Opinion ID: 1965654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: inadequate investigation claim

Text: The petitioner next claims that the habeas court improperly denied his petition for certification to appeal from the denial of his claim of an inadequate investigation by his trial counsel. The petitioner specifically claims that his counsel did not substantiate the DNA test results or request a second test of the DNA samples by his own expert. For example, he contends that his counsel should not have accepted the state's conclusion, based on the evidence, that a boot print found on the gate separating the victim's compartment from that of the four inmates was made by the petitioner's boot, rather than the boot of one of the other three inmates. He also claims that his counsel improperly relied on testimonial evidence supplied to him by the state, some of which allegedly was unsworn and outdated, instead of validating the testimony by conducting his own investigation. The respondent replies that the petitioner failed to produce any exculpatory evidence that would have called into question the incriminating evidence. The respondent also asserts that the petitioner failed to show that his trial counsel's performance prejudiced the defense. We conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal as to the petitioner's inadequate investigation claim. The following additional findings made by the habeas court are relevant to our resolution of this issue. The petitioner's original attorney, Dakers, provided the petitioner with copies of the police reports and witness statements, including statements by the victim and the other inmates. Barber, who replaced Dakers in the summer of 2000, did not hire a private investigator and did not speak with the witnesses directly. He did receive copies of the police reports and witness statements, however, and met with the petitioner to review and discuss the contents of these documents. The petitioner admitted his participation in the charged offenses after the DNA test results implicated him in the assault. In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court did not decide whether the petitioner's claim that his trial counsel had failed to conduct an adequate investigation of the underlying case was in procedural default, as the respondent alleged in the return. The court instead reviewed the claim on its merits and concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated that his counsel had overlooked any exculpatory evidence that should have been presented in the habeas proceeding. The court noted that the petitioner had persisted in maintaining that the fact that he had not touched the victim had some bearing on his convictions and that the petitioner had called Bridges as a witness at the hearing and submitted Bridges' sworn affidavit attesting that the petitioner had not touched the victim. The court further noted that the elements of the crimes to which the petitioner pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine did not require that he touch the victim or sexually assault her. The court specifically noted that General Statutes § 53a-8 (a) provides in relevant part that [a] person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense, who . . . intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender. The court finally observed that the forensic evidence established that the petitioner's semen was present on the victim's clothing, hair and glasses, as well as on Bridges' clothing, and that the victim, who was prepared to testify if the matter had gone to trial, reported that the petitioner had grabbed her breasts and placed his penis up against her face and struck her with it. The court also concluded, with respect to the prejudice prong of Hill, that the petitioner had failed to show that, but for his counsel's deficient performance, he would have decided to plead not guilty, insisted on going to trial and based his decision to do so on the likelihood that the introduction of allegedly missing evidence or an unidentified defense would have been successful. The habeas court therefore denied the claim of inadequate investigation and the petitioner's subsequent petition for certification to appeal. We first determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion under Simms on the grounds that the claim regarding counsel's inadequate investigation is not debatable among jurists of reason, that the court could not have resolved the claim in a different manner and that there are no allegations in connection with the claim that deserve further review. Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. at 616, 646 A.2d 126. This requires plenary review of the habeas court's application of the standard articulated in Strickland and Hill. [15] See Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 234 Conn. at 152-53, 662 A.2d 718 (examination of habeas court's determination regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claim is mixed question of law and fact that requires plenary review). We are mindful of the principle that, although it is incumbent on a trial counsel to conduct a prompt investigation of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction . . . counsel need not track down each and every lead or personally investigate every evidentiary possibility. . . . In a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner's burden of proving that a fundamental unfairness had been done is not met by speculation . . . but by demonstrable realities. . . . One cannot successfully attack, with the advantage of hindsight, a trial counsel's trial choices and strategies that otherwise constitutionally comport with the standards of competence. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edwards v. Commissioner of Correction, 87 Conn.App. 517, 525-26, 865 A.2d 1231 (2005). In the present case, we agree with the habeas court that the petitioner failed to present evidence that takes his claim out of the realm of speculation and makes it a demonstrable reality. The claim that his trial counsel should have verified the DNA test results and the testimonial statements taken by the state is not based on evidence that the DNA testing was flawed, that the testimonial statements lacked credibility or that the state overlooked evidence that would have exonerated the petitioner but appears to be grounded in speculation that, if the petitioner's counsel had conducted an additional and possibly redundant investigation, he might have discovered exonerating evidence. Moreover, the petitioner does not dispute that he admitted his guilt to his trial counsel after he was informed of the DNA test results that implicated him in the assault. The petitioner thus provides no tangible support for his claim that his trial counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the [s]ixth [almendment; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; and that his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See id., at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is therefore unnecessary to examine whether the petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel's representation under the test enunciated in Hill. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner's certification to appeal from its denial of this claim. The issue of whether trial counsel adequately investigated the petitioner's case is not debatable among jurists of reason, the court could not have resolved the issue in a different manner and there are no allegations in connection with this claim that are deserving of further review. See Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. at 616, 646 A.2d 126. The judgment is reversed with respect to the habeas court's dismissal of the petitioner's claim that trial counsel had failed to inform the petitioner correctly about his sentence and the case is remanded with direction to rendered judgment denying the habeas petition as to that claim; the appeal is dismissed with respect to the petitioner's claim that trial counsel inadequately investigated the petitioner's case.