Opinion ID: 1758546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Minnesota's Fair and Accurate Reporting Privilege

Text: We agree with the policy objective that the fair and accurate reporting privilege supportsthat the public interest is served by the fair and accurate dissemination of information concerning the events of public proceedings. Further, we find persuasive the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611's articulation of the common law on the fair and accurate reporting privilege. However, our decision here must be limited to the legal questions presented by the facts of this case and made within the context of our own common law. In Nixon, we recognized a privilege for the fair and accurate reporting of a judicial proceeding. The same policy considerations found in Nixon support extending that privilege to fair and accurate reports of legislative proceedings as well, including city council meetings. Also, our legislature has stated that, in the criminal context, the policy objectives of a fair and accurate reporting privilege are furthered by protecting such reports from challenges of common law malice. See Minn.Stat. § 609.675, advisory committee cmt. (1964). We believe that the policy objectives of the fair and accurate reporting privilege warrant such protection in the civil context as well. Accordingly, we conclude that the fair and accurate reporting privilege extends to protect the accurate and complete report or a fair abridgment of events that are part of the regular business of a city council meeting. This privilege will not be defeated by a showing of common law malice, but is defeated by a showing that the report is not a fair and accurate report of that proceeding. The Supreme Court's decisions in Sullivan and Gertz and our subsequent decisions should then be used to determine the standard of care required by a publisher to ensure the fairness and accuracy of such a report. See generally Jadwin, 367 N.W.2d at 491-92.
Having concluded that the fair and accurate reporting privilege extends to city council meetings, we must now decide whether the Times' March 23 article was a fair and accurate report of the March 10 city council meeting. Our examination of the Times' article leads us to conclude that the district court erred in its application of the fair and accurate reporting privilege to this article. We reach this conclusion because the article included material reporting on events other than those that occurred at the city council meeting. Section 611's description of what additions will generally defeat the fairness and accuracy of a report is helpful to our analysis in this case. Section 611's commentators note that a reporter is not privileged under this Section to make additions of his own that would convey a defamatory impression, nor to impute corrupt motives to any one, nor to indict expressly or by innuendo the veracity or integrity of any of the parties. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611, cmt. f. This limitation on the privilege also is expressed with respect to arrests. See id. at cmt. h. While an arrest or indictment is an official act generally covered by this section, statements made by the police or by the complainant or other witnesses or by the prosecuting attorney as to the facts of the case or evidence expected to be given are not yet part of the judicial proceeding or of the arrest itself and are not privileged under this Section. Id. We have applied a similar rule in the context of the official immunity that a police officer has with respect to allegedly defamatory statements made in a police report. See Carradine v. State, 511 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn.1994). In Carradine, we were asked to decide whether comments made by a police officer to the press concerning the officer's arrest of the plaintiff were absolutely privileged, protecting the officer from civil liability for defamation. See id. We stated that as long as the officer's comments only reiterated the contents of his official report, he was protected. See id. However, we also stated that to the extent that his comments departed from his report and those comments not in his report significantly added to the plaintiff's injury, then such comments would not be privileged. See id. We remanded that issue to the district court to make the necessary factual determinations. See id. Even though a fair and accurate report of a city council meeting is privileged, that privilege can be defeated if additional contextual material, not part of the proceeding, is added that conveys a defamatory impression or comments on the veracity or integrity of any party. The entire report then would be subject to evaluation as any other allegedly defamatory statement. As we noted in Carradine, determining whether additional material affected the nature of the report is a question best left to the district courts. Id. In his complaint, Officer Moreno alleges that the Times' March 23 article was defamatory. He does not distinguish any particular part, but addresses the article as a whole and we concluded earlier that he has pleaded facts sufficient to place the entire article at issue. Of the nine paragraphs in the article, only three actually report on the events of the city council meeting. While it appears that these three paragraphs are fair and accurate descriptions of the events of the city council meeting, the other six paragraphs relate to subsequent events. Viewing this article in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, as we must on appeal from summary judgment, the article contains information and facts which could raise material issues of fact. See Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. North Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn.1999). More particularly, the article deals with the activities of local authorities in response to McDaniel's accusation. The article also discusses local rumors about the arrest of police officers. Finally, the article relays an interview with Chief Monteen about the investigation and about McDaniel. The report of the fact that there is an official investigation underway arguably adds credibility to McDaniel's accusation and could increase the defamatory effect of this article. The article also contains references to McDaniel that could be interpreted as commenting on his veracity or integrity. The record before us does not indicate that these issues were argued before the district court nor did the court make any findings concerning these issues. We conclude that the record on appeal does not permit us to determine as a matter of law whether the material in the Times' article that reported events other than those of the city council meeting conveyed a defamatory impression or impermissibly commented on McDaniel's veracity or integrity. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for further determination of the question of whether the material in the Times' article, which did not report on the events of the council meeting, conveyed a defamatory impression or commented on the veracity or integrity of any party. In summary, we hold that the fair and accurate reporting privilege extends to protect the accurate and complete report or a fair abridgment of events that are part of the regular business of a city council meeting and that this privilege is not defeated by a showing of common law malice, but is defeated by a showing that the report is not a fair and accurate report of that proceeding. We also hold that the district court erred in its application of the fair and accurate reporting privilege to this article in failing to determine whether the additional material included in the article either conveyed a defamatory impression or commented on the veracity or integrity of any party. However, as we noted earlier, the Times asserted several defenses of privilege in its answer. The fair and accurate reporting privilege is the only one presented to us on appeal. Therefore, our analysis should not be construed to imply that if the fair and accurate reporting privilege does not apply, the Times' article is defamatory or that other privileges are not appropriate. See, e.g., Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn.1991) (recognizing a qualified privilege for fair comment on performance of public officials). We reverse the court of appeals and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.