Opinion ID: 2461858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: funds for medical contracts

Text: The budget bill provided $900,000 fund for medical service contracts for county jails. It also provided a condition, that that fund be maintained in an individual account specifically for medical contracts, and furthermore that a county must be certified before it received its share of the funding. In order to be so certified, the county must attest that it has investigated and obtained the most feasible medical contract or contracts possible. The contract(s) is subject to approval by the Corrections Cabinet. Budget, Part I, General Fund, C. Corrections, Item 27d. Local Jail Support. It is claimed by appellant that such provision is in conflict with KRS 441.045. [14] It is argued that the budget bill contains substantive law and that such a requirement is not an appropriation. The trial court disagreed and so do we. It is an altogether too familiar litany that the premise of this provision is to react to the financial crunch of the state and that such directive is only temporary. It is also too familiar to say that this attempt of the General Assembly to regulate even temporarily, the procurement by medical services contracts  in an economical manner  is clearly a subject of an appropriation. The General Assembly is saying to counties, in effect, we will give you $900,000 in aid but you don't qualify unless the contract you obtain is the most economical and feasible one. It cannot be seriously argued that this is not appropriation and therefore germane. There is no need to wrap up this opinion with a lengthy summary. The General Assembly has the basic constitutional power and responsibility to tax and to spend the public's money. This power, as we have seen in prior decisions, is exclusive to the General Assembly and includes the power to use a budget bill to repeal, amend, modify and suspend existing statutes. Such power must be exercised within all constitutional proscriptions, including those of Section 51. The General Assembly, in the questioned statute hereinbefore described and relying on its own specific statutory authority, did precisely that. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. STEPHENS, C.J., and GANT, LEIBSON, STEPHENSON, WHITE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. VANCE, J., dissents, and files a dissenting opinion.