Opinion ID: 382219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: scope and manner of judicial review

Text: 25 Appellants' complaint sought two alternative remedies: the first was a judgment against appellees ordering that Blue Cross's hearing officer award to appellants reimbursable costs as calculated in appellants' cost reports; the second was a remand to the Secretary with instructions to modify provider-reimbursement appeal procedures in order to cure alleged deprivations of due process. Since any award rendered by Blue Cross's hearing officer would ultimately be paid out of the Medicare trust fund, the first remedy sought by appellants was in essence a money judgment against the United States. The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction of claims against the United States whenever, as in this case, the amount claimed exceeds $10,000, and the claim does not sound in tort. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491 & 1346 (1976); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1036 (Ct.Cl.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009, 98 S.Ct. 718, 54 L.Ed.2d 751 (1978). The exclusiveness 4 of the Court of Claims's jurisdiction may not be defeated by couching a prayer for a money judgment in terms of a request for injunctive or declaratory relief. E. g., Hoopa Valley Tribe v. United States, 596 F.2d 435, 436 (Ct.Cl.1979). Thus insofar as appellants seek a money judgment, their cause belongs in the Court of Claims. As noted above, this is not an effect of § 405(h), which is inapplicable to the present case; rather, the district court simply lacks jurisdiction of appellants' claim for money owed by the federal government. 26 Appellants' constitutional claims, however, are cognizable by the district court; here § 1331 provides jurisdiction where no specific statutory avenue to judicial review is open. See St. Louis Univ., supra, 537 F.2d at 291-293. Sensitive to the problems raised by blocking all paths to review of constitutional claims, yet loath to ignore § 405(h), the district judge assumed arguendo that her court had jurisdiction to consider appellants' constitutional claims. She concluded in dicta that these claims were without merit. Without passing on the validity of the district court's conclusions, we must note that the practice of assuming jurisdiction arguendo cannot provide a meaningful review of constitutional claims. 27 Appellees argue that appellants have waived their opportunity to challenge the Secretary's delegation of quasi-judicial power to Blue Cross; it is true that appellants chose to be paid through a fiscal intermediary rather than by the Secretary or his subordinates. It is true also that appellants knew that a Blue Cross Appeals Board would initially handle any objections appellants might make to the reimbursements set by Blue Cross; but there is no evidence that appellants were aware that the Secretary would not review the Blue Cross Appeals Board's decision. 28 In 1970 the Medicare Act provided that the determinations made by the fiscal intermediary would be (subject) to such review by the Secretary as may be provided for by the agreement (between the Secretary and the intermediary) .... 42 U.S.C. § 1395h(a) (1970). It carries this language too far to say that the Secretary could have entered into an agreement precluding all review of a fiscal intermediary's decisions. St. Louis Univ., supra, 537 F.2d at 293. Our attention has not been directed to any evidence (other than this statutory language) that appellants chose Blue Cross as the final arbiter of appellants' reimbursement disputes. Thus no waiver of the right to challenge the finality of BCA's decision can be inferred. 29 The district court thought it pointless to require the Secretary to review the fiscal intermediary's decision, since most 5 of appellants' objections to Blue Cross's award were grounded on the Constitution, and claims based directly on the Constitution are generally considered to be beyond the competence of administrative agencies. It is true, of course, that the Secretary's constitutional interpretation would not be authoritative, but that does not mean that the Secretary should be or would be required to affirm an administrative decision which was in his opinion constitutionally infirm. Moreover, the Secretary might have reversed the Blue Cross Board on purely statutory grounds, rendering constitutional questions moot. Cf. Salfi, supra, 422 U.S. at 762, 95 S.Ct. at 2465 (Requiring a final determination of Social Security eligibility by the Secretary is manifestly reasonable, since is assures the Secretary the opportunity prior to constitutional litigation to ascertain, for example, that the particular claims involved are neither invalid for other reasons nor allowable under other provisions of the Social Security Act.).