Opinion ID: 786106
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Filed Within the Limitations Period

Text: 58 Now that we have determined that the 1997 claims are time-barred, we turn to Mr. Lucas' discrete claims of discrimination that fell within the limitations period in order to determine whether he has set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. 59 Mr. Lucas may provide direct 12 evidence of discrimination or he can rely on the indirect burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 879, 123 S.Ct. 79, 154 L.Ed.2d 134 (2002). Ordinarily, to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discipline based on indirect evidence Mr. Lucas must demonstrate that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was performing his job satisfactorily; (3) he suffered adverse employment action; and (4) the employer treated similarly situated employees outside of the protected class more favorably. See Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir.2003); Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir.2002). To the extent that the plaintiff claims that he was subject to disparate punishment, as Mr. Lucas does here, the second and fourth prongs of McDonnell Douglas merge. See Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir.2002); Flores v. Preferred Technical Group, 182 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir.1999). In those situations, there is no question that the employee failed to meet his employer's expectations. Instead, the plaintiff must establish that he received dissimilar — and more harsh — punishment than that received by a similarly situated employee who was outside the protected class. See Grayson, 308 F.3d at 817; Flores, 182 F.3d at 515. 60 If Mr. Lucas meets his initial burden, the burden of production shifts to the CTA to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action. If the CTA comes forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts back to Mr. Lucas to demonstrate the reason offered was pretextual. See Peters, 307 F.3d at 545. Mr. Lucas alleges several acts of discrimination, and we now address each in turn.
61 The facts are undisputed that Machara conducted an investigation and concluded that Mr. Lucas filed a false report that led to Blatz's arrest and charges of battery. As a result of this finding, Machara recommended that Mr. Lucas be terminated. However, the Employee Relations Department recommended that Mr. Lucas only be suspended. Machara accepted this recommendation and converted the discharge into a suspension. Id. Machara suspended Mr. Lucas for twenty-two days as a result of the January 18 incident. 13 62 Mr. Lucas is a member of a protected class and suffered an adverse employment action, suspension of twenty-two days. Therefore, the critical element remaining for Mr. Lucas to prove is that similarly situated employees received less severe punishment. Mr. Lucas does not identify any other employee who falsified a report or document, nor does Mr. Lucas identify any employee who had lied. Despite the admission that Machara made the suspension decision, Mr. Lucas maintains that Blatz made the decision to suspend him as part of an ongoing effort of discrimination. Mr. Lucas contends that Blatz and Machara did not suspend him for lying and filing a false report, but suspended him for stopping the CTA train and remaining quiet. See Appellant's Br. at 8-9, 16, 20, 23. 14 Mr. Lucas claimed that Blatz initially told him not to stop the trains and asked whether he understood this statement. Mr. Lucas responded by stating he would no longer stop the trains, but subsequently remained quiet and refused to answer Blatz's questions. Mr. Lucas asserts that Blatz continued to yell, but he remained silent in order to diffuse the situation. However, the statement of uncontested facts indicates that Machara determined Mr. Lucas gave a false report. Machara originally recommended termination, but, after consulting with the Employee Relations Department, Machara agreed to convert the termination into a suspension. Additionally, in his response to the CTA's statement of uncontested material facts, Mr. Lucas does not deny that Machara suspended him but only denies that his suspension was for twenty-two days when it was actually for twenty-four. The CTA stated that Machara suspended Plaintiff for 22 days as a result of the incident that occurred on January 18, 2001. R.20 ¶ 96. Mr. Lucas responded: Denies. The suspension was for 24 days. R.26 ¶ 96. Further, in his appellate brief, Mr. Lucas contends that [t]he Court wholly ignored Blatz's acts of discrimination and retaliation alleged in the complaint and focused instead on Machara's decision to suspend Mr. Lucas at the hearing. Appellant's Br. at 8 (emphasis added). 15 63 As we have demonstrated at some length, the defendant asserts and Mr. Lucas admits that Machara suspended him because of Mr. Lucas' filing a false report and not merely because Mr. Lucas had stopped the train. 16 Mr. Lucas' failure to put forth any similarly situated employee is fatal to his claim. 64 Nor can Mr. Lucas argue that Blatz's racial animus was the basis for Machara's conclusion that Mr. Lucas lied in the report he filed. Generally speaking, comments by a non-decision maker do not suffice as evidence of discriminatory intent. See Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 790 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir.2001)). However, we have cautioned that [i]t is different when the decision makers themselves, or those who provide input into the decision, express such feelings (1) around the time of, and (2) in reference to, the adverse employment action complained of. Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir.2000). If a person with racial animus provides input into the decision making process then, in some circumstances, it may be possible to infer that the decision makers were influenced by those feelings in making their decision. Id. at 652-53. 65 Blatz did provide indirect input into the decision to suspend Mr. Lucas. He was one of the witnesses interviewed by Machara during the investigation. There are no facts, however, to support the conclusion that his allegedly racial animus influenced Machara's conclusion that Mr. Lucas had lied about the event. Blatz's statement was only one element of a comprehensive investigation into the event and into the veracity of Mr. Lucas' allegations, Tijan and Machara conducted an investigation of several witnesses; Blatz was not the only witness interviewed, Machara participated in interviews of Blatz, Quintana, who was Mr. Lucas' partner and boarded the train with him that day, and another CTA employee, Carlos Flores, who also witnessed part of the events. Not only was Blatz's participation limited to providing a statement, but the parties also agree that Machara and the investigators were unaware of Mr. Lucas' allegations stemming from the 1997 incidents. Relying on these witnesses and each party's statement, Machara and Tijan's report indicated, contrary to Mr. Lucas' statements, that Blatz only had put his hand upon Mr. Lucas' shoulder. Neither believed, after talking with the witnesses, that there was any hostility, and, therefore, both signed the report finding Mr. Lucas lied about the incident. 66 In sum, Mr. Lucas' submissions do not indicate the CTA's proffered reason for Mr. Lucas' discipline — that he filed a false report against Blatz — was a lie. Mr. Lucas, himself, admits that the false report was the reason Machara suspended Mr. Lucas. Mr. Lucas cannot show that the CTA's reason was a dishonest explanation, a lie, rather than an oddity or an error. Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir.2000). Mr. Lucas may believe that his suspension was incorrect, ill-advised, or undesirable; he has not established, however, that the CTA did not honestly believe that Mr. Lucas filed a false report that justified his suspension. See Wade v. Lerner New York, Inc., 243 F.3d 319, 323 (7th Cir.2001). Therefore, Mr. Lucas cannot rely on the January 2001 incident to establish discrimination.
67 Mr. Lucas next contends that he was the only employee disciplined for going to the credit exchange during the hours of 7-9 a.m. In explaining what discipline he received, Mr. Lucas merely asserts that he was disciplined, Appellant's Br. at 12-13, and written up, id. at 29-30. In response to the CTA's argument that Mr. Lucas failed to assert any adverse employment action, Mr. Lucas only elaborates in his reply brief that he was issued a caution and instruct[ed] by Escorcia to create a paper trail after going to the credit union. Appellant's Reply Br. at 15. However, at no point does Mr. Lucas indicate what the tangible consequences of the write up and discipline were. 68 Mr. Lucas fails to allege adequately any adverse employment action resulting from this discipline. Our past decisions indicate that a negative evaluation or admonishment by an employer does not rise to the level of an adverse employment act. See Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 556-57 (7th Cir.1998) ([N]egative performance evaluations, standing alone, cannot constitute an adverse employment action.); Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir.1996) (same). There must be some tangible job consequence accompanying the reprimand to rise to the level of a material adverse employment action; otherwise every reprimand or attempt to counsel an employee could form the basis of a federal suit. See Sweeney, 149 F.3d at 557. Mr. Lucas failed to prove such a tangible consequence existed. Because Mr. Lucas failed to put forth the appropriate facts to demonstrate an adverse employment act regarding the discipline he received for visiting the credit exchange, his discrimination claim must fail.
69 Mr. Lucas next asserts that he and his partner Jose Quintana were singled out for written warnings for returning late from lunch when co-workers were returning at the same time or later and they were not written up. Appellant's Br. at 13. Mr. Lucas continues to explain that the evidence is that Francisco Garcia also returned late from lunch at the same time as Lucas 17 and Quintana but he was not written up by Escorcia. Id. Mr. Lucas concludes this argument by stating that the district court ignored this evidence of different, adverse treatment of African-Americans. Id. Even assuming these allegations are true, Mr. Lucas fails to meet his prima facie burden. First, Mr. Lucas failed to explain in his opening brief that he suffered a tangible employment action as a result of his tardiness. 18 Second, Mr. Lucas failed to demonstrate that he was singled out for discipline on the basis of his race. Mr. Lucas identifies three people who, he asserts, were similarly situated in returning late from lunch. Mr. Lucas is an African-American, Quintana, who was also disciplined, is a Hispanic, and the third person, a person not disciplined and allegedly given better treatment, was Francisco Garcia. We are not told whether Francisco Garcia is also a member of a protected class; this fact is apparently not in the record. 19 It was incumbent upon Mr. Lucas to demonstrate that other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably. See Peters, 307 F.3d at 546. All Mr. Lucas has demonstrated is that he and his Hispanic partner were both disciplined in a similar fashion and another individual of unknown race and ethnicity was not. Mr. Lucas, therefore, has not met his burden with respect to this element. 70 In his complaint, Mr. Lucas also alleged that his discipline for returning late from lunch was retaliation for filing his discrimination claim. R.1 ¶ 43. However, he does not forward this argument on appeal. Although this argument is subject to waiver principles, we also dismiss Mr. Lucas' retaliation argument for similar reasons as his discrimination claim. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the indirect burden-shifting method, a plaintiff must demonstrate that after filing the charge only he, and not any similarly situated employee who did not file a charge, was subjected to an adverse employment action even though he was performing his job in a satisfactory manner. Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 879, 123 S.Ct. 79, 154 L.Ed.2d 134 (2002); see Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 820, 123 S.Ct. 97, 154 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002). 20 Mr. Lucas admits that his partner, Quintana, who presumably did not file a discrimination complaint, also received similar discipline. Stone instructs, however, that the plaintiff has to demonstrate that he, and not any similarly situated employee who did not file a charge, was subjected to an adverse employment action. Stone, 281 F.3d at 644. Mr. Lucas did not satisfy the requirement set forth in Stone. Because Mr. Lucas waived his retaliation claim, and because he failed to meet the standards set forth in Stone to show that he was singled out for adverse employment action, his claim of retaliation was properly dismissed on summary judgment.
71 Mr. Lucas finally contends that he was singled out for discipline after refusing a June 29, 2001 order issued by Escorcia to remove the pushcart from the tracks during rush hour. Mr. Lucas maintains that the order was against CTA rules and that three other trackmen also refused to comply but were not similarly disciplined. The CTA asserts that Mr. Lucas was suspended for one day due to disrespect to management after Mr. Lucas told Escorcia the order was stupid and idiotic. Mr. Lucas admits that he told Escorcia that his order was stupid and idiotic and that no other employee made a similar remark but nevertheless maintains that he was singled out for discipline on the basis of race. R.20 ¶ 109; R.26 ¶ 109; Appellant's Reply Br. at 14. We previously have stated that 72 in disciplinary cases — in which a plaintiff claims that he was disciplined by his employer more harshly than a similarly situated employee based on some prohibited reason — a plaintiff must show that he is similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct. This normally entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them. 73 Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617-18 (7th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted); see Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir.2002); Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir.2002). It is uncontested that Mr. Lucas was the only employee who made a comment disparaging the supervisor's order after refusing to comply. Mr. Lucas provides no similarly situated employee who engaged in the same or similar type of conduct. Mr. Lucas has failed to meet his burden with respect to this allegedly discriminatory action.