Opinion ID: 1210508
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requirement of a certificate of probable cause following a guilty plea

Text: Defendant contends that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear his 1979 automatic appeal in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, because it arose from a plea of guilty and the trial court did not issue a certificate of probable cause as, defendant contends, is required under section 1237.5. Section 1237.5 requires a defendant to obtain from the trial court a certificate of probable cause when appealing from a conviction resulting from a plea of guilty. In 1979, when defendant entered his plea of guilty in this case, section 1237.5 provided in relevant part: No appeal shall be taken by [a] defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere ... except where: [¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury[,] showing reasonable ... grounds going to the legality of the proceedings; and [¶] (b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the county clerk. (Italics added.) Defendant points out that he did not file with the trial court the requisite written statement and the trial court did not issue a certificate of probable cause. Accordingly, he argues, this court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his appeal in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309. Defendant acknowledges that to require a defendant sentenced to death to obtain a certificate of probable cause would be inconsistent with section 1239(b), which, as previously explained, provides that a judgment of death results in an automatic appeal without any action by [the defendant] or his 69... counsel. (Italics added.) Defendant argues, however, that because section 1237.5's certificate of probable cause requirement was enacted more recently than section 1239(b)'s automatic appeal provision, section 1237.5 controls. He invokes the principle of statutory construction that in the event of a conflict between two statutes, effect will be given to the more recently enacted law. ( Blealstein v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 152, 160, 208 Cal.Rptr. 428.) Principles of statutory construction guide us in achieving our ultimate task, which is to ascertain the Legislature's intent. ( People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 937, 67 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 941 P.2d 1189.) As we explain below, after examining the purpose of section 1237.5 we conclude that the Legislature did not intend that provision to apply to appeals from judgments of death based on a plea of guilty. The purpose for requiring a certificate of probable cause is to discourage and weed out frivolous or vexatious appeals challenging convictions following guilty and nolo contendere pleas. [Citations.] The objective is to promote judicial economy `by screening out wholly frivolous guilty [and nolo contendere] plea appeals before time and money is spent preparing the record and the briefs for consideration by the reviewing court.' [Citations.] ( People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75-76, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061.) This goal is inapplicable to an appeal from a sentence of death because, as we have explained, the Legislature has imposed on this court a duty to examine the record in all death sentence cases to determine whether the proceedings leading to the conviction and sentence were conducted fairly. ( People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 833, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889.) We therefore reject defendant's contention that in enacting section 1237.5, which generally requires a certificate of probable cause in cases involving a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the Legislature intended that requirement also to apply to automatic appeals in capital cases.