Opinion ID: 186939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Forged Signatures and Last Minute Representations

Text: 21 U-Haul next argues the Union's distribution of a petition supported by forged signatures and of a `Guarantee' certificate misrepresenting the Union's powers, individual employees' rights, and [U-Haul's] management authority were calculated to misinform the employees, and were cynically timed to ensure that [U-Haul] would have no opportunity to respond. The Guarantee stated that, if the Union won the election, then it [would be] illegal for the company to close or threaten to close the plant. 22 The Board considered this objection pursuant to both its longstanding precedent, Midland National Life Insurance Co., 263 NLRB 127, 133 (1982), holding that misleading campaign statements are cause to set aside an election only if a party has used forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize the propaganda for what it is, id. at 130 (internal quotation mark and citation omitted), and the exception thereto engrafted by the Sixth Circuit, which held that an election also may be set aside where no forgery can be proved, but where the misrepresentation is so pervasive and the deception so artful that employees will be unable to separate truth from untruth. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 343, 348 (1984). The Board agreed with the hearing officer that the misrepresentations alleged in this case did not meet either standard and that the Guarantee —although arguably ... an erroneous reading of Board law—would be seen and treated by voters as union propaganda. 23 U-Haul challenges the Board's decision upon the basis of the Sixth Circuit's five-factor test for whether misrepresentations interfered with employees' freedom of choice, see NLRB v. St. Francis Healthcare Ctr., 212 F.3d 945, 963-64 (2000). The Board argues U-Haul may not raise this argument here because, although the Company did object on the basis of Van Dorn, it did not argue the Board should apply the five factors identified in St. Francis, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (No objection that has not been urged before the Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure ... be excused because of extraordinary circumstances). U-Haul responds that whereas § 160(e) bars a new objection, here the employer is only adducing new support for an objection that it did make before the Board. 24 We agree the argument is barred. St. Francis represents a distinct alternative to the Board's approach in Midland and adds additional considerations to the Sixth Circuit's own approach in Van Dorn. See Majestic Star Casino, 373 F.3d at 1349 (Subsection 160(e) bars argument first raised in court that Board should adopt factors explicated in St. Francis ). 25 The Board concluded the alleged misrepresentations in the form of the Guarantee and the forged signatures on the Union's petition did not change the employees' understanding of the petition or of the Guarantee as union propaganda to be treated accordingly, and therefore they were not grounds for setting aside the election. According to the Board, the few allegedly forged signatures, which suggested more employees supported the Union than may have been the case, would not have prevented employees from recognizing that the Union was circulating the petition to garner support for its cause. As for the Guarantee, which plainly emanated from the Union, the Board similarly concluded employees would see the document as union propaganda and treat it as such. 26 The Board's reasoning is consistent with the standard set in Midland We therefore hold the Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the alleged Union misrepresentations in this case did not compromise employees' freedom of choice.