Opinion ID: 1293711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel For Failing to File Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements The Involuntary Confession Issue.

Text: A. Breach of essential duty. The defendant also contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his statements to the police because Detective Thomas's promises of leniency rendered his confession involuntary. The defendant's trial counsel testified at the remand hearing that after viewing the videotape it never occurred to him that he could move to suppress the defendant's statements on the basis that the statements were involuntary. He testified further that he could think of no grounds for filing a motion to suppress the statements. There was therefore no strategic or tactical reason for not filing the motion. The question then becomes whether Detective Thomas in fact made promises of leniency. Of course, the best evidence on that question is the videotape itself. The State contends that Detective Thomas made no direct promises of leniency. Alternatively, the State suggests that if we find that the statements Detective Thomas made do qualify as promises of leniency, we should analyze the claim of promissory leniency applying the federal totality-of-the-circumstances test under the due process clause of the federal constitution rather than applying a per se exclusionary rule. Under the federal totality-of-the-circumstances test, the courts look at both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973). The federal courts assess the following factors: the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Id. (citations omitted). 1. Applicable Iowa law. In State v. Mullin , this court held involuntary a written confession induced by an officer's statement to the defendant that it would be best for the defendant to tell what he knew about a robbery because more mercy would be granted by the authorities that handled the prosecution. 249 Iowa 10, 18, 85 N.W.2d 598, 602-03 (1957). This court held that if it clearly appears the confession was induced by force, threats, promises, or other improper inducements, the question is one of law for the court alone and the statement should be rejected. Id. at 14, 85 N.W.2d at 600. This court made clear in Mullin that a confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise, `for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner', and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence by force or other inducement has admittedly been exerted upon him. Voluntary [is] defined as meaning a statement made of the free will and accord of the accused, without coercion, whether from fear of any threat of harm, promise or inducement, or any hope of reward. Id. at 14, 85 N.W.2d at 600. Thus, it is clear that this court decided the admissibility issue not on a constitutional basis but on an evidentiary basis. In State v. Quintero , we followed Mullin : The present case lends itself to resolution without resorting to constitutional principles. A coerced confession should not be admitted in evidence because of its inherent lack of reliability. Our cases have long reversed criminal convictions for admitting involuntary confessions. The rule was developed, not as a constitutional principle, but because the law has no way of measuring the improper influence or determining its effect on the mind of the accused.... We hold that Quintero's involuntary confession was inadmissible, not on the basis of a constitutional principle, but as a matter of the law of evidence. Its probative value, if any exists, is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of issues and would be misleading to the jury under Iowa rule of evidence 403. 480 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Iowa 1992). An officer can tell a suspect that it is better to tell the truth without crossing the line between admissible and inadmissible statements from the defendant. State v. Hodges, 326 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Iowa 1982). However, the line is crossed if the officer also tells the suspect what advantage is to be gained or is likely from making a confession. Id. Under the latter circumstances, the officer's statements ordinarily become promises of leniency, rendering the statements involuntary. Id. 2. Analysis. The district court did not decide the voluntariness issue under a totality-of-the-circumstances test. It is clear from the court's ruling that it decided the issue on an evidentiary basis, a procedure with which we concur. This is evident from the court's failure to employ the usual factors federal courts resort to under that test. Moreover, we note the State filed no post-hearing motion asking the court to employ the federal totality-of-the-circumstances test. After describing in detail what the videotape revealed, the district court made these findings: After approximately twenty-two times of telling the defendant that if he didn't pull the trigger, he wouldn't be in any trouble, Detective Thomas told the defendant that he could not help him out unless he told him the truth. After approximately twenty-five times of telling the defendant that if he didn't pull the trigger he would not be in any trouble, the defendant told Detective Thomas that he went over to the apartment after [Jonathan Johnson's death] to help his brother and a person by the name of Chance remove the body.... The detective then left the room for a period of time and returned and for the twenty-sixth time told the defendant that if he didn't pull the trigger he would not be in any trouble. It was at that point that the defendant finally told the detective that he was in the restroom of the apartment when he heard [gunshots] and came out to see the victim, his brother and Chance in an altercation. He then saw Chance and his brother shoot the victim through a pillow and saw his brother stab the victim twice until the knife handle broke. .... The court finds that Detective Thomas's statement during defendant's interview: If you didn't pull the trigger, you won't be in any trouble, repeated at least twenty-five times, indicates leniency in exchange for defendant's confession. Moreover, Detective Thomas's statement suggested that it would be advantageous for defendant if he offered a confession or made inculpatory statements. The implication of Detective Thomas's repeated statement was, if the defendant didn't shoot Jonathan Johnson, he would not be in any trouble and he would [be] free to go or at least not be charged with Johnson's murder. It is questionable whether or not the aforementioned statement by Detective Thomas if mentioned once or twice to the defendant would have resulted in the Court's conclusion that the statement was a promise of leniency. However, once the Court reviewed the video it is apparent that this statement repeated twenty-six times in an hour and a half could only lead one to believe that a statement given would not result in charges being filed against the defendant. Having viewed the videotape, we agree with and adopt these findings. We also agree and adopt the court's findings that the defendant's trial counsel was aware of what was on the videotape, should therefore have filed a motion to suppress the defendant's statements, and counsel's failure to do so constituted a breach of an essential duty. B. Prejudice. The district court also found that the defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file the motion because of the lack of evidence implicating the defendant in the crime. Earlier, we found prejudice for the same reason on the illegal seizure issue. So we concur in the district court's finding of prejudice. C. Use of incriminating statements and prior trial testimony on retrial. As mentioned, the defendant took the stand and repeated the incriminating statements. Ordinarily, a defendant's testimony at a former trial is admissible against the defendant in a later proceeding. Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2010, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047, 1051 (1968). This is because [a] defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives. Id. Moreover, the waiver is no less effective or complete because the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him. Id. However, the same principle that prohibits the use of illegally obtained incriminating statements prohibits the use of any testimony impelled thereby  the fruit of the poisonous tree, to invoke a time-worn metaphor. Id. The invocation of that principle turns on whether the defendant took the stand to overcome the impact of [incriminating statements] illegally obtained and hence improperly introduced. Id. at 223, 88 S.Ct. at 2010, 20 L.Ed.2d at 1052. If that was the defendant's motivation in taking the stand, then his testimony was tainted by the same illegality that rendered the [incriminating statements] themselves inadmissible. Id. The burden is on the State to show that the defendant's testimony was not in fact impelled by the prosecution's use of the defendant's illegally obtained incriminating statements. Id. at 225, 88 S.Ct. at 2011, 20 L.Ed.2d at 1053. In its limited remand ruling, the district court found the incriminating statements that the defendant gave to Detective Thomas impelled the defendant to testify. And without that evidence, the defendant would have chosen not to testify. In our de novo review, we likewise find that the incriminating statements impelled the defendant to testify. In his trial testimony, the defendant insisted that his brother Lawrence had brought him to the Emerald Drive apartment against his wishes, and he had no advance knowledge of what his brother intended to do. The defendant further testified that he had no direct involvement in the killing, refused his brother's request for help to subdue the victim, and even tried to help him. When the defendant attempted to leave, Chance forcefully told him not to leave. Clearly, in our opinion, the defendant took the stand in an attempt to overcome and explain the incriminating statements he had made. We therefore conclude that the State has failed to show that the defendant's testimony was not impelled by the State's use of his illegally obtained incriminating statements. Harrison makes clear that the State here may not use the defendant's prior trial testimony in its case-in-chief on retrial. What is not clear is whether the videotape and the defendant's prior trial testimony can be used for impeachment purposes if the defendant again testifies. Ordinarily, the State may use illegally obtained evidence to impeach if the defendant testifies, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4 (1971) (evidence obtained in violation of the strictures of Miranda are admissible for impeachment purposes); accord Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1181, 108 L.Ed.2d 293, 303 (1990) (incriminating statements obtained in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are admissible for impeachment purposes); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916-17, 64 L.Ed.2d 559, 566 (1980) (evidence suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure is admissible for impeachment purposes); State v. Hatter, 414 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Iowa 1987) (incriminating statements obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest are admissible for impeachment purposes). In Mincey v. Arizona , however, the United States Supreme Court held that  any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law. 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2416, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 303 (1978) (involuntary statements could not be used for impeachment purposes); accord Harvey, 494 U.S. at 351, 110 S.Ct. at 1181, 108 L.Ed.2d at 303 (incriminating statements obtained in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not admissible if they are involuntary); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459-60, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501, 510 (1979) (defendant's testimony before a grand jury under a grant of immunity could not constitutionally be used to impeach defendant; such testimony is compelled and for that reason violates the privilege against compelled self-incrimination provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); United States v. Walton, 10 F.3d 1024, 1033 (3d Cir.1993) (defendant's statements to federal agents about illegal firearms trafficking were held to be coerced by agent's promises that his statements would not be used against him; because such statements were therefore involuntary in violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment right they could not be used to impeach defendant); Hatter, 414 N.W.2d at 338 (recognizing rule that involuntary incriminating statements are not admissible for impeachment purposes; however incriminating statements were found to be voluntary). Obviously, the reason involuntary incriminating statements cannot be used for any purpose in a criminal trial is because such statements are not reliable and therefore not trustworthy. Nowlin v. State, 346 So.2d 1020, 1023-24 (Fla.1977) (discussing requirement in Harris that before illegally obtained evidence may be used to impeach, the trustworthiness of such evidence must satisfy legal standards; court held that at the very least [this requirement] means that the statements must be voluntarily given). Although our decision that the defendant's incriminating statements were involuntary is based on an evidentiary rather than a constitutional analysis, we see no reason why the rule against use of involuntary statements for impeachment purposes should be different under our evidentiary analysis. Therefore, we hold that the State may not use the videotape either in its case-in-chief or for impeachment purposes on retrial because the defendant's statements in that videotape were involuntary. We likewise hold that under Harrison the State is foreclosed from using the defendant's prior trial testimony on retrial in its case in chief because that testimony was impelled by the use of the defendant's involuntary statements. The State is also foreclosed from using the defendant's prior trial testimony on retrial for impeachment purposes because the involuntary nature of the defendant's video statements taints his trial testimony: He was impelled to testify because of his involuntary statements. See Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.2d 801, 802-03 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (trial testimony impelled by involuntary incriminating statements cannot be used on retrial for impeachment purposes), appeal after remand, 470 So.2d 770 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (same).