Opinion ID: 752407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Replace Appointed Counsel (Ramirez )

Text: 25 Claiming a total breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, Ramirez sought to replace court-appointed counsel three weeks before trial. He alleged that appointed counsel had refused to turn over in timely fashion documents Ramirez wished to review, refused to intervene with prison officials after Ramirez was placed in special punitive confinement, and failed to conduct an adequate investigation or to consult with Ramirez in preparing a defense. 26 As there is no absolute right to replace appointed counsel, see United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir.1989), we review the district court ruling for abuse of discretion only, United States v. Richardson, 894 F.2d 492, 496 (1st Cir.1990), after assessing, inter alia: (i) the timeliness of the request, (ii) the adequacy of the inquiry into the defendant's concerns, and (iii) whether the conflict between client and counsel resulted in a total lack of communication and precluded an adequate defense. Id. The challenged ruling was well within the district court's discretion. 27 The trial judge repeatedly urged Ramirez to particularize the grounds for his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, then followed up with probing questions directed to counsel. 18 Counsel assured the court that he had explained all aspects of the case to Ramirez and that he had been prepared for trial. 19 Furthermore, Ramirez acknowledged that counsel ultimately delivered all requested documents and discussed the case with him on the five or six occasions he visited Ramirez in prison. See, e.g., United States v. Pierce, 60 F.3d 886, 891 (1st Cir.1995) (finding no abuse, even where lawyer-client relationship was beset with problems, because lawyer and client were conversing with one another). The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the grounds advanced by Ramirez failed to demonstrate the requisite total lack of communication.C. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Ramirez ) 20 28 Ramirez claims that the government adduced insufficient evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, all elements of the three charged offenses. See supra notes 10-12. He relies primarily on the contention that the trial testimony provided by Lugo was crucial to his conviction and that Lugo demonstrated conclusively that he is an inveterate liar. 21 29 Although fully informed of Lugo's prevarications, as well as the generous terms of his plea agreement with the government, the verdicts substantiate that the jury nonetheless credited Lugo's trial testimony at least in part. Lugo testified that he promptly informed Ramirez, his friend since childhood, that Chispo had ordered Lugo to kill Mejias, and that Ramirez later complied with Lugo's November 1 telephonic instruction to deliver the revolver and the black Oldsmobile to El Ideal. See United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 798, modified on other grounds, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.1985). Moreover, the El Ideal owner on duty the morning of November 1 testified that she overheard the phone conversation Lugo had with Ramirez, during which Lugo talked about killing the guy (i.e., Officer Mejias). In addition, a search of the Ramirez residence disclosed incriminating circumstantial evidence corroborating Ramirez' close association with Lugo and his ready access to weapons. 22 Nor did any other trial evidence, see, e.g., supra note 21, constrain the jury to reject Lugo's corroborated testimony that Ramirez intentionally participated in the charged offenses, see supra note 20. 23 D. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Cirilo )
30 The government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mejias was murdered by Lugo, the alleged principal, and that Cirilo consciously shared Lugo's criminal design, associated himself with it, and actively sought to ensure its success. See United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 235 (1st Cir.1995); see also United States v. Ruiz, 105 F.3d 1492, 1499 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Loder, 23 F.3d 586, 591 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Francomano, 554 F.2d 483, 486-87 (1st Cir.1977). Thus, in the present case the specific-intent element for aiding and abetting a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(B) required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Cirilo, before the murder occurred, consciously shared Lugo's intention to kill Mejias and sought to ensure the success of the criminal enterprise by operating the black Oldsmobile used to effect the getaway after the Suzuki had been dumped. See Spinney, 65 F.3d at 235; United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986, 998-1000 (1st Cir.1995). Even assuming, arguendo, that Cirilo's actions after the Mejias murder are insufficient to establish his foreknowledge, see United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552, 557 n. 5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1239, 116 S.Ct. 1890, 135 L.Ed.2d 183 (1996), those actions may provide support for a reasonable inference regarding his foreknowledge.
31 We review de novo the district court's determination that the jury reasonably found each element of the crime to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.... United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1295 (1st Cir.1996) (reversing conviction for aiding and abetting murder) (emphasis added), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 963, 136 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). We must consider the evidence as a whole, together with all rational inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government. Loder, 23 F.3d at 589; United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir.1991). Where de novo review discloses that essential jury findings on knowledge or specific intent were purely speculative, an aiding and abetting conviction cannot stand. See, e.g., Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1295; Spinney, 65 F.3d at 235 (reversing conviction for aiding and abetting use or carrying of firearm by principal during crime of violence); de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d at 1002 (vacating conviction for aiding and abetting possession of cocaine with intent to distribute). 32 As in any case, of course,  '[w]e defer, within reason, to inferences formulated by the jury in the light of its collective understanding of human behavior in the circumstances revealed by the evidence.'  United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332, 339 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Passos-Paternina, 918 F.2d 979, 985 (1st Cir.1990)). Furthermore, the jury is entitled to rely on a chain of reasonable inferences, as long as each constituent inference is rooted in the evidence. See Spinney, 65 F.3d at 237-38. Finally, it is important to point out that though the beyond-reasonable-doubt burden applies to 'every element' of each offense charged[,][it] neither [applies] to all the subsidiary inferences nor to 'every hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence.'  United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1017 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Spinney, 65 F.3d at 234) (emphasis added).
33 Cirilo essentially maintains that his proven participation--in operating the getaway vehicle, disposing of Mejias' body, and sharing the spoils removed from it--though arguably adequate to demonstrate that he was an accessory after the fact, see 18 U.S.C. § 3, did not establish the requisite preexistent intent to aid and abet the Mejias murder. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2; supra notes 10 & 11. Thus, Cirilo correctly contends that something more than mere presence and mere association is required, see, e.g., United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060, 1064 (1st Cir.1997); that is to say, the evidence, direct and circumstantial, must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he not only associated himself in some manner with the Mejias murder, as the evidence plainly shows, see infra Section II.D.4, but that he did so after acquiring the requisite knowledge that Lugo intended to kill Mejias. 34 For its part, the government relies first and foremost on Cirilo's presence throughout virtually the entire period immediately preceding and including the capture and abduction of Officer Mejias, Cirilo's longstanding association with Lugo and Mangual, and his direct involvement in the events which unfolded from the time the white Suzuki departed the El Ideal premises carrying Lugo, Mangual and Mejias. See, e.g., United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63 F.3d 1142, 1150 (1st Cir.1995) (mere association defense), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1234, 116 S.Ct. 1879, 135 L.Ed.2d 174 (1996); Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d at 18 (mere presence defense). 24
35 Cirilo allows that the government may have adduced sufficient evidence that he knew Lugo intended to beat up Officer Mejias, but argues that it adduced no direct evidence that he knew, at any time, that Lugo intended to murder Mejias. We note as well that any jury finding regarding Cirilo's foreknowledge and intent could not have been predicated on his lack of credibility, since Cirilo did not testify. Nor did any witness testify that Cirilo had been told of Lugo's lethal intentions before Mejias was abducted in the Suzuki, nor that Cirilo ever admitted knowing that Lugo harbored such intentions. See, e.g., Loder, 23 F.3d at 592 (rejecting, as too weak, an inference that because defendant helped principal dismantle car, principal had communicated to defendant that purpose of dismantling was to facilitate an insurance fraud by the car owner, absent any evidence that defendant had been informed of the scheme, or that defendant ever mentioned the scheme). Instead, Cirilo points out, Lugo--the chief prosecution witness and, at least arguably, the person most likely to have informed Cirilo of the murder plan--testified without contradiction that Cirilo was completely in the dark about the murder plan on November 1. Cf. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1294-95. 36 The prosecution need not adduce direct evidence, of course, but may rely entirely on circumstantial evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime charged, see United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Akinola, 985 F.2d 1105, 1109 (1st Cir.1993), including the alleged aider and abettor's foreknowledge, see Spinney, 65 F.3d at 235; de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d at 999 n. 9; United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 975 (1st Cir.1995); Loder, 23 F.3d at 592. In other words, the criminal law does not place a special premium on direct evidence, O'Brien, 14 F.3d at 706, and a defendant's intent may be inferred from the circumstances and the actions of the defendant. See Valerio, 48 F.3d at 63. Moreover, where the evidence as a whole is sufficient to support the verdict, the government need not rule out every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence. O'Brien, 14 F.3d at 706. 37 A network of record facts, see supra note 3, prominently supported a rational inference that the longstanding association among Lugo, Mangual and Cirilo at El Ideal was neither entirely casual nor exclusively social. In the first place, the evidence plainly disclosed that Chispo (along with Yito Morales) supplied the drugs Lugo and Mangual--Cirilo's constant companions at El Ideal--sold at the El Ideal drug point. Furthermore, at trial Lugo was asked about a post-arrest FBI debriefing in which he falsely cast Cirilo as the principal planner and triggerman in the Mejias murder. At that time Lugo had informed the FBI that Cirilo committed the murder to pay off an outstanding drug debt due Chispo, the same person who ordered Lugo to kill Mejias. Although Lugo later disavowed the earlier FBI debriefing as a partial fabrication as concerned the identity of the actual killer, see generally supra Section II.A, he nevertheless testified at trial that Cirilo did indeed owe Chispo money, without identifying the amount or nature of the obligation. Moreover, there was neither evidence nor argument that Chispo was engaged in any other business, activity or endeavor which would account for the debt owed him by Cirilo. 38 In all events, given Ramirez' demonstrated reluctance even to drive the getaway car to El Ideal, not to mention the inherent risk in relying upon an inexperienced, unlicensed driver for so dangerous and important a responsibility in these stressful circumstances, we think the suggested inference of mere presence and association is not only counter-intuitive, but considerably less plausible than the inference that Cirilo was there to drive the Ramirez automobile, as corroborated by, inter alia, the ready acceptance accorded him among the three other defendants from the time he arrived at El Ideal, including most of the pre-capture period and throughout the capture and abduction. See, e.g., Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d at 1064 (Criminal conspirators do not often 'welcome innocent nonparticipants as witnesses to their crimes.' ); Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d at 18 ([T]he factfinder may fairly infer ... that it runs counter to human experience to suppose that criminal conspirators would welcome innocent nonparticipants as witnesses to their crimes.). 25 Moreover, immediately after the doors of the Suzuki were closed Cirilo got into the driver's seat of the Ramirez Oldsmobile and followed behind the Suzuki, which was carrying Lugo, Mangual and the suspected police officer whom Cirilo had just seen captured and abducted at gunpoint moments after having been told he could leave unharmed. See supra Section I. 39 In our view, therefore, the evidence supported a rational jury inference that Cirilo, who was indebted to the same drug supplier who ordered Lugo to murder Mejias, did not appear at El Ideal by mere happenstance minutes after the getaway vehicle and the murder weapon were delivered by Ramirez; nor by odd coincidence innocently associate thereafter in the high-stakes criminal enterprise of capturing, abducting, and carjacking a suspected police officer. See Guerrero, 114 F.3d at 343 (Although these facts, in isolation, do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the [defendants] knew ..., in combination [ ] they constitute more than enough evidence to support a finding of positive knowledge ....) (emphasis added). 26 40 For his part, Cirilo proposes no reasoned argumentation which would preclude a rational jury--employing its experience, reason, common sense, and understanding of human behavior, see, e.g., id. at 339--from inferring that the three other defendants would not have welcomed him in their immediate presence during the capture, carjacking, and abduction of Officer Mejias, unless it were well understood among them that Cirilo shared their knowledge and criminal intent. See Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d at 18. Instead, ignoring the incriminating circumstantial evidence, or according it piecemeal attention, but see O'Brien, 14 F.3d at 707, Cirilo focuses on the direct evidence which comports with his mere presence and association; principally, Lugo's testimony that Cirilo had not been told, and did not know, Mejias was to be killed, but only that he was to be assaulted. 41 We address this contention against the backdrop of the entire record, viewed favorably to the government, to determine whether the aiding and abetting verdict was adequately supported. See, e.g., Guerrero, 114 F.3d at 339; O'Brien, 14 F.3d at 707. No direct evidence enabled a finding that Cirilo knew, prior to his arrival at El Ideal on November 1, that Lugo intended to harm Officer Mejias in any way. Moreover, Lugo testified without contradiction that he never told Cirilo that Mejias was to be killed, but merely urged that Cirilo, inter alios, beat up Mejias. 27 42 We conclude nonetheless that the evidence afforded adequate support for a reasonable jury inference that Cirilo acquired the requisite knowledge in the course of the riveting events that transpired in his immediate presence, from the time Lugo attempted unsuccessfully to incite Ramirez, Mangual and Cirilo to beat up Officer Mejias, see supra Section I, through the point in time when Lugo's flagrant actions--as Mejias was about to leave unharmed in the white Suzuki--made it unmistakably clear that Lugo was not going to release Mejias at all. We trace these constituent inferences step by step. See Spinney, 65 F.3d at 234. 28 43 Lugo's uncontroverted testimony, together with the four Cirilo prints lifted from the hood of the Suzuki itself, were sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cirilo was standing real close to the Suzuki as Mangual and Ramirez searched for the Mejias weapon at Lugo's direction. See supra Section I. Moreover, there was no evidence and no contention that Cirilo departed from the immediate vicinity of the Suzuki until it exited the El Ideal parking area immediately after Mejias was abducted by Lugo, at which point Cirilo, without hesitation, got into the driver's seat of the Ramirez Oldsmobile and followed the Suzuki onto the highway fronting El Ideal. 44 Consequently, the jury reasonably could find that Cirilo witnessed the events which took place at this critical juncture: first, as Lugo suddenly ordered Officer Mejias to get into the driver's seat of the Suzuki and not come around there anymore; then, moments later, as Lugo--in an abrupt about-face following immediately on the heels of the Papilin warning to take (kill) Mejias because he might come back--ordered Mejias at gunpoint to get out of the front seat and into the back seat of the Suzuki. See supra note 5. Whether the jury considered Papilin merely the messenger or something more, at that point it reasonably could conclude that the message itself--that Mejias was not going to be released after he had been abducted--hardly could have gone unheeded by Cirilo. See Spinney, 65 F.3d at 237 (Jurors are 'not expected to ignore what is perfectly obvious,' but, rather, 'to take full advantage of their collective experience and common sense.' ) (citations omitted). Finally, after Lugo got into the Suzuki beside Mejias, revolver in hand, Mangual replaced Mejias in the driver's seat. Whereupon Cirilo in turn promptly got behind the wheel of the Ramirez Oldsmobile and followed the Suzuki onto the highway. 45 Even assuming Cirilo had not become consciously involved earlier, the jury therefore reasonably could have found that what transpired in his immediate presence, before the Suzuki departed El Ideal, undermined any inference of innocent participation thereafter, particularly in light of Cirilo's unchallenged presence among the other defendants throughout almost the entire pre-capture period and his unhesitating aid to their criminal enterprise during the post-abduction and post-murder stages. 29 See, e.g., Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d at 18 ( 'understanding of human behavior' may ground reasonable inference from circumstantial evidence). 46 For these reasons, therefore, we hold that the jury rationally could infer that Cirilo, at least by then, possessed the requisite conscious knowledge that Lugo intended to kill Mejias in order to make certain that he could not come back, as Papilin had forewarned in Cirilo's immediate presence; and further that immediately thereafter--as plainly evidenced by his affirmative conduct--Cirilo shared and sought to facilitate Lugo's criminal purpose by driving the getaway vehicle. 47 Although the foregoing analysis is substantiated by various subsidiary inferences as well, the most telling evidence was Lugo's sudden, about-face decision not to release Mejias, which indicated unmistakably that he had heeded the Papilin warning that the defendants, inter alios, would be exposed to a greatly increased risk of apprehension, prosecution and punishment were Mejias to be released after having been abducted, carjacked and assaulted at gunpoint. Viewed in context, Lugo's decision--that Mejias was not going to be released after all--severely undercut any inference that Cirilo was not consciously aware, from that moment on at least, that Lugo intended to ensure that Mejias not come back as Papilin had advised. Notwithstanding the rapidity of the ensuing events, therefore, the flagrant developments witnessed by Cirilo immediately before the Suzuki left El Ideal plainly permitted a reasonable inference that--by then, if not sooner--Cirilo had (i) acquired the conscious knowledge that Mejias was to be killed and (ii) formulated the requisite intent to aid and abet the murder by following the Suzuki in the Ramirez Oldsmobile, thereby ensuring his criminal associates their only means of effecting a safe getaway. 48 Accordingly, we conclude that the uncontroverted evidence that Cirilo was present earlier, when Lugo tried to incite him, Mangual, and Ramirez to assault Mejias, undermined any inference that Cirilo, from that time forward, remained a mere bystander innocently caught up in a secret plot among his longtime associates to assault and abduct a suspected police informant. Furthermore, the uncontroverted evidence that Cirilo also was present later--as Lugo instructed Mejias to leave and not return, then countermanded that instruction in direct response to Papilin's warning that Mejias had to be killed because he might come back--eroded any rational inference that Cirilo's operation of the getaway vehicle thereafter was undertaken without the requisite foreknowledge and shared intention to facilitate the Mejias murder. III