Opinion ID: 2003518
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Move for Substitution of Judge

Text: Defendant contends that trial counsel's failure to move for a substitution of judge at trial represents ineffective assistance of counsel. Apparently, at the time of the commission of the offense in the case at bar, defendant was free on bond with sex offense charges pending against him. The trial judge in the case at bar was also the judge who admitted defendant to bail. A local newspaper editorial was critical of the fact that defendant was free on bond at the time of the offense. While defendant cites no authority involving similar facts, he insists that under these circumstances trial counsel's failure to move for substitution of judges deprived him of an impartial tribunal. We disagree. This court has noted that outside of situations where a judge's pecuniary interest in a case requires disqualification, [a]nother guiding principle on the issue of judicial bias is whether the case involves a possible temptation such that the average person, acting as judge, could not hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused. ( People v. Del Vecchio (1989), 129 Ill.2d 265, 275, 135 Ill.Dec. 816, 544 N.E.2d 312, citing Tumey v. Ohio (1926), 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444, 71 L.Ed. 749, 758.) In Del Vecchio, this court further observed that only under the most extreme cases would disqualification for bias or prejudice be constitutionally required. ( Del Vecchio, 129 Ill.2d at 275, 135 Ill.Dec. 816, 544 N.E.2d 312, citing Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie (1986), 475 U.S. 813, 821, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 1585, 89 L.Ed.2d 823, 832.) No doubt any judge would be distressed to learn that an individual admitted to bail by that judge had thereafter been accused of committing a violent crime. But to conclude from this alone that the judge could not set aside personal feelings and act in an impartial manner would give too little credit to the temperament and integrity of members of the bench. The additional element of media attention to defendant's freedom on bail at the time of the offense does not alter our conclusion. The mere fact that a judge has been subjected to press criticism in connection with a case or a party does not necessarily require the judge's disqualification. In one court's words, [b]y training and inclination, judges meet media criticism of their actions with robust insensitivity. ( United States v. Martorano (3d Cir.1989), 866 F.2d 62, 69 (although the press had criticized the trial judge for acting as a character witness for defendant's attorney in other proceedings, court rejected argument that the trial judge dealt harshly with defendant to refute the implication of favoritism towards defendant's attorney).) In any event, the editorial in the case at bar posed no significant danger of judicial bias. While the editorial mentioned that defendant was free on bond at the time of Vernita Wheat's murder, its overall theme was that the criminal justice system as a whole had failed. The criticism was not levelled against the trial judge personally, and the editorial did not fault the trial judge personally for defendant's release on bond. Indeed, the trial judge is not even identified by name. Trial counsel's failure to move for a substitution of judges did not deprive defendant of an impartial tribunal or otherwise engender prejudice.