Opinion ID: 1489278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Appearance of Bias and Alleged Partisan Misconduct

Text: We begin by considering Coulter's claim that Judge Combs Greene had an appearance of partiality or an actual bias in favor of defendants/appellees that tainted both the pre-trial and trial proceedings and deprived [Coulter] of her right to an impartial adjudicator. As the basis for her claim about the appearance of partiality, Coulter asserts that Judge Combs Greene is the spouse of a physician who is of the same ilk as the appellee physicians and who was insured under the same Malpractice pool as the appellees. She argues that this (purported) circumstance was sufficient to lead an objective observer ... reasonably to question the judge's impartiality, Mejia v. United States, 916 A.2d 900, 903 (D.C. 2007), and that this purported appearance of bias made it inappropriate for Judge Combs Greene to dispose of Coulter's pre-trial Motion for Disqualification simply by describing a reasonable basis for each of the pre-trial rulings in appellees' favor. Coulter further contends that Judge Combs Greene was required to articulate her reasons for denying Coulter's motion requesting that the judge disclose information relative to her status as a medical spouse and medical liability coverage. [1] We see no need to discuss in detail the examples of purported bias that Coulter raised in her pre-trial Motion for Disqualification, which focused primarily on Judge Combs Greene's decisions to re-set deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions. We are satisfied from our review of the record that, substantially for the reasons Judge Combs Greene described in her order denying the motion, Coulter's claims of demonstrated bias do not withstand scrutiny. We do agree with Coulter that in her order, Judge Combs Greene should have responded not only to Coulter's claims of demonstrated bias, but also to Coulter's claim alleging an appearance of partiality. That is because a judge must recuse from any case in which there is an appearance of bias or prejudice sufficient to permit the average citizen reasonably to question the judge's impartiality. Garrett v. United States, 642 A.2d 1312, 1315 (D.C. 1994) (internal punctuation omitted). [2] But we also conclude that the omission was harmless, because the putative circumstances that Coulter describes are not ones as to which an objective person, informed of the trial proceedings, could reasonably conclude an appearance of bias existed. Mejia, supra, 916 A.2d at 903. Canon 3(E)(c) of the District of Columbia Courts Code of Judicial Conduct states that: A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including ... where ... the judge's spouse ... has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy... or has any more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, Canon 3(E)(c) (1995). [3] The Code nowhere suggests that the mere fact that a judge's spouse belongs to the same profession as a party is enough to create an appearance of partiality. Cf. Klein v. Dietz, No. 95-CA-47, 1998 WL 896345, at, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6196, at  (Ohio Ct.App., Dec. 16, 1998) (To disqualify every judge from a medical malpractice suit merely because they are a member of some hospital board or have a family member in the practice of medicine would be extremely impractical). Moreover, the Code states that an economic interest denotes ownership of a more than de minimis legal or equitable interest, or a relationship as officer, director, advisor or other active participant, in the affairs of a party.  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra, Terminology (emphasis added). Nothing in the Code suggests that the mere (purported) fact that a judge's spouse belongs to the same malpractice insurance pool as a defendant physician is enough to raise an appearance of bias. [4] To discern the appearance of partiality that Coulter posits, we would have to make a number of assumptions for which there is no support in the record: that Judge Combs Greene's spouse was insured by the same malpractice insurance company and in the same malpractice pool as one or more of the defendants, and that a judgment against one or more of those defendants in this case would have a significant adverse impact on the malpractice insurance premiums paid by the judge's spouse. In other words, we would have to layer[ ] several speculative premises on top of one another to reach [the] speculative conclusion that Coulter would have us reach. Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., 234 Fed.Appx. 341, 356 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 600 (5th Cir.2004)). Such an edifice of conjecture will not support an objective conclusion that [the trial judge] has a financial interest in the outcome of this case. Scott, 234 Fed.Appx. at 357 (quoting Sensley, 385 F.3d at 600); see also York v. United States, 785 A.2d 651, 656 (D.C.2001) (citing authority that speculation will not satisfy the requirements for disqualification of a judge) (citations omitted); Hoatson v. New York Archdiocese, 280 Fed.Appx. 88, 90 (2d Cir.2008) (Any pecuniary interest that Judge Crotty's brother may have in the instant litigation by virtue of his status as a partner in a law firm that represents the [defendant] Archdiocese in other litigation is too `remote, contingent, indirect or speculative' to lead a reasonable person to question Judge Crotty's impartiality). We agree with an observation by the Supreme Court of Alabama in a case in which that court considered whether an appearance of bias arose from the fact that defense expert witnesses were members of the same mutual liability insurance company as the defendant: the potential for bias ... due to ... coverage under a professional liability policy is so remote as to be virtually non-existent. Otwell v. Bryant, 497 So.2d 111, 115 (Ala.1986). In light of the remoteness of any potential for bias, we also cannot agree that Judge Combs Greene abused her discretion in denying Coulter's request for disclosure. Coulter is correct that under the Code  specifically, the Commentary to Canon 3(E)  a judge should disclose on the record of her own accord information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra, Canon 3(E) cmt. However, the law affirmatively shields judges from... questioning such as Coulter tendered to Judge Combs Greene. Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1489 n. 10 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941)). Once trial commenced, Coulter did not renew her request that the trial judge recuse herself for bias, and appellees argue that we may review only for plain error Coulter's claims about the trial judge's partisan misconduct during voir dire and trial. Assuming, however, that the recusal motion remained alive, and with due regard for any risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process, ( Thaddeus ) Foster v. United States, 615 A.2d 213, 222 (D.C.1992), we have painstakingly reviewed each of Coulter's many examples of claimed partisan misconduct by the trial judge. We see no evidence of partisan misconduct that could warrant relief under any standard of review. This already-quite-lengthy opinion would require many more pages were we to address here each of Coulter's allegations of partisan misconduct. We discuss only a sampling (which, we think, will suffice to convey the tenor of the remaining examples). [5] Several of Coulter's allegations of partisan misconduct focus on jury selection. One is that Judge Combs Greene refused to strike for cause a prospective juror, the daughter of a cardiologist, who said that she maybe [had] a little bit of question about the validity of some large medical malpractice settlements, and who expressed some concern about whether there should be any cap on medical malpractice things and about high [malpractice] insurance premiums charged to OBGYNs. But the juror also had a history of thyroid cancer, a breast biopsy and a lung mass  a history that one might expect would make her sympathetic to Coulter, counterbalancing her concern about large malpractice awards. Moreover, the juror said repeatedly that she thought she could be fair, saying at one point that she could be fair unless I felt that the amount being requested was in my mind totally out of line with what the situation was but that would depend on what I heard. The juror made these statements in response to the court's extensive inquiries about whether she could be fair in this case to everyone and fair in terms of the evidence. We see no basis for concluding that the court's action with respect to this juror evidenced bias in favor of appellees. [6] Several of Coulter's claims of partisan misconduct reflect an erroneous understanding of the law. For example, Coulter complains of Judge Combs Greene's having threatened to hold Coulter's counsel in contempt for having directly contacted defendants' experts to arrange deposition dates. Coulter's argument as to why this was improper is a citation to our case law recognizing that an adverse party may call another party's experts as witnesses. See Abbey v. Jackson, 483 A.2d 330, 333 (D.C.1984). However, nothing in Abbey required the trial judge to condone the contact by Coulter's counsel with defendants' experts. And, contrary to Coulter's argument, this court's opinion in Nelson v. McCreary, 694 A.2d 897, 903-04 (D.C.1997), in no way suggests that counsel's contact with the adverse party's testifying experts is permissible so long as no confidential or privileged information is disclosed. Judge Combs Greene's reaction was consistent with case law recognizing the ethical issues raised by direct ex parte contact with an expert witness who will testify... for the opposing party on the central issue in the case. Chemical Bank v. Executive Mgmt. Co., 1995 WL 774526, 1995 Conn.Super. LEXIS 3429 (Conn.Super.Ct. Oct. 23, 1995); see also Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 27 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions following one party's contact with the other party's designated expert). [7] In another example of purported partisan misconduct, Coulter asserts that Judge Combs Greene untruthfully told the jury that Coulter consented to the presentation of Dr. Zuurbier's testimony out of turn. In fact, the judge told the jury that Coulter had graciously allowed the Defendant to call this witness out of order which was true in that  although he initially objected  Coulter's counsel made no further protest or response once the court described this accommodation as a matter of civility and asked counsel to explain why an accommodation was not appropriate. As to Coulter's suggestion that the judge's statement should be regarded as a partisan attempt to avoid a ruling that Dr. Taylor waived the right to move for a directed verdict by putting on a witness during plaintiff's case, the short answer is that a defendant does not waive[ ] the right to move for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case merely by putting on evidence out of turn. O'Neil v. Bergan, 452 A.2d 337, 343 n. 7 (D.C.1982). [8] An error of law also underlies Coulter's assertion that Judge Combs Greene erroneously ruled that Dr. Fullum was Ms. Coulter's witness and could, therefore, be lead [sic] by Fullum's own counsel. The court's ruling was correct. Under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 43(b), when a party (here, Coulter) calls an adverse party as a witness, that witness (here, Dr. Fullum) may be cross-examined by the adverse party; and, as our case law recognizes, leading questions are the principal tool and hallmark of cross-examination. United States v. Hsu, 439 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C.1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In summary, we reject Coulter's claims of partisan misconduct, because we can say with assurance that, on the record before us, an objective observer would have no difficulty understanding that Judge Combs Greene's conduct of the trial was not influenced by bias. Gibson v. United States, 792 A.2d 1059, 1069 (D.C. 2002).