Opinion ID: 1191292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: exclusion of lay testimony

Text: Briefly recapitulating, the court allowed Mrs. Jakoski's co-workers, Carol Sturgeon and Ann Reid, to relate their observations but upheld objections to their expressing an opinion on her ability to work. The Jakoskis argue that the prevailing authority favors receiving lay opinion in such circumstances, citing 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 546(23) at 164-165: Such an observer may also infer and state that a person's ability to help himself or to work has or has not been impaired; that he continued his usual work in the customary manner; that after the injury he tried to do all the work he could; and that certain work exhausted a diseased person and required nearly all the strength he had, as bearing on the physical condition of another. The witness may also state the inability of such person to follow an occupation because of his condition and whether there has or has not been an impairment of his faculties, or the use of his limbs or other parts of his body, or his earning capacity (footnotes omitted). In Houger v. Houger, [1] we addressed a nearly identical issue. Houger was a divorce case, which raised, inter alia, the question of the fairness of a child support decree. The trial court had modified the decree on the ground that a recent automobile accident had rendered the father medically unfit to work. Faced with the subsidiary question of whether the father's father and brother, who were his fellow workers, were competent to testify that since the accident he was incapable of working in their business as a floor finisher or carpenter, we held that they were, stating: If a question of the nature or character of appellee's injuries were involved, some special skill would be needed, and expert testimony by someone qualified in medical science would be required. But as Professor Wigmore points out, there are numerous related matters involving health and bodily soundness, not exclusively with the domain of medical science, upon which the ordinary experience of everyday life is entirely sufficient. One of such matters is a man's capacity or lack of it to perform certain types of work as it relates to an injury he has received. On this subject there is probably no one better informed than the injured man himself, or his associates who observe his efforts to perform such work. [2] We agree with the appellants that Houger is dispositive, and that the lower court erred in excluding the proffered opinion testimony of Mrs. Jakoski's co-workers, Sturgeon and Reid. Their testimony, as far as we can perceive from the record before us, would not have included technical assessments of the nature or character of Mrs. Jakoski's injuries. Rather, these witnesses would have testified only that in their opinion, appellant was experiencing such pain in the days immediately following the accident that she was unable to work at all. We think that there are only two foundational prerequisites to the admission of lay opinion testimony concerning the effect of an injury upon an individual's capacity to perform certain types of work. The proponent must establish (1) that the witness had sufficient opportunity to observe the victim in pain or otherwise exhibiting inability to perform the task and (2) that the witness was knowledgeable concerning the demands of the victim's employment at the time of his observation. [3] Mrs. Jakoski's co-workers satisfy this test; but we do not limit the application of the test to co-workers. Under proper circumstances, teachers, teammates and even competitors, to name a few, may qualify. In reaching our conclusion on this issue we have given careful consideration to the purpose for which appellants sought to introduce the excluded testimony. The record indicates that Mrs. Jakoski resigned from her position with the Rural Community Action Program within a month of the November 13, 1968 accident. Sturgeon and Reid had only a brief period after the accident in which to observe Mrs. Jakoski at work. They would, therefore, have been incompetent to testify as to the long-range effects of the injuries on her ability to perform her job, and it would not have been error for the court to have excluded their testimony had this been the purpose for which appellants sought to introduce it. Appellants, however, sought to use the Sturgeon and Reid testimony only as evidence going to Mrs. Jakoski's ability to perform her work immediately after the accident. We think it was perfectly proper to introduce their testimony for such a limited purpose. We hold, however, that the Jakoskis were not prejudiced by the exclusion of the testimony. The proffered testimony applied only to the period immediately after the accident; Holland did not challenge the inability of Mrs. Jakoski to work in that period, but attributed it to factors other than the accident. Moreover, the specific opinion testimony was obtained from her supervisor Thomas Echols: Q Now, did you form an opinion as to whether or not, based on your observation of her, that she was capable then of doing her work? THE COURT: You're talking now about before or after? Q Following the accident. A No, as I repeated  as I told you a couple of times, I came to the conclusion she was not capable of performing. The witnesses Sturgeon and Reid also either expressed an opinion or gave substantially similar testimony to the effect that Mrs. Jakoski was unable to perform her job in the month following the accident. Mrs. Sturgeon stated: [W]ell, Mrs. Jakoski would try to come in and work but she couldn't because she was in pain and she was going to the doctor for treatment ... and she would come into the office to work and couldn't because she  you could tell she was in pain and hurting. She further testified: Q How would you describe the effect of those headaches upon her before the accident? Did they effect her before the accident and if so, what did you observe about that? A Well, she was able to work and the  after the accident she definitely wasn't able to work. Mrs. Reid testified pertaining to Mrs. Jakoski's work after the accident: [Y]ou'd give her something to do, she'd start it but she couldn't complete it, I mean she'd set there, shake, our office was one huge mass of machinery, constant noise, and you'd look at her and she'd be off in a daze ... The court then struck the additional portion of Mrs. Reid's testimony stating: in my opinion, she wasn't able to work. Alaska Civil Rule 61 provides that: No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence ... is ground for ... setting aside a verdict ... unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Here Holland never contended that Mrs. Jakoski was capable of working in the period immediately after the accident, and substantial lay testimony was given to the effect that she was unable to work. The proffered testimony was cumulative at best, and we have previously held that error in excluding such matter is harmless. [4] We hold that in this case the error in failing to permit the addition of opinion testimony by the witnesses Sturgeon and Reid was harmless.