Opinion ID: 2107726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: daubert/schafersman i gatekeeping duty

Text: Section 27-702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Until our decision in Schafersman I, we had employed the Frye test to evaluate the admissibility of an expert's testimony. Under the Frye test, when an expert relied on a scientific principle or discovery, the proponent of the expert's testimony had to prove that the principle or discovery had `gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.' Schafersman I, 262 Neb. at 222, 631 N.W.2d at 870 (2001) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923)). In Schafersman I, however, we abandoned the Frye test and, in its place, adopted the framework set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), and General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). Under the Daubert/Schafersman I framework, the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert's opinion. Carlson v. Okerstrom, 267 Neb. 397, 675 N.W.2d 89 (2004). This entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Schafersman I. In addition, it is not enough for the trial court to determine that an expert's methodology is valid in the abstract. The trial court must also determine if the witness has applied the methodology in a reliable manner. Carlson, supra . Both the Daubert/Schafersman I framework and the Frye framework seek to exclude unreliable expert testimony, but they go about this in significantly different ways. The Frye framework relies on the expert's field to weed out unreliable testimony. The focus is on whether `an asserted expertise [i]s believed valid by enough asserted experts. If enough of them [think] so  that is, if the asserted expertise enjoys general acceptance  then a court [i]s justified in concluding that the proffered testimony [i]s valid.'  Schafersman I, 262 Neb. at 229, 631 N.W.2d at 875 (quoting Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 Jurimetrics J. 229 (2000)). By contrast, under the Daubert/Schafersman I framework, the burden to weed out unreliable expert testimony is placed directly on the trial court. While general acceptance remains a valid factor to be considered, the trial court cannot piggyback its decision onto someone else's judgment. Schafersman I, 262 Neb. at 229, 631 N.W.2d at 875. The trial court must ultimately determine whether the expert has presented enough rational explanation and empirical support to justify admitting his or her opinion into evidence. Id. at 231, 631 N.W.2d at 876. In short, the Frye framework relies exclusively on the assessment of the testifying expert's field; the Daubert/Schafersman I framework relies on the trial court. We recognize that the Daubert/Schafersman I framework will frequently require trial judges to grapple with unfamiliar scientific principles. Our recent decisions involving Daubert/Schafersman I have shown that this can be a daunting task. Accord Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.1995). However, a trial court need not discover the essence of `science' each time it is confronted with expert testimony. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir.1996). Rather, the objective of the trial court's gatekeeping responsibility is to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 268 Neb. 138, 681 N.W.2d 47 (2004). The trial court's task is also eased by the Daubert/ Schafersman I framework, which recognizes a range of reasonable methods exists for distinguishing reliable expert testimony from false expertise. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, the trial court has considerable discretion in deciding what procedures to use in determining if an expert's testimony satisfies Daubert/Schafersman I . See, Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir.2003); Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State University, Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.2002), amended 319 F.3d 1073 (2003). The trial court's discretion further extends to deciding what factors are reasonable measures of reliability in each case. See, Kumho Tire Co., supra . Cf. Schafersman I, 262 Neb. at 233, 631 N.W.2d at 877 (setting out factors that might bear on gatekeeping determination but noting [t]hese factors are ... neither exclusive nor binding; different factors may prove more significant in different cases, and additional factors may prove relevant under particular circumstances). The trial court's discretion, however, is not boundless. As we have discussed, the Daubert/Schafersman I framework relies on trial courts to determine whether an expert's testimony is reliable. Once a party opposing an expert's testimony has sufficiently called into question the testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application ... the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline. (Emphasis supplied.) Schafersman I, 262 Neb. at 233, 631 N.W.2d at 877. In other words, the trial court does not have the discretion to abdicate its gatekeeping duty. See, Kumho Tire Co., supra (Scalia, J., concurring); Elsayed Mukhtar, supra ; Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir.2000). A necessary component of this rule is that a trial court, when faced with a Schafersman I objection, must adequately demonstrate by specific findings on the record that it has performed its duty as gatekeeper. Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1088. See, also, Elsayed Mukhtar, supra; 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.02[6][c] (2d ed.2004); 29 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6266 (Supp.2002). After a sufficient Daubert/Schafersman I objection has been made, the losing party is entitled to know that the trial court has engaged in the `heavy cognitive burden' of determining whether the challenged testimony was relevant and reliable, as well as a record that allows for meaningful appellate review. Schafersman I, 262 Neb. at 229, 631 N.W.2d at 875. Without specific findings or discussion on the record, it is impossible ... to determine whether the [trial] court `carefully and meticulously review[ed] the proffered scientific evidence' or simply made an off-the-cuff decision to admit expert testimony. Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1088 (quoting U.S. v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402 (10th Cir.1997)). This does not mean, however, that trial courts must `recite the Daubert standard as though it were some magical incantation.' Goebel, 215 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Ancho v. Pentek Corp., 157 F.3d 512 (7th Cir.1998)). Nor does it infringe on the discretion that the trial court has in making the Daubert/Schafersman I determination. But it does mean that the trial court must explain its choices so that the appellate court has an adequate basis to determine whether the analytical path taken by the trial court was within the range of reasonable methods for distinguishing reliable expert testimony from false expertise. Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court's Trilogy on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 29 (Federal Judicial Center 2d ed.2000). Thus, the record must include more than a recitation of the Daubert/ Schafersman I boilerplate and a conclusory statement that the challenged evidence is or is not admissible. A trial court adequately demonstrates that it has performed its gatekeeping duty when the record shows (1) the court's conclusion whether the expert's opinion is admissible and (2) the reasoning the court used to reach that conclusion, specifically noting the factors bearing on reliability that the court relied on in reaching its determination. See 29 Wright & Gold, supra. When the court fails to make these findings, it abdicates its gatekeeping function. Goebel, supra .