Opinion ID: 2508525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voir Dire on Multiple Murder

Text: Prior to the commencement of voir dire, defense counsel submitted a proposed jury questionnaire that contained the following question: Do you feel you would automatically vote for death instead of life imprisonment with no parole if you found the defendant guilty of two or more murders? The prosecution objected that the subject areas should be covered by the Court in its death qualification voir dire. Defense counsel stated that he appreciated that the Court would be doing the questioning in all aspects on [death qualification voir dire], but I think the Court will need something to get started on to get an idea of ... what questions to ask that would intelligently bring out prospective jurors' views on the death penalty. The question was not included in the jury questionnaire. Moreover, the judge's questions to prospective jurors did not ask this or a similar question. [6] Defendant claims error for refusing his request to inquire into the ability of prospective jurors to vote for life imprisonment without parole in the case of multiple murder convictions. More specifically, he contends reversal of the penalty phase judgment is compelled by our holding in People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 718-723, 122 Cal. Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332 ( Cash ). He further claims that these errors violated his rights to equal protection, due process, a fair jury trial and protection against cruel and unusual punishment found in the United States and California constitutions. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th, & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 17.) We conclude there was no error. In Cash the defense, anticipating that the prosecution would introduce into aggravation the defendant's murder of his elderly grandparents at age 17, attempted to ask a prospective juror during voir dire whether there were `any particular crimes' which would have caused the juror `automatically to vote for the death penalty.' ( Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 719, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) The trial court ruled the question improper, and also denied a subsequent motion to ask prospective jurors whether there were any aggravating circumstances that would cause them to automatically vote for the death penalty. ( Ibid. ) We held the trial court erred. We began our analysis with an articulation of the basic principles of voir dire in capital cases: Prospective jurors may be excused for cause when their views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) `The real question is `whether the jurors views about capital punishment would prevent or impair the jurors ability to return a verdict of death in the case before the juror. '' [Citations.] Because the qualification standard operates in the same manner whether a prospective jurors views are for or against the death penalty ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492), it is equally true that the `real question' is whether the juror's views about capital punishment would prevent or impair the juror's ability to return a verdict of life without parole in the case before the juror. ( Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 719-720, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) We therefore found error in the trial court's refusal of the defense's proposed voir dire: [T]he trial court's ruling prohibited defendant's trial attorney from inquiring during voir dire whether prospective jurors would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant had previously committed another murder. Because in this case defendant's guilt of a prior murder (specifically, the prior murders of his grandparents) was a general fact or circumstance that was present in the case and that could cause some jurors invariably to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the strength of the mitigating circumstances, the defense should have been permitted to probe the prospective juror's attitudes as to that fact or circumstance. In prohibiting voir dire on prior murder, a fact likely to be of great significance to prospective jurors, the trial court erred. ( Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 721, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) Of particular importance for the present case was Cash's discussion of People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 745-746, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2. In Medina, on which the Attorney General particularly relies, the trial court initially declined to permit voir dire on whether prospective jurors could vote for life imprisonment if the defendant had committed multiple murders, but later the trial court changed its ruling and allowed such questioning. Despite dictum expressing doubt that the court's initial ruling was incorrect, we held that the initial ruling did not prejudice the defendant because `after the trial court clarified its position with respect to the multiple murder question, defendant failed to ask to reexamine any juror on this topic.' ( People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 746, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Here, by contrast, the trial court never altered its erroneous ruling, and defendant had no opportunity to reexamine any juror with respect to the prior murder question. ( Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 722, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) As our discussion of Medina in Cash suggests, a trial court's categorical prohibition of an inquiry into whether a prospective juror could vote for life without parole for a defendant convicted of multiple murder would be error. Multiple murder falls into the category of aggravating or mitigating circumstances likely to be of great significance to prospective jurors. ( Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 721, 122 Cal. Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) The Attorney General does not dispute this point. [7] Rather, the Attorney General argues that defendant was not denied the opportunity to conduct voir dire on the subject of multiple murder. We agree. Although the trial court did not include the sought-after question on multiple murder in the jury questionnaire, it never suggested that defense counsel could not raise the issue in voir dire. The trial court never ruled that the question was inappropriate, and the prosecutor did not object to the question itself, but only opined that the question was probably better asked by the court. To be sure, as discussed more fully in the next part of this opinion, the trial court conducted voir dire by itself and for the most part did not allow counsel to directly question prospective jurors. But the trial court made clear that it would permit on voir dire supplemental questions that I would ask if you ask me to ask. Defense counsel never suggested to the court that it voir dire on the subject of multiple murder. The court presented the questions he planned to ask prospective jurors regarding the death penalty and defense counsel stated that he had no legal objections. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court's invitation to ask supplemental questions was clearly for the limited purpose of allowing the attorneys to suggest clarifying questions with respect to certain individual jurors, not an invitation for counsel to suggest additional general questions to be directed to the full jury panel. But the record belies that contention. The trial court incorporated into its general voir dire, for example, a question suggested by the prosecution informing prospective jurors that the prosecution would be calling a witness who had entered into a plea bargain and inquiring whether they believed plea bargaining to be improper. Whether or not the trial court would have approved an additional general question on voir dire asking about juror's attitudes toward multiple murderers is unclear. What is clear is that defendant did not request such a question. Nor does he contend the trial court had a sua sponte duty to ask the question on voir dire merely because it was informed that defense counsel desired such a question be included in the questionnaire. Thus, the question is not, as defendant contends, whether his claim of Cash error was properly preserved, but rather whether any error was committed. Although asking the multiple-murder question in the jury questionnaire would not have been improper, refusal to include the question was not error so long as there was an opportunity to ask the question during voir dire. Because defendant did not attempt to have the trial court conduct a multiple murder inquiry during voir dire, and the trial court was given no opportunity to rule on the propriety of that inquiry, we conclude defendant cannot claim error. (See Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 722, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332; People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 746, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.)