Opinion ID: 2496
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicability of Davis v. United States

Text: The government, looking to language in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), takes the view that an initial invocation of one's Fifth Amendment rights such as Plugh's must be unambiguous and that the ambiguity is resolved against Plugh. The government argues that Plugh did not unambiguously invoke his rights and that therefore, the agents were free to continue to question him. This view seriously misunderstands the sweep of Davis. [11] In Davis, the Supreme Court held that if a defendant validly waives his Fifth Amendment rights initially and then thereafter attempts to invoke those rights, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the invocation was unambiguous and unequivocal to trigger the prophylaxis rules. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460-62, 114 S.Ct. 2350; accord Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1996). Davis does not instruct courts how to analyze an initial invocation of one's Fifth Amendment rights following the Miranda warnings where no waiver occurred. In our view, Davis only provides guidance for circumstances in which a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously waived Fifth Amendment rights. In order to use statements made by a suspect without counsel present while under custodial interrogation, the burden is on the government to prove the suspect waived his rights. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169, 107 S.Ct. 515. Once the government has met its burden, the suspect has the burden of proving that he resurrected rights previously waived. The invocation must be unambiguous and unequivocal. To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The Court fashioned the rule to avoid transform[ing] the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity. Id. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule ensures that a suspect does not use the Fifth Amendment as a sword to excise unfavorable evidence after discarding it as a shield. The Davis Court was careful to note that only  after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. [12] Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis added); see also id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (noting that an ambiguous reference to an attorney would not compel the  cessation of questioning) (emphasis added); id. (noting that a statement [that] fails to meet the requisite level of clarity ... does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect) (emphasis added); id. (declining to extend Edwards to require officers to  cease questioning upon an equivocal statement by a suspect) (emphasis added). Clearly, Davis is not in play here.