Opinion ID: 2173675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Capacity of the Former Shareholders

Text: Since the defendants have also excepted to the superior court's conditional granting of their own motion to dismiss the former shareholders suing in their individual capacities, we must determine whether the dismissal was proper. Both the superior court judge, in the reserved case, and plaintiff's counsel, on brief and in oral argument, have indicated their belief that if MBC were found to lack capacity to bring suit, the former shareholders would succeed to the cause of action. We disagree. [7] The legislature has provided a precise and orderly scheme for the winding up of dissolved corporations' affairs. RSA 294:98. The corporation continuance statute exclusively controls matters concerning dissolved corporations. If we were to allow rights to be asserted by representatives of a corporation subsequent to the continuance period, RSA 294:98 would be meaningless. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc. v. Pan American Gyro-Tex Co., 345 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1972). We will not permit the corporation continuance statute to be circumvented by allowing former shareholders to assert expired rights of a defunct corporation after the statutory period has elapsed. The expired right is no more enforceable in the former shareholders' possession than it is in the defunct corporation's. Note, Corporate DissolutionSurvival of Remedy, 23 Mo. L. Rev. 82, 84 (1958). New Hampshire's corporation continuance statute mandates the public policy of this State regarding the status of dissolved corporations. All remedies available to either the corporation or the shareholder may be enforced only during the statutory continuance period. The former shareholder has no greater rights than the defunct corporation. Gordon v. Loew's Inc., 147 F. Supp. 398 (D.N.J. 1956); accord, U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc. v. Pan American Gyro-Tex Co., 345 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Fleischer v. W.P.I.X. Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 17, 213 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1961). [8] Plaintiff's counsel argues that equity and justice demand the allowance of a remedy and assumes that the corporation's expired rights are revived in the former shareholders. We reject the basic underpinning of plaintiff's assumption. On these facts, we hold that equity will not intervene. See Miller, The Status of Choses in Action of Dissolved But Unadministered Corporations After Expiration of the Statutory Period for Winding Up, 9 MISS. L. REV. 455, 478 (1937). MBC's former shareholders cannot maintain the present action because the statutory corporation continuance period expired before the action was brought. Exceptions sustained in part and overruled in part; case dismissed.