Opinion ID: 1785851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lawson

Text: Adams argues that the failure to inform him that his first attempt at sex offender treatment had to be successful violates due process. In Lawson, 969 So.2d at 225, we rejected a nearly identical argument, the only difference being that the case involved substance abuse treatment instead of sex offender treatment. Therefore, our consideration of Petitioner's argument must begin (and may end) with an analysis of that case. Our decision in Lawson also concerned the extent of a trial court's discretion in finding a violation of probation. We first reiterated that the grant of probation `rests within the broad discretion of the trial judge and is a matter of grace rather than right.' Id. at 229 (quoting Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490, 494 (Fla. 1974)). We further explained that [j]ust as there is broad discretionary power to grant the privilege of probation, the trial court has equally broad discretion to revoke it. Id. After detailing the statutes related to court-ordered drug treatment, we concluded: Based on these statutory provisions, the Legislature's concern with court-ordered treatment programs . . . is clear  rehabilitation pursuant to an individualized treatment plan. . . . [B]ecause the circumstances of treating each substance abuse problem are unique to that individual, trial courts must be able to operate with an element of flexibility. . . . Id. at 231-32. We held: [A] trial court could be well within its discretion in finding a willful and substantial violation where a defendant fails to complete a court-ordered drug treatment program, even though the order did not specify how many chances the defendant had to complete the program or when it had to be completed. Probation orders need not include every possible restriction so long as a reasonable person is put on notice of what conduct will subject him or her to revocation. . . . [A] probationer who has been given the privilege of being placed on probation, in lieu of serving jail time, is put on adequate notice that the treatment program should be undertaken at the beginning of the probationary period and that, if he or she is discharged for nonattendance, he or she may not have another chance to complete the program. Id. at 235. Thus, in the context of substance abuse, Lawson rejected a bright-line rule that a trial court may never find that a probationer substantially and willfully violated probation after being discharged from a drug treatment program for nonattendance if the probation order fails to specify the number of attempts allowed or set a specific time parameter for completion. Id. at 234. We noted that such a rule may undermine the trial court's ability to `consider each violation on a case-by-case basis for determination of whether, under the facts and circumstances, a particular violation is willful and substantial and is supported by the greater weight of the evidence.' Id. at 236 (quoting State v. Carter, 835 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla.2002)). However, we limited our decision to drug treatment programs and did not address other distinct categories of treatment programs. Id. at 225 n. 1. Today, we resolve the issue as it relates to sex offender treatment. For the reasons explained in the next section, we find the statutes addressing sex offender treatment reflect the same desire for rehabilitation pursuant to an individualized treatment plan, and a corresponding need for trial court flexibility. We therefore hold that the reasoning of Lawson applies.