Opinion ID: 2635220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct?

Text: [¶16] Even though our determination of the first issue requires reversal, we will discuss this second issue to restate important legal principles and to make sure the same mistakes are not made if the matter is re-tried. [¶17] Our standard for the review of claims of prosecutorial misconduct is well settled: Where there has been an objection below, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under a harmless error standard: Wyoming Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.04 states that any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing court. Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) and Wyoming Rule of Evidence 103(a) contain similar provisions. The test for harmless error is as follows: An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under `circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.' Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 386, 389 (Wyo.2004) ( quoting Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo.2003)). Where there has not been an objection below, claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed under the plain error standard set forth earlier herein. Condra, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d at 389. We decide claims of prosecutorial misconduct by reference to the entire record, and where the claim is one of improper argument, we consider it in the context of the entire argument. Law [ v. State ], 2004 WY 111, ¶ 12, 98 P.3d [181,] 191 [(Wyo.2004)]. We are reluctant to find plain error in a closing argument lest the trial court becomes required to control argument because opposing counsel does not object. Belden v. State, 2003 WY 89, ¶ 38, 73 P.3d 1041, 1087 (Wyo.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1165, 124 S.Ct. 1179, 157 L.Ed.2d 1212 (2004) ( quoting James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 207 (Wyo.1994)). The question is whether, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. Lopez v. State, 2004 WY 103, ¶ 56, 98 P.3d 143, 157 (Wyo.2004). The burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct rests upon the appellant who raises the issue. Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32, 43 P.3d 80, 94 (Wyo.2002). Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 38, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo. 2005). [¶18] The appellant identifies nine alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct, the cumulative effect of which allegedly denied to appellant a fair trial: 1. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the panel, [c]an we agree that, in my role as a prosecutor, that part of my job is to present the evidence, which I think tends to show Mr. Seymore guilty of a crime? (Emphasis added.) This comment drew an objection from defense counsel and, during a bench conference, the prosecutor agreed that his phrasing was improper and offered to rephrase the statement. He then did so, as follows: Can you agree that as a prosecutor, it would be my job to present the evidence that tends to show Mr. Seymore guilty, and [defense counsel`s] job, as the attorney for Mr. Seymore, is to present whatever evidence tends to show him not guilty, and then your job will be to determine the wheat from the chaff? Where I`m going with that is, can we agree those are the roles? If the defense has evidence they want you to consider in deciding this case, then they should put it to you. They should bring it to your attention. They should bring it to court and show it to you, or have someone testify about it, that it`s not the State`s role to present that evidence to you. Although there was no trial objection to the rephrased question, the appellant now relies upon Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 21, 110 P.3d 1206, 1214 (Wyo. 2005) [2] , cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1633 (2006), for the proposition that it is always improper for a prosecutor personally to vouch for the credibility of the state`s evidence: The rationale for this rule has been stated as follows: When the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal belief, an additional factor is injected into the case. This additional factor is that counsel may be perceived by the jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater weight than their own opinion; that members of the jury might be persuaded not by the evidence, but rather by a perception that counsel`s opinions are correct because of his position as prosecutor, an important state official entrusted with enforcing the criminal laws of a sovereign state. While the prosecutor is expected to be an advocate, he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the evidence or misapply the law. [ Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 29, 63 P.3d 875, 886 (Wyo. 2003)]. See also Mazurek [ v. State, 10 P.3d 531,] 542 [(Wyo. 2000)]. ([I]t is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence of the guilt of the defendant.). 2. The prosecutor`s rephrasing of his I think question made the situation worse because he then misstated the law as to the burden of proof by adding the statement as to defense counsel`s duty to bring exculpatory evidence into court. The appellant cites White v. State, 2003 WY 163, ¶ 24, 80 P.3d 642, 653 (Wyo. 2003), and Lane, 12 P.3d at 1066, for the dual propositions that the burden of proof in a criminal case never shifts from the State to the defendant, and the defendant has no duty to present evidence. 3. During closing argument, the prosecutor resurrected his improper burden-shifting argument through the use of a demonstrative exhibit (not preserved in the record) that indicated evidence the prosecutor believed should have been brought before the jury by the appellant. Defense counsel`s objection was overruled. 4. During voir dire, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor`s question in regard to the State`s burden of proof being beyond a reasonable doubt, whether we [can] all agree that does not mean beyond any doubt? The appellant`s trial counsel argued, and appellate counsel now argues that it is error to attempt to define the term reasonable doubt. The appellant relies upon Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 861 (Wyo. 1975), wherein we confirmed the holding in Cosco v. State, 521 P.2d 1345, 1346 (Wyo. 1974) that no instruction defining reasonable doubt should be given, because the term is self explanatory. See also Rivera v. State, 987 P.2d 678, 681 (Wyo. 1999); Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 699 (Wyo. 1993); Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201, 205 n.1 (Wyo. 1980); and Bentley v. State, 502 P.2d 203, 206 (Wyo. 1972). 5. The appellant`s fifth alleged claim of prosecutorial misconduct concerns the first issue discussed in this opinion. During voir dire, defense counsel objected when the prosecutor told the jury panel that [t]he State has to show you the who, the when, the where, and the what they did, but I don`t have to show you why they did it. I don`t have to show you what was going on in the mind  The objection was overruled and the prosecutor went on to explain at considerable length why proof of the appellant`s mindset was unnecessary. The appellant`s argument that this constituted prosecutorial misconduct tracks his argument as to the first issue. 6. In discussing the concept of escape near the end of the State`s voir dire, the prosecutor described movies he had seen wherein Clint Eastwood or Steve McQueen [were] climbing the wire, tunneling out under the fence, guard towers, sirens, spotlight. You all can concede that the law will tell you it could be different than that. It doesn`t have to be that extreme or dramatic. Defense counsel`s objection that the prosecutor was making an argument on the law was sustained, but nothing further was said and the comments were not ordered to be stricken. The appellant contends that the statement was improper because it went to the ultimate issue: was Mr. Seymore guilty of `escape.' See Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 771 (Wyo. 1995); and Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 617 (Wyo. 1993), which, respectively, condemn a prosecutor or a witness giving an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant. 7. After outlining the State`s evidence during his opening statement, the prosecutor concluded by saying, It`s that straightforward, folks. July of 2004, Brian Seymore walked away from the FCS program, walked away from justice, and now he`s asking you to help him do it again. Defense counsel objected to the statement as being argument, but her objection was overruled. The appellant now contends not that the statement was argument, but that it went to the ultimate issue. 8. The prosecutor failed to produce in discovery certain documents mentioned by State witnesses concerning courses the appellant had taken while at FCS. Defense counsel`s objections as to the relevancy of the information and alleging the discovery failure both were sustained. The appellant`s appellate complaint is that the State has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). 9. The appellant`s ninth allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, which involves numerous comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument, will be easier to follow if quoted verbatim rather than being paraphrased: In closing, the [prosecutor] argued that the defense and the State agree on almost everything. He argued that the only question is escape and informed them that Instruction No. 3 provided that a person placed in an [adult community corrections] facility is `deemed' to have escaped if, without proper authority, the person fails to return within the time prescribed. It means, if you check out, and they tell you you have to be back by a certain time, the law says that`s escape. He went on to state that the facts were that the defendant checked himself out, and he chose not to return. He asked, rhetorically, whether the defendant regret(ted) that decision today as he sits in front of you? I`m sure he does, but does that change the fact that it happened? No. He explained that it was for the jury to hold someone accountable, responsible for their actions. I know that`s a tough decision to look at someone and say they did wrong, but that`s what you agreed to do when you agreed to become part of this jury . . . look at the facts, apply the law, and hold someone accountable. Without bothering to say that the evidence showed the following scene, the [prosecutor] simply told the jury what happened on the night in question. . . . Mr. Seymore walked away from the FCS program. He walked away from a court order placing him at that program. Now he`s hoping you will let him walk away from this court one more time by being swayed by sympathy or thinking it wasn`t such a big crime, as they all go. . . . I submit that it`s your duty to find him guilty of the crime of escape as charged. (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.) Specifically, the appellant then argues that it is reversible error for a prosecutor to tell a jury that it is the jury`s duty to find the defendant guilty. See United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999); and United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986). [¶19] Finally, the appellant contends that, even if this Court finds each instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct to have been individually non-prejudicial, the doctrine of cumulative error requires reversal. See Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 30-31, 74 P.3d 699, 711-12 (Wyo. 2003) (the doctrine is, indeed, an available tool to address prosecutorial excess). Cumulative error is defined at Black's Law Dictionary 582 (8th ed. 2004) as follows: The prejudicial effect of two or more trial errors that may have been harmless individually.   The cumulative effect of multiple harmless errors may amount to reversible error. This Court has considered cumulative error innumerable times. See, e.g., Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 342 (Wyo. 1995). Seldom, however, have we reversed a conviction based upon the doctrine. See, e.g., Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 743 (Wyo. 1986); and Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 895 (Wyo. 1982). [¶20] A similar fate has almost always befallen the appellant who raises in this Court the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, despite specific rules against such misconduct. Time-and-time again, we have said that prosecutorial misconduct has always been condemned in this state. Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 5, 100 P.3d 386, 388 (Wyo. 2004); see also Adams v. State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Wyo. 2005); Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, ¶ 21, 54 P.3d 248, 254 (Wyo. 2002); and Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d 975, 986 (Wyo. 2002). More specifically, we have said that prosecutors are not to inject into the trial their personal beliefs as to the credibility of the evidence. Moe, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 21, 110 P.3d at 1214; and Lane, 12 P.3d at 1065. We have also repeatedly said that prosecutors should not suggest that a defendant carries any burden of proof. Id. at 1066 ( citing Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 405 (Wyo. 1998)). And it is not appropriate for a prosecutor to argue to a jury that it is the jury`s duty to convict the defendant. Lafond v. State, 2004 WY 51, ¶ 25, 89 P.3d 324, 332 (Wyo. 2004); Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 50, 46 P.3d 309, 321 (Wyo. 2002); s ee also Sanchez, 176 F.3d at 1224. [¶21] Despite these repeated admonitions, prosecutors continue to test the waters by making statements and asking questions that cross the line, forcing this Court repeatedly to analyze an entire record for harmless error in the context of the whole case. In the instant case, we find that the cumulative effect of the following transgressions was prejudicial error in that we cannot be sure that the appellant was convicted just upon the evidence presented: 1. The prosecutor told the jury panel during voir dire that I think the evidence shows the appellant is guilty. 2. The prosecutor told the jury panel during voir dire and in closing argument that the defendant should bring any exculpatory evidence into court and present it to the jury. 3. The prosecutor told the jury panel during voir dire that the State did not have to prove any mens rea element of the crime. 4. The prosecutor told the jury panel during closing argument that, by becoming jurors, they had agreed to hold someone accountable. 5. The prosecutor told the jury panel during closing argument that it`s your duty to find him guilty of the crime of escape as charged. [¶22] Perhaps, as the State argues in its brief, we could search the record and find support for the conjecture that none of these comments prejudiced the appellant because of the strength of the evidence, or because there was no objection, or because there was an objection, or because of the context, or because defense counsel successfully countered the comment. However, we are convinced that the number and gravity of these errors require reversal. The cumulative effect of the instructional error and the prosecutor`s misstatements in this case was a conviction that cannot be trusted because it was a conviction by a jury that was not told that it had to find the appellant had acted voluntarily, but was told that the prosecutor believed the appellant was guilty, that the appellant had a duty to bring in any exculpatory evidence, and that the jury had a duty to convict the appellant.