Opinion ID: 3177408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Longstanding Supreme Court and Second Circuit

Text: precedent defines “race,” for purposes of § 1981, as encompassing ethnicity. Accordingly, it has been clear at least since our decision in Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc), that § 1981 protects against discrimination based on ethnicity, including Hispanic ethnicity or lack thereof. b. Because it has been clearly established at least since 1988 that “Hispanic” describes a race for purposes of See Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 331 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[S]ince the 107 City concedes that its mayor is a high‐ranking official with final policymaking authority in the municipal employment area at issue in this case, the City can, pursuant to § 1983, be held liable for the actions of its mayor.”). 44 § 1981, we reject Hardwick’s assertion of qualified immunity based on his claim that it was “objectively reasonable” for him to believe that discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity did not constitute racial discrimination under federal law. c. Under Title VII, as with § 1981, “race” encompasses ethnicity. Accordingly, a plaintiff who alleges employment discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity or lack thereof may be able to state a claim of racial discrimination within the meaning of Title