Opinion ID: 1866280
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the chancellor err in terminating appellant's alimony based upon her alleged adulterous relationship?

Text: The subsequent misconduct of a wife following an absolute divorce from her husband may, in proper circumstances, constitute a material change in circumstances so as to entitle the husband to modification of the final decree for divorce. McHann v. McHann, 383 So.2d 823 (Miss. 1980); McRae v. McRae, 381 So.2d 1052 (Miss. 1980); and Rubisoff v. Rubisoff, 242 Miss. 225, 133 So.2d 534 (1961). The misconduct most often complained of involves alleged sexual misconduct of a wife whereby the husband seeks a termination of future alimony provided for by the final decree of divorce. Although in previous decisions this Court has referred to this type of sexual misconduct as adultery, adultery cannot be committed by an unmarried woman with an unmarried man, the gist of the offense being voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's spouse. Because the bonds of matrimony in cases such as this one have been severed, the offending spouse's sexual misconduct cannot be categorized as anything more than fornication. In such a case, the chancellor, as the trier of fact, has the duty to find whether or not the alleged misconduct of the former wife is of such a nature as to forfeit her right to future alimony. This question must be faced and determined on a case-by-case basis. McHann, supra, and McRae, supra . An adulterous relationship may be established by circumstantial evidence, the act itself usually being committed in secret, thereby rendering direct proof thereof impossible. Hand, Mississippi Divorce, Alimony and Child Custody § 4-7 (1981), and Bunkley & Morse's Amis, Divorce and Separation in Mississippi § 3.09(5) (1957). Where the proof is circumstantial, the party asserting the adulterous relationship carries a heavy burden. In Banks v. Banks, 118 Miss. 783, 79 So. 841 (1918), this Court stated: Where an offense of this kind is sought to be proven by circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be proven with reasonable certainty, and the circumstances so proven must be such that the conclusion sought to be established follows logically from the facts. If there are two or more reasonable theories which may be drawn from the facts proven, the proof will be insufficient because, to invest mere circumstances with the force of truth, the conclusion must not only be logical, and tend to prove the facts charged, but must be inconsistent with a reasonable theory of innocence. (118 Miss. at 787-88, 79 So. at 842). See also Hulett v. Hulett, 152 Miss. 476, 119 So. 581 (1928). The proof of such a charge must be clear and convincing. Nix v. Nix, 253 Miss. 565, 176 So.2d 297 (1965); and McCraney v. McCraney, 208 Miss. 105, 43 So.2d 872 (1950). Adultery is a violation of the exclusivity of the marital relationship. Hand, supra. A divorce upon a charge of adultery may be granted upon a showing of either an infatuation for a particular person of the opposite sex or a generally adulterous nature on the part of the defendant. Either of these elements must be supported by proof of a reasonable opportunity to satisfy. Hand, supra, and Bunkley & Morse's Amis, supra, § 309(6). These elements must be shown to obtain a divorce upon the ground of adultery. McHann, supra, and McRae, supra, both are distinguishable from the present case. In both cases the divorced wives admitted sexual relationships and cohabitation with men following their divorce decrees. This was not established in the present case. Here the proof at most showed that appellant dated Ellis frequently and the two would occasionally visit alone together in her home. Both denied any sexual relationship and furthermore denied ever sleeping in the same house except when they visited appellant's mother in Nashville. Appellee relied upon the presumption that appellant had engaged in fornication with Haywood Ellis. Although the proof showed both a mutual infatuation and an opportunity to gratify, there was no presumption created thereby because appellant was not a married woman. There being no presumption created by the circumstances, the evidence was insufficient to establish a material change of circumstances due to appellant's alleged sexual misconduct. The chancellor was therefore manifestly wrong in terminating appellant's alimony for this reason.