Opinion ID: 1372176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Other Oregon cases distinction in cases arising on demurrer.

Text: According to the opinion by Justice Peterson, under Oregon law no cause of action is stated. For the reasons previously stated, I disagree. I recognize that no case has previously been presented to this court involving similar facts. As recognized by Justice Peterson, however, the law is not an inanimate, unmoving thing, but must be capable of meeting the needs of a dynamic, changing society. I believe this to be not only illustrated by our decisions in other cases involving problems of foreseeability, although under different facts, but that such a decision in this case would be consistent with and supported by our analysis of the problem of foreseeability in those cases. First, in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., supra , it might well have been said, as in this case, that it would take a real stretch of the imagination to foresee that sparks from a welding operation at defendant's mill would not only cause a fire that would spread to a nearby warehouse but that plaintiff, who was at home listening to the radio, would not only offer his assistance but would then be hoisted by a forklift to the roof of the warehouse, where he would step on a corrugated plastic skylight, which would then give way, causing him to fall through and be injured. Indeed, it could have been said that plaintiff's injury in that fall resulted from a concatenation of highly unusual circumstances, as urged by defendant in this case. Instead, this court held that the question of foreseeability in that case was not out of the range within which a jury could determine that the injury was reasonably foreseeable. Another extreme case involving a concatenation of unusual circumstances was Connolly v. Bressler, 283 Or. 265, 583 P.2d 540 (1978), in which defendant allowed one Wilt to use his pickup truck. Wilt drove it to a tavern with plaintiff and plaintiff's brother. He left it outside with the keys in the ignition. Plaintiff's brother, while drunk, then started to drive the truck away. Plaintiff then, in trying to stop his brother, jumped in the bed of the truck and was injured when it ran off the road. Yet this court held that there was liability because the injury was of the general kind which was foreseeable, despite the bizarre manner of the occurrence. For other cases in which the court has held the question of foreseeability to be a question of fact for the jury under somewhat extreme facts, see Mezyk v. National Repossessions, Inc., 241 Or. 333, 405 P.2d 840 (1965) (in which defendant left his key in the ignition of his car, which was then stolen by a thief and recklessly driven into the plaintiff), and Gunn v. Hi-C-House, Inc., 260 Or. 404, 490 P.2d 999 (1971) (in which an elderly lady in a nursing home was standing near a fountain and fell when startled by the turning on of the fountain). See also Hills v. McGillvrey, 240 Or. 476, 402 P.2d 722 (1965); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979), and Kirby v. Sonville, 286 Or. 339, 594 P.2d 818 (1979). Defendants also contend that plaintiff's complaint was insufficient because it failed to allege that the matron knew that Thompson posed a threat of physical harm to anyone, or that she knew of his dangerous propensities. In my view, however, plaintiff's complaint was sufficient because a jury could properly find from the alleged facts that the matron had actual or constructive knowledge that Thompson and the girl inmate had a close personal relationship and that the two of them had previously stolen an automobile together and fled the county; that if she allowed Thompson to enter the center and visit that inmate, the two of them might well attempt to escape, and that persons attempting to escape from jail and who had previously stolen a car in an attempt to flee the county may well be sufficiently desperate as to be dangerous, so as to pose a threat of physical injury to persons who may attempt to prevent their escape or to capture them after their escape. It is also important to note, in considering the past decisions by this court, that a clear distinction has been made between cases in which the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury is raised after a trial on a motion for directed verdict or for a judgment n.o.v. and cases in which the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint is raised by demurrer, as in this case. In Mezyk v. National Repossessions, supra , this court recognized the importance of allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to present his case before ruling in the defendant's favor on the issue of foreseeability. Justice Denecke stated: A complaint which states that an act was done negligently is not ambiguous. It may be subject to a motion to make more definite and certain but when there is a duty to act with due care and the complaint alleges that an act was done negligently, the complaint, when tested by demurrer, states a cause of action.    Whether or not the defendant was negligent depends upon whether or not the defendant's conduct in leaving the keys in the car created a likelihood of harm to the plaintiff. This question in turn can be subdivided: (1) Should the defendant have foreseen that someone might very well steal his car because he left the keys in it; and (2) Should he have foreseen that the thief would drive negligently?    Under the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to offer any admissible evidence relevant to these two issues. We hold that it is reasonably conceivable that the plaintiff could introduce evidence which would enable the trier of the facts to find that the defendant should have foreseen both of these contingencies. (Emphasis added) 241 Or. at 338-39, 405 P.2d at 843. As also held in Brennen v. City of Eugene, supra : Because this case is before us on demurrer, we must assume the truth of all plaintiff's well pleaded allegations and any facts that might conceivably be adduced as proof of such allegations. Citing Mezyk, 285 Or. at 405, 591 P.2d 719, 722. See also Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Temco Metal Products Co., 267 Or. 230, 236-37, 516 P.2d 80 (1973), recognizing this same distinction.