Opinion ID: 3012838
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Debra Vlanich

Text: Ms. Vlanich contends that several errors were made with respect to her proffered defense of entrapment. The defense theory was that Ms. Vlanich was a lonely widow, unusually vulnerable to male blandishments, and was led astray by the attentions of Trooper Cornetta who allegedly “wined and dined” her on various occasions. Because it was disclosed before trial that Ms. Vlanich would be claiming entrapment, the Government was allowed, during its case in chief, to present evidence of her earlier 7 involvement in illegal gambling activities. She and her late husband had long operated a bar-restaurant with illegal video-poker machines. At trial, in support of her entrapment theory, Ms. Vlanich sought to present the testimony of mental-health experts to the effect that, as a result of her widowhood and lonely existence, Ms. Vlanich was unusually susceptible to male attention in social situations. The district judge ruled that the proffered psychiatric evidence was inadmissible under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §17(a) because it did not constitute evidence that the “defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of [her] acts”. As noted by this court in United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d, 889, 896 (3d Cir. 1987) Section 17(a) does not bar all evidence of mental disease or defect other than that applicable to an insanity defense, but the use of such evidence is strictly limited to that which “negates specific intent or any other mens rea, which are elements of the offense.” Id. at 890. It is clear that the proffered expert testimony did not purport to show that Ms. Vlanich was legally insane or incapable of forming the intent to commit the crime charged; the real issue is whether Section 17(a) renders such evidence inadmissible to show that Ms. Vlanich was unusually susceptible to inducement. A related issue is whether, regardless of Section 17(a), the proffered evidence in this case could properly have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 704 because of its minimal probative value and the likelihood of confusing the jury because of the close similarity to a 8 proscribed “diminished capacity” defense. After excluding the proffered expert testimony, the district judge ultimately ruled that, as a matter of law, the evidence did not support an entrapment defense on behalf of Ms. Vlanich. On appeal, Ms. Vlanich contends (1) it was error to admit evidence of previous criminal involvement, (2) it was error to exclude the proffered expert testimony, and (3) it was error to refuse an entrapment charge. If the evidence of Ms. Vlanich’s previous criminal activity would have been inadmissible except to refute her defense of entrapment, a contention that this evidence should not have been received unless entrapment issues were to be submitted to the jury might well have at least arguable merit. To permit the Government to introduce damaging evidence during its case in chief for the sole purpose of refuting a non-issue seems indeed likely to impair the fundamental fairness of the trial. In the present case, however, there was no error. Evidence of Ms. Vlanich’s earlier involvement in the video-poker industry consisted of her own statements, recorded by the undercover operatives during the formation and conduct of the conspiracy. Ms. Vlanich was enthusiastic about the prospects of success of the Finleyville Coffee Shop, and encouraged Cornetta and Hansen to proceed with Mr. Amati’s proposals because she and her late husband had made so much money in their earlier venture. Thus, the evidence of her previous criminality was clearly admissible, not only because it demonstrated her own familiarity with the “ins and outs” of video-poker gambling (thus, 9 her “knowledge” under Rule 704) but also because it bore directly upon the formation of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. With respect to the admissibility of the expert testimony, we find it unnecessary to consider whether the proffered testimony was admissible in support of an entrapment defense, because the trial court properly ruled that, as a matter of law, an entrapment defense was not available to Ms. Vlanich, and this ruling was not affected by exclusion of the proffered expert testimony. The undisputed facts establish that no Government agent induced Ms. Vlanich to participate in the conspiracy. She was introduced to the operation by her paramour, Mr. Amati, and acted at his request and pursuant to his instructions at all times. Thus, unless Mr. Amati himself was entrapped -- an issue which will be addressed below -- there is simply no basis for charging the Government with having induced M s. Vlanich to participate. In addition, of course, the evidence showed conclusively that Ms. Vlanich was predisposed to engage in video-poker activities. Absent proof that the Government induced her criminal behavior, and that she was not predisposed to commit the crime, Ms. Vlanich did not have a defense of entrapment. United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42; United States v. Fedroff, 874 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1989).