Opinion ID: 2615040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: letters harkness had written

Text: Harkness contends the trial court erred in refusing to admit Defense Exhibit H into evidence. This exhibit consisted of letters the defendant wrote to his family while he was at Larned for an evaluation of his competency to stand trial. The letters covered a period of time from the first of August until the first of December 1981. Defense counsel asked to make a proffer, which the trial court granted, and to leave the letters with the court reporter for the purpose of appeal. The record before us does not show a proffer was made, and the letters are not part of the record. The State's initial objection to the letters was on the grounds of hearsay. Harkness argued that the letters were not being offered to show the truth of the matter, but to show his mental state. The trial court withheld its ruling, allowing the State to review the letters. The State subsequently objected to the letters on hearsay and relevancy grounds. In response, Harkness contended that the letters had some probative value concerning his state of mind. The trial court sustained the State's objection, reasoning the letters were immaterial because it was the defendant's state of mind at the time of committing the offenses, not his subsequent condition, that was important in determining whether the M'Naghten test was satisfied. On appeal, Harkness argues the letters were relevant because they were offered to show his clearing mental state ... after the administration of psychotropic medication, and by inference, [his] mental state when not medicated. `Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact. K.S.A. 60-401(b). The defendant contends the material fact the defense sought to prove was that in his unmedicated state he was unable to distinguish between right and wrong. He argues that, because the trial court refused to admit the letters into evidence, he was unable to present his defense. In discussing relevancy, we have stated: To render evidence of collateral facts competent, there must be some natural, necessary, or logical connection between them and the inference or result they are designed to establish. State v. Friberg, 252 Kan. 141, Syl. ¶ 6, 843 P.2d 218 (1992). Harkness failed to establish that connection. When he attempted to proffer the letters, he only argued that the letters were being offered to show his state of mind. He did not elaborate. The defendant argued for the first time in his post-trial motion for a new trial, which was denied, that the letters were being offered for the purpose of showing the confusion that existed in [his] mind early on when he went down to the hospital, and how that seemed to clear up as his medication took hold. Furthermore, when Harkness attempted to enter the letters into evidence, there was no specific mention that he was receiving psychotropic medication during his stay at Larned. The record on appeal does not indicate if the defendant was receiving psychotropic medication when he wrote the letters and, if so, how much medication he had received when he wrote such letters. The record on appeal also is vague concerning when Harkness last took his medication prior to committing the crimes. His mother testified that he told her on June 2, 1981, that he was not taking medication. June 2, 1981, is the date of the first kidnapping and attack. It is not known when he last took the medication, how long the drug stays in the system, and if he took medication on the dates the other crimes were committed. In State v. Garcia, 233 Kan. 589, Syl. ¶ 5, 664 P.2d 1343 (1983), this court held that evidence of the defendant's behavior subsequent to the commission of the alleged crimes is relevant to the insanity issue only if such evidence assists in determining the defendant's mental condition at the time the alleged crimes were committed. In Garcia, the defendant wanted to admit into evidence videotapes of an interview between him and his expert witness, a clinical psychologist. At a hearing on whether to admit the tapes, the psychologist said that he relied upon the tapes, in part, in reaching his conclusion that the defendant did not know the difference between right and wrong at the time the crimes were committed and that the tapes would be useful in explaining his diagnosis and conclusions to the jury. This court upheld the trial court's refusal to admit the tapes, reasoning: Here the videotapes were offered by the [defendant] to support [the psychologist's] opinion concerning the [defendant's] mental condition at the time the crimes were committed. It is highly possible that the jury would be misled by the evidence and misuse it in considering the issue of insanity on the night in question, rather than limiting its use to support the basis of [the psychologist's] opinion. Furthermore, ... the jury does not possess the training, skill or experience to analyze the behavior of the [defendant] exhibited during the interview and interpret from it his mental condition at the time the crimes were committed. The strong possibility of misuse of the evidence by the jury outweighs whatever probative value the evidence may have had in lending support to [the psychologist's] conclusions. In addition, the admission of this evidence would have placed before the jury the issue of the validity of the expert's conclusions and would have required them to evaluate whether, based upon that evidence, those conclusions were proper. This the jury was not qualified to do. Garcia, 233 Kan. at 601. Harkness attempts to distinguish the instant case from Garcia, contending that the same concerns are not present here. He focuses upon only one of the concerns discussed in Garcia, that being that the jury might mistake the defendant's state of mind as evidenced on the videotapes for his state of mind at the time the crimes were committed. Harkness argues that the letters were offered to show how the medication improved his state of mind, not to show aberrant behavior. The defendant also claims the letters are more reliable than the Garcia videotapes because the letters were not elicited for examination purposes. We find Harkness' contention unpersuasive. There is just as much possibility the letters would have misled the jury in this case as the videotapes would have misled the Garcia jury. The jury could have mistaken Harkness' state of mind at the time of writing the letters for his state of mind at the time of committing the crimes. The jury would have been placed in the inappropriate position of collaterally evaluating the validity of the experts' conclusions. The jury lacked the expertise to interpret the letters in relationship to the defendant's state of mind at the time the crimes were committed. Admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to exclusionary rules. Friberg, 252 Kan. 141, Syl. ¶ 5. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the letters into evidence.