Opinion ID: 202716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Physical Restraint Sentencing Enhancement

Text: 23 Ossai next contends that the district court erred in imposing a two-level sentencing enhancement for using physical restraint against Chick during the course of the robbery, viz., placing the gun to Chick's head to force him to kneel. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (requiring a two-level enhancement if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense). Ossai argues that § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) should be triggered only if defendant tied, bound or locked up the victim, or forced the victim to accompany him to another location to prevent the victim's escape. Finally, Ossai maintains that the § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement amounts to impermissible double-counting under the Sentencing Guidelines, in that the method by which he restrained Chick — using a dangerous weapon — had already triggered a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 440 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir.2006) (reversing enhancement as double-counting, but noting that double-counting is not automatically impermissible under the Guidelines). 24 A sentence imposed under the now-advisory Sentencing Guidelines is to be reviewed for reasonableness. United States v. Alli, 444 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)). Normally, the district court must determine the applicable GSR, assess whether other factors identified by the parties warrant a sentence above or below the GSR, consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and explain its reasons for imposing the ultimate sentence. Id. Thus, a sentence which exceeds the maximum GSR may be reasonable in the circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 433-34 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2054, 164 L.Ed.2d 802 (2006); United States v. Jordan, 435 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2050, 164 L.Ed.2d 802 (2006). Our emphasis . . . will be on the [district court's] provision of a reasoned explanation, a plausible outcome and — where these criteria are met — some deference to different judgments by the district judges on the scene. ( United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir.2006)) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 928, 166 L.Ed.2d 715 (2007). We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo, and its findings of fact only for clear error. United States v. Robinson, 433 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir.2005). 25 Physically restrained connotes the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n. 1 (K); see also id. § 2B3.1, cmt. background (The guidelines provide an enhancement for robberies where a victim was forced to accompany the defendant to another location, or was physically restrained by being tied, bound, or locked up.). Of course, these enumerated examples of physical restraint are merely illustrative, rather than exhaustive. See United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 39 (1st Cir.1998). 26 Ossai's argument is premised primarily on the contention that use of the gun was at most a psychological restraint on Chick, rather than a physical one, as well as being a restraint intrinsic to virtually all armed robberies. The physical restraint test is necessarily case-specific and fact-intensive. Not every physical contact by a defendant with a victim necessarily qualifies as a cognizable restraint under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), nor would the absence of such actual physical contact necessarily foreclose a finding of restraint, see United States v. Wallace, 461 F.3d 15, 33-35 (1st Cir.2006) (affirming § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement where the armed defendant blocked the victim's path). We need not address Ossai's argument, however, as he utilized more than the gun to make Chick kneel. Ossai's simultaneous placement of his hand on the victim's neck and shoulder to force him into a kneeling position, especially while stating that I do not want to hurt you, unquestionably qualifies as a physical restraint under any reasonable connotation of that term. See DeLuca, 137 F.3d at 39 (noting that the defendant's pushing of the victim to prevent his escape from hallway qualified as physical restraint). Witnesses testified that Chick is a large and powerful man. By forcing Chick onto his knees, Ossai rendered Chick more vulnerable to Ossai's will, thereby diminishing Chick's freedom of movement and ability to resist or escape. Further, this evidence also moots Ossai's argument that the § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement amounted to impermissible double-counting, since the use of the gun and his hand constituted discrete actions warranting distinct enhancements. See United States v. Rucker, 178 F.3d 1369, 1373 (10th Cir.1999) (finding no impermissible double-counting because these two enhancements serve distinct purposes). 27