Opinion ID: 853352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Inadequate Penalty Phase Investigation and Presentation

Text: Before the post-conviction court, Wrinkles claimed ineffective assistance based on counsels' alleged inadequate investigation for the penalty phase of trial and insufficient presentation of evidence in mitigation of the death sentence. More specifically, Wrinkles argues that counsel failed to investigate and present the impact of [his] drug addiction on his mental health, as well as other aspects of his background and personality. Br. of Appellant at 47. He claims that if such evidence had been presented during the penalty phase, the jury would have sentenced him to a term of years rather than death. The record shows that before the penalty phase of trial began on May 20, 1995, the trial court incorporated the evidence from the guilt phase of trial. R. at 3193. Counsel specifically requested that Dr. Engum's guilt phase testimony and report be incorporated. R. at 3230. On May 19, 1995, just one day before the penalty phase, Dr. Engum testified in depth about Wrinkles' various mental illnesses, one of which was amphetamine dependence, with the likelihood of amphetamine-induced psychotic disorder with delusions, which is basically saying he bec[a]me increasingly paranoid when he would abuse the methamphetamine. R. at 2994-95. Dr. Engum then explained the effects of Wrinkles' amphetamine dependence on his behavior. R. at 2995. Despite this incorporated testimony, Wrinkles argues that counsel should have called an expert during the penalty phase who could have explained to the jury how dangerously addictive methamphetamine is and how addicts become violent and paranoid. Br. of Appellant at 55. However, Dr. Engum testified during the guilt phase to just thata pretty typical trait of severe methamphetamine abuse [is that the individual] become[s] increasingly aggressive, angry, hostile; in some cases, violent aggressive, but highly paranoid. R. at 2995. When mitigating evidence has already been presented at the guilt phase of trial, counsel's failure to duplicate this evidence during the penalty phase of trial does not constitute deficient performance. Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23, 48 (Ind. 1998); see also I.C. § 35-50-2-9(d) (providing that the jury may consider all the evidence introduced at the trial stage of the proceedings [during the penalty phase].); Benefiel v. State, 716 N.E.2d 906, 913 (Ind.1999) (While hearing the same testimony again at the penalty phase might have reinforced the idea that the mental disease discussed during the guilt phase could have mitigating weight, we cannot say that the failure to reintroduce the testimony created a reasonable probability that the jury would have recommended against death.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830, 121 S.Ct. 83, 148 L.Ed.2d 45 (2000). Wrinkles' real argument seems to be that counsel should have called an additional expert, such as Dr. Evans or Dr. Smith, during the penalty phase to further explore his methamphetamine addiction. Attorney Vowels testified at the post-conviction hearing that he did not want to dwell on Wrinkles' methamphetamine addiction during the penalty phase because he did not want Wrinkles to appear as a heavy doper. P-C R. at 1327. This was a strategy decision that we will not second-guess. See Lambert, 743 N.E.2d at 743 (holding that it was reasonable for counsel to emphasize the defendant's character during the penalty phase instead of relying on complicated mental health issues); Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 261 (As a matter of trial strategy, a defense counsel in a capital case may decide what is the best argument to present during the penalty phase. After an investigation into potentially mitigating evidence, a defense counsel may decide that it would be better for his client not to argue, as mitigation evidence, defendant's background history such as a history of drug abuse and a bad family life.) (citations omitted); Hayes v. Lockhart, 852 F.2d 339, 352 (8th Cir.1988) (observing that counsel's decision not to present additional mitigating evidence regarding defendant's drinking problem was a reasonable trial tactic, one that was based upon counsel's calculated assessment that the risk of probable harm exceeded the possible benefit that might have resulted....), judgment vacated on other grounds, 491 U.S. 902, 109 S.Ct. 3181, 105 L.Ed.2d 691 (1989). Wrinkles' next contention concerns evidence of his background and personality. During the penalty phase of trial, counsel called Steven Brock, a sentencing consultant and mitigation specialist who, before testifying, interviewed approximately forty people including Wrinkles and his family, friends, and customers. R. at 3231, 3237. He also reviewed Wrinkles' medical and educational records, depositions conducted in the case, and Dr. Engum's report. R. at 3240. Brock testified in great detail about Wrinkles' early years, particularly that he grew up in a troubled home with an alcoholic father who physically and verbally abused his wife and children. R. at 3243-47. Brock also identified other mitigators: Wrinkles' lack of significant criminal history, R. at 3249; he was under extreme mental and emotional disturbance when he committed the murders, R. at 3249; his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, R. at 3249-50; he has a psychological profile as put forth by Dr. Engum as a paranoid individual who sees conspiracies everywhere, R. at 3251; and his daughter Lindsay Wrinkles and the guardians of the Wrinkles and Fulkerson children did not want him executed, R. at 3259. [9] In this appeal, Wrinkles challenges Brock's testimony on two grounds. First, he argues that allowing Brock to testify instead of his family, friends, and customers gave the impression that Wrinkles had no one who cared about him and had to pay someone to testify on his behalf. Br. of Appellant at 48. However, this was a tactical decision that we will not second-guess. See Wisehart, 693 N.E.2d at 48 n. 26 ([W]hich witnesses to call is the epitome of a strategic decision.) (quotation omitted). Next, Wrinkles argues that Brock left out important information in his summary. For example, Wrinkles points to the following post-conviction witnesses: his mother and brother gave examples of the abuse he received as a child from his alcoholic father; his friends testified that he abused drugs and had not been acting like himself weeks before the murders; and his customers testified that he was a good mechanic who went out of his way for them. However, Wrinkles' family testified to the same events at the post-conviction hearing that Brock testified to during the penalty phase of trial. Compare P-C R. at 378-88, 389-98 with R. at 3244-46. Therefore, their testimony would have been cumulative to Brock's testimony. Further, Wrinkles' drug use was presented during the guilt phase through four lay witnesses, one expert witness, and Wrinkles himself. R. at 2711-12, 2715, 2720, 2722-23, 2834, 2843, 2861-62, 2931-32, 2935-37, 2994-97, 3002, 3006-07. See Wisehart, 693 N.E.2d at 48 ([W]hen mitigating evidence has already been presented, the failure of counsel to duplicate during the penalty phase the mitigating evidence presented to the jury during the guilt phase does not constitute deficient performance.). Finally, as far as Wrinkles' customers are concerned, counsel could have made a decision not to call them because they possibly would have been exposed to Wrinkles' bad acts on cross-examination. This was a strategy call that we will not second-guess. See Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438, 447 (Ind.1998) (identifying that [a] decision regarding what witnesses to call is a matter of trial strategy which an appellate court will not second-guess....). The post-conviction court did not err in concluding that counsel were not ineffective on these grounds.