Opinion ID: 678781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the Board of Review an Agent of Congress?

Text: 26 Following the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in CAAN, 501 U.S. at 264-70, 111 S.Ct. at 2306-09, we first determine whether the Board is an agent of Congress. No single factor is dispositive. Among the factors considered by the CAAN Court were the conditioning of the lease of the two airports on the Authority's creation of the Board of Review, the presence of the drop-dead clause, the Federal Government's 27 strong and continuing interest in the efficient operation of the airports ... [which] motivated the creation of the Board of Review, ... [and] [m]ost significant, [that] membership on the Board of Review [was] limited to federal officials, specifically members of congressional committees charged with authority over air transportation. 28 CAAN, 501 U.S. at 266-67, 111 S.Ct. at 2307. The Court concluded: 29 We thus confront an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the powers of which Congress has delineated, the purpose of which is to protect an acknowledged federal interest, and membership in which is restricted to congressional officials. Such an entity necessarily exercises sufficient federal power as an agent of Congress to mandate separation-of-powers scrutiny. 30 Id. at 269, 111 S.Ct. at 2308. 31 As amended, the Transfer Act presents us with the same entity, although devoid of the explicit membership restrictions. The new Board and its powers continue to be the creation of Congress, the drop-dead provision remains in place, and the federal interest in the efficient operation of the two airports continues unchanged. The question, then, is whether erasing the condition that the Board's membership be limited to Members of Congress, eight of whom sit on specified congressional committees, while requiring the Authority to select members from lists prepared by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, suffices to eliminate the Board's status as an agent of Congress and thus immunizes the amended Act from separation-of-powers review. 32 It is true that the Court found the original membership condition [m]ost significant. Id. at 266-67, 111 S.Ct. at 2307. Yet this condition was but one of [s]everal factors combin[ing] to warrant separation-of-powers analysis, id. at 264-66, 111 S.Ct. at 2306-07. Its elimination, then, does not end our inquiry. Indeed, the Court specifically called for a functional approach, reminding us that  'separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity.'  Id. at 267, 111 S.Ct. at 2307 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393, 109 S.Ct. 647, 666, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989)). 33 To this end, we look to the revised provisions establishing the Board. Its members must be: (1) frequent users of the Metropolitan Washington Airports; (2) registered voters of a State other than Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia; and (3) experienced in aviation matters and in addressing the needs of airport users. 49 U.S.C. app. Sec. 2456(f)(2)(C). Hechinger maintains that these qualifications are met by Members of Congress who serve on the relevant oversight committees, thus assuring their domination of the Board. Similarly, the United States, an intervenor, argues that the district court correctly concluded that the new requirements for Board membership ensured that many members of Congress--and few others--will be eligible to serve on the Board of Review. Hechinger, 845 F.Supp. at 907. The Authority responds that these requirements do not compel the selection of a Member of Congress but merely ensure that the Board will provide nationwide users with informed representation. 34 While it is true that Board membership is no longer limited to Representatives and Senators who sit on committees that have jurisdiction over air transportation, as a practical matter, relatively few individuals other than members or alumni of those committees will be able to meet the new criteria. Thus it is hardly happenstance that of the nine members appointed to the Board following adoption of the 1991 Amendments, eight were Members of Congress who served on committees having jurisdiction over air transportation--the lone outsider being a former Secretary of Transportation. Cf. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1677, 1684, 128 L.Ed.2d 399 (1994) (Court looks beyond explicit terms of facially neutral local ordinance to its practical effect and design.). 35 We are also struck by Congress's choice of the period within which the Board must make its recommendations: the longer of 30 calendar days or 10 legislative days. Again, it is not happenstance that computation of the latter requires the exclusion of those days on which Representatives and Senators may be expected to be out of town; namely, the week-ends, holidays, and congressional adjournments and recesses when they are free to work in their respective constituencies. Id. Sec. 2546(f)(4)(C). There can be no reason for such a provision other than to serve the convenience of the Members of Congress who were expected to serve on the Board. 36 Finally, we examine the manner in which the members of the Board are selected. While they are no longer required to be Members of Congress, and while they may now be removed for cause by the Directors, id. Sec. 2456(f)(11), they must still be nominated by the Speaker of the House or the President pro tempore of the Senate. Id. Sec. 2456(f)(1). It is true that the Directors may request that additional names be submitted, id. Sec. 2456(f)(1), but we have little doubt who would win a test of wills because the 1991 Amendments also provide that at any time that the Board 37 has more than 4 vacancies and lists have been provided for appointments to fill such vacancies, the Airports Authority shall have no authority to perform any of the actions that [must] be submitted to the Board of Review. 38 Id. Sec. 2456(f)(2)(D). 39 In CAAN, the Supreme Court found it significant that appointments must be made from the lists, and there is no requirement that the lists contain more recommendations than the number of Board openings. 501 U.S. at 268-69, 111 S.Ct. at 2308 (emphasis in original). This remains true of the amended Act. Because the Directors may never go outside the lists furnished by the Speaker and the President pro tempore, we conclude that Congress retains control over the appointments. This control, together with the provisions that in practice ensure that the Board will be dominated by Members of Congress, persuades us that Congress intended the Board to serve, and we hold that it does serve, as its agent. 40