Opinion ID: 171652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of a Heightened Standard

Text: To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate four factors: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant's favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2008); see also O Centro, 342 F.3d at 1177. Because the primary goal of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the pre-trial status quo, courts should be especially cautious when granting an injunction that requires the nonmoving party to take affirmative actiona mandatory preliminary injunctionbefore a trial on the merits occurs. [3] O Centro, 389 F.3d at 977. Therefore, before we will grant such relief, we require a movant seeking such an injunction to make a heightened showing of the four factors. Id. at 977, 979. In doing so, our aim is to minimize any injury that would not have occurred but for the court's intervention. Id. at 978. While we recognize that mandatory preliminary injunctions are traditionally disfavored, Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2005), when the moving party demonstrates that the exigencies of the case require extraordinary interim relief, the district court may grant the motion upon satisfaction of the heightened burden. O Centro, 389 F.3d at 978. Palace argues that the magistrate judge failed to apply the appropriate standard for granting a mandatory preliminary injunction. See Aplt. Br. at 20-22. It claims that the ruling does not identify the requisite exigencies upon which such extraordinary relief may be granted and fails to impose, both implicitly and explicitly, the heightened strong showing burden on RoDa. Id. at 21-22. Essentially, it argues that, because RoDa already held complete control over the properties at issue and Palace never once contravened RoDa's decision-making authority, it was impossible for RoDa to demonstrate irreparable harm. Id. Palace's arguments lack merit. The district court methodically laid out the standard it relied upon, citing all four factors, discussing the unusual nature of a mandatory injunction, and declaring that an injunction of this sort `must be more closely scrutinized to assure the exigencies of the case support the granting of a remedy that is extraordinary even in the normal course.' RoDa Drilling, 2008 WL 4056229 at , ¶ 2 (quoting O Centro, 389 F.3d at 975). The magistrate judge further announced that he had more closely scrutinized the ... factors to assure that the exigencies of the case support the granting of [the motion]. Id. at , ¶ 4. While the court did not discuss the heightened burden explicitly, it is clear from the cited language of the order that the magistrate judge was aware that a mandatory injunction is an unusual form of relief and one that must not be granted without heightened consideration. Palace further claims that the district court failed to identify any particular exigencies that would warrant such relief. The contention that the magistrate judge erred because he failed to engage in the proper analysis ignores the many pages of factual findings and legal analysis in which the magistrate found that (1) RoDa did not grant Palace any interest in the properties, (2) transfer of title was not conditioned on any other obligation RoDa may have had to Palace, (3) Palace refused to transfer record title to RoDa, (4) Palace continued up until the date of the order to retain revenues generated from the properties each month, and (5) for a variety of other reasons RoDa had been suffering and would continue to suffer irreparable harm were the title transfers not effectuated. See id. at -4, ¶¶ 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19. In sum, the magistrate judge, after hearing the evidence, found that RoDa would be denied the opportunity to make use of its own property during the pendency of litigation without the transfer of legal title. Surely, Palace must recognize that there is a difference between holding full legal title to a property versus merely making all crucial decisions, Aplt. Br. at 21, about a property while another holds record title. The fact is that Palace objects to the grant of a preliminary injunction because it hopes to recover from RoDa financially, and by retaining legal title to the properties, Palace would ensure a source for that recovery. We have never before required an explicit listing of exigencies, nor do we here. The court clearly found that the situation required immediate action, and we do not see how the order is deficient in any way. The magistrate judge's decision on this point certainly does not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion.