Opinion ID: 202431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Berhe's Arguments

Text: 31
32 Berhe argues that, even applying the hypothetical federal felony approach, his 2003 state drug possession conviction is not a felony under federal law because the 1996 conviction was neither charged nor proven during the 2003 proceeding. He notes that under federal and Massachusetts law, a defendant must be charged with a prior conviction before the government can seek a recidivism-based sentencing enhancement. See 21 U.S.C. § 851; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 11A; see also Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 42, 44 (1st Cir.1999) (holding that federal courts lack[ ] authority to impose the statutory enhancement where the government has not complied with the strictly enforced § 851 charging procedures). Berhe acknowledges that both the state and the federal government (had it brought charges against him) could have sought a recidivism-based sentence enhancement which, if successful, would have resulted in a felony conviction under federal law. But, because he was not so charged, and instead pleaded guilty only to simple possession of a controlled substance (which is only a misdemeanor under federal law because it is punishable by no more than one year in prison, see 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)), the government failed to establish that he was convicted of a hypothetical federal felony. 33 We agree. Because Berhe's 1996 conviction is not a part of the record of the 2003 conviction, the government did not establish that Berhe was convicted of a hypothetical federal felony. As recently articulated, this circuit applies a modified categorical approach for determining whether an alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony. Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 55-56 (1st Cir.2006). Under this approach, the government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence derived solely from the record of the prior proceeding, that (i) the alien was convicted of a crime and (ii) that crime involved every element of one of the offenses enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Id. at 56. When the statute on which the underlying conviction rests necessarily involves all of the elements enumerated in one of the INA's definitions of aggravated felony, proof of the fact of conviction suffices to discharge the government's burden. Id. Where, however, the underlying statute sweeps more broadly (i.e., encompasses crimes that are not necessarily aggravated felonies under the INA), the government ... must demonstrate, by reference only to facts that can be mined from the record of conviction, that the putative predicate offense constitutes a crime designated as an aggravated felony in the INA. Id. (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); In re Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I & N Dec. 330, 335-36, 1996 WL 230227 (BIA 1996)). 6 34 As noted above, the underlying state statute here encompasses crimes that ordinarily would not constitute felonies under either state or federal law. Compare Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 34, with 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (both setting a maximum term of imprisonment of one year for knowingly or intentionally ... possess[ing] a controlled substance). Therefore, we must look to the record of conviction of the alleged aggravated felony to determine whether the government met its burden of proving that Berhe had a prior conviction for a drug offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (noting that if an offense for simple possession is committed after a prior conviction for a drug offense has become final, the maximum penalty increases to two years' imprisonment). The record of Berhe's 2003 conviction in state district court—the criminal complaint alleging misdemeanor possession of crack cocaine and the official criminal docket indicating Berhe's plea of guilty to that charge—contains no reference to Berhe's 1996 conviction. Both the criminal complaint and the docket clearly indicate that Berhe was charged and convicted of the misdemeanor crime (under both Massachusetts and federal law) of simple possession of a controlled substance punishable by no more than one year in prison. 7 35 Because the record of conviction here contains no reference to Berhe's prior conviction, or to any other factor that would hypothetically convert his 2003 state misdemeanor conviction into a felony under federal law, the Board erred by concluding that his 2003 conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). The Board therefore also erred in concluding that Berhe is ineligible for asylum and cancellation of removal. Hence, we must remand so that it may consider the merits of those claims. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (noting that a court of appeals should ordinarily remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands).
36 Berhe also argues that the Board erred in reversing the immigration judge's decision granting him withholding of removal. He contends that the Board did not base its decision on substantial evidence and failed to explain sufficiently why it chose to disregard the immigration judge's conclusions. At oral argument, and in a supplemental post-argument filing, the government argues that the Real ID Act of 2005 strips us of jurisdiction to review Berhe's claim for withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (divesting jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense in violation of a law relating to controlled substances). Because Berhe was found removable based on a controlled substance offense, the government argues, this court may review only questions of law and constitutional claims. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (preserving our jurisdiction for such claims). The government contends that Berhe's withholding of removal claim does not present any legal or constitutional issues. Berhe counters that the adequacy of the Board's reasoning is a legal question that we may review. Berhe is correct. See Enwonwu v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 35 (1st Cir.2006) 37 During removal proceedings, Berhe, appearing pro se, asserted that he feared religious persecution on the basis of his status (or imputed status) as a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The immigration judge found no evidence that this would be held against him in Eritrea, but granted Berhe's application for withholding of removal on another ground. The judge found that documentary evidence (presumably the State Department country reports) established that conditions in Eritrea are generally bad, that the ruling regime is quite brutal, and that people who are deemed sympathetic in any way to critics [of the government] are detained and subjected to severe mistreatment. Thus, crediting Berhe's testimony that he came to the United States as a refugee and has continued to seek asylum even after becoming removable, the judge found that, upon return to Eritrea, he would likely be targeted for persecution as a suspected critic of the Eritrean government. 38 On appeal, the Board found that there is no basis to find that it is more likely than not that the respondent would be subjected to persecution based upon the religion of his adoptive parents. Nowhere, however, did the Board engage the immigration judge's rationale for granting Berhe's application for withholding of removal. 8 39 We agree with Berhe, therefore, that this case is controlled by Enwonwu. See 438 F.3d at 35 (holding that, where the Board's reversal of an immigration judge's grant of relief under the CAT only addressed one of the two findings made by the judge in support of its decision, the Board's opinion was insufficiently reasoned as a matter of law). Although we have previously noted that the Board need not spell out every last detail of its reasoning where the logical underpinnings are clear from the record, there is a heightened obligation to offer more explanation when the record suggests strong arguments for the petitioner that the [Board] has not considered. Id. (quoting Sulaiman v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 347, 350 (1st Cir.2005)). We agree with Berhe that there was adequate support in the record for the immigration judge's finding, and that it was therefore an error of law for the Board to reverse without addressing that finding. The proper course, therefore, is to remand to the Board for further consideration of Berhe's claim for withholding of removal. See id.; see also Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353.
40 Finally, Berhe argues that the Board erred in refusing to consider his claim for relief under the CAT. The Board held that Berhe had waived his CAT claim by failing to inform the immigration judge of his intention to appeal. See Matter of Shih, 20 I & N Dec. 697, 698-99 (BIA 1993). The Board further noted that Berhe's Notice of Appeal, which was filed six months after the immigration judge's decision, was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b). In his petition, Berhe contends, and the government concedes, that the immigration judge failed to advise Berhe of his right to appeal the decision to deny him protection under the CAT. He argues, therefore, that he could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal. We agree. 41 The regulations governing immigration proceedings require that [a] party affected by a decision of an immigration judge which may be appealed to the Board ... shall be given notice of the opportunity for filing an appeal. Id. § 1003.3. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5) (requiring the immigration judge to inform the alien of the right to appeal from an order of removal). The Board has previously recognized that any waiver of the right to appeal must be made knowingly and intelligently. In re Rodriguez-Diaz, 22 I & N Dec. 1320, 1322 (BIA 2000); see also Shih, 20 I & N Dec. at 698-99 (finding waiver where the alien was specifically informed of the consequences of his waiver). 42 In this case, the immigration judge both failed to inform Berhe of his right to appeal and affirmatively suggested that Berhe had no reason to appeal. At the close of proceedings, after having asked DHS's attorney whether she wished to appeal, the immigration judge told Berhe: I've granted your applications for relief. Did you understand all of that? Further assuring Berhe of the completeness of his victory, the judge stated: If the Government does not actually file an appeal, you will be released. No reference was made to any right of cross-appeal or to the peril that Berhe's inaction could result in his waiving the CAT claim. Nor was any subsequent notice sent to Berhe informing him of his right to appeal. 43 In these circumstances, the Board erred by ruling that Berhe knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal the rejection of his CAT claim. The equities weigh especially in Berhe's favor, given that he was not represented by counsel. See Rodriguez-Diaz, 22 I & N Dec. at 1323 (stressing that in cases involving unrepresented aliens, more detailed explanations [of the alien's right to appeal] are often needed). Nor should Berhe be faulted for the late filing of his Notice of Appeal. The Board's bar against hearing untimely appeals is inapplicable in these circumstances. See Zhong Guang Sun v. United States Dep't of Justice, 421 F.3d 105, 108-09 (2d Cir.2005) (collecting cases recognizing that the Board's bar has an exception for unique or extraordinary circumstances beyond the alien's control); Vlaicu v. INS, 998 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (holding that the Board may have jurisdiction to hear an otherwise untimely appeal in unique circumstances, such as when the appellant was misled by the words or conduct of the [immigration] court) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the government should not be allowed to benefit from the immigration court's failure to follow its own regulations. Nelson v. INS, 232 F.3d 258, 262 (1st Cir.2000) (An agency has the duty to follow its own federal regulations, and failure to follow those regulations can lead to reversal of an agency order and a new hearing). We believe that such a remand is the proper course here.