Opinion ID: 1239150
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motions to quash and traverse the July 31, 1984, search warrant and to suppress evidence

Text: (1a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying in part his motions to quash and traverse the search warrant and to suppress the evidence seized in the search conducted on July 31. Following several hearings on the motion to suppress evidence, the trial court ultimately permitted the prosecutor to introduce into evidence several photographs and negatives depicting Shari Miller, as well as a knife seized in the course of that search. We set forth the relevant procedural facts below. Detective Worthen, assigned to investigate the disappearance of Tracey Campbell, and Detective Ravens, assigned to investigate the murder of one Mischa Stewart, believed to have been murdered by defendant, decided to conduct their respective searches simultaneously on July 31. Detective Worthen subsequently assumed responsibility for both investigations. Mischa Stewart, an African-American homosexual male, 23 years of age, last was seen alive near closing time on the night of October 8, 1982, departing from the Pink Elephant, a gay bar located in Santa Monica. Stewart left in the company of a man who earlier in the evening had informed the doorman that his name was Bill and that he was trying to sell his truck or motorhome. The following morning, Stewart's nude body was discovered in an alleyway across the street from the Tennessee Savings & Beer Co., a bar frequented by defendant. A woman's bra, used as a ligature to strangle Stewart, was wrapped around his neck, and a pair of women's panties bearing the logo, Genuine Harley Ass, covered his face. Semen was discovered on his upper leg. The doorman at the Pink Elephant subsequently identified defendant from a photographic lineup as the man who left with Stewart. On July 31, Detective Worthen prepared an affidavit of probable cause in support of a warrant to search defendant's person, apartment, and vehicle. The affidavit did not refer to Jane Doe No. 60, who had not yet been identified as Shari Miller nor connected to defendant, but did refer to Tracey Campbell, as well as to Mischa Stewart. The affidavit included extensive information as to the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Campbell and the death of Stewart, describing defendant's connection to both cases, including the circumstance that he appeared to be the last person to have been seen with each victim. The affidavit also described the incident in the desert involving Julianne P. for which charges then were pending against defendant. The affidavit explained defendant's considerable involvement in photography and stated that it appeared, as part of defendant's modus operandi, that he takes photographs [of] or films his victims. The affidavit referred to numerous attachments, including the following: the police reports of the investigations in the Campbell and Stewart cases; the police and medical reports of the Julianne P. incident, noting that she had been threatened with a knife and ice pick, forced to submit to various sexual atrocities, and that part of these acts were filmed by the suspect; a report of a police interview with Tracey's cousin Todd Heidrick, noting that defendant had photographed him prior to engaging in sexual activity with him; [8] and defendant's three-page rap sheet indicating other incidents of sexual or violent assaults. The search warrant authorized the seizure from defendant's person of samples of blood, semen, saliva, and head and pubic hair. With regard to Tracey Campbell, the warrant authorized the search and seizure of any blood, head and pubic hair, and particular items of clothing and jewelry and, with regard to Mischa Stewart, a particular jacket. The warrant also authorized the seizure of any and all photographs and negatives, camera equipment, sexual devices, items of underclothing such as bras, panties, novelty items, and negligees, defendant's bank books, credit cards, gasoline purchase receipts, mail order catalogs, and receipts for such items purchased. Pursuant to the warrant, the police seized among other items 189 photographs (including those of Shari Miller), a knife, and a rifle. Defendant, asserting that the warrant was overbroad and not supported by probable cause and that the search itself was general and exploratory, moved to quash and traverse the warrant and to suppress numerous items seized. Following argument by counsel, the trial court ruled that the warrant was overbroad to the extent it permitted the seizure of any and all photographs and deemed the warrant amended so that, in effect, the references to any and all photographs were limited to those pertaining to Campbell or Stewart or to certain lingerie. The prosecution then urged that, despite the warrant's overbreadth, it was unnecessary to suppress any of the evidence seized, because the good faith exception to the rule requiring suppression of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant was applicable, and that any evidence seized beyond the proper scope of the warrant was admissible pursuant to the nexus rule. To determine whether the good faith exception and nexus rule applied, and whether a general, exploratory search had been conducted, the trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing. At that hearing, Detective Worthen testified that he provided Detectives Ravens and Rooney with copies of the search warrant and explained the contents of the warrant and affidavit to these detectives, as well as to Detective Rockwood and other officers. The officers discussed the warrant over the course of several days, and Detective Worthen held a meeting on the morning of the search. Detective Worthen instructed the officers to search for photographs of Stewart, Campbell, and other males and females, particularly young females (due to his suspicion that items of Campbell's clothing might be worn by other subjects in certain of the photographs), and for photographs depicting desert scenes. Detective Worthen told the officers to search for anything having evidentiary value, including the items specified in the warrant and the attachments to the affidavit, such as an ice pick, knife, or rifle. Detective Worthen testified that he had given these instructions based in part upon information he had received concerning defendant's previous criminal activities. Detective Worthen had been informed by the San Fernando Valley district attorney's office of the incident that had occurred several weeks prior to the disappearance of Tracey, in which defendant had taken Mark W. and Tamara H. out to the desert. Detective Worthen had learned, and informed the investigating officers, that defendant had threatened Mark W. with a rifle, may have forced Tamara H. to perform oral copulation, and had taken photographs of one or both victims. Detective Worthen also relied upon information he had concerning the circumstances of the alleged attack on Julianne P. Although the police previously had searched defendant's motorhome in connection with that case, Detective Worthen believed additional items might be located in defendant's apartment. Detective Worthen also had learned from defendant's former wife, Cindy, that many years previously, defendant sometimes had awakened screaming due to nightmares of a girl that he murdered and buried, and that defendant once had threatened Cindy with a rifle. A number of interviewees had informed Detective Worthen that for a period of several years, defendant had photographed various young women and girls, often having them dress in outfits selected by defendant. Detective Worthen learned of at least one other unreported possible criminal incident occurring in 1972 or 1974, in which defendant purportedly had driven a female 15 years of age to Malibu Canyon, where he attempted to give her narcotics and take her photograph. Based upon his review of defendant's criminal history and his knowledge of the facts of the present cases, Detective Worthen suspected that defendant might be responsible for the deaths of persons in addition to Stewart and Campbell. Detective Worthen testified that he also relied upon defendant's rap sheet. Defendant's prior record included a 1972 charge of assault with intent to commit rape, reduced to battery pursuant to defendant's guilty plea, several charges of indecent exposure in 1971 that had been dismissed, and several earlier charges of automobile theft. Detective Worthen testified that he believed he had probable cause to seize each of the photographs on the basis of the warrant and affidavit. Detective Worthen had informed the police officers assigned to search the apartment that they were not limited to the items described in the warrant, but were to seize any item that might have relevance to anything mentioned in the affidavit. Detective Worthen did not recall whether he had a photograph of Campbell or Stewart with him at the time he and the officers executed the search warrant. Detective Ravens, who was in charge of the search of defendant's apartment, testified that prior to the search, he had read the affidavit of probable cause but not its numerous attachments. He believed that the police were to seize an item not listed in the warrant if, once the police were inside the apartment, there appeared evidence related to other possible murder victims that might be used in future investigations. The police seized many of the contents of the hall closet in defendant's apartment. Detective Ravens seized a .22-caliber rifle not described in the warrant, because it was common police practice to seize all firearms in a homicide case. Pursuant to the warrant's direction to seize all photographs, Detective Ravens seized a photo album in the belief that photographs might be relevant to another criminal investigation. Detective Ravens had not been informed specifically what jewelry Tracey was wearing when she disappeared, and therefore seized numerous pieces of jewelry that he believed might belong to her. After 6:00 p.m. on July 31, Detective Rooney conducted a search of defendant's automobile. The detective had investigated the death of Mischa Stewart, had seen his photograph and observed his body at the murder scene, and also had received a photograph and description of Tracey. Rooney previously had examined and had with him a copy of the search warrant, but did not recall reading the affidavit. Rooney searched for those items listed in the warrant and also for items having evidentiary value with regard to defendant's criminal activities. Detective Rooney testified that he seized various items, including a bag that contained numerous photographs and negatives, pursuant to the search warrant's directive to seize all photographs. Due to the difficulty in examining the items with a flashlight inside the vehicle, and because he believed that Detective Worthen would be better able to determine their relevancy, Detective Rooney removed the items and placed them on a desk inside the police station. Upon briefly examining the photographs  including those that proved to be of Shari Miller  Detective Rooney believed it possible they might be of Tracey Campbell, or that they might relate either to the case involving the sexual assault and torture of defendant's girlfriend occurring in the desert, or the case involving the man and woman who were tied and threatened with a knife in the desert. Because he believed a knife was involved in that case, Detective Rooney also seized a knife found inside the trunk. That same evening, Detective Rockwood, who had observed the body of Jane Doe No. 60, reviewed the photographs that Detective Rooney had placed on the desk. Detective Rockwood noticed that a woman in the photographs appeared to have tattoos in the same area of the left ankle as the area in which skin had been removed from the body of Jane Doe No. 60 and concluded there was some connection between the two women. The trial court denied the defense motion to suppress evidence. The court ruled that the police officers had not conducted an exploratory search, but rather had seized items described in the warrant or closely resembling such items, or that were so interconnected with specifically described items that it would be impossible or impracticable to separate the items prior to their seizure. Prior to the trial court's ruling, our court had held that items not named in a search warrant may be seized if the officer is `presently aware of some specific and articulable fact from which a rational link between the item seized and criminal behavior can be inferred.' ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 872 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813]; People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 573-574 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908]; People v. Superior Court ( Meyers ) (1979) 25 Cal.3d 67, 73-74 [157 Cal. Rptr. 716, 598 P.2d 877]; People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 762 [117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1], overruled on other grounds in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 5 [135 Cal. Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872].) Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321, 326 [107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347], held that, when the initial intrusion that brought officers within plain view of an item is supported by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances, the seizure of items not listed in a warrant is legal only if the police have probable cause to believe (rather than merely a reasonable suspicion) that the items are related to a crime. Based upon that ruling, defendant moved for reconsideration of the motion. Upon reconsideration, the trial court granted the motion in part, suppressing the rifle seized from defendant's apartment, but declining to suppress the several photographs depicting Shari Miller or the knife. The trial court determined that despite the warrant's overbreadth, the photographs seized from defendant's vehicle were admissible because the officers executed the search in a good faith belief the warrant was valid, and because Detective Rockwood's testimony concerning the connection he perceived between the woman in the photographs and Jane Doe No. 60 established a nexus between those photographs and the items whose seizure was authorized by the warrant. The court found that a nexus was established between the knife and two acts of criminal behavior where a knife had been used.
(2) Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly limited the scope of the hearing by declining to permit defendant to introduce all of the items, including 189 photographs, that the police had seized. The record reflects that defendant's motion catalogued each item seized. The police officers who testified were examined extensively by the defense, not only concerning the knife and several photographs that the prosecutors sought to have admitted, but also concerning numerous other photographs and items seized. The trial court did not err in declining to permit the introduction into evidence and examination of the police officers as to every single item seized. The reporter's transcript and related minute orders recording the lengthy proceedings involved in the suppression motion demonstrate that the trial court, in ruling on the motion, was well aware of the nature and number of items seized that did not directly pertain to the subject investigations, and therefore properly could evaluate, for example, whether the search was exploratory in nature.
(1b) Defendant asserts that the warrant was so facially deficient that no reasonable police officer could have relied upon it to conduct the search, and that therefore the trial court erred in even considering whether to apply the good faith exception to the rule otherwise requiring the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to a facially valid warrant subsequently determined to be invalid. As noted above, in the present case the trial court determined that the reference in the search warrant to all photographs was overbroad, thus finding the warrant partially invalid. (3) Pursuant to California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (d), our review of issues related to the suppression of evidence derived from police searches and seizures is governed by federal constitutional standards. ( People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 595-596 [286 Cal. Rptr. 780, 818 P.2d 63]; see People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 363 [45 Cal. Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729]; People v. Banks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 926, 934 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 524, 863 P.2d 769]; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146].) (4) The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment expressly provides that no warrant may issue except those particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Walter v. United States (1980) 447 U.S. 649, 656-657, fn. 8 [100 S.Ct. 2395, 2402, 65 L.Ed.2d 410].) General warrants, of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. `(T)he problem (posed by the general warrant) is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings.... (The Fourth Amendment addresses the problem) by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized.' ( Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 ... (1971). ( Andresen v. Maryland (1976) 427 U.S. 463, 480 [96 S.Ct. 2737, 2748, 49 L.Ed.2d 627].) The high court also has recognized, however, that in a complex case resting upon the piecing together of many bits of evidence, the warrant properly may be more generalized than would be the case in a more simplified case resting upon more direct evidence. ( Id. at p. 481, fn. 10 [96 S.Ct. at p. 2749].) (5) In United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677], the high court held that evidence obtained pursuant to a facially valid search warrant subsequently determined to be invalid is admissible if the officers executed the search in objectively reasonable reliance upon the validity of a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. ( Id. at pp. 922-923 [104 S.Ct. at pp. 3420-3421]; People v. Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d 592, 602-603; see People v. Machupa (1994) 7 Cal.4th 614, 618, fn. 1 [29 Cal. Rptr.2d 775, 872 P.2d 114].) The court in Leon noted several exceptions to the admissibility of evidence seized under these circumstances, however, including the situation in which the warrant is so facially deficient  i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or things to be seized  that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. ( United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897, 923 [104 S.Ct. 3405, 3421].) A police officer may not shift all of the responsibility for the protection of an accused's Fourth Amendment rights to the magistrate by executing a warrant no matter how deficient it may be in describing the places to be searched and the items to be seized. An officer applying for a warrant is required to exercise reasonable professional judgment. ( People v. Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d 592, 604; Bailey v. Superior Court (1992) 11 Cal. App.4th 1107, 1114 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 17] [lack of probable cause was so apparent that reliance upon warrant was unreasonable]; see People v. Maestas (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 1208, 1218-1221 [252 Cal. Rptr. 739].) (6) Defendant relies upon several cases from the federal courts of appeals. Such decisions, as we often have observed, provide persuasive rather than binding authority. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 120, fn. 3 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]; People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 854, fn. 2 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270].) (1c) The cases cited by defendant are distinguishable in any event. In U.S. v. Stubbs (9th Cir.1989) 873 F.2d 210, 212, a search warrant, held to be so facially invalid that a reasonable officer could not have presumed it to be valid, permitted the seizure of all accounts and business records that had been created during a seven-year period and that contained references to a number of individuals. In Center Art Galleries - Hawaii, Inc. v. U.S. (9th Cir.1989) 875 F.2d 747, the warrant held to be facially invalid ( id. at pp. 752-753) permitted the seizure of all `documents, books, ledgers, records and objects which are evidence of violations of federal criminal law.' ( Id. at p. 749.) In U.S. v. Dozier (9th Cir.1988) 844 F.2d 701, 707-708, the warrant held to be facially invalid authorized the seizure of `written records, financial statements, address books, ... telephone books, and bills.' In United States v. Washington (9th Cir.1986) 782 F.2d 807, 819-820, the court held to be facially invalid a warrant authorizing the seizure of evidence of the suspect's association with several named persons as well as any unnamed persons. In the present case, by contrast, the only portion of the warrant that the trial court deemed to be overbroad was the reference to any and all photographs. [9] Assuming arguendo that the trial court was correct in finding that part of the warrant to be overbroad, the reference to photographs encompassed only one category of items, and the warrant otherwise specified the items to be seized. The warrant's failure to particularize items within this category of articles to be seized did not render it so facially deficient that no reasonable officer could presume it to be valid.
Defendant contends that, even assuming the warrant's facial validity justified a reasonable officer in presuming it valid and performing the search pursuant to its authorization, the prosecutor failed to demonstrate that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner. First, according to defendant, few of the officers involved in the execution of the warrant actually had read the warrant, the affidavit in support of probable cause, or the attached exhibits. To the contrary, the record of the evidentiary hearing establishes that Detective Ravens, who executed the warrant to search the apartment, had read the affidavit in support of the search warrant, and that Detective Rooney, who executed the warrant to search the vehicle, had the warrant in his possession and seized items within the scope of the warrant. In addition, Detective Worthen, who had investigated the Campbell and Stewart cases and had learned of defendant's prior criminal activity, had discussed with the officers, including Ravens and Rooney, the contents of the affidavit and warrant and the acts presently under investigation, as well as the previously charged and uncharged criminal acts. Second, defendant asserts that the officers' lack of good faith is demonstrated by the testimony of Detective Worthen and Officer Ravens, which indicated either their personal belief, or their communication to other officers, that the investigators were not limited to the items named in the warrant and could seize anything possibly relating to a crime, once having gained access to the apartment and automobile. In view of the entire testimony of these officers, we do not believe that their isolated comments, to the effect that they could seize items not listed in the warrant, demonstrates failure on their part to act in an objectively reasonable manner. (7a) The plain-view doctrine permits, in the course of a search authorized by a search warrant, the seizure of an item not listed in the warrant, if the police lawfully are in a position from which they view the item, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object. ( Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 135-137 [110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307-2308, 110 L.Ed.2d 112]; Texas v. Brown (1983) 460 U.S. 730, 739 [103 S.Ct. 1535, 1541-1542, 75 L.Ed.2d 502] (plur. opn.); see Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 374-375 [113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-2137, 124 L.Ed.2d 334].) In such circumstances, the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, even if the discovery of the evidence is not inadvertent. ( Horton v. California, supra, 496 U.S. 128, 130 [110 S.Ct. 2301, 2304].) Where an officer has a valid warrant to search for one item but merely a suspicion, not amounting to probable cause, concerning a second item, that second item is not immunized from seizure if found during a lawful search for the first item. ( Id. at pp. 138-139 [110 S.Ct. at pp. 2308-2309].) This rule was stated by the high court in Horton in the context of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant, notwithstanding the circumstance that in other cases applying the plain view doctrine in various contexts, the determination that the incriminating nature of an item was immediately apparent was based upon whether the officers had probable cause to believe that the item was either evidence of a crime or contraband. (E.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. 366, 375 [113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-2137]; Arizona v. Hicks, supra, 480 U.S. 321, 326-327 [107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153-1154].) (1d) In the present case, the testimony of the officers involved in the search indicated their belief that they could search for items not listed in the warrant. This testimony, read in context and considered in light of the information in their possession concerning not only the Campbell and Stewart matters but the other incidents, simply reflected their entirely appropriate understanding that such items lawfully might be seized if reasonably believed to be related to criminal activity. Absent any indication to the contrary, this testimony does not demonstrate that the officers' conduct was objectively unreasonable.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that a nexus existed between items named in the search warrant and the photographs of Shari Miller and the knife found in defendant's vehicle (items not described in the warrant), thereby improperly justifying the seizure of those items. He urges that probable cause did not exist to seize those items. (7b) As discussed above, in the course of a search authorized by a warrant, the seizure of an item not listed in the warrant may be authorized by the plain view doctrine. The plain view doctrine does not create an independent exception to the warrant clause, but simply is an extension of whatever may be the prior justification for the officers' access to an object. ( Texas v. Brown, supra, 460 U.S. 730, 738-739 [103 S.Ct. 1535, 1541].) The officers lawfully must be in a position from which they can view a particular area; it must be immediately apparent to them that the items they are observing may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to lawful seizure, and the officers must have a lawful right of access to the object. ( Horton v. California, supra, 496 U.S. 128, 136-139 [110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307-2309]; see Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. 366, 374-375 [113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-2137]; Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 465-468 [91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037-2039, 29 L.Ed.2d 564].) If, however, the incriminating character of an object in plain view is not immediately apparent, the plain view doctrine cannot justify its seizure. ( Horton v. California, supra, 496 U.S. 128, 135-137 [110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307-2308]; see Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. 366, 375 [113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-2137].) (1e) As we previously have explained, the photographs were seized pursuant to a warrant, later determined by the trial court to be overbroad to the extent it authorized the officers to seize any and all photographs, a determination we assume, for the sake of argument, to be correct. Detective Rooney, acting in the objectively reasonable belief that the warrant was valid, seized the photographs pursuant to that warrant. Therefore, no basis has been presented upon which to suppress this evidence. In addition, even were the good faith exception not available to justify the seizure of the photographs, the elements of the nexus rule were satisfied. Officer Rooney expressly was authorized to search the vehicle and to seize, at a minimum, photographs relating to Tracey Campbell and Mischa Stewart. As night fell, Rooney transported the bag of photographs and negatives 100 feet to a desk inside the police station in order to examine them. Within a short time, Detective Rockwood, also assigned to the investigation of the Campbell and Stewart cases, observed the photographs that bore a resemblance to Jane Doe No. 60. Therefore, the officer made this discovery during the course of the search for photographs authorized by the warrant. (See Horton v. California, supra, 496 U.S. 128, 140-142 [110 S.Ct. 2301, 2309-2311] [weapons that were discovered prior to locating the proceeds of the robbery named in the warrant were lawfully seized].) Detective Rockwood, without further investigation, merely examined the photographs and realized their similarity to Jane Doe No. 60  thus, it was immediately apparent to him that the items he observed might be evidence of a crime or otherwise subject to seizure without conducting any further search of the object. ( Id. at p. 136 [110 S.Ct. at p. 2307]; Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. 366, 375 [113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-2137].) The elements of the nexus rule also were established with regard to the seizure of the knife. Detective Rooney lawfully was in a position to view the contents of the vehicle trunk, and it immediately was apparent to him that the knife might be evidence relating to a criminal incident. ( Horton v. California, supra, 496 U.S. 128, 136 [110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307-2308]; Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, 508 U.S. 366, 374-375 [113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-2137].) The trial court did not err in determining that the nexus rule applied.
Defendant contends that the police improperly utilized the warrant to conduct a general, exploratory search of his apartment and vehicle. (8) The purpose of the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is to avoid general and exploratory searches by requiring a particular description of the items to be seized. ( Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. 443, 467 [91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038-2039]; Stanford v. Texas (1965) 379 U.S. 476, 485 [85 S.Ct. 506, 511-512, 13 L.Ed.2d 431].) The high court has rejected, however, the contention that police action disregarding the authorized scope of a warrant transforms the warrant into an impermissible general warrant, requiring suppression of the entire fruit of the search, rather than merely those items as to which there was no probable cause to support seizure  where the officers have not exceeded the scope of the warrant in the places searched, but only in seizing items unconnected to the investigation or prosecution of the crime. In such circumstances, when all items unlawfully seized are suppressed, there is certainly no requirement that lawfully seized evidence be suppressed as well. [Citations.] ( Waller v. Georgia (1984) 467 U.S. 39, 43-44, fn. 3 [104 S.Ct. 2210, 2214, 81 L.Ed.2d 31]; Andresen v. Maryland, supra, 427 U.S. 463, 482, fn. 11 [96 S.Ct. 2737, 2749].) In the present case, the officers searched for and seized items  including some that the trial court considered unlawfully seized and ordered suppressed  only from the places designated in the warrant. In asserting that the search was general and exploratory, defendant relies upon the contention made and rejected earlier  that the executing officers had not read the contents of the warrant or the affidavit of probable cause. Defendant also asserts that because the officers seized more items not named in the warrant than items named, this circumstance establishes the exploratory nature of the search. In view of the information possessed by the officers in charge, the contents of the affidavit of probable cause, and the information contained in the attachments, that circumstance did not by itself establish that the search was exploratory.