Opinion ID: 3162569
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: board’s denial of salem’s defense to ulp

Text: CHARGE Salem’s final salvo is that the Board prevented it from litigating supervisory taint as a defense to the ULP charge. We do not see how Salem could establish taint without relitigating the predicate supervisory question but it nonetheless maintains that the Board should have permitted it to make the argument as a defense in the ULP proceeding. Board regulations generally prohibit—in ULP proceedings—relitigation of matters that arose at the earlier representation proceeding stage. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(f) (“[This rule] shall preclude . . . parties from relitigating, in any related subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding, any issue which was, or could have been, raised in the representation proceeding.” (emphasis added)). We have upheld the rule, see Pace Univ. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 19, 23–24 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and only limited exceptions apply. For example, relitigation is allowed if newly discovered evidence requires reexamination of the representation decision. See Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 1146, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“It is well established that in the absence of newly discovered evidence or other special circumstances requiring reexamination of the decision in the representation proceeding, a respondent is not entitled to relitigate in a subsequent refusal-to-bargain proceeding representation issues that were 24 or could have been litigated in the prior representation proceeding.” (quotation omitted)). Relitigation is also permitted if subsequent legal authority changes the relevant law. See Alois Box Co. v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 69, 78 (D.C. Cir 2000) (“Because . . . the company failed to present legal authority indicating that the Board had changed its standard for determining supervisory status” the application of its “rule against relitigation” was proper). Again, we review application of the Board’s no-relitigation rule for abuse of discretion. See Pace Univ., 514 F.3d at 24. The relitigation ban plainly applied to Salem. Salem had already raised the CNs’ supervisory status issue in the representation proceeding and lost. It was also unsuccessful in pursuing its supervisory taint charge. Salem nonetheless makes three arguments in favor of relitigation. First, Salem recycles the argument about its inability to present supervisory status evidence at the representation hearing. We resolved this issue at the representation hearing level, see supra part II.A, and Salem offers no reason for us to reconsider it at the ULP stage. Next, Salem contends that parties in ULP proceedings are guaranteed the right to raise affirmative defenses, notwithstanding the GC considered the facts supporting the defense in the context of a potential charge and declined to issue a complaint. Although Salem is correct, see United Food and Commercial Workers v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 346, 354–55 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (because “[a] party subject to an unfair labor practice complaint has a right to a hearing” and “the scope of the General Counsel's investigatory inquiry does not approach that of the required hearing,” GC’s consideration and denial of charge cannot prevent party from litigating facts of charge as defense in ULP proceeding), the argument gets it only half-way to the finish line. It removes one obstacle—the GC’s decision not to pursue a supervisory taint complaint—but leaves another undisturbed—the fact that Salem already 25 litigated—and lost—a question of fact essential to the defense, namely, the CNs’ non-supervisory status. Finally, Salem contends that Board precedent permits relitigation here, relying on Sub-Zero Freezer Co., 271 NLRB 47 (1984) (allowing employer to relitigate pre-election issues at ULP proceeding). But, as the Board describes it, Sub-Zero is a limited exception. Salem Hosp. Corp., 357 NLRB No. 119, 2011 WL 5976073 at  n.5 (“Sub-Zero is one of a limited number of cases in which the Board has departed from the [no-relitigation] rule.”). There, the Board credited allegations that union supporters had threatened the property and lives of voting employees.21 The election was also close—the union won by only two votes. Sub-Zero, 271 NLRB at 47. The Board in Sub-Zero acknowledged its departure from the general no-relitigation policy but explained that failure to make an exception there would result in an order “requiring an employer to bargain with a union that has not attained the status of majority representative from a free and fair election.” Id. Assuming arguendo that the Board erred by not allowing Salem to use the Sub-Zero exception, we believe no prejudice resulted therefrom. As we have explained, substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that the CNs were not supervisors. In addition, Salem had failed to persuade the RD that the CNs engaged in any conduct resulting in supervisory taint even if they were in fact supervisors. We therefore conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting Salem from relitigating supervisory taint. 21 In Sub-Zero, the Board incorporated by reference the facts set forth in an earlier Board decision. Sub-Zero, 271 NLRB at 47 (citing 265 NLRB 1521, 1522–23 (1982)). 26