Opinion ID: 1515950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exemption for Private Detectives

Text: The defendant next asserts that, as a licensed private detective, his clandestine surveillance of the plaintiff was exempt from the stalking statute. See RSA 106-F:4, I-b(c) (2001). He argues that, as a matter of law, his conduct was for a legitimate purpose because it was within the scope of his employment as a licensed private detective. RSA 633:3-a, II(a). Unlike the stalking statutes in some other states, New Hampshire's stalking statute does not specifically exempt licensed private detectives. Compare RSA 633:3-a, II(a) (stalking does not include constitutionally protected activity or conduct that was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of making contact with the targeted person), with La.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14.40.2(F) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) (provisions of stalking statute do not apply to licensed private investigators acting during the course and scope of . . . employment and performing . . . duties relative to the conducting of an investigation), S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-1700(G) (West 2005) (stalking statute does not apply to licensed private investigator performing services or an investigation as described in detail in a contract signed by the client and the private investigator) and Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(1) (2003) (stalking injunctions may not be obtained against licensed private investigators acting in their official capacity). Nor is it specifically an affirmative defense to a stalking petition or prosecution brought under New Hampshire law that the defendant is a licensed private detective as it is under stalking statutes in some other states. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229(c) (2005) (it is affirmative defense to stalking prosecution that actor is a licensed private investigator acting within the reasonable scope of his or her duty while conducting surveillance on an official work assignment); N.D. Cent.Code § 12.1-17.07.1(4) (1997) (defense that private investigator was acting within scope of employment); Wash. Rev.Code § 9A46.110(3) (2006) (defense to crime of stalking that defendant is licensed private investigator acting within the capacity of his or her license as provided by statute governing such investigators). Rather, New Hampshire's stalking statute exempts only constitutionally protected conduct and conduct that was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of making contact with the targeted person. RSA 633:3-a, II(a). Pursuant to RSA 633:3-a, IV, the defendant has the burden to show that his conduct was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose. RSA 633:3-a, IV provides: In any complaint, information, or indictment brought for the enforcement of any provision of this statute, it shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption contained herein and the burden of proof of any exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption shall be upon the defendant. That the defendant's conduct was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose is an exception, excuse, proviso, or exemption upon which the defendant has the burden of proof. Cf. State v. Small, 150 N.H. 457, 461-62, 843 A.2d 932 (2004) (assuming without deciding that legitimate purpose is defense to offense of stalking upon which defendant has burden of proof). The defendant contends that he met this burden of proof by testifying that he secretly followed the plaintiff in his capacity as a licensed private detective. We disagree. As we held in Porelle, 149 N.H. at 425, 822 A.2d 562, conduct that is necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose refers to conduct that is accordant with law. To prove that the conduct in which he was engaged was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose, the defendant was required to show that the conduct was lawful, irrespective of the stalking statute. See Nastal v. Henderson & Associates Invest., 471 Mich. 712, 691 N.W.2d 1, 7 (2005). To meet this burden, the defendant had to do more than merely testify that he was a licensed private detective who was hired to follow the plaintiff. He also had to show that the purpose for which he was hired was itself lawful. See id. at 7-8. For instance, had he been hired to follow the plaintiff so that a third party could kill her, the purpose for which he was hired was not lawful. See RSA 106-F:9 (Supp. 2005) (investigators must file surety bond that is so conditioned that the person bonded shall conduct his or her business in a lawful and honest manner without committing, compounding, aiding or abetting the commission of any criminal offense); see also Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 154-55, 816 A.2d 1001 (2003) (ruling that private investigators have duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing third party's personal information to client, in part, because of foreseeable risk that such information could be used by stalkers to harm victim). Similarly, had he been hired to follow the plaintiff for the purpose of causing her to fear for her own personal safety, that purpose also would be unlawful. We do not construe RSA 633:3-a, II(a) as authorizing stalking by proxy. In this case, the defendant refused to testify as to why he was hired. Accordingly, by his own election, he failed to demonstrate that the purpose for which he was hired was lawful. Thus, the trial court did not err when it ruled that the defendant's conduct was not for a legitimate purpose merely because he engaged in it in his capacity as a licensed private detective.