Opinion ID: 150289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The De Minimis Theory

Text: NDOC asserts that the three SNWCF positions were the only correctional lieutenant promotions in the NDOC system as a whole restricted to women applicants and that twenty-nine out of thirty-seven correctional lieutenant positions filled over a four year period went to men. Relying on these statistics, NDOC maintains that the concededly discriminatory policy of excluding men from the SNWCF correctional lieutenant positions had only a de minimis impact on the plaintiffs and so did not violate Title VII with regard to them. This conclusion reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the basic precepts of Title VII and is not supported by our case law. It is beyond dispute that the denial of a single promotion opportunity such as the one here at issue is actionable under Title VII. See Ricci v. DeStefano, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2671, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009) (finding for plaintiffs who were denied a chance at promotions); Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir.2007) (It is . . . well established . . . that the denial of a promotion is an actionable adverse employment action.) (emphasis omitted); McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1121-22. Whether there will be other promotional opportunities for which the person may become eligible has never been a consideration. Here, for example, the correctional lieutenant position pays more than the correctional sergeant job. It is also a prerequisite for the more senior, more responsible, and higher paying position of associate warden. That another opportunity may later arise for which the applicant is eligible does not negate the injury of being denied an earlier position on the basis of one's sex, with the resulting loss of pay for a period and delayed eligibility for another promotion. Stout, for instance, was later promoted to correctional lieutenant, but had he been promoted to a SNWCF position, he would have earned more during the period before his eventual promotion and would have become eligible for promotion to an associate warden position two years earlier than he did. Moreover, correctional lieutenant jobs in Nevada prisons are not fungible from the point of view of employees, as illustrated by Stout's declaration that the SNWCF positions were desirable to him because the facility's location would not have required selling my house and causing my wife to quit her job to relocate. As Stout's example demonstrates, an employee who is denied a promotion on the basis of sex but later promoted has not been restor[ed] to the position in which [he] would have been absent the discrimination. EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1518 (9th Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1988). Further, Title VII is offended when an individual suffers discrimination with respect to a particular adverse employment decision, even if others of the same protected group are not similarly disadvantaged. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (A racially balanced work force cannot immunize an employer from liability for specific acts of discrimination.). The fact that on average men are more likely than women to be hired into correctional lieutenant positions might have some relevance if NDOC disputed the discriminatory nature of the policy. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 153, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (holding that the existence of many similarly situated employees over age 50 was relevant, [but] certainly not dispositive of the employer's lack of intent to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of age). It has no bearing, however, on the question whether a man denied a specific promotional opportunity expressly on the basis of his sex can establish a Title VII violation. [T]he obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of [sex], without regard to whether members of the applicant's [sex] are already proportionately represented in the work force. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 579, 98 S.Ct. 2943. Put another way, Title VII protects the ability to pursue one's own career goals without being discriminated against on the basis of race or sex, even if others of the same race or sex were not subject to disadvantage. In holding otherwise, the district court relied on Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.1998) (per curiam). Robino, however, is inapposite. The policy at issue in Robino restricted job responsibilities, not employment or promotional opportunities. Id. at 1110. Robino does not suggestnor could it, for the reasons we have discussedthat a refusal to hire an individual because of sex can be considered de minimis because others of the same sex were hired. Specifically, Robino concerned prison officials' decision to assign only female guards to six posts in a women's prisonthose from which the guard could observe inmates in the showerto accommodate the privacy interests of the female inmates and reduce the risk of sexual conduct between [guards] and inmates. [4] Id. The plaintiffs in Robino were current male guards complaining that female guardsindividuals holding the same positionwere to a limited degree given different job assignments within the same job category. It was in this context that Robino held that the post-restriction policy limits eligibility for such a small number of positions (six out of forty-one) that it imposes such a de minim[i]s restriction on the male [guards'] employment opportunities. Id. Thus, the restriction in Robino was de minimis not, as the district court thought, because a small proportion of positions were affected, but because male [guards had] not suffered any tangible job detriment beyond a reduced ability to select their preferred watches. Id. ; see also Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1527 (9th Cir.1993) (The conflict between the right of [male guards] not to be discriminated against in job opportunities and [female inmates] to maintain some level of privacy has normally been resolved . . . through adjustments in scheduling and job responsibilities for the guards. (quotations and citation omitted)); Tharp v. Iowa Dep't of Corr., 68 F.3d 223, 226 (8th Cir. 1995) (approving a policy that restricted four out of sixteen shifts to women); Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1373 (11th Cir.1982) (Since the majority of . . . positions in the male section of the jail do not require . . . observation of inmates' use of shower or toilet facilities, . . . modification of the system of rotating . . . assignments will avoid the clash between privacy rights and equal employment opportunities.). Robino 's premise, then, was necessarily that a minor impact on job assignments was too minimal to be actionable. This very limited concept has no application to NDOC's policy. An employer's fail[ure] or refus[al] to hire on the basis of sex is, without limitation, actionable under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). NDOC's refusal to hire men in the correctional lieutenant positions therefore violates Title VII unless NDOC can demonstrate that gender is a BFOQ for the positions. NDOC cannot meet that burden, as we now explain.