Opinion ID: 2518363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the jury's failure to reach a verdict on aggravated arson affect dixon's convictions for felony murder and burglary?

Text: Questions posed by the jury about aggravated arson demonstrate its lack of understanding about whether the defendant had to intend to use fire or explosive to damage property or whether the defendant simply had to intend to damage property and happened to have done so by fire or explosive. The following response, given by the trial judge to one of the questions, is typical of all his responses: In addition to the required intent to damage, Element number 1 of Instruction 19 requires that you find that the damage occurred by means of fire or explosion. He further advised the jurors to review all of the instructions as you consider this matter. Among the other instructions was the following: Ordinarily a person intends all of the usual consequences of his voluntary acts. This inference may be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case. You may accept or reject it in determining whether the State has met its burden to prove the required criminal intent of the defendant. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the aggravated arson count. Because Dixon was not convicted of aggravated arson, the State takes the position that any question about the offense is moot and not properly before the court. The defendant points out, however, that aggravated arson was a predicate offense for burglary and felony murder. Thus, Dixon contends, the jury's failing to convict him of aggravated arson ought to be examined relative to the burglary and felony murder convictions. Dixon was charged with felony murder for the deaths of Dana and Gabriel Hudson. The jury was instructed that the State had introduced evidence on alternative underlying feloniesaggravated arson and burglary. The jury was instructed with regard to the second charge of burglary that the State was required to prove that Dixon knowingly entered a dwelling without authority with the intent to commit theft, aggravated arson, criminal damage to property, or some combination of the three. He was convicted of the second burglary. Arson is [k]nowingly, by means of fire or explosive:. . . [d]amaging any building . . . which is a dwelling in which another person has any interest without the consent of such other person. K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-3718(a)(1)(A). Aggravated arson is arson committed upon a building . . . in which there is a human being. K.S.A. 21-3719. The jury was instructed on aggravated arson as follows in accordance with PIK Crim. 3d 59.22: To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 1. That Mr. Dixon intentionally damaged a building or property in which another person had an interest, and that Mr. Dixon did so by means of fire or explosion; 2. That Mr. Dixon did so without the consent of Eastgate Plaza, Inc.; 3. That at the time there was a human being in the building or property; 4. That the fire or explosion resulted in a substantial risk of bodily harm; and 5. That this act occurred on or about the 29th day of July, 2001, in Lyon County, Kansas. Dixon maintains that the correct interpretation of the statutes and pattern instruction is that an accidental fire or explosion ignited as a result of intentional property damage is not aggravated arson because there was no intent to cause a fire or explosion. In other words, he contends that the required intent is the intent to use fire or explosion to damage property. He cites State v. Walker, 21 Kan. App. 2d 950, 910 P.2d 868 (1996), as suggesting the same construction. Walker was convicted of attempted aggravated arson resulting in substantial risk of bodily harm for pouring gasoline on the ground in front of the apartment where McCoy, who earlier had poured gasoline on Walker, lived. Walker did not ignite the gasoline and testified that he never intended to do so, but merely wanted to force McCoy to smell gasoline. The Court of Appeals concluded that the legislature had not intended for the arson statute to be interpreted literally. 21 Kan. App. 2d at 954. It reasoned as follows: The literal interpretation of the statute would mean that if one pours gasoline on another person's shrubs in front of their house and the shrubs are damaged, he or she has damaged another's property with an explosive, gasoline. Pursuant to [the statute], the person would be guilty of arson. Similarly, if one throws an unlit stick of dynamite through the window of a building, he or she has committed arson. This is true even though the dynamite would not have exploded because the fuse was not lit. The question for the jury to decide was whether Walker intended to ignite the gasoline and damage the building by fire or explosion, not whether he intended damage by the pouring of gasoline around the building. . . . . [W]e believe the unmistakable intent of the legislature was that the term `explosive' was to be interpreted as `explosion' and that the use of the word `explosive' was an error in terminology. [Citation omitted.] 21 Kan. App. 2d at 953-55. The problem identified in Walker, the term explosive, has been remedied in the pattern instruction and was avoided in the present case by use of the pattern instruction. See PIK Crim. 3d 59.22. The facts in Walker paralleled the illustration of an unlit stick of dynamite causing property damage by being thrown through a window. But in the present case, the property damage at issue is not comparable to the broken window but rather to the total destruction of a dwelling by the dynamite's exploding when it landed in a blazing fire. In the first instance, there was an explosive but no fire or explosion; in the second, there was a fire and explosion resulting from the ignition of an explosive. Nonetheless, Dixon would have the court apply the lesson from Walker to the facts of the present case to conclude that he could not have been found guilty of aggravated arson because he did not ignite the gas released from the broken supply pipe, nor did he ever intend to ignite it. Examination of the statutory language does not support Dixon's construction. The legislature defined arson in pertinent part as knowingly, by means of fire or explosive, damaging property. Knowingly is an adverb that modifies the verb damaging, and the phrase by means of fire or explosive is set off by punctuation, making it an independent phrase that could be placed elsewhere in the definition. For example: Arson is knowingly damaging any building or property, which is a dwelling in which another person has any interest, by means of fire or explosive without the consent of such other person. If the legislature had intended to require the specific intent to use fire or explosive in order to damage property, it could have expressed that intent by defining arson as knowingly using fire or explosive to damage property. This court has long held that an accused need not be prosecuted for or convicted of the underlying felony in order to be convicted of felony murder under K.S.A. 21-3401(b). State v. Beach, 275 Kan. 603, 617, 67 P.3d 121 (2003); State v. Wise, 237 Kan. 117, 123, 697 P.2d 1295 (1985). In such a case, however, a challenge to the felony-murder conviction may be made on the sufficiency of the evidence to support it. In Beach, the court framed the issue and concluded as follows: The question in this case . . . is whether after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the jury rationally could have found Beach participated in the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. That the jury acquitted Beach of aggravated robbery independent of the felony murder does not impair our conclusion. 275 Kan. at 622. Here, we conclude that the jury rationally could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixon committed aggravated arson. Thus, aggravated arson could have supported his felony murder and burglary convictions.