Opinion ID: 622803
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Schutte’s Testimony

Text: In 1984, Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), redefining insanity and making it an affirmative defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 17. The IDRA also provided that: “Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.” The IDRA does not, however, address, whether it precludes the admission of psychological or psychiatric expert testimony to negate the specific intent element of a charged crime. We have previously recognized that “numerous other circuits”2 have found that so-called “diminished capacity evidence is admissible to defeat the mental state requirement of a specific intent crime.” United States v. Eff, 524 F.3d 712, 720 n.11 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). This case does not, however, require us to weigh in on that question because even assuming that diminished-capacity evidence is admissible, Herbst cannot show that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Schutte’s testimony. To be sure, Schutte’s testimony cannot be said to be irrelevant to Herbst’s claim that he lacked knowledge of the drugs in the van. Certainly, Schutte’s testimony concerning Herbst’s low intelligence and ability to be manipulated lends credibility to his assertion that he was duped into driving drugs across the border. Yet, given the fact that Schutte testified that Herbst could nevertheless form the requisite intent to transport something from point A to point B and that he did not testify regarding the effect, if any, of the relationship between Herbst and Santiago on Herbst’s ability to evaluate the circumstances relevant to this 2 See, e.g., United States v. Dupre, 462 F.3d 131, 137 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Brown, 326 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Worrell, 313 F.3d 867, 874 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Schneider, 111 F.3d 197, 201 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1060 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 678–79 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3d Cir.1987). 12 Case: 11-50169 Document: 00511755899 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/13/2012 No. 11-50169 case, Schutte’s testimony’s relevance to the knowledge element of the charged offenses is not strong. As our colleagues on the Eleventh Circuit have noted, [b]ecause psychiatric evidence (1) will only rarely negate specific intent, (2) presents an inherent danger that it will distract the jury’s [sic] from focusing on the actual presence or absence of mens rea, and (3) “may easily slide into wider usage that opens up the jury to theories of defense more akin to justification,” Pohlot, 827 F.2d at 904–5, district courts must examine such psychiatric evidence carefully to ascertain whether it would, if believed, “support a legally acceptable theory of lack of mens rea.” Id. at 906. Cameron, 907 F.2d at 1067; see also Schneider, 111 F.3d at 201 (“[S]pecific medical evidence offered may still be irrelevant to the requisite intent or [the] probative value [of the evidence] may be substantially outweighed by confusion or delay.” (citation omitted)). In this case, the district court found that Schutte’s testimony did not connect “how manipulation affected [Herbst’s] ‘knowledge,’” as defined by this court and “would only serve to confuse the jury.” The concerns voiced by the district court mirror the cautions of the Eleventh Circuit and other courts about the difficulty of admitting diminished-capacity evidence. Herbst has made no showing that the district court’s view of the law or Schutte’s testimony was erroneous, see Jackson, 636 F.3d at 692; therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of Schutte’s testimony.