Opinion ID: 1196421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 37

Heading: Testimony of Dr. Patterson

Text: (48) The night of his arrest for the rape of Jane B., defendant was examined by Dr. Patterson, a physician specializing in psychiatry. The People called Dr. Patterson to the stand in the penalty phase of defendant's capital trial and, over objection, elicited details of defendant's confession that he had killed Pierce. Defendant contends admission of this evidence was error for two reasons. First, he claims it violated his Miranda rights because the same evidence was suppressed on similar grounds by the trial court presiding over his 1975 prosecution for murder and rape. The record fails to support defendant on this point. Much of the record of the 1975 case was destroyed in accordance with court policy. What survives, however, shows defendant's motion to suppress Dr. Patterson's testimony at the preliminary hearing was denied because it was defendant who called Patterson to the stand. A later minute order reveals defendant's confession to Detective Cook was ordered suppressed by the superior court; there is no mention in the order of the confession to Dr. Patterson. Defendant contends that because his motion to suppress his confessions to both Cook and Patterson was denied by the magistrate at the preliminary examination, it is reasonable to conclude that the same motion to suppress was made in superior court. We fail to perceive the reasonableness of this assumption and decline to speculate whether defendant renewed his motion to suppress the confession to Dr. Patterson. Because defendant called Dr. Patterson to the stand as a defense witness at the preliminary hearing, the magistrate correctly ruled defendant could not then move to suppress the evidence. Under these circumstances, it is more likely defendant abandoned this claim in superior court because it was obviously meritless. Moreover, defendant may have decided against renewing the motion because there was no evidence of a Miranda violation; we note Dr. Patterson testified at the penalty phase that before he questioned defendant, he read him his Miranda rights and defendant waived them. Second, defendant argues Dr. Patterson's testimony should have been excluded from the penalty phase because it was irrelevant, cumulative of other evidence, and more prejudicial than probative. (Evid. Code, § 352.) As the trial court held, however, the evidence of the circumstances of Pierce's slaying was relevant to rebut the implication raised by other defense evidence that defendant became impulsively violent only when placed in a stressful situation. [20] Defendant's confession to Dr. Patterson arguably showed that when defendant killed Pierce, he was not under any particular stressor, thus tending to negate other defense evidence suggestive of brief reactive psychosis, i.e., a temporary loss of contact with reality when faced with a stressful situation. Although this was not the only inference which could be drawn from Dr. Patterson's testimony (one could, for example, argue that Pierce's homosexual remark caused defendant to experience stress), the existence of other, contrary inferences only affects the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. Defendant contends this evidence was cumulative of that given by Detective Cook. Even assuming that to be true, we fail to see the prejudice, especially in light of the fact that defendant admitted killing Pierce and raping Jane B., pursuant to his 1975 guilty plea. Although the trial court did not make an express statement announcing it had balanced the probative value of Patterson's proposed testimony with its prejudicial effect (see Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 25 [record must affirmatively show trial court conducted proper weighing of factors]), the record clearly shows the court was aware of its duty under Evidence Code section 352 and properly discharged its legal obligation. The court announced that although it was denying the Evidence Code section 352 motion, the prosecutor was limited to its offer of proof and could not ask more detailed questions regarding defendant's alleged homosexual activities. Under these circumstances, we think the record shows the trial court properly exercised its discretion. ( People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1028 [251 Cal. Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103].) Because we find no error, we also reject defendant's Eighth Amendment claim that admission of Dr. Patterson's testimony unconstitutionally affected the reliability of the death sentence.