Opinion ID: 2443308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Opinion on Motion of Counsel for Appellants and Appellees Respectively, for Allowance of Counsel Fees for Services in the Supreme Court

Text: Counsel for appellees have filed a motion for the allowance by this Court of a fee for their services in this Court of not less than $500, to be paid out of the school funds of Carter County, stating that the record shows that the Chancellor fixed their fee in the Trial Court at the sum of $350 for services in that Court, said sum to be paid out of the school funds of said county. Counsel for appellants who neither sought nor obtained an allowance of fee in the Chancery Court, have filed a written motion also, for the allowance by this Court of the sum of $500 to them for their services for representing the complainants appellants in this Court, and further, that the cause be remanded to the Chancery Court for the sole purpose of having a reasonable fee fixed for services in the Chancery Court; or in the alternativethey move that the cause be remanded to the Chancery Court or the purpose of fixing their fees for services in both the Supreme Court and the Chancery Court; although the written motion does not state that the fee should be paid out of the school funds, it leaves the inference that such is the aim because it is said that the appellants acted in the public interest to conserve the public funds and not for any personal gain or aggrandizement. Reference to the record and the original opinion of this Court will disclose that this suit purported to be filed for the purpose of seeking a declaratory judgment to determine the effective date of Chapter 136, Public Acts of 1955, the General Education Bill, and second, whether it is mandatory as of the date of the filing of the bill, that the Board of Education elect as county-wide employees, including supervisors, only those who have been recommended by the county superintendent of education. It was alleged in the original bill that the defendants were guilty of certain acts of misconduct and that their failure as members of the board of education to elect only such county-wide employees as have been recommended by the county superintendent of education would have the ultimate effect of causing Carter County to be deprived of its share of the money coming from the State Education fund. It is our opinion that there is no basis on which any counsel fees should have been allowed or could be allowed out of the school funds. If the suit be regarded as one for the protection of the school funds or the prevention of the loss of same, or the misappropriation, etc., the members of the Board of School Commissioners could not maintain a suit of this kind because the statute, Code § 2314, subsection 16, devolves the duty upon the State Commissioner of Education by and with the consent of the Governor to take all necessary steps to protect the school funds of the State, or any part thereof, and there is no showing of any circumstances indicating that the said State Commissioner of Education was in any way remiss in his duty in this regard. Garner v. Scales, 183 Tenn. 577, 585, 194 S.W.2d 452. If on the other hand  it be regarded as a suit for a declaratory judgment simply, as it purported to be, there could still be no allowance for counsel fees out of said educational funds. In either aspect the following language from Southern v. Beeler, 183 Tenn. 272, 301, 195 S.W.2d 857, 870, is applicable: Now in the instant case the suit results in preventing the waste of public funds. The well nigh universal rule is that where counsel fees are awarded by the court the fee allowed must be paid out of a specific fund recovered, or out of specific property protected against threatened loss, or it must rest in contract, either express or implied. The principle underlying the declaration of lien for counsel fees is that there has been a recovery of money or property in behalf of a plaintiff litigant. Grant v. Lookout Mountain Co., supra [93 Tenn. 691, 28 S.W. 90, 27 L.R.A. 98]; Blackburn v. Clarke, 85 Tenn. 506, 3 S.W. 505. The motion of counsel for appellants and appellees, respectively, is therefore disallowed. Attention is called to the fact that there was no question raised on appeal with reference to the allowance of the $350 fee by the Chancellor for services rendered by counsel for the defendants in that Court. Therefore, the original opinion does not deal with that question at all, otherwise than we affirm the Chancellor's decree except for his failure to make a declaration on the second question involved in the appeal. Be that as it may  the allowance of this fee in the Court below is erroneous and the State Commissioner of Education will probably take proper steps to protect the educational fund as the statute above mentioned requires.