Opinion ID: 222036
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Changed Legal Circumstances

Text: Northridge argues principally that the enactment of RLUIPA five years after entry of the consent judgment constitutes a changed legal circumstance that warrants modification of the consent judgment. Plymouth responds that RFRA governed the same conduct as RLUIPA, so RLUIPA's enactment is not a changed circumstance. In Rufo, the Supreme Court explained that [a] consent decree must be modified if, as it later turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible under federal law. 502 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. 748. Alternatively, modification of a consent decree may be warranted when the statutory or decisional law has changed to make legal what the decree is designed to prevent. Id. Also, [w]hile a . . . clarifi[cation of] the law will not, in and of itself, provide a basis for modifying a decree, it could constitute a change in circumstances that would support modification if the parties based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing law. Id. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 748. Northridge does not claim that RLUIPA ma[de] legal what the decree is designed to prevent; it only suggests that its obligations [under the consent judgment] ha[ve] become impermissible under federal law. Our task is thus to determine whether RLUIPA constitutes a  change . . . in law, Horne, 129 S.Ct. at 2593 (emphasis added), under which one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible, Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. 748 (emphasis added). See also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (allowing modification of a continuing injunction in light of a bona fide, significant change in subsequent law). This language contemplates modification of a consent judgment in light of an alteration in the legal landscape because parties negotiate for various benefits and burdens differently depending on what they are entitled to under federal law. When the parties agreed to the consent judgment in 1995, RFRA was in effect, and that statute provided part of the basis for Northridge's lawsuit against Plymouth. RFRA proscribed any law that substantially burdened a person's religious exercise, unless the law was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, held unconstitutional by Flores, 521 U.S. at 536, 117 S.Ct. 2157. RLUIPA's stricturesthough tailored specifically to zoning restrictions, instead of being generally applicable as in RFRAare identical: No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). In fact, Congress intended that RLUIPA replace RFRA after the latter's invalidation by the Supreme Court. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). Thus, in all relevant respects, the same test for First Amendment zoning challenges that existed at the time Northridge and Plymouth entered into the consent judgment applies now. The fact that case law has clarified the particular nuances of the test since the parties entered into the consent judgment is inadequate to establish changed legal circumstances under Rule 60(b)(5); otherwise, every affected consent judgment would be vulnerable to attack, a development that would undermine the finality of such agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settlements. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389, 112 S.Ct. 748. One final point cements our conclusion that the legal landscape has not changed such that Northridge should escape its obligations under the consent judgment: Northridge's initial complaint alleged that, [u]nder [RFRA], the Township may not, through its Zoning Ordinance, place a substantial burden on the Church's exercise of its rights of freedom of religion unless the Township can demonstrate that its application of the Zoning Ordinance to the Church furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. (Compl., Dist. Ct. Docket No. 2 ¶ 22 (available electronically at Summons & Compl., Dist. Ct. Docket No. 50-5, at 18).) This is the exact challenge that Northridge now makes under RLUIPA. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding no significant change in the law between 1995 and now.