Opinion ID: 64509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Selection of the Tolling Period

Text: Having determined the consequences of the tolling period selections, we turn now to the proper selection of that period. The primary issue presented is whether the Morgan class action tolled prescription until 2000, when the district court dismissed the class claims on the merits, or 2004, when the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. We start from the bedrock premise that a party who sues on a cause of action tolls the statute of limitations during the entire prosecution of the action, including the prosecution of any appeal; otherwise, a plaintiff could not count on an appeal to protect his or her rights. [2] UPS does not argue that the claims of an individual plaintiff, or a named plaintiff in a class action, are not tolled during the pendency of an appeal. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has made it clear that members of a certified class are to be treated essentially as named plaintiffsand are bound by the resulting judgmentwhen they are adequately represented by the class representative and the other requirements of FED. R.CIV.P. 23 are met. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 395, 116 S.Ct. 873, 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996). The purpose of Rule 23 would be subverted by requiring a class member who learns of a pending suit involving a class of which he is a part to monitor that litigation to make certain that his interests are being protected; this is not his responsibilityit is the responsibility of the class representative to protect the interests of all class members. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 76 (5th Cir.1973). That responsibility does not end at the district court because [i]t is axiomatic that an appeal is a significant element in the judicial process. Id. [3] The same result does not flow for members of a putative class that has not been certified. As indicated above, the district court found that the certified class action in Morgan only tolled the statute of limitations until 2000, when the Eastern District of Missouri dismissed the class claims in Morgan, rather than in 2004, when the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. As we explain below, we are satisfied the district court erred in reaching this conclusion because it did not recognize the distinction between putative members of an uncertified class and members of a certified class in determining the application of tolling principles. We begin with American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), and Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983), the two most prominent Supreme Court cases concerning tolling in connection with the denial of class certification. In American Pipe, the State of Utah timely filed a civil action against American Pipe, seeking class action status and describing the putative class; the suit was filed 11 days before the applicable statute of limitations ran. 414 U.S. at 542, 94 S.Ct. 756. The district court eventually determined that although the action met the Rule 23(a)(2)-(4) factors, it failed to meet Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity requirement; accordingly, the court entered an order denying class certification under Rule 23(c)(1). Id. at 543, 94 S.Ct. 756. Eight days after entry of the order, more than 60 former putative class members filed motions to intervene in the action as plaintiffs. Id. at 544, 94 S.Ct. 756. The district court denied their motions, reasoning that the filing of the purported class action had not tolled the statute of limitations with respect to putative class members because the class was never certified. Id. After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In a matter of first impression, the Supreme Court closely examined the text and history of Rule 23, id. at 545-52, 94 S.Ct. 756, and determined that, consistent with federal class action procedure ... commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action. Id. at 554, 94 S.Ct. 756. Applying this rule, the Court explained that the one-year statute of limitations period, which had been tolled 11 days prior to its expiration by the filing of the suit, resumed when the district court denied certification. Id. at 561, 94 S.Ct. 756. Because the motions to intervene were filed eight days after entry of the denial order, they were timely, and the former putative class members could intervene to assert their still-viable rights. Id. In Crown, Cork & Seal, the respondent, Parker, was a putative class member in an employment discrimination class action, which was filed in September 1978. 462 U.S. at 347, 103 S.Ct. 2392. At the same time, Parker was pursuing an EEOC charge, and the EEOC sent him a notice of his right to sue on November 9, 1978, giving him 90 days to file suit. Id. at 347-48, 103 S.Ct. 2392. Thus, he received the notice while he was a member of a putative class, but before the district court had made a class certification decision. In May 1979, the named plaintiffs in the purported class action filed a motion for class certification, which the court denied in September 1980 for failure to meet the Rule 23 requirements of typicality, adequate representation, and numerosity; that action continued as an action with only the named plaintiffs as parties. Id. Parker did not intervene in the action but instead filed his own action, within 90 days after the denial of class certification but nearly two years after receiving the EEOC notice. Id. at 348, 103 S.Ct. 2392. The only issue presented on appeal was whether the class action tolled the statute of limitations for Parker even though he filed an individual suit instead of intervening in the existing suit after class certification had been denied. [4] The Supreme Court held that [t]he filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class, not just as to intervenors. Id. at 350, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Parker's entire 90-day limitation period (triggered by the EEOC notice) was tolled by the purported class action because he received the notice while the action was pending. Id. at 354, 103 S.Ct. 2392. Tolling did not resume until class certification was denied, and Parker's individual suit was filed within 90 days of that denial; thus, it was timely. Id. Therefore, it is clear from these cases that if the district court denies class certification under Rule 23, tolling of the statute of limitations ends. Our opinion in Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Assoc., 863 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.1989), makes it clear that an appeal of the denial of class certification does not extend the tolling period. There, the district court had previously denied class certification, and when the plaintiffs' appeal of that ruling reached us, we remanded the case and specifically invited the district court to reconsider its denial of class certification. 863 F.2d at 389. In the meantime, after the denial of certification but before the appeal was decided, the two-year statute of limitations ran. Id. at 390. On remand, the district court certified a class that included former putative class members. On appeal the second time, we determined that tolling had ended for the former putative class members' claims when the district court initially denied class certification. Id. Because those claimants had failed to protect their rights by intervening or filing suit after the denial of certification, the two-year statute of limitations expired in the interim, and the district court's new certification order could not revive those time-barred claims. Id. Calderon therefore establishes that the denial of certification ends the tolling period without regard to any appeal from that decision. Calderon does not control the instant case, however, because it did not involve the merits dismissal of the claims of a certified class, as this case does. Fortunately, the Third Circuit in Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co., 717 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 468 U.S. 1201, 104 S.Ct. 3566, 82 L.Ed.2d 867 (1984), considered a case with facts identical in principle to today's case. The appellant, Edwards, was an employee of the defendant, Boeing Vertol. 717 F.2d at 762. He was also a class member (but not a named plaintiff) in a class action, Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Division ), filed September 2, 1971, asserting employment discrimination claims against Boeing Vertol arising on or after September 2, 1965. Id. The Croker district court certified the class on August 4, 1972, but on June 20, 1977, following the liability portion of a bifurcated trial, the district court dismissed the claims of non-named class members, including Edwards, on the merits. Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Division), 437 F.Supp. 1138 (E.D.Pa.1977). Critically, however, the Croker district courtas in the Morgan class actiondid not deny class certification. See id. The Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the dismissal of the class claims on September 30, 1981. See Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 662 F.2d 975, 990-98 (3d Cir.1981) (en banc). [5] While the class action was pending, Edwards filed an individual EEOC charge on November 21, 1973, received a notice of his right to sue in 1980, and filed an individual suit in December 1980. Edwards, 717 F.2d at 762-63. Edwards argued that his claims, arising as early as September 2, 1965, had been tolled by the Croker action, but the district court refused to consider any claims arising before May 25, 1973, 180 days prior to the filing of his 1973 EEOC charge. Id. at 763-64. [6] On appeal, the Third Circuit found that the Croker action had tolled the running of the statute of limitations on Edwards's claims until the merits dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Although American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal were not controlling, the court relied on the principles established in those cases to determine when tolling ends for the claims of a certified class member: Reliance on the pendency of a certified class action is more reasonable than the reliance on an uncertified class action which those cases approve. The certification of the class should discourage, rather than encourage, the proliferation of filings of individual actions .... Consistency with the policies reiterated in Crown, Cork & Seal requires that the tolling of the statute of limitations continue until a final adverse determination of class claims. That occurred in this case on September 30, 1981. Id. at 766 (footnote omitted). In concluding that tolling continued until September 30, 1981, when the district court's judgment was affirmed on appeal, the Edwards court followed the general rule that tolling continues until the judgment in the case becomes final or until a final adverse determination is made. If the judgment is appealed, this occurs when the appeal is decided; if no appeal is taken, the judgment becomes final when the time for appeal ends. Edwards, as a member of a certified class, was given the same rights as a named plaintiff with respect to tolling: Since Edwards filed his complaint before the Croker case was finally determined in favor of Boeing Vertol, he should be able to prove any acts of discrimination against him which he could have proved had he been a named party in that action. Id. The result reached by Edwards is not inconsistent with American Pipe, Crown, Cork & Seal, or Calderon. In those cases, the district court's refusal to certify the class was tantamount to a declaration that only the named plaintiffs were parties to the suit. Thus, those cases logically concluded that after the district court's denial of certification, the putative class members had no reason to assume that their rights were being protected. Stated differently, they were notified that they were no longer parties to the suit and they should have realized that they were obliged to file individual suits or intervene in the class action. This conclusion follows from the limited inquiry under Rule 23 regarding class certification: The analysis under Rule 23 must focus on the requirements of the rule, and if findings made in connection with those requirements overlap findings that will have to be made on the merits, such overlap is only coincidental. The findings made for resolving a class action certification motion serve the court only in its determination of whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been demonstrated. Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 307, 312 (5th Cir.2005). When a class is certified, however, the district court has necessarily determined that all of the Rule 23 factors are met. From that point forward, unless the district court later decertifies the class for failure to satisfy the Rule 23 factors, members of the certified class may continue to rely on the class representative to protect their interests throughout the entire prosecution of the suit, including appeal. A contrary rule would require certified class members to immediately intervene or file individual suits in the event of a merits dismissal of the class action in the district court. Such a rule would not work to prevent needless multiplicity of actions, Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 351, 103 S.Ct. 2392, and would ignore the intended benefit of certificationefficient representation of a class of claimants. See Edwards, 717 F.2d at 766. Applying the above principles to the case before us, we find a clear answer to the tolling question. The Morgan district court granted conditional certification on October 30, 1996 and modified the classes on April 25, 1997, all under Rule 23; the court never denied certification. See Morgan, 143 F.Supp.2d at 1145. The court's June 26, 2000 order granting summary judgment was on the merits and did not consider certification under Rule 23, although UPS had moved, in the alternative, for decertification of the class. [7] Id. at 1147-52. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit's August 30, 2004 opinion addressed the merits of the class claims and did not mention the Rule 23 factors. See Morgan, 380 F.3d 459. In sum, because the Morgan district court did not deny class certification, American Pipe, Crown, Cork & Seal, and Calderon are inapposite. Because Taylor remained a member of a certified class while Morgan was on appeal, he was entitled to assume that the class representatives continued to represent him and protect his interests in appealing the order dismissing the class claims on the merits. This is consistent with the general rule that all members of a certified class enjoy the same rights as individually named plaintiffs in the suit. Thus, we conclude that Taylor's claims were tolled until August 30, 2004, when the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order in Morgan. This action by the Court of Appeals was the final adverse determination of the claims of the certified class of which Taylor was a member.