Opinion ID: 1915437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Law Fraud and CPPA Claims Regarding Satisfaction Guaranteed Sign

Text: Pearson contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his claim that the Satisfaction Guaranteed sign constituted common law fraud and a violation of various provisions of the CPPA, specifically D.C.Code § 28-3904(a), (d), (e), (f), (h), and (u). [6] To prevail on a common law fraud claim, a plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence that there was (1) a false representation (2) made in reference to a material fact, (3) with knowledge of its falsity, (4) with the intent to deceive, and (5) an action that is taken in reliance upon the representation.... Park v. Sandwich Chef, Inc., 651 A.2d 798, 801 (D.C.1994) (citation omitted). See also Lumpkins v. CSL Locksmith, LLC, 911 A.2d 418, 424 (D.C.2006). Violations of the CPPA must also be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Caulfield v. Stark, 893 A.2d 970, 976 (D.C.2006) (the clear and convincing evidence standard applies to claims of intentional misrepresentation under the CPPA (quoting Osbourne v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 727 A.2d 322, 326 (D.C.1999))). [7] Pearson's argument is that the Chungs' guarantee of customer satisfaction constituted common law fraud and violated the cited provisions of the CPPA since they did not live up to that promise. Pearson's claims regarding the Satisfaction Guaranteed sign are premised on his interpretation that the sign is an unconditional and unlimited warranty of satisfaction to the customer as determined solely by the customer, without regard to the facts or to any notion of reasonablenessa position he has consistently advocated both in the trial court and on appeal. In his opening brief, for example, Pearson challenged the trial court's rejection of his position that Satisfaction Guaranteed is an affirmative representation of unconditional customer-determined satisfaction, and argues unambiguously that [a]s a consequence of offering an unconditional guarantee of satisfaction a merchant is required to satisfy a consumer's demand for lawful compensation (for example, for any amount of money ). (emphasis added). Indeed, in his trial testimony, he confirmed that in his view, if a customer brings in an item of clothing to be dry cleaned, and the dry cleaner remembers the item, and the customer then claims that the item is not his when the dry cleaner presents it back to the customer after it has been cleaned, the dry cleaner must pay the customer whatever the customer claims the item is worth if there is a Satisfaction Guaranteed sign in the store, even if the dry cleaner knows the customer is mistaken or lying. [8] In fact, every Custom Cleaners customer who testified, other than Pearson, testified that if Custom Cleaners lost or damaged an item of clothing, Custom Cleaners should reimburse them only for the value of the clothing. This interpretation coincides with the interpretation of the Satisfaction Guaranteed sign given by Soo Chung. As the trial court found, a reasonable interpretation of the Satisfaction Guaranteed sign is that if there is a problem with drycleaning, laundry or alterations, the cleaner should try to fix it, and if the problem cannot be fixed, the cleaner should make reasonable compensation to the customer for the value of the damaged item. The Court does not find that the evidence presented by the plaintiff in any way establishes that the defendants had no intention of honoring that guarantee. To the contrary, the evidence presented by Mr. Pearson regarding his experience in 2002 demonstrates that they did. When a pair of his pants could not be located at that time, Custom Cleaners compensated Mr. Pearson fully for the value of the pants. Thus, the trial court, showing basic common sense, rejected this unlimited view of a Satisfaction Guaranteed sign, relying instead upon case law generally supporting the position that, as with a common law fraud claim, a claim of an unfair trade practice is properly considered in terms of how the practice would be viewed and understood by a reasonable consumer. That position has ample support. See Campbell Music Co. v. Singer, 97 A.2d 340, 341-42 (D.C.1953) (holding that although a television set had been guaranteed to the personal satisfaction of the purchaser at the time of purchase, the customer could not return the television for a refund over fifteen months after it was purchased); Rossman v. Fleet Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 280 F.3d 384, 394 (3d Cir. 2002) (in a Truth in Lending Act case, holding that the meaning of no annual fee advertisement was based on the understanding of a reasonable consumer); Alicke v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 324 U.S.App. D.C. 150, 153, 111 F.3d 909, 912 (1997) (rejecting customer's claim that MCI committed fraud by reporting long-distance telephone calls in full-minute increments on bills because no reasonable customer could actually believe that each and every phone call she made terminated at the end of a full minute, [and thus] MCI's billing practices could not mislead a reasonable customer.); Uebelacker v. Paula Allen Holdings, Inc., 464 F.Supp.2d 791, 805-06 (W.D.Wisc.2006) (phrase quality satisfaction guaranteed, which appeared in a description of a business, is a classic example of commercial `puffery' on which no reasonable person would rely, citing Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 270 Wis.2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233, 245 (2004), which defined puffery as the exaggerations reasonably to be expected of a seller as to the degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of which cannot be precisely determined). Pearson, on the other hand, cites no pertinent authority [9] that supports his interpretation of Satisfaction Guaranteed. Because we agree with the trial court that Pearson's expansive interpretation of Satisfaction Guaranteed is not supported by law or reason, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that Pearson failed to establish that the Chungs' Satisfaction Guaranteed sign constituted common law fraud or violated the CPPA. Moreover, the factual findings support that Custom Cleaners acted in accordance with its own policy. In 2002, when Custom Cleaners lost Pearson's pants, it reimbursed him for the full replacement value of the pants as reported by him. As for the pants allegedly lost in 2005, the trial court found Soo Chung to be highly credible and declined to accept Pearson's testimony that the pants he brought in were not the pants that Soo Chung returned to him, finding instead that the evidence was in equipoise. Because Pearson failed to meet the standard of proving either his common law fraud claim or any of his CPPA claims by clear and convincing evidence, [10] we affirm the trial court's decision awarding judgment to the Chungs on those claims. In the end, whether Pearson's claims are considered under a common law fraud claim or under the CPPA makes no difference because he was unable to establish the underlying factual basis for relief. Finding Soo Chung to be very credible, the trial court wrote: The Court agrees with the plaintiff that the pants in the defendant's possession do not appear to match the jacket to this burgundy and blue pinstriped suit. The Court will also accept that Mr. Pearson does not like cuffs on his pants. The plaintiff may well believe that he brought the pants to his burgundy and blue pinstriped suit to the defendants, but there also is strong evidence that he did not. The Court found Soo Chung to be very credible and her explanation that she recognized the disputed pants as belonging to Mr. Pearson because of the unusual belt inserts was much more credible than his speculation that she took a pair of unclaimed pants from the back of the store and altered them to match his measurements. Mr. Pearson only recently had received four suits back from his son, he brought in several pairs of pants over a period of less than two weeks for alterations, and it certainly is plausible that the pants on the hanger with his blue and burgundy pinstriped suit jacket were not the pants that matched the jacket, even if Mr. Pearson assumed that they were. In summary, noting that claims of common law fraud, as well as violations of the CPPA, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, Judge Bartnoff concluded that the plaintiff has not met his burden of proving that the pants the defendant attempted to return to him were not the pants he brought in for alterations. Without such proof, all of his claims pertaining to those pants must be denied, and we affirm Judge Bartnoff's decision to do so.