Opinion ID: 3172548
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Overinclusivity

Text: Wolfson next contends that the Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are unconstitutionally overbroad because the Campaign Prohibition bans involvement with 10 Judges and judicial candidates may make limited contributions to another candidate or political organization under Rule 4.1(A)(4) and may engage in political activity that pertains to the legal system or attend dinners or similar functions that do not constitute a public endorsement of candidates under Rule 4.1(C). WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 17 ballot measures, and the Endorsement Clauses forbid judges from endorsing anyone, even candidates like the President of the United States who are highly unlikely to appear before the judge.11 A regulation “may be overturned as impermissibly overbroad because a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, Williams-Yulee forecloses Wolfson’s arguments. There, the petitioner contended that even though Florida could constitutionally prevent judges from soliciting one-on- one or in person with lawyers and litigants, Canon 7C(1) was overbroad because it included a prohibition of solicitation through mass mailings. Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670–71. The petitioner argued that the latter would have less impact on the public confidence of the judiciary. Id. at 1671. But the Supreme Court was not convinced, reasoning that such distinctions became so fine as to be unworkable, and in large part, Florida’s restriction still left judicial candidates “free to discuss any issue with any person at any time.” Id. at 1670–71. Further, the Court held that though 11 We need not reach whether Arizona could constitutionally forbid judges from discussing ballot measures. Arizona interprets the Clauses to allow candidates to discuss any disputed issue, including those in issuebased initiatives, while cautioning that judicial candidates shall not “with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office” and shall “act in a manner consistent with the impartiality, integrity and independence of the judiciary.” Ariz. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Op. 06-05 (2006); see also Ariz. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Op. 0801 (2008). 18 WOLFSON V. CONCANNON these speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored, they need not be “perfectly tailored.” Id. at 1671 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 209 (1992)). “[M]ost problems arise in greater and lesser gradations, and the First Amendment does not confine a State to addressing evils in their most acute form.” Id.; see also O’Toole v. O’Connor, No. 153614, 2015 WL 5515061, at  (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2015). Wolfson asks us to draw a similarly unworkable and unnecessary line. Although supporting a United States presidential candidate may have less of an effect on the public confidence than endorsing or campaigning for an Arizona State senator or a local prosecutor, creating a rigid line is as unworkable as it is unhelpful. Judges engaging in political acts may present different levels of impropriety in different situations. It is not our proper role to second-guess Arizona’s decisions in this regard. Much as the state drew a line between personal solicitation by candidates and by committees in order to preserve public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity, Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1671, so too can the state decide that judicial candidates should not engage in legislative or executive campaigns. “These considered judgments deserve our respect, especially because they reflect sensitive choices by States in an area central to their own governance—how to select those who ‘sit as their judges.’” Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)). Our conclusion is consistent with White I. Arizona’s prohibitions do not prevent judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political subjects. See White I, 536 U.S. at 788. Instead, Arizona simply makes the distinction that a judicial candidate may do so only in relation to his or her own campaign. This follows WOLFSON V. CONCANNON 19 the reasoning in White I, where the Supreme Court was concerned about restrictions on the ability to express legal views while campaigning, see id. at 770–74, not on the ability to advance the political views and aspirations of another candidate. The latter is not the kind of speech the Court in White I sought to protect. See Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010, 1026 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he endorsement clause does not regulate speech with regard to any underlying issues, and thus the candidates are free to state their positions on these issues, in line with White I.”); Siefert, 608 F.3d at 984 (“While an interest in the impartiality and perceived impartiality of the judiciary does not justify forbidding judges from identifying as members of political parties, a public endorsement is not the same type of campaign speech [as that] targeted by the impermissible rule against talking about legal issues the Supreme Court struck down in White I.”); Bauer, 620 F.3d at 711–12 (holding that the reasoning employed in Siefert to uphold a prohibition against judicial candidate endorsements is equally applicable to a prohibition on partisan activities). The compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of judiciary warrants a favorable view of Arizona’s attempt to foreclose judicial candidates from engaging in political campaigns other than their own. The Endorsement Clauses and Campaign Prohibition are not fatally overbroad.