Opinion ID: 2570148
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Issue a Protective Order

Text: Defendant contends the court erroneously refused to issue a protective order, allowing the prosecutor to abuse discovery procedures by intimidating witnesses and limiting mitigating evidence. [17] These claims fail.
At a pretrial hearing, defendant agreed to give the prosecution notes and tapes of interviews with numerous potential defense witnesses, under compulsion of the reciprocal discovery statutes and to assist in settlement negotiations. He sought a protective order on the ground that this case involves a number of highly sensitive, highly embarrassing, very secret issues among defendant's family, extended family, and close friends. Defense counsel had been told by his capital case coordinator that there were threats to kill or castrate counsel if he harm[ed] the family. The case coordinator also believed that defendant's grandfather was in all likelihood having sexual relations with defendant's mother. The parties agreed on a protective order temporarily precluding the prosecution from disclosing discovery information or contacting penalty phase witnesses. At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the court stated that the order about not disclosing that information to anyone and not doing any follow-up with that information would stay in effect at least through the guilt phase. However, the defense was free to permit investigation into particular areas before the penalty phase. Counsel agreed that a detective could review the discovery and speak to defendant's former teachers and principal. By recounting these unusual arrangements, we do not suggest that they were required. Following the guilt phase, the prosecutor brought up the disclosure of witness statements and interviews. He observed there were approximately 45 defense witnesses, and only three weeks before they would testify. Defense counsel responded that a number of witnesses had expressed grave reservations about testifying. He was concerned that if the prosecutor confronted these witnesses with allegations of sexual and physical abuse, incest, and homosexuality, defense counsel's job would become more difficult in terms of getting them here and getting them to testify. Therefore, while he intended to elicit testimony in these areas, he requested that the court direct the prosecutor not to explore them during his investigation. The court lifted the protective order, ruling that the prosecutor was entitled at this point to investigate the information. The court noted, Obviously it would be improper for the prosecution to do anything that was designed to intimidate defense witnesses or . . . suggest to them that they better not show up in court. The court also suggested that the prosecutor assure the witnesses he was not seeking information to prosecute them for the acts in question, which occurred outside California. Several days later, the parties revisited the subject. Defense counsel sought an order precluding the prosecutor from either sharing with family members the investigators' reports reflecting their impressions of the witnesses, or asking one witness about another witness's statement. In particular, defense counsel was concerned that the prosecutor would ask witnesses about the case coordinator's impression that on one visit she had interrupted an incestuous encounter between defendant's mother and grandfather. The trial court denied the request, except to the extent any investigator's impressions of a witness could be considered work product. I don't see how you can tell the prosecution, well, yes, I am going to be presenting evidence along these lines in my case in mitigation but I want the prosecution precluded from investigating or inquiring into those areas. If you're going to be presenting the evidence they have a right to investigate it. The court also stated, I really don't think it's in the realm of the court to try to supervise and delineate the specific rules of either side's investigation, other than to assure that nothing is done by either side that results in either intentional or unintentional intimidation of the other side's witnesses, which would, of course, be improper.
Defendant claims the court abused its discretion by failing to order the prosecutor not to show one defense witness the statement of another witness. Not so. (11) Under the discovery statute, the defense is required to disclose to the prosecution certain materials, including any relevant written or recorded statements of those it intends to call as witnesses at trial. (§ 1054.3, subd. (a).) A defendant demonstrating good cause may seek to deny, restrict, or defer disclosure. (§ 1054.7.) `Good cause' is limited to threats or possible danger to the safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence, or possible compromise of other investigations by law enforcement. ( Ibid. ) However, the trial court retains authority to regulate discovery to protect a defendant's constitutional rights. ( People v. Superior Court ( Mitchell ) (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1229, 1238 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 859 P.2d 102]; Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 382 [285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304].) Here, defendant contends a protective order was necessary to avoid the possible loss or destruction of evidence. (§ 1054.7.) However, he fails to explain how the prosecutor's legitimate questioning of defense witnesses about the very matters defendant intended to explore at trial would lead to the loss or destruction of evidence. Witnesses might be reluctant to discuss sensitive issues, or might deny they happened. However, such reluctance flows from the nature of the evidence itself and its public discussion, not from the trial court's refusal to issue a protective order. Defendant further contends the prosecution improperly used the witness reports to dissuade witnesses from testifying. He points to no facts supporting this assertion. Indeed, he expressly refrains from asserting prosecutorial misconduct. Similarly, there is no factual support for defendant's claim that the failure to issue a protective order hindered his counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence, particularly the alleged incestuous relationship between his grandfather and mother. Only the investigator's suspicions suggested such a relationship, and defendant fails to show how the absence of a protective order prevented him from investigating it, whether it preceded the capital crimes, whether defendant knew of it, or how it might be relevant in any way to the defense.