Opinion ID: 740982
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rejection of Comparative Fault

Text: 32 The above-described approaches to foreseeability, causation, and superseding cause in Pennsylvania strict products liability cases are compelled by Pennsylvania's rejection of comparative fault. Of particular relevance to the instant case, Walton explained that 33 [The Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has continually fortified the theoretical dam between the notions of negligence and strict no fault liability. It would serve only to muddy the waters to introduce comparative fault into an action based solely on strict liability. 34 610 A.2d at 462 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). It has been noted by numerous courts that [t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court, perhaps more than any other state appellate court in the nation, has been emphatic in divorcing negligence concepts from product-liability doctrine. Kern v. Nissan Indus. Equip. Co., 801 F.Supp. 1438, 1440 (M.D.Pa.1992)(quoting Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 578 F.Supp. 1429, 1434 (E.D.Pa.1983), rev'd on other grounds, 743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir.1984)). 35 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently explained its reasons for not extending the defense of comparative negligence to a strict products liability action: 36 Our position is not based solely on the problem of the conceptual confusion that would ensue should negligence and strict liability concepts be commingled, although that concern is not negligible. Rather, we think that the underlying purpose of strict product liability is undermined by introducing negligence concepts into it. Strict product liability is premised on the concept of ... liability for casting a defective product into the stream of commerce. 37 The deterrent effect of imposing strict product liability standards would be weakened were we to allow actions based upon it to be defeated, or recoveries reduced by negligence concepts. 38 Kimco Dev. v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 536 Pa. 1, 637 A.2d 603, 606-07 (Pa.1993)(emphasis added). 39 Similarly, in McCown v. Int'l Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975), the plaintiff, as here, was injured by an industrial vehicle. According to the plaintiff, the machine's design was defective and caused his injuries. The defendant argued that plaintiff's contributory negligence should have been considered either to reduce the plaintiff's permissible recovery or as a defense to liability. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that it would be unwise to create a system of comparative assessment of damages for 402A actions. Id., 342 A.2d at 382. 40 Pennsylvania's wish to avoid muddy[ing] the waters dictates that in discussing causation, the comparative fault of the parties involved is immaterial. Rather, the focus is again on whether the activity engaged in by the plaintiff was foreseeable. If foreseeable, and the defect is found to have been a cause of the injury, the plaintiff's actions cannot preclude defendant liability. Any other approach would require weighing negligence or lack of care, which would inject comparative fault into strict products liability. 41 In Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430 (3d Cir.1992), which undertook an extensive survey of Pennsylvania products liability law, the trial court's final charge expressly permitted the jury to consider plaintiff's alleged negligence when determining whether defendant's product caused his injuries: The defendant denies that it is liable for plaintiff's injuries. Defendant contends that the 773 truck was not defectively designed, and that any injuries sustained by plaintiff were caused by the acts of plaintiff himself. 959 F.2d at 440. In Dillinger, we reversed, disapproving this jury charge because we found that it effectively framed the issue as one of contributory negligence.... Id. at 440 n. 18. The defendant point[ed] to a line of cases which suggest[ ] that, although evidence of a plaintiff's contributory negligence is ordinarily inadmissible, it is admissible to rebut the 'causation' prong of a products liability claim. Id. at 441. 42 We rejected the defendant's arguments and found the line of cases cited to be in some instances [irreconcilable] with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's declarations on this subject. Id. at 441. We also distinguished that line of cases from the case then before us, by explaining that in the cases cited by the defendant, the plaintiff's conduct [had] actively contributed to the cause of the accident, [rather than] merely [failing] to prevent the accident attributable to the defect. Id. at 442. We reasoned in Dillinger that the evidence of the plaintiff's conduct was especially inadmissible when the conduct was merely insufficient to prevent the accident attributable to the defect. Id. In Dillinger, therefore, we left open the question of whether a different result would obtain where the plaintiff's conduct had been more than merely insufficient to prevent the accident attributable to the defect. Id. 43 The argument of the defense in the instant case--that a plaintiff's foreseeable conduct can break the causal chain set in motion by a product defect--was championed in Foley v. Clark Equip. Co., 361 Pa.Super. 599, 523 A.2d 379 (1987). But as we stated in Dillinger and reiterate today, we believe that case is inconsistent with Pennsylvania strict products liability law. Dillinger, 959 F.2d at 443. In Foley, the Superior Court endorsed the admission of evidence of a plaintiff's contributory negligence in a section 402A suit. There, as here, the plaintiff was struck by an industrial vehicle when the operator failed to notice him. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer had defectively designed the vehicle in that, inter alia, the driver's view was improperly obstructed. The Superior court stated that negligen[t] conduct is admissible where it is relevant to establish causation[,] and plaintiff's allegedly negligent behavior is admissible for this purpose. Foley, 523 A.2d at 393. Nonetheless, we explained in Dillinger that 44 there is no meaningful way to reconcile the view that a plaintiff's negligence of the type involved in Foley should be admitted to undercut causation with the Supreme Court's prohibition of the introduction of a plaintiff's negligence to defeat liability.... In Foley, the plaintiff did not observe the oncoming forklift and did not move out of its way. Because the driver similarly had not noticed the plaintiff, the driver crashed into him. Although the plaintiff contended that the design of the forklift ... was defective because, in part, ... [of the] obstructed ... view, the court permitted the defendant to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's inattention because the accident could have been avoided if the plaintiff had not acted negligently.... [T]here is no principled reason to prohibit evidence of the plaintiff's negligence in McCown but permit evidence of an almost identical character in Foley. 45 959 F.2d at 443-44. The fact that the plaintiff in Foley could have moved out of the way does not mean that Foley caused the accident, and that the driver (who also could have moved out of the way) did not cause the accident. Obstructed vision was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries in Foley; no meaningful distinction can be made between the operator's and the plaintiff's roles in causing the accident. 46 In Dillinger, although we did not endorse as dispositive the distinction between plaintiffs who set [their] accident[s] in motion and those who merely fail to stop them, we limited our holding to cases in which the plaintiff merely failed to stop his injury from being caused by a product defect. 959 F.2d at 444. This distinction is somewhat artificial, as plaintiff's conduct will often be susceptible to characterization in either category. But assuming that in directing the operator to swing the boom, Mr. Parks set the accident in motion, we will now address the question of the permissible uses of evidence of plaintiff's conduct where such conduct has actively set the accident in motion. Id. 47 Based on the foregoing discussion of the permissible uses of plaintiff's conduct evidence in section 402A actions, we find that the evidence of Mr. Parks' actions preceding his death were appropriate for the jury to consider only if it first decided that those actions were not reasonably foreseeable or were otherwise extraordinary. In failing to put that test to the jury, the district court gave the impression that the jury's function was to assess the relative contributions of Mr. Parks and the machine's defect in causing Mr. Parks' death. As a matter of law, however, strict products liability demands that a plaintiff's foreseeable actions can never displace manufacturer liability when a product defect was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury.