Opinion ID: 1833241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: The ultimate issue in this case is whether Acosta was entitled to an award of temporary total disability benefits during the period of time a determination was pending regarding what specific vocational services Acosta needed. The January 25, 1996, order concluded that the court did not have the statutory authority to order payment of temporary total disability except for the period after commencement of an approved plan of vocational rehabilitation. This order was not appealed by Acosta. Instead, on March 15, Acosta again asked the court to order payment of temporary total disability benefits from the time of the award. Seedorf asserts that these facts give rise to the doctrine of res judicata. We agree. The doctrine of res judicata is based on the principle that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in any later litigation involving the same cause of action. Kirkland v. Abramson, 248 Neb. 675, 538 N.W.2d 752 (1995). The doctrine of res judicata bars the relitigation of a matter that has been directly addressed or necessarily included in a former adjudication if (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) the former judgment was a final judgment, (3) the former judgment was on the merits, and (4) the same parties or their privies were involved in both actions. Baltensperger v. United States Dept. of Ag., 250 Neb. 216, 548 N.W.2d 733 (1996). Any right, fact, or matter in issue and directly adjudicated upon, or necessarily involved in, the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered upon the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and privies whether the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same or not. Id. The court's January 25, 1996, order determining that it did not have statutory authority to award payment of temporary total disability except for the period after commencement of an approved plan of vocational rehabilitation was a direct adjudication of a right in issue in this case. As such, it could not be relitigated by Acosta through the March 15 motion. In determining whether to affirm, modify, reverse, or set aside a judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court review panel, a higher appellate court reviews the findings of the single judge who conducted the original hearing. Cords v. City of Lincoln, 249 Neb. 748, 545 N.W.2d 112 (1996). For the reasons set forth, we therefore affirm the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court review panel. AFFIRMED. McCORMACK, J., participating on briefs.