Opinion ID: 1363797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: counsel retained by parents

Text: The issue here is whether a defendant who is in custody and has had an attorney retained for him by his family can waive his right to counsel where the attorney's retention is known by police officials, but is not known by the defendant. We have not had occasion to discuss this issue in any of our prior cases. Other jurisdictions have decided this issue with varying results. The most restrictive approach has been taken by the New York Court of Appeals, which has held that once the police know or have been apprised of the fact that a defendant is represented by counsel, the right to counsel attaches and this right to counsel cannot be waived by the defendant in the absence of such counsel. People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968). [5] A majority of other jurisdictions are less restrictive than New York and hold that a defendant who is being held for custodial interrogation must be advised, in addition to the Miranda rights, that counsel has been retained or appointed to represent him where the law enforcement officials involved have knowledge of the attorney's retention or appointment. This rule is based on the theory that without this information, a defendant cannot be said to have voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 703 P.2d 667 (Colo.App.1985); Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674 (Del.1983); People v. Smith, 93 Ill.2d 179, 66 Ill.Dec. 412, 442 N.E.2d 1325 (1982); State v. Matthews, 408 So.2d 1274 (La.1982); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 490 A.2d 1228 (1985); Elfadl v. State, 61 Md.App. 132, 485 A.2d 275 (1985); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 355 Mass. 313, 244 N.E.2d 560 (1969); State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d 150, 472 N.E.2d 1097 (1984), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1845, 85 L.Ed.2d 144 (1985); Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528 (Okla.Ct.Crim.App.1984); State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979) (In Banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 2175, 64 L.Ed.2d 802 (1980); State v. Jones, 19 Wash.App. 850, 578 P.2d 71 (1978). [6] The Oregon Supreme Court has formulated one of the most commonly quoted reasons for requiring law enforcement officials to adivse a defendant that counsel has been retained or appointed for him in order to effectuate a valid Miranda waiver in State v. Haynes, 288 Or. at 72, 602 P.2d at 278: To pass up an abstract offer to call some unknown lawyer is very different from refusing to talk with an identified attorney actually available to provide at least initial assistance and advice, whatever might be arranged in the long run. A suspect indifferent to the first offer may well react quite differently to the second. If the attorney appears on request of one's family, that fact may inspire additional confidence. (Footnote omitted). The Delaware Supreme Court spoke forcefully on this issue in Weber v. State, 457 A.2d at 685-86: When a suspect does not know that an attorney, who has been retained or properly designated to represent him, is actually present in the police station seeking an opportunity to render legal assistance, and the police do not inform him of that fact, there can be no intelligent and knowing waiver.... The Miranda warnings indicate to the suspect an abstract right to counsel, and the waiver of that right only means that for the moment the suspect is foregoing the exercise of that conceptual privilege. But that is clearly distinct from the opportunity to confer with a specifically retained or designated attorney who is actually present, seeking to render legal assistance.... ... To allow the police to use tactics which prevent or forestall a suspect from exercising his rights is inconsistent with the clear purpose of Miranda .... Furthermore, the use of such tactics is logically incongruous with the concept of a knowing and intelligent waiver.... (Citations omitted). We are persuaded by the majority view which holds that a defendant being held for custodial interrogation must be advised, in addition to the Miranda rights, that counsel has been retained or appointed to represent him where the law enforcement officials involved have knowledge of the attorney's retention or appointment. To allow law enforcement officials simply to recite the Miranda rights without mentioning the availability of a specific attorney is inherently deceptive and cannot be countenanced if the principles of Miranda are to retain their validity. Some courts incorrectly have characterized the majority view we have adopted as a variation of the restrictive New York rule, but we disagree. We previously rejected the New York rule, which requires the presence of counsel to waive the right to counsel, in State v. Wyer, ___ W.Va. ___, 320 S.E.2d 92 (1984). In Wyer, we discussed at some length the difference between the right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. We cited Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), where the United States Supreme Court pointed out, as it had done in earlier cases, that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel was created in Miranda as an adjunct to the defendant's right against self-incrimination. This Fifth Amendment right to counsel is triggered when a defendant is taken into custody by law enforcement officials who desire to interrogate him. [7] The Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises, as we observed in Wyer, when adversary judicial proceedings have been commenced against a defendant and we quoted from Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, 436 (1977): Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him`whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' [ Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411, 417 (1972).] (Citations omitted). See also State v. Gravely, ___ W.Va. ___, 299 S.E.2d 375 (1982). After concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached in Wyer, we held in Syllabus Point 3, in part: There is no per se rule against a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We do, however, hold that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be judged by stricter standards than a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.... [8] In Syllabus Point 4 of Wyer, we set out the requirements for the waiver of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and concluded, in addition to the Miranda rights, he must be informed of the nature of the charge and must execute a written waiver of his rights. [9] Thus, Wyer, which involved the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, clearly rejects the New York rule, which is premised on the right to counsel under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The central issue raised in the present case is the validity of the defendant's three waivers of the right to counsel. We have held that courts will `indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of a fundamental constitutional right and will not presume acquiescence in the loss of such fundamental right.' Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Browning v. Boles, 149 W.Va. 181, 139 S.E.2d 263 (1964) (citation omitted). See also State v. McNeal, 162 W.Va. 550, 555, 251 S.E.2d 484, 487 (1978), citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938). McNeal also noted that the burden is on the State to prove the waiver and cited Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d at 439-40, which summarized this law as follows: [I]n determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law ... it was incumbent upon the State to prove `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. [at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023, 82 L.Ed. at 1466, 146 A.L.R. at 362]. That standard has been reiterated in many cases. We have said that the right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant... and that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver.... This strict standard applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings.... (Citations omitted). After examining the facts of this case in light of the foregoing law, we conclude the State met its burden in proving the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel. On June 26, 1981, after he had voluntarily allowed Mr. Leonard to take him into custody, the defendant was advised of the Miranda rights on three different occasions by three different law enforcement officials. On each occasion, the defendant initialed and signed the forms indicating he understood his rights and then signed the waiver part of the forms. The critical factor in the present case is that the defendant was advised that his parents had contacted an attorney and was asked if he wanted the attorney present. This information was given by Prosecutor Roark who, as earlier noted, testified that the defendant indicated he did not want anybody. This conversation was corroborated by Mr. Leonard and Officer Lee, who were present in the room at the time. Since the defendant was fully informed of his Miranda rights and of the fact that his family had contacted an attorney on his behalf and was asked if he wanted to consult with the attorney, which he declined, we conclude the defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. [10]