Opinion ID: 1910611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority's Misinterpretation of Chenery

Text: The majority properly acknowledges that S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp., supra , bears upon the issue of whether to affirm or remand. [15] The Supreme Court there recognized the settled rule that, in reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 58 S.Ct. 154, 82 L.Ed. 224 [(1937)]. The reason for this rule is obvious. It would be wasteful to send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the appellate court concluded should properly be based on another ground within the power of the appellate court to formulate. But it is also familiar appellate procedure that where the correctness of the lower court's decision depends upon a determination of fact which only a jury could make but which has not been made, the appellate court cannot take the place of the jury. [ Id. 318 U.S. at 88, 63 S.Ct. at 459.] The District of Columbia expressly adopted this rule shortly after Chenery was decided, see Simpkins v. Brooks, D.C.Mun.App., 49 A.2d 549 (1946), and has reaffirmed its dedication to the doctrine in the recent past. See, e. g., Capitol Hill Restoration Society v. Zoning Commission, D.C.App., 380 A.2d 174, 185 (1977); Silverstone v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 372 A.2d 1286, 1287-88 (1977) (quoting much of the above excerpt); Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., D.C.App., 280 A.2d 775 (1971) (trial court's holding that interest was not usurious upheld although trial court's reason for so holding was erroneous). In other cases we have also adopted the essence of the Chenery rule, although not citing Chenery. See, e. g., Duddles v. United States, D.C.App., 399 A.2d 59, 64-65 (1979); Randall v. United States, D.C.App., 353 A.2d 12, 13 (1976) (court can, of course, affirm the denial of a motion to suppress if, for any reason, the ruling is correct). Thus, the Chenery doctrine is well entrenched in the law of the District. The Chenery rules is fairly simple and straightforward, but has nevertheless been misapplied by the majority. The rule relates to the issue of whether to remand or to affirm in a given situation, depending upon whether the decision-maker is a judge or is a jury. If the decision-maker is a judge, then regardless of the reasoning employed or the law applied to reach the decision, it will be affirmed so long as a plausible ground for affirmance exists. However, where the decision-maker is a jury, then the appellate court must remand for the jury to make the decision, even if a conceivably correct ground for the decision exists. Acting contrary to the simple well settled rule of appellate procedure, the majority chooses to proceed as if the decision-maker below were a jury rather than the trial judge. To the majority, Chenery stands for the proposition that it cannot affirm the trial court's decision unless it must affirm the decision as a matter of law. If this interpretation were correct, then it would have been a meaningless exercise for the Supreme Court to outline a different procedure for a court than for a jury because if any decision is required as a matter of law, then it will be made by the appellate court regardless of who the decision-maker would otherwise be. The clear error of the majority's interpretation may also be seen in its departure from our past decisions. For example, in Karath v. Generalis, D.C.App., 277 A.2d 650 (1971), we considered the effect of the trial judge's possibly having improperly failed to consider a union rule in holding for the plaintiff-appellee. In that case we held: Under the doctrine of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943), it is not necessary for a trial court to make findings, and if the record discloses some valid ground for supporting its judgment, it should not be disturbed on appeal. Our review of the record impels the conclusion that the trial judge on the evidence before him could have determined that, assuming the rule was proper, proof of appellee's violation of the rule was lacking.       Accordingly, although it might have been within the province of the trial judge to have found otherwise, we cannot say that on this evidence, the trial judge erred. . . . [ Id. at 653 (emphasis added).] Thus, by employing the correct rule of law, we held that the trial court could have reached the decision that it did. We also held that the decision reached was not required as a matter of law. Nevertheless, because a plausible reason existed to sustain the trial court's decision to hold for the appellee, his decision must be affirmed. Under the rule now advanced by the majority, of course, we would remand in such a situation. Whereas in Karath the decision of the trial court was to hold for the plaintiff, the decision of the trial court in Harper v. Wyatt, D.C.App., 281 A.2d 442 (1971), was to allow certain counterclaims. Citing Chenery, we held that if the record discloses some valid ground for supporting [the trial judge's] conclusion, an appellate court should allow it to stand. Id. at 444 n. 2. Applying Chenery, we found that there was testimony on the record to [support] the action of the court in granting the counterclaim. . . . Id. at 444. It is important to note that we did not hold that the testimony compelled granting the counterclaim as a matter of law, but only that it [supported] the counterclaim. [16] The correct interpretation of Chenery applied to this case compels affirmance rather than remand. The majority concedes that the trial court's decision to exclude the testimony could be sustained under either the second or third of the Dyas tests. By its decision to remand, the majority is holding that the decision to exclude the testimony is within the province of the trial judge. Karath v. Generalis, supra at 653. Therefore, because the decision was for the trial court, rather than for the jury, and because all agree that either of the last two Dyas tests would provide a basis to support the decision to exclude the expert testimony, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed under Chenery and its progeny, especially Karath and Harper. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971). Specifically applied to the law of evidence, the Chenery rule has been advocated by the leading authorities in the field. Professor Wigmore states: [W]hen a general objection is sustained [emphasis in original] by the trial court, it may be presumed that some valid ground was apparent to the judge without express statement; and as the exception is here to be taken by the proponent of the evidence, it is fair to insist that he should have asked for the specific ground of objection, if he did not perceive it; or should have made an offer to obviate it, if he did perceive it; or should have stated clearly the precise basis of his claim for admissibility, if he had rested on any specific ground. Hence, the general objection will suffice, on appeal by the proponent of the evidence, if on the face of the evidence and the rest of the case there appears to be any ground of objection which might have been valid (or, otherwise stated, if there is any purpose for which the evidence would conceivably be inadmissible ). . . . [Emphasis added.]       So, too, a specific objection sustained [emphasis in original] (like a general objection) is sufficient, though naming an untenable ground, if some other tenable one existed. [Emphasis added.] [1 J. Wigmore, Evidence 338, 342 (3rd ed. 1940) (footnotes omitted).] [17] Particularly the emphasized portions of the quotation illustrate the fault of the majority's ruling. By remanding for the trial court to rule again on the proffer, the majority concedes that both the second or third Dyas tests are [grounds] of objection which might have been valid. Id. The evidence might conceivably be inadmissible under either ground and either test is a tenable one for excluding the testimony. Id. Moreover, casting a distinction on discretionary judgment grounds as the majority does, ante at 636 n. 17, is bootless since the proffered testimony was otherwise correctly excluded as irrelevant to any material issue in the case. See Part III, infra. Accordingly, we are bound to affirm the decision to exclude the evidence.