Opinion ID: 2493631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in overruling Gulfport's objection to Elliott's testimony regarding alternatives and substitutes.

Text: ¶ 71. At trial, Elliott testified, without objection, that his valuation required an assumption that there was a willing buyer and a willing seller as, in eminent-domain proceedings, Gulfport is a more than willing buyer[,] while Dedeaux is a less than willing seller.... Thereafter, in explaining his valuation, Elliott discussed the principle of alternatives and substitutes. In other words, does a willing buyer have an alternative or a substitute to pay this type price. At this point, counsel for Gulfport objected, contending that [h]e's talking about a buyer under compulsion. The trial judge overruled the objection, stating that Elliott would be subject to cross-examination. Elliott subsequently testified that the condemnor can't substitute another piece of land or another utility system for this utility system because [it] wants the hole in the donut. ¶ 72. Gulfport argues that Elliott's testimony was contrary to the rule that neither the buyer [n]or seller should be considered under a compulsion. According to Gulfport, this testimony denied it a fair trial on the issue of just compensation. ¶ 73. Without question, fair-market value involves the sales price that would be negotiated between knowledgeable and self-interested persons, ... the seller being under no obligation or compulsion to sell, and the buyer being under no necessity of having the property. Potters II, 608 So.2d at 1231. But public-utility properties are unique because they are so rarely bought and sold on the open market. City of Phoenix, 415 P.2d at 869. Furthermore, this Court fails to discern how a discussion of alternatives and substitutes (or the lack thereof) equates to compulsion. One factor affecting value which any reasonable buyer or seller would consider is the nature of the property at issue. While Elliott's to pay this type price language is suspect, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting such testimony. ¶ 74. Moreover, even if the admission of this testimony was error, this Court finds that such error was cured by the jury instructions. Jury Instruction P-2 provided, in pertinent part, that a fair-market value determination requires neither [party] being under duress or under any compulsion to either buy or sell.... Likewise, Jury Instruction D-5 stated that a fair-market-value determination involves an amount that a purchaser who is willing, but not required to buy, would pay and an amount that a seller who is willing, but not required to sell, would accept. These accurate statements of the controlling law cured any purported error.