Opinion ID: 2363816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: An erroneously scored prior conviction is a legal error

Text: ¶ 12 The parties agree that the real issue in this case is whether an erroneously scored prior conviction constitutes a legal error, in which case Wilson is entitled to be resentenced, or a factual error, in which case Wilson may have waived any challenges. Our decision in In re Personal Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wash.2d 861, 50 P.3d 618 (2002), controls the analysis. ¶ 13 In Goodwin, we held that, in general, a defendant cannot waive a challenge to a miscalculated offender score and that a sentence based on an improperly calculated score lacked statutory authority. A sentence that lacks statutory authority cannot stand, absent perhaps the factual waiver discussed below. The law in this area is well settled. [A] sentence that is based upon an incorrect offender score is a fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of justice. Goodwin, 146 Wash.2d at 867-68, 50 P.3d 618 (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wash.2d 558, 568, 933 P.2d 1019 (1997)); In re Pers. Restraint of Gardner, 94 Wash.2d 504, 507, 617 P.2d 1001 (1980) (a plea bargaining agreement cannot exceed the statutory authority given to the courts); In re Pers. Restraint of Carle, 93 Wash.2d 31, 33, 604 P.2d 1293 (1980) (emphasis omitted) (`[W]hen a sentence has been imposed for which there is no authority in law, the trial court has the power and duty to correct the erroneous sentence, when the error is discovered.') (quoting McNutt v. Delmore, 47 Wash.2d 563, 565, 288 P.2d 848 (1955)). ¶ 14 The facts of Goodwin are similar to those here. Defendant Goodwin's juvenile offenses were improperly included in his offender score, and Goodwin, just like Wilson, agreed to the calculation in a negotiated plea agreement. But the plea agreement did not waive the challenge, we reasoned, because a defendant cannot empower a sentencing court to exceed its statutory authorization. We did, however, establish limitations to our holding: While waiver does not apply where the alleged sentencing error is a legal error leading to an excessive sentence, waiver can be found where the alleged error involves an agreement to facts, later disputed, or where the alleged error involves a matter of trial court discretion. Goodwin, 146 Wash.2d at 874, 50 P.3d 618. To explain the distinction, we discussed a case where waiver was found when the defendant stipulated to incorrect facts and another where the defendant argued for the first time on appeal that two of his convictions constituted the same criminal conduct. Goodwin, 146 Wash.2d at 874-75, 50 P.3d 618 (discussing State v. Majors, 94 Wash.2d 354, 616 P.2d 1237 (1980); State v. Nitsch, 100 Wash.App. 512, 997 P.2d 1000 (2000)). But in both instances, a factual determination would have been required, unlike here where the court need only examine the prior judgment and sentence to discover whether prior convictions involve misdemeanors or felonies. ¶ 15 The State argues that Wilson's offender score calculation is a factual dispute, and Mr. Wilson has therefore waived any challenge by accepting the plea agreement. However, in this case, whether the prior conviction is a felony or misdemeanor for purposes of sentencing is a legal dispute, with the status determined simply by reference to the specific statute underlying the conviction. The prior conviction is either for a felony or a misdemeanor, and it cannot be reclassified through any factual inquiry. [3] ¶ 16 The State analogizes this case to State v. Collins, 144 Wash.App. 547, 182 P.3d 1016 (2008), another situation with a plea deal and an agreement as to the offender's criminal history. Collins, however, is not helpful on this point because there the issue was whether the State needed to prove the comparability of out-of-state convictions. Comparability is both a legal and a factual question. Collins, 144 Wash.App. at 553, 182 P.3d 1016 (citing State v. Morley, 134 Wash.2d 588, 605-06, 952 P.2d 167 (1998)). The Collins court reasoned that when a defendant affirmatively acknowledges the comparability of foreign convictions in his criminal history, the trial court needs no further proof. This comports with our decision in State v. Ross, 152 Wash.2d 220, 230-31, 95 P.3d 1225 (2004), which involved a similar challenge to out-of-state convictions and defendants who had affirmatively acknowledged comparability. Contrary to the State's argument, in this case no facts must be acknowledged, or compared, to determine whether a Washington conviction is a felony conviction and whether there is no dispute that the attempted violation of the UCSA is a gross misdemeanor. [4] ¶ 17 We agree with Wilson that prior conviction classifications are legal questions, and so an erroneously scored prior conviction presents a legal error and, not a factual error. [T]he remedy for a miscalculated offender score is resentencing using the correct offender score. Ross, 152 Wash.2d at 228, 95 P.3d 1225 (citing State v. Ford, 137 Wash.2d 472, 485, 973 P.2d 452 (1999)).