Opinion ID: 3023718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Common to Both the Age and the

Text: Disability Discrimination Claims
We have noted that “[i]nstructions . . . explain[ing] the subtleties of the McDonnell Douglas framework are generally inappropriate when jurors are being asked to determine whether intentional discrimination has occurred.” Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., 191 F.3d 344, 347 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999). Sometimes, elements of the framework may be given as part of the instructions, but “judges should present them in a manner that is free of legalistic jargon.” Id. The New Jersey courts agree, and have held, that the McDonnell Douglas test should not generally be laid out because the “prima facie case and the shifting burdens confuse lawyers and judges, much less juries, who do not have the benefit of extensive study of the law on the subject.” Mogull v. Commercial Real Estate, 744 A.2d 1186, 1199 (N.J. 2000). New Jersey’s Supreme Court recently approved Model Jury 21 Charges that “remove from the jury’s consideration the issues of whether the plaintiff and the defendant have met the first and second stages, respectively, of the McDonnell Douglas test,” supporting instead their consideration by motion for judgment at the end of the plaintiff’s case. New Jersey Model Jury C h arg es, “In t r o d u c t o r y N o t e t o t h e C o u rt,” http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/charges/civil/221.htm. Even though a district court should not generally include language on the burden shifting analysis or require a jury to decide whether a prima facie case has been established, these, by themselves, are insufficient to vacate a judgment. In Watson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, we concluded that harmless error in parts of a jury charge that do not prejudice the complaining party are not grounds to order a new trial. 207 F.3d 207, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2000). In Armstrong’s case, the District Court did use legal jargon to describe the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, required the jury to consider whether Armstrong established a “prima facie” case of age or disability discrimination, and instructed that the jury had to determine whether the Hospital’s suggested reason for its actions was not a “pretext.”16 Nonetheless, we believe each instruction contained an explanation that a reasonable juror could likely understand. As 16 The District Court’s relevant instructions on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework are reprinted in