Opinion ID: 173109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State of New Mexico

Text: Mr. Jackson’s allegations against the State are too general and conclusory to address. And, allegations against particular State officials are wholly lacking except for references to the public defenders, the district attorney, and judges. Those allegations are addressed separately in Mr. Jackson’s other actions, except for judges, and they have absolute immunity for the acts alleged—all of which were done in their judicial capacity. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). In any event, the State cannot be sued under § 1983 for two separate reasons. First, § 1983 “does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity.” Will, 491 U.S. at 66. And, despite Mr. Jackson’s arguments to the contrary, the State of New Mexico has not waived its immunity in civil rights suits such as this. Second, § 1983 applies only to “persons” and, when sued solely for money damages, as in this case, “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991). Thus, for the foregoing reasons and those set out in the Magistrate Judge’s Mem. Op., dated August 11, 2009, and the District Court’s Order Dismissing Case, dated September 2, 2009, this suit against the State must be dismissed under -10- 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. B. The County of Bernalillo and City of Albuquerque Cities and counties are not immune from suit in federal court under § 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Will, 491 U.S. at 65 n.7 (“[A] municipality is a person under § 1983. . . .”). But, we agree with the district court that Mr. Jackson has failed to make any allegations of wrongdoing with respect to any named or otherwise identified person, with the exception of Albuquerque police officer Keith Sandy (who is not a named party defendant), the district attorney, the public defender and the judge who imposed a bond (also not a named party defendant), all of whom we have discussed above. And, he has failed to identify any County or City policy, custom or practice, or any policymaker, connected to an alleged violation of his rights under the Federal Constitution. Thus, as to those entities, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Nevertheless, we turn briefly to Mr. Jackson’s constitutional tort claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and related claims. In this circuit, the state tort law of false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution provides a starting point for analyzing a corresponding claim under § 1983. See Erikson v. Pawnee County Bd. of County Com’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, -11- 1154 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing malicious prosecution); Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing false arrest and false imprisonment). In New Mexico an essential element of each of those torts is a lack of probable cause. See State v. Johnson, 930 P.2d 1148, 1153 (N.M.1996); Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1996) (lack of probable cause is an essential element of malicious prosecution in New Mexico). See also Nielander, 582 F.3d at 1164 (“To establish a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant initiated or continued a proceeding against him without probable cause.”). Mr. Jackson acknowledges this requirement. Appellant’s Op. Br. at 6, ¶3.A. Mr. Jackson recites that Officer Sandy issued him a citation for having an open container of an alcoholic beverage, then arrested him when he twice refused to sign the citation, although he agreed at the point of arrest. Id. at 5, ¶2. Significantly, Mr. Jackson does not deny that he indeed had an open container of an alcoholic beverage in his vehicle or that the officer lawfully cited him for it. Although Mr. Jackson does not furnish any details regarding the location of this incident, we note that it is unlawful in New Mexico to have an open can, bottle or other receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage in one’s vehicle while on the public highway. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-138 (B), (C). The offense is classified as a Penalty Assessment Misdemeanor for the first offense, carrying a penalty assessment of $25.00. Id. § 66-8-116. -12- As indicated, Mr. Jackson does not deny that he violated the open container law. His argument is that he was not subject to arrest for refusing to sign the citation because he agreed at the point of arrest to sign it. Thus, he contends, his arrest was unlawful and led to a myriad of other woes (the setting of a bond, incarceration and so forth). Likewise, Mr. Jackson alleges that Officer Sandy arrested him for battery, an offense under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-4, but does not deny that the elements of that statute (or the related statute concerning assault, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3- 1—to which some reference appears in these pleadings) were met so as to provide Officer Sandy probable cause to arrest. First of all, Mr. Jackson is wrong about Officer Sandy’s right to arrest him along with issuing a citation for violating the open container law. New Mexico law, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1-6(A), appears to give the officer discretion to arrest. Regardless, the Supreme Court has said that “when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, the balancing of public and private interests is not in doubt. The arrest is constitutionally reasonable.” Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604 (2008); Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”). -13- While there may exist a line somewhere beyond which something is so minor that even the rule of the Moore and Atwater cases does not apply, we decline to draw it in a situation where a driver is on the road with an open container of alcohol available in his vehicle. The arrest for this admitted offense was clearly supported by probable cause (a statutory offense in the officer’s presence), and was, therefore, reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. The same conclusion applies to the arrest of Mr. Jackson for battery. And, since the arrests were supported by probable cause, the ensuing court proceedings did not violate the Constitution. We have considered all of Mr. Jackson’s arguments. Most relate to his lawful arrest and detention based on probable cause and fail as a result. His Eighth Amendment claims are wholly conclusory and name no individuals. Thus, they fail as well, along with other conclusory allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). For the reasons stated above and those stated in the Magistrate Judge and District Court’s orders referred to above, we dismiss the complaint against the County of Bernalillo and City of Albuquerque under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. -14-