Opinion ID: 51501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Berquist was Qualified for the Position

Text: According to Berquist, he met the objective criteria listed in a job posting for credit review officers and held the title of credit examiner for two years after the merger. Berquist contends that he has performed the same job since 1994, which includes the operational, audit, and administrative areas of credit review. To the contrary, Washington Mutual argues that absent the reorganization eliminating Berquist's job function, Berquist still could not have remained in his position as a credit review officer. Washington Mutual explains that Berquist lacked any background and experience in credit process review; instead, Berquist only held internal audit positions during his seventeen years at United Savings Bank and Bank United. Washington Mutual maintains that Berquist's prior work experience included cataloging the risk grades of Bank United loans and preparing audit committee reports. The district court concluded that Berquist was not qualified for his position at Washington Mutual because the fact that Berquist was given the position of Credit Review Officer in the first place [does not] constitute evidence that he was qualified. To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the qualification element in every case involving termination. The district court's conclusion was error and expressly foreclosed under Fifth Circuit precedent established in Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir.1988). The record does not reflect that the district court considered Bienkowski in its analysis of Berquist's claim; similarly, Washington Mutual did not address Bienkowski in its brief to this court. In Bienkowski, an employer alleged that the plaintiff was not qualified for his job as a security representative, even though his performance had been satisfactory for ten years, because his supervisors became unsatisfied with his work. Id. at 1504-05. The employer submitted two affidavits from the plaintiff's supervisors documenting a decline in his performance. Id. at 1505. The employer argued that under the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff must prove that he performed his job to the standards of his employer. Id. Thus, the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case. Id. This court reasoned that [A] plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion . . . can ordinarily establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action. . . . By this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired. Id. at 1506 & n. 3. The court established this rule in order to simplify application of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in the context of termination and demotion cases. The court concluded that in applying this reasoning, [t]he lines of battle may then be drawn over the employer's articulated reason for its action and whether that reason is a pretext for age discrimination. Id. at 1506. After the merger, Berquist monitored the process of conforming Bank United's risk ratings to Washington Mutual's rating system. Once Berquist completed the conversion, Washington Mutual assigned Berquist to a credit process review position. Washington Mutual interprets Berquist's response to the PIN issued in March 2003, reiterating his skills in the operational and administrative side of credit review, as an admission that he lacked qualifications in the credit review arena. Washington Mutual characterizes his statements as undisputed evidence, demonstrating that [Berquist] did not have the skills, experience and background for credit review process work at Washington Mutual. More specifically, Washington Mutual maintains that Berquist could not lead a credit review examination through origination, administration, and follow-up. Similar to the plaintiff in Bienkowski, however, Berquist possessed the same job qualifications when Washington Mutual terminated him as when Martinez assigned him to the credit review position. Accordingly, Berquist need not show that his performance met Washington Mutual's expectations to establish a prima facie case. Although Washington Mutual submitted evidence that Berquist's supervisors were not pleased with his performance, this evidence does not prove a lack of qualifications at the prima facie stage. See Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238 F.3d 674, 681 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that an employer may not utilize wholly subjective standards by which to judge its employees' qualifications and then plead lack of qualification when its promotion process is challenged as discriminatory); Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 987 F.2d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that it is not appropriate for the district court to determine whether subjective criteria are bona fide, in effect making dispositive determinations about the employer's credibility, on summary judgment). As aptly stated in Bienkowski, [p]lacing a plaintiff's `qualifications' in issue at both the prima facie [] and pretext stages of a termination case is an unnecessary redundancy. Id. at 1505. Therefore, for the limited purposes of establishing a prima facie case, Berquist demonstrated that he was qualified for his position.