Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Function of Choice in Conflict Analysis

Text: 219 The majority looks to statements by the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits to support the panel's contention that an actual conflict does not exist until an attorney makes a choice between his interest and the interest of his client. See Beets, 65 F.3d at 1277 (citing Stevenson v. Newsome, 774 F.2d 1558, 1561-62 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1089, 106 S.Ct. 1476, 89 L.Ed.2d 731 (1986); United States v. Litchfield, 959 F.2d 1514, 1518 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Acevedo, 891 F.2d 607, 610 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1419 (7th Cir.1988)). The concept of making a choice is typically used in cases where an attorney has a potential conflict (frequently between two clients)--i.e., a situation where interests have not yet diverged but could do so in the future. The courts look to whether a choice has been made only to signal that a divergence of interests has occurred--i.e., only to signal that a potential conflict has become an actual conflict. The central question is whether the interests have diverged, and the concept of making a choice is an analytical tool used to answer this question. 220 The cases cited by the majority support this proposition. See Stevenson, 774 F.2d at 1562 (noting that [t]here is no evidence in this case that [the attorney] was subject to divided loyalties sufficient to establish an actual conflict of interest, thus, rejecting Stevenson's allegations upon a determination that divergent interests were absent from the case) (emphasis added); Horton, 845 F.2d at 1420 (focusing on the absence of divergent interests in finding no conflict was created by counsel's application for a position as a United States Attorney by stating that [i]n any event, a candidate for a high federal position in his professional field would not advance his own interest by demonstrating that he is a weak or unskilled attorney on behalf of his client's interests.); Acevedo, 891 F.2d at 610 (failing to find conflict, but noting that if Acevedo had alleged in her affidavit that her attorney was involved with her in the criminal activity, he would have an obvious interest in preventing Acevedo from testifying and thus implicating him in the illegal scheme); Litchfield, 959 F.2d at 1518 (rejecting defendant's claim that a conflict of interest arose because trial counsel, concerned that defendant was going to commit perjury, held an ex parte conference with judge, noting that [t]he situation presented counsel with a difficult dilemma, and we cannot say that his ex parte discussion with the district court was a violation of his ethical duty or evidence of a conflict of interest.) 221 This focus on divergent interests to determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists is also the focus in our circuit:  '[a] conflict exists when defense counsel places himself in a position conducive to divided loyalties.'  United States v. Vaquero, 997 F.2d 78, 89 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 769 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir.1985)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 614, 126 L.Ed.2d 578 (1993); accord Mitchell v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 912, 103 S.Ct. 222, 74 L.Ed.2d 176 (1982). 222 In Beets's case, divergent interests existed, at the latest, when Andrews executed the media rights contract. At that point, it was in Beets's interest for Andrews to withdraw and testify, while it was in Andrews's interest to remain as counsel so that he would receive the value of the media rights. 223 The majority recognizes that disagreements between the majority and this dissent exist not only on whether there was an actual (as opposed to a potential) conflict but also on whether the conflict should be judged from an objective standpoint. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1278. In my view, it is important to be clear that determining whether divergent interests are present such that an actual conflict exists contemplates an objective evaluation of the situation in which counsel is placed. 10 As the Ninth Circuit recently noted, [t]he existence of an actual conflict cannot be governed solely by the perceptions of the attorney; rather, the court itself must examine the record to discern whether the attorney's behavior seems to have been influenced by the suggested conflict. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir.1994). 224 This objective evaluation makes perfect sense, for if the rule were as the majority suggests, counsel's actions benefiting himself and harming his client would not be actual conflicts, irrespective of their effect on the proceedings, as long as counsel was too obtuse, insensitive, or selfish to recognize that the pursuit of his own goals was coming at the expense of his client's defense. As the Supreme Court commented in an analogous context, [i]t is unlikely that [an attorney] would concede that he continued improperly to act as counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 265 n. 5, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1100 n. 5, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (describing how the conflict of interest was properly presented when the lawyer who allegedly had the conflict of interest had prepared the brief and the petition for certiorari). The fact that Andrews arguably chose to continue his representation thoughtlessly as opposed to deliberately does not obviate the fact that given the possible decisions he could have made as an attorney, he undertook a course of action that benefited himself while hindering Beets's defense. Simply put, an actual conflict is demonstrated when a defendant objectively shows that his interest and his attorney's interest diverged with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action, and such a divergence occurred in this case. 11 225