Opinion ID: 2541196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: penalty phase error when the jury was told appellant's prior crimes were against children

Text: Appellant additionally argues that error occurred in the penalty phase when a probation and parole officer, after testifying as to Appellant's prior convictions, told the jury that each of the crimes she had mentioned involved children. Because we are remanding for a new penalty phase, this error is moot; however, to avoid error on remand we shall address it herein. KRS 532.055(2)(a), provides, in pertinent part, that in the penalty phase of felony cases, [e]vidence may be offered by the Commonwealth relevant to sentencing including: 1. Minimum parole eligibility, prior convictions of the defendant, both felony and misdemeanor; 2. The nature of prior offenses for which he was convicted.... Appellant argues that the term nature of prior offenses permits only a general description of the crime, and hence it was error for the probation and parole officer to tell the jury the crimes involved child victims. Since the trial of this case, we rendered Mullikan v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.3d 99 (Ky.2011), which established a bright-line rule regarding what evidence is permissible in showing the nature of prior offenses, pursuant to KRS 532.055(2)(a). Recognizing that the nature of a prior conviction is closely akin, if not identical to, the definition of a prior conviction, we held that the evidence of prior convictions is limited to conveying to the jury the elements of the crimes previously committed. We suggest this be done either by a reading of the instruction of such crime from an acceptable form book or directly from the Kentucky Revised Statute itself. Said recitation for the jury's benefit, we feel, is best left to the judge. The description of the elements of the prior offense may need to be customized to fit the particulars of the crime, i.e., the burglary was of a building as opposed to a dwelling. The trial court should avoid identifiers, such as naming of victims, which might trigger memories of jurors who may  especially in rural areas  have prior knowledge about the crimes. Id. at 109. On remand, therefore, the rule articulated in Mullikan shall apply. Where age is an element of the crime, such would be properly conveyed to the jury through the reading of the relevant statute. Id. For the aforementioned reasons we affirm Appellant's convictions but vacate the sentence and remand to the trial court for a new penalty phase consistent with this opinion. All sitting. All concur.