Opinion ID: 787168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant Joy

Text: 29 We suggest the district court failed to show deference to the judgment exercised by [Joy,] a qualified professional. Id. at 322, 102 S.Ct. 2452. The facts in this case fall considerably short of establishing Joy's training and supervisory decisions represented a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards. Id. at 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452. The district court found Joy (1) failed to enforce certain ADA Unit policies and (2) failed to discipline employees who violated policies. The district court cited the ADA Unit policy of specifically prohibiting patients from leaning over or coming behind the nurses' station. The district court declared: 30 [I]nstead of taking additional care to ensure that her employees were adequately trained and supervised, Joy overlooked rule violations. On at least one occasion, Joy was told that D.P. had been allowed to go behind the nurses' station, but Joy failed to take any action to discipline the staff members involved or enforce the policy. In fact, Joy testified that she herself saw D.P. leaning over the desk at the nurses' station on more than one occasion, and simply told him that he could not hang over the desk. 31 The district court did not address how this particular rule violation, and Joy's knowledge and alleged acquiescence in the violation, were causally related to Beck's sexual assault. Curiously, the district court granted summary judgment to a non-supervisory defendant, whom the summary judgment facts established had repeatedly violated this particular rule by permitting D.P. to walk behind the nurses' station and access patient charts. The court granted summary judgment because Beck ... failed to establish any connection between [this] violation[ ] and the rape. The same absence of a causal nexus between the policy violation and the subsequent sexual attack is equally applicable to Joy. 32 Absent evidence that Joy's supervisory and training decisions represented a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, we conclude the court erred in finding a reasonable jury could conclude Joy failed to exercise professional judgment. Joy's supervisory actions and inactions in this case simply [do] not approach the sort of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was designed to prevent. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (concluding a lack of due care does not violate the Due Process Clause); see Burton II, 370 F.3d at 729 (reversing and directing entry of summary judgment because defendants' actions were not conscience-shocking, and defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs have failed to show a constitutional violation); S.S. v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 963-64 (8th Cir.2000) (en banc) (holding state actors' alleged actions did not rise to the level of egregiousness that is required to support an action for a substantive due process violation). Based on the summary judgment facts, we cannot conclude any of the alleged state acts or omissions shock[ ] the conscience, Lewis 523 U.S. at 846, 118 S.Ct. 1708, or constitute a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards, Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452.