Opinion ID: 1058965
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Defect in Indictment Because of Disjunctive Language

Text: In assignment of error 15, Muhammad asserts that the indictment charging capital murder under the terrorism predicate is defective because of the use of disjunctive terms. The indictment in question follows the language of Code ง 18.2-46.4 which states in pertinent part: Act of terrorism means an act of violence as defined in clause (i) of subdivision A of ง 19.2-297.1 committed with the intent to (i) intimidate the civilian population at large; or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of the government of the United States, a state or locality through intimidation. Code ง 18.2-46.4 (emphasis added). Muhammad claims that the indictment is defective because it did not specify which of the two intents Muhammad had at the time of the killing. His argument is not based upon any constitutional claims; rather, his argument is confined to state law issues. The indictment charges a single offense and not two separate offenses. The single offense can be satisfied upon proof of either or both of two mens rea conditions. A reasonable construction of the indictment as rendered by the grand jury includes both. Here, the trial court permitted the amendment of the indictment to more particularly express what was already a reasonable construction of the meaning of the indictment as delivered. The indictment was amended from or to and/or. Previously, we considered a similar claim of defective indictment based upon the use of the disjunctive, or. In Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 398, 384 S.E.2d 757, 763 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063, 110 S.Ct. 880, 107 L.Ed.2d 963 (1990), the defendant was charged with capital murder based upon the killing of more than one person as a part of the same act or transaction. Buchanan killed four people. We observed that: The first indictment charged, in essence, that Buchanan killed Buchanan, Sr. as part of the same act or transaction in which he killed J.J., Donnie, or, Mrs. Buchanan. 238 Va. at 396, 384 S.E.2d at 762. We held that this indictment reasonably placed Buchanan on notice in the following manner: Under the first indictment, Buchanan was on notice that he had to defend against a claim that he killed Buchanan, Sr. and all three of the other victims as part of the same act or transaction; that he killed Buchanan, Sr. and any two of the other victims as part of the same act or transaction; or that he killed Buchanan, Sr. and any one of the other victims as part of the same act or transaction. Id. at 397, 384 S.E.2d at 762. Muhammad had notice in the indictment, as originally found by the grand jury and as amended, that he was charged with a single offense that could be proved by showing: (1) his intent to intimidate the civilian population at large, or (2) his intent to influence the conduct or activities of the government of the United States, a state or locality through intimidation; or (3) his intent to do both 1 and 2 above. The trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the terrorism indictment.