Opinion ID: 2541515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Because Mitchell Was Legally Entitled to Possess a Firearm in His Vehicle, His Discharge Was Contrary to KRS 237.106

Text: Mitchell also asserts that his discharge was contrary to KRS 237.106. It provides, in relevant part: (1) No person, including but not limited to an employer, who is the owner, lessee, or occupant of real property shall prohibit any person who is legally entitled to possess a firearm from possessing a firearm, part of a firearm, ammunition, or ammunition component in a vehicle on the property. . . . . (4) An employer that fires, disciplines, demotes, or otherwise punishes an employee who is lawfully exercising a right guaranteed by this section and who is engaging in conduct in compliance with this statute shall be liable in civil damages. An employee may seek and the court shall grant an injunction against an employer who is violating the provisions of this section when it is found that the employee is in compliance with the provisions of this section. (5) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any real property: . . . . (c) Where a section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes specifically prohibits possession or carrying of firearms on the property. UK argues that subsection (5)(c) relieves it of liability for terminating Mitchell, because KRS 237.115 is a section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes that specifically prohibits possession or carrying of firearms on the property. As explained above, KRS 237.115, while recognizing the implicit right of a university to control weapons on its campus, is limited by KRS 527.020. Because KRS 527.020(4) and (8) specifically permitted Mitchell to store a firearm in his vehicle, even while on University property, UK has failed to point to a section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes [that] specifically prohibits possession or carrying of firearms on the property. KRS 237.106(5)(c). Mitchell's discharge was therefore contrary to KRS 237.106(4).