Opinion ID: 3014747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Sullivan make an implied promise

Text: that Jacobs’ statements regarding the Stewart drug conspiracy would not be used against her? A promise by a law enforcement officer may qualify as coercion. United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1030 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Conley, 859 F. Supp. 830, 836 (W.D. Pa. 1994). However, because “a law enforcement officer promises something to a person suspected of a crime in exchange for the person’s speaking about the crime does not automatically render inadmissible any statement obtained as a result of that promise.” Walton, 10 F.3d at 1028. Rather, a promise—express or implied—is a factor (indeed, a potentially significant one) in the totality of the circumstances inquiry as to whether a statement was voluntary. Id.; Miller v. Fenton, 796 19 F.2d 598, 608 (3d Cir. 1986). The District Court examined Walton and Conley in considering the promises of law enforcement officers in the context of a voluntariness inquiry. Jacobs, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 629-31. In Walton, an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms met with the defendant on a park bench. 10 F.3d at 1027. The agent and the defendant were high school classmates and the agent told the defendant that his statements would be “off the cuff.” Id. The defendant then made several incriminating statements. Id. The Government sought to use these statements in a subsequent prosecution against the defendant. Id. In analyzing the totality of the circumstances, our Court emphasized that the inquiry did not rest solely on the promises made. Id. at 1030. However, this did not diminish the significance of the promise itself: “[G]iven the uniquely influential nature of a promise from a law enforcement official not to use a suspect’s inculpatory statement, such a promise may be the most significant factor in assessing the voluntariness of the accused’s confession in the light of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397, 401-04 (4th Cir. 1985)). We determined that the defendant’s prior relationship with the agent, his comment that the conversation would be “off the cuff,” and that the defendant had no reason to believe that he was the subject of a criminal investigation, taken together, rendered the defendant’s statements involuntary. Id. 20 In Conley a federal agent spoke with the defendant to gain information about others involved in illegal activity. 859 F. Supp. at 833-35. At the initial meeting, the agent told the defendant that he was willing to speak off the record and that the defendant was not the target of the investigation. Id. at 833. The agent also intimated that he was in a position to help the defendant if he cooperated. Id. Several weeks later, the defendant and the agent met at a hotel. Id. During that conversation the defendant made numerous incriminating statements. Id. at 834-35. The Government later sought to use those statements in a prosecution against him. Id. at 832. The Court determined that the statements were involuntary. Id. at 837. Although the Court noted that the “typical” indicators of coercion were not present, the agent’s promise to speak off the record and his friendly manner “combined to overcome Conley’s reticence about making statements to the FBI.” Id. After reviewing Walton and Conley, the District Court determined that Jacobs made both her March and April statements involuntarily. Jacobs, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 631-32. The crux of the Court’s involuntariness holdings is its finding that Sullivan made an implied promise to Jacobs that her statements regarding the Stewart drug conspiracy would not be used against her.12 Id. at 632. It reasoned: 12 It is unclear from the District Court’s opinion whether it found an implied promise as to both statements or only as to those made in April. See 312 F. Supp. 2d at 631-32. We need 21 Most importantly, [Jacobs’] ten year relationship with [] Sullivan, during which he assisted her in resolving criminal charges and the fact that she was not aware that she was a target in the instant criminal investigation and, in fact, provided helpful information in the investigation, in the Court’s view, establish, at least by implication, that whatever [Jacobs] said would not be used against her. Specifically, the implied promises by [] Sullivan deprived [Jacobs] of the ability to make a knowing and voluntary election of whether to make a statement to the FBI Task Force. Id. The Government inveighs against this reasoning (and its inevitable conclusion) in many ways. We address each in turn. (a) The Government begins by asserting that the District Court “conclude[d] [erroneously] . . . that an implied promise arose out of Jacobs’ status as a police informant.” (Emphasis added.) However, the Court did not conclude this, for nowhere not resolve this issue because, even giving Jacobs the benefit of doubt (as we do) that the Court found an implied promise as to the March statements, we conclude they were nonetheless voluntary. 22 does it say that all informants have per se received an implied promise not to have their statements used against them by virtue of their status as informants. Rather, it explained that the circumstances particular to this case gave rise to an implied promise. (b) The Government next emphasizes that Jacobs was regularly admonished that she could not engage in any unlawful acts except as specifically authorized, and that she would be prosecuted if she engaged in those acts. It is true that Jacobs was on notice that she could be prosecuted for breaking laws without prior authorization, and does not argue otherwise. Rather, she argues she was not on notice that Sullivan might use her statements against her. (c) The Government points out that Sullivan had assisted Jacobs by speaking to prosecutors and then argues that any promise could not have rendered Jacobs’ statements involuntary because “[t]his court has repeatedly found . . . that even explicit law enforcement ‘promises’ to refer the fact of a defendant’s cooperation to prosecutors do not constitute unconstitutional coercion” (citing United States v. Fraction, 795 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1986)). However, Fraction does not apply and the Government’s argument fails because the District Court did not find a promise “to refer”; it instead found an implied promise by Sullivan not to use Jacobs’ statements against her. Indeed, our Court has stated that “given the uniquely influential nature of a promise from a law enforcement official not to use a suspect’s 23 inculpatory statement, such a promise may be the most significant factor in assessing the voluntariness of the accused’s confession.” Walton, 10 F.3d at 1030. Furthermore, those promises need not be the product of an express representation and can arise out of an understanding or custom that has developed over the years. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970) (confession must not be “obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). (d) The next contention is that “the only possible implied promise that could have arisen in this case is that . . . Sullivan would have recommended to the relevant prosecutors that [Jacobs] not be charged in connection with the Stewart organization.” It does not support this conclusory statement with any reasoning. Further, the statement is likely untrue, as Jacobs could have inferred that, if Sullivan repeatedly went out of his way to get her out of trouble, he would not then turn around and affirmatively get her into trouble by using her statements to him against her. (e) Attack is made on the District Court’s reliance that Jacobs had been paid in the past for providing information, as “at best . . . this prior history could only reasonably lead the defendant to believe that she could be paid if she provided useful information.” But presumably the Court was reasoning that, because when Jacobs had provided helpful information in the past she received money (i.e., was rewarded), it was 24 reasonable to anticipate the same result when she provided the helpful information about the Stewart drug conspiracy. Even if she was not to be rewarded, she would at least infer she would not be punished by having the information used against her. While past payments for information might not imply a promise to forgo use of Jacobs’ current statements against her, the payments nonetheless are a valid factor supporting the existence of an implied promise. (f) The Government tries to minimize the damage of Sullivan’s “cover you” statement. To recap, near the end of the March 14 meeting Sullivan asked Jacobs if she had ever taken a trip to Los Angeles for Stewart, and Jacobs replied she had not. Sullivan then told Jacobs, “Listen[,] if you did, just tell me . . . because if it comes out later, I can’t cover you.” The Government is correct, of course, that this particular statement cannot retroactively make involuntary what Jacobs said beforehand in her March statements. However, it could make Jacobs think that Sullivan would “cover her” (and thus not affirmatively use her statements against her) if she gave him information at the April 4 meeting. Furthermore, the statement may indicate a general understanding between Jacobs and Sullivan that existed throughout both meetings, i.e., that Sullivan would cover Jacobs (and thus not use her statements against her) as long as she let him know before “it c[a]me[] out later” in what illegal activities she was involved. (g) Continuing its assault on the District Court’s 25 conclusion of involuntariness, the Government turns to the Court’s reliance on the fact that Jacobs did not know she was the target of a criminal investigation and subject to possible prosecution at the time of her statements. In Walton, we concluded that [m]ost important [to the finding of an implied promise not to use the defendant’s statements against him] is that in arranging the “off the record” discussion with [the investigating official, the defendant] had no reason to believe that he was the subject of a criminal investigation; he knew only that he had been the subject of a regulatory inspection. 10 F.3d at 1030 (emphasis added). The Government is correct that, at the time of the March statements, the FBI had not begun an investigation and thus Jacobs was not yet a suspect.13 Thus, the argument proceeds, Sullivan did not coercively mislead 13 The District Court reasoned, in part, that on March 14 Jacobs “had no reason to believe that she was the target of a criminal investigation and subject to possible criminal prosecution . . . .” 312 F. Supp. 2d at 631. This statement implies the District Court found that Jacobs was a target of a criminal investigation on March 14. As the investigation of the Stewart organization did not begin until after March 14, Jacobs was not a target at that time. 26 Jacobs on March 14 into thinking she was not the subject of an investigation. Turning to the April statements, the Government notes that Sullivan began the meeting by telling Jacobs that he believed she was involved in the conspiracy. However, this does not necessarily mean that Jacobs knew she was the target of a criminal investigation and subject to possible prosecution at the time of the April statements. That Jacobs continued to act as an informant rather than a suspect throughout that meeting and during the next day (when she retrieved the suitcases from her home and led Agent Duffey to the safe house) suggests that she did not know she was the target of a criminal investigation and subject to possible prosecution at the time of her April statements. (h) Finally, the Government argues as a fallback that, assuming Sullivan did implicitly promise not to use Jacobs’ statements against her, his promise did not cause her to confess. However, there is no evidence that Jacobs wanted to confess a serious crime to an FBI agent who would try to use that confession to put her in prison. Had Jacobs known Sullivan was an adversary who would use her statements to convict her—rather than believed he was an ally who would not use her statements against her—it is hard to believe she would have made the statements she did.