Opinion ID: 2349737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: defendant's alternate grounds for affirmance

Text: In response to the state's claims, the defendant presents four alternate grounds to affirm the trial court's judgment sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The defendant argues that the trial court's sentence should be upheld because: (1) ง 53a-46a (b) [66] does not permit a trial court to impanel a new jury after the original jury becomes deadlocked in the penalty phase of a capital case; (2) principles of accessorial liability cannot be used to prove the existence of aggravating factors, and therefore the state presented insufficient evidence to prove any aggravating factors necessary for the imposition of the death penalty; (3) the state failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the particularized mental state required by each aggravating factor; and (4) Pinkerton liability cannot be used to prove the existence of aggravating factors, and therefore the state presented insufficient evidence to prove any aggravating factors. We disagree with each of the defendant's alternate grounds for affirmance. A The defendant first claims that the trial court's judgment denying the state's motion for a mistrial, and the subsequent imposition of a life sentence, was proper because ง 53a-46a (b) does not permit a trial court to impanel a new jury after the original jury becomes deadlocked in the penalty phase of a capital case. Specifically, the defendant argues that, pursuant to the plain language of ง 53a-46a (b), a trial court may impanel a new jury for a second sentencing hearing only upon a showing of good cause, and the fact that a jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision on the appropriate punishment cannot be considered good cause when interpreted in relation to similar statutes. Consequently, the defendant argues, because ง 53a-46a (b) bars the impanelment of a new jury for a second sentencing hearing in the case of a deadlocked jury, and because the declaration of a mistrial by the court would have allowed for such an impaneling, the trial court properly denied the state's motion for a mistrial and subsequently imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. [67] We disagree. The question of whether ง 53a-46a (b) prohibits the impaneling of a new jury after the original jury becomes deadlocked in the penalty phase of a capital case is a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. See Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 546-47, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002). The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. Public Acts 2003, No. 03-154, ง 1. [68] Therefore, our analysis begins with the text of ง 53a-46a (b). Section 53a-46a (b) provides in relevant part that a penalty hearing shall be conducted (1) before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, or (2) before a jury impaneled for the purpose of such hearing ... (C) if the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause .... (Emphasis added.) Although the statute, and the Penal Code in general, [69] fail to define good cause, this court in State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 680 A.2d 147 (1996), had occasion to define the phrase in reference to ง 53a-46a (b). In Webb, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the general requirement of ง 53a-46a (b) that the same jury determine both the guilt and penalty phases for a defendant in a capital case, arguing that a jury's determination of guilt creates a bias sufficient to prevent the jury from determining the penalty phase issues fairly and impartially. Id., at 464-65 n. 52, 680 A.2d 147. In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, this court concluded, among other things, that even if the defendant were able to establish that the jury was in fact biased, the statute provides a mechanism to address such a situation in that it specifically allows a trial court to impanel a new jury for good cause. Id., at 469 n. 57, 680 A.2d 147. This court then equated good cause in the context of ง 53a-46a (b) with a conclusion by the trial court that the jury cannot fairly perform its penalty phase duties. Id. On the basis of the definition espoused in Webb, and because it is manifest under Connecticut penal law that jurors are required to be unanimous in their verdicts, [70] it cannot be said that the fact that a jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict does not constitute good cause pursuant to ง 53a-46a (b). The fact that a jury is deadlocked undoubtedly indicates that the jury cannot fairly perform its penalty phase duties; id.; thereby necessitating the impaneling of a second jury rather than the imposition of a life sentence. See, e.g., Aillon v. Manson, 201 Conn. 675, 681 n. 5, 519 A.2d 35 (1986) (noting that deadlocked jury constitutes quintessential rationale for manifest necessity in declaring mistrial). Our conclusion finds further support in our decision in State v. Daniels, supra, 207 Conn. 374, 542 A.2d 306. In Daniels, both the defendant and the state challenged the trial court's sentencing of the defendant to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment for capital felony and murder after the jury unanimously found the existence of an aggravating factor, but was unable to agree unanimously on the existence of a mitigating factor. Id., at 378, 542 A.2d 306. The state argued that ง 56a-46a required that once it has established the existence of an aggravating factor, a defendant can escape the death penalty only by persuading the trier of fact that a mitigating factor exists. Id., at 386, 542 A.2d 306. The defendant, however, argued a diametrically opposite construction of the statute, claiming that the statute does not authorize the imposition of a death sentence unless there has been an unconditional and unanimous finding by the trier of fact that no mitigating factors exist within the meaning of ง 53a-46a (e). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In upholding the judgment of the trial court, this court concluded that contrary to the arguments of both the state and the defendant, ง 53a-46a does not mandate a specific outcome for death penalty cases in which the trier of fact cannot come to a unanimous decision on the imposition of the death penalty. Id., at 394, 542 A.2d 306. The court reasoned that, [i]n such circumstances, the statute neither authorizes imposition of the death penalty nor requires the imposition of a life sentence. Id. Rather, the court stated that the trial court could elect from among three options, one of which was to declare a mistrial, impanel a new jury and retry the penalty phase. Id., at 394-96, 542 A.2d 306. Accordingly, under this court's construction of the statute in Daniels, it is apparent that ง 53a-46a (b) does not preclude a trial court from declaring a mistrial and subsequently impaneling a new jury for a retrial when the jury is deadlocked in the penalty phase of a capital case. [71] Furthermore, the legislature's failure to amend ง 53a-46a after our decision in Daniels, leads us to presume that the legislature agreed with our interpretation of the statute in that case. We have noted that, although legislative inaction is not necessarily legislative affirmation... we ... presume that the legislature is aware of [this court's] interpretation of a statute, and that its subsequent nonaction may be understood as a validation of that interpretation.... Time and again, we have characterized the failure of the legislature to take corrective action as manifesting the legislature's acquiescence in our construction of a statute. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 874, 792 A.2d 774 (2002). In Daniels, where this court concluded that ง 53a-46a mandates the imposition of neither a life nor death sentence in the event of a deadlocked jury, but, rather, permits a trial court, among other things, to declare a mistrial, and subsequently impanel a new jury for a retrial of the penalty phase, the court freely acknowledge[d] that [its] construction of ง 53a-46a places Connecticut alongside a very small minority of jurisdictions with regard to the proper procedure to be followed when the jury cannot unanimously agree. The majority of states have statutorily provided for an automatic sentence of less than death in the event of a deadlocked jury. State v. Daniels, supra, 207 Conn. at 393, 542 A.2d 306. The court then invited the legislature to address the issue if it disagreed: Whether our decision ... calls for corrective action is a matter that only the legislature can decide. Id., at 394, 542 A.2d 306. Despite numerous substantive changes to Connecticut's capital sentencing scheme since the Daniels decision, the legislature has failed to act on this court's invitation. [72] Accordingly, based upon the legislature's failure to act, it is reasonable for this court to conclude that the legislature agreed with the Daniels decision. The defendant attempts to overcome Webb and Daniels by relying on the United States Supreme Court case of Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 380-81, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999), in which the court concluded that the phrase `good cause,' within the federal death penalty statute; 18 U.S.C. ง 3593; [73] does not include impaneling a second sentencing jury in the event of a deadlock. The defendant claims that because [18 U.S.C. ง 3593] and ง 53a-46a have the same lineage [74] and have virtually the same language setting forth when the jury that determined guilt can be discharged and a new jury impaneled for a penalty retrial, they should be interpreted similarly. We are not persuaded. In Jones v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at 381, 119 S.Ct. 2090, the court held that, [t]he phrase `good cause' in ง 3593(b)(2)(C) plainly encompasses events such as juror disqualification, but cannot be read so expansively as to include the jury's failure to reach a unanimous decision. In doing so, the court referenced a corresponding section of the death penalty statute which provides: Upon a recommendation under section 3593(e) that the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without possibility of release, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly. Otherwise, the court shall impose any lesser sentence that is authorized by law. Notwithstanding any other law, if the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense is life imprisonment, the court may impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release.  (Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C. ง 3594. The text of the statute that we have italicized prompted the court to conclude that the term `[o]therwise' meant that, without unanimity, the sentencing determination passes to the court, which may impose a sentence of life imprisonment. Jones v. United States, supra, at 380-81, 119 S.Ct. 2090. Despite the defendant's contention in the present case, such language is clearly absent from Connecticut's death penalty statute. Consequently, 18 U.S.C. ง 3593 and ง 53a-46a are not analogous and should not be interpreted as such, and we therefore conclude that the defendant's reliance on Jones is unavailing. B The defendant's second claim is that the trial court's judgment sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment should be upheld because principles of accessorial liability cannot be used to prove the existence of aggravating factors, and the state therefore presented insufficient evidence to prove any aggravating factors needed for the imposition of the death penalty. [75] To support this claim, the defendant argues that: (1) the plain language of General Statutes ง 53a-8 [76] indicates that principles of accessorial liability cannot be used to prove aggravating factors; (2) the plain language of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) ง 53a-46a (i) [77] indicates that principles of accessorial liability do not apply to aggravating factors; and (3) the use of accessorial liability to prove an aggravating factor violates the eighth [78] and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. [79] The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this issue. The state relied upon four aggravating factors, in accordance with ง 53a-46a (i), in seeking the death penalty for the murder of Brown. These were: (1) in the course of Brown's murder, Clarke was placed at a grave risk of death; (2) the murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; (3) the defendant paid Lee with cocaine to help commit the crime; and (4) the defendant paid money to Garner, the person who drove Adrian to and from the murder scene, to help commit the crime. With respect to the second count of capital felony, i.e., the double homicide of Brown and Clarke, the state alleged three aggravating factors, the same as those alleged for Brown's murder, with the exception of the first. At the beginning of the penalty hearing, the defendant moved to strike each aggravating factor. He argued that: (1) nothing in Connecticut's death penalty statutory framework allows principles of vicarious liability to be used to prove aggravating factors; (2) the state failed to produce evidence that the defendant instructed Adrian on how the murders were to be carried out, and therefore he did not know that they would be committed in a heinous, cruel or depraved manner; and (3) under the eighth amendment to the United States constitution, the defendant cannot be sentenced to death for the acts of another. After listening to the parties' arguments and thoroughly reviewing the briefs they submitted, the trial court denied the motion to strike, concluding that under Connecticut law, both a coconspirator and an accessory may be charged and punished as if he were the principal offender. In addition, citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), the trial court stated that the United States Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment does not prevent the death penalty from being imposed vicariously if there is evidence of major participation by the defendant combined with reckless indifference to human life. Therefore, the trial court concluded that the aggravating factors alleged by the state may be applied vicariously because the defendant was a major participant in the planning of the offense ... and had knowledge of the manner in which the killings were to be completed, and, consequently it denied the defendant's motion to strike. The defendant first argues that the plain language of ง 53a-8 indicates that principles of accessorial liability cannot be used to prove aggravating factors in the penalty phase of a capital case. The defendant contends that because ง 53a-8 limits its application to an offense, which is defined by General Statutes ง 53a-24 (a) as any crime or violation, [80] the use of accessorial liability to prove aggravating factors is necessarily precluded. We disagree. As a preliminary matter, we set forth our applicable standard of review. The question of whether principles of accessorial liability can be used to prove aggravating factors in the penalty phase of a capital case is a question of statutory interpretation over which our review is plenary. See Waterbury v. Washington, supra, 260 Conn. at 546-47, 800 A.2d 1102. As we previously noted herein, [t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes, and only [if] the meaning of such text is... [ambiguous can] extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute ... be considered. Public Act 03-154, ง 1. When the statute in question is one of a criminal nature, [however] we are guided by additional tenets of statutory construction. First, it is axiomatic that we must refrain from imposing criminal liability where the legislature has not expressly so intended. State v. Breton, 212 Conn. 258, 268-69, 562 A.2d 1060 (1989). Second, [c]riminal statutes are not to be read more broadly than their language plainly requires and ambiguities are ordinarily to be resolved in favor of the defendant.... State v. Jones, 234 Conn. 324, 340, 662 A.2d 1199 (1995). Finally, unless a contrary interpretation would frustrate an evident legislative intent, criminal statutes are governed by the fundamental principle that such statutes are to be strictly construed against the state. State v. Ross, [supra, 230 Conn. at 200, 646 A.2d 1318]. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 788-89, 772 A.2d 559 (2001). It is, however, equally understood that despite the nature of the statute, it must be construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant.... (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613, 621, 678 A.2d 473 (1996). In other words, [n]o part of a legislative enactment is to be treated as insignificant or unnecessary, and there is a presumption of purpose behind every sentence, clause or phrase ... [so that] no word [or phrase] in a statute is to be treated as superfluous. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 240 Conn. 766, 771-72, 695 A.2d 525 (1997); see State v. Ayala, 222 Conn. 331, 346, 610 A.2d 1162 (1992); State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 274, 559 A.2d 164, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 866, 110 S.Ct. 188, 107 L.Ed.2d 142 (1989). With these standards in mind, we begin by examining the text of ง 53a-8. The statute provides in relevant part: A person, acting with the mental state required for commission of an offense, who solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender. General Statutes ง 53a-8 (a). By its express terms, the statute provides that a person may be prosecuted and punished as the principal without actually committing the offense himself. The defendant's interpretation, however, would have this court focus solely upon the use of accessorial liability to prosecute a defendant as if he were a principal, and ignore the statute's mandate that an accessory shall also be punished as if he were the principal. Our well established rules of statutory construction prohibit us from interpreting a statute in such a way as to ignore some of the express wording enacted by the legislature. Moreover, the defendant's proffered interpretation would vitiate one of the clearly stated, overarching purposes of the statute, i.e., the punishment of a person as if he were the principal, when, with the requisite mental state, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids the person who physically committed the crime. General Statutes ง 53a-8 (a); see also State v. Davis, supra, 255 Conn. at 792, 772 A.2d 559 ([t]he accomplice liability statute permits an accessory to be `prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender' [emphasis in original]). It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that, [i]nsofar as the language of the statute will permit, we interpret it in accordance with the purpose of the statute, because legislation is a purposive act. Cislo v. Shelton, 240 Conn. 590, 598, 692 A.2d 1255 (1997); see also State v. Talton, 209 Conn. 133, 141, 547 A.2d 543 (1988) (basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature acted to accomplish some purpose and statutes must be interpreted accordingly [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Campbell, 180 Conn. 557, 561, 429 A.2d 960 (1980) (fundamental principle of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed so that they carry out the intent of the legislature). The defendant's interpretation of ง 53a-8 (a), however, would vitiate its overarching purpose in contravention of this fundamental principle of statutory interpretation. This court has addressed a similar issue in State v. Davis, supra, 255 Conn. at 792, 772 A.2d 559, where we concluded that [t]he fact that [a statute] is a sentence enhancement provision rather than a separate and distinct offense ... is of no consequence to [whether ง 53a-8 applies]. (Citation omitted.) In Davis, the defendant claimed that General Statutes ง 53-202k, [81] which provides for an enhanced sentence for any person who commits any class A, B or C felony with the use of a firearm, could not be applied to him through the application of principles of accessorial liability. Id., at 787, 772 A.2d 559. Specifically, the defendant claimed that the plain language and legislative history of ง 53-202k demonstrate the legislature's intent that the statute apply only to an individual who actually uses a firearm during the commission of a felony. Id. In upholding the trial court's application of ง 53a-8 to ง 53-202k, we reasoned that, [t]he accomplice liability statute permits an accessory to be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.... Thus once convicted of [the substantive offense], even if as an accessory, the defendant is legally indistinguishable from the principal actor. Accordingly, the defendant is subject to the enhancement penalty that the principal also would have received had he been caught and convicted. (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 792, 772 A.2d 559. Similar to the statute at issue in Davis , ง 53a-46a is analogous to a sentence enhancement statute. See generally Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The statute sets forth the procedure for the enhancement of a defendant's penalty for a capital felony conviction from life imprisonment to death through jury findings based on the state having proven certain aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. See General Statutes ง 53a-46a (f) and (i). [82] We therefore conclude that the interpretation offered by the defendant in this case runs counter to this court's precedent, would ignore the explicit wording of the statute, and would frustrate clear legislative intent. Accordingly, we decline to read ง 53a-8 to preclude its application to aggravating factors in the penalty phase of a capital case. Similarly, the defendant also argues that the plain language of ง 53a-46a (i) indicates that principles of accessory liability do not apply to aggravating factors. Specifically, the defendant contends that because all but one of the aggravating factors set forth in ง 53a-46a (i) state that they apply when [t]he defendant committed the offense; (emphasis added); such language necessarily precludes their proof through principles of accessorial liability. [83] We disagree. The text of the revision of the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offenses in the present case provides in relevant part: The aggravating factors to be considered shall be limited to the following ... (3) the defendant committed the offense and in such commission knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense; or (4) the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; or (5) the defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.... [84] General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) ง 53a-46a (i). The defendant equates the statute's express use of the phrase the defendant and its failure to make an express reference to accomplices, with an affirmative decision by the legislature that ง 53a-46a (i) applies only to principals. We disagree. In making such an assertion, the defendant attempts to draw a distinction between principal and accessorial liability. Such a differentiation, however, misconstrues the nature of accessorial liability. This court has long since abandoned any practical distinction between the terms accessory and principal for the purpose of determining criminal liability.... The defendant is incorrect ... when he argues that his liability turns on whether he was found to be a principal or an accessory. Those labels are hollow.... Instead, [t]he modern approach is to abandon completely the old common law terminology and simply provide that a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when he is an accomplice of the other person in the commission of the crime.... The legislature adopted this view and expressed it in ... ง 53a-8 (a). Accordingly, accessorial liability is not a distinct crime, but only an alternative means by which a substantive crime may be committed.... This principle is apparent throughout our state's criminal statutes. General Statutes ง 53a-54a (a), for example, provides that [a] person is guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person.... The fact that our murder statute prohibits specified criminal conduct of the principal actor, without ever expressly including accomplices, does not preclude its application to accomplices. Although, by its terms, our murder statute encompasses only the principal actor, it undoubtedly applies to all participants in the crime. See, e.g., State v. Henry, 253 Conn. 354, 358, 752 A.2d 40 (2000); State v. Delgado, 247 Conn. 616, 622, 725 A.2d 306 (1999).... [Additionally] [b]ecause the legislature is presumed to know the state of the law when it enacts a statute; State v. Dabkowski, 199 Conn. 193, 201, 506 A.2d 118 (1986); we can assume that, absent an affirmative statement to the contrary, it did not intend to change the existing law to create a distinction between accessories and principals when it enacted [ง 53a-46a (i)].... Had the legislature intended to deviate from our usual practice of treating accessories and principals alike, it easily could have expressed this intent.... In the absence of specific language to that effect, we refuse to adopt an interpretation of [the statute] that would require courts to retreat to the days of determining which actors should be identified as principals and which should be identified as accomplices. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis, supra, 255 Conn. at 789-91, 772 A.2d 559. We therefore decline to interpret the language of ง 54a-46a (i) as precluding the establishment of aggravating factors through the application of principles of accessorial liability. The defendant's final argument is that the use of accessorial liability to prove an aggravating factor violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. Specifically, the defendant contends that using accessorial liability to prove an aggravating factor would violate the eighth amendment by: (1) depriving the defendant of the constitutionally required individualized consideration of the appropriate punishment for him; and (2) defining a class of death-eligible defendants in a manner unrelated to their individual moral blameworthiness, thereby making death a disproportionate punishment. [85] We are not persuaded. The eighth amendment to the United States constitution provides that [e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. In recognizing the unique nature of the death penalty and the need for heightened reliability in death penalty deliberations; State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 230, 646 A.2d 1318; the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the eighth amendment to require, among other things, that sentencers not be given unbridled discretion in determining the fates of those charged with capital offenses. The [c]onstitution instead requires that death penalty statutes be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 231, 646 A.2d 1318, quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987). This includes defin[ing] the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates standardless sentencing discretion.... Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). A statutory requirement that, before death may be imposed, the sentencer must find at least one statutorily mandated aggravating circumstance is a constitutionally permissible response to the need to avoid standardless sentencing discretion and to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 302, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988); Jurek v. Texas, [428 U.S. 262, 270-71, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976)]; Proffitt v. Florida, [428 U.S. 242, 251-53, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976)]; Gregg v. Georgia, [428 U.S. 153, 198, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)]. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ross, supra, at 232, 849 A.2d 648. The aggravating factor, however, must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, supra, 264 Conn. at 62, 836 A.2d 224. Therefore, when principles of accessorial liability are used by the state in an attempt to establish that a defendant should be sentenced to death, the focus [must still remain] on [the defendant's] culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot the victims, for [the United States Supreme Court] insist[s] on individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at 149, 107 S.Ct. 1676. Although the issue of whether the eighth amendment precludes the application of principles of accessorial liability to prove aggravating factors in the penalty phase of a capital case is an issue of first impression for this court, the United States Supreme Court has addressed a similar issue and, in doing so, implicitly answered the question before us. In Tison, where the defendants were charged with murder based upon accessory liability similar to the present case, the Supreme Court concluded that major participation in the [murders] committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life demonstrated culpability sufficient for imposition of the death penalty. Id., at 158, 107 S.Ct. 1676. In that case, the defendants, who were brothers, planned and carried out the escape of their father from prison, with the help of another brother, where the father was serving a life sentence for having killed a correction officer during a previous escape. Id., at 139, 107 S.Ct. 1676. After the defendants' father and another inmate were freed, the group of five men flagged down a passing automobile after their own automobile became disabled. The four occupants of the automobile that stopped to help the defendants were overtaken, driven into the desert and brutally executed by the defendants' father and his fellow escapee. Id., at 139-41, 107 S.Ct. 1676. The defendants in Tison individually were tried for and convicted of, among other things, capital murder under Arizona's felony murder and accessorial liability statutes. Id., at 141-42, 107 S.Ct. 1676. During the penalty phase of the proceedings, the trial court found sufficient evidence to establish three statutory aggravating factors, namely: (1) the defendants had created a grave risk of death to persons other than the victims; (2) the murders had been committed for pecuniary gain; and (3) the murders were especially heinous. [86] Id., at 142, 107 S.Ct. 1676. The trial court did not find any statutory mitigating factors but did find sufficient evidence to establish several nonstatutory mitigating factors. The court concluded, however, that the mitigating factors were outweighed by the aggravating factors, and sentenced the defendants to death. Id., at 142-43, 107 S.Ct. 1676. In evaluating the trial court's findings of aggravating and mitigating factors, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the first aggravating factor โ creation of a grave risk to others โ was not supported by the evidence, but upheld the finding of the other factors and, therefore, the imposition of the death sentence. Id., at 143, 107 S.Ct. 1676. The defendants appealed, claiming, among other things, that the state had failed to prove that the defendants had `inten[ded] to kill' the victims, as required by the Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-98, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at 143, 107 S.Ct. 1676. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the [e]ighth [a]mendment did not preclude imposing the death penalty on two brothers who participated substantially in their father's armed prison breakout and in a related kidnapping and robbery that resulted in four murders, even though neither defendant took any act which he desired to, or was substantially certain would, cause death.... [The court] found that the [defendants'] involvement in the crime was such that both subjectively appreciated that their acts were likely to result in the taking of innocent life ... and that the record would support a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless indifference to human life.... [The court] noted that reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an intent to kill ... and [it] remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Arizona for a specific determination [of] whether the [defendants] possessed that mental state.... (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 818-19, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), citing Tison v. Arizona, supra, at 150-52, 157-58, 107 S.Ct. 1676. Although the Tison court did not address expressly the narrow issue before this court, i.e., whether principles of accessorial liability may be used to prove aggravating factors under the eighth amendment, in broadly concluding that the eighth amendment did not preclude the imposition of the death penalty based on accessorial liability when there is major participation by the defendant and he evidences a reckless indifference to human life; Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at 152, 158, 107 S.Ct. 1676; the court acknowledged that the eighth amendment does not preclude using accessorial liability to prove aggravating factors. By explicitly recognizing the trial court's finding of aggravating factors established through principles of accessorial liability, and thereafter concluding that an accessory could be sentenced to death, the Supreme Court in Tison implicitly concluded that the eighth amendment permitted the use of accessorial liability to prove aggravating factors. Id. In other words, by answering the broader question, i.e., whether the eighth amendment permitted imposing the death penalty on an accessory, the Tison court necessarily decided the more narrow issue that is presently before us, namely, whether accessorial liability may be used to prove aggravating factors. Furthermore, we can conceive of no reason why a statutory scheme that requires a jury to evaluate aggravating factors need face a more stringent requirement under the eighth amendment when principles of accessorial liability are being used to prove those aggravating factors rather than the commission of the crime itself. In other words, because the eighth amendment does not mandate that the fact finder evaluate aggravating factors for a capital punishment statutory scheme to be constitutionally valid, and because the death penalty has been upheld as constitutional despite the application of accessorial liability to the crime of capital murder; see id., at 158, 107 S.Ct. 1676; there should be no greater standard under the eighth amendment when principles of accessorial liability are used to prove aggravating factors that could lead to the imposition of the death penalty, as compared to being used to prove the commission of a crime that could result in the imposition of the death penalty. The United States Supreme Court has emphatically stated that, [a]ny argument that the [c]onstitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this [c]ourt. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984) (concluding that neither sixth amendment, nor eighth amendment, nor any other constitutional provision provides defendant with right to have jury determine appropriateness of capital sentence). For example, in Jurek v. Texas, supra, 428 U.S. at 270, 96 S.Ct. 2950, the court concluded that the Texas death penalty statute did not violate the eighth amendment or any other section of the federal constitution although the statute did not provide for the narrowing of death-eligible defendants by a jury's consideration of aggravating factors. The court reasoned that, [w]hile Texas has not adopted a list of statutory aggravating circumstances the existence of which can justify the imposition of the death penalty as have Georgia and Florida, its action in narrowing the categories of murders for which a death sentence may ever be imposed serves much the same purpose.... In fact, each of the five classes of murders made capital by the Texas statute [87] is encompassed in Georgia and Florida by one or more of their statutory aggravating circumstances. (Citations omitted.) Id. The Supreme Court concluded by stating that the only mandated requirement of a death penalty statutory scheme under the eighth and fourteenth amendment is that a capital-sentencing system must allow the sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances. Id., at 271, 96 S.Ct. 2950. In other words, as long as sentencers are not given unbridled discretion in determining the fates of those charged with capital offenses, so that the death penalty is administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion; State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 231, 646 A.2d 1318; and a defendant is permitted to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence regarding his character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense; (internal quotation marks omitted) id.; the eighth amendment's prescription of cruel and unusual punishment requires nothing more for a capital sentencing scheme to be constitutional. Because the United States Supreme Court clearly has stated in Tison that principles of accessorial liability may be used to prove the crime of capital felony under the eighth amendment, and the eighth amendment does not require that a death penalty scheme must mandate that a jury consider aggravating factors, we can conceive of no reason why a statutory scheme that requires a jury to determine the existence of aggravating factors need face a more stringent requirement under the eighth amendment when principles of accessorial liability are being used to prove those aggravating factors rather than the commission of the crime itself. [88] Consequently, we conclude that when principles of accessorial liability are used to prove the existence of aggravating factors, the additional requirements that a defendant be a major participant and that he exhibit a reckless indifference to human life, as established by the United States Supreme Court in Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct. 1676, sufficiently protect a defendant's constitutional rights under the eighth amendment. Turning to the facts of the present case, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant's involvement in the crimes was not minor, but, rather, was substantial and that he evidenced a reckless disregard for human life. Far from merely asking his brother Adrian to murder the two victims, the defendant was actively involved ... in the entire sequence of criminal activity culminating in the murder of [Brown and Clarke] .... Id. The defendant planned every detail of the crime. This included soliciting the commission of the murders by Adrian, purchasing the gun that eventually was used by Adrian to commit the crimes, and paying Lee to inform him when both Brown and Clarke were at home so that the murders could be committed simultaneously. The defendant even demonstrated to Adrian how he wanted Brown to be killed. Such participation in these murders clearly rises to the level of major participation that evidences a reckless disregard for human life. Id. The defendant argues that, despite the United States Supreme Court's conclusion in Tison, the use of accessorial liability to prove an aggravating factor would define a class of death-eligible defendants in a way unrelated to their individual moral blame-worthiness, thereby making death a disproportionate punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Specifically, the defendant argues that there is a moral difference between the culpability of a person who was not the triggerman, was not at the murder scene and did not direct how the murder was to occur, and the actual murderer. Therefore, the defendant contends that by allowing the jury to find aggravating factors based upon his status as an accessory to the murders, the jury was not able to make the kind of reasoned moral judgment about the appropriate penalty that the eighth amendment requires. We are not persuaded. As we previously noted herein, when a legislature broadly defines capital offenses and provides for the narrowing of culpability for those offenses by jury findings of aggravating circumstances, as the Connecticut legislature has chosen to do here; see General Statutes ง 53a-46a; the only other constitutional requirement under the eighth amendment at the sentencing phase is the jury's consideration of mitigating factors. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319-28, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). The jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense in order that the punishment be directly related to the personal culpability of the defendant. Id., at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 2934; see also Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988); Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. at 113-15, 102 S.Ct. 869. The fact that aggravating factors may be established through principles of accessorial liability therefore is irrelevant to the eighth amendment's requirement that punishment be related to the personal culpability of the defendant. Rather, the only requirement of the eighth amendment is that the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense. Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 2934. In this case, it is clear from the trial court's jury instruction that the jury was required to consider the fact that the defendant was not at the murder scene, and did not control or direct how the murder was to occur at the scene. Specifically, the jury was instructed: The defendant has a whole list [of mitigating factors], and there is nothing that bars anything from your consideration, even things beyond the list [he] submit[s] that come to you in your consideration, your judgment, of the totality of the facts developed here before you in the case. The trial court then reiterated this instruction near the end of its charge stating: In addition to any of the mitigating factors claimed by the defendant, you may give a mitigating force to any fact taken alone or in conjunction with facts presented providing, of course, you are persuaded that the fact or facts exist by a preponderance of the evidence and that the fact or facts are mitigating in nature, as that term had been defined for you. We conclude that such instructions were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the eighth amendment. C The defendant's third argument is that, even if accessory liability may be used to prove aggravating factors, the state failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the particularized mental state required by each aggravating factor and, therefore, the trial court's judgment of life imprisonment without parole should be upheld. Specifically, the defendant claims that the state failed to prove that the defendant: (1) knew that, in killing Brown, another person would be subject to a grave risk of death; (2) intended to or was callously indifferent to the fact that the victims would be killed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner; General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) ง 53a-46a (i)(4); and (3) intended to procure the murders by payment of money or anything else of pecuniary value. We disagree. The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this issue. During the penalty phase of the defendant's trial, the jury indicated on the final verdict form that, in reference to count two, i.e., the death of Brown, it had agreed unanimously that the state had proven one or more aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had failed to prove any statutory mitigating factors, and that at least one member of the jury found the existence of one or more nonstatutory mitigating factors. The form further indicated, however, that the jury was unable to agree unanimously that one or more of the proved statutory aggravating factors outweighed one or more of the proved nonstatutory mitigating factors. We begin by briefly reviewing what is required under our death penalty statute for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment. Section 53a-46a (g) provides that a judgment of life imprisonment shall be imposed by a trial court when the fact finder unanimously finds that: (1) one or more statutory mitigating factors, as set forth in ง 53a-46a (h), exists; (2) none of the aggravating factors, as set forth in ง 53a-46a (i), exists; or (3) one or more of the aggravating factors and one or more nonstatutory mitigating factors exist, but the aggravating factor or factors do not outweigh the mitigating factor or factors. If the jury does find one or more aggravating factors and one or more nonstatutory mitigating factors, ง 53a-46a (e) sets forth the required weighing process. That subsection provides that, [t]he jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence of any factor set forth in subsection (h), the existence of any aggravating factor or factors set forth in subsection (i) and whether any aggravating factor or factors outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist pursuant to subsection (d). (Emphasis added.) General Statutes ง 53a-46a (e). Consequently, in applying these precepts to the present case, if we were to determine that there is evidence in the record to support the existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence to support the state's alleged aggravating factors would necessarily end. That is because even if we were to assume that the other aggravating factors alleged by the state were not supported by sufficient evidence, we could not conclude, as a matter of law, that the jury would have found that the one aggravating factor did not outweigh the mitigating factor or factors found, thereby requiring the imposition of a life sentence. Section 53a-46a (g) necessarily provides that the only way in which a life sentence would be mandated, as a matter of law, without the jury having to perform its weighing function, would be if this court were to conclude that none of the aggravating factors proposed by the state were supported by sufficient evidence in the record. Only in that specified scenario would this court not need to remand for further proceedings. In other words, the issue presently before us is whether, as a matter of law, a life sentence is mandated. Once there is sufficient evidence to support one aggravating factor, a life sentence is not mandated because there remains an issue of fact, namely, whether the supported aggravating factor outweighs any found mitigating factor or factors. This question must be decided by the fact finder, i.e., the jury in the present case. Therefore, the narrow question we must determine is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the aggravating factors alleged by the state. We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that, in killing Brown, another person would be subject to grave risk of death, as articulated in ง 53a-46a (i)(3). We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard of review. [B]ecause of the seriousness of any death penalty determination, we will subject a finding of an aggravating factor to the same independent and scrupulous examination of the entire record that we employ in our review of constitutional fact-finding, such as the voluntariness of a confession ... or the seizure of a defendant. (Citations omitted.) State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 259, 646 A.2d 1318. However, [e]ven with the heightened appellate scrutiny appropriate for a death penalty case, the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of aggravating circumstances must be reviewed, in the final analysis, by considering the evidence presented at the defendant's penalty hearing in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts impliedly found by the jury.... Furthermore, [i]n viewing evidence which could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with [the existence of the aggravating factor] and is not required to draw only those inferences consistent with [its nonexistence]. The rule is that the jury's function is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, supra, 264 Conn. at 87-88, 836 A.2d 224. The defendant argues that the state failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended that the offense be committed in such a way as to knowingly create a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim. Specifically, the defendant claims that the state failed to prove that he knew that, in carrying out the murder of Brown, Clarke would be exposed to a grave risk of death.... General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) ง 53a-46a (i)(3). We disagree. Before we review the evidence adduced by the state in the present case, we define the standard by which it is to be measured. Neither this court nor the legislature, however, has had an occasion to define the phrase grave risk of death, as set forth in ง 53a-46a (i)(3). Thus, in construing the term, we look to its commonly approved usage, an inquiry that often is [achieved through] the examination of dictionary definitions. Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 17, 843 A.2d 500 (2004); see also State v. Vickers, 260 Conn. 219, 224, 796 A.2d 502 (2002) ([w]here a statute does not define a term it is appropriate to look to the common understanding expressed in the law and in dictionaries [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795, 809, 640 A.2d 986 (1994) ([i]f a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary); see also General Statutes ง 1-1(a). Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines grave as meaning very serious: dangerous to life.... Therefore, in order to establish the aggravating factor set forth in ง 53a-46a (i)(3), the state must prove that the defendant knew that in killing one person, another person would be subject to a very serious risk or danger to his or her life. In the present case, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant intended to have someone kill not only Brown, but also Clarke, thereby clearly subjecting Clarke to a grave risk of death. The defendant first asked Taylor to kill  two nobodies. (Emphasis added.) After Taylor declined, the defendant proceeded to ask both Lee and Adrian if either of them would murder both Brown and Clarke. Furthermore, the evidence reveals that the defendant asked Lee to tell him when both Brown and Clarke arrived home, demonstrating an intent that he wanted the crimes to be committed together. Finally, at the time of the murder, the defendant knew that Brown was a young child, approximately eight years old. On the basis of this fact, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant knew, or should have known, that there was a strong possibility that Brown's mother would be in close proximity to him, wherever he went, and, therefore, if the defendant intended to have Brown killed, he also would subject Clarke to a substantial risk of death. On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew that in killing Brown, another person, i.e., Clarke, would be subject to a grave risk of death, pursuant to ง 53a-46a (i)(3). Consequently, because we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating factor, we need not address the remaining aggravating factors, and therefore we reject the defendant's alternate ground for affirmance. D The defendant's final argument is that the trial court's judgment sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment should be upheld because Pinkerton liability cannot be used to prove aggravating factors, and the state therefore presented insufficient evidence to prove any aggravating factors required for the imposition of the death penalty. To support this claim, the defendant argues that: (1) the application of Pinkerton liability to aggravating factors is inconsistent with the plain language of ง 53a-46a; (2) Pinkerton liability is inconsistent with the mental state requirements of aggravating factors; and (3) the use of Pinkerton liability to prove a capital murder, which could result in the imposition of the death penalty, would violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. Our review of the record in the present case, however, reveals that the trial court's instructions to the jury during the penalty phase of the trial were completely devoid of any instruction on Pinkerton liability. [89] We therefore conclude that the defendant's claim is irrelevant to the facts of this case, and we need not address it. See Pizzola v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 167 Conn. at 209, 355 A.2d 21 (defendant's constitutional attack on statute predicated on hypothetical facts deemed irrelevant and therefore court declined to address claim); Housing Authority v. Olesen, supra, 31 Conn.App. at 361, 624 A.2d 920 (court declined to address defendant's claim because irrelevant to disposition of appeal). The judgment is affirmed with respect to the defendant's conviction; the judgment is reversed with respect to the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and the case is remanded for a new penalty phase hearing.