Opinion ID: 1609412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Court's Method

Text: The peculiar difficulties encountered by the trial court in attempting to establish a permitted volume are demonstrated by the following colloquy, which transpired between Brunson's counsel and the trial judge during a post-judgment hearing: BRUNSON'S COUNSEL: The court went on and established a permitted average daily volume of 160 yards in this case. . . . . THE COURT: That's not that was not established from any evidence. My view was that Brunson didn't prove the right to deposit much of anything and that Brunson had the burden. It is just as an equitable matterI didn't feel like shutting them down lock, stock and barrel and I found somehow or other that the other side would acquiesce in that. In other words, it is not that it was proved that 160 cubic yards, whatever it was, was appropriate, it is not proved by anything. It is simply that I didn't want to shut them down and the other side didn't kick when I let them do that much and, therefore, it ended up as part of the relief. I agree with you that there is the lack of proof on what is appropriate and it is a real problem. BRUNSON'S COUNSEL: And that's where I was going, Judge. It is uncertainI understand you gave us that as a matter of equitable grace and it is just hard to tell where it came from. What I am getting from your Honor this morning we are probably not going to be able to tell.... THE COURT: Yes, basically, what I figured I could get away with as far as the plaintiffs were concerned with. (Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding these remarks, the City of Prichard contends that [t]he record is replete with evidence sustaining the ... decision of the trial court. Brief of Appellee, at 44. In support of this contention, however, it cites only Brunson's reports for the quarters ending September and December 1990, neither of which contained any evidence of waste deposits. Therefore, at the time October 1990at which Brunson should have requested from ADEM a specific permitted volume, Brunson's records, the City of Prichard contends, failed to establish that Brunson was entitled to any permitted volume. In other words, the City of Prichard attempts to bolster the trial court's calculations, which produced a figure of 160 cubic yards, with evidence that Brunson was entitled to 0 cubic yards. This argument is unpersuasive. The City of Prichard has thus failed to offer a formula, which, when applied to data contained in the record, would support the trial court's calculations. Similarly, our own attempts to correlate the trial court's calculations with relevant data have been unfruitful. The judiciary's difficulty in developing a coherent method of its own for establishing a permitted volume demonstrates the utility and wisdom of deferring such matters to the agency charged with that duty. In cases involving the issuance of licenses or permits, courts lack the `specialized competence' possessed by licensing agencies functioning in the `field of operation entrusted to [them] by the legislature.' Hamrick v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 628 So.2d 632, 633 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). ADEM should not, therefore, have been relieved of its responsibility to establish Brunson's permitted volume. See Fraternal Order of Police, Strawberry Lodge No. 40 v. Entrekin, 294 Ala. 201, 210, 314 So.2d 663, 671 (1975).