Opinion ID: 779439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Sentencing Court's Recommend[ation] Binding?

Text: 62 The BOP also asserts that even if the sentencing court did not intend to award Ruggiano a credit as that term is used in § 3585(b), it nevertheless only issued a nonbinding recommendation that Ruggiano's sentence be adjusted downward for time served on his state conviction, a recommendation that the BOP was free to ignore. We disagree. In interpreting a sentencing court's statements, we inspect[] ... the sentencing transcript as well as the judgment the sentencing court entered. Rios, 201 F.3d at 265. When a sentencing court's oral sentence and its written sentence are in conflict, the oral sentence prevails. United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir.2000). However, when there is no conflict between the oral and written statements, but rather only ambiguity in either or both, we have recognized that the controlling oral sentence often [consists of] spontaneous remarks that are addressed primarily to the case at hand and are unlikely to be a perfect or complete statement of all the surrounding law. Rios, 201 F.3d at 268 (citation omitted). 63 In interpreting the oral statement, we have recognized that the context in which this statement is made is essential. For instance, in Rios, we were called upon to interpret a sentencing court's oral statement sentencing the defendant to a term of 90 months on both counts to run concurrently with each other and concurrently with the state sentence and that you receive credit for time served. Id. at 261. There, as here, the BOP contended that the sentencing court's provision for credit for time served was mere surplusage and nonbinding. See id. at 269. In concluding otherwise, we emphasized the need to view the sentencing court's language in the context of the overall proceeding, id., taking particular note of the fact that the defendant had, during the sentencing hearing, specifically asked the court to adjust his sentence downward for time served on a pre-existing state conviction. See id. at 267 (noting that [t]he juxtaposition of the actual words used in pronouncing the sentence and the discussion between the attorneys on the one hand and the court on the other demonstrates that the sentencing court was cognizant of the time Rios had spent in pre-sentence incarceration, and further that Rios sought consideration for that time from the court in its determination of the sentence to be imposed). 64 Applying a similar method of analysis here, we think it clear that by its statements — both oral and written — the sentencing court intended to adjust downward for the time served on Ruggiano's New York sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3(c) and to make this adjustment binding on the BOP as part of Ruggiano's final sentence. The mere fact that the sentencing court did not refer to § 5G1.3(c) specifically in its sentence does not dissuade us from our conclusion, for, as we noted in Rios, 201 F.3d at 268, it is not necessary for the court [to] state explicitly its reliance on section 5G1.3(c) and Application Note 3 when the overall context in which the court imposed the sentence and the information before the court at that time — here, Ruggiano's attorney had twice specifically requested that this [the federal] sentence be concurrent with the state sentence under 5G — makes clear that the court was indeed relying on this provision. 65 Nor are we persuaded by the BOP's emphasis on the sentencing court's use of the word recommend. In stating, I think it makes sense to go ahead and recommend that [Ruggiano's sentence] be served concurrently and that he receive credit for the amount of time served there [on his state sentence], the sentencing court merely indicated its intent to go ahead and adjust the sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3(c). This, as we see it, is in fact what the court did, as evidenced by its written statement to that effect — Sentence imposed to run concurrent with State sentence. Defendant to receive credit for time served. We see no conflict between the oral and written statements, but rather consistency; the sentencing judge said that he was going to go ahead and adjust, and that is precisely what he did. 66 At most the oral sentence might be viewed as ambiguous, but as we stated in Rios: 67 District judges normally deliver their decisions on sentencing from the bench, just after, and sometimes in the course of, the presentation of numerous arguments and even evidence as to the permissible range and proper sentence. These often spontaneous remarks are addressed primarily to the case at hand and are unlikely to be a perfect or complete statement of all of the surrounding law. 68 201 F.3d at 268. It is therefore understandable that Judge Roettger's use of the word recommend was less than opportune. The mere fact that he may have been somewhat loose in his language pronouncing the sentence, however, does not persuade us that he intended to issue only a nonbinding recommendation to the BOP when the written judgment — which merely clarifies, and is not in conflict with, the oral sentence — as well as the context in which the judge's remarks were made demonstrate otherwise. 69 Moreover, the BOP, in arguing that the sentencing judge intended through his nonbinding recommendation to grant to the BOP the power and discretion to adjust Ruggiano's sentence for time served on his state conviction, would have us believe that the sentencing judge gave the BOP power which it is statutorily prohibited from exercising, for as we noted above, see supra at 132, adjusting a sentence for time served on a state conviction pursuant to § 5G1.3 is within the exclusive authority of the sentencing court. Adjustments for time served on an unrelated state conviction are outside the purview of the BOP's powers to grant credit, which are limited to matters such as time served in detention related to the instant offense, good behavior, etc. We decline to attribute to as capable and experienced a jurist as Judge Roettger an ineffective pronouncement that would amount to nothing more than surplusage. 6