Opinion ID: 2611462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether Action was a statutory co-employee of Malco, Tucker and Clark

Text: Tucker and Clark argue that the Meers test applies in this situation to determine whether Action was a statutory co-employee and, thus, immune from suit. They further argue that when the district court applied the Meers test, it failed to construe the facts in their favor; therefore, the order granting the motion to dismiss must be reversed. In Meers, Centel, a telephone company, contracted with Haughton Elevators (Haughton) to do specialized maintenance for the elevators in Centel's business facility. Ms. Meers, employed as Centel's business office supervisor, was injured in an elevator at the Centel building. After receiving SIIS benefits through her employer, Centel, Ms. Meers sued Haughton. Haughton alleged that since it was Centel's subcontractor, it was in the same employ as Ms. Meers, pursuant to NRS 616.560(1)(a); therefore, Haughton contended, it was immune from suit under NIIA. See Meers, 101 Nev. at 284-85, 701 P.2d at 1006-07. This court held that although NIIA afforded immunity to all subcontractors and their employees, the protection is by no means absolute. Id. at 285, 701 P.2d at 1007. Rather, this court invoked the normal work test used in other jurisdictions to determine whether the type of work a subcontractor does entitles it to NIIA immunity: The test (except in cases where the work is obviously a subcontracted fraction of a main contract) is whether that indispensable activity is, in that business, normally carried on through employees rather than independent contractors. Id. at 286, 701 P.2d at 1007 (quoting Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. McReynolds, 216 Va. 897, 224 S.E.2d 323 (1976)). Applying this test, we held that Centel did not normally conduct specialized maintenance of its elevators through its own employees. Id. Since maintaining elevators was not part of Centel's normal work, Centel was not Haughton's statutory employer, nor was Haughton the statutory co-employee of Ms. Meers. Therefore, NIIA immunity did not apply, and Ms. Meers could proceed with her suit against Haughton. Id. The history of worker's compensation cases in this state is marked by much confusion as to which test applies when determining who is in the same employ for NIIA immunity purposes. For instance, in Leslie v. J.A. Tiberti Construction, 99 Nev. 494, 664 P.2d 963 (1983), this court applied a five-factor, fact-intensive control test in a construction case; however, this test was then applied in some non-construction cases as well. See, e.g., Sims v. General Telephone & Electronics, 107 Nev. 516, 815 P.2d 151 (1991). In 1991, the Nevada State Legislature enacted NRS 616.262 (recodified as NRS 616B.603), which provided in part: 1. A person is not an employer for the purposes of this chapter if: (a) He enters into a contract with another person or business which is an independent enterprise; and (b) He is not in the same trade, business, profession or occupation as the independent enterprise. . . . . 3. The provisions of this section do not apply to a principal contractor who is licensed pursuant to chapter 624 of NRS. Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 1348-49, 905 P.2d 168, 174-75 (1995), highlighted that NRS 616.262(1)(b) codified the Meers test, holding that the same trade language used in NRS 616.262(1)(b) referred to the normal work test stated in Meers. Oliver further stated: If a principal contractor is a licensed contractor pursuant to chapter 624, the principal contractor will be the statutory employer of the independent contractors (or subcontractors) and their employees. If a principal contractor is not a licensed contractor, it will be the statutory employer only if it can show that it is in the same trade under the Meers test. Id. at 1349, 905 P.2d at 174-75. In order to determine whether a defendant is immune from suit per NIIA, we now set forth the following required inquiry. First, construction cases must be differentiated from non-construction cases. If the particular situation is a non-construction case, the Meers test is to be applied to ascertain whether the defendant is immune from suit under NIIA or may be sued on common law principles. [4] However, remaining consistent with Oliver, further examination is required in construction cases. Initially, if the defendant in a construction case is not a principal contractor [5] licensed pursuant to NRS chapter 624, or is not working pursuant to a construction agreement with such a licensed principal contractor, the Meers test must be applied to determine immunity. On the other hand, if the defendant in a construction case is a principal contractor licensed pursuant to NRS chapter 624, or is a licensed contractor working pursuant to a construction agreement with a licensed principal contractor, and the defendant is performing part of the construction work for which it is licensed when the injury occurs, that contractor is immune from further suit as a matter of law. [6] No further factual analysis is necessary. We conclude that by the enactment of NRS 616.262, the legislature intended the use of only the Meers test as discussed above. Accordingly, we now explicitly hold that the control test is no longer the primary standard applicable to determine whether one is immune from suit under NIIA. Rather, the issue of control is only one factor to be considered in resolving normal work issues under Meers. [7] In the present case, Tucker and Clark expend much effort applying the Meers test to the facts of this case. They explain that a material factual issue remains regarding whether the particular scaffolding required for the Shrine project was a highly specialized necessity that Malco's employees would not normally carry out. Tucker and Clark's emphasis is misplaced because according to our conclusion above, the Meers test is not applicable in this matter. Applying the above analysis in this case, we first note that this is a construction case. Next, the record indicates that Action is a licensed scaffolding contractor pursuant to NRS chapter 624, rendering its services pursuant to a construction subcontract. Further, it was performing the very services for which it was licensedscaffoldingwhen Tucker and Clark were injured. Therefore, Action is immune from suit under NIIA as a matter of law. Accordingly, no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding workplace immunity. See NRS 616.262(3), NRS 616.560(1)(a), NRS 624.020 and other relevant sections of NRS chapters 616 and 624.