Opinion ID: 864338
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the chancery court erred when it denied

Text: THE NATURAL CHILDREN’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT, MOTION FOR RECUSAL, AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IN THIS MATTER. ¶20. We address these three issues together. The natural children allege that the chancellor considered facts which were not part of the record and made explicit references to and considered her meetings with the parties’ father. They moved for her recusal from the case after the judgment was rendered, citing several portions of the Code of Judicial Conduct as follows: 7 Canon 2(B) A judge “should not allow his family, social or other relationships to influence his judicial conduct or judgment.” Canon 3(A)(4) “[A] judge should . . . [not] . . . consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding.” Canon 3(C)(1) mandating recusal “including but not limited to instances where (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; (b) . . . or the judge . . . has been a material witness concerning [the matter]. Though this Court finds that the chancellor used an incorrect legal standard in deciding the instant case, no evidence has been presented indicating that bias, prejudice, or ex parte proceedings persuaded the chancellor to decide as she did. ¶21. Recently, this Court referenced an earlier decision that found “the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself from a case in which he had limited ex parte contacts with a lawyer representing a party in that pending case.” In re Conservatorship of Bardwell, 849 So. 2d 1240, 1246 (Miss. 2003) (citing Bryan v. Holzer, 589 So. 2d 648 (Miss. 1991)). In Bardwell, this Court further explained the objective criteria under Canon 3 to be considered in whether recusal is necessary: “A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality.” Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So. 2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986); [Collins v. Dixie Transport, Inc., 543 So.2d 160, 164 (Miss.1989); Jenkins v. State, 570 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Miss.1990)]. . . . When a judge is not disqualified under the constitutional or statutory provisions, “the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to be decided by the judge and is subject to review only in case of manifest abuse of discretion.” Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312 at 317 (Miss.1985) (quoting McLendon v. State, 187 Miss. 247, 191 So. 821, 823 (1939)); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 587 So.2d 892 (Miss.1991); Turner, 573 So.2d at 677. Bardwell, 849 So. 2d at 1246-47 (quoting Bryan, 589 So.2d at 654). ¶22. The chancellor did make references in court to the late Douglas Wynn and their ex parte communications just prior to his death, but the record does not show that the court based its decision on 8 these. The evidence here is not adequate to support a finding that a reasonable person would harbor doubts about the chancellor’s impartiality. As stated in Bardwell, if ‘substantial involvement’ in a case (or a party) were legitimate grounds for recusal, a circuit judge or county judge with five indictments on the same defendant would have to get four other judges involved in presiding over the remaining cases because of ‘substantial involvement’ with the criminal defendant in the first case. 849 So. 2d at 1247. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s refusal to recuse from the case.