Opinion ID: 303767
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony as to Pre-trial Photographic Identification Admissible

Text: 54 Appellees interpret Mrs. Edgecomb's hesitancy in firmly identifying the two perpetrators of this murder and robbery as implying a lack of accuracy in her identification and as justifying invalidating her subsequent identification. Neither conclusion is correct. Mrs. Edgecomb's testimony is replete with indications of her awareness of the seriousness of the crime, and of the seriousness of her identification of anyone perpetrating murder. We interpret her hesitancy as the hesitancy of the responsible citizen knowingly performing an important act. It has been frequently observed that, sad to relate, the more glib and self-assured witness sometimes makes a stronger impression on an unsophisticated jury than does a careful and conscientious witness, who registered fairly his certainties and uncertainties on different aspects of his testimony. The appellees urge us to draw the same false conclusion, i. e., take the conscientious effort of Mrs. Edgecomb to be absolutely fair and careful in her identification as the mark of an unreliable or influenced witness, when in fact it is probably the mark of reliability and independence of judgment. 55 It is significant that the photos shown to the witness in October, allegedly of Brown and Proctor, do not at all resemble the appellees as they appear in the lineup photo. In reliance on both briefs' statement that Proctor's photo was included in each group, we believe Proctor is identifiable in two individual photos, one in each group shown. (Mrs. Edgecomb was not told a definite suspect was in either group, and had twice previously been shown many photos in which Brown and Proctor were not included; she made no identification on either occasion.) As for Brown, there appears one photo in each group that is similar to Brown's picture in the lineup, but these two individual photos appear to be of two different men. 56 We draw these conclusions: First, that it is thoroughly understandable why Mrs. Edgecomb made no identification of Brown and Proctor from the individual photos shown her in October. Second, we conclude that neither her identification of Brown and Proctor in the lineup photograph nor her possible identification of the appellees at trial was or would be tainted by viewing the individual photos; rather, such identification would be made in spite of such viewing. It follows that appellees' due process violation argument based on repeated showings of photographs of the accused to the witness-on the facts of this case-is not sustainable. And, third, it appears that Mrs. Edgecomb did have an ample opportunity to observe the two defendants while in the store. 57 To whatever extent the argument about Mrs. Edgecomb's hesitancy in making her identification of Proctor and Brown has validity or affects the strength of her testimony, it is an argument which appellees can make to a jury. But it is not a valid due process argument for suppressing her identification of the lineup photograph. 58 In considering the admissibility of identification evidence at trial, constitutional infirmities will bar its admission, but testimonial infirmities go only to the weight of the evidence. We start with the principle, well phrased by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger in a different context but thoroughly applicable here: When an eyewitness is willing to give testimony, under oath and subject to all the rigors of cross-examination and penalties of perjury, he must be heard. 18 59