Opinion ID: 1924395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the circuit court properly transfer this action from the first judicial district of hinds county to lafayette county?

Text: ¶ 15. Boston filed her complaint in the First Judicial District of Hinds County on May 8, 1995. The complaint named Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (HAIC), Lafayette County, Vera Lee Theobald (Theobald) in her capacity as deputy chancery clerk of Lafayette County, F.D. Buddy East (East) individually and in his capacity as sheriff of Lafayette County, Ricky Miller (Miller), Lyndon Carpenter (Carpenter), and John Thomas (Thomas) individually and in their capacities as jailers of Lafayette County, and Bill Plunk (Plunk) individually and in his official capacity as Chancery Clerk of Lafayette County. ¶ 16. On July 6, 1995, the defendants filed a motion to transfer venue to Lafayette County in accordance with Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13(2), commonly known as the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. On January 2, 1996, the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, while not citing a specific statute, entered an order finding the defendants' motion for change of venue to be well taken and gave Boston twenty (20) days to dismiss individual defendants and their sureties, upon which time the court would reconsider its decision. By order dated April 2, 1996, having found that more than twenty (20) days had passed and no motion to dismiss had been submitted by Boston, the court transferred the action to the Lafayette County Circuit Court. This decision was reiterated in an order dated October 29, 1996, where the court denied Boston's motion to reconsider because Boston had failed to respond within the twenty (20) days as required by the original order from January 2, 1996. ¶ 17. Boston contends that because she is an adult resident citizen of Jackson, First Judicial District of Hinds County and HAIC is a non-resident of Mississippi, her suit should have stayed in Hinds County Circuit Court. Citing M.R.C.P. 82(c), Boston asserts that since venue was proper in the First Judicial District of Hinds County as to HAIC under Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-11-7 & -11 (1972), then venue was proper as to the remaining defendants. M.R.C.P. 82(c) states: (c) Venue Where Claim or Parties Joined. Where several claims or parties have been joined, the suit may be brought in any county in which any one of the claims could properly have been brought. Whenever an action has been commenced in a proper county, additional claims and parties may be joined, pursuant to Rules 13, 14, 22 and 24, as ancillary thereto, without regard to whether that county would be a proper venue for an independent action on such claims or against such parties. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-7 covers the suing of insurance companies: Actions against insurance companies, groups of insurance companies or an insurance association may be brought in any county in which a loss may occur, or, if on a life policy, in the county in which the beneficiary resides, and process may be sent to any county, to be served as directed by law. Such actions may also be brought in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation or company may be. In case of a foreign corporation or company, such actions may be brought in the county where service of process may be had on an agent of such corporation or company or service of process in any suit or action, or any other legal process, may be served upon the insurance commissioner of the state of Mississippi, and such notice will confer jurisdiction on any court in any county in the state where the suit is filed, provided the suit is brought in the county where the loss occurred, or in the county in which the plaintiff resides. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-11-11 addresses damage suits against nonresidents: All civil actions for the recovery of damages brought against a nonresident or the representative of the nonresident in the state of Mississippi may be commenced in the county in which the action accrued or where the plaintiff then resides or is domiciled, except as otherwise provided by law. The complaint shows that Boston, a beneficiary, resided in the First Judicial District of Hinds County at the time of her filing. ¶ 18. HAIC counters by stating that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13 applies because a political subdivision is being sued and because it was the statute in effect at the time this suit was filed in state court. In pertinent part the section states: (2) The venue for any suit filed under the provisions of this chapter against the state or its employees shall be in the county in which the act, omission or event on which the liability phase of the action is based, occurred or took place. The venue for all other suits filed under the provisions of this chapter shall be in the county or judicial district thereof in which the principal offices of the governing body of the political subdivision are located. The venue specified in this subsection shall control in all actions filed against governmental entities, notwithstanding that other defendants which are not governmental entities may be joined in the suit, and notwithstanding the provisions of any other venue statute that otherwise would apply. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13(2) (Supp.2001) (emphasis added). ¶ 19. Decedent died July 12, 1987. Boston v. Lafayette County, 743 F.Supp. at 464. Her death was almost six years before Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13 went into effect. While acknowledging that Boston did not file a civil action in state court until May 8, 1995, the only way that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13 could apply to the present case is if the statute was found to be retroactive. ¶ 20. This Court has addressed the issue of retroactivity of statutes contained in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. In Jones v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., 735 So.2d 993 (Miss.1999), this Court held that if a statute is to apply effective from and after passage, it is not to apply to causes of action that have accrued prior to the passage of the statute. This Court made the following analysis: Although the present case concerns the retroactivity of numerous sections of the Sovereign Immunity Act rather than solely paragraph (m) of § 11-46-9, the intent of this Court is clear. If the statutory language mandates that the statute is to apply from and after passage, it is not to be applied retroactively to causes of action which accrued prior to passage of the statute. The cause of action in this case accrued prior to the enactment of § 11-46-3 (providing immunity to the state and its political subdivisions, approved April 1, 1993) and 11-46-11 (providing for notice of claim requirement and one year statute of limitations, approved April 1, 1993). Id. at 998 (emphasis added). ¶ 21. This Court has also recently reiterated that a statute will not be retroactive unless clearly stated in the statute: This Court has continuously followed the rule that statutes will be construed to have a prospective operation only, unless a contrary intention is manifested by the clearest and most positive expression. Anderson v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth., 419 So.2d 1010, 1026 (Miss.1982). If the statute is unconditionally repealed without a savings clause in favor of pending suits, all pending proceedings thereunder are terminated. Beatty v. State, 627 So.2d 355, 357 (Miss.1993). A statute will not be construed to be retroactive unless the words admit of no other construction or meaning, and there is a plain declaration in the act that it is. Anderson v. Jackson Municipal Airport Auth., 419 So.2d at 1027. Hudson v. Moon, 732 So.2d 927, 931-32 (Miss.1999) (emphasis added). Fortune v. Lee County Bd. of Supervisors, 725 So.2d 747 (Miss.1998) and State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d 624 (Miss.1991), provide additional support that a statute is to be applied prospectively unless clearly and positively expressed in the language of the statute. These two cases upheld this Court's decision in Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So.2d 481 (Miss.1966) where this Court, after giving a comprehensive list of authority, stated: [a] statute will not be given retroactive effect unless it is manifest from the language that the legislature intended it to so operate. It will not be construed as retroactive unless the words admit of no other construction or meaning, and there is a plain declaration in the act that it is. In short, these cases illustrate a well-settled attitude of statutory interpretation: A preference that it be prospective only, and a requirement that there should be a clearly expressed intent in the act to make it. Id. at 484. ¶ 22. Given the fact that the Decedent died prior to the enactment of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act and that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13 does not contain plain and clearly expressed language that it is to be retroactive, we find that this statute is not applicable to the present case and that venue should not have been changed under the authority of this statute. ¶ 23. As stated previously, when venue was changed in the present case, no statute was cited by the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. It should not be assumed that the change in venue was based upon the language found in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13 as asserted by both parties to this suit. The question that remains is, if change of venue was not proper under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13 because the statute was not in effect at the time the action accrued, did Lafayette County have a right to change venue to its home county that pre-dates the Mississippi Tort Claims Act making the change of venue in this case proper? This Court considered such prior to the enactment of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, and in doing so may well have provided the logical basis for the venue aspects of the Act: In the case of Simpson v. Neshoba County, 157 Miss. 217, 127 So. 692, 693 [(Miss.1930)], we had before us the question as to whether a county could be sued outside of the courts of the county, by joinder with another defendant, and although the statute applicable in that case expressly provided that the county could be sued in any court situated at the county site, it was contended that the section was inapplicable, and that the county could be sued in another county where a joint defendant resided. After referring to the statutes involved in that case, it is said: It is the contention of the appellant that under the last section it was competent to sue Newsom in the county and district of his residence and bring the county into said district as a codefendant. It is our view that this contention is not well founded. A county is a subdivision of the state and partakes of the sovereignty of the state and can only be sued in the way and on the conditions prescribed by law, and section 3980 of Hemingway's 1927 Code (section 309, Code of 1906) has provided how a county may be sued, and where the suit shall be instituted. This statute is not affected by the general statute as to ordinary parties litigant. There is sound reason for requiring a county to be sued in the county, or in the court which sits at the county site and has jurisdiction of the suit. A county can only act through its officers, and these officers are charged with various duties for the public welfare. In defending suits against counties, the officers might be taken out of the county or called away from their public duties and the public interests would suffer in many cases by reason of their absence from their duties while attending court in other places than at the county site. The records might often have to be carried away from the county site, if such suits were maintained, to the place where the suit was tried and would endanger the safety of the said records and discommode the public who might desire to resort to the records for any lawful purposes for which they are made and used. City of Jackson v. Wallace, 189 Miss. 252, 196 So. 223, 224-25 (1940). ¶ 24. In Simpson this Court determined as a matter of public policy and practicality, when a county is being sued, such suit should take place in that county's court even if the presence of a codefendant would normally make venue proper in another county. Section 3980 of Hemingway's 1927 Code was the statute in effect at the time both Simpson and City of Jackson were decided. It stated: Section 3980 of Hemingway's 1927 Code (section 309, Code of 1906) provides: Any county may sue and be sued by its name, and suits against the county shall be instituted in any court having jurisdiction of the amount sitting at the county site; but suit shall not be brought by the county without the authority of the board of supervisors, except as otherwise provided by law. Simpson, 127 So. at 693. This statute was carried forward unchanged into subsequent codes and exists today as Miss.Code Ann. § 11-45-17. It states: Any county may sue and be sued by its name, and suits against the county shall be instituted in any court having jurisdiction of the amount sitting at the county site; but suit shall not be brought by the county without the authority of the board of supervisors, except as otherwise provided by law. ¶ 25. As was stated earlier, this action accrued prior to the enactment of the Tort Claims Act making the Act inapplicable to this case. However, this Court has commented on Miss.Code Ann. § 11-45-17, a statute which is still effective, and how it is bolstered by Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13(2) of the Act: [S]uits against the county shall be instituted in any court having jurisdiction of the amount sitting at the county site... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-45-17 (1972). A complaint against Simpson County, therefore, would be properly filed in Simpson County. This position is further supported by Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13(2), which provides that proper venue for a tort suit against any government entity, including a county or municipality, is in the county or judicial district thereof in which the principal offices of the governing body of the political subdivision are located. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-13(2) (Supp.1997). Estate of Jones v. Quinn, 716 So.2d 624, 627 (Miss.1998). ¶ 26. Both statutory and case law support finding that transfer of venue from Hinds County to Lafayette County was proper.