Opinion ID: 2363278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Converse Instruction

Text: The trial court held Instruction No. 5 Davis' converse instructionerroneous because it failed to specifically converse the acts of negligence set forth in the plaintiff's verdict director in Instruction No. 3, and awarded plaintiff a new trial as against Davis on that ground. Davis contends on appeal that the court erred because Instruction No. 5 was a general converse of the second paragraph of Instruction No. 3 and was patterned after MAI 33.04(1) and thus it was not necessary to converse all the elements in the first paragraph of the verdict director. Plaintiff relies, in support of the trial court's actions, on Davis v. St. Louis Southwestern Railroad, supra and contends that the instruction deviated from MAI Notes on Use to MAI 33.02 and 33.04, hence the trial court did not err in granting to plaintiff a new trial against defendant Davis. The issue which we must determine therefore is whether a converse instruction which converses the negligence submission of a verdict director which contains several disjunctive submissions must also converse each disjunctive submission. Or to put the issue another waywhere the defendant elects to converse the second paragraph (negligence submission) of a verdict director, must the converse specifically converse each of the disjunctive submissions in the verdict director? In Davis , plaintiff brought an action for personal injury under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Verdict was for the defendant but the trial court sustained a motion for new trial. Plaintiff's verdict director instructed the jury that verdict should be for plaintiff if (1) the defendant failed to provide reasonably safe methods of work, or (2) defendant's employee other than plaintiff dropped a brake beam on a hammer handle and (3) defendant in respect to (1) was negligent or the employee with the respect to (2) was negligent. The defendant's converse instruction merely stated: Your verdict must be for the defendant if you do not believe that defendant was negligent. The converse instruction was held to be erroneous and the granting of a new trial was affirmed. In Davis , the verdict director submitted the negligence of two different entitiesthe corporation and a fellow employee. The negligence paragraph in Davis (paragraph third) submitted two negligence standards in the alternative, I. e., one for the employer and one for the employee. The defendant in Davis used an if you do not believe converse, MAI 33.02(2)Your verdict must be for [the] defendant if you do not believe that defendant was negligent. Such an instruction was clearly erroneous because it was a misdirection and conversed only the negligence of the employer and did not refer to the negligence standard of the employee. Davis relied upon the Caution in the Notes on Use to MAI 33.02. [18] Davis seems to require and implies that a defendant who converses the negligence paragraph of the verdict director containing disjunctive acts of negligence must also converse all disjunctive specifications. [19] In this regard the implication is unfortunate and does not accord with MAI 33.04. The cautionary note to MAI 33.04 is applicable when the defendant elects to converse some or all of the disjunctive submissions; it is not applicable to a situation as here when the defendant elects to converse only the negligence paragraph of the verdict director. The Davis opinion was not erroneous because the negligence paragraph in the verdict director contained disjunctive negligence submissions. Davis therefore must be limited to its peculiar facts. MAI 33.04 contains five unless you believe converse instructions. MAI 33.04(1) and (4) converse the negligence paragraph of a disjunctive verdict director without conversing the disjunctive submissions of the verdict director. But MAI 33.04(5) converses several disjunctive submissions with an unless you believe clause. If the defendant elects to converse some aspect of or all of the disjunctive submissions he is then required to converse all disjunctive submissions. However, if he elects to converse only the general negligence submission, there is no requirement in MAI 33.04(1) or 33.04(4) to converse the disjunctive submissions in the verdict director. Davis is distinguishable and does not govern this case. Davis is not applicable to the situation here so as to invalidate a converse instruction by the defendant who elected to converse only the second paragraph of the verdict director (the negligence submission) and who did not converse the disjunctive submissions of negligence. [20] Here, Instruction No. 3 informed the jury in paragraph second, that defendant Davis' conduct was negligent in either or both respects submitted in Paragraph First and the converse instruction, following MAI 33.04(1), conversed paragraph second of the verdict director, and specifically referred the jury to the plaintiff's verdict director. It was not, as in Davis , a misdirection, nor was it misleading. [21] We therefore hold that in electing to converse the general negligence paragraph of the verdict director the defendant Davis was not required to converse the disjunctive submissions in the verdict director. We rule this point against the plaintiff. The trial court erred in granting a new trial to the plaintiff as against Davis on this ground.