Opinion ID: 1445166
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

Text: Finally, Popoalii alleges that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs, and the district court consequently erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Smith v. Clarke, 458 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir.2006). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A prison official's deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Alberson v. Norris, 458 F.3d 762, 765-66 (8th Cir.2006). A prima facie case alleging deliberate indifference requires the inmate-plaintiff to demonstrate that she suffered from an objectively serious medical need and the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded that need. Id. Medical malpractice alone, however, is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment. Smith, 458 F.3d at 724. For a claim of deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1995). Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal recklessness, which demands more than negligent misconduct. Olson v. Bloomberg, 339 F.3d 730, 736 (8th Cir. 2003). A serious medical need is one that is so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. Vaughn v. Greene County, Ark., 438 F.3d 845, 851 (8th Cir. 2006). Cryptococcal meningitis unquestionably is a serious medical condition. We focus, then, on whether Popoalii presented evidence that defendants knew of and disregarded her cryptococcal meningitis. We agree with the district court that Popoalii has not produced any evidence to show that the defendants were more than grossly negligent. In light of the facts described above, we affirm the district court. Although Popoalii's situation is truly tragic, the facts in the record do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Popoalii emphasizes that although the CMS defendants asked for her medical records on March 22, 2004, they were not received until possibly April 2, 2004. But, even if the CMS defendants had received Popoalii's medical records sooner, they would only have been informed of a diagnosis that would not have put them on notice of Popoalii's actual condition. Popoalii had none of the normal signs or risk factors of cryptococcal meningitisshe was not HIV positive or immuno-compromisedand cryptococcal meningitis is difficult to diagnose. Although CMS defendants could, and probably should, have been more vigilant in obtaining Popoalii's medical records, they did ask for and eventually obtain those inaccurate records. Defendants' actions with regard to Popoalii's medical records, while regrettable, do not constitute deliberate indifference. Popoalii also argues that defendants acted with deliberate indifference when sending her to administrative segregation from the TCU and when issuing conduct citations. Before sending Popoalii to administrative segregation, MDOC defendants received approval from CMS defendants that Popoalii was healthy enough for the transfer, and CMS defendants checked Popoalii's vital signs, as was standard procedure, before giving approval. It is indeed regrettable that Popoalii received conduct citations and was put on suicide watch, not for actual misconduct, but for behavior arising from meningitis-caused hallucinations and blindness. However, the factual record is without genuine dispute, and the record simply does not reflect that CMS defendants knew Popoalii's behavior was a result of a serious medical condition. The record also does not show Popoalii's conduct citations impeded the medical care that she did receive, however ineffective it proved to be. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Popoalii, the record does not show that Popoalii's Eighth Amendment rights were violated.