Opinion ID: 392663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Plaintiffs' Appeals

Text: 71 The district court also ruled:So long as there is no interference with Shelton College's religious teaching or educational programs, this Court should abstain from deciding the remaining constitutional issues and permit them to be decided in the pending State Court action. This court will retain jurisdiction pending completion of the State Court proceedings in the event further interim relief should be required. 72 482 F.Supp. at 980. 28 Thus the present status of the case is that a Pullman type stay has been entered, with a retention of jurisdiction to consider further injunctive relief when the state court construes the statute and regulations. The plaintiffs point out, quite correctly, that this order is a denial of a large part of the injunctive relief which they requested. They urge, moreover, that its entry was error. All of the factors bearing on their choice of a federal forum discussed in Part IV above, they urge, are equally relevant with respect to the additional relief they sought. That relief includes a decision on plaintiffs' entanglement and free exercise claims. 73 The plaintiffs' appeal requires that we consider, in a first amendment context, the interrelationship between the Pullman abstention doctrine and the standards for the award of preliminary injunctive relief. Since, as we have already noted in Part V, a grant of pendente lite relief is not a final interpretation of state law by a federal court, and leaves the state court entirely free to place any construction on its law, limiting or otherwise, which it determines to be consistent with the first amendment, Pullman considerations have very little weight at the preliminary injunction stage. Once the court has concluded that an immediate dismissal on Younger grounds is inappropriate, a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, especially in first amendment contexts, ought, we think, to be considered without regard to the separate question whether a Pullman stay of final hearing is appropriate. Assuming the case is not to be dismissed outright, the district court should be guided by the classic requirements for a preliminary injunction: 74 The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in the absence of its issuance he will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits. 75 Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. at 931, 95 S.Ct. at 2567. Our review is confined to a determination whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying the quoted standards. Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. at 931-32, 95 S.Ct. at 2567-2568. 76 We noted in Part III that the plaintiffs' entanglement and free exercise clause claims are significant; in Part IV that the remedies available in a state tribunal, especially interlocutory appellate remedies, are problematical, and Supreme Court review of a state preliminary injunction is unavailable; and in Part VI A above, that the plaintiffs have been left in somewhat of a dilemma by the limited preliminary relief which was granted. On the other hand, as the district court noted, New Jersey has a significant interest in protecting both the consumers of education and the public which may rely upon the certification of proficiency implicit in the award of a degree. Certainly the likelihood of success on the merits, with respect to the degree granting aspect of the case, was not as clear as was the claim to be free to teach and to advertise. 29 Moreover the district court did not leave the plaintiffs entirely unprotected. It reserved jurisdiction to consider further applications for interim relief. Given the competing considerations facing the district court, we cannot hold that refusing to grant additional pendente lite relief, when on January 4, 1980 the district court acted initially, was an abuse of discretion. 77 The plaintiffs also urge that rather than staying final hearing, the district court, in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, should have enjoined the section 18A:68-5 proceeding entirely. We reject this contention. The decision to stay the federal court action while a New Jersey state court was given the opportunity to construe that state's statute and regulations was within the permissible range of district court discretion.
78 The plaintiffs, on November 20, 1980, applied to the district court for additional preliminary injunctive relief, and that appeal was referred to this panel. Thereafter the appeal was dismissed. Thus we do not address any of the issues to which it was directed.