Opinion ID: 359526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court's construction.

Text: 15 The district court correctly instructed the jury: 16 The word willfully as used in this charge means that the act or omission or failure to act was committed by the Defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally, and with knowledge that it was prohibited by law, and with the purpose to disobey or to disregard the law, and not by mistake, accident or in good faith or other innocent reason or motive. The court, however, then went on to say: 17 An act is done knowingly if it is done willfully and intentionally, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake, accident or other innocent reason or motive. 18 Just before the court gave the above-quoted instructions on wilfulness, the court had said: 19 Unless outweighed by evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person knows what the law forbids and what the law requires to be done. Therefore, the evidence that the Defendant acted or failed to act because of ignorance of the law does not constitute a defense. 20 These two instructions are inconsistent with the element of specific intent, which requires the government to prove that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a known legal duty. 21 In a series of recent decisions this circuit has dealt with the problem of instructions on ignorance of the law in specific intent crimes. U. S. v. Schilleci, 545 F.2d 519 (CA5, 1977); U. S. v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922 (CA5, 1978); U. S. v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (CA5, 1978); U. S. v. Wellendorf, 5 Cir., 574 F.2d 1289 (1978); See U. S. v. Petersen, 513 F.2d 1133 (CA9, 1975) (relied on in Schilleci ). Considered together, these cases require that the trial court, when instructing that specific intent is required, may not instruct that ignorance of the law is no excuse, because ignorance of the law goes to the heart of the defendant's denial of specific intent. Schilleci, 545 F.2d at 524. 22 Our cases are not one hundred percent consistent. Schilleci dealt with a conspiracy-to-wiretap charge. The trial court properly instructed the jury on specific intent but also instructed: 23 It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew that a particular act or failure to act is a violation of law. The presumption is that every person knows what the law forbids, and what the law requires to be done. 24 The defendant had requested a charge indicating that evidence of ignorance of the law is relevant to whether or not the defendant acted with specific intent. 3 We held that the trial court's instructions were erroneous. As a result of the instructions, the jury never had the opportunity to consider the effect of lack of knowledge on the requisite specific intent. 545 F.2d at 524. 25 Granda dealt with a charge that defendant failed to report that she was transporting into the country over $5,000, an offense we held to require specific intent. The trial court did not instruct the jury at all on specific intent. We said, (T)he proper instruction would include some discussion of the defendant's ignorance of the law since the defendant's alleged ignorance of the reporting requirement goes to the heart of his or her denial of the specific intent necessary to commit the crime. 565 F.2d at 926. Schnaiderman dealt with the same reporting requirements as Granda. We reiterated the responsibility of the trial court to discuss in the instructions the effect of defendant's ignorance of the law. 568 F.2d at 1211 n. 8. 26 Wellendorf dealt with a charge of filing false federal income tax withholding forms. The trial court properly instructed that specific intent was required. We said that the court's failure to instruct that ignorance of the law may be considered was not erroneous. We distinguished Schilleci on the ground that the judge in Schilleci had given an instruction that it is presumed everyone knows the law. 574 F.2d at p. 1290. Wellendorf referred only to Schilleci and did not consider the later cases, Granda and Schnaiderman. We need not resolve the possible conflict between Wellendorf and Granda, because in this case, as in Schilleci, the court gave an instruction covering the presumption that everyone knows the law. The court's failure to discuss the relevance of ignorance of the law brings this case squarely within Schilleci, Granda, and Schnaiderman. 27