Opinion ID: 1718207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Conflict with Federal Policy?

Text: The principal opinion then takes up the respondents' argument relating to the federal constitutional and statutory policies implicit in 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Just as defendant's counsel does, it trumpets the statement in an article by the plaintiffs' trial counsel, Simon, Fee Sharing Between Lawyers and Public Interest Groups, 98 Yale L.J. 1069 (1989) that the Supreme Court has never expressly extended First Amendment protection to fee-sharing arrangements with nonprofit groups. I should think that our purpose would be to determine what is right and proper under the laws of the United States and of our state, and not to move only when we are prodded from above. Be that as it may, the fair intendment of NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963) and In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978) clearly supports the plaintiff's position. The conclusion of the principal opinion impedes the policy underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Supreme Court of the United States has regularly struck down state statutes or rules governing the legal profession when they conflict with federal law. [12] We should construe our statutes and rules in a manner consistent with the federal constitution and statutes. [13] Otherwise we transgress the supremacy clause. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), recognized, perhaps to the surprise of many in the private bar, that litigation of issues within the ambit of the bill of rights and the equal protection clause is a form of political expression and association which is entitled to First Amendment protection against infringing state action. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People engaged in the kinds of activities one might gather from its name. It maintained a staff of salaried attorneys who prosecuted suits on behalf of those who claimed to be victims of racial discrimination. Its representatives sought to get in touch with potential victims of discrimination to determine their possible availability as plaintiffs. The state court held that this conduct violated ethical rules against solicitation of lawsuits. The Supreme Court said that the state could not impose these rules as a barrier to the pursuit of antidiscrimination actions. The Court observed that the state rules were designed to protect the public against predatory lawyers acting for their own economic benefit, and that their application to the activities of NAACP was not necessary to serve any proper state purpose. In later cases (cited in footnote 12) the Court has made it clear that rules of professional conduct inhibiting behavior variously described as champerty, maintenance, or barratry could not be applied beyond their legitimate purpose so as to impede First Amendment rights. The most recent case is In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978), in which a state sought to discipline an attorney who wrote to a litigant who had been sterilized in a possibly unconstitutional manner, advising her of the availability of a public interest organization to assist her in the pursuit of her constitutional claim. The attorney did not stand to recover a fee in the action. The Court stressed the absence of economic motivation on the part of the lawyer and the organization, and held that the solicitation represented protected speech which had been infringed by the inhibitory state regulation. It distinguished Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 reh. denied, 439 U.S. 883, 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L.Ed.2d 198 (1978), decided the same day, which held that the state could discipline lawyers who personally solicited accident victims in hospital beds. There is no principle that fee awards under that statute must go to the attorney who renders the services, when the attorney is hired for the purpose of maintaining civil rights lawsuits and paid a regular salary. [14] The principal opinion enunciates no state interest, compelling or otherwise, which justifies our Court in setting itself in opposition to the policy and principle of the federal statutes. There is no doubt that our action makes organizations, of whatever hue of the political spectrum, which sponsor civil rights litigation less able to serve their constituencies than are like organizations in other states. Sections 1983 and 1988, therefore, operate less effectively in Missouri than in other states. This situation is at war with the supremacy clause. Under Button and Primus those who are interested in the cause of men who want to appear on the streets of Clayton in women's clothes have the first amendment right to advocate their position by litigation, and to solicit potential plaintiffs to this end. The First Amendment is applicable to the states because it is incorporated into the fourteenth. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, the latter providing for attorneys fees, are statutes passed to implement the fourteenth amendment, under the express authority of section 5 of that article, and therefore to implement the first amendment rights recognized by Button and Primus . A state statute or policy which interferes with the operation of federal statutes implementing the fourteenth amendment must necessarily fall under the supremacy clause of Article VI. My conclusion is consistent with the recent opinion of Judge Scott O. Wright of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, in which he finds a violation of the supremacy clause in the attempt of the state of Missouri to recoup the cost of incarceration out of awards of punitive damages to prisoners under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Hankins v. Finnel, No. 88-4094, slip op. at 8, 11-12 (W.D.Mo. Jan. 28, 1991). The judge holds that the state action thwarts the policy of the federal statute, which has as its purpose the discouragement of violations by prison employees. Id. Here the interference is patent. If the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the fees awarded for the services of their staff attorneys, they may be able to continue and expand the hiring of staff attorneys, so as better to serve the litigants Congress wants to encourage them to assist. It might help to consider the economics of the arrangement in more detail. Fees under § 1988 are manifestly contingent, available only to a prevailing party. [15] They differ from the usual contingent fee arrangements which are usual in personal injury litigation in that they must be based on hourly computations and prevailing hourly rates rather than on a percentage of recovery. Many civil rights cases, such as this one, cannot be valued monetarily. So it is much more difficult for the civil rights lawyer than for the personal injury lawyer to make up for losses by wins. For this reason, a civil rights action may be less attractive than a damage suit to a private practitioner. [16] Some will decline contingent actions of this kind and others may be forced to limit their intake. An organization which provides a salaried lawyer, therefore, serves a salutary purpose. This Court's decision, then, makes it more difficult for civil rights claimants to get the legal representation the federal statutes seek to assist them in getting. This is the necessary effect, and therefore the intent, of the principal opinion. If the defendant's position is upheld his employer could only operate as a procurement agency for his law practice, subsidizing unsuccessful actions without being able to recoup in successful ones. It is neither necessary nor desirable to place it in such a position. The arrangement under which the defendant was hired is perfectly legitimate. The defendant suggests that ACLU/EM is not eligible for a fee award because its governing board includes non-lawyers. Dozens of cases sanction fee awards to similar organizations. [17] There is no obstacle to awarding fees to organizations such as the plaintiff based on prevailing market rates. Nor is there any authority for reducing the portion of the fee award the plaintiffs can recover because of the nature of ACLU/EM. In Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1983), [18] the Court stated: It is also clear from legislative history that Congress did not intend the calculation of fee awards to vary depending on whether plaintiff was represented by private counsel or by a nonprofit legal services organization. [19] The retainer agreement makes it clear that the lawyer represents only the client, and thus the client is free to discharge the lawyer at any time. The defendant surely does not suggest that his management of this case was the subject of improper outside interference. Nor is there any indication that any case sponsored by the plaintiffs was handled other than in accordance with the highest professional standards. If problems arise in future cases the disciplinary arm should be adequate.