Opinion ID: 2654645
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion[.]

Text: In Warren, 809 P.2d at 790, Warren challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of attempted voluntary manslaughter, arguing that there was no evidence of an attempt to kill. After stating the substantive elements of attempted voluntary manslaughter, this Court proceeded to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence as to those elements, primarily the evidence supporting Warren’s “attempt” to kill his victim and the accompanying inference regarding Warren's intent. Id. We concluded that the reasonable inference from the evidence presented was that “Warren attempted to kill [his victim], and a jury could so find beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In the context of appellant’s claimed “logical impossibility,” particularly the intent element of an attempt versus that of an underlying general intent crime, attempted second-degree murder is indistinguishable from attempted voluntary manslaughter. Indeed, voluntary manslaughter is a “lesser included offense of the crime of second degree murder,” and is “a general intent crime that does not require a deliberate intent to kill.” State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1138-39 (Wyo. 1993). .... Nothing about the instant case convinces us that we should now find it legally or logically impossible for a person to attempt a general intent crime. As we said in Compton, 931 P.2d at 940, 941 (quoting People v. Frysig, 628 P.2d 1004, 1007 n. 4, 1008 (Colo. 1981)), the question 17 presented to the jury in an attempt case essentially has two levels: (1) whether the person had “ ‘the intent to perform acts which, if completed, would constitute the underlying offense’ ”- in other words, did the person intend the conduct that constitutes the substantial step; and (2) whether the person had the intent necessary as an element of the underlying offense—“ ‘[e]xcept for the intentional conduct constituting the substantial step, the requisite culpability is that provided for in the definition of the [underlying] offense.’ ” That analysis works just as well for attempted crimes that traditionally have been categorized as general intent crimes as it does for attempted crimes that traditionally have been categorized as specific intent crimes. Id., ¶¶ 6-12; 55 P.3d at 1261-63 (footnote omitted). Bloomfield v. State, 2010 WY 97, ¶ 13, 234 P.3d 366, 371-73 (Wyo. 2010) (emphasis added). [¶36] Noel seeks to distinguish this precedent, asserting that the issue herein is different, in that it involves the particular form of “voluntary manslaughter.” What Noel’s argument really boils down to is his assertion that the district court should have concluded that Noel lacked intent, thereby invalidating any guilty plea for either Noel’s original charges or his amended charges. However the court was under no obligation to draw such a conclusion, particularly in light of the totality of evidence presented to it, nor has Noel provided this Court with legal or factual support to deviate from its precedent. The Court declines to accept his invitation to do so.