Opinion ID: 146638
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure To Adequately Cross-Examine Tagaban

Text: Next, Munoz argues that Bergmann was ineffective in failing to adequately cross-examine Tagaban (or, technically speaking, to adequately re -cross him) regarding the statement he gave to Delaney and Frizzell upon his arrest. At the start of Tagaban's direct examination, the government introduced Tagaban's favorable plea agreement and questioned him about it, presumably to draw the sting of Bergmann's inevitable attempt to impeach Tagaban on that basis. Sure enough, Bergmann then cross-examined Tagaban at length regarding the plea agreement, including the fact that Tagaban had two prior felony convictions and would therefore receive a 20-year minimum sentence but for his cooperation with the government. Bergmann's cross-examination culminated with this exchange, clearly suggesting that Tagaban had a motive to lie: Q. All right. If you do all these things, if you testify, if youyou have to provide substantial assistance in the prosecution. . . then you're hoping that the government will recommend a downward departure, right, on your sentencing? A. Yes sir.    Q. You . . . hope that you don't have to do 20 years? A. No, no, sir. Q. So a lot today depends on your testimony. Is that right? A. I guess so, sir. On redirect, the government attempted to rehabilitate Tagaban by pointing to a contemporaneous statement he had given to Delaney and Frizzell before he entered into the plea agreement, presumably to show that Tagaban had made prior statements consistent with his trial testimony before he had a motive to lie: Q. You were arrested on July 27, correct?. . . What you said to [the officers] that day, before you ever had a plea agreement with the government, was that pretty much what you said here today?    A. Well, I told them what [Munoz] had done, but I didn't go into any specific detail. Q. I see. But you did say that Munoz had taken Fed Ex packages for you, didn't you? A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Q. You said that he'd done it on two occasions, correct? A. Correct. Bergmann then performed a brief re-cross, during which he elicited from Tagaban that he had cooperated from the beginning even before the plea agreement was signedbecause, even then, he hoped for some consideration on [his] sentence. In other words, Bergmann undercut the government's attempt to rehabilitate Tagaban by prior consistent statement by pointing out that Tagaban already had a motive to lie at the time he made that earlier statement. Munoz argues that Bergmann was ineffective because he failed to highlight on re-cross that Tagaban's prior consistent statement to Delaney and Frizzelli.e., that Munoz had taken the Fed Ex packages for [Tagaban]said nothing about whether Munoz knew that the packages contained drugs. In other words, the supposed prior consistent statement actually neither supported nor contradicted the most critical part of Tagaban's trial testimony. Accordingly, it did not truly show that Tagaban was telling the same story before he had a motive to lie. While a shrewd cross-examiner might have pointed this out, Bergmann's failure to do so did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. After skillfully impeaching Tagaban, Bergmann did undermine the government's attempt to rehabilitate him, albeit on a different basis: the fact that Tagaban's motive to lie preceded the prior consistent statement. That Bergmann did not spot, or did not choose to emphasize, every basis for undermining the rehabilitation of Tagaban does not render his re-cross constitutionally ineffective. [17] [T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect litigation. Baze v. Parker, 371 F.3d 310, 320 (6th Cir.2004). [18]