Opinion ID: 2301803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: PCRA Proceedings

Text: Keaton claims the PCRA court deprived him of due process when it denied his request for discovery. Keaton requested the police records in all cases in which he was interrogated at the same time he was interrogated regarding Hall's murder, as well as the police records in the rape case regarding Nadine S.; he claimed these records were relevant because the cases were factually and procedurally intertwined and his arrest for Nadine S.'s rape started the chain of events which led to his subsequent interrogation and arrests. Amended PCRA Petition, 11/20/00, at 124, ¶ 331a. Keaton requested the police records in two other rape cases involving the same officer who investigated Michelle B.'s rape; he claimed these records were relevant to analyze the credibility of this officer and his role in the investigation on this case. Id., at ¶ 331b. Keaton also requested the notes of testimony on his pre-trial motion to dismiss counsel, alleging only that his right to counsel was violated by the trial court's summary denial of his subsequent motion for dismissal of counsel. Id., at ¶ 331c. Finally, Keaton requested the medical records from Michelle B. and another rape victim; he claimed these records were relevant to the petition and necessary to analyze the testimony of these witnesses. Id., at 125, ¶ 331d. We review the denial of discovery for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Collins, 598 Pa. 397, 957 A.2d 237, 272 (2008) (citation omitted). On the first counseled [PCRA] petition in a death penalty case, no discovery shall be permitted at any stage of the proceedings, except upon leave of court after a showing of good cause. Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(2). A showing of good cause requires more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence. Collins, at 272 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 855 A.2d 726, 750 (2004)). A general assertion of necessity will not suffice to establish good cause. Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167, 1175 (1999). `[A]n evidentiary hearing ... is not ... a fishing expedition for any possible evidence that may support some speculative claim of ineffectiveness.' Commonwealth v. Wharton, 571 Pa. 85, 811 A.2d 978, 989 n. 12 (2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 561 Pa. 617, 752 A.2d 871, 877 n. 8 (2000)). We find the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in denying Keaton's discovery request. His general assertion of relevance to suppression and credibility issues is insufficient to meet his burden of showing good cause. He essentially requested wholesale discovery of police and medical reports, as well as hearing transcripts, in order to discern whether his assertions were true. Williams, at 1175 (quoting Abu-Jamal, at 91). Accordingly, Keaton's discovery claim fails. Keaton contends the PCRA court abused its discretion in granting an evidentiary hearing only on his claim regarding trial counsel's failure to investigate and present adequate mitigating evidence during the penalty phase; he argues he is entitled to a hearing on all of his other claims, and he should be permitted to amend his pleadings to cure any procedural deficiencies. A PCRA petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right, but only where the petition presents genuine issues of material fact. Pa. R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2); Commonwealth v. Harris, 578 Pa. 377, 852 A.2d 1168, 1180 (2004). A PCRA court's decision denying a claim without a hearing may only be reversed upon a finding of an abuse of discretion. Id. Here, as Keaton has received a new penalty phase based on the mitigating evidence issue, there is no need for a hearing on the remainder of his penalty phase claims. Furthermore, as none of his guilt phase claims entitle him to relief, no further purpose would have been served by a hearing, see Pa. R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2), and the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of the hearing to the single issue of mitigation evidence.