Opinion ID: 2972622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Plaintiffs’ Experts

Text: A district court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and this Court will only reverse if firmly convinced that the district court erred. Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 666 (6th Cir. 2000).
In Daubert, the U.S. Supreme Court listed four factors as guidelines for a trial judge to consider in assessing whether an expert’s proposed testimony involving scientific or other specialized knowledge will conform to Fed. R. Evid. 702: (a) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (b) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (c) the known or potential rate of error; and (d) general acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594; see also Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 251 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001). In this case, the district court conducted an extensive inquiry into the qualifications and reliability of the opinions of Dr. Collins and Johanson (as discussed below), including “a review of their deposition testimony, expert reports, testimony during a Daubert hearing (consisting of approximately 30 hours of testimony), along with a summary of such evidence during oral arguments.” The district court recognized Dr. Collins as a qualified expert in the field of 6 biomechanical engineering and summarized Dr. Collins’ opinion testimony as follows (which Dr. Collins admitted was a correct interpretation): In laymen’s terms, what your [sic] saying [is] that your analysis reveals that as the mask went into the boards in face-first posture, that the equilibrium of forces was destroyed by the giving way of the J- clip on the right side, thereby permitting the vertical force to take over because the mask gave way and causing the downward rotation to the crown presentation. The district court excluded Dr. Collins’ testimony because “[w]hile Dr. Collins has performed mathematical calculations, the Court has found these calculations and the methods employed to be suspect and unreliable.” Our review of the record leads us to reach the same conclusion as the district court. First, Dr. Collins’ analysis was based on his personal review of the helmet and mask. His research included watching the videotape of the incident and performing measurements of the helmet and mask, then incorporating such observations and measurements into mathematical calculations based on Newton’s Laws of Physics, a recognized and valid scientific method. Dr. Collins did not, however, attempt to replicate the incident, perform any manner of accident reconstruction or conduct any relevant technical or scientific testing of the helmet/facemask combination (using either the incompatible components present in this case or compatible helmets and masks). Dr. Collins acknowledged that such testing could have been performed to evaluate the veracity of his claims (and Dr. Collins in fact had set up a protocol for such tests), but Plaintiffs had not authorized him to conduct any such tests. Second, Dr. Collins did not cite any published work to buttress his opinion, nor could he 7 because Dr. Collins’ theory has not been subject to peer review and publication. Third, not only does Dr. Collins’ opinion that Mohney’s spinal injury could occur as the result of a face-first impact lack general acceptance within the relevant scientific community, it is not accepted in any scientific community. In fact, Dr. Collins’ preliminary review dated January 24, 2002, quoted another researcher/expert as saying: Biomechanical studies have not supported the notion that the helmet is an important factor in causing spinal injury (Bishop et al. 1983). . . . La Prade and co-workers (1998) found no evidence that face masks are related to an increase in overall head and neck injuries. Fourth, Dr. Collins performed his calculations based on a series of assumptions (including the theory of Johanson regarding the abrupt release of the J-clip rejected by the district court (as discussed below)). Dr. Collins admitted that he did not utilize the actual data as input in the mathematical equations to support his theory but rather used an “illustration of parameters,” i.e., estimates. Dr. Collins then concluded that, within a reasonable degree of biomechanical certainty, such incompatibility of the mask and helmet combination led to a re-direction of the impact forces to cause the spinal injuries and permanent disability. We find that the estimates and assumptions used by Dr. Collins undermine the likelihood that Dr. Collins used data sufficiently tied to the facts of the case here, which the Supreme Court has indicated is critical: Nothing either in Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to the existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proferred. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). The correspondence between Dr. Collins 8 and his supervisors also suggests that his supervisors were not convinced of the reliability of Dr. Collins’ calculations and conclusions. For the reasons stated, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Collins’ testimony.
The district court recognized Johanson as a qualified expert in the field of mechanical engineering. In summary, Johanson concluded that: (a) the incompatibility of the helmet and mask resulted in an asymmetric attachment of the mask, (b) such asymmetry resulted in the mask’s full engagement of the left-hand side J-clip but only minimal engagement with the right-hand side J-clip, (c) based on that minimal engagement on the right-hand side, two screw-nut combinations affixing the right-hand side J-clip were loosened over time, such that (d) when Mohney’s face struck the boards, the pre-existing loose fitting screw-nut combinations instantly and simultaneously vibrated apart at or immediately after the initial time of impact, (e) resulting in the J-clip dislodging, and (f) allowing the mask to release to the downward torque. The district court found Johanson’s testimony on the asymmetrical fit of the mask and helmet to be reliable but excluded Johanson’s testimony regarding the screw-nut combination and J-clip because it was not the product of a reliable methodology. Plaintiffs claim that the exclusion of Johanson’s J-clip testimony was due to the district court’s adoption of Bauer’s version of the facts, namely Johanson’s conclusion that the J-clip was not present at the time of the incident. A simple review of the portion of the district court’s opinion excluding Johanson’s testimony regarding the 9 J-clip reveals that the district court did not discuss the facts of the case whatsoever. Rather, the district court concluded that Johanson did not perform any tests to form his opinions in this case, but had simply based his opinion on his visual inspection and measurements of the helmet and mask. The district court rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that Johanson conducted a “test” by shaking the J- clip back and forth with his hand while resting an exemplar helmet on a table. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Johanson had not conducted adequate testing to support his opinion. First, there is no evidence that the “test” conditions accurately replicated or even approximated those at the time of the incident. Second, Johanson cited no research or publications quantifying the impact forces (vibrations) necessary to cause the screw-nut combinations to become loose. Third, Johanson’s conclusions are further undermined because Johanson: (i) assumed (but did not know) the remaining screw-nut combinations on the left-hand side J-clip were the same as those on the right side, (ii) did not attempt to determine the thread class of the screws or test whether the thread class of the left-hand side screw-nut combinations was sufficient, but rather just made the assumption that they were not, and (iii) failed to support his opinion with any objective testing or analysis (i.e., using any control standards). We conclude that such “testing” and Johanson’s opinion on the basis of such “testing” cannot be considered reliable under the four factors set forth in Daubert, supra. For the reasons stated, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Johanson’s testimony regarding the J-clip.
10 Dr. Ramnath was the treating physician at the hospital to which Mohney presented immediately following his injury on May 21, 1995. Dr. Ramnath completed a history and physical of Mohney, which included the following statement: “This seventeen year old man was playing hockey at approximately 11:00 this morning and was thrown face forward into the boards, striking his face against the boards.” Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit signed by Dr. Ramnath detailing his treatment of Mohney and Dr. Ramnath’s conclusions regarding the manner in which Mohney’s injury occurred. Paragraphs 9-11 of Dr. Ramnath’s affidavit state: 9. I have had the opportunity to review the MiniDV tape of the accident. The accident is consistent with the history recorded in my records. Levi Mohney hit the boards face first. Subsequent to the initial impact, his head rotates down so that the crown of his head is in contact with the boards. 10. This history is consistent with a facial impact and rotation into a crown presentation with a vertical load and hyperflexion type of injury. 11. The injuries Levi Mohney sustained are consistent with the history and physical findings of the injury recorded in the medical records of Flower Hospital, and with the tape of the accident. The district court excluded Paragraphs 9-11 of Dr. Ramnath’s affidavit because Dr. Ramnath based his conclusions in such paragraphs on his review of the videotape of the incident, not his personal observations of Mohney in treating him. Plaintiffs-Appellants did not list Dr. Ramnath as an expert (and do not seek to have him testify as one) but rather argue that a treating physician may render opinions with respect to causation without being subject to disclosure requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). See Martin v. CSX Trans., Inc., 215 F.R.D. 554 (S.D. Ind. 2003). The Martin court, however, ruled that 11 disclosure requirements were not necessary in that case because the treating physician formed the causation opinion during the care and treatment of the plaintiff, not in anticipation of litigation. On the other hand, the Martin court also noted that where the treating physician’s opinion is rendered in anticipation of litigation, courts have held that “causation is beyond the scope of the testimony a treating physician may provide without tendering an expert disclosure report.” Id. at 556-57 (citations omitted) (recognizing a split of authority on the issue in the Seventh Circuit). More significantly, this Court has squarely addressed this issue. See Harville v. Vanderbilt University, Inc., 95 Fed.Appx. 719 (6th Cir. 2003). In Harville, this Court upheld a district court’s decision to exclude the expert testimony portions of the deposition testimony of treating physicians for failure to comply with Rule 26 disclosure requirements. Id. at 724-25; cf. Ridder v. City of Springfield, 108 F.3d 1377, 1997 WL 117024, at  (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding order permitting plaintiff’s treating physician to testify without Rule 26(a)(2)(B) expert report disclosures “so long as they do not purport to testify beyond the scope of their own diagnosis and treatment”). Despite Dr. Ramnath not being listed as an expert witness, he clearly was opining as to the manner in which Mohney’s head rotated from a facial impact to a crown presentation, based in part on his viewing of the video. Dr. Ramnath’s affidavit was not prepared until December 2002, long after the incident occurred. There is no evidence that Dr. Ramnath reached the same conclusions regarding causation at the time he treated Mohney. As such, it was reasonable for the district court to find that Dr. Ramnath was rendering an expert opinion that was subject to disclosure requirements and to exclude his affidavit for failing to satisfy those requirements. Moreover, by striking only Paragraphs 9-11 of Dr. Ramnath’s affidavit, the district court left intact those matters over which 12 Dr. Ramnath had personal knowledge. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Paragraphs 9-11 of Dr. Ramnath’s Affidavit.
Dr. Funk prepared an affidavit based on his examination of the helmet as well as the medical records and x-rays that were obtained immediately after Mohney’s injury. He opined that (a) physical evidence on the helmet and mask indicated that Mohney struck the boards in a face first position, (b) upon impact the right clip fastener (J-clip) failed, and (c) such failure contributed to a consequential flexion and rotation of Mohney’s head. The district court’s January 23, 2004, Memorandum, Opinion and Order includes the following discussion of Dr. Funk’s affidavit (emphasis added): [Bauer] also seeks to exclude the affidavits of Dr. Funk and Dr. Ramnath, arguing that to admit them is tantamount to offering expert testimony in contravention of disclosure requirements in Rule 26. Dr. Funk’s affidavit presents findings regarding the helmet-mask combination in this case and their role in causing [Mohney]’s head to torque from a face first to a crown position. This affidavit represents an attempt to buttress the opinions offered by Mr. Johanson and Dr. Collins, Plaintiffs’ retained liability experts, with testimony from an unlisted/unidentified expert witness. Thus, Dr. Funk’s affidavit is inadmissible and stricken in its entirety. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in excluding the affidavit because Plaintiffs’ Designation of Experts filed on September 10, 2001, listed him as an expert witness (and included a copy of his affidavit and C.V.). Plaintiffs assert that a clerical problem led to the document not being put on the docket until after the district court granted summary judgment in 2004. 13 Our review of the record reveals the following. First, on February 8, 2002, the district court directed Plaintiffs to provide all outstanding expert disclosure. On February 22, 2002, Plaintiffs filed Supplemental Expert Disclosures in which Dr. Collins was listed (and Dr. Funk was not listed) as a liability expert for Plaintiffs. Second, Bauer filed a motion to strike affidavits (including that of Dr. Funk) on procedural and substantive grounds on December 19, 2002. Among the reasons to exclude Dr. Funk’s affidavit set forth in Bauer’s motion to strike affidavits were the following: (i) since the appeal of the 1999 grant of summary judgment by the district court, Plaintiffs had not utilized Dr. Funk, (ii) Dr. Funk had been replaced as a liability expert by Dr. Collins, (iii) at pre-trial conferences with the district judge, the only liability experts of Plaintiffs discussed were Dr. Collins and Johanson, (iv) in a March 18, 2002, letter, Plaintiffs’ counsel identified only Dr. Collins and Johanson as expert witnesses, and (v) by Dr. Funk’s own admission, the opinion set forth in his affidavit was an untested theory and nothing more (he had conducted no research or testing). Pursuant to a December 26, 2002, telephonic hearing, the district court struck Dr. Funk’s affidavit in its entirety.3 Third, at the Daubert hearing, the district court said “I believe in an oral order to the parties there was an indication that Dr. Funk’s affidavit had been stricken from the record[.]” In considering this issue, the district court’s rationale in the Memorandum, Opinion and Order dated January 23, 2004, appears to be technically inaccurate, as Dr. Funk clearly was listed on the September 10, 2001, Designation of Experts. The fact of the matter, however, is that the district court struck Dr. Funk’s affidavit at the December 26, 2003, hearing, long before issuing its written Memorandum, Opinion and Order. Although the parties have not produced a transcript of 3 Neither of the parties set forth the basis of the district court’s ruling from that telephonic hearing, nor has a transcript of that hearing been put in the record. 14 the December 26, 2003, hearing, any one of the grounds set forth by Bauer in its motion to strike would provide sufficient basis upon which to strike Dr. Funk’s affidavit. In addition, the district court explicitly stated that Dr. Funk’s affidavit had been excluded during the December 26, 2004, hearing at the initial day of the Daubert hearing (without objection by Plaintiffs’ counsel), prior to the issuance of the Memorandum, Opinion and Order. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Funk’s affidavit.