Opinion ID: 795361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Michael competent to dismiss his appeal?

Text: 54 The District Court found Michael competent in its 2004 opinion. Normally, we would presume that Michael's competency continues to the present. See, e.g., Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 588, 589 (11th Cir.1995) ( per curiam); Smith v. Armontrout (Smith VII ), 865 F.2d 1502, 1505 (8th Cir.1988) ( en banc ). But the presumption of continuing competency does not hold if some substantial reason to the contrary appears. Smith VII, 865 F.2d at 1505. 55 We believe that such a substantial reason appears here. In the District Court proceedings, Dr. Wettstein's role was particularly important; his report and testimony were the bases for the District Court's competency finding. The Court expressed high regard for Dr. Wettstein in its opinion, calling him exceptionally well-qualified, and stating that [t]here was no evidence of possible bias on [his] part and that [t]here can also be no dispute about [his] qualifications. Michael, 2004 WL 438678, at . But Dr. Wettstein subsequently has thrice taken the position that Michael should be reevaluated. As noted above, after learning of Michael's desire to pursue this appeal, he wrote in June 2004 that it is my psychiatric opinion that Mr. Michael's mental state needs further exploration. His representation that he wishes to litigate his criminal conviction and death sentence should be evaluated. In January 2006, Dr. Wettstein wrote again, stating that, because of Michael's vacillations, a concern had been raised as to whether any waiver of his appeal of his death sentence is valid and voluntary. My previous report to the District Court was premised in part on his apparent steadfastness[,] which has now dissipated. He wrote a third time—in February 2006—to suggest further evaluation. This second-guessing by the expert who was the foundation of the District Court's competency finding constitutes a substantial reason not to presume continuing competency here. 56 The result in Smith VII is not to the contrary. There, Smith had changed his mind about whether he wished to pursue his habeas proceeding, apparently because he had gotten married. Smith VII, 865 F.2d at 1504. The en banc Eighth Circuit Court held that his change of position did not warrant reopening proceedings for the purpose of holding an additional competency hearing. Id. at 1506. The Court cited for support the conspicuous absence of any allegations of new psychiatric examinations or new conduct by Smith, other than the facts of his marriage and his changes of mind. Id. at 1504. Although affidavits from three psychiatrists supporting reassessment were before the Court, these did not suffice either. None of these psychiatrists had ever examined Smith, they had all used language that was carefully hedged and tentative, and the Court considered the dispositive issue to be one of common sense and good moral judgment rather than of medical expertise. Id. at 1505. 57 But here Dr. Wettstein has examined Michael, and thoroughly. Moreover, Michael's previous steadfastness had been a key basis for Dr. Wettstein's conclusion of competence. Dr. Wettstein has not now declared Michael incompetent, but he has called for a new evaluation, in language that is neither hedged nor tentative. The principal source for the District Court's competency finding has wavered based on Michael's post-evaluation conduct. We therefore do not apply the presumption of continuing competency to the District Court's 2004 finding. 58 An appeal may not be withdrawn if the prisoner is incompetent. See id. at 1506-07 (If someone decides that he or she prefers to acquiesce in a presumptively lawful judgment of a court, this decision should be respected, unless that person's mental condition is so abnormal that it does not meet accepted legal requirements.); cf. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313-14, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966) ( per curiam ) (requiring a prisoner's competency to be determined before deciding whether to allow a prisoner to withdraw his certiorari petition); Hammer, 226 F.3d at 232 & n. 2 (noting that we were satisfied with Hammer's competency before granting his motion to dismiss his appeal). In Rees v. Peyton, the Supreme Court faced the question of how it should proceed when Rees, who had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death, directed his counsel to withdraw his petition for certiorari and to forgo any further federal habeas proceedings. 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583. Rees's counsel advised the Court that he could not conscientiously accede to these instructions without Rees's receiving a psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 313, 86 S.Ct. 1505. Rees was examined, but experts did not agree on whether he was incompetent. Id. The Court concluded that the District Court had to make a determination regarding Rees's competency before it could make a decision about the certiorari petition. Because his mental competence [was] of prime importance to the question of whether withdrawal would be allowed, the District Court was directed to make a judicial determination as to Rees' mental competence and render a report on the matter to [the Supreme Court]. Id. at 313-14, 86 S.Ct. 1505. The Court further directed the District Court to determine whether Rees ha[d] capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he [was] suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity. Id. at 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505. 59 If we have any doubts about Michael's competency, Rees requires us to remand to the District Court for another competency hearing before we dismiss his appeal. Dr. Wettstein's letters do give rise to doubts about Michael's competency; thus we remand to determine if Michael is competent to make the decision to dismiss the appeal. Upon the District Court's making its determination, it should send us its report on the issue setting forth its conclusion and the reasons for it. If Michael is again found competent, and if he again wishes to withdraw his appeal, then we must obey his wishes. Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983) (noting that an accused has the ultimate authority to decide whether to take an appeal). 60