Opinion ID: 2651290
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bartering/Unlawfully Sought to Obtain

Text: The district court’s application of the enhancement relied, in large part, upon the language of § 922(j) that proscribes the act of bartering with stolen firearms. Although “bartering” is a means of violating § 922(j), it is not listed in the guidelines as a method of calculating the number of firearms involved in an offense for the purposes of § 2K2.1(b). The district court’s finding that Hagman “barter[ed] for the return of the stolen weapons” is based upon an erroneous interpretation of § 922(j). “Barter,” as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 171 (9th ed. 2009), is “the exchange of one commodity for another without the use of money.” See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993) (“By attempting to trade his MAC-10 for the drugs, he used or employed it as an item of barter to obtain cocaine; he derived service from it because it was going to bring him the very drugs he sought.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)); United States v. Dyer, 589 F.3d 520, 526–27 (1st Cir. 2009) (differentiating between selling commodities “for money” and “exchanging commodities by barter”) (citation omitted); United States v. Birk, 453 F.3d 893, 899–900 (7th Cir. 2006) (bartering involved the defendant’s expectation to obtain two handguns in exchange for facilitating the sale of a shotgun). Hagman’s alleged attempt to exchange money for the eleven missing firearms does not constitute bartering for the purposes of § 922(j). Therefore, the district court’s application of the four-level enhancement was based upon flawed reasoning and cannot be affirmed on those grounds. We assume that the spirit of the district court’s finding that Hagman engaged in bartering is analogous to the government’s argument on appeal that Hagman “unlawfully sought to obtain” the eleven missing firearms. At sentencing, Officer Vest testified that upon Hagman’s return to work at Unkle 10 Case: 12-51093 Document: 00512513346 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/27/2014 No. 12-51093 Dick’s, Hagman told Stallcup that he had been researching “in the streets” to determine who took the missing firearms and could possibly get them back for $150 each. According to Officer Vest, Stallcup told Hagman to “do what he had to do to find these weapons.” The government argues, essentially, that because Hagman was a convicted felon, it was unlawful for him to seek to obtain Stallcup’s eleven missing firearms. 5 We disagree. We are unaware of any section of the United States Code that makes it unlawful for a felon to attempt to possess or obtain a firearm. See United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 353–55 (3d Cir. 2011) (recognizing that there is no general federal attempt statute); United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 251 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that there is “no general federal statute proscribing attempt” and “an attempt to commit criminal conduct is . . . actionable only where . . . a specific criminal statute makes impermissible its attempted as well as actual violation” (second omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The government, as the party who has the burden of proof in this matter, must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence not only that Hagman sought to obtain the eleven missing firearms, but also that his doing so was unlawful. The government’s argument that Hagman’s conduct was unlawful, without supporting authority, is without merit.