Opinion ID: 1722366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Character Evidence of Victims

Text: The evidence regarding the character of the victims was introduced without objection and no error in that regard is claimed on appeal. It was not improper for the trial judge to exclude testimony offered in rebuttal that following a high speed chase of a stolen vehicle, Deputy Briscoe shot out three of the tires of the stolen vehicle to stop it. The issue began with the Commonwealth's direct examination of Powell County Coroner Carl Wells, to wit: Q. 33. Would you describe either one of them as being aggressive, gung-ho type of individuals? A. No, Sir. Q. 34. Would it be quite the opposite? A. It would be the opposite. To rebut this testimony, Baze proposed to introduce evidence concerning an incident in which Deputy Briscoe arrested one Doug Pasley for theft of an automobile. As reported in the January 16, 1992 edition of the local newspaper, Pasley attempted to elude Briscoe, but was captured when Briscoe shot out the tires of Pasley's vehicle. Briscoe is alleged to have approached Pasley with gun drawn and asked, Do you want to meet your Maker? Inquiry was made of Coroner Wells, on cross-examination whether he . . . knew of an incident that occurred in Powell County, Kentucky . . . involving Deputy Briscoe? Before Wells could respond, the Commonwealth interposed an objection which was sustained. Baze made no effort to obtain Wells' response by avowal. KRE 103(a)(2). Instead, he attempted to rebut Wells' testimony by offering a copy of the newspaper article and by attempting to call Pasley as a witness to testify to the facts of the incident. The trial judge properly sustained objections to both attempts. Baze also offered to rebut Wells' testimony by testifying to his own hearsay knowledge of the event. He testified by avowal that he had been informed . . . about Arthur Briscoe shooting out tires and so forth on this boy's car. He never claimed to have read the newspaper article or to have heard of the alleged meet your Maker threat. Coroner Wells' testimony marginally qualified as evidence of the victims' character for peacefulness. KRE 404(a)(2). Thus, Baze should have been permitted to inquire whether Wells had heard of or knew about the facts surrounding Pasley's arrest, which at least constituted evidence of Briscoe's character for aggressiveness. KRE 405(b). But whatever Wells' answer, further inquiry concerning that issue would then have been precluded. If Wells had admitted knowledge of the incident, the Commonwealth would have been entitled to an admonition that the jury could consider that evidence only insofar as it affected the credibility of Wells' opinion of Briscoe's character for peacefulness (non-aggressiveness). Broyles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 73, 74 (1954); Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.20, at 85 (3rd Ed., Michie, 1993). If Wells had denied knowledge of the incident, Baze could not have proven the incident by extraneous evidence, i.e., the newspaper article, Pasley, or his own testimony. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 548 (1988); Etherton v. Commonwealth, 246 Ky. 553, 55 S.W.2d 343, 347 (1932). If Wells did not know of the Pasley incident, the error in refusing to permit the inquiry was harmless. Of course, absent an avowal, there is no way to know what Wells' response would have been, i.e., whether Baze was prejudiced by the error. Unpreserved errors are reviewable in a case where the death penalty has been imposed. KRS 532.075(2); Ice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671, 674 (1984). But an unpreserved error cannot be reviewed when, as here, it is impossible to ascertain from the record whether the error was harmless or prejudicial. Prejudice will not be presumed from a silent record. Walker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 476 S.W.2d 630, 631 (1972). Furthermore, even if Wells would have responded that he knew of the prior incident involving Pasley's arrest, we are not persuaded that the exclusion of this evidence, which would serve only to impeach marginal character evidence, affected the jury's finding of guilt or its imposition of the death penalty in this case. Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665, 668 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 831, 112 S.Ct. 107, 116 L.Ed.2d 76 (1991); Cosby v. Commonwealth, Ky., 776 S.W.2d 367, 369 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063, 110 S.Ct. 880, 107 L.Ed.2d 963 (1990). Baze belatedly claims on appeal that his own testimony about the incident was admissible to show that he acted out of fear of Briscoe when he resisted arrest and killed Briscoe and Bennett. See Carnes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 595 (1970). However, as pointed out in Carnes, the offered evidence must have some reasonable relationship to the defendant's claim of self-defense. Id. at 598; see also Lawson, supra, § 8.05, at 366-67. It must tend to prove that the defendant had a justifiable fear of the victim at the time of their encounter. Lawson, supra, § 2.15, at 70. Baze's avowal testimony does not prove that he knew of Briscoe's alleged threatening remark to Pasley. The avowal proved only that Baze knew Briscoe had effected Pasley's arrest by shooting out the tires of the vehicle Pasley was driving. Nor did Baze testify that this information caused him to be in fear that Briscoe would kill him, but only that it put some caution in me when dealing with him. The most logical interpretation of Baze's avowal is that his knowledge of Pasley's arrest caused him to be cautious about resisting Briscoe's efforts to effect his own arrest. It would be a great and impermissible leap in logic to infer from this avowal testimony that Baze so feared Briscoe that he believed he needed to kill him in self-protection.