Opinion ID: 1768224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Court's Authorities Are Flawed

Text: The Court relies upon four cases from other states to justify its approach today. See United States v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 697 P.2d 658 (1985); Lupo v. Lineberger, 313 Ark. 315, 855 S.W.2d 293 (1993); State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 656 N.E.2d 1288 (1995); Conn v. ITT Aetna Fin. Co., 105 R.I. 397, 252 A.2d 184 (1969). Notwithstanding the fact that our mandamus jurisprudence is fully developed, and until recently, appeared well-settled under the Walker standard, all four cases are distinguishable. In United States v. Superior Court , the Arizona Supreme Court gave way to its general policy of declining jurisdiction of an original proceeding because the case dealt with adjudication and quantification of water rights, one of the most important issues conceivable in an arid state such as Arizona. United States v. Superior Court, 697 P.2d at 662. CSR does not invoke such an issue in this case. In Lupo, the Arkansas Supreme Court considered whether it should provide extraordinary relief to a physician who the trial court ordered to testify by deposition. Lupo, 855 S.W.2d at 293. Not only did the supreme court deny the petitioner extraordinary relief, but the case did not involve a special appearance. Lupo, 855 S.W.2d at 295. It involved a discovery dispute not unlike our recent apex deposition case where we afforded mandamus relief to corporate executive after the trial court ordered him to appear for deposition. Lupo, 855 S.W.2d at 294-96; see also Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.1995). Lupo is not instructive here. In Steiner, the Ohio Supreme Court granted extraordinary relief to a mother involved in a custody battle over her two children against her estranged mother-in-law. Steiner, 656 N.E.2d at 1290. Steiner offers no support for today's opinion because this Court has previously recognized that an adequate remedy on appeal may be lacking in special appearance cases involving the parent-child relationship. See Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 307. Conn is the only case closely analogous to today's facts; however, it is distinguishable also. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island decided Conn in 1969, at a time where, because of a changing economy and greater means of communication and transportation, courts, to keep pace, began to relax the jurisdictional strictures of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877). Conn, 252 A.2d at 186. The Conn court allowed for interlocutory review of the denial of a corporate defendant's special appearance to interpret the state's new longarm statute and to provide some guidance to the bar and to the courts on the scope of the statute.... Conn, 252 A.2d at 188. Except for the court's need to interpret the new longarm statute for future litigation, the court would have denied extraordinary relief. Conn, 252 A.2d at 188. Over a quarter of a century has passed since the Supreme Court of Rhode Island decided Conn. Today's opinion is not necessary to explain anything to our state's bench and bar about now fully-evolved principles of personal jurisdiction. Consequently, Conn's logic does not support the Court's action here. In some other states, courts have the benefit of a statutory guide or a rules device providing interlocutory relief following the denial of a special appearance or plea to the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 506 So.2d 1084 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987)(interlocutory relief allowed by Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure); Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill.2d 295, 140 Ill.Dec. 368, 549 N.E.2d 1240 (1990)(statute and rules of procedure allowed for interlocutory relief); Byrd v. Ontario Freight Lines Corp., 39 N.J.Super. 275, 120 A.2d 787 (1956)(discussing availability of statute allowing for interlocutory review of personal jurisdiction issue); Poret v. State Personnel Comm'n, 74 N.C.App. 536, 328 S.E.2d 880 (1985), overruled sub nom. on other grounds, Batten v. N. Carolina Dep't of Correction, 326 N.C. 338, 389 S.E.2d 35 (1990)(immediate appeal of jurisdictional question allowed by statute); United Erectors, Inc. v. Pratt & Lambert Corp., 338 Pa.Super. 577, 488 A.2d 43 (1985)(discussing Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure allowing interlocutory relief from order sustaining personal or in rem jurisdiction). We do not. Without statute or rule to provide interlocutory appeal, I do not believe mandamus is appropriate after the denial of a special appearance except in cases involving sovereign immunity, comity and child custody issues. These limited exceptions invoke important, and many times, immediate public policy concerns, which is not the case here, nor was it the case in National Sand. The Court's recent decisions in this area are troubling, and I believe, confirm my views. Compare National Sand, 897 S.W.2d at 769 (providing mandamus relief for denial of special appearance) with Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 304 (denying foreign defendant mandamus relief after denial of special appearance). These decisions, along with today's opinion, do not square. There is little rhyme or reason to these cases except perhaps the amorphous standard of clear and super clear abuse of discretion. See Canadian Helicopters, 876 S.W.2d at 310 (Hecht, J., dissenting). As the Court has been reminded, hard cases make bad law. See Robinson v. Central Tex. MHMR Ctr., 780 S.W.2d 169, 172 n. 1. (Tex.1989)(Hecht, J., dissenting). CSR's position in this case offers hard enough facts. Nevertheless, I believe that the Court's decision today sets bad precedent that adds uncertainty to pretrial rulings and, as a result, encourages litigants to unnecessarily file original proceedings. [9]