Opinion ID: 506212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues relating to appellants individually.

Text: 126 Appellant Barrington argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction under several counts. 38 127 Count 9 charged Barrington with conspiracy to import marihuana in connection with the Tye episode. We do not lightly infer a defendant's knowledge of and acquiescence in a conspiracy. United States v. Jackson, 700 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hicks v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 139, 78 L.Ed.2d 132 (1983). However, the agreement between conspirators may be silent and need not be spoken or explicit. United States v. Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d 496, 502 (5th Cir.1986). We have found ample record evidence showing that Barrington participated in the count 9 conspiracy by working with Goff. 128 Count 21 charges Barrington with aiding and abetting others in the possession of marihuana with intent to distribute in the course of the Granbury episode. The evidence establishes beyond any doubt Barrington's relation to certain defendants who were engaged in distribution. The evidence also links Barrington with Schoenhoff, who was also engaged in distribution. 39 129 Barrington asserts that in order to be guilty of the offense of aiding and abetting, the aiders and abetters must have assisted the principals directly, and that the guilt of the principals must be established at trial as part of the proof of the charge of aiding and abetting. This is not a correct statement of the law of aiding and abetting. It is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting another to commit a crime if the evidence shows that the defendant associated himself with the venture, participated in it, and acted to make it succeed. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769-70, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949); Manotas-Mejia, 824 F.2d at 367; United States v. Palacios, 556 F.2d 1359, 1364 (5th Cir.1977); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. Spratlen testified that he and Barrington had flown together looking for the drop site used in the Granbury venture, and that after the drop, Barrington flew over the site looking for the missing seven bags. Barrington clearly associated himself with the venture which culminated in possession by the principals here charged. 130 Barrington's brief also asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under counts 14, 15, 16, and 20. The record does not clearly establish that Barrington traveled in interstate commerce with intent to distribute the proceeds of an unlawful activity on or about December 16, 1984, as charged in count 16. His conviction under this count must therefore be reversed. We find no doubts raised by the record as to Barrington's guilt with respect to counts 14, 15, and 20, and uphold his convictions on these counts as well as counts 9, 21, and 25.
131 Drewes contends that the searches of Poe Hangar at Sweetwater and his home contravened his Fourth Amendment rights and that the district court erred in admitting the fruits of these searches following suppression hearings during trial. Drewes does not specify when these searches occurred or which counts he wishes us to review in the light of this contention. 40 We find no error in the court's decision to admit evidence resulting from these searches. 132 The court properly held that Drewes lacked standing to contest the search of the hangar and the airplane and car located in it. At the suppression hearing, Drewes failed to assert any property interest in the hangar, the aircraft, or the car. Thus, he may not seek to exclude evidence resulting from these searches. United States v. Parks, 684 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.1982). Drewes' claim, for the first time on this appeal, that he had leased the hangar is untimely and will not be considered. 133 Drewes' contention concerning the search of his home is likewise without merit. Officers entered Drewes' home and arrested both him and appellant Goff pursuant to proper warrants. When asked whether there were any weapons in the house, Mrs. Drewes told them there were two and where they were located, and an officer retrieved them. Goff conceded at trial that he consented to the search of his luggage. Drewes lacks standing to challenge the admissibility of the items found in Goff's luggage. 134 Additionally, Drewes contends that the court erred in allowing the government to introduce in evidence the weapons belonging to him that were seized at the time of his arrest. He argues that these should have been excluded as prejudicial extrinsic evidence under Rule 403, Fed. R.Evid., pursuant to United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979). Possession of weapons is highly probative as to an accused drug trafficker's criminal intent as tools of the trade. United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1057 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1962, 95 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987). The government did not highlight the weapons evidence at trial, and Drewes does not claim that he was prejudiced by their introduction. Their probative value clearly outweighs any likely prejudicial impact. Drewes had not asked the court to make an on-the-record articulation of its probative/prejudicial inquiry. See United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 213 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1008, 104 S.Ct. 1003, 79 L.Ed.2d 235 (1984). The court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the guns into evidence. 135 Finally, Drewes argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars his conviction under counts 9, 11, 12, 20, and 21, since, he urges, these all concern alleged activities within the course of a single conspiracy. We have already considered the double jeopardy question with respect to counts 9, 11, and 20. Since Drewes offers no separate argument as to the evidence or law with respect to counts 12 and 21, we do not consider them on appeal.
136 Goff asks this Court to find that his convictions under counts 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 21 are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause inasmuch as they all were committed as aspects of a single conspiracy. We have found that the Tye and Granbury episodes constitute a single, on-going conspiracy and that the government must, on remand, choose which set of conspiracy counts [9 and 11, or 14 and 20] is to be dismissed. Goff argues that the substantive and aiding and abetting counts relating to this on-going conspiracy must also be dismissed. It is well established that conspiracy to commit a crime and the crime itself are separate punishable offenses. Periera v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 74 S.Ct. 358, 364, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954); Nichols, 741 F.2d at 772-73. It is also well established that conspiracy and aiding and abetting are separate punishable offenses. United States v. Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023, 1031, 1033 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Krol, 374 F.2d 776, 778-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835, 88 S.Ct. 46, 19 L.Ed.2d 97 (1967). Counts 10, 12, 15, 17, and 21 do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 137 Next, Goff urges that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions under the Tye and Granbury counts charging conspiracy and aiding and abetting, namely, counts 9 and 14 (conspiracy to import), counts 11 and 20 (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute), and counts 12 and 15 (aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute and importation). He argues that there was no evidence that he committed these offenses [b]eyond flying an airplane containing contraband or landing an airplane containing contraband. This highly significant evidence does not stand alone. 138 There was testimony that Goff had discussed the Tye venture with Drewes and others and that Goff and Drewes had told the owner of the hangar that they had stored the Tye load of marihuana there. Further, Goff arranged to have a long range fuel system installed in Barrington's Titan that was later flown to Belize for the Granbury trip and Goff used a debugger to check the Titan for a suspected beeper in December, 1984. Goff, along with Drewes and Barrington, said that they could not find some of the marihuana bags kicked out near Pecos in connection with the Granbury episode. It was shown that Goff was one of those at the January 1985 meeting discussing the Granbury load and expressing puzzlement as to how the Tye load had been taken off. 139 We find overwhelming evidence to uphold the jury's findings that Goff was guilty of the offenses charged in counts 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 20. 41
140 Kuntze contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions for conspiracy and for aiding and abetting in connection with the Granbury episode. He avers that the only evidence linking him with that episode was Spratlen's testimony that on the day following the drop, he and Kuntze drove to the drop site and looked for the missing bags: 141 We spent the night there, the following day me and Lon Kuntze went out to the drop site and ... Ben [Barrington] flew over to see if we could find it and he called me on the ground-to-air radio and told me he couldn't see nothing and me and Lon Kuntze walked the drop site to see if we could find the seven bags. 142 While it would have been legally impossible for Kuntze to have conspired with the government informer, Spratlen, there is strong circumstantial evidence that he was acting pursuant to an agreement with Barrington. There was testimony that Kuntze flew into Fort Worth with Barrington after Barrington learned that some of the bags were missing. It was the next day that Kuntze, together with Spratlen, searched the drop site for the missing bags, while Barrington directed the operation from the air. This is clearly enough evidence to connect Kuntze's activities as conspiratorial with Barrington. We affirm Kuntze's conspiracy convictions under counts 14 and 20. 143 The same evidence supports Kuntze's convictions for aiding and abetting. 144 To prove aiding and abetting, the government must prove that the defendant associated with a criminal venture, participated in the venture, and sought by his action to make the venture succeed. [Citation omitted.] The defendant must share the principal's criminal intent and engage in some affirmative conduct designed to aid the venture. [Citations omitted.] 145 Manotas-Mejia, 824 F.2d at 367. This evidence shows that Kuntze associated himself with the venture and sought by his action to make it succeed. We affirm his conviction for aiding and abetting under counts 15 and 21. 146 Kuntze also argues that his convictions under counts 6, 25, and 27 are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, since only one cocaine conspiracy existed. The point is moot. We have found the evidence insufficient to establish the existence of the conspiracies charged in counts 6 and 27. In summary, Kuntze's convictions under counts 14, 15, 20, 21, and 25 are affirmed.
147 Appellant Horst Schoenhoff raises issues which we examine in the following sequence: double jeopardy claims; claims as to admissibility of evidence; and claims of insufficient evidence. 148
149 Appellant contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars separate, consecutive sentencing for his convictions under counts 9, 10, 14, 20, and 21 because these offenses were all committed in the course of the same conspiracy and because the same evidence supports all counts. 42 Earlier in the opinion we held that the counts 9, 14, and 20 must be vacated and remanded for election by the government. We also observed that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar separate convictions for a substantive offense, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy even though all may relate to the same unlawful activity. We conclude that Schoenhoff's double jeopardy claims are without merit after our holding that Tye and Granbury were one conspiracy. 150
151 Schoenhoff claims that the court erred in admitting testimony that he was known as Frenchie. He also objects to the admission of statements alleging that Frenchie was or was to be the source for marihuana in Belize. No objection was made at trial to such statements, or to statements explicitly identifying Schoenhoff as the Belize marihuana connection. This objection has not been properly raised on appeal. United States v. Hamilton, 694 F.2d 398, 401 (5th Cir.1982). Undoubtedly this testimony was damaging. It was also highly probative. Schoenhoff thoroughly cross-examined the witness concerning it at trial. The jury was entitled to determine its weight. We do not find that the court committed plain error by permitting the jury to hear this testimony. Fed.R.Crim.P. rule 52(b). 152 Schoenhoff next contends that the court erred in admitting alleged co-conspirator hearsay regarding the fact that the appellant was to receive and received $330,000.00 for the 'Granbury' Episode. Having so claimed in headnote fashion, he makes no further argument as to relevant facts or law. We summarily dismiss this claim. 153 Finally, Schoenhoff argues that the court erred in admitting in evidence a piece of paper on which someone had written, HORST 1206. The document in question was Barrington's charge slip from the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Fort Worth dated January 7, 1985. 43 Appellant claims to have objected at trial that the exhibit was not forwarded in the defense discovery package, but we do not find evidence of such objection on the record. Appellant did object to the authenticity of the entry, and noted in objection that the government had presented no testimony that either the handwriting or entry was that of a hotel employee. The court admitted the exhibit over this objection, stating that the predicate was sufficient to leave the question of weight to the jury. We find no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence challenged by Schoenhoff on this appeal. 154
155 Finally, Schoenhoff argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions under counts 9, 10, 14, 18, 20, and 21. Counts 9 and 10 relate to the Tye episode, counts 14, 20, and 21 to Granbury, and count 18 charges travel in interstate commerce on December 24, 1984, with intent to distribute proceeds of an unlawful activity. Having reviewed the record, we find the evidence overwhelming to sustain Schoenhoff's convictions on all counts except number 18. 156 Contrary to Schoenhoff's assertions on appeal, proof of his connection with the Tye episode does not rest solely on Spratlen. 44 Testimony by others also implicated Schoenhoff. While the truck loaded with marihuana was still parked near Poe hangar, Drewes told the witness that it would be gone as soon as the Frenchman came and got it. Drewes then identified the Frenchman as the man that loaded them down south. There was further testimony that Drewes and Goff linked the Frenchman in other ways with the conspiracy. 157 Schoenhoff's involvement in the Granbury episode likewise is fully demonstrated by the evidence. Spratlen testified that Barrington told him in mid-December, 1984, that a man called Horst from Belize would be his Belize connection where he would get the marihuana. Barrington also had introduced him to Schoenhoff prior to the Granbury trip, saying This is Horst and he's the man from Belize that we'll be doing business with. Afterwards Spratlen talked with Schoenhoff about going down and picking up some marihuana of high quality. 158 Spratlen testified further that Schoenhoff told him that he had personally loaded the Granbury marihuana. There was other testimony that Schoenhoff was closely associated with Barrington and the Granbury episode. According to Spratlen, Barrington and Schoenhoff received money derived from the transaction, and flew with it in their suitcases from Texas to Las Vegas on January 9 or 10, 1985. The government presented corroborating circumstantial evidence, in particular a customs declaration dated January 6, 1985, showing that a person named Horst Schoenhoff had entered New Orleans on that date via an airline serving Belize. In addition, a California narcotics officer who had been keeping Schoenhoff's residence in South Lake Tahoe under surveillance testified that he had seen him there on January 10, 1985, and that on January 11, Schoenhoff had deposited $10,000 in cash at a local branch bank. 159 Appellant does not offer separate arguments with respect to the Tye and Granbury counts. We merely state, therefore, that we find the evidence supports his convictions under counts 9, 10, 14, 20 and 21. 160 The government offered no evidence at all to support Schoenhoff's conviction on count 18. It presents no argument with respect to it on this appeal. The alleged travel in interstate commerce on or about December 24, 1984, is beyond the scope of the Tye episode (which yielded no proceeds), but prior to the Granbury importation. It is difficult to conceive how Schoenhoff could have traveled in interstate commerce with intent to distribute the proceeds of an importation that had not yet occurred. The government does not contend that Schoenhoff's travel to Las Vegas on January 9 or 10, 1985--over two weeks later--is the basis for the offense charged in count 18. Schoenhoff's conviction on count 18 must therefore be reversed for want of sufficient evidence.