Opinion ID: 2837800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Batson Challenge to Peremptory Juror Strike

Text: Monell next claims that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory juror challenge solely on the basis of race in violation of his equal protection rights as articulated in Batson v. - 15 - Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).7 Batson established the following three-part framework for evaluating such claims: First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-29 (2003) (citations omitted) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98). The opponent of a strike bears the burden of proof throughout the inquiry. United States v. Girouard, 521 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2008). Our review is for clear error. Id. at 115. The challenged strike was to Juror 19, who apparently was the only African-American juror remaining in the venire at the time of the strike.8 Juror 19 identified herself in response to the district court's question to the venire about involvement in criminal matters. She recounted the horrible experience of being falsely accused of a hit-and-run and being treated with total 7 Batson's holding applies to federal courts under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. United States v. Girouard, 521 F.3d 110, 112 n.1 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991)). 8 The only other African-American juror in the venire was dismissed by the court for cause when he admitted unequivocally that he would have trouble being fair based on past negative encounters with the police. - 16 - disrespect by [a police] officer. The district court asked her, [a]re you confident you could be fair to both sides? Are you hesitating? Juror 19 admitted, I'm hesitating. This experience, just knowing that truths weren't told by officers. I'm just being honest. Juror 19 later said that she would be fair to both sides, and, when asked if she would take [a police] witness as he or she comes, responded affirmatively. Later, the prosecutor used his second peremptory strike on Juror 19 when she was one of fourteen potential jurors placed in the jury box. Monell's counsel objected to the strike on the basis that Juror 19 was the only African-American person left, I think, in the entire venire. Without making a finding that defense counsel established a prima facie case of discrimination, the district court invited a response. After accurately summarizing Juror 19's negative experience with the police, the prosecutor gave the following race-neutral reason for striking Juror 19: She was, as she said, wrongly accused, and we believe she would have difficulty fairly judging the facts in this case given there are a number of police officers, many of whose credibility would be an important issue in this case given her own experience. The district court then denied Monell's Batson challenge: I'm going to accept that as a facially neutral reason for striking the juror. [Juror 19] certainly in my judgment did express her views - 17 - strongly about her experience and had some hesitation, concluding that she could be fair to both sides, and so I will accept the challenge as not violative of Batson or the Equal Protection Clause or otherwise illegal. Assuming that Monell satisfied his initial burden of making a prima facie showing of discrimination, we have little trouble concluding that the district court did not clearly err in ruling that Monell failed to carry his ultimate burden of showing purposeful discrimination. Few trial lawyers would be eager to seat a juror who initially and explicitly expressed hesitation about her ability to be fair to counsel's side of the case. Furthermore, in gauging both the degree of the juror's potential bias and the credibility of the prosecutor's explanation, the district court was in a far better position than are we. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) ([T]he trial court must evaluate not only whether the prosecutor's demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror's demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor.). We discern no basis in the record for finding fault with the district court's on-theground determination. Monell attempts to head off this conclusion by arguing, based on two cases citing studies of racial profiling by law enforcement, that allowing peremptory strikes on the basis of negative interactions with police will disproportionately exclude - 18 - African-American jurors. Monell did not make this argument below, so we review it for plain error. Girouard, 521 F.3d at 115. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that disparate impact alone can sustain a Batson challenge, and Monell gives us no reason to think that the law nevertheless plainly so provides. See United States v. Charlton, 600 F.3d 43, 55 (1st Cir. 2010) (Lynch, C.J., concurring) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991) (plurality opinion)); see also United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 635 (1st Cir. 1994) ([A]n explanation may be 'race neutral' even though it does not produce uniform results across racial lines.). Moreover, the challenge here did not arise simply because the juror reported a negative interaction with police from which one might infer an unwillingness to believe other police officers. Here, the juror herself was not certain that such an inference would be inaccurate.9