Opinion ID: 4431323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consumer Fraud Act Allegations

Text: With the safe harbor off the table, our next question is whether the complaint adequately alleges that Hill’s and PetSmart committed a deceptive or unfair practice. These are separate categories; deceptive conduct is distinct from unfair conduct. A claim under the Consumer Fraud Act may be premised on either (or both), but the two categories have different pleading standards. If the claim rests on allegations of deceptive conduct, then Rule 9(b) applies and the plaintiff must plead with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. Specifically, the complaint must identify the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud. Id. (quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff may allege that conduct is unfair … without alleging that the conduct is deceptive.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935. To determine whether a practice is unfair, Illinois courts consider three factors: whether it No. 17-3633 11 “offends public policy”; is “immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous”; or “causes substantial injury to consumers.” Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, Inc., 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff need not satisfy all three factors; “[a] practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three.” Robinson, 775 N.E.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted). And because fraud is not a required element, Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply. See Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, under either theory of the case, the plaintiff must adequately plead causation—more specifically, he must allege that but for the defendant’s deceptive or unfair conduct, he “would not have been damaged.” Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks omitted). The complaint alleges that the defendants’ marketing practices are both deceptive and unfair. Taking the first category first, the complaint alleges that the prescription requirement, prescription label, and related marketing materials for Hill’s Prescription Diet pet food are deceptive because no prescription is necessary and there is no material difference between the “prescription” food and nonprescription food. Hill’s and PetSmart respond that the complaint is deficient because it does not allege that Vanzant and Land relied on the deceptive representations when purchasing Hill’s Prescription Diet food. This argument misconstrues Illinois law. “[R]eliance is not an element of statutory consumer fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 593 (Ill. 1996). Rather, it’s the plaintiff’s “damage,” not his purchase, that must occur “as a result of” the deceptive act or practice. Oliveira, 776 N.E.2d at 160. Indeed, it was enough 12 No. 17-3633 in Connick that the plaintiffs’ purchases “occurred after the allegedly fraudulent statements.” 675 N.E.2d at 595. Here, the complaint alleges that the prescription requirement, prescription label, and associated marketing materials for Hill’s Prescription Diet were deceptive; that Vanzant and Land saw the specific “prescription” language and symbols when they made their purchases; that the prescription pet food was something less than they expected; and that they suffered damages because they paid a higher price. These allegations detail the “who,” “what,” and “how” of the fraud claim with particularity. Camasta, 761 F.3d at 737. The complaint also alleges the “when” and “where” of the fraud. Vanzant saw marketing materials for Prescription Diet pet food before purchasing the cat food at PetSmart in February 2013 and thereafter. Land saw similar marketing materials before purchasing Prescription Diet cat food from PetSmart in November 2013 and thereafter. Nothing more is needed. In short, the complaint pleads a deceptive-practices claim to the degree of particularity required by Rule 9(b). That’s enough to reverse the dismissal of the Consumer Fraud Act claim, so it’s not necessary to address the adequacy of the allegations under the unfair-practices theory of the case. As we’ve noted, an unfair-practices claim has no fraud element and therefore is not subject to a heightened pleading standard.