Opinion ID: 1999216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Exclusivity Clause and Waiver of Common-Law Rights

Text: It has not been established that plaintiff suffered an injury, as that term is defined in the act, to trigger the act's exclusivity provision. See Hawkes v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 764 A.2d 258, 261-62, 265 (Me.2001) (holding that the tort claims of an employee who released any and all claims under Maine's workers' compensation act were not barred, in part because the personal injury claims    did not arise in the course of his employment, thus rendering the immunity and exclusivity provisions inapplicable). The exclusivity provision of the act provides that the remedy for an injury    shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to that injury now existing, either at common law or otherwise   . G.L. 1956 § 28-29-20 (emphasis added). However, injury is a defined term under the statute, which limits it to a personal injury to an employee arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, connected and referable to the employment. Section 28-29-2(7)(i). Whether plaintiff's broken femur was an injury as defined by the act was the very point of contention between the parties that led to their eventual settlement and the execution of the release. Further, after they successfully negotiated a resolution to the dispute, the parties asked the court to approve their proposed settlement agreement, and the court specifically found as a fact in the WCC decree that the claimed injury    did not occur in the course of [plaintiff's] employment    connected therewith and referable thereto. (Emphasis added.) Although the parties did not quibble about the fact that plaintiff fell and fractured her femur, it was established that this injury did not occur during the course of her employment. Indeed, they agreed that the injury did not so occur. If the exclusivity provision contained in § 28-29-20 is construed to bar all claims of an employee against an employer after a settlement of a disputed claim under § 28-33-25.1, then the final sentence of § 28-33-25.1, which gives an employer the right to a duly executed release of all liability, would be rendered a nullity. In other words, the General Assembly's inclusion of language entitling the employer to such a release after payment in accordance with a settlement under § 28-33-25.1 would be completely unnecessary if the exclusivity provision were interpreted to serve as an automatic bar to any further employer liability in every case in which there was a settlement of a disputed claim. In light of the statutory language, and in consideration of the canon of statutory interpretation requiring that meaning be given to every sentence, I cannot accept such a result. [8] See Local 400, International Federation of Technical and Professional Engineers, 747 A.2d at 1005. I dissent as well from the majority's holding that Kulawas's premises-liability claim also is barred because she waived her common-law rights when she did not reserve these rights under § 28-29-17 and because she received a workers' compensation remedy under § 28-33-25.1. First, as the majority notes, a payment approved by a judge of the WCC, in accordance with § 28-33-25.1, `shall not be deemed to be the payment of workers' compensation benefits, but shall be considered a compromise payment of a disputed claim.' (Emphases added.) This Court has said that if an employee has not properly reserved his or her common-law rights under the act, he or she is barred from bringing a tort action against his or her employer if workers' compensation benefits are appropriate. Cianci v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 659 A.2d 662, 668 (R.I.1995) (holding that the act immunizes the insurer as well as the employer) (emphasis omitted). In my view, an employee who has not reserved his or her common-law rights is prohibited from bringing a tort action only if workers' compensation benefits were appropriate, which is not the case here. [9] Again, for workers' compensation benefits to be appropriate, there must be an injury that falls within the definition under the act. Also, in my opinion, construing § 28-29-17 to apply in every instance in which there is a settlement and accompanying remedy received under § 28-33-25.1 further would render the final sentence of that section entitling the employer to a release mere surplusage. Local 400, International Federation of Technical and Professional Engineers, 747 A.2d at 1005.