Opinion ID: 1933178
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Archdiocese's Financial Capacity To Complete The Project

Text: First, petitioners challenge the conclusions of the Mayor's Agent that the Archdiocese has the financial ability to complete the project, and contend that a new, separate determination of special merit of the project was required. In essence, they assert that because K & C Associates no longer is involved in the project, there is no demonstrated financial ability to complete it since the Mayor's Agent relied on the personal assets of K & C Associates in approving the project, and the Archdiocese has made no commitment to use its own resources. Furthermore, they argue that the January 11, 1995, decision authorizing issuance of the demolition permits should not have been made without a new determination of special merit under D.C.Code § 5-1004(e). The Archdiocese primarily maintains that the Mayor's Agent has made consistent factual findings that the Archdiocese has the financial ability to complete the project. The record shows that the Mayor's Agent and the Commission both have reaffirmed the Archdiocese's financial capacity to complete the project. On August 19, 1994, the Mayor's Agent made the determination, which was supported by record evidence. Moreover, in considering the Archdiocese's fifth extension request, the Commission stressed that the only actual applicant for the project is the Archdiocese, and its commitment to the project was amply evidenced by the substantial sums the Archdiocese has spent on the project and the significant up-front amenities it has provided. Our attention has been directed to no regulatory or statutory provision requiring the property owner to acquire a development partner in order to demonstrate the financial capacity to complete a project. With respect to the issue as to whether a new determination of special merit was required under D.C.Code §§ 5-1004(e) [2] or 5-1007(f), [3] the Mayor's Agent referred the matter of the design changes to the HPRB on August 19, 1994, with specific instructions to consider only the changes specified in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of its order, that is, the addition of windows on the north, east and south elevations, and the increase in the setback on the south elevation. We see nothing in the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions precluding the limited review ordered by the Mayor's Agent and conducted by the HPRB. Nor could the Mayor's Agent's order be viewed as an open invitation to relitigate the special merit conclusion made in 1987, because the doctrine of issue preclusion ... prevents the same parties from relitigating an issue actually decided in a previous final adjudication, whether on the same or a different claim. Rhema Christian Ctr. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 515 A.2d 189, 193 (D.C.1986) (citations omitted). Not only did the staff of the HPRB review the specified design changes and recommend their approval, but a December 8, 1994, hearing before the HPRB also focused on those changes. Witnesses testified for the Archdiocese and for those opposing the project. Those opposing the project sought to address issues beyond those authorized by the Mayor's Agent, such as the impact of issuing demolition permits. After the testimony had been completed, the HPRB approved the design changes, with two abstentions. This court is not in a position to second guess the Mayor's Agent or the HPRB as to whether the few design changes concerning windows and a setback required a new determination of special merit based upon exemplary architecture. This matter is squarely within the expertise of the Mayor's Agent and the District agencies responsible for historic preservation, construction and zoning matters. On this record we see no reason why we should not defer to that expertise. See District of Columbia Preservation League, supra, 711 A.2d at 1275. Indeed, we are not persuaded that § 5-1007(f), concerning new construction permits, nor the construction of a project of special merit aspect of the definition of necessary in the public interest were applicable at all to the December 1994, proceedings before the Mayor's Agent and the HPRB.