Opinion ID: 1153985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory Dedication of Streets and Alleys

Text: The Platting and Dedication Act, supra, governs the filings of all of the subdivision plats at issue in this case except the original town plat. Section 34-12-104, W.S. 1977, of the Act has remained substantially the same since its adoption and provides: The acknowledgment and recording of such plat, is equivalent to a deed in fee simple of such portion of the premises platted as is on such plat set apart for streets, or other public use, or is thereon dedicated to charitable, religious or educational purposes. Appellants contend that under this statute the City received a fee simple determinable in dedicated streets and alleys, which interest includes the right to the underlying minerals for so long as the City uses the property for public ways. [2] In support of their position, appellants cite Belgum v. City of Kimball, 163 Neb. 774, 81 N.W.2d 205, 62 A.L.R.2d 1295 (1957); Mattheisen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. City of La Salle, 117 Ill. 411, 2 N.E. 406 (1885); City of Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa 234 (1868). While we have not previously considered the question of a city's right to extract the minerals underlying its streets and alleys, we have analyzed the interests acquired by municipalities under § 34-12-104 in other contexts. In Tissino v. Mavrakis, 67 Wyo. 560, 228 P.2d 106 (1951), we upheld the district court's order enjoining a private property owner from obstructing a public street and found no error in the court's declaratory judgment    [t]hat the fee simple title to all of that portion of Harvey Avenue,    together with all alleys within such Subdivision    as shown by said Plat, belongs to the public and such fee simple title is hereby confirmed in the public, for public use as such street and alleys. 228 P.2d at 109. More recently, we examined the terms of the statute as they bear on a city's right to vacate and sell land dedicated as a street. We said that the statutory language effected a conveyance to the municipality of a title in trust for the benefit of the public:    [I]n answer to the precise question submitted, we have no alternative but to hold that the interest the defendant city acquired in the above-described premises as a result of the dedication under the then existing statutory provisions was, at best, a title in trust for the public, granting to the city the right to hold, use, occupy, and enjoy the premises for public use as a street. Once that right was terminated by vacation pursuant to authority delegated to the city by the legislature the city no longer had any title or interest in the premises. It has nothing to sell or to convey. Payne v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 398 P.2d 557, 562 (1965). In reaching this conclusion we relied on the discussion by the Iowa Supreme Court in City of Des Moines v. Hall, supra, an opinion existing at the time that we adopted our platting statutes from those in effect in Iowa: In considering the matter, it is fitting that we go first to the source of the statutes relating to the platting of a townsite. As mentioned in Thomas v. Jultak, 68 Wyo. 198, 231 P.2d 974, 979, our statutes, adopted in 1876, were taken almost verbatim from Iowa, and the provision with which we are particularly concerned, § 34-115 [predecessor of § 34-12-104, W.S. 1977] is substantially the same as § 637, Code of Iowa, 1851. In 1868, some eight years prior to adoption here, the Iowa Supreme Court in The City of Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa 234, 239, was called upon to construe the meaning of the section. In the initial opinion it was said in substance that the force of the statute was to divest the proprietor of the title to the premises set aside for the street and to vest the same in the public. In essence that is the view this court took of that language in Tissino v. Mavrakis, 67 Wyo. 560, 228 P.2d 106, 115. In neither opinion was anything said concerning the vesting of title in a municipality. However, the Iowa court's opinion as to the streets went on to point out, at 24 Iowa 238, that the statute nevertheless gave to the municipality `the fullest power and control over the same, which can arise from title, in order that all improvement of them as highways might be made without let or hindrance from any quarter.' Then on rehearing the court went further. It was then said that statutory dedication under the provisions of § 637 did vest a `fee simple' title to the streets in the municipality. But, even then, the Iowa court did not go as far as we are asked to go. As pointed out in the dissent, at 24 Iowa 248, the majority conceded the possibility of reverter in case the streets should be vacated and conceded `that the city could not sell the streets or any part of them.' With these limitations it is apparent that Iowa, at the time our statute was adopted, did not hold that the language employed vested a fee simple absolute to the streets in the municipality. Instead, the interest received was what is sometimes rather loosely described as a qualified, base, or determinable fee. [Citations.] 398 P.2d at 559-560. We summarized the holdings in our prior cases in Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v. Billingsly, supra, 660 P.2d at 279-280, and concluded that § 34-12-104 was intended not to vest the public authority with fee title to the land underlying a street or alley, but rather to grant an interest or title in trust in designated ways for the public benefit. We held in that case that abutting property owners lacked sufficient interest in a dedicated roadway to maintain an action in trespass for the installation of a water line within the street area. Notwithstanding the foregoing cases characterizing the public's interest as a title for public use as such street and alleys or the right to hold, use, occupy, and enjoy the premises for public use as a street, appellants contend that the public authority also acquires a fee simple in the mineral estate when streets and alleys are dedicated. The strong language of § 34-12-104 requires such a conclusion, appellants urge. Section 34-12-104 provides that the proper filing of a subdivision plat is equivalent to a deed in fee simple of areas set apart for public use. The term fee simple distinguishes estates in real property which, typically, are of potentially infinite duration. This general term includes the estate in fee simple absolute and all types of estates in fee simple defeasible. Restatement of the Law 2d Property § 14 and Comment a. A fee simple may be created in the mineral estate alone or in the surface estate alone. Williams v. Watt, Wyo., 668 P.2d 620 (1983). We considered the ramifications of a statutory reference to the fee simple estate in State ex rel. Cross v. Board of Land Commissioners, 50 Wyo. 181, 58 P.2d 423 (1936). The statute at issue there directed State officials, under specified circumstances, to issue a land patent conveying title in fee simple to the patentee. The purchaser contended that the terms of the statute required a conveyance of the mineral estate, notwithstanding the fact that the State had reserved the minerals in the contract for sale: Stress is laid by relator upon the language of section 91-513,[ [3] ] quoted above, that when a patent for state lands is issued it shall `convey a good and sufficient title to the patentee therein named in fee simple,' and it is said that the use of the words `in fee simple' establishes that the title to said land when sold must necessarily include all the minerals below the surface thereof. 58 P.2d at 429-430. After reviewing pertinent authorities, this court concluded that the statute in question permitted the board of commissioners to transfer to the purchaser a fee-simple estate in the land, excepting, however, minerals and mining rights. 58 P.2d at 430. It is clear that the concept of a fee simple estate in the surface in no way violates the commonly understood meaning of the phrase in fee simple found in § 34-12-104. The statute goes on to precisely define and limit the fee simple estate transferred by the recording of a plat to  such portion of the premises platted as is on such plat set apart for streets, or other public use. (Emphasis added.) Giving these words their plain and ordinary meaning, [4] that portion of the subdivision set apart for streets and alleys reasonably includes only the surface and so much of the subsurface as is necessary for street construction and municipal services. We would impermissibly strain the express statutory provisions were we to hold that those areas set apart for streets and alleys include a band of ground extending to the center of the earth and encompassing all of the minerals beneath the roadways. The transfer of mineral rights to the public domain is inconsistent with the dedication of narrowly specified areas of private property for public passage. The case for excluding the minerals from the transferred estate is even stronger under § 34-12-104 than under § 91-513, supra n. 3, at issue in State ex rel. Cross v. Board of Land Commissioners, supra. There, the statute required the board of land commissioners to convey a fee simple title to the land purchased. In holding that the board could convey the land exclusive of the mineral estate, we emphasized the importance of reason and context in interpreting statutory language: It is argued that the use of the word `land' in the statutes of this state, providing for the sale by the board of land commissioners of state-owned property of that character, refers only to land in the sense of its having an indefinite extent upward and downward from the surface, and therefore it always includes whatever may be erected upon it and whatever may be directly under it. The word may have that meaning of course, under some circumstances, but it does not always have it. Reason and context play an important part in determining its true significance. 58 P.2d at 429. We hold, therefore, that the City of Evanston acquired no interest in the oil, gas or other minerals underlying its streets and alleys as a result of the recording and acknowledgment of subdivision plats pursuant to § 34-12-104. We note that courts in other jurisdictions have interpreted legislation corresponding to § 34-12-104 in a similar fashion. Mochel v. Cleveland, 51 Idaho 468, 5 P.2d 549 (1930) (under a statute identical to ours the city acquired title to lands for public use only); Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. 111, 116 (1909) (the fee to the surface passes pursuant to a statute which vests the fee of dedicated parcels of land for the uses intended in the recorded plat [5] ); City of Leadville v. Bohn Mining Company, supra, 86 P. at 1040 (under a statute which vests in the municipality the fee of the streets, alleys and other designated places, the city acquired a complete, perpetual, and continuous title to the space designated as streets, so long as it used them for the purpose intended). We decline to follow those cases cited to us by appellants as we find them inconsistent with the language and subject matter of § 34-12-104. Appellants' argument that the broad dedicatory language enlarges the effect of the statutory dedications fails for the reasons discussed with respect to common-law dedications. The declaratory judgment entered by the district court is affirmed. ROONEY, J., filed a specially concurring opinion.