Opinion ID: 852517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Denial of a Fair Post-Conviction Hearing

Text: Overstreet complains that he was denied a fair post-conviction hearing. He alleges: (a) the post-conviction court erred in the admission and exclusion of evidence; (b) the post-conviction court erred in quashing a subpoena to the Johnson County Prosecutor; and (c) an inaccurate post-conviction hearing transcript denies him a fair appellate review of the post-conviction proceedings.
Under this general heading, Overstreet makes three claims: (1) the post-conviction court erred in sustaining the State's objection to the admission of demonstrative evidence; (2) the post-conviction court erred in sustaining the State's objection to the admission into evidence an affidavit of a defense witness; and (3) the post-conviction court erred in allowing a State's rebuttal witness.
At the post-conviction hearing Overstreet presented four mental health experts that testified about various aspects of his mental illness. During the testimony of one of the experts, Overstreet sought to introduce as a demonstrative exhibit excerpts from a motion picture about the life of a person diagnosed with schizophrenia. Overstreet argued that the excerpts would be of assistance to the Court in terms of showing how the . . . hallucinations and delusion symptoms work on a schizophrenic. P-Cr. at 532. The post-conviction court sustained the State's objection to the introduction of the exhibit. Demonstrative evidence is evidence offered for purposes of illustration and clarification. Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ind.1999). To be admissible, the evidence must be sufficiently explanatory or illustrative of relevant testimony to be of potential help to the trier of fact. Id. By granting the State's motion the post-conviction court apparently concluded that excerpts from the motion picture would be of no help in illustrating or clarifying the witness' testimony. The record shows that the post-conviction court listened to hours of testimony and reviewed several documents detailing Overstreet's mental illness. We find no abuse of discretion in the court declining to allow into evidence a fictional story, albeit based on a true-life event that at most would have amounted to cumulative evidence.
During hearings on August 16 and August 20, 2004, Overstreet sought to introduce into evidence the affidavits of three expert witnesses, one of which was Dr. Eric Engum's. The post-conviction court sustained the State's objection to the admission of these affidavits, but allowed the Petitioner one additional day of trial on September 13, 2004, in which to present these experts for testimony and cross-examination. App. at 301. At the September 13 hearing defense counsel informed the court that Dr. Engum was not available, would not be available until October, and requested the court to give us another day in October and try and get Dr. Engum here to testify. P-Cr. at 839-40. The post-conviction court declined to delay the proceedings any further and also declined to reconsider its ruling on the affidavit. Id. at 840. Complaining that despite their best efforts counsel could not secure Dr. Engum by the date of the continued hearing, Overstreet argues that, [g]iven the relevance of the information contained in the affidavit, the PCR judge abused its discretion in rejecting the affidavit. Br. of Appellant at 89. [12] First, the problem with the affidavit is not one of relevance, but the ability of the State to question and cross-examine the affiant. See Shumaker v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1381, 1382 (Ind.1988) (noting that the proffered affidavit was hearsay and improperly admitted because it was an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein and not susceptible to cross-examination). Indeed, affording the State an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Engum, as well as other witnesses whose testimony Overstreet sought to present by way of affidavit, prompted the post-conviction court to sustain the State's objection in the first place. Second, Overstreet had nearly a month to make alternative arrangements to secure the testimony of Dr. Engum and apparently failed to do so. Third, and perhaps most important, the critical point of Dr. Engum's affidavit  that he also would have diagnosed Overstreet as schizophrenic  was not only cumulative, but would have made no difference in the penalty phase of trial. As we discussed earlier in Part III. A, Dr. Smith testified at the post-conviction hearing that he diagnosed Overstreet as suffering from schizophrenia. And the jury heard extensive testimony from Dr. Engum about the seriousness of Overstreet's mental illness. In sum, the post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allow Engum's affidavit into evidence.
Overstreet also complains about the post-conviction court's decision to allow the State to call a rebuttal witness. The scope of rebuttal evidence lies within the post-conviction court's discretion. Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221, 232 (Ind.1991). As we mentioned earlier, during the post-conviction hearing Overstreet presented four mental health experts that testified about various aspects of his mental illness. After Overstreet had concluded his presentation, the State called Dr. Ned Masbaum, a forensic psychiatrist, to give his opinions regarding the reports that have been offered by these experts. P-Cr. at 840. Overstreet objected and complained that allowing Dr. Masbaum to testify was not consistent with the court's case management schedule and Dr. Masbaum's testimony was unnecessary because he could only rebut the testimony of Dr. Engum who did not testify. After a lengthy discussion and argument by both sides, the post-conviction court overruled Overstreet's objection. Among other things, Dr. Masbaum testified that the trial court appointed him in 1998 to evaluate Overstreet for an opinion regarding his competence to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. Dr. Masbaum's clinical diagnosis at that time was that Overstreet had a history of alcohol dependence. He concluded that Overstreet had sufficient comprehension to understand the proceedings and to assist his attorneys in his defense. Dr. Masbaum also opined that Overstreet was of sound mind at the time of the offenses and that he was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Noting that he had reviewed the reports of various defense experts, including reports making the diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, Dr. Masbaum testified that [Overstreet] had no schizophrenia when I examined him. Id. at 896. He also testified that he stood by that conclusion despite the additional records he had reviewed in preparation for the hearing. Id. Overstreet vigorously cross-examined Dr. Masbaum, challenging his assumptions and pointing out that Dr. Masbaum did not review the post-conviction testimony of Overstreet's experts. Id. at 905-13. On appeal Overstreet has not explained how he was harmed by the post-conviction court's decision to allow Dr. Masbaum to testify. Overstreet complains that he was caught by surprise. Br. of Appellant at 90. But the thoroughness of Overstreet's cross-examination reveals that he was well prepared to meet any challenge posed by the testimony of this witness. We find no abuse of discretion here.
During the post-conviction proceedings Overstreet served a subpoena on the prosecutor of Johnson County directing him to appear in court for questioning. Overstreet sought to explore a broad range of topics, including decisions the prosecutor made during trial as well as the prosecutor's investigation of Scott Overstreet's involvement in the death of Kelly Eckart. [13] On motion by the Attorney General, the post-conviction court entered an order quashing the subpoena. Overstreet complains the court erred. This Court has held: As a general rule, a prosecuting attorney cannot be called as a defense witness unless the testimony sought is required by compelling and legitimate need. The trial court in its discretion may deny the request if the prosecutor does not have information vital to the case. Where the evidence is easily available from other sources and absent extraordinary circumstances or compelling reasons, an attorney who participates in a case should not be called as a witness. Ingle v. State, 746 N.E.2d 927, 933 (Ind. 2001) (quotation omitted) (finding there was no basis to conclude that prosecutor had any information that was not easily available from other sources); see also Badelle v. State, 754 N.E.2d 510, 536 (Ind.Ct. App.2001) (finding the defendant established a compelling and legitimate need for some of the information requested from former prosecutor, but the need was met by former prosecutor's affidavit and the testimony of a deputy prosecutor), trans. denied, 761 N.E.2d 423 (Ind.2001). Citing Ingle and Badelle, the post-conviction court determined that although Overstreet may have a compelling need for the information sought, [he] has failed to show that the information is not available from other sources or by other means. App. at 167. In this appeal Overstreet still makes no attempt to demonstrate that the information he sought is not easily available from other sources. Instead he contends Ingle is not relevant and that Badelle is distinguishable on its facts. Br. of Appellant at 91-92. We agree with the post-conviction court. Overstreet's failure to show that the information he requested is not easily available from other sources is fatal to his claim.
After the post-conviction court entered its order denying Overstreet relief, he thereafter filed a motion to correct and supplement the transcript of the post-conviction proceedings. Attached to his motion was an eighteen-page errata sheet, based on Overstreet's review of audio discs, listing suggested corrections of misspelled words and transcriptions of testimony the court reporter found inaudible. App. at 585-605. Overstreet requested that the transcript be corrected consistent with his errata sheet and that a corrected transcript be submitted as a supplemental transcript in accordance with the Indiana Appellate Rules. [14] The State responded arguing that although Overstreet for the most part correctly identified typographical, grammatical, or spelling errors, Overstreet failed to show that these inaccuracies were material. The post-conviction court denied Overstreet's motion. Overstreet complains that the post-conviction court's ruling violated his right to a fair opportunity to pursue his claims. [15] Br. of Appellant at 94. In support Overstreet relies in part on Ben-Yisrayl v. Davis, 277 F.Supp.2d 898, 905 (N.D.Ind. 2003), where the district court granted habeas corpus relief to a petitioner in part because of inaccuracies in the transcript of petitioner's capital trial. On appeal to the circuit court, Judge Manion observed, [T]his faulty record does not provide the foundation necessary to render due process to the defendant in this appeal. Ben-Yisrayl v. Davis, 431 F.3d 1043, 1054 (7th Cir.2005) (Manion, J., concurring). Ben-Yisrayl provides Overstreet no relief. At stake in that case was the accuracy and reliability of the trial record. [16] See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) ([I]t is important that the record on appeal disclose to the reviewing court the considerations which motivated the death sentence in every case in which it is imposed.); see also Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357, 358, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993) (per curiam) (We have emphasized before the importance of reviewing capital sentences on a complete record.). Importantly, the district court in Ben-Yisrayl determined that the record, in particular a transcript of comments the State made during closing argument, contained too many errors and uncertainties to enable the court to explore fully the existence and extent of any constitutional error. Ben-Yisrayl, 277 F.Supp.2d at 906. In this case the errors in the transcript are inconsequential. [17] Significantly, our review of Overstreet's post-conviction claims has not been impeded by inaccuracies in the transcript. Many errors listed are in portions of the proceedings that are not germane to the issues Overstreet has raised for review. And just as important, Overstreet makes no claim that he has been harmed in any way by the inaccuracies. For example, Overstreet does not contend that his presentation of the issues in this appeal have been in any way affected by the post-conviction transcript's deficiencies, and Overstreet does not contend that his ability to advance a claim has in any way been adversely affected by the transcript's deficiencies. We find no error.