Opinion ID: 57923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of the Firearm

Text: McCoy first argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm because exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the officers’ protective sweep of Apartment 9. In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error and the application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 2004). We construe the facts in the light most favorable to the party prevailing in the district court, United States v. Hromada, 49 F.3d 685, 688 (11th Cir. 1995), and we may affirm a district court decision on any ground supported by the record, 5 Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1088 n.21 (11th Cir. 2007). While “[t]he warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable,” United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), “[t]he exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement recognizes a warrantless entry by criminal law enforcement officials may be legal when there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause must exist, however, even where exigent circumstances are present, id., and the government bears the burden of proving exigent circumstances, United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). The exigent circumstances exception only applies if the police reasonably believed that an emergency situation justified warrantless action. Id. at 1338. Examples of exigent circumstances include: “danger of flight or escape, loss or destruction of evidence, risk of harm to the public or the police, mobility of a vehicle, and hot pursuit.” Bashir, 445 F.3d at 1328 (internal quotation marks omitted). We hold that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of Apartment 9 because the risk of harm that the officers reasonably perceived presented a compelling need for immediate action. The officers believed that 6 McWhorter was inside the apartment when Suarez noticed the chrome revolver. The officers knew, moreover, that McWhorter was known to carry weapons, was a suspect in at least three murders, and was believed to be inside the apartment. Although Tillman acknowledged that he saw a beige vehicle leaving the scene at a high-rate of speed around the same time that Suarez yelled “gun,” Tillman testified that his attention was focused on the potentially dangerous situation at the apartment. The district court did not err, therefore, in denying McCoy’s motion to suppress the firearm. We reject McCoy’s argument based on United States v. Colbert, 76 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 1996), because the circumstances in Colbert are not analogous to those that the officers faced here. Colbert was arrested while leaving his girlfriend’s apartment. Even though a shotgun was resting in plain view inside the apartment when the officers arrested Colbert, the Sixth Circuit determined that the protective sweep of the apartment was unreasonable because nothing suggested that anyone might have been in the apartment. Id. Here, however, the officers’ belief concerning the possible presence of a dangerous person in Apartment 9 was reasonable.