Opinion ID: 2756032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Verdict

Text: Perez-Barocela argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir. 2011). The jury’s verdict will be affirmed if “any reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ochoa, 667 F.3d 643, 647 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “[W]e do not evaluate the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, but view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the verdict.” Girod, 646 F.3d at 313 (citation omitted). 4 Case: 13-40617 Document: 00512850813 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/26/2014 No. 13-40617 To establish conspiracy, the government must demonstrate that: (1) an agreement existed between two or more persons to perform an illegal activity, (2) the defendant knew of the agreement, and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in the activity. See Ochoa, 667 F.3d at 648. Perez-Barocela argues that both the character of the evidence (circumstantial) and the inferences that could reasonably be drawn from it were insufficient to support his conviction for conspiring to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute it. First, Perez-Barocela contends that the only evidence linking him to the conspiracy is circumstantial testimony from co-conspirators. Jurors, though, may “infer any element of [conspiracy] from circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Lechuga, 888 F.2d 1472, 1476 (5th Cir. 1989). More specifically, “[a]s long as it is not factually insubstantial or incredible, the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator, even one who has chosen to cooperate with the government in exchange for non-prosecution or leniency, may be constitutionally sufficient evidence to convict.” United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1190 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Consequently, the government was permitted to rely on the testimony of co-conspirators to link Perez-Barocela to the conspiracy. Next, Perez-Barocela argues that the government’s evidence proved, at most, that his legitimate work in the trucking industry resulted in his association with criminals. There is little basis for this claim. Testimony from Perez-Barocela’s co-conspirators and Agents Lehmann and Bishop detailed Perez-Barocela’s recruitment of co-conspirators to transport marijuana, accompaniment of shipments across the border, arrangement of transportation inside the United States, phone conversations with co-conspirators, and payment of co-conspirators. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a 5 Case: 13-40617 Document: 00512850813 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/26/2014 No. 13-40617 reasonable doubt that Perez-Barocela conspired to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute it. II. Assessment of Three Criminal History Points for Prior Conviction Perez-Barocela argues that the district court erred when it increased his offense level by three points for his New Jersey conspiracy conviction. We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Cantu-Ramirez, 669 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 2012). The Guidelines instruct district courts to assess three criminal history points “for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). If such a sentence is “totally stayed or suspended,” however, the government should assess only one criminal history point. §§ 4A1.1(c), 4A1.2(a)(3). Perez-Barocela, while conceding that his sentence for the New Jersey conviction exceeded one year and one month, notes that his sentence was stayed pending appeal and argues that the government was not permitted to rely on Westlaw’s reproduction of the opinion confirming his sentence to demonstrate that it was no longer stayed or suspended. 1 He claims the government was instead required to introduce the judicial record verifying his affirmed sentence. According to Perez-Barocela, this requirement follows from the Supreme Court’s decision in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). In Shepard, the Court held that the government may not rely on police reports and complaint applications to prove that a defendant’s conviction satisfies the 1 Perez-Barocela also argued in his objections to the PSR that, regardless of whether his sentence was affirmed, the enhancement was unwarranted because he never actually served his sentence. Perez-Barocela has not briefed this issue on appeal and we therefore decline to consider it. See Brinkman v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). 6 Case: 13-40617 Document: 00512850813 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/26/2014 No. 13-40617 elements of generic burglary, but instead must rely on the charging document, the plea agreement or transcript related to the plea, or a comparable judicial record. Id. at 16, 26. Shepard “does not apply when determining whether the government has satisfied its burden of proof as to the existence of a prior conviction.” United States v. Neri-Hernandes, 504 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 2007). For proof of a conviction we consider whether the documents relied upon “have sufficient indicia of reliability to support their probable accuracy . . . .” Id. The government may rely on uncertified case summaries so long as they are reliable and the defendant fails to offer contradictory evidence. Id. Here, the district court appropriately relied on Westlaw’s reproduction of the opinion affirming Perez-Barocela’s sentence, because it is a reliable reproduction of a judicial record and Perez-Barocela has offered no evidence undermining its reliability. Accordingly, the district court did not err in enhancing PerezBarocela’s offense level by three points. III. Three-Point Increase in Offense-Level for Managerial Role in Conspiracy Perez-Barocela argues that the district court erred when it increased his offense level by three points for playing a managerial role in the conspiracy. He alleges that he “was a mere pawn in Raul Peraza-Trejo’s drug trafficking organization . . . .” We review a district court’s factual findings for sentencing purposes for clear error. Cantu-Ramirez, 669 F.3d at 628. “District courts enjoy wide discretion in determining which evidence to consider and to credit for sentencing purposes.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, clear error will not be found so long as a factual finding “is plausible in light of the record read as a whole.” United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 942 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The defendant bears the burden of proving that the 7 Case: 13-40617 Document: 00512850813 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/26/2014 No. 13-40617 evidence relied upon by the district court is “materially untrue” and therefore implausible. Id. at 943. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense level of a defendant may be increased by three points if he played a managerial or supervisory role in a criminal activity but not a leadership or organizational role. § 3B1.1(b). The commentary to the Guidelines instructs courts to consider the following factors when distinguishing managers and supervisors from leaders and organizers: (1) “the exercise of decision making authority,” (2) “the nature of participation in the commission of the offense,” (3) “the recruitment of accomplices,” (4) “the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime,” (5) “the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense,” (6) “the nature and scope of the illegal activity,” and (7) “the degree of control and authority exercised over others.” § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. We use these same factors to determine whether a district court erred in finding that a defendant was a manager or supervisor. See United States v. Reagan, 725 F.3d 471, 494 (5th Cir. 2013). Perez-Barocela contends that his recruitment of others to transport marijuana does not give rise to the conclusion that he was a manager in the conspiracy to transport marijuana. He further contends that there was no evidence that he negotiated the amounts or prices of the marijuana or that he received more money than his co-conspirators. These specific gaps in the evidence, however, do not undermine what the evidence as a whole plausibly establishes. The detailed, consistent testimony from Perez-Barocela’s coconspirators, as corroborated and substantiated by Agents Lehmann and Bishop, demonstrated that Perez-Barocela: (1) recruited Benitez, CabreraEnriquez, and Galindo to drive trucks through the Falfurrias checkpoint carrying marijuana hidden amongst legitimate cargo in exchange for cash 8 Case: 13-40617 Document: 00512850813 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/26/2014 No. 13-40617 payments; (2) escorted the trucks across the checkpoint; (3) arranged for the marijuana to be offloaded onto trailers and hidden amongst legitimate cargo; and (4) made over three hundred phone calls to Benitez, Cabrera-Enriquez, Galindo, and Quijano to coordinate these operations. Upon this evidence, the district court could plausibly conclude not only that Perez-Barocela recruited accomplices, as he claims, but that he exercised decision-making authority, participated heavily in the transportation of the marijuana, planned and organized the transportation, and exercised control over his co-conspirators. In other words, the court could plausibly find that no fewer than six out of the seven factors mentioned in the Guidelines mitigated in favor of finding that Perez-Barocela played a managerial or supervisory role in the criminal activity. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in assessing the three-point enhancement. IV. Two-Point Increase in Offense Level for Witness Intimidation Perez-Barocela contends that the district court erred when it increased his offense level by two points for threatening a witness. Our review is for clear error. Cantu-Ramirez, 669 F.3d at 628. We also consider that a district court “can adopt facts contained in a PSR without inquiry if those facts had an adequate evidentiary basis and the defendant does not present rebuttal evidence.” Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d at 943 (citation omitted). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense level of a defendant who played an aggravating role in a criminal activity may be increased by two points for witness intimidation or obstruction of justice. § 2D1.1(b)(15)(D). Perez-Barocela contends that the testimony and information contained in the PSR were insufficient to demonstrate that he threatened the witness Quijano. He did not, though, provide rebuttal evidence in support of his claim and 9 Case: 13-40617 Document: 00512850813 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/26/2014 No. 13-40617 therefore cannot meet his burden of demonstrating that the evidence relied upon was materially untrue and implausible. Furthermore, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the district court exercised its discretion improperly. Quijano testified that, during March 2013, while he and Perez-Barocela were incarcerated in the Karnes City Corrections Center pending trial, Perez-Barocela threatened to harm him and his family if he cooperated with the government. He further testified that he called his wife and asked her to inform his lawyer of these threats, and that he was transferred to a different facility three weeks later. The PSR notes that recorded phone conversations between Perez-Barocela and Quijano corroborate Quijano’s testimony and that Perez-Barocela had attempted to persuade Quijano to sign paperwork indicating that he was not involved in the conspiracy. In addition, the government offered to provide, if necessary, testimony from a DEA agent and recorded phone conversations corroborating the then-existing evidence. Taken together, this evidence could certainly support a finding that Perez-Barocela threatened Quijano. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in levying the two-point enhancement.