Opinion ID: 1349481
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: People v. Grove

Text: The Michigan State Police arrested defendant Grove on March 1, 1991, in connection with allegations of criminal sexual conduct. Defendant was charged in Delta County with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, [2] a felony offense carrying a maximum sentence of life or any term of years, [3] and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, [4] a felony offense carrying a maximum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment. [5] The complainant was the defendant's fifteen-year-old daughter, who was under the age of thirteen at the time of the acts for which defendant was charged. [6] On August 2, 1991, the prosecutor, defendant, and defendant's counsel appeared before acting circuit Judge Robert E. Goebel for a pretrial conference. [7] The parties informed the court that they had reached a plea agreement whereby the defendant would plead guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, [8] a misdemeanor offense carrying a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment and a $500 fine, [9] and the prosecutor would move to dismiss the other charges and recommend a sentence in the county jail not to exceed one year. Judge Goebel examined the defendant in accordance with MCR 6.302 to ensure that the plea was understanding, voluntary, and accurate. [10] The judge took the plea under advisement to review the presentence investigation report and to schedule sentencing. On the date set for sentencing, October 8, 1991, Judge Goebel rejected the defendant's bargained guilty plea: The Court has had the benefit of reading the presentence report, and I've had a conference with counsel and Mr. Ayotte of the corrections department in chambers. I noted to them that I had read the Defendant's version of the incident, as well as the victim's version ... of what had happened.... I noted the victim recommended prison time and the cap as recommended by the prosecutor would not allow for prison time. I indicated that I thought I had the discretion, having taken the plea under advisement, and needed to first rule on whether or not I would accept the guilty plea.... I do not feel it would be in the interest of justice. I feel that there is such a wide disparity between what the victim claims had happened, as opposed to what the Defendant claimed had happened, and the victim's desire of a prison term that it would not be fair and in the interest of justice to accept this matter plea bargained to fourth degree. If, in fact ... the first degree criminal sexual conduct had happened in the course of time as the victim claims, I feel the matter should go to trial on the original charge. And the Defendant, if found guilty, should be sentenced appropriately under the charge he was found guilty on or pled guilty to as the case may be. If indeed this was only a relatively minor fourth degree incident, and there was no prior first degree criminal sexual conduct, or if indeed there was no factual basis for the sexual conduct at all, then the Defendant would be more fairly found not guilty. The prosecutor in chambers urged me to accept the plea, one of the reasons being that he felt the victim had recanted her story and she would be subject to possible impeachment.... [T]he difficulty in proving this case ... was one of the principal reasons he wished to have this plea bargain accepted at the fourth degree level. Defendant's counsel objected to the judge's refusal to accept the plea, and implied that the judge had attempted to coerce the defendant in chambers into agreeing not to contest the scoring of the penetration issue. After a brief hearing, [11] the judge stated on the record that he had neither engaged in such coercion nor penalized the defendant in any way for failing to admit anything. [12] The prosecutor, while indicating it was his intent to go forward with the plea bargain, stated that it would be both appropriate and ethical to try the case at the level originally charged. The judge restated his ruling, and his belief that it was a valid exercise of the Court's discretion.... However, the judge specifically declined to preclude the parties from taking the plea agreement to Judge Shipman to seek his acceptance. The prosecutor did not submit the plea to Judge Shipman. On December 10 through December 12, 1992, the defendant was tried before a jury on the original charges and convicted of one count of CSC II. Judge Shipman sentenced the defendant to forty months to fifteen years imprisonment. The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded with instructions for the trial court to permit defendant to plead guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct in exchange for the terms of the parties' previous plea agreement. 208 Mich.App. 574, 580, 528 N.W.2d 796 (1995). We granted leave to appeal, [13] and we now reverse for the reasons stated below.