Opinion ID: 1441328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ebone's Challenge to the Timeliness of the District's Appeal

Text: Ebone contends that the trial court erred in vacating and re-entering judgment against the District on its cross claim, and thus, the District's appeal of the cross claim judgment is not timely. The District argues that its appeal is timely given the requirements of D.C.App. R. 4(a)(3) and Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58. We consider first whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of Rule 4(a)(3). D.C.App. R. 4(a)(3) provides: Entry of judgment or order. A judgment or order is deemed to be entered when it is entered on the civil docket, including microfilmed entry, by the Clerk of the Superior Court. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 79(a). When judgment or final order is entered or decided out of the presence of the parties and counsel, such judgment or order shall not be considered as having been entered, for the purpose of calculating the time for filing a notice of appeal or an application for the allowance of an appeal under Rule 6, until the fifth day after the Clerk of the Superior Court has made an entry on the docket, including microfilmed entry, reflecting the mailing of notice by that clerk. The District maintains that [t]he [court's] judgment [on its cross claim] was `entered... out of the presence of the parties,' within the meaning of D.C.App. R. 4(a)(3), [and thus,] the 30-day period for taking an appeal began on the fifth day after the Clerk of the Superior Court has made an entry on the docket ... reflecting the mailing of notice by that Clerk. Under this interpretation, the District argues, the appeal period began to run on May 14, 1997. In contrast, Ebone contends that under Rule 4(a)(3) the appeal period began to run on September 9, 1996, when final judgment against the District on its cross claim was entered on the docket by the Clerk of the Superior Court, because the `mailing of notice' by the clerk is not a pre-requisite for the entry of judgment when the judgment or order is decided in the presence of counsel.  (Emphasis supplied.) The trial court appeared to adopt the District's position in deciding to grant the District's motion to vacate and re-enter judgment: Notice from the Clerk's Office even by way of computer printout seems to be required under D.C.App. R. 4. The trial court misapprehended the clause, When judgment or final order is entered or decided out of the presence of the parties and counsel, as it appears in Rule 4(a)(3). Perhaps the court was mislead by a footnote which appeared in our opinion in A.J. v. L.O., 697 A.2d 1189, 1191 n. 3 (D.C.1997). In footnote 3 of that decision, we said that current Rule 4(a)(3) now applies whenever the judgment or final order is `entered or decided out of the presence of the parties and counsel,' ... even if, as in this case, the parties were on notice of the judge's decision but were awaiting a written order. Id. In A.J., the trial court granted L.O.'s motion to dismiss at a hearing but informed the parties that she would issue a written order soon thereafter. Id. at 1191. In that case, unlike the present case, the court issued an order out of the presence of counsel detailing the reasons for its dismissal of the case. In this case, there was no subsequent order issued out of the presence of the parties. Rather, the court's judgment here was rendered orally on August 5, 1996, and later entered mechanically on the docket, with the express notation that reasons [for the decision were] articulated on the record orally. In construing the predecessor version of Rule 4(a)(3), that is Rule 4 II(a)(3), we concluded that the rule has no application ... where the judgment was rendered in open court in the presence of ... counsel.... Brees v. Kelly Adjustment Co., 302 A.2d 214, 215 (D.C.1973). We also said that: The rule provides ... that the time for filing a notice of appeal runs whether or not the notice [of the order from which an appeal is taken] is sent or received. Pryor v. Pryor, 343 A.2d 321, 323 (D.C.1975). Given the presence of the District and Ebone when the court orally entered judgment for Ebone on the District's cross claim, the out of the presence of the parties and counsel provision of Rule 4(a)(3) is inapplicable. Therefore, we hold that where a final judgment or order is entered or decided in the presence of the parties or counsel for the parties, and no further substantive judgment or order is to be entered on the subject matter, the judgment or order is deemed to have been entered when it appears on the civil docket, including microfilmed entry. Thus, in this case, under Rule 4(a)(3), the judgment on the District's cross claim is deemed to have been entered on September 9, 1996. Given our holding with respect to Rule 4(a)(3), the District's appeal would be untimely, unless it must be deemed timely under Rule 58. We now turn to a consideration of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58 provides in pertinent part: Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b) [pertaining to judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties]: (1) Upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by the Court that a party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied, the Clerk, unless the Court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment without awaiting any direction by the Court; (2) upon a decision by the Court granting other relief, or upon a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, the Court shall promptly approve the form of the judgment and the Clerk shall thereupon enter it. Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. (Emphasis added.) To determine the timeliness of the District's appeal under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58, we focus on the italicized language, Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. We have not had occasion recently to examine Rule 58 with respect to the timeliness of an appeal. However, in Delany v. Murphy, 338 A.2d 432 (D.C.1975), we found an appeal to be timely even though judgment had been first announced orally in February 1973, then confirmed in a May 1973 order, followed by entry of judgment in September 1973. We said that prior to the entry of judgment in September 1973, there was no appealable order since Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58 and 79(a) require that to be effective, a judgment must be contained in a separate document and entered on the civil docket.... Id. at 434. Since our decision in Delany, supra, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the District of Columbia Circuit have had an opportunity to examine Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58 is virtually identical to the federal rule. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that: The sole purpose of the separate-document requirement, which was added to Rule 58 in 1963, was to clarify when the time for appeal... begins to run. Id. at 384, 98 S.Ct. 1117. Furthermore, the Supreme Court said: The separate-document requirement was thus intended to avoid the inequities that were inherent when a party appealed from a document or docket entry that appeared to be a final judgment of the district court only to have the appellate court announce later that an earlier document or entry had been the judgment and dismiss the appeal as untimely. The 1963 amendment to Rule 58 made clear that a party need not file a notice of appeal until a separate judgment has been filed and entered. Id. at 385, 98 S.Ct. 1117. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court referenced its decision in United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 36 L.Ed.2d 202, (1973), declaring that the separate-document rule must be `mechanically applied' in determining whether an appeal is timely. Id. [] at 221-22 [93 S.Ct. 1562]. Bankers Trust, supra, 435 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. 1117. The Supreme Court explained that: Technical application of the separate-judgment requirement is necessary ... to avoid the uncertainties that once plagued the determination of when an appeal must be brought. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit has addressed Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. In Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 283 U.S.App. D.C. 216, 899 F.2d 24 (1990), the court explained that the rule requires `a judgment set out on a separate document  distinct from any opinion or memorandum  which provides the basis for the entry of judgment.' Id. at 224; 899 F.2d at 32 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 advisory committee's note regarding the 1963 amendment to the rule). In addition, the rule `must be applied in such a way as to favor the right to appeal.' Id. (quoting Matter of Seiscom Delta, Inc., 857 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir.1988)). See United States v. Haynes, 332 U.S.App. D.C. 421, 424, 158 F.3d 1327, 1330 (1998) (concluding that an appeal was not time-barred under Rule 58 and citing Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302-03, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), for the proposition that a `separate document' is not needed for an order to become appealable, one is needed to render an appeal untimely). [3] In short, not until May 7, 1997, did the trial court's order in this case comply with the requirement of Rule 58, that: Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. Thus, the District's appeal of the trial court's cross claim judgment was timely. See Pack v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 327 U.S.App. D.C. 278, 279, 130 F.3d 1071, 1072 (1997) (Because the district court's order failed to comply with Rule 58, ... notice of appeal cannot be considered late.) (citing Baker v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 114 F.3d 57 (5th Cir.1997)). As the court said in Pack, supra : An appellant may ... safely wait until a conforming judgment has been entered and file an appeal at that time. Id. (citation omitted). [4]