Opinion ID: 1829968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 33

Heading: Evidence of Other Prior Convictions

Text: Hansen complains that the Circuit Court admitted, over his objection, evidence of his ten prior felony convictions in Florida. We have addressed Hansen's objection at the guilt phase. At the penalty phase, Hansen argues that only two prior convictions were required to establish his habitual offender status and that nothing was to be gained parading the other ten convictions before the jury. He argues that the prejudicial impact of the other convictions outweighed their probative value rendering them inadmissible. See Rules 609 and 403, Miss.R.Ev. We do not think so, and for two reasons. First, notions of necessity form no part of the rule of relevance in our law of evidence. Rules 401-403, Miss.R.Ev. Evidence is relevant if it would suggest to the jury that a fact of consequence is more likely so or not so than it would appear without the evidence. See Kolb v. State, 542 So.2d 265, 269 (Miss. 1989); Edlin v. State, 533 So.2d 403, 410 (Miss. 1988); Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89, 91-92 (Miss. 1987). We are concerned whether the evidence is too speculative, as in the case of hearsay, or whether its use would compromise other interests, as with privileged communications, but we largely leave necessity judgments to the litigants, subject only to the trial court's discretionary competence under Rule 403 to say enough is enough and put a stop to the parade on grounds of repetition, redundancy and cumulativeness. We almost never reverse on these latter grounds. The more serious question is whether this evidence transgresses legal limits on what the prosecution may show in aggravation. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5) provides that aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Hansen's pre-1987 criminal record consists of four grand theft convictions, four burglary convictions and two escape convictions. None of these is a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person within Section 99-19-101(5)(b). This would suggest they are of doubtful relevance. Rule 401, Miss.R.Ev.; Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d at 91-92. Notwithstanding the seemingly absolute shall be limited language of the statute, we have in the past upheld the prosecution's proof of a non-statutory aggravating circumstance of future dangerousness. Ten prior convictions over the space of ten years are substantial evidence that Hansen lacked the ability to conform his behavior to the norms society demands. We cannot rationally say that this evidence was irrelevant to the question of the punishment Hansen should receive for his most recent crime. See Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1098-99 (Miss. 1987); Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 433-34 (Miss. 1988); and Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 652 (Miss. 1983). Here, however, the evidence was not offered in aggravation, and the jury was not instructed that these prior convictions could be considered as aggravating circumstances. The jury's verdict at sentencing did not rely upon these. Rather, the prosecution's use of these prior convictions appears in the nature of rebuttal evidence. At the penalty phase Hansen produced a number of witnesses who testified regarding his past. The Circuit Court allowed Hansen great leeway in proving by way of mitigation the assorted troubles and difficulties of his youth, and, as well, positive points regarding his behavior while incarcerated. These ten prior convictions are as much a part of Hansen's life story as the proof he offered himself. In this context, we find no error in the Circuit Courts admitting this evidence.