Opinion ID: 166424
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the Seizure

Text: 20 A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). We have held that a routine traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998). We therefore analyze such stops under the principles developed for investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See id. To determine the reasonableness of an investigative detention, we make a dual inquiry, asking first whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and second whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. 21
22 Ms. Bradford conceded before the district court that Trooper Peech's initial action in stopping [her] was justified at its inception as a result of the traffic violations he observed. Bradford, 290 F.Supp.2d at 1270. Even if she had not conceded this issue, there is no question that Trooper Peech's observations of her following too closely, failing to use a turn signal, cutting in front of a semi-truck without using a signal, and driving inattentively, id. at 1266, justified him pulling her over, because a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir.1995). 23
24 Ms. Bradford argues Trooper Peech's actions were not reasonably related in scope to the stop because of his detailed questioning while she was seated in the patrol car and his further questioning after he gave her back her paperwork. See Aplt. Br. at 14. Neither contention has merit. 25 While Trooper Peech was issuing the citation and running a computer check of Ms. Bradford's records, he chatted with her about the nature of her trip. It is well-established that [a] law enforcement officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir.1997). Moreover, we have held that during the stop, an officer may ask routine questions about the driver's travel plans. See United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir.2001) ([W]e have repeatedly held (as have other circuits) that questions relating to a driver's travel plans ordinarily fall within the scope of a traffic stop.). Clearly, this was a routine traffic stop and Trooper Peech did not exceed its scope by asking about Ms. Bradford's travel plans. 26 After the purpose of the traffic stop is completed, further detention for purposes of questioning unrelated to the initial traffic stop is impermissible unless: (1) the officer has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal activity has occurred or is occurring, or (2) the initial detention has become a consensual encounter. See United States v. Cervine, 347 F.3d 865, 868-69 (10th Cir.2003). The questioning here was valid under both rationales. 27
28 When determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we look to the totality of the circumstances to see whether the officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (further quotation omitted). It is important to note that many aspects of Ms. Bradford's behavior, standing alone, would be insufficient to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion. Some items motorists might possess must be outrightly dismissed as so innocent or susceptible to varying interpretations as to be innocuous, Wood, 106 F.3d at 946, including cellular telephones. Williams, 271 F.3d at 1269. Likewise, wrappers from fast food establishments strewn about a car may indicate slovenliness or the need to travel while eating, but do not by themselves indicate a driver smuggling contraband. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1138 (8th Cir.1998) (We also conclude that the mere presence of fast-food wrappers in the Buick is entirely consistent with innocent travel such that, in the absence of contradictory information, it cannot reasonably be said to give rise to suspicion of criminal activity.); Wood, 106 F.3d at 947 (holding suspicion associated with possession of fast-food trash is virtually nonexistent); Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 496 (3d Cir.1995) (noting fast food wrappers have become ubiquitous in modern interstate travel and do not serve to separate the suspicious from the innocent traveler). The mere fact that a rental car was procured in California does not make its driver a drug dealer. See Beck, 140 F.3d at 1132 (We do not think that the entire state of California, the most populous state in the union, can properly be deemed a source of illegal narcotics such that mere residency in that state constitutes a factor supporting reasonable suspicion.). Moreover, we have repeatedly emphasized that nervousness and its signs should not be overcounted in our analysis. Compare United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir.2000) (holding nervousness is of limited significance in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists) with United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir.2000) (noting extreme and continued nervousness is entitled to somewhat more weight) and Williams, 271 F.3d at 1269 (concluding that when nervousness exceeds that of the average citizen during a traffic stop, there is no reason . . . to ignore [a defendant's] nervousness in reviewing the totality of the circumstances.). 29 Nevertheless, even if each factor confronting Trooper Peech may have had an innocent explanation when standing alone, the totality of the circumstances compels the conclusion that Trooper Peech had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. As the district court noted, in addition to the cellular telephone, the luggage in the backseat, and the fast-food wrappers, Ms. Bradford exhibited numerous physical manifestations of fright, including perspiration, hard breathing, shaking, wringing of hands, splotchiness, nervous laughter, and a squeaky voice. Bradford, 290 F.Supp.2d at 1271. Her answers to basic questions were evasive and conflicting at best, and the story she told defied common sense, particularly the financial illogic of purchasing a series of one-way plane tickets and one-way car-rentals. She could not answer simple questions about where her grandmother lived in Cheyenne. She could not explain the timing discrepancies of her story, including her claim that she picked up the rental car at Los Angeles International Airport prior to a week-long family reunion even though the car's rental agreement reflected that it had been picked up only two days earlier. Finally, the passing vehicle displayed bold chase car behavior. We are confident in our conclusion that reasonable, articulable suspicion existed. 30
31 If an encounter between an officer and a driver ceases to be a detention and becomes consensual, and the driver voluntarily consents to additional questioning, no further Fourth Amendment seizure or detention occurs. See United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir.1997). A traffic stop may become a consensual encounter, requiring no reasonable suspicion, if the officer returns the license and registration and asks questions without further constraining the driver by an overbearing show of authority. See West, 219 F.3d at 1176. A consensual encounter is the voluntary cooperation of a private citizen in response to non-coercive questioning by a law enforcement officer. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether an encounter can be deemed consensual depends on whether the police conduct would have conveyed to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An officer is not required to inform a suspect that she does not have to respond to his questioning or that she is free to leave. Id. An unlawful detention occurs only when the driver has an objective reason to believe he or she is not free to end the conversation with the officer and proceed on his or her own way. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 32 After Trooper Peech issued Ms. Bradford the warning and gave her documents back, he asked if there was anything in the car he needed to know about. See Bradford, 290 F.Supp.2d at 1267. We follow the bright-line rule that an encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual unless the driver's documents have been returned to [her]. United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787. The return of a driver's documentation is not, however, always sufficient to demonstrate that an encounter has become consensual. United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813-14 (10th Cir.1997). A routine traffic stop becomes a consensual encounter once the trooper has returned the driver's documentation so long as `a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe [she] was free to leave or disregard the officer's request for information.' Id. at 814 (quoting United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir.1993)). 33 The fact that Ms. Bradford was sitting in . . . [Trooper Peech's] patrol car, without more, does not make her consent involuntary. United States v. Gigley, 213 F.3d 509, 514 (10th Cir.2000); United States v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir.1997) (finding an encounter to be consensual, despite the fact that the officer and the defendant were both sitting in the patrol car during the questioning, because a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter). Even so, Ms. Bradford, seated in the rear of a trooper's vehicle, after having been stopped for a perfectly legitimate reason, would not necessarily view herself as free to exit the vehicle if Trooper Peech continued with a stream of questions. See United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir.1994) (No one who is seated in a law enforcement officer's vehicle after having been stopped by the officer for a perfectly legitimate reason, and who then asks whether the stop is at an end (`That's it?') and is immediately told `No' and to `wait a minute,' can reasonably view himself or herself as free to leave the patrol car.). 34 Although we are troubled by the fact that Ms. Bradford was sitting in the patrol car while Trooper Peech questioned her after handing back her documents, there is no indication here that Trooper Peech made any coercive show of authority, such as the presence of more than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer, or his use of a commanding tone of voice indicating that compliance might be compelled, suggesting that the detention had not ended. See United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 959 (10th Cir.1991). Ms. Bradford neither argues nor cites to the record for any evidence that Trooper Peech asking her if there was anything in the car he should know about and asking to look in the trunk after handing back her documents was a result of a coercive show of power. Thus, after Trooper Peech handed back the documents, the traffic stop was over, and they were engaged in a consensual encounter. 35 After this consensual encounter ended, Trooper Peech told Ms. Bradford to have a safe trip; she exited the patrol car and headed toward the rental car. See Bradford, 290 F.Supp.2d at 1267. Trooper Peech reinitiated contact with Ms. Bradford in front of the patrol car and asked if he could ask her a few more questions. See id. She said yes, and he asked her if she was sure. See id. She said yes again. See id. Ms. Bradford admits that this formed the basis of a consensual encounter because this questioning was consensual in nature. Aplt. Br. at 14-15. From this point until Trooper Peech detained Ms. Bradford to wait for the drug dog, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. When a driver voluntarily consents to additional questioning, no further Fourth Amendment seizure or detention occurs. Anderson, 114 F.3d at 1064.