Opinion ID: 6227007
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Heading: the right to an impartial jury: its scope and the

Text: REMEDY FOR ITS VIOLATION ¶18 The constitutional right to trial ―by an impartial jury‖ requires maintaining the sanctity of the jury process throughout the trial. In this part, we first explain the scope of this right and how it prohibits undue outside influence on the jury at any point between the jury‘s empanelment4 and the rendering of judgment. We then explain that the remedy for unauthorized communications likely to influence the jury‘s judgment—like those that took place here—is a rebuttable presumption that the defendant has been prejudiced. A. The Jury Must Not Be Tainted by Undue Outside Influences ¶19 Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution both guarantee a criminal defendant the right to trial ―by an impartial jury.‖ Today, we focus on outside contacts with the jury after its empanelment. ___________________________________________________________ 4 A jury is said to have been ―empaneled‖ upon having been sworn in ―to try an issue or case.‖ Empanel, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 6 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court ¶20 At the threshold, we explain the relative roles of our state and federal constitutions in our analysis. While some of our past cases on improper jury contacts have included discussion of the Sixth Amendment, see, e.g., State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1985), most of our cases focus on the Utah Constitution. We see that as a prudent practice for two reasons. First, our State protected defendants from prejudicial jury contacts with others long before the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment against the states. See State v. Anderson, 237 P. 941, 942–44 (Utah 1925); State v. Thorne, 117 P. 58, 67 (Utah 1911). Second, ―even when the text of our constitution is identical to its federal counterpart, ‗we do not presume that federal court interpretations of federal constitutional provisions control the meaning of identical provisions in the Utah Constitution.‘‖ S. Salt Lake City v. Maese, 2019 UT 58, ¶ 27, 450 P.3d 1092 (citation omitted). Indeed, this court has ―not hesitated to interpret the provisions of the Utah Constitution to provide more expansive protections than similar federal provisions.‖ State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 83, ¶ 24, 199 P.3d 935. ¶21 Still, the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury was incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (per curiam). As such, the Sixth Amendment forms the ―floor‖ below which the Utah Constitution‘s protections cannot fall. Briggs, 2008 UT 83, ¶ 26. And Sixth Amendment jurisprudence helps inform our understanding of the original public meaning of the right to an impartial jury. Thus, while we cite mostly to Utah jurisprudence interpreting the Utah Constitution throughout this opinion, we also consider the scope of the Sixth Amendment regarding improper jury contacts. ¶22 When ―interpreting the Utah Constitution, prior case law guides us to analyze its text, historical evidence of the state of the law when it was drafted, and Utah‘s particular traditions at the time of drafting.‖ Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 12, 140 P.3d 1235. ―There is no magic formula for this analysis— different sources will be more or less persuasive depending on the constitutional question and the content of those sources.‖ Maese, 2019 UT 58, ¶ 19. ¶23 The Utah Constitution ―guarantees to every one accused of a public offense a trial by an impartial jury.‖ Anderson, 237 P. at 942 (citing UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12). Our constitution is silent as to the scope of this right, and the constitutional convention debates include no information to further our inquiry, as the delegates never discussed the contours of the right to an impartial jury while 7 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court addressing article I, section 12. See 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION 306–12 (1898). ¶24 But our prior case law, from the early days of statehood, establishes the importance of shielding jurors from outside influences: [L]ong experience has demonstrated the necessity of preventing the jury from mingling or conversing with the people, and of keeping them secluded from all outside influences calculated to interfere with or affect their impartiality or judgment. These safeguards were at common law deemed essential to the right itself of trial by jury. That right with its ancient safeguards has been preserved in this country by Constitutions and statutes. Thorne, 117 P. at 67. Granted, Thorne was a capital case involving a jury contact that occurred during deliberations. Id. at 62, 66. Nevertheless, our subsequent case law and the entirety of this opinion demonstrate how the core principle articulated in Thorne—the need to shield the jury from outside influences likely to affect their judgment—applies more broadly to all criminal cases where a jury must decide ―the personal liberty of individuals charged with offenses.‖ Anderson, 237 P. at 944. ¶25 To protect this paramount right to an untainted jury, this court also has long recognized that improper influences on a jury need not be intentional or even perceived by the jury. Certain outside communications are so apt to ―consciously or unconsciously . . . influence the judgment of the juror‖ as to likely violate the guarantee of an impartial jury. See id. at 943; State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 194 (Utah 1943); see also Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 (―[I]mproper contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be able to recognize . . . .‖). ¶26 Our view of improper jury contacts under the Utah Constitution aligns with federal jurisprudence interpreting the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These decisions—many of them contemporary to the ratification of our constitution—also inform our understanding of the original public meaning of the right to an impartial jury. ¶27 The United States Supreme Court sees the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury as protecting against improper contacts between juries and others. The Court has explained that the Sixth Amendment guarantees that ―the ‗evidence developed‘ against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial 8 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court protection of the defendant‘s right of confrontation, of crossexamination, and of counsel.‖ Parker, 385 U.S. at 364 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court has prohibited ―private talk‖ with the jury and ―outside influence‖ on it. See id. at 364–66 (citation omitted). ¶28 In Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892), the Court talked about the protection from outside influences in commonlaw terms but did not reject a constitutional protection. Mattox also explained that past opinions treated improper contacts between jurors and third parties as ―an irregular invasion of the right of trial by jury.‖5 Id. at 150. Later opinions picked up on this constitutional reliance and made it explicit. In Parker v. Gladden, for example, the Court held that a bailiff‘s statements to jury members that the defendant was guilty implicated a ―federal question‖ and that such comments to a jury ―are controlled by the command of the Sixth Amendment.‖ 385 U.S. at 364. Even today, Mattox is described by the United States Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals as part of the canon of decisions about the constitutional right to an impartial jury. See, e.g., Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 49 (2016); United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 319 (4th Cir. 2009).6 ___________________________________________________________ 5Mattox explains that People v. Knapp, 3 N.W. 927 (Mich. 1879), ―held‖ the above-mentioned proposition. 146 U.S. at 150. But the phrase does not appear in that opinion. Instead, Mattox also cites Gainey v. People, 97 Ill. 270, 281 (1881), in which the Illinois Supreme Court used a similar phrase to explain the holding of Knapp. 146 U.S. at 150. 6 We acknowledge that we recently noted that the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah did not ―read Mattox to issue a constitutional requirement.‖ State v. Bess, 2019 UT 70, ¶ 47 n.11, 473 P.3d 157 (referring to People v. Ritchie, 42 P. 209, 212–13 (Utah 1895)). But our comment and Ritchie‘s conclusion pertained to another part of Mattox. Additionally, since our decision in Bess, the United States Supreme Court opined indirectly on the point, noting, in the context of jury unanimity, that ―the Sixth Amendment affords a right to ‗a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, . . . includ[ing] all the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and England when the Constitution was adopted.‘‖ Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Patton v. United States, (continued . . .) 9 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court ¶29 The federal courts of appeals, and state courts interpreting the Sixth Amendment, have followed cases like Mattox and Parker and closely scrutinized certain jury contacts with outsiders. See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 929 N.W.2d 646, 661 (Iowa 2019) (―The constitutional right to an impartial jury may be impaired by jury misconduct and jury bias.”); Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that a jury must not decide guilt based on ―extraneous sources of decision‖); United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120, 123 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that prejudice is presumed whenever a juror has an unauthorized, outside communication ―that presents a likelihood of affecting the verdict‖); Tarango v. McDaniel, 837 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2016) (―Mattox and its progeny further establish that undue contact with a juror by a 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930)). Although that is not a conclusive assessment of the scope of the right-to-an-impartial-jury clause, we think it has value when analyzing the impact of Mattox on current constitutional jurisprudence about the clause. Contemporaneous cases that followed Mattox also viewed it as relating to the constitutional right to impartial jury. See, e.g., People v. Dinsmore, 36 P. 661, 662 (Cal. 1894) (A prosecution witness became indisposed during her testimony, and the trial court decided to postpone trial by more than two months and allowed the jury to separate without supervision. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that ―[t]he law is most jealous of these matters, in the interests of justice to all parties, and its care and anxiety to have a fair and impartial jury in every case is fully [exemplified] by the provisions of both constitution and statute.‖ The court reasoned that ―the chances largely preponderate that, under the circumstances here depicted, one or more of them did not return to the box at the expiration of the continuance in the same frame of mind as to the case as when he left it‖); United States v. Spencer, 47 P. 715, 716 (N.M. 1896) (The jury was allowed to separate, drank alcohol during the trial and visited a saloon. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that ―[i]f jurors should be permitted to separate, . . . converse and mingle with people generally, then the sacredness and respect for trial by jury would be destroyed, and the practice of excluding juries from outside and external influences and temptations for tampering and bribery is nullified, and no litigant would be protected in his constitutional right of a fair and impartial trial by a jury‖). 10 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court government officer almost categorically risks influencing the verdict.‖). ¶30 The consistent thread that connects all these decisions is the concern for jury purity, alongside the threat to that purity caused when an outsider invades the jury‘s privacy. Indeed, ―[i]t is of the utmost importance to the administration of justice that the purity of the trial by jury should be preserved.‖ Hines v. State, 27 Tenn. (8 Hum.) 597, 601 (1848). Courts around the nation have not obsessed over the form of the intrusion, but rather on the principle guarding against it—―safeguard[ing] in every possible way the purity of the stream of justice; to prevent it from in any manner being polluted by influences other than that which are produced by the legal evidence and the law governing the case.‖ Bilton v. Territory, 99 P. 163, 165 (Okla. Crim. App. 1909). That is because constitutions ―enshrine[] principles, not application of those principles.‖ Maese, 2019 UT 58, ¶ 70 n.23. ¶31 In sum, Utah‘s Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to an impartial jury, and that right includes protection from improper contacts between the jury and others during trial. The federal courts, and other state courts interpreting the Sixth Amendment, hold that the U.S. Constitution provides the same protection. We now turn to how we effectuate this protection—a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. B. The Presumption of Prejudice ¶32 Once an improper jury contact is shown, ―prejudice is presumed,‖ Thorne, 117 P. at 66, and ―the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence the juror.‖ Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. ¶33 The presumption of prejudice is rooted in the constitutional requirement that verdicts need to ―be above suspicion as to [whether they were] influenced by any conduct on [any juror‘s] part during the trial.‖7 Anderson, 237 P. at 944. Accordingly, we have ―long taken a strict approach in assuring that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial not be compromised ___________________________________________________________ 7 As the Utah and federal cases we discuss throughout this opinion make clear, jury ―conduct‖ is not limited to affirmative and intentional actions taken by a juror. It also includes inadvertent conduct and communications directed at a juror. 11 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court by improper [jury] contacts.‖ Pike, 712 P.2d at 279; see also State v. Ahrens, 479 P.2d 786, 787–88 (Utah 1971); Crank, 142 P.2d at 194. ¶34 In keeping to this strict approach, we have recognized that certain jury contacts may be expected to ―consciously or unconsciously . . . influence the judgment of the juror.‖ Anderson, 237 P. at 943; see supra ¶ 25. In such situations, ―[t]o say that the accused cannot sustain his claim of prejudice until he also shows that the juror talked about something harmful to the accused‘s rights is to fritter away the constitutional and statutory provisions requiring the jury to be kept secluded from all outside influences.‖ Thorne, 117 P. at 67. Therefore, we have said that ―prejudice is presumed‖ in such instances, id. at 66, ―unless the prosecution shows beyond reasonable doubt that the [defendant] has received no injury by reason thereof.‖ State v. Morgan, 64 P. 356, 360 (Utah 1901). In Pike, we synthesized our prior case law and provided a useful starting point for the improper-contacts analysis—juror contacts with ―witnesses, attorneys or court personnel‖ that go ―beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact‖ will typically trigger a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. 712 P.2d at 280. ¶35 Pike provided two main reasons for why a rebuttable presumption is required. These reasons are deeply rooted in the jurisprudence of this court and from across the nation, even well before the ratification of the Utah Constitution. ¶36 First, as already alluded to, it is exceedingly difficult to prove ―how or whether a juror has in fact been influenced by‖ interactions with third parties. Id. at 280. Positive or negative impressions, humorous feelings, expectations, or any such unintended and unseen psychological coercion may spring from such interactions and exert influence upon the deliberations of a juror, ―consciously or unconsciously.‖ See Anderson, 237 P. at 943. Our court of appeals has similarly explained that ―it is difficult, if not impossible, to prove how an improper contact may have influenced a juror.‖ State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 for this proposition). ¶37 Second, we want to avoid the ―deleterious effect upon the judicial process‖ created by even ―the appearance of impropriety,‖ Pike, 712 P.2d at 280, thereby keeping ―judicial administration . . . above suspicion as regards weighing out justice,‖ Thorne, 117 P. at 67. For when a defendant‘s liberty is at stake, there can be no doubt as to the validity and impartiality of a jury verdict which, ―like Caesar‘s wife, must be above suspicion,‖ Crank, 142 P.2d at 194. 12 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court As our court of appeals observed shortly after Pike, we have ―reversed criminal convictions based solely on the appearance that [the right of an accused to an impartial jury] may have been jeopardized.‖ State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). ¶38 In sum, Utah jurisprudence forcefully holds that once a court is apprised of an improper jury contact, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice attaches.8 The question, then, is whether the jury contact at issue in the present case triggered the presumption. We now address that question and answer it in the affirmative.