Opinion ID: 1037023
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Obtained by Search Warrant

Text: Strausbaugh next challenges the admittance of evidence seized during the search of Strausbaugh’s home: he argues that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and was overbroad, insisting that the evidence should have been suppressed. We exercise plenary review over the district court’s legal conclusions, and clear error review of its factual findings. United States v. Torres, 534 F.3d 207, 209 (3d Cir. 2008).
Strausbaugh makes several arguments attacking the probable cause underlying the search warrant. “The test for probable cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification.’” Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). As the Supreme Court has noted, all that is required is the kind of “fair probability” on which “reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.” Id. (alteration in original, citation omitted). Probable cause exists 6 when, viewing the “totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). In reviewing a magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause, we must look at the “factual context[]” and must uphold the finding if a “substantial basis” supports it, even if a different magistrate judge might not have made the same finding. Id. Strausbaugh argues that the method with which the USPIS determined the Strausbaugh IP address did not establish probable cause. Specifically, Strausbaugh argues that the IP address obtained by the USPIS was used 20 days after the email to Canada, and that Strausbaugh’s name and address was just one of a number of different names that could have been associated with that “dynamic” IP address. Strausbaugh’s argument fails to take into account that a probable cause determination must consider the “totality of the circumstances.” The circumstances in this case show that the USPIS linked the IP address at issue with the email address used in the Canada email exchange, several email addresses associated with the Strausbaughs, a business operated by Strausbaugh, and to the Strausbaugh property itself. Thus, the probable cause determination was not based merely on the USPIS’s determination that the email to Canada was sent from that particular IP address—rather, it was based on several other facts linking the Strausbaugh home to the IP address. Strausbaugh also argues that the search warrant was based on the “Canada picture,” which, he argues, does not constitute child pornography, and therefore, there was no probable cause to support the warrant. This argument is without merit. Even if 7 the “Canada picture” was not “lascivious” under United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal 1986), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987)—which is not a foregone conclusion, as it appears that several Dost factors are satisfied—we must look at the totality of the circumstances. We also must remember that the test is whether there is a “fair probability”—not absolute certainty—of criminal activity. Any reasonable magistrate considering the photograph, which depicted the nude infant, the email exchange, in which it was clear that the purpose was to exchange nude pictures of infants for the purpose of sexual excitement, and the fact that the email originated from the Strausbaugh home would find a “fair probability” that criminal activity was taking place at the Strausbaugh home. Examining the factual context and the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that there was a “substantial basis” to support the finding of probable cause.
Strausbaugh also argues that any evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, beyond one camera and specific pictures, was too broad. When the USPIS applied for the warrant, it produced evidence that the internet, email, and electronic equipment had been used to distribute child pornography. This provided a “fair probability” that evidence of child pornography-related crimes would be found within the Strausbaugh home. Additionally, Postal Inspector Corricelli, whose affidavit supported the warrant, had specialized knowledge and experience as to the typical manner in which child pornographers create, distribute, receive, and store their contraband. A law enforcement official’s specialized experience and training is a legitimate consideration in determining 8 probable cause. United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 390 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Arvizu, 543 U.S. 266, 275 (2002)). In light of that, it was not an error for the District Court to uphold the search and seizure of evidence beyond the camera and specific photographs.