Opinion ID: 2330426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Closing Argument Ruling Proper

Text: Anderson next contends that the Superior Court erred by prohibiting him from presenting a valid defense to the jury. Specifically, Anderson argues that because the indictment charged him with Attempted Murder by shooting [Perez], he should have been allowed to argue that the State failed to prove that Anderson committed that offense as charged by the indictment. The jury ultimately acquitted Anderson of Attempted Murder and found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First Degree. Because the jury convicted on a lesser-included crime, however, Anderson's specific argument on appeal about that lesser-included crime was not presented to the trial judge. Therefore, Anderson acknowledges that plain error is the applicable standard of appellate review. The evidence at trial indicated that there were two shooters. Anderson and Bobby Thomas were indicted for Attempted Murder and related crimes. The Attempted Murder count read that Anderson and Thomas [15] did intentionally attempt to cause the death of Hector Perez by shooting him. Perez was shot at least twice, but no bullets remained in his body. The trial testimony indicated that Anderson was armed with a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol and fired at least eight shots. The record reflects that the other shooter was probably armed with a .44 caliber revolver. At Anderson's trial, the defense focused on the words by shooting him to argue that the State had to prove that one of the eight bullets fired by Anderson actually hit the victim. According to Anderson, if Perez had been struck only by bullets fired by the other shooter, Anderson could not be held accountable. Since no bullets were recovered from Perez's body, Anderson submits it was impossible for the State to introduce direct evidence on that matter. The record reflects that the by shooting him issue came up initially at the prayer conference in the context of the Attempted Murder charge. The State proposed amending the indictment to read by shooting at him, but the trial judge denied that request because it would be a material change in the indictment. [16] This issue was raised again in connection with Anderson's motion to dismiss the Attempted Murder charge. The prosecutor argued that the indictment, as written, did not specify that Anderson actually succeeded in shooting the victim, only that he tried and, in trying, intended the victim's death. The trial judge ruled that the indictment, as written, did not require proof that Perez was hit at all, only that Anderson attempted to do so. The by shooting him language in the indictment came up for the last time during defense counsel's summation. When Anderson's attorney drew the jury's attention to the language of the indictment, the prosecutor, anticipating defense counsel's argument, asked to approach the bench. At the sidebar conference, defense counsel contended that he should be allowed to argue to the jurors that, in order to convict Anderson of Attempted Murder, they had to find that one of the bullets fired by Anderson actually struck the victim. The prosecutor argued that neither the language of the indictment nor the trial judge's jury instructions required such a finding. The trial judge ruled that defense counsel could not argue legal standards that were not contained in the court's jury instructions, although defense counsel was free to argue that the State had not proved that any of Anderson's shots hit Perez: I will allow you to discuss the fact that he was not shot by that gun, that type of thing. . . . I think that argument is fair game. But I think you're taking the legal instruction that's actually presented. I mean, you're fine with the argument, you're fine with pointing out this, but you can't say this is an element that the State has failed to prove. The State argues that this case is distinguishable from the two decisions upon which Anderson relies. [17] In Herring v. New York, [18] a total denial of the right to argue a defense was found to violate the Sixth Amendment. In Dailey v. State, [19] the trial judge restricted defense counsel's right to raise an argument that the Superior Court, on appeal, held to be proper. Both of those cases relied upon by Anderson are not only distinguishable but recognize the trial judge's responsibility to prohibit counsel from raising questionable legal arguments. On appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion or undue prejudice to the defendant, we will not interfere with the trial court's determination as to the proper bounds of closing argument. [20] The record reflects that there was no abuse of discretion in the parameters set by the trial judge regarding the closing argument by Anderson's attorney regarding the Attempted Murder charge. Since there was no abuse of discretion with regard to the charge of Attempted Murder, a fortiori that ruling did not constitute plain error with regard to the lesser-included offense of Assault in the First Degree.