Opinion ID: 151073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Begay Retroactive?

Text: Sun Bear filed his § 2255 motion within one year of the Supreme Court's decision in Begay. Consequently, there is no dispute that Sun Bear's § 2255 motion was timely if Begay applies retroactively in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). But the question remains whether Begay is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Because the Supreme Court did not declare that Begay is retroactive, we must apply the established principles of retroactivity: When a Supreme Court decision results in a new rule of criminal procedure, that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review, but, as to convictions that are already final, the rule applies only in limited circumstances. New substantive ruleswhich narrow the scope of a criminal statute or which place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State's power to punishgenerally apply retroactively. New procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively unless the rule is of watershed magnitude implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding, or unless the rule prevents the lawmaking authority from criminalizing certain kinds of conduct. Never Misses A Shot v. United States, 413 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)). The rule in Begay, that a crime must be similar in kind to the enumerated offenses in order to qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA, is wholly unlike procedural rules, which merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519; see also Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2010) ( [Begay] does not address the accuracy of the process afforded [the defendant]; it addresses the degree to which the government may punish him for his violation of the law.). Admittedly, the rule in Begay is also different from traditional substantive rules. Begay did not narrow any of the elements of a criminal offense and it does not call into question Sun Bear's conviction. Instead, Begay limited the scope of conduct that can be used to increase a person's sentence under a federal statute. For example, in this case, Begay repudiated the sentencing court's basis for determining that the sentencing range was 360 months to life instead of 292 to 365 months. As the Seventh Circuit recently summarized: When the elements of a crime are narrowed, that change serves to prohibit any punishment for the conduct. Begay prohibits some of that punishment. We believe, however, that this distinction is one of degree, not one of kind. Welch, 604 F.3d at 415. [3] In accordance with the government's concession in this case, we believe that Begay is more akin to a substantive rule than a procedural rule. The government could argue that Begay is retroactive only for sentencing errors under the ACCA and not for errors under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. However, this Court has held that the inquiries under § 4B1.1 and the ACCA are the same. Williams, 537 F.3d at 971. Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) speaks only of the right asserted, and we see no basis for limiting the right newly recognized in Begay to the specific statutory context of that case. Accordingly, we hold that the rule in Begay is applicable retroactively to cases on collateral review.