Opinion ID: 1804268
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: First Amendment Implications

Text: As noted by the United States Supreme Court, [o]ur profound national commitment to the free exchange of ideas, as enshrined in the First Amendment, demands that the law of libel carve out an area of `breathing space' so that protected speech is not discouraged. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)). Whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The same can also be said for the tort of false light invasion of privacy. Indeed, this Court recognized in Cason that there was an important need to balance the right to be let alone against the legitimate interests flowing from free speech and free press. 20 So.2d at 251. However, the highly offensive to a reasonable person standard runs the risk of chilling free speech because the type of conduct prohibited is not entirely clear: Because tort law is intended both to recompense wrongful conduct and to prevent it, it is important that it be clear in its identification of that wrongful conduct. The tort of false light fails that test. The sole area in which it differs from defamation is an area fraught with ambiguity and subjectivity. Recognizing highly offensive information, even framed within the context of what a reasonable person would find highly offensive, necessarily involves a subjective component. The publication of highly offensive material is more difficult to avoid than the publication of defamatory information that damages a person's reputation in the community. In order to prevent liability under a false light tort, the media would need to anticipate whether statements are highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities even though their publication does no harm to the individual's reputation. To the contrary, defamatory statements are more easily recognizable by an author or publisher because such statements are those that would damage someone's reputation in the community. In other words, defamation is measured by its results; whereas false light invasion of privacy is measured by perception. Bueno, 54 P.3d at 903 (emphasis added). The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately refused to recognize false light because it is too amorphous a tort and risks inflicting an unacceptable chill on those in the media seeking to avoid liability. Id. at 904. This sentiment was echoed by the Texas Supreme Court: The Restatement adds an element not associated with defamation, the requirement that the statement places the subject in a false light highly offensive to the reasonable person. The distinction fails to draw reasonably clear lines between lawful and unlawful conduct, however. A law forbidding or requiring conduct in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates due process. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964); see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (classification of speech as outrageous for suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not provide a meaningful standard, and would allow jury to impose damages on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views). Thus, the uncertainty of not knowing what speech may subject the speaker or writer to liability would have an unacceptable chilling effect on freedom of speech. Cain, 878 S.W.2d at 584. In addition, many safeguards and privileges have been established throughout the years that have effectively balanced the right of individuals to be free from defamatory statements against the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of expression. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986) (requiring public-figure plaintiffs in a matter of public concern to prove falsity); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967) (applying actual malice standard to suits by public figures against publishers); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (applying actual malice standards to suits by public officials against publishers). In Florida, this Court and the district courts have also applied various privileges to defamatory statements. See Abram v. Odham, 89 So.2d 334, 335-36 (Fla.1956) (qualified privilege for fair and accurate statements made in reporting on official government activities); Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234, 238 (1933) (qualified privilege for defamatory statements republished by a defendant); Abraham v. Baldwin, 52 Fla. 151, 42 So. 591, 592 (1906) (qualified privilege for defamatory statements made by a person who has a duty, interest or right in a specific subject matter); Fullerton v. Fla. Med. Ass'n, 938 So.2d 587, 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (stating that the common law recognizes that an absolute privilege extends to a witness's testimony in relation to an existing judicial proceeding); Demby v. English, 667 So.2d 350, 353 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (Under Florida common-law principles anyone who publishes defamatory matter is not liable if the remarks are published upon a conditionally privileged occasion and the privilege is not abused.). The Florida Legislature has also provided certain requirements for plaintiffs to meet in order to bring a defamation suit, which serve to protect First Amendment interests. Under Florida's defamation law, a prospective plaintiff is required to give a media defendant notice five days before initiating a civil action. § 770.01, Fla. Stat. (2007). The notice must specify the alleged false and defamatory statements contained in the article or broadcast. Id. Further, section 770.02, Florida Statutes (2007), limits the amount of damages a plaintiff may recover where: (1) the statements were published in good faith; (2) the statements were false due to an honest mistake of facts; (3) there were reasonable grounds for believing the statements were true; and (4) a full and fair correction, apology, or retraction was published or broadcast within a specific time period. We believe that all of these protections are necessary to ensure the delicate balance between preventing tortious injury resulting from defamatory statements and protecting the constitutional right to free speech. Although defamation actions are governed by these extensive protections, the same cannot be said for actions in false light. Without these protections that have slowly developed over the years, recognizing false light could persuade plaintiffs to circumvent these safeguards in order to ensure recovery, even though the same conduct could equally be remedied under defamation law. The Restatement echoes this concern: When the false publicity is also defamatory so that either action can be maintained by the plaintiff, it is arguable that limitations of long standing that have been found desirable for the action for defamation should not be successfully evaded by proceeding upon a different theory of later origin, in the development of which the attention of the courts has not been directed to the limitations. As yet there is little authority on this issue. The answers obviously turn upon the nature of the particular restrictive rule, the language of a particular statute and the circumstances of the case, and no generalization can be made. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. e. We acknowledge that this risk could be alleviated by simply extending all of the defamation safeguards to actions for false light, much as some courts in other jurisdictions have done. See, e.g., West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640 (Tenn.2001) (applying defamation privileges to false light); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992) (same); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70 (1984) (same); see also Cain, 878 S.W.2d at 582 (noting other jurisdictions that have applied the defamation safeguards to false light). However, we conclude that it is more prudent for the Florida legislature to address these issues by statute, such as the application of privileges, the prerequisites to suit, and the governing statute of limitations. In fact, we note that this matter has already been studied by the Legislature, but no action has yet been taken. See Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, Analysis of Cause of Action for False Light Invasion of Privacy (Nov.2007) (on file with the Florida State Archives). Furthermore, because many statements could form the basis of actions for either defamation or false light, no useful purpose would be served by the separate tort if these restrictions [we]re imposed. Cain, 878 S.W.2d at 582.