Opinion ID: 2060173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Does ch. 234, Stats., delegate legislative authority in violation of art. IV, sec. 1, Wisconsin Constitution?

Text: Art. IV, sec. 1, Wisconsin Constitution, provides: ... The legislative power shall be vested in a senate and assembly. In State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman (1928), 196 Wis. 472, 505, 220 N. W. 929, the rule was established as follows: ... The power to declare whether or not there shall be a law; to determine the general purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; to fix the limits within which the law shall operate,is a power which is vested by our constitutions in the legislature and may not be delegated. When, however, the legislature has laid down these fundamentals of a law, it may delegate to administrative agencies the authority to exercise such legislative power as is necessary to carry into effect the general legislative purpose .... See also: Olson v. State Conservation Comm. (1940), 235 Wis. 473, 293 N. W. 262; Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Comm. (1945), 248 Wis. 59, 21 N. W. 2d 5; United Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1949), 255 Wis. 154, 38 N. W. 2d 692. [25] In Milwaukee v. Sewerage Comm. (1954), 268 Wis. 342, 351, 67 N. W. 2d 624, this court stated: ... The true test and distinction whether a power is strictly legislative, or whether it is administrative and merely relates to the execution of the statutory law, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done. To the latter, no valid objection can be made. State ex rel. Adams v. Burdge (1897), 95 Wis. 390, 70 N. W. 347; State ex rel. Buell v. Frear (1911), 146 Wis. 291, 131 N. W. 832.... In State ex rel. La Follette v. Reuter, supra, at 33 Wis. 2d 394, this court citing State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel (1953), supra, which quoted People ex rel. Curren v. Schommer (1945), 392 Ill. 17, 24, 63 N. E. 2d 744, stated: `... it has long been accepted that the legislature may delegate that reasonable measure of authority which is necessary to accomplish the constitutional purpose desired. We hardly see how ... it can be said that the legislature, which is the voice of the people, has no freedom of action in determining the best methods of giving to the public that service for which it is willing and able to pay. It is the best judge of what is necessary to meet the needs of the public and in what manner the service shall be directed....' The power delegated to the Authority by ch. 234, Stats., authorizes the Authority to act in such a way as will assist in the development and construction of housing for low and moderate income families and persons and in the elimination of substandard housing conditions in the state of Wisconsin. The legislature has declared that there shall be a law and has determined the general policy sought to be achieved. The Authority must act within the limits as expressed by the purpose of ch. 234. Such a standard has been held sufficient to protect legislative enactments from attacks based upon alleged delegation of legislative power. [26] A similar grant of power was upheld in Jolly v. Greendale Housing Authority (1951), 259 Wis. 407, 49 N. W. 2d 191. The court, at page 409, stated: The purpose of sec. 66.40, Stats., the `Housing Authorities Law,' is stated in sub. (2). It is there declared, in substance, that there exist insanitary and unsafe dwelling accommodations resulting in a shortage of safe or sanitary dwelling accommodations for persons of low income, forcing them to occupy overcrowded and congested dwelling accommodations; that these circumstances cause conditions not conducive to the public welfare and safety; and that the construction of housing projects for such persons and the clearing and reconstruction of the areas in which such unsatisfactory conditions exist and the providing of safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations for them are public uses and purposes for which public money may be spent. By sub. (9), sec. 66.40, Stats., the Authority, the corporation established to function as the agency to administer the law, is granted the `powers necessary or convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of the law. Thus the act does not grant unlimited authority to engage in the housing business regardless of the nature, character, or purpose of the venture. It is only when the purpose of the law is to be effectuated that the Authority may proceed. The court in New Jersey Mortgage Finance Agency v. McCrane (1970), 56 N. J. 414, 426, 267 Atl. 2d 24, observed that: ... the necessities of modern government have increasingly dictated the use of general rather than minutely detailed standards in regulatory enactments under the police power.... Necessarily the Authority must determine what persons or families are to receive its assistance and through what vehicles this assistance may be more expeditiously provided. The legislature, by enacting sec. 234.01 (8), Stats., [27] has provided that the recipients of financial aid shall be persons and families of low and moderate income. The Authority is not delegated the power to make law but to make factual determinations in execution of the law as declared by the legislature. An argument similar to that of respondents' was rejected in Martin v. Housing Corp., supra . The North Carolina Supreme Court, at 277 N. C. at 55, 175 S. E. 2d 680, stated: The clear and declared purpose of the General Assembly is to provide `residential housing' for `persons and families of lower income.' Necessarily the Corporation must determine what persons and what families are to receive its assistance. The General Assembly, in Section 3 (11) of the 1969 Act, provided: ` (P)ersons and families of lower income means persons and families deemed by the Corporation to require such assistance as is made available by this Act on account of insufficient personal or family income, taking into consideration without limitation, such factors as (a) the amount of the total income of such persons and families available for housing needs, (b) the size of the family, (c) the cost and condition of housing facilities available, (d) the eligibility of such persons and families for federal housing assistance of any type predicated upon a lower income basis, and (e) the ability of such persons and families to compete successfully in the normal housing market and to pay the amounts at which private enterprise is providing decent, safe and sanitary housing, and deemed by the Corporation therefore to be eligible to occupy residential housing constructed and financed, wholly or in part, with insured construction loans or insured mortgages, or with other public or private assistance.' We are of the opinion and hold that the Corporation does not legislate but determines factually, by application of the factors the General Assembly has prescribed, what persons or families are `persons and families of lower income' and therefore entitled to the benefits of the 1969 Act. [28] Respondents contend that the term eligible sponsor, as defined in sec. 234.01 (3), Stats., [29] is so inadequately defined as to grant to the Authority unlimited power in determining who are to be the recipients of construction and long-term mortgage loans under sec. 234.04, and grants under sec. 234.06. The terms housing corporation, limited-profit entity, and nonprofit corporation are defined in sec. 234.01 (4), (6) and (7), Stats., [30] respectively. The term any other entity, contained in sec. 234.01 (3), must be read in conjunction with the declared purpose of the legislation. The Authority has not been delegated the power to make law but only to exercise the discretion necessary to effectuate its goals as delineated by the legislature. The court, in Martin v. Housing Corp., supra, at 277 N. C. 56, 175 S. E. 2d 681, after determining that the establishment of the North Carolina Housing Corporation [31] was not unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislative authority, stated: ... Obviously, the Corporation must exercise its discretion and judgment with reference to the choice of sites and the identity of the sponsor, builder or developer with whom the Corporation will deal in connection with a particular project.... Respondents argue that there is nothing in the law to prevent the private lending institutions from turning the program to their own profit at the expense of the intended recipients. The Authority must exercise its discretion so that the loans are so distributed as to meet the housing shortage in accordance with the legislative direction. Should the factual considerations underlying ch. 234, Stats., cease to exist or should the Authority undertake action in excess of the power conferred upon it by ch. 234, a remedy through judicial proceeding would then be available. After considering all of the contentions advanced by the respondents, we are of the opinion that ch. 234, Stats., does not empower the Authority to act in the capacity of lawmaker. The act places in it a discretionary authority to implement the statutory direction within the boundaries fixed by the enactment. This endowment of discretion is necessary and essential to achieve a valid governmental objective as declared by the legislature and does not constitute an illegal delegation of legislative authority.