Opinion ID: 1886434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Like Lancaster, Gayles challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict her. First, she argues that her mere presence during the armed robbery did not aid or abet the commission of that crime, and so she should have been acquitted on that count. Second, even if the jury could find that she participated in the armed robbery as an aider and abettor, the government still was required to prove that she aided and abetted the possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (the armed robbery) to support her conviction for aiding and abetting Lancaster's PFCV violation. She argues that there was insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find her guilty of aiding and abetting Lancaster's possessory offense. In general, to prove aiding and abetting, the government must show that (1) a crime was committed by someone; (2) the accused assisted or participated in its commission; and (3) the accused participated with guilty knowledge. Tyree v. United States, 942 A.2d 629, 636 (D.C. 2008). Because armed robbery is a specific-intent crime, the government must prove that the aider and abettor shared the same mens rea required of the principals  in this case, the specific intent to steal from Greene. See Walters v. United States, 940 A.2d 101, 102 (D.C.2007) (holding that Wilson-Bey applies to specific-intent crime of robbery). We agree with Gayles that her mere presence during the robbery would have been insufficient to prove her intent to rob Greene, but in this case the government established far more. The government presented evidence that Gayles lured Greene into her apartment, then left, returning a few minutes later followed by three armed men, who then robbed Greene at gunpoint. While Gayles vomited in the bathroom, one of the robbers asked her if she was alright, indicating that the robbers were acquainted with Gayles and concerned for her. A few minutes later, Gayles stood by and watched the robbers threaten Greene, and then she left the apartment at their direction. Taken in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could find that Gayles knew the robbers and shared their intent to rob Greene. The trial court did not err in denying Gayles's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of aiding and abetting armed robbery. We reach a different conclusion as to Gayles's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of aiding and abetting PFCV. The government cites Dang v. United States, 741 A.2d 1039 (D.C.1999), for the proposition that it must show only that Gayles knowingly acted in furtherance of the common purpose to rob Greene  the predicate crime of violence for the PFCV charge against Lancaster  to support her conviction for aiding and abetting PFCV. In Dang, this court upheld the sufficiency of the evidence to support Dang's conviction for aiding and abetting his co-defendants' possession of their guns during an armed robbery. The court noted that although there was no evidence that Dang himself possessed a gun during the robbery, he entered and exited the apartment with his co-defendants and he worked in concert with them by ... blocking the door, guarding [a victim] and pointing a knife at [another victim]. Id. at 1043. From these facts the court concluded that a reasonable juror could find that Dang aided and abetted his co-defendants' possession of firearms. Id. Although we do not believe it is enough that one charged with aiding and abetting the crime of PFCV work in concert with the principal in the commission of the predicate crime of violence (here, the armed robbery), the facts in Dang establish that Dang did much more than that. Dang also took specific steps to assist his co-defendants in the actual possession of firearms. As the government argued in its brief in Dang, Dang's concrete actions of blocking the door, guarding a victim, and pointing a knife at another victim assisted the principals in maintaining possession of the guns by preventing the victims from grabbing the gun[s] or from obtaining outside help. In the present case, by contrast, the government offered no proof that Gayles did anything at all to aid in the possession of a firearm by any of the robbers. On the contrary, Gayles did nothing after she lured Greene into her apartment. She did not block the way to prevent Greene from leaving and she did not guard or threaten him. Instead, she merely stood in the bathroom in her apartment watching the confrontation between Greene and the robbers for a brief time until she followed the robbers' directive to leave the apartment. Thus, we do not find Dang controlling here. Instead, this case much more closely resembles McCoy v. United States, 760 A.2d 164 (D.C.2000). In McCoy, we held that for a defendant to be convicted of aiding and abetting the crime of carrying a pistol without a license (CPWOL), a possessory offense similar to PFCV, there must be a showing of some conduct by an alleged accomplice of an affirmative character in furtherance of the act of carrying the pistols by the principals. Id. at 186, quoting Halicki v. United States, 614 A.2d 499, 503 (D.C.1992) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In McCoy, we reversed the trial court's judgment, rejecting the government's reliance on evidence of defendants' participation in a larger scheme to murder the victim as sufficient to support their convictions for aiding and abetting CPWOL. We explained that under Halicki the government must show more than general participation in the criminal venture to prove aiding and abetting of the possessory firearms offense. McCoy, 760 A.2d at 186. In this case, as in McCoy, the government relies solely on evidence of Gayles's participation in the larger scheme of the armed robbery to support her conviction for aiding and abetting the robbers' PFCV. As noted above, the government presented no evidence that Gayles engaged in any conduct that aided in the possession of a firearm by any of the robbers. In response to questioning at oral argument as to where in its brief the government explained the requirements for aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, the government submitted a post-argument letter again referring the division to the pages of its brief that argued merely that Gayles knowingly acted in furtherance of a common purpose to rob Greene. That evidence establishes that Gayles was properly convicted of aiding and abetting armed robbery, but it says nothing about her assistance or participation in the robbers' possession of firearms. [5] Thus, the type of evidence that was sufficient to support affirmance of the conviction in Dang is missing here, nor can the government's theory in this case  that participation in the larger scheme is sufficient  be reconciled with the principle articulated in McCoy as applied in a CPWOL case. The inconsistency urged upon us by the government is made especially stark by our acknowledgment in Halicki that we have sometimes equated the concepts of `carrying on or about the person' and `possession' by using the terms interchangeably. Halicki, 614 A.2d at 503 n. 9. [6] We find McCoy's analysis of the proof required to support a charge of aiding and abetting the possessory offense of CPWOL persuasive because it gives meaning to the language of the offense, and we believe the facts in Dang show that the government there presented the same nature and quantum of proof as the court required in McCoy. [7] That is appropriate because there is no meaningful distinction between what should be required to uphold a charge of aiding and abetting these two very similar possessory offenses. We therefore reverse Gayles's conviction on the charge of aiding and abetting PFCV. [8] Affirmed in part and reversed in part.