Opinion ID: 1363760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sain Burglary.

Text: Willie Joe Sain testified that on September 23, 1983, he returned home about 8:00 a.m. after working a night shift. He found that his side garage door had been pried up by a round object which he thought was probably a screwdriver. He began to testify to statements by his wife concerning cash missing from her wallet, but a hearsay objection was sustained. The Commonwealth offered no further evidence except Caminade's admissions. The Commonwealth relies upon Caminade's statements that he was in the Sain neighborhood, committing burglaries, within a range of days which included the date of the offense, and that a lake lay behind four of the houses he had entered. It is undisputed that a lake lies behind the Sain house. This proof, the Commonwealth argues, is sufficient to support the conviction. We do not agree. Caminade's statements were admissions, not confessions, because they did not furnish all facts necessary for conviction. [A] confession is generally defined as a statement admitting or acknowledging all facts necessary for conviction of the crimes at issue. An admission, on the other hand, consists of an admission or acknowledgment of a fact or facts tending to prove guilt but falling short of an admission to all essential elements of the crime. E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 144, at 362 (3d ed.1984) (footnotes omitted). It was, of course, incumbent upon the Commonwealth to prove both corpus delicti and criminal agency. Even though the admissions might furnish circumstantial evidence from which a fact finder might infer criminal agency, after corpus delicti has been established by other evidence, the admissions furnish no proof of corpus delicti in themselves. The record is devoid of evidence (1) that an entry was actually made into the Sain house, and (2) by a person having the requisite intent. Caminade's admissions could not supply these crucial elements because he simply did not know which houses he had entered. Like any other elements of a crime, each of these must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not left to speculation. Sain's testimony furnished evidence only of tool marks on a garage door. The rule in criminal cases is that the coincidence of circumstances tending to indicate guilt, however strong and numerous they may be, avails nothing unless the corpus delicti, the fact that the crime has been actually perpetrated, be first established. So long as the least doubt exists as to the act there can be no certainty as to the criminal agent. Maughs v. City of Charlottesville, 181 Va. 117, 121, 23 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1943) (quoting Poulos v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 495, 500, 6 S.E.2d 666, 667 (1940)). See also Phillips v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 207, 211, 116 S.E.2d 282, 284-85 (1960). Thus, the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Caminade's convictions of the Cox and Olson burglaries, reverse his conviction of the Sain burglary, dismiss the indictment for the Sain burglary, and enter final judgment here in all three cases. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and final judgment.