Opinion ID: 708054
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Specific Application of Alien Tort Act to Appellants' Claims

Text: 28 In order to determine whether the offenses alleged by the appellants in this litigation are violations of the law of nations that may be the subject of Alien Tort Act claims against a private individual, we must make a particularized examination of these offenses, mindful of the important precept that evolving standards of international law govern who is within the [Alien Tort Act's] jurisdictional grant. Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 425. In making that inquiry, it will be helpful to group the appellants' claims into three categories: (a) genocide, (b) war crimes, and (c) other instances of inflicting death, torture, and degrading treatment. 29 (a) Genocide. In the aftermath of the atrocities committed during the Second World War, the condemnation of genocide as contrary to international law quickly achieved broad acceptance by the community of nations. In 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared that genocide is a crime under international law that is condemned by the civilized world, whether the perpetrators are private individuals, public officials or statesmen. G.A.Res. 96(I), 1 U.N.GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188-89 (1946). The General Assembly also affirmed the principles of Article 6 of the Agreement and Charter Establishing the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal for punishing  'persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds,'  regardless of whether the offenders acted  'as individuals or as members of organizations,'  In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp. 544, 555 n. 11 (N.D.Ohio 1985) (quoting Article 6). See G.A.Res. 95(I), 1 U.N.GAOR, U.N.Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946). 30 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, for the United States Feb. 23, 1989 (hereinafter Convention on Genocide), provides a more specific articulation of the prohibition of genocide in international law. The Convention, which has been ratified by more than 120 nations, including the United States, see U.S. Dept. of State, Treaties in Force 345 (1994), defines genocide to mean 31 any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 32
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34 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 35 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births with the group; 36 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 37 Convention on Genocide art. II. Especially pertinent to the pending appeal, the Convention makes clear that [p]ersons committing genocide ... shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. Id. art. IV (emphasis added). These authorities unambiguously reflect that, from its incorporation into international law, the proscription of genocide has applied equally to state and non-state actors. 38 The applicability of this norm to private individuals is also confirmed by the Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1091 (1988), which criminalizes acts of genocide without regard to whether the offender is acting under color of law, see id. Sec. 1091(a) ([w]hoever commits genocide shall be punished), if the crime is committed within the United States or by a U.S. national, id. Sec. 1091(d). Though Congress provided that the Genocide Convention Implementation Act shall not be construed as creating any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by any party in any proceeding, id. Sec. 1092, the legislative decision not to create a new private remedy does not imply that a private remedy is not already available under the Alien Tort Act. Nothing in the Genocide Convention Implementation Act or its legislative history reveals an intent by Congress to repeal the Alien Tort Act insofar as it applies to genocide, 6 and the two statutes are surely not repugnant to each other. Under these circumstances, it would be improper to construe the Genocide Convention Implementation Act as repealing the Alien Tort Act by implication. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 1392, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987) ([R]epeals by implication are not favored and will not be found unless an intent to repeal is clear and manifest.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026, 1034 (2d Cir.) (mutual exclusivity of statutes is required to demonstrate Congress's clear, affirmative intent to repeal), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941, 111 S.Ct. 2235, 114 L.Ed.2d 477 (1991). 39 Appellants' allegations that Karadzic personally planned and ordered a campaign of murder, rape, forced impregnation, and other forms of torture designed to destroy the religious and ethnic groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats clearly state a violation of the international law norm proscribing genocide, regardless of whether Karadzic acted under color of law or as a private individual. The District Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to the Alien Tort Act. 40 (b) War crimes. Plaintiffs also contend that the acts of murder, rape, torture, and arbitrary detention of civilians, committed in the course of hostilities, violate the law of war. Atrocities of the types alleged here have long been recognized in international law as violations of the law of war. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14, 66 S.Ct. 340, 347, 90 L.Ed. 499 (1946). Moreover, international law imposes an affirmative duty on military commanders to take appropriate measures within their power to control troops under their command for the prevention of such atrocities. Id. at 15-16, 66 S.Ct. at 347-48. 41 After the Second World War, the law of war was codified in the four Geneva Conventions, 7 which have been ratified by more than 180 nations, including the United States, see Treaties in Force, supra, at 398-99. Common article 3, which is substantially identical in each of the four Conventions, applies to armed conflict[s] not of an international character and binds each Party to the conflict ... to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 42 Persons taking no active part in the hostilities ... shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 43 To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 44 (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 45 (b) taking of hostages; 46
47 (d) the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court.... 48 Geneva Convention I art. 3(1). Thus, under the law of war as codified in the Geneva Conventions, all parties to a conflict--which includes insurgent military groups--are obliged to adhere to these most fundamental requirements of the law of war. 8 49 The offenses alleged by the appellants, if proved, would violate the most fundamental norms of the law of war embodied in common article 3, which binds parties to internal conflicts regardless of whether they are recognized nations or roving hordes of insurgents. The liability of private individuals for committing war crimes has been recognized since World War I and was confirmed at Nuremberg after World War II, see Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International Law, 450 Int'l Conciliation 304 (April 1949) (collecting cases), and remains today an important aspect of international law, see Jordan Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crimes Jurisdiction Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, in 4 The Vietnam War and International Law 447 (R.Falk ed., 1976). The District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Alien Tort Act over appellants' claims of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law. 50 (c) Torture and summary execution. In Filartiga, we held that official torture is prohibited by universally accepted norms of international law, see 630 F.2d at 885, and the Torture Victim Act confirms this holding and extends it to cover summary execution. Torture Victim Act Secs. 2(a), 3(a). However, torture and summary execution--when not perpetrated in the course of genocide or war crimes--are proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or under color of law. See Declaration on Torture art. 1 (defining torture as being inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment pt. I, art. 1, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985), entered into force June 26, 1987, ratified by United States Oct. 21, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 590, 591 (1995) (defining torture as inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity); Torture Victim Act Sec. 2(a) (imposing liability on individuals acting under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation). 51 In the present case, appellants allege that acts of rape, torture, and summary execution were committed during hostilities by troops under Karadzic's command and with the specific intent of destroying appellants' ethnic-religious groups. Thus, many of the alleged atrocities are already encompassed within the appellants' claims of genocide and war crimes. Of course, at this threshold stage in the proceedings it cannot be known whether appellants will be able to prove the specific intent that is an element of genocide, or prove that each of the alleged torts were committed in the course of an armed conflict, as required to establish war crimes. It suffices to hold at this stage that the alleged atrocities are actionable under the Alien Tort Act, without regard to state action, to the extent that they were committed in pursuit of genocide or war crimes, and otherwise may be pursued against Karadzic to the extent that he is shown to be a state actor. Since the meaning of the state action requirement for purposes of international law violations will likely arise on remand and has already been considered by the District Court, we turn next to that requirement. 52