Opinion ID: 867207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial evidence of premeditated first degree murder

Text: ¶ 14 Nelson next argues that his conviction should be vacated because the State's evidence shows only passage of time but not the actual reflection required for premeditation. ¶ 15 Premeditation is statutorily defined as follows: [T]hat the defendant acts with either the intention or the knowledge that he will kill another human being, when such intention or knowledge precedes the killing by any length of time to permit reflection. Proof of actual reflection is not required, but an act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. A.R.S. § 13-1101(1). As we made clear in State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 27, 65 P.3d 420, 427, the legislature did not intend to eliminate the requirement of reflection altogether or to allow the state to substitute the mere passing of time for the element of premeditation, but rather intended to relieve the state of the burden of proving a defendant's thought processes by direct evidence. ¶ 16 Premeditation can, of course, be proved by circumstantial evidence. Thompson, 204 Ariz. at 478-79 ¶¶ 27, 31, 65 P.3d at 427-28. Nelson left to procure a weapon and killed Amber with it within the same hour. Circumstantial evidence supporting a finding of premeditation may include the acquisition of a weapon by the defendant before the killing. Id. at 479 ¶ 31, 65 P.3d at 428. Carrying the murder weapon to the scene is strong evidence of premeditation. ... Leaving the scene to retrieve a weapon is even stronger evidence of premeditation because it suggests that [the defendant] had formed a plan for committing the murder[] and then set about carrying it out. United States v. Begay, 673 F.3d 1038, ___ (9th Cir.2011) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also State v. Pittman, 118 Ariz. 71, 75, 574 P.2d 1290, 1294 (1978) (finding premeditated murder conviction supported by evidence that defendant entered victim's house with gun and then shot the victim three times). ¶ 17 Nelson claims that [t]his is not a case where the defendant went and obtained a gun, a knife or some other `deadly weapon.' We disagree. Although in an ordinary context, a hammer is usually considered a tool, not a weapon, in many instances assailants have used hammers to perpetrate a deadly attack. State v. Beard, 273 Kan. 789, 46 P.3d 1185, 1194 (2002). Moreover, [b]ecause hitting someone with a hammer will very likely result in extensive injury or death to the victim, a hammer may be considered just as deadly when used as a weapon as a pipe, baseball bat, knife, or gun. Thus, the use of the hammer as a weapon of attack may lend support to the inference of premeditation. Id. at 1195. ¶ 18 A defendant's actions after a murder can also help establish premeditation. See, e.g., Beard, 46 P.3d at 1195; State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 440 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1994). Nelson hid the murder weapon under a bed, disposed of his bloody shirt, and returned a sleeping bag that had Amber's blood on it. ¶ 19 Although the evidence of premeditation in this case is circumstantial, it is nonetheless substantial. The jury's finding of premeditation was not legally incorrect.