Opinion ID: 46001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I. Credit also named Thomas’s company (Thomas

Text: Global), his wife (Wayne Thomas), and various entities related to Thomas Global as defendants. Only Thomas appeals. 6 misrepresentation, violations of Article 24.11 of the Texas Insurance Code, promissory estoppel, and conspiracy. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, contending, in part, that Thomas’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.3 Thomas responded that the discovery rule applied to save his claims because he was not aware until January 2000 of his injury, i.e., that he had to pay annual interest on the A.I. Credit loan.4 The district court, agreeing with Appellees that Thomas’s claims were barred by the respective statutes of limitations and finding that the discovery rule did not apply to save them, granted summary judgment in Appellees’ favor. According to the 3 Thomas’s claims were governed either by two-year or four-year limitations periods: (1) fraud, four years; (2) violations of the Texas Insurance Code, two years; (3) breach of fiduciary duty, four years; (4) negligent misrepresentation, two years; (5) promissory estoppel, four years; and (6) conspiracy, two years. See A.I. Credit Corp. v. Thomas, No. 03-cv-00298, at 4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2005) (order granting summary judgment). 4 Thomas also claims that he was unaware that he had to reapply for financing on a yearly basis; however, he did not raise this argument before the district court. We consider it waived. Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 263 (5th Cir. 2005). 7 court, Thomas could not argue that he was unaware until January 2000 of the annual interest payment requirement because the terms of the note, signed in January 1999, indicated that Thomas would have to pay interest annually. The court cited Martinez Tapia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 149 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 1998), for this proposition. On appeal, Thomas concedes that absent the discovery rule, all of his third party claims are barred by the respective statutes of limitations. However, he argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to when he discovered or should have discovered his injury and that the district court therefore erred in deciding that the discovery rule does not save his third party claims. This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see 8 also Wheeler, 415 F.3d at 401. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id. at 40102. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the relevant portions of the record, we affirm the district court’s judgment essentially for the reasons stated therein. Under Texas law, Thomas was put on notice of his injury as of the date he signed the promissory note. His arguments to the contrary are unavailing. AFFIRMED. 9