Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Selection: Adequacy of Voir Dire

Text: The trial court indicated it would con duct voir dire pursuant to then newly enacted section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section provides that in a criminal case the court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors, but that the parties upon a showing of good cause may supplement the examination. Consistent with this procedure, the court decided to have prospective jurors give written answers to questions in a jury questionnaire. The defense offered its own questionnaire, which included a series of questions pertaining to each prospective juror's experience with and attitudes about child molestation. [1] Defense counsel argued that questions about each prospective juror's background, relatives, friends, associates, feelings on the subject of child molestation were necessary to enable the defense to intelligently exercise its challenges for cause. The trial court refused to use defendant's proposed questions. The court's jury questionnaire did have this general question regarding juror experience with crime and the criminal justice system: Have you or any close friend or relative ever been involved in a criminal incident or case either as a victim, suspect, defendant, witness, or other? (Original emphasis.) The court's questionnaire also included questions about child molestation. After explaining that defendant was charged with sexual misconduct involving the death of a child, prospective jurors were asked: In light of this, do you know any reason why you would not be a completely fair and impartial juror in this case? In addition, the questionnaire described the capital sentencing process and then posed a series of inquiries to be answered in light of the charges against defendant relating to allegations of sexual misconduct involving the death of a child. For instance, each prospective juror was asked whether because of the nature of the charges the juror would automatically refuse to vote: in favor of the penalty of death and automatically vote for a penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole? or conversely, would automatically refuse to vote in favor of the penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and automatically vote for a penalty of death? (Original underscore.) After reviewing the completed questionnaires, defense counsel observed that only 1 of the 104 prospective jurors had revealed a personal experience with child molestation. He noted that this constituted less than 1 percent of the total number of prospective jurors, and that according to scientific studies, between 6 and 38 percent of the general population reportedly have been victims of child molestation. He attributed the disparity in this case to the trial court's refusal to question the prospective jurors regarding personal or family experience with child molestation. Defendant renewed his request for such questions to the prospective jurors. Again, the trial court refused to do so. Defendant now contends that this refusal violated the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, sections 15 and 16 of the California Constitution. We disagree. We have long recognized that [t]he right to unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an inseparable and inalienable part of the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution. ( Lombardi v. California St. Ry. Co. (1899) 124 Cal. 311, 317, 57 P. 66.) Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored. Without adequate voir dire the trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled. ( Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 182, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22.) Yet, trial courts have great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire. ( Mu'Min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 424, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493.) In a state such as California that in capital cases provides for a sentencing verdict by a jury, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution requires the sentencing jury to be impartial to the same extent that the Sixth Amendment requires jury impartiality at the guilt phase of the trial. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 666, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752, citing Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728 and 740, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.) [clarifying the constitutional underpinnings of the Morgan holding].) California's Constitution provides an identical guarantee. ( People v. Williams, supra, at p. 666, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; see People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1210-1211, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1248, fn. 4, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251.) As we explained in Williams, [w]hen a prospective juror's views about the death penalty `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror' ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841]), the juror is not impartial and may be challenged `for cause.' ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 667, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; see People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 712, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729 [noting the same test applies when the prosecution challenges jurors opposed to capital punishment that governs defense challenges to those favoring capital punishment].) We have also held that [a] prospective juror who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is ... subject to challenge for cause.... ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) Consequently, to preserve the right to a fair and impartial jury on the question of penalty, the death qualification process must probe prospective jurors' death penalty views as applied to the general facts of the case, whether or not those facts [have] been expressly charged. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248;. People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d. 583, 597, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127 [noting that death penalty voir dire seeks to determine only the views of the prospective jurors about capital punishment in the abstract].) Here the trial court's voir dire procedure fully satisfied the requirements of the state and federal Constitutions that a fair and impartial jury determine questions of guilt and of penalty. The jury questionnaire mentioned that the charges against defendant pertained to sexual misconduct involving the death of a child, and it inquired of each prospective juror whether those charges would have any effect on the juror's ability to be fair and impartial. And, after describing the sentencing process in a capital case, the questionnaire asked whether the charges against defendant relating to allegations of sexual misconduct involving the death of child would have any effect on the juror's sentencing decision. Answers to these questions provided an adequate basis for the trial court and counsel to determine whether a prospective juror's views or attitudes about child molestation would prevent the juror from impartially deciding defendant's guilt ( Mu'Min v. Virginia, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 430, 111 S.Ct. 1899; Patton v. Yount (1984) 467 U.S. 1025, 1035, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847) or would cause the juror to invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of ... circumstances... present in the case being tried ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248). Defendant nevertheless insists that the more specific questions he had proposed regarding the jurors' personal experience with and attitudes about child molestation were constitutionally compelled in this case. He invokes a line of United States Supreme Court authority requiring the questioning of prospective jurors on racial prejudice in certain cases in which the defendant and the victim belong to different racial or ethnic groups. The high court first imposed this requirement as part of its supervisory power over lower federal courts. (See Aldridge v. United States (1931) 283 U.S. 308, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed. 1054 [holding it was reversible error for a federal court to fail to inquire into racial prejudice in a case involving a black defendant accused of killing a white police officer]; see also Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1980) 451 U.S. 182, 192, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 [concluding that a federal court must inquire about racial prejudice when requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups].) The court has held that in state court actions the federal Constitution imposes a similar obligation when the factual circumstances of the case raise a reasonable possibility that racial prejudice could influence the jury. (See Ham v. South Carolina (1973) 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 [reversible error to fail to question prospective jurors on racial prejudice in the trial of a black civil rights activist charged with marijuana possession when the defendant intended to raise the defense that he had been framed due to his civil rights activities]; but see Ristaino v. Ross (1976) 424 U.S. 589, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 [no factors comparable to those in Ham required questioning on racial prejudice in trial of black defendant charged with attempted murder of white security guard].) Most recently, in Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27, involving a black defendant sentenced to death for killing the white owner of a jewelry store during a robbery, the high court held that, upon request, a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias. ( Id. at pp. 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683.) The court explained that because of the range of discretion a jury has in determining a capital defendant's sentence, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected. ( Id. at p. 35, 106 S.Ct. 1683.) Here, however, racial prejudice was not in issue. Defendant is quick to point out, however, that some federal appellate decisions have suggested that the defense has a right to question prospective jurors not only about racial prejudice but also about other topics `concerning which either the local community or the population at large is commonly known to harbor strong feelings that may stop short of presumptive bias in law yet significantly skew deliberations in fact.' ( United States v. Jones (9th Cir.1983) 722 F.2d 528, 529-530, quoting United States v. Robinson (D.C.Cir.1973) 154 App.D.C. 265, 475 F.2d 376, 380-381.) Defendant contends that sexual molestation is such a topic. Even if we were to agree with defendant in that regard, defendant suffered no denial of his constitutional rights as a result of the trial court's refusal to ask prospective jurors the particular questions defendant had proposed. As we noted earlier, a trial court retains discretion as to the form and number of questions on the subject, including the decision whether to question the venire individually or collectively. ( Turner v. Murray, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 37, 106 S.Ct. 1683.) Here, the trial court's questionnaire asked each prospective juror whether the juror or any close friend or relative [had] ever been involved in a criminal incident or case either as a victim, suspect, defendant, or witness (underscore omitted). The questionnaire then informed the prospective jurors that the charge against defendant pertained to sexual misconduct involving the death of a child and asked whether that fact would adversely affect any juror's impartiality in deciding defendant's guilt or sentence. We conclude that, considered together, these questions sufficiently probed the attitudes and views of potential jurors about child molestation. The federal and state Constitutions require no more.