Opinion ID: 2226536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Case Distinguishable From Those in Which This Court Has Construed Shall as Permissive Rather Than Mandatory

Text: Only three times has this court construed the word shall to be permissive in order to save a statute from constitutional infirmity. In Nebraska Loan & Building Ass'n v. Perkins, 61 Neb. 254, 85 N.W. 67 (1901), this court construed as permissive a portion of a legislative act of 1873 which stated in pertinent part that although the dues, fines, premiums, and other charges paid by members of a building and loan association may aggregate a greater amount than the legal rate of interest on loans made to them, such payments shall not be construed to make such transactions usurious. The court reasoned: It is not within the province of the legislature to interpret the law, or to apply it to particular cases, that being peculiarly the duty of the courts. But we do not think that the legislature, in reciting that the contracts of these associations should not be construed to be usurious, intended to usurp judicial functions. While the wording of the statute would bear the construction that it was a direction to the courts, yet the substance of the legislation must be regarded, rather than the form, and for that reason we are of opinion that it was rather the intention of the legislature to establish a rule of interest relative to this particular class of contracts; that the act is declaratory, the intent thereby being to relieve the contracts of these institutions from the operation of the usury laws, rather than an attempt to arrogate to the legislature judicial functions. Id. at 261, 85 N.W. at 69. In State ex rel. Sorensen, v. State Bank of Minatare, 123 Neb. 109, 242 N.W. 278 (1932), we held that a legislative act providing that the secretary of the department of trade and commerce shall be the sole receiver of all insolvent state banks amounts to no more, in a judicial proceeding properly pending in a court of equity for the liquidation of a bank, than a legislative recommendation to the judiciary to appoint him, as otherwise the enactment would be an unconstitutional encroachment on judicial power. The court reasoned: French legislators once imprisoned judges for failure to comply with the legislative will. Montesquieu suggested a government with legislative, executive and judicial departments, each independent of the other. The framers of the American Constitution and the people of Nebraska adopted that plan. It has been regarded by statesmen and philosophers as an outstanding advancement in the science of government. Throughout the judicial history of the present system the courts have scrupulously respected the prerogatives of the legislative and executive departments and extended to them the comity due to governmental divisions of equal rank, but courtesy does not extend to the surrendering of judicial power. It is an imperative duty of the judicial department of government to protect its jurisdiction at the boundaries of power fixed by the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 114, 242 N.W. at 280-81. In State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 37, 524 N.W.2d 788, 797 (1994), this court was faced with construing a statute which read, `If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the other proceeding is pending....' The court held that the word shall was directory, stating that if the portions of [the statutes] at issue merely recommend that a judge engage in certain communications rather than command that the judge do so, that is, if the provisions are directory rather than mandatory, they will survive constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 42, 524 N.W.2d at 799-800. The court reasoned: The due process and ethical problems which arise when judges turn into inquisitors by undertaking to personally investigate the facts in matters they must adjudicate illustrate one of the reasons the distribution of powers clause contained in Neb. Const. art. II, § 1, prohibits the legislative department of government from telling the judicial department of government how to conduct judicial business. (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 41-42, 524 N.W.2d at 799 (citing State ex rel. Sorensen, v. State Bank of Minatare, supra ). Thus, this court has construed the word shall to be directory, in order to save the constitutionality of a statute only in cases where the Legislature has attempted to encroach upon the judiciary's duties and prerogatives by telling the judiciary how to conduct its judicial business. In Anderson v. Carlson, 171 Neb. 741, 107 N.W.2d 535 (1961), this court held that a statute permitting private taxation without affording property owners the opportunity to be heard by a competent tribunal upon the question of whether the property has been arbitrarily or unjustly included within the boundaries of the proposed district is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In that case the court stated: In order to suggest a question on construction, appellants urge that the word shall be interpreted as permissive in order to uphold a legislative act. With this we do not agree. It is not the function of the courts to legislate. There may be occasions where it is apparent the word shall may have been used by inadvertence, and the rest of the act so indicates, in which case appellants' argument would have merit. However, that is not the case here.... . . . . ... To so hold would be judicial legislation in which we do not intend to indulge. Id. at 745-46, 107 N.W.2d at 538-39. The instant case is distinguishable from Nebraska Loan & Building Ass'n v. Perkins, 61 Neb. 254, 85 N.W. 67 (1901); State ex rel. Sorensen, v. State Bank of Minatare, 123 Neb. 109, 242 N.W. 278 (1932); and State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, supra , in that in the instant case the Legislature's encroachment is upon the executive branch, not the judiciary. The judiciary, not the executive branch, serves as a check upon the constitutionality of legislative enactments. As such, the judiciary is permitted to construe legislative enactments in a manner that eliminates legislative attempts to usurp judicial power. As stated, It is an imperative duty of the judicial department of government to protect its jurisdiction at the boundaries of power fixed by the Constitution. State ex rel. Sorensen, v. State Bank of Minatare, 123 Neb. at 114, 242 N.W. at 281. See, also, State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, supra . For the foregoing reasons, we refuse to give the word shall, as it appears in § 81-2707(1), a permissive construction and instead apply the general rule that the word shall is mandatory and inconsistent with the idea of discretion.