Opinion ID: 685153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ms. Billops: Amount of cocaine base attributable to Ms. Billops' relevant offense conduct

Text: 30 The district court found that, for purposes of sentencing, the amount of cocaine base attributable to Ms. Billops for her relevant conduct was between 500 grams and 1.5 kilograms. To the 10.4 grams found in Ms. Billops' residence the court added the 50 half-ounces of cocaine base that Mr. Morning admitted selling and 50 half-ounces of cocaine base that Mr. Morning admitted distributing. Relying on our holding in United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1213 (7th Cir.1993), Ms. Billops maintains that the district court must make an explicit finding as to the drug quantity attributable to the defendant. It must also state the reasons why the defendant was aware of or reasonably could have foreseen the sale by a co-defendant, and must make clear that it considered the evidence of the defendant's agreement to join the conspiracy. In this case, argues Ms. Billops, the district court failed to state why the amounts sold and distributed by Mr. Morning were reasonably foreseeable to Ms. Billops. She further submits that it also failed to state whether Ms. Billops was aware of the sale and distribution of these amounts by Mr. Morning, and whether she had agreed to join the conspiracy for the sale and distribution of those amounts. Ms. Billops maintains that these infirmities require that she be resentenced. 31 The determination of the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant and therefore constituting the relevant offense conduct for purposes of sentencing is a finding of fact which must be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Herrera, 948 F.2d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1596, 118 L.Ed.2d 311 (1992). We have made it clear on several occasions that sentencing courts are expected to make explicit findings as to drug quantities. See United States v. Young, 34 F.3d 500, 505-06 (7th Cir.1994) (Young II); DePriest, 6 F.3d at 1213; United States v. Young, 997 F.2d 1204, 1211 (7th Cir.1993) (Young I ). Indeed, we have suggested that the district courts adopt the practice of setting forth these findings in a sentencing memorandum in order to avoid needless misinterpretation by this court on appellate review. See Young I, 997 F.2d at 1211; United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1399 n. 2 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---- 112 S.Ct. 1590, 118 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992). Our principal concern here is the one that we noted in DePriest: 32 In making such a determination, the sentencing court should state reasons why each individual defendant was aware of or reasonably foresaw the particular amount of drugs for which he will be held accountable, with references to supporting evidence. 33 6 F.3d at 1213 (citing United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 775 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 241, 126 L.Ed.2d 195 (1993)). We are aware that requiring such detailed specificity places a significant burden on the conscientious district court that desires to convey to the defendant at sentencing a sense of the solemnity of the occasion. It no doubt will take time and experience for even the most skilled trial judge to harmonize the need for that solemnity with the demands of the congressionally-mandated guidelines for precision. 34 Our task on appeal, however, is, in the final analysis, to determine whether the procedures employed by the district court produce substantial prejudice to the defendant and therefore warrant reversal. We have examined with care the transcript of the sentencing proceedings in this case and must conclude that the district court's determinations amount to substantial compliance with our earlier cases. While a more explicit statement as to why the amounts of contraband attributed to Mr. Morning ought to be attributed also to Ms. Billops would have been preferable, we cannot say that the district court committed reversible error. Indeed, we note that trial defense counsel admitted at the disposition hearing that the court's findings as to quantities were not unreasonable. This admission could possibly be construed as a waiver of this issue on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Livingston, 936 F.2d 333, 335-36 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 884, 116 L.Ed.2d 787 (1992). Counsel's candor is certainly supported by the record. The district court heard evidence that Mr. Morning and Ms. Billops lived together and sold drugs together. Indeed, they admitted engaging in drug trafficking together. The court specifically referred to the fact that Ms. Billops admitted selling crack cocaine from the residence at least 100 times, and that Mr. Morning and Ms. Billops admitted trafficking in cocaine base over an extended period of time. The court referred to the quantity that Mr. Morning admitted was sold from the residence during the time of the conspiracy. At no time did Ms. Billops suggest that she played a lesser role in the operation. On the basis of our study of the record, we must conclude that these findings were sufficiently specific to constitute substantial compliance with the mandates of our caselaw. We cannot say therefore that the district court's determination concerning quantity of drugs attributable to Ms. Billops is clearly erroneous. The record discloses a careful and conscientious effort to comply with the mandate of the guidelines while reminding all in the courtroom that the sentencing proceeding--at which a young woman of nineteen was sentenced to incarceration for a period of almost twenty-two years--was indeed a tragic and solemn occasion for the entire community.