Opinion ID: 6109557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure to call additional lay and expert mitigation witnesses in penalty phase

Text: Mr. McFadden argues the motion court clearly erred in rejecting his claim defense counsel were ineffective for failing to call lay witnesses Lisa Thomas, Tanesia Clark, Elwyn Walls, Sean Nichols, and Willibea Blackburn, and for failing to call expert witnesses Dr. White, Dr. Draper, and Dr. Gelbort during the penalty phase. Because Movant is challenging counsel's failure to call certain witnesses during the penalty phase, a 'viable defense' is one in which there is a reasonable probability that the additional mitigating evidence those witnesses would have provided would have outweighed the aggravating evidence presented by the prosecutor resulting in the jury voting against the death penalty. Deck, 381 S.W.3d at 346 . In a death penalty case, trial counsel has an obligation to investigate and discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence, Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898 , 906 (Mo. banc 2016) , including, medical history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences.  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 , 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527 , 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (emphasis omitted). But the  'duty to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off-chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.'  Strong, 263 S.W.3d at 652 , quoting, Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 , 383, 125 S.Ct. 2456 , 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005). In the real world containing real limitations of time and human resources, criminal defense counsel is given a heavy measure of deference in deciding what witnesses and evidence are worthy of pursuit. Twenter, 818 S.W.2d at 635 (citation omitted). Counsel will not be found ineffective for choosing to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another. Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 912 (citation omitted). At the postconviction hearing, defense counsel testified that, before deciding their mitigation defense, they conducted a thorough investigation of Mr. McFadden's childhood, development, criminal background, and environment by talking with his family and friends and by having Dr. Draper review this information. They also assessed the strength of each of the witnesses' testimony at Mr. McFadden's previous trials. Because of the weakness of prior expert testimony about mitigation issues, defense counsel made a strategic decision to build their mitigation defense using six lay witnesses who had done well on both direct and cross-examination at Mr. McFadden's previous trials. The testimony of each of these lay witnesses centered around defense counsel's theme for mitigation-that Mr. McFadden grew up in a violent neighborhood, lacked guidance growing up, and had a chaotic childhood in which he did not have consistent parenting and was shuffled around from home to home. Defense counsel did not believe it would be helpful to call the additional lay witnesses, as each had serious weaknesses or was duplicative. Counsel further decided not to again call expert mitigation witnesses who previously had been ineffective and were subject to serious impeachment and whose testimony risked overshadowing the message they wanted to present through lay witnesses.
During the penalty phase, defense counsel first called Elaine Hood, who knew Mr. McFadden because he was friends with her daughters when they were younger. As he got older, Mr. McFadden babysat Ms. Hood's grandsons four or five times per week. When she and Mr. McFadden saw each other, which was just about every day, they would talk about church, jobs, and staying out of trouble. Ms. Hood enjoyed being around Mr. McFadden. She also testified regarding the culture of Pine Lawn, saying it was a rough neighborhood because of all the shootings, which were terrifying and the main reason she moved. Even though violence and drugs were rampant in Pine Lawn, she testified on cross-examination she knew good people who lived in the community. Counsel also brought in family members to discuss Mr. McFadden's upbringing. Mr. McFadden's aunt testified regarding his childhood. She recalled his father was a severe alcoholic and his mother worked two jobs to support the family, often leaving Mr. McFadden and his sisters home alone. The siblings ended up staying with their aunt frequently, and she always made sure he attended sports or other activities and supported him during those activities. She believed she was a good role model for the children. Finally, Mr. McFadden's aunt also recounted he was  small for his size and picked on regularly but was never beaten or sexually abused. Another of Mr. McFadden's aunts also testified, as did her husband, a church minister. 6 She and her husband got Mr. McFadden involved in church. They treated him as their son and participated in fun activities with him. Mr. McFadden was small for his age and when other kids bullied him, his uncle would intervene. When he was a teenager, Mr. McFadden requested to live with them permanently. Had he done so, they would have intervened to prevent him from taking part in inappropriate activities, but unfortunately, Mr. McFadden's mother would not allow him to live with them permanently. Mr. McFadden's grandmother similarly discussed his upbringing, describing that Mr. McFadden's mother was often absent and his father suffered from alcoholism, though he was never aggressive, violent, or in prison. Mr. McFadden stayed with his grandmother often, sometimes for extended periods of time. His grandmother and grandfather were good to Mr. McFadden and provided him with a good home. Finally, Mr. McFadden's father testified. He said, because he was an alcoholic, he would often promise to do things with Mr. McFadden but then never show up, which often left his son disappointed. His father did not believe he was good to Mr. McFadden, but he always made sure his children had something to eat. On cross-examination, Mr. McFadden's father discussed Mr. McFadden's time at Tarkio Academy, an alternative school, and admitted it was likely his son's fighting behavior that placed him there. He further testified he was unsure whether his son was the one being bullied or the one bullying others but knew his son got into fights often and had visible bruises and injuries.
Mr. McFadden now claims defense counsel also should have called Sean Nichols and Elwyn Walls to testify regarding the terrible social conditions of those living in Pine Lawn, as they did at the evidentiary hearing. But Ms. Hood already testified about these conditions, and unlike Ms. Hood, these two witnesses did not know Mr. McFadden personally and would have been able to testify only about the general social conditions of Pine Lawn. Testimony regarding the particular circumstances surrounding Mr. McFadden's life and his crimes would only have been speculation. Further, putting these two witnesses on the stand would have opened the door to especially damaging cross-examination regarding Mr. McFadden's other crimes and the fact Mr. McFadden was a member, not a victim, of the gangs responsible for much of the violence in Pine Lawn. Counsel instead chose a strategy throughout the penalty phase of keeping out evidence of gang and drug activity. The motion court did not clearly err in concluding the risk of negative testimony from these two witnesses outweighed any mitigation value. The other four lay witnesses Mr. McFadden says defense counsel should have called testified either in-person or by deposition at the postconviction hearing regarding their positive interactions with Mr. McFadden and how the culture in Pine Lawn consists of gangs, drugs, violence, and poverty. This testimony would have been cumulative to the testimony already presented by Ms. Hood and Mr. McFadden's family members. Counsel is not ineffective for not presenting cumulative evidence. Deck, 381 S.W.3d at 351 (citation omitted). This is  particularly true when, as here, the witnesses' testimony would have been subject to damaging cross-examination about the fact Mr. McFadden and his gang were responsible for a substantial part of the violence creating that dysfunctional social culture. Such evidence would have been aggravating, rather than mitigating, and the motion court did not clearly err in concluding defense counsel were not ineffective in failing to call these witnesses, whose testimony would have detracted from counsel's efforts to keep out evidence of gang activity. McLaughlin, 378 S.W.3d at 337 ; Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 912 .

Mr. McFadden argues the motion court clearly erred in rejecting his claim defense counsel were ineffective in failing to call Dr. Norman White to testify during the penalty phase regarding the cultural milieu of Pine Lawn. Dr. White's research focuses on determining what factors cause young people to become involved in crime. Postconviction counsel retained Dr. White to create a social profile regarding what life was like growing up in Pine Lawn. Dr. White interviewed multiple individuals who lived there and interviewed Mr. McFadden on four separate occasions. He also spoke with others who worked in youth services in nearby areas when Mr. McFadden was growing up. He concluded the lack of education and poverty, and the fact the area was rife with teen pregnancy, was predictive of high crime rates for young African-American males. He believed these factors also were the likely result of Pine Lawn's high level of gang activity. Much of the evidence Dr. White presented regarding the cultural milieu of Pine Lawn was not available in 2008. Defense counsel also testified they were unaware of the use of such sociological testimony in capital cases in 2008; at the time, it would have been normal to present evidence of the culture surrounding Pine Lawn through lay witnesses, as counsel did here. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's performance at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . In any event, counsel explained they had considered calling a gang expert but strategically decided an expert on the issue would likely have been more harmful than helpful as it could have brought attention to Mr. McFadden's gang involvement, an issue defense counsel specifically wanted to minimize at trial. Dr. White's testimony similarly would have been subject to cross-examination about Mr. McFadden's gang involvement and could have exposed the jury to damaging evidence about Mr. McFadden's drug dealing and other crimes in which he was the prime suspect. Finally, Dr. White never discussed the facts of Mr. McFadden's offenses or related them to the conditions in which he grew up and was unable to render an opinion regarding the impact of growing up in Pine Lawn on Mr. McFadden's choice to murder Leslie. As his testimony was of limited assistance, the motion court did not err in concluding counsel were not ineffective in failing to call him as a witness.
Mr. McFadden also argues defense counsel were ineffective in failing to call Dr. Draper, whom they utilized as an expert during the penalty phase of both trials involving the murder of Mr. Franklin  and the first trial involving the murder of Leslie. Dr. Draper testified at the postconviction hearing that Mr. McFadden suffered from an attachment disorder that arose in reaction to the insufficient structure and bullying of his childhood. Defense counsel testified that while Dr. Draper's opinions were helpful, their usefulness was outweighed by her weakness as a witness. In all three penalty phases in which she testified and at the postconviction hearing, Dr. Draper gave damaging opinions that Mr. McFadden knew the difference between right and wrong, his attachment disorder did not make him a murderer, and he used his free will to choose to murder. Moreover, Dr. Draper had testified really badly in the third trial-that is, in Mr. McFadden's second penalty phase trial for Mr. Franklin's murder, including revealing Mr. McFadden had threatened his mother with a shotgun. She further was badly impeached in that trial, which made it just look as if she just says whatever [defendants] want, if it helps them. Baumruk v. State, 364 S.W.3d 518 , 536 (Mo. banc 2012) , found no clear error in choosing not to present expert testimony regarding movant's brain limitation when it had been presented in Baumruk's first trial to no avail and, therefore, it was a reasonable strategic decision for Baumruk's counsel to present different mitigating evidence during Baumruk's second trial. Similarly here, it was not clear error for the motion court to find defense counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to call Dr. Draper and instead to rely on lay witnesses who performed better in front of the jury. This decision was not based on inadequate investigation or unreasonable trial strategy but due to concerns Dr. Draper's previous damaging cross-examinations would be used to impeach her in this trial. 7 Counsel will not be found ineffective for choosing to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another. Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 912 .
Similarly, the motion court did not clearly err in finding defense counsel were not ineffective for failing to call Dr. Gelbort as a neurological expert to testify Mr. McFadden's mental capacity was that of someone under the age of 18. To the extent Mr. McFadden argues a mental age of less than 18 entitles him to be treated as a juvenile for sentencing purposes and precludes imposition of the death penalty even though he was 23 at the time he committed the murder, this Court already has rejected that argument in Tisius, 519 S.W.3d at 430-31 . Tisius held that even though the United States Supreme Court recognized the potential for a defendant's mental age to differ from his or her biological age, it  nonetheless, implemented a bright line rule as to the minority age for imposition of the death penalty and trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to object on grounds that Mr. Tisius' mental age prohibited imposition of the death penalty because his biological age was over 18. Id. at 431 . While it may be, at some future time, courts will prohibit imposition of the death penalty for those younger than 25 years, this is not currently the law. 8 To the extent Mr. McFadden is arguing counsel were unreasonable in deciding not to call Dr. Gelbort as a neurological expert in mitigation, his claim also fails. The record shows counsel's decision was based on their specific familiarity with Dr. Gelbort and their belief calling him would have hurt Mr. McFadden's case. In 2004, he was hired by counsel to perform a neuropsychological exam on Mr. McFadden. He concluded Mr. McFadden had a full-scale IQ in the low-average range, had impulse control problems, and had impairments in the areas of the brain that give rise to decisionmaking. But he also would not characterize Mr. McFadden as mentally disabled and believed Mr. McFadden's mental capacity did not absolve him of responsibility for the murders of Leslie and Mr. Franklin. Defense counsel nonetheless called Dr. Gelbort to testify during the first trial involving the murder of Leslie and the first trial involving the murder of Mr. Franklin, but he performed poorly on cross-examination. Counsel believed Dr. Gelbort's previous testimony was not particularly helpful because he could not definitively say Mr. McFadden's cognitive functioning had any impact on the decision to kill Leslie, the testimony had not been well-received by the jury because Dr. Gelbort had an attitude on the stand, and in both cases, the jury recommended death. Because of Dr. Gelbort's previous poor performance, defense counsel chose to try a new strategy in the retrial by calling only lay witnesses. Such strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible opinions are virtually unchallengeable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . The motion court did not clearly err in failing to find defense counsel ineffective for failing to repeat strategies that did not work at the prior trials, Baumruk, 364 S.W.3d at 536 , and instead choosing to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another. Davis, 486 S.W.3d at 912 . 9