Opinion ID: 1119218
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutional Validity of the ULSPA Amendments.

Text: Article II, section 13 of the Alaska Constitution [15] requires that every bill be confined to one subject which must be expressed in its title. The 1977 amendments to ULSPA find their genesis in House Bill 67, entitled An Act Relating to the Uniform Land Sales Practices Act. 1977 House Journal 63. The bill was introduced at the Governor's request and all of its provisions related directly to ULSPA. See Governor's Transmittal Letter, id. at 63-66. The primary impact of House Bill 67 was to amend ULSPA to bring in-state sales of subdivided land within the Act's scope and to add a general antifraud section. With only minor changes, the bill received the House's approval and was sent to the Senate for its consideration. At the instance of the Senate Rules Committee, a Senate Committee Substitute was approved. 1977 Senate Journal 1517. This version of the bill was entitled An Act Relating to Land; And Providing for an Effective Date. Id. at 1489. The sections relating to ULSPA were essentially the same as those approved by the House, but the Senate Committee Substitute also contained various amendments to the Alaska Land Act, AS 38.05.005-38.05.370. These amendments pertain to the leasing of state-owned lands and to the Division of Lands' zoning power. It was this version of the bill that ultimately became law. Ch. 138, SLA 1977. That every section of Chapter 138, SLA 1977 in some respect concerns land is not disputed. However, it is just as clear that many of its provisions have nothing else in common. Thus, the issue to be resolved is whether the general heading land can be considered one subject for purposes of article II, section 13. Were we writing on a clean slate, we would be inclined to find this subject impermissibly broad. Permitting such breadth under the one-subject rule could conceivably be misconstrued as a sanction for legislation embracing the whole body of the law. Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 340, 55 N.W. 869, 870 (Neb. 1893). Nevertheless, while the issue is indeed close, we are unable to say that the legislature has transgressed the limits of article II, section 13 established by prior decisions of this court. To determine if a bill is confined to one subject, [a]ll that is necessary is that the act should embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be part of, or germane to, one general subject. [16] Thus, what constitutes one subject for purposes of art. II, § 13 is broadly construed. [17] And [n]o act will be set aside for failing to comply with this provision except where the violation is both substantial and plain. [18] In Gellert v. State, 522 P.2d 1120 (Alaska 1974), we upheld a bill that provided for the issuance of bonds to finance flood control and small boat harbor projects. These two topics were found to be confined to one subject because they both pertained to one ongoing plan for the development of water resources. Id. at 523. More recently, in North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P.2d 534, 545 (Alaska 1978), we upheld An Act Relating to Taxation; And Providing for an Effective Date. Because its various provisions, although diverse, all related to state taxation, we found no violation of the one-subject rule. Id. at 544-46. In light of these decisions, we must likewise conclude that land is not an unduly broad subject for purposes of article II, section 13. Consequently, Chapter 138, SLA 1977, the provisions of which all relate to this subject, is constitutionally valid. [19]