Opinion ID: 463698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver Under the Tucker Act

Text: 53 The Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity only for those claims founded on statutes, regulations, contracts, or provisions of the Constitution that create substantive rights to money damages. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2967-68, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). 34 Whether the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity therefore turns on whether plaintiff's claims are based on a statute, regulation, contract, or constitutional provision that can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400, 96 S.Ct. 948, 954, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct.Cl.1967)). We must therefore review each of appellants' non-tort claims to determine which, if any, are based on statutes, constitutional provisions, contracts, or regulations that demand monetary compensation. 54 1. The Takings Clause claims. As the District Court noted, appellants' Takings Clause claim is in essence an inverse condemnation proceeding, in which a citizen is deprived of property by the government and then must initiate judicial action to obtain just compensation. 586 F.Supp. at 783. It is well established that an individual claiming that the United States has taken his property can seek just compensation under the Tucker Act    . Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2880, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984). Given the alleged damage to appellants' real and personal property directly caused by the evacuation program, there is no question that appellants have stated a claim cognizable under the Takings Clause. 35 55 Appellee, however, argues that actions taken pursuant to a perceived need to protect the national security cannot constitute a taking. Brief of appellee at 57. There is no legal support for this proposition. 36 Only a showing of actual (and not merely imagined) military emergency vitiates a Takings Clause claim. United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 73 S.Ct. 200, 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952). Here the gravamen of appellants' claim is that there was no such military emergency. The District Court concluded that, given the procedural posture of this case, the allegations of appellants (as plaintiffs below) were dispositive. We agree. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra. 37 56 2. Contract claims. Appellants allege breach of express contracts, both oral and written, contracts implied in fact and contracts implied in law. Complaint at 67-68 p 133, JA 73-74. These contracts allegedly concerned the nature of detention, the services (including bailment) to be provided them during detention, and specific protections to be accorded the internees. The contracts allegedly arose from promises made by the relevant authorities and from official conduct. 57 The Tucker Act, however, waives sovereign immunity only for express contracts and contracts implied in fact. There is no waiver for contracts implied in law or contracts based on equitable principles. See United States v. Mitchell, supra, 463 U.S. at 218, 103 S.Ct. at 2968-69. Consequently, only appellants' claims for breach of express contracts and contracts implied-in-fact appear to survive this threshold bar. 58 3. Fiduciary duty claims. By contrast, appellants' fiduciary duty claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Appellants allege that the statutes, regulations and orders promulgated by the United States established a system of comprehensive and pervasive federal control, management, and supervision over the daily lives of the internees. Complaint at 68 p 134, JA 74. Appellants argue that such a fiduciary duty included an obligation to deal truthfully with the evacuees and that appellee breached its duty by failing to disclose the lack of military necessity for the evacuation. See Complaint at 69 p 135, JA 75. 59 Appellants' argument is reducible to the proposition that whenever the United States imposes such a pervasive regulatory scheme it necessarily enters into a fiduciary relationship with the individuals whose lives it supervises. Brief of appellants at 42-43. Appellants cite Mitchell to support this proposition. We do not read Mitchell to go so far. 60 Mitchell construed the clause of the Tucker Act that waives sovereign immunity for claims founded on statute or regulation. 463 U.S. at 218, 103 S.Ct. at 2968-69. The Court held that this provision operated to waive sovereign immunity for claims of breach of fiduciary duty where specific statutes or regulations gave rise to the fiduciary duty in question. Mitchell, however, found that the relevant statutes and regulations, by their own terms, explicitly created a fiduciary relationship by requiring the Secretary of the Interior to manage the Quinalt Indians' assets for the best interests of the Indian owner   . Id. at 224, 103 S.Ct. at 2972 (quoting 25 U.S.C. Sec. 406(a) (1982)). 38 61 In our case there are no analogous statutes or regulations. It is true that the government did sometimes speak of acting for the benefit of the evacuees. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Exhibit Q, War Relocation Authority Tentative Policy Statement, JA 141-146. Within this context the government may have undertaken to treat the internees in a responsible manner. But even assuming, without deciding, that the applicable regulations could be construed to create specific duties to the evacuees, such duties must be distinguished from a comprehensive obligation to provide for the best interests of the evacuees. We are reluctant to find that such a distinct, overarching duty is implicit in a narrower set of regulatory obligations. 39 62 Appellants also rely on Juda v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 441 (1984). In Juda the court found a tacit contractual commitment by the United States to act as fiduciary for Bikini Islanders whom the United States removed from their atoll in 1946 while the government tested nuclear bombs on that site. Id. at 452. Our case is plainly distinguishable. Unlike Juda, appellants here have not alleged that the United States contracted, even tacitly, to act as a fiduciary. Their fiduciary duty argument is based solely on regulatory obligations. Complaint at 68-69 p 134, JA 74-75. Moreover, even if, arguendo, the United States did enter into a contractual relationship with the evacuees, it was a contract to provide specific services. Just as we are loath to impute a regulatory commitment to act as a fiduciary on the basis of alleged narrow regulatory obligations, we are also reluctant to infer a broad contractual commitment to act as fiduciary on the basis of an alleged contract to provide specific services. 63 4. Other constitutional claims. Plaintiffs also allege sundry violations of their constitutional rights under the Due Process, 40 Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fifth Amendment; the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment; the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment; the rights to fair trial and counsel under the Sixth Amendment; the Press, Speech, Religion, Petition, and Assembly Clauses of the First Amendment; the prohibition of Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws and the right to the writ of habeas corpus under Art. I, Section 9; and the protection from involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment. Complaint at 60-66 paragraphs 112-113, 116-127, JA 66-72. We find that sovereign immunity bars all such claims. 64 Appellants allege that the Tucker Act's declaration that the United States is amenable to suit in actions founded upon the Constitution waives sovereign immunity for all of their constitutional claims. Brief of appellants at 47; reply brief of appellants at 17. The law of this circuit 41 and of other circuits 42 is to the contrary. 65 Appellants argue, however, that because some of these constitutional provisions have been found to mandate compensation in Bivens actions against individual defendants, this court ought to find that they also mandate compensation in an action against the United States. Brief of appellants at 48, 50-51. This circuit has rejected that view. See Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 103 (D.C.Cir.1984); Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia, 353 F.Supp. 1249, 1254 (D.D.C.1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 684 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021, 95 S.Ct. 497, 42 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). See also Garcia v. United States, 666 F.2d 960, 966 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 832, 103 S.Ct. 73, 74 L.Ed.2d 72 (1982). 43