Opinion ID: 169751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discrimination by reason of disability

Text: The ADA requires more than physical access to public entities: it requires public entities to provide  meaningful access to their programs and services. Chaffin v. Kansas State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 857 (10th Cir.2003); see also Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850, 858 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that although deaf inmate could physically attend prison activities, he did not have meaningful access without a sign language interpreter). The Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated regulations to implement the nondiscrimination mandate of Title II. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (requiring the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to implement Title II). [7] To effectuate Title II's mandate, the regulations require public entities to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). [8] The regulations also provide: (a) A public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as communications with others. (b) (1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services[ [9] ] where necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity. (2) In determining what type of auxiliary aid and service is necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160. The only limitation on these duties is that a public entity is not required to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens. 28 C.F.R. § 35.164. Mr. Robertson contends that the detention facility was required to provide him with auxiliary aids and services necessary to enable him to participate in and enjoy the benefits of the detention facility's services. He claims that the facility failed to fulfill this obligation because (1) he was not able to use a telephone to call his attorney while he was in his cell, and (2) he could not participate in the televised probable cause hearing. The defendants argue, and the District Court agreed, that they cannot be held liable under the ADA because they did not know Mr. Robertson was deaf and because he failed to request an accommodation of any kind, let alone a TTY, TDD, or someone to interpret the court proceedings. Before a public entity can be required under the ADA to provide a disabled individual an auxiliary aid or service, a public entity must have knowledge of the individual's disability and the individual's need for an accommodation. In this case, there is a question of fact as to the detention facility's knowledge of each. Consequently, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants.
A public entity cannot know that a modification to its services under the ADA is necessary if it does not first understand that an individual requires such modification because he is disabled. In the context of Title I ADA claims, we have explained that, when an individual's disability is not obvious, the individual must inform its employer of the disability before the employer can be held liable under the ADA for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). This is a duty dictated by common sense lest a disabled [individual] keep his disability a secret and sue later for failure to accommodate. Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir.1996). This duty is no less applicable in the context of Title II claims. Thus, before a public entity can be required under the ADA to provide an auxiliary aid necessary to afford an individual an equal opportunity to participate in the entity's services, programs, or activities, the entity must have knowledge that the individual is disabled, either because that disability is obvious or because the individual (or someone else) has informed the entity of the disability. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Robertson, there is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the defendants knew of Mr. Robertson's disability. The record reveals that Deputy Emery knew that Mr. Robertson had difficulty hearing and that he reported the same to the booking officer when he delivered Mr. Robertson to the detention facility. Although Mr. Robertson was able to answer all the questions posed to him during the booking process and he never asked for hearing assistance, he testified that he did not recall being asked if he was deaf because [t]he detention officers simply acted as if they knew I was deaf. Furthermore, when the officers booked Mr. Robertson, they inventoried hearing aid batteries. These facts create a genuine issue of fact with respect to whether the defendants knew Mr. Robertson was deaf.
Once a public entity has knowledge of an individual's disability, the entity must also have knowledge that an individual requires an accommodation of some kind to participate in or receive the benefits of its services. In other words, the entity must have knowledge that an individual's disability limits her ability to participate in or receive the benefits of its services. See Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir.1996) (noting the ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate limitations, not disabilities). This knowledge may derive from an individual's request for an accommodation. In certain instances, however, this knowledge will follow from the entity's knowledge of the individual's disability and his need for, or attempt to participate in or receive the benefits of, a certain service. That is, the entity will know of the individual's need for an accommodation because it is obvious. See, e.g., Kiman, 451 F.3d at 283 (noting, in a Title II case that, the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement usually does not apply unless triggered by a request, but sometimes the person's [disability and concomitant] need for an accommodation will be obvious; and in such cases, different rules may apply (alteration, quotation, and citation omitted)); Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 n. 7 (1st Cir.2001) (noting, in a Title I case, that a request for an accommodation may not be required when the disabled individual's needs are obvious); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir.2001) (When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or regulation), the public entity is on notice that an accommodation is required. . . . (emphasis added)). When a disabled individual's need for an accommodation is obvious, the individual's failure to expressly request one is not fatal to the ADA claim. See, e.g., Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 330 (3d Cir.2001) (reversing district court's holding that a request for an accommodation was necessary when the public entity had knowledge of [plaintiff's] hearing disability but failed to discuss related issues with him). [10] Thus, a public entity is on notice that an individual needs an accommodation when it knows that an individual requires one, either because that need is obvious or because the individual requests an accommodation. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Robertson, there is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the defendants knew Mr. Robertson needed an auxiliary aid to be afforded the same benefits as non-disabled prisoners in his use of the phone and participation in his probable cause hearing. First, there is a genuine issue as to whether Mr. Robertson informed the defendants of his need for an accommodation (i.e., whether he made a request for an accommodation). Mr. Robertson placed a note in the slot of the cell indicating that he wanted to call his attorney, despite the availability of a phone in his pod. Further, he told the detention officer at the probable cause hearing that he could not hear what was happening. That Mr. Robertson did not request the use of a specific auxiliary aid in either instancesuch as a TTY, TDD, or closed captioningdoes not matter. While it is true that a public entity, in providing an auxiliary aid to prevent discrimination, must give primary consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities, 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2), the regulations do not require the plaintiff to request a specific auxiliary aid. Hence, for both Mr. Robertson's use of the phone and his participation in the probable cause hearing, there is a question of fact with respect to whether Mr. Robertson informed the detention facility of his need for an accommodation. Second, even if a fact finder concluded that Mr. Robertson did not so inform the facility, it could still find that the defendants were on notice of Mr. Robertson's need for an accommodation to use the phone and to participate in his probable cause hearing if that need was obvious to the defendants. As noted above, there is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the defendants knew Mr. Robertson is deaf. Practically speaking, if they knew Mr. Robertson is deaf, there is a question of fact regarding whether his need for an accommodation was obvious when he attempted to use prison services necessarily involving aural communication. With respect to Mr. Robertson's use of the phone, the record reveals that when Mr. Robertson was arrested, he initiated a phone call to his attorney (via his niece) using a relay service installed on his home computer, rather than a traditional telephone. Deputy Emery was present for this phone call and was also the one who informed prison workers that Mr. Robertson had difficulty hearing. In addition, Mr. Robertson left a note indicating he wanted to contact his attorney, despite the presence of a phone in the pod. Although Mr. Robertson never specifically stated that he could not use the phone in the pod to make a phone call, the totality of the circumstances present at least a fact question as to whether it was obvious that Mr. Robertson needed an auxiliary aid to be afforded an equal opportunity to use the phone. Similarly, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether it was obvious that Mr. Robertson needed an auxiliary aid to participate in his probable cause hearing. He specifically told the officer present that he could not hear what was happening. In sum, the only question before this Court on summary judgment is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to conclude that the detention facility knew that Mr. Robertson had a substantially limiting hearing impairment and that he needed an auxiliary aid or service to afford him an equal opportunity to use the phone and to participate in his probable cause hearing. Because the record contains this evidence, summary judgment is inappropriate. Nevertheless, the defendants maintain that they did not discriminate against Mr. Robertson because they never specifically refused him access to a telephone. Instead, they suggest, when Mr. Robertson did ask to make a phone call by placing a note in the slot, it was too late to accommodate his request. In other words, the defendants appear to argue that they cannot be held liable for failing to provide Mr. Robertson with an auxiliary aid for the telephone because they did not have enough time to accommodate his request. The defendants' suggestion appears to invoke the exception under 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 that a public entity need not take any action that would result in an undue administrative burden. But whether this exception applies here presents a question of fact. The facility had several hours between the time Mr. Robertson asked to make a phone call and the time he was taken to his probable cause hearing. The defendants cite no authority suggesting that the protections of the ADA apply only to detentions that last a certain period of time. Moreover, even if an action, such as obtaining a TTY or TDD, would result in an undue administrative burden, the public entity must take any other action that would not result in . . . such burdens but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the benefits or services provided by the public entity. 28 C.F.R. § 35.164 (emphasis added). Here, the facility took no action in response to Mr. Robertson's request to call his attorney. Finally, the defendants argue that they did not discriminate against Mr. Robertson with regard to his probable cause hearing because (1) his lawyer attended the hearing on his behalf, and Mr. Robertson's presence at the hearing was therefore not required, and (2) the charges against Mr. Robertson were dismissed, and therefore, Mr. Robertson was not injured as a result of any lack of accommodation. We disagree with both propositions. Because Mr. Robertson was detained at a facility that permits detainees to attend their probable cause hearings, Mr. Robertson was eligible to participate in this program. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952. The defendants' contention that they did not discriminate against Mr. Robertson because his presence at the hearing was not required misses the point. Title II applies to those benefits, programs, and services that are considered both mandatory and voluntary. See id. at 211, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (holding that participation in programs, services, and activities includes both mandatory and voluntary participation). Even though his presence was not required, because the facility makes the activity available to detainees in general, it must do so on nondiscriminatory terms. Furthermore, with respect to the second argument, the defendants take too narrow a view of Mr. Robertson's injury. Though the charges against Mr. Robertson were dismissed, he was denied the ability to participate in his probable cause hearing to the same extent as non-disabled individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (prohibiting public entities from excluding a qualified individual with a disability from participation in . . . the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or . . . subject[ing such individual] to discrimination); see also Chisolm, 275 F.3d at 320, 331 (holding that the jury could find that county court denied [the plaintiff] the ability to participate in an extradition hearing to the same extent as non-disabled individuals, even though the charges against plaintiff were quashed and the extradition hearing was cancelled). In sum, because genuine issues of fact remain concerning Mr. Robertson's ADA claims, summary judgment is inappropriate.