Opinion ID: 2275955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructions Denied

Text: Lickliter argues that the trial judge erred when she refused to instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication, second-degree manslaughter and the defense of insanity. We disagree. In order to justify an instruction on intoxication, there must be evidence that not only was the defendant drunk, but that he was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing. Springer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 439 (1999). Voluntary intoxication is a defense if it negates the existence of an element of the offense. KRS 506.080(1). See also 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 11.30 (1999). Here, there was no evidence that Lickliter was intoxicated to the extent that his intoxication negated the element of intent with respect to the killing of the victim. Lickliter confessed to the police that he intentionally killed the victim. Although there was evidence that he was acting under a delusional state of mind, the fact remains that he killed the victim intentionally. Thus, the trial judge properly declined to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication. Because Lickliter was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of intoxication, he was also not entitled to an instruction on the related offense of second-degree manslaughter. See Fields v. Commonwealth, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 275 (2000). Nor was Lickliter entitled to an instruction on insanity. Pursuant to KRS 504.060(5), Insanity means that, as a result of mental condition, lack of substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law. The mental condition referred to in this definition, must be a mental illness or mental retardation. See 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 11.31 (1999). Drug addiction, by itself, is not a disease constituting or leading to mental illness. Commonwealth v. Tate, Ky., 893 S.W.2d 368 (1995). Here, there was evidence that Lickliter abused illegal drugs, but there was no evidence of mental illness. The supporting evidence presented by the two experts was not sufficient, when taken as a whole, for the jury to be given an insanity instruction. There was no possibility that the jury could infer a reasonable probability that the condition of insanity existed. Cf. Cannon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 591 (1989). See also Rogers v. Sullivan, Ky., 410 S.W.2d 624 (1966). The two defense experts did not give any opinion that Lickliter suffered from insanity as defined by KRS 504.060(5). At best, they recited only symptoms. Thus, Lickliter was not entitled to an insanity instruction and the trial judge properly rejected the requested instruction. We recognize that Lickliter did present evidence that he killed the victim based on delusional thoughts, which manifested itself because of chronic abuse of methamphetamines. Nevertheless, under the current state of the law in Kentucky, there is no basis for either of the instructions sought by Lickliter. The legislature of this state has not expressed any intention that drug addiction arising from the voluntary ingestion of drugs, by itself, affords a defense to a criminal charge based on mental illness. Tate, supra . Any action in this state to recognize voluntary drug addiction, standing alone, as a mental illness, is to be accomplished, if ever, by the legislature rather than by judicial decree. Tate, 893 S.W.2d at 372.