Opinion ID: 2588383
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Doe's Best Interest

Text: We turn next to the magistrate's analysis regarding whether termination was in Doe's best interest. After concluding termination would be in C.R.'s best interest, the magistrate determined termination would also be in Doe's best interest. He wrote: In the case at bar, [Doe] is an unrepentant, untreated child molester in denial. [Doe] testified on cross examination that his own handwritten statement in his criminal Presentence Report . . . admits that he `hurt' [A.R.] and did not trust himself to be alone with her. . . . It is not in [Doe's] best interest to be alone or in contact with children. His untreated impulse to do, say or write something sexually inappropriate would likely subject him to additional criminal prosecution and/or institutional punishment such as solitary confinement. If [Doe's] rights to [C.R.] remain intact, so will his financial obligation of support. As he currently has no significant income, he would likely be facing a large child support arrearage judgment upon his eventual release. [Doe's] unrealistic hope to soon regain his freedom and reunite with [C.R.] as a family is currently providing him with some degree of motivation to refuse available psycho-sexual treatment. The termination of [Doe's] parental rights to [C.R.] would benefit him by reducing his stress and bringing finality and closure to the lingering legal issues surrounding [C.R.'s] presently uncertain status as a member of [C.L.'s family]. Such closure and finality will also benefit [Doe] by helping to push him beyond his denial and delusions surrounding his current and future circumstances. In short, termination will be a much-needed reality injection for [Doe]. The Court having considered and weighed the foregoing factors against [Doe's] stated and sincere desire to retain legal paternity of [C.R.], the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in [Doe's] best interest. Doe argues the magistrate erred in determining termination would be in Doe's best interest. First, he contends that because no independent investigation was done into the allegations of his abuse of A.R. by the Department the magistrate's analysis supports a phantom prosecution. Second, Doe also argues the magistrate incorrectly presumed that any individual convicted of sexual abuse of a child would abuse again. [4] Once again, Doe's arguments amount to nothing more than his asking this Court to reweigh the evidence. Although Doe contends that the Department should have conducted an independent investigation, he provides this Court with no authority for that contention. Moreover, even if this contention were true, there were more than mere allegations that Doe had sexually abused A.R. Doe pleaded guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct with his adopted daughter. The claim that the termination here supports a phantom prosecution lacks any basis in the record. Doe was prosecuted for his actions, and his complaints that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently have already been addressed in his criminal case. [5] In addition, Doe claims that the magistrate presumed that an individual convicted of sexual abuse with a child would sexually abuse children in the future. However, Judge Julian did not `presume' anything. Instead, he found it was likely that Doe would molest C.R., given the opportunity, because he was living in denial about his molestation of A.R. and because of his continued refusal of psycho-sexual therapy. The basis for those findings is supported by substantial and competent evidence. We move now to Doe's contention that the trial court incorrectly presumed an individual convicted of sexual abuse would abuse another child if given the chance. The magistrate was rightly concerned that Doe would sexually molest C.R., and these concerns were supported by substantial and competent evidence. Doe's argument in this instance is supported with declarations of how much he and his daughter love each other. However, the magistrate was completely within his discretionary powers to determine that other factors outweighed the genuine affection between this parent and child. In the past, this Court has recognized that parental affection is a priceless advantage. However, a child may not live on parental affection alone. In addition to love and affection and the satisfaction of his physical needs, a child requires moral guidance and training to allow [her] to grow into a well-adjusted, normal adult. State ex. rel . Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 896, 477 P.2d 834, 837 (1970). The magistrate did not error by giving other factors more weight than the love between father and daughter and determining that it was in both Doe's and C.R.'s best interest to have their parent-child relationship terminated. To the extent that we can assume Doe was arguing termination based on his best interest is not supported by the evidence, we will now address that concern. First, substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate's determination that it would be in Doe's best psychological interest to have his parental rights terminated in order to bring Doe closure and help him push past his delusions and seek the help he needs in psycho-sexual treatment. The only evidence presented which contradicts the magistrate's findings and conclusions was Doe's own testimony. However, the magistrate found that Doe's testimony wholly lacked credibility, that Doe was not an admirable or trustworthy person, but instead was manipulative and deceitful, and that Doe blamed his current problems on public institutions and the people around him. The magistrate also found that Doe lived in his own little world of delusion and denial. . . . All of these determinations are supported by either the testimony of witnesses or attributable to the magistrate's own observations of Doe. As such, they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Conversely, the magistrate's determination that it would be in Doe's best financial interest to have his parental rights terminated was error. It is our strong public policy that parents have a duty to support their children. Idaho recognizes that all parents have a duty to support and maintain their minor children. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 93 Idaho 419, 424, 462 P.2d 512, 517 (1969). This duty is not removed because of incarceration, Nab v. Nab, 114 Idaho 512, 519, 757 P.2d 1231, 1238 (Ct.App.1988), [6] nor can support obligations be removed by contract, see Morrison v. Young, 136 Idaho 316, 319-20, 32 P.3d 1116, 1119-20 (2001). Only by terminating parental rights is this duty removed. To consider the removal of this universal duty to support a benefit is not a proper consideration for the court; rather, courts must examine the benefits specific to that parent. As such, it was error for the magistrate to have considered the removal of the support duty as being in the parent's best interest. This is not to say that a court could not consider a parent's inability to provide support when examining the child's best interest, within certain limits. While a parent has the duty to financially support a child, the fact that a child might be in a better financial situation after adoption is not the end all of the analysis. In this instance it is clear that C.R. would wholly lack any financial support from Doe during his incarceration while in contrast she would be well supported by her maternal great-aunt if termination occurred. As such, the magistrate did not err when he considered financial support for C.R. when examining whether termination was in her best interest. While it was error to consider Doe's best financial interest, the magistrate's ultimate conclusionthat termination would be in Doe's best interestremains valid and is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Moreover, the first basis, that termination would be in Doe's psychological best interests, alone would be sufficient to terminate Doe's parental rights under I.C. § 16-2005(e). Therefore, because the magistrate's determination that it would be in both C.R.'s and Doe's best interest if the parent-child relationship were terminated is supported by substantial and competent evidence, we affirm the order terminating Doe's parental rights to C.R.