Opinion ID: 171597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mr. Persichitte's and Mr. Reffel's ClaimsDoes Renewal Trigger the PIP Offer Requirement?

Text: The district court granted American Family summary judgment on Mr. Persichitte's and Mr. Reffel's claims. The district court rested this ruling in part upon the conclusion that the CAARA in effect when American Family issued the Persichitte policy did not require the offer of enhanced PIP benefits, which forms the basis of Mr. Persichitte's. [2] Although Mr. Persichitte and Mr. Reffel renewed their policies after the CAARA was amended to require the offer of optional enhanced PIP benefits, the district court concluded the renewal of a policy is not the same as the issuance of a policy under the CAARA. Mr. Persichittealong with Mr. Reffel implicitlyappeals this conclusion. We review the district court's interpretation of Colorado statutes de novo. See Freightquote.com, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 397 F.3d 888, 892 (10th Cir.2005) (citing Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991), for the statement, The obligation of responsible appellate review and the principles of a cooperative judicial federalism underlying Erie require that courts of appeals review the state-law determinations of district courts de novo.). Resolving the issue of whether, under the CAARA, the renewal of a policy equates to the issuance of a policy requires that we reconcile whether statutory interpretation controls, as found by the district court, or whether we should rely upon case law, as argued by Mr. Persichitte. [3] The statute at issue was Colo.Rev.Stat. § 10-4-710. In 1992, the Colorado legislature amended this statute to require an insurer to offer enhanced PIP benefits. Colo.Rev. Stat. § 10-4-710(2)(a) (2002). The amendment only applied to policies issued on and after July 1, 1992. Id. at § 10-4-710(4) (2002). Significantly, § 10-4-710(4) did not include a reference to policies that were renewed on and after July 1, 1992. This is in contrast to other statutes and bills that reference both issuance and renewal. E.g. § 10-4-609(2) (2002) (Prior to the time the policy is issued or renewed....); H.B. 92-1176 § 13 (Colo.1992) (This act shall apply to all policies issued or renewed on or after July 1, 1992.). The Colorado Supreme Court's application of the canons of statutory construction to look first to the plain meaning of a statute suggests that the inclusion of issued necessarily excludes issued or renewed. Lunsford v. W. States Life Ins., 908 P.2d 79, 84 (Colo.1995) (Where the language of a statute is clear on its face, we must apply it as written.... Furthermore, when the legislature speaks with exactitude, we must construe the statute to mean that the inclusion or specification of a particular set of conditions necessarily excludes others.). The district court concluded that § 10-4-710(2)(a) applied only to policies issued on and after July 1, 1992 and that it did not apply to policies issued before July 1, 1992, but renewed after July 1, 1992. Mr. Persichitte disagrees with the district court's interpretation of the statute and instead emphasizes the case law definition of issued. Under Colorado insurance law, a renewal policy is `just as much a new contract as if issued on a form carrying a different number than the original policy.' Hoang v. Monterra Homes (Powderhorn) LLC, 129 P.3d 1028, 1035 (Colo.Ct.App.2005), rev'd on other grounds, 149 P.3d 798 (Colo.2007) (quoting Aronoff v. Carraher, 146 Colo. 223, 361 P.2d 354, 357 (Colo.1961)); Am. Cas. Co. v. Glaskin, 805 F.Supp. 866, 872 (D.Colo. 1992) (Each renewal of an insurance policy is a separate contract that may be enforced as written.). We note that this view of renewals is not uniform in all states. See Pierce v. Allstate Ins. Co., 316 Or. 31, 848 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Or.1993) (The statutory scheme also makes clear that the renewal of a motor vehicle liability policy for an additional period does not constitute the issuance of a new policy.). Colorado courts, however, have treated renewed policies as new contracts before, and after, the 1992 amendment to § 10-4-710(2)(a). Because the Colorado legislature is presumed to be familiar with existing case law, we are asked to infer that the legislature intended to include renewed policies within its reference to issued policies. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 852 P.2d 459, 464 n. 5 (Colo.1993) (Because the legislature is presumed familiar with existing case law, this precedent is deemed approved.). Mr. Persichitte concludes that § 10-4-710(2)(a) applied to policies issued or renewed after July 1, 1992. Additionally, Mr. Persichitte argues that other Colorado statutes explicitly treat an insurer's obligations under a renewed policy differently. Mr. Persichitte cites former § 10-4-706(4) for the statement, After a named insured selects a policy with desired [PIP] coverage, an insurer shall not be under any further obligation to notify such policyholder in any renewal or replacement policy of the availability of a basic [PIP] policy or of any alternative [PIP] coverage. Similarly, Mr. Persichitte highlights language in § 10-4-601(3), defining renewal policy to be the issuance and delivery by an insurer of a policy replacing at the end of the policy period a policy previously issued.... While both of Mr. Persichitte's arguments have some appeal, § 10-4-710(2)(a) is unambiguous and its plain meaning must control. It is clear that the legislature was aware that under the CAARA the issuance of a policy is treated differently from the renewal of a policy. By citing other Colorado statutes, Mr. Persichitte underscores that the Colorado legislature was aware of this distinction. Because the legislature distinguished between the issuing and renewing of policies in the CAARA, we cannot ignore the clear language of the statute by applying case law interpretations of other statutes. Accordingly, the legislature chose to apply § 10-4-710(2)(a) to policies issued on and after July 1, 1992 and not to policies renewed after that date. American Family issued the policy that covered Mr. Persichitte in 1987. Although the policy was renewed after 1992, § 10-4-710(2)(a) did not apply to this renewed policy. As noted by the district court, the same analysis applies to Mr. Reffel's claims. American Family first issued Mr. Reffel's policy in November 1984, before the applicability of the 1992 amendment to the CAARA. Because we conclude that § 10-4-710(2)(a) does not apply to Mr. Reffel's claims, we need not consider Mr. Reffel's arguments concerning the accrual date for the statute of limitations and equitable tolling.