Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prosecutor's Implied Comment on Defendant's Failure to Testify

Text: Defendant contends the prosecutor's argument that defendant had not expressed true remorse for the killing constituted an implied comment on defendant's choice not to testily in his own defense, in violation of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106. We find no such implied comment in the prosecutor's argument. Dr. Carlin, the defense psychiatrist, testified at the penalty phase that when she asked defendant what he thought about what had happened, he answered, `I don't think it should have happened. We were stupid. We were drunk. I have a lot of remorse. It would be better to tie him' emphasize him`up and take his life savings and split from the country.' [13] In obvious reference to this testimony, the prosecutor argued to the jury: Again, remorse. The defendant expressed a possible factor in mitigation. Did he say he was sorry, but only sorry that he got caught? Not a significant factor in mitigation. When he expressed his remorse, `We should have just tied her up and taken her life savings and split the country.' Again, a selfish concern only for his own well-being, never expressing a type of remorse, `I'm sorry I did it, I'm sorry I caused pain.' With two years of reflection, no evidence of that type of remorse. (Italics added.) The italicized phrase, defendant argues, must have referred to defendant's failure to testify, rather than to Dr. Carlin's interview, because Dr. Carlin last interviewed defendant in February of 1990, only 19 months after the July 12, 1988, killing. We observe, however, that the evidentiary portion of defendant's trial took place during September and October of 1991, more than three years after the killing, making it unlikely the prosecutor's two years referred specifically to that period. From the context, moreover, even the italicized comment would naturally be taken to refer to what defendant had or had not said to Dr. Carlin. Finally, even if the prosecutor's remarks could be taken more broadly to refer to defendant's failure to show true remorse at any time through trial, they would not impliedly refer to his failure to testify, as defendant discussed the crimes and his attitudes toward them with Deputy Pirozzi during the trial itself. The record, therefore, does not show a reasonable likelihood ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705) the jury would have understood the prosecutor's argument as a comment on defendant's failure to testify.