Opinion ID: 1898380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 33

Heading: Did the trial court err in limiting defendant's cross-examination of Pettigrew, and in allowing the prosecution to use certain documents in its redirect examination of Pettigrew?

Text: During cross-examination of the witness Pettigrew, defendant sought to establish that the two men were not close, and that it was unlikely defendant would confide in him. On redirect, the State had Pettigrew review twenty-six letters between him and defendant, most of which involved defendant's giving legal advice to Pettigrew. Much of the correspondence included defendant's suggestions to Pettigrew that he lie to beat the charges against him. The State never sought to admit those letters as evidence; it used only portions of the letters to refresh Pettigrew's recollection. The State's intention in using those excerpts was, in its own words, to expose the depth of the friendship between the two men. Defendant now contends that the letters served only to inflame the jury against him, and were improperly used by the prosecution. Defendant also argues that the trial court unfairly limited his cross-examination of Pettigrew. In neither of these instances do we find any abuse of judicial discretion. Although the letters did have a prejudicial effect on defendant's case  they exposed defendant as encouraging Pettigrew to lie  they also had significant probative value in demonstrating the continued correspondence between Pettigrew and defendant. Furthermore, with regard to defendant's second argument, we have held that the scope of cross-examination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 293 A. 2d 649 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945, 93 S.Ct. 1393, 35 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1973). We discern no examples in which the trial court abused its discretion with regard to defendant's cross-examination of Pettigrew.