Opinion ID: 1991907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: TIME FOR PREPARATION OF RCr 11.42 MOTION

Text: Appellant correctly states that although the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not require states to provide a mechanism for post-conviction relief, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), when a state chooses to do so the courts must construe and interpret available remedies in a manner which accords with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Appellant argues, however, that the post-conviction scheme in Kentucky does not provide a uniform process for death row inmates to meaningfully develop and present their RCr 11.42 issues. Citing his case as an example of the disparate treatment of death row inmates, Appellant notes that his conviction became final on April 20, 1998, when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. An execution warrant was thereafter signed by the Governor on May 5, 1998, and Appellant's execution was scheduled for June 5, 1998. Appellant contends that upon the signing of the execution warrant, the three-year statute of limitations contained in RCr 11.42 and the one-year time period imposed under the AEDPA [1] became irrelevant, and the filing of an RCr 11.42 motion, however incomplete, was necessary to stay his execution. Appellant's argument with respect to the need for additional time to prepare and file an RCr 11.42 motion is virtually identical to the argument raised and rejected in Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 926 S.W.2d 667, 670 (1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1223, 116 S.Ct. 1855, 134 L.Ed.2d 955 (1996), in which we stated: We are aware of the complexities involved in preparing an RCr 11.42 motion that will adequately address any and all legal challenges a defendant may have. The rule states that the motion shall state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in support of such grounds. RCr 11.42. Moreover, any possible grounds that could have been raised will be lost if not presented in the same proceeding. Id. These requirements must be met or the motion may be summarily dismissed. It is very clear that any defendant is entitled to a review of the conviction and death sentence by the Kentucky Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. KY CONST. § 110; KRS 532.075; U.S. CONST. art. III. Further, a defendant is entitled to pursue post-conviction remedies, and appeal, subject to the rules of this Court. Coupling the availability of these procedures with the gravity of the punishment involved, it is mandatory that a defendant raise all issues without delay. In recognition of the need for both speed and specificity, we hold that an RCr 11.42 motion must be filed in an expeditious manner and is subject to amendment, if appropriate, with leave of court. Due to the unquestioned right of defendants to have their contentions decided by a court, leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires. CR 15.01. The Department of Public Advocacy provided Appellant continuous competent counsel since the commencement of charges against him. Appellant had over fourteen months from the issuance of this Court's opinion affirming his conviction to prepare an RCr 11.42 motion. Although he argues that new witnesses were identified and a comprehensive review of [his] medical history was undertaken for the first time, Appellant fails to identify a single issue he would have raised but for the time constraints. Reviewing federal appellate courts clearly expect work on a condemned prisoner's habeas petition to commence upon this Court's announcement of its opinion affirming the denial of RCr 11.42 relief. See In re Parker, 49 F.3d 204, 212 (6th Cir. 1995). We have expressed a similar expectation where the next step in the attack on the judgment is from direct appeal to RCr 11.42. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 975 S.W.2d 905, 909 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025, 119 S.Ct. 1266, 143 L.Ed.2d 361 (1999). Therefore, we decline Appellant's invitation to revisit this issue. Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 964 S.W.2d 803, 804 (1998).