Opinion ID: 852697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trade Name Infringement

Text: The Rushville P.C.'s complaint also alleges that The defendants' use of the plaintiff's name . . . has created confusion in the marketplace as to the source of the defendants' legal services. The Court of Appeals treated this as a claim for unfair competition and cited Hammons Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Laser Mobile Home Transport, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 458, 461 (Ind. Ct.App.1986), trans. denied, for the proposition that actionable unfair competition consists of passing off and requires a showing that the defendant intended to deceive. We do not agree that unfair competition is limited to passing off. Nor does every ground of unfair competition require intentional wrongdoing. In Bartholomew County Beverage Co. v. Barco Beverage Corp., 524 N.E.2d 353, 358 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988) the Court of Appeals correctly observed that Although the law of unfair competition has been defined as the palming off of ones goods or services as that of some one else, and the attempt thereof, the tort of unfair competition is much broader and also includes actions for the interference with a contract or business relationship, as well as for predatory price cutting. (internal citations omitted). See also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428, 123 S.Ct. 1115, 155 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (Traditional trademark infringement law is part of a broader law of unfair competition that has its sources in English common law, and was largely codified in the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) (internal citations omitted). Use of confusingly similar corporate, business and professional names has been labeled unfair competition by courts. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 428, 123 S.Ct. 1115; McCarthy, supra, at § 1:10. It is more precisely described as trade name infringement, which like passing off, is a subspecies of unfair competition. We take the Rushville P.C.'s allegation of confusion in the marketplace as asserting a claim for trade name infringement. A trade name is a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, or a combination of such designations, that is distinctive of a person's business or other enterprise and that is used in a manner that identifies that business or enterprise and distinguishes it from the businesses or enterprises of others. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 12. Both the Rushville P.C. and the Fort Wayne firm are using a variant of the common surname of their principals as a trade name. At common law, trade name infringement exists when a defendant's use of a name is likely to cause confusion as to the source of goods or products, irrespective of whether the defendant has a subjective intent to deceive or confuse. Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 731 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir.1984); Hulburt Oil & Grease Co. v. Hulburt Oil & Grease Co., 371 F.2d 251, 256 (7th Cir.1966); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Metro. Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir.1960); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 20 cmt. c. Although evidence of an intent to deceive is not required for trade name infringement, it can create a rebuttable inference of a likelihood of confusion. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 20 cmt. c. And once infringement is established, the scope of relief may also be more extensive if the defendant had an intent to deceive. Id. at §§ 35-37. Because intent to deceive is not a required element of a claim of common law trade name infringement, we do not agree with the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that intent to deceive is a necessary component of the Rushville P.C.'s claim. We nevertheless agree that the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Fort Wayne firm. As a reviewing court, we are not limited to reviewing the trial court's reasons for granting or denying summary judgment but rather may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any theory supported by the evidence. Bernstein v. Glavin, 725 N.E.2d 455, 458-59 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000), trans. denied. We conclude that the undisputed facts establish the Rushville P.C. is not entitled to the statewide protection it seeks, and that the evidence does not support even localized protection. In order to state a cognizable claim for trade name infringement, a plaintiff must make a threshold showing of a protectable trade name. At common law it was held that every person had an absolute right to use his own name as his own property and had the same right to use and enjoy it as any other species of property. See, e.g., Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 233 U.S. 461, 470-71, 34 S.Ct. 648, 58 L.Ed. 1046 (1914); Brown Chem. Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 544, 11 S.Ct. 625, 35 L.Ed. 247 (1891). Modern authority holds that a trade name, including a personal name, is protectable if it is distinctive. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 9-12. Personal names, including surnames, are not inherently distinctive and are only protectable as trademarks or trade names upon proof of secondary meaning. Id. at § 14 cmt. e. Secondary meaning denotes that the name, in this case the surname Keaton, or the brand Keaton and Keaton, although not inherently distinctive, has come to be uniquely associated with a particular business through use. Id. The existence of secondary meaning is a question of fact, with the burden of proof on the person claiming rights in the name. Id. at § 13 cmt. a. Tracking the original common law roots of this doctrine, we think that where the alleged trade name is the surname of the alleged infringer, the burden is even higher. In the present case, the Rushville P.C. has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the name Keaton has acquired a unique association with the Rushville P.C. At best, the evidence designated by the Rushville P.C. showed one isolated instance of confusion by the clerk of the court in Rushville where the Rushville P.C. is a well known and respected local firm. This is woefully insufficient to establish that the Rushville P.C.'s use of its name has recognition by the general public or any significant statewide segment of consumers of legal services. Law firms with the same or similar names are abundant, and there is no evidence that the Rushville P.C. has any name recognition in Fort Wayne over 100 miles from Rushville. To the extent the Rushville P.C. has demonstrated a secondary meaning in its locale, we agree with the trial court that the three instances of alleged name confusion designated by the Rushville P.C. in its motion for summary judgment are insufficient as a matter of law to establish actionable infringement. See Hammons Mobile Homes, 501 N.E.2d at 462 (a person cannot be held liable for incidental damages to a rival in business using the same name) (internal quotations omitted). The Rushville P.C. has not identified any injury it has suffered arising from the alleged instances of confusion. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the Fort Wayne firm on the Rushville P.C.'s trade name infringement claim.