Opinion ID: 1831348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: To retain legal council immediately,

Text: II. To voice opposition to the proposed budget of the department of public safety, specifically that part pertaining to the fire department, at the public hearing August 12, 1964, unless our askings are granted in full before this date. The executive board of Local 11 was instructed by a vote of an overwhelming majority of all members, to prepare this news release on the material here included. We will carry out the wishes of our members. The Executive Board of Local 11 Association of Professional Fire Fighters of Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Chief Hunter first learned of this news release upon its publication. Schmitt, Klein and Scott were immediately called before the chief and the assistant chiefs of the department where each admitted his part in its preparation and release. Scott's admissions included a statement he realized the news release was against the rules and regulations and that rules and regulations were necessary for the operation of the fire department. At the conclusion of this interview with plaintiffs and a conference with the assistant chiefs who unanimously recommended 90 days suspension for each of the three firemen, Chief Hunter made such an order. It was made on the basis of disobedience as outlined in Code section 365.19 by violation of departmental rules 23 and 34. Chief Hunter's testimony before the commission includes; Q. Now, Chief Hunter, would you state in your opinion as Chief of the Fire Department, and as a career fire fighter, whether or not rules and regulations are necessary for a fire department, and whether or not it is necessary in your opinion to require compliance and obedience to such rules and regulations? A. It is my opinion that any good organization must have rules and regulations. And more especially a fire department, because we are organized as a semi-military organization, so to speak. When orders are given they must be implicitly obeyed. It might mean life or death to someone, or the destruction of property, if they are not followed out. Several of the assistant chiefs gave like testimony. Klein testified before the commission he considered wages and budget as fire department business. None of the plaintiffs contended they were strictly and only union affairs. III. This court has not heretofore passed squarely upon the question of governmental control of actions or speech of public employees in respect to matters outside the actual performance of their duties. It has, however, come to the attention of courts in other jurisdictions and is the subject of an annotation in 163 A.L.R. 1358. McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517, on which the trial court strongly relied, seems to be the early landmark case in this area of the law. In that case the court approved discharge of a city policeman for disobedience of a departmental rule prohibiting soliciting money for political purposes and becoming a member of a political committee. The court held the rule was not open to constitutional or statutory objection and that it was reasonable. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes speaking for the court at pages 517, 518, states: The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control. This condition seems to us reasonable, if that be a question open to revision here. Since the McAuliffe case (1892) many opinions have been written upholding the constitutionality of statutes, rules and regulations limiting the actions and words of employees of various branches of government. Included are those approving the reasonableness and constitutionality of the Hatch Political Activities Act. United Public Workers, etc. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754; State of Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Com., 330 U.S. 127, 67 S.Ct. 544, 91 L.Ed. 794. See also Anno. 91 L.Ed. 787. The general rule is now well established that one employed in public service does not have a constitutional right to such employment and is subject to reasonable supervision and restriction by the authorized governmental body or officer to the end that proper discipline may be maintained, and activities among the employees may not be allowed to disrupt or impair the public service. State ex rel. Curtis v. Steinkellner, 247 Wis. 1, 18 N.W.2d 355; Kane v. Walsh, 295 N.Y. 198, 66 N.E.2d 53, 163 A.L.R. 1351; Riley v. Board of Police Com'rs of City of Norwalk, 147 Conn. 113, 157 A.2d 590; DeGrazio v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Chicago, 31 Ill.2d 482, 202 N.E.2d 522; McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517; Flood v. Kennedy, 12 N.Y.2d 345, 239 N.Y.S.2d 665, 190 N.E.2d 13; Hayman v. City of Los Angeles, 17 Cal.App.2d 674, 62 P.2d 1047; Board of Education of City of Los Angeles v. Swan, 41 Cal.2d 546, 261 P.2d 261; Belshaw v. City of Berkeley, Cal.App., 54 Cal.Rptr. 727; Anno. 163 A.L.R. 1358. IV. The real and decisive question in the case at bar may be pin pointed to the inquiry of whether the regulations established by rules 23 and 34 are reasonable and necessary for proper departmental discipline and protection of public service. Some dissension in a fire department is certain to arise. It is a semi-military organization. Disciplinary rules to avoid adverse effects to public interest are necessary. Flood v. Kennedy, 12 N.Y.2d 345, 239 N.Y.S.2d 665, 190 N.E.2d 13; DeGrazio v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Chicago, 31 Ill.2d 482, 202 N.E.2d 522; State ex rel. Curtis v. Steinkellner, 247 Wis. 1, 18 N.W.2d 355. The purpose of such rules and regulations must be to maintain order and discipline among the employees and to advance and improve the public service. The record, which we have set out perhaps in greater detail than necessary, clearly establishes the news releases relate only to attempts by Local No. 11, its officers and members to obtain better hours, wages and fringe benefits. There is not the slightest proof plaintiffs' conduct impaired the administration of the public service of which they were a part. V. Generally speaking, employees have a right to publicize the facts of a labor dispute. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855; Anno. 93 L.Ed. 1184. In absence of proof of impairment of the administration of public service, this rule applies to public employees. Belshaw v. City of Berkeley, Court of Appeal, 1966, 54 Cal. Rptr. 727, 730, 731 and citations; City of St. Petersburg et al. v. Pfeiffer, Fla., 52 So.2d 796. VI. We conclude the news release of August 5, 1964 by plaintiffs represented nothing more than an exercise of their constitutionally protected right of free speech regarding a labor dispute for which, in the absence of a showing of impairment of public service, they should not have been punished. To the extent rules 23 and 34 authorize such punishment they are too broad, rigid and unreasonable. Under the fact their enforcement was arbitrary and capricious and therefore illegal. We hold defendant commission acted illegally and the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. The writ of certiorari is sustained. Suspension of plaintiffs should be set aside and compensation for the period thereof made. Reversed and remanded. LARSON, RAWLINGS, BECKER and MASON, JJ., concur. STUART, J., GARFIELD, C. J., and SNELL, J., dissent.