Opinion ID: 2273096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Public Trust

Text: In Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 303 (1972), Justice Hall alluded to the ancient principle that land covered by tidal waters belonged to the sovereign, but for the common use of all the people. The genesis of this principle is found in Roman jurisprudence, which held that [b]y the law of nature the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea were common to mankind. Justinian, Institutes 2.1.1 (T. Sandars trans. 1st Am. ed. 1876). No one was forbidden access to the sea, and everyone could use the seashore [3] to dry his nets there, and haul them from the sea.... Id., 2.1.5. The seashore was not private property, but subject to the same law as the sea itself, and the sand or ground beneath it. Id. This underlying concept was applied in New Jersey in Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup.Ct. 1821). The defendant in Arnold tested the plaintiff's claim of an exclusive right to harvest oysters by taking some oysters that the plaintiff had planted in beds in the Raritan River adjacent to his farm in Perth Amboy. The oyster beds extended about 150 feet below the ordinary low water mark. The tide ebbed and flowed over it. The defendant's motion for a nonsuit was granted. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's subsequent motion to set aside the nonsuit. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick, in an extensive opinion, referred to the grant by Charles II of the land comprising New Jersey with all rivers, harbors, waters, fishings, etc., and of all other royalties, so far as the king had estate, right, title or interest therein to the Duke of York. 6 N.J.L. at 85 (2d ed. 1875) (emphasis deleted). The duke had been delegated the same power as the king with respect to the land, and by virtue of the charter could divide and grant only those properties and interests that the king could. The Chief Justice's analysis then turned to the power of the English king. According to English law, public property consisted of two classes. Some was necessary for the state's use, and the remainder was common property available to all citizens. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick wrote that [o]f this latter kind, according to the writers upon the law of nature and of nations, and upon the civil law, are the air, the running water, the sea, the fish and the wild beasts. Id. at 86. He argued that though this title, strictly speaking, is in the sovereign, yet the use is common to all the people. Id. He pointed out the significant difference between public property necessary for the state and common property: The title of both these, for the greater order, and, perhaps, of necessity, is placed in the hands of the sovereign power, but it is placed there for different purposes. The citizen cannot enter upon the domain of the crown and apply it, or any part of it, to his immediate use. He cannot go into the king's forests and fall and carry away the trees, though it is the public property; it is placed in the hands of the king for a different purpose; it is the domain of the crown, a source of revenue; so neither can the king intrude upon the common property, thus understood, and appropriate it to himself, or to the fiscal purposes of the nation, the enjoyment of it is a natural right which cannot be infringed or taken away, unless by arbitrary power; and that, in theory at least, could not exist in a free government, such as England has always claimed to be. [ Id. at 87-88 (emphasis supplied).] The Chief Justice traced the use of common property by the kings and concluded that appropriation of common property by William the Conqueror and his successors was questionable and that the Magna Charta rectified the prior improper conduct by providing  that where the banks of rivers had first been defended in his time, (that is, when they had first been fenced in, and shut against the common use, in his time) they should be from thenceforth laid open.  Id. at 88. A charter of Henry III confirmed this principle at least to the extent that only grants of common property made before the reign of Henry II were valid. Id. at 89. [4] Chief Justice Kirkpatrick concluded that all navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows and the coasts of the sea, including the water and land under the water, are common to all the citizens, and that each [citizen] has a right to use them according to his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate that use.... Id. at 93. Regulation included erecting docks, harbors and wharves, and improving fishery and oyster beds. This common property had passed from Charles II to the Duke of York. Upon surrender of all rights of government in 1702, the common property reverted to the Crown of England, and upon the Revolution these royal rights became vested in the people of New Jersey. Id. at 94. See also J. Angell, A Treatise on the Right of Property in Tidewaters and in the Soil and Shores Thereof 42-43 (2d ed. 1847); D. Ducsik, Shoreline for the Public 89-91 (1974). Later, in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 13 S.Ct. 110, 118, 36 L.Ed. 1018, 1043 (1892), the Supreme Court, in referring to the common property, stated that [t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested ... than it can abdicate its police powers.... [5] In Avon, Justice Hall reaffirmed the public's right to use the waterfront as announced in Arnold v. Mundy . He observed that the public has a right to use the land below the mean average high water mark [6] where the tide ebbs and flows. These uses have historically included navigation and fishing. In Avon the public's rights were extended to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities. 61 N.J. at 309. Compare Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268, 106 Eng.Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821) (holding no right to swim in common property) with Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 10 L.Ed. 997 (1842) (indicating right to bathe in navigable waters). The Florida Supreme Court has held: The constant enjoyment of this privilege [bathing in salt waters] of thus using the ocean and its fore-shore for ages without dispute should prove sufficient to establish it as an American common law right, similar to that of fishing in the sea, even if this right had not come down to us as a part of the English common law, which it undoubtedly has. [ White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 59, 190 So. 446, 449 (1939).] It has been said that [h]ealth, recreation and sports are encompassed in and intimately related to the general welfare of a well-balanced state. N.J. Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 488 (Law Div. 1971), aff'd, 61 N.J. 1, appeal dismissed sub nom. Borough of East Rutherford v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Authority, 409 U.S. 943, 93 S.Ct. 270, 34 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1972). Extension of the public trust doctrine to include bathing, swimming and other shore activities is consonant with and furthers the general welfare. The public's right to enjoy these privileges must be respected. In order to exercise these rights guaranteed by the public trust doctrine, the public must have access to municipally-owned dry sand areas as well as the foreshore. The extension of the public trust doctrine to include municipally-owned dry sand areas was necessitated by our conclusion that enjoyment of rights in the foreshore is inseparable from use of dry sand beaches. See Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 228 (1981). In Avon we struck down a municipal ordinance that required nonresidents to pay a higher fee than residents for the use of the beach. We held that where a municipal beach is dedicated to public use, the public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference and that any contrary state or municipal action is impermissible. 61 N.J. at 309. The Court was not relying on the legal theory of dedication, although dedication alone would have entitled the public to the full enjoyment of the dry sand. Instead the Court depended on the public trust doctrine, impliedly holding that full enjoyment of the foreshore necessitated some use of the upper sand, so that the latter came under the umbrella of the public trust. In Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174 (1978), we stated that the public's right to use municipally-owned beaches was not dependent upon the municipality's dedication of its beaches to use by the general public. The Borough of Deal had dedicated a portion of such beach for use by its residents only. We found such limited dedication immaterial given the public trust doctrine's requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality. 78 N.J. at 179-80.