Opinion ID: 2003747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Jury Commentary

Text: Keene, who declined to testify at trial, contends that the State impermissibly remarked on that fact during its rebuttal argument to the jury. The State had noted that certain evidence it presented, essentially Hoover's testimony, was uncontradicted. The problem, Keene asserts, is that the substance of Hoover's testimony pertained only to matters Keene, himself, could have countered. Thus, Keene argues, the State was impliedly referring to Keene's having invoked his fifth amendment right not to testify. U.S. Const., amend. V; see also People v. Howard (1991), 147 Ill.2d 103, 146-47, 167 Ill.Dec. 914, 588 N.E.2d 1044. Keene concedes that it is generally permissible for the State to point out in closing argument that evidence is uncontradicted. (See People v. Bryant (1983), 94 Ill.2d 514, 524, 69 Ill.Dec. 84, 447 N.E.2d 301.) What is not concededand what the issue turns onis the extent to which the reference is appropriate in the context of the trial. (See Howard, 147 Ill.2d at 147, 167 Ill.Dec. 914, 588 N.E.2d 1044, citing United States v. Robinson (1988), 485 U.S. 25, 31-32, 108 S.Ct. 864, 868-69, 99 L.Ed.2d 23, 31.) The State may not point the finger of blame directly at the defendant for his failure to testify when it was within his power to enlighten the jury. ( People v. Mills (1968), 40 Ill.2d 4, 9, 237 N.E.2d 697.) Such prosecutorial design crosses the `danger line' marking the outer boundary of proper commentary. (See Mills, 40 Ill.2d at 9, 237 N.E.2d 697, quoting People v. McMahon (1910), 244 Ill. 45, 59, 91 N.E. 104.) But short of that the State may comment that evidence is uncontradicted and may do so even if the defendant was the only person who could have provided contrary proof. ( Mills, 40 Ill.2d at 8, 237 N.E.2d 697.) To put it differently, the State is free to point out what evidence was uncontradicted so long as it expresses no thought about who specificallymeaning the defendantcould have done the contradicting. See, e.g., People v. Wollenberg (1967), 37 Ill.2d 480, 487-88, 229 N.E.2d 490 (involving the comment, [n]o one else testified). The State here insists that the commentary was proper simply because such proof could have been supplied by either of the two accomplices. Those would have been Hoover and Ehlers. Given that the State built its case on bargained-for testimony from Hoover, the notion that he could have also provided contrary proof is too clever by half: If Hoover could have testified to a different scenario, what evidence would there have been to contradict? That Ehlers could have supplied contrary proof is nearly as forthright: it is doubtless that Ehlers would have exercised his own fifth amendment right not to testify. It is certainly the case that Audrey Krueger could have testified that Keene did not intend to take part in the robbery. She could also have provided proof that Keene was unaware that murder was a part of the plan. Marion Janssen, another witness, could also have provided contradictory evidence. Janssen said that she saw Keene, Hoover, and Ehlers walking in the vicinity of the gun shop shortly before the crimes occurred. If Keene had not been with Hoover and Ehlers in Freeport on that day, Janssen could have directly disputed proof of Keene's participation. The fact that Krueger and Janssen existed as witnesses is relevant in evaluating the State's comments within the context of the trial. (See Mills, 40 Ill.2d at 9-10. 237 N.E.2d 697.) It is of no consequence that Krueger and Janssen testified for the State. What is important is that they had been present at events pertaining to the crimes for which Keene was charged. That allows for a consideration of what they might have testified to were it different from what they did, in fact, relate. Even so, the fact that a witness besides a defendant could have provided contrary proof does not end the analysis: impermissible commentary on the defendant's failure to testify may nevertheless be expressed. But that is not the case here. The commentary about the evidence being uncontradicted shows no such prosecutorial design. The State kept its remarks to the what of the evidence uncontradictedhow the crimes went down including testimony that Keene had slit Peters' throatand did not stray into the who of the issue. For that reason, as well as the fact that other witnesses existed showing the commentary to be appropriate within the context of the trial, Keene's argument must fail. Keene also cites as error several other remarks made by the State during rebuttal argument. However, Keene's post-trial motion preserved for review only the comments about uncontradicted evidence. No objection accompanied any of the other comments and the argument is not based on insufficient evidence. The issue may be reviewed only to the extent permitted as a matter of plain error. For reasons explained previously, the case against Keene was not closely balanced. That leaves the existence of an affected substantial right as the only ground for reaching the claim's merits. Improper jury summations can implicate substantial rights. (See Wangerin, 29 DePaul L.Rev. at 774 n. 108.) If the commentary has the effect of undermining the entire trial, plain error exists and reversal for a new trial is warranted. (See, e.g., People v. Fort (1958), 14 Ill.2d 491, 502, 153 N.E.2d 26, (involving comments that defendant was a habitual criminal).) If it does not, the commentary amounts to harmless error (see Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705), in which case, as pointed out earlier, the procedural default may not be excused. The inquiry is a difficult one, for the record rarely reveals objective grounds for assessing harm. Four different types of unpreserved comments are cited. The first pertained to Hoover's improper statement about Keene's incarceration in Wisconsin. The State mused that Keene was unable to aid in planning the crimes until he came down to get together with Hoover and Ehlers. In a comment Keene says is related, the State suggested that the crimes were done pretty professionally. The implication, Keene argues, is that Hoover sought to include Keene in the crimes because, as evidenced by the prior incarceration, Keene was a career criminal. Pointing out Keene's inability to help plan the crimes until he arrived in Illinois was proper commentary rooted in evidence. It is a fact that Keene came to Illinois, joining Hoover and Ehlers at Audrey Krueger's house in Tinley Park. That fact was elicited by the defense after the jury was told to disregard what Hoover said about Keene's release from prison. To that extent, there is no basis to conclude that the State was attempting to remind the jury about the impermissible evidence it had heard about Keene's prior incarceration. Commenting about the professional nature of the crimes was also grounded in evidence. The crimes were planned in advance and were accomplished with, for lack of a more appropriate expression, a degree of efficiency. The comment as to why Hoover asked Keene to join in the crimes is not so directly connected to evidence, and so it is reasonable for Keene to argue that the State meant to imply Keene's guilt by reference to his prior imprisonment. But, even assuming such was the State's intent, we believe the harmful effect to have been negligible at most. The implication was subtle and was communicated in a single sentence. The second and third comments both relate to the law and can be considered together. The State described its burden of proofthe beyond a reasonable doubt standardas universal and not unreachable. The State also described Keene's presumed cloak of innocence to have been shredded and ripped and pulled [off] to reveal guilt. This court has cautioned against attempts by counsel as well as trial judges to explain the reasonable doubt standard. ( People v. Speight (1992), 153 Ill.2d 365, 374, 180 Ill.Dec. 97, 606 N.E.2d 1174.) The danger is that, no matter how well-intentioned, the attempt may distort the standard to the prejudice of the defendant. If sufficient prejudice results, reversal is warranted. (See Speight, 153 Ill.2d at 374, 180 Ill.Dec. 97, 606 N.E.2d 1174 (describing the requisite degree of prejudice for reversal as substantial).) The same holds for misstatements of law. Such misstatements in closing argument are often held remedied by jury instructions. (See People v. Terry (1984), 99 Ill.2d 508, 517, 77 Ill.Dec. 442, 460 N.E.2d 746.) But proper direction may not undo the harm occasioned. See People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill.2d 467, 470, 220 N.E.2d 432 (describing the requisite harm for reversal as manifest[ ] prejudice[ ] where repeated misstatements of law destroyed the presumption of innocence and imposed a heavier burden than the law required). Reviewing courts are, again, ill-equipped to assess what harm may have occurred. (See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828, 17 L.Ed.2d at 711 (noting that the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is one not ordinarily applied by reviewing courts).) Assessment of harm is often a blind exercise, for records cannot convey a feel for the emotional environment of the courtroom. That is why doubt as to the extent of harm is resolved in favor of the defense. (See Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d at 472, 220 N.E.2d 432.) No exhaustive list of factors exists for measuring how much doubt may exist or how much prejudice resulted. The degree of inaccuracy of the commentary (see, e.g., Speight, 153 Ill.2d at 374, 180 Ill.Dec. 97, 606 N.E.2d 1174) as well as the number of times the jury is made to hear it (see, e.g., Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d at 470, 220 N.E.2d 432) are, however, relevant. The State here did not suggest that the standard of proof was a pro forma consideration (see People v. Eddington (1984), 129 Ill.App.3d 745, 780, 84 Ill.Dec. 887, 473 N.E.2d 103) or that the defense bore the burden of proof (see People v. Starks (1983), 116 Ill.App.3d 384, 395, 71 Ill.Dec. 931, 451 N.E.2d 1298). In those respects, at least, the State's commentary was not inaccurate. That is not true of the theatrical description of the stripping away of Keene's presumption of innocence. The statement was wrong. Keene enjoyed the benefit of the presumption until the point during deliberation when the jury concluded that there existed proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (See generally People v. Viser (1975), 62 Ill.2d 568, 585-86, 343 N.E.2d 903.) Even so, to its limited credit, the State did not use repeated references to either the burden of proof or the presumption of innocence. We believe that that ameliorated the extent of harm. In the final comments Keene cites, the State referred to Hoover's testimony as being consistent with what Hoover told police on the day he was arrested. The result, Keene argues, underscored improperly the idea that Hoover was a credible witness. The State does not contend that a basis existed for the comments. (See People v. Powell (1973), 53 Ill.2d 465, 474-75, 292 N.E.2d 409.) Instead, the State answers that the reference did not detail what exactly Hoover had originally told the police. True enough. But the commentary is not, for that reason, made innocent, as the State would have it. Pointing out the fact that Hoover had given the police a statement, the State rhetorically asked the jury whether it had heard other versions of how the crimes went down. More particularly, the State asked whether Hoover had ever said that Keene was not involved. The State provided the answers to its own questions. The jurors had not heard other versions, the State explained, because Hoover had never recounted different versions. Had Hoover done so, the State assured, the defense would have exposed the fact through cross-examination. The implication was that Hoover was to be believed because what he testified to was what he had first told police. The commentary was improper. The question is whether it caused sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial. Again, repetition is a relevant concern. (See People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill.2d 487, 501, 74 Ill.Dec. 11, 455 N.E.2d 41.) The concern is heightened when the repeated reference involves the prior consistent statement of a witness who provides all evidence of guilt. See Emerson, 97 Ill.2d at 501-02, 74 Ill.Dec. 11, 455 N.E.2d 41 (holding such reference to be reversible error). The State did, more than once, invite the conclusion that Hoover had been steadfast in relating a consistent version of events. Furthermore, Hoover's bargained-for testimony was critical to the State's case. But there was also, in Audrey Krueger's account of the events, other corroboration the effect of which was to highlight, quite properly, Hoover's credibility. For the reasons stated above, we do not believe that the individual comments made during the State's rebuttal argument caused sufficient harm to have compromised the integrity of the entire guilt phase of the trial. Nor do we believe that the cumulative effect of the comments caused the adversary system to breakdown. Plain error being absent, there is no ground to excuse the procedural default. Keene separately complains of comments made by the State in its closing argument at the second stage of the sentencing hearing. Generally, the State drew the conclusion that Keene, by his acts, had sealed his own fate. The effect of the comments, Keene says, was to shift improperly the responsibility of imposing the death sentence away from the jury in violation of the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII). The comments were not objected to contemporaneously, nor was issue taken in Keene's post-trial motion with their having been made. As above, the procedural default precluding review of the issue may be excused only as plain error. We do not believe any harm arose from the State's attempt to underscore that Keene alone chose to commit the crimes for which he stood convicted. If any harm could have arisen from such commentary, the harm was ameliorated by other comments by which the State impressed upon the jury that it ultimately was the determiner of Keene's fate. No grounds exist to excuse the procedural default regarding the commentary.