Opinion ID: 880728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue 1: Motions to amend, add experts, and lengthen discovery schedules

Text: The District Court summarily disposed of all Lindey's motions. Regarding the motion to amend, the court stated only that justice does not require the amendments be allowed under Rule 15(a) of M.R.Civ.P. Of the motion to modify the scheduling order to allow experts to be added and discovery lengthened, the court noted there was no good cause to grant the motion as required by Rule 16(b), M.R.Civ.P. Lindey's contends that, although it failed to meet time requirements imposed by the District Court, its amendment to add experts, extend discovery and amend pleadings should be granted in the interest of justice in the absence of substantial prejudice to the other parties. Rule 15(a), M.R. Civ.P., covering amendments reads in pertinent part as follows: [A] party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. The decision to grant or deny a motion to amend lies within the discretion of the trial court. Foman v. Davis (1962), 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222, 226. The District Court's decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Roberts v. Arizona Bd. of Regents (9th Cir.1982), 661 F.2d 796, 798; Mende v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (9th Cir.1982), 670 F.2d 129, 131. As this Court has previously noted, Rule 15(a), M.R.Civ.P., provides for liberal amendment of pleadings but does not require amendments to be allowed in all instances. Fry v. Heble (1981), 191 Mont. 272, 274, 623 P.2d 963, 964. While the rule favors allowing amendments, a trial court is justified in denying a motion for an apparent reason such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc. Foman at 182, 83 S.Ct. at 230, 9 L.Ed.2d at 226. See also Lien v. Murphy Corp. (1982), 201 Mont. 488, 491, 656 P.2d 804, 806, and Sooy v. Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc. (1985), 218 Mont. 418, 421, 708 P.2d 1014, 1016. The party seeking to overturn the trial court's decision must demonstrate that an abuse of discretion occurred. Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair (8th Cir.1974), 497 F.2d 849, 854. In this case, Lindey's has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow second and third amended complaints. Almost two months after the deadline for amending pleadings, the trial court, in accordance with Rule 15(a), M.R. Civ.P., granted Lindey's first motion to file an amended complaint. When Lindey's failed to file the amended complaint within the extended time granted, the trial court was well within its discretion in not granting Lindey's motions to file second and third amended complaints. Had the trial court granted Lindey's motion, all defendants would have been substantially prejudiced and the trial unduly delayed. Granting the amendments would have required additional discovery and time to determine the sufficiency of the claims alleged in the amended complaints, all costing the defendants additional time, energy and money to resolve the case. Lindey's contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to extend discovery and add experts. The time allowed for discovery and listing expert witnesses was set out in the February 10, 1989 stipulation which the court ordered would govern the proceedings. Rule 16(b), M.R. Civ.P., provides that A schedule shall not be modified except by leave of the judge upon a showing of good cause. Lindey's maintains that extension of deadlines is necessary in order to add experts and do further discovery. Lindey's learned on June 21, 1989 at the deposition of its expert witness, that the expert it had retained did not agree with its allegation of professional negligence and would not provide expert testimony. As set out in the scheduling order, deadline for identifying expert witnesses was June 1, 1989, but Lindey's did not move for an extension until August 29, 1989, even though it knew two months earlier that the expert it had retained did not agree with its position on professional negligence. Clearly, Lindey's failed to meet the threshold showing of good cause. Lindey's motion was not timely and appears to be the result of Lindey's procrastination and failure to act diligently. The District Court did not err in finding there was not good cause to amend the scheduling order. This Court will not disturb the District Court's finding on appeal.