Opinion ID: 195084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of Adverseness.

Text: 16 Perhaps the better argument against appellate jurisdiction in the case of a granted Rule 35(b) motion is that the defendant, qua appellant, lacks such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). At least in certain circumstances, a prevailing party cannot appeal from an order or judgment entered in his favor. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 907 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir.1990); In re Public Serv. Co., 898 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1990); Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Coulombe, 888 F.2d 179, 180 (1st Cir.1989). And, here, the lower court's order operated in appellant's favor, trimming 29 months from his sentence. It is, therefore, arguable that appellant, having derived a substantial benefit, should not be allowed to appeal from the ruling. 17 The problem with such an argument is twofold. First, it is overly simplistic. The key to the appealability of a final order is injury, not prevailing party status. See Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bk. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 334, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 1171-72, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980) (explaining that appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the requirements of Art. III). A prevailing party dissatisfied with the quantum of relief obtained--say, a personal injury plaintiff who receives a favorable liability finding but a paltry damage award--ordinarily can seek appellate review. 8 So it is here. 18 Second, this court has already repudiated the lack of adverseness argument in an almost identical context. In Distasio, we considered the case of a criminal defendant who, after having been granted a reduction in sentence under an earlier version of Rule 35(b), sought to appeal the adequacy of the reduction. See Distasio, 820 F.2d at 22. Although we vacated the district court's order on a different ground, we ruled squarely that a criminal defendant may appeal the adequacy of sentence reductions granted pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b). Id. at 24. The recent amendments to Rule 35(b) do not undermine the rationale on which Distasio rests, 9 and we are bound by it. See, e.g., Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d 856, 861 (1st Cir.1993) (discussing binding effect of prior panel opinions within a circuit). 19 We hold, therefore, that we have jurisdiction to hear a timely appeal in which a prevailing defendant complains that the district court acted too grudgingly in dispensing relief under Rule 35(b). This case fits within that jurisdictional enclave.