Opinion ID: 146702
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Parole Status and Fact of Prior Convictions

Text: In his next argument, Mr. Butt contends that “he was not advised at his providency hearing that he would be facing an aggravated sentencing range or that he had a right to a jury determination of aggravating elements.” This argument is premised on Blakely and Apprendi, which hold that “‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). Both the Colorado Court of Appeals and the federal district court concluded that Blakely and Apprendi exempt from this rule the fact that the defendant has certain prior convictions and the fact that the defendant was on parole when he committed the instant offense. At the outset, we note that the sentencing court in this case did not use Mr. Butt’s prior convictions to aggravate or increase the statutory maximum for his offenses. Instead, the court very clearly stated only that Mr. Butt’s parole status triggered application of an aggravated sentencing range under Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1.3- 401(8)(a)(II). The court considered Mr. Butt’s prior convictions only as part of selecting a particular sentence within that aggravated range. Thus, it is not necessary to consider Blakely and Apprendi in the context of the sentencing court’s use of Mr. Butt’s prior -7- convictions.3 Nevertheless, to the extent Blakely and Apprendi do control the issue, those cases clearly exempt judicial fact-finding regarding prior convictions from the rule that only a jury may constitutionally find facts which increase a defendant’s maximum sentence. Moreover, since Blakely and Apprendi were decided, we have concluded that a defendant’s status as a parolee is a fact linked to the fact of a prior conviction, thus qualifying parole status under the prior-conviction exception explained above. See United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815, 820 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he ‘prior conviction’ exception extends to ‘subsidiary findings’ such as whether a defendant was under court supervision when he or she committed a subsequent crime.”). To the extent Mr. Butt argues that both the parole and prior-conviction exception may no longer be good law, a § 2254 habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief unless the state court decided his legal claim “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because the Supreme Court has not determined that the parole and prior-conviction exception are no longer permissible constructions of federal law under Blakely and Apprendi, Mr. Butt is not entitled to relief on this point. Our conclusion further requires that we reject Mr. Butt’s argument that the 3 Although the magistrate was correct in its suggestion that “pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(6), the trial court was . . . permitted to sentence Petitioner up to twice the authorized maximum term because his nine prior felonies were also held to be extraordinarily aggravating circumstances,” it is clear from the record that the sentencing court did not take this approach. -8- sentencing court failed to advise him that he had a right to a jury determination of these facts. In addition, Mr. Butt does not cite any federal authority holding that Blakely and Apprendi require a sentencing court to advise a defendant that he may be subject to an enhanced sentence if the court makes certain findings of fact. Finally, to the extent Mr. Butt seeks a COA on the factual issue of whether sufficient evidence supported the sentencing court’s finding that he committed nine felonies in the past, the sentencing court’s finding is presumed correct, and Mr. Butt has not rebutted this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).