Opinion ID: 2221513
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the evidence was offered for a proper purpose

Text: ¶ 54. The first step in our analysis of whether evidence of the Cindy P. assault was properly admitted is to determine whether the evidence was offered for an acceptable purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2). Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772. ¶ 55. The record indicates that during pretrial hearings, the State proposed various purposes for which the evidence could be admitted. The trial court's rulings on which purposes were permissible are somewhat unclear. The trial court ruled that the evidence could not be admitted solely for the purpose of establishing motive. However, the court later concluded that because the evidence was admissible for the purposes of establishing opportunity and plan or scheme, it could be admitted for the purpose of motive as well. The court reasoned that although the danger of prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence for the purpose of establishing motive, the danger of prejudice did not outweigh the evidence's probative value for the purpose of establishing plan or scheme. The court apparently concluded that because the evidence was therefore admissible for at least one purpose, all applicable purposesmotive, opportunity, and plan or schemecould be submitted to the jury. The jury instruction permitted the jury to consider evidence of the Cindy P. assault for the purpose of establishing motive and plan or scheme. [13] ¶ 56. Applying the greater latitude rule, the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was offered for a permissible purpose under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 904.04(2). We agree. ¶ 57. First, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing motive. Our cases establish that when the defendant's motive for an alleged sexual assault is an element of the charged crime, other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of establishing motive. See Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 593 (citing Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 25; Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 260-61; State v. Mink, 146 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 429 N.W.2d 99 (Ct. App. 1988)). ¶ 58. The defendant in this case was charged with second-degree sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2). At the time of the defendant's crime, the statute provided in relevant part: Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony. [14] Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2). Sexual contact is defined by Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5), which provided at the time of Davidson's offense: Sexual contact means any intentional touching by the complainant or defendant, either directly or through clothing by the use of any body part or object, of the complainant's or defendant's intimate parts if that intentional touching is either for the purpose of sexually degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant. Wis. Stat. § 948.01(5). [15] ¶ 59. Thus the defendant's purpose or motive for allegedly touching Tina H. was one element of the charged crime, and evidence relevant to motive was therefore admissible. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 595-96. See also Fishnick, 127 Wis. 2d at 260-61. ¶ 60. The evidence also was admissible to establish plan or scheme. Evidence of other crimes may be admitted for the purpose of establishing a plan or scheme when there is a concurrence of common elements between the two incidents. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d at 24; State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 99, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977). The defendant accurately points out that there were differences between the Cindy P. and Tina H. assaults. The Cindy P. assault took place 10 years before the Tina H. assault, the victims were not the same age, the assaults took place in different places, and only the Tina H. assault involved touching of the victim's breasts. ¶ 61. However, as the trial court noted, the circumstances of the two incidents bear striking similarities. In both assaults, the victim was particularly vulnerable. Tina H., a thirteen-year-old girl, had been drinking wine given to her by the defendant; Cindy P., a six-year-old girl, had ventured alone to the basement of the church to get a drink of water. Also, both offenses took place in unlikely locations, in which the defendant could easily have been apprehended during the commission of the offense. Tina H. was assaulted in a camper while family members slept nearby; Cindy P. was assaulted in the basement of the church, next to the men's room and near to an occupied nursery, while church services took place on the main floor. Finally, both assaults involved touching the girls between the legs. [4] ¶ 62. Because of these common elements, and in light of the greater latitude rule, we conclude that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it allowed evidence of the Cindy P. assault to be submitted to the jury for the purpose of establishing plan or scheme.