Opinion ID: 2626902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Creation of an Actual Parent-Child Relationship

Text: ¶ 82 I now turn to the second part of the de facto parent test. To satisfy this part, the petitioner must prove that he or she and the child formed an actual parent-child relationship. Cf. Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 711 N.E.2d 165 (1999) (holding that an aunt was a de facto parent where she and the child had developed a substantial mother-daughter relationship). A petitioner satisfies this requirement by establishing that (1) the petitioner lived with and cared for the child on a daily basis, and as a result (2) the petitioner and the child formed a parent-child bond.
¶ 83 In order for a third party and a child to develop an actual parent-child relationship, the third party must have lived with and cared for the child on a daily basis. See V.C., 748 A.2d at 551 (requiring that a petitioner lived in the same household as the child and assumed obligations of parenthood); H.S.H-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421 (same). There is no minimum period of time during which a third party must have lived with and cared for the child. It is, however, appropriate for a court to consider the amount of time during which the third party has functioned as a parent when determining whether an actual parent-child relationship has been created. See V.C., 748 A.2d at 553. In other words, the petitioner must have functioned in a parental role for a long enough period of time to allow a bonded parent-child relationship to develop. Id. How much time is necessary will turn on the facts of each case, including the child's age, [10] developmental stage, and the nature of the relationship. Id. ¶ 84 The care the third party provides to the child during this time must be equivalent to the care a biological or legal parent would provide. This does not require that the third party have the exact same relationship with the child or assume the same responsibilities toward the child as the legal parent. Rather, it demands that the third party assume the normal obligations of parenthood and do so without the expectation of financial compensation. Id. at 551. These obligations include taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education and development, H.S.H-K, 533 N.W.2d at 436, and may or may not include financial contributions to the child and the household. V.C., 748 A.2d at 553. As with the other parts of the de facto parent test, this inquiry is fact sensitive and will vary with each individual case. ¶ 85 Turning to the facts of this case, I believe that Jones has clearly and convincingly shown that she lived with and cared for the child on a daily basis. Jones lived with Barlow and the child from the child's birth until the child was two years old. During that time, Jones participated in the child's daily care as if she were a parent. She took her to doctor appointments, dropped her off at child care, and attended to the child's daily personal needs, such as eating and bathing. Jones also provided the child with financial security, not only by providing for the child in her will and securing a life insurance policy, but also by contributing to the household expenses. ¶ 86 As is the case in most two-parent households, Jones' parental obligations and responsibilities were not the same as Barlow's. For example, when the child was an infant, Barlow, as the nursing mother, nearly always fed the child. Likewise, during the first fifteen months of the child's life, Barlow stayed at home while Jones worked. As the child grew, the parties' roles evolved accordingly, with Barlow returning to work and Jones assuming more care-giving responsibilities. These differences, however, do not mean that Jones was not fulfilling a parental role. Indeed, this division of roles is nearly identical to that frequently found between married men and women with children. Like the district court, I am convinced that Jones assumed the obligations of parenthood by taking sufficient and significant responsibility for the child's care, upbringing, future education and well-being . . . without expectation of financial compensation. ¶ 87 I recognize that Jones' role had changed by the time she filed her petition for visitation. Barlow and the child had moved out, and therefore Jones was no longer living with the child and caring for her on a daily basis. This is not problematic, however. Unlike the doctrine of in loco parentis, a de facto parent need not still be living in the same household as the child at the time the petition is filed; in fact, it is highly unlikely that he or she will be. The third party need only petition the court for visitation within a reasonable time after the legal parent interferes with the third party's relationship with the child. As a practical matter, this interference often will not occur until the third party and the child no longer live together and the legal parent denies visitation. [11] In this case, Jones filed her petition within a reasonable time of Barlow's interference. The parties separated on November 7, 2003, Barlow denied Jones visitation with the child later that same month, and Jones filed her complaint on December 19, 2003. Thus, Jones satisfies our requirement that she lived with and cared for the child on a day-to-day basis.
¶ 88 In addition to the requirement that a petitioner live with and care for the child, to prove the existence of an actual parent-child relationship, the petitioner must show that the petitioner and the child share a relationship with deep emotional bonds such that the child recognizes the person, independent of the legal form of the relationship, as a parent from whom they receive daily guidance and nurturance. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 559 (Colo.Ct.App.2004), cert. denied, 2004 WL 2377164, 2004 Colo. LEXIS 851, cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1111, 125 S.Ct. 2551, 162 L.Ed.2d 287 (2005). A child can form this type of relationship regardless of whether the potential de facto parent is biologically related to the child. See, e.g., J. Hammond Muench & Martin R. Levy, Psychological Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 Fam. L.Q. 129, 152 (1979) ([T]he child's development depends upon the continuity and character of [the] relationship with the adult he perceives as his parent, and . . . this perception rather than the fact of biological parenthood is the basis of their relationship. (citation omitted)); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) ([B]iological relationships are not [the] exclusive determination of the existence of a family.). Rather, bonded parent-child relationships form when children receive sensitive and responsive care from familiar adults, who may or may not be biologically related, in the course of everyday caresuch as being fed, held, spoken to, played with, soothed, and stimulated. Joan B. Kelley & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 297, 298 (2000); see also Smith, 431 U.S. at 844, 97 S.Ct. 2094 ([T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in `promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children. (citation omitted) (alteration in original)). In addition, parent-child bonds develop and grow stronger when the child spends time in the third party's general proximity. Kelley & Lamb, supra ¶ 88, at 298. ¶ 89 There is ample evidence of an actual parent-child bond in this case. As noted previously, Jones lived with and cared for the child for the first two years of the child's life. Jones testified that she felt bonded to the child during this time, particularly in the mornings when she and the child were alone. Moreover, as is evident by this lawsuit, Jones seriously wishes to maintain this relationship. I find it persuasive that family and friends testified that the relationship between Jones and the child mirrored a traditional parent-child relationship. The district judge found the testimony of these witnesses particularly persuasive because they witnessed this relationship in the home at times that were not merely social occasions, but rather in evenings and early mornings. The child's pediatrician echoed these witnesses, testifying that [i]n the office, both [Jones and Barlow] seemed to take a very active role in [the child's] well-being and be very genuinely interested in how she was doing. Like the district judge, I find this testimony extremely important. ¶ 90 It is undisputed that Barlow also shared a close mother-daughter relationship with the child. Like the district judge, I believe that Barlow may have had a closer relationship with the child given that she was the biological and nursing mother. I do not believe, however, that Barlow's closer relationship with the child prohibits the child and Jones from also developing an actual parent-child relationship. That the third party is not the child's primary caregiver does not imply that the third party and the child do not share a real parent-child bond. Research has shown that children generally form attachments to both parents at the same age, usually around six to seven months. Kelly & Lamb, supra ¶ 88, at 300. This is true even where one parent spends more time with the child than the other, as is the case in the traditional home. Id. Evidence that Barlow was the child's primary caregiver does not defeat a claim of an actual parent-child bond between Jones and the child. Thus, Jones meets the requirement that she formed an actual parental bond with the child.