Opinion ID: 2159325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Other trial issues raised.

Text: 1. Did the court incorrectly omit the jury charge on intoxication? Defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to charge the jury on the legal effect of voluntary intoxication. In this case the defendant's intoxication defense was predicated on the testimony of Dr. Cooke that defendant had been increasingly dependent on drugs and alcohol; on evidence that defendant had stolen and used a gram of methamphetamine on the day of the crime; and on the testimony of defendant's girlfriend that she knew that defendant frequently used methamphetamine and had often seen him using marijuana. In State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42 (1986), we interpreted N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8, the intoxication defense under the Code, to be consistent with prior law. Thus, when the requisite culpability for a crime is that the person act `purposely' or `knowingly,' evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to disprove that requisite mental state. Cameron, supra, 104 N.J. at 53. Under the statute, intoxication may be attributed to drugs or to alcohol, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8e(1), but must cause prostration of faculties, 104 N.J. at 54, to be considered relevant to negating an element of the offense. We held that unless the evidence met that standard, the issue should not be presented to the jury. 104 N.J. at 54-57. To avoid any judicial weighing of the evidence in a criminal trial, we employed the familiar standard that only in those rare cases in which, after viewing the evidence and the legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to defendant,    there is no suggestion in the evidence that defendant's faculties were so [affected]    as to render [defendant] incapable of purposeful or knowing conduct, should the trial court deny defendant's request. [ State v. Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. at 617 (quoting State v. Cameron, supra, 104 N.J. at 57 (citation omitted).] We are satisfied that this is such a case. In its charge conference, the trial court carefully reviewed the evidence to determine whether there was any competent, reliable evidence that at the time of the crime defendant's faculties were prostrated due to intoxication. Indeed, it found no reliable evidence of ingestion of drugs or alcohol, much less any incapacitation of judgment due to use such substances. The trial court noted in its charge conference that it had previously prepared an intoxication charge for use in the case. (Recall that jurors had been questioned about their attitudes towards narcotics.) The court felt that now that we are through [with] the case, I cannot to the best of my knowledge find any proof of intoxication. The only indication of it came from the testimony of the psychologist, Dr. Cooke, and psychiatrist, Dr. Sadoff. But as we all know and as was said in State v. Lucas [30 N.J. 37 (1959)] by the New Jersey Supreme Court statements made by the defendant to doctors are not hearsay because they're not offered as proof of the facts asserted but merely as circumstantial indications of the state of mind of the accused as a foundation for the doctor's findings. Even were we to find that Lucas means no more than that the doctor's recital of defendant's account must find independent corroboration in the record, if those facts are to be accepted, we find no evidence of prostration of faculties either in the experts' recitals or in the other accounts of the event. The only other item of evidence alluded to is a statement from one witness that Zola had stolen a gram of metha[m]phet[am]ine from her on the morning of the crime. Moreover, the court found that the expert mental health witnesses did not state or imply that defendant was intoxicated on the murder date, but rather that he was a drug-dependent person who on this date had sunk into a delusional state. Finally, the woman with whom defendant lived did not testify to his being in an intoxicated state when he returned on the night of the crime, but stated only that defendant had been tired and had soon gone to sleep. On this record, the trial court did not err in denying the intoxication instruction. The circumstances parallel those of a recent Appellate Division case: [D]efendant himself did not testify that he was intoxicated, and no expert testified to the probable effect of the liquor he had consumed. Witnesses who observed him a short time before [for Zola, after] the crime testified that he did not appear to be intoxicated and defendant's testimony showed a clear and detailed recollection as to the events of that evening. See State v. Selby, 183 N.J. Super. 273, 284 (App.Div. 1981). [ State v. Micheliche, 220 N.J. Super. 532, 543 (1987).] On the question of whether the jury should have been given a separate instruction concerning the effect of intoxication on defendant's diminished capacity defense, we are satisfied that the jury had been presented with, and instructed to consider, all of the above evidence. As noted, Dr. Cooke had traced defendant's deteriorating life-style and his attempts to compensate for his emotional maladjustments by an increasing use of drugs and alcohol. The doctor believed that these dependencies in turn caused defendant's eventual decompensation, from a personality already unstable, to the point of psychosis. The question of defendant's mental state at the time of the murder was for the jury to decide. 2. Did comments made by the prosecutor deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial? Defendant contends that his right to a fair trial was violated by various comments made by the prosecutor during the proceeding. Specifically, defendant asserts that statements made by the prosecutor during his opening and summation shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, violated his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination by highlighting defendant's failure to take the stand, and inflamed and prejudiced the jury. In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 320, we noted that prosecutors occupy a unique position in the criminal justice system and that their primary duty is not to obtain convictions but to see that justice is done. State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 104 (1972). Although generally limited to commenting on the evidence and to drawing any reasonable inferences supported by the proofs, a prosecutor may nonetheless make a vigorous and forceful presentation of the State's case. State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 57 cert. denied, 357 U.S. 910, 78 S.Ct. 1157, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1160 (1958). We also stated in Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322, that prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction unless the conduct was such that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. Factors to be considered in analyzing prosecutorial conduct include: whether defense counsel made a timely and proper objection, whether the remark was withdrawn promptly, and whether the court gave the jury a curative instruction. 106 N.J. at 323. We believe that the prosecutor's statement that the victim had been tied spread eagle on her own bed and subjected to sexual indignities did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. The remarks were well within the scope of the evidence before the jury. Nor does our reading of the record disclose that defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was violated by the State's opening comments explaining defendant's connections to the crime scene. After describing the forensic proof that the State intended to offer, the prosecutor stated that in our search for how defendant entered the victim's apartment, [s]cience fails to be of assistance here, and only James Zola and Barbara Berrisford know for sure. Defense counsel did not make an objection to the comment when made and his motion for a mistrial after the State's opening was denied. We believe that the prosecutor's statement was a non-invidious reference to the circumstantial nature of the evidence and that the trial court was in the best position to assess any possible prejudice to the defendant. The trial court should be careful to discourage such remarks where it is clear that the defendant will not testify. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's closing remarks that the primary basis for knowing what Zola did or didn't do at Barbara Berrisford's apartment [and his life history] were the self-serving statements of James Zola impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant or drew attention to his failure to take the stand. We note that these comments were intended to address not so much the failure of the defendant to testify as the incompleteness of the experts' analyses of all the evidence in the trial. Zola did not have to take the stand to address the questions that conflicted with the mental health experts' version of the facts. These items of proof could have been furnished by the defense team before the witnesses testified. Defendant's objection to this statement was not raised below. Under the plain error standard, we find that these remarks of the prosecutor were not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. Finally, we are satisfied that the prosecutor's references to defendant's lack of employment at the time of the offense were not intended to be impermissibly suggestive of indigency as a motive for crime. See State v. Mathis, 47 N.J. 455, 471 (1966) (Undoubtedly a lack of money is logically connected with a crime involving financial gain. The trouble is that it would prove too much against too many.). Rather, we think that the statement was intended to emphasize the fact that defendant had worked at the Wingate Apartments previously and that he had no fixed work schedule at the time of the crime. [T]here [was] something more than poverty to tie defendant to the crime. 47 N.J. at 472. In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 323-24, we cautioned prosecutors in capital cases to be particularly sensitive to assuring that defendants are treated fairly and that justice is done. Although in this case we are satisfied that the alleged misconduct did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, we note again the special responsibilities of court and counsel in cases whose potential verdicts admit of no correction. 3. Did the trial court wrongfully fail to permit allocution by defendant before the jury imposed the sentence of death? Defendant contends that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the court refused him the opportunity to make a statement to the jury without waiving his right not to be a witness against himself. He invokes the common-law right of allocution, the ancient right of a defendant to present to the [sentencer] his plea in mitigation. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed. 2d 670, 673 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion). The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. Ibid. This common law right is codified in our Rules of Court by Rule 3:21-4(b), which provides: Before imposing sentence the court shall address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment. The defendant may answer personally or by his attorney. A separate Rule of Court, Rule 3:21-4A, prescribes the procedure in capital murder cases. That Rule makes no specific reference to a capital defendant's statement in mitigation of punishment; it seems to have been assumed that such statements were not permitted. In this case, defendant's attorneys elected not to present the defendant as a witness, where he would have been subject to cross-examination, during either the guilt phase or the penalty phase of the trial. Defendant contends that denial of his opportunity to make an unsworn personal statement to the jury is unconstitutional. In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed. 2d 711 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 2873, 33 L.Ed. 2d 765 (1972) (deciding as well an Ohio case), the Court held that in an Ohio single-verdict capital trial it was not constitutionally impermissible to require that a defendant choose between testifying, subject to cross-examination, during the trial of his guilt or having a death verdict returned by a jury which never heard the sound of his voice. 402 U.S. at 220, 91 S.Ct. at 1474, 28 L.Ed. 2d at 733. In that single-verdict capital trial system, a jury finding a defendant guilty was to simultaneously decide whether they would recommend that defendant for mercy. The Court noted that petitioner was not seeking vindication for his interest in making a personal plea for mercy. Id. at 219, 91 S.Ct. at 1473, 28 L.Ed. 2d at 733 (footnote omitted). Even were that so, the Court noted that the right of allocution was not in itself a constitutional right; that its purposes could be satisfied by the arguments of counsel; and that, in any event, Ohio permitted allocution before the judge actually entered the capital sentence. The dissenting members of the Court saw that form of allocution as merely vestigial: since the jury's verdict had fixed the sentence of death, the defendant's speech before a judge would be but a hollow ritual. The question for us is not what the Constitution commands, but what our civilization commends. Under our system of capital punishment, a jury of men and women forms the essential link between society and the defendant before the court. Each capital jury expresses the collective voice of society in making the individualized determination that a defendant shall live or die. Whatever the Constitution permits, it bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sentenced to death by a jury which never heard the sound of his voice. McGautha, supra, 402 U.S. at 220, 91 S.Ct. at 1474, 28 L.Ed. 2d at 733. The State is wisely concerned that defendant not be permitted to lie with impunity to a jury that is attempting to reach a rational fact-based conclusion on whether he shall live or die. The defendant recognizes this concern and seeks no more than the right to stand before the jury and ask in his own voice that he be spared. He would not be permitted to rebut any facts in evidence, to deny his guilt, or indeed, to voice an expression of remorse that contradicts evidentiary facts. Similar procedures have been adopted in other jurisdictions. Washington apparently permits a capital defendant personally to make an unsworn statement to the jury prior to closing arguments. See State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 729, 718 P. 2d 407, 430 (Wash. 1986). Maryland now permits allocution by a defendant before capital sentencing. Booth v. Maryland, 306 Md. 172, 507 A. 2d 1098, 1109-18 (Md. 1986), vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1987). The Maryland procedure would permit more than we contemplate in that it seemingly would allow the defendant to deny the killing. That would be more than a plea for mercy and should expose the defendant to impeachment. See State v. Bontempo, 170 N.J. Super. 220, 244 (App.Div. 1979) (Where, as here, a defendant's unsworn statements take on a `testimonial' color, the jury might well be misled. Thus, a defendant who `undertakes to answer part of the evidence against him [in a testimonial manner] is subject to comment as to factual thrusts he does not meet.') (quoting State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.J. 109, 117 (1965)). The procedure we contemplate would allow the jury to hear from the defendant's voice that he is an individual capable of feeling and expressing remorse and of demonstrating some measure of hope for the future   . Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation, 15 N.M.L. Rev. 41, 41 (1985). Should the defendant stray from that plea either to dispute facts in issue or to offer other facts to exculpate himself, [t]hese types of facts are subject to rebuttal and form the basis for disputed issues which the trier of facts must resolve and, therefore, justify impeachment. In contrast, the accused making a plea for mercy does not intend to advance or to dispute facts, but instead uses the plea to ask for lenience or understanding in the sentencer's decision. If the accused does not stray from this subject matter in his statement, the plea does not justify traditional impeachment. [ Id. at 63.] In many capital cases, defendants do take the stand to offer evidence in mitigation of their sentence. They thus necessarily expose themselves to cross-examination upon the issues of the trial. In State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454 (1988), also to be decided this term, we will have to deal with the breadth of such cross-examination. In other cases, as here, a capital defendant may elect not to testify, either because he believes it unlikely that he will persuade jurors or because he might be examined about previously inadmissible evidence not forming a statutory aggravating factor. It is difficult to sympathize with defendants who have caused so much suffering, but we need not discard our common humanity in the process of decision. In the face of the State's forceful pleas in favor of the death penalty, it is difficult as well to accept the argument that the briefest statement by the defendant would inject a fatal emotionalism into the jury's deliberations. We see little harm that would come from an examination of the process requested by the Public Defender in this case. We do not base our argument on State or federal Constitutions and would not find the absence of the right grounds to reverse a capital trial conducted prior to this date. We make our ruling in the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction over criminal trials in New Jersey. Hence, in the future, we shall permit the narrowly-defined right of a capital defendant to make a brief unsworn statement in mitigation to the jury at the close of the presentation of evidence in the penalty phase. Before a defendant speaks, he shall be instructed by the court, outside of the presence of the jury, of the limited scope of the right; that his statement is subject to the court's supervision; and that should the statement go beyond the boundaries permitted he will be subject to corrective action by the court including either comment by the court or prosecutor or in some cases possible reopening of the case for cross-examination. We shall request the Committee on Capital Causes to suggest any necessary procedures to assist trial courts in this aspect of capital sentencing. It might be useful for a court to examine in advance of the defendant's speech a written outline of the proposed statement. At any rate, we shall stand ready to reconsider this ruling if experience dictates that allocution creates more problems than it solves. 4. Did the trial court wrongfully fail to explain mitigating factors? Defendant contests the trial court's failure to explain the mitigating factors, set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5), in understandable terms related to the evidence in the case. This issue was raised in State v. Bey II, 112 N.J. 123, 166 (1988). We there explained that [t]he requirement that capital sentencing must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating circumstances would be hollow without an explanation of how the evidence can mitigate the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 169. We emphasize here, as we did there, that a court must do more than read the words of the capital punishment act when charging the jury on the mitigating factors indicated or implied by defendant's evidence. Since most jurors are untrained in statutory interpretation, instructions that merely recite verbatim the language of the Act are generally inadequate. State v. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 170. In fairness to the court, the trial in this case, as in Bey II, occurred before our opinion in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 292-99, in which we discussed the adequacy of jury instructions on particular mitigating factors. On remand, the trial court should conform its charge to the requirements of that opinion and of Bey II, supra . 5. Did the court incorrectly instruct the jury on unanimity of findings for mitigating factors? Defendant contests the trial court's instructions requiring that the jury unanimously agree on the existence of any mitigating factors. This point was decided in State v. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 152-162. We held there that the logic of the Act indicates that the Legislature intended that jurors need not unanimously find the existence of a mitigating factor. 112 N.J. at 159. We explained that it would contravene the logic of the Act for a jury to agree unanimously on a sentence of death where even a sole dissenter believes there is at least one mitigating factor present not outweighed by the aggravating factors. 6. Was the charge on aggravating factor c(4)c inadequate? In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 197-211, Chief Justice Wilentz set forth the Court's understanding of the legislative meaning of this aggravating factor. In that case and in State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 48-52, we confined the meaning of the murder [that] was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman to the second portion of the statutory provision, i.e., to murders that involve[] torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the victim. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)c. In Ramseur and Biegenwald this Court elaborated on the meaning of each of these subsidiary considerations. Since there must be a retrial of the penalty phase, we do not resolve the adequacy of the c(4)c charge in this case (which objection was not raised below). On remand the court shall charge in accordance with those decisions. In his supplemental brief the defendant contended that there was insufficient evidence to consider certain elements of factor c(4)(c). See State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 50, 524 A. 2d 130 (on retrial only depravity of mind element could be presented due to insufficient evidence of torture or aggravated battery). We disagree. The wounding and scalding of the victim here may indicate defendant's desire to make the victim suffer before he killed her, or, if these injuries were inflicted after the victim had died, they could constitute a mutilation of the corpse. See State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 211, 524 A. 2d 188. On this record, although there was some evidence of a motive of revenge, a properly charged jury might have concluded that the murder served no purpose of the defendant other than the desire to kill. State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 50-51, 524 A. 2d 130. On the remand the trial court should not submit to the jury any c(4)(c) elements that do not find support in the record. 7. Did the court wrongfully fail to charge the jury on the consequences of a non-unanimous verdict? This point was raised in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 299-304, and State v. Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 177. In those cases we explained that the 1985 amendment to the Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3f, requires that the jury be informed that a failure to reach a unanimous verdict shall result in sentencing by the court pursuant to subsection b, i.e., to life imprisonment with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. The special verdict forms provided to the jury should indicate these consequences of the jury's inability to reach a unanimous decision. In this case, prior to the trial court's charge at the penalty phase, the defendant requested that the jury be informed of the consequences of their failure to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial court denied defendant's request, analogizing the jury's penalty phase deliberations to those of a jury in an ordinary trial, which is not advised concerning the effect of a deadlock. As the trial court observed, a jury is not so advised except in situations when they specifically request this information Subsequent to the verdict in this case, the statute was amended to require that the jury be informed that a failure to reach a unanimous verdict shall result in a sentence of life imprisonment. On remand, the jury shall be charged in accordance with the statute. 8. Were the non-capital sentences excessive? The trial court sentenced defendant on the non-capital offenses to a consecutive term of 80 years in prison with a 40-year parole bar. Those sentences were made consecutive to the sentence on murder. Defendant suggests that the court misapplied the Code's sentencing factors when it concluded that [the jury] imposed the maximum sentence. I feel it is therefore incumbent upon myself in my opinion to do likewise. I feel strongly that my sentence should be consistent with theirs. There's no reason and no justification for me imposing any other sentence than the maximum allowed by law. If ever a case cried out for the maximum penalties allowed by law, this does. The court thus imposed four consecutive sentences for the maximum terms possible, all consecutive to the death sentence. Specifically, the court sentenced defendant on Count II (burglary) to a term of 10 years, 5 without parole; on Count Three (aggravated sexual assault), to 20 years, 10 without parole; on Count Five (kidnapping), to 30 years, 15 without parole; and on Count Six (robbery), to 20 years, 10 without parole. In State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), we set forth general guidelines for courts to fashion consecutive sentences for multiple offenses imposed on one sentencing occasion. We there recognized that even within the general parameters that we have announced there are cases so extreme and so extraordinary that deviation from the guidelines may be called for. 100 N.J. at 647. Obviously, if defendant is resentenced to death, this issue will become moot. Rather than resolve the question in this abstract context, we shall await the resentencing of defendant on the murder count. This issue will be preserved for review in the context of the murder sentence imposed by that jury. It is sufficient to observe that the sentence of death for the murder count does not dictate the imposition of maximum consecutive sentences for all related offenses. 9. Was the sentence of death disproportionate? At the time of his trial, defendant would have been automatically entitled to proportionality review under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e. L. 1982, c. 111, § 1 (effective August 6, 1982). Subsequently, the Legislature amended the statute to provide for proportionality review only when requested. L. 1985, c. 178, § 2 (effective June 10, 1985). Our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary to undertake such a review under either statutory scheme. We note that defendant reserved the right to make a statistical proportional argument when data were compiled that would classify homicide sentences according to race and sex of victim and defendant, type of crime, and similar factors. In addition, defendant contends that his severe emotional impairments make the death penalty disproportionately excessive in his case. This argument appears to call for the conventional form of sentence review similar to [that for] `excessiveness' claims raised in non-capital cases. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 324 n. 84. The brutalized victim of a broken home, abandoned, and, worse, abused by his family, he drifted in and out of state institutions, failed in marriage, and lost his own child. Defendant's brief asserts that [e]ven in the end his mother failed him. At the penalty phase of his trial, with his life on the line, she could not face the ordeal of testifying and literally fled from the courthouse. The defense asks whether he can be said to have suffered enough. Defendant is especially aggrieved by the jury's failure even to consider as a mitigating factor the evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or defect that impaired his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d). The jury's finding, in defendant's view, was unsupported by the evidence. In uncontradicted testimony, Dr. Cooke, a psychologist, and Dr. Sadoff, a psychiatrist, had diagnosed defendant's condition as a borderline personality disorder, complicated by drug and alcohol dependency, that decompensated    into a psychotic state marked primarily by    paranoid pathology, paranoid delusions and hallucination    [that] actively distort[ed] reality. Although the jury's finding on this mitigating factor was perhaps influenced by the requirement that its finding of any mitigating factor must be unanimous, juries are not bound to accept the testimony of expert witnesses. Still, it seems that defendant shares characteristic features of mental disturbance with many other death-sentenced in New Jersey. L. Bienen, N. Weiner, D. Denno, P. Allison, and D. Mills, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12-13 (Interim Report, Part I) (to be published in 41 Rutgers L.Rev. No. 1 (1988)). This troubling statistic would have to be weighed in the proportionality review that might follow a jury's resentencing defendant to death. The record before us contains insufficient information for us to resolve the question of whether in New Jersey the death sentence is disproportionally imposed on mentally-disturbed defendants.