Opinion ID: 2536023
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court should have suppressed certain testimony by shumpert.

Text: ¶ 17. Clark makes several arguments pertaining to allegedly improper testimony by Shumpert. Specifically, Clark argues that (1) Shumpert was allowed to bolster the testimony of Hailey, a competent witness; (2) Shumpert gave opinion evidence on confidential matters; (3) Shumpert opined that Hailey was placed into DHS custody due to the severity of the injuries as a criminal act committed by Wanda Clark[,] which usurped the province of the jury; and (4) the trial court permitted Shumpert to testify about Clark's statements made to Shumpert during the home investigation and allowed the State to cross-examine Clark using those statements. ¶ 18. The first three of Clark's arguments are procedurally barred, because Clark did not present them to the trial court by objecting to the aspects of Shumpert's testimony of which she now complains. Ross v. State, 954 So.2d 968, 987 (Miss.2007). Clark mounted no challenge whatsoever at trial to these aspects of Clark's testimony. The failure to make a contemporaneous objection operates as a waiver of the issue on appeal. An objection must be made with specificity, and failure to articulate the grounds for objection constitutes a waiver of the alleged error. Id. Clark did raise these arguments in her motion for a new trial. However, raising objections in a motion for new trial which should have been made at trial has never been thought to cure the failure to object at the proper time. Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 797 So.2d 854, 856 (Miss.2001)). It is axiomatic that a litigant is required to make a timely objection. Smith, 797 So.2d at 856. ¶ 19. Clark's remaining argument is that the trial court should not have allowed Shumpert to testify about Clark's statements during the home investigation, and should not have allowed the State to cross-examine Clark using those statements. Clark contends that the statements were elicited in violation of her Fifth-Amendment rights because she was not given Miranda [3] warnings prior to making the statements. She further argues that the statements should have been excluded because they were the fruit of an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment; she contends that two law enforcement officers accompanied Shumpert to Clark's residence, and they had no search warrant, exigent circumstances, or any other exception that would have permitted their entry into her home. ¶ 20. Before trial, Clark moved to suppress any statements Clark made to Shumpert during the home investigation. [4] In support of the motion, she argued that Shumpert had a responsibility to advise Clark of her Miranda rights because, as the DHS investigator, Shumpert knew or should have known that charges would result from the investigation. Clark's arguments were limited to her claim that her statements were elicited in violation of the Fifth Amendment; she claimed no violation of her Fourth-Amendment rights. Because Clark did not raise her Fourth-Amendment claims before the trial court, these arguments are barred from appellate consideration. Ross, 954 So.2d at 987. ¶ 21. We proceed to Clark's argument that her statements to Shumpert were inadmissible because she was not given Miranda warnings. At the pretrial hearing, it was established that two law enforcement officers accompanied Shumpert to Clark's home for safety purposes during the investigation. Although Clark was not placed under arrest, Shumpert told Clark that she had to answer her questions or Clark would not be permitted to see Hailey. Clark argued that these circumstances required that Clark be given Miranda warnings before talking to Shumpert. The trial court found that Clark was not under imminent arrest at the time of the home investigation; she was arrested approximately two weeks later. The trial court held that Clark's statements would not be suppressed unless Clark produced authority holding that a statement by an alleged abuser during a DHS investigation should be suppressed. Clark produced no authority, and Shumpert testified to Clark's statements. ¶ 22. This Court will reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress only if the ruling is manifest error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Barnes v. State, 30 So.3d 313 (Miss.2010). Under Miranda, the accused must be warned of the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney before any custodial interrogation may occur. Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602). If the accused invokes the right to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. To be subject to custodial interrogation, one must be both in custody and undergoing interrogation. Wilson v. State, 936 So.2d 357, 362 (Miss.2006). A suspect is in custody if a reasonable person in the circumstances would have believed the right to leave freely had been restricted. Culp v. State, 933 So.2d 264, 273 (Miss.2005). To be in custody, the suspect must reasonably feel he or she is going to jail, not merely being temporarily detained. Id. at 272. ¶ 23. The determination of whether a suspect was under custodial interrogation is based on the totality of the circumstances. Drake v. State, 800 So.2d 508, 513 (Miss.2001). The vital point is whether, examining all the circumstances, the defendant was deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner, and the defendant was aware of such restraint. Roberts v. State, 301 So.2d at 859, 863 (Miss.1974). In a non-custodial setting where interrogation is investigatory in nature . . ., Miranda warnings are not required in order that a defendant's statements be admissible. Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899, 907 (Miss.1993). The fact that there is a mere possibility of incrimination does not mean that a custodial interrogation occurred. Drake, 800 So.2d at 514. In Roberts, the Court held that a person was not subject to custodial interrogation when the sheriff questioned her in her front yard, she was not under arrest, and she was not aware of any restraint on her freedom. Roberts, 301 So.2d at 863. ¶ 24. Clark argues that she was subject to custodial interrogation because Shumpert was accompanied by two law enforcement officers. Mississippi law authorizes DHS to request the accompaniment of law enforcement officers during an investigation: In any investigation by the Department of Human Services of a report made under Section 43-21-101 et seq. of the abuse or neglect of a child as defined in Section 43-21-105, the department may request the appropriate law enforcement officer with jurisdiction to accompany the department in its investigation, and in such cases the law enforcement officer shall comply with such request. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-27-113 (Rev.2009). Clark was questioned by Shumpert, not the law enforcement officers who accompanied her. This Court has held that questioning by a social worker did not constitute custodial interrogation, noting that a social worker is not a law enforcement officer and has no power to arrest, although the social worker was under a duty to investigate child abuse and report it to law enforcement officials. Hennington v. State, 702 So.2d 403, 409 (Miss.1997). During the questioning, Clark was not under arrest; she was in her own home and free to terminate the interview. [A]bsent an arrest, interrogation in the familiar surroundings of one's own home is generally not deemed custodial. U.S. v. Plugh, 522 F.Supp.2d 481, 491 (W.D.N.Y.2007) (citing United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 675 (2d Cir.2004)). Nothing in the testimony of Clark or Shumpert indicated that Clark believed that she was going to jail rather than temporarily being detained. The Court finds that, considering the totality of the circumstances, Clark was not subjected to custodial interrogation; thus, no Miranda warnings were required, and her statements to Shumpert were admissible.