Opinion ID: 194980
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suspect Class Based on Social Condition.

Text: 14 The equal protection clause of the Puerto Rico Constitution, eclectically patterned on such works as the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, is more liberally phrased than its federal counterpart. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) (state constitution may afford more, but not less, protection than Federal Constitution). Specifically, Article II, section 1, of the Commonwealth constitution bans discrimination based on social origin or condition. See supra note 4. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has held that any statutory classification that discriminates on the basis of a human dignity standard enumerated in Article II, section 1, is inherently suspect. See, e.g., Leon Rosario v. Torres, 109 P.R. Dec. 804, 813-14 (1980). Thus, although its precise contours remain undefined, poverty is considered a suspect classification under the Commonwealth constitution, triggering strict scrutiny analysis unobtainable under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Compare, e.g., Molina v. Urban Renewal and Hous. Corp., 114 P.R. Dec. 295, 312 (1983) (summarizing history of Puerto Rico's constitutional convention, noting that there can be no doubt that the drafters of our Constitution thought it was basic that there be no discrimination against any person by reason of the person's poverty ... and any classification based on this should be regarded with suspicion and be strictly scrutinized) (Irizarry, J., concurring), with, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2691, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980) ([P]overty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification.). 15 Notwithstanding the unique history, culture and legal traditions of Puerto Rico, and the absence of a federal lodestar for a constitutional classification based on poverty, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (noting that, unlike race or gender, the class of disadvantaged 'poor' cannot be identified or defined in customary equal protection terms), we are confident that Nieves would not prevail on her claim under existing Commonwealth law. The claim falters on evidentiary grounds in that the summary judgment record is plainly deficient to enable a determination that the immunity scheme established by section 4105 operates to discriminate on the basis of a suspect classification. 16 Nieves does not contend that section 4105 discriminates--either on its face or as applied--against poor patients. Nor is it self-evident that patients utilizing public health services in Puerto Rico--a facially neutral statutory classification--are all, or even primarily, poor. In addition, since section 4105 merely provides a defense which may be invoked by private civil litigants, i.e., public health service doctors, against any patient allegedly injured as a result of medical malpractice by a public health service physician, Nieves cannot demonstrate that the Commonwealth has applied the statute selectively against only that subset of public health service patients who are poor. Rather, Nieves' only colorable argument is that section 4105 has the actual effect of discriminating against poor people because a disproportionate share of public health services in Puerto Rico is administered to the poor. Given this position, we think that Nieves' proposed showing would not establish unlawful discrimination under existing Puerto Rico judicial authority. 17 As a preliminary matter, we note that Nieves' claim of disparate impact rests on a fragile foundation. The data are presented in the form of a lawyer's assertions, 8 rather than in the form required by Rule 56(e), 9 and are much less compelling and probative than Nieves' counsel claims. 10 Nonetheless, we assume, for present purposes only, that many of the users of Puerto Rico public health services are likely to be poorer than the average population. Still, we are not persuaded that the Puerto Rico courts would find that such a showing was a dispositive basis from which to declare section 4105 unconstitutional. 18 In addition to raw statistical data of disproportionate impact, we think the Commonwealth courts would require evidence (e.g., historical patterns of discrimination against the targeted class, or pre-enactment legislative history) that the Puerto Rico legislature enacted section 4105 with an invidious discriminatory purpose or intent against the poor as a class. Cf., e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2295-97, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (upholding gender-neutral state statute that gave civil service employment preference to veterans, even though preferred class was proven to be 98% male, absent proof that Legislature enacted it because of, rather than in spite of its adverse effects on women); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (upholding testing for police officer applicants, despite statistical evidence that test had disproportionate adverse impact on black applicants, absent other evidence of racially discriminatory purpose of legislative enactment). Nieves proffered no such evidence of discriminatory purpose. In fact, section 4105's legislative history suggests that the Legislature was animated by far more beneficent motives--concern that inflationary malpractice insurance premiums would dry up the supply of physicians willing to practice in public health services, depriving many Puerto Rican families of quality health care. See generally Enriquez Perez, 108 P.R. Dec. at 677-80. 19 Given this shortfall, we simply lack a reliable evidentiary base from which to appraise whether section 4105 discriminates against the alleged suspect classification under Commonwealth law. 11 20