Opinion ID: 544586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Treatment of NAFI Personnel

Text: 12 Appellants point to the treatment of NAFI personnel as other than employees of the United States in other, nontax circumstances. They base the claim that they should likewise be considered other than employees of the United States for purposes of section 911 on the in pari materia principle of statutory construction. See Sutherland Statutory Construction Sec. 51.01 (Sands 4th ed. rev. 1984), 2 and on the claim that this demonstrates congressional intent. Neither of these approaches succeeds. The treatment of NAFI personnel in the other contexts appellants cite is always for particular, limited nontax purposes, and thus these instances are not in pari materia with section 911. The wide range of treatments given NAFI personnel in various contexts demonstrates that had Congress sought to impose a special definition of employee in this case it would have done so explicitly. 13 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2105(c) treats NAFI personnel as other than employees of the United States for a variety of civil service purposes. 3 14 An employee paid from nonappropriated funds of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service, Navy Ship's Stores Ashore, Navy exchanges, Marine Corps exchanges, Coast Guard exchanges and other instrumentalities of the United States under the jurisdiction of the armed forces conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, and mental and physical improvement of personnel of the armed forces is deemed not an employee for the purpose of-- 15 (1) laws (other than subchapter IV of chapter 53 of this title, subchapter III of chapter 83 of this title to the extent provided in section 8332(b)(16) of this title, and sections 5550 and 7204 of this title) administered by the Office of Personnel Management; or 16 (2) subchapter I of chapter 81, chapter 84, and section 7902 of this title. 17 This subsection does not affect the status of these nonappropriated fund activities as Federal instrumentalities. 18 Section 2105 was passed in response to Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 62 S.Ct. 1168, 86 L.Ed. 1611 (1942), which treated Army Exchanges as exempt from state tax. H.R.Rep. No. 1995, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952). Following some administrative confusion about the proper treatment of NAFI personnel in light of Standard Oil, section 2105 standardized and codified the treatment of NAFI personnel as other than government employees for purposes of civil service laws and regulations. Id. 19 The wording of section 2105(c) makes clear that application beyond the terms of this section is inappropriate. Section 2105(c) states that an employee ... is deemed not an employee for certain specified purposes. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2105(c). The initial recognition of employee status deflates any claim that section 2105(c) confers a general nonemployee status. Moreover, the patchwork of applications of the deemed status indicates that the drafters intended specific, limited use of this definition. Where Congress has so specifically directed when to use a particular definition of employee it would defeat the legislative purpose to infer a broader application. 20 During the years relevant for this case NAFI personnel were treated differently for FICA purposes than those civil service employees who were covered by statutory retirement plans. I.R.C. Sec. 3121(b)(6)(A) (1982). However, section 3121(b) gave varying treatment to a wide range of persons in the employ of the United States or its instrumentalities. See, e.g., id. Sec. 3121(b)(6)(C)(i) (excluding from employment, inter alia, service by the President); id. Sec. 3121(b)(6)(B)(ii) (including within employment, inter alia, service by Federal Reserve Bank employees). Thus it is impossible to conclude from this section that NAFI personnel were generally to be considered other than employees of the United States. This is especially the case because section 3121 ultimately stated that service performed by NAFI personnel was not excluded from employment for FICA purposes. I.R.C. Sec. 3121(b)(6)(A) & (B)(iv) (1982). 21 I.R.C. Sec. 3122 requires the Secretary of Defense to collect FICA taxes on persons working for an instrumentality of the United States subject to the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense, at installations of the Department of Defense for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, and mental and physical improvement of personnel of such Department, and during the relevant years authorized the Secretary of Defense to determine whether such service was employment. I.R.C. Sec. 3122 (1982). The Secretary apparently determined that this service was employment and accordingly withheld taxes. First Stipulation for Trial, pp 14-15, 36-37 (March 4, 1988) (Joint Appendix H, 5-6, 10). 22 I.R.C. Sec. 3121(d) defines employee as any individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee. Although this definition applies only for purposes of this chapter [the Insurance Contributions Act], I.R.C. Sec. 3121(d), it demonstrates the problems of construing I.R.C. Sec. 911 in tandem with 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2105(c) when other statutory provisions also define employee. Although the definition of employee in section 3121 applies only for the purpose of FICA, this purpose is at least as closely related to I.R.C. Sec. 911 as is the purpose of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2105. 23 Appellants cite Brummitt v. United States, 329 F.2d 966, 967 (Ct.Cl.1964), and Donaldson v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 830, 840 (1969), as tax cases standing for the proposition that NAFI personnel are other than employees of the United States or its agencies. In Brummitt, the stronger of these two cases for appellants, that proposition is offered in unsupported dicta. In Donaldson, the Tax Court at most assumed arguendo that the petitioning NAFI employee was not a government employee. These cases offer no support to appellants. 4 24 Looking at all of the authorities appellants cite, it is clear that none are in pari materia with the tax statute under consideration. It would be manifestly inappropriate to rely on statutes, regulations, and cases having limited purpose and applicability to interpret, in derogation of a plain meaning, another statute having an unrelated purpose. As the Supreme Court said in United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 69, 61 S.Ct. 102, 108, 85 L.Ed. 40 (1940), [n]o mere collation of other statutes can be decisive in determining what the instant statute means. 25 Appellants' argument that the treatment of NAFI personnel as United States employees in the contexts cited makes it likely that Congress intended to treat them as other than employees, essentially argues that with so many special provisions for the status of NAFI personnel, Congress presumably forgot that NAFI personnel are common law employees of the United States. We cannot make such a presumption.