Opinion ID: 1379313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: davenport/lockett contentions

Text: The prosecutor's pretrial notice of aggravating evidence included proposed proof of the absence of mitigating factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (j) and (k), listed in section 190.3. Over defense objection, the prosecutor was permitted to argue aggravation on that basis. Two years later, in People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861], we held that in the future, prosecutors should not be permitted to argue that the absence of mitigating factors is automatically aggravating. Despite the reference in Davenport to the future, we have subsequently applied the rule to cases tried before the decision. ( People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1184 [259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) (25) The Attorney General argues that the prosecutor did not claim that the absence of a mitigating factor is automatically aggravating, but merely aggravating under the facts of the case. Our review of the record, however, discloses that on more than one occasion, the later Davenport rule was violated. Nevertheless, the error was harmless for reasons we have repeatedly stated in the past. ( People v. Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 200-201; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1234.) In addition, this was not a close case on the question of penalty. Defendant actively participated in two brutal murders. This was compounded by the compelling aggravating factor of the Missouri murder of several years earlier. Defendant admitted choking and stabbing the victim, and holding her head under water. Given these facts, there is little chance the jury would give significant weight to the absence of mitigating factors. Defendant makes several additional related contentions we have repeatedly rejected: the court erred in not deleting any assertedly inapplicable statutory factors ( People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1, 47); the court's instructions, and prosecutor's argument, under section 190.3, factor (d) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance), factor (f) (reasonable belief in moral justification or extenuation), and factor (g) (extreme duress or substantial domination of another person) deprived him of his right, under Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954], to have the jury consider all evidence offered in mitigation ( People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 908 [274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282]); it was error to instruct the jury to consider factor (i), the age of the defendant at the time of the crime, and for the prosecutor to argue that defendant's age  37 at the time of the present crimes  was aggravating, not mitigating ( People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 908-909; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 301-302 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052]); and the court erred in refusing defendant's request for an instruction listing a large number of specific mitigating circumstances (e.g., that he was an industrious employee, a model college student, and had been honorably discharged from the Air Force) for the jury to take into account ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1276-1277 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251]; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 439-443 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]). We decline defendant's invitation to reconsider these issues.