Opinion ID: 2595567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: standard of review

Text: Review of a decision made by the circuit court upon its review of an agency's decision is a secondary appeal. The standard of review is one in which this court must determine whether the circuit court was right or wrong in its decision, applying the standards set forth in HRS § 91-14(g) [(1993)] to the agency's decision. Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawaii v. Sullivan, 87 Hawai`i 217, 229, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327 (1998) (quoting Bragg v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., 81 Hawai`i 302, 304, 916 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1996)) (alteration in original). HRS § 91-14, entitled Judicial review of contested cases, provides in relevant part: (g) Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. [U]nder HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects under subsection (3); findings of fact under subsection (5); and an agency's exercise of discretion under subsection (6). In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 81 Hawai`i 459, 465, 918 P.2d 561, 567 (1996) (citing Outdoor Circle v. Harold K.L. Castle Trust Estate, 4 Haw.App. 633, 638-39, 675 P.2d 784, 789 (1983)).
. . . . The standard of review for administrative agencies therefore consists of two parts: first, an analysis of whether the legislature empowered the agency with discretion to make a particular determination; and second, if the agency's determination was within its realm of discretion, whether the agency abused that discretion (or whether the agency's action was otherwise arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by . . . [a] clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, HRS § 91-14(g)(6)). If an agency determination is not within its realm of discretion (as defined by the legislature), then the agency's determination is not entitled to the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Allstate [Ins. Co. v. Schmidt], 104 Hawai`i 261,] 265-66, 88 P.3d [196,] 200-01 [(2004)]. If, however, the agency acts within its realm of discretion, then its determination will not be overturned unless the agency has abused its discretion. . . . . In summary, when reviewing a determination of an administrative agency, we first decide whether the legislature granted the agency discretion to make the determination being reviewed. If the legislature has granted the agency discretion over a particular matter, then we review the agency's action pursuant to the deferential abuse of discretion standard (bearing in mind that legislature determines the boundaries of that discretion). If the legislature has not granted the agency discretion over a particular matter, then the agency's conclusions are subject to de novo review.
Pursuant to HRS § 91-14(g), an agency's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 216, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984), while an agency's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, HRS § 91-14(g)(5). Paul's Elec. Serv. v. Befitel, 104 Hawai`i 412, 416-20, 91 P.3d 494, 498-502 (2004).
This court reviews the [circuit] court's conclusions of law (COLs) de novo under the right/wrong standard. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Roe, 96 Hawai`i 1, 11, 25 P.3d 60, 70 (2001). Under this . . . standard, we examine the facts and answer the question without being required to give any weight to the trial court's answer to it. . . . Thus, a[COL] is not binding upon the appellate court and is freely reviewable for its correctness. State v. Kane, 87 Hawai`i 71, 74, 951 P.2d 934, 937 (1998). Troyer v. Adams, 102 Hawai`i 399, 409-10, 77 P.3d 83, 93-94 (2003) (quoting State v. Entrekin, 98 Hawai`i 221, 225, 47 P.3d 336, 340 (2002) (some brackets in original and some added)). On the other hand, The [circuit] court's [findings of fact (]FOFs[)] are reviewed on appeal under the clearly erroneous standard. [ In re Jane Doe, Born on May 22, 1976, 84 Hawai`i 41, 46, 928 P.2d 883, 888 (1996)] (citing State v. Naeole, 80 Hawai`i 419, 423 n. 6, 910 P.2d 732, 736 n. 6 (1996)). A FOF is clearly erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the appellate court is nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai`i 383, 392, 894 P.2d 80, 89 (1995) (citation omitted). `Substantial evidence' . . . is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. Doe, 84 Hawai`i at 46, 928 P.2d at 888 (quoting State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i 382, 391-92, 910 P.2d 695, 704-05 (1996)); see also State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai`i 319, 328, 984 P.2d 78, 87 (1999). Troyer, 102 Hawai`i at 410, 77 P.3d at 94 (quoting In re Jane Doe, Born on June 16, 1994, 101 Hawai`i 220, 227, 65 P.3d 167, 174 (2003)).
. . . . In construing statutes, we have recognized that our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose. When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. . . . In construing an ambiguous statute, [t]he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. HRS § 1-15(1) [(1993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool. Gray [v. Administrative Dir. of the Court], 84 Hawai`i 138,] 148, 931 P.2d [580,] 590 [(1997)] (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995)) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted). This court may also consider [t]he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it . . . to discover its true meaning. HRS § 1-15(2) (1993). Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another. HRS § 1-16 (1993). Barnett v. State, 91 Hawai`i 20, 31, 979 P.2d 1046, 1057 (1999) (quoting State v. Davia, 87 Hawai`i 249, 254, 953 P.2d 1347, 1352 (1998)). If we determine, based on the foregoing rules of statutory construction, that the legislature has unambiguously spoken on the matter in question, then our inquiry ends. See, e.g., ( Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). When the legislative intent is less than clear, however, this court will observe the well established rule of statutory construction that, where an administrative agency is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the mandate of a statute which contains words of broad and indefinite meaning, courts accord persuasive weight to administrative construction and follow the same, unless, the construction is palpably erroneous. Brown v. Thompson, 91 Hawai`i 1, 18, 979 P.2d 586, 603 (1999) (quoting Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai`i 217, 226, 941 P.2d 300, 309 (1997)). See also Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Hyman, 90 Hawai`i 1, 5, 975 P.2d 211, 215 (1999) ([J]udicial deference to agency expertise is a guiding precept where the interpretation and application of broad or ambiguous statutory language by an administrative tribunal are the subject of review. ([Q]uoting Richard v. Metcalf, 82 Hawai`i 249, 252, 921 P.2d 169, 172 (1996)[.])). [Footnote omitted]. Such deference reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches, insofar as the resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a question of policy than law. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696, 111 S.Ct. 2524, 115 L.Ed.2d 604 (1991). The rule of judicial deference, however, does not apply when the agency's reading of the statute contravenes the legislature's manifest purpose. See Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 216, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984) (To be granted deference, . . . the agency's decision must be consistent with the legislative purpose.); State v. Dillingham Corp., 60 Haw. 393, 409, 591 P.2d 1049, 1059 (1979) ([N]either official construction or usage, no matter how long indulged in, can be successfully invoked to defeat the purpose and effect of a statute which is free from ambiguity. . . .). Consequently, we have not hesitated to reject an incorrect or unreasonable statutory construction advanced by the agency entrusted with the statute's implementation. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dang, 89 Hawai`i 8, 15, 967 P.2d 1066, 1073 (1998); In re Maldonado, 67 Haw. 347, 351, 687 P.2d 1, 4 (1984). In re Wai`ola O Moloka'i, Inc., 103 Hawai`i 401, 422-23, 83 P.3d 664, 685-86 (2004) (quoting In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiamaker;hole), 94 Hawai`i 97, 144-45, 9 P.3d 409, 456-57 (2000) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted)).
In Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973), this court observed that [i]t is the general rule that an appellate court should only reverse a judgment of a trial court on the legal theory presented by the appellant in the trial court. Id. at 9, 514 P.2d at 570 (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, Fujioka also articulated the standard of review that we employ in determining whether to notice plain error in civil cases: However, we have also said that the rule is not inflexible and that an appellate court may deviate and hear new legal arguments when justice requires. We also stated that in the exercise of this discretion an appellate court should determine [(1)] whether the consideration of the issue requires additional facts, [(2)] whether the resolution of the question will affect the integrity of the findings of fact of the trial court[,] and [(3)] whether the question is of great public import. Greene v. Texeira, 54 Haw. 231, 234-235, 505 P.2d 1169, 1172 (1973); In re Taxes, Hawaiian Land Co., 53 Haw. 45, 53, 487 P.2d 1070, 1076 (1971), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 907, [92 S.Ct. 938, 30 L.Ed.2d 778](1972). See also, Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, [68 S.Ct. 1031, 92 L.Ed. 1347] (1948); Duarte v. Bank of Hawaii, 287 F.2d 51 (1961), cert. den. 366 U.S. 972, [81 S.Ct. 1938, 6 L.Ed.2d 1261] (1961)[(]affirming the territorial Supreme Court's decision in Bank of Hawaii v. Char, 43 Haw. 223 (1959)[)]. 55 Haw. at 9, 514 P.2d at 570; see also Montalvo v. Lapez, 77 Hawai`i 282, 290-91, 884 P.2d 345, 353-54 (1994) (noting that [t]he plain error doctrine represents a departure from the normal rules of waiver that govern appellate review and reiterating the Fujioka test by way of this court's decision in State v. Fox, 70 Haw. 46, 760 P.2d 670 (1988)); Okada Trucking Co., Ltd. v. Bd. of Water Supply, 97 Hawai`i 450, 459, 40 P.3d 73, 81 (2002) (quoting Montalvo ).