Opinion ID: 164208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Instruct

Text: Defendants next claim the district court erred in failing to give Defendants’ proposed instruction on “estoppel.” In relevant part, Defendants’ “estoppel” instruction stated, “if an agent breaches a duty owed to its principal, the agent is not entitled to, or is estopped from, claiming any right to compensation.” Aerotech, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. 11 The district court held Defendants’ failed to properly object to the exclusion of their estoppel instruction prior to the jury’s discharge and failed to show prejudice. “Instructional error requires reversal only if the error is determined to have been prejudicial, based on a review of the record as a whole.” Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 1999). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 51, “[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.” (emphasis added). “[A] general objection that does not inform the court of the party’s grounds for disagreement will not suffice.” Giron v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999). If a party fails to properly object to an instruction under Rule 51, we review the district court’s failure to instruct under the plain error standard. Id. Under this standard, we will reverse only in “an exceptional circumstance - one where the error was patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In this case, the district court noted that during the instruction conference, Defendants only objected to the exclusion of its estoppel instruction in the context of Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim and failed to adequately object in the context of Plaintiff’s fraud by silence claim. Aerotech, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1228. After reviewing the record, we agree. Although Defendants adequately objected to the district court’s failure to proffer their estoppel instruction in the context of Plaintiff’s fiduciary duty 12 claim, they failed to even propose, much less object to, the court’s exclusion of the instruction in the context of any other claim. Thus, Defendants failed to state “distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection” as required by Rule 51. Therefore, the next step in our analysis is to determine whether the district court committed plain error by excluding Defendants’ estoppel instruction. Giron, 191 F.3d at 1289. For the exclusion of an instruction to constitute plain error, it must be plainly erroneous and prejudicial. Id. Here, as the district court correctly noted, the exclusion of Defendants’ instruction was not prejudicial. Defendants were not prejudiced because they clearly proffered their estoppel instruction only in the context of Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim which the jury found in favor of Defendants. Although Defendants claim they also proffered their estoppel instruction within the context of Plaintiff’s other claims, our review of the record shows otherwise. For example, one of Defendants’ proposed jury instructions reads: If you determine that there was a business relationship entered into between the parties whereby the defendant was a principal and the plaintiff was a broker with regard to the proposed sale of the subject aircraft to TAME then the parties were in a confidential relationship with each other, owed to each other a fiduciary duty and were bound to act in good faith with regard to each other. This relationship imposed on the defendant the duty to remain loyal to the interests of the plaintiff and to not act to the exclusion of plaintiff’s interests. Conversely this relationship imposed on the plaintiff the duty to remain loyal to the interests of the defendants . . . . This instruction shows Defendants’ estoppel argument is closely connected with 13 Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. Likewise, while moving for a directed verdict at trial, Defendants’ stated: Aerotech’s withholding material information to Dodson, such as the price of the airplane, such as their agreement with PluServicios, such as TAME’s requirements for buying the aircraft, as a matter of law preclude Aerotech’s right to get any commission from Dodson for any breach of fiduciary duty claim that was owed by Dodson. This statement also shows that Defendants specifically raised their estoppel instruction only in the context of Plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary claim. After reviewing the record, we are simply unable to discover any proposed “estoppel” instruction which Defendants proffered that fit within the context of Plaintiff’s other claims. Because Defendants prevailed on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, Defendants did not suffer any prejudice and the district court’s exclusion of the estoppel instruction did not constitute plain error.