Opinion ID: 186699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to Xcel's Evidence

Text: 37 BNSF also challenges the Board's reliance upon certain evidence in Xcel's SAC presentation. As detailed below, we do not find its arguments persuasive. 38
39 BNSF contends the Board should have dismissed Xcel's complaint either (1) when BNSF, in its motion to dismiss, identified what it described as obvious, elementary, and fundamental errors in Xcel's operating plan, which assumed trains would travel at unrealistic speeds on the SARR, or (2) in its decision on the merits, when the Board instead substituted BNSF's proposed operating plan, with slower estimated train speeds and higher estimated costs, for Xcel's flawed plan. 40 First, the Board denied BNSF's threshold motion to dismiss after reviewing Xcel's SAC presentation and concluding the errors in Xcel's operating plan, upon which the motion to dismiss was based, appeared to be readily correctable without a significant redesign of the SARR and were not so large in magnitude or so egregious as to warrant dismissing the complaint at that early stage. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. d/b/a Xcel Energy v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., STB Docket No. 42057, 2003 WL 1788666, 2 (STB served April 4, 2003). The Board later explained that Xcel had made out a prima facie case by virtue of its good faith effort to present reasonable evidence on all of the basic components of the SAC test. Decision II, at 6. BNSF argues that by permitting Xcel to proceed with an admittedly flawed operating plan, the Board relieved Xcel of its burden of proving every element of its claim. 41 Although Xcel does bear the burden of persuasion, see Coal Rate Guidelines, 1 I.C.C.2d at 547 ([T]he complainant must demonstrate that the challenged rate is unreasonable), the complainant's initial presentation need not be flawless in order to resist a motion to dismiss. See 49 U.S.C. § 11701(b) (requiring dismissal of the complaint if it does not state reasonable grounds for investigation and action); McCarty Farms v. Burlington N., Inc., ICC Docket No. 37809, 1995 WL 55449, 8 (ICC served Feb. 1, 1995) (Unless the model is patently incapable of meeting the shipper's needs, we will presume that the stand-alone system is feasible unless and until its feasibility is challenged in the railroad's case-in-chief). Because of the sheer size of a SAC presentation, it will almost inevitably have some flaws to which the carrier can point. Therefore, we do not think the Board unreasonably refused to dismiss Xcel's complaint merely because its presentation was less than perfect. See Decision II, at 5 (Were we to entertain only those rate complaints where the railroad could not poke holes in the operating plan devised by the shipper for its SARR, almost every rate challenge [would have to be dismissed]). 42 Second, the Board's substitution for Xcel's flawed operating plan of a modified version of BNSF's own plan, did not relieve Xcel of the need to prove BNSF's rates were unreasonable. Rather the Board concluded that Xcel could and did meet its burden by using evidence submitted by (and more favorable to) BNSF. So long as the record supports that conclusion, BNSF has no cause to complain about the source of the evidence. Cf. Consol. Edison Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 992, 1008 (D.C.Cir.1999) ([T]he burden of proof requirement ... relates to the burden of persuasion ..., not to the burden of production, and thus the identity of the party submitting evidence is not dispositive). 43
44 BNSF also argues the Board should have excluded the largest movement on the SARR — the movement of coal to Western Resources' Jeffrey plant, which currently moves on a shorter and less congested route — because Xcel did not submit competent evidence that the rerouting was reasonable and would meet the shipper's transportation needs. Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., STB Docket No. 42056, 2003 WL 1523335, 21-24 (STB served Mar. 24, 2003). The Board used the data in BNSF's operating plan to compare the travel times and lengths of the two routes and concluded they would provide comparable service; it also added $150 million for additional capital investment in order to cover the costs of any congestion created by moving the traffic on the SARR. Decision I, at 20-22, 30. In so doing, the Board, we think, reasonably applied its own expertise to fill a minor gap in the record. See Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 386 U.S. 372, 430, 87 S.Ct. 1100, 18 L.Ed.2d 159 (1967) (Board is not the prisoner of the parties' submissions but rather has a duty to weigh alternatives and make its choice according to its judgment how best to achieve and advance the goals of the National Transportation Policy) (Brennan, J., concurring). 45
46 Finally, BNSF objects to the Board's reliance, in estimating revenues available to the SARR, upon a rate forecast produced by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the United States Department of Energy in preference to either of the forecasts proffered by the parties. BNSF, invoking [f]undamental principles of administrative law and due process, argues it was entitled to advance notice that the Board would take official notice of extra-record evidence so it could parry its effect. See Union Elec. Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 1193, 1202-04 (D.C.Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). BNSF protested generally the use of the EIA data in its motion for reconsideration, but unlike the petitioner in Union Electric, did not make a good showing it [could] contest the evidence. 890 F.2d at 1203 (citing Market St. Ry. v. R.R. Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548, 562, 65 S.Ct. 770, 89 L.Ed. 1171 (1945)). In fact, the carrier failed to identify any flaw in the evidence or even to request an additional opportunity in which to do so. 47 Due process requires only a meaningful opportunity to challenge new evidence, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), which opportunity BNSF failed to take in its application for rehearing. Cf. Opp. Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm'r of Wage & Hour Div., 312 U.S. 126, 152, 61 S.Ct. 524, 85 L.Ed. 624 (1941) (The demands of due process do not require a hearing, at the initial stage or at a particular point or at more than one point in an administrative proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective); Gutierrez-Rogue v. INS, 954 F.2d 769, 773 (D.C.Cir.1992) (an opportunity to rebut officially noticed facts satisfies due process). We have no occasion, therefore, to overturn the Board's decision on this ground.