Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Instruction on Membership in the Conspiracy

Text: 267 In instructing the jury on the standards it must follow in determining whether a particular defendant became a member of the conspiracy the court stated: 268 Now, this element of participation or membership must be considered and decided with specific and individual reference to the particular Defendant you are considering in the case. This must be emphasized even though conspiracy and membership in a conspiracy involves relationships between participants. 269 Each Defendant's participation in the alleged conspiracy, if it is to be found, must be established by evidence of the Defendant's own words, his own actions and the general course of his conduct. 270 Tr. 12365 (emphasis added). 271 Haldeman, relying on D.C. Criminal Jury Instruction 4.92, 245 contends that the italicized words, and the general course of his conduct, injected an impermissible element into the charge by suggesting that membership in the conspiracy could be determined on the basis of something other than a particular defendant's own words and acts. We do not so interpret the added words. The correct formulation of this rule is that a particular defendant's connection with a conspiracy must be established by proof aliunde that is, by proof other than the extra-judicial (hearsay) declarations of persons named or charged as co-conspirators or accomplices. 246 Some preliminary determination 247 must be made as to whether, if the testimony of Government witnesses is accepted as true, each defendant's own acts and statements show a connection with the conspiracy sufficient to justify the admission of the acts and statements of co-conspirators against him. The corollary to this rule is that, once the conspiracy has been established and a particular defendant linked to it by independent evidence, incriminating statements made by a co-conspirator during the pendency and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against that defendant as an exception to the hearsay rule. See generally 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1079 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1972), and cases cited in note 246 supra. 272 Given this purpose to the rule, it is clear that a defendant's own  conduct may be treated in the same manner as his own statements and acts since it is proof independent of the hearsay declarations of co-conspirators; it should therefore be considered in establishing his connection to the conspiracy. The weight of authority supports this. 248 Furthermore, referring to the general course of his conduct does not add something impermissible to words and acts, but rather suggests to the jury that instead of being limited to viewing the words and acts of the accused in isolation, it was proper to reflect upon their general course over a period of time and to draw such conclusions therefrom as would be indicated to the jurors. Conduct is not something different from words and acts but is a pattern perceived from individual or repeated words and acts. 273 It is seldom that a major case will be tried without some deviation from the approved instructions being fully justified to more closely fit a precise situation in the interest of clarity or desired emphasis. We so view the words which were added here. The questioned portion of the instruction merely called the attention of the jury to the fact that, if they wished, they might be able to arrive at a more perceptive conclusion from the words and acts by viewing the general course indicated thereby. We see no error in the added words. They merely add an element of common sense.