Opinion ID: 423567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Grand Jury Indictments

Text: Flomenhoft attacks his grand jury indictments on several grounds which, for reasons of clarity, this Court will discuss seriatim. a). The Requirement that a Grand Jury Be Independent and Informed. Flomenhoft contends that he was never charged by an independent and informed grand jury because the government failed to present exculpatory evidence before the first grand jury. He further contends that the government's failure to present the exculpatory evidence to the first grand jury was not cured by the subsequent submission of the exculpatory evidence to the second grand jury because the second grand jury consisted of entirely different individuals from the first grand jury, and because the government failed to call the ten live witnesses Flomenhoft requested to testify before the second grand jury. Our analysis of Flomenhoft's contentions must commence with the recognition of the unique role that the grand jury plays in the American criminal process. The purpose of the grand jury is ... to provide a fair method of instituting criminal proceedings ... Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956). Its mission is to clear the innocent, no less than to bring to trial those who may be guilty. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17, 93 S.Ct. 764, 772-773, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (footnote omitted). The grand jury serves as a check on prosecutorial power; it is ... a protector of citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 617, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). It is axiomatic, therefore, that the grand jury must be both independent and informed. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962). As Chief Justice Warren noted in Wood: 1 Historically, this body has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will.... The necessity to society of an independent and informed grand jury becomes readily apparent .... 2 370 U.S. at 390, 82 S.Ct. at 1373 (1962). To be independent and informed, the grand jury must be able to obtain all relevant evidence, since only then can its judgment truly be informed. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 573, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 1775, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976) (plurality opinion); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44, 94 S.Ct. 613, 617-618, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). Flomenhoft contends that both the first and the second grand jury operated in a factual vacuum: the first was unable to evaluate key exculpatory documents, the second, although having the documents before it, was unable to evaluate the exculpatory testimony because it consisted of entirely new individuals from the first grand jury and did not have the testimony of live witnesses before it. As such, Flomenhoft concludes neither grand jury was independent and informed. 3 This Court's careful scrutiny of the alleged exculpatory evidence, which the government failed to present to the first grand jury, causes us to echo the sentiments of trial Judge Leighton who noted ... there is a big difference between exculpatory evidence and evidence that may be impeaching in some important or unimportant respect. (Transcript of Proceedings, April 15, 1982, p. 3). Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that this exculpatory evidence meets the clearly exculpatory standard enunciated in United States v. Dorfman, 532 F.Supp. 1118, 1133 (N.D.Ill.1981) (... while prosecutors need not present to the grand jury all circumstances which might be considered exculpatory, they must present evidence which clearly negates the target's guilt.), this is not a case where the government failed to present the exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Cf. United States v. Gold, 470 F.Supp. 1336, 1352-53 (N.D.Ill.1979). All the exculpatory evidence was presented to the second grand jury. The government also informed the second grand jury of its willingness to subpoena any witnesses the second grand jury desired to hear. The second grand jury, after consideration of the evidence before it, simply determined there was no need to subpoena the other ten witnesses. 4 We hold that the district court properly upheld the grand jury indictment as independent and informed. The second grand jury had before it the entire transcript of the first grand jury as well as the alleged exculpatory evidence which had not been presented to the first grand jury. The government offered to call any necessary witnesses if the second grand jury felt their testimony would be helpful. The second grand jury independently decided that their testimony was unnecessary. 5 b). Excessive Hearsay Evidence. 6 Flomenhoft contends that the second grand jury relied upon excessive hearsay in returning the superseding indictment. Such excessive hearsay, claims Flomenhoft, deprived the second grand jury of the ability to make an independent and informed evaluation of the credibility of witnesses presented to the first grand jury. 7 We note initially that hearsay evidence is admissible before a grand jury. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (An indictment based solely on hearsay evidence is valid). Nonetheless, excessive use of hearsay evidence in a grand jury proceeding may violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1136 (2d Cir.1972) (When the framers of the Bill of Rights directed in the Fifth Amendment that 'no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,' they were not engaging in a mere verbal exercise.). The grand jury may not become a rubber stamp endorsing the wishes of a prosecutor as a result of the needless presentation of hearsay testimony in grand jury proceedings. United States v. Gallo, 394 F.Supp. 310, 314 (D.Conn.1975). 8 Flomenhoft relies principally upon Gallo, supra, as authority that this Court must dismiss the superseding indictment as based upon excessive hearsay. Our analysis of Gallo, however, indicates that it is inapposite to the facts presently before this Court. This is not a case where the prosecutor failed to inform the grand jury as to the hearsay quality of the evidence they were receiving. 394 F.Supp. at 315. Rather, the record reflects that the prosecutor carefully informed the grand jurors that the evidence they were receiving was hearsay, and that he was willing to produce the actual witnesses if the grand jury so desired. This is not a situation where the prosecutor presented the grand jury with perjured testimony. Id., or failed to supply the second grand jury with the full and complete record of the proceedings before the first grand jury. Id. The sole factor which Gallo and the present case share in common is that the second grand jury was composed of individuals different from those who had first indicted the defendants. Id. Defendant has failed to cite any authority to this court that this last factor alone merits dismissal of an indictment, and our research has failed to find any. The district court properly determined the indictment was not invalid as based upon excessive hearsay. 9 c). Duty to Create Jencks Act Statements. 10 Flomenhoft argues that the government deprived him of Jencks Act material by failing to call key witnesses before the grand juries. This same argument has been convincingly rejected in United States v. Cruz: 11 ... no part of the Jencks Act has ever been construed to require the government to develop potential Jencks Act statements so that such material can be combed in the hopes of obtaining impeaching inconsistencies. 12 (emphasis in original) 478 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir.1973).