Opinion ID: 50023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Parra’s sentence

Text: Finally, Parra argues that his sentence violates Booker, because it was enhanced based on his role in the offense and the drug quantity, which were not charged in the indictment, admitted by him, or proven to a jury. He asserts that the district court committed constitutional error when it enhanced his sentence based on its factual findings as to the drug amount and his role, and statutory error when it applied the guidelines in a mandatory fashion. He contends that the government 10 could not show that the errors were harmless, since the district court: (1) specifically noted that it was imposing the lowest possible sentence in the guideline range; (2) limited Parra’s sentences to concurrent, instead of consecutive, terms of incarceration; and (3) rejected the government’s request for an alternative sentence. Parra also contends that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence based on his leadership role in the offense, arguing that the evidence established that Orlando was the leader who organized the activities of the coconspirators and that his role was that of a person who ran errands and made deliveries for Orlando. He points out that Orlando recruited and advised Angel, organized Angel’s delivery of money to certain co-conspirators, provided Angel with cell phones, recruited Patricia, conducted the necessary transactions for the movement of the cocaine into the United States, overrode Parra’s decision to have Patricia move out of the stash house, conducted the leadership of the organization on the day of the seizure, sent Angel’s sister to visit him in prison to convey threats, and provided support for Angel’s family. a. Booker error Because Parra objected to his sentence based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed. 403 (2004), we review his sentence de novo in light of Booker. See United States v. Paz, 405 F.3d 946, 948 (11th Cir. 2005). 11 Under this standard, we will reverse only if any error was harmful. Id. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Supreme Court also held, in Blakely, that the imposition—based solely on the sentencing judge’s factual findings—of a sentencing enhancement violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because the facts supporting the findings neither were admitted by the defendant, nor found by a jury. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296-97, 124 S.Ct. at 2534-38. After Parra was sentenced and while his case was pending on direct appeal, the Supreme Court, in Booker, extended Blakely to the Sentencing Guidelines and held that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines rendered them incompatible with the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a right to a jury trial. Booker, 543 U.S. at 231-36 , 125 S.Ct. at 749-51. The Court ruled that sentencing courts nevertheless must consider the Guidelines together with the factors set forth in § 3553(a) when imposing sentences. Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. at 765. In United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 2935 (2005), we stated that, under 12 the holding in Booker, “the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is violated where under a mandatory guidelines system a sentence is increased because of an enhancement based on facts found by the judge that were neither admitted by the defendant nor found by the jury.” We since have held that there are two types of Booker errors: (1) constitutional error resulting from enhancements based on judicial fact-finding; and (2) non-constitutional statutory error resulting from mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2005). We have held that, where the defendant admitted to the facts that enhanced his sentence, there was no Sixth Amendment violation under Booker. Id. at 1330. A different standard of reviewing for harmless error applies depending on the type of Booker error. See United States v. Mathenia, 409 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005). “When the error is of the constitutional variety, a higher [harmless-error] standard is applied and it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the sentence obtained.” United States v. Robles, 408 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). “The burden to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt rests squarely on the government.” Id. Parra objected to the district court’s factual finding that he was leader and 13 application of the enhancement. Therefore, he made an objection to a constitutional error. The government concedes that it cannot show that the error is harmless and we agree: based on statements the district court made, it is unclear what it would have done had there not been a mandatory sentencing scheme. Therefore, Parra’s sentence is vacated. b. Role Enhancement We review for clear error a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in the offense. United States v. DeVaron, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Section 3B1.1(a) provides for a four-level enhancement if a “defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). “The government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had an aggravating role in the offense.” United States v. Yeager, 331 F.3d 1216, 1226 (11th Cir. 2003). In determining the nature of the defendant’s role, the court may consider “the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). 14 In addition, “[t]here can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy.” Id. The district court did not clearly err by applying a four-level enhancement based on Parra’s role as an organizer or leader. While the evidence may have established Orlando as a leader in the organization, it also established that Parra was the leader and organizer of operations in the United States, while Orlando was in Colombia. The record does not support Parra’s claims of being only a courier or errand boy but rather shows his planning and organizing of the United States size of the operation. As the government concedes, because Parra’s sentence was enhanced, under a mandatory guidelines system, based on facts that were not charged in the indictment, admitted by Parra, or found by a jury, the district court committed constitutional and statutory error in sentencing him, and, because it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that these errors were harmless, Parra’s sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of Booker. We note, however, that the district court did not err factually by applying the role enhancement. CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED.1 1 Parra’s request for oral argument is denied. 15