Opinion ID: 1953228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court erred in granting Jury Instruction 3.

Text: ¶ 4. Eason argues that Jury Instruction No. 3 was improper in that it does not accurately state the law of defamation as applicable to the present case. Instruction No. 3 reads as follows: An absolutely privileged communication is a communication which would be actionable as defamatory except that it was made in the interest of the public service or the due administration of justice and was reasonably relevant and pertinent thereto. It is a question of law whether an absolute privilege exists, but it is a question of fact whether the privilege has been exceeded. If you find from the preponderance of the evidence in this case that the words spoken by the defendant, whether defamatory or not, were reasonably pertinent and relevant to report in the news of the death of Preston Tanner, then your verdict shall be for the defendant. ¶ 5. This Court agrees with Eason that the trial court's granting of Instruction 3 constitutes reversible error. The defense of absolute privilege generally refers in the defamation context to statements made by public officials such as legislators and judges in the performance of their official duties. 50 Am.Jur.2d § 275 notes that the defense of absolute privilege is practically limited to legislative and judicial proceedings and other acts of the state, including communications made in the discharge of a duty under express authority of law. ¶ 6. WDAM responds as follows: Plaintiff specifically argues that the instruction involving an absolutely privileged communication was misleading to the jury and preemptory in nature. However, it is clearly established in our law that `one is privileged' to publish the actual facts as to the commission of the crime, and the facts as to the arrest and charges made against the person suspected of a crime, provided the statement does not go further than a mere report of the news by making charges, directly or by inference, insinuation or assumption that the person is guilty of a crime. (citing 33 AM. Jur. Libel and Slander 167 §); Krebs v. McNeal, 222 Miss. 560, 76 So.2d 693, 699 (1955). ¶ 7. WDAM's discussion of the reporter's privilege ignores the fact that Instruction 3 deals with the totally distinct absolute privilege. WDAM provides a correct recitation of the reporter's privilege, but the reporter's privilege is merely a qualified privilege. In addition, as stated above, the reporter's privilege only grants a reporter the privilege to report accurately regarding the events in question. ¶ 8. The entire basis for the lawsuit in the present case is that the report in question was inaccurate as it pertained to the location in which the shooting occurred, and the reporter's privilege accordingly does not apply under the present facts. This Court noted in Whitten v. Commercial Dispatch Pub. Co., Inc., 487 So.2d 843 (Miss. 1986) that: Finally, we reject he defendant's argument that the newspaper is protected by the qualified privilege to publish matters of public concern. While a newspaper publishing company is granted some leeway in its reporting, they may not misstate the facts or otherwise misconstrue the truth. Whitten, 487 So.2d at 846. ¶ 9. It is clear that Instruction 3 did not merely mislabel the applicable privilege as being an absolute one; to the contrary, the instruction misstated the applicable law in such a manner as to deprive Eason of a fair trial. As noted earlier, the instruction states that, as long as the statements made in the report whether defamatory or not, were reasonably pertinent and relevant to report in the news of the death of Preston Tanner, then your verdict shall be for the defendant. Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation lawsuit in Mississippi, and it defies reason that a false statement could be pertinent or relevant in the reporting of an event. Daniels by Glass v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 634 So.2d 88 (Miss. 1993). ¶ 10. As long as Eason is considered a private figure, a negligence standard of care applies in the present case regarding the false statements made by WDAM. That is, the jury should have been required to determine whether or not the station was negligent in the manner in which it obtained the false information regarding the location of the incident. The station asserts that it received the information through the county coroner, although the coroner denied that she misinformed the station's reporter that the shooting occurred at Tanner's house. The present case thus involves in large part the jury's resolution of the fact issue of whether the testimony of the reporter or the coroner is more credible. ¶ 11. At any rate, the station clearly enjoyed no absolute privilege for its statements and this Court concludes that the present case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. This Court finds it unnecessary to consider the remaining issues on direct appeal.