Opinion ID: 2973311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment for Thorpe

Text: We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment in favor of Thorpe. The issues pertaining to the City and Thorpe were identical. Therefore, Burris was on notice that she had to come forward with all her evidence, and she had a reasonable opportunity to respond to all the issues. First, the district court correctly found that Burris’s causes of action under state criminal law for sexual battery and assault were not actionable and should be dismissed as the state statutes alleged do not create a private cause of action. Second, the district court correctly found that Burris’s claim under O.R.C. § 3701.81(A), which creates a private cause of action for someone who has been negligently exposed to a contagious disease, does not allow recovery unless the plaintiff actually has contracted the disease. See Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ohio 1989) (“a person who negligently exposes another to an infectious or contagious disease, which such other thereby contracts, is liable in damages therefor.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). It is undisputed that Burris never contracted HIV. Therefore, she has no claim under O.R.C. § 3701.81(A).. Finally, the district court did not err in its determination that Thorpe was not acting under color of state law and, therefore, was not liable under § 1983. See Mills v. City of Barbourville, 389 -4- No. 05-3269 Burris v. Thorpe F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (“In order to prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish the violation of a constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law.” (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970))). The operative factor in determining if a person is acting under color of state law is “whether the actor intends to act in an official capacity or to exercise official responsibilities pursuant to state law. . . the acts of state officials ‘in the ambit of their personal pursuits’ do not constitute state action.” Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Accordingly, a defendant’s private conduct, outside the course or scope of his duties and unaided by any indicia of actual or ostensible state authority, is not conduct occurring under color of state law. See McNeese v. Vandercook, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3405, No. 97-6512, 1999 WL 133266,  (6th Cir. Feb. 25, 1999) (unpublished table decision) (holding that a deputy sheriff who struck a fellow deputy did not act under color of state law); Mooneyhan v. Hawkins, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30223, No. 96-6135, 1997 WL 685423,  (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1997) (unpublished table decision) (holding that a police officer did not act under color of state law when he took advantage of his friendship with the plaintiff, not his authority as a police officer, to rape her); D.T. by M.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1188 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a teacher who molested three students at a basketball camp during summer vacation had not acted under color of state law). For the purposes of a state-action analysis, there can be no pretense of acting under color of state law if the challenged conduct is not related in some meaningful way either to the actor's governmental status or to the performance of his duties. See Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 1999). Id. (emphasis added). It is axiomatic that “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a constitutional law must be ‘fairly attributable’ to the state.” Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). “The fact that a police officer is on or off duty, or in or out of uniform is not controlling. ‘It is the nature of the act performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the -5- No. 05-3269 Burris v. Thorpe status of being on duty, or off duty, which determines whether the officer has acted under color of law.’” Stengel v. Belcher, 533 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1975) (quotation omitted). As the district court noted: In this case, the nature of the act — consensual sexual intercourse — was purely personal and private. It was not part of Thorpe’s official responsibilities, and there is no evidence that Thorpe intended to act in an official capacity. The conduct certainly furthered no governmental interest and was not related in any meaningful way to Thorpe’s status as a police officer. Neither was this consensual sexual relationship aided “by any indicia of actual or ostensible state authority.” While Ms. Burris may have been attracted to Thorpe in part because he was a police officer, she willingly entered into a long-term consensual sexual relationship with him. Plaintiff concedes that [Thorpe] never used his position as a police officer to coerce her to have sex with him, or to prevent her from breaking off the relationship. Simply put, when Thorpe was engaging in sexual intercourse with Burris, even when he was on duty and in uniform, he was not acting under color of state law. As Thorpe was not acting under color of state law, we need not decide if Burris’s constitutional rights were implicated. Therefore, Burris’s § 1983 claim against Thorpe must fail.