Opinion ID: 2165491
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ministerial Duties and the Board Policy against Strip Searches

Text: The third issue raised by Appellants in their Motion for Discretionary Review was whether the Court of Appeals erroneously determined the actions of the teachers/administrators were in the performance of a ministerial duty or to have been clearly violative of a Board policy. This issue is critical because the Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (1982), limited the application of a qualified immunity defense to officials performing discretionary functions. Harlow left unresolved the immunity applicable to officials who perform ministerial acts and the lower federal courts are in conflict on this issue. The Harlow qualified immunity defense, however, does not apply to violations of state law claims. These claims are governed by state immunity law. Kentucky immunity law is discussed in the Kentucky Supreme Court decision, Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky.2001), which explains official immunity is immunity from tort liability afforded to public officers and employees for acts performed in the exercise of their discretionary functions. Id. at 521. Quoting from 63C Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 309 (1997), we explained in Yanero, supra , when public officers and employees are sued in their individual capacities, they enjoy only qualified official immunity... Id. at 522. The court further explained, quoting from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895D, that qualified official immunity applies to the negligent performance by a public officer or employee of: (1) discretionary acts or functions, i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee's authority. Id. Appellees in this case argue the written Board policy preempted any claim that appellants' actions were discretionary. Appellees also contend that in the context of school searches, the term strip search contemplates something far less than a nude search, and therefore, the written school policy regarding such searches would apply, and the teachers/administrators are not entitled to qualified immunity against the state claims. We believe the actions of the teachers/administrators were made in good faith, were discretionary in nature and were within the scope of their authority because the Board policy did not clearly apply to the searches conducted on these female students. The term strip search was not defined any where within the school's policies. This would imply the term should be given its ordinary meaning, that which a reasonable person would interpret the term to mean. The majority of cases using the term strip search have defined it as requiring the removal of clothing. ( See McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609 (Tex.Crim.App.2003); Craddock v. Com., 40 Va.App. 539, 580 S.E.2d 454 (2003); Roberts v. Rhode Island, 175 F.Supp.2d 176 (D.R.I.2000); State v. Esquivel, 987 S.W.2d 481 (Mo.App. W.D.1999)) If the facts are as the students allege in this case, the searches do not involve removal of the girl's clothing, but rather lifting their shirts above their bras and lowering their shorts to their knees. Their underwear was never touched or altered in any way, nor was their clothing fully removed from their bodies. We have issued many decisions expressing the common rule that the plain meaning of statutes controls when interpreting statutory language. See Wheeler & Clevenger Oil Co., Inc. v. Washburn, 127 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Ky.2004). And the only time the plain meaning rule is not to be applied is when doing so would constitute an absurd result. Id. at 614. We think the interpretation of policy language follows this same plain meaning rule and therefore, the plain meaning of strip search should be applied to the Board's policy as such would not produce an absurd result, but rather the most reasonable outcome. There were four cases prior to 1998, when these girls were searched, dealing with strip searches of students. We think these cases define the term strip search as a nude search, or search far more invasive than those endured by the female students in this case. The Kentucky Court of Appeals case involving strip searching a student is Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky.App.1983), which describes the involved strip search as: Although appellant was requested during the search to lower both his trousers and undershorts, those articles of his clothing were never removed. Additionally, the appellant was never offensively touched during any part of the search. The only clothing completely removed from the appellant was his jacket and shoes. The avowed purpose of having the appellant lower his shorts and undershorts to his thighs was to determine if either contained drugs or marijuana, underclothing being a prime hiding place for controlled substances. Id. at 30. We believe this description entails a search where clothing and underwear are at least partially removed. The Supreme Court case, Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 101 S.Ct. 3015, 69 L.Ed.2d 395 (1981), involved a strip search of a 13 year old female student performed after a police dog alerted to the presence of drugs on her person. The dissent from this case reads: Petitioner was met at the nurse's office by two adult women, one a uniformed police officer. After denying that she had ever used marihuana, petitioner was ordered to strip. She did so, removing her clothing in the presence of the two women. The women then looked over petitioner's body, inspected her clothing, and touched and examined the hair on her head. Id. at 1023-1024, 3016, 101 S.Ct. 3015. This case at least indicates the strip search involved full removal of the girl's clothing. The opinion later references the nude search of the girl's body, again indicating, a level of search exceeding that performed on the two girls in this case. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals case, Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir.1991), is the closest case to describe strip searching in a way that would come close to encompassing the alleged searches in this case. In Williams , the opinion reads: Ellington asked Easley to take Williams into her office and search her person, in the presence of a female secretary. Inside Easley's office, Williams was asked to empty her pockets which she promptly did. Easley then asked the girl to remove her T-shirt... [which she did]. Williams was then required to lower her blue jeans to her knees. In her deposition, Williams testified that Easley pulled on the elastic of her undergarments to see if anything would fall out, but Easley disputes this contention. Id. at 883. We believe this description still exceeds the severity of the searches conducted in this case, and does not clearly define the term strip search to mean a search much less intrusive than a nude search. The remaining 6th Circuit Case, Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir.1984), involves a student who had been detained and searched by school officials because of suspicion of marijuana possession and possible dealing. The court describes the involved search as, Pursuant to defendant's request, David Tarter emptied his pockets, removed his jacket, boots and shirt..... Raybuck and Spargur then asked Tarter to remove his pants; Tarter refused, the search ceased, and the police were summoned. Id. at 979-80. The court later addresses the search saying, [Tarter's] eventual refusal to be strip-searched..., id. at 980, which would indicate the court did not feel the search that had occurred was a complete strip search. Although this case does not involve student strip searches, we believe the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals said it best in Spear v. Sowders, 33 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 1994): A `strip search,' though an umbrella term, generally refers to an inspection of a naked individual.... Id. at 581. As the above mentioned cases were the only pre-1998 cases which the Board could refer for the definition of strip search within the context of a school setting, we hold the Board's policy did not apply to the searches alleged in this case as the term strip search used within the policy contemplated nothing less than a nude search of the type described in these cases or common language of the day. We also find the acts of the teachers/administrators were made in good faith, were discretionary in nature and within the scope of their authority, and thus, they are also entitled to qualified immunity against the state claims. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. LAMBERT, C.J., COOPER, GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. KELLER, J., dissents by separate opinion.