Opinion ID: 161085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Familial Status Discrimination

Text: 4 We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment and apply the same legal standard employed by that court. See Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 53 (1999). To wit, summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Simms, 165 F.3d at 1326. In the instant case, both parties sought summary judgment on the familial status issue. 5 Since its amendment in 1988, the FHA has prohibited discriminatory housing practices based on familial status. See 42 U.S.C. 3604(a)-(e). The FHA defines familial status as (1) one or more minors (2) domiciled with (3) a parent or legal custodian or the designee of a parent or custodian. Id. 3602(k). 1 Keys' group home satisfies the first element: there are one or more minors. 6 Regarding the second element, Olathe intimated to the district court that Keys' living arrangements did not satisfy the domiciled with requirement. Aplt. App. II, at 331, 340-41 (Def. Mem. in Support of Summ. J. Mot., at 14, 23-24). For unknown reasons, the district court did not address this point, although it did make relevant factual findings (discussed infra). See Keys Youth II, 52 F. Supp.2d at 1294. Olathe raises the issue again on appeal, and we think it warrants discussion given the somewhat novel application of law to facts presented by Keys' claim. 2 7 There is no material dispute regarding the living arrangements at Keys' proposed youth group home. Ten minors would live at the home. They would be supervised twenty-four hours a day by a rotating staff of Keys' employees. Though by no means dispositive, we note that Dr. Edward Neufeld, a licensed psychologist who counsels Keys' existing group home occupants, characterized the Keys' homes as therapeutic milieus rather than a family environment because, in his view, these are not group homes that are characterized by a foster parent or two foster parents who are there all the time. It's more a staffing situation. Aplt. App. II at 463. 8 More specifically, the summary judgment record indicates that in the proposed home in question a manager would work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday; an assistant manager and a staff number 3 employee would work from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., Monday through Friday; and an additional staff member would work from either 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. or 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. each night. Aplt. App. III at 854-55 (Depo. of Keys Program Director). In addition, one teaching parent (shift number 1) would work from 6:00 a.m. Monday morning to 2:00 p.m. Tuesday afternoon, and from 2:00 p.m. Wednesday to 2:00 p.m. Thursday; another teaching parent (shift number 2) would work from 2:00 p.m. Tuesday to 2:00 p.m. Wednesday, and from 2:00 p.m. Thursday to 10:00 p.m. Friday; a weekend staff person would work 10:00 p.m. Friday until 6:00 a.m. Monday morning; and a part-time staff person would work 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. Saturday and Sunday. Id. at 855. In sum, as the district court put it, The staff works on day and night shifts and does not reside at the home. Keys Youth II, 52 F. Supp.2d at 1294. 9 Familial status requires that the minors be domiciled with their caretaker. This means that the youths and Keys' staff must be domiciled together, at the same dwelling. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 23 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2184 (The Committee intends to cover by this definition a parent or other person having legal custody, or that individual's designee, domiciled with a child or children under age 18.). The question thus becomes whether any Keys' staff members would be domiciled at the proposed home with the youths. 3 10 The FHA does not define domiciled, nor are we aware of a federal or state court that has done so in the familial status context. We therefore look both to the generally accepted meaning of the term 'domicile' and to the purpose of the statute for the appropriate definition. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47 (1988) (defining domicile for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act). Domicile is a familiar, if not precisely defined, concept in the law. It is typically used for jurisdictional or conflict of laws purposes which require general recognition of a single State with which the individual, actually or presumptively, is most closely connected. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 340 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 11 cmt. f (1971). For purposes of the FHA, however, we must fix the Keys employees' domicile within a specific dwelling, not simply a particular state. Where necessary, we therefore narrow the following principles of domicile accordingly. 11 A domicile is an individual's 'true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establishment.' Eastman v. Univ. of Mich., 30 F.3d 670, 672-73 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 484 (6th ed. 1990)). Traditionally, an individual has only one domicile at a time. See Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914). An adult establishes a domicile by physical presence in a place [i.e., a dwelling] in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one's intent to remain there. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48; see also Crowley v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1983); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 15. There is no question that Keys' staff would be physically present in the group home during their respective shifts. To establish it as their domicile, however, they must also intend to remain--to make that dwelling their home. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 18; see also District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 455 (1941) (stating that the question of domicile is to be settled by reviewing the indicia of where a man's home is). 12 In light of the FHA context of our inquiry, the definition of home given in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws seems particularly applicable: [T]he place where a person dwells and which is the center of his domestic, social and civil life. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 12. While many facts may aid in determining one's home, see id. cmts. c-j; cf. Walbro Corp. v. Amerisure Cos., 133 F.3d 961, 967 (6th Cir. 1998) (listing potential factors indicating one's domicile), an individual's employment at the site is not one of them. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 12 cmt. f. Absent other indicia, one's workplace is not one's home and, thus, not where one is domiciled for purposes of the FHA. 13 Based on our review of the summary judgment record in the instant case, it appears the sole connection between Keys' staff and the group home is the fact that the staff works there. No other reason for their presence in the house is given. Since the staff members clearly do not live at the group home, they must of necessity be residing someplace else, presumably at their actual homes/domiciles. The fact that some of Keys' employees work a night shift or a twenty-four or thirty-six hour shift does not alter our conclusion. The critical fact remains that the only proffered reason these employees occupy the home is for employment. As a matter of law under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that Keys' employees, collectively or individually, are domiciled at the group home. Thus, the youths cannot be domiciled with them, and Keys' proposed group home therefore cannot qualify for familial status under the FHA. Any other conclusion stretches the meaning of domiciled and the scope of familial status protection beyond sensible bounds. We reverse the grant of summary judgment for Keys and order summary judgment entered for Olathe on Keys' familial status discrimination claim.