Opinion ID: 1448292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: psrb's definition of mental disease or defect by reference to the dsm

Text: Petitioner next argues that the PSRB erred as a matter of law in enacting a rule that defines a mental disease or defect in part by reference to the current DSM and in applying the DSM-III-R to his case. The legislature has not defined the phrase mental disease or defect directly, other than to exclude from the definition an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct    [or] any abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder. ORS 161.295(2). See also ORS 161.295(1) (describing conditions for verdict of guilty except for insanity). Pursuant to ORS 161.387(1), [8] the PSRB in 1985 adopted rules in which it incorporated those statutory exclusions, OAR 859-10-005(4) (1987), [9] and defined the terms mental disease and mental defect, OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987). Before a 1995 amendment, [10] those terms were defined as follows: (5) `Mental Disease'. Mental disease is defined as any diagnosis of mental disorder which is a significant behavorial [sic] or psychological syndrome or pattern that is associated with distress or disability casuing [sic] symptoms or impairment in at least one important area of an individual's functioning and is defined in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association. (6) `Mental Defect'. Mental defect is defined as mental retardation, brain damage or other biological dysfunction that is associated with distress or disability causing symptoms or impairment in at least one important area of an individual's functioning and is defined in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association. OAR 859-10-005 (1987) (emphasis added). The DSM is a publication of the American Psychiatric Association that compiles a list of mental disorders and sets forth the diagnostic criteria for each one. It provides clinicians and research investigators with a common language with which to communicate about the disorders for which they have professional responsibility. DSM-III at 1. The American Psychiatric Association has published five editions of the DSM. The DSM-III was published in 1980. It was revised and republished as the DSM-III-R in 1987. Both the PSRB and the Court of Appeals applied the DSM-III-R in petitioner's case. Petitioner's arguments require that we determine what the reference to the current DSM in OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987) means and whether the PSRB improperly delegated its authority to the American Psychiatric Association by defining mental disease and mental defect in part by reference to the DSM. Petitioner argues that the PSRB should have referred to the DSM-III, rather than the DSM-III-R, because the DSM-III was the current edition in effect in 1985 when OAR 859-10-005 was adopted. He asserts that he would be entitled to be discharged had the PSRB applied the DSM-III. In the alternative, petitioner argues that the rule is not valid if current means the latest edition of the DSM in effect at the time of the hearing. Relying on Hillman v. North. Wasco Co. PUD, 213 Or. 264, 323 P.2d 664 (1958), overruled on other grounds by Mauldinq v. Clackamas County, 278 Or. 359, 365, 563 P.2d 731 (1977), petitioner argues that the PSRB could not lawfully adopt subsequent changes to a privately compiled manual without holding a new hearing. In interpreting a statute or regulation, we must ascertain the intent of the body that promulgated it. Perlenfein and Perlenfein, 316 Or. 16, 20, 848 P.2d 604 (1993). We look first to the text and context of OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987) to determine what the PSRB meant by current in the present case. See ibid. (explaining method of analysis); PGE, 317 Or. at 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (same). The text of the rule does not state expressly which edition is the current edition of the DSM. The usual definition of current is: [1]c(1): presently elapsing    (2): occurring in or belonging to the present time: in evidence or in operation at the time actually elapsing    (3) of a serial publication: most recent    3a: in general knowledge, acceptance, use, or practice: PREVALENT, ACCUSTOMED, GENERAL: commonly accepted, engaged in, followed, used, or practiced: in vogue: CONTEMPORARY. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 557 (unabridged ed 1993) (emphasis in original). That definition suggests that the current DSM is the edition that was in effect at the time the PSRB adopted the rule but, without more, it does not clearly resolve the issue. Context, however, does make clear that meaning. Context includes existing rules of substantive law that are relevant to the statute being interpreted. Owens v. Maass, 323 Or. 430, 438, 918 P.2d 808 (1996). There is such a rule that is relevant here. In 1958, this court held that an agency may adopt a particular edition of another body's code or other set of standards but may not adopt, prospectively, subsequent changes to that code. Hillman, 213 Or. at 284, 323 P.2d 664. Specifically, in Hillman, this court held that a state agency's adoption of a national electrical safety code and subsequent changes therein violated the constitutional prohibition against the delegation of legislative powers. Ibid. The legislature had given the Public Service Commission (PSC) the authority to regulate the construction, maintenance, and operation of power lines in Oregon. In turn, the PSC had adopted certain portions of the National Electrical Safety Code `together with any subsequent changes, modifications, or alterations in such code which may hereafter be issued or adopted by the Bureau of Standards of the Department of Commerce.' Id. at 282-83, 323 P.2d 664 (quoting PSC order No. 922). This court held that the PSC did not have the right to adopt prospectively without hearing or further consideration subsequent changes, modifications or alterations in such code. Id. at 284, 323 P.2d 664. When the PSRB referred to the current DSM in OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987), it did so in the context of the rule of law announced in Hillman. The text and context make clear that the current DSM in that rule means the DSM-III. We conclude that the PSRB did not unlawfully delegate its power to the American Psychiatric Association when it adopted a rule defining a mental disease or defect in part by reference to the current DSM. The current DSM under OAR 859-10-005(5) and (6) (1987) is the DSM-III, because that is the edition that was in effect at the time that the PSRB adopted the rule.