Opinion ID: 172013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second and Third Convictions

Text: Like Scoville's 1993 conviction, his 1995 and 2000 convictions for third-degree burglary, violations of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.12, constitute violent felonies for § 924(e) purposes. Initially, the government concedes the district court should not have found the convictions were generic burglaries and therefore violent felonies based on the language of the first-degree burglary indictments. Where, as here, a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser included offense of that originally charged, a defendant cannot be said to have been convicted of the allegations in the original indictment. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143; cf. United States v. Bennett, 108 F.3d 1315, 1317-18 (10th Cir.1997) (evaluating whether a prior conviction was a crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2(a), the court could not rely on the indictment charging first-degree burglary when the defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of second-degree burglary). Consequently, as a fall back the government argues the third-degree convictions constitute violent felonies because they meet the residual definition of violent felony contained in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) because they otherwise involve[ ] conduct that presents a serious risk of potential physical injury to another. [4] We agree. The relevant portion of the 1995 version of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.12 under which Scoville was convicted provides: No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall do any of the following: ... Trespass in a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person is present or likely to be present, with purpose to commit in the habitation any misdemeanor that is not a theft offense. Similarly, the relevant portion of the 2000 version § 2911.12 supporting Scoville's third conviction provides: No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall ... Trespass in an occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied structure, with purpose to commit... any criminal offense. Occupied structurea term which appears in the 2000 version of the statute includes houses, buildings, vehicles or other structures that are occupied as a dwelling or habitation, that are adapted for the overnight accommodation of any person, or in which a person is present or likely to be present. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2909.01 (effective in 2000). [5] Neither of these statutes qualifies as generic burglaryand thus a violent felonyunder the categorical approach because both are overbroad under Taylor. Additionally, as the government concedes, even under the modified categorical approach, the convictions fail to qualify as generic burglaries because Scoville pleaded to lesser included offenses and no helpful information on which we can rely was available at sentencing. Taylor makes clear, however, that the government remains free to argue that any offenseincluding offenses similar to generic [offenses such as] burglaryshould count towards enhancement under § 924(e)'s residual clause. 495 U.S. at 600 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 2143; see also United States v. Matthews, 466 F.3d 1271, 1274-76 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that defendant's prior Florida convictions for third-degree burglary were violent felonies under the ACCA's residual clause). The government did so here. We thus turn to § 924(e)'s residual clause to determine whether these convictions constitute violent felonies that is, whether they involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We conclude that they do. As we have previously recognized, for a crime to constitute a violent felony under § 924(e)'s residual clause, it must proscribe conduct roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed to the enumerated examples preceding the clause. United States v. Williams, No. 08-3159, 2009 WL 692323, at  (10th Cir. Mar.18, 2009) (citing United States v. Dennis, 551 F.3d 986, 989 (10th Cir.2008)) (quoting Begay v. United Sates, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008)). Additionally, to qualify as a violent felony under the residual clause, every conceivable offense need not present a serious potential risk of physical injury; instead, the conduct encompassed by the offense, in the ordinary case, must create a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. James, 550 U.S. at 207-08, 127 S.Ct. 1586; see also Williams, 2009 WL 692323, at . Moreover, the residual clause is intended to reach purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct rather than merely negligent or reckless acts. Williams, 2009 WL 692323, at  (describing Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1586). Therefore, the question here is whether third-degree burglary under Ohio law, in the ordinary case, is roughly (1) similar in kind, and (2) similar in degree of risk to burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving explosives. Williams, 2009 WL 692323, at . Here, burglary is the closest analogue of the enumerated offenses to Scoville's convictions. Consequently, the question is whether ordinary violations of the 1995 and 2000 versions of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.12 are similar in kind and in risk to burglary. Ordinary violations of the 1995 and 2000 versions of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.12 are obviously similar in kind to burglary. See Williams, 2009 WL 692323, at . First, Ohio's third-degree burglary is a subset of an enumerated offense in § 924(e). Furthermore, like generic burglary, violations of the 1995 and 2000 versions of Ohio's third-degree burglary statute typically involve the unlawful entry into a home or place of habitation for the purpose of committing a crime. See United States v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1990) (construing similar language in Ohio's second degree burglary statute as a violent felony). Ordinary violations of the 1995 and 2000 versions of the Ohio statute are also similar in risk to burglary. See James, 550 U.S. at 199, 127 S.Ct. 1586 ([T]he most relevant common attribute of the enumerated offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, and explosives use is ... that all of these offenses, while not technically crimes against the person, nevertheless create significant risks of bodily injury or confrontation that might result in bodily injury.). As the Supreme Court explained, the risk posed by burglary is the possibility of face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third partywhether an occupant, a police officer, or a bystander who comes to investigate. James, 550 U.S. at 203, 127 S.Ct. 1586 (finding attempted burglary, under Florida law, a violent felony). Under both versions of Ohio's statute, the risk posed is similar to that of generic burglary. The 1995 version of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.12 specifically includes the requirement that any person is present or likely to be present. Given the requirement that a person be present or likely be present, the risk posed by an ordinary violation of this statute is similar to that posed by generic burglary, as explained in James, because the offense entails a possibility of confrontation. Similarly, the 2000 version of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.12 requires trespassing in an occupied structure with purpose to commit a criminal offense. As defined, occupied structure includes structures that are used as dwellings or habitations, structures that are specially adapted for overnight accommodation, and those in which a person is present or likely to be present. See Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2909.01 (effective in 2000). Again, given the statute's requirement that the structure be occupied, an ordinary violation of the 2000 version of the statute poses a risk of confrontation similar to that of generic burglary. Consequently, ordinary violations of both the 1995 and 2000 versions of the statute qualify as violent felonies under § 924(e)'s residual clause. Third-degree burglary, as defined by both versions of the Ohio statute, ordinarily creates a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.