Opinion ID: 2616171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: washington's assault on caveat emptor

Text: In Washington, the assault upon the doctrine of caveat emptor began with Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wn.2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958). In Hoye, the plaintiff entered into a building contract with the defendant for the construction of a house. Due to defects in construction, the house apparently became uninhabitable. The issue was whether the construction contract contained an implied warranty of fitness for habitation where the contract only required the builder to provide labor and materials. The court began its analysis on the assumption that caveat emptor would preclude an implied warranty of fitness if the parties had contracted for the sale of a new, completed house. Hoye, at 832. Nevertheless, the court held that, where the contract involved the construction of a dwelling, the contract contained an implied warranty that the completed house would be fit for human habitation. Hoye, at 833. Accord, Fain v. Nelson, 57 Wn.2d 217, 356 P.2d 302 (1960). This warranty, which became known as the warranty of workmanlike quality, represents the first assault upon the archaic barriers created by the doctrine of caveat emptor. House v. Thornton, 76 Wn.2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969) represents the second, and more important, assault on the doctrine of caveat emptor. In House, the builder-vendor constructed a house on an unstable site, leading to severe deterioration of the foundation. The plaintiffs first viewed the dwelling when it was substantially completed, and subsequently purchased it from the builder-vendor. After almost 2 years of occupancy, the house became unfit for further occupancy, and the plaintiffs sued the builder-vendor. After noting that Hoye and Fain did not apply to the sale of a completed dwelling, the court nonetheless stated that the present trend is toward the implied warranty of fitness and away from caveat emptor when it comes to the things which vitally affect the structural stability or preclude the occupancy of the building. House, at 434. The court went on to hold that, when a vendor-builder sells a new house to its first intended occupant, he impliedly warrants that the ... house is structurally safe for the buyer's intended purpose of living in it. House, at 436. The warranty enunciated in House, which became known as the warranty of habitability, was considered again in Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn.2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976), the court's most recent decision in this area. In Klos, this court refused to impose liability under the warranty of habitability on the widow of a professional builder who, after her husband's death, built three more houses, one of which allegedly was defective. Klos, at 572. In Klos, this court refined the elements of the warranty of habitability first enunciated in House. First, the builder-vendor must be regularly engaged in building, so that the sale is commercial rather than casual or personal in nature. (Citations omitted.) Klos, at 570. Second, the house must be constructed for purposes of resale, and not personal use. Cf. Klos, at 570. Finally, the sale must be fairly contemporaneous with completion and not interrupted by an intervening tenancy ... Klos, at 571. The only exception to this final requirement exists where the builder-vendor created such an intervening tenancy for the primary purpose of promoting the sale of the property. (Citation omitted.) Klos, at 571. Together, House and Klos stand for the proposition that liability under the implied warranty of habitability only exists where: (1) the structure is a house, (2) the house is new, (3) the house was built for purposes of resale, (4) the sale was commercial, and (5) the defect complained of was structural and rendered the house uninhabitable. Application of virtually any one of the aforementioned elements would justify this court's refusal to extend the warranty to the Frickel-Sunnyside transaction. Nevertheless, the majority apparently relies upon only one of the elements, number three, in refusing to apply the implied warranty of habitability to this case. Majority opinion, at 718-19. In addition, the majority apparently adds two more requirements, unmentioned in House or Klos ; namely, that (1) the purchaser must not acquire the structure for investment purposes, majority opinion, at 720, and that, (2) regardless, the purchaser must seek expert help to determine whether structural defects exist. Majority opinion, at 720. In my opinion, the two elements added by the majority are indefensible and do a great disservice to the existing doctrine underlying the warranty of habitability. More important, however, I believe several of the elements enunciated in Klos and House, including the for purposes of resale requirement, are supported by little or no rationale. Accordingly, in support of my argument that the elements of the warranty of habitability should be modified, it is necessary to reveal the weaknesses in these elements.