Opinion ID: 76252
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ordinance 1204: A Constitutional Orphan?

Text: 24 Ordinance 1204 does not fit neatly into any of these three categories. Unlike the laws upheld in Barnes and Erie, Ordinance 1204 is not a law of general application. It prohibits nudity only in adult entertainment establishments. It does not prohibit public nudity anywhere else in Cocoa Beach. 10 Although no worker in an adult entertainment establishment in Cocoa Beach may appear totally nude, apparently one may do so at the local Jiffy Mart or in the public library. As a result, the ordinance bans nudity with reference to the expressive content of that nudity, and is content-based. See Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831, 843 (7th Cir.2000) (holding a similar ordinance content-based because the Ordinance by its plain terms specifically targets erotic expression). 11 25 Nor does 1204 appear to be a Renton -type of regulation of adult entertainment. Although it purports to be a mere regulation on the time, place, or manner of adult entertainment aimed at reducing its secondary effects, as permitted by Renton, it does not place restrictions on nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments. It bans it. 12 26 Ordinance 1204 appears to be a discriminatory regulation that expressly targets and prohibits nude dancing. Neither Barnes nor Erie applied a secondary-effects rationale to permit a statute to target expressive conduct. In each, a content-neutral law of general application was upheld because it was justified without reference to nude dancing. 27 Nor does Renton permit a statute that targets nude dancing to completely ban it. 475 U.S. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925 (The Renton ordinance, like the one in American Mini Theatres, does not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely provides that such theaters may not be located within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. The ordinance is therefore properly analyzed as a form of time, place and manner regulation); see also City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 443, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (ordinance warrants intermediate scrutiny only it if it is time, place, and manner regulation and not a ban). 28 Thus, Ordinance 1204 appears to be without constitutional underpinnings. 13 At least two courts have invalidated similar ordinances on the grounds that, by targeting and banning nude dancing, they unconstitutionally suppress protected speech. Nakatomi Investments, Inc. v. City of Schenectady, 949 F.Supp. 988, 998-999 (N.D.N.Y.1997); Books, Inc. v. Pottawattamie County, Iowa, 978 F.Supp. 1247, 1257 (S.D.Iowa 1997); see also Schultz, 228 F.3d at 847-48 (invalidating portion of city ordinance targeting adult entertainment that banned certain movements and gestures). Fly Fish argues that 1204 is similarly unconstitutional. 29 We disagree. Although not directly controlling, 14 we believe that the Court's analysis in Erie effectively forecloses this argument. In rejecting the dissent's claim that, as applied to nude dancing, the public nudity ordinance amounted to an unconstitutional complete ban on expression, the Court reiterated the distinction it made in Barnes between the means of expression — nudity — and the message — eroticism. 529 U.S. at 292-293, 120 S.Ct. 1382. See also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571, 111 S.Ct. 2456 (The appearance of people of all shapes, sizes and ages in the nude at a beach, for example, would convey little if any erotic message). Rejecting the dissent's characterization of the ordinance as a complete ban on the message of nude dancing, the Court said: 30 The public nudity ban certainly has the effect of limiting one particular means of expressing the kind of erotic message being disseminated at Kandyland. But simply to define what is being banned as the message is to assume the conclusion. 31 Id. at 293, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 32 Although conceding that there may be cases in which banning the means of expression so interferes with the message that it essentially bans the message, 529 U.S. at 293, 120 S.Ct. 1382, the Court rejected the contention that Erie was such a case: 33 [E]ven if Erie's public nudity ban has some minimal effect on the erotic message by muting that portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped, the dancers at Kandyland and other such establishments are free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings. Any effect on the overall expression is de minimis. 34 Id. at 294, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 35 If the message of nude dancing is eroticism, then Ordinance 1204 may properly be characterized as a Renton -type of time, place, or manner regulation. It does not ban erotic dancing, but rather totally nude dancing in an adult entertainment establishment. Therefore, it merely regulates the manner of presentation of the erotic message. It does not ban the message; it only requires more clothing on the messenger. Therefore, 1204 may be properly characterized as a time, place, and manner regulation. 36 This is so even though 1204's prohibition of nudity regulates conduct and is not a traditional zoning regulation of the type approved by Renton. Erie extends the secondary effects rationale of Renton beyond its zoning context to the regulation of expressive conduct. 15 Under Renton, an ordinance may target adult entertainment establishments, and the nude dancing that occurs there, if it is aimed at reducing the negative secondary effects associated with these establishments. 16 After Erie, an ordinance may do so by banning totally nude dancing in these establishments. Thus, Erie makes clear that: 37 Even if the city thought that nude dancing at clubs like Kandyland constituted a particularly problematic instance of public nudity, the regulation is still properly evaluated as a content-neutral restriction because the interest in combating the secondary effects associated with those clubs is unrelated to the suppression of the erotic message conveyed by nude dancing. 38 Id. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 39 The City has determined that totally nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments generates undesirable secondary effects. Under Erie and Renton, it is entitled to combat these effects, so long as it does not ban, but merely regulates the erotic message. Ordinance 1204 is such an ordinance, and the district court did not err by not applying a heightened level of scrutiny. 17