Opinion ID: 3012564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: In his post-conviction motion Gattis argued that he was denied his rights to a speedy trial, due process, and equal protection as result of the delays preceding his trial, and 8 that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to pursue his right to a speedy trial. Gattis contends that as a result of the delay he was sentenced under the revised death penalty statute and was prejudiced because under the previous law he could not have received the death penalty if, as here, the jury was not unanimous in recommending the death penalty. In his brief to the Delaware Supreme Court Gattis presented the claim in a mere two pages, offering little argument, asserting without explanation that the 28 month period of delay is presumptively prejudicial; that the delays occasioned by Gattis first counsels' continued requests for medical testing were unreasonable and highly prejudicial; that counsels' lack of diligence caused delay which may cost him his life; and that the delay occasioned by the malfeasance of Gattis' public defenders should not be attributed to Gattis in the court's speedy trial analysis. The Superior Court found the claim procedurally defaulted but addressed it on the merits because Gattis had received the death penalty. Applying the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) -- the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant -- the court found the claim meritless. Most of the delay was occasioned by counsels' requests for continuances in order to obtain medical testing for Gattis. The court determined that those continuances could not be attributed to the state and that they should be subtracted from the delay for purposes of a speedy trial analysis. Further delay was caused by the temporary stay pending a determination of questions certified to the Delaware Supreme Court, a process in which Gattis participated along with eight other defendants. Thus, rather than asserting his right to a speedy trial, he took affirmative steps guaranteed to prolong the pretrial waiting period. State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961 at  (Del. Super. December 28, 1995). Finally, the court rejected Gattis' prejudice argument. The Delaware Supreme Court made no reference to procedural default, addressing this claim exclusively on the merits. In doing so, the court essentially followed the 9 Superior Court's analysis, rejecting Gattis' assertions of prejudice for lack of substantiation. Because Gattis fails to make and substantiate specific allegations of actual prejudice, and because we find no evidence of prejudice to Gattis resulting from the delay, we conclude that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gattis' motion. . . . Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d at 1180. In his habeas corpus petition, Gattis asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated when he was not tried for an inordinately long time after indictment, prejudicing his right to a fair trial. . . . As in state court, in his opening brief in support of his petition Gattis complains that counsels' continued requests for worthless medical testing were unreasonable and prejudicial, resulting in an eighteen-month delay which should not be attributed to Gattis. In his reply brief, Gattis responded to the state's argument that the claim was defaulted by arguing that counsels' ineffectiveness is cause for the default. He complains that counsel failed to pursue his speedy trial claim, that counsel seemed unaware that an amendment to the death penalty statute was pending, and that state court decisions prevented adequate factual development of the issue, resulting in insufficient record for its proper resolution. Gattis also filed the Saunders affidavit, which notes, inter alia, that the amendment to the death penalty statute had been introduced in the Delaware Senate on March 26, 1991 and that on March 31st the Wilmington News Journal had noted that the bill had been sent to the judiciary committee. Nevertheless, counsel evidently did not know of, or ignored, the possible change in the law; he neither mentioned it at the May hearing nor discussed its significance with Gattis. The affidavit opines that adequate assistance of counsel, especially in a death penalty case, requires counsel to be aware of any law that may affect his client's interests, especially the sorts of changes contemplated by the amendment in question here. Moreover, the affidavit represents that there was no need for a postponement beyond July or August. Because the Delaware Supreme Court had addressed the claim solely on the merits, the District Court did so as well, 10 rather than dismissing the claim as defaulted at the state's request. The court found the claim meritless because the Delaware Supreme Court's analysis of the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law. Gattis v. Snyder, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 372. Because the Superior Court expressly addressed the claim on the merits regardless of whether it was procedurally defaulted, and because the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the claim exclusively on the merits without any reference to procedural default, we agree with the District Court that the claim is not defaulted. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989).