Opinion ID: 2070879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I guess so.

Text: 1042 (R.I. 1998) Q. You have had a lawyer before? A. Yes, sir. Q. And, did you understand what your rights were? A. Yes, sir; at that point in time as I was reading them, yes sir. I pretty much understood them.    Q. Tell me the words you used in asking for a lawyer? A. `Whaz up with a lawyer,' and Q. You have to repeat that. A. `Whaz up with a lawyer? Q. Whaz up with a lawyer?' A. Yes, sir. Meaning, `Is there a lawyer? Where I can get appointed a lawyer.' The hearing justice subsequently confirmed that the statement Whaz up with a lawyer? was the entirety of Page's alleged request. In contrast to defendant's testimony, the two police officers who interviewed defendant denied that he had ever mentioned a lawyer in their presence. The hearing justice, having had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, concluded: I don't believe a word of what Mr. Page said about asking for a lawyer.    I find, without question in my mind, well beyond the threshold test of clear and convincing evidence, I find beyond any question in my mind that this defendant in all respects waived his rights under Miranda; that he expressly, explicitly, impliedly in every possible manner was content to speak with the officers without a lawyer, never asked for a lawyer, never made a passing reference to a lawyer. Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant did make the alleged comment Whaz up with a lawyer, in our opinion this passing reference did not constitute a sufficient invocation of the right to counsel. See State v. Peabody, 611 A.2d 826, 837 (R.I.1992); see also United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 949 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1773, 84 L.Ed.2d 833 (1985). Because of defendant's familiarity with the procedures during an arrest, Page's words could reasonably have been interpreted as a request by him for an explanation of his right to counsel, the affirmation of which, according to defendant's own testimony, in fact followed. Having been advised of his right to counsel and told that an attorney would be provided for him at the state's expense if he could not afford one, defendant chose to speak with the police without any further question or request for a lawyer. On these facts, we conclude that defendant was well informed of his right to counsel and chose to waive it rather than to invoke it. Therefore, the police did not elicit defendant's statement in violation of that right. In denying defendant's motion to suppress his statement, the trial justice concluded that he was satisfied from all the credible evidence before me, and from the totality of circumstances, that this defendant, beyond all peradventure, understood all of his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily, without coercion of any kind, and without a desire or request for counsel decided to speak with the officers, and that his decision to do so was a product of his free and intelligent choice. Hence, having carefully reviewed the record de novo, we concur with the trial justice's conclusion. Accordingly, we reject defendant's appeal on this issue and affirm the trial justice's denial of the motion to suppress. TenYear Concurrent Sentence The defendant also argued on appeal that the additional ten-year sentence, to be served concurrently with his sentence of life without the possibility of parole, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The defendant's argument in this respect was predicated upon his fundamental misunderstanding of the reason for the imposition of the sentence. The defendant contended that the ten-year term was an additional sentence pursuant to Rhode Island's habitual offender statute, G.L.1956 § 12-19-21, when in fact the ten-year sentence was imposed as the sentence for his conviction on an entirely separate count, namely, that of committing a crime of violence while armed with a firearm. Because defendant has appealed from a sentence that was not in fact imposed, we need not discuss this issue any further. We do note, however, that defendant concedes that he has failed to comply with our consistent instruction in prior cases that a Rule 35 motion determination is a prerequisite to an appeal to this court as to the propriety of a sentence. [2] State v. Baptista, 632 A.2d 343, 345 (R.I.1993) (citing long line of cases for this proposition); see also State v. Charette, 688 A.2d 1286, 1289 (R.I.1997). Even were the nature of defendant's sentencing as he alleged, his appeal of the sentence to this Court would be premature. Effectiveness of Counseil Last, the defendant has argued that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at his trial and sentencing. In respect to this issue, this Court has enunciated a clear rule, namely, that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised by means of a petition for postconviction relief. Accordingly, this Court has consistently explained that we shall only consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal if the claim is based on specific rulings by the trial justice, State v. Gonsalves, 476 A.2d 108, 112 (R.I.1984), inasmuch as this rule is `consistent with the fundamental principle that only specific rulings of a trial justice are reviewable on direct appeal.' Id. (quoting State v. Levitt, 118 R.I. 32, 40, 371 A.2d 596, 600 (1977)). Because we lack a fully developed record and a decision of the Superior Court regarding whether defense counsel's alleged failings were a `genuine manifestation of ineffective assistance,' State v. Tooher, 542 A.2d 1084, 1088 (R.I. 1988) (quoting State v. Farlett, 490 A.2d 52, 54 (R.I.1985)), we decline to review the defendant's fendant's claims in respect to the insufficiency of his prior representation, without preju to his seeking postconviction relief in the Superior Court, if he sees fit to do so.