Opinion ID: 2445590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority's Holding

Text: The majority, I submit, erroneously interprets this legislative history and line of cases to suggest that Section 12-202 limits our ability to review certain pending appeals on the merits. As justification for this discordant holding, the majority relies on two propositions: (1) that the Jourdan-Williams line of cases suggests that bypass jurisdiction should be limited, and (2) that the plain language of Section 12-202 must be interpreted to limit our jurisdiction in these cases. I disagree with both of these propositions. Rather than apply the clear rationale of Williams that Section 12-202 relates only to the action of the CSA in granting or denying an application for leave to appeal, the majority effectively limits the holdings of Williams and its progeny to their specific factual or procedural circumstances. First, the majority distinguishes a series of cases in which the petitioner did challenge the actual decision of the CSA to deny leave to appeal. [7] Rather than foreclosing our jurisdiction here, these cases simply apply the statutory rule that the Court of Appeals shall not review the grant or denial of an application for leave to appeal. Second, the majority identifies a number of cases in which this Court reviewed the merits of a case after a CSA decision. [8] The majority concludes from these cases that a decision from the lower appellate court is a prerequisite to our review. [9] The majority supports this holding with the following, aforementioned, language in Jourdan: Under Maryland Code (1974), § 12-202(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, this Court has no jurisdiction to review a decision of the Court of Special Appeals granting or denying leave to appeal in a post conviction proceeding. However, once the Court of Special Appeals grants leave to appeal in such a case and transfers the case to its appeal docket, the matter takes the posture of a regular appeal, and we do have jurisdiction under § 12-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to review the Court of Special Appeals' decision on the appeal itself. 275 Md. at 506 n. 4, 341 A.2d at 394-95 n. 4 (emphasis added by majority). Again, the majority ignores the more important proposition from this quote in Jourdan, which is that after the CSA transfers the case to its appeal docket, the matter takes the posture of a regular appeal. It is the case's status as a regular appeal that allowed us to review the [CSA's] decision[,] and should allow us to exercise bypass certiorari here. The majority avoids this logical result by transforming the effect of the Jourdan rule in one case into a precondition in all cases. The majority fails to support its interpretation of the Jourdan-Williams line of cases with any passage from those cases even hinting that our bypass jurisdiction under Section 12-203 is so limited. Indeed, these cases do not even mention our bypass jurisdiction. The cases simply show instances in which we have elected to grant certiorari in the circumstance that the CSA has decided the merits of the case. The majority's second rationale is a statutory construction theory. Relying on the adage that in interpreting a statute, we must always take care that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory, (Maj. Op. at 298, 6 A.3d at 919), the majority reasons that to allow these appeals would render superfluous Section 12-202's use of the word granted. (Maj. Op. at 297, A.3d at 919). The familiar canon that a provision should not be construed so as to render it nugatory[,] Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 548, 873 A.2d 1122, 1141 (2005), is merely a restatement of one of the principles of a plain language statutory interpretation: The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology. In construing the plain language, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. Statutory text should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory. The plain language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation. Rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect. Kushell v. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-577, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005) (emphasis added). The rule against rendering passages nugatory, like any canon of statutory construction, is not absolute. In the unusual case where the Legislature has not meant what it said and said what it meant[,] then the correct interpretation of the Legislature's intent may render words or passages superfluous: [W]here words are found in a statute which appear to have been inserted through inadvertence or mistake, and which are incapable of any sensible meaning or are repugnant to the rest of the statute and tend to nullify it, and the statute is complete and sensible without them, they may be rejected as surplusage... The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain from the entire statute the intention to be accomplished by the enactment. When that intention is clear it should be carried out, even though it may be necessary to strike out or insert certain words. (Emphasis added). Pressman v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 78, 88-90, 102 A.2d 821, 827-828 (1954). We have long recognized that the current form of Section 12-202 is the rare example where the statute's plain language does not accurately represent the legislature's intent. As this Court explained in Williams, and in the majority's opinion in this case, the legislature never intended to give the statute any other meaning than its old form. For this reason, this Court has repeatedly declined to give full import to the plain language of the recodified version of the statute. In two cases, this Court looked to the original version of the statute, which clearly only barred the granting or denying. Williams, 292 Md. at 208-11, 438 A.2d at 1304-05; Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1, 11, 728 A.2d 1280, 1285 (1999). The majority recognizes our long line of Section 12-202 jurisprudence, and acknowledges twenty-nine years of legislative acquiescence to our interpretation in Williams. See Maj. Op. at 292, 6 A.3d at 916, citing Chapter 295 of the Maryland Laws of 1983, Chapter 233 of the Maryland Laws of 1991. The majority, however, draws a choke-chain around the Jourdan-Williams line of cases, and analyzes the statutory language anew. [10] Moreover, despite the majority's assertions that it is engaging in a plain language interpretation, the majority fails to even address the plain language of Section 12-203: If the Court of Appeals finds that review of the case described in § 12-201 of this subtitle is desirable and in the public interest, the Court of Appeals shall require by writ of certiorari that the case be certified to it for review and determination. The writ may issue before or after the Court of Special Appeals has rendered a decision. Id. (emphasis added). This statutory language makes it unmistakably clear that our bypass jurisdiction is coterminous with our jurisdiction to review a CSA decision on the merits under Section 12-201. The majority's attempt to wrench the two apart, based on the single word granted in Section 12-202, ignores the interdependent nature of Sections 12-201, 12-202, and 12-203, and the clearly expansive certiorari jurisdiction that the three sections give this Court. Even if we were to follow the majority's premise that we must give meaning to each word in the current form of Section 12-202, I still disagree that my interpretation would render part of the statute nugatory. While admittedly, under my view, this Court would always have [bypass] certiorari jurisdiction when the Court of Special Appeals grants leave to appeal, it does not follow that Section 12-202 would apply only to denials of leave to appeal and thus contain irrelevant words. Section 12-202 still bars review of the intermediate appellate court's actual decision to grant leave to appeal. There are no recorded cases in which we have considered such an appeal, but the nonexistence of these cases does not mean that the grant clause of Section 12-202 is nugatory. The State could request certiorari, arguing that the CSA abused its discretion in granting a post-conviction defendant's request for leave to appeal. An inmate, who was successful in an inmate grievance proceeding, could appeal the CSA's decision to grant the warden's request for leave to appeal. A criminal defendant, having pled guilty and received a sentence, could apply for certiorari on the grounds that the CSA should not have granted the State's application for leave to appeal an illegal sentence. In any of these cases, the granted part of Section 12-202 would preclude our issuing certiorari; indeed, we have never considered, in a written opinion, such an appeal. My final problem with the majority's opinion is that it cannot be linked to any statutory purpose nor meaningful policy goal. The majority imposes a requirement here that this Court wait for a decision from the lower appellate court, even when this Court will likely issue certiorari after the decision. Yet, our bypass jurisdiction serves an obvious purpose: where a case is of pressing importance, we may address the case without waiting for a CSA decision. This process serves judicial economy and ensures more speedy justice in important cases. The majority's interpretationthat we have bypass jurisdiction for any case pending in the CSA except for the five statutory categories of Section 12-202, supports no meaningful policy goals and is inconsistent with the well-defined legislative intent that this Court have expansive certiorari jurisdiction. In conclusion, I submit that the primary purpose of Section 12-202 was to relieve this Court of jurisdiction to review the otherwise high volume of complaints by convicted criminals seeking post-conviction relief that the CSA should have accepted their appeals. In doing so, the statute freed the Court to perform its other work. [11] I see no evidence of legislative intent to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction under Section 12-203 to exercise its bypass jurisdiction of these types of cases, when it deemed them to be of sufficient public interest. For the above-stated reasons, I dissent. Judges HARRELL and RODOWSKY authorize me to state that they join in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.