Opinion ID: 297400
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the question of obviousness.

Text: 49 On appeal, Beckman's primary contention is that the McCoy patent claims involved are invalid for obviousness as defined in 35 U.S.C. § 103. Other defenses, including late claiming, were urged before the district court but are not relied upon in this appeal and thus will not be discussed. 50 a. The Applicable Standard. 51 To be patentable, an alleged invention must be shown to be new and useful per 35 U.S.C. § 101 and nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The requirement of novelty is more specifically defined in 35 U.S.C. § 102 and Beckman suggests in passing that we might find the McCoy patent invalid as fully anticipated by one or more of the prior art check systems discussed in full in Section II, supra. We think it clear that the McCoy patent is not anticipated by the prior art and pass on to the more substantial question of obviousness. 52 The statutory requirement of nonobviousness is found in 35 U.S.C. § 103 which prohibits the patenting of an invention, even though not identically shown in the prior art, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 53 Beckman's initial contention here is that the McCoy patent is somehow invalid on its face, without regard to the prior art, in view of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct. 127, 95 L. Ed. 162 (1950). Specifically, we are warned to scrutinize carefully those patents which include combinations of elements which are individually old in light of the alleged improbability of finding invention in such a combination. The argument is that the McCoy patent fails to satisfy the constitutional standard of patentability enunciated in A & P because the claimed invention consists of old elements (amplifiers, potentiometers, switches, etc.) which operate within the claimed combination in the same fashion as they have always operated in the prior art. 54 This argument fails on two grounds. First, it misconstrues the import of the A & P decision. Second, it suggests an analytical approach to patentability which is directly contrary to the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 103 which provides that the inquiry into patentability must be drawn toward the subject matter as a whole and not to the elements of a claimed combination and their individual novelty. 55 The claims in issue here are, in statutory language, machine claims. 3 They define a new machine which is composed of certain defined elements in combination. Carried to its logical conclusion, the argument here would result in a rule to the effect that A & P precludes the patenting of virtually every new mechanical or electrical device since the vast majority, if not all, involve the construction of some new device (or machine or combination) from old elements. 4 The A & P rule does not require that a combination patent be held invalid merely because of all of the elements in the combination are old. It supports patentability where the combination produces unusual or surprising consequences. As will be seen, that is what the McCoy patent does. 56 The Court's decision in A & P recognizes that non-obviousness is less likely to occur in combination patents, and therefore applies a somewhat more stringent rule of non-obviousness to such patents. It is not inconsistent with, but merely in application of, the general rule stated in § 103. The Court's more recent decision in Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 90 S.Ct. 305, 24 L.Ed.2d 258 (1969) supports this interpretation of the A & P decision. 57 Black Rock involved a similarly simple combination of old elements. The Court found that there was no invention when viewed by the obvious-nonobvious standard. Id. at 63, 90 S.Ct. 305. Moreover, the Court in Black Rock reaffirmed the position it had previously taken in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L. Ed.2d 545 (1966) to make clear that the crucial question in determining obviousness is whether the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented, as a whole, and the prior art are obvious to a man of ordinary skill in the art. 58 From an analytical view, the most definitive statement of the requirement of nonobviousness and the approach to be taken by federal courts in determining this question is found in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 684 (1966). 59 Under [35 U.S.C.] § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Graham v. John Deere Co., supra at 17, 86 S.Ct. at 694. 60 This court has consistently followed the analysis as thus prescribed in Graham, noting that the entire tenor of the Graham decision is that there should be strict observance of all three explicit conditions precedent to the issuance of a patent, namely novelty, utility and non-obviousness, with special emphasis being placed on the latter. Jeddeloh Brothers Sweed Mills, Inc. v. Coe Manufacturing Co., 375 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1967). See also Ashcroft v. Paper Mate Mfg. Co., 434 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1970); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1970). 61 The claims involved in this case appear in Section I, supra, and the prior art relied upon by Beckman is set forth in Section II. As for the differences, we have already noted that the prior art methods of accomplishing the claimed static check failed to check at the input to the integrator. The claims in issue here all require checking at the integrator input. 5 62 Whether this difference rises to the level of patentability depends upon the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. It is difficult to set forth any meaningful quantitative evaluation of the level of skill in a given art. Rather, such determination can be made only by an analysis of the problem allegedly solved by the invention and the efforts of others to arrive at a satisfactory solution. In this respect, the Supreme Court has noted that [s]uch secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. Graham v. John Deere Co., supra at 17-18, 86 S.Ct. at 694. 63 The magnitude of the checking problem in general purpose analog computers is well demonstrated by the number of prior art attempts presented to the district court. Our review of the record reveals some fifteen approaches to the problem solved by the McCoy patent. When the evidence shows that several others in the art have attempted to solve the same problem and have not arrived at the solution claimed by the patent in suit, the statutory presumption of validity 6 is substantially strengthened. 7 64 Evidence of the magnitude of this problem and the efforts directed at solving it is particularly strong as regards the research conducted at one of the nation's leading technical institutions, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. As noted above, M.I.T. developed and constructed one of the first general purpose analog computers. 65 There was extensive testimony during the trial in this case of the existence of this problem and the efforts of personnel at M.I.T. to derive a satisfactory method of checking its computer which did not disturb the problem set-up and constituted a thorough check of interconnections, potentiometer setting, etc. 66 We have discussed the work of an M.I. T. graduate student, Stephen Jatras. 8 Jatras testified during the trial and his Master's thesis was introduced in evidence. The total effect of the testimony and thesis shows that Jatras conducted a detailed study, compiled extensive data on machine failures and their detection and wrote a lengthy thesis which essentially concluded that automation of the then existing procedures was the best approach he could devise. 67 His efforts, along with those of Tremblath, Mathews and Seifert, clearly establish the existence of a problem which had plagued the computer industry since the development of complex analog computers. Substantial efforts by others in the art which fail to accomplish the result achieved by the patented invention are persuasive indications of nonobviousness. 9 68 The circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter of the McCoy patent are perhaps best demonstrated by the sequence of events surrounding the construction of a large analog computer facility at Wright Air Development Center (WADC). In 1954, WADC was contemplating the construction of an analog computer facility of a size and complexity far in excess of anything previously built. 69 L. M. Warshawsky was the chief of the computer operation at WADC and a man with considerable experience and expertise in the field of analog computers. In July, 1954, Warshawsky wrote to Reeves, Beckman, and other large analog computer manufacturers and invited their proposals for specifications for the new WADC machine. The request called for a better approach to computer checking to minimize human and machine errors. The impetus to produce something new for the project was substantial since the opportunity to construct the world's largest and most advanced analog computer was at stake. 70 In response to the request, Reeves, Beckman, and three others proffered their ideas. While there were other matters involved in the proposal, the portions dealing with computer checking as submitted by Beckman and the other companies were essentially limited to prior art approaches. The Reeves proposal, on the other hand, included the problem check of the McCoy patent. This proposal was adopted by WADC and incorporated into the specifications of the computer ultimately built by Reeves and still in use at WADC. 71 Warshawsky testified at the trial to his reaction to the problem check proposal of McCoy. In addition to recognition of the potential and simplicity of the McCoy approach, Warshawsky said that he and his colleagues had wondered why didn't we think of this ourselves. 72 In short, we believe that the extensive efforts at M.I.T., the additional efforts in response to the WADC request and the acceptance of McCoy's proposal demonstrate that the admittedly simple approach to computer checking involved in this appeal was such that the differences between that approach and the prior art were not obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, and did produce the unusual or surprising result referred to in A & P, supra. 73