Opinion ID: 3009557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: R.'s Fifth Amendment challenge to the use of the

Text: reports of the psychiatric and psychological evaluations at the transfer hearing is based on the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In Estelle, which concerned a capital murder prosecution, the trial court ordered a pre-trial psychiatric evaluation of the defendant in order to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. The defendant was not informed of his rights prior to the evaluation, was adjudged competent to stand trial, and was found guilty of first degree murder. The problem arose at the sentencing phase of the trial when the court allowed the government to present the testimony of the psychiatrist who performed the evaluation, concerning the future dangerousness of the defendant. In affirming the order vacating the death sentence, the Court provided three bases for its conclusion that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were violated. First, because of the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the Court noted that it could discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent's capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned. 451 U.S. at 462-63. Second, the Court found it significant that the use of defendant's statements from the evaluation in the penalty phase went considerably beyond the limited, neutral purpose of determining his competency to stand trial for which the evaluation was ordered. Id. at 465. Consequently, the interview with Dr. Grigson cannot be characterized as a routine competency examination restricted to ensuring that respondent understood the charges against him and was capable of assisting in his defense. Indeed, if the application of Dr. Grigson's findings had been confined to serving that function, no Fifth Amendment issue would have arisen. Id. (emphasis added). Finally, the Court examined the considerations undergirding Miranda's restrictions on custodial interrogation. It concluded that the use of the psychiatrist's testimony at the penalty phase in effect transformed what, it again emphasized, was otherwise a neutral competency examination into custodial interrogation within Miranda's purview. When Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting to the court on the issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent's future dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting. Id. at 467. Viewed in terms of the general Fifth Amendment principles outlined above, the reason the evaluation created a self-incrimination problem when used at the penalty stage, but not at the competency determination, lies in the purpose and effect of the evaluation's use. At the penalty stage in Estelle, the defendant's statements were being used to prove an element of the government's burden in the criminal prosecution. At the competency stage, however, the issue of guilt or innocence is yet to be addressed. Before the substance of the case can be addressed, the court has to determine whether the status of the defendant is such that the case can proceed at all. As the Court concluded in Estelle, as long as the use of the evaluation is confined to this preliminary scope, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. Consideration of the present case in light of the analysis in Estelle, informed by the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination, leads us to conclude that there was no violation of A.R.'s Fifth Amendment rights. Other courts addressing adult certification hearings have repeatedly characterized them as civil in nature,4 primarily because they result only in a decision upon the status of the individual. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 4 Our analysis of this point, as well as of the issues presented more generally in this case, is informed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), in which it considered the question of what protections must be afforded a juvenile at a transfer hearing. The Court did not express an opinion as to the merits of transfer in the case, but held that there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony--without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. Id. at 554. The Court cautioned, however, that [w]e do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Id. at 562. 1990). The determination is not one of guilt or innocence, or even of delinquency or non-delinquency, but rather concerns the manner in which the state elects to proceed against an alleged malefactor. As such, the district court is entitled to assume that the juvenile committed the offense charged for the purpose of the transfer hearing. In re Sealed Case, 893 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Furthermore, while the evidence introduced at the hearing must be consistent with the concepts of due process and fundamental fairness, it need not be in compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d at 1255. And although the government bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of juvenile treatment, the government need only persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence. Parker, 956 F.2d at 171. Finally, the ultimate decision on waiver is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. Gerald N., 900 F.2d 189, 191 (9th Cir. 1990). The determination that the trial court must make at an adult certification hearing, then, parallels that which must be made at a competency hearing. Both proceedings deal with a preliminary forensic determination. More fundamentally, both deal with whether a defendant should be exempted from criminal prosecution because he falls within a category of persons who, in the eyes of the law, are not viewed as fully responsible for their acts. The use of the psychiatric or psychological reports is very similar, whether they are generated when an adult is examined for competency or a juvenile is examined for certification as an adult. In neither case does the report bear on the ultimate substantive question of guilt or innocence. In both situations, the evaluation serves the same limited, neutral purpose.5 The failure to administer Miranda warnings to A.R. prior to the evaluations did not deprive him of his right against self-incrimination, because the use of the evaluations at the transfer hearing did not incriminate him.6 5 The transfer statute provides that [s]tatements made by a juvenile prior to or during a transfer hearing shall not be admissible at subsequent criminal proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 6 We note that we are aware of and have considered United States v. J.D., 517 F.Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), which is apparently the only other case considering this precise question and which reached a contrary result. The court's reasoning in that case, however, was explicitly based on the Supreme Court's statement in Gault that no person shall be 'compelled' to be a witness against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of his liberty. 387 U.S. at 50. In Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 372 (1986), the Supreme Court backed away from this broad statement of the privilege's applicability in civil proceedings, here a civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, proclaiming that it is plainly not good law. We note further that the court in United States v. J.D. gave as one reason for its decision the fact that defendants would be open to a far larger period of incarceration if the transfer motion were to be successful than if they were to be proceeded against as juveniles. 517 F.Supp. at 72. However, to date there has not been defined a constitutional right to be tried in the court where, if the defendant were to be found guilty, the lightest sanction would be imposed. Cf. Sill v. Pennsylvania State University, 462 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1972) (It is well settled that there is no constitutional right to be heard by a particular tribunal, citing Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142 (1922)). For this reason, we conclude that, despite the penalty that may ensue, the civil proceeding to select the appropriate forum in which to try a defendant does not implicate Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.