Opinion ID: 2691602
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The reclassification provisions

Text: violate the separation-of-powers doctrine {¶ 55} The AWA’s provisions governing the reclassification of sex offenders already classified by judges under Megan’s Law violate the separationof-powers doctrine for two related reasons: the reclassification scheme vests the executive branch with authority to review judicial decisions, and it interferes with the judicial power by requiring the reopening of final judgments. It is well settled that a legislature cannot enact laws that revisit a final judgment. We have held for over a century that “the Legislature cannot annul, reverse, or modify a judgment of a court already rendered.” Bartlett v. State, 73 Ohio St. at 58, 75 N.E. 939. See also United States v. O’Grady (1874), 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647-648, 22 L.Ed. 772 (“Judicial jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a cause, and    Congress cannot subject the judgments of the Supreme Court to the reexamination and revision of any other tribunal or any other department of the government”). As the Supreme Court of California recently explained, “judgments cannot be deprived of their ‘finality’ through statutory conditions not in effect when the judicial branch gave its ‘last word’ in the particular case,” 18 January Term, 2010 regardless of the policy behind the legislation. People v. King (2002), 27 Cal.4th 29, 35, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 214, 37 P.3d 398, citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227, 230, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328. “A judgment which is final by the laws existing when it is rendered cannot constitutionally be made subject to review by a statute subsequently enacted   .” Gompf v. Wolfinger (1902), 67 Ohio St. 144, 65 N.E. 878, at paragraph three of the syllabus. See also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 222, quoting The Federalist No. 81 (J. Cooke Ed.1961) 545 (“ ‘A legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particular case   ’ ”). The reclassification provisions violate these bedrock principles. {¶ 56} The reclassification scheme in the AWA works to “legislatively vacate[] the settled and journalized final judgments of the judicial branch of government.” State v. Russell, Trumbull App. No. 2008-T-0074, 2009-Ohio5213, ¶ 93 (Grendell, J., concurring in judgment only). The legislative attempt to reopen journalized final judgments imposing registration and communitynotification requirements on offenders so that new requirements may be imposed suffers the same constitutional infirmity. “It does not matter that the legislature has the authority to enact or amend laws requiring sex offenders to register or that the current Sex Offender Act does not order the courts to reopen final judgments. The fact remains that the General Assembly ‘cannot annul, reverse, or modify a judgment of a court already rendered.’ Bartlett, 73 Ohio St. at 58, 75 N.E. 939. [Reclassification], as a practical matter, nullifies that part of the court’s [initial classification] Judgment [in this case] ordering [the offender] to register for a period of ten years as a sexually oriented offender. To assert that the General Assembly has authority to create a new system of classification does not solve the problem that [the] original classification constituted a final judgment. There is no exception to the rule that the final judgments may not be legislatively annuled [sic] in situations where the Legislature has enacted new legislation.” State v. 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Grate, Trumbull App. No. 2008-T-0058, 2009-Ohio-4452, 2009 WL 2710100, ¶16. {¶ 57} Just as “Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch” or interfere with the judiciary by “commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments,” Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218, 219, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328, the General Assembly cannot vest authority in the attorney general to reopen and revise the final decision of a judge classifying a sex offender. {¶ 58} Our Constitution and case law make undeniably clear that the judicial power resides exclusively in the judicial branch. Ex parte Logan Branch of State Bank of Ohio (1853), 1 Ohio St. 432, 434. The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in the courts. Section 1, Article IV, Ohio Constitution. The power to review and affirm, modify, or reverse other courts’ judgments is strictly limited to appellate courts. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution. The AWA intrudes on that exclusive role and thus violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. {¶ 59} Moreover, once the final judgment has been opened, the AWA requires that the attorney general “shall determine” the new classifications of offenders and delinquent children who were classified by judges under the former statutes. R.C. 2950.031(A)(1) and 2950.032(A)(1)(a) and (b). In doing so, it violates a second prohibition by assigning to the executive branch the authority to revisit a judicial determination. {¶ 60} Thus, we conclude that R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032, which require the attorney general to reclassify sex offenders who have already been classified by court order under former law, impermissibly instruct the executive branch to review past decisions of the judicial branch and thereby violate the separation-ofpowers doctrine. 20 January Term, 2010 {¶ 61} We further conclude that R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032, which require the attorney general to reclassify sex offenders whose classifications have already been adjudicated by a court and made the subject of a final order, violate the separation-of-powers doctrine by requiring the opening of final judgments. {¶ 62} In light of our conclusion that the reclassification provision is unconstitutional, we decline to address the remaining constitutional claims at this time. The sole remaining salient question is, Which remedy to apply? See State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 84.