Opinion ID: 1826525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suspension of Sentences

Text: This Court has repeatedly held that the only time a trial judge can suspend a sentence is immediately after the defendant is convicted and at the time the trial judge announces and imposes sentence. Denton v. Maples, 394 So.2d 895, 898 (Miss. 1981) If no appeal is perfected and [the] defendant begins to serve the sentence imposed, the time has passed for the trial judge to suspend the sentence under § 47-7-33. Id. Moreover, if a case is appealed to this Court and is affirmed, [t]here is no authority in the circuit court, or indeed this Court, following the issuance of a mandate affirming the case, to modify a judgment and sentence theretofore imposed. Harrigill v. State, 403 So.2d 867, 868 (Miss. 1981). Later we indicated that, after the term of court during which the defendant was sentenced has passed, the circuit judge's sole authority in the case was to determine whether or not all or a portion of the original suspended sentence should be revoked. Campbell v. State, 430 So.2d 851, 853 (Miss. 1983)(emphasis added). See also Lewis v. State, 414 So.2d 435 (Miss. 1982). In light of our prior decisions, Judge Russell should have been aware that suspending the sentences in the instant cases was prohibited. In the Kemp matter, Judge Russell suspended the remainder of a sentence originally imposed during 1976. Although the time limit imposed by § 47-7-47 does not apply to Kemp because his conviction was prior to April 14, 1977, Kemp was clearly ineligible for release pursuant to § 47-7-47. Subsection (2)(a) expressly states that defendants with prior convictions of crimes where a death sentence or life imprisonment is the maximum penalty ... or where the defendant has been confined for the conviction of a felony ... or has been convicted of a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon is not eligible for earned probation. Moreover, Kemp had been taken into custody for a parole violation involving weapons and alcohol. There was no motion by an attorney who represented Kemp and the District Attorney's Office had refused to drop the weapons charges. Yet, Judge Russell, acting solely on his own after numerous ex parte communications with others, chose to suspend the remainder of Kemp's original sentence. Although Judge Russell repeatedly testified that he felt he had an obligation to right a wrong and that he believed Kemp's constitutional rights had been violated, he simply had no legal authority to take the action that he did. Moreover, it appears that Judge Russell, in trying to protect Kemp's constitutional rights, may have violated those same due process rights when he rescinded the May 18, 1990 order and reincarcerated Kemp without notice or a hearing. In the Chester Shook matter, Judge Russell sentenced Shook to the penitentiary for two counts of possession of a controlled substance on November 12, 1993. Again, with the use of a nunc pro tunc order, Judge Russell suspended Shook's sentence following ex parte communications with Shook's daughter, Pat Hall. Judge Russell argues that he acted pursuant to § 47-7-47 [1] in suspending Shook's sentence. This statute is clear: the circuit court may act at the time of the initial sentencing only, not earlier than thirty (30) nor later than one hundred eighty (180) days after the defendant has been delivered to the custody of the Department of Corrections. Judge Russell admits that no mention of shock probation was made during the original sentencing hearing. Moreover, the original sentencing order does not indicate that Judge Russell reserved the right to judicial review or any other language which would indicate that Judge Russell acted pursuant to § 47-7-47. Judge Russell argues, citing Smith v. State, 580 So.2d 1221 (Miss. 1991) that § 47-7-47 contains awkward language. While the language contained in this statute is not the epitome of clear drafting; it is obvious that some indication must be made at the time of the original sentencing. Moreover, each of the original sentencing orders in Smith contained the language in the custody of the Miss. Dept. of Corrections under the terms and conditions of Miss. Code Ann., Sec. 47-7-47 (shock probation)... . Id. at 1222. At the time of Shook's sentencing, Judge Russell's intent was clear: Being well aware of your age and physical condition ... I think it will be a just and equitable sentence that you spend some time in the penitentiary. However, Judge Russell again utilized the nunc pro tunc method to accomplish what had not been done at the time of the original sentencing. Like the Kemp matter, no hearings were held with regard to the release of Shook, nor was Shook's attorney involved in the process. Judge Russell, after numerous phone calls from Shook's daughter and advice from Steiger (MDOC), decided to grant this aging, ill prisoner a reprieve from Parchman. However, at the time Judge Russell decided to do so, he no longer possessed the authority. In the Bonds matter, Judge Russell once again utilized a nunc pro tunc order to suspend a sentence. On January 10, 1994, Judge Russell sentenced Bonds to three years each on two counts of burglary. This time was to run consecutively to Bonds' prior sentence of seven years for burglary ordered by Judge Thomas Gardner, III. However, on April 7, 1994, Judge Russell entered a nunc pro tunc order which purported to correct the January 10, 1994 sentencing order to reflect that Judge Russell reserved judicial review for a period of 180 days. This language was not included in the original sentencing order, nor was any mention made of § 47-7-47 or possible suspension at the sentencing hearing. On that same day, Judge Russell, sua sponte, entered an Order Vacating Sentences and Placing Defendant on Probation. In this order, Judge Russell vacated both the sentence imposed by himself on January 10, 1994, as well as the sentence imposed by Judge Gardner on August 17, 1993, thus commuting those to time served and suspending the remainder. Judge Russell then placed Bonds on supervised probation for a three-year period pursuant to §§ 47-7-43; 47-7-35. Judge Russell again argues that he acted in accordance with § 47-7-47. However, there was no mention of § 47-7-47 at the time of the original sentencing nor was Bonds eligible for earned probation pursuant to § 47-7-47 due to a prior felony conviction. Also, Judge Russell suspended not only his sentence for the 1993 charges, but that imposed by Judge Gardner. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-47(2)(b) explicitly states, the authority granted in this subsection shall be exercised by the judge who imposed sentence on the defendant, or his successor. Thus, Judge Russell simply could not act under the statutory authority of § 47-7-47. Moreover, Judge Russell admits: he acted due to ex parte communications with several individuals; that no hearing was held; and that no motion by Bonds' attorney was made. Rather, the record reveals that Judge Russell instructed Bonds' former attorney to draw up the Orders and present them. The last and final matter in issue before us is the case of Robert Daniel Parham. Again, Judge Russell testified that he acted pursuant to § 47-7-47. Unlike the other cases, Judge Russell did reserve the right to judicial review in the original sentencing order and on July 19, 1994, Judge Russell, sua sponte, entered an order releasing Parham from the penitentiary. Parham was released only one month after he had been denied parole by the Parole Board. Although Judge Russell reserved the right of judicial review in the Parham case, there was no indication at the time of the original sentencing that Judge Russell acted pursuant to § 47-7-47 nor did he act within the 180-day time period required by § 47-7-47. Judge Russell suspended Parham's sentence eighteen months after Parham was sentenced and committed to the custody of MDOC. Again, Judge Russell admitted he released Parham following ex parte communications with others. However, Judge Russell argues that once he recognized his error in the Parham matter, he immediately took corrective action. Specifically, Judge Russell argues that once the Attorney General's office became involved and filed a Petition to Vacate Void Orders, he immediately rescinded the orders. A brief history of Judge Russell's conduct in the Parham matter, presented in the timeline below, reveals otherwise.