Opinion ID: 702356
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employer Status Under the MPPAA

Text: 12 Central States argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Rheem, finding that Rheem was not an employer for MPPAA purposes, and therefore could not be liable for withdrawal payment under Sec. 1381. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment applying the same standard as the district court. Berdella v. Delo, 972 F.2d 204, 209 (8th Cir.1992). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). 13 The MPPAA does not provide a definition of employer. In Seaway Port Authority v. Duluth-Superior ILA Marine Ass'n Restated Pension Plan, 920 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 S.Ct. 2827, 115 L.Ed.2d 997 (1991), a panel of this Court, in a matter of first impression in this circuit, established a definition of employer for MPPAA purposes. We adhere to that definition in the instant case, and find that the district court correctly found that Rheem was not an employer under the MPPAA. 14 In Seaway, we joined the Second and Eleventh Circuits in holding that, for MPPAA purposes, the definition of employer is  'a person who is obligated to contribute to a plan either as a direct employer or in the interest of an employer of the plan's participants.'  Id. at 507 (quoting Korea Shipping Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n--Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n Pension Trust Fund, 880 F.2d 1531, 1537 (2d Cir.1989)); see Carriers Container Council, Inc. v. Mobile Steamship Ass'n--Int'l Longshoreman's Ass'n, AFL-CIO Pension Plan & Trust, 896 F.2d 1330, 1343 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 926, 111 S.Ct. 308, 112 L.Ed.2d 261 (1990). In applying this definition, the appropriate inquiry is whether the alleged employer had an obligation to contribute and what was the nature of that obligation. Seaway, 920 F.2d at 508. We found, after review of the case law applying the Korea Shipping definition of employer, that there was one fact common to all of the parties held subject to withdrawal liability; they were contractually bound to make pension contributions, either in collective bargaining agreements, general cargo agreements, or shipping association agreements. Id. at 509. The nature of the obligation to contribute establishing an entity as an employer for MPPAA purposes, therefore, is contractual, and the party who is signatory to a contract creating the obligation to contribute is the employer for purposes of establishing withdrawal liability. 5 15 In Seaway, we found that SPAD was not an employer because it had not signed a contract obliging it to contribute to the pension fund: 16 In this case, it is undisputed that SPAD did not sign any collective bargaining agreements. Nor did it sign a shipping association agreement. Nor did SPAD sign the pension plan's trust agreement that established the contribution duty during the relevant period. Our review of the record does not reveal any contracts SPAD signed explicitly obligating it to make pension contributions. Thus, applying the relevant case law, SPAD is not obligated to contribute and is not an employer under the MPPAA. 17 Seaway, 920 F.2d at 509 (footnote omitted). The facts in Seaway are comparable to those in the instant case, and the holding in Seaway is directly applicable here. Knight, and not Rheem, was contractually bound to make pension contributions to Central States. The Agreement between Knight and Rheem stated that Knight would provide the benefits required by any collective bargaining agreement, and Knight, and not Rheem, signed the collective bargaining agreement creating the obligation to contribute to Central States. Further, Knight, and not Rheem, signed the trust agreement with Central States creating the obligation to make payments to Central States. Central States directs us to no document that could create a contractual obligation for Rheem to contribute to Central States. 18 Moreover, in keeping with these obligations, Knight made payments to Central States throughout Knight's association with Rheem. It was not until after Central States discovered that Knight was unable to pay the withdrawal liability that Central States notified Rheem of its belief that Rheem was liable for the withdrawal payment. 19 We find that Seaway is controlling in this case, and that, as a matter of law, Rheem was not contractually obliged to make contributions to Central States. Thus, under the Seaway definition of employer under the MPPAA, Rheem was not an employer. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Rheem on the grounds that Rheem was not an employer as a matter of law.