Opinion ID: 1325306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Statements Made by Gray to the Police.

Text: Gray contends that his statements to the police were involuntary. He argues that his statements were not voluntary under either the requirement set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), or the totality of circumstances standard. Gray gave statements to the police on two occasions. The first statement was given to Officer Freeman on the morning of May 22, 1985. The second statement was given to Sergeant Lilley and Detective Bunker on the evening of May 23, 1985. Freeman testified at the suppression hearing that at 8:30 a.m. on May 22, 1985, Gray, who was in a holding cell at the Suffolk jail, shouted out that he wanted to talk to me. Freeman walked to the cell, and Gray said he wanted to get something off his mind that had been bothering him. Approximately 9:30 a.m., after Gray had eaten breakfast, he was brought to Freeman's office. Freeman told Gray that he would not talk to him unless Gray executed a Legal Rights Advice Form. Freeman then presented Gray with a form and read each question on the form to him. Gray executed the form, which reads as follows: SUFFOLK POLICE DIVISION Legal Rights Advice Form Date May 22, 1985 1. Do you understand what you may be charged with? Armed Robbery Yes 2. Do you understand that you have the right to remain silent? Yes 3. Do you understand that any statement you make may be used as evidence against you in a court of law? Yes 4. Do you understand that you have a right to talk to a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during all questioning, if you so desire? Yes 5. Do you understand that if you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, a lawyer will be appointed to represent you and be present during all questioning, if you so desire? Yes. 6. The above rights have been fully explained to me, and I sign this paper with complete understanding of them. I further state that I waive these rights and desire to make a statement. I understand that I have the right to stop answering questions at any time. Yes 7. This statement is completely free and voluntary on my part without any threats or promises from anyone. Yes Witness /s/ Lt. W. A. Freeman /s/ Coleman W. Gray Signature of Person Witness _____________________ Being Advised of His Rights Date 5/22/85 Time 9:33 A.M. Date 5/22/85 Time 9:35 A.M. Suffolk Det. Bur ____________________ Exact Location Exact Location Freeman testified that after executing the form, Gray, without any questioning by Freeman, became emotional, and began walking around the room, hitting the wall and exclaiming, the man wasn't supposed to die. Freeman suggested that Gray [c]alm ... down, just sit down [and] [t]ell me what happened. Without any questioning or interruption by Freeman, Gray proceeded to give him a detailed account of how the offenses had occurred. Gray admitted he had participated in the commission of the crimes with Melvin Tucker, but stated that Tucker actually shot McClelland. Gray told Freeman: I'm not going to let you write anything. When we get into court it will just be your word against mine. After the interview, Freeman immediately returned to his office and reduced his recollection of Gray's statements to typewritten form. On the evening of May 22, Gray told Detective Lilley that he wanted to talk with him, saying he would tell everything. Lilley told Gray that he would talk with him after the arraignment the following day. On the morning of the 23rd, Gray again told Lilley that he wanted to talk with him. Lilley first contacted Gray's court-appointed counsel and arranged for him to interview Gray. When he arrived at the police station, Gray's counsel conducted a lengthy interview with him. After his attorney left, Gray again demanded in the presence of the Suffolk Chief of Police and Detective Bunker that he be allowed to speak with Lilley. Bunker testified at the suppression hearing that Gray asked him what he should do. Bunker asked Gray, [W]hat did your attorney tell you to do? Gray said, My attorney told me to not say anything, to which Bunker responded, Well, then you should do what your attorney said. Gray, however, said, No, I want to talk to Sergeant Lilley. Thereafter, Lilley was contacted and he, Bunker, and Gray went to Lilley's office. Gray executed another rights form containing essentially the same questions and answers as the one he had executed for Freeman the preceding day. Gray then gave Lilley a lengthy and detailed statement in question and answer form. The statement was tape-recorded on a machine that was in full view of Gray at all times, and he saw tapes being changed. When transcribed, the statement consisted of 78 typewritten pages. In his statement to Lilley, Gray again admitted his participation in each of the crimes for which he was charged, but continued to assert that Melvin Tucker was the person who shot McClelland. Gray contends on appeal, as he did at the suppression hearing, that he would not have made any statements had he known that an unwritten statement could be used against him. He also claims he did not fully understand what his signature on the rights form meant. Additionally, Gray claims that the police made certain statements to him that were coercive or threatening or that contained promises of leniency. The police denied making threats, promises, or coercive statements. The trial court found that Gray desired to make the statements and did so without promises, inducements, or intimidation. The court also concluded that Gray understood thoroughly his constitutional rights as set forth in Miranda. A defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights is valid only if the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. Whether a statement is voluntary is ultimately a legal rather than factual question. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, ___, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). Subsidiary factual questions, however, are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Id. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 451. The test to be applied in determining voluntariness is whether the statement is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, or whether the maker's will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2046, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In determining whether a defendant's will has been overborne, courts look to the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, id. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047, including the defendant's background and experience and the conduct of the police, Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 464, 352 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987); Stockton, 227 Va. at 140, 314 S.E.2d at 381. Gray was nearly 28 years old at the time of the offense. He possessed a high school equivalency diploma and stated that he could read and write. Gray initiated both conversations with the police. He stated that he understood the legal rights advice form, and his 12-year involvement with police and law enforcement procedures corroborates his statement. In addition to carefully explaining the waiver forms, the police repeatedly told him that they could make no promises or guarantees, and Gray indicated he understood. The police told Gray numerous times that he had a right to have his attorney present, a right to stop answering questions at any time, and that anything he said could be used against him. Gray indicated that he understood and repeatedly told the police that he wanted to talk. Our review of the record reveals that Gray's right to have counsel present and his privilege against self-incrimination were scrupulously honored by the police. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). From an assessment of the totality of all the surrounding circumstances of the present case, we conclude, as did the trial court, that Gray's statements to the police were made freely, knowingly, and voluntarily and that his Miranda rights were not violated.