Opinion ID: 2544453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial: Presence or Absence of Easements for the County

Text: A bench trial was held on the remaining claims on October 6 through 9, 1997. The many exhibits admitted into evidence by agreement of all the parties were substantially the same exhibits considered by the court at the summary judgment proceeding. Also admitted was WDC's roads and drainage systems plan for the area, which bear a final date of July 3, 1973. This plan also contains the signatures of the County's Director of Public Works and Director of Planning, with the notation approved appearing next to each of the signatures. The County officials' signatures are dated April 6, 1973, twelve days before WDC conveyed Wailea Alanui Drive to the County and the County's subsequent acceptance of the conveyance. The plans include two inlets along the curb of future Wailea Alanui Drive through which water would drain from the road. Testimony adduced at trial indicated that the location of the inlets corresponds to the subsequent location of Easements 62 and 63. Among the Association's witnesses was Brian Gray, a civil engineer. Gray testified that, from an engineering standpoint[,] a flowage easement gives the upslope owner a right to drain water onto another party's land through the natural drainage ways and that the upslope party has no responsibility for what happens after the flowage leaves the upslope property. A drainage easement, on the other hand, normally involves either a pipe or some kind of conduit or an open channel and an easement that is surrounding it, and usually the person above is responsible for both maintenance and replacement, if necessary. Alan Watanabe, the land surveyor and right of way agent for the County, testified that Easements 62 and 63the Easements adjoining the roadresembled apron easements that the County often accepts. According to Watanabe, the County often accepts easements that include the concrete apron or basin into which culverts that pass under a road drain. The purpose of the concrete apron is to protect the ground[,] presumably from erosion, where the water exits the pipe. Watanabe testified that the purpose of such easements in favor of the County is for maintenance of the concrete apron. Watanabe acknowledged, however, that he was not involved with the original work concerning the specific aprons or easements in this particular case. Also admitted into evidence was Watanabe's deposition testimony in which he acknowledged that he was aware of other situations in which the County held drainage easements where the County was responsible for repairing and maintaining pipes that were part of the easements. Howard Hanzawa, a civil engineer for the County, testified that the reason the County places concrete aprons next to roadways is to ensure that County employees and their equipment can obtain access to culverts and drainage ways in order to clear them. However, Hanzawa had been working for the County for only four years and did not have any specific knowledge of the original circumstances of this particular development or the County's practices during the mid 1970s. WRC called Carl Takumi, the civil engineer who designed the drainage system at Wailea Elua. In response to a question as to whether the culverts under Wailea Alanui Drive took water from the mauka properties and the road and deposited water where there were natural gullies that flowed towards the ocean, Takumi answered I believe so. He also testified that the purpose of the fifty-four inch pipes was to channel[ize] water away from its natural flow through the Wailea Elua property to accommodate several buildings that were built in the natural drainage plain. However, Takuma's deposition testimony, which was also admitted into evidence, indicated that, in general, one could expect more water to run off from a concrete roadway than from unimproved land. Nonetheless, Takumi did not specifically know the permeability of the land that became Wailea Alanui Drive before the development of the roadway. In addition, at the time of his deposition and with the information available to him, Takumi was not able to opine as to whether the presence of the road altered the direction of the natural flow of the water. Takumi also interpreted portions of his earlier 1977 drainage studies. He testified that the south drainage system was designed with the idea that the culverts under Wailea Alanui Drive drained forty-six acres of mauka properties and that his calculation for drainage needs in the event of a fifty-year storm took into account the planned future development of those mauka properties. The trial court ruled that the County was the holder of express or, alternatively, implied, easements in the pipes. The court's ruling included the following pertinent findings of fact (FOFs) and COLs: FINDINGS OF FACT .... 10. The April 18, 1973 Deed and TCT No. 156986 conveyed to the County express drainage easements across lots adjoining Wailea Alanui [Drive], including the Wailea Elua property, with the intent that the precise location of such drainage easements would be determined at a later time. .... 14. Easements 61, 62 and 63 are located on and encumber the Wailea Elua property. 15. Openings in the curbs along Wailea Alanui to allow water to drain from Wailea Alanui are located along Wailea Alanui in the same locations as Easements 62 and 63. 16. Runoff water from Wailea Alanui flows through the openings in the curbs, then through catch basins located within Easements 62 and 63, and then flows through the 24 and/or 54 drainpipe systems located under the Wailea Elua property, ultimately outfalling in the area of Easement 61. 17. The Deed to the County dated April 18, 1973 specifically refers to the granting of easements for drainage purposes and a future Grant of Easement document as opposed to referring to flowage easements or making no reference to drainage issues. 18. The County is the owner of drainage easements, elsewhere in Maui County, and where the County holds drainage easements, the County is responsible for repairing and maintaining the drainpipes. 19. The language of the Deed dated April 18, 1973; the language of the Transfer Certificate of Title 156,869; the acceptance of the Deed by the County; the above-described creation of Easements 61, 62 and 63, the manner in which Wailea Alanui was constructed, and the manner in which the drainage systems at the Wailea Elua property were constructed manifested the intent that the location of the express easements previously conveyed to the County were to be the area within the Wailea Elua property where the 24 and 54 drainpipe systems are located. 20. Alternatively, the language of the Deed dated April 18, 1973; the language of the Transfer Certificate of Title 156,869; the acceptance of the Deed by the County; the above-described creation of Easements 61, 62 and 63, the manner in which Wailea Alanui was constructed, and the manner in which the drainage systems at the Wailea Elua property were constructed, manifest an intent to create implied easements in favor of the County in the location of and over and through the 24 and 54 drainpipes which run through the Wailea Elua property. .... CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .... 3. County is the owner of express drainage easements through the Wailea Elua property in the location of and through the 24 and 54 drainage systems located under the Wailea Elua property. 4. Alternatively, County owns an implied easement through the Wailea Elua property in the location of and through the 24 and 54 drainage systems located under the Wailea Elua property.
This court reviews the trial court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Beneficial Hawai`i, Inc. v. Kida, 96 Hawai`i 289, 305, 30 P.3d 895, 911 (2001). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support the finding, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction in reviewing the entire evidence that a mistake has been committed. A finding of fact is also clearly erroneous when the record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding. We have defined substantial evidence as credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, brackets, and block quotation format omitted). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
On appeal, the County makes five primary arguments in support of its contention that the trial court erred in ruling that it owned express and implied easements in the locations of the drainage pipes. First, the County contends that, under the reasonable use rule, it has an absolute right to discharge surface water off of the road. Second, the County contends that it never accepted the easements. Third, the County contends that, pursuant to Rules of the Land Court (RLC) Rule 15(1) (1989), the easement must be in writing and may not be implied. Fourth, the County contends that it cannot own an implied easement in the location of the pipes because the Association did not adduce evidence that a quasi-easement existed at the time WDC severed its common ownership of the properties by conveying the future road to the County. Fifth, the County contends that the trial court's ruling will have an adverse fiscal impact on the County. We address each of these issues in turn.
The County asserts that, under the reasonable use rule espoused in Carter and Rodrigues, it has an absolute right to discharge surface water off of Wailea Alanui Drive. The County submits that the Association failed to adduce sufficient evidence at trial to demonstrate that the diversion of surface water from the road was unreasonable. Therefore, the County, in essence, contends that the trial court erred because the County does not need a drainage easement for the road. Relying on the facts of Carter, the County argues that it cannot be responsible for damages caused by the failure of the drainage system. In Carter, a downslope landowner sued Hawai`i County (Defendant) after an underground drain running through her property ruptured and caused flood damage to a home on her property. Carter, 47 Haw. at 69, 384 P.2d at 309. Entrances to the drain began on the upslope property owned by Defendant, and the drain followed the line of a natural watercourse through both properties. See id. at 69-71, 384 P.2d at 310. Most of the drain had been constructed at least fifty years earlier by unknown parties and at a time when both parcels were privately owned. See id. at 83, 384 P.2d at 316. The trial court found in favor of Defendant, and this court affirmed. In her appeal, the plaintiff-landowner put forth two theories that are pertinent here. First, she contended that Defendant had violated the common law doctrine that limited a dominant owner from diverting surface waters into a natural drainage way that would not otherwise drain in that direction. Id. at 74, 384 P.2d at 312. This court held that the plaintiff-landowner had failed to adduce sufficient evidence that Defendant had impermissibly altered the natural flow of water. See id. at 74-76, 384 P.2d at 312-13. Consequently, Defendant was permitted to utilize the underground drain without liability. See id. Subsequently, in Rodrigues, this court clarified the rule discussed in Carter to articulate the reasonable use rule noted earlier. Discussing Carter and other cases, this court stated: Our decisions, then, allow possessors of land to guard themselves against the hazards of surface water so long as reasonable precautions are taken not to negligently injure others. We believe our decisions so closely approach the reasonable use rule that it is incumbent upon us to adopt it. We hold that each possessor of land may interfere with the natural flow of surface water for the development of his land so long as such interference is not unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 164-65, 472 P.2d at 516 (footnote omitted). Comparing the facts of this case to those of Carter and applying the rule announced in Rodrigues, the County contends that the Association is a downslope owner who failed to demonstrate that the County's improvements to the road unreasonably altered the drainage of surface waters. In particular, the County relies upon testimony that the purpose of the pipes was to channelize water to facilitate development on Wailea Elua, suggesting that there was no evidence that the road unreasonably altered the flow of surface water. Accordingly, like Defendant in Carter, the County maintains that it is not liable for damages to the pipes on Wailea Elua property. However, regardless of whether the improvements to the road constitute reasonable use of upslope property, the plaintiff-landowner in Carter put forth another argument which, although not accepted by the court in Carter, is applicable here. The plaintiff-landowner in Carter also argued that Defendant had adopted the drain as a part of its public drainage system and thereby became responsible for its maintenance. Carter, 47 Haw. at 78-79, 384 P.2d at 314. Agreeing that a municipality could become responsible for a drainage system if it either (1) adopted (or accepted) a drainage system, or (2) assumed control of a drainage system, this court held that there was no evidence of either. See id. at 79-80, 384 P.2d at 314-15. In addressing the first circumstance, this court explained: There is no evidence of any express dedication of an easement for a drain through plaintiff's property by her or by any predecessor in title. Nor is there any evidence tending to show intention on the part of the board of supervisors of the county or of any other county official with proper authority to act, to take over the drain on her property. Id. at 79-80, 384 P.2d at 314-15 (emphases added). Thus, if the County accepted or adopted drainage easements across Wailea Elua, then consideration of the reasonable use rule is unnecessary. Accordingly, we turn to the County's second contention, i.e., that it never accepted such easements.
The County contends that it did not accept easements across Wailea Elua. Specifically referring to Easements 61, 62, and 63, the County submits that the easements cannot be forced upon it because the language of the deed to Wailea Alanui Drive conveying the easements was conditional and the County never accepted the easements. As previously stated, the language of the deed, conveyed the future road (Lot 5) to the County together with: easements for drainage purposes over, under and across portions of the lots adjoining Lot 5, said easements to be determined and designated after construction of the improvements in Lot 5 has been completed by [WDC], and [WDC] agree[s] to promptly file a petition to designate such easements and to execute Grant of Easement documents in favor of the [County] in such form as shall be mutually agreed upon; provided that [the County] shall execute a document canceling this grant concurrently with the execution of Grant of Easement documents from [WDC] to [the County]. (Emphases added.) The language of the deed expressly conveyed drainage easements to the County that were appurtenant to the road; this deed was accepted by the County Council the following day. However, the location of the drainage easements was conditioned upon further agreement between WDC and the County. Apparently, a meeting of the minds never transpired with respect to location, notwithstanding the fact that WDC designated Easements 61, 62, and 63. The Association argues that, even though the location of Easements 61, 62, and 63 was not mutually agreed upon, subsequent events established the County's acquiescence as to the location of the easements. As discussed below, we agree that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the County accepted Easements 61, 62, and 63 and that, therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that the County also possessed easements in the location of the pipes connecting Easements 61, 62, and 63. Substantial evidence adduced at trial supports the conclusion that the County intended to possess drainage easements involving drainpipes through the Wailea Elua property. Brian Gray, a civil engineer, testified that, from an engineering perspective, the term drainage easement typically involves a pipe or conduit in which the holder is responsible for its maintenance and repair. Gray contrasted this with a flowage easement, in which the upslope owner has no such responsibility. Alan Watanabe also acknowledged that he was aware of other situations where the County was responsible for repairing and maintaining pipes that were part of drainage easements. This evidence of engineering practice supports the conclusion that the County intended to be responsible for pipe maintenance when it accepted the drainage easements in the deed. Moreover, WDC's 1973 roads and drainage plan, which was reviewed and approved by County officials before the County Council accepted the deed, showed curb inlets where water would be draining off of the proposed Wailea Alanui Drive; it would only be logical that such inlets would lead to the locations that WDC subsequently designated as easements. Given that the road was part of a larger development, the reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that the County knew that pipes would be used to carry water from these locations. Although there was contradictory testimony that the roadside easements constituted apron easements, whose purpose was merely to prevent erosion or to permit the County to obtain access to the culverts passing under the road, an appellate court will not pass upon issues dependent on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, which are matters within the province of the trier of fact. In re Doe, 95 Hawai`i 183, 190, 20 P.3d 616, 623 (2001). Consequently, the trial court did not err when it effectively found that the County intended to possess drainage easements and the pipes associated therewith. See Findings of Fact noted supra at 111-112, 58 P.3d at 623-624. Under the particular circumstances of this case, it can be concluded that the County accepted easements for drainage purposes across Wailea Elua. The County points out that Easements 61, 62, and 63 do not contain the actual area of land where the underground drainpipes traverse Wailea Elua. The County is correct. However, it would not be possible to effectuate the intent to utilize drainpipes to drain water away from the locations of Easements 62 and 63 without the drainpipes themselves. Moreover, the water from these locations apparently would not drain to Easement 61 without the presence of the pipes. Thus, although the only definitively located express easements are Easements 61, 62, and 63, the need for the existence of the pipes connecting Easements 61, 62, and 63 is essential for the proper functioning of those easements. Pursuant to Restatement, supra, § 4.10, the holder of an easement or profit . . . is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. See also Restatement, supra, § 4.10 comment c (Under the rule stated in this section, the servitude holder is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the easement. Even when the easement is located in a specific portion of the servient estate, the servitude beneficiary has the right to use other parts of the servient estate when reasonably necessary for convenient use of the easement.... Frequently, reasonably necessary uses will also include making improvements or constructing improvements for use of the easement. If necessary, additional areas of the servient estate may be used during construction. The right to use additional areas of the servient estate is sometimes called a secondary easement. Conceptually, a secondary easement can be regarded either as an easement by necessity or as inherently included within the primary-use rights granted by the easement.); cf. Adair v. Kona Corp., 51 Haw. 104, 114, 452 P.2d 449, 455 (1969) (The absence of metes and bounds description [in an express easement] would not have posed any insurmountable problem in case of disagreement between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, for the law is that where an easement is not definitely located in a grant or a reservation, and the dominant and servient owners fail to agree, a court may locate it in the exercise of its equity powers.). Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in concluding that the County's express easements include easements in the locations of the twenty-four inch and fifty-four inch drainpipes.
The County also points to the fact that the land in question is under the jurisdiction of the land court and that, pursuant to RLC Rule 15(1), [9] [e]asements in land court must be in writing and may not be implied. Because the easements in the pipes are necessary parts of the express easements, which are memorialized in writing and filed with the Land Court, the County's argument on this point is not directly applicable.
The County also contends that the trial court erred in ruling that it held implied easements in the location of the pipes. Because the easements are necessary parts of the express easements, this court need not consider the implied easement issue.
The County contends that the trial court's ruling is a clear deviation from the reasonable use rule and that, if the County is held responsible in this case, it will be faced with many similar claims. The holding in this case is based narrowly on the fact that the County accepted express easements, and the substantial evidence supporting this holding is based on specific testimony suggesting that the County intended to possess such easements. Nothing precludes a future trial court in another case from concluding that there was no such acceptance or intent based upon the particular evidence presented to it. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's ruling, as articulated in COL No. 3, that the County is the owner of express drainage easements through the Wailea Elua property in the location of and through the twenty-four inch and fifty-four inch drainage systems located under the Wailea Elua property.