Opinion ID: 203936
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's reasonable reliance finding

Text: Appellants' principal argument on appeal is that a reasonable jury could conclude that appellees Dow, Goodrich, and Union Carbide did not reasonably rely on Monsanto to provide Taylor with adequate warnings about the dangers of VC. They suggest that appellees' participation in secrecy agreements to obtain preliminary results from European cancer studies shows that they knew Monsanto was not providing accurate safety information to its employees. Appellants also point to record evidence that shows that Indian Orchard employees did not know that VC could cause cancer in humans until early 1974, and that controls at Indian Orchard were not designed to protect against the dangers of liver injury or cancer. As we have explained, reasonable reliance is not an element of the sophisticated user defense as it exists in Massachusetts. The district court therefore erred when it stated: Given that Monsanto was the end user for purposes of the `sophisticated user' defense, the next question is whether the supplier Defendants were reasonable in relying on Monsanto to provide adequate warnings to Claude Taylor. [8] Even if the appellees did not reasonably rely on Monsanto to provide warnings to Taylor, they are not liable for failure to warn if Monsanto was a sophisticated user of VC. Therefore, appellees were still entitled to summary judgment on the appellants' failure to warn claim if a reasonable jury could only conclude that Monsanto knew, or reasonably should have known, of the dangers posed by appellees' product, VC. See Carrel, 852 N.E.2d at 108 (supporting this formulation). We now examine that question. [9] In doing so, we cite much of the same evidence cited by the district court in establishing that appellees reasonably relied on Monsanto to provide Taylor with warnings. That evidence is also relevant to Monsanto's knowledge of the dangers posed by VC.