Opinion ID: 2981636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wrong Standard of Proof

Text: Next, Hillman argues that the trial court erred in its statement of law governing the prima facie case of retaliation and further erred in concluding that she had not met her burden of proof as to causation. Hillman faults the trial court for requiring her to show “sufficient evidence” of causation, when her burden at this stage is only “minimal,” citing Brown v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, No. 10-5846, 2012 WL 2105366, at  (6th Cir. June 12, 2012). Characterizing the burden as “sufficient evidence” or “minimal evidence” does not change the fact that Hillman failed to meet her burden of proof at the summary judgment stage. As part of her prima facie case, Hillman was required to point to evidence of causation sufficient to support a verdict in her favor. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Hillman’s assertion that she was terminated in retaliation for her involvement in the 2002 lawsuit is merely her opinion, and does not suffice to meet her burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. As the district court properly held, “[c]onclusory assertions, supported only by Plaintiff's own opinions, cannot withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Arendale, 519 F.3d at 605. The district court also correctly ruled that because two years had elapsed between the filing of the lawsuit and Hillman’s termination, Hillman was required to present some evidence linking the two events. This circuit holds that if the adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, temporal proximity alone is significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation. Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008). “But where some time elapses between when the employer learns of a protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment action, the employee must couple temporal proximity with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality.” Id. See, e.g., Brown, No. 2012 WL 2105366, at -6 (temporal proximity supported an inference of retaliation where adverse employment action occurred less than one month after the plaintiff filed an EEOC charge against her employer; but that second adverse employment action, which occurred roughly eight months after Title VII protected activity, was too remote to support an inference of retaliation).5 Hillman claims that the district court assessed only Sumlar’s and Hampton’s depositions, and ignored her submissions. We disagree, and find that the district court correctly held that Hillman failed to establish causation. 5 Hillman also cited EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 1997), as authority to support her contention that the district court required her to meet an unfairly heavy burden of proof. In Avery Dennison, the court stated that “the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law or summary judgment if a plaintiff has proven its prima facie case.” Id. at 861. In Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2011), this court clarified Avery Dennison: The Avery court . . . was not referring to summary judgment, but rather judgment at trial. 104 F.3d at 861. To survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant’s proffered rationale is pretextual, as that would be enough proof for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff must prove only enough to create a genuine issue as to whether the rationale is pretextual. Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 532 (6th Cir.2007); Tysinger v. Police Dept. of City of Zanesville, 463 F.3d 569, 576–77 (6th Cir.2006). At oral argument, Whitfield argued the opposite extreme: that an ADA plaintiff need not produce any evidence of pretext to survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment. In Whitfield’s view, she need only create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a prima facie case in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment and proceed to trial. This is wrong. Because, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an ADA plaintiff bears the burden at trial of proving that the defendant's proffered explanation is pretextual, the plaintiff must be able to show a genuine issue of material fact as to that issue at the summary judgment stage. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (“Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to ... establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). Id. at 260.