Opinion ID: 670796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Use and Enjoyment Class.3

Text: 51 The appellants argue that the Amended Consolidated Complaint left intact the 15 prior class actions. However, this is not a situation in which the class representatives joined in a joint motion or discovery action. This is a situation in which a whole new complaint was voluntarily filed, designating five entirely different classes. The representatives of some of the new classes came from several of the prior classes; for example, the proposed representatives for the Commercial Fishing Class came from 12 of the previously separate class actions. 52 The plaintiffs in the Amended Consolidated Complaint were free voluntarily to file an amended complaint, joining their claims and designating new classes, because the defendants had not answered. No court order was required. The plaintiffs did not seek in the Consolidated Complaint to preserve the individual identity of their former class action complaints. As the district court observed, Fifteen separate class actions could not be transformed into 5 proposed classes without the claims being joined. The same principle applies to the plaintiffs in the Wisner case, who later joined in the consolidated action. 53 The class action plaintiffs argue that the Consolidated Complaint did not join the individual class actions because an earlier state pretrial consolidation order, entered by Judge Shortell, provided that papers filed in the Exxon Valdez litigation could be made applicable to multiple actions by including the title and docket number of each action in the caption of the document filed. The appellants contend that by listing each short title and docket number, the separate identities of the cases were preserved. They rely on Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354, 1358 (2d Cir.1975), In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litigation, 128 F.R.D. 262, 264 (D.Minn.1989), and In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 416 F.Supp. 161, 176-77 (C.D.Cal.1976), for the proposition that consolidation cannot effect a physical merger of the actions or the defenses of the separate parties. Katz, 521 F.2d at 1358. 54 However, none of those cases involved the certification of classes that drew plaintiffs from a variety of other class actions. As we have noted in this litigation, several of the originally individual actions have plaintiffs in more than one new class, and several new classes certified by Judge Shortell contain plaintiffs from more than one of the original cases. 55 Furthermore, the removal context of the question before us also distinguishes Katz, Wirebound Boxes, and Equity Funding. In all three cited cases, the consolidated complaints were ordered by the district courts. Judge Shortell did not order the plaintiffs to file a consolidated complaint. In Wirebound Boxes and Equity Funding, the courts stated that at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, they would consider whether it was appropriate to preserve for trial and judgment the separate identities of the actions consolidated for pretrial purposes. Wirebound Boxes, 128 F.R.D. at 264; Equity Funding, 416 F.Supp. at 177 n. 12. Judge Shortell made no similar statement. The appellants point to his use of the plural form of cases in certain of his orders, but there is no clear indication that the separate identities of the cases were to be preserved. In fact, as Judge Holland reasoned, the plaintiffs' proposal to form 5 classes out of 15 cases indicates just the opposite. Thus, we have more than consolidation alone. See Katz, 521 F.2d at 1358. 56 A class action is a multiple joinder device, permitting the litigation, in one single action, of multiple claims involving similar or identical questions of law and fact, usually arising from the same set of operative facts. Lesch v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co., 279 F.Supp. 908, 911 (N.D.Ill.1968). Although the appellants originally filed their class actions separately, they subsequently filed an amended complaint requesting five superseding classes to be constituted of their various individual plaintiffs. We hold that the class actions were joined. 57 Similarly, the Wisner v. Exxon Corporation plaintiffs became part of the action. They joined the class action plaintiffs' motion for class certification, even though the plaintiffs in Wisner had filed their own class action motion and complaint, and were not parties to the Consolidated Complaint. After the state court certified the classes, the Wisner plaintiffs became representatives of the Commercial Fishing Class, the Area Business Class, and the Property Owner Class. Thus, Wisner was joined with the other class actions. 58 Because the plaintiffs are all in the same case as plaintiffs Alaska Sportfishing Association, who were part of the proposed Conservation Trust Class, asserting a removable claim, Judge Holland properly determined that the claims of the class action plaintiffs were removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441(c). 59 The class action plaintiffs contend that even if there were a joinder with the action of the trust plaintiffs, the removal was not proper because it failed to meet the separate and independent claim requirement of section 1441(c). The trust plaintiffs' claims are clearly separate and independent from the claims of the class action plaintiffs and Wisner plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are proceeding to enforce rights that are individual to them, not rights that are jointly held by them. 1A James W. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice p 0.163, at 336 (2d ed. 1993). That is, each of the plaintiffs had a separate and independent claim against the defendants, which could have been sued upon alone without joinder of the other plaintiffs. See, e.g., Northside Iron and Metal Co. v. Dobson and Johnson, Inc., 480 F.2d 798, 801 (5th Cir.1973). The trust plaintiffs were seeking relief for the general public for damages to the natural resources, whereas the class action plaintiffs were seeking compensatory relief for damages suffered by each member of their classes. The claims were separate and independent. The trust plaintiffs' claims were removable. Thus, the entire case is properly removable under section 1441(c). See also Stokes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 523 F.2d 433 (6th Cir.1975). 60 American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 71 S.Ct. 534, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951), does not counsel otherwise. Finn involved multiple claims by one plaintiff against three defendants, arising out of a fire loss on property owned by the plaintiff. Id. at 7-8, 71 S.Ct. at 537. The causes of action against two of the defendants, out-of-state insurance companies, would have been removable if sued upon alone. Id. at 8, 71 S.Ct. at 537. 61 The Court analyzed Finn's pleading and determined that a single wrong, the failure to compensate Finn for the property loss, had occurred, id. at 14, 71 S.Ct. at 540, and that substantially the same facts were contained in the allegations against all three defendants. Consequently, the Court concluded that the claims for relief were not separate and independent, and that removal was not justified. Id. at 16, 71 S.Ct. at 541. 62 It is not clear that the rationale of Finn applies to the claims of multiple plaintiffs. In any event, the multiple plaintiffs before us have suffered distinctly different harms as a result of the oil spill, and, if they prevail on their claims, are entitled to separate recoveries. Under the Finn definition of cause of action, different primary rights are being asserted by different plaintiffs. The claims are separate and independent, and properly were removed.