Opinion ID: 187183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conspiracy Jurisdiction

Text: Eisenberg and FCIG argue further that specific jurisdiction exists because IFX was a conspirator with Titan in wrongs that Titan perpetrated against FCIG through acts in the District. Appellants' Br. 25 (capitalization altered). In the proceedings below, they did not cite any statutory authority for this theory of jurisdiction; however, the district court assumed that they intended to rely on the agent language of subsection (a)(1). [10] See FC Inv. Group, 479 F.Supp.2d. at 38. Section 13-423(a)(1) authorizes the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who, whether directly or by an agent (in this case, a co-conspirator), transact[s] any business in the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1); see also Second Amend. Found., 274 F.3d at 523 (Persons who enter the forum and engage in conspiratorial acts are deemed to `transact business' there `directly'; co-conspirators who never enter the forum are deemed to `transact business' there `by an agent.' (quoting D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1))). For conspiracy jurisdiction under subsection (a)(3), the plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of a civil conspiracy. . ., (2) the defendant's participation in the conspiracy, and (3) an overt act by a co-conspirator within the forum, subject to the long-arm statute, and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Kopff v. Battaglia, 425 F.Supp.2d. 76, 81 n. 4 (D.D.C.2006) (quotation omitted); see also Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv. Gen. Counsel, 949 F.2d 415, 425 (D.C.Cir.1991). The district court rejected this personal jurisdiction theory as well because, based on the allegations of the amended complaint, it did not appear that Titan had committed . . . [any] act in furtherance of the conspiracy within the District of Columbia that was sufficient to subject [Titan] to jurisdiction under the D.C. long-arm statute. FC Inv. Group, 479 F.Supp.2d at 42-43 (citing Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 335 F.Supp.2d 72, 83 (D.D.C. 2004)). The amended complaint alleged that the conspiracy between Titan and IFX began on an unspecified date [i]n or about 2002, Am. Comp. ¶ 15, and continued through late 2003 and into January 2004. See id. ¶¶ 25, 26. During that time Titan sent account statements to Eisenberg in the District, see id. ¶¶ 10, 13; Titan employee Knott contacted Eisenberg at least twice, once to inform Eisenberg that Titan was replacing IG with IFX as Titan's currency broker and once to invite Eisenberg to IFX's London office, see id. ¶¶ 15, 18; and Titan board member Lichtenstein sent a false deposit slip to Eisenberg in the District after Eisenberg demanded that his funds be returned. [11] See id. ¶ 26. The district court concluded that the  unspecifiedbut undoubtedly smallnumber of mailings, Knott's meetings with Eisenberg and Lichtenstein's sending of the deposit slip were insufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over Titan. FC Inv. Group, 479 F.Supp.2d at 43. [12] Whether or not the district court correctly found Titan's District contacts insufficient, its finding of no personal jurisdiction over IFX on a conspiracy theory can be upheld on another ground. See Amgen, Inc. v. Smith, 357 F.3d 103, 111 (D.C.Cir.2004) (This court may affirm the dismissal of a complaint on different grounds than those relied upon by the district court. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997))). In order to establish jurisdiction under a theory of civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must plead with particularity overt acts within the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. World Wide Minerals v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1168 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1187, 123 S.Ct. 1250, 154 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2003). `[B]ald speculation' or a `conclusory statement' that individuals are co-conspirators is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under a conspiracy theory. Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1031 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (quoting Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C.Cir.1983)). We believe that Eisenberg and FCIG failed to plead the conspiracy with particularity. In support of their claim that IFX had agreements and/or understandings with Titan and Martinic to commit fraud, Am. Comp. ¶ 39, they allege the following facts: 1. Lichtenstein testified (apparently in a related case) that IFX was Titan's business partner and that his points of contact at IFX were Charles Cruden and senior sales executive Andy Demetriades. Id. ¶ 15. 2. Cruden sent Lichtenstein a fax inquiring when he would be available to meet with IFX employee Carole Napoliello. Id. ¶ 16 3. [N]umerous electronic-mail communications. . . between various IFX employees and Martinic, including a December 9, 2002 email . . . confirm[ ] IFX and Titan's `close and effective working relationship.' Id. 4. Desiree Lichtman, Knott's assistant, worked with Cruden and Napoliello to create a PowerPoint presentation that Eisenberg saw while visiting IFX's London offices. See id. ¶ 19. The Power-Point presentation indicated in no uncertain terms that Titan and IFX had established a joint venture with respect to foreign currency trading. Id. ¶ 21. The PowerPoint presentation prominently displayed IFX's logo. Id. It also discussed Titan's trading strategies and named several members of IFX's Investment Committee. Id. 5. On December 10, 2002, Titan wired $100,000 to IFX from Titan's account at U.S. Bank. Id. ¶ 22. 6. On March 10, 2003 Cruden sent a letter to Lichtenstein outlining further `potential revenue streams' for Titan and IFX. . . . Id. ¶ 24. Even assuming the truth of these allegations, they fall short of the requirement that the plaintiff plead with particularity `the conspiracy as well as the overt acts within the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.' Jungquist, 115 F.3d at 1031 (quoting Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 786 F.Supp. 65, 78 (D.D.C.1992)). The allegations establish only the existence of an on-going business relationship between Titan and IFX. They do not demonstrate that IFX had agreements and/or understandings with Titan and Martinic to commit fraud, Am. Comp. ¶ 39, or that IFX acted with knowledge that it was [participating in a] fraudulent currency exchange scheme, id. ¶ 15, and are therefore insufficient to establish a conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction. See First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (D.C.Cir.1988) ([T]he `bare allegation' of a conspiracy or agency is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. (citing McLaughlin v. McPhail, 707 F.2d 800, 806 (4th Cir.1983); Lehigh Valley Indus. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir.1975))).