Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Count Thirteen B: Investigation of Larry Bjorklund

Text: In 1989, petitioner joined a church at which Larry Bjorklund was pastor. Between that time and May 1992, when he became inactive in the church, petitioner, who was a church elder, and Pastor Bjorklund had a number of disputes. According to Pastor Bjorklund, petitioner was very critical of his preaching, his doctrinal approach, and his general performance as a pastor. Based on petitioner's perception of the pastor's personal problems, petitioner doubted Pastor Bjorklund's pastoral abilities. At a church meeting in early 1992, petitioner accused Pastor Bjorklund of giving a heretical and blasphemous sermon and impliedly accused him of having an extramarital affair. Petitioner became inactive at the church a short time later. According to petitioner, at some point during this period, Detective Sergeant Milt Gauthier of the Madera Sheriffs Office came to petitioner's chambers to discuss a child molestation investigation involving a member of petitioner's church. Gauthier wanted to learn what petitioner knew about the alleged victim's father. During the conversation, Gauthier stated that the pastor had counseled and interviewed the alleged victim for 15 to 20 hours, trying to get her to admit that her father had molested her. In response, petitioner told Gauthier that he had some real concerns about [the pastor's] methods in trying to ... prove a case against [the alleged victim's father], because [the pastor] was upset at the alleged victim's father. Petitioner, who was a church elder at the time, also voiced concern about the church's potential civil liability for permitting the pastor to provide counseling if he were not licensed. According to petitioner, Gauthier also expressed interest in determining the pastor's licensing status, suggesting that counseling without a license might be a misdemeanor under a county ordinance. Petitioner then stated: Well, you know, don't do it for me. If you run across any information whether he's licensed or not, I'd like to know. I want to advise the church Board if we have a risk going on. When Gauthier replied that he intended to call the State Board of Licensing, petitioner replied: That's up to you.... I'd appreciate knowing what you find out. A short time later, Gauthier delivered a written summary of his investigation to petitioner, which indicated that the pastor was not licensed, that he had not had a license revoked, and that he probably did not need to be licensed. Other than petitioner's testimony, the only evidence before the Commission regarding this incident came from a deposition the pastor gave pursuant to a stipulation and order of the presiding special master. The deposition was ordered in anticipation of the pastor's unavailability for trial. On direct examination, and without objection by petitioner, the pastor testified that he received a call after petitioner had left the church from someone named Gene, who informed him that petitioner had ordered an investigation into [the pastor's] credentials as a pastoral counselor. After the pastor called the sheriffs office to investigate the information, he received a visit from Gauthier, who told [him] that [petitioner] had ... asked [Gauthier] to do an investigation to find out about [the pastor's] qualifications as being a pastoral counselor, and that petitioner had some concern about the church maybe being legally... liable. Prompted by petitioner's questions on cross-examination, the pastor testified that Gene Zimmerman, who was with the Madera Employees Union, had first contacted him about the alleged investigation. The pastor also reiterated on cross-examination, again without objection, that Gauthier had explain[ed] the circumstances under which he felt obligated to perform th[e] investigation, but he had been directed by [petitioner]. Petitioner then asked, Is that what he told you? The pastor replied: That's the word. That's what he told me. On this record, the special masters found that, by asking Gauthier to share information gathered during the course of his investigation, [petitioner] was using the prestige of his office for a personal purpose. They concluded: Although, this incident does not constitute the `instigation' of any criminal investigation for a personal purpose, it nevertheless constitutes willful misconduct. The Commission found that petitioner had prevailed upon Sergeant Gauthier to inquire and advise [him] regarding the license status of Pastor Bjorklund for reasons that were entirely personal and unrelated to Sergeant Gauthier's investigation of the molestation case. Finding that Gauthier had acted because [petitioner] invoked his authority as a judge to request the report, and not out of friendship or as a favor, the Commission unanimously concluded that petitioner abused the judicial power and committed willful misconduct in office by ask[ing] Sgt. Gauthier to conduct an investigation of his rival for a personal purpose. Petitioner contends that there is no competent evidence to support the finding that he asked Gauthier to investigate the pastor. He argues that the pastor lacked personal knowledge regarding petitioner's role in the inquiry, that the pastor's deposition testimony on this subject is inadmissible hearsay, and that we should not consider it despite his failure to object during the Commission proceedings. We do not reach the merits of petitioner's evidentiary objection because, even crediting the pastor's testimony, we find the evidence insufficient to support the Commission's willful misconduct conclusion. Even if we assume that petitioner asked Gauthier to investigate the pastor, we find that petitioner was not acting in a judicial capacity when he did so. First, petitioner was not performing one of the functions generally associated with his position as a judge. [Citations.] ( Dodds, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 175, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 906 P.2d 1260.) Second, though petitioner was [in his chambers] when he met with [Gauthier], that location was simply a convenient meeting place that [Gauthier] selected. The meeting had nothing to do with petitioner's work as a judge, but rather his status as [someone who knew individuals involved in the matter] that [Gauthier] was investigating. [Citation.] ( Ibid ) Finally, there is no evidence that petitioner attempt[ed] to curry favor with [Gauthier]... on account of his judicial status. [Citation.] ( Id., at p. 176, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 906 P.2d 1260.) Nor does the pastor's deposition testimony that Gauthier felt obligated to perform th[e] investigation constitute clear and convincing evidence that petitioner use[d], or attempt[ed] to use, his authority as a judge for improper ends.... ( Dodds, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 172, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 906 P.2d 1260.) To hold that petitioner acted in a judicial capacity simply because his [request] carried with it a degree of authority due to his status as a judge ... would mean that a judge is always acting in a judicial capacity when he [or she] talks to [law enforcement personnel]. We decline to interpret `judicial capacity' so broadly. ( Id. at p. 175, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 906 P.2d 1260.) Nor, on the totality of the circumstances in this case, do we find clear and convincing evidence that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct. The record does not indicate that petitioner attempted to pressure Gauthier into investigating the pastor. In the context of a conversation that Gauthier initiated by coming to petitioner's chambers and seeking his help in the molestation investigation, and given Gauthier's expressed concern about the pastor's counseling of the alleged victim, petitioner's request (assuming he made it) that Gauthier determine the pastor's licensing status does not constitute prejudicial misconduct. As a church elder, petitioner was legitimately concerned about the pastor's conduct and his qualifications. Although judges must be careful not to take advantage of their position, petitioner's position as a judge did not disable him from making a request of the sheriffs office that any other member of the community with similar concerns could make. Moreover, having independently reviewed the evidentiary record, and even considering the pastor's testimony, we do not find clear and convincing evidence to support the Commission's conclusion that petitioner asked Sgt. Gauthier to conduct an investigation of the pastor. Even unchallenged hearsay statements should be evaluated ... for what they are worth. (Saw Bernardino Valley Water Dev. Co. v. San Bernardino Valley Mun. Water Dist. (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 238, 266, 45 Cal.Rptr. 793.) They should `be weighed by the trier of facts the same as other evidence and may be disregarded where shown to be unconvincing or insubstantial. [Citation.]' ( Estate of Moore (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 64, 74, 300 P.2d 110.) Here, there are good reasons to question the pastor's hearsay testimony. The record shows that both the pastor and Gauthier could be considered petitioner's opponents. The Commission's findings support this conclusion, describing petitioner's relationship with the pastor and with Gauthier as, respectively, hostile and strained and not one of mutual friendship and trust. Notably, unlike the Commission, the special masters did not find that petitioner initiated the investigation, but found only that he asked Sgt. Gauthier to advise him if he discovered during the course of his investigation that [the pastor] was not a licensed counselor and to share information gathered during the course of his investigation. On review, we accord special weight to the factual findings of the special masters, not of the Commission. Given the special masters' finding and petitioner's direct testimony on the matter, even considering the pastor's testimony, we do not find clear and convincing evidence that petitioner directed Gauthier to investigate the pastor or committed prejudicial misconduct in asking Gauthier to share the results of his inquiry. [20] Because we find insufficient evidence of willful or prejudicial misconduct, we dismiss the charge contained in count thirteen B of the second amended notice of formal proceedings. [21]