Opinion ID: 4450759
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deficiency Prong

Text: Applying de novo review, we conclude that Mr. Harris’s attorney was deficient in failing to request a pretrial hearing to assess an intellectual disability. The State argues that defense counsel strategically decided to forgo a pretrial hearing after a thorough investigation. Strategic decisions draw considerable deference when the attorney has thoroughly investigated the law, the facts, and the plausible alternatives. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). But merely calling something a strategy does not prevent meaningful scrutiny. We must still determine (1) whether an attorney has chosen to forgo a course of action and (2) whether that choice was reasonable under the circumstances. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1369 (10th Cir. 1994). In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation, we engage in close scrutiny during the penalty phase of capital cases. 13 Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 859 (10th Cir. 2013). In these cases, “we refer to the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.” Id. These guidelines require that “[c]ounsel at every stage of the case should take advantage of all appropriate opportunities to argue why death is not suitable punishment for their particular client.” ABA Guidelines § 10.11(L). One appropriate opportunity involved a pretrial hearing on the existence of an intellectual disability. 6 State ex rel. Lane v. Bass, 87 P.3d 629, 633 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004), overruled in part on other grounds by Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135, 1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). Had Mr. Harris been found intellectually disabled, he would have been ineligible for the death penalty. Id. at 632. When the 2005 retrial took place, Oklahoma law permitted pretrial evidentiary hearings before a judge on the existence of an intellectual disability. See State ex rel. Lane v. Bass, 87 P.3d 629, 633–35 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004), overruled in part on other grounds by Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135, 1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). If the defendant preferred a jury, he or she could also opt for a jury finding on the existence of an 6 Alternatively, Mr. Harris could have asked the trial jury to determine the existence and impact of an intellectual disability. Lane, 87 P.3d at 632. But Mr. Harris argues only that his attorney should have requested a pretrial hearing. 14 intellectual disability. If the jury found no intellectual disability, the defendant could ask the judge to revisit the issue after the trial. Id. at 635. So if the judge or jury found no intellectual disability, the defense would have lost nothing. But if either the judge or jury found an intellectual disability, the death penalty would have vanished as a possibility. Defense counsel thus had a risk-free opportunity to avoid the death penalty. Frazier v. Jenkins, 770 F.3d 485, 501 (6th Cir. 2014) 7; see Clinkscale v. Carter, 375 F.3d 430, 443 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that defense counsel was deficient by failing to file a timely notice of an alibi defense when counsel had “everything to gain” and “nothing to lose”); see also Browning v. Baker, 875 F.3d 444, 473 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he obligation to investigate, recognized by Strickland, exists when there is no reason to believe doing so would be fruitless or harmful.”). 8 7 The Frazier court explained: “[W]e fail to see the downside in having a non-frivolous Atkins hearing, and it is difficult to ascertain a strategic reason for withdrawing the motion [for an Atkins hearing] in this case.” 770 F.3d at 501. 8 At oral argument, the State also suggests that Mr. Harris might have wanted to avoid the delay from a pretrial hearing on intellectual disability. But the State had never before argued in state or federal court that Mr. Harris wanted to expedite his capital proceedings. See United States v. Gaines, 918 F.3d 793, 800–801 (10th Cir. 2019) (“We typically decline to consider an appellee’s contentions raised for the first time in oral argument.”). 15 Though no downside existed, 9 a pretrial hearing had considerable upside. The evidence of an intellectual disability was ready-made. For example, Mr. Harris had IQ scores under the 70-point threshold necessary for a determination of intellectual disability under Oklahoma law. Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 567–68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002), overruled in part on other grounds by Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135, 1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). One expert witness, Dr. Martin Krimsky, had already diagnosed Mr. Harris with a mild intellectual disability. And other evidence of Mr. Harris’s difficulties in intellectual and adaptive functioning had already been introduced at a competency hearing and the 2001 trial. The State contends that defense counsel did not request a pretrial hearing because he believed that Mr. Harris was not intellectually disabled. 10 For this contention, the State points to the voir dire, where 9 We do not suggest that counsel should always argue points lacking any downside. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121–22 (2009) (stating that counsel may not be ineffective by declining to assert a defense even when there is nothing to lose). 10 In oral argument, the State also argues for the first time that a pretrial hearing on intellectual disability might have generated new evidence for the State to support an aggravating circumstance. This argument was omitted in the briefs. See note 8, above. But even if we were to consider this argument, the State does not explain what new evidence would have been elicited at the pretrial hearing that had not already been fully aired in the 2001 proceedings. Those proceedings included a competency hearing and trial, and both included considerable evidence of Mr. Harris’s mental state. In fact, the State ultimately conceded that any 16 defense counsel conceded that Mr. Harris was not intellectually disabled. We do not know why defense counsel made this concession, 11 and there is nothing to suggest that he had investigated the possibility of an intellectual disability. Before this concession, Dr. Krimsky had already testified that Mr. Harris was intellectually disabled. Even if defense counsel had disagreed with Dr. Krimsky’s assessment, the ABA guideline required him to take advantage of every opportunity to argue against a death sentence. One such opportunity existed for a pretrial hearing on an intellectual disability, and the failure to request this hearing fell outside the acceptable range of reasonable performance. See Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1517–18 & n.12 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the petitioner’s counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a competency hearing given the existing evidence of incompetency and the lack of any strategic advantage).