Opinion ID: 1331614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. McQuaide's Opinion Regarding the Identity of the Perpetrator; Family Member Testimony Regarding Statements of the Child

Text: This Court affirms the decisions of the lower court with regard to the inadmissibility of Ms. McQuaide's opinion that Mr. G. committed the abuse and the inadmissibility of the child's family members' testimony regarding statements of the child. The circuit court found that Ms. McQuaide [8] offered opinions beyond the field of counseling when she was permitted to offer her personal opinion that Mr. G. had perpetrated the abuse. Similarly, with reference to family members, the circuit court ruled that testimony by the child's family members regarding statements made by the child constituted inadmissible hearsay. While we affirm the decisions of the circuit court that such testimony is inadmissible, we find that the family court's error in admitting such testimony was harmless and did not affect the ultimate outcome of this child custody modification matter. We observe that none of the family court's seventeen findings refers to opinion evidence offered by Ms. McQuaide regarding her personal conclusions about the identity of the perpetrator. Nor does the family court appear to rely upon family member testimony regarding the child's statements. The family court's ultimate alteration of custody is based upon the child's statements as properly revealed through her counselor, Ms. McQuaide; testimony regarding the child's physical condition; testimony regarding the child's knowledge and acting out of sexual activity; and testimony from the child's guardian ad litem. Based upon our review of the evidence and the reasoning of both the family court and the circuit court, we conclude that the family court's error in admitting Ms. McQuaide's opinion that Mr. G. committed the offenses and in admitting the family members' hearsay testimony regarding statements of the child did not result in substantial injustice or prejudice to substantive rights. Therefore, we consider such error harmless. Rule 61 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides: No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Rule 103(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence also provides that [e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. . . . As this Court articulated in State v. Bradshaw, 193 W.Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456 (1995), cert. denied, Bradshaw v. West Virginia, 516 U.S. 872, 116 S.Ct. 196, 133 L.Ed.2d 131, [t]he harmless error inquiry involves an assessment of the likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the trial. 193 W.Va. at 539, 457 S.E.2d at 476. Our conclusion that the admission of the evidence at issue was harmless is bolstered by the fact that this case was tried before the bench, rather than a jury. Unlike a jury, a trial judge in a bench trial is presumed to know the law and to follow it and `this presumption may only be rebutted when the record affirmatively shows otherwise.' People v. Thorne, 352 Ill.App.3d 1062, 288 Ill.Dec. 513, 817 N.E.2d 1163, 1177 (2004) (quoting People v. Mandic, 325 Ill.App.3d 544, 259 Ill.Dec. 658, 759 N.E.2d 138, 141 (2001)). [9]