Opinion ID: 539917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Offet is Inconsistent with Congressional Intent.

Text: 27 [T]he initial question whether exhaustion is required should be answered by congressional intent; and a court should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 501-02, 102 S.Ct. at 2560 (emphasis added); Coit Independence v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. ----, ----, 109 S.Ct. 1361, 1372, 103 L.Ed.2d 602, 619 (1989). 28 Section 1983 provides every citizen with a federal civil remedy in federal court for the violation of federal rights. Section 1983 allows immediate access to federal court and does not include any requirement that state remedies be exhausted. 6 29 The history of section 1983 reveals that Congress intended the federal courts to assume a primary role in the guarantee of federal rights. Section 1983 is an important part of the basic alteration in our federal system wrought in the Reconstruction era through federal legislation and constitutional amendment. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2160-62, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972). Opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 had objected that it unfairly invaded the province of the states. Id. at 241-42 & n. 32, 92 S.Ct. at 2161-62 & n. 32. 7 Congress brushed aside these criticisms and enacted what has become section 1983 pursuant to its powers under the fourteenth amendment to secure due process of law. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1218 n. 13, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). ... Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights.... The very purpose of Sec. 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people.... Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 242, 92 S.Ct. at 2162 (emphasis added). 30 Section 1983 and the writ of habeas corpus reflect Congress's decision to provide all Americans, including prison inmates, with the right to have a federal court ultimately decide the scope of their federal rights. Congress has required prisoners to exhaust state remedies in only two circumstances: in habeas corpus claims under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b) and in 1983 actions in states with grievance procedures which conform to federal standards. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1997e(a) (1981). 8 Under section 1997e, a prisoner's 1983 claim must be stayed for ninety days by a federal district court pending state administrative review of the prisoner's grievance. In all other circumstances, Congress has intended that federal court jurisdiction for prisoners' section 1983 suits be immediately available. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 512, 102 S.Ct. at 2565. 31 Initially, congressional sentiment with respect to section 1983 exhaustion is clearly revealed in the legislative history of section 1997e. The President's Crime Commission and private studies had recommended the establishment of prison grievance mechanisms as a means of enabling prison authorities to anticipate internal problems and as an aid to good morale. 125 Cong.Rec. 12491 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan). Adoption of prison grievance procedures is voluntary under section 1997e; the purpose of 1997e was to provide incentives to the states to stimulate the development and implementation of effective administrative mechanisms for the resolution of grievances in correctional and pretrial facilities.... H.R.Rep. No. 96-80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979) (House Report). The House Judiciary Committee anticipated that [t]he effect of H.R. 10 would be to improve the quality of life for institutionalized persons, and to assist in relieving the caseloads of Federal courts in prisoner petitions. Id. The exhaustion requirement of section 1997e was suggested by the minority members of the Judiciary Committee, was strongly endorsed by the States, and passed with bipartisan support. 124 Cong.Rec. 11976 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); House Report at 3. 9 32 Offet is inconsistent with section 1997e in two ways. First, Offet overwhelms the incentive Congress offered the states to develop grievance mechanisms. Congress concluded that the development of state prison grievance procedures was desirable and offered essentially an administrative exhaustion rule as an incentive for the adoption of state grievance procedures. Offet, however, allows state prison authorities to subject prisoner claims to state judicial exhaustion without participation in the section 1997e program. While there are non-disciplinary grievances, states will have less incentive to certify their grievance procedures when the effect of Offet is understood. This purpose would be frustrated by judicial discretion to impose exhaustion generally: the States would have no incentive to adopt grievance procedures capable of certification.... Patsy, 457 U.S. at 511-12, 102 S.Ct. at 2565. 33 Second, Offet is inconsistent with Congress's understanding when it enacted section 1997e. The hearings and debates are replete with recognition that exhaustion is generally not required of prisoner complaints under section 1983. For many years, some of us have felt that the requirement of exhaustion of remedies would be desirable in the case of 1983 actions, but for various reasons it has been impossible to implement this requirement. The bill, however, makes a modest approach at an exhaustion of remedies requirement. 124 Cong.Rec. 23180 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Wiggins). 10 34 The Supreme Court recognized the intent of Congress in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, a decision not considered by Offet. In Patsy, the Court extensively reviewed the legislative history of section 1997e and declined to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in a section 1983 suit. 457 U.S. at 507-12, 102 S.Ct. at 2563-66. The Court concluded that with 1997e, Congress believed it was creating an exception to exhaustion rules, and that [i]mplicit in this decision is Congress's conclusion that the no-exhaustion rule should be left standing with respect to other Sec. 1983 suits. Id. at 509, 102 S.Ct. at 2564. 35 Section 1997e and its legislative history demonstrate that Congress understood that exhaustion is not generally required in Sec. 1983 actions, and that it decided to carve out only a narrow exception to this rule. A judicially imposed exhaustion requirement would be inconsistent with Congress' decision to adopt Sec. 1997e and would usurp policy judgments that Congress has reserved for itself. 36 Id. at 508, 102 S.Ct. at 2563. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred, expressing the hope that Congress would consider expanding exhaustion requirements. Id. at 516-17, 102 S.Ct. at 2568 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 37 Next, Offet is inconsistent with congressional intent because it effectively prevents some prisoners from ever having their legal claims adjudicated by a federal court. If a prisoner wants to challenge the legality of any aspect of a disciplinary proceeding in which one sanction imposed affects his release date, Offet forces him to go first to state court. If the prisoner loses in state court, he can appeal to a state appeals court. If he loses again, he can file a habeas action in federal court. At the same time, he can file a companion section 1983 action requesting damages, provided the 1983 action is stayed pending resolution of the habeas claims. This procedure can take years. Often the prisoner will no longer be incarcerated by the time state remedies are exhausted and federal court jurisdiction is invoked. Because habeas claims relating to disciplinary decisions can usually be pursued only by confined persons, under Offet, many short-term prisoners will be unable to obtain federal court review of the state's legal conclusions. If they pursued state relief first, they will be estopped from seeking damages under section 1983 for asserted violations of their federal rights because federal habeas relief will be unavailable, even though their damage claims are not moot. 11 This is inconsistent with the congressional policy of making available to every citizen federal adjudication of the scope of federal civil rights. It also effectively stymies the development of federal law by federal courts. 38 Finally, Offet surrenders control of federal court jurisdiction to state prison officials. It encourages prison officials always to include the loss of good-time credits as a sanction to defeat a prisoner's right to a federal hearing. As the Seventh Circuit concluded in deciding not to follow Offet, ... Offet, ultimately proves too much.... [T]he state could insulate every imposition of discipline from attack under section 1983 by simply revoking one hour, or one day, of good time as part of every punishment.... We cannot accept such off-hand treatment of the importance to a state prisoner of prompt access to federal court under section 1983.... Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir.1989) (Cudahy, Easterbrook, and Ripple). For example, today the majority concludes that Charles Reese must exhaust state remedies because he was sanctioned with a loss of good-time credits, ante at 1308, even though Reese is serving a life term without possibility of parole. By sanctioning Reese with a meaningless loss of good-time credits, his disciplinary committee delayed his access to federal court. In the name of enhancing federal-state comity, Offet places control of federal court jurisdiction in the hands of unelected state prison disciplinary committees. 39