Opinion ID: 1510072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Stop and Frisk Cases

Text: The first articulation by the Supreme Court of the United States of the stop and frisk exception to the traditional requirement of probable cause as a condition of conducting a search came in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The Terry fact scenario is familiar. Officer McFadden, a longtime Cleveland police officer, was patrolling the streets of down-town Cleveland. He was alone and all events occurred during daylight hours. Two men standing on a street corner attracted his attention and he placed them under surveillance. One of these men left the other and walked down the street past several stores, pausing to look in a particular store window. He then continued along the street, turned around and again stopped at the same store window. Thereafter, he rejoined his companion and the two talked briefly. Then the second man went through the same motions. This ritual was repeated by the two men alternately some five or six times each. After the two men had been observed pacing, peering, and conferring, they walked off together in the direction taken by a third man who had previously engaged them in conversation. Officer McFadden, suspecting that they were casing a job, a stick-up, followed them until they stopped in front of a store to talk to the same man who had conferred with them earlier. He then approached the three men, identified himself as a police officer and asked for their names. The Court recognizes at the very outset that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has `seized' that person. 392 U.S. at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d at 903. Further, the danger of the argument which attempts to distinguish between a stop and an arrest or seizure, seeks to isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the policeman and the citizen. (Emphasis supplied) 392 U.S. at 17, 88 S.Ct. at 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d at 903. Thus, the Fourth Amendment comes into play irrespective of the nature or nomenclature of the intrusion. Therefore, officer McFadden seized Terry and subjected him to a search. 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905. Thus, the Court determined that its dual inquiry was whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.  (Emphasis supplied) 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905. With this predicate, and after making it clear that the notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the requirement of probable cause remain valid, the Court laid down a balancing test: [I]t is necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen, for there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails. (citations omitted) And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. [18] The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? (citations omitted) Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulable hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. (citations omitted) And simple good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough. (Emphasis supplied). 392 U.S. at 21, 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905, 906. Footnote 18 reminds that: This demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Conceding the right of a police officer to search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, the Court restricts and circumscribes that right: [T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of a police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909. Thus, the frisk of Terry was upheld on the basis of the officer's reasonable belief that criminal activity may be afoot and that Terry may be armed and presently dangerous.