Opinion ID: 1271254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of Comparative Negligence.

Text: undermined by this court's adoption of comparative negligence in Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982). They reason that the doctrine of joint and several liability only made sense when courts had no method for apportioning damages among co-tortfeasors. Now, they argue, comparative negligence under Goetzman provides a method for the division of damages between a plaintiff and defendants based on the percentage each party's negligence bears to the total negligence that proximately caused the damages. They therefore urge us to use the same rationale whether or not a plaintiff is negligent and apportion damages among defendants as well. The Farises also assert that fairness demands that they be held liable for no more than the percentage of negligence attributable to them, again citing Goetzman where we said: Under a system of comparative negligence, the keystone to fairness is proportionate responsibility for fault, not the relative severity of injuries. Each party's recovery of damages is reduced in proportion to that party's responsibility for them. As a result, no one is unjustly enriched. 327 N.W.2d at 754. In response, plaintiff argues that the adoption of comparative negligence need not automatically mandate the abrogation of joint and several liability. She relies heavily on cases from other jurisdictions which have judicially adopted comparative negligence but retained joint and several liability. Of the six jurisdictions that have judicially adopted comparative negligence and also addressed the issue of joint and several liability, only New Mexico has abrogated the doctrine. Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct.App.), cert. denied 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982). Alaska, California, Illinois, Michigan and West Virginia have not. Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979); American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 578, 146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899 (1978); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill.2d 104, 73 Ill.Dec. 337, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983); Weeks v. Feltner, 99 Mich.App. 392, 297 N.W.2d 678 (1980); Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 679 (W.Va.1982). B. Before analyzing the parties' contentions and the cases on which they rely, we note that both the plaintiff and the defendants focus primarily, as will we, on cases from other jurisdictions like Iowa which have adopted comparative negligence by judicial decision. The legal analysis is necessarily different in jurisdictions whose law is based on comparative negligence statutes of various types or whose statutes have specifically abolished or modified joint and several liability. At last count (from checking authorities cited by the parties) of the thirty-eight other states that have adopted comparative negligence by statute or judicial decision, twenty-nine have completely retained joint and several liability, five have retained the doctrine in a modified form, and only three have done away with it (two by statute, one by court decision). Neither do the parties here contend that we should in any way base our decision on the recently-enacted Iowa statute which will take effect on July 1, 1984 and provides: The doctrine of joint and several liability shall not apply if a plaintiff is found to bear any comparative negligence with respect to any claim. 1983 Iowa Acts ch. 198, § 28. That statute is inapplicable here because of its delayed effective date and because plaintiff was neither alleged nor found to have been negligent. C. Farises do make one statute-based public policy argument, contending that Iowa Code chapter 516A discloses an intent to require plaintiffs rather than defendants to bear the risk that one of several defendants will be insolvent. While the issue of joint and several liability does present the policy question of who should pay for the insolvent tortfeasor, we find neither an express nor implied answer to that policy question in chapter 516A. The statute merely requires automobile insurers to make uninsured motorist coverage available to owners of automobiles who purchase insurance. It is relevant only in those tort cases that involve owners of automobiles who choose to purchase insurance. Moreover, Iowa does not even require motorists to have liability insurance. Iowa Code ch. 321A (1983); Walker v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 340 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1983). Our decision therefore does not turn on statutory interpretation. We must rather find in the common law decisions of Iowa and other states our answer to the question whether the doctrine of joint and several liability is reasonably compatible with comparative negligence and basically sound and fair in its application to this case. D. To determine whether the long-established Iowa doctrine of joint and several liability is compatible with pure comparative negligence we must reexamine Goetzman. The holding was clear: We hold that in all cases in which contributory negligence has previously been a complete defense, it is supplanted by the doctrine of comparative negligence. In such cases contributory negligence will not bar recovery but shall reduce it in the proportion that the contributory negligence bears to the total negligence that proximately caused the damages. 327 N.W.2d at 754. That holding delineated a rule for a specific category of cases and displaced a single doctrine, the doctrine of contributory negligence. Goetzman eliminated in that specific category of cases the total bar to recovery which a negligent plaintiff had faced under contributory negligence. A quid pro quo was effected. The contributory negligence bar to recovery was replaced by a formula for reducing the amount that the plaintiff would be allowed to recover. The amount of the plaintiff's recovery would be reduced in that proportion (by that percentage) that the plaintiff's negligence bears to the total negligence that proximately caused damages. We found that percentage reduction a sufficient penalty for plaintiffs to pay for their own negligence. Goetzman left room for us to retain joint and several liability and find that any one defendant is still liable for payment of the reduced amount a plaintiff recovers from that defendant and others jointly causing the injury. In contrast, the underlying basis for joint and several liability in Iowa is that when the negligent acts of two or more defendants proximately cause a plaintiff's injury and the injury is indivisible, the plaintiff may sue the defendants jointly and severally and recover against one or all. McDonald v. Robinson, 207 Iowa at 1295-97, 224 N.W. at 821-22; see also Restatement of Torts (Second) § 875 (1977). This is compatible with comparative negligence; under Goetzman, the injury is not divided but the recovery for the injury is proportionately reduced. The actors who caused harm are liable not for the entire harm but for the proportionally reduced amount. For that amount defendants may, consistent with our theory of comparative negligence, be held jointly liable. Were we to modify or eliminate joint and several liability as Farises here advocate, the burden of the insolvent defendant would fall entirely on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's damages would be reduced beyond the percentage of negligence attributable to that plaintiff. Comparative negligence does not mandate this further reduction. Our conclusion is supported by the great weight of authority from other states which have decided the issue on common law principles. The doctrine of comparative negligence has been retained in all but one of the six jurisdictions which have adopted comparative negligence by judicial decision and addressed the issue. The reasons given by those five courts have not been uniform but the underlying principle remains. Each of the five has concluded that negligent defendants should in fairness continue to bear the full responsibility for payment of the reduced amount a comparatively negligent plaintiff may recover in damages. New Mexico courts alone have reached a contrary result, concluding that fairness to all the parties and not just plaintiffs require the abrogation of joint and several liability in that state. Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation Inc., 100 N.M. at 140, 667 P.2d at 447 (dictum); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Co., 98 N.M. at 159, 646 P.2d at 585. We disagree, finding more persuasive the reasoning given by the Illinois Supreme Court which we find consistent with our Goetzman decision: Were we to eliminate joint and several liability as the defendant advocates, the burden of the insolvent or immune defendant would fall on the plaintiff; in that circumstance, plaintiff's damages would be reduced beyond the percentage of fault attributable to him. We do not believe the doctrine of comparative negligence requires this further reduction. Nor do we believe this burden is the price plaintiffs must pay for being relieved of the contributory negligence bar. The quid pro quo is the reduction of plaintiff's damages. Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill.2d at 123, 454 N.E.2d at 205 (emphasis in original). Similarly, a Michigan court of appeals decision succinctly summarized the reason comparative negligence in that state did not undermine joint and several liability: Unlike the concept of contributory negligence [comparative negligence] avoids unduly penalizing a plaintiff for his own fault. Weeks v. Feltner, 99 Mich.App. at 395, 297 N.W.2d at 680. We hold that Iowa's joint and several liability doctrine is both sound as applied in this case and unaffected by our adoption of pure comparative negligence. The trial court correctly held all defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the plaintiff's judgment. AFFIRMED.