Opinion ID: 1160924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Presumptions in Pre-Trial Vindictive Prosecution Claims

Text: {9} In State v. Stevens, 96 N.M. 627, 630, 633 P.2d 1225, 1228 (1981), interpreting the federal Due Process Clause, this Court declined to adopt a per se presumption of vindictiveness at the pre-trial stage whenever a prosecutor acts in a way that arguably chills the exercise of a legal right. Instead, the Stevens court deemed it better to allow a defendant to present evidence of vindictiveness and request relief from the court on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 631, 633 P.2d at 1229. We reaffirm Stevens today. See United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 45 (1st Cir.1997) ([C]ourts should go very slowly in embracing presumptions of prosecutorial vindictiveness in pretrial proceedings.) (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381, 102 S.Ct. 2485). See also United States v. Meyer, 810 F.2d 1242, 1246 (D.C.Cir.), vacated en banc, 816 F.2d 695, and reinstated en banc sub nom. Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1241-42 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has declined to adopt a per se rule that in the pretrial context no presumption of vindictiveness will ever lie).