Opinion ID: 2244925
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegedly invalid warrant.

Text: Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence derived from his detention pursuant to an arrest warrant issued February 11, 1994. The warrant was limited in scope, being for the purposes of obtaining photographs, fingerprints, and participate in a physical lineup. (R. at 384-85.) While in the custody of the police, defendant was put in a lineup for possible identification by potential witnesses. Among the witnesses who participated in that lineup who would later testify at trial were Damon Nunn, Jill Barkley, Jackie Barkley, Latonia Young, and Carla Goree. Defendant claimed at the suppression hearing and asserts now on appeal that the warrant was invalid because of allegedly misleading testimony given by a police officer at the probable cause hearing leading to the issuance of the warrant. He asserts the identification evidence from the lineup should therefore be suppressed. To preserve a suppression claim a defendant must make a contemporaneous objection at trial that is specific enough to alert the trial judge fully to the legal issue being raised. Moore v. State, 669 N.E.2d 733, 742 (Ind.1996). Where the defendant fails to object to the introduction of evidence, makes only a general objection, or objects only on other grounds, the defendant waives the suppression claim. Id. The only objections during trial that might be related to the allegedly invalid warrant and the evidence derived therefrom were defendant's objection to the identification testimony of Jackie Barkley on the basis of the previously raised issue (R. at 1403); to the identification evidence of Jill Barkley on the basis of issues we've previously raised (R. at 1444); and to the identification testimony of Carla Goree based on our previously raised motions (R. at 2120). No objection was made to the identification testimony of Damon Nunn or to that of Latonia Young. Considerable testimony was also placed into evidence concerning the arrest and police lineup procedures without objection from defendant. However, we choose not to determine whether the minimal objections made at trial were sufficient to preserve the allegation of error raised and instead address on the merits the assertion that the issuing warrant was invalid. Suppression is an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant is misled by information that is known to be false or that would be known by the person offering the testimony to be false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. Bradley v. State, 609 N.E.2d 420, 423-24 (Ind.1993), citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 698-99 (1984). At the probable cause hearing, a police officer testified that the passenger in the back seat of McCloud's car, Jill Barkley, had viewed defendant in a lineup and identified him as one of the gunmen in the murder of Marvin McCloud. (R. at 380.) Later in the hearing, the court asked the officer: Then you had a person who was in the back seat of the McCloud vehicle at the time of the shooting who made a positive identification? The officer replied, That's correct. (R. at 384.) Defendant asserts this was misleadingly false testimony because Jill Barkley had identified defendant in a one-person lineup and the police officer knew it. Barkley had been asked to come to the police station to view a suspect in the McCloud shooting. She was taken to a room with one-way glass and asked if she recognized the person in the room. The only person in the room was defendant, who had voluntarily agreed to come to the police station. Barkley told police that she would never forget his face and that the person in the room was the man who had fired into McCloud's car on the passenger side. (R. at 441-42.) A one-on-one show-up is inherently suggestive and carries with it a potential for irreparable misidentification. Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Ind. 1990), citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206 (1967). Thus, the fact that the identification was made in a one-on-one situation was relevant and should have been disclosed by the officer at the probable cause hearing. Nevertheless, the officer's testimony at the probable cause hearing was not false. Barkley did in fact positively identify defendant as one of the shooters and did so in unmistakably clear terms. Further, other indicia of probable cause to issue a limited arrest warrant were placed into evidence at the probable cause hearing, the veracity of which are not challenged by defendant. The testifying officer also stated that telephone calls had been made to police asserting that one of the men who had killed Marvin McCloud was in the Oasis right now. (R. at 378.) The caller or callers provided information about the man's clothing and physical description. Upon immediate investigation, police officers traveled to the Oasis tavern, and found a man there who matched the description provided by the caller. The person turned out to be defendant. The issuing judge was also told that although defendant had initially agreed to travel to Anderson to participate in a lineup, he had become recalcitrant about doing so and that the police were therefore requesting a limited warrant to compel [defendant] to appear in a physical lineup to be viewed by other witnesses. (R. at 380-81.) In addition, the officer testified at the probable cause hearing that Latonia Young, a witness to the murder, had stated to him that one of the killers had a unique appearance matching that of defendant. (R. at 383.) Finally, the warrant that was actually issued was for the limited purpose of obtaining photographs, fingerprints, and to participate in a physical lineup. The limited warrant was not based upon information known to be false and the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained during its execution.