Opinion ID: 694307
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: New York Tolling Doctrine

Text: 27 Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of establishing by prima facie proof that the limitations period has expired since the plaintiff's claims accrued. Hoosac Valley Farmers Exchange, Inc. v. AG Assets, Inc., 168 A.D.2d 822, 563 N.Y.S.2d 954, 955 (3d Dep't 1990). Klotz has met this burden, since all of plaintiff's claims had accrued by September 1949--the date of the last alleged abuse--and more than two years have run since then. 28 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the limitations period should be tolled. Waters of Saratoga Springs, Inc. v. State, 116 A.D.2d 875, 498 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 68 N.Y.2d 777, 506 N.Y.S.2d 673, 498 N.E.2d 146 (1986). Simply by establishing her birth date as November 6, 1942, Overall has met her burden with regard to infancy tolling under N.Y.Civ.Prac.Act Sec. 60. But infancy tolling extends her period only to November 6, 1965. She relies on duress tolling to extend the limitations period until 1992, but her reliance is misplaced. 29 In order to determine the scope of duress tolling, we bear in mind that New York construes tolling doctrines as narrowly as possible. McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459, 435 N.E.2d 1072 (1980) ([T]olling provisions should not readily be given an expansive interpretation tending to undermine the basic purposes behind the Statutes of Limitation.). We must also remember that it is only one of several tolling doctrines, each developed in Chancery to remedy a different inequity. We can say with confidence that equity generally favors blameless plaintiffs and punishes blameworthy defendants. But because these laudable goals of fairness undergird all tolling doctrines--particularly equitable estoppel and duress they cannot explain all the differences between these doctrines. 10 30 In order to invoke equitable estoppel, a plaintiff must show that the defendant wrongfully induced the plaintiff to refrain from timely commencing an action by deception, concealment, threats or other misconduct. Zoe G. v. Frederick F.G., 208 A.D.2d 675, 617 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (2d Dep't 1994); see also Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 449, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262, 377 N.E.2d 713 (1978) (discussing fraud, misrepresentations, or deception as grounds for estoppel); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 162 A.D.2d 249, 556 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (1st Dep't 1990) (listing fraud, misrepresentation, threat, or deception). Because a person who seeks equity must do equity, a plaintiff invoking estoppel must show that he brought his action within a reasonable time after the facts giving rise to the estoppel have ceased to be operational. Simcuski, 44 N.Y.2d at 450; Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 608. Equitable estoppel, therefore, looks at the parties' conduct only to determine their relative blameworthiness in delaying the commencement of suit. 31 Duress tolling, on the other hand, examines the parties' conduct only to determine whether that conduct constitutes a continuation of the underlying tort. New York law requires that a plaintiff be subjected to a continuous wrong for duress tolling to be appropriate. Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 722 (2d Cir.) (tolling limitations period as long as plaintiffs were subjected to ongoing extortion), cert. denied sub nom. Nassau County Republican Comm. v. Cullen, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3266, 97 L.Ed.2d 764 (1987); Kamonitsky v. Corcoran, 97 Misc. 384, 388, 161 N.Y.S. 756, 759 (Sup.Ct.App.Term 1st Dep't 1916) (same), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kamenitsky v. Corcoran, 177 A.D. 605, 164 N.Y.S. 297 (1st Dep't 1917) (finding insufficient facts pleaded to support claim of tolling). In Kamenitsky, the Appellate Division for the First Department rejected a claim of duress tolling by a plaintiff who made payments to the defendant for eleven years, purportedly under the duress of a single original threat. The court required the plaintiff to allege some further conduct by the defendant in order to establish a continuous wrong: Even if the first payment were made under duress, it could not be successfully claimed that, where not another word ever passed between the parties, each monthly payment continuing thereafter for 11 years was made under duress of the original threat. Kamenitsky, 164 N.Y.S. at 301. 32 Duress involves both threats or force by the defendant, and the submission of the plaintiff's free will to those threats. Both elements of duress must continue in order for a duress-based tort to persist as a continuous wrong. As shorthand for this rule, courts have explained that duress tolling is available only when duress is an element of the cause of action alleged. Cullen, 811 F.2d at 722 (permitting tolling because duress is element of extortion); Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 813 (2d Cir.) (rejecting tolling because duress is not element of false arrest or unlawful search and seizure), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 71, 121 L.Ed.2d 37 (1992); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (rejecting duress tolling because duress is not element of negligence, fraud or malpractice); Baratta v. Kozlowski, 94 A.D.2d 454, 464 N.Y.S.2d 803, 806-07 (2d Dep't 1983) (rejecting tolling because duress is not element of embezzlement). 33 Duress tolling is not triggered, however, simply because duress constitutes an element of the underlying tort. In order to constitute a continuous wrong that tolls the limitations period, the tortious conduct itself must continue. See, e.g., Pacchiana v. Pacchiana, 94 A.D.2d 721, 721, 462 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (2d Dep't 1983) (rejecting duress tolling in action to rescind antenuptial agreement, because coercion ceased upon execution of the agreement). Furthermore, the tortious conduct must continue uninterrupted. In the seminal case of Piper v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 67, 71, 13 N.E. 632 (1887), for example, the New York Court of Appeals would not permit tolling for duress where the defendant coerced the plaintiff into signing over a deed, and later forced him into forgoing a lawsuit to rescind the deed. Because the two episodes of coercion were separate, the limitations period as to the first was not tolled by the second. See also Gallas v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, 154 Misc.2d 494, 502, 587 N.Y.S.2d 82, 88 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.County 1991) (rejecting duress tolling where coercion allegedly ceased in 1983 and resumed in 1985). 34 The rationale behind duress tolling is that certain torts occur over a stretch of time, not just at the single identifiable moment when the cause of action accrues. When a plaintiff is subject to a continuous wrong, the moment of accrual still determines when judicial relief is first available, but equity begins to run the limitations period from when the tortious conduct ceases. We presume that a plaintiff is unable to file suit so long as--but no longer than--she is subjected to a duress-based tort. We now examine whether Overall has brought forward any evidence that she was continuously subjected to any duress-based torts and thus was entitled to toll the limitations period for duress. 35