Opinion ID: 777616
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rooker-Feldman Abstention

Text: 12 In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), the Supreme Court held that federal court review of state court proceedings is jurisdictionally limited to the Supreme Court of the United States by 28 U.S.C. § 1257. 12 See also Patmon v. Michigan Sup.Ct., 224 F.3d 504, 506 (6th Cir.2000). We refer to this doctrine as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). The Feldman Court stated that United States District Courts ... do not have jurisdiction ... over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may only be had in this Court. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303; see also Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, 266 F.3d 487, 492 (6th Cir.2001). In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court restated the doctrine as follows: under [the doctrine] a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). 13 We have held that there are two elements to a Rooker-Feldman analysis. First, in order for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply to a claim presented in federal district court, the issue before the Court must be [inextricably intertwined] with the claim asserted in the state court proceeding. Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir.1998) (quotation omitted). Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment. Id. (quotation omitted). Second, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal court jurisdiction where the claim is a specific grievance that the law was invalidly — even unconstitutionally — applied in the plaintiff's particular case. Id. In contrast, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar federal court jurisdiction where the claim is a general challenge to the constitutionality of the state law applied in the state action. Id. See also Patmon, 224 F.3d at 509-10. 14 In this case, the district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine because [c]learly, Plaintiffs' complaints amount to nothing more than a challenge to various state-court judgments against them. J.A. at 184 (Opinion and Order). The record fully supports this conclusion. In Count I of their November 9, 1999 complaint before the district court, the Tropfs directly attacked the state court judgments against them: 15 9. That the authorities in Michigan will provide no remedy for the theft of Plaintiffs' land except that Plaintiffs accept a collusive, unjust, and un-collectable Judgment ... and that the Defendants be allowed to wrongfully confiscate the Plaintiffs [sic] land without trial, or compensation ... violating the Plaintiffs [sic] constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 23. That the Michigan Courts have consistently refused to apply the Michigan Law applicable to the Plaintiffs' claims because of the collusive nature of the lawsuits, and, the decisions of the Courts are inconsistent with Michigan Law, have been misapplied, unjustly enrich Defendants and violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights to be treated equally under the 14th Amendment. 17 J.A. at 25, 27-28 (Nov. 9, 1999 Compl.). Furthermore, all the rest of the Tropfs' claims not only appear to be inextricably intertwined with the state court judgments regarding the validity of the warranty deed and the land contract, but they also appear to be particular to the Tropfs' case. 18 The Tropfs allege a variety of vague fraud and RICO claims, as well as constitutional due process and equal protection violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See J.A. at 22-33 (Nov. 9, 1999 Compl.). 13 All their claims, however, rely on the argument that the warranty deed and land contract executed by the Tropfs and Wolenski were fraudulent. Because the warranty deed and the land contract were upheld in all of the state actions involving the Tropfs, 14 the Tropfs' federal claims are therefore predicated on their conviction that the state courts were wrong — the very definition of inextricably intertwined. Moreover, the Tropfs do not argue that any state law applied to them is itself unconstitutional; instead, they argue only that their equal protection and due process rights were violated in the particular application of the state laws to their case. Thus, the district court was correct in finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine. 19 Because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Tropfs' case, it should not have reached the merits of the case. We therefore do not address the district court's holdings as to res judicata and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).