Opinion ID: 779947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Response to Dissenting Opinion

Text: 57 Our dissenting colleagues' opinion makes two basic points repeatedly: (1) although the new evidence might convince some, or even most, reasonable jurors that Paul House is actually innocent (page 23), some juror might still conclude, even in light of the new evidence, that Paul House should be executed, and (2) the certification of questions to the Tennessee Supreme Court is merely a novel diversionary process that will delay House's execution. 58 With respect to the first point, our dissenting colleagues misunderstand Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). In that case, the Court rejected the old narrow standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992), in actual innocence cases like this one presenting new evidence. That is why Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia dissented. Our dissenting colleagues in this case would apply the old standard of the sufficiency of the evidence at trial to new evidence that indicates that the capital defendant may be legally innocent. 59 In Schlup, it turned out that the Court's reversal saved Schlup's life. He was found to be innocent of the crime. Had the Court followed the standard proposed by our dissenting colleagues, the Eighth Circuit would have been affirmed, there would have been no delay to review the new evidence and Schlup would have been executed. For a description of Lloyd Schlup's case and the cases of numerous other condemned prisoners, whose convictions were set aside after numerous levels of trial and appellate review were exhausted, see James S. Liebman, et al., A Broken System, Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It, 24-35 & notes 128-132 (Feb. 11, 2002). 60 The question is not, as our dissenting colleagues seem to believe, whether the trial evidence with the new information remains sufficient for a juror to vote to convict but rather if they [the new statements]... are true, whether a juror, conscientiously following the judge's instruction requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt, would vote to convict. 513 U.S. at 331, 115 S.Ct. 851. This is far different from the test used by our dissenting colleagues — the sufficiency of the evidence in the trial record. The dissent looks to whether there is evidence that could have supported a jury's decision to convict, regardless of the new evidence. But Schlup looks instead to the likely behavior of the trier of fact — what a conscientious juror would do given all the evidence. Justice Stevens specifically holds, in reversing the Eighth Circuit, that petitioner's showing of innocence is not insufficient solely because the trial record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Id. 4 61 With respect to the question of delay, it is better to be safe than sorry, as we learned after Lloyd Schlup's case was reversed. We must remember, as members of the Supreme Court have advised us, that death is different — that [t]he taking of life is irrevocable,  so that [i]t is in capital cases especially that the balance of conflicting interests must be weighed most heavily in favor of the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights, Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 45-46, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957), (Frankfurter, J. concurring), and that [i]n death cases doubts... should be resolved in favor of the accused, Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752, 68 S.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 1055 (1948), and that [t]he Court ... has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 & n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). 62 We must take seriously the Supreme Court's admonition in Schlup, quoted above, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of `actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim,  513 U.S. 298, 314 n. 28, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808. In such cases as this one, it is not obvious what avenues of relief are open, and we are not inclined to agree with our dissenting colleagues that the door should be closed and the man executed without asking any questions. 63 One further error in the dissenting opinion should be noted. The dissenters say that all the questions before us are fully exhausted in the state courts. This is simply wrong. The DNA semen evidence has not been presented to state courts. Neither has the husband's confessions nor the conclusion of the Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Tennessee that the blood found on House's pants leaked from vials of blood from the autopsy of the victim. Had the Tennessee Supreme Court considered this evidence and decided that no avenues of relief are open in the courts of Tennessee, we would not be certifying the case to it.