Opinion ID: 1751352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fact issue

Text: The owners argue that, while ruling on Standridge's motion to dismiss, the Trial Court resolved a factual dispute in that he determined the legal effect of the facts. Under these circumstances, they contend that a writ of prohibition is not a proper remedy, citing Porter Foods Inc. v. Brown, 281 Ark. 148, 661 S.W.2d 388 (1983), and Twin City Lines, Inc. v. Cummings, 212 Ark. 569, 206 S.W.2d 438 (1947). In the Twin City Lines case a factual dispute existed because certain evidence was in direct conflict. Helen Pearce was killed in a bus accident while riding on a bus owned by Twin City Lines. The administrator of her estate filed a negligence action against Twin City Lines in Benton Circuit Court. The applicable venue statute provided that such an action might be brought either in the county where the accident happened or the county where the deceased resided at the time of her death. At the hearing on Twin City Lines' motion to dismiss for improper venue, there was a factual dispute concerning the decedent's residence. The administrator offered proof that the decedent resided in Benton County. Twin City lines presented evidence that her true residence was Sebastian County. The Trial Court found that she resided in Benton County, and therefore, venue in Benton Circuit Court was proper. As it was necessary for the Trial Court to decide a question of fact to determine the proper venue, we held that prohibition was not proper. In Porter Foods, Inc. v. Brown , on the other hand, there was a dispute concerning whether certain facts indicated the application of a particular venue provision. In that case, Charles Swafford filed a complaint in Greene County in which he alleged that Porter Foods breached an employment contract and stock purchase agreement. Summons was served on the president of Porter Foods in Pulaski County and also on a salesman for Porter Foods located in Greene County. Porter Foods moved to dismiss for improper venue contending venue was proper only in the county where the defendant resided or was served, and thus it should have been sued in Pulaski County rather than in Greene County. In response, Swafford contended that Porter Foods maintained a branch office or other place of business through its salesman in Greene County, and Greene County was a proper venue under a statute that provides that a corporation may be subject to suit in any county in which it maintains a branch office. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-58-125 (1987). The Trial Court held that venue was proper and denied the motion to dismiss. This court denied prohibition, carefully pointing out that there does not necessarily have to be a factual dispute for the jurisdiction of the trial court to rest on a factual determination. We said: When jurisdiction depends on the establishment of facts or turns on facts which are in dispute, the issue is one correctly determined by the trial court [citations omitted]. This does not necessarily mean that the evidentiary facts presented must be in dispute, but rather the legal effect of such facts is in controversy between the parties. A question of fact must be determined.       In the case at bar, the question decided by the court below involved a determination from facts presented, of whether or not the activities in Green County constituted an other place of business.... It is this type of jurisdictional factual dispute that is properly resolved by the trial court and not by this court on a writ of prohibition. From these cases, it appears that a writ of prohibition will not be issued as long as resolution of the venue (jurisdiction) issue rests on one of two possible kinds of factual determinations. The first instance is where, as in the Twin City Lines case, the evidence presented by both parties is in direct conflict, and the trial court's resolution of this conflict was the basis of its denial of the motion to dismiss for improper venue. The second kind is illustrated in the Porter Foods, Inc ., opinion, where the evidentiary facts are not in direct conflict; however, there is a dispute over whether the established facts fit a certain legal definition. For example, we have stated that where jurisdiction turns on whether the activities of a party satisfy the minimum contacts test, a writ of prohibition should be denied. In Wisc. Brick & Block Corp. v. Cole, 274 Ark. 121, 622 S.W.2d 192 (1981), we said: Whether the minimum contacts test has been satisfied is a question of fact. In cases where jurisdiction depends upon the establishment of facts, the issue of jurisdiction must be decided by the trial court, and even if that decision should be wrong, we correct that error on appeal and not on prohibition. The owners contend that a factual dispute similar to the one described in the Porter Foods, Inc ., case exists in this case. More specifically, they contend that the Trial Court's jurisdiction rested on a determination of whether the facts fit the definition of joint liability as that term is used in the cases cited. This case only involves a legal determination whether there was joint liability. That depends not upon resolution of any dispute as to what was done or not done by the parties or determination of any particular status either of them may occupy. Rather, the question here depends on the nature of the litigation and whether there can be joint liability, given the pleadings before the Court. That is purely a question of law.