Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Concerning the Penalty Phase Retrial

Text: The jury that found defendant guilty at the guilt phase of the trial eventually deadlocked 10 to two on the appropriate penalty. The trial court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. At the penalty phase retrial, a newly empanelled jury decided defendant deserved the death penalty. Defendant raises several issues concerning these events. As we recently have explained, alleged errors in the penalty phase of a capital trial that results in a hung jury for inability to reach a unanimous verdict generally cannot result in relief on appeal when the defendant is subsequently given a penalty retrial. People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1212, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262.) Because defendant here contends that errors in his first penalty trial improperly contributed to a mistrial and penalty retrial that, he claims, violated his rights under the double jeopardy clause, we proceed to discuss his claims.
Defendant first argues that penalty retrials are unconstitutional per se. He reasons juries must view a defendant as cloaked with a presumption of innocence, but a jury empanelled for a retrial of penalty would not do so. Moreover, he contends a jury that had just convicted a defendant of capital crimes would consider as a mitigating factor at the penalty phase any lingering doubts it had of the defendant's guilt, whereas a second penalty jury would not harbor such doubts. He claims use of a different jury to decide questions of guilt and penalty violates his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a fair trial, and to a reliable and proportional sentence in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He also claims the penalty retrial violates analogous guarantees in the California Constitution. That a jury that has just convicted a defendant would view him as cloaked with innocence seems unlikely. In any event, as defendant concedes, we rejected these precise arguments in previous cases. (See, e.g., People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1192-1194, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) Defendant requests we reconsider our precedents but provides no grounds to do so.
Defendant next contends retrial of the penalty phase of this trial violated his rights under both the federal and state constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend. [No person shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb], 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 [Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense.]; see Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 [federal double jeopardy clause applicable to the states]; see also § 1023.) He concedes a retrial is permitted under both the federal and state Constitutions if the jury is unable to come to a verdict. (See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington (1978) 434 U.S. 497, 509, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717; Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199; People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 300, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832; Paulson v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 1, 5, 22 Cal.Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641.) A federal court may declare a mistrial and order a defendant retried if the jury is deadlocked to such a degree that the court believes there is a `manifest necessity' to declare a mistrial. ( Arizona v. Washington, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 509, 98 S.Ct. 824.) California courts employ a similar rule: a trial court can declare a mistrial if the jury cannot come to a unanimous decision and the court decides there is a legal necessity to discharge the jury and start anew. ( People v. Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 300, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832.) Under either standard, a mistrial may be declared if the defendant consents. ( Id. at pp. 299-300, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832.) At the threshold, we must address whether defendant preserved this claim for appeal. The general rule is that former jeopardy [must] be affirmatively pleaded, ... or any claim on that ground is not preserved for review. ( People v. Belcher (1974) 11 Cal.3d 91, 96 [113 Cal.Rptr. 1, 520 P.2d 385]....) ( People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 821, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1201, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.) Respondent argues defendant failed to so affirmatively plead, once in jeopardy before his penalty retrial, and thus failed to preserve the claim for appeal. We agree and accordingly find the double jeopardy issue is not cognizable on appeal. Assuming for argument we were to reach the issue, we would conclude there was no violation of defendant's double jeopardy rights because the trial court was well justified in declaring a mistrial. The record shows the jury retired to deliberate on the appropriate penalty at 4:15 p.m. on October 24, 1989, and deliberated until 4:45 p.m. It returned the next day (October 25th) at 9:15 a.m. to continue its deliberations. It broke for lunch at 12:15 p.m., resumed deliberations at 2:00 p.m., and continued until 4:30 p.m. The jury declared itself at an impasse around 11:00 a.m. the next morning, October 26th, the foreperson stating that the jury was so far polarized that [further deliberations] would be an exercise in futility. The trial court offered to reinstruct the jury, or have the reporter read back any testimony, but the foreperson replied, I don't think that would resolve it. The foreperson noted the vote was 10 to two, and, when asked by the trial court if he sincerely and truly believe[d] that the jury is in a deadlocked position, he answered in the affirmative. The trial court decided to poll the jurors. Juror No. 1 agreed with the foreperson, but Juror No. 2 thought further deliberations might be of assistance. The court then directed the jury to resume its deliberations. Outside the jury's presence, Defense Counsel Barnett moved for a mistrial on the basis that the jury cannot agree. The trial court denied the motion, explaining: The Court is of the belief that based upon the limited inquiry of basically the three people that were questioned, one of those three certainly felt that further deliberation might be fruitful. As long as that is the opinion of some or a portion of the jurors, the Court is inclined to request that they deliberate and continue their discussions. The jury deliberated the rest of that afternoon. The jury also deliberated during the morning of Friday, October 27, 1989. After deliberating the morning of October 30th, the foreperson sent a note to the trial court, indicating the jury now unanimously believed it was deadlocked. In court, the foreperson affirmed that the jury was still split 10 to two, and that a reread of testimony or instructions would not further assist the jury. The foreperson stated he believed the jury had exhausted every possibility [of reaching a unanimous decision]. The court individually polled the jurors and confirmed that they unanimously believed no further deliberations would produce a unanimous verdict. The trial court then declared a mistrial and dismissed the jury. Section 1140 states: Except as provided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the minutes, or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. (Italics added.) Determining whether there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court ( People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 195, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862); on the facts of this case, it does not appear the trial court abused its discretion. The deliberations were not unusually short, and the jurors unanimously affirmed in open court that further deliberations would be fruitless.
Assuming grounds existed for accepting the jury's assertion that it was hopelessly deadlocked, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by coercing the jury to reach that conclusion. The court must exercise its power [in declaring a mistrial] ... without coercion of the jury, so as to avoid displacing the jury's independent judgment `in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency.' ( People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 319, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585, quoting People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 817, 69 Cal.Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353.) Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by improperly encouraging the jury to reach an impasse in three ways: (i) it declined to directly answer a jury inquiry about the consequences of a deadlock; (ii) it declined to permit a readback of defense counsel's closing argument; and (iii) it effectively dissuaded the jury from having a defense witness's testimony reread. As we explain, none of these contentions has merit. After deliberating just a short time, the jury sent out a note inquiring what consequences would ensue if it could not come to a unanimous decision. After conferring with the parties, the court informed the jury it was not to consider possible consequences of a deadlocked jury as a factor in its decisionmaking process. As the trial court recognized, we addressed this precise issue in People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310, explaining that an instruction setting forth the consequences of a hung jury would have the potential for unduly confusing and misguiding the jury in their proper role and function in the penalty determination process. Penalty phase juries are presently instructed that their proper task is to decide between a sentence of death and life without the possibility of parole. Any further instruction along the lines suggested herein could well serve to lessen or diminish that obligation in the jurors' eyes. ( Id. at p. 814, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310.) In short, the trial court did not err by declining to answer the jury's question, and its response to the question could not have improperly influenced the jury to become deadlocked. The jury also requested a read back of defense counsel's closing argument, particularly the part of counsel's argument where he stated that if any one juror could not vote for death, the defendant would receive a sentence of life in prison. [28] After conferring with the parties, the trial court [29] informed the jury that it is not appropriate that the arguments of counsel on either side be reread to the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The rehearing of evidence is governed by section 1138. [30] That section gives a deliberating jury the right to rehear evidence and instruction on request, but does not extend to argument of counsel. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 266, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) Moreover, because the jury was interested in a portion of defense counsel's argument that arguably misstated the law, the court was well within its discretion to decline the request for a read back irrespective of section 1138. Defendant responds that because he has a state and federal constitutional right to present closing argument to the jury ( Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 864-865, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 [federal right]; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 694, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217 [state right]), he has a corollary right to have his jury rehear such argument if it so requests. He suggests that the trial court's failure to permit the jury to rehear counsel's argument violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and requires automatic reversal. Because defense counsel was able to make a full closing argument before the jury, defendant's ability to have counsel participate fully and fairly in the factfinding process was not significantly diminished. ( People v. Bonin, supra, at p. 695, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217.) Accordingly, we find no error, and no coercion of the jury, flowing from the trial court's decision not to allow a readback of counsel's argument. Third, defendant contends the trial court compounded the above alleged errors by dissuading the jury from following through on its initial request to rehear the testimony of Dr. Mindy Rosenberg, a defense witness who provided mitigating evidence in the form of a social science explanation of the influence of defendant's childhood on his later behavior. Defendant's contention does not accurately describe the proceedings below. The record shows the jury sent a note to the trial court indicating Juror No. 6 wished to rehear the testimony of pathologist Dr. Sharon Van Meter, Frederick Mangum, and Dr. Rosenberg. The trial court indicated Dr. Van Meter's testimony took up about 40 pages of the daily transcript, Mangum's testimony only seven pages, but Dr. Rosenberg's testimony took up 180 pages. The court stated: A very rough estimate of a time that it would take to reread that is fairly close to the time that it takes for them to have testified. Dr. Rosenberg was all day. It might be less, but it would be probably three hours, for Dr. Rosenberg's [testimony] approximately. An hour perhaps less for Dr. Van Meter. And not too long for [Mr.] Mangum. The trial court then asked: Was there a particular part of any testimony that you were seeking be reread? Juror No. 6 responded: OnI guess on the Rosenberg part I was thinking mainly about the whole thing, but certainly I wasn't thinking about the time and [if] no one else objects, I'll withdraw the request for the Rosenberg testimony. The court stated it would make the necessary arrangements for the jury to rehear the testimony of Dr. Van Meter and Frederick Mangum. The court then advised the jury: [I][a]sk you to think about, even including the Dr. Rosenberg one, whether youwhat you do want.... You have a right to have anything read back that you wish to have read back. And we will make the time and the reporters available. (Italics added.) As is clear, the trial court did not dissuade the jury from rehearing Dr. Rosenberg's testimony. Instead, it acted reasonably by inquiring whether the juror wished to hear the entire testimony or just some portion of it. The juror then retracted the request. The trial court reiterated that it would allow the jury to rehear any of the testimony, even including Dr. Rosenberg's testimony, if the jury so desired. We find no abuse of discretion, and no coercion of the jury, flowing from the trial court's actions. In sum, we conclude defendant's penalty retrial was not unconstitutional per se, that he forfeited the double jeopardy claim for appeal by failing to enter such a plea before the second penalty phase, and that even if the issue were properly before this court, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the jury was hopelessly deadlocked and in declaring a mistrial. We further find the court did not improperly coerce the jury's deadlock by refusing to answer the jury's question regarding the consequences of a deadlock, in declining to order a readback of defense counsel's closing argument, or by inquiring whether the jury wished to rehear Dr. Rosenberg's testimony in its entirety.