Opinion ID: 2206365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ambiguous or unambiguous contract

Text: [¶ 14] Contract language is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations. Portland Valve, 460 A.2d at 1387. Both parties argue that the license agreement is unambiguous, and both parties have set forth reasonable, but contradictory, interpretations of the agreement. [¶ 15] The portion of the license agreement at issue is the definition of appurtenances. The agreement provides that CMP has the right to request that appurtenances be installed in or over Guilford's land and that Guilford must grant the request unless Guilford's engineering officer determines that the installation would interfere with rail operations. Appurtenances are defined in the license agreement as pipes, poles, wires and other equipment. CMP argues that appurtenances unambiguously includes fiber optic wires or cables and that wires is not limited to wires that carry electric current. Guilford contends that wires refers only to strands of metal capable of carrying electric current, and, because fiber optic cable or wire is made of glass and does not carry electric current, the term wires cannot mean fiber optic wire. [¶ 16] We interpret language in a contract by its generally prevailing meaning. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(A) (1981). Both parties have supplied the court with numerous dictionary definitions of wire. Dictionaries support Guilford's position that wire is made of metal. See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2080-81 (2d ed.1993) (1. a slender, stringlike piece or filament of relatively rigid or flexible metal  (emphasis added)); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 2048 (1992) (1. A usually pliable metallic strand or rod made in many lengths ... used chiefly for structural support or to conduct electricity.) There are dictionary definitions, however, that support CMP's position that wire includes communication cable. See, e.g., CHAMBERS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DICTIONARY 972 (1988) (( Telecomm. ) A continuous connection through a system, particularly a telephone exchange, whether automatic or manual); OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 798 (1980) (2, a cable used to carry telephone or telegraph messages.) We have used the term fiber wire to refer to fiber optics. See A.A.R.P. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 678 A.2d 1025, 1029 (Me.1996). [¶ 17] There appear to be generally prevailing meanings of wire that would support the meaning urged by Guilford and the meaning urged by CMP. We conclude that the contract term wires is susceptible to differing, but reasonable, interpretations. [¶ 18] We look at the entirety of the contract to see if this apparent ambiguity is resolved elsewhere in the document. See T-M Oil Co., Inc. v. Pasquale, 388 A.2d 82, 86 (Me.1978) (viewing the entire lease to determine if the ambiguity in one paragraph could be resolved). CMP finds support for its argument in another part of the license agreement, paragraph nine, which requires it to remedy any interference with the railroad that results from appurtenances which consist of electrical power or communication wires and equipment. [5] Thus, CMP contends, appurtenances include communication wires, and fiber optic wires or cables are communication wires. Guilford counters this argument by contending that paragraph nine refers only to CMP's communication wires used to communicate between a control center and a switch. Guilford's interpretation of paragraph nine, however, is not evident from the four corners of the license agreement, and CMP's interpretation, while helpful to its position, is not so persuasive as to be determinative. [¶ 19] Guilford supports its argument, that the parties never intended to include fiber optic cable in appurtenances, by reference to the fee schedule attached to the license agreement. The fee schedule is based on voltage, and for transverse crossings of appurtenances that carry between zero and 750 volts, the annual fee is $75. Guilford argues that because fiber optic cable does not have an electrical charge, the fee schedule demonstrates that the parties could not have intended the agreement to cover fiber optic cable. CMP argues in response that because the fee schedule includes zero volts, the parties intended that wires with no electric current are included within the definition of appurtenances. The fee schedule lends support to Guilford's argument because it seems that if the parties had anticipated extensive fiber optic crossings Guilford would have insisted on more of a fee. On the other hand, the fee schedule can be seen as a boost to CMP's argument because it would appear that the parties anticipated at least some wires with zero voltage. [¶ 20] The contract dispute boils down to two basic contentions: (1) CMP's argument that if the parties had intended to exclude fiber optic cable they would have done so explicitly and nothing in the agreement limits appurtenances to conduits of electricity; and (2) Guilford's argument that at the time the parties entered into the license agreement, CMP was only an electric utility and was not engaged in telecommunications, and therefore, the parties could only have intended appurtenances to mean conduits integral to the business of an electric utility. [¶ 21] We conclude that an examination of the entire document does not resolve the ambiguity in the terms appurtenances and wires and does not resolve whether it was the intention of the parties to include fiber optics within the license. Although both parties argued before the PUC and this Court that the agreement was unambiguous and neither contended that they have extrinsic evidence to submit to a factfinder, it is apparent from Guilford's statement of material facts filed with the PUC that extrinsic evidence exists. [6] In addition, the briefs filed with this Court from both Guilford and CMP contain references to the history of dealings between the parties on the fiber optic issue and the impact of proposed legislation on their negotiation of the master license agreement. Because the license agreement is ambiguous, its interpretation is a matter of fact, and we must remand to the factfinder. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Case remanded to the PUC for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.