Opinion ID: 880020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Conflict Between Special Verdict and the Instructions

Text: In a second attack upon the special verdict form, the Bank contends the form was inherently contradictory with the instructions in allowing the jury to fix a verdict based on breach of contract when the court had instructed the jury on the tort measure of damages. The full text of the special verdict form and the responses of the jury are set forth under footnote 1, infra. It will be seen from the responses that the jury determined that the November 14, 1975 contract had not been modified by the parties on December 30, 1976; and that the Bank had breached the November 14, 1975 contract, which resulted in damages of $104,709.75. The jury further found that the Bank breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because the jury awarded damages under the breach of contract claim, the special verdict form directed the jury not to fix damages for the breach of the implied covenant and directed the jury's attention instead to whether punitive damages should be awarded. The jury did fix punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00. In Montana, the measure of damages for a breach of contract is the compensatory amount for all the detriment proximately caused by or likely to result therefrom in the ordinary course of things. Damages for such breach must be clearly ascertainable both in nature and origin. Section 27-1-311, MCA. The measure of damages for a tort in Montana is the compensatory amount for all the detriment proximately caused by the tort whether it could have been anticipated or not. Section 27-1-317, MCA. The Bank contends here that the measure of damages for a breach of contract is substantially narrower than the tort measure under the statutory definitions and that the failure of the District Court to instruct on the measure of damages for breach of contract was a serious fundamental error. The anomaly in the Bank's position is that it offered instructions accepted by the District Court which instructed the jury that in a breach of contract case the amount of damages must be clearly ascertainable in nature and origin, and in instruction no. 34, embodied the statutory definition of the measure of damages for breach of contract. However, these instructions were withdrawn by the Bank in the course of settling the instructions. The District Court did give the jury its instruction no. 21 which embodied the measure of damages for a tort. In its instruction no. 25, however, it warned the jury that damages for loss of profits should not be speculative. It further told the jury that no damages were recoverable which were not clearly ascertainable both in nature and origin and that only profits which are reasonably certain could be awarded. The jury award of $104,790.75 can be mathematically determined from the transcript. The Weinbergs claimed the payment of excess interest over 9.5 percent of $33,158.17; loss of three years' cash crops $42,532.99; loss of 1985 barley crop $7,349.59; and loss of 3 years' hay production $21,750.00. Whether regarded from the viewpoint of damages for tort or for contract, the amount awarded by the jury would have been the same based on the claims of the Weinbergs. The District Court recognized this and arranged the special verdict forms so as not to allow the jury to bring in an award of double damages, one for breach of contract, and one for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In any event, the damages would have been the same. For three reasons, therefore, (1) the instructions on breach of contract damages were withdrawn by the Bank during the settlement instructions, (2) the instructions given by the court were substantially modified so as to include the essential elements for breach of contract damages, and (3) no harm was done because the damages would be the same in any event, we find no merit in this issue raised by the Bank. [1]