Opinion ID: 1347876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Snakenberg Analysis

Text: The special referee determined that insurance coverage existed based on our earlier precedent established in Miller v. Fidelity Phoenix Ins. Co., 268 S.C. 72, 231 S.E.2d 701 (1977). In Miller, we held that the validity of an intentional act exclusion provision in a homeowner's policy required a two-prong analysis. The first is whether the act causing the loss was intentional, and the second is whether the results of the act were intended. Id.; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Biggerstaff 703 F.Supp. 23 (D.S.C.1989); Couch on Insurance 2d (Rev. ed.) § 44A:133. Vermont argues that this case should no longer be controlling and that we should adopt the analysis espoused by the Court of Appeals in Snakenberg v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, Inc., 299 S.C. 164, 383 S.E.2d 2 (Ct.App.1989). In Snakenberg, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether the tort arising from an invasion of privacy was an intentional act which would preclude coverage under the policy issued to Mr. Snakenberg. A reading of the Snakenberg opinion raises two interesting considerations. The first is that throughout the opinion there is no citation or reference to Miller, supra, or to the twoprong analysis announced in Miller. The second is that the parties in Snakenberg conceded that there was no coverage as to the tort of outrage and, therefore, the Court of Appeals focused only on the intentional act characterization of the invasion of privacy action. Vermont argues that we should ignore our own precedent to adopt a more contemporary intentional act analysis. This argument misapprehends the Snakenberg decision. The Respondents argue, and we agree, that the Court of Appeals focused almost entirely on whether the tort of invasion of privacy was an intentional act. The intended harm or results of the act were not addressed because the arguments presented in Snakenberg concentrated on the question of whether a tort, which could be premised either on negligence or an intentional act, would trigger an insurance policy exclusion for defending against intentional acts. Snakenberg, supra ; see also South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Insurance Joint Underwriting Association v. Ferry, 291 S.C. 460, 354 S.E.2d 378 (1987). Snakenberg, supra, addressed a single and very narrow issue, and there simply is no indication that the opinion adopted a new or different analysis. Judge Bell opened the Snakenberg opinion with the observation, This appeal raises an important question about the scope of the common law action for invasion of privacy. Id., 299 S.C. at 166, 383 S.E.2d at 3. If we accepted Vermont's interpretation of Snakenberg as the law, then almost any negligent act which required an affirmative decision would fall within the homeowner's insurance policy's intentional act exclusion. Consequently, the better rule is still found within our decision announced in Miller, supra, and it is against this Miller analysis that we now examine these facts.