Opinion ID: 47002
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process and False Imprisonment

Text: Anderson’s due process claim is limited to the denial of a preliminary hearing after his arrest for suspected parole violations. Under the Constitution, a parolee is entitled to certain due process protections before revocation of his parole, including the right to a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a violation had occurred and a final hearing to determine if revocation is appropriate. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484-88, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2602-03, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Here, the appellees admitted that Anderson did not waive his right to a hearing and that he did not receive a hearing as required to satisfy due process concerns when he was arrested in January 2001. Thus, the only question is what remedy was appropriate. The district court determined that the only remedy to which Anderson was entitled was the quashing of the arrest warrant. Anderson contends that he was entitled to monetary damages. This court has held that members of the parole board are entitled to quasijudicial immunity for suits seeking monetary damages. Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying immunity to suit by parolee who was arrested and incarcerated based on erroneous allegations of parole violations); Fuller, 851 F.2d at 1310. Therefore, although the district court did not address the issue of 10 monetary damages when it determined that Anderson had received the appropriate remedy, summary judgment was proper on the alternate ground that Ray was immune from suit for monetary damages. Finally, because the only parties relevant to the false imprisonment claim were Henderson and Collins, and they never received service of process, we need not address whether Anderson was subject to false imprisonment.