Opinion ID: 170360
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mixed-Motive Theory of Retaliation

Text: A mixed-motive case is not established, and the Price Waterhouse framework does not apply, until the plaintiff presents evidence that directly shows that retaliation played a motivating part in the employment decision at issue. We have referred to this method of establishing retaliation as the direct method, see Medlock, 164 F.3d at 550, but we emphasize that although some of our cases seem to suggest otherwise, we do not require direct evidence in its sense as antonym of `circumstantial.' See Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir.1992); see also Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir.2004) (Direct evidence in this context is not the converse of circumstantial evidence, as many seem to assume.). Thus, a plaintiff can establish retaliation directly under Price Waterhouse, through the use of direct or circumstantial evidence. In a mixed-motive case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged retaliatory motive `actually relates] to the question of discrimination in the particular employment decision' and may do so through the production of either direct or circumstantial evidence. Medlock, 164 F.3d at 550 (quoting Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 203 (D.C.Cir.1997)) (emphasis added) (alteration in original). Although circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish that the employer Was motivated by retaliatory animus, that circumstantial evidence must be tied directly to the retaliatory motive. See Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1512 (10th Cir. 1997) (A plaintiff will be entitled to the burden-shifting analysis set out in Price Waterhouse upon presenting evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged [retaliatory] attitude. (alteration in original) (quotations omitted)). Ms. Fye argues that the March 6 letter by itself and without reference to other, supportive evidence demonstrates direct evidence of discrimination. We first note that the March 6 letter is clearly not direct evidence of retaliation, as it is not retaliatory on its face and would require us to infer retaliatory motive on the part of the OCC. See Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th Cir.2007) (Direct evidence is evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of a fact in issue without inference or presumption. (quotation omitted)). Ms. Fye may, however, use circumstantial evidence to establish directly that retaliatory animus played a motivating part in the OCC's decision to terminate her. [6] Such circumstantial evidence must relate to a fretaliatory] reason for the employer's action. Sartor v. Spherion Corp., 388 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir.2004) (quotation omitted). The March 6 letter does not, however, resemble the evidence of conduct or statements by a decisionmaker that we have previously held sufficient to satisfy a plaintiffs burden of directly showing retaliatory motive. See, e.g., Thomas, 111 F.3d at 1512 (holding that plaintiff was entitled to a mixed-motive instruction when people involved in the promotion decision expressly stated that plaintiff would not be considered due to his discrimination complaint); Kenworthy v. Conoco, 979 F.2d 1462, 1471 n. 5 (10th Cir.1992) (holding evidence was sufficient to warrant a mixed-motive instruction when there was testimony that a supervisor held plaintiffs EEOC filing against her, falsified and altered her performance evaluations, and misrepresented incidents involving plaintiff; and a manager testified that he relied on a misrepresented incident in his decision not to promote plaintiff). Ms. Fye relies primarily on Medlock, contending that the March 6 letter presents more direct evidence of retaliation than was present in that case. In Medlock, the plaintiff filed suit alleging discriminatory pay on the basis of race. Shortly after his deposition for that case was taken, the plaintiff was suspended and then fired. 164 F.3d at 549. The employer suspended him [a]s a result of issues raised in [his] deposition. Id. at 550 (quotation omitted). The employer fired him, in part, because of his continuous dissatisfaction with [his] compensation. Id. (quotation omitted). The plaintiff then amended his complaint to allege retaliatory discharge. We held that there was sufficient evidence that directly reflected the retaliatory motive. Specifically, we noted that the suspension letter admitted On its face that the employer considered the subject matter of the plaintiffs deposition, which included testimony about his race discrimination claim. Id. We also noted that the termination letter explicitly referred to the plaintiffs dissatisfaction with his compensation, which formed the primary basis for the discrimination claim. Id. This evidence may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged [retaliatory] attitude. Thomas, 111 F.3d at 1512 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). By contrast, the March 6 termination letter does not suggest that the OCC considered anything other than the demands made by Ms. Fye when it terminated her. Rather than directly reflecting a retaliatory motive, it reflects the ACC's concern for an expeditious and cooperative restructuring of the agency. We agree with the District Court that the letter does not contain verbiage from which a reasonable inference of . . . retaliatory animus[] may be drawn.