Opinion ID: 1959633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waste-Management Statute

Text: Finally, in its counterclaim and as an alternative theory of liability, the State maintains that Vermont's Waste Management Act, see 10 V.S.A. §§ 6601-6632, requires that, even if partial foreclosure were upheld, plaintiff still should be held liable for remediation of the Mill Lot. In general, a secured lender, holding indicia of ownership in a facility primarily to assure the repayment of a financial obligation, cannot be held liable as an owner or operator of contaminated property. 10 V.S.A. § 6615(g)(1)(A) (the safe harbor provision). The State, however, contends that this secured-lender exemption does not apply in this instance. It argues that, by obtaining title to a contiguous parcel of land, Lot 1A, plaintiff is liable for remediation costs associated with the Mill Lot. This liability is premised on the State's assertion that the Mill Lot and Lot 1A are part of the same facility. Id. § 6602(10). Thus, by foreclosing on Lot 1A, plaintiff necessarily became the owner of, and thereby liable for, the entire facility, including the Mill Lot. See id. § 6615(a)(1) (facility owners and operators are liable for remediation). Under the Act, `[f]acility' means all contiguous land, structures, other appurtenances, and improvements on the land, used for treating, storing, or disposing of waste. A facility may consist of several treatment, storage, or disposal operational units. Id. § 6602(10) (emphasis added). Disposal is defined as the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any ground or surface waters. Id. § 6602(12). The parties stipulated that [w]aste from the Mill Lot was not disposed of on the lands of Lot 1A . . . which lie to the west of the west bank of the Hoosic River. Rather, waste water was discharged, first directly (prior to 1962) and then indirectly (after 1962), through a series of lagoons, into the river from a portion of the east bank. This easterly bank of the Hoosic River from which the eventual waste water was discharged from lagoon 5 is situated within the boundaries of Lot 1A. As a result of this discharge, there are elevated levels of lead and chromium in the riverbed within the boundaries of Lot 1A. At this time, however, remediation of that portion of the Hoosic River within Lot 1A is not necessary and will not be undertaken by the State. The trial court concluded that Lot 1A and the Mill Lot are contiguous because the two parcels abut each other. See, e.g., Route 4 Assocs. v. Town of Sherburne Plan. Comm'n, 154 Vt. 461, 462, 578 A.2d 112, 113 (1990) (contiguous means touching). The trial court, however, did not address the issue of whether the disputed lots constitute a facility under § 6602(10). [2] Although the trial court does not appear to have ruled on the State's counterclaim, per se, by issuing a decree of foreclosure, that claim was rejected implicitly. Moreover, no party on this appeal argues that pertinent facts went unresolved, requiring a trial below. Hence we are left with the duty to apply the law to the agreed facts. See DeWitt v. Brattleboro Zoning Bd. of Adj., 128 Vt. 313, 324, 262 A.2d 472, 478 (1970) (where parties do not contend that there is shortage of facts, and sufficient undisputed facts permit resolution of issues, we must apply the applicable law to these undisputed facts). Putting aside for the moment questions of ownership, Lot 1A could be considered a facility under § 6602(10). It is contiguous to the Mill Lot, and was used in a broad sense in the disposing of waste, as some of that material evidently passed through it in earlier periods. This was, of course, long before plaintiff mortgagee had any interest in Lot 1A. As a mere mortgagee, plaintiff is a secured lender subject to the safe harbor provision of § 6615(g)(1)(A). The State concedes as much. Once a mortgagee commences foreclosure, it is still only a secured lender. The State's counterclaim must set forth any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party. V.R.C.P. 13(a). The State has not shown what claim it had, under the waste-management statute, at that time. At a later time, after the decree of foreclosure becomes choate by expiration of rights of redemption, plaintiff will become the owner of Lot 1A. Whether it thereby becomes liable in some way for being the owner of that lot is not for determination at this time. We may decide only claims pending between parties, not all possible future claims. See C.V. Landfill, Inc. v. Environmental Bd., 158 Vt. 386, 391, 610 A.2d 145, 148 (1992) (noting the general jurisdictional prerequisite that a court exercise its power to resolve only real disputes cases and controversiesas opposed to issuing advisory or hypothetical opinions) (internal quotation marks omitted). Affirmed.