Opinion ID: 1089369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims for Damages and Equitable Relief

Text: This Court has repeatedly held that § 14, Ala. Const.1901, affords the State and its agencies an `absolute' immunity from suit in any court. Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004); see also Ex parte Mobile County Dep't of Human Res., 815 So.2d 527, 530 (Ala.2001) (Pursuant to § 14, Ala. Const. of 1901, the State of Alabama and its agencies have absolute immunity from suit in any court.); Ex parte Tuscaloosa County, 796 So.2d 1100, 1103 (Ala.2000) (Under Ala. Const. of 1901, § 14, the State of Alabama has absolute immunity from lawsuits. This absolute immunity extends to arms or agencies of the state. . . .). This absolute immunity from suit also bars suits for relief by way of mandamus or injunction. Ex parte Troy Univ., 961 So.2d 105, 110 (Ala.2006). Because the immunity of the State is absolute, this Court has usually provided that any exceptions to that immunity extend only to suits naming the proper State official in his or her representative capacity. See Latham, 927 So.2d at 821 (laying out the exceptions to sovereign immunity). Even when an action names the proper State official in his or her representative capacity, such an action will be barred if it is, in substance, an action against the State for damages. See Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Ala.2006) (Additionally, a party may not indirectly sue the State by suing its officers or agents `when a result favorable to plaintiff would be directly to affect the financial status of the state treasury. ' (quoting Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002), quoting in turn State Docks Comm'n v. Barnes, 225 Ala. 403, 405, 143 So. 581, 582 (1932)) (emphasis added in Patterson )). Good Hope argues that this Court, in Milton Construction Co. v. State Highway Department, 568 So.2d 784 (Ala.1990) ( Milton I ), and State Highway Department v. Milton Construction Co., 586 So.2d 872 (Ala.1991) ( Milton II ), allowed a plaintiff to bring a breach-of-contract action against the State Highway Department, the predecessor agency to ALDOT, notwithstanding the absolute immunity of the State agency. In Milton I, the plaintiff, Milton Construction Company, sought a judgment declaring that the disincentive clause of an incentive/disincentive-payments provision in each of two highway-construction contracts it had entered into with the Highway Department was void and unenforceable as a penalty. On these grounds, Milton asked the trial court to order the Highway Department to pay it the amounts of disincentive payments that the Highway Department had allegedly wrongfully withheld. This Court held that the disincentive clause in the highway-construction contracts was void as a penalty and therefore unenforceable. 568 So.2d at 791. We remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. In Milton II, the Highway Department argued that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the trial court from ordering it to repay the money that it had withheld from the plaintiff under the void disincentive clause. This Court stated that actions brought to force state employees or agencies to perform their legal duties are among the established exceptions to the protection afforded the state or its agencies by sovereign immunity. Milton II, 586 So.2d at 875 (emphasis added). We held that sovereign immunity would not bar an action to compel State officials to perform a legal duty, and in this case the Highway Department had incurred a legal duty to pay money owed under the highway-construction contracts. In Milton II, notwithstanding the language suggesting that the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply to State agencies, the Court held that this lawsuit is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because it is in the nature of an action to compel state officers to perform their legal duties and pay Milton Construction for services contracted for and rendered. 586 So.2d at 875. The case the Court relied on in Milton II, Ex parte Carter, 395 So.2d 65, 68 (Ala.1980), restricts the sovereign-immunity exceptions, except for declaratory-judgment actions, to suits against State officials. In Milton I and Milton II, the plaintiff had named the director of the Highway Department, in his official capacity, as a party to the action, along with the Highway Department. Milton I and Milton II thus do not support Good Hope's claim that it has a right to sue a State agency in the agency's own right on a breach-of-contract theory, and we disavow any contrary implication of the language of those opinions. As we noted above, a State agency is absolutely immune from suit. Good Hope also argues that it is entitled to [a] writ of mandamus from the trial court directing ALDOT to perform its contractual and legal duties. . . . Good Hope's answer at 15. Again, Good Hope has named as a party only the State agency; it has not named any State official. The absolute immunity of the State agency from suit bars actions for relief by mandamus or injunction. Ex parte Troy Univ., 961 So.2d at 110. Each of the cases Good Hope cites, Dampier v. Pegues, 362 So.2d 224, 225-26 (Ala.1978), Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co., 353 So.2d 779, 780 (Ala. 1977), and State Board of Administration v. Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 121, 117 So. 757, 758 (1928), [2] is a case in which a plaintiff sought the writ of mandamus directing a State official, not the State agency itself, to act. Because the immunity of a State agency is absolute under § 14, Ala. Const.1901, ALDOT is also immune from the counts in Good Hope's complaint alleging negligence and unjust enrichment and seeking recovery under a theory of quantum meruit. See § 14, Ala. Const. 1901 ([T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.); Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 810-11 (Ala.2002) (dismissing an action alleging negligence against a State agency on the ground of the agency's absolute immunity from suit). In short, there is no set of facts that will support the negligence, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit allegations of the complaint; therefore, Good Hope cannot prevail on those claims.