Opinion ID: 1198869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Forfeiture Principles to Sims's Claim

Text: The running themes in respondents' request for Sims's psychiatric records are their contentions (1) that Sims's complaint, his deposition testimony, and the deposition testimony of his hired expert, [are] all to the effect that ... he had suffered serious emotional damages as a result of the assault  (respondents' brief on appeal at 6 (emphasis added); see, e.g., id. at 3, 28-29); (2) that even a request for only garden-variety damages waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege because the psychiatric records might conceivably disprove the experiencing of the pain and suffering (Oral Arg. Tr. 19 (emphasis added); see also respondents' brief on appeal at 42-43); and (3) that Sims's psychiatric records may be used to show that Sims, rather than Blot, started the December 20 altercation, i.e., that Sims's mental state is and always has been at the heart of this case (respondents' brief on appeal at 11) in which [t]he principal issue at trial will be whether Sims first physically attacked officer Blot or vice-versa (respondents' letter brief on appeal, dated February 15, 2008, at 1). The district court appears to have accepted these arguments. The February 2006 Disclosure Order that granted respondents' motion for a renewal of the 2002 Disclosure Order was not accompanied by a new written explanation, and we assume that the district judge's reasons for granting disclosure were those she expressed in the 2002 Disclosure Order, as well as those she is described by the parties as having stated at the unrecorded October 28, 2005 oral argument of the renewal motion. In ordering disclosure in 2002, the district judge stated, in pertinent part, as follows: [P]laintiff argues that his withdrawal of his non-garden variety claims for emotional damages and his undertaking not to testify to his fear of defendants or that he was placed in the PSU for security reasons makes contrary material in his mental health records inadmissible. That information may be inadmissible at trial, however, does not preclude its discovery. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). More importantly, however, plaintiff may not unring the bell. Once he waives his privilege ..., a witness may not withdraw his waiver to prevent matters which he has already gone into from being explored in greater detail. United States [ex rel. Carthan] v. Sheriff, 330 F.2d 100, 102 (2d Cir.1964) (citing Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958)).... Here, plaintiff testified freely as to communications with mental health professionals and as to the supposed circumstances of his placement in the PSU in an effort to support his claim and otherwise gain advantage in this litigation. Defendants, on the other hand, are disadvantaged both specifically in their inability to, for example, prove the negative that plaintiff was not [ sic ] placed in the PSU for psychiatric reasons and generally in not being able to test plaintiff's credibility based on what is apparently not an insubstantial mental health issue. See Chnapkova v. Koh, 985 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir.1993). Accordingly, fairness requires that defendants have access to plaintiff's mental health records for the period from two years before the incident at issue through the present. 2002 Disclosure Order at 1-2 (emphases added). And at the October 2005 oral argument of the renewal motion, the district judge apparently indicated that Sims had forfeited his psychotherapist-patient privilege for the additional reasons (a) that he had placed his psychiatric history at issue by relying on evidence that he suffered from a pre-existing physical condition to support his claim that he was attacked by Officer Blot, and (b) that Sims claimed that Blot's attack on him was unprovoked, which might be undermined because Sims's psychiatric records might show that he had masochistic or suicidal tendencies. (Sims brief on appeal at 15 (emphasis in original).) We note first that the record in no way justifies acceptance of respondents' contentions that Sims's complaint, his deposition testimony, and the deposition testimony of his expert witness assert that Sims suffered serious emotional damages as a result of the assault (respondents' brief on appeal at 6). The original complaint filed by Sims, described in Part I.A. above, describes as his injuries only shoulder pain and a laceration over his eye; Sims's current complaint alleges that Sims suffered serious and painful physical injuries, which required emergency medical attention (Amended Complaint ¶ 58 (emphasis added)); but neither complaint so much as mentions emotional injury. Nor do we see that Sims suggested that he was asserting a claim for emotional injury, serious or otherwise, in his deposition testimony. As quoted in Part I.A.1. above, Sims testified that he thinks and dreams about the assault and that he becomes anxious at the sight of a corrections officer holding a knife. But he testified, I wouldn't say I suffered mental injuries as a result of this (Sims Dep. 55); he testified that he was not receiving any treatment for emotional injury related to the events underlying this litigation ( see id. at 55-56); and nowhere did he state that he was seeking damages for mental or emotional injuries. Finally, as to Sims's expert's deposition, respondents have provided us with no page citation to support their contention that his testimony includes the opinion that Sims suffered serious emotional damages as a result of the assault; and in our own review of that deposition, we have seen no testimony as to any emotional consequences at all, much less as to any serious emotional injury. In addition, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court's 2002 Disclosure Order and the rationales stated at the 2005 oral argument of the renewal motion were based on erroneous views of the law and did not properly apply the privilege-forfeiture principles discussed in Part II.B.1. above.
In reaching its conclusion that Sims's mental health records should be disclosed because Sims may not unring the bell, 2002 Disclosure Order at 1, the court quoted United States ex rel. Carthan v. Sheriff ( Carthan ) for the proposition that  [o]nce he waives his privilege. .., a witness may not withdraw his waiver to prevent matters which he has already gone into from being explored in greater detail, 330 F.2d at 102 (emphasis ours). The context in which the Carthan statement was made, however, was materially different from the circumstances here. To begin with, Carthan was not a plaintiff in a civil case in which he could withdraw a claim; he was a witness in a grand jury investigation over which he had no control. Further, he was a New York City employee who was required, by the City Charter, to waive his privilege against self-incrimination with respect to city affairs if he wished to retain his position and his eligibility for any other city employment; and he in fact executed a Limited Waiver of Immunity. 330 F.2d at 101. In addition, Carthan had proceeded to disclose financial information for certain years by answering grand jury questionnaires. When he thereafter, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, resisted compliance with a grand jury subpoena for his income tax returns for those years and was held in contempt, we refused to disturb the contempt ruling because he had knowingly waived his privilege. This was the context of the statement that Carthan could not withdraw his waiver, id. at 102. The circumstances of the present case are far different. For example, nothing in the record here suggests that Sims made a knowing election to waive his psychotherapist-patient privilege. Sims requested and was denied assignment of counsel, and nothing has been called to our attention to indicate that he was even aware that he had such a privilege and was entitled to maintain the confidentiality of his psychiatric communications. Further, unlike a grand jury witness who has no say over the issues in the proceeding, Sims, as a plaintiff in a civil case, was entitled not to pursue a claim he had asserted. Indeed, Sims's attorneys stated that Sims never intended to place his mental or emotional state `at issue', and that condition is not an element of his Section 1983 claim. (Korn Letter at 1.) And as discussed above, there is in fact no mention in either Sims's original complaint or his Amended Complaint of emotional distress. But in any event, especially given that Sims commenced the action pro se, his subsequent counseled express disavowal of any claim for unusual emotional distresswhether such a claim was actually asserted or was merely imputed to him by respondentsshould have been given effect. Finally as to Carthan, as discussed in Part II.B.2.c. below, a disclosure made to the grand jury is materially different in impact from a disclosure made to a party opponent in a deposition. A grand jury uses the information it receives in order to decide whether or not a criminal proceeding will be commenced. Deposition testimony in a civil action, on the other hand, might never come to the attention of any decisionmaker. For all of these reasons, Carthan 's ruling that the grand jury witness could not withdraw his waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination bears little relationship to this civil-action plaintiff's withdrawal of a claim. In addition, the district court in the present case cited Chnapkova v. Koh, 985 F.2d 79, 82 (2d Cir.1993), in support of its view that Sims's psychiatric records should be disclosed in order to avoid respondents' being disadvantaged ... specifically in their inability to, for example, prove the reason for Sims's return to the PSU, and disadvantaged ... generally if they are unable to use those records to test [his] credibility, 2002 Disclosure Order at 2. Chnapkova, however, which concerned admissibility of a plaintiff's psychiatric records at trial, did not analyzeor even mentionprivilege and did not involve an issue of privilege waiver or forfeiture. Rather, its focus was solely on the probative value of the records. The trial in Chnapkova took place prior to this Court's first recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see In re Doe (Diamond), 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir.1992), and the Chnapkova trial judge excluded the plaintiff's psychiatric records from evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403 on the ground that any probative value they might have was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This Court reversed, holding that the records could be used because they would be sufficiently probative of ... credibility, 985 F.2d at 81, and certainly probative of one of the facts in issue, see id. at 82. Our conclusion in Chnapkova, which was decided in 1993, that the prejudice resulting from disclosure of psychiatric records could be outweighed by the probative value of those records, was overtaken by the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Jaffee that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not subject to such a balancing test. As discussed above, Jaffee held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence, 518 U.S. at 9-10, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (internal quotation marks omitted), and transcend[s] the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth, id. at 15, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, the district court's reliance on Chnapkova in the 2002 Disclosure Order for the proposition that Sims's psychiatric records should be disclosed in order to allow respondents to prove certain facts and to test Sims's credibility was misplaced, as that case did not involve a claimed privilege forfeiture or entail the type of fairness analysis that a determination as to forfeiture requires, and instead utilized a balancing analysis that is now foreclosed by Jaffee. Nor does the district court's decision comport with Jaffee based on the rationale stated in October 2005 that Sims's psychiatric records should be disclosed, on account of his assertion that the assault on him was unprovoked, because those records might undermine that assertion by showing that he had masochistic or suicidal tendencies. The possibility that a patient has such tendencies is a far better reason to deny disclosure than to grant it. If the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12, 116 S.Ct. 1923, and the public interest in securing psychiatric help for a patient who has suicidal tendencies surely transcends the interest of an accused assailant who wishes to suggest that the existence of such tendencies indicates that the patient started the fight. The suicidal tendencies rationale exceeded appropriate bounds of discretion. Finally, while the district court recognized the importance of fairness to the other side in considering whether there should be a forfeiture of the privilege, we do not see that the court gave consideration to several components of fairness in this context, which are discussed in Part II.B.1. Sims, who had expressly withdrawn any claim of emotional distress injury (beyond garden variety pain and suffering from physical injury) had not attempted to use the privilege both as `a shield and a sword.' In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d at 182. This case had nothing in common with that of a defendant who asserts an advice-of-counsel defense but then invokes the privilege in an effort to prevent the adversary from discovering his communications with his counsel. Id. at 182-83 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor was Sims assert[ing] a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292. Sims was not partially disclos[ing] privileged communications or affirmatively rely[ing] on privileged communications to support [his] claim ... and then shield[ing] the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party. In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d at 182. He did not take affirmative steps to inject privileged materials into the litigation while simultaneously trying to shield the privileged communications from scrutiny by the adversary. Id. at 187. The unfairness courts have found which justified imposing involuntary forfeiture [of a privilege] generally resulted from a party's advancing a claim to a court or jury (or perhaps another type of decision maker) while relying on its privilege to withhold from a litigation adversary materials that the adversary might need to effectively contest or impeach the claim. Doe Co., 350 F.3d at 303. This case exhibited none of these characteristics. Further, in basing its waiver finding on the proposition that at his deposition Sims testified freely, 2002 Disclosure Order at 2, about his communications with Del Santo, the district court apparently gave no consideration to the fact that at that deposition Sims was not represented by counsel, the court having denied his request either for permission to provide discovery in some other manner or for the appointment of counsel to represent him. While a party to a civil action of course has no constitutional right to the assignment of counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 176 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916, 102 S.Ct. 1771, 72 L.Ed.2d 176 (1982), and we intend no criticism of the district court for not having appointed counsel for Sims sooner, it is nonetheless relevant to the fairness analysis that the record does not indicate that Sims was learned in the law and does indicate that when Sims represented himself at his deposition it was not by his choice.
Further, we cannot accept the district court's finding that fairness required the disclosure of Sims's psychiatric records on the basis that his testimony (a) as to his communications with mental health professionals and [b] as to the supposed circumstances of his placement in the PSU constituted an effort to support his claim and otherwise gain advantage in this litigation, 2002 Disclosure Order at 2. The finding with respect to Sims's communications with mental health professionals would have been an appropriate rationale for disclosure to Del Santo, the psychiatric nurse, if she were still a defendant in this action. Sims testified that the reason he had sued Del Santo, who was not present at the December 20 incident, was that he had told her he was repeatedly threatened by two of the corrections officers and had asked her to intercede with prison officials on his behalf ( see Sims Dep. 62-64), but that nothing had been done about his complaints. If the lack of any curative response to those complaints were the basis of an existing claim by Sims against Del Santo, Sims could properly have been found to be using his confidential communications as a sword and be prohibited from using his privilege as a shield. But Del Santo was dismissed from this action in September 2001, prior to the defense request for Sims's psychiatric records, and there wereand areno assertions of this type with respect to Blot and Caraballo. Further, Sims has represented that he will offer no evidence at trial that he fears corrections officers or that he ever communicated any fear of Blot and Caraballo to mental health officials. As to the finding that Sims sought to support his claim and gain a litigation advantage by testifying as to the supposed circumstances of his placement in the PSU, it is not clear whether the district court was referring to his placement in the PSU before or after the December 20 incident, but it is difficult to see how either placement supportsor refutesSims's claim so as to provide a permissible rationale for disclosure of his mental health records. The pre-altercation theory advanced by respondents, i.e., the contention that Sims forfeited his psychotherapist-patient privilege by alleging in his original complaint that the altercation occurred while he was on his way to SHU from the PSU, is baseless. There is no dispute as to where the altercation occurred; there is no dispute as to where Sims was coming from when the altercation occurred; and the place from which Sims was coming sheds no light on any factual issue to be tried in this case. Similarly, to the extent that the district court instead meant that respondents would be disadvantaged if they could not use Sims's mental health records to show that Sims was returned to the PSU for mental health reasons, rather than for security reasons, on the day after the altercation, the court did not explain how the reason for his return to the PSU would shed any light on who had started the fight; and we see no connection. In any event, the circumstances of Sims's return to the PSU after the altercation had been withdrawn from the case by Sims's attorneys' representations in 2002 ( see Korn/Ryan Letter at 1 (we do not intend to offer . . . evidence that Mr. Sims was transferred to the psychiatric satellite unit after the incident or that he was transferred there for security rather than psychiatric reasons)). Nor does the deposition testimony of Sims's forensic pathologist, Isidore Mihalakis, M.D., to which the court apparently referred at the October 2005 oral argument of respondents' motion to renew the 2002 Disclosure Order, provide a proper basis for finding that Sims forfeited his psychotherapist-patient privilege. At that deposition, Mihalakis gave his opinion that it was unlikely that Sims was the aggressor in the December 20 incident (by moving in a sudden and violent manner as apparently described in a deposition given by Blot) because Sims had a memory of pain, associated with such a movement, from a preexisting physical condition. (Deposition of Isidore Mihalakis, M.D., October 4, 2005, at 40.) This testimony does not justify a forfeiture of Sims's psychotherapist-patient privilege for several reasons. First, Mihalakis's opinion concerned the effects of a chronic condition that was not psychological but physical. Second, Mihalakis is not a psychiatrist or a psychologist; he would not be qualified to testify at trial as to Sims's mental state. And third, Sims's attorneys had represented that they would not offer at trial evidence that Sims's mental health status affects his behavior. ( See Korn/Ryan Letter at 1.) In addition, clarifying that representation in response to this Court's request at oral argument, Sims's attorneys have stated that Mihalakis did not review any of Sims's mental health records, and that Sims will not offer any testimony from Dr. Mihalakis concerning the effect of Mr. Sims' emotional state or `memories of pain' on his actions (Sims letter brief on appeal, dated February 8, 2008, at 1). Given this record, the prospective testimony of the pathologist provides no basis for finding that fairness demands disclosure of Sims's psychiatric records to respondents. In sum, we conclude that with respect to Sims's claims against Blot and Caraballo, who are the only remaining defendants, the district court erred in indicating that Sims essentially used his privilege as a sword.