Opinion ID: 1482683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Bailey Bill

Text: Steuart launches a bifurcated attack on the Bailey Bill: first, it says that this was zoning by plebiscite, and alternatively that the scope of the Bailey Bill is too broad to be the subject of a public local law. [6] We regard the first argument as based on misconception. In the context of zoning law, a plebiscite of the neighbors or of the neighborhood refers to instances where the action of an administrative body which effects a change in zoning and deprives an individual of a property right is predicated on the pleasure of the owners of nearby property rather than on a comprehensive plan, which imposes mutual restrictions and confers mutual benefits on all, Benner v. Tribbitt, 190 Md. 6, 20, 57 A.2d 346, 353 (1948). See Montgomery County Council v. Scrimgeour, 211 Md. 306, 313, 127 A.2d 528, 532 (1956). Steuart argues that the Bailey Bill was equivalent to zoning by plebiscite because there are no other refineries in existence or planned in St. Mary's County, and that this circumstance would necessarily lead the average voter to conclude that a vote for the Bailey Bill was actually a vote against Steuart's proposed refinery. The simple answer to this contention is that the Bill, by its very title, would ban the use of any land in the County for refineries and chemical industries. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972). The Bailey Bill was no more zoning by plebiscite than would have been the case had the County's 1974 zoning ordinance been taken to referendum. It has long been settled that the applicability of an act of the Legislature to a particular area may be conditioned on a vote of the residents, Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541 (1866); Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill 11 (1844). See particularly the discussion in Cole v. Secretary of State, 249 Md. 425, 434-35, 240 A.2d 272, 277-78 (1968). Steuart argues that the Bailey Bill is too broad in its scope, or too far-reaching in its effect, to be regarded as a public local law and that a public general law cannot be subject to referendum at the direction of the Legislature. As regards the first part of the argument, the lower court concluded, as do we, that nothing could be more local in scope than legislation affecting land use in a single county, irrespective of the fact that it could be contended that adjacent counties were indirectly affected. Our cases recognize that although a local law may be applicable to all persons, it is effective only within defined territorial limits, Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 378, 293 A.2d 241, 251-52 (1972); State v. County Comm'rs of Baltimore County, 29 Md. 516, 519-20 (1868) and that while a local law may be of benefit to all, persons living beyond the limits within which the legislation is effective have no direct interest in it, Norris v. Mayor & City Council, 172 Md. 667, 681-82, 192 A. 531, 537-38 (1937). Once the Bailey Bill is determined to be a public local law, the second part of the argument falls. It was entirely appropriate to refer the legislation to the people of the area affected for their approval, Brawner v. Supervisors, 141 Md. 586, 594-95, 119 A. 250, 251-52 (1922); Hammond v. Haines, 25 Md. 541 and Burgess v. Pue, 2 Gill 11, both supra.