Neither case is directly on point factually, but the facts of Agins are closer to the facts of this case than Nectow, and the Supreme Court's recognition in Agins of the legitimate government interest in limiting urbanization is dispositive. 60 Not every governmental attempt to restrict commercial development will be upheld as advancing the interest of protecting against urbanization, but the Buckles' claim that the government went too far in this case fails in light of the facts that the Buckles purchased the property when it was zoned for residential use, they actually used it for residential use for years, and it was zoned for commercial use for only a short period of time before thatzoning was invalidated. If the Buckles were to prevail in their argument that the government lacks a legitimate interest in drawing a line at existing commercial use in non-urban areas, King County correctly points out that the whole of rural King County would eventually be zoned commercial. 61 AFFIRMED. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.