Opinion ID: 795993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 30 Firishchak next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the district court's findings. Because the right to acquire American citizenship is a precious one, the government carries a heavy burden of proof when attempting to divest a naturalized citizen of his citizenship. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505, 101 S.Ct. 737, 66 L.Ed.2d 686 (1981); Naujalis v. INS, 240 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir.2001). The evidence justifying revocation of citizenship must be clear, unequivocal and convincing, not leaving the issue in doubt. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505, 101 S.Ct. 737. Even though the government's burden at trial is heavy, this Court reviews the trial court's findings of fact under a deferential clearly erroneous standard. Spurgin-Dienst v. United States, 359 F.3d 451, 453 (7th Cir.2004). We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo. Id. In this case, the district court derived many of its findings of fact and conclusions of law from pre-trial stipulations. Ordinarily, stipulations of fact will obviate the need for appellate review of factual findings. TMF Tool Co. v. Siebengartner, 899 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir.1990). This Court will, however, review findings derived from stipulated facts for clear error. Id. In other words, where the district court adopts a stipulated fact wholesale, it is binding on the parties and thus waived, but where the court makes inferences or derives factual findings from other stipulated facts, the clear error standard of review applies.
31 As mentioned above, whether Firishchak was a member of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police is the linchpin of this case because he stipulated to nearly all other relevant facts. Firishchak contends that the government failed to prove his membership in the UAP by clear and convincing evidence. Firishchak's argument relies heavily on two facts: 1) that he denied UAP membership at all relevant times and 2) that the government produced no evidence from anyone with personal knowledge that Firishchak performed the duties of the UAP. The United States argues that testimony from people with personal knowledge is unnecessary, and cites cases in which citizens were denaturalized based on documentary evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Tittjung, 753 F.Supp. 251 (E.D.Wis.1990); United States v. Baumann, 764 F.Supp. 1335 (E.D.Wis.1991). 32 Without deciding whether documentary evidence alone is enough to revoke citizenship, we note that the district court based its decision on more than the twenty-one wartime documents. In addition to those documents, the district court based its findings on Firishchak's own testimony and admissions. Firishchak identified seven signatures from UAP documents as his own, and the district court's credibility determination that Firishchak was lying on the stand permitted it to conclude that the documents linking Firishchak to UAP service were accurate. Consequently, the evidence demonstrating Firishchak's UAP membership was sufficient to support the trial court's factual finding.
33 Firishchak next questions the district court's conclusion that he assisted in the persecution of civil populations, which would have rendered him ineligible for a visa under § 2(b) of the DPA. Because of numerous pre-trial stipulations, which he did not mention in his brief, Firishchak is bound by the facts leading to the trial court's conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 94 F.3d 346, 349 (7th Cir.1996) (stipulating to conduct waives any claim that a defendant has not engaged in that conduct); Soo Line R.R. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir.1997) (stipulations are binding upon the party making them). Firishchak stipulated, for one, that the UAP enforced persecutory measures against Jews. Pre-trial Order at 5. He also stipulated that the UAP assisted in checking the identification of Jews and arresting them for violating various rules. Id. In fact, Firishchak specifically stipulated that if he performed the routine duties of a Ukrainian Auxiliary policeman, he assisted in the persecution of civil populations. 34 Although we are not bound by stipulations to legal conclusions, Saviano v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 765 F.2d 643, 645 (7th Cir.1985), in determining whether conduct amounted to assistance in persecution, the district court's application of the law to the facts of the case is reviewed deferentially. See United States v. Mankiewicz, 122 F.3d 399, 403 n. 1 (7th Cir.1997). The district court relied on the pre-trial stipulations and Dr. Pohl's testimony regarding the role of the UAP in the District Galicia to conclude that Firishchak assisted in persecution. This conclusion was within the court's discretion since it had already found that Firishchak was a member of the UAP and that finding was not erroneous. 35 Firishchak also claims that the DPA requires evidence that he committed a particular atrocity or persecutory act in order to render him ineligible for a visa. However, personal involvement in atrocities need not be proven. See, e.g., Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 510 n. 32, 101 S.Ct. 737; United States v. Ciurinskas, 148 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir.1998). Firishchak's attempt to distinguish these cases by pointing out immaterial factual differences is unconvincing. Moreover, his own pre-trial stipulations waive any argument that specific acts need to be proven. NLRB v. PIE Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 892 (7th Cir.1990) (noting that a party's stipulation can waive legal arguments). 36
37 Firishchak next contends that the government failed to prove that he served in a movement hostile to the United States, which would render him ineligible for a visa under § 13 of the DPA. Again, Firishchak stipulated to this legal conclusion, so he waived the issue. PIE Nationwide, 894 F.2d at 892. Even if the argument had not been waived, courts considering the issue have held that service in a Nazi-sponsored police unit constitutes membership in a hostile movement under the DPA. United States v. Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir.1985) (holding that UAP service amounts to membership in a hostile movement); United States v. Koziy, 540 F.Supp. 25, 34 (S.D.Fla.1982) (same); United States v. Osidach, 513 F.Supp. 51 (E.D.Pa.1981) (same). 38 Firishchak relies on United States v. Kwoczak, 210 F.Supp.2d 638, 652-53 (E.D.Pa.2002), to argue that his UAP membership did not disqualify him under the DPA because the UAP was not named in a list of organizations considered hostile under the DPA (the Inimical List). Although Kwoczak initially held that ineligibility under § 13 of the DPA was limited to members of groups on the Inimical List, the court issued an amended opinion holding that inclusion on the list was not a prerequisite to disqualification. United States v. Kwoczak, No. Civ.A. 97-5632, 2002 WL 32137688, at -3 (E.D.Pa.2002). Moreover, Mario DeCapua, former head of the Displaced Persons Commission Security Investigations Division, testified that the Inimical List was not exhaustive, and membership in an organization that did not appear on the list could be disqualifying under the DPA, depending on the nature of the group's activities. Given the trial court's findings regarding the activities of the UAP, its conclusion that Firishchak participated in an organization hostile to the United States was proper. 39
40 Firishchak next argues that the government failed to prove that he willfully misrepresented material facts in order to gain admission into the United States. Such misrepresentations would render him ineligible for admission under § 10 of the DPA. Again, this argument was waived. PIE Nationwide, 894 F.2d at 892. The parties stipulated that Firishchak's wartime activities, including his alleged membership in the UAP, were material facts, and the trial court agreed. A misrepresentation is material under the DPA if it has a natural tendency to affect the decision of the Displaced Persons Commission regarding visa eligibility. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988). 41 Even if this argument were not waived, Firishchak could not prevail. In his visa application, Firishchak told immigration officials that he was a laborer for a Ukrainian cooperative in L'viv from December 1941 to April 1944. However, the trial court found that he was serving in the UAP during this time. This inconsistency demonstrates that Firishchak misrepresented his wartime activities, and the truth would have influenced his visa eligibility. Though Firishchak suggests that UAP service is not a material fact, two trial witnesses testified to the contrary. First, Everett Coe, the vice consul who processed Firishchak's visa application, stated that he would not have issued Firishchak a visa had Firishchak truthfully disclosed his wartime activities. Second, Mario DeCapua testified that the Commission routinely rejected the applications of persons known to have served in Nazi-directed police forces. Given these facts, the district court properly concluded that Firishchak made material misrepresentations during the visa application process. 42
43 Finally, Firishchak contends that the government failed to prove that he advocated or acquiesced in activities or conduct contrary to civilization and human decency on behalf of the Axis countries during WWII. Such conduct would have rendered him ineligible for a visa under state department regulations at the time of his application. 22 C.F.R. § 53.33(j) (1949). Again, this argument is subject to the same waiver analysis, given that Firishchak stipulated that UAP service constituted conduct contrary to civilization and human decency. PIE Nationwide, 894 F.2d at 892. Further, given the facts established at trial, the district court properly concluded that Firishchak's UAP service constituted conduct contrary to human decency.