Opinion ID: 495040
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Potential Harm to Other Persons in Prison

Text: 13 During closing argument in the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor stated: 14 Mr. Campbell's past conduct in this case, carrying a grudge for having victimized a woman, an innocent woman, of sodomy and assault in 1974, carrying that grudge until 1982 and then brutally and savagely killing her--Certainly Mr. Campbell, if he gets life in prison without parole, maybe he will never be out again but suppose he gets angry at a fellow prisoner? How long will he carry a grudge there? Will he get back at them? How about prison guards? The help in prison? A cook? Someone who is not a prison guard. How about those people? 15 The prosecutor's argument in this instance was permissible because it was related to the future dangerousness of this particular defendant. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the future dangerousness of a defendant is a proper consideration for the jury in a capital sentencing proceeding. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 335, 105 S.Ct. at 2642-43; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2957-58, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). Such consideration is consistent with the kind of individualized focus required in capital sentencing decisions. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1005-06, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3455-56, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). We agree with the district court that 16 the evidence provided a logical basis for the concerns [the prosecutor] raised [in his closing argument to the jury]. The evidence supported the conclusion that Campbell committed the murders in retaliation for testimony approximately six years earlier. The suggested danger to others with whom Campbell might have contact in the future was therefore directly related to his character and record. 17 Campbell nevertheless argues that the jury's consideration of any relevant factors under Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 10.95.070 is restricted to mitigating factors only. That section provides in part that a jury may consider [w]hether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to others in the future. Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 10.95.070(8). The state trial court included section 10.95.070 in its instructions to the jury made prior to closing argument, and the prosecutor tailored his closing argument to those instructions. Campbell does not contend that the court's instructions were improper. 18 Campbell argues that because the defendant's future dangerousness is an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor, any argument regarding that issue was improper. He contends that State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079, 1088 (1984), held that section 10.95.070 must be construed to allow jury consideration of only mitigating factors. In Bartholomew, the court stated that 19 the jury's liberal mandate under RCW 10.95.070 to consider any relevant factors shall be limited to mitigating factors only.... Specifically, evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors must be limited to defendant's criminal record, evidence that would have been admissible at the guilt phase, and evidence to rebut matters raised in mitigation by the defendant. 20 Id. 683 P.2d at 1086-87. 21 We disagree with Campbell's characterization of Bartholomew. Nothing in Bartholomew suggests that the court intended to place restrictions on the consideration of dangerousness. On the contrary, Bartholomew approved the trial court's reading of section 10.95.070(8): 22 The court also read the jury the list of relevant factors for consideration provided in RCW 10.95.070. The jury may have found helpful a definition of mitigating circumstances. However, we conclude that these instructions adequately guided the jury as to the nature and function of mitigating circumstances. 23 Id. at 1089. 24 In Campbell, with Bartholomew as its guide, the court concluded that reference in the jury instructions to the future dangerousness of the defendant does not introduce a nonstatutory aggravating factor into the proceedings: 25 Defendant argues that by delineating eight possible mitigating factors, which the defendant has not raised, the court has in fact introduced prejudicial nonstatutory aggravating factors.... 26 We recently held that the trial court's reading of the relevant factors provided in RCW 10.95.070 adequately guided the jury as to the nature and function of mitigating circumstances. State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d 631, 647, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984). See also [State v.]Rupe, 101 Wash.2d at 701, 709-10, 683 P.2d 571 [1984]. As in Bartholomew, the trial court's recitation of the eight factors merely served as an illustration to the jury of the information it might consider in determining mitigating circumstances. Instruction 7 advised the jury that it may consider any relevant factors and that consideration was not limited to the eight enumerated factors. We see nothing in the instruction that imposed additional aggravating factors.... The statutory standard for mitigation gives proper guidance to the jury.... 27 Campbell, 691 P.2d at 944. 28 We therefore conclude that the prosecutor's argument addressing the issue of dangerousness did not transgress federal constitutional standards. 4