Opinion ID: 2566866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: tobias and feld's infliction of emotional distress counterclaims

Text: ¶ 53 We next consider whether the district court erred when it granted ADC's motion to dismiss Tobias and Feld's counterclaims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In reviewing a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss a counterclaim under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we accept the factual allegations in the [counterclaim] as true and consider them, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ¶ 38, 54 P.3d 1054 (internal quotations omitted). Because the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, we give the [district] court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). ¶ 54 In dismissing Tobias and Feld's counterclaims for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, the district court reasoned that none of ADC's alleged conduct rose to [the] level of extreme or outrageous or intolerable conduct. Although the district court erroneously applied the element of outrageous conduct to the counterclaim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, we nevertheless uphold the dismissal of both claims because Tobias and Feld have failed to plead facts sufficient to satisfy the elements of either claim.
¶ 55 To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a party must plead facts indicating that the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ¶ 58, 70 P.3d 17 (internal quotations omitted). A mere allegation of improper filing of a lawsuit or the use of legal process against an individual does not state a claim for outrageous or intolerable conduct and, as such, is not redressable by a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ¶ 66. ¶ 56 Tobias and Feld's counterclaim against ADC for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based solely on ADC's initiation and continuation of the lawsuit against them. As stated above, without more, neither the filing of a lawsuit nor the improper use of the legal process is sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, Tobias and Feld failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress upon which relief can be granted, see Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the district court properly granted ADC's motion to dismiss that claim.
¶ 57 Unlike a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress does not require proof of outrageous conduct. Rather, [i]f the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor (a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or peril of a third person, and (b) from facts known to him, should have realized that the distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm. Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 69 (Utah 1998) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1965)). ¶ 58 As was the case with their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Tobias and Feld based their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on ADC's filing and continuation of the lawsuit against them. Whether the act of either filing an improper lawsuit or abusing the legal process is sufficient, without more, to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is an issue of first impression in this court. In resolving this issue, we first examine the repertoire of claims available to plaintiffs seeking to remedy abusive litigation and then assess whether the tort of negligent infliction should be added to that repertoire. ¶ 59 As discussed below, we have previously recognized narrowly defined causes of action for wrongful civil proceedings and abuse of process. See Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65, ¶¶ 17, 19, 981 P.2d 841. We acknowledge, however, as have other jurisdictions, that these torts have the potential to impose an undue `chilling effect' on the ordinary citizen's willingness to . . . bring a civil dispute to court, and, as a consequence, the tort[s] ha[ve] traditionally been regarded as . . . disfavored cause[s] of action. Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498, 501-02 (1989); see also Dawley v. La Puerta Architectural Antiques, 133 N.M. 389, 62 P.3d 1271, 1275 (Ct.App. 2002) ([T]he tort of malicious abuse of process must be construed narrowly to protect the right of access to the courts.); Butera v. Boucher, 798 A.2d 340, 354 (R.I. 2002) ([T]his Court has viewed abuse-of-process actions with disfavor because they tend to deter the prosecution of crimes and/or to chill free access to the courts. (internal quotations omitted)); Schmit v. Klumpyan, 264 Wis.2d 414, 663 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Ct.App. 2003) (Because of its potential chilling effect on the right of access to the courts, the tort of abuse of process is disfavored and must be narrowly construed to insure the individual a fair opportunity to present his or her claim.). Accordingly, we have ensured that the elements of the tort[s][are] carefully circumscribed so that litigants with potentially valid claims will not be deterred from bringing their claims to court by the prospect of a subsequent abuse of process or wrongful civil proceeding claim. Sheldon Appel, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d at 502. [4] ¶ 60 It is against this backdrop that we consider whether to recognize a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based solely upon the filing of an improper lawsuit. We conclude that it is unnecessary and, in fact, would be ill-advised. It is unnecessary because a plaintiff seeking redress for the filing of such a lawsuit can file a claim for abuse of process or wrongful use of civil proceedings and receive substantially the same recovery. It is ill-advised in light of the tension between the public policy advanced by recognizing such a cause of action and the contrary policy favoring free access to the courts. We see no wisdom in increasing the potential number of torts by which a plaintiff may seek to recover for the same allegedly improper conduct and are concerned that recognizing suits for negligent infliction of emotional distress based solely on the filing of an improper lawsuit may, in fact, chill the filing of meritorious suits. Cf. Nairon v. Land, 242 Ga.App. 259, 529 S.E.2d 390, 392 (2000) (rejecting the invitation to extend the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress to instances of improper use of the legal process based on a concern that it would upset the balance between free access to the courts and the need for a remedy for serious abuse of process); Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991, 373 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (1978) ([I]t may be questioned whether the doctrine of liability for intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress should be applicable where the conduct complained of falls well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability, here malicious prosecution and abuse of process.). Finally, we conclude it would be incongruent to recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress based solely on the filing of an improper lawsuit when, as discussed above, we have declined to recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the same conduct. ¶ 61 In short, we hold that allegations of abusive litigation, without more, cannot support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Because Tobias and Feld have failed to allege any facts beyond ADC's use, or abuse, of the legal process, they have failed to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Consequently, we hold that the district court properly dismissed their counterclaim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.