Opinion ID: 3134365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Release from probation from Florida (20 years)

Text: through Nebraska control[.] The report concludes with the statement that police authorities informed Stalder and his attorney that they would contact the appropriate police, probation, prosecuting, and federal agencies to see what, if anything, could be worked out. The rule is well-established that the State's knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain a criminal conviction constitutes a violation of due process of law. People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 223 (1995). A conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury's verdict. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-80, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381-82 (1985). These same principles obtain where the State, although not soliciting the false testimony, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173 (1959); People v. McKinney, 31 Ill. 2d 246, 251 (1964). It is equally well established that the above principles apply even where the witness' false testimony goes only to that witness' credibility. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1221, 79 S. Ct. at 1177. This is because the jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1221, 79 S. Ct. at 1177. Applying these principles here, we conclude that defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Defendant charges that the State elicited testimony from Stalder that he was only given immunity from prosecution for the Burris burglary in exchange for his testimony, when in fact the State knew that Stalder had obtained a multijurisdictional deal which included the dismissal of a number of other charges pending against him. Defendant asserts that, despite this knowledge, the State allowed Stalder's false testimony to go uncorrected, in violation of his right to due process. This claim is supported by the record. The record of defendant's jury trial discloses that Stalder testified that the only promise made to him in exchange for his testimony against defendant was that he was given immunity for burglarizing the Burris residence. The following colloquy occurred at the conclusion of Stalder's direct examination: [Q.]  Mr. Stalder, I would like to know whether or not on occasions prior to your appearance in Court today you have discussed the same subject matter that you have testified about today with members of the law enforcement community?
Q. Specifically, I'd like to know whether or not you have discussed the nature and the subject matter of your testimony today with the State's Attorney of Whiteside County, a gentleman named Gary Spencer? A. Yes, I have. Q. And is it true, sir, that as a result of your discussions with him that an agreement has been reached between yourself and Mr. Spencer in his role as State's Attorney? A. Yes, there was. Q. I would like you to indicate for the ladies and gentlemen what your understanding is of the agreement that exists? [sic] A. The only agreement that exists is that the charges, as far as the burglary at the Burris residence are concerned, are to be dropped. That's the only agreement. THE COURT: Against this witness? A. Against me. That's right, sir. Q. And in return for the dropping of the charges, were you informed as to what would be expected of you? A. I was to give a true and factual statement and testimony, if necessary--be against any persons that I knew that might have had any connection with that same burglary and their conversations or whatever. (Emphasis added.) This was the full extent of Stalder's testimony concerning the consideration he obtained as a result of his cooperation with Illinois authorities. We find that a fair appraisal of this record requires the conclusion that Stalder framed his testimony in such terms as to impart to the jury the message that the only consideration he received for testifying was immunity from the Burris burglary. Once Stalder framed his testimony in this manner, the State was under an obligation to correct any falsity. This case is therefore distinguishable from People v. Pecoraro, No. 78457, slip op. at 10-12 (February 6, 1997), where we explained that the State has an obligation to correct false testimony, not an obligation in the first instance to impeach its own witnesses with all evidence bearing on their credibility. In contrast to Stalder's trial testimony, the affidavit of Stalder's attorney, which we must accept as true for purposes of deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing (Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d at 245), unambiguously declares that Stalder obtained a multijurisdictional deal as a direct result of his cooperation with Illinois authorities concerning this case. The affidavit of Stalder's attorney states that he reached an understanding with a United States District Attorney that if Mr. Stalder cooperated with the Illinois authorities, he would receive favorable treatment in [his] pending federal case. Stalder's attorney further averred that he negotiated with the State's Attorney of Whiteside County on Stalder's behalf. The affidavit next states: Our plan was that in exchange for testimony in the homicide case, Mr. Stalder would receive absolute immunity on the Illinois burglary from [the State's Attorney of Whiteside County], [the United States District Attorney] would accept a plea to one count of the federal indictment and dismiss the other, and Florida and Nebraska would dismiss their pending actions against Mr. Stalder. Because of the seriousness of the homicide case and the materiality of Mr. Stalder's anticipated testimony, the various prosecuting authorities were understandably co-operative.  We were able to work out a global settlement of all pending charges against Mr. Stalder. (Emphasis added.) We conclude that the attorney's affidavit makes a substantial showing that Stalder did in fact receive a multijurisdictional deal in exchange for his testimony implicating defendant in the homicides and that Stalder therefore committed perjury when he testified to the contrary. In addition, we are persuaded that defendant has also made a substantial showing that Illinois authorities knew of this multijurisdictional deal, but nonetheless allowed Stalder's false testimony to go uncorrected. In order to establish a violation of due process, the prosecutor actually trying the case need not have known that the testimony was false; rather, knowledge on the part of any representative or agent of the prosecution is enough. People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 94, 103 (1995) (and cases cited therein); accord Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972). Here, Stalder's attorney's affidavit states that he was in contact with the State's Attorney of Whiteside County regarding his negotiation of Stalder's multijurisdictional deal, and that the State's Attorney of Whiteside County then traveled to Des Moines, Iowa, and consummated his part of the deal on July 16, 1982. The attorney's affidavit is bolstered by the investigative report kept by the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, also attached to defendant's post-conviction petition. This report indicates that Illinois authorities had knowledge that Stalder was facing charges in several different jurisdictions and was willing to cooperate with Illinois authorities regarding their homicide investigation in exchange for a package deal. This report concludes with the statement that Illinois and other police authorities told Stalder they would contact the prosecuting agencies to see what could be worked out. We conclude that the affidavit sufficiently indicates that the prosecutor's office had knowledge that Stalder received a multijurisdictional deal. Defendant is therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. The State responds that any failure on its part to correct Stalder's testimony constitutes harmless error. According to the State, evidence of a multijurisdictional deal would have been merely cumulative because the jury was informed that Stalder had received immunity from prosecution for the Burris burglary and that he had been charged with numerous crimes in the past. The State thus maintains that defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because Stalder's lack of credibility and potential motive to fabricate were already conveyed to the jury. A conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury's verdict. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-80, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 492, 105 S. Ct. at 3381-82. This standard is equivalent to the harmless error standard recently applied by this court in People v. McNeal, No. 78736, slip op. at 12-13 (January 30, 1997), and People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 228-29 (1995). See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 n.9, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 492 n.9, 105 S. Ct. at 3382 n.9. In considering the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we are not able to conclude that evidence that Stalder obtained a multijurisdictional deal in exchange for his testimony against defendant would not have affected the jury's verdict. Such information would show that Stalder had a powerful motive to testify falsely--i.e., his own self-interest in obtaining the dismissal of several charges pending against him in a number of jurisdictions. Had the jury been informed of such information, it may well have concluded that Stalder was unworthy of belief because he had an overwhelming incentive to fabricate testimony. More importantly, the testimony of Edward Stalder was critical to the State's case against defendant. The State's evidence traced the murder weapon of Stevens and Bushman to the Burris burglary. Three men admitted their participation in this burglary--defendant, Onken and Stalder. However, Stalder's testimony was the only evidence placing the murder weapon in defendant's hands. In addition, Stalder provided the only evidence which attributed a motive to defendant for the killings. Stalder claimed that defendant had attempted to recruit him in a plan to take over the local drug business by stealing drugs from the victim Adams and the codefendant Duncan, and leave no witnesses. Maintaining Stalder's credibility was therefore crucial to the State's case against defendant. Accordingly, our evaluation of the record as a whole compels us to conclude that any error in this regard may not be considered harmless. The fact that the jury was apprised of Stalder's immunity for the Burris burglary and his criminal convictions does not alter our conclusion. This information did inform the jury that Stalder had some motive to testify falsely. Nonetheless, the motive of which the jury was informed pales in comparison to the motive Stalder actually had if he indeed received the multijurisdictional deal attested to in his counsel's affidavit. See People v. Sawyer, 48 Ill. 2d 127 (1971) (evidentiary hearing ordered where prosecutor failed to disclose prior narcotics conviction of State's star witness). The State also argues that we should find this issue waived because it could have been raised on direct appeal. We do not agree that waiver is appropriate here. Initially, we note that neither the attorney's affidavit on which defendant relies nor the investigative report were made part of the record on direct appeal. Also, the record of defendant's trial leaves no doubt that the jury was under the impression that the only deal received by Stalder for his testimony was immunity for the Burris burglary. Under these circumstances, we find that principles of fundamental fairness are implicated and require a relaxation of the strict waiver rule. See Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d at 230 (similarly declining to apply the waiver rule); People v. Cihlar, 111 Ill. 2d 212, 218 (1986) (same). In a related argument, defendant submits that the State, at defendant's trial, failed to turn over to the defense all evidence material to Stalder's impeachment as required by Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). These decisions establish that a defendant is deprived of his constitutional right to due process of law where the prosecution fails to turn over material impeachment evidence to the defense. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 490, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380 (1985). Evidence is material in this context only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494, 105 S. Ct. at 3383. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494, 105 S. Ct. at 3383. We find that this issue is so closely tied to the issue discussed above, regarding the prosecutor's failure to correct Stalder's allegedly perjurious testimony, that it too should be considered at the evidentiary hearing to be held on whether Stalder received a multijurisdictional deal. Without an evidentiary hearing, we cannot determine whether defendant's constitutional right to due process of law has been violated.