Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Lyons' Reference to the Threat of a Lie Detector Test

Text: As a general rule, and as the trial court instructed here, the results of polygraph tests are inadmissible for any purpose because their scientific reliability has not been established. [31] Similarly, polygraph evidence is never admissible if it is offered to establish that a witness' version of the events is true. These rules reflect a legitimate concern that jurors will assume that the results of the polygraph are accurate and will therefore accept the witness' testimony as the truth. Put differently, the concern is that a potentially unreliable lie detector test will take the place of the jury in assessing the credibility of witnesses. [32] The State nevertheless contends that evidence of the threat of a polygraph test is admissible, even if the results of the polygraph test are not admissible. Curiously, neither party in all the voluminous briefs [33] filed in the case before us cites Whalen v. State, [34] where we held, in the unique circumstances of that case, that a polygraph test may be admissible as a relevant fact in assessing the voluntariness of a defendant's confession. The Whalen Court reached this conclusion because the presentation to the trier of fact of all relevant facts and circumstances is appropriate when it must assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession. [35] The holding in Whalen preserves the rule prohibiting the use of the results of a polygraph test without prior agreement of the parties. [36] We believe that any reference to a polygraph test is potentially mischievous. In fact, we cannot now foresee scenarios in which the potential for prejudice would not exist. At the very least, the trial court must apply enhanced scrutiny (in addition to a Rule 403 analysis) to assure that any references to a polygraph are necessary, of minimal prejudicial impact and that no other appropriate alternative evidence is available to establish the relevant operative fact sought to be admitted. The trial court must also formulate a clear cautionary instruction for the jury. [37] Whalen may not be read broadly to permit references to a lie detector test to prove a limitless range of operative facts, and it must be limited to the circumstances that were present in the Whalen case itself. [38] Accordingly, we do not pronounce today a per se exclusionary rule prohibiting any reference to a lie detector test, but we caution that one cannot rely on a broad reading of Whalen. The State characterizes the threat of a polygraph test as an event like any other event that could cause a witness to change his or her testimony in one direction or the other. [39] But a lie detector test is fundamentally different from other events because its purpose as an investigative tool is to gauge whether a person is telling the truth. [40] In the present case, the jury may have inferred from Lyons' testimony: (1) that Gerry was not telling the truth before the threat of a lie detector test and (2) that he was telling the truth after the threat. [41] The admission of Lyons' testimony relating to a threat of a polygraph test in this situation was improper because it runs the risk that a reasonable juror could infer that the witness was lying before the threat of a test but telling the truth afterward. Given the judicial suspicion of lie detector tests and the potentially prejudicial nature of the lie detector testimony described above, the threshold question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the State to elicit testimony that Gerry disclosed information in response to the threat of a lie detector test [42] even for the limited purpose for which the testimony was admitted and within the context of the trial court's limiting instructions. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we find that the trial court's admission of Lyons' reference to a lie detector test does not require a reversal of Capano's conviction. We believe there is no basis to conclude that the jury would ignore the cautionary instruction given in this case. As discussed in subsection C of this Section, we conclude that any error in allowing this testimony is harmless when viewed through the prism of the totality of the record and in light of the trial judge's limiting instruction.