Opinion ID: 2368117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of RSA 637:5, II(i)

Text: RSA 637:5, I (2007) provides: A person is guilty of theft as he obtains or exercises control over the property of another by extortion and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. The statute provides eight specific circumstances in which extortion occurs, as well as a catch-all provision, under which the State charged the defendant. RSA 637:5, II(a)-(i). The catch-all provision states that extortion occurs when a person threatens to [d]o any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit him but which would harm substantially any other person with respect to that person's health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships. RSA 637:5, II(i). The defendant argues that RSA 637:5, II does not prohibit his conduct because none of its eight specific provisions includes a threat to file a lawsuit. In addition, he asserts that the term substantially benefit encompasses the kind of non-pecuniary satisfaction he would receive by ending the salon's alleged discrimination, and that this provision was satisfied by his standing to bring suit against the salon under RSA chapter 354-A (2009). Resolution of this issue requires that we interpret RSA 637:5, II(i), which presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Gallagher, 157 N.H. 421, 423, 951 A.2d 130 (2008). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. Id. at 422, 951 A.2d 130. We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used. Id. at 422-23, 951 A.2d 130. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language it did not see fit to include. State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 84, 945 A.2d 1 (2008). Further, we interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id. The defendant first asserts that we should interpret RSA 637:5, II(i) as excluding any threat to sue, regardless of whether there is a basis for the threatened suit, because it does not constitute the type of harm contemplated by the statute. In support of this assertion, he argues that this type of threat falls outside the core purpose of the extortion statute, and that including a threat to sue in the statute would chill the right of access to the courts. The defendant also argues that the rule of lenity supports his interpretation. We disagree. At common law, extortion consisted of the corrupt taking of a fee by a public officer, under color of his office, where no fee is due, or not so large a fee is due, or the fee is not yet due. State v. O'Flynn, 126 N.H. 706, 709, 496 A.2d 348 (1985) (quotation and brackets omitted). Beginning in the 19th century, many states enacted extortion statutes to criminalize conduct that was extortionate but did not fall within the ambit of the narrow crime of common law extortion. Rendelman v. State, 175 Md.App. 422, 927 A.2d 468, 474 (Ct.Spec.App.2007), aff'd, 404 Md. 500, 947 A.2d 546 (2008). This statutory form of extortion applied to both private individuals and public officials, and made criminal the act or practice of obtaining something or compelling some action by illegal means, as by force or coercion. Id. (quotations and brackets omitted). In New Hampshire, the legislature has enlarged the scope of extortion to include unlawful acquisitions of property by means of threats, O'Flynn, 126 N.H. at 709, 496 A.2d 348; see RSA 637:5, II (2007). Here, the defendant suggests that a threat to sue is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute in part because the threat of civil litigation ... does not give rise to the kind of intimidation that constitutes extortion. While we agree that simply threatening to institute a lawsuit does not, standing alone, carry the inherent hallmarks of an extortionate act, our inquiry does not end there. Unlike the other provisions within RSA 637:5, II, the plain language of RSA 637:5, II(i) does not simply evaluate the type of threat that was made; that is, the substance of the threat. Rather, it requires us to consider both the threat's potential harm to the person threatened as well as its potential benefit to the person making the threat. Thus, contrary to the defendant's interpretation, we cannot simply evaluate the threat on its face and disregard the circumstances under which it was made. In order to make a proper determination as to these additional factors, we must consider all of the circumstances surrounding that threat on a case-by-case basis. We, therefore, cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that there are no circumstances under which a threat to sue would constitute extortion. We recognize that several courts have drawn a contrary conclusion, finding that a threat to sue, even if baseless, does not constitute extortion. See United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1207-08 (11th Cir.2002); First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Bro, 847 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir.1988); I.S. Joseph Co., Inc. v. J. Lauritzen A/S, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir.1984); Rendelman, 927 A.2d at 483. The focus in the majority of these cases is whether the threat constitutes a wrongful means to achieve a wrongful objective, as defined by the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000). See, e.g., Pendergraft, 297 F.3d at 1205-06. For example, in Rendelman, the court stated: A wrongful purpose does not necessarily make the means threatened to accomplish it wrongful. The means threatened must be of a sort that will instill fear.... The threat of litigation, being a lawful means in which a third party assigned by government to decide disputes will decide that very dispute, is not such a means. Rendelman, 927 A.2d at 482. Similarly, in I.S. Joseph Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that only the most liberal construction of the word `fear' in the extortion statute could make it apply to the threat to file a civil action. I.S. Joseph Co., 751 F.2d at 267. However, we find these cases distinguishable, because the courts' analyses considered the wrongful meansthe threatindependent from the wrongful objectivethe taking of property. As such, the type of threat made is a determinative factor. RSA 637:5, II(i) does not make such a distinction. Rather, as discussed above, it more broadly considers the consequences of the threat, both to the person making it and to its intended recipient. Furthermore, RSA 637:5, II(i) does not require there to be fear as a result of the threat, but, rather, only that there be substantial harm. We do not believe that these terms are interchangeable. Further supporting our interpretation, other courts have held that an extortion conviction may be supported by the threat to bring a civil suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has indicated that, under federal law, an extortion charge may be based upon the threat of litigation if there is no basis for the threatened suit. See United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir.1989) (It would be unjust to convict A of extortion unless she knew she had no claim to the property that she allegedly sought to extort.). Additionally, in construing a statute almost identical to RSA 637:5, II(i), a New Jersey court upheld a conviction for theft by extortion based upon a demand for money coupled with a threat to sue. See State v. Roth, 289 N.J.Super. 152, 673 A.2d 285, 290-91 (App.Div.), cert. denied, 146 N.J. 68, 679 A.2d 655 (1996). We also disagree with the defendant's contention that this interpretation chills an individual's right of access to the courts. By no means does our holding imply that every demand for money, buttressed by a threat to sue, constitutes extortion. Rather, we are simply denying the defendant's contention that a threat to sue may never constitute extortion. Moreover, we decline to apply the rule of lenity in support of the defendant's interpretation. The rule of lenity forbids interpretation of a federal statute so as to increase the statutory penalty when legislative intent is unclear and is applicable only where statutory ambiguity has been found. State v. Ravell, 155 N.H. 280, 284, 922 A.2d 685 (2007) (quotation omitted). The statute at issue does not seek to increase a statutory penalty, and we have not found it ambiguous. The defendant next argues that RSA 637:5, II(i) does not cover his conduct because he stood to substantially benefit from his actions. He argues that the term benefit is not limited to tangible interests, but encompasses advantages to the sense of well-being, including his satisfaction in eliminating an instance of gender-based price discrimination. We disagree. Under the defendant's interpretation of benefit, the extortion statute could be circumvented by any social injustice or generalized concern, regardless of how attenuated the connection between it and the defendant or whether he had sustained some actual injury to support the claim. In essence, any perceived bias would be sufficient to evade a charge of extortion. We do not believe the legislature intended such a result. We agree with the trial court that the phrase substantially benefit is not so broad as to encompass an altruistic sense of accomplishment for ridding the world of a perceived injustice. Indeed, as Roth explained, this type of conceptual interpretation is far too abstract to constitute a substantial benefit under this statute; it bespeaks of a societal goal, not personal gain. Allowing such a tenuous advantage to fulfill the substantial benefit requirement would simply eviscerate the statute. Roth, 673 A.2d at 288-89. We agree and similarly conclude that the defendant's asserted general interest in ending discrimination is insufficient to satisfy the substantially benefit element. The defendant next argues that his standing to pursue a lawsuit under RSA chapter 354-A removed him from the ambit of RSA 637:5, II(i) by substantially benefit[ting] him. The dissent agrees in part, concluding that the defendant had a good faith basis to believe that the threatened action had merit. We disagree with both contentions. We begin by noting that the defendant threatened the salon with a claim under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), RSA chapter 358-A, demanding $1000 in order to avoid litigation because $1000 is a fair amount as it is the minimum that would be awarded for an unfair trade practice alone. Even assuming that the defendant marshaled a good faith argument that the salon was engaging in a prohibited act, he fails to explain exactly how his threatened CPA claim fits within the statutory language conferring private-party standing upon only those  injured by another's use of any method, act or practice declared unlawful. RSA 358-A:10, I (emphasis added); see, e.g., Remsburg v. Docusearch, 149 N.H. 148, 160, 816 A.2d 1001 (2003) (holding that person deceived by investigator proper party to bring suit under CPA, notwithstanding lack of privity with investigator). Although the CPA formed the basis for the defendant's demand of $1000, and although he maintained at trial that he had standing under the CPA, he no longer presses this argument on appeal. The defendant argues only that he had standing under RSA chapter 354-A. We presume that, because this is his sole argument, the defendant premises his $1000 demand to the salon upon the threatened RSA chapter 354-A action. Among other things, RSA chapter 354-A prohibits unlawful discriminatory practices in a place of public accommodation, RSA 354-A:17, and permits only persons aggrieved, RSA 354-A:21, I(a) (2009); RSA 354-A:21-a, I (2009), to complain of discriminatory practices. In the abstract, the word aggrieved may leave room for advocacy regarding its intended meaning, but no reasonable attorney would construe the term in a vacuum. The defendant, who lacked a client and did not personally patronize the salon, could not reasonably conclude that he was aggrieved by virtue of his general interest in ending sex discrimination and its distressing effect upon him. The State Commission for Human Rights presumes that all participants in RSA chapter 354-A proceedings have direct interests. See N.H. Admin. Rules, Hum 311.01(a) (permitting intervention only by person or entity, other than a party, having a direct interest in the outcome of the public adjudicative hearing (emphasis added)). Furthermore, we have never construed aggrieved to confer standing in the absence of a direct and particularized interest. See Babiarz v. Town of Grafton, 155 N.H. 757, 760, 930 A.2d 395 (2007) (holding, in construing RSA 669:35 (2008) (amended 2008), that a person aggrieved by a ruling of the board of recount has an interest [in the election] which is special or superior to that of a mere voter or member of the public (quotation and brackets omitted)); Goldstein v. Town of Bedford, 154 N.H. 393, 395, 910 A.2d 1158 (2006) (holding, in the context of a zoning board appeal pursuant to RSA 676:5, I, that to be a person aggrieved a petitioner must demonstrate some direct definite interest in the outcome of the proceedings, and, further, that we will not extend standing to all persons in the community who might feel that they are hurt by a local administrator's decision (quotations omitted)). If any doubt remained about the meaning of aggrieved, it is resolved after reviewing the monetary remedies available to an aggrieved person. If an unlawful discriminatory practice is found in a public accommodation action brought before the commission, the claimant may receive, within the discretion of the commission, only compensatory damages. RSA 354-A:21, II(d) (2009); see Black's Law Dictionary 416 (8th ed. 2004) (defining compensatory damages as [d]amages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered); see, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 243, 513 A.2d 341 (1986). Furthermore, the defendant's threat to seek punitive damages, a remedy unavailable in this state absent statutory authorization, RSA 507:16 (1997), is entirely baseless because RSA chapter 354-A authorizes only the assessment of an administrative fine and that fine is payable only to the general fund. RSA 354-A:21, II(d). Even in an action removed to superior court, the statute authorizes only damages and relief which could have been awarded by the commission, except that in lieu of an administrative fine, enhanced compensatory damages may be awarded. RSA 354-A:21-a, I (emphasis added). Enhanced compensatory damages are, as their name indicates, compensatory and not punitive in nature. See Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto, Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 73, 289 A.2d 66 (1972). Thus, by incorporating the idea of compensation into each monetary remedy payable to the public accommodation claimant, the legislature quite clearly contemplated that such claimants will have suffered direct harm. We respectfully disagree with the dissent's conclusion that the defendant had a good faith basis to argue for standing under RSA chapter 354-A. See Kukene v. Genualdo, 145 N.H. 1, 3, 749 A.2d 309 (2000) (A frivolous claim lacks ... any reasonable claim in the law as it is, or as it might arguably be held to be. (quotation omitted)). A review of Scarborough v. R.T.P. Enterprises, Inc., 120 N.H. 707, 422 A.2d 1304 (1980), shows that it does not establish a substantial possibility, Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 110 comment d at 172 (2000), that a tribunal would accept the contention that a claimant may bring an RSA chapter 354-A public accommodation action for damages without having suffered the slightest direct harm. Scarborough centered upon an employment dispute and the defendant-employer's challenged misconduct was directly applied to the plaintiff. We looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Intern. Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), and rejected the contention that a plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie showing of employment discrimination. Scarborough, 120 N.H. at 710, 422 A.2d 1304. We said that, in order to prove a violation of RSA 354-A:8, I (current version at RSA 354-A:7, I (2009)), a plaintiff need not give the defendant the opportunity to reject her because she could demonstrate a violation by showing a failure to fairly consider her because of her sex. Id. A charge that an employer failed to give equal consideration to an applicant would never require the applicant to wait until she is formally rejected because the offense is complete before that time. Id. at 711, 422 A.2d 1304. Unlike the plaintiff in Scarborough who actually contacted the defendant employer and attended a job interview, Scarborough v. Arnold, 117 N.H. 803, 805, 379 A.2d 790 (1977), the defendant here had no preexisting relationship with the salon before threatening litigation and, furthermore, he suffered no direct, compensable harm. Neither is there here, as there was in Scarborough, federal or other persuasive authority supporting such a remarkable extension of the compensatory monetary remedies within RSA chapter 354-A. While the defendant pointed at trial to Massachusetts' identical public accommodation law, its monetary remedies, unlike RSA chapter 354-A, include punitive damages. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 9 (West 2004). Furthermore, it is well established that [t]o qualify as a `person aggrieved,' a person must allege substantial injury as the direct result of the action complained of. Mass. Elec. v. Mass. Com'n Against Discrim., 375 Mass. 160, 375 N.E.2d 1192, 1204 (1978) (construing public accommodation administrative remedy within Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151B, § 5 (West 2004)). Turning to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that RSA 637:5, II(i) applies to the defendant's conduct. It is apparent that the defendant, acting as an attorney, sent a letter to the salon demanding money and threatening to file a lawsuit if it did not pay him. The defendant did not have a client who had suffered from the alleged discriminatory pricing at the salon, nor had he been a client of the salon himself. In fact, the money the defendant demanded, and eventually received, was for his own personal gain. For the reasons set forth more fully above, we fail to see how the threatened action would have substantially benefited the defendant. As the State aptly explains, it was the defendant's threat to bring an action which ... as an attorney [he] knew he could not pursue, coupled with his demand for a cash payment to which he was not legally entitled, that makes the defendant's conduct criminal. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss.