Opinion ID: 772486
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Confrontation Clause and the Waiver-By-Misconduct Doctrine

Text: 43 We begin with a brief overview of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the evolution of the waiver-by-misconduct doctrine. The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The right enjoyed by a criminal defendant to confront the witnesses against him is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965), and is designed to secure for the defendant the opportunity of cross examination. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678 ([T]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross examination. (quotation marks omitted)); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) ([A] primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is the right of cross examination.); United States v. Laljie, 184 F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 1999). 44 Although the confrontation right is of constitutional dimension, it is not absolute, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847-48 (1990) ([W]e have repeatedly held that the Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the defendant's inability to confront the declarant at trial.), and may be waived by a defendant through a knowing and intentional relinquishment. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1996); cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (There is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, and for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For example, a defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives his rights under the Confrontation Clause. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). The Supreme Court has similarly held that a defendant's intentional misconduct can constitute a waiver of his rights under the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (defendant waives his confrontation rights and his right to be present at his trial if he engages in disruptive and disrespectful behavior requiring his removal from the courtroom); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (No doubt the privilege [to confront one's accusers and cross examine them] may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct.), overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); see also Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272 (collecting cases). These cases recognize that although the right of confrontation is an essential trial right, it may be waived by the defendant's misconduct. 45 Consistent with that principle, this Court, as well as a majority of our sister circuits, have also applied the waiver-by-misconduct rule in cases where the defendant has wrongfully procured the witnesses' silence through threats, actual violence or murder. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 814-15 (10th Cir. 2000) (murder); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (murder); United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (murder); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1997) (murder); Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1278-79 (murder); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir. 1994) (murder); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1992) (written and verbal threats); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir. 1982) (witness was under the control of the defendants who had procured her refusal to testify); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-60 (8th Cir. 1976) (threats). Recognizing that [s]imple equity and common sense justifies a defendant's forfeiture of his confrontation rights under circumstances where he wrongfully procures the witnesses' absence, the D.C. Circuit held: 46 It is hard to imagine a form of misconduct more extreme than the murder of a potential witness. Simple equity supports a forfeiture principle, as does a common sense attention to the need for fit incentives. The defendant who has removed an adverse witness is in a weak position to complain about losing the chance to cross examine him. And where a defendant has silenced a witness through the use of threats, violence or murder, admission of the victim's prior statements at least partially offsets the perpetrator's rewards for his misconduct. We have no hesitation in finding, in league with all circuits to have considered the matter, that a defendant who wrongfully procures the absence of a witness or potential witness may not assert confrontation rights as to that witness. 47 White, 116 F.3d at 911. Relying on the maxim that the law [will not] allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong, Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 272 (quoting Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 458 (1912)), in Mastrangelo and cases following, we have reaffirmed the principle that, where a defendant wrongfully procures the silence of a witness or potential witness, he will be deemed to have waived his sixth amendment rights and, a fortiori, his hearsay objection to the admission of the declarant's statements. Id. at 272; see also Miller, 116 F.3d at 668; Thai, 29 F.3d at 814; Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47; accord White, 116 F.3d at 912; Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1282. We extended that principle to situations where there was [no] ongoing proceeding in which the declarant was scheduled to testify. Miller, 116 F.3d at 668; see also Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1279-80. The application of Mastrangelo under these circumstances is both logical and fair since a contrary rule would serve as a prod to the unscrupulous to accelerate the timetable and murder suspected snitches sooner rather than later. Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1280. 48