Opinion ID: 2320518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Severance Properly Denied

Text: In a consolidated indictment, Monroe was charged with the Attempted Murder of Ferrell on January 27, 2006 and Murder in the First Degree for killing Ferrell on April 2, 2007. On appeal Monroe argues that the denial of his motion to sever resulted in substantial injustice. According to Monroe, the joint trial of the two shootings of Ferrell permitted the jury to use evidence from the attempted murder case to infer a general criminal disposition of Mr. Monroe to do harm to Andre Ferrell. This Court reviews the Superior Court's denial of a motion to sever charges under an abuse of discretion standard. [2] The denial of a motion to sever the trial of multiple offenses will not be disturbed on appeal unless a defendant demonstrates a reasonable probability that substantial prejudice may have resulted from a joint trial. [3] Superior Court Criminal Rule 8(a) allows multiple offenses to be charged in the same indictment provided that one of the following circumstances exists: the offenses are of the same or similar character; the offenses are based on the same act or transaction; the offenses are based on two or more connected acts or transactions; or the offenses are based on two or more acts or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. [4] Monroe does not contest the initial consolidation of the charges relating to both shootings in one indictment. Rule 8 is designed to promote judicial economy and efficiency, provided that the realization of those objectives is consistent with the rights of the accused. [5] Therefore, when it appears that the defendant is unduly prejudiced by a joinder of offenses in an indictment, the Superior Court may sever the offenses and order separate trials even though the offenses were properly joined in the same indictment. [6] In making that determination, the trial court must balance the rights of the accused against the legitimate concern of judicial economy to be achieved by a joint trial. [7] Delaware courts have recognized at least three situations in which prejudice arises: (1) an accumulation of evidence of the various crimes to establish guilt, when the separate consideration of the evidence would not lead the jury to so find; (2) a consideration of the evidence of one of the crimes would lead the jury to infer a general criminal disposition of the defendant to commit the crimes charged; and (3) the confusion of the jury or embarrassment to the defendant resulting from the presentation of different offenses to the joined offenses. [8] Monroe focuses on the second of these concerns. The defendant has the burden of demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that a joint trial caused substantial prejudice [9] to his defense. [10] A crucial factor to be considered by the trial judge in ruling on a motion to sever is whether the evidence of one crime would be admissible in the trial of the other crime. [11] If such evidence were admissible at a separate trial, there would be no unfair prejudice in having a joint trial. It [is] well established that evidence of other crimes [is] not, in general, admissible to prove that the defendant committed the offense charged. [12] Despite this general prohibition on evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, Delaware Rule of Evidence (D.R.E.) 404(b) provides that: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts. . . may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. Such evidence of prior misconduct is admissible when it has `independent logical relevance' and when its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [13] D.R.E. 404(b) permits the admission of evidence that the accused committed other crimes to show motive, intent, identity and consciousness of guilt. In this case, the trial judge concluded that evidence of the attempted murder would be admissible at a separate murder trial to show Monroe's motive and intent to kill Ferrell. The trial judge's ruling stated, in part: Moreover, the court believes that severance would ultimately be a drain on judicial economy. If this court were to grant severance, the Murder First Degree case would presumably be tried first, and Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b) would very likely allow the introduction in the murder trial of the evidence of the attempted murder as part of motive and/or intent. The State submits that the Superior Court properly ruled that evidence of Monroe's attempt to kill Ferrell would be admissible at a separate murder trial to prove his intent to cause Ferrell's death and as a motive to eliminate Ferrell as a witness to the attempted murder. Accordingly, the State argues, that evidence was not introduced to show that Monroe had a propensity to act violently. Instead, the State contends, evidence of the attempted murder was both relevant and admissible to establish that Monroe had the intent and a motive to kill Ferrell. Generally, upon the trial of a criminal case, acts, conduct, and declarations of the accused occurring after the commission of an alleged offense which are relevant and tend to show a consciousness of guilt or a desire or disposition to conceal the crime are admissible in evidence. [14] The State argues that evidence of a continued intent to kill Ferrell and to eliminate Ferrell as a witness to the attempted murder meets those criteria for admissibility. [15] We agree. This Court addressed the same issue in Stevenson v. State . [16] In Stevenson, the defendant was on trial for the capital murder of Kristopher Heath (Heath). There, the State's theory was that Heath was murdered to eliminate him as a witness at Stevenson's pending trial for theft. To establish that motive, the State sought to introduce evidence of the pending theft charges against Stevenson and Heath's role as the State's key witness. The Superior Court concluded that this other crime evidence was admissible after conducting an analysis pursuant to D.R.E. 404(b) and this Court's holding in Getz v. State . [17] Although evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible, motive is an exception expressly recognized by Rule 404(b). The State's evidence of Stevenson's other crimes at his murder trial established that Heath, as the chief investigating security officer at the department store where the thefts took place, was the primary witness against Stevenson. This Court held that [t]he record supports the Superior Court's conclusion that this evidence was highly probative to the State's case and not unfairly prejudicial to Stevenson. [18] In Monroe's case, at the time of Ferrell's murder, charges had been pending against Monroe for more than a year for the attempted murder of Ferrell. The State's theory was that Monroe intended to kill Monroe fifteen months later because of personal animus, and also to eliminate Ferrell as a witness at Monroe's attempted murder trial. Here, for the reasons stated in Stevenson, we also conclude that the attempted murder evidence was highly probative to the State's murder case and not unfairly prejudicial to Monroe. [19] Nevertheless, Monroe argues that the Superior Court erred in concluding that if the motion to sever were granted, the evidence of the attempted murder would have been admissible at the severed murder trial. In support, Monroe contends that the evidence of the attempted murder would not have been admitted at a severed murder trial because it was sparse and unreliable. Specifically, Monroe argues that the attempted murder evidence would not survive a Getz analysis because the eyewitness testimony was not credible. That argument goes to the weight of the State's evidence and not its admissibility. This Court has held that under a Getz analysis, sworn testimony constitutes clear and convincing evidence for purposes of admissibility, with credibility to be decided by the trier of fact. [20] Whether two crimes are joined for a single trial or the other crime evidence is introduced at a separate trial, the most important consideration is to carefully instruct the jury on how to consider and use the evidence of different crimes. If the other crime evidence is introduced at a separate trial pursuant to D.R.E. 404(b), the jury must be given a limiting instruction. [21] That was done in Stevenson's case. If the other crime evidence is presented to sustain a separate charge at a single trial following a multi-count or consolidated indictment, as in Monroe's case, the jury must be carefully instructed on how to evaluate the other crime evidence. That was done in this case. When the trial judge denied Monroe's pretrial severance motion, he correctly recognized that he should give a separate charge instruction to the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows: The defendant is charged in Counts 1 through 10 with criminal charges relating to the incident on April 2, 2007 and, in Counts 11 and 12, with criminal charges related to the incident on January 26, 2006. These are separate and distinct offenses and must, therefore, be independently evaluated by you. Just because you reach a conclusion with regard to the other offenses does not mean you need to reach a similar conclusion as to any of the other charges. Again, each charge is separate and distinct, and you must evaluate evidence as to one independently from evidence as to the others. This Court has held that such an instruction effectively mitigates any potential prejudice when a defendant is tried for two separate attacks against a single victim. [22] The jury is presumed to have followed that instruction. [23] In this case, the record supports that presumption because the jury acquitted Monroe of the Attempted Murder of Ferrell and the related charges. We hold that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Monroe's motion to sever.