Opinion ID: 1103881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: prejudicial closing argument of district attorney

Text: In this familiar complaint we also encounter the just as familiar failure of defense counsel to make the appropriate objection and motion. If an attorney hears opposing counsel make inappropriate statements in closing argument, he has one of two choices, to remain silent or object. Quite frequently counsel deems it wiser to say nothing, surmising that an objection will pointedly direct the jury's attention to a statement they might otherwise pay little, if any heed to. If he fails to object, however, it is singularly poor grace for that same attorney to fault a trial judge on appeal for not stopping an argument to which he made no objection. Let us suppose counsel decides to object, and makes an objection, which the trial judge sustains. By sustaining the objection the trial judge has told the jury the argument was improper. Counsel then has another option. He can let the matter rest there, or move for a mistrial. There may be a very good reason for not asking for a mistrial after the judge has sustained an objection to the opposing attorney's argument. Counsel might have a good feeling that the jury verdict will be in his favor, so why abort the trial? Yet, if he chooses not to ask for a mistrial, it is again and singularly poor grace to come to this Court and complain of an error he did not ask the trial judge to correct. This Court can have very little sympathy for such assignments of error before us. Counsel complains of five statements made by the prosecuting attorney in closing argument. Counsel made objection to three of these statements and the court sustained his objection. He made no objection to the other two statements. He now complains the argument constituted reversible error, and the court erred in not further admonishing the jury to disregard the objectionable argument. In only one instance did he ask the circuit judge to admonish the jury, and the court sustained the request. If counsel wanted more out of the trial judge, he was plainly under a duty to request it. See: Clanton v. State, 279 So.2d 599 (Miss. 1973); Wells v. State, 162 Miss. 617, 139 So. 859 (Miss. 1932). We have carefully considered all the remarks of which complaint is now made. Some may very well have been proper, but even conceding some were improper, none was of such magnitude that any possible prejudice therefrom was either dissipated by the court sustaining the objection, or would have been dissipated by counsel further requesting the court to admonish the jury. We have repeatedly held that in order for counsel to preserve such trial court errors, he must follow the procedure outlined above. See: Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196 [(Miss. 1985) and cases reported therein]; Auman v. State, 271 So.2d 427, 432 (Miss. 1973); Aldridge v. State, 180 Miss. 452, 177 So. 765 (1938).