Opinion ID: 1450006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sifagaloa's Due Process Claim

Text: On appeal to this court, Sifagaloa argues that he was denied his constitutional right to due process of law, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution, because the Trustees have conflicting interests  awarding retirement benefits and preserving the financial integrity of the ERS fund. In effect, Sifagaloa urges that the Trustees' alleged conflict of interest gives rise to an appearance of impropriety on the basis of which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned; accordingly, Sifagaloa concludes that the Trustees should have been disqualified from adjudicating his appeal of the Medical Board's decision. This court has articulated the conceptual framework within which we begin our analysis of Sifagaloa's due process claim. In Sussel v. City and County of Honolulu Civil Service Com'n, 71 Haw. 101, 784 P.2d 867 (1989), we declared the following propositions to which we continue to subscribe: [T]here are certain fundamentals of just procedure which are the same for every type of tribunal and every type of proceeding. R. Pound, Administrative Law 75 (1942). Concededly, a `fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136[, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942] (1955). This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579[, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 488] (1973). Withrow v. Larkin 421 U.S. 35, 46-47[, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1463-64, 43 L.Ed.2d 712] (1975). Of course, a biased decisionmaker [is] constitutionally unacceptable[.] Id. at 47[, 95 S.Ct. at 1464]. But no one would argue seriously that the disqualification of [decision-makers] on grounds of actual bias ... prevents unfairness in all cases. State v. Brown, 70 Haw. 459, 467, 776 P.2d 1182, 1187 (1989). So our system of [justice] has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. In re Murchison, supra . The Supreme Court teaches us too that justice can perform its high function in the best way [only if it satisfies] `the appearance of justice.' Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14[, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11]. In re Murchison, supra . For in a popular government, `justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done....' Rex v. Justices of Bodmin, [1947] 1 K.B. 321, 325. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 n. 19, [71 S.Ct. 624, 649 n. 19, 95 L.Ed. 817] (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (1951). And, [t]here can be little question that use of a truly independent adjudicator is essential to attainment of this goal. Indeed, if there exists any reasonable doubt about the adjudicator's impartiality at the outset of a case, provision of the most elaborate procedural safeguards will not avail to create [an] appearance of justice. M. Redish & L. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455, 483-84 (1986).... . . . . Since the fundamentals of just procedure impose a requirement of impartiality on administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as [on] courts[,] Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 46 [, 95 S.Ct. at 1463], we see no reason why an administrative adjudicator should be allowed to sit with impunity in a case where the circumstances fairly give rise to an appearance of impropriety and reasonably cast suspicion on his impartiality. State v. Brown, 70 Haw. at 467 n. 3, 776 P.2d at 1188 n. 3. 71 Haw. at 107-109, 784 P.2d at 870-71. On the other hand, we have long held that: (1) legislative enactments are presumptively constitutional; (2) a party challenging [a statutory scheme] has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the constitutional defect must be clear, manifest and unmistakable. Blair v. Cayetano, ___ Haw. ___, 836 P.2d 1066, 1069, (Haw. 1992); Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 58 Haw. 25, 31, 564 P.2d 135, 139 (1977); see also Bishop v. Mahiko, 35 Haw. 608 (1940). The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961); Wolkenstein v. Reville, 694 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir.1982). Whether a particular decision-making procedure is constitutionally defective for want of impartiality will depend on many factors.... Wolkenstein, 694 F.2d at 41. These factors include: the character of the decision being made, see Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 247-49, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 1615-16, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980); Wolkenstein, 694 F.2d at 41; the nature of the individual and governmental interests at stake, see Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Educational Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 491, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 2313, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Wolkenstein, 694 F.2d at 41; and the feasibility of alternative procedures. Wolkenstein, 694 F.2d at 41. An appearance of impropriety does not occur simply where there is a joinder of executive and judicial power. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534, 47 S.Ct. 437, 445, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (cited with approval in Sussel, 71 Haw. at 108, 784 P.2d at 870-71). Administrators serving as adjudicators are presumed to be unbiased. See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 1670, 72 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421, 61 S.Ct. 999, 1004, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1949). The presumption can be rebutted by a showing of disqualifying interest, either pecuniary, see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1972)], or both, see Tumey, supra . Wolkenstein, 694 F.2d at 42. But the burden of establishing a disqualifying interest rests on the party making the assertion. Id. (citing Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 195, 102 S.Ct. at 1670). Our review of the record persuades us that Sifagaloa has failed in the present case to establish a disqualifying interest on the part of the Trustees. The Trustees have no direct, personal, pecuniary interest in their adjudications. [6] See Wolkenstein, 694 F.2d at 42; cf. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 519, 47 S.Ct. at 440 (village mayor derived salary directly contingent upon defendants' convictions of violations of state's prohibition act in Liquor Court over which mayor presided and therefore had direct, personal, pecuniary interest in outcome of the such adjudications). Neither does the record show that the Trustees have any interest other than running a successful operation. . . . It cannot seriously be supposed that [they] would make unjustified determinations ... to ingratiate [themselves] with the ERS membership or the general public, the latter having no financial stake in the ERS and the potential award to Sifagaloa posing no conceivable threat to the former. See Wolkenstein, 694 F.2d at 42-43. Thus, Sigafaloa has simply failed to demonstrate that the Trustees' situation is one which would offer a possible temptation to the average [person] as a judge. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S.Ct. at 444; Ward, 409 U.S. at 60, 93 S.Ct. at 83; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). Put succinctly, [f]airly read, neither the facts ... nor the generalized assertions made here about [the Trustees'] `inconsistent' responsibilities prove an interest on [their] part in the outcome of the determinations made [on Sifagaloa's claim] sufficient... to overcome the `presumption of honesty and integrity' that attaches by virtue of [their] office. Wolkenstein, 694 F.2d at 42; see Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. at 1461. [7] We therefore hold that Sifagaloa has failed to overcome the presumption of lack of bias by showing a disqualifying interest on the Trustees' part. That being the case, we further hold that Sifagaloa has failed to meet his burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any constitutional defect in the adjudicatory mechanism created by HRS ch. 88 for determining members' ERS disability retirement benefits.