Opinion ID: 1057832
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Apprendi and its Progeny

Text: We begin with a brief review of the line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and culminating in Cunningham . In Apprendi , the United States Supreme Court considered a state sentence that had been increased beyond the statutory maximum upon the trial judge's determination that the defendant had committed the crime `with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.' 530 U.S. at 469, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.1999-2000)). The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment prohibited the enhanced sentence, id. at 497, 120 S.Ct. 2348, and stated, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In Blakely v. Washington , the defendant was convicted of a felony under Washington law for which he was subject to a sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months unless the trial judge found `substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.' 542 U.S. 296, 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (quoting Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 9.94A.120(2) (West 2000)). Finding that the defendant had committed the offense with deliberate cruelty, the trial court increased the defendant's sentence to ninety months. Applying the rule of Apprendi , the Supreme Court held the defendant's sentence unconstitutional. Id. at 305, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Court emphasized that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his proper authority. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court addressed this issue in the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Booker was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The corresponding base sentence pursuant to the Guidelines was 210 to 262 months. The trial court increased Booker's sentence to 360 months after determining that the preponderance of the evidence established that Booker had possessed a quantity of drugs greater than that determined by the jury's verdict. Finding that there was no relevant distinction between the sentence imposed pursuant to the Washington statutes in Blakely and the sentence[] imposed pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, id. at 235, 125 S.Ct. 738, the Supreme Court ruled Booker's sentence violative of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738. In Cunningham , the Supreme Court considered California's determinate sentencing law. Cunningham had been convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen. Under California's statutory sentencing scheme, Cunningham was subject to imprisonment for a lower term sentence of 6 years, a middle term sentence of 12 years, or an upper term sentence of 16 years. 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 860. The trial court was required to sentence Cunningham to the middle term, however, unless it found one or more aggravating facts. At a sentencing hearing, the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence six aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance. Concluding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstance, the judge sentenced Cunningham to the upper term sentence of sixteen years. In finding that California's sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment, id., the Supreme Court emphasized that the crucial inquiry under Apprendi is the maximum sentence allowed under the relevant statutory scheme based solely on those facts reflected by the jury's verdict (or admitted by the defendant). Id. at 860. In examining California's sentencing scheme, the Court first determined that the key California Penal Code provision states that the sentencing court ` shall order imposition of the middle term' absent `circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.' Id. at 866 n. 10 (quoting Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 1170(b)) (emphasis in Cunningham ). The Court next recognized that, [u]nder California's [determinate sentencing law], an upper term sentence may be imposed only when the trial judge finds an aggravating circumstance. Id. at 868. For Sixth Amendment purposes, then, the middle term prescribed in California's statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum. Id. Because the trial court sentenced Cunningham to the upper term sentence based on judicially determined facts not otherwise reflected by the jury's verdict or admitted by the defendant, the Court held that the sentence violated Cunningham's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 871.