Opinion ID: 2982513
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Patel’s sentencing

Text: Finally, we consider the procedural reasonableness of Patel’s sentencing, an issue we review for an abuse of the district court’s discretion. See United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2014). A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court improperly calculated the guideline range. Id. Patel points to error in the district court’s attribution of an amount of loss more than $7 million but less than $20 million, thereby increasing his base offense level by 20 levels under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K) (Nov. 2010). In Patel’s view, the district court’s sentencing ruling was insufficient to satisfy the instruction of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3)(B) that the court, “for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter” must “rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” Neither issue compels us to reverse. -26- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. In Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007), issued shortly after our decision in United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2007), the Supreme Court explained that a “sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Where the arguments presented are “conceptually simple,” the court’s statement of reasons, “though brief,” is legally sufficient. Id. In this case, Patel and the government each filed an extensive sentencing memorandum in the district court discussing the sentencing issues presented for resolution. Patel’s objection to the amount-of-loss enhancement was conceptually simple and, in light of the extensive record developed over the course of a six-week jury trial, the court was not required to hear any additional evidence to resolve the factual dispute. Having read the parties’ briefs and having heard oral argument at the sentencing hearing, the court simply ruled that it understood both Patel’s objection and the parties’ positions and that it accepted the government’s position over Patel’s, leaving in place the twenty-level enhancement to the base offense level. Although brief, the district court’s ruling complied with Rita and Rule 32(i)(3)(B) because it satisfies us that the court considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising decisionmaking authority. The court’s decision to overrule Patel’s objection to the sentencing enhancement was not an abuse of discretion. See Davis, 751 F.3d at 773. The court was not required to determine the amount of the loss with precision because a reasonable estimate is sufficient. United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 712 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Kohlbach, 38 F.3d 832, 835 (6th Cir. 1994). The evidence demonstrated that Patel’s entire relationship with VDA was fraudulent so that one hundred percent of VDA billings—approximately $2.9 million—was properly included in the amount of the loss. That amount alone added eighteen levels to the base offense level. -27- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). To justify the addition of two more levels (to 20) for an amount of loss exceeding $7 million, the government was required to show only that Patel’s fraud generated an additional $4.1 million in loss. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K). Where the trial evidence proved that Patel’s billings to Medicare, Medicaid, and Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan totaled more than $67 million, only about six percent of those billings must be fraudulent to reach the additional $4.1 million in loss. Because the trial record provided the district court with a rational basis to estimate the amount of loss between $7 million and $20 million, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the procedural reasonableness of the sentencing calculation. See Davis, 751 F.3d at 773.