Opinion ID: 1256193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Communications with his Trial Counsel

Text: {31} Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by admitting testimony of other inmates regarding statements Defendant made to them about his trial strategy and his communications with his trial counsel. The prosecutor elicited testimony from one inmate who stated that Defendant said he was going to beat this case. The prosecutor elicited testimony from another inmate who stated that Defendant said he had confessed to his lawyer ... from the very first that he'd killed the girl, but that his lawyer had told him that all they had was circumstantial evidence, and that if he'd just keep his mouth shut that he would get him off. Defendant did not object in a timely manner to this line of questioning at trial. On appeal, he claims that the testimony elicited by the prosecution was irrelevant and its only purpose was to impugn the integrity of Defendant's trial counsel or to improperly suggest to the jury that they should infer Defendant's guilt from his invocation of his constitutional rights. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI; N.M. Const. art. II, §§ 14 (as amended 1994), 15. {32} We recognize that testimony or comments regarding Defendant's invocation of his right to counsel may amount to plain or fundamental error for the same reasons that we discussed with respect to Defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent. See Gershman, supra, § 9.3(c), at 9-20. Further, we recognize that it is improper for the prosecution to attack defense counsel's integrity by insinuating that defense counsel believed his client was guilty or was lying, see Gershman, supra, § 10.4(b), (c), and that communications between Defendant and his lawyer may be subject to the lawyer-client privilege, see Rule 11-503 NMRA 1999. {33} In this case, however, the testimony regarding Defendant's communications with his trial counsel was not privileged because Defendant disclosed the communications to a third party. See Rule 11-511. The third party's testimony did not indicate that Defendant's trial counsel was speaking on Defendant's behalf or that Defendant was invoking or following his counsel's advice to just keep his mouth shut. On the contrary, the testimony indicated that Defendant instead proceeded to share both his admissions of guilt and his lawyer's advice with others. Further, the testimony did not dwell on Defendant's trial counsel but instead turned to Defendant's conversations with his mother. Under these narrow circumstances, we conclude that the inmate's testimony regarding Defendant's communications with his trial counsel is not the kind of reference to the invocation of Defendant's constitutional rights that would amount to plain or fundamental error. Cf. Loera, 1996-NMSC-074, ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 641, 930 P.2d 176. {34} With respect to the issue of whether the prosecutor's questions amounted to a conscious effort to impugn the integrity of Defendant's trial counsel, we conclude that the view of the evidence suggested by Defendant is not the only possible construction, and that the trial court was in a better position to weigh and analyze such situationally specific questions than we. United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 390-91 (D.C.Cir.1997). We note that the inmate's testimony regarding Defendant's conversation with his trial counsel appeared in the context of a line of questioning about a series of inculpatory statements that Defendant made to that inmate. The prosecutor's questions focused on this series of inculpatory statements and any details about the crimes that they might reveal. These statements were relevant in proving Defendant's guilt. Thus, when we consider context, we cannot say the reference to Defendant's trial counsel was elicited for an improper purpose or that it makes the question of guilt `so doubtful that it would shock the conscience to permit the conviction to stand,' State v. Osborne, 111 N.M. 654, 662, 808 P.2d 624, 632 (1991) (quoting State v. Rogers, 80 N.M. 230, 232, 453 P.2d 593, 595 (Ct.App.1969)); cf. State v. Clark, 1999-NMSC-035, ¶ 54, 128 N.M. 119, 990 P.2d 793 [hereinafter Clark III ] (rejecting the defendant's contention that the State improperly impugned the integrity of defense counsel by accusing him of trying to circumvent the judicial system), nor did the admission of this testimony amount to plain error. {35} Finally, we note that some portions of the inmate's testimony were consistent with Defendant's position of maintaining his innocence at trial. In particular, the statements that the evidence against Defendant was circumstantial and that he would beat this case were consistent with that position. Inasmuch as these statements were self-serving, we cannot say that Defendant was unfairly prejudiced by their admission. Thus, we do not find a basis for reversal in the admission of the inmate's testimony regarding Defendant's statements about his trial strategy or his communications with his trial counsel.