Opinion ID: 2747913
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether images were found on the

Text: defendant’s computer; (2) the number of images of child pornography that were found … ; (3) whether the content of the images was evident from their file names … [;] (4) defendant’s knowledge of and ability to access the storage area for the images … [; and (5)] the number of occasions that the images were copied [or downloaded]. 527 F.3d at 67, 69 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Applying those factors, Franz argues that the evidence was not sufficient to allow a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that his receipt of the 202.jpg image was “knowing.”24 We disagree. 24 Franz also argues that the government was required to prove the specific date on which he received the image. We reject that argument. He relies on an unpublished district court case that states, without citation to authority, that when receipt of child pornography is alleged, “the government [is] obliged to prove that the material traveled in interstate commerce, and also the date of receipt.” United States v. MacEwan, No. CRIM.A.04-262, 2004 WL 3019316, at  n.1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 445 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). Proof of the specific date of receipt 41 Two images were found on Franz’s computer. The number is admittedly small, and he may not have known the content of the images from file names alone. But Price testified that someone viewed the 202.jpg image on the internet and again in Franz’s download folder and then saved it to his external hard drive. That chain of events strongly suggests that whoever received the image did so knowingly. Cf. United States v. Brown, 862 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that evidence of ordering child pornography is circumstantial evidence of knowing receipt of child pornography). Price further testified that Franz’s computer had one user-created profile, that Franz lived alone, and that the image was viewed on the computer when the user was logged in as Franz. Finally, Price testified that the folder “Internet Downloads 14” – which was stored on the root drive of the external hard drive and would have been visible to would doubtless strengthen the overall evidentiary picture for purposes of establishing the defendant’s mens rea. But when Congress has not identified time as an essential element of an offense, “proof of the acts charged on any date within the statute of limitations and before the return date of the indictment is sufficient to support a conviction.” United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 745 (3d Cir. 1974) (addressing variances between indictment and proof). Furthermore, “[b]y the use of the qualifying phrase ‘on or about’, the grand jury indicates its unwillingness to pinpoint the date of the offense charged.” Id. Here, the indictment charged Franz with knowing receipt “[o]n or about June 9, 2008.” (App. at 44.) Price testified that someone using Franz’s computer viewed the image on a website, and then on June 9, 2008, someone viewed the same image on Franz’s computer in a folder titled “Downloads.” That is enough. 42 anyone who used that device – was not created or named by default; rather, someone created and named the file folder. Thus, three of the five Miller factors (the first, fourth, and fifth) point to Franz knowingly receiving the image in question. Because a rational juror could conclude, based on that evidence, that Franz knowingly received the image, his Rule 29 challenge fails. Viewing the evidence as a whole, a rational jury could – and did – conclude that Franz knowingly received the image at issue.