Opinion ID: 2537376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Payment of bond

Text: On appeal, Spinks, citing Anders v. Fowler, 423 So.2d 838 (Ala.1982), and Lightsey v. Kensington Mortgage & Finance Corp., 294 Ala. 281, 315 So.2d 431 (1975), argues that the trial court erred by issuing the preliminary injunction because, Spinks says, [t]he Order requires no bond from APS for the payment of costs, damages, and attorneys' fees should it be found that Spinks was improperly enjoined, and the Order makes no specific finding based upon competent evidence that an exception to the mandatory bond requirement exists. Spinks's brief, pp. 17-18. We agree. Rule 65(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs, damages, and reasonable attorney fees as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained; provided, however, no such security shall be required of the State of Alabama or of an officer or agency thereof, and provided further, in the discretion of the court, no such security may be required in domestic relations cases. Also, `there are [other] necessary exceptions to such an absolute holding in all cases under Rule 65(c), such as requiring only a nominal security, or where the litigant is impecunious or the issue is one of overriding public concern.' Anders, 423 So.2d at 840 (quoting Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 285, 315 So.2d at 434, citing in turn Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2954, p. 529). APS does not contend that any of the exceptions listed above apply in this case; instead, APS, citing several federal authorities, contends that there is authority for the fact that this requirement [of posting a bond] is not absolute. [2] APS's brief, p. 12. Specifically, APS notes that certain federal decisions have held that, under certain circumstances, district courts have the discretion to dispense with the bond requirement of Rule 65(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. [3] Additionally, APS contends that this Court should apply in this case the rationale set forth in those federal decisions because, APS says, Alabama courts have relied upon federal case law in the interpretation of Rule 65. APS's brief, p. 12 (citing Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 285, 315 So.2d at 434). Moreover, APS contends that [t]he rationale from the federal decisions is consistent with the express language of [Rule 65(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.], which only requires the giving of security `in such sums as the court deems proper.' Further, as noted by the federal courts, the burden should be on the enjoined party to request a bond. Spinks did not make any request of the trial court for a bond prior to filing her appeal in this case. APS's brief, p. 15. Alabama law, however, clearly provides that [i]t is mandatory that security be given under Rule 65(c), `unless the trial court makes a specific finding based upon competent evidence that one or more of the exceptions, stating them, do exist.' Anders, 423 So.2d at 840 (quoting Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 285, 315 So.2d at 434) (emphasis added); see also Chunchula Energy Corp. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 503 So.2d 1211, 1215 (Ala.1987) (stating that the provisions of Rule 65(c) are mandatory). Furthermore, this Court has long recognized the above-stated rule. See Ex parte Miller, 129 Ala. 130, 133, 30 So. 611, 612 (1901) (stating that [t]here can be no injunction. . . until the bond has been given) (quoted with approval in Anders, 423 So.2d at 840, and Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 284, 315 So.2d at 433). APS's arguments fail to convince us that we should alter this Court's well established rule on this issue. [4] Here, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction without requiring APS to give security as mandated by Rule 65(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. Furthermore, the trial court failed to make a specific finding based upon competent evidence that one or more of the exceptions, stating them, do exist. Anders, 423 So.2d at 840. As noted, there can be no injunction . . . until the bond has been given. Anders, 423 So.2d at 840 (quoting Ex parte Miller, 129 Ala. at 133, 30 So. at 612, quoted with approval in Lightsey, 294 Ala. at 285, 315 So.2d at 434). Accordingly, [u]nder the clear mandate of Rule 65(c), and the previous decisions of this court, we have no alternative but to reverse and remand. Anders, 423 So.2d at 840; see also Chunchula Energy Corp., 503 So.2d at 1215-16 (stating that an injunction issued without the giving of security by the applicant is defective and due to be reversed).