Opinion ID: 2679951
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meaning of “Arabic Numbered Lot”

Text: [¶12] It is well settled law that, in construing a deed, we first give words their general and ordinary meaning to determine if they create any ambiguity. Wentworth v. Sebra, 2003 ME 97, ¶ 10, 829 A.2d 520. Benson’s deed refers to two distinct categories of subdivision lots—those designated by Arabic numbers and those designated by Roman numerals. The plain language of the deed reflects that those categories were to be treated differently: the grantors expressly conveyed the lots designated by Roman numerals to Benson, but excepted from the conveyance “all the Arabic numbered lots.” Lot 40A is an Arabic numbered lot; that it also includes a letter from the Latin alphabet does not, as the defendants have asserted, transform its designation. No third category of lots is included in the language of the deed and there is nothing in the deed that indicates that the parties intended to create a third category. See Perry v. Buswell, 113 Me. 399, 401, 94 A. 483, 484 (1915) (stating that the “cardinal rule” for interpreting a deed is “the expressed intention of the parties”). 8 2. Meaning of “That Parcel of Land Shown As a Right of Way” [¶13] The defendants next contend that Benson’s deed is susceptible to more than one construction because it uses the singular form of the terms “parcel” and “right-of-way,” while the referenced plan depicts multiple rights-of-way. The referenced plan indeed depicts many rights-of-way, but its title unambiguously identifies only two access roads shown on the plan and does so using the singular form of the term “right-of-way.”2 It is firmly established that we must “look at the instrument as a whole” to construe the language of a deed. Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 2009 ME 29, ¶ 24, 967 A.2d 690. When a deed description references a plan, the entirety of the plan becomes a part of the deed. See Lincoln v. Wilder, 29 Me. 169, 169 (1848). [¶14] Further, by using the singular form of the term “parcel,” Benson’s deed unambiguously refers to a single continuous parcel of land that is not separated by intervening land.3 The combination of the plan’s title and the explicit quotation of that title in Benson’s deed using the singular form of the term “parcel” 2 The exact title of the 1970 plan reads: Map of Right of Way 1. Hawkes Rd of N. Sebago Shores Development. And 2. Right of Way Development To Route #114 Me. Hwy. 3 A “parcel” is defined as “a continuous tract or plot of land in one possession no part of which is separated from the rest by intervening land in other possession.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1640 (2002); see also Silsby v. Belch, 2008 ME 104, ¶ 12, 952 A.2d 218 (stating that a court may resort to a dictionary to help discern the common and ordinary meaning of language in a deed). 9 therefore unambiguously excludes from the conveyance one continuous parcel comprising the two roads specifically named in the title of the 1970 plan and a small lot that connects the two roads at their intersection—and nothing more. See Browne v. Gorman, 208 S.W. 385, 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (“nothing passes by a deed except what is described in it”); Walter G. Robillard & Lane J. Bouman, CLARK ON SURVEYING AND BOUNDARIES § 18.03 (LEXIS Law Publishing, 7th ed. 1997) (same). 3. Meaning of the Additional Recitals [¶15] Finally, the defendants contend that certain recitals, which follow the deed description and the two “excepting” paragraphs, create additional ambiguity because they appear to convey to Benson the entirety of the title that Bernstein and Smith acquired in 1976 as a result of the partition judgment. Those paragraphs state, in pertinent part, (1) “Meaning and intending to convey and hereby conveying solely those premises conveyed to the Grantors herein by Beryl H. Josephson, F. Arnold Josephson and D. Wilson Hawkes by deed dated December 24, 1976,” and (2) “[b]eing the same premises conveyed to the within Grantors by deed . . . dated December 24, 1976.” However, a reference in a deed to another deed will neither enlarge nor limit a grant when the property description is unambiguous. See Matteson v. Batchelder, 2011 ME 134, ¶ 12, 32 A.3d 1059; Smith v. Sweat, 90 Me. 528, 533, 38 A. 554, 556 (1897) (a “definite and certain” 10 deed description “will control a general reference to another deed as the source of title”); Abbott v. Pike, 33 Me. 204, 207 (1851) (“Particular recitals, when used merely as descriptive of the grant, do not limit or restrict it, when the general language of the conveyance is intelligible and effective, without the recitals.”). Here, because the references simply serve as a source of the grantor’s title, see id.; see also Brown v. Heard, 85 Me. 294, 297, 27 A. 182, 183 (1893) (a “meaning and intending” clause “is merely a help to trace the title, but cannot enlarge the grant”), they do not cause ambiguity. [¶16] When interpreting a deed whose terms are not ambiguous, we do not speculate about the grantors’ actual or probable objectives; rather, we focus on what is expressed within the four corners of the deed. See N. Sebago Shores, LLC, v. Mazzaglia, 2007 ME 81, ¶ 13, 926 A.2d 728; see also Perry, 113 Me. at 401, 94 A. at 484 (“The cardinal rule for the interpretation of deeds and other written instruments is the expressed intention of the parties, gathered from all parts of the instrument, giving each word its due force, and read in the light of existing conditions and circumstances. It is the intention effectually expressed, not merely surmised. This rule controls all others.”). Although Benson’s deed is complex, it is not ambiguous, as all of its parts can coexist without raising questions about its meaning. Viewing the instrument as a whole, the expressed intention of the parties was to (1) convey to Benson the parent parcel, (2) except from that conveyance all 11 the Arabic numbered lots and the rights-of-way held in fee by the Town, and (3) further convey to Benson all access rights that the grantors possessed over the rights-of-way and roadways associated with the subdivision.4 When we give each word in Benson’s deed its due force, as we must, see Perry, 113 Me. at 401, 94 A. at 484, the plain language of the deed unambiguously excludes lot 40A from the conveyance to Benson. Fee simple title to lot 40A thus remained in the grantors, Bernstein and Smith, at the time of their property transfer to Benson in 1976.