Opinion ID: 2185967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Balance

Text: Applying the Barker test, we begin with the proposition that after one year the government has the burden to demonstrate that appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated. All except twelve of the fifty-one months of delay were due to institutional factors which are properly classified as either neutral or, under Loud Hawk, justifiable delay; appellant failed explicitly to seek expedition of the interlocutory appeals, and while initially asserting his right to a speedy trial at an early time, he did not renew his request for a speedy trial during the remand proceedings following the first appeal or until three months had elapsed following the remand after the second appeal; appellant was never incarcerated; and appellant's claim of prejudice to his defense is weakened by his failure to keep in touch with a witness. On the other hand, the fifty-one months of delay was very long for a simple case; twelve months of that time was unnecessary appellate delay caused by the government's failure to comply with the rules of this court notwithstanding our opinion in Day, supra, 390 A.2d at 968, and counts as significant delay against the government; appellant indicated at the earliest possible moment, following his indictment, that he wanted a speedy trial, persisted in that view at least until the mistrial, arguably continued to express that desire in filing a motion to dismiss the government's first appeal for failure timely to file the record, and explicitly expressed his desire for a speedy trial when the case was again in a posture to proceded to trial; and appellant suffered severe personal anxiety and demonstrated possible prejudice to his defense. There is no suggestion that appellant directly acted at any time in a manner contrary to the expedition of his trial. He did not file frivolous motions [10] and his principal requests for postponements were due to matters beyond his control: his attorneys' representation of another client and his mother's terminal illness. His assertion of the right to a speedy trial was explicit, unlike that of the defendant in Graves. On the other hand, this case is unusual because there were two interlocutory appeals. Neither appeal, and appellant does not contend otherwise, was unjustified or taken in bad faith. [11] At the same time the government, being on notice of this court's view of appellate delay in assessing a defendant's claim of denial of a right to a speedy trial, nevertheless neglected (viewing the government's inaction most favorably to it) its duty to comply with the rules of this court. In Graves, supra, we stated that the circumstances in that case approached the boundary between delay which offends the Constitution and that which does not. 490 A.2d at 1105. There was a twenty-five month lapse between Graves' arrest and trial, the government failed to expedite an interlocutory appeal, which it withdrew six months later, and Graves, who was incarcerated throughout this period, repeatedly sought dismissal of the charges on speedy trial grounds. The en banc court found significant that the bulk of delay was due to neutral institutional factors and that Graves had not sought to expedite the appeal or demand a speedy trial, and had shown no impairment of his ability to defend or personal prejudice. We also readily acknowledge that the Barker factors have no `talismanic' qualities. Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. Applying those factors here, we conclude that the Graves boundary has been passed. Fifty-one months delay in a simple case is extreme delay. The government has not offered an explanation for its failure to expedite two interlocutory appeals, which added an extra year of unnecessary delay to an already lengthy period of delay. The time deemed to weigh significantly against the government because of its non-expedition was four and one-half months in Graves, and twelve months here. Appellant asserted his right to a speedy trial (as distinct from seeking dismissal of the charges) at the earliest possible moment, and has demonstrated severe personal prejudice as well as possible prejudice to his defense. The government, which has the burden, has failed to show convincingly, as it must, Parks, supra, 451 A.2d at 602, that appellant has not been prejudiced by the delay. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for dismissal of the indictment.