Opinion ID: 1169807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: vetoes of appropriations items

Text: In drafting appropriations bills, the Legislature historically has made lump sum appropriations to agencies, but has used both provisos and appropriations to express policy determinations or further refine an appropriation to specific programs within an agency. The Legislature has not employed a true programmatic or line item budget. The Legislature has chosen to make general agency appropriations with provisos for policy or specific agency programs in budget bills, rather than setting out more specific programmatic appropriations where each program in the budget is found in a separate section of a budget bill. Masciocchi, 64 WASH. L. REV. at 895-96, 910-11. We must decide if such budget provisos are constitutional appropriations items subject to veto. Article III, section 12 confers upon the Governor the power to veto appropriation items, to exercise a true line item veto, reviewing individual programs. By its very specific language, article III, section 12 envisions appropriation items as something less than an entire section of an appropriations bill. Under this Court's analysis in Ruoff, virtually any component of an appropriations bill was subject to the veto as an appropriation item. [7] Relying on Ruoff, Washington governors began to veto sentences and phrases in general legislation that did not contain appropriations, often altering the meaning of substantive legislation. Masciocchi, 64 WASH. L. REV. at 894. This Court ended such practices for nonappropriations bills in Washington Ass'n of Apartment Ass'ns, Inc. The intent of SJR 140, enacted in 1974 as the 62nd Amendment to the Washington Constitution, was to restore the veto power of the Governor to what it was understood to be prior to Ruoff. 1974 Senate Journal, 3d Ex.Sess. 89. Plainly, at that time, the Governor had a line item veto and an item was something less than a full section of a bill. We reject the dissent's unconventional notion that the 62nd Amendment repealed the Governor's line item veto. Dissent at 901. The Legislature argues the Governor's line item veto power extends only to dollar amounts contained in an appropriations bill because language in an appropriations bill conditioning expenditure of funds does not constitute an appropriations item. Br. of Appellant at 22-29. The Governor argues veto of appropriations items can occur without any consequence to the overall expenditure of the agency. Br. of Resp't at 21-23. We disagree with both approaches. The Legislature's view of an appropriations item is too narrow, and would eviscerate the Governor's line item veto power. The Governor's line item veto is designed to restrain unnecessary expenditures, and to allow the Governor, whose perspective is statewide as opposed to district-specific, to avoid pork barrel projects and advance the best interests of the State. On the other hand, while the Governor's view of an appropriations item is closer to our analysis of an appropriations item under article III, section 12, the Governor misreads the consequences of a line item veto of a budget proviso, giving too little deference to the Legislature's direction of how money may be spent. Because the purpose of the Governor's line item veto is to excise line items in appropriations bills, we should give effect to such a purpose. The Legislature frustrates such a purpose, however, if it drafts budget bills as lump sum appropriations to agencies. The only feature of modern legislative bill drafting in Washington that resembles the traditional budget line item is the budget proviso. Consequently, we hold that any budget proviso with a fiscal purpose contained in an omnibus appropriations bill is an appropriations item under article III, section 12. Thus, so long as the Legislature drafts budget bills as lump sum appropriations to agencies conditioned by provisos as we have defined them here, the Governor's appropriations item veto power extends to each such proviso. [8]
Where the Legislature provides that the money appropriated may be used solely for a particular purpose, if the Governor vetoes such proviso language, the overall agency appropriation is reduced by the amount referenced in the proviso. For example, in Laws of 1994, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 6, § 135, the Legislature appropriated $41,497,000 to the Department of General Administration, but conditioned the overall appropriation in § 135(9) on $171,000 being expended solely on a statewide collocation program. Governor Lowry vetoed § 135(9). By vetoing § 135(9), the Governor reduced the overall agency appropriation by $171,000. Not all provisos are so clear. For example, in Laws of 1994, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 6, § 610(5)(a), the Legislature conditioned an appropriation to the Higher Education Coordinating Board for financial aid and grant programs as follows: $95,039,000 is provided solely for the state need grant program. Of this amount, a maximum of $249,000 may be expended to establish postsecondary education resources centers through the early intervention scholarship program to the extent that an equal amount of federal matching funds are also provided. The board shall, to the best of its ability, rank and serve students eligible for the state need grant and the early intervention scholarship program in order from the lowest family income to the highest family income. The Legislature conditioned the appropriation to the Higher Education Coordinating Board on a maximum dollar figure that could be expended by the Board. If the Governor vetoes this proviso language, as Governor Lowry did, the overall appropriation to the agency ought not be reduced by a sum of $249,000 because it is unclear how much of the $249,000 might be expended by the Board in the biennium for the referenced purpose. The Board may spend nothing or up to $249,000. The Legislature limited the amount that could be used for this purpose. When the Governor vetoes such a subsection in an appropriations bill, the veto does not automatically reduce the appropriation to the agency by a sum certain because the proposed expenditure is not for a sum certain, although the agency may not exceed the specified legislative cap on spending. [9] Thus, the Governor's veto of a dollar proviso reduces the appropriation to the agency only when the Legislature expressly states the money may be used solely for the purpose set forth in the proviso. We look to the specific language in the appropriations bill to determine whether the Governor's veto of the proviso should result in a reduction in the overall appropriation to the agency.
The more difficult questions are whether nondollar budget provisos constitute appropriations items under article III, section 12, and the effect of the Governor's veto of such provisos. Nondollar provisos condition an agency appropriation on the agency's taking or not taking certain action. For example, the Legislature appropriated $145,609,000 to the Washington State Patrol for field operations. Laws of 1994, ch. 303, § 5. In section 5(4) of the legislation, the Legislature conditioned the appropriation as follows: only commissioned officers and commercial vehicle enforcement officers involved directly and primarily in traffic enforcement activities will be assigned vehicles by the Washington state patrol. Provisos in appropriations bill that do not have a specific dollar amount are very common. At their best, such nondollar provisos are a legitimate expression of the Legislature's oversight function over agencies and programs. At their worst, such provisos are legislative micromanagement of agencies or a device to revive substantive legislation that perished during a legislative session. For example, in Laws of 1994, ch. 303, § 2(2), the Legislature conditioned an appropriation to the Traffic Safety Commission as follows: It is the intent of the legislature that the responsibilities of and appropriation to the Washington traffic safety commission be transferred to the Washington state patrol as of July 1, 1994. The appropriations in this section represent funding necessary to operate the agency for fiscal year 1994 only. Similarly, in Laws of 1994, ch. 303, § 7(3), the Legislature conditioned a $63.525 million appropriation to the State Patrol's support services bureau: It is the intent of the legislature that: (a) There be no cadet classes during the 1993-95 biennium; and (b) the chief of the Washington state patrol shall maintain the current field force level of seven hundred troopers and sergeants through management reductions. The Legislature argues these nondollar provisos are not appropriations items, basing this contention largely on a Senate floor colloquy between sponsors of a 1974 constitutional amendment adopted by the people as article III, section 12: Senator Grant: [I]t is our intent, the intent of the sponsors of this measure, that he could not veto less than an entire section, a proviso that was less than an entire section, except for the appropriations amount. Senator Dore: When referring to appropriation item in the bill you are talking about a dollar amount. Senator Grant: That is correct, Senator. Senate Journal, 43d Legislative, 3d Ex.Sess. 116 (1974). The intent of legislative sponsors of a measure is noteworthy, but not conclusive as to our interpretation of the plain language of a measure. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 1722, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979) (The remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history.); Spokane County Health Dist. v. Brockett, 120 Wash.2d 140, 154-55, 839 P.2d 324 (1992) (a legislator's comments from the floor are not necessarily indicative of legislative intent); North Coast Air Servs., Ltd. v. Grumman Corp., 111 Wash.2d 315, 325-26, 759 P.2d 405 (1988) (legislative colloquy not conclusive as to legislative intent). Nondollar provisos must be appropriations items under the constitution, as the rationale for application of the line item veto to dollar provisos applies with equal force to nondollar provisos. This interpretation is consistent with the real purpose of such provisos and the tenor of our constitution. In any event, these nondollar provisos are intimately connected to the expenditure of funds by executive agencies and cannot be viewed in isolation from such expenditures. Our general case law on statutory provisos requires such an interpretation. [10] For example, in State v. Wright, 84 Wash.2d 645, 652, 529 P.2d 453 (1974), we reaffirmed a long-standing rule for the interpretation of statutory provisos: [A] proviso in a statute must be construed in the light of the body of the statute, and in such a manner as to carry out the legislature's intent as manifested by the entire act and laws in pari materia therewith. Provisos operate as limitations upon or exceptions to the general terms of the statute to which they are appended and as such, generally, should be strictly construed with any doubt to be resolved in favor of the general provisions, rather than the exceptions. See Garvey v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 103 Wash.2d 756, 697 P.2d 248 (1985); Pfeifer v. City of Bellingham, 112 Wash.2d 562, 772 P.2d 1018 (1989). Reading nondollar budget provisos in pari materia with the appropriations they reference compels the conclusion they are appropriations items. Our constitution also evidences a clear policy that bills should pertain to single subjects and should not be encumbered by riders containing divergent subjects, as is the practice in Congress; our Framers vigorously opposed legislative logrolling. Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash.2d 544, 566-67, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995) (Talmadge, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part). [11] To treat nondollar provisos as something other than appropriations items to which the line veto does not extend only encourages legislative logrolling, forestalls treatment of policy issues on their individual merits, and ultimately undercuts the benefits of the line item veto. If the only alternatives for the Governor are vetoing a nondollar proviso (and the attendant veto of the whole agency or program appropriation it conditions) or allowing the proviso to remain, the Governor very likely will not exercise the veto. The salutary effect of the line item veto to compel fiscal responsibility is lost. For instance, it is unlikely the Governor would risk the biennial appropriation for the State Patrol's field operations over a disagreement with the Legislature about the officers' use of vehicles, even if the legislative proviso is fundamentally unwise. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a Legislature would ever intend to eliminate the entire biennial appropriation for an agency simply because the Governor vetoes a nondollar amount proviso in an appropriations bill. [12] The Legislature's suggested approach defeats sound public policy from the point of view of both the legislative and executive branches of government, and would encourage legislators to weave substantive policy provisions and fiscal measures into appropriations bills, thereby legitimizing Byzantine bill drafting in appropriations measures. To the extent we immunize nonappropriations provisos in appropriations bills from the Governor's veto, the Legislature will try to slip substantive law provisos into appropriations bills to derive political advantage against the executive, thereby upsetting the constitutional framework of checks and balances. Nondollar budgetary provisos carry significant policy implications and should be addressed individually, on the merits, as substantive legislation; policy should be made in a formal bill subject to the normal legislative process. [13] The Governor's line item veto should extend to nondollar provisos in appropriations bills. [14] This interpretation is consistent with that of other state constitutions. Rios v. Symington, 172 Ariz. 3, 833 P.2d 20 (1992); State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 107 N.M. 439, 759 P.2d 1380 (1988); Karcher v. Kean, 97 N.J. 483, 479 A.2d 403 (1984). In summary, the Constitution did not limit the Governor's choice either to veto the entire field operations budget of the Washington State Patrol or to allow the entire section to become law. We hold nondollar provisos are appropriations items for purposes of the Governor's line item veto. We hold the Governor may veto a nondollar proviso in an appropriations bill without diminishing the overall agency appropriation. [15]