Opinion ID: 779439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: What the Sentencing Court Did

Text: 40 As discussed above, during the sentencing hearing Ruggiano's attorney asked the court to sentence Ruggiano concurrently with his state sentence and reminded the court that it had the authority to do so under U.S.S.G. § 5G. Minutes later, Ruggiano's attorney again requested that the court consider ruling that [the federal] sentence be concurrent with the state sentence under 5G and —, upon which the court interrupted: 41 It doesn't sound as if he has much to go on the state sentence. But I think it makes sense to go ahead and recommend that it be served concurrently and that he receive credit for the amount of time that he has served there. 42 [A43.] That same day, the court entered its written judgment, which stated: 43 The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 112 months. Sentence imposed to run concurrent with State sentence. Defendant to receive credit for time served. 44 [A47.] 45 Ruggiano contends that the court's oral and written sentence indicate that his total sentence was to be adjusted so as to account for time served on his state conviction. In other words, Ruggiano submits, his final sentence was intended to be and hence was 112 months minus the 14 months served on his state conviction, totaling 98 months. The BOP counters that even if a sentencing court has the authority to adjust for time served under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), the sentencing court here did not in fact do so for three reasons. First, the BOP contends that the sentencing court had no authority to grant the defendant credit for time served, because only the BOP, under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), and not the sentencing court, has the authority to award credit to inmates when calculating their sentence. Second, and relatedly, the BOP contends that the sentencing court's oral sentence — particularly its use of the word recommend — indicates that the court was imposing only a nonbinding recommendation on the BOP that it was free to ignore in calculating Ruggiano's sentence. Finally, and also relatedly, the BOP avers that under Eleventh Circuit law, which is the jurisdiction in which the sentencing court — the District Court for the Southern District of Florida — is located, awarding credit for time served on a state conviction is not allowed. Hence, the BOP argues, we cannot infer that the sentencing court intended to award such credit when doing so would have been in violation of the controlling Eleventh Circuit authority on the subject. We address each of the BOP's contentions, in turn.
46 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), entitled Credit for prior custody, states: A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences — 47 (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or 48 (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; 49 that has not been credited against another sentence. 50 As we have noted previously, § 3585(b) uses the term credit as a term of art. See Rios, 201 F.3d at 269. This type of credit, awarded for time served in detention for the same offense for which the defendant is ultimately sentenced, may only be calculated by the BOP. The sentencing (district) court has no authority to award credit as that term is used in § 3585(b). United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992). 51 The type of credit awarded by the sentencing court to Ruggiano, however, was completely different from the type of credit discussed in § 3585(b). While the latter is within the exclusive authority of the BOP to award, credit for time served on a pre-existing state sentence is within the exclusive power of the sentencing court. Indeed, as quoted above, § 3585(b) specifically prohibits the BOP from awarding credit for time that has been credited against another sentence. As was ably explained by our colleague Judge Stapleton in his concurring opinion in United States v. Dorsey, 166 F.3d 558 (1999): 52 [M]uch of th[is] conflict ... is attributable to [the] use of the word credit to refer to two distinct benefits that a convicted defendant may receive[:] 53 [1.] A sentencing judge is charged with determining the length of any sentence of incarceration to be served. In the course of doing so, it may impose a lesser sentence than it otherwise would have because of any number of relevant factors in the case. 54 [2.] After a defendant has been sentenced to a term of incarceration, the custodian must determine when the sentence imposed will have been satisfied. In the course of doing so, the custodian may give credit against the sentence for such things as presentence detention, good behavior, etc. 55 Id. at 564. 56 The BOP argues that even if credit can be used to refer to two distinct benefits, one which is within the sentencing court's authority and one which is not, it was the second of the two benefits described by Judge Stapleton to which the sentencing court was referring when it sentenced Ruggiano. We find this argument implausible in light of the fact that the court's oral sentence granted the credit immediately after referring to Ruggiano's state sentence: 57 It doesn't sound as if he has much time to go on the state sentence. But I think it makes sense to go ahead and recommend that ... he receive credit for the amount of time that he has served there. 58 The written sentence evinces a similar intent when it states, Sentence imposed to run concurrent with State sentence. Defendant to receive credit for time served. 59 It is clear to us, therefore, that the sentencing court intended to award Ruggiano the first of the two benefits described by Judge Stapleton, which was well within its authority, and not credit as that term is used in § 3585(b), for, as we noted in Rios, the mere fact that an application of section 5G1.3(b) or (c) and the commentary by the sentencing court, and the award of sentencing credit by the BOP under section 3585(b), may result in the same benefit to the defendant ... does not alter the fact that the two benefits bestowed are distinct, and the Supreme Court's opinion in Wilson only meant to refer to the award of sentencing credit under section 3585(b) when it determined that the power to award that credit was entrusted exclusively to the BOP. 201 F.3d at 270. All that happened here is that, just as in Rios and Dorsey, the sentencing court simply used th[e] term [`credit'] slightly imprecisely, which ... cannot be considered an unprecedented occurrence. Id. at 269. 60 While we think that the sentencing court's intentions were clear enough, we encourage sentencing courts in the future to avoid using the term credit to refer to § 5G1.3 adjustments so as not to engender any unnecessary confusion. We admit that our court has not always been consistent in how we have referred to § 5G1.3 adjustments. In Brannan, 74 F.3d at 454, we termed the recognition of time served on a state sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3 a downward departure, while noting that using the term departure in this sense var[ied] slightly from the concept [of `departure'] elsewhere in the Guidelines, id. at 452 n. 6. However, in Dorsey, 166 F.3d at 560, we appeared to refer to § 5G1.3 departures as credits (which is what prompted Judge Stapleton to write his aforementioned concurrence); and later, in Rios. (2000), we dubbed a § 5G1.3 departure an adjustment. 201 F.3d at 266. 61 Because the term departure is, as we acknowledged in Brannan, imprecise, and because the term credit raises the confusion with § 3585(b) described above, we prefer the term adjustment to describe the kind of benefit being awarded a defendant by a sentencing court under § 5G1.3. See United States v. Zapata, 1996 WL 673866, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 30301 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1996) (not precedential) (In general, courts do not have authority to calculate credits, ... [but] the district court can make an adjustment to the second sentence in order to assure that it is fully concurrent with the first one.) (emphasis added). We therefore urge sentencing courts in the future to state something to the effect of I hereby adjust the defendant's federal sentence under § 5G1.3(c) so as to be fully concurrent with his state sentence, in order to avoid much of the confusion that this case, and many others, have presented.
62 The BOP also asserts that even if the sentencing court did not intend to award Ruggiano a credit as that term is used in § 3585(b), it nevertheless only issued a nonbinding recommendation that Ruggiano's sentence be adjusted downward for time served on his state conviction, a recommendation that the BOP was free to ignore. We disagree. In interpreting a sentencing court's statements, we inspect[] ... the sentencing transcript as well as the judgment the sentencing court entered. Rios, 201 F.3d at 265. When a sentencing court's oral sentence and its written sentence are in conflict, the oral sentence prevails. United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir.2000). However, when there is no conflict between the oral and written statements, but rather only ambiguity in either or both, we have recognized that the controlling oral sentence often [consists of] spontaneous remarks that are addressed primarily to the case at hand and are unlikely to be a perfect or complete statement of all the surrounding law. Rios, 201 F.3d at 268 (citation omitted). 63 In interpreting the oral statement, we have recognized that the context in which this statement is made is essential. For instance, in Rios, we were called upon to interpret a sentencing court's oral statement sentencing the defendant to a term of 90 months on both counts to run concurrently with each other and concurrently with the state sentence and that you receive credit for time served. Id. at 261. There, as here, the BOP contended that the sentencing court's provision for credit for time served was mere surplusage and nonbinding. See id. at 269. In concluding otherwise, we emphasized the need to view the sentencing court's language in the context of the overall proceeding, id., taking particular note of the fact that the defendant had, during the sentencing hearing, specifically asked the court to adjust his sentence downward for time served on a pre-existing state conviction. See id. at 267 (noting that [t]he juxtaposition of the actual words used in pronouncing the sentence and the discussion between the attorneys on the one hand and the court on the other demonstrates that the sentencing court was cognizant of the time Rios had spent in pre-sentence incarceration, and further that Rios sought consideration for that time from the court in its determination of the sentence to be imposed). 64 Applying a similar method of analysis here, we think it clear that by its statements — both oral and written — the sentencing court intended to adjust downward for the time served on Ruggiano's New York sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3(c) and to make this adjustment binding on the BOP as part of Ruggiano's final sentence. The mere fact that the sentencing court did not refer to § 5G1.3(c) specifically in its sentence does not dissuade us from our conclusion, for, as we noted in Rios, 201 F.3d at 268, it is not necessary for the court [to] state explicitly its reliance on section 5G1.3(c) and Application Note 3 when the overall context in which the court imposed the sentence and the information before the court at that time — here, Ruggiano's attorney had twice specifically requested that this [the federal] sentence be concurrent with the state sentence under 5G — makes clear that the court was indeed relying on this provision. 65 Nor are we persuaded by the BOP's emphasis on the sentencing court's use of the word recommend. In stating, I think it makes sense to go ahead and recommend that [Ruggiano's sentence] be served concurrently and that he receive credit for the amount of time served there [on his state sentence], the sentencing court merely indicated its intent to go ahead and adjust the sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3(c). This, as we see it, is in fact what the court did, as evidenced by its written statement to that effect — Sentence imposed to run concurrent with State sentence. Defendant to receive credit for time served. We see no conflict between the oral and written statements, but rather consistency; the sentencing judge said that he was going to go ahead and adjust, and that is precisely what he did. 66 At most the oral sentence might be viewed as ambiguous, but as we stated in Rios: 67 District judges normally deliver their decisions on sentencing from the bench, just after, and sometimes in the course of, the presentation of numerous arguments and even evidence as to the permissible range and proper sentence. These often spontaneous remarks are addressed primarily to the case at hand and are unlikely to be a perfect or complete statement of all of the surrounding law. 68 201 F.3d at 268. It is therefore understandable that Judge Roettger's use of the word recommend was less than opportune. The mere fact that he may have been somewhat loose in his language pronouncing the sentence, however, does not persuade us that he intended to issue only a nonbinding recommendation to the BOP when the written judgment — which merely clarifies, and is not in conflict with, the oral sentence — as well as the context in which the judge's remarks were made demonstrate otherwise. 69 Moreover, the BOP, in arguing that the sentencing judge intended through his nonbinding recommendation to grant to the BOP the power and discretion to adjust Ruggiano's sentence for time served on his state conviction, would have us believe that the sentencing judge gave the BOP power which it is statutorily prohibited from exercising, for as we noted above, see supra at 132, adjusting a sentence for time served on a state conviction pursuant to § 5G1.3 is within the exclusive authority of the sentencing court. Adjustments for time served on an unrelated state conviction are outside the purview of the BOP's powers to grant credit, which are limited to matters such as time served in detention related to the instant offense, good behavior, etc. We decline to attribute to as capable and experienced a jurist as Judge Roettger an ineffective pronouncement that would amount to nothing more than surplusage. 6
70 Finally, the BOP contends that because Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence, which was the controlling legal authority for the sentencing court, does not permit adjustments for time served on a state conviction under § 5G1.3(c), we ought to assume that the sentencing court was following this precedent and did not intend to award Ruggiano an adjustment that is impermissible under Eleventh Circuit law. We decline to view the sentencing court's statements solely in the context of Eleventh Circuit law, for while such an exercise is arguably relevant to discerning the court's true intent in issuing its sentence, we think that, for the reasons stated above, the sentencing court clearly indicated its intention to adjust Ruggiano's sentence for the time served on his state conviction, and it is therefore unnecessary to explore Eleventh Circuit law on the matter. Moreover, if the government is correct in its assertion that the court's sentence contravened Eleventh Circuit law, it should have appealed the sentence directly to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 7 71 Even were we to import Eleventh Circuit law, however, it is, as far as we can tell, inconclusive on the issue of whether a sentencing court may adjust for time served on a pre-existing state sentence under § 5G1.3(c). Unlike the Second Circuit in Fermin, which we discuss supra, the Eleventh Circuit has not definitively declared that adjustments for pre-existing sentences are not permitted under § 5G1.3(c). 72 The only supporting cases the BOP cites are United States v. Johnson, 87 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.1996), and United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir.1993), neither of which, the BOP concedes, necessarily shows that adjustments for pre-existing sentences under § 5G1.3(c) are prohibited, but rather only that they are not prefer[red]. Br. of BOP at 31-32; see also Br. of BOP at 37 (noting that Johnson only suggests that such adjustments are not authorized). In Johnson, the defendant argued that the sentencing court should have granted him credit for time served on his state sentence. In just one paragraph that lacked any thorough analysis, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument by noting that the sentencing court did not shirk its responsibilities under § 5G1.3(c) by refusing to grant credit. The Johnson Court never stated, however, that the sentencing court would have been prohibited from adjusting for time served on a pre-existing state sentence under § 5G1.3(c). It simply was satisfied that in the case before it, no such adjustment was required. While the Eleventh Circuit to our knowledge has never explicitly authorized such adjustments, we hardly read Johnson as prohibiting them altogether. At best for the BOP, Eleventh Circuit law is inconclusive on this point, which only increases our hesitation to import it for purposes of construing what the sentencing court intended here. 8