Opinion ID: 2365387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Inflammatory Testimony

Text: At defendant's first penalty-phase trial, defendant made a motion in limine in respect of the testimony of Detective Richard Norcross and Officer Joseph Downs. The court limited the scope of Norcross's testimony to his observations of McLaughlin's shooting, how many times and where he was shot, defendant's actions in pursuing him down the steps and shooting at him, and Investigator McLaughlin's attempt to escape on his elbows. The court excluded Detective Norcross' testimony regarding Norcross' collapse and officers coming to his aid, his treatment at the hospital, the number and nature of his gunshot wounds, and his forced retirement. In respect of Officer Downs' testimony, the court permitted him to discuss his activities outside the Nelson residence, his observation of Norcross leaving the residence, Norcross' apparent injuries, that Norcross sought cover, that defendant fired shots during the entire time, and that Norcross was picked up by another patrol car and taken away from the scene. Defendant now argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony and in failing to give a curative instruction. In general, a trial court is afforded considerable latitude regarding the admission of evidence, and is to be reversed only if the court abused its discretion. Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 82, 716 A. 2d 395. In a capital sentencing trial, admissible evidence includes that evidence relating to the aggravating and mitigating factors at issue. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 71, 524 A. 2d 130. In assessing the probative value and the risk of undue prejudice under N.J.R.E. 403, the trial court has discretion to make appropriate determinations and will be reversed only if the trial court's ruling `was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.'  State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147, 784 A. 2d 1244 (2001) (quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484, 691 A. 2d 293 (1997)) (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 216, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984)). Here, defense counsel objected to one portion of the aforementioned testimony but did not object to the remainder. Counsel's only objection came after Officer Sack was asked if he knew that he was endangering himself when he looked out from behind cover. However, because the trial court sustained the objection, defendant may not now assert that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the remaining testimony. Defendant also claims that the court erred in failing to give a curative instruction after Officer Sack acknowledged that he was putting himself in danger. Because defendant did not request a curative instruction, the lack of instruction is error only if it constitutes plain error, that is, error producing an unjust result. State v. Mays, 321 N.J.Super. 619, 633, 729 A. 2d 1074 (App.Div.1999). When evaluating whether the failure to give an instruction was error, a reviewing court owe[s] some degree of deference to counsel's strategic or tactical decisions[.] Ibid. Based on that reasoning, and in light of the fact that the jury would not be surprised that Officer Sack believed it was dangerous to come out from behind cover, the lack of a curative instruction regarding his testimony is not capable of producing an unjust result. See R. 2:10-2. Defendant also did not object to any of the other allegedly inflammatory testimony. Thus, we analyze the admission of the testimony under the plain error standard. Defendant's lack of objections, particularly when considered in light of the careful attention paid to potential testimony during the motion in limine colloquy, weighs against defendant's claim that errors were clear or obvious. Indeed, [i]t [is] fair to infer from the failure to object below that in the context of the trial the error was actually of no moment. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 333, 273 A. 2d 1 (1971). We therefore conclude that none of the testimony about which defendant complains was sufficient to divert the jury's attention from its responsibility as described by the trial court's instruction to not consider anything else as leaning in favor of the death sentence other than the aggravating factor I've just described and then only proven beyond a reasonable doubt.