Opinion ID: 2179099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: constitutional speedy trial issues

Text: The constitutional right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by U.S. Const. amend. VI and Neb. Const. art. I, § 11; the constitutional right to a speedy trial and the statutory implementation of that right exist independently of each other. State v. Karch, 263 Neb. 230, 639 N.W.2d 118 (2002); State v. Tucker, 259 Neb. 225, 609 N.W.2d 306 (2000). Determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated requires a balancing test in which the courts must approach each case on an ad hoc basis. This balancing test involves four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. None of these four factors standing alone is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial; rather, the factors are related and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. State v. Tucker, supra . In affirming the district court's determination that Feldhacker was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Court of Appeals determined that the first, second, and fourth factors which make up the balancing test weighed in favor of the State. It concluded that the third factor, i.e., assertion of the right, favored Feldhacker. On further review, Feldhacker argues that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the three factors which the court found to weigh against a constitutional violation. We have examined Feldhacker's arguments and are not persuaded by them. We agree with the analysis of the Court of Appeals as set forth in its opinion. In its petition for further review, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that under the third factor of the test, Feldhacker had asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, an appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis which is not needed to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. State v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668, 668 N.W.2d 448 (2003); State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663, 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003). Resolution of the issue of whether Feldhacker asserted his constitutional right for purposes of the balancing test would serve no purpose in deciding the matter before us, as we agree with the Court of Appeals that the other three factors which compose the test weigh in favor of the State and defeat Feldhacker's claim that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether the Court of Appeals was correct in its conclusion that Feldhacker asserted such right.