Opinion ID: 1300601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: JMSC and Dual-Office Holding

Text: Petitioner's dual-office argument presents a bona fide legal challenge. Article III, § 24 of the South Carolina Constitution provides: No person is eligible to a seat in the General Assembly while he holds any office or position of profit or trust under this State, the United States of America, or any of them, or under any other power, except officers in the militia, members of lawfully and regularly organized fire departments, constables, and notaries public. If any member accepts or exercises any of the disqualifying offices or positions he shall vacate his seat. Article VI, § 3 of the South Carolina Constitution provides: No person may hold two offices of honor or profit at the same time. This limitation does not apply to officers in the militia, notaries public, members of lawfully and regularly organized fire departments, constables, or delegates to a constitutional convention. Petitioner asserts service on the JMSC is a constitutional office, a contention Respondents deny. A careful review of our jurisprudence compels a finding that the JMSC is an office in the constitutional sense. One who is charged by law with duties involving an exercise of some part of the sovereign power, either small or great, in the performance of which the public is concerned, and which are continuing, and not occasional or intermittent, is a public officer. Sanders v. Belue, 78 S.C. 171, 174, 58 S.E. 762, 763 (1907). In considering whether a particular position is an office in the constitutional sense, it must be demonstrated that [t]he power of appointment comes from the state, the authority is derived from the law, and the duties are exercised for the benefit of the public. Willis v. Aiken County, 203 S.C. 96, 103, 26 S.E.2d 313, 316 (1943). The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged with regard to a public office must be defined, directly or impliedly, by the legislature or through legislative authority. The duties must be performed independently and without control of a superior officer, other than the law, unless they are those of an inferior or subordinate officer, created or authorized by the legislature and by it placed under the general control of a superior officer of body. 63C Am Jur.2d Public Officers and Employees § 5 (2009). The JMSC asserts it exercises no part of the sovereign and merely serves in an advisory capacity because the Legislature may reject the candidates approved by the JMSC. The JMSC misapprehends its power. The exercise of power of the sovereign by the JMSC is seen not only in its ability to favorably submit judicial candidates to the Legislature for consideration, but more importantly in its power to exclude candidates. The Legislature lacks any authority to consider a judicial candidate whose name is not favorably submitted by the JMSC. See S.C. Const. Art. V, § 27 (No person may be elected to these judicial positions unless he or she has been found qualified by the commission.); S.C.Code Ann. § 2-19-80(B) and (C)(1) (2008) (providing that the General Assembly... shall not elect a person not nominated by the commission [and] [i]f the commission does not find the incumbent justice or judge qualified for the judicial office held and sought, his name shall not be submitted to the General Assembly for re-election and upon expiration of his then current term of office, he shall cease serving in that judicial position). The JMSC exercises the power of the sovereign. There can be no serious contention that the JMSC is not a constitutional office, for it exercises part of the sovereign and it possesses essentially all the additional characteristics, and more, commonly associated with an office in the constitutional sense. The features and powers of the JMSC include the authority to administer oaths; take depositions; issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of records; petition the circuit court in the case of contumacy; and most importantly, absolute control over which judicial candidates will, and will not, be submitted to the Legislature for a vote. See § 2-19-80(B). A finding of an office, for constitutional purposes does not end the inquiry. Our jurisprudence has a narrow, yet firmly established, exception which provides that double or dual office holding in violation of the constitution is not applicable to those officers upon whom other duties relating to their respective offices are placed by law. Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District, 211 S.C. 77, 92, 44 S.E.2d 88, 95 (1947) (emphasis added). This exception is commonly referred to as the ex officio or incidental duties exception. As applied here, service on the JMSC by members of the General Assembly is properly characterized as incidental to their legislative duties. This is so because the Legislature is impressed by our constitution with sole responsibility for the election and re-election of judges. Conversely, service on the JMSC by one who holds an office in the executive or judicial branch would violate the constitutional ban on dual-office holding. The ex officio or incidental duties exception may be properly invoked only where there is a constitutional nexus in terms of power and responsibilities between the first office and the ex officio office. This narrow construction of the ex officio or incidental duties exception preserves inviolate the central feature of separation of powers in our constitution. S.C. Const. Art. I, § 8. The case of Ashmore v. Greater Greenville Sewer District is instructive. In Ashmore, the General Assembly passed legislation calling for the building of an Auditorium. The legislation provided for a Board of Trustees to oversee the issuance of bonds to finance the project. By law, the Board included many persons, including the Senator and a Representative of [Greenville] County. Membership on the Board by legislators was successfully challenged as a violation of separation of powers and dual-office holding. The Ashmore Court analyzed the constitutional issues: An enlightening discussion of the quoted provision is found in Spartanburg County v. Miller, 135 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 673, 677 [(1924)], where it was said: `As a general rule the Legislature of the state may not, consistently with the constitutional requirement here involved, undertake both to pass laws and to execute them by setting its own members to the task of discharging such functions by virtue of their offices as legislators, would seem to be self-evident. The principle, as we apprehend, upon the correct application of which depends the solution of any such problem as to the exercise by the Legislature of nonlegislative functions, is that the Legislature may properly engage in the discharge of such functions to the extent, and to the extent only, that their performance is reasonably incidental to the full and effective exercise of its legislative powers.' Paraphrasing the sentence which precedes [sic] this quotation from the opinion, it may be said that the members of the Legislature from Greenville County were elected for the purpose of making laws, not administering them. The principle stated in Spartanburg County v. Miller, supra, was applied in Bramlette v. Stringer, 186 S.C. 134, 195 S.E. 257, and a county bond issue act was held invalid for attempting to leave the execution of the law to the members of the legislature from the county. The authority of that decision cannot be consistently avoided in this. It requires similar holding of invalidity of the challenged provisions. The qualifications of members of the General Assembly are carefully set out in Article III of the constitution. Section 24 thereof forbids the holding of other public office or position, and provides that upon the acceptance of any such by a member he shall vacate his seat. The proposition seems to us to prove itself, that a member cannot sit upon the board of auditorium trustees established in the act under review and at the same time retain his membership in the General Assembly. The language of the fundamental law is plain and unambiguous. It admits of no doubt of its meaning. Id. at 89-90, 44 S.E.2d at 94. Service by members of the legislative branch in an office charged with the execution of the law violates separation of powers and dual-office holding. That was the case in Ashmore. Ashmore referenced the ex officio or incidental duties exception: A common example is ex officio membership upon a board or commission of the unit of government which the officer serves in his official capacity, and the functions of the board or commission are related to the duties of the office. Id. at 92, 44 S.E.2d at 95 (emphasis added). Paraphrasing from Spartanburg County v. Miller , as approvingly referenced in Ashmore, members of the General Assembly may properly serve on the JMSC as such service is reasonably incidental to the full and effective exercise of their legislative powers. Accordingly, we dismiss Petitioner's dual-office claim against the members of the General Assembly who serve on the JMSC.