Opinion ID: 1036479
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Heading: Batson and Its Progeny

Text: It is clearly established federal law that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a criminal defendant has a constitutional “right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85–86, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court established a three-step test for evaluating racial discrimination claims in jury selection. In the first step, the defendant must establish a prima facie case by producing evidence sufficient to support the inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169–70, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2416–17 (2005); Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. In determining whether the defendant has made a prima facie case, the court must consider, inter alia: (1) any pattern of strikes against jurors of one race; and (2) “the prosecutor’s questions and statements during voir dire examination” and in exercising peremptory challenges. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723; 53 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 54 of 128 see also United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A] pattern of strikes against all venire members of one race or gender is considered significant” in establishing a prima facie case.). “Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing,” in the second step “the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. The State may not rebut the defendant’s prima facie case by simply denying a discriminatory motive or “affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections.” Id. at 98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723–24 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The State’s proffered explanation need not be “persuasive, or even plausible . . . . the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–78, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has rejected the contention “that the justification tendered at the second step be not just neutral but also at least minimally persuasive.” Id. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. “It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant . . . .” Id. In the third and final step, “[t]he trial court . . . will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S. Ct. at 1724. This is “a pure issue of fact, subject to review under 54 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 55 of 128 a deferential standard . . . . [and] ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 365, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991) (plurality opinion). Further, “[i]n deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1723; see also id. at 93, 106 S. Ct. at 1721 (“In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Those relevant circumstances may include the strength of the defendant’s prima facie case at step one. See id. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723 (observing that “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors . . . might give rise to an inference of discrimination”); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375, 111 S. Ct. at 1875 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Disproportionate effect may, of course, constitute evidence of intentional discrimination. The trial court may, because of such effect, disbelieve the prosecutor and find that the asserted justification is merely a pretext for intentional race-based discrimination.”). “In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S. Ct. at 1869 (plurality opinion). “[E]valuation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility 55 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 56 of 128 lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate court may not “overturn the state trial court’s finding on the issue of discriminatory intent unless convinced that [the trial court’s] determination was clearly erroneous.” Id. at 369, 111 S. Ct. at 1871; see also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). The determination “on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364, 111 S. Ct. at 1868; see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (2008). Ultimately, the burden of persuasion to show purposeful discrimination “rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. “[A] defendant may rely on ‘all relevant circumstances’ to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination” in the third step. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005). As to “side-by-side comparisons,” the Supreme Court has said that “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Id. at 241, 125 S. Ct. at 56 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 57 of 128 2325.12 Importantly too, “under Batson, the striking of one black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause, even where other black jurors are seated, and even when valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors are shown.” United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478, 128 S. Ct. at 1208 (“Because we find that the trial court committed clear error in overruling petitioner’s Batson objection with respect to [one venire member], we have no need to consider petitioner’s claim regarding [a second venire member].”). With this Supreme Court background, we turn to the jury-selection record.