Opinion ID: 48706
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Rights at Capital Sentencing: Williams v. New York

Text: 17 Constitutional rights traditionally have been more circumscribed at sentencing, even capital sentencing, than during the guilt phase. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), a state judge sentenced a defendant to death on the basis of information obtained pursuant to a statutory presentence investigation and relayed to the judge outside the courtroom. At the sentencing hearing, the judge explained why he believed the death penalty was appropriate: 18 [The judge] stated that the pre-sentence investigation revealed many material facts concerning appellant's background which though relevant to the question of punishment could not properly have been brought to the attention of the jury in its consideration of the question of guilt. He referred to the experience appellant had had on thirty other burglaries in and about the same vicinity where the murder had been committed. The appellant had not been convicted of these burglaries although the judge had information that he had confessed to some and had been identified as the perpetrator of some of the others. The judge also referred to certain activities of appellant as shown by the probation report that indicated appellant possessed a morbid sexuality and classified him as a menace to society. 19 Id. at 244, 69 S.Ct. 1079. 20 The defendant challenged his sentence on due process grounds, stating that his constitutional rights had been violated because the sentence of death was based upon information supplied by witnesses with whom the accused had not been confronted and as to whom he had no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal. Id. at 243, 69 S.Ct. 1079. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that a judge, consistent with due process, could sentence a defendant on the basis of information untested in open court. [P]ossession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics was essential to a judge's selection of an appropriate sentence, and therefore 21 we do not think the Federal Constitution restricts the view of the sentencing judge to the information received in open court. The due-process clause should not be treated as a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure. So to treat the due-process clause would hinder if not preclude all courts state and federal from making progressive efforts to improve the administration of criminal justice. 22 Id. at 247, 251, 69 S.Ct. 1079. The Court was urged to draw a constitutional distinction as to the procedure for obtaining information where the death sentence is imposed, but it explicitly refused to do so. Id. at 251, 69 S.Ct. 1079. 23 Williams is a due process, rather than Sixth Amendment, case and therefore does not dictate the result of Fields's Confrontation Clause challenge. We conclude, however, that Williams 's distinction between guilt and sentencing proceedings and its emphasis on the sentencing authority's access to a wide body of information in the interest of individualized punishment is relevant to our Confrontation Clause inquiry. Included in the notion that information influencing a sentencing decision need not be introduced in open court is the idea that defendants have no confrontation right at that phase and therefore that testimonial hearsay is not per se inadmissible. Indeed, the Court referred to the rights to confront and cross-examine as salutary and time-tested protections included within the due process guarantee but available only where the question for consideration is the guilt of the defendant. Id. at 245, 69 S.Ct. 1079. 8