Opinion ID: 1126715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the assignments

Text: No. 5Severance: Davis does not dispute that the two murders could be tried together on the authority of La.C.Cr.P. Art. 493. Instead, he contends, on the authority of La. C.Cr.P. Art. 495.1, that he was unfairly prejudiced by the trial court's denying his motion to sever the trial of the two crimes. Davis was placed by one or more witnesses at each convenience store when each murder was committed. Each murder was committed with Davis's pistol late at night in the same general area of Shreveport. Both occurred during an armed robbery. The trial court reasoned that a jury could differentiate between the evidence in each case without confusion of defenses as to the quality and legal sufficiency of the evidence and without undue prejudice, because each murder occurred on a different night at a different store with different supporting witnesses and evidence. The jury's return of differing aggravating circumstances on the verdict in each case strongly indicates that the jury did in fact differentiate and separately consider the evidence in each case. The jury was obviously impressed that Davis shot Sanchez three times, once between the eyes, while firing only one shot each at Mr. Moore and Mrs. Moore. A defendant in any case bears a heavy burden of proof when alleging prejudicial joinder of offenses as grounds for a motion to sever. State v. Washington, 386 So.2d 1368 (La.1980). Factual, rather than conclusory, allegations are required. Evidence of a crime other than the one charged, which may not, for some reason, be admissible under Prieur [3] in a separate trial of that charge, does not prevent the joinder and single trial of the charge of both crimes, if the joinder of both crimes is otherwise permissible. State v. Celestine, 452 So.2d 676 (1984). Patricia Williams and Jerome Mitchell, the primary witnesses in the Sanchez murder, were two of the first witnesses presented. The videotape, Mrs. Moore, and Thomas Adgate were the primary witnesses in the Moore murder. Davis's cousin, Marlin Rogers, was a state's witness. Some police and expert witnesses testified, of course, about their investigation and findings in each case. Davis clearly admitted the Moore robbery and shooting but categorically denied the Sanchez robbery and shooting. We conclude the evidence of each murder was compartmentalized and not confused. The jury was instructed that it should consider the evidence in each case and need not return the same verdict as to each count and that a separate verdict in each case was required. Defense counsel emphasized this in his argument to the jury. On this record, we cannot conclude that severance was required or that Davis was unfairly convicted of the Sanchez murder by being unduly prejudiced by the evidence of the Moore murder. Davis's assignment five has no merit.