Opinion ID: 2793906
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of E.J.’s Testimony

Text: Villareal first argues that the district court violated his right to due process by allowing E.J. to testify that he had abused her years earlier. Because the habeas statute only allows for a writ of habeas corpus to issue to a state prisoner -4- who is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), we do not consider whether the trial court committed an error of state law by admitting E.J.’s testimony, see Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Rather, we may only “disturb a state court’s admission of evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts” if “the probative value of such evidence is so greatly outweighed by the prejudice flowing from its admission that the admission denies [the] defendant due process of law.” Knighton v. Mullin, 293 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 787 (10th Cir. 1998)). In rejecting his claim on direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) found that: Appellant had ample notice of the details of the proffered evidence and argued against its admissibility in a pretrial hearing; the trial court found a visible connection between the past conduct and the present offenses, given the age, gender, and other circumstances of the alleged victims. The trial court also instructed the jury on the limited use of the other-crimes evidence. R., Vol. I, Doc. 1-1 at 2; Villareal v. State, No. F-2009-328, slip op. at 2 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2010). The district court agreed that E.J.’s testimony “demonstrated [Villareal]’s history as a sexual predator with young girls,” R., Vol. I, Doc. 15 at 4; Villarreal v. Patton, No. CIV-11-123-RAW-KEW, 2014 WL 4966175, at  (E.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2014), and further noted that this prior -5- evidence of abuse demonstrated his lewd intent involved in his “pretend” tickling of another one of the victims, M.C., id. In his application for a COA, Villareal has not presented any argument attacking the district court’s conclusion. Nor do we see any obvious flaws in the district court’s reasoning. Villareal’s prior acts provided probative evidence of his lewd intent in his “pretend” tickling of M.C. Furthermore, E.J.’s age and family situation were similar enough to those of M.C. and J.Y. that E.J.’s testimony added credibility to their accounts. Whatever unfair prejudice may have resulted from E.J.’s testimony was mitigated by the trial court’s limiting instruction as well as by the fact that Villareal was informed before trial of the state’s intent to call E.J. as a witness. Given this and Villareal’s lack of specific argument, we find that Villareal has not made a substantial showing that the OCCA’s resolution of this issue was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent or that it was based on an unreasonable factual determination.