Opinion ID: 1443088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Administrative Order Enhancement

Text: Turning to Goldberg's alternative sentencing objection, we agree that the two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(8)  violating a prior, specific judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in the guidelines  was unwarranted. As a general rule, federal courts of appeals considering the issue have been willing to impose the enhancement after a meaningful negotiation or interaction led the agency to issue a directive that the defendant subsequently violated. For example, the Second Circuit held that a defendant who failed to abide by a negotiated consent decree was subject to the enhancement, a proposition that the Seventh Circuit also agreed with. See United States v. Mantas, 274 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Spencer, 129 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir.1997). Going even further, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mantas held that the enhancement was merited after the Illinois Department of Agriculture (the U.S.D.A.'s state counterpart) inspected a meat packing plant, discussed the situation with the owner face to face, proposed a possible remedy, and then officially seized the meat products at issue (the owner then sold the meat in question nonetheless). That said, no court of appeals has held that a mere warning letter, without more, can justify the enhancement. To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Wallace, a post- Mantas decision, held that the enhancement should not be applied to every situation where a defendant knew or was told by someone in authority that what she was doing was illegal. 355 F.3d 1095, 1097-1098 (7th Cir.2004). The Ninth Circuit also adopted this view in United States v. Linville, saying, [T]he Guideline speaks of `violations.' That is a perfectly intelligible usage as it applies to an `order, injunction [or] decree' It is considerably less intelligible if process is taken to mean a mere letter or ... warning. 10 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir.1993). We agree with the analysis of our sister circuit courts to the extent that they deem administrative orders, injunctions, decrees, and processes as flexible concepts. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ([D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.). We also agree that even this flexible approach cannot permit a district court to impose the enhancement for no other reason than that the defendant continued to engage in certain conduct after the agency questioned its legality. As a result, we hold that imposing the two-level enhancement requires an interaction between the agency and defendant that allowed the defendant to participate in some meaningful way (if he elected to do so), and that led to a definite result, like a consent decree or a seizure. See Wallace, 355 F.3d at 1097-1098; United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 227-28 (3d Cir.1999). The question then is whether this happened here. The Government argues that the F.D.A.'s repeated dealings with Goldberg were sufficient because it notified Goldberg (by a so-called Section 305 Notice) that he had engaged in prohibited conduct, that he had the opportunity to attend a meeting with agency officials where he could present [his] views on this matter, and that the next step was to refer the matter to the Department of Justice for possible criminal prosecution. This, the Government contends, represented the final agency action, a precursor to criminal proceedings. Government Br. 89. In doing so, it equates § 2B1.1(b)(8)'s prior, specific ... administrative order, injunction, decree, or process language with any final agency action, citing 21 U.S.C. § 335, governing the F.D.C.A., which provides that [b]efore any violation of this chapter is [referred] for institution of a criminal proceeding, the person against whom such proceeding is contemplated shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his views, either orally or in writing, with regard to such contemplated proceeding. We disagree. Just because the agency believes it has enough information to act  and thus believes itself finished with this part of the process  it has not a fortiori issued a specific ... administrative order, injunction, decree, or process sufficient to trigger § 2B1.1(b)(8). Instead, § 2B1.1(b)(8) requires some specific directive that the defendant can defy. In other words, like the defendant in Mantas whose meat products were seized (and thus who had the option of either respecting the seizure or defying it), or the defendant in the Second Circuit's Spencer case who entered into a consent decree, in order to subject Goldberg to this enhancement, he had to be ordered to stop. To that end, there is no dispute that the F.D.A. never issued any definitive order telling Goldberg that he had to stop. This makes the F.D.A.'s notice insufficient for these purposes. [7] In the alternative, the Government argues that the enhancement is proper in light of the letter Goldberg received from the Kentucky Board of Veterinary Examiners stating that he should CEASE AND DESIST from engaging in the practice of veterinary medicine (emphasis in original). [8] While this contains the explicit directive that we are looking for, it fails because the other required element is missing  Goldberg was not offered the chance to participate in the process in any meaningful way. The Kentucky letter starts out by stating that the Board has already referred the ... matter to the Office of the Attorney General for possible enforcement proceedings (e.g., injunctive relief and/or criminal sanctions), and threatens to pursue all available legal remedies unless Goldberg CEASE[S] AND DESIST[S] from engaging in the practice of veterinary medicine or consulting with unlicensed animal owners in the Commonwealth. There is no invitation for Goldberg to state his case, or to come to a resolution with the Board. Instead, he has two choices, stop or be subject to further proceedings. This is the quintessential warning letter saying nothing more than stop or else. As a result, it cannot provide the basis for the two-level enhancement pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(8). Therefore, we find nothing in the record justifying the two-level enhancement.