Opinion ID: 46
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony on Retrial

Text: While much of the challenged testimony was inadmissible, not everything that these witnesses said should be prohibited upon retrial. It is therefore worth noting, in the interest of judicial economy, which particular pieces of testimony are inadmissible, and which the District Court has discretion to admit. Most obviously, testimony that a third party (such as a prosecutor or a police supervisor) found the defendants to be credible should be excluded. Similarly, there is no justification for testimony that anybody but the defendants themselves believed that probable cause existed to arrest or prosecute Cameron and Higgenbottom. As to Lieutenant Peterson, he testified about his personal observations when he arrived at the scene of the incident; such testimony seems entirely appropriate. [8] He also testified that, during the seven months preceding the incident, in which he supervised Officers Ramos and Rivera, he did not see [Ramos] engage in any type of inappropriate behavior. J.A. 351. This seems relevant to Appellants' Monell claim, as it goes to the question of whether Ramos's supervisors were faced with a pattern of misconduct and [did] nothing. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir.2007). Peterson's testimony that he thought that [the police] had probable cause to effect the arrest and that he had no reason to doubt the officers' account of the facts that day, J.A. 353, on the other hand, should not be permitted upon retrial. The first comment bears on neither the Monell issue nor the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. The second comment, while it does in some ways relate to the Monell issue, extends far beyond Peterson's personal observations of Ramos's behavior and discusses directly Peterson's opinion of her credibility. [9] Nor can we see any reason for allowing Peterson to testify regarding the security camera photos, which he saw [a] long time after this incident happened. J.A. 359. His opinion of how the pictures should be interpreted is entirely irrelevant, and his testimony on the subject added nothing that the jury could not see for itself by looking at the photos. As to ADA Brandon, her testimony regarding the substance of her interactions with Officer Rivera seems entirely proper. Her comments as to whether she had any reason not to believe Officer Rivera's account, and whether she believed that probable cause existed to arrest or charge Appellants, however, should be avoided on retrial. Regarding Brandon's testimony that it was her decision to prosecute Cameron, and that Rivera had no say in whether or not a criminal prosecution was initiated and that Rivera did not urge [her], encourage [her], or press [her] to proceed with the criminal prosecution, J.A. 271-72, we do not think that this testimony needs to be precludedif, that is, it is accompanied by the District Court's clear and correct instruction that Ramos's and Rivera's conduct sufficed as a matter of law to initiate prosecution. Whether the police officers aggressively sought prosecution, or only allowed the District Attorney's handling of the case to run its own course, seems probative on the important question of whether the officers acted with malice, and so the District Court would be within its discretion to permit the same testimony on retrial. Finally, as to ADA Pangilinan, she should not be permitted to testify to her legal conclusions about the case, or to her opinions of the officers' credibility. As with ADA Brandon, we see nothing improper in her testifying about her interactions with Ramos and Rivera insofar as they allow the jury to draw appropriate inferences one way or another as to the officers' malice. It also would appear to be permissible for Pangilinan to testify as to the content of the 911 calls and the booking photoCameron's demeanor and statements in the former, and her appearance in the latteras the photo and the tapes of the calls are no longer in existence and Pangilinan personally observed them. See Fed.R.Evid. 1004; Glew v. Cigna Group Ins., 590 F.Supp.2d 395, 413 (E.D.N.Y.2008) (Oral testimony has been admitted as secondary evidence, if the original is lost or destroyed.). [10] But she should not be allowed to state conclusions such as her opinions that the 911 calls corroborated the officers' version of events, that the security camera photos actually strengthened [the] prosecution, and that the booking photo supported to some extent continued prosecution of the case. J.A. 504-05.