Opinion ID: 6317681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applying Choice-of-Law Principles

Text: ¶ 22. Having established that there is a conflict between Vermont’s and Virginia’s workers’ compensation laws, including their exclusive-remedy provisions, we move on to determine which state’s laws applied to determine if the underlying tort action was viable. We conclude Virginia law applied in plaintiff’s federal diversity case against coworker and thus the claim against the coworker was barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of Virginia’s workers’ compensation act. ¶ 23. Vermont has adopted the approach in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for assessing choice-of-law questions in tort actions. Amiot v. Ames, 166 Vt. 288, 292, 639 A.2d 675, 677 (1997). Under the Restatement, the “law of the state where the injury occurred” applies in a personal-injury action “unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more 10 significant relationship” to the occurrence or the parties. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971); see also McKinnon v. F.H. Morgan & Co., Inc., 170 Vt. 422, 424, 750 A.2d 1026, 1028 (2000) (explaining that relevant rule is specific section of Restatement applicable to type of action in dispute). Here, the injury occurred in Virginia and therefore its law applied absent some other significant relationship. ¶ 24. To assess whether a more significant relationship exists, we look to the following broad principles: (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(2). We also consider the following contacts specifically applicable to tort cases: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Id. § 145(2). We apply these principles to the undisputed facts without deference. Miller v. White, 167 Vt. 45, 47-48, 702 A.2d 392, 393 (1997). ¶ 25. The injury in this personal-injury claim occurred in Virginia, so a presumption in favor of Virginia law applies. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146. Plaintiff did not contend below and does not argue on appeal that any of the general principles in Restatement § 6 overcome this presumption such that Vermont has a more significant relationship to the case, and he has not analyzed any of these choice-of-law principles. See McKinnon, 170 Vt. at 424, 750 A.2d at 1028 (stating law of place of injury applies in personal injury cases “unless plaintiff 11 demonstrates that Vermont’s interests in the litigation override the place-of-injury presumption”). Furthermore, several factors specific to personal-injury cases weigh in favor of applying Virginia law. In addition to plaintiff’s injuries occurring in Virginia, the conduct causing the injuries— coworker’s driving—also occurred there. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2)(a)-(b). The relationship between plaintiff and coworker is centered in Virginia because coworker was assigned to transport plaintiff to and within Virginia, which he had done, and they were both working and staying in that state for their mutual employer at the time of injury. See id. § 145(2)(d). The final factor can be read in favor of either Vermont or Virginia law, as plaintiff is a Vermont resident, but coworker was a resident of Canada temporarily staying in Virginia for work. See id. § 145(2)(c). Taken together, these specific choice-of-law considerations bolster the presumption in favor of applying Virginia law. We therefore conclude Vermont does not have a more significant interest to override the presumption that the law of the place where the injury occurred governs. See Martineau v. Guertin, 170 Vt. 415, 417, 751 A.2d 776, 778 (2000) (explaining that more-significant-relationship analysis serves as “escape valve in situations when applying the specific, presumptive sections would make little sense”). ¶ 26. Plaintiff raises two arguments against the application of Vermont’s choice-of-law principles to the underlying case. Neither is availing. First, he asserts that coworker implicitly acquiesced to the application of Vermont law in the federal diversity case by failing to raise choice of law as an issue in his responsive pleading. Second, he proposes the Vermont workers’ compensation act applies to his common-law negligence claim against his coworker. ¶ 27. We reject plaintiff’s argument that Vermont law applied in the federal diversity action because coworker failed to raise choice of law as an issue and cited Vermont law in his first responsive pleading. Plaintiff cites ample Second Circuit cases concluding that the parties in a diversity case “implicitly acquiesced” to the application of the forum state’s law when no party raised choice of law as an issue. Soojung Jang v. Trs. of St. Johnsbury Acad., 331 F. Supp. 3d 12 312, 330 (D. Vt. 2018); see, e.g., Bennett v. Sterling Planet, Inc., 546 F. App’x 30, 33 (2d Cir. 2013) (“In a diversity case, where the parties have agreed to the application of the forum law—as evidenced by reliance on that law in the parties’ briefing, as in this case—their agreement ends the choice-of-law inquiry.”). However, plaintiff does not cite, and we do not find, any case in the Second Circuit that establishes choice of law is an issue that must be raised during a defendant’s first responsive pleading such that coworker would have been precluded from arguing it in the federal diversity case had it proceeded. See Reed Constr. Data Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 49 F. Supp. 3d 385, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Courts, though, do not generally hold the choice-of-law determination to have been waived until a late stage in litigation, such as at the point of making summary judgment motions.” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 28. Plaintiff also asserts that because Vermont’s workers’ compensation act does not preclude a common-law action against a third party, Vermont’s laws must apply to his negligence claim against coworker, thus creating a “statutory right” to sue coworker. This argument ignores the rule explained and applied above that, when the laws of two states potentially apply, we determine whether a conflict exists and conduct choice-of-law analysis before applying Vermont law. See Klaxon Co., 313 U.S. at 496 (explaining that courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply forum state’s choice-of-law analysis). It also stretches Vermont’s workers’ compensation provisions beyond recognition. The purpose of § 624 is “to preserve the injured workers’ common law rights of action” against third parties, such as plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim against coworker. Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 80, 539 A.2d 981, 983 (1987). However, in preserving such common-law claims, the statute does not purport anywhere to create a cause of action; it simply governs election of remedies under Vermont law. See 21 V.S.A. § 624(a) (stating that accepting compensation under statute “shall not act as an election of remedies”).4 4 Plaintiff proposes that defendant’s filing a claim under Vermont’s workers’ compensation laws for payment from employer was unethical if he believed Virginia law applied. 13 ¶ 29. For the reasons explained above, we conclude Virginia law applied and barred plaintiff’s negligence claim against coworker in the federal court action. Because plaintiff’s negligence claim against coworker was not viable as a matter of law, regardless of the existence of the general release, plaintiff cannot prove defendant’s counselling plaintiff to execute the release documents caused plaintiff any injuries. Therefore, defendant was entitled to summary judgment.5