Opinion ID: 2632907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's initial interrogation: alleged Miranda violation

Text: Defendant contends his statements in the initial interrogation conducted by Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed were illegally obtained because they did not advise him of his Miranda rights. Before being subjected to `custodial interrogation,' a suspect `must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.' ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 732, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485, quoting Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) Here, it is undisputed that at the time of the interrogation defendant was a suspect: Detective Reed so testified at the hearing on defendant's suppression motion. The trial court found, however, that there was no need to advise defendant of his Miranda rights because he was not subjected to custodial interrogation. Defendant challenges that ruling. An interrogation is custodial when a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) Whether a person is in custody is an objective test; the pertinent inquiry, is whether there was `a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.` ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 401, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) When reviewing a trial court's determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must apply a deferential substantial evidence standard ( id at p. 402, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442) to the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, a reasonable person in [the] defendant's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave ( ibid.). Defendant asserts that to determine whether a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave, we must decide whether a reasonable person with defendant's age, low intelligence, and developmental disability would have felt free to leave. Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has decided whether these factors should be considered in deciding whether a suspect is in custody (see generally Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 666-668, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938), but we will assume for the sake of argument that these factors may be considered. Defendant also points out that the interrogation was initiated by the deputies, that he was fingerprinted before being questioned; that the interrogation was relatively long (three and a half hours) and took place, in an interrogation room in the sheriffs department; that the door to the interrogation room was closed and Detective Reed sat between defendant and the door; and that when, on one occasion, defendant tried to go down the hall to the bathroom, Detective Reed escorted him back to the interrogation room, asking him to wait in the interrogation room and not to wander around. Notwithstanding the facts cited by defendant, we agree with the trial court that he was not subjected to custodial interrogation. Detective Reed repeatedly told defendant that he was not under arrest and he was free to end the questioning at any time and leave. Indeed, at the end of the interrogation the deputies did not arrest him; instead they took him home. When defendant asked to use the telephone, he was permitted to do so. (See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 [Miranda warnings are designed to protect suspects who are cut off from the outside world and subjected to incommunicado interrogation.].) The door to the interrogation room was not locked, and when defendant was left alone to make his telephone calls, he left the room to use the bathroom. Significantly, after using the telephone, defendant told Detective Reed that the person he had spoken to had advised him to leave, but he preferred to remain and answer questions, and he later told his father on the telephone that he was free to go. Although the ... determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by ... the person being questioned ( Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293), defendant's comments reinforce our view that a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave.