Opinion ID: 3203360
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: N.J. Civ. R. 56.1(a).

Text: Veverka’s compliance argument is puzzling because Royal Caribbean’s statement sets forth the facts necessary to decide its summary judgment motion, complete with numbered paragraphs and citations to the record. But even if Royal Caribbean did not comply with Rule 56.1, the District Court’s decision did not constitute reversible error. We have held that district courts have substantial discretion to depart from their local rules “where (1) [they] ha[ve] a sound rationale for doing so, and (2) so doing does not unfairly prejudice a party who has relied on the local rule to his detriment.” United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 200 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2000). The District Court explained its rationale for excusing any technical error in Royal Caribbean’s statement of fact, explaining that its statement sufficiently narrowed the record such that the “Court [was] able to adjudicate the motion without the need for a factual scavenger hunt.” App. 9. Moreover, Veverka has not pointed to any unfair prejudice she suffered from the District Court’s decision. Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion. 3 3 Veverka also argues that Royal Caribbean never responded to her supplemental statement of fact and that, pursuant to Rule 56.1, her supplemental facts should have been deemed admitted. Rule 56.1 provides, in relevant part, “[T]he [nonmoving party] may 8 Veverka argues that the record contains two disputes of material fact: (1) whether she received a ticket from Royal Caribbean, which is relevant to whether Veverka is bound by the limitations clause of the ticket agreement, and (2) whether Royal Caribbean had knowledge of her insurance agreement with Medicare, which is relevant to her tortious interference claim. We will address both arguments. We have previously held that a passenger is bound by a contractual limitations clause in a cruise ticket if the clause language is reasonably communicated to the passenger. Marek v. Marpan Two, Inc., 817 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1987). A passenger who has possession of a cruise ticket is charged with knowledge of the terms of the ticket, even if she has not read them. Id. at 247. Here, Mr. Biancella testified that Royal Caribbean sent Veverka a ticket, which included the terms of the limitations clause. Veverka denies receiving a ticket and points to her deposition testimony in support. But her testimony reveals that she never denied receiving a ticket; rather, she testified that she did not remember receiving a ticket. Moreover, the Biancella affidavit states that passengers must sign the acknowledgement form portion of the cruise ticket before boarding, indicating that Veverka could not have also furnish a supplemental statement of disputed material facts . . . if necessary to substantiate the factual basis for opposition. The movant shall respond to any such supplemental statement of disputed material facts as above, with its reply papers.” But the District Court did “deem [Veverka’s supplemental facts] undisputed for purposes of [the summary judgment] motion” in light of Royal Caribbean’s failure to respond. Veverka v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 12-cv-3070, 2015 WL 1270139,  n.1 (Mar. 18, 2015). Accordingly, the District Court followed the express language of Rule 56.1. 9 boarded without acknowledging receipt of her ticket. Veverka testified that her daughter handled all aspects of booking the cruise, but she admitted that she received some paperwork regarding the cruise before boarding. Moreover, even if Veverka’s daughter had possession of her ticket at all times, Veverka is still charged with constructive notice of its terms. Marek, 817 F.2d at 247 (concluding that a “[friend’s] possession of [a ticket] is sufficient to charge [litigant] with notice of its provisions”). Accordingly, there is no dispute of material fact concerning the application of the limitations clause, and we will affirm the District Court judgment that Veverka’s negligence and breach of contract claims are untimely. Veverka next argues that there is a dispute of fact as to her tortious interference claim, specifically whether Royal Caribbean had knowledge of her contract with Medicare. To prove tortious interference under New Jersey law,4 a litigant must demonstrate: “(1) actual interference with a contract; (2) that the interference was inflicted intentionally by a defendant who is not a party to the contract; (3) that the interference was without justification; and (4) that the interference caused damage.” Dello Russo v. Nagel, 817 A.2d 426, 434 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); see also Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 563 A.2d 31, 37 (N.J. 1989) (discussing elements of claim for tortious interference in context of prospective economic relationship). 4 Neither party on appeal disputes the District Court’s reliance on the law of New Jersey as the proper choice of law for this claim. 10 Veverka’s complaint is vague in the details of her tortious interference claim. Her summary judgment brief explains: “Plaintiff is required under the MMSEA Extension Act of 2007 (Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP) to reimburse Medicare for the medical expenses incurred. Defendant is tortuously [sic] interfering with Plaintiff’s contractual relationship with Medicare by refusing to remit reimbursement of the medical treatment provided and paid for by Medicare.” App. 179-180. The District Court granted summary judgment in Royal Caribbean’s favor, finding that Veverka failed to point to any record evidence supporting the allegation that Royal Caribbean knew about a contract between Veverka and Medicare. 2015 WL 1270139, at . Without proof of knowledge, there can be no intent to interfere with a contract. A review of Veverka’s statement in opposition to summary judgment shows that she did not identify any record evidence supporting Royal Caribbean’s knowledge of a contract. Instead, she cited to paragraph 18 of her amended complaint, which states, “Defendant failed to comply with an agreement for goods and services and failed to fulfill such agreement causing the Plaintiff economic and other forms of damages. Further, Defendant interfered with the Plaintiff’s third party contract for medical services and care.” App. 185. But at summary judgment, Veverka must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). A nonmoving party cannot create a genuine issue of fact by citing the pleadings. Orsatti v. N. J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 11 484 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A] plaintiff cannot resist a properly supported motion for summary judgment merely by restating the allegations of his complaint, but must point to concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essential element of his case.”). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Veverka’s tortious interference claim. D. Breach-of-Contract Claim Veverka next argues that the District Court committed error by entering judgment sua sponte on her breach-of-contract claim without giving her notice that her claim was subject to dismissal. She further argues that she was prejudiced because breach of contract “involves highly fact-specific inquiries, and there is no indication that the factual record was fully developed.” Appellant’s Br. 25. Contrary to Veverka’s assertion, the District Court’s decision was not sua sponte. Royal Caribbean’s motion for summary judgment was unequivocal. It sought judgment on all counts of the amended complaint and thoroughly briefed the statute of limitations issue which formed the basis of the District Court’s judgment on that claim. Veverka’s own briefing contradicts her position because it addressed Royal Caribbean’s statute of limitations argument as well as the merits of her breach of contract claim. Accordingly, the District Court’s entry of judgment was not sua sponte. Veverka’s prejudice argument is equally meritless. The District Court record shows that discovery was concluded by the time Royal Caribbean moved for summary judgment. If Veverka believed that further discovery was necessary, she could have filed 12 an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d) requesting further discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (allowing a court to defer consideration of a motion for summary judgment and order discovery if nonmovant is unable to present facts in opposition to summary judgment). Having failed to make such a request, Veverka cannot now claim prejudice on appeal.