Opinion ID: 776323
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Factors Before Original Sentencing Court

Text: 16 Rodgers argues that the resentencing court erred in its consideration of facts that were before the original sentencing court, but upon which the original sentencing court did not rely. We disagree. The resentencing court acted properly in its assessment of Rodgers' sentence based on all available relevant facts, including facts that were before the original sentencing court. 17 When a district judge sentences a defendant after a remand, the judge is permitted to revisit the entire sentencing procedure, unless she is restricted in her review by the remand order. United States v. Bond, 171 F.3d 1047, 1048 (6th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). When the remand order does not restrict the district court in its reassessment of its sentence, the court remains free to rely upon any legitimate factors when making its determination, as long as it rules without vindictiveness. Id.; see United States v. Duso, 42 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir.1994) (recognizing that, because the sentencing guidelines allow a judge to reach the same conclusion by relying on any one of a number of legitimate factors, a successful appeal of a sentence, resulting in a remand, may result in a Pyrrhic victory for the defendant). 18 This Court's remand order recognized that, pursuant to our holding in Jeter, the original sentencing court may have erred in denying the Defendant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility when the court relied on conduct by the Defendant that occurred prior to his federal indictment. The scope of the remand, however, was not so limited. On the Government's motion, we determined that a remand was proper to allow the district court to determine whether the defendant is entitled to a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. Thus, the district court was not limited on resentencing to consider only Rodgers' second arrest to determine whether he was entitled to a three-level reduction. To the contrary, we find that, under Bond and Duso, the district judge was entitled to revisit the entire sentencing procedure, and properly did so. In particular, we find proper the district court's reliance on Rodgers' continued criminal conduct, as evidenced by his positive drug screen, as a relevant factor that impacted the length of his sentence. See United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir.1994) (holding that the continued engagement in criminal conduct is a permissible basis for a denial of a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility). 19