Opinion ID: 2517832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: United States v. Leon

Text: In Leon, the United States Supreme Court decided that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. 468 U.S. at 900, 104 S.Ct. 3405; see 468 U.S. at 918-22, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The holding resulted from a challenge to a search warrant that was issued for several vehicles and three residences in Burbank, California; one of the residences belonged to Leon. The affidavit indicated that a confidential informant told officers that two persons, identified as Armando and Patsy, were selling large quantities of drugs from their Price Drive residence in Burbank. The informant had witnessed a drug sale by Patsy at this residence 5 months prior to issuance of the warrant and had seen a shoe box containing a large amount of cash belonging to her. According to the informant, Armando and Patsy usually kept only small quantities of drugs at the Price Drive residence and stored the remaining drugs at another Burbank location. On the basis of the informant's statements, the Burbank police initiated an investigation of three Burbank residences. They discovered that cars parked at the Price Drive residence belonged to Armando Sanchez and Patsy Stewart. Sanchez had been previously arrested for possession of marijuana, but Stewart had no previous criminal record. The officers observed a vehicle belonging to Ricardo Del Castillo parked at the Park Drive residence and later saw him leave the residence carrying a small paper sack. Del Castillo had previously been arrested for possession of 50 pounds of marijuana. When officers checked his probation records, they found that Leon was Del Castillo's employer. Leon had previously been arrested on drug charges, and an informant had told police that, at the time of his arrest, Leon was involved in the importation of drugs into the country. Before the current investigation began, another informant told police that Leon stored a large quantity of drugs at his residence. Officers learned that Leon's residence was on Sunset Canyon in Burbank. They subsequently saw several individuals, at least one of whom had prior drug involvement, arrive at the Price Drive residence and leave with small packages. They further observed a variety of other material activity at the Price Drive residence, the Sunset Canyon residence, and a third residence on Via Magdalena. Based on this information, Officer Rombach of the Burbank Police Department submitted an application for a search warrant for the three residences. The magistrate issued a facially valid search warrant which yielded large quantities of drugs at the Sunset Canyon and Magdalena residences and a small quantity at the Price Drive residence. 468 U.S. at 902, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The defendants, owners of the residences, were indicted on a number of drug-related counts, including conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine. The defendants then filed motions to suppress the evidence seized under the search warrant. The federal district court granted the motions to suppress, concluding that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.1983). With regard to the Sunset Canyon residence, the appellate court determined that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause because the affidavit included no facts indicating the basis for the informants' statements concerning respondent Leon's criminal activities and was devoid of information establishing the informants' reliability and because these deficiencies had not been cured by a police investigation. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The United States Supreme Court granted the Government's petition for certiorari, in which the Government expressly declined to seek review of the probable cause determination. Accepting the appellate court's determination that there was no probable cause, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in a reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant that is subsequently held to be defective. 468 U.S. at 905, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Court discussed at length the policy and rationale of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and noted the Court's strong preference for the involvement of a neutral magistrate in a decision to search. The Court cited its previous statement that `in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fail.' [Citations omitted.] 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Court justified this distinction by noting that reasonable minds can differ as to the adequacy of an affidavit; as a consequence, the Court concluded that great deference should be given to the magistrate's decision. 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The deference is not boundless, however. The Leon Court recognized there are at least three situations when a reviewing court may determine that deference should not be accorded to the issuing magistrate's probable cause determination, that is, where a warrant may be invalid. The first is if the probable cause determination is based on the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit supporting the warrant. 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 [1978]). Second, a warrant will be invalidated when the issuing magistrate was not `neutral and detached,' that is to say, when a magistrate is serving merely as a rubber stamp for the police. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 [1964]). Third, even if the warrant application was supported by more than a `bare bones' affidavit, a warrant will be invalidated if it is based on an affidavit that does not `provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.' Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, reh. denied 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 [1983]). The Leon Court then weighed the appropriate remedy when one of these defects caused an unconstitutional search and considered whether the exclusionary rule would serve a deterrent effect when any of these situations apply. The Court concluded that excluding evidence obtained when officers purposefully deceived the magistrate could deter future wrongdoing. On the other hand, because the exclusionary rule is not designed to punish the errors of judges and magistrates (468 U.S. at 916, 104 S.Ct. 3405), the Court held that the evidence should not be suppressed, i.e., the exclusionary rule should not be applied, where officers obtained evidence while acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, even though the warrant was ultimately found to be invalid. 468 U.S. at 918-22, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Court further explained: In most such cases [where an officer has obtained a warrant in objective good faith from a magistrate who acted within his or her scope], there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. 468 U.S. at 920-21, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Thus, in the usual case, the Court concluded that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion. 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Leon Court recognized that not all cases would be considered usual and, consequently, there would be some cases where the exclusionary rule would apply even where an officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms. 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405. In discussing the possible parameters for application of a good faith exception, the Court rejected reliance on an officer's subjective good faith. The Court explained: `If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, only in the discretion of the police.' [Citation omitted.] 468 U.S. at 915 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Rather, the Court recognized that the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable, [citation omitted], and it is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. (Emphasis added.) 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Court recognized four circumstances where the officer's belief would not be objectively reasonable and, therefore, suppression remains an appropriate remedy. 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The exclusionary rule still applies where: (1) the magistrate issuing the warrant was deliberately misled by false information; (2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his or her detached or neutral role; (3) there was so little indicia of probable cause contained in the affidavitin other words, the affidavit was so bare bonesthat it was entirely unreasonable for the officer to believe the warrant was valid; or (4) the warrant so lacked specificity that officers could not determine the place to be searched or the items to be seized. 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Court seemed to recognize that typically  or in the usual case  the good faith exception would be available if a magistrate issued a warrant. `[S]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness,' [citation omitted], for `a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish' that a law enforcement officer has `acted in good faith in conducting the search.' [Citation omitted.] 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405. With this discussion of the Leon analysis in mind, we turn to the specific issue before us of what probable cause standards were set when the Court iterated these principles. Our careful review of the decision finds only two probable cause standards mentioned. These two standards, when placed in the context of the analysis, pinpoint two ends of a probable cause continuum. At one end are affidavits that `provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause. ' (Emphasis added.) 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S.Ct. 3405. In those cases, there is a valid warrant. See State v. Hicks, 282 Kan. 599, 603, 147 P.3d 1076 (2006). At the other end of the continuum are the so-called bare bones affidavits, those affidavits so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. This is the situation enumerated above as the third circumstance where an officer's reliance would be objectively unreasonable and suppression would be appropriate. In the analytical space between the ends of the continuum are those cases where the warrant is ultimately found to be unsupported by an affidavit containing a substantial basis for the determination of probable cause, but where officers executed the warrant in objective good faith. It is in this analytical space between the extremes on the continuum that the good faith exception applies. In those cases where the good faith exception applies, the affidavits do not provide a substantial basis for the determination of probable cause but do provide some indicia of probable cause that is sufficient to render official reliance reasonable. This reading of Leon is supported by the Leon Court's application of its holding to the facts of the case. The Court noted: In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. . . . Officer Rombach's application for a warrant clearly was supported by much more than a `bare bones' affidavit. The affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided panel of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Under these circumstances, the officers' reliance on the magistrate's determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate. 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405.