Opinion ID: 2168349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defining Excuse or Justification

Text: The second question presented is whether the trial court erred in excluding a definition of excusable or justifiable from one of Canfield's tendered jury instructions. The instruction as tendered read: At the time of the accident, there was in force a statute of the State of Indiana which provides in part: No person shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. I.C. 9-4-1-87(b). A violation of this statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the person so violating the statute or law, unless the person shows that such violation was excusable or justifiable by showing by a fair preponderance of the evidence that such person did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence acting under similar circumstances who desires to comply with the law. Record at 293. The trial court modified this instruction by adding information about another safety statute and amending the paragraph about the legal import of violating such statutes. As modified, the instruction read: At the time of the accident, there was in force a statute of the State of Indiana which provides in part: No person shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. [A]nother statute provides in part that When facing a green light: Vehicular traffic, including vehicles turning right or left, shall yield right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent sidewalk at the time such signal is exhibited; Vehicular traffic shall yeld [sic] the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection; and Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal, pedestrians facing any green signal, except when the sole green signal is a turn arrow, may proceed across the roadway within any marked or unmarked crosswalk. A violation of this statute creates a presumption of negligence on the part of the person so violating the statute, unless the person shows that such violation was excusable or justifiable. Record at 367. It is generally error for a trial court to refuse to define in its instructions technical and legal phrases relevant to material issues of a lawsuit if it is properly requested to do so. Conder v. Hull Lift Truck, Inc. (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 10. As used in this instruction, however, excusable or justifiable is not a technical or legal phrase requiring definition. Excuse and justification are words of common usage which take on no unusual meaning in the context of this jury instruction. The trial court might well have assisted the jury had it given the language requested by Canfield, but it did not err in excluding the definition from the tendered instruction. We vacate the opinions of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court. DeBRULER, J., concurs. DICKSON, J., concurs in result with separate opinion. GIVAN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion in which PIVARNIK, J., concurs.