Opinion ID: 1967333
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Heading: Maryland and Equitable Adoption

Text: In Maryland, as in other American jurisdictions, adoption did not exist at common law; it is a creature of statute, having been brought into being in this State by Ch. 244, Acts of 1892. Strahorn, Adoption in Maryland, 7 Md.L. Rev. 275 (1943). As a general rule, there is no method, other than the statutory procedure, by which a child can be adopted in this State. Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306 (1937). Thus, Professor Strahorn wrote: Whether or not a private arrangement or agreement, entered into since the local statutory adoption procedure has been in force, will be given enforcement as a contract to adopt is a matter not yet passed on in Maryland adjudication. There is authority elsewhere in favor of the specific performance of such contracts.... 7 Md.L.Rev. at 278 [footnote omitted]. Professor Strahorn, however, wrote that before our predecessors decided Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 59 A.2d 499 (1948). That case, says McGarvey, shows that Maryland has recognized the doctrine of equitable adoption. [1] In Besche, Stella Besche alleged facts that would have established an equitable or virtual adoption. She also alleged that her purported adoptive mother had died testate. The will included a specific pecuniary bequest for Stella (as well as bequests for others) and a residuary clause giving all the rest and residue of the purported adoptive mother's estate to those persons who under the laws of the State of Maryland would take in case of intestacy. Id. at 541, 59 A.2d at 500. Although Ms. Besche had never been formally adopted, she claimed under the residuary provision as an equitable adoptee, relying on dictum in Clayton v. Heptasophs, 130 Md. 31, 36-37, 99 A. 949, 951-952 (1917): the authorities very generally establish the proposition, that a parol obligation by a person to adopt the child of another as his own, accompanied by the virtual though not statutory adoption, and acted upon by both parties during the obligor's life, may be enforced upon the death of the obligor, who dies without disposing of the property by his will.... Chief Judge Marbury, writing for the Besche court, said [t]his dictum seems to be supported by the weight of authority in this country to the extent that the courts decree that a child so treated will be entitled to a right of inheritance from the estate of the foster parent such as a natural child would enjoy, where the child in question has faithfully and fully performed the duties of a natural child to the foster parents. 190 Md. at 546, 59 A.2d at 502-503. He then proceeded to a careful review of equitable adoption cases throughout the country, noting both the contractual performance and estoppel basis for various decisions, and that the proof [in them] must be clear, cogent and convincing.... Id. at 548-549, 59 A.2d at 504. He listed at least 16 jurisdictions as adopting the doctrine and only three as rejecting it. This discussion may well suggest that the court looked with favor on the doctrine, at least to the extent that it would be applied to allow an equitably adopted child to take a distributive share of the equitably adoptive parent's estate on intestacy. But the court did not apply the doctrine in Besche. Intestacy was not involved; there was a will. Chief Judge Marbury reasoned: It is, of course, within the power of a parent to disinherit his natural child, and if a claimed adoptive parent has made a will, leaving his property to others, there would be no practical basis upon which the one who claimed a right to be considered his adopted child, could ask the intervention of the court. He could not be declared an adopted child, as we have already shown, and he could not be given a share in an estate which had been left by will to others. He is only entitled to be placed in the position he would have been in, had he been adopted, and in that position, he would have inherited nothing. Id. at 549-550, 59 A.2d at 504 [emphasis supplied]. This was because the residuary clause did not create an intestacy, but created a class of persons who would take as legatees and not under the intestacy statute. Because Ms. Besche was not one of those named in the statute, she could not take under the residuary clause. Id. at 552, 59 A.2d at 505. From this language we can deduce that Maryland would likely look with favor upon the doctrine to the extent of permitting an equitably adopted child to take property from an equitably adoptive parent by intestate succession. In so doing, we would align ourselves with what appears to be some 27 other jurisdictions that apply the doctrine in those circumstances. Annotation, 97 A.L.R.3d at 359-365. The fairness of applying the doctrine in that context, once the prerequisite facts have been established by clear and convincing evidence, is apparent. And that application of the doctrine fits well within the traditional contractual and equitable estoppel notions that have been advanced to support it. Thus, we are prepared to assume that Maryland does recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption, to the extent we have indicated. But, as we now explain, that will be of no benefit to McGarvey.