Opinion ID: 1315571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the motion to vacate the tro should be granted

Text: Even assuming that a private right of action exists under HAVA, I believe that Northeast Ohio Coalition for Homeless v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006), demands that this court issue a stay and vacate the district court's temporary restraining order.
The Help America Vote Act, known as HAVA, requires each state to: implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the State level that contains the name and registration information of every legally registered voter in the State and assigns a unique identifier to each legally registered voter in the State (in this subsection referred to as the computerized list)[.] 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1)(A). Further: The chief State election official and the official responsible for the State motor vehicle authority of a State shall enter into an agreement to match information in the database of the statewide voter registration system with information in the database of the motor vehicle authority to the extent required to enable each such official to verify the accuracy of the information provided on applications for voter registration. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(B)(i). Under the plain language of the statute, it is clear that all that this section requires is that a state: (1) have an agreement between the election official and the motor vehicle authority official to share and compare information in the statewide voter registration system with information in the motor vehicle authority database; and (2) give the state election official and the motor vehicle official the ability to check voter registration information in the system. There is absolutely no language that imposes an affirmative duty on any state official to enable a purge of voters by either scouring the database to locate mismatches or by providing a system that would allow a person to make such a search. It is clear from the language of the statute and by looking at legislative history that HAVA's matching requirement was intended as an administrative safeguard for `storing and managing the official list of registered voters,' and not as a restriction on voter eligibility. Washington Ass'n of Churches v. Reed, 492 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1268 (W.D.Wash.2006). In fact, the two federal courts to consider the provision in question here, Reed and Florida NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir.2008), both rejected the argument asserted by ORP that HAVA requires matching to be used to verify eligible voters. Reed, 492 F.Supp.2d at 1268; Browning, 522 F.3d at 1172. The Reed court stressed that the matching system is simply one way that a new voter who registered by mail could be verified. Reed, 492 F.Supp.2d at 1268. Reed went on to explain that a system that made matching the only way to verify voter identity would violate HAVA. Id. at 1269 ([R]equiring a match prior to registration directly conflicts with 42 U.S.C. 15473(b).). In Browning, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that, while HAVA would allow a state to require that an individual have a match to be eligible to vote, HAVA did not compel such a requirement. Browning, 522 F.3d at 1172. Though Browning and Reed disagree as to whether a state can choose to base voter eligibility solely on matching, they agree on the issue before this court: HAVA does not compel states to use a certain type of match system to verify voters. All that HAVA requires is that election officials have some method by which to verify registrations. The language of HAVA does not mandate what system the states must use to match or verify votes, leaving such decisions to the discretion of the states. The majority of this circuit thus conflicts with the Eleventh Circuit and creates a circuit split that should be resolved by the Supreme Court. It boggles the mind that the majority can distort this simple language to force a state to implement a specific type of match system. This conclusion flies in the face of HAVA's own directive that the State gets to choose how to implement HAVA. 42 U.S.C. § 15485 (The specific choices on the methods of complying with the requirements of this subchapter shall be left to the discretion of the State.  (emphasis added)). I cannot comprehend why the majority is going to such lengths to force this strained interpretation into the case law, and I dissent from the majority's violation of the plain statutory language. Moreover, the majority's view would require the Secretary to violate the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and HAVA. HAVA specifically provides for the removal of voters in accordance with the provision of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(2)(A)(i). NVRA, however, does not permit registered voters to be removed based on computer matching. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6. Indeed, the NVRA requires that any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters must be completed at least 90 days prior to a federal election. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). The stated purpose of the TRO is to allow for an effective way to access and review the mismatches located in the current database, because, allegedly, some mismatches will reflect voter fraud. Dist. Ct. Ord. at 11. Thus, the TRO demands a program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters. § 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A). Therefore, the TRO, now sanctioned by the majority's forced interpretation of HAVA, mandates that the Secretary violate federal law. Congress cannot have intended HAVA to be read in such a way. Applying the correct interpretation of this statute to the facts in this case, I believe Ohio is likely in compliance with HAVA. Currently, the Secretary has a database which matches the information a voter provided when registering to vote with the information contained in the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles database. If there is a mismatch, the database notes the mismatch. This record of mismatches in the database is accessible by both the Secretary and the individual boards of election in Ohio. The individual boards of election can query a voter's match status in real time in order to verify registration. [6] This is all HAVA requires. It is true that the statewide voter database does not provide for a list of these mismatches, but HAVA does not require that level of user-friendliness. To be sure, it might be nice if the system printed out a list of individuals within, for example, a particular precinct, that did not match, but I refuse to manipulate the clear language of Congress in HAVA to require Ohio to comply with a particular interested private party's view of what type of match system would be best. For all these reasons, I conclude that the likelihood that the Secretary will succeed on the merits is great.
The district court found that there would be no harm to others, including the Secretary, if it issued the TRO that ORP sought. This determination is wholly unsubstantiated and contrary to the realities of the TRO issued. In a week, the database that the district court has ordered to be reprogrammed will be used to generate the Election Day poll books. Secretary Br. at 19. The district court made its reprogramming order without hearing any evidence pertaining to how such a reprogramming would affect the existing election system and, more importantly, how long it would take to test the reprogrammed system, retrain personnel, and ensure that the new reprogramming did not cause problems. The Supreme Court has exhorted courts to exercise proper judicial restraint before making precipitate changes to election procedures and policies when an impending election is imminent and a State's election machinery is already in progress. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585-86, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); see also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 7-8, 127 S.Ct. 5, 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). Election procedures are matters of state law, and federal courts should hesitate to interfere, particularly when operating on limited information in the weeks preceding an election. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 7-8, 127 S.Ct. 5. The Secretary must handle all problems related to the reprogramming that is required under the district court's novel order embraced by the majority of the en banc court. The most alarming possible side-effect of reprogramming would be that a programming glitch could cause validly registered voters to be inadvertently purged from poll books. Such a glitch would leave the Secretary with a database that can no longer be trusted for use in generating the poll books required for the election, causing delays and inaccuracies in the creation of the poll books. Secretary Br. at 19. The short time-frame available to comply with the TRO amplifies the risk of programming errors, one of numerous significant problems presented by the requirements imposed by the district court on short notice. Additionally, even if the court-ordered reprogramming works perfectly, the Secretary will be faced with a large number of mismatches to contend with at the last minute. See Brennan Ctr. Amicus Br. at 12-13; Ohio Democratic Party (ODP) Amicus Br. at 23-24. Because of the time limitations, voters whose information does not match may not be aware that there is any question about their registration and may not have or be able to obtain the documents necessary to further verify their registration. It is unlikely that the state can properly investigate all of the mismatches created by the TRO, and as a result, properly registered voters will likely be forced to cast provisional ballots, will believe that they cannot vote, or will be turned away at the polling places. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 7, 127 S.Ct. 5 (demanding careful consideration of any legal challenge that involves the possibility that qualified voters might be turned away from the polls). It is worth noting that the procedures each county uses to deal with these mismatches may not be uniform and could result in disproportionate disenfranchisement. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000) (per curiam) (noting importance of statewide standards for resolving questions of voting procedure). This confusion over what HAVA requires in terms of matching would affect not only Ohio, but every state in the country. ODP Amicus Br. at 15-16. Moreover, at a time when the Secretary is already busy with routine election procedures, the TRO will require the Secretary to expend significant scarce resources on the reprogramming and matching effort. This diversion of resources could leave the state unable to respond to routine election issues such as broken voting machines and lines at polling places. If significant energies are devoted to matching issues, the orderly administration of the election will suffer. For all these reasons, I conclude that the Secretary would suffer irreparable injury if we do not grant a stay and vacate the district court's TRO.
Given the fact that hurriedly reprogramming the database could lead to the purging of validly registered voters, a stay of the district court's intrusive TRO is necessary to protect the voters of Ohio. Though I agree with the district court's conclusion that safeguarding the legitimacy of the election of the President of the United States, Dist. Ct. Ord. at 15, is of great public importance, the TRO is not required to protect that interest. It is striking that both the district court and the majority of this court have determined that the TRO is the proper remedy without any factfinding. The district court stressed that the public, as well as ORP, would be injured by voter fraud if a TRO were not granted. Dist. Ct. Ord. at 12-14. This is the kind of inquiry that demands extensive factfinding. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 7-8, 127 S.Ct. 5. However, rather than undertake such factfinding, the district court, citing two newspaper articles, merely assumed that there will be widespread voter fraud absent the issuing of a TRO. Numerous other newspaper articles quote election officials who distinguish voter-registration fraud from actual voter fraud, and who indicate that actual improper voter registrations are already being detected. See, e.g., Joe Guillen, Multiple Registrants Tell Cuyahoga County Elections Board ACORN Workers Begged for Signatures, Cleveland Plain Dealer at A-1 (Oct. 14, 2008). Given the shaky ground on which the district court's suggestion of voter-fraud rests, I believe that this unsubstantiated fear does not warrant the district court's intrusion into the established state practice. Additionally, available evidence indicates that this intrusive TRO will cause more harm than it seeks to address. Computer matching is not a reliable way to verify voter eligibility. Brennan Ctr. Amicus Br. at 12-13; ODP Amicus Br. at 19-20; ACLU Amicus Br. at 7-8. Indeed, evidence from other states indicates that human error, not fraud, causes most mismatches. ODP Amicus Br. at 19. Data suggests that when the database match is conducted, anywhere from 15 to 30 percent of registered voters will fail to match. Brennan Ctr. Amicus Br. at 12-13. Disturbingly, mismatches have been shown to bar non-white voters more frequently than white voters. ACLU Amicus Br. at 7-8. Data from the Secretary of State shows that there are at least 485,000 new registered voters in Ohio this year. Rich Exner, Ohio Voter Registration Surges, available at http://www.cleveland.com/ datacentral/index.ssf/2008/10/ohio_voter_ registration_surges.html#more (Oct. 6, 2008). Given these numbers, the TRO issued by the district court and revived by today's result, could result in anywhere between 72,750 to 145,500 registered voters being removed from voting rolls, being forced to cast provisional ballots, or being otherwise wrongly disenfranchised. In contrast to these concrete projections, ORP has failed to present evidence that any voters, including those who have registered in the last year, have committed actual voting fraud. Indeed, data collected by the Brennan Center, the same nonpartisan organization that studied the failure rate of data matching, indicates that actual voter fraud is extremely rare. Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/ content/resource/truthaboutvoterfraud/ (Nov. 09, 2007). The Brennan Center noted that claims of voter fraud are frequently used to justify policies that do not solve the alleged wrongs, but that could well disenfranchise legitimate voters. Id. at 3. In fact, this report noted that [t]he most common source of superficial claims of voter fraud, and the most common source of error, probably involves matching voter rolls against each other or against some other source to find alleged double voters, dead voters, or otherwise ineligible voters. Id. at 8. Similarly, the League of Women Voters of Ohio and the Coalition on Homelessness and Housing in Ohio studied the 9 million votes cast in Ohio between 2002 and 2004, and found only four fraudulent ballots. Let the People Vote, available at http://www.cohhio. org/alerts/ElectionReformReport.pdf (Jun. 14, 2005). Therefore, the matching policy mandated by the TRO purportedly to eliminate voter fraud is actually likely to cause mismatches which will erroneously be labeled voter fraud, thereby disenfranchising individual voters and undermining public confidence in election results. [7] The likelihood that this last-minute TRO will undermine confidence in the election results and will adversely affect, and perhaps even disenfranchise, a large number of voters is greater and more disturbing than the possibility that fraudulent votes will dilute the strength of legitimate ballots. Cf. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 7, 127 S.Ct. 5. On the eve of the presidential election, ORP asks this court to derail election procedures that have been months in the making. The stay that the majority has vacated would simply have preserved the status quo and allowed Ohio to conduct its elections in the orderly method it had planned. The majority's ruling today upends all order, injects the potential for erroneous disenfranchisement of qualified voters into the election, and creates confusion surrounding voting rights on the unverified specter of potential fraud. In a case involving legislative apportionment, an issue which raises the same questions of vote dilution that prompted the district court to issue a TRO, the Supreme Court highlighted the importance of not making hasty, unconsidered changes to election plans on the eve of major elections: under certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and a State's election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief in a legislative apportionment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme was found invalid. In awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles. With respect to the timing of relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of the election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements of the court's decree. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585, 84 S.Ct. 1362. The TRO perverts the clear language of HAVA, and makes a provision meant to ensure that every American who is eligible to vote can vote into a tool to effect widespread voter disenfranchisement. 148 Cong. Rec. S2527 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2002) (statement of Sen. Daschle). The harm that the TRO will inflict on the Secretary, the voters, and the public is clear: elections in Ohio will be chaotic at best, blatantly unfair at worst, and doubt will fall on the validity of election results across the state. The mere specter of voter fraud, often raised but seldom proven, is the only injury that ORP asserts, and this unfounded threat cannot be used to coerce courts into acceding to the eleventh-hour demands of a partisan group that is intimately concerned with the results of the election it seeks to control. Accordingly, I would hold, as I did previously, that we should stay the TRO originally issued by the district court.