Opinion ID: 1461769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Wicomico County Code

Text: The sections of Article VI of the Wicomico County Code authorizing the Board to grant variances and noting the criteria to be considered in determining whether to grant or deny variance requests in the Buffer state:  § 125-35. Authorization. The Wicomico County Board of Zoning Appeals is hereby empowered to grant variances to the provisions of this chapter where, owing to special features of a site or other circumstances, a literal enforcement of provisions would result in unwarranted hardship.  § 125-36. Bases for grants. The Board of Zoning Appeals shall examine all facts of the case and render a decision. Variance requests in the Critical Area District shall not be granted unless the decision is based on the following criteria: A. That special conditions or circumstances exist that are unique to the subject property or structure and that a strict enforcement of the provisions of this chapter would result in unwarranted hardship which is not generally shared by owners of property in the same land use management areas ... of the Critical Area District. B. That strict enforcement of the provisions within the Critical Area District would deprive the property owner of rights commonly shared by other owners of property in the same management area within the Critical Area District. C. That the granting of a variance will not confer upon an applicant any special privilege that would be denied to other owners of like property and/or structures within the Critical Area District. D. That the variance request is not based upon conditions or circumstances which are self-created or self-imposed, nor does the request arise from conditions or circumstances either permitted or nonconforming which are related to adjacent parcels. E. That the granting of the variance will not adversely affect water quality or adversely impact fish, wildlife or plant habitat within the Critical Area District, and that the granting of the variance will be consistent with the spirit and intent of the critical area program and associated chapters. F. That greater profitability or lack of knowledge of the restrictions shall not be considered as sufficient cause for a variance. G. That the proposed variance is consistent with the Wicomico County Comprehensive Plan and Chapter 225, Zoning. County Code, §§ 125-35 and 125-36 (emphasis added). The County Code continues by placing certain conditions on the granting of a variance in § 125-38:  § 125-38. Conditions.... A variance will not be granted by the Board of Zoning Appeals unless and until: A. A completed application form for a variance is submitted which demonstrates the applicability of the above criteria. In addition, requests for variance in the Critical Area District shall not be heard unless the State's Critical Area Commission has received a copy of the variance application at least two weeks prior to the scheduled public hearing. B. The Board of Zoning Appeals shall find that the reasons set forth in the application justify the granting of the variance and that the variance is the minimum variance that will make possible the reasonable use of land, building or structures. In making this determination for variance requests in the Critical Area District, the Board of Zoning Appeals shall consider the following guidelines: (1) That the granting of a variance results in new structures or impervious surfaces being located as far back from mean high water, tidal wetlands or tributary streams in the critical area as is feasible. (2) That the applicant takes steps to mitigate impacts, insofar as possible, including: (a) Reforestation on the site to offset disturbed forested or developed woodlands on at least an equal-area basis. (b) Afforestation of areas of the site so that at least 15% of the gross site is forested. (c) Implementation of any mitigation measures which relate to habitat protection areas, as delineated in the Wicomico County Critical Area Program, recommended by state and/or County agencies are included as conditions of approval. (3) The Board of Zoning Appeals shall further find that the granting of the variance will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this chapter, shall not result in a use not permitted in the zone in which the property subject to variance is located and will not be injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. (4) For variances in the Critical Area District, the Board of Zoning Appeals shall find that the granting of the variance will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of this chapter and the Wicomico County Critical Area Program, shall not result in a use not permitted in the management area ... or an increase in the number of permitted dwelling units (i.e., density limits) in which the property subject to the variance is located and will not be injurious to the neighborhood or otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. (5) In addition, and to the extent possible based on best available information, all property owners immediately contiguous to the application shall be notified by certified mail and furnished a copy of said application. (6) In granting the variance, the Board of Zoning Appeals may prescribe such conditions and safeguards as it deems appropriate which comply with the intent of this chapter and the Wicomico County Critical Area Program. Violations of such conditions and safeguards, when made part of the terms under which the variance is granted, shall be deemed a violation of this chapter and punishable under Article IX. Section 125-35 of the County Code empowers the Board to grant variances to the provisions of Chapter 125 where an applicant, because of special features of a site or other circumstances, a literal enforcement of provisions would result in unwarranted hardship. As a result, the ultimate inquiry is whether applicants, like petitioner, suffer an unwarranted hardship because of special features of their property. This Court has recently interpreted the unwarranted hardship standard, as used by the County Code, as the equivalent of the general unnecessary hardship standard used in zoning variance law. See White, 356 Md. at 46 n. 12, 736 A.2d at 1081 n. 12; Belvoir Farms Homeowners Association, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 275-76, 734 A.2d 227, 236-37 (1999). In Belvoir Farms, we ultimately held that the unwarranted hardship standard was akin to the denial of a reasonable and significant use of the property, when we said: We reject the proposition that the unnecessary or unwarranted hardship standard is equal to an unconstitutional taking standard. If this were true, it would be a superfluous standard because the constitutional standard exists independent of variance standards. We generally avoid a construction of statutory language that would render the statute unnecessary, meaningless, or redundant. See Hyle v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 348 Md. 143, 149, 702 A.2d 760, 763 (1997); Board of County Comm'rs v. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, 346 Md. 160, 178, 695 A.2d 171, 180 (1997). We hold, therefore, that the unnecessary or unwarranted hardship standard, or similar standards, are less restrictive than the unconstitutional taking standard. The unwarranted hardship standard, and its similar manifestations, are equivalent to the denial of reasonable and significant use of the property. Whether a property owner has been denied reasonable and significant use of his property is a question of fact best addressed by the expertise of the Board of Appeals, not the courts. Thus, we leave the application of this standard to petitioner's variance application to the Board on remand. Belvoir Farms, 355 Md. at 282, 734 A.2d at 240 (emphasis added). In determining whether such an unwarranted hardship exists, i.e., whether the applicant's intended use is a reasonable and significant use, the Wicomico County Zoning Board must apply the criteria enumerated in § 125-36 of the County Code to the variance request before it. We have recently held, in White, that these criteria must be applied in total and generally, and that no individual factor is to be determinative. We further explained the application of the unwarranted hardship standard, when we said: [T]he essential determination is whether an unwarranted hardship exists. [15] The specific factors that must be considered cannot be construed individually to overrule a finding of unwarranted hardship any more than they could overrule a finding of an unconstitutional taking of one's property. The individual provisions that must be considered are part of the entire matrix that defines what information is necessary to reach a finding as to the existence or nonexistence of an unwarranted hardship. White, 356 Md. at 50-51, 736 A.2d at 1083 (alteration added). We further explained the application of the unwarranted hardship standard in Mastandrea, 361 Md. 107, 760 A.2d 677 (2000). In Mastandrea, the Mastandreas applied for a variance for pathways they had built within the Critical Area Buffer located on their property for the purpose of allowing their disabled, wheelchair-bound daughter to access the waterfront of the property. We held that strict adherence to the code would constitute an unwarranted hardship for the Mastandreas, as their property's subjection to other reasonable uses did not preclude the requested variance because the proposed variance's use was also a reasonable use in light of the special conditions of the land and circumstances of the daughter's disability. We stated: The Commission also argued that, `at most,' the denial of the variance would cause the Mastandreas an `inconvenience,' not an unwarranted hardship, because relocating the lateral pathways outside of the buffer area would not prevent a reasonable and significant use of the `entire' property. In White v. North , we were asked whether the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals properly granted the Whites a variance to construct a swimming pool in their backyard which, because of its slope, was within the extended Critical Area buffer provided for by the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area regulations. After an extensive review of the Chesapeake Critical Area Program, we focused on Anne Arundel County Code Article 3, § 2-107, which governs the issuance of a Critical Area variance and which lists a series of factors, similar to the ones in the present case, which an applicant must persuade the Board are satisfied. We initially explained that the first factor, whether `strict implementation of the County's Critical Area program would result in an unwarranted hardship,' was the determining consideration. We concluded that the other factors provided guidance for the unwarranted hardship analysis, and resolved that the question was not whether the Whites' variance request met every factor in Anne Arundel County Code § 2-107, but whether the information derived from all of those factors amounted to an unwarranted hardship. Moreover, we added that forcing compliance with every individual factor might have unconstitutional taking implications. When discussing the unwarranted hardship standard in White, we relied on our previous analysis of a similar issue in Belvoir Farms v. North, 355 Md. 259, 734 A.2d 227 (1999). There, we defined `unwarranted hardship' as `a denial of reasonable and significant use' of the land. In explaining this standard, we made clear that unwarranted hardship is a lesser standard than that required to prove an unconstitutional taking. Moreover, we determined that `[w]hether a property owner has been denied reasonable and significant use of his property is a question of fact best addressed by the expertise of the Board of Appeals, not the courts.'  The Board in this case, therefore, did not have to consider whether denying the variance would have denied the Mastandreas a reasonable and significant use of the `entire' lot. Rather, the Board was required to (and did) consider whether the property owners, in light of their daughter's disability, would be denied a reasonable and significant use of the waterfront of their property without the access that the path provided. There is substantial evidence in the record establishing that, without the path, a person in a wheelchair could not enjoy the waterfront portion of the property. Evidence before the Board indicated that the soil composition of the Mastandreas' property near the shoreline, `one of the heaviest clay soils' their expert `had ever tested,' does not allow handicap access to the waterfront. The record indicates that the Commission neither offered any evidence to the contrary nor questioned the Mastandreas' expert witness on this point when he testified before the Board. The Commission did not offer such evidence apparently because it did not conduct any site-specific studies or project a quantifiable adverse impact of the path on the Critical Area buffer or Glebe Creek. In other words, there is no evidentiary refutation by the Commission on the record that would support its argument that the Mastandreas' property is not unique or `in any way different from other properties in the neighborhood or in the Talbot County Critical Area.' The record evidence supports the Mastandreas' assertion, and substantiates the Board's finding, that there was a special condition or circumstance unique to the lot. The record also supports the Board's finding that, without the pathway in question, Leah would not be able to access reasonably the rear yard, view wildlife along the water's edge, or participate in shoreline-oriented activities. Mastandrea, 361 Md. at 134-37, 760 A.2d at 691-93 (citations omitted)(footnotes omitted)(emphasis added). In consideration of these standards, the Board in the case sub judice must use the criteria within § 125-36 of the County Code to determine the ultimate question of whether strict enforcement of § 125 would deny petitioner a reasonable and significant use of his land. In doing so, it is clear that the Board should apply a standard that does not look to whether petitioner would be denied all reasonable uses of his entire property, but rather a standard that should determine if petitioner's proposed use is a reasonable and significant one in consideration of all of the § 125-36 factors. As we shall discuss, although the Board purported to act otherwise, it essentially applied the incorrect unconstitutional takings standard.