Opinion ID: 161452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Claim: Retaliatory Discharge in Violation of First and Fourteenth Amendments

Text: 11 An individual public employer is liable for retaliatory discharge when he terminates an employee because she engaged in protected speech. Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Schools Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1338 (10th Cir. 2000). If the court determines that the speech at issue was not protected, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 5 If the speech was protected, the claim is then submitted to the jury, which must decide whether that speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination, Bd. of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996), and if so, whether the employer would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected speech. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). If the jury resolves the foregoing causation issues in the employee's favor, the individual who made the termination decision may be liable for damages. Id. Because the mere fact [t]hat a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of federal rights at the hands of a [public] employee will not alone permit an inference of [governmental] culpability and causation, Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1997), a plaintiff who seeks to reach beyond an individual defendant to the employer as a public entity must also show that the constitutional violation is attributable to that entity. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121-23 (1988) (plurality opinion); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-83 & n.12 (1986) (plurality opinion); Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 12 We begin our analysis with the plaintiff's most fundamental objection: that the district court refused to instruct the jury on her theory of the case. 6 See FDIC v. Schuchmann, 235 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that a party is entitled to an instruction on [her] theory of the case . . . if he has offered sufficient evidence for the jury to find in his favor) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Instruction 22 erroneously: 13 limited the scope of expressive activities on which [her] First Amendment retaliation claim was based just to her one telephone conversation with Dr. Hendrick. That was not the theory of Dr. Craven's case. She claimed retaliation based not only on that [1] one conversation, but also upon her earlier speech in connection with [2] indoor air quality problems resulting from construction activities at the Barbara Davis Center, [3] the storage and disposal of bio-hazardous waste, and [4] other matters. 14 Aplt. Br. at 16-17 (emphasis added). Because Dr. Craven raised this objection to the trial court before the jury retired, see IV Aplt. App. 818, our review is de novo. Karnes v. SCI Colo. Funeral Serv., Inc., 162 F.3d 1077, 1079 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. In de novo review, we consider the instructions in their entirety and reverse only if we determine that the error was prejudicial in light of the record as a whole. Giron v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999). 15 The underlying premise of Plaintiff's objection to the limited scope of Instruction 22 is that the district court erred when it ruled that the telephone call was protected, but that her speech regarding the IAQ problem, the infectious waste room, and other safety matters was not. See IV Aplt. App. 520, 523-24, 878-79. In order to assess the merits of the objection, we must therefore determine whether any or all of the above-referenced speech was protected. Cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 n.10 (noting that courts are obligated to examine . . . the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they are made to see whether or not they . . . are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment . . . protect, and therefore cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case) (internal quotations and citations omitted, first omission in original). This is a purely legal inquiry, see id. at 148 n.7, which we conduct on the basis of the trial record, notwithstanding UH's failure to file a cross-appeal on this point. 7 See Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.3d 1436, 1441 n.14 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc). 16 Of the four categories of speech upon which Plaintiff seeks to base her 1983 claim, we must reject two at the outset. First, Dr. Craven's allegation that she was terminated in retaliation for her speech on other matters is patently inadequate. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). It is the place of counsel, not the Court of Appeals, to identify the specific instances of speech upon which the plaintiff seeks to base her claim. We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant, and a bare assertion does not preserve a claim, particularly when, as here, a host of other issues are presented for review. Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.). 17 Second, the plaintiff's reliance on her speech concerning the infectious waste room is misplaced. In any retaliatory discharge case, the threshold inquiry is whether the speech at issue involved a matter of public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47. Although it is not entirely clear from Plaintiff's brief, she appears to argue that she was terminated, in part, for the proposal she made to Ms. Sens regarding a presentation to the management council about the storage and disposal of bio-hazardous waste. Aplt. Br. at 17. Although it is well-settled that a public employee need not spread [her] views before the public in order to pursue a claim for retaliatory discharge, Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979), it is equally well-settled that [i]n deciding whether a particular statement involves a matter of public concern, the fundamental inquiry is whether the plaintiff speaks as an employee or as a citizen. David v. City & County of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1355 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147). In consulting with Ms. Sens regarding the propriety of presenting certain photographs to a group of managers with no direct responsibility for the photographs' subject matter, Plaintiff was obviously speaking as an employee not as a citizen. Id. at 277, 549; see also id. at 277 (testimony of Dr. Craven, describing photographs as really gross). The Supreme Court has firmly rejected the view that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public concern, noting that such a presumption would mean that virtually every remark . . . would plant the seed of a constitutional case. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149. This is not the law. [T]he First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over [such] internal office affairs as the proper forum and composition for a presentation on infectious waste. 8 Id. 18 Strictly for the sake of analysis, we assume without deciding that Dr. Craven's speech regarding internal air quality and radiation safety did involve matters of public concern, and we proceed to the second component of our inquiry: whether Dr. Craven's interests, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern outweigh the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). We have held that the balance of interests may favor the employer when some restriction is necessary to . . . insure effective performance by the employee. Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 815 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Relevant considerations include: whether the [employee's speech] impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73). 19 Because [t]he government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer, Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion)), courts have consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large. Id. (quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 673). The employer cannot, however, rely on purely speculative allegations that certain statements caused or will cause disruption . . . . Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 815. Instead, the government must articulate specific concerns about the impact of an employee's speech, and those concerns must be reasonable and formed in good faith. Andersen v. McCotter, 205 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). The government need not allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the [operation] and the destruction of working relationships is manifest . . . . Connick, 461 U.S. at 152; accord Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 934 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that employer need not wait for speech actually to disrupt core operations before taking action). With these legal standards in mind, we turn to the speech at issue.
20 Plaintiff's speech regarding the IAQ problem had a significantly adverse impact on her relationship with various HSC personnel involved in the Barbara Davis Center construction project. Because UH and HSC have, in many senses, a common mission, it is extremely important that employees of both institutions maintain good collegial relationships and respect and trust each other. IV Aplt. App. 736 (testimony of Ms. Cashman). Negative relationships between UH and HSC employees create a lot of tension . . . [and] distrust, and have an adverse effect on the institutions' abilities to resolve problems. Id. at 737. With respect to the IAQ problem, it was particularly important for Dr. Craven to have a comfortable and collegial relationship with John Allison, HSC's project manager for the Barbara Davis Center, as well as the other HSC employees and contractors involved. Dr. Craven made no attempt to foster such a relationship. In fact, it appears that she went out of her way to antagonize Mr. Allison and his team, first by copying a memorandum that concerned him directly to his supervisor and other high level officials, id. at 980, then by bringing angry staff members to a meeting at which she was rude and disrespectful to her HSC colleagues, eventually becoming so emotional that she had to withdraw from participating in the meeting in order to collect herself. Id. at 203 (testimony of Dr. Craven). 21 As a result, the colleagues with whom the plaintiff was supposed to be working in harmony to resolve problems and further a common goal came to view her as snide, abrasive, unprofessional, unwilling to help, degrading, nonrespectful, id. at 620-22 (testimony of Mr. Allison), completely inappropriate, cynical, argumentative, uncooperative, incorporating vigilante-ism, id. at 1110-12 (5/19/94 e-mail from Mr. Allison to Mr. Pauline), and tending to create havoc. Id. at 664 (testimony of Mr. Kohler). Dr. Jones expressed her concerns about Dr. Craven's approach to the IAQ problem on numerous occasions. Id. at 1108-09 (5/24/94 letter, advising the plaintiff to slow down and think clearly, to be more sensitive to the appropriate manner in dealing with patients, staff and faculty, to employ procedures that would keep people calm rather than contribute to their anxiety, and commenting: I find the surprise appearance of employees at a construction meeting to be thoroughly inappropriate and need to advise you that it should not reoccur); id. at 1130 (5/28/94 e-mail: [Y]our effectiveness has little to do with where you sit, but a lot to do with how you approach people.); see also id. at 1105-07 (6/1/94 letter); id. at 1004-05 (6/4/94 e-mail). On the record before us, it was more than reasonable for UH to conclude that Plaintiff's manner, including the manner in which she expressed herself to others, was having a negative impact both on her performance and on the hospital's operations. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676. Because there is no basis for us to second-guess that judgment, we hold that the Pickering balance favors the defendant as to Dr. Craven's IAQ-related speech, and that her speech on that issue was not entitled to First Amendment protection for purposes of her retaliatory discharge claim.
22 There is no dispute as to the substance of the plaintiff's telephone conversation with Dr. Hendrick. See IV Aplt. App. 307-09; cf. Waters, 511 U.S. at 668. Several of the facts asserted by Dr. Craven in that conversation, however, were controverted by Dr. Johnson. He testified that the incident at issue did not involve a spilt infusion of intravenous radioactive iodine, cf. IV Aplt. App. 307 (testimony of Dr. Craven), but rather, a patient's reaction to radioactive iodine in capsule form. Id. at 686 ([W]hat had happened was that the patient had thrown up.). Dr. Johnson also clarified the procedures to be followed when a radiation incident occurred. He explained that the hospital maintained a call-down list of several people including him that could be called upon to respond in the event of a radiation emergency. Id. at 680. Regardless, inadvertently false speech on a matter of public concern may still provide a basis for a retaliatory discharge claim. See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73. 23 Even assuming that the call did involve matters of public concern, UH's interests in efficiency far outweigh the plaintiff's interests, as a citizen, in commenting on the radiation incident at issue to Dr. Hendrick. From the record before us, it appears that Plaintiff's conversation with Dr. Hendrick had a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, . . . interfere[d] with the regular operation of the enterprise, and impede[d] the performance of the speaker's duties . . . . Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. As noted, it is essential that UH and HSC employees maintain collegial relationships so that they can work with, rather than against, one another in solving problems that affect both institutions. See IV Aplt. App. 736-37. According to Ms. Sens, major problems develop[ed] between UH Administration and the Health Sciences Center because of [Dr. Craven's] communications with Ed Hendrick[] concerning the radiation safety officer. Id. at 1114. Ms. Cashman testified that the plaintiff's conversation with Dr. Hendrick would lead to misunderstandings between UH and HSC's radiology department and call Ms. Cashman's credibility as a manager into question. Id. at 845-47. 24 With respect to the plaintiff's own performance, Ms. Sens testified that she had explicitly advised Dr. Craven to make her concerns known to Joyce Cashman and then let it rest, id. at 553, but that Dr. Craven would just not give it up, id., and that her persistence eventually went from annoying to destructive. Id. at 574. After Dr. Craven's telephone call to Dr. Hendrick, Ms. Sens realized that if Dr. Craven was to continue in her position, she would require [v]ery intense supervision on a [d]ay to day basis, obligating Ms. Sens to constantly check[] what she had said [and] who she had spoken to, a very inappropriate level of supervision for a manager. Id. at 570-71. Simply put, Ms. Sens felt that she could no longer trust the plaintiff's judgment. Id. at 571. We find the foregoing evidence sufficient to tip the Pickering balance in favor of the hospital with respect to the plaintiff's telephone call to Dr. Hendrick. 9 Accordingly, that call provides no basis for Dr. Craven's 1983 claim.
25 In sum, of the four categories of speech cited in Dr. Craven's brief, none can provide an adequate basis for her retaliatory discharge claim. Her argument regarding speech on other matters is too vague, her speech concerning infectious waste did not involve a matter of public concern, and even assuming that her IAQ- and radiation safety-related speech touched on matters of public concern, UH's interests, as an employer, clearly outweighed the plaintiff's interests, as a citizen, in commenting on those matters as she did. Accordingly, we hold that UH was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Dr. Craven's 1983 claim. Because the 1983 claim should never have been submitted to the jury, the other five errors alleged in Dr. Craven's brief were harmless, and we need not address them. See Aplt. Br. at 16-17. We now turn to the plaintiff's pendent claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 26