Opinion ID: 2266221
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issues

Text: Miles asserts that the trial court erred by admitting Darryl Bryant's testimony that Miles committed an armed robbery hours before Demby's murder. The admission of prior bad acts is within the discretion of the trial court and will only be reversed upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 541 Pa. 211, 662 A.2d 621 (1995). Here, the record reveals that Bryant testified that Miles used a .357 Magnum to steal a gold chain from a young boy hours before Demby's murder. The trial court overruled the defense's objection to the admission of this evidence. However, the next day, prior to the taking of testimony, the court reversed itself, sua sponte. At sidebar, the trial court sustained the defense's objection and offered to give an instruction advising the jury to ignore Bryant's testimony referring to the robbery. The defense refused the offer of a curative jury instruction and therefore the court did not caution the jury. Despite the trial court's subsequent decision to sustain the defense's objection, we find no error in the trial court's initial admission of this evidence. Generally, evidence of prior crimes is inadmissible because it is so inflammatory and prejudicial that it deprives a defendant of a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Nichols, 485 Pa. 1, 400 A.2d 1281 (1979). However, prior crimes evidence is admissible to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, common scheme, plan or design or identity. Commonwealth v. Sneeringer, 447 Pa.Super. 241, 668 A.2d 1167 (1995). Prior crimes evidence that forms part of the chain or sequence of events leading to a crime and enhances the natural development of the facts is admissible. Commonwealth v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 543 A.2d 491 (1988). For example, in Commonwealth v. Nolen, 535 Pa. 77, 634 A.2d 192 (1993), we upheld the trial court's admission of evidence of two burglaries that occurred approximately a week before the murder being tried. We held the evidence was probative because guns that matched the murder weapons had been stolen in the burglaries. Similarly here, the evidence of Miles' robbery of a young boy using a .357 Magnum hours before Demby's murder was probative of Miles' possession of such a weapon at the time of Demby's murder. Also, a jury instruction would have cured any prejudice caused by the admission of the robbery, but defense counsel refused the judge's offer to give an instruction for strategic reasons. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
This Court has a duty to affirm the sentence of death unless we determine that: (i) the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; (ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d); or (iii) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3). After reviewing the record, we first conclude that the sentence imposed was not the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Second, we examine whether the Commonwealth established beyond a reasonable doubt the four aggravating factors found by the jury. First, the Commonwealth presented evidence that a jury convicted Miles of Second Degree Murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment in an unrelated case on October 7, 1991. With this evidence, the Commonwealth established both that Miles had been convicted of another federal or state offense for which the court could impose a sentence of life imprisonment and that he had been convicted of another murder before the time of the offense at issue. 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(d)(10) and (11). The Commonwealth also produced evidence that Miles committed the murder while robbing Demby. Witnesses testified that Miles grabbed the murder victim's sneaker bag, brought the sneakers back to his neighborhood and then sold them to a friend. This evidence supports the jury's finding that Miles killed Demby while in the perpetration of the felony of robbery. 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(d)(6). Further, the Commonwealth presented evidence from an eyewitness and the co-defendants, which established that Miles fired his .357 Magnum in a fight with four other people at a public shopping center. This evidence supports the fourth aggravating circumstance found by the jury, that Miles created a risk of death to another person other than the victim. 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(d)(7). Thus, we find that the Commonwealth's evidence supported all four aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, we have reviewed the sentencing data compiled by the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts concerning similar cases and conclude that the sentence of death imposed upon appellant is not disproportionate. 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(h)(2); Zettlemoyer, supra . Accordingly, we affirm the verdict and the sentence of death imposed upon Kenyatta Miles by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. [13]