Opinion ID: 438941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal for Lack of Proper Service.

Text: 9 Appellant also argues that dismissal of his complaint for failure to comply with the technical requirements of Rule 4(d) was improper in this case. The Secretary argues that failure to comply with the technical requirements of Rule 4(d)(5) always requires dismissal of the claims. We reject the Secretary's argument and hold that failure to comply with Rule 4(d)'s technical requirements is excusable under some circumstances. 10 Under Rule 4(d)(5), service of process upon an officer or agency of the United States is made by serving the United States and sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to such officer or agency. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(5). The required service upon the United States is made 11 by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United States ... and by sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia. 12 Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(4). 13 Appellant, who was handling the litigation pro se, complied with all of Rule (4)(d)'s requirements except the requirement that the summons and complaint be personally served on the United States Attorney in Las Vegas. He claims that he was verbally advised by the lower court that he could not deliver the summons and complaint himself and that the United States Marshal's office would not deliver the documents. Accordingly, he claims, he had the documents delivered the only way he knew how--he sent them by certified mail. 14 The Secretary admits that the United States Attorney received the complaint and summons by certified mail on September 14. Nevertheless, she ignored the complaint and acted only after the default motion was granted. She asserts, however, that appellant was given an opportunity to cure the defect in service, but elected not to do so. She argues that appellant cannot maintain this action because he failed to comply with the personal service requirement. In addition, she asserts that appellant cannot appeal the termination of his benefits by initiating a new suit and properly effecting personal service upon the United States Attorney because more than 60 days have elapsed since the Secretary's final decision and appellant is therefore time-barred under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) (1976). 15 The Secretary argues that when Rule 4(d)(5)'s personal service requirement has not been complied with, dismissal of the complaint is always required. We reject the Secretary's argument. 16 We have not previously considered whether dismissal is always required when there has been a technical defect in service. We have stated, however, that the provisions of Rule 4 should be given a liberal and flexible construction. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 197 v. Alpha Beta Food Co., 736 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.1984). Many other courts have made similar statements. See, e.g., Nowell v. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956, 88 S.Ct. 1053, 19 L.Ed.2d 1150 (1968); Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir.1963); Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.1942); Insurance Co. of North America v. S/S Hellenic Challenger, 88 F.R.D. 545 (S.D.N.Y.1980); Nichols v. Surgitool, Inc., 419 F.Supp. 58 (W.D.N.Y.1976); Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Turner, 50 F.R.D. 144 (D.Ariz.1970); Adams Dairy Co. v. National Dairy Products Corp., 293 F.Supp. 1164 (W.D.Mo.1968); Hysell v. Murray, 28 F.R.D. 584 (D. Iowa 1961); Frasca v. Eubank, 24 F.R.D. 268 (E.D.Pa.1959); James v. Russell F. Davis, Inc., 163 F.Supp. 253 (N.D.Ind.1958); Blane v. Young, 10 F.R.D. 109 (N.D.Ohio 1950); Leigh v. Lynton, 9 F.R.D. 28 (E.D.N.Y.1949); Zuckerman v. McCulley, 7 F.R.D. 739 (E.D.Mo.1948), appeal dismissed, 170 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir.1948). 17 With regard specifically to Rule 4(d)(4)'s personal service requirement, the District of Columbia Circuit has recently stated that 18 [w]here the necessary parties in the government have actual notice of a suit, suffer no prejudice from a technical defect in service, and there is a justifiable excuse for the failure to serve properly, courts should not and have not construed Rule 4(d)(4) so rigidly ... as to prevent relief from dismissal. This is especially true when dismissal signals the demise of all or some of the plaintiff's claims. 19 Jordan v. United States, 694 F.2d 833, 836 (D.C.Cir.1982) (citations omitted). 20 We think that the exception the District of Columbia Circuit refers to is sensible and necessary to prevent serious miscarriages of justice. We therefore adopt the exception and hold that failure to comply with Rule 4(d)(5)'s personal service requirement does not require dismissal of the complaint if (a) the party that had to be served personally received actual notice, (b) the defendant would suffer no prejudice from the defect in service, (c) there is a justifiable excuse for the failure to serve properly, and (d) the plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if his complaint were dismissed. 1 21 Appellant meets parts (a) and (b) of the test. His allegation that he received erroneous information from the lower court regarding service of process, if correct, would ordinarily be sufficient to meet part (c). 2 Finally, if the Secretary's contention that the claim is now time-barred is correct, appellant would meet part (d) as well. 3 Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order and remand the case for a determination of whether appellant's failure to comply with Rule 4(d)(5)'s personal service requirement should be excused under the standard we adopt. 22 AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.