Opinion ID: 167696
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the defendants violated clearly established law

Text: 69 We consider whether a reasonable official in the defendants' circumstances would understand that his or her conduct violated the Gomeses' due process rights. Moore, 438 F.3d at 1042. [T]he salient question. . . is whether the state of the law [at the time of the incident] gave the [defendants] fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508. Officials who are mistaken about the lawfulness of their conduct may still be entitled to qualified immunity if the mistake is reasonable in light of the applicable law and the facts known to them at the time. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1300 (10th Cir.2004). 70 We emphasize that when, as here, there is no dispute as to the material facts, the question is a legal one for the court to decide. As the Eighth Circuit has explained: 71 [O]nce the predicate facts have been established, for the purposes of qualified immunity there is no such thing as a genuine issue of fact as to whether the officer should have known that his conduct violated constitutional rights. The conduct was either reasonabl[e] under settled law in the circumstances, or it was not. . . . 72 Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (second brackets in original)); see also Cortez v. McCauley, 438 F.3d 980, 990-91 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that when the parties agree on the `what-happened' questions, the question of whether a[] [reasonable] officer `should have known' that his conduct violated constitutional rights is one of law). 73 Moreover, if officers of reasonable competence could disagree about the lawfulness of the challenged conduct, then [qualified] immunity should be recognized. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). In those instances, the fact that the uncontroverted evidence supports opposite legal conclusions as to the reasonableness of an official's conduct demonstrates that the official has not violated clearly established law. See id.; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (stating that [t]he relevant question . . . is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the official's conduct] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the . . . officers possessed) (emphasis added); Cortez, 438 F.3d at 990-91 (same); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir.1988) (same). 74 Here, in light of those principles, we must determine whether a reasonable official, presented with the relevant information regarding Rebekah's skull fracture in April 2000, would have understood that there were no [e]mergency circumstances which pose an immediate threat to [her] safety, Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739, and that, as a result, removing her from home without prior notice and a hearing violated the Gomeses' due process rights. Resolution of that question requires consideration of the case law in existence at that time. 75 As of April 2000, we had announced the emergency circumstances exception to the notice and hearing requirement, see Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739, and we had had two occasions to apply that standard: in Hollingsworth itself and in Malik, 191 F.3d at 1315. However, in neither case was there any evidence whatsoever of an immediate threat. See Malik, 191 F.3d at 1315 (explaining that [o]fficials' desire to circumvent an attorney's attempt to negotiate protective conditions for an interview does not rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance dangerous to the child); Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 739 (stating that the record contains no evidence that [the plaintiff] actually endangered the welfare of her children prior to their removal). Moreover, as of April 2000, we had not yet identified as an important consideration the time available to state officials to seek and obtain judicial authorization for the removal without jeopardizing the safety of the child. Nor had we held that the reasonable suspicion standard applies to the determination of whether emergency circumstances exist. Additionally, we had stated that considerable deference should be given to the judgment of responsible government officials in acting to protect children from perceived imminent danger or abuse. Washington County, 127 F.3d at 925 (quotation marks omitted). 76 In applying that case law to the circumstances confronted by the defendants, we conclude that officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether there were emergency circumstances justifying the removal of Rebekah without a hearing. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. In conducting the first step in the qualified immunity analysis (whether the Gomeses have alleged the violation of a constitutional right), we have set forth the evidence that supports their contention that emergency circumstances did not exist. However, other evidence supports the opposite conclusion. 77 In particular, Dr. Knorr informed Ms. Annes that Ms. Gomes's explanation of Rebekah's injury was possible, but suspicious. Aplts' App. at 797. He added that he had seen many children who had fallen from beds or objects of similar heights but who had not suffered such a fracture. Dr. Knorr's suspicion was supported by Ms. Annes's inspection of the bed at the Gomeses' residence. Based on her inspection, she too thought it unlikely that Rebekah could have sustained her head injury from the reported fall. Dr. Knorr also expressed concern about the Gomeses' delay in seeking medical treatment. He explained that Rebekah's skull would have shown swelling and bruising within hours of the reported fall from the bed but that Ms. Gomes did not seek treatment until the following day. Confronted with evidence of a significant head injury to an infant, a questionable explanation from the parents, and a delay in seeking medical treatment, a reasonable official could have believed that there was an immediate threat to Rebekah's safety. 78 That conclusion is supported by many reported decisions granting qualified immunity to state officials responsible for removing children from the home. See, e.g, Berman v. Young, 291 F.3d 976, 983-84 (7th Cir.2002) (concluding that defendant state officials were entitled to qualified immunity when they removed a child from a home because they had a reasonable basis for believing that the child was being abused); Hatch, 274 F.3d at 25 (holding that, when (a) a nine-year-old boy asserted that he had been abused, (b) two school officials took the boy's claim seriously, and (c) a neutral physician reported that the boy's injuries were consistent with the claim of abuse, the defendant state official was entitled to qualified immunity because the official had a reasonable basis both for suspecting child abuse and for believing [a child] to be in danger, and noting that [t]he fact that this suspicion proved, in the long run, to be unfounded does not strip [the defendant] of his entitlement to qualified immunity); Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant officials were entitled to qualified immunity when they placed a child in foster care because the child had alleged abuse by her parents, had bruises on her arm, stated that she did not wish to return to her parents, and threatened suicide and adding that immunity was not lost even if the investigation and custody determination procedures were not textbook perfect) (internal quotation marks omitted); van Emrik v. Chemung County Dept. of Social Services, 911 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir.1990) (observing that protective services caseworkers [must] choose between difficult alternatives and that [i]t is precisely the function of qualified immunity to protect state officials in choosing between such alternatives, provided that there is an objectively reasonable basis for their decision, whichever way they make it). 79 Although there are instances in which qualified immunity has been rejected, they generally involve circumstances in which officers of reasonable competence, Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, would agree that an immediate threat to the safety of a child did not exist. See, e.g, Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 924 (5th Cir.2000) (concluding that police officers who removed a child from the home were not entitled to qualified immunity because [t]here is no indication in this record of any threat to [the child's] safety, nor were the officers investigating allegations that he previously had suffered abuse); Roska, 328 F.3d at 1250 (concluding that because the child's health and safety were not in immediate danger, clearly established law put the defendants on notice that their conduct [removal without pre-deprivation procedures] violated the Constitution); Malik, 191 F.3d at 1314-15 & 1315 n. 5 (affirming the district court's denial of qualified immunity based on the public officials' acknowledgment that the child was not in imminent danger of abuse). 80 Our holding is also supported by the policies underlying the qualified immunity doctrine. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 408, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997) (observing that the doctrine protects the public from unwarranted timidity on the part of public officials, helps to ensure that talented candidates are not deterred from entering public service, and reduces the chance that lawsuits will distract from the performance of public duties). Here, as we have noted in discussing the grounds supporting the reasonable suspicion standard, [s]ocial workers face extreme difficulties in trying simultaneously to help preserve families and to serve the child's best interests. Martinez v. Mafchir, 35 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir.1994). When confronted with evidence of child abuse, they may be required to make on-the-spot judgments on the basis of limited and often conflicting information, Hatch, 274 F.3d at 22, with limited resources to assist them. They must balance the parents' interest in the care, custody and control of their children with the state's interest in protecting the children's welfare. Additionally, social workers must consider the vital importance of curbing overzealous suspicion and intervention on the part of health care professional and government officials, particularly when such overzealousness may have the effect of discouraging parents or caretakers from communicating with doctors or seeking appropriate medical attention for children with real or potentially life-threatening conditions. Thomason, 85 F.3d at 1373. In the circumstances of this case, imposing the added burden of potential liability for damages under § 1983 would interfere unnecessarily with the performance of a difficult and essential job. 81 Accordingly, we conclude that the defendants Megan Annes, Kerri Ketterer, Tess Blackmer, and Deborah Wood are entitled to qualified immunity from the Gomeses' claim for damages under § 1983. 6