Opinion ID: 2604674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: probationary licenses and 1995 legislative changes

Text: Because the Legislature in 1995 repealed or amended statutes relating to probationary licenses after these appeals were filed, we must first determine whether those changes affect this case. [4] The Legislature created the new category of probationary license in the 1994 Omnibus Drunk Driving Act (Act), which took effect July 1, 1994. [5] Under the Act the Department of Licensing (Department) issued probationary licenses to persons under certain circumstances, including those violating RCW 46.61.502 [6] or RCW 46.61.504 [7] who take a test showing a blood alcohol concentration of .10 or higher. Respondents were issued probationary licenses under those statutes. [8] Under the 1994 Act, former RCW 46.61.5051 provided penalties for a person with a regular driver's license who was convicted under RCW 46.61.502 and RCW 46.61.504. Former RCW 46.61.5052 outlined penalties for a person with a probationary license who was convicted of violating those statutes. Under the statutes a person with a probationary license was subject to mandatory minimum penalties which were harsher than those imposed upon a person with a regular driver's license under similar circumstances. For example, a person with a probationary license who violated RCW 46.61.502(1)(a) or RCW 46.61.504(1)(a) because of a blood alcohol level of at least .10, but less than .15, was subject to imprisonment of at least seven days, but not more than a year; a fine of at least $500.00, but not more than $5,000.00; and suspension of that person's driver's license or permit for one year. [9] By comparison, a person holding a regular driver's license under similar circumstances, who had not been convicted of violating RCW 46.61.502 or RCW 46.61.504 within five years prior to the current violation, was subject to imprisonment for at least one day, but not more than a year; a fine of at least $350.00, but not more than $5,000.00; and suspension of that person's driver's license or permit for 90 days. [10] The Legislature in 1995 repealed former RCW 46.61.5051 and former RCW 46.61.5052, effective September 1, 1995. [11] It then enacted RCW 46.61.5055, which outlines penalties for all persons convicted of violating RCW 46.61.502 or RCW 46.61.504, effective September 1, 1995. [12] Unlike former RCW 46.61.5052, RCW 46.61.5055 does not provide harsher mandatory minimum penalties for those holding probationary licenses than for those holding regular licenses under similar circumstances. [13] One of respondents' primary arguments is that a probationary license is punishment under double jeopardy analysis because it subjects its holder to enhanced mandatory minimum penalties in the future if that person subsequently violates RCW 46.61.502 or RCW 46.61.504. The 1995 statute, RCW 46.61.5055, does not provide enhanced mandatory minimum penalties for persons holding probationary licenses. The 1995 statute would satisfactorily overcome respondents' argument on double jeopardy if it were applied retroactively. But we conclude it applies only prospectively. A statute is presumed to apply prospectively unless it is remedial in nature or unless the Legislature provides for retroactive application. [14] A remedial statute is one which relates to practice, procedures and remedies and is applied retroactively when it does not affect a substantive or vested right. [15] A `right' is a legal consequence deriving from certain facts, while a remedy is a procedure prescribed by law to enforce a right. [16] There is no legislative indication in the language or history of RCW 46.61.5055 that it is to be applied retroactively. [17] The presumption that RCW 46.61.5055 applies prospectively only is strengthened by the Legislature's use of only present and future tenses in the wording. [18] We conclude that RCW 46.61.5055 should not be applied retroactively, but applied prospectively only. Accordingly, other 1995 legislative changes to statutes relevant to this case also should not be applied retroactively. [19] We therefore focus our attention on the statutes in effect when Respondents were charged prior to the 1995 changes. Because there are no disputed facts, we will consider only questions of law, which we review de novo. [20]