Opinion ID: 1224665
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Section 9 of HRS chapter 37D governs our review of questions regarding financing agreements. It provides: The director of finance may petition the supreme court for an opinion as to the validity of any financing or related agreements entered into pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. The petition shall constitute a case for purposes of section 602-5, and the supreme court shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to receive and determine the question presented in the petition, irrespective of an actual controversy or dispute regarding the agreement or its validity. When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 904 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed people in two or more different senses. Id. Reading the statute as a whole, it is unclear whether the legislature intended to limit our review to financing agreements entered into by agencies or intended, irrespective of an actual controversy or dispute, that we should review the kinds of proposed agreements presented by the Director for our review. Thus, we resort to the legislative history, to determine legislative intent as to our jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bragg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Hawai`i 302, 306, 916 P.2d 1203, 1207 (1996); [4] Pacific Int'l Services Corp. v. Hurip, 76 Hawai`i 209, 217, 873 P.2d 88, 96 (1994) (when construing an ambiguous statute, courts may refer to the legislative history as an interpretive tool). By enacting chapter 37D, the legislature sought to avoid jeopardizing the ratings of the State's bonds and implemented a judicial review provision authorizing the Director to petition the Supreme Court for an opinion on whether municipal leases count against the debt ceiling. Hse. Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 112, in 1996 House Journal, at 1015. From this language, along with the purpose and intent language of Act 119, § 1, quoted above, we conclude that the legislature intended that this court should consider general questions regarding the validity of proposed financing agreements and did not limit our review to actual, individual financing agreements. [5] Thus, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to answer the question submitted.