Opinion ID: 1154746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The State and All Landowners)

Text: The primary arguments regarding ownership asserted by Magoon (parcel 2), Kelley (parcels 4, 6, and 8), and DHRDC (parcel 13) are essentially identical. They argue that they are not bound by this court's decision in In re Kelley, but that the State is bound by the land court's 1767 Decision, which ruled that the Trustees conveyed title to the strip to the original grantees. The landowners, therefore, conclude that the State is precluded from relitigating ownership of these parcels based upon statutory estoppel, pursuant to HRS § 501-53. As a secondary argument, the landowners assert that the State is precluded from relitigating ownership under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Magoon and DHRDC additionally contend that relitigation is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata. The State essentially argues that as a respondent in the land court action, it cannot be bound by the 1767 Decision because HRS § 501-53 only applies to applicants. According to the State, if a contesting respondent wished to register title to land, it must file an application and bring its own action as an applicant to register title to disputed property. We disagree. HRS § 501-53 provides in relevant part: If the court finds that the applicant has not title proper for registration, a decree shall be entered dismissing the application and the decree may be ordered to be without prejudice in whole or in part; but unless it is so ordered, it shall bind the parties, their privies, and the land in respect to any issue of fact which has been tried and determined. (Emphasis added.) When construing a statute, our foremost obligation `is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature' which `is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself'. Franks v. City and County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. ___, ___, 843 P.2d 668, 671 (1993) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is well-settled that courts are bound to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no clause, sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all words of the statute. State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. ___, ___, 845 P.2d 547, 551-52 (citations omitted), recon. denied, 74 Haw. ___, 849 P.2d 81 (1993); accord Camara v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 212, 215-16, 685 P.2d 794, 797 (1984). According to the plain language of the statute, unless the land court decree is specifically ordered to be without prejudice, in whole or in part, it is binding on the parties, their privies, and the land in respect to any issue of fact which has been tried and determined. HRS § 501-53. There is no question that the State was a party to the land court proceedings and is thus bound by the factual findings of the land court. Assuming that this court concludes that it is bound by the 1767 Decree, pursuant to HRS § 501-53, the State further argues that the 1767 Decree merely denied the Trustees' application to register title, implying that the written joint decision of the land court, which vested title in the landowners to their respective parcels (except parcel 5), is not to be considered on appeal. We acknowledge that HRS § 501-53 refers solely to a decree and does not expressly mention a land court decision, which decision normally sets forth the factual issues tried and determined, and serves as the basis for the land court's conclusions. However, as this court has stated, `even absent statutory ambiguity, departure from literal construction is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and the literal construction in the particular action is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act.' Franks, 74 Haw. at ___, 843 P.2d at 674 (citation omitted). Upon review of the Land Court Registration Statute, HRS chapter 501, we are of the firm opinion that HRS § 501-53 implicitly contemplates a decision when referring to any issue of fact which has been tried and determined. We believe that, on appeal, an appellate court must necessarily look to the written decision of the land court to determine what issues of fact were actually tried and determined, because such information is not statutorily required to be contained in the decree. Pursuant to HRS § 501-74, a land court decree must contain the following: Every decree of registration shall bear the date of the year, day, hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the registrar. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and if married the full name of the husband or wife. If the owner (or spouse of the owner) has been known by more than one name, all the names of such person shall be stated. The wife's maiden name and surname shall be stated in all cases. If the owner is under disability it shall state the nature of the disability, and if a minor, shall state the minor's age. It shall contain a description of the land as finally determined by the court; and shall set forth the estate of the owner, and also, in such manner as to show their relative priority, all particular estates, mortgages, easements, liens, attachments, and other encumbrances including rights of husband or wife, if any, to which the land or the owner's estate is subject; and may contain any other matter properly to be determined in pursuance of this chapter. The decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of title hereinafter mentioned. HRS § 501-74 (1985); see also LAND COURT REGISTRATION AND CONVEYANCING IN HAWAII at 6 (1935) (the decree is described as a final document [that] is a simple statement of ownership. It is purposely made brief, simple, easy of understanding. It is essentially a commercial document for it is the original certificate of title itself designed for use in the busy marts of trade where time is of such vital importance.). Obviously, in order for an appellate court to evaluate the correctness of the conclusions reached by the land court as set forth in the decree, it must necessarily examine the factual findings in the decision upon which the land court's conclusions are based. Pursuant to HRS § 501-63 (1985), an appeal to the supreme court shall lie from the final decree of the land court on behalf of any party aggrieved by the decree. The final decree of the land court constitutes the final judgment in a land court action and is akin to a final judgment in a civil case. Cf. HRCP Rule 58 (requiring every judgment to be set forth on a separate document). In an appeal of a civil case, where a final judgment has been entered pursuant to jury verdict, the appellate court's review is not limited to the judgment itself. The court must consider the entire record in order to determine the correctness of the conclusion stated in the final judgment. Similarly, in a civil action tried without a jury, the appellate court reviews the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine whether the judgment is correct. If an appellate court, in review of a land court decree, were to limit its review solely to the language of that decree, that portion of HRS § 501-53, which provides that the parties, their privies, and the land are bound by the issues of fact tried and determined, would be rendered nugatory. Moreover, the statutory informational requirements of a decree, as provided for under HRS § 501-74, would necessarily require expansion to accommodate the factual issues tried and determined; otherwise, appellate review of a land court decree for correctness would be impossible. Requiring appellate review of a land court decree without the benefit of its written decision would be akin to requiring review of a civil judgment entered subsequent to a jury or jury-waived trial without the benefit of the entire record or the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, we acknowledge what should be intuitively obvious that a land court decree need not contain factual issues tried and determined in a land court application. We further acknowledge that an appellate court is not limited to reviewing the decree, but should review the land court's written decision and the entire record to determine the binding effect on the parties in accordance with the mandate of HRS § 501-53. To determine otherwise would unduly restrict the appellate court's authority of review to the four corners of the decree and thus lead to absurd and unjust results. When we apply our construction of HRS § 501-53 to this case, we reach a single, unavoidable result: the land court did not order the 1767 Decree to be without prejudice, in whole or in part, and therefore all the parties, including the State, their privies, and the land are bound by all issues of fact tried and determined in the Lunalilo Application, which are recited in the 1767 Decision. The State contends that even if HRS § 501-53 applied, it would only bind the State to specific facts determined in that decision. The State asserts that at a minimum, the holding in the Lunalilo Application (1767) that the adjoining landowners own the Old Diamond Beach Road [the strip] was a question of law and fact and therefore HRS § 501-53 does not estop the State from relitigating the issue of ownership to the disputed area. The State's contention is without merit. Following a trial wherein all parties, including the State, presented evidence allegedly establishing their respective ownership, the land court decided the ultimate issue of ownership adversely to the State's factual assertions, concluding that the State had failed to establish any title to the parcels in issue. The land court's decision specifically set forth the following pertinent findings of fact: After considering all of the evidence in the case and being fully advised on the law I find that: 1. A road did not exist over the disputed area before the grant to Lunalilo; . . . . 3. The disputed area was never dedicated to a public use for road purposes by statutory dedication, there being absent both an intent to dedicate and an acceptance by the government; 4. The disputed area was never devoted to a public purpose in such a manner so as to carry title to the fee simple to the government; 5. The disputed area was at most encumbered by an easement of way in favor of the public or an easement of way in favor of the Grantees of the abutting lots. Whether or not the said easement of way was in favor of the public or the abutting lot owners is immaterial since such easement was long ago abandoned and the statute of limitations has run several years over since said abandonment; . . . . 7. The [Lunalilo] Trustees clearly intended to convey title in fee simple to the disputed area to their Grantees, the owners of lots abutting the disputed area, by their deeds dated April 17, 1885 and introduced in evidence as Applicants' Exhibits 5, 6, 7, and 8; and 8. The descriptions used in the conveyances of the Grantees of the lots abutting on the disputed area conveyed title in the disputed area to the said Grantees. 9. Each Grantee appearing in the deeds dated April 17, 1885 (Applicants' Exhibit 5, 6, 7, and 8) secured title to the land in the disputed area to the extent of the portion of the land described by metes and bounds in their respective deeds. The land court's decision provided in relevant part that the Trustees had conveyed the strip to the original grantee by deeds executed in 1885 from which the landowners received their respective titles. The land court expressly determined that all of the State's claims were meritless and that it had failed to establish its contention that it owned the entire strip, including parcels 2, 4, 6, 8, and 13. There is no doubt that the State was aggrieved by the the 1767 Decision and Decree, yet failed to appeal it. In light of the plain and unambiguous language of HRS § 501-53, the State is now estopped from relitigating ownership of parcels 2, 4, 6, 8, and 13 because it is bound by the land court's factual findings that were decided adversely to the State in the 1767 Decision. [3] The State relies heavily upon In re Application of Kaimuki Land Co., Ltd., 35 Haw. 254 (1939), for the proposition that an appeal from land court is from the decree and not from its decision. In Kaimuki Land, the applicant, Kaimuki Land Company, Limited (KLC), filed an application to register title to certain land in land court. Marguerite Mamo Clark, as a respondent, filed an answer opposing KLC's ownership. Ray J. O'Brien and the Hawaiian Trust Company, Limited (collectively trustees) also filed an answer in which they claimed title to the land in issue and disputed any interest claimed by Clark or KLC. The land court expressly determined that respondent Clark was the owner of the property and entered a decree dismissing KLC's application. Apprehensive that failure to appeal the land court's decision would bar them from ever claiming title in a subsequent action, the trustees appealed. The Kaimuki Land court determined that the trustees' apprehension that res judicata would bar them from relitigating title was groundless, stating [a]n appeal to this court by a writ of error runs from the final decree. Specific rulings are considered only incidental in passing upon the correctness of the final judgment. Kaimuki Land, 35 Haw. at 257 (citations omitted). We note that Kaimuki Land dealt solely with the issue of common law res judicata and completely overlooked the then-existing and applicable language in Revised Laws of Hawaii (RLH) 1935 § 5032, which is the predecessor to HRS § 501-53 and is substantively identical to it. RLH § 5032 provided: If the court finds that the applicant has not title proper for registration, a decree shall be entered dismissing the application and the decree may be ordered to be without prejudice in whole or in part; but unless it is so ordered, it shall bind the parties, their privies, and the land in respect to any issue of fact which has been tried and determined. The applicant may withdraw his application at any time before final decree, upon terms to be determined by the court. The court may in its discretion require the applicant who moves to withdraw his application or to substitute some other person as applicant, to stipulate that he shall be bound by the result of any issue of fact which has been tried and determined, and such stipulation shall bind the parties, their privies and the land itself. (Emphasis added.) The Kaimuki Land court merely cited to RLH § 5032 for the land court's authority to dismiss the application to register title by KLC. By not reviewing and analyzing the then-existing statutory estoppel language of RLH § 5032, we believe the Kaimuki Land court reached its conclusions incorrectly. Furthermore, although the Kaimuki Land court held that the land court was without authority to adjudicate title as between respondents who challenged an applicant's claim to title and that an appellate court was similarly restricted, it is apparent that this court in Kelley overruled Kaimuki Land sub silentio. In Kelley, this court affirmatively determined that a respondent, the State of Hawaii, held title to parcel 5, which the applicant, Kelley, had sought to register via the Kelley Application. [4] We are convinced that the holding of Kaimuki Land was contrary to statutory law and the principles properly applied In re Kelley. Thus, we now explicitly overrule Kaimuki Land. The State also argues that, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, the In re Kelley decision is controlling in this case. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, where a [legal] principle has been passed upon by the court of last resort, it is the duty of all inferior tribunals to adhere to the decision, without regard to their views as to its propriety, until the decision has been reversed or overruled by the court of last resort or altered by legislative enactment. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 653, 658 P.2d 287, 297 (1982) (citations omitted), recon. denied, 66 Haw. 528, 726 P.2d 1133 (1983). Stare decisis relates to the effect of legal propositions announced in prior adjudications upon subsequent actions which involve similar questions between strangers to the proceedings in which the adjudications were made. State v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 48 Haw. 152, 397 P.2d 593 (1964) (emphasis added). In re Kelley was issued subsequent to the valid 1767 Decision and Decree; we cannot and will not apply the doctrine of stare decisis retroactively. Whether In re Kelley has any stare decisis effect prospectively is not an issue before us, and we decline to address that issue at this time. Finally, the State contends that the circuit court was correct in deciding that the 1767 Decision does not preclude the State from relitigating the issues decided in that case because this court, on July 21, 1967, dismissed the appeal of the 1767 Decree with prejudice, finding that the dismissal would have no prejudice to the respondents remaining in the case, i.e. the State. We disagree. The trial court, in its February 7, 1991, order stated in pertinent part: The Lunalilo Trustees and the State appealed the Lunalilo App. [1767], and the State appealed the Kell[e]y App. [1768] ... On July 21, 1967, the [s]upreme [c]ourt dismissed the [1767] appeal with prejudice stating, `there being no prejudice to the respondents remaining in the case.' ... The [s]upreme [c]ourt found that the State's interest in properties involved in [1767] was not prejudiced by the dismissal of the [1767] appeal. Thus, the [c]ourt concluded that the motion of the State to consolidate the appeals of [1767 and 1768] was rendered moot by said dismissal. The effect of said action was to preserve the State's claim to parcels involved in [1767]. (Emphasis added.) The circuit court's reasoning that the effect of this court's language in the order of dismissal was to preserve the State's claim to parcels involving [1767] is faulty because its conclusion was based on its erroneous finding that the State had appealed 1767. The record is clear (and the State concedes) that it did not appeal 1767. [5] Also erroneous was the circuit court's determination that the qualifying language in this court's order  that there was no prejudice to the respondents remaining in the case  included the State. There is no reference in the record to indicate that the qualifying language, respondents remaining in the case, referred to the State. Moreover, it is illogical to dismiss an appeal with prejudice and yet allow one or more parties to the appeal to pursue their claims as though the dismissal were without prejudice. It is elementary that where a party to a suit does not appeal from the decree entered therein[,] he [or she] must be held to acquiesce in it[.] Castle v. Irwin, 25 Haw. 786, hrg. denied, 25 Haw. 807, hrg. denied, 25 Haw. 813 (1921). Having accepted the land court's decision by failing to appeal 1767 for whatever reason, the State cannot be said to be one of the respondents remaining in the case who would not be prejudiced by the dismissal order. By not appealing 1767, the State obviously would have been prejudiced by this court's dismissal of 1767 because the State would then have no vehicle to contest any aspect of the land court's 1767 Decision and Decree on appeal. On the other hand, the respondent landowners who prevailed in 1767 by being determined to be the owners of the parcels in question would sustain no prejudice by this court's dismissal of the appeal. In our view, it is therefore apparent that the qualifying language, respondents remaining in the case, referred to the respondent landowners and not the State. We further hold that this court's dismissal with prejudice of the appeal of 1767 was a final adjudication binding on all parties to the case. We note that to hold otherwise would be directly contrary to the fundamental purpose of the doctrine of res judicata. As we expressed in Kauhane v. Acutron Co., Inc., 71 Haw. 458, 795 P.2d 276 (1990): The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to prevent a multiplicity of suits and [to] provide a limit to litigation. It serves to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication. The res judicata doctrine thus furthers the interests of litigants, the judicial system and society by bringing an end to litigation where matters have already been tried and decided on the merits. `It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, `of public policy and private peace[.]'' The doctrine therefore `permits every litigant to have an opportunity to try his [or her] case on the merits; but it also requires that he [or she] be limited to one such opportunity.' Unsatisfied litigants have a remedy: they [may] appeal through available channels. But they [may not], even if the first suit may appear to have been decided wrongly, file new suits. Id. at 463-64, 795 P.2d at 278-79 (citations omitted). Therefore, even assuming that In re Kelley (1768) determined that the land court's decision and decree in 1767 was erroneously decided, the State's failure to appeal 1767 precludes it from relitigating that case. Merely because the litigant in this case is the State of Hawaii, which claims on behalf of the public the enjoyment of the parcels in dispute, we cannot disregard the applicable law. We are compelled to hold the State accountable for its failure to appeal in the same manner and to the same extent as private individuals under like circumstances. Based on the foregoing discussion, we hold that the State is precluded from maintaining its ejectment action with respect to parcels 2, 4, 6, 8, and 13, pursuant to HRS § 501-53. We now turn to the remaining parcel of land in dispute  parcel 5.