Opinion ID: 1389370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the law applicable to this appeal

Text: Appellants set forth several contentions which they urge have the effect of removing their claims from the worker's compensation law. The Appellants' Contentions The appellants contend that the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act does not provide absolute immunity to an employer for intentional torts of assault and battery and intentional outrageous conduct inflicting emotional distress committed by a supervisory agent of the employer because: 1. An intentional act of assault and battery or obscene conduct is not an `accident' for which Worker's Compensation benefits are provided. 2. Mental anxiety is not an `injury' for which benefits are provided under the Act. 3. The injuries to appellants resulting from the tortious acts of the managing agent of appellee, Wendy's of Montana, Inc., while occurring `in the course of' employment did not `arise out of' the employment from the standpoint of the statutory definitions. The single issue for our decision in this appeal is: Was the claimed harm  i.e., assault and battery to the persons of the appellants and intentional infliction of emotional distress  a covered injury within the contemplation of the Worker's Compensation Act? If the appellants' allegations of harm constitute injury as conceived by the Act, and if it was inflicted when the appellants were within the scope of their employment, there cannot be an independent right of action against Wendy's because that company is the contributing employer of the appellants and would therefore be absolutely immune from suit. [2] The test for determining whether the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act operate to prevent actions against covered employers for intentional acts of employees is whether or not the claimed injury would be compensable under the Act. In determining whether the workmen's compensation statute in general and the exlusivity provision in particular preclude an employee from bringing an action at law against his employer for fraud, defamation, false imprisonment or the like, most courts have inquired whether the injury complained of is one which was compensable under the Compensation Act. Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1279, 1282. Assuming this to be the test for deciding whether the worker's compensation statute, § 27-12-103, provides the workers with an exclusive remedy under the facts of this case, it becomes necessary to determine whether the kinds of injuries which are claimed by the appellants would be compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act.