Opinion ID: 2786368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Direct-Threat Instruction

Text: We consider these elements to determine whether the district court correctly instructed the jury. Doing so, we conclude that the instruction did not accurately convey the direct-threat standard. The direct-threat instruction contained two parts. The first part explained what Beverage Distributors had to “prove” to establish the defense: To establish this defense, Beverage Distributors must prove both of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
position posed a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of Mr. Sungaila and/or other employees; and 5 2. Such a risk could not have been eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. Appellant’s App. at 78. The second part of the instruction elaborated on the standard: The determination that a direct threat exists must have been based on a specific personal assessment of Mr. Sungaila’s ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment of Mr. Sungaila’s ability must have been based on either a reasonable medical judgment that relied on medical knowledge [or best objective evidence] available at the time of assessment . . . . An employer’s subjective belief that a direct threat exists, even if maintained in good faith, is not sufficient unless it is objectively reasonable. . . . . In determining whether Beverage Distributors acted objectively reasonably when it determined that Mr. Sungaila was a direct threat, you must consider the following factors: (a) the duration of the risk; (b) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (c) the likelihood that the potential harm would occur; and (d) the imminence of the potential harm. Id. The instruction did not accurately convey the direct-threat standard. The first part of the instruction required Beverage Distributors to prove more than what was legally necessary. According to the first part, Beverage Distributors had to prove that Mr. Sungaila posed a direct threat. That was not accurate under our case law. Beverage Distributors should have avoided liability if it had reasonably believed the job would entail a direct threat; proof of an actual threat should have been unnecessary. See Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact-finder does not independently assess whether it believes that the employee posed 6 a direct threat.”). Thus, the instruction overstated Beverage Distributors’ burden. See Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1470-71 (10th Cir. 1988) (concluding that jury instructions were erroneous because they confused the burden of proof). The second part of the instruction did not cure the error. This part stated that the jury was to consider the reasonableness of Beverage Distributors’ belief regarding the existence of a direct threat. But, the jury was never told why it was to consider the reasonableness of what Beverage Distributors thought. Thus, the error was not cured by a reference in the instruction to the reasonableness of the company’s subjective belief. 2 In sum, the instruction was erroneous. The first part of the instruction inaccurately stated that Beverage Distributors had to prove that Mr. Sungaila posed a direct threat. And the second part of the instruction did not cure the error by directing the jury, without explanation, to consider the reasonableness of Beverage Distributors’ belief. 2 The EEOC suggests that the instruction directed the jury to consider Beverage Distributors’ subjective determination by referring to that determination in the past tense. For instance, the instruction stated that “[t]he determination that a direct threat exist[ed] must have been based on a specific personal assessment of Mr. Sungaila’s ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.” Appellant’s App. at 78 (emphasis added). We reject this argument. Even if the instruction had directed the jury to consider Beverage Distributors’ determination, that determination was about the “existence” of a direct threat, not the objective reasonableness of the determination. 7