Opinion ID: 3166757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Recorded Interview

Text: [¶11] The court allowed the State to admit in evidence and play for the jury the recorded New York interview. Pratt contends that the court should have excluded Vogel’s questions and statements because their admission (1) violated M.R. Evid. 802 and 403, (2) allowed improper prosecutorial vouching, and (3) resulted in prejudice that was not cured by the court’s limiting instruction.
[¶12] The court allowed the jury to hear Vogel’s statements over Pratt’s objection. Pratt first argues that Vogel’s statements constitute inadmissible hearsay pursuant to M.R. Evid. 8021 because “[t]here is . . . no ‘context’ exception to the hearsay rule.” In State v. Mannion, we considered the same argument under the same circumstances presented here. 637 A.2d 452, 455-56 (Me. 1994). We concluded that hearsay rules did not foreclose admission of statements made by an officer during a taped interrogation of the defendant because “the statements of the officer were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.” Id. at 456. Accordingly, “the admission of the statements of the officer to show context, not to prove their truth, was within the court’s discretion.” Id. 1 Maine Rule of Evidence 802 (Tower 2014) provided: “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.” The Restyled Maine Rules of Evidence did not take effect until January 1, 2015, after the trial had been completed. 2014 Me. Rules 15 (effective Jan. 1, 2015). 7 [¶13] The court’s decision to admit the recording pursuant to Rule 4032 is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Steadman v. Pagels, 2015 ME 122, ¶ 18, --- A.3d ---. Although the recording was adverse to Pratt’s cause, it was also probative concerning the central issue at trial—whether it was Pratt or someone else who murdered the victim. From the interview, the jury could conclude that Pratt’s responses to questions were inconsistent and that some of his actions were insufficiently explained; if it did so, the jury would logically consider the next question: why Pratt answered and behaved that way if he had not committed the crime. [¶14] Rule 403 does not provide for the exclusion of relevant evidence simply because it is adverse; rather, it operates to exclude relevant evidence when it is unfairly prejudicial because the prejudice resulting from its admission substantially outweighs its probative value. M.R. Evid. 403. The court did not err in determining that that was not the case here.
[¶15] Pratt contends that because Vogel was the lead detective in the case, sat at the State’s counsel table at trial, and was referred to by the prosecutor during his opening statement as one of the people responsible for proving the State’s case, 2 The rule in effect at the time of trial provided: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” M.R. Evid. 403 (Tower 2014). 8 Vogel’s assertion during the recorded interview that Pratt was lying was the equivalent of the prosecutor telling the jury at trial that Pratt was a liar. We have said that “it is improper for a prosecutor to express an opinion on the credibility of a defendant. This is particularly true because prosecutors are cloaked with the authority of the State, and [are] duty-bound to see that justice is done.” State v. Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 16, 957 A.2d 80 (alteration in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [¶16] Pratt’s argument, for which he cites no authority from any state or federal court, is not persuasive. A police officer heard on a recording telling a suspect that he believes the suspect is lying is fundamentally different from a prosecutor telling a jury that a witness lied. The use of a recorded police interview is not an expression of the prosecutor’s personal opinion, and therefore does not constitute improper vouching by the State’s attorney, because jurors know that the roles of a police officer and a prosecutor are not the same, and they are capable of discerning the difference between the two. See State v. Lowe, 2015 ME 124, ¶ 33, 124 A.3d 156 (stating that jurors are “charged with the responsibility of drawing on their common sense and life experiences”). 9
[¶17] Subject to his objection to Vogel’s statements being played to the jury at all, Pratt agreed with a limiting instruction that the court gave before the jury heard the recorded interview. The court instructed the jury that during the course of questioning Mr. Pratt, Detective Vogel and possibly Detective Rybeck make various statements about the facts as Detective Vogel understood them or as he stated he understood them. And his statements . . . are hearsay and cannot be considered by you as evidence of any of the factual assertions Detective Vogel made or as to any factual statements that are contained in Detective Vogel’s questions. However, Detective Vogel’s statements and questions may be considered as part of the interview of Mr. Pratt. The statements made by Mr. Pratt in that interview are evidence and you can consider Mr. Vogel’s statements and questions to the extent that they give meaning to Mr. Pratt’s statements and answers or to the extent they allow you to understand Mr. Pratt’s answers. [¶18] Pratt now contends that the limiting instruction was insufficient. Because Pratt agreed with the instruction he now challenges, we review the instruction for obvious error. See State v. Whiting, 538 A.2d 300, 302 (Me. 1988). We defer to a trial court’s determination that an instruction will cure a potential problem, and “presume that the jury followed the court’s instruction.” State v. Wyman, 2015 ME 1, ¶ 24, 107 A.3d 641. Here, where the language of the instruction correctly stated the law that the jury is presumed to have followed— “you can consider Mr. Vogel’s statements and questions to the extent that they give meaning to Mr. Pratt’s statements and answers or to the extent they allow you 10 to understand Mr. Pratt’s answers,” see Mannion, 637 A.2d at 456—the record reveals no error, much less obvious error.