Opinion ID: 2631227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The jury instruction regarding malice

Text: Stuart and Barricade contend that the jury was given an improper instruction on the issue of actual malice, a standard required by the U.S. Constitution when the subject of the alleged defamation is a public figure. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Inaccuracies in jury instructions mandate reversal unless it can be shown that any errors were harmless. See, e.g., Robey v. State, 96 Nev. 459, 462, 611 P.2d 209, 211 (1980). Relevant Nevada case law holds that [r]eckless disregard for the truth may be defined as a high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of a statement. It may be found where the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement, but published it anyway. Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 454, 851 P.2d 438, 443 (1993) (emphasis added). Further, in Nevada Independent Broadcasting v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404, 414, 664 P.2d 337, 344 (1983), we held that [t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication ( citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968)); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) (holding that only those false statements made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions). The court instructed the jury on malice as follows: In this action, plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that one or both defendants knew the communication was false or acted in reckless disregard of these matters. Clear and convincing evidence means evidence establishing every factual element to be highly probable or evidence which must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt.