Opinion ID: 1457496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Order of Inquiry in Further Proceedings

Text: The inquiry on remand should focus first on the Air Force's justification for its impingement on the right to private intimate sexual relations and the compelling nature of any interest that is served by that measure. The Air Force should be required to identify a compelling interest with sufficient specificity so that the relation between the Don't Ask, Don't Tell statute and that policy can be evaluated. It is difficult to accomplish that goal if the compelling interest is as broadly stated as management of the military or, say, winning wars. Moreover, under strict scrutiny, it is not enough that the interest be merely served by the challenged legislation; the legislation must be necessary to that purpose, and must sweep no more broadly than is essential to serve the governmental purpose. See Dunn, 405 U.S at 345-46, 351-52, 92 S.Ct. 995. Thus, as a matter of due process, the Air Force can be required to show why there is a compelling need to discharge homosexuals who have been sexually active outside of their duty station with persons unconnected to the military and why the measure it has adopted is narrowly tailored to the satisfaction of that compelling need. As a matter of equal protection, the Air Force can be asked to show what compelling need is narrowly served by treating homosexuals who are sexually active off duty and outside the military context differently from heterosexuals who are sexually active off duty and outside the military context. These requirements are case-specific in that they reflect the alleged facts that Major Witt conducted all of her relations with her female partner off-base, and her partner was alleged not to be in or employed by the military. If the Air Force cannot meet these requirements, the statute must be invalidated in such applications. There are clear advantages to addressing the Air Force's justifications first, before any inquiry into the personal characteristics and situation of Major Witt in her unit. First, requiring the Air Force to make the requisite showing as a threshold matter may end the case. Second, the inquiry directed toward the Air Force is less potentially disruptive than a focus on Major Witt herself and, particularly, the allegedly favorable attitude toward her on the part of other members of her unit. To require unit members to testify or submit affidavits concerning the degree to which they do or do not consider themselves adversely affected by the presence of a known, sexually active homosexual, may constitute a distraction from regular duties. It is better to employ such an inquiry only as a last resort. [6] Finally, requiring the Air Force to justify the application of the statute to a generic service member who carries on a homosexual relationship and intimate conduct away from the duty station and its personnel provides more protection of the constitutional right set forth in Lawrence. Because the right to choose to engage in private, intimate sexual conduct is a constitutional right of a high order, it must be protected not just for the outstanding service member like Major Witt, but also for the run-of-the-mill airman or soldier. It is thus the general application of the statute to the generic service member that the Air Force must be required to justify. In Lawrence, after all, the Supreme Court struck down the statute as applied to anyone engaging in homosexual conduct; it did not find it necessary or relevant to inquire into whether the individual conduct of which the petitioners had been convicted was more or less offensive to the interests of the State under the circumstances of its occurrence.