Opinion ID: 2774347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Havilah’s Appeal

Text: Havilah‘s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of VLK on the malicious prosecution count because the filing of a lis pendens, or alternatively the filing of thirty-one lis pendens, satisfies the ―special injury‖ element for a claim of malicious prosecution as a matter of law. Principally, Havilah argues that the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that the filing of lis pendens without probable cause satisfies the ―special injury‖ requirement. Havilah further claims that many other jurisdictions recognize that a lawsuit for malicious prosecution can be brought based on the filing of lis pendens in bad faith. Under the District of Columbia‘s formulation of the malicious prosecution cause of action, Havilah must present evidence that: (1) the underlying suit terminated in its favor; (2) there was malice on the part of VLK in filing the underlying suit; (3) there was a lack of probable cause for the underlying suit; and (4) that it suffered a special injury as a result of the suit. See Joeckel, 793 A.2d at 1282. ―Special injury‖ is defined as an arrest, a seizure of property, or an injury ―which would not necessarily result from suits to recover for like causes of action.‖ Id. (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The last 42 definition of ―special injury‖ is at issue here.21 We have repeatedly held that, in the District of Columbia, ―injuries to reputation, emotional distress, loss of income, and substantial expense in defending‖ are outside the scope of what constitutes a ―special injury.‖ Id. (citing Mazanderan v. McGranery, 490 A.2d 180, 182 (D.C. 1984), Epps v. Vogel, 452 A.2d 320, 324 (D.C. 1982), and Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d 196, 198 (D.C. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have narrowly defined ―special injury‖ as part of this court‘s long-standing policy to ―maintain . . . free access to the courts by persons with grievances who might otherwise be restrained from seeking redress because of their fear of liability should they fail . . . .‖ Ammerman, supra, 384 A.2d at 641. The fear is that ―[o]therwise litigation would lead, not to an end of disputing, but to its beginning, and rights violated would go unredressed for fear of the danger of asserting them.‖ Melvin v. Pence, 76 U.S. App. D.C. 154, 157, 130 F.2d 423, 426 (1942). Recognizing, however, that ―some sort of balance ha[s] to be struck between the social interest in preventing unconscionable suits and in permitting honest 21 We disagree with Havilah‘s attempt to analogize a lis pendens filing with an injunction or a seizure of property because a lis pendens does not in and of itself restrict property interests. Instead, it is more appropriately characterized as simply notice to third parties of pending litigation regarding the property. See Heck, supra note 1, 941 A.2d at 1030 n.1 (―[L]is pendens is still only a notice; unlike a lien, a person obtains no new property interest through the operation of the lis pendens doctrine.‖ (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 43 assertion[s] of supposed rights[,]‖ Joeckel, supra, 793 A.2d at 1282 (quoting Soffos v. Eaton, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 306, 307, 152 F.2d 682, 683 (1945)), in certain rare instances, we have allowed malicious prosecution suits on the basis that a party has sustained an economic injury beyond what is normally incidental to like causes of action. Joeckel, supra, 793 A.2d at 1283. For example, in Soffos, the court concluded that Soffos‘ suit for malicious prosecution should not have been dismissed because the burden of being compelled to defend against ―successive unconscionable suits [for possession of real property] is not [an injury] which would necessarily result in all suits prosecuted to recover for like causes of action.‖ 80 U.S. App. D.C. at 307, 152 F.2d at 683 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court reasoned that, contrary to our general stated policy of open courts, ―[n]o one is likely to be deterred from litigating an honest claim by fear that some future jury may erroneously decide that he has brought two suits maliciously and without probable cause.‖ Id. (footnote omitted). Consequently, the court determined that in rare instances where one party consecutively sues another with malice (meaning at least twice), there is ―no good reason why the law should tolerate repeated abuse of its processes.‖ Id. 44 Likewise, in Davis v. Boyle Bros., Inc., 73 A.2d 517, 520 (D.C. 1950), the court concluded that Davis articulated an actionable malicious prosecution claim because, although there was only one suit filed, the underlying action against Davis constituted ―what might be termed one suit plus[,]‖ meaning ―[i]t involves something more than the usual suit brought maliciously and without probable cause.‖ Id. (emphasis added). Specifically, in Davis, defendant Boyle Bros. explicitly admitted to Davis that it sued the wrong person for failing to pay for merchandise purchased at its store, and promised her that the suit would be dismissed. Id. at 519-20. However, after having admitted its error, Boyle Bros., nonetheless, maintained suit against Davis and received a default judgment against her, and even attempted to have a trial on the merits after the default judgment was set aside. Id. The appeals court concluded that, under these unique ―one suit plus‖ circumstances, this default ―judgment is not an incident of an ordinary suit involved in this kind of claim.‖ Id. at 520. In contrast, any economic injuries stemming from a simple filing of lis pendens cannot accurately be described as an injury beyond what is normally incidental to like causes of action that meets our narrow definition of ―special injury.‖ This is because lis pendens are routinely filed in lawsuits involving real property interests; its primary purpose is to give third parties‘ constructive notice 45 of pending litigation. See 1st Atl. Guar. Corp. v. Tillerson, 916 A.2d 153, 157 (D.C. 2007). See, e.g., Kerns v. Kerns, 53 P.3d 1157, 1162 (Colo. 2002) (stating that the filing of lis pendens promotes ―the finality of litigation and economy of judicial resources‖ (citation omitted)). Moreover, a failure to file a notice of lis pendens in this jurisdiction actually prevents a plaintiff from later invoking its protections; namely, that a third party acquiring an interest in the property takes his or her interest subject to the parties‘ rights as finally determined by the litigation. See 1st Atl. Guar. Corp., supra, 916 A.2d at 157 (―Most jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, have enacted statutes requiring a party to record a notice that litigation affecting property is pending in order to obtain the benefits of lis pendens.‖); see also Trustee 1245 13th Street, NW No. 608 Trust v. Anderson, 905 A.2d 181, 185 (D.C. 2006) (―[T]he appellee has valid title to the property by equitable conversion, undisturbed by the foreclosure action since lis pendens was not invoked . . . .‖ (footnote omitted)). In addition, the relevant statute also broadly authorizes the filing of lis pendens for essentially any action or proceeding ―in either state or federal court in the District of Columbia, or in any other state, federal, or territorial court, affecting the title to or tenancy interest in, or asserting a mortgage, lien, security interest, or other ownership interest in real property.‖ D.C. Code § 42-1207 (a) (emphasis 46 added). In fact, we have interpreted the phrase ―other ownership interest in real property‖ to encompass even claims of equity. See Heck, supra note 1, 941 A.2d at 1029-30; see, e.g., 18A Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 666 (2013) (concluding that in a usurpation of corporate opportunity case, ―the corporation may seek an equitable forfeiture, requiring the shareholder to return any ill-gotten gains‖) (emphasis added). Consequently, unlike the extraordinary facts in Soffos and Davis, the lis pendens filed pursuant to the Maryland lawsuit, which involved real property interests, cannot be considered an injury that would ―not necessarily result from suits to recover for like causes of action.‖ For the same reason, any monetary losses suffered by Havilah stemming from VLK‘s filing of lis pendens are merely incidental economic losses. See Joeckel, supra, 793 A.2d at 1283. We have recognized that our adoption of a narrow ―special injury‖ requirement for malicious prosecution claims is the minority position. In fact, we have admitted that while we are ―aware that the majority of the states have now rejected a special injury requirement, [we have] nonetheless opted to affirm our requirement of the same, in the belief that it best promotes this jurisdiction‘s policy of encouraging free access to the courts.‖ Morowitz, supra, 423 A.2d at 198. The 47 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 677 (1979), which Havilah argues that we should embrace, follows the majority view and adopts a much broader interpretation of ―injury.‖ Specifically, that Restatement section, which encompasses the tort of malicious prosecution, explicitly states that bad actors are liable for ―any material harm that is caused to the person who is deprived of the possession of his land or other things by his inability to use them for any legitimate purpose.‖ § 677 (Emphasis added). Thus, under the Restatement‘s formulation, Havilah would not likely be barred from pursuing a malicious prosecution claim against VLK, given that the filings of lis pendens did, in some way, deprive Havilah from fully utilizing its properties for a legitimate purpose.22 However, Havilah is not the first party to ask this court to modify, broaden, or abandon our ―special injury‖ requirement. We have long ―declined prior invitations to abandon or modify the special injury rule based on the court‘s longheld belief ‗that it best promotes this jurisdiction‘s policy of encouraging free access to the courts.‘‖ Joeckel, supra, 793 A.2d at 1284. 22 In addition to the Restatement, Havilah points us to cases from Maryland and other jurisdictions — including Rhode Island, New Jersey, North Carolina, and New York — that appear to state in some fashion that a lis pendens filing may satisfy the injury component for a malicious prosecution claim. 48 Havilah‘s alternative argument, that even if one lis pendens was insufficient to constitute a special injury, the filing of thirty-one lis pendens together is so excessive that such a large number of filings should be deemed a special injury, is similarly unpersuasive. This case fails to satisfy either narrow exception to the special injury rule that this jurisdiction has previously recognized. It neither presents the ―two or more‖ malicious lawsuits scenario envisioned in Soffos, nor the ―one suit plus‖ case articulated in Davis. Although the Soffos court concluded that the ―burden of being compelled to defend successive unconscionable suits‖ constituted an injury beyond what was normally incidental to like causes of action, this court has never held that, without more, the burden of having to defend oneself against a singular suit, even if unconscionable, qualified as a special injury. 80 U.S. App. D.C. at 307, 152 F.2d at 683. As Davis makes clear, a malicious prosecution claim involving only one unconscionable suit, i.e., the ―one suit plus‖ scenario, must involve ―something more than the usual suit brought maliciously and without probable cause which ordinarily is commenced[.]‖ 73 A.2d at 520. Here, given the context of the Maryland lawsuit, which by its nature involved numerous properties in dispute, we do not believe that any of the injuries alleged, i.e., incidental economic losses stemming from multiple lis pendens filings, would be unique from similar disputes 49 involving multiple properties. Therefore, the number of lis pendens filed pursuant to this one lawsuit is not dispositive in determining special injury. To hold otherwise would be contrary to our narrow construction of ―special injury,‖ and to our policy of maintaining an open court system, since malicious prosecution claims arguably could then be brought based simply on the number of causes of action alleged in a single lawsuit. See Ammerman, supra, 384 A.2d at 641. Lastly, we also find such an argument arbitrary. As the trial court stated, ―one could not logically argue that [twenty-five] lis pendens notices could not produce a special injury if [thirty-one] could, or that the injury caused by [fifteen] notices would be less ‗special‘ in any logical way tha[n] stemming from [twentyfive], and so on down the slippery slope.‖ For all of these reasons, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the claim of malicious prosecution.