Opinion ID: 78113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sixth Amendment and Supreme Court Precedent

Text: Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, all criminal defendants are entitled to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 136-37, 67 S.Ct. 1716, 1718, 91 L.Ed. 1955 (1947); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1022-23, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). This fundamental Constitutional right attaches at the time adversarial criminal proceedings are initiated, see Rothgery v. Gillespie County, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2593, 177 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008), and continues through completion of a first, non-frivolous direct appeal, see Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 278, 120 S.Ct. 746, 760, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). The right to counsel is a fundamental part of the adversary system of criminal justice and recognizes the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty.... Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63, 58 S.Ct. at 1022. Nevertheless, the right to counsel is intended as a tool, not a tether. [I]t is one thing to hold that every defendant... has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833, 95 S.Ct. at 2540. For that reason, it has long been established that a criminal defendant may waive the right to counsel when he does so intentionally and knowingly. See, e.g., Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023. Less clear are the means by which a defendant may waive his right to counsel. In Faretta, the Supreme Court recognized the right to self-representation in the context of deciding whether a defendant who had asked to represent himself and had demonstrated a rudimentary knowledge of legal procedure was entitled to proceed pro se. In determining he was, the Court noted, The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the [Sixth] Amendment, [wi]ll be an aid to a willing defendantnot an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533. Faretta 's recognition of the right to self-representation was grounded in respect for a defendant's free choice. The right to defend is personal, for it is [t]he defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, [who] will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540-41. It is important to remember that Faretta 's discussion of the right to self-representation presupposed a cooperative defendant willing to engage in reciprocal dialogue with the court. The Supreme Court has never confronted a case in which an uncooperative defendant has refused to accept appointed counsel or engage in a colloquy with the court. Consequently, the Court has never been asked to determine whether a defendant may waive counsel without making an explicit, unqualified request to represent himself.