Opinion ID: 323986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: per-emption

Text: 34 Appellees argue that, whatever may be the merits of the alternative bases for jurisdiction asserted by appellant, they are pre-empted by Section 717(c). Neither the Act itself nor its legislative history conclusively demonstrates that such pre-emption was intended. Congress enacted Section 717(c) to provide aprivate right of action for federal employees-- a right it believed to have been previously non-existent or so difficult to enforce as to have been in effect non-existent. The most persuasive argument in favor of pre-emption is that the Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity and as such must be strictly construed. 35 The doctrine of sovereign immunity forbids suits against the government without its consent. Sovereign immunity in the present context involves not only that of the United States but also that of its officers in performing their official functions. As the Eighth Circuit succinctly put it: 36 'A suit against an officer of the United States is one against the United States itself 'if the decree would operate against' the sovereign' Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58, 83 S.Ct. 1052, 1053, 10 L.Ed.2d 191 (1963); or if 'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration', Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947); or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act', Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1468, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) . . ..' Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1277 (8 Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970). 37 The court in Gnotta held that demands for promotion and back pay fall within the scope of this immunity as they necessarily involve expenditures from the Treasury and compel the exercise of administrative discretion in an official personnel area. 415 F.2d at 1277. This is precisely the relief demanded in the instant case. 38 Sovereign immunity would bar prosecution of this action absent an effective waiver. Congress can impose restrictions on its consent to be sued, Battaglia v. United States, 303 F.2d 683, 685 (2 Cir.), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 907 (1962), including limitations on the time within which suit must be commenced. United States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 1353, 1357 (5 Cir. 1972). The consent Congress has given for the instant type of action is set forth in Section 717(c). Such consent is conditioned on compliance with the 30 day filing requirement. 39 Statutes waiving sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed. But assuming, as appellant argues, that decisions of the Supreme Court illustrate a more liberal attitude with regard to waivers of sovereign immunity at least where a federal agency is concerned, see Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940); Kiefer & Kiefer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939), we cannot ignore the explicit condition imposed by Congress on a suit such as the instant one. It would wholly frustrate Congressional intent to hold that a plaintiff could evade the 30 day filing requirement 'by the simple expedient of putting a different label on (his) pleadings.' Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973). 40 The instant complaint was filed more than a year after passage of the 1972 Act. Brown had notice of its provisions. He has offered no excuse for failure to comply, nor has he addressed the issue of retroactivity. We find no injustice in requiring compliance with the 30 day filing requirement. On the contrary, to permit suit without compliance with the conditions imposed by Section 717(c) would effectively undermine the strong public policy that requires strict construction of a statute which waives sovereign immunity. 13 41