Opinion ID: 156357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the IEPs Were Reasonably Calculated to Provide a FAPE

Text: 83 Besides having to consider procedural deficiencies, we must also consider whether the IEPs were reasonably calculated to provide a FAPE and whether Molly actually received educational benefits. See Urban, 89 F.3d at 726. Both the hearing officer and the reviewing officer found that Molly made various degrees of progress during the 1993 school year. While her progress was not steady in all areas, and her parents testified as to the general difficulties, emotional and otherwise, that she had with school and school work, the record fully supports the officers' conclusions by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 The record also supports the finding, made by both administrative officers and the district court, that Molly's parents were in constant communication with her teachers and were aware of Molly's status at school. 84 Additionally, the August addendum to Molly's IEP reflected a real attempt by the District to respond to the O'Tooles' frustration with her progress. It incorporated a number of modifications based upon Molly's CID evaluation, reduced her time in the regular classroom, provided more related services, and modified her curricular goals to reflect her functioning level. We must evaluate this IEP prospectively only, however, since the O'Tooles' removal of Molly immediately following the August IEP meeting rendered the District unable to actually implement the amended IEP. See Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 534. Viewed from that perspective, while some of the stated goals were more general than the O'Tooles desired, we conclude that it was reasonably calculated to provide Molly with a FAPE. In sum, our review of the record in this case convinces us that Molly's IEPs, even if not optimal, id. at 535, were calculated to, and did, confer some educational benefits, as required by the IDEA and Kansas law. 85 Furthermore, the fact that she made more progress, and by her parents' account was happier, at the CID, does not compel the conclusion that the CID was the appropriate placement for her under the IDEA and Kansas law, and that her IEP as implemented at SEC was inappropriate. As we have said,  'the appropriate education required by the Act is not one which is guaranteed to maximize the child's potential.'  Urban, 89 F.3d at 727 (quoting Johnson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (10th Cir.1990)). And as the Second Circuit recently acknowledged, [a] disabled child is 'not ... entitled to placement in a residential school merely because the latter would more nearly enable the child to reach his or her full potential.'  Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, No. 97-7155, 1998 WL 177971, at  20 (2d Cir. April 16, 1998) (quoting Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 227 (1st Cir.1983)); see also Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1057 (The school district is required by the statute and regulations to provide an appropriate education, not the best possible education, or the placement the parents prefer.) (citation omitted); Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d at 613 (IDEA does not require the best possible education or superior results.). Accordingly, an IEP is not inadequate simply because parents show that a child makes better progress in a different program. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132; see also Fuhrmann, 993 F.2d at 1039-40. 86 We therefore hold that the record supports the conclusion that Molly's IEPs were reasonably calculated to confer educational benefit on her and she made sufficient progress toward achieving her IEP goals in the 1993 school year. The IDEA and Kansas law require no more. III. Exclusion of Evidence 87 The O'Tooles next argue that the district court and the hearing officer violated the IDEA by refusing to permit them to submit additional evidence, including evidence relating to the impact of the introduction of sign language into a hearing impaired child's educational program. Appellant's Br. at 41. 88 The O'Tooles first argue the district court erred in refusing to admit additional evidence, although they do not specify exactly what evidence they wished to have admitted. 21 As the District points out, the district court actually denied the O'Tooles' motion for an enlargement of time in which to file a formal written request to submit additional evidence. After granting summary judgment to the District, the district court held that the District's motion to prevent the O'Tooles from submitting additional evidence was moot. 89 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) provides that the district court in an IDEA case shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings [and] shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party. We have held that the district court has discretion to determine if such additional evidence is necessary. See Murray, 51 F.3d at 927; see also Monticello Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. George L., 102 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir.1996); Susan N. v. Wilson Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 751, 759-60 (3d Cir.1995); Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir.1993). The district court denied the O'Tooles' motion for enlargement of time to file a formal written request to present additional evidence because their counsel failed to explain why he did not timely identify and produce such evidence during the discovery period, which closed over three months prior to the filing of this motion. O'Toole, 963 F.Supp. at 1014. We review motions for an enlargement of time for abuse of discretion. Buchanan v. Sherrill, 51 F.3d 227, 228 (10th Cir.1995). We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision in this case not to enlarge the time in which the O'Tooles could seek to submit additional evidence. 90 The O'Tooles also argue that the hearing officer erred in precluding the presentation of evidence as relates to the impact that sign language has on the development of spoken language skills. Appellant's Br. at 41. They acknowledge that the Supreme Court has said that once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034; see also Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 292 (7th Cir.1988). They also do not dispute that, in general, the debate about whether sign language or spoken language is the best way to educate the hearing impaired involves a dispute about methodology. The O'Tooles attempt to distinguish Rowley and the other cases by arguing that this case does not involve a dispute about the methodology to be used in an appropriate placement, or in choosing between two appropriate placements, but rather, in this case, the choice of methodology itself renders the District's placement (i.e., at SEC) inappropriate. 91 Despite the O'Tooles' effort to cast this methodological debate as a debate about appropriate placement, we conclude that, in reality, the O'Tooles' complaint relates to the best methodology for educating a hearing impaired child. That is precisely the kind of issue which is properly resolved by local educators and experts. Thus, we perceive no error in the hearing officer's decision not to permit the introduction of evidence as to which methodology best serves a hearing impaired child. 22 We have held that the IDEA was not violated; having held so, we decline to find error in the refusal by the administrative officers to engage in a dispute about methodology. IV. District Court's Reliance on Local Rule 92 Finally, the O'Tooles argue the district court erred in relying on its local rule, D. Kan. R. 56.1, to exclude evidence in its consideration of the District's motion for summary judgment. Rule 56.1 requires motions for summary judgment to identify disputed facts and provide citations to the record in support thereof. The O'Tooles' argument appears to be that the district court, in requiring compliance with Rule 56.1 and excluding evidence submitted in violation of the rule, somehow violated its obligation under the IDEA to conduct a modified de novo review of the administrative record and any other materials submitted by the parties and accepted by the court. 93 The O'Tooles do not dispute, as they could not, that summary judgment can be granted in IDEA cases. However, as everyone acknowledges, summary judgment in such cases is somewhat unusual, in light of the district court's obligation to independently review the record and reach a decision based on a preponderance of the evidence. We perceive neither an inherent inconsistency between following a rule like Rule 56.1 and following the requirements of the IDEA, nor do we perceive any actual failure by the district court in this case to exercise its review properly under the IDEA. In any event, we have conducted our own independent review of the record in affirming the judgment of the district court.