Opinion ID: 864742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the verdict of the jury with respect

Text: TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NUMBER ONE WAS AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL. ¶9. When considering whether a jury verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we “show great deference to the jury verdict by resolving all conflicts in the 5 evidence and every permissible inference from the evidence in the appellee's favor.” Venton v. Beckham, 845 So.2d 676, 684 (Miss. 2003) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 807 So.2d 382, 389 (Miss. 2001). We will disturb a jury verdict on appeal only if it “is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Id. (quoting Herrington v. Spell, 692 So.2d 93, 103-04 (Miss. 1997)). ¶10. “[T]he standard of review for denials of motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a request for a peremptory instruction is the same.” Shelton v. State, 853 So.2d 1171, 1186 (Miss. 2003). Each tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented to the trial court. Id. We properly review the ruling “on the last occasion the challenge was made in the trial court, when the circuit court overruled the JNOV.” Id. Further, we have stated: [T]his Court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, we are required to reverse and render. On the other hand if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required. The above standards of review, however, are predicated on the fact that the trial judge applied the correct law. Ala. Great S. R. Co. v. Lee, 826 So.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Miss. 2002). Moreover, where a party requests a new trial and the trial court denies that request, we will reverse only if the denial amounts to an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1236. ¶11. Plaintiff argues that the verdict should have been overturned because the jury instructions were too confusing. She further contends that if the jury had been given the 6 correct instructions, it would not have rendered the verdict that it did in this case. Plaintiff refers us to Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.2d 248 (Miss. 1993), in support of this argument. While Prestage does stand for the proposition that Mississippi uses the riskutility analysis instead of the consumer expectations analysis, it does not support plaintiff’s argument that there is no requirement that a product either differ from its intended form or have a manufacturing defect. The simple fact is that plaintiff’s claim is based on a strict liability design defect. The language of the risk-utility instruction that was given to the jury, which originated from plaintiff’s proposed P-2A instruction and was approved by the plaintiff at trial, contains the words defective condition. Furthermore, Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) employs the wording defective condition unreasonably dangerous. Prestage states Section 402A is still the law in Mississippi. Id. at 254. In light of these facts, the trial court properly instructed the jury. ¶12. Plaintiff further contends that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. She asserts that she presented solid evidence about the risks of cigarettes and smoking, supported by all the warnings that are required by law to be on advertisements and packaging. In addition, plaintiff contends that she presented evidence about the alleged minimal utility of cigarettes. She contends that no reasonable juror could have heard the evidence that was presented and conclude that the utility of cigarettes outweighs their risk. ¶13. This Court in Prestage held: In balancing a product's utility against the risk of injury it creates, a trial court may find it helpful to refer to the seven factors enumerated in Professor John Wade's article, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.L.J. 825. The factors are: 7 (1) The usefulness and desirability of the product--its utility to the user and to the public as a whole. (2) The safety aspects of the product--the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury. (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe. (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility. (5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product. (6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions. (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance. 617 So. 2d at 256. The parties agreed to omit the seventh factor from the instructions submitted to the jury. ¶14. With respect to the Prestage factors, RJR presented an array of evidence that included information regarding Nunnally’s enjoyment and love of cigarette smoking, as well as expert evidence regarding the subjective personal benefits reported by smokers. There was evidence that there exists no safe cigarette and that RJR constantly did research to provide the safest, consumer-desirable cigarette possible. Plaintiff was not aware that her husband had ever tried to quit smoking, therefore avoiding any danger from the product. Further, there was evidence concerning the community awareness of the cigarette smoking’s harmful effects. ¶15. In light of the evidence presented and the fact that plaintiff put on evidence only to support the unreasonably dangerous aspect of the case and failed to provide evidence of 8 any type of defect, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative, a new trial. III. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF NEGLIGENCE. ¶16. We afford trial courts “considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of jury instructions.” Splain v. Hines, 609 So.2d 1234, 1239 (Miss. 1992). This Court does not look at jury instructions in isolation - rather, we read them as a whole. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Miss. 2003). “While a party is entitled to have jury instructions submitted that represent his or her theory of the case, an instruction that ‘incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence’ need not be submitted to the jury.” Id. (quoting Humphrey v. State, 759 So.2d 368, 380 (Miss. 2000). If, after reading the instructions as a whole, we find that they fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, then we will not find reversible error. Bolden, 854 So.2d at 1054. ¶17. Plaintiff argues that she was deprived of a jury instruction on negligence. She contends that her complaint contained claims for negligent design and for simple negligence. Plaintiff maintains that although half of the trial was consumed with evidence regarding negligence and proximate cause, the trial court denied the proffered negligence instructions and submitted the case to the jury solely on the theory of strict liability. She asserts that RJR made “the reasonableness of its conduct the theme of its defense”; RJR was negligent in not removing the more dangerous higher tar brands from the product line, thereby forcing 9 acceptance of the safer brand; and RJR was negligent for marketing the cigarettes when it knew the cigarettes were addictive and deadly. ¶18. First, we consider plaintiff’s negligent design claim. Our holding in Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264 (Miss. 1999), is directly on point. In Hunter, the trial court refused to accept the plaintiff's requested negligence instruction. Instead, the court gave an instruction based on the risk-utility test set out in Prestage, just as the trial judge did here. In Hunter, we relied on United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), for the proposition that [t]he risk-utility balancing test is merely a detailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus. 729 So.2d at 1277. As a commonsense matter, the jury weighs competing factors presented in evidence and reaches a conclusion about the judgment or decision (i.e., conduct) of the manufacturer. The underlying negligence calculus is inescapable. Hunter, 729 So.2d at 1277. An examination of the riskutility [sic] test establishes that the test is essentially a negligence test, and [there was]....no error in failing to grant a negligence instruction in addition to the riskutility test. Id. at 1278. Because Hunter controls the case at hand, we find that the trial court did not err when it refused to submit a negligence instruction in addition to the Prestage-based instruction. ¶19. Next we consider plaintiff’s claim that RJR was guilty of negligence in selling the cigarettes after RJR became aware that its cigarettes were addictive and could result in death. We find that this point is without merit because it is the same claim that plaintiff asserted in different wording through its defective design claim. 10 ¶20. Third, plaintiff asserts that RJR was negligent in not removing the higher tar brands from the product line and forcing acceptance of the lower tar brands. This argument also mirrors the design defect claim since, in essence, it states that the levels of tar found in the cigarettes is a defect. Plaintiff failed to proffer any evidence that the proximate cause of Nunnally's death was RJR’s failure to remove the higher tar brands from the market. Therefore, this point is without merit. ¶21. Next, plaintiff contends that RJR was negligent because it withheld from the governmental and scientific communities information concerning carcinogens found in cigarette smoke; maintained the appearance of a controversy over whether cigarettes caused lung cancer when no such controversy existed; and failed to encourage smokers to use a lower tar brand developed by RJR as their only brand. All three of these arguments are covered by plaintiff’s claims of failure-to-warn, misrepresentation, which were dismissed before trial began. Thus, we find that this point is likewise without merit. ¶22. Finally, plaintiff contends that RJR made its central issue the reasonableness of their actions, thereby making that the negligence instruction was an essential part of this trial. RJR asserts that plaintiff picks and chooses phrases from the transcript in order to make it seem like this was the case. In fact, all testimony that plaintiff refers to was given by David Townsend, an RJR expert. RJR asserted that Townsend is a design expert and the focus of his testimony was RJR’s design efforts to make the safest, most desirable product possible. We find that this point is without merit. ¶23. We find that the trial court committed no error in refusing the proffered negligence instruction. 11