Opinion ID: 2167084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant urges that the evidence presented below did not support the guilty findings rendered by the trial judge in that Ms. Lane's testimony was not credible and was not adequately supported by other evidence. That terse statement actually raises three issues, the first of which may be answered summarily. Whether Ms. Lane's testimony is credible is not for us to resolve; judging credibility, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and weighing the evidence are matters for the trial court. Md. Rule 8-131(c); Gibson v. State, 238 Md. 414, 209 A.2d 242 (1965). The second issue, which requires some discussion, arises from some of the court's comments in announcing its findings, and that is whether the trial court, in fact, found Mrs. Lane's version credible. As noted at the beginning of this Opinion, appellant and his wife gave very different stories as to what occurred. The judge recognized that they were diametrically opposed and irreconcilable versions, neither of which he was prepared to accept in full. He was particularly incredulous over Ms. Lane's explanation of the recitation in her diary as to the affair she was supposedly having. She claimed that it was not a real affair, but rather was a fantasya life she wished she had. The judge noted some uncertainty as to whether he understood the meaning of her testimony and suggested that, if her diary were a fantasy, she must be a person who is capable of fantasizing in pretty detailed fantasy. He did not, however, express any doubt with respect to her recitation of what occurred in the bedroom. The judge then recounted appellant's version, following which he said that there are aspects to both of those stories that are not very plausible, but that, as between the two, the Defendant's recounting is more implausible than the victim's. He then added that as to which is more likely so than not, the Court has no difficulty at all in assessing that the version of events as recounted by Mrs. Lane is more likely to be the truth or closer to the truth than the Defendant's. Immediately recognizing that the appropriate standard was not a preponderance of evidence but proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge examined the other evidence that might either corroborate or detract from the two versions. He noted the records of Ms. Lane's 911 callsan abandoned call, an interrupted call, and a call that the judge described as the voice of a hysterical woman. That evidence, corroborated by the observations made by the police officers when they arrived at the scene, the judge found, was consistent with Ms. Lane's testimony. The officers characterized her as hysterical, excited, and extremely upset, which is how the judge said she sounded on the third tape. The judge recounted the medical evidence, including abrasions posterior to the vaginal outlet, which he found consistent with digital insertion and probably not consistent with appellant's story of consensual foreplay. Responding to the question of whether appellant could have done all of the things Ms. Lane said he didhold her hands, remove her clothes, penetrate her vagina with his hand, and assault her with his penisthe judge concluded from the fact that, in his employment as a loss prevention officer appellant was able to subdue shoplifters without excessive violence, that appellant is capable of holding and subduing a person against their will without leaving any substantial injuries upon them and [t]hat is pretty consistent with what his wife said he did to her. Turning then to the elements of the various offenses, the judge, necessarily rejecting appellant's version, found that there was no evidence of consent and that there certainly is evidence of force. He stated his conclusion as follows: The Court thinks that the corroboration supplied by the 911 tape, the police officers' testimony, hospital records, particularly when, in considering the lack of corroboration and inconsistencies and somewhat implausibilities of some aspects of the Defendant's version of what happened, are sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he did commit an assault upon her, that the assault was committed upon her with the intent of engaging in forcible intercourse with her, and that he did engage in forcible fellatio with her. Notwithstanding that the judge found certain of the details in Ms. Lane's story puzzling or hard to accept, it is clear that, with the corroborating evidence that he described, he found, in the end, that the evidence sufficed to establish the elements of the various offenses. It is not necessary that the trier of fact believe each and every statement made by the State's witnesses, so long as, upon the totality of the evidence, it finds the elements of the crime established beyond a reasonable doubt. The third issue implicit in appellant's complaint is that the judge's findings were not, in fact supported by substantial evidence and that those findings were therefore clearly erroneous. We find no merit to that claim. There was, as the judge noted, evidence that appellant attempted to have sexual intercourse with his wife by force, without her consent, and against her will and that he forced his penis into her mouth against her will and without her consent. That evidence sufficed to establish attempted second degree rape, a second degree sexual offense, and an unnatural and perverted sex act. SENTENCE IMPOSED ON COUNT SEVEN (UNNATURAL AND PERVERTED SEX ACT) VACATED; JUDGMENTS OTHERWISE AFFIRMED; APPELLANT TO PAY THE COSTS.