Opinion ID: 609824
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Recusal denied

Text: 212 Chandler argues that the district court erred in denying Chandler's motion for recusal. In an order denying Chandler's pretrial motion to strike the death penalty from the indictment, the district court stated: 213 [b]ased on the evidence the court has heard during the trial of [Chandler's] co-defendants, this court is satisfied that the government has properly exercised prosecutorial discretion in not also seeking the death penalty for [Jarrell]. Jarrell was an alcoholic lackey for Chandler who for $500, or maybe simply a fifth of liquor, likely would have done anything Chandler directed him to do. 214 RI-201-3. 215 Chandler suggests that this holding demonstrates that the district court's lack of impartiality and the necessity of recusal. We review the district court's denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion. McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir.1990) (per curiam). 216 A judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The test under Section 455(a) is whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality. Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066, 109 S.Ct. 2066, 104 L.Ed.2d 631 (1989). However, we have held that a judge's bias must be personal and extrajudicial; it must derive from something other than that which the judge learned by participating in the case. McWhorter, 906 F.2d at 678. Likewise, a judge's rulings in a related case may not ordinarily serve as the basis for recusal. Id. There is an exception to this general rule when the movant demonstrates pervasive bias and prejudice. Id. 217 In his order denying Chandler's motion, the district judge articulated that his comment concerning the relative culpabilities of Jarrell and Chandler was based on the evidence the court had heard during the trials of Chandler's co-defendants. This is the only comment cited by Chandler, and the comment was not extrajudicial. Moreover, although Chandler argues that the district judge's pervasive bias is demonstrated by the admission of evidence of uncharged and unproven crimes, his repeated denials of the defense's jury instructions, and his imposition of the maximum sentences possible for the non-capital convictions, these decisions are just a few of the many decisions that a district judge is called upon to make in the course of a trial and fail to demonstrate pervasive bias and prejudice. Thus, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Chandler's motion for recusal. 218