Opinion ID: 1445104
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the driving under the influence charge

Text: By now, the appropriate method of resolving properly raised issues of criminal procedure in Oregon should be axiomatic. All issues should first be addressed on a subconstitutional level. Courts then should consider any remaining issues under the Oregon Constitution. Finally, if no state law, including the state constitution, resolves the issues, courts then should turn for assistance to the Constitution of the United States. See State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 262, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983) (setting forth methodology). The trial court did not do that in this case. As noted, the trial court decided this case on probable cause to seize and search groundsa constitutional consideration. However, with respect to the DUII charge, defendant first had argued for suppression of the results of all three blood alcohol tests on statutory grounds, viz., that suppression was required under ORS 813.140. The trial court did not rule on this theory. It should have. The motion was well taken. ORS 813.140 provides: Nothing in ORS 813.100 [Oregon's Implied Consent Law] is intended to preclude the administration of a chemical test described in this section. A police officer may obtain a chemical test of the blood to determine the amount of alcohol in any person's blood    as provided in the following: (1) If, when requested by a police officer, the person expressly consents to such a test. (2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, from a person without the person's consent if: (a) The police officer has probable cause to believe that the person was driving while under the influence of intoxicants and that evidence of the offense will be found in the person's blood or urine; and (b) The person is unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering the person incapable of expressly consenting to the test or tests requested. Under this statute, blood tests like those administered to defendant may only be used in an ensuing prosecution for violation of ORS 813.010 if the requesting officer asks for and obtains consent to the tests or, in the alternative, if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicants, that evidence of the offense will be found in defendant's blood and the person charged was unconscious or otherwise incapable of expressly consenting to the test. Neither of those circumstances existed here. Defendant did not consent; he was conscious and capable of consenting if he wished to do so. It has been the law in this jurisdiction, at least since 1975, that blood test evidence obtained from a DUII defendant in any way other than pursuant to the statutory procedure is inadmissible in the DUII prosecution. See State v. Stover, 271 Or. 132, 146-47, 531 P.2d 258 (1975) (so holding under prior version of statute); State v. Heintz, 286 Or. 239, 254, 594 P.2d 385 (1979) (same); see also State v. Milligan, supra, 304 Or. at 664, 748 P.2d 130 (recognizing principle that blood alcohol test derived from nonconsensual, warrantless seizure of a blood sample only admissible, if otherwise relevant and competent, as to crimes other than DUII). In the 17 years since this particular construction of the DUII statutes was announced in Stover, the legislature has had numerous chances to change the pertinent language of the statutes involved; it has not done so. As the foregoing amply demonstrates, the trial judge had a legal basis for suppressing evidence of defendant's blood alcohol level that was derived from all three samples, at least with respect to the DUII charge. The fact that the judge did not recognize that justification does not change the fact that his ruling suppressing the results of all three blood alcohol tests was, as to the DUII charge, legally correct. It follows that the Court of Appeals holding that reversed the suppression of the second and third samples with respect to the DUII charge was error. That holding is reversed. With respect to the charge against defendant of driving under the influence of intoxicants, in violation of ORS 813.010, the order of the trial court suppressing evidence of the results of all three blood tests is affirmed.