Opinion ID: 1778032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Refusal to Give the Written Jury Charge on Subsequent Negligence

Text: At the close of all the evidence, fourteen written requested charges were submitted to the trial court by the appellant. Requested charge number four concerned the issue of subsequent negligence or last clear chance. The charge reads: In addition to simple negligence, the plaintiff claims that the defendant was also guilty of subsequent negligence. Under the doctrine of subsequent negligence, irrespective of the negligent acts of a plaintiff in putting himself in a position of danger, he may recover against a defendant who fails to use reasonable and ordinary care in avoiding the accident after such defendant discovered the perilous position of the plaintiff. A defendant is not liable where an emergency is so sudden that there is no time to avoid the accident or where a defendant did not have actual knowledge that the plaintiff was in a position of danger. In order for defendant to be liable for subsequent negligence, the plaintiff must reasonably satisfy you from the evidence: that the plaintiff was in a perilous position; that the defendant had actual knowledge that the plaintiff was in a position of danger; that the defendant with such knowledge negligently failed to use reasonable and ordinary care in avoiding the accident; that to have used such reasonable and ordinary care would have avoided the accident; and that the plaintiff was injured or damaged as a proximate result of the defendant's subsequent negligence. With regard to subsequent negligence, the Court has held that [u]nder our system of pleading, subsequent negligence can be the basis of recovery under a count charging simple negligence. However, there must be some evidence requiring an instruction on subsequent negligence.  (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Owen v. McDonald, 291 Ala. 572, 574, 285 So.2d 79 (1973). Elements essential for a prima facie showing of subsequent negligence were reiterated in Scotch Lumber Co. v. Baugh, 288 Ala. 34, 256 So.2d 869 (1972): It is well established in this jurisdiction that in order to predicate liability for subsequent negligence, the defendant must be shown to have had actual knowledge of the plaintiff in a perilous position, and thereafter negligently failed to use all the means at his command and known to skillful engineers, so circumstanced, to avert damage to the plaintiff, when to have promptly and duly used such means could have averted the accident. Young v. Woodward Iron Co., 216 Ala. 330, 113 So. 223; Wood v. Northern Alabama Ry. Co., 22 Ala.App. 513, 117 So. 495; Emmett v. Alabama Great So. Ry. Co., 226 Ala. 310, 146 So. 811; Beavers v. Southern Ry. Co., 212 Ala. 600, 103 So. 887. 288 Ala. at 40, 256 So.2d 869. Hence, both actual knowledge of [a party] in a perilous position, and the subsequent negligent failure of a driver to use all the means at his command and known to skillful [drivers]... to avert damage are requisite to a prima facie showing of subsequent negligence. The appellant does attempt to establish that appellee had knowledge of the appellant's peril by inference, but appellant did not address the second element of subsequent negligence, nor did he introduce evidence at trial indicating that the appellee had reasonable opportunity and necessary time to avert the accident by use of due care. In Owen v. McDonald, 291 Ala. 572, 575, 285 So.2d 79 (1973), the Court held: The doctrine of subsequent negligence on the part of the plaintiff or defendant is not to be applied in a case where the manifestation of peril and the catastrophe are so close in point of time as to leave no room for preventative effort. In Owen, the plaintiff was not discovered to be in peril until the defendant, who was traveling approximately twenty-five (25) miles per hour, was approximately 20 feet from the point of impact. Similarly, the uncontradicted evidence in this case shows that, in appellee's best judgment, his own headlights on low beam illuminated the roadway approximately thirty (30) feet ahead; he first saw appellant's headlight approximately fifty to fifty-five (50-55) feet ahead, at which time he was traveling forty-five to fifty (45-50) miles per hour in a fifty-five (55) mile-per-hour speed zone. The Court, in Owen, found: There was no evidence introduced directly or indirectly from which an inference could be drawn that had McDonald attempted to swerve to his left, gone straight, or swerved in any other direction, he would have been able to avoid striking the child. No evidence was introduced that McDonald could have stopped the truck within a few feet after the child came into a position of peril discovered by McDonald. 291 Ala. at 574, 285 So.2d 79. The appellant in the instant case failed to introduce evidence even suggesting that the appellee could have swerved or stopped within the 55-foot span to avoid this mishap. Further, the record shows that appellee slammed on his brakes upon discovering the appellant's peril, but the impact was virtually instantaneous. This Court has made it plain that [w]hile it is the duty of the jury to try the facts and apply those facts to the law, it is the duty of the [c]ourt to determine questions of law, to declare the law, and to direct the application of the law to the facts. McArdle v. State, 408 So.2d 491, 493 (Ala.1981). Therefore, since the appellant, as a matter of law, failed to establish a prima facie case of subsequent negligence, the trial court judge did not commit reversible error in refusing to charge the jury on the doctrine of subsequent negligence.