Opinion ID: 3209138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expected or Intended Bodily Injury Exclusion

Text: Peerless next argues that coverage is precluded by the “Expected or Intended Bodily Injury” exclusion in both policies. As noted, the state trial court ruled that the employees must prove wanton and willful misconduct to recover against the driver under Wyoming law. Peerless claims that if the employees make that showing—and recover at trial—then they will have necessarily proven that the driver expected or intended the passengers’ injuries, triggering the exclusion. The district court disagreed, finding the two standards are not equivalent under state law. We agree with the district court that the employees can succeed at trial without showing the driver “expected or intended” their injuries, so the exclusion does not apply. The Wyoming Supreme Court has defined willful and wanton misconduct in several cases. In Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191, 193 (Wyo. 1979), the court said willful and wanton misconduct does not require “intent to cause injury or damage,” but rather the “intent to do an act, or an intent to not do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences, and under such circumstances and -12- conditions that a reasonable man would know, or have reason to know, that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another.” In another case, the court stated willful and wanton misconduct requires “a state of mind approaching intent to do harm.” Formisano v. Gaston, 246 P.3d 286, 291 (Wyo. 2011). Peerless would prefer we adopt the second definition, which more closely tracks the exclusion’s language requiring intent to cause the injury. But as the district court recognized, a state of mind “approaching” intent to do harm is not the same. Construing the policy in favor of the insured—the driver in this instance—and noting the intent standard adopted by the Wyoming Supreme Court, we conclude the exclusion does not equate to willful and wanton misconduct. Shaffer, 261 P.3d at 711. First, the exclusion requires intent or an expectation of injury viewed “from the standpoint of the ‘insured.’” By contrast, in analyzing whether conduct is willful and wanton, the Wyoming Supreme Court looks to what a “reasonable man” knows or should know. Danculovich, 593 P.2d at 193. In other words, one analysis requires a subjective test while the other uses an objective one. The jury in the passengers’ suit could conclude that a reasonable man should have known that driving while impaired could lead to injury without also concluding that the driver himself intended or expected such a result. Second, willful and wanton misconduct requires intent only to do the act which causes the injury. The actor need not intend to cause the injury. See id. -13- The exclusion, however, requires the injury itself be intended or expected. Determining whether this requirement is satisfied calls for a different analysis than the willful or wanton misconduct question. So, again, the jury could conclude that the driver intended to commit the act that caused the injury—driving under the influence—without also intending to cause the injury itself. In sum, we reject Peerless’s argument that the expected or intended injury exclusion necessarily applies if the injured employees succeed at trial.