Opinion ID: 2005321
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: issues

Text: Defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of his sanity under three assignments, that is that the court erred in overruling his motion for judgment at the conclusion of the State's case, that the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence and that the judgment was contrary to law. The issues are the same under the two last mentioned assignments and will be treated as one. As to the motion for judgment on the evidence, the ruling thereon is not subject to review, as the defendant did not stand upon it but introduced evidence in his defense. Pinkston v. State, (1975) Ind. App., 325 N.E.2d 497; Hancock v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 697, 271 N.E.2d 731; Warren v. State, (1963) 243 Ind. 508, 188 N.E.2d 108. The substance of the defendant's insanity plea was that he was a drug addict suffering from withdrawal reaction to the extent that he could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law thus meeting the requirements of Hill v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429, wherein we adopted the following test: A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. It is doubtful that drug addiction is a mental disease or defect under the foregoing test; and it is highly questionable that the law could tolerate a policy of accepting such addiction as an excuse for criminal activity. It appears that we are not dealing with an incapacity born of mental disease or defect but rather with an inability to withstand temptation born of a great physical need. It is unnecessary, however, to pass upon that question in this case, as our review of the record reveals a conflict in the evidence upon the issue of the defendant's capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. It is true, as claimed by the defendant, that the psychiatric testimony given at trial indicated that he could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and that he was a heroin addict. Since the defendant's claim of insanity was predicated upon a claim that his disability was the result of his being in withdrawal, it follows logically that if he was in fact not in that deplorable state at the time of the robbery, his defense was without foundation. The psychiatric testimony also revealed the various physical manifestations of drug withdrawal  stomach cramps, crying, sweating and diarrhea. The testimony of police officer, Winkle, refutes the defendant's claim. The officer was among those who apprehended the defendant while the robbery was in progress, and he was present during the booking procedures at the police station that followed fifteen or twenty minutes later. In all, he observed the defendant for approximately one and one-half hours during this critical period and had known the defendant and observed him from time to time over a period of seven years. This officer testified that the defendant's appearance and conduct during the arrest and booking was essentially the same as it had been on all other occasions of their meeting, that his speech and mannerisms were normal, that he was not crying or sweating or cramping and did not have diarrhea. The testimony of Officer Winkle was substantial and probative evidence that the defendant was not encountering drug withdrawal reactions at the time of the robbery, and within the context of the defense offered, it was substantial and probative evidence of the defendant's sanity. We have frequently held that the question of insanity is a factual one to be determined by the trier of fact. As in other factual determinations, we do not, on appeal, weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses but look to the evidence most favorable to the appellee and to the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom; and we affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment. Sotelo v. State, (1976) Ind., 342 N.E.2d 844; Dragon v. State, (1974) Ind., 316 N.E.2d 827; Moore v. State, (1973), 260 Ind. 154, 293 N.E.2d 28. The weight to be accorded expert testimony, as well as lay testimony, is the exclusive province of the trier of fact which is at liberty to discount it or to reject it in the face of lay testimony which it finds more persuasive. Moore v. State, supra ; Sotelo v. State, supra ; Riggs v. State, (1976) Ind., 342 N.E.2d 838.