Opinion ID: 2299346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construing Subsections Together

Text: Faced with this apparent contradiction, we move to the next stage of our analysis: deciding whether seemingly inconsistent provisions can be interpreted in a way that would harmonize them. See Carey, 457 A.2d at 1108 ([S]tatutory provisions are to be construed not in isolation, but together with other related provisions.') (citation omitted). Sections 25-130(b-1) and 25-132(a) both indicate on their face that they do not apply to the underage possession of alcohol. We should therefore construe section 25-130(b-2) in light of this fact, and read the word alternative as not applying to underage possession. This would not make the word alternative superfluous, as it would still indicate that the civil penalties of section 25-130(b-2) constitute an alternative to the criminal penalties of section 25-130(b-1) for misrepresentation of age in order to obtain alcohol in violation of section 25-130(b). The advantage of such a reading is that it would eliminate the seeming confusion surrounding the penalties available for possession of alcohol by a minor. Under that reading, a civil fine would be the primary penalty for possession, and the phrase in addition to in section 25-130(c) would indicate that the suspension of driving privileges may be imposed as a supplement to that civil fine. There would be no references to other, nonexistent, sanctions. The District of Columbia concurs with this approach, but reaches a different conclusion. It points to a general provision of the ABC Act which provides that [p]rosecutions for violations of [the Act] . . . shall be on information filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia by the Corporation Counsel. D.C.Code § 25-132(c). The Morrissey opinion commented that the references to prosecution and information in this subsection imply that violations of the Act are criminal in nature. See Morrissey, 668 A.2d at 796 (explaining that prosecutions on information is terminology commonly used in criminal proceedings). The government contends that, because the alternative civil fines of section 25-130(b-2) and the additional license suspensions of section 25-130(c) are not criminal penalties, the language of section 25-132(c) compels that we apply some criminal sanction to underage possession of alcohol. Because the criminal sanction in section 25-132(a) was expressly eliminated as a possible penalty by the Council for underage possession of alcohol (in response to this court's decision in Morrissey, as discussed below), the District argues that the misdemeanor penalties described in section 25-130(b-1) must be applicable. We do not agree with the District's interpretation of the statute. With limited exceptions, unambiguous statutory language trumps all other considerations. See Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 503 U.S. at 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146 (holding that, when the words of a statute are clear, `the judicial inquiry is complete') (citation omitted); Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., 470 A.2d at 754 (noting that literal meaning will not be followed, inter alia, where result is absurd). Section 25-130(b-1) is unambiguous: [a]ny person under 21 years of age who falsely represents his or her age for the purpose of procuring [any] alcoholic. . . beverage shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. D.C.Code § 25-130(b-1) (Supp.2000). On its face, it does not apply to mere possession of alcohol by a minor. See id. Plain words such as these cannot be altered by a secondary rule of construction. Nor do we think, contrary to the dictum in Morrissey, that the language of section 25-132(c) requires us to impose criminal sanctions for all violations of the ABC Act. The language of section 25-132(c) referencing criminal sanctions, does not necessarily implicate all violations of the Act. Rather, it can be read to distinguish between those criminal violations of the ABC Act which are prosecuted as felonies by the United States Attorney, and those other criminal violations that are misdemeanors prosecuted based on information filed in Superior Court by the Corporation Counsel. We therefore understand that section 25-132(c) does not compel a criminal sanction, but merely provides, with respect to violations of the Act that are criminal in nature, how they are to be prosecuted: misdemeanors by the Corporation Counsel, and felonies by the U.S. Attorney. This interpretation is supported by the provisions for how purely civil infractionswhich the District agrees are clearly contemplated by the statuteare to be pursued. For example, section 25-130(b-2), which was added post- Morrissey, expressly provides that [a]djudication of any infraction of this section [providing for an alternative civil fine] shall be pursuant to §§ 6-2701 to 6-2723 (the Civil Infractions Act). This, by its own terms, is a civil sanction. That leaves the suspension of driving privileges under section 25-130(c), which is cast in the mandatory shall, and follows automatically from an adjudication of a violation, with the length of suspension also dictated by the statute, depending on whether it is the first, second or third violation of the ABC Act. Although whether this particular sanction is civil or criminal is in the first instance a matter of statutory construction, see Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (citation omitted), we find little guidance in its language, other than by contrast with the express labeling of the fine in 25-130(b-2) as civil. We conclude that the suspension of driving privileges for violations of the Act by underage persons who possess or consume alcohol, or who lie about their age in order to do so, also is a civil sanction, because of its mandatory character and because its primary objective is traffic safety, not retribution and deterrence. See id.; Commonwealth v. Duffey, 536 Pa. 436, 639 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1994) (holding that statute requiring that whenever a person is convicted . . . the court . . . shall order the operating privilege of the person suspended was civil in nature because of the ministerial nature of the judge's role and the involvement of administrative agency) (citations omitted); cf. Hills v. Iowa Dep't. of Transp. & Motor Vehicle Div., 534 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Iowa 1995) (holding that license revocation upon conviction for drug possession was criminal punishment within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause because it was not primarily related to traffic safety, but intended to enhance punishment for drug possession). Regulations issued under the Traffic Act also require the Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke the license of any person under twenty-one who has any measurable amount of alcohol in the blood. See 18 DCMR § 301.1(f) (1995). The suspension of driving privileges of an underage person who, though without such measurable blood alcohol, can be presumed to be headed down that path by possession or consumption of alcohol (or misrepresenting age in order to do so) similarly supports traffic safety. That the Council sought to achieve this objective by deterring young people from alcohol with the prospect of losing their driving privileges, see COMM. ON CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT ON BILL 10-207, THE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ACT AND RULES REFORM AMENDMENT ACT OF 1993, SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS (December 15, 1993), does not alter its purpose of regulating traffic safety. The Council's purpose since it increased the drinking age to twenty-one in 1986 has been traffic safety as persons under the age of 21 are inexperienced drivers and thus more likely than any other age group to have their driving significantly impaired by even small quantities of alcohol. Jarrett v. Woodward Bros., Inc., 751 A.2d 972, 984 (D.C.2000) (quoting COMM. ON CONSUMER AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT ON BILL NO. 6-508, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ACT LEGAL DRINKING AGE AMENDMENT ACT OF 1986 (October 14, 1986)). Therefore, we do not think that section 25-132(c) needs to be read as requiring that all violations of the ABC Act are criminal in nature.