Opinion ID: 688371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 12 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material facts and the moving party should prevail as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
13 Police officials are entitled to qualified immunity in a Sec. 1983 action if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1993) (a police officer is immune from suit if in light of clearly established principles governing the conduct in question, the officer objectively could have believed that his conduct was lawful). In deciding whether officials are entitled to qualified immunity, we must determine (1) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, and (2) whether, in light of that law, a reasonable official could have believed his conduct to be lawful. Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994). Whether the law is clearly established is a question of law, which the court of appeals reviews de novo. Elder v. Holloway, 114 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1994). 14 Here, the district court found that while there was a dispute as to the events surrounding the arrest, it did not create a genuine issue of material fact because no violation of a clearly established right occurred under either scenario. We agree.
15 According to Fredericks's and Thompson's statements, neither officer entered the house. Instead, when Fredericks appeared at the doorway and asked, how can I help you?, Burke informed him that he was under arrest and asked him to step outside, which Fredericks did. 16 In Payton v. New York, the Supreme Court stated that the 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' 445 U.S.C. 573, 585-86 (1980) (quoting United States v. United States District court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). Following this reasoning, we have held that it is not a fourth amendment violation for government officers to knock on an individual's door and to arrest the individual when the door is opened, even if the individual is still standing at the doorway. See United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 1983) (a doorway ... is a public place; no warrant was required when DEA agents knocked on defendant's door and immediately arrested him when he opened the door); United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (179); see also United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (defendant's doorway was public area, allowing warrantless arrest of defendant standing there); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1386-87 (7th Cir. 1991) (Payton prohibits only a warrantless entry into a home, not a policeman's use of his voice to convey a message of arrest from outside the home); Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1101-02 (8th Cir.) ([t]he doorway of an individual's home or apartment or hotel room may be a public place for purposes of making a warrantless arrest if the individual has come to stand in the doorway voluntarily), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 852 (1989); United States v. Mason, 661 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1981) (no fourth amendment violation when defendant came to doorway as agents approached the house and was then placed under arrest); United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987) (no fourth amendment violation when government agents knocked on defendant's door and arrested him when he opened the door). 1 17 Given the state of the law on this issue, the district court correctly concluded that, as of March 1992, it was not clearly established that a warrantless arrest of an individual who voluntarily appears at the doorway of his residence violates the fourth amendment. See Whitten, 706 F.2d at 1015; Botero, 589 F.2d at 432; Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1386-87; Duncan, 869 F.2d at 1101-02. Moreover, the officers could have reasonably believed that their actions were lawful, and thus the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Mendoza, 27 F.3d at 1360.
18 Under this version, the arrest took place inside the house in the foyer. According to Burke, he knocked on the door. Fredericks stated that he asked Thompson to see who's there. 2 Thompson answered and Burke asked Thompson if they could come in. Thompson said that they could. Once inside, Burke asked if Fredericks was there, but before Thompson could respond, Fredericks appeared and asked, how can I help you? Burke then placed him under arrest. 19 On appeal, Fredericks contends that Thompson was not his agent and that Thompson's consent, allowing the officers to enter Fredericks's home, was invalid and thus his warrantless arrest inside the residence was nonconsensual and violated the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. This contention lacks merit. 20 First, as the district court observed, and Fredericks concedes, consent may be valid under an agency theory. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1964); United States v. Baswell, 792 F.2d 755, 759 (8th 1986) (consent may be valid under an agency theory of authority). 21 Here, Fredericks asked Thompson to see who was at the door. In response, Thompson opened the door and consented to the officers' entry into the foyer of the house. Given these circumstances, the district court properly found that Thompson was acting as the agent for Fredericks to the extent he allowed the officers into the foyer of the house. See oner, 376 U.S. at 488-89; Baswell, 792 F.2d at 759. 22 Second, even if Thompson were not acting as Fredericks's agent, the fourth amendment is not violated when a law enforcement officer conducts a warrantless entry based on a reasonable belief that the consenting party has the authority to consent. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 15533 (9th Cir.) ([e]ven if the consenting third party does not in fact possess actual authority to consent, a warrantless search [and seizure] may be justified when the authorities have reasonable grounds to believe the consentor has apparent authority to consent), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1988); United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Sledge, 650 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1981). The pertinent inquiry is whether the facts available at the moment would cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the consenting party had authority over the premises. Illinois, 497 U.S. at 177-78; see also United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir. 1992) (validity of government agent's reliance on third party's apparent authority to consent to search or seizure rests entirely on the reasonableness of the officer's belief). 23 Here, Thompson appeared at the door in response to Burke's knock, responded affirmatively to the officer's requests to come in, and did not indicate that he was a guest in the house. Moreover, upon entering, the officers were immediately met by Fredericks, who did not object to the officers' presence in the foyer, but instead asked, how can I help you? Given these circumstances, the officers could have reasonably believed that their entrance into the foyer of the house was permissible. See Illinois, 497 U.S. at 177-78. 24 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's determination that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Mendoza, 27 F.3d at 1360; Act Up!/Portland, 988 F.2d at 871. 3
25 In Fredericks's reply brief, he concedes that the city's liability stands or falls on the officer's liability. Appellant's Reply Brief at 6. We agree and affirm the district court's judgment as to the city. See Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799; Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1994).
26 The district court found that Fredericks had failed to state a claim for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress arising out of the arrest and several other alleged incidents of harassment. 4 Under Oregon law, to state a claim for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant performed acts which constituted an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct. See Madani v. Kendall Ford, Inc., 818 P.2d 930, 933-34 (Or. 1991); Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 816 P.2d 593, 599 (Or. 1991); see also Rice v. Comtek Mfg. of Oregon, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 1539, 1543 (D. Or. 1990) (Oregon courts require an extremely outrageous transgression of social norms in order for a plaintiff to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). 27 Here, none of the incidents alleged by Fredericks taken individually or as a whole constitutes extraordinary transgressions of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct. Moreover, as Fredericks observes in his reply brief, his arrest by Officer Burke is the central part of his state-law claims of intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. Appellant's Reply Brief at 6. Given these circumstances, the district court did not err by dismissing Fredericks's state tort claims. 28 AFFIRMED.