Opinion ID: 4527826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NJLAD Discrimination Claims and 42 U.S.C.

Text: § 1981 Claim NJLAD makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee on the basis of race, national origin, religion, and creed. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code also prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. See St. 7 Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987). Claims brought under NJLAD and § 1981 are analyzed under the same framework. See Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 906–07 (N.J. 1990). Discrimination claims brought under both NJLAD and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff must establish “(1) that s/he is a member of a protected class; (2) s/he was qualified for the position s/he sought to . . . retain; (3) s/he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination”). Once a plaintiff meets the initial burden of production of making out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendantemployer to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the employment decision. See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013). Finally, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff, who must show through direct or circumstantial evidence that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason given is merely pretext and the protected status of the plaintiff was the determinative factor of the adverse employment action. See Makky, 541 F.3d at 214–20. The District Court held that Ali’s NJLAD and § 1981 claims for discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or perceived religion could not survive summary judgment because Ali had not presented evidence raising a genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants’ reasons for Ali’s termination were pretext for discrimination. We agree. 8 Defendants proffered three non-discriminatory reasons for Ali’s termination: (1) Ali disseminated links to anti-Semitic online articles through the school’s official channels; (2) Ali expressed no remorse for this conduct; and (3) Ali’s history of teaching Holocaust denial theories to his students. Ali testified in his deposition that on September 9, 2016, Connelly had seen copies of the MEMRI articles containing anti-Semitic references included in his lesson plan and nevertheless approved the lesson plan. He argues that Connelly’s approval casts doubt on the legitimacy of Defendants’ first rationale for terminating Ali. But even if Connelly had permitted the inclusion of the MEMRI articles in the lesson plan, Connelly’s approval neither precluded Defendants from terminating Ali for posting links to anti-Semitic material nor does it raise an inference that Defendants’ rationale for termination is a pretext for discrimination. Moreover, Zega’s statement to the reporter on September 28, 2016, the day before Ali’s termination, that “the teacher [would] be disciplined severely” shows that Defendants anticipated disciplining Ali based on Ali’s posting of the MEMRI links, not for purported discriminatory reasons. Importantly, Ali has not presented any evidence to challenge the notion that Defendants’ second or third rationale was pretext, or that racial or religious discrimination more likely than not played a role in Defendants’ decision to terminate Ali’s employment. Ali does not deny that he never expressly apologized for his conduct during the meeting with Lottman and Connelly. Moreover, evidence such as the students’ assignments and emails to Ali and Ali’s deposition testimony show that Ali permitted conspiracy-theorist and Hitler-apologist presentations in his class and encouraged students to develop these opinions. Indeed, Ali did not dispute that he presented sources containing the conspiracy-theorist 9 and Hitler-apologist views that appeared in his students’ work product. Defendants presented at least two legitimate reasons for Ali’s termination. Since Ali has not presented a genuine dispute of material fact that two of Defendants’ rationales were a pretext for discrimination, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on both the NJLAD and § 1981 discrimination claims.