Opinion ID: 853928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Systemic Defects in Lake County Public Defender System

Text: Coleman claims that systemic defects and unfavorable conditions in the Lake County public defender system were so extreme at the time of his trial that he necessarily received ineffective assistance of counsel. [14] Because this same claim was raised by five other Lake County capital post-conviction petitioners, [15] the court scheduled a single evidentiary hearing at which all six petitioners could present their evidence. (P-C.R. at 1929.) The court subsequently vacated the hearing, however, holding that this claim was not available for post-conviction review, and directed the petitioners to present their evidence as a Record of Excluded Evidence. Although the court stated that the systemic defects claim was not cognizable in a post-conviction hearing, the court's findings state that Coleman waived this claim. It reasoned that any such claim pertaining to trial counsel was available on direct appeal, and that the evidence as it related to appellate counsel was irrelevant because it indicated problems with the public defender system generally, rather than relating to anything specific to Coleman's case. (P-C.R. at 1745b-46a.) We conclude this issue was available for collateral review. First, rather than appearing in the trial record where appellate counsel could have found and raised the issue, the evidence allegedly showing systemic defects in the Lake County public defender system comes from extraneous sources, such as the testimony of former and current public defenders and experts on public defense systems and criminal defense generally. While claims available but unraised on direct appeal can be deemed waived from post-conviction review, claims based upon evidence unavailable on direct appeal are not waived and are appropriate for post-conviction review, see P-C.R. 1(1)(a)(4). Second, as relates to appellate counsel, although the post-conviction court used the term waiver, it appears that the court actually determined the evidence irrelevant, and thus inadmissible. ( See P-C.R. at 1746a-46b (finding the proposed testimony of witnesses to contain nothing about the performance of the public defenders in this case and the report of the expert to be conclusionary reasoning based upon gossip and guesswork).) We recently addressed a claim similar to Coleman's, pertaining to Marion County's indigent defense system, in Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466 (Ind.1997). There we discussed systemic defects and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), the seminal case on this issue, at length. See Games, 684 N.E.2d at 478-79. [16] We stated,  Cronic provides a narrow `exception' to the traditional Strickland two prong analysis. Under Cronic, certain circumstances will negate the Strickland requirement that a defendant establish both specific errors leading to deficient performance and actual prejudice. Id. at 479. We noted that Cronic delineated three such circumstances, one of which arose when situations surrounding a lawyer's representation are such that `the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial,' id. (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039). As the Supreme Court of Illinois observed when reviewing Coleman's similar allegations against Illinois' Lake County public defender office, see People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919, 936-37 (Ill. 1995), examination of the examples given in the Cronic opinion sheds further light on what this dicta in Cronic really means. [17] First, Cronic discusses Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), as an example of a case in which circumstances surrounding a lawyer's representation were so bad that ineffectiveness could be presumed without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 660-61, 104 S.Ct. 2039. In Powell, [t]he defendants had been indicted for a highly publicized capital offense. Six days before trial, the trial judge appointed all members of the bar for purposes of arraignment. Whether they would represent the defendants thereafter if no counsel appeared in their behalf, was a matter of speculation only, or, as the judge indicated, of mere anticipation on the part of the court. [ Powell, 287 U.S. at 56, 53 S.Ct. 55.] On the day of the trial, a lawyer from Tennessee appeared on behalf of persons interested in the defendants, but stated that he had not had an opportunity to prepare the case or to familiarize himself with local procedure, and therefore was unwilling to represent the defendants on such short notice. The court decided that the Tennessee lawyer would represent the defendants, with whatever help the local bar could provide. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 660, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Second, a Cronic footnote cites Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 59, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 45, 65 S.Ct. 517, 89 L.Ed. 739 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764, 65 S.Ct. 978, 89 L.Ed. 1348 (1945) (per curiam); and Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 115-16, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572 (1944) (per curiam), as further exemplifying instances in which surrounding circumstances would make counsel constitutionally ineffective, per se. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 661 n. 28, 104 S.Ct. 2039. In Chambers Justice Harlan wrote, Where counsel has no acquaintance with the facts of the case and no opportunity to plan a defense, the result is that the defendant is effectively denied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 59, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). White states that it is a denial of the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial to force him to trial with such expedition as to deprive him of the effective aid and assistance of counsel. 324 U.S. at 764, 65 S.Ct. 978. House involved a situation where the trial court, without warning, and over petitioner's protests, forced him to plead to the information without the aid and advice of his counsel, whose presence he requested. 324 U.S. at 45-46, 65 S.Ct. 517. Ex parte Hawk involved allegations that the state court forced [the petitioner] into trial for a capital offense, ... with such expedition as to deprive him of the effective assistance of counsel ... and that his conviction was based in part on the introduction at the trial of evidence known by the prosecution to be perjured.... 321 U.S. at 115-16, 321 U.S. 114. [T]he burden under Cronic is extremely heavy. Games, 684 N.E.2d at 481.  [O]nly when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (emphasis added). We think the Illinois Supreme Court was correct that such a presumption is justified only in cases involving circumstances of similar character and magnitude as those cited as examples in Cronic. See Coleman, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d at 936. A presumption of ineffectiveness is not justified from Coleman's proposed evidence. Even if true, the evidence only indicates problems in Lake County's public defender system generally. Coleman offers no evidence indicating that the alleged difficulties had any influence on his counsel specifically, which is the constant theme throughout the cases cited in Cronic as examples of per se prejudice, [18] nor do we think deleterious influence can automatically be presumed. First, Coleman's Record of Excluded Evidence cited potential testimony from various Lake County public defenders who all testified about general conditions and personal complaints with Lake County's system. For example, Coleman intended to call Daniel Toomey, who Coleman says would have provided the following testimony: Because of the absence of accountability, some Trial Public Defenders spend as little time as possible preparing their cases and spend little or no time with their clients. There is no employment consequence to those Public Defenders for this conduct. The lack of independence creates problems because Public Defenders are employees of the judges, who are less interested in quality representation than in keeping things moving. . . . [C]ase loads are overwhelming and create the risk that any given case does not get nearly the attention it should. Until the promulgation of Rule 24 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, there was no caseload reduction even while defending a death penalty case. Toomey often has 50 open felony cases. The public defenders treat their private clients differently than they treat their indigent clients. This is a function of caseload. There are so many public defender cases that each one receives a little less attention than it otherwise would. Public defender cases suffer from late and often insufficient preparation. (P-C.R. at 1388-89.) While this testimony, if true, surely indicates need for improvement in Lake County's public defender system generally, [19] there is no indication that Coleman's counsel were affected by these deficiencies. Coleman fails to produce evidence showing that his counsel spent as little time as possible in preparing his case, that his counsel were affected by being appointed by the judge, that his counsels' particular caseloads were so overloaded that they could not spend adequate time with Coleman's case, or that his counsel treated him differently than they treated their private clients (if they had any). In fact, while one of his trial attorneys, Cornell Collins, stated that he stopped doing public defender work generally because his assigned workload became unmanageable, (P-C.R. at 2465), he also said this about the work he and his co-counsel did for Coleman: [W]e spent an inordinate amount of time working on [Coleman's case] together, separately, and away from families. And this was not a situation where we decided to do nothing, and on the day of the trial we picked a file up and went to court. We did a lot of work. And, in fact, I have no regrets. I don't know about [my co-counsel], but I have no regrets about the work we put in here in this Coleman case, because it was substantial. (P.C.R. at 2500.) Second, Coleman's Record of Excluded Evidence indicated that Coleman would have introduced testimony from Robert Spangenberg, president of The Spangenberg Group which describes itself as a nationally recognized research and consulting firm specializing in improving justice programs. (P-C.R. at 1395.) Spangenberg's testimony was to center around a report his group had written regarding its analysis of the Lake Superior Court's public defender system between 1982 and 1992. The report concluded that the system could not guarantee reasonably effective assistance of counsel as required under the Sixth Amendment in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. (P-C.R. at 1398-99.) Spangenberg's proposed testimony and report mention ways in which Lake County could improve its system and cites many authorities which support their recommendations, but there is no indication from the report that these alleged deficiencies affected Coleman's lawyers specifically. The blueprints contained in documents like American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals are very helpful in structuring public defender services, but failure to follow them is not per se a violation of the Sixth Amendment. [20] Third, Coleman's Record of Excluded Evidence indicates that Coleman would have attempted to offer a record of testimony given by Dean Norman Lefstein of the Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, in a previous case challenging the Marion County public defender system. (See P-C.R. at 1482.) In this testimony Dean Lefstein concluded that that system ought to be declared ... unconstitutional because of its failure to safeguard the rights of the accused. (P-C.R. at 1557.) Even if testimony about the Marion County system could be relevant to Coleman's claim, this evidence, like the rest, speaks in general terms without showing how the particular public defender system influenced the attorneys in that particular case. Indeed, Dean Lefstein acknowledged that his general view of the Marion County system did not necessarily describe how individual lawyers perform: Q This system that we've got here in Marion County, not only theoretically but probably practically in many cases, it can provide excellent representation, can it not, for a particular criminal defendant of a particular case? A I assume that it can. Q A lawyer could do a heck of a job for somebody, tremendous job, could he not, or she not? A I have to assume that that's possible. (P-C.R. at 1558.) Because Coleman's proposed evidence did not indicate that his attorneys' representation of him was affected by the alleged defects within the system, he would have lost on this claim had it been properly adjudicated on its merits below. As the Supreme Court of Illinois said: The general allegations in this case ... do not demonstrate circumstances of either the character or magnitude that would give rise to a per se ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Coleman, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d at 937.