Opinion ID: 2494456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Powell Case and the Miranda Warning Administered Therein

Text: Because this Court in Rigterink I relied on Powell I, a brief discussion of the Powell case, and the Miranda warning given by police to the defendant in that case, is helpful. In Powell, the police arrested the defendant for unlawful possession of a loaded firearm. See Powell II, 130 S.Ct. at 1200. The police transported the defendant to police headquarters where, before questioning him, they read their standard consent and release form, which provided: You have the right to remain silent. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost and before any questioning. You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview. See id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). After the police administered this Miranda warning, the defendant acknowledged that he had been informed of his rights, that he understood them, and that he was willing to talk with the officers. See id. The defendant then signed a consent and release form that contained the aforementioned Miranda warnings. See id. After providing his signature, he admitted ownership of the handgun found in the apartment and that he knew that he was prohibited from possessing a gun because he was a convicted felon. See id. The State charged the defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm. See id. Before trial, he moved to suppress the inculpatory statements he made to the police. See id. The defendant argued that the trial court should suppress the statements because the Miranda warning was deficient due to its failure to inform him of his right to the presence of counsel during questioning. See id. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted the defendant of the gun-possession charge. See id. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision. See id. In doing so, it held that the Miranda warning did not adequately inform the defendant that he had the right to counsel during the custodial interrogation. See id. This Court accepted review of that decision as a matter of great public importance. See id. In this Court's Powell decision, we noted the requirements of both the Fifth Amendment, as explained in Miranda, and the Florida Constitution, as explained in Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla.1992). See Powell I, 998 So.2d at 537-38. We held that our prior explanation in Traylor of the federal and state requirements included the requirement that a suspect be informed of the right to have counsel present during questioning. See id. at 538. After examining the content of the Miranda warning administered to the defendant, we found that the warning was misleading because there is nothing in that statement that suggests the attorney can be present during the actual questioning. Id. at 541. We further held that the last statement of the warningi.e., the catch-all phrasedid not effectively convey to the defendant that he had the right to counsel both before and during police questioning. See id. Instead, this court found that the defendant should have been clearly informed of his right to the presence of counsel during the custodial interrogation, and that the catch-all phrase did not supply the missing warning of the right to have counsel present during police questioning because a right that has never been expressed cannot be reiterated. Id. (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review of this Court's Powell decision. Before examining the sufficiency of the Miranda warning given in Powell I, the High Court examined whether this Court based its decision on an independent and adequate state-law ground. See Powell II, 130 S.Ct. at 1201. Although much of Powell I invok[ed] Florida's Constitution and precedent in addition to [the United States Supreme Court's] decisions, the United States Supreme Court concluded that Powell I was based on an interpretation of federal Miranda law and not on an independent and adequate state-law ground. Id. at 1202. It based its decision on the postulate that Powell I did not indicate[] clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds. Id. at 1203 (alteration in original) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)). The United States Supreme Court then reviewed the Miranda warning at issue under federal Miranda law. See id. at 1203. It held that Miranda requires that police advise a suspect that he has the right to counsel both before and during a custodial interrogation. See id. It stated, In determining whether police officers adequately conveyed warnings . . . reviewing courts are not required to examine the words employed `as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda. ' Id. at 1204 (alterations in original) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989)). The High Court then reasoned: The Florida Supreme Court found the warning misleading because it believed the temporal languagethat Powell could talk to a lawyer before answering any of [the officers'] questionssuggested Powell could consult with an attorney only before the interrogation started. In context, however, the term before merely conveyed when Powell's right to an attorney became effectivenamely, before he answered any questions at all. Nothing in the words used indicated that counsel's presence would be restricted after the questioning commenced. Instead, the warning communicated that the right to counsel carried forward to and through the interrogation: Powell could seek his attorney's advice before responding to  any of [the officers'] questions and  at any time . . . during th[e] interview. Although the warnings were not the clearest possible formulation of Miranda's right-to-counsel advisement, they were sufficiently comprehensive and comprehensible when given a commonsense reading. Id. at 1205 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court vacated this Court's decision in Powell I and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See id. at 1206. The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari review of this Court's decision in Rigterink I, vacated this Court's judgment in that case, and remanded for further consideration in light of its decision in Powell II. See Rigterink II, 130 S.Ct. at 1235.