Opinion ID: 3162657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Starling’s Motion For Postconviction Relief

Text: In April 2007, Starling filed three pro se Rule 61 motions for postconviction relief. 20 The Superior Court appointed counsel, who filed an Amended Petition for Postconviction Relief on April 1, 2008. During the next six years, the Superior Court held numerous hearings on various petitions and responses. At the postconviction relief hearings, Starling’s post-conviction counsel examined various individuals involved in his prosecution between 2001 and 2004. On November 26, 2012, one of the prosecutors testified about her recollections of dealing with the potential extradition of Gaines after he was shot in Chester, and of 17 Starling, 882 A.2d at 751. 18 Id. at 759. 19 Starling v. State, 903 A.2d 758, 767 (Del. 2006). 20 Starling, 2014 WL 4386127, at . 10 a possible cooperation agreement with Gaines.21 The prosecutor was not able to recall many details about her work on the case. She did, however, testify that she requested that the Superior Court withdraw a pending capias and VOP charges against Gaines such that he would not be extradited to Delaware. 22 The lead prosecutor also testified. He testified that he believed and told Trial Counsel before trial that Gaines’ VOP was “pending” and “we weren’t doing anything or that nothing was being done with them, they were being held in abeyance until after his trial . . . .” 23 Trial Counsel also testified and submitted an affidavit. Trial Counsel testified that he was not aware that the State had asked the Superior Court to withdraw the capias and Gaines’ VOP charges. Trial Counsel said that the State provided him with a summary of Gaines’ prior criminal history just before trial, which listed Gaines’ VOP charges as pending. Trial Counsel also testified that he forgot to ask Moore about the statements Moore made to an investigator—that neither of the photographs in the newspaper of suspects in the barbershop shooting, one of which was Starling, looked like the shooter. Moore had also described the shooter as substantially taller than Starling. According to Trial Counsel, Moore’s opinion that Starling did not look like the shooter “was something that obviously 21 App. to Opening Br. at 1178-273. 22 Id. at 1229. 23 Id. at 1333. 11 was favorable to the defense.”24 Additionally, Trial Counsel admitted that his failure to cross-examine Moore about it “certainly wasn’t strategic or tactical.” 25 Finally, Trial Counsel testified that he believed Michael’s statement was coerced and involuntary, but that rather than object to its admission, he sought to let the jury decide whether to believe it by playing them the recording of the entire interview. Starling based his Rule 61 motion on various grounds. We discuss only those necessary to resolve this appeal. First, Starling argued that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to examine Moore on his statements to an investigator. The Superior Court concluded that Trial Counsel was not ineffective for failing to do so because Starling failed to establish how “Moore’s testimony would have altered the outcome of Starling’s trial.” 26 The Court noted that various eyewitnesses testified regarding the shooter’s height and weight, and Starling made no showing that Moore’s additional testimony “would have altered the jury’s perception of the shooter’s body type in a way that would have produced a different trial outcome.” 27 24 Id. at 1840. 25 Id. (“I recall filling out the affidavit, shaking my head, I missed it, how did I miss it, I have no clue.”). Despite Trial Counsel’s attempts to recall Moore to the stand after realizing the mistake, he was unable to locate Moore. Id. at 1840-42; id. at 921. 26 Starling, 2014 WL 4386127, at . 27 Id. The record indicates that Starling had only one attorney representing him at trial. 12 Second, Starling asserted that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s admission of Michael’s statement to detectives into evidence. The Superior Court also rejected this argument. It observed that the tape’s introduction “permitted the jury to consider the credibility of Michael’s confession, thus providing potentially exculpatory evidence for Starling.” 28 Third, Starling argued that the State violated its obligation under Brady v. Maryland by withholding information useful to impeach Gaines’ testimony. At the recommendation of Gaines’ probation officer and the request of the Delaware Attorney General’s office, the State withdrew Gaines’ capias and VOP charges on October 17, 2001. 29 The Superior Court first concluded that Rule 61(i)(3) barred this claim. 30 On the merits, the Superior Court accepted the State’s assertion that it made no deal with Gaines, and concluded that the State allowed Gaines to remain in Pennsylvania because of safety concerns related to Starling’s alleged shooting of Gaines in Chester. 31 The Superior Court also explained that “disclosure was not 28 Id. at . 29 App. to Opening Br. at 358 (Probation Progress Report, Oct. 16, 2001). 30 Starling, 2014 WL 4386127, at . 31 See id. at  (“According to the State, there was no deal between the State and Gaines. The Court accepts the representations of the prosecutors who emphatically disclaimed that there was any deal with Gaines and stated firmly that no promises had been made to Gaines in exchange for his testimony.”). 13 mandated because Trial Counsel . . . knew that Gaines’ probation had been discharged.” 32 The Superior Court rejected these arguments for postconviction relief and his other claims. Starling renews the same claims on appeal.33