Opinion ID: 532146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Claims/Fair Trial Claims

Text: 18
19 Report. 20 As his next assignment of error, Benefield alleges that in deciding his sentence, the district court took into account disputed facts in the presentence investigation report (PSI) that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence. Appellant's Brief at 16. Specifically, the defendant challenges the court's conclusion that Benefield had received the warning letter from the Department of Agriculture. Id. at 17. After considering the record of the sentencing proceeding, we find this charge without merit. 21 In United States v. Restrepo, 832 F.2d 146, 148 (11th Cir.1987), this court held that disputed facts in a sentencing report must be shown by some reliable proof by which the trial court can conclude that it is not unlikely that the government's statements are true. The government easily met this burden. As the government notes, the question of whether the defendant received the letter is not the issue. The issue is whether Benefield received a warning from the Department of Agriculture. Although the defendant denies receiving both the telephone call and the letter, an employee of Benefield signed a receipt for the letter. In addition, the letter, since it was written as a confirmation of the telephone call, provides evidence that the call was actually received. 5 The only contrary evidence is the defendant's testimony which the district court did not find credible. We therefore find that the evidence was sufficient for the district court to conclude that it is not unlikely that the government's statements are true. 22
23 Benefield also argues that the district court erred in granting the government's motion to limit the number of character witnesses. Benefield originally sought to have ten character witnesses, but in response to the government's motion, the court limited the number to five. Benefield urges us to adopt the practice of both the state courts in this circuit and the Fourth Circuit and hold that it is an abuse of discretion to limit the number of character witnesses. 24 The Supreme Court has noted that the district courts are invest[ed] with discretion to limit the number of [character] witnesses and to control cross-examination. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480, 69 S.Ct. 213, 220-21, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). Furthermore, we should overturn these determinations rarely and only on a clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id. Benefield alleges that the general rule is modified when the defendant's credibility and reputation are of great significance. Appellant's Brief at 19 (citing United States v. Escamilla, 467 F.2d 341, 348-49 (4th Cir.1972)). 25 The significance of the defendant's character in this case is that his testimony directly contradicts the government's case against him. Credibility determinations such as this are involved in most every trial. The instant case is indistinguishable from Michelson where the court noted that determination of the [case] turned on whether the jury should believe the [federal revenue] agent or the accused. 335 U.S. at 471, 69 S.Ct. at 216, see also United States v. Johnson, 730 F.2d 683, 688 (11th Cir.) (affirming trial court decision to limit character witnesses to three when district court determination that fourth witness would be cumulative was not abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 867, 105 S.Ct. 211, 83 L.Ed.2d 142 (1984). 26 In this case the defendant conceded at trial that he could sufficiently present his case with six character witnesses. (R2:112-15) The defendant has not--either at trial or in this court--explained what the sixth witness would have added to the defendant's case. After reviewing the record, we find no abuse of discretion. 27
28 In his fourth assignment of error, Benefield alleges that the questioning of him by the court denied him due process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Specifically, Benefield points to two instances where the court's actions are alleged to have interfered with the jury's ability to determine the credibility of the witnesses at trial and who should be believed. Appellant's Brief at 22. 29 While the court can interrogate witnesses to clarify testimony and insure that a case is tried fairly, United States v. Block, 755 F.2d 770, 775 (11th Cir.1985), the judge may not repeatedly interject himself into the proceedings when the attorneys are conducting their case in a competent manner. Id. We have examined the record and conclude that the court's brief questions cannot be classified as so numerous or egregious as to require reversal. Id. at 776. In addition, any supposed prejudice caused by the brief questioning by the court was corrected by its charge to the jury: 30 Moreover, any questions that I have asked of witnesses in this case are to be given no more significance or importance than the questions that are asked by the lawyers. 31 And if I have made any comment on the evidence in this case, I instruct you now to disregard it. Because you are the sole and exclusive finders of fact in this case. And the findings of fact is your exclusive province. I give you the law, but you decide the facts. 32 (R2:212) Thus, looking at the record as a whole, we are unable to find any intervention by the court requiring reversal.