Opinion ID: 2982291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dorsey: 404(b) Evidence of Prior Conviction

Text: Dorsey challenges the district court’s decision to allow evidence of his 2001 drug conviction in New York for possession of crack cocaine under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Ahead of trial, the government filed a notice that it intended to introduce evidence “in its case-in-chief, during cross examination, or rebuttal” of the 2001 conviction “to demonstrate the requisite intent and absence of mistake or accident of defendant to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine base (‘crack’).” Dorsey did not respond to the notice, but objected at trial to - 11 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. the testimony of Sergeant Wayne Manolescu of the Utica, New York, police department regarding the conviction. The district court overruled the objection, stating simply, “[The government] gave you appropriate notice,” and allowed Manolescu to testify that he stopped Dorsey on the street after another officer had witnessed a hand-to-hand drug deal involving Dorsey. Manolescu testified that he then searched and found ten baggies of crack cocaine on Dorsey, who subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance. As a preliminary matter, the government argues the Court should review Dorsey’s claim for plain error because Dorsey failed to object until after Manolescu began to testify. A review of the transcript shows that Dorsey’s counsel requested a sidebar and objected to the 404(b) evidence soon after Manolescu took the stand and immediately after he began responding to the prosecutor’s question about the events on the day of the 2001 arrest. Thus, while Dorsey declined several opportunities to object to the testimony of Manolescu before the officer took the stand, Dorsey’s counsel nonetheless objected to and cut off Manolescu’s testimony before any evidence of the prior conviction was introduced. For this reason, we apply the usual standard. The admissibility of evidence of other acts under Rule 404(b) is determined by a threestep process: The first step requires the district court to decide whether there is sufficient evidence that the other act in question actually occurred. If so, the district court must decide whether the evidence of the other act is “‘probative of a material issue other than character.’” Finally, if the evidence is probative of a material issue other than character, the district court must decide whether the “probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect.” Haywood, 280 F.3d at 719–720 (citations omitted). Dorsey has conceded step one—that he was convicted in 2001 for possession of crack cocaine. - 12 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. 1. Probative Value. As to the second step, “[e]vidence of other acts is probative of a material issue other than character if (1) the evidence is offered for an admissible purpose, (2) the purpose for which the evidence is offered is material or ‘in issue,’ and (3) the evidence is probative with regard to the purpose for which it is offered.” Id. at 720 (citing United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (6th Cir. 1994)). Here, the government stated in its notice that it sought to introduce Dorsey’s 2001 conviction to show “intent and absence of mistake.”3 This Court has recognized intent is an admissible purpose for 404(b) evidence and is “in issue” when a defendant is charged with a specific intent crime, such as Dorsey’s possession with the intent to distribute charge. See id. at 721. Whether the 2001 conviction was probative of this purpose is another matter. “To determine if evidence of other acts is probative of intent, we look to whether the evidence relates to conduct that is ‘substantially similar and reasonably near in time’ to the specific intent offense at issue.” Id. (citing United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985)). In addressing whether a possession conviction was probative of intent on a distribution charge, the court in Haywood noted that this “analysis turns on whether [the defendant] intended to distribute” the drugs in the prior possession conviction. Id. Dorsey argues that the eight-year-old possession conviction in New York is insufficiently similar and too remote in time to be probative to establish intent for possession with the intent to distribute. The government argues that Dorsey’s possession conviction demonstrated his intent to distribute because Dorsey was arrested in 2001 when carrying drugs in individually packaged baggies, and the conviction came only two years before the start of the conspiracy charged here. 3 As for “absence of mistake,” as Dorsey persuasively argues, it was never at issue in this case because Dorsey’s defense was that he did not possess the drugs discovered by law enforcement officers. - 13 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. According to Dorsey’s presentencing report and an information filed by the government, Dorsey’s 2001 conviction was for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. Under New York law, “[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree” either if he possesses “a controlled substance with intent to sell it” or if he simply possesses specific drugs in certain quantities, such as half an ounce of a “narcotic preparation” or 500 milligrams of cocaine. N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06(1)–(7) (McKinney 2001). Unfortunately, the district court did not hold a hearing to review the conduct underlying Dorsey’s prior conviction, such that the basis of the conviction is clear, and the details that emerged at trial are sketchy at best. For instance, Manolescu’s testimony did not make clear whether Dorsey bought or sold drugs in the 2001 transaction. Based on the facts in the record, the only similarity between the prior offense and the charged offenses appears to be the hand-to-hand nature of the drug deal that led to the possession conviction. Manolescu testified that he arrested Dorsey on the street after another officer witnessed a hand-to-hand drug transaction that involved Dorsey. Similarly, Rush testified that Dorsey’s role when he came to Tennessee in 2006 was in part to “learn the town and distribute” with “a couple hand to hand” powder cocaine sales that Rush witnessed. However, by Dorsey’s second trip to Tennessee in 2009, his role appeared to have changed to operating a stash house for Maddox and not conducting sales, according to Rush. The government has shown no further evidence of similarity. Most notably, nothing in the charge or the circumstances described by Manolescu tied Dorsey’s drug deal to a larger conspiracy of the sort at issue here, much less to Maddox’s operations in New York or Tennessee. See United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 444 (6th Cir. 2008). - 14 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. In addition, the timing is not as tight as the government claims. The 2001 sale occurred five years before Dorsey first came to Tennessee to sell drugs, according to Rush, and eight years before the arrest leading to the possession with intent to distribute charges in this case. See United States v. Freeman, 412 F. App’x 735, 745 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that, while “[t]here is no absolute maximum number of years that may separate a prior act and the offense charged,” a ten-year-old conviction was not sufficiently similar or reasonably close in time to be probative of intent for a subsequent charge, though both dealt with the sale of crack-cocaine in Tennessee). The government argues the conviction came only two years before the start of the overall conspiracy in which Dorsey played a part. But this ignores that the government presented no evidence tying Dorsey to the conspiracy before 2006 or, again, tying the 2001 offense to a larger conspiracy. As this Court stated in Bell, “[t]he only way to reach the conclusion that the person currently has the intent to possess and distribute based solely on evidence of unrelated prior convictions for drug distribution is by employing the very kind of reasoning—i.e., once a drug dealer, always a drug dealer—which 404(b) excludes.” Bell, 516 F.3d at 444. Given the long period of time and the lack of evidence establishing a similarity between the prior conviction and the conduct for which Dorsey was charged here, it was an error for the district court to implicitly find the 404(b) evidence was probative of Dorsey’s intent. 2. Prejudicial Effect. Even if it were probative, the evidence of the 2001 conviction was inadmissible because its value was substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. Haywood, 280 F.3d at 723. The district court decision in this balancing process is generally “afforded great deference,” and the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to its proponent. Bell, 516 F.3d at 445. - 15 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. We have noted that when weighing the probative value of prior convictions or other acts evidence, a court “should consider the government’s alternative sources of proving intent,” Bell, 516 F.3d at 445, to determine if the 404(b) evidence was unnecessary, Haywood, 280 F.3d at 723. In our opinion, the evidence of Dorsey’s past conviction was of little value to the jury in establishing Dorsey’s intent to distribute the cocaine in Ebberts’ car trunk, in light of the government’s witness testimony, see United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir. 1996), and the substantial quantity of drugs found in the trunk, Bell, 516 F.3d at 446. Given that Rush testified about Dorsey’s 2006 drug sales and his role in 2009, the prior conviction evidence was unnecessary. On the flip side, it was highly prejudicial. We have repeatedly stated that prior crimes evidence “unquestionably has a powerful and prejudicial impact” on a jury. Bell, 516 F.3d at 446 (citing Johnson, 27 F.3d at 1193). This is particularly true when the evidence risks leading the jury to punish the defendant for being a “bad guy,” rather than for his involvement in the offense at issue. Id. The government argues that any prejudicial impact was mitigated by the district court’s limiting instruction, in which the court told the jury it could “consider the evidence only as it relates to the Government’s claim on . . . the Defendant’s knowledge and intent. You should not consider it for any other purpose.” While this Court has noted that a limiting instruction may significantly mitigate prejudice in admitting 404(b) evidence, we have also recognized that limiting instructions directing the jury to regard evidence for intent when the evidence is not probative of intent does nothing to abate the evidence’s prejudicial impact. See Bell, 516 F.3d at 446–47; Haywood, 280 F.3d at 724. - 16 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. 3. Harmless Error. However, even if the district court abused its discretion in allowing the prior conviction into evidence, Dorsey is not entitled to a new trial if the error was harmless. “An error is harmless unless one can say, with fair assurance that the error materially affected the defendant’s substantial rights—that the judgment was substantially swayed by the error.” United States v. Murphy, 241 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). This “generally depends on whether the properly admissible evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming.” Haywood, 280 F.3d at 724. The government’s evidence against Dorsey—as described in detail in the next section— met this standard. Dorsey was arrested at Maddox’s house, soon after Ebberts parked her car outside the house with the 1.5 kilograms of cocaine that Rush and Maddox purchased still in the trunk. Rush established that Dorsey served as a drug dealer for Maddox and essentially as a guard, with Miller, of the cocaine. Both Rush and Ebberts testified that Dorsey spoke with either Maddox or Rush after they were pulled over by police; according to Rush, Dorsey told Maddox that police had descended on Maddox’s home, and Maddox instructed Dorsey not to let them in. In addition, police officers testified that they witnessed Dorsey keeping watch on the street in the lead-up to Ebberts’ arrival and that they intercepted a text message sent by Maddox to flush the keys to Ebberts’ car. This evidence was also largely uncontested. While the defendants on the whole attempted to undermine Rush’s general credibility as a witness, and there was some inconsistency as to who spoke to whom after Maddox and Rush were pulled over, the jury resolved these matters and returned a guilty verdict. As a result, we cannot say that the jury was substantially swayed by Dorsey’s inadmissible conviction, rather than the weight of other evidence against him. - 17 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. B. Ruffin: Admission of Incriminating Statements Ruffin argues that the district court erred in partially denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements Ruffin made to DEA agent Brian Vicchio after Ruffin’s arrest. Vicchio arrested Ruffin after he and other officers observed Ruffin driving his car in Johnson City, Tennessee. Vicchio mirandized Ruffin while placing him into a squad car, and Ruffin made incriminating statements while in the car. Vicchio then drove Ruffin to a DEA field office in Johnson City, where Ruffin was again mirandized and made more incriminating statements. After holding a suppression hearing, the magistrate judge recommended suppression of Ruffin’s statements made at the scene of the arrest, finding Vicchio’s Miranda warning—which was videotaped—insufficient because it did not make clear Ruffin had the right to a lawyer before undergoing questioning. However, the magistrate judge recommended denying the motion as to Ruffin’s statements made at the DEA field office. The second Miranda warning was not recorded, but the magistrate judge noted that Vicchio had testified that he re-mirandized Ruffin at the field office before initiating the interrogation, and that he specifically included Ruffin’s right to consult with an attorney before questioning began. The magistrate judge found Vicchio’s testimony credible and uncontroverted, as Ruffin had declined to testify. The magistrate judge also rejected Ruffin’s argument that he was intoxicated on cocaine at the time of his arrest and unable to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights. The video of his arrest showed that he told Vicchio, “I’m telling you man, I’m fucked up, man.” The magistrate judge determined the statement referred to Ruffin’s “legal problems” and not his mental state. Finding that “there is absolutely no evidence before this court to suggest that the defendant abused cocaine or any other drug at any particular time before his arrest, much less - 18 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. [was] intoxicated on some drug,” the magistrate judge concluded that Ruffin was properly mirandized at the field office and had made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation without further findings of fact, save for a finding that review of the arrest video did not indicate any coercion by officers. On appeal, Ruffin argues that the district court should have excluded the second set of incriminating statements because (1) the statements were impermissible fruits of the earlier, improper Miranda warnings; and (2) the district court erred in finding that Ruffin’s waiver was voluntary. As with the other evidentiary issues before us, we review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 607 (6th Cir. 2008). “We review the evidence ‘in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision.’” Id. (citation omitted). 1. Miranda. As to the Miranda issue, Ruffin argues the second set of incriminating statements should have been suppressed under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), because the “[a]rresting officers subjected Mr. Ruffin to a question-first, warn-later interrogation.” Ruffin does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Vicchio properly mirandized Ruffin before questioning him at the office. Rather, he argues that this “second round of questioning was merely a continuation of the first round, with the same officers asking the same or similar questions approximately thirty minutes later.” Thus, he argues, the district court should have excluded the second set of statements, as well. In Seibert, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s confession was inadmissible, even though it came after a Miranda warning, because the police had interrogated the defendant without a proper warning first in order to elicit the same confession. 542 U.S. at 604–06 - 19 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. (plurality opinion). In assessing the effectiveness of a Miranda warning delivered “midstream” between rounds of questioning, a plurality of the Court looked to several “relevant facts”: the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first. Id. at 615. The Justices determined “[i]t would have been reasonable to regard the two sessions as parts of a continuum,” given that the first, unwarned interrogation was “exhaustive” and both interrogations were conducted in the same location by the same officers asking the same questions and were separated only by a 15- to 20-minute break. Id. at 616–17. By contrast, in Bobby v. Dixon, the Court held that a properly mirandized confession— following an unwarned and inadmissible confession—may be admissible, if there was no “‘nexus’” between the two sets of statements and if the circumstances of the interrogation had changed. 132 S. Ct. 26, 31–32 (2011) (per curiam). There, the Court found the defendant’s confession to forging a murder victim’s signature sufficiently distinct from his subsequent confession to murdering the victim. It also noted that a four-hour break in the questioning— during which time the defendant traveled to jail and claimed to have spoken with his lawyer— sufficiently changed the circumstances of the interrogations. Id. Here, Ruffin’s situation bears little resemblance to Seibert. Though the same officer, Vicchio, conducted all of the questioning, the focus of Vicchio’s questions at the arrest scene did not relate to the substance of the charges in the case. At the arrest scene, Vicchio focused on explaining Ruffin’s situation to him, asking if there were any drugs in the car Ruffin drove, and asking if Ruffin would agree to speak with agents at their office. - 20 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. During this conversation, Ruffin asked Vicchio what the officers wanted to talk about, and Vicchio responded that he wanted Ruffin “to tell [him] anything and everything [Ruffin] know[s] about the distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine.” Ruffin argues that this statement overlaps with the office interrogation, which elicited statements about the drug conspiracy, such that both sets of questions should be treated as one continuous interrogation under Seibert. This is a distortion of what happened. The video makes clear that Vicchio’s statement was an explanation, not part of a line of questioning. Ruffin did not respond to it, and Vicchio did not press for a response. In fact, Vicchio repeatedly explained in the car that he wanted to interrogate Ruffin at the office and not at the scene of the arrest. As Vicchio explained at the suppression hearing, he had no intention of interrogating Ruffin on the side of the road, where Ruffin could be spotted as a snitch. In addition, review of the video of his arrest makes clear that the DEA agents did not engage in a deliberate “question-first, warn-later” strategy, even if they did intentionally question him before he was appointed counsel the following day. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 618–22 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (focusing on the officer’s intent). When placing Ruffin in the patrol car, Vicchio attempted a full Miranda warning and properly warned Ruffin of his right to remain silent and to an attorney. Though Vicchio failed to warn Ruffin that his right to an attorney included a right to speak with the attorney before any interrogation occurred, there is no concrete evidence this omission was intentional. Ruffin nonetheless argues that testimony by DEA agent Kevin Kimbrough, who was present at the arrest and observed the office interrogation, shows Vicchio deliberately attempted to circumvent Miranda with this defective warning. Kimbrough testified at the suppression hearing that “[the officers] usually seize the opportunity to interview someone prior to [the - 21 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. arrestee] being appointed counsel” and that they did so with Ruffin. Ruffin treats this statement as a circumstantial admission of an improper intent, given Vicchio failed to expressly include this right in the initial Miranda warning. However, it’s important to note what Kimbrough did not state. He did not testify that officers knowingly question improperly mirandized arrestees or that they deliberately do not mirandize arrestees in order to question them without counsel—or even that they pressure mirandized arrestees to speak with officers outside the presence of counsel. Rather, he testified that officers “seize” the chance to do so if they can. Kimbrough immediately followed his statement with an explanation that he believed Vicchio had mirandized Ruffin before the interrogation, and that, given Ruffin was “extremely forthcoming,” Kimbrough sensed Ruffin would talk to officers that night and again in the future. Without more, Kimbrough’s statement does not show that Vicchio intentionally delivered an incomplete set of warnings at the scene of the arrest in order to interrogate Ruffin later outside the presence of counsel. As such, the district court did not err in treating the arrest scene questioning as separate from the field office interrogation, and in admitting Ruffin’s statements made after Vicchio gave him the second and proper set of Miranda warnings. 2. Waiver. Ruffin also makes two arguments related to waiver: (1) that the district court erred in finding no persuasive evidence that Ruffin was intoxicated, and (2) that it improperly placed the burden on Ruffin to show the waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A defendant’s “statement during a custodial interrogation is inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused ‘in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived [Miranda] rights’ when making the statement.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 - 22 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. (2010) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)). The waiver of the right to remain silent can be express or implied, based on the words and actions of the person interrogated. Id. at 383–84, 387. To establish an implied waiver, the prosecution must show (1) that a Miranda warning was given, (2) that it was understood by the accused, and (3) that the subsequent statement was uncoerced. Id. at 384. As to Ruffin’s argument that the district court improperly placed this “heavy burden” to show a valid waiver on him, he overreaches. The magistrate judge—whose reasoning and conclusions were adopted by the district court—addressed and explicitly examined the required burden on the government before determining that it had met its burden through Vicchio’s uncontradicted testimony. While the magistrate judge’s explicit findings of fact were somewhat sparse, Vicchio testified at the suppression hearing that (1) he properly mirandized Ruffin, (2) he repeatedly asked if Ruffin would agree to answer questions without an attorney present, and (3) Ruffin agreed to talk. Asked about Ruffin’s demeanor, he testified that Ruffin was “humble,” “relaxed,” and “laughed throughout the interview.” Kimbrough largely substantiated Vicchio’s account and also testified that Ruffin “was extremely forthcoming.” In addition, the district court reviewed the videotaped arrest and concluded that no evidence of police coercion existed. Together, this evidence was sufficient for the government to meet its burden in establishing that Ruffin waived his right to remain silent. As to Ruffin’s argument that the district court clearly erred in finding that no “persuasive evidence of intoxication” existed, we cannot agree. The magistrate judge heard and viewed credibly the testimony of two seasoned DEA agents who both testified that Ruffin did not appear to be under the influence of narcotics and was forthright during the interrogation. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (“[W]hen a trial judge’s finding is based on his - 23 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.”). The magistrate judge also interpreted Ruffin’s videotaped statement at the scene of the arrest that he was “fucked up” to refer to Ruffin’s “legal problems” and not his mental condition.4 This Court may not have come to the same conclusion about the meaning of Ruffin’s ambiguous statement, but that does not make the magistrate judge’s otherwise reasonable interpretation clear error. See id. at 574–76 (citations omitted) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). As to the positive drug screen result, while this Court is troubled by the potential afterthe-fact revelation of evidence relevant to the suppression issue, we cannot hold that the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous. To do so on the facts before us would require too much conjecture. Ruffin has highlighted a section of his presentencing report, which states that he submitted to a drug screen on the night of the arrest and the results “were presumptively positive for cocaine.” But nothing in the record or briefs explains what a “presumptively positive” result means, much less how it compares with the cocaine intoxication level required to render a defendant incapable of waiving his Miranda rights. Ruffin also insinuates that the government’s failure to disclose the drug test may violate the principles underlying Brady. However, we do not know when Ruffin or the government learned of the test result. At this stage, the 4 The magistrate judge claimed this interpretation matched Vicchio’s testimony. However, the hearing transcript—not available at the time the report and recommendation and district court order were issued—shows that Vicchio testified that he believed the statement referred to the amount of drugs Ruffin “had at the time.” Specifically, Vicchio testified that it meant that Ruffin “[did]n’t have anything at that point in time.” - 24 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. unexplained test result alone does not rise to the level of extrinsic evidence that undermines the credibility of Vicchio’s and Kimbrough’s testimony. Finally, even if Ruffin had shown some evidence of intoxication, his claim fails because he cannot point to any evidence that Vicchio or Kimbrough used coercion to elicit the incriminating statements. United States v. Dunn, 269 F. App’x 567, 572 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (noting that “[a]bsent coercion,” this Court has “held that a waiver was voluntary even where the defendant was under the influence of ‘an intoxicating medication’” or had been “drinking heavily.”). Again, the district court reviewed videotape evidence of the arrest and found no evidence of coercion, a finding Ruffin does nothing to rebut or challenge on appeal. C. Carr: Admission of Incomplete Recording Carr argues the trial court erred in admitting the partial audio recording of a conversation between him and a confidential informant that the informant secretly recorded on August 11, 2008. To begin, Carr first argues that the court abused its discretion because “the entire tape” played at trial was inaudible. The admission of audio “recordings at trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). To be admissible, recordings must “be authentic, accurate and trustworthy,” as well as “audible and sufficiently comprehensible for the jury to consider the contents.” Id. A recording is “inadmissible if the ‘unintelligible portions are so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy.’” Id. (citations omitted). In arguing that the recording at trial was sufficiently inaudible to be inadmissible, Carr relies solely on a notation in the trial transcript by the court reporter: “Playing of audio tape - 25 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. inaudible. Record reflects conversation from provided transcript.” This alone is insufficient to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. This Court declines to treat a court reporter’s transcription notes either as evidence or as an implied finding of fact by the trial court, as Carr appears to ask us to do. The district court made no findings on the matter of audibility, and Carr never objected, before or at trial, that the recording was inaudible. In fact, Carr’s counsel stated at trial that he preferred the entire recording enter into evidence, which suggests he initially believed it was audible. And, as the government notes, the court reporter often used this notation when audio recordings were played at trial—recordings that witness testimony makes clear were audible. Here, for instance, the witness testifying at the time testified that he recognized the voices in the recording as his and Carr’s, and answered specific questions about statements made in the recording. Next, Carr argues that the trial court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 106 because it did not listen to the entire recording to determine the relevance of the omitted portions. This claim also has no merit. Rule 106 provides that, “[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it..” Fed. R. Evid. 106 (2010) (amended 2011). This Court has determined that “Rule 106 is intended to eliminate the misleading impression created by taking a statement out of context,” but “is not designed to make something admissible that should be excluded.” United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982). “In ruling on a Rule 106 request to supplement a statement, the district court must determine ‘(1) whether the additional evidence explains the evidence already admitted; (2) whether it places the admitted - 26 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. evidence in its proper context; (3) whether its admission will serve to avoid misleading the trier of fact; and (4) whether its admission will insure a fair and impartial understanding of all of the evidence.’” United States v. McAllister, 693 F.3d 572, 584 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Glover, 101 F.3d 1183, 1190 (7th Cir. 1996)). At trial, Carr objected to the government playing only a portion of the recording during the direct examination of a witness.5 The government—which had prepared a transcript of the excerpt only—explained to the court that the omitted part of the recording contained a conversation between the testifying witness and a third party that did not relate to the drug transaction relevant to the trial. However, it did not object to Carr introducing the entire recording on cross examination. Stating that introducing irrelevant evidence would “waste the time of the jury,” the court overruled Carr’s objection. There are two problems with Carr’s argument on appeal. First, according to Carr, the district court had a formal “obligation” under Costner, 684 F.2d 370, to independently review the entirety of the recording and “make a determination which would allow it to excise only irrelevant portions.” However, the court in Costner discussed this specific “obligation” to review the evidence in the context of Federal Rule of Evidence 612, which relates to the admission of a writing used to refresh a witness’s memory. 684 F.2d at 373. This distinction matters because Rule 612 explicitly requires a district court to examine the writing in camera and to remove irrelevant portions before allowing the writing into evidence. Rule 106 does not contain the same requirement. Second, Carr has failed to controvert the trial court’s finding that the omitted portions of the recording were irrelevant. Carr has not presented evidence of these portions’ contents, much 5 Carr’s counsel expressly stated that he did not object to the recording, but requested the government play the entire recording. The district court treated this as an objection. - 27 - Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. less argued that he was prejudiced in any way by their omission from the evidence. Thus, this Court cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting only part of the August 11, 2008, recording.