Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Voluntariness of Coffman's Statements and Admissibility of Evidence Derived Therefrom

Text: A similar analysis leads to the conclusion that Coffman's statements were voluntary and thus properly admitted. Although Coffman's interrogation was lengthy and officers ignored her requests for an attorney, they provided her with food and coffee, allowed her a cigarette, and brought her socks and other clothing after she complained of feeling cold. Although officers did not immediately provide medical attention for Coffman's leg wound, the injury, approximately two weeks old at the time, clearly was not as serious as that in Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 399-402, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, in which the high court held that statements resulting from the repeated interrogation of a hospitalized suspect suffering from a gunshot wound were involuntary. Coffman's admissions occurred after repeated confrontation with the known evidence. She contends that investigators improperly threatened to have her child removed from his home in Missouri, but since she rejected the factual possibility their suggestion clearly had no coercive effect on her. Coffman also contends the officers induced her to involuntarily admit her guilt by falsely telling her Marlow had incriminated her and by making promises of assistance. [15] What the officer meant in asserting he would help Coffman is unclear, but we are unpersuaded his comments constituted a promise of leniency that rendered her subsequent statements and conduct involuntary. The scenario here differs from Collazo v. Estelle (9th Cir.1991) 940 F.2d 411, on which Coffman relies. There, the federal court of appeals found reversible error in the admission of a confession obtained after an interrogating officer attempted to discourage a suspect from talking with a lawyer by predicting a lawyer would direct him not to speak with the police and it might be worse for the suspect. ( Id. at pp. 414, 416, 420.) Here, the officersâ questioning Coffman in the midst of authorities' efforts to locate Novisâ did not hint she would receive harsher treatment if she failed to cooperate. Moreover, Coffman continued for a considerable period to resist the officers' requests that she tell them where Novis could be found. Rather than threaten Coffman, interrogators attempted by various techniques to appeal to her sense of moral integrity and any possible sympathy or sensitivity she might have toward the victim's family. The record supports the conclusion that Coffman's statements were the product of her own free will. Even were we to conclude otherwise, i.e., that the trial court erred in finding Coffman made her statements voluntarily, the record contains overwhelming evidence of her guilt. Specifically, the testimony of Richard Drinkhouse and Veronica Koppers supported the conclusion that Coffman willingly participated in the offenses; Harold Brigham testified Coffman was the person who pawned the stolen typewriter using Novis's identification; Victoria Rotstein placed Coffman near the location where identification belonging to Coffman, Marlow and Novis was found several days after the offenses; and Coffman's (along with Marlow's) fingerprints were found on Novis's car. Any error in the admission of Coffman's statements therefore did not, beyond a reasonable doubt, contribute to the verdict. ( Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827.) Coffman further contends the discovery of Novis's body and the evidence derived from it were the product of her coerced statements and should have been excluded. Having concluded Coffman's statements were voluntarily made, we further conclude the fruits of those statements were properly admitted. Moreover, even had the statements been involuntary, the trial court properly ruled the physical evidence was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, which recognizes that if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, then the exclusionary rule will not apply. ( Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443-444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377.) This is so because the rule is intended to ensure that the prosecution is not placed in a better position than it would have been had no illegality occurred; the rule does not require it be put in a worse one. ( Ibid. ) Novis's body lay, partially exposed, in a shallow grave in a working vineyard near a residential area. Investigators found evidence that bicycles and horses had been ridden nearby. On these facts, the trial court reasonably could find that Novis's body ultimately would have been found regardless of defendants' statements.