Opinion ID: 3052350
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “aiding and abetting” a “brings to” offense

Text: AFTER LOPEZ Under the aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, a person who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” the commission of an offense against the United States is “punishable as a principal.” In this circuit, the elements necessary to convict an individual under an aiding and abetting theory are (1) that the accused had the specific intent to facilitate the commission of a crime by another, (2) that the accused had the requisite intent of the underlying substantive offense, (3) that the accused assisted or participated in the commission of the underlying substantive offense, and (4) that someone committed the underlying substantive offense. United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 1988). We elaborated on the meaning of aiding and abetting in Lopez: In United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1980), we wrote that “[c]onviction as an aider and abettor requires proof the defendant willingly associated himself with the venture and participated therein as something he wished to bring about.” Id. at 1174. Elsewhere, we have stated that “[a]n abettor UNITED STATES v. SINGH 8817 is one ‘who, with mens rea . . . commands, counsels or otherwise encourages the perpetrator to commit the crime.’ ” United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 645 (2d ed. 1969)); see also Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 5.1 (2005) (instructing that, to obtain a conviction for aiding and abetting, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, inter alia, the defendant “knowingly and intentionally aided, counseled, commanded, induced or procured [the principal] to commit each element” of the crime charged). Lopez, 484 F.3d at 1199 (emphasis added). Against this backdrop, we considered the specific evidence tying Lopez to the smuggling operation. After completion of the “brings to” offense, Lopez twice spoke to a person who might have been the transporter. This fact alone, however, did not provide sufficient evidence of aiding and abetting because it could not establish that the defendant “knowingly and intentionally commanded, counseled, or encouraged the initial transporter to commit the ‘brings to’ offense.” Id. at 1200. Similarly, merely showing that Lopez was associated with someone who was involved with a smuggling operation in some unknown way or that she was associated with the transportation of the aliens within the United States after the fact of smuggling was insufficient to show that she had the specific intent to bring about the “brings to” offense or that she knowingly and intentionally commanded, counseled, or encouraged the initial transporter to commit the “brings to” offense. Id. at 1201. We noted that a “brings to” conviction would be “particularly inappropriate” in Lopez because the district court found that “the defendant ‘wasn’t obviously the first choice’—‘someone else was supposed to pick [the aliens] up,’ ” and Lopez was contacted “only after the aliens were already in the country and the plan for the first person to pick them up had been frustrated.” Id. at 1200. These factors stand 8818 UNITED STATES v. SINGH in stark contrast to Singh’s involvement in the smuggling venture. [1] Although Lopez clarified that a defendant who does not physically transport aliens across the border may be held criminally liable for aiding and abetting a “brings to” offense, id. at 1199, Lopez did not call for us to elaborate what actions may constitute aiding and abetting a “brings to” offense. We did, however, signal the issue now before us in this case: [W]e do not decide that if a smuggling operation “relies on” a secondary, state-side transporter—in the sense that the secondary transporter’s agreement to participate induces or encourages the commission of the initial, extraterritorial “brings to” offense and the secondary transporter intended to so induce or encourage the commission of the crime—aiding and abetting liability will never lie. Those are not the facts of this case and we do not consider that ques- tion here. Id. at 1201 n.19. [2] Because Singh’s act of transporting an alien commenced only after the “brings to” offense was completed, as in Lopez, his transportation of Patel, standing alone, cannot sustain his conviction on Count 10. However, in this case, there is much more. We conclude—on the basis of additional evidence that Singh agreed ahead of time not only to assist with secondary state-side transport, but also to return to Vancouver after delivering Patel to New York—that the district court did not plainly err in finding that sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that Singh associated himself with the venture and participated in it as in something he wished to bring about. Zemek, 634 F.2d at 1174. We are especially reluctant to find plain error when this court has expressly left open the question of aiding and abetUNITED STATES v. SINGH 8819 ting liability for participating in secondary state-side transport, without more. Lopez, 484 F.3d at 1201 n.19. Indeed, because Singh’s involvement does encompass more, that question remains unresolved. In concluding that the district court did not plainly err by placing Singh into the category of aiders and abettors that Lopez left undefined, we have in mind Lopez’s guidance regarding the contours of the offense: Any complete specification of the category of aiders and abettors would have to take into account, and attempt to avoid redundancy with, the separate offense Congress created for one who “encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.” Id. at 1199 n.16 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)).4 Our case law is sparse with respect to the “encourages or induces” offense. In our one published decision on this point, the defendant was charged under both § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (encourages and induces) and § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) (brings to), and the court found the evidence was sufficient to sustain both charges. See United States v. Yoshida, 303 F.3d 1145, 114952 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the evidence showing that the Yoshida escorted aliens onto a plane to the United States provided sufficient evidence not only of a “brings to” offense, but also of an “encourages or induces” offense).5 The “encourages or induces” offense, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), 4 None of the individuals charged in the twenty-three count indictment, including Singh, were charged with violating § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). 5 In Yoshida, the defendant was the last in a series of escorts who accompanied several aliens on their journey from the Peoples Republic of China to the United States in three stages, with Yoshida accompanying them on the final leg of the trip from Japan to Los Angeles. Id. at 1148. 8820 UNITED STATES v. SINGH criminalizes the act of encouraging the alien herself to illegally enter or reside in the United States, whereas aiding and abetting the principal in a “bringing to” offense, § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), criminalizes the act of aiding, counseling, inducing or encouraging not the alien but the principal, the person or venture who is illegally bringing the alien to the United States. Here, Singh aided and abetted the principals in the human smuggling conspiracy, not Patel herself, in committing the “brings to” offense that brought Patel into the United States.