Opinion ID: 1249328
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Pinkerton part of our common law?

Text: The state argues that Pinkerton has already been adopted in Arizona. If that were the case, a healthy respect for stare decisis would end our inquiry. This court, however, has not addressed the issue. The court of appeals applied the Pinkerton doctrine, without comment, in State v. Garcia, 117 Ariz. 67, 69, 570 P.2d 1080, 1082 (App. 1977), a case decided before October 1, 1978, the effective date of the current criminal code. That court also mentioned the doctrine, in dicta, in State v. Verive, 128 Ariz. 570, 580-81, 627 P.2d 721, 731-32 (App. 1981) and, in a later case, upheld the propriety of instructing the jury on the doctrine in the face of a claim that it constituted a comment on the evidence. State v. Agnew, 132 Ariz. 567, 577, 647 P.2d 1165, 1175 (App. 1982). [2] The state also points out that the doctrine appears in the Recommended Arizona Jury Instructions  Criminal § 10.-035 (1989). This instruction, however, relies upon Garcia, and thus we are right back where we started. Before the enactment of the current criminal code, there was no comprehensive statutory treatment of vicarious criminal liability in Arizona. Chapter 1 of Title 13 of the 1956 Arizona Revised Statutes, entitled General Provisions, did, however, contain several sections on the liability of principals. One of these sections defined principals to include all persons concerned in the commission of a crime ... whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission. A.R.S. § 13-139 (1956), repealed by Laws 1977, Ch. 142, § 2. This was the only section which, even indirectly, dealt with vicarious liability by making aiders and abettors liable as principals, and nothing about it seemed to preclude other theories of liability. This is similar to the federal scheme, both as it is currently written, and as it existed at the time Pinkerton was decided. See 18 U.S.C. § 550 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1988) (stating that anyone who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal)). The current Arizona criminal code, which became effective in 1978, is loosely based on the Model Penal Code. Chapter Three of Title 13, concerning Parties to Offenses: Accountability, defines criminal accountability. A.R.S. § 13-302 states that [a] person may be guilty of an offense committed by such person's own conduct or by the conduct of another for which such person is criminally accountable as provided in this chapter, or both. (Emphasis added.) Criminal accountability for the conduct of others is then provided for in A.R.S. § 13-303, which begins [a] person is criminally accountable for the conduct of another if and then lists various circumstances in which that is the case (see quote, infra ). (Emphasis added.) If in this context clearly means if and only if. This scheme, in contrast to the provisions of the prior code and its federal analogue, exclusively defines when one may be held liable for acts committed by others and makes judicial adoption of the Pinkerton theory inappropriate unless it is otherwise within the statutory list. [3]