Opinion ID: 2516952
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Police Officers Acted Within Their Discretion and Therefore Togiak Is Immune from Suit.

Text: We affirm the superior court for a second reason: Apart from the question of duty, we hold that the officers and Togiak are immune from suits of this sort. Alaska Statute 09.65.070 exempts municipalities from civil liability for claims based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty by a municipality or its agents . . . whether or not the discretion involved is abused. This statutory grant of immunity, which we previously characterized as discretionary function official immunity, [14] is a type of qualified immunity. [15] Under this qualified immunity, a public official is shielded from liability . . . when discretionary acts within the scope of the official's authority are done in good faith and are not malicious or corrupt. [16] We have previously described discretionary functions as actions that require personal deliberation, decision, and judgment. [17] In Pauley v. Anchorage School District, we granted immunity to a school district under AS 09.65.070 after the school released a child to his non-custodial parent. [18] In holding that the release of the child was a discretionary act, we considered, among others, the following factors: (1) the principal acted with deliberation and made a considered judgment; (2) the principal reviewed relevant court documents and identification presented by the non-custodial parent; and (3) the principal's actions were in no sense malicious, corrupt, or taken in bad faith. [19] Although the facts of Pauley differ considerably from the events in this case, we find the analysis for classifying an act as discretionary instructive to the case at hand. We recently clarified our test for determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for performing a discretionary act in Sheldon v. City of Ambler. [20] In Sheldon we explicitly adopted the federal immunity standard, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz , for granting discretionary function official immunity to police officers. [21] The Supreme Court, in Saucier, set out a two-part test for qualified immunity. In determining whether an officer is immune, a court considers (1) whether an officer's actions were objectively reasonable and (2) whether the officer might have reasonably believed that his actions were reasonable. [22] In Sheldon, we found that a city was immune from suit after a village police officer (VPO), faced with an intoxicated man posing a violent threat to the man's girlfriend and others, in an escalating emergency situation, used a bear hug to take the man down. [23] Injuries resulting from this bear hug led to the man's death. [24] Because the VPO did not reasonably know that a bear hug could result in death and because the act itself was not on its face excessive or egregious, we held that he had acted reasonably and that therefore the city was immune. [25] In this situation, even drawing all factual inferences in the Logusaks' favor, the decision of the police to take Elsie home to her parents was clearly discretionary. Under the Pauley factors for characterizing discretionary acts  personal deliberation, decision, and judgment  it is manifest that the police were exercising discretion. As discussed above, Alaska law required that they release Elsie to her parents rather than retain her in custody unless there was a lawful reason not to do so. Here, there was no lawful reason not to release Elsie to her parents. Indeed, the officers' decision to release her to her parents exhibited reasoned judgment. The uncontroverted testimony shows police officers who simply tried to take an intoxicated minor to her family so they could care for her. They first drove Elsie to her sister's house so that her sister could care for her. Upon learning her sister was not home and that Elsie's parents were in town, the police declined to leave Elsie with her brother, who was an inappropriate chaperone as he was underage and known to drink, and instead drove her home so that she could be released to her parents. Even given that Elsie's parents had requested that the police detain her to control her and even assuming that the officers understood Elsie's cryptic remark about her brother to hint at suicide, there is no shred of evidence suggesting that the police's decision not to detain her was in bad faith. Without any showing of capriciousness or maliciousness, the Logusaks have failed to show that Ferris and Gust's decision was not an exercise of discretion. We turn now to the Sheldon inquiry: whether the police acted reasonably in performing this discretionary act. Ferris and Gust relied on a reasonable interpretation of AS 47.37.170 that prohibited placing minors in jail and encouraged the release of intoxicated minors to their parents. They also acted pursuant to AS 12.25.030(b)(3)(B), which as noted above provides that the police must release a minor who has consumed alcohol to her parents unless there is a lawful reason for further detention. The officers followed the law and placed Elsie in the care of her parents, who would presumably be better equipped to handle Elsie. This situation thus presents an even clearer case for immunity than Sheldon where there were no applicable laws regulating the VPO's behavior. The City of Togiak, therefore, is immune under discretionary function official immunity.