Opinion ID: 3055301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: warrant to search carson’s home

Text: As noted above, in reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to 29 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 30 of 53 suppress, this Court reviews factual findings for clear error and applications of law de novo. See Tamari, 454 F.3d at 1261. The government says, though, that because the district court’s ruling on Carson’s motion to suppress the results of the warrant was based entirely on written evidence, this Court’s review should be completely de novo. See United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980). 10
On appeal, Carson argues that the district court improperly applied the good faith exception to the warrant requirement in denying his motion to suppress the results of the January 5, 2011 search of his home. Carson argues that a reasonably trained police officer would have known the warrant was unconstitutionally broad because it permitted law enforcement to “seize virtually anything they thought might be connected with any criminal activity.” In support, Carson cites the “bare minimum” amount of education Alabama police officers receive regarding criminal procedures and laws. The government argues that the district court’s ruling may be affirmed because: (1) the search warrant was not overly broad and thus not an unconstitutional general warrant; (2) even if overbroad, the unconstitutionally 10 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to September 30, 1981. 30 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 31 of 53 overbroad sections of the warrant may be severed from those portions supported by probable cause; and (3) as the district court held, at the very least, the motion was properly denied on the basis of the good faith exception. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It further provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” Id. “The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1016 (1987). The exclusionary rule operates to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights like the particularity requirement for a search warrant. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (1974). But under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1985), the prosecution is not barred from using in its case-in-chief evidence obtained by law enforcement officers that acted in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached, neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid. See id. at 913, 104 S. Ct. at 3415. This Court has explained that Leon’s good faith exception applies in all but four limited sets of circumstances: (1) where the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would 31 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 32 of 53 have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role . . . ; (3) where the affidavit supporting the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) where, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant is so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Carson challenges the application of the good faith exception based on the fourth circumstance. We conclude that this case does not fit within the fourth circumstance, and thus the district court’s ruling that the good faith exception applies is due to be affirmed. Here, the affidavit specified the location to be searched and the items to be seized, including marijuana, which law enforcement attested to observing at the residence. The inclusion of a “catch-all” provision in Attachment 1 does not render the warrant “so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3421. For instance, in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976), the Supreme Court concluded that a similarly challenged phrase was constitutional as it “must be read as authorizing only the search for and seizure of evidence relating to” the specific crime at issue. Id. at 480, 96 S. Ct. at 2748. While in Andresen, 32 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 33 of 53 the general clause came after the specific items to be seized and a specified crime to which the items contained in the general clause must relate, in this case, the face of the warrant limited the items in Attachment 1 to those “common to the drug trade.” Accordingly, the warrant was not so facially deficient that the executing officers could not have reasonably presumed it was valid. We affirm the district court’s denial of Carson’s motion to suppress the results of the search warrant.