Opinion ID: 1727659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: District Court's Gatekeeping Duty

Text: The State argues that the district court did not make adequate findings on the record with regard to the admissibility of Hensen's testimony. At a hearing concerning Hensen's proposed testimony, the court did not specifically and expressly make findings. However, the record shows the court concluded that Hensen's testimony was admissible, see Zimmerman v. Powell, 268 Neb. 422, 684 N.W.2d 1 (2004), and the court left open the opportunity for the State to object at trial. During trial, the court permitted Hensen to testify that the signal cabinet should have been replaced. The record indicates, in accordance with Zimmerman v. Powell , that the court expressed its reason for allowing Hensen to testify and the factor considered by the court bearing on the reliability of his testimony: Hensen's testimony was based on his expertise, and he was entitled to rely on his experience in the field to make the recommendation that the cabinet be pulled. A trial court may not abdicate its gatekeeping duty under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), in a bench trial, but the court is afforded more flexibility in performing this function. See, generally, Seaboard Lumber Co. v. U.S., 308 F.3d 1283 (Fed.Cir.2002) (holding that while concerns underlying Daubert requirements are of lesser import in bench trials, Daubert standards must nevertheless be met); City of Owensboro v. Adams, 136 S.W.3d 446 (Ky.2004) (noting that Daubert is applied in procedurally different manner in bench trial in that trial court often admits evidence first and then disregards it upon deciding it is unreliable); USGen New England v. Town of Rockingham, 177 Vt. 193, 862 A.2d 269 (2004) (holding that admissibility standards of Daubert are required in bench trial but in more relaxed manner). In determining whether an expert's testimony is reliable, a trial court necessarily must first hear the testimony. And we presume that a trial court considers only competent and relevant evidence in rendering its decision. See Eicher v. Mid America Fin. Invest. Corp., 270 Neb. 370, 702 N.W.2d 792 (2005). Based on a de novo review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting Hensen's testimony. When the trial court has not abdicated its gatekeeping function, an appellate court reviews the trial court's decision to admit or exclude the evidence for an abuse of discretion. Zimmerman v. Powell, supra . The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Fickle's expert to testify. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the State's appeal is without merit and affirm the district court's judgment holding the State liable in this matter under the State Tort Claims Act. We now turn to the cross-appeal.