Opinion ID: 891577
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Domination or Control

Text: {36} The district court made the following findings relating to domination or control: 11. Viola Varela used her position of confidence and power to her advantage to influence and control the actions and decisions of Gregoria C de Baca. 12. Viola Varela used her position of influence and control to manipulate the bank accounts of Gregoria C de Baca. . . . . 17. Viola Varela had an assertive and domineering personality. Gregoria C de Baca was submissive when around Viola. 18. Viola Varela attempted to poison the relationship between Gregoria C de Baca and her other children by making disparaging and derogatory remarks about them and attempting to restrict their access to Ms. C de Baca. 19. Viola Varela interfered with the efforts of Gregoria C de Baca to obtain independent legal counsel. {37} Using Hummer as its touchstone, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate control and dominance, since [t]here is no indication that Gregoria was afraid of Viola or that Viola induced Gregoria to believe things that she otherwise would not have believed. Chapman, 2008-NMCA-108, ¶ 32, 144 N.M. 709, 191 P.3d 567. The Court acknowledged the evidence that Viola spoke for Gregoria and disparaged the other siblings, but noted that no evidence had shown that the other siblings' relationships with their mother were interrupted by Viola. Id. The Court also noted the testimony of the psychologist who evaluated Gregoria and of Gregoria's doctor, both to the effect that Gregoria had not been dominated by Viola. Id. ¶¶ 33-34. As for Viola's alleged interference with Gregoria's attempt to secure legal counsel to return the land deeded to Viola, the Court of Appeals held that [e]ven if Viola influenced Gregoria's decision to fire [the attorney], we do not believe that evidence supports a further inference that Viola manipulated Gregoria into making a will that did not reflect her intentions. Id. ¶ 37. None of this evidence helped to decide the ultimate issuewhether Gregoria intended the distribution of her property that is set out in the will. Id. ¶ 38. {38} We see no reason to categorically exclude the evidence considered by the district court, even though, under our precedents, it might not be sufficient by itself to decide the issue of undue influence. The Court of Appeals was correct that the decedent in Hummer was more dominated by the proponents of her will than is true in this case. 75 N.M. at 284, 404 P.2d at 117 (There is evidence that decedent was easily influenced, made no independent suggestions herself, agreed with anything anyone stated to her, and that she agreed with what the last person to talk to her had to say.). However, Hummer gives no indication that this level of domination is the baseline below which evidence of dominance or control may not even be considered. We do not see why less definitive evidence should not be considered. See, e.g., Peralta, 2006-NMCA-033, ¶ 22, 139 N.M. 231, 131 P.3d 81 (taking into account evidence that [two of the decedent's children] were maligning [a third child] to [the decedent] in an apparent effort to isolate [the decedent]). Other authorities also state a less exacting standard: 3 Bowe & Parker, supra § 29.78, at 692-93 opines that [e]vidence which tends to show that the beneficiary acquired control over testator's mind before the will was made, and retained such control beyond the period at which the will was executed, is admissible, even if such evidence relates to a remote period of time (footnotes omitted). {39} Moreover, this section of the Court of Appeals' opinion appears to draw some inferences against the party that prevailed at trial. See Chapman, 2008-NMCA-108, ¶¶ 33, 37, 40, 144 N.M. 709, 191 P.3d 567. For instance, the evidence presented by a psychologist, the family doctor, and the attorney who executed the will that Gregoria was not dominated by Viola is evidence contrary to the district court's ultimate finding of undue influence. As we have noted, when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, [w]e consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and disregard any inferences and evidence to the contrary. Doughty, 117 N.M. at 287, 871 P.2d at 383. The question is whether, disregarding these witnesses as the finder of fact was entitled to do, there was evidence to support a finding of control or dominance. {40} We find support in the record for all of the findings of fact made by the district court on this point: that Viola may have taken part in firing an attorney retained by Gregoria to investigate the deeds; that Viola spoke for Gregoria; that Viola disparaged the other siblings, although not to the point of estranging them; that Gregoria was submissive around Viola; and that Viola manipulated Gregoria's bank accounts. {41} We see no reason to categorically exclude this evidence from consideration, even if it might not be sufficient in and of itself to raise the presumption of undue influence. We find curious, for example, the Court of Appeals' statement that [e]ven if Viola influenced Gregoria's decision to fire [her attorney], we do not believe that evidence supports a further inference that Viola manipulated Gregoria into making a will that did not reflect her intentions. Chapman, 2008-NMCA-108, ¶ 37, 144 N.M. 709, 191 P.3d 567. The firing in question occurred only a few months after the execution of the will and would certainly seem to suggest that Viola was exerting control over Gregoria, if accepted as true by the finder of fact. Although this evidence does not directly go to the issue of Gregoria's intent regarding the will, it flies in the face of reason to hold that it could not contribute in any way to raising a suspicion of undue influence.