Opinion ID: 2408478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior ConvictionCR 87-1985

Text: For his second assignment of error, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred in using a 1987 burglary and theft of property conviction in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Docket No. CR-87-1985, in determining his sentence as an habitual offender under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-501 (Repl.1993). The State has the burden of proving a defendant's prior conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement. Byrum v. State, 318 Ark. 87, 884 S.W.2d 248 (1994). On appeal, the test is whether there is substantial evidence that the defendant was previously convicted of the felony in question. Id. In Heard v. State, 316 Ark. 731, 876 S.W.2d 231 (1994), we reviewed the statutory method of proof of previous convictions as follows: (a) A previous conviction or finding of guilt of a felony may be proved by any evidence that satisfies the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was convicted or found guilty. (b) The following are sufficient to support a finding of a prior conviction or finding of guilt: (1) A certified copy of the record of a previous conviction or finding of guilt by a court of record; (2) A certificate of the warden or other chief officer of a penal institution of this state or of another jurisdiction, containing the name and fingerprints of the defendant as they appear in the records of his office; or (3) A certificate of the chief custodian of the records of the United States Department of Justice, containing the name and fingerprints of the defendant as they appear in the records of his office. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-504 (Repl.1993). In the present case, the trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury, during which the State introduced a certified copy of the trial court's docket sheet in Pulaski County Circuit Court, which indicated that appellant had pleaded guilty to burglary and theft of property in CR87-1985. While the docket sheet did not reflect an entry of judgment, it indicated that appellant had received a suspended sentence in the case and had been represented by attorney James Phillips. The State offered the testimony of attorney Phillips, who testified during the in-camera hearing that he had appeared in court and had represented appellant on the charges in question. Mr. Phillips recalled that the disposition of the case had taken place in Judge Floyd Lofton's chambers, where appellant pleaded guilty to something involving bicycles. According to Mr. Phillips, Judge Lofton was going to put appellant in the penitentiary, but appellant convinced him otherwise. After hearing this evidence, the trial court announced that it was convinced that appellant had been convicted of the prior offense in question, and allowed the State to present the evidence to the jury for consideration in the penalty phase. Appellant first contends that the certified copy of the trial court's docket notation is hearsay. Under A.R.E. 803(8), a record of a public office setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities is not hearsay. Thus, appellant's argument is without merit. Appellant also complains that, because the State's evidence did not reflect that a judgment of conviction was entered in CR87-1985, the conviction for burglary and theft of property could not properly be used to enhance his sentence. We have previously rejected this argument in Reeves v. State, 263 Ark. 227, 564 S.W.2d 503, cert. denied 439 U.S. 964, 99 S.Ct. 450, 58 L.Ed.2d 422 (1978). In that case, Reeves questioned the admissibility of the State's proof of previous convictions under the habitual criminal statute. Three of Reeves's four convictions that were proved showed that the sentences had been suspended. On appeal, Reeves argued that the sentences were not convictions within the meaning of the habitual criminal law. In rejecting Reeves's argument, we reviewed our previous holdings as follows: In Rogers v. State, 260 Ark. 232, 538 S.W.2d 300 (1976), we held that under the habitual criminal statute in effect in 1975, a judgment imposing a suspended sentence was admissible as a conviction. Act 228 of 1953, as amended. That statute was superseded by the Criminal Code, which became effective on January 1, 1976, under which the case at bar was tried. Act 280 of 1975, 1001 (a section now in turn superseded by Act 474 of 1977, 4; Ark. Stat. Ann. 41-1001 [Repl.1977]). We do not see, however, any such difference between the language of the statute construed in the Rogers case and that of the 1975 Code as to indicate a change in the legislative intention. 263 Ark. at 230-1, 564 S.W.2d 503. While it is true that a docket notation is not the entry of a final judgment, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-504(a) provides that a previous conviction may be proved by any evidence that satisfies the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was convicted or found guilty. Id. In Heard, supra , we noted that the original commentary to the statute provides: The Commission wished to make clear the fact that the state may prove a previous felony conviction by means other than introduction of the certificates described in the statute. See Original Commentary to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-504 (Repl.1993). In the present case, appellant makes no suggestion whatsoever that the certified docket sheet offered by the State did not correctly reflect that he had been convicted of burglary and theft of property in CR87-1985. See Heard, supra . Appellant's counsel in CR87-1985, Mr. Phillips, did not dispute the conviction; rather, he recalled that appellant had pleaded guilty in the trial judge's chambers and had in fact talked the trial judge out of sentencing him to a term of imprisonment. Under these circumstances, there was substantial evidence to satisfy the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had been previously convicted of the felonies in CR87-1985. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred in allowing the State to submit evidence of this prior conviction to the jury for consideration in recommending appellant's sentence.