Opinion ID: 790531
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kay

Text: 71 The first and fifth Foltice factors clearly favor an award to Kay, for the reasons discussed above. As the district court found, First Trust does not contest that it has the ability to pay a fee award. And, as the district court stated, such an award may help to ensure that designated beneficiaries are included in future suits, making such suits simpler to litigate and more likely to protect the interests of such beneficiaries. An award to Kay will hopefully serve to deter First Trust from litigating in this manner in future cases. Finally, although only Kay will benefit directly from a fee award, a common benefit will be conferred upon future litigants in Kay's shoes vis-a-vis First Trust. 72 Thus, we hold that the district court committed a clear error in judgment in limiting Kay's request for attorney's fees. Without explanation, the district court limited Kay to the fees and expenses associated with her efforts to intervene. The court thereby prohibited the rightful beneficiary from pursuing fees related to all issues pertaining to her claim, including protecting herself from First Trust's improper requests for attorney's fees which she would not have had to incur but for First Trust's litigating tactics. In creating this limitation, the court seems to have been persuaded by First Trust's argument that it should not have to pay attorney's fees to a claimant that are incurred in the ordinary course of pursuing her claims. For all of reasons discussed, First Trust's conduct took the proper claimants well beyond the ordinary course of interpleader actions. We therefore hold that the district court's limitation on Kay's fee request was clearly an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.