Opinion ID: 1784225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issue # 2: Whether the Sheriff Was Immune from Liability?

Text: Upon concluding that the Sheriff owed no duty to the public, Judge Bailey wrote the following: Even if there was a duty to keep the prisoners confined, the particular practices, methods and day to day operational functions necessary to maintain a jail and to hold inmates and not allow them to escape is based entirely upon the Sheriff's personal deliberation, decision and individual judgment, and not on any particular specifically designated mechanical duty. Such decisions are based on the inmates' conduct in the jail, the Sheriff's information about the inmate's habits, customs and plans, the funds available and the condition of the physical plant, the Sheriff's available facts for conducting searches, and the Sheriff's information in dealing with possible panic caused by publicity surrounding escaped prisoners. The state law and the affidavits provided by the Defendant clearly establishes that the deceased Sheriff's actions, as done in the totality of circumstances, were totally discretionary. There were no affidavits submitted by the Plaintiff to the contrary on this point. Plaintiff relies on Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So.2d 689 (Miss. 1984) which stated that the defense of qualified immunity will not lie when the Defendant has substantially exceeded his authority. The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff has stated no facts which indicate that the Sheriff did exceed his authority. The Court in relying on Grantham v. Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219 (Miss. 1986 [1988]), referring to Rausa stated that public officials, such as Sheriff Williams, lose qualified immunity only when they substantially exceed their authority and commit willful wrongs or malicious acts under color of office. The Court is of the opinion that there are no such facts nor inferences raised in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint that would substantiate this allegation. The Court is of the opinion and so finds that the Defendant Sheriff is protected from discovery, trial and liability by qualified immunity and that the Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted. McQueen contends that the judge's decision is erroneous and that the Sheriff should not be protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity since his duties are ministerial in nature. McQueen simply explains: (1) that under statutory law, the Sheriff was duty-bound to keep his prisoners confined; (2) that [t]his duty is ministerial in nature; and (3) that his failure to keep Minnick and Dyess confined renders him liable for their tortious acts. The Sheriff counters that he owed no duty, or, assuming arguendo he owed a duty, this duty is clearly discretionary in nature  not ministerial. He explains: [T]he particular practices, methods and day to day operational functions necessary to maintain a jail and to hold inmates and not allow them to escape, is based entirely upon the Sheriff's personal deliberation, decision and individual judgment, and not on any particular specifically designated duty. Such decisions are based on: a. The inmate's conduct in the jail; b. The Sheriff's information about the inmate's habits, customs and plans; c. The funds available and the condition of the physical plant; d. The Sheriff's available facts for conducting searches; and e. The Sheriff's information in dealing with possible panic caused by publicity surrounding escaped prisoners. The state law and the affidavits submitted by [McQueen] clearly establish that the Sheriff's actions, as done in the totality of circumstances, were totally discretionary. As was pointed out in the Opinion by the lower court, There were no affidavits submitted by the Plaintiff to the contrary on this point. The Sheriff adds that the doctrine of qualified immunity shields from liability governmental officials who, like himself, must use their discretion in the performance of their legal duties.
This Court has provided instruction on matters involving the issue of qualified immunity: The immunity of a public official is limited, not an absolute immunity. Since the purpose of the immunity is to protect the official in his decision-making role, we have held that immunity will not apply unless the action involves a discretionary decision-making process. Phrased otherwise, if the action is merely ministerial, there is no immunity. Davis v. Little, 362 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss. 1978), quoted in Region VII, Mental Health v. Isaac, 523 So.2d 1013, 1016 (Miss. 1988). In distinguishing between duties which are ministerial in nature and those which are discretionary, this Court has explained: The most important criterion, perhaps, is that (if) the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion, the act in discharge thereof is ministerial. Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 865, 158 So. 922, 923 (1935) (citing and quoting various treatises and cases). And finally, this Court has cautioned that qualified immunity is not impenetrable: The public officials of this state ... lose th[eir] immunity ... when they substantially exceed their authority and commit wrongs under color of office. They have no immunity where they commit wilful wrongs or malicious acts. Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So.2d 689, 696 (Miss. 1984) (citing cases). Our law thus directs that a governmental official has no immunity to a civil action for damages if his breach of a legal duty causes injury and (1) that duty is ministerial in nature, or (2) that duty involves the use of discretion and the governmental actor greatly or substantially exceeds his authority and in the course thereof causes harm, or (3) the governmental actor commits an intentional tort. Beyond that, a government official has no immunity when sued upon a tort that has nothing to do with his official position or decision-making function and has been committed outside the course and scope of his office. Grantham, 522 So.2d at 225; see MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(c) (1990 Supp.) (A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim ... [b]ased upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused.); see also Grantham v. Dep't of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 223 n. 2 (Miss. 1988) (Construing § 11-46-9(c), this Court noted that the discretionary/ministerial dichotomy relates to suits against officials, not the agencies or departments they serve.).
Applying the foregoing law to the case sub judice, the Sheriff's duties are deemed to be discretionary in nature and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity. Indeed, McQueen cited no guideline or procedure  statutory or otherwise  to show that the Sheriff's decision-making in the performance of his duties involves no discretion. The statutes which McQueen did cite merely directed the Sheriff to safely keep in the jail of his county all persons committed by order of [the] courts. MISS. CODE ANN. § 19-25-35 (1972); see also id. §§ 19-25-69 & 19-25-71 (1972) & 97-9-39 (1990 Supp.). Instead, these statutes relegate to all sheriffs the power of personal deliberation, decision, and judgment in the performance of their duties. Davis, 362 So.2d at 643 (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 132 (4th ed. 1971)). Such power of discretion entitles a sheriff to qualified immunity so long as he does not substantially exceed his authority or commit an intentional tort. Grantham, 522 So.2d at 225, citing Hudson, 462 So.2d at 696. In sum, the Sheriff is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity. This Court therefore affirms on this issue.