Opinion ID: 149588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Finding of Abandonment and Denial of a Continuance

Text: Ogunfuye first challenges the BIA's order affirming the IJ's finding that she abandoned her applications for relief, and dismissing her claims. Applicants for certain kinds of relief from removal, including the relief requested by Ogunfuye, are required to submit biometric information such as fingerprints so that DHS can verify the applicant's identity and conduct a security investigation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(a), (b). The applicant abandons an application for relief and may suffer dismissal for failure to submit biometrics. Id. § 1003.47(c). Ogunfuye's argument on appeal centers around whether the IJ gave her proper notice of the biometrics requirement under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d). That provision requires DHS and the IJ to notify the applicant of the biometrics requirement [a]t any hearing at which a respondent expresses an intention to file or files an application for relief for which identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations are required. Id. § 1003.47(d). DHS shall notify the respondent of the need to provide biometrics and other biographical information and shall provide a biometrics notice and instructions to the respondent for such procedures. Id. Pertinent to this appeal, the IJ is required to specify for the record when the respondent receives the biometrics notice and instructions and the consequences for failing to comply with the requirements of this section. Id. Ogunfuye correctly points out that the IJ did not comply with its notice obligations under the regulation. Although the record contains several exchanges between the IJ and Ogunfuye's counsel that demonstrate counsel's awareness of the biometrics requirement, the required record statements at a hearing that Ogunfuye received the biometrics notice from DHS and that her applications would be deemed abandoned if she did not submit her biometrics are absent. [3] The consequences of this defect are another matter. Ogunfuye's main argument is that the IJ's failure to comply with § 1003.47(d) violated her right to due process of law. Problematically, Ogunfuye makes this argument in the face of uncontroverted evidence that her counsel received actual notice of the biometrics requirement in the IJ's March 26 written order. [4] When pressed by the IJ about Ogunfuye's failure to submit fingerprints at her final immigration hearing, counsel did not attribute it to any defect in the notice given. Counsel admitted that the error was due to an office mistake and complained that the files are so big. On this record, we cannot conclude that the outcome of Ogunfuye's proceeding would have been any different had she received proper notice because the admitted reason for her failure to submit biometricsattorney neglecthad nothing to do with whether § 1003.47(d) was satisfied. As a result, Ogunfuye has not demonstrated the initial showing of substantial prejudice necessary to prevail on her due process claim. Anwar v. INS, 116 F.3d 140, 144 (5th Cir.1997); see id. (applicant must show that he could make a strong showing in support of his application in order to demonstrate substantial prejudice). Because Ogunfuye is an aggravated felon, the court has no jurisdiction to reach her related argument that the lack of notice constituted good cause warranting a continuance. Title 8, United States Code, section 1252(a)(2)(C) strips this court of jurisdiction to review a final order of removal entered against an alien convicted of certain criminal offenses, including aggravated felonies, subject to § 1252(a)(2)(D)'s exception for review of constitutional claims and questions of law. Unlike her due process claim, Ogunfuye's argument that the IJ abused its discretion by not granting her a continuance does not present a constitutional claim or issue of law that this court has jurisdiction to consider. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 328-30 (2d Cir.2006); see also Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir.2006) (holding that the denial of a motion to continue is reviewed for abuse of discretion). This court's decision in Ahmed v. Gonzales , holding that the denial of a motion to continue was not subject to a different jurisdiction-stripping provision, does not dictate otherwise. See 447 F.3d at 436-37 (discussing § 1252(a)(2)(B)). The Ahmed court had no occasion to discuss whether § 1252(a)(2)(C)'s broader jurisdiction-stripping provision applied because the petitioner had not committed one of the criminal offenses enumerated in that provision. As an aggravated felon, Ogunfuye is subject to § 1252(a)(2)(C), and she has not shown that her abuse of discretion claim is outside the scope of that provision.