Opinion ID: 3174015
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause

Text: To state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, Demien must have alleged it was deprived of a protected interest without due process of law. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Omaha, 574 F.3d 1003, 1005-06 (8th Cir. 2009). Protected interests under the Due Process Clause are those to which a person holds a “legitimate claim of entitlement,” and stem from “independent source[s] such as state law.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Unless Demien can demonstrate it held a valid property interest under Missouri law in the subject contract, we must affirm the district court’s dismissal of Demien’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. See L & H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769 F.2d 517, 524 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding “the district court did not err in dismissing appellants’ § 1983 claim challenging the city’s allegedly arbitrary award of the contract for failure to state a claim because [none of the plaintiffs] had a protected property interest under [state] law”). “Under Missouri law an unsuccessful -6- bidder on a construction project has no property right in the contract.” Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 808 (8th Cir. 1999); see also State ex rel. Mid-Mo. Limestone, Inc. v. County of Callaway, 962 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). “[W]here a public body reserves the right to reject any and all bids,” a rejected bidder has “no vested interest or property right” in the contract. La Mar Constr. Co. v. Holt Cty., R-II Sch. Dist., 542 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Here, the District’s invitation to bid clearly advised “[t]he [District] . . . reserves right to select a Bidder other than the lowest” and “reserves right to reject any and all proposals.” No rejected bidder gained a property right in the award of the contract. See id.; cf. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (stating “a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion”). Demien accuses the district court of ignoring Metropolitan, Public Communications Services, Inc. v. Simmons, 409 S.W.3d 538 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), and State ex rel. Mid-Missouri Limestone, cases Demien contends “establish the right of an unsuccessful bidder to bring suit if the award of the bid was done unfairly.” While these cases demonstrate an unsuccessful bidder may have standing under Missouri law to challenge the award of a contract, none grant a property right to the lowest bidder, and, furthermore, “[s]tanding to bring a state court claim of deprivation of property rights does not establish a protected property interest,” Kim Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Trustees of Mundelein, 14 F.3d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Metro., 23 F.3d at 1371; Simmons, 409 S.W.3d at 546; State ex rel. Mid-Mo. Limestone, 962 S.W.2d at 441 (declaring “unsuccessful bidders” do not have “private, pecuniary interests which the law will recognize and enforce”). Finally, we are unpersuaded by Demien’s attempts to create a binding obligation from language in the AIA guide and the invitation to bid. Because the AIA guide said the contract “should” be awarded to the lowest bidder, Demien argues the -7- District was obligated to award the contract to Demien. As the District suggests, the invitation and AIA guide merely state the District may accept the lowest bid, “but . . . doesn’t need to.” Demien tries to find ambiguity in the AIA guide and the invitation to bid, maintaining principles of contract law demand we construe any ambiguity against the District. But rules of contractual interpretation are inapplicable here because Demien and the District never entered into a contract. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Sevier, 98 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Mo. 1936) (determining an advertisement soliciting bids to a public project “‘was not an offer of a contract, but an offer to receive proposals for a contract’” (quoting Anderson v. Bd. of Pub. Sch., 27 S.W. 610, 612 (Mo. 1894))). In sum, Demien failed to allege the District deprived Demien of any entitlement, and so it failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.