Opinion ID: 1975121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Prior Drug Arrest and Character Trait of Peacefulness

Text: The majority upholds the trial court's ruling that the government could question appellant's prospective character witness about appellant's previous arrest for possession of PCP, a fact the jury did not know about. (After that arrest, appellant had pleaded guilty to attempted possession and had received and completed probation). The character witness would have testified as to appellant's character trait of peacefulness. The trial court's ruling resulted in the defense not calling the witness to the stand because the defense did not want the jury to learn of appellant's previous arrest involving illegal drugs. To support its position, the majority quotes decontextualized dicta from three cases in adopting the trial court's reasoning of plain common sense that there is an unfortunate coexistence of guns, money, drugs and violence and to uphold the trial court's conclusion that there is a clear connection between the asserted character trait and the arrest offense. This, however, was not a drug case. Furthermore, appellant's previous arrest involved no guns or violence. Whether the trial court has abused its discretion in making an evidentiary ruling depends in part on whether the trial court's action was within the range of permissible alternatives. Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365. In this case the trial court declared that this court had determined that possession of guns goes hand and glove with drug possession. To support that unequivocal statement, the trial judge cited our opinions in Bigelow v. United States, 498 A.2d 210 (D.C.1985), and Wesley v. United States, 547 A.2d 1022 (D.C.1988). Neither case, however, has anything to do about the proper scope of cross-examination of a defense character witness and the alleged connection between drug possession and guns/violence. [13] Furthermore, the cases the majority cites in defense of the trial courtauthority on which the trial court did not purport to relyare also not on point. Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1321 (D.C.1991) (en banc), quoted ante at 555, is a Terry -stop case in which this court reviewed the trial court's denial of a suppression motion. In Peay the majority concluded that it was reasonable for a police officer to believe that a person carrying something in his hand in a building known for narcotics trafficking, and who had just failed to respond to the officer's request to stop, was carrying a weapon. Viewed in context, then, the quoted dicta, as has often been observed, drugs and weapons go together, refers to what it was reasonable for a police officer to believe in a fast-moving encounter with a suspect. Likewise, Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 31 (D.C.1989), quoted ante at 555, also involves a completely different context. In that case the issue was whether it was reasonable for the trial court to allow a police expert to testify regarding illicit drug operations and how guns are used in such operations. That is a far cry from saying that the government can cross-examine a character witness about a defendant's unrelated, prior arrest for simple possessionwithout intent to distribute resulting in a conviction of attempted possession, simply because the offense for which the defendant is now on trial involved the use of a gun. Finally, United States v. Payne, 256 U.S.App.D.C. 358, 361, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065 (1986), cited ante at 555, does not support the majority's position. In fact, the D.C. Circuit Court takes care to show how the situation there did not violate FED.R.EVID. 404 (character evidence), which would seem to prohibit the government from rebutting evidence of a defendant's character for peacefulness with evidence that the defendant had a prior arrest for simple possession. The issue in Payne was whether guns seized from the defendant's apartment along with illegal drugs and paraphernalia were admissible as tools of the drug distribution scheme. When the government raises questions about a defendant's previous illegal drug use in front of the jury, it raises a highly inflammatory ... allegation, United States v. Fowler, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 83, 465 F.2d 664, 668 (1972), which may generate unwarranted prejudice from the jury, United States v. Sampol, 204 U.S.App.D.C. 349, 395, 636 F.2d 621, 667 (1980), because of hostility based on the general odium of narcotics use, United States v. Kearney, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 332, 420 F.2d 170, 174 (1969). Because evidence of, or comments in front of the jury about, a defendant's illegal drug use and possession is so prejudicial, it is only permitted for specifically circumscribed purposes. Thus, for example, under no circumstances may evidence of a defendant's drug use be introduced as a general attack on credibility. See United States v. Leonard, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 52, 494 F.2d 955, 971 (1974), cited with approval in Durant v. United States, 551 A.2d 1318, 1326 (D.C.1988). After the trial court's ruling, the defense refrained from calling its character witness, recognizing the inherent prejudice in allowing the government to raise in front of the jury the specter of appellant's arrest for possession of an illegal drug. Because the trial court's decision to allow the government to cross-examine the character witness about appellant's previous arrest was based on an erroneous interpretation of our law, the court's exercise of discretion was erroneous. Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365. In sum, the trial court failed to provide any sound legal basis for its personal view that appellant's previous arrest for simple possession related negatively to the proffered character trait of peacefulness. As in its other decision-making activity, the court's substantial freedom of choice in an exercise of discretion must be tempered by rationality. Id. at 362.