Opinion ID: 2274446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Charge for Continuous Failure to Disclose Change of Address was Multiplicitous

Text: Ms. Harris argues the charges against her violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the government charged her with welfare fraud as both a series of individual crimes and as one continuing offense. We agree. Because [a]n illegal sentence-including a sentence for a conviction that should have merged with another conviction to avoid a double jeopardy violation-may be challenged at any time, Carter v. United States, 957 A.2d 9, 22 n. 19 (D.C.2008) (internal citation omitted), we remand for vacation of one of the multiplicitous charges and convictions despite the fact that Ms. Harris failed to object to the charging information at trial. [3] We have held that the commission of a single fraud, i.e., making one misrepresentation to DHS, which results in the receipt of multiple payments or benefits can be charged only as a single ongoing offense. Blackmone v. United States, 151 A.2d 191, 195 (D.C.1959). [4] We also have held, however, that a person can be charged with multiple fraud offenses where he or she makes multiple false representations to the government. Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1267 (D.C.1991). [5] Thus, it is not inherently problematic for a person charged with welfare fraud to be charged with both a continuing offense and a series of individual offenses, so long as the offenses are based on different conduct and thus constitute separate criminal acts. With this framework in mind, we agree that Count 1 was multiplicitous with Counts 4 and 5. [6] All three of these charges were based on violations of D.C.Code § 4-218.01(a) (2001), which provides in pertinent part: Any person who, with the intent to defraud, by means of false statement, failure to disclose information, or impersonation, or by other fraudulent device, obtains or attempts to obtain or any person who knowingly aids or abets such person in the obtaining or attempting to obtain: (1) any grant or payment of public assistance to which he is not entitled; ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than $500, or to imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both. (Emphasis added). Count 1 charged Ms. Harris with a continuing offense, specifically the failure to disclose her change of address between May 16, 2001, and February 28, 2003. Counts 4 and 5, on the other hand, were based on individual incidents of providing a false address to DHS on March 28, 2002 and June 2, 2002 respectively. There is [] no double jeopardy bar to `separate and cumulative punishment for separate criminal acts,' even if those separate acts do happen to violate the same criminal statute, Ellison v. United States, 919 A.2d 612, 614 (D.C.2007) (quoting Brown, supra note 3, 795 A.2d at 63), but here we do not find separate criminal acts. Where a defendant has been convicted of two violations of the same statute, we have employed a fact-based analysis to determine whether separate criminal acts have occurred. For purposes of this fact-based merger analysis, criminal acts are considered separate when there is an appreciable length of time between the acts that constitute the two offenses, or when a subsequent criminal act was not the result of the original impulse, but a fresh one. Id. at 615 (quoting Sanchez-Rengifo v. United States, 815 A.2d 351, 354 (D.C. 2002)). Here, when Ms. Harris provided a false address to DHS on March 28 and June 2, the bases for Counts 4 and 5, she simultaneously failed to disclose her correct address, the basis for Count 1. These criminal acts were thus inextricably intertwined, and we cannot find an appreciable length of time between these simultaneous acts or a separate criminal impulse to establish sufficient separation between the acts. Id. [7] The court's failure to sua sponte strike either Count 1 or Counts 4 and 5 was thus error. The government urges us to apply plain error review because appellant failed to object to the multiplicitous charging at trial. This court, however, has previously not refrained from reaching merger issues which become apparent for the first time on appeal,... even if not specifically raised by the appellant. Brown, supra note 3, 795 A.2d at 62 (citation omitted). This court has further held that, [w]here there are duplicate convictions for the same offense, one or more must be vacated in order that only one conviction and sentence remains for a single offense. Sanchez-Rengifo, supra, 815 A.2d at 354. Accordingly, we remand with instructions to vacate either Count 1 or Counts 4 and 5.