Opinion ID: 2803541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Darryl Colbert

Text: Darryl Colbert challenges Application #3 through Application #6, alleging that these applications did not comply with the wiretap statute’s “necessity” requirement. We review the issuing judge’s finding of necessity for an abuse of discretion. See Corrado, 227 F.3d at 539; see also United States v. Canales Gomez, 358 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The issuing judge’s decision that the wiretap was necessary is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.”). Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102522, governs the legal requirements for wiretaps. The statute requires that “[e]ach application 4 The other individuals indicted were Branch, Harmon, Regina Skinner, Marvin Skinner, Derrick Watson, Gavin Parker, Gerald Griffin, and William Brown. They are not part of this appeal. -4- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire . . . communication” include “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). This “necessity” requirement is designed “to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime” and to prevent wiretapping from being “routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation.” United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 19-20 (6th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). “All that is required is that the investigators give serious consideration to the non-wiretap techniques prior to applying for wiretap authority and that the court be informed of the reasons for the investigators’ belief that such non-wiretap techniques have been or will likely be inadequate.” United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 163-64 (6th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The government “need not prove the impossibility of other means of obtaining information,” as “the mere fact that some investigative techniques were successful in uncovering evidence of wrongdoing does not mandate that a court negate the need for wiretap surveillance.” Stewart, 306 F.3d at 305. In his supporting affidavits for Application #3 through Application #6, SA Porrini 5 addressed whether non-wiretap, or “traditional,” investigative techniques had been tried. If investigators attempted a specific technique, SA Porrini explained why that technique provided information of limited value. If investigators did not attempt a particular technique, SA Porrini articulated why that technique would not have gleaned viable information. 5 The supporting affidavits for Application #3 through Application #6 differed to the extent that SA Porrini incorporated new information that arose from the ongoing investigation, especially regarding new suspects like the Colbert brothers. However, SA Porrini’s basic analysis and conclusions about the success of traditional investigative techniques remained unchanged from affidavit to affidavit. -5- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. In doing so, SA Porrini described specifically and factually the following investigative techniques: (1) surveillance, which included physically observing the investigation’s targets, videotaping them with pole cameras, tracking them through cell phone GPS or “cell site” data, and attaching tracking devices to their vehicles; (2) the use of confidential sources; (3) the use of grand jury subpoenas; (4) the use of interviews, which sought to compel cooperation by revealing to the targets evidence gathered against them; (5) the collection of telephone subscriber information through toll record and pen register analysis; (6) the use of trash searches; and (7) the execution of search warrants on suspected “stash houses.” SA Porrini concluded that each of these traditional investigative techniques was inadequate to uncover the full extent of illegal activity, necessitating the use of a wiretap. On appeal, Darryl Colbert’s necessity claim primarily argues that the supporting affidavits for these applications (1) used generic “boilerplate” language when stating that traditional investigative techniques were unlikely to be successful or too dangerous to attempt; (2) discounted many traditional investigative techniques without attempting them in good faith; (3) diminished the success of techniques that were effective; and (4) contained false statements and omissions that gave the impression a wiretap was necessary. These contentions lack merit. We have examined SA Porrini’s lengthy affidavits in support of Application #3 through Application #6, and we find that they establish necessity under an abuse of discretion standard. As described above, SA Porrini devoted a section to numerous non-wiretap methods of investigation. In each section, SA Porrini “explained in depth why ordinary methods of investigation failed to achieve all of law enforcement’s objectives, why other methods were contemplated but determined to be unlikely to succeed if attempted, and why certain methods would be likely to alert the co-conspirators to the ongoing investigation.” -6- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. United States v. Patel, 579 F. App’x 449, 454 (6th Cir. 2014). See also Stewart, 306 F.3d at 305 (deeming necessity satisfied where affidavit provided “a tremendous amount of information” and included “a statement as to . . . specific investigative techniques that had been utilized, including confidential informants and cooperating witnesses, controlled purchases of drugs, consensual recordings, physical surveillance, and telephone records”). Colbert attempts to minimize the level of detail SA Porrini provided, claiming that he employed “boilerplate” language applicable to any Title III investigation. But the “mere fact that the affidavit . . . rested in part on statements that would be equally applicable to almost any . . . case [of this kind] does not render the affidavit insufficient” so long as there is “information about particular facts . . . which would indicate that wiretaps are not being routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation.” Landmesser, 553 F.2d at 20 (quotation marks and citations omitted). As the district court explained when addressing Colbert’s suppression motion below: Porrini’s affidavit contains a comprehensive and case specific discussion, not boilerplate, as to why traditional investigative techniques had been or likely would have been unsuccessful in attaining the overall objectives of the investigation. Each of the successive affidavits detailed the progress of the expanding investigation which lead to the wiretaps of Darryl Colbert’s cellular telephones. Upon reviewing these affidavits, we are convinced that SA Porrini offered case-specific examples as to why traditional surveillance techniques would not achieve the goals of the investigation, contrary to Colbert’s assertion of “boilerplate” language. Finally, Colbert contends that the investigators never attempted a full panoply of surveillance techniques. For example, Colbert states that law enforcement did not use a tracking device on Branch’s vehicle, even though Branch did not suspect that he was being tracked. Similarly, Colbert remarks that investigators did not attempt trash searches beyond the -7- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. residences of Harmon and Branch. But the United States is “not required to prove that every other conceivable method has been tried and failed or that all avenues of investigation have been exhausted.” Alfano, 838 F.2d at 163. As SA Porrini oversaw the investigation, he was in the best position to judge whether an avenue of investigation was likely to achieve the investigation’s objectives. “[T]he prior experience of investigative officers is indeed relevant in determining whether other investigative procedures are unlikely to succeed if tried . . . .” Landmesser, 553 F.2d at 20. Consequently, we concur with the reasoning of the district court: While defendant . . . parse[s] each technique and contend[s] that more should have been done with the techniques that were working, and attempts should have been made with those that were deemed non-viable, the Court agrees with the government that a “hyper-technical and speculative analysis” is inappropriate. Rather the affidavit is assessed in a practical and common sense fashion. Given SA Porrini’s experience and the realities of a complex drug conspiracy, the affidavits established necessity. See United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding necessity satisfied when the supporting affidavit “specifically mentioned that the government used a confidential informant, consensual recordings, a pen register, physical surveillance, and documents before resorting to the wiretap”); Stewart, 306 F.3d at 305-06 (noting that wiretapping was “particularly appropriate” when “various members of the drug conspiracy facilitated the criminal enterprise through multiple telephone conversations from several locations” and the “government could [not] have uncovered the full scope of the conspiracy, especially not in a relatively safe manner, without the wiretaps” (citation omitted)); Alfano, 838 F.2d at 164 (concluding that affidavit established necessity when government “indicated the steps that had been taken with regard to other investigative targets, and the difficulties in placing an informant in or maintaining continual surveillance of those involved in far-flung operations, including involvement of a number of members of a close-knit family -8- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. group”). In light of the “great deference” owed the issuing judge, as well as the affidavit’s detailed discussion of other investigative techniques, the district court did not err in its determination. Colbert also purports that SA Porrini made false statements and omissions in his affidavits that distorted the issuing judge’s necessity determination. He cites three allegedly material and reckless false statements made in Application #3: (1) the assertion that Branch and Colbert were associated with the Los Angeles Crips street gang; (2) the assertion that law enforcement found over $10,000 and what appeared to be a drug ledger during an October 2010 traffic stop of Colbert; and (3) the assertion that there was probable cause to believe a substantial DTO involving current or past Crips members was operating from Los Angeles and Akron. He cites an additional allegedly false statement in Application #4: the characterization of Colbert as a known California cocaine trafficker. Colbert believes this statement implied SA Porrini had first-hand knowledge that Colbert was trafficking in cocaine. Colbert further insists that the affidavits omitted that “[t]here was absolutely no mention of the use of weapons, the use of violence, or the use of violent threats” in any of the intercepted conversations. He concludes that these false statements and omissions gave the issuing judge the impression that the targets of the investigation were violent individuals, which lowered the United States’ bar for showing necessity by making traditional investigative techniques appear too dangerous. Colbert invokes United States v. Rice in support of his position. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court in that case found that investigators misled an issuing judge about the necessity of a wiretap when the supporting affidavit falsely stated that law enforcement had conducted physical surveillance on the investigation’s targets and faced an unreasonable risk -9- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. of danger. Rice, 478 F.3d at 707-09. The Sixth Circuit reviewed the affidavit and held that the district court did not clearly err in that determination. Id. at 710-11. Rice is inapposite. In that case, the district court determined that the affiant made false or misleading statements in the wiretap application. In contrast, the court below concluded that Colbert offered no proof that SA Porrini’s statements were false. See also United States v. Dusenberry, No. 94-3804, 1996 WL 306517, at  (6th Cir. June 6, 1996) (finding necessity challenge meritless where defendant “has not alleged any specific falsehoods in the affidavit concerning the necessity issue”). Moreover, it is unlikely that SA Porrini’s statements even gave the impression that Colbert was violent. SA Porrini never expressly described any of the targeted individuals as violent. While Colbert contends that the statements associating him with the Crips implied that he was violent, without more information, this affiliation alone would not definitively suggest a violent temperament.
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to a hearing to determine whether the affidavit contained a false statement when that defendant “makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and . . . the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Id. at 155-56. “The defendant must specifically point to the disputed portions of the challenged affidavit, and must support these charges with an offer of proof.” Stewart, 306 F.3d at 304. If this burden is met, the court must reconsider the affidavit without the disputed portions and determine whether probable cause still exists. Id. at 304-05. If probable cause no longer exists, -10- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. the court must then hold a full evidentiary hearing to determine whether the affidavit was properly submitted. Id. at 305. Colbert states that he deserved a Franks hearing because SA Porrini’s affidavit in support of Application #4 made three false statements: (1) that Colbert was a known California cocaine trafficker; (2) that Colbert was searched during an investigative traffic stop in October 2010, with officers seizing over $10,000 in cash and what appeared to be a drug ledger; and (3) that Branch and Colbert were affiliated with the Los Angeles Crips street gang, carrying the implication that they were violent individuals. The district court correctly held that Colbert “does not make a substantial preliminary showing because he does not offer proof the statements were false and he does not analyze the affidavits without the statements.” Nowhere in his brief does Colbert provide proof that these statements were false. Instead, he merely alleges that SA Porrini’s statements suggested an ulterior motive. For instance, Colbert claims that SA Porrini associated Branch and Colbert with the Crips in order to insinuate they were violent individuals, thus making normal surveillance riskier in the eyes of the issuing judge. As the district court noted, however, SA Porrini’s affidavit never even stated that these individuals were violent. Similarly, Colbert improperly shifts the burden of proof back to the United States. For example, he argues that the government failed to substantiate its repeated allegations that Colbert was previously arrested during an October 2010 traffic stop, leading to the discovery of drug money and ledgers during the search incident to that arrest. But the burden is on Colbert to prove that statement was false, and he did not satisfy this burden. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied Colbert’s request for a Franks hearing. See Poulsen, 655 F.3d at 504-505 (holding that a district court correctly denied -11- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. the defendant a Franks hearing when it determined that the defendant “has not made any showing, let alone a ‘substantial preliminary showing’”).