Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of the Right to Counsel at the Penalty Phase

Text: Defendant contends he was denied his constitutional rights to counsel, a fair trial, a reliable verdict, and due process of law when, without notice, waiver, consent or order of court, his second counsel, Steven Harmon, represented him at the penalty phase of the trial. Defendant also asserts' that Harmon could not adequately assist him at the penalty phase because Harmon was not present at either the jury selection or the guilt phase of trial and lead attorney Barnett was not present to assist Harmon at the penalty phase. Defendant implies that Attorney Harmon was forced upon him at the penalty phase, or was otherwise improperly substituted for lead defense counsel. This argument is without merit. At a pretrial hearing conducted on February 19, 1987 (nearly one year prior to the commencement of the guilt phase of the trial), lead counsel for the defense, William Barnett, moved for appointment of second counsel, pursuant to section 987.2. Barnett described second counsel Harmon as eminently qualified and very experienced. Barnett thereafter informed defendant: Mr. Hart, I just introduced you to Steve Harmon, explained to you that we were going to cocounsel and come up and talk to you; do you agree Mr. Harmon can co-counsel with me in your case? Defendant replied: Yes. The trial court thereafter appointed Harmon as cocounsel. The record is devoid of any suggestion that second counsel Harmon was substituted for lead counsel Barnett, forced upon defendant, or revealed to defendant in an untimely fashion. Defendant's consent to Attorney Harmon's assistance in the representation of defendant was clear and unequivocal, as was the trial court's discretionary decision ( Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108) to permit Harmon to serve as co counsel. In view of the prosecution's intention to present at the penalty phase defendant's numerous prior convictions as well as the evidence linking him to the murder of Shelah McMahan, the appointment of Harmon was well within the trial court's discretion ( Keenan v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d 424, 430-432, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108) and facilitated the preparation and presentation of a full and complete defense. ( People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 163, 158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587.) The circumstance that defendant's two attorneys shared the representation of defendant by having lead counsel Barnett handle the guilt phase of the trial, and cocounsel Harmon the penalty phase, did not reflect a substitution of the latter attorney for the former. Defendant raises a related contention that the substitution of counsel led to a disturbing pattern of ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of this contention, defendant argues that Harmon was unfamiliar with the record, surprised by Cindy Widney's testimony, and cursory in his examination of Criminalist Faye Springer. In order to establish his claim, however, defendant must point to a deficiency so egregious that his attorney's conduct fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 552, 561, 54 Cal. Rptr.2d 52, 917 P.2d 1175.) He fails to do so. As noted, there was no substitution. Nor does the record support a claim of ineffective assistance. To the contrary, defense counsel at the penalty phase vigorously cross-examined key prosecution witnesses, sought to cast doubt on the case against defendant involving Shelah, and presented a thorough case in mitigation. During the penalty phase, defendant expressed his high regard for defense counsel, informing the court: As for phase two, I am totally pleased with both my counsel. In view of the foregoing, we reject defendant's contention that the appointment of Attorney Harmon to the defense team denied defendant his constitutional right to counsel. [29]