Opinion ID: 202645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of CDA Section 230 Immunity

Text: Section 230 provides that [n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), and that [n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section, id. § 230(e)(3). Thus, unless an exception applies, Lycos is immunized from a state law claim if: (1) Lycos is a provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the claim is based on information provided by another information content provider; and (3) the claim would treat Lycos as the publisher or speaker of that information. Although this court has not previously interpreted CDA Section 230, we do not write on a blank slate. The other courts that have addressed these issues have generally interpreted Section 230 immunity broadly, so as to effectuate Congress's policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech through the . . . route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000). In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit noted the obvious chilling effect that such intermediary tort liability -12- could have, given the volume of material communicated through such intermediaries, the difficulty of separating lawful from unlawful speech, and the relative lack of incentives to protect lawful speech. 129 F.3d at 331. The Fourth Circuit also recognized the congressional purpose of removing the disincentives to selfregulation that would otherwise result if liability were imposed on intermediaries that took an active role in screening content. Id. In light of these policy concerns, we too find that Section 230 immunity should be broadly construed. In the context of this case, we have no trouble finding that Lycos's conduct in operating the Raging Bull web site fits comfortably within the immunity intended by Congress. In particular: (1) web site operators, such as Lycos, are provider[s] . . . of an interactive computer service; (2) message board postings do not cease to be information provided by another information content provider merely because the construct and operation of the web site might have some influence on the content of the postings; and (3) immunity extends beyond publisher liability in defamation law to cover any claim that would treat Lycos as the publisher.
There is no merit to UCS's suggestion that Lycos might not be a provider of an interactive computer service and so is not entitled to Section 230 immunity. The statute defines interactive computer service to be any information service, system, or access -13- software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). A web site, such as the Raging Bull site, enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, namely, the server that hosts the web site. Therefore, web site operators, such as Lycos, are providers of interactive computer services within the meaning of Section 230. UCS argues that Lycos might not be such a provider because it does not provide user access to the internet. Providing access to the Internet is, however, not the only way to be an interactive computer service provider. While such providers are specifically included, there is no indication that the definition should be so limited. Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123.
The message board postings to which UCS objects are, on their face, information provided by another information content provider. Section 230 defines information content provider to be any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). This is a broad definition, covering even those who are responsible for the development of content only in part. In -14- this case, it is clear that the individual posters on the Raging Bull web site are information content providers. A key limitation in Section 230, however, is that immunity only applies when the information that forms the basis for the state law claim has been provided by another information content provider. Id. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, an interactive computer service provider remains liable for its own speech. See Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding an online dating service not immune under Section 230 from claims that it manufactured false profiles and sent profiles of actual, legitimate former subscribers whose subscriptions had expired (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is, by now, well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not enough to make it the service provider's own speech. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 33233; see also Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514, 525 (Cal. 2006). We confirm that view and join the other courts that have held that Section 230 immunity applies even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the third-party content. UCS emphasize[s] that Lycos was manifestly aware of the illegal nature of [the] subscriber postings, but does not rely on notice alone in arguing against immunity. UCS argues instead that Lycos has involved itself with its subscriber[s'] conduct/activities and/or rendered culpable assistance to its -15- registered subscribers to the Lycos Network, through the construct and operation of its web site, and that such conduct falls outside Section 230 immunity. UCS has alleged nothing, however, that suggests that Lycos should be considered to have been responsible, even in part, for the creation or development of the alleged misinformation. At best, UCS's allegations establish that Lycos's conduct may have made it marginally easier for others to develop and disseminate misinformation. That is not enough to overcome Section 230 immunity. In Carafano, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's suggestion that an online dating service should have been considered a developer of a false profile because it provided the questionnaire that a user of the service answered falsely. 339 F.3d at 1124-25. The court reasoned that the underlying misinformation that formed the basis for the complaint was contained entirely in the responses provided by the user, and that the particularly objectionable content bore [no] more than a tenuous relationship to the actual questions asked. Id. at 1125. Compared to Carafano, the allegations in this case provide an even less substantial basis to find that Lycos was a developer of the alleged misinformation. UCS points to the fact that Lycos does not prevent a single individual from registering under multiple screen names, and to the fact that Lycos links sites providing objective financial information to the Raging Bull site. -16- UCS's theory is that these features of the Raging Bull site make it possible for individuals to spread misinformation more credibly, by doing so under multiple screen names and in a context that is associated with objective content. In Carafano, the plaintiff at least had a colorable argument that the misinformation may have been prompted by the dating service's questions. Here there is not even a colorable argument that any misinformation was prompted by Lycos's registration process or its link structure. There is no indication that the Lycos features that UCS criticizes are anything but standard for message boards and other web sites. To impose liability here would contravene Congress's intent and eviscerate Section 230 immunity. In a related argument, UCS argues that Lycos has provided culpable assistance to subscribers wishing to disseminate misinformation, and hence Lycos exceeded the bounds of Section 230 immunity. UCS draws an analogy to the copyright case of MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). In Grokster, the Supreme Court held that copyright liability could be premised on a theory of active inducement of infringement, so that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. Id. at 2770. -17- UCS argues that, similarly, Lycos should enjoy no immunity if it actively induces its subscribers to post unlawful content. It is not at all clear that there is a culpable assistance exception to Section 230 immunity. The language of culpable assistance used by UCS appears to have been drawn from Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003). But that court used the language in the context of determining whether the defendant might be secondarily liable under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). We note that liability under the ECPA is specifically exempted from Section 230 immunity. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(4). There is no ECPA claim here. Similarly, Grokster itself was a copyright case, and secondary liability for copyright infringement is not affected by Section 230 because intellectual property laws are also exempted. See id. § 230(e)(2). We need not decide whether a claim premised on active inducement might be consistent with Section 230 in the absence of a specific exception. Even assuming arguendo that active inducement could negate Section 230 immunity, it is clear that UCS has not alleged any acts by Lycos that come even close to constituting the clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster unlawful activity that would be necessary to find active inducement. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770. UCS relies in part -18- on Lycos's registration process and link structure; as described above, these are standard elements of web sites with [both] lawful and unlawful potential, see id. at 2780, and hence, without more, cannot form the basis to find inducement. UCS's complaint also cites the fact that Lycos has taken legal action to protect its subscribers, including moving to quash subpoenas and intervening in relevant cases. Actions taken to protect subscribers' legal rights, however, cannot be construed as inducement of unlawful activity, and UCS does not allege that Lycos lacked a reasonable basis for its legal activities. Cf. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51 (1993) ([L]itigation cannot be deprived of [antitrust] immunity as a sham unless the litigation is objectively baseless.). The unmistakable evidence of an unlawful objective found in Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2782, is entirely absent here.3 Thus, it is clear that, taking UCS's allegations as true, Lycos has done nothing in this case that might make the 3 UCS also argues that because it bases its claims on Lycos's alleged intentional misconduct, those claims are not subject to Section 230 immunity. It is not clear how UCS is using the phrase intentional misconduct. If this refers to Lycos's acting intentionally with knowledge of the third-party misinformation, then such claims are barred under our holding that notice does not preclude Section 230 immunity. If this refers to Lycos's acting with intent to harm UCS, then this is a variant on an active inducement theory, which, as we have described, has no basis in UCS's factual allegations. -19- misinformation at issue its own, rather than that of another information content provider.
Finally, liability under either the Florida securities law or the Florida cyberstalking law would involve treating Lycos as the publisher of the misinformation.4 UCS's securities claims are based on the theory that individuals were taking a short position in UCS stock and then spreading misinformation to depress the stock price, so as to profit from their short position.5 There is no allegation that Lycos has been involved in any UCS stock transactions; thus, any liability against it must be premised on imputing to it the alleged misinformation, that is, on treating it 4 On the federal cyberstalking claim under 47 U.S.C. § 223, in addition to finding the claim barred by Section 230, the district court also found that the cyberstalking statute does not provide a private right of action. UCS does not challenge this dispositive ruling on appeal, so we affirm the dismissal of the claim on that basis, expressing no view on the appropriateness of applying Section 230 immunity to a putative civil claim under 47 U.S.C. § 223. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this [title 47], . . . or any other Federal criminal statute. (emphasis added)). Nor do we express a view on whether the specific exception in § 230(e)(1) for federal criminal statutes might apply to analogous state statutes. UCS's brief might be read to suggest something along these lines, but issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 5 To take a short position in a stock means to sell borrowed stock at the current price in the hope that the stock price will decline and the borrower will be able to return the borrowed stock by purchasing it at the later, lower price. -20- as the publisher of that information.6 Similarly, the alleged cyberstalking involves only the publication of a series of postings on the Raging Bull web site. Again, Lycos's liability would depend on treating it as the publisher of those postings. UCS argues that the prohibition against treating Lycos as the publisher only immunizes Lycos's exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions -- such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content, Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330, and not its decisions regarding the construct and operation of its web sites. This argument misapprehends the scope of Section 230 immunity. If the cause of action is one that would treat the service provider as the publisher of a particular posting, immunity applies not only for the service provider's decisions with respect to that posting, but also for its inherent decisions about how to treat postings generally. UCS is ultimately alleging that the construct and operation of Lycos's web sites contributed to the proliferation of misinformation; Lycos's decision not to reduce misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much an editorial decision with respect to that misinformation as a decision not to delete a particular posting. Section 230 immunity does not depend on the form that decision takes. See Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 6 We express no view on the viability of such a claim, absent Section 230 immunity. -21- 2003) (finding that liability for the alleged negligent failure to properly police [AOL's] network for content transmitted by its users . . . would 'treat' AOL 'as the publisher or speaker' of that content). We hold that, given the allegations in UCS's complaint, liability for Lycos under either the Florida securities statute or the Florida cyberstalking statute would involve treating Lycos as the publisher of information provided by another information content provider. Thus, we affirm the district court's ruling that both claims are barred by Section 230.