Opinion ID: 2505697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Property Statutes:

Text:  OCGA § 14-5-46[A]ll deeds of conveyance. . . are and shall be deemed and taken to be good and valid, and available in law, for the intents, uses and purposes contained in such deeds of conveyance: and all lots of land so conveyed, shall be fully and absolutely vested in such church or religious society, or in their respective trustees, for the uses and purposes in the said deed expressed; to be Holden to them or their trustees for their use, by succession, according to the mode of church government, or the rules of discipline exercised by such churches or religious societies respectively.  OCGA § 44-5-30A deed to lands must be in writing, signed by the maker, and attested by at least two witnesses. It must be delivered to the purchaser or his representative and be made on a good or valuable consideration. The consideration of a deed may always be inquired into when the principles of justice require it.  OCGA § 44-5-164Possession of real property under written evidence of title in conformance with the requirements of Code Section 44-5-161 for a period of seven years shall confer good title by prescription to the property against everyone except the state and those persons laboring under the disabilities stated in Code Section 44-5-170, provided that, if the written title is forged or fraudulent and if the person claiming adverse possession had actual notice of such forgery or fraud when he commenced his possession, no prescription may be based on such possession. Agency Statute:  OCGA § 10-6-2Where the exercise or performance of an agency is by written instrument, the agency shall also be created by written instrument; provided, however, unless a contrary intent is expressly set forth therein, any written instrument creating an agency regardless of the formality of its execution shall conclusively be deemed to authorize the execution of instruments with the formalities necessary or appropriate to accomplish the purposes for which the agency was granted. A corporation may create an agent in its usual mode of transacting business and without its corporate seal. Any deed or other instrument executed under seal pursuant to an agency created by an act not under seal, if not otherwise required to be under seal for its validity, shall be binding upon the principal and valid as if an unsealed instrument. Trust Statutes:  OCGA § 53-12-2As used in this chapter, the term: . . . (3) `Express trust' means a trust as described in Code Section 53-12-20. . . . (5) `Implied trust' means a resulting trust as described in Code Section 53-12-130 or a constructive trust as described in Code Section 53-12-132. . . . (11) `Settlor' means the person who creates the trust, including a testator in the case of a testamentary trust. . . . (13) `Trust' means an express trust or an implied trust but shall not include trusts created by statute or the Constitution of Georgia. (14) `Trust instrument' means the document, including any testamentary instrument, that contains the trust provisions. (15) `Trust property' means property the legal title to which is held by the trustee. . . . (16) `Trustee' means the person or persons holding legal title to the property in trust.  OCGA § 53-12-6(a)Trusts are peculiarly subjects of equity jurisdiction. Suits by or against a trustee which sound at law may be filed in a court of law.  OCGA § 53-12-20(a) Except as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section, an express trust shall be created or declared in writing and signed by the settlor or an agent for the settlor acting under a power of attorney containing express authorization. (b) An express trust shall have, ascertainable with reasonable certainty: (1) An intention by a settlor to create such trust; (2) Trust property;. . . (4) A trustee; and (5) Trustee duties specified in writing or provided by law. . . .  OCGA § 53-12-23A person has capacity to create an inter vivos trust to the extent that such person has legal capacity to transfer title to property inter vivos. A person has capacity to create a testamentary trust to the extent that such person has legal capacity to devise or bequeath property by will.  OCGA § 53-12-25(a) Transfer of property to a trust shall require a transfer of legal title to the trustee. (b) For any interest in real property to become trust property in a trust of which any transferor is a trustee, the instrument of conveyance shall additionally be recorded in the appropriate real property records.  OCGA § 53-12-132(a) A constructive trust is a trust implied whenever the circumstances are such that the person holding legal title to property, either from fraud or otherwise, cannot enjoy the beneficial interest in the property without violating some established principle of equity. (b) The person claiming the beneficial interest in the property may be found to have waived the right to a constructive trust by subsequent ratification or long acquiescence. Equity Statutes:  OCGA § 23-1-3Equity jurisdiction is established and allowed for the protection and relief of parties where, from any peculiar circumstances, the operation of the general rules of law would be deficient in protecting from anticipated wrong or relieving for injuries done.  OCGA § 23-1-6Equity is ancillary, not antagonistic, to the law; hence, equity follows the law where the rule of law is applicable and follows the analogy of the law where no rule is directly applicable.  OCGA § 23-1-10He who would have equity must do equity and must give effect to all equitable rights of the other party respecting the subject matter of the action.  OCGA § 23-1-12The equity of a party who has been misled is superior to that of the person who willfully misleads such party.  OCGA § 23-1-16He who takes with notice of an equity takes subject to that equity.  OCGA § 23-1-23Where the rules of construction will allow, equity seeks always to construe conditions subsequent into covenants and to relieve against forfeitures.  OCGA § 23-1-25Equity gives no relief to one whose long delay renders the ascertainment of the truth difficult, even when no legal limitation bars the right.  OCGA § 23-2-2Great inadequacy of consideration, joined with great disparity of mental ability in contracting a bargain, may justify equity in setting aside a sale or other contract.  OCGA § 23-2-51(a) Fraud may be actual or constructive. (b) Actual fraud consists of any kind of artifice by which another is deceived. Constructive fraud consists of any act of omission or commission, contrary to legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, which is contrary to good conscience and operates to the injury of another. (c) Actual fraud implies moral guilt; constructive fraud may be consistent with innocence.  OCGA § 23-2-52Misrepresentation of a material fact, made willfully to deceive or recklessly without knowledge and acted on by the opposite party or made innocently and mistakenly and acted on by the opposite party, constitutes legal fraud.  OCGA § 23-2-53Suppression of a material fact which a party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case.  OCGA § 23-2-57Fraud may not be presumed but, being in itself subtle, slight circumstances may be sufficient to carry conviction of its existence.  OCGA § 23-2-58Any relationship shall be deemed confidential, whether arising from nature, created by law, or resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and agent, etc.  OCGA § 23-2-59Where, by the act or consent of parties or the act of a third person or of the law, one person is placed in such relation to another that he becomes interested for him or with him in any subject or property, he is prohibited from acquiring rights in that subject or property which are antagonistic to the person with whose interest he has become associated.  OCGA § 23-2-60Fraud will authorize equity to annul conveyances, however solemnly executed. Constitutional Provisions:  U.S. Const. Amend. 1Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.  Ga. Const., Art. 1, Sec. I, Para. INo person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.  Ga. Const., Art. I., Sec. I, Para. XIThe right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate, except that the court shall render judgment without the verdict of a jury in all civil cases where no issuable defense is filed and where a jury is not demanded in writing by either party. . . .  Ga. Const., Art. I., Sec. II, Para. IIIThe legislative, judicial, and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct; and no person discharging the duties of one shall at the same time exercise the functions of either of the others except as herein provided. All of the above-listed state statutes are neutral principles under Jones. CCS has the right to insist that this Court properly apply these pertinent state statutes and constitutional provisions to ensure the protection of CCS's legal rights. If this Court applied all of the applicable state statutes, which are neutral principles under Jones, it is unclear on what basis, if any, the majority would allow the National Church to create a trust on somebody else's property for the benefit of the National Church despite OCGA § 23-2-59 expressly precluding the National Church's wrongful attempt to acquire rights in CCS's property that are antagonistic to its confidential relation CCS. See OCGA § 23-2-59 ( Where, by the act or consent of parties or the act of a third person or of the law, one person is placed in such relation to another that he becomes interested for him or with him in any subject or property, he is prohibited from acquiring rights in that subject or property which are antagonistic to the person with whose interest he has become associated. (emphasis added)). Similarly, it is unclear on what basis, if any, the majority would allow the National Church to transfer CCS's property to itself without even a deed or any other writing that complies with Georgia laws requiring deeds to be in writing and witnessed by two people so as to protect against ultra vires transfers such as this. See OCGA § 44-5-30 (A deed to lands must be in writing, signed by the maker, and attested by at least two witnesses. . . .). Although the majority also fails to mention the many laws designed to protect citizens from fraud and deceit, it is beyond serious dispute that these state statutes are neutral principles under Jones as well. Furthermore, I would conclude that the parties' failure to argue each and every one of the above-listed statutes in the lower courts does not necessarily preclude this Court from considering and applying all of the applicable state statutes in resolving this case, unless the state statute involves an affirmative defense set forth in OCGA § 9-11-8(c). To hold otherwise would make the outcome of a case dependent on the skill of the lawyers with regard to identifying and arguing all of the applicable state statutes, rather than dependent on the language of the law itself, which appears to run afoul of various state statutes regarding equity. See generally OCGA §§ 23-1-3, § 9-3-3. In my view, it is this Court's responsibility to evaluate and apply all of the applicable laws in resolving this case on appeal, just as [i]t is for the trial court to evaluate if a jury instruction is applicable, supported by evidence in the record, and an accurate statement of the law, 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 921. It is important to underscore that all of the above-listed state statutes are neutral principles under Jones. The historical narrative detailed at length by the majority under the guise of church governing documents is not a neutral principle under Jones. Moreover, prior cases, including Carnes, that rely on what all parties now agree is the mistaken statutory interpretation of OCGA § 14-5-46 are not neutral principles of law. Further, OCGA § 14-5-47, which by its plain unambiguous terms applies only when there is a conveyance to trustees, is a neutral principle. But, prior cases that hold that this code section applies to deeds that do not convey title to trustees are not neutral principles. Thus, OCGA § 14-5-47 has no application to the facts of this case. Nevertheless, the majority relies on cases misapplying both OCGA § 14-5-46 and OCGA § 14-5-47 as controlling policy or, in fact, neutral principles here. Maj. Op. at 250. I strongly disagree with this determination by the majority. The majority's logic in this case is confounding. The statutes do not apply as written. Yet, a court case mistakenly said they did apply to similar situations. The majority thus uses as a neutral principle to determine whether a trust exists or not, prior case law that all parties hereto agree mistakenly held these statutes to apply to similar facts is used in lieu of the statutes themselves. The result is that the majority transforms the statutory language enacted by the Legislature by filtering state statutes through bad case law that all parties agree misinterpreted the statutes. Which, as between good statutes and bad case law, is a neutral principle?