Opinion ID: 3156792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Election Context

Text: This Court has applied the MLRPC, and MLRPC 8.2(a) in particular, to statements made by lawyers in a variety of contexts. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frost, 437 Md. 245, 359-68, 85 A.3d 264 (2014) (statements by an attorney about judges and other public officials made in email sent to ex-wife and later forwarded to other attorneys); cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gansler, 377 Md. 656, 835 A.2d 548 (2003) (statements made by prosecutor about pending cases in press conferences). This case involves a statement made in the context of an election campaign. This context is relevant for three reasons. First, as the Supreme Court has observed, “speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office,” including judicial candidates, is “at the core of our First Amendment freedoms.” Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002); see also McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (“the First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of [election] campaigns’”) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). The speech at issue in this case — which purported to describe the views of a candidate for judicial office — is core political speech and has the highest level of First Amendment protection.8 This is important because the canon of constitutional 8 The dissenting opinions would ignore or minimize the extent to which the First Amendment constrains government entities in regulating campaign speech. For example, Judge Harrell’s opinion relies heavily on the position of the MJCCC in framing its analysis. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Harrell at 1-2, 7 & nn.1-2. Unlike State entities, including this Court, the MJCCC is a private entity not constrained by the First Amendment. As the MJCCC’s website explains, it was created in part precisely because the First Amendment limits a state supreme court’s ability to 9 avoidance requires that we be cognizant of the constitutional values at stake in construing the MLRPC: to the extent that MLRPC 8.2(a) “‘is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which would not involve a decision as to the constitutionality of the [provision] while the other would, the construction which avoids the determination of constitutionality is to be preferred.’” G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746, 763, 521 A.2d 1225 (1987) (quoting Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 505, 312 A.2d 216 (1973)). Thus, any interpretation of MLRPC 8.2(a) in an election context must take into account the First Amendment protections for speech in election campaigns. Second, the election context is significant as there inevitably is some imprecision in language used during the heat of a political campaign. There are often short timeframes in which a candidate must respond to claims or criticisms made by an opponent, there may be limited time to vet language, and a short and snappy oneliner usually prevails over a lengthier, more carefully phrased sentence. 9 Opposing restrict candidate speech in judicial elections. See . 9 For example, a campaign flyer supporting Judge Densford’s election asserted that the County Judicial Nominating Commission had found Mr. Stanalonis “Not Qualified to be a Judge” when, in selecting among the applicants for appointment to a circuit court position it did not send his name to the Governor. As Judge Densford conceded during his testimony, this was a “technically inaccurate” description of the determination made by the nominating commission. See COMAR 01.01.2008.04F & COMAR 01.01.2015.09F (executive orders specifying the function of judicial nominating commissions). 10 candidates for judicial office do not have the opportunity to depose each other.10 And campaign flyers are not appellate briefs. In this context, imprecise wording is not necessarily a violation of MLRPC 8.2(a). Finally, although this particular case arises out of an election for judicial office, MLRPC 8.2(a) also regulates statements by lawyers about “public legal officers,” such as the Attorney General and State’s Attorneys, and candidates for those elective offices. Frost, 437 Md. at 261 & n.9. Thus, whatever we hold in this case will also control what a lawyer may say about a candidate for election as Attorney General or as a State’s Attorney.