Opinion ID: 1780236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court improperly denied Moore's motion to suppress his confession.

Text: ¶ 26. In reviewing the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress a confession, this Court applies the familiar general rule that since the trial court sits as the fact-finder when determining the issue of whether the accused's confession has been intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily given, we will only reverse the trial court's determination of this issue when such determination is manifestly wrong. Glasper v. State, 914 So.2d 708, 716 (Miss.2005). The determination of whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which is not disturbed unless the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or the decision was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Thorson v. State, 895 So.2d 85, 115 (Miss. 2004) ( quoting Lee v. State, 631 So.2d 824, 826 (Miss.1994)).
¶ 27. Moore says his statement given while in custody following an illegal arrest must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Moore acknowledges, however, that a confession given in such a situation is not per se inadmissible. Coleman v. State, 592 So.2d 517, 521 (Miss. 1991). Thus, Moore contends that this Court must assess the statement's ultimate admissibility by examining the five factors [3] established by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), and adopted by this Court in Hall v. State, 427 So.2d 957, 959-60 (Miss.1983). ¶ 28. We need not engage in the requested Brown analysis because, as discussed supra, Moore's arrest was not illegal. Moore gave a statement while he was in custody pursuant to a lawful arrest. As such, Brown and Hall are inapposite, and Moore's argument that the statement was fruit of the poisonous tree consequently fails. See Glasper v. State, 914 So.2d 708, 722 (Miss.2005); Jones, 841 So.2d at 127. This portion of Moore's second assignment of error is meritless.
¶ 29. Moore argues that his confession should be suppressed because it was not freely and voluntarily given. First, Moore states he did not understand what he was doing when he signed the Miranda waiver. Second, Moore claims he was threatened with bodily injury by a police officer if he did not confess to the crimes. ¶ 30. Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights, statements made by a suspect while under `custodial interrogation' are inadmissible at trial where prior to making the statements, the suspect was not Miranda warned. Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368, 1374 (Miss. 1987) ( citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602). The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily and not given because of promises, threats or inducements. Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 587 (Miss.1998). [T]he prosecution shoulders the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 86 (Miss.1996). The `burden is met and prima facie case made out by testimony of an officer, or other persons having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without threats, coercion, or offer of reward.' Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 838 (Miss.1994) ( quoting Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 761, 763 (Miss. 1991)). The circuit court sits as fact finder when determining voluntariness of a confession, and its determination will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong. Manix v. State, 895 So.2d 167, 180 (Miss. 2005). ¶ 31. According to Moore, when Officer Reedy asked him to talk about what happened on the night of June 21, 2003, Moore responded, [w]ell what about an attorney? Officer Reedy then stated, I've got to read you your rights first. The officer pulled out a piece of paper and read the rights on the first half of the sheet, [4] asked Moore if he understood those rights, and had Moore sign the bottom of the page. After signing, Moore again asked about an attorney, and Officer Reedy said, [w]ell you just signed away your rights to an attorney. According to Moore, Officer Reedy did not read to him the second half of the paper titled Waiver of Rights. [5] Moore did not read the waiver for himself but relied on Officer Reedy to accurately read it to him in its entirety. During his first statement, Moore said that to the best of his knowledge, he did not rape anyone the night of the crime. ¶ 32. Sometime while waiting in the interrogation room with Officer Jones after giving his initial statement, Moore asked to use the restroom. Moore claims that Officer Jones said, [i]f you're not going to cooperate with us, then I'm not going to do anything to help you out. You can sit there and use the bathroom in your pants for all I care. After Officer Jones finally let Moore use the restroom, Moore says the officer grabbed his shoulder and said, [y]ou're going to confess to this. You're going to cooperate with us. You're going to do what we tell you to do, because if you don't I can make sure that you get a bond set so high that you can't get out, and plus I can also make your stay here very unpleasant. When Moore said he could only tell them what he had been told by his friends, Officer Jones allegedly said, [w]ell that's fine. Just we'll go over it real quick and then we'll go back to the interview room and then you can tell Scotty Reedy what you just told me. Moore says he went over his story, and Officer Jones said, [t]hat's fine. Just word it like you were the one that did it. Moore says he then gave a second statement to the police in which he confessed to the rape, but several times during the interview when the question referred to something about which his friends had not told him, he said I don't know or I don't remember. ¶ 33. Again, Moore's testimony differs significantly from that of the officers and documents involved. According to the officers, Moore never asked for an attorney. Moore voluntarily waived his Miranda rights after Officer Reedy read the entire waiver to him. Moore marked the box I have had read to me and signed the waiver. He acted as though he understood what he was doing. According to the officers, Moore was neither threatened nor promised anything in return for his confession. Before Moore gave his second statement, Officer Reedy again brought Moore's attention to the waiver, saying, Charles, you remember when we talked earlier that this little piece of paper I read your rights to you. Remember signing this? to which Moore responded, Yeah. ¶ 34. While the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore's confession was voluntary, Morgan, 681 So.2d at 86, the burden is met when there is testimony from officers that the confession was made without threats, coercion, or offers of reward. Chase, 645 So.2d at 838. The State offered evidence from three officers and provided a signed waiver as proof that Moore voluntarily confessed. The trial court had sufficient evidence before it to conclude that the State met its burden of proof. In his Order overruling Moore's motion to suppress the confession, the trial judge stated, said statement by the defendant was made by him at a time when he had been fully advised of his Constitutional Rights, and that his statement was not the result of coercion, promises or threats and was fully and voluntarily made after having been advised of his Miranda rights including his right to an attorney. ¶ 35. As the fact finder when determining whether a confession was voluntary, the circuit court's determination will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong. Manix, 895 So.2d at 180-81 (testimony by officer that defendant voluntarily confessed was enough to affirm trial court's overruling of defendant's motion to suppress the confession). The record reveals no basis to conclude the trial court's decision was manifestly wrong. Therefore, Moore's second assignment of error is without merit.