Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of Allocating Burden of Proof on Competency to Defendant

Text: In a related argument, defendant contends that by placing the burden on him of proving incompetence at a restoration hearing, pursuant to Mixon, the trial court deprived him of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Although both this court and the United States Supreme Court have held the presumption of competence as applied in an initial hearing under section 1369 does not violate due process rights ( Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 446-453, 112 S.Ct. 2572; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 881-885, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282), defendant, relying on a more recent high court decision ( Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 [state may not require that defendant prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence]), argues due process required a different burden allocation once he had been found incompetent. As just discussed, nothing in the record indicates the trial court actually employed Mixon's presumption of competence in finding competence restored, and in these circumstances the asserted misallocation of the burden of proof could not have been prejudicial under any standard of prejudice. This case therefore provides no occasion to address the constitutional issue.