Opinion ID: 667507
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: John Taylor

Text: 35
36 Taylor argues that there was not enough evidence to demonstrate his participatory link with the conspiracy and that, at most, the evidence proved only an illegal agreement between him and Milton Sims to transport $69,500 of cocaine proceeds from Milwaukee to Los Angeles. We disagree. 37 Although we require the government to establish each defendant's participation in a conspiracy with substantial evidence ( United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1228 (7th Cir.1990), a defendant nonetheless bears a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of this evidence on appeal. United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 758 (7th Cir.) (citing United States v. Gutierrez, 978 F.2d 1463, 1468 (7th Cir.1992)), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 241, 483, 558 (1993). As with any other sufficiency of the evidence argument, we review the record in a light most favorable to the government, granting it the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Id. 2 And we do so keeping in mind that circumstantial as well as direct evidence will support a conspiracy conviction. Id.; United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1390 (7th Cir.1991) (Conspiracies, like other crimes, may be proved entirely by circumstantial evidence.) (citing Durrive, 902 F.2d at 1225). Our focus ultimately is on whether the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant knew of the conspiratorial agreement and intended to join it. Goines, 988 F.2d at 758-59. 38 We note at the outset that the evidence was more than sufficient to establish that by the time Taylor allegedly involved himself in the conspiracy, Sims had couriers regularly travelling the circuit between Los Angeles and Milwaukee to deliver cocaine to the distribution network in Milwaukee and return to Los Angeles with the proceeds. Against this backdrop, the government posits that Taylor succeeded Ann Love and Roosevelt Williams as one of Sims' couriers. As proof that Taylor assumed this role, the government relies on the following evidence: 39 (1) Amtrak records place Taylor (a Los Angeles resident) in Milwaukee on February 14, February 25, and March 10, 1989. Tr. 326-27; Gov.Ex. 258-60. 40 (2) Taylor was stopped by Sheriff's deputies at Mitchell Airport in Milwaukee on March 15, 1989 and $69,500 was seized from his luggage. Tr. 294-300. Taylor told the deputies that he didn't know the cash was there, that it did not belong to him, and explained that he was running an errand for a man he knew only as Bob. Tr. 317-322. Sims subsequently hired Taylor a lawyer to try to get the money back. Eastern Tr. 94-95. 41 (3) Business card notations in Taylor's wallet contained addresses or phone numbers associated with co-conspirators Roosevelt Williams, Darryl Tooter Ellison, Milton Sims, and Timothy Eastern. Tr. 325-26; Gov.Ex. 256, 257, 507. 42 (4) In August 1989, undercover agents in Los Angeles attempted to negotiate a purchase of one-quarter kilogram of cocaine from Taylor. After two attempts, the negotiations broke down and the agents made the purchase from another individual, Donald Taylor, known to them as Duck. The transaction took place at Duck's residence, and after it was completed, the agents observed Taylor arrive, park his car in front of the residence, and walk down the driveway into the house. Tr. 368-80. 43 (5) Taylor's residence was searched on March 26, 1990. Found on the premises were mobile phone documentation, notations bearing beeper numbers for Milton Sims and co-conspirator James McGee, a phone number for co-conspirator Tim Eastern, numbers for Landry Hampton and Duck, and a driver's license in Taylor's name bearing a false birth date and an address that corresponded with the residence of Milton Sims' mother. Tr. 185-192; Gov.Ex. 264-70. 44 (6) Phone toll analysis of calls corresponding chronologically to Taylor's train and plane trips to Milwaukee established contacts between him, Milton Sims, Roosevelt Williams, Tooter Ellison, and Tim Eastern. Tr. 548-558, Ex. 500-504. 45 We agree that this evidence was sufficient to establish Taylor's agreement to participate in the conspiracy by (at a minimum) transporting proceeds from the sale of cocaine from Milwaukee to Los Angeles. Taylor's trips to Milwaukee are certainly consistent with the courier system Sims had established. The large amount of cash found in his luggage at the conclusion of his last known trip is particularly probative, to the extent one may reasonably infer that the money constituted proceeds from cocaine sales. And we think this inference is reasonable--few people would pack nearly $70,000 in cash in their luggage for legitimate purposes. Taylor suggested at trial that he was carrying the money with him for purposes of purchasing property for his children, but the jury was certainly entitled to reject that implausible story. Moreover, the fact that Sims hired a lawyer for Taylor in an effort to retrieve the money confiscated tends to confirm (absent an extraordinarily philanthropic impulse on Sims' part) that the cash was drug proceeds rather than a real estate down payment. Indeed, according to Timothy Eastern, Sims later remarked that he had sent Taylor to Milwaukee to pick up a large sum of money and that Sims intended to try to retrieve the cash from the authorities. Eastern Tr. 93-95. 46 Finally, even if Taylor's involvement was limited to three or so trips to Milwaukee, we believe it reasonable for the jury to infer that he had joined the larger conspiracy. As we have previously observed: 47 Not every coconspirator must participate in, or even know the details of, every aspect of the conspiracy. It is enough for the government to prove that each knew of the agreement to distribute cocaine and joined that agreement. 48 Goines, 988 F.2d at 772. See also United States v. Auerbach, 913 F.2d 407, 415 (7th Cir.1990). Based upon his repeated service as a courier, a jury could reasonably infer that Taylor was at least aware of the illicit purpose of the conspiracy and of its broad outlines, if not each detail and each conspirator. See United States v. Diaz, 876 F.2d 1344, 1354 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Marks, 816 F.2d 1207, 1209 (7th Cir.1987); see generally United States v. Burrell, 963 F.2d 976, 988 (7th Cir.) (The jury also may consider overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy as circumstantial evidence establishing knowing participation in a conspiracy,), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 357 (1992). Cf. United States v. Osborne, 931 F.2d 1139, 1159 (7th Cir.1991) (the courier performs an important conveyance and/or transportation function in a drug conspiracy and is a necessary culpable member who helps insure the success of the overall conspiratorial drug distribution scheme). Taylor's conflicting explanations for the cash found in his suitcase on the occasion of his last trip to Milwaukee in particular tend to confirm that Taylor knew what illicit ends his trips were serving. See United States v. McCarthur, 6 F.3d 1270, 1280 (7th Cir.1993). The inference that Taylor was a knowing participant is further bolstered by the evidence indicating that Taylor was familiar with a number of other members of the conspiracy and had contact with them on the occasion of his own trips to Milwaukee. See Marks, 816 F.2d at 1211-12; see also Burrell, 963 F.2d at 991; United States v. Smith, 995 F.2d 662, 668 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 718 (1994). His possession of mobile phone documentation and a driver's license with false information is also consistent with his involvement in the conspiracy, as mobile phones are tools of the drug trade and the address on the driver's license was that of Sims' mother, suggesting more than a fleeting alliance with Sims. See United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255, 1260 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 174 (1992); United States v. Calvo, 865 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023, 109 S.Ct. 1750 (1989). Finally, the evidence concerning the undercover agents' unsuccessful attempt to purchase cocaine from Taylor in Los Angeles, which the district court admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), arguably helps to confirm that his intent was to distribute cocaine, although the amount involved in those negotiations was relatively small and it is not clear where Taylor would have procured the cocaine. In sum, we find the evidence sufficient to support Taylor's conviction for conspiracy and therefore affirm his conviction on Count One of the superseding indictment. 49 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence--Attempted Possession of Six Kilograms of Cocaine on July 7, 1988 (Count Three) 50 The government concedes that this conviction should be reversed. According to the government, the evidence indicated that Taylor joined the conspiracy as a courier no earlier than October, 1988, months after this attempt. Under United States v. Covelli, 738 F.2d 847, 859 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 867, 105 S.Ct. 211 (1984), Taylor cannot be held to account for substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators prior to his joining the conspiracy. We therefore reverse Taylor's conviction on Count Three of the superseding indictment and remand for resentencing. 51 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence--Travel Act--Interstate Travel to Facilitate Cocaine Trafficking on March 15, 1989 (Count Four) 52 This count stems from the seizure of money from Taylor's luggage at Mitchell Airport. Taylor had flown to Milwaukee from Los Angeles earlier the same day with Corey Sims. Phone records indicated that upon arrival in Milwaukee at 6:30 a.m., Taylor called Roosevelt Williams, who (as we have noted) distributed Sims' cocaine in Milwaukee and had acted as a courier as well. See Tr. 556-57. Taylor subsequently checked into a local hotel, checked out, and was back at the airport by 10:40 a.m. Tr. 328-29. Security personnel then stopped Taylor when they discerned a suspicious object in his suitcase. Tr. 294-300. That object turned out to be two shoe boxes containing the $69,950 in cash. Tr. 296-300. 53 In order to sustain a Travel Act conviction, the evidence must establish that the defendant travelled in interstate commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity or to otherwise promote, manage, establish [or] carry on ... any unlawful activity, and thereafter did or attempted to do so. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952(a). The Act defines unlawful activity to include any business enterprise involving ... narcotics or controlled substances. Sec. 1952(b). To constitute a business enterprise for purposes of the Travel Act, the activities must be part of a 'continuous course of conduct.'  United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319, 1327 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Corbin, 662 F.2d 1066, 1072 (4th Cir.1981)), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067, 109 S.Ct. 1345 (1989). Moreover, the travel which supplies the basis for the charge  'must relate significantly, rather than incidentally or minimally, to the illegal activity.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Raineri, 670 F.2d 702, 717 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1035, 103 S.Ct. 446 (1982)). 54 We again begin with the observation that the evidence was more than sufficient to prove that Sims had established a courier network for the delivery of cocaine to Milwaukee and return of the proceeds to Los Angeles. This and other evidence concerning the overall scope of the conspiracy amply establishes the requisite business enterprise. See Muskovsky, 863 F.2d at 1327. In that context, the jury could reasonably infer that Taylor was making this trip for Sims (as Tim Eastern's testimony suggests) and that the purpose of the trip was to retrieve drug proceeds (if not to drop off a shipment of cocaine as well). The circumstances of his trip, in particular his travel to Los Angeles with another conspirator, his very short turn-around time, and the large amount of cash found on his person as he prepared to return to Los Angeles, tend to eliminate any alternate explanations for his travel. The evidence was therefore more than sufficient to prove that Taylor traveled in interstate commerce in order to facilitate cocaine trafficking. Quite clearly this travel related significantly to the affairs of the conspiracy, and thus it represented a sound basis for his conviction under the Travel Act. We therefore affirm Taylor's conviction on Count Four of the superseding indictment. 55 4. Sufficiency of the Evidence--Attempted Possession of Four Kilograms on March 9, 1990 (Count Eight) 56 This involves the controlled delivery of cocaine to Sims and Ellison that police attempted unsuccessfully after Carolyn Baker was arrested in possession of the cocaine in Los Angeles. See Tr. 167-73. There was no evidence that Taylor had anything to do with this transaction. Instead, the government contended (and the jury apparently agreed) that Taylor was liable for the attempt under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180 (1946), due to his membership in the conspiracy. See United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 929 n. 2 (9th Cir.1992); see generally United States v. Gutierrez, supra, 978 F.2d at 1467-68; United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir.1991). Taylor contends that he was no longer a member of the conspiracy by this time, and thus cannot be held liable under Pinkerton. 57 As the government notes, the burden is on the defendant to prove his withdrawal from the conspiracy. United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1206-07 (7th Cir.1993). We have held repeatedly that merely by ceasing his participation in the conspiracy a defendant does not absolve himself of responsibility for the subsequent acts of his co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 1206 (collecting cases). Instead, a conspirator affirmatively must make his withdrawal known either by confessing to the police or by clearly communicating to his co-conspirators that he had abandoned the venture. Id. Taylor does not point to any evidence in the record that he withdrew from the conspiracy. Instead, he seems to rely solely on the fact that he was no longer actively participating in the conspiracy as of March 1990. This is not enough to establish his withdrawal. Id. at 1206-07. 58 As we have noted, the jury could reasonably infer that Taylor was still involved in the conspiracy as of March of 1989, when Taylor travelled to Milwaukee and the money was seized from his luggage as he prepared to return to Los Angeles. Even if we assume that this was the last act he took in furtherance of the conspiracy, the passage of one year in and of itself does not suggest his withdrawal. Indeed, the fact that Sims hired an attorney for Taylor to seek return of the seized money could be read to suggest that Taylor remained a member of the conspiracy. 59 The only remaining questions are whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Sims and Ellison attempted to possess the cocaine and whether that attempt was a reasonably foreseeable act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The rules governing attempt charges are straightforward. The government must prove that Taylor acted with specific intent to commit the underlying offense, and in addition took a substantial step toward its completion. United States v. Cea, 914 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir.1990). We think the evidence sufficient to establish that both Sims and Ellison attempted to possess the cocaine on March 9, 1990. After Baker arrived in Milwaukee in the company of the authorities, she followed routine procedure and paged Sims in order to arrange a pickup of the cocaine. Shortly after she and Sims spoke by telephone, Sims and Ellison arrived at her house. The jury could reasonably infer that they stopped by in order to retrieve the cocaine. At the same time, because this attempted transaction was a routine step in the distribution chain, and given Taylor's experience as a courier in that chain, it was a transaction reasonably foreseeable to him, and thus attributable to him under Pinkerton. We therefore affirm Taylor's conviction on Count Eight of the superseding indictment. 60 4. Introduction of Tax Return Evidence in Rebuttal 61 In an effort to explain why he had $69,950 in cash with him in Milwaukee on March 15, 1989, Taylor contended at trial that he had brought the money to Milwaukee to help his children buy property and that he had earned the money legitimately. See Tr. 702-05. Toward that end, he submitted copies of what purported to be his IRS returns for 1987 and 1988, which reflected income of $112,788 and $135,120, respectively. Tr. 720; Taylor Ex. 1, 2. In rebuttal, the government offered into evidence copies of the 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1988 returns Taylor had produced in the civil action in which he sought return of the seized money. Tr. 748-50; Gov.Ex. 408-11. Consistent with Taylor's contention at his criminal trial, these returns reflected income of $45,238 in 1984, $87,666 in 1986, $112,788 in 1987, and $135,120 in 1988. However, the government also introduced certified copies of the tax returns that Taylor had actually filed in these years, together with the IRS transcripts of account prepared in conjunction with these returns. Tr. 753-61, Gov.Ex. 401-07. These documents reflected adjusted gross income of $9,954 in 1984, $15,220 in 1985, $17,666 in 1986, and $16,572 in 1987. Taylor had not yet filed a return for 1988. Taylor contends that the admission of this evidence was improper and prejudicial. 62 In our view, the evidence was appropriate rebuttal. Taylor offered the 1987 and 1988 returns in order to show that he had a legitimate source of income which would explain his ability to carry such a large sum of cash. The admission of the other returns Taylor had produced in the civil action, coupled with proof of the actual returns Taylor had filed with the IRS, tended to show that Taylor's story was concocted. Not all of these returns might have been relevant standing alone, given that Taylor had only offered returns for 1987 and 1988, but considered in light of the apparently phony returns Taylor had offered at trial, the returns introduced by the government suggested an effort to falsify the source of the seized funds. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. See United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1500 (7th Cir.) (in narcotics cases, defendant's failure to file tax returns admissible to show that defendant lacked legitimate source of income), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863, 111 S.Ct. 173 (1990). 63 5. Admission of Evidence Concerning Efforts to Purchase Cocaine from Taylor in August, 1989 64 The district court permitted the government to establish that in August 1989, an undercover agent had attempted to purchase a quarter kilogram of cocaine from Taylor. As we have noted, after two unsuccessful negotiation sessions, the agent made the purchase from Duck, and Taylor arrived while the purchase was in progress. Tr. 368-80. The court allowed this evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b). 65 The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. Although the transaction with Taylor was never consummated, the negotiations themselves arguably established his willingness to distribute cocaine, which in turn was relevant to his intent to join the charged conspiracy. As the government notes, conspiracy is a specific intent crime, and precedent in this circuit renders intent evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) in this context regardless of whether the defendant has put intent at issue. United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S.Ct. 2087 (1989). In any event, Taylor's defense would seem to have put his intent in issue, since he claimed the lack of evidence to show that he became a participant in the conspiracy. See Tr. 985-95. 66 6. Finding at Sentencing that Taylor was Responsible for Between Fifteen and Forty-Nine Kilograms of Cocaine 67 Taylor argues that the district court had no basis other than pure speculation for the conclusion that he should be deemed responsible for between fifteen and forty-nine kilograms of cocaine. This is a finding of fact, subject to review under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Hoffman, 957 F.2d 296, 300 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2315 (1992). In a drug conspiracy, each conspirator is responsible not only for amounts with which he was directly involved, but also for amounts involved in transactions by co-conspirators that were reasonably foreseeable to him. United States v. Paters, No. 92-3816, slip op. at 5 (7th Cir. Feb. 8, 1994); U.S.S.G. Secs. 2D1.1(a)(3), 1B1.3(a). The government contends that the fifteen to forth-nine kilogram range was appropriate, because the evidence showed that Taylor had made at least three courier trips by train to Milwaukee beginning in at least February 1989 and that Carolyn Baker and Rita Brown had made similar trips prior to the termination of the conspiracy in March 1990. 68 Having reviewed the record, we find it necessary to vacate the sentence and remand so that the district court can render more specific findings that would justify attributing at least fifteen kilograms of cocaine to Taylor. The district court declined to articulate a basis for arriving at fifteen kilograms, observing that it's not necessary for the Court to be arithmetically precise in determining the amount of drugs that a defendant is involved with or responsible for under the guidelines. Rather, we are to find a general zone of responsibility that fairly reflects the conduct of the defendant. Taylor Sent. Tr. 9-10. Although we agree that the court need not calculate the drug quantity with apothecarial precision, it is nonetheless obligated to identify with some specificity its means of arriving at the total for which it deems an individual defendant responsible. United States v. DePriest, supra, 6 F.3d at 1213-14. The district court did not do so, and unfortunately, neither did the government or the probation officer. See PSR p 93 & Addendum at 2; Taylor Sent. Tr. 8-9. Given the large quantities of cocaine that this conspiracy handled, the fifteen-kilogram figure may well be justified, even conservative. For example, Taylor himself appears to have made at least three trips to Milwaukee from Los Angeles beginning in February 1989, and although there was no direct evidence that Taylor carried cocaine with him on these occasions, the district court might reasonably infer that he did so. Other couriers made similar trips to Milwaukee both before and after Taylor, carrying with them multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine. Provided these trips were reasonably foreseeable to Taylor, he may be held to account for the amounts involved. But the record does not supply a ready basis to determine the amounts Taylor and other couriers may have carried on each trip, nor is there any other immediately apparent ground on which to conclude either that Taylor himself dealt with fifteen or more kilograms of cocaine or that others did so in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable to him. Thus, without more detailed findings, we are unable to determine whether the district court's conclusion was clearly erroneous or not. We therefore remand for further findings on this subject.