Opinion ID: 11189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the AEDPA/IIRIRA Jurisdiction Provisions

Text: 16 Pichardo did not receive confinement for his 1972 conviction, but rather, probation. Thus, that conviction fails to meet the qualifying criteria. Pichardo's 1988 conviction satisfies the criteria in that it was for a crime unquestionably involving moral turpitude and he received a sentence in excess of one year. 17 Because at least two of Pichardo's convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude that serve as the basis for his deportation must satisfy the conditions of unamended section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act (disregarding any consideration of the date of the crime's commission), Pichardo's third conviction must meet the conditions in order to trigger the judicial review bar enacted by the AEDPA and the IIRIRA. His third conviction was for aggravated assault and Pichardo was sentenced to a minimum prison term of 11 1/2 months with a maximum of 23 months. The facts confront us with two questions: (1) whether such a prison term is to be considered a term of one year or more, and (2) whether aggravated assault under the Pennsylvania statute is a crime involving moral turpitude. 18 For purposes of exclusion and deportation proceedings, an indeterminate sentence is to be considered a sentence for the maximum term imposed. Fonseca-Leite v. INS, 961 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir.1992); see also Nguyen v. INS, 53 F.3d 310 (10th Cir.1995); In re D-, Int.Dec. 3236, 1994 WL 284067 (BIA 1994). Pichardo received a sentence of 11 1/2 to 23 months for his aggravated assault conviction, and the maximum of his sentence, 23 months, is in excess of one year's confinement, thus fulfilling one of the requisite conditions of section 241(a)(2)(A)(i). 19 Regarding the other necessary condition, the Act does not define the term moral turpitude and legislative history does not reveal congressional intent. See Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir.1996). Congress left the term to future administrative and judicial interpretation. Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir.1994). A determination that a crime involves moral turpitude for purposes of deportation is a question of law, which we review de novo. Hamdan, 98 F.3d at 185. Whether a crime involves moral turpitude depends upon the inherent nature of the crime, as defined in the statute concerned, rather than the circumstances surrounding the particular transgression. Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863, 865 (5th Cir.1982). When considering this question, we are limited to the statute and to Pichardo's record of conviction. Id. 20 While we do accord some deference to the BIA's interpretation of questions such as this, see Hamdan, 98 F.3d at 185, no findings regarding moral turpitude were made related to Pichardo's aggravated assault conviction. 4 However, the BIA has summarized the judicial and administrative interpretation of the general definition of moral turpitude, and we have previously relied on its definition. See Id. at 186. 21 Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct that shocks the conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general. Moral turpitude has been defined as an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one of moral turpitude. Among the tests to determine if a crime involves moral turpitude is whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind. 22 Id. (quoting In re Hamdan, at 4 (BIA Jan. 5, 1995) (citations omitted)); see also In re Fualaau, Int.Dec. 3285, 1996 WL 413576, at 3 (BIA 1996) (en banc ). 23 Following Okabe's direction, we turn to the Pennsylvania statute. The Pennsylvania aggravated assault statute provides for four categories of aggravated assault. 5 Among them are attempt offenses. There is no distinction for immigration purposes with respect to moral turpitude between the commission of a crime and the attempt to commit it. In re Davis, Int.Dec. 3181, 1992 WL 443920, at 15 (BIA 1992). We thus examine the commission offenses in the statute for the elements typically involved in assault that have resulted in findings of moral turpitude. Those are bodily injury together with a minimum mens rea of recklessness. See In re Fualaau, at 4; In re Danesh, 19 I & N Dec. 669, 1988 WL 235462, at 4 (BIA 1988). All four categories of commission offenses in 18 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 2702 involve these two elements. 6 In addition, § 2702(a)(4)'s assault with a deadly weapon has long been regarded to involve moral turpitude. See In re Medina, 15 I & N Dec. 611, 612 (BIA 1976). Having found the elements typical to moral turpitude findings to be necessary elements of the statute's commission offenses, all the requisite conditions have been satisfied that trigger the AEDPA's and IIRIRA's judicial review bar. 7 CONCLUSION 24 Because this Court lacks jurisdiction, the petition for review is DISMISSED.