Opinion ID: 622781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claim Based on the CWA and the NPDES Permit

Text: When evaluating contentions that the violation of mandatory requirements implies a waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA, we must refrain from imposing liability on the government when doing so would subvert a congressional decision to preclude regulated entity liability in the statute creating the mandatory directive. Id. at 30. The Supreme Court in Dolan v. United States Postal Service, 546 U.S. 481, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006), stated that the general rule that `a waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity will be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign,' did not apply in a case interpreting an exception to the FTCA. Id. at 491, 126 S.Ct. 1252 (quoting Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996)). [T]he proper objective of a court attempting to construe one of the subsections of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 is to identify those circumstances which are within the words and reason of the exceptionno less and no more. Id. at 492, 126 S.Ct. 1252 (quoting Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1519, 79 L.Ed.2d 860 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Abreu, we held that the unavailability of damages under the RCRA demonstrated that allowing recovery of compensatory damages under the FTCA for RCRA violations would adversely affect the RCRA statutory scheme. [5] 468 F.3d at 31. The RCRA, we held, did not present a situation in which Congress simply left unaddressed the question of damages liability under the mandatory statute. Id. The statute's citizen-suit provision confers jurisdiction on district courts to restrain violations and order persons in violation of permits, standards, regulations, conditions, requirements, prohibitions, or orders effective under the statute to take such other action as may be necessary. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a); see also Abreu, 468 F.3d at 31. We stated that although this provision confers jurisdiction over suits for injunctive relief, Abreu, 468 F.3d at 31, the Supreme Court had recognized limits on this grant of jurisdiction to compensatory damages, id. (citing Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484-85, 116 S.Ct. 1251, 134 L.Ed.2d 121 (1996)), and it was clear that Congress did not intend that the RCRA authorize civil tort actions against the federal government for damages, id. at 32 (quoting H. Rep. No. 102-111, at 15 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1287, 1301) (internal quotation mark omitted). It is clear that Congress did not intend that the CWA authorize civil tort actions against the federal government for damages. The plaintiffs' theory that they may sue under the FTCA for alleged CWA violations is expressly barred by the intent of Congress. In Meghrig, the Supreme Court relied on its decision in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981), for the proposition that when Congress has provided `elaborate enforcement provisions' for remedying the violation of a federal statute. . . `it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens suing under' the statute. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487-88, 116 S.Ct. 1251 (quoting Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14, 101 S.Ct. 2615). The decision in Sea Clammers addressed, inter alia, the availability of compensatory damages under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), the citizen-suit provision in the CWA. 453 U.S. at 14, 101 S.Ct. 2615. That provision states that the district courts have jurisdiction to enforce . . . an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty and apply civil penalties allowed in a separate provision. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). In Sea Clammers, the Supreme Court held that both the structure and legislative history of the CWA dictate that Congress intended that private remedies in addition to those expressly provided [in the CWA] should not be implied. 453 U.S. at 18, 101 S.Ct. 2615. It reasoned that [w]here, as here, Congress has made clear that implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment. Id. The Court emphasized that the Senate Report for the Act placed particular emphasis on the limited nature of the citizen suits being authorized. Id. at 18 n. 27, 101 S.Ct. 2615 (citing S.Rep. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971)). It also emphasized that the citizen-suit provision of the [CWA] was expressly modeled on the parallel provision of the Clean Air Act, and that the legislative history of the latter Act contains explicit indications that private enforcement suits were intended to be limited to the injunctive relief expressly provided for. Id. Sea Clammers does not only demand the conclusion that Congress intended to foreclose the availability of compensatory damages under the CWA. The decision also supports the conclusion, required by Abreu, that this clear congressional intent is relevant in determining the availability of an action for damages under the FTCA. See Abreu, 468 F.3d at 30. In Sea Clammers, the Court held that [w]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615. It is hard to believe, the Court stated, that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many specific statutory remedies, including the citizen-suit provision in the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), and a parallel provision in the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g). Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615. As in Abreu, allowing the recovery of damages in a FTCA suit, based on the violation of a mandatory permitting requirement under a federal statute that precludes compensatory damages would undermine the intent of Congress. Abreu, 468 F.3d at 32. For the reasons already articulated in Abreu, moreover, the waiver of sovereign immunity reflected in various statutes must be interpreted in light of significant policies reflected in other related federal statutes. Id. at 30. Sea Clammers makes clear that the decision not to permit damages under the CWA is a significant policy of that statute, and a policy significant enough to demand the conclusion that Congress intended the CWA to foreclose the availability of damages available before the statute was enacted. [6] Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20-21, 101 S.Ct. 2615. The plaintiffs seek to evade this conclusion by arguing that our Abreu decision was inconsistent with previously decided Supreme Court precedent and with decisions of other courts. That is not so. With respect to the Supreme Court precedent, they argue that Abreu is inconsistent with Gaubert, as well as general statements by the Supreme Court that the FTCA's exceptions should not be construed in an unduly generous fashion, see Kosak, 465 U.S. at 853 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1519; see also Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289, 298, 103 S.Ct. 1089, 75 L.Ed.2d 67 (1983). With respect to the decisions from beyond this circuit, the plaintiffs invoke a pair of district court decisions that postdate Abreu. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d 644 (E.D.La. 2009); Adams v. United States, No. 03-0049, 2006 WL 3314571 (D.Idaho Nov. 14, 2006). They argue that these decisions demand that we confine Abreu to its facts and allow their present FTCA claim to proceed. We disagree. A panel of this court is ordinarily constrained by prior panel decisions directly (or even closely) on point. United States v. Guzmán, 419 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2005). A panel is not so bound when a prior panel decision has been undermined by (1) controlling authority that postdates the decision, like a Supreme Court opinion, en banc decision of the circuit, or statutory overruling, or (2) non-controlling authority that postdates the decision that may offer a compelling reason for believing that the former panel, in light of new developments, would change its collective mind. Id. The second exception, we have stated, fairly may be described as hen's-teeth rare. Id. The plaintiffs have hardly advanced an argument under the second of these exceptions, and they have advanced no argument under the first. The Supreme Court decisions do not postdate Abreu. Indeed, the Abreu panel carefully considered how the Supreme Court's decision in Gaubert informed its analysis and how other Supreme Court precedent informed the breadth of exceptions to FTCA liability. The two district court opinions from beyond this circuit do not suffice to meet the exacting standard of the second exception. [7]