Opinion ID: 520588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Single Transaction as Evidence of Membership in Conspiracy

Text: 16 At the outset we announce again the oft-stated principles governing appellate challenges to the sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases. It is well-established that a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a 'very heavy burden,'  United States v. Buck, 804 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.1986) (citation omitted), and that a verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence ... to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). Also, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1002 (2d Cir.1985), and the reviewing court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the verdict. United States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606, 614 (2d Cir.1986). If any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction must be upheld. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). With these principles in mind, we now turn to consider appellant's claims. 17 Zabare's principal contention before us is that he was entitled to the benefit of the so-called single transaction rule, because his isolated purchase of tickets from Richard Folch was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that he knowingly joined in the conspiracy charged. The single transaction rule was adopted by this Court in United States v. Zeuli, 137 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.1943) (L. Hand, J.). Simply put, the rule states that if a crime necessarily involves the mutual cooperation of two persons, and if they have in fact committed the crime, they may not be convicted of a conspiracy to commit it. Id. at 846. In Zeuli, this Court applied the rule to exonerate an individual in a situation such as the one herein, where the individual was found to have committed a crime with a member of an established conspiracy, and was accused of having joined the conspiracy by virtue of his single action. See id.; see also United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 748 (7th Cir.1969); United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 974, 80 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 40 L.Ed.2d 1009, 1010 (1960). 18 In conspiracy cases, where an outsider commits a single crime with a member of an existing conspiracy and is thereafter accused of having joined that conspiracy by virtue of his criminal association with one of its members, courts have applied the single transaction rule to hold that the mutual cooperation between the outsider and the conspirator in the context of the single crime is not a substitute for proof of an independent agreement on the part of the outsider to join the ranks of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Aviles, 274 F.2d at 190. In cases such as this, involving a purchase of contraband from a member of an existing conspiracy, courts have held that the act of buying stolen goods, even goods known to have been stolen, standing alone, does not make the purchaser a member of [an existing] conspiracy to steal the goods or to receive stolen goods. United States v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 863, 876 (11th Cir.1982); see Varelli, 407 F.2d at 748; Zeuli, 137 F.2d at 846. While it is true that a purchaser of illicit drugs or stolen goods may advance the ultimate goals of a criminal conspiracy simply by virtue of the revenues his purchase generates, the single purchase alone does not per se evidence the buyer's intent to knowingly join and participate in that conspiracy. As the Eighth Circuit stated in United States v. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.1981): 19 The relationship of buyer and seller absent any prior or contemporaneous understanding beyond the mere sales agreement does not prove a conspiracy to sell, receive, barter or dispose of stolen property although both parties know of the stolen character of the goods. In such circumstances, the buyer's purpose is to buy; the seller's purpose is to sell. There is no joint objective. 20 Id. at 634 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1307 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 361, 58 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (citations omitted)). 21 Notwithstanding all of the above, it also is settled in this Circuit that a defendant's participation in a single transaction can suffice to sustain a charge of knowing participation in an existing conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 903 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1123-24 (2d Cir.1974); United States v. DeNoia, 451 F.2d 979, 981 (2d Cir.1971) (per curiam); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 835-36 (2d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959, 83 S.Ct. 1013, 10 L.Ed.2d 11 (1963). The test that has evolved for determining whether a single act is sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction is whether  'the qualitative nature' of the act 'viewed in the context of the entire conspiracy' ... in a particular case supports beyond a reasonable doubt the inference that an individual is involved in a conspiracy. Murray, 618 F.2d at 903 (quoting Torres, 503 F.2d at 1124). In this case, appellant argued to the district court that the government's proof was insufficient to show that he knowingly joined Folch's conspiracy to buy and sell stolen Ticketron tickets. Zabare contended that the most the evidence showed was that he had participated in a single, isolated transaction involving the purchase of Ticketron tickets from Folch on July 25, 1983. In response, the government asserted that Zabare's participation in a conspiracy to sell Ticketron tickets could reasonably be inferred from the surrounding circumstances leading up to the sale, the sale itself, and the magnitude of the purchase. 22 At the earlier trial of Zabare's alleged co-conspirators, Judge Haight found, and the government did not contest, that the single-count indictment charged what has been commonly referred to as a wheel conspiracy. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 754-55, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1242-43, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); see, e.g., United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 896 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1392 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 174, 102 L.Ed.2d 143 (1988). As Judge Haight noted, Richard Folch was the center of the wheel, and [h]e intended to sell Ticketron blanks to a number of purchasers who formed the respective spokes of the conspiracy wheel. Accordingly, Judge Haight stated that, in order for the government to convict the individual purchasers in this case as members of the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment, the Government was obliged to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [each purchaser] had knowledge of the far-reaching, overall scheme of which Folch ... formed the center core. See United States v. Sieger, No. SS84 Cr. 158-CSH, 1985 WL 565 (S.D.N.Y.) (Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 19, 1985). Because the indictment charged Zabare and his alleged co-conspirators with participation in a single conspiracy to distribute stolen Ticketron tickets, the focus of the district court's inquiry in both of these cases was on whether the government had proved that each of the charged purchasers had sufficient awareness of the existence of other members of the alleged conspiracy to render them part of the rim of the wheel to enclose the spokes. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755, 66 S.Ct. at 1243; see also United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 589-90 (2d Cir.) (In such conspiracies, whether the spoke participants may be found to be members along with the core conspirators depends on whether or not the 'spokes' knew or had reason to know of the existence, but not necessarily the identity, of one or more of the other spoke participants in the wheel conspiracy.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947, 98 S.Ct. 281, 285, 287, 298, 30 L.Ed.2d 264 (1971). 23 In the case of Zabare's alleged co-conspirators, the district court found the evidence insufficient to link the defendants Lindsay and Brown to the conspiracy, but sufficient to find Folch's principal co-conspirator Howard Sieger guilty of participating in the conspiracy charged. While the district judge thought that the facts of Zabare's case presented a close question on the conspiracy issue, he nevertheless concluded that it was reasonable to infer that Zabare knew he was part of a wider criminal enterprise when he bought the stolen tickets. According to the district judge, the reasonable inferences for Zabare to draw from the single transaction in which he engaged were that: (a) Folch had access to substantial quantities of blank Ticketron tickets; and [that] (b) Zabare was being offered an opportunity to purchase some, but not all, of that supply. The district judge went on to state: It necessarily follows that Zabare could reasonably infer the 'horizontal' presence of other purchasers from Folch, who would then seek to process or resell the blank tickets in just the same manner that Zabare undoubtedly intended. 24 We believe the inferences drawn by Judge Haight from appellant's single purchase were warranted, and that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support those inferences. The record evidence reveals the following: (1) prior to the July 25th transaction, Folch contacted Zabare for the first time in two years, having never done business with him before, informed him that he was going to get a shipment of blank tickets, and inquired whether Zabare would be interested in purchasing any of those tickets; and (2) on the day in question, Folch appeared at Zabare's apartment and sold him 6,400 blank Ticketron tickets--tickets with a resale value of at least $200,000. Based on the sheer quantity of tickets, the unusualness of the circumstances surrounding Folch's contact with Zabare, and Richard Folch's implicit representation to Zabare that he was but one of those invited to participate in distributing the tickets, Judge Haight was amply justified in finding that Zabare knew, or had reason to be aware, that Folch was engaged in a scheme to sell blank Ticketron tickets to one or more persons other than himself. As Judge Haight properly found, it was Zabare's awareness of the horizontal scope of Folch's network which linked him to the conspiracy charged and rendered his single purchase an act done in furtherance of that conspiracy. See also United States v. Magnano, 543 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091, 97 S.Ct. 1100, 1101, 51 L.Ed.2d 536 (1977); DeNoia, 451 F.2d at 981; Agueci, 310 F.2d at 835-36. 25 We note that our holding today is based solely on the facts and circumstances presented in this case. Our decision should not be read to relax the requirement that the government prove knowing participation in an existing conspiracy. Neither the prior contact between Folch and Zabare, nor the mere quantity of tickets, standing alone, would have sufficed to connect Zabare to the conspiracy. It is only when we consider these events together that we can confidently affirm the judgment of the district court. 26 On appeal, Zabare contends that he should have fared as well as two of his alleged co-conspirators, Lindsay and Brown, both of whom purchased only some of Folch's tickets and both of whom actually met Hackbart while dealing with Folch. Specifically, Zabare attacks the district court for failing to explain why the 800 tickets purchased by Lindsay and Brown, who were acquitted, would not also lead them to infer the presence of other horizontal purchasers. As the government correctly points out in response, this argument obscures the fact that Judge Haight's rulings as to these defendants were based not only on the size of the transactions, but on the entire circumstances surrounding the sale. As Judge Haight stated in his opinion: The circumstances bringing Folch and Zabare together, and the magnitude of the transaction between those individuals, bear no qualitative resemblance to the single package of tickets fortuitously sold by Folch to Brown and Lindsay. We do not disagree and we find Zabare's argument on this point unpersuasive. 27