Opinion ID: 2535642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Danny Ferns

Text: First, Bolin alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the descriptive use of what appeared to be blood in Danny Ferns' testimony. Below, the Sixth Circuit Court in and for Pasco County, Florida, denied Bolin's first claim, stating: Although there may be other ways to say it, the witness probably could not accurately convey to the jury that the substance looked like blood without using the word blood. Had Ferns simply said that he saw a red substance, it would not have conveyed the essence of what he observed. An intelligent person with some degree of experience may testify as a lay witness to what they observe. See Jones v. State, 440 So.2d 570 (Fla.1983), citing Peacock v. State, 160 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). In this case, the witness testified that he observed blood. See Trial Transcript, pp. 874-875. Defendant's objection to the testimony is partly that Ferns stated that he was sure it was blood, rather than it appeared to be, or looked like, blood. See November 16, 2006 Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, pp. 66-67. Even if counsel had objected, the testimony would not have been excluded. The State or defense counsel would simply elaborate on Ferns' testimony by further establishing that he could not know to a scientific certainty that the substance was actually blood. There is little danger in this case that the jury was misled by the testimony to believe that the witness had scientifically tested the substance to determine that it was, in fact, actual human blood from the victim. The witness' testimony revealed that he was approximately 13 years old and an elementary school student at the time of the murder. See Trial Transcript, pp. 871, 885. Moreover, the State elaborated on Danny Ferns' testimony that he saw blood by questioning him as to whether he had ever seen blood before and whether he had any doubt that the substance appeared to be blood. See Trial Transcript, pp. 874-875. Mr. Swisher testified at the evidentiary hearing that he doesn't recall whether or not he objected. See November 16, 2006 Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, pp. 68-70. Nor does he recall specifically why he would not have objected, but posited several tactical reasons why he might not have done so based on and depending on what other testimony followed that opinion. See id. During Defendant's trial, Mr. Swisher attempted to show that the victim's body was allegedly sprayed with a hose for several minutes and there was no blood visible on the ground at the time of the murder, yet Danny Ferns testified that he saw a three foot circle of blood on the ground several hours later when Phillip Bolin brought him home after school. See Trial Transcript, pp. 524, 778-780, 823-826, 882-885; November 16, 2006 Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, pp. 97-98. In this case, Mr. Swisher's hypothesized tactical reasons why he may not object coincide with what occurred at trial. An attorney's decisions regarding trial tactics are not subject to attack in a motion for post conviction relief. See Buford v. State, 492 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1986). Furthermore, the testimony would not have been excluded even if counsel had objected. An objection would only result in a clarification that the witness could not be certain the substance was actually blood. Between the State's attempted clarification regarding Danny Ferns' knowledge of blood and the testimony that Ferns was a 13 year old elementary student at the time of the murder, there is sufficient clarification that the witness was testifying as to what he observed and not that he was testifying as to any scientific certainty that the substance was blood. This claim is denied accordingly. We agree. At trial, Danny Ferns testified that in early December 1986, he and Phillip Bolin were best friends and attended the same elementary school, and that Phillip had told him something unusual at the bus stop one morning. Ferns agreed to go back to Valencia Drive with Phillip. In response to counsel's question asking him to explain what he saw on the ground once there, Ferns testified that he saw [a] lot of blood and stuff on the grass. And the grass was kind ofI don't know. This exchange continued: Q. Well, let me ask you this. Back in '86, had you ever seen blood before? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you know what color blood was? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you feel comfortable enough that when you looked down on the grass that you could tell in your own mind that appeared to be blood ? A. Absolutely. Q. Was there any doubt in your mind when you looked on that grass that that appeared to be blood ? A. No doubt. I knew it was. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, on direct examination, it was Ferns' testimony that he saw what appeared to be blood on the grass and that in his mind there was no doubt what he saw. It is not likely that the jury was confused or believed that a thirteen-year-old boy had tested the substance he saw on the ground. Nor is it likely that Ferns could have conveyed what he saw without using the word blood. Section 90.701, Florida Statutes provides: If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony about what he or she perceived may be in the form of inference and opinion when: (1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he or she has perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and the witness's use of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of the objecting party; and (2) The opinions and inferences do not require a special knowledge, skill, experience, or training. § 90.701, Fla. Stat. (2001). Here, Ferns could have testified that he saw a red substance on the ground, but that would not have conveyed with equal accuracy that he saw what appeared to be blood. Likewise, there is not a readily apparent set of words that would equally convey that what Ferns saw appeared, to him, to be blood. Additionally, because Ferns' testimony was that what he saw appeared to be blood, it is not likely that he misled the jury to Bolin's prejudice. As we noted in Gardner v. State, 480 So.2d 91 (Fla.1985), A lay witness may give opinion testimony so long as the opinion testimony does not mislead the trier of fact. Id. at 93 (finding proper a police officer's opinion testimony as a lay witness regarding a codefendant's character based on hours of observation). In Gantling v. State, 40 Fla. 237, 23 So. 857 (1898), we held that it was not improper for a witness to testify regarding the color of stains on a garment and their relationship to blood. Id. at 860. Specifically, after the trial court sustained a defense objection to the witness's testimony that he saw splotches or stains of some kind ..., which he supposed was blood; he felt confident that it was blood[,] the witness rephrased his testimony, stating that he was not an expert and that the stains were of a yellow or reddish color; they had been there so long that they were not the color of blood. Id. We held that such testimony was not improper and that the trial court properly overruled the objection to it, stating, It requires no expert knowledge to enable one to know that there are stains upon clothing, nor their color, where they are visible to the eye. These are matters open to common knowledge and common observation. Id. Bolin now suggests that Gantling stands for the proposition that a witness may not opine that a stain is blood. Gantling makes no such holding. Nothing in Gantling supports Bolin's assertion that Ferns' testimony was improper or that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to it. Bolin also raises Floyd v. State, 569 So.2d 1225 (Fla.1990), in support of his argument. In Floyd, a police officer testified that a tablecloth found lying on the bed `appeared like someone had taken some type of object that had blood on it and wiped it on there and left it on the bed.' Id. at 1231. We upheld the testimony as proper and within the permissible range of lay observation and ordinary police experience. Id. at 1232. Additionally, there are cases where lay witnesses have mentioned blood in their testimonies that have been upheld by this Court and the district courts of appeal. See Smith v. State, 7 So.3d 473, 489 (Fla. 2009) (witness testified that he helped to clean up blood after he witnessed a shooting); Thorp v. State, 777 So.2d 385, 388 (Fla.2000) (an employee of the mission where defendant was staying testified that he saw Thorp with blood on his shirt); Davis v. State, 586 So.2d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 1991) (witness testified that she discovered the victim lying in pool of blood), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1216, 112 S.Ct. 3021, 120 L.Ed.2d 893 (1992) (vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992)); Moody v. State, 418 So.2d 989, 991 (Fla.1982) (a witness who had been living with Moody in a Volkswagen saw a puddle of blood on the victim's floor); King v. State, 390 So.2d 315, 317 (Fla.1980) (a counselor at the facility where King was incarcerated saw that the crotch of King's pants was covered in blood), receded from on other grounds by, Strickland v. State, 437 So.2d 150 (Fla.1983); Bartlett v. State, 993 So.2d 157, 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (witness testified to there being a substance that appeared to be blood on one of two knives). Additionally, in Rose v. State, 617 So.2d 291 (Fla.1993), the defendant raised a similar issue on postconviction alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of two witnesses, neighbors of Rose who had given him a ride home the night of the murder and testified that he had blood on his person. Id. at 296; Rose v. State, 774 So.2d 629, 632-33 (Fla.2000), receded from on other grounds by, Guzman v. State, 868 So.2d 498 (Fla.2003). We upheld the court's denial of Rose's postconviction motion and did not find counsel deficient. Rose, 617 So.2d at 296-97. Defense counsel, Swisher, testified that although he could not remember the exact reason he chose not to object to Ferns' testimony, it was possible that he was attempting to discredit that there was ever anything on the ground for Ferns to identify. Swisher's theory of the case, that the hose used to wash off Matthews' body that left her and the grass wet would have also washed away any blood, was not unreasonable. Further, because Phillip Bolin's testimony was not improper, it is likely that any objection would have been overruled. Accordingly, we do not find Swisher's performance deficient. Moreover, even if we found that Swisher was deficient, Bolin has not established prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of his trial. Ferns' testimony corroborated that of Phillip Bolin. Phillip testified that he witnessed Bolin strike Matthews with a metal-tipped stick matching the description of one given to him by his employer. Both boys' testimony that the ground was wet was corroborated by the physical evidence that Matthews was found wet although it had not rained recently. Additionally, a semen sample found on the victim matched Bolin's blood sample. Furthermore, it is not likely that the jury was misled by Ferns' testimony. Accordingly, this claim is denied.