Opinion ID: 1987598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dorothea's possible children and issue who were living at her death took, at the most, a contingent interest in the income

Text: Appellants, to support their contention that Dorothea did not die seized or possessed of any taxable interest, advance two ingenious arguments: (1) that Dorothea's surviving children (and issue of deceased children) were given the principal after Dorothea's death (a) under the explicit language of Walton's will, or (b) under the principle that a gift of income unlimited and unrestricted as to time, amount and conditions, with no gift over, is a bequest of the corpus of the fund from which said income is derived: Lowitz Estate, 360 Pa. 91, 61 A. 2d 342; Carmany Estate, 357 Pa. 296, 53 A. 2d 731; Thompson Trust, 348 Pa. 228, 35 A. 2d 261; Gibbons's Estate, 317 Pa. 465, 177 A. 50; Yeager Estate, 354 Pa. 463, 47 A. 2d 813. Appellants contend that the word same in the bequest . . . the income from my entire estate shall be given unto my daughter . . . for her life, and upon her death the same to be divided equally between her children who may be living at . . . her death . . . refers to the principal from which she was receiving the income. We are convinced that this is incorrect. We are convinced from the language of this paragraph as well as from the language of the entire will that the testator said, meant and intended the same to mean income; and he clearly gave to Dorothea's surviving children and issue, the income which Dorothea was receiving for her life. In view of Walton's clearly expressed intent, we therefore find no merit in this contention of appellants  even though it will result in an intestacy [] and even though a testator is presumed to wish to dispose of his entire estate when he executes a will [] : Conlin Estate, 388 Pa. 483, 493, 131 A. 2d 117; Verner Estate, 358 Pa. 280, 56 A. 2d 667; Berger Estate, 360 Pa. 366, 61 A. 2d 855. `. . . the presumption against an intestacy, even where there is no countervailing presumption, [such, for example, as the equally potent presumption that an heir is not to be disinherited except by plain words or necessary implication] cannot be used to ignore or distort or alter testator's language in order to avoid an intestacy. . . .': Conlin Estate, supra (page 493). Appellants' alternative contention  which, we repeat, is based upon the principle or canon of construction that a gift of the income unlimited as to time, amount or conditions, and when there is no gift over, is a gift of the principal  likewise lacks merit because the principle is inapplicable. The principle is an artificial one which was derived from the days of feudal tenure: Gibbons's Estate, 317 Pa. 465, 177 A. 50; Coke on Littleton, 4, 6. There are three well recognized exceptions to the principle or rule, namely, (1) Where the gift is limited in time or amount or by one or more conditions; or (2) where the trustee has active duties to perform; or (3) where the testator indicates a contrary intent: Thompson Trust, 348 Pa., supra; Gibbons's Estate, 317 Pa., supra. The principle is inapplicable in the instant case because the testator's will shows a contrary intent. Appellants rely heavily upon Carmany Estate, 357 Pa., supra. That case supports the aforesaid legal proposition upon which they rely, but is distinguishable on its facts. In that will Carmany gave the income from his trust estate to my daughter, her heirs and assigns. The Court held this gave her a fee and said (page 300): The gift to Mary O. Forney was not only accompanied by words of inheritance but also unlimited and unrestricted as regards time, amount and conditions.