Opinion ID: 1176393
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Municipal Court Proceedings.

Text: Defendant moved in superior court under section 995 to set aside the information on the ground that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing. The motion was denied and defendant now contends that this ruling was erroneous. This contention requires a review of the proceedings in municipal court.
The public defender was appointed to represent defendant on July 9, 1980. The deputy assigned to the case was Sam Gordon. In early September, defendant filed motions in propria persona (pro. per.) for discovery, for allocation of trial preparation funds, and for appointment of an investigator. In the motion papers defendant cited Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525]. On September 19, 1980, before the preliminary hearing which ultimately commenced on January 5, 1981, defendant told the court he had not seen Mr. Gordon since July 21 and had received no response to two letters and a telephone message. Defendant had been moved to the pro. per. tank at the jail, apparently by mistake, and had assumed this meant Mr. Gordon was no longer representing him. Referring to Mr. Gordon, defendant stated: I do waive him as a legal representative of any kind because he has put up no defense at all for me, none whatsoever, won't even communicate with me. The court set a hearing on the issue of representation for September 22. In the interim, defendant filed a written notice of motion for appointment of cocounsel. In the moving papers defendant cited section 1095 (two counsel may argue a death penalty case), former section 13 of article I of the California Constitution (a person accused of crime has the right to defend in person and with counsel), and Evidence Code section 730 (providing for court appointment of experts). At the hearing on September 22, the court handed these motion papers to Deputy Public Defender Gordon as attorney of record. Defendant interjected: Your Honor, I waive Mr. Gordon and the Public Defender as counsel. I want to proceed in pro. per. The court reminded defendant it was a capital case and it might not be too prudent for him to represent himself. The court stated it could not appoint cocounsel for defendant because the court's powers are limited and this court can only appoint ... the Los Angeles County Public Defender, and that has already occurred. Defendant replied: Then I prefer to remain in pro. per. I waive the Public Defender.... I have given you the reasons already. Asked to state the reasons again, defendant said Gordon had not communicated with him and had made no efforts to research the case or to prepare a defense. A recess was then taken to give Mr. Gordon an opportunity to discuss the matter with defendant. After the recess, defendant again stated he wanted to waive the Public Defender and to be granted pro. per. status. The court reminded defendant that the prosecutor was an experienced lawyer, that self-representation was almost always a bad decision, that defendant would receive no special treatment and would be required to follow the normal rules, and that defendant would not have the advice of an experienced criminal lawyer. Defendant stated he understood and the court then granted the motion for self-representation, finding a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. Defendant asked whether lack of funds was the only reason why the court would not appoint a lawyer other than the public defender. Mr. Gordon stated there was no conflict of interest and the court agreed none had been shown. Mr. Gordon then explained that another attorney could be appointed if there were a conflict of interest but not at the defendant's whim. The court stated that defendant's motion for appointment of cocounsel was denied for the reasons indicated, that this court cannot afford to appoint an independent lawyer to defend you.... This court can only appoint a private lawyer if the Public Defender cannot defend you, and that does not exist in this case. On October 14, defendant filed a motion for dismissal, arguing that failure to appoint cocounsel to assist him constituted invidious discrimination on the basis of indigency. This motion was denied. The question of representation was again raised on November 18 when defendant orally renewed his motion for cocounsel or an advisory counsel. The renewed motion was denied. The preliminary hearing commenced on January 5, 1981. At the outset, the magistrate asked defendant whether he wanted to be represented by the public defender. Defendant replied: I asked for co-counsel before and I accept co-counsel or advisory counsel. The magistrate stated: I didn't offer you co-counsel. I offered you counsel to represent you. Defendant answered: No, I don't want counsel to represent me. The magistrate advised defendant of the dangers of self-representation, after which defendant stated: I reject the public defender but I do accept co-counsel and advisory counsel. The magistrate commented that the attorneys working for the public defender were fine lawyers. Defendant stated: I had the public defender and his opening statement to me was to plead guilty and offered no defense. And I didn't see him for two months, so I rejected him. A recess was taken to permit defendant to discuss the case with Mr. Winckler, another deputy public defender, who stated after the recess that he had explained to defendant the policy of the public defender's office against allowing its attorneys to act as advisory counsel. The magistrate replied: I had indicated to the defendant I was not going to appoint co-counsel at this stage of the proceeding, that is, just in an advisory capacity, which he seemed to be interested in; but I would offer him the opportunity of having a lawyer represent him. Defendant then reaffirmed his decision to represent himself, stating he intended to call the public defender to ask him to make an exception to the rule. [3]
(1) A criminal defendant lacking the means to employ private counsel has a constitutional right to the assistance of court-appointed counsel ( Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 342-345 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 804-806, 83 S.Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733]) and this assistance must satisfy certain minimum standards of competence ( United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 654-655 [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 664-665, 104 S.Ct. 2039]; McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 [25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, 90 S.Ct. 1441]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839]). (2) When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 124 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44].) A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation ( In re Banks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 337, 342 [93 Cal. Rptr. 591, 482 P.2d 215]) or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result ( People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 93-94 [184 Cal. Rptr. 611, 648 P.2d 578, 23 A.L.R.4th 476]; cf. People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 812-814 [218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396]). (3a) Relying on these principles, defendant contends that his first assertion of inadequate representation triggered a duty by the court to inquire into the adequacy of counsel's performance and, ultimately, to appoint a different attorney. Defendant further contends that the court should have conducted a more thorough inquiry and should have appointed counsel other than the public defender. During the municipal court proceedings defendant asserted inadequate representation by counsel only as an explanation for his decision to act as his own attorney. (I do waive [Deputy Public Defender Gordon] as a legal representative of any kind because he has put up no defense at all for me.) A request for advisory counsel (referred to as co-counsel in defendant's written motion but apparently intended to act primarily or solely in an advisory capacity) was soon added to the request for self-representation but defendant did not at any time during the municipal court proceedings seek the appointment of substitute counsel to assume control of his defense. Aside from indicating he would accept advisory counsel, defendant requested only that he be permitted to represent himself. (4) A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to choose self-representation instead of representation by counsel. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 807, 819-821 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 566, 572-574].) The only determination a trial court must make when presented with a timely Faretta motion is whether the defendant has the mental capacity to waive his constitutional right to representation by an attorney with a realization of the probable risks and consequences. ( People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 943 [196 Cal. Rptr. 339, 671 P.2d 843].) A request for self-representation does not trigger a duty to conduct a Marsden inquiry ( supra, 2 Cal.3d 118) or to suggest substitution of counsel as an alternative. ( People v. Wright (1977) 72 Cal. App.3d 328, 338-341 [140 Cal. Rptr. 98].) (3b) Defendant was fully advised of the dangers of self-representation and he unquestionably had the mental capacity to waive his right to representation by an attorney. Accordingly, the motion for self-representation was properly granted. As no request for substitute counsel was made in municipal court, the Marsden procedures were not required. Defendant has failed to demonstrate denial of the right to counsel during the municipal court proceedings.
(5) Defendant contends that his requests in municipal court for appointment of advisory counsel should have been granted. It is doubtful that this issue is preserved for review as it was not expressly raised in defendant's motion under section 995 to dismiss the information. (See § 996; People v. Harris (1967) 67 Cal.2d 866, 870 [64 Cal. Rptr. 313, 434 P.2d 609]; People v. White (1981) 118 Cal. App.3d 767, 773 [173 Cal. Rptr. 575].) Assuming arguendo that the grounds of the motion may be construed to encompass this issue, there is yet another reason making it unnecessary to review the merits of this claim. We have held that after trial and conviction, error in judicial rulings at or before the preliminary hearing is grounds for reversal only if the defendant demonstrates that the error resulted in denial of a fair trial or otherwise affected the judgment. ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [165 Cal. Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].) Application of the rule here makes it unnecessary to decide whether failure to appoint advisory counsel in municipal court was error because defendant makes no showing of prejudice flowing directly from these rulings. [4] Rather than attempting to demonstrate prejudice, defendant argues that the rule of Pompa-Ortiz is unfairly invoked against a pro se defendant who properly challenges municipal court rulings by a section 995 motion to set aside the information but then ignorantly fails to seek review by writ of prohibition in the Court of Appeal. This argument is based on an assumption that the purpose of the Pompa-Ortiz rule is to induce counsel to apply for a pre-trial writ. That assumption is incorrect: the rule of Pompa-Ortiz has no purpose other than obedience to the mandate of section 13 of article VI of the California Constitution that a judgment shall not be set aside for error not resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Defendant's argument also assumes that a self-represented defendant's presumed lack of legal acumen may justify exceptions to the normal rules of appellate review. (6) There is no authority for this position; on the contrary, it is settled that a pro se defendant may not claim incompetent representation as a basis for reversal on appeal. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581].) Application of the Pompa-Ortiz rule ( supra, 27 Cal.3d 519) is not unfair in this situation. Finally, defendant argues that application of the Pompa-Ortiz rule will effectively preclude appellate review of municipal court rulings on advisory counsel requests because of the impossibility of assessing prejudice, as recognized in Bigelow. ( People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 745.) This argument is simply incorrect. Rulings of the magistrate at the preliminary hearing are reviewable in the superior court on a motion pursuant to section 995 and pretrial appellate review by petition for writ of prohibition is statutorily available (§ 999a).