Opinion ID: 3011009
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: Davis was also charged with witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1512(b): Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to . . . hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. Unlike S 1503, S 1512 does not require an official proceeding to be pending or imminent at the time of the offense. A reasonable belief that the named witness will 23 communicate information to a law enforcement officer is enough to create liability under the statute. See United States v. Kozak, 438 F.2d 1062, 1066 (3d Cir. 1971). As discussed above, a reasonable jury clearly could have found that Davis believed that Sabol was communicating with the authorities. To be criminally liable, the defendant must know that his conduct has the natural and probable effect of interfering with the witness's communication, whether or not it succeeds. See United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 1992). Davis indicated that he wanted Vittorio to stop dealing with Sabol and warned Vittorio that Sabol was setting him up. He also hoped that Vittorio would kill Sabol. The government argues that the natural, foreseeable, and probable consequence of Davis's acts was that Sabol would be killed or otherwise prevented from gaining and conveying information. Although we find the government's theory extremely broad, we conclude that Davis's conduct in this case falls within the statutory meaning of corrupt persuasion. Simply interfering with the flow of information to the government is not enough to constitute witness tampering. Suppose that Vittorio became suspicious of Sabol on his own and stopped talking to him, thus decreasing the amount of information Sabol could communicate to the government. By the government's theory, this would apparently constitute witness tampering by Vittorio. Or hypothesize that Michael tried to dissuade Vittorio from his criminal ways, using as one of his arguments the proposition that the government had infiltrated the Giampa Crew. By the government's theory, this would apparently constitute witness tampering by Michael. Indeed, a lawyer's instruction to a client not to speak to potential government witnesses, including government investigators, would also apparently constitute witness tampering by this theory, except that the statute excludes lawful, bona fide legal services in connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. S 1515(c). A defendant's husband or mother, however, would not fall within this safe harbor if he or she advised a defendant to keep silent when approached by potential witnesses. 24 Our rejection of the government's broad theory has a basis in the statute. Because there is no allegation that Davis used misleading conduct,4 intimidation, physical force, or threats, we limit our inquiry to whether he engaged in corrupt persuasion with the relevant intent.