Opinion ID: 3066762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Claims against Wells Fargo13

Text: Glover’s claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) (Count XI) also fails. Section 1692e(2) of the FDCPA prohibits the “false representation of . . . (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or (B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), (B), while section 1692f(1) prohibits as an “[u]nfair 12 In Counts I, II, and III, Glover also alleged that Wells Fargo breached the mortgage by misallocating her monthly mortgage payments, improperly collecting escrow charges, and failing to provide proper escrow account statements. On appeal, however, she abandoned these arguments and instead focused on the issue of attorneys’ fees. We therefore do not have occasion to address the sufficiency of these allegations to support a breach of contract claim. 13 Glover does not appeal the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of her claims under Pennsylvania’s Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act (Counts XIV & XV), or the grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on her unjust enrichment claim (Count IX). 18 practice[]” the “collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” According to Glover, “[t]he basis for [her FDCPA] claim” is that Wells Fargo “demanded” unreasonable attorney’s fees “that were not legally owed” under her mortgage. Opening Br. 32–33. We agree with the District Court that Glover failed to introduce “any shred of evidence that the fees requested by Wells Fargo were not owed.” App. 2471. Glover’s proclamation that any attorney’s fees Wells Fargo “demanded were not . . . reasonable” and that what she really owed was “$0.0,” Opening Br. 32, is not evidence that Wells Fargo was “false[ly] represent[ing]” the fee amounts, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2), or attempting to collect amounts “not expressly authorize[d]” under the 2008 LMA, Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 369 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1)). See Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 250 n.12. Thus, the District Court properly entered summary judgment as to Count XI.
We next address Glover’s claim under the Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law (“Act 6”), 41 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 502 (Count XVI). Section 406 of Act 6 allows a residential mortgage lender to contract for or receive from the mortgage debtor a reasonable fee actually incurred in connection with foreclosure actions. 41 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 406. Even assuming Wells Fargo is a “residential mortgage lender” under § 406, Glover has failed to present evidence on which a reasonable jury could 19 conclude that she was charged attorney’s fees not incurred or permitted under the loan documents and, more significantly, that she paid any such fees. Thus, she has not shown that there is a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to resolve in connection with her Act 6 claim and so we will affirm summary judgment in Wells Fargo’s favor on Count