Opinion ID: 2599781
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wilson claim

Text: As noted, Dr. Cotton testified about the frequency of the genetic profile that matched defendant's DNA and DNA extracted from the vaginal swabs using both the interim ceiling method and the product rule; under the former, the frequency of the profile in the general population was 1 in 53,000, under the latter the frequency of the profile among Caucasians was 1 in 5.7 million. Citing People v. Wilson, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1237, 45 Cal. Rptr.3d 73, 136 P.3d 864, defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting Dr. Cotton to testify to the frequency of the profile only among Caucasians, the racial group to which defendant belongs, rather than for the three major racial and ethic groups  Caucasian, African-American and Latino  for which DNA databases exist. He asserts, moreover, that the error is of federal constitutional dimension because it improperly lowered the prosecution's burden of proof, thus violating his federal due process rights. We conclude that defendant has forfeited his claim by failing to specifically object on the grounds he now advances. In any event, we find the claim without merit and, even if error occurred, harmless. Defendant concedes there was no specific objection to this testimony, but nonetheless argues that the issue is cognizable on appeal because he had previously objected to the admission of DNA evidence as a whole, and that this objection had been overruled. He argues in this connection that his due process objection flows from his trial court objection and is therefore preserved under People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765. Alternatively, he contends his federal constitutional claim is cognizable even without an objection. These arguments are unpersuasive. A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless: [¶] (a) There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion. (Evid. Code, § 353.) What is important is that the objection fairly inform the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling. ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) Defendant's failure to specifically object at trial to the population frequency testimony on the ground that evidence regarding only the Caucasian database improperly suggested that the perpetrator was a member of defendant's race deprived the prosecution of the opportunity either to present frequency evidence for the other two databases or to defend its decision not to. His failure to have lodged a specific objection on this ground is especially glaring given that Dr. Cotton testified that Cellmark ordinarily analyzes the frequency of a DNA profile for each major database, and, on cross-examination, provided the frequency of the perpetrator's genetic profile in the African-American population. Therefore, had defendant lodged a timely and specific objection, Dr. Cotton could presumably have testified to the frequency of the DNA profile for all three major populations. Alternatively, the prosecution could have defended its decision to present testimony as to the Caucasian population only by pointing out, for example, that hairs recovered from the victim's fingernails and hands indicated that the perpetrator was likely Caucasian. A timely and specific objection would also, of course, have permitted the trial court to have made a fully informed ruling. Defendant attempts to excuse his failure by arguing that he had previously objected to admission of DNA evidence as a whole, and the specific objection at issue here was merely a subset of that larger objection that the trial court had already overruled. We are unpersuaded. Defendant refers us to his pretrial motion, argued several months before his trial, in which he objected to all DNA evidence on the grounds that DNA analysis was not generally accepted by the scientific community as required by the Kelly/Frye rule. ( People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240; Frye v. United States (D.C.Cir.1923) 293 F. 1013.) In passing, defendant cited People v. Pizarro (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 57, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, which he described as questioning the acceptability of statistical ratios assigned to a particular racial or ethnic data bases. Notwithstanding this brief reference, defendant did not press this objection but argued rather that D.N.A. analysis in not admissible in California courts because it failed to pass muster under the Kelly/Frye rule. Under these circumstances, we disagree that a general attack on the scientific validity of DNA testing made months before trial encompasses the specific claim that defendant seeks to advance regarding the use of a single database to calculate the frequency of a particular genetic profile, because defendant's present claim assumes the general validity of DNA testing and questions only whether the population frequency evidence was unfairly skewed to his detriment. Defendant also fails to demonstrate that he was excused from raising this objection at trial because such objection would have been futile. Nor do we agree that this case presents a scenario similar to the one we addressed in Partida. In Partida, a timely and specific objection to the admission of evidence was made on state law grounds. The issue was whether that objection was sufficient to preserve a federal due process claim where the due process claim was merely an additional legal consequence of the asserted [state] error.... ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 438, 35 Cal. Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) Here there was no specific or timely objection from which it could be argued that the constitutional claim flowed. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant's failure to object forfeits his claim on appeal. We reject his further argument that his constitutional claim is of such magnitude that principles of forfeiture should not apply. In any event, the claim fails on its merits. While in Wilson we held that, generally, the frequency of the perpetrator's genetic profile should be given as to all three major population groups, we left open the possibility that, where the perpetrator's ethnicity is established by other evidence, the frequency of that population only might be acceptable. ( People v. Wilson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1249, 45 Cal. Rptr.3d 73, 136 P.3d 864.) Here, the hair analysis established that hairs removed from the victim's fingernails were characteristic of Caucasians. Thus, there was other evidence before the jury suggesting that the perpetrator was Caucasian. Finally, for the reasons set forth in the preceding section, even if there were error, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.