Opinion ID: 1130959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Interpretation of Treaties and of Abrogation of Treaty Rights

Text: All of the parties to this litigation agree that the Yakima Indians are entitled to water for irrigation purposes and, at least at one time, were entitled to water for the preservation of fishing rights. The disagreement here is the extent of the treaty rights remaining. [5] In water rights adjudications, state courts have the right to determine the extent of the reserved treaty water rights of Indian tribes. [32] In making that determination, state courts must apply federal law. [33] [6-9] In interpreting Indian treaties, courts are required to liberally construe the treaties in favor of the Indians. [34] Ambiguous treaties must be resolved in favor of Indians. [35] Further, in determining water rights for Indian reservations, a court is not to balance the competing interests of Indian and non-Indian water users to reach an equitable apportionment. [36] On the other hand, even though legal ambiguities are to be resolved to the benefit of Indians, courts may not ignore statutory language that, viewed in its historical context and given a fair appraisal, clearly runs counter to the tribe's claims. [37] [10] Congress may unilaterally abrogate a treaty provision, without the consent of the tribe. [38] The abrogation may be implied or express. [39] [11] Where an abrogation or limitation is not clear from the face of a statute, the standard to be applied in determining whether such rights have been abrogated has been stated in various ways by the United States Supreme Court. [40] The Court has said that without explicit statutory language stating an intent to abrogate treaty rights, courts should be extremely reluctant to hold an abrogation of those rights exists. [41] Abrogation is thus not to be lightly inferred. [42] The United States Supreme Court also has held that it is proper to look to the statute's legislative history and surrounding circumstances as well as to the language of the statute. [43] Subsequent history also may be considered in determining congressional intent. [44] Ultimately, it is the intent of Congress which controls. [45] The most recent articulation of the standard by the Supreme Court is set forth in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 90 L.Ed.2d 767, 106 S.Ct. 2216 (1986), a case in which the Court found that the passage of the Bald Eagle Protection Act by Congress constituted an abrogation of the treaty hunting rights of Indians to take bald eagles and golden eagles. In a unanimous opinion, the Court stated: Explicit statement by Congress is preferable for the purpose of ensuring legislative accountability for the abrogation of treaty rights. We have not rigidly interpreted that preference, however, as a per se rule; where the evidence of congressional intent to abrogate is sufficiently compelling, the weight of authority indicates that such an intent can also be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the legislative history of a statute. What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty. (Citations omitted. Some italics ours.) Dion, 476 U.S. at 739-40. In the case now before the court, this standard must be applied to alleged limitations on two specific rights, (1) the right to water necessary to maintain fish in the Yakima River and its tributaries in order to fulfill the Indians' treaty right to fish in all their usual and accustomed places, and (2) the right to water for irrigation on the reservation. The Irrigation Districts argue that the Indians' reserved rights for water for fishing purposes were extinguished or diminished by the United States by any one or more of the following: (1) The limitation imposed by the Secretary of the Interior in 1906 on the quantity of water the Indians could receive during the low water flow; (2) The Act of August 1, 1914; (3) The effect of congressional, executive, administrative and judicial actions by the United States between 1905 and 1968; (4) The consent judgment of 1945; or (5) The 1968 settlement and judgment entered in an Indian Claims Commission case. The trial court found insufficient evidence to conclude that the rights to water for fulfillment of treaty fishing rights had been extinguished, but found that those rights had been substantially diminished and that generally the rights to water for fishing purposes were subordinate to other irrigation rights. The trial court held, however, that the Indians were entitled to the minimum instream flow which is necessary to maintain anadromous fish life in the river. The trial court held that the specific amount which is necessary for fish life should be determined according to the annual prevailing conditions as determined by the project superintendent in consultation with the Yakima River Basin Systems Operations Advisory Committee, Irrigation Districts and company managers and others.