Opinion ID: 534558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suit Against Federal Officials

Text: 33 Plaintiffs assert claims against the federal officials individually for breach of the government's trust relationship with its Indian citizens. Plaintiffs also allege claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), for the denial of their alleged constitutional right to vote in the 1983 Cherokee tribal elections. The basis of both the breach-of-trust claims and the Bivens claims is the failure of these defendants to intervene in the alleged discriminatory tribal election process. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. We affirm, concluding instead that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against these defendants. 34 In Wheeler v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 811 F.2d 549 (10th Cir.1987), we explicitly rejected plaintiffs' argument that the federal government's general trust responsibilities impose a duty on these federal officials to involve themselves in the tribal election. As in this case, the plaintiffs in Wheeler, argued that the government 35 has a duty to protect the Cherokee Indians' right to self-government and that to do so, it must step in under authority of its general trust responsibilities, as it did in United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983), and Milam v. United States Department of Interior, 10 Indian L.Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3013, No. 82-3099 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1982). 36 Id. at 552. We distinguished Mitchell as a case involving federal statutes and regulations requiring government action with respect to a specific trust corpus. Id. at 553. In contrast, in Wheeler and the instant case there is no corpus, and no statute or regulation requires Department involvement in Cherokee election disputes; rather, as noted previously, federal law precludes Department action. Id. We distinguished Milam as involving a tribe which, contrary to the Cherokee Nation, had no tribal forum for interpreting tribal law, thus requiring the Department to interpret the tribal constitution in order to determine which government it should recognize in its interactions. Id. 37 Our conclusion in Wheeler that the plaintiffs had no cause of action based on the government's non-intervention in the tribal election process is equally applicable to plaintiffs' claims against the federal officials here. 38 Indian tribes have a right to self-government, and the Federal Government encourages tribes to exercise that right. Consequently, while the Department may be required by statute or tribal law to act in intratribal matters, it should act so as to avoid any unnecessary interference with a tribe's right to self-government. Plaintiffs have not cited, and we have not found, any federal statute or any provision of Cherokee law that requires the Department to intervene in a Cherokee election dispute. Rather, the Cherokee Nation provides a tribal forum for resolving such disputes. Consequently, the Department has no authority to take action contrary to the tribal resolution of such disputes. In the present case, the Department does not have authority to invalidate the Cherokee election, and the courts have no authority to order the Department to grant such relief. Id. 13 39 Plaintiffs' remaining claims, to the extent they are pursued on appeal, are implicitly resolved adversely to plaintiffs by the holdings we articulate in this opinion. 40 AFFIRMED.