Opinion ID: 2445933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the sellers convey Old Lot 826 to appellants?

Text: The trial court concluded that appellants could not base their claim of ownership to Old Lot 826 on their predecessors' ownership by adverse possession because none of appellants' deeds conveyed any interest in Old Lot 826. At oral argument, appellants' counsel contended that, although title to Old Lot 826 was never perfected by predecessors, that property was nevertheless conveyed to appellants when they acquired adjoining lots 816, 817, and 818. Relying on Bonds v. Smith, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 118, 143 F.2d 369 (1944), appellants claim that their acquiring possession of those lots also vested their grantors' ownership of Old Lot 826. In addition, appellants argue that the word rights, as used in the language of conveyance (which is substantially identical in the three deeds), necessarily included the grantor's adverse possessory rights to Old Lot 826. We think that appellants misread the import of Bonds and that theirs is an unreasonable interpretation of the deeds that is at odds with their plain language. In Bonds the court recognized that rights to an easement appurtenant to land were enforceable by a person who had acquired possession of the land through the unprobated will of her godfather. 79 U.S.App.D.C. at 119-20, 143 F.2d at 370-71. The court noted that the will was not necessary to prove privity between the grantee and her predecessor, however, because [a]nyone rightfully in possession of premises to which an easement is appurtenant may enjoin its obstruction. 79 U.S.App.D.C. at 120, 143 F.2d at 371. Evidence showed that the grantee had lived with her godfather for most of her life and that they continuously, openly, notoriously and adversely used for more than twenty years a four foot right of way over a portion of [the] lot as means of ingress and egress.... 79 U.S.App.D.C. at 119, 143 F.2d at 370. In other words, Bonds did not involve a claim of ownership to a separate property by adverse possession, but a right to an easement (created by adverse possession) that was appurtenant to property to which the claimant had title. With respect to appellants' argument that their predecessors intended to convey ownership of Old Lot 826 in the rights language of the deeds, we examine the language of those deeds. The deed to lot 816 provides: The parties of the first part [Downeys] do hereby grant unto the party of the second part [Sears], in fee simple as Sole Owner, all that piece or parcel of land, together with the improvements, rights, privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging, situate in the District of Columbia described as follows [legal description of lot 816, followed by street address]. Similarly, the deed to lot 817 provides: [T]he said parties of the first part [Greentree and Thompson] do grant and convey unto the parties [of the] second part [Howard and Kretzschmar] in fee simple as tenants in common, all that property situate in the District of Columbia described as [legal description of lot 817, followed by street address] ... said land and premises above described or mentioned and hereby intended to be conveyed, together with ... all and every title, right, privileges, appurtenances and advantages thereunto belonging, or in any way appertaining.... The deed to lot 818 provides: [T]he said parties of the first part [Mahr and Nelson] do grant unto the said party of the second part [Sears], in fee simple, as Sole Owner, the following described land and premises, with the improvements, elements and appurtenances thereunto belonging, situate, lying and being in the District of Columbia, namely [legal description of lot 818]. The interpretation of deeds, like contracts, is a legal question that we review de novo. See 1010 Potomac Assoc. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C.1984). We note, first, that appellants' argument assumes that their predecessors had already acquired ownership to Old Lot 826 by adverse possession. This is an issue that, as the trial court properly noted, was factually disputed and would have to be presented to the jury. Resolution of that factual dispute was unnecessary in this case, however, because we conclude that, as used in the deeds, the word rights, without more, does not include conveyance of a parcel of land other than the one expressly described and identified in the deed. Appellants have not cited any authority to support their argument and common sense suggests it should not be so, as it would be absurd to allow the fee of one piece of land, not mentioned in the deed, to pass as appurtenant to another distinct parcel, which is expressly granted by precise and definite boundaries. Harris v. Elliott, 35 U.S. 25, 54, 10 Pet. 25, 9 L.Ed. 333 (1836); see Baylor v. Soska, 540 Pa. 435, 658 A.2d 743, 746 (1995) (noting that the only method by which an adverse possessor may convey the title asserted by adverse possession is to describe in the instrument of conveyance by means minimally acceptable for conveyancing of realty that which is intended to be conveyed). [13] We think the more reasonable reading of the word rights in a deed to a particular piece of property corresponds to the generally understood meaning of that term in connection with ownership of land, as a bundle of property rights.... Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights `to possess, use and dispose of it.' Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945)). In this case, this bundle of property rights pertains to the particular property being conveyed in fee simple, which in all the deeds was specifically demarcated by the legal description, respectively, of lots 816, 817 and 818, and in no minimally acceptable way could be read as including Old Lot 826. [14] Baylor, 658 A.2d at 746; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1348 (8th ed. 2004) (defining property right as [a] right to specific property, whether tangible or intangible) (emphasis added). As the language of the deeds makes clear, the rights transferred are thereunto [the described property] belonging (deeds for lots 816, and 817) and to the same [described property] belonging (deed for lot 818). Unlike an easement that is said to run with, and is transferred in conjunction with, a piece of property, see Bonds, 79 U.S.App.D.C. at 120, 143 F.2d at 371, a claim of ownership by adverse possession to a separate piece of property belongs to the adverse possessor, and must be separately conveyed. Moreover, the contemporaneous evidence in this case shows that at the time of conveyance the sellers did not intend to convey whatever rights they might have had in Old Lot 826; instead, they expressly disclaimed conveying any rights in Old Lot 826 to appellants. In the plat attached to the deed conveying lot 818 to appellant Sears, for example, a hand-written note reads: Lot 818 is what is being sold. Land beyond the survey line is part of Lot 25 and is not of record to the seller.... On the plat, lot 818 is clearly demarcated and the part of Old Lot 826 adjacent to lot 818 is crossed out. [15] Ms. Downey testified that when she and her husband sold lot 816 to Sears in 1996, she told Sears that the deed did not convey any part of Old Lot 826, and that Sears could pursue legal action to try to obtain title in his own right. Our interpretation that the deeds did not convey title to Old Lot 826 is also consistent with appellants' conduct when they purchased lots 816, 817 and 818, as appellants themselves did not act as if they considered that they had acquired an interest in Old Lot 826. They did not request quit-claim deeds to Old Lot 826 at the time they purchased their respective lots from their predecessors, nor has any of them ever paid taxes on Old Lot 826. On this record, we agree with the trial court's ruling, as a matter of law, that even assuming the appellants' predecessors had obtained ownership by adverse possession of Old Lot 826, that ownership was not conveyed to appellants when they acquired lots 816, 817 and 818.