Opinion ID: 2116215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: expert witness evidence

Text: Next, Larsen contends that the trial court erred in not granting a continuance or excluding the expert witness testimony of Scalora. Larsen asserts that the evidence should have been excluded on the grounds that the State failed to comply with Neb.Rev. Stat. § 29-2203 (Reissue 1995) and the Douglas County District Court rule on pretrial motions, Fourth Jud. Dist. R. of Proc. 4-2(B) (rev.1995). Larsen argues that his counsel was not given notice, as required by § 29-2203 and rule 4-2(B), prior to the entry of an ex parte order by the district court requiring Larsen to be transferred to the Lincoln Regional Center for an evaluation by Scalora. Section 29-2203 provides that if a criminal defendant intends to plead not guilty by reason of insanity, he or she may not offer evidence for the purpose of establishing his or her insanity unless notice of intention to rely upon the insanity defense is provided to the State and filed with the court no later than 60 days prior to trial. Section 29-2203 further provides, in pertinent part: Upon the filing of the notice the court, on motion of the state, may order the defendant to be examined at a time and place designated in the order, by one or more qualified experts, appointed by the court, to inquire into the sanity or insanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.... The presence of counsel at the examination shall be within the discretion of the court. The results of such examination shall be sent to the court and to the prosecuting attorney.... In the interest of justice and good cause shown the court may waive the requirements provided in this section. Although rule 4-2(B) was not made a part of the record on appeal, we note that the Douglas County District Court rules are on file with this court, and thus, we will take judicial notice of rule 4-2(B). This rule provides, in relevant part, that [u]nless otherwise ordered by the court, all pretrial ... motions ... which require a hearing shall be filed in the case prior to the scheduled hearing. Rule 4-2(B) further provides that [t]imely notice of said hearing shall be personally delivered or mailed to the opposing party. On May 23, 1996, Larsen filed his notice of intention to rely upon the insanity defense, and on June 14, Larsen provided the State with copies of Gutnik's psychiatric evaluation. Along with the evaluation, Larsen's attorney sent a letter requesting that in the event the State was intending to hire an expert witness, it should notify him prior to such examination, as he wanted to be present at Larsen's psychiatric examination. However, without giving notice to Larsen's attorney, the State, pursuant to an oral motion, obtained an ex parte order from the district court requiring Larsen to be sent to the Lincoln Regional Center for an evaluation by Scalora. It is implicit in § 29-2203 that defense counsel be notified that the defendant is to be examined and be given an opportunity to be heard. Otherwise, defense counsel would be unable to make any argument to the court as to why he or she should be present at the examination, rendering the court's discretion as to whether defense counsel should be present unguided. Furthermore, rule 4-2(B) explicitly requires that a motion be filed when a hearing is required. Thus, the district court erred in sustaining the prosecution's ex parte oral motion. However, we conclude that the district court did not err in overruling Larsen's motion to exclude the expert witness evidence on the basis that the State did not comply with § 29-2203 and rule 4-2(B). As the subsequent discussion illustrates, the failure to comply was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as Larsen's defense counsel was given adequate opportunities to depose Scalora and received a copy of Scalora's report as soon as the State received the report. Nevertheless, on July 25, 1996, at the same hearing in which the court denied Larsen's motion to exclude expert evidence, Larsen's attorney also requested a continuance so that he could have sufficient time to review Scalora's report prior to the trial that was scheduled to commence on July 29. During the hearing, the State noted that it probably would not receive a written report from Scalora until July 26, but that on July 23 it offered Larsen's counsel an opportunity to depose Scalora. Following the hearing, the trial court overruled Larsen's motion for a continuance. However, the trial court afforded Larsen's counsel an opportunity to depose Scalora on either July 26 or July 27. The trial court further entered an order requiring that all medical records and reports generated by the Lincoln Regional Center regarding Larsen's examination, which concluded on July 25, be furnished to the State by July 26. On July 26, 1996, the State faxed certain medical records from the Lincoln Regional Center to Larsen's counsel; however, Scalora's report was not among those documents, as it had not yet been generated. Therefore, Larsen renewed his motions to exclude Scalora's testimony and, in the alternative, for a continuance. The trial court overruled Larsen's renewed motions, but directed the State either to initiate a joint telephone call to Scalora so that both parties' counsel could talk to Scalora and find out what they needed to know in preparation for trial or to have Scalora come to Douglas County the night before he was to testify so that both parties' counsel could depose him. In accordance with the court's directive, both parties' counsel on July 29 had a 40-minute conversation with Scalora. Despite the fact that Larsen's counsel had a lengthy conversation with Scalora, Larsen again renewed his motions on July 29 to exclude Scalora's testimony and for a continuance. In overruling Larsen's renewed motions, the trial court determined that Larsen would not suffer any prejudice, because both parties' counsel were laboring under the same disadvantage, as neither counsel had yet received a physical copy of Scalora's report. Nonetheless, the trial court afforded Larsen's counsel another opportunity to depose Scalora prior to Scalora's testifying at trial. On July 30, 1996, Scalora's report was faxed to the State, and on that same day, the State photocopied and delivered the report to Larsen's counsel. By this time, the trial had already commenced. Scalora testified at trial on August 2. After the jury returned its verdict, Larsen filed a motion for new trial, contending, inter alia, that he suffered prejudice from the admission of Scalora's testimony into evidence. In support of his motion, Larsen claimed that he attempted to employ two psychologists from the area to review Scalora's report, but that he was unsuccessful, as both psychologists avowed in affidavits that they did not have time to review Larsen's psychological test results that were included within Scalora's report during the week of July 29, 1996. The district court overruled Larsen's motion for new trial. In the instant case, since the State made Scalora's report available to Larsen as soon as the State received it, there is certainly no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, the sole issue we must determine on appeal is whether Larsen was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to exclude the expert witness evidence, to grant a continuance, or to grant a new trial when Larsen did not receive Scalora's report until the trial had already commenced. The decisions whether to exclude expert witness testimony and to grant a continuance in a criminal case are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Buechler, 253 Neb. 727, 572 N.W.2d 65 (1998) (expert witness); State v. Turner, 252 Neb. 620, 564 N.W.2d 231 (1997) (continuance); State v. Kula, 252 Neb. 471, 562 N.W.2d 717 (1997) (continuance); State v. Thieszen, 252 Neb. 208, 560 N.W.2d 800 (1997) (expert witness). In addition, in a criminal case, a motion for new trial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and unless an abuse of discretion is shown, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed. State v. Jacob, 253 Neb. 950, 574 N.W.2d 117 (1998); State v. Kula, supra . Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1912 (Reissue 1995) provides the procedure for discovery in criminal cases. State v. Null, 247 Neb. 192, 526 N.W.2d 220 (1995). Under § 29-1912, whether a prosecutor's late disclosure of evidence results in prejudice depends on whether the information sought is material to the preparation of the defense, meaning that there is a strong indication that such information will play an important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding preparation of witnesses, corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or rebuttal. See State v. Kula, supra . In the instant case, Larsen claims that he was unsuccessful in employing a psychologist to review Scalora's report during the week of July 29, 1996. However, Larsen's claim is not well founded, since Gutnik, Larsen's own expert witness at trial, testified on direct examination that he reviewed the reports generated by the Lincoln Regional Center. Therefore, the evidence supports the conclusion that Gutnik was available during the week of July 29 to assist Larsen in analyzing any reports, including Scalora's, generated by the Lincoln Regional Center. Moreover, while recognizing that the delay in receiving Scalora's report until the trial had commenced posed a heavy burden on Larsen's counsel, we do not conclude that such delay rose to the level of prejudicial error. Any prejudice that Larsen may have suffered as a result of the delay was cured by the fact that the State and the trial court made every opportunity available to Larsen to depose Scalora prior to the commencement of trial. Indeed, on July 23 and July 25, 1996, the State and the trial court afforded Larsen opportunities to depose Scalora. In addition, on July 29, the trial court directed the State either to initiate a joint telephone call to Scalora or to have Scalora come to Douglas County the night before he was to testify so that both parties' counsel could depose him. The record shows that on July 29, Larsen's counsel did have a 40-minute conversation with Scalora. We determine that since Larsen was given ample opportunity to depose Scalora prior to Scalora's testifying at trial on August 2 and did, in fact, have a 40-minute conversation with Scalora, Larsen was not prejudiced by the late disclosure of Scalora's report. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to overrule Larsen's motion for exclusion of Scalora's testimony, motion for a continuance, or motion for new trial.