Opinion ID: 4531995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State v. Wallace

Text: In State v. Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 683 S.E.2d 275 (2009), however, this Court purported to abandon the well-settled logical connection standard for analyzing Rule 404(b) objections. The defendant in Wallace was charged with CSC with a minor in the second degree for sexually assaulting his stepdaughter. 384 S.C. at 431, 683 S.E.2d at 276. The trial court permitted the State to introduce the testimony of the victim's sister that she also had been sexually assaulted by the defendant. 384 S.C. at 431-32, 683 S.E.2d at 277. The trial court admitted the testimony under the common scheme or plan exception to Rule 404(b), 384 S.C. at 432, 683 S.E.2d at 277, and the jury convicted him, 384 S.C. at 431, 683 S.E.2d at 276. The court of appeals reversed his conviction. State v. Wallace, 364 S.C. 130, 133, 611 S.E.2d 332, 333 (Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 384 S.C. 428, 683 S.E.2d 275 (2009). In an opinion written by then Chief Judge Hearn, the court of appeals review[ed] the underlying facts of Lyle in order to fully understand the common scheme or plan exception. 364 S.C. at 136, 611 S.E.2d at 335. The court also reviewed the primary cases we relied on in Lyle to formulate [t]his notion of a connection. See 364 S.C. 130, 137-39, 611 S.E.2d 332, 336-37 (discussing People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901) and People v. Romano, 82 N.Y.S. 749 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903)). The court of appeals found the sister's testimony should have been excluded because the trial court did not address any connection between the two crimes and the evidence falls far short of the threshold for the admission of a prior crime under the common scheme or plan exception. 364 S.C. at 141, 611 S.E.2d at 338. Relying on a decision of this Court, the court of appeals concluded the appellate courts of this state have refused to recognize a specific exception to the inadmissibility of prior bad act evidence in criminal sexual conduct cases. 364 S.C. at 139, 611 S.E.2d at 337 (citing State v. Nelson, 331 S.C. 1, 14 n.16, 501 S.E.2d 716, 723 n.16 (1998); State v. Tutton, 354 S.C. 319, 328, 580 S.E.2d 186, 191 (Ct. App. 2003)). Based on Nelson and Tutton, the court of appeals concluded—we now find correctly so—the trial court erred in finding the evidence fit the common scheme or plan exception simply because of the close degree of similarity. 364 S.C. at 141, 611 S.E.2d at 338. In a divided opinion, this Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the conviction. 384 S.C. at 435, 683 S.E.2d at 279. For the first time in our jurisprudence, contrary to over eighty years of interpretation of Rule 404(b) and its pre-Rules predecessor Lyle, the Court stated, A close degree of similarity establishes the required connection between the two acts and no further 'connection' must be shown for admissibility. 384 S.C. at 434, 683 S.E.2d at 278; see 384 S.C. at 436, 683 S.E.2d at 279 (Pleicones, J., dissenting) (We have repeatedly held in non-sexual offense cases that, 'the mere presence of similarity only serves to enhance the potential for prejudice,' yet under the majority's view, similarity is the touchstone of admissibility in child sexual offense cases. (citations omitted)); State v. Perez, 423 S.C. 491, 502, 816 S.E.2d 550, 556 (2018) (Hearn, J., concurring) (calling the majority opinion in Wallace a marked departure from earlier case law requiring some connection between crimes beyond mere similarity). We find this statement from—and the reasoning and holding in—our opinion in Wallace is based on a misunderstanding of Rule 404(b) and our cases interpreting it, particularly the seminal case Lyle.3 The decision in Wallace effectively created a new rule of evidence,4 and rendered meaningless the restrictive application of the common 3 In a footnote in Wallace we stated the court of appeals mis-read Lyle. 384 S.C. at 432 n.3, 683 S.E.2d at 277 n.3. The Lyle Court did note the marked similarity in technique of operation, etc., between the other Aiken forgeries and the crime charged was part of what satisfied the logical connection standard for the other Aiken crimes. 125 S.C. at 418, 118 S.E. at 808. However, the Lyle Court also held the same similarity between the Georgia forgeries and the crime charged was not a sufficient connection. We held, The mere fact that the Georgia crimes were similar in nature and parallel as to methods and technique employed in their execution does not serve to identify the defendant as the person who uttered the forged check in Aiken as charged . . . . 125 S.C. at 420, 118 S.E. at 808; see also 125 S.C. at 427, 118 S.E. at 811 (finding no such connection was shown to exist between the separate Georgia offenses and the Aiken crime and thus evidence of the Georgia crimes was not admissible merely to show plan or system). In Wallace, it was not the court of appeals that misinterpreted Lyle. We did. 4 See Wallace, 384 S.C. 428, 436, 683 S.E.2d 275, 279 (Pleicones, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's interpretation of Rule 404(b), and stating if we are to permit the admission of propensity evidence in these types of cases, then we should propose a new rule of evidence). Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 were added by Congress in 1994, and expressly permit the admission of similar crimes in scheme or plan exception that is so deeply embedded in our precedent. Concurring in Perez, Justice Hearn challenged, the Court should . . . overturn . . . State v. Wallace . . . [because it] so expanded the admissibility of prior bad acts in sexual offense cases that the exception has swallowed the rule. 423 S.C. at 501, 816 S.E.2d at 556 (Hearn, J., concurring). We now overrule Wallace.5 E. Admissibility of the Stepdaughter's Testimony The State did not offer any argument that the stepdaughter's testimony served a legitimate purpose, or that a logical connection exists between Perry's abuse of his stepdaughter and the current charges. The State simply relied on Wallace, and argued what it called substantial similarities between the two crimes outweighed any dissimilarities. Therefore, the State argued, the stepdaughter's testimony was admissible. We disagree. sexual assault and child molestation cases. See Fed. R. Evid. 413 and 414. However, unlike other states that have adopted versions of Rules 413 and 414, we chose not to adopt these rules with our Rules of Evidence in 1995. 5 In its opinion in Wallace, the court of appeals noted some of the appellate decisions appear to focus exclusively on the alleged close similarity between the other crime and the crime charged, while others look beyond mere close similarity to consider the system or connection between the two, but stated sorting out any apparent inconsistencies in the appellate decisions of this state is not the province of [the court of appeals]. 364 S.C. at 139 n.2, 611 S.E.2d at 337 n.2. While doing so is the province of this Court, we do not see the necessity of doing so. Rather than reconsidering the results of prior cases, our focus is on restoring the integrity of the Rule 404(b) analysis that this Court changed in Wallace. We do, however, single out one case: State v. Hallman, 298 S.C. 172, 379 S.E.2d 115 (1989). Hallman, which has never been meaningfully discussed by this Court, does not say no logical connection is required. In its limited analysis, however, Hallman offers no explanation of what could have been a sufficient logical connection. Rather, Hallman focuses only on similarity. 298 S.C. at 175, 379 S.E.2d at 117. Without an explanation of any logical connection, it is not possible to determine whether Hallman is distinguishable from Wallace, or from this case. Therefore, we overrule Hallman. First, Perry's sexual assault of his stepdaughter is not substantially similar to his assault of his biological children; nor are the assaults of his children even substantially similar to each other.6 Perry began sexually assaulting Daughter Two at age five to seven, his stepdaughter at age nine, and Daughter Three at age ten or eleven. He assaulted Daughter Two nearly every weekend for at least nine years until she was sixteen, his stepdaughter periodically over four years until she was thirteen, and Daughter Three five times within an approximate one-year period ending before she turned twelve. He began sexually assaulting Daughter Two in his own bedroom while she was watching television. He began sexually assaulting the stepdaughter and Daughter Three in their bedrooms while they were sleeping. He first assaulted his stepdaughter with digital penetration, committed oral sexual assault on her once,7 and—according to the solicitor who tried the case— progress[ed] on into actual vaginal/penile penetration. However, there is no evidence of penile penetration with his biological daughters. Perry did commit oral sexual assault on Daughter Two, but not on Daughter Three. He generally used physical restraint against Daughter Two, but did not use any physical force against his stepdaughter or Daughter Three. Finally, he threatened his stepdaughter with 6 The State made a strategic choice to try the crimes against Daughters Two and Three together. This was permissible because the test for whether the State may do this does not focus on similarity. See State v. Harris, 351 S.C. 643, 652, 572 S.E.2d 267, 272 (2002) (listing four considerations for a trial court in deciding whether to try separate crimes in a joint trial). This choice created problems, however, for the State's Rule 404(b) argument. The State's reliance only on similarity to support admission of the stepdaughter's testimony under Rule 404(b) forces the State—and this Court—to examine the lack of similarity between the charged crimes. If the charged crimes are not substantially similar to each other, then Perry's crimes against his stepdaughter can have a close degree of similarity to only one of them. Though dissimilarities between charged crimes are not integral to the joinder analysis, the State's choice to try them together made their dissimilarity directly related to the Rule 404(b) analysis. 7 Although not specifically discussed in her pre-trial testimony, the stepdaughter testified during trial Perry committed oral sexual assault on her on one occasion. violence against her family if she disclosed what he had done,8 but neither of his biological daughters testified he threatened any violence. The State argues the children's ages were similar because all of the abuse began when the victims were at a pre-pubescent age. This is a clever attempt to make dissimilarities sound similar, but assaulting one child beginning at age five to seven and another at age ten or eleven is not a similarity. Perry began assaulting the stepdaughter at age nine, which is not similar to age five. Age nine may be similar to ten, but in terms of the age at which a sexual predator begins sexually assaulting a daughter, ages nine and seven hardly seem to show a close degree of similarity. The State also argues the location where the sexual assaults occurred is similar because the sexual abuse occurred within the home. We find this is too general to be considered a meaningful similarity. The fact Perry began assaulting one child in the father's bedroom and the other children in their own bedrooms is not a similarity. Finally, Perry assaulted his stepdaughter while bathing her in the bathtub, but there is no allegation he did that with his biological daughters. Certainly, there are similarities. In addition to the general similarities discussed above, the State emphasized the specific similarity that Perry was the only father figure in the lives of each victim. There is nothing in this record, however, that amounts to a close degree of similarity, as Wallace purports to permit. Wallace, 384 S.C. at 434, 683 S.E.2d at 278. We make one final point regarding similarity. Referring to a statement we made in Lyle, the State argues the defendant . . . had a monopoly on the methods and means in committing sexual abuse against these children because he was the father figure in the home. See Lyle, 125 S.C. at 420-21, 118 S.E. at 808 (stating, There is nothing to indicate that the defendant held any monopoly of the methods and means used in passing the forged checks in Georgia, or that they were unique in the annals of crime.). The statement from Lyle does not help the State. We made the statement in a passage in which we explained that the required connection cannot be made from mere naked similarity of the crime. 125 S.C. at 421, 118 S.E. at 808. Our 8 The stepdaughter testified at the pre-trial hearing, I was told my mom would not believe me and if I said anything he would make me out to be a liar and then he would hurt my family. Threatening physical violence—as testified to by the stepdaughter—is quite different from telling Daughters Two and Three they would get in trouble and be taken away from their mother. point was that if a defendant did hold a monopoly on the method used, or if the methods and means were truly unique, then—in contrast to the Georgia crimes in Lyle—a good argument could be made that the connection is sufficient. Like the Georgia crimes in Lyle, however, Perry's methods and means are not unique. Rather, in our significant collective experience dealing with crimes of this nature, a very high percentage of sexual crimes against children are committed just like Perry's alleged crimes: by father figures, in the home, in a bedroom, beginning in the pre-pubescent years. The fact Perry's crimes fit this general pattern does not give Perry a monopoly on his criminal method. Second, the stepdaughter's testimony must serve some legitimate purpose beyond propensity. At oral argument, the State correctly argued, A piece of evidence can appear to be propensity, but it can also have a proper purpose and be admissible. In support, the State cited State v. Benton, 338 S.C. 151, 526 S.E.2d 228 (2000), in which we addressed the admissibility of other burglary convictions to prove an element of first degree burglary. 338 S.C. at 153-54, 526 S.E.2d at 229. Recognizing the inherent tendency of evidence of other crimes to show propensity, we stated, Propensity evidence is admissible if offered for some purpose other than to show the accused is a bad person or he acted in conformity with his prior convictions. 338 S.C. at 156, 526 S.E.2d at 230. The legitimate purpose for which the State offered the other burglary convictions in Benton was to prove a statutory element of the current first degree burglary charge. Id. We specifically noted the State did not offer the convictions for the improper purpose—propensity. We stated the State's purpose was not to suggest appellant was a bad person or committed the present burglary because he had committed prior burglaries. Id. In this case, however, the State has never suggested there is any legitimate purpose for the stepdaughter's testimony. At trial, the State did not identify any fact in the crimes charged that was made more or less likely to be true by the testimony of the stepdaughter. At oral argument, the Court pressed the State to explain how the stepdaughter's testimony helped the jury to understand the current charges. The State had no answer, instead contending only the crimes were similar under Wallace. As we explained earlier, part of the task of this Court on appeal in this case is to determine whether the stepdaughter's testimony has sufficient probative force for serving a legitimate purpose. Under Rule 403, the danger of the evidence being used only for the improper purpose of propensity must not substantially outweigh the probative value of any legitimate use. With no fact in issue in the crimes charged that is made more or less likely by the stepdaughter's testimony—other than he did it—the probative force lies only in the use of the testimony to prove character, and from that character to prove he acted in accordance. In other words, the stepdaughter's testimony served only one purpose—propensity. It is not enough to meet the logical connection standard for admission of other crimes under the common scheme or plan exception to Rule 404(b) that the defendant previously committed the same crime. Repetition of the same act or same crime does not equal a 'plan.' Perez, 423 S.C. at 502, 816 S.E.2d at 556 (Hearn, J., concurring) (quoting Daggett v. State, 187 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). When evidence of other crimes is admitted based solely on the similarity of a previous crime, the evidence serves only the purpose prohibited by Rule 404(b), and allows the jury to convict the defendant on the improper inference of propensity that because he did it before, he must have done it again. See United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1331 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing the district court's admission into evidence of similar forgery crimes because they would, at best, merely demonstrate the repetition of similar criminal acts, thus indicating [the defendant]'s propensity to commit this crime. Evidence of other crimes is not admissible for this purpose). Quoting Justice Hearn one final time from her concurrence in Perez, the repeated commission of the same criminal offense [is] offered obliquely to show bad character and conduct in conformity with that bad character. 423 S.C. at 502, 816 S.E.2d at 556 (Hearn, J., concurring) (quoting Daggett, 187 S.W.3d at 452). The common scheme or plan exception demands more. There must be something in the defendant's criminal process that logically connects the other crimes to the crime charged. For example, in McClellan, we upheld the admission into evidence of other crimes under the common scheme or plan exception because the State proved the defendant used the same particularly unique method of committing two uncharged crimes that he used to commit the charged crime. We explained, All three daughters testified concerning the pattern of this and prior attacks. According to them, these attacks commenced about their twelfth birthday, at which time Appellant began entering their bedroom late at night, waking them, and taking one of them to his bedroom. There he would explain the Biblical verse that children are to Honor thy Father, and would also indicate he was teaching them how to be with their husbands. The method of attack was common to all three daughters. 283 S.C. at 391, 323 S.E.2d at 773. The defendant in McClellan developed a particularized plan for sexually assaulting his children through which he invoked the Bible, placed a duty on the children to honor him, and placed himself in the role of teaching them to submit to sexual violence. The fact he carried out his plan in its unique detail when assaulting all three children warranted the admission of the uncharged crimes into evidence. The evidence had a logical connection to whether a crime was committed and to who committed it. We emphasize today that McClellan represents the proper application of Rule 404(b) and remains good law. We provide two other examples of the proper use of the common scheme or plan exception with our opinions today in State v. Durant, Op. No. 27964 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed May 6, 2020) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 18 at 64), and State v. Cotton, Op. No. 27965 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed May 6, 2020) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 18 at 75). In Durant, the defendant was charged with CSC in the second degree for sexually assaulting a young girl at the church where the defendant served as pastor. The State offered into evidence the testimony of three other girls the defendant sexually assaulted as evidence of a common scheme or plan. We affirmed the trial court's admission of the other crimes because the defendant used a particularly unique method of committing his attacks and that method was common to all the girls. We noted there were differences between the crimes, but relying on our opinion in this case, refused to engage in a mathematical exercise where the number of similarities and dissimilarities are counted. Rather, we relied on the fact the method of his attack was more than just similar, it was unique, and because of its uniqueness 'reasonably tended to prove a material fact in issue.' Durant, (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 18 at 64, 68) (quoting Lyle, 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807). As to the particular facts supporting the use of the common scheme or plan exception, we explained, Durant exercised his position of trust, authority, and spiritual leadership to hold private prayer meetings with teen girls who had grown up in his church. He told them he was praying for their health and good fortune, and represented that part of this process was touching them sexually and having intercourse. Durant then warned the girls of misfortune if they refused or told anyone. Moreover, he used scripture as a means of grooming the children into performing sex acts . . . . Indeed, the trial court noted it was one of the more compelling cases of common scheme or plan evidence it has ever seen. Durant, (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 18 at 64, 69). In Cotton, the defendant was charged with CSC in the first degree and kidnapping. The State offered into evidence the testimony of another victim who testified the defendant committed a remarkably similar sexual assault and kidnapping against her seven months earlier. We affirmed the admission of the evidence under the common scheme or plan exception. The similarities between the two incidents were extensive. The trial court discussed these similarities at length in its pre-trial ruling. But the other crimes evidence in Cotton had more than just similarity. As the State argued in its brief in that case, Even if the similarities alone are not sufficient for admission of the testimony, the testimony clearly establishes a logical relevance to the underlying crime. Brief for Resp't at 18, State v. Cotton, (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 18 at 75). The State went on to explain its theory of a logical connection to a specific, disputed fact.9 In addition, the trial court in Cotton conducted an extensive, on-the-record analysis of the balance between the unfair prejudice that would result from the evidence against the probative value in the logical connection. Using the new framework set forth in [this case], we [found] the admission of the second victim's testimony satisfied the requirements of Rules 404(b) and 403, SCRE, and we affirmed. Cotton, (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 18 at 75, 77).