Opinion ID: 1152999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of Bellevue's Adult Entertainment Ordinances

Text: Respondents next challenge the trial court's conclusion that the provisions of Bellevue's ordinances, with the exception of BCC § 5.08.070(B)(2), restrict only conduct, and that even if they restrict expression they permissibly regulate only the time, place, or manner of expression. Respondents claim that the ordinances violate the federal and state constitutions. Respondents also argue that the expressive element of nude dancing is entitled to broader protection under the Washington Constitution. Because Respondents' primary argument centers on the state constitution we begin there. An appellate court reviews issues of law de novo. State v. Campbell, 125 Wash.2d 797, 888 P.2d 1185 (1995). The State bears the burden of justifying a restriction on speech. Collier v. City of Tacoma, 121 Wash.2d 737, 753, 854 P.2d 1046 (1993); Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir.1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 557, 70 L.Ed.2d 468 (1981). In State v. Gumvcdl, 106 Wash.2d 54, 58, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), we enumerated several nonexclusive criteria which a court should consider to determine whether, in a given situation, it is appropriate to resort to the Washington Constitution for separate and independent state grounds of decision: (1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or local concern. The same factors have been analyzed to determine whether the state constitution ultimately provides greater protection than its corresponding federal provision. State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571, 575, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). As this court noted in State v. Reece , [t]he question to be asked here is not whether the concept of free speech is interpreted more broadly under the state constitution than under the federal constitution. This court has already answered this question in the affirmative. State v. Reece, 110 Wash.2d 766, 778, 757 P.2d 947 (1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812, 110 S.Ct. 59, 107 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989). Instead, the inquiry must focus on the specific context in which the state constitutional challenge is raised. Even where a state constitutional provision has been subject to independent interpretation and found to be more protective in a particular context, it does not follow that greater protection is provided in all contexts. See State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 57, 882 P2d 747 (1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 2004, 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995); State v. Reece, 110 Wash.2d 766, 777-78, 757 P.2d 947 (1988) (stating that the proper inquiry under Gunwall is whether on a given subject matter the Washington constitutional provision should give greater protection than the niinimum protection afforded by the federal constitution), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812, 110 S.Ct. 59, 107 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989). Application of this principle has also been evident in this court's interpretation of Const. art. I, § 7. See, e.g., Bedford v. Sugarman, 112 Wash.2d 500, 507, 772 P.2d 486 (1989) (noting that art. I, § 7 gives enhanced protection against certain governmental searches and seizures, but declining to consider the extent to which this provision guarantees a more general right of privacy); see also Ramm v. City of Seattle, 66 Wash. App. 15, 27, 830 P.2d 395 (holding that art. I, § 7 offers the same degree of protection as its feder counterpart in matters not involving search and seizure), review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1018, 844 P.2d 437 (1992). Thus, in Reece we identified the issue as whether obscenity is to be afforded broader protection under the state constitution than under the federal constitution. Reece, 110 Wash.2d at 778, 757 P.2d 947. We examined the Gunwall factors and concluded that in the context of obscenity, art. I, § 5 does not afford broader protection. Similarly, when faced with a challenge to Seattle's telephone harassment law, under art. I, § 5 we found no justification for extending greater protection under the state constitution for speech in nonpublic fora and applied the federal standard. City of Seattle v. Huff, 111 Wash.2d 923, 926, 767 P.2d 572 (1989). The federal analysis also applies when confronting art. I, § 5 challenges to regulations of commercial speech. National Fed'n of Retired Persons v. Insurance Commn'r, 120 Wash.2d 101, 119, 838 P.2d 680 (1992). In JJR, Inc., we declined to extend the full protection of art. I, § 5 to licensure of nude dancing, observing that nude dancing clings to the edge of protected expression. JJR, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 126 Wash.2d 1, 9, 891 P.2d 720 (1995). Most recently, we reaffirmed that art. I, § 5 extends no greater protection than its federal counterpart when evaluating false or defamatory statements. Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wash.2d 368, 382, 922 P.2d 1343 (1996). The issue here, then, is whether nude or sexually explicit dancing is to be afforded greater protection under the state constitution than under its federal counterpart. The first factor to consider in the Gunwall inquiry is the text of the state constitution. Article I, § 5 provides that [e]very person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. This court has interpreted the text of this provision in evaluating time, place, and manner regulations, and claims of prior restraint and overbreadth. In Collier, the court recognized that the broad language of Const. art. I, § 5 justifies a more protective standard for evaluating governmental restrictions on political speech. Collier, 121 Wash.2d at 748, 854 P.2d 1046. The standard adopted by this court for evaluating time, place, and manner restrictions on speech requires the government to show a compelling state interest. Id. at 747, 854 P.2d 1046; Bering, 106 Wash.2d at 234, 721 P.2d 918. Regulations which rise to the level of prior restraints may be subject to an even stricter standard. Holding that the language of art. I, § 5 forbids prior restraints on publication, we have struck down prior restraints in most contexts, allowing only post publication sanctions to punish the abuse of free speech rights. See, e.g., State v. Coe, 101 Wash.2d 364, 374-75, 679 P.2d 353 (1984) (holding that the language of art. I, § 5 forbids prior restraints on the publication or broadcast of constitutionally protected speech that was lawfully obtained, true, and a matter of public record). The strict standard for evaluating prior restraints under the state constitution lies in the plain language of Const. art. I, § 5 which seems to rule out prior restraints under any circumstances. Bering, 106 Wash.2d at 242, 721 P.2d 918 (quoting Coe, 101 Wash.2d at 374, 679 P.2d 353). In the context of adult entertainment, however, the court has declined to afford the full protection of art. I, § 5, observing that nude dancing clings to the edge of protected expression. See JJR, Inc. 126 Wash.2d at 9, 891 P.2d 720. In regard to claims of overbreadth, the text of art. I, § 5 is less tolerant than the First Amendment of overbroad restrictions on expression when such restrictions rise to the level of a prior restraint. O'Day v. King County, 109 Wash.2d 796, 804, 749 P.2d 142 (1988). The broad language of art. I, § 5 has been found to warrant greater protection for speech, both spoken and written, in some contexts. However, it has not previously been applied to extend greater protection to expressive conduct or sexually explicit dance. Moreover, art. I, § 5 mentions only the right to speak, write and publish. In the absence of language relating to expressive conduct, we do not find that the text of art. I, § 5 justifies extending greater protection to the adult performances at issue here. In The second factor to consider is the difference in the texts of the federal and state constitutions. The text of the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. U.S. Const. amend. I. This court has found the difference in text between art. I, § 5 and the First Amendment justifies an independent interpretation as noted above. With respect to time, place, and manner restrictions, federal courts have interpreted the First Amendment as requiring only a substantial or important state interest. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50, 106 S.Ct. 925, 930, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (applying to time, place, and manner restrictions on pure speech a test requiring a substantial governmental interest), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132, 106 S.Ct. 1663, 90 L.Ed.2d 205 (1986); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (applying to time, place, and manner restrictions on expressive conduct a test requiring an important or substantial governmental interest), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900, 89 S.Ct. 63, 21 L.Ed.2d 188 (1968). In contrast, because of its broad language, Const. art. I, § 5 has been interpreted to offer greater protection than the First Amendment in the context of pure noncommercial speech in a traditional public forum. See Collier, 121 Wash.2d at 747, 854 P.2d 1046 (time, place, and manner restriction on political speech in traditional public forum of streets and sidewalks must serve compelling state interest); Bering, 106 Wash.2d at 233-34, 721 P.2d 918 (time, place, and manner restriction on abortion clinic protest on city streets and sidewalks must meet compelling governmental interest test). In other contexts, however, this court has followed the federal standard when evaluating time, place, and manner restrictions. See Huff, 111 Wash.2d 923, 767 P.2d 572; Reece, 110 Wash.2d 766, 757 P.2d 947; National Fed'n of Retired Persons, 120 Wash.2d 101, 838 P.2d 680. In some cases, art. I, § 5 also provides more protection against prior restraints. For example, federal courts have held under the First Amendment that delays in issuing dancers' licenses, but not operators' licenses, constitute a prior restraint. [2] By contrast, in JJR, Inc., we made no distinction between operators' and dancers' licenses in holding that suspension or revocation of either type of license constitutes a prior restraint. However, as noted above, the court did not extend the full protection of Const. art. I, § 5. With respect to claims of overbreadth, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment by stating, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361-62, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). A comparison of the language in the First Amendment and Const. art. I, § 5 does not dictate adoption of a more protective state doctrine for determining overbreadth. See State v. Talley, 122 Wash.2d 192, 209, 858 P.2d 217 (1993) (stating that Washington courts apply a federal analysis to claims of overbroad restrictions on speech). See also O'Day, 109 Wash.2d at 804, 749 P.2d 142 (applying the federal test for overbreadth but finding more protection if overbreadth rises to the level of a prior restraint). It is clear that the differences in the texts of art. I, § 5 and the First Amendment may justify a different interpretation under the state constitution. It is also clear that greater protection under the state constitution is not warranted in every context. Respondents have failed to explain how the difference in texts justifies greater state constitutional protection in the context of sexually explicit nude and semi-nude dancing. The third factor to consider is constitutional history. Although the State Constitutional Convention adopted the most protective of three proposed free speech provisions, this choice sheds no light on whether the drafters intended that art. I, § 5 give greater protection than the federal constitution in this context. See Russell, Reece, Sugarman, and Ramm, (indicating that state constitutional provisions may offer greater protection only in certain contexts). The fourth factor in a Gunwall analysis is preexisting state law. State cases and statutes from the time of the constitution's ratification, rather than recent case law, are more persuasive in determining whether the state constitution gives enhanced protection in a particular area. See Reece, 110 Wash.2d at 779, 757 P.2d 947 (noting, as part of its Gunwall analysis, that Washington criminalized obscenity both immediately prior to and after ratification of the state constitution); Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 66, 720 P.2d 808 (looking to the prestatehood Code of 1881 for evidence that the state constitution gives enhanced protection for telephonic communications). The city cites a case published in 1893 in which this court interpreted a statute to proscribe only businesses providing a public show which openly outrages decency and tends to corrupt the public morals. State v. Brown, 7 Wash. 10, 13, 34 P. 132 (1893). The statute in question provided for the abatement as nuisances of all ... structures used as a place of resort, where women are employed to draw custom, dance, or for purposes of prostitution.... Id. at 11, 34 P. 132 (citing Hill's Gen.Stat., Vol. I, § 2894 (1891)). Respondents offer no evidence that the constitution's drafters intended, in the context of sexually explicit nude and semi-nude dancing, to impose a stricter standard for regulations challenged as overbroad or as unduly restring the time, place, or manner of expression. Neither do Respondents cite recent case law to support this proposition. In regard to prior restraints, Respondents cite our recent decision in JJR, Inc., to argue that the state constitution provides more protection than its federal counterpart against prepublication sanctions. In JJR, Inc., we invalidated as a prior restraint a provision allowing revocation and suspension of operators' licenses without sufficient procedural safeguards. JJR, Inc., 126 Wash.2d at 9, 891 P.2d 720. The provision suppressed future expression because establishments with revoked or suspended licenses were prohibited from showcasing nude dancing. Id. at 8, 891 P.2d 720. We declined to apply the general rule categorically invalidating all prior restraints, stating that an adult entertainment licensing scheme providing for revocation or suspension of licenses was valid provided that procedural safeguards were available. [3] Id. Thus, pre-existing state law justifies a greater degree of protection from regulations which impose prior restraint on the expressive conduct of sexually explicit dance, but does not support application of the more rigorous time, place, and manner analysis developed in the context of pure speech in a traditional public forum. The fifth Gunwall factor to consider is the structural difference between the federal and state constitutions. The federal constitution is a grant of enumerated powers, while the state constitution acts as a limitation on the otherwise plenary powers of state government. Reece, 110 Wash.2d at 780, 757 P.2d 947 (citing Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 62, 720 P.2d 808). This distinction simply reinforces this court's responsibility to engage in independent state analysis and afford broader protection when necessary. Id. The sixth factor is whether this case raises a matter of particular state or local concern. With regard to adult entertainment, Respondents state only that activities of this nature have been traditionally regulated by municipalities. Br. of Resp't at 28. This factor favors an independent state analysis; however, we do not agree that greater protection follows, because, as Appellant points out, both state and local law regulated or prohibited dancing early in this state's history. Appellant cites a Washington statute enacted in 1889 granting cities the authority to prohibit or suppress, or license or regulate all dance houses..... Bal.Code § 855(4) (1897). Appellant also points to Pearson v. City of Seattle, 14 Wash. 438, 439, 44 P. 884 (1896), concerning a City of Seattle ordinance prohibiting dances in any saloon or in any place in connection with liquor sales. We conclude that while traditional regulation by municipalities supports independent analysis under the state constitution, it does not support enhanced protection for self-expression through sexually explicit dancing. Respondents fail to show that the sexually explicit dance at issue in this case warrants application of the more protective time, place, and manner analysis developed under art. I, § 5 of the state constitution. Nor is greater protection indicated with regard to the claims of overbreadth not rising to the level of prior restraint. Therefore, we will evaluate Respondents' claims of overbreadth and challenges to time, place, or manner regulations by applying federal constitutional law. However, the text and history of Const. art. I, § 5 dictate enhanced protection under the state constitution in the context of adult entertainment regulations that impose prior restraints. A.