Opinion ID: 593201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualified Immunity--Britt

Text: 11 Britt answers Liberda's Section 1983 claims with the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity determinations implicate a multi-faceted framework. This case represents a procedurally unique setting in which to discuss qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is normally raised prior to trial at the summary judgment stage. Indeed, the thrust underlying the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is to allow public officials to avoid time consuming, and exhaustive litigation. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir.1992). 12 A prior panel of our court has already decided that Britt was not entitled to qualified immunity following a directed verdict in favor of defendants. See Mouille, 918 F.2d at 551. The Mouille panel remanded Liberda's claims to the district court where he commenced a second trial--this time around the defendants were able to introduce their own evidence. Crucial evidence that established Britt was not entitled to qualified immunity in the first trial was either: (i) ineffectively presented by Liberda; or (ii) sufficiently eviscerated by the defendants during the second trial. 13 In Mouille, the plaintiffs had proven that Britt did not enter the L & R offices until thirty minutes after Mouille had parked his car. 2 The current record is bereft of any evidence upon which to conclude that thirty minutes elapsed from the time Mouille pulled into the parking lot until the time Britt burst through the door. 3 Therefore, the life blood of the Mouille panel's conclusion: that Officer Britt's actions were bizarre and shockingly unreasonable, is emasculated. 4 Significantly, the current record establishes that eight minutes elapsed from Britt's last radio contact during the chase on I-35 until his next report when Britt informed the dispatcher that Mouille was in custody. The foregoing merely establishes that we are not bound by the Mouille decision. 14 Initially, plaintiff must allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. See Siegert v. Gilley, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1792, 114 L.Ed.2d 277, 287 (1991). Liberda alleges that Officer Britt used excessive force against him during the course of Mouille's arrest. Currently, allegations of excessive use of force implicate the fourth amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable seizures. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1870-71, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). 5 Liberda's allegations fall under the broad definition of seizure for fourth amendment purposes. 6 However, prior to Graham, the law in this Circuit clearly held that excessive use of force claims were governed by the substantive due process clause in the fourteenth amendment. See Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.Unit A Jan. 1981). 15 Categorization of the precise constitutional rubric violated by excessive force has been subject to the sands of temporality. Be that as it may, the underlying standard throughout has always been that qualified immunity operates as a cloaking device from personal liability for police officers who act in an objectively reasonable manner. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Under Anderson and its progeny, the reasonableness of action taken must be assessed in light of the clearly established law in effect at the time. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038; see also Jackson v. Beaumont Police Dep't, 958 F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1992); Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir.1990). 16 Approached from a different vantage point: police officers are free to exercise their discretion as long as they do not trample over clearly established legal rights. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038. The rationale behind the clearly established law requirement rests on the notion that police action should not be subject to retroactive application of newly created legal standards. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). 17 Furthermore, the approach is objective in nature so that all officials will conduct their activities subject to the same standards. Moreover, where clear legal rights are not involved it is better to have a policy that encourages action, without the fear of Monday morning quarterbacking. Therefore, even if we conclude, with the benefit of hindsight, that Britt did violate Liberda's constitutional rights, but we also conclude that a reasonable officer placed in Britt's shoes would have acted similarly--then Britt is entitled to the protective shroud of qualified immunity. See Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, 950 F.2d 272, 280 (5th Cir.1992). 18 A threshold inquiry into what is objectively reasonable must establish the law in effect on January 9, 1987. Applying the clearly established law requirement to the present case points us to Shillingford. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Graham, the controlling legal precedent in this Circuit held that the substantive due process clause of the fourteenth amendment governed excessive use of force claims. See Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir.1990) (citing Shillingford, 634 F.2d at 265). Shillingford stated: 19 If the state officer's action caused severe injuries, was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances and was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience, it should be redressed under Section 1983. 20 Id. 21 The Shillingford decision sets forth a conjunctive tripartite test to determine the reasonableness of an officer's actions. The standard has coalesced and can be simply stated: (i) did the action cause severe injury; (ii) was the action grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances; and (iii) did the officer act so maliciously that it would shock the conscience. See id. Therefore, if any of the three elements of the test are missing, then the plaintiff has not suffered a violation of constitutional magnitude. This test represents the clearly established law, which guided law enforcement as of January 9, 1987. 22 Applying the standard to the case at hand, we must first place ourselves, as reasonable officers, in Britt's shoes. Next, we have to account for Britt's sudden and unexpected predicament--trying to discount the benefit of hindsight. Certainly, we do not want to hold Britt to standards higher than what reasonable peers of his would have done under the same circumstances. 23 The most relevant prong in the three part inquiry for our purposes is number two: whether Britt's actions were grossly disproportionate to the need for action. Britt acted reasonably when he chased Mouille into the L & R offices because he was trying to evade arrest. Perhaps Britt may have opened the office door with less vigor. However, none of the people inside that office were entitled to interfere with Britt's arrest. Indeed, citizens have no right to intervene in lawful police business. Further, Liberda's actions were undoubtedly inappropriate. We do not wish to countenance like behavior in the future. 24 When Britt saw Liberda approaching him menacingly--he did not know what Liberda's intentions were. If he were to passively await the outcome he may have been injured or even worse. The constitution does not empower private citizens to imperviously interfere with police business. The jury found that Britt did not use excessive force and we too agree that Britt acted reasonably when he attempted to quell a volatile situation under rapidly evolving and unpredictable circumstances. Therefore, Britt's actions were not grossly disproportionate to the need for action. 25 Secondly, we focus on the third prong of Shillingford and consider whether Britt acted so maliciously that it shocks the conscience. Objectively, we must analyze Britt's actions, and consider whether a reasonable officer would use a firearm to protect himself when approached by unknown individuals during the course of an arrest. We conclude that Officer Britt's actions were objectively reasonable and not excessive, given the circumstances. Indeed, they do not shock the conscience. 26 The severe injury prong of Shillingford need not be addressed. In fact, the jury below was charged on the basis of significant injury. To be sure, the law on excessive force claims, as it currently stands in this Circuit, requires that plaintiffs must prove significant injury. See Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir.1989) (en banc) (per curiam). The Johnson holding has been called into doubt by Hudson v. McMillian, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 995, 997, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (excessive force claim tenable in eighth amendment context even without significant injury). 7 We expressly decline to decide whether Johnson 's vitality has been impaired by Hudson. Incidently, anything that we say regarding Johnson would be dicta for two reasons: (i) because we find that Britt is entitled to qualified immunity under Shillingford 's second and third prongs, we need not address the first prong; and (2) Britt is not bound by legal developments that occurred after 1987.