Opinion ID: 1266113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err in granting appellee's motion for directed verdict?

Text: The proper standard to be applied in determining the appropriateness and validity of a directed verdict was stated in State Savings & Loan v. Corey, 53 Haw. 132, 488 P.2d 703 (1971). Quoting from Young v. Price, 47 Haw. 309, 313, 388 P.2d 203, 206 (1963); rehearing, 48 Haw. 22, 24, 395 P.2d 365, 367 (1964), this court held that: `[O]n motions for a directed verdict, the evidence and the inferences which may be fairly drawn from the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed and if the evidence and inferences viewed in that manner are of such character that reasonable persons in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment may reach different conclusions upon the crucial issue, then the motion should be denied and the issue should be submitted to the jury.' [ Id. 53 Haw. at 145, 488 P.2d at 711.] However, it should be noted that facts essential to the question of submissibility may not be inferred in the absence of a substantial evidentiary basis. Frazier v. Stone, 515 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Mo. App. 1974). And `where there is no conflict from the evidence and but one inference can be drawn from the facts, it is the duty of the court to pass upon the question of negligence and proximate cause of questions of law.' Tsugawa v. Reinartz, 56 Haw. 67, 71, 527 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1974), quoting from Young v. Price, supra, 47 Haw. at 313, 388 P.2d at 206. In considering whether the evidence is conflicting and the inferences therefrom, the basis of liability for an owner of a dog that has caused or inflicted injuries must first be determined. The court in State ex rel. Kroger Company v. Craig, 329 S.W.2d 804, 808-809 (Mo. App. 1959) stated the general rule: [I]n an action against the owner or harborer of a dog for injury inflicted by such animal, defendant's scienter (i.e., actual or constructive knowledge) of the vicious or dangerous propensities of the dog . .. is (except where removed by statute) an essential element of the cause of action and a necessary prerequisite to recovery... . `[T]he gist of the action is the keeping of a vicious dog after knowledge of his vicious propensities.' [Citation omitted] Therefore, in order for the appellants to prove scienter, it is necessary that the evidence show that Tiger, the German shepherd dog in the present case, had in fact vicious or dangerous propensities. State ex rel. Kroger Company v. Craig, supra . Of course, the injury complained of must result from the exercise of the dangerous propensity. Maxwell v. Fraze, 344 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Mo. App. 1961). The terms vicious propensities and dangerous propensities have been defined as [a]ny propensity on the part of the dog, which is likely to cause injury under the circumstances in which the person controlling the dog places it ... and a vicious propensity does not mean only the type of malignancy exhibited by a biting dog, that is, a propensity to attack human beings. 3A C.J.S. Animals § 199, at page 701 (1973); Dansker v. Gelb, 352 S.W.2d 12, 16-17 (Mo.Sup. 1961). It `includes as well a natural fierceness or disposition to mischief as might occasionally lead him to attack human beings without provocation.' (Citation omitted.) Frazier v. Stone, supra at 768. We now proceed to apply the above standards and examine the evidence and inferences therefrom to determine if, when taken in the light most favorable to the appellants, it is of such character that reasonable persons may draw different conclusions upon the crucial issue of appellees' negligence, that is, whether the appellees kept a vicious or dangerous dog with knowledge of the dog's vicious or dangerous propensities, and whether the injury complained of was the result of any such propensity. In granting the appellees' motion for a directed verdict, the trial court in its findings stated: There is evidence that the defendants allowed the dog to roam free and the dog would run and bark at people. There is no evidence that the dog was considered vicious. The running and barking of the dog at strangers on defendants' own property cannot be said of such dangerous propensity to find the defendants negligent. There is no evidence that the defendant, Kim Payton had intentionally urged the dog to chase the plaintiffs. There is testimony that Kim Payton may have stopped the dog by ordering the dog to stop; however, there is no evidence that he had failed to try to do so. There is no evidence of biting or any contact of the dog with the plaintiffs. At the most, the dog was about fifteen feet from the plaintiffs at the nearest point. The evidence is clear that the injury was caused or injuries were caused by the negligence of the plaintiffs and not the defendants. The injury to Miss Laubenfels was due to the negligence of the plaintiff, Mrs. Ruth Farrior. It is true that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have properly found that the German shepherd dog was subject to Kim's oral commands. There was also evidence placing Kim and the German shepherd dog together near the Payton residence patio when Mrs. Farrior reached the flat sand and rock area fronting the Payton property. The German shepherd dog barked continuously for approximately ten (10) minutes before running towards Mrs. Farrior, thus certainly calling Kim's attention to it. The circumstances permit an inference that Kim saw the German shepherd dog start for Mrs. Farrior and that he then had an opportunity to stop it by an oral command. The fact that Mrs. Farrior did not hear a command and the fact that the German shepherd dog did not stop running towards her permit an inference that no command was given. Furthermore, Kim's statement to the injured appellants, Trespassers, serves you right!, permits, at the least, an inference that he saw Mrs. Farrior on the property before the accident. If this were true, he owed her a duty of care to control the dog to prevent harm to her notwithstanding the fact that she may have been a trespasser. The rule is stated in Restatement, Second, Torts § 338 (1965): A possessor of land who is in immediate control of a force, and knows or has reason to know of the presence of trespassers in dangerous proximity to it, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to them by his failure to exercise reasonable care (a) so to control the force as to prevent it from doing harm to them, or (b) to give a warning which is reasonably adequate to enable them to protect themselves. In Pickard v. City & County, 51 Haw. 134, 135, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (1969), we stated: We believe that the common law distinctions between classes of persons have no logical relationship to the exercise of reasonable care for the safety of others. We therefore hold that an occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all persons reasonably anticipated to be upon the premises, regardless of the legal status of the individual. (Emphasis added.) In our statement of the case we have stated that one of the reasons the Payton family kept the dog was to deal with the occasional `problem of trespassers'. In addition, Kim's knowledge of the dog's propensities gave him notice that someone was close enough to motivate the dog to bark and run. He owed a duty to control the German shepherd dog to prevent harm to that person, and it does not matter whether he had then actually seen Mrs. Farrior. In our judgment, Kim's statement to the appellants after their fall and his knowledge of the dog's propensities, coupled with the fact that he refused to aid the injured appellants and the fact that his parents first learned of the incident after the complaint was filed nearly 11 months later, raise a strong inference of willful or wanton misconduct on Kim's part. The evidence in the record also establishes the fact that the Payton family not only knew of their dog's propensity to run and bark at strangers utilizing the short-cut via the man-made seawall and the natural rock wall but also expected such activity from their German shepherd dog. Although it has been held that [b]arking, running loose, jumping, and lunging are activities in which all dogs engage and, absent further showing, do not alone justify a finding of vicious propensities, Frazier v. Stone, supra at page 769, it is our belief that the circumstances of this case necessitate otherwise. The rule is well-settled that: [T]he owner or keeper of a domestic animal is bound to take notice of the general propensities of the class to which it belongs, and also of any particular propensities peculiar to the animal itself of which he has knowledge or is put on notice; and insofar as such propensities are of a nature likely to cause injury he must exercise reasonable care to guard against them and to prevent injuries which are reasonably to be anticipated from them. In this respect, a vicious or dangerous disposition or propensity may consist of mere mischievousness or playfulness of the animal, which, because of its size or nature, might lead to injury, for it is the act of the animal, rather than its state of mind, which charges the owner or keeper with liability. 4 Am.Jur.2d Animals § 86, p. 332 (1962). Accord, 3A C.J.S. Animals § 177, pp. 668-669 (1973); see Mungo v. Bennett, 238 S.C. 79, 119 S.E.2d 522 (1961); Groner v. Hedrick, 403 Pa. 148, 169 A.2d 302 (1961); Pennyan v. Alexander, 229 Miss. 704, 91 So.2d 728 (1957); Loftin v. McCrainie, 47 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1950). The Paytons testified that their German shepherd dog would stop short of strangers but would continue barking. This fact, however, would not be known to those encountering the dog. [6] It has been said that with respect to such dogs [German shepherd dogs], `[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that the court can almost take judicial knowledge of the fact that police dogs are, by nature, vicious, inheriting the wild and untamed characteristics of their wolf ancestors.' [Citation omitted] Ford v. Steindon, 35 Misc.2d 339, 232 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (1962). In Machacado v. City of New York, 80 Misc.2d 889, 365 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975), an action was brought by a woman who sustained injuries when, in an attempt to avoid what was believed to be an imminent attack by a ferocious animal, she slipped on a snow covered sidewalk after the defendant's German shepherd dog emerged from behind a brick wall on the defendant's property and hurled itself against a cyclone fence separating the sidewalk and the property. In denying a motion to dismiss the complaint, the New York Supreme Court, Queens County, held: It is for a jury to determine whether the owner had the duty to do other than erect the fence knowing that it bordered upon a sidewalk used by the public and that his dog had the propensity to charge at and frighten passing pedestrians. Similarly, the issues of proximate cause and foreseeability are questions of fact. One cannot avoid liability solely by the creation of a cyclone fence. Danger and physical harm are not of necessity screened out by the presence of a barrier if that barrier is in some way surmountable or permits the threat of danger. The right to harbor animals must yield to the duty of containing them in a reasonable manner so as to avoid the harm that can befall an unsuspecting person, lack of physical contact notwithstanding. Owning and keeping a German shepherd dog in an urban area requires the highest standards to be employed in the protection of the innocent public. The exercise of reasonable care transcends the fence itself thereby requiring a jury's examination of all of the circumstances leading up to the injury. Whether an owner owes no further duty than to erect a fence under the circumstances of this case and without other reasonable safeguards or restraints is a question to be answered by community standards through a jury's verdict. [ Id. at 979-980] The harm which appellants suffered was a consequence of serious mental distress caused by the actions of the Paytons' dog. We have held that there is an obligation to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious mental distress, which duty is owed to those who are foreseeably endangered by a defendant's conduct and is owed with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 174, 472 P.2d 509, 521 (1970). It would be predictable that Mrs. Farrior would become frightened and would retreat to a precarious position. In this respect, it was stated in Machacado v. City of New York, supra at 976, that: Experience and common sense dictate that a person, believing herself to be in imminent danger of attack by a feral animal, will take immediate and precipitous action to avoid injury. As such, if the footing, as in this case, is treacherous or uncertain, it increases the probability that injury will result either from the attacking animal or from the frightened actions of its intended prey. If Mrs. Farrior were negligent in her attempt to escape the charging German shepherd dog, it was for the jury to assess the comparative negligence under the circumstances. HRS § 663-31 (Supp. 1975). Having examined the evidence in the record, it is our judgment that, under the circumstances of this case, there was sufficient evidence and inferences therefrom for reasonable persons in the exercise of fair and impartial judgment to reach different conclusions as to the crucial issue. It is also our judgment that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that the appellees knew or should have known that their dog was of a vicious or dangerous disposition or propensity within the rules and authorities cited above. The nature and extent of the Paytons' duty as landowners, as distinct from Kim's duty as the person in charge of the dog, to persons who might intrude upon the makai portion of their property under the circumstances of this case, was not briefed or argued and we will not anticipate the question. See Restatement of Torts, § 512 (1938); Restatement, Second, Torts § 335 (1965); Restatement, Second, Torts § 512 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1964). Although the issue was not raised by the parties, we felt it necessary to comment on the effect of Kim's age in respect to the liability of his parents. The record fails to establish whether Kim was a minor or had reached the age of majority at the time of the incident. If Kim were a minor, the liability of Mr. and Mrs. Payton may be established pursuant to HRS § 577-3 (Supp. 1975). [7] Even if Kim had reached the age of majority, [8] Mr. and Mrs. Payton may be held liable as joint owners of the German shepherd dog. Appellees, in their answer to the amended complaint, admit that they owned, kept and harbored the German shepherd dog. The fact that Mr. and Mrs. Payton were not at home at the time of the incident would not necessarily absolve them of liability for their negligence in improperly maintaining a vicious or dangerous dog with knowledge of the dog's vicious or dangerous propensities. See Harris v. Fisher, 115 N.C. 318, 20 S.E. 461 (1894); State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Craig, supra . It was at their instance or with their approval that the dog was given the general run of the property, the makai portion of which was unfenced. It was in this area that the critical events leading to the appellants' injuries occurred. At common law, joint owners of an animal may be liable in an action for injuries caused by such animal. Oakes v. Spaulding, 40 Vt. 347, 94 Am.Dec. 404 (1867). In addition, it is stated that: Where joint ownership in a vicious animal exists, one joint owner ordinarily owes to third persons the same degree of care to protect them from its attacks as does the other, unless the peculiar circumstances of the given case should relieve one or the other from that duty. 4 Am.Jur.2d Animals, § 91, p. 338 (1962). See Oakes v. Spaulding, supra ; Swain v. Tillett, 269 N.C. 46, 152 S.E.2d 297 (1967). Thus, it is clear that Mr. and Mrs. Payton, along with their son, Kim, are proper defendants in the present case. HRS § 663-1 (Supp. 1975). Appellants also contend that a violation of a municipal ordinance [9] is evidence of negligence as a matter of law and that the trial court erred in finding otherwise. We find appellants' contentions without merit. Although this may be true under certain circumstances, [10] such ordinances were not in evidence nor were they called to the attention of the trial court for judicial notice. See e.g. Cooper v. Sawyer, 48 Haw. 394, 405 P.2d 394 (1965). HRS § 622-13 (Supp. 1975) [11] is specific upon the proof of the existence of an ordinance and its terms. When a statute provides the method of proof of an ordinance to make it admissible as evidence, that method must be strictly followed. Territory v. Yoshikawa, 41 Haw. 45, 47 (1955); State v. Shak, 51 Haw. 626, 466 P.2d 420 (1970). The trial court did not err, for in the absence of proof of the existence of and the terms of the ordinances alleged to have been violated, it could not have properly taken judicial notice of them. We cannot now take cognizance of them.