Opinion ID: 1227333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Costs to Defendants

Text: Finally, Plaintiffs challenge the district court's award of costs to Defendants. We are not persuaded by their arguments. The district court ruled that Defendants were not entitled to costs under the ADA because such costs are appropriate only if the claim is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. See Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the standard announced in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)permitting the recovery of attorney fees by a prevailing defendant under Title VII only when the claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundationalso applies to the award of costs under the ADA). The court held that Plaintiffs' ADA claims did not meet that standard. The district court awarded costs under the Rehabilitation Act, however. Although there was no direct authority to guide it, the district court observed that the costs provision of the Rehabilitation Act is more similar to the costs provision in Title VII than to the costs provision in the ADA. For that reason, the district court concluded that costs under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by National Organization for Women v. Bank of Cal., N.A., 680 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam), which held that costs under Title VII follow the general rule that costs are awarded as a matter of course absent express statutory provision, `unless the court otherwise directs.' Id. at 1294 (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(d)). The district court also ruled that Defendants were entitled to costs on Plaintiffs' state law tort claims. The court apportioned costs and, because the ADA claim was the central claim in Plaintiffs' action, awarded only 50% of Defendants' request. Plaintiffs argue that the same standardthe Christiansburg standardthat governs costs under the ADA should govern costs under the Rehabilitation Act. To our knowledge, none of our sister circuits has applied the Christiansburg standard to costs under the Rehabilitation Act, and we decline to do so here. In Brown, we examined the text of the ADA to determine whether our ruling in Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.1997), in which we acknowledged that the Christiansburg standard applies to a request for attorney fees under the ADA, also applied to a request for costs under the ADA. Brown, 246 F.3d at 1190. We looked at the text of the costs provision of the ADA: [T]he court ..., in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.... 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (emphases added). We observed that the ADA makes fees and costs parallel and held that, as a result, the Christiansburg standard does apply to costs under the ADA. Brown, 246 F.3d at 1190. That parallel structure in the ADA between costs and attorney fees is critically absent from the relevant texts of both the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) [Rehabilitation Act] (permitting the prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs (emphasis added)), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) [Title VII] (allowing a reasonable attorney's fee ... as part of the costs (emphasis added)), with 42 U.S.C. § 12205 [ADA] (permitting the court to award a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs (emphases added)). Thus, our rationale in Brown for applying Christiansburg to the award of costs under the ADA does not carry over to costs under the Rehabilitation Act. Considering the similarity between the costs provisions in Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, it is appropriate to use our Title VII precedent, as the district court did, to establish a standard for the award of costs under the substantively identical text in the Rehabilitation Act. As is the case with Title VII, [t]here is no express statutory provision for applying Christiansburg to cost awards [under the Rehabilitation Act], and we see no reason to impose rigid limitations on the district court's discretion. Nat'l Org. for Women, 680 F.2d at 1294. Moreover, the text of the Rehabilitation Act supports an inference that costs are to be awarded in the ordinary course. Section 794a(b) of the Rehabilitation Act provides that, [i]n any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of [the Rehabilitation Act], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. That text makes an attorney fee award discretionary; if given, it may be made a part of the costs. The text does not suggest that the costs are similarly discretionary, but rather that they are a given, to which fees may attach. Accordingly, the wording of the statute supports an inference that the general provision in Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedurethat costs are allowed in the ordinary course to the prevailing partyapplies. Rule 54(d)(1) creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party. Ass'n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). For these reasons, we hold that an award of costs under the Rehabilitation Act need not satisfy the Christiansburg test and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to Defendants as the prevailing party on the Rehabilitation Act claim. With respect to the calculation of costs, the district court justified its award by explaining that, although Defendants could not recover costs on Plaintiffs' central claimthe ADA claimthe remaining three primary claims accounted for about half the case. Thus, the court awarded 50% of Defendants' total request. Having presided over the case from its inception, the court knew the relative proportion of the total litigation that each of the primary claims represented. The court's explanation, although not extensive, was sufficient and was reasonable. Therefore, we affirm the award of costs. AFFIRMED.