Opinion ID: 2338798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did reversible prosecutorial misconduct occur?

Text: [¶ 50] In her fourth issue, Ms. Benjamin complains of several instances of alleged misconduct on the part of the prosecution at trial. Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and `hinge on whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair trial.' Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 39, 228 P.3d 874, 887 (Wyo. 2010), quoting Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 2000). Two of the asserted instances of prosecutorial misconduct were objected to at trial, and we will review them by applying a harmless error standard. Harris v. State, 2008 WY 23, ¶ 12, 177 P.3d 1166, 1170 (Wyo. 2008). The instances not objected to will be reviewed for plain error. Schreibvogel, ¶ 39, 228 P.3d at 887. [¶ 51] The first instance of asserted misconduct occurred during voir dire. Ms. Benjamin contends that the prosecutor made improper comments about the personal background of the assistant prosecutor. The prosecutor called his co-counsel a carpet bagger from Chicago, said that he was a graduate of the University of Wyoming and had spent four years as a prosecutor in Rock Springs. Defense counsel objected to these comments. The district court sustained the objection, reminding the prosecutor that it was not appropriate to pass out the resume. [¶ 52] Ms. Benjamin points out that W.R.Cr.P. 24(c)(2) prohibits comment on the personal lives of the attorneys involved in a case. We have previously stated, however, that [T]he limitations placed on voir dire by the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure are flexible, and purposely so, so as to allow the trial court discretion in that important process. Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, ¶ 33, 100 P.3d 1270, 1286 (Wyo. 2004). Although the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection, the preference for flexibility in the voir dire process nonetheless guides our review on appeal. The prosecutor's comment that the assistant was a carpet bagger was plainly an attempt at humor rather than a reference to his personal life. In context, the comments were a preface to questions about whether anyone on the jury panel would hold against the State anything that the two prosecutors may have done in their various jobs. Considering this context, the information imparted by the prosecutor could be deemed useful in discovering any bias that the jurors may have had. Accordingly, given that the trial court's discretion is justified with this objective in mind, we cannot say that the comments amounted to misconduct. Even if the comment could be considered improper, Ms. Benjamin has not articulated how it was harmful to her. Indeed, as the comment was meant to reflect negatively on the assistant prosecutor, we cannot perceive that it was prejudicial to Ms. Benjamin. [¶ 53] The second instance also occurred during voir dire. Ms. Benjamin asserts that the prosecutor made an improper statement about her defense counsel: [Prosecutor]: Okay. Picking a jury is never easy. There is always somebody that you look out there and you say darn, I should know that person and there is a story behind it. You look familiar. Do I know you? And the lady answers, yes, I know you. I have known you since you were a young boy. And you say, well, what do you know of me? Well, I know you drink too much, you cheat on your wife, you are generally no good, and I would not believe anything you said. Dang, I shouldn't have asked that question. Well, do you know the defense attorney? Yes, I have known him since he was a young boy. What do you think of him? Well, he cheated his way through school, he drinks too much, he has a gambling problem, and I would not believe a word he has to say. [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, these kind of jokes have no purpose in voir dire at all and they are improper. THE COURT: Sustained. Please proceed. [¶ 54] Ms. Benjamin cites authority from several other jurisdictions that disparaging remarks directed toward defense counsel have no place in a courtroom, and clearly constitute misconduct. We may be willing to apply this rule in Wyoming as well, but contrary to Ms. Benjamin's claim, these comments cannot reasonably be interpreted as an insult to defense counsel. Even in his objection, defense counsel referred to the comments as jokes. The prosecutor did not seriously contend that defense counsel had cheated in school or drank too much, any more than he meant to indicate that he himself had cheated on his wife or lacked credibility. Read in context, the comments appear to be part of an effort to put prospective jurors at ease about revealing information they might know about the parties, the witnesses, or the attorneys. Such jokes may or may not be an effective voir dire technique, but we cannot say that they constituted prosecutorial misconduct. [¶ 55] Third, Ms. Benjamin objects to remarks made during the prosecutor's opening statement. After telling the jury it would hear evidence that Mr. Benjamin was mean and a drunkard, the prosecutor continued, You will also hear that he was somebody's son, somebody's brother, four kids' father, a good worker, a good friend. Somebody that would help people. Ms. Benjamin did not object below, but now contends that these comments were improper references to victim impact. Reviewing for plain error, we note that the record is clear as to what the prosecutor said. We turn then to the second and third prongs of the analysis, determining whether a clear rule of law was violated and whether a substantial right has been denied causing material prejudice to the defendant. We note that the defendant bears the burden of proving prejudice. Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 10, 169 P.3d 512, 520 (Wyo. 2007). [¶ 56] The prosecutor stated that Mr. Benjamin was a son, brother, and father. These were facts supported by the evidence and, moreover, did not indicate anything about the impact of Mr. Benjamin's death on his relatives. The prosecutor also asserted that Mr. Benjamin was a good worker and good friend. This similarly indicated nothing about the impact of his death on his co-workers or friends. Ms. Benjamin does not cite to any authority supporting her conclusion that the statements amounted to victim impact testimony. In consideration of Ms. Benjamin's failure to provide any authority by which we can compare the prosecutor's statements to victim impact testimony, we turn to our general definition of victim impact evidence: Broadly speaking, victim impact evidence is that evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and to the physical, emotional, or social impact of a crime on its victim and the victim's family. Sweet v. State, 2010 WY 87, ¶ 41, 234 P.3d 1193, 1207 (Wyo. 2010). The statements made by the prosecutor simply did not address the physical, emotional, or social impact of the crime, and the statements did not create any inferences that could not otherwise have been drawn from the mere fact of the victim's death. Further, because there was no suggestion of victim impact in these statements, we do not perceive how they could have prejudiced Ms. Benjamin. Indeed, Ms. Benjamin concedes that Standing alone, these comments might be held to be harmless, but she states that when these comments are added to statements made during closing arguments, she was denied her right to a fair trial. [4] In recognition of the rule that allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are examined with reference to the entire record, Mazurek, 10 P.3d at 542, we acknowledge that our review should encompass the cumulative effect of the alleged instances of misconduct. But our review of the total effect of such instances does not warrant acceptance of conclusory allegations regarding individual incidents where there has been no attempt to demonstrate prejudice. We conclude that the comments did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct, and that Ms. Benjamin has not met her burden of proving that prejudice resulted from the statements. We find no reversible error in the prosecutor's opening statement. [¶ 57] Fourth, Ms. Benjamin cites several instances in the prosecutor's closing argument in which he reminded the jury that it would never hear Mr. Benjamin's side of the story. Again, in the absence of an objection below, we review for plain error. To support her claim that such remarks were improper, Ms. Benjamin cites a Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Beavers, 492 Pa. 522, 424 A.2d 1313, 1315 (1981). This case indicates that a prosecutor may not tell the jury what he believes a victim would have testified if he were still alive. However, the prosecutor here told the jury only that Mr. Benjamin was not there to testify. He did not suggest how Mr. Benjamin might have testified if he were still alive. Once again, Ms. Benjamin provides no authority, and presents no clear and unequivocal rule of law, to support an assertion that it is improper to tell the jury that it will not hear the victim's side of the story. Additionally, Ms. Benjamin does not argue that she was prejudiced by this statement, other than to assert that the prosecutor improperly interjected this issue into the minds and deliberations of the jury. We fail to see how raising the fact of the victim's death resulted in undue prejudice to Ms. Benjamin, and, as a result, do not find plain error. [¶ 58] Fifth, Ms. Benjamin complains that the prosecutor speculated and created scenarios that were unsupported by any evidence. In particular, she complains that the prosecutor presented a version of the shooting in which Mr. Benjamin, not Ms. Benjamin, had gone back to use the bathroom, and Ms. Benjamin followed him and got the gun, and Mr. Benjamin turned around and she was there with the gun. She also objects to the prosecutor's argument that Ms. Benjamin removed her bloody clothes, then put them back on before turning herself in at the police station. In both instances, Ms. Benjamin asserts that these arguments lack any factual support. In both instances, no objection was made below, and we will review for plain error. [¶ 59] We agree with Ms. Benjamin's contention that closing arguments must be based on the evidence admitted at trial. Wide latitude is allowed in discussing inferences to be drawn from the evidence. However, prosecutors must limit their closing arguments to commenting on the evidence. Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 22, 100 P.3d 386, 392 (Wyo. 2004). To the extent that [a prosecutor's] observation is not reflected by the evidence, it was an improper comment. Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Wyo. 1978). We disagree, however, with Ms. Benjamin that the prosecutor's arguments in this case lacked factual support. [¶ 60] To analyze the prosecutor's remarks, we find it helpful to consider the full text of the argument rather than a characterization of it. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated as follows: [Ms. Benjamin] will also tell you that she left the argument and went back to the bathroom. Let[']s talk about that bathroom a little bit. Thirty inches between the shower door and the front of the stool. This door you have seen in the pictures. You will have the pictures. Originally the thought was maybe they are both in there. How didWhere was [Ms. Benjamin] positioned and where was the victim's position? Because if [Ms. Benjamin] was in here, then the victim would have to crowd in here, maybe here, get his feet positioned and then push her into the shower door. Or if [she] is out here, then somehow she would have to get pushed, make several steps back into the shower door and bang into it but not so hard that she would be flying through or fall inside of the shower, but hard enough to break it and somehow injure her right arm in the process. Or, if [Mr. Benjamin] went back to that bathroom and was using the restroom and then turned around and [Ms. Benjamin] had a gun, I submit to you that makes more sense. There is no way there is a pushing and shoving match in here and the shower door got broke, and [Ms. Benjamin] tells you that she pushed past, somehow, [Mr. Benjamin] and traveled over here, this twenty some feet, recovered a gun from under the bed there and came back, stood about here, that she had a conversation or exchanged words with the victim and then she shot him after he charged [her]. Ask yourself when you are judging the possibility of that story, why would the victim be standing in that bathroom[?] The only explanation [Ms. Benjamin] was able to give you was that he was looking at the glass, at the broken door, but if the door was not broken until he was shot, why is he standing around looking at it, maybe while she travels these forty feet round trip and shows up with a gun? And then if he is pushing her, how does she get out of there? If there is really a fight going on, or a push, she says, I am out of here, and he stands around in the bathroom and waits and she gets the gun and comes back and says, get out of here. The physical evidence at the scene does not support the testimony of [Ms. Benjamin]. The prior story of [Ms. Benjamin] doesn't support the physical evidence. Sometime during the next twenty-four hours, or the next fifteen hours, rather, [Ms. Benjamin] leaves the scene at least once to go to the police station. We know that. She does not remember if she sent anotherShe sent a text saying I am in town, but she does not recall if she did that. She texts. She calls folks. She leaves this note, death leaves a heartache no one can heal text message. She does some tidying up around the scene, and never does she call the authorities until she goes in at 4:20 in the morning. If she did leave the scene before thatI submit to you that you will see a photograph of her clothing setting on the vanity there in the bathroom. On top of that clothing is the cosmetic bag. Stuffed inside of the cosmetic bag is the note that is Exhibit 27 that is saying that I killed [Mr. Benjamin]. This was found crumpled up inside of the bag. I submit to you that she put clothes on and left the scene and came to town. She decided she could not turn herself in, and we will never know that, and went back home, and before 4:30 a.m., replaced the bloody clothes on her person. Why would she say that she did not have blood on my underwear? Did you have blood on you? I don't know, all I had was the socks and underwear. Question, well, it soaked through, right? Answer, well, they did not take those. They did not take my socks. Then she also says to Officer Simeral, I have blood on my clothes. I did not even change or anything. Look at that photograph. Think about the testimony. Draw the reasonable inferences that you can from the facts of the case. She was prepared with the note. She was prepared to provide her story. Remember when she told Officer SimeralI asked, was that a response to a question, and he said, no, she just stated that. He shoved me into the shower. She had that statement prepared for him. (Emphasis added.) [¶ 61] As discussed earlier, Ms. Benjamin provided the only eye-witness testimony about the shooting incident. The prosecutor's argument did postulate a scenario somewhat different from Ms. Benjamin's testimony, but as also discussed earlier, Ms. Benjamin's testimony was not entirely consistent with some of the physical evidence. Of particular significance here, she testified that the shower door broke when Mr. Benjamin pushed her into it, while forensic evidence indicated that the door was shattered by a bullet. This provided a factual basis for the prosecutor to question Ms. Benjamin's testimony that Mr. Benjamin was standing in the bathroom looking at the broken shower door before any shot was fired. This was a sufficient basis for the prosecutor to posit that Mr. Benjamin had been in the bathroom when Ms. Benjamin followed him with the pistol. Given that the physical evidence contradicted Ms. Benjamin's testimony on multiple points, and that a prosecutor is allowed wide latitude in discussing inferences drawn from the record, we conclude that the prosecutor's argument violated no clear and unequivocal rule of law. [¶ 62] With regard to the bloody clothing, when Ms. Benjamin turned herself in at the police station, there was a significant amount of blood on Ms. Benjamin's clothing, but none on her underwear. This provided a factual basis from which the prosecutor could properly draw an inference that Ms. Benjamin had removed her bloody clothing, including the underwear, then put the clothing back on over clean underwear. The prosecutor's argument was sufficiently based on the trial evidence, and did not constitute plain error. [¶ 63] Finally, Ms. Benjamin objects to the prosecutor's characterization of Battered Woman's Syndrome: I think that folks have a general common sense idea of what a domestic violence cycle or domestic violence pattern relationship is. The idea is that the abuser is in constant control of the victim of that violence. The abuser lives with them, of course. Sometimes imprisons them and does not let them out of the house. The abuser controls their every movement.... The abuser may control and beat them and then reconcile. You heard that testimony from the expert, there is reconciliation and the honeymoon to draw the victim back in there, and then the abuse begins anew and it is worse than before. The victim of that kind of abuse has this learned helplessness. You heard about that. They are so downtrodden and beat down and broke that they cannot help themselves, that they cower in the face of these situations and cannot do anything. The prosecutor further asserted that Ms. Benjamin was not under Mr. Benjamin's control, as they had separated and were living apart. He asserted that she was not downtrodden and broken, but to the contrary, she was often the aggressor in confrontations with Mr. Benjamin. In sum, the prosecutor argued that Ms. Benjamin's characteristics did not match those of someone suffering from Battered Woman's Syndrome. [¶ 64] Ms. Benjamin claims that this characterization of Battered Woman's Syndrome was not supported by any evidence. Our review of the record, however, reveals testimony about the extent of control an abuser exerts over a battered woman. There was evidence about cycles of reconciliation followed by renewed violence. Ms. Benjamin's social worker and a psychologist gave testimony relating to the cycle of violence associated with Battered Woman's Syndrome, including the extent to which an abuser may control the victim. Specifically, there was testimony that the relationship is often marked by a honeymoon period, after which the cycle will start over again, many times involving escalating acts of violence. There was also evidence that individuals suffering from Battered Woman's Syndrome often respond to events with strong feelings of fear and helplessness. The psychologist testified that there is almost always in Battered Woman's Syndrome really low self-esteem of a victim and the traumatic bonding between the victim and the perpetrator. The traumatic bonding is that[i]t is really difficult to understand for most of us but the more violence there is, the stronger the attachment is between the two people. Further, Ms. Benjamin's social worker testified that a common feature of Battered Woman's Syndrome is an imbalance of power between the captive and caregiver, a statement invoking an implication of forced confinement or subjugation. In light of this testimony, we find adequate evidence to support the prosecutor's arguments. [¶ 65] We do not conclude that the prosecutor misstated the evidence. Rather, he sought to convey the evidence using descriptive language that was not specifically used by the witnesses, but that may fairly be inferred from their testimony. We also find no showing by Ms. Benjamin that she suffered prejudice from the prosecutor's arguments. Accordingly, she has not demonstrated any prejudicial misconduct. [¶ 66] Individually and collectively, the instances pointed out by Ms. Benjamin do not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.