Opinion ID: 891568
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Language Analysis

Text: {16} The first step in any statutory construction is to try to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent by analyzing the language of the statute. Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135. The deadly weapons definitional statute, which includes specifically named weapons and several generic catchalls, neither refers to a pocketknife in particular nor to all knives in general. While it includes any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, it does not include any knife. See § 30-1-12(B). Instead, Section 30-1-12(B) clearly designates by name a number of specific kinds of knives as included within its definition of deadly weapon: daggers ... switchblade knives, bowie knives, poniards, butcher knives, dirk knives ... swordcanes, and any kind of sharp pointed canes. {17} Because a common pocketknife is not mentioned in the statute, we consider whether the Legislature intended to give it the same status as the specifically named weapons through application of the three general catchall clauses in the statute: (1) any weapon which is capable of producing death or great bodily harm, (2) and all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted, and (3) or any other weapons with which dangerous wounds can be inflicted. Section 30-1-12(B). The State argues that the Court of Appeals was correct in interpreting the phrase and all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted as reflecting a legislative intent to include pocketknives as per se deadly weapons. {18} Because all of the catchalls relate specifically to weapons rather than a more inclusive term such as items or instruments, we must address what the Legislature meant by its use of the term weapons. That term is not defined separately in the statutes, and we therefore must consider the ordinary meaning most likely to have been in the minds of the enacting legislators. See State v. Gutierrez, 2007-NMSC-033, ¶ 30, 142 N.M. 1, 162 P.3d 156 (interpreting the intended meaning of words used by the Legislature by consulting dictionaries to ascertain their ordinary meaning). The dictionary definitions of weapon focus on an object's use or intended use against another. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2589 (1976) (an instrument of offensive or defensive combat); Black's Law Dictionary 1624 (8th ed. 2004) (An instrument used or designed to be used to injure or kill someone). The Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the applicability of this mode of interpretation in State v. Neatherlin, 2007-NMCA-035, ¶ 15, 141 N.M. 328, 154 P.3d 703: This Court has previously relied on the definition of `weapon' from Black's Law Dictionary 1593 (6th ed. 1990): `An instrument of offensive or defensive combat, or anything used, or designed to be used, in destroying, defeating, threatening, or injuring a person.' (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {19} The definitions of the specific items named in the statute emphasize that the Legislature must have had in mind instruments used or carried for use in injuring or killing people when it repeatedly used the term weapons. See, e.g., 8 Oxford English Dictionary 95 (2d ed.1989) (defining poniard as [a] short stabbing weapon); 4 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 214 (defining dagger as [a] short stout edged and pointed weapon, like a small sword, used for thrusting and stabbing); Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 642 (defining dirk as a long straight-bladed dagger); id. at 2314 (defining sword cane as a cane or walking stick that conceals the blade of a sword or dagger); id. at 2314 (defining sword as a weapon with a long blade for cutting and thrusting); id. at 262 (defining bowie knife as a large hunting knife adapted esp. for knife-fighting and common in western frontier regions). {20} The striking characteristic of all the inherently dangerous items identified by name in the statute is that they are generally carried on one's person for their utility as offensive or defensive weapons. In contrast, no definition of pocketknife we have found refers to it as a weapon or refers to its having a purpose of use against other human beings. See id. at 1747 (defining pocketknife simply as a knife with a blade folding into the handle to fit it for being carried in the pocket). {21} New Mexico courts have long recognized the ejusdem generis principle of statutory construction, that where general words follow words of a more specific meaning, the general words are not construed in their widest extent but are instead construed as applying to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. State v. Foulenfont, 119 N.M. 788, 791, 895 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Ct.App.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see id. at 790-91, 895 P.2d at 1331-32 (declining to interpret a chainlink fence as a structure as meant in the burglary statute, which criminalizes unlawful entry into any vehicle, watercraft, aircraft, dwelling or other structure, movable or immovable (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 269, 317 P.2d 317, 318-19 (1957) (applying the principle to hold that lewdness, as meant by a statute defining a sanctionable nuisance as any place upon which lewdness, assignation or prostitution, is conducted, did not include the showing of pornographic films or other acts not connected with assignation or prostitution) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The meaning of weapons in the catchall phrases thus would necessarily share the attributes of the items specifically named, that is, inherently dangerous items that either are carried for use or are actually used to inflict injuries on people. {22} The application of this concept of statutory construction to this case is made inescapable by the Legislature's use of the adjective such before weapons in the generic phrase relied on by the State, which is found immediately after the itemization of prohibited kinds of knives: and all such weapons with which dangerous cuts can be given, or with which dangerous thrusts can be inflicted. Section 30-1-12(B). The word such has the same meaning in legal analysis as it does in other linguistic applications. See 17 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, at 102 (defining such as [o]f the same kind or class as something mentioned or referred to; of that kind; similar, the like); Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 849 (2d ed. 1995) ( Such is properly used as an adjective when reference has previously been made to a category of persons or things: thus such = of this kind, not this, these or those. ). The use of the word such in this definitional statute underscores that the generic catchall is directed to the same kind of things specifically named, instruments carried for use, or actually used, to injure or kill people. {23} Significantly, the statute names only one kind of knife that folds for carrying in a pocket, the weapon known as a switchblade, which is commonly defined as a pocketknife having the blade spring-operated so that pressure on a release catch causes it to fly open, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 2314, and which is defined further in our statutes as a knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the knife, or any knife having a blade which opens or falls or is ejected into position by the force of gravity or by any outward or centrifugal thrust or movement. NMSA 1978, § 30-7-8 (1963). It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature could have meant to include all pocketknives when it not only did not name them but at the same time expressly named only one narrowly specialized type of folding pocketknife that is designed for quick use in a knife fight. The age-old Latin phrase inclusio unius est exclusio alterius is applicable here. It means the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of the other. The legislature did not see fit to include it in the statute, therefore it is excluded. City of Santa Rosa v. Jaramillo, 85 N.M. 747, 749-50, 517 P.2d 69, 71-72 (1973) (applying the concept to the scope of a permissible liquor license transfer). {24} Even though we can find nothing in the plain wording of the statute that reflects any expression of legislative intent to criminalize the carrying of a common pocketknife, out of caution we also have traced the statute's long history in New Mexico law.