Opinion ID: 503753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the d.c. court of appeals' decision

Text: 5 The D.C. Court of Appeals answered our question in the negative. It stated of the wording of the insurance policy that covered Mr. Edwards: 6 We hold that such policy does not cover one who has disembarked from a common carrier, even though the person has not yet reached a zone of safety when an injury occurs. In other words, a person may complete getting off the vehicle and thus cease to be a passenger for purposes of an insurance policy such as the one at issue here, even though he or she has not yet reached a zone of safety. 7 Claree Edwards, supra, at 1191. The court distinguished the case at bar from those in which courts have adopted a broader interpretation of the concept of a passenger. It recognized that some courts have defined the term passenger to include a rider who has disembarked but not yet reached a zone of safety, and even a person hit by a train while crossing the track to reach another train due to arrive at the station. Id. at 1192. But it noted that, unlike those cases, an insurance policy existed in the instant case whose language defined the covered class with some specificity. The court was persuaded that [t]he language [of the policy] is sufficiently clear to preclude resort to the significantly broader definition of tort liability based not on the terms of each particular contract but on general principles of public policy. Id. at 1192. 8 Having dismissed the zone of safety test as inapplicable, the D.C. Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had been correct to focus its inquiry on whether Mr. Edwards had completed his departure from the bus before he fell beneath its wheels. Id. at 1192. The court noted that the term getting off will to some extent necessarily be fact-specific. Nevertheless, it provided some general guidance. Although declining to settle upon a  'general rule of interpretation ... in vacuo,'  id. (quoting Saint Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Broyles, 230 Miss. 45, 92 So.2d 252, 254 (1957)), the court stated that: 9 ... the notion of 'getting off' a vehicle includes 'all acts normally performed [ ...] under similar circumstances' by persons departing a similar vehicle and is complete when one 'has embarked upon an entirely different course of conduct.' 10 Id. (quoting Carta v. Providence Washington Indemnity Co., 143 Conn. 372, 378, 122 A.2d 734, 737 (1956); Stoddard v. AID Ins. Co. Mutual, 97 Idaho 508, 510, 547 P.2d 1113, 1115 (1976)). The court went on to state that  '[s]ome reasonable length of time must be allowed a person, after getting out, for the completion of acts which can reasonably be expected from those in similar situations. Id. at 6, quoting Carta, supra, 143 Conn. at 377, 122 A.2d at 736. Having answered the question put to it, the court declined to express an opinion on the facts of the case at bar.