Opinion ID: 4562740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Velasquez’s Sentence

Text: The Government concedes that the district court erred in classifying Velasquez as a career offender. A limited remand is accordingly warranted. To be subject to the heightened penalties as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, the government must show that “(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 27 convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). The Government contends that the second requirement is not satisfied in this case because Velasquez’s current offenses do not qualify as either a “controlled substance offense” or a “crime of violence.” The Government acknowledges that a violation of § 1958 is not a “crime of violence” as used in the Sentencing Guidelines. To be considered a “crime of violence,” Velasquez’s murderfor-hire conviction must have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). As discussed, this court has held that § 1958 may be violated when a defendant simply “traveled in interstate commerce with the intent that a contract murder be committed.” Ransbottom, 914 F.2d at 746. In Ransbottom, the defendant violated the statute merely by travelling from Tennessee to Kentucky with the intent to discover the location of the victim. Id. at 744, 746. It is therefore apparent under the categorical approach that a violation of § 1958 can occur without the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against another person. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Other courts have come to the same conclusion with respect to the identical provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). See United States v. Boman, 873 F.3d 1035, 1042 (8th Cir. 2017); Dota v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 3d 1354, 1361 (C.D. Cal. 2018); United States v. Herr, No. 16-cr-10038-IT, 2016 WL 6090714, at  (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2016). The Government and Velasquez also correctly agree that our decision in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (per curiam), invalidated the district court’s determination that conspiracy to distribute cocaine qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” under the career offender Guideline. In Havis, issued shortly after Velasquez was sentenced, we held that “[t]he Guidelines’ definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ does not include attempt crimes.” Id. at 387. The statement to the contrary in the Application Note to § 4B1.2 did not matter: “the Sentencing Commission has no power to add attempt crimes to the list of offenses in § 4B1.2(b) through commentary.” Id. at 384. “Although the specific facts of Havis involved an attempt crime, its reasoning applies with equal force to other inchoate crimes not listed in the text of § 4B1.2(b).” United States v. Butler, 812 F. App’x 311, 314 (6th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, we have acknowledged that, in light of Havis, conspiracy to distribute controlled Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 28 substances is not a “controlled substances offense” under § 4B1.2(b). See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 812 F. App’x 356, 357 (6th Cir. 2020) (mem.) (per curiam) (conspiracy to distribute cocaine); Butler, 812 F. App’x at 314-15. We therefore accept the Government’s concession that Velasquez was improperly sentenced as a career offender. Velasquez is entitled to resentencing on remand. In addition to arguing that he was wrongly classified as a career offender, Velasquez takes issue with the district court’s calculation of the offense level for his murder-for-hire conviction. Velasquez contends, as did Cordero, that the base offense level of 32 in U.S.S.G. § 2E1.4 applies rather than the base offense level of 33 in U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5. For the reasons provided above with respect to Cordero’s sentence, this argument fails.4 See Part VII, supra. Velasquez also asserts that the district court erred by not factoring in the three-level reduction for inchoate crimes under U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1. Section 2X1.1(b)(2) provides, If a conspiracy, decrease by 3 levels, unless the defendant or a co-conspirator completed all the acts the conspirators believed necessary on their part for the successful completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances demonstrate that the conspirators were about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or interruption by some similar event beyond their control. The probation office in its presentence report, which was adopted by the district court, acknowledged that conspiracy to commit murder for hire is covered by § 2X1.1, but reasoned that Velasquez could not benefit from the reduction because “[t]he defendants completed the conspiracy to commit murder for hire when they engaged in a telephone conversation over state lines in which they discussed the murder for hire.” The Government does not respond to Velasquez’s argument with respect to the three-level reduction in § 2X1.1 and indicated at oral argument that it expects the district court to take up the issue once more on remand. Velasquez, on the other hand, has not addressed the reasons provided by the district court for denying the three-level reduction. In these circumstances, it would be unwise to decide the issue of the three- 4At the sentencing hearing, Velasquez challenged the district court’s imposition of a four-point increase for an offense “involv[ing] the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder,” U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5(b)(1). He does not raise this issue on appeal. Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 29 level reduction, where the legal arguments are not adequately presented. We therefore remand for the district court to consider the issue anew in recalculating Velasquez’s offense level.