Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Marlow's Refusal to Discuss Involvement in Methadone Robbery

Text: Marlow contends the prosecutor violated the rule of Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. at pages 617-618, 96 S.Ct. 2240 ( Doyle ), in eliciting testimony from Detective Scharf of the Ontario Police Department that in 1979, after being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights and answering several questions relating to methadone found in his possession, Marlow refused to answer questions about the clinic robbery. Marlow failed to object at trial on the ground he now advances and therefore has forfeited the contention for purposes of this appeal ( People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 332, 116 Cal. Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432), but he contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this respect. We conclude Marlow is not entitled to relief. Doyle holds that the prosecution may not, consistent with due process and fundamental fairness, use postarrest silence following Miranda warnings to impeach a defendant's testimony at trial. ( Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 617-618, 96 S.Ct. 2240.) Respondent asserts Doyle has no application here because Scharf testified, not in impeachment, but before Marlow took the stand. We find this contention inconsistent with the rationale of Doyle, that the impeachment by postwarning silence there condemned was fundamentally unfair because Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him. ( Anderson v. Charles (1980) 447 U.S. 404, 407-408, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 65 L.Ed.2d 222.) No less unfair is using that silence against a defendant by means of the prosecutor's examination of an interrogating detective even before the defendant has had the opportunity to take the stand. Respondent further asserts, citing People v. Hurd (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1084, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, that Doyle does not protect against prosecutorial use of a defendant's refusal to answer selected questions after waiving Miranda rights and electing to speak to law enforcement authorities. The Hurd court stated: A defendant has no right to remain silent selectively. Once a defendant elects to speak after receiving a Miranda warning, his or her refusal to answer questions may be used for impeachment purposes absent any indication that such refusal is an invocation of Miranda rights. . . . [Defendant] was not induced by the Miranda warning to remain silent. . . . [ļ] . . . We do not think Doyle was meant to preclude the prosecutor from commenting on highly relevant evidence bearing on [defendant's] credibility, including [defendant's] refusal to provide critical details, when he had voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. ( Id. at pp. 1093-1094, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 203.) Other courts have taken a different view. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that a suspect may selectively waive his Miranda rights by agreeing to answer some questions but not others. ( United States v. Soliz (9th Cir.1997) 129 F.3d 499, 503-504, overruled on another ground in United States v. Johnson (9th Cir.2001) 256 F.3d 895; United States v. Garcia-Cruz (9th Cir.1992) 978 F.2d 537, 541-542.) Several other federal circuits have specifically held that Doyle precludes the use of partial silence to the extent that the defendant relied on a Miranda warning in refusing to answer specific questions. ( Hockenbury v. Sowders (6th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 155, 159; United States v. Scott (7th Cir.1995) 47 F.3d 904, 906-907; United States v. May (10th Cir.1995) 52 F.3d 885, 890; United States v. Canterbury (10th Cir.1993) 985 F.2d 483, 486.) In United States v. Harrold (10th Cir. 1986) 796 F.2d 1275, the federal Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reasoned, To the extent that a defendant clearly relies on a Miranda warning to refuse to answer specific questions, he had been induced by the government to do it and his silence may not be used against him. ( Id. at p. 1279, fn. 3.) We need not, in this case, determine whether comment on Marlow's refusal to answer questions pertaining to the robbery violated Doyle, because any such error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of other witnesses' testimony regarding Marlow's involvement in the robbery and the incident's relatively minor significance in the prosecution's case in aggravation. The lack of prejudice stemming from the assumed error is fatal to Marlow's related claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the challenged comments.