Opinion ID: 2623194
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Regarding One of Defendant's Statements

Text: Over defendant's hearsay objection, the court admitted evidence of his statement to Deputy Mayoya that he would not contradict his brother Steven if Steven had said he had committed a 1988 robbery of McCullough. The prosecutor referred to this evidence in his opening statement. Defendant later moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor's reference to the statement was prejudicial. The court denied the motion. In his rebuttal argument to the jury, the prosecutor argued without objection that this statement suggested that defendant had, in fact, committed that crime. [4] Defendant contends the court erred in admitting the evidence and denying the mistrial motion, and that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his argument to the jury. We disagree. Defendant argues that the statement does not come within the exception to the hearsay rule for statements against interest. (Evid.Code, § 1230.) We need not decide the question, for the statement clearly comes within another exception to the hearsay rule: statements of a party. The hearsay rule does not bar statements when offered against the declarant in an action in which the declarant is a party. (Evid.Code, § 1220.) The evidence was of statements, defendant was the declarant, the statements were offered against him, and he was a party to the action. Accordingly, the hearsay rule does not make the statements inadmissible. ( People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1049, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531.) [5] It is not clear from the record whether the court admitted the evidence as a statement of a party or as a declaration against interest, but it does not matter. The ruling was correct on at least one legal theory. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) Defendant also argues the prosecution did not establish the corpus delicti of the 1988 robbery, and the statement was inadmissible evidence of other crimes. However, he objected solely on hearsay grounds, so he may not raise other objections on appeal. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1049, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531.) Absent an objection at trial, which would have given the prosecutor the opportunity to argue the matter, it is hard to evaluate defendant's contention, but the statement appears relevant at least to show defendant's previous knowledge about McCullough and his home, which was relevant to defendant's guilt of the charged offense. Moreover, It is not clear that the corpus delicti rule applies to other crimes evidence offered solely to prove facts such as motive, opportunity, intent, or identity, or for impeachment. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 124, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.) Assuming the rule does apply here, an objection on corpus delicti grounds would have permitted the prosecution to attempt to satisfy any evidentiary gap. In any event, evidence was presented without objection  partly by defense counsel  that McCullough had told others that he had been the target of crimes, and had identified Steven Horning as having perpetrated a 1988 robbery, which would seem to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. ( People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 115, 181 Cal.Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253 [`slight or prima facie proof'  suffices to establish the corpus delicti].) Because the court properly overruled defendant's objection to the evidence, it acted within its discretion in denying defendant's mistrial motion following the prosecutor's reference to it in his opening statement. ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1038, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Defendant contends the prosecutor's argument to the jury was misleading and contrary to facts the prosecutor knew. The issue is not cognizable on appeal because defendant did not object to the argument at trial, and an objection could have cured any harm. ( People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1212, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) Defendant claims that because the court admitted the statement over his objection, any objection to the prosecutor's argument or to the (misleading) inference he sought to have the jury draw would have been futile. We disagree. A hearsay objection is different from an objection that argument is misleading or contrary to the known facts. Defendant was obligated to object at trial to preserve the point for appeal. ( Id. at pp. 1212-1213, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) This he failed to do. Moreover, any objection would have lacked merit. The prosecutor merely argued the evidence and inferences to be drawn from it, as he was entitled to do. ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Defendant points out that McCullough had previously identified Steven Horning as the perpetrator. Therefore, he argues, the prosecutor knew full well that defendant had not committed the crime. However, the prosecutor knew no such thing. The prosecutor was not present at the 1988 events. He knew  as did the jury  that evidence existed that McCullough had identified Steven Horning as the perpetrator. Indeed, he acknowledged this fact to the jury. But he did not know that McCullough was correct or that Steven was the sole perpetrator. (See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1181-1182, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 472-474, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298.) This whole point was minor in the context of the case as a whole, but the prosecutor was entitled to argue his view of the evidence  and the significance of defendant's statement to Deputy Mayoya  just as defendant was entitled to argue his view of it.