Opinion ID: 2630917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The State failed to specify the predicate felony to support a second-degree felony-murder conviction

Text: Nevada's felony offense of child neglect and endangerment, NRS 200.508, provides that a person can be held criminally liable for both willful and passive neglect or endangerment. Under NRS 200.508, a person is guilty of neglect or endangerment if he or she either (1)  willfully causes a child ... to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of ... neglect [3] or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of ... neglect, or (2) is responsible for the safety or welfare of a child and... permits [4] or allows [5] that child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of ... neglect or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as a result of the ... neglect. NRS 200.508(1) and (2) (emphases added). Whereas NRS 200.508(1) addresses scenarios where the person charged under the statute directly committed the harm, NRS 200.508(2), by contrast, addresses situations where a person who is responsible for the safety and welfare of a child fails to take action to protect that child from the abuse or neglect of another person or source. NRS 200.508(2) does not require that the person directly inflict the harm to be found guilty of child abuse or neglect. As a result, in many instances, NRS 200.508(2) cannot serve as a predicate felony to second-degree felony murder. Cf. Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 449 (concluding that Labastida's commission of child neglect under NRS 200.508(2) could not support her second-degree murder conviction because her husband was the person who committed the harm). Here, the State charged Ramirez with second-degree felony murder under NRS 200.508 generally, without distinguishing between subsections 1 and 2. Further confusing the matter, the State charged that Ramirez did willfully and unlawfully ... permit or allow [Trinity] to suffer unjustifiable physical pain as a result of abuse or neglect, including the willful language from NRS 200.508(1), and the passive permit or allow language from NRS 200.508(2). Because the State's charging document and the instruction submitted to the jury contained language from both NRS 200.508(1) and NRS 200.508(2), the jury was not specifically instructed as to the predicate felony under which the State's theory rested. This is particularly important considering that Ramirez could not be found guilty of second-degree felony murder under NRS 200.508(2) in the event that the jury believed that Aponte actually killed Trinity. See Labastida, 115 Nev. at 307, 986 P.2d at 448-49 (noting that there must be an immediate and direct causal relationship  without the intervention of some other source or agency  between the actions of the defendant and the victim's death).