Opinion ID: 874401
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nancy's Omitted Spouse Claim

Text: Idaho Code § 15-2-301 is the specific statutory provision relating to omitted spouses and states in relevant part: (a) If a testator fails to provide by will for his surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same share of the estate he would have received if the decedent left no will unless it appears from the will that the omission was intentional or the testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside the will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of the testator or from the amount of the transfer or other evidence. The purpose of this provision is to avoid the unintentional disinheritance of the spouse of a testator who executes a will prior to the marriage but neglects to revise it afterwards. Estate of Keeven, 110 Idaho at 457, 716 P.2d at 1229. The provision reflects the view that the spouses intestate share is what the decedent would have wanted the spouse to have if the decedent had thought about the relationship of his old will to the new situation. Id. at 458, 716 P.2d at 1230. In some cases, a will executed prior to marriage makes a devise to the testators future spouse. Idaho has adopted the view that some such devises preclude the surviving spouse from qualifying as an omitted spouse under the statute even though the devise was not expressly made in contemplation of marriage. Id. However, sometimes such a devise can be so minimal and made in such a way that it appears that the testator failed to provide for the surviving spouse within the meaning of the statute. Id. The surviving spouse bears the burden of proving that the devise does not reflect what the testator would have wanted. This determination requires consideration of the following factors: (1) the alternative takers under the will, (2) the dollar value of the testamentary gift to the surviving spouse, (3) the fraction of the estate represented by the gift, (4) whether comparable gifts were made to other persons, (5) the length of time between execution of the testamentary instrument and the marriage, (6) the duration of the marriage, (7) any inter vivos gifts the testator has made to the surviving spouse, and (8) the separate property and needs of the surviving spouse. Id. at 458-59, 716 P.2d at 1230-31. In this case, Jims will devises to Nancy a house that his estate no longer owns and contains no indication that Jim considered Nancy as a future spouse at the time he made it. Thus, the will is ambiguous as to what Jim intended Nancy, as his surviving spouse, to inherit from his estate. When a court determines that a document is ambiguous, interpretation of the document presents a question of fact that focuses upon intent. Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 873-74, 993 P.2d 1197, 1204-05 (1999) (holding issue of settlor's intent, as a question of fact, could not be resolved on summary judgment). The magistrate judge stated that in his view, Jim did not forget about Nancy as a spouse, intended her only to have the minimal devise under the will, and made transfers outside the will which, judging from their value, Jim intended to be in lieu of a devise under the will. In doing so, the magistrate judge made factual findings regarding Jims intent after weighing all the evidence presented, whether admissible or not. This was error, as stated above, because the magistrate judge should have determined the admissibility of evidence as a threshold matter and after doing so, if a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Jims intent, the magistrate judge was not free to weigh the evidence in order to resolve the factual dispute by way of summary judgment. We also deem it appropriate to provide guidance as to another evidentiary issue that will arise on remand. The district court determined that statements attributed to Jim submitted by all parties on the omitted spouse issue were hearsay and would normally be inadmissible; however, the district court concluded that I.C. § 15-2-301(a), which provides that the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision [may be] shown by statements of the testator creates an exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the statements were properly admitted. The appropriate analysis is found by reference to the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Idaho Rule of Evidence 1102 states: Statutory provisions and rules governing the admissibility of evidence, to the extent they are evidentiary and to the extent that they are in conflict with the applicable rules of Idaho Rules of Evidence, are of no force or effect. See also Richard W. Effland, Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual 60-61 (Robert R. Wright ed., Association of Continuing Legal Education Administrators, 1972) (stating Nothing in the [omitted spouse] statute, however, is intended to alter rules of evidence applicable to statements of a decedent.). Thus, we conclude that the omitted spouse statute does not create an exception to the hearsay rule. Rather, the exception is found in I.R.E. 803(3), which provides: A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. Several courts have interpreted similar rules to permit admission of hearsay evidence of a decedent's state of mind with respect to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of his will. In Honey v. Hickey, 26 Ark.App. 99, 760 S.W.2d 81 (1988), it was alleged that a decedent and her husband had orally contracted to execute and not revoke mutual wills providing that the surviving spouse would inherit certain property that would then be divided among the children in a certain manner. Id. at 81. The decedent violated this alleged agreement by giving the property to the daughters with a reservation of a life estate. Id. at 81-82. The court ruled that testimony by the husband's sister as to hearsay statements made by the husband and wife in her presence at the time the wills were executed concerned the intent and state of mind of the testators at the time the wills were executed and thus was not excluded under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(3). Id. at 83. In Okken v. Okken Estate, 348 N.W.2d 447 (N.D.1984), a testatrix left her entire estate to her second son and gave nothing to her first son. Id. at 449. The court held evidence from the second son's wife that the testatrix had told her of her bad relations with the first son was admissible under Rule 803(3) as evidence of the testatrix's mental, emotional, or physical condition at the time she made her will. Id. at 451. In Knesek v. Witte, 715 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.App.1986), the court held that statements by a testatrix's late husband to a witness that he and the testatrix had made their wills and that all of the property was going to his nieces and nephews was admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(3) to show the existence of an oral contract to make wills. Id. at 197. Similarly, evidence of statements made by Jim as to how he intended to distribute his property should be admitted if such statements relate to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of his will. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district courts decision affirming the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment on the omitted spouse issue and affirm the district court's decision vacating the grant of summary judgment and remanding on the partnership issue. This matter will be remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment on both issues and to remand this case for proceedings before the magistrate judge consistent with this opinion.