Opinion ID: 2279771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. Waiver of Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Objection Rights

Text: We have never decided this issue but we agree with the overwhelming weight of authority that appellant's Confrontation Clause rights must fall in these circumstances. As the trial judge correctly observed, a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause are not absolute. A defendant may waive his right to confrontation by express waiver, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (waiver by guilty plea), or through his own intentional misconduct. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (privilege lost by misconduct of defendant); Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20, 94 S.Ct. 194, 196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (per curiam) (waiver by boycotting own trial); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1060-61, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (defendant's disruptive behavior requiring removal from courtroom waived his right to confrontation). Nor is a defendant protected when he does away with witnesses against him. All federal and state courts that have addressed this issue, that we could find, have concluded that when a defendant procures a witness's unavailability for trial with the purpose of preventing the witness from testifying, the defendant waives his rights under the Confrontation Clause to object to the admission of the absent witness's hearsay statements. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (where the absent witness had given sworn testimony in a previous trial of the same case, the defendant who procured the witness's unavailability for trial waived his confrontation rights); Houlihan, supra, 92 F.3d 1271 (defendant waives his Confrontation Clause rights by murdering a potential witness). [4] We agree with the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit: [W]hen confrontation becomes impossible due to the actions of the very person who would assert the right, logic dictates that the right has been waived. The law simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving benefits from murdering the chief witness against him. To permit such a subversion of a criminal prosecution would be contrary to public policy, common sense, and the underlying purpose of the confrontation clause, ... and make a mockery of the system of justice that the right was designed to protect. Thevis, supra, 665 F.2d at 630 (citation omitted). [5] Accordingly, we hold that because, as discussed below, it was sufficiently established that Devonshire was responsible for the witness's unavailability, he cannot prevent the introduction of this evidence on grounds that his right to confront the witness has been denied him. For essentially the same reasons, Devonshire also waived any hearsay objections to Ms. Harmon's out-of-court statements. [6] See Houlihan, supra, 92 F.3d at 1281 (by causing witness's unavailability, defendants waived not only their confrontation rights but also their hearsay objections); United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 456, 496, 115 S.Ct. 456, 993, 130 L.Ed.2d 364, 406 (1994); Aguiar, supra ; Mastrangelo, supra ; Thevis, supra; Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.1982); Balano, supra ; United States v. White, 838 F.Supp. 618, 621 (D.D.C. 1993); Gettings, supra ; Geraci, supra .