Opinion ID: 161267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whose Speech Is It?

Text: 23 Denver owns each component part of the display. Aplt. App. at 89. The City maintains and replaces those parts when necessary, it erects the fence that surrounds the display, and it provides video cameras, motion detectors, and a security guard to protect the display. Id. at 69-70, 88-89, 102-03. In Denver's view, the display is the City's message to the community. Id. at 95-96, 101-04. On the other hand, Ms. Wells and the FFRF contend that the display is merely an assortment of private speech by corporations that have paid for the privilege. E.g., id. at 95. Plaintiffs' characterization of the display is not supported by the record. 24 Plaintiffs' argument revolves around the large Happy Holidays sign, which stands inside the fence at the far right of the display. See Addendum, infra at 1154. 4 According to the City, the Happy Holidays sign is a Thank You from Denver to the sponsors, Aplee. Br. at 20 n.10, and the district court agreed. Aplt. App. at 140-41. In the plaintiffs' view, however, the plain language of the sign demonstrates that it is a message from -- not to -- the sponsors, and they assert that they are equally entitled to communicate their message from within the fence. Aplt. Br. at 18-19. We conclude that the sign is Denver's speech, not that of the listed corporations. 25 The Supreme Court has provided very little guidance as to what constitutes government speech. As noted, we are aware of only one case, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), in which the Court actually applied the principles that underlie the government speech doctrine. In that case, the Court upheld the government's prohibition on abortion-related advice applicable to recipients of federal funds [under Title X] for family planning counseling. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194). We recognize that Rust did not place explicit reliance on the rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental speech; when interpreting the holding in later cases, however, [the Supreme Court has] explained Rust on this understanding. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. at 1048. The other Supreme Court cases that have discussed the doctrine have done so only in dicta. Id.; Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. In each case, the Court held that the speech at issue did not constitute government speech. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. at 1049 (The advice from the attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech even under a generous understanding of the concept.); Southworth, 529 U.S. at 235 (In the instant case, the speech is not that of the University or its agents. It is not, furthermore, speech by an instructor or a professor in the academic context, where principles applicable to government speech would have to be considered.); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841 (The University has taken pains to disassociate itself from the private speech involved in this case.). 5 A few of our sister circuits, however, have had occasion to apply the government speech doctrine, and their opinions are instructive. Downs, 228 F.3d at 1013-16; Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1093-94; see also Muir, 688 F.2d at 1044. 26 The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Knights of the KKK is particularly on point. That case arose when the Ku Klux Klan of Missouri wrote to the University of Missouri's public radio station, KWMU, offering to underwrite four segments of National Public Radio's All Things Considered. 208 F.3d at 1089. Under federal law, public radio stations must acknowledge the underwriters (sponsors) of particular broadcasts by identifying them, on the air, during the broadcast. Id. at 1088 (citing 47 U.S.C. 317(a)(1)). To encourage contributions, KWMU operated an enhanced underwriting program, pursuant to which acknowledgments could include a limited amount of additional information about the underwriter. Id. at 1088-89 & n.3 (citations omitted). The Klan included the following proposed announcement with its offer of funds: 27 The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a White Christian organization, standing up for rights and values of White Christian America since 1865. For more information[,] please contact the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, at [mailing address]. Let your voice be heard! 28 Id. at 1089 (first alteration in original). When the station declined the Klan's offer, the organization sued, alleging violations of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The Eighth Circuit rejected both challenges, holding, inter alia, that the underwriting acknowledgments constituted government speech. Id. at 1093. 29 To support that conclusion, the Eighth Circuit relied on a number of factors: (1) that the central purpose of the enhanced underwriting program is not to promote the views of the donors; (2) that the station exercised editorial control over the content of acknowledgment scripts; (3) that the literal speaker was a KWMU employee, not a Klan representative; and (4) that ultimate responsibility for the contents of the broadcast rested with KWMU, not with the Klan. Id. at 1093-94. The Ninth Circuit relied on similar factors in Downs, in which the court rejected a public school teacher's claim that he had a First Amendment right to respond to his school's recognition of Gay and Lesbian Awareness month by posting anti-homosexuality materials on a school bulletin board. See Downs, 228 F.3d at 1011-12 (holding that content of bulletin boards was government speech in that boards were used to express school policy, that access was limited to faculty and staff, that postings were subject to the oversight of the school principals, that the school district had made no affirmative effort to disclaim responsibility for the [boards'] content, and that the boards were the property and responsibility of the school and the district). Due to the special characteristics of the school environment, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)), we rely primarily on the four factors articulated in Knights of the KKK. 6 30 As to the purpose of the sign, the record evidence includes the City's complete control over the sign's construction, message, and placement, as well as Mr. Hall's testimony that [t]he sign is there to thank the sponsors and the citizens for the support of the cost of the display. . . . It is there to recognize their financial support and presentation of the display. Aplt. App. at 96; see also id. at 102-03. The district court found Mr. Hall's testimony to be credible, id. at 140, and we cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous. The fact that the sponsors may receive an incidental benefit from the Happy Holidays sign -- in the form of publicity and good will -- does not refute Mr. Hall's testimony as to the sign's purpose. Indeed, any benefit that accrues to the sponsors ultimately serves the City's interests by providing current and putative sponsors with an incentive to contribute to the Keep the Lights Foundation in the future. In this sense, the sign is comparable to the enhanced underwriter acknowledgments in Knights of the KKK. See 203 F.3d at 1088, 1093-94 & nn.10-11. 31 Second, it is uncontroverted that the City built, paid for, and erected the sign. Aplt. App. at 86-87; see also Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094 n.9 (recognizing that the announcements at issue served primarily to identify sponsors, but noting that conveyance of this collateral information remains a communicative act of the government). Significantly, there is no indication that any of the corporate sponsors even knew about the Happy Holidays sign, much less exercised any editorial control over its design or content. Ms. Wells and the FFRF could have obtained discovery on this issue by serving interrogatories on Denver, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, or by deposing representatives of the listed corporations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1) (allowing deposition of non-party); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 (allowing party to subpoena witness to appear at deposition). Rather than pursue these options, however, Plaintiffs stipulated to the entry of a final judgment. Aplt. App. at 38-40. According to that stipulation, [n]either the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants has any additional witnesses, evidence, or argument to present to the Court at this time and, therefore, agree that this action may, pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2) F.R.C.P., be advanced and consolidated on the merits based upon the evidence received at the hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Id. at 39, 4 (emphasis added). 32 As to the final Knights of the KKK factor, this litigation is itself an indication that the City bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of the display. Even more persuasive is the fact that the City has assumed full responsibility for providing security for the display, including a fence to guard against theft and protect citizens from possible electrical hazards, Aplt. App. at 88, video cameras, id. at 102-03, motion detectors, id., and a security guard. Id. at 69-70, 103. Accordingly, we conclude that the holiday display, including the Happy Holidays sign, is government speech. 33 The dissent relies on a footnote in Knights of the KKK for the proposition that [a]n additional factor relevant to the inquiry is who the listener believes to be the speaker. Infra at 1155 (citing Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094 n.9). Even assuming, arguendo, that listeners' perception is one relevant factor, our consideration of that factor would be limited to the perception of an informed and objectively reasonable observer. Cf., e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., U.S., 121 S.Ct. 2093, 210607, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001) (rejecting subjective, speculative listeners' perception argument as a modified heckler's veto, in which a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of what the youngest members of the audience might misperceive) (emphasis added); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ([T]he reasonable observer . . . must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears. . . . Nor can the knowledge attributed to the reasonable observer be limited to the information gleaned simply from viewing the challenged display.) (emphasis added); Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d 542, 555 (10th Cir. 1997) (attributing to reasonable observer knowledge of the purpose, context and history of public education in Salt Lake City, including the historical tension between the government and the Mormon Church). In this case, an informed, objectively reasonable observer would know the significance of the display's location on the City and County Building Steps; would know that Denver has erected this or a similar holiday display since at least 1979, see Citizens Concerned for the Separation of Church & State, 508 F. Supp. at 825; would view the size, content, and location of the Happy Holidays sign in the context of the display as a whole; 7 and would consider the fact that the sign's largely generic lettering is a far cry from the sophisticated graphic design generally associated with commercial speech. Weighed against this knowledge, we cannot agree with the dissent's conclusion that the mere fact that the sign did not contain the words Thank You would lead a reasonable observer to conclude that the display was corporate speech. Having determined that the display constituted government speech, we turn now to the constitutional implications of that conclusion. 34 B. Given that the Holiday Display Constitutes Government Speech, To What Extent Can Denver Control the Contents of the Display? 35 [W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. For example, the First Amendment does not bar the government from mak[ing] a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-92 (internal quotations and citations omitted), or from implementing that judgment by refusing to fund activities, including speech, which relate to abortion. Id. at 194-95. Similarly, [a]n arm of local government . . . may decide not only to talk about gay and lesbian awareness and tolerance in general, but also to advocate such tolerance if it so decides, and restrict the contrary speech of one of its representatives by refusing to incorporate that speech into its own presentation. Downs, 228 F.3d at 1014; see also Knights of the KKK, 203 F.3d at 1094-95 (holding that government-owned radio station may control the contents of its own speech, but declining to decide whether governmental speech that is not editorial in nature is per se exempt from forum analysis). 36 Upon consideration, we conclude that the City of Denver is entitled to present a holiday message to its citizens without incurring a constitutional obligation to incorporate the message of any private party with something to say. Simply because the government opens its mouth to speak does not give every outside individual or group a First Amendment right to play ventriloquist. Downs, 228 F.3d at 1013. Although we recognize that viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself the speaker, Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. at 1048, there is nothing in this record that supports the plaintiffs' assertion that the Winter Solstice sign was excluded from the display for viewpoint-based reasons. In fact, Mr. Hall testified that he had also denied an anonymous caller's request for permission to add a menorah to the 1999 display. Aplt. App. at 95, 104. We see no inconsistency between that denial and Mr. Hall's reluctance to rule out the possibility that he might consider an elected official's proposal that the City include a menorah in future displays. Id. at 108-09. Nor do we agree that the district court abused its discretion by sustaining the City's objection to a line of inquiry that called for speculation as to the possible content of future displays. Id. at 109. 37 In sum, we hold that the City acted within its rights to control the contents of its own speech. See, e.g., Muir, 688 F.2d at 1044 ([T]he First Amendment does not preclude the government from exercising editorial control over its own medium of expression.). 38 II. Does Denver's Private Unattended Display Ban, Either on its Face or As Applied, Violate the Plaintiffs' First Amendment Rights to Freedom of Speech? 39 Plaintiffs' Winter Solstice sign was removed not only because it was an intrusion into the display [the City] had erected, but also because [i]t was an unattended display on the front [i.e., East] steps of the City and County Building. Aplt. App. at 92. Although Denver permits demonstrations, rallies, picketing, leafleting, and similar speech activities on the City and County Building's interior sidewalks and -- absent a conflict with another event -- on the East Steps, the City does not permit private unattended displays on the steps. Id. at 89-92. Thus, whether speech is permissible or impermissible depends solely on its manner, namely: whether or not the speaker is present. Id. at 91. As explained, we assess the regulation of private speech on government property according to a three-step analytical framework. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797; accord Mesa v. White, 197 F.3d 1041, 1044 (10th Cir. 1999); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 1997). Because the defendants have conceded that the Winter Solstice sign constitutes protected speech, Aplee. Br. at 12, our analysis begins with the second step: whether the property to which the plaintiffs seek access is a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, or a non-public forum. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797; accord Summum, 130 F.3d at 913. This characterization of the relevant forum is necessary to determine the extent to which [Denver] may limit access to this property -- i.e., whether a heightened or reasonableness standard applies . . . . Summum, 130 F.3d at 913 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797). Third, we must assess whether [Denver's] justifications . . . satisfy the requisite standard, id., in this case, whether the unattended display ban is narrowly tailored to further significant government interests, while leaving open ample alternative channels for communication. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). A. Public Forum Analysis 40 [T]he Court [has] identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802) (alteration in original); accord Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 871 (1999). In addition, certain government properties are not fora at all. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (citation omitted). Traditional public fora, such as public parks and sidewalks, are places that by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate . . . . Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Within a traditional public fora, the appropriate First Amendment standard depends on whether a restriction on speech is content-based or content-neutral. Content-based restrictions must survive strict scrutiny -- i.e., they must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Id.; see also United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting that under strict scrutiny, [i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative). On the other hand, we will uphold content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech provided they are 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.' Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 45) (emphasis added). 41 The second category of government property consists of designated public fora. The designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited character, is one a state creates 'by intentionally opening a non-traditional forum for public discourse.' Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802); see also Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (Designated public fora . . . are created by purposeful governmental action.). Designated public fora differ from traditional public fora in that a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility . . . . Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46); accord Summum, 130 F.3d at 914; see also DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (The government has an inherent right to control its property, which includes the right to close a previously open forum.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1067 (2000). While a designated public forum remains open for public discourse, however, the government is subject to the same standards that apply in a traditional public forum. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 42 Other government properties are either nonpublic fora or not fora at all. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79 (1992)). Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 49). A reasonable restriction need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808.
43 Before we may properly characterize the forum at issue, we must first identify its boundaries. See id. at 801 ([F]orum analysis is not completed merely by identifying the government property at issue). To define the relevant forum, the Supreme Court has 44 focused on the access sought by the speaker. When speakers seek general access to public property, the forum encompasses that property. In cases in which limited access is sought, [the Court's] cases have taken a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the confines of the government property. 45 Id. (citation omitted). For example, the Cornelius Court defined the relevant forum as the federal fund-raising drive to which the plaintiffs sought access, rather than the federal workplace in general. Id.; see also Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 69 F.3d 650, 655-56 (2d Cir.) (defining forum as particular advertising space to which plaintiff sought access, rather than alternative space also owned by defendant), amended by 89 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1995); Texas v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 58 F.3d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir. 1995) (defining forum as Adopt-a-Highway Program rather than public highways generally, where KKK sought permission to participate in Program near recently desegregated housing project). We recognize that Ms. Wells and the FFRF initially sought access only to the fenced-off area, Aplt. Add. at 9-12 (Pl. Ex. 11-12), and that they actually installed the Winter Solstice sign inside the fence. Id. at 2 (Pl. Ex. 4). Nonetheless, the record shows that for the purpose of Plaintiffs' as applied challenge to the unattended display ban, the relevant forum encompasses the entire East Steps, whether fenced-off or not. See Aplt. App. at 49 ([W]e don't even want [the Winter Solstice sign] included in [Denver's] display. All we want to do is to have the right to post our sign unattended on the steps . . . .) (statement by Plaintiffs' counsel at hearing) (emphasis added). 8
46 The parties disagree as to whether the relevant forum is a traditional or a designated public forum. See Aplt. Br. at 10 & n.3 (traditional); Aplee. Br. at 12-14 (designated). We find it unnecessary to resolve this dispute. As explained, the only distinction between the two types of public fora is that the government is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of a designated public forum. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; accord Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287; Summum, 130 F.3d at 914. Since neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants claim that the unattended display ban has effectively closed the forum, the distinction between traditional and designated public fora has no practical significance in this case. E.g., Aplt. App. at 114 ([T]he only difference between [a designated] and a traditional public forum . . . is that [a designated forum] can be canceled as a public forum if the City so chooses, but it hasn't so chosen, so it's a public forum.) (statement by Plaintiffs' counsel at hearing). As long as a public forum remains open, the government is subject to the same constitutional standards regardless of whether the forum is designated or traditional; the critical inquiry is content-neutrality.
47 In this case, the district court concluded that Denver did in fact have a policy prohibiting unattended displays, and that the policy was content-neutral. Aplt. App. at 139-40. We agree. The trial court based its finding on the testimony of Mr. Hall, and on the absence of any evidence to the contrary. Id. at 139-42. Despite the district court's exclusive reliance on testimonial evidence, in cases raising First Amendment issues . . . an appellate court has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.' Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 n.9 (1987) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964))); see also Aplt. App. at 49 ([T]his case probably can be decided without evidence . . . because it really is an issue of law. I don't think there is much factual dispute.) (comment by court). Thus, our review is de novo. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1230 n.7 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 48 Upon a careful review of the entire record, we agree that Denver does indeed have a policy that prohibits unattended displays on the East Steps, and we hold that this policy is content-neutral both on its face and as applied. As to the existence of the policy, Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to counter Mr. Hall's testimony, given under oath, that Denver's unattended display ban has been in effect since at least 1985. Aplt. App. at 92, 97. Unlike the dissent, we cannot construe the City's failure to cite the unattended display ban in response to Plaintiffs' letters as evidence that no such policy existed. The record shows that both the 1998 letter and the 1999 letter specifically requested permission to place the Winter Solstice sign inside the fenced-off display. Aplt. Add. at 9 (Pl. Ex. 11) (1999 letter) (noticing intent to place the [] sign inside this year's Christmas display area) (emphasis added); id. at 11 (Pl. Ex. 12) (1998 letter) (noticing intent to have the sign included in the Christmas display) (emphasis added). But cf. Aplt. Br. at 4 (stating that letters noticed Plaintiffs' intention to place a display on the steps of the City and County Building). We have already held that the City was not required to incorporate Plaintiffs' message into its holiday display. Accordingly, we cannot accept Plaintiffs' argument that the City's failure to cite the unattended display ban constitutes evidence that the ban was fabricated for the purpose of this litigation. Aplt. Br. at 12. 9 The same reasoning applies to the anonymous caller's request to add a menorah to the display i.e., inside the fence. Aplt. App. at 104. The City's failure to volunteer information either to Plaintiffs or to the anonymous caller about an irrelevant policy is probative of nothing.