Opinion ID: 2386480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the swilleys' appeal

Text: Under Rule 166-A, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there exists no material fact issue and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of his affirmative defense, he must, therefore, conclusively prove all essential elements of that defense. Cf. Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation, 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.1970). Respondents thus had to show, as a matter of law, that there was no consideration for the note sued on or that the agreed consideration had failed. The only summary judgment proof offered was the deposition of Paul Hughes, a party and an interested witness. In order for the testimony of an interested witness to establish a fact, as a matter of law, it must be clear, direct and positive with no circumstances in evidence tending to discredit or impeach such testimony. Great American Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.1965); Cochran v. Wool Growers Central Storage Co., 140 Tex. 184, 166 S. W.2d 904 (1942). Paul Hughes testified that the note and deed of trust were made to James Hughes in order for Mr. James Hughes to endorse a $45,000 note of Paul Hughes to the Small Business Administration; that, instead, the S.B.A. made a loan to him of $28,000 in January, 1965 without requiring endorsement by James Hughes; and that James Hughes never in fact endorsed the loan. But the deed of trust securing the note, made a part of the deposition as plaintiff's exhibit #2, was not filed for record until June 22, 1965, some six months after execution of the $28,000 note, and Paul Hughes admits that he is the one who had it recorded. Moreover, the $45,000 note was left outstanding and the securing lien was unreleased when this suit was filed in June, 1969. Those facts are inconsistent with the testimony of Paul Hughes that the bargained-for consideration had failed. So, within the summary judgment proof there lie circumstances tending to discredit Paul Hughes' testimony on failure of consideration. Respondents failed to establish the defense as a matter of law and were not entitled to summary judgment. In a case such as this, when the movant's evidence only serves to raise a fact issue, the opponent of the motion need not offer contradictory proof. Torres v. Western Casualty and Surety Company, 457 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.1970). In our summary judgment practice, the opponent's silence never improves the quality of a movant's evidence. Statements to the contrary in the opinions of two of the justices of the court of civil appeals in this case are based upon a misunderstanding of Railroad Commission v. Sample, 405 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.1966). Sample holds only that when a movant fails to controvert his opponent's evidence, that evidence must be accepted as true on appeal. It is manifestly wrong to read that case as holding the converse, and it is contrary to summary judgment logic to assume that the converse naturally follows. Respondents assert, however, that even if petitioners had no burden of offering proof, they nevertheless had a duty to point out the deficiencies in respondents' proof to prevent an erroneous ruling by the trial judge; that because petitioners did not even appear at the hearing on the motion, the trial judge committed an error which might very well have been avoided. Two justices of the court of civil appeals appear to have been impressed by this thesis, especially the concurring justice, who favored extending the application of this court's holding in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1962). In Youngstown we held that when an opponent fails to object to purely formal defects in the movant's papers, the defects are waived. There, we dealt with affidavits which did not recite that they were made on personal knowledge or that the affiant was competent to testify. Obviously the case at bar is not within Youngstown, and we are not persuaded of the wisdom of extending that rule to include this case. Our interpretation has always been that the function of summary judgment is the elimination of patently unmeritorious claims or untenable defenses. Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929 (1952). Rule 166-A provides a method of summarily terminating a case when it clearly appears that only a question of law is involved and that there is no genuine issue of fact. Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 358 S.W.2d 557 (1962). Virtually all burdens are on the movant. Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation, 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.1970); Torres v. Western Casualty and Surety Company, 457 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.1970); Prestegord v. Glenn, 441 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.1969). Cf. Moore Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Company, (Tex.1972); Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. McBride, 159 Tex. 442, 322 S.W.2d 492 (1958). Having taken that position, we could not with reason hold that the opponent of the motion must, upon penalty of waiver, appear and object to movant's proof when that proof is only sufficient to raise a fact issue. Wilson v. Brickstone Products Corporation, 465 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n. r. e.). Summary judgments are not to be granted on default of the opponent, but only on the merit of the summary judgment proof. The judgment of the trial court that Alice Hughes take nothing in her various capacities is left undisturbed. The judgments of the courts below that the intervenor-Swilleys take nothing are reversed and as to them the cause is severed and remanded to the trial court. We are not to be understood as having held that intervenors have standing to continue prosecution of the suit. That is an issue which should be decided by the trial court upon proper defensive motions or pleas which at this point have not been filed or urged.