Opinion ID: 2817779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preparation and Application

Text: Holmes oversaw the preparation of the warrants, warrant applications and factual affidavits. He also reviewed and edited the factual affidavits that were sworn to by Task Force detectives to satisfy himself that the warrants were supported by probable cause. He then presented the warrant applications to a state court judge for approval. Whether a prosecutor’s application for a warrant is protected by absolute immunity depends on the function the warrant serves. The prosecutor in Kalina had “commenced a criminal proceeding against [the plaintiff] by filing three documents”: “an information charging [the plaintiff] with burglary”; “a motion for an arrest warrant”; and a probable cause certification that “summarized the evidence supporting the charge.” 522 U.S. at 120–21. The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s “activities in connection with the preparation and filing of” the information and the motion for an arrest warrant were protected by absolute immunity. Id. at 129. These activities were “the work of an advocate and [were] integral to the initiation of the prosecution.” Id. at 130. And in KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004), we held that a prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity when procuring a search warrant, when the warrant “sought evidence to prosecute the crimes charged in the indictment.” Id. at 1112. Because the prosecutor obtained the warrant to 14 TORRES V. GODDARD “marshal evidence for trial,” he was performing a “traditional function of an advocate for the [s]tate.” Id. at 1112–13. However, a warrant may also be sought for an investigative purpose. See Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638 (citing KRL, 384 F.3d at 1110–16). In KRL, we held that the prosecutor wasn’t entitled to absolute immunity when he sought a search warrant that “went beyond any legitimate preparation to prosecute” the plaintiff for the crimes charged, and was instead part of a “collateral investigation into new crimes.” 384 F.3d at 1113–14. We treated this second warrant differently, not because the prosecutor’s acts were different, but because the prosecutor sought the warrant for a different purpose. Id.; Genzler, 410 F.3d at 642–43. Thus, when evaluating an act such as the procurement of a warrant, we “take into account the goal of performing [the] action to determine function.” al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 960 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). Plaintiffs argue that the warrants here fall on the investigative side of the line. They point out that, unlike the prosecutor in Kalina, Holmes prepared and applied for the warrants before he filed any forfeiture complaints against the seized property. And, because the Task Force set up a call center to help weed out legal transfers, Holmes never filed forfeiture complaints against some of the funds. They argue that this multi-step process—a seizure warrant, followed by the call center, followed by a forfeiture complaint only in some cases—raises an issue of fact as to whether Holmes applied for the warrants in order to initiate forfeiture proceedings or instead used the warrants as an investigative tool. TORRES V. GODDARD 15 But plaintiffs’ position misapprehends the role of a courtissued seizure warrant in Arizona’s civil forfeiture process. While seizure for forfeiture can be accomplished in several ways, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4305(A), the warrants Holmes prepared and applied for required a prior judicial determination of probable cause that the property was subject to forfeiture. See id. §§ 13-4305(A)(1), 13-4310(B). The seizure warrants couldn’t be used to conduct an investigation that might lead to a probable cause determination. Rather, in order for the warrants to be issued, the attorney for the state was first required to make that determination, prepare a warrant with a supporting factual affidavit and seek issuance of the warrant by a judge. That’s why the seizure warrants issued in this case stated that there was “probable cause to believe that conduct giving rise to forfeiture has occurred with respect to all of the property” covered by the warrants, and that “forfeiture is authorized pursuant to” Arizona’s forfeiture statutes. Thus, Holmes wasn’t performing the “detective’s role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126 (quoting Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273). Rather, upon review of the factual affidavits sworn to by Task Force detectives, Holmes determined that there was probable cause to believe that the property covered by the warrants was subject to forfeiture. Only then did Holmes apply for the warrants. Moreover, seizure of the property is “integral to the initiation of” an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding, id. at 130, because it’s a “prerequisite to the court’s jurisdiction,” State v. One Single Family Residence at 1810 E. Second Ave., 969 P.2d 166, 169 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 84 (1992)). Although the court’s issuance of a seizure warrant doesn’t constitute a civil forfeiture complaint, “[t]he in rem 16 TORRES V. GODDARD complaint and the seizure warrant are intimately connected— one follows the other and effectuates it.” Schrob, 948 F.2d at 1416. Holmes’s preparation of and application for seizure warrants is the civil forfeiture analog to the prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant in Kalina. These actions are likewise shielded by absolute immunity and may not form the basis of a claim for damages. Arizona’s insertion of an intermediate step that allowed for the rapid release of some seized funds doesn’t change the character of Holmes’s actions. While Arizona law authorizes the release of property seized for forfeiture “if forfeiture or retention is unnecessary,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 134306(A), nothing prevented Arizona from seeking forfeiture of every seized wire transfer. When a prosecutor decides to initiate a criminal proceeding, he is surely aware that he may have to terminate the proceeding if the factual allegations that supported probable cause turn out to be untrue. That doesn’t mean that the prosecutor’s initiation of the proceeding (or the acts he takes in preparation for it) aren’t protected by absolute immunity. In Kalina, for example, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s preparation and filing of the arrest warrant were protected by absolute immunity even though the criminal charges were subsequently dismissed. 522 U.S. at 122. State officials do not lose absolute immunity by constructing an additional step in the civil forfeiture process to avoid unnecessary judicial proceedings.