Opinion ID: 1779012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fourth amendment rights

Text: Addison argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his custodial statements, photographs of him, and incourt identifications by the victims on the basis that they resulted from an unlawful stopping and subsequent custodial detention in violation of his fourth amendment rights. It is his contention that these pieces of evidence were tainted fruit of the illegal stopping and detention under Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), and inadmissible. We disagree. The fourth amendment guarantees the right of people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. A person has been seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Burks v. State, 293 Ark. 374, 738 S.W.2d 399 (1987). A seizure pursuant to an arrest or any other detention that severely intrudes upon a person's liberty, such as a custodial interrogation, must be supported either by probable cause or by clear and positive testimony that demonstrates consent. Id. See Rose v. State, 294 Ark. 279, 742 S.W.2d 901 (1988). See also Foster v. State, 285 Ark. 363, 687 S.W.2d 829 (1985), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929, 107 S.Ct. 3213, 96 L.Ed.2d 700 (1987). [D]etention for custodial interrogation  regardless of its label  intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). See also Kiefer v. State, 297 Ark. 464, 762 S.W.2d 800 (1989); Burks, supra . Under Rule 3.1, a suspect may be stopped and detained for questioning on reasonable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). This rule provides as follows: A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or (2) a misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, if such action is reasonably necessary either to obtain or verify the identification of the person or to determine the lawfulness of his conduct. An officer acting under this rule may require the person to remain in or near such place in the officer's presence for a period of not more than fifteen (15) minutes or for such time as is reasonable under the circumstances. At the end of such period the person detained shall be released without further restraint, or arrested and charged with an offense. For the purposes of Rule 3.1, reasonable suspicion means a suspicion based upon facts or circumstances which give rise to more than a bare, imaginary, or purely conjectural suspicion. Ark.R.Crim.P. 2.1. The initial stopping of Addison and his detention on the street was permissible since the facts and circumstances known to the investigating officers provided reasonable suspicion that Addison was the perpetrator of the rapes. Ark.R.Crim.P. 3.1. Officer Blankenship testified that Addison fit the description of the rapist, was in the same general area at the time in which the rapes had occurred, had no identification, gave several reasons for being in the area, and could not tell the officers at which address he just had been. These circumstances provided more than a bare, imaginary, or purely conjectural suspicion that Addison was the culprit. Addison's subsequent detention for custodial interrogation at the police station was not authorized by Rule 3.1 because the rule by its plain language does not contemplate the detention of persons at one place and a subsequent detention at a police station. Moreover, his detention was not in conformity with Ark.R.Crim.P. 2.3. Ark.R.Crim.P. 2.3 provides as follows: If a law enforcement officer acting pursuant to this rule requests any person to come to or remain at a police station, prosecuting attorney's office or other similar place, he shall take such steps as are reasonable to make clear that there is no legal obligation to comply with such a request. One of the officers testified that he asked Addison if he would mind going down to the station, to which Addison replied that he had no problem with that. Addison then asked if the officers would take him home later. An officer responded, after we get through with you. Another officer stated that he told Addison that he was at the station voluntarily. In either event, none of the officers specifically informed him that he had no obligation to be there or that he could leave if he wanted. Clearly, the officers breached the positive duty mandated by Rule 2.3. See Burks, supra . In light of the authorities' failure to comply with our Rules of Criminal Procedure and the fact that detention for custodial interrogation intrudes so severely on interests protected by the fourth amendment, we conclude that Addison's detention for custodial interrogation constituted a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment and thus must be supported either by probable cause or consent. See Kiefer, supra ; Burks, supra . Probable cause exists where there is a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that a crime has been committed by the person suspected. Id.; Hines v. State, 289 Ark. 50, 709 S.W.2d 65 (1986). Probable cause to arrest without a warrant does not require the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a conviction. Burks, supra . The determination of probable cause is based upon factual and practical considerations of everyday life upon which ordinary men, not legal technicians, act. Hines, supra . A nontechnical approach correctly balances the competing interests of the individual and society, so that law enforcement officers will not be unduly hampered, nor law abiding citizens left to the mercy of overzealous police officers. Id. In making the determination of probable cause, we are liberal rather than strict. Sanders v. State, 259 Ark. 329, 532 S.W.2d 752 (1976). Addison was in the same general area at the time in which the rapes took place, fit the description of the rapist, did not have any identification, gave several reasons for being in the area, and could not tell the officers at which address he just had been. Although Officer Blankenship testified he did not have probable cause to arrest Addison, the issue of probable cause to arrest or detain is a matter law for this court to determine. In this instance, the evidence established probable cause to support Addison's detention at the station. Since there was probable cause to detain Addison, it is not necessary for us to address the issue of consent.