Opinion ID: 2301195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Interference

Text: Appellant next asserts that counsel was ineffective for not raising a claim of jury interference. This claim is confined to an allegation respecting counsel's performance on appeal. Brief of Appellant at 37 ([C]ounsel properly preserved the issue at trial.) The PCRA court reviewed and rejected this contention, finding that it was pure speculation. Once again, we agree with the PCRA court. On February 25, 1985, several weeks prior to the trial in the instant case, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for the killing of Anthony D'Amore. See Commonwealth v. Sneed, 362 Pa.Super. 640, 520 A.2d 1217 (1986). D'Amore's widow attended Appellant's trial for the murder of Calvin Hawkins. On the second day of trial, defense counsel raised the following point for the record: Defense: [A]s the court is well aware, Mrs. D'Amore who was the victim's wife in the last Sneed case is present in the courtroom with either her husband or her paramour or something. The court: I am puzzled about why she is here. I assume she is not a witness. Prosecutor: She called me to see if she could come down to see what happens in the second case. Defense: I am not particularly crazy about it, but I have no reason to say anything with regard to that. The court: Wait a minute. Is she doing anything with the jury other than sitting there? Defense: I don't know. When Your Honor gave the jury permission to go to the ladies room.... The court: They were accompanied by [a court officer]. Defense: That's correct, and I understand that M[r]s. D'Amore tried to go into the ladies room, and rightfully so, the [court officer] told M[r]s. D'Amore you cannot go in there. I assume [a court officer] took them into the men's room but [Mrs.] D'Amore's husband, or paramour or whatever, was walking in the hall  what I don't need is for somebody to do some talking out loud  and I'm only presupposing at this point  saying I would like to see this guy get what he deserves. The court: Please, sir, don't add anything you don't know.... I see no reason for them to be here, but I have no way in the law to keep them away. The only thing I can do is keep them away from the jury. N.T., 3/11/85, at 61-62. Two days later, prior to the start of closing arguments, defense counsel informed the court that one of the jurors, Alberta McCool, was approached by a woman in the bathroom. The court held a colloquy with Ms. McCool, during which she informed the court that the woman asked her about the wind and her hairdo and how she styled her hair. Ms. McCool stated that she did not respond to the woman, did not know who she was, and did not inform anyone but the court. Thereafter, to the assent of both the prosecutor and defense counsel, the court informed Mrs. D'Amore and her companion that they were no longer permitted in the courtroom. [17] N.T., 3/13/85, at 3-7. Based on the foregoing, Appellant contends that the actions of Mrs. D'Amore and her companion infected the trial proceedings, interfered with specific members of the jury, and interfered with [Appellant]'s rights to due process and an impartial jury. He maintains that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise and/or properly litigate this claim on appeal. Brief of Appellant at 37. An extraneous influence may compromise the impartiality and integrity of the jury, raising the specter of prejudice. See Carter by Carter v. U.S. Steel Corp., 529 Pa. 409, 604 A.2d 1010, 1015-16 (1992) (plurality). The relevant inquiry is whether the extraneous influence caused a reasonable likelihood of prejudice. Id. at 1016; see also Commonwealth v. Bradley, 501 Pa. 25, 459 A.2d 733, 739 (1983) (requiring showing that contact between member of the jury and court officer resulted in a reasonable likelihood of prejudice to defendant.). In making the reasonable likelihood of prejudice determination, the court must consider: (1) whether the extraneous influence relates to a central issue in the case or merely involves a collateral issue; (2) whether the extraneous influence provided the jury with information they did not have before them at trial; and (3) whether the extraneous influence was emotional or inflammatory in nature. Carter, 604 A.2d at 1017 (footnote omitted). The burden is on the party claiming prejudice. Id. While the contact was improper, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable likelihood that he suffered prejudice. Mrs. D'Amore's remarks bore no relation to the case and were innocuous. [18] Moreover, her comments were ambiguous and not of such a nature that it can be said without hesitation that the speaker intended to influence a decision adverse to [Appellant]. Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346, 357 (1999). Further, Appellant's claim is entirely speculative. Appellant made no proffer as to what trial counsel would say in response to this claim. Counsel was at the scene, he noticed the prospect of some supposed improper contact, the issue was explored, and nothing was developed that supports a claim on appeal that Appellant was somehow denied a fair trial because of innocuous remarks by a person who may have been related to another of Appellant's murder victims and who had as much right as any member of the public to attend Appellant's trial. Based on the record, we cannot conclude that Mrs. D'Amore's comments compromised the integrity of the jury. Consequently, this claim lacks arguable merit. Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1, 896 A.2d 1191, 1210 (2006). By extension, the PCRA court did not err in denying the claim without a hearing.