Opinion ID: 559043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Raised in Restrepo's Appeal

Text: 15
16 Restrepo argues that there is insufficient evidence that he agreed to distribute cocaine. The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Dorotich, 900 F.2d 192 (9th Cir.1989). 17 Restrepo argues that because he speaks only Spanish, there is no evidence in the record that he understood the June 6, 1989, conversation concerning the sale of cocaine to the agents. Restrepo also asserts that since there is no proof in the record that he received any money from the Special Agents or that he was present when the cocaine was delivered to them, the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that he agreed to sell cocaine or was a member of the conspiracy. Restrepo maintains that the evidence produced by the Government shows mere association with Arman and McGinley. He asserts that, at most, the record demonstrates that he acquiesced in their illegal activity. We disagree. 18 [I]t is clear that mere association with members of a conspiracy, or simple knowledge, approval, or acquiescence in the object or purpose of the conspiracy, without intention and agreement to accomplish a specific illegal objective, is not sufficient to make one a conspirator. 19 United States v. Melchor-Lopez, 627 F.2d 886, 891 (9th Cir.1980). 20 The record shows more than mere association and acquiescence. Restrepo was present at the June 6, 1989, meeting at which the arrangements were made to deliver cocaine to Special Agents Couchman and Jones. He told Special Agent Jones that he was Harold's partner and could provide significant quantities of cocaine. During these negotiations Restrepo quoted the price of cocaine and discussed the quantity he could deliver. Restrepo speculates that Arman could have created this conversation out of whole cloth because he translated the negotiations from Spanish to English. This contention finds no support in the record. The Special Agents testified regarding what Restrepo told them at their meeting. They testified that he talked with them. There is nothing in the record to support the contention that Arman acted as an interpretor for Restrepo. This same argument was presented to the jury by Restrepo's trial counsel. The jury rejected it. 21 Restrepo left the breakfast meeting on June 25 in the car in which the cocaine was later delivered. Restrepo watched the transaction from across the street and attempted to escape from the DEA agents. 22 The prosecution is not required to show that a conspiracy agreement was explicit; the agreement may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 179, 107 L.Ed.2d 135 (1989). Circumstantial evidence, and proper inferences drawn therefrom, may sustain a conviction. United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 179, 107 L.Ed.2d 135 (1989). Once the conspiracy is established, evidence of even a slight connection to it is sufficient if shown beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094, 107 S.Ct. 1309, 94 L.Ed.2d 164 (1987). The evidence was sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that Restrepo knowingly agreed to participate in a conspiracy to sell cocaine. 23
24 Restrepo also asserts that there is insufficient evidence to show that he possessed the cocaine. He argues that there is no evidence that the cocaine was in the brown Oldsmobile when he was in the vehicle. Thus, he maintains that there is no evidence that he had dominion and control over the cocaine. 25 In order to show possession, the Government must prove that Restrepo had dominion and control over the contraband. United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 350 (9th Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Behanna, 814 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 761 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir.1985))). Possession of a controlled substance under section 841(a)(1) 'may be constructive, as well as actual.'  United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1350 (9th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 873, 100 S.Ct. 153, 62 L.Ed.2d 99 (1979)). Constructive possession may be shown by proof that the defendant had an ability to produce the drug through the use of agents. Arrelanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603 (9th Cir.) (citing Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.1962)), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 930, 83 S.Ct. 294, 9 L.Ed.2d 238 (1962). It may be demonstrated by direct or circumstantial evidence that the defendant had the power to dispose of the drug. Disla, 805 F.2d at 1350 (citing Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 311, 312 (9th Cir.1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 889, 81 S.Ct. 1042, 6 L.Ed.2d 199 (1962)). Constructive possession may also be shown by proof that the defendant participated in a joint venture, and thus shared dominion and control over the contraband. United States v. Hernandez, 876 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 179, 107 L.Ed.2d 135 (1989); United States v. Valentin, 569 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir.1978). The evidence is sufficient to show that Restrepo participated in a joint venture with Lupio and McGinley to sell cocaine to Special Agents Couchman and Jones. 26
27 Restrepo asserts that the district court erred in denying a reduction of the offense level for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 because he did not provide substantial assistance to the Government. Restrepo appears to argue that consideration of a defendant's assistance to the Government is only appropriate when the sentencing court is considering a downward departure for substantial assistance to the Government under Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines. Restrepo claims that the district court's comment that it considered the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of his statements to the Government is an indication of improper reliance on Section 5K1.1 factors by the district court in making its decision whether to decrease the offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Whether or not a defendant has accepted responsibility for his crime is a factual determination we review for clear error. United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir.1990). 28 The record and the Guidelines do not support Restrepo's argument. The court did not indicate in any way that it was applying the factors set forth in Section 5K1.1 in denying a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Furthermore, Section 3E1.1 requires a court to consider whether a defendant has made a truthful admission to authorities of his involvement in the offense and related conduct. Thus, it was not error for the trial court to consider the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of defendant's statements to government officials under Section 3E1.1. 29 In this matter Restrepo made no statement to the arresting officers. During the booking procedures he identified himself as Ricardo Vargas and denied that his true name was Restrepo, until he was confronted with his driver's license. He pleaded not guilty and put the Government to its burden of proof at trial. Upon being informed that Restrepo intended to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the probation officer did not discuss the facts that led to Restrepo's arrest. 30 The Commentary to Section 3E1.1 states that the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. Restrepo stated to the probation officer that the court should give me what I deserve, because I have been convicted. This statement does not reflect an acceptance of responsibility. Instead, it is simply a realistic acknowledgment that he was convicted by the jury and will be punished by the court. 31 In a letter to the court, prior to the sentencing hearing, Restrepo stated [T]his act without a doubt has been the most shameful of my life. During the allocution, Restrepo apologized to the people of the United States for the wrong I may have caused. Restrepo also told the court [i]t's the first time that I've committed an offense of this magnitude. The district court was free to discount Restrepo's belated expression of remorse and repentance. The district court's determination that Restrepo's conduct did not demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility by his post-conviction statements is not clearly erroneous.