Opinion ID: 2447513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lively's status

Text: Lively first argues there were material questions of fact as to whether she was an invitee and it was reversible error for the Trial Court to determine she was a licensee as a matter of law. The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact is upon the summary judgment movant, and all proof submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. Any doubt and all inferences must be resolved against the moving party. Carmichael v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 305 Ark. 549, 810 S.W.2d 39 (1991). We have defined invitee as one induced to come onto property for the business benefit of the possessor. Kay v. Kay, 306 Ark. 322, 812 S.W.2d 685 (1991); Coleman v. United Fence Co., 282 Ark. 344, 668 S.W.2d 536 (1984). A licensee is one who goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the owner for one's own purposes and not for the mutual benefit of onesell and the owner, lucker v. Sullivan, 307 Ark. 440, 821 S.W.2d 470 (1991). In Tucker v. Sullivan, supra, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (1965), we recognized an invitee may either be a public invitee or a business visitor. A public invitee is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public. A business visitor is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with the business dealings of the possessor of the land. Lively contended that allowing employees to use the facilities free of charge as a fringe benefit better enabled Libbey Memorial to attract prospective employees and retain them. We cannot agree that there were no material questions of fact presented as to whether Libbey Memorial obtained a potential business benefit from Lively's use of the whirlpool baths. Libbey Memorial argues St. Louis I.M. & S Co. v. Pyles, 114 Ark. 218, 169 S.W. 799 (1914), is directly on point and requires an affirmance of the Trial Court's decision that Lively was a licensee. Pyles was an employee of the defendant railroad company. His duties included traveling with supply cars and distributing oil. On a Saturday night, Pyles had traveled from El Dorado to Gurdon and was en route to Argenta the next day. Pyles obtained permission from his foreman to leave the cars at Gurdon and travel to Argenta on Saturday night instead of waiting for the cars to be transported on Sunday. The railroad company had furnished Pyles a pass allowing him to ride on all trains. As Pyles was running down a path located between the main track and a sidetrack in an attempt to board a train bound for Little Rock, he stumbled on a pile of coal and fell under a slowly moving freight train. Pyles sued the railroad company for negligence in allowing the pile of coal to remain on the path. In finding Pyles to be a mere licensee when using the path, we stated, There is not the slightest evidence to indicate that the pathway was used in a way that an invitation can be implied on the part ot the railway company to the public or its employees to use it. The use was, at the most, merely permissive, and those who used it were licensees, who took the privilege with its concomitant peril. Lively offered to prove her use of the whirlpool facility as a fringe benefit was more than merely permissive. A factual issue thus remained in that respect.