Opinion ID: 1834596
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Heading: Applicability of the SAA

Text: Orchelle's SAA claim was based on 45 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 9, and 49 C.F.R. § 232.17(b)(1), a regulation promulgated pursuant to the SAA. [1] The purpose of the SAA is to promote the safe movement of trains over mainline tracks by requiring the installation of brakes that will effectively control the movement of those trains. United States v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 361 U.S. 78, 80 S.Ct. 12, 4 L.Ed.2d 25 (1959); United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 237 U.S. 410, 35 S.Ct. 634, 59 L.Ed. 1023 (1915); Grogg v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 841 F.2d 210 (8th Cir.1988); Erskine v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 814 F.2d 266 (6th Cir.1987). To achieve that purpose, the provisions of the SAA require railroads to install air brakes on their trains; they also regulate the inspection, maintenance, and repair of those brakes. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. The United States Supreme Court has held that the SAA should be liberally construed to allow railroad employees to recover if their injury is caused or contributed to by defective or insufficient braking equipment. Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S.Ct. 275, 93 L.Ed. 208 (1949); Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 239, 44 S.Ct. 64, 68 L.Ed. 284 (1923). Issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and due care are irrelevant in SAA cases, O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 U.S. 384, 70 S.Ct. 200, 94 L.Ed. 187 (1949), and an employee is not precluded from recovery simply because his injury was not one that the SAA sought to prevent. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66, 37 S.Ct. 598, 61 L.Ed. 995 (1917); see also Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 394, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1958) (discussing the scope of liability under the SAA, the Jones Act, and the Boiler Inspection Act). In Louisville & N. R.R. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617, 37 S.Ct. 456, 61 L.Ed. 931 (1917), the Court affirmed a judgment for an injured railroad employee. That employee had been on one of five freight cars loaded with coal. An engine pushed a stock car into the last of the freight cars and drove them into a standing train. Neither the stock car nor the freight car that it struck was equipped with automatic couplers, as required by the SAA. The stated purpose of the automatic coupler requirement was to avoid the necessity of men going between the ends of cars. The railroad argued that this stated purpose showed that Congress intended the requirement only for the benefit of employees who were injured while coupling or uncoupling cars. The Court rejected the railroad's argument, holding that liability was not restricted to SAA violations that interfered with the accomplishment of the SAA's stated purpose: The language of the acts and the authorities we have cited make it entirely clear that the liability in damages to employees for failure to comply with the [SAA] springs from its being made unlawful to use cars not equipped as required,not from the position the employee may be in or the work which he may be doing at the moment when he is injured.... [C]arriers are liable to employees in damages whenever the failure to obey these safety appliance laws is the proximate cause of injury to them when engaged in the discharge of duty. 243 U.S. at 621, 37 S.Ct. at 457. In addition, in Davis v. Wolfe, supra , the Court held that a railroad employee should be allowed to recover if the failure to comply with the requirements of the [SAA] is a proximate cause of the accident, resulting in injury to him while in the discharge of his duty, although not engaged in an operation in which the safety appliances are specifically designed to furnish him protection. 263 U.S. at 243, 44 S.Ct. at 66. In a case that is closely analogous to the instant case, a brakeman was injured while trying to release a tightly set hand brake. In his attempt to force the brake, the brakeman put his left foot on a running board and his right foot on a grab iron (a required safety appliance) to better position himself for putting pressure on the brake. His weight caused the plank to which the grab iron was bolted to split, and he lost his balance, fell, and was injured. The railroad argued that the grab iron's purpose was to give employees an appliance to grasp with their hands, not to provide a foot brace. The Court rejected that argument, holding that the SAA should be liberally construed so as to give a right of recovery for every injury the proximate cause of which was a failure to comply with a requirement of the Act. Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry., 294 U.S. 529, 531, 55 S.Ct. 517, 517, 79 L.Ed. 1041 (1935). Orchelle presented evidence that tended to show that CSX had allowed the air hose he was attempting to couple to drag along the track, thus causing the threads of the coupler to become burred. He says that, as a result of the burring, he was unable to connect the hoses, and that his attempt to force the ends of the hoses together caused his wrist injury. He argues that CSX violated 49 C.F.R. § 232.17(b)(1) by allowing the threads of the hose coupler to become burred. That regulation reads in part: Brake equipment on cars other than passenger cars must be cleaned, repaired, lubricated, and tested as often as required to maintain it in a safe and suitable condition for service. In view of the construction that has been placed on the SAA by the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts, it is clear that Orchelle presented sufficient evidence of a violation to warrant a jury charge on that Act. Therefore, the trial court erred by refusing to give that charge; its judgment is reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new trial. APPLICATION GRANTED; ORIGINAL OPINION WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; REVERSED AND REMANDED. HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, JONES, SHORES, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.