Opinion ID: 6271431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: [3] The Nebraska Postconviction Act contains a 1-year time limit for filing a verified motion for postconviction relief, which runs from one of four triggering events or August 27, 2011, whichever is later. 4 The triggering event here is contained in § 29-3001(4)(a): “The date the judgment of conviction became final by the conclusion of a direct appeal or the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal.” [4] The issuance of a mandate by a Nebraska appellate court is a definitive determination of the “conclusion of a direct appeal,” and the “date the judgment of conviction became final,” for purposes of § 29-3001(4)(a). 5 Hill’s direct appeal concluded when our mandate issued on February 6, 2018. His motion for postconviction relief—filed on April 1, 2021—was filed outside the 1-year limitation period. In an attempt to escape the time bar, Hill now advances two tolling arguments. He did not clearly raise these arguments in the district court. To the extent that the timeline set forth in the procedural background section of Hill’s motion for postconviction relief was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review, neither of his arguments has merit. First, Hill contends that the limitations period was tolled by the filing of his motion for new trial and subsequent disposition of that motion. His argument rests on the 21 days remaining in the limitations period under § 29-3001(4) at the time he filed his motion for new trial. Hill maintains that upon the issuance of our mandate in 2021 concerning his motion for new trial, he should have 21 days to file his motion for 3 Id. 4 State v. Edwards, 301 Neb. 579, 919 N.W.2d 530 (2018). 5 State v. Koch, 304 Neb. 133, 933 N.W.2d 585 (2019). - 651 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. HILL Cite as 310 Neb. 647 postconviction relief based upon tolling. And he points out that he filed his motion for postconviction relief on the 20th day following our mandate. But Hill cites no authority supporting his request. [5,6] In Nebraska, postconviction relief is strictly prescribed. 6 We have characterized it as “a special statutory proceeding that permits collateral attack upon a criminal judgment” 7 and as “a very narrow category of relief, available only to remedy prejudicial constitutional violations.” 8 The postconviction proceeding is one “the Legislature intended to be limited in scope and summary in nature.” 9 And because the U.S. Supreme Court 10 and this court 11 have recognized that states have no obligation to provide postconviction relief proceedings, any right to such relief is not grounded in the federal or state Constitution. [7] A postconviction proceeding and a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence are both collateral attacks on a final criminal judgment. 12 But the Nebraska Postconviction Act is the primary procedure for bringing collateral attacks on final judgments in criminal cases based upon constitutional principles. 13 If a defendant has a collateral attack that could be asserted under the act, that act is his or her sole remedy. 14 The Legislature has not provided for the tolling of the limitation period under § 29-3001(4). Extending the limitation period until resolution of a different collateral attack on 6 State v. Lotter, 278 Neb. 466, 771 N.W.2d 551 (2009). 7 State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29, 41, 881 N.W.2d 864, 875 (2016). 8 Id. at 43, 881 N.W.2d at 876. 9 Id. 10 See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987). 11 See, State v. Lotter, supra note 6; State v. Victor, 242 Neb. 306, 494 N.W.2d 565 (1993). 12 See State v. Harris, 307 Neb. 237, 948 N.W.2d 736 (2020). 13 State v. Smith, 288 Neb. 797, 851 N.W.2d 665 (2014). 14 Id. - 652 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. HILL Cite as 310 Neb. 647 a final judgment is inconsistent with the statutory language of § 29-3001(4) and with the summary nature of a postconviction proceeding. Just as we said with respect to recognizing a common-law remedy for the purpose of asserting time-barred postconviction claims, if we allowed the time to be tolled for other collateral attacks “we would be undermining the purpose of the Legislature in enacting § 29-3001(4).” 15 [8,9] Second, and alternatively, Hill argues that the limitations period should be equitably tolled under the circumstances. The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court to excuse a party’s failure to comply with the statute of limitations where, because of disability, irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his or her control, the plaintiff cannot be expected to file suit on time. 16 Equitable tolling requires due diligence on the part of the claimant. 17 Our cases applying the equitable tolling doctrine have involved situations where a claimant was prevented from bringing a timely claim due to the alleged actions of a court or governmental entity. 18 Thus, we have stated that “it is difficult to conceive of a circumstance outside § 29-3001(4)(c) that would support application of the equitable tolling doctrine in a postconviction motion.” 19 We have not yet determined whether equitable tolling applies to postconviction proceedings under § 29-3001, 20 and we need not do so here. At the time Hill chose to file his motion for new trial, nothing prevented him from filing his motion for postconviction relief. We have stated that “a prisoner is not deprived of the opportunity to bring a postconviction action if 15 Id. at 803, 851 N.W.2d at 670. 16 State v. Mata, supra note 2. 17 See State v. Conn, 300 Neb. 391, 914 N.W.2d 440 (2018). 18 See id. 19 Id. at 399, 914 N.W.2d at 446. 20 See State v. Mata, supra note 2. - 653 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports STATE v. HILL Cite as 310 Neb. 647 there is some time within the period of the 1-year limitation that the prisoner could have filed a postconviction action.” 21 Hill provides no explanation for his failure to file for postconviction relief in the 344 days between the issuance of our mandate concluding his direct appeal and the filing of his motion for new trial. Even if the doctrine of equitable tolling could apply in a postconviction proceeding, the circumstances here do not support its application.