Opinion ID: 1781165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Humphrey's statements were the result of an illegal arrest.

Text: For this point, Humphrey argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because of his warrantless arrest while in his home. He relies on Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), where the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Consistent with this principle, this court has held that all warrantless and nonconsensual entries into the home are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, unless at the time of entry there exists probable cause and exigent circumstances. Butler v. State, 309 Ark. 211, 829 S.W.2d 412 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 998, 113 S.Ct. 597, 121 L.Ed.2d 534 (1992); Mitchell v. State, 294 Ark. 264, 742 S.W.2d 895 (1988).
Humphrey initially challenges the existence of probable cause to arrest him. A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person committed a felony. Ark.R.Crim.P. 4.1(a)(i). Probable cause exists where there is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person to believe that a crime has been committed by the person suspected. Ross v. State, 300 Ark. 369, 779 S.W.2d 161 (1989). The degree of proof sufficient to sustain a conviction is not required for probable cause to arrest. Id. All presumptions are favorable to the trial court's ruling on the legality of the arrest, and the burden of demonstrating error rests on the appellant. Id. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had reasonable cause to arrest Humphrey for committing a felony. Officers Dinwiddie and Bozarth both heard gunshots, and arrived at the crime scene only minutes after the shots. Frank Galloway immediately told Dinwiddie that Marko Humphrey committed the shooting. Dinwiddie asked Johnson who had shot her, and she told him that Humphrey did it. Dinwiddie knew who Humphrey was, and where he lived (and that the house was nearby). Humphrey argues that the witness and victim identification of Humphrey was not reliable, highlighting Caperton's own testimony that he had found Galloway to be unreliable in a prior, unrelated investigation. However, this is not a typical probable cause case where an informant has provided information to police officers. Rather, one of the surviving victims specifically identified Humphrey as the perpetrator. This identification was corroborated by another eyewitness. Where information is provided by a victim or witness to a crime, concerns about veracity or basis of knowledge are not as great. See generally, Wayne R. LaFave & Jeorld H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 3.3(d) (1984 and supp.1991) (distinguishing informant probable cause cases from victim-witness type probable cause cases). Here, both the victim and an eyewitness described the perpetrator in great detail identifying him by nameonly minutes after the shootings. Only a short amount of time elapsed between the time of the crime and the arrest, and Humphrey could have easily walked or run the few blocks between the crime scene and his grandmother's house. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the officers had probable cause to arrest Humphrey.
Next, we turn to Humphrey's contention that the officers' entry into his grandmother's house was nonconsensual. If the officers did not have valid consent, then there must have been exigent circumstances justifying the entry. Payton v. New York, supra . We have stated that consent to a warrantless search of one's home must be given freely and voluntarily. Guzman v. State, 283 Ark. 112, 672 S.W.2d 656 (1984). The State has a heavy burden to prove by clear and positive testimony that consent was freely and voluntarily given. Id. On appeal, we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances to determine if the State has met its burden. Id. At the suppression hearing, Dinwiddie testified that he went to Richardson's residence with Bozarth and Caperton. When they arrived, Dinwiddie knocked on the door and Richardson answered. He testified that he told her they needed to talk with Marko. When asked what was [Richardson's] response? Dinwiddie answered: She said okay, that he was in bed asleep and she went in, we all went in, and she woke him up and she wanted to know what was the problem and we told her what we had heard and we needed to take him down to the office and talk with him. Caperton corroborated this version of events: We knocked at the door and his grandmother came to the door. I believe Officer Dinwiddie was the one that said that we wanted to know if Marko was at home and told her that there had been a shooting and that we needed to talk to him. She let us in the house and took us to Marko's room where he was laying in the bed and we got him up and got him dressed and carried him to the county jail. Additionally, Bozarth testified to this sequence of events: We approached the door, knocked, and Marko's grandmother answered the door and we asked her if Marko was at home and she said yes, he was. He'd been there for a little while. We asked if we could speak with him and she wanted to know what the problem was and we advised her that we had suspected Marko had been involved in a shooting incident and we needed to talk with him. So she let us in the house and she walked to the bedroom where Marko was asleep so we woke Marko up and at that time we took Marko into custody. Bozarth admitted that they did not inform Richardson that they did not have an arrest warrant for Humphrey, or that she did not have to let them in. Richardson testified that the officers knocked on the door and that she answered. They then announced that they were looking for Marko. Richardson further testified to the following: Q: Was there any more conversation before they entered the house? A: No. Q: Did you invite them in? A: Well, I just opened the door and they just come in. Q: You didn't say `Come on in'? A: No, I just opened the door. Q: Did you believe at that time that you were free to tell themto refuse them entry? A: I didn't know. Q: Did any of them tell you they didn't have a warrant? A: If they had one I didn't see it. Q: Did any of them tell you that you were free not to let them in if you didn't want to? A: No. She further testified that she went into Humphrey's room before Officer Dinwiddie in order to get Humphrey. The officers' testimony constitutes clear and positive evidence that Richardson voluntarily let them in her house after they informed her that they were there to talk to Humphrey. The State correctly notes that an officer is not required to inform a person that consent may be withdrawn; the failure to so advise an individual does not invalidate consent. See Grant v. State, 267 Ark. 50, 589 S.W.2d 11 (1979). At most, Richardson's arguably conflicting testimony simply required a credibility determination by the trial court. In such cases, we defer to the trial court's superior position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. See Hamm v. State, 296 Ark. 385, 757 S.W.2d 932 (1988); Jones v. State, 11 Ark.App. 129, 668 S.W.2d 30 (1984). Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous in determining Richardson consented to the officers' entry into her home.
However, even if Richardson had not consented to the entry into her home, there were still exigent circumstances justifying the officers' warrantless entry. Exigent circumstances are those requiring immediate aid or action, and, while there is no definite list of what constitutes exigent circumstances, several established examples include the risk of removal or destruction of evidence, danger to the lives of police officers or others, and the hot pursuit of a suspect. Butler v. State, 309 Ark. 211, 829 S.W.2d 412 (1992). The facts of the present case are not unlike those presented in Gaylor v. State, 284 Ark. 215, 681 S.W.2d 348 (1984). There, an armed robbery was committed in a restaurant at about 10:00 p.m. The investigating officers determined that the robbery must have been committed by a former employee. The appellant, a former employee of the restaurant, fit the description of the robber and was known to be in need of money. The officers then went directly to the appellant's residence at 10:27 p.m., and knocked on the door and announced themselves over a loudspeaker. After receiving no response, the officers entered the residence through an unlocked door and arrested the appellant, in addition to seizing incriminating evidence. On appeal, the appellant argued that, based on Payton v. New York, supra , the officers lacked reasonable cause to arrest and exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry. The Gaylor court affirmed, noting six potential exigent circumstances: 1) the commission of a grave offense; 2) belief that the suspect is armed; 3) a clear showing of probable cause; 4) strong reason to suspect that the suspect is in the premises being entered; 5) likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and 6) danger of the destruction of evidence. Gaylor v. State, supra (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976) and Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1970)). In the present case, murder had been committed, clearly a most grave offense. Since the victims were shot and no murder weapon was immediately apparent at the crime scene, the officers had good reason to believe that the suspect was armed and dangerous. Additionally, Bozarth and Dinwiddie testified that they heard gunshots at about 3:35 a.m., and Caperton testified that they arrived at the residence at 4:21 a.m., less than an hour after the shootings. As discussed above, the officers had strong probable cause to believe that Humphrey was the perpetrator. Dinwiddie also knew that Humphrey lived with his grandmother, giving the officers a strong reason to suspect that Humphrey was in the premises being entered. Under these particular facts, we conclude that sufficient exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless entry into the home, even if Richardson did not consent to the entry. See Gaylor v. State, supra . Therefore, the trial court was not clearly erroneous in denying the motion to suppress on the ground that the officers illegally arrested Humphrey.