Opinion ID: 1959465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Doret's Other Arguments

Text: We are satisfied that none of Doret's other arguments require reversal of his convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine, PWID, and unlawful possession of ammunition. Doret contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the drug charges because: (1) the single ziplock bag recovered from the Center Street apartment was insufficient to support the distribution of cocaine charge because the contents of the ziplock were found only to be consistent with an amount for personal use; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his latent fingerprints from envelopes inside the Center Street safe. We disagree. With respect to Doret's first argument, we have previously held that: packaging of narcotics in a manner making them ready to sell to individual purchasers is strong evidence of an intent to distribute. Taylor v. United States, 662 A.2d 1368, 1371 (D.C.1995) (citation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as we must, see Owens v. United States, 688 A.2d 399, 402 (D.C.1996), we conclude that there was ample evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Doret of the drug charges, based, in part, on the testimony of: (1) Officer Joe L. Henderson that in searching the Center Street apartment, he discovered a safe, a scale, a bag with some plastic bags in it and some rubber gloves; (2) Sgt. Wagner that there were numerous small ziplock bags [found at the apartment], the kind that are used to package narcotics for street sales of [ ] crack cocaine. . . ., and that one ziplock bag contained traces of white powder . . . that was field tested positive for cocaine; (3) Officer Tyrone R. Thomas that the amount of cocaine found at the apartment was a usable amount, and that the safe, scale, surgical gloves, safe and ziplock bags were used by drug dealers; and (4) Eugene Frazier and Darren Hargrove that they routinely sold drugs together with Doret, and that Doret was the leader of the group. See Price v. United States, 746 A.2d 896, 899 (D.C.2000) (The government need not prove the presence of a usable amount of the controlled substance. . . though if the government does establish such usability[,] it will have met its burden, since `if a substance is usable it is also measurable') (citation and internal quotations omitted); Barnes v. United States, 760 A.2d 556, 558 n. 3 (D.C.2000) (The quantity and packaging of the drugs, together with the discovery of the cutting and packaging paraphernalia, was more than sufficient to show the required intent.). With regard to Doret's argument pertaining to the admission of his latent fingerprint, we find no abuse of discretion. He asserts a relevancy argument regarding the fingerprint. However, `The evaluation and weighing of evidence for relevance and potential prejudice is quintessentially a discretionary function of the trial court, and we owe a great deal of deference to its decision.' Clayborne, supra, 751 A.2d at 963 (quoting Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. 1999) (other quotation omitted)). Moreover, without the latent fingerprint, there was testimony from Hargrove, Frazier and Cristwell that, on at least one occasion, they observed Doret handling either drugs or drug revenue at the Center Street apartment. Therefore, we cannot say that even if allowing testimony of the latent fingerprint constituted error, that it amounted to reversible error under Kotteakos, supra . Finally, Doret argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the government to introduce prejudicial evidence of his use of aliases, including Anthony Wayne Grant, because [n]o witness identified [him] by any alias . . . [or] referred to [him] by the name Grant. Contrary to Doret's assertion, Frazier identified Doret as Anthony Grant, Gill, or Grant throughout his testimony. Cristwell knew Doret only as Gill and used that name throughout her testimony. Thus, the use of the nicknames and aliases served the useful purpose of informing the jury, rather than `arous[ing] suspicion that the accused is a person who has found it useful or necessary to conceal his identity.' Johnson v. United States, 389 A.2d 1353, 1355 (D.C.1978) (quoting United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir.1948) (footnote omitted)). Even assuming error, we conclude that Doret suffered no recognizable prejudice warranting reversal. See Kotteakos, supra ; see also Reavis v. United States, 395 A.2d 75, 79 n. 2 (D.C.1978). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm Doret's convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine; possession with intent to distribute cocaine; and unlawful possession of ammunition. However, we reverse his convictions for first-degree murder (premeditated) while armed, and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence; and order a new trial on those charges. So ordered.