Opinion ID: 4200908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court erred in holding

Text: THAT THE ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS WERE VOLUNTARY AS TO BIRTH FATHER ¶ 86 Under ICWA, a parent has a right to receive notice of and to intervene in any proceeding involving the involuntary termination of his or her parental rights. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (“In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the . . . termination of parental rights to[] an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe . . . of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.”). As we discussed above, Birth Father is a “parent” under ICWA. Supra ¶¶ 74– 77. The district court held that the proceeding was voluntary as to Birth Father, which meant he was not entitled to notice and intervention. We reverse and hold that the proceeding was involuntary as to Birth Father. ¶ 87 Originally, these proceedings appeared to be voluntary on the part of both parents because Birth Mother misrepresented her brotherin-law as the biological father and had him sign a consent form for termination of parental rights in order to make the adoption go faster. Even after Birth Father filed a motion to intervene to establish paternity and after Birth Mother filed an affidavit informing the court that Birth Father was the biological parent and a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the court still believed the case to be “undoubtedly a voluntary proceeding” because it was “initiated not by the State but by Petitioners after the child’s mother indicated her (at the time) voluntary desire to relinquish her parental rights and place the child for adoption.” While we recognize that the proceedings were voluntary as to Birth Mother, it is clear that Birth Father never sought to opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness.”). I am also confident that were we to reinstate Birth Mother’s rights, any due process concerns could be addressed by requiring Birth Father to provide Birth Mother with notice that her parental rights have been reinstated and that she possesses the ability to waive her parental rights in compliance with ICWA’s timing requirements. 52 Cite as: 2017 UT 59 Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part voluntarily terminate his parental rights. We disagree with the district court’s characterization of “involuntary proceedings” as “statesponsored proceedings” and “voluntary proceedings” as “proceedings initiated by an Indian parent seeking to terminate her parental rights.” Rather, we hold that proceedings to terminate a parent’s parental rights against his or her will are involuntary proceedings under ICWA. ¶ 88 ICWA does not define “involuntary proceeding” as used in 25 U.S.C. section 1912(a), so we look to the plain meaning of the term instead. The plain language in section 1912(a) refers to “any involuntary proceeding in a State court.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “involuntary” as “[n]ot resulting from a free and unrestrained choice; not subject to control by the will.” Involuntary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). When a parent’s rights are terminated against his or her will, the termination does not “result[] from a free and unrestrained choice” by that parent. Id. And if the proceedings are involuntary as to one parent, a plain language analysis leads to the conclusion that they are involuntary proceedings under ICWA, regardless of whether those proceedings are initiated by the state or by the other parent. Additionally, in light of ICWA’s policy “to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families,” 25 U.S.C. § 1902, it would be inconsistent to deny a parent the right to receive notice and to intervene in proceedings for the termination of his or her parental rights just because the termination of the other parent’s rights was voluntary. Thus, we conclude that the proceedings in this case are involuntary as they pertain to Birth Father.34 Birth Father therefore was entitled to notice of the proceedings and the opportunity to intervene. 34 Regardless of whether the proceedings are voluntary, because Birth Father is a parent for purposes of ICWA, see supra ¶¶ 74–77, he was “entitled to the protections under [25 U.S.C. sections] 1912(d) and (f) and other applicable provisions.” Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 979 (Alaska 2011). But nothing in the record indicates that Birth Father was provided with, for example, any “remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family[.]” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). And the district court has made no “determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by (cont.) 53 Adoption of B.B. Himonas, J., Opinion of the Court in part