Opinion ID: 1998324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issue i: did the trial court err in failing to require a voluntariness hearing outside of the jury's presence?

Text: Our standard of review regarding voluntariness of confessions or incriminating statements is well established. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that such confessions or incriminating statements were freely and voluntarily made. State v. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 716 (S.D.1990) (citing State v. Faehnrich, 359 N.W.2d 895, 898 (S.D.1984); State v. Janis, 356 N.W.2d 916, 918 (S.D.1984)). If the trial court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the incriminating statements were voluntarily made, that finding is binding upon this Court unless we find, from our review of the record, that the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d at 716; State v. Albright, 418 N.W.2d 292, 297 (S.D. 1988). A finding is `clearly erroneous' when after reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. State v. Almond, 511 N.W.2d 572, 574 (S.D.1994) (quoting Selle v. Pierce, 494 N.W.2d 634, 636 (S.D.1993). In reviewing the trial court's finding on voluntariness, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. State v. Headrick, 357 N.W.2d 268, 270 (S.D.1984); State v. Cowell, 288 N.W.2d 322, 325 (S.D. 1980). The trial court, over defense counsel's objection, allowed statements made by Erickson to the police to be admitted into evidence during the State's direct examination of the police officer. These statements were admitted in the presence of the jury. We believe that the trial court did find in favor of the State at this point and was required, under previous holdings of this court, to hold a hearing outside of the jury's presence to determine whether those statements were voluntarily made. Defendant argues he was so intoxicated the statements were not voluntary. In State v. Thundershield, 83 S.D. 414, 422, 160 N.W.2d 408, 412 (1968), this court first adopted procedures by which the trial court must determine the voluntariness of confessions and incriminating statements before their admissibility into evidence. When a confession or an incriminating statement allegedly made by the accused is offered by the prosecution and objected to, the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the same was freely and voluntarily made. This proof must be made in an independent hearing of all relevant facts outside the presence of the jury. At this hearing the defendant may testify and be cross-examined as to the issue of voluntariness without jeopardy to or waiver of his right to remain silent at the trial. After hearing the facts the trial judge must finally and solely determine, as a matter of law, whether or not the confession or incriminating statement is, or is not, voluntary. This determination and the evidence upon which it is based should be made part of the record. If found to be involuntary the confession or statements may not be admitted at the trial as evidence. If found to be voluntary they may be admitted in evidence for consideration by the jury as to their weight and credibility together with all other facts and circumstances. No special instructions on this subject should be necessary. Id. Headrick, 357 N.W.2d at 270; State v. Janis, 321 N.W.2d 527, 528-29 (S.D.1982); Cowell, 288 N.W.2d at 324; State v. Stumes, 90 S.D. 382, 389-90, 241 N.W.2d 587, 591-92 (1976); State v. Kiehn, 86 S.D. 549, 555-56, 199 N.W.2d 594, 597-98 (1972); 23 C.J.S. Crim. Law § 939 (1989). In an opinion authored by Justice Henderson, this court in State v. Lufkins, 309 N.W.2d 331 (S.D.1981) upheld Lufkins' conviction when his lawyer agreed to a voluntariness determination of Lufkins' statement to a sheriff in the presence of the jury. In a subsequent habeas proceeding in federal court, the United States District Court held this determination of voluntariness to be inadequate under constitutional due process requirements. Lufkins v. Solem, 554 F.Supp. 988 (D.S.D.1983). The United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, requiring a finding of voluntariness outside of the presence of the jury before allowing a defendant's incriminating statements to be admitted into evidence at trial. Lufkins v. Solem, 716 F.2d 532, 536 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219, 104 S.Ct. 2667, 81 L.Ed.2d 372 (1984)). In Lufkins, the sheriff testified during the State's case-in-chief regarding incriminating statements made by defendant Lufkins. During this testimony, the defendant rose and challenged the Sheriff's veracity. Lufkins, 716 F.2d at 535. The defendant had also offered handwritten objection prior to trial regarding the voluntariness of his statements to the sheriff. However, no pretrial motion to suppress these statements had been made by Lufkins' attorney. Lufkins, 716 F.2d at 534. At the conclusion of the sheriff's direct examination testimony, Lufkins' attorney objected on the ground that Lufkins' statements were not voluntarily made. The trial court overruled the objection. Lufkins, 716 F.2d at 535. Our court held by so ruling, the trial court implied the statement was given voluntarily. Lufkins, 309 N.W.2d at 334. In the subsequent habeas proceeding, the United States District Court held Lufkins' voluntariness hearing, which involved taking evidence during the course of the trial, in open court, and in the presence of the jury, did not meet the due process requirements set out by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno. Lufkins, 554 F.Supp. at 992. The district court noted [t]he importance of the voluntariness question cannot be overstated, because `[i]t is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession.' Id. at 991 (quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964)). `A defendant objecting to the admission of a confession is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined.' Id. (quoting Jackson, 378 U.S. at 381, 84 S.Ct. at 1783). The district court, though characterizing Lufkins' attorney's objection as cursory and catchall and holding that it fell short of the duty of competent representation, determined that the trial court had not made the required clear-cut finding of voluntariness before admitting Lufkins' statements at trial. Lufkins, 716 F.2d at 536. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding the district court's decision, stated the trial court was required to provide the defendant with a full and fair voluntariness hearing in order to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Citing the Jackson decision, the court noted the hearing must be `fully adequate to insure a reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession, including the resolution of disputed facts upon which the voluntariness issue may depend.' Lufkins, 716 F.2d at 537 (quoting Jackson, 378 U.S. at 391, 84 S.Ct. at 1788). Providing a defendant with a meaningful opportunity to challenge the state's testimony on voluntariness is not an extravagant, procedural formality to be cast aside when convenient; it is fundamental to a fair and reliable determination of voluntariness and hence firmly rooted in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Lufkins, 716 F.2d at 539. Here, as in Lufkins, no clear-cut determination was made by the trial court regarding the voluntariness of Erickson's statements to the police. No evidentiary hearing was held which would have allowed Erickson a meaningful opportunity to challenge the state's testimony on voluntariness outside of the jury's presence. There was no finding made by the trial court that the State had met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that statements made by Erickson to the police were voluntary. The trial court was aware, through defense counsel's pretrial motion, of the level of intoxication of Erickson during interrogation by the police. Erickson, through his attorney, made objection at trial to the admission of any statements he may have made to the police. Though we believe better practice would be to individually object and to state grounds for objection rather than make the standing objection made here, we believe the trial court erred in not stopping the proceedings at this point and holding a hearing outside of the jury's presence to determine the voluntariness of those statements beyond a reasonable doubt prior to their admission into evidence. We believe this to be clear error and reverse and remand for a new trial. [2] A defendant may waive his Miranda rights provided the waiver is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. State v. Braddock, 452 N.W.2d 785, 788 (S.D. 1990); State v. West, 344 N.W.2d 502, 504 (S.D.1984). Determination of an effective waiver requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances in which the waiver was made. State v. Oster, 495 N.W.2d 305, 308 (S.D.1993); State v. Bult, 351 N.W.2d 731, 735 (S.D.1984). The court looks to the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Braddock, 452 N.W.2d at 788 (quoting West, 344 N.W.2d at 504). See also Bult at 735. If the trial court finds the waiver to be effective in that it was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, this court will uphold that finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Oster, 495 N.W.2d at 308; Braddock, 452 N.W.2d at 788. Custodial statements made by an intoxicated defendant are not per se involuntary, but rather this is one of the circumstances to be considered by the trial judge in his determination of voluntariness. State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723, 727 (S.D.1981), rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (citing U.S. v. Brown, 535 F.2d 424 (8th Cir.1976)). The trial judge must make the decision regarding voluntariness of the statement in the first instance. Id. (citing Cowell, 288 N.W.2d at 324; Stumes, 241 N.W.2d at 591; State v. Adkins, 88 S.D. 571, 225 N.W.2d 598 (1975)). Here, the trial court failed to make the decision in the first instance. Failure to make a determination on voluntariness requires reversal and is dispositive. However, because we remand for a new trial, we feel it necessary to address certain other issues raised by defendant. State v. Breed, 399 N.W.2d 311, 312 (S.D.1987); State v. Carlson, 392 N.W.2d 89, 92 (S.D.1986); State v. Helling, 391 N.W.2d 648, 650 (S.D.1986).