Opinion ID: 2517971
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Board's public hearings became a de facto contested case trial-type proceeding.

Text: [¶ 12] In his appellate briefing, Gilbert states that he has never claimed he was entitled to a contested case proceeding when the Board provided a public hearing to consider his variance request. As defined in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, contested case means a proceeding ... in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing.... Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009). Procedures in contested cases are set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107 (LexisNexis 2009) and include, inter alia, the proceeding including all testimony shall be reported verbatim stenographically or by any other appropriate means determined by the agency .... § 16-3-107(p). Gilbert has not proposed that his variance request is a legal right and has cited no authority for that proposition. We observed in Snake River Venture v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, Teton Cty., 616 P.2d 744, 751 (Wyo.1980), there is no vested property right in a contemplated use of land subject to zoning. Our research indicates that no person has a legal right to a variance and they are to be granted sparingly. Whelan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norfolk, 430 Mass. 1009, 722 N.E.2d 969, 970 (2000). A zoning variance is equitable in nature and subject to the rules of equity. Cooper Bros. Inv. Co. v. Ray, 629 P.2d 796, 798 (Ok.Ct.App.1981) (citing Twist v. Kay, 434 P.2d 180, 186 (Ok. 1967)). According to Gilbert's variance request, he did not know what use he wanted to make of his parcel and simply wanted an extension of the expiration date concerning LUC-59 to have time to consider that use. He does not claim that he has a legal right to that extension. Because the Board was not determining a legal right in its proceeding concerning Gilbert's variance request, it was not conducting a contested case hearing as defined in § 16-3-101(b)(ii). [¶ 13] Although Gilbert acknowledges that he never claimed he was entitled to a contested case proceeding, and the Board notes that he never requested one, he contends that the Board's actions during its several public hearings on his variance request functioned as a constructive contested case proceeding. He asserts that the proceedings became contentious at the second hearing and that by the fourth and final hearing the Board was questioning the validity of his evidence. He maintains that the increasingly adversarial relationship between the Board and himself resulted in a de facto contested case proceeding. Because his variance request hearings resulted in a de facto contested case proceeding, he argues, the Board was required to provide a verbatim record; because no verbatim record was made, he concludes, the Board's decision denying his variance request must be reversed. Gilbert correctly observes that this Court has not addressed the issue of de facto contested case proceedings. [¶ 14] In his effort to persuade this Court to recognize this de facto contested case concept, he offers an Oregon court of appeals decision and decisions from the Supreme Court of Hawaii. In Anderson v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 95 Or.App. 676, 770 P.2d 947 (1989), the court reviewed an order of the medical examiners board revoking Anderson's license to practice medicine. Id. at 948. The board's order was based on Anderson's refusal to comply with a subpoena to attend an informal interview with the board; such refusal was grounds for revocation under Oregon statutory law. Id. Challenging this board's order, Anderson reasoned that the board had conducted a previous informal interview with her concerning the complaints about her practice methodologies; that the board's approach had become adversarial and had assumed the character of a contested case; and that the proceedings were on the verge of becoming disciplinary. Id. Under Oregon statutory law, disciplinary proceedings involving license suspension or revocation require contested case procedures. Id. at n. 1. Rejecting Anderson's de facto contested case concept, the court explained that, because the investigatory informal interview never occurred, it could not conclude that the interview would have turned out to be a disciplinary proceeding requiring contested case procedures to protect Anderson's license to practice medicine. Id. at 949. The court observed that had the nature of the informal interview turned out to be a disciplinary proceeding with the board conducting a de facto contested case and issuing a reviewable disciplinary order, Anderson could have obtained redress by assigning error to the interview proceeding. Id. Gilbert states, without adequate explanation, that his situation is quite similar to Anderson's. We fail to see the similarity. Gilbert was requesting a variance as to which he had no vested property right; Anderson had a vested property right in her medical license which could be adversely affected by the medical examiners board's disciplinary action only after a statutorily required disciplinary proceeding to which contested case procedures attached. Anderson is not authority for the broad proposition that a board's public hearings on a variance request, as to which there is no vested right, mutates into a de facto contested case proceeding when matters become contentious and adversarial with the board questioning the validity of the evidence offered by the party requesting a variance. [¶ 15] Gilbert next briefly points to In re Application of Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc., 56 Haw. 260, 535 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1975), claiming the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that a public hearing, conducted pursuant to public notice, is a `contested case' within the meaning of HRS § 91-14 (which statute, Gilbert states, sets forth judicial review of contested cases). Actually, Hawaiian Electric did not so hold, but a case cited in that opinion did, see East Diamond Head Ass'n v. Zoning Board, 52 Haw. 518, 479 P.2d 796, 799 (1971) (without explanation, the court stated [t]hat the public hearing was not a `contested case' is without merit). In East Diamond Head, the central issue was whether owners of land adjoining a parcel that had been issued a zoning variance to allow its use as a movie production location had standing to seek judicial review of the issuance of the variance following a public hearing in which the adjoining owners had participated but had not intervened. Id. at 797-98. The court held they were persons aggrieved by the zoning variance and, therefore, had standing to seek judicial review. Id. at 798. The concept of a de facto contested case is nowhere to be found in the court's opinion. Briefly returning to Hawaiian Electric, we note that it too is a standing case and not one involving a de facto contested case concept. Hawaiian Electric filed an application for a rate increase with the public utilities commission. The commission, after giving due notice, held contested case hearings on that application. 535 P.2d at 1104. A nonprofit corporation that used the utility's services and was concerned with environmental preservation and protection as well as an individual who subscribed to the utility's services sought but were denied intervention; however, they were granted participation status. Id. In that capacity, they submitted proposed cross-examination questions for adverse witnesses, presented limited testimony, discussed the case with commission staff members, and submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. After the commission made its decision in favor of the utility's rate increase and the commission staff did not file an appeal, the nonprofit corporation and the individual subscriber claimed standing to seek judicial review of the commission decision. Id. The court held they were aggrieved by the commission's action and granted them standing to appeal. Id. at 1105-06. Hawaiian Electric does not support Gilbert's position. [¶ 16] The final case that Gilbert relies on for the de facto contested case concept is Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 881 P.2d 1210 (1994). Without providing the factual and legal context of that case, Gilbert states the court there addressed the issue of public hearings becoming contested cases when they were adversarial in nature. Gilbert's statement suggests that the court approved the concept of a de facto contested case when a public hearing becomes adversarial in nature. Our review of the factual and legal context of that case causes us to conclude that such a suggestion is incorrect. Nowhere in the opinion in that case does the court mention, let alone discuss, the de facto concept. Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) applied to the Department of Health (DOH) for two authority-to-construct permits for a well field containing fourteen wells and a power plant. Id. at 1212. Under state law, DOH had discretionary authority to hold public hearings on PGV's application; however, several individuals requested contested case hearings and testified before DOH determined to grant or deny that request. Id. After the attorney general's office informed DOH that there was no legal mandate to grant a contested case hearing, DOH denied the request and later granted PGV's application for the two permits. Id. Pele Defense Fund (PDF) appealed DOH's decision to grant PGV's permits in circuit court. That court denied PGV's motion to dismiss the appeal. Id. at 1212-13. PGV appealed to the supreme court for a determination whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain PDF's appeal of DOH's decision granting PGV's permits. Id. at 1213. The supreme court found the dispositive issue to be whether PGV's interest in obtaining an authority-to-construct permit constituted a property interest such that DOH's hearing was a contested case under applicable state law. Id. at 1214. The court agreed with PGV's assertion that a contested case is required when the agency denies PGV's proposed property use; and the court noted that, as a matter of constitutional due process, an agency hearing is also required where the issuance of a permit implicating an applicant's property rights adversely affects the constitutionally protected rights of other interested persons who have followed the agency's rules governing participation in contested cases. Id. Because DOH's public hearings involved PGV's effort to have its legal rights of land in which it held an interest declared over the objections of other landowners in the area, the court found those public hearings were contested cases. Id. The court next considered whether those individuals who had requested contested case hearings had followed DOH's rules in that regard. Id. at 1215. Finding they had, the court held the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction in the case. Id. The court then turned to consider whether some of those individuals had shown they had standing to request review of DOH's decision. Id. The court found that several of the individuals who claimed PGV's proposed activities would cause potential harm of diminished property values, deterioration of air quality, odor nuisance, and possible physical injury had clearly demonstrated sufficient threatened injury in fact to establish standing. Id. at 1216. The final element of the court's analysis was whether those individuals were involved in or participated in a contested case. Id. The court concluded that certain individuals had contested before DOH whether PGV's permits should be issued and thereby had satisfied the requirement of adversary participation. Id. at 1217. Thus, those individuals who had demonstrated sufficient participation and potential injury were entitled to seek judicial review of DOH's decision. Id. at 1218. In light of our review of Pele Defense Fund, we fail to see that it supports Gilbert's assertion of a de facto contested case concept. We decline to recognize that concept in this case.