Opinion ID: 202709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Forfeiture-Related Claims

Text: 35 Pierre argues that the forfeiture order was error because the government failed to demonstrate that he earned $500,000 as a result of the conspiracy for which he was convicted. He further argues that the government was improperly permitted to seize substitute assets prior to the 2003 trial.
36 Following the guilty verdict at the 2004 trial, the jury returned a special verdict in which it found that at least $500,000 and a pair of diamond earrings seized by the government were derived, directly or indirectly, from the conspiracy. 4 A forfeiture verdict must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Keene, 341 F.3d 78, 86 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641, 648 (1st Cir.1996). We have no problem finding a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict here. 37 The evidence in support of the forfeiture verdict at the 2004 trial included Mickens's testimony, as well as several records documenting expenditures by Pierre. Mickens testified that from the time she moved to Fall River in 1998 until she developed a relationship with Pierre the following year, she saw Pierre exchanging money with others in various locations. She further testified that during the period of her involvement with Pierre—from summer 1999 until her arrest in September 2001—Pierre admitted to her that he had been in the drug business for years, and she observed Pierre regularly obtain cocaine from a source in Brockton and sell crack to customers in Fall River and New Bedford. Mickens testified that she drove Pierre to his source in Brockton [q]uite a bit, once a week, twice a week, sometimes more, and that she drove Pierre around Fall River [j]ust about every day so that he could collect money or drop off ounces. She also testified that she sold crack for Pierre, and at the height of her involvement she sold up to $3000 worth of crack per night; she further indicated that if Pierre did not need her to drive him around, she was in the bar [selling drugs] from the time they opened, all day. Mickens also stated that she collected at least $1000 two times per week from Pierre's biggest wholesale customers, and that Pierre also collected money from them. Finally, Mickens testified that she observed Pierre cook up part of a half-kilogram of cocaine that he had obtained in Florida. 38 The documentary evidence presented by the government showed that during the course of the conspiracy Pierre spent over $6000 on motel rooms, over $22,000 on cars, and deposited and withdrew nearly $40,000 from a bank account. He also spent at least $4700 on jewelry. Finally, he paid the living expenses of Mickens, totaling over $12,000 per year, and the expenses of his children and their mother. Mickens testified that Pierre had no job other than drug dealing. At the time Mickens met Pierre, he did have a used car lot, but Mickens testified that he used the car lot to deal drugs and sold only one or two cars before getting rid of the lot a couple of months after she had met him. 39 Although one cannot, based on this testimony and documentary evidence, tally specific amounts to arrive at $500,000, the government may satisfy its burden of proof by either direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1299 (1st Cir.1996). From the time of her involvement in 1999, Mickens estimated that she earned or collected between $3400 and over $20,000 per week in drug money for Pierre. The jury could easily have inferred from the evidence presented that on average Pierre sold at least $3000 worth of cocaine or crack each week over the life of the conspiracy. Such an inference supports the jury's finding that $500,000 was forfeitable.
40 When Pierre was arrested, the government seized from him various pieces of jewelry—including a watch, necklace, ring, bracelet, and earrings—subsequently valued at over $60,000. It then began administrative forfeiture proceedings, but when Pierre filed a motion contesting the forfeiture, the government abandoned the claim. Pierre's motion also requested immediate return of the jewelry, but the government refused to return the jewelry to Pierre, stating that it was evidence of criminal activity. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(g) (providing that the district court may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to [seized] property and its use in later proceedings). The district court agreed that the government was permitted to retain possession of the jewelry as evidence and denied Pierre's motion requesting return of the jewelry. 41 On September 24, 2003, the government obtained a second superceding indictment that included a forfeiture allegation specifying the seized jewelry and $500,000 as forfeitable. At the 2003 trial, Fernandes testified that Pierre had spent money on gold chains and a jeweled bracelet, and the government offered the jewelry into evidence without objection. Prior to the 2004 trial, however, Pierre challenged the admissibility of the jewelry, arguing that the government was unable to tie it to the alleged conspiracy. The district court granted Pierre's motion to exclude the jewelry from the 2004 trial, except for the pair of earrings, which Mickens testified Pierre purchased for himself during their relationship. Defense counsel then took possession of the excluded jewelry. 42 After the jury in the 2004 trial returned a special verdict finding that $500,000 and the earrings were forfeitable, the district court entered a preliminary order forfeiting the earrings and the other four pieces of jewelry as substitute assets, 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), since the government was unable to locate the $500,000 specified in the special verdict. See United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 58 n. 7 (1st Cir.2006) (Substitute property may be seized by the government to satisfy a forfeiture order where, by an act or omission, the defendant has prevented the government from tracing his illegally obtained assets.). Nine months later, the district court entered a final order of forfeiture, forfeiting the earrings and the substitute assets. 43 Pierre does not object to the forfeiture of the four pieces of jewelry as substitute assets, but rather to the district court's having permitted the government to retain possession of them prior to the 2003 trial. As a remedy, he seeks to have the jewelry (or its monetary equivalent) returned to him now. We review the district court's interpretation of Rule 41(g) de novo. See United States v. Dean, 100 F.3d 19, 20 (5th Cir.1996). The district court's factual determination that the jewelry had evidentiary value to the government is reviewed for clear error. See id. 44 Rule 41(g) provides that [a] person aggrieved . . . by the deprivation of property may move [the district court] for the property's return. Once seized property is no longer needed as evidence, a criminal defendant is presumed to have the right to its return. See Dean, 100 F.3d at 20; United States v. Mills, 991 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir.1993). However, [a] Rule 41[(g)] motion is properly denied `if the defendant is not entitled to lawful possession of the seized property, the property is contraband or subject to forfeiture[,] or the government's need for the property as evidence continues.' Mills, 991 F.2d at 612 (quoting United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1061 (9th Cir.1991)); see also United States v. Saunders, 957 F.2d 1488, 1495 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that [t]he motion for the return of the paperwork, even papers that were not introduced at trial, was premature because defendant's direct appeal was still pending); Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d at 1061 (holding that a defendant's motion for the return of property may be denied based on the government's need for the property as evidence). 45 The district court's finding that the jewelry had evidentiary value to the government was not clearly erroneous. The government introduced the seized jewelry into evidence at the 2003 trial and presented testimony attempting to link the jewelry to the proceeds of the charged conspiracy. Once it became clear that the government's evidence on this point was not particularly strong, the district court granted Pierre's motion to exclude four pieces of the jewelry, and defense counsel took possession of those pieces at that time. 46 Moreover, even if the district court's order permitting the government to retain possession of the jewelry before the 2003 trial was in error, Pierre still would not be entitled to return of the jewelry now. An illegal seizure of property does not immunize it from forfeiture as long as the government can sustain the forfeiture claim with independent evidence. United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641, 648 (1st Cir.1996) (rejecting a claim that property illegally seized by law enforcement officers was not forfeitable). The cases cited by Pierre in support of his argument that the jewelry must be returned do not suggest otherwise. Rather, the remedy in each of those cases was to affirm the denial of or vacate the grant of a pre-trial restraining order as to substitute assets. United States v. Gotti, 155 F.3d 144, 146, 150 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. Field, 62 F.3d 246, 247-48, 250 (8th Cir.1995); In re Assets of Martin, 1 F.3d 1351, 1354, 1362 (3d Cir.1993); United States v. Floyd, 992 F.2d 498, 498-99 (5th Cir.1993). 47 The forfeiture of the jewelry was not erroneous.