Opinion ID: 1192200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unreasonable or Unnecessary Delay

Text: We review a district court's finding that a pre-arraignment delay was reasonable for clear error. See United States v. Padilla-Mendoza, 157 F.3d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1998). Although in Corley the Supreme Court specifically declined to address what constitutes an unreasonable or unnecessary delay, the court noted that delay for the purpose of interrogation is the epitome of `unnecessary delay.' Corley, 129 S.Ct. at 1563 (quoting Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455-56, 77 S.Ct. 1356). We recently addressed what constitutes an unreasonable or unnecessary delay in United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 569 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir.2009). In Garcia-Hernandez, we stated that administrative delays due to the unavailability of government personnel and judges necessary to completing the arraignment process are reasonable and necessary. Id. Accordingly, we held that the nineteen hour delay in presenting Garcia-Hernandez to a magistrate did not violate the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a) because the delay was caused not by a desire to interrogate Garcia further but by a shortage of personnel necessary to process Garcia and determine whether he should be criminally charged.  Id. at 1106 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Matus-Leva, 311 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that a twenty-four hour pre-arraignment delay was reasonable and necessary because the defendant needed to receive medical treatment); United States v. Gamez, 301 F.3d 1138, 1141-43 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that a thirty-one hour pre-arraignment delay was necessary because the defendant spoke only Spanish, and the first available Spanish-speaking FBI agent did not arrive until approximately 27 hours after defendant's arrest). Here, however, unlike in Garcia-Hernandez, the delay in presenting Liera to a magistrate judge was not necessary to redress a shortage of personnel necessary to process [Liera] and determine whether he should be criminally charged. Garcia-Hernandez, 569 F.3d at 1106. At about 4:15 a.m., Customs and Border Protection Officers arrested Liera. At 9:18 a.m., over five hours after Liera's arrest, Officer Figueroa interrogated Liera for the first time. At 10:45 a.m., Officer Figueroa interrogated the two material witnesses, Le Chen and Wu Chen. After interrogating Liera and both material witnesses the first time, the government had more than enough information to determine whether Liera should be criminally charged, and was not prevented by personnel shortages from processing Liera appropriately. [6] The government could have arraigned Liera during Magistrate Judge Lewis's 3:00 p.m. arraignment calendar at the El Centro United States Courthouse, if not earlier. At 1:30 p.m., Officer Figueroa discovered that the video recording equipment used during Liera's first interrogation malfunctioned and did not record any audio. Rather than proceed with the arraignment at 3:00 p.m., the government conducted a second interrogation at 2:57 p.m., nearly eleven hours after Liera's arrest. As a result, Liera was not arraigned until 10:48 a.m. the next day, over thirty hours after his arrest. The purpose of the McNabb-Mallory Rule is not merely to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943). Rather, the McNabb-Mallory Rule was also designed to insure that a defendant is brought before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he may be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may be promptly determined. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) the government was required to present Liera to a magistrate as quickly possible so that Liera could be advised of his rights by a judicial officer. Instead of presenting Liera to a magistrate as quickly as possible, the government delayed Liera's arraignment so that it could interrogate Liera a second time and obtain an audio recording of his statements. An audio recording of Liera's statements was, however, unnecessary to complete the arraignment process or determine whether to file criminal charges against Liera. [7] Accordingly, we hold that the district court clearly erred by refusing to suppress statements Liera made during his second interrogation. [8]