Opinion ID: 2075958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Dangers posed by a forced sale.

Text: Petitioners hypothesize a forced sale of the property, due either to outstanding taxes or bankruptcy, or to a new owner who Petitioners fear might be free to put up a building twice the size of the one now proposed. The source of this fear is that the covenant will not take effect until all appeal periods have run. Although the possibility of a forced sale of the property obviously has increased in light of the consent order approved by the Bankruptcy Court of the District of Columbia, see supra note 3, we see no merit in this argument. Even if a buyer were able to purchase the property at a forced sale free of the covenant, the landmark status of the structure now on the property provides built-in protection against the sort of improper commercial development Petitioners fear. After all, this is not just any parcel of land; it contains the Fraser Mansion, a national historic landmark. Any development on that site will require compliance with the Preservation Act and the approval of the HPRB, and such approval is not likely to be granted lightly or quickly. At the very least, any new development would have to leave the Fraser Mansion intact, which in itself limits the amount of development allowable as a matter of right. Moreover, any new development also would have to complement the Fraser Mansion and the surrounding environs from the viewpoint of the HPRB. Given the concerns expressed by the HPRB in this case about the transition between the Fraser Mansion and surrounding buildings and the overall character and appearance of the streetscape, we conclude that the specter of a new owner erecting a building twice the size of the one now proposed by Fourways is speculative at best. In addition to the development restrictions inherent in the property itself, there is the added protection of due process. If the present case is any indication of the normal processes of obtaining HPRB approval, and we see no reason to doubt that it is, approval would require a thorough examination of the proposed development by the HPRB. That examination would take time and, thus, the Commission would be in a position to take steps during its pendency to restrict new development. Therefore, given these built-in protections, the Commission reasonably could conclude that the possibility of a forced sale did not threaten to undo the safeguards of the covenant. [26]
In December 1987, as the Commission was set to deny the three proposals Fourways had submitted for reconsideration in September, Fourways offered a new proposal and the Commission, without issuing a final order on the pending proposals, reopened the record. Petitioners contend that this action by the Commission violated 11 D.C.M.R. § 3029.5, which states: a motion for reconsideration, rehearing or reargument of a final decision in a contested case proceeding under § 3022 may be filed by a party within ten (10) days of the order having become final.... The Commission shall not receive or consider any motion for reconsideration, rehearing, or re-argument of a final decision in a contested case proceeding that is filed prior to the order having become final. 11 D.C.M.R. § 3029.5 (1989). Petitioners contend that by reopening the record and calling for comments on Fourways's proposal, Petitioners were denied a trial-type hearing on material issues of fact. The Commission viewed the matter differently. In Finding 14 of Z.C. Order No. 555, the Commission stated that counsel for Fourways requested the Commission to reconsider the proposed decision to deny the application. When dealing with proposed, or non-final decisions, the Commission may reopen the record and hear further evidence. As 11 D.C.M.R. § 3024.4 (1989) states: The Commission reserves the right to reopen the record at any time prior to the issuance of a final decision. In a [contested case] proceeding ..., notice of reopening the record shall be served upon all parties to the proceeding. As 11 D.C. M.R. § 3025.1 (1989) adds: Prior to filing the final decision, the Commission may on its own motion reopen the record and require further hearing on designated issues before the Commission. Thus, the Commission properly exercised a power specifically granted to it to reopen the record before issuing a final decision. Moreover, the Commission provided notice to Petitioners and all other interested parties. Finally, Petitioners contend that the Commission should have held hearing on the issue of whether rezoning the site from 5-5-B to R-5-B would make use of the site by a chancery more likely and, thus, deprive the Fraser Mansion of its protection under federal and local preservation laws. Petitioners point to D.C.Code § 5-1206(b)(2) (1988), which provides that [a] chancery shall be permitted to locate: (A) In any area which is zoned medium-high or high density residential.... Petitioners contend that they were never given a chance to present evidence that under existing regulations a chancery could not locate in the Fraser Mansion if its zoning remained R-5-B, because of its existing uses, but that a chancery could locate there if it were rezoned to R-5-C. They also contend that the Commission should have looked further into the issue of whether federal and local preservation laws apply to buildings once they become chanceries. The chancery issue was presented to the Commission for the first time during the post-hearing phase of the case in a February 1988 letter to the Commission from Petitioner, Dupont Circle Citizens Association. The Commission sought the Corporation Counsel's advice on the matter. The Commission stated the Corporation Counsel's advice in Finding 33 of Z.C Order No. 555: (1) in chancery proceedings, the Foreign Missions Board of Zoning Adjustment has the sole authority to determine historic preservation issues; (2) in this determination, the Board is charged with ensuring substantial compliance with District and Federal legislation which govern historic preservation; and (3) the Board is also authorized by the Foreign Missions Act to determine whether the site of a proposed chancery is within an area determined on the basis of existing uses, which includes offices or institutional uses ..., albeit the area is not zoned Diplomatic. Relying on the Corporation Counsel's advice the Commission did not hold any further hearings on the chancery matter. Petitioners disagree with the Corporation Counsel's advice, asserting that it conflicts with the positions taken by other District of Columbia and federal agencies. However, Petitioners do not identify these agencies. They contend that on the basis of these conflicts and other doubts, the Commission should have looked further into the issue by holding a trial-type public hearing. Petitioners contend that they have a right to contest the Corporation Counsel's advice in such a hearing under D.C.Code § 1-1509(b) (1988), which provides in relevant part that [e]very party shall have the right to present in person or by counsel his case or defense by oral and documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. Because the section upon which Petitioners rely specifically refers to oral and documentary evidence, their argument hinges on whether or not legal advice received from the Corporation Counsel is evidence. We conclude that it is not. 11 D.C.M.R. § 3024.5 (1989) provides that [l]egal advice from the Office of the Corporation Counsel may be requested or received at any time. Since this section applies even when the record has been closed, we conclude that it removes such legal advice from the category of contestable evidence. [27] Affirmed.