Opinion ID: 2537276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Codefendant Nixon's Sentence

Text: As previously stated, three of the codefendantsWade, Jackson, and Cole were sentenced to death for both murders. Although originally indicted with the others on charges of first-degree murder, Nixon pleaded guilty to the lesser charges of second-degree murder in exchange for his cooperation and truthful testimony at each of his codefendants' trials. At his sentencing, Nixon's revised sentencing scoresheet provided the court with discretion to sentence Nixon anywhere from the lowest guidelines sentenceforty-seven and one-tenth yearsto life in prison, and even to go below the guidelines based on any mitigation found by the trial court. Nixon's original scoresheet reflected a range of fifty-two years to life. The scoresheet was recalculated when the armed element of the kidnapping and robbery charges was deleted. After hearing mitigation testimony at Nixon's sentencing hearing, the court imposed concurrent forty-five-year sentences for the second-degree murders. Nixon was sentenced after all three of his codefendants were tried and the juries recommended death sentences, but before Wade or Cole was sentenced. Wade first contends that his death sentences are not proportional to codefendant Nixon's sentences for a term of years. Thus, he claims that his sentences must be commuted to life because Nixon was equally culpable for the murders. Wade's contention fails. In Shere v. Moore, 830 So.2d 56, 60 (Fla.2002), we stated that where more than one defendant was involved in the commission of the crime, we would consider the relative culpability of the codefendants in determining the proportionality of the death sentence imposed. We deemed such analysis necessary because equally culpable codefendants should not be treated differently. We have recognized, however, that [i]n order to have that same degree of blame or fault the codefendants must, at a minimum, be convicted of the same degree of the crime. Id. at 61. Accordingly, Nixon's sentences for second-degree murder do not provide a basis for concluding that Wade's death sentences are disproportionate. Furthermore, where the codefendant's lesser sentence was the result of a plea agreement or prosecutorial discretion, this Court has rejected claims of disparate sentencing. England v. State, 940 So.2d 389, 406 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Kight v. State, 784 So.2d 396, 401 (Fla.2001)); accord Smith v. State, 998 So.2d 516, 528 (Fla.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2006, 173 L.Ed.2d 1101 (2009). Wade also argues that in sentencing him for the two murders, the trial court erred by not considering Nixon's disparate forty-five-year sentences as mitigation. This argument is not preserved for review. Although Wade was sentenced after the same court sentenced Nixon, Wade never requested that the trial court consider Nixon's sentence as mitigation of his own sentence. Wade is precluded from making this argument for the first time on appeal.