Opinion ID: 490628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Supreme Court Law on Implied Rights of Action.

Text: 46 It is widely thought that Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874 (1916) was the first case in which the Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of action under a federal statute which did not itself provide one. Some commentators and courts believe the doctrine had its origins in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) or even earlier. See, e.g., Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982); Foy, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal Courts, 71 Cornell L.Rev. 501 (1986); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 285 (1963). For many years the Supreme Court followed an expansive or receptive view of the common law power of courts to imply remedies into statutory schemes where none existed. It followed some variation of the basic maxim ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right there is a remedy). See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964). In so doing, the Court looked into the language and legislative history of the particular statute to determine Congressional intent concerning implied private rights of action and it considered whether the judicial implication of a remedy would advance or frustrate the purpose of Congress in enacting the particular statutory scheme. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); see also generally Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U.L.Rev. 227 (1984); Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 Va.L.Rev. 553 (1981). During the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the federal law of implied private actions began to flower. Foy, 71 Cornell L.Rev. at 559. 47 In 1975, in its decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Court endeavored to make explicit the criteria to be used in determining whether a private cause of action should be implied in a statute which does not provide one explicitly. It was those factors which the district court applied in this case. Since Cort, the question of Congressional intent has become the main concern and the other Cort factors have diminished in significance. The question of implication of private remedies is now viewed as a strict question of statutory construction to determine whether Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2485, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); see also Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36, 104 S.Ct. 831, 838, 78 L.Ed.2d 645 (1984); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 13, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2622-23, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2066, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981); Shoultz v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 754 F.2d 318 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1259, 89 L.Ed.2d 569 (1986). If Congressional intent on the question of an implied civil remedy can be discerned from the statute or its legislative history, further inquiry into whether the judicial implication of such a remedy would further or impede Congressional goals is unnecessary. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). 48 In addition, in Touche Ross, the Supreme Court employed the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius to find no implied liability where a statutory scheme contained provisions providing express liability elsewhere. Thus, there has been a distinct shift away from the full application of the Cort factors to a narrower exercise of statutory construction in order to glean Congressional intent. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). 22 49 As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, the Supreme Court has imposed increasingly severe restrictions on the availability of implied causes of action under federal statutes. Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir.1982). 23 Because the Colorado courts draw useful guidance from the Supreme Court's cases on the question of implication of remedies and because our review of Colorado cases on the subject convinces us that the Supreme Court's increasingly restrictive view of the availability of such judicially implied remedies is consistent with Colorado law on that issue, we view the restrictive trend in the Supreme Court as supportive of our conclusion in this case.