Opinion ID: 2544268
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Timely Objection

Text: Finally, we must recall that to prevail on this issue, Borrero need not prove any prejudice (actual or otherwise) resulting from the State's omission. Whether a defendant was prejudiced by a defective information is only to be considered if the information is challenged for the first time after a verdict. Johnson, 119 Wash.2d at 149, 829 P.2d 1078 (emphasis added) (citing Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 106, 812 P.2d 86; State v. Hopper, 118 Wash.2d 151, 155-56, 822 P.2d 775 (1992)). The reason we do not require a showing of prejudice is to encourage defendants not to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Id. This incentive is appropriate because the State can freely amend an information anytime before verdict to make it constitutionally sufficient. Id.; see also CrR 2.1(d). This point is best made in Johnson, where we reversed even though we clearly believed the defendants suffered absolutely no prejudice whatsoever. 119 Wash.2d at 149, 829 P.2d 1078. But Borrero made his motion to dismiss before verdict. Notwithstanding the trial court erroneously denied the motion, ruling: The motions to dismiss the attempted murder in the first degree counts will be denied. I think the Rhodes [sic] case from the Court of Appeals does essentially control this decision.... In the Rhodes [sic] decision the court in its opinion makes reference to prejudice really being the key-stone of this analysis, and they don't use those words but that is implicit, and here there really isn't any prejudice at all. Everybody knows since the amended information this was an attempted murder charge. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Mar. 9, 1998) at 9. This is plain error. Rhode pertained to a postverdict motion and therefore applied the liberal construction standard, which includes a prejudice requirement. State v. Rhode, 63 Wash.App. 630, 633-37, 821 P.2d 492 (1991). Under the Johnson preverdict standard applied in this case, Borrero is not required to prove prejudice. While our majority does not clearly demand Borrero prove prejudice, it appears to imply as much. For example, it concludes its analysis with the statement: [t]he information sufficiently informed Borrero of the nature of the accusation against him so that he was able to prepare his defense to the crime charged. Majority at 250. Unless the majority is considering whether Borrero was prejudiced by the information, why does Borrero's actual ability to prepare a defense even matter? Under Johnson, Borrero is entitled to relief even if he was an expert in criminal attempt law. Borrero thoroughly argued a motion to dismiss before verdict. This motion put the State on notice of its failure to include the essential statutory element of a substantial step in the information. VRP (Mar. 5, 1998) at 105-06. Nevertheless, the State maintained the charging document was good enough as is and chose not to amend it to remove any constitutional suspicion. The State therefore risked strict construction review which does not require any showing of prejudice on Borrero's part. For these reasons the conviction for attempted murder must be reversed.