Opinion ID: 2244856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Emergency Room Interview

Text: The defendant challenges the admission of his statements made while he was being treated in the emergency room. Early in the morning of May 23, 1993, the defendant called 911 and reported that he had killed Emily Smith. Finding Smith in bed with fatal gunshot wounds, police officer Robert Knuckles then went to the defendant's home and found him in the basement with a gun. After stating to the officer that he had killed Smith, the defendant shot himself. The wound was not life-threatening and the defendant was taken to the hospital. While in the hospital, an oxygen tube in the defendant's nose restricted his ability to speak and the defendant answered questions from hospital personnel by shaking his head yes or no. Officers James Roberts and Thomas Hayswhom the defendant knew from his days as a former police officer noticed the defendant communicating with the hospital staff in this way and asked the defendant if he would answer their questions in the same manner, to which the defendant responded affirmatively. The officers gave the defendant a Miranda advisement, which he indicated he understood. He also indicated that he wished to waive his Fifth Amendment rights and communicated to the officers that he had argued with the victim, that he believed she was dating someone else, that he was upset, and that he shot her. The defendant voluntarily testified at trial. Contrary to his hospital statements, at trial the defendant testified that Smith reached for the gun and that it went off when they struggled over it. He denied being upset about her seeing someone else. To impeach this testimony, on rebuttal the State called Officer Roberts, who testified regarding the defendant's hospital statements. The defendant argues that, because of his physical, physiological, mental, emotional, educational and/or psychological state, capacity and condition he was incapable and unable to appreciate and understand the full import of his Miranda rights and that alleged statements made by the defendant were not made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Brief of Appellant at 10. However, it is well-established that statements by a defendant are admissible for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's trial testimony, even if the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda. [1] Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645-46, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4-5 (1971) (The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.). See also Barker v. State, 440 N.E.2d 664 (1982); Johnson v. State, 258 Ind. 683, 284 N.E.2d 517 (1972). Use of the defendant's statements as impeachment is restricted only when such statements are obtained under coercion or duress. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). Ensuring that statements are voluntary protects against police misconduct. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). [2] Thus, we have recognized that the critical inquiry into the voluntariness of statements is whether, looking to all of the circumstances, the defendant's statements were induced by violence, threats, promises or other improper influence. Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 942 (Ind.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 734 (1996); Rowe v. State, 444 N.E.2d 303, 304 (Ind.1983). The defendant contends that his statements were not voluntary because he had taken medications, was very tired, had tried to commit suicide, and was questioned at the emergency room where he was being treated. The defendant cites the United States Supreme Court decision in Mincey as dispositive. However, the facts of Mincey distinguish it from the facts of the case at bar. The defendant in Mincey was in extremely serious condition in the intensive care unit, his answers were not coherent, he repeatedly asked the police to stop questioning him until he could get an attorney, he gave unresponsive or uninformative answers, and he complained several times that he was confused or unable to think clearly, or that he could answer more accurately the next day. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 400-01, 98 S.Ct. at 2418, 57 L.Ed.2d at 305. The officers disregarded the defendant's requests and extreme medical condition, continuing to question him for four more hours, stopping only when the defendant lost consciousness, and immediately continuing once he regained consciousness. The Court found that the actions by police under those circumstances were coercive, causing the defendant's will to be overborne. In the case at bar, the trial court, after testimony from both sides, found that the defendant's statement was voluntary. We recognize that the defendant may well have been tired, depressed, and upset. However, as we have recently stated, [a]lthough a person's mental condition is relevant to the issue of susceptibility to police coercion, where the person voluntarily makes a confession without police coercion the confession may be considered in spite of the mental condition. Roark v. State, 644 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ind.1994). The defendant does not demonstrate that police misconduct, coercion, violence, threats, promises, or any other improper police influence rendered the confession involuntary. [3] We find no error in the admission of the defendant's statements to impeach his trial testimony.