Opinion ID: 147677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ground One: Ineffective Assistance Regarding Evidence of Sexual Assault

Text: Jones argues that trial counsel should have objected to the State's presentation of evidence and argument that he committed a rape or sexual battery on the victim. Jones contends that the lower courts conclude[d] that the State's conduct was not objectionable and that[ ] essentially did not occur. Jones's only legal argument, which he does not support with citations of authority, is a conclusion: Certainly, reasonable jurists might differ on this issue. We reject this argument. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that Jones's attorneys made a reasonable tactical decision not to object to the evidence, but to argue instead that the evidence did not support an inference of a sexual assault: Jones provides no support for his contention that the State's presentation of evidence of the physical condition of McRae's body was objectionable. Evidence of the condition of the victim's body as found by the police was clearly relevant. Further, [trial counsel] Buzzell testified that defense counsel were aware that the State believed that the evidence supported the inference of a sexual assault and that the defense strategy was to expose the weaknesses in the State's theory. On cross-examination of serologist Diane Hanson, defense counsel elicited testimony that a presumptive test for the presence of semen on an area of Jones' jeans came back negative. Defense counsel also elicited testimony from the medical examiner that the condition of the victim's clothes suggested that she had been dragged to the area where she was found, and testimony from McRae's husband that at times McRae did not wear underwear with her jeans. Counsel's strategic decision to rebut the State's suggestion of a possible sexual assault on cross-examination, rather than object to the evidence, cannot be considered unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. In addition, Jones does not identify specifically which comments in the prosecutor's opening statements and closing arguments were objectionable. We assume Jones is referring to the prosecutor's opening statements regarding the condition of McRae's body and the closing argument that McRae's shoes may have been off because Jones wanted her pants off. However, these comments were not improper. By referring to the way in which McRae's body was found, the prosecutor was merely outlining what he in good faith expected to be established by the evidence presented at trial, which is the purpose of opening statements.... In closing argument, the prosecutor appropriately pointed to an inference that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Moreover, the prosecutor did not tell the jury that McRae had been sexually assaulted. Accordingly, the trial counsel's failure to object was not deficient performance and the trial court did not err in denying this claim for relief. Jones II, 949 So.2d at 1031-32 (citations omitted). Jurists of reason could not debate the decision of the district court to deny relief on this ground. The record supports the finding that Jones's attorneys made the tactical decision described by the Florida Supreme Court, and it is not debatable that the ruling of that court was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law.