Opinion ID: 2636938
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stateness.

Text: Defendant urges the 1978 Mackey murder was too remote in time from his 1990-1991 penalty retrial and should have been excluded on that ground. According to defendant, admission of this stale criminal episode on the issue of penalty violated his constitutional rights of due process, fair and speedy jury trial, confrontation, and a reliable penalty determination. The contention lacks merit. Under factor (b), the prosecutor may offer evidence in aggravation of criminal violence that has occurred at any time. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1158, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 ( Rodrigues ); People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 192, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629; Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 202, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480.) This rule does not violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. ( Rodrigues, supra, at p. 1161, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) `[T]he state has a legitimate interest in allowing a jury to weigh and consider a defendant's prior criminal conduct in determining the appropriate penalty, so long as reasonable steps are taken to assure a fair and impartial penalty trial. [Citation.] Remoteness of the offense affects the weight, not admissibility, of the offense. [Citation.]' ( People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th 694, 772, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2, quoting Rodrigues, supra, at p. 1161, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; see also People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 476, 276 Cal.Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107.) Defendant concedes these principles, but asserts that a 12-ฝ-year gap is too extreme as a matter of law. He is mistaken. (See, e.g., Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1160-1161, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 [12-year-old crime not too remote]; People v. Anderson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 453, 476, 276 Cal.Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107 [14-year-old crime not too remote].) [13] Moreover, defendant identifies no basis for suspecting that the delay unfairly prejudiced his ability to mount a defense to the Mackey homicide. He complains about the mental state of the primary prosecution witness, Deborah, and observes that there were no defense witnesses, but he points to no evidence that the passage of time contributed to these concerns. Defendant notes that Deborah did not come forward until soon before the penalty retrial, but he fails to explain how this delay compromised his ability to confront her. On the other hand, the prosecution presented a number of witnesses who testified extensively concerning the Mackey episode. Aside from Deborah, these witnesses included law enforcement officials whose memories of the Mackey case, often refreshed by reference to contemporaneous records of their homicide investigation, corroborated details of Deborah's testimony. Both Deborah and a police detective testified that within a year before the penalty retrial, Deborah directed investigators by memory to several locations pertinent to the Mackey episode, including the murder scene itself. Defendant was able to cross-examine all the prosecution witnesses at length. The appellate record thus contains no inkling that defendant's rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination were violated by the delay in presenting evidence that he murdered Mackey. His attack on the staleness of the Mackey murder must therefore be rejected.