Opinion ID: 1903868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred by applying the terms and provisions of the mississippi tort claims act.

Text: ¶ 9. In essence, the case at bar concerns a difference in opinion over statutory application. On one hand, Bailey asserts that Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (Supp.2001) is the controlling statutory scheme since the alleged malpractice occurred on July 26, 1990. Because the MTCA's effective date was not until April 1, 1993, Bailey argues that it cannot apply to an action based in fact upon events occurring long before that date, no matter when the injury was discovered. The contention is that the statute in effect at the time of the injury is determinative rather than the statute in effect at the time of discovery. In Kilgore v. Barnes, 508 So.2d 1042, 1044-45 (Miss.1987), we held that we may not give retroactive effect to newly enacted statutes of limitations shortening the period within which a claim arising prior to enactment must be brought. Bailey argues that the same reasoning precludes the application of the MTCA to the present case and demands the general medical malpractice statute be utilized. In pertinent part, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36 states, except as otherwise provided in this section, no claim in tort may be brought against a licensed physician ... for injuries or wrongful death arising out of the course of medical, surgical or other professional services unless it is filed within two (2) years from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered. Since it is uncontested that Bailey could not have known of the alleged malpractice until April 5, 1995, he had until April 5, 1997, to file suit. As the complaint was filed on December 31, 1996, Bailey, therefore, was well within the prescribed statutory two-year limit. ¶ 10. At the same time, Al-Mefty contends that the MTCA and specifically Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Supp.2001), the statute of limitations therein, govern the present situation because Bailey's claims did not accrue until April 5, 1995, the date upon which he actually discovered the alleged malpractice. Since the MTCA became effective April 1, 1993, Al-Mefty asserts that Bailey's complaint was filed well into the authoritative reign of the MTCA and is subject to its provisions, including the one-year statute of limitations as defined in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11. As authority for this position, Al-Mefty cites language contained in Jones v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-Golden Triangle, Inc ., in which he believes this Court emphasized the date of accrual for statute of limitation purposes; the intent of this Court is clear. If the statutory language mandates that the statute is to apply from and after passage, it is not to be applied to causes of action which accrued prior to passage of the statute. Jones v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-Golden Triangle, Inc., 735 So.2d 993, 998 (Miss.1999). Al-Mefty infers from this passage that causes of action which accrue after the MTCA's passage are subject to its provisions, and Bailey's claims accrued over two years after the passage of the MTCA. If Al-Mefty's interpretation is correct and the date of accrual determines which statutory scheme is controlling, then Bailey's claims would be time barred under the one year limit imposed by the MTCA. However, Al-Mefty draws conclusions not fully supported by the language of the Jones opinion. In addition, the MTCA's language dictates otherwise. ¶ 11. Since this case pivots on statutory interpretation, we are compelled to first examine the language of the statute in question. The primary rule of construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statute as a whole and from the language used therein. Where the statute is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, but where it is ambiguous the court, in determining the legislative intent, may look not only to the language used but also to its historical background, its subject matter, and the purposes and objects to be accomplished. Clark v. State ex rel. Miss. State Med. Ass'n, 381 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Miss.1980). As Bailey correctly points out, the MTCA clearly states, [a]ll actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp.2001) (emphasis added). Furthermore, under the limitations on liability section, the MTCA refers to claims or causes of action arising from acts or omissions occurring on or after... various enumerated dates. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-15(1) (Supp.2001). The language contained within the statute clearly puts the emphasis upon the date when the alleged tortious action occurred, rather than when it accrued. True, Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So.2d 332, 334 (Miss. 1994); Barnes v. Singing River Hosp., 733 So.2d 199 (Miss.1999); and Jones, 735 So.2d at 998, do establish that the discovery rule is applicable to medical malpractice cases. As such, statutes of limitations do not begin to run until the injury is discovered. However, unlike Al-Mefty and the trial court, we do not believe these cases are instructive as to which statute of limitations should be used. For this, we need look no further then the language of the MTCA, which clearly states that it is to apply to actions occurring after April 1, 1993. In the present case, the tortious act occurred in 1990, three years before the effective date of the MTCA. Since the MTCA obviously does not apply to the present situation, the general medical malpractice statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (Supp.2001), must be controlling, leaving Bailey two years in which to file suit. Therefore, the trial court erred in holding the MTCA applicable, and we reverse accordingly.