Opinion ID: 2509027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue 3: Did the district court err by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense?

Text: Horn was charged with first-degree premeditated murder. The jury was instructed on this charge and on second-degree murder. Horn argues that the jury should also have been instructed on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, and that the district court erred in refusing his request. A trial court must instruct the jury as to lesser included crimes [i]n cases where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime as provided in subsection (2) of K.S.A. 21-3107 and amendments thereto. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3414(3). It is well settled that voluntary manslaughter, like second-degree murder, is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. State v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. 104, 109, 865 P.2d 1021 (1993). The evidence of a lesser included offense need not be strong or extensive as long as it presents circumstances from which the lesser offense might reasonably be inferred. State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. 791, 795, 696 P.2d 381 (1985). Such an instruction must be given even though the evidence is weak and inconclusive and consists solely of the testimony of the defendant. State v. Follin, 263 Kan. 28, 33, 947 P.2d 8 (1997). However, the duty to so instruct arises only where there is evidence supporting the lesser crime. State v. Shannon, 258 Kan. 425, 427, 905 P.2d 649 (1995). State v. Spry, 266 Kan. 523, 528, 973 P.2d 783 (1999). On review, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. at 109. K.S.A. 21-3403 sets forth the elements of voluntary manslaughter: Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of a human being committed: (a) Upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion; or (b) upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justified deadly force under K.S.A. 21-3211, 21-3212 or 21-3213 and amendments thereto. Voluntary manslaughter is a severity level 3, person felony. Some basic principles on this issue were set forth by this court in State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. at 796-97: (1) Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing in the heat of passion as a result of severe provocation. . . . (2) `Heat of passion' means any intense or vehement emotional excitement of the kind prompting violent and aggressive action, such as rage, anger, hatred, furious resentment, fright, or terror. Such emotional state of mind must be of such a degree as would cause an ordinary man to act on impulse without reflection. [Citations omitted.] (3) In order to reduce a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter, there must be provocation, and such provocation must be recognized by the law as adequate. A provocation is adequate if it is calculated to deprive a reasonable man of self-control and to cause him to act out of passion rather than reason. 2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 155. In order for a defendant to be entitled to a reduced charge because he acted in the heat of passion, his emotional state of mind must exist at the time of the act and it must have arisen from circumstances constituting sufficient provocation. [Citations omitted.] (4) The test of the sufficiency of the provocation is objective, not subjective. The provocation, whether it be `sudden quarrel' or some other form of provocation, must be sufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose control of his actions and his reason. [Citations omitted.] In applying the objective standard for measuring the sufficiency of the provocation, the standard precludes consideration of the innate peculiarities of the individual defendant. The fact that his intelligence is not high and his passion is easily aroused will not be considered in this connection. State v. Jackson, 226 Kan. [302,] 307 [, 597 P.2d 255 (1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 952 (1980)]. (5) Mere words or gestures, however insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation, but insulting words when accompanied by other conduct, such as assault, may be considered. 2 Wharton's Criminal Law § 156. In State v. Buffington, 71 Kan. 804, 81 Pac. 465 (1905), it was held that the trial court properly instructed the jury that no words, however abusive and insulting, will justify an assault or will justify a sufficient provocation to reduce to manslaughter what otherwise would be murder. See also State v. Hardisty, 121 Kan. 576, 249 Pac. 617 (1926). With these standards in mind, we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence of an adequate provocation to instruct on voluntary manslaughter. Horn argues sufficient evidence is present based upon two sources: (1) the testimony of Krystal Kern and (2) testimony that Weaver had previously complained about Horn's drinking. The State points to a possible third source: the testimony of Deputy Alexander. We agree that all should be considered when we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. at 109. Krystal Kern testified that as she left for work around noon on Friday, May 17, she saw Weaver standing inside Weaver's house staring through the screen door and waved to Weaver, but Weaver did not acknowledge her. Kern then heard a man's loud, angry voice coming from Weaver's house, but did not see Weaver react in any way. Horn couples Kern's testimony with his testimony regarding the discordant relationship he had had with Weaver concerning his drinking to conclude he may have been provoked on the day of her death. However, Horn's argument that Kern's observation evidences provocation is virtually eliminated by the testimony of Greg Fisher, who saw Weaver with her head out of the front door approximately 5 hours later. With the passing of time after provocation, passion cools and gives way to reason and mastery over one's passion. An act of violence separated from the provocation by sufficient cooling time is the product of malice and cold calculation rather than heat of passion. State v. Follin, 263 Kan. at 38; see State v. Spry, 266 Kan. at 528-29. Moreover, mere words or gestures, however insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation. State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. at 797. Additionally, beyond the Kern testimony, Horn points to no evidence even suggesting that the discordant relationship somehow resulted in a provocation which caused her death. His major problem is that he simply has no recollection of killing Weaver. Furthermore, any suggestion that the killing was in the heat of passion is virtually eliminated by the coroner's testimony indicating that after someone struck Weaver repeatedly with the carpenter's level, someone then methodically began to saw her head off  while she was alive  for at least 30 minutes. Finally, while the State raises the possibility of Deputy Alexander's testimony as providing the basis for Horn's provocation, we agree with the State that it is insufficient. According to Alexander, Horn was screaming that Weaver was bitching at him, he got mad and twisted her neck, then took a saw and started cutting her head off. Mere words or gestures by Weaver, however insulting, do not constitute adequate provocation. See State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. at 797. Horn's vague evidence simply does not meet the provocation threshold  that which is calculated to deprive a reasonable man of self-control and to cause him to act out of passion rather than reason  to warrant the voluntary manslaughter instruction. Finally, we observe that even if the instruction should have been given, the error does not warrant reversal. Since the instruction had been requested, denied, and objection made, our standard is as follows: `When reviewing challenges to jury instructions, we are required to consider all the instructions together, read as a whole, and not to isolate any one instruction. If the instructions properly and fairly state the law as applied to the facts of the case, and a jury could not reasonably have been misled by them, the instructions do not constitute reversible error even if they are in some way erroneous.' State v. Peterson, 273 Kan. 217, 221, 42 P.3d 137 (2002) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 269 Kan. 349, 355, 7 P.3d 1135 [2000]) In this case, the jury was instructed on both first-degree premeditated murder and second-degree murder, a lesser included offense. Instruction No. 5 provided: If you do not agree that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, you should then consider the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 1. That the defendant intentionally killed Tina A. Weaver; and 2. That this act occurred on or about the 17th day of May, 2002, to the 18th day of May, 2002, in Sedgwick County, Kansas. (Emphasis added.) The jury is presumed to follow the instructions. State v. Kunellis, 276 Kan. 461, 484, 78 P.3d 776 (2003). Here, the jury convicted Horn of first-degree premeditated murder, and did not descend to the lesser included charge of second-degree murder. As the district court pointed out at sentencing about the failure to give the jury instructions on yet another lesser included charge: In order to reach voluntary manslaughter, according to the instructions, the jury would have at least had to have reached second-degree murder, which they didn't in this case. So, really, the issue is moot because even if the Court had given voluntary manslaughter, the jury in this case apparently would have never reached it. While we disagree that the issue became moot, neither did it constitute reversible error. See State v. Metcalf, 203 Kan. 63, 67, 452 P.2d 842 (1969) (rule has been well established that when a defendant has been charged with and convicted of murder in the first degree, the correctness of instructions relating to manslaughter becomes immaterial). Accord, State v. Spencer, 186 Kan. 298, 303-04, 349 P.2d 920 (1960); Ross v. State, 482 A.2d 727, 736 (Del. 1984) (substantial body of law in other jurisdictions that a finding of guilt to a greater offense renders harmless any error in instructions on lesser included offenses). The case of Easter v. State, 306 Ark. 615, 816 S.W.2d 602 (1991), is directly on point. There, the defendant argued that it was reversible error for the trial court to decline to instruct on the lesser included offense of manslaughter, when it had instructed on first- and second-degree murder. As the Arkansas Supreme Court held: When a lesser included offense has been the subject of an instruction, and the jury convicts of the greater offense, error resulting from failure to give an instruction on another still lesser included offense is cured. [Citations omitted.] This is commonly referred to as `the skip rule.' 306 Ark. at 620.