Opinion ID: 827985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: survey of other jurisdictions

Text: Tyler and Davis do not support, much less mandate, the majority’s result. Because there is no controlling Michigan authority, I turn to other jurisdictions for guidance. Many courts have observed that the Cady decision included language that sharply distinguished automobile searches from searches of private residences.43 Therefore, they 41 Toohey, 438 Mich at 275-276. 42 Krezen, 427 Mich 681; Toohey, 438 Mich 265; Ohlinger, 438 Mich 477; Davis, 442 Mich 1. 43 See, e.g., United States v Erickson, 991 F2d 529, 532 (CA 9, 1993) (“Although it involved a community caretaking function, Cady clearly turned on the ‘constitutional difference’ between searching a house and searching an automobile.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 14 have limited the community-caretaking exception solely to the former.44 Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit joined the majority of other federal circuits and adopted this approach: We agree with the conclusion of the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits on this issue, and interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady as being expressly based on the distinction between automobiles and homes for Fourth Amendment purposes. The community caretaking doctrine cannot be used to justify warrantless searches of a home. Whether that exception can ever apply outside the context of an automobile search, we need not now decide. It is enough to say that, in the context of a search of a home, it does not override the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment or the carefully crafted and well-recognized exceptions to that requirement.[45] 44 United States v Pichany, 687 F2d 204, 207-209 (CA 7, 1982); Erickson, 991 F2d at 532; United States v Bute, 43 F3d 531, 535 (CA 10, 1994); State v Gill, 2008 ND 152, ¶ 23; 755 NW2d 454, 459 (2008); Ryon, 137 NM at 185. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit similarly declined to allow an entry into a private residence pursuant to the community-caretaking exception. United States v McGough, 412 F3d 1232, 1239 (CA 11, 2005). However, it is unclear whether McGough was limited to the facts before the court or whether it established a categorical rule for searches of private residences. Several courts have cited McGough for the proposition that the Eleventh Circuit, like the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, has declined to extend the community-caretaking exception to allow warrantless searches of private homes or businesses. See, e.g., Gill, 2008 ND 152, at ¶ 17; 755 NW2d at 459. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has applied the community-caretaking exception to allow a warrantless entry of a home in order to abate a nuisance. See Rohrig, 98 F3d 1506. However, the Rohrig court placed great emphasis on “the fact-specific nature of this holding,” Rohrig, 98 F3d at 1525 n 11, leaving doubts about whether it was intended to be broadly applicable. Subsequent Sixth Circuit decisions have questioned whether Rohrig stands for the proposition that the communitycaretaking exception can justify warrantless entries into private residences. See, e.g., Williams, 354 F3d at 508 (“[D]espite references to the doctrine in Rohrig, we doubt that community caretaking will generally justify warrantless entries into private homes.”). 45 Ray v Warren Twp, 626 F3d 170, 177 (CA 3, 2010). 15 Numerous other courts have tacitly rejected extending the community-caretaking exception to warrantless entries into private residences.46 Similarly, others have evaluated the warrantless entry under the emergency or emergency-aid exceptions only and, finding them inapplicable, declared the entry unconstitutional without considering a broader community-caretaking exception.47 Cases from jurisdictions in which the courts have ostensibly permitted warrantless entries into private residences pursuant to the community-caretaking exception are also instructive. For example, in United States v Quezada,48 the Eighth Circuit upheld a warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment. The Quezada Court stated that “[a] police officer may enter a residence without a warrant as a community caretaker where the officer has a reasonable belief that an emergency exists requiring his or her attention.”49 Thus, the warrantless entry in that case, like the entries in Tyler and Mincey v Arizona, was premised on an emergency situation, not simply that the officer was acting 46 See, e.g., Ortiz v State, 24 So 3d 596, 615 (Fla App, 2009) (Orfinger, J., dissenting) (“Other than situations involving the medical emergency exception, until today, the community caretaker exception has not been applied in Florida as a separate exception to the Fourth Amendment to validate an entry into a residence.”). 47 See, e.g., State v Ford, 2010 VT 39, ¶¶ 11-21; ___ Vt ___, ___; 998 A2d 684, 689-692 (2010) (recognizing the existence of both the community-caretaking and emergency-aid exceptions, but holding an officer’s entry into a private residence unconstitutional because it failed to satisfy the emergency-aid exception). 48 United States v Quezada, 448 F3d 1005 (CA 8, 2006). 49 Id. at 1007, citing Mincey, 437 US at 392-393 (emphasis added). 16 in a community-caretaking capacity.50 Many other cases that purportedly allowed warrantless entries into homes under the community-caretaking exception similarly relied on the fact that an emergency situation was involved.51 Cases like Quezada persuasively illustrate how the law pertaining to the community-caretaking exception, the emergency exception, and the emergency-aid exception are often muddled. Courts often confuse a police officer’s actions pursuant to a community-caretaking function with the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Moreover, these cases also reveal the dearth of authority for a communitycaretaking exception to the warrant requirement that applies to homes independently of the emergency or emergency-aid exceptions. The majority ignores all of this and assumes, without really deciding the issue, that community-caretaking duties can justify a warrantless entry into a private residence. This assumption is precariously based, given the dearth of authority to support it. I would hold that, to the extent an independent community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement may be recognized in Michigan, it cannot justify a warrantless entry into a private residence. Rather, such entries must be justified by another exception, such as the emergency or emergency-aid exceptions discussed in Tyler and Davis. 50 Tyler, 436 US 499; Mincey, 437 US 385; see also Ray, 626 F3d at 176 (stating that Quezada and similar cases “do not simply rely on the community caretaking doctrine established in Cady”). 51 See, e.g., Deneui, 2009 SD 99, at ¶ 80; 775 NW2d at 251-252 (Meierhenry, J., dissenting) (distinguishing cases cited by the majority as grounded in the emergency and emergency-aid exceptions, not a broader community-caretaking exception). 17 4. THE MAJORITY’S MISCONSTRUCTION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS The majority’s articulation of the general legal principles applicable to this case is generally accurate. For example, I do not dispute that the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness. The problem is that the majority opinion restricts itself to general legal principles. Indeed, a simple reason exists why the majority does not answer my refutation of Tyler and Davis as a basis for its holding or my discussion of the other caselaw: it cannot. Instead, it attempts to distract from this failure by dismissing my opinion as “bemoan[ing]” the state of the law in this area.52 The majority also claims that my approach would “further muddle Fourth Amendment doctrine . . . .”53 To the contrary, my analysis fully examines and evaluates the existing nuances in Fourth Amendment doctrine recognized by courts across the country, including this one. Such nuances are lost on the majority. If, as the majority asserts, my understanding of these nuances is “needlessly complex,”54 so too is the understanding of countless other judges and commentators. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the emergency and emergency-aid exceptions are not merely “aspects” of the community-caretaking exception.55 As previously explained, the 52 Ante at 22. 53 Ante at 23. 54 Ante at 22. 55 See Deneui, 2009 SD 99, at ¶ 80; 775 NW2d at 251-252 (Meierhenry, J., dissenting) (“[T]he community caretaking function of police is an aspect of the emergency exception and emergency aid exception. The community caretaker exception, however, is an independent and broader exception to the Fourth Amendment and has not been expansively recognized by any authority outside of the context of motor vehicles.”). 18 community-caretaking functions of police and other state actors provide the basis for several distinct exceptions to the warrant requirement. These exceptions include the inventory exception, the emergency exception, and the emergency-aid exception.56 Each 56 See Laney v State, 117 SW3d 854, 860-861 (Tex Crim App, 2003): The notion that officers act pursuant to their “community caretaker functions” serves as a basis for three separate doctrines created by the [United States] Supreme Court: 1) the emergency aid doctrine, established in Mincey; 2) the automobile impoundment and inventory doctrine, first conceived in Cady, and later expanded upon in Opperman; and, 3) the community caretaking doctrine, or public servant doctrine, established in Cady, and followed by this Court . . . . The common thread in each of these three exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements is the officer’s purpose. The emergency doctrine is not the same as the community caretaking doctrine established in Cady. The distinction between the emergency doctrine and the community caretaking doctrine, hereinafter referred to as the Cady doctrine, is a narrow, but critical one. Under the emergency doctrine, the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that he or she must act to “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” On the other hand, under the Cady doctrine, the officer “might or might not believe there is a difficulty requiring his general assistance.” Therefore, while both doctrines are based on an officer’s reasonable belief in the need to act pursuant to his or her “community caretaking functions,” the emergency doctrine is limited to the functions of protecting or preserving life or avoiding serious injury. Additionally, the Cady doctrine deals primarily with warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles (and will be limited to those circumstances except in unusual circumstances), while the emergency doctrine deals with warrantless entries of, but is not limited to, private residences. [Citations omitted.] 19 exception is subject to a different standard for assessing whether a warrantless entry or search conducted pursuant to that exception was reasonable.57 The majority opinion falls short because it creates out of whole cloth a previously unrecognized community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. Its wholly unsupported decision not only to adopt that exception but to extend it to warrantless entries into private residences compounds this error. Moreover, the majority refuses to recognize that its stated standard for this new exception is the essence of the standard for the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. Implicit in this failure is the inevitable conclusion that, under the majority’s new exception, warrantless entries into a home to perform nonemergency community-caretaking functions can be reasonable.58 In sum, the majority’s opinion today (1) extinguishes the emergency and emergency-aid exceptions to the warrant requirement in Michigan by creating a broader community-caretaking exception with no discernable limitation,59 (2) exposes the perils 57 See Davis, 442 Mich at 25-26 (“[P]olice may enter a dwelling without a warrant when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. They must possess specific and articulable facts that lead them to this conclusion.”); Toohey, 438 Mich at 284 (“To be constitutional, an inventory search must be conducted in accordance with established departmental procedures, which all police officers are required to follow, and must not be used as a pretext for criminal investigation.”). 58 Thus, although the majority claims that it is not reaching this question, see ante at 22, 24 n 60, the dicta from its opinion are loud and clear. 59 Under the majority’s new exception, state actors never need rely on the aforementioned exceptions, as the new community-caretaking exception will always make their warrantless entry reasonable under such circumstances. Surely the unanimous Davis Court did not think it was wasting its time in carefully crafting a standard for applying the emergency-aid exception. 20 of distilling broad Fourth Amendment principles from inapposite authority and without comprehensive analysis, (3) pays only lip service to United States Supreme Court precedent emphasizing the difference between the home and a vehicle,60 (4) ignores the United States Supreme Court’s admonition that the warrant requirement is subject only to specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,61 (5) directly contravenes Davis by applying a general reasonableness standard to all warrantless entries carried out to perform community-caretaking functions,62 and (6) fails to explain which communitycaretaking functions, beyond responding to an emergency or administering emergency aid, would reasonably justify a warrantless entry into a home.63 60 The majority acknowledges that “the threshold of reasonableness is at its apex when police enter a dwelling pursuant to their community caretaking functions.” Ante at 12. However, nothing else in its analysis gives any effect to this crucial distinction. 61 Katz, 389 US at 357. The specifically established and well-delineated emergency-aid exception has existed in Michigan since at least 1991, see Ohlinger, 438 Mich 477. As previously explained, there is no Michigan authority specifically adopting a communitycaretaking exception. Moreover, the community-caretaking exception established in Cady has not been specifically established, let alone well delineated, outside the context of automobile searches. 62 Davis, 442 Mich at 25 (“While categorizing these different activities under the heading of ‘community caretaking functions’ may be useful in some respects, it does not follow that all searches resulting from such activities should be judged by the same standard.”). 63 I agree with the majority that there is no indication that Davis intended to depart from “the universal application of the reasonableness standard to all Fourth Amendment inquiries[.]” Ante at 24 n 59. But as the majority notes, Davis established a specific standard for how courts could assess reasonableness in the emergency-aid context. The majority today applies a similar standard to assess the reasonableness of entries in emergency situations, such as to abate an imminent threat of fire. However, the majority errs when it grounds its decision in the community-caretaking exception because it gives no equivalent standard applicable to warrantless entries to perform nonemergency community-caretaking functions. 21 B. DOES THE COMMUNITY-CARETAKING EXCEPTION APPLY TO FIREFIGHTERS? This portion of the majority’s holding is unique.64 No jurisdiction has extended the community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement to firefighters. As previously mentioned, Tyler established that firefighters are entitled to enter private residences without a warrant in emergency situations, including fighting a blazing fire. Stuart makes clear that police may enter homes to render emergency aid to someone inside in clear need of medical treatment.65 Both of these exceptions are subsumed within the broader rubric of community-caretaking functions. Because I would not allow the community-caretaking exception to justify warrantless entries into private residences by any state actors, I would not reach this issue. However, under the majority’s broad new community-caretaking exception, The majority claims that any such standard would be dictum because the only question here is whether a firefighter may enter a home to address the threat of an imminent fire. This would be an adequate response if the majority were applying the emergency exception, but not when it creates a new community-caretaking exception. Surely we need not decide the reasonableness of every possible emergency police officers or firefighters may encounter. However, as previously noted, the majority’s decision is based on a new community-caretaking exception without a standard in the event of a nonemergency. The majority leaves lower courts to guess when other, less urgent community-caretaking functions can reasonably justify warrantless entries and searches of homes. Our lower courts and the public deserve more. 64 See ante at 14 (“Tyler’s holding and rationale lead inexorably to the conclusion that the community caretaking exception applies to firefighters.”). 65 I do not dispute that firefighters, as well as police officers, could also invoke the emergency-aid exception to justify a warrantless entry into a home. 22 firefighters and police officers may effectively enter private residences at any time and for virtually any reason without a warrant. C. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE Under existing law, the firefighters in this case were permitted to enter defendant’s townhouse only to combat an ongoing emergency. The thin factual record precludes the conclusion that a reasonable person could have believed that an emergency existed in defendant’s townhouse. At best, the facts establish that a potential fire threat existed in the townhouse neighboring defendant’s, which belonged to Kathleen Tunner. The only facts that the firefighters responding to Tunner’s phone call knew when they entered defendant’s home were that (1) Tunner had observed water running over her electrical box and (2) she thought that she heard water running between the common wall her townhouse shared with defendant’s townhouse. As the majority observes, Royal Oak Fire Department Lieutenant Michael Schunck testified that he did not independently confirm that water was running in Tunner’s home. Hence, he did nothing to respond to the only possible emergency of which he was aware when he arrived—a potential fire hazard in Tunner’s townhouse.66 In concluding to the contrary, the majority discounts the legal principle that a warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable.67 The government bears 66 Even Tunner did not consider the situation in her townhouse to be an imminent hazard. She first attempted to contact her next-door neighbor and the management company to address the water issue. Only when the management company told her there was nothing it could do did Tunner call the fire department. 67 See, e.g., Welsh, 466 US at 750, citing Payton, 445 US at 586. 23 the burden of proving that a “‘carefully delineated’” exception to the warrant requirement applies.68 Indeed, the facts justifying the entry in this case are significantly less compelling than those present in Davis. In Davis, the police had received a radio dispatch informing them that the manager at a motel had reported hearing gunshots fired in or near one of two motel rooms. The dispatcher identified two possible rooms and directed police officers to a possible witness, but did not suggest that any person was injured. With this dispatch as their only source of information, the police arrived at the motel and proceeded to one of the two rooms. Once there, they encountered an occupant who was unwilling to open the door. Notably, the police had not themselves heard shots fired. Nor did they interview any witnesses who heard them, not even the desk clerk, whom the dispatcher had identified as the source of the information. The initial source of information gave very little detail about the situation. The record did not indicate that the police made inquiries of the manager who approached them or that they knocked on other doors. They encountered no circumstances that suggested that shots had in fact been fired. Under these facts, the Davis Court unanimously refused to apply the emergency-aid exception to uphold the warrantless entry. Thus, Davis involved a situation in which gunshots had been fired—a situation specifically recognized by courts as falling within the emergency exception.69 Yet the 68 Welsh, 466 US at 749-750, quoting United States v United States Dist Court, 407 US 297, 318; 92 S Ct 2125; 32 L Ed 2d 752 (1972). 69 See Decker, Emergency circumstances, pp 480-484. 24 Davis Court refused to apply the exception absent police corroboration of the shots independent of the phone call. This case involves an alleged water leak and potential electrical problem—not a scenario specifically recognized as falling within the emergency exception. Just as in Davis, however, the warrantless entry was carried out without any independent corroboration that water was actually leaking and causing a potential electrical problem in defendant’s home. If there was no water leaking, there was no electrical problem and hence no emergency or imminent threat to life or property. Therefore, there was no exception to the warrant requirement that justified the warrantless entry in this case. The majority concludes to the contrary by establishing a broad, undefined new community-caretaking exception to the warrant requirement wholly unsupported by existing law. Indeed, the scope of the majority’s newly created exception to the warrant requirement is limitless. Finally, I question the legal significance of at least one of the facts the majority finds significant when evaluating the reasonableness of the warrantless entry. The majority contends that because the townhouse complex contained several units attached to one another, this fact “elevated the imminence of the potential hazard.”70 Not so. Certainly, the fact that the townhouse complex has numerous attached units elevated the potential scope of the fire threat and the number of people who potentially might have been affected. But that fact is utterly irrelevant to the imminence of a fire threat from water running over an electrical box. The question of the imminence of a fire might be 70 Ante at 19. 25 influenced by whether someone saw sparks flying from the box or saw a large quantity of water flowing over it. But the scope of the threat and the imminence of the threat are distinctly different inquiries. For these reasons, I agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it is impossible to determine whether the firefighters acted reasonably in entering defendant’s apartment. Thus, I would hold that the prosecution did not meet its burden of establishing that an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement justified the firefighters’ entry.