Opinion ID: 784350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jorgensen's evidence of access

Text: 16 Access means that an alleged infringer had a reasonable possibility — not simply a bare possibility — of hearing the prior work; access cannot be based on mere speculation or conjecture. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir.1988); see also Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1250; Grubb v. KMS Patriots, L.P., 88 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996); Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506-07 (6th Cir.1999); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.02[A], at 13-19 to 13-20 (2002) ([R]easonable opportunity ... does not encompass any bare possibility in the sense that anything is possible. Access may not be inferred through mere speculation or conjecture.); but cf. id. at § 13.02[A], at 13-22 (noting that [a]t times, distinguishing a `bare' possibility from a `reasonable' possibility will present a close question). In order to support a claim of access, a plaintiff must offer significant, affirmative and probative evidence. Scott v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 449 F.Supp. 518, 520 (D.D.C.1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C.Cir.1979) (table), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S.Ct. 137, 66 L.Ed.2d 60 (1980); see also Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F.Supp.2d 539, 547 (S.D.N.Y.2000). 17
18 Jorgensen argues, first, that his act of mailing unsolicited tapes of Lover to scores of record and music publishing companies, including the corporate defendants, constituted access because the corporate employees who allegedly received the mailing could have provided the Heart and Amazed songwriters with a copy of Lover. With two exceptions reviewed below, however, Jorgensen has not provided any reasonable documentation that he actually mailed such tapes (or when or to whom these tapes were purportedly sent). Jorgensen's mass-mailing allegation was, thus, properly rejected by the District Court as legally insufficient proof of access. 2002 WL 31119377, at  (noting that Jorgensen did not maintain a log of where and when he sent his work, or keep receipts from certified mailings to establish a chain of access); see also Dimmie v. Carey, 88 F.Supp.2d 142, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that the mailing of tapes to a corporation could be equated with access where there was no evidence that the tapes were ever received or forwarded to the alleged infringers); Jorgensen v. Careers BMG Music Publ'g, No. 01 Civ. 0357, 2002 WL 1492123, at -5 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2002) (Preska, J.) ( Jorgensen I ). 4
19 Jorgensen's second and more narrow theory of access, predicated on Pollock's and Leeds's admissions that they received Jorgensen's submissions, was also rejected by the District Court. 2002 WL 31119377, at -5. For the reasons outlined below, we agree with the District Court that Jorgensen's speculation that Pollock could have provided the Amazed songwriters with a copy of Lover did not, standing alone, suffice to prove access, where there was no evidence of any relationship between Pollock and the songwriters and where Pollock stated in his sworn declaration that he had never forwarded Jorgensen's tapes to anyone. With respect to Leeds and the Heart defendants, however, we find that Jorgensen introduced sufficient evidence to make the District Court's grant of summary judgment inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings. 20
21 In his sworn declaration, Pollock stated that his job as a managing producer in BMG's Special Products division has nothing to do with the publishing company, Careers BMG Music Publishing, Inc., or working creatively with songwriters at all. Although he conceded that he had received a CD recording of Lover, Pollock denied that he had ever listened to the song and asserted that he never conveyed the CD to anyone at any time, much less anyone who contributed creative ideas or material to Amazed or Heart. Meta-Film Assocs., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F.Supp. 1346, 1355-56 (C.D.Cal.1984); see also Tisi, 97 F.Supp.2d at 547-48 (finding no proof of access where plaintiff alleged that he sent unsolicited tapes to record companies, including the company that released records containing the allegedly infringing song, but there was no evidence that plaintiff's song was conveyed to anyone with creative input into the allegedly infringing song). In fact, Jorgensen conceded at his deposition that he had no knowledge that Pollock did anything with the CD that Jorgensen sent to him. Pollock stated that he did not have any relationship with the writers of Amazed, and Jorgensen has submitted no evidence to the contrary. Cf. Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 583 (4th Cir.1996) (A court may infer that the alleged infringer had a reasonable possibility of access if the author sent the copyrighted work to a third party intermediary who has a close relationship with the infringer. An intermediary will fall within this category, for example, if she supervises or works in the same department as the infringer or contributes creative ideas to him. (emphasis added)); Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 944 (8th Cir.1992) (finding access where intermediary was in a position to provide suggestions to the alleged copiers); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 354 (4th Cir.) (jury could infer access where intermediary with access to plaintiff's drawings had a close relationship to the alleged infringers), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1038, 121 S.Ct. 2000, 149 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2001); Tomasini v. Walt Disney Co., 84 F.Supp.2d 516, 522 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (finding no relationship between recipient of plaintiff's work and alleged infringers). 22 Jorgensen's claim against the Amazed defendants was properly dismissed because he has not offered any evidence to rebut Pollock's assertions. The most that Jorgensen offers to show a nexus between Pollock and the Amazed songwriters is his global assertion that anything and everything can very well happen. Such speculation does not give rise to a triable issue of access. See Ferguson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir.1978) (holding that plaintiff's mere speculation did not support a finding of access where defendant offered uncontroverted evidence of a lack of access); Towler, 76 F.3d at 582-83; Segal v. Paramount Pictures, 841 F.Supp. 146, 150 (E.D.Pa.1993), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir.1994) (table); Novak v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 752 F.Supp. 164, 169 (S.D.N.Y.1990); Meta-Film, 586 F.Supp. at 1355 (plaintiff's tort[u]ous chain of hypothetical transmittals was insufficient to avoid summary judgment on the question of access). Jorgensen has not adduced proof of a reasonable possibility that the paths of [the Amazed song-writers] and the infringed work crossed. Towler, 76 F.3d at 582. Bare corporate receipt of Jorgensen's work, without any allegation of a nexus between the recipients and the alleged infringers, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of access. 5 See Jorgensen I, 2002 WL 1492123, at -5; Dimmie, 88 F.Supp.2d at 146-47; Tisi, 97 F.Supp.2d at 547-48. 23
24 At his deposition, Leeds admitted that he had received tapes from Jorgensen but stated that he did not listen to them and he believed that they had been discarded. Leeds testified that his job as a Sony vice president involved reviewing promotional touring budgets and that he was not involved in the A & R process. Leeds also stated that he did not know the Heart songwriters. 25 Citing this evidence (and echoing their arguments with respect to Pollock), the defendants assert that the mere fact that Leeds had received a copy of Jorgensen's song does not mean that the Heart songwriters had a reasonable opportunity to hear it. Defendants argue that it is undisputed that Leeds did not forward Jorgensen's tape to the Heart songwriters, but they do not address the evidence introduced by Jorgensen that Leeds and his assistants repeatedly told Jorgensen that his tapes — including, in particular, one containing the song Lover — were being sent to Sony's A & R department. 6 Leeds, at his deposition, disputed Jorgensen's version of events, testifying that he did not recall ever making such a promise to Jorgensen and that he likely threw Jorgensen's tapes away. Leeds also conceded, though, that it was possible that if there was a tape that he received that he found interesting he might pass it on to one of his friends in the A & R department. 26 To draw a connection between Sony's A & R department and Horner and Jennings, the creators of Heart, Jorgensen relied on Sony's admission, in its response to his Request for Admissions, that during the relevant time period, on limited occasions, writers, producers or musicians affiliated with Sony may have been shown some material solicited by the A & R Dept. .... In concluding that Leeds did not forward Jorgensen's package, the District Court made no mention of (i) Jorgensen's deposition testimony to the contrary or (ii) Sony's admission regarding the practices of its A & R Department. 7 2002 WL 31119377, at . 27 Although the defendants accurately note that Jorgensen has put forth no evidence that the Heart songwriters actually heard his song, that argument misapprehends Jorgensen's burden. Jorgensen must show a reasonable possibility of access by the alleged infringer. Dimmie, 88 F.Supp.2d at 146 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1249 (explaining that to show access, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged infringer had a reasonable opportunity to view his work (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). He is not required to establish actual access. See Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 354-55 (A copyright infringement plaintiff need not prove that the infringer actually saw the work in question; it is enough to prove that the infringer (or his intermediary) had the mere opportunity to see the work and that the subsequent material produced is substantially similar to the work.) (emphasis added). 28 The facts of Jorgensen's case against the Heart defendants are entirely distinguishable from those presented in Dimmie, upon which the defendants rely, where the district court found that the plaintiff had not introduced a scintilla of evidence that the corporate recipient of her tape had forwarded it to the alleged infringers. 88 F.Supp.2d at 146; see also Novak, 752 F.Supp. at 169. Jorgensen's evidence sets out a clear nexus between Leeds, who has admitted receiving the Lover tape and the Sony A & R department, to which Leeds told Jorgensen he'd forwarded the tape. In addition, Jorgensen elicited an admission that the Sony A & R department occasionally shares such material with affiliated songwriters. Cf. Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 354 (noting that it was permissible for the jury to rest its access finding, in part, on the standard office routines of the defendant). What is not clear from the record before us is whether Horner and Jennings were songwriters affiliated with Sony in the period between when Jorgensen sent his tapes to Sony and when Heart was published. Absent some evidence on this issue, a jury could not reasonably infer simply from Sony's access to Jorgensen's work that Horner and Jennings also had such access. See generally Towler, 76 F.3d at 583 (refusing to find access where there was no evidence that intermediaries (who had access to plaintiff's screenplay) had contact with alleged infringer during the relevant time period). 29 As already noted, it is the defendant seeking summary judgment who must demonstrate a lack of evidence supporting an essential element of plaintiff's claim. See Repp, 132 F.3d at 890. The Heart defendants, who undoubtedly possess information about the time frame of Sony's affiliation with Horner and Jennings, failed to support their summary judgment motion with any evidence showing the lack of a relationship during the relevant period. 8 Because Jorgensen, appearing pro se, may not have appreciated the need to develop this particular evidence in discovery, summary judgment should not have been granted to defendants until the timing of any affiliation was clarified. Viewing the evidence adduced thus far in the light most favorable to Jorgensen and drawing all justifiable inferences in his favor, as we must at the summary judgment stage, see Mack, 326 F.3d at 119, we find that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the Heart defendants. Of course, it would be well within the District Court's discretion to permit limited discovery into the question of the timing of the songwriters' affiliation with Sony and to entertain a renewed motion for summary judgment, as may be appropriate.