Opinion ID: 2225450
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental State for Second Degree Murder

Text: Prior to the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1961, a conviction for murder required proof that the killing was committed with malice aforethought. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, ch. 38, par. 358 (Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, in the peace of the people, with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied).) Manslaughter was previously defined as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, express or implied, and without any mixture of deliberation whatever. (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev. Stat.1959, ch. 38, par. 361.) Because the term malice aforethought was not susceptible to clear definition, the legislature eliminated any reference to it in the definition of murder in the new criminal code. (Ill.Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 9-1, Committee Comments1961, at 17 (Smith-Hurd 1979).) By eliminating the requirement of malice, the drafters of the new code removed the element that distinguished the crimes of murder and voluntary manslaughter. Following the enactment of the Criminal Code of 1961, murder was defined in the following manner: A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or (2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary manslaughter. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1. Likewise, voluntary manslaughter was no longer described simply as a killing without malice aforethought. Instead, the offense of voluntary manslaughter was defined as follows: (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion   .       (b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing    but his belief is unreasonable. (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-2. Thus, the unreasonable use of force form of voluntary manslaughter as set forth in section (b) required the same mental state as that required for murder, i.e., that the killing be intentional and knowing. Therefore, voluntary manslaughter was transformed from murder minus malice to murder plus mitigation. The presence of one of the mitigating factors did not negate an element of murder. Rather, it simply reduced the seriousness of the offense and the severity of punishment. Compare Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1) (the penalty for first degree murder shall be not less than 20 years nor more than 60 years), with Ill.Rev. Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(4) (the penalty for second degree murder, a Class 1 felony, shall be not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years). In People v. Wright (1986), 111 Ill.2d 18, 94 Ill.Dec. 726, 488 N.E.2d 973, this court clarified that the mental state for murder was identical to that of voluntary manslaughter. This court expressed that: The definition of voluntary manslaughter in our criminal code does not contain language distinguishing it from murder in regard to the defendant's intention or mental state. Voluntary manslaughter is in relevant part defined simply as criminal homicide committed by one `acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation' or acting in the mistaken belief that self-defense justified the use of deadly force. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 9-2.) There cannot be a judgment of voluntary manslaughter in the absence of one of these mitigating factors. Thus, murder cannot be reduced to manslaughter unless one of the two statutory conditions is present. (Emphasis added.) Wright, 111 Ill.2d at 28-29, 94 Ill.Dec. 726, 488 N.E.2d 973. In holding that the mental states required for murder and voluntary manslaughter were indistinguishable, this court, sub silentio, overruled its ruling of the prior year in People v. Hoffer (1985), 106 Ill.2d 186, 88 Ill.Dec. 20, 478 N.E.2d 335. In Hoffer, the court held that the mental states for murder and voluntary manslaughter were mutually inconsistent. ( Hoffer, 106 Ill.2d at 194-95, 88 Ill.Dec. 20, 478 N.E.2d 335.) At this time, we reaffirm this court's holding in Wright that the mental states required for voluntary manslaughter, now known as second degree murder, are identical to that required for first degree murder. Illinois law recognizes only the following four mental states: intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars. 4-3 through 4-7.) Murder and second degree murder each require the same mental state: either intent or knowledge. (See People v. Allen (1992), 153 Ill.2d 145, 150-51, 180 Ill. Dec. 72, 606 N.E.2d 1149 (It is the presence of    statutory mitigating factors that reduces an unlawful homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter or second degree murder; it is not the absence of an intent to kill); People v. Fausz (1983), 95 Ill.2d 535, 539, 70 Ill.Dec. 204, 449 N.E.2d 78.) Moreover, second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of murder. Section 2-9 of the Criminal Code of 1961 defines an included offense in pertinent part as an offense that [i]s established by    a less culpable mental state. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 2-9(a).) Having determined that the mental states for murder and second degree murder are identical, it is evident that second degree murder is not a lesser included offense of first degree murder. Rather, second degree murder is more accurately described as a lesser mitigated offense of first degree murder. See People v. Newbern (1991), 219 Ill.App.3d 333, 161 Ill.Dec. 912, 579 N.E.2d 583 (second degree murder is a lesser offense because its penalties upon conviction are lesser, and it is a mitigated offense because it is first degree murder plus defendant's proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a mitigating factor is present). We recognize that there have been decisions of this court that have not been exacting in the phraseology used to describe the mitigating factors of voluntary manslaughter and second degree murder. For instance, the mitigating factors of serious provocation or unreasonable belief in justification have been improperly referred to as mental states    of lesser culpability ( Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 195, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141) or mitigating mental states ( People v. Flowers (1990), 138 Ill.2d 218, 241, 149 Ill. Dec. 304, 561 N.E.2d 674). Such terminology is inconsistent with our decision today, and should therefore no longer be followed.