Opinion ID: 1561776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Missing Voicemail Message

Text: Beasley alleges that he informed trial counsel that he made a telephone call to the victim within days after the murder and left a voicemail message. He urges that this voicemail may have contained exculpatory or impeaching information which could have demonstrated that he was innocent because he was unaware of the murder and believed that Mrs. Monfort was still alive. By not litigating the possibility of an exculpatory tape, Beasley contends that counsel was deficient because they failed to develop a record concerning the tape or to pursue further support for his claim of innocence. Therefore, according to Beasley, counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and address this voicemail issue. In rejecting the claims with regard to counsel's investigation, the postconviction court specifically noted that there was no evidence of any bad-faith destruction of evidence by the State to support a motion attacking the prosecution based on the undisclosed voicemail message. We evaluate the trial court's factual findings with regard to the performance of counsel for competent, substantial evidence and consider de novo whether counsel made reasonable tactical decisions concerning investigation of the voicemail. The United States Supreme Court has considered several standards concerning the constitutionally guaranteed right of access to evidence. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). Each focuses on the type of violation asserted and the impact of the evidence on the defendant's case. For example, in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), the Supreme Court explained: In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), we held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id., at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), we held that the prosecution had a duty to disclose some evidence of this description even though no requests were made for it, but at the same time we rejected the notion that a prosecutor has a constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to defense counsel. Id., at 111, 96 S.Ct. 2392; see also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972) (We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case). Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 55, 109 S.Ct. 333. Furthermore, to establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show (1) that favorable evidence either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) that because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); see also Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla.2000). To meet the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had the suppressed evidence been disclosed, the jury would have reached a different verdict. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 S.Ct. 1936. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome. See Way, 760 So.2d at 913; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Thus, whether the good or bad faith of the State is relevant to an analysis of an alleged due process violation depends on the type of error asserted and whether the evidence is exculpatory, impeaching, or merely potentially useful. Exculpatory evidence has been defined as that tending to establish a criminal defendant's innocence. Black's Law Dictionary 597 (8th ed.2004). Impeachment evidence refers to that which is used to undermine a witness's credibility. Id. at 768. When evaluating the suppression of evidence alleged to be exculpatory, there is no requirement for a showing of bad faith for a determination of a violation under Brady. See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333 (The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Brady, makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence.). For circumstances in which the State failed to preserve evidence that is merely potentially useful, however, unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Id. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333. The determination by trial counsel that the evidence was actually just potentially useful, and not exculpatory, is reasonable. Although the voicemail may have been argued to support Beasley's defense that he left town to visit friends in Miami and that he was unaware of the murder, the voicemail does not in any way eliminate Beasley as the person who committed the offense. The alleged voicemail was created by Beasley after the murder and could reasonably be cast as a self-serving creation. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the allegedly withheld evidence was not direct or exculpatory evidence under Brady or Youngblood and therefore the defense would have been required to demonstrate that the State withheld, destroyed, or failed to preserve the voicemail in bad faith. Beasley also failed to demonstrate the basic foundation of this claimthat the voicemail even existed. Beasley did not testify that he left the message or introduce the phone records or the documentation of the evidence collected by the State during discovery. Beasley not only failed to establish that the missing voicemail existed, he presented nothing more than speculative argument with regard to the content of the voicemail, which is an essential element in determining whether a due process violation occurred for both a Brady and a Youngblood claim. Beasley also did not present any evidence to support his claim that the State possessed the voicemail, which is an obvious prerequisite to demonstrating that the voicemail was withheld or destroyed, regardless of intent. Without establishing that the voicemail existed and was possessed by the State, Beasley could only speculate through argument and cross-examination with regard to the State's alleged bad faith destruction or suppression of the voicemail. The testimony of defense counsel refuted Beasley's speculative claims. Trial counsel acknowledged that a Youngblood motion would have been appropriate if the voicemail had never been disclosed and the State had possessed evidence of it. This, however, was a hypothetical answer to a question posited by postconviction counsel. Counsel testified that the issue of an alleged missing voicemail was not litigated because it could not be demonstrated that the State had lost or destroyed the alleged voicemail in bad faith. Under the Youngblood analysis, this was a reasonable strategy for defense counsel. Thus, we affirm the order with regard to this claim because Beasley has not demonstrated either deficient performance or that there is a reasonable probability that litigating the missing voicemail would have impacted the verdict.