Opinion ID: 1314019
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vindictiveness.

Text: If the trial court determines in the proper exercise of its discretion that it cannot achieve the rehabilitative goals of probation without imposing an objectionable condition, then it will be fully justified in denying probation on that basis if the defendant declines to accept it. On rare occasion, however, the trial court may respond to a defendant's valid objection by improperly refusing to grant probation on the remaining, adequate terms and conditions. With all due respect for the integrity of bench officers, the reality is that on occasion a defendant's invocation of constitutional rights may impair judicial objectivity. (Cf. People v. Morales (1967) 252 Cal. App.2d 537, 546 [60 Cal. Rptr. 671] [trial court abused discretion in imposing more severe sentence because defendant availed himself of right to trial]; People v. Miller (1931) 112 Cal. App. 535, 539 [297 P. 40] [abuse of discretion in denying probation because defendant invoked right to jury trial].) Without necessarily anticipating impropriety, I think it salutary nevertheless to sound a cautionary note that any appearance of vindictiveness in this context is subject to scrutiny; and reviewing courts should not be reluctant to fashion appropriate remedies when warranted. (Cf. People v. Thornton (1971) 14 Cal. App.3d 324, 326-327 [92 Cal. Rptr. 327] [absent new facts, abuse of discretion to impose prison term on retrial if defendant originally granted probation; North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 726 [23 L.Ed.2d 656, 670, 89 S.Ct. 2072] [more severe sentence on retrial following successful appeal must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding].)