Opinion ID: 2766544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Doctrine of Equivalents Theory

Text: We review a discovery sanction for abuse of discretion. Kaufman v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 601 F.3d 1088, 1092 (10th Cir. 2010); O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Teashot argues that the district court erred in imposing a discovery sanction under Rule 37 because its infringement contentions were not disclosed in response to any interrogatory, subjecting Teashot to a duty to supplement its disclosure under Rule 26(e). Teashot argues that its infringement contentions were disclosed pursuant instead to the district court’s scheduling order. Teashot asserts that that the district court did not find a violation of the scheduling ordering and that Teashot fully complied with the scheduling order. We find Teashot’s arguments meritless. The district court specifically noted that its “Scheduling Order directed Plaintiff to serve ‘its infringement contentions, claim charts, and associated documents on Defendants’ no later than May 1, 2012.” Teashot, 2014 WL 485876, at  (quoting the scheduling order). The district court then found that “[i]t is undisputed that Plaintiff did not include the doctrine of equivalents in its original infringement contentions, served on May 1, 2012, and again failed to include this theory in its March 7, 2013 supplement.” Id. at . Teashot’s violation of the scheduling order is the 8 TEASHOT.LLC v. GREEN MOUNTAIN COFFEE ROASTER basis for the district court’s conclusion that “Plaintiff waived its right to raise the doctrine of equivalents by failing to timely disclose it as an infringement theory.” Id. at . Teashot’s assertion on appeal that it “fully complied with the Scheduling Order” is not supported by any showing that it disclosed any doctrine of equivalents theory by the deadline in the scheduling order. See Reply Br. 17-18. Rather, Teashot’s assertion is based on its argument that “the Scheduling Order is utterly silent about any required contents of the infringement contentions, and contains no supplementation prohibition.” Id. But silence on the required contents of “infringement contentions” does not mean that Teashot can choose to disclose nothing about its doctrine of equivalents theory. Silence on supplementation prohibition also does not mean that Teashot can amend at will after the scheduling order deadline. Teashot’s focus on what the scheduling order is “silent” about glosses over Teashot’s disclosure duties under the guise of ignorance. It was in the context of addressing Teashot’s claim of ignorance that the district court compared Teashot’s duty to disclose its infringement contentions under the scheduling order to a disclosure duty under Rule 26(e) in response to a contention interrogatory. See Teashot, 2014 WL 485876, at  (“Plaintiff alleges that this did not constitute waiver because nothing in this Court’s Scheduling Order or Local Rules required it to disclose this theory any earlier in the litigation.”). The district court dismissed Teashot’s arguments because “Plaintiff’s attorneys are experienced patent litigators, who are reasonably expected to understand that infringement contentions— whether responsive to a contention interrogatory, required by local patent rules, or included in a scheduling order—should specify what infringement theories the party is pursuing.” Id. at . TEASHOT.LLC v. GREEN MOUNTAIN COFFEE ROASTER 9 We find that Teashot’s complaints about the discovery sanction take the district court’s reasoning relating to Rule 26(e) out of context. Examining “the totality of the circumstances involved in the case,” we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in imposing the discovery sanction on Teashot. See Olcott v. Del. Flood Co., 76 F.3d 1538, 1557 (10th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s exclusion of Teashot’s doctrine of equivalents theory and affirm the summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of Green Mountain. AFFIRMED