Opinion ID: 70556
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Calculation of the Upward Departure

Text: 16 Determining whether an upward departure under U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3 is calculated by going horizontally across or vertically down the sentencing table requires an interpretation of the Guidelines. It is therefore a legal question subject to de novo review. See United States v. Dukovich, 11 F.3d 140, 141 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2112, 128 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994). 17 Section 4A1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines authorizes a departure when the criminal history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3, p.s. Although Sec. 4A1.3 expressly contemplates departures beyond criminal history category VI (the highest category on the sentencing table), there was once little guidance on how to calculate a departure above category VI. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3 (Nov. 1991). In 1992, Sec. 4A1.3 was amended to explain that departures beyond category VI are calculated by moving vertically down from category VI by increasing offense levels. 5 18 At Maurice's sentencing hearing, the probation officer suggested that a departure under Sec. 4A1.3 could be calculated by adding 17 additional criminal history points to the appellant's score, placing him into what she called a criminal history category of VIII. (R. 2 at 98.) The probation officer further explained to the court that the departure was calculated by beginning at offense level 13, criminal history category II, then moving horizontally across four columns to category VI, then moving vertically down two offense levels to level 15. (R. 2 at 98-99); see U.S.S.G. Sec. 5A. This process resulted in a sentence range of 41-51 months. The court adopted the suggested departure. Id. Appellant argues that the district court erred by moving horizontally across the sentencing table rather than vertically down and by creating a criminal history category that does not exist. 19 The record is clear that the district court used the method suggested in the policy statement in calculating the departure. The calculation explained by the probation officer and adopted by the court follows the procedure described in Sec. 4A1.3. Appellant's argument that the court used a flawed procedure to calculate the guideline range is without merit. 20 Because Maurice waived his remaining arguments by failing to raise them in the district court, we review them only for plain error. Appellant argues that the court failed to consider the nature as well as the number of his prior offenses. When departing above criminal history category VI pursuant to Sec. 4A1.3, the policy statement indicates that the court should consider that the nature of the prior offenses rather than simply their number is often more indicative of the seriousness of the defendant's criminal record. At the sentencing hearing, the judge stated that the appellant has been, throughout most of his life at least, bound upon a course of deceit and fraud. (R. 2 at 99.) This statement reflects that the court did consider the nature of appellant's prior offenses. There is no error here, plain or otherwise. 6 21 Maurice also argues that the departure was unreasonable because the district court failed to consider intervening criminal history categories and offense levels. When departing upward under Sec. 4A1.3, the sentencing court generally is required to compare the defendant to other defendants in the next highest criminal history category until an appropriate category is reached. 7 However, where a sentencing court selects a higher criminal history category under Sec. 4A1.3 by adding point totals for remote convictions, we have held that an explanation of this calculation serves as an adequate explanation for the inappropriateness of the intervening criminal history categories. See United States v. Brown, 51 F.3d 233, 234 (11th Cir.1995). Because the departure in this case was calculated in the same manner as the departure in Brown, 51 F.3d 233, and that calculation was explained at the hearing, the district court adequately explained the departure from category II to category VI. Appellant also argues that the district court failed to consider the next offense level when departing above criminal history category VI. Before the 1992 amendment to Sec. 4A1.3, the district court was not required to conduct such a step-by-step inquiry when departing above criminal history category VI. United States v. Simmons, 924 F.2d 187, 191 (11th Cir.1991). Arguably, under United States v. Brown, 9 F.3d 907, 913 (11th Cir.1993), the rule in Simmons is unchanged by the 1992 amendment. However, it is unclear whether Brown applied Sec. 4A1.3 as amended in 1992. 8 We do not decide the question because we find the departure above category VI reasonable, which forecloses any possibility of plain error.