Opinion ID: 2599891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: I. The Statutes Plainly Differentiate Between Methamphetamine and Salts of Methamphetamine

Text: ¶ 23 Issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. New Castle Invs. v. City of LaCenter, 98 Wash.App. 224, 228, 989 P.2d 569 (1999); State v. Van Woerden, 93 Wash.App. 110, 116, 967 P.2d 14 (1998). Intent is determined by looking at the language of the statute. Van Woerden, 93 Wash.App. at 116, 967 P.2d 14. If the language is plain, then it requires no construction. State v. Wilson, 125 Wash.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320 (1994) (Plain language does not require construction.). We have held that [c]ourts should assume the Legislature means exactly what it sayseven if the court disagrees with the result or finds the result distressing. State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001). See also State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003); State v. Groom, 133 Wash.2d 679, 689, 947 P.2d 240 (1997) ([H]owever much members of this court may think that a statute should be rewritten, it is imperative that we not rewrite statutes to express what we think the law should be . . . . even if the results appear unduly harsh. (citations omitted)). Finally, this court has made it clear that courts cannot add words or clauses to an unambiguous statute when the legislature has chosen not to include that language. State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003). ¶ 24 When defining drug delivery crimes, the legislature distinguished methamphetamine from other substances, which included methamphetamine's salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers. Compare RCW 69.50.206(a) with RCW 69.50.206(d)(2). ¶ 25 Exclusion of language from one statute when included in others indicates an intent to do so. See, e.g., Delgado, 148 Wash.2d at 729, 63 P.3d 792; City of Seattle v. Parker, 2 Wash.App. 331, 335, 467 P.2d 858 (1970) (Expressio unis est exclusio alterius. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.). By applying this canon, the plain language must mean only manufacture, delivery, or possession of the base form of methamphetamine, and not its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers, is prohibited under the former statute. ¶ 26 Thus reasoned the Court of Appeals Division Two in Morris, 123 Wash.App. 467, 98 P.3d 513, where the Court of Appeals held the plain language of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) was unambiguous and included only the liquid form of methamphetaminebut not its salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, which are governed instead by former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(iii). ¶ 27 The court held since the legislature had specified methamphetamine's salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers in Schedule II [2] but not in former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii), the language of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) was unambiguous and covers only methamphetamine in its pure form, its base. Morris, 123 Wash.App. at 474-75, 98 P.3d 513. The court then noted even if the statute were ambiguous the result would be the same with application of the rule of lenity. Id. at 474 n. 6, 98 P.3d 513. ¶ 28 Morris followed Halsten, 108 Wash. App. 759, 33 P.3d 751, which in turn relied on Jackson, 137 Wash.2d 712, 976 P.2d 1229, which held the legislature's inclusion of certain language in statutes and the failure to include it in others compelled the conclusion that the Legislature made a deliberate choice, and it was not proper for the court to read into the statute that which is not there based upon the court's opinion of what would be sound policy. Id. at 724, 976 P.2d 1229. ¶ 29 In Halsten the court determined pseudoephedrine hydrochloride was not pseudoephedrinethe possession of which was prohibited. Halsten concluded the legislature's reference to salts in one part of the code but not in another was clear and plain, and meant salts were not included in the latter. Halsten, 108 Wash.App. at 763, 33 P.3d 751. Division Two held the differing statutory language demonstrate[s] that when the legislature intended a section to cover a drug and its salts, it was capable of saying so. Id. ¶ 30 The Halsten court also rejected the prosecution's attempt to have the court effectively add reference to salts into the statute based upon the theory that the Legislature probably meant to cover salts as well because [t]he drafting of a statute is a legislative, not a judicial function, id. at 764, 33 P.3d 751, and warned: [T]he court must resist the temptation to rewrite an unambiguous statute to suit its notions of what is good public policy. Id. ¶ 31 Similarly in Jackson this court applied the same fundamental principles to hold the legislature's inclusion of certain language in some statutes while failing to include it in others compelled the conclusion the legislature made a deliberate choice. Jackson, 137 Wash.2d at 724, 976 P.2d 1229. We made it clear that it was not a proper judicial function to read into a statute that which the legislature did not include. Id. Moreover, we concluded even if the statute had been ambiguous, it would be required under the rule of lenity to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the defendant. Id. at 729, 976 P.2d 1229. Applying Jackson we should likewise conclude salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers were not included in subsection (ii) of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1). ¶ 32 The majority refuses to follow Morris and Halsten and instead engages in second-guessing what the legislature meant to say, concluding based on the expert's testimony the base and salt forms of methamphetamine are the same chemical substance, and given the frequency with which the salt form is recovered by law enforcement, it is reasonable to infer that the commonly understood definition of `methamphetamine' includes its salt form. Majority at 596 (emphasis added). I disagree. It is neither reasonable nor proper for this court to infer that the unqualified use of methamphetamine under former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii) includes all forms of the substance.