Opinion ID: 201524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our Review of the Statute

Text: 15 In our review of § 4852d(b)(3), we must first ask whether it is clear that Congress intended either to limit the term lessee to a party who legally enters into a lease with a lessor or to permit the minor children who reside with the lessee to enforce the disclosure provision. See Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 84 (1st Cir.2002) (If the meaning of a statute is clear, we enforce that meaning.). Here, the plain language of the statute limits recovery under § 4852d(b)(3) to a purchaser or lessee. We find this limitation not only clear, but also consistent with the purpose of the disclosure provision — to provide the purchaser or lessee of target property with notice that there could be a lead-based paint hazard present in the subject premises, and the opportunity to either decline to enter into a contract regarding the premises or proceed forward with the transaction in the face of the knowledge that a lead-based paint hazard could be present. See § 4852d(a)(1). This disclosure provision does not require the seller or lessor to abate the lead-paint hazard, nor disqualify a purchaser or lessee with young children from occupying a property that possibly contains lead-based paint hazards. Thus, because a violation of the statute occurs when the seller or lessor fails to disclose, it is logical that the party harmed by the failure to disclose is the purchaser or the lessee. See Gladysz v. Desmarais, No. Civ. 02-208-B, 2003 WL 1343033, at  (D.N.H. March 17, 2003) (unpublished) (The civil liability provision in RLPHRA is within the `disclosure' section and as such, it is both logical and reasonable to read the civil liability to cover only purchasers or lessees who were deprived of the required notice of lead hazards `upon the transfer of residential property.'). Although it appears that we are the first circuit court of appeals to address this issue, district courts have similarly found that the plain meaning of § 4852d(b)(3) limits recovery to a purchaser or lessee to the exclusion of minor children of a lessee. See id. at  (holding that grandchildren of lessee residing in home with lead-based paint hazards did not have standing to sue landlord because § 4852d(b)(3) clearly limits recovery to a `purchaser or lessee'); L.B. III v. Hous. Auth. of Louisville, 345 F.Supp.2d 725, 729 (W.D.Ky.2004) (minor children of lessees fail to fit the statutory [standing] requirement because they were neither purchasers nor lessees of the property in which they lived). 7 16