Opinion ID: 3012662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment for Kubichek

Text: A court may enter summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. 5 P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court must view all evidence, and draw all inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here Brennan. See, e.g., Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2003). Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary. See, e.g., Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003). In New Jersey, an insured may not change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy except by “substantial compliance” with the method provided in the contract between the insured and the insurer. Strohsahl v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States, 71 N.J.Super. 300, 304 (Ch. Div. 1962). “[A]n insured will be released from a strict observance of the terms of the policy if the court can be convinced that the insured made every reasonable effort to effect a change of beneficiary.” Haynes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 166 N.J.Super. 308, 313 (App. Div. 1979). The MetLife plan will pay life insurance benefits to the beneficiary of the basic policy named on the proper form, and the insured may change the beneficiary “at any time by filing written notice thereof on such a form with [GM] or [MetLife].” The same terms apply for designating and changing the beneficiary for the optional policy. Brennan’s strongest evidence demonstrating that the decedent substantially complied with this policy is the letter of February 24, 1991, purportedly sent from the decedent to MetLife, asking 6 MetLife to confirm the change of beneficiary to Brennan.3 This letter, if authentic, is a written expression of the decedent’s desire to make Brennan the designated beneficiary for both policies. It also reports that the decedent made repeated efforts to effectuate this change. Nevertheless, there is no evidence, however the decedent may have articulated his intentions in a letter, that he in fact substantially complied with MetLife’s change of beneficiary policy. The letter itself is of questionable authenticity. Even if it were authentic, however, it would fall short of showing that the decedent did complete and submit the proper forms, or even that he tried to, and substantially did, do so. The November 19, 1991 letter from GM to the decedent, confirming his enrollment in the basic and optional policies, does not reveal in any way that the he changed his beneficiary designation; it merely shows that he renewed his enrollment following his furlough. The cases cited by the District Court support this conclusion. For example, in Czoch v. Freeman, 317 N.J.Super. 273 (App. Div. 1999), the Court rejected as insufficient evidence of substantial compliance a vague oral expression of an intent to change beneficiaries. Id. at 284-89. While acknowledging that literal compliance with the insurer’s change of beneficiary policy was unnecessary, the Court cited examples in 3 Brennan also argues that the decedent, by way of the 1984 form, designated her at that time as the beneficiary for both policies. She argues that, because the 1984 form does not have a box to check for the optional policy, the decedent intended to change the beneficiary for all of his policies at that time. We are not persuaded by this reasoning. 7 which there were written agreements or judgments evidencing substantial compliance with the insurer’s change of beneficiary policy. Id. The letter here does not approach the certainty of the examples cited in Czoch – e.g. a property settlement agreement between separated spouses, id. at 285-87 (citing Vasconi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 124 N.J. 338 (1991), and Seavey v. Long, 303 N.J.Super. 153 (App. Div. 1997)), and a divorce judgment naming a beneficiary, Czoch, 317 N.J.Super. at 286-87 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Prashker, 201 N.J.Super. 553 (App. Div. 1985)). And although the decedent in Haynes substantially complied with his insurer’s change of beneficiary policy, that case is distinguishable. In Haynes, the decedent filed the appropriate forms with the insurer, but did not submit the policies with these forms – and thereby comply fully – because the policies were in the possession of his estranged wife. Haynes, 166 N.J.Super. at 311. In sum, Brennan has not demonstrated that the decedent substantially complied with MetLife’s change of beneficiary policy to name her the beneficiary of his optional policy. We will affirm the District Court’s granting of Kubichek’s motion for summary judgment.