Opinion ID: 2077873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delaware Guilty Plea as a Predicate Offense For Habitual Offender Status

Text: Hall argues that the Superior Court erred when it allowed the State to introduce a docket sheet, rather than the text of Hall's guilty plea, to establish a predicate offense required for habitual offender status. [37] Hall argues that Morales v. State [38] requires the State to produce the text of any guilty plea when the State offers a guilty plea to establish a predicate offense. The State argues that the Superior Court did not err because the docket sheet in question clearly identified the crimes to which Hall pleaded guilty. Following the verdict, the State moved to sentence Hall as an habitual offender. Section 4214(b) of the habitual offender statute requires a court to impose a life sentence upon a defendant who has been 2 times convicted of a felony ... hereinafter specifically named ... and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony hereinafter specifically named.... [39] Such a sentence is not subject to probation or parole. The subsequent felony the State offered was Hall's conviction for second degree burglary in this case, which is indeed one of the felonies enumerated in Section 4214(b). The two prior convictions the State offered under Section 4214(b) were also for burglary in the second degree, one from 1981 and one from 1988 and both from Delaware courts. The 1981 conviction was based upon a guilty plea. To prove the 1981 conviction the State provided the sentencing order and the docket sheet. The docket sheet lists the entry of nolle prosequi for three charges and a guilty plea for two. The docket sheet specifically records that Hall pleaded guilty to two counts of burglary in the second degree. In Morales v. State, [40] the State offered Morales' guilty plea from a Massachusetts court as one of the predicate offenses for habitual offender status. [41] The State offered certified copies of two indictments, and two docket entries. [42] The two indictments were for possession with intent to deliver in 1977 and trafficking in 1985, respectively. [43] Morales had initially pleaded not guilty to the second charge. [44] The docket entry for the first charge read, Defendant offers to plead guilty  After hearing Court accepts defendant's offer. [45] The second docket entry read, Plea Retracted and Plea Guilty Offered and Accepted by the Court. [46] The State also introduced into evidence a National Crime Information Center report that Morales had been convicted of both trafficking and possession with intent to deliver. [47] We concluded that it is not apparent from the sparse record before this Court what offenses and statutes were the bases for Morales' prior convictions. [48] This Court was clearly concerned with the 1985 plea, which contained an ambiguity. One possible explanation for the language of that plea was that Morales had initially decided to plead guilty, later retracted his plea for some reason, and then offered a plea to the same offense again upon reconsideration. This interpretation would have qualified Morales for habitual offender status under Delaware law because trafficking is indeed an enumerated offense within Section 4214(b). On the other hand, another interpretation was that Morales initially decided to plead guilty, retracted his plea, and then accepted a plea bargain to a lesser offense. This interpretation might have disqualified Morales from habitual offender status because his conviction might not have been for an enumerated offense. Furthermore, the National Crime Center report was no help because there was no evidence to suggest that it was based upon a correct interpretation of the docket entry's ambiguous language. Thus, this Court set aside Morales' sentence as an habitual offender because the State had failed to prove habitual offender status beyond a reasonable doubt. [49] Hall argues that Morales stands for the proposition that the State must produce the text of a guilty plea whenever the State uses a guilty plea as a basis for habitual offender status, regardless of whether the plea is from a foreign jurisdiction or from a Delaware court. [50] Morales stands only for the proposition that the State must show a guilty plea offered as a predicate offense for habitual offender status beyond a reasonable doubt, not that it must necessarily do so with the text of that guilty plea. Both this Court and the Superior Court have favored this narrower reading. [51] In fact, we are aware of no other jurisdiction, state or federal, [52] that categorically requires the text of a guilty plea to show habitual offender status. [53] Finally, some jurisdictions may not keep records of the text of every guilty plea offered for decades. Given that guilty pleas are a significant percentage of all convictions, such a rule might significantly reduce the utility of the habitual offender statute in a way that the Delaware General Assembly did not intend. Therefore, we decline to adopt it. Morales holds that the State has the burden of proof in establishing that each predicate offense meets the requirements of Section 4214 and that the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. [54] The extent of the holding in Morales was that the patent ambiguity of the record there created a reasonable doubt. We hold that the State need offer only unambiguous documentary evidence of a prior predicate conviction, not live witnesses, [55] and not a particular or exclusive type of documentary evidence. Once the State has offered evidence of the prior conviction that is regular on its face, the State has met its burden of establishing a prima facie case. [56] The State need not anticipate every possible difficulty in that proof that a defendant might raise. [57] When the State offers a conviction based upon a guilty plea as a predicate offense for habitual offender status, there are at least two problems that might arise. One is whether the defendant's conduct actually constituted a predicate offense within the meaning of Section 4214(a) (requiring that the predicate offense be a felony) or Section 4214(b) (requiring that the predicate offense be one in a list of felonies). The other is whether the defendant pleaded guilty to all of the charged offenses, some of the charged offenses, or to a lesser included offense of one of the charges. As to the first problem, Delaware courts have said that in order to qualify as a predicate offense, the conduct leading to an out-of-state judgment must be such that it would have supported a conviction for the appropriate predicate offense in Delaware. [58] Thus, a court must look at the prior conduct of the defendant as it relates to the felonies in the Delaware Criminal Code, rather than to rely on technical classifications of other jurisdictions over which our legislature has no control. [59] One of the reasons Morales vacated the defendant's sentence in that case was that the State had offered no evidence that the conduct underlying Morales' guilty plea constituted a predicate offense under Delaware law. [60] Here, however, Hall's guilty pleas were all in Delaware courts, to offenses charged under Delaware law. Thus, this problem does not apply to this case. The State must also establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually pleaded guilty to, or was found guilty of, a predicate offense, and not merely that the defendant was charged with one. In Morales, because of the patent ambiguity, it was unclear whether the defendant had been convicted of trafficking or of a lesser offense that would not constitute a predicate offense. [61] Thus, the State had not met its burden of proof. Here, by contrast, it is clear that Hall pleaded guilty to two of his five original charges and that the State entered a nolle prosequi as to the rest. It is also clear that Hall pleaded guilty to two specific counts of burglary in the second degree, which are indeed enumerated offenses under Section 4214(b). The Superior Court's determination of habitual offender status must be supported by substantial evidence, and free from legal error and any abuse of discretion. [62] Here, there was substantial evidence to support the Superior Court's conclusion that the State had met its burden of proof in establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the predicate offenses required under Section 4214(b).