Opinion ID: 3011695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Propriety of the Independent Medical

Text: Examination Tice's next ADA claim is that CAT A violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. S 12112(d)(4) by requesting a medical examination that was not consistent with business necessity. Tice alleges that this impr oper examination resulted in an injury to him, because the delay occasioned by the requirement prevented him fr om working for the _________________________________________________________________ 9. For instance, on July 10, 1996, CAT A wrote to Dr. Kuhlengel with a list of tasks that a bus driver must be able to per form (such as assisting wheelchair users, climbing in and out of the bus, and operating all hand and foot controls), and asked for Dr. Kuhlengel's opinion as to Tice's ability to perform these tasks. T ice does not argue, and there is no evidence to suggest, that CATA inquir ed about any physical limitations beyond those demonstrably relevant to his job. 15 minimum six weeks necessary to interrupt the expiration of his two years of medical leave, eventually r esulting in his discharge. Therefore, Tice r equests monetary damages to remedy the alleged violation. We have held that Tice is not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and it is not clear from the text of the ADA itself whether nondisabled individuals ar e permitted to sue for violations of S 12112(d). See, e.g., Watson v. City of Miami Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 935 (11th Cir . 1999) (declining to reach the question whether nondisabled individuals have a cause of action for violations of S 12112(d)); Armstrong v. Turner Indus., 141 F.3d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 1998) (same). As have many of our sister circuits, we leave for another day the question whether the ADA permits nondisabled individuals to sue, because it is clear that in this case, CATA's requirement of an IME was permissible under the statute. The evidence surrounding CAT A's request amply demonstrates that the examination was consistent with business necessity, and Tice has submitted virtually no evidence of his own in rebuttal. Throughout the course of his dealings with CA TA, Tice complained of severe pain and difficulty walking to the point of requiring narcotic medication. Moreover, he had apparently experienced spasms that interfered with his use of his legs such that CATA had r eceived complaints about reckless driving. There is no question that such a history raised legitimate safety concerns about Tice's ability to drive a bus. Tice does not even appear to dispute that CATA had cause to inquire about his medical condition. Rather, Tice submits that CAT A should have been content with being permitted to question Dr. Kuhlengel instead of forcing Tice to undergo a new medical examination. Therefore, we will review the infor mation CATA had at the time of its request for an IME. In July 1995, during Tice's medical leave, Dr . Kuhlengel wrote to CATA explaining that if T ice were to receive surgery, his chances of being able to r eturn to his job were good to excellent, but that if he did not r eceive surgery, his prognosis for return to full duties is limited. In April 1996, Tice informed CATA that he would be undergoing surgery in July of that year, but in June he submitted the 16 note from Dr. Kuhlengel stating that he could perform his duties with special seating. Around this time, he also informed CATA that he had canceled the planned surgery. While Tice was on leave, CATA infor med him that to return, he would be required to submit doctor's certification that he could drive without risk. The certificate actually submitted did not mention risk or the safety of T ice or of his passengers, and, in fact, a supplement to the certificate was sent a few days later stating that Tice would be able to man new lift equipped buses with associated duties as tolerated (emphasis added). When CAT A requested that Dr. Kuhlengel provide more information about Tice's condition, Dr. Kuhlengel explained by letter that I, as you are, am very concerned about passenger safety, and I'm relying on Mr. Tice's assessment of his capabilities, in that he feels he can perform the duties under safe conditions. Such evidence allows no serious dispute that CA TA was fully justified in its decision not to rely exclusively on Dr. Kuhlengel for an assessment of Tice's ability to perform his job. Dr. Kuhlengel had first recommended surgery, and provided no explanation as to his change of opinion. His diagnosis rested largely on Tice's own evaluation of his abilities, and his Return to Work Certificate essentially (and tautologically) stated no more than that T ice would be able to perform his duties as much as T ice could perform them. We believe that, under these facts, CA TA's unwillingness to rely on Dr. Kuhlengel's opinion was r easonable, and that its request for an IME was consistent with business necessity in order to ensure the safety of its passengers. See, e.g., Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 809 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999) (once an employee's ability to perform his job has been placed in doubt, an employer may r equire a medical examination with a doctor of its choosing); Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1996) ([W]hen health problems have had a substantial and injurious impact on an employee's job performance, the employer can require the employee to undergo a physical examination designed to determine his or her ability to work. . . .). Tice contends that CATA's request for an IME was not consistent with business necessity because CA TA had never before or since requested an IME. T ice particularly 17 emphasizes that on one occasion, an employee diagnosed with sleep apnea was permitted to retur n to work after four months' absence with only a doctor's certification as to his abilities. We find this evidence insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to the business necessity of CATA's request for an IME from Tice. The ADA's requirement that an IME be consistent with business necessity is an objective one. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1119 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that an employer's subjective belief in the necessity of a practice with discriminatory impact is not sufficient to escape Title VII liability). That is, even a good faith mandatory medical examination by an employer may nevertheless give rise to liability if the court determines that the examination was unwarranted. Cf. T aylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that there is no reasonable mistake defense to a claim of discrimination on the basis of disability where the mistake is premised on a generalized misunderstanding of the effects of the plaintiff 's disability). However, an employer's standard practice with regard to medical examinations is certainly relevant evidence of what is necessary (as suggested above, CA TA did not usually require them), and, just as we routinely hold that evidence of differential treatment among similarly situated employees is probative on the issue of discrimination in Title VII suits, see, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 353-54 (3d Cir. 1999), an employer's dif ferential application of a medical examination requirement is r elevant evidence of what is necessary to the employer's business. Nonetheless, we do not believe that Tice has produced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to the necessity of the IME to which he was subject. If we are to compare the application of an IME requirement across employees, we must first establish that the employees are, in fact, similarly situated.10 But Tice has submitted no _________________________________________________________________ 10. This is particularly important for ADA claims, because impairments may vary widely across employees, and an employer's animus toward, say, people with mental disabilities may not extend to people who use canes. Likewise, an employment practice that is per fectly permissible 18 details regarding this other (sleepy) employee; we do not know, for instance, the exact nature of that employee's illness, or whether the doctor who signed his Retur n to Work Certificate provided more details about the employee's condition than did Dr. Kuhlengel about T ice's impairment. Tice cannot survive summary judgment on such a minimal record. Moreover, any comparison between employees must be made with an eye to the ultimate inquiry, i.e., the necessity of the examination of the plaintiff. Although disparate treatment across employees may assist the factfinder in an otherwise uncertain case as to what the job r eally requires, it cannot suffice to cr eate an issue of fact as to necessity in a case such as this one, wher e the evidence is overwhelming that CATA had good r eason to be doubtful of Tice's abilities and to distrust the opinions of Dr. Kuhlengel. For these reasons, we conclude that the IME was jobrelated and fully consistent with business necessity, and will affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to CATA on the issue of CATA's compliance with the medical examination provisions of 42 U.S.C.S 12112(d).