Opinion ID: 2332719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Defense Counsel's Admissions of Guilt

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to inquire whether Appellant knowingly and voluntarily consented to defense counsel's admissions of guilt during opening and closing arguments. Specifically, counsel told the jury during opening statements that Appellant was a thief and burglar, and that although he went to Williamson's residence on the day in question to steal from her, Appellant was not the person who murdered Williamson. Again, during closing arguments, defense counsel stated that Appellant had committed the other crimes, even the theft of Betty Geiman's wallet, but he was not a murderer. Appellant, relying on Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091, 102 S.Ct. 656, 70 L.Ed.2d 630 (1981), now argues that the trial court should have conducted a sua sponte inquiry as to whether Appellant consented to such a trial strategy. In Wiley, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a petitioner's request for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that petitioner's counsel had admitted petitioner's guilt as a trial tactic, but had not gained petitioner's knowing consent prior to the admission. The Court held: [A]n attorney may not admit his client's guilt which is contrary to his client's earlier entered plea of `not guilty' unless the defendant unequivocally understands the consequences of the admission. Counsel may believe it tactically wise to stipulate to a particular element of a charge or to issues of proof. However, an attorney may not stipulate to facts which amount to the `functional equivalent' of a guilty plea. Id. at 649. (citations omitted). The Court concluded that the client's knowing consent to such trial strategy must appear on the record, outside the presence of the jury, in a manner consistent with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). However, in a subsequent companion case, Wiley v. Sowders, 669 F.2d 386, 389 (6th Cir.1982), the Court clarified its prior holding, stating an on-the-record inquiry by the trial court to determine whether a criminal defendant has consented to an admission of guilt during closing arguments represents the preferred practice. But we did not hold in Wiley, and do not now hold, that due process requires such a practice. Thus, contrary to Appellant's argument, the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a sua sponte inquiry as to Appellant's consent to his counsel's strategy. More importantly, while Appellant couches this issue in terms of the trial court's duty, this is essentially an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This court has held as a general rule that claims of ineffective assistance are not properly raised on direct appeal, but rather must proceed by way of a post-trial motion under RCr 11.42 to allow the trial court the opportunity to review the issues. Humphrey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 870, 872 (1998). In fact, the Sixth Circuit recognized that both Wiley cases presented ineffective assistance of counsel claims. However, the Court determined that although the claims had not been preserved in the trial court, they were fairly presented to this Court, and as such, Petitioners had exhausted their state remedies. Wiley, 669 F.2d at 388.