Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence to prove aggravating circumstances in violation of miss. r. evid. 8.03.

Text: ś 317. Evans argues that the trial court erred in allowed the introduction of his prior Texas conviction for aggravated sexual battery in support of the aggravating circumstance that he was previously convicted of a felony involving the use of threat of violence to the person. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(d). Evans argues that this conviction was based upon a plea of nolo contendere and is thus inadmissible hearsay pursuant to M.R.E. 803(22). ś 318. During the sentencing phase, the State introduced certified copies of the indictment and additional documents relating to the State of Texas v. Jason Michael McGowan, [10] 86CR0374, 212th District. Court for Galveston County. Following Evans' objection, the trial court, relying on the Texas classification of aggravated sexual assault, allowed the conviction to be admitted. The trial court noted that this evidence could have also been admitted pursuant to M.R.E. 8.03(24). ś 319. Utilizing traditional conflict of law analysis, Evans argues that Mississippi law, the law of the forum, governs procedural aspects of a trial such as the admission of evidence. Evans, therefore, argues that his prior conviction is inadmissible under M.R.E. 803(22), which states: (22) Judgment of Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty ( but not upon a plea of nolo contendere ), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the state in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility. (emphasis added). ś 320. In Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 874 (Miss.1991), this Court was called upon to decide a similar issue. There, the State sought to introduce a 1974 Texas rape conviction. This Court cautioned the State upon remand for re-sentencing that: Although a trial court is not required to examine the underlying legal validity of the prior conviction, Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1099 (Miss.1987); Phillips v. State, 421 So.2d 476, 481 (Miss. 1982), determining whether a defendant's prior conviction was a felony involving the use or threat of violence requires that this state's statutes be construed and applied. Where as here the conviction occurred in a sister state, this Court does not look to how that state characterizes the question of whether the crime was one of violence, rather, the analysis must be done under Mississippi law. For a conviction to qualify as predicate for an aggravating circumstance under this state's statutes, the conviction from the sister state must have been acquired under a statute which has as an element the use or threat of violence against the person or, by necessity, must involve conduct that is inherently violent or presents a serious potential risk of physical violence to another. United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1010-11 (9th Cir.1988). Id. (emphasis added). ś 321. Holland clearly requires a trial court to utilize Mississippi law in order to determine whether a prior conviction from another state is in fact a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Here, however, this Court is called upon to address whether a prior criminal conviction entered upon a plea of nolo contendere is admissible under the M.R.E. in light of the method by which the conviction was obtained. We now hold that M.R.E. 803(22) does not apply to the situation presented in the case sub judice. ś 322. Rule 803 sets forth numerous hearsay exceptions, one of which is Rule 803(22), which provides that evidence of judgments of previous convictions are exceptions to the hearsay rule. However, judgments entered upon a plea of nolo contendere are not exceptions to the hearsay rule. Evans now argues that 803(22) and the language exempting judgments entered upon a plea of nolo contendere from the exception serve to prohibit the introduction of his prior conviction. ś 323. This rule applies to evidence of a prior judgment offered to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment. Here, however, evidence of Evans' final judgment of conviction was not offered to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment. Rather, the conviction was introduced by the State to prove the prior conviction. In light of the clear language of Rule 803(22), this provision is simply not applicable to the case sub judice and therefore does not prohibit the admission of Evans' prior conviction. The trial court did not err. This issue is without merit.