Opinion ID: 2640086
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limits on Voir Dire

Text: During the initial or hardship/publicity phase of voir dire, defendant moved orally and in writing to amend the court's preliminary questionnaire. As noted, the four questions on that form targeted prospective jurors who would never allow the case to proceed to a penalty phase, or who would always vote for death or LWOP. Under defendant's proposed amendment, the first two questions, which asked about refusing to return a murder conviction or to sustain special circumstances, referred to [two] counts of premeditated murder, and identified the three special circumstances as lying in wait, financial gain, and multiple murder. Defendant's other two questions, which asked about voting automatically for death or LWOP, similarly differed from the court's version by identifying the premeditated nature of the murder and the special circumstances (lying in wait, financial gain, and multiple murder[]). [9] Defendant argued that he was entitled to delve into specific facts at this early stage to adequately identify automatic death jurors. He emphasized that two homicides were alleged. The prosecutor disagreed. He observed that the court's questionnaire generally conformed to Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770] (Witherspoon) , concerning the excusal of prospective jurors who would always choose LWOP or death, and that defendant's case-specific factors could be explored later in voir dire. The court declined to amend its preliminary questionnaire to accommodate the defense. The questionnaire's purpose, the court stated, was to identify those jurors who would always or never vote for death under any circumstance, including special circumstance cases in which only a single murder was alleged. Nevertheless, the court made clear that it was not barring reference to all the things counsel had raised. The court assured counsel that it would orally instruct on the murder and special circumstance allegations before prospective jurors completed the preliminary questionnaire and answered oral inquiries about it. The court further observed that jurors would have those case-specific factors in mind when they subsequently completed the main questionnaire (which included more death penalty questions), and were examined about those written replies during general voir dire. The court alluded to the standard it would apply at that stage under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] ( Witt, which would permit the court to disqualify persons based on their views on capital punishment, even if they would not always choose LWOP or death. Two days later, codefendant Lee joined defendant in challenging the court's preliminary questionnaire and the decision to leave it unchanged. The court reaffirmed its ruling that case-specific factors would be excluded from the four-question form on the one hand, but that prospective jurors would be instructed on such factors before any death qualification occurred on the other hand. The court explained that it sought to strike a balance in questioning jurors about use of the death penalty in any case versus this case, and that it did not want them to prejudge penalty or undergo brainwashing. Later the same day, the court assured the defense that its concerns would be met. [W]e will find out from these jurors whether[,] if one or all of these special circumstances . . . are found to be true, whether without regard to any other evidence that they might hear in mitigation, they would automatically vote for death. That question will be posed. (Italics added.) The court indicated that nothing in its earlier ruling was intended to foreclose questioning on the factors the defense had sought to include in the preliminary death penalty questionnaire. The trial court adhered to the foregoing plangiving instructions and conducting examinations in the manner proposed to counsel. First, before answering any written or oral questions on capital punishment, all prospective jurors were instructed (in groups) that the case involved the murder, killing, or death of two people, or women, whose bodies were found in the Universal garage on Mother's Day 1995. At the same time, before death qualification began, the court described the charges to all prospective jurors. They learned that defendant had been charged with two counts of first degree premeditated murder and three special circumstancesmultiple murder, murder committed for financial gain, and murder perpetrated while lying in wait. [10] Second, the same facts and charges arose during the oral examination. As to everyone who answered yes to any of the four questions on the preliminary death penalty questionnaire, the court asked whether they would always vote for or against LWOP or the death penalty if allegations of premeditated murder with one or more special circumstances were sustained. [11] Similar exchanges occurred during both general voir dire and the peremptory challenge phase, where answers on the main questionnaire indicated the person might have difficulty voting for a particular penalty. In some instances, the court inquired about the person's views on penalty assuming defendant was convicted of first degree murder and one or more special circumstances were found true. [12] At other times, the oral examination focused more specifically on premeditated murder, multiple murder, and murder involving financial gain and lying in wait. [13] Despite these developments, defendant and codefendant Lee never stopped complaining about the court's ruling. For instance, during voir dire on the preliminary questionnaire, counsel faulted the court for not being more case specific about people who would automatically give death. Counsel also noted later, during general voir dire, that jurors had not been asked pointblank whether they would always impose death under the circumstances the defense had tried to include in the initial questionnaire, e.g., murdering two people for financial gain. At one point, counsel recognized that he was testing the court's patience and essentially apologized for rehashing the issue. On appeal, defendant repeats his claim that the trial court erred in limiting reference to case specific factors he sought to include in the preliminary questionnaire, namely premeditated multiple murder, lying in wait, and financial gain. Defendant insists that several challenges for cause were erroneously denied as a result, and that he was forced to use peremptory challenges to ensure that none of these persons sat on the jury. The flip side of this argument also is raised. Defendant complains that prospective jurors were not asked whether they would always impose LWOP in such specific cases, and that various prosecution challenges for cause were thus erroneously granted over defense objection. Here, as in the trial court, defendant claims violations of his right to due process and to a fair and impartial jury under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and parallel state constitutional provisions. (1) At the time of defendant's trial, as now, qualifications to serve on a capital jury were not limited to determining whether the person opposed or supported the death penalty in every case. Then, as now, both federal and state law permitted the excusal for cause of a prospective juror whose views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424, fn. omitted.) In articulating this standard, the high court made clear that Witt, supra, at page 424, clarif[ied] Witherspoon by allowing excusals for cause in a potentially broader range of circumstances, that is, even where the prospective juror has not made it unmistakably clear that he would automatically vote a certain way. ( Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21.) (2) The trial court has considerable discretion to place reasonable limits on voir dire ( People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1120 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4] ( Zambrano )), and to determine the number and nature of questions on the death penalty. ( Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 514, 540.) We have explained that death-qualifying voir dire seeks to determine prospective jurors' attitudes about capital punishment only in the abstract, and whether, without knowing the specifics of the case, they have an open mind on penalty. ( Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1120, quoting People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 597 [268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127].) Thus, a defendant cannot insist upon questions that are `so specific' that they expose jurors to the facts of the case, or tempt them to prejudge penalty based on the aggravating and mitigating evidence. ( Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1121, quoting People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 721-722 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332] ( Cash ).) Nevertheless, voir dire cannot be so abstract that it fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair their performance under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424. Rules have developed to balance the competing interests. Thus, on the one hand, the trial court cannot bar questioning on any fact present in the case that could cause some jurors invariably to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the strength of the mitigating circumstances. ( Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th 703, 721, italics added.) But the court's refusal to allow inquiry into such facts is improper only if it is categorical ( People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 286 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990] ( Vieira) , italics added) and denies all opportunity to ascertain juror views about these facts. ( Id. at p. 287.) In Cash, the defense sought to determine whether prospective jurors could consider LWOP for someone who had killed more than one person alluding to anticipated penalty phase evidence that, when he was a juvenile, the defendant had murdered his grandparents. ( Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th 703, 719.) The trial court concluded that because this circumstance appeared nowhere in the information, it could not be disclosed to prospective jurors and no questioning on the topic would be allowed. ( Ibid. ) The ruling was enforced at every phase of voir dire. (See id. at pp. 721, 722.) On appeal, this court reversed the death judgmentour lone reversal for limiting death penalty inquiry into case-specific facts. We explained that the nature of the error prevented us from determining whether any seated juror held the disqualifying view that the death penalty should be imposed invariably and automatically on any defendant who had committed one or more murders other than the [charged] murder. ( Id. at p. 723.) We reached a different result in Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th 264. There, before voir dire began, the defendant moved to modify the court's questionnaire to ask whether prospective jurors would automatically impose death if they convicted him of `two or more murders.' ( Id. at p. 284.) The court did not include this question in the written questionnaire, or ask about multiple murder during oral questioning about the death penalty. Vieira itself does not make clear whether the court read the information alleging multiple murder to prospective jurors beforehand. Nevertheless, this court found no violation of Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th 703. We emphasized that the trial court never ruled or otherwise suggested that prospective jurors could not be asked, during general voir dire, the multiple murder question excluded from the written questionnaire. [R]efusal to include the question [in the written form] was not error so long as there was an opportunity to [orally] ask the question during voir dire. ( Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 287.) (3) The gravamen of Cash and Vieira both of which were decided after defendant's trialis that the defense cannot be categorically denied the opportunity to inform prospective jurors of case-specific factors that could invariably cause them to vote for death at the time they answer questions about their views on capital punishment. By definition, such an opportunity arises where the trial court instructs all prospective jurors on such casespecific factors before any death-qualification begins. It is logical to assume that when prospective jurors are thereafter asked (orally or in writing) whether they would automatically vote for life or death regardless of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, they have answered the question with those case-specific factors in mind, and are aware of the factual context in which the exchange occurs. This assumption seems all the more reasonable where answers given orally in open court refer to the specific facts and charges contained in the court's instruction and indicate that they are being taken into account. Here, we assume solely for the sake of argument that premeditated murder committed while lying in wait and for financial gain are potentially inflammatory circumstances analogous to multiple murder and prior murder, that they could transform an otherwise death-qualified juror into one who could not decide penalty fairly, and that exploration of juror attitudes about the death penalty in such cases cannot be wholly disallowed. (See Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1122 [declining to treat issue of victim's dismemberment in such a manner].) Even so, under the unique circumstances of this case, no error occurred. Contrary to what defendant suggests, the trial court never ruled that prospective jurors were prohibited from learning about the foregoing circumstances or from considering them when expressing their views on capital punishment. Although it denied defendant's motion to include any casespecific factors in the preliminary questionnaire, the court kept its promise to counsel and told all prospective jurors about the specific facts and charges the defense had sought to include therein. Thus, jurors knew the case involved two counts of premeditated murder and the three special circumstances of multiple murder, lying in wait, and financial gain. The court also conveyed this information before anyone completed either the preliminary or general questionnaire, and before they were orally examined about their answers on either written form. A significant number of prospective jurors indicated in the nonsequestered presence of their colleagues, in response to instructions that they all received, that they were taking these case-specific factors into account when asked orally and in writing whether they would automatically vote a certain way. We are thus satisfied that the court's procedures in this case were adequate to ascertain the prospective jurors' attitudes on case-specific factors that might disqualify them to participate in a capital trial. No error under Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th 703, or Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th 264, occurred. [14]