Opinion ID: 887195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Montana's Approach

Text: ¶ 65 Montana did away with the Frye general acceptance test before Daubert. In Barmeyer v. Mont. Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 193, 657 P.2d 594, 598, we rejected the Frye test as not being in conformity with the spirit of the new rules of evidence. We adopted the reasoning of United States v. Baller (4th Cir.1975), 519 F.2d 463, 466, wherein the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation. Barmeyer, 202 Mont. at 193-94, 657 P.2d at 598. Nearly twelve years later, we adopted Daubert, concluding that before a trial court admits scientific expert testimony, there must be a preliminary showing that the expert's opinion is premised on a reliable methodology. State v. Moore (1994), 268 Mont. 20, 42, 885 P.2d 457, 471. ¶ 66 Unfortunately, we also stated that the Daubert guidelines were consistent with Barmeyer concerning the admission of novel scientific evidence. Moore, 268 Mont. at 42, 885 P.2d at 471. I say unfortunately because, as it turns out, we have, since, essentially done away with the Daubert standards by limiting the requirements of that case and the courts' gatekeeping obligation to proffered expert testimony of novel scientific evidence only. See State v. Cline (1996), 275 Mont. 46, 55, 909 P.2d 1171, 1177; Hulse v. State, 1998 MT 108, ¶¶ 55-69, 289 Mont. 1, ¶¶ 55-69, 961 P.2d 75, ¶¶ 55-69; State v. Southern, 1999 MT 94, ¶ 59, 294 Mont. 225, ¶ 59, 980 P.2d 3, ¶ 59; Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 1999 MT 188, ¶¶ 18-20, 295 Mont. 345, ¶¶ 18-20, 983 P.2d 869, ¶¶ 18-20; State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 56, 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 56, 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 56; State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶ 37, 315 Mont. 395, ¶ 37, 68 P.3d 768, ¶ 37. See also Robert L. Sterup, Into the Twilight Zone: Admissibility of Scientific Expert Testimony in Montana after Daubert, 58 Mont. L.Rev. 465, 485-86 (Summer 1997) (hereinafter Sterup ). ¶ 67 In doing so, we have committed an error of logic. The proposition that A implies B is not the equivalent of non-A implies non-B, and neither proposition follows logically from the other. The process of inferring one from the other is known as the fallacy of denying the antecedent. Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc. (2nd Cir.1980), 634 F.2d 690, 702-03 (citing J. Cooley, A Primer of Formal Logic 7 (1942)). In Cline, we committed this error when we essentially reasoned that if novel scientific evidence requires a Daubert hearing, then non-novel scientific evidence does not require a Daubert hearing. Cline, 275 Mont. at 55, 909 P.2d at 1177. Therefore, if the proffered scientific evidence is not novel, our approach, based on Barmeyer, is to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony, and to allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation. Moore, 268 Mont. at 41-42, 885 P.2d at 470-71. See also Hulse, ¶ 69, Southern, ¶ 59, Hocevar, ¶¶ 56-61, and Ayers, ¶¶ 37-50. ¶ 68 While, arguably, the DNA evidence considered in Moore was novel in 1994, as far as Montana was concerned, and while Daubert was consistent with Barmeyer (without applying Daubert's various standards, per se ), our consistency observation grew into an exception which has effectively now swallowed Daubert. Worse, as I will discuss later, in imposing this limitation we have not only turned the Daubert approach on its head, unreasonably constraining, in the process, the trial judge's gatekeeping function, but we have rejected Kumho Tire [1] , and have paved the way for the admission of scientific evidence whose reliability and methodology have never been subject to any level of intellectual rigor. Contra Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1176. Indeed we have, as this case demonstrates, fallen in to the trap of admitting expert scientific opinion that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert, contra Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, 118 S.Ct. at 519  the only exception being for that scientific evidence which is not novel. [2] We have come to accept the notion that certain disciplines, techniques, methods, sciences and even some presumptions are grounded in scientific principle; are not novel; and are, therefore, presumptively reliable without more. It is to that problem that I now turn.