Opinion ID: 1279824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Sentence Imposed for First Degree Murder.

Text: The sentencing panel concluded that an officer's custody of the defendant or another is necessary before § 29-2523(1)(g) becomes operative as an aggravating circumstance for the death penalty. The State suggests that the sentencing panel's reading of the statute is contrary to the clear and obvious meaning of the statute, and adds a requirement that was obviously not intended by the Legislature. Section 29-2523(1)(g) reads, The victim was a law enforcement officer or a public servant having custody of the offender or another. This statute clearly meant to protect law enforcement officers and jailers. It is ridicules [sic] to think that this statute is only designed to protect law enforcement officers if they have someone in custody, and that is not what the statute says. (Emphasis in original.) Brief for appellant at 4-5. The State concludes that, regarding the aggravating circumstance prescribed in § 29-2523(1)(g), `having custody of the offender or another,' refers solely to, `public servant', and not to, `law enforcement officer.' (Emphasis in original.) Brief for appellant at 6. While the State's preceding interpretation of the statutory aggravating circumstance in question presents a rather restricted view, limited to the particular factual setting in the present appeal, we are denied the luxury of limitation in the necessary judicial examination of § 29-2523(1)(g) and must consider reasonably probable circumstances beyond the present appeal. If the State's interpretation prevails, then killing at any time any person who happens to be a law enforcement officer justifies application of § 29-2523(1)(g) as an aggravating circumstance for imposition of the death penalty. In its present form, § 29-2523(1)(g) raises all-too-obvious questions: Must the officer, at the time of the officer's death, be in the performance of an official duty? Must the defendant have known, or should the defendant have reasonably known, that the victim was a law enforcement officer? Without answers to the preceding questions, and perhaps answers to other questions stemming from the absence of definitive statutory language, the State's broad and virtually unrestricted interpretation of § 29-2523(1)(g) may likely raise serious constitutional issues regarding vagueness in § 29-2523(1)(g) or equal protection inherent in the dichotomy of two homicide victims when one victim is a law enforcement officer who is not performing an official duty at the time of death, while the other victim is not a law enforcement officer. There is no legal distinction between the homicide victims reflected in the dichotomy. Yet, in the first part of the dichotomy, one is exposed to the death penalty on account of § 29-2523(1)(g), while, in the second part of the dichotomy, one is not exposed to the death penalty by virtue of § 29-2523(1)(g). Of the 36 states in which the death penalty is authorized as a punishment for first degree murder, 27 states have chosen to fashion a statutory aggravating circumstance similar to § 29-2523(1)(g), but, unlike Nebraska, the 27 other states have provided a reasonably precise definition, characterization, or description of the law enforcement officer as a victim whose death may be the basis for imposition of the death penalty; for example, see, Ariz. Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703 F (1989) ([t]he murdered individual was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew, or should have known, that the victim was a peace officer); Colo. Rev.Stat. § 16-11-103(6)(c) (Supp.1989) ([t]he defendant knowingly killed [a law enforcement officer] while such person was engaged in the course of the performance of his official duties or in the enforcement of laws, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was such a person engaged in the performance of his official duties or in the enforcement of laws, or the victim was knowingly killed in retaliation for the performance of his official duties or in the enforcement of laws); Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)1 (Smith-Hurd Supp.1990) (the murdered individual was a peace officer ... killed in the course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.04(A)(6) (Anderson 1987) ([t]he victim of the offense was a peace officer ... whom the offender had reasonable cause to know or knew to be such, and ... the victim, at the time of the commission of the offense, was engaged in his duties). Included in additional states which have a statutory aggravating circumstance for the death penalty based on a defendant's killing a law enforcement officer who is performing an official duty (duty) or a defendant's killing a law enforcement officer during the officer's performance of an official duty when the defendant knew, or should have known, that the victim was a law enforcement officer (duty and knowledge) are DelawareDel. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)c (1987) (duty); FloridaFla.Stat.Ann. § 921.141(5)(j) (West Supp.1990) (duty); GeorgiaGa. Code Ann. § 17-10-30(b)(8) (1982) (duty); IdahoIdaho Code § 19-2515(g)(9) (1987) (duty); IndianaInd. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(6) (Burns Supp.1990) (duty); KentuckyKy.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 532.025(2)(a)7 (Michie Supp.1988) (duty); LouisianaLa. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 905.4A(2) (West Supp.1990) (duty); MarylandMd.Ann.Code art. 27, § 413(d)(1) (1988) (duty); MassachusettsMass.Gen.Laws.Ann. ch. 279, § 69( a )(1) (West Supp.1990) (duty); MissouriMo.Ann.Stat. § 565.032 (Vernon Supp.1990) (duty); MontanaMont. Code Ann. § 46-18-303(6) (1989) (duty); NevadaNev.Rev.Stat. § 200.033(7) (1990) (duty and knowledge); New JerseyNJ.Stat.Ann. § 2C:11-3c(4)(h) (West Supp.1990) (duty); New MexicoN.M.Stat.Ann. § 31-20A-5 (1987) (duty); North CarolinaN.C.Gen.Stat. § 15A-2000(e)(8) (1988) (duty); OklhomaOkla.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, § 701.12(8) (West 1983) (duty); OregonOr.Rev.Stat. § 163.095(2)(a)(A) (1989) (duty); Pennsylvania42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 9711(d)(1) (Purdon Supp.1990) (duty); South CarolinaS.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(7) (Law. Co-op.Supp.1989) (duty); South DakotaS.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-27A-1(7) (Supp.1990) (duty); TennesseeTenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(i)(9) (Supp.1989) (duty and knowledge); UtahUtah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-207(2) and 76-5-202(1)(k) (1990) (duty and knowledge); and WashingtonWash.Rev.Code Ann. § 10.95.020(1) (Supp.1990) (duty and knowledge). We point out the statutes of other states only to show that killing a law enforcement officer while the officer is lawfully performing an official duty is a fairly common subject for an aggravating circumstance in conjunction with imposition of the death penalty. An aggravating circumstance of such nature has an obvious purpose: There is a special interest in affording protection to [those] public servants who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and property. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636, 97 S.Ct. 1993, 1995, 52 L.Ed.2d 637 (1977). In other words, as a result of a law enforcement officer's service to the public, many states have determined that murder of a law enforcement officer during the officer's performance of an official duty is an aggravating circumstance in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. It appears that the State wishes us to forestall a possible constitutional quandary in § 29-2523(1)(g) by our supplying necessary but omitted qualifying language which accomplishes an acceptable definition or characterization for a law enforcement officer as a victim whose death may provide a basis for imposition of the death penalty in Nebraska. To that end, the State would have us apply the highly questionable rule of statutory construction expressed in Board of Regents v. Gillette, 149 Neb. 56, 66, 30 N.W.2d 296, 301 (1947): The rule is that words may be supplied by the courts in construing a statute where that is necessary to complete the sense thereof and give effect to the intention of the Legislature manifested therein. We reject the foregoing expression as a valid rule for statutory construction. In Nebraska, as an apparent attempt at legislative economy, § 29-2523(1)(g) indicates categories of homicide victims, that is, a law enforcement officer and a public servant who has custody of a particular individual. However, without clarifying language to define or sufficiently characterize the officer-victim whose death may be the basis for the aggravating circumstance in question, § 29-2523(1)(g) presents very real and practical problems. Although [b]revity is the soul of wit, economy of language to the point of verbal paucity in a statute is a dubious hallmark of, and may not be conducive to, constitutionally sound legislation, especially in reference to substantive or procedural due process required in the criminal justice system. Consequently, we decline to rewrite § 29-2523(1)(g) to conform with the State's wishes and desired interpretation of the statute. The sentencing panel's interpretation of § 29-2523(1)(g) is correct under the circumstances and preserves the statute from constitutional suspicion. Therefore, we affirm the life sentence which the sentencing panel imposed on Reynolds for his conviction of first degree murder.