Opinion ID: 2000819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fair Cross Section Requirement

Text: Fundamental to the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury is the right to have both grand [12] and petit juries chosen from sources representing a fair cross section of the community. [13] Duren v. Missouri, supra at 358-59, 99 S.Ct. at 665-666; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530, 95 S.Ct. 692, 697, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). In Duren, the Supreme Court fashioned a three-part test for establishing a prima facie case of a fair cross section violation. [T]he defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. [439 U.S. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668.] Once the challenger has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the government to show that attainment of a fair cross section [is] incompatible with a significant state interest. Id. at 368, 99 S.Ct. at 670. Without deciding whether appellant met the first two prongs of the Duren test, [14] we agree with the trial judge that he failed to show that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion of the group. Citing to Duren, appellant argues that, by merely showing that a high comparative disparity existed over a long period of time and that the underrepresentation probably did not happen by chance, he proved that the exclusion was systematic. [15] We do not read Duren, so broadly as to hold that a statistical showing alone, without some analysis of the particular system involved, is sufficient to prove systematic exclusion. The Court went on to point out that, not only had the petitioner there shown a statistical underrepresentation, but he had also shown exactly when in the selection process and why the exclusion occurred. Id. at 366-67, 99 S.Ct. at 669-670. Moreover, appellant's case is significantly factually distinguishable from those presented in Duren and Taylor v. Louisiana, supra , another case appellant heavily relies upon. In Duren, women constituted 54% of the total adult population of the county, yet, because of Missouri's automatic exemption for any woman who chose not to serve, they represented only 14.5% of the final venires. In Taylor, 53% of all persons eligible for jury service were women, but, due to Louisiana's provision that no woman could serve on a jury unless she filed a written declaration of her willingness to do so, they constituted less than 1% of the persons chosen from the jury wheel for service. The discrepancies at issue here are not as great as those in Duren and Taylor. [16] Nor does our system have any exemptions, automatic or otherwise, that would necessarily single out Spanishsurnamed persons as to exclude a large segment of the population from jury service, as occurred in those cases. We find that appellant did not present sufficient evidence to show that the underrepresentation of Spanish-surnamed persons was systematic. Consequently, the trial judge was correct in ruling that he had not made out a prima facie case.