Opinion ID: 2615183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This case arises in a limited factual setting.

Text: Partee filed this action alleging, inter alia, breach of contract in that the San Diego Chargers (Chargers) failed to pay his 1976 salary, and violation of the Cartwright Act in that the Chargers' adherence to various NFL rules and practices damaged his business and property interests. The antitrust action concerns five operating rules (contained in the NFL constitution and bylaws and incorporated by reference in the standard player contract) which, Partee alleged, imposed an unreasonable restraint on player transfer. Partee challenged these rules (the draft, option clause, Rozelle rule, tampering rule and one-man rule) as they existed in 1974. These operating rules and practices have since been modified due in large part to several other actions against the NFL brought by players under federal antitrust laws. Three individual plaintiffs have prevailed on the merits of their challenge to these same rules. ( Smith v. Pro-Football (D.D.C. 1976) 420 F. Supp. 738, revd. in part, affd. in part (D.C. Cir.1976) 593 F.2d 1173; Kapp v. National Football League (N.D.Cal. 1974) 390 F. Supp. 73 (9th Cir.1978) 586 F.2d 644, cert. den. 441 U.S. 907 [60 L.Ed.2d 375, 99 S.Ct. 1996]; Mackey v. National Football League (D.Minn. 1975) 407 F. Supp. 1000, affd. in part, revd. in part (8th Cir.1976) 543 F.2d 606, petn. for cert. withdrawn (1977) 434 U.S. 801 [54 L.Ed.2d 59, 98 S.Ct. 28].) In Kapp, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, finding the draft, Rozelle rule, tampering rule and one man rule violative of the Sherman Act. The Smith court found the draft a per se restraint on trade; the circuit court affirmed on the rule of reason theory, but remanded for recomputation of damages. In Mackey, the circuit court affirmed a judgment that the Rozelle rule violated the Sherman Act; thereafter, the NFL's petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court was withdrawn pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement in Alexander v. NFL (D.Minn. 1977) 1977-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 61,730. Alexander was a class action brought on behalf of all NFL players, during the same period that NFL management was attempting to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the NFL Players Association (NFLPA). In March 1977, the NFL and NFLPA agreed to a comprehensive settlement which included the adoption of a new collective bargaining agreement which was made retroactive to the expiration date of the prior agreement in 1974. (This agreement expired in 1982.) The 1977 collective bargaining agreement sought to stimulate player mobility and remedy the lack of competitive bidding by, for example, modifying the Rozelle rule, providing a team with a right of first refusal when a free agent negotiates with another team for his services, and requiring that compensation take the form of draft choices. (See, e.g., Comment, Sport in Court : The Legality of Professional Football's System of Reserve and Compensation (1980) 28 UCLA L.Rev. 252.) Thus, the 1977 agreement substantially modified the rules and practices challenged by Partee and may have obviated most of the problems with unreasonable trade practices. (Of course, we are here concerned only with the NFL's rules and practices in effect in 1974 and need not consider whether the terms of the 1977, or for that matter the 1982, collective bargaining agreement are still so restrictive as to violate antitrust laws, state or federal.) The Alexander settlement also contained a covenant not to sue in antitrust by the class members. Partee, however, is not bound by the settlement agreement as he filed this action before the specified cut-off date and chose not to be a class member. [4] Thus, as earlier noted, he is one of a handful of players who is not precluded from challenging the NFL rules in force in 1974. The present action proceeded to trial in 1979. After a nonjury trial, the court found in favor of Partee on the antitrust and breach of contract causes of action. [5] As to the antitrust cause of action, the trial court found that [t]he facts of this case present no undue burden upon interstate commerce, nor is there any preemption of the field by the Sherman Act or other federal statutes or the Constitution.... Based on the evidence and, alternatively, on the doctrine of collateral estoppel (in reliance on Smith, Kapp, and Mackey ), the court found that all of the challenged rules, with the exception of the option clause, constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Cartwright Act. The court assessed actual damages under the antitrust cause of action in the amount of $34,500 (based on the difference between the World Football League offer and Partee's 1974 salary from the Chargers computed through 1976) and trebled that amount under the Cartwright Act for a total amount of $103,500. Damages under the breach of contract cause of action were assessed in the amount of $30,550. The Chargers do not appeal from the breach of contract judgment as they assert claims of error only as to the antitrust judgment. The Chargers contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to apply the Cartwright Act to the interstate activities of professional football.