Opinion ID: 1621727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to break for lunch during voir dire without being sequestered and to obtain the agreement of the parties to allow the petit jury to go home after they were sworn in without being sequestered

Text: ¶ 86. The jury was impaneled in Lincoln County. After the jurors were sworn, the parties agreed that they would be allowed a short time in which to pack some things at home before they were transported from Brookhaven to Columbia in Marion County that same afternoon, where they would be sequestered throughout the trial. The circuit court instructed the jurors not to read any newspapers, listen to the radio or talk with anyone about the case while they got ready. Watts now asserts that it was reversible error to so allow. ¶ 87. Rule 10.02 of the Mississippi Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules states that [i]n any case where the state seeks to impose the death penalty, the jury shall be sequestered during the entire trial. There is no corresponding statutory directive, rather the rule stems from the common law rule of jury sequestration. Wilson v. State, 248 So.2d 802, 803 (Miss. 1971). Watts, apparently laboring under the misapprehension that court rules are made by the Legislature, charges that [t]he trial court indisputably violated this clear legislative directive. He then refers the Court to State v. Watts, 579 So.2d 931 (La.1991), which is totally irrelevant to the assignment of error at issue. ¶ 88. In Wilson, this Court found that despite agreement by the defendant that the jury could disperse for the night after the first day of trial in his capital murder case, allowing the jury to separate for the night after the first day of trial was reversible error. Id. at 803. It rejected the idea that any error was cured by the consent of the defendant, raising concerns about the prejudice that might befall a defendant asked to consent to a waiver of sequestration: In this case it is suggested by the counsel for the State that if there was any error in permitting the jury to separate, it was cured by the consent of the prisoner. We do not agree with counsel in this view of the law. We are of the opinion that the court has no power to authorize the separation of the jury during the trial of a capital case, either with or without the consent of the prisoner, except in cases of great necessity; and if it be done, and the prisoner be found guilty, a new trial will be granted. The prisoner ought not to be asked to consent. Who dare refuse to consent, when the accommodation of those, in whose hands are the issues of his life or death, is involved in the question? He would have to calculate the chances of irritation from being annoyed by a refusal on the one hand, and of tampering on the other. No consent of the prisoner in the extremity of his need, ought to bind him. He may really be unwilling to permit the jury to separate, but may consent for fear that his refusal may prejudice the jury against him. Id. at 803-04 ( quoting Woods v. State, 43 Miss. 364, 372-73 (1870)). This Court reiterated in Cox v. State, 365 So.2d 627 (Miss. 1978) that in a capital case, the jury shall be sequestered during the entire trial and this right cannot be waived either by the attorney for the accused or at the discretion of the trial court. Id. at 629. See also Weaver v. State, 272 So.2d 636, 638 (Miss.1973)(if this were a capital case, dispersal and separation of jurors would be reversible error even if permitted with the consent of the defendant.). But see Barnes v. State, 374 So.2d 1308, 1309 (Miss.1979)(in manslaughter case, failure to sequester jury was not error because Defendant agreed to procedure). In Cox, the jury was sent home for the night after the first day of trial in a capital murder case after the defendant became ill late in the day and the judge determined that it would be impossible to arrange transportation and hotel rooms for the jurors. Id. at 628. As distinguished from Wilson, Woods and the case sub judice, however, counsel for the defense apparently did not agree to dispersing the jury. Id. ¶ 89. In this case, as further distinguished from Wilson and Cox, although the jury already had been sworn, it had not yet heard opening arguments or the testimony of any witnesses. The jurors were not dispersed for any great length of time; rather, court was adjourned at 4:10 p.m. and they were directed to hurry back to the courthouse so that they might travel to Columbia that afternoon. There is no suggestion in the record that any of the jurors disregarded the court's instructions regarding discussion of the case. ¶ 90. None of the Mississippi cases address the situation now before this Court: where the jury has been permitted to disperse briefly after the completion of preliminary proceedings but before the actual trial and introduction of evidence. In the majority of other jurisdictions, where the common law practice of sequestration has been superseded by statute so as to allow waiver by consent, dispersal of the jury before the actual trial has not been found to be grounds for a new trial. Allen E. Korpela, Annotation, Separation of Jury in Criminal Case Before Introduction of Evidence Modern Cases, 72 A.L.R 3d 100, 103 (1976 and Supp.1995). In Louisiana, where the Criminal Code was amended in 1995 to relax the sequestration requirement so as to provide that [i]n capital cases, after each juror is sworn he shall be sequestered, unless the state and the defense have jointly moved that the jury not be sequestered. La.Code Crim. P., art. 791(B), it was noted that the restriction against wavier was premised on the idea that a `[d]efendant ought not to be placed in the position of having to consent, or perhaps prejudice the jury by withholding consent.' State v. Taylor, 669 So.2d 364, 381 (La.1996)( quoting State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d 396, 400 (La.1973), overruled by Taylor, 669 So.2d at 381). As the Taylor court pointed out, concerns about prejudicing the defendant may be remedied by following the proper procedure, that is, by considering the issue of waiver of sequestration outside the presence of the jury and requiring both the state and the defendant to consent before sequestration may be waived. Id. See also State v. Robertson, 712 So.2d 8 (La.1998). ¶ 91. The better practice would have been for the circuit court to advise venire members the night before final jury selection and swearing in to come to court with packed suitcases. However, allowing the jurors, with the consent of both parties, to go home and quickly pack their bags after they were sworn in but before they were sequestered for the actual trial and the introduction of any evidence, does not warrant reversal of the entire case for a new trial. The jurors were advised that both sides had agreed that they could have a few minutes to get their things ready. The potential for jury prejudice against the defendant upon which the rule against allowing any waiver of sequestration even with the defendant's consent is premised was eliminated when consent was obtained by both parties outside of the presence of the jury.