Opinion ID: 779335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identity of the Marks

Text: 44 We begin from the recently-established requirement that for a dilution claim to succeed, the mark used by the alleged diluter must be identical, or nearly identical, to the protected mark. Playboy Enterprises, 279 F.3d at 805. Such a requirement comports with the statutory language, the four-part dilution test derived from that language outlined in Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir.1998) and Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 874, and with the statute's legislative history and purposes. 45 The statute establishes that the junior user, to be liable for dilution, must use a mark or trade name ... after the mark has become famous. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). As articulated in Panavision and Avery Dennison, the test for dilution similarly provides that to make out an antidilution cause of action, a plaintiff must show that  its mark is famous and the defendant is making commercial use of the mark in commerce. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 874 (emphasis added); see Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324; see also Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir.2002) ( `Dilution' refers to the `whittling away of the value of a trademark' when it's used to identify different products.) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). These locutions indicate that the defendant must use essentially the same mark, not just a similar one. Concomitantly, this circuit's description of the two most common forms of dilution — blurring and tarnishment — requires a defendant to use the plaintiff's actual mark, rather than a mark that is merely similar. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326 n. 7 (Blurring occurs when a defendant uses a plaintiff's trademark to identify the defendant's goods and services, and [t]arnishment occurs when a famous mark is improperly associated with an inferior mark or offensive product or service.). 46 The legislative history, while not definitive on the issue, also suggests that the marks must be identical or close thereto. In explaining the difference between dilution and infringement, the Senate Report states that: The concept of dilution focuses on the investment the owner has made in the mark and on the commercial values and aura of the mark itself, protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own benefit. S.Rep. No. 100-515, at 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5583 (emphases added). The Report then lists two hypothetical examples of dilution: where a mark such as Kodak is used for pianos, or Buick is used for aspirin. Id. No example is given of the use of marks that are merely similar to the famous mark. 47 Further, a dilution claim alleges a form of appropriation. Playboy Enterprises, 279 F.3d at 805. Appropriation implies the adoption of the mark itself, not the use of a similar mark. As discussed previously, infringement is designed to protect against consumer confusion about the source of a product that may arise, inter alia, because a company uses a similar mark. Dilution, on the other hand, protects the distinctiveness of a particular mark whether or not the products compete or consumer confusion exists. § 1127. Because dilution and likelihood of confusion tests are directed at different actions, it does not make sense to import the relatively subjective similarity of the marks test from the likelihood of confusion context into the dilution context. See 4 J.McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 24:90.2 (4th ed.2001). 48 In Playboy Enterprises, we elucidated the identical or nearly identical standard by adopting the Eighth Circuit's expression of the requirement: For marks to be nearly identical to one another, they must be `similar enough that a significant segment of the target group of customers sees the two marks as essentially the same.' 279 F.3d at 806 n. 41 (quoting Luigino's Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir.1999)). Other circuits also have adopted more stringent similarity of marks tests in the dilution context than in the infringement context. For example, the Second Circuit recently stated that the anti-dilution act's purpose is to protect famous marks against dilution when a junior user uses the same mark in a non-confusing way. TCPIP Holding Co., Inc. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir.2001). It has thus adopted the following test: 49 The marks must be of sufficient similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the junior mark will conjure an association with the senior.... (We hold ... that the marks must be `very' or `substantially' similar and that, absent such similarity, there can be no viable claim of dilution.). 50 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218 (quoting Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1029 (2d. Cir. 1989)); see also Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 218). 7 The Fourth Circuit has held that there must be a sufficient similarity between the junior and senior marks to evoke an instinctive mental association of the two by a relevant universe of consumers. Ringling Bros. — Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Development, 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir.1999) (internal quotations omitted). But see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000) (using the same similarity test for a dilution claim used for a related infringement claim). 51 Applying the Playboy identical or nearly identical standard, we conclude that although TREK and OrbiTrek are not identical to one another, the possibility exists that a reasonable factfinder could find that OrbiTrek is using a mark nearly identical to Trek's mark. The OrbiTrek mark contains the entire TREK mark and highlights the TREK mark by capitalizing it in the middle of a single word. A reasonable trier of fact could determine that Thane use[d] the TREK mark by incorporating the same word into its own mark as a separate, visually identifiable element, and that a significant segment of the consuming public would likely focus on that element as an identifier essentially the same as the TREK mark. On the other hand, a reasonable factfinder could decide that examined as a whole, the OrbiTrek mark is sufficiently dissimilar from the TREK mark that the two could be viewed as not essentially the same. After all, Trek in OrbiTrek is conjoined with Orbi rather than appearing as a separate word and Trek is not all in capital letters. We conclude that the issue of identity cannot be decided on a motion for summary judgment.