Opinion ID: 1578120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Even Under the Chmura II Analysis, the Statements are Outside the Bounds of Protected Speech

Text: Even assuming that Chmura II applies in this case, the statements do not constitute protected political speech because they contain objectively factual and provably false connotations. In Chmura II , this Court held: If the communication at issue sets forth objectively factual matters, the communication must then be analyzed to determine whether the statements communicated are literally true.... [I]f the public communication conveys an inaccurate statement, the communication, as a whole, must be analyzed to determine whether the substance, the gist, the sting of the communication is true despite such inaccuracy. Once it has been determined that a judicial candidate has, in fact, made a false public communication, the inquiry then focuses on whether such communication was made knowingly or with reckless disregard. [ Id. at 93, 626 N.W.2d 876.] Further, this Court noted that whether the false communication was made with reckless disregard is determined by using an objective person standard. Id. at 68, 626 N.W.2d 876. Therefore, to avoid censure for false public communications, the statements must be supported by a reasonable factual basis. Id. Here, the statements concerned objectively factual matters: whether the prosecutor conducted no investigation and covered up a murder. There is no dispute that the statements were false: the prosecutor did conduct an investigation and did not cover up a murder. Under Chmura II , we must then determine whether the substance, the gist, the sting of the communication is true despite such inaccuracy. The comments as a whole were false; no serious argument can be made that the gist of the statements was true despite their falsity. Further, contrary to the distinction drawn in Justice Cavanagh's statement, nothing in Chmura II suggests that greater protection should be afforded objectively false statements concerning an elected official's nonfeasance as opposed to malfeasance. This leads to the final step in the analysis: determining whether the false public communication was made knowingly or with reckless disregard. Even if the statements were not made knowingly, no reasonable factual basis exists to support them. Therefore, even applying the Chmura II analysis, the statements are not protected political speech. Finally, the conclusion of the hearing panel and the ADB that the statements were merely matters of opinion because they were prefaced with As far as I'm concerned is untenable under the Chmura II analysis. There, this Court clarified that an expression of opinion is protected under the canon as long as it does not contain provably false factual connotations.  Id. at 93, 626 N.W.2d 876 (emphasis added). Simply concluding that a statement is an expression of opinion does not suffice to end the inquiry. As explained above, the statements contained provably false factual connotations and protection as expressions of opinion therefore cannot be claimed, regardless of how they were prefaced.