Opinion ID: 729726
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Daubert Analysis for Soft Science

Text: 45 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court addressed the standards of admissibility for scientific evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 11 The Court rejected the general acceptance test for novel scientific testimony from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and asserted flexible guidelines for admissibility of scientific evidence under Rule 702. 46 Under Daubert, the trial judge plays a gatekeeping role, ensuring that all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is both reliable and relevant. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.7, 597. 47 The Daubert opinion emphasized first that the expert must testify to scientific knowledge. [T]he requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to `scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability. Id. at 590 & n.9. Knowledge applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds. Id. at 590 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986)). 48 The Court explained scientific knowledge in terms of a theory or technique that (1) can be and has been tested, (2) has been subjected to peer review, (3) has a known or potential rate of error (when technique is scientific), and (4) has been generally accepted by the scientific community. Id. at 593-94. 49 The touchstone under Rule 702 is reliability. As the opinion states, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. Id. at 589. 50 Furthermore, the knowledge must assist the trier of fact. That is a relevance issue. Id. at 591. The key question for the trial judge in determining relevance under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) 12 is whether the expert proposes to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Id. at 592. 51 The Daubert opinion, while dealing with scientific evidence, specifically noted that the discussion was limited to a scientific context that was the nature of the expertise offered in that case. The discussion in the case does not apply to technical, or other specialized knowledge[,] but only to scientific knowledge. Id. at 590 n.8. 52 Here, we deal with a social science in which the research, theories and opinions cannot have the exactness of hard science methodologies such as blood tests, DNA, spectrographic evidence or chemical exposures with which Daubert dealt. As observed in a recent article, Daubert principles may not fully apply to certain social science evidence. 53 Application of Daubert criteria to behavioral and social science evidence, particularly psychological syndromes, is problematic for two reasons: (1) judges' level of understanding of scientific principles and methodology may ill prepare them to evaluate science, including social science, as now required by Daubert and (2) the nature of certain social and behavioral science theories may be inherently inconsistent with Daubert criteria such as falsifiability and error rates. 54 James T. Richardson, et al., The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 Judicature 10, 10-11 (July-Aug. 1995); see also Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995). But see Rincon v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 41 (1993) (summarily remanding case for reconsideration in light of Daubert where expert testimony about reliability of eye witness testimony at issue). 55 The standard of review for admission of expert testimony is abuse of discretion. See Cook v. American S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court recently revisited the abuse of discretion standard in Koon v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 4512, 4517 (Jun. 13, 1996): 56 Little turns, however, on whether we label review of this particular question abuse of discretion or de novo, for an abuse of discretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond appellate correction. Cooter & Gell, [496 U.S. 384] 402 (1990). A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. 496 U.S., at 405. That a departure decision, in an occasional case, may call for a legal determination does not mean, as a consequence, that parts of the review must be labeled de novo while other parts are labeled an abuse of discretion. See id., at 403 (court of appeals should apply a unitary abuse-of-discretion standard). The abuse of discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.