Opinion ID: 844251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Requested Special Instructions Regarding the Scope of the Jury's Consideration of Aggravating and Mitigating Evidence

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated state law and his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair and reliable penalty determination by denying his request for instructions clarifying the scope of aggravating and mitigating evidence the jury could consider as well as the scope of the jury's sentencing discretion. As explained below, we find no prejudicial error.
Defendant asked the trial court to explain to the jury that a special circumstance renders a defendant death eligible, but the appropriate penalty is entirely up to the jurors. The proposed instruction, however, was duplicative of CALJIC Nos. 8.84 and 8.88. CALJIC No. 8.84 informed the jurors in this case that state law required that a defendant found guilty of a special circumstance murder be punished by death or confinement in prison for life without the possibility of parole and that you must now determine which of these penalties shall now be imposed on the defendant. (Italics added.) CALJIC No. 8.88 further advised the jurors that you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate.  (Italics added.) The trial court thus properly denied this requested instruction.
Defendant proposed a supplement to CALJIC No. 8.85 to instruct jurors that they were prohibited from double counting the same facts under section 190.3, factor (a), as both a circumstance of the crime and as a separate and distinct matter in aggravation of penalty. (26) When requested, a trial court should provide such an instruction. ( People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 789 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956].) Here, however, the trial court's refusal to do so was not prejudicial. We have explained that CALJIC No. 8.85 does not inherently encourage the jury to double count the same facts, contrary to defendant's argument. ( Monterroso, at pp. 789-790; see also Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 811.) Further, because the prosecutor did not mislead the jury or otherwise suggest it engage in improper double counting, the absence of an instruction cautioning against double counting does not require reversal. ( Monterroso, supra, at p. 790.) Defendant additionally asked the trial court to modify CALJIC No. 8.85 to explain, with regard to section 190.3, factor (k), that the enumerated mitigating circumstances are only examples, that the jurors could consider any other circumstances as reasons for not imposing death, that a single mitigating factor alone may be sufficient to reject death as the appropriate penalty, that the jurors need not be unanimous in finding mitigating factors, and that mitigating factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but may be supported by any evidence, no matter how weak. The trial court properly denied defendant's requested modification. Pursuant to the standard version of CALJIC No. 8.85, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider, take into account, and be guided by, among other things, [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this principle. (CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k).) We have repeatedly held that this instruction adequately instructs the jury concerning the circumstances that may be considered in mitigation, including sympathy and mercy. ( Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 261; see People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 875 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376, 209 P.3d 596]; People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 309 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 180 P.3d 351].) In addition, the proposed instruction was unnecessary and, in large part, argumentative. Therefore, the trial court was not obligated to give it. (See People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 729 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248]; see also People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1067-1068 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].)
Defendant requested that CALJIC No. 8.88 be supplemented to inform the jurors that they could return a life verdict even in the absence of mitigating factors and despite the presence of aggravating factors. (27) The trial court did not err in refusing to supplement this instruction as requested, as we have previously rejected a similar claim. (See Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1192.) In any event, CALJIC No. 8.88 adequately advises jurors on the scope of their discretion to reject death and to return a verdict of life without possibility of parole. ( Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 574.)
(28) Defendant requested an instruction that would have informed the jurors that they could spare defendant's life based on mercy or sympathy alone. But such an instruction is not required; indeed, the jury may be admonished that it should not decide the penalty on the basis of mere, or factually untethered, sympathy. ( Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 711; see also, e.g., People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1275 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159]; California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 542-543 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837].) Under CALJIC No. 8.88, the jury was properly instructed, in part, that [it] is free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In addition, the jury was informed under CALJIC No. 8.85 that it could consider any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death. No error occurred.
(29) Defendant faults the trial court for refusing his request to instruct the jury that, in determining the appropriate penalty, it could not consider (1) whether the death penalty is a deterrent or (2) the cost to the state of execution versus life imprisonment. We have said that, although a trial court would not err in giving the requested instruction, its refusal to do so is not prejudicial when such considerations are not raised at trial. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 146 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559]; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 132 [246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37]; see also Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 456.) Here, only defense counsel commented on the issues of deterrence and cost during argument, briefly mentioning to the jury that these issues were not listed among the aggravating and mitigating factors that it could consider in making its penalty determination. The prosecutor never suggested the contrary. Under these circumstances, the trial court's refusal to give this instruction was harmless.