Opinion ID: 4166342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualified to Perform Essential Functions

Text: Milwaukee Schools believes that, with or without reasonable accommodation, Brown was not qualified for either the Assistant Principal position or four of the alternative vacant positions because those positions required her to be in the vicinity of potentially unruly children, which she was unable to do. Brown disagrees, arguing that she was able to be near potentially unruly students, and that, in any case, none of the positions required such contact.
As noted above, identifying reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee requires both employer and employee to engage in a flexible, interactive process. See Stern, No. 16-1971 11 788 F.3d at 292. The key principle for purposes of this case is that if the employee “does not provide sufficient information to the employer to determine the necessary accommodations, the employer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the disabled employee.” Reeves, 759 F.3d at 702. Such a situation occurred in Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070 (7th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff in that case had a condition that restricted her breathing. It was dangerous for her to be exposed to certain chemicals, which limited the jobs she could perform at the chemical company where she worked. She initially gave her employer a doctor’s note ordering that she not be exposed to chemicals, a restriction “the company took … seriously.” Id. at 1072. “Given the blanket nature” of that restriction, “the obligation fell” to the plaintiff “to update or further clarify the kinds of work she could do.” Id. She did not do so. When the company offered Steffes a reassignment conditioned on her doctor’s approval, her doctor’s reply “failed to address the exposure issues” the company asked about, and “displayed a poor understanding” of the company’s operations. Id. at 1072–73. The company explained that to the plaintiff and did not offer her the reassignment, but asked her to update it if her condition changed. The plaintiff “did not provide any further information to the company,” and thereby “failed to hold up her end of the interactive process.” Id. at 1073. Brown’s case parallels Steffes. She repeatedly presented Milwaukee Schools with a broad restriction for a school system: she needed to avoid proximity to potentially unruly students. Essentially all students are potentially unruly. Milwaukee Schools was always clear about its understanding of her 12 No. 16-1971 restrictions, and Brown never challenged that understanding. Gorton repeatedly told Brown that she could not perform positions that required being “in the vicinity of potentially unruly students.” He said that she was not qualified for a position because she would “need to be in the schools to interact with students and staff.” In Brown’s retelling of one meeting, Gorton told her (not surprisingly, we must add) that almost “every job in the district required individuals to work with students.” Nowhere in the record did Brown tell him he had misunderstood her abilities and limitations. 1 She points out that on four occasions, other people acting on her behalf challenged Milwaukee School’s understanding. On three of those occasions, however, the undisputed facts show that Milwaukee Schools sought clarification and either did not receive any or was again told that she could not be near students. On the fourth and final occasion, Milwaukee 1Two points in the record, both in Brown’s deposition, ambiguously suggest such a correction, but neither would justify denying summary judgment. In the first, Brown described her 2012 conversation with Gorton about the Student Services Coordinator position. She said that he told her she was not physically qualified and that “there was a disagreement … in the conversation … I told him that I would not be controlling the students.” Later in the deposition, discussing a different position, Brown said that she agreed “at that particular time” that the job duties required being in the vicinity of potentially unruly students, but that that “has changed to the degree that I had to explain to him at a later date that not knowing how he was coming up with it and the information that he was getting in terms of me not being qualified because of my medical condition, it did not change, but my interpretation of what he was telling me changed. And I began—and I challenged him after that in terms of the positions that he offered me.” It is unclear from those comments what she communicated to Gorton, and neither comment addressed Brown’s medical restrictions, focusing instead on the duties of particular positions. No. 16-1971 13 Schools appropriately interpreted the comment in the context of earlier exchanges. The first instance began in May 2010. In that month, Brown’s doctor modified her work restrictions, which had previously prohibited student interaction, to allow incidental contact between Brown and students. But when Milwaukee Schools assigned Brown to a school where, in her words, she was expected to “patrol the halls, [and] be involved in student contact,” she immediately called Gorton and told him that her restriction had not changed: she still needed to “avoid interaction with volatile students.” Two days later, her doctor confirmed that, sending Milwaukee Schools a much more restrictive letter. The letter said Brown was permanently unable to be “in the vicinity of potentially unruly students.” It enclosed the doctor’s recent examination notes, which said Brown needed to be in a position “that doesn’t require her to deal with children with lots of movement.” On the second occasion, Brown’s union’s attorney sent Gorton a letter explaining that Brown was able to “interact[] with students and staff” and that Gorton’s contrary belief was “at best, in error.” If that were correct, that would be important, of course. Gorton wrote back, disagreeing and offering to show the attorney the doctor’s letter with its greater restrictions. There is no evidence that the union attorney or anyone else followed up with Gorton. The third occasion was Brown’s 2011 return to work following a surgery. Her work restrictions did not include the earlier broad ban on working “in the vicinity of potentially unruly students,” but instead instructed her to avoid “student discipline situations.” Gorton asked for clarification, quoting 14 No. 16-1971 the earlier restriction and asking whether the doctor was lifting it. The doctor replied that the earlier restriction “remains in place.” The fourth and final occasion was in August 2014, four days before Brown’s leave of absence expired. Brown’s doctor sent Gorton a fitness-for-duty certificate. The attached patient examination notes said that there was “no reason why she could not be around students; she just must not be responsible for controlling those students.” They said that she, “as before, should not be put in a position where she is responsible for monitoring and controlling students.” The notes did not claim to change Brown’s restrictions. Some of the language is broad and ambiguous, referring to situations “where there could be some question” of controlling a student and noting that security should be available to control students. By then, Milwaukee Schools had believed for four years that Brown could not be near “potentially unruly” students. It had been told that restriction was permanent. The 2014 doctor’s note did not say Milwaukee Schools had been wrong, and it did not say the situation had changed. Milwaukee Schools had twice before been given doctor’s notes that appeared to loosen the restrictions on Brown, only to be told later that the strict restriction remained in place. Given that history, we do not believe a reasonable jury could find that the last-minute and ambiguous doctor’s note, which did not address that history, adequately informed Milwaukee Schools that Brown’s limitations were no longer as restrictive. The undisputed facts show that Milwaukee Schools acted consistently with the restrictions imposed by Brown’s doctors, which said that Brown simply could not work in the vicinity of potentially unruly students. To the extent Brown is arguing No. 16-1971 15 that her restrictions were less severe than Milwaukee Schools believed, the undisputed facts show that Brown “failed to hold up her end of the interactive process by clarifying the extent of her medical restrictions.” Steffes, 144 F.3d at 1073. Milwaukee Schools accordingly cannot be held liable for failing to put her in a position it believed would exceed those restrictions.
Brown argues that being in the vicinity of potentially unruly students was not an essential function of any of the positions she requested, for two reasons. First, she asserts, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii), that being in such proximity is a description of work environment, not a description of a job function. Second, she argues that such proximity is not an essential function according to any of the factors courts usually consider: it is not listed on any job descriptions, for example, nor do any of the positions exist to perform it. See Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc., 807 F.3d 849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2015) (courts should examine several factors to determine essential functions, including the employer’s judgment and the written job description), citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)-(3). Brown’s rigid distinction between work environment and job functions is not realistic. Some job functions can be performed without regard to some aspects of work environment. In many office environments, for example, it may be possible to change the temperature, lighting, or desk arrangements to accommodate someone’s needs. But sometimes a job function requires a specific work environment. Lawn maintenance cannot be performed indoors; a jockey must often work atop a horse; receptionists must be near office visitors. Section 16 No. 16-1971 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) does not say otherwise. It simply lists changes to work environment as one possible way of accommodating a disabled employee. Neither Brown’s evidence nor her arguments suggest that the positions she wanted could have been modified to avoid student contact. Brown’s second argument is similarly artificial. She focuses on a narrow framing of her restriction, ignoring the logical consequences of that restriction. If Brown could not be near students, then she could not meet with students, could not walk down school hallways during the school day, could not sit in on classes, etc. Milwaukee Schools argues this means she could not perform: (1) the Assistant Principal position, because it would require her to be in schools overseeing their day-to-day operations; (2) the GE Grant Administrator position, because it would require her to attend and lead meetings at which students were present and in schools in which students were present; (3) the Student Achievement Supervisor position, because it would require her to conduct classroom observations and work daily in schools; (4) the Charter School Program Officer, because it would require in-school compliance checks and classroom observations; and (5) the Student Services Coordinator position, because it would require inschool meetings with students with serious disciplinary problems. To support these points, Milwaukee Schools relies on job descriptions, affidavits from human resources employees, and Brown’s deposition testimony. Brown offers nothing to contradict these points, so we must agree with Milwaukee Schools. See Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (non-moving No. 16-1971 17 party must identify “with reasonable particularity the evidence upon which the party relies”), citing Johnson v. Cambridge Industries, Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003).