Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Hastening the Verdict (Lewis, Oliver)

Text: Defendants contend the trial court hastened jury deliberations and coerced the guilt verdicts in violation of state law. In addition, defendants claim they were denied due process under the Fifth Amendment, an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment, and a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth Amendment. Violations of analogous state constitutional rights also are alleged. For reasons we explain, all claims are procedurally barred and lack merit. Defendants maintain that the trial court improperly suggested to the jurors that if they did not complete deliberations by February 11, 1993, they would have to continue them during the week of February 15. The record indicates that Friday, February 12, was the Lincoln's Birthday holiday, and that Monday, February 15, was the Presidents' Day holiday. The court had told jurors previously that trial would be in recess from February 12-19. However, on February 4, the court responded to a report that a recent appellate decision had held that to interrupt deliberations would constitute reversible error even with counsel's consent. Hence, the court alerted the jury that it might have to continue with trial if deliberations began before the holiday period. The court asked the jurors if continuing to deliberate would cause any scheduling problems. Two jurors spoke up. One said that she needed to go to Sacramento on Friday, February 19. The court stated that doing so presented no problem, because court would not be in session that day even if deliberations continued during the holiday week. Another juror said she had made travel plans for the week of February 15. On February 9, however, before deliberations began, and hence before any pressure to hasten a verdict could emerge, the court stated that the juror had resolved the scheduling conflict, presumably by altering her travel plans. The jury reached its verdict on February 11, 1993, and thus did not have to work through the holiday week. As a threshold matter, we note that the court and counsel discussed the handling of this matter outside the jury's presence beforehand. Counsel did not object to the court's approach. Counsel on both sides said they had no problem with it. Because defendants did not object to the trial court's comments regarding scheduling, they have forfeited their state law claim that it interfered with the jury's deliberations and coerced a verdict. (See People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th 704, 754, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.) They also have forfeited their related constitutional claims. ( Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) In any event, no impropriety occurred. (See People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989-990, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153; cf. People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 469, 276 Cal.Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107.) The first juror in question was not forced to choose between deliberating and traveling. The second juror  who might have been forced to make such a choice if deliberations had continued past February 11  chose before deliberations began to give deliberations priority, and apparently altered her travel plans. Hence that juror could not have felt pressured to reach a verdict. We reject defendants' claim.