Opinion ID: 1952878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defendants' Other Arguments

Text: A. Agents Are Not Immune From All Liability for Alleged Nondisclosures of Material Information in Connection with Real-estate Transactions The agents argue that our holding in Kennett v. Marquis, 798 A.2d 416 (R.I.2002) (per curiam), is controlling in this case. In Kennett, this Court considered the liability of a seller's agent for alleged misrepresentations. The plaintiffs in Kennett argued that a groundwater report containing illegible information misled them into believing that the property did not contain wetlands, when in fact it did. Id. at 417. The plaintiffs sued the sellers' agent for intentional or negligent misrepresentation by providing a partially illegible report to the plaintiff-buyers. Id. This Court held that the sellers' agent was not liable for several reasons. First, we recounted the general common-law rule that an agent [working] on behalf of a disclosed principal is not personally liable to a third party for acts performed within the scope of the [agent's] authority. Id. at 418 (quoting Cardente v. Maggiacomo Insurance Agency, Inc., 108 R.I. 71, 73, 272 A.2d 155, 156 (1971)). Second, none of the exceptions to this rule applied in the Kennett case: (1) the challenged acts of the agent were not outside the scope of the agency; (2) the challenged acts were ones that the agent was bound to perform under contract with the seller; and (3) the challenged acts were not within the scope of a disclosure duty independent of the agency relationship. Id. at 419. In Kennett, we also observed that there was no evidence that the sellers' agent had supplied false information. Kennett, 798 A.2d at 419. If she had done so, she could have been liable for supplying false information in a business transaction. Id. (citing Estate of Braswell v. People's Credit Union, 602 A.2d 510, 512 (R.I.1992)). Also, we noted that there was no evidence that the sellers' agent in Kennett failed to exercise reasonable care in transmitting the information, or that [sellers' agent] knew of the presence of wetlands on the property. Id. Nor was there evidence that the sellers' agent delivered false information knowingly or intentionally. Id. Under these circumstances, we agreed that the sellers' agent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. One key difference, however, between Kennett and this case is that here some evidence suggests that both sets of real-estate agents were aware that the seller's property may have been defective because it was susceptible to severe erosion. If so, then, as noted in Stebbins I, this could give rise to a duty on the part of the agents  independent of the seller's disclosures  to disclose this information to the buyer. B. The Buyer Did Not Waive his Common-Law Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims At oral argument, counsel for the agents suggested for the first time on this appeal that the buyer had waived any argument that his common-law claims for negligence and breach-of-fiduciary duty remained viable causes of action after our decision in Stebbins I. Specifically, they argued that buyer had failed to challenge the motion justice's granting of summary judgment on these claims in either his prebriefing or supplemental statements in Stebbins I. As a result, they argued, he waived his right to raise such arguments on this appeal. The failure of a party to challenge a trial court's ruling or to brief a particular issue on appeal results in a waiver of that issue. See S.Ct. R.App. P. 16(a) (Errors not claimed, questions not raised and points not made [in a party's brief] ordinarily will be treated as waived and not considered by the court.). In particular, as we recently noted, [i]ssues that the appellant fails to brief are waived on appeal. See Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 482 n. 6 (R.I. 2002) (citing Wilkinson v. State Crime Laboratory Commission, 788 A.2d 1129, 1131 n. 1 (R.I. 2002)). (Emphases added.) We agree with defendants that claims first decided by the trial court and then not raised in this Court by an appellant  either in the appellant's brief, or, for cases placed on the show-cause calendar, in that party's prebriefing or supplemental show-cause statements  are deemed waived, both for purposes of the appeal at issue, and throughout any future proceedings after the case is remanded. See James J. O'Rourke, Inc. v. Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island, 478 A.2d 195, 198 n. 4 (R.I.1984) (explaining that a party's failure to brief and argue a previously dismissed claim on appeal constitutes a waiver of that issue). In this case, however, after reexamining each of the prebriefing and supplemental show-cause statements submitted by the parties in Stebbins I, we cannot conclude, as the agents urge, that the buyer failed in his previous appeal to challenge the court's grant of summary judgment with respect to his common-law negligence and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. In the buyer's supplemental show-cause statement in Stebbins I, he specifically raised as a point of error the motion justice's granting of summary judgment on his breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against the buyer's agent. Indeed, the buyer devoted three pages of his supplemental statement in Stebbins I to this argument, quoting § 5-20.6-6, and concluding with the contention that [i]n granting summary judgment, the [t]rial [c]ourt ignored the statutorily imposed fiduciary duties between [the buyer's agent] and [the buyer] and its ruling should be reversed for this reason as well. Besides arguing for recognition of a private cause of action for damages under chapter 20.8 of title 5, the buyer's supplemental statement challenged the motion justice's granting of summary judgment with respect to his common-law negligence claims against all defendants: Even if [§ 5-20.8-1 et seq.] did not recognize such a private right of action   , the Disclosure Statute still establishes a per se negligence claim against defendants. It is black letter law that `[w]hen a statute provides that under certain circumstances particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as fixing a standard for all members of the community, from which it is negligence to deviate.' [W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 36 at 220 (5th ed.1984)]. Accordingly, [the buyer argued] the Disclosure Statute both creates a private right of action and sets an appropriate standard of conduct for sellers and brokers of real estate  one that concededly has been violated here. On this appeal, the buyer also has included arguments in his prebriefing statement suggesting that the Superior Court justice again erred in concluding that Stebbins I affirmed the grant of summary judgment against the buyer's common-law claims for negligence and for breach of fiduciary duty: [E]ven if the Trial Court was correct that there is no private right of action under the Disclosure Statute against brokers   , the Statute sets an appropriate standard of conduct under the negligence claim which remained in the case under Stebbins I. Similarly, the standard of care set out in the Disclosure Statute bears on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Because the buyer raised the dismissal of his breach-of-fiduciary duty and negligence claims as points of error in his original Stebbins I supplemental statement on appeal, and argued these same issues again in his prebriefing and supplemental show-cause statements on this appeal, we hold that he has not waived his claims for negligence, negligent omission, and breach of fiduciary duty. On the other hand, because buyer failed to challenge the Superior Court's granting of summary judgment against his claims alleging deceptive trade practices, civil racketeering violations, breach of contract, breach of the implied duty of good-faith and fair-dealing, and breach of warranty as points of error in Stebbins I, we deem these counts to have been waived and therefore, not part of this case in any future proceedings.