Opinion ID: 2981032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing

Text: A detention hearing may be reopened if 1) new information exists that was unknown to the movant at the time of the hearing; and 2) the new information has a material bearing on the issue of whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure a defendant’s appearance at trial and the safety of any other person in the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B). In other words, the -3- No. 11-2338 new information must be of a nature that would increase the likelihood that the defendant will appear at trial and would show that the defendant is less likely to pose a danger to the community. Watson asserts that the first prong of §3142(f)(2)(B) is satisfied in two respects. Watson first contends that the district court failed to address the basis for his original detention. He maintains that the district court should have taken into account the fact that the homicide investigation involving Watson, which was part of the district court’s basis for finding him dangerous, has not produced any evidence linking him to that crime. This information is not new. Watson has consistently argued that the use of the homicide investigation as a basis for detention was improper, and defense counsel even stated at the bond hearing that it was “not clear that the defendant was in any way involved” with the homicide. Thus, the failure of this investigation to produce evidence against him was certainly not unknown to Watson at the time of his original detention hearing, and Watson cannot claim this was new information sufficient to satisfy the first prong. Next, Watson argues that the district court’s suppression of evidence and statements is new information that serves as a basis to reopen the detention hearing. Watson cites to United States v. Peralta, 849 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and United States v. Shareef, 907 F. Supp. 1481 (D. Kan. 1995), for the proposition that suppression of evidence provides a basis to reopen the bond determination. In Peralta, the district court reopened the detention hearing after ruling against the defendant on his motion to suppress drugs and cash found on his person. 849 F.2d at 625. The court reasoned that the adverse ruling may make Peralta more inclined to flee and that repeated cocaine possession or sale had a material bearing on the safety of another person or the community as a -4- No. 11-2338 whole. Id. Watson argues that the inverse of Peralta applies: the district court’s grant of his motions to suppress makes him less likely to flee and diminishes the evidence against him. The district court found that while the suppressed evidence works in Watson’s favor, suppression of evidence is not a basis to reopen a detention hearing. The district court did not abuse its discretion in making such a finding. Shareef is distinguishable by virtue of the fact that all of the evidence in the case against that defendant was suppressed. 907 F. Supp. at 1483. Only Watson’s post-arrest statements and the items found on his person were suppressed. The evidence seized from the home Watson was staying in was not suppressed. Thus, there was still admissible evidence on which the district court could determine that Watson remained a danger to the community. Moreover, Watson cites Shareef as providing a “basis to reopen.” While a basis to reopen arguably exists, attention must again be turned to the use of the word “may.” See id. (“suppression of all the evidence in the case is information that may form the basis upon which a detention hearing may be reopened) (citing Peralta, 849 F.2d at 625) (emphasis added). As previously mentioned, use of the word “may” indicates discretion on the part of the district court. Thus, there is no requirement to reopen a detention hearing on the basis of suppressed evidence. Watson’s insistence that the district court should have looked to factors in addition to§ 3142(f)’s requirement of new information material to his appearance in court or the safety of the community is improperly argued in an appeal from a motion to reopen a detention hearing. As the -5- No. 11-2338 Government correctly states, this is not an appeal from the initial detention order, where those arguments would have been more appropriate. See United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985). Given the foregoing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Watson’s motion to reopen his detention hearing.