Opinion ID: 1890466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Waiver of Twelve Jurors

Text: While the jury was deliberating, a strange thing occurred. A juror who implicitly had stated before trial that he was able to make an impartial decision, determined as deliberations got underway that his religion actually prevented him from voting with the jury and that he was there only for assistance. Left with few options, the trial justice met with the parties to discuss what to do next. She asked the parties whether they had any ideas but none was offered. The trial justice noted that she could call the dissident juror in and read him the riot act; she could perhaps substitute the alternate juror; or they could proceed with eleven jurors. After conferring with defendants, defense counsel and the state agreed to proceed with eleven jurors. Thereafter, the trial justice asked whether defendants needed an interpreter; [3] both responded that they understood English. The trial justice then set forth four options available to defendants: the three mentioned earlier, as well as declaring a mistrial. In the presence of their attorneys, both defendants told the trial justice that they wished to proceed with eleven jurors. The defendants now argue that the trial justice insufficiently explained all the options available to defendants, thus failing to obtain a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of their right to a jury of twelve required by Rule 23 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 23(b) states: Juries shall be of twelve (12) but at any time before verdict the parties may in open court stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve (12). We have upheld a defendant's voluntary and intentional waiver of his known right to a jury of twelve even when the defendant was not instructed on the possibility of a mistrial. State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 864 (R.I.1991). Our holding in Pailon turned on the relatively small likelihood that a mistrial would have been declared or the juror dismissed even if the defendant had challenged the juror during voir dire. Id. Our decision in Pailon is relevant in holding that a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver can be made even when the trial justice does not thoroughly explain every single potential option available. We hold now that in this case there were knowing, intelligent and voluntary waivers from both defendants and, thus, defendants' rights were not violated. The trial justice was very thorough in ascertaining whether defendants' waiver was knowing and voluntary. After defense counsel informed the trial justice of their clients' intent to proceed with eleven jurors, the trial justice carefully questioned defendants to ascertain whether they actually understood what had been decided. She read Rule 23(b) aloud to defendants to make sure they understood their rights and then questioned each defendant separately about his educational background, how long he had lived in the United States, and whether he had a clear head when making the decision. She also asked whether defendants' lawyers had thoroughly explained the options to them, and both defendants answered yes. [4] She also asked defendants to sign a waiver, pursuant to Rule 23(b), which both parties did willingly. She concluded that she was satisfied that the parties are voluntarily agreeing to proceed with 11 jurors, and I think they understand the consequence of that, and I think they have a clear mind and they understood what I said to them and what the attorneys said. The trial justice clearly and substantially did all that was required of her before determining that defendants understood the nature of their rights and what they were waiving by proceeding with a jury of eleven. Therefore, we affirm the trial justice's ruling that defendants' constitutional rights were not violated when they agreed to proceed with eleven jurors.