Opinion ID: 436120
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possession Count (IV)

Text: 12 The defendants were charged in Count IV of the indictment with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, on board a vessel within the customs waters of the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 955a. As is not disputed, United States authorities may enforce the laws of the United States in the customs waters as to the ship of another nation only as permitted by treaty or other arrangement with the foreign government. See 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(j); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1379-83 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114, 103 S.Ct. 748, 74 L.Ed.2d 967 (1983). 13 The shrimper in this case was of Panamanian registry. Further, the shrimper was boarded by the Coast Guard on the high seas approximately 250-300 miles off the coast of the United States. Thus, the shrimper was subject to the laws of the United States only as permitted by a treaty or arrangement between the United States and the Panamanian government. 14 The United States sought to prove that such an arrangement existed between the United States and the Panamanian government with regard to the shrimper in this case. Essentially the government's proof as to the arrangement consisted of Commander White's testimony as to how he was advised by a series of teletype messages that the government of Panama had authorized his crew to board the shrimper, 2 plus certified copies of two of the messages. The defendants contend that the above evidence was hearsay, subjected to a timely objection, and that the erroneous admission of that evidence, being the only evidence submitted in proof of the arrangement, was an abuse of discretion. The United States in its brief concedes that the evidence introduced to prove an arrangement was hearsay. The district court, nonetheless, admitted the evidence, and the United States argues that under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid. 803(24), 3 such a ruling was proper. 15 In applying the residual exception to the hearsay rule, district courts are given considerable discretion, and a court of appeals will not disturb the district court's application of the exception absent a definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors. Page v. Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir.1982). The Panamanian official who gave the requisite permission was not subject to the subpoena power of the United States and thus there was no non-hearsay alternative that was probative on the issue. The teletype messages introduced into evidence reflected the attainment and transmittal through diplomatic channels of the foreign government's authorization. The teletype messages of United States governmental agencies, the trial court felt, were of the requisite trustworthiness. No issue is raised as to the verity of their substantive contents. Although the defendants were furnished, by pretrial discovery, notice of the government's intended use of the hearsay evidence in question, which notice included a pretrial ruling by the district court that the teletypes were admissible, the defendants did not seek to raise any question with regard to those contents, nor did they attempt to produce evidence to the contrary of the contents of these teletypes. See Piva v. Xerox Corporation, 654 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir.1981). 16 The defendants principally rely upon United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 298-300 (5th Cir.1977), for the proposition that in criminal cases the residual exception to the hearsay rule must yield in light of the presumption favoring live testimony engendered by a defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. The court in Mathis, however, merely suggested that the preference for live testimony should be an added consideration in the balancing required in applying the residual exception. Id. at 299. Nonetheless, even considering the preference for live testimony in criminal cases, we find no clear error in the admission of the evidence because the defendants do not attack the essential authenticity of the hearsay evidence, and we are unable to see how live testimony of State Department officials could have been more probative on the issue or have been more susceptible to attack by the defendants. 17 We do not feel that the district court made clear error in this case in weighing the relevant factors and concluding that the evidence was admissible on the ultimate issue of jurisdiction, because of its reliability and probativeness, and because their admission did not create undue or unfair prejudice to the defendants.