Opinion ID: 1058080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: enforcement of the rofr

Text: Fairfax also argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that it could only enforce the ROFR as a condition subsequent by filing an action of ejectment. We disagree. Fairfax cites Landa v. Century 21 Simmons & Co., Inc., 237 Va. 374, 377 S.E.2d 416 (1989), and Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner v. Windsor Industries, Inc., 272 Va. 64, 630 S.E.2d 514 (2006). In Landa, an executor, Peterson, was selling a parcel of land, a portion of which was subject to the Landas' right of first refusal. After learning that the estate had received an offer from another purchaser, the Landas made their own offer but Peterson nevertheless contracted to sell to the other purchaser. The Landas and the other purchaser both commenced lawsuits against the various parties and this Court held that the circuit court was required to order Peterson and the estate's realty company to perform under the Landas' right of first refusal. Id. at 380-84, 377 S.E.2d at 419-22. In Windsor, the Commonwealth acquired a parcel of land from 1314 West Main Corporation in 1977 in anticipation of building a state highway (Route 288). However, the parcel was never used and, in 2004, VDOT proposed to sell it by sealed bid. Windsor, 1314 West Main Corporation's successor in interest, sued to compel the Commonwealth to convey the parcel to it. The circuit court determined that Code § 33.1-90(B) required that any parcel acquired by the Commonwealth in anticipation for use in a highway project be offered to its prior owner if not so used. We affirmed, ruling that the statute created a right of re-entry in the prior owner, and ordered the Commonwealth to convey the parcel to Windsor. Both Landa and Windsor are distinguishable from this case because the parties against whom specific performance was sought retained title to the parcel. Here, Fairfax has sought specific performance by the Kapanis, who no longer hold title to the parcel. Accordingly, the circuit court's determination that it could not order the Kapanis to perform because it was impossible for them to offer the parcel to Fairfax was correct. Cangiano v. LSH Bldg. Co., 271 Va. 171, 180, 623 S.E.2d 889, 895 (2006); Shepherd v. Colton, 237 Va. 537, 541, 378 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1989); Fishburne v. Furguson, 85 Va. 321, 328, 7 S.E. 361, 364-65 (1888).