Opinion ID: 565275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inadequate preparation time.

Text: 49 Mares' second argument concerning Agent Georges' testimony is that he had inadequate time to prepare for his cross-examination of the witness. It is true that the government only informed the court and defense counsel of its intention to call Agent Georges as an expert witness on the first day of trial, and it is also true that the appellant would have been able to spend more time preparing for his testimony if he had been given more notice. It does not follow, however, that the judge's decision to permit the testimony on such short notice violated Mares' sixth amendment rights. Mares must show that he was prejudiced by the allegedly inadequate preparation time; we find that he has failed to make such a showing. 50 Effective cross-examination of an expert must focus on two main areas, the expert's qualifications and the substance of his testimony. As to Agent Georges' qualifications, the judge instructed the government to make the Agent and his resume available to defense counsel prior to calling him as a witness. As a result, his testimony was put off until the next day of trial. In addition, the appellant took advantage of the opportunity to examine the witness' qualifications in front of the jury during voir dire. And as to the substance of Agent Georges' testimony, Mares was notified in a timely manner that the government intended to call Officer Nottingham as an expert in the field of counter-surveillance. Agent Georges' testimony was largely cumulative, and the appellant has not indicated how additional preparation time would have enhanced his cross-examination of the witness. In addition to these considerations, Mares' failure to request a continuance persuades us that he was not prejudiced by the judge's decision to permit Agent Georges to testify on such short notice. Accordingly, we find no error. 51 D. TRIAL JUDGE'S INTERRUPTION OF CLOSING ARGUMENT 52 Appellant Martinez-Osuna separately argues that the trial judge's interruption of his closing argument denied him a fair trial. We will reverse a conviction on this basis only if the record discloses actual bias on the part of the trial judge or leaves the reviewing court with an abiding impression that the judge's remarks ... projected to the jury an appearance of advocacy or partiality. United States v. Mostella, 802 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir.1986) (citation omitted). 53 The challenged comments took place during the following exchange in the course of counsel's closing argument: 54 Counsel: There has been testimony in this case that these men are Mexican nationals, they do not care about the laws of this country. But they would care deeply about what would happen to their friend. People in the drug business in Mexico they knew were hurt or killed, and they were concerned, and they drove through that lot-- 55 The Court: Just a moment. There is no evidence of that. You talk about the evidence of this case, not suppositions. 56 Counsel: I think it is reasonable to infer-- 57 The Court: It is not reasonable to infer from the evidence what you just said. You're not testifying. 58 We think the judge's comments were entirely appropriate. Far from injecting an unfair bias into the trial, he acted to limit counsel to remarks that could fairly be considered to be supported, at least inferentially, by the evidence. Accordingly, the judge's interruption of counsel's closing argument was not error.