Opinion ID: 613588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was There An Objection?

Text: To preserve a claim for review, an objection must be ample and timely to bring the alleged federal error to the attention of the trial court and enable it to take appropriate corrective action. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 125, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990); accord Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 242 (2d Cir.2003). We have interpreted New York's contemporaneous objection rule to require a claim to be interjected at the fact-finding level in such a manner and at such a time as to fairly apprise the court and the opposing party of the nature and scope of the matter contested. Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir.1999) (discussing N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 470.05(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, in my view, defense counsel's statement was sufficient to put the trial court on notice that Downs was objecting to the exclusion of his brother. First, defense counsel's choice of words makes clear that he was objecting. He used the phrase for the record not once, but twicethereby advising the court and the prosecution unequivocally that he was making an objection. There is no ambiguity about the words for the record. Indeed, a lawyer makes a statement for the record precisely so that there will be a recordfor the appeal. As a trial judge, I certainly understood that a lawyer was objecting when she stood up and said for the record before expressing disagreement with my ruling. Second, counsel amply and timely brought his concerns to the attention of the trial court. Counsel noted that the court had asked a family member to leave because of his age and because the court had a policy of excluding children under the age of 16 or 17. He then expressed his belief that the young man was of a suitable age, who would not have been an obstruction to the proceedings. These words fairly apprised the trial court that Downs disagreed with its ruling and was objecting to the court's application of a blanket policy of excluding children without giving individualized consideration to whether the particular childNathanielwould actually be disruptive. The words were also timely, as defense counsel spoke as soon as the proceedings resumed on the record; the trial court could have taken appropriate corrective action then and there. Third, the sequence of events sufficiently alerted the court and the prosecution that defense counsel was objecting. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 377, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002) (holding sequence of events made clear that defense counsel was objecting (quoting Osborne, 495 U.S. at 124, 110 S.Ct. 1691)). The trial court issued its ruling off the record, and defense counsel put his statement on the record as soon as the proceedings resumed on the record. This is what an attorney does to preserve an issue for appellate review. The majority writes that with these words defense counsel was arguably acquiesc[ing] in the order excluding Nathaniel. Maj. Op. at 105. Perhaps. But it is much more likely, in my view, that defense counsel was objecting. If he were merely acquiescing, there would have been no reason for him to say anything at all, and he certainly would not have expressed disagreement for the record. As for counsel's comment to the court that he had informed the family and he was sure they [would] comply, clearly counsel was saying that while the family did not agree with the court's order, it would nonetheless comply. This was not at all inconsistent with the intent to preserve the objection. Indeed, as defense counsel's affidavit to the Appellate Division makes clear, his intent was to object. [2] In short, I would hold that Downs objected to the exclusion of his brother from the trial.