Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Selection of the second jury

Text: Defendant raises a number of challenges to the selection of the jury that decided penalty. As explained below, none has merit.
Before selection of the penalty retrial jury, the prosecutor filed a motion requesting that prospective jurors be questioned about their ability to impose the death penalty on an actual killer who lacked an intent to kill in a felony-murder special-circumstance case. [16] The prosecutor argued that such questioning was appropriate because a prospective juror who indicates, as an abstract, philosophical proposition, an inability to impose the death penalty in a felony-murder case absent an intent to kill, is biased and unable to follow the law, and thus should be dismissed for cause. Defense counsel submitted written opposition to the motion, arguing in relevant part that the proposed line of inquiry was a constitutionally impermissible attempt to seek prospective jurors' advisory opinions on the specific facts to be presented at trial. After hearing the motion, the trial court agreed with defense counsel that, under applicable principles, it would be improper to present prospective jurors with the facts of the case and ask them if they would require an intent to kill in order to impose death. But the trial court also found it would be permissible to explain, in conjunction with the court's customary practice of emphasizing to prospective jurors that they must follow the law, that the felony-murder rule does not require an intent to kill, and to probe their attitudes on that point. The trial court ruled that it would present the issue in the questionnaire, with oral questioning as needed either in open court or in chambers. After soliciting proposals from the parties on the wording of the question, the trial court added question No. 85 to the questionnaire, which began with this preface: The law in California says that when a person is engaged in the commission of certain felony crimes such as burglary, rape, and oral copulation, and a death results, then he can be convicted of first degree murder. This is called a felony murder case. Also in such a felony murder case if the person is the actual killer, he may be subject to the death penalty even though he did not have the intent to kill a person. That is, the death can be unintentional or accidental. Following this preface were four questions: (1) Do you have any views, attitudes, principles, or religious reasons about capital punishment that would prevent or substantially impair your ability to follow the law in regards to capital punishment as far as the felony murder rule is concerned?; (2) Would you be able to consider imposing the death penalty in a felony murder case in which a defendant did not intend to kill the victim?; (3) Would you automatically vote for the sentence of life without the possibility of parole in a felony murder case in which the defendant did not intend to kill the victim?; and (4) Would you automatically vote for the sentence of death in a felony murder case in which the defendant did not intend to kill the victim? Defendant contends that these questions violated his constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury and to a fundamentally fair trial. As explained below, we disagree. (26) The goal of voir dire in a capital case is to disclose whether prospective jurors hold views and attitudes that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with their instructions and oath. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844].) Our decisions have explained that death-qualification voir dire must avoid two extremes. On the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in the case being tried. On the other hand, it must not be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and aggravating evidence likely to be presented. [Citation.] In deciding where to strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts have considerable discretion. [Citations.] ( People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 721-722 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332].) In People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 916-918 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571] ( Pinholster ), we approved the prosecutor's inquiry into the prospective jurors' views on imposing the death penalty in a felony-murder case. As we explained, the prosecutor's voir dire questions, although related to facts of the particular case, led to an exchange that disclosed something about the jurors' attitudes in the abstract, which ultimately informed the crucial question whether the jurors could impose the death penalty in any burglary-murder case. ( Id. at p. 918; cf. People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 69-71 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506] [applying the reasoning of Pinholster to conclude voir dire questioning disclosing that the codefendant in a murder-for-hire case did not participate in the actual killing was not an improper inquiry into specific facts of case].) (27) Here, the questionnaire conveyed to prospective jurors a specific fact about the case: defendant did not intend to kill the victim. Contrary to defendant's assertion, however, nothing in the wording of the questions suggests they were being used for the prohibited purpose of instructing, educating, cajoling, or prejudicing the jury ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 182 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]), or that they invited prospective jurors to prejudge the case. Rather, as in Pinholster, the four questions regarding the absence of intent to kill elicited from the prospective jurors information from which the trial court could determine their views in the abstract. A prospective juror who, regardless of the facts, could not vote for the death penalty in a felony-murder case absent a showing of intent to kill is properly excused for cause because holding such a view would substantially impair the prospective juror's ability to perform a juror's duties. ( Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 918.) Here, the trial court struck the proper balance ( People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 722) when it granted the prosecutor's request to explore prospective jurors' views on whether the absence of an intent to kill would substantially impair their ability to follow the law of felony murder. Defendant further complains that the inquiry into prospective jurors' views on imposing the death penalty absent a showing of intent to kill allowed the prosecutor to eliminate all prospective jurors who might have an open mind to the question whether it is appropriate to execute a person who did not intend to kill. In support of this complaint, defendant observes that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against all three of the prospective jurors who gave ambiguous answers to the question Would you be able to consider imposing the death penalty in a felony murder case in which a defendant did not intend to kill the victim? Defendant's argument is not well taken. As discussed, the trial court added the challenged questions to the questionnaire for the proper purpose of facilitating the disclosure of prospective jurors' attitudes in the abstract, which helped inform the trial court's determination whether they could impose the death penalty in any felony-murder case where there was no showing of intent to kill. Furthermore, defendant cites no authority suggesting that the prosecutor was not entitled to exercise a peremptory challenge against any prospective jurors she believed would refuse to vote for the death penalty absent evidence of an intent to kill. Indeed, we have held to the contrary. ( People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 460 [the prosecutor may excuse a juror whose opposition to the death penalty makes it less likely the juror will impose it].)
Defendant claims the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury by conducting an inadequate examination into the possible racial bias of the jurors selected to decide the penalty retrial. We disagree. The prospective jurors for the penalty retrial, like their counterparts at the guilt phase, filled out a lengthy questionnaire that asked for yes-or-no or multiple-choice responses with space provided for additional comment. Like the questionnaire for the guilt phase, but with appropriate textual revisions, the questionnaire for the penalty phase included four questions that elicited from the prospective jurors their racial attitudes, inquiring, for example, whether they held any racial biases and, if so, whether those biases were Strong, Moderate, or Mild. The questionnaire also asked prospective jurors if the circumstance that defendant was an African-American man convicted of committing crimes against a Caucasian woman would affect their impartiality in determining penalty. [17] The trial court and counsel for both sides reviewed the questionnaire answers. A group of 30 prospective jurors were then briefly questioned, in open court and, where appropriate, in chambers outside the presence of the other prospective jurors. Defendant asserts that the trial court conducted inadequate voir dire of four jurors whose responses to the questionnaire required followup questioning on their racial views. He complains that although each of the four jurors indicated they had Mild racial or ethnic prejudices, the trial court asked no questions designed to elicit how these jurors' racial attitudes might affect their impartiality. Defendant has forfeited this claim because his counsel failed to suggest any additional questions regarding racial bias or complain about the trial court's questioning. ( People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 620; cf. Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, 37 [90 L.Ed.2d 27, 106 S.Ct. 1683] ( Turner ) [a defendant may not challenge on appeal the trial court's failure to question potential jurors on racial prejudice without having made a specific request for such an inquiry].) As during the first jury's selection, during selection of the second jury, the trial court communicated to the attorneys that it would consider their suggestions for followup questions, but defense counsel offered none. In any event, defendant's claim fails on the merits. We have reviewed the juror questionnaire responses at issue, as well as the entire record of voir dire, and find no support for defendant's claim of inadequate questioning on potential racial bias. Although four jurors indicated they had mild racial prejudices, their explanatory comments conveyed temperate, unremarkable attitudes that rendered further inquiry unnecessary. For instance, Juror No. 1 wrote, I feel all of us have some ethnic prejudices and I am no different. Moreover, all four of the jurors responded Yes to the question whether they could be impartial in determining the appropriate penalty in a case involving an African-American man convicted of crimes committed against a Caucasian female. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, on this record, the trial court was not obligated to pose the same question orally during voir dire. Our review of the record also discloses that the trial court was well aware of and fully satisfied its duty to ask prospective jurors relevant questions likely to reveal conscious or unconscious bias or prejudice. ( People v. Taylor, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) Notably, the questionnaire responses of two prospective jurors prompted the trial court to probe deeper into the subject of racial bias during in-chambers voir dire, and the trial court ultimately excused those prospective jurors for cause. The court personally questioned every member of the penalty retrial jury, observing firsthand their responses and demeanor, and thereby gleaning valuable information about their states of mind. ( People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451.) Therefore, the trial court's determination regarding the manner and scope of questioning is entitled to deference on appeal. ( Ibid. ) That defense counsel did not ask the court to pose additional questions to specific prospective jurors further suggests that the trial court's voir dire provided ample basis for ferreting out prospective jurors whose racial bias would interfere with their ability to be impartial. ( People v. Taylor, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.) Defendant correctly observes that the United States Supreme Court has recognized the special risks that potential racial bias poses in the penalty phase of a capital trial. In reversing the death sentence of an African-American defendant in Turner, supra, 476 U.S. 28, the high court explained that the trial court's refusal to ask prospective jurors any questions about possible racial bias compelled reversal of the defendant's death sentence due to a conjunction of three factors: the fact that the crime charged involved interracial violence, the broad discretion given the jury at the death-penalty hearing, and the special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing in a capital case. ( Id. at p. 37.) Turner does not assist defendant here, however. As previously discussed, the questionnaire amply explored the subject of racial bias, nothing in the jurors' responses to the questionnaire or at voir dire compelled further inquiry, and defense counsel did not ask the trial court to pose additional questions to specific prospective jurors. ( People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 640 [defendant's reliance on Turner is misplaced where the trial court probed racial bias issue in the questionnaire, and again orally at defense request].)
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his Wheeler/Batson motion asserting that the prosecutor impermissibly exercised peremptory challenges against two African-American prospective jurors and one Latina prospective juror on the basis of their race. We disagree. As previously explained ( ante, at pt. II.B.4.), a Wheeler/Batson motion involves a three-step inquiry. First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case `by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the `burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, `[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.' [Citation.] ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168, fn. omitted.) During selection of the second jury, the prosecutor exercised her fourth peremptory challenge against a Latina prospective juror, M.E. When the prosecutor later used her eighth peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror A.F., an African-American man, defense counsel asked for a conference in chambers, but the trial court denied the request. The prosecutor's next peremptory challenge was to Prospective Juror C.D., an African-American woman, and defense counsel again sought a hearing in chambers. After the parties had exercised several more peremptory challenges, the trial court called a recess and, outside the jury's presence, heard defense counsel's motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's excusal of the three prospective jurors. Defense counsel asserted that the prosecutor was kicking off everybody of color and confirmed with the trial court the names of the prospective jurors in question, but he advanced no further argument on the motion. The trial court then invited the prosecutor to give her reasons for excusing A.F., prefacing the request with an explanation similar to the one it gave during selection of the first jury. The trial court stated: Normally, I know in a Wheeler case there has to be some type of a showing that there is a pattern; however, in this type of case, the seriousness and the jaundiced eye that will be looking at this record[,] . . . I think it is important that you tell me why you did kick these people. The prosecutor explained she had excused A.F. because, with 28 years as a probation officer, he came in with precomposed [ sic ] ideas about the system. The prosecutor felt A.F. would be very open to defense arguments on the root causes of defendant's behavior, given that A.F. had a social worker therapy type job and a social welfare degree, and that his questionnaire answers indicated he believed society should look at the causes of crime. The trial court interjected, You have said enough, and then asked about C.D. The prosecutor responded that she mainly was concerned about C.D.'s occupation as a psychiatric nurse and whether C.D. would buy everything that the doctors say on behalf of the defendant. The prosecutor also noted that C.D. had started off undecided on the death penalty. The court again stated it had heard enough and indicated that the prosecutor should move on to M.E. The prosecutor explained that one reason for the excusal was that M.E. had served on a jury that failed to reach a verdict in a murder case. The prosecutor was also wary of M.E.'s attitudes on the death penalty, citing M.E.'s comment to the effect that she did not oppose the death penalty but had a problem . . . with the consistency of the death penalty and who gets it. After defense counsel declined the trial court's invitation to make further argument, the court stated, At this point I see no systematic exclusion of these protected groups. When defense counsel again indicated he had nothing to add, the trial court reiterated, I see no exclusion, and noted that the defense itself had knocked off a person of color. When the prosecutor interjected that defense counsel's Wheeler/Batson objection during selection of the first jury involved only a single strike, the trial court dismissed her point, stating: All I care about is what's before me in this case. I don't find any exercise of systematic exclusion at this time. The trial court then added, There were reasons why you exercised your peremptories in this case, and in this court's opinion, it has nothing to do with having people of color off the jury. Initially, we must again decide whether to infer from the trial court's invitation to the prosecutor to state her reasons for the challenged excusals that the trial court found defendant had satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case so as to proceed to a third-stage Wheeler/Batson analysis. In determining whether to infer a trial court's finding of a prima facie case under Wheeler, we look to the whole record, examining the court's remarks in context. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 605, fn. 2.) (28) For reasons similar to those previously discussed in connection with defendant's challenge to selection of the first jury (see, ante, pt. II.B.4.), we conclude the trial court found no prima facie case of intentional discrimination. The trial court's prefatory remarks to the prosecutor when it asked her to make a record of reasons for her strikes presupposed that the defense had not made a prima facie case. Moreover, the trial court did not evaluate any of the prosecutor's stated reasons. Indeed, the trial court's repeated references to finding no systematic exclusion leaves little doubt that the trial court denied defendant's Wheeler/Batson motion on the ground that defendant had not established a prima facie case of discrimination. We have recognized that although the term systematic exclusion is more appropriate to a claim of underrepresentation in the jury venire, courts sometimes use the term to describe a discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 549, fn. 38.) For example, in People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 716, the trial court based its finding of `no prima facie showing that there was a systematic exclusion' on factors relevant to a first-stage Wheeler/Batson inquiry. (See also People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 342 [agreeing with the trial court that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing where the trial court denied the Wheeler/Batson motion after finding `no systematic exclusion of Blacks'].) Likewise, the trial court's pronouncements here that it saw no systematic exclusion, viewed in context, are fairly understood as a finding that defendant failed to put forth sufficient evidence from which discrimination could be inferred. [18] Nor is a different conclusion compelled by the trial court's remark to the prosecutor at the end of the hearing: There were reasons why you exercised your peremptories . . . [that have] nothing to do with having people of color off the jury. We have encouraged trial courts to ask prosecutors to make a record of their reasons for any objected-to peremptory challenges even when no prima facie case has been established. ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343, fn. 13; see also People v. Adanandus (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 496, 500-501 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 25] [the trial court may invite the prosecutor to state race-neutral reasons before announcing its finding on whether the defendant has met his burden in the first step of the Wheeler/Batson test].) Viewed in context, the trial court's concluding comment is reasonably understood as an observation that the prosecutor's proffered reasons confirmed its finding that defendant failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination. (Cf. People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 80 [after hearing the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons, the trial court repeated its earlier finding that no prima facie case had been shown].) As we did in resolving defendant's challenge to the denial of the Wheeler/Batson motion he made during selection of the first jury, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that defendant failed to produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170.) Defendant's showing in support of his second Wheeler/Batson motion was meager. At the hearing, defense counsel relied solely on the fact the prosecutor had exercised three of her 10 peremptory challenges to excuse two African-American prospective jurors and one Hispanic prospective juror. Such evidence, without more, is insufficient to create an inference of discrimination, especially where, as here, the number of peremptory challenges at issue is so small. ( People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 79-80 [no prima facie showing where the defendant's motion was based solely on the assertion that the prosecutor used three of 11 peremptories to excuse African-American prospective jurors]; People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 343 & fn. 12 [an inference of discrimination is difficult to discern from a small number of challenges].) That defendant, A.F., and C.D. are African-American is some evidence permitting an inference of discriminatory excusal. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 779.) Also relevant is whether the victim and a majority of the seated jurors are members of the same group ( ibid. ), and we will assume for argument's sake in this case that they are. However, the record lacks any other evidence that permits an inference of discriminatory excusal. The record does not disclose, for example, the number of African-American or Latino prospective jurors in the jury venire or on the jury panel at the time defendant raised his Wheeler/Batson objections, which is evidence from which we could conclude that the prosecutor `struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire.' ( Kelly, supra, at p. 779; see People v. Hawthorne, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 79-80 [noting absence of similar evidence].) Nor do we find it significant that the prosecutor asked no questions of the prospective jurors during voir dire, as discussed more fully in part II.B.4. The record shows that although the prosecutor did not question the prospective jurors directly, she excused A.F., C.D., and M.E. after having reviewed their answers on the 99-question questionnaire and observed the trial court's questioning in open court. [19] Nor is there any suggestion that the prospective jurors excused by the prosecution were not adequately questioned. ( People v. Kelly, supra, at p. 779.) To the contrary, the record shows that all three of the excused prospective jurors completed the 99-question questionnaire and that the trial court questioned each as extensively as the seated jurors. Indeed, defendant complains that A.F.'s views on the criminal justice system were subjected to greater scrutiny than were those of three White jurors who served on the penalty retrial jury. Here, the record not only fails to support an inference of discrimination, but it also shows obvious race-neutral reasons for the excusal of all three of the prospective jurors in question. According to the questionnaires, A.F. was employed as a probation officer and C.D. worked as a nurse. Thus, both were engaged in professions the prosecutor reasonably could believe would tend to make them overly sympathetic to the defense. ( People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 924-925 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 74 P.3d 852] [prosecutor may properly challenge potential jurors on the belief that their occupations do not render them the best type of juror to sit on the case]; United States v. Thompson (9th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 1254, 1260 [excusing jurors based on their profession is wholly within the prosecutor's prerogative].) As for M.E., her prior service on a deadlocked jury is an acceptable race-neutral ground for excusing her. ( People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 138; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 170 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521].) Based on our independent review of the voir dire record, we conclude defendant failed to carry his burden of showing an inference of discrimination, and that the trial court, therefore, did not err in denying his Wheeler/Batson motion. [20]