Opinion ID: 2815220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

Text: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a person's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Generally, the Fourth Amendment requires the police to have a warrant in order to conduct a search. Robinson v. State, 407 S.C. 169, 185, 754 S.E.2d 862, 870 (2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2888 (2014). Evidence seized in violation of the warrant requirement must be excluded from trial. Id. However, a warrantless search may nonetheless be proper under the Fourth Amendment if it falls within one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id.; see State v. Brown, 401 S.C. 82, 89, 736 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2012) (recognizing the following exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) hot pursuit, (3) stop and frisk, (4) automobile exception, (5) the plain view doctrine, (6) consent, and (7) abandonment). The exigent circumstances doctrine provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment[']s protection against warrantless searches, but only where, from an objective standard, a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant exists. State v. Abdullah, 357 S.C. 344, 351, 592 S.E.2d 344, 348 (Ct. App. 2004); see State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 587, 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) (acknowledging the exigent circumstances doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement). For instance, a warrantless search is justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine to prevent a suspect from fleeing or where there is a risk of danger to police or others inside or outside a dwelling. Abdullah, 357 S.C. at 351, 592 S.E.2d at 348 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990)). In such circumstances, a protective sweep of the premises may be permitted. Id. (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990)). A 'protective sweep' is a quick and limited search of the premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). In parallel with the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the South Carolina Constitution also provides a safeguard against unlawful searches and seizures. State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 643, 541 S.E.2d 837, 840 (2001); S.C. Const. art. I, § 10. The relationship between the two constitutions is significant because '[s]tate courts may afford more expansive rights under state constitutional provisions than the rights which are conferred by the Federal Constitution. Forrester, 343 S.C. at 643, 541 S.E.2d at 840 (quoting State v. Easler, 327 S.C. 121, 131 n.13, 489 S.E.2d 617, 625 n.13 (1997)). Therefore, state courts can develop state law to provide their citizens with a second layer of constitutional rights. Id. This relationship is often described as a recognition that the federal Constitution sets the floor for individual rights while the state constitution establishes the ceiling. Id. Thus, this Court can interpret the state protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in such a way as to provide greater protection than the federal Constitution. Id. at 644, 541 S.E.2d at 840.
In the context of Fourth Amendment analysis, scholars have explained: One police tactic that courts have increasingly subjected to reasonableness review is the procedure known as knock and talk. The knock and talk procedure is a common and seemingly innocuous procedure that police use proactively, making the procedure vulnerable to potential abuse. The knock and talk appears innocuous because courts do not generally consider its use a search and seizure, but rather an investigative tactic. The potential for abuse arises when police attempt to gain access for consensual searches and instead provoke exigencies that normally validate a warrantless search. Bryan Abramoske, Note, It Doesn't Matter What They Intended: The Need for Objective Permissibility Review of Police-Created Exigencies in Knock and Talk Investigations, 41 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 561, 562 (2008) (footnotes omitted). Despite the potential for abuse and the heightened expectation of privacy in one's home, the United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the knock and talk technique as constitutionally permissible. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16 (2013) (We have accordingly recognized that 'the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds. . . . Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is 'no more than any private citizen might do.'  (citations omitted)). Moreover, nearly every federal circuit, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, has recognized the constitutional propriety of the knock and talk technique. See United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 493 (4th Cir. 2001) (A voluntary response to an officer's knock at the front door of a dwelling does not generally implicate the Fourth Amendment, and thus an officer generally does not need probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify knocking on the door and then making verbal inquiry.). See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule Permitting Knock and Talk Visits Under Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 A.L.R. 6th 515, 515 (2006 & Supp. 2015) (Although the ['knock and talk'] procedure is not per se violative of the Fourth Amendment and corresponding state constitutional provisions, police must conduct themselves in a manner that does not communicate to a reasonable person that he or she is not free to ignore the police presence, and police must remain in those areas of the property that are impliedly open to the public.).4 4 See also United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir. 1990) (A policeman may lawfully go to a person's home to interview him. In doing so, he obviously can go up to the door. (citations omitted)); United States v. Lucas, 462 Fed. Appx. 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2012) (recognizing as constitutionally permissible officer's use of knock and talk in approaching defendant's apartment); In re Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d 497, 519 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that courts generally recognize a 'knock and talk' exception to the warrant requirement); United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001) (Federal Courts have recognized the 'knock and talk' strategy as a reasonable investigative tool when officers seek to gain an occupant's consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect criminal activity.); United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277 (6th Cir. 2005) (Consensual encounters do not lose their propriety, moreover, merely because they take place at the entrance of a citizen's home. A number of courts, including this one, have recognized 'knock and talk' consensual encounters as a legitimate investigative technique at the home of a suspect or an individual with information about an investigation.); United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 691-92 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that a knock and talk is ordinarily consensual unless coercive circumstances exist); United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 679 (8th Cir. 2011) (This principle permits police officers—consistent with the Fourth Amendment— to 'approach[ ] the front door to announce their presence,' make 'inquir[ies],' and 'request consent to search the remainder of the property,' 'commonly referred to as a 'knock and talk.'  (quoting United States v. Weston, 443 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. Similar to federal precedent, this Court has found that police ha[v]e the investigative authority to approach the front door of [a] home in order to investigate [the] anonymous tip. State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 445, 706 S.E.2d 324, 328 (2011). Applying the above-outlined principles to the facts of the instant case, we find the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial judge's denial of Counts' motion to suppress because the actions of law enforcement did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under either the state or federal constitution. We discern no error of law in the judge's analysis and there is evidence to support the judge's findings of fact that once Counts, a known felon, voluntarily opened the door, an exigent circumstance arose when the officers saw that he had a weapon. Significantly, Counts requested that the officers provide identification before he opened the door. Yet, even after they provided proof of their law enforcement authority, Counts opened the door armed with a handgun. Because there was a risk of danger to the officers, the officers were justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine to detain Counts and conduct a protective sweep of his residence. A search of Counts' person revealed a bag of marijuana. During the protective sweep, the officers also observed drugs and a scale in plain view, which provided them with probable cause to procure a search warrant. Accordingly, we affirm this portion of the Court of Appeals' decision.