Opinion ID: 852804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Retroactivity of Indiana Code section 25-23.6-6-1

Text: The general rule of statutory construction is that unless there are strong and compelling reasons, statutes will not be applied retroactively. Martin v. State, 774 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Ind.2002). Statutes are to be given prospective effect only, unless the legislature unequivocally and unambiguously intended retrospective effect as well. Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Judd, 554 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). There is an exception to this general rule for remedial statutes, that is, statutes intended to cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute. Bourbon Mini-Mart, Inc. v. Gast Fuel & Servs., Inc., 783 N.E.2d 253, 260 (Ind.2003) (citing Martin, 774 N.E.2d at 44). Relying on our statement in Bourbon and Martin that remedial statutes will be applied retroactively to carry out their legislative purpose unless to do so violates a vested or constitutional guaranty, (emphasis added), Center argues that I.C. § 25-23.6-6-1 was enacted to cure a defect in the physician/patient privilege statute and thus it is remedial and applies retroactively to bar disclosure of communications between Center's counselor and the Pelley family. We first observe that it is not at all clear to us that the counselor/client privilege statute is remedial. It is true the statute was enacted following the Court of Appeals' decision in Matter of C.P., 543 N.E.2d 410 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), aff'd in part, 563 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind.1990), which held that the physician/patient privilege did not protect communications between a counselor and a client. However, it is equally true, as the State points out, that the statute was enacted as part of a much broader scheme to regulate social workers as professionals. Public Law 186-1990 created Article 23.6, Marriage and Family Therapists. This article created a credentialing board for social workers and marriage family therapists, and addressed certification, examinations, unlawful practices, privileged communications, and mandatory disclosures. See I.C. § 25-23.6. It is reasonably plausible that by creating Article 23.6 under Title 25, the Legislature intended to recognize social workers as mental health professionals who were afforded state recognition and subject to state regulation, much the same as psychologists under Title 25, Article 33. We have no legislative history to inform us either way. In any event, even assuming the counselor/client privilege statute is remedial, Center's retroactivity argument still fails. Despite language in Bourbon and Martin suggesting otherwise, not all remedial statutes are automatically applied retroactively. It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that although statutes and rules concerning procedural and remedial matters may be made to operate retroactively, it is not the case that they must apply retroactively. State ex rel. Uzelac v. Lake Crim. Ct., 247 Ind. 87, 212 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1965). As we held in Gosnell v. Indiana Soft Water Service, Inc. : Unless there are strong and compelling reasons, statutes will normally be given prospective application. While statutes addressing merely procedural and remedial matters may be applied retroactively, such application is not required.    Even under [the] argument that the statute is merely procedural or remedial, retroactive application is the exception, and such laws are normally to be applied prospectively absent strong and compelling reasons. 503 N.E.2d 879, 880 (Ind.1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Like the physician/patient privilege, the statutorily created counselor/client privilege is also in derogation of common law. So it too must be strictly construed. Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d at 1360. For this reason, and because laws creating privileges prohibit the ascertainment of truth in many controversies, courts do not extend the scope of the privilege by implication. Matter of C.P., 563 N.E.2d at 1277 (discussing the physician/patient privilege). This approach is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's rule that privileges are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974)). In this case, even assuming I.C. § 25-23.6-6-1 is remedial or procedural, the Legislature did not expressly make the statute retroactive. And we decline to construe the privilege contained in the statute as applying retroactively. Rather, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary we apply here the general rule favoring prospective application. In sum, the counselor/client privilege is not applicable in the case before us. Accordingly the trial court erred in quashing the State's subpoena requesting documents revealing communications between Center's counselor and the Pelley family. On this issue we reverse the judgment of the trial court.