Opinion ID: 739313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fourth Amendment Search

Text: 39 At trial, appellant Lloyd Phillip Maestas moved to suppress evidence attained during a February 27, 1994 search of his ranch in New Mexico because the material facts alleged in the affidavit for the search warrant were based on stale information. The district court found that the information upon which the affidavit was based indicated a long-standing, ongoing pattern of criminal activity. The district court, therefore, concluded that the warrant was supported by probable cause and denied Maestas's suppression motion. On appeal, Maestas contends that the district court's decision constituted reversible error. 40 This court engages in a two-step review of a district court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress. United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.1992). The first step requires the court to determine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3420-21, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The second step requires the court to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for ... concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332-33, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (internal quotation omitted). If the good-faith exception applies, the court need not reach the question of probable cause. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d at 320; see also United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir.1988) (Principles of judicial restraint and precedent dictate that, in most cases, we should not reach the probable cause issue if a decision on the admissibility of the evidence under the good-faith exception of Leon will resolve the matter). 10 41 In Leon, the Supreme Court established the good-faith exception, holding that evidence obtained by law enforcement officials acting in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search warrant is admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, even though the affidavit on which the warrant was based was insufficient to establish probable cause. Craig, 861 F.2d at 821 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21). Issuance of a warrant by a magistrate normally suffices to establish good faith on the part of law enforcement officers who conduct a search pursuant to the warrant. Id. Law enforcement officers cannot establish objective good faith, however, when the warrant is based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.'  Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3420-21). See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 818 F.2d 345, 350 & n. 8 (5th Cir.1987) (concluding that a bare bones affidavit did not justify good-faith reliance on a warrant); United States v. Barrington, 806 F.2d 529, 531-33 (5th Cir.1986) (same). 42 To prevail on his fourth amendment claim, Maestas must establish that the facts alleged in the affidavit were so dated that no reasonable officer could have believed that the affidavit established probable cause to search his ranch. Craig, 861 F.2d at 822. In addressing a similar staleness claim in United States v. Craig, we explained: 43 Two considerations have consistently appeared in this court's opinions on the issue of staleness. First, if the information of the affidavit clearly shows a long-standing, ongoing pattern of criminal activity, even if fairly long periods of time have lapsed between the information and the issuance of the warrant, the information need not be regarded as stale. Second, the nature of the evidence sought is also relevant. Courts are more tolerant of dated allegations if the evidence sought is of the sort that can reasonably be expected to be kept for long periods of time in the place to be searched. 44 Id. at 822-23 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 45 The affidavit in the instant case was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render good-faith reliance on a warrant issued pursuant to it entirely unreasonable. The affidavit included information provided by Bowers that set forth the existence of a large-scale and ongoing drug-distribution enterprise. According to Bowers, Maestas's ranch was used by the organization as a distribution point for the shipment of marijuana and cocaine to California, Oklahoma, and Indiana. Bowers claimed that these drugs were transported in the hidden compartments of horse trailers, pickup trucks, and semi-tractors. Approximately six months prior to execution of the contested search warrant, Bowers accompanied federal agents to New Mexico where he pointed out Maestas's ranch and identified several vehicles on the property that Bowers had used to transport drugs. 46 The affidavit also contained the contemporary observations of government agents that tended to corroborate the information provided by Bowers. Aerial surveillance of Maestas's ranch three days before the contested search produced photographs of several horse trailers and a semi-tractor that were consistent with vehicles described by Bowers. In addition, when Maestas was arrested the day before the contested search, the officers executing Maestas's arrest warrant observed in plain view a number of vehicles fitting Bowers's description. The officers also observed extra saddle fuel tanks (allegedly used by the organization to store contraband) in plain view on the property. Finally, on the day preceding the contested search, a related search of Gil's property produced a horse trailer with a false compartment that was registered to Maestas Farms. 47 Maestas argues that the corroborative evidence gathered by the government contemporaneously with its application for a search warrant should be discarded because the evidence is consistent with the innocent activities of a legitimate rancher. This argument is unavailing. Both the Supreme Court and this circuit have recognized that innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. at 2335 n. 13; see also United States v. Mendez, 27 F.3d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1994). Taken together, the information provided by Bowers and the contemporary, corroborative evidence gathered by the government were sufficient for a reasonable officer to believe that the challenged warrant was based on probable cause. Thus, the good-faith exception applies, and the district court did not err in denying Maestas's motion to suppress.