Opinion ID: 3066815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contractual Right to the Property

Text: ¶15. CCB also argues that its motion to dismiss should have been granted because it has a contractual right to the property. To establish that contractual right, CCB attached a copy 22 City of Belmont, 860 So. 2d at 295 (citing Brewer, 768 So. 2d at 922; Overstreet, 570 So. 2d at 1197; Grantham, 522 So. 2d at 220; Lester Eng’g Co., 504 So. 2d at 1187; Stanton & Assocs., Inc., 464 So. 2d at 505). 23 Magee, 119 So. 3d at 1055 (“Magee’s motion to set aside the replevin was filed on February 24, 2009. He argued that the replevin should be set aside for insufficient service of process.”). 7 of the promissory note as an exhibit to its answer and motion to dismiss. As stated above, “Rule 12(b)(6) motions ‘are decided on the face of the pleadings alone.’”24 This is because a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint.25 Neither the complaint, nor any exhibit to it,26 establishes that CCB had a contractual right to the property. ¶16. Certainly, under Rule 12(b)(6), the circuit judge could have considered the exhibit attached to the defendant’s motion.27 But for the exhibit to have warranted a ruling in CCB’s favor, the circuit judge would have to have (1) converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56; (2) provided notice that he was doing so; and (3) provided an opportunity to supplement the record.28 No such notice appears in the record, and the circuit judge’s order disposes of the motion as one under Rule 12 without any mention of the promissory note.