Opinion ID: 2627219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due South Is a Private Place Within the Meaning of the Public Intoxication Statute

Text: ¶ 32 Due South and the DABC disagree over whether section 32A-12-216 [34] incorporated the entire public intoxication definition from section 76-9-701, including the public place/private place distinction and, if it did, whether Due South is a private place within the meaning of the statute. We hold that section 32A-12-216 did incorporate the public place/private place distinction and that Due South is a private place. ¶ 33 The DABC argues that section 32A-12-216 only incorporates the level of intoxication in the public intoxication statute, not the public intoxication statute [itself]. This argument fails on closer analysis because the public intoxication statute establishes two different levels of intoxication, depending on whether the individual is in a private or public place. [35] Under the public intoxication statute, an individual is guilty of intoxication in a public place if he is under the influence of alcohol ... to a degree that [he] may endanger himself or another. [36] And he is guilty of intoxication in a private place if he is under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that [he] ... unreasonably disturbs other persons. [37] Our principles of statutory construction direct us to assume that the legislature used each term in the statute advisedly [38] and to interpret[ ] statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid[ ] rendering portions of the statute superfluous. [39] The DABC's interpretation runs contrary to these principles because it would require that we ignore half of the public intoxication statute. The public intoxication statute does not articulate a universal level of intoxication that is independent of the public place/private place distinction. Accordingly, we reject the DABC's argument and interpret section 32A-12-216 to incorporate the public place/private place distinction. ¶ 34 Whether Due South, as a private club, is a private place within the meaning of the statute presents a more difficult issue that is not resolved by the plain language of the statute. When there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose. [40] ¶ 35 One policy objective of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act is to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages in a manner that will reasonably satisfy the public demand and protect the public interest, including the rights of citizens who do not wish to be involved with alcoholic products. [41] This objective requires a balancing of two opposing intereststhe public demand for alcohol and the public interest in avoiding alcohol or its adverse consequences. ¶ 36 Interpreting a private club as a private place within the meaning of the public intoxication statute best satisfies both of these objectives. First, in the alcohol regulatory scheme, there are Public Liquor Licenses [42] and Private Club Liquor Licenses. [43] Public Liquor Licenses apply to places that the general public is likely to visit, such as restaurants, [44] airport lounges, [45] and banquets held at hotels, resorts, sports centers, or convention centers. [46] The Private Club Liquor Licenses apply to places that are not open to the general public. In order to enter a private club, an individual must be a member, have purchased a visitor card, or be a guest of either a member of the club or a holder of a visitor card. [47] Furthermore, minors are not allowed into private clubs when alcohol is being served, [48] and any public advertising for a private club must clearly specify that the club is a private club for members. [49] These restrictions on private clubs ensure that the general public will not be inadvertently exposed to the higher level of alcohol consumption that is allowed to occur in a private place under the public intoxication statute. Moreover, providing public venues where individuals can meet and share alcoholic drinks satisfies the public demand for alcohol, while still protecting the public interest. Since private clubs do not allow entrance without a membership, unwary citizens will not accidentally find themselves exposed to alcohol consumption. ¶ 37 In arguing that Due South is not a private place under the public intoxication statute, the DABC relies heavily on Elks Lodges #719 & # 2021 v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, in which we held that private liquor clubs were within the public sphere. [50] Elks Lodges is inapposite because the interests at stake and the analysis employed were demonstrably different than they are here. In Elks Lodges, the plaintiff argued that, as private clubs, the Elks Lodges could discriminate against women based on their constitutional right to freedom of association. [51] In contrast, no constitutional rights are involved in this case. The only issue regarding the private club status of Due South is whether Due South qualifies as a private place under the public intoxication statute. Unlike Elks Lodges, this issue does not require us to balance the rights of private individuals against the right of the State to regulate activities that take place in the public sphere. Instead, the analysis in this case is an issue of statutory interpretation to determine Due South's obligation within the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. Thus, the Elks Lodges analysis is not applicable and does not undermine our conclusion that Due South is a private place within the meaning of the public intoxication statute. ¶ 38 We note, however, that on remand the public place/private place distinction may have little practical effect because the instant that a patron leaves the premises of a private club, he is no longer in a private place. At that point, the public place standard for intoxication applies.