Opinion ID: 578371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tolling Due to Physical and Mental Incapacity

Text: 20 Lawson also argues that the district court erred in granting the appellees' motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds because the running of the statute was tolled for at least the requisite one day pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-90, 9-3-91, due to Lawson's mental and physical incapacity. 21 In his response to appellees' motion to dismiss, Lawson alleged that the statute of limitations was tolled because as a result of the injury caused by defendants, the plaintiff was physically and mentally incapacitated and was incompetent to manage his own affairs.... Appellees replied arguing that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90 requires a showing (1) that plaintiff was legally incompetent, (2) because of mental retardation or mental illness as defined in Title 37 of the Georgia Code. Accordingly, appellees contended that plaintiff could not withstand their motion to dismiss because plaintiff had not alleged either that he had been declared legally incompetent or that he was mentally retarded or mentally ill. 22 The district court, without explaining what standard it was applying, granted appellees' motion to dismiss, stating simply that  [t]he facts alleged by plaintiff indicated that he was hospitalized, but this does not constitute incapacity as intended by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90 (Supp.1985). In so holding, the district court erred. 23 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90 (Supp.1987) provides a tolling of the statute of limitations for persons who are legally incompetent because of mental retardation or mental illness for so long as their disability persists. 7 Appellee Glover argues on appeal, as he did below, that a plaintiff who alleges that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to section 9-3-90 must establish both that he was legally incompetent and that he was either mentally ill or mentally retarded as those terms are defined in Title 37 of the Georgia Code. Glover, however, cites no cases to support his interpretation of section 9-3-90. Moreover, he neglects to mention that the Georgia Court of Appeals, the highest Georgia court to have interpreted the mental incapacity tolling provision, has adopted a markedly different standard. 24 Specifically, the Georgia Court of Appeals consistently has employed the same standard for determining whether the statute of limitations should be tolled due to plaintiff's mental incapacity pursuant to section 9-3-90 as it employed under the mental incapacity provision of Ga.Code Ann. § 3-801, the predecessor statute to section 9-3-90. Under this standard: 25 [t]he test for mental incapacity is not whether one did not manage his own affairs, acquiescing in the management thereof by others, or whether one has merely managed his affairs unsuccessfully or badly. That one was not 'bright' or not clear about some matters occurring during the period is not evidence of mental incompetency. The test is one of capacity--whether the individual, being of unsound mind, could not manage the ordinary affairs of his life. 26 Curlee v. Mock Enterprises, Inc., 173 Ga.App. 594, 327 S.E.2d 736, 742 (1985) (citations omitted; emphasis added) (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90, quoting Tri-Cities Hosp. Auth. v. Sheats, 156 Ga.App. 28, 30, 273 S.E.2d 903 (1980) (interpreting Ga.Code Ann. § 3-801), aff'd, 247 Ga. 713, 279 S.E.2d 210 (1981); see Modern Roofing & Metal Works, Inc. v. Owen, 174 Ga.App. 875, 332 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1985) (plaintiff's claim that he was unable to manage the ordinary affairs of his life due to depression resulting from medical problems and job-related stress sufficed to invoke the tolling provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90); cf. Whisnant v. Coots, 176 Ga.App. 724, 337 S.E.2d 766, 768 (1985) (physical disability alone will not toll the running of the statute of limitations). As we are not aware of any persuasive indication that Georgia's Supreme Court would interpret O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90 otherwise, we adopt the standard for mental incapacity employed by the Georgia Court of Appeals. See Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942, 948 (11th Cir.1982). 27 Turning to whether plaintiff's allegations in his response to the motion to dismiss were sufficient to withstand the motion, we observe that under the Georgia Court of Appeals' interpretation of section 9-3-90, a plaintiff may establish a toll due to mental incapacity based on the claim that, as a result of the occurrence giving rise to the cause of action, the plaintiff became mentally and physically incapacitated so as to be incapable of acting for himself in carrying on his business and in prosecuting his claim. Lowe v. Pue, 150 Ga.App. 234, 257 S.E.2d 209, 210, 212 (1979); see City of Atlanta v. Barrett, 102 Ga.App. 469, 116 S.E.2d 654, 657-58 (1960). We conclude that under this standard Lawson's allegation that as a result of the injury caused by defendants, [he] was physically and mentally incapacitated and was incompetent to manage his own affairs.... for a period of more than one day was sufficient to invoke the tolling provisions of section 9-3-90 and thus to enable him to withstand appellees' motion to dismiss his complaint. See Lowe, 257 S.E.2d at 210, 212 (plaintiff's allegation that, as the result of the automobile crash which gave rise to her cause of action, she was totally physically and mentally incapacitated with the result that she was incompetent to manage her affairs for a period of three weeks following the crash sufficiently invoked the tolling provisions of Ga.Code Ann. § 3-801 to enable plaintiff to withstand defendant's motion to dismiss); Barrett, 116 S.E.2d at 657-58 (plaintiff's allegation that he was wholly and completely mentally and physically disabled from conducting his own ... affairs sufficiently invoked the tolling provisions of Ga.Code Ann. § 3-801 to withstand a general demurrer); see also Owen, 332 S.E.2d at 15-16 (plaintiff's claim, supported by an affidavit from his doctor, that depression resulting from medical problems and stress rendered him unable to manage the ordinary affairs of his life sufficiently invoked O.C.G.A. § 9-3-90 to enable plaintiff to withstand a motion for summary judgment); cf. Whisnant, 337 S.E.2d at 767-68 (applying, though distinguishing, the rule of Barrett ).