Opinion ID: 684125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Object in the Trial Court

Text: 23 We conclude that the petitioners' failure to object in the trial court to the voir dire procedure did not constitute a procedural default. English, Tano, and Davis's trials all took place before Gomez was decided. As we explained in France, any objection at the time of their trials would have been futile, because a 'solid wall of circuit authority'  prior to Gomez had held that it was not error for magistrates to conduct voir dire in felony trials. France, 886 F.2d at 228 (quoting Guam v. Yang, 850 F.2d 507, 512 n. 8 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc); United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55, 57-58 (9th Cir.1970) (en banc)). Because it would be pointless (and indeed wasteful) to require a defendant to raise such a futile objection in the district court, we held in France that, at least in cases that were tried before Gomez was decided, a defendant did not forfeit a Gomez claim merely by failing to raise an objection in the trial court. See id. at 227-28. Accordingly, English, Tano, and Davis's failure to object in the trial court does not prevent us from reaching the merits of their claims. 5