Opinion ID: 1843293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the court erred in failing to grant defendant's instruction concerning the credibility of impeached witnesses?

Text: When cross-examining the State's witnesses, McGee emphasized (1) Conner's failure to mention multiple packets in her report or at the post-sale meeting, and (2) Gibb's testimony concerning what Conner had said about her inability to see what McGee was doing when he reached down to get the cocaine. McGee characterizes these alleged prior statements as inconsistent with Conner's assertion on the witness stand that McGee had at least two or three additional packets of cocaine in his possession at the time of the sale. Accordingly, he offered the following jury instruction: The testimony of a witness or witnesses may be discredited or impeached by showing that on a prior occasion they have made a statement which is consistent [sic] with or contradictory to their testimony in this case. In order to have this effect, the inconsistent or contradictory prior statement must involve a matter which is material to the issues in this case. [T]he prior statement of the witness or witnesses can be considered by you only for the purpose of determining the weight or believability that you give to the testimony of the witness or witnesses that made them. You may not consider the prior statement as proving the guilt or innocence of the defendant. In refusing the proposed instruction, the trial court found that no inconsistency or contradiction existed. See Murphy v. State, 566 So.2d 1201, 1206 (Miss. 1990) (trial court may refuse instruction which is without foundation in evidence); Lancaster v. State, 472 So.2d 363, 365 (Miss. 1985) (evidentiary basis for instruction must exist). In Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807 (Miss. 1986), this Court held: The refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper, only if the trial court  and this Court on appeal  can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the requesting party, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could find the facts in accordance with the theory of the requested instruction. Id. at 809. In this case, Conner testified: I could see other packets in his hand as he was taking his hand out of the bag. Gibbs testified concerning Conner: All I remember she saying [was] that she couldn't see because it was down inside and he reached down between his legs. Taking these statements in the light most favorable to McGee, and considering all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them in favor of McGee, it is inescapable that a hypothetical reasonable juror could find the facts in accordance with the theory of McGee's requested instruction; i.e., that a juror could find Gibbs' testimony contradictory to and inconsistent with Conner's testimony. While McGee's instruction D-5 could undoubtedly have been drawn to fit the facts more closely, no one could realistically contend that the principle it sets out has no bearing on the case. An evidentiary basis for the instruction clearly exists. Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in refusing the instruction.