Opinion ID: 167585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subordinate Bias Liability

Text: 27 Other courts have recognized claims under Title VII based on the bias of a subordinate, often using the terms cat's paw or rubber stamp to describe the theory. The cat's paw doctrine derives its name from a fable, made famous by La Fontaine, in which a monkey convinces an unwitting cat to pull chestnuts from a hot fire. See Fables of La Fontaine 344 (Walter Thornbury trans., Chartwell Books 1984). As the cat scoops the chestnuts from the fire one by one, burning his paw in the process, the monkey eagerly gobbles them up, leaving none left for the cat. Id. Today the term cat's-paw refers to one used by another to accomplish his purposes. Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 354 (2002). In the employment discrimination context, cat's paw refers to a situation in which a biased subordinate, who lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal decisionmaker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action. Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir.1998). The rubber stamp doctrine has a more obvious etymology, and refers to a situation in which a decisionmaker gives perfunctory approval for an adverse employment action explicitly recommended by a biased subordinate. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 288 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc). Our sister circuits overwhelmingly have endorsed some version of these doctrines. See Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1026 n. 9 (9th Cir.2005); Hill, 354 F.3d at 290; Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.1999); Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C.Cir.1998); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354-55 (6th Cir.1998); Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir.1996); Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213-14 (3d Cir.1995); Stacks v. S.W. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1323 (8th Cir.1994); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (Posner, J.) (inaugurating the descriptor cat's-paw for this category of claim). 28 Although this Court has not yet had occasion to find for a plaintiff on a subordinate bias claim, we have strongly signaled our endorsement of the theory. We have stated that under certain circumstances, a defendant may be held liable for a subordinate employee's prejudice even if the manager lacked discriminatory intent. English v. Colo. Dep't of Corrs., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir.2001). Specifically, we have described a rubber stamp theory of liability, noting that [t]o recover under this theory, the plaintiff must show `that the decisionmaker followed the biased recommendation [of a subordinate] without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.' Id. (quoting Stimpson, 186 F.3d at 1332) (alteration in original). Twice we have held that a plaintiff could not prevail because the decisionmaker had conducted an independent investigation of the facts, rather than relying entirely on the recommendation of the biased subordinate. See Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231-32 (10th Cir.2000) (finding it [i]mportant[ ] that in the course of his investigation the decisionmaker asked the employee to give his version of the exchange, but the employee declined to do so); English, 248 F.3d at 1011 (noting that the decisionmaker met twice with the employee and his attorney, and specifically asked for evidence rebutting or mitigating the findings of the allegedly biased subordinates). But we have described the plaintiffs' underlying theory of liability as correct. English, 248 F.3d at 1011. 29 These subordinate bias theories comport with the basic agency principles incorporated by statute into Title VII. For purposes of Title VII, the term employer includes not only any person engaged in an industry affecting commerce but any agent of such a person. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Although that language surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers are to be held responsible, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), employers may be vicariously liable for the actions of their employees — even intentional torts outside the scope of their employment — if the employee `was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation,' Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) (1958) [hereinafter Restatement]). In Ellerth, which involved a hostile work environment claim, the Supreme Court held that a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer. Id. at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Citing with approval the seminal cat's paw opinion by Judge Posner, the Court seemed unconcerned with the possibility that the tangible employment decision[ ] might be subject to review by higher level supervisors. Id. (citing Shager, 913 F.2d at 405). The aided by the agency relation standard applies even more clearly to subordinate bias claims, such as cat's paw or rubber stamp claims, because the allegedly biased subordinate accomplishes his discriminatory goals by misusing the authority granted to him by the employer— for example, the authority to monitor performance, report disciplinary infractions, and recommend employment actions. See Restatement § 219(2) cmt. e (explaining that the aided by the agency relation standard applies in situations where the servant may be able to cause harm because of his position); cf. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802-05, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (contemplating vicarious liability based on abuse of authority by supervisors, but emphasizing that the aid in the aided by the agency relation formula must amount to more than access to a pool of potential victims and the unspoken suggestion of retaliation). 30 Holding employers accountable for the actions of biased subordinates also advances the purposes of Title VII. It should go without saying that a company's organizational chart does not always accurately reflect its decisionmaking process. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (finding that the bias of a supervisor, the husband of the formal decisionmaker, could be imputed to the company because the supervisor was the actual decisionmaker and was principally responsible for petitioner's firing); Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that courts will not blindly accept the titular decisionmaker as the true decisionmaker). A biased low-level supervisor with no disciplinary authority might effectuate the termination of an employee from a protected class by recommending discharge or by selectively reporting or even fabricating information in communications with the formal decisionmaker. Recognition of subordinate bias claims forecloses a strategic option for employers who might seek to evade liability, even in the face of rampant race discrimination among subordinates, through willful blindness as to the source of reports and recommendations. Id. n. 13 (holding that employers may not insulate themselves from Title VII claims simply by ensuring that the one who performed the employment action was isolated from the employee). Indeed, such claims have the salutary effect of encouraging employers to verify information and review recommendations before taking adverse employment actions against members of protected groups — particularly if, as we have held, an employer can escape liability entirely by performing an independent investigation. See English, 248 F.3d at 1011. Construing the definition of an employer to permit subordinate bias claims therefore serves Title VII's deterrent purpose. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (noting that the extent of employer liability under Title VII should not depend exclusively on common-law agency principles, but also should encourage employer procedures that prevent discriminatory actions). 31 Despite broad support for some theory of subordinate bias liability, our sister circuits have divided as to the level of control a biased subordinate must exert over the employment decision. Some courts take a lenient approach, formulating the inquiry as whether the subordinate possessed leverage, or exerted influence, over the titular decisionmaker. See Russell, 235 F.3d at 227. On this view, summary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Shager, 913 F.2d at 405). This standard apparently contemplates that any influence, the reporting of any factual information, or any form of other input by a biased subordinate renders the employer liable so long as the subordinate may have affected the employment action. Such a weak relationship between the subordinate's actions and the ultimate employment decision improperly eliminates a requirement of causation. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (construing Title VII to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority (emphasis added)). When a biased subordinate merely plays a peripheral role, it cannot be said that he has accomplish[ed] a tortious act and cause[d] harm as required under agency law principles and, accordingly, under Title VII. Restatement § 219(2)(d) & cmt. e; see also id. cmt. a (Rationale of liability) (The assumption of control is a usual basis for imposing tort liability when the thing controlled causes harm.). Moreover, a lenient may have affected standard that punishes employers for any input — no matter how minor — weakens the deterrent effect of subordinate bias claims by imposing liability even where an employer has diligently conducted an independent investigation. 32 At the opposite extreme, the Fourth Circuit has held that an employer cannot be held liable even if a biased subordinate exercises substantial influence or plays a significant role in the employment decision. Hill, 354 F.3d at 291. Taking its cue from the Supreme Court's statements in Reeves that petitioner [had] introduced evidence that [the supervisor] was the actual decisionmaker and was principally responsible for his firing, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097, the Fourth Circuit held that these formulations mark the outer contours of who may be considered a decisionmaker for purposes of imposing liability upon an employer. Hill, 354 F.3d at 289. On this view, the decisionmaker must be a cat's paw so completely beholden to the subordinate that the subordinate is the actual decisionmaker. Id. at 290. The Fourth Circuit's strict approach makes too much of the phrase actual decisionmaker in Reeves; the Court was describing what the petitioner's evidence showed, not prescribing the outer contours of liability. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (using the phrases actual decisionmaker and principally responsible only in Part III.B, which begins, Applying this standard here . . .). The Fourth Circuit's peculiar focus on who is a `decisionmaker' for purposes of discrimination actions, Hill, 354 F.3d at 286, seems misplaced. The word decisionmaker appears nowhere in Title VII. Instead, the statute imposes liability for discrimination by employers and their agents, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), which in accordance with agency law principles includes not only decisionmakers but other agents whose actions, aided by the agency relation, cause injury. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760, 118 S.Ct. 2257. The Fourth Circuit's standard also undermines the deterrent effect of subordinate bias claims, allowing employers to escape liability even when a subordinate's discrimination is the sole cause of an adverse employment action, on the theory that the subordinate did not exercise complete control over the decisionmaker. 33 We find ourselves in agreement with the Seventh Circuit, which has rejected the Fourth Circuit's approach as inconsistent with the normal analysis of causal issues in tort litigation. Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004). To prevail on a subordinate bias claim, a plaintiff must establish more than mere influence or input in the decisionmaking process. Rather, the issue is whether the biased subordinate's discriminatory reports, recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse employment action. Id. This standard comports with the agency law principles that animate the statutory definition of an employer. See Restatement § 219 (describing the scope of a master's liability for the torts of his servants and thereby incorporating standard tort concepts like causation). Both the Supreme Court and this Court require a comparable causal connection as part of analogous workplace discrimination claims. See, e.g., Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (requiring a causal connection between the plaintiff's protected activities and the adverse employment action in a Title VII retaliation claim); Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1457 (10th Cir.1994) (requiring a causal nexus between allegedly discriminatory workplace statements and the termination decision in an ADEA claim). We reaffirm our earlier decisions holding that, because a plaintiff must demonstrate that the actions of the biased subordinate caused the employment action, an employer can avoid liability by conducting an independent investigation of the allegations against an employee. English, 248 F.3d at 1011. In that event, the employer has taken care not to rely exclusively on the say-so of the biased subordinate, and the causal link is defeated. Indeed, under our precedent, simply asking an employee for his version of events may defeat the inference that an employment decision was racially discriminatory. Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231-32. Employers therefore have a powerful incentive to hear both sides of the story before taking an adverse employment action against a member of a protected class. 34 Finally, we address the district court's conclusion that an employer may be liable on a subordinate bias theory only if the decisionmaker receives and approves an explicit recommendation to terminate an employee. Regrettably, subordinate bias cases have suffered from an abundance of vivid metaphors. The Fourth Circuit, for example, seems to have taken the cat's paw metaphor too literally in deriving its total-control-over-the-actual-decision standard. Lust, 383 F.3d at 584. Likewise, the district court in this case seems to have taken the rubber stamp metaphor too literally, requiring that an explicit recommendation must cross the desk of the decisionmaker, regardless of whether the subordinate's discriminatory actions in fact caused the termination. That limitation of subordinate bias claims not only runs counter to the fairly broad aided by the agency relation principle embodied in Title VII, but would leave employees unprotected so long as a subordinate stops short of mouthing the words you should fire him, in person or on paper, to the decisionmaker. Stripped of their metaphors, subordinate bias claims simply recognize that many companies separate the decisionmaking function from the investigation and reporting functions, and that racial bias can taint any of those functions. We see no reason to limit subordinate bias liability to situations that closely resemble the cat's paw, rubber stamp, conduit, vehicle, or other metaphors that imaginative lawyers and judges have developed to describe such claims. 35 With these principles in mind, we turn to BCI's decision to terminate Mr. Peters.