Opinion ID: 2590700
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Instruct on the Meaning of Life Without the Possibility of Parole

Text: On appeal, defendant contends the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on the meaning of the penalty life without possibility of parole. He states that certain jurors' responses indicated there were serious doubts among many of the potential jurors that a life without parole sentence meant parole ineligibility. Relying on Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, and its progeny, defendant also asserts that because his future dangerousness was at issue, the trial court was constitutionally required to inform the jury that such a sentence meant defendant was statutorily ineligible for parole. We disagree. Absent a request, a trial court is not required to instruct on the meaning of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 688, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 561-562, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 698, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217.) This term does not have a technical meaning which requires a sua sponte definitional instruction. ( People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 688, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213, citing People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 698, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217.) Contrary to defendant's contention, the record does not show that the jurors share[d] a `common and widespread misconception' that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole does not mean what it says. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 698, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217.) During voir dire, defense counsel questioned five prospective jurors, two of whom eventually sat on the jury, about their responses to the following question on the juror questionnaire: When a jury votes that a person be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, what does that mean to you? Zara C., who sat on the jury, had written, I wonder if that will happen. After defense counsel told her the judge will explain this type of sentence and said we have to assume the sentence will be carried out, she replied: As I've sat in this, I realize that. I didn't know that that was โ let's put it this way. If the judge says he's sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, I would believe that. Another sitting juror, Glenda L., said although she had some reservations accepting as fact that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is just that, she would have to accept it. Prospective Juror Wilhelmina R. had written on her juror questionnaire she thought this sentence meant that a defendant may be out some day. When defense counsel asked Wilhelmina R., If the judge told you that [life in prison without possibility of parole is just that], would you accept it as a fact, she replied, Yeah, of course. She earlier stated that she would have to hear the judge tell her that. Prospective Alternate Juror David G. wrote the following answer regarding what his opinion was on life in prison without the possibility of parole: If found guilty โ then the possibility of parole [ sic ]. During voir dire, he explained that there's always some โ somewhat changes along the line after the fact. That can be possible, yes. However, after defense counsel stated that there is no possibility of parole when that sentence is imposed, David G. said he understood. Moreover, on his juror questionnaire he wrote that he thought a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole was worse than death for a defendant because if guilty โ person must remain behind bars for life. Another prospective alternate juror, Donald C., wrote on his questionnaire that he always doubted the phrase `without the possibility of parole.' During voir dire, he explained that he wasn't aware there was a law that made that exactly the definition, that there was no possibility. However, when defense counsel asked Donald C. if the judge assured him, would he accept as a fact that life imprisonment without possibility of parole was just that, he replied, Yes, I would. On his juror questionnaire, Donald C. also wrote that this sentence meant that the person is put away from society, never to be allowed out of custody. Wilhelmina R., David G., and Donald C. were ultimately excused, and did not sit on the jury. Although defense counsel told the jury that the trial court would instruct on the meaning of a life without possibility of parole sentence, defense counsel did not request such an instruction and the trial court did not instruct sua sponte. The trial court did, however, give both introductory and concluding jury instructions on the two penalty alternatives, life without possibility of parole and death. (CALJIC Nos. 8.84, 8.88.) We conclude that these jurors' responses do not reflect that jurors shared a `common and widespread misconception' about the meaning of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 698, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217.) Rather than indicating a misconception, Zara C.'s responses simply showed that she previously did not know that the law provided for such a sentence, and that if the judge says he's sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, she would believe it. Also, Glenda L.'s reservations about the meaning of this type of sentence mainly reflected her view that convicted defendants, including those who serve life in prison without possibility of parole, should lose all their rights. She complained that instead, such defendants are allowed to go to school, they are allowed to appeal, they are allowed to come back into court. Some of them have even made their way out of prison for things like that. So I don't think they've lost all their rights. The italicized language reasonably reflects that rather than thinking that defendants who serve life without possibility of parole would somehow be released on parole, Glenda L. was referring to defendants who are released due to appellate reversals. Ultimately, she stated that she would have to accept the judge's instruction on this type of sentence. Despite what defense counsel described as her strong views about punishment and death penalty, Glenda L. emphasized that she could remain fair and impartial and would follow the law. The responses of three prospective jurors who were excused do not strengthen defendant's claim that the jurors in general were laboring under a misconception. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 698, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217.) Even assuming that these three prospective jurors, and the two who sat on the jury, misunderstood what life without possibility of parole meant, responses from five individuals do not establish that such a misconception was `common and widespread.' ( Ibid. [responses of 10 out of 204 prospective jurors do not establish misconception was common and widespread]; People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 562, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420 [responses of eight prospective jurors [o]ut of a large pool of prospective jurors].) Contrary to defendant's contention, Simmons v. South Carolina, supra, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S. 36, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178, and Kelly v. South Carolina (2002) 534 U.S. 246, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670, do not dictate otherwise. ( People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 437-438, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 123, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Under Simmons and its progeny, `whenever future dangerousness is at issue in a capital sentencing proceeding ... due process requires that the jury be informed that a life sentence carries no possibility of parole.' ( People v. Turner, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 438, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505.) Defendant asserts the prosecutor here suggested defendant's future dangerousness by stating he continues to be a threat when presenting evidence of defendant's solicitation for murder. Even assuming defendant's future dangerousness was at issue, these high court decisions stemming from death sentences imposed under South Carolina law are readily distinguishable, in that the juries in those cases were told that the alternative to a death sentence was one of `life imprisonment' without instruction that a capital defendant given such a sentence would not be eligible for parole. [Citations.] ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 123-124, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Here, in contrast, the jury was instructed it could sentence defendant to death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole. (CALJIC Nos. 8.84, 8.88.) As such, defendant's claim based on Simmons and its progeny fails.