Opinion ID: 23165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether aedpa violates article iii

Text: 9 Tucker argues that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) violates Article III. 2 More specifically, he argues that, as interpreted by this Court in Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), the AEDPA standards violate Article III by forcing federal judges to defer to a state court's view with respect to federal constitutional rights. In Drinkard, this Court held that an application of law to facts is unreasonable only when it can be said that reasonable jurists considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect. 97 F.3d at 769. Tucker complains of this formulation of the unreasonable application rule. 10 Since the filing of Tucker's opening brief, the Supreme Court has addressed his concerns. See Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). 3 In Williams, the Supreme Court explained that when making the unreasonable application determination, federal courts should inquire whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. 120 S.Ct. at 1521. The Court specifically noted that, in Drinkard, 4 we apparently had applied the reasonable jurist standard in a subjective manner. Id. at 1522. 11 The Supreme Court thus has clarified how the challenged language of the AEDPA should be interpreted. Of course, as instructed by the Supreme Court, when making the unreasonable application inquiry under the AEDPA, we will determine whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. 5 We now apply the AEDPA inquiry to each of his claims. 6 12