Opinion ID: 1699298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: on suggestion of error and motion to correct judgment

Text: GILLESPIE, J. Of the several points raised in the suggestion of error only one requires discussion. The same point is raised in appellant's motion to correct judgment. Appellant cites Section 8923-51, Mississippi Code of 1942, which authorizes any state board authorized to hold examinations and grant license to practice any profession to bring suit in the proper county to enjoin and prohibit any person from unlawfully practicing a profession. The statute provides, ... and no bond shall be required,  and no damages, fees or other costs shall be taxed against said board for the bringing of such suit. Appellant contends (1) that the lower court unlawfully taxed a part of the costs against appellant (the cost of its witnesses), and (2) this Court unlawfully taxed all the costs of appeal against appellant. Appellant argues that it should not be taxed with any costs whatever. We have carefully considered the statute relied upon by appellants as to whether it applies to ordinary court costs. It provides that ... no damages, fees or other costs shall be taxed against said board for the bringing of such suit. (Emphasis added) The legislature did not indicate what it meant by other costs, and it evidently meant something different from the preceding damages, fees but of the same general category. It used the phrase, ... for the bringing of the suit. It did not name court costs incurred in maintaining the suit. It seems that the intent of the legislature was to exempt professional boards from being required to pay damages, fees and other items of the same category by reason of bringing the injunction suit. It apparently did not intend to exempt the boards from paying court costs incurred in maintaining the suit if the board loses the suit. Section 1572, Mississippi Code of 1942, provides that the state, counties, municipalities, state boards, and certain officers shall not be required to secure or pay costs before commencing a suit. It does not exempt the payment of costs. (Hn 2) If we construe the statute according to appellant's contention it would permit the various professional boards to invoke the processes of the courts and leave the court officials with no source from which to collect costs if the board loses the suit. The statute should not be so construed unless it clearly and expressly relieves such boards from the payment of court costs. When the statute is considered in the light of the general statutes relating to costs, we are forced to the conclusion  that it was not the intent of the legislature to exempt said boards from the payment of ordinary court costs when they are otherwise taxable against such boards. What has been said disposes of the matter of costs in the trial court and those incurred on appeal. Suggestion of error and motion to correct judgment overruled. All Justices concur, except Roberds, Holmes and Arrington, JJ., who took no part.