Opinion ID: 149604
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Offense Level Based on Methamphetamine

Text: Mr. Mendez also challenges the decision of the district court to base his sentence on the amount of pure methamphetamine attributed to him. Because he raised this procedural-reasonableness issue below, we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 2009). The guidelines provide two methods for calculating offense levels based on unlawful dealings with methamphetamine. First, the calculation can be based on the weight of the “controlled substance [methamphetamine],” which is “the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance [methamphetamine].” USSG § 2D1.1(c) n.(A) (2007). The alternative is to base the calculation on the quantity of “Methamphetamine (actual),” which is “the weight of the [methamphetamine], itself, contained in the mixture or substance.” Id. n.(B). The guidelines state that the court should calculate the offense level using both methods and then use “whichever is greater.” Id. The district court did precisely what the guidelines require. Mr. Mendez claims, however, that the rule of lenity requires that he be sentenced based on the lower calculation—in his case, using the level for the mixture. But the rule of -5- lenity applies only to ambiguous laws, and the guidelines involved here are precise. We have previously rejected the identical lenity argument. See United States v. Decker, 55 F.3d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995). Mr. Mendez attempts to distinguish Decker on the ground that it was decided when the guidelines were mandatory, and that current law making them only advisory renders them ambiguous here. But the presence of sentencing discretion does not mean that the trial court must vary from the guidelines range. And a guideline does not become ambiguous simply because a court need not follow precisely what it says. We conclude that the district court did not err in calculating Mr. Mendez’s guidelines sentencing range. We add that insofar as Mr. Mendez is complaining that the guidelines calculation was incorrect because the court treated the methamphetamine as “ice,” he relies on a faulty factual premise. The court did not treat the methamphetamine as ice. Having correctly calculated Mr. Mendez’s guidelines sentencing range, the district court was not required to give a lengthy explanation for its sentence within the guidelines range. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The district court adequately articulated its reasons for imposing a 180-month sentence.