Opinion ID: 1104066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: HVFO Sentences

Text: Gudinas also argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it adjudicated him as an HVFO and sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment for his attempted burglary with an assault conviction and his attempted sexual battery conviction. He maintains that HVFO enhancements on those two counts exceeded the statutory maximum and the dictates of Apprendi v. New Jersey. However, Gudinas has not properly preserved this claim for appellate review. Rule 3.851(e)(2)(B) requires petitioners to plead the reasons that their claims were not raised in the former motion or motions. Gudinas made the HVFO argument for the very first time in his successive 3.851 motion. Clearly, Gudinas has had multiple post-trial opportunities to challenge his HVFO convictions and he did not challenge them on direct appeal, see Gudinas, 693 So.2d at 959, nor did he raise the argument in his first postconviction motion that Apprendi impacted his HVFO sentences (despite the fact that he did argue Apprendi in his habeas petition). See Gudinas, 816 So.2d at 1100-01, 1111. Further, Gudinas does not now explain why this argument was not previously raised. Therefore, this claim is procedurally barred as not being properly raised as a claim within a successive 3.851 motion. Aside from the procedural bar to this issue, this claim has no merit. In Apprendi, the U.S. Supreme Court exempted prior convictions from facts that must be submitted to a jury because they increase the penalty for a crime. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Additionally, this Court has held that the sentencing enhancement scheme found in the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (PRR), which is akin to HVFO sentencing, is unaffected by Apprendi. See Robinson v. State, 793 So.2d 891, 893 (Fla.2001) (holding that Florida's PRR statute is not invalidated by Apprendi : [T]he [PRR] Act does not increase the maximum statutory penalty. Here the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the statutory range is simply limited. Accordingly, proof to the jury of a defendant's release which subjects a defendant to a sentence under the Act is not required.); Parker v. State, 790 So.2d 1033, 1035-36 (Fla.2001); McGregor v. State, 789 So.2d 976, 977-78 (Fla.2001); Sheffield v. State, 794 So.2d 592, 594 (Fla.2001); Barnes v. State, 794 So.2d 590, 592 (Fla.2001); Smith v. State, 793 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla.2001); Marshall v. State, 789 So.2d 969, 970-71 (Fla.2001); McDowell v. State, 789 So.2d 956, 957 (Fla. 2001); Sheffield v. State, 789 So.2d 340, 342 (Fla.2001); Balkcom v. State, 789 So.2d 949, 950-51 (Fla.2000). Notwithstanding the recidivist exception in Apprendi, and our application of that exception to Florida's PRR Act, this Court has consistently ruled that the habitual offender statutes meet constitutional muster. See Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219, 222-23 (Fla.1980) (upholding the habitual offender act upon the defendant's argument that the act did not afford him the same rights as an accused person in the guilt portion of a criminal trial); see also Warren v. State, 609 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1992) (holding that the HVFO statute was constitutional upon challenges that the act was inequitable, subject to arbitrary and capricious application, and violated double jeopardy and citing Tillman v. State, 609 So.2d 1295 (Fla.1992), and Ross v. State, 601 So.2d 1190 (Fla.1992), for the same propositions). Accordingly, for the reasons set out above, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief. It is so ordered. WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. CANTERO, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in result only. CANTERO, J., specially concurring. I concur in the majority opinion. Moreover, regarding the petitioner's claim that Florida's capital sentencing scheme violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), I also would hold, for the reasons stated in my specially concurring opinion in Windom v. State, Nos. SC01-2706 & SC02-2142, ___ So.2d ___, 2004 WL 1057640 (Fla. May 6, 2004), that Ring does not apply retroactively. WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.