Opinion ID: 365775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Standard Applied: Who's Confused? By What?

Text: 21 A finding of likelihood of confusion is based upon an evaluation both of the marks themselves and of certain extrinsic conditions, such as the parties' business operations or the intent of the alleged infringer. 7 The evaluation of the marks themselves is of course the most important consideration, for it is in their similarity that the roots of the confusion lie. See Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d at 386; B. H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 5 Cir., 1971, 451 F.2d 1254, 1261; I. T. S. Industria Tessuti Speciali v. Aerfab Corp., S.D.N.Y., 1967, 280 F.Supp. 581, 586; Callmann, Supra note 5, § 80, at 538. 22 In this case, although the District Court found similarities in Armstrong's and World's business operations, the Court based its finding of likelihood of confusion primarily upon findings of similarities in the companies' products and marks. 8 The Court found that the companies' carpets were, without the federally required label, indistinguishable. Findings of Fact No. 31. This factor, coupled with what the Court considered to be the substantial similarity in the companies' marks, was the deciding consideration leading to the Court's finding of likelihood of confusion: The carpet products are so closely related that use of substantially similar marks would create a strong likelihood of confusion. Id. 23 Of course, the findings of similar marks and products are also governed by the clearly erroneous standard. In this case, it is an error in one of these findings that tars the finding of likelihood of confusion with the brush of clear error. The Court's finding that Armstrong's proposed name and World's trademark are substantially similar is clearly erroneous, and without this finding, the finding of likelihood of confusion cannot stand. 24 The mere fact that Armstrong's proposed corporate name contains the word World does not, of itself, make the name substantially similar to World's trademark. A mark must be viewed in its entirety and in context. It is the overall impression that counts. B. H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d at 1262 n. 2; Restatement of Torts § 729, Comment b (1938). 25 Part of this overall impression includes the manner in which a particular mark or designation is to be used. Callmann, Supra note 5, § 82.2(e). In this case, the Court attached significance to the fact that Armstrong would use its corporate name on its carpet labels and that this would likely cause confusion with World. Therefore, a comparison of World's carpet label and Armstrong's proposed carpet label 9 seems appropriate:NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE 26 World's carpet label. 27 NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE 28 Armstrong's proposed carpet label. 29 An examination of Armstrong's proposed label shows that the diminutive appearance of the word World in fine print at the bottom right of the label is obviously quite different from the appearance of World's bold WORLD. The attention-getting feature in Armstrong's label is unquestionably Armstrong's own trademark Armstrong with a circled A. The import of each label is altogether distinctive. With such clearly dissimilar labels, we fail to see how the ordinary purchaser of carpets would likely be confused between the two companies' products. 10 Cf. Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Development Corp., W.D.Ark., 1967, 264 F.Supp. 852, 861. 11 30 Moreover, it must be emphasized that Armstrong seeks merely to change its corporate name. There is no showing that Armstrong is seeking to feature either the new name in its entirety or, more significantly, the term World to denominate or advertise its carpets. There is nothing in the record that suggests that Armstrong will deviate from its present policy of promoting its own admittedly well-known and distinctive trademark. 12 Under such circumstances, we believe that the District Court was clearly erroneous in finding that Armstrong's proposed corporate name is substantially similar to World's trademark. 31 Once the Court's finding of similarity of marks is rejected, the other factors supporting the Court's determination appear insignificant. The only other factors cited by the Court in its findings were the similarities in the companies' business operations and products. These findings, standing without the critical finding of trademark similarity, are hardly sufficient to support a determination of likelihood of confusion. 32 Indeed, much other evidence at trial seems to support a contrary finding. For example, the existence of eighty-five different carpet companies using without objection from World the word World in their business not to mention World's toleration of Armstrong's own use of the terms INDOOR WORLD and Pacific World militates against the finding of likelihood of confusion. 13 Restatement of Torts § 729, Comment (g), at 596 (1938) (The greater the number of identical or more or less similar trade-marks already in use . . . the less is the likelihood of confusion.). 33 World, however, contends that there is evidence showing not merely likelihood of confusion, but even actual confusion. First, World points to commentary in a trade magazine that purportedly suggests that Armstrong might have acquired World. This information came into the record via Armstrong's answer to World's interrogatory. 14 The commentary itself was properly excluded as hearsay. We find this evidence to be practically useless. From the interrogatory, it is of course impossible to know exactly what was written in the trade magazine. It is also impossible to determine whether the author of the comments was actually confused, merely speculating, or attempting to be humorous about whatever it was he or she was writing about. 34 World also cites the testimony of two businessmen who stated that upon first learning of Armstrong's proposed name change they entertained short-lived impressions that Armstrong had acquired or merged with World. 15 To the extent that this evidence shows confusion at all, it is insufficient to tip the scales in World's favor. The fact that there might have been some evidence to support a particular finding does not make that finding impervious to F.R.Civ.P. 52(a) reversal if the reviewing court is convinced that a mistake has nonetheless been made. W. R. B. Corp. v. Geer, 313 F.2d at 752; Sanders v. Leech, 5 Cir., 1946, 158 F.2d 486, 487.