Opinion ID: 2334407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of the Rhode Island Family Court

Text: This nation's early treatment of juveniles accused of criminal conduct was much harsher than it is today. Until the late nineteenth century, most juvenile offenders were treated as adults, consistent with the common law view that only children under the age of seven were irrebuttably incapable of forming criminal intent. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, legislation in states throughout the country gave `criminal courts discretion either to sentence juveniles to reform school or to impose such punishment as [was] otherwise provided by law.' Laureen D'Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders is Not a Panacea, 2 Roger Williams U.L.Rev. 277, 279-80 (1997) (quoting John J. Cloherty III, Note, The Serious Juvenile Offender in the Adult Criminal System: The Jurisprudence of Rhode Island's Waiver and Certification Procedures, 26 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 407, 414 (1992)). Then, in 1899, the Juvenile Court Act was passed in Illinois and the first juvenile court was created in Chicago. This presaged a new trend in the United States, and [w]ithin twenty years, all but three states had created similar juvenile systems. Lynn A. Foster, School Shootings and the Over-reliance Upon Age in Choosing Criminal or Juvenile Court, 24 Vt. L.Rev. 537, 540 (2000). The philosophy underlying the movement to create juvenile justice systems, separate from the adult criminal system, stemmed from the belief that people under a certain age inherently were less culpable than were adults. Society's goal for juveniles, it was believed, should be to rehabilitate through treatment and supervision, an option not available under the punishment-driven adult criminal system. As a result of their philosophical underpinnings, the newly created juvenile courts of the various states differed greatly from their adult court counterparts. The hearings were civil and confidential in nature, and [r]ehabilitative `sentencing,' left almost entirely to the judge's discretion, varied greatly with each case because of the diverse needs of each individual youth. Julie B. Fails, Statutory ExclusionWhen the Protector Becomes the Abuser, 32 Suffolk U.L.Rev. 81, 85 (1998). Following the national trend, the Rhode Island juvenile system began to take shape in the early 1900s. In 1944, the Rhode Island Legislature removed what was then called the juvenile court from the jurisdiction of the District Court, created Rhode Island's first fully independent juvenile court, and gave that new court its own chief justice. P.L.1944, ch. 1441. Eventually, in 1961, the juvenile court was merged with the Family Court, which assumed jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. P.L.1961, ch. 73. The Family Court's jurisdiction was both original and exclusive and it extended to, among other things, the adjudication of matters involving juveniles alleged to be either wayward or delinquent. As it exists today, the Family Court is a court of limited statutory jurisdiction, State v. Kenney, 523 A.2d 853, 854 (R.I.1987) (the Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction whose powers are strictly limited to those conferred by the Legislature), and its governing statutes give it subject matter jurisdiction only over a very narrow range of criminal violations dealing with offenses committed by adults against either children or members of the offender's family. Thus, children accused of conduct that would amount to a crime if committed by an adult are not actually charged with, tried for, or convicted of the underlying crime in the Family Court. Indeed, according to § 14-1-40(a), a juvenile never can be charged with or convicted of a crime in any court, except as provided in [that] chapter. (Emphasis added.) Instead, juveniles accused of conduct that would be otherwise criminal in nature are brought before the Family Court on delinquency petitions and their conduct is evaluated through an adjudication governed by chapter 1 of title 14 and the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings. [7] So, although the Family Court has exclusive personal jurisdiction over juveniles appearing before it on delinquency petitions, it lacks the subject matter jurisdiction needed to adjudge a juvenile's behavior criminal in the traditional sense. [8] On the other hand, the Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction, and it is fully cloaked with the authority to hear cases involving violations of our criminal laws. Conversely, in the absence of a waiver from the Family Court, the Superior Court lacks personal jurisdiction to adjudicate allegations of criminal conduct with respect to children; that is the exclusive province of the Family Court. The purpose of this jurisdictional division is, as we have stated in prior cases, to guard    [children] against the stigma attaching to criminal proceedings. State v. Cook, 99 R.I. 710, 713, 210 A.2d 577, 579 (1965) (quoting Givardi v. Juvenile Court, 49 R.I. 336, 337, 142 A. 542, 542 (1928)). Sections 14-1-7 and 14-1-7.1 serve as a jurisdictional bridge between the two courts. Section 14-1-7 says that waiver of jurisdiction in the Family Court is appropriate for either (1) any child who is accused of conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime that would be punishable by life imprisonment, or (2) a child who is sixteen years or older and who is accused of conduct that otherwise would constitute a felony. Section 14-1-7.1 delineates the factors that the Family Court justice must consider in deciding whether to waive a child from the jurisdiction of that court. First, the justice must assess whether the Attorney General has produced enough evidence to find that probable cause exists to believe that the child in question has committed the act upon which the motion to waive is based. Second, if the justice finds that such probable cause exists, he or she then must find that either the heinous nature of the juvenile's alleged conduct by itself, or the nature of the juvenile's act in conjunction with his or her past behavior and treatment in the juvenile system, indicates that the child is not amenable to rehabilitation. [9] If the Family Court justice finds that the statutory requirements have been met, waiver is appropriate because the state's interest in protecting the child from the stigma of conviction is outweighed both by the public's need for safety from the possible future misconduct of the accused child and its need for redress for the wrong allegedly committed. Once the justice decides that waiver is appropriate, § 14-1-7.1(b) authorizes him to waive jurisdiction over the child and refer the child to the appropriate adult court to be tried for the offense as an adult. And, according to § 14-1-7.1(c), the waiver constitutes both a waiver of jurisdiction over that child for the offense upon which the motion is based as well as for all pending and subsequent offenses of whatever nature   . Armed with a better understanding of the waiver process and the reasons supporting its existence, we now turn to the question presented in this case: after the Family Court has waived jurisdiction over a juvenile in accordance with § 14-1-7.1, is the jurisdiction of the adult court to which the child is referred limited to the charges for which probable cause was found in the Family Court?