Opinion ID: 168164
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Moya's argument

Text: 24 Before applying the above finality principles to determine whether this case involves a final decision, we first dispose of the finality argument advanced by Mr. Moya. He argues that the district court's dismissal order should be considered final because if he were forced to start over with a new complaint the applicable statute of limitations would now bar recovery for some of the conduct by Defendants of which he complains. In support of his position, Mr. Moya cites our statement in Bragg v. Reed that [i]f it is clear that the plaintiff may not start over again with a properly drawn complaint, because of limitations problems or otherwise, the action is treated as final and the order is appealable. 592 F.2d at 1138 (emphasis added). 25 Mr. Moya's position misunderstands the Bragg holding and is without merit. Our reference in Bragg to limitations problems was not a reference to statutes of limitations that eventually may bar recovery in federal court subsequent to the initial dismissal of the complaint by the district court, but to the administrative limitations periods at issue in that case that had already run. The district court in Bragg had dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged racial discrimination, because she had failed to file a discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within the 30-day period specified in 5 C.F.R. § 713.214(a)(1)(i). 10 See 592 F.2d at 1138. Even though the dismissal was nominally of the plaintiff's complaint and not her entire action, we concluded that it was a final decision because the reason for dismissal meant amendment was futile; that is, it was clear that the plaintiff [could] not start over again with a properly drawn complaint, because of [the administrative] limitations [period given in 5 C.F.R. § 713.214]. Id.; see also id. (The [district court's] ruling was that the period of limitations with respect to filing an administrative complaint barred the lawsuit. Plaintiff cannot cure that defect except to persuade this court that the agency and trial court's interpretation of the law was erroneous.). Therefore, Bragg did not, as Mr. Moya claims, hold that the subsequent expiration of a limitations period makes an otherwise non-final district court order final. Rather, Bragg merely reiterated the rule that the dismissal of a complaint is a final decision where it in effect dismisses the entire action. 26 Moreover, the finality rule argued for by Mr. Moya is generally unnecessary because a plaintiff in Mr. Moya's situation is in little danger of being barred by the statute of limitation when he or she erroneously attempts to appeal the non-final dismissal of his or her complaint. If the dismissal is not a final decision, that necessarily implies that the plaintiff may seek to amend the complaint—otherwise the dismissal would have been final. 11 See also Mobley, 40 F.3d at 339 (stating that when only a complaint is dismissed, amendment [is] generally ... available); Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) ([L]eave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.). That amendment (assuming it was limited to the conduct, transaction, or occurrence at issue in the original complaint) would then relate back to the date that the original complaint was filed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) (An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading....). Thus, no claim that was timely when made in the original complaint would be barred when made in a properly authorized amended complaint. We therefore reject Mr. Moya's proposed basis for finding the district court's dismissal to be a final decision. 27