Opinion ID: 1852242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Estate

Text: ¶ 60. In the event the litigants wish to pursue a claim on behalf of the estate of the deceased, [14] such estate must, of course, be opened and administered through the chancery court. As is true in all estates administered through the chancery court, chancery approval is required for the appointment of the personal representative of the estate, whether executor, executrix, administrator or administratrix. ¶ 61. There is no general requirement under law that the personal representative obtain chancery approval to pursue the claims of the estate in the litigation. Nor is there a general requirement that counsel representing the personal representative and the estate in the litigation obtain prior chancery approval of such representation or the agreement for compensation of counsel. However, obtaining such prior approval is a widely accepted and wise practice. [15] Such prior approval will, in most instances, avoid difficulty when the chancellor is approached for an order approving the accountings and the final distribution of estate proceeds, where such payments include compensation to counsel. ¶ 62. Where a recovery is had by the estate in the litigation, the proceeds must be administered and distributed though the chancery court in the same manner as other assets of the estate, and counsel for the estate must be paid from estate proceeds or assets, upon approval of the chancery court in the same manner as other debts and obligations of the estate. ¶ 63. In the case before us, Lori, represented by David Raines, opened the estate of Huey P. Long, and obtained prior chancery approval of the Hopkins Firm's representation of the estate, including the contingency fee contract. Appropriately, the chancellor's approval of the Hopkins Firm was limited to representation of the estate and the payment of fees from estate proceeds. However, for reasons not apparent from the record before us, the estate was not named as a party in the litigation. ¶ 64. Lori appears only as Lori McKinney, Individually and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries of Huey P. Long, Deceased, and the Hopkins Firm appears in this litigation only as counsel for Lori McKinney, Individually and on behalf of all wrongful death beneficiaries of Huey P. Long, Deceased. Thus, were this litigation to proceed to conclusion in its current form, and even assuming arguendo that Lori requested and recovered damages for the estate, the Hopkins Firm would have difficulty establishing its entitlement to attorney fees from the estate since, under its contingency fee contract with the estate which was approved by the chancellor, the Hopkins Firm is required to do that which it is not doing, that is, represent the estate in the litigation. ¶ 65. We wish to point out that this opinion is not intended  and should not be read  to imply wrongful, improper or incompetent acts on the part of the trial court, the parties or their counsel. But we do wish to be understood to point out that, where a skilled and experienced trial judge such as the trial judge herein, and competent and respected lawyers such as those in this case, can serve to render litigation in such convoluted and unexplainable circumstances as those before us, no further argument seems necessary to justify our actions and pronouncement today.