Opinion ID: 6110099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: SVPs Have a Due Process Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

Text: The State argues that even if an SVP has a due process right to counsel, the Constitution does not guarantee appointed counsel must be effective. In support, it notes Rules 24.035 and 29.15 provide for the appointment of counsel in postconviction proceedings, yet this Court has held this does not guarantee the postconviction movant has the right to effective assistance of counsel. The State's argument ignores the fundamental distinction between a postconviction proceeding and an SVP commitment proceeding. A postconviction proceeding is a collateral attack on a final judgment. Barnett v. State, 103 S.W.3d 765 , 769 (Mo. banc 2003) . The right to counsel in such collateral proceedings is not constitutionally required, McFadden v. State, No. SC96453, 553 S.W.3d 289 , 301-02 (Mo. banc July 17, 2018), 2018 WL 3432647 , and is why the provision for counsel in this Court's rules does not constitutionally require counsel be effective. Unlike a postconviction proceeding, an SVP proceeding is the original trial at which the initial determination is made whether the respondent can be involuntarily  committed as an SVP. These original actions are brought by the State and result in a proceeding in which the courts determine in the first instance whether the person's liberty will be taken away. Counsel in these proceedings help to protect the individual from having a fundamental right of liberty taken away. The SVP proceeding is in this way more comparable to the trial of a criminal defendant than to the criminal defendant's postconviction proceeding. In the criminal context, this Court has recognized the right to counsel means the right to effective counsel. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 , 609 (Mo. banc 2012). 6 While the SVP proceeding is civil, as Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181 , 1183 (10th Cir. 1985) , held in the context of imprisonment for civil contempt, The right to counsel, as an aspect of due process, turns not on whether a proceeding may be characterized as 'criminal' or 'civil,' but on whether the proceeding may result in a deprivation of liberty. Accord Lane, 313 S.W.3d at 186 (civil contempt); see also State v. Churchill, 454 S.W.3d 328 (Mo. banc 2015) (citing Lane with approval but finding it did not apply as there was no risk of imprisonment in protective custody case). For these and similar reasons, those states recognizing a constitutional or statutory right to counsel in SVP proceedings recognize counsel must be effective. See, e.g., In re Ontiberos, 295 Kan. 10 , 287 P.3d 855 , 867 (2012) (holding the due process right to counsel in SVP proceedings carries with it a correlative right to competent, effective counsel); Jenkins v. Dir. of Va. Ctr. for Behavioral Rehab., 271 Va. 4 , 624 S.E.2d 453 , 460 (2006) (holding that based on the substantial liberty interest at stake the movant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during the proceeding in which he was adjudicated a sexually violent predator, and on appeal from that adjudication); Matter of Chapman, 419 S.C. 172 , 796 S.E.2d 843 , 846 (2017) (given the significant due process implications inherent in civil commitments, we find section 44-48-90's right to counsel is not merely a statutory right, but also a constitutional one arising under the Fourteenth Amendment and the South Carolina Constitution); see also cases discussed infra, section II.C, II.D. This Court holds likewise. Indeed, an SVP's due process right to counsel in SVP proceedings would be hollow were there no accompanying requirement counsel be effective. 7 C. Proper Avenue for Bringing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims  Neither the Act nor this Court's cases currently provide an avenue for persons committed as SVPs to raise a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The parties ask this Court to develop rules as to how all such claims should be brought. Their briefs and argument debate the relative merits of appointment of a master on appeal, remand for an evidentiary hearing by the probate division, use of habeas corpus, or the creation of a post-SVP hearing procedure akin to that used for postconviction claims in criminal cases. These are important and difficult issues which this Court will, at some future point, need to resolve should the legislature not resolve the issue in the interim by adopting a statutory procedure for the consideration of such claims. 8 Here, however, all of Mr. Grado's claims of ineffective assistance involve counsel's actions at trial, and are evident on the record. For claims based on what happened at the trial, it is consistent with the approach taken in states such as Maine and Illinois to allow the ineffectiveness claim to be determined on appeal. See, e.g., In re Henry B., 159 A.3d at 827-28 (citation omitted) (A direct appeal from an order of involuntary commitment may include a claim that the individual's attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel 'when the record is sufficiently well developed to permit a fair evaluation' of the claim.); Matter of Carmody, 274 Ill.App.3d 46 , 210 Ill.Dec. 782 , 653 N.E.2d 977 , 985 (1995) (in involuntary commitment proceedings, as opposed to post-conviction criminal proceedings, no issues are likely to arise regarding respondent's counsel's failure to adequately investigate or prepare for trial, or counsel's failure to pursue defenses or witnesses). Kansas also permits a person detained under the KSVPA may raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on direct appeal. Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 866 . Allowing record-based ineffectiveness claims to be raised on direct appeal is also consistent with how this Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance in termination of parental rights cases. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793 , 820 n.22 (Mo. banc 2011) , specifically found such claims had been and could continue to be raised on direct appeal when such claims could be evaluated on the trial record. 9 Similarly, In the Interest of J.C., Jr. , 781 S.W.2d at 228, considered parents' claims of ineffectiveness in their termination of parental rights proceeding on direct appeal. Allowing claims that counsel  was ineffective at trial to be raised on direct appeal also is consistent with the fact this Court reviewed at least some claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in criminal cases before the enactment of postconviction relief rules. For example, State v. Wheat, 775 S.W.2d 155 , 157 (Mo. banc 1989) , held courts could review ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal when the record was adequate. As in the above cases, Mr. Grado alleges counsel was ineffective for failing to make certain objections or take certain actions on the record at the SVP proceeding. These alleged errors can be determined through review of the appellate record. D. Mr. Grado's Counsel Was Not Ineffective The Act and this Court's cases also fail to address the standard to be applied to determine whether counsel was effective, and the parties ask the Court to resolve this issue also. The State asks this Court to adopt the standard applied in termination of parental rights cases by determining whether the attorney was effective in providing his client with a meaningful hearing based on the record. In Interest of J.P.B., 509 S.W.3d at 97 . It says there is no question that counsel provided a meaningful hearing by challenging the State's evidence and presenting substantial evidence on behalf of Respondent. Respondent does not claim that he was not provided with the kind of meaningful hearing required in termination of parental rights cases. Rather, he argues that because a deprivation of his constitutional due process rights is involved, he is entitled to application of the standard set out in Strickland. In support, he notes that this is the standard applied in SVP and other involuntary commitment proceedings in other states. See, e.g., Matter of Commitment of J.M. , 381 Wis.2d 28 , 911 N.W.2d 41 , 50 (2018) ; In re Ontiberos, 287 P.3d at 867-68 (Kansas SVP standard). Again, this is an issue that must be left for another day, for Mr. Grado would not be entitled to relief under either the meaningful hearing or Strickland standard. Under the meaningful hearing standard, this Court would determine - based on the record on appeal - whether counsel provided Mr. Grado with a meaningful SVP hearing. Strickland would require Mr. Grado to show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) his or her counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that a reasonably competent counsel would in a similar situation, and (2) he or she was prejudiced by that failure. Mallow v. State, 439 S.W.3d 764 , 768-69 (Mo. 2014) . In order to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective, Smith v. State, 370 S.W.3d 883 , 886 (Mo. banc 2012) , Mr. Grado would have to identify specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance, Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170 , 176 (Mo. banc 2009) . Trial strategy decisions may only serve as a basis for ineffective counsel if they are unreasonable. Id. In order to prove the prejudice prong of Strickland , the question is whether there is a reasonably probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . Reviewing the record, Mr. Grado's counsel was not ineffective under either standard for failing to object to the State's introduction of evidence Mr. Grado had watched animalistic pornography, played a pedophilic video game, and engaged in sexual activity with animals. The State's expert Dr. Witcher testified that part of the  evidence on which she based her diagnosis that Mr. Grado had pedophilia was the fact he showed pornography to a child he abused. Dr. Witcher also testified that a person with two paraphilias was at an increased risk to reoffend. She testified this applied to Mr. Grado because in addition to having pedophilia, he has zoophilia, which is a sexual attraction to animals. In explaining the basis of this diagnosis she discussed his sexual activity with animals. This tied in with testimony by Mr. Gould that Mr. Grado disclosed while in MOSOP that he played a video game where an adult babysitter would earn trust points with the children by performing certain tasks; those points could then be traded for sexual interactions between the child and babysitter. Mr. Gould found the game strikingly parallel to the manipulation tactics Mr. Grado used on his own victims. Mr. Gould also stated Mr. Grado watched pornography featuring half-human, half-animal characters. Finally, Mr. Gould testified about Mr. Grado's sexual attraction to animals and stated Mr. Grado more willingly discussed his interactions with animals than with children. Dr. Witcher also testified she reviewed all of Mr. Grado's MOSOP records and his grooming behavior increased his risk because it reflected planning and forethought. Mr. Grado does not argue counsel was ineffective in failing to limit the use of this evidence, but rather argues it was inadmissible. Because the State's experts relied on this evidence to support their opinions, this argument would not have been successful. See § 490.065.3 (experts can rely on facts reasonably relied upon by experts in the field); Zink, 278 S.W.3d at 188 (trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to make non-meritorious objections) (citation and quotations omitted). As this evidence was properly admitted by the State, this Court cannot say it was ineffective for counsel to pursue a trial strategy to cross-examine the State's witnesses on these activities or have Mr. Grado testify about this evidence in an attempt to minimize its impact and persuade the jury it did not increase his risk to reoffend. Id. at 176 .