Opinion ID: 867274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comments Regarding Causal Nexus

Text: ¶37 During her penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor stated: [T]he bottom line on that abuse [Villalobos suffered], if it happened, is what does it have to do with the murder of Ashley Molina? What does it have to do with repeatedly punching her in the stomach? What does it have to do with letting her die those slow two to four hours? The bottom line question is what about his childhood reduces his moral[] culpability or blameworthiness for all the decisions he made on January 3, 2004? . . . . [T]he defense team asserts that his borderline IQ is mitigating.... [H]e did have learning disability in reading and mathematics, but what does this have to do with the murder of Ashley Molina? . . . . This is the fabric of who he is. And I submit to you there is absolutely nothing mitigating about who he is in light of what you've seen him do, what you've seen demonstrated in this case. Villalobos argues that these comments improperly suggested that a causal nexus was required between the crime and any mitigating evidence. ¶38 A jury cannot be precluded from hearing mitigation evidence because it lacks a causal nexus to the murder. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284-87, 124 S.Ct. 2562. However, there is no constitutional prohibition against the State arguing that evidence is not particularly relevant or that it is entitled to little weight. Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 350 ¶ 97, 111 P.3d at 392; see also State v. Pandeli, 215 Ariz. 514, 525-26 ¶¶ 31-32, 161 P.3d 557, 568-69 (2007). The jury may thus appropriately consider a lack of causal nexus when assessing the quality and strength of mitigation. Newell, 212 Ariz. at 405 ¶ 82, 132 P.3d at 849. ¶39 Villalobos does not claim that the trial court excluded any evidence for lack of a causal nexus. Rather, he objects to the prosecutor's comments. We have repeatedly held, however, that the state may fairly argue that the lack of a nexus to the crime diminishes the weight to be given alleged mitigation. See, e.g., Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 350 ¶ 97, 111 P.3d at 392; Pandeli, 215 Ariz. at 525-26 ¶ 31, 161 P.3d at 568-69. Thus, the statements here were not improper. Moreover, the jury was properly instructed that it could consider any relevant evidence as mitigation and that it alone should determine the weight to attach to that mitigation. See Pandeli, 215 Ariz. at 526 ¶ 36, 161 P.3d at 569; Roque, 213 Ariz. at 224 ¶ 126, 141 P.3d at 399. ¶40 Villalobos also argues that A.R.S. § 13-751(G) unconstitutionally requires a causal nexus between mitigation and the crime. This is incorrect. Relevance, not a causal nexus, is the only statutory limitation on the jury's ability to consider mitigation evidence. A.R.S. § 13-751(G); see Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 350 ¶ 97, 111 P.3d at 392 (noting distinction between admissibility and the weight given mitigation).