Opinion ID: 1891717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: has prejudice been established?

Text: While the affidavit of prejudice was properly denied, in view of Gary's strident allegations concerning the trial judge, we direct our attention to this issue. Most of the allegations concern matters outside the record which are unsubstantiated by the present record, and, therefore cannot properly be considered. Without setting forth these allegations in detail, we believe the evidence will not support a showing of actual prejudice. By their nature, proceedings relating to custody require a trial court to assess the character of the respective parents. A court may understandably become somewhat confident of its assessment in the course of four years of litigation. When the controversy has been long and heated, and apparently to some extent reported by the public press, and has involved proceedings of the judicial commission, it is entirely possible strong feelings might develop. Melanie argues that if prejudice were to be found, the trial judge should be excused any prejudice because Gary deliberately provoked him, hoping to secure his removal. Calculated alienation of the trial judge, she argues, should not be rewarded by disqualification of the trial judge. It is unnecessary to reach this contention. From the record before us, it does not appear that the trial judge has formed a prejudice which would require his removal. We do, however, observe that in the earlier custody proceedings in this case, the trial judge made use of an independent investigator unknown to the parties. This court held in Bahr v. Bahr, supra, 150, that the use of the investigator and his oral report: . . . is error, for the right of cross-examination is denied and the report does not become a part of the record of the court. Block v. Block (1960), 9 Wis.2d 378, 101 N.W.2d 101; Wunsch v. Wunsch (1945), 248 Wis. 29, 31, 20 N.W.2d 545. In discussing the holding of Wunsch, Konnak, in Survey of Wisconsin Domestic Relations Law, 1946-1953, 1954 Wis. L.R. 464, at page 490, said: `This is a salutary rule and will act as a warning against the unofficial supplementation of the record by reports from social workers, psychiatrists and others directly to the court. It is not that these reports are not valuable, but when they are made copies should be supplied to counsel on both sides and an opportunity to cross-examine the person making them should be provided.' [18] The admonition is clear and forceful. Nevertheless, the trial court apparently continues to consider evidence and opinions outside the record. He stated at the hearing on visitation rights: . . . I thought about this case very, very much. I discussed it with people like perhaps, Sharon Wood [of the office of the family court commissioner]. I discussed it with my wife. I discussed it with anybody who I thought could help me to make up my mind. At Melanie's request, the court advised that it would refrain from speaking informally with the parties. On this appeal, both parties complain of the judge's tendency to look beyond the record of the case. There is no allegation, however, that informal communications exerted any particular influence upon the order now on appeal. It also appears the trial judge made certain comments to the public press concerning this longstanding dispute. We therefore deem it appropriate to invite attention to two provisions of the Code of Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis.2d 252 (1967). Standard 10, page 258, provides in part: 10. A judge should always bear in mind the need of scrupulous adherence to the rules of fair play. He should not permit private interviews, arguments, briefs or communications designed to influence his decision. . . . and Rule 15 provides: 15. A judge shall not, while a judicial proceeding is pending, make any comments upon its merits, or make any comment which might affect its outcome or preclude a fair trial. Code of Judicial Ethics, supra, 262. The order of November 1, 1976, is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Until the further order of the trial court, the order of August 5, 1976, will remain effective. The several orders of this court staying proceedings in the trial court pending this appeal are vacated. By the Court. Order reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.