Opinion ID: 722387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard to determine the existence of legally significant white bloc voting.

Text: 14 The plaintiffs argue that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when evaluating the existence of a significant white voting bloc. Instead of viewing the few black victories as an explainable exception to the general rule of white bloc voting domination, the district court erred in deeming these black successes as convincing proof that white bloc voting had only a negligible effect, if any, on the candidacy of African Americans. The plaintiffs maintain that the four black victories can be explained by special circumstances. In one election, an incumbent ran unopposed. Further, in the other three elections the black candidate ran against three or more candidates where the multiple non-black candidates split the vote of the white voting community. 8 The plaintiffs contend that the district court effectively changed the test under Gingles III from the white community's cohesive voting practices usually defeat the minority candidate to the white community's cohesive voting practices always defeat the minority candidate. 9 15 By contrast, FBISD contends that the district court asked the plaintiffs for the appropriate legal standard, and the plaintiffs declined to provide the court with this information. When the district court asked the plaintiffs' voting rights expert, Attorney George Korbel, for the standard, Korbel provided only evasive answers suggesting only that the I know it when I see it standard (as used in pornography cases) was appropriate. 10 16 Further, FBISD argues that federal courts use the Senate Committee Factors, or the Zimmer Factors 11 when evaluating whether the totality of the circumstances establish a violation under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. FBISD asserts that the district court in this case applied the correct legal standard; the plaintiffs simply failed to present sufficient, unimpeached evidence which could demonstrate under the totality of the circumstances that the FBISD at-large election system resulted in unequal access to the political process. 17 The plaintiffs' arguments regarding the special circumstances stem directly from Supreme Court language in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 57, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2770, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). The Gingles Court established the three requirements that the plaintiffs must satisfy to present a section 2 claim: (1) Gingles I: that the black voters are sufficiently numerous and populous to constitute a majority of the voting age population in at least one single district; (2) Gingles II: that the black community tends to vote in a cohesive manner to support black candidates; and (3) Gingles III: that in contested elections involving white and black candidates, the white community votes cohesively and that as a result the candidates supported by the minority community are usually defeated. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67. 18 In clarifying the analysis of the third Gingles requirement the Supreme Court articulated the definition of polarized voting: If black voters are cohesive and consistently support black candidates, but those candidates are usually submerged when votes from white areas are counted, significant racially polarized voting exists. 478 U.S. at 56, 106 S.Ct. at 2769. The Gingles Court noted that the success of a minority candidate does not automatically disprove the existence of white bloc voting. The Court listed several alternate explanations or special circumstances that may explain minority electoral success in a polarized contest: (1) the absence of an opponent, (2) incumbency, or (3) utilization of bullet voting. See id. (emphasis added). The plaintiffs maintain that because alternative explanations account for the Collins and Cherry victories, those isolated victories do not discredit the polarized white bloc voting in FBISD. 19 We must review de novo the district court's interpretation of the standard under Gingles. The district court was required to specifically discuss the special circumstances because the plaintiffs' evidence raised the issue of whether special circumstances explained the four victories. Heretofore, the Fifth Circuit has treated the special circumstances inquiry as an essential part of the Gingles III requirement. The Court consistently lists the requirement as follows: the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it--in the absence of special circumstances--usually to defeat the minority preferred candidate. See, e.g., Houston v. Lafayette County, 56 F.3d 606, 609 (5th Cir.1995); Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1994); Magnolia Bar Ass'n v. Lee, 994 F.2d 1143, 1146 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 994, 114 S.Ct. 555, 126 L.Ed.2d 456 (1993); see also Rangel v. Morales, 8 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir.1993); Monroe v. City of Woodville, 881 F.2d 1327, 1329 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 822, 111 S.Ct. 71, 112 L.Ed.2d 45 (1990); Overton v. Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir.1989); and Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905, 109 S.Ct. 3213, 106 L.Ed.2d 564 (1989). The issue is, therefore, whether the district court properly considered and analyzed the applicable special circumstances in the present case. 20 We find that the district court expressly discussed the special circumstances when addressing the black victories. The district court indicated that the evidence did not support the plaintiffs' claims regarding the special circumstances. The district court explained: 21 Plaintiffs claim that white bloc voting defeats the preferred candidate of the minority community unless there are special circumstances present. Plaintiffs define such circumstances as a multi-candidate race in which two or more strong Anglo candidates split the white vote and thereby enable the minority candidate to succeed. The analysis of the races, using statistics and other factors, does not bear out this claim.... The evidence demonstrates that minority candidates have been elected to the FBISD school board without special circumstances, such as a candidate running unopposed or opposed by two strong Anglo candidates. 12 22 The plaintiffs expressly raised issues regarding victories caused by incumbency and by white candidates splitting the white vote. The district court impliedly acknowledged the applicability of the running unopposed special circumstance to Collins' 1989 reelection. Additionally, the district court concluded that Cherry's victory in 1991 was the only one that resulted from white candidates splitting the vote. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Collins' 1986 and 1993 victories resulted from a split by white candidates. The plaintiffs offered no other theory or special circumstance to explain Collins' 1986 and 1993 victories. 23 Interestingly enough, in 1986, Collins ran against two white candidates receiving 89 and 1,161 votes, an Hispanic candidate receiving 200 votes, and a black candidate receiving no documented votes. The results do not reflect a voting split by the white candidates or any candidates for that matter. Dr. Alford testified that the election does not reflect a white split because one white candidate received in excess of ninety percent of the white votes. Dr. Alford further noted that [Collins was] elected in spite of the fact that the splitting here is a split among minority candidates. The district court explained that because the Hispanic and black candidates opposing Collins were weak, Collins effectively defeated a white candidate in a head-to-head race. We agree. Collins appears to have won the election despite the absence of a white split. 24 Similarly, in 1993 when a trustee seat became vacant after his 1992 election defeat, Collins ran against one white candidate receiving 3,334 votes, and two Hispanic candidates receiving 4,867 and 651 votes respectively. Dr. Alford testified that there could not be a splitting by white candidates because only one white candidate ran. He explained that [i]f the Anglos wanted to vote cohesively for an Anglo, there [was] an Anglo there for them. 25 Though an Hispanic and a white candidate split the votes in the 1993 election, the plaintiffs cite no authority to show that the mere presence of multiple candidates in an election qualifies as a special circumstance as described by the Supreme Court in Gingles. There is nothing special about an election in which a minority candidate splits the vote with either a white candidate or a minority candidate which allows another minority candidate to be elected. In this particular case, the minority victory which resulted from a voting split caused by another minority candidate cannot be attributed to a special circumstance. Dr. Alford testified that Collins would have won the 1993 election even if none of the minority boxes had voted. Plaintiffs did not persuasively rebut FBISD's evidence concerning the 1993 election. Accordingly, the district court simply did not believe that any special circumstances could explain away the other two victories Collins achieved. On this record, we cannot say that the district court erred. 26 Moreover, the district court's analysis appears consistent with the handling of the special circumstances in Gingles. The Gingles Court's comment regarding circumstances that may explain a single minority candidate's victory cannot be transformed into a legal standard which requires the court to force each and every victory of several minority candidates to fit within a prescribed special circumstance. Every victory cannot be explained away as a fortuitous event. The Supreme Court's mandate to the district court is to analyze the district's voting practice by evaluating the three Gingles factors and then by looking at the totality of the circumstances. This directive did not compel the district court in the present case to automatically pigeonhole the four minority victories into the prescribed special circumstances. If the victories could be explained with the special circumstances, the district court was free to do so; however, because the special circumstances did not fit, the district court was not required to force it. We hold that based on the treatment of special circumstances in Gingles, the district court did not misapply the legal standard simply because it did not find special circumstances where none existed. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we cannot say that this finding was clearly erroneous. 13 27