Opinion ID: 1165515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: effect on essential governmental functions

Text: (5) Petitioners' third challenge is that Proposition 8 is invalid as an impermissible impairment of essential government functions. They rely on cases which hold as a general proposition that The initiative ... is not applicable where `the inevitable effect would be greatly to impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of some other governmental power, the practical application of which is essential....' [Citations.] ( Simpson v. Hite (1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 134 [222 P.2d 225], italics added; see Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 143, 144 [130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001] [mere speculative consequences are insufficient].) We assume, for purposes of discussion, that the principles of these cases (which involve local initiative or referendum measures) are equally applicable to measures of statewide application. Petitioners conjure several supposed consequences of Proposition 8 which will severely impair the functioning of the courts, the Department of Corrections and the public school system. As will appear, however, none of these consequences is as inevitable as petitioners suggest. Indeed, we may assume that the courts and other agencies, interpreting and applying the various provisions of Proposition 8, will approach their task with a view toward preserving, rather than destroying, the essential functions of government. First, petitioners predict that the measure's restrictions upon plea bargaining will have a most damaging effect upon already crowded court calendars. Even assuming that this prediction is accurate, we cannot accept petitioners' underlying premise that an initiative measure which, as a collateral effect, may aggravate court congestion is void under the Simpson principle. In Simpson we examined an initiative measure which would have directly prevented a local board of supervisors from designating a site for court buildings. We stressed that, among other adverse effects, such an initiative could interfere with the functioning of the courts by depriving them of the quarters which the supervisors were bound to, and in good faith sought to, furnish. (36 Cal.2d at p. 133; see also Geiger v. Board of Supervisors (1957) 48 Cal.2d 832, 839 [313 P.2d 545] [referendum inapplicable to repeal local sales and use tax]; Chase v. Kalber (1915) 28 Cal. App. 561, 569-570 [153 P. 397] [referendum inapplicable to repeal street improvement ordinance].) No such constricting effect on court operations is herein presented. While plea bargaining may well be a useful device in reducing court congestion, unlike a courthouse it is really not an essential prerequisite to the administration of justice. Moreover, any effect upon the criminal justice system from restrictions upon plea bargaining would be largely speculative and would not appear on the face of Proposition 8. That measure's conditional prohibition against plea bargaining appears to apply only to the postindictment or postinformation stage, and only with respect to serious felonies as defined therein. Bargaining may continue with respect to lesser offenses. Moreover, even as to serious felonies, bargaining may proceed if material witnesses or evidence become unavailable, or if the plea would not substantially reduce the expected sentence. Finally, the Legislature by a two-thirds vote may restore plea bargaining in all cases. For similar reasons, we reject petitioners' assertion that a breakdown of the justice system will inevitably result from (1) giving crime victims an opportunity to appear in both felony and misdemeanor cases, and (2) imposing greater punishment on defendants whose multiple offenses are tried separately. Assuming arguendo that petitioners' characterization of the legal effect of Proposition 8 is correct in these respects, any supposed breakdown is wholly speculative. Unlike petitioners, we cannot presume that most crime victims will accept the opportunity (and accompanying embarrassment and inconvenience) of testifying at misdemeanor trials, or that most prosecutors will forego the obvious concrete advantages of consolidated trials in the hope of securing an aggravated term for habitual offenders. Petitioners next predict that Proposition 8's more severe sentencing provisions will increase California's prison population to an extent exceeding the state budget for prison expenditures. Again, the point is entirely conjectural; one might as readily argue that the measure will deter persons who otherwise might resort to crime, thereby reducing the prison population. Either contention involves pure guesswork and, in any event, we find no authority for the proposition that an initiative measure may be declared invalid solely by reason of the high financial cost of implementing it. Finally, petitioners assert that Proposition 8's creation of a right of safety for students and staff of public schools might very well herald the end of public education as we know it. Petitioners suggest that enforcement of the right of safety might entail substantial increased expenditures for school security guards, safety devices, and payments of tort damages and legal fees at the cost of books, equipment, and more traditional operational and maintenance expenses. Yet the implementation of comparably broad constitutional rights, such as the right to pursue and obtain safety (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1) has not produced any such financial ruin. In any event, we need not speculate on these matters for, as we have indicated, the mere possibility that implementation of Proposition 8 might entail substantial additional public funding is not a proper ground for invalidating the measure. We conclude that Proposition 8 does not on its face constitute an undue impairment of essential governmental functions under the Simpson rule.