Opinion ID: 1058336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Revocation of Waiver

Text: Pike next contends that her petition for post-conviction relief was never legally withdrawn because she moved to vacate the order dismissing her petition before the order became final. Pike argues that a death-sentenced inmate should be allowed thirty days within which to revoke a waiver of post-conviction review. Pike claims that affording a death-sentenced inmate thirty days to revoke or to withdraw a waiver of post-conviction relief is consistent with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f) (Rule 32(f)). Rule 32(f) provides: A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice, the court after sentence, but before the judgment becomes final, may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea. Applying the analytical framework of Rule 32(f), the trial court denied Pike's motion to vacate. The trial court found that permitting Pike to reinstate her post-conviction petition was not necessary to correct manifest injustice. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The State maintains that the lower courts appropriately analogized the circumstances of this case to Rule 32(f) and correctly applied its manifest injustice standard. According to the State, Pike offered nothing beyond a change of heart and deference to her family's feelings in support of her request to withdraw her motion to dismiss. Therefore, the State avers that Pike failed to support her motion by a showing of manifest injustice and that, in the absence of such a showing, the trial court properly denied Pike's motion to vacate her waiver and to reinstate her post-conviction petition. Whether and under what circumstances a competent death-sentenced inmate may revoke a waiver and resume post-conviction review is a question of first impression. Neither the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to post-conviction proceedings except as specifically provided by the Supreme Court Rules. See Tenn. S.Ct. R. 28, § 3(B). However, Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 11 does not answer this question. Nor do other generally applicable rules of procedure provide an answer. Nonetheless, when an issue arises for which no procedure is specifically prescribed, Tennessee courts have inherent power to adopt appropriate rules of procedure. State v. Mallard, 40 S.W.3d 473, 480-81 (Tenn.2001); Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 264-65 (Tenn.1999); State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tenn.1998); see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-118 (2003) (recognizing this Court's authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for post-conviction proceedings). As we explained in Reid , such supplementary rules must be consistent with constitutional principles, statutory laws, and generally applicable rules of procedure, and trial courts should pattern such rules upon analogous generally applicable rules of procedure. Reid, 981 S.W.2d at 170. The trial court herein adhered to the principles enunciated in Reid . [9] In dealing with Pike's motion to vacate, the trial court identified Rule 32(f) as the most analogous generally applicable rule of procedure. We agree that Rule 32(f) is the most analogous generally applicable rule of procedure and that it is a proper point of departure for our analysis. However, the analogy breaks down insofar as Rule 32(f) applies a lenient standard to motions filed before imposition of sentence and a stricter standard to motions filed after imposition of sentence. Imposition of sentence does not occur in post-conviction proceedings, and there is no readily comparable procedural event in post-conviction proceedings. Thus, in determining whether to permit Pike to revoke her waiver, the courts below had no clear basis on which to choose between the lenient any fair and just reason standard and the strict to prevent manifest injustice standard. The courts below apparently equated the order dismissing Pike's petition with the imposition of sentence and therefore evaluated Pike's motion under the strict to prevent manifest injustice standard of Rule 32(f). Upon careful consideration, we are not convinced that either of the Rule 32(f) standards provides the appropriate framework for analysis in the context of this case. Admittedly, we have herein declined to mandate post-conviction review of death sentences. Nevertheless, in exercising our inherent power to fashion an appropriate rule of procedure, we must be mindful that a sentence of death is final, irrevocable, and `qualitatively different' than any other form or level of punishment. Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 809 (Tenn.2001). We also must take into account the existing statutory limitations on post-conviction remedies, which likely would bar a second post-conviction petition by a death-sentenced inmate who has sought and obtained dismissal of an initial post-conviction petition. [10] Given the unique nature of the death sentence and the existing statutory limitations on post-conviction remedies, we hold that a death-sentenced inmate whose request to waive post-conviction has been granted must be allowed thirty days from the trial court's order dismissing the petition to revoke the waiver. [11] We emphasize the limited scope of our holding. Pike had not previously waived or attempted to waive post-conviction review. Had she done so, a very different case would have been presented. We need not and do not in this appeal adopt a rule which applies in such cases. Our holding herein affords to death-sentenced inmates a single thirty-day period to unilaterally revoke an initial waiver of post-conviction review. This holding does not afford, and should not be applied to afford, death-sentenced inmates a means by which to manipulate and to delay the judicial process. In this case, Pike filed within thirty days her motion seeking to vacate the trial court's order dismissing her post-conviction, to reinstate her post-conviction petition, and to schedule an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, applying our holding, Pike's petition for post-conviction must be reinstated and an evidentiary hearing must be scheduled. Counsel for Pike should prepare for and proceed with the evidentiary hearing as expeditiously as possible and make every effort to avoid unnecessary delay.