Opinion ID: 783023
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restriction of the Scope of Closing Argument and Accompanying Jury Instruction

Text: 27 The district court relied on two grounds to restrict defense counsel's closing argument: (1) that no evidence supported the idea that Calarruda was the gunman; and (2) that Miguel's counsel did not have a good faith basis to make the argument because he stated in earlier proceedings that Miguel was the gunman. The record supports neither ground. Because reasonable inferences from the evidence supported the defense theory, the court erred in precluding counsel from arguing his theory and in instructing the jury that no evidence supported it. Such an error is structural and requires reversal under our precedent. 28
29 A district court certainly retains the power to preclude closing arguments on defense theories that are not supported by the evidence. 13 That is not what happened here. The physical evidence, expert testimony, testimony from the Government's eyewitnesses, and permissible inference from that evidence all supported the defense theory. 30 Very limited physical evidence existed at the scene. However, defense counsel focused on the one piece of physical evidence highlighted in his opening statement: the shell casing. The shell casing was 114 feet from the cabin. The Government's firearms expert testified that the casing ejected to the right, traveling approximately five to ten feet. Thus, the jury could infer that the shooter fired the gun from the area five to ten feet to the left of where the police found the shell casing. 14 31 The Government's eyewitness testimony also supported the defense theory. Calarruda testified that he was near the location of the shell casing when the gun went off. 15 Meanwhile, Tapaoan testified that Miguel and Jose were forty feet from the cabin, more than sixty feet from the shell casing. This testimony, combined with the physical evidence and the testimony from the Government's firearms expert, alone permits an inference that Calarruda was the gunman. 16 32 Thus, we must disagree with the district court. The evidence supported the defense theory that Calarruda was the gunman. Accordingly, the court should have allowed defense counsel to argue the defense theory in closing. 17 The district court's order to counsel not to argue this theory and its instruction to the jury that no evidence supported it prevented defense counsel from fram[ing] and giv[ing] content to the core of [the] defense. 18 33
34 We require very little analysis to dispose of the second basis for the district court's decision to preclude argument on the defense theory. It appears that the court held Miguel's counsel's various statements at the transfer proceeding against the defendants at trial. 19 On appeal, the Government argues that the court relied on the concept of judicial estoppel: that counsel was estopped from arguing that Calarruda fired the gun because he previously admitted that Miguel was the gunman. 20 35 Even if it were appropriate to apply judicial estoppel in this context, 21 the procedural posture of this case demonstrates the frailty of the Government's position on appeal. Counsel made the statements in the context of the transfer proceeding. Transfer proceedings are not about guilt or innocence: they only establish[ ] a basis for district court jurisdiction. 22 The district court itself, at the Government's prompting, assumed the truth of the Government's allegations: that Miguel committed the offenses charged. 23 Counsel's statements were made in the context of the district court's assumption. The Government's position in this appeal has absolutely no merit. 24 36 3. Precluding Argument on the Defense Theory and Instructing the Jury that no Evidence Supports the Theory is Structural Error. 37 Reasonable inferences from the evidence supported the defense theory. Thus, the court should have allowed defense counsel to argue their theory that Calarruda was the gunman. Likewise, the court should not have instructed the jury that no evidence supported the defense theory. Under this circuit's caselaw, such an error is structural and requires reversal. 25 38 However, even were we to conclude that harmless error analysis applies, as the Government suggests, we would still reverse. The Government asserts that the district court's error is harmless as to the felony murder conviction because it does not matter who fired the gun. 26 However, it does not matter who pulled the trigger only if we assume that all of the young men participated in the underlying felony. The facts of this case belie such an assumption. 39 To convict someone of felony murder, the Government must show that a participant in the underlying felony committed the killing during the course of the felony. 27 The jury could have concluded that Calarruda was a non-participant at the time of the shooting. According to Calarruda, he entered the WARC grounds with the rest of the group. However, he testified that he decided not to proceed and did not approach the cabin. Further, he testified that he called Tapaoan away from the cabin. Calarruda stated that he did all of these things before the defendants even stepped onto the Latchum's porch. 28 40 Thus, the jury had before it evidence from which it could draw two crucial inferences. First, it could have concluded that Calarruda was the gunman. Second, it could have concluded that Calarruda did not participate in the attempted robbery or burglary. If Calarruda shot Latchum and Calarruda was not a participant in the underlying felonies, then Miguel and Jose did not commit felony murder. Accordingly, even if our caselaw permitted us to fall back on harmless error analysis, we would still reverse. 41