Opinion ID: 1926237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: count i: gross sexual misconduct class a crime

Text: On or about the 1st day of March, 1981, in the Town of Wilton, County of Franklin, State of Maine, the above-named defendant, LEO LEVASSEUR, did engage in a sexual act with [name of alleged victim], who was not his spouse, and who submitted to said sexual act as a result of compulsion. Levasseur argues for the first time on appeal that because the information did not state whether the compulsion was as defined by section 253(1)(A)(1), 253(1)(A)(2), or 253(2)(B), it did not allege an essential element of the crime of gross sexual misconduct and therefore failed to charge an offense. Because the failure of an information to charge an offense shall be noticed and acted upon by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding, Levasseur's present objection has not been waived even though not noticed or suggested at the trial level. M.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2); State v. Michaud, 473 A.2d 399, 402 (Me.1984). We have previously noted that an indictment or information has three constitutionally based functions: (1) to provide the defendant with adequate notice of the charged offense so he may prepare to defend against it; (2) to avoid unfair surprise to the defendant at trial; and (3) to protect the defendant from twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense. State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d 247, 250 (Me.1981). For adequate notice to be provided to a defendant, the information must set out every essential element of the offense. State v. Huntley, 473 A.2d 859, 861 (Me.1984). The reference to the statute and the class of crime in the caption of the information is not a part of the information and cannot supply a missing essential element in the information. State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d at 254-55. In State v. Colson, 405 A.2d 717, 719, 720 (Me.1979), we concluded that section 253 defined several separate and distinct crimes under the label of gross sexual misconduct, each crime being dependent on the particular attendant circumstances involved in the prohibited activity. The language of the instant information does not advise Levasseur which of the distinct crimes of gross sexual misconduct defined in section 253(1)(A)(1), 253(1)(A)(2) or 253(2)(B) he allegedly committed. By failing to inform him of the type of compulsion used to effect the alleged sexual act, the information failed to set forth an essential element of the crime of gross sexual misconduct and is, therefore, insufficient to charge a criminal offense. State v. Michaud, 473 A.2d at 403; State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d 932, 934 (Me.1980). Accordingly, the judgment on Count I of the information must be vacated.