Opinion ID: 76886
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: White's Invocation of His Fifth Amendment Privilege was Harmless Error.

Text: 24 Florida argues that if the trial court erred by permitting White to invoke his right not to incriminate himself, any error was harmless. We agree. Although the trial court erred by allowing White to invoke his privilege after White's previous waiver of that privilege, that error was harmless because De Lisi elicited substantial evidence to allow the jury to assess White's credibility. 25 The trial court erred by permitting White to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege to refrain from responding to De Lisi's question about whether White had committed tax fraud. In a pre-trial deposition, White waived the privilege when he answered the same question. A witness who testifies at any proceeding, instead of asserting his Fifth Amendment rights, loses the privilege. United States v. White, 846 F.2d 678, 690 (11th Cir.1988). 26 Although the trial court erred by permitting White to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege, that error entitles De Lisi to habeas relief only if the error was not harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Error is constitutionally harmful if the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5, 117 S.Ct. 337, 338, 136 L.Ed.2d 266 (1996). Because the erroneous exclusion of evidence occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, [the error can be] quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine the effect it had on the trial. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 27 Although this trial error is subject to harmless error review, trial errors are subject, on habeas review, to an even less exacting standard than that employed on direct review. [W]here a judge, in a habeas proceeding, applying this standard of harmless error, is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error, the habeas petitioner must win. Roy, 519 U.S. at 5, 117 S.Ct. at 338. Grave doubt means that, in the judge's mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995). We do not find ourselves in equipoise. 28 The Supreme Court has explained that we must holistically evaluate the cross-examination of the witness and determine whether an error in limiting cross-examination was harmless: 29 Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness'[s] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. 30 Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1438. Although White's testimony was vital to the prosecution, was not cumulative, and lacked substantial corroboration, the limitation on De Lisi's cross-examination of White was insubstantial. 31 De Lisi conducted a searching cross-examination of White in which De Lisi elicited copious evidence to impeach White. When White invoked his right against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury in response to a question about tax fraud, that invocation actually benefitted De Lisi, as he reiterated in his closing argument. Because the addition of the tax returns to this already ample evidence would not have substantially changed the jury's view of White's bias or credibility, the error of the trial court in permitting White to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be said to have had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Roy, 519 U.S. at 5, 117 S.Ct. at 338. 32 2. The Trial Court Did Not Violate the Confrontation Clause by Precluding Cross-Examination About White's Bank Records. 33 Florida next argues that the district court erred when it found that the trial court violated De Lisi's rights by preventing him from cross-examining White about White's bank records. De Lisi intended to question White about his bank records to show that White had more assets than he could legitimately explain. The trial court did not violate De Lisi's rights, because De Lisi showed, even without the bank records, that White had suspiciously extensive assets. 34 If anything, the exclusion of the bank records saved De Lisi from a potential embarrassment. Before the trial, De Lisi asserted that the bank records evidenced that White deposited between four million and fifteen million dollars, but ten years later, De Lisi revised his estimate drastically downward. If the trial court had permitted De Lisi to use the bank records, the government would have been able to expose De Lisi's earlier miscalculations and even bolster White's damaged credibility. 35 There is a stark contrast between the minor limitation of De Lisi's cross-examination of White and the categorical limitations condemned by this Court and the Supreme Court in other cases. In Lankford, the trial judge did not permit any evidence that the children of the star witness of the government were subject to pending government prosecution that might be dropped if the witness testified favorably. 955 F.2d at 1548. In United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, the trial court excluded all the evidence necessary for several credibility challenges against the star witness of the government. 17 F.3d 1354, 1366-67 (11th Cir.1994). In Van Arsdall, the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that [the star witness of the government] would be biased as a result of the State's dismissal of his pending public drunkenness charge. 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. at 1435 (emphasis added). In contrast, the trial court allowed De Lisi to conduct a broad inquiry and elicit damaging admissions from White. Because the jury was allowed to assess White's credibility and possible motives for bias, the Sixth Amendment [was] satisfied. Lankford, 955 F.2d at 1549 n. 10. 36