Opinion ID: 1886897
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Response to a Jury Question

Text: At one point during the charge, the following exchange took place between the trial court and one of the jurors: Juror: On the life in prison, is that without parole, just so that we are sure? Would there be a chance of parole if it was life in prison? Trial Court: I don't see how I can guarantee  that's the present law. But what if the legislature changes the law? I can't guarantee that. That's the way the law is now. Juror: Just so we know, Your Honor. Trial Court: Who knows two years from now if they'll change the law. I can't tell you. N.T., 11/10/1994, pp. 2767-68. At that point, the prosecutor requested a sidebar conference. At the conclusion of the discussion, the trial court gave the jury the following answer: I am to tell you, and it's accurate, `Life is life.' There won't be any parole. Life is life. N.T., 11/10/1994, p. 2769. Presently, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to mention that there was no possibility of parole if Appellant would receive a life sentence. Thus, Appellant maintains that the jury was confused by the instructions and the trial court further compounded their misunderstanding by giving an answer indicative that life imprisonment may include the possibility of parole. [69] Ultimately, Appellant contends that not informing the jury during the sentencing instructions that a life sentence means life without the possibility of parole offends the evolving standards of decency that underlie the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Brief for Appellant, p. 143. Essentially, Appellant's contention is that the trial court should have provided the jury with the instruction pursuant to Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), that a life sentence means life without a possibility of parole. However, as this Court has repeatedly held, a Simmons instruction is required only where the prosecution makes the future dangerousness of the defendant an issue in the case and the defendant specifically requests such an instruction. Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 832 A.2d 403, 417 (2003); see also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 554 Pa. 293, 721 A.2d 344, 355 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1082, 120 S.Ct. 804, 145 L.Ed.2d 677 (2000). [70] Here, the Commonwealth did not argue future dangerousness and defense counsel did not request a Simmons instruction. Therefore, no instruction was required. As it relates to the statement made by the trial court in response to the question posed by the juror, it is similar to what this Court faced in Commonwealth v. Clark, 551 Pa. 258, 710 A.2d 31 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070, 119 S.Ct. 1465, 143 L.Ed.2d 550 (1999). Just as in this case, the trial court in Clark responded to the jury's question as to the meaning of life imprisonment by acknowledging, inter alia, that, although the present state of the law does not allow parole in the circumstances at hand, it cannot predict whether the legislature will decide to change that in the future. Id. at 35. We found that this instruction was not erroneous, id. at 36, and believe that Clark is directly on point with the circumstances presently before us. Therefore, we find no error in the instruction given by the trial court. [71]
Appellant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to bar the Commonwealth from seeking the death penalty in this case pursuant to various provisions of the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Initially, Appellant maintains that his trial counsel should have challenged the constitutionality of the death penalty statute because there is an `unacceptable risk' that the decision to prosecute Appellant and to seek the death penalty against him was based upon selective factors, in violation of [Appellant]'s protections against cruel and unusual punishment guaranteed by the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution. Brief for Appellant, p. 158. Appellant identifies these selective factors as his indigence and his race; yet, he also concedes that [t]here is no evidence ... to suggest that the District Attorney actually employed these improper factors in the decision to seek the death penalty. Brief for Appellant, pp. 158-9. Moreover, Appellant presents a number of arguments that the Pennsylvania Death Penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face. The claims raised by Appellant in regard to the constitutionality of 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9701, et seq., have been previously addressed by this Court. We simply refer Appellant to the multitude of decisions issued by this Court since we first found the present statute to be constitutional in Zettlemoyer, supra, rejecting arguments essentially identical to what Appellant raises now. For this reason, we find that Appellant's claim of counsel ineffectiveness fails, because the substantive arguments that his counsel could have presented lacked merit.