Opinion ID: 724615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intoxication and Specific Intent Instructions

Text: 8 Cantrell argues that the district court's limited instruction on intoxication, and the absence of instructions regarding the relationship between intoxication and specific intent, failed to convey adequately to the jury this theory of defense. We review de novo whether the instructions adequately covered Cantrell's theory of the defense. Duran, 59 F.3d at 941. The district court did not commit reversible error by rejecting Cantrell's proposed instructions if other instructions, in their entirety, adequately cover [the] defense theory. Id. (quoting United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990)). 9 Evidence in the record could have supported a jury conclusion that Cantrell was intoxicated at the time of the assault, and the parties agree that voluntary intoxication can negate the element of specific intent required for a conviction under § 113. See United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 259 (9th Cir.1975) (following rule that intoxication (although voluntary) which precludes the formation of the necessary intention may be established as a defense). Cantrell's proposed instructions arguably would have provided the jury with better guidance in applying the intoxication defense to the element of specific intent than the instructions that the district court gave. However, the district court instructed the jury that the specific intent to do bodily harm was an element of § 113, and that the government had to prove each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court also gave the jury the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 6.06, which instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of intoxication in deciding whether the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intent required for conviction. 10 Because Cantrell's claim of intoxication is a gloss on the specific intent issue rather than an analytically distinct claim, a separate instruction regarding the application of the intoxication defense to the element of specific intent was unnecessary. See United States v. Cebian, 774 F.2d 446, 447-48 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming district court's refusal to give separate diminished capacity instruction because specific intent instruction was given). Considered together, the specific intent and Ninth Circuit 6.06 instructions informed the jury that Cantrell's intoxication could affect an element required for conviction. We therefore conclude that the district court's instructions adequately covered Cantrell's intoxication theory of defense.