Opinion ID: 1923817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was trial court right in overruling defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss, grounded on alleged reprehensible police conduct?

Text: Defendant produced several witnesses in support of this motion. Trial court's ruling denying the motion concluded that from this testimony a fact finder could find, that during that investigation Deputy Anderson 1) contacted and used the juveniles as providers of information without the knowledge or consent of the juvenile's parents, 2) purchased for and furnished to the juveniles beer, 3) provided on one occasion his own marijuana for them to smoke, and 4) operated his motor vehicle with the juveniles in it when he was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, [and] that the Officer had no authority from his superiors to engage in any criminal conduct as a part of his undercover work other than the commission of simple misdemeanors regarding the personal consumption of alcohol on a public highway and the disobedience of minor traffic regulations. Neither did he have authority from his superiors to use minors as contacts without parental permission. Anderson took the stand, denied he was intoxicated on any occasion, and further denied he bought alcoholic beverages or distributed them to minors. He admitted two minor traffic violations and that he had consumed beer on a public highway. With respect to the marijuana incident, he asserted the substance was supplied by the minor girls, and that he held the pipe but did not smoke it. Trial court assumed, without deciding, that Anderson participated in the illegal activities as claimed, but nonetheless held the conduct was not so outrageous that defendant's prosecution should be aborted. We agree. There is no nexus between Anderson's alleged conduct with the sophisticated minors and the defendant. The latter was not present during any of the alleged illegal activity. These acquaintances only led Anderson to Furman; that contact in turn led to defendant. Defendant does not suggest how Anderson's alleged conduct, described above, affected him, and he raises no claim of entrapment. In making this observation we do not foreclose the possibility of barring prosecution in extreme cases, even where an entrapment defense is not established. See State v. Pooler, 255 N.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Iowa 1977). Courts have recognized the necessity to infiltrate drug rings may require a limited participation in unlawful practices. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L.Ed.2d 366, 373-74 (1973); United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146, 148-49 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975); State v. Apt, 244 N.W.2d 801, 803-04 (Iowa 1976). We hold our decisions in Pooler (undercover police officer participated in break-in with defendant) and Apt (undercover officer permitted informant to smoke marijuana in his presence) control here. If defendant's evidence relating to Anderson's conduct is true, we agree it was reprehensible. Nonetheless, it was unrelated to any activity involving defendant, and not so outrageous and reprehensible that a defendant whose rights were not infringed should be acquitted because of it. Pooler, 255 N.W.2d at 331. Trial court properly overruled the motion.