Opinion ID: 186488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Contested Procedural Orders

Text: 26 Shekoyan also contests two procedural orders issued by the district court during the course of the litigation. The first is the district court's refusal to permit Shekoyan to file a motion for summary judgment after the deadline for filing dispositive motions. Order, Case No. 00-2519 (February 3, 2004) (summary judgment order). The second is the district court's denial of Shekoyan's motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Sibley's lawyers. Order, Case No. 00-2519 (February 17, 2004) (Rule 11 Order). We review both orders for abuse of discretion. See Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C.Cir.1996) (reviewing denial of motion to amend complaint for abuse of discretion); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) ([A]n appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determination.). In the Rule 11 context, we note that a district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Id. 27 Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs the district court to enter a scheduling order that limits the time ... to file motions [and] to complete discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b). On December 6, 2002 the district court issued a scheduling order that required all dispositive motions to be filed by March 28, 2003. Order, Case No. 00-2519 (December 6, 2002) (Scheduling Order I). This deadline was later extended to April 28, 2003. Order, Case No. 00-2519 (February 24, 2003) (Scheduling Order II). Shekoyan filed his Motion to File Motion for Summary Judgment Out of Time on January 30, 2004—more than nine months after the deadline set by Scheduling Order II. Shekoyan's explanation for the delayed filing is that he had finally obtained an eyewitness declaration corroborating his allegations of discrimination at Sibley. Yet Shekoyan had earlier filed a motion to supplement his opposition to Sibley's motion for summary judgment with the newly obtained declaration, which allowed the district court to consider the material in evaluating whether summary judgment was warranted. See Summary Judgment Order. Moreover, corroboration of Shekoyan's version of the facts was irrelevant to the summary judgment analysis. At the summary judgment stage, all inferences from the evidence are to be drawn in favor of the non-movant. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Thus, the district court was already under an obligation to accept as true Shekoyan's allegations of discrimination in ruling on Sibley's motion for summary judgment. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shekoyan's motion. 28 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for sanctions for filing a paper with the court for any improper purpose, including harassment, delay or increasing the costs of an opponent in litigation. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). Likewise, all legal and factual allegations made by a litigant before the court must be made in good faith. Id. Shekoyan filed his motion for Rule 11 sanctions in response to Sibley's motion to strike from the record the disputed unsigned and unnotarized affidavits submitted by Shekoyan's lawyer. Rule 11 Order at 11. Shekoyan accused Sibley's lawyers of bad faith in filing the motion to strike, eliciting perjured testimony and manipulating witnesses, and violating the district court's Local Rule 7(m), which requires counsel to confer with opposing counsel before filing non-dispositive motions. See Rule 11 Order at 11-12; LCvR 7(m). In particular, Shekoyan claimed to have an audio recording of his lawyer's conversation with David Bose that verified the content of the draft declaration and established Sibley's witness manipulation. The district court found that the motion to strike was justified but that Sibley had violated Local Rule 7(m) by failing to discuss the motion with Shekoyan. Despite being troubled by the competing claims of inaccuracy with respect to the Bose and Vanderhoof declarations, the court refused to sift through the audio recording in order to determine which party's account was accurate. Rule 11 Order at 12-13. Instead, it ruled that Shekoyan could use the recording to impeach Sibley's witnesses at trial. Id. at 13. The Supreme Court has instructed that: [t]he district court is best acquainted with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 11's goal[s]. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 404, 110 S.Ct. 2447. We ordinarily find that decisions concerning Rule 11 sanctions are better left to the discretion of the district court which has a bird's eye view of the actual positions taken by the litigants, Corley v. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 388 F.3d 990, 1013 (7th Cir.2004) (citing Brandt v. Schal Assocs., Inc., 960 F.2d 640, 645 (7th Cir. 1992)), and will not second guess the factual determinations integral to the district court's decision not to impose Rule 11 sanctions. 29 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is affirmed. 30 So ordered.