Opinion ID: 2977492
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michel Abboud’s Criminal History Category

Text: Defendant next argues that the district court erred in considering his post-sentencing state conviction when determining his Criminal History Category. On a general remand for resentencing, a district court sentences the defendant de novo, “which means that the district court may redo the entire sentencing process including considering new evidence and issues.” United States v. Moor, 131 F.3d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1997). However, a Booker remand is not a general remand. In United States v. Worley, this court held that “because the purpose of a Booker remand is to ensure that the defendant’s sentence is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the district court may consider only those facts that existed at the time the defendant was first sentenced.” United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316, 323 (6th Cir. 2007). “The goal of the [Booker] remand is to determine if, at the time of sentencing, the district judge would have imposed a different sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. Post- sentencing events or conduct simply are not relevant to that inquiry.” Worley, 453 F.3d 706, 706 (6th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original). As such, “the district court [is] not permitted to consider the defendants’ post-sentencing conduct for purposes of Booker resentencing.” United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 2008). In this case, the order of remand was for resentencing in light of Booker. Such a remand “did not require or permit consideration of factors postdating the original sentencing hearing.” Worley, 453 F.3d at 707. Defendant’s state law conviction was not in existence at the time Defendant was first sentenced. Therefore, it should not be considered for the purpose of determining Defendant’s Criminal History Category. The government argues that the decisions of this Court that have vacated a district court’s sentence based on the district court’s consideration of post-sentencing conduct have been limited to situations where the district court took the defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts into account. See, e.g., Keller, 498 F.3d at 323. Unlike post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, which are discouraged from consideration by district courts by a Guidelines policy statement, USSG § 5K2.19, consideration of a defendant’s criminal history is properly considered under the Guidelines, USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1). However, the rationale behind Worley is not whether a post-sentencing factor is disfavored by the Guidelines. “Worley is predicated . . . on the conclusion that consideration of post-sentencing factors is incompatible with the limited scope of a Booker remand, that is, reviewing whether the defendant would have received the same sentence had the Guidelines been advisory, rather than mandatory, at the time of the original sentencing.” United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316, 324 (6th Cir. 2007). To increase a defendant’s Guidelines range based on a post-sentencing conviction is inconsistent with this purpose. The government also argues that the conviction should be taken into account because the conduct underlying the conviction occurred before the original sentencing. However, it was the conviction, not the underlying conduct, that the district court relied on to increase Defendant’s Criminal History Category. Therefore, the district court erred in taking Defendant’s post-sentencing conviction into account when calculating Defendant’s Criminal History Category. “A remand will not be required, and an error deemed harmless, however, when ‘we are certain that . . . any such error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.’” United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). However, “it is unclear that an error in determining the Guidelines recommendation can ever be considered harmless post-Gall.” United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 330 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the district court began its sentencing analysis from an incorrect benchmark, we cannot find that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it begun its consideration from the correct Guidelines range. Therefore, we vacate Michel Abboud’s sentence, and remand for resentencing.