Opinion ID: 2570849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: claims for clergy malpractice

Text: ¶ 16 In light of the First Amendment principles discussed above, the question of whether courts can adjudicate a claim for clergy malpractice has become a frequently litigated issue in recent years. See, e.g., Nally Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal.3d 278, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1644, 104 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 285 (Colo.1988); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 550 (Mo.Ct.App.1987); Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584, 586 (1991). Moreover, Mlle issue has generated a growing body of scholarly commentary. Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321, 327 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (citing Samuel E. Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 Val. U.L.Rev. 163 (1981); Michael J. Fiorillo, Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause of Action for Improper Counseling by a Clergyman?, 192 Dick. L.Rev. 223 (1987); G. Grace McCaffrey, Note, Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley: Clergy MalpracticeA Threat to Both Liberty and Life, 11 Pace L.Rev. 137 (1990)). ¶ 17 However, despite the apparent controversy, courts throughout the United States have uniformly rejected claims for clergy malpractice under the First Amendment. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir.1994) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Coffey, J., concurring) (Indeed, a cause of action for clergy malpractice has been rejected uniformly by the states that have considered it.). These courts have generally held that a determination of such claims would necessarily entangle the courts in the examination of religious doctrine, practice, or church polityan inquiry that we have already explained is prohibited by the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Destefano, 763 P.2d at 285; Amato v. Greenquist, 287 Ill.App.3d 921, 223 Ill.Dec. 261, 679 N.E.2d 446, 453 (1997); Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 141 Ill. App.3d 898, 96 Ill.Dec. 114, 490 N.E.2d 1319, 1324, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915, 107 S.Ct. 317, 93 L.Ed.2d 290 (1986); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 244 Neb. 715, 508 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1993). ¶ 18 For example, in Nally, like the case at hand, parishioners sued a clergyman for allegedly mishandling the pastoral counseling relationship. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the clergyman was negligent in failing to warn them of the mental state of their son, whom the clergyman had counseled, but who ultimately committed suicide. Nally, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d at 952. In resolving the case, the California Supreme Court considered and rejected the clergy malpractice theory of liability, stating: Because of the differing theological views espoused by the myriad of religions in our state and practiced by church members, it would certainly be impractical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, to impose a duty of care on pastoral counselors. Such a duty would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity. Id., 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d at 960 (emphasis added). ¶ 19 Similarly, in White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1990), under strikingly similar facts to the case at hand, the Utah Court of Appeals also considered and rejected the clergy malpractice theory of liability. See id. at 1318-19. In White, parents asserted a claim for malpractice against a clergyman, not for negligently referring a parishioner to outside counseling-the factual allegations in the case at hand, but for negligently failing to refer their son to trained professionals. Id. at 1318. In dismissing the clergy malpractice claim, the court of appeals stated: [A]ppellant wishes to impose a duty upon [clergy] to make further inquiry into the alleged family conflicts, and then, if beyond [their] expertise, refer [parishioners] to others who are qualified to treat such problems. Under the present circumstances, charging lay clergy with this duty of care goes too far because it approaches the same level of care imposed upon trained professionals in medicine and psychology. ... Even assuming that workable standards of care could be established in the present case, ... [s]uch a duty would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity. Id. at 1318-19 (quoting Nally, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d at 960). We find the reasoning of the Nally and White courts to be sound.