Opinion ID: 2817768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The “Webster Street incident”

Text: [¶19] Begin argues that Vierling’s testimony about the details of the Webster Street incident was unfairly prejudicial to him. See M.R. Evid. 403. [¶20] “We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Norwood, 2014 ME 97, ¶ 16, 97 A.3d 613. Rule 403 requires the court to determine, first, whether the proffered evidence is relevant, and, second, whether the probative value of the relevant evidence is “‘substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.’” Id. ¶ 17 (quoting M.R. Evid. 403). Unfairly prejudicial evidence is that which has “an undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an improper basis, commonly, though not always, an emotional one.” Id. ¶ 16 (quotation marks omitted). [¶21] Here, Begin defended the assault charge by arguing that his actions were only in response to Vierling’s unjustified use of force. Begin emphasized that Vierling could have taken alternative courses of action, including simply allowing Vierling to go inside the house, but instead chose to initiate the use of 10 physical force against Begin unnecessarily. The jury was thus charged with determining whether Vierling’s initial use of force against Begin was reasonable, and the court instructed the jury about the use of force by law enforcement. [¶22] Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 108(1-A) (2014), a person is not entitled to use nondeadly force against a law enforcement officer who is attempting to effect an arrest, unless the officer uses nondeadly force that is not justified pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 107(1). Section 107(1), in turn, authorizes a law enforcement officer to use a reasonable degree of nondeadly force when effecting an arrest, unless the officer knows that the arrest is illegal. Therefore, the reasonableness of the force that Vierling applied in his effort to arrest Begin was material to Begin’s claim that he acted in self-defense against Vierling. Because the jury was tasked with determining the reasonableness of Vierling’s use of force, the court properly determined that evidence related to Vierling’s state of mind was relevant. [¶23] Significantly, the State did not elicit testimony about the details of the Webster Street shooting during its direct examination of Vierling. During cross-examination, Begin elicited testimony suggesting that Vierling had no reason to believe that Begin had a gun inside the house and that the protected party in this case was not in danger because she was outside on the sidewalk. Then, on redirect, Vierling testified that the Webster Street incident—in which a protected party was murdered outside of her home after a police officer, while in the process of serving 11 a protection order, allowed the subject to re-enter the home—was on his mind at the time of his encounter with Begin. [¶24] The court properly determined that the Webster Street shooting was probative of Vierling’s state of mind and his assessment of the dangers presented by Begin re-entering the house. Although the State could have made the point without getting into the specific details of the Webster Street shooting, the testimony was relevant, Begin opened the door for it, and there is no indication that the jury considered it other than for the limited purpose for which it was offered. It was not an abuse of the court’s discretion to allow this testimony.