Opinion ID: 874304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Court Apply the Wrong Standard in Denying Heisses' Petition to Remove Conti as Guardian?

Text: Heisses cross-appeal the court's denial of their petition to have Conti removed as Children's guardian. They contend that the court applied the incorrect standard when denying their petition. Under Idaho law, a person can become the guardian of a minor child in one of two ways. A person becomes a guardian of a minor by acceptance of a testamentary appointment or upon appointment by the court. I.C. § 15-5-201. If a person becomes a guardian by acceptance of a testamentary appointment, there is no need for appointment by the court. These are alternative ways of becoming the guardian of a minor. Testamentary appointment of a guardian for an unmarried minor child is governed by Idaho Code § 15-5-202. [3] Under that statute, A testamentary appointment becomes effective upon the filing of the guardian's acceptance in the court in which the will is probated, if, at the decedent's death, no parent of the minor was alive who had a right to appoint a guardian for the minor. Assuming the testamentary appointment is valid, the guardianship becomes effective upon the filing of the guardian's acceptance. It does not require court approval or any finding that such appointment is in the best interest of the child(ren). At that point, the court need only issue letters of guardianship to the testamentary guardian. In their wills, Parents appointed Conti as guardian of Children. It is undisputed that the wills were valid. On October 22, 2008, Conti filed her acceptance of appointment in the court where Parents' wills were being probated. At that point, Conti became the guardian of Children, and she was entitled to exercise the powers of a guardian until her guardianship was terminated. Heisses contend that even if there is a testamentary guardian, another person seeking to become guardian should be able to file a petition for appointment, and the court should then determine which of the two would make the better guardian. In support of that contention, they point to the sentence in Idaho Code § 15-5-204, which states, In all cases, the court shall consider the best interests of the child as the primary factor in the determination whether to appoint, and whom to appoint, as a guardian for such child. They argue that all cases includes the testamentary appointment of a guardian. Their argument fails because section 15-5-204 governs the court appointment of a guardian, not the testamentary appointment. Likewise, sections 15-5-206 and 15-5-207 apply to court appointment, not testamentary appointment. Section 15-5-204 begins, The court may appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor if all parental rights of custody have been terminated by prior court order or upon a finding that the child has been neglected, abused, abandoned, or whose parents are unable to provide a stable home environment. The statute provides for court appointment of a guardian in two circumstances. First, the court may appoint a guardian if all parental rights of custody have been terminated by prior court order. Id. If the person who was appointed testamentary guardian has accepted that appointment, that person would have parental rights of custody. I.C. § 15-5-209. The court would not be able to appoint a guardian unless the guardianship created by that testamentary appointment was first terminated by court order. The last sentence of section 15-5-204 confirms that. It states that a guardian appointed by will has priority over any guardian who may be appointed by the court but the court may proceed with an appointment nonetheless upon a finding that the testamentary guardian has failed to accept the testamentary appointment within thirty (30) days after notice of the guardianship proceeding. It provides that where there has been a testamentary appointment of a guardian, the court may proceed with an appointment if the testamentary guardian has failed to accept the appointment timely. If the testamentary guardian has accepted the appointment timely, then the court may not proceed with the proceedings for court appointment of a guardian. Second, the court may appoint a guardian upon a finding that the child has been neglected, abused, abandoned, or whose parents are unable to provide a stable home environment. I.C. § 15-5-204. Because neither circumstance existed in this case, section 15-5-204 would not permit the court to appoint Heisses as guardians unless Conti's guardianship had been terminated. Heisses also encourage[] the Idaho Supreme Court to adopt the view point adopted in Illinois. They cite to In re Marriage of Russell, 169 Ill.App.3d 97, 119 Ill.Dec. 725, 523 N.E.2d 193, 197 (1988) (citations omitted), in which the court stated: In Illinois, the best interests and welfare of the minor is the determining question in a guardianship proceeding. Consequently, the feelings and desires of the adult parties must yield to the court's obligation to protect the best interests of the minor child. The appointment of guardians for unmarried minor children in Idaho is governed by statute. It is not the province of this Court to adopt a different statutory scheme, such as that in Illinois. Enacting and modifying statutes is the province of the legislature. Heisses also contend that their proposed procedure would be fairer than the existing statutes. They argue: It is fair and consistent with the rights of the infants to make a standard that all other things being equal (the child's best interests will be served equally by either competing guardian) a named testamentary guardian should have priority over another for appointment. It is not fair to the children to say that you are not entitled to have the best possible upbringing and life. It is not fair to treat orphans of a parent with a will naming a testamentary guardian, different than orphans whose parents did not have a will. One orphan is left to another by will, while the other orphan is entitled to have his or her best interest promoted. Heisses' views of the unfairness of the statutory scheme are unavailing. It is the legislature that has the power to change the statutes, not this Court. The legislature obviously believed that parents should be able to direct who will have guardianship of their unmarried minor children in the event of the parents' deaths. Heisses are understandably dissatisfied with their son's choice of guardian for their grandchildren, but he was empowered to make that choice under Idaho law. Although Heisses' motion sought a determination that Conti was unfit to be Children's guardian, it was in legal effect a motion to remove her as guardian. Idaho Code § 15-5-212(a) provides that a guardian may be removed on the ground that removal would be in the best interest of the ward. The court held that this statute required a finding that the guardian was unfit or unqualified to remain as guardian. Heisses contend that the statute should be interpreted to permit removal if someone else would be a slightly better guardian. Heisses assert that the words best interest in section 15-5-212(a) should be construed in the same manner as the words best interests in Idaho Code § 32-717(1), which provides for awarding custody in divorce actions. Under that statute, a court is often required to determine which of two loving, caring, and fit parents should have primary physical custody of a child based upon the best interests of the child after considering the factors listed in the statute and any other relevant factors. See King v. King, 137 Idaho 438, 445, 50 P.3d 453, 460 (2002). Because parents have equal rights to custody, the divorce court must compare the parents when determining that issue. According to Heisses, the same standard should apply in removing a guardian, assuming that the person seeking removal also requests appointment as a successor guardian. Heisses' argument is not consistent with the guardianship statutes for four reasons. First, Idaho Code § 32-717(1) applies to divorce actions in which there are two parents who have equal rights to the custody of their minor child(ren). The divorce court must often make the difficult choice of determining which of the parents will be primary custodian of the child(ren). When considering the removal of the guardian of an unmarried minor child, the guardian and the person seeking to become the successor guardian are not on equal footing in relation to the child(ren). The guardian has the powers and responsibilities of a parent who has not been deprived of custody of his minor and unemancipated child. The person seeking removal of the guardian and appointment as a successor guardian does not have any of those rights and responsibilities. Thus, the issue is not whether the person seeking to become the successor guardian may be a better guardian. It is whether there is a reason to remove the current guardian. [4] Second, Idaho Code § 15-5-204 begins, The court may appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor if all parental rights of custody have been terminated by prior court order. The termination of the existing guardian must first occur before the court can consider appointment of a successor guardian. Because the termination must occur first, the determination of whether removal of the guardian would be in the best interest of the child(ren) must focus upon the fitness of the existing guardian and whether it would be in the best interest of the child(ren) to remove the guardian regardless of who may be then appointed as successor guardian. This is supported by the comment to section 15-5-204, which Heisses quote in their brief, but apparently fail to appreciate its significance. In their brief, Heisses state as follows: The official comment (underlining added) to Idaho Code § 15-5-204, (which the Magistrate ruled is not applicable to the testamentary appointment of a guardian (R. Vol. I, P. 254)), provides: The words all parental rights of custody are to read with Sections 5-201 and 5-209 which give testamentary and court appointed guardians of minors certain parental rights respecting the minor. Hence, no authority to appoint a guardian for a minor exists if a testamentary guardian has accepted an effective appointment by will. The purpose of this restriction is to support and encourage testamentary appointments which may occur without judicial act. If a testamentary guardian proves to be unsatisfactory, removal proceedings as provided in Section 5-211 may be used if the objection device of Section 5-203 is unavailable. .... Clearly the standard to remove the guardian named in a will should be the best interests of the ward, rather than the fitness standard employed by the Magistrate. (Emphasis theirs.) The portion of the comment underlined by Heisses states, If a testamentary guardian proves to be unsatisfactory, removal proceedings... may be used.... (Emphasis added.) The comment does not support Heisses' argument; it supports the magistrate court's interpretation of section 15-5-212. [5] Third, Heisses' proposed interpretation of best interest in section 15-5-212(a) would substantially diminish parents' rights to appoint their children's guardians by will. The Official Comment to Idaho Code § 15-5-204, which governs court appointment of a guardian, states, [N]o authority to appoint a guardian for a minor exists if a testamentary guardian has accepted an effective appointment by will. The purpose of this restriction is to support and encourage testamentary appointments which may occur without judicial act. If a court could remove the parents' choice of guardian because the court felt that someone else would be a slightly better guardian, it would substantially diminish the rights of parents to choose the guardian they believe would be in the best interest of their children. Finally, because of the power given to parents to make a testamentary appointment of a guardian for their unmarried minor children, Heisses' proposed interpretation conflicts with Idaho Code § 15-5-204. A person can become a guardian of an unmarried minor child by acceptance of testamentary appointment or by court appointment. I.C. § 15-5-201. A person who contends that he or she would be a better guardian than the testamentary guardian could only become guardian by court appointment. As explained above, the court cannot appoint such person as guardian if either the testamentary guardian has already accepted appointment or does so within thirty days after notice of the proceedings seeking court appointment. I.C. § 15-5-204. If the legislature intended that anyone could challenge a testamentary appointment simply by contending he or she would be a better guardian, there would have been no reason to limit proceedings for court appointment of a guardian as it has done in section 15-5-204. The magistrate court held that in order to prove that removal of Conti as guardian would be in the best interest of the children, Heisses must prove that Conti was unfit or unqualified to be guardian of the children. Heisses failed to do so. The court did not err in refusing to adopt the interpretation of best interest proposed by Heisses. The court found that Conti is in fact a fit and proper person to discharge the duties of testamentary guardian. As such, her removal would not be in the best interest of Children.