Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Fahey's Statements Fall within the State of Mind Exception

Text: D.R.E. 803(3) provides a hearsay exception for: A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the defendant's will. [127] The exclusion of statements of memory or belief derives from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shepard v. United States , in which a witness testified that the victim had stated, Dr. Shepard [the defendant] has poisoned me. [128] The Shepard Court held that this declaration was not admissible under the state of mind exception because it was a statement of memory. [129] Specifically, the Court stated: Declarations of intention, casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were ignored. The testimony now questioned faced backward and not forward. This at least it did in its most obvious implications. What is even more important, it spoke to a past act, and more than that, to an act by some one not the speaker. Other tendency, if it had any, was a filament too fine to be disentangled by a jury. [130] Following Shepard and the text of Rule 803(3), a statement that I am afraid is admissible. This statement fits within the justification for the hearsay exception, namely, the declarant's unique perspective into his own feelings and emotions. [131] Similarly, the statement that I am afraid of D  is generally admissible. [132] The case is different with respect to a statement that I am afraid of D because he is a maniac  or I am afraid of D because he threatened me  or I am afraid of D because he is going to kill me.  [133] Such statements are simply perceptions or beliefs a victim has of events, and their admission is not justified under the rationale for the state of mind exception. There is substantial authority holding that such statements of memory or belief are not admissible under Rule 803(3). [134] Thus, the statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind would not include anything but the assertion that I am afraid. The reasons why she was afraid cannot be characterized as assertions ( i.e., statements) of her state of mind. [135] The State argues that the hearsay evidence admitted against Capano nevertheless falls within the state of mind exception. The State also argues that, by stipulating to their admission before trial, Capano waived any hearsay objections with respect to Fahey's diary, the Capano-Fahey emails, and testimony by Kim Lynch-Horstmann. We address this fact, along with the State's argument that the trial court appropriately limited the jury's consideration of the evidence to the state of mind of Miss Fahey at or about the time when the alleged incidents occurred, as part of the harmless error analysis below. The State maintains that it did not offer the contested testimony to prove the fact remembered or believed  i.e., that Capano actually engaged in the conduct described or that Capano is a controlling, jealous person. Instead, the State argues that it offered the testimony to prove that Fahey believed that these things were true and, as a result, wanted to end her relationship with Capano. The State therefore argues that the testimony of Fahey's friends and psychotherapists does not fall within the definition of hearsay because the testimony was not offered to prove that the events and opinions described were actually true. Under the State's theory, to the extent that the proffered testimony is prejudicial, the trial court (as the court did in this case) must determine whether the testimony is admissible under the balancing test of D.R.E. 403. Although one could plausibly interpret the state of mind exception to authorize the admission of testimony of memories or beliefs for some purpose other than proving the fact remembered or believed, [136] this interpretation places a difficult burden on the jury. In particular, the jury must confine its consideration of the declarant's memories and beliefs, including memories of potentially serious misconduct by the defendant, to the limited issue of a person's state of mind. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for the jury to make such an abstract distinction, even when properly defined by the trial court's limiting instructions. [137] In practice, the broad reading of the state of mind exception proposed by the State relies heavily on the balancing test of Rule 403 to ensure that the defendant is not unfairly prejudiced by testimony describing the declarant's memories or beliefs. Thus, where the danger of unfair prejudice from the admission of these statements substantially outweighs the probative value of the statements, the trial court may exclude the statements under D.R.E. 403. This reliance on Rule 403 presents a potential problem because it replaces hearsay limitations with the more lenient Rule 403 prejudice balance. The hearsay rule is designed to exclude statements untested by cross-examination that are insufficiently reliable due to possible defects in the declarant's memory, perception or veracity. The Rule 403 analysis, on the other hand, assumes that these reliability concerns are overcome and focuses on balancing the effects of the statement on the jury. In view of the wide range of untested, and potentially unreliable, out-of-court statements that would be admissible under the State's broad interpretation of the state of mind exception, we conclude that Rule 803(3) authorizes the admission of hearsay statements by Fahey to her friends and psychotherapists [138] reflecting her fear of the defendant (that is, her state of mind), but not the memories or beliefs giving rise to that fear. Applying the above analysis to the present case, we conclude that Fahey's description of specific events involving Capano and her opinion of Capano reflect not on Fahey's state of mind, but on her beliefs and memories of facts as she expressed them to her friends and psychotherapists. [139] For example, Jill Morrison testified that Fahey told her about being locked in a garage by Capano while they argued, an experience Fahey found extremely frightening. [140] The narrative of this incident is not a state of mind  it is a memory of an event  and does not fall under Rule 803(3) as we interpret that rule. [141] In contrast, Fahey's statements that she was upset, that she was afraid of Capano, or that she intended to break off her relationship with Capano are admissible as statements revealing Fahey's emotional or mental state. [142] Accordingly, the evidence going solely to Fahey's state of mind was admissible. The portions of the testimony describing Fahey's beliefs or memories of facts were inadmissible.