Opinion ID: 2085741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant begins this section of his brief with the assertion that the evidence was insufficient to support any of his convictions, but proceeds to support that assertion with argument only on the attempted murder conviction. To the extent that he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for resisting law enforcement and carrying a handgun without a license, these arguments are waived for failing to make a cogent argument. See Daniels v. State, 683 N.E.2d 557, 559 n. 4 (Ind.1997). Even absent waiver, we find overwhelming evidence to support both of these convictions. We turn, then, to the evidence of attempted murder. When examining the sufficiency of evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility; rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Deckard v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind.1996). We affirm if, considering that evidence and those inferences, we find substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Minter v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1382, 1383 (Ind.1995). To obtain a conviction for attempted murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, while acting with the specific intent to kill another person, engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the killing. Ind.Code §§ 35-41-5-1(a) & 35-42-1-1 (1993); Greenlee v. State, 655 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Ind.1995). At Appellant's trial, two eyewitnesses testified that Appellant pointed the gun directly at Reed, that Appellant said he was going to kill Reed, and that Appellant pulled the trigger several times, and discharged the gun in close proximity to Reed. In view of this evidence, Appellant's argument that there is no direct or circumstantial evidence that he intended to kill Reed fails. Not only was there evidence that Appellant expressly stated he would kill Reed, Appellant's actions manifested that intent when he aimed and fired the gun in Reed's direction. See Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (Ind.1997) (intent to commit murder may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death). Appellant's intention was also demonstrated by his repeated, though mostly unsuccessful, attempts to fire the gun at Reed. See Parks v. State, 513 N.E.2d 170, 171 (Ind.1987). That Appellant's aiming and shooting the gun directly at Reed was a substantial step toward the killing is obvious. Appellant provides no citation to support his contention that there was no evidence of his intent to kill Reed merely because the bullet struck Reed's friend instead, and the doctrine of transferred intent provides to the contrary. Under the doctrine, a defendant's intent to kill one person is transferred when, by mistake or inadvertence, the defendant kills a third person; the defendant may be found guilty of the murder of the person who was killed, even though the defendant intended to kill another. White v. State, 638 N.E.2d 785, 786 (Ind.1994). This doctrine also applies to the intent necessary for attempted murder. Straub v. State, 567 N.E.2d 87, 90-1 (Ind. 1991) (establishing that state need not introduce evidence that the defendant intended to kill the actual victim, but only that the defendant intended to kill someone). The conviction for attempted murder was supported by sufficient evidence.