Opinion ID: 2122024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase

Text: Defendant claims his counsel's representation was so deficient at the sentencing phase of trial that the process failed. Although its basis is not identified, such a claim is rooted in protections of the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. (See U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) It should be noted that counsel who represented defendant at sentencing did not represent him on direct appeal or in the post-conviction proceeding. Defendant asserts several grounds independently support his claim. Two relate directly to Weliczko's testimony. Defendant first points to the failure to verify Weliczko's credentials. He then argues that proffering Weliczko's testimony actually undermined the defense strategy. Neither point may now be considered. Again, defendant's opportunity to raise those arguments was on direct appeal. Any inadequacy there may have been with counsel's representation with respect to Weliczko was evident when Weliczko was cross-examined. Defendant failed to take issue with that representation on direct appeal and so is procedurally barred from doing so here ( People v. Albanese, 125 Ill.2d at 104-05, 125 Ill.Dec. 838, 531 N.E.2d 17) absent some exception. We find none. Defendant next asserts counsel failed to independently investigate and present other mitigating evidence, including a competent psychological profile. Defendant argues that that evidence would show he had endured a childhood of psychological, emotional, and sexual abuse and that he had a history of alcohol and drug addiction. Defendant points to reports of two psychologists which recount that background in confirming it could explain defendant's acts. One adds the factor of head injury. Defendant also points to affidavits from two former teachers. They offer that defendant was a well-adjusted student and that news of his involvement in the crimes came as a shock. The ever present duty of independent investigation in a criminal defense effort (see United States v. Decoster (D.C.Cir.1979), 624 F.2d 196, 209-10) is to be judged using a standard of reasonableness in light of all circumstances presented ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695). Reasonableness is to be determined by considering the informed strategic choices of, as well as the information supplied by, the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695-96. Initially, then, it bears noting that Weliczko, who, it must be remembered, was retained by defendant's own parents, had already generated a psychological evaluation. Ignoring, as would be proper in separately analyzing this issue, that an ineffectiveness claim for not verifying Weliczko's training in psychology is barred, the evaluation's existence would seem reason enough to dismiss the claim that counsel was ineffective for not having obtained another. The State suggests just such a disposition. But defendant's argument fails substantively as well. Courts may resolve ineffectiveness claims against the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reaching only the prejudice component, for lack of prejudice renders irrelevant the issue of counsel's performance. ( People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill.2d 504, 525-27, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246, adopting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) That involves looking at the findings unaffected by error, accounting for the effect of error on remaining findings, and answering, in the end, whether the decision would reasonably likely have been different. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698-99.) The assessment must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, `nullification,' and the like ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698) an important observation given that, in this State, the sentencer could have elected to preclude the death penalty for any reason found to be sufficiently mitigating (Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(h)). Just as importantly, the assessment may include evidence about the actual process of decision if that evidence is a part of the record of the proceedings being reviewed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. The unaffected findings show that defendant, then 25 years old, enlisted the aid of two juveniles to methodically chart a plan to isolate, bind, and gag a 15-year-old girl for purposes of raping her, stabbing her to death, and, in the end, concealing the corpse. (See Erickson, 117 Ill.2d at 279-83, 111 Ill. Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367.) For those crimes, defendant was remorseless. He bragged about the stabbing immediately after the deed. He boasted of the crimes days after and even did so much later when detained in a county jail awaiting trial. Other aggravating evidence, including the commission of another rape at knife point and a third threatened one, attests to some pattern of sexual assault against women. Any laxity of counsel notwithstanding, what is offered to bolster the ineffectiveness claim does not show the result would reasonably likely have been different, excluding the possibility of arbitrariness. Briefly, the psychologists' reports could, at best, only suggest what may have explained defendant's criminal behavior of July of 1982. The evaluations were produced years after the crimes and, apparently, without the aid of the trial record, which revealed, through witnesses' testimony, defendant's actual behavior. The affidavits of the teachers, one from fourth grade and one from high school, disclose that neither maintained close contact with defendant after he left their respective classrooms. And, if anything, they show defendant to be polite, intelligent, and engaging, not a person troubled by a disturbed psyche which might account for his criminal behavior. The record is also revealing as to the process of decision, underscoring the lack of prejudice which might have been occasioned by any deficiencies of counsel. The trial judge, who defendant elected to impose sentence, actually took into account the notion that defendant may have suffered from a personality disorder. In addition, the trial judge noted that a presentencing investigation report on defendant revealed a background free of what might be normally encountered given the nature of the crimes. It would appear, then, that the trial judge on his own considered, and rejected, the gist of what defendant hoped the evidence might show. Defendant raises two other issues, tangentially related to claims of ineffectiveness addressed above, insisting each supports the need for an evidentiary hearing on the petition. Defendant claims the judge who ruled on the post-conviction petition did so improperly by guessing at how the original trial judge, who recused himself, would have ruled in light of the evidence defendant claims should have been presented. Both defendant's post-conviction counsel and the State conceded that the judge ruling on defendant's petition could do so after reviewing the trial transcript and other evidence in the record. The judge stated that he did, indeed, review the entire record and that he, himself, not the trial judge, found the petition to be without merit. The judge did refer to the original trial judge by name, stating he reviewed the materials supporting defendant's petition just as the sentencing judge would have had the materials been presented in mitigation. A fair reading of those remarks, however, does not show that the judge evaluated defendant's petition in any way other than as defense counsel and the State conceded would be the only way possible. No prejudice is found here. Finally, defendant notes that his parents had executed a promissory note for the balance of fees for counsel's representation. Ultimately, counsel sued to collect on the note. Defendant now theorizes that the failure to obtain a competent psychological profile may have been due to a reluctance to incur additional costs. If so, defendant reasons, the conflict contributed to counsel's ineffectiveness. The record answers any speculation as to why counsel did not seek out a psychological profile in addition to Weliczko's evaluation. The reasons are not as defendant suggests. Surprised by Weliczko's disclosure of his true background on cross-examination, counsel sought a continuance of the hearing to obtain an acceptable evaluation. (See Erickson, 117 Ill.2d at 301, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367.) That request, though denied (see Erickson, 117 Ill.2d at 301-02, 111 Ill.Dec. 924, 513 N.E.2d 367), would be inconsistent with a reluctance to incur additional expense on defendant's behalf. Further, as earlier noted, an evaluation of defendant had already been generated. Without reason to doubt Weliczko's competency, the evaluation's existence, not conjecture about preoccupation with collecting fees, explains the failure to produce another.