Opinion ID: 2994812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of the Sentence Modification

Text: on the Operation of the INA The INS argues that Sandoval’s original conviction remains a conviction for immigration purposes because a vacation of that conviction would constitute action under a state rehabilitative scheme. The BIA has held that state rehabilitative statutes, which allow a state court to expunge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge or otherwise remove a guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction, are of no effect in determining whether an alien is considered convicted for immigration purposes. In re Roldan-Santoyo, Interim Decision 3377 (BIA 1999), removal orders vacated sub nom. Lujan- Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000). Under the reasoning in Roldan-Santoyo, even if a state court expunges a conviction, or withholds adjudication of guilt unless parole is violated, aliens who receive the benefit of these rehabilitation schemes are still considered convicted for the purpose of federal immigration law. See id. The INS concludes this modification was part of a scheme of rehabilitation, and thus the original felony conviction remains a conviction for immigration purposes. The strength of its position has been called into question by the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of much of Roldan- Santoyo’s reasoning. Yet even if the Roldan- Santoyo decision stood undisturbed, it would not lead us to conclude that Sandoval is deportable. The instant case is distinguishable from Roldan- Santoyo because it does not involve a state rehabilitative scheme. Adjudication of guilt was not withheld, nor was an alien’s criminal record cleared; rather, Sandoval was convicted of an offense and sentenced, and then received a modified sentence. Though the insufficiency of the state court record has led to some confusion, the INS has not provided any convincing reason to ignore the most logical conclusion, which is that the Illinois judge must have vacated the original conviction and modified Sandoval’s sentence accordingly. The BIA has found that a conviction vacated pursuant to this type of post-conviction scheme does not constitute a conviction for immigration purposes within the meaning of section 1101(a)(48)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See In re Rodriguez-Ruiz, Interim Decision 3436 (BIA 2000) (distinguishing the NY criminal procedure law on post judgment motions from the statutes implicated under the Roldan-Santoyo decision). Further, in Roldan-Santoyo, the BIA did not address the situation where the alien has had his or her conviction vacated by a state court on . . . grounds relating to a violation of a fundamental statutory or constitutional right in the underlying criminal proceedings. Interim Decision 3377 (BIA 1999). Because the very purpose of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act is to remedy constitutional violations in the underlying criminal proceedings, the Illinois scheme falls outside the category of statutes discussed in Roldan-Santoyo. See id. The INS also alleges that the modification was entered solely for immigration purposes, and is thus ineffective. This allegation is unfounded. The judge’s modification was in response to Sandoval’s properly filed motion stating a cognizable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. That Sandoval may have filed his motion in response to the threat of deportation is irrelevant. Further, even if the state court judge’s decision to modify Sandoval’s sentence was motivated by the consequences of the federal immigration law, that fact would not render the modification ineffective for immigration purposes. See Matter of Kaneda, 16 I.&N. Dec. 677 (BIA 1979); Matter of O’Sullivan, 10 I.&N. Dec. 320, Interim Decision 1294 (BIA 1963).