Opinion ID: 4843446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentence Challenges

Text: Finally, we consider Jeune’s sentencing challenges. Here, the district court determined that Jeune’s total adjusted offense level was 34, and her criminal-history category was III, yielding a guideline range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. As we have noted, Jeune was sentenced to a total of 180 months’ imprisonment. We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and we review its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Perez, 943 F.3d 1329, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2019). “Clear-error review is deferential,” meaning “we will not disturb a district court’s findings unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted) Sentencing arguments raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Haynes, 764 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2014). Jeune asserts that her sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Our review of the reasonableness of a sentence requires us to undertake a two-step process. United States v. Fox, 926 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2019). At the first step, we review the sentence for procedural reasonableness to ensure a correct calculation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. If we conclude that the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we move onto the second step and evaluate 42 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 43 of 65 whether the sentence is substantively reasonable, considering the totality of the circumstances and the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. Jeune raises five procedural-reasonableness challenges: (1) she contends that the district court used the incorrect loss amount, causing it to add too high an enhancement for loss; (2) she asserts that the unauthorized-access-device enhancement was not applicable here; (3) she argues that the district court attributed too great a role to her; (4) she urges that the district court should not have applied the abuse-of-trust enhancement; and (5) she asks us to find the obstruction-of-justice enhancement wrongly imposed. We address each contention in turn. Because we conclude that the district court erred in imposing the obstruction-of-justice enhancement, we must vacate the sentence and do not reach the substantiveunreasonableness argument. United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1253 (11th Cir. 2009).
On appeal, Jeune argues that the district court’s determined loss amount “lump[s] together” losses from the entire conspiracy, incorrectly pinning the full loss on her. Jeune raises this argument for the first time on appeal, so any review would be for plain error. But the government responds that we should not address this argument on appeal because in the district court, the parties agreed that “the amount of loss is 43 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 44 of 65 more than $550,000 but not more than [$]1.5 million.” So if any error occurred, the government asserts, Jeune invited it. And under the invited-error doctrine, we do not review any error when a party has induced the district court into making the alleged error challenged on appeal. United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 132728 (11th Cir. 2005). We agree with the government. Any error here was invited. But we note that we see no error, in any case. Jeune was the key actor in the tax-fraud conspiracy here. She owned the tax-preparation businesses and ran its daily operations, her inner circle of friends and family directed clients to her, she had control and authorization over Investment Equity bank accounts, and she openly admitted to using other employees’ EFINs to electronically file tax returns. Jeune also pointed to no evidence to rebut her central role as a key actor who participated fully in the conspiracy. Nor did she identify evidence to recalculate the loss amount. For these reasons, we find no error, let alone plain error, as to the 14-point loss enhancement. See, e.g., Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 730-31. 2. 2-point Production-of-Unauthorized-Access-Devices Enhancement Next, Jeune challenges the unauthorized-access-device enhancement. Under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i), a defendant is subject to a two-level increase in her offense level if the offense involved the production of an unauthorized access device. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i). The commentary defines “production” to mean 44 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 45 of 65 “manufacture, design, alteration, authentication, duplication, or assembly.” Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.10(A). The Guidelines provide that an “unauthorized access device” means what 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(3) says it means. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.10(A). And § 1029(e)(3) defines “unauthorized access device” to mean “any access device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or obtained with intent to defraud.” Section 1029(e)(1), in turn, defines “access device,” as relevant here, to mean account numbers, personal identification numbers, “or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1). We have held that “a social security number qualifies as an ‘access device’ under the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1) and for purposes of the Special Rules in the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Wright, 862 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2017). The record establishes Investment Equity’s practice of duplicating taxpayers’ Social Security numbers without their knowledge on falsified tax documents to access fraudulent refunds in their names, some of which were not passed along to the taxpayers. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.10(A); 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1), (3). That is sufficient to sustain this enhancement. 45 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 46 of 65 3. 4-point Enhancement for Jeune’s Role in the Offense Jeune argues that the district court erred in applying four points to her offense level for her role. The Guidelines provide for a four-level increase if “the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). If the defendant was not an organizer or leader but served as a manager or supervisor and the criminal activity involved at least five participants or was otherwise extensive, a three-point role enhancement is appropriate. Id. § 3B1.1(b). And if the defendant played any of these roles in a criminal activity that involved fewer than five participants and was not otherwise extensive, the court should increase the offense level by two points for the defendant’s role. Id. § 3B1.1(c). A court should consider several factors in determining role in the offense, including “the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices . . . , the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense . . . , and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.” Id. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4. Here, Jeune argues that the government provided no evidence of the other conspirators’ roles in the scheme, so there was no evidence on which to base an enhancement of four points instead of two under § 3B1.1. Jeune also contends that 46 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 47 of 65 the government failed to establish that she was a controlling figure in the scheme because the other conspirators did not cease their activities when she was in prison. Jeune made no written or oral objections to the role enhancement, so we review for plain error. We find no error. As we have mentioned, ample evidence at trial established Jeune’s central role in Investment Equity’s daily operations. Witness testimony showed that she, Voltaire (who lied for her and obtained an EFIN that he allowed her to use), Gordon (who obtained an EFIN that he allowed her to use and who was seen working at her office and under her supervision), Dorothy (who prepared returns along with her), and Chester Wright (who was seen working at Jeune’s office and under her supervision) all participated in the scheme, with Jeune supervising and directing them. She also directed these employees to lie on her behalf so she could repeatedly conceal her improper use of EFINs. Not only did Jeune direct employees who came from her inner circle, but she also served in multiple capacities, such as bookkeeper, office manager, corporate agent, and vice president, at Investment Equity. See Haynes, 764 F.3d at 1308; U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. nn.4-5. The district court did not plainly err in imposing this enhancement. 4. 2-point Enhancement for Abuse of Trust Jeune argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred in applying an abuse-of-trust enhancement because, in her view, her position as a tax preparer “did not lead to a position of trust vis-à-vis the taxpayer of the type that would 47 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 48 of 65 facilitate the commission or concealment of the crime.” Once again, we review for plain error. The Guidelines provide for an offense-level increase of two if a defendant abused a position of public or private trust “or used a special skill” in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. For that adjustment to apply, the government must establish that (1) the defendant held a position of “private or public trust”; (2) the defendant “abused that position in a way that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense”; and (3) the victim “conferred the trust.” United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007). A position of public or private trust refers to a position “characterized by professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference),” and persons holding such positions “ordinarily are subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose responsibilities are primarily non-discretionary in nature.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1. The district court did not plainly err in applying this enhancement. Jeune had clients who were specifically referred to her for tax-preparation services. As evidenced by witnesses like Peaches Davis and Lennox Griffith, Jeune’s clients entrusted Jeune to use her tax-preparation expertise to accurately prepare their tax returns and, if appropriate, to obtain refunds for them. Jeune used that trust to file 48 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 49 of 65 fraudulent tax returns and to obtain fraudulent refunds that, in some cases, she kept substantial parts of for herself, also without advising her clients. As a result, some of her clients found themselves with IRS identity-theft flags and holds on their refunds. For these reasons, the district court properly applied the abuse-of-trust enhancement here. 5. 2-point Enhancement for Obstruction of Justice Finally, Jeune challenges the district court’s application of the two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice. The Guidelines provide for a two-level increase if (1) a defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede” justice regarding the instant offense’s “investigation, prosecution, or sentencing”; and (2) the obstructive conduct related to the defendant’s “offense of conviction and any relevant conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. “Obstructive conduct that occurred prior to the start of the investigation of the instant offense of conviction may be covered . . . if the conduct was purposefully calculated, and likely, to thwart the investigation or prosecution of the offense of conviction.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.1. Jeune argues that the false affidavit she provided to the IRS during its civil investigation of Investment Equity cannot be a proper basis for the obstruction-ofjustice enhancement, since the audit related to the business’s delinquent corporate returns for the 2009 and 2010 tax years, not the criminal conduct that the indictment charged occurred between January 2011 and October 2016. If anything, Jeune urges, 49 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 50 of 65 her false statements made under penalty of perjury in her affidavit only led to the criminal investigation—not impeded it. Jeune raised this argument before the district court, so we now review for clear error. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003). We agree with Jeune. At the time Jeune provided her false affidavit to the IRS civil auditors, the IRS criminal investigation does not appear to have been contemplated yet. True, that in and of itself is not necessarily a reason to rule out the possibility that the enhancement may apply. Even though the text of § 3C1.1 clearly requires that the perjury occur during the course of the criminal investigation, the Guidelines’ commentary provides that any obstructive conduct can occur before the start of instant offense’s criminal investigation. United States v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, as our precedent demonstrates, they must still obstruct the forthcoming criminal investigation in some way. In Shriver, for example, the defendant made false statements but did not make them under oath to an IRS inspector. United States v. Shriver, 967 F.2d 572, 575 (11th Cir. 1992). We reversed the district court’s application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement because the false statements did not significantly obstruct an official investigation, and the government failed to “present evidence establishing that the investigation had been in any way hindered.” Id. 50 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 51 of 65 Similarly, the government did not show that Jeune’s fraudulent statements during the IRS’s civil audit impeded the criminal investigation. To the contrary, it spurred the criminal investigation. Auditor Schmergel, who was initially unaware of Jeune’s convicted-felon status, had no reason to suspect that Jeune could not electronically file taxes with the IRS. 7 Her suspicions of criminal activity arose after she informed Jeune and Voltaire of the criminal consequences of perjury. Nevertheless, the civil investigation continued for several months after Jeune submitted her falsified affidavit, and Schmergel reached out to the IRS criminal investigation division only after she completed the civil audit. So Jeune’s actions were the impetus of the criminal investigation, not the impediment. In short, the government did not establish, as a matter of fact, that Jeune significantly obstructed the official criminal investigation. Id. For this reason, imposition of the enhancement was error, and we must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. 7 Schmergel did not become aware of Jeune’s prior conviction until February 10, 2012, when she performed a simple Google search on Jeune and found a Department of Justice press release about her 2009 conviction. Schmergel also explained that the IRS criminal division never spoke to her about the 2009 conviction because the IRS civil and criminal divisions are separate entities with separate databases. And having a civil auditor work directly with a criminal investigator would have violated IRS policy to independently further an investigation. 51 USCA11 Case: 19-13018 Date Filed: 08/23/2021 Page: 52 of 65