Opinion ID: 856641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of the Jailhouse Letters

Text: Byrom received at least two letters from Junior while they were both incarcerated. In these letters, which were purportedly written with the intention that law enforcement intercept them, Junior took full responsibility for Edward’s murder and disclaimed the existence of a murder-for-hire scheme. These letters were given to Byrom’s attorney, who intended to use the letters as impeachment evidence if Junior testified consistently with the prosecution’s theory of the case against Byrom. Before trial began, the court warned Byrom’s counsel to disclose impeachment evidence to the prosecution or risk discovery sanctions at trial. Disregarding the court’s admonition, counsel withheld the letters until they were unveiled during Junior’s cross-examination. Counsel did so for strategic surprise, as well as to ensure that Junior would remain a key prosecution witness. Byrom’s attorney also believed that his tactic was permissible under 8 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 the relevant rule, a claim the court did not accept.6 As a sanction, the trial court barred counsel from referencing or handling the letters in front of the jury. Nevertheless, counsel was permitted to question Junior about the letters and to read directly from the letters while questioning him. During cross-examination, Junior admitted to offering different accounts of the murder to different people, including previous statements taking complete responsibility for the murder. Junior did, however, ultimately deny direct responsibility for his father’s death. On re-direct, Junior said he took responsibility for the murder in the letters because they were written during a time of deep depression and that he did so to exonerate Byrom and Gillis. The Mississippi Supreme Court, on direct appeal, rejected Byrom’s claim that the letters’ exclusion was improper. Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836, 869–71 (Miss. 2003). The court analyzed the relevant state discovery rule and determined that the trial court followed the correct procedure and reached an appropriate outcome. Id. at 868–71. That same court also rejected Byrom’s assertion that the exclusion was prejudicial since Byrom’s counsel was nevertheless able to elicit testimony from Junior that favored Byrom’s theory of the case using the letters’ contents. Id. at 871. On review, the district court deferred to the state court’s interpretation of its own evidentiary rules since it did not appear that the court was attempting to evade a federal issue. Byrom v. Epps, 817 F. Supp. 2d 868, 887 (N.D. Miss. 2011). The district court found that it was not improper to exclude direct 6 In Mississippi, a reciprocal discovery rule required that defense counsel disclose “the contents of any statement, written, recorded or otherwise preserved” for “all witnesses in chief which the defendant may offer at trial[.]” URCCC 9.04(C)(1). Byrom contended that this rule did not require disclosure of Junior’s letters because “they were to be offered for impeachment purposes only and not as substantive evidence in her case-in-chief.” Byrom, 863 So. 2d at 868. Based on prior precedent, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Byrom’s claim because the relevant rule is concerned with discouraging the sort of “trial by ambush” that counsel had attempted. Id. at 869 (quoting Coates v. State, 495 So.2d 464, 467 (Miss. 1986)). 9 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 references to the jailhouse letters as a sanction for willfully withholding them prior to trial. Id. Further, the sanction was carefully crafted to let defense counsel “question Junior extensively from the letters in order to provide the defense with the opportunity to present its theory of the murder.” Id. at 887–88. In fact, trial counsel read portions of the letters verbatim. Id. at 888. Because trial counsel’s discovery violation was a willful, strategic tactic, and because the sanction itself deprived Byrom’s defense of very little, the district court denied habeas relief. Id. Byrom bases her motion for an expanded COA on Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), an attempted murder case in which the trial court excluded a defense witness because of trial counsel’s willful failure to disclose the witness prior to trial. 484 U.S. at 401–02. In Taylor, the defendant’s attorney did not disclose the existence of a witness until the second day of trial, despite the prosecution’s pre-trial request for a list of all defense witnesses and an amendment defense counsel made to his witness list on the first day of trial—an amendment that did not include the withheld witness. Id. at 403–04. When asked about the failure to disclose his witness, defense counsel claimed to have only recently located the witness. Id. at 404. This, however, was not true. Before determining whether the new witness could testify, the court conducted its own examination of the witness. Id. During that colloquy, the witness disclosed that he and the attorney had first met months before, and that counsel visited him around a week before trial began. Id. at 405. The witness also made statements suggesting he had not actually witnessed the altercation at issue. Id. at 404–05. The trial judge concluded that complete exclusion of the witness’s testimony was the appropriate sanction in light of the attorney’s deliberately misleading statements and the likelihood that the witness had not in fact witnessed the altercation that gave rise to the case. Id. at 405. 10 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 In upholding the sanction, the Supreme Court rejected both parties’ extreme positions: “Petitioner’s claim that the Sixth Amendment creates an absolute bar to the preclusion of the testimony of a surprise witness is just as extreme and just as unacceptable as the State’s position that the Amendment is simply irrelevant.” Id. at 410. Instead, the Court decided that a complete evidentiary exclusion was an acceptable sanction in certain situations, though it declined to enumerate a definitive test. Id. at 414–16. Given the nature of the violation in Taylor, the Court found “the inference that [counsel] was deliberately seeking a tactical advantage . . . inescapable.” Id. at 417. Because counsel’s violation was “willful and blatant,” complete exclusion was appropriate, regardless whether “prejudice to the prosecution could have been avoided.” Id. at 416–17. Here, Byrom attempts to distinguish the facts of Taylor in order to undermine the validity of the trial court’s discovery sanction, which Byrom views as identical to the sanction levied in Taylor. Byrom characterizes the sanction here as a complete exclusion and claims that it was inappropriate because Taylor was not a capital murder case and the attorney in Taylor went so far as to deliberately mislead the court. Here, Byrom’s attorney believed withholding Junior’s letters fell within the letter of the law, and Byrom never misled the court. These points are well taken, but Byrom fails to appreciate how the sanction in Taylor differs from this case. Whereas Taylor involved the complete exclusion of a defense witness, the trial court here only partially restricted the extent to which counsel could use Junior’s jailhouse letters. In fact, Byrom’s trial counsel was able to read directly from the letters while questioning Junior, and Junior acknowledged many of the key points counsel sought to establish. He acknowledged making inconsistent statements concerning his role in the murder and the existence of a murder-for-hire plot; and he admitted writing Byrom a letter stating that he killed his father. The 11 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 trial court merely precluded counsel from handling the letters in front of the jury and from specifically referring to their existence. That is, trial counsel was able to explore their theory of the case, though in a more limited capacity than originally planned. Counsel could not impeach Junior using the letters, but he nevertheless acknowledged giving inconsistent stories and claiming responsibility for the murder, points defense counsel specifically sought to elicit for the sake of undermining Junior’s credibility and supporting their theory of the case. Here, the sanction fit the violation and fell well within Byrom’s Sixth Amendment rights. As the district court noted, “[Byrom’s] right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is to the “opportunity for effective cross-examination.” Byrom, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 887 (quoting United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 363 (5th Cir. 2009)) (emphasis original). To the extent Byrom’s opportunity was limited, it was due to the deliberate actions of her attorney. When counsel engages in willful discovery omissions for purely tactical reasons, the Sixth Amendment is not offended by the imposition of proportionate sanctions. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 (1988). For these reasons, reasonable jurists could not find the district court’s assessment of Byrom’s constitutional claim debatable or wrong. Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 484 (2000). While the discovery violation in this case was not as egregious as the one in Taylor, neither was the sanction. As the district court stated: [t]he trial court allowed the defense a remedy for its discovery violation that still allowed it to present its theory, and it allowed the defense to question Junior extensively from the letters in order to provide the defense with the opportunity to present its theory of the murder. In fact, trial counsel read exact quotes from the letters in many instances. 12 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 Byrom, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 888. Contrary to Byrom’s representations, the trial court did not use the discovery violation to freely exclude defense evidence with little regard for the impact on Byrom’s constitutional rights. Rather, the court evaluated defense counsel’s discovery violation in light of the circumstances of the case and fashioned a remedy that addressed the violation while still affording Byrom wide latitude to present her theory of the case. Moreover, counsel was able to elicit much of what it wanted from Junior. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (denying federal habeas relief for trial error unless the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”). Reasonable jurists could not find the district court’s assessment of this issue debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court denies Byrom’s motion for an expanded COA on whether the exclusion of Junior’s jailhouse letters amounted to a violation of Byrom’s rights.