Opinion ID: 2155795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applicable substantive principles.

Text: The defendants in this case could properly be convicted of obstruction of justice only if the prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants had the intent to induce Mrs. J. to withhold, or to prevent her from giving, truthful testimony. D.C.Code § 22-722(a)(2). Mrs. J.'s credibility was therefore a critical issue in the case. The defendants contend that the trial judge's restriction of Dr. Ijeh's testimony prevented them from presenting to the jury probative evidence which would have shed light on Mrs. J.'s credibility or lack thereof. They claim that although Dr. Ijeh was permitted to testify as a fact witness, he was effectively precluded from giving any meaningful expert testimony. We discern merit in the defendants' position. At the first trial, half a century ago, of Alger Hiss, the trial judge ruled that psychiatric testimony was relevant and admissible to shed light upon the credibility, or lack thereof, of Hiss' accuser, Whittaker Chambers. United States v. Hiss, 88 F.Supp. 559, 559-60 (S.D.N.Y.1950). This was apparently the first ruling on the issue by a federal court, but the court cited a number of analogous state court precedents in support of its decision. Id. Five years later, Connecticut's Supreme Court of Errors, relying, inter alia, on Hiss and authorities there cited, was able to declare that there can be little doubt that psychiatric testimony is admissible to impeach credibility. Taborsky v. State, 142 Conn. 619, 116 A.2d 433, 438 (1955). There is now ample case law supporting that proposition. See, e.g., Vereen v. United States, 587 A.2d 456 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (where a prosecution witness had been diagnosed as schizophrenic and had reported vapors, i.e., fluorescent auras. . . that appeared over people's heads, id. at 457, but where she was able to respond normally to questions during voir dire and was able to function as a student and as an employee, id., the trial judge was illequipped[, without expert testimony,] to determine whether the `vapors,' premonitions, and any other irregularities were harmless aberrations or might, in some way, bear on her perception, recollection, or ability to distinguish fact from unreality, id. at 458); People v. Neely, 228 Cal. App.2d 16, 39 Cal.Rptr. 251, 253 (1964) (in rape prosecution, it was error to exclude expert testimony regarding the effects of mental illness on the credibility of the complaining witness); People v. Borrelli, 624 P.2d 900, 904 (Colo.Ct.App.1980) (holding that the trial court erred in excluding medical testimony regarding the principal prosecution witness' organic brain syndrome, because [mental] incapacity of a witness is clearly admissible for the purpose of impeachment, since it bears directly upon the question of credibility) (quoting People v. Schuemann, 190 Colo. 474, 548 P.2d 911 (1976) (alteration in original)); cf. United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1163-66 (11th Cir.1983) (where the chief prosecution witness suffered from mental illness which manifested itself in violent threats and bizarre conduct, the trial court erred in denying the defendant access to psychiatric materials); and see generally 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 932 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1970 & Supp.2000). In the present case, Dr. Ijeh was allowed to tell the jury about Mrs. J.'s visual and auditory hallucinations and her depression. He was not permitted, however, to explain the nature of the condition from which she was suffering, or the purpose of the medications which he had prescribed and which Mrs. J. had apparently declined to take. Dr. Ijeh was thus precluded from expressing an opinion regarding how Mrs. J.'s illness, and in particular her failure to take her medicine as directed, were likely to affect her ability to observe and recall accurately, and to describe truthfully, the events regarding which she was testifying. A similar restriction was held to be error in Vereen, supra, 587 A.2d at 457-58. To be sure, the jurors knew that Mrs. J. had been hearing imaginary voices and seeing things that were not in fact there. But these symptoms alone, even if unexplained, did not necessarily render her testimony incredible. As the Supreme Court had occasion to observe more than a century ago, Martin Luther believed that he had a personal conflict with the devil; Dr. Johnson was persuaded that he had heard his mother speak to him after death . . . [and] Socrates . . . had one spirit always prompting him. District of Columbia v. Arms, 107 U.S. 519, 524, 2 S.Ct. 840, 27 L.Ed. 618 (1883) (citations omitted). All of these august figures might nevertheless have proved to be believable and persuasive witnesses in a court of law. Mrs. J.'s credibility could have been more effectively evaluated if the jurors had heard expert testimony regarding the nature and origin of her symptoms, the condition from which she suffered, and the consequences of her affliction upon her ability to observe and relate accurately the events which generated the prosecution of these defendants. In People v. Neely, supra , a physician called as an expert witness by the defense was prepared to testify that the complainant, a mental patient at Napa State Hospital, had poor judgment and comprehension. 39 Cal.Rptr. at 253. He proffered that although I don't believe she wilfully lies, . . . I believe she's given to exaggerations due to misapprehensions, fears[,] and lack of understanding as to what is actually intended by other people. Id. The trial judge excluded the proposed testimony. The appellate court held that the evidence should have been admitted: While the jury had been told that Delores' general reputation for truth, honesty and integrity was bad, the appellant was also entitled to have the jury informed of the mental and emotional instability of the prosecuting witness through the expert medical testimony of the doctor in charge of her case. The jury was entitled to hear such testimony and to have it before them [sic] as an aid in evaluating [Delores'] testimony. Id. (emphasis added). Although the Neely decision may be subject to criticism on other grounds, [10] we believe that the quoted passage is consistent with this court's approach in Vereen, reflects a correct analysis of the issue before us, and constitutes persuasive authority in the case at bar. We do not suggest that the trial judge was required to permit Dr. Ijeh to use the phrase schizoid affect[ive] disorder in describing Mrs. J.'s condition. If the judge viewed this nomenclature as unnecessarily alarming and prejudicial, it was within his discretion to require the use of less inflammatory terminology. We hold, however, that the defendants were entitled to elicit from Dr. Ijeh his expert opinion both regarding the substance of what was wrong with Mrs. J. and regarding the effects of her illness and of her failure to take prescribed medication on the reliability of her testimony. [11]