Opinion ID: 2604071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Equal Protection and Policy Considerations

Text: The FEHA, as indicated, provides two avenues for resolution of claims: first, a complaint to the Department; second, if that agency fails to act, a private court action. ( Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 217; see §§ 12960, 12965, subd. (b).) Observing that punitive damages are available to persons who pursue court action ( Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 221), Commission argues that the denial of such damages to administrative complainants will create a disparate situation that will undermine the administrative avenue and thwart the Act's primary objective of resolving discrimination complaints through the administrative procedure: complainants will be encouraged to bypass the administrative forum in favor of court action; the department will forego seeking administrative relief in the most egregious cases when punitive damages are appropriate and be unable to engage in effective conference, conciliation and persuasion efforts to resolve the dispute (§ 12963.7); and because complete administrative relief will be unavailable, the victims of the most outrageous situations will be forced to await relief from our already overburdened courts. Further, denying exemplary damages in the administrative adjudication, Commission asserts, will create two classes of complainants: those who can afford to hire a private attorney and file a civil action and those equally or even more deserving victims who lack the resources to pursue litigation by themselves and rely, instead, on the administrative process. Because economic standing is often strongly correlated with race, sex and other forms of prohibited discrimination (see Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d 477, 486), denial of the opportunity to obtain a punitive damages award solely because of the complainant's economic or social circumstances is contrary to the Legislature's intent to eliminate discrimination and raises serious equal protection concerns. Commission's policy and equal protection arguments rest on speculative and seemingly conflicting premises: on the one hand, that when a case is appropriate for punitive damages, complainants will bypass the administrative forum and the department will forego seeking administrative relief, thus defeating the Act's objective of administrative resolution; and, on the other hand, that given the substantial volume of complaints received, the department pursues only the most egregious cases, with the result that claimants with weaker cases who can afford to sue will have access to exemplary damages while the most worthy victims whose cases are heard by the commission will be denied such recompense. We are aware of no authority supportive of either premise. Although Justice Richardson, dissenting in Commodore Home, spoke of the anomaly of allowing punitive damages to accusors who have been unsuccessful administratively before the commission, [while denying] such damages to those whose claims have been successfully established (32 Cal.3d at p. 222), this comment mistakenly assumes that a civil action is open only to those whose complaints the commission has refused to prosecute and overlooks the department's evident policy to permit any complainant to sue who wishes to, as well as the unlikelihood in any event of judicial recovery by a litigant whose claim the department has in fact found unworthy. Concerning department policy, a former counsel to the department states: Some respondents have asserted that a private right of action cannot be pursued before 150 days have passed, but this argument has not been accepted by most courts to which it is addressed. Because the investigation process ... takes time, and because the Department, as a matter of sound administrative policy, handles employment cases on a first-in-first-out basis, it is virtually impossible for an accusation to issue in an employment case before 150 days have passed. Furthermore, because of the incredible volume of cases handled by the Department  8,105 in fiscal year 1982  it would be a waste of resources to investigate a case the Department knows will be pursued in court. It is, therefore, the policy not to proceed on any case which will be pursued elsewhere. This decision is clearly within the Department's discretion.... (Gelb & Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment and Housing Act: A Viable State Remedy for Employment Discrimination (1983) 34 Hastings L.J. 1055, 1066, fn. 87; see Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 218, fn. 8; Carter v. Smith Food King (9th Cir.1985) 765 F.2d 916, 922-923.) Thus, while the department no doubt pursues only cases it deems meritorious ( State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 434, fn. 14; see Mahdavi v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 326 [136 Cal. Rptr. 421]; Marshall v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 680 [98 Cal. Rptr. 698]), because its case load precludes the pursuit of all such claims, any complainant who so wishes may bring a private court action. In these circumstance neither policy considerations nor equal protection concerns require that the administrative and judicial remedies be identical. To the contrary, the separate avenues justify different remedies. We recognized as much in Commodore Home where, having noted that the FEHA leaves an aggrieved party on his own if the Department declines to pursue an administrative claim in his behalf, we stated that [t]o limit the damages available in a lawsuit might substantially deter the pursuit of meritorious claims, ... (32 Cal.3d at pp. 220-221.) Nor is an indigent complainant denied an equal opportunity to go to court. An eligible plaintiff may sue in forma pauperis (§ 68511.3, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 985; Isrin v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 153 [45 Cal. Rptr. 320, 403 P.2d 728]) and a complainant whose case is appropriate for the award of punitive damages is unlikely to have difficulty finding an attorney willing to serve on a contingent fee basis. Further, the court has discretion to award litigation expenses to the successful employee. (§ 12965, subd. (b).) One recognized purpose of punitive damages is to make a civil action economically feasible. As one commentator has stated: All serious misdeeds cannot possibly be punished by government prosecution.... [L]imited judicial and prosecutorial resources permit prosecution for only a fraction of the crimes and violations committed. For these reasons, individual members of society must play a significant role in instituting actions to impose sanctions for serious misconduct. Society's interest in bringing a wrongdoer to justice is especially strong where the wrongdoer's conduct exceeds all bounds of decency. [¶] The doctrine of punitive damages promotes this interest. By offering the potential for recovery in excess of actual damages, the doctrine encourages plaintiffs to bring such actions. This is particularly important where actual damages are minimal.... Punitive damages thus can be characterized as a reward for the plaintiff's valuable role as a `private attorney general.' Even where compensatory damages are substantial, an award of punitive damages helps to finance deserving claims by defraying the expenses of the action, such as attorneys' fees, that generally are not recoverable in American courts. (Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach (1980) 31 Hastings L.J. 639, 649-650, fns. omitted.) Moreover, in appropriate cases a complainant can seek punitive damages by filing an independent civil action alleging tort causes of action either with or without an FEHA count. ( Commodore Home, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 220; see Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 486-487; Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932 [160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58]; cf. Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.3d 493.) The FEHA was meant to supplement, not supplant or be supplanted by, existing antidiscrimination remedies, in order to give employees the maximum opportunity to vindicate their civil rights against discrimination. ( State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 431, citing § 12993, subd. (a).) Although Commission asserts that denying it authority to award punitive damages will impede the administrative resolution of cases, the converse may well be true. As we recognized in Commodore Home, One basis for federal holdings under title VII is a fear that the availability of punitive damages might hamper the EEOC's efforts to resolve discrimination disputes by `conference, conciliation, and persuasion.' [Citations.] (32 Cal.3d at p. 217; cf. Naton v. Bank of California (9th Cir.1981) 649 F.2d 691, 699 [same re pain and suffering damages under Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act].) In Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co. (3d Cir.1977) 550 F.2d 834, cited by the Ninth Circuit in Naton, supra, the court stated with respect to emotional distress damages: While the existence of such an item of damages might strengthen the claimant's bargaining position with the employer, it would also introduce an element of uncertainty which would impair the conciliatian process. Haggling over an appropriate sum could become a three-sided conflict among the employer, the Secretary, and the claimant. ( Id. at p. 841, italics added.) A fortiori the availability without limitation of punitive damages  usually a matter within the broad discretion of the jury after consideration of the defendant's wealth, the egregiousness of his conduct and the amount of the plaintiff's actual damages (see Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. (1971) 18 Cal. App.3d 266, 270-272 [95 Cal. Rptr. 678]; BAJI No. 14.71 (7th ed. 1986); 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, §§ 867-869, pp. 3155-3158, (1984 Supp.) §§ 869A-869B, pp. 553-557)  would introduce an element of uncertainty detrimental to the conciliation process. Nor does effective conciliation require that the administrative and judicial remedies be identical. Rejecting such a contention in Commodore Home, supra, we stated: We are not persuaded. In the first place there is no right to sue, even after conciliation breaks down, unless the Department fails to file an accusation before the Commission. To that extent the availability of court remedies remains within the Department's control. More importantly, the compliance structure of the FEHA encourages cooperation in the administrative process. While that process continues the Department acts on the victim's behalf and absorbs costs of pursuing his claim. Court action inevitably is speculative, and the FEHA makes civil suit the claimant's sole responsibility. That helps deter strategies of `holding out' for court damages in inappropriate cases. Further, the possibility that an action might lead to punitive damages may enhance the willingness of persons charged with violations to offer fair settlements during the conciliation process. [Fn. omitted.] (32 Cal.3d at p. 218.) In short, Commission's policy and equal protection arguments are fallacious. If a complainant wants relatively prompt restitutionary redress free of personal financial risk he or she can elect the administrative avenue of relief, with all expenses paid by the department. ( State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment Housing & Com., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 432.) If, however, the complainant prefers to seek the potentially more lucrative redress of punitive damages, he or she can go to court like any other litigant.