Opinion ID: 1959999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Propriety of the Prosecutor's Remarks

Text: As a general rule, prosecutors may not express their personal opinions or beliefs about the credibility of witnesses or about the truth of testimony. [5] As a corollary to this rule, we have held that prosecutors may refer to statements or testimony as a lie only (1) if one may legitimately infer from the evidence that the statement is a lie and (2) if the prosecutor relates his argument to specific evidence which tends to show that the testimony or statement is a lie. [6] As officers of the court and as representatives of the State, prosecutors have a special duty to ensure that any convictions are based on the evidence presented at trial, rather than on the basis of the prosecutor's personal opinions. [7] Where prosecutors fail to provide an evidentiary foundation for their conclusions about the truthfulness of a witness, they impermissibly tip the scales against the defense. [8] Applying this analysis to the present case, [9] the State correctly asserts that its manipulation-of-the-truth comment is at least arguably supported by the evidence. In particular, Waters testified that Clayton was not present when the undercover agent first approached Waters, but the videotape of the conversation showed that another person, later identified as Clayton, was present. Yet the prosecutor's comment did not discuss the videotape or other specific evidence indicating that Waters had manipulated the truth. [10] As a result, the prosecutor's comment about Waters' testimony was improper because the jury could interpret the comment as an official condemnation of the testimony by the State. [11] Another corollary of the general rule prohibiting counsel from commenting on the truth of testimony is the prohibition on personally vouching for the credibility of a witness. The Court in Saunders v. State [12] defined improper vouching as a prosecutor's comment implying personal knowledge of the truth of a witness' statement beyond that logically inferred from the evidence presented at trial. The Saunders Court was particularly concerned that such remarks amount to an official endorsement of the witness' testimony. [13] The prosecutor's repeated assertions that the State's witnesses offered consistent testimony and had not manipulated the truth present a potentially serious problem under this analysis. The State suggests that these comments are permissible because the jury could have inferred from the evidence that the State's witnesses had not changed their testimony and had not manipulated the truth. This conclusion is based on a misreading of Saunders. The Saunders Court held that the jury must be able to infer logically from the evidence that the prosecutor's comment is accurate. [14] The use of the modifier logically indicates that the inference must be the product of some form of deductive reasoning and not merely a permissible inference. For example, the prosecutor's assertion that the State's witnesses had been consistent can be deduced from the evidence: If the witnesses have not contradicted themselves in their testimony or in their prior statements, they have arguably been consistent. [15] But the prosecutor's assertion that its witnesses had not manipulated the truth has no such logical basis in the evidence. Although the jury is free to infer that the State's witnesses testified truthfully, nothing in the evidence necessarily or logically leads to this conclusion. By asserting that the State's witnesses had not manipulated the truth, the prosecutor improperly endorsed the testimony of these witnesses. Consequently, the prosecutor's comments constituted impermissible vouching.