Opinion ID: 2219142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: ISSUE FIVEâ SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE WARRANTLESS SECOND SEARCH

Text: ś 122. The State asks that the circuit court's order suppressing evidence seized during the second search should be reversed, because the defendant's brother had either actual or apparent authority to consent to the search. Alternatively, if the court holds that the brother did not have valid authority to consent to the search, the State asks that circuit court's order be reversed due to the inevitable discovery doctrine. ś 123. Relying on United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974), the State contends that the evidence seized during the second search of Knapp's bedroom should not be suppressed because the evidence was obtained during a lawful search conducted with the valid consent of the defendant's brother, the renter-occupant of the apartment. [24] ś 124. Moreover, the State argues that Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, is distinguishable from the present case. First, the defendant's bedroom was not in a separate structure. Second, George kept personal property in the bedroom. Third, George had access to the bedroom (the bedroom door had a lock, but apparently there was no key). ś 125. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, and upon well-established case law, the State argues that George possessed the authority to consent to a search of the defendant's bedroom. ś 126. Finally, the State argues that not only did George have actual authority to consent to the search of the defendant's bedroom, the police acted upon the reasonable belief that George had the power to consent to such a search, and therefore, there was apparent authority for George's consent. ś 127. In assessing third-party consent to search, the State contends the critical question is the sufficiency of the consenting individual's relationship to the premises to be searched . . . . Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d at 542 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171). Although the circuit court used Kieffer in concluding that George had no authority to consent to the search of the guest bedroom, the State argues that Kieffer is distinguishable. [25] ś 128. Alternatively, the State argues that the evidence seized in the second search should not have been suppressed because it would inevitably have been discovered through use of a search warrant. The State claims that if the court concludes that George did not have proper authority to consent to the search of the defendant's bedroom, the seizure of the evidence obtained in that search should nonetheless have been allowed under the inevitable discovery doctrine. A search tainted by some illegal act may be justified under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. ś 129. Knapp disagrees and asks this court to uphold the ruling of the circuit court. Knapp maintains that the circuit court correctly suppressed the evidence seized during the second search of Knapp's bedroom on December 13, 1987, because George did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to the search, and the evidence is not admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. Knapp maintains that the search of his bedroom, following consent by George, was a violation of Knapp's Fourth Amendment rights, because Roets intentionally by-passed Knapp, rendering the consent invalid. ś 130. Knapp argues that courts in similar circumstances have held that when police intentionally bypass a suspect who is present and known to have a superior privacy interest in the place to be searched, in order to gain consent to search, the validity of a third-party consent is questionable. United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984). [26] ś 131. Knapp contends that the search of his bedroom following consent by George was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights because George did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of his bedroom. [27] Based on Kieffer Knapp maintains that the police must consider the surrounding circumstances, which often requires further inquiry on the part of the officers. ś 132. Knapp argues that here the inquiry was non-existent. The circuit court found that Roets simply determined that George and his wife paid rent on the apartment. (R. 107:23; Def. App. 269). There was no further inquiry beyond that point. Knapp argues that the evidence illegally seized from his room at the time of his arrest and during the search upon George's consent is not admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. ś 133. To avail itself of the inevitable discovery doctrine under State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 500, 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987)), Knapp argues that the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) It is reasonably probable that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means but for the intervening police misconduct; (2) Before the misconduct occurred, the police already had the leads making the discovery inevitable, and (3) The police were actively pursuing these leads at the time of the illegality. ś 134. The State argues that: it is readily inferable that if George Knapp had not consented, Detective Roets would have applied for a search warrant, a warrant would have been issued, and the evidence in the second search would have been discovered (Pl.-Appellant Br. at 23). Knapp argues that based upon the State's own admission, it is unreasonable to believe that the police were actively pursuing leads at the time, enough so to satisfy the third prong of the Schwegler test for inevitable discovery.