Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ehrlichman's motion for severance

Text: 70 Appellant Ehrlichman contends that his motion for severance under Rule 14, filed May 1, 1974, was improperly denied. In his motion he claimed that severance was required because his co-defendants would assert defenses inconsistent with, and hostile to, his own. As he puts it, Mitchell and Haldeman asserted that their contacts with then President Nixon were lawful and proper in every respect, while (i)n direct contrast, Appellant Ehrlichman sought to establish that his contact with Mr. Nixon was lawful, but that he had been misled by the former President. 59 71 While there are situations in which inconsistent defenses may support a motion for severance, the doctrine is a limited one. As set forth in Rhone v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 48, 365 F.2d 980, 981 (1966), the governing standard requires the moving defendant to show that the defendants present conflicting and irreconcilable defenses and there is a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty. Application of this standard, which is for the District Court in the first instance, and reviewable here only for abuse of discretion, requires that the accounts of co-defendants be not merely divergent from one another but indeed so contradictory as to raise an appreciable danger that the jury would convict solely on the basis of the inconsistency. To warrant a severance, in short, the accounts of co-defendants must be on a collision course. United States v. Bolden, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 60, 69, 514 F.2d 1301, 1310 (1975). 72 Ehrlichman's claim that the defenses of Haldeman and Mitchell were in direct contrast to his assertion that he should be judged innocent because he had been misled by former President Nixon does not meet this standard. The defenses of the co-defendants were simply not at the requisite level of conflict. The jury could have accepted or rejected both. (T)he mere presence of hostility among defendants or the desire of one to exculpate himself by inculpating another have both been held to be insufficient grounds to require separate trials. United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 530 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 327, 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971). 60 Here the contention is further diluted by the circumstance that appellant is not claiming prejudice because other defendants were inculpating him, as in the Valdes' case 61 Ehrlichman relies on, but rather is asserting that he lacks the knowledge and blame that may be imputable to the co-defendants. Any inconsistency in defenses stems from Ehrlichman's defense strategy to shift the blame onto, to assign sole culpability to, his co-defendants. 73 Ehrlichman stresses the difference between his claim and Haldeman's concerning their meeting with CIA representatives on June 23, 1972. Each contended his purpose in attending the meeting was lawful. Haldeman had to overcome the tape recording of his earlier June 23 meeting with then President Nixon with respect to the need to use the CIA to derail the FBI investigation because, in Haldeman's words, the FBI is not under control. 62 Haldeman attempted to explain that the prior conversation was not for the purpose of enlisting the CIA to stifle the FBI's Watergate investigation. Whether successful or not, this did not cut across Ehrlichman's defense. Ehrlichman contended that he had not been made privy to the conversation in question an assertion neither the Government nor Haldeman disputed and had no reason to attribute any but a lawful purpose to the meeting, namely, that he believed Mr. Nixon's statement that an investigation into the activities of the persons behind the Watergate matter might interfere with the legitimate activities of the CIA. 74 More broadly, Ehrlichman is claiming that he was prejudiced because there was strong evidence implicating his co-defendants. There are instances where severance is necessary to overcome gross disparity in the weight of the evidence which might tend to prejudice a defendant involved in a relatively inconsequential part of the trial. 63 But here the evidence against Ehrlichman, while perhaps not as compelling in certain details as with respect to the others, is not only consequential but overall a very strong showing of involvement in the coverup. The judge instructed the jury in the clearest terms that it could consider only a defendant's own words and acts in determining whether he joined the conspiracy, Tr. 12365, and that it must consider the guilt or innocence of each defendant separately and independently, Tr. 12407. And even in a separate trial the Government would have been entitled to prove the scope of the entire conspiracy, and would not have been restricted to the limited involvement of the severed defendant. 64 Appellant Ehrlichman falls far short of the showing of clear abuse of discretion required for reversal even when there is a welter of conflicting stories and veiled accusations emanating from the defense table    . 65 We do not here discern anything like the kind of unfairness necessary to overcome a joint trial of defendants shown by substantial, independent evidence to be involved in the conspiracy for which they have been jointly indicted.