Opinion ID: 366929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of the Charge

Text: 53 The record demonstrates that the district court judge never explained to Horsley the meaning of the charge and what basic acts must be proved to establish guilt. Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1970). The judge thus failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 11 that he personally inform the defendant of the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. 2 Horsley does not claim, however, that he did not In fact understand the nature of the charge to which he pled, or that, but for the court's failure to comply strictly with the Rule, he would not have pled guilty. 3 Therefore, under the ruling of United States v. Timmreck, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979), Horsley is not entitled to collateral relief. 54 In Timmreck, the petitioner moved, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate his sentence on the ground that the district court judge failed to inform him during the Rule 11 colloquy of the existence of the mandatory special parole term required by the applicable statute. The petitioner did not, however, allege any specific prejudice arising out of the asserted violation of the Rule. The Supreme Court denied his claim, holding that collateral relief is not available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Rule. --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. at 2088, quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). The Court reasoned that habeas corpus relief is available only to protect against a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, (or) an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. at 2087, Quoting Hill, 368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. 468. And the Court concluded that petitioner could not claim that a fundamental defect or omission occurred when he did not argue that he was actually unaware of the special parole term or that, if he had been properly advised by the trial judge, he would not have pleaded guilty. --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. at 2087. 55 We are convinced that no principled distinction between Timmereck and this case can be drawn. Thus, because Horsley failed to allege specific prejudice 4 i. e., failed to maintain that he did not understand the nature of the charge to which he pled, or that he would have pled not guilty but for the district court's error collateral relief is not available to him. 56 At argument, Horsley's counsel relied on Horsley v. United States,583 F.2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1978) (Horsley I ), 5 which also involved a failure of the district court to comply with Rule 11's nature of the charge requirement, and which is factually indistinguishable from this case. In Horsley I, we recognized that under Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974), a collateral attack cannot be successful unless the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of error by the trial court. 583 F.2d at 672. We held, however, that prejudice inheres when an accused pleads guilty, thus convicting himself of a criminal offense, without understanding the significance or consequences of his action. Id. at 673, Quoting Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189, 191 (3d Cir. 1969). Moreover, we created what was in effect an irrebuttable presumption that if the record does not show that the defendant was apprised of facts that constitute commission of a crime, 583 F.2d at 674 n.6, then the defendant did not, for purposes of Rule 11, understand the nature of the offense to which he pled. In sum, Horsley I stands for the proposition that a defendant automatically suffers prejudice whenever the district court fails to comply with the nature of the charge provision of Rule 11. We conclude that this approach is inconsistent with Timmreck, and therefore we are compelled to reject it. 57