Opinion ID: 67025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: a ge d iscrimination

Text: “We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal standards as the district court.” Id. at 1023. The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c). If the non-moving party bears the ultimate burden of proof regarding the claim at issue in the motion, that party, in response to the motion, must go beyond the pleadings and establish, through competent evidence, that there truly is a genuine, material issue to be tried. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). 3 The ADEA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee over 40 years old on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a). “When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer’s decision. That is, the plaintiff’s age must have actually played a role in the employer’s decisionmaking process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2105 (2000) (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). However, the ADEA does “not . . . prohibit employment decisions based on factors that sometimes accompany advancing age, such as declining health or diminished vigor and competence.” Barnes v. Sw. Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 611 (11th Cir. 1987). Absent direct evidence of an employer’s discriminatory motive, a plaintiff may establish his case through circumstantial evidence, using the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024. Under this framework, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of “an ADEA violation . . . by showing that he (1) was a member of the protected age group, (2) was subjected to adverse employment action, (3) was qualified to do the job, and (4) was replaced by or otherwise lost a position to a younger individual” or that 4 similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably. Id. Summers clearly met the first and third requirements of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. He was 59 years old at the time he participated in the training, within the age group protected by the ADEA. Further, he was qualified to perform his duties as a police officer because at the time of the alleged discrimination he had been a police officer for almost seven years and passed the new training. We thus turn to the second requirement and consider whether Summers demonstrated that he was subjected to an adverse employment action. An adverse employment action is “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). To constitute a violation, “the employer’s action must impact the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of the plaintiff’s job in a real and demonstrable way.” Id. To determine whether an action constitutes a violation, “the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. Here, Summers did not establish that the new training program constituted an adverse employment action. Officers were always required to participate in annual training; this training was simply more rigorous. Moreover, the training only occurred for five days, once a year. Thus, Summers did not demonstrate “a 5 serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” See id. Moreover, Summers did not satisfy the fourth requirement that a younger person replaced him or that similarly situated, younger employees were treated more favorably. Summers was treated no differently than younger employees. Therefore, he did not establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment age discrimination. Disparate impact claims are also cognizable under the ADEA. Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 233-41, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1541-45 (2005). However, “the scope of disparate-impact liability under [the] ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.” Id. at 240, 125 S. Ct. at 1544. Because age, unlike race or other protected characteristics, “has relevance to an individual's capacity to engage in certain types of employment,” an employer is not liable for age discrimination if the adverse impact was attributable to a reasonable, non-age factor. Id. at 240, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination by disparate impact, “a plaintiff must show that the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly discriminatory impact.” Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2530 (1982). “[I]t is not enough [for an employee] to simply allege 6 that there is a disparate impact on workers. . . .” Smith, 544 U.S. at 241, 125 S. Ct. at 1545. After identifying the specific practice that causes this impact, the employee must prove causation: he “must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected group.” Watson v. F. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2789 (1988). Here, Summers did not show that the new training program had a significantly disparate impact on older officers. While the evidence showed that some older officers found the training program exhausting and some suffered injuries, the record does not reveal the extent of the injuries or whether younger officers also had trouble completing the program. Further, every officer successfully completed the program, regardless of his or her age. Moreover, the Navy’s decision to implement the training program was in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, a decision based on a reasonable nonage factor. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 239-40, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45 (noting the preclusion of liability as long as the adverse impact was attributable to a “reasonable” nonage factor). Thus, Summers failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact age discrimination. 7