Opinion ID: 1666085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Necessity of Materiality

Text: In his first assignment of error, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to provide him certain exculpatory evidence as required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and in so doing, undermined his capacity to present a defense. We disagree, as the evidence did not impact Appellant's fundamental rights since it was not material to his guilt. Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to reveal evidence of an alternative perpetrator before trial, thus violating his due process rights. At trial, Detective Morrison testified that upon learning of Michelle Benjamin's death, he initially thought that Tim Brown may have had something to do with the murder. Tim Brown was a known drug dealer in the area and Michelle, who had been working with the Mayfield Police Department as an informant, had made some allegations against Brown. Appellant alleges that he and counsel were unaware that police had considered an alternative perpetrator until hearing Morrison's testimony at trial. Appellant's counsel moved for a mistrial upon grounds of a Brady violation. In Brady , the United States Supreme Court ruled that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of good or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-1197. Implicit in Brady 's requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence affected the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). However, in Agurs , the Supreme Court indicated that an item of undisclosed information is not rendered material by the mere possibility that it may have helped the defense or might have affected the trial. Id. at 109-110, 96 S.Ct. at 2400. Thereafter, in United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court further revised the materiality requirement, stating that irrespective of the request, evidence is considered material only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different. 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The Court then indicated that in the context of this different result consideration, a reasonable probability was one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Admittedly, reasonable probability and materiality are nebulous concepts at best. However, the notion was perhaps best clarified in Kyles v. Whitley, wherein the Supreme Court articulated Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ( quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381). Here, Appellant argues that by not disclosing, before trial, that police had initially considered Tim Brown as an alternative perpetrator, the prosecution suppressed evidence that was both favorable to his defense and material to his guilt. Moreover, Appellant claims that without this disclosure, he did not receive a fair trial or a verdict worthy of confidence, thus violating his due process rights.