Opinion ID: 654620
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expressive Conduct.

Text: 37 In determining whether section 3631(b) violates the defendants' First Amendment rights, we must first determine whether this type of cross burning is expressive conduct, giving the defendants a claim to First Amendment protection against their conviction. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 2538, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). Although the United States Supreme Court has rejected the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled speech whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea, the Court has recognized that conduct may be sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 404, 109 S.Ct. at 2539 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we [ask] whether '[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.'  Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 2730, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974)). 38 In this case, the evidence showed that the defendants burned the crosses to tell those in the Jones household (and no doubt to anyone else who saw the burning crosses) that black people were unwelcome in Keeneyville and that association with blacks was not approved. Anyone who saw the burning crosses, especially those in the Jones household, was highly likely to understand their meaning. Indeed, a burning cross may provide different connotations to different people. Some would certainly view a burning cross as a precursor to physical violence and abuse against African-Americans and ... an unmistakable symbol of hatred and violence based on virulent notions of racial supremacy. Charles H. Jones, Proscribing Hate: Distinctions Between Criminal Harm and Protected Expression, 18 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 935, 948 (1992). Inevitably the cross burnings here involved some degree of expressive conduct, albeit not absolutely protected conduct. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, --- U.S. ----, ---- & n. 1, ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2541 & n. 1, 2544, 2550, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (stating that cross burning is expressive conduct that is not subject to total First Amendment protection and, therefore, may be punished under certain laws). No doubt, the defendants wanted to express their dislike, even hatred, of blacks through the cross burnings. But the act of cross burning also promotes fear, intimidation, and psychological injury. Therein lies the reason cross burning, as done in this case, lacks First Amendment protection. Seeid. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2544 (Non-verbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses.). Cloaking an act that portends violence with the guise of protected expression is nothing more than claiming that the First Amendment protects fighting words. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2545 (Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck ... both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim upon the First Amendment.). Accordingly, some forms of expression, in this case cross burning used to intimidate, are harmful and damaging to others and, as such, do not enjoy the protecting cover of speech in the constitutional sense. 39