Opinion ID: 778482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Challenges Raised by Johnson

Text: 75
76 Johnson first argues that the district court erred in calculating his offense level for conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering. According to Johnson, the court failed to give him a three-level reduction to which he was entitled under Guideline § 2X1.1(b)(2). See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X1.1(b)(2) (1998). Whether a reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2) is warranted by the facts is reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 156 F.3d 936, 939 (9th Cir.1998). 77 Along with the other five defendants, Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering. Section 2X1.1(a), which sets the offense level for conspiracy, provides that the base offense level for conspiracy is generally the same as the base offense level for the underlying substantive crime. However, under § 2X1.1(b)(2), 35 a defendant convicted of conspiracy is entitled to a three-level reduction if the substantive offense that he conspired to commit was not substantially completed (unless the failure to complete is the result of an unavoidable interruption, an exception not at issue in this case). According to Johnson, in light of § 2X1.1(b)(2), he is entitled to a three-level reduction because he, individually, never completed the substantive crime of promotional money laundering. 78 Johnson's argument is unpersuasive. It is likely that Johnson alone never completed the substantive crime of promotional money laundering, as there is no indication in the record that he ever engaged in a financial transaction for the purpose of promoting additional criminal activity. However, Johnson's failure to complete the substantive crime is not enough to warrant a three-level reduction. To obtain a § 2X1.1(b)(2) reduction, Johnson must also show that none of his co-conspirators completed the crime of promotional money laundering. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X1.1(b)(2) (1998). Given that Eames and Rudisill were convicted on eleven counts of the substantive promotional money laundering, Johnson cannot meet this burden. As such, Johnson was not entitled to a three-level reduction under § 2X1.1(b)(2), and the district court did not err in refusing to grant this reduction.
79 Johnson next argues that, because money laundering is a victimless crime, the trial court erred in applying the vulnerable victim enhancement of § 3A1.1(b) to his group for conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b) (1998). In addition, Johnson claims that the court improperly double-counted the vulnerable victim enhancement by applying it to both the fraud group and the group for conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering. As these claims involve the district court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines, we apply de novo review. See United States v. Montano, 250 F.3d 709, 712 (9th Cir.2001). 80 Under our decision in United States v. Calozza, 125 F.3d 687 (9th Cir.1997), the vulnerable victim enhancement of § 3A1.1(b) 36 applies whenever the offense of conviction involved relevant conduct that victimized a person that the defendant knew or should have known was vulnerable. See id. at 691; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1(b) (1998). The Guidelines define as relevant conduct all acts ... that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a) (1998). 81 Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude that the district court was correct to add a vulnerable victim enhancement to the group for conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering. It is undisputed that the victims in this case were vulnerable, and that Johnson, in his capacity as a front man, knew or should have known of this vulnerability. Moreover, it is clear that conduct relevant to Johnson's crime of conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering victimized these vulnerable persons. In committing the crime of conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, Johnson engaged in overt acts in the form of wire fraud and mail fraud, which provided the illicit funds necessary to finance additional criminal activity. These acts of fraud involved vulnerable victims. Therefore, the district court was correct to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement to Johnson's group for conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering. 82 Additionally, we find no error in the district court's application of the vulnerable victim enhancement to both the fraud group and the conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering group. While the Presentence Report indicates that the vulnerable victim enhancement was used in calculating the base offense level for both groups, this was done simply to determine which group provided the higher base level offense, as allowed by Calozza. See 125 F.3d at 690. Once the conspiracy group was selected, the district court dropped the two-level enhancement from the fraud group before computing the total offense level, as required by Calozza. See id. at 692. Thus, no double counting occurred, and Johnson's claim in this regard is meritless.
83 Johnson's third argument is that the district court erred by not reducing his offense level under § 3B1.2(a) to reflect his role as a minimal participant in the conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering. We review for clear error a district court's determination that a defendant does not qualify for minimal participant status. See United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1436 (9th Cir.1994). 84 The Guidelines provide for a four-level downward adjustment if the defendant is a minimal participant in the offense. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(a) (1998). The notes to § 3B1.2 indicate that a minimal participant is one who is clearly among the least culpable in a criminal group. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2(a), cmt. n. 1 (1998). Clarifying this rule, we have held that a defendant's culpability is to be measured against his co-participants, not a hypothetical average participant. See United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1447 (9th Cir.1992). Finally, even if a defendant establishes that he was among the least culpable of the group, a downward adjustment under § 3B1.2(a) is appropriate only if the defendant was at least substantially less culpable than his co-participants. See United States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1498 (9th Cir.1994). 37 85 In support of his claim that he was only a minimal participant in the conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, Johnson points to the fact that he did not engage in the financial transactions that completed the substantive offense of money laundering. In addition, Johnson notes that he did not work at AEA for the entire duration of the scheme. While the criminal activity in this matter ran from January of 1996 until June of 1997, Johnson worked at AEA from January through March of 1996, and again in late 1996 and the spring of 1997. 86 Johnson's argument fails to persuade. It is true that Johnson spent less time at AEA than the other reloaders, and that he was less directly involved in the actual money laundering than Eames or Rudisill. Thus, it may be fairly said that Johnson was the least culpable participant in the scheme at AEA. However, it is also true that Johnson was actively involved in the scheme for a substantial amount of time, and that his efforts as both a front man and reloader contributed significantly to the procurement of funds that were used to perpetuate AEA's illegal activities. Indeed, the record indicates that Johnson's efforts were uniquely instrumental, among the reloaders, in getting the scheme off the ground. He was the best front man in the early days of the operation, and was rewarded for his contribution by being the first sales person to receive a promotion to reloader. Under these circumstances, we cannot say with a definite and firm conviction that the district court erred in failing to find Johnson substantially less culpable than his co-participants. See United States v. Maldonado, 215 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that a decision is clearly erroneous only if it leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made). Therefore, we decline to disturb the district court's decision regarding Johnson's minimal participant status.
87 Finally, Johnson argues that the trial court improperly increased his offense level for conspiracy by considering a criminal justice sentence that occurred after the conclusion of the offense. We review de novo a district court's determination that a prior conviction is within the scope of the Guidelines. See United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 763(9th Cir.1991). 88 The Guidelines provide for a two-point enhancement to a defendant's offense level if any part of the instant offense is committed while the defendant is under any criminal justice sentence, including parole. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(d), cmt. n. 4 (1998). In addition, the Guidelines require a one-point enhancement if any part of the instant offense takes place within less than two years following the defendant's release from imprisonment. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(e), cmt. n. 5 (1998). 89 Considering these principles and the facts of this case, we conclude that the district court correctly enhanced Johnson's offense level under § 4A1.1(d)-(e). In May of 1996—five months after he joined AEA—Johnson's probation on an earlier conviction was revoked, and he was given a two-year sentence. He was released from this sentence, on parole, in November of 1996. At that time, he returned to work in AEA's Atlanta office. Johnson argues that, because he did not engage in any reloading activities after his return, no part of his offense of conspiring to commit promotional money laundering occurred after the May, 1996 sentence and prison time, and the district court should not have considered that sentence in determining the offense level. This argument fails because it ignores other activities in which Johnson engaged upon his return to AEA. 90 Though Johnson did not work as a reloader after November of 1996, he continued to provide services as a front man. In this capacity, Johnson qualified potential victims for AEA, and thus assisted in obtaining the funds by which the illegal scheme was perpetuated. Therefore, it is clear that Johnson engaged in conduct relevant to the conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering upon his return to AEA. Because these post-November 1996 activities were part of the instant offense, and because they were committed both while Johnson was on parole and within two years of his release from imprisonment, the district court was correct to enhance his sentence under § 4A1.1(d)-(e).