Opinion ID: 1942621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Estate's amended complaint relates back to the date the original complaint was filed pursuant to M.R.C.P. 15(c).

Text: ¶ 19. Some of the defendants were named in both the original complaint and the amended complaint. Bedford Care Center of Hattiesburg, L.L.C.; Nicole M. Bevon; Frances Griffin; Brenda J. Leone; and Mike Hatten were named in the original complaint and later dismissed by the trial court. Thus, those five Original Defendants were no longer party to this lawsuit. However, Bedford Health Properties, L.L.C.; Hattiesburg Medical Park, Inc.; Hattiesburg Medical Park Management Corporation; and Michael E. McElroy, Sr., (collectively the four Original/Amended Defendants) were named in both the original and amended complaints. Therefore, this Court now must consider whether the amended complaint related back to the original complaint as to the seven newly added Amended Defendants and the four Original/Amended Defendants that were named in both the original and amended complaint. ¶ 20. The Amended Defendants argue that the Estate failed to meet the requirements of Rule 15(c). The Estate contends that even if the substitution via Rule 9(h) is incorrect, then provided the parties had notice and the other elements of Rule 15(c) are met, the amendment is proper. ¶ 21. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides: (c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(h) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining the party's defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. An amendment pursuant to Rule 9(h) is not an amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted and such amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. (Emphasis added). ¶ 22. In Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher, 926 So.2d 890, 894-95 (Miss.2006), this Court described the practical application of Rule 15(c). This Court held: [W]hen the amended complaint does change a named defendant, as here, there are two additional requirements: notice and knowledge by the defendant who would be named. Id. These two additional requirements must be met within the Rule 4(h) time period, or 120 days of the original complaint. Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc., 669 So.2d 92, 94 (Miss.1996) (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986)). Thus, it is not that one of the requirements of Rule 15(c) is that the amendment change a party; instead, it is that only those amended pleadings which do change a party are the pleadings which have three requirements. To pinpoint the rule as it applies to this case, the three requirements of a complaint that changes a named defendant are: (1) the claim in the amended complaint must arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as that set forth in the original complaint; (2) the newly-named defendant must have received notice of the action within the 120 days; and, (3) the newly-named defendant must have or should have known that an action would be brought against him within the 120 days unless a mistake existed as to the parties' identities. ¶ 23. The trial court granted leave for the Estate to amend its original complaint. M.R.C.P. 15(a) states, in part leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. The Amended Defendants assert that the Estate (1) made significant and substantial changes in the conduct, transaction, or occurrences which formed the basis of the claim set forth in the original complaint, and (2) added new parties whose identities were known at the time of the filing of the original complaint. In Issue I, we already determined that the seven new defendants added by the amended complaint were not fictitious parties pursuant to Rule 9(h); therefore, there is no exception of the automatic relation back to the original complaint. ¶ 24. There are two major distinctions between the original complaint and the amended complaint. The place of the alleged injuries and Williams's residence are different in the original complaint and the amended complaint. The original complaint incorrectly cited the place of the alleged injuries and Williams's residence as Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg, whereas the amended complaint correctly cited Conva-Rest of Northgate as the place of the alleged injuries and Williams's residence. Furthermore, there are a number of changes in the named licensees; administrators; and parties that owned, operated, and/or controlled the two nursing facilities in the amended complaint. ¶ 25. The comments to M.R.C.P. 15(c) concerning the first test to determine whether an amendment relates back to the original complaint is whether the amended claim or defense arose from the same `conduct, transaction, or occurrence' as the original. M.R.C.P. 15(c) cmt. The distinction that the parties make in regard to whether the amended complaint relates back to the original complaint is relatively simple. The Amended Defendants emphasize the words and descriptions in the original and amended complaints. The original complaint incorrectly listed Williams as residing in Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg. The place of the alleged injuries also were incorrect in the original complaint. The amended complaint correctly listed Williams as residing at Conva-Rest of Northgate. In addition, the Amended Defendants argue that the original complaint contained incorrect names of individual administrators, licensees, and directors. Therefore, the Amended Defendants cite to differences in locations and identities in the original and amended complaints. In contrast, the Estate argues that the claims are based upon the injuries that Williams allegedly suffered while a resident at the nursing facility, not the location. ¶ 26. Both parties cite to numerous cases to demonstrate whether the Estate met the conduct, transaction, or occurrence test of M.R.C.P. 15(c). The Defendants rely on Parker v. Miss. Game and Fish Comm'n, 555 So.2d 725 (Miss.1989) and Bracey v. Sullivan, 899 So.2d 210 (Miss.Ct.App.2005). In Parker, this Court noted that the standard for determining whether amendments qualify under Rule 15(c) is not simply an identity of transaction test . . . the courts also inquire into whether the opposing party had been put on notice regarding the claim or defense raised by the amended pleadings. Parker, 555 So.2d at 731. The amended complaint in Parker sought to add a claim of malicious prosecution to the two claims in the original complaint which were false imprisonment and false arrest. Id. at 726. This Court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the identity of transaction test. Id. at 731. The Court reasoned that the conduct, transaction, or occurrence which gave rise to the false arrest and false imprisonment claims in the original complaint was the arrest. Id. The conduct, transaction, or occurrence which gave rise to the added malicious prosecution claim in the amended complaint was their prosecution. Id. This Court held that the arrest and prosecution were separate and distinct events which failed the identity of transaction test. Id. Furthermore, this Court found that there was not proper notice because the original complaint failed to inform of the criminal prosecution. Id. Therefore, the Court in Parker determined that the amended claim failed the relation back doctrine of M.R.C.P. 15(c). Id. ¶ 27. In Bracey, the Court of Appeals likewise found that a proposed amended complaint did not relate back to the original complaint. Bracey, 899 So.2d at 212. Bracey's original complaint was based on a claim of malpractice for prescribing an ACE inhibitor which allegedly caused injury and the death of Addie Mae Palmer. Id. Thereafter, Bracey sought to amend the complaint by adding the doctor who prescribed the allopurinal. Id. at 213. ¶ 28. The Court of Appeals found that the original complaint put the doctor on notice of a negligence claim due to prescribing ACE inhibitors, whereas the amended complaint put the doctor on notice of a negligence claim for prescribing allopurinal. Bracey, 899 So.2d at 214. These claims were determined to be separate and distinct events which failed to satisfy the identity of transaction test and failed to inform the doctor of a particular occurrence. Id. The Court of Appeals also determined that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the notice requirement. Id. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded that the doctor received notice based on his attorney receiving a copy of the amended complaint. Id. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to met the requirements of the relation back doctrine and the amended complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. ¶ 29. The Amended Defendants argue that the case before the Court today falls under the holdings of Parker and Bracey. However, Parker is distinguishable from the facts of this case because the plaintiffs in Parker added a new claim. Here, the Estate reasserted the same eight claims in both the original and amended complaints. Accordingly, it did not add a new claim, unlike Parker. ¶ 30. While the decisions of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court, the logic supplied by the Court of Appeals in Bracey is flawed and not applicable when applied to the case at hand. Here, the Amended Defendants cite Bracey in part for the proposition that the identity of transaction requires the amended complaint to arise out of the same nucleus of common facts. Bracey, 899 So.2d at 213. The Court of Appeals in Bracey stated: [T]he Mississippi Supreme Court has noted in dicta that the same transaction or occurrence language means that the claims arise from `the same nucleus of common facts.' Kiddy v. Lipscomb, 628 So.2d 1355, 1357 (Miss.1993). However, the Kiddy case concerns Rule 20 joinder and refers to the same transaction and occurrence language in Rule 20, not the language of Rule 15(c). Furthermore, this case, unlike joinder cases, has only one plaintiff, the Estate. This is not a situation where various defendants have different products and plaintiffs have different medical histories to consider. Here, the Estate is the sole plaintiff suing corporate entities, named and served with both the original complaint and amended complaint, and individuals that are all closely related to the nursing care of Williams. Clearly, this is not a situation at all analogous to joinder. Furthermore, in Bracey the plaintiff was attempting to add a new malpractice claim. Here, the Estate is not adding new claims as discussed above with Parker and now Bracey. ¶ 31. In their reply brief, the Amended Defendants also cite Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Adams, 922 So.2d 787, 790 (Miss.2006), for the minimum pleadings requirements. In Adams, a plaintiff claimed exposure to hazardous materials at the Railroad's yards, shops, and other facilities. This Court held: [A]t a minimum, a complaint must identify a litigable event which entitles the particular plaintiff to recover. That is to say, the complaint must disclose, in general terms, what each defendant did wrong to each plaintiff, and when and where the alleged wrong took place. Id. The plaintiff failed to stated where the yards, shops, and other facilities were located. Here, the Estate gave the required information but made a mistake in the location. ¶ 32. The Estate, on the other hand, argues that this Court's holdings in Estes and Womble are applicable to this case. In Estes, the plaintiff filed against Donald Starnes suit for injuries resulting from a car accident. Estes v. Starnes, 732 So.2d 251, 252-53 (Miss.1999). More than three years after the accident, Estes sought to amend her complaint to name David Starnes, Donald's son, as the driver of the vehicle that hit her. Id. at 253. The trial court denied the motion to amend the complaint. Id. This Court held that the trial court erred by denying Estes's motion to amend the complaint. Id. We held that David and Donald had notice of the action because of Estes's negotiations with the Starnes's insurance company and the suit filed against Donald. Id. The Starnes also knew or should have known that David was the correct party to Estes's suit even though Estes's named the incorrect person, Donald. Id. Further, this Court found that there was no prejudice because Donald had legal representation since the suit began in 1994. Id. ¶ 33. In Womble, the plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to add some doctors and an emergency group. Womble, 618 So.2d at 1265. Womble died on April 11, 1986, and suit was filed on March 28, 1988. Id. at 1268. The trial court granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor because Dr. Longmire and Dr. Weatherall were added more than two years and eight months after Womble's death. Id. at 1265. Another defendant, Dr. Calhoun, was added three years and seven months later. Id. at 1266. ¶ 34. This Court held that pursuant to M.R.C.P. 15(c) the summary judgment was proper as to Dr. Longmire and Dr. Weatherall. Womble, 618 So.2d at 1268. The Court reasoned that the insurance carrier for these two doctors sent correspondence to a lawyer retained to represent them on April 20, 1988. Id. at 1267. The doctors received copies of the correspondence and met with the lawyer. Id. at 1267-68. ¶ 35. This Court concluded that Dr. Longmire and Dr. Weatherall had notice of the suit and knew or should have known that they would have been included in the lawsuit. This Court also reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Emergency Room Group, Ltd. Womble, 618 So.2d at 1268. While Dr. Longmire and Dr. Weatherall were officers of the corporation in 1989, the annual report did not indicate the time period covered by the report. Id. The records did not indicate that the doctors were on the board at the time of their notice of Womble's lawsuit. Id. Therefore, this Court held that there was a question as to the roles of the two doctors at the time that they acquired notice of the lawsuit. Id. As for Dr. Calhoun, this Court held that there was no indication that he possessed awareness that he would have been included in the lawsuit and affirmed the summary judgment for only him. Id. ¶ 36. As for the cases cited by the Estate, the original suit in Estes was filed in 1994 and the original suit was in Womble was filed in 1988. A 1998 advisory committee historical note for M.R.C.P. 15 states [e]ffective July 1, 1998, Rule 15(c) was amended to state that the relation back period includes the time period permitted for service of process under Rule 4(h). M.R.C.P. 4(h) provides for 120 days service of a summons and complaint. Estes was decided in 1999 and Womble in 1993; however, the 1998 advisory note was not applicable because the plaintiffs in Estes and Womble filed the complaints in 1994 and 1988, prior to the 1998 change in the rules. Today, the issue of newly added defendants in Estes and Womble would fail because M.R.C.P. 15(c) imposes the time limitations of 120 days for service and summons pursuant to M.R.C.P. 4(h) as the time period within which a newly added defendant must have notice of the filing of the original complaint. See Walker, 926 So.2d at 895. However, we are left with this Court's reasoning as to the notice requirements pursuant to M.R.C.P. 15(c)(1) and (2). ¶ 37. The Amended Defendants assert that the Estate failed to meet the initial requirement of Rule 15(c) that the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. We disagree. They argue that the original complaint and the amended complaint rely on two different factual basis for the claims. The original complaint stated: 1. Williams resided at Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg located at 10 Medical Boulevard, Hattiesburg, Forrest County, Mississippi; 2. Nicole M. Bevon and Michael E. McElroy, Sr. were licensees of ConvaRest of Hattiesburg; 3. Frances Griffin, Brenda J. Leone, Michael E. McElroy, Sr., and Mike Hatten were all administrators of ConvaRest of Hattiesburg; 4. The defendants, including the fictitious parties, owned, operated and/or controlled ConvaRest of Hattiesburg; and 5. The eight claims in the complaint arose out of the care and treatment of Williams at ConvaRest of Hattiesburg. On the other hand, the amended complaint contained the following information: 1. Williams resided at ConvaRest of Northgate located at 298 and 300 Cahal Street, Hattiesburg, Forrest County, Mississippi; 2. Michael E. McElroy, Jr. was the licensee of ConvaRest of Northgate; 3. Michael E. McElroy, Sr., Robert Perry and Gina Simonetti were all administrators of ConvaRest of Northgate; 4. The defendants, including the fictitious parties, owned, operated and/or controlled ConvaRest of Northgate; and 5. The eight claims in the amended complaint arose out of the care and treatment of Williams at ConvaRest of Northgate. ¶ 38. The original complaint and amended complaint had the same wording as to the conduct asserted in the eight claims of (1) negligence by the corporations and licensees, (2) negligence by the administrators, (3) medical malpractice, (4) malice and/or gross negligence, (5) fraud, (6) breach of fiduciary duty, (7) statutory survival claim, and (8) statutory wrongful death claim. A few of the names of the personnel and the location of the injuries were changed as reflected in the above comparison of the original and amended complaint, but the conduct was the same in both documents ¶ 39. We first will address the four Original/Amended Defendants that were named in both the original complaint and the amended complaint, those being, Bedford Health Properties, L.L.C.; Hattiesburg Medical Park, Inc.; Hattiesburg Medical Park Management Corporation; and Michael E. McElroy, Sr. We find that the facts of this case are unique and merit close review. First, as stated above these four defendants were named in the original and amended complaints. Second, one of the corporate entities, Bedford Health Properties, L.L.C., owned both Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg and Conva-Rest of Northgate. Third, Michael E. McElroy, Sr., had 26% ownership interest in Bedford Health Properties, L.L.C., which owned Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg and Conva-Rest-Northgate. Fourth, in addition to his ownership interest, Michael E. McElroy, Sr., was served both the original and amended complaint in his capacity as licensee of Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg and administrator of Conva-Rest-Northgate. Fifth, Michael E. McElroy, Sr. and Jr., were the registered agents for all the corporate entities served in the original complaint and amended complaint. Sixth, defense counsel was the same for all the Original Defendants and the Amended Defendants. Seventh, the corporate entities all have the same address. Finally, while the same corporate counsel may not be a decisive factor, it imparts more weight here because of all the other intertwined relationships in this case. ¶ 40. Notwithstanding the unique circumstances of this case, the four Original/Amended Defendants knew that there was simply a mistake in the location and corresponding personnel of the Estate's claims. In fact, the defendants pointed out the incorrect location of the nursing home to the Estate in their answers. Furthermore, the injuries alleged to be suffered by Williams were the same, and the same eight claims stated in the amended complaint were stated in the original complaint. No new claim was added to the amended complaint. ¶ 41. Mississippi is a notice pleading state. Estate of Stevens v. Wetzel, 762 So.2d 293, 295 (Miss.2000). M.R.C.P. 8 governs general pleadings. The Court in Wetzel held: While M.R.C.P. 8 has eliminated the technical forms of pleadings required in years past, notice pleadings are still required to place the opposing party on notice of the claim being asserted. No magic words are required by the Rules of Civil Procedure; however, this Court has previously stated: Under Rule 8 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, it is only necessary that the pleadings provide sufficient notice to the defendant of the claims and grounds upon which relief which is sought. Wetzel, 762 So.2d at 295. ¶ 42. The Estate did not change the amended complaint to add a new claim. The premise of the lawsuit, to sue the owners, managers, and operators of a nursing facility for injuries suffered by Williams, remained the same. ¶ 43. The Amended Defendants argue that the amended complaint failed to meet an identity of transaction because the amended claims did not arise from the same nucleus of common facts. As discussed, the cases relied on by the Amended Defendants are distinguishable from the case at hand. Unlike those cases which concerned a significant change in the pleadings by adding a new claim, the Estate did not change the eight claims stated in the original complaint. Importantly, Bedford Health Properties, L.L.C., owned both Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg and Conva-Rest of Northgate. Also, Michael E. McElroy, Sr., one of the original named defendants, was an administrator of Conva-Rest-Northgate and a licensee of Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg. In addition, the four Original/Amended Defendants had notice of the lawsuit because they were named and served the original complaint. The Estate was made aware of the error by the Original Defendants which included the four Original/Amended Defendants. Furthermore, all the Original Defendants and Amended Defendants used the same defense counsel for their representation. As such, there has been continuous legal representation. ¶ 44. We find that as to the four Original/Amended Defendants, the amended complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint. These four Original/Amended Defendants were party to both the original and amended complaints. We find that the trial court correctly determined that the amended complaint related back to these four Original/Amended Defendants and properly allowed the amendment as to these four Original/Amended Defendants. We also find that the conduct, transaction, or occurrence test of Rule 15(c) is satisfied. We find that the change in location from Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg to Conva-Rest-Northgate met Rule 15(c). ¶ 45. This Court now turns to the seven newly added Amended Defendants and whether these individuals and entities had notice of the original lawsuit pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1) and (2). These newly added Amended Defendants were M.E. McElroy, Inc.; HMP Management; Bedford Care CenterMonroe Hall, L.L.C.; Bedford Care CenterWarren Hall, L.L.C.; Michael McElroy, Jr.; Robert Perry; and Gina Simonetti. ¶ 46. This Court's analysis in Walker, is applicable to the facts before us today. When analyzing Rule 15(c)(1) and (2) the newly-named defendant must have received notice of the action within the 120 days; and, [] the newly-named defendant must have or should have known that an action would be brought against him within the 120 days unless a mistake existed as to the parties' identities. Walker, 926 So.2d at 894-95. Therefore, the newly added defendants had to have notice, not service of process, of the lawsuit within 120 days of filing the original complaint. ¶ 47. This Court recently addressed the application of the notice requirement of Rule 15(c) in Walker. That case involved a collision between a vehicle, driven by Gallagher, and a eighteen-wheeler tractor and trailer rig. Walker, 926 So.2d at 892. The driver of the tractor truck, Anders, allegedly ran a red light and struck Gallagher's vehicle. Id. Anders, Randy Hunt, and Randy Hunt Trucking, Inc., the owner of the eighteen-wheeler, were sued within the three year statute of limitations by Gallagher. Id. During the discovery process, Gallagher learned that Ralph Walker, Inc. (Walker), owed the trailer rig that was involved in the collision. Id. Anders was delivering a load to Walker's business at the time of the accident. Id. In addition, Anders was hauling loads pursuant to Walker's directions during this time period. Id. Walker also had an agreement with Randy Hunt Trucking, Inc., to be in charge of dispatching the eighteen-wheeler driven by Anders. Id. ¶ 48. Once Gallagher learned of Walker's existence, he filed an amended complaint to add Walker, almost five years after the collision, to the lawsuit. Id. The circuit court granted leave to file the amended complaint and denied Walker's subsequent motion to dismiss for failure to file within the statute of limitations. Id. This Court reversed the circuit court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss, and rendered judgment in favor of Walker. Id. ¶ 49. After analyzing whether Walker received notice of the lawsuit and whether Walker knew or should have known that a lawsuit would have been brought against him by Gallagher pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1) and (2), this Court found that Walker did not have notice or knowledge of the lawsuit being filed within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint. Walker, 926 So.2d at 897. ¶ 50. To reach that decision, this Court first considered Rule 15(c)(1). This Court determined that Walker received no formal notice of the lawsuit between the filing of the complaint on March 21, 2002, and April 2004, when he was named as a defendant in the action. Id. at 895. In fact, this Court found that Gallagher offer[ed] no proof of evidence outside of speculative theories that Walker had sufficient notice to meet the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1). Id. (Emphasis added). This Court further held: No proof has been presented of any notice to Walker whatsoever within the 120 days after the original complaint was filed, and we cannot assume Walker had notice sufficient to satisfy the rule based solely on speculation. Id. at 895-96. ¶ 51. This Court then determined that Gallagher failed to meet the requirements of Rule 15(c)(2). The purpose of the second prong of Rule 15(c) is to allow some leeway to a party who made a mistake, so long as the party does what is required within the time period under the rule. Walker, 926 So.2d at 896. Gallagher argued numerous reasons why Walker knew or should have known of the lawsuit within 120 days of its filing, such as, damage to the trailer from the collision, a delay in the delivery on the day of the collision, possible insurance claims, the business relationship between Walker and the other defendants, and a reasonable person should assume litigation would result from a collision between an eighteen-wheeler and a car. Id. This Court found that Gallagher's arguments were assumptions and held: None of [Gallagher's] theories convince us that Walker knew, or should have known, within 120 days of the complaint, a lawsuit existed. Gallagher makes many great leaps in his reasoning, relying almost entirely on assumptions. The litigation here did not begin until almost three years after the accident, and the existence of damage to Walker's trailer is simply insufficient to prove Walker's knowledge of litigation. A delay in delivery and the existence of a business relationship also do not automatically rise to the level or putting Walker on notice of the existence of a lawsuit, particularly when Walker was not brought into the proceedings until almost two years after the complaint was filed. Id. Therefore, this Court found that the damage to Walker's trailer, a delay in the delivery on the date of the collision to Walker's business, and the business relationship between Walker and the other defendants was insufficient notice to Walker of the filing of the lawsuit. ¶ 52. Here, Williams died on December 28, 2002. The original complaint was filed on December 13, 2002. The Original Defendants all filed their answers no later than February 14, 2003. In their answers, the Defendants stated that Williams resided at Conva-Rest of Northgate and not Conva-Rest of Hattiesburg. On July 16, 2003, the Estate filed a motion to substitute and leave to amend the complaint. A draft amended complaint was attached to the motion. The trial court granted leave to file the amended complaint on August 10, 2004. The Estate filed the amended complaint on August 26, 2004. Therefore, the amended complaint was filed outside the 120 day time period provided in Rule 4(h). At the summary judgment hearing and on appeal, the Estate argued that the Defendants had notice of the lawsuit. There was no distinction made between the four original/Amended Defendants and the seven newly added Amended Defendants. The Amended Defendants argued that the events that prompted the filing of the amended complaint did not arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. In addition, the Amended Defendants argued that there was no mistake in the identities of the newly added Defendants because Hawthorne knew the names of the correct Defendants. ¶ 53. As in Walker, we find that there is no proof pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1) that all of the seven newly-added Amended Defendants had formal notice of the lawsuit between the filing of the original complaint on December 13, 2002, and the filing of the amended complaint in August 2005. ¶ 54. We find that as to Bedford Care CenterMonroe Hall, L.L.C.; Bedford Care CenterWarren Hall, L.L.C.; M.E. McElroy, Inc.; HMP Management [3] ; and Michael McElroy, Jr., these five newly added Amended Defendants had notice of the lawsuit within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint. Michael McElroy, Jr., was the registered agent for service of process for Bedford Health Properties, L.L.C., named in the original complaint and, therefore, would have had knowledge of the original complaint. He also had a 24.5% interest in Bedford Health Properties, L.L.C. His father, Michael McElroy, Sr., had a 26% ownership interest in Bedford Health Properties, Inc. Furthermore, Bedford Care CenterMonroe Hall and Bedford Care CenterWarren Hall were wholly owned by Bedford Health Properties, Inc., and have knowledge of the original complaint by way of its corporate relationship. ¶ 55. As to M.E. McElroy, Inc., and HMP Management, both these companies had the same corporate address as the other properly noticed corporate Amended Defendants. In addition, the record indicates that M.E. McElroy, Inc., and HMP Management operated and managed ConvaRest of Northgate, respectively, until at least March 31, 2001. Michael McElroy, Sr., was president of M.E. McElroy, Inc., had 100% ownership of ConvaRest of Northgate and had 100% ownership of HMP Management at that time. Also, the record indicates that M.E. McElroy, Inc., d/b/a ConvaRest of Northgate, owned the facility in question for some period of time prior to April 2001. ¶ 56. As to Robert Perry and Gina Simonetti, there is no proof that these individuals would have known of the lawsuit within 120 days of filing the complaint. The record provides no proof that Perry and Simonetti were notified by any of the other Original or Amended Defendants that the lawsuit existed. While it is highly likely that a current administrator like Perry would be informed of litigation concerning a former resident, there is absolutely no proof in the record to demonstrate notice beyond pure speculation and assumption. As a former administrator, Simonetti may have been informed of the litigation. However, there also is no proof of notice in the record beyond speculation. Again, to determine that these newly added Amended Defendants had notice within 120 days of the filing of the complaint would amount to pure speculation on the part of this Court. This is in line with the logic of Walker. In Walker, this Court found no notice or constructive notice to Walker, even though, Walker's trailer was damaged in the collision and Anders was delivering goods to Walker at the time of the collision. Furthermore, Anders was in effect working for Walker at the time of the collision since Walker had a business relationship with Hunt Trucking, Inc., and Walker was in charge of dispatching Anders for trucking jobs. This Court could have easily found that Walker had notice or constructive notice of the lawsuit based on the facts and the strong ties between Walker and the other defendants. In addition, Rule 15(c)(1) and (2) does not address the notice requirement in terms of constructive notice. ¶ 57. As for Rule 15(c)(2), the Estate argues that the Defendants knew or should have known that but for a mistake in identity an action would have been brought against them. The Estate bases its argument on the assertion that the Defendants stated in their answers that Williams was a resident of ConvaRest of Northgate and not a resident of ConvaRest of Hattiesburg. While this assertion is true of the four Original Defendants, the seven newly added Amended Defendants were not served with process at that point and therefore, made no answer to that effect. [4] As for Bedford Care CenterWarren Hall; Bedford Care CenterMonroe Hall; Michael McElroy, Jr.; M.E. McElroy, Inc.; and HMP Management, they knew or should have known but for the mistake of the Estate that they would have been named as the correct parties to the lawsuit. Michael McElroy, Jr., was on notice as the registered agent for some of the Original Defendants, his father was an registered agent for some of the corporations and was served with process individually. Both men had ownership interests in the nursing homes, both men held offices in some of the newly added corporations, and Michael McElroy, Sr., owned HMP Management. As for the other two Amended Defendants, Perry and Simonetti, we have already determined that they did not meet the requirement of Rule 15(c)(1), therefore, we do not need to address them further. ¶ 58. Accordingly, we find that Bedford Care CenterWarren Hall; Bedford Care CenterMonroe Hall; Michael McElroy, Jr.; M.E. McElroy, Inc.; and HMP Management met the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1) and (2) and were correctly added Amended Defendants. However, we find that Robert Perry and Gina Simonetti failed to meet the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1) and (2) and were not correctly added Amended Defendants.