Opinion ID: 895649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: THE WRITING REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 602(2)(b)

Text: APPLIES TO MR. REYNOLDS ¶9 Mr. Reynolds contends that the writing requirement of Section 602 does not apply to him because Defendants knew their client intended for Mr. Reynolds to rely on their advice. Citing legislative history of Section 602 and caselaw interpreting similar statutes from other states, Mr. Reynolds argues that requiring an accountant to provide a client with “[w]ritten acknowledgement of [the] client’s own undisputed intentions . . . is a meaningless exercise that the law does not require.” We disagree with Mr. Reynolds’s interpretation of Section 602. ¶10 “When interpreting statutory language, our primary objective is to ascertain the intent of the legislature.” Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011 UT 54, ¶ 21, 266 P.3d 751. “The best evidence of the legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute itself.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 (internal quotation marks omitted). We resort to legislative history and other interpretive tools only if the statute’s plain meaning cannot be discerned from its text. Id. ¶ 15. ¶11 Here, the contours of the statute are clear. Section 602 provides in full: A licensee, a CPA firm registered under this chapter, and any employee, partner, member, officer, or shareholder of a licensee or CPA firm are not liable to persons with whom they are not in privity of contract for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services performed by that person, except for: (1) acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitute fraud or intentional misrepresentations; or (2) other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct, if the person performing the professional services: (a) knew that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or 4 Cite as: 2013 UT 32 Opinion of the Court influence the particular person seeking to establish liability; and (b) identified in writing to the client that the professional services performed on behalf of the client were intended to be relied upon by the particular person seeking to establish liability. The statutory language unambiguously sets forth a default rule with two exceptions: Accountants “are not liable to persons with whom they are not in privity of contract . . . except for” (1) cases of fraud or intentional misrepresentation or (2) cases where the accountant (a) knew the client intended the third party to rely and (b) the accountant “identified in writing to the client” an intent that the plaintiff rely. Because the requirements under subsection (2) are conjunctive, both the knowledge requirement of subsection (2)(a) and the writing requirement of subsection (2)(b) must be fulfilled before liability can run to a third party under this exception. We have no need to consider legislative history or other interpretive resources because the language is entirely clear on this point. ¶12 We next examine the writings that Mr. Reynolds presented to the district court to determine whether they satisfied the writing requirement of subsection (2)(b).