Opinion ID: 1935406
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Heading: Is the promotion provision of the collective bargaining agreement enforceable?

Text: Sec. 62.13, Stats., is a provision of the general charter law which applies to all cities except cities of the first class, i.e., Milwaukee. In Wisconsin, municipalities have no inherent power to govern, and the general charter law, like the special charter legislation before it, is the necessary enabling legislation setting out the areas in which local government can enact legislation. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 85, 268 N.W. 108, 109 (1936). Sec. 62.13, Stats., governs the organization of police and fire departments. Subsection (4) (a) states that The chiefs shall appoint subordinates subject to the approval of the board. Sec. 62.13 (12), Stats., states that The provisions of section 62.13 . . . shall be construed as an enactment of state-wide concern for the purpose of providing a uniform regulation of police and fire departments. The City contends that by making the chief's appointments subject only to approval by the board, sec. 62.13 (4) (a), Stats., vests unfettered discretion in the chief concerning promotion of subordinates, restricted only by the requirement of board approval. The City argues that a contract term requiring the chief to promote the most senior qualified candidate cannot be reconciled with sec. 62.13 (4) (a). The City contends further that, since sec. 62.13 (4) (a) is a statewide concern prompted by an effort to achieve uniformity in city organization, a provision of a labor agreement restricting this discretion is illegal. [3] A labor contract may not violate the law. In WERC v. Teamsters Local No. 563, supra , we held that a contract provision interpreted to permit an employee to violate an ordinance requiring him to live within the city was illegal. In Durkin v. Board of Police & Fire Commissioners, 48 Wis.2d 112, 180 N.W.2d 1 (1970), we held that an amnesty clause in a contract could not foreclose an elector from exercising his statutory power to file disciplinary charges with the board. However, we are not persuaded by the City's argument that the promotion provision of this labor agreement is void because it violates sec. 62.13 (4) (a), Stats. Although sec. 62.13 (4) (a), Stats., requires all subordinates to be appointed by the chief with the approval of the board, it does not, at least expressly, prohibit the chief or the board from exercising the power of promotion of a qualified person according to a set of rules for selecting one among several qualified applicants. In fact, the record shows that the Chief of Police has already accepted limitation of his discretion to promote by considering as qualified only those three candidates recommended to him by the Board. A labor contract requiring the chief to appoint the most senior qualified candidate does not contradict an express command of law. Compare: WERC v. Teamsters Local No. 563, supra . It does not purport to take away a power expressly conferred by law. Compare: Durkin v. Board of Police & Fire Commissioners, supra . A requirement that the chief promote the most senior qualified applicant merely restricts the discretion that would otherwise exist. [4] The City appears to concede that the Chief himself can decide to limit his discretion without violating sec. 62.13 (4) (a), Stats. We conclude that the same can be done through a labor agreement ratified by the Common Council. Moreover, as a municipal employer under sec. 111.70 (1) (a), Stats., the City of Glendale must bargain with the chosen representatives of the municipal employees concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment, the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under sec. 111.70(1) (d). Beloit Education Asso. v. WERC, supra . Promotions are a condition of employment and are subject to mandatory collective bargaining. Because a promotions provision of this collective bargaining agreement is directly authorized by sec. 111.70, Stats., we are constrained to give effect to both the agreement and the statutes if this can be done. In Muskego-Norway Consolidated Jt. School Dist. No. 9 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 35 Wis.2d 540, 556, 151 N.W.2d 617 (1967), we held that sec. 111.70, Stats., should be harmonized with other statutes whenever possible and that the provisions of sec. 111.70 can modify preexisting statutes. Specific contract provisions authorized by MERA must also be harmonized with the preexisting statutory scheme. In Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 37 Wis.2d 483, 492, 155 N.W.2d 78 (1967), we held that matters concerning wages, hours, and conditions of employment which are fixed by the school statutes in ch. 40 cannot be the subject of collective bargaining, but that [w]hat is left to the school boards in respect to the school calendar is subject to compulsory discussion and negotiation. [5] This conclusion was based, at least in part, on the conclusion that because sec. 111.70, Stats., was enacted after ch. 40 it is presumed to have been enacted with full knowledge of the preexisting statutes and that these statutes should be harmonized by construction. Again, in Board of Education v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 52 Wis.2d 625, 638, 191 N.W.2d 242 (1971), the court held that sec. 118.21 (4), Stats., which provides in part that School boards may give to any teacher, without deduction from his wages, the whole or part of any time spent by him in attending a teachers' . . . convention . . . , gives school boards discretion as to whether teachers individually or collectively will be given time off to attend conventions, how much time off, how many conventions, or whether the time off shall be with or without pay in whole or in part. But the court also held that although the final determination must rest with the board of education, it is a subject upon which the board . . . must negotiate with the representative of the majority labor organization representing the teachers. 52 Wis.2d at 639. Finally, in Richards v. Board of Education, 58 Wis.2d 444, 206 N.W.2d 597 (1973), a school board relieved a teacher of his coaching assignment without notice and a hearing. This was permitted by sec. 118.22, Stats., but it violated the grievance provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. In its original opinion the court concluded that: [The defendant, subject to sec. 118.22, Stats., was empowered to relieve the plaintiff of his coaching assignment without prior notice and the requirement of a common-law hearing. To the extent that the master agreement purports to limit this power, it is void.] Richards v. Board of Education, supra at 460a. On motion for rehearing this language was withdrawn. In its stead the court substituted in pertinent part: Under the act, a school district is considered to be a `municipal employer,' sec. 111.70 (1) (a), Stats., and this court has no difficulty in concluding that a grievance procedure established by a collective bargaining agreement, and relating to dismissals falls within the embrace of `wages, hours and conditions of employment,' and that the conditions of such an agreement are binding on the parties. See, our opinion in Local 1226 v. Rhinelander (1967), 35 Wis.2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30. Richards v. Board of Education, supra, at 460b. [10] The relationship between public sector bargaining agreements and other statutes governing terms and conditions of employment can be one of the most difficult issues in public sector labor law. [6] As one commentator has pointed out, a rule giving automatic priority to the statute can reduce the statutory duty to bargain into insignificance, while a rule giving automatic priority to the agreement can result in effective repeal of state law. [7] The scope of the employer's duty to bargain under sec. 111.70, Stats., in light of the other statutes, is particularly difficult because sec. 111.70, Stats., does not contain a legislative resolution of any statutory conflicts as does the State Employment Labor Relations Act, secs. 111.80-97, Stats. The State Act provides that the labor agreement supersedes provisions of civil service and other statutes related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment. Sec. 111.93, Stats. In the absence of such a legislative resolution of the problem in sec. 111.70, Stats., et seq., we have held that collective bargaining agreements and statutes also governing conditions of employment must be harmonized whenever possible. When an irreconcilable conflict exists, we have held that the collective bargaining agreement should not be interpreted to authorize a violation of law. WERC v. Teamsters Local No. 563, supra . [11] The labor agreement in this case can be harmonized with sec. 62.13(4) (a), Stats. The statute vests authority in the chief to appoint subordinates with the approval of the board. Appointments are to be made by promotion within the ranks when this can be done with advantage, presumably when qualified insiders exist. Under the labor agreement, the chief is under no compulsion to promote an unqualified person or a person determined solely by the union. The seniority restriction operates only where there is more than one qualified candidate. Nothing in sec. 17.01 of the labor contract requires an appointment by promotion of the most senior officer if there are no qualified candidates within the police force or in other City employment. The arbitrator found Officer Kerber to be qualified, and the City does not challenge that determination. Although by entering into the collective bargaining agreement the City relinquished some of the discretion the Chief and the Board enjoyed previously concerning appointments and promotions, it has not transferred from the Chief or the Board the authority to determine who is qualified, and it has not transferred away the appointing authority. [12] Our construction gives effect to both the Chief's power under sec. 62.13 (4) (a) and the municipality's duty to bargain under sec. 111.70, Stats. Sec. 62.13 (4) (a) is enabling legislation which places the exercise of discretion in a certain office, while sec. 111.70 permits the City to limit the scope of this discretion through a collective bargaining agreement. The Common Council has not, as the City contends, bargained away a power possessed by the Chief that is not the City's to bargain. In ratifying the agreement, the Council has effectuated the municipal employer's statutory duty to bargain on conditions of employment and has preserved the statutory requirement that only qualified persons be appointed. Because we have concluded that the contract and the statute can be harmoniously construed, we are not persuaded that the promotions provision of the contract violates the home rule amendment. The home rule amendment provides in part that Cities . . . organized pursuant to state law are hereby empowered, to determine their local affairs and government, subject only to this constitution and to such enactments of the legislature of state-wide concern as shall with uniformity affect every city.... Wis. Const., art. XI, sec. 3. Since the legislature has declared sec. 62.13 (4) (a), to be a statute of statewide concern, the City contends that the contract term which limits the chief's discretion is illegal. The home rule amendment makes a general grant of legislative power to municipalities with respect to matters of local concern. State ex rel. Michalek v. LeGrand, 77 Wis.2d 520, 526, 253 N.W.2d 505 (1977). It also restricts the power of cities and villages to elect not to be subject to state laws or to enact, repeal, or amend any part of their charter where the matter involved is a matter of statewide concern. Van Gilder v. City of Madison, supra . On the other hand, the fact that a state statute is one of statewide concern does not make invalid all local regulation in the area covered by the statute. The home rule amendment limits a municipality's power to veto, block, or withdraw from legislation of statewide concern, but it does not prohibit the legislature from authorizing local regulation to further proper public interests, even in areas of statewide concern. Menzer v. Elkhart Lake, 51 Wis.2d 70, 186 N.W.2d 290 (1971). Sec. 111.70, Stats., is legislation that specifically authorizes local action, i.e., the adoption of collective bargaining agreements covering wages, hours, and conditions of employment even though statutes of statewide concern also govern wages, hours, and conditions of employment. [13] Thus this is not a case of a municipality in the exercise of its home rule power deciding to withdraw from or circumvent sec. 62.13(4) (a), Stats. Sec. 17.01 of the agreement is authorized by sec. 111.70, Stats., a statute which also deals with a matter of statewide concern. In entering into this agreement, the City is not illegally exercising local autonomy in an area of statewide concern but is effectuating the legislature's mandate in sec. 111.70. Under these circumstances, where the issue is the relationship between the requirements of two state laws, home rule considerations are inapplicable. [14] The promotions provision of the labor agreement does not violate the home rule amendment. It complements, rather than contradicts, sec. 62.13 (4) (a), Stats., and for that reason the circuit court erred in declaring it unenforceable. Since the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in enforcing this contract and since no other ground for vacating the award has been alleged, we must set aside the order vacating the award and direct the circuit court to enter an order confirming the award. By the Court. Judgment reversed, with directions to enter an order confirming the arbitrator's award.