Opinion ID: 215941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Watson's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

Text: Mr. Watson next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in C.R. England's favor on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. [19] To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a party must plead facts indicating that the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, (b) where any reasonable person would have known that such would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 338 (Utah 2005) (quoting Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 30 (Utah 2003)); accord Cabaness v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486, 499 (Utah 2010). [I]t is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. Cabaness, 232 P.3d at 499 (quoting Gygi v. Storch, 28 Utah 2d 399, 503 P.2d 449, 450 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order for conduct to be considered extreme or outrageous, it must evoke outrage or revulsion; it must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 207 (Utah 2001). A defendant's intentional behavior does not necessarily meet this standard merely because it is tortious, injurious, or malicious, or because it would give rise to punitive damages, or because it is illegal. Id. Furthermore, in the employment contextas this case isliability under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ... may be found only where the conduct complained of has been so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, so as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Oman v. Davis Sch. Dist., 194 P.3d 956, 970 (Utah 2008). In granting summary judgment in favor of C.R. England, the district court concluded that the company's conduct in presenting Watson's trainee with the acknowledgment form disclosing [his] HIV status may not be reasonably regarded as extreme or outrageous. EEOC v. C.R. England, No. 2:06-CV-00811BSJ, slip op. at 27. We agree. Although some might view C.R. England's use of the HIV-acknowledgment form as unreasonable or unfair, we would be hard-pressed to conclude that its actions qualify as revulsi[ve] or so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, so as to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Franco, 21 P.3d at 207. Because Mr. Watson cannot satisfy this element of his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, C.R. England is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in C.R. England's favor on this claim.