Opinion ID: 1231511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In Limine Ruling Violations

Text: Appellant maintains that the trial court incorrectly allowed a pre-trial ruling to be violated during the opening statements of WMH and also during the testimony of the investigating city police officer, John Hall. The pre-trial ruling in question appeared in the February 14, 2002, order of Judge Thornsbury, which Appellant maintains disallows evidence regarding the events leading up to the crash and the ability of a person to survive such an accident irrelevant to the central issues of the case. [11] Appellant moved for a mistrial based upon the following opening statements made on behalf of WMH: Jason Kominar died . . . when his truck went across four lanes of a highway at high speed and crashed head on into a rock cliff. . . . [T]he drawing of the accident scene made by the Officer John Hall [referring to a drawing of the scene shown to the jury during opening]. . . . No evidence that he ever attempted to brake. . . . John Hall says high speed motor vehicle accident. . . . You can see the front part of the truck basically destroyed [stated while showing a picture of the crash scene]. She also objected to the hospital's citing auto death statistics to support its contention that the victim could not have survived the crash. Although we find that the opening remarks involving the substance of the anticipated testimony of Officer Hall adhere to the strictures of the in limine ruling, survival statistics from these types of crashes stray from that which the February 14, 2002, order defined as relevant evidence. As clearly stated in the order, the only evidence that is relevant as to the Plaintiffs [sic] claim against the Defendant's [sic] is evidence as to factors that may have caused or contributed to the decedent's treatment and subsequent death after the time the decedent entered into the care of the Defendants. General statistics about survival rates from these types of accidents do not shed light on whether Mr. Kominar had vital signs at the time treatment was administered or whether the care provided met the standards for delivery under the specific circumstances of the case. Although the jury is instructed that opening statements are not to be considered evidence, such a violation of the established law of the case should not be treated lightly. See Syl. Pt. 4, Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 194 W.Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995); Honaker v. Mahon, 210 W.Va. 53, 552 S.E.2d 788 (2001). On retrial, the lower court should require careful and steadfast adherence to the February 14, 2002, ruling throughout the trial. The portion of Officer Hall's testimony given in response to questions posed by MCAS' counsel that Appellant maintains also violates the in limine ruling is: Q. Given your experience as a police officer and someone who has investigated hundred[s] of accidents, would it [be] fair to say given the injuries that you observed and the condition of the scene of the accident that you were not surprised to learn that Jason hadn't survived this accident. A. That is correct. While the opening statements may have been misleading, this testimony of the police officer was improperly admitted evidence. This testimony falls outside the clear parameters set forth in the February 14, 2002, order for relevant evidence. There was no defensible reason to have a uniformed police officer testify to whether he was surprised Mr. Kominar died except to confuse the issue before the jury by intentionally introducing irrelevant and therefore prejudicial evidence. As we have already determined grounds on which that this case should be remanded, we stress that such a violation of the in limine ruling is ground for reversing the jury verdict and should not be repeated in a subsequent trial.