Opinion ID: 155998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reduction of SRS' Share According to Injured Party's Negligence

Text: 34 In the hearing on Copeland's Motion to Apportion Proceeds, the district court, as well as SRS, appeared to agree with Copeland that § 39-719a(c) was applicable to Copeland's settlement recovery and that Copeland's own negligence would proportionately reduce SRS' recovery. The district court thus allowed the parties to submit evidence of fault, and Copeland submitted evidence that she was under the influence of alcohol and was speeding at the time of the accident. SRS did not challenge Copeland's evidence either by presenting evidence that Copeland was not at fault or by presenting evidence that another party was responsible for the accident. In its April 12 order, however, the district court refused to attribute a percentage of fault to Copeland and necessarily refused to reduce SRS' recovery under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719a(c). Because the only evidence before the district court indicated Copeland's fault and because that evidence was not challenged, Copeland contends the district court was required to find that Copeland's negligence was 100% and thus was required to reduce SRS' subrogation right by 100%. 35 The reduction of SRS' recovery under § 39-719a(c) expressly occurs only [i]n the event of a recovery pursuant to K.S.A. 60-258a. Id. § 39-719a(c). Copeland's settlement with Toyota, however, did not constitute a recovery pursuant to § 60-258a, and thus the court was not required to reduce SRS' recovery according to Copeland's negligence. 36 Section 60-258a does not address settlements, but instead contemplates a full trial on the merits in cases [w]here the comparative negligence of the parties ... is an issue. In such cases, § 60-258a provides that an injured party's negligence does not bar the party from bringing an action and recovering damages, so long as the party's negligence is less than the negligence of the alleged tortfeasor against whom recovery is sought. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258a(a). Section 60-258a further provides that 37 the jury shall return special verdicts, or in the absence of a jury, the court shall make special findings, determining the percentage of negligence attributable to each of the parties, and determining the total amount of damages sustained by each of the claimants, and the entry of judgment shall be made by the court. No general verdict shall be returned by the jury. 38 Id. § 60-258a(b). When the fact finder determines a plaintiff is contributorily negligent, the statute provides that the total award of damages to the plaintiff shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. Id. § 60-258a(a); cf. Mick v. Mani, 244 Kan. 81, 766 P.2d 147, 150 (1988) (discussing purposes of comparative negligence statute). 39 Section 60-258a thus speaks in terms of the jury or, in the event of a bench trial, the trial court making determinations as to the plaintiff's total damages and comparative negligence following a trial. At the conclusion of such a fact finding trial, the plaintiff's damage award is reduced by the court according to the negligence attributed to the plaintiff by the fact finder. Because the settlement in this case did not involve factual determinations of negligence and total damages following a trial, and because there was accordingly no reduced damage award, § 60-258a is inapplicable. 40 Like § 60-258a, § 39-719a(c) contains no language expressly referring to settlements. Copeland argues, however, that under § 39-719a(c), when there is a settlement, the court apportioning the settlement proceeds must make findings as to the negligence of the injured party, and then must reduce SRS' subrogation right according to the injured party's negligence. Section 39-719a(c), however, imposes no such requirement on the court. 41 The conclusion that § 39-719a(c) does not apply to the settlement in this case is consistent with the apparent purpose of the provision. When an injured party has been found by the fact finder at trial to be negligent and has therefore received a reduced damage award, § 39-719a(c) ensures that SRS' reimbursement for medical assistance may only be taken from the injured party's reduced damage award and not from the full damage determination. SRS' reimbursement for medical assistance payments will thus never exceed the actual damage award received by the injured party following a trial. In contrast to a fact finder's total damage determination following a trial, no possibility exists that the injured party's recovery in a settlement can be further reduced by a determination of that party's negligence. Much like the situation of the court reducing the total damage determination by the percentage of the injured party's own negligence following a trial, the amount of the settlement necessarily incorporates a reduction attributable to the injured party's own negligence, if any. Thus, the concerns addressed by § 39-719a(c) are not implicated in cases when an injured party settles with the alleged tortfeasor. 42 We conclude that because § 39-719a(c) is inapplicable, the district court did not err in refusing to make a determination of Copeland's negligence and did not err in refusing to reduce SRS' reimbursement of medical assistance based on Copeland's alleged negligence.