Opinion ID: 1192958
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defining Prudent for Purposes of Assessing Alternatives

Text: The AAIA does not define the phrase prudent alternative, see 49 U.S.C. § 47102 (definitions), nor has the FAA promulgated regulations interpreting it. In 1980, however, the agency issued Order 5050.4, which served as an instructional manual to guide FAA officials and included a definition of prudent alternative as used in § 47106(c)(1)(B). See FAA Order 5050.4, Airport Environmental Handbook, 45 Fed.Reg. 56624 (Aug. 25, 1980) (Order 5050.4). The interpretive order explained that a prudent alternative reflects sound judgment and that an alternative may not be prudent ... because of safety, policy, environmental, social, or economic consequences. Id. at 56652. This definition remained unchanged when the FAA issued Order 5050.4A in 1985 to amend the Airport Environmental Handbook. See FAA Order 5050.4A, Airport Environmental Handbook ¶ 83(b) (Oct. 8, 1985) (Order 5050.4A). Subsequently, the agency substantially update[d] and revise[d] ... and cancelled] Order 5050.4A by implementing Order 5050.4B, which became effective on April 28, 2006. FAA Order 5050.4B, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing Instructions for Airport Projects at Cover Memorandum (2006), http://www. faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/ airports/resources/publications/orders/environmental_5050_4 (Order 5050.4B). This order describes a prudent alternative as one reflecting rational[] judgment and lists the following factors to aid FAA officials to decide if an alternative is prudent: 1. Does it meet the project's purpose and need? 2. Does it cause extraordinary safety or operational problems? 3. Are there unique problems or truly unusual factors present with the alternative? 4. Does it cause unacceptable and severe adverse social, economic, or other environmental impacts? 5. Does it cause extraordinary community disruption? 6. Does it cause added construction, maintenance, or operational costs of an extraordinary magnitude? or 7. Does it result in an accumulation of factors that collectively, rather than individually, have adverse impacts that present unique problems or reach extraordinary magnitudes? Id. ¶ 1007.e(5)(a). All iterations of Order 5050.4 thus interpret the term prudent to permit consideration of non-environmental factors when assessing alternatives. We proceed to consider what, if any, deference is owed these interpretive orders. [7]
The FAA's orders, as agency manuals without the force of law, are not afforded deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Nevertheless, we conclude that the definition of prudent found in these orders is entitled to deference pursuant to Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). See Friends of Richards-Gebaur Airport v. FAA, 251 F.3d at 1186 (according Order 5050.4A Skidmore deference); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000); Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir.2008). Under Skidmore, the weight courts accord an agency interpretation depends on the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control. 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. Our analysis of the Skidmore factors in this case leads us to conclude that the FAA's interpretation of the phrase prudent alternative has a great deal of persuasive weight. As already noted, the statute does not define the term prudent, nor does it limit the factors that the agency may consider in assessing whether an alternative is imprudent. The absence of statutory guidance provides the FAA, which is charged with the statute's administration, with flexibility to implement a broad interpretation of the term. See Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir.2008) (under Skidmore, we construe the statute in the first instance, and where the text does not resolve the issue, we give effect to [the agency's] nonlegislative interpretation to the extent we find it persuasive). Moreover, the agency's interpretation is longstanding. See id. at 107; see also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n. 12, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982) (In construing a statute, this Court normally accords great deference to the interpretation, particularly when it is longstanding, of the agency charged with the statute's administration.). The FAA first defined prudent in 1980, modifying that definition only once, in 2006. See Order 5050.4B Cover Memorandum (observing that Order 5050.4A has served FAA well for over 20 years). Throughout, the agency has provided for a number of non-environmental factors to be considered in determining whether an alternative is prudent. Finally, the agency's definition is the product of an interpretation that is relatively formal within the universe of informal interpretations. Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d at 110. Specifically, the FAA's interpretation of prudent for purposes of considering alternatives is set forth in a manual rather than, for example, a non-precedential letter ruling. Moreover, the interpretation is generally applicable and not an ad hoc position. See Chauffeur's Training Sch., Inc. v. Spellings, 478 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir.2007) (observing that agency interpretation is entitled to greater Skidmore deference when the interpretation in question is not merely ad hoc but... is applicable to all cases). These circumstances all support Skidmore deference.