Opinion ID: 2967245
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victim Misconduct

Text: The conduct of First Community was central to the district court's determination that a departure in sentencing was warranted. According to the guidelines, [i]f the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. The factors enumerated in § 5K2.10 are tailored to crimes involving violence, and the guideline makes clear that only in unusual cases will victim misconduct warrant a reduced penalty in the case of a non-violent offense. Id. By way of example of an appropriate non-violent case warranting departure, the guideline states that an extended course of provocation and harassment might lead a defendant to steal or destroy property in retaliation. Id. In interpreting § 5K2.10, we have emphasized that not only must the victim's conduct be provocative, butthe victim must actually have done something wrong. United States v. Morin, 80 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 1996). The allegations of misconduct in the present case were based on the Bank's delay in confronting the LeRoses and the chief executive officer's mistaken belief that fees generated by overdrafts were profitable. Finding that the so-called and alleged victim invited what happened to it, the district court concluded that the case fell outside the 6 heartland of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1. J.A. 220. We believe that the district court abused its discretion in departing from the guidelines based on the Bank's handling of the LeRose accounts. The Bank was not a socalled and alleged victim, but an actual victim that lost $3,364,958 because of an elaborate check-kiting scheme. In cases of non-violent offenses, the guideline provides that provocation and harassment of the defendant may warrant a departure for victim misconduct. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. Provocation necessarily involves deliberate conduct that stirs a defendant to action, and such misconduct is simply absent from the present case--the Bank in no way goaded the LeRoses into launching the kiting operation. On the contrary, the record reveals that the LeRoses spent a great deal of time planning and coordinating their efforts to defraud the three banks. Labeling First Community as a provocateur also ignores the fact that kiting schemes work because the different banks involved do not see what [is] going on with each of the other . . . accounts--that [is] how the kite [is] able to fly. United States v. Yoon, 128 F.3d 515, 525 (7th Cir. 1997). We find completely unavailing the argument by LeRose that the Bank's inaction somehow lessens his culpability so as to entitle him to a reduction in sentence. Clearly, the LeRoses' mastery of manipulation rather than the Bank's conduct accounts for the enormous loss. Furthermore, LeRose can take no solace in the fact that the chief executive officer of the Summersville branch believed that overdraft fees were profitable. Bank officers from First Community testified before the grand jury that overdraft fees represented reimbursement for overhead that a bank must utilize to return checks and in no way represented profit to the bank. J.A. 84. In fact, one officer testified that the $64,000 assessed in fees during the last year of the checkkiting scheme was inadequate and that the Bank actually lost $44,000 in the wash because it was forced to borrow money to fund the LeRose accounts. Morever, undue emphasis on the chief executive officer's attitude toward fees gives the illogical appearance that the bank gladly exchanged $3 million for $64,000 in fees. Again, this ignores the deception employed by the LeRoses and the efficacy of a kiting scheme which defrauds multiple banks having no knowledge of account activity at the other financial institutions. See Yoon, 128 7 F.3d at 525. Thus, the chief executive officer's misconception concerning overdraft fees is of no help to LeRose. In sum, the evidence did not establish that First Community's lack of action provoked or led to the fraud. Consequently, there was no misconduct by the victim as contemplated by the guidelines and therefore no grounds for departure based on the Bank's conduct. Hence, the district court abused its discretion in basing its decision to depart on the Bank's response to the problem LeRose created.