Opinion ID: 2451781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to grant new trial motion

Text: At trial, Wal-Mart presented considerable testimony on its internal safety procedures. As part of this defense, Wal-Mart's store manager, Roger Trover, responded to a question on direct examination about taping the entrance mats down: Well, actually, from a safety standpoint, from my perception, that would cause more of a risk than if they weren't taped down, because the tape could roll up or it could come unstuck or whatever, and represent more of a trip hazard than the mat, itself, would. Because two days after the trial the mats were taped down at the store entrance, Piercy wants to use this information to impeach Wal-Mart personnel and urges that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We do not agree. Rule 59(a)(7) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure states that a new trial may be granted because of newly discovered evidence material for the party applying, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial ... A new trial based on newly discovered evidence, however, is not a favored remedy. National Bank of Commerce v. Beavers, 304 Ark. 81, 802 S.W.2d 132 (1991). Whether to grant a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Liggett v. Church of Nazarene, 291 Ark. 298, 724 S.W.2d 170 (1987). When a trial court denies a motion for a new trial, the test is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, giving the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences permissible under the proof. Isbell v. Ed Ball Const. Co., 310 Ark. 81, 833 S.W.2d 370 (1992); Scott v. McClain, 296 Ark. 527, 758 S.W.2d 409 (1988). We have held that in a hearing on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the burden is on the movant to establish that he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced the evidence at the time of trial, that the evidence is not merely impeaching or cumulative, and that the additional testimony would probably have changed the result of the trial. See Rogers v. Frank Lyon Co., 253 Ark. 856, 489 S.W.2d 506 (1973); see also KKO.C. v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.1986); Chemical Delinting Co. v. Jackson, 193 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.1951); 6A Moore's Federal Practice, § 59.08[3], pp. 59-10359-104 (1987); 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2808, p. 60 (1973). Using these standards, the proof in question before us fails primarily for one reason. Piercy admits that he wants to use the new evidence to totally impeach Wal-Mart's manager. The fact that new information has been discovered which might merely impeach or otherwise test the credibility of a witness is not a sufficient reason to warrant a new trial. There was no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's ruling.