Opinion ID: 1729809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: grand jury attack

Text: There remain, as possible bases for jurisdiction in this Court, the two prongs of the grand jury challenge. By various motions, appellant first sought production of the grand jury master list and dismissal of the information and underlying indictment on the basis of discrimination in selection of the grand jury pool; an evidentiary hearing was also sought by appellant to determine the validity of the grand jury pool, appellant alleging that the method of its selection discriminated against various specified groups in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, depriving him of an impartial grand jury of his peers fairly representative of a cross-section of the community. The second prong of attack was raised in the motion to dismiss, in which appellant asserted that Section 5 of Chapter 57-550, Laws of Florida, 1957, denied him due process and equal protection of law by reason of the section's alleged vagueness, improper delegation of powers and violation of the principle of separation of powers in making circuit judges selectors of jurors. None of the motions involved in either portion of the grand jury challenge was supported by affidavits, and, other than the conclusory statements contained in the motion itself, there was no showing of any facts sufficient to raise any suspicion that the grand jury pool was improperly constituted. The motions for production of the grand jury master list and for an evidentiary hearing were denied by the trial court, as were the motions seeking dismissal of the information and the underlying indictment. We find that jurisdiction here has not been properly invoked by these rulings of the trial court, inasmuch as the motion, upon these grounds, was simply held not to be well founded. As stated in 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, § 182, one objecting to the composition of a jury panel must allege such discrimination as is here asserted by asserting facts to show the existence of the discrimination. Additional support may be found in United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20 (C.A.6, 1965), and in Windom v. United States, 260 F.2d 384 (C.A.10, 1958), both of which stand for the proposition that before a court will be required to permit a full-scale investigation of its jury panel, the panel must be shown to be suspect. This does not, of course, require that the challenge show that the panel is improperly constituted; but what it does require is that the challenger assert facts that tend to raise a doubt as to whether the panel may be improperly constituted. Then follows the inquiry to see if such suspicion, duly alleged, is supported by proof. To require a full-scale investigation of the grand jury panel solely upon a mere assertion, not supported by so much as an affidavit based upon information and belief, that the panel was improperly drawn, would be to open every grand jury panel, no matter how perfectly impartial and representative, to a full-scale investigation  or perhaps more accurately, to a fishing expedition of broad range. Such a course would consume enormous amounts of time and energy of our already overburdened trial courts, with concomitant delays in their calendars, and would be especially injurious to the prompt disposition of justice. In this regard, we note that CrPR 3.191, 33 F.S.A. requires speedy trials within 180 days (in the case of a felony charge) or 90 days (for misdemeanor charges) without the necessity for any demand, and within 60 days where such a demand is made (as it was in this case). Failure to meet the speedy trial deadline results in a complete discharge. CrPR 3.191, 33 F.S.A. To require our trial courts to expend endless hours exploring attacks on the grand jury panel which are without factual basis of any kind might well result in needlessly freeing felons without trial; this we will not permit. Before the court will be required to permit a full-scale investigation of its jury panel, there must be a sufficient factual showing to raise a reasonable suspicion that the panel was improperly drawn. There was none here. Appellant asserts that the hearing he requested would have produced the evidence that the grand jury panel was improperly drawn, thus meeting the need for evidence that his rights were violated, and directs our attention to State v. Covington, 258 N.C. 495, 128 S.E.2d 822 (1963), in which it was held that the trial court had erred in not allowing an evidentiary hearing and the subpoenaing of records in an attempt to show discrimination in the selection of the grand jury. But in that case, unlike the case at bar, there was an affidavit of counsel, asserting certain facts based on information and belief, supporting the motion. Even this minimal factual support for the motion was lacking in the case before us today. In the instant case, we have neither a showing that the panel was suspect nor an affidavit showing any factual basis upon which such a suspicion could properly rest; we have only the bare conclusory allegations of the motion itself. This is insufficient. Viewing the motions as postured above, it is clear that, in denying the motions for production of the grand jury master list and the request for an evidentiary hearing, the trial court did not pass upon the constitutionality of any statute, nor did it explain or define any constitutional provision; the trial court merely (and correctly) ruled upon an insufficient motion. Hence, the denial of these motions does not properly give rise to a direct appeal to this Court under the provisions of Article V, § 3(b)(1). As we said in State v. Demetree, 213 So.2d 709 (Fla. 1968), it is the composition of the grand jury pool, not the particular grand jury itself, which determines whether equal protection has been denied. So far as can be determined from the record, it appears that the trial court denied the motions to dismiss the indictment and information on the basis that there had been no factual showing to support the allegations of constitutionally improper procedures having been used in selecting the grand jury pool. In so doing, the trial court did not explain, define or otherwise by express language remove existing doubts as to the proper construction of a constitutional provision. This does not support a direct appeal to this Court. [3] Moreover, it appears that appellant has waived his challenge to the grand jury by failing to raise these points timely. Silva v. State, 286 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1973).