Opinion ID: 2057541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecution's Questioning

Text: Perigo argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial, which was based upon the prosecutor's cross-examination of him. The interrogation in contention is: Q. [Prosecutor] You've learned something else though down there in those months of thinking about this, too, haven't you? That's the difference between voluntary manslaughter and murder. Haven't you learned the difference between those in those four months you've had to think about this? A. [Perigo] Yes. Q. So, when you decided in the afternoon of April the 13th to give your second statement and cooperate with the police, you didn't know those differences, did you? MR. ROBERT CANADA [Perigo's attorney at trial]: Your honor, may we approach the bench? Counsel then moved for a mistrial, outside the presence of the jury. Perigo argued that the questioning implied a fabricated defense. Judge Edward Campbell agreed that the inference suggested by defense counsel might be drawn but it was certainly not necessarily the only inference. Judge Campbell ruled that the questioning did not rise to the level of Hossman v. State (1985), Ind. App., 473 N.E.2d 1059, and denied the motion. Perigo's counsel also made a motion in limine on this issue. It was denied. Upon return of the jury, the prosecution asked: Q: I think, Mr. Perigo, what I was referring [to] was the one before  the difference between murder and voluntary manslaughter. And would you answer that question. A. Between murder and involuntary manslaughter? Q. Voluntary manslaughter, sir. A. Voluntary. Q. Yes. A. I'd heard of voluntary manslaughter, but I really didn't know the difference. That is the entire record on Perigo's assertion that the prosecutor misbehaved by implying Perigo's defense was fabricated. Perigo argues his claim of prosecutorial misconduct solely upon the precedent of Hossman v. State . Perigo further asserts that the above questioning requires a mistrial under the test of Maldonado v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843. We need not reach the Maldonado test because we hold that this questioning is not prosecutorial misconduct under Hossman. In Hossman, the Court of Appeals found misconduct when the prosecution used fabricated defense as its theme throughout the trial. In the prosecutor's opening statement, he asserted that the defense witnesses were burglars and thieves, courtroom regulars, and have been witnesses prior in Circuit Court, irrelevant comments which violated the Indiana Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 7-106(c)(1). 473 N.E.2d at 1063. In the prosecutor's closing argument, he bluntly asserted: I had made a decision in this trial I was going to call their witnesses before the State's evidence was put on. Before they got their acts together, before they had an opportunity to create stories so I wouldn't have to listen to perjury again. The prosecutorial conduct in Hossman was not the work of a subtle quilter with needle and thread but that of an eager blacksmith with hammer and anvil. The Court of Appeals stated, Even had Hossman not objected to these final argument remarks, we would review them as fundamental error and reverse. Id. at 1065. The scope and extent of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we reverse only when an abuse of discretion is shown. Williams v. State (1986), Ind., 492 N.E.2d 28. Perigo argues that permitting this questioning is an abuse of discretion because it implied a fabricated defense. Judge Campbell correctly noted that more than one implication might be drawn from this questioning. Further, impeachment is a legitimate part of cross-examination and this prosecutor worked with a needle rather than a hammer. The limited questions asked of Perigo were within the bounds of effective cross-examination and did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct.