Opinion ID: 2069673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: .... Basis of Payment:

Text: The contract unit price bid per ton for the item `Bituminous Concrete for Maintenance of Traffic' and `Graded Aggregate for Subbase for Maintenance of Traffic,' complete in place, shall include the cost of furnishing, hauling and placing all materials, for all labor, tools, and equipment necessary to complete the item. The question of interpretation presented by this case involves the description of the work covered by the above. Bramble contends that furnishing and placing bituminous concrete in temporary locations for maintenance of traffic as directed by the Engineer refers to the initial construction of temporary roads. The Board, however, found that the underlying Contract specification language in dispute ... means that temporary bituminous concrete necessary for patching, pothole repair and miscellaneous repair tie-ins, as directed in the field by the Engineer during the course of the project as problems arise, NOT the bituminous concrete needed to create the detour and temporary roads. That material is to be paid for pursuant to the bid price provided for items 5003 and 5004. SHA contends that it is unreasonable to construe the description of the work under Spl. Traffic Prov. § 814 to include the original construction of the temporary roads, because the temporary roads are fully described in the plans to be followed by the contractor. The location, elevation, length, and width of the temporary roads are determined by, and set forth on, the drawings that are part of the traffic control plan. The depth and required number of layers of materials to be used in paving the temporary roads in the process of their construction are prescribed on the plans. SHA submits that the phrase, as directed by the Engineer, in the context of Spl. Traffic Prov. § 814, plainly addresses work that is not shown on the plans. This is because the plans cannot show in advance where the need will arise for patching, pothole repair and miscellaneous tie-ins. Such incidental work in temporary locations necessarily must be as directed by the Engineer. The Board's reading of the description of the work in Spl. Traffic Prov. § 814 is consistent with that special provision's Construction Requirements that state [t]he Engineer shall indicate the lengths, widths, and depths, and required number of layers of which materials to be used. The plans, however, provide pavement detail for detour roads and temporary auxiliary lanes. The pavement legend requires the contractor to lay temporary roads from the top of the subgrade with a six inch base course using graded aggregate, on which is placed a three and one-half inch (nominal) bituminous concrete base, band BF. The surface is a one and one-half inch (nominal) bituminous concrete, band SC. The plans and Spl. Traffic Prov. § 814 are harmonized by reading as directed by the Engineer to relate to the interstices of the Contract, and not to that which is spelled out in it. Special Traffic Prov. § 814, as interpreted by the Board, is also compatible with the estimated fifty tons of aggregate base and of bituminous concrete that was used by SHA in the bid schedule for Maintenance of Traffic. Bramble's owner admitted that, in bid preparation, he knew that fifty tons underestimated the quantity of temporary road paving materials, and he realized that at least 1,000 tons would be required. In fact, as reflected by Bramble's claim for payment at $100/ton, 2757.44 tons of bituminous concrete were used for temporary roads. Bramble's owner testified that he was not particularly concerned about SHA's obvious underestimation of quantity because he considered that the matter would be subject to an equitable adjustment under the VEQ clause. [7] This explanation for not seeking clarification does nothing to undermine the Board's interpretation that Spl. Traffic Prov. § 814 did not refer to the construction of temporary roads, because the explanation does not account for the phrase, as directed by the Engineer. Bramble's argument ultimately rests on the proposition that all work under any SHA contract is as directed by the Engineer because the plans were authorized, signed, and issued by the SHA Engineer. This argument is not a reasonable construction of the Special Provision. For example, Std. Spec. 814.01.01 states that [a]ll work shall be in accordance with the latest issue of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), Specifications, Plans, Special Provisions and as directed by the Engineer.... In this context, as directed by the Engineer clearly has a meaning different from Specifications, Plans, and Special Provisions. If it did not, the phrase would be redundant. Because this Court will ordinarily avoid interpreting contracts in a way that renders its provisions superfluous, Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 330 Md. 758, 782, 625 A.2d 1021, 1033 (1993), the phrase, as directed by the Engineer, as it is used in Spl. Traffic Prov. § 814, should not be read to be synonymous with the directions and specifications found in the Contract plans. Special Traffic Prov. 17, Maintenance of Project, which Bramble cites for its use, in part, of the future tense, actually supports the Board's decision. Special Traffic Prov. 17 includes in the scope of the work through the life of the project [p]ot hole repair as directed, and states that the work will be as directed by the Engineer. Other types of work included in Spl. Traffic Prov. 17 include the pick up of debris, the mowing of grass, and the sweeping of roadways. Obviously, the locations where these tasks are to be performed from time to time cannot be reflected in advance on the plans, but will be as directed by the Engineer. Bramble's position that work as directed by the Engineer fully embraces work specified in the plans in addition to work not set forth in the plans is belied by contract provisions in which as directed by the Engineer is used in contradistinction to work specified in the plans. For example, in that part of Spl. Traffic Prov. § 814, headed, Concrete Barriers, the bidder is referred to Std. Spec. 814.05, Temporary Concrete Barrier for Maintenance of Traffic. Standard Spec. 814.05.01 describes the work as furnishing, placing, resetting and removal of precast concrete barriers for temporary use during construction along highways, streets and at locations indicated on the Plans or as directed by the Engineer. (Emphasis added). Temporary road pavement markers are to be completed in place, as indicated on the approved Traffic Control Plan or as directed by the Engineer. Std. Spec. 814.04.01. The same distinction between plans and the direction of the engineer is made for locating a traffic barrier W beam, Std. Spec. 814.06.01, for locating tubular markers for maintenance of traffic, Std. Spec. 814.07.01, and in other specifications involving Maintenance of Traffic devices that may require shifts of location as the work progresses or circumstances dictate. The same reasoning applies to filling potholes in temporary roads. Judicial review of administrative agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act is narrow. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People's Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 576, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994). The reviewing court determines only `(1) the legality of the decision and (2) whether there was substantial evidence from the record as a whole to support the decision.' Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 77-78, 706 A.2d 1073, 1076 (1998) (citing Baltimore Lutheran High Sch. Ass'n v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662, 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985)). The reviewing court is under no constraint to affirm an agency decision premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law. Insurance Comm'r v. Engelman, 345 Md. 402, 411, 692 A.2d 474, 479 (1997). The question of whether a contract is ambiguous ordinarily is determined by the court as a question of law. See JBG/Twinbrook Metro Ltd. Partnership v. Wheeler, 346 Md. 601, 625, 697 A.2d 898, 911 (1997) (stating that the interpretation of a written contract is ordinarily a question of law for the court.) (citing Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 324 Md. 294, 306, 596 A.2d 1069, 1075 (1991)). Thus, the fact that witnesses for Bramble testified, in effect, that Bramble's interpretation was reasonable while SHA relied primarily on the arguments of counsel is immaterial under the facts of this case. For the reasons stated above the provision that the courts below found to be ambiguous is not controlling, and the provision that is controlling is not ambiguous. Bramble's competing construction of Spl. Traffic Prov. § 814 is not consistent with the Contract as a whole. There was no error of law by the Board. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR THE ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR KENT COUNTY AND REMANDING THIS ACTION TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR KENT COUNTY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT, DAVID A. BRAMBLE, INC.