Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Constitutional Challenges to Death Penalty Statute and Instructions

Text: Defendant contends a number of California's death penalty provisions violate the federal Constitution. He acknowledges that this court has repeatedly rejected identical claims in prior decisions but argues that we should reconsider our holdings. Having found no reason to do so, we reject these claims without extensive discussion. Defendant argues that California's death penalty statute does not meaningfully narrow the pool of murderers eligible for the death penalty. We have repeatedly held that section 190.2 does not contain so many special circumstances that it fails to perform the constitutionally mandated narrowing function. [Citations.] ( People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 677 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509]; see People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 729 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 154-156 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) Defendant contends section 190.3, factor (a) is unconstitutional because it has been applied in such a wanton and freakish manner, without the application of any reasonable limiting construction, that it results in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. To the contrary, section 190.3, factor (a) instructs the jury to consider a relevant subject matter and does so in understandable terms. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976 [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630].) Defendant further complains that factor (a) unconstitutionally permits circumstances to be considered aggravating in one case while neutral or mitigating in another case. We have rejected this precise claim, explaining that there is no constitutional requirement that the sentencer compare the defendant's culpability with the culpability of other defendants. [Citation.] ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1051 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044].) Defendant argues that California's death penalty statute violates the federal Constitution because it fails to incorporate certain safeguards against the arbitrary imposition of death. We address each alleged omission in turn. First, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], defendant claims that jurors must find aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously agree on the presence of a particular aggravating factor, and find that the aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors. We have repeatedly rejected such claims. ( People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 620 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292]; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 893 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135]; People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731.) Second, defendant contends the state and federal Constitutions require that the jury be instructed that it may impose a death sentence only if it determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors and that death is the appropriate penalty. We have rejected this contention on numerous occasions. ( People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 620; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 614 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076]; People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 730.) Third, defendant argues that the failure to assign the state a burden of proof renders unconstitutional California's death penalty statute. Defendant claims that, at a minimum, a jury should have to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an aggravating factor exists, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, and that death is the appropriate sentence. We disagree. We have previously concluded that no burden of proof or burden of persuasion is required during the penalty determination. ( People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 487-488 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968]; People v. Lenart, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1135-1136.) Defendant identifies no reason to revisit our prior decisions. Fourth, defendant contends that some burden of proof is constitutionally required at the penalty phase to break ties for those jurors who find themselves torn between imposing a death sentence and sentencing the defendant to life without the possibility of parole. As discussed above, no burden of proof or burden of persuasion is required during the penalty phase. ( People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 487-488; People v. Lenart, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1135-1136.) Additionally, the jury was instructed it could return a sentence of death only if it conclude[d] that the aggravating circumstances substantially outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, no tie-breaking rule was necessary. Fifth, defendant alternatively argues that the jury should have been instructed that there was no burden of proof. We have repeatedly rejected identical claims. ( People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 488; People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 104 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622].) Sixth, defendant contends the failure to require written or other specific findings by the jury regarding aggravating factors violates the federal Constitution. We have rejected that contention on numerous occasions. (See People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 488.) Seventh, defendant claims that the lack of intercase proportionality review for death penalty cases is unconstitutional. We have, as defendant acknowledges, repeatedly held that intercase proportionality review is not required. ( People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 338 [52 Cal.Rptr.3d 268, 148 P.3d 47]; People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 488; People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 602.) Defendant argues that the California sentencing scheme denies capital defendants equal protection by denying procedural safeguards to capital defendants that are afforded to noncapital defendants. As we have previously explained, [t]he death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection because it provides a different method of determining the sentence than is used in noncapital cases. ( People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 374.) Defendant contends the death penalty statute violates international law, a contention we have repeatedly rejected. ( People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 488.) Nor, contrary to defendant's argument, does the death penalty violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 754-755 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145].)