Opinion ID: 2834306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: When Should Orders Compelling Arbitration Be Reviewed?

Text: At the outset, the Culls assert it is too late to review the trial court’s order referring this case to arbitration. First, they argue the pre-arbitration mandamus proceedings establish the law of the case and preclude the Defendants from raising the same arguments now. We recently rejected this argument, holding that as mandamus is a discretionary writ, “its denial, without comment on the merits, cannot deprive another appellate court from considering the matter in a subsequent appeal.” [7] Mandamus is only available when a final appeal would be inadequate; [8] if filing for mandamus precluded a final appeal, that requirement would be self-fulfilling. Because the earlier proceedings here were denied without comment on the merits, they do not foreclose our review. Second, the Culls argue that an order compelling arbitration can only be reviewed before arbitration occurs. The Culls address none of the cases in which this Court and the United States Supreme Court have reviewed such orders after arbitration. [9] Nor do they address the general rule that parties waive nothing by foregoing interlocutory review and awaiting a final judgment to appeal. [10] But most important, the Culls do not address section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which expressly prohibits pre-arbitration appeals: Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28 [providing for certified questions to federal circuit courts], an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order . . . directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title [providing for orders compelling arbitration] . . . . [11] This ban on interlocutory appeals of orders compelling arbitration was added by Congress in 1988 to prevent arbitration from bogging down in preliminary appeals. [12] We have held that routine mandamus review of such orders in state court would frustrate this federal law. [13] The Culls assert that post-arbitration review is unavailable because an arbitration award can be vacated only for statutory grounds like corruption, fraud, or evident partiality. [14] But reviewing the trial court’s initial referral to arbitration is not the same as reviewing the arbitrator’s final award; as the United States Supreme Court has held, courts conduct ordinary review of the former and deferential review only of the latter. [15] We agree that post-arbitration review of referral may create (as the Culls allege) a “huge waste of the parties’ resources.” But if review is available before arbitration, parties may also waste resources appealing every referral when a quick arbitration might settle the matter. Frequent pre-arbitration review would inevitably frustrate Congress’s intent “to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.” [16] We recognize the potential for waste, but that is a risk a party must take if it moves for arbitration after substantially invoking the litigation process.