Opinion ID: 1375296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Paint Chip Evidence

Text: In response to discovery requests propounded to the State on March 16, 1993, Appellant was apprised of the existence of a July 14, 1980, F.B.I. report analyzing paint chips found on Nancy Santomero's clothing. The paint chips themselves were apparently misplaced by the State until the end of the first day of trial. Upon the re-discovery of the original paint chip samples, the State had a second analysis performed by Sergeant Alkire of the state police. Appellant argues that the trial court's admission of the paint chip samples and the second analysis of the samples [14] violates Rule 16 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the evidence is unreliable, and that the balancing test required by Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence bars the admission of such evidence. Additionally, Appellant claims that he was precluded from performing any independent testing of the chips due to the misplacement of the samples. [15] Appellant contends that the State violated the rule established in State v. Hager, 176 W.Va. 313, 342 S.E.2d 281 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Woodson, 181 W.Va. 325, 382 S.E.2d 519 (1989), governing the admission of material evidence not disclosed until trial: Where the State is unaware until the time of trial of material evidence which it would be required to disclose under a Rule 16 discovery request, the State may use the evidence at trial provided that: (1) the State discloses the information to the defense as soon as reasonably possible; and (2) the use of the evidence at trial would not unduly prejudice the defendant's preparation for trial. Syllabus, Hager, 176 W.Va. at 313, 342 S.E.2d at 282. Appellant argues initially that the State violated the first Hager requirement by not disclosing the paint chip evidence as soon as reasonably possible. Id. The State maintains that they first rediscovered the existence of the paint chip evidence on May 17 or 18, 1993, and then made Appellant aware of such discovery on May 18, the day before opening statements. Appellant does not suggest that delay occurred at this juncture, but instead relies on Sergeant Alkire's testimony that to the best of his knowledge, no person acting on the State's behalf made any effort to contact the State Police Criminal Investigation Bureau in response to Appellant's March 1993 discovery motion. Sergeant Alkire also testified, however, that he had made unsuccessful efforts in October or November of 1992 to locate the paint chip evidence. The flaw in Appellant's argument is that the Hager rule regarding disclosure pertains to sharing discovered evidence in a diligent fashion; it does not portend the requirement implied by Appellantthat any dilatoriness in actually discovering the evidence should bar the admission of such evidence. Moreover, even Appellant's counsel conceded that the State thought they [the paint chips] were lost[] and that no ill motive was attributed against the State in connection with the last minute discovery of the paint chip samples. We conclude, therefore, that the record in this case supports the State's conclusion that it disclosed the paint chip discovery as soon as reasonably possible. Hager, 176 W.Va. at 313, 342 S.E.2d at 282, Syllabus. Appellant also asserts that admission of the paint chip evidence is barred by the second requirement of Hager that the use of such evidence would not unduly prejudice the defendant's preparation for trial. Id. On this issue of prejudice, the trial court recognized that the defense hasn't actually disclosed its defense yet, officially[,] ... [b]ut if it's an alibi defense, this can't be prejudice. [16] Moreover, the circuit court recognized that there is still time to undertake to rebut it [the new paint chip report]. There is even time to have the samples analyzed if... [the State] want[s] to.... The record suggests that Appellant did not request the opportunity to perform an independent analysis of the re-discovered paint chip evidence. Our cases have consistently expressed a preference for continuance when there has been a discovery violation. State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill, 193 W.Va. 133, 141, 454 S.E.2d 427, 435 (1994); Martin v. Smith, 190 W.Va. 286, 291, 438 S.E.2d 318, 323 (1993); State v. Barker, 169 W.Va. 620, 623, 289 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1982) (even if this were a `proper' case in which to claim surprise, the appellant failed to move for a continuance, and, therefore, waived his right to one). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion with regard to the trial court's conclusion that Appellant's trial preparation was not prejudiced by the introduction of the paint chip evidence. On the issue of reliability, Appellant maintains that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody sufficient to warrant the admission of the paint chip evidence. Evidence may not be admitted unless it is authenticated in a manner sufficient to support a finding that the proffered object is what the proponent of its admission claims it is. See W.Va.R.Evid. 901(a). We recently reviewed the rules regarding chain of custody requirements in State v. Dillon, 191 W.Va. 648, 447 S.E.2d 583 (1994), stating that to allow the admission of physical evidence into a criminal trial, `it is only necessary that the trial judge, in his discretion, be satisfied that the evidence presented is genuine and, in reasonable probability, has not been tampered with.' Id. at 662, 447 S.E .2d at 597 (quoting, in part, State v. Davis, 164 W.Va. 783, 786-87, 266 S.E.2d 909, 912 (1980)). Evidence adduced regarding the chain of custody showed that Dr. Sopher, the State's medical examiner, removed the paint chips at issue from Nancy Santomero's clothing and sent such chips to the state police crime lab. Due to the succession of officers in charge of the evidence, it was shown through the testimony of Sergeant Giacalone that he had received the paint chip evidence from his predecessor Corporal Keyo who had received it from Lieutenant Barber. While the paint chip evidence was under the control of Lieutenant Barber, it was sent for analysis to an F.B.I. laboratory. The paint chips were returned to the state police crime lab and remained in the lab following such return. [17] In these circumstances, the court properly ruled that the evidence was sufficiently authenticated to permit its admission into evidence. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's conclusion that a proper chain of custody had been established through the testimony of Sergeant Giacalone. The final ground upon which Appellant alleges error concerning the admission of the paint chip evidence is under Rule 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence. [18] Appellant argues that the probative value of the paint chip evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Specifically, Appellant contends that the unavailability of the van [19] from which the paint chips were alleged by the State to have emanated [20] substantially reduced the probative value of Sergeant Giacalone's microscopic analysis of the paint chip evidence performed on May 17, 1993. The record reveals that both the unavailability of the van and the paint chip analysis were the subject of aggressive and extensive cross-examination. Appellant's counsel conducted a vigorous cross-examination of Sergeant Giacalone regarding the second paint chip analysis that he performed. During this cross-examination, he admitted that it would be helpful to have a comparison between the paint chips and the suspect vehicle. In addition, Sergeant Giacalone admitted on cross-examination that his paint chip analysis was not inconsistent with the defense's theory that the paint originated from a Chevy Nova, a vehicle in which witnesses allegedly spotted the two hitchhikers exiting from prior to the murders. Thus, as the State notes, even if Fowler's van was not available for comparison, the jury had placed before [it] all the relevant evidence designed to discredit the probative value of the evidence. [21] We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the paint chip evidence was relevant in light of the proffered testimony regarding the removal of paint chips by Dr. Sopher from Nancy Santomero's body, the prospective testimony regarding the hitchhikers having been in Richard Fowler's blue van, and the state's theory that the bodies had been dragged from the van. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's admission of the paint chip evidence under Rule 403, either from a probative value analysis or from a confusion of the jury analysis. See W.Va.R.Evid. 403.