Opinion ID: 2622136
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Detectives Violate the State or Federal Constitution when they Obtained Athan's DNA without a Warrant?

Text: ś 9 When presented with arguments under both the state and federal constitutions, we review the state constitution arguments first. State v. Carter, 151 Wash.2d 118, 125, 85 P.3d 887 (2004). Under the Washington Constitution, it is well established that article I, section 7 qualitatively differs from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and in some areas provides greater protections than does the federal constitution. State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 29, 60 P.3d 46 (2002). Accordingly, a Gunwall [2] analysis is unnecessary to establish that this court should undertake an independent state constitutional analysis. [3] State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 259, 76 P.3d 217 (2003); McKinney, 148 Wash.2d at 26, 60 P.3d 46. ś 10 The only relevant question is whether article I, section 7 affords enhanced protection in the particular context. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d at 26-27, 60 P.3d 46.
ś 11 Article I, section 7 reads [n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law and requires a two-step analysis: was there a disturbance of one's private affairs and, if so, was the disturbance authorized by law. In re Pers. Restraint of Maxfield, 133 Wash.2d 332, 339, 945 P.2d 196 (1997). Athan argues this case involves three matters that are private affairs under Washington law: one's body and bodily functions; communications with a person one believes is an attorney; and sealed correspondence intended for one's attorney. We examine each of these claims separately to determine if any one of them constitutes a private affair under our state constitution. ś 12 The term private affairs generally means those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984). In determining if an interest constitutes a private affair, we look at the historical treatment of the interest being asserted, analogous case law, and statutes and laws supporting the interest asserted. Voluntary exposure to the public is relevant to our inquiry and can negate an asserted privacy interest. State v. McKinney, 148 Wash.2d 20, 29, 60 P.3d 46 (2002).
ś 13 Athan argues that case law and statutory law require us to recognize a privacy interest in one's body and bodily functions. Division One of the Court of Appeals has held, [t]here is thus no doubt that the privacy interest in the body and bodily functions is one Washington citizens have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash.App. 795, 819, 10 P.3d 452 (2000). Robinson involved a challenge to a pre-employment urinalysis drug testing program, which the court partially invalidated. The appellate court noted the testing was highly invasive in the taking of the sample, the chemical analysis of its contents, and the possible disclosure of explanatory medical conditions or treatments. Robinson, 102 Wash.App. at 822, 10 P.3d 452. Athan submits that all three of the appellate court's concerns are present here. Athan also argues that, except for convicted felons under RCW 43.43.754 and court ordered parentage tests under RCW 26.26.400, no person is subject to DNA testing without consent in the state of Washington. ś 14 The State distinguishes Robinson by arguing the drug-testing program in that case involved the nonconsensual taking of urine samples. The statutes, likewise, are distinguishable because they involve the taking of biological samples by force. In this case, the State argues, Athan voluntarily relinquished his DNA when he licked the envelope and mailed it to a third party. The State maintains that DNA obtained from one's saliva is akin to a person's physical description, appearance, or other characteristic voluntarily exposed to the public, thus, it is not a private affair at all. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 151 Wash.2d 118, 126, 85 P.3d 887 (2004). ś 15 We find there is no inherent privacy interest in saliva. Certainly the nonconsensual collection of blood or urine samples in some circumstances, such as under the facts of Robinson, invokes privacy concerns; however, obtaining the saliva sample in this case did not involve an invasive or involuntary procedure. The relevant question in this case is whether, when a person licks an envelope and places it in the mail, that person retains any privacy interest in his saliva at all. Unlike a nonconsensual sampling situation, there was no force involved in obtaining Athan's saliva sample here. The facts of this situation are analogous to a person spitting on the sidewalk or leaving a cigarette butt in an ashtray. We hold under these circumstances, any privacy interest is lost. The envelope, and any saliva contained on it, becomes the property of the recipient. ś 16 Amicus [4] American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argues DNA has the potential to reveal a vast amount of personal information, including medical conditions and familial relations, therefore DNA should constitute a privacy interest. While this may be true in some circumstances, the State's use of Athan's DNA here was narrowly limited to identification purposes. What was done with the letter, including DNA testing for the limited purpose of identification, was not within the sender's control. The concerns raised by the ACLU, while valid, are not present in this case. The State used the sample for identification purposes only, not for purposes that raise the concerns advanced by the ACLU.
ś 17 Athan argues Washington law provides a strong privacy protection of communications between attorneys and their clients. See RCW 5.60.060(2)(a). Although the police officers here were not actually attorneys, they held themselves out as attorneys, in violation of RCW 2.48.180(2)(a). Athan contends he reasonably relied on the detectives' representations that they were attorneys, and thus he should be entitled to rely on the attorney-client privilege to protect his communications as a private affair. ś 18 The State argues the saliva used to seal the envelope was not a communication and therefore not protected by the attorney-client privilege. The communication, if any, would have been the enclosed letter, which the State notes Athan never moved to suppress at trial. Finally, the letter contained a handwritten note stating, [i]f I am billed for any of your services disregard my signature and my participation completely. Ex. 53. The State suggests this added condition of not wanting to be billed by the firm is evidence Athan did not intend to form an attorney-client relationship at that time; instead, he sought merely to preserve his chance to be involved in the lawsuit at some future date. ś 19 As the State notes, Athan did not object to the letter, or its contents, being admitted during the trial. Thus, we need only decide if the saliva on the envelope flap is a communication subject to protection by the attorney-client privilege. Because we find saliva is not a communication in this case, we do not need to decide if an attorney-client relationship was even established. We note this case is not about police intercepting mail addressed to someone else. The envelope, its contents, and the saliva contained on it, were addressed to and received by the SPD detectives, albeit through the use of a ruse. ś 20 When there is no statutory definition to guide us, words should be given their ordinary meaning. Often, we rely on dictionaries to supply the ordinary meaning. State v. Gurske, 155 Wash.2d 134, 145, 118 P.3d 333 (2005) (Sanders, J., concurring). [C]ommunication may be defined as [t]he expression or exchange of information by speech, writing, or gestures. Black's Law Dictionary 296 (8th ed.2004). Under the facts of this case, Athan's saliva was merely a means by which he could seal the envelope. There was no intent or expectation on Athan's part that his saliva would be an expression or exchange of information. Although the State was ultimately able to gain information from the saliva, it does not mean the saliva was a communication as it is ordinarily defined. ś 21 Athan argues he was entitled to rely on the SPD representation that they were attorneys and thus anything sent to them would be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Relying on RCW 5.60.060(2)(a), regarding attorney-client privilege, and RCW 2.48.180(2)(a), regarding unlawful practice of law, and case law, Athan contends police officers posing as attorneys is a ruse strictly prohibited by both Washington law and the law of evidence in general. ś 22 The State distinguishes Athan's cited cases by noting the cases all involved actual communications. In State v. Cory, 62 Wash.2d 371, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963), jail officers eavesdropped on conversations between the defendant and his attorney. In State v. Granacki, 90 Wash.App. 598, 959 P.2d 667 (1998), a police detective intentionally read a legal pad containing privileged notes between the defendant and his attorney. Thus, the State contends, neither case is on point because the facts here do not involve police obtaining actual attorney-client communications. The State also distinguishes People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 27 N.W. 539 (1886) (detective posed as criminal defense attorney to obtain statements from the defendant) and State v. Russell, 83 Wis. 330, 53 N.W. 441 (1892) (prosecutor posed as defendant's attorney in order to obtain statements about the case) because those cases involved the receipt of privileged information. ś 23 We find there is no absolute prohibition of police ruses involving detectives posing as attorneys in the state of Washington. While such a ruse has the potential to gather privileged and confidential information, thereby implicating the concerns raised by Athan and amici, that was not the case here. First, we have already found the saliva on the envelope was not a communication. Second, the letter sent to Athan did not ask Athan to provide additional or confidential information. Thus, the detectives were not seeking a confidential communication and the risk of receiving such a communication was minimal. Unlike Barker and Russell, the ruse was not designed to obtain statements or other confidential information about the Sumstad murder; the goal of the ruse was only to induce Athan to mail an envelope. The use of the ruse did not violate a private affair protected by article 1, section 7. ś 24 We find further support for police posing as an attorney in the analogous case of State v. Townsend, 147 Wash.2d 666, 57 P.3d 255 (2002). In Townsend, a Spokane police officer, posing as a 13-year-old girl, engaged in on-line communications with the defendant, Townsend. The police officer saved and later printed the communications for use as evidence against Townsend. Townsend argued the police detective's actions violated Townsend's privacy rights under a similar provision of the state privacy act. In upholding his conviction, we found the communications were private, but that Townsend impliedly consented to the recording of his private email conversations because it was reasonable to infer Townsend was aware it was possible to record the messages. Townsend, 147 Wash.2d at 674-79, 57 P.3d 255. Like Townsend, who presumably was not aware his emails were being sent to and recorded by a police detective for use as evidence against him, Athan impliedly consented to the receipt of his saliva because he mailed it. The fact that he was not aware the recipient was a police detective does not vitiate that consent. ś 25 As we note in our discussion of Athan's CrR 8.3(b) motion, police officers are allowed to use some deception, including ruses, for the purpose of investigating criminal activity. Generally, ruses are upheld as long as the actions do not violate a defendant's due process rights. Because we agree with the trial court that the police ruse used here did not violate Athan's due process rights, we find this ruse permissible.
ś 26 Finally, Athan argues that, under RCW 9.73.020, his letter was protected. Athan relies on State v. Christensen, 153 Wash.2d 186, 198, 102 P.3d 789 (2004), to argue the state privacy act protects sealed messages, letters, and telegrams from being opened or read by someone other than the intended recipient. According to Athan, a law firm was his intended recipient, not the police. Because the police were not the intended recipients, he argues they violated the act by opening the letter and, at the same time, violated his privacy rights. ś 27 The State argues the letter was in fact opened by the intended recipient because it was opened by the detectives listed in the law firm's letterhead or by their agents. The State finds it immaterial that the persons designated in the letterhead were detectives and not attorneys. ś 28 RCW 9.73.020 reads, [e]very person who shall wilfully open or read, or cause to be opened or read, any sealed message, letter or telegram intended for another person, or publish the whole or any portion of such a message, letter or telegram, knowing it to have been opened or read without authority, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing in the statute indicates the intended recipient must be who the recipient actually claims to be. The detective who actually received the letter was listed on the law firm letterhead and thus, under the state privacy act, had authority to open or cause to be opened, the letter. Since the letter was received by the intended addressee, though not an attorney as Athan believed, he has failed to establish a statutory violation. ś 29 We are again reminded of Townsend. Townsend argued the police detective's actions violated Townsend's privacy rights under a similar provision of the state privacy act. In upholding his conviction, we found the communications were private, but that Townsend impliedly consented to the recording of his private e-mail conversations because it was reasonable to infer Townsend was aware it was possible to record the messages. Notably, our holding did not turn on Townsend's subjective belief he was communicating with a child and not a police detective. Townsend, 147 Wash.2d at 674-79, 57 P.3d 255. Similarly, Athan's privacy act claim here does not turn on his subjective belief he was corresponding with a law firm. The detectives listed on the letterhead were the intended recipients of the letter; their actual occupation is immaterial for the purposes of RCW 9.73.020. ś 30 Having found there is no privacy interest in saliva after it has been voluntarily placed on an envelope and relinquished to a recipient; the act of placing saliva on an envelope to seal the envelope does not constitute a communication under the ordinary meaning of the word; and the police did not violate RCW 9.73.020 because the detective named on the letterhead was the intended recipient, we conclude Athan's private affairs were not disturbed under article I, section 7. We now examine if his rights were violated under the Fourth Amendment.
ś 31 The Fourth Amendment reads, [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Athan asserts two privacy rights were violated under the federal constitution: bodily privacy and privacy of the mail. Each asserted right will be analyzed to determine if a search occurred, and if so, if the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. ś 32 There is no United States Supreme Court opinion directly addressing this issue so we apply established Fourth Amendment principles to guide our analysis. A Fourth Amendment search does not occur unless there is a subjective manifestation of privacy in the object searched and society recognizes that privacy interest is reasonable. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). Additionally, the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches. Reasonableness is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, including the degree to which the search intrudes upon an individual's privacy and the degree to which the search is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). Thus, a Fourth Amendment violation occurs only when there is a reasonable privacy interest protected and the search of that interest is unreasonable in light of all the circumstances.
ś 33 Athan argues the collection and analysis of biological samples from an individual constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. He contends that because the letter and, consequently, his DNA were obtained and examined without a warrant, they were unreasonable searches and thus, in violation of Fourth Amendment protections. ś 34 The State argues Athan had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his saliva when he voluntarily placed it on an envelope and mailed it. The State also argues the use of the police ruse here did not vitiate the voluntary nature of Athan's surrender of his saliva. ś 35 While case law exists supporting Athan's assertion that forcible collection of bodily fluids constitutes a search under the federal constitution, see, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), no cases have been cited dealing with the voluntary relinquishment of a bodily fluid which is collected without force or invasion and analyzed by the government. Similar to our state constitution approach, the question under the Fourth Amendment is whether persons retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their saliva after they lick an envelope and place it in the mail. We find no cases or support for such a conclusion. Police may surreptitiously follow a suspect to collect DNA, fingerprints, footprints, or other possibly incriminating evidence, without violating that suspect's privacy. No case has been cited challenging or declaring this type of police practice unreasonable or unconstitutional. People constantly leave genetic material, fingerprints, footprints, or other evidence of their identity in public places. There is no subjective expectation of privacy in discarded genetic material just as there is no subjective expectation of privacy in fingerprints or footprints left in a public place. Physical characteristics which are exposed to the public are not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21, 93 S.Ct. 774, 35 L.Ed.2d 99 (1973). The analysis of DNA obtained without forcible compulsion and analyzed by the government for comparison to evidence found at a crime scene is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Coleman, 122 Ariz. 130, 593 P.2d 684, 687 (Ct.App.1978) (finding analysis of shoe soles does not constitute Fourth Amendment search because the [e]xamination of such physical characteristics `involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search' (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969))).
ś 36 Athan argues he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the envelope he mailed to the law firm. He relies on Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877), and United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970) for the proposition that sealed letters and packages cannot be searched without a warrant. ś 37 The State argues, as it did in the state constitution claim, no violation exists because the detective who received the letter was named in the letterhead and thus, was an intended recipient of the envelope. The State distinguishes the cases relied on by Athan because here the SPD did not intercept and search the contents of a letter being sent to a third party. It is of no consequence that Athan did not know the intended recipient was a detective and not a lawyer, according to the State. ś 38 The Fourth Amendment protects a person's privacy interests in the contents of sealed letters and documents sent through the mail. See e.g., Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 251, 90 S.Ct. 1029. However, a similar analysis from Athan's state constitution mail claim applies here. The detectives were listed on the envelope as the intended recipients; no interception of the letter while it was in transit to a third party occurred. There is no Fourth Amendment violation when, as here, the police open and analyze a sealed letter addressed to one or more of their detectives.