Opinion ID: 2611375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inasmuch As Officer Veneri Conducted A Custodial Interrogation Of Kane Without First Affording Him The Procedural Safeguards Mandated By Miranda, Kane's Statements To Officer Veneri Are Inadmissible At Trial.

Text: The circuit court ruled that Kane's statements to Veneri regarding the device found in his truck and its purpose were unlawfully obtained and therefore inadmissible. In this connection, the circuit court entered the following COL: That the defendant was in custody prior to being questioned by Officer Veneri and the questions asked of the defendant were designed to illicit [sic] responses which would evoke an incriminating response. State v. Melemai [,] 64 Haw. 479, 643 P.2d 541 (1982); State v. Ikaika [,] 67 Haw. 563, 698 P.2d 281 (1985). The prosecution urges (1) that the foregoing COL is clearly erroneous and (2) that Kane's statements to Officer Veneri pertaining to what the explosive device was and what it was to be used for should be admitted under the public safety exception to Miranda. These arguments are not persuasive. An individual accused of a criminal offense enjoys the protections of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution. State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai`i 17, 32, 881 P.2d 504, 519 (1994) (citing State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 501, 849 P.2d 58, 69 (1993)). In Hoey, we set forth the safeguards to which an individual is entitled before being subjected to a custodial interrogation: Miranda imposed upon the prosecution the burden of demonstrating in any given case that these procedural safeguards had been employed and described them in relevant part as follows: Prior to any [custodial] questioning, the [defendant] must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Hoey, 77 Hawai`i at 33, 881 P.2d at 520 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612) (brackets in original). We also noted that `the protections which the United States Supreme Court enumerated in Miranda have an independent source in the [Hawai`i] Constitution's privilege against self-incrimination.' Hoey, 77 Hawai`i at 33, 881 P.2d at 520 (quoting State v. Nelson, 69 Haw. 461, 467, 748 P.2d 365, 369 (1987)) (brackets in original). If the procedural safeguards mandated by Miranda are not satisfied, then `statements made by the accused may not be used either as direct evidence ... or to impeach the defendant's credibility[.]' Hoey, 77 Hawai`i at 33, 881 P.2d at 520 (quoting Nelson, 69 Haw. at 467, 748 P.2d at 369) (ellipsis points in original); see also State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971). `The test to determine if a custodial interrogation ha[s] taken place is whether the investigating officer should have known that his or her words or conduct were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.' State v. Roman, 70 Haw. 351, 357, 772 P.2d 113 (1989) (quoting State v. Ikaika, 67 Haw. 563, 698 P.2d 281 (1985)). It is uncontroverted that Kane was in custody when he was questioned by Officer Veneri. He had been arrested, was handcuffed, and was sitting in a patrol car at the time. It is also apparent that, before he approached Kane, Officer Veneri knew that the device he had found in Kane's fanny pack was an explosive, the possession of which was a crime. Hence, Officer Veneri should have known that the questions that he posed to Kane were likely to elicit an incriminating response. Under these circumstances, Kane was subjected to a custodial interrogation. Accordingly, the holdings of both this court and the United States Supreme Court require that, inasmuch as he was not first informed of his rights protected by article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution and the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, his statements to Officer Veneri must be suppressed. The prosecution next argues that, even if Kane was subjected to a custodial interrogation without being informed of his Miranda rights, his statements are, nevertheless, admissible under the public safety exception to Miranda. This argument, however, fails for two reasons. First, while the United States Supreme Court has adopted the public safety exception as a limitation on the procedural safeguards necessary for the protection of the rights afforded by the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, this court has never formally adopted an analogous limitation on the protections afforded to criminal defendants by article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution. Second, on the facts of this case, the public safety exception to the Miranda requirements, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Quarles, supra, is not applicable and, therefore, cannot render Kane's statements admissible even under federal constitutional analysis. In Quarles, the police apprehended a suspected rapist after a chase through a supermarket. Because the victim had indicated that her assailant had carried a gun, the police searched him for the weapon, but found only an empty shoulder holster. Concerned that the unlocated gun posed a threat to public safety, the arresting officer immediately asked, before reading the suspect his Miranda rights, where the gun was. When the suspect told him, the officer first retrieved the gun and, only afterward, formally arrested the suspect and informed him of his fifth amendment rights as required by Miranda. The Quarles Court reasoned that the exigency created by having a gun freely available in a public place, where it could be found by and cause injury to anyone in the area, justified the police in questioning the suspect for the limited purpose of neutralizing the immediate danger without first giving the warnings required by Miranda. Quarles is inapposite to this case. Unlike the police officer in Quarles, Officer Veneri had ascertained the location of Kane's device and was aware that it was an explosive. Armed with this knowledge, Officer Veneri did not require additional information from Kane in order to verify the need to call the bomb squad. Accordingly, Officer Veneri's questions cannot be said to have been designed solely for the purpose of addressing the danger posed by the explosive. The public safety exception to Miranda being inapplicable to this case, we hold that Kane's answers to Officer Veneri's questions pertaining to what the explosive was and why Kane was in possession of it are inadmissible in evidence.