Opinion ID: 196319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims against federal defendants.

Text: 3 Appellant's complaint is essentially a reiteration of the issues raised in his appeal from his federal conviction and sentence for bank fraud. It contains claims of constitutional violations by probation officers, judges, clerks, prosecutors and other federal actors involved in his conviction and sentencing. Pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), Pandey cannot establish the elements of a Bivens action until his conviction has been declared invalid or otherwise impugned.... Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26, 27 (5th Cir.1994); see also Tavarez v. Reno, 54 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.1995). We affirmed Pandey's conviction and sentence in United States v. Pandey, No. 91-2219, 1992 WL 348046 (1st Cir. Nov. 23, 1992). Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing those claims against the federal defendants that call into question the validity of Pandey's conviction and sentence.
4 Pandey's complaint includes claims that the conditions in which he was kept by prison officials during the three weeks between his sentence and his arrival at a medical facility constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Although not barred by Heck, Pandey's Eighth Amendment claims were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. 5 This court's review of a dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is plenary. See, e.g., Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1991). The question is whether, accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construing them in the light most favorable to Pandey, the complaint indicates any facts which could entitle him to relief. See Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988). Because it was filed pro se, Pandey's complaint is entitled to an extra degree of solicitude. See Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22, 23 (1st Cir.1991). 6 [I]t is now settled that 'the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.'  Farmer v. Brennan, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976 (1994) (citation omitted). There are two prerequisites to an Eighth Amendment violation by a prison official: 7 First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,.... 8 The second requirement follows from the principle that only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment. ... In prison conditions cases [the prison official's state of mind] must be one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. 9 Id. at 1977. The requirement of deliberate indifference has a subjective component: a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. at 1979. 10 Pandey's allegations concerning the size and condition of the cells in which he was kept, the denial of lunch during an eight-hour trip and of baby oil, soap and other comforts while incarcerated, as well as the delay in placing him in a medical facility, even if accepted as true, fail to meet the first requirement of sufficiently serious deprivations. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) ([E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.) The district court sentenced Pandey to a medical facility so that he could receive treatment for chronic fatigue. The complaint does not allege that delay in treatment of that condition presented a serious health risk to Pandey. 11 While the denial of prescribed medicine (for diabetes and high blood pressure) could constitute a sufficiently serious harm, the complaint fails to allege facts which would support a finding of deliberate indifference. When, as here, a convict claims that state prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by withholding essential health care, he must prove that the defendants' actions amounted to 'deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.'  DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir.1991). 12 Pandey failed to allege facts showing that the defendants themselves (the prison wardens) knew of an excessive risk to his health or safety if the proper medicine was not promptly supplied. The complaint states that on three occasions Pandey wrote to one of the warden defendants. The first communication allegedly detail[ed] his debilitating medical condition and need for medical attention. The next day he was allegedly seen by two physician's assistants. The second communication is merely alleged to have requested the warden's personal assistance in obtaining proper medical care. 13 Finally, Pandey alleges that he wrote to the warden on December 8, 1991, indicating that his medication was about to run out. On December 12, 1991, a physician's assistant provided him with medicine for the diabetes and high blood pressure from which he allegedly suffered. The complaint's allegations that Pandey was provided with the wrong medicine in an untimely manner, at most state a claim of negligence, but not of deliberate indifference. Pandey did not allege that he informed the warden that he would experience a serious medical reaction if he did not immediately receive the proper medicine. (Nor did he allege that such a reaction resulted from the failure to timely provide the proper medicine.) Therefore, the pleadings fail to allege that the defendant warden was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists. Farmer, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. 14 Pandey alleges frequent complaints to physician's assistants and others with whom he had immediate contact at the prison. Supervisors, however, cannot be held liable in a Bivens claim on the sole basis of their supervision of others. Cf. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir.1989) (liability under Sec. 1983 may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior). 15 Pandey failed to allege that sufficiently serious symptoms resulted from his failure to receive the proper medication, much less that the defendants knew of such symptoms. See Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corrections, No. 94-1835, slip op. at 9-10 (1st Cir., Sept. 7, 1995) (holding that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent if they did not learn of the serious symptoms that [plaintiff] actually experienced while detained as a result of the withholding of prescribed medication). Therefore, the complaint failed to state a claim of Eighth Amendment violations by the wardens or other prison officials named as defendants.