Opinion ID: 798459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Treatment of evidence of Thacker's bipolar disorder

Text: As for the OCCA's rejection of Thacker's claim that Judge Goodpaster disregarded evidence of Thacker's bipolar disorder, or treated such evidence as an aggravating circumstance, Thacker contends in this appeal that the OCCA's decision was unreasonable and entirely contrary to ... Judge Goodpaster's affidavit as a whole[,] which confirms Judge Goodpaster did discount the bipolar evidence. Aplt. Br. at 29. More specifically, Thacker asserts that Judge Goodpaster's affidavit, considered as a whole, establishes that Judge Goodpaster limited the force of the [bipolar] evidence to the considerations of competency and sanity. Id. And such a limitation, Thacker argues, was contrary ... to the principles of Eddings.  Id. at 30. Unlike the first of the two claims asserted in Proposition One, this second claim was not rejected by the OCCA on the basis of waiver or procedural bar, but rather on the merits: Petitioner further claims, based upon ex parte hearsay discussions his post-conviction counsel had with Judge Goodpaster, that the trial judge was of the opinion that bipolar disorder was not a serious mental illness and that said evidence was treated by said judge as aggravating, rather than mitigating. Petitioner claims he was unaware of the trial judge's positions on these matters. This claim, however, is refuted by Judge Goodpaster's own affidavit, which states he did not discount such evidence in sentencing Petitioner. OCCA's Opinion Denying Second and Third Applications for Post-Conviction Relief at 7-8. The OCCA also rejected Thacker's assertion that Judge Goodpaster refus[ed] to consider [his] mental illness as a mitigating factor, concluding that this [wa]s a strained reading of [Judge Goodpaster's] affidavit, one that [w]as not fairly supported by the record. Id. at 10. In the instant appeal, Thacker concedes that Judge Goodpaster, in his affidavit, den[ied] that he discounted ... Thacker's [bipolar disorder] mitigation evidence because of personal bias. Aplt. Br. at 22. But Thacker continues to argue, as he did before the OCCA, that Judge Goodpaster admitted that he gave the evidence no meaningful mitigating effect because it did not provide a legal defense to the crime. Id. at 22-23. More specifically, Thacker contends that Judge Goodpaster admit[ted] that the failure of the [bipolar disorder] evidence to establish incompetency or a defense of insanity rendered it essentially useless to ... Thacker in mitigation. Id. at 24. And Thacker attacks the OCCA's denial of this claim as unreasonable, arguing that Judge Goodpaster's affidavit as a whole ... confirms Judge Goodpaster did discount the bipolar evidence by limit[ing] the force of the evidence to the considerations of competency and sanity. Aplt. Br. at 29. Thacker also argues that [t]he OCCA offered no support for its conclusion that Thacker's assertion that Judge Goodpaster refused to consider the bipolar disorder as a mitigating factor was based on a strained reading of Judge Goodpaster's affidavit. In short, Thacker argues that the OCCA's decision was contrary ... to the treatment in Eddings of strikingly similar language uttered by the OCCA itself in that case, as well to the principles of Eddings,  because Judge Goodpaster did not consider [the bipolar disorder evidence] fully or afford it meaningful mitigating effect. Id. at 29-30. The initial, and ultimately fatal, problem for Thacker is that he cannot rebut the factual findings made by the OCCA in resolving his claim. Factual findings made by the OCCA are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070-71 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)); see also Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir.2004) (As to factual findings underlying claims which the OCCA decided on the merits and for which the federal district court refused to grant an evidentiary hearing, the dictates of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) apply and we must presume them true unless rebutted by [the petitioner] by clear and convincing evidence.). The OCCA found, as an initial matter, that the statements contained in Judge Goodpaster's affidavit were true. The OCCA in turn found, based upon its interpretation of the statements in Judge Goodpaster's affidavit, that Judge Goodpaster gave full consideration to the bipolar evidence proffered by Thacker, but concluded it was insufficiently compelling to justify a sentence less than death. Although Thacker argued that Judge Goodpaster's statements indicated that he considered the bipolar evidence relevant only to the issues of sanity and competency, the OCCA characterized that as a strained reading of Judge Goodpaster's statements. We conclude, having conducted our own review of Judge Goodpaster's affidavit, that the OCCA's findings regarding the intent and meaning of Judge Goodpaster's statements were entirely reasonable. And, given the OCCA's unrebutted findings, we in turn conclude that the OCCA's resolution of Thacker's claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Eddings. Although the affidavits submitted by the parties appear at first blush to be diametrically opposed, they are not. The affidavit from Thacker's post-conviction counsel asserts that Judge Goodpaster told her he discounts bipolar disorder as an excuse for the commission of a crime. Fair enough. But Thacker's argument here (as it was before the OCCA) is that Judge Goodpaster did not consider the possibly mitigating effect of his bipolar disorder, and he relies on counsel's affidavit for support. Judge Goodpaster, however, unequivocally stated in his affidavit that he did consider the disorder. His statement stands unrefuted. [7] And, in fact, it is entirely consistent with what he said at sentencing: Every witness called by the defense in mitigation was given full and complete consideration with a high degree of scrutiny and has been weighed by the court by weighing the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances. Those mitigating circumstances include but are not limited to the love of his mother, aunt, sister, friend and former girlfriend. The reporting of the missing can of mace, the belief of the minister that Mr. Thacker has accepted some religion in his life and the doctor's report indicating some level of bipolar illness, and further that Mr. Thacker has shown remorse for his actions. Tr. of Non-Jury Sentencing Trial, Vol. II, at 396. Thus, Thacker's argument attempting to equate an excuse for the commission of crime with mitigation fails. As a final matter, Thacker contends, as he did with the first part of Proposition One, that the federal district court should have conduct[ed] an evidentiary hearing at which [he] would have [had] the opportunity to refresh Judge Goodpaster's recollection and support his claim. Aplt. Br. at 20. But because Thacker has failed to sufficiently challenge the OCCA's factual findings, there was no basis for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933.