Opinion ID: 1997708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Were the statements a mater of public concern?

Text: Whether a statement addresses a matter of public concern is a question of law. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., supra, 472 U.S. at 761-62, 105 S.Ct. at 2946-47 (plurality opinion); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690 n. 7, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (The inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact.). In Dun & Bradstreet, the plurality said that whether a statement addressed a matter of public concern had to be determined by its `content, form and context.' 472 U.S. at 761, 105 S.Ct. at 2946 (quoting Connick, supra, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690). We distinguish between matters of public concern and those of private concern in light of the reason that the Supreme Court as given in support of the distinction. The plurality in Dun & Bradstreet explained the reason for the distinction as resting on the Court's long recogni[tion] that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. 472 U.S. at 758, 105 S.Ct. at 2944. The plurality stated that its special concern for speech on public issues is no mystery: The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. Speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values and is entitled to special protection. In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern. As a number of state courts ... have recognized, the role of the Constitution in regulating state libel law is far more limited when the concerns that activated New York Times and Gertz are absent. In such a case, there is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press. Id. at 759-60, 105 S.Ct. at 2945-46 (footnotes, citations, internal quotations and alterations omitted). In light of the lessened constitutional interest in purely private speech, the plurality said that a different balance was appropriate between the risk that some speech will be inhibited and the opportunity of states to fashion rules to protect reputations and compensate damage to them. Id. at 760-61 & n. 7, 105 S.ct. at 2945-46 & n. 7. The two concurrences in Dune & Bradstreet each agreed that less protection for speech without public importance was appropriate. Id. at 764, 105 S.Ct. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 774, 105 S.Ct. 774, 105 S.Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring). The Dun & Bradstreet contrast of speech about political and social changes, public affairs, self-government, and public issues with speech of purely private concern shows that the focus of the phrase matters of public concern is not on speech that might be of popular interest because it captures the attention of the public based and its sensational or human interest aspects, but is instead of speech of constitutional interest because it relates to the ordering of government and society at large. This approach is consistent with Gertz, supra, where the Court expressly rejected any test that turns on a judicial determination of whether the content of the defamatory statement attracted public interest. 418 U.S. at 346, 94 S.Ct. at 3010 (rejecting plurality approach in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43, 91 S.Ct.d 1811, 1819-20, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), which would have had protection turn o a determination that the statement was a matter of public or general interest); see also Rosenbaum, supra, 403 U.S. at 63-64, 91 S.Ct. a 1829-30 (Harlan, J., dissenting) arguing that majority went too far in applying New York Times to private libels that arise out of events found to be of `public or general concern.'); id. at 78-79, 92 S.C.t at 1836-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting (same)); see also Harley-Davidson Motorsports v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1977) (recognizing Gertz 's rejection of plurality approach in Rosdenbloom ). In rejecting the Rosenbaum plurality approach, the Gertz Court reasoned that, on the one hand, a private individual would have no recourse if the publication concerned a matter that happened to be popular or of general interest; thus, the Rosenbloom plurality test was under-protective of the private figure. Id. On the other hand, the uncertainty of determining what is of popular interest would insufficiently protect the publisher, who would be left to the mercy of the common law if it misjudged the issue. Id. Thus, Gertz, like Dun & Bradstreet, rejects any distinction in constitutional protection based on what may happen to capture public attention and what does not. [6] The foregoing distinction comport with the Court's holdings in the three cases in which it decided whether speech concerning a private figure was of public or private concern. In Gertz, supra, the speech of public criticized the criminal prosecution of a police officer. 418 U.S. at 326-27, 94 S.Ct. at 3000-01. In Hepps, supra, the speech of public concern alleged that a businessman had corruptly influenced public officials to give him favorable regulatory treatment. 475 U.S. at 769, 106 S.Ct. at 1559-60. In Dun & Bradstreet, supra, on the other hand, the speech of private concern related to the financial status of a small company, disseminated to the company's creditors for the purpose of informing their decisions in business dealings. 472 U.S. at 751-52, 105 S.Ct. at 2941-42. The determining factor in these three cases is whether or not the speech addressed the conduct of government. In the two cases where it did, Gertz and Hepps, the Court determined that the speech was a matter of public concern. Three state-court decisions cited favorably by the Dun & Bradstreet plurality also illustrate the point. In Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis.2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883, 103 S.Ct. 179, 74 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982), the court held that a statement made by the defendant to a reporter in an interview about a stockholder dispute concerning a private company was not entitled to special protection under Gertz. Id. 318 N.W.2d at 143, 153. The court quoted from Justice Goldberg's concurrence in New York Times: Purely private defamation has little to do with the political ends of a self-governing society. The imposition of liability for private defamation does not abridge freedom of public speech for any other freedom protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 153 (quoting New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 301-02, 84 S.Ct. at 737 (Goldberg, J., concurring)). In Harley-Davidson Motorsports, supra, the Oregon Supreme Court held that Gertz protections did not apply in an action for defamation based on a letter written by the plaintiff's competitor to their common franchisor that reported that the plaintiff had poorly served a customer. 568 P.2d at 1361, 1364. The court reasoned, In the present case the interest in democratic dialogue is on-existent. The defamatory matter does not contribute to the free exchange of ideas in decision making for a self-governing society. When this interest supporting First Amendment speech is removed, the only interest left, when weighed against the states' protection of a private individual's reputation, call for a conclusion that he free speech guarantee does not require interference with the states' interest in providing redress for defamation. The Supreme Court of the United States has never indicated in 'this context that constitutional curtailment of state actions was necessary to protect free speech interests. Id. at 1364. Finally, in Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978), the court held that where the defamatory remarks relate[d] to the conduct of an individual's business affairs, they were essentially private in natureand the protection afforded by Gertz against presumed damages should not apply. Id. 579 P.2d at 84. Like the court in Denny, the court in Rowe quoted Justice Goldberg's concurrence in New York Times and held that the balance should bed stuck in favor of the private plaintiff where his reputation has been injured by a non-media defendant in a purely private context. Id. 579 P.2d at 84-85. Although the foregoing cases speak of striking a balance between the risk that truthful speech on a particular topic will be inhibited and the risk that injury to reputation will go uncompensated and undeterred, our threshold decision is in essence a decision about who shall strike that balance. If we decide that the First Amendment protects the defamatory statements in this case, then the decision will have been made  the balance struck  at the most fundamental level of national legislation through the Constitution. If we decide, however, that First Amendment protection does not apply to the defamation claim in this case, then we permit the ordinary law-making organs of state and national government to strike the balances they think are best suited to the times and places over which they exercise jurisdiction. Thus, we pause to consider what factors should affect our decision about who should decide. Where speech concerns the conduct of government or important issues of self-governance, there is a grave danger that those who make and apply the rules at a given time  the governing majority of the moment  will undervalue criticism of the status quo in relation to the reputations of those who represent it. Thus, it is important that the balance in connection with such issues be struck in favor of protection of speech  and against undue government regulation of speech  through the more permanent device of the Constitution. Therefore, such matters are properly treated as of public concern, and speakers are protected by the First Amendment from the inhibition that they inadvertently may run afoul of defamation laws. Where the matter is note that affects the interests of all, on the other hand, there is less danger that the value of defamatory speech will be inadequately weighed by the government in the balance against reputation. Applied to the airline safety concern allege in this case, where the issue is the safety of all and the reputations of a few, it is more likely that he risk of inhibited speech will be over valued in relation to the risk that damage to the reputations of a few will go unvindicated. Moreover, the danger to public safety posed by various non-governmental actors is one that is subject to significant change over time. Thus, it is more appropriate in that context to use the usual decision-making process of government do determine which risks should be reduced at the expense of others. Such matters are therefore properly treated as being of private concern and speakers are properly subject to the regulations of defamation laws. In view of the forgoing, we conclude that the content of Washington's letters to Ayala's employer was of private concern, and subject to defamation law, but that the content of her letter to the FAA was incidental to allegations of public concern, and therefore protected by the Constitution. Washington's letters to Ayala's employer merely communicated information regarding the alleged misconduct of a single private individual, albeit misconduct that could have a significant effect on public safety. The allegations did not, however, address any issue concerning the conduct of government or the structure of society or any social issue. There is little danger that government, acting through defamation law, will improperly weigh the social interest in communication of such information against the reputation interest of the subject of such communications. Indeed, for the reasons discussed above, where the subject matter is the safety of a l, the weighing his best done through he ordinary process of government, which are able to respond to shifts in the social value of the competing interests, whether they are caused by changes in circumstances or popular mood. In fact the interest in airline safety implicated by Washington's communication to Ayala's employer are precisely the sort that are best evaluated and regulated through the usual non-constitutional legislative and judicial processes, because the interests at stake are shared accross society. [7] Washington's letter to the FAA is of a different character, however. In it, she criticizes the FAA's handling of her accusations. She asserts that the agency's failure to give credence to her charges is the result of discrimination against her as a woman and as a non-elite. Such speech is at the very core of the First Amendment; the fact that it was directed to a government agency instead of top the pubic at large merely brings it within an even more specific clause of the First Amendment  that which prohibits laws abridging ... the right ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Because Washington's letter to the FAA concerned such grievances, addressed to an agency of the government, we hold that it was in a matter of public concern.