Opinion ID: 2588193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Reversal of its Ruling Concerning Barcai's Prior Acts and Barcai's Right to a Fair and Impartial Jury

Text: As previously stated, Plaintiffs filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude evidence of Barcai's prior violent acts. Specifically, Plaintiffs sought to exclude Barcai's history of violence related to, inter alia: (1) domestic violence involving his wife, Lou Ann Barcai, as well as his first wife; (2) a fight with his brother Melvin Barcai and a police officer; (3) a terroristic threatening charge involving his sister, Karen Gushiken; and (4) a terroristic threatening and assault conviction arising from an incident that occurred on December 11, 1988. Plaintiffs also filed a separate motion in limine to exclude any reference to Barcai's hospitalization at the Hawai`i State Hospital in 1989. The court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' motions on October 6, 1997, prior to jury selection. During argument on Plaintiffs' motion to exclude evidence of past violence, the court asked, Isn't anything that the doctor knows about the behavior of a psychiatric patient relevant to what [the doctor] does? Plaintiffs responded that Dr. Betwee had not based his treatment decisions on Barcai's past behaviors. Defense counsel conceded that Dr. Betwee's medication decisions were not based on Barcai's past behaviors, but pointed out that Dr. Betwee's knowledge of Barcai's past behaviors had an impact on his decision to order restraint and seclusion. The defense argued that Barcai's predilection to violence was, therefore, relevant to Plaintiffs' claims of false imprisonment and battery. In response, Plaintiffs offered to dismiss these claims with prejudice. Based primarily on this offer, the court ruled that Barcai's history of violence would not be admissible. Following the hearing on these and other motions in limine, the parties proceeded to jury selection, and the jury was sworn in later that afternoon. Opening statements were scheduled for the following morning. The next day, the parties met before opening statements to review issues concerning the motions in limine. Defense counsel in effect asked the court to reconsider its ruling as to the admissibility of Barcai's prior violence, now contending that Dr. Betwee would testify that he had taken this history into account when treating Barcai. Defense counsel also pointed out that Plaintiffs had already agreed that the medical record pertaining to the hospitalization at issue in the case could be admitted into evidence and that this record contained references to Barcai's history. In fact, a portion of the medical record that had been previously offered and stipulated as being admissible into evidence by both parties referred to the fact that Barcai had been committed to HSH (Hawai`i State Hospital) in 1982, that he had been arrested after assaulting and threatening a police officer in 1988, thereafter remained jailed from December 1988 to August 1989, and that he had spent an additional thirty days at HSH during this time period. These references are contained within a few lines on a single hand-written doctor's progress note that constitutes one page out of over one hundred and fifty pages of medical records from Barcai's hospitalization at MMH. The legibility of the handwriting is marginal at best and also contains medical shorthand. Plaintiffs argued that it would not be fair for the court to change its ruling on the motion in limine because, had they known that evidence of prior violence was going to be admissible, they would have questioned potential jurors differently. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' argument, the court reversed itself, ruling that the information was admissible: it seems to me in a psychiatric case that all of the behavior that the doctor actually knew about, prior behavior of the decedent, is relevant when he is making a consideration  making a decision about psychoactive drugs, whatever the correct term is, because he needs to know what level of behavior is involved. If he made a mistake, that's a different issue. During the course of the trial, the aforementioned doctor's progress note was admitted into evidence without comment as to any of its contents. [2]
Whether there has been a denial of the right to a fair and impartial jury is an issue of law. Issues of law are reviewed under the right/wrong standard. Lee v. Corregedore, 83 Hawai`i 154, 158, 925 P.2d 324, 328 (1996).
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court's reversal of its initial ruling to preclude evidence of Barcai's history of violence substantially impaired their right to a fair and impartial jury. Plaintiffs submit that they relied on the court's initial ruling during jury selection and, as a result, they did not attempt to eliminate those potential jurors who may have been biased against Barcai due to his history of violence. Plaintiffs contend that they were, therefore, deprived of their right to an informed exercise of their peremptory challenges and their ability to challenge jurors for cause. Plaintiffs' contention is specious. Assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs were deprived of an informed exercise of their right to participate in jury selection, it was only with respect to a single issue: the ability to ascertain whether potential jurors would be predisposed to judge Barcai harshly because of his history of violence. Notably, however, Plaintiffs do not point to anywhere in the record where evidence of Barcai's past violent behavior was discussed at trial. Thus, even assuming there were jurors predisposed to judge Barcai harshly because of his past behavior, Plaintiffs do not demonstrate where such jurors had an opportunity to do so and how it may have affected the outcome of the trial. Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate even a remote possibility of prejudice to them. Cf. Kawamata Farms v. United Agri Products, 86 Hawai`i 214, 245, 948 P.2d 1055, 1086 (1997) (judgment will not be reversed based upon error in awarding the correct number of peremptory challenges to co-defendants unless the error is shown to be prejudicial); Kaowili v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 68 Haw. 640, 644, 727 P.2d 67, 69 (1986) (trial court committed prejudicial error necessitating a new trial when it made statements or asked questions during voir dire which implied or stated a conclusion as to the central fact issue in the case). Plaintiffs rely upon broad languagederived from a secondary sourcecited in Carr v. Kinney, 41 Haw. 166 (1955), to support their apparent contention that they do not need to demonstrate any such prejudice: To obtain an impartial jury an examination into the qualifications, attitudes and inclinations of jurors before they are impaneled and sworn to try a case is necessary. Only by such examination can the information be obtained to constitute a basis for the exercise of a challenge to exclude from the jury those who might act from prejudice or interest or without qualification to judge soundly, and wide latitude is permitted an attorney in examining jurors on their voir dire to discover the state of mind of the juror with respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence. Id. at 168-69 (citing 31 Am.Jur., Jury, §§ 104 and 107). Carr, however, does not stand for the expansive proposition that Plaintiffs would have this court follow. In Carr, the plaintiff, in a personal injury suit, was prohibited from asking potential jurors during jury selection any questions relative to their interests in two insurance companies that insured the defendant or any questions involving insurance in any form. Id. at 168. This court held that the restriction on the plaintiff constituted reversible error. Id. at 179. However, the primary focus of the analysis was upon the defendant's contention that, if the suggestion was raised that a defendant was insured, then jurors would not be able to impartially judge the case and would be inclined to decide too easily in favor of the plaintiff or award the plaintiff a larger amount in damages than they otherwise would. Id. at 170 (internal quotation marks omitted). This court reasoned that it is widely known by jurors that many individuals carry insurance policies and that it was an insult to the intelligence and the fidelity of jurors and to the jury system as a whole to assume that jurors would automatically decide a case against an insured defendant based solely on the fact that the defendant carried insurance. See id. at 170-71 (emphasis omitted). Significantly, this court noted the distinct possibility that individual members of the jury panel could have had a financial interest in one of companies that insured the defendant, given the fact that the company was owned in large part by one of Hawaii`s largest employers. See id. at 173. Moreover, the court noted that, in fact, two of the employees of this corporation holding stock in the insurance company were listed on the jury panel[.] Id. The court further reasoned that: Were the plaintiff permitted to thoroughly examine the prospective jurors it might readily appear that some one or more of the jury panel might have large interests in such holding companies or be employees thereof or have pending business with these companies or with the insurance company itself. Id. at 173-74. It is clear, therefore, that the court's decision in Carr rested upon its perception that there existed a significant likelihood of prejudice to the plaintiff as a result of her inability to ask questions concerning the financial interests of potential jurors in the companies that insured the defendant. See, e.g., id. at 172 (it is proper to ascertain fully the relationship of any prospective juror to the parties interested in the outcome of the case so as to enable counsel to exercise intelligently his right to peremptorily challenge) (citing Tucker v. Kollias, 223 Mo. App. 367, 16 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1929) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The facts of this case are in no way similar to the situation in Carr, and Plaintiffs' reliance upon dictum in Carr is not persuasive, especially where they have failed to point to anything in the record suggesting that the harm they sought to guard againstevidence addressing Barcai's past violent behaviorsever actually arose at trial. [3] Indeed, the only evidence of past violence, of which we are aware, that was admitted which Plaintiffs do not refer to in their briefis the doctor's progress note that Plaintiffs themselves offered into evidence before the court's initial ruling on their motion in limine. Even if Plaintiffs had specifically advanced a claim of prejudice resulting from the admission of this evidence, such a claim would be fruitless because they themselves offered the evidence. Cf. Condron v. Harl, 46 Haw. 66, 81, 374 P.2d 613, 621 (1962) (litigant could not complain of prejudice resulting from receipt of evidence that he invited the trial court to erroneously admit); Kanoii v. Kaioipahia, 11 Haw. 326, 330 (1898) (a litigant introducing evidence without objection cannot thereafter raise on appeal the question of the admissibility of such evidence). Therefore, Plaintiffs could not have relied upon the trial court's initial ruling in the first place to assume that they did not have to question potential jurors about their attitudes towards violence and cannot now blame the trial court for their own decision not to do so. Based on the foregoing, we hold that Plaintiffs' right to a fair and impartial jury was not violated.