Opinion ID: 1671765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Cross-Examination of James Holley

Text: ¶ 165. James Holley was a former Greenwood Police Officer who was called by the defense to testify that he saw Byron De La Beckwith in Greenwood on the night of Medgar Evers' murder. On cross-examination, the prosecution was allowed, over defense objection, to impeach Mr. Holley's testimony with prior inconsistent statements he made during his testimony at Beckwith's grand jury proceeding in 1990. The District Attorney had tape recorded Mr. Holley's grand jury testimony and had had it transcribed, a copy of which transcript was provided to the defense. Beckwith argues that Mr. Holley's grand jury testimony was improper impeachment evidence since, under State v. Burrill, 312 So.2d 1, 3 (Miss. 1975), a defendant has no right in Mississippi to compel the presence of a stenographer at grand jury proceedings. ¶ 166. We squarely addressed this issue in Scott v. State, 446 So.2d 580 (Miss. 1984). In that case, the prosecutor attempted to impeach a defense witness' testimony by use of her grand jury testimony. Scott, 446 So.2d at 584. The prosecutor had no transcript of the witness' grand jury testimony, but rather simply gave his versions of what she had told the grand jury, which versions she denied. Id. We noted that [f]ederal courts permit the introduction of grand jury testimony to impeach a witness where there is a transcript of that proceeding and where the witness is available for examination. Id. (citing Young v. United States, 406 F.2d 960, 132 U.S.App. D.C. 142 (1968)). Because there was no transcript of the witness' grand jury testimony, we reasoned: The district attorney could have simply made any incriminating statement he chose and repeatedly asked [the witness] had she not made that statement before the grand jury. Without a transcript of the proceedings the only rebuttal to the district attorney's line of questioning becomes the witness' denial. Scott, 446 So.2d at 584. The two dangers inherent in such a situation, we explained, are (1) the prosecutor, whom the jury is far more likely to believe, becomes a witness against the defendant, and (2) defense counsel, having been barred from the grand jury proceedings, has no way of rebutting the prosecutor's accusation. Id. at 584-85. We reversed on the issue, holding that allowing a district attorney to accuse a witness of making conflicting statements before a grand jury without offering any proof to that effect amounts to a denial of due process. Id. at 585. Our determination in the case sub judice, therefore, is whether the transcript of Mr. Holley's grand jury testimony constituted any proof to that effect under Scott. We find that it did. ¶ 167. Although there might be some question as to the trustworthiness of a prosecutor's assertions of a witness' grand jury testimony where those assertions are supported only by a transcript which the prosecutor himself had prepared, in the case sub judice Mr. Holley's grand jury testimony was transcribed from a tape recording, which transcript was provided to the defense, and which tape recording was offered to the defense. Furthermore, when the district attorney showed to Mr. Holley and read to him portions of his alleged grand jury testimony, Mr. Holley's responses indicated that those were in fact the statements he made to the grand jury. Therefore, this was not a case where the jury had only the prosecutor's unsupported version of Mr. Holley's grand jury testimony to weigh against Mr. Holley's trial testimony, nor was defense counsel without any means to rebut the prosecutor's assertions. The concerns we expressed in Scott having been met, we hold the trial court did not err in permitting the prosecutor to impeach Mr. Holley's testimony by use of his grand jury testimony. ¶ 168. Beckwith also argues, without citing any authority, that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor, over the defense's continuing objection, to question Mr. Holley about Beckwith's outspoken views on racial segregation and whether Mr. Holley shared those views. Beckwith contends this line of questioning was irrelevant and did nothing more than inflame and prejudice the jury. ¶ 169. We have discussed above the relevancy of evidence regarding Beckwith's views on racial segregation, and we concluded that such evidence was admissible to show motive. As for evidence that Mr. Holley shared those views, Mississippi Rule of Evidence 616 provides, For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of bias, prejudice, or interest of the witness for or against any party to the case is admissible. This state allows wide-open cross-examination of any matter affecting the credibility of a witness, including a witness' possible interest, bias or prejudice in a case. Meeks v. State, 604 So.2d 748, 755 (Miss. 1992). We find that Mr. Holley's testimony that he shared Beckwith's views on racial segregation was admissible for the purpose of showing a possible bias or prejudice in the case so as to attack Mr. Holley's credibility under Rule 616.