Opinion ID: 2615051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: adjudication/conviction

Text: As part of the public health chapter covering sexually transmitted diseases, RCW 70.24.340(1)(a) mandates HIV testing for all persons [c]onvicted of a sexual offense under chapter 9A.44 RCW. Testing is to occur soon after sentencing upon an order of the sentencing judge. RCW 70.24.340(2). All tests are to be performed by the local health department and must include both pre- and posttest counseling. RCW 70.24.340. Distribution of the test results is strictly limited to those persons with a genuine interest. RCW 70.24.105(2). Appellants argue that RCW 70.24.340(1)(a) does not apply to juvenile sexual offenders, because the statute requires a conviction prior to mandatory HIV testing. Technically speaking, juveniles are not convicted of crimes, but rather adjudicated to have committed offenses. As a result, appellants contend, the Legislature's use of the word convicted evidences an intent to test only adult sexual offenders. [1, 2] When statutory language is used in an unambiguous manner we will not look beyond the plain meaning of the words. Everett Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 819, 822, 748 P.2d 1112 (1988). Unfortunately, however, such is not the case with the statute before us. The statute uses both the terms convicted and offense without differentiation. Subsection (1) of RCW 70.24.340 uses the term convicted of, while subsection (3) states that the section applies to offenses  a term inclusive of both adult and juvenile crimes. [1] Furthermore, the Legislature's use of conviction in statutes to refer to juveniles appears to be endemic. Numerous other statutes, including sections of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, RCW 9.94A, and the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, RCW 13.40, use convicted to reference both adult and juvenile offenders. See, e.g., RCW 9.94A.030(9) (`Conviction' means an adjudication of guilt.); RCW 9.94A.030(12)(b) (Criminal history includes a defendant's prior convictions in juvenile court.); RCW 13.40.280(4) (refers to the convicted juvenile); RCW 43.43.830(4) (Conviction record includes crimes committed while either an adult or juvenile.); RCW 46.20.342(2) (refers to the conviction of a juvenile); RCW 74.13.034(2) (refers to convicted juveniles). In fact, several statutes use convicted specifically to reference juvenile sexual offenders. RCW 9.94A.360; RCW 9A.44.130(3)(a) (the term `conviction' refers to adult convictions and juvenile adjudications). It is readily apparent, therefore, that we cannot rely exclusively on the technical meaning of convicted to resolve this issue. [2] Instead, it is necessary to turn to statutory construction to determine the meaning of this statute. Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wn.2d 133, 143, 821 P.2d 482 (1992). In accomplishing this task, our primary directive is to adopt that interpretation which best advances the statute's legislative purpose. See, e.g., State v. Elgin, 118 Wn.2d 551, 555, 825 P.2d 314 (1992). The purposes of the mandatory HIV testing statute are broad: The legislature declares that sexually transmitted diseases constitute a serious and sometimes fatal threat to the public and individual health and welfare of the people of the state. The legislature finds that the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases is rising at an alarming rate and that these diseases result in significant social, health, and economic costs, including infant and maternal mortality, temporary and lifelong disability, and premature death. RCW 70.24.015. By adopting this statute, the legislative intent was to provide a program that is sufficiently flexible to meet emerging needs, deal[] efficiently and effectively with reducing the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, and provide[] patients with a secure knowledge that information they provide will remain private and confidential. RCW 70.24.015. [3] Interpreting RCW 70.24.340(1)(a) so as to include mandatory HIV testing of juvenile sexual offenders is consistent with the statute's broad public health policies. [3] The statute potentially benefits both juveniles and society by making the offenders aware of their HIV status. Anonymous Fireman v. Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 417 (N.D. Ohio 1991). If a juvenile sexual offender is infected, the statute provides counseling, and an opportunity to adjust future behavior to avoid infecting others. A juvenile sexual offender who is aware of an infection might also be treated with AZT or other drugs to stall the onslaught of the disease. Government of V.I. v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 903-04 (D.V.I. 1991). The victims of the juvenile sexual offender also benefit by learning whether they may have been exposed to the AIDS virus. Excluding juvenile sexual offenders from the statute's operation would only thwart the testing statute's broad public health policies. There is no evidence that the Legislature intended to limit the effectiveness of the mandatory AIDS testing statute by narrowing its application to adult sexual offenders. Indeed, the legislative mandate to protect the health of victims, offenders, and society is better served when juvenile sexual offenders are included in RCW 70.24.340(1)(a)'s testing provisions. Appellants rely heavily upon a recent Attorney General opinion, AGO 23 (1991), which concluded that RCW 70.24.340(1)(a) does not apply to juveniles. In reaching this conclusion, the AGO relied primarily upon In re Frederick, 93 Wn.2d 28, 604 P.2d 953 (1980), which addressed the applicability of a general criminal statute to juvenile offenders. Because the HIV testing statute impose[d] a disability or mandatory requirement, rather than a benefit, on a juvenile, the AGO concluded that Frederick limits the statute's application to adult offenders. AGO 23, at 4. [4, 5] This reasoning is not persuasive. AGO 23 fails to recognize that the mandatory HIV testing statute is a public health law, not a criminal one. The testing statute does not define the elements of a crime, nor does anyone suggest that testing is imposed as an additional punitive measure. As such, special protections applicable to criminal statutes, like the rule of lenity, are not relevant. Moreover, the AGO misreads Frederick. That case did not address the meaning of convicted, but rather the meaning of felony. [4] It held only that juveniles do not commit felonies  they commit offenses. Frederick, at 30. In contrast, the HIV testing statute does not use the word felony; it uses the broader term offense, which does apply to juveniles. In short, the Attorney General's reliance on Frederick is misplaced because the concerns that motivated the analysis in that case are not present here. [5] We therefore apply our normal rules of statutory construction and construe the testing statute to include juvenile sexual offenders.