Opinion ID: 3012838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amati’s Sentence

Text: As calculated by the Probation Department’s Presentence Report (PSR) appellant’s total offense level was 16 (base level of 12, with 2 levels added as a result of grouping of the various counts, and an additional 2 levels for abuse of a position of trust), and his criminal history category was I, resulting in a guideline range of 21-27 months. These calculations are not challenged on appeal. At the time of sentencing, however, the district court imposed an additional 4 level upward adjustment under §3B1.1 (“Aggravating Role”) and a further upward adjustment of 2 levels because, in the Court’s view, appellant had also obstructed justice by committing perjury in the course of his trial. As calculated by the district court, appellant’s guideline range was 41-51 months. Appellant was sentenced to 42 months imprisonment, followed by 2 years of supervised release, together with a fine of $7,500.00. Appellant challenges the upward adjustments made by 11 the Court.
Guideline §3B1.1 provides: “Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows: (a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels. (b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels. (c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels.” We agree with appellant that the 4-level increase called for by sub-section (a) should not have been applied in this case, because the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. §1955, itself requires proof of the factors specified in the guideline, so that imposing the upward adjustment amounts to double counting. The statute of conviction applies to “whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business ...” and defines an illegal business as meaning a gambling business which, inter alia, “(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business ...” The base offense level for a violation of §1955 is 12, and is, by its terms, applicable to persons in a leadership 12 role of a gambling enterprise involving five or more persons. We are confident that the Commission did not intend a 4-level upward adjustment from the stated base offense level predicated upon the very same factors which are essential elements of the crime itself. Further support for this conclusion is found in the introductory commentary to part B, which states “when an offense is committed by more than one participant, §3B1.1 or §3B1.2 (or neither) may apply”.
The district court found that appellant committed willful and intentional perjury in an attempt to support his defense of entrapment, by testifying falsely that Mr. Hansen, the confidential informant, repeatedly sought appellant’s help in setting up a gambling business, over a period of many months beginning in early 1997, whereas actually, according to the government, Mr. Hansen first became involved in October, 1997, and became directly involved in the acquisition only in May, 1998. We review the court’s finding for clear error. United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1997). The district court’s ruling on this issue is set forth in its Memorandum and Order dated May 10, 2001, in which the district court referred to Amati’s testimony that his contacts with Hansen concerning the possible purchase of a restaurant site for videopoker operations began in March 1997, and involved several meetings and discussions thereafter. Initially, they discussed the possible purchase of an establishment known as “Tee Time,” owned by a lady named Maggie Hill. The district court’s finding that this 13 testimony amounted to perjury was based upon the fact that, in a recorded telephone conversation in February 1998, Mr. Hansen professed not to know who Maggie Hill was, and defendant did not express surprise, but merely described Maggie Hill in order to jog Hansen’s recollection. Appellant argues, on the other hand, that in an earlier conversation in January 1998, also recorded, it was clear that Mr. Hansen was discussing a person who, in the context, could only have been Mrs. Hill. Appellant also points out that, according to Mr. Hansen himself, he had had discussions with Mr. Amati about possible locations for a video-poker establishment as early as 1993, and, at the very least, long before the October 1997 date of his direct involvement with Mr. Amati in an undercover capacity. The government’s brief on appeal devotes little attention to this issue. At no point, either in the government’s brief or in the district court’s findings, is the testimony alleged to have been perjurious set forth. Cf. United States v. Copus, 100 F.3d 1529, 1536-37 (10th Cir. 1997) (district court should identify specific testimony it found perjurious). The parties have not included in their appendices the entire testimony of either the appellant Amati or Mr. Hansen. But in the portions of Mr. Amati’s testimony relied upon by the government, there is nothing squarely at odds with the recorded telephone conversations referred to by the district court, nor, so far as we are able to determine, is Amati’s testimony inconsistent with the testimony of Hansen himself. Mr. Hansen testified that, when he first met with the government agents in connection with this case, the following occurred: 14 “Q. And what is it they asked you to do? A. They asked me if .. to recontact, I guess, with Mr. Amati and give him an opportunity to see if he would follow through with what he had promised to do before.” Thus, there apparently was no dispute about the fact that appellant and Mr. Hansen had earlier discussed possible acquisition of a site for video-poker activities, and that the eventual renewed contact in October 1997 was just that -- a renewal of earlier discussions. It should also be noted that, to the extent Amati testified to a meeting with Mr. Hansen in March of 1997, that testimony served to undermine any attempt to establish an entrapment defense, since Hansen was not then a government agent. To regard this testimony as an attempt to obstruct justice seems, therefore, problematical. A further problem with the district court’s finding of perjury is the distinct possibility that what the district court found to have been false was not the actual testimony of appellant, but rather the “spin” placed on that testimony in the closing arguments of trial counsel. Needless to say, appellant cannot be charged with perjury on the basis of his counsel’s exaggerations of his testimony, rather than appellant’s actual testimony. Since the case will be remanded for re-sentencing, the district court will have an opportunity to reconsider the perjury issue. We make no final determination on that subject, but merely note that a finding that appellant obstructed justice by false testimony 15 at trial must set forth specifically the testimony found to be false, and must be based upon that testimony itself, rather than counsel’s interpretation of the testimony. We note also that the jury’s finding of guilt does not establish that the jury rejected appellant’s testimony. For the reasons set forth above, the convictions of both appellants are affirmed. The sentence imposed on appellant Ronald Amati is vacated, and his case is remanded for re-sentencing. TO THE CLERK: Please file the foregoing opinion. /s/ John P. Fullam