Opinion ID: 217249
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misidentification of the Order Delegating Authority to Authorize Wiretap Applications

Text: As noted above, law enforcement officers must obtain authorization from an executive official before submitting a wiretap application to a federal judge, and they must identify the authorizing official in the application itself. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1) and 2518(1)(a); see also United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.2001) (setting forth the procedure for obtaining a wiretap order). The Attorney General may specially designate certain executive officials to authorize wiretap applications. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1). When the Attorney General delegates the power to authorize wiretap applications via an AG Order, law enforcement officers reference the specific order in their wiretap applications. Evidence obtained from a wiretap must be suppressed if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of [the wiretap statutes]. Id. § 2515. Aggrieved persons may move to suppress such evidence when the communication was unlawfully intercepted or the order of authorization or approval under which [the communication] was intercepted is insufficient on its face. Id. § 2518(10)(a)(i), (ii). [1] Not all deficiencies in wiretap applications, however, warrant suppression. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974) (stating that not every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral communications `unlawful'); cf. United States v. Radcliff, 331 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir.2003) (refusing to suppress evidence when deficiency in wiretap order constituted a technical defect that did not undermine the purposes of the statute or prejudice [the] [d]efendant). Rather, the critical inquiry is whether there has been a failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). The government concedes that each wiretap application submitted in connection with this case referenced an outdated AG Order delegating power to the executive official who authorized the application. Indeed, the government readily acknowledges that each wiretap application referenced AG Order 2758-2005, which, unbeknownst to the officers submitting the applications, had been revoked and replaced by AG Order 2887-2007. Although the new order technically rendered AG Order 2758-2005 void, it did not revoke the authority to approve wiretap applications from any official who had been designated under the prior order. Rather, AG Order 2887-2007 expanded the list of executive officials empowered to authorize wiretap applications. Thus, although the wiretap applications misstated the source of the officers' authority to file them, they were all in fact authorized by an executive official with the power to do so. In Chavez, the Supreme Court held that the [f]ailure to correctly report the identity of the person authorizing the [wiretap] application [ ] when in fact th[e] Attorney General has given the required preliminary approval to submit the application... does not warrant the suppression of evidence gathered pursuant to a court order resting upon the application. 416 U.S. at 571, 94 S.Ct. 1849. In other words, when the executive official who actually authorized a wiretap application had the power to do so, a law enforcement officer's failure to correctly identify the official in the wiretap application does not require suppression. These are the circumstances of this case. [2] Indeed, the officers' reference to an outdated AG Order was merely a technical defect which did not subvert the primary purposes of the wiretap statute's authorization requirement. See United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir.2010) (holding that DEA's reference to AG Order 2758-2005 rather than XXXX-XXXX was a clerical error which did not subvert the reviewing functions required by Congress). Accordingly, the district court correctly refused to suppress the wiretap evidence on this basis.