Opinion ID: 3170633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence of “Firearm” Use

Text: All three counts upon which Lawson was convicted re‐ quired the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson aided and abetted the use of a “firearm.” Law‐ son contends that the government did not meet this burden No. 14‐3276 11 because the only evidence that a firearm was used comes from Hunter, who testified that she was not sure whether the object was a firearm or a well‐made replica. When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi‐ dence, “we must view the evidence in the light most favora‐ ble to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Smith, 697 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). Determinations of a witness’s credibility are to be made by the jury, and “[w]e will not … second‐guess the jury’s credibility determinations.” United States v. King, 643 F.3d 1003, 1006 (7th Cir. 2011). “Generally, juries may reject parts of a witness’s testimony while accepting other parts.” United States v. Colston, 936 F.2d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 1991). A “firearm” is defined as “any weapon … which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projec‐ tile by the action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3)(A). Use of a replica or toy gun is not sufficient to convict of an offense involving a “firearm.” Cf. United States v. Jones, 222 F.3d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 2000) (implicitly acknowledging that a BB gun is not a “firearm”). Because the object used was never recovered and the surveillance footage could not be enhanced, the only evi‐ dence that there was a “firearm” comes from the testimony of Hunter. There is no requirement that the government produce the firearm or other corroborating evidence to sus‐ tain a conviction. See United States v. Buggs, 904 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding conviction based on witness testimony without presence of the weapon). Nor is there any 12 No. 14‐3276 requirement that the government produce an expert witness or more than one lay witness. See, e.g., United States v. Floyd, 81 F.3d 1517, 1526 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding firearms con‐ viction based on testimony of one lay witness experienced with firearms); United States v. Beverly, 99 F.3d 570, 572 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding conviction where victim testified that the defendant “threatened him with a gun during the course of the robbery, and that the gun … was a chrome‐plated re‐ volver”); Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 1382, 1384–85 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding conviction for using a “firearm” after concluding that testimony by an “expert” witness is not nec‐ essary). Hunter had ample opportunity to view the gun up close while it was pointed directly at her stomach. Hunter testified that she was familiar with guns, that the gun looked like a Cobra .380, and that it was not a revolver. Additionally, the robber told her that he had a gun—implying that it was op‐ erable and that he would be willing to use it if Hunter did not comply. Cf. Parker, 801 F.2d at 1384 (“The act of threaten‐ ing others with a gun is tantamount to saying that the gun is loaded and that the gun wielder will shoot unless his com‐ mands are obeyed.” (quotation marks omitted)). Hunter’s testimony is sufficient for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the object used was in fact a firearm. The jury was free to discredit the portions of Hunter’s testimony where she admitted that it “could have been” a well‐made replica. In fact, we have rejected just such an argument. Buggs, 904 F.2d at 1074–75 (upholding firearms conviction where police officer and lay witness testified that they saw “what appeared to them to be a large pistol. It ap‐ No. 14‐3276 13 peared to each of them to be a .357 magnum but neither was sure.” (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, while it is preferable for there to be physical evidence and more witnesses to testify regarding the exist‐ ence of a “firearm,” it is not necessary. The jury was free to credit Hunter’s testimony that the object was in fact a fire‐ arm, discredit the defense’s attempts to show that it was a well‐made replica, and find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson’s confederate used a firearm.