Opinion ID: 785576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gonzalez's Out-of-Court Statements

Text: 10 Although the defendants couch their arguments in terms of the Confrontation Clause, their reasoning more clearly invokes concerns about their compulsory-process rights (or simple evidentiary error). We first explain why the Confrontation Clause does not apply here. Then, we explain why the trial court's actions were ultimately correct, no matter how the argument is phrased. 11 Defendants' argument finds no support in the Confrontation Clause. Gonzalez did not testify. The defendants were able to (and did) cross-examine the government agents who recounted Gonzalez's statements. So the only way the defendants can prevail under the Confrontation Clause is if they can show they had a right to cross-examine Gonzalez due to the agents' testimony recounting his statements. But no such right existed because Gonzalez's statements were nontestimonial, 4 co-conspirator statements, which fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 5 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). When a statement satisfies the requirements for a co-conspirator statement under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, both the Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause allow the government to introduce the statement through a witness who heard the statement, even if the government cannot show that the co-conspirator is unavailable. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986). In short, the Confrontation Clause does not give the defendant the right to cross-examine a person who does not testify at trial and whose statements are introduced under the co-conspirator hearsay exclusion. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992); cf. United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 590-91 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that the Confrontation Clause did not guarantee the defendant the right to cross-examine a speaker whose statements were imputed to the defendant as adoptive admissions of a party opponent), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1048, 123 S.Ct. 2112, 155 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003). 12 Nor did the trial court violate the defendants' compulsory-process rights. The defendants tried to compel Gonzalez to the stand. But he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, and the trial court correctly held that he did not have to answer any of the questions the defendants wanted to ask him. Neither defendant contests the validity of Gonzalez's privilege assertion. And wisely, they do not argue that their right to compulsory process trumped Gonzalez's Fifth Amendment right. See Culkin v. Purkett, 45 F.3d 1229, 1233 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Robaina, 39 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir.1994). Instead, they argue that the trial court either should have forced him to assert the privilege in the jury's presence, or when it refused to do so, should have stricken all testimony about his out-of-court statements. 6 Both arguments are wrong. 13 First, this situation differs from the one in which the government seeks to use a privilege invocation against the defendant who invokes the privilege. Gray v. Maryland, 368 Md. 529, 796 A.2d 697, 727 (2002) (Raker, J., concurring). In that situation, the Constitution forbids any adverse inferences because allowing such inferences would burden the defendant's right not to incriminate himself. U.S. Const. amend. V. Here though, the defendants tried to help their case with an inference from another witness's privilege invocation. Such tactics implicate the Federal Rules of Evidence, but not the Fifth Amendment, because no party sought to use Gonzalez's privilege invocation against him in a criminal proceeding. See United States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 884 (2d Cir.1993). 14 But even though arguing the inference would not have violated Gonzalez's Fifth Amendment right, the Federal Rules of Evidence further limit the defendants' compulsory-process rights. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.). Federal Rule of Evidence 401 requires that the evidence be relevant. And Rule 403 gives the trial court considerable discretion to exclude evidence when the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the evidence's probative value. 15 Very rarely will these rules allow a party to argue inferences from a witness's privilege invocation. See United States v. Doddington, 822 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir. 1987) ([A] defendant does not have the right to call a witness to the stand simply to force invocation of the right against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury.) (citing United States v. Lyons, 703 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir.1983)). A third party's privilege invocation is not often relevant. And even if the party seeking to argue the inference concocts a reason that the silence may be relevant, the danger of unfair prejudice usually outweighs the probative value because there is no way the opponent can test the meaning attributed to the invocation. Deutsch, 987 F.2d at 884. On cross-examination, a witness who is asked why she invoked the privilege will undoubtedly respond with another privilege assertion. Also, due to the courtroom drama an invocation creates, the jury is likely to place far too much emphasis upon an ambiguous invocation. Id. Thus, absent extraordinary circumstances, trial courts should exercise their discretion to forbid parties from calling witnesses who, when called, will only invoke a privilege. United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 231 (1st Cir.1997); Deutsch, 987 F.2d at 884; see Doddington, 822 F.2d at 822. The district court in this case did not abuse its discretion when it refused to require Gonzalez to assert his privilege in the jury's presence. 16 Finally, we reject the defendants' argument that, once the district court prevented the defendants from calling Gonzalez, it should have stricken the testimony relating to his statements from the record. Defendants rely upon a line of cases that are much different from this one. See, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 696 F.2d 72, 75 (8th Cir.1982). In Humphrey, the government called a witness, the witness testified on direct, and then the witness invoked the privilege to prevent the defendant from cross-examining the witness. See id. In that situation, the trial court must sometimes strike the testimony because a defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine a witness who testifies against him at trial. Id. ([I]f the witness' refusal to answer prevents the defendant from directly assailing the truth of the witness' testimony, the court should strike at least the relevant portion of the testimony.). But when a statement is admissible as a co-conspirator statement, the Constitution gives the defendant, at most, the right to confront the witness who recounts the statement. White, 502 U.S. at 356, 112 S.Ct. 736. That is, the very essence of the firmly-rooted-hearsay-exception doctrine is that introducing those statements without cross-examination of the declarant does not violate the Confrontation Clause. While the defendant can call the declarant as a witness, he cannot do so when, as here, the declarant's only testimony will be an inadmissible privilege invocation. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410, 108 S.Ct. 646. 7 17 The trial court did not err by refusing to strike the testimony about Gonzalez's statements. If Gonzalez had been absent from the trial, there is no question the government could have offered the testimony about his statements. It hardly makes sense, then, to argue that the trial court should have stricken the government's testimony after it determined that Gonzalez would only invoke his privilege. In other words, if the testimony about Gonzalez's statements was admissible without him being present, it surely did not become inadmissible when the court determined that Gonzalez would provide no relevant testimony if called.