Opinion ID: 2995181
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sexual Harassment in the Form of a

Text: Hostile Work Environment
Plaintiff also alleges that the School District created a hostile work environment that constitutes sexual harassment. An employer violates Title VII when ’discrimination based on sex . . . create[s] a hostile or abusive work environment.’ Adusumilli v. City of Chi., 164 F.3d 353, 361 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 988, 120 S. Ct. 450, 145 L. Ed.2d 367 (1999). Our inquiry turns on whether the alleged harassment occurred because of the sex of the complainant, thus we ask whether she was ’exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex [were] not exposed.’ Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S. Ct. 998, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993) (Ginsburg, J. concurring)). Harassment is not limited to acts of sexual desire, see Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 1999); Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1008 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80), but rather is a broad term which encompasses all forms of conduct that unreasonably interfere with an individual’s work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64). Workplace harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 ([N]ot all workplace conduct that may be described as ’harassment’ affects a ’term, condition, or privilege’ of employment.); Russell v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 243 F.3d 336, 342-43 (7th Cir. 2001) (In order to survivesummary judgment on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must present evidence that would establish that the allegedly hostile conduct was so severe or pervasive as to create an abusive working environment in violation of Title VII.). We have recognized, however, that harassment need not be both severe and pervasive--one extremely serious act of harassment could rise to an actionable level as could a series of less severe acts. See Smith, 189 F.3d at 533-34. To prevail on a hostile environment claim, the plaintiff must show that the work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. The requirement of subjectivity is intended to ensure that the plaintiff did actually feel harassed, because if the victim does not subjectively regard the environment as abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the victim’s employment and there is accordingly no Title VII violation. McKenzie, 92 F.3d at 479 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 20-22). An objectively hostile work environment is one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. See Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361. In determining whether a plaintiff has met this standard, a court must consider all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also Russell, 243 F.3d at 343; Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 533- 34 (7th Cir. 1999). We have made clear that Title VII do[es] not mandate admirable behavior from employers, Russell, 243 F.3d at 343, thus ’simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ’terms and conditions of employment.’ Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361 (quoting Far agher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1998)); see also Russell, 243 F.3d at 343-44 (citing a number of Seventh Circuit cases which held that various statements were not so offensive as to constitute actionable conduct); Saxton v. AT&T, 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that conduct was not so severe or pervasive as to create an objectively hostile work environment). The point of all this language, much of which we have already commented on in other cases, is to assist judges in determining which claims deserve to survive summary judgment and go to trial. Thus we must decide whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that plaintiff was harassed, that she was harassed because of her sex, and that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a subjectively and objectively hostile work environment. See Mazzei v. Rock ’N Around Trucking, Inc., 246 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2001) ([S]ummary judgment is improper [ ] if a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.) (citation omitted). We thus turn to that task, reviewing all of plaintiff’s evidence in the light most favorable to her. The following are the primary factual allegations made by the plaintiff with regard to her hostile work environment claim: 1. The high school principal, Sanders, asked the superintendent, Norsted, not to allow plaintiff to return to the high school because she was not qualified. This request was made notwithstanding plaintiff’s satisfactory evaluations and without consulting plaintiff’s supervisor. 2. Norsted, the School District superintendent, promised Fougner, the male custodian that plaintiff bumped when she returned to the high school, that he would get his job back.