Opinion ID: 1140735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the tort of alienation of affections should be abolished on public policy grounds.

Text: ¶ 13. Fitch argues that this Court should abolish the tort of alienation of affections as a matter of public policy. Fitch states: [t]he adversarial positions taken in this litigation over the intensely personal and private matters of [Valentine] and Sandra certainly does not serve as a shining example to the citizens of Marshall County that marriage as an institution must be preserved. Fitch frames the trial as a classic morality play with [t]he hapless victim; his wife's virtue stolen by the rich villain. Fitch contends that since the divorce rate continues to escalate in Mississippi, the institution of marriage has already been devalued and the justification for this tort's continued existence is outdated and discredited. ¶ 14. To the contrary, Valentine asserts that this Court should continue to allow alienation of affection cases against third parties who cause the destruction and breakdown of the marital bond and family relationship. Valentine further contends that [t]he focus of this Court should be to continue to allow the viability of the tort which imposes liability . . . [and deters third parties] from intentionally interfering with a marriage. ¶ 15. The tort of alienation of affections was recognized in Mississippi as early as 1926 in McRae v. Robinson, 145 Miss. 191, 110 So. 504 (1926). In Camp v. Roberts, 462 So.2d 726, 727 (Miss.1985), this Court held [w]here a husband [wife] [10] is wrongfully deprived of his rights to the `services and companionship and consortium of his [her] wife [husband],' he [she] has a cause of action `against one who has interfered with his [her] domestic relations.' Id. at 727 (citing Walter v. Wilson, 228 So.2d 597, 598 (Miss.1969), overruled in part on other grounds; Saunders v. Alford, 607 So.2d 1214, 1219 (Miss. 1992)). Without question, Mississippi's recognition of the tort of alienation of affections places it among the minority of states. See Helsel v. Noellsch, 107 S.W.3d 231, 235 (Mo.2003) (Benton, J., dissenting) (the other states are Illinois, Hawaii, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah). However, in his special concurrence in Bland v. Hill, 735 So.2d 414 (Miss.1999), Chief Justice (then Justice) Smith wisely responded to the everybody else is doing it, so should I view, by stating: [w]hile I agree that it appears society's moral values have changed during modern times, I do not believe Mississippi should get aboard this runaway train. I would also not take away an offended spouse's only legal means to seek redress in our courts for the wrongful conduct of a third party who wilfully and intentionally interferes in and aids in destroying a marriage. Id. at 422 (Smith, J., specially concurring). [11] ¶ 16. In retaining the tort, this Court has stated that the purpose of a cause of action for alienation of affection is the `protection of the love, society, companionship, and comfort that form the foundation of a marriage. . . .' Id. at 417 (quoting Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215). The right sought to be protected is that of consortium. Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215. Justice Smith's special concurrence in Bland explained the justification and need for continued recognition of the tort of alienation of affections, stating: [s]hould an individual be allowed to intrude upon a marriage to such an extent as to cause it to come to an end? Does a spouse have a valuable interest in a marriage that is worthy of protection from the intruding third party? In my view, the answer to both questions is in the affirmative. The traditional family is under such attack both locally and nationally these days that this Court should not retreat now from the sound view of the tort of alienation of affections espoused by this Court in Saunders as entitling a spouse to protection of the love, society, companionship, and comfort that form the foundation of a marriage. [ Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215] (quoting Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991)); see also Horner v. Byrnett, [132 N.C.App. 323,] 511 S.E.2d 342 (N.C.Ct.App.1999). I do not believe that under the compelling facts of this particular case this Court should hold that the doctrine of alienation of affections has outlived its usefulness as a deterrent protecting the marital relationship of a husband and wife in cases where the facts clearly warrant. Bland, 735 So.2d at 422 (Smith, J., specially concurring) (emphasis added). In addition to protecting the marriage relationship and its sanctity, see id. at 418, the tort of alienation of affections also provides an appropriate remedy for intentional conduct which causes a loss of consortium. The dissenting opinion in Helsel summarized this position, stating: [i]n tort cases where a spouse is injured, the other spouse often has a separate claim for loss of consortium. Powell v. American Motors Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Mo. banc 1992). Most of these losses are caused by a defendant's negligence. In alienation of affection  an intentional tort  a defendant's intentional conduct causes the loss. See Gibson [v. Frowein,] 400 S.W.2d [418,] 421 [(Mo. banc 1966)]. It is inconsistent [if] the law compensates for negligent conduct causing a loss of consortium, but . . . does not compensate for intentional conduct causing the same loss. Helsel, 107 S.W.3d at 234 (Benton, J., dissenting). See also Bland, 735 So.2d at 421 (Smith, J., specially concurring) (there is no point in abolishing an otherwise valid common law tort, especially now that we have leveled the playing field in Kirk. Would the dissent strike down consortium next?). Therefore, in the interest of protecting the marriage relationship and providing a remedy for intentional conduct which causes a loss of consortium, this Court declines the invitation to abolish the common law tort of alienation of affections in Mississippi. [12] Alienation of affections is the only available avenue to provide redress for a spouse who has suffered loss and injury to his or her marital relationship against the third party who, through persuasion, enticement, or inducement, caused or contributed to the abandonment of the marriage and/or the loss of affections by active interference.