Opinion ID: 1237936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 40

Heading: Impugning Character of Defendant and of Defense Counsel

Text: While addressing the jury during opening statement, the prosecutor made this remark: You're going to be spending a good deal of time in Mr. Price's presence while he plays his `Gee willikers, golly shucks,' role and probably rarely misses a chance to hold [defense counsel] Ms. Klay's chair. But during the evidentiary portion of this case, which we will shortly embark upon, you're going to have the opportunity to meet some other people who have had contact with Mr. Price. (78) Defendant maintains that this was improper comment on defendant's nontestimonial courtroom behavior. We disagree. The prosecutor's remark did not urge the jury to draw any adverse inference from defendant's courtroom behavior. On the contrary, it advised the jury, in effect, to ignore defendant's courtroom demeanor and to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of the evidence. The comment was not improper. (79) The defense objected when the prosecutor asked Janet Myers, on direct examination, whether she had ever seen defendant mad enough to kill. The trial court sustained the objection. The prosecutor then asked if the witness had seen defendant violently mad during the time he had been staying at her house. The court again sustained a defense objection. Out of the jury's presence, the prosecutor explained that the purpose of the questions was to support the witness's credibility by showing that she was testifying against defendant despite a justifiable fear of him. The trial court remarked that the evidence might become relevant on redirect. The trial court then instructed the jury to disregard the questions. We find no misconduct and no prejudice. (80) The prosecutor asked Clifford Smith if he was personally aware of whether or not the Aryan Brotherhood membership is doing anything right now to assist the defendant Curtis Price in his defense of this case. The trial court sustained the defense objection before the witness answered. The question implied, at most, that defendant was an AB member. Given the jury's awareness of defendant's admission, by prior testimony in another case, that he was an AB member, this implication was hardly prejudicial. (81) During cross-examination of Sergeant Fredrickson, defense counsel asked about a wood chip the police had found in the search of defendant's car. Fredrickson testified that the police had found the chip in a manual for an AR-7 rifle, and that the Department of Justice laboratory had later reported that the chip did not match wood in the Hickey apartment. Defense counsel then asked: Has there been any sort of investigation of the department to see if an officer placed it there in the pamphlet? The prosecutor did not object and the witness answered in the negative. On redirect, the prosecutor prefaced his first question with this remark: [P]erhaps we can eliminate [defense counsel's] sleazy ... information right up front. The trial court sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard the implication that there had been anything sleazy. The prosecutor's remark was plainly improper, but this was an isolated incident in a very long trial and we are persuaded that the trial court's prompt and vigorous admonition was effective to cure any prejudice. (82) Jim Robison, a police officer for the City of Arcata, testified that he was dispatched to the Triplex Theater to investigate a report of a suspicious person. When the prosecutor began to question the officer about the description of this person that appeared on a dispatch card, defense counsel stated in the jury's presence that he had never received a copy of the card and asked to approach the bench. At the bench, defense counsel represented that he had asked for the card during discovery and had been told it was lost or destroyed. The prosecutor responded: Tell them you got it ... don't lie to him anymore. If he says he hasn't had it, that's a fucking lie. The trial court immediately excused the jury and informed counsel that any further outbursts of the sort would result in contempt citations. The prosecutor apologized to both the court and defense counsel, admitting that his conduct had been inexcusable. The court admonished the jurors that if any of them had overheard the remark counsel had made at the bench, they were to disregard it. The court said it had explained to counsel that such comments were not acceptable and noted that it might have been attributable to the cumulative stresses of the trial which, including jury selection, had then continued for seven and three-quarters months. The prosecutor later explained that his records showed that the defense had received discovery of the dispatch card. Out of the jury's presence, prosecution investigator Barry Brown testified that he had given a copy of the dispatch card to defense counsel. The court apparently found this testimony credible, but it nonetheless excluded as cumulative all evidence relating to the dispatch card. As the prosecutor conceded, his remarks at the bench were inexcusable misconduct. We are unable to conclude, however, that defendant suffered prejudice. Assuming that the jury was able to overhear the prosecutor's remark, the trial court's prompt and forceful response was sufficient to prevent any reasonable juror from being influenced by the remark in a manner adverse to defendant or his trial counsel. The evidence that prompted the dispute was excluded, and there were no further incidents of this kind. (83) While questioning defendant's mother on redirect, the prosecutor asked whether defendant had returned to live with her because defendant's brother and his wife, with whom defendant had been living, threw him out of their house. The trial court sustained a defense objection on the ground that the question exceeded the scope of cross-examination. Defendant contends that the question constituted misconduct because it had no legitimate purpose and tended to impugn his character. We disagree. Defendant's brother testified that defendant had been living with him but had left following a disagreement. The brother said he later gave defendant, as a peace offering, a radio he had purchased. The prosecution disputed this testimony, arguing that the radio found among defendant's possessions had not been purchased by defendant's brother, but instead had been taken from the Hickey apartment. In support of this position, the prosecution argued that it was improbable that defendant's brother would have given defendant an expensive present soon after a serious disagreement. Therefore, defendant's relationship with his brother was a legitimate subject of inquiry. (84) Witnesses to the Triplex robbery used a device called an IdentiKit to prepare composites of the robber's facial features. The original composites were disassembled after being photocopied, but the copies were apparently unsatisfactory. The prosecution called Ronald Waters, a police officer for the City of Eureka, to testify to the manner in which he had recreated the composites. The defense objected on relevance grounds, noting that Waters had not prepared the original composites. The prosecutor explained that the witness redid the composites, and he added that defense counsel had already introduced two of those in evidence. After a hearing out of the jury's presence, the court ruled the evidence admissible. In the jury's presence, the prosecutor asked the witness if he was aware that the only composites that [defense counsel] didn't want the jury to see were those by [names of three of the Triplex robbery witnesses]. Defense counsel did not object or request an admonition. Defendant contends on appeal that the question was improper because it implied that defense counsel was attempting to conceal evidence from the jury. We conclude that the point is not preserved for review. Had defense counsel objected and requested an admonition, the court could have averted any possible prejudice by instructing the jury that defense counsel had raised a routine trial objection addressed to the reliability of the evidence, and that it was not to draw any adverse inference from the making of such objections.