Opinion ID: 2277075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Race-Based Peremptory Challenges

Text: Feddiman's next argument in this appeal is that the prosecutor impermissibly used race as a basis for exercising peremptory challenges. At one time, the law presumed that a prosecutor only exercised peremptory challenges in order to obtain a fair and impartial jury. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222, 85 S.Ct. 824, 837, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 921, 85 S.Ct. 1528, 14 L.Ed.2d 442 (1965); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1013. In Swain, the Court noted that a defendant could overcome this presumption by proving that the prosecutor had systematically exercised peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular group over a period of time. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 222-24, 85 S.Ct. at 836-38. Many state courts adopted Swain's dicta as the applicable test for determining whether peremptory challenges have been exercised on invidious grounds. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1011-12. However, in Riley, this Court adopted a different standard. Riley held that [t]o rebut the presumption recognized in Swain, the defendant was only required to make a prima facie showing that, considering all circumstances in the given case, there is a substantial likelihood that the prospective jurors are being peremptorily challenged solely on the basis of race. Id. at 1013 (emphasis added). This area of the law was changed significantly by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). First, Batson held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes the prosecutor in a state criminal action from exercising peremptory challenges based upon race. Id. at 88-89, 106 S.Ct. at 1718-19. [19] Second, in Batson, the Court adopted an evidentiary burden, which was similar to our holding in Riley, and allowed a defendant to use evidence gathered solely from his own trial to establish a prima facie case of the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection? 74 Va.L.Rev. 811, 815 (1988) (emphasis added). See Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1013. In particular, Batson held that a defendant could establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that: (1) defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) the group's members have been excluded from the defendant's jury; and (3) the circumstances of the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race. Project: Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 76 Geo.L.J. 969-70 (1988) (footnotes omitted). Batson further held that if the trial judge is satisfied that the defendant has established a prima facie case the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The prosecutor's explanation for the peremptory challenges must be more than an affirmation of good faith or an assumption that the challenged jurors would be partial to the defendant because of race. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24. Although the prosecutor's explanation for the peremptory challenge need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause, it must be related to the particular case to be tried. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. See also Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1013. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court declined to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's [peremptory] challenges. 476 U.S. at 99, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. See Baynard v. State, Del.Supr., 518 A.2d 682, 688 (1986). Thus, [t]he Supreme Court has left the lower courts to grapple with the proper implementation of the Batson test. They must determine not only the quantum of proof necessary for a defendant to establish a prima facie case but also the types of explanations sufficient to rebut the defendant's claim. Moreover, lower courts must adopt appropriate procedures for an adequate Batson hearing. Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection? 74 Va.L.Rev. 811, 817 (1988). Prior to Batson, this Court concluded that it was not only desirable but necessary for this Court to set out in general terms a procedure for trial courts to follow... when they are fairly presented with a claim that peremptory challenges have been exercised on discriminatory grounds. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1012-13. According to the procedure set forth in Riley, the initial burden to make a complete record in support of his claim is upon the defendant, after objecting to the State's exercise of its peremptory challenges. Id. at 1013. See also, Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d at 687; Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73, 75-76 (3d Cir.1986) denial post-con. relief rev'd, 865 F.2d 59 (1989). Once a prima facie showing, [20] as now outlined in Batson, has been made by the defendant, the burden will shift to the State to prove that the exercised challenges were not racially motivated. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1013. When the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that peremptory challenges were not exercised on the basis of race, it must satisfy the [trial] court that its peremptory challenges were made on grounds of specific, individual juror bias, or on grounds reasonably related `to the particular case o[n] trial or its [particular] parties or witnesses' and not solely on the ground of the juror's race. Id. (quoting People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 765 (1978)). In our view, the foregoing procedures, and the duty imposed upon the State by this Court, in Riley are consistent with the principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Batson. [21] See Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 686-88. Those procedures were followed in this case. Feddiman's attorney alleged that the prosecutor had used the race of several jurors as a basis for exercising peremptory challenges. It was unnecessary for the trial court to find that the burden to explain those peremptory challenges had shifted to the State because, in response to that objection, the prosecutor offered to provide a neutral reason for each peremptory challenge that had been exercised. See id. The record reflects that the prosecutor gave the following reasons: PROSECUTOR: As to Wayne Thompson, he had a five-page criminal record. There were a number of felonies with no disposition, and there were a number of misdemeanor convictions. THE COURT: All right. DEFENSE ATTORNEY: We object to that. THE COURT: WHAT? DEFENSE ATTORNEY: We certainly object to his being struck on those grounds, if there were not any convictions. THE COURT: Why don't we let her finish her list of explanation? PROSECUTOR: As to Dennis Nichols, Mr. Nichols slumped down in the chair, hiding his face, and he did not appear that he wanted to be here at all. He had a driving record that included a DUI, and I struck him. THE COURT: I was surprised, based upon his demeanor, that you did not strike him first. PROSECUTOR: He was avoiding any eye contact. Then when I went through, I noticed that Peggy Nichols, when I looked at the driving record that I ran, had the exact same address as Dennis Nichols. I was concerned that there would be some feeling against the State for striking Dennis Nichols by Peggy Nichols if he were her husband or something. As regards Janet Brumble, she works at Perdue, as did Mr. Nichols. Again, I was not sure whether she may have known him. I would note that at least two of the people who I struck were replaced with black jurors, and the State is not seeking to strike them for any reason. THE COURT: You ran out of strikes. PROSECUTOR: But I had opportunity to do so. In fact, I did not strike only black people; I struck white people. THE COURT: I agree. I note there are four blacks on the panel and one alternate. Feddiman's attorney argued that the prosecutor's explanations for exercising each peremptory challenge were insufficient. Feddiman's attorney renewed his objection and asked the trial judge to find that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges had been racially motivated. The trial judge made the following ruling: THE COURT: I am satisfied that a substantial criminal record at a misdemeanor level and unresolved felony charges is an adequate reason to strike a juror. I am, likewise, convinced that Mr. Nichols' demeanor in the jury box was such that it was not improper to strike him on the basis of demeanor. Peggy Nichols having the same last name and same address seems to me to be adequate. I have some concern over Janet Brumble working at the same place. But I am still looking at a jury panel that is one-third black, which is substantially higher than the portion of the population, and fifty percent of the alternates are black. While I would have to be concerned with any pattern of prejudice that would be exhibited by the State in this case, as you note, I have made a list of names because I was concerned that four of the five strikes were black. There was one content. The content came with black jurors on the panel. It gave me cause for making an independent inquiry had you not raised the question. I am satisfied, based upon the explanations given by [the prosecutor], my own observations of the jury panel, and the fact that I have tried numerous cases involving multi-racial crimes involving black defendants, that [this prosecutor], in the past, has never exhibited a pattern of excluding racially. I note your objection. I am satisfied that a suitable jury panel has been seated. As the Batson Court noted `a finding of intentional discrimination [or a lack thereof] is a finding of fact' entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court. Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). [22] This Court acknowledged and adopted those principles in Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d at 688. In Feddiman's case, the trial judge found that the State had `adequately explained the basis for the exercise of its challenges' and had `met its burden' by articulating `legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its exercise of peremptory challenges.' United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070 (5th Cir.1987). The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court critically evaluated the race-neutral reasons which the prosecutor gave for exercising each peremptory challenge. The trial court also appraised the demeanor and credibility of both the potential jurors and the prosecutor and determined that the State's exercise of its peremptory challenges was nondiscriminatory. Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d at 688. The trial court concluded that, assuming arguendo, Feddiman had succeeded in making out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the prosecutor successfully rebutted the discriminatory inference by proving that the challenges were based on articulable and specific racially neutral criteria. United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d at 1070. [23] We are satisfied that the analysis of the prosecutor's explanations by the trial court, and the conclusions reached by the trial court concerning those explanations, are supported by the record. Accordingly, the decision of the Superior Court, that Feddiman had failed to meet his burden of proof in showing a discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the State, is affirmed. [24]