Opinion ID: 11168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Whether Underlying Crime Was Federal Offense

Text: 23 The appellant argues that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on a necessary element of accessory after the fact, i.e., that the underlying crime was a federal offense. The trial judge instructed the jury with respect to the elements as follows:For you to find each defendant guilty of this crime as charged in Count One of the indictment, you must be convinced that the Government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that each defendant knew that Demetrius Guzman, Steven Thomas, Gary Harris, or others, had committed the crime of bank robbery. 24 And second, that thereafter, each defendant comforted, assisted, received, or relieved, Demetrius Guzman, Steven Thomas, Gary Harris, or others. 25 And third, that each defendant did the above, intending to hinder or prevent the apprehension, trial, or punishment, of Demetrius Guzman, Steven Thomas, Gary Harris, or others. 26 (R. 13 at 105). Thus the trial judge's only reference to the underlying crime was simply calling it a bank robbery without further definition or instruction that the robbery must be a federal offense. 5 27 The appellant argues that under United States v. Gaudin, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), it was error not to require the jury to find that the bank robbery was a federal offense. The Supreme Court in Gaudin reversed criminal fraud convictions because the judge had not submitted the issue of materiality, conceded by the Government to be an element of the charged offense, to the jury. The Supreme Court emphasized that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require criminal convictions to be supported by a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged. Gaudin, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2313. The appellant argues that the first element of accessory after the fact requires the establishment of an offense against the United States and that the jury did not pass on that issue. 28 We will assume without deciding that the trial judge erred by merely requiring a finding of a bank robbery, as opposed to a finding of a federal crime. 6 Nonetheless, we find such an error does not require reversal. 29 Because the appellant's counsel failed to object to the instruction as written, we believe the plain error standard of review should apply. It is true that counsel for the codefendant did argue that the instruction should require the jury to find that the underlying crime was a federal offense. (R. 13 at 93-94). However, the objection of one defendant, in and of itself, does not preserve the appellate rights of other defendants. Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 30 states, No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto ... (emphasis added). The appellant cites no authority to support the proposition that he can assert the rights of his codefendant. Indeed, the greater weight of authority counsels that a party can rely upon the objection of his codefendant only if he joins in the objection. See, e.g., United States v. Bernal, 814 F.2d 175, 181-82 (5th Cir.1987) (codefendant's objection was expressly joined by defendant); United States v. Pincione, 565 F.2d 404, 405 (6th Cir.1977) (defendant specifically incorporated codefendant's objections); Freije v. United States, 386 F.2d 408, 411 n. 7 (1st Cir.1967) (codefendant's objection was echo[ed] by defendant). 7 30 In the instant case, rather than joining his codefendant's objection, the appellant's counsel told the trial judge, I don't have any objections to the charge. (R. 13 at 94). Having chosen not to object or at least to join his codefendant's objection, the appellant did not preserve the issue for appeal, leaving us to examine the instruction only for plain error. 31 Under the plain error standard as articulated in Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 52(b) and case law, this court may reverse the conviction only if 1) there was an error, 2) the error was clear and obvious, and 3) the error affected a defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730-31, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1775-76, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). We will assume for purposes of this discussion that the trial court's failure to specify that the underlying conviction must be for a federal offense was a clear and obvious error. We find that the error did not affect the appellant's substantial rights. 32 The Supreme Court noted in Olano that in most cases, for an error to be deemed to have affected substantial rights, the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Id. at 734, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. In the instant case the failure to specify the federal nature of the underlying bank robbery offense cannot be construed to have affected the jury's verdict. The rendering of the guilty verdict means the jury found that the appellant knew that the conspirators committed a bank robbery. Having made such a finding, no properly instructed and rational jury would have concluded that the bank robbery was not a federal offense. The bank's vice president testified that the deposits of the Normangee State Bank were federally insured. (R.9 at 131). The federal insurance is the trigger conferring federal status to the crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(f). The appellant's counsel chose not to cross-examine the vice president on the issue of the federally insured nature of the bank, nor did the appellant contest the federal nature of the underlying crime in any other way. 33 Simply put, the failure to instruct the jury that the underlying crime must be a federal offense worked no prejudice on the appellant. Thus the error did not affect substantial rights and does not warrant reversal. 8 34 We are compelled to make one final point before putting this issue to rest. We discussed the implications of Gaudin and Olano recently in United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046 (5th Cir.1996). In Jobe, under a plain error standard of review, we held that the failure to instruct on materiality in a bank fraud instruction did not require reversal, even assuming that such failure affected the appellants' substantial rights. Jobe, 101 F.3d at 1062-63. We relied upon the reasoning of Olano that Rule 52(b) is permissive, not mandatory. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. We said in Jobe that an appellate court need not exercise discretion to correct the error unless it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Jobe, 101 F.3d at 1062. 35 We declined to exercise such discretion in Jobe because of the substantial expenditure of government resources, the overwhelming nature of incriminating evidence, and the fact that materiality was never seriously contested by the defendants at trial. Id. Likewise in the instant case, even if we were to have found that the error in instructions impacted the appellant's substantial rights, we would not have chosen to exercise our discretion to reverse the conviction on that basis. A jury found the appellant guilty after an eight-day trial during which the federal nature of the underlying crime was never contested by the appellant or his codefendant. We decline to reverse on the basis of an error that had no effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the underlying proceedings. Jobe, supra.