Opinion ID: 1807977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: referee's factual findings

Text: Having disposed of Graham's motions, we turn to the substance of this disciplinary hearing. The referee's factual findings were comprehensive and may be summarized as follows: Graham has been a licensed Minnesota attorney since 1967. He practiced in Brainerd, Minnesota from 1981 until August 1988, when he moved to Quebec, Canada. While practicing in Brainerd, substantial personal and political ill-will arose between Stephen Rathke, Crow Wing County Attorney, and him. The animosity continued throughout the period covered by this matter. Graham's statements against Rathke, Spellacy, McNulty and Milligan, which led to this suit for disciplinary action, followed the Shockman v. Rathke decision that denied issuance of an injunction against prosecution of Michael Shockman. The background of that case forms the basis for Graham's accusations and this disciplinary matter. On September 21, 1987, Michael Shockman struck his seven-year-old son on the face causing facial bruises. The son's school reported the bruises. Brainerd city police removed the boy from school and placed him in protective custody on September 25, 1987. The Shockmans retained Graham on September 26, 1987 to help them regain their son. The son was returned to the family on September 28, 1987. On October 1, 1987, subsequent to the child's return, Graham wrote to a member of the Crow Wing County Board complaining about the handling of several custody and child protection cases, including that of the Shockmans. He did not refer to the Shockmans by name. He criticized Rathke in particular, but not in connection with handling the Shockman case. The letter caused heated debate at the county board meeting held on October 6, 1987. On October 9, 1987, an assistant Crow Wing County attorney, with the agreement of Rathke, signed a fifth degree assault charge against Shockman for striking his son. Graham, as the Shockmans' attorney, filed a federal court complaint on October 21, 1987 seeking to enjoin the assault prosecution on the grounds that Rathke had commenced it in retaliation for Graham's letter to the county board. In response, Rathke requested district court judge John Spellacy to convene a grand jury to consider whether to indict Michael Shockman for assault and to inquire into the process which gave rise to the criminal complaint against Shockman. A grand jury was convened in the Shockman matter, and a special prosecutor unconnected with Rathke was appointed. The grand jury returned an indictment against Michael Shockman. During this period, Judge Spellacy had remarked to Graham that Graham's comments in his October 1, 1987 letter might constitute criminal defamation. No charge or indictment was made as to possible defamation by Graham, but Graham took Spellacy's comment to mean the grand jury had really been convened to indict him for criminal defamation. On December 9, 1987, Rathke, Rathke's attorney Michael Milligan, and Graham met with Magistrate Patrick J. McNulty in Duluth on Graham's motion for a temporary injunction in the Shockman case. They decided to hold an expedited trial in January on the suit for permanent injunction. The referee found that the proceedings and results of this December 9 hearing did not support Graham's later assertion that at that hearing [t]he judge had indicated preliminary approval of the suit. The evidence seemed reasonable. The law . . . seemed reasonable.. . . [McNulty] suggested clearly enough that the matter might have real merit. . . . [and] clearly enough hinted he was going to give my clients . . . relief pendente lite. In re Graham, No. C3-88-1760, Finding of Fact 20 (Feb. 21, 1989) (hereinafter Order). Graham filed an amended complaint following the December 9 hearing. Milligan answered on Rathke's behalf alleging violation of Rule 11 of Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and Minn.Stat. § 549.21 (1988) and asserting rights to attorney fees, costs and disbursements. The expedited trial seeking an injunction was held January 4-6, 1988. McNulty found for defendant Rathke. Milligan moved for award of attorney fees. His argument in support of the motion described Graham as the real party in interest who brought the suit only in order to harass and embarrass Rathke. The referee found Milligan's written argument reasonably made and not a bizarre procedural irregularity as Graham claimed it to be. In late January, Graham heard via a third party about a conversation that occurred during a local bar association Christmas party held on December 11, 1987. According to what Graham heard, Bruce Alderman, who attended the party, understood someone to say that Milligan had telephoned someone else who in turn contacted the judge in Duluth about the upcoming Shockman case and that everything had been taken care of or the result was in the bag. Graham suspected a conspiracy and contacted Alderman to discuss the conversation. During the meeting, Graham tried to get him to say that Spellacy was the middleman in the conspiracy, but to the contrary, he never indicated that Spellacy was or could have been the middleman, nor did he say that Rathke's name had been mentioned in connection with the conspiracy. Based on (1) his interview with Alderman, (2) his belief that Milligan engaged in bizarre procedural irregularities, and (3) that McNulty showed an abrupt change in attitude from the December 9 hearing and the trial, Graham made the accusations that are the basis of this disciplinary action. Sworn accusations were made on the basis of Graham's certain knowledge that the case was fixed at some time during December 9-11, 1987, at least three weeks before trial, by means of improper influence consisting of political connections and illicit persuasion. In a letter to Jerome Arnold, United States Attorney, Graham alleged that at the request of Rathke, Milligan had contacted Judge Spellacy who contacted Magistrate McNulty and obtained McNulty's commitment to decide the upcoming case of Shockman v. Rathke without regard to the law and facts. [2] Noting that Graham later acknowledged that Rathke may not have requested the case be fixed, but only acquiesced in a fix arranged by others, the referee found that [t]here was no reasonable basis for these allegations in respondent's log [EVIDENCE] or elsewhere. Order, finding 38. In a complaint of judicial misconduct, [3] Graham alleged of his certain knowledge that Judge Spellacy using his long established political connections and friendship as the modus operandi  obtained Magistrate McNulty's commitment to decide against the Shockmans. [Graham] further alleged    [that] it was in fact known to Mr. Rathke, Mr. Milligan, Judge McNulty and others how the case would be decided some three weeks before the opening of trial on January 4, 1988, all as a consequence of corrupt influence . . . Order, finding 44. The referee found these accusations to be false, both as statements and in the sense that they were made as absolutes when in fact Graham admitted at the disciplinary hearing that: by political he meant old boy influence peddling not just organized political party connections    [and] that by certain knowledge, he meant several things, including belief and great probability. Order, finding 45. The referee noted that Graham is a learned and intelligent attorney, capable of using words according to their normal meanings. In these and other instances he either chose not to do so or, when confronted by evidence, to try to explain away his specific claims. Id. Graham also made similar accusations in his sworn affidavit in support of the motion to recuse Magistrate McNulty from considering the award of attorney fees in the Shockman case. The referee also found these statements to be false. The referee in this disciplinary matter found that nothing in the Shockman v. Rathke trial transcript supported Graham's allegations that Milligan knew what was going to happen at trial before it happened; nor did it support Graham's allegations that Judge McNulty was exceedingly biased, displayed an abrupt change of attitude from the December 9 meeting, and had his mind made up before he walked into the courtroom. Moreover, the referee found that Milligan's post-trial written argument in support of awarding attorney's fees was reasonable and not a bizarre procedural irregularity. Additionally, Graham stated under oath in both the complaint to the eighth circuit and in his affidavit that of his certain knowledge the acts of fixing the Shockman case were done with the knowledge and consent of others, yet at the hearing before the referee, Graham testified that he had no knowledge of any  others  involved. Again, the referee found his allegations against others false. [4] Voluminous telephone records and testimony as to the whereabouts of the various people accused of the conspiracy during the relevant period belied Graham's conclusions. Thus, the referee also found that the accused parties could not have conspired as alleged because evidence showed no contact between the parties occurred during the relevant period: December 9-11, 1988. In sum, the referee found that Graham had no reasonable basis for his assertions of a conspiracy in the Shockman v. Rathke case and that his allegations were false, frivolous, and made in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity.