Opinion ID: 3064503
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability.-Beginning on the date of

Text: the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall comply with respect to WIPP, with— (A) the regulations issued by the Admin- istrator establishing the generally appli- cable environmental standards for the management and storage of spent nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and transuranic radioactive waste and con- tained in subpart A of part 191 of title 40, Code of Federal Regulations; (B) the Clean Air Act (40 U.S.C. [§] 7401 et seq.); (C) the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. [§] 6901 et seq.); (D) title XIV of the Public Health Ser- vice Act (42 U.S.C. [§] 300f et seq.; commonly referred to as the “Safe Drink- ing Water Act”); (E) the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. [§] 2601 et seq.); (F) the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. [§] 9601 et seq.); 3070 STATE OF WASHINGTON v. CHU (G) all other applicable Federal laws pertaining to public health and safety or the environment; and (H) all regulations promulgated, and all permit requirements, under the laws described in subparagraphs (B) through (G). With respect to transuranic mixed waste designated by the Secretary for disposal at WIPP, such waste is exempt from treatment standards promulgated pursuant to section 3004(m) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. [§] 6924(m)) and shall not be subject to the land disposal prohibitions in section 3004(d), (e), (f), and (g) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 3188 (§ 9(a)(1)) (emphasis to the 1996 amendment added). DOE argues that this amendment, which exempts designated TRUM waste from the land disposal prohibitions, and by extension the identical HWMA provisions, establishes that DOE no longer has an obligation to treat designated TRUM waste or to limit the length of time such waste is stored at Hanford or any other location prior to disposal at WIPP. [1] DOE first argues that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius requires us to adopt its interpretation of the designation exemption. This doctrine requires that “where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” See Beach v. Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). The cases that DOE STATE OF WASHINGTON v. CHU 3071 cites in support of its proposition, however, are not on all fours with the present case, because they do not involve differences in language within the same statutory section. See id. (explaining that because a statutory right of rescission could cloud a bank’s title on foreclosure, that Congress “may well have chosen to circumscribe that risk [in one part of the statute], while permitting recoupment damages regardless of the date a collection action may be brought [in another part of the statute].”); Or. Natural Res. Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d 334, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that because the section discussing the deadline for publishing the final regulation does not mention the filing of the petition, the fact that the filing of the petition is mentioned in another section does not preclude a plain text reading of the publishing deadline). [2] Unlike the cases cited by DOE, the exemption language here falls within the 9(a)(1) subsection, as Congress confirmed when, in the savings provision of the 1996 WIPP Amendments, Congress specifically referred to the exemption, “described in section 9(a)(1).” See § 14.17 Further, § 9(a)(1) begins by stating that as of “[the] date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary [of Energy] shall comply with respect to WIPP,” with the federal statutes and regulations in the subsequent subparagraphs. The plain and undisputed interpretation of this language is that the WIPP facility must be in compliance with the enumerated environmental regulations. The second phrase (“with respect to [TRUM]”) is a sub-part of Section 9(a)—“with respect to WIPP.” Congress’s decision to place the designation exemption at this location indicates 17 Section 14, the “SAVINGS PROVISION,” addresses the effect of the statute generally on the Clean Air Act and the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Under the 1996 WIPP Amendments, this provision is unchanged, except for the recognition of the designation exemption “described in section 9(a)(1).” Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 3188(d) (1996). Moreover, DOE has also recognized the designation exemption as being in “Section 9(a)(1)(H)”— a subsection of Section 9(a)(1). See 69 Fed. Reg. 39,456 (June 30, 2004) (A DOE record of decision locating the designation exemption at Section 9(a)(1)(H)). 3072 STATE OF WASHINGTON v. CHU that it meant for the designation exemption to apply only “with respect to WIPP.”18 DOE also asserts that we must adopt its interpretation of the designation exemption in order to give meaning to the phrase “[w]ith respect to [TRUM] designated by the Secretary for disposal at WIPP” in relation to the introductory phrase of Section 9(a)(1), “with respect to WIPP.” “ ‘[S]tatutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect.’ ” Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997)). DOE argues that in order to give meaning to the word “designate” and the designation process itself, we must assume that Congress included the word “designate” to distinguish the scope of the designation exemption from the scope of the introductory phrase “with respect to WIPP.” As a result, we would have to read the designation exemption as applying to wastes not at WIPP, as opposed to only applying the exemption “with respect to WIPP.” Our reading of “the language and the design of the statute as a whole,” McCarthy, 500 U.S. at 139, however, conflicts with this interpretation and compels the opposite conclusion —that the designation exemption extends only to wastes at WIPP. First, the 1996 WIPP Amendments as a whole are entirely focused on the ongoing establishment of the WIPP site as a depository for transuranic waste. The language and design of the statute as amended pertain solely to WIPP. No section of the statute deals with the conditions, contents, or 18 Further, we have also stated that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius “ ‘is a rule of interpretation, not a rule of law,’ which we have explained is ‘properly applied only when it makes sense as a matter of legislative purpose.’ ” United States v. Fuller, 531 F.3d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992)). As we discuss below, we do not believe that DOE’s interpretation fits with Congress’s purpose in enacting the 1996 WIPP Amendments. STATE OF WASHINGTON v. CHU 3073 schedules for the cleanup of wastes stored elsewhere. All references to the existing regulatory schemes, with the exception of the designated waste in question, emphasize that such regulations, without revision or exception, pertain to WIPP. Further, the treatment standards from which “waste designated . . . for disposal at WIPP” is exempt are critical. Such waste is “exempt from treatment standards promulgated pursuant to section 3004(m) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act . . . and shall not be subject to the land disposal prohibitions in section 3004(d), (e), (f), and (g) . . . .” Because the treatment standards are relevant “for wastes subject to land disposal prohibitions,” RCRA § 3004(m), we turn to the land disposal prohibitions to which the exemption refers. [3] All of these prohibitions are plainly location-specific. A waste is not subject to land disposal prohibitions only if there is “a reasonable degree of certainty, that there will be no migration of hazardous constituents from the disposal unit or injection zone for as long as the waste [ ] remain[s] hazardous.” RCRA § 3004(d)(1), (e)(1), & (g)(5) (emphasis added). The EPA regulations implementing these provisions are just as transparent. The regulations explain that no-migration determinations apply only to the land disposal “of the specific restricted waste at the individual disposal unit . . . and [do] not apply to any other restricted waste at that disposal unit, or to that specific restricted waste at any other disposal unit.” 40 C.F.R. § 268.6(i) (emphasis added). Accordingly, an exemption from the prohibition from land disposal is contingent both on the identification of a specific restricted waste and the identification of a specific disposal unit. [4] The designation exemption does not, itself, specify the disposal unit where the waste will actually be disposed—the exemption provides only that waste be “designated for disposal at WIPP”—but we need not look far to determine the unit from which Congress intended to exempt the designated waste. Congress explicitly identified “the individual disposal 3074 STATE OF WASHINGTON v. CHU unit” when it chose to place the designation exemption within § 9(a)(1)—“with respect to WIPP.” DOE’s position is not to the contrary. In fact, DOE acknowledges in its opening brief that by amending the 1992 WIPP Act to include the designation exemption, “Congress [ ] in effect granted DOE the nomigration determination that would have been required under RCRA.” With this acknowledgement, DOE appears to recognize that Congress did identify a disposal unit, and that designation of waste “for disposal at WIPP” allows DOE to only and ultimately dispose of the waste at WIPP. Throughout this litigation, DOE has never, in fact, argued that the designation exemption allows DOE to land-dispose untreated but designated waste elsewhere on the basis that the designation itself establishes that the waste is no longer “land-disposal prohibited.” With respect to the storage prohibition, however, DOE reverses course and argues that the designated waste escapes RCRA’s storage prohibition wherever that waste may be located. DOE arrives at this conclusion by reasoning that because the storage prohibition applies only to “hazardous waste which is prohibited from one or more methods of land disposal,” see RCRA 3004(j), and designated waste is not prohibited from land disposal at WIPP, the waste is in fact no longer “land-disposal prohibited.” This argument is not persuasive. First, by specifically invoking the narrow scope of the land disposal prohibitions at § 3004(d)(1), (e)(1), and (g)(5)—and nowhere mentioning the storage prohibition at § 3004(j)—Congress established that the waste “designated by the Secretary for WIPP” is exempt from the treatment standards and the land disposal prohibitions with respect to WIPP. That is precisely what a nomigration determination would have accomplished. Because an exemption for WIPP says nothing about removing the land disposal prohibition from designated wastes at other locations, the logical consequence of Congress’s action is that the wastes not at WIPP continue to be “prohibited from one or STATE OF WASHINGTON v. CHU 3075 more methods of land disposal” and that the land disposal restrictions, including the storage prohibition, apply at those locations. DOE’s attempts to rebut this argument by alleging that a successful no-migration determination renders the storage prohibition inapplicable to waste wherever such waste may be stored. This argument is without merit. DOE’s citations to the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations, see 40 C.F.R. § 268.6, 268.50(d); 54 Fed. Reg. 36,967, 36,968 (September 6, 1989); 51 Fed. Reg. 40,572, 40,579 (Nov. 7, 1986), are inscrutable. They provide no support for the proposition that a no-migration determination for one location has the effect of excluding from the storage prohibition similar waste that is located at other locations. Rather, the sum of these citations merely stands for the principle that if the identified waste is stored at an identified “no migration” location, and a petition for a no-migration determination is successful, that waste can be “stored” at that location without violating RCRA’s storage prohibitions, so long as the no-migration determination is valid. [5] After reading the language of designation exemption in the context of the statute as a whole, we conclude that DOE’s interpretation of the designation provision is not compelled by the plain meaning of the statute. The land disposal prohibitions enumerated in the designation exemption simply provide no basis on which to conclude that the specified provisions permit exemptions for itinerant waste or waste wherever such waste may be located. DOE’s argument along such lines, which is not a position made explicit in any of DOE’s records of decision designating waste for disposal at WIPP, nor supported by any reference to the statute’s implementing regulations or to case law, is not compelled by the plain text of § 9 of the 1996 WIPP Amendments and is incompatible with the land disposal prohibitions contained in § 3004(d)(1), (e)(1), and (g)(5). Nonetheless, because our reading of § 9(a)(1) reveals some ambiguity in the text of the statute itself, we turn 3076 STATE OF WASHINGTON v. CHU to the legislative history of the WIPP Act for further “guidance and insight into Congressional intent.” Resident Councils, 500 F.3d at 1031.