Opinion ID: 2184636
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The preliminary.

Text: Because of our holding that the complaint is sufficient we must consider respondent's contention that the preliminary examination was not properly conducted, in that he was not allowed to call and examine certain witnesses. During the preliminary Susan Lien testified for the state as to the incident and identified the defendant. Defense counsel did not question Susan Lien but moved the magistrate to dismiss because no probable cause for bindover had been established. This motion was denied. The defense then called Susan Lien as its own witness, presumably adversely. The state objected, arguing that the defense could have cross-examined her. It also argued that once the defense moved for dismissal, it was precluded from calling any witnesses. In the end, the magistrate allowed the defense to call Susan Lien. She was treated much the same as though under cross-examination. The defense then sought to call the victim's mother and the chief of police, . . . to delve further into exactly what Susan understood about the incident and as to statements she made at that time as to what [the defendant] said. There may very well be contradictory evidence supplied by both Mrs. Lien and Chief Luers. An objection by the state was sustained and the defendant was bound over. In the trial court, the defendant subsequently urged this refusal to let the defense call certain witnesses as a basis for his motion for dismissal. That court expressly did not reach the issue since it dismissed the complaint on the reliability issue. It is true that sec. 954.08 (1), Stats., does provide that a defendant may call witnesses at the preliminary examination. [15] Here the defense was not allowed to call certain witnesses. But this is not an unrestricted right. [16] In State v. McCarter [17] we noted that there was no indication the defense desired to call the defendant's mother-in-law as a witness in order to effect pretrial discovery of the state's evidence. To the contrary, indications were that the defendant's purposes were defensive in nature. In McCarter we therefore concluded that the magistrate should have permitted the defense to call defendant's mother-in-law as a witness. But here there is every indication that the purpose of the defense was to fish for elements of the state's case. The magistrate could well conclude that to allow the defense to call these witnesses was to permit pretrial discovery where such is not recognized. Further, as the magistrate noted, the preliminary is not concerned with the credibility of the witnesses: . . . That issue as to credence or credibility is for the trial. The hearing as to probable cause before the magistrate is not a preliminary trial. It is not the proper forum to debate and determine issues as to credibility and weight of evidence once essential facts as to probability have been established. [18] By questioning these two additional witnesses, what defense counsel sought was to expose inconsistencies in the accounts given by the victim to various people. This would affect her credibility. This was the entire thrust of his adverse examination of the victim. We fail to see how defendant was prejudiced by being unable, at this point, to call additional witnesses who would possibly shake the credibility of the victim. Her testimony was sufficient in the mind of the magistrate to establish probable cause. Defendant could, however, no doubt gain some valuable information for his defense. This unquestionably would be pretrial discovery. This is not the role of the preliminary. We conclude that the magistrate properly forbade the defense to call its two additional witnesses during the preliminary examination. By the Court. Order reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.