Opinion ID: 1721954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing the identification of melton's car by tonya brown and admission of pictures of the automobile over melton's objection.

Text: ¶ 12. Melton contends there was a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial when Tonya Brown was allowed to identify his car. He objects to her identification at the police station where she was shown a picture of the car, and he objects to her identification of the car at the impound lot. Melton asserts the car was the only auto on the lot when Brown identified it while Brown testified there were several cars but the car she identified was the only maroon one. ¶ 13. The state contends the appellant failed to raise this error in his motion for a new trial and is thus procedurally barred from raising it now. Alternately, the state contends the defendant cites no authority for his position that identification of cars should be afforded the same procedural safeguards as identification of suspects. Finally, the state contends the identification of Melton's car did not deny his right to a fair trial. Tonya Brown had an adequate opportunity to view the car on the day it was parked near the dirt pile. She testified that she noticed the car because it was similar to one driven by her boyfriend and no doubt she spent time trying to distinguish the car from her boyfriend's car. She described it to police before being shown a photo of the car or identifying it at the impound lot. ¶ 14. In prescribing which errors must be included in a motion for a new trial to be preserved on appeal, this Court has held, [a]ll new matters, no[t] shown of record and not merely cumulative irregularities, mistakes, surprises, misconduct and newly discovered evidence must be brought to the attention of the trial judge before the Court is allowed to review them. Jackson v. State, 423 So.2d 129 (Miss.1982)(quoting Colson v. Sims, 220 So.2d 345, 346 n. 1 (Miss.1969)). Counsel for Melton objected during the trial to this evidence; therefore it was a matter of record and it was not necessary that he list it in his motion for a new trial. [I]t is not necessary to make a motion for a new trial grounded upon errors shown in the official transcript of the record.... Colson, 220 So.2d at 346 n. 1. ¶ 15. We have held an appellant's failure to cite any authority in support of assignments of error precludes this Court from considering these issues on appeal. Grey v. Grey, 638 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1994) (citing Matter of Estate of Mason, 616 So.2d 322, 327 (Miss.1993)). While failure to cite authority should not be considered a procedural bar, this Court is not bound to consider an unsupported argument. ¶ 16. In Ohio v. Roberts , which Melton cites, the United States Supreme Court allowed the testimony of a witness who did not appear at defendant's trial when the witness had testified at the preliminary hearing. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). She had been subject to questioning that was the equivalent of crossexamination and was unavailable to appear at trial. Id. Ohio does not address identification, the very issue for which Melton cites it as support. The United States Supreme Court has dealt with identification and the attachment of Sixth Amendment rights in several cases. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). However, this line of cases addresses the identification of human beings not automobiles. There is no rational basis for Melton's argument and we find it without merit.