Opinion ID: 6218011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of the function

Text: Whether a judge acts in his judicial capacity depends on whether the challenged action “is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties.” Just. Network Inc., 931 F.3d at 760 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, the nature and function of the act is the subject of scrutiny, not the act itself. Just. Network Inc., 931 F.3d at 760. If a particular act relates to a general function a judge typically performs, then the act is in his judicial capacity. Id. To determine whether Judge Derrick’s actions were judicial in nature, we must further examine his challenged practices. The Appellants first allege that when criminal defendants appear before Judge Derrick, he advises them of their right to counsel but fails to appoint counsel. Judge Derrick admits that he informs his defendants of their right to counsel and tells them that the court 5 will appoint one on their behalf if they cannot afford one. Appellants, however, contend that Judge Derrick’s failure to inquire about the defendants’ ability to afford counsel is a violation of their due process rights. Regardless of the merits of this claim, the appointment of counsel is clearly a judicial function, which Judge Derrick carries out in his judicial capacity. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 8.2(a). Appellants next allege that Judge Derrick sets bond without considering an individual’s ability to pay. When defendants appear before a judge, the judge must set money bail if he determines that there is no other way to reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant in court. Ark. R. Crim. P. 9.2(a). This requirement squarely places the authority to set bond with a judge. Id. Consequently, judges’ decisions concerning bond are made in their judicial capacities. See Just. Network Inc., 931 F.3d at 760. Appellants relatedly claim that Judge Derrick unlawfully fines defendants and sets uniform payment schedules without considering defendants’ ability to pay. Arkansas Code Annotated §§ 16-13-701 et seq. (Repl. 2010 & Supp. 2021) governs the assessment and collection of court-imposed fines. It grants courts authority to, inter alia, impose fines, Id. § 16-13-702(a)(1), imprison a defendant who fails to pay a fine, Id. § 16-13-702(a)(5), and establish installment plans for defendants to pay their fines, Id. § 16-13-704(a)(1). As with bond, Judge Derrick makes these decisions in his judicial capacity. See Just. Network Inc., 931 F.3d at 760. While only a judge may impose fines or create an installment plan to assist defendants with their payments, Appellants argue that the judge’s delegation of certain administrative aspects of these duties—namely, permitting court clerks to grant payment extensions or 6 accept partial payments at their discretion—requires this court to find that court-imposed fines are administrative rather than judicial duties. But this is not so. The mere delegation of ancillary administrative tasks does not rid a function of its judicial nature. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227–28 (1988). Judges may often ask their subordinates to perform tasks on their behalf to promote the administration of justice. Asking a court clerk to accept a payment for a fine or, in his discretion, permit a defendant to make a partial payment is not akin to the nonjudicial, administrative function of, for example, hiring court employees. See id. at 222. The imposition and administration of fines is purely an adjudicative, i.e., judicial, function. See id. The above analysis equally applies to the Appellants’ allegation that Judge Derrick wrongfully imprisons defendants who fail to pay their fines. The decision to imprison a defendant for his failure to pay court-imposed fines stems from the ability to impose the fines initially. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 16-13-703. Ordering a defendant imprisoned is a quintessential judicial function. In fact, suing judges for their sentencing decisions was one of the exact issues that the Supreme Court considered when deciding to extend the defense of judicial immunity to § 1983 claims. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225 (noting that judicial immunity is “a device for discouraging collateral attacks and thereby helping to establish appellate procedures as the standard system for correcting judicial error”). Thus, as with all other challenged acts, Judge Derrick’s decision to imprison defendants who are delinquent on their fines is unquestionably an exercise of his judicial authority. Accordingly, all the challenged actions were done in Judge Derrick’s judicial capacity. Just. Network Inc., 931 F.3d at 762. 7