Opinion ID: 1881162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The ADEA Claim.

Text: Sievers contends the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on her ADEA claim. She contends the instructions taken as a whole are confusing, unfairly defense-oriented, and saddle her with nearly impossible burdens of proof. Iowa Mutual responds such a broadsided attack on the instructions fails to preserve error. Sievers also raises specific objections to various instructions the district court submitted to the jury. Iowa Mutual contends Sievers never made any of these specific objections in the district court. For these reasons, Iowa Mutual concludes Sievers preserved no error for our review. We review objections to instructions on assigned error. Iowa R. Civ. P. 4; Grefe & Sidney v. Watters, 525 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1994). On appeal, we consider only those objections to instructions raised in the district court. Iowa R. Civ. P. 196; Grefe & Sidney, 525 N.W.2d at 824. To preserve error for our review, a party must specify the subject and grounds of the objection. Iowa R. Civ. P. 196; Grefe & Sidney, 525 N.W.2d at 824. The objection must be sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the basis of the complaint so that if there is error the court may correct it before submitting the case to the jury. Grefe & Sidney, 525 N.W.2d at 824. A party therefore may not amplify or change the grounds on appeal. Moser v. Stallings, 387 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Iowa 1986). Like Iowa Mutual, we too have carefully compared Sievers' objections to the instructions in the district court with those she raises on appeal. We agree with Iowa Mutual that the objections she now raiseswith the exception of twoare new or amplify the grounds she raised in the district court. The two exceptions, which we address shortly, relate to instruction nine, the marshaling instruction. Although in the district court Sievers did characterize the instructions as confusing, unfairly defense-oriented and improperly present[ing] nearly impossible burdens of proof to the plaintiff, we deem such a challenge too vague and generalized to preserve error. See id.; Clausen v. R.W. Gilbert Constr. Co., 309 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Iowa 1981). Such a challenge does nothing to inform a trial judge how particular instructions were confusing, or were unfairly defense-oriented, or improperly placed on the plaintiff impossible burdens of proof. A. Whether instruction nine improperly incorporates allocation of burdens of production under McDonnell Douglas. Sievers objected to instruction nine on two grounds, both of which she raises on appeal. She first complains instruction nine improperly incorporates the shifting burdens of production under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). She relies on Grebin v. Sioux Falls Independent School District, 779 F.2d 18, 20 (8th Cir.1985) (holding that in jury cases trial courts should not incorporate in instructions the three-part McDonnell analysis of prima facie case, answer, and rebuttal). Recently, we described the elements of a prima facie case and allocation of the evidentiary burdens under a McDonnell Douglas type case: the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discriminationthat he was a member of a protected class, performing his work satisfactorily, and had adverse action taken against him. The defendant must then articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action. Although the defendant need not establish this by a preponderance of the evidence, he must clearly set forth some legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for his action. If the defendant satisfies his burden of asserting a legitimate explanation, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove the asserted reason is merely pretext and that the discriminatory motive played a substantial part in the actions taken. Vaughan v. Must, Inc., 542 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Iowa 1996) (citations omitted). In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Supreme Court further explained burden shifting in the context of an age discrimination claim: Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, [e]stablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. To establish a presumption is to say that a finding of the predicate fact (here, the prima facie case) produces a required conclusion in the absence of explanation (here, the finding of unlawful discrimination). Thus, the McDonnell Douglas presumption places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie casei.e., the burden of producing evidence that the adverse employment actions were taken for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. [T]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action. It is important to note, however, that although the McDonnell Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, [t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, 416 (1993) (citations omitted). Instruction nine stated: In this case, the plaintiff, Gwenda Sievers, must prove all of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 1. The plaintiff was over 40 years of age; 2. The plaintiff, on and before May 17, 1995, met the defendant employer's job performance expectations; 3. The defendant constructively discharged the plaintiff; and 4. Plaintiff was replaced by a younger person after the discharge. If the plaintiff has not proved any one of the above numbered elements by a preponderance of the evidence, your verdict must be for the defendant. If plaintiff has proved all of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence, then you will determine whether the plaintiff's age was a determining factor in the decision to constructively discharge her, or whether the decision was based on a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, as claimed by the defendant. If plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her age was a determining factor in the defendant's decision, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff; if she has not proved it, your verdict must be for the defendant. Instruction nine is a correct statement of the law, containing all of the necessary elements detailed in McDonnell Douglas. The instruction correctly focuses on Sievers' ultimate burden of proving, at the risk of nonpersuasion, that Iowa Mutual constructively discharged her because of her age. See St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. at 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d at 416. Further, we fail to see where the instruction mentions any burden shifting formulation set out in McDonnell Douglas and as more fully explained in Hicks. B. Whether it was incorrect to include the element that plaintiff was replaced by a younger person. The only other preserved claim of error also pertains to instruction nine. Sievers contends there was no need to include element fourplaintiff was replaced by a younger person after the discharge. In support of her contention, Sievers argues that the prima facie case analysis is necessary only to determine whether a plaintiff has generated a rebuttable presumption of age discrimination. She further argues that some federal cases hold that the plaintiff may create the presumption without meeting all of the elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case analysis. The notion is that whether or not the position has been filled is irrelevant because the fact that the employee was not replaced weakens but does not eliminate the inference of discrimination. See, e.g., Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995-96 (2d Cir.1985). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has acknowledged this line of cases exists but has recently required federal district courts in its circuit to instruct juries on all elements of the prima facie case. Kehoe v. Anheuser-Busch, 96 F.3d 1095, 1105 (8th Cir.1996). As to the replacement by a younger person element, the same circuit has said: The phrasing of this fourth prong reflects the United States Supreme Court's recent modification. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310, 134 L.Ed.2d 433, 438 (1996). Many courts had previously required a plaintiff to show replacement by a worker outside the protected class, i.e., under the age of 40. Such a requirement is no longer permissible. As the O'Connor Court concluded, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class. Id. Hopper v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 87 F.3d 983, 988 n. 5 (8th Cir.1996). We agree with the Eighth Circuit that trial courts should instruct juries on all elements of the prima facie case for an age discrimination claim. We note that the challenged instruction contains the replacement by a younger person element in accordance with O'Connor. We conclude Sievers' two challenges to instruction nine are without merit. Overall, the instructions are balanced, present correct statements of the law, and present fairly the issue of age discrimination. The district court patiently and painstakingly covered every proposed instruction with both counsel. In several instances, the court made changes suggested by Sievers' counsel. The court's questions of counsel and its discussion of pertinent cases convince us that the court had a good grasp of this difficult area of the law and the particular case before it.