Opinion ID: 626146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Solicitation for a Political Organization or Candidate

Text: A judicial candidate shall not solicit funds for a political organization or a candidate for public office. 52 Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 4.1(4)(a). The plurality, through a faulty ripeness analysis, avoids any attempt to either explain or validate this limitation on Wersal's constitutionally protected judicial election activity. Accordingly, in turn, I do not address the Rule in detail. For the reasons outlined above in conjunction with the endorsement and personal solicitation clauses, activity prohibited by this rule clearly is protected by the Constitution. Indeed, soliciting campaign contributions for an endorsed candidate for public office would usually be, at least, simply an added form of endorsement. So whether evaluated for connection with a court-opinion-defined compelling state interest of either actual bias or perceived bias, the Rule is unconstitutional. III. CONCLUSION As Justice O'Connor said in White I: Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested popular elections instead of through an appointment system or a combined appointment and retention election system along the lines of the Missouri Plan. In doing so the State has voluntarily taken on the risks to judicial bias described above. As a result, the State's claim that it needs to significantly restrict judges' speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is particularly troubling. If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges. 536 U.S. at 792, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In sum, as stated in the beginning, the Appellees' limitations are unconstitutional and must be enjoined. Accordingly, I dissent.