Opinion ID: 1461836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Comments in the Prosecutor's Closing Argument

Text: Gordon and Williams contend that the prosecutor made several improper comments in his closing and rebuttal arguments that were so prejudicial that a mistrial was warranted in the interest of justice. [3] Although appellants primarily find fault with the prosecutor's conduct, we must review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C. 1989) (citation omitted). Because appellants raised timely objections to the alleged improper comments that were made during the government's closing and rebuttal arguments to which the trial court chose not to take any remedial action, our review is for harmless error. Clark v. United States, 593 A.2d 186, 192 (D.C. 1991); Franklin v. United States, 555 A.2d 1010, 1013 (D.C.1989); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). First, Williams contends that he was substantially prejudiced by the prosecutor's rebuttal argument to the jury that he came to the police station with an alibi for the Simms' murder even before he was formally notified of the charges against him. The apparent basis for this argument was the prosecutor's personal belief that Williams' then attorney, Kenneth Mundy, had made such a statement when he surrendered Williams to the police. During the government's cross-examination, Williams denied his attorney made such a statement. Nonetheless, the prosecutor argued in rebuttal: [Y]ou have the fact that as Wesley Williams admitted on the stand, he came into [the] police station with an alibi before he even knew the date. So how is it that this man knew the date of the murder before he was ever charged or told about the date? Why would he come in talking about [an] alibi? In order to give an alibi defense you have to know the date and time. [4] This argument is particularly troubling because it suggested to the jury that Williams had confessed his guilt to his trial attorney prior to arriving at the police station. The record reflects that Williams never made such an admission during his trial testimony, and no other government or defense witness testified to such an event. Thus, we conclude that the prosecutor's argument was improper because it implied facts not in evidence and testimony not in the record. See Lewis v. United States, 541 A.2d 145, 147 (D.C.1988). Gordon and Williams also complain that the prosecutor compounded the prejudicial impact of Gravette's testimony about her fear of appellants by again referencing it in his closing argument. In addition, they argue that the prosecutor enhanced the prejudice created by Gravette's testimony when he told the jury that Dianne Harrison was also scared to testify during the trial. Specifically, the prosecutor stated, [y]ou heard, ladies and gentlemen, that Mrs. Harrison as well was afraid. Again, and soon thereafter the prosecutor repeated, [n]ow Dianne, even being fearful of testifying, doesn't deny that the car stopped and that she talked to the people in the car. . . . In addition to the fact that the record does not support the government's argument that Dianne Harrison was fearful of appellants, we conclude that the prosecutor's statement that Harrison was fearful of testifying, and the insinuation that her fear was similar to the fear expressed by Gravette, was an attempt to appeal to the juror's sympathies and, thus, was improper. See Carpenter v. United States, 635 A.2d 1289, 1296 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted).