Opinion ID: 185615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court Should Determine Whether Further Discovery is Necessary

Text: 35 Appellees argue that even if the District Court applied an erroneous standard in evaluating appellant's prima facie case, the error was harmless because appellant did not come forth with sufficiently specific facts to establish the other elements of her prima facie case: namely, that she applied for open SES positions for which she was qualified and that the FAA passed her over for those promotions while continuing to seek other applicants. Ms. Stella alleged only that she applied for two open SES positions since 1995 for which she was qualified but was not selected. The FAA argues that she was required to give more details, including the names of the positions, the selecting officials, the exact dates, and so on. 36 We reject this argument. First, appellees conceded at oral argument that additional specificity is not required for appellant to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The FAA did not argue that Ms. Stella did not apply for the positions, that she was not qualified for them, or that no one was promoted to SES during the relevant period. Thus, once advised of the correct legal standard, the District Court may conclude that Ms. Stella established her prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. 37 Even if more specificity is required, the District Court should determine in the first instance whether to defer ruling on the motion for summary judgment until those details can be obtained through discovery that appellant has requested. In her Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Stella notified the District Court that the FAA had not responded to her requests for documents, including documents pertaining to the employees who did receive promotions during the relevant time period. Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 17. She characterized this request as relevant comparator data to support that adverse actions occurred. Id. In a sworn declaration in support of Ms. Stella's Opposition, her attorney stated that Ms. Stella had sought comparator data on promotions and awards for male employees and documentation pertaining to the people who received promotions during the relevant time period. Brown Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10, reprinted in J.A. 47-48. He stated that this information would be particularly relevant since Defendant has claimed there exists no adverse action and Plaintiff points to her repeated denials of promotions. Id. ¶ 10, reprinted in J.A. 48. 38 The District Court granted summary judgment, holding that Ms. Stella could not prevail on her discrimination claim because men and women were promoted to the SES positions for which she had applied. Mem. Op. at 17-18. It follows from the District Court's reasoning that the requested documents could not have helped her to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Had the District Court applied the correct legal standard, it may not have granted summary judgment without requiring the FAA to supply the requested data regarding the SES positions that were open during the relevant period and the employees who were chosen to fill those positions. Alternatively, the court might have determined that no additional details were necessary to establish that appellant applied for promotions for which she was qualified and did not receive them. 39 District Courts are afforded substantial discretion to manage discovery as they see fit. Moreover, District Courts are afforded discretion in ruling on requests for additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f). See Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 765 (D.C.Cir.1997). Having corrected the standard pursuant to which the District Court must evaluate appellant's prima facie case, we remand so that the District Court may determine whether further discovery is called for. If the District Court determines that appellant has submitted facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case, it must proceed with the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas and evaluate the FAA's proffered reasons for declining to promote Ms. Stella to the SES positions for which she applied. The information requested by appellant may also be relevant in the future in determining whether any reasons the FAA offers for failing to promote Ms. Stella are pretextual. See generally Paquin v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 119 F.3d 23, 25, 28-29 (D.C.Cir.1997) (reversing the District Court's grant of summary judgment and remanding for further discovery where the plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit had requested, but had not received, certain comparator data).