Opinion ID: 157623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Relevant Conduct Approach

Text: 99 The relevant conduct for which Mr. Nichols must be held accountable also supports the district court's conclusion to select guideline 2A1.1 over 2K1.4. The Guidelines provide that a defendant is responsible for, among other things, all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. 1994 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Thus, in choosing the most analogous guideline, the district court must take into account all the circumstances of the case. Osborne, 164 F.3d at 438. 6 100 It is evident from the record of the sentencing hearing that the district court took into consideration all of the relevant circumstances of the case. The court noted that the jury had found that (1) the object of the conspiracy was to use a weapon of mass destruction against the Murrah building and the persons inside, (2) death resulted from the conspiracy, and (3) the deaths were a foreseeable result of Mr. Nichols' conduct. Considering the record as a whole, we think there was sufficient information from which the district court could infer that it was more likely than not Mr. Nichols harbored the malice and premeditation necessary to bring the case under section 2A1.1 of the Guidelines. 7 101 The evidence presented to the jury and relied upon by the district judge at sentencing establishes the malicious nature of Mr. Nichols' conduct. [M]alice does not require a subjective intent to kill, but may be established by evidence of conduct which is ... reckless and wanton[,] and a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, ... that [one] is warranted in inferring that [the] defendant was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm. Sides, 944 F.2d at 1558 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir.1987). Mr. Nichols reached an agreement with Mr. McVeigh and its objective was to detonate a 3000-6000 pound truck bomb in front of the Murrah building. Both defendants intended to use the bomb as a weapon of mass destruction against not only the building but the persons inside. Furthermore, as the jury found, the deaths were a foreseeable result of Mr. Nichols' conduct. Mr. Nichols was aware of a serious risk of death attending his conduct and his callous and wanton disregard for the persons inside the Murrah building more than suffices to show malice aforethought. See United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1500 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that malice aforethought may be based on one's callous and wanton disregard for human life). 102 Furthermore, the totality of the evidence in this case preponderates towards a finding of premeditation. The requirement of premeditation under section 1111(a) involves a prior design to commit murder. We have defined it as: 103 The act of meditating in advance; deliberation upon a contemplated act; plotting or contriving; a design formed to do something before it is done. Decision or plan to commit a crime ... before committing it. A prior determination to do an act, but such determination need not exist for any particular period before it is carried into effect. 104 McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1198 (quoting United States v. Jenny, 7 F.3d 953, 957 (10th Cir.1993)). In the preceding paragraph, we described the scope and object of the criminal activity Mr. Nichols agreed to jointly undertake. The ambitious and elaborate nature of the scheme serves in itself as evidence of deliberation upon a contemplated act. As we noted in McVeigh, once there has been a finding of malice aforethought, one would have to find premeditation, simply because the method of murder employed--the bombing--could not have been implemented without an enormous amount of planning. McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1198. Moreover, the temporal extent of the premeditation was confirmed by the jury. The jury found the government had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the agreement to destroy the Murrah building and the persons inside was set in motion on or about September 13, 1994, seven months before the bomb was actually detonated. Mr. Nichols' involvement in the scheme persisted through April 1995. Given the circumstances of this case, the district court was correct to conclude that Mr. Nichols' offense conduct was most analogous to first-degree murder and section 2A1.1. 105 VIII. Did the District Court Err by Failing to Make Findings Explaining Why it Chose not to Depart Downward Under 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 n.1? 106 Assuming 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 is the correct guideline, Mr. Nichols next argues that the court failed to make findings regarding the defendant's mental state in determining whether a downward departure was warranted. Section 2A1.1 n.1 states: 107 If the defendant did not cause the death intentionally or knowingly, a downward departure may be warranted. The extent of the departure should be based upon the defendant's state of mind (e.g., recklessness or negligence), the degree of risk inherent in the conduct, and the nature of the underlying offense conduct. However, the Commission does not envision that departure below that specified in § 2A1.2 (Second Degree Murder) is likely to be appropriate.... 108 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 n.1. Mr. Nichols reads this note to require a district court to make findings regarding the defendant's mental state before deciding whether to depart. The only decision to reach the same conclusion is United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d 767, 784 (7th Cir.1994). 109 We think Prevatte is wrongly decided on this point. Nothing in the guideline requires a district court to make any findings when deciding whether to depart. The section merely states that if a district court chooses to depart, the extent of that departure should be based on a number of enumerated factors. The initial determination of whether to depart at all under section 2A1.1 n.1 remains wholly discretionary, just as it is with all other decisions to depart. See United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1131 (8th Cir.1998) (discussing section 2A1.1 n.1); Tocco, 135 F.3d at 131 (same). Therefore, we cannot exercise jurisdiction to review a refusal to depart under section 2A1.1 n.1 unless the district court states or believes it does not have any authority to depart. See United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 887 (10th Cir.1998). Here, there is no dispute the trial court was aware of its authority to depart under section 2A1.1 n.1. The court simply chose in its discretion not to do so. 110