Opinion ID: 2630189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of Hearsay Evidence

Text: We begin by considering whether the People's use of hearsay evidence, undertaken by the People without timely providing Loveall with the names of the declarants, constitutes a denial of his constitutional right to due process. Under the facts here presented, we hold that it does. In Morrissey v. Brewer , the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations. 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (extending Morrissey holding to probation revocation hearings). The lower standard for due process available in revocation hearings was justified, according to the Court, by the State's overwhelming interest in returning an individual to prison without the burden and associated costs of mounting a new criminal trial, provided there was sufficient evidence that the individual failed to abide by the conditions of his probation. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483, 92 S.Ct. 2593. The Morrissey Court avoided creating a code of procedure for revocation hearings. Id. at 488, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (We cannot write a code of procedure; that is the responsibility of each State.). Instead, the Court set forth the minimum requirements such proceedings must follow to comply with due process. Id. at 488-89, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Among the rights afforded probationers is that to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Soon after Morrissey was announced, the General Assembly answered the Court's call, establishing the procedure required for revocation hearings in Colorado. See § 16-11-206, C.R.S. (2009). In Colorado, the prosecution can admit hearsay evidence at a revocation hearing provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut hearsay evidence. § 16-11-206(3). Since section 16-11-206(3) was enacted, the court of appeals has attempted to clarify what a fair opportunity to rebut hearsay entails. Loveall cites two of these cases, People in Interest of T.M.H., 821 P.2d 895 (Colo.App. 1991), and People v. Thomas, 42 Colo.App. 441, 599 P.2d 957 (1979), to argue that he was entitled to greater due process. In T.M.H., the court of appeals held that, where the prosecutor is unable to produce any corroborating documentary evidence and the only witness lacks personal knowledge of the essential incriminating facts, the probationer is not provided a fair opportunity to rebut hearsay testimony. 821 P.2d at 896-97. Similarly, in Thomas, the court of appeals held that hearsay evidence presented via a probation officer's testimony does not provide a fair opportunity to rebut even where the probationer stands ready to take the stand and deny the accusation. 599 P.2d at 958. We find these cases distinguishable. The violations of probation alleged by the prosecution in T.M.H. and Thomas were additional criminal acts allegedly perpetrated by the probationers. T.M.H., 821 P.2d at 895-96; Thomas, 599 P.2d at 957-58. As such, they are not subject to the preponderance of evidence standard, which is applicable here, but to the more stringent, beyond a reasonable doubt standard. § 16-11-206(3); see also People v. Kelly, 919 P.2d 866, 868 (Colo.App. 1996) (applying similar analysis to distinguish Thomas and T.M.H. ). Nor do we find it necessary to determine whether a probation officer's testimony, based solely on hearsay evidence, can ever establish a violation of probation beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, we find it sufficient to hold that hearsay evidence may be used to establish a probation violation other than an alleged crime provided minimum due process requirements are met. [8] On multiple occasions, the court of appeals wrestled with the due process requirements set forth by the Morrissey Court and the General Assembly. [9] From this line of cases, we discern a workable standard: where revocation is based on a violation other than an alleged crime, the defendant's due process right is satisfied by subjecting the probation officer to cross-examination about proffered hearsay and affording the [probationer] an opportunity to present witnesses and testify in his or her own behalf. Manzanares, 85 P.3d at 610. However, the impact of these techniques is greatly diminishedif not eradicated entirely where the defendant is given little or no opportunity to test the accuracy of the hearsay evidence or the credibility of the declarants from whom it was gleaned. See Singletary v. Reilly, 452 F.3d 868, 874-75 (D.C.Cir. 2006) (ordering new parole revocation hearing where declarants of hearsay evidence relied upon by prosecution were never cross-examined nor were their identities even revealed for purposes of evaluating their credibility). Here, the prosecution failed to provide Loveall's defense counsel the nurses' letters, Woodard's narrative describing her phone conversation with Mann, or any other document containing the nurses' names until shortly before the probation revocation hearing. The trial court sustained Loveall's initial objection as to the letters, holding that the prosecution denied Loveall a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the nurses, but admitted Woodard's narrative regarding the phone conversation without regard for its late disclosure. The trial court then went on to hold that defense counsel could not use Mann's letter to impeach Woodard's narrative without first admitting the letter into evidence in its entirety. [10] In so deciding, the trial court presented Loveall's defense counsel with a Hobson's choice: either to admit Mann's letter into evidence in order to impeach the narrative, which stated only that Loveall was present at the hospital, or to proceed without admitting the letter only to leave Woodard's narrative, which contained Mann's highly damaging accusation that Loveall actually held the baby, unchallenged. [11] Under these circumstances, we do not find that defense counsel's decision to admit Mann's letter into evidence prevents him from later raising a due process claim. Thus, we hold that, under the facts of this case, the prosecutor's decision to withhold the names of the declarants until shortly before the hearing prevented Loveall from receiving the minimum due process rights owed him.