Opinion ID: 874778
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea?

Text: Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) states: A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea. The rule distinguishes between pleas made prior to and after sentencing, exacting a less rigorous measure of proof for presentence motions. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485, 861 P.2d 51, 55 (1993). To withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, the defendant must show a just reason for withdrawing the plea. Id. If he does so, then the State may avoid the granting of the motion by showing that prejudice would result if the plea were withdrawn. Id. A showing of manifest injustice is necessary in order to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea brought after sentencing will only be granted to correct manifest injustice. State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007). 1. Defendant must show manifest injustice. Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea nine months after the district court sentenced him. Defendant contends that the motion should be considered as having been made before sentencing because the sentencing was void. According to Defendant, the court never actually accepted the plea of guilty after it had made the determinations required by I.C.R. 11(c) or adjudged him guilty of the crime. If it did not accept the guilty plea, then Defendant was never formally adjudged guilty under I.C. § 19-101; [s]ince he had never been adjudged guilty, he could not be sentenced; and thus his sentence was illegal, and he was being unlawfully held in prison. Idaho Criminal Rule 11(c) states: Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show: (1) The voluntariness of the plea. (2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply. (3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the defendant would waive the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses against the defendant. (4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against the defendant. (5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by any promises or recommendation from either party as to punishment. In this case, Defendant's attorney recited the plea agreement to the district court, and then the prosecutor agreed with the recitation and moved to dismiss two of the charges. The court granted the motion and asked Defendant if he would like to enter a new plea to the rape charge. Defendant answered that he would, the court asked what the plea was, and Defendant responded, Guilty. The court then asked some questions about Defendant's knowledge or belief about the victim's age, his understanding that a mistaken belief she was over eighteen years of age was not a defense to the rape charge, and whether the act of sexual intercourse was consensual. The court then said, I accept the plea of guilty to count one [the rape charge], and the court then proceeded to question Defendant to make a record of the matters set forth in subsections (1) through (5) of Rule 11(c). Defendant contends that because the court's verbal acceptance of the guilty plea preceded rather than followed the questioning, the court never properly accepted the guilty plea. Defendant has not pointed to any authority requiring that the court verbally announce that it has accepted a defendant's plea of guilty. Idaho Code § 19-101 states, No person can be punished for a public offense except upon a legal conviction in a court having jurisdiction thereof. Idaho Code § 19-109 states, No person can be convicted of a public offense unless by the verdict of a jury, accepted and recorded by the court, or upon a plea of guilty. . . . Thus, a conviction occurs `by the verdict of a jury . . . or upon a plea of guilty' and it must precede punishment. United States v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 404, 179 P.3d 1059, 1060 (2008). There is no requirement that a court orally announce that it has accepted a guilty plea in order for there to be a conviction. The court questioned Defendant at length to ensure that he had pled guilty voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and it then announced a date for imposing sentence. The court obviously had accepted Defendant's guilty plea because it could not proceed to sentencing if it had not done so. Therefore, Defendant was required to show manifest injustice in order to withdraw his plea of guilty. 2. District court's failure to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d)(2) did not constitute manifest injustice. Defendant contends that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because the district court failed to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d)(2) by advising him that he would be required to register as a sex offender. Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver is not met. State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195 (2007). To determine whether a plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, we examine the record to determine: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484, 861 P.2d 51, 54 (1993). Defendant does not contend that he did not understand the nature of the charges, and the record shows that he did. Count 1 of the information alleged, That the said HALTON LEE FLOWERS, in the County of Bannock, State of Idaho, on or about the 1st day of August, 2007, did accomplish an act of sexual intercourse with a person, under the age of eighteen, A.C. of the present age of sixteen (16) years. The district court stated that before accepting the plea he was going to ask some questions, and the first question was, In Bannock County, Idaho, on or about August 1, 2007, did you accomplish an act of sexual intercourse with a person under the age of eighteen, being then the age of sixteen? Defendant answered, Yes, sir. The court then inquired about Defendant's belief as to the victim's age, his knowledge that a mistake as to her age was not a defense, and his understanding that she could not legally consent to sexual intercourse. Defendant does not contend that he was coerced into pleading guilty, and during his colloquy with the court, Defendant stated that nobody had threatened him or promised him anything to plead guilty and that his guilty plea was entirely voluntary and of his own free will. Near the end of the colloquy, the court again asked Defendant if the plea was entirely voluntary and of his own free will, and Defendant answered that it was. Defendant does not contend that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself. Prior to pleading guilty, Defendant filled out a Guilty Questionnaire. One of the questions was as follows: 14. Do you understand that you have a Constitutional right to: A. Jury trial where the State must convince all jurors of your guilt? B. Remain silent and not make any statement to the Court or any person that will incriminate you, or any way help to prove the charges against you? C. Require that all persons who have accused you of the crime appear in Court and be questioned under oath? To the right of each question was a line in which Defendant wrote, Yes. During the colloquy, the court explained these rights to Defendant in greater detail, and Defendant stated that he understood he was waiving them by pleading guilty. Defendant contends that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty because, At no time before this [sentencing] hearing or prior to entering my plea was I advised by my counsel or the court of the punishment and requirement to register that I'd be subject to. . . . [3] Defendant knew the maximum sentence for the crime of rape. In the Guilty Questionnaire, Defendant was asked, What is the maximum prison sentence that you may receive for each crime? In the line below the question, he wrote, Life Count 1. In its colloquy with Defendant, the court stated: And, sir, this is a felony, and the legislature has set the maximum sentence you could receive. It could be up to life in a state correctional facility without parole or good time. The court did not inform Defendant that he would be required to register as a sexual offender. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a court is only required to inform the defendant of the direct consequences of the plea. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99, 982 P.2d 931, 934 (1999). [S]ex offender registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. Therefore, the district judge's failure to inform [Defendant] prior to entry of his plea that he would be required to register as a sex offender does not invalidate his plea. Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 11(d)(2) provides: (d) Other advisories upon acceptance of plea. The district judge shall, prior to entry of a guilty plea or the making of factual admissions during a plea colloquy, instruct on the following: . . . . (2) If the defendant is pleading guilty to any offense requiring registration on the sex offender registry, the court shall inform the defendant of such registration requirements. The failure to comply with Idaho Criminal Rule 11 does not, by itself, constitute manifest injustice. That rule has not been held to be constitutionally mandated in order to fulfill the requirement of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea. State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 98, 156 P.3d 1193, 1196 (2007). Likewise, amending the rule in 2007 to add subsection (d)(2) did not transform the registration requirement into a direct consequence of the plea. 3. Alleged violations of the plea agreement. Defendant contends that there is manifest injustice because the State violated the plea agreement. He asserts that the first two violations occurred during the sentencing hearing because the presentence report and the prosecutor's comments both referred to facts relating to the dismissed charges. There was no violation of the plea agreement. The plea agreement, as stated by Defendant's counsel, was: He is going to plead guilty to statutory rape. The State's going to recommend three fixed, seven indeterminate and they're going to dismiss all other charges in all other cases. We're free to make our own recommendations at sentencing. The plea agreement did not in any way restrict the information that the State could provide to the district court at sentencing. Under the plea agreement, the prosecutor agreed to recommend a sentence of ten years in the custody of the Idaho Board of Correction, with three years fixed and seven years indeterminate. The district court was not bound by that recommendation. It could impose that sentence, a lesser sentence, or a greater sentence. There is no requirement that the State limit the information provided to the sentencing court to the amount estimated as necessary to convince the court to impose the recommended sentence. There should be no limitation placed on the information presented to the court regarding the background, character, and conduct of the defendant being sentenced. In State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 583, 618 P.2d 759, 761 (1980), we quoted with approval from Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1337, 1342 (1949), as follows: [M]odern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial. Information that a sentencing court can rely upon includes a defendant's past criminal behavior that resulted in a conviction, Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2204-05, 132 L.Ed.2d 351, 362 (1995); the defendant's prior uncharged criminal conduct, id.; and the defendant's prior conduct for which he was tried and acquitted, United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156, 117 S.Ct. 633, 637-38, 136 L.Ed.2d 554, 564 (1997). When imposing a sentence, the court is to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, Idaho Code § 19-2521(1), and it is to consider whether imprisonment is warranted for protection of the public. Absent a provision in the plea agreement expressly limiting the information that the State can present, it can present any relevant information that could assist the court. Defendant's conduct relating to the dismissed charges could properly be considered by the district court, and there was nothing in the plea agreement purporting to prevent the State from submitting that information or referring to it. Defendant also contends that the State breached the plea agreement during the hearing on Defendant's motion for reduction of sentence made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. The district court imposed a sentence that was greater than the prosecutor's recommendation pursuant to the plea agreement. At the hearing on Defendant's motion for reduction of the sentence, the prosecutor argued against the reduction, stating, I don't think granting the Rule 35 is appropriate and we would ask you to keep his sentence the same. Relying upon State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 223 P.3d 750 (2009), Defendant argues that the prosecutor's conduct constituted a breach of the plea agreement. In Lampien, the prosecutor agreed to be bound by a plea agreement under which the defendant would receive a withheld judgment, no jail time, and probation. The trial court instead sentenced the defendant to five years in prison with a minimum period of confinement of three years. She filed a motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 for reduction of her sentence, and the prosecutor opposed the motion. We held that under the somewhat unusual language of the plea agreement, the prosecutor breached the agreement by doing so. Id. at 378, 223 P.3d at 761. The agreement recited that [t]he State and Defendant agree to be bound to following [sic] sentence agreement. Id. at 377, 223 P.3d at 760. We stated, The significance of this language is that the State was not simply bound to the agreed-upon recommendation at Lampien's sentencing, but the broad language represents an unqualified commitment by the State to adhere to the sentencing recommendation at every stage of the proceedings. Id. at 378, 223 P.3d at 761. The circumstances in this case differ from Lampien. The prosecutor did not agree to be bound by a particular agreed-upon recommendation. Rather, he simply agreed to make a particular sentencing recommendation. There was nothing in the language of the plea agreement indicating that the parties intended the agreement to remain in effect after the initial sentencing. Therefore, the prosecutor did not breach the agreement by his comments at the post-sentencing hearing on Defendant's motion for reduction of sentence. State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 241 P.3d 955 (2010). Defendant has failed to show manifest injustice. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.