Opinion ID: 1730477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 34

Heading: the trial court erred in limiting consideration of emotional disturbance mitigation to extreme emotional disturbance.

Text: Carr argues that because the extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigating factor was submitted to the jury, the jury's consideration of the evidence was unconstitutionally limited since they were not permitted to consider any emotional disturbance. The State contends that the list of mitigating factors given the jury was the defense's list, not the prosecution's. Therefore, the State concludes that Carr cannot at this stage complain of the mitigating circumstances submitted. Furthermore, the State argues that any deficiency inherent in the extreme emotional disturbance mitigator was cured with the jury's consideration of the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of law mitigator, as well as the catch-all mitigating factor of [a]ny circumstances or combination of circumstances surrounding the defendant's life and character which reasonably mitigates against imposition of the death penalty. Carr did in fact submit the list of mitigating factors to the court which were given to the jury for consideration. Furthermore, during closing argument in the sentencing phase, defense counsel referred specifically to that factor using the extreme language. The United States Constitution requires that the jury not be precluded from considering any aspect of a defendant's character or record or any circumstances of the offense as mitigating factors. Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 762 (Miss. 1991) ( citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990 (1978)). In Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984), this Court, faced with an impermissibly restrictive mitigating circumstance argument, stated that the jury should not be precluded from considering mitigating circumstances; however, the Court stated that there must be an evidentiary basis for a mitigating circumstance instruction. Id. at 760-761. Furthermore, the Court stated that the catch-all mitigating factor should be granted to avoid this claim of error in the future. Id. at 761, n. 11. The only evidence as to emotional disturbance presented at the sentencing hearing was the testimony of Dr. Kallman. He testified that it was his opinion that Carr had a serious underlying psychotic condition. Carr cites no binding authority for his position; however, he does quote from a Florida Supreme Court case considering the same mitigating factor. In Cheshire v. State, 568 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1990), the trial court overrode the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, and sentenced the defendant to death. The trial court found no mitigating factors, and three aggravating factors. The trial court concluded that emotional disturbance was not a mitigating factor because it failed to meet the statutory criterion of extreme. Id. at 910. The Florida Supreme Court stated that it would be clearly unconstitutional for the state to restrict consideration to only extreme emotional disturbances; any emotional disturbance relevant to the crime must be considered. Id. at 912. The case sub judice is distinguishable from Cheshire. First, this is not a case of the trial court's overriding a jury verdict to give a harsher sentence. Second, the jury instructions on mitigating factors, when read as a whole, provide ample opportunity for a jury to give consideration to any emotional disturbance Carr may have suffered. There was evidence that Carr was entitled to an emotional disturbance instruction. However, the catch-all mitigating factor, along with the extreme emotional disturbance, and capacity to appreciate criminality mitigating factors allowed the jury to consider any mitigating evidence. We find no error in this assignment.