Opinion ID: 202945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Admission of Co-Conspirator Statements

Text: The appellants argue that the district court improperly admitted statements made by alleged co-conspirator Vélez-García in tape recorded telephone conversations with cooperating witness Escobar-Lopez. While out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted would normally be hearsay, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) explicitly excepts a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy from the definition of hearsay. In this circuit, out-of-court statements by an alleged co-conspirator are only admissible if the district court determines that it is more likely than not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy . . . and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1977). Such a finding is called a Petrozziello determination. The district court must consider all of the evidence in determining whether the prosecution has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the declarant and the defendant were co-conspirators. See United States v. Murphy, 193 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1999). Thus, while the district court is generally required to make a conditional admissibility determination if the defendant objects to the introduction of an out-of-court statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), this circuit require[s] the court to delay its final Petrozziello determination until the close of all evidence. Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir.1980). If the district court, having conditionally admitted the statements, later determines that they are inadmissible, it should strike the statements and give a curative instruction or, if no instruction would cure the prejudice, declare a mistrial. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d at 638. In this case, the government sought to introduce a tape recording and transcript of the conversations between Vélez-García and Escobar-Lopez at trial during the direct examination of Task Force Agent López. The defendants objected, asserting that Vélez-García's statements were inadmissible hearsay because he was acting as a government informant at the time and therefore was not a co-conspirator under United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 126 (1st Cir.1987) ([G]overnment agents do not count as co-conspirators . . . [T]he government informer is not a true conspirator.). On March 7, 2005, the district court issued its preliminary admissibility ruling, concluding that [t]he preponderance of the evidence so far leads us to conclude that Mr. Vélez-García was a `bona fide' co-conspirator in the conspiracy charged and not an informant. In making this ruling, the district court relied on: the allegations of the indictment that the conspiracy lasted from November 2000 to December 2002, an FBI 302 report of an interview with Escobar-Lopez in which he said Vélez-García was a member of the conspiracy, the tape recordings themselves, [5] the testimony up to this moment of task force agent Victor López, and an FBI certification letter that listed the dates that Vélez-García was a cooperating witness as May 16, 2000 through August 16, 2002, and February 11, 2003 through May 7, 2003. The appellants take issue with the district court's reliance on this last piece of evidence, arguing that the author of the certification letter, FBI Special Agent in Charge Luis Fraticelli, did not testify at trial and therefore was not subject to cross-examination, allegedly in violation of the appellants' Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against them. We find no error in the district court's reliance on the Fraticelli letter in making its preliminary admissibility determination. A court may consider any evidence it wishes, unhindered by considerations of admissibility, in making preliminary admissibility determinations. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987); see also Fed.R.Evid. 104(a). Moreover, since a district court is not required to hold a formal hearing in making this preliminary determination, as the appellants acknowledge, no violation of the appellants' right to cross-examination occurred. See United States v. Campbell, 268 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.2001). The appellants also appear to complain that the evidence ultimately introduced at trial did not support admissibility of the statements. Here, the district court erred in failing to make a final Petrozziello determination at the close of the evidence. As noted earlier, [f]or Petrozziello purposes, the critical juncture is the close of all the evidence. United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 715 (1st Cir.1992). However, although the defendants objected at the time the statements were introduced, leading to the preliminary determination, they never renewed their objection at the close of the evidence nor did they request a final Petrozziello determination. This court has held that a defendant's failure to object to the omission of such an express trial-end determination bars him from raising the point on appeal in the absence of plain error. Ortiz, 966 F.2d at 715 (quoting United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1283 (1st Cir.1991)); see also Campbell, 268 F.3d at 5-6. We find no plain error on the record of this case. Even putting to one side the out of court statements on which the district court relied in making its preliminary determination, [6] the government presented significant admissible evidence at trial that Vélez-García was a co-conspirator, not a government informant, at the time of the tape recordings. FBI agent Marrero explicitly testified at trial that Vélez-García was a cooperating witness for the FBI only from May 16, 2000, until August 16, 2002, and again from February 11, 2003, until April 7, 2003. Similarly, Task Force Agent López testified during cross-examination by one of the co-defendant's counsel that while Vélez-García was a government informant at other times, he was not a government informant in December 2002 when he made statements at issue. The evidence relied on by the appellants only shows that Vélez-García was a government informant at some point in time, not that he was a government informant, and therefore not a co-conspirator, when the tape recordings were made. A new trial is not required.