Opinion ID: 2518296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: part iii. discussion.

Text: ¶ 11 The question of whether disability should be attributed to an initial accident or a second depends on whether the second injury is merely a recurrence of an initial injury or, instead, the result of an independent and intervening cause. See Chromalloy-Am., Okla. Div. v. Wright, 1977 OK 93, 567 P.2d 71, 72-73. A [s]ubsequent incident or accident aggravating [an] original injury may be of such nature and occur under such circumstances as to make [the] original injury [the] responsible cause. Patterson Steel Co. v. Stevens, 1965 OK 184, 408 P.2d 782, 782 (First Syllabus by the Court). Where there have been two accidents to an employee, the question of whether the disability sustained by him should be attributed to the first accident or to the second accident depends on whether or not the disability sustained was caused by a recurrence of the original injury or by an independent intervening cause. New York Indemnity Co. v. Miller, 1933 OK 303, 163 Okla. 283, 22 P.2d 107, 108 (Seventh Syllabus by the Court). Of course, the question as to the responsibility for medical care, i.e., whether the necessity therefore may be attributed to an initial work-related accident or a second non-work-related accident or event, is controlled by the same test(s) or standard(s) related in the above three cases. ¶ 12 Further, [t]he cause and extent of the disability resulting from an accidental injury is a question of fact, and where the evidence is in conflict and there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support the finding of the State Industrial Commission [predecessor to the WCChereafter referred to as WCC], an order or award based thereon will not be disturbed on review. Griffith v. Viersen Oil and Gas Co., 1956 OK 278, 302 P.2d 969, 969 (Syllabus by the Court). Thus, when there is conflicting competent evidence as to the factual causation issue supportive of a decision in favor of either the employer or the claimant, and no issue is raised upon review other than that the record does not contain competent evidence supporting the decision of the WCC tribunal, an appellate court must sustain the WCC decision when there is, indeed, competent evidence supporting its decision, regardless of whether that decision is in favor of the employer or the claimant. ¶ 13 It was also stated in Carey Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Carey, 1961 OK 278, 368 P.2d 493, 495, quoting from Tippett & Bond v. Moore, 1934 OK 220, 167 Okla. 636, 31 P.2d 583, 583 (First Syllabus by the Court): Where a claimant is asserted to have suffered two different accidental personal injuries... the question of whether either one or both of such injuries is responsible for the resulting disability is one of fact to be determined by the [WCC]. The finding of that body on such a question will not be disturbed in this court if supported by any competent evidence. [6] The instant case, after a searching analysis of the trial record, in our view, is a classic example of one involving a factual dispute over whether the subsequent event at claimant's home caused merely a recurrence of the initial work-related injury to his low back, or, instead, whether the home event constituted an intervening cause, so that the causal nexus to the original work accident could be considered broken. ¶ 14 As we have set forth in PART II, FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY, the medical evidence presented was in direct conflict as to the causation issue, notwithstanding the COCA majority's mistaken view that it was not. Simply stated, the majority misinterpreted the trial record when it indicated there was no conflict in the evidence pertaining to the salient facts determinative of this review proceeding. Thus, unless there is some other legal issue raised by petitioners (employer and its workers' compensation insurer) that would call for vacation of the three-judge panel's order, we must sustain the panel's decision, not second-guess it as to pertinent factual determinations. As an appellate court, we may not substitute our view of the evidence for that of the WCC as to how to resolve a factual conflict like that involved here as to the causation issue. We also conclude petitioners have shown no legal flaw in the three-judge panel's order. [7] ¶ 15 Contrary to the seeming view of the COCA's majority and petitioners, the reasonableness of a claimant's acts or omissions in relation to a home or non-work event that occurs subsequent to a work-related injury-causing accident, may be a relevant or a pertinent factor as to the causation question. In Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. State Indus. Comm'n, 1936 OK 35, 176 Okla. 84, 54 P.2d 348, a worker while in the employ of a certain company in 1929 sustained an accidental personal injury through oil and gas exposure poisoning to his hands which manifested itself in acute Eczema on both hands. Id. at 348. The injury caused was termed an allergic or susceptible condition whereby his hands were thereafter permanently sensitive to oil and grease. Id. at 348-349. The worker was awarded temporary total disability for a time and by virtue of a stipulated agreement of the parties, approved by the WCC, was paid a lump sum for permanent partial disability. Id. Several years later, in 1935, while working on a farm in Kansas performing the task of repairing an automobile, the worker placed his hands in oil and grease and as a result thereof had another acute Eczema attack on both hands and again became disabled for the performance of any work. Id. The worker instituted proceedings before the WCC and, in effect, attempted to hold the employer he worked for in 1929 responsible for the 1935 incident. This Court vacated the WCC award in the worker's favor and in so doing stated the following: And this [C]ourt has held that where an employee has been awarded compensation under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and has suffered an aggravation or recurrence of injury through inadvertence or accident under such circumstances as to make the original injury the responsible cause, that further compensation may be awarded properly. However, this is not the situation that was presented to the [WCC] and which is now presented to us. . . . The record further discloses that the [worker] was aware of this condition at the time he exposed himself to oil and grease on March 25, 1935, and that such exposure was not accidental or inadvertent, but was the result of a deliberate act on [his] part . . . and with full knowledge of the probable consequences. To say that under these circumstances the [WCC] is authorized under the law to charge the result back to the original injury and to award the [worker] further compensation therefor is in effect to say that a man may profit by his own wrong. That this is not permissible is so fundamental as to require no citation of authorities in support hereof. Since the [worker] had sustained a permanent partial disability as the result of his sensitivity to oil and grease exposure, it was incumbent upon him to refrain from any conscious or deliberate act which would probably result in recurrence of his former disability; and since the evidence clearly discloses that the [worker] did not take any precautions for his own safety, but with full knowledge of his condition and in disregard of his own safety deliberately invited the very thing that happened, we are of the opinion that the present injury was the direct and proximate result of the [worker's] own act, and that therefore there was no competent evidence before the [WCC] upon which to base its finding in making the instant award. Id. at 350. (citations omitted). ¶ 16 In Patterson Steel Co. v. Stevens, 1965 OK 184, 408 P.2d 782, 784-785, citing and quoting from Deep Rock Oil Corp. v. Betchan, 1934 OK 406, 169 Okla. 42, 35 P.2d 905, 907-908, is contained the following: The instant case is analogous to the circumstances disclosed in Deep Rock Oil Corp. v. Betchan . . . wherein we considered the question of whether the cause of an employee's second injury was from slipping while engaged in the course of his employment, or from cranking his Model A Ford automobile. Therein we said:    Not every incident (referring to the cranking of his automobile) following an injury which physically aggravates it can be treated as a responsible intervening agency.          It seems that a law designed to compensate workmen for loss of earning capacity from industrial accidents must have been intended to extend its shield at least to aggravations affecting the course of the injury during convalescence when such are produced by not unnatural events and involve no omission or breach of duty. We therefore think the [WCC] (is) sustained by the record in disregarding the automobile incident (cranking) as a responsible cause. In the instant matter, competent evidence was presented at the trial before the WCC trial judge to show that claimant was adhering to his doctor-ordered forty (40) pound weight restriction when he reasonably picked up his twenty (20) pound daughter to suction her trachea. There was also plainly competent evidence presented at the trial supportive of a finding that the incident involving his daughter caused only a recurrence of the original work-related injury at the L4-5 level and that the recurrence was the result of mere inadvertence and accident on his part. ¶ 17 Thus, although the reasonableness of a home or non-work event is not always determinative of the causation issue, depending on the facts existent it may be a pertinent factor impacting the issue in certain circumstances. If the event is found by the WCC to be merely inadvertent and accidental and the injury suffered to be only a recurrence of an original work-related injury, the chain of causation or causal nexus will properly still be linked to that original work-related injury. However, if a recurrence of the former work-related injury is brought about by the deliberate, conscious act of the injured person, as in the Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. situation, it would be improper to attribute the recurrence back to the original work-related event.