Opinion ID: 2516950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Problems With the Alternative Means Theory

Text: The alternative means theory creates problems of interpretation with regard to the first means by which the offense of inattention to driving could be committed-namely, to operate a vehicle without due care. It is a basic rule of statutory interpretation that [p]rovisions of a penal statute will be accorded a limited and reasonable interpretation . . . in order to preserve its overall purpose and to avoid absurd results. State v. Bates, 84 Hawai'i 211, 220, 933 P.2d 48, 57 (1997). Under the first part of the alternative means theory, one may be prosecuted for slips in attention or other instances of inattentiveness while driving, such as momentarily taking one's eyes of the road, even when no harm results. Such possibilities show the potential for arguably absurd applications resulting from the alternative means interpretation. The alternative means theory also raises potential constitutional concerns. [W]here possible, we will read a penal statute in such a manner as to preserve its constitutionality. To accord a constitutional interpretation of a provision of broad or apparent unrestricted scope, courts will strive to focus the scope of the provision to a narrow and more restricted construction. Id. Interpreting the statute to apply to any driving that betokens, without more, a lack of due care raises potential problems of unconstitutional vagueness, by granting indeterminate discretion to arresting officers to apply the statute. This court has explained that [d]ue process of law requires that a penal statute state with reasonable clarity the act it proscribes and provide fixed standards for adjudicating guilt, or the statute is void for vagueness. Statutes must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct. Id. Vagueness is measured by the following standard: [A] criminal statute is void for vagueness unless it: 1) gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he or she may act accordingly, and 2) provides explicit standards for those who apply the statute, in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. Id. Because it fails to specify an explicit standard, the mere command that one not drive without due careregardless of any physical harm caused by such drivingraises potential problems of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The potential of the alternative means theory to violate important penal and constitutional principles suggests that a more sensible interpretation would be preferred.
Past decisions also provide implicit disapproval of the alternative means theory in the context of inattention to driving. In State v. Mitchell , the ICA upheld a conviction for inattention to driving when the defendant's vehicle plowed into the rear of a car in front of it, which sustained rear-end damage. 94 Hawai'i 388, 401, 15 P.3d 314, 327 (App.2000). In explaining its opinion, the ICA stated that Mitchell contends, and we agree, that mere occurrence of an accident without more, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for inattention to driving. Admittedly, the record does not suffer from a plethora of evidence as to the physical circumstances of the accident. However, as detailed above, there is more in this record than the mere occurrence of an accident. Id. (citation omitted). By rejecting the possibility that a mere accident could lead to liability, the ICA also rejected, impliedly and sub silentio, the non-culpable alternative of the alternative means theory of the statute. [9] But see Momoki, 98 Hawai'i 188, 46 P.3d 1 (endorsing the alternative means theory, discussed supra note 7). Moreover, in all prior published decisions concerning HRS § 291-12, the physical harm element has been present, usually in the form of a collision. See State v. Reyes, 57 Haw. 533, 533, 560 P.2d 114, 115 (1977) (defendant, intending to make a left turn from a two-lane highway into a gravel road, moved the vehicle he was driving from the right to the left lane, where it was struck from behind by a vehicle which was overtaking a line of three cars); Mitchell, 94 Hawai'i 388, 15 P.3d 314 (rear-end collision); State v. Lee, 55 Haw. 505, 523 P.2d 315 (1974) (clarifying that the inattention to driving statute applies to activity on private roads and accordingly reversing trial court's dismissal of two cases; in both, the charge was that the defendant's vehicle had collided with another vehicle).