Opinion ID: 1221868
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of United States Supreme Court precedent to Sandstrom v. Montana

Text: Unlike In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which was the subject of Ivan V. v. City of New York, supra , Sandstrom v. Montana, supra , did not announce a new constitutional doctrine. Rather, it announced a prophylactic rule designed to further effectuate the Winship doctrine. In this regard Sandstrom v. Montana is similar to Michigan v. Payne, supra , and Johnson v. New Jersey, supra , in that, like those cases, Sandstrom v. Montana did not confer a constitutional right that had not existed prior to [the] decision but rather created a protective umbrella serving to enhance a constitutional guarantee. 412 U.S. at 54, 93 S.Ct. at 1970. The Supreme Court, in In re Winship, held: Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of ... convincing the fact-finder of his guilt. 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072. The purpose of that doctrine was to overcome an aspect of trial that did substantially impair the truth-finding function of trial and cast serious doubt upon the validity of prior convictions  the allowance of a finding of guilt on a less than beyond a reasonable doubt standard. See Ivan V. v. City of New York, supra . The same was true of the rule announced in Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra , where the burden of proof was explicitly shifted to the defendant by a jury instruction. Yet, it is recognized that `there is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding.' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1341, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). The constitutional requirement that guilt in criminal cases be proved beyond a reasonable doubt serves to limit, but cannot eliminate, the number of criminal defendants found guilty who are in fact innocent. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-372, 90 S.Ct. 1075-76, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) .... Williams v. United States, supra, 401 U.S. at 664, 91 S.Ct. at 1158. The major purpose, then, of In re Winship, supra , was to correct a very substantial impairment of the fact-finding process that did raise serious questions about the validity of the verdict in every case where the new rule had not been followed. To effectuate that correction the case announced a new constitutional doctrine under the due process clause requiring the State to prove every material element of a crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra , the jury was instructed that the State could prove a material element of a crime by a presumption unless the defendant offered proof in negation of the presumption. The effect of that instruction was the same as the practice condemned in In re Winship. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, supra . The shifting of the burden of proof by an explicit instruction clearly infected the fact-finding process and raised a substantial likelihood that prior verdicts may have been invalid in most, if not all, of the cases in which such an instruction had been given. The Sandstrom v. Montana situation is, however, different. In that case the jury was not told that the State had a lesser burden of proof than that constitutionally required. Nor was it told that the defendant had any burden on any material element of the crime. In that case the jury was merely instructed that the law presumes a man to intend that which he does. [16] The Supreme Court did not find that this instruction impermissibly lessened the State's burden of proof or that it impermissibly shifted the burden to the defendant. The instruction was condemned on the basis that the jury may have interpreted the... instruction as constituting either a burden-shifting presumption ... or a conclusive presumption.... Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, 442 U.S. at 524, 99 S.Ct. at 2459. (Emphasis added). The error in the case was not so much the instruction itself but the possibility that the jury may have misinterpreted the instruction. The major purpose of the rule announced in Sandstrom v. Montana is, therefore, to further effectuate the Winship doctrine by reducing the risk of possible jury misinterpretation of instructions that could lead to an In re Winship, or a Mullaney v. Wilbur , type of error. This prophylactic rule is not designed to overcome an aspect of trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function. The mere possibility of a jury misinterpreting an instruction cannot be said to be a substantial impairment of the truth-finding process at trial. After all, [i]mplicit in [the] constitutional requirements of jury trial is a belief that juries can be trusted.... Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 405, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1796, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 932 (1964). Our system of criminal justice could not operate if the effective presumption was that juries consistently misinterpret the instructions given to them by the court. Applying the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana retroactively would also occasion windfall benefits for some defendants Michigan v. Payne, supra, 412 U.S. at 53, 93 S.Ct. at 1970, and would undoubtedly affect cases in which no unfairness occurred. Stovall v. Denno, supra . The purpose to be served by the prophylactic rule announced in Sandstrom v. Montana , therefore, would not be significantly furthered by full retrospective application. This is especially true in light of the countervailing considerations of finality of judgments; [17] reliance on the prior rule allowing the instruction; the burden that retroactivity would have on the administration of justice; and the availability of other grounds of relief under Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra and In re Winship, supra , when the instruction goes beyond the mere possibility of jury misinterpretation and impinges upon the proper distribution, or level, of burden of proof. See Johnson v. New Jersey, supra ; Michigan v. Payne, supra .
The reliance placed on the pre- Sandstrom practice of allowing the disapproved instruction also militates against the retroactive application of the rule announced in that case. The case presently before us, for example, was tried in 1969, a full decade before the decision in Sandstrom v. Montana . The Sandstrom v. Montana rule was not foreshadowed prior to Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra . Indeed, it cannot be said that even Mullaney v. Wilbur clearly forewarned of the result in Sandstrom v. Montana as that holding was not mandated by Mullaney v. Wilbur . Rather, the holding in Sandstrom v. Montana was a new protective rule issued to prevent an unknowing encroachment upon the rights announced in Mullaney v. Wilbur and In re Winship. Who could have foreseen that the United States Supreme Court would find that the possibility of jury misinterpretation of the word presume would be equated to specifically shifting or lessening the burden of proof? The courts cannot be faulted for not anticipating Sandstrom v. Montana . There was no clear foreshadowing of that rule. Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 283, 92 S.Ct. 916, 919, 31 L.Ed.2d 202, 208 (1972).