Opinion ID: 3053354
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment in Bankruptcy Court

Text: Appellee filed its first motion for summary judgment in the Bankruptcy Court (“First Summary Judgment Motion”) on February 11, 2005, to determine whether the statutory award for “willful” copyright infringement, from the District Court Action, was nondischargeable. At the hearing on the First Summary Judgment Motion, the Bankruptcy Judge recog- nized the potential question of fact that the jury verdict in the District Court Action presented, and therefore discussed with counsel how to prepare just “the intent issue, for trial.” In discussing why the issue of intent would be set for trial, rather than determined on the First Summary Judgment Motion, counsel for the Appellee asked: “The fact that through even her [Albarran’s] testimony that she received this [September 3] letter, and thereafter on September 17th, provided that response; that, just for clarification, doesn’t provide you what is necessary with respect to her intent?” The court responded clearly and correctly: “Not in the current context, no.” The September 3, 1999, letter referenced by Appellee’s counsel informed Appellants that Appellee was asserting an exclusive right to duplicate and sell the films in question. Appellants’ response letter dated September 17, 1999, acknowledged Appellee’s assertion of exclusive rights to duplicate and sell the videos in question. However, the Bankruptcy Judge wisely found at the hearing on the First Sum- mary Judgment Motion that, given the facially ambiguous IN THE MATTER OF BARBOZA 13423 jury finding, a finding of the requisite intent could not be determined based on the knowledge of the letter alone. Thereafter, Appellee filed a subsequent motion for partial summary judgment (“Second Summary Judgment Motion”), which focused on the intent issue. At the hearing on that motion, the Bankruptcy Judge admitted the difficulty of com- ing to a decision concerning the matter: “Well, I have wrestled with this and gone back and forth.” As to whether the willfulness found by the jury was based on reckless disregard or intentional conduct the Bankruptcy Judge stated: The Jury verdict doesn’t tell me which one they’re looking at [reckless disregard or intentional], but the evidence is uncontroverted that [Appellants] knew, the April 19th letter. [sic] And I have to take the jury finding that the copying occurred and combine that with the uncontroverted evidence of the knowledge. Now whether, as Mr. Quinton says, they [Appel- lants] ultimately never received them, the copies were diverted from [R]eel [P]ictures. Whether it was Miguel who really did it, I don’t know the answer to that. But based upon all of this and my review, and although I think it’s got some interesting questions in it, I believe that summary judgment should be granted for the [Appellee] . . . and I’ll sign an order to that effect.2 2 We note that there is no “April 19th letter.” However, the Bankruptcy Judge was most likely referring to the first warning letter sent to Appel- lants dated September 3, 1999. This was the same letter that the Bankruptcy Judge correctly held in the hearing on the First Motion for Summary Judgment would be insufficient to help him determine the “willfulness” of Appellants’ infringement due to the blatant ambiguity in the jury findings. 13424 IN THE MATTER OF BARBOZA