Opinion ID: 1146584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Verified ComplaintโSubject Matter or Personal Jurisdiction?

Text: The majority relies in large part on the statement of the two types of jurisdiction set out in the case of Woolf v. McGaugh, 175 Ala. 299, 57 So. 754 (1911). [2] See the majority opinion, at 1137. It is important to note that Woolf is a civil case, [3] and, therefore, that the jurisdictional analysis in that case fails to touch upon the subtle, yet strict, element of subject matter jurisdiction present in criminal cases; namely, that a court, having a general subject matter jurisdiction over the class of crimes within which the defendant is charged and the defendant's voluntary appearance, must, nevertheless, have its power to adjudge a particular offense properly invoked by the State's filing the accusation in lawful form. An excellent explanation of this principle is set out with particularity in the case of Pease v. State, 74 Ind.App. 572, 129 N.E. 337 (1921): The word `jurisdiction' is sometimes used in a general sense, and sometimes in a particular sense. In the general sense it signifies the abstract right of a tribunal to exercise its power in causes of a certain class. In the particular sense it relates to the right of a tribunal to exercise its power with respect to a particular matter. The former is conferred by the Constitution or statutes, but the latter is conferred by instituting an action in a lawful and proper manner. For a concrete illustration: A. holds a promissory note in the sum of $100 against B. and secured by mortgage on B.'s real estate; a controversy concerning payment arises between the parties, and A. concludes to call upon the state to aid him in enforcing his claim against B. by foreclosure proceedings. To what court shall A. go for relief? By consulting the statutes he may learn that a justice of the peace is empowered to hear and determine an action on a promissory note of that amount and to render a personal judgment, but has not been empowered to foreclose a mortgage. From the same source he may learn, also, that the circuit court has been empowered to hear and determine the whole matter and to grant all the relief to which A. may be entitled. In other words, the circuit court has been designated by law as a proper court in which to bring causes of the class to which A.'s cause of action belongs, and has been authorized by law to hear and determine causes of that class. Hence it is commonly said in an abstract sense that the circuit court has general jurisdiction of the subject. In other words, the subject is within the scope of that court's authority. But it has no jurisdiction of the particular controversy between A. and B., and has no right to exercise jurisdiction of that particular subject-matter until an action has been commenced and perfected in a lawful and proper manner. Under our Code an action is commenced when a complaint has been filed and summons issued. By filing his complaint and taking out a summons A. submits himself and his cause of action to the court; and service on B., or his voluntary appearance, perfects the action and gives the court complete jurisdiction of the particular subject-matter involved. [Citations omitted.]  The same principle holds good, of course, in criminal law. In this branch of the law, however, the principle is applied with greater strictness. To illustrate: if the prosecuting attorney for Marion County should be of the opinion that C. has committed the crime of burglary, and has determined to prosecute him for that offense, he may readily learn by consulting the statutes that the criminal court has general jurisdiction to try and determine causes of the class to which a prosecution for burglary belongs. However, the criminal court can have no jurisdiction, and cannot enter upon a trial, of the particular controversy between the state and C. until an action has been commenced and perfected in a lawful and proper manner. In this state it has been held consistently that a criminal action can be commenced only in the manner provided by law, and that it is the filing of the accusation in lawful form that invokes the jurisdiction of the court in the particular cause. [Citations omitted.] It is a universal principle as old as the law that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment void. Springer v. Shavender, 118 N.C. 33, 23 S.E. 976, 54 Am.St.Rep. 708. There can be no conviction or punishment for crime, except on accusation made in the manner prescribed by law. The Legislature has provided that all public offenses, except treason and murder, may be prosecuted in the circuit or criminal court, by affidavit filed in term time, that the first pleading on the part of the state is either an indictment or affidavit, and that the affidavit shall have the approval of the Prosecuting Attorney indorsed thereon. Sections 1989, 2039, Burns' Ann.St. 1914. It is essential that there be a strict compliance with the legislative requirements concerning the commencement of a criminal action, for the power of the Legislature to prescribe the requirements is plenary. [Citations omitted.] In the case at bar the defendant participated in the proceedings and seems to have made no objection on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction until after the pretended judgment. But his conduct in that respect did not estop him from afterward raising the question of jurisdiction. Even his unqualified consent could not confer jurisdiction; for the question of jurisdiction was a matter between the Legislature and the court, and not between the parties. The jurisdiction of the courts is in reality a power inherent in the state, and is conferred on the courts either directly by the people through their Constitution, or indirectly through the Legislature by laws duly enacted. [Citations omitted.] The legislature, having in mind the liberties of the people, has declared that no citizen shall be put on trial for a public offense except on indictment or affidavit. Manifestly the legislative purpose is to shield and protect the individual from the disgrace, expense, and hazard involved in a criminal prosecution in so far as that may be done consistently with the public welfare. The Legislature has determined that the public welfare is best promoted by saving the individual from the criminal prosecution unless the accusation rests on sworn testimony given to the grand jury or on a sworn statement in the form of an affidavit.  (Emphasis added.) 74 Ind.App. at 574-77, 129 N.E. at 338-39. Similarly, in Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887), the United States Supreme Court granted the defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus for the reason that the defendant was convicted upon an indictment which had been amended, without his consent, by the trial court upon the motion of the United States attorney. Construing the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, after which our Amendment 37, supra, is modeled, providing that [N]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, the Court held: We are thus not left to the requirements of the common law in regard to the necessity of a grand jury or a trial jury, but there is the positive and restrictive language of the great fundamental instrument by which the national government is organized, that `no person shall be held to answer' for such a crime, `unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury.' But even at common law it is beyond question that in the English courts indictments could not be amended.... The learned judge who presided in the circuit court at the time the change was made in this indictment, says that the court allowed the words, `comptroller of the currency and,' to be stricken out as surplusage, and required the defendant to plead to the indictment as it then read. The opinion ... rests the validity of the court's action in permitting the change in the indictment upon the ground that the words stricken out were surplusage, and were not at all material to it, and that no injury was done to the prisoner by allowing such change to be made. He goes on to argue that the grand jury would have found the indictment without this language. But it is not for the court to say whether they would or not.... [H]ow can it be said that, with these words stricken out, it is the indictment which was found by the grand jury? If it lies within the province of a court to change the charging part of an indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to have been, or what the grand jury would probably have made it if their attention had been called to suggested changes, the great importance which the common law attaches to an indictment by a grand jury, as a prerequisite to a prisoner's trial for a crime, and without which the constitution says `no person shall be held to answer,' may be frittered away until its value is almost destroyed. ... We are of the opinion that an indictment found by a grand jury was indispensable to the power of the court to try the petitioner for the crime with which he was charged.... It only remains to consider whether this change in the indictment deprived the court of the power of proceeding to try the petitioner and sentence him to the imprisonment provided for in the statute. We have no difficulty in holding that the indictment on which he was tried was no indictment of a grand jury. The decisions which we have already referred to, as well as sound principle, require us to hold that after the indictment was changed it was no longer the indictment of the grand jury who presented it. Any other doctrine would place the rights of the citizen, which were intended to be protected by the constitutional provisions, at the mercy or control of the court or prosecuting attorney; for, if it be once held that changes can be made by the consent or the order of the court in the body of the indictment as presented by the grand jury, and the prisoner can be called upon to answer to the indictment as thus changed, the restriction which the constitution places upon the power of the court, in regard to the prerequisite of an indictment, in reality no longer exists. It is of no avail, under such circumstances, to say that the court still has jurisdiction of the person and of the crime, for, though it has possession of the person, and would have jurisdiction of the crime, if it were properly presented by indictment, the jurisdiction of the offense is gone, and the court has no right to proceed any further in the progress of the case for want of an indictment. If there is nothing before the court which the prisoner, in the language of the constitution, can be `held to answer,' he is then entitled to be discharged so far as the offense originally presented to the court by the indictment is concerned. The power of the court to proceed to try the prisoner is as much arrested as if the indictment had been dismissed or a nolle prosequi had been entered. (Emphasis added.) 121 U.S. at 6, 9-10, 12-14, 7 S.Ct. at 784-788. Identical principles have been embraced in this jurisdiction with respect to indictments. See discussion, supra. And, although the majority dismisses them as founded upon inappropriate reasoning, for over 100 years the courts of this state have repeatedly applied these principles, sometimes expressly, sometimes implicitly, to cases involving fatally defective and insufficient complaints and informations in state prosecutions. An accusation made in the manner prescribed by law (constitutional or statutory) is a prerequisite to the court's power to exercise its jurisdiction over a criminal offense. This is true even though the court still has jurisdiction of the person and of the crime. Ex parte Bain, supra . Compare Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 250, 71 L.Ed. 505 (1927), where the United States Supreme Court, construing waivability of an improperly verified warrant of arrest under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, held: The invalidity of the warrant [of arrest] is not comparable to the invalidity of an indictment. A person may not be punished for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation even if he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court. Compare Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849. But a false arrest does not necessarily deprive the court of jurisdiction of the proceeding in which it was made. Where there was an appropriate accusation either by indictment or information, a court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by his voluntary appearance. That a defendant may be brought before the court by a summons, without an arrest, is shown by the practice in prosecutions against corporations which are necessarily commenced by a summons. Here, the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter; and the persons named as defendants were within its territorial jurisdiction. The judgment assailed would clearly have been good, if the objection had not been taken until after the verdict. This shows that the irregularity in the warrant was of such a character that it could be waived.... (Footnotes omitted.) (Emphasis added.) 273 U.S. at 8-9, 47 S.Ct. at 252-253. [4] In Ethridge v. State, 76 Tex.Crim.R. 41, 172 S.W. 784 (1915), the defendant was tried for a misdemeanor offense only upon a complaint. No information was filed. The Constitution of Texas (art. 5, ง 17) allowed for this, providing that prosecutions may be commenced ... by information..., or by affidavit as may be provided by law. A Texas statute, however, provided: If the offense be a misdemeanor, the attorney shall forthwith prepare an information, and file the same, together with the complaint, in the court having jurisdiction of the offense. Noting that, under such circumstances, an information is just as much a jurisdictional prerequisite in misdemeanor cases as an indictment is in felony cases, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held: The Legislature is vested with authority, doubtless, to prescribe that the case may be tried, in misdemeanors, in the county court without filing an information under the language of articles 5, 6, and 17 of the Constitution, or it may require that the information be filed. This has not only not been done, but the opposite is required. The Legislature has provided that the information shall be filed, based upon a complaint or affidavit. This would settle the question beyond dispute. Construing the Constitution and the statutes, the courts have invariably held that the county court cannot acquire jurisdiction or try a misdemeanor where it originated in the county court, until an information has been filed. [Citations omitted.] This court will reverse a conviction from the county court where an information was not filed in that court, provided the case originated in the county court, whether there was a motion made in the trial court or not. It is a jurisdictional question. An information is as prerequisite, under such circumstances, in the county court, as is the indictment in a felony prosecution in the district court. To hold that a party could waive an information in the county court would be equivalent to holding substantially that the party could waive an indictment in a felony prosecution. The invalidity of a prosecution originating in the county court without an information has been decided so often, and has become so thoroughly the settled law, it is deemed unnecessary to discuss the matter or cite further authorities. (Emphasis added.) 75 Tex.Crim.R. at 42, 172 S.W. at 785. Accord Davis v. State, 150 Tex.Crim.R. 463, 202 S.W.2d 943 (1947). See also Harris v. State, 46 Del. Ill, 82 A.2d 387 (1951). [5] In State v. Coleman, 186 Mo. 151, 84 S.W. 978 (1905), the Missouri Supreme Court noted that the state constitution had been amended so as to allow prosecutions for murder by information instead of by indictment. The court, nevertheless, held that an information for a crime, which is prosecuted at common law only by an indictment found upon the oath of the grand jurors, should conclude upon the oath of the prosecuting attorney, and that the information is invalid if it is not so sworn. Therefore, the court concluded, the information being invalid, the question of its validity may be properly raised for the first time in the supreme court. See also State v. Chacon, 62 N.M. 291, 309 P.2d 230 (1957), where the court held that a criminal complaint subscribed to only by the county sheriff was insufficient to give the court jurisdiction to accept defendant's guilty plea; constitutional provisions requiring grand jury indictment or information by district attorney in felony cases were deemed mandatory and nonwaivable. Particularly on point is a line of New York cases beginning with People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383, 79 N.E. 330 (1906). In that case, the New York Court of Appeals held that, based on the definition of criminal complaint contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure (viz., the allegation made to a magistrate, that a person has been guilty of some designated crime), a criminal complaint must be made in writing upon an oath. The court explained: The statute does not expressly provide that it is to be sworn to, nor even that it must be in writing, although the word `allegation' from the analogy of other judicial proceedings points to that formality....  From all the analogies of the law, both civil and criminal, the information is intended to be made upon oath. While the statute does not expressly require it, we think it is necessarily implied, for otherwise an unfounded accusation could be set on foot and an investigation instituted upon unsupported assertion without any proof whatever.... Neither the great lawyers who drafted the Code of Criminal Procedure nor the Legislature which enacted it into law intended that a criminal investigation should be made by a magistrate without evidence given under the sanction of an oath and subject to the penalty for perjury if wilfully false. ... The information should fairly warrant the inference by the magistrate that in good faith and on reasonable grounds the complainant believes that a definite crime has been committed by a designated person. There is then a proper foundation upon which to issue subpoenas and take depositions, whereas without it the inquiry is prosecuted on the mere chance that some crime may be discovered.... The highest care of the law is personal liberty, and, construing the statute in the light of that principle, we think that the respondent was without jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding or to require the attendance of witnesses, because sufficient proof was not laid before him. ... We are of the opinion that the subpoena issued by the magistrate was void upon its face, and that it called for obedience to its commands on the part of no one. (Emphasis added.) 186 N.Y. at 390-93, 79 N.E. at 332-34. Accord People v. Tompkins, 202 Misc. 147, 114 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1952) (requirement of written information not waived by a plea of guilty). Four other New York decisions are squarely on point. They are People v. Scott, 3 N.Y.2d 148, 164 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1957); People v. Semonite, 18 Misc.2d 427, 189 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1959); People v. Ragusa, 44 Misc.2d 940, 255 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1964); and People v. Dros, 11 N.Y.2d 167, 227 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1962). In People v. Scott, supra , the defendant was stopped by a police officer and issued a uniform traffic ticket charging the defendant with driving while intoxicated. The defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a $25 fine or 25 days in jail. The defendant paid the fine and was granted permission to appeal. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that [f]rom the form of the ticket or summons prescribed by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, pursuant to the authority granted in section 74 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, it is clear that it is not intended to fulfill the function of an information. The court went on to hold at 3 N.Y.2d at 151-53, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 709-12, as follows: Provision for the new form of uniform traffic ticket did not change the previously existing law that the summons was not the process which instituted a criminal proceeding; indeed, in section 74-b of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the necessity for a verified complaint in a criminal proceeding in addition to the summons was recognized, and the aforesaid regulations (Uniform Traffic Ticket Regulations; N.Y.Off.Comp. of Codes, Rules & Regulations, 10th Off.Supp., 1955, p. 734) provide that `no uniform complaint is prescribed at this time.' No complaint or information was here placed before the court. In this case, where defendant is charged with the commission of a misdemeanor and not a minor offense ( People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 141, 183 N.E. 273, 274, 86 A.L.R. 1266), it is not disputed that a written information is required, and the law in this respect appears to be well settled. [Citations omitted.] An additional objection to the use of the traffic ticket as an information is that it is not verified. It has been frequently held not only that an information is necessary but, that where it is used as the basis for obtaining a warrant of arrest, it must be verified. [Citations omitted.] In our opinion, the same reasons of policy which we stated in People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383, 79 N.E. 330, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 159, supra, require verification of an information when used as a basis for obtaining a warrant of arrest, require verification of an information when used as a pleading. The rule in the Federal courts is not to the contrary, for there the informations are filed by the United States Attorneys under their oaths of office, and are thus not required to be verified. [Citations omitted.] We turn now to the question of whether defendant has waived his objection to the lack of an information by his plea of guilty. It is well settled that by such a plea he waives his objection to the form of the information, or where it is based on information and belief without disclosing the source thereof. [Citations omitted.]  However, objections to the jurisdiction of the court are not waived, nor is the objection that the information does not state a crime. [Citations omitted.] In the present case, therefore the question is whether the absence of a verified information is a formal or a jurisdictional defect. Some earlier lower court decisions have held that it is a formal defect, which is waived by a plea of guilty ( City of Buffalo v. Murphy, 228 App.Div. 279, 286, 239 N.Y.S. 206, 215; City of Buffalo v. Neubeck, 209 App.Div. 386, 391, 204 N.Y.S. 737, 740, supra; People v. Carter, 88 Hun. 304, 306, 34 N.Y.S. 764, 765; People v. Park, 92 Misc. 369, 374, 156 N.Y.S. 816, 819; People v. Burns, 19 Misc. 680, 44 N.Y.S. 1106), but authority may be found to the contrary (as, e.g., People v. James, 11 App.Div. 609, 612, 43 N.Y.S. 315, 317; see People v. Bell, supra, 31 N.Y.Cr.R. at page 376, 148 N.Y.S. at page 756). It should be noted that City of Buffalo v. Murphy, supra, involved the violation of a city ordinance not amounting to a misdemeanor and remaining cited cases were decided prior to Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, at page 8, 47 S.Ct. 250, at page 252, 71 L.Ed. 505, supra, in which case the Supreme Court stated: `A person may not be punished for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation even if he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court.' Indeed, since our decision in People v. Jacoby, supra, lower courts have taken the position that the requirement of a written information was not waived by a plea of guilty ( People v. Tompkins, 202 Misc. 147, 148-149, 114 N.Y.S.2d 297, 198, supra; People v. Halling, 203 Misc. 428, 122 N.Y.S.2d 543, supra; People v. Mavis, 5 Misc.2d 943, 154 N.Y.S.2d 220). The view of these later cases appears by far to be the sounder one. If in a case involving a misdemeanor a mere unverified summons is to be the equivalent of an information, then any verified paper could be treated likewise. This would be a dangerous practice for there are countless misdemeanors for which a defendant may be punished by imprisonment for a year plus a fine of $500 (Penal Law, Consol. Laws, c. 40, ง 1937), not to speak of additional penalties, such as loss or suspension of a license to drive an automobile, to practice one's profession or to engage in a licensed business.  The requirement that a prosecution for misdemeanor be based upon a sworn information (unless, of course, made by a District Attorney) is an essential guarantee to a defendant of a fundamental right, namely; that he be not punished for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation, and this right may not be waived by a plea of guilty ( Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 8, 47 S.Ct. 250, supra; Weeks v. United States, 2 Cir., 216 F. 292, 293, supra; People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249 N.Y. 314, 318, 164 N.E. Ill, 61 A.L.R. 793). ` Forms and procedure still have their place and purpose in the administration of the law; without them we would have chaos' ( People v. Zambounis, 251 N.Y. 94, 97, 167 N.E. 183, 184). (Emphasis added.) In People v. Semonite, supra , the defendant was convicted of speeding. The case is similar to Dison in that the information charging the defendant was signed but not verified. However, at a later time, the justice of the peace verified the signature. The court held this to be an inadequate oath, stating: Judicial construction has decreed that such an information must be made under oath [citations omitted]. The same requirements in regard to an oath should be observed in regard to an information charging a traffic infraction [citations omitted]. As to an oath, whatever the form adopted, it must be in the presence of an officer authorized to administer it and it must be an unequivocal and present act by which the affiant consciously takes upon himself the obligation of an oath. 18 Misc.2d at 427-28, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 257-58. The court concluded that, there being no valid oath, the information must therefore fall and ordered the conviction reversed, the information dismissed, and the fine remitted. To the same effect is the case of People v. Ragusa, supra , where the police officer did not verify the information prior to arraignment and trial, but rather, during the trial, the trial court elicited testimony from the officer-witness whereby he swore to the facts alleged by the information charging the defendant with speeding. The court in Ragusa held the information to be jurisdictionally defective, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to try the case. The fourth New York case apropos to Dison and the present case is People v. Dros, supra . In Dros, the defendant, who had been convicted of violations of the multiple dwelling law, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the information charging him was unsworn. The court noted that, for purposes of expediting disposition, such violations had been recently downgraded by the legislature from misdemeanor offenses to just offenses. However, the court further noted that, under the multiple dwelling law, violations must be treated procedurally as misdemeanors. Citing the other New York cases discussed herein, the court stated that [w]here a defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor, rather than an offense of less than the grade of misdemeanor it can no longer be doubted that an unsworn information is jurisdictionally defective, 11 N.Y.2d at 170, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 432, and the court held that the writ should be granted. In so holding, the court remarked, [I]ndeed, the more expeditious the process, the greater may be the need to insure that a defendant's rights will not be brusquely violated. Id., 11 N.Y.2d at 172, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 434. Clearly, the requirement that a prosecution for a misdemeanor be based upon a sworn complaint or information is an essential guarantee to a defendant of a fundamental right, namely, that he not be punished for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation, and this right may not be waived by the failure to object or by a plea of guilty. Nevertheless, as suggested in People v. Dros, supra , perhaps there is some basis for relaxing these requirements in prosecutions for offenses below the grade of misdemeanor. At least, the courts in Alabama have so held, which leads me into an analysis of Alabama law.