Opinion ID: 768928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Decision in Ritter v. Surles

Text: 11 In Ritter v. Surles, 144 Misc. 2d 945 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1988), a New York State Supreme Court Justice declared N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§730.40(1) and 730.60(6) and the related state regulation, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 14, §540.3, unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution. In Ritter a declaratory judgment action was brought by individual plaintiffs charged with misdemeanors, adjudged incapacitated person[s] and committed to state mental health facilities pursuant to final orders under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 730. See 144 Misc. 2d at 946, 951. Because the individuals had been found incompetent, the criminal charges against them had been dismissed and the final order of observation barred their further prosecution on the charges. See id. at 951. Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action against the Commissioners of Mental Health and Mental Retardation alleging that the process by which they were committed violated the U.S. Constitution. Their principal argument was that defendants failed to accord them due process and equal protection because individuals committed pursuant to §730.40 of New York's Criminal Procedure Law were treated differently from those involuntarily committed under the civil provision of the state's Mental Hygiene Law. See id. at 946, 948-49. 12 The New York court agreed, ruling that once criminal charges had been dismissed, there was no basis for involuntarily confining individuals absent compliance with the provisions of the Mental Hygiene Law. It found the provisions for commitment of those charged with commission of a crime facially unconstitutional. However, the state trial court did not order the individuals in question released; instead it gave the Mental Health Commissioner a choice either to release the plaintiffs or to initiate civil commitment proceedings against them. See id. at 951-52. 13 No party to Ritter appealed that 1988 decision. As acting Mental Health Commissioner at the time, defendant Dvoskin was responsible for his office's compliance with its obligations under Ritter. After Ritter was decided, Dvoskin wrote a memorandum (Dvoskin Memorandum) directed to regional and facility directors and forensic coordinators of the Mental Health Department outlining procedures to be followed as an interim response to and in an attempt to comply with Ritter. The memorandum required that all persons committed pursuant to §730.40 be evaluated to see if they met the civil commitment criteria, authorized the Office of Mental Health facilities to confine an incapacitated person for a 72-hour period without civilly committing him or her, and directed facilities to refrain from implementing certain procedures, including the hospital forensic committee review of placement on less restrictive status. Further, the memorandum stated that the notification provisions contained in §730.60(6) and the state regulation could no longer delay a patient's status change. Defendants concede that the procedures contained in the Dvoskin Memorandum did not embody the protections of Article 9, the civil commitment statute. They were intended as a stop-gap, so the state could consider whether to commence involuntary civil commitment proceedings against an individual whose misdemeanor charge had been dismissed due to his incompetence to stand trial. 14 As Director of the South Beach Psychiatric Center, where McGhie was committed, defendant Sarkis received the Dvoskin Memorandum. On October 13, 1994 the New York City Criminal Court (Duberstein, J.) found Roy McGhie incompetent to stand trial on his charge of second degree criminal trespass, N.Y. Penal Law §140.15. Pursuant to a §730.40 final order of observation, the court remanded him to the custody of the Office of Mental Health and dismissed the charge. After an involuntary detention of 72 hours or less, the state initiated successful civil commitment proceedings against McGhie. McGhie alleges that after his admission to South Beach Psychiatric Center, he was denied treatment he otherwise would have received because Sarkis subjected him to an automatic review process before authorizing any new or different treatment for him. 15 In his due process claim against defendant Dvoskin, plaintiff contends that the 72-hour period of post-dismissal confinement, which was authorized in the Dvoskin Memorandum, deprived him of his liberty without due process of law. The equal protection claim against defendant Sarkis rests on the allegation that, as Executive Director of the South Beach Psychiatric Center, she failed to implement the Center's compliance with the Dvoskin Memorandum. Instead, the Center continued to follow the procedures outlined in N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §730.60 and N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 14, §540. Sarkis allegedly subjected McGhie to this automatic review process, depriving him of care and treatment he otherwise would have received. The Center's challenged review process, which the complaint describes as devoid of procedural protections and of time limits for initiating and completing reviews, was applied to all patients remanded pursuant to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §730.40 who were subject to final orders of observation, but not to Article 9 civil committees. 16 Defendants Dvoskin and Sarkis moved for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds. From the district court's denial of their motion, defendants appeal.