Opinion ID: 2195379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issue I: Defamatory Meaning

Text: Our initial inquiry concerns whether the statement that the Tuckers' claimed $10,000,000.00 in compensation for damage to their sexual relationship was capable of a defamatory meaning. In an action for defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving ... [t]he defamatory character of the communication. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8343(a). It is the function of the court to determine whether the challenged publication is capable of a defamatory meaning. If the court determines that the challenged publication is not capable of a defamatory meaning, there is no basis for the matter to proceed to trial. Thomas Merton Center v. Rockwell International Corp., 497 Pa. 460, 442 A.2d 213, 215-16 (1981). To determine whether a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning, we consider whether the statement tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third parties from associating or dealing with him. Birl v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 402 Pa. 297, 167 A.2d 472, 475 (1960) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 559 (1989)). Libel is the malicious publication of printed or written matter which tends to blacken a person's reputation and expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860, 862 (1954); see also Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899, 904 (1971) (same). The court must view the statements in context. Baker v. Lafayette College, 516 Pa. 291, 532 A.2d 399, 402 (1987). [W]ords which standing alone may reasonably be understood as defamatory may be so explained or qualified by their context as to make such an interpretation unreasonable. Thus, we must consider the full context of the article to determine the effect the article is fairly calculated to produce, the impression it would naturally engender, in the minds of the average persons among whom it is intended to circulate. Thomas Merton, 442 A.2d at 216 (internal citations and quotations omitted). It is not enough that the victim of the [statements]... be embarrassed or annoyed, he must have suffered the kind of harm which has grievously fractured his standing in the community of respectable society. Scott-Taylor, Inc. v. Stokes, 425 Pa. 426, 229 A.2d 733, 734 (1967). We have demonstrated a willingness to dismiss defamation claims where we have determined that the offending statements were not capable of a defamatory meaning. Baker, 532 A.2d at 402, 403 (affirming grant of summary judgment because the statements in letters to the college provost that: (1) the department chairman consider[ed the professor's presence in] classes to be an extraordinary, peculiar, and academically deplorable arrangement[;] and (2) that the chairman had reported that the professor was cavalier in his dealings with students [demonstrating]... a general attitude that the best way to build a program is by giving high grades[;] were not capable of defamatory meanings); Thomas Merton, 442 A.2d at 214-15 (dismissing complaint, as not capable of defamatory meaning, that alleged that an Associated Press article conveyed the impression that the members of the Thomas Merton Center were Communists by stating that the Soviets were funding opposition to the B-1 bomber project and identifying the Center as a group opposed to the project that may have unknowingly received Soviet financing); Clark v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 204 A.2d 42 (1964) (sustaining grant of preliminary objections dismissing defamation claim arising out of a letter expressing shock that U.S. Senator's voting record indicated that he had Communist tendencies); Scott-Taylor, 229 A.2d at 733 (statement of Chairman of Board of Supervisors indicating concern that proposed new building project would end up like a project owned by plaintiff that the Chairman stated looked like a chicken coopdismissed on preliminary objections despite averment that Chairman made the statements maliciously, knowing they were false and with intent to harm the owner). However, as the Third Circuit recently pointed out, we have found other statements capable of conveying defamatory meaning. Tucker III, 237 F.3d at 282-83 (3d Cir.2001). In Tucker III, the Third Circuit considered statements that appeared in Newsweek and Time virtually identical to ones Appellant-newspapers made in the instant case, and predicted, based on the law of Pennsylvania, that we would view the statements as capable of a defamatory meaning. The court based its position on two cases, Cosgrove Studio & Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane, 408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751 (1962), and Birl, which Appellant-newspapers contend are distinguishable. Cosgrove involved a dispute between competing camera shops. The plaintiff shop advertised that it would provide a free roll of film for every roll it developed. The defendant shop responded with its own advertisement advising the public that you get nothing for nothing and that the defendant shop would not: 1. inflate the prices of developing your film to give you a new roll free! 2. Print the blurred negatives to inflate the price of your snapshots! 3. Hurry up the developing of your valuable snapshots and ruin them! 4. Use inferior chemicals and paper on your valuable snapshots. Cosgrove, 182 A.2d at 752. We held that the statement was capable of a defamatory meaning because the advertisement clearly imputes, to the person to whom it refers, characteristics and conduct which are incompatible with the proper and lawful exercise of a business. Id. at 753. Because we had previously held that any language which unequivocally, maliciously and falsely imputes to an individual or corporation want of integrity in the conduct of his or its business is actionable[,] we allowed the case to proceed. Id. at 754. Similarly, in Birl, we held that statements made by the Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO), Birl's former employer, to his current employer, were capable of a defamatory meaning. There, a PECO sales manager contacted the current employer of Birl and told him that PECO would not do business with Birl because Birl had left his employment with PECO without notice. Apparently, business with PECO was important to Birl's current employer, which told him that it would discharge him if PECO did not reverse its position. PECO refused and Birl was discharged. He sued for defamation and tortious interference with contractual relations and the trial court dismissed both counts on preliminary objections. The Superior Court affirmed. We reversed, holding that both claims should have been allowed to proceed further. As to the defamation claim, we held that the statements of PECO were capable of a defamatory meaning because people who heard the statement, could reasonably conclude that Birl lacked honor and integrity and was not a person to be relied upon insofar as his business dealings were concerned. Birl, 167 A.2d at 476. Although we agree with the argument of Appellant-newspapers that Birl and Cosgrove are distinguishable because they considered situations in which it was indisputable that an issue existed as to whether the statements imputed a want of integrity in ... business, Cosgrove, 182 A.2d at 754, that does not end our analysis. The question for us is whether the statements of Appellant-newspapers tended to harm the reputation of the Tuckers so as to tarnish their reputation and expose [them] to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. Schnabel, 107 A.2d at 862. In Tucker III, the Third Circuit applied Pennsylvania law to the Newsweek and Time articles and concluded that the statement that the Tuckers had sued for $10 million because the lyrics damaged their sex lives was capable of a defamatory meaning. The court stated: Reading the statements at issue in this case in context and looking at the impression that they were likely to engender in the minds of the average reader, we conclude that each is capable of a defamatory meaning. Mrs. Tucker has led a campaign against the immorality of gangsta rap and those who profit from it. The statements made by the defendantsto the effect that Mrs. Tucker and her husband brought a $10 million lawsuit because Shakur's lyrics damaged their sex lifecarry numerous disparaging implications. Because of the inherent implausibility of the idea that lyrics alone could cause millions of dollars of damage to a couple's sexual relationship, the statements were capable of making the Tuckers look insincere, excessively litigious, avaricious, and perhaps unstable. Furthermore, the statements tended to suggest that the Tuckers are hypocritical, that after condemning the gangsta rap industry for profiting from pornography, the Tuckers were only too willing to open up their own sex life for public inspection in order to reap a pecuniary gain. In the more colloquial language used by the defendants themselves, the statements suggested that the Tuckers were [g]rabbing [a]t a [d]ead [s]tar[`s] [b]ooty and were willing to take the witness stand at trial and publicly provide the testimony about their sex lives that Fischbein [couldn't] wait to hear. Such statements were capable of lowering the Tuckers' reputation in the eyes of the community and of causing others to avoid associating with them. Tucker III, 237 F.3d at 282-83 (3d Cir. 2001).-It is known that married people have sexual relations, and it is not generally defamatory to report that they do so. However, it may be defamatory to state falsely that a husband has sued to recover ten million dollars for loss of sexual relations as a result of the lyrics of two songs. Such a statement could make the Tuckers seem overly interested in money or sex, and not concerned with their life work of fighting for civil rights. It is possible to conclude that such a false statement would cause people to decline to associate with the Tuckers. We also recognize that this is still the pleading stage. There has been no discovery. Therefore, we cannot know the full effects of the statement. We can only be guided by the pleadings, which allege that the articles made the Tuckers objects of ridicule in the world ... [and that the Tuckers] cannot go anywhere or do anything without friends, relatives, acquaintances, and even strangers questioning the[m] ... as to why they brought such a ridiculous law suit. (R.R. at 38a-40a.) The Complaint does not specifically state that the Tuckers suffered the kind of harm which has grievously fractured [their] standing in the community of respectable society. Scott-Taylor, 229 A.2d at 734. It does not state that the statements harmed their reputation and expose[d them] to public hatred, [or] contempt.... Schnabel, 107 A.2d at 862. However, it does put Appellant-newspapers on notice that the Tuckers have brought a defamation claim against them and have suffered damages measured by the allegation that the articles have held them out for ridicule in the world. Therefore, the Complaint, albeit barely, alleges that the statements are capable of a defamatory meaning and, at this point in the proceedings, we so find. Issue II: Constitutional Limits on State Defamation Law Having determined that the statements may be capable of a defamatory meaning, and are not subject to dismissal on preliminary objections, we turn to the second question at issue in this case. That is, whether the First Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, precludes the Tuckers from recovering in their defamation action. It cannot be disputed that the Complaint in Tucker II included a claim for loss of consortium and that, by definition, a loss of consortium claim includes a claim for loss of sexual relations. Consortium is defined as the legal right of one spouse to the company, affection, and assistance of and to sexual relations with the other. Machado v. Kunkel, 804 A.2d 1238, 1244 (Pa.Super.2002) (quoting Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Edition (1998)). More generally, consortium means: Conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and the right of each to the company, society, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 309 (6th ed.1990). A claim for loss of consortium arises from the marital relationship and is based on the loss of a spouse's services resulting from an injury. Cleveland v. Johns-Manville Corp., 547 Pa. 402, 690 A.2d 1146, 1149 (1997). Accordingly, there can be no dispute that the definition of consortium includes a claim for damage to the sexual relationship of a married couple. Indeed, the Tuckers admit as much. [15] Because Appellant-newspapers reasonably relied upon the plain meaning of consortium and the conclusion of the attorney for the Estate of Shakur that the Tuckers were suing for loss of sexual companionship, Appellant-newspapers ask how can they be held liable for making a true statement. Clearly, if the newspapers printed a true statement, they could not be held liable in a defamation action. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710. The issue, as formulated by Appellant-newspapers, assumes that there is no dispute that the statement, the Tuckers are suing the record companies because the lyrics of Shakur songs damaged their sex life, is true. However, the Tuckers claim that Appellant-newspapers published the articles with knowledge that the statements were false and/or with reckless disregard for the truth. (R.R. 38a.) Specifically, the Tuckers allege that some of the newspapers actually knew, before they printed the articles, that the Tuckers were not suing for loss of sexual relations because, they claim, their attorney communicated that information to the newspapers. (R.R. 36a.) The Tuckers also claim that Appellant-newspapers acted with reckless disregard of the truth because some of them allegedly: (a) failed to contact the Tuckers' lawyers; (b) relied upon the biased statement of the attorney for the Estate of Shakur; (c) failed to research the background of the Tuckers; (d) failed to obtain the Tucker II Complaint; (e) failed to read it; (f) ignored the Tuckers' press release regarding Tucker II; (g) and/or failed to properly investigate the facts of the article. (R.R. 34a-38a.)