Opinion ID: 2135985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Elicitation of Statements Regarding Defendant's Prior Incarceration.

Text: Prior to trial, defendant gave a statement to Detective Robert Barth regarding the shooting of Woodcock and the robbery of the convenience store. The following is a portion of defendant's statement, which was read by Detective Barth while testifying. [Detective Barth]: Would you please tell me in your own words what your activities were while at the Short Stop store in Fairview Heights on February 21, 1990, at about 11:15 p.m.? [Terrance Towns]: I went in the Short Stop store knowing that Charles [Woodcock] was working. I started a conversation with him about motorcycles until the store was closed. And I took $70 from off the counter when Chuck went to the back to turn off the lights. He came back to the cash register and noticed a small portion of money missing. Me knowing that if he called the police I would go back to jail. At this point, the prosecutor stopped Detective Barth from reading the statement, and after a discussion with the trial judge in chambers, it was determined that the comment made by the defendant referring to the prospect of returning to jail would not be repeated, and no further reference would be made of this comment in front of the jury. Upon returning to open court, Detective Barth was told to start reading defendant's statement where he had left off. [Terrance Towns]: So I asked him to recheck the store to see if he lost it. He said, `No. I am calling the police.' And I said, `Chuck, I can't go back to jail.' He said, `That's your problem.' So I shot him twice. When he fell, I went and grabbed the money on the counter by the cash register. I then went behind the counter and grabbed his jacket. On my way to leave, I noticed that the safe was open. I took one role of dimes and a roll of quarters. I snatched a bank deposit bag and put everything, the money, in the bag and left. I got into Chuck's vehicle, Chuck's Escort, and went to my house. Defendant now claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel's failure to move to exclude the two references of defendant's prior incarceration which were elicited by the prosecutor during the trial. The defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be analyzed in light of Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Under Strickland, the defendant must prove the following in order to establish that defense counsel's performance was constitutionally defective: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense such that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial whose result was reliable. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.) Further, Strickland holds that an ineffectiveness claim can often be disposed upon a showing that a defendant suffered no prejudice from the claimed errors without deciding whether the errors constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699.) Additionally, the Strickland standard requires a reasonable probability of a different result, not merely a possibility. People v. Gacy (1988), 125 Ill.2d 117, 129-30, 125 Ill.Dec. 770, 530 N.E.2d 1340. In support of his argument, defendant refers to numerous cases holding that evidence of unrelated and unconnected criminal conduct is inadmissible. (See People v. Lampkin (1983), 98 Ill.2d 418, 75 Ill.Dec. 260, 457 N.E.2d 50.) While this general proposition is true, this is not what we have in the case at bar. In this case, two isolated remarks were made: I would go back to jail, and Chuck, I can't go back to jail. No evidence was presented as to defendant's specific prior criminal conduct. The remarks were not referred to by either the prosecutor or the defense attorney, nor did the trial judge ever bring these remarks to the attention of the jury. What we have here is not a situation where specifics about a defendant's prior unrelated criminal conduct is being used against him in order to obtain a conviction, but rather where out of a lengthy statement, two isolated remarks were made evidencing that defendant had previously been in jail. Additionally, there has been no showing that the prosecutor intentionally elicited these statements from Detective Barth. While it is true that these references to defendant's prior incarceration are apparent from the face of his written statement, the prosecutor interrupted Detective Barth's testimony in an attempt to have these remarks omitted from the defendant's statement. Nevertheless, due to an apparent oversight by the parties and the trial judge, upon resumption of Barth's testimony, the second reference to defendant's prior incarceration was made. Due to the fact that these statements neither were substantively used nor were they ever referred to again, defendant has failed to show that he suffered any prejudice from the two isolated remarks. Thus, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.