Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Admission of Hearsay Evidence Under The Co-conspirator Exception

Text: Grandison next argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the admission of hearsay evidence under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. This is so, he argues, because the State had not proven the existence of a conspiracy by independent proof showing his participation therein. Furthermore, he argues that several of the statements related to matters not within the scope of the conspiracy and several statements were made by someone not alleged to be part of a conspiracy. After reviewing the record we perceive no merit to Grandison's contentions. Grandison concedes that out of court declarations of one conspirator made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against a co-conspirator as an exception to the hearsay rule. See Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 245, 157 A.2d 119, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 721, 80 S.Ct. 1599, 4 L.Ed.2d 1521 (1960). What Grandison seems to argue is that before this hearsay exception is available, there must be a prima facie showing of the existence of a conspiracy and his participation therein. To the contrary, it is not necessary that a conspiracy be conclusively established before the declarations are admissible. Flexibility in the order of proof is allowed. Greenwald, 221 Md. at 257, 157 A.2d at 126; see Hill v. State, 231 Md. 458, 461, 190 A.2d 795, 796, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 861, 84 S.Ct. 127, 11 L.Ed.2d 87 (1963); Mason, Taylor and Taylor v. State, 18 Md. App. 130, 137, 305 A.2d 492, 497 (1973). In the instant case, we have reviewed the record and are persuaded that there was ample evidence presented, independent of the challenged hearsay statements, of the existence of a conspiracy to justify the trial court's application of this hearsay exception. For example, Grandison's letter of March 14 to Janet Moore telling her to take Short (Evans) to see Rodney (Kelly) to take care of something to do with his upcoming trial; the evidence of Evans' and Moore's visit thereafter with Grandison in the City Jail; and Theresa Purdie's testimony that Evans, Moore, and Kelly all spoke to Grandison over her phone about protective glass at a motel. In addition, Calvin Harper testified that Kelly took a gun to show to Evans and the next day Kelly left with the gun and returned without it. There was also testimony to the effect that Kelly got $500.00 from a Michael Queen, which apparently was used to obtain the gun. It is settled that not much in the way of independent evidence is needed to show the existence of a conspiracy and an accused's involvement therein. See Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 378 A.2d 1104 (1977). In our view the independent evidence in this case was sufficient. Finally, Grandison contends that there was one instance of double hearsay which did not fall within the co-conspirator exception and that another statement could not be said to be in furtherance of the conspiracy. Furthermore, he complains that one statement that Grandison told Purdie  she should deny knowing Charlene Sparrow  was made after the conspiracy had ended. We find no merit in these contentions.