Opinion ID: 1849100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: how to interpret conflicting sections of the constitution.

Text: The recent order of this Court permitting the Court to sit in three divisions composed of three judges each is based upon a mistaken interpretation of Section 149A of the Mississippi Constitution. This section is in the following language: The Supreme Court shall have power, under such rules and regulations as it may adopt, to sit in two divisions of three judges each, any two of whom when convened shall form a quorum; each division shall have full power to hear and adjudge all cases that may be assigned to it by the court. In event the judges composing any division shall differ as to the judgment to be rendered in any cause, or in event any judge of either division, within a time and in a manner to be fixed by the rules to be adopted by the court, shall certify that in his opinion any decision of any division of the court is in conflict with any prior decision of the court or of any division thereof, the cause shall then be considered and adjudged by the full court or a quorum thereof. (Emphasis added). This section was promulgated by a concurrent resolution of the Legislature. [Appendix I]. The concurrent resolution for the proposed amendment to the Constitution was based upon the proposition that the Court would be increased to six judges, not nine. The proposed amendment was predicated upon the following language: Whereas, At its session held A.D. 1914, the legislature of the state of Mississippi, in the manner prescribed by section 273 of the constitution of the state of Mississippi, passed an amendment to said constitution adding a new section thereto, providing that the supreme court may sit for the trial of causes in two divisions, the resolution embodying said amendment, as appears from chapter 519 of the laws of 1914, being as follows:       `In event there shall be adopted at this election an amendment to the constitution increasing the number of judges of the supreme court, the constitution shall then be further amended by adding thereto a new section, which shall read as follows:' Ch. 152 [1916] Miss.Gen.Laws 208-09. The Court was then given power to sit in two divisions of three judges each by the amendment. Section 149A was adopted  in my judgment, beyond any question  only to apply to a six-judge court. Moreover, it is unreasonable to suppose that a nine-judge court can sit in two divisions of three judges each as is permitted by Section 149A of the Constitution. If it is considered that Section 145B (added to the Constitution in 1952) is in conflict with Section 149A of the Constitution (which was ratified in 1916), Section 145B must prevail because it is the last expression of the will of the people. The last paragraph of 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 69, at 247 (1964), is in the following language: If there is a real inconsistency between a constitutional amendment and an antecedent provision, the amendment must prevail because it is the latest expression of the will of the people. In such a case there is no room for the application of the rule as to harmonizing inconsistent provisions. If it covers the same subject as was covered by a previously existing constitutional provision, thereby indicating an intent to substitute it in lieu of the original, the doctrine of implied repeal, though not favored, will be applied and the original provision deemed superseded. See also 11 Am.Jur. Constitutional Law § 54, at 664 (1937). It is said in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 42, at 132 (1956): Even though an amendment does not in terms expressly repeal a constitutional provision, yet, if it covers the same subject provided for in such provision, the amendment will be regarded as a substitute for, and as superseding, it. In a well-reasoned opinion in Chesshir v. Copeland, 182 Ark. 425, 428, 32 S.W.2d 301, 302 (1930), the Supreme Court of Arkansas said: The general rule is that constitutional provisions and amendments thereto must be harmonized where practical. If there is to some extent an inconsistency or repugnancy between a provision of the Constitution and an amendment thereto so that one or the other must yield, the amendment, being the last expression of the sovereign will of the people, will prevail as an implied repeal to the extent of the conflict. The same rule of construction would apply in the construction of amendments. The latter amendment would govern to the extent that it was repugnant to, or in conflict with, the provisions of the former one. [Citing cases]. The principle of constitutional construction above laid down has been uniformly adhered to and applied according to the varying facts of the different cases. In the case of Summers v. State, 244 Ala. 672, 15 So.2d 502 (1943), where the issue before the court was whether or not a constitutional amendment pertaining to pardons and paroles was intended to be a substitute for a previous constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of Alabama stated: The insistence seems to be that Amendment XXXVIII of the Constitution, as found preceding Title 1, page 332, Code of 1940, did not authorize the Legislature to create a board of pardons and paroles different from that already provided for in Section 124 of the Constitution of 1901, and that the only authority for the granting of pardons and paroles is that found in this latter section. True, Amendment XXXVIII does not state in so many words that it constitutes a substitute for Section 124 of the Constitution, but we think when the original act submitting the proposed constitutional amendment is considered in connection with the act of the Legislature passed in pursuance thereof five months thereafter, that it clearly appears said amendment was intended as a substitute for said section. 244 Ala. at 672-73, 15 So.2d at 503. In Sylvester v. Tindall, 154 Fla. 663, 18 So.2d 892 (1944), the Florida Supreme Court had an opportunity to also point out that where a constitutional amendment conflicts with a preexisting provision of the constitution, the amendment must prevail since it is the latest expression of the people's will. In Townsend v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 273, 275, 42 S.W.2d 410, 412 (1931), the Supreme Court of Arkansas said: The general rule of construction applicable to constitutional amendments is that the later amendment governs to the extent that it is repugnant to, or in conflict with the provisions of the former one. [Citing Chesshir v. Copeland, 182 Ark. 425, 32 S.W.2d 301 (1930)]. In Dawson v. Tobin, 74 N.D. 713, 24 N.W.2d 737 (1946), the court pointed out that new amendments supersede the old amendments when they are in conflict. This rule seems to be universal. See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 311, 21 S.Ct. 648, 659, 45 L.Ed. 862, 874 (1901); Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F.2d 208, 109 A.L.R. 798 (8th Cir.1937); Pressley v. Industrial Comm'n., 73 Ariz. 22, 30, 236 P.2d 1011, 1017 (1951); Williams v. Magma Copper Co., 5 Ariz. App. 236, 238, 425 P.2d 138, 140 (1967); People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 165 P.2d 3 (1946) (opinion by Justice Traynor); Wilson v. Crews, 160 Fla. 169, 34 So.2d 114 (1948); State ex rel. Kemp v. City of Baton Rouge, 215 La. 315, 40 So.2d 477 (1949); Smith v. State, 210 La. 582, 27 So.2d 359 (1946); State ex rel. University of Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 272, 220 N.W. 951, 956 (1928); State ex rel. Chase v. Babcock, 175 Minn. 103, 107, 220 N.W. 408, 410 (1928). It is, therefore, abundantly clear that Section 145B must take precedence over the formerly adopted Section 149A, Mississippi Constitution, since they cover the same subject matter.