Opinion ID: 3013699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII and PHRA

Text: In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in a reduction in force case arising under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position in question, (3) she was terminated, and (4) individuals not within the protected class were retained. In re Carnegie Center Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 294-95 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Once the prima facie case is successfully made, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s termination. See Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then prove that the defendant’s reason was a pretext for a discriminatory motive. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. Claims arising under the PHRA are governed by the same legal standard as 5 that applied to Title VII. See Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083-84 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). The central issue here is whether Lepore satisfied the fourth prong of the prima facie case, that is, whether she demonstrated that individuals not within the protected class were retained. In a reduction in force case, the persons outside the protected class are those employees who are “similarly situated,” that is, they work in the same area in approximately the same position. See Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2002). Lepore points to Jovings and Zajicek as the retained individuals outside the protected class. She claims that these “[t]wo male peers with less seniority and experience . . . were retained” while she was terminated. Lepore Br. at 7. We agree with Lepore that the comparison to Jovings and Zajicek was proper. We conclude, however, that neither of those individuals was retained and therefore Lepore fails to make a successful prima facie case. As to Jovings, it is undisputed that he transferred out of Direct Sales before Lepore left for maternity leave and before the August 1998 reduction in force. With respect to Zajicek, while it is true that he transferred to Professional Services for one month, it is undisputed that he was laid off in September 1998 as part of the same reduction in force that resulted in Lepore’s termination. Because Lepore cannot point to any similarly situated employees outside of the protected class who were retained, the District Court 6 correctly concluded that Lepore failed to establish a prima facie discrimination case. In the alternative, Lepore argues that she has produced direct evidence of discrimination and that therefore we should also analyze her claim under the mixed motives analysis set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989). A plaintiff attempting to prove discrimination by direct evidence faces a “high hurdle.” Connors v. Chrysler Financial Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1998). Specifically, the evidence must demonstrate that the “decision makers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision.” Id. In putting forth her mixed motives claim, Lepore relies mainly on her childcare conversation with Smeage, a conversation she admitted was not discriminatory. Furthermore, Lepore offers no evidence that “addresses directly the reasons for implementing the [reduction in force].” Anderson, 297 F.3d at 249. Based on the foregoing, we find Lepore has not cleared the high evidentiary hurdle of Price Waterhouse. Her mixed motives claim was therefore properly rejected.