Opinion ID: 853949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attempted Battery Instruction

Text: In Spradlin v. State , we held that a jury instruction purporting to set out the elements of attempted murder must inform the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with intent to kill the victim, engaged in conduct which was a substantial step toward such killing. 569 N.E.2d at 950 (emphasis added). Richeson urges us to extend Spradlin to attempted battery, requiring the trial court to instruct the jury that the State must prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent to touch the victims in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. [1] (Appellant's Br. at 8-9 (emphasis added).) Although we have used broad language suggesting an intent to extend Spradlin to all attempt crimes, [2] decisions in the Court of Appeals indicate that the issue is far from settled, and a split of authority originating in that court has prompted our review in this case. [3] The issue, then, is whether the attempt statute, Ind.Code § 35-41-5-1, requires the State to prove in an attempted battery prosecution that the defendant took a substantial step toward the completion of an intentional battery. We hold that it does not, and we expressly limit Spradlin to attempted murder. Indiana's attempt statute, Ind.Code § 35-41-5-1(a), provides: A person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the culpability required for the commission of that crime, he engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime (emphasis added). The culpability required for battery is knowingly or intentionally. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-2-1(a) (West 1998). We conclude that the attempt and battery statutes, when taken together, do not require an attempted battery instruction providing that the State must prove that the defendant intended to batter. Rather, if the instruction requires the State to prove that the defendant took a substantial step to accomplish a knowing or intentional battery, then the two statutes are satisfied. [4] This straightforward application of the attempt statute to the battery statute does not change our interpretation of its application to the murder statute, Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1, nor does it require that we overrule Spradlin and its progeny. Attempted murder is a special case, deserving special treatment. Accordingly, we neither remove the gloss that we placed on the attempt statute when it is applied in the context of murder, nor do we expand that gloss to cover other contexts. Murder has traditionally been treated differently by this Court and by the legislature. For example, the General Assembly has classified murder as its own offense, Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1, with its own sentencing range, Ind.Code § 35-50-2-3, separate from the felony-misdemeanor classifications and the sentencing system for all other criminal offenses. Moreover, we think that the distance between perpetrator and victim in many attempted murder cases poses special problems of intent ambiguity. In other attempt prosecutions, the probable or intended victim and result are often clearly indicated by the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 683 N.E.2d 560 (Ind.1997) (attempted rape case where victim was targeted and intent to rape was expressly stated); Miller v. State, 591 N.E.2d 146 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (attempted kidnaping case where victim was targeted and intent to kidnap was obvious from the circumstances). In many attempted murder cases, however, the victim, the result, or both, are more difficult to ascertain. A drive-by shooting is the paradigm problematic attempted murder case. In such cases it is often unclear whether the defendant intended to murder or to batter, whether he knew of a high probability of death or a touching, or whether he simply recklessly disregarded either. Such ambiguity carries with it the risk that the jury will fail to distinguish between levels of culpability, imposing a penalty for reckless actions, rather than for intentional or knowing ones. In order to ensure that juries sort out the higher level of culpability in attempted murder prosecutions, we construed the attempt statute in Spradlin to require proof that the defendant intended death. While attempted battery can involve this same type of ambiguity, unlike attempted murder, attempted battery is not subject to the most severe penalty imposed by the legislature for attempted crimes, that of a Class A felony. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-5-1(a) (West 1998); Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-2-1 (West 1998). An attempted murder conviction subjects a defendant to a penalty that is two and one-half to fifty times higher than the penalty for attempted battery. [5] The lower sentence range for attempted battery convictions reduces the need for a heightened mens rea requirement to protect against jury confusion caused by ambiguity, because, while the risk of confusion remains similar, the harm that might result from such confusion is much less severe. It is the higher sentence range for attempted murder in combination with the ambiguity involved in the proof of that crime that justifies the result in Spradlin and distinguishes other types of attempt prosecutions that involve either stringent penalties, [6] or ambiguity, [7] but not both. We conclude that the special precautions we took in Spradlin are not warranted for lesser offenses. We hold, therefore, that the attempt statute permits an instruction that the jury may convict upon proof that the defendant took a substantial step toward a knowing battery.