Opinion ID: 72403
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rollover Rate Charge--Statistical Objection

Text: 8 Plaintiff's final challenge to the jury charges must be analyzed using a different standard of review, since a proper objection was made at trial, and the issue was properly preserved for appeal. In this challenge, Heath asserts that in the rollover rate charge, the trial court compelled the jury to consider statistics, despite the court's pretrial order prohibiting the introduction of statistical evidence. Heath alleges this instruction confused the jury and effectively directed a verdict against him. We find no merit in this argument. 9 Our review of the trial court's jury instructions is ultimately deferential. This Court examines jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately addressed the issue and correctly stated the law. Christopher v. Cutter Laboratories, 53 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir.1995). So long as the jury instructions as a whole reflect pertinent substantive law, the trial judge is given wide discretion as to the style and wording that he may employ. Andres v. Roswell-Windsor Village Apartments, 777 F.2d 670, 673 (11th Cir.1985); see also Goulah v. Ford Motor Co., 118 F.3d 1478, 1485 (11th Cir.1997). Mindful of our deferential posture, we conclude that Heath's challenge to the trial court's jury instruction comparing the rollover rate of the Samurai to other SUV's and not passenger cars is not meritorious. 10 Heath's objection is essentially based on how rollover rate is defined. He argues that rollover rate can only mean statistics, and that statistical evidence indicating such a rate was excluded from the trial in light of the district court's pretrial order limiting the use of statistics to those reflecting substantially similar conditions. We disagree with the limited interpretation of the word rate that Heath espouses. As the district court aptly pointed out in its order denying plaintiff's motion for new trial, rate is not synonymous with statistics, but can readily be taken to mean proportion. Additionally, we find compelling that the plaintiff's expert, Wade Allen, in his testimony made frequent mention of the roll rate of the Samurai as compared to other vehicles. Given that statistics were not an issue at trial, we find no evidence in the record that the jury took, or could take, the word rate to mean only statistics. 7 Therefore, we find that district court committed no reversible error in charging the jury with this rollover rate instruction.