Opinion ID: 1301672
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying our case law to Seekins's claim

Text: We disagree with the broad view of the implied covenant that Seekins proposes, and we conclude that even when viewed in the light most favorable to Seekins, the record fails to support her breach of covenant claim. According to Seekins, Era knew that she left full-time employment with Alaska Airlines in Washington to take a job with Era in Alaska; Era also knew that she would not have done so had Era not offered her a position in Kenai comparable to the one she left in Seattle. Although she entered into an at-will contract, Seekins remained under the impression that her employment would continue unless she failed to perform her job adequately. Once hired, Seekins received little training or guidance. She soon had a personality conflict with her supervisor, Mona Sim; Sim met with Seekins once and complained without justification about her job performance. About two weeks later, Seekins's supervisor, Smith, met with Sim and Seekins. Smith informed Seekinsagain without basisthat her job performance had not improved. Smith offered Seekins the option of resigning or being fired. Seekins decided not to resign, and Smith fired her with no further opportunity to improve her job performance. Although the stated reason for the firing was inadequate job performance, the true reason, alleges Seekins, was Sim's personality clash with her. Even if proved, these facts would be legally insufficient to warrant a finding that Era breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Reduced to its essence, Seekins's theory is thatdespite her awareness of a valid at-will clause in her contract of employmentthe covenant converted her at-will job into a good-cause contract because she reasonably expected that Era would fire her only in the event of poor job performance. This theory is flawed with respect to both the objective and subjective aspects of the covenant. It is flawed as to the objective facet of the covenant, becauseas we recently held in Ramsey the covenant is implied to effectuate, not to alter, the reasonable expectations of the parties; hence, [it] cannot be interpreted to prohibit what is expressly permitted by [the] contract. . . . [24] Because recognizing and enforcing Seekins's unilateral expectation of a good-cause employment relationship would alter the basic character of her at-will employment agreement by prohibit[ing] what is expressly permitted, [25] the expectation is unreasonable as a matter of law. Seekins's theory is also flawed as to the subjective aspect of the implied covenant. The subjective element focuses notas Seekins implicitly positson the employee's personal feelings of unfairness, but rather on the employer's motives, requiring proof that the employer's decision to fire was actually made in bad faith. [26] To be subjectively unfair, the employer's conduct must actually be motivated by an improper or impermissible objective: An employer engages in subjective bad faith when it discharges an employee for the purpose of depriving him or her of one of the benefits of the contract. [27] Hence, in the at-will employment context, it is insufficient to show that an employee was discharged for reasons unrelated to job performance; instead, the employee must show a purpose that is, in itself, improper or impermissible. [28] Given the at-will nature of Era's employment contract with Seekins, we cannot say that the company's alleged desire to avoid a personality conflict between two of its employees would, if proved, amount to an impermissible motive for firing Seekins. [29] The trial court thus construed ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers [30] too broadly. Despite language in Akers generally suggesting that a discharge based on a non-work-related personality conflict could amount to a breach of the good faith covenant, [31] a close reading of our opinion indicates that the case is inapposite here. Although Akers was initially hired as an at-will employee, he was issued an ARCO personnel handbook that entitled him to progressive discipline prior to termination and to written notice of ARCO's reasons for terminating him. [32] ARCO acknowledged, moreover, that it violated its own personnel policies in discharging Akers. [33] Given these facts, we proceeded on the assumption that ARCO was required to have good cause for termination. And, twice, relying on the procedural posture of the case, we specifically avoided examining the validity of this assumption. [34] In summary, the evidence offered by Seekins, viewed in the light most favorable to her, would prove neither an objective nor subjective violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Because [Seekins's] employment contract authorized [Era] to terminate [her] for any reason whatsoever, [35] we hold here, as we did in Ramsey, that, [a]s a matter of law, a jury could not find [that Era's] termination ... violated the implied covenant. [36]