Opinion ID: 1106451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Newly Discovered Claim and Brady Claim

Text: In his first issue raised on appeal, Rutherford asserts that the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing as to his claim of newly discovered evidence establishing Rutherford's innocence and his claim that the State withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Both of these claims concern affidavits that were generated after the signing of the death warrant and relate to Mary Heaton's possible involvement in the murder.
Rutherford asserts newly discovered evidence in the form of affidavits by two persons relating statements made by Heaton. In the first affidavit dated December 16, 2005, Heaton's former housemate Alan Gilkerson stated that in the early 1990s, Heaton told him that she once killed an old lady with a hammer and made it look like A.D. Rutherford committed the crime. Gilkerson stated that Heaton told him that her motive for murdering the old lady was to get money. In the second affidavit dated December 23, 2005, defense investigator Michael Glantz stated that in a conversation with Heaton on December 22, 2005, Heaton confirmed that she knew Gilkerson and had previously resided with him. However, Heaton denied having told Gilkerson that she committed the murder in this case. According to Glantz's affidavit, Heaton stated that she knew the victim, had been present at the victim's home at the time of the murder, had witnessed Rutherford strike the fatal blow, and had been present when the victim's belongings were buried. Heaton claimed that she had previously provided this information to law enforcement officers during their investigation of the crime and had also tried to lead the officers to the location where the victim's belongings were buried. In Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla.1991), this Court set forth the standard that must be satisfied in order for a conviction to be set aside based on newly discovered evidence. First, the asserted facts `must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence.' Id. at 916 (quoting Hallman v. State, 371 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla.1979)). Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Jones, 591 So.2d at 915. In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial under Jones, the trial court must consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible, and must evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial. Id. at 916. This determination includes whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it constitutes impeachment evidence. The trial court should also determine whether this evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the case. The trial court should further consider the materiality and relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly discovered evidence. Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998) (citations omitted). In this case, the assistant attorney general represented to the circuit court that the State would not contest the first prong of Jones whether defense counsel exercised due diligence in obtaining this evidence. Thus, the only issue before the circuit court was whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine whether the newly discovered evidence would probably result in an acquittal or imposition of a life sentence on retrial. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(d) provides that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on postconviction claims for relief unless the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(f)(5)(B) applies the same standard to successive postconviction motions in capital cases. In reviewing a trial court's summary denial of postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, this Court must accept all allegations in the motion as true to the extent they are not conclusively rebutted by the record. Hodges v. State, 885 So.2d 338, 355 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Gaskin v. State, 737 So.2d 509, 516 (Fla.1999)). To uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised in a 3.850 motion, the claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively refuted by the record. McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948, 954 (Fla.2002) (quoting Foster v. Moore, 810 So.2d 910, 914 (Fla.2002)). The legal sufficiency of the allegations in Rutherford's postconviction motion to vacate is not in dispute. Thus, our sole focus is on whether the motion, files, and record conclusively show that Rutherford is entitled to no relief on his newly discovered evidence claim. Because the Jones test requires a comparative weighing of the alleged newly discovered evidence and the evidence introduced at trial, we discuss Heaton's testimony, the impeachment of her credibility and corroboration of her testimony, and the remaining evidence of guilt. At trial, Heaton testified that between 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. on August 22, 1985, Rutherford came to her home with a blank check from the victim. Heaton testified that Rutherford asked her to fill out the check and that when she told him that she did not know how to fill out a check, he asked her niece Elizabeth Ward to do it for him. [4] According to Heaton's testimony, she and Rutherford then went to the Santa Rosa Bank to cash the check. Heaton acknowledged that she went inside the bank alone and cashed the check. The check was made out to Heaton in the amount of $2,000. Heaton denied endorsing the check and testified that Rutherford signed her name on the back of the check. Heaton also testified that Rutherford signed Mrs. Salamon's name on the check but that he did not sign the check in her presence. Heaton stated that she received $500 from the cashed check. On cross-examination, the defense established that at the time of trial Heaton was residing in a mental institution against her will, and that at the time of the murder she had trouble distinguishing fact from fantasy. Ward testified that Rutherford came to the home she shared with Heaton and asked Ward to fill out the blank check on the victim's account. Ward testified that she filled out the check but refused to sign either Heaton's name or Mrs. Salamon's name. Ward testified that she witnessed Rutherford endorse the check, and that Heaton later gave her $5 for filling out the check. Other evidence against Rutherford included his self-incriminating statements made to numerous individuals about his involvement in the murder, evidence of his fingerprints and palm prints in the bathroom where the victim was found, and evidence impeaching Rutherford's explanation why his prints were found in the bathroom. One witness testified that Rutherford said he planned to kill a woman and place her body in a bathtub. Another witness testified that Rutherford said that he would force a woman to write him a check and then put her in a bathtub, and a third witness testified that Rutherford said that he could get easy money by knocking a woman he worked for in the head. A fourth witness testified that Rutherford told him on the day of the murder that he had killed the old lady by hitting her in the head with a hammer, and then had put her in the bathtub. Law enforcement officers testified that Rutherford's fingerprints and palm prints were found in the bathroom where the victim's body was found. In response to this testimony, Rutherford explained that his prints were found in the bathroom because, he claimed, Mrs. Salamon had asked him to realign the shower door because her nieces and nephews had knocked the door off of the track. The State impeached this testimony by proving that Mrs. Salamon did not have any nieces or nephews, and that no young children had visited Mrs. Salamon's home in the weeks prior to her murder. Rutherford contends that when analyzed cumulatively with the evidence discussed above, Heaton's subsequent statements to Gilkerson and Glantz would probably produce an acquittal or imposition of a sentence less than death on retrial. There is no evidence in the record conclusively refuting the allegations made in reliance on the Gilkerson and Glantz affidavits. Accepting these allegations as true, i.e., that Heaton made these statements, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on Rutherford's newly discovered evidence claim because the motion, files, and record in this case conclusively show that Rutherford is not entitled to relief. Rutherford is not entitled to relief because the alleged newly discovered evidence does not satisfy the second prong of Jones in that Heaton's contradictory statements are not such that, if presented to the jury, would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Heaton's statements to Gilkerson and Glantz concerning whether she committed the murder are contradictory on their face. In her statement to Gilkerson, Heaton confessed to killing Mrs. Salamon. However, this confession is contradicted by her subsequent statement to Glantz, in which she stated that it was Rutherford who struck the fatal blow, killing Mrs. Salamon. When viewed against the impeachment evidence presented at trial concerning Heaton's mental problems and difficulty distinguishing fact from fantasy, Heaton's inconsistent statements to Gilkerson and Glantz would only serve to impeach Heaton's credibility further. Clearly, this evidence does not establish that Heaton committed the crime or that Rutherford is innocent. At most, these conflicting versions of events suggest that Heaton's involvement in the crime may have been greater than was presented at trial. Even assuming that Heaton played a more significant role in the crime than was presented at trial, this evidence fails to satisfy the second prong of Jones when considered cumulatively with the evidence presented at trial. First, there is no probability that this evidence would produce an acquittal on retrial. Although Heaton's statements could be used to impeach her credibility and her testimony at trial concerning her involvement in the crime, these statements would not have contradicted or provided an innocent explanation for any of the other evidence presented at trial indicating that Rutherford was the perpetrator. Nor would these statements have affected Ward's uncontradicted testimony placing Rutherford in possession of the victim's check. Further, there is no probability that this evidence would result in imposition of a sentence less than death on retrial. In this case, there was overwhelming evidence of Rutherford's guilt. Although the affidavits suggest that Heaton may have had greater involvement in the murder than she acknowledged at trial, her statements to Gilkerson and Glantz do not warrant a reasonable belief that Rutherford is less than wholly culpable for the murder. Despite the fact that Heaton stated that she was present at the time of the murder and when the victim's belongings were buried, Heaton does not state that she did anything to assist Rutherford in committing the murder or in disposing of the victim's belongings. In addition, Heaton's statements do not affect the aggravating factors found by the trial court in this case. Based on these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in determining that Rutherford was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his newly discovered evidence claim. This case is similar to others in which we have affirmed the denial of claims of newly discovered evidence that purports to establish the defendant's innocence. In Buenoano v. State, 708 So.2d 941 (Fla. 1998), the defendant, a prisoner under a sentence of death and a third death warrant, asserted that the trial court erred in summarily denying her newly discovered evidence claim. The defendant had been convicted of the first-degree murder of her husband, who died as a result of chronic arsenic poisoning. See id. at 943. The newly discovered evidence consisted of a report issued by the Office of the Inspector General of the United States Department of Justice that brought into question some of the practices of an FBI special agent who testified concerning collateral-crime evidence presented during the guilt phase of Buenoano's trial. See id. at 945. After introducing evidence that another man with whom the defendant lived after her husband's death had also died of acute arsenic poisoning, the State presented the testimony of a third man who testified that he suspected that the defendant was trying to poison him with vitamin capsules. See id. Pursuant to a stipulation, the jury was informed that based on an examination, the FBI agent had determined that the capsules given to the third man contained paraformaldehyde, a Class III poison. See id. at 944. In affirming the summary denial of the defendant's newly discovered evidence claim, the Court noted with approval the trial court's determination that this evidence constitutes, at most, impeachment evidence. Id. at 950. We observed that in addition to the stipulation, the State also presented the testimony of two expert witnesses who testified that they believed the victim's death was related to arsenic poisoning; a close friend of the defendant who testified that the defendant would joke with her about how they could solve their problems with their husbands by poisoning them with arsenic; a witness who testified that the defendant informed her that she could kill her husband with some kind of insect poison and that the defendant confessed to killing her husband with arsenic; and a witness who testified that the defendant had told him that she killed her husband. See id. Based on this record, we agreed with the trial court that there is no reasonable probability that the new evidence would result in an acquittal or recommendation of life on retrial. Id. at 951; see also Kokal v. State, 901 So.2d 766 (Fla.) (affirming the denial of a newly discovered evidence claim that another person confessed to committing the murder because this inadmissible hearsay evidence contradicted the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt presented at trial), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 560, 163 L.Ed.2d 471 (2005); Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657 (Fla.2000) (affirming the denial of a newly discovered evidence claim consisting of hearsay statements that a person other than the defendant committed the murder, because the evidence was admissible solely for impeachment purposes, did not place this person at the scene of the crime, and did not affect the testimony of eyewitnesses who identified the defendant as the perpetrator). Rutherford relies on several cases in support of his argument that the circuit court's decision was erroneous. However, these cases are distinguishable. In those decisions, the Court determined that an evidentiary hearing was necessary because the newly discovered evidence was either significant to several of the aggravating factors found by the trial court, see Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238 (Fla.1999), was corroborated by other independent evidence, see Swafford v. State, 679 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996), or consisted of several affidavits stating that someone else confessed to committing the crime to contradict a single eyewitness' testimony tying the defendant to the crime. See Johnson v. Singletary, 647 So.2d 106 (Fla.1994). Rutherford also relies on Roberts v. State, 678 So.2d 1232 (Fla.1996), and Jones. In Roberts, we remanded for an evidentiary hearing because the State conceded that an evidentiary hearing was necessary and the trial judge failed to give any reasons for denying a hearing. See 678 So.2d at 1235. In Jones, the Court was unable to assess the correctness of the trial court's ruling from the face of the pleadings. See 591 So.2d at 916. Therefore, these decisions are not controlling and do not support the conclusion that Rutherford is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this case. [5] The dissent would require an evidentiary hearing so that the trial court could determine whether either version provided by Heaton in the Gilkerson and Glantz affidavits is credible. This would be a futile exercise. To conclude that this evidence is such that it could probably result in an acquittal or a life sentence, we would have to consider the contents of each affidavit in isolation from the other affidavit and also from the evidence at trial. We decline to examine the alleged newly discovered evidence through such a narrow lens. This Court has never adopted a per se rule requiring an evidentiary hearing in a successive postconviction motion simply because an admission by another person comes to light at virtually the last minute. Although an evidentiary hearing is required on an initial postconviction motion in a capital case on claims requiring a factual determination, see Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(A)(i), a successive postconviction motion may be denied without an evidentiary hearing if the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B). Based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial, the contradictions in the Gilkerson and Glantz affidavits, and the evidence in the record that Heaton has suffered from mental difficulties that have impaired her ability to differentiate fact from fantasy, a reasonable juror's determination of Rutherford's guilt would not be shaken by these affidavits. Thus, the motion, files, and records conclusively show that he is not entitled to relief. As part of Rutherford's Brady claim, which is addressed below, he asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for access to Heaton's psychological records. Rutherford's motion was based on Heaton's statement to Glantz that she discussed the facts of the crime, including her presence at the scene of the crime, with mental health professionals and in group therapy sessions. We do not reach the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Rutherford's motion because even if the records supported her statements in Glantz's affidavitwhich was the only basis asserted by Rutherford for seeking the recordsthey would not have changed our analysis on the motion for new trial. Under the second prong of the Jones test, there would still be no probability of an acquittal or sentence less than death. Heaton's presence at the crime scene does nothing to reduce Rutherford's culpability for the murder, and is irrelevant to any aggravating or mitigating factor.
Rutherford next asserts that the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the State withheld evidence in violation of Brady. To establish this claim, Rutherford relies solely on Heaton's statement to Glantz that in 1985 she told law enforcement officers about her involvement in the murder during their investigation in this case. Because this evidence is favorable to the defense, Rutherford asserts that a Brady violation occurred. [6] To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced. Allen v. State, 854 So.2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003). We recently explained in Davis v. State, 915 So.2d 95 (Fla.2005): Prejudice is established when a defendant demonstrates that the suppressed evidence was material. See Allen, 854 So.2d at 1260. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). The United States Supreme Court has defined reasonable probability as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (expressly applying the Strickland formulation of reasonable probability to Brady cases). Davis, 915 So.2d at 119-20 (parallel citations omitted). We conclude that the circuit court did not err in determining that Rutherford was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim. At the Huff hearing, defense counsel explained that the defense was uncertain as to whether Heaton was in fact telling the truth when she stated that she informed law enforcement officers about her involvement in the crime. Defense counsel acknowledged that it is also possible that she may be lying about that aspect as she has misrepresented other aspects in the past. In response, the attorney general denied that the State ever had any statement from Ms. Heaton after the crime from law enforcement. In the postconviction motion filed in this Court, defense counsel states that Mr. Rutherford's position is that the statement to Glantz . . . was a lie. Thus, the motion, files, and record in this case conclusively show that Rutherford is not entitled to relief on this wholly uncorroborated assertion that has been denied by the State and that even Rutherford's counsel considers untrue. [7]