Opinion ID: 1057653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Search of Defendant's Residence

Text: The search provision at issue in Samson was pursuant to a specific California statute. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 846, 126 S.Ct. 2193. Tennessee does not have a similar statute; rather, our statutory scheme allows the Board of Probation and Parole to impose [on parolees] any conditions and limitations that [it] deems necessary. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-28-116(b) (2006). One of the conditions imposed on Defendant was the warrantless search provision, which is a standard condition. [12] It is uncontroverted that Defendant agreed in writing to the warrantless search provision. Moreover, Officer Palmer and Defendant both verified this condition of Defendant's parole with her parole officer immediately prior to the search of her residence. We must now review the totality of the circumstances, of which Defendant's status as a parolee and her agreement to the warrantless search condition are salient circumstances, and determine whether the search of Defendant's residence [13] was reasonable. The trial court determined that it was not, after finding only that [t]he total process took anywhere between one and two hours and that Defendant's home was located in another part of Union City from where the traffic stop took place. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed, holding that [t]he application of the reasonable parole condition by the police officers, in this case, became unreasonable as a result of this lengthy seizure of [Defendant]. Turner, 2008 WL 1891445, at . We respectfully disagree with the courts below that the search of Defendant's residence was unreasonable. Based on information he had received from an informant, Officer Palmer was concerned that Defendant was engaged in drug dealing. He knew she had been previously convicted for a drug offense in Tennessee. He knew her parole status and confirmed that she was thereby subject to warrantless searches. Upon observing her commit a traffic infraction, which constituted a Class C misdemeanor and thus violated the terms of her parole, he pulled her over and conducted a search of her person and vehicle. He found no drugs but did find a large sum of cash on Defendant's person. [14] The presence of this large sum of money together with the absence of any drugs on Defendant's person or in her car gave Officer Palmer some grounds to be concerned that Defendant might have recently made a drug sale and might have more drugs at her residence. [15] Officer Palmer's decision to search Defendant's residence was not unreasonable when examined under the totality of the circumstances. There is no proof in the record that Officer Palmer acted for any reason other than the furtherance of legitimate law enforcement concerns. Defendant had been convicted of drug offenses in two states. Officer Palmer had information from an informant that she was currently involved in selling crack cocaine. He verified Defendant's parole status and the warrantless search condition before he proceeded to search her residence. Neither the search of Defendant's vehicle nor that of her residence was unreasonably lengthy. That the total time of Defendant's detention may have been at most two hours, and included a short trip by Defendant in her own vehicle, did not so prolong the detention as to make the search unreasonable. We hold that the warrantless search of Defendant's residence, made pursuant to a written condition of her parole, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 7, of the Tennessee Constitution, even if made without any reasonable, individualized, or particularized suspicion.