Opinion ID: 8487230
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis of Severance

Text: While the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny severance under Rule 14, Bailey v. United States, 10 A.3d 637, 642 (D.C. 2010), “a disparate quantum of evidence” against each co-defendant “may conceivably require a severance under some circumstances.” Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C. 1979) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Severance should be granted “only where the evidence of a defendant’s complicity in the overall criminal venture is de minimis when compared to the evidence against his [co-defendants],” Bush, supra, 516 A.2d at 193 (italics omitted), or when failure to do so would “violate a defendant’s right to due process and a fair trial,” such as when co-defendants “present conflicting and irreconcilable defenses and there is a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty.” Sweet v. United States, 438 A.2d 447, 451 (D.C. 1981) (citation omitted). In this case, Sanquan’s and Bost’s sole argument as to why their respective motions to sever should have been granted is that their individual cases were prejudiced by admission of evidence of unrelated conduct and offenses; for Sanquan, it is evidence of the second conspiracy, including the South Capitol Street murders, for Bost it is evidence of the first conspiracy that led to Howe’s murder. However, it is well-established that severance is not required “just because a significant portion of the government’s trial evidence is applicable only to [his co-defendants].” Rollerson v. United States, 127 A.3d 1220, 1230 (D.C. 2015) (citation omitted). Moreover, both Sanquan and Bost were active participants in conspiracies to commit first-degree murder, so we cannot say that either of appellants’ “complicity in the overall criminal venture is de min-imis when compared to the evidence against his [co-defendants].” Bush, supra, 516 A.2d at 193 (italics omitted). Specifically, Sanquan was the mastermind behind the first conspiracy that led to Howe’s murder — Sanquan gathered the co-conspirators together for the purpose of finding and killing the person who stole, his bracelet. Bost, likewise, was an active participant in both the South Capitol Street murders and Nelson’s murder; in fact, the evidence showed that he intentionally shot and killed Nelson in an attempt to rob Nelson of his weapon. Lastly, the evidence presented of both conspiracies was not “so complex or confusing that the jury could not make individual determinations about the guilt or innocence of each defendant.” Rollerson, supra, 127 A.3d at 1231 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The record further demonstrates that the trial court made efforts to ensure that the jury was not confused about the charges. For example, it reminded the jury on several occasions that Sanquan was not charged with participation in the second conspiracy and Bost was .not charged with participation in the first conspiracy. The court also instructed the jury that no statement made after March 22, the date of the first conspiracy, could be used against Sanquan, and no statement made before March 23, the date the second conspiracy began, could be used against Bost. Lastly, the court gave a strongly worded curative instruction to the jury after the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, in which the court stressed to the jury that Sanquan could not be held responsible for the South Capitol Street and Nelson murders. Given both Sanquan’s and Bost’s active participation in the first and second conspiracies, respectively, and the trial court’s instructions intended to limit jury confusion, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Sanquan’s and Bost’s motions to grant severance. 30