Opinion ID: 2629943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Brown procedurally barred from raising Rankin in his second PRP?

Text: ¶ 15 The State contends that Brown is barred from raising his Rankin challenge to the constitutionality of his seizure because (1) he raised similar issues in his first PRP, and (2) he raised the issue in his direct appeal, the Court of Appeals decided against him, and he abandoned it upon appeal to this court. ¶ 16 The government alleges RCW 10.73.140 provides strong guidance to the Court that a person is entitled to one petition absent good cause. Resp. to PRP at 12. However, RCW 10.73.140 does not bar the Supreme Court from considering successive PRPs. In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wash.2d 558, 563-66, 933 P.2d 1019 (1997). And the issue Brown raised pro se in his first PRP is not similar to the issue he raises in his second PRP. In his first PRP, Brown raised the issue of whether an Oregon trip permit was valid on Washington's roads. In his second PRP Brown questioned whether he was unconstitutionally seized when the officer requested identification without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. ¶ 17 The State also cites Rule of Appellate Procedure 16.4(d) that [n]o more than one petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner will be entertained without good cause shown. However, similar relief has been defined by this court as the same grounds, meaning simply a distinct legal basis for granting relief having been determined adversely to the applicant on a prior application. In re Pers. Restraint of Taylor, 105 Wash.2d 683, 688, 717 P.2d 755 (1986). The legal basis for granting relief if the trip permit had been valid was distinct and separate from the legal basis for granting relief if Brown was unconstitutionally seized when an officer requested identification without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Further, even if this court treated Brown's PRP as a request for similar relief under RAP 16.4(d), the good cause exception to that bar applies. We have held a significant, intervening change in the law, which may result from a decision by this court, is good cause. Johnson, 131 Wash.2d at 567, 933 P.2d 1019; In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wash.2d 687, 701, 9 P.3d 206 (2000). ¶ 18 The State also claims that Brown abandoned the Rankin issue by not preserving it upon direct review. However, the only authority cited by the State is In re Personal Restraint of Lord, 123 Wash.2d 296, 303, 868 P.2d 835 (1994), and only for the proposition that a personal restraint petitioner may not renew an issue that was raised and rejected on direct appeal unless the interests of justice require relitigation of that issue. Id. at 303, 868 P.2d 835 (citing Taylor, 105 Wash.2d at 688, 717 P.2d 755). The case on which Lord relies undermines the State's argument. The seminal Taylor case follows the United States Supreme Court in determining that the ends of justice are served where `[i]f purely legal questions are involved, the applicant may be entitled to a new hearing upon showing an intervening change in the law.' Taylor, 105 Wash.2d at 688, 717 P.2d 755 (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-1078, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963)). ¶ 19 `[W]here an intervening opinion has effectively overturned a prior appellate decision that was originally determinative of a material issue, the intervening opinion constitutes a significant change in the law.' In re Pers. Restraint of Grasso, 151 Wash.2d 1, 11, 84 P.3d 859 (2004) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wash.2d 687, 697, 9 P.3d 206 (2000)). The Court of Appeals below directly and repeatedly relied upon its fellow Court of Appeals decision in State v. Rankin, 108 Wash.App. 948, 33 P.3d 1090 (2001) to reject Brown's challenges to his seizure. This court reversed that decision in Rankin, 151 Wash.2d 689, 92 P.3d 202. We released our Rankin opinion a mere three weeks after Brown was notified that his motion for reconsideration of his Court of Appeals decision had been denied, [4] and a mere six weeks before Brown filed his petition for review in this court. The case was not even published in the advance sheets until July 20, 2004  the very day Brown filed his petition for review with this court. ¶ 20 Further, the State has not been prejudiced by Brown's raising this issue in a PRP rather than his petition for review. Brown could just as easily have moved to amend his petition for review under Title 17 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this court could have granted the motion since Brown's case is also here on direct review. Prior to this court's accepting Brown's petition for review Brown brought forth the Blakely issue, and this court granted Brown's motion to amend the petition simultaneously with granting review only as to that issue. The State suffers no prejudice from a similar approach to Brown's PRP, and the State adequately briefed the merits of Brown's Rankin claim.