Opinion ID: 77450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Review of the Taylor Hardin4 file

Text: 25 Williams asserts two claims of ineffective assistance regarding his counsel's alleged review of his Taylor Hardin file. First, Williams claims that at the guilt phase, Bivens failed to read or review the file, and that this prejudiced Williams because Bivens (1) did not raise all the appropriate objections to Williams's inculpatory statement to Danny Hubbard, (2) did not introduce extenuating evidence to place Williams's words in context, and (3) failed to locate and introduce substantive evidence of chronic alcohol and drug use noted in the file that would have supported the defense theory that Williams was incapacitated at the time of the crime. Second, Williams raises a penalty phase ineffectiveness claim, arguing that Biven's failure to read and review the file prejudiced him because the file contained information that would have been useful during his presentation of mitigation evidence. 26 We turn first to the claim of ineffectiveness at the penalty phase. In state court, Williams did not raise a penalty phase ineffectiveness claim regarding counsel's failure to read and review the Taylor Hardin report. Rather, Williams's claim of ineffectiveness at sentencing related to counsel's failure to investigate and present sufficient mitigation evidence, albeit information Bivens allegedly could have gleaned from his reading of the Taylor Hardin report. However, the specific issue raised here was never fairly presented to the state courts. As such, the claim is precluded from federal review. See Henry v. Dep't of Corrs., 197 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir.1999) (a petitioner's constitutional claims [must] be `fairly presented' to the state courts such that they have `an opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon them') (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 513, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). 27 In state court, Williams did raise at the guilt phase his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to read the report. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found as follows with regard to this claim: 28 Fifth, the appellant contends that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance because they allegedly did not examine the records furnished by the State and therefore did not discover that he had made a statement to an employee at Taylor Hardin to the effect that he had killed one white man and would kill another. He also argues that counsel should have objected to the admission of the statement on the ground that it was not relevant. In addressing these contentions, the circuit court made the following findings: The thrust of Williams' treatment of this contention in his post-hearing brief is that [trial counsel] erred by not interposing a relevancy objection to this testimony of Mr. Gaskin . . . . Indisputably, [trial counsel] was surprised by Mr. Gaskin's testimony concerning the statement made in his presence by Williams, because neither Dr. Sumrall nor Dr. Formby had noted it or called it to his attention. Dr. Formby testified that he had gone through the records in question but just simply didn't pick up on it. (EH 414). 29 The Court of Criminal Appeals analyzed the content and context of the statement attributed to Williams by Gaskin in its opinion, although it did so in connection with responding to Williams' contention that the statement should have been excluded because he had not been read his Miranda rights prior to making the statement. 30 Nonetheless, at the end of the entire opinion, after having addressed all issues which had been specifically raised, the court declared, We have searched the entire record for any error which may have adversely affected the appellant's substantial rights and have found none. 601 So.2d at 1087. As previously noted, [a] finding of no plain error is one factor to consider when assessing the performance of trial counsel. Hallford v. State, 629 So.2d 6, 10 (Ala.Crim. App.1992). 31 . . . 32 . . . Likewise, this court finds in this case that any deficiency in the records review, or investigation otherwise, by Dr. Formby, Dr. Sumrall, and/or [trial counsel] did not result in the requisite degree of prejudice. Unless a defendant satisfies both the deficient performance prong and the prejudice prong of Strickland, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687[, 104 S.Ct. 2052]. . . . [T]he court finds that there is no reasonable probability that a relevancy objection would have been sustained, nor that overruling it would have constituted reversible error. The testimony of Mr. Gaskin followed immediately after the testimony of Priscilla Jones. She had testified that when she encountered Williams at her apartment project the morning of Saturday, January 23, 1988, he had made the statement to her in the course of their conversation that he had killed a white man. (R. 479-80). When questioned further as to whether Mr. Williams had told her: I just killed a white man, she confirmed that as his statement to her. (R. 502). On the heels of that testimony, Mr. Gaskin testified that Williams had stated in the course of an argument with another patient at Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility, in Mr. Gaskin's presence and hearing, on December 12, 1988, I have killed one white m____ f____; I'll kill another one. (R. 515-17, 537-38). The patient with whom Williams was arguing was white and Mr. Gaskin is black. (R. 549). Mr. Gaskin recorded that statement in the SOAP notes portion of Mr. Williams' record at Taylor Hardin (R. 539-43; State's Exhibit 3 at the evidentiary hearing). Williams had been arrested during the early morning hours of January 25, 1988, and had been incarcerated at various locations at all times between then and the date of the statement overheard by Mr. Gaskin. Presumably there would have been no opportunity to kill undetected a white person, or any other person, during that time frame. Accordingly, the statement made by Williams in the hearing of Gaskin would have related to an event preceding January 25, 1988. Consequently, it is not remote to the January 23, 1988, incident, and statements that date to Priscilla Jones. The court finds the testimony was relevant. The rule is stated to be that the acts, declarations and demeanor of an accused before or after the offense whether a part of the res gestae or not are admissible against him, but unless a part of the res gestae are not admissible for him. . . . 33 Accordingly, the court concludes that the statement was not objectionable on grounds of relevancy, and also concludes that the Court of Criminal Appeals would have noted it to have been thus objectionable, under the search the record for error rule of review attending capital murder appeals, were that not so. 34 783 So.2d at 127-29. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the circuit court's findings and adopted them as part of the appellate decision. Id. at 129. 35 Assuming arguendo that Williams's counsel was deficient for failing to thoroughly review the Taylor Hardin file in order to prepare for a response to Mr. Gaskins's testimony, Williams cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. The state trial court found that Williams could not prove prejudice because there is no reasonable probability that a relevancy objection would have been sustained, nor that overruling it would have constituted reversible error. Williams, 783 So.2d at 128-29. Under AEDPA, these findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Williams cannot demonstrate that the state courts' decisions were either contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, federal law. Therefore, Williams is entitled to no relief on this claim. 5 36