Opinion ID: 312185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: adjudicative hearings

Text: 15 Duquesne and St. Joe contend that due process demands that they be afforded some form of hearing by the EPA prior to the federal adoption of the state implementation plan. Central to a viable concept of due process is the principle that [c]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. 22 16 Moving from this fundament, the Court must proceed to consider the companies' requests for adjudicative or legislative hearings, bearing in mind that the government function involved is the protection of the health of the citizenry, and that a degree of flexibility in responding to the companies' requests is essential. 17 An attempt to draw a bright line between situations requiring adjudicative hearings and those calling for rule-making is a task often unresponsive to the actual problems presented in a given case. Rather, a growing body of case law 23 and scholarly discussion 24 has indicated that hybrid proceedings, tailored to the types of issues contested, appear to be a salutary alternative to efforts to sketch a rigid demarcation. Determination of this case, required, however, that the Court examine both adjudicative and legislative type hearings in fashioning an appropriate order. 18 Although we do not at this time have to decide whether the EPA is bound to follow the APA, reference to the APA facilitates distinguishing adjudicative hearings from legislative, rule-making proceedings. This Court recently made such a comparison in Virgin Islands Hotel Ass'n v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, 476 F.2d 1263 at 1267 No. 72-1996 (3d Cir., filed April 12, 1973). 25 The Court explicated the difference as follows: 19    Rule-making proceedings are controlled by Sec. 553, [of the APA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 551 et seq.] which requires only that interested parties be given adequate notice of the proposed rule, see Sec. 553(b), and 'an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation,' Sec. 553(c). The procedure for adjudication is set out in Secs. 554 and 556, under which '[a] party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.' Sec. 556(d). 20 The Supreme Court has recently enumerated the occasions in which an adjudicative hearing is required before agency promulgation of a rule. In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum, 406 U.S. 742, 92 S.Ct. 1941, 32 L.Ed.2d 453 (1972), and United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 410 U.S. 224, 93 S.Ct. 810, 35 L.Ed.2d 223 (1973), the Supreme Court made clear that unless the statute providing for agency action prescribes hearings on the record, either in those exact words or in similar phrases, an adjudicative hearing need not be held. 26 Section 110(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act does not speak in terms of hearings prior to EPA approval of the state implementation plans. 27 Therefore, if the APA were applicable there is nonetheless an absence of the language which the Supreme Court has indicated is necessary to trigger the requirement of an adversary hearing. 21 In International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 No. 72-1517 (D.C. Cir. filed February 10, 1973), the District of Columbia Circuit remanded proceedings to the EPA. The question to be decided on remand concerned certain aspects of the automobile emission control program, a subject entrusted by the Clean Air Act directly to the Administrator, without involvement or hearings at the state level. 28 Moreover, the section itself contemplates that the EPA would hold hearings on issues raised in this section. 29 Given these two factors, present in International Harvester, but wanting in this case, the modified adjudicatory hearing required by the District of Columbia Court 30 is not apposite nor will it be required here. 22 Duquesne and St. Joe further contend that a failure to accord them an adjudicative hearing in the face of the federal sanctions possible under the Clean Air Act would deprive them of due process. Florida East Coast Railway, supra, and Virgin Islands Hotel Ass'n, supra, appear dispositive of the due process claims. In both cases, increased rates were being imposed on a general segment of the population. In Florida East Coast Railway the increase was an added per diem charge for box cars assessed against railroads, in Virgin Islands Hotel Ass'n the increase was a raising of electric rates. The protestants claimed in each case that the higher rates fell more harshly upon them or were more injurious to them than to others. Nonetheless, each Court emphasized the general nature of the rule, not its effect on any particular party, in determining whether an adjudicatory hearing was required by due process. In each case, the Court concluded that because of the general applicability of the statute, and its prospective effects, adjudicative hearings were not required. 31 Bound by both the Supreme Court and the recent decision of this Court, we hold that on remand, there is no need for adjudicative hearings. 32