Opinion ID: 1058945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Summary Judgment for Defendant Clarke

Text: Although the trial court did not make specific findings of fact, the Court of Appeals determined that the summary judgment granted to Dr. Clarke was based on the standard of care requirement set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(a)(1). This statute embraces the so-called locality rule, which requires that the standard of professional care in a medical malpractice action be based upon the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community. As this Court recently explained: A medical expert relied upon by a plaintiff must have knowledge of the standard of professional care in the defendant's applicable community or knowledge of the standard of professional care in a community that is shown to be similar to the defendant's community. Robinson v. LeCorps, 83 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tenn.2002). We also clarified that while an expert's discussion of a national standard of care does not require exclusion of the testimony, such evidence may not substitute for evidence that first establishes the requirements of Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a)(1). Id.; see also Sutphin v. Platt, 720 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tenn.1986). In Robinson , this Court held that the trial court properly excluded testimony from an expert witness who purported to testify about the standard of care for orthopaedic surgeons in Nashville, Tennessee. The expert testified that Nashville is certainly recognized as a regional medical center, and communication and training are such ... that the two standards, locally, as held in Nashville and for that matter where I practiced in Johnson City, would be expected to be the same, and also the same as a national standard. Robinson, 83 S.W.3d at 721. [5] In holding that the testimony failed to satisfy Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(a)(1), we stressed that the expert did not relate the basis for his knowledge of the standard of care in Nashville or indicate why the Nashville medical community was similar to, and thus had the same standard of professional care as the community with which [the expert] was familiar. Id. at 725. In this case, contrary to Robinson , we agree with the Court of Appeals' assessment that the plaintiff presented expert testimony establishing the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in Franklin, Tennessee, or in a similar community. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a)(1) (Supp.2002). First, Dr. Uhrig did not rely upon a national standard of care, nor did he simply equate the local standard with a national standard. Moreover, although Dr. Uhrig had never practiced medicine in the State of Tennessee, he testified that he had reviewed over twenty medical charts from the State of Tennessee and had testified in three other malpractice cases in middle Tennessee. In addition, Dr. Uhrig stated in his supplemental affidavit that he had reviewed statistical information about the medical community in Williamson County, Tennessee, which included information about the medical specialists and resources available at the Williamson County Medical Center. Unlike the expert proof in Robinson , Dr. Uhrig also expressed understanding of the locality rule and explained that he had applied the locality standard of careand not a national standardto the facts and circumstances in this case. Moreover, Dr. Uhrig did not simply offer a vague, conclusory statement that he was familiar with the local standard but instead showed some underlying basis for his testimony. In sum, all of these factors distinguish this case from Robinson and should be considered by the trial court when determining whether an expert's testimony satisfies the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(a)(1). Dr. Clarke, however, contends that the trial court should not have considered Dr. Uhrig's supplemental affidavit and that his statements were based on information provided several years after the alleged malpractice in this case. We are not persuaded. First, we find no error in the trial court's consideration of Dr. Uhrig's supplemental affidavit because it was filed in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment before the trial court's ruling. Second, we note that Dr. Clarke's arguments essentially contest the weight of Dr. Uhrig's statements and thus misapprehend the procedural context of this case: the proper analysis with respect to summary judgment is whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, raises a genuine issue as to a material fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals properly held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Dr. Clarke. It follows that the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Clarke was also erroneous. [6]