Opinion ID: 71471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal Protection Retaliation Claim

Text: 41 The district court held that [w]ith respect to the claim that Mrs. Watkins was fired in retaliation for complaints regarding sexual and racial harassment, again, I think there is just not any evidence of substance that Mr. Bowden knew about her performance. Watkins argues that the district court erred in granting appellees' motion for a directed verdict on her claim of retaliation under the Equal Protection Clause because the evidence adduced at trial gives rise to a reasonable inference that Bowden knew of her complaints of sexual and racial harassment. Appellees counter that the district court's assessment of the evidence was accurate and, in any event, that Watkins did not contend, and did not prove, that she, as a female (or African-American) who raised complaints of sexual (or racial) harassment, was treated differently from any male (or white) who raised similar claims. Appellees assert that [t]he equal protection clause prohibits only such class-based distinctions; it does not, as ... other federal non-discrimination statutes do, prohibit generic 'retaliation.' Therefore, [Watkins] failed to prove a violation of the equal protection clause. 42 We review the district court's granting of a directed verdict motion under the de novo standard. Sherrin v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 373, 377 (11th Cir.1993). In so doing, we use the same standard the district court employed in determining whether to grant the motion. See Sherrin, 2 F.3d at 377; Lamb v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1 F.3d 1184, 1187 (11th Cir.1993). Again, [o]ur review of an order granting a directed verdict is not confined to the grounds relied on by the district court. We will affirm if the district court can be sustained on any grounds. Weeks v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 1485, 1490 n. 6 (11th Cir.1984). 43 Watkins asserts that two elements of her prima facie case of retaliation under the Equal Protection Clause are that she engaged in protected conduct or statements, and that her termination was based, at least in part, on her membership in a protected classification. To the extent Watkins contends that she was dismissed because of her expressive activity, that claim arises under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 468 (5th Cir.1990) (dismissing plaintiff's equal protection claim in retaliation case because it amounts to no more than a restatement of his first amendment claim); Vukadinovich v. Bartels, 853 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (7th Cir.1988) (finding that plaintiff's equal protection retaliation claim, based on allegation that he was treated differently because he exercised his right to free speech, is best characterized as a mere rewording of [his] First Amendment-retaliation claim). Moreover, to the extent Watkins links her alleged retaliatory dismissal to her gender or race, that allegation constitutes part of her equal protection discrimination (i.e., hostile work environment sexual and racial harassment) claim. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 529-30 (4th Cir.1994). A pure or generic retaliation claim, however, simply does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause. See Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340 (11th Cir.1995) (reversing denial of qualified immunity on equal protection retaliation claim because [t]he right to be free from retaliation [for making complaints of discrimination] is clearly established as a first amendment right and as a statutory right under Title VII; but no clearly established right exists under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation); Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1296 n. 8 (7th Cir.1996) (Equal Protection Clause does not establish a general right to be free from retaliation); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) ([W]e know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (Gray's right to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 1476, 108 L.Ed.2d 613 (1990); Long v. Laramie County Community College Dist., 840 F.2d 743, 752 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825, 109 S.Ct. 73, 102 L.Ed.2d 50 (1988). Consequently, we affirm the district court's grant of a directed verdict for appellees on Watkins's equal protection retaliation claim. 44 C. Jury Instruction on the Hostile Work Environment Sexual and Racial Harassment Claim Against the County 45 In order to prevail on her hostile work environment sexual and racial harassment claim under the Equal Protection Clause, Watkins had to show that (1) she belonged to the protected groups at issue; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual and racial harassment; (3) the harassment was based upon her gender and race; (4) the harassment affected the conditions of her employment; (5) the defendant (the county, as represented by Bowden) acted under color of law; and (6) the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose or intent. See Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504, 1507-08 (11th Cir.1995). 46 The jury instruction at issue involved the fourth element above. As to that element, a plaintiff must show that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 20-22, 114 S.Ct. at 370; Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir.1995); Cross, 49 F.3d at 1507. 19 In Harris, the Supreme Court further defined this element, granting certiorari ... to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be actionable as abusive work environment harassment ..., must seriously affect an employee's psychological well-being or lead the plaintiff to suffer injury. Harris, 510 U.S. at 20, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 20 In deciding this issue, the Court elaborated on the objective and subjective components of the hostile work environment inquiry: 47 Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment--an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive--is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation. 48 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (emphasis added). 21 49 Despite Harris, Watkins contends that the district court erred in instructing that the jury look to see whether, objectively speaking, a hostile working environment existed looking through the eyes of a reasonable person. She argues that the court's original, more contextual standard, which asked the jury to assess the working environment from the standpoint of a reasonable African American or woman, was a correct statement of the law and that the substituted instruction caused her prejudicial harm. 50 In reviewing the district court's jury instructions, this court will look to see whether the charges, considered as a whole, sufficiently instruct the jury so that the jurors understand the issues involved and are not misled. Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 750 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th Cir.1985); see also Cross, 49 F.3d at 1505. If the instructions, taken together, properly express the law applicable to the case, no reversible error has occurred, even if an isolated clause may be inaccurate, ambiguous, incomplete, or otherwise subject to criticism. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir.1991). 51 Given Harris, we cannot conclude that the district court's corrective instruction did not properly express the law applicable to this case. 22 Moreover, the district court clearly identified the superseded instruction, concisely articulated the corrective instruction, and then restated the subjective component of the hostile work environment inquiry. Therefore, the court's instructions gave the jurors sufficient guidance and did not mislead or confuse them. Accordingly, no reversible error occurred, and we affirm the judgment for the county on Watkins's hostile work environment sexual and racial harassment claim.