Opinion ID: 2184797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of the Right to Self-Representation

Text: After trial, defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial, a pro se supplemental motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a pro se motion in arrest of judgment. Defendant also moved to be permitted to act as co-counsel. Addressing defendant in open court, the trial court stated, My understanding of the law    is that    you have a right to represent yourself or of course you have the right to be represented by an attorney but you can't do both or you can't take a position in between. However, the trial court allowed defendant to submit his pro se motions and permitted defense counsel to argue the motions. Defendant argues through counsel and in his pro se brief that the trial court violated his absolute constitutional right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Faretta held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to refuse state-provided counsel and proceed without representation if he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. See People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 544, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (1995). A trial court may appoint standby counsel to assist the defendant. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581 n. 46. However, Faretta does not require the trial judge to permit `hybrid' representation. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183, 104 S.Ct. 944, 953, 79 L.Ed.2d 122, 136 (1984). See also United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1114 (10th Cir.1995); Cain v. Peters, 972 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir.1992). It has been stated that there is a crucial difference between a defendant seeking to represent himself and a defendant asking to serve as `co-counsel' in his defense. The defendant has no absolute right to the latter. Instead, `[t]he decision to grant or deny hybrid representation lies solely within the discretion of the trial court.' [Citation.] United States v. Stevens, 83 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 1996). In view of these principles, the denial of defendant's request to act as co-counsel was not a violation of defendant's constitutional right of self-representation. Defendant further argues through counsel that the failure of his appellate attorneys to raise this issue on direct appeal constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are evaluated under the standard set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, which, as previously noted, requires the defendant to show both deficient performance by counsel and resultant prejudice. See People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 523, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (1995). Since we have concluded that the issue of defendant's right to self-representation is meritless, defendant suffered no prejudice under Strickland as a result of appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue. See Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 523, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919.