Opinion ID: 470866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 24 Appellant contends that no conspiracy existed as charged because many of the named conspirators did not know him and he did not purchase all of his cocaine from Toscano. If there were a conspiracy, he argues that it was a multiple conspiracy and not the single one charged. Defendant further claims that the indictment erroneously alleged that a conspiracy existed continuously from 1972 to 1982 and that Toscano, the Florida cocaine supplier, had supplied the drug during that entire period. Finally, he claims that the indictment alleged that all the drugs involved in the conspiracy came from Florida. As to each of these contentions, Stanley asserts a failure of proof of the conspiracy charged against him. 25 Count 2 of the indictment sets forth the factual basis for defendant's participation in the drug conspiracy: 26 That beginning in approximately late 1972 and continuing until approximately June 1982, within the Eastern District of Michigan, and elsewhere JAMES GREGORY TANCEUSZ, RICHARD SHROPE, BURNS STEPHEN STANLEY, GLENN TIMOTHY SEAVER, PAUL TOSCANO, and PHILIP VERN NAYLOR all Defendants herein, did knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with other persons whose names are both known and unknown to the grand jury to commit an offense or offenses against the United States that is to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute various quantities of cocaine, a Schedule II Narcotic Drug Controlled Substance. 27 All in violation of Sections 841(a)(1) and 846 of Title 21, United States Code. 28 It was part of said unlawful conspiracy that JAMES GREGORY TANCEUSZ would travel to Florida and obtain quantities of cocaine for distribution in Michigan. 29 It was further part of said unlawful conspiracy that JAMES GREGORY TANCEUSZ would cause others to transport quantities of cocaine from Florida to Michigan. 30 It was further a part of said unlawful conspiracy that JAMES GREGORY TANCEUSZ would cause various people to transport currency to Florida. 31 It was further part of said unlawful conspiracy that PAUL TOSCANO would supply quantities of cocaine to JAMES GREGORY TANCEUSZ. 32 It was further part of said unlawful conspiracy that RICHARD JOSEPH SHROPE, BURNS STEPHEN STANLEY, GLENN TIMOTHY SEAVER and PHILIP VERN NAYLOR would obtain quantities of cocaine from JAMES GREGORY TANCEUSZ for redistribution. 33 The government charged that a single continuing conspiracy existed from 1972 until 1982, involving appellant and various others. The government theorized that the conspiracy charged was of the 'chain' type. 34 In one form of conspiracy, often described as a 'chain' conspiracy, the agreement can be inferred from the interdependent nature of the criminal enterprise . . .. Conspiracies to distribute narcotics, which normally involve numerous sales and resales of drugs until they reach the ultimate consumers, are often 'chain' conspiracies . . .. Because the success of participants on each level of distribution is dependent upon the existence of other levels of distribution, each member of the conspiracy must realize that he is participating in a joint enterprise, even if he does not know the identities of many of the participants. 35 United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 36 If the evidence can be construed reasonably to support a finding of multiple conspiracies rather than a single continuing one, 'the resulting variance between the indictment and the proof is reversible error if the appellant can show that he was prejudiced thereby.' Warner, 690 F.2d at 548 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1935); United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1195-96 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982)). Appellant contends that there was a variance and that he suffered the requisite prejudice. 37 Stanley claims that it was not until at least 1978 that he began distributing cocaine that he obtained from Tanceusz; that he did not deal regularly with Tanceusz at any time, and he did not deal with or know Tanceusz's retail distributors; and that Toscano was not shown to be a part of the conspiracy until 1982. 38 A defendant, however, may be guilty of conspiracy even if he does not know all the members of the conspiracy and even if he does not participate in the conspiracy throughout its duration. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558 (1947); Warner, 690 F.2d at 550-51 & n. 7; United States v. Shermetaro, 625 F.2d 104, 108 (6th Cir. 1980). Furthermore, a single conspiracy is not converted into multiple conspiracies merely because there are changes among conspirators during the lifetime of the conspiracy. United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984). Thus, 'a single conspiracy does not become 'multiple conspiracies' merely because 'each member did not know of or become involved in all of the activities in furtherance of the conspiracy. McLernon, 746 F.2d at 1108; United States v. Gravier, 706 F.2d 174, 178 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 996 (1983). A single conspiracy is established if the evidence shows that the conspirators agreed to participate in what they knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal. Warner, 690 F.2d at 549. The conspirators need only be aware of the 'essential nature of the plan and their connection with it.' Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 557; United States v. Pickett, 746 F.2d 1129, 1134 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1222 (1985). Finally, the question whether the evidence establishes a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies is a factual issue for the jury; if the evidence could plausibly support the finding that a single conspiracy was proved, a defendant's multiple conspiracy claim must fail. See Warner, 690 F.2d at 548; United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231, 1238 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977); United States v. Etheridge, 424 F.2d 951, 963-65 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 993 (1971). 39 In applying these principles to the evidence adduced before the jury, we must view that evidence in a light most favorable to the government and uphold the conspiracy conviction if it is supported by substantial evidence. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Chandler, 752 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1985). We find the evidence sufficient to show that Stanley was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. The evidence showed that Stanley engaged in repeated cocaine transactions with Tanceusz and others throughout the conspiratorial period. According to Nowicki's testimony, both Stanley and Tanceusz were selling cocaine in wholesale quantities as early as 1972. At a later date, Tanceusz told Nowicki that he was the person who supplied Stanley with cocaine, from which the jury could reasonably infer that their relationship had existed for several years. In 1979, the evidence showed, Stanley obtained cocaine from Tanceusz on an occasional basis--when his own supplier was unable to provide it to him, when he had a particularly large order, or when he needed a higher quality of cocaine than his regular supplier was able to provide. There was evidence of other contacts between Stanley and Tanceusz over the years in question when Stanley was dealing in drugs. 40 The evidence further showed that in 1981 and 1982, Tanceusz assigned an associate to deliver large quantities of cocaine to Stanley. Jones testified that during the three-year period that he worked as Stanley's drug salesman, he met Tanceusz in the presence of Stanley on numerous occasions. Finally, in the spring of 1982, there were dealings involving coconspirator Charles Mark, Stanley, and Tanceusz, and a substantial payment to Tanceusz for drugs by Stanley by reasonable inference. 41 There was evidence to show as early as 1978, Stanley and Tanceusz were part of a 'loose-knit, multi-person conspiracy' to distribute cocaine in the Eastern District of Michigan. See United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 474 (2d Cir. 1980). Thus, even if Stanley did not work directly below Tanceusz in a hierarchical chain of command, the two men engaged in a continuing, long-term business relationship that the jury could properly have found to constitute part of a single cocaine distribution conspiracy. 42 The evidence does not support Stanley's claim that he was not involved with or aware of other members of Tanceusz's distribution network. Although not familiar with every member of the overall drug distribution operation, the evidence showed that Stanley knew enough about the other conspirators to have a clear idea of the scope of the enterprise with which he wilfully associated himself. Thus, unlike Kotteakos, where a number of peripheral defendants dealt separately with a single core defendant and did not know about nor were affected by the other defendants, Stanley could reasonably be found to have appreciated the scope of this cocaine distribution conspiracy. 43 In addition, unlike the situation in Kotteakos, the principal members of the conspiracy, including Stanley, were aware of and dealt with many of the other conspirators. David Jones, one of Stanley's retailers, was known to both Stanley and Tanceusz. Gary Petroni, one of Tanceusz's retailers, met Stanley through Tanceusz as early as 1976, although he sold drugs only for Tanceusz. Kathy Gallagher, who helped distribute Tanceusz's drugs, knew Stanley and delivered cocaine directly to him on occasion. Mark Nowicki, Tanceusz's partner at one time, dealt with both Tanceusz and Stanley at various times during the conspiratorial period. This was not a case of a defendant in a 'rimless wheel' conspiracy unaware of the existence of any of the alleged coconspirators. In this case, the core conspirators, including Stanley, dealt regularly with one another, relied on one another, and benefited from their mutual dealings. 3 The jury could therefore properly conclude that the evidence established a single conspiracy, not the multiple conspiracies claimed by Stanley. 44 Defendant argues that the government's evidence did not establish the existence of a conspiracy involving Stanley until 1978 while the indictment stated that the conspiracy began in 1972. He also contends that the government's evidence went beyond the allegations in the indictment because more than one supplier of coaine was shown to have participated in the conspiracy instead of Toscano alone. 4 These claimed 'variances' are not material taken in context with the totality of circumstances. Appellant discovered the evidence with regard to the conspiracy's time frame and the individuals alleged to be members of the conspiracy and their respective roles before trial. He has demonstrated no prejudical surprise. These claimed variances of proof did not prevent him from receiving a fair trial. See United States v. Miller, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 1814 (1985). 45 Another variance is alleged to have occurred because the government introduced as evidence drug transactions between Stanley and Hal Hassenfrantz. Stanley contends also that evidence of these drug transactions established a conspiracy separate from any conspiracy between Stanley, Hassenfrantz, and those individuals charged in the indictment. It is reasonable, however, under the evidence to infer that Hassenfrantz's name appeared on telephone lists kept by Stanley, Tanceusz, and Toscano in the same code, thus permitting a finding that Hassenfrantz was involved in the same conspiracy. Even if Hassenfrantz dealt principally with Stanley, that determination would not require that the transactions between Hassenfrantz and Stanley be regarded as part of a separate conspiracy. Thus, we find no prejudicial, material variance to have occurred and hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Stanley's conviction. 46