Opinion ID: 800997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Actually Accepted

Text: The second factor, judicial acceptance of the prior position, is also met. Under Tennessee law, Tennessee courts have a special responsibility to protect a minor’s interest. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-121(b); see also id. § 29-34-105(a); Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 178-79 (Tenn. 2011) (and cases cited therein). That is, before approving the settlement, the state court had to determine that it was in the best interests of the child, so it necessarily “accepted” Watkins’ position in the state court action. And because the state court judge “deem[ed] the compromise to be in the best interest of the minor” here, the order approving and confirming the settlement was “binding on [Arckasier].” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-121(b). In other words, there was “judicial acceptance” of the prior inconsistent position. See Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599 n.5 (stating that judicial acceptance does not require that a party actually prevail on the merits in the prior proceeding but simply that “the first court has adopted the position urged by the party, either 3 Judicial estoppel would apply under state law because Watkins’ statements were made under oath. See Decatur County Bank v. Duck, 969 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Tenn. App. 1997) (“The law of judicial estoppel ordinarily applies to one who has made oath to a state of facts which in a later proceeding [s]he undertakes to contradict.” ) 10 No. 10-5258 Watkins v. Bailey, et al. as a preliminary matter or as part of a final disposition”); Reynolds v. C.I.R., 861 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1988) (same; citing Edwards).