Opinion ID: 2995865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion In Limine to Exclude Expert Testimony

Text: Next, Liu argues that we should reverse the district court’s denial of her motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Price Waterhouse and CLR’s accounting expert, 3 We do not need to reach the merits of Yang and Liu’s second argument on appeal—that the district court erred in denying certain revised jury instructions regarding damages—as it relies upon a finding that Liu was the true owner of the copyright in the China RevUp32 program. Nos. 01-1744 and 01-2119 11 Julie Davis, on the issue of Liu’s alleged damages due to Price Waterhouse and CLR’s copyright infringement. We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. See Bourelle v. Crown Equip. Corp., 220 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2000). However, we note that even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting Davis’s expert testimony, such an error is not grounds “for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 61; see also Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332, 1339 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Disturbing the judgment of the district court on evidentiary grounds is necessary only if an erroneous ruling had a substantial influence over the jury.”) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we will not reverse a jury verdict if an erroneous admission of expert testimony is harmless; we recognize that an error is harmless if it did not contribute to the verdict in a meaningful manner. See Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709, 725 (7th Cir. 1999). In the present case, Davis testified to the amount of damages Liu sustained on account of Price Waterhouse and CLR’s alleged infringement of her copyrights. The jury, however, never actually reached this issue when determining their verdict because the jury found that neither Price Waterhouse nor CLR was liable to Liu for any damages for infringement, as neither party was found to have committed copyright infringement. Therefore, Davis’s testimony was irrelevant to the jury’s verdict. Thus, even if we were to assume that the district court did err in denying Liu’s motion in limine, we would not disturb the judgment of the district court as Davis’s testimony cannot be shown to have had any influence at all upon the jury’s verdict. 12 Nos. 01-1744 and 01-2119