Opinion ID: 3201361
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Credibility Determination

Text: 38 Mr. Morgan contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that the defendants’ race‐neutral explanation for striking Jurors Seven and Nine was “honest and credible” and 39 “not pretext for discrimination.” In Mr. Morgan’s view, this determination was clearly erroneous because: (1) the defend‐ ants’ proffered nondiscriminatory rationale is inherently or presumptively pretextual based on its racially disproportion‐ ate impact, and (2) the defendants’ differential treatment of prospective jurors during voir dire provides sufficient evi‐ dence of their racially discriminatory purpose. We address these contentions in turn, keeping in mind that “the ultimate 38 In his brief, Mr. Morgan urges that “[t]he standard of review is de novo as at the time of the strikes the District Court never made a record as to the credibility of the defendants’ justifications.” Appellant’s Br. 7. The Su‐ preme Court has explained, however, that the credibility determination is a “pure issue of fact,” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991), and deference is “necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations,” Miller‐El v. Cockrell (“Miller‐El I”), 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003). This rationale for appellate deference applies with equal force whether the trial court made its credibility determination at the time of the objection or, as here, in a posttrial order. 39 R.108 at 5. No. 14‐3307 29 burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from,” Mr. Morgan. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.
Mr. Morgan first contends that the race‐neutral basis for the defendants’ peremptory strikes—familiarity with the lo‐ cation of Mr. Morgan’s arrest—is inherently pretextual be‐ cause “the practical reality is this rationale would effectively mean that Defendants would only strike African‐American venirepersons due to the demographics of the South Side of 40 Chicago.” At the outset, we note that Mr. Morgan’s position is diffi‐ cult to maintain in light of the Supreme Court’s pronounce‐ ment that disparate racial impact, although relevant, is alone insufficient to establish purposeful discrimination under Bat‐ son. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359–60. Rather, “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required.” Id. (internal 41 quotation marks omitted). Acknowledging this principle, 40 Appellant’s Br. 10. 41 We note that some Batson claims involve the presentation of statistical evidence concerning a party’s use of peremptory challenges as a means through which the court may infer discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Hernan‐ dez, 500 U.S. at 363 (“[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the [classification] bears more heavily on one race than another.” (alterations in original) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976))); Harris, 680 F.3d at 951; see also Miller‐El I, 537 U.S. at 342 (“In this case, the statistical evidence alone raises some debate as to whether the 30 No. 14‐3307 Mr. Morgan invites our attention to United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990). In Briscoe, an African‐American venireperson testified on voir dire “that during the last five years he had resided at three different addresses on the west side of Chicago.” 896 F.2d at 1488. The Government sought to peremptorily strike the panelist, arguing that all three ad‐ dresses were “geographically close” to the addresses of two individuals scheduled to testify in the case and that it would impair the Government’s interests to “allow[] a juror who somehow may be personally familiar with, if not the people involved, certainly the area involved where these events have taken place.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The dis‐ trict court found this justification to be credible, and we af‐ firmed. Id. In doing so, we noted our “cognizan[ce] of the fact that the west side of Chicago is predominantly black and that exclusion of jurors based solely on their residence in this area of the city could be a pretext for discrimination.” Id. We held, however, that the Government’s explanation had gone “well beyond a cursory statement that [the potential juror] resided on the west side of Chicago” and had in fact “explicitly stated” that his last three residences were “geographically close to the addresses of” the scheduled witnesses. Id. at 1488– 89. Mr. Morgan points to our brief aside in Briscoe that the “ex‐ clusion of jurors based solely on their residence … could be a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 1488 (emphasis added). This prosecution acted with a race‐based reason when striking prospective ju‐ rors.”). Mr. Morgan has not provided any such empirical basis for his ar‐ gument. No. 14‐3307 31 language, he argues, places a heightened burden on “attor‐ ney[s] using residence as a rationale for striking a venireper‐ son” and, in this context at least, permits an inference of racial motivation unless counsel provides a “juror specific” basis for 42 the strike. We cannot accept Mr. Morgan’s interpretation. In Briscoe, we recognized that the Government had a genuine in‐ terest in removing venirepersons “personally familiar with, if not the people involved, certainly the area involved.” 896 F.2d at 1488. “[I]t is quite likely,” we said, “that [the potential juror] might very well have been familiar with, if not [the witness] herself, the individuals involved … thus justifying the gov‐ ernment’s peremptory challenge.” Id. We therefore concluded that the district court correctly accepted the Government’s stated basis for striking the juror. We said nothing in Briscoe, however, of imposing a heightened burden on parties seeking to remove a venireperson on the basis of residency, nor could we have, as such a burden would go inappropriately to the accuracy of the rationale rather than the genuineness of the motive. The district court in this case found that the defendants’ proffered race‐neutral reason, like the Government’s in Bris‐ coe, “went well beyond a cursory statement” concerning the prospective jurors’ residency, and, therefore, was “honest and 43 credible.” There is certainly an adequate basis for that find‐ ing. When Juror Nine was asked during voir dire whether she 42 Appellant’s Br. 11. 43 R.108 at 5 (quoting United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.3d 1476, 1488–89 (7th Cir. 1990)). 32 No. 14‐3307 was familiar with the location of Mr. Morgan’s arrest, she re‐ 44 sponded, “Yes, I am. … I live not far away.” To the same question, Juror Seven also answered in the affirmative, add‐ 45 ing that she had “a couple of friends that live in that area.” The record shows that Mr. Morgan’s pretrial witness list in‐ cluded three individuals who were with him at 7746 South Greenwood Avenue at the time of his arrest, two of whom 46 lived within a block of that address. Given their answers, and the limited area occupied by a single city block, a signifi‐ cant possibility existed that one or both of the prospective ju‐ rors “might very well have been familiar with, if not [the wit‐ nesses themselves], the individuals involved” in Mr. Mor‐ gan’s arrest. Briscoe, 896 F.2d at 1488; see also Dunham v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 967 F.2d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 1992) (af‐ firming denial of Batson challenge because “there was at least the potential that [the prospective juror] may have been a friend of a friend of the Plaintiffs” (internal quotation marks 47 omitted)). Indeed, it was this precise concern that counsel for 44 R.115‐1 at 44. 45 Id. at 45. 46 R.56 at 13–14. 47 Mr. Morgan takes issue with defense counsel’s failure to inquire to greater depth the extent of the two prospective jurors’ familiarity with the area. Appellant’s Br. 14–15. In light of the already apparent potential for juror bias, however, we see no reason to attach analytical significance to counsel’s failure to pursue this line of questioning further. Cf. United States v. Brown, 809 F.3d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 2016) (expressing “skeptic[ism] as to whether the failure to ask a follow‐up question … suggests pretext”). No. 14‐3307 33 the defendants “explicitly stated,” Briscoe, 896 F.2d at 1489, to the district court: I think this case should be decided by people that have no familiarity with the area or may have contacts in any way. The evidence is going to show that the plain‐ tiff has a number of friends in that area, and they were present. They were there, and [Juror Nine] lives in that particular area, [and] may have some knowledge through others of this particular incident.[48] Finally, we note that although familiarity with the block may not have been sufficient to justify removing these pro‐ spective jurors for cause—indeed, the district court rejected this rationale as “not enough to support a challenge for 49 cause” —“[u]nlike a challenge for cause, a peremptory strike need not be based on a strong or good reason, only founded on a reason other than race.” United States v. Smallwood, 188 F.3d 905, 915 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omit‐ ted); accord Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (“[T]he prosecutor’s expla‐ nation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a chal‐ lenge for cause.”). 48 R.115‐1 at 49; see also id. at 50 (providing the same reason for striking Juror Seven). 49 Id. at 49; see also id. at 50 (denying challenge for cause of Juror Seven because “she hasn’t indicated that she knows any people particularly in‐ volved in the case” and “it is not enough to support a challenge for cause based upon familiarity with the area”). 34 No. 14‐3307
Mr. Morgan next contends that differences in the defend‐ ants’ treatment of prospective jurors during jury selection es‐ tablishes that their facially neutral rationale for striking Jurors Seven and Nine was merely a pretext for race. At Batson step three, “[a]n opponent of a strike may rely on all relevant cir‐ cumstances to raise an inference of purposeful discrimina‐ tion.” Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 2012) (inter‐ nal quotation marks omitted); see also Miller‐El I, 537 U.S. at 339 (“Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, [counsel’s] demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improba‐ ble, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered ra‐ tionale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.”). For exam‐ ple, a pattern of differential questioning can show discrimina‐ tory intent when it indicates an effort to elicit disqualifying answers from minority venirepersons. Miller‐El II, 545 U.S. at 255–60. Similarly, a “comparative juror analysis” showing that the purported reason for striking African‐American pro‐ spective jurors was not equally applied to non‐African‐Amer‐ icans can constitute evidence of pretext. Harris, 680 F.3d at 953. Here, Mr. Morgan offers a litany of discrete comparisons that he claims demonstrate the defendants’ underlying racial 50 motive during jury selection. Upon review of the record, 50 We note that several of Mr. Morgan’s specific arguments concerning differential questioning were not included in his motion for a new trial before the district court and have been raised for the first time on appeal. The defendants, however, do not argue waiver; they address each of Mr. Morgan’s contentions on the merits. Accordingly, the defendants have waived their waiver arguments, and we will address Mr. Morgan’s No. 14‐3307 35 however, we do not believe these examples are indicative of purposeful discrimination. Mr. Morgan first asserts that the defendants “target[ed]” African‐American venirepersons for questioning during voir 51 dire. As evidence, Mr. Morgan relies on questions asked only to Jurors Six and Nineteen, the two African‐American prospective jurors who were eventually seated on the jury. To Juror Six, counsel for the defendants asked several questions regarding her level of education. To Juror Nineteen, counsel asked whether her children were in school or employed; when Juror Nineteen responded that her children were all of adult age, counsel then pursued a line of questioning concern‐ ing their employment and education. We do not believe that these questions, when considered in context, betray a discriminatory motive on the part of the defendants. Counsel’s questions to Juror Six regarding her ed‐ ucation were posed in response to the prospective juror’s statement that she worked with “medical information” as a 52 data entry clerk. Defense counsel emphasized medical train‐ ing and experience throughout voir dire, even peremptorily striking a physical therapist; and Mr. Morgan’s medical rec‐ ords were in fact introduced at trial and discussed extensively during closing arguments. As to Juror Nineteen, although it is true that defense counsel did not question other venireper‐ new arguments on the merits. See Riemer v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 148 F.3d 800, 804 n.4 (7th Cir. 1998). 51 Appellant’s Br. 13. 52 R.115‐1 at 36–37. 36 No. 14‐3307 sons to this degree of depth about their children, Juror Nine‐ teen was the only prospective juror who made clear during voir dire that her children were of adult age. Without any‐ thing more, we decline to attribute invidious intent to the de‐ fendants based solely on this line of questioning. Finally, we note that despite this additional probing, both Jurors Six and Nineteen were ultimately seated on the jury. See United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 808 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he fact that two black jurors remained on the jury … is a valid (if not disposi‐ tive) factor.”). Mr. Morgan also invites our attention to the defendants’ questioning of Jurors Nine and Seven regarding their famili‐ arity with the location of the arrest, while Juror Twelve, a 53 non‐African‐American individual also from Chicago, was not similarly questioned. See Miller‐El II, 545 U.S. at 241 (“If a [party]’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise‐similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrim‐ ination to be considered at Batson’s third step.”). Again, how‐ ever, we find this difference unremarkable when examined in context. Juror Twelve had revealed that his cousin formerly served as Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago. Both parties’ questioning of Juror Twelve focused on this fact. Given the Corporation Counsel’s involvement in this case, we see no reason to infer pretext from the defendants’ failure to pursue other lines of questioning. See Brown, 809 F.3d at 375 53 The racial composition of the venire was not stated on the record in the district court, but the parties appear to agree that Juror Twelve was not African‐American. No. 14‐3307 37 (indicating “skeptic[ism] as to whether the failure to ask a fol‐ low‐up question … suggests pretext” where the circum‐ stances of jury selection implied “that the government did not want to interrupt the flow of the proceeding, not that it was trying to deceive the court”). Finally, Mr. Morgan contrasts the defendants’ peremptory strike of Juror Seven, a security guard who “should have been an ideal juror for defendants,” with their “significant effort to rehabilitate” Juror Five,54 a white female who stated during voir dire that she was friends with a police officer who had 55 told her stories about “people in Chicago of color.” The rec‐ ord will not support this argument. As we discussed previ‐ ously, the defendants provided a race‐neutral explanation for striking Juror Seven—her familiarity with the 7700 block of South Greenwood Avenue. With regard to Juror Five, after Mr. Morgan challenged her for cause, the district court asked defense counsel for a response, to which counsel replied, “Judge, I think she indicated that despite what, she, you know, has learned through her friend, she could be fair and 56 impartial to both sides in this particular case.” This is hardly an “adamant defense” or a “significant effort to rehabili‐ 57 tate.” 54 Appellant’s Br. 17–19. 55 R.115‐1 at 36. 56 Id. at 48. 57 Appellant’s Br. 17, 19. 38 No. 14‐3307 We are satisfied that nothing in the voir dire record sug‐ gests that the defendants’ facially race‐neutral reason for striking Jurors Seven and Nine was a pretext for race.