Opinion ID: 604198
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Give a Voluntariness Instruction

Text: 46 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) provides in relevant part: 47 If the trial judge determines that [a] confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances. 48 Thus, where a defendant raises a genuine issue at trial concerning the voluntariness of a statement, the trial court is obligated by statute to instruct the jury concerning the weight to be accorded that statement. United States v. Fera, 616 F.2d 590, 594-95 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969, 100 S.Ct. 2951, 64 L.Ed.2d 830 (1980). 49 Chan's counsel devoted the majority of her cross-examination of the Hong Kong police witnesses and her closing argument to the circumstances of Chan's statements, which she argued included overly long periods of questioning, sleep deprivation, and unnecessary use of handcuffs and hoods. That she did not ultimately persuade the jury to disregard the statements does not mean that the weight to be given the statements was not in issue. The district court therefore properly recognized that a § 3501(a) instruction was required, although it rejected Chan's proposed instruction 3 in favor of Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 4.01. 4 Only moments after ruling that it would give the preferred Ninth Circuit instruction, however, the district court failed to give any instruction regarding a defendant's extrajudicial statements. Chan argues that this was error requiring reversal of his conviction. 50 Because Chan did not object to the district court's apparently inadvertent omission when the instructions were given, we review for plain error. United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 1541 (9th Cir.1991).  'A plain error is a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial rights.'  United States v. Dischner, 960 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979)), amended, 974 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir.1992). We may reverse Chan's conviction for plain error only if the district court's failure to give the Ninth Circuit instruction so affected the jury's ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly that it tainted the verdict and deprived [Chan] of a fair trial. United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 935 (9th Cir.1992). Reversal of a criminal conviction on the basis of plain error is an exceptional remedy, which we invoke only when it appears necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.1986). 51 Although we have stated that improper jury instructions will rarely justify a finding of plain error, id. at 1367-68, we are necessarily more cautious when the trial court omits an instruction that is unequivocally mandated by statute. We are also aware that several circuits have held that a failure to issue a § 3501(a) instruction when voluntariness is in issue is plain error per se, focusing their analysis on whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1118 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Sauls, 520 F.2d 568, 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1021, 96 S.Ct. 459, 46 L.Ed.2d 393 (1975); United States v. Barry, 518 F.2d 342, 347 (2nd Cir.1975); United States v. Bernett, 495 F.2d 943, 962 (D.C.Cir.1974). The Supreme Court, however, has clearly stated that a per se approach to plain error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) is improper. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16-17 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046-1047 n. 14, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). The reason is that plain error is not merely a question of obviousness. An error that rises to the level of reviewability under Rule 52(b) must not only affect substantial rights, but must also have had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations. Id. at 17 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 1047 n. 14. Any such error must necessarily be harmful. The alternative would be to have appellate courts indulge in the pointless exercise of reviewing 'harmless plain errors'--a practice that is contrary to the draftsmen's intention behind Rule 52(b). Id. 52 Without referring to the Supreme Court's words in Young, some of our cases have indicated that a plain error can also be harmless error. See United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1466 n. 6 (9th Cir.1991) (discussing the split within this circuit), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1598, 118 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992). The Supreme Court's analysis in Young is dispositive and is well supported. The language of Rule 52, which defines harmless error as one which does not affect substantial rights and plain error as one affecting substantial rights, is logically read to suggest that the two are mutually exclusive. See United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1457 (9th Cir.) (Where the alleged error is harmless, plain error does not exist and review is unwarranted.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830, 106 S.Ct. 96, 88 L.Ed.2d 78 (1985); accord United States v. Loya, 807 F.2d 1483, 1492 (9th Cir.1987). Moreover, because plain error requires a high probability that the error materially affected the jury's verdict, United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858, 110 S.Ct. 167, 107 L.Ed.2d 124 (1989), it is difficult to see how such an error can be held harmless on the basis of a probability that the error did not materially affect the verdict, see United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir.1977). 5 We can think of no error prejudicial enough to cause us to overlook a failure to object that would not cause us to reverse. See Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 372 (7th Cir.) ([W]hen a court, on direct appellate review, finds that an error rises to the level of plain error, reversal is automatic.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 206, 107 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989). Our search for a harmless plain error leads us to conclude that there is no such animal. 6 53 Our plain error analysis must therefore turn not on any per se rule, but on whether the district court's failure to give the required instruction, under all of the circumstances presented, was so prejudicial that it tainted the verdict or deprived Chan of a fair trial. We conclude that it was not. Chan's confession was corroborated by the physical evidence, including his ownership of the company that shipped the lychees and his possession of documents relating to the shipment as well as the lease and keys to the packing warehouse. Further evidence indicated that Chan was repeatedly read his rights, signed three separate statements after being permitted to read and correct them, and was given approximately seven hours in a cell to sleep between interviews. All insinuations by Chan's counsel of threats and intimidation were denied on the stand by the Hong Kong Police witnesses, 7 whose trustworthiness the jury was instructed to weigh by the court's general credibility instruction. See United States v. Williams, 484 F.2d 176, 178 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (omission of § 3501(a) instruction not plain error where jury instructed generally on credibility and weight to be accorded witness testimony), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1070, 94 S.Ct. 581, 38 L.Ed.2d 475 (1973). Because we do not believe that any reasonable juror could have disregarded Chan's confession had the § 3501(a) instruction been given, we are convinced that there is no reasonable possibility that the error had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations. Young, 470 U.S. at 17 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 1047 n. 14. The district court's failure to give the § 3501(a) instruction, although amounting to error, was therefore not such as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 16, 105 S.Ct. at 1046.