Opinion ID: 164315
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The district court's application of the standard of review

Text: 54 Here, the district court noted that UNUM had admitted its inherent conflict of interest. Aplt's App. at 12-13. The court then stated that it was [f]ully recognizing that conflict. Id. at 13. UNUM argues that the district court's use of the word fully in the order indicates that the district court engaged in the appropriate re-calibration along the sliding scale, while Ms. Fought argues that the district court did not reduce its deference in recognition of the conflict. 55 We certainly do not question the district court's awareness of a conflict. However, it is not completely clear how the district court's full recognition of the conflict of interest affected its review of the plan administrator's decision to deny benefits to Ms. Fought. 56 Immediately after recognizing the conflict, the district court provided the following description of its analysis: [T]he guiding inquiry must be whether the plan administrator's decision was objectively reasonable given the administrative record — not whether a different reasonable decision could have been made. Aplt's App. at 13. This statement is difficult to distinguish from pure arbitrary and capricious deference: 57 When reviewing under the arbitrary and capricious standard, [t]he Administrator['s] decision need not be the only logical one nor even the best one. It need only be sufficiently supported by facts within [his] knowledge to counter a claim that it was arbitrary or capricious. The decision will be upheld unless it is not grounded on any reasonable basis. 58 Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir.1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Notably, in Kimber, upon which the district court relied, see Aplt's App. at 13, the court had considered and rejected the possibility that the administrator's conflict of interest required it to slide away from the pure arbitrary and capricious standard. See Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1098 ([T]here is insufficient evidence of a conflict of interest and review with deference is appropriate.). 59 The Kimber court's reasonable basis language, echoed by the district court here, is thus not the proper inquiry in this case. In Kimber, there was insufficient evidence of a conflict of interest. Here, the conflict was clear and uncontested. Under the standard we have set forth in this opinion, UNUM was required to justify its decision to exclude coverage by a preponderance of the evidence. Under that standard, we now proceed to consider the district court's grant of summary judgment to UNUM. In so doing, we examine the language of the plan and the evidence on which UNUM relies in denying Ms. Fought's claims for benefits.