Opinion ID: 757642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asylum Issue

Text: 7 The first issue involves Asani's application for asylum. Asani applied for asylum under § 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Immigration Act or INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), and withholding of deportation under § 243(h) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), alleging past persecution and a fear of future persecution if he were to return to Macedonia. The IJ denied his application for asylum, and the BIA affirmed. 8 Under § 208(a), an alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) ]. 8 U.S.C. § 1158; Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir.1990). The Immigration Act defines refugee as 9 any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality    and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 10 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). If an alien establishes past persecution, he or she is then entitled to a rebuttable presumption in favor of granting asylum. This presumption may be overcome by evidence indicating that the alien no longer is in danger of being persecuted again due to changed conditions in the home country. Bereza, 115 F.3d at 472 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(I)); Angoucheva v. INS, 106 F.3d 781, 788 (7th Cir.1997); Skalak v. INS, 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir.1991). However, in some cases, even if there is little likelihood of future persecution, asylum may be granted as a matter of discretion for humanitarian reasons if the alien has suffered an atrocious form[ ] of persecution because [e]ven though there may have been a change of regime in his country, this may not always produce a complete change in the attitude of the population, nor, in view of his past experiences, in the mind of the refugee. Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104, at  16 (BIA 1989).
11 The BIA found that Asani had not established that he suffered past persecution as contemplated under § 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration Act. Specifically, the BIA commented that [a]lthough the respondent testified that his teeth had been knocked out as a result of being beaten by the police during his last detainment, we do not find that the harm suffered by the respondent rises to the level of past persecution within the meaning of the Act. In Re Asani, Asn-tyl-noi, at 2 (BIA Sept. 12, 1997). With respect to the first arrest, the BIA continued that although the conditions in the facility were deplorable, the record does not reflect that he suffered any physical or psychological harm. Id. As for his last two detentions, the BIA found that they did not constitute past persecution because they consisted of only a few hours and [Asani] apparently did not suffer any serious injuries from the beating. Id. 12 We review the BIA's interpretation of the Immigration Act de novo and its factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard. Borca v. INS, 77 F.3d 210, 214 (7th Cir.1996). 13 The BIA found no past persecution, in part because it applied the wrong standard and in part because it seems that the BIA does not believe that knocking a person's teeth out is harm enough to constitute past persecution. Applying an incorrect standard, the BIA apparently believed that Asani was not subject to past persecution because he had not suffered any physical or psychological harm from his mistreatment by the Yugoslavian authorities and because he did not receive serious injuries when he was beaten by the police. However, this is not the standard recognized by this Court. While the Immigration Act does not provide a definition for the term persecution, we have defined it as  'punishment' or 'the infliction of harm' which is administered on account of    race, religion, nationality, group membership, or political opinion   . Id. Although the conduct in question need not necessarily threaten the petitioner's 'life or freedom,' it must rise above the level of mere 'harassment' to constitute persecution. Id. (citing Balazoski v. INS, 932 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir.1991) (citations omitted)). 14 Accordingly, we remand in order for the BIA to apply the correct standard. However, we also are concerned that the BIA did not rationally consider the evidence of the harm Asani actually suffered due to his political activities. Even applying an incorrect and more demanding standard, the BIA found that the loss of two of Asani's teeth as a result of a police beating was not a serious injur[y] and that a two-week detainment in a cell with only enough room to stand, handcuffed to a radiator, and deprived of sufficient food and water because of Asani's participation in a pro-Albanian demonstration did not constitute physical or psychological harm. We call into question the BIA's conclusion that the harm Asani suffered did not cause serious injuries or result in physical or psychological harm. If having two teeth knocked out and being deprived of sufficient food and water are not serious injuries or physical harm, what is? 15 However, because the BIA applied an incorrect standard, we remand for it to apply the proper one, noting that the appropriate standard--punishment or infliction of harm that rise[s] above the level of mere 'harassment' --is even less demanding than the standard used by the BIA and thus questioning whether the BIA's finding that Asani did not suffer past persecution is supported by substantial evidence. Id. On remand, we are confident that the BIA will consider the evidence fully and fairly under the correct standard. 16 We also note, as guidance on remand, that the two cases cited by the BIA in support of its conclusion that Asani did not suffer past persecution--Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir.1990), and Skalak v. INS, 944 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.1991)--are distinguishable. 17 In Zalega, we held that actions by Polish authorities were not sufficient to demonstrate past persecution justifying granting of asylum where they arrested and interrogated Mr. Zalega on several occasions. 916 F.2d at 1260. Reasoning that [f]or these detentions to be considered persecution, Zalega had to demonstrate that his detention involved more than simple incarceration, we found that because Zalega was detained for short periods of time and was not mistreated while incarcerated, it was reasonable for the BIA to hold that this was not substantial evidence of persecution. Id. 18 In Skalak, we likewise held that a Polish national had not suffered past persecution when she was jailed twice and interrogated for three days for her activities in the Solidarity movement and was harassed by officials at the school where she taught for her refusal to join the Communist Party, reasoning that the brief detentions and mild harassment that [ ] Skalak experienced at the hands of the Polish authorities do not add up to 'persecution.'  944 F.2d at 365. We also note that because we had already concluded that Skalak did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution, she had to demonstrate whether she should be eligible for asylum, notwithstanding the absence of any danger of persecution, merely because she was persecuted in the past. Id. To be eligible for asylum based on past persecution alone, an alien must show persecution so severe that perhaps a person should not be forced to return to the country in which she underwent it even if the danger of recurrence is negligible. Id. Thus, in addition to the fact that Skalak only suffered brief detentions and mild harassment, she had a much higher burden in order to rest her case exclusively on past persecution. 19 In contrast, Asani suffered more than the brief detentions and mild harassment suffered by Skalak and Zalega. He was detained in a jail cell with no room to sit, deprived of food and water, and repeatedly interrogated. He was also physically harmed by being subjected to a police beating where two of his teeth were knocked out. Furthermore, because Asani may be able to demonstrate a fear of future persecution, see discussion infra Part I.B, his situation is distinguishable from that of Skalak, who, in basing her asylum claim on past persecution alone, had to demonstrate more severe persecution than is required of an alien who relies on past persecution combined with a fear of future persecution to be granted asylum. 20 The BIA and the INS also rely on a case, Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 (BIA 1989), where the BIA found that the past persecution suffered by Mr. Chen was so severe that asylum should be granted on that basis alone. Id. at  21. The BIA held that where an asylum applicant has been subjected to especially severe persecution in the past, humanitarian reasons may warrant the granting of asylum even if there is little likelihood of future persecution, id. at  19, reasoning that a petitioner who has suffered under atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected to repatriate even if conditions had changed substantially in his or her country of origin. Id. To establish such eligibility, an alien must show past persecution so severe that repatriation would be inhumane. Baka v. INS, 963 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir.1992). 21 Mr. Chen, a Chinese Christian, was persecuted in China during the Cultural Revolution. His father had been systematically tortured for eight years due to his religious beliefs, having been dragged through the streets in humiliation and badly burned during a Bible-burning crusade. Chen himself also had been tortured and harassed since the age of eight, having been locked in his house for six months, interrogated, physically abused resulting in permanent injuries, deprived of food and necessary medical attention, and exiled to a rural village for reeducation. 22 The INS argues that because Asani's situation is not as egregious as that of Mr. Chen, Asani has not suffered past persecution. Although we have not established a minimum showing of atrocity necessary to justify a discretionary grant of asylum based on past persecution, we concede that Asani's claims do not approach the level of atrocity suffered by the petitioner in Chen, and thus that the past persecution Asani experienced may not rise to the level of severity necessary to qualify for a humanitarian grant of asylum based on past persecution alone. See Bereza, 115 F.3d at 476 (noting the higher showing that must be made in the absence of a well-founded fear of future persecution). 23 However, Asani still may be statutorily eligible for asylum if he demonstrates a well-founded fear of future persecution if he is deported, which will be presumed based on a showing of past persecution. In such a case, the past persecution that must be proven does not need to rise to the level of Chen, where Chen's mistreatment merited a humanitarian grant of asylum based on past persecution alone. See id. at 475 ([w]ithout a well-founded fear of persecution, [petitioner] must establish particularly heinous past persecution in order to show that he has compelling reasons for not returning to [his home country]); Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, 406 (7th Cir.1997) (a refugee who has no reasonable fear of future persecution must indeed prove that his past persecution was a severe rather than a mild    form of persecution). In a case where the alien relies on past persecution plus a well-founded fear of future persecution, persecution is not defined as the sustained, abusive treatment involving ferocious and sustained degradation (Respondent's Br. at 31, 32) that Mr. Chen received, but rather as punishment or the infliction of harm administered on account of race, religion, nationality, group membership, or political opinion which need not necessarily threaten the petitioner's life or freedom, but which must rise above the level of mere harassment to constitute persecution. Borca, 77 F.3d at 214. Thus the Chen case is not the benchmark for what constitutes past persecution in a situation where the alien also presents evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution in order to receive asylum, but rather is an extreme case that far surpasses the threshold for past persecution as articulated by this Court in Borca. 24 We remand in order for the BIA to apply the correct standard. As previously noted, it is likely that the events described by Asani--being beaten resulting in the loss of two teeth, deprived of food and water, detained in a cell with no room to sit, and chained to a radiator--are sufficiently serious to rise beyond the level of mere harassment. Thus, while Asani may not be able to base his asylum claim solely on the treatment he received in the past, if he is able to demonstrate that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution, he may be granted asylum. 2
25 In order to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, an alien must not only show that his or her fear is genuine but must establish that a reasonable person in the alien's circumstances would fear persecution. Id. The BIA concluded that Asani did not present evidence that he had a well-founded fear of persecution if he were to return to Macedonia. However, because conditions in Macedonia have changed since the time of the BIA's decision, we order a limited remand, see Caterpillar, Inc. v. NLRB, 138 F.3d 1105, 1107-1108 (7th Cir.1998); Mirchandani v. United States, 836 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir.1988), to permit Asani to file a motion, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c), to reopen the asylum issue based on changed circumstances in his home country. 26 Based on the record at the time, the BIA concluded that Asani had not demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution if he were to return to Macedonia. The BIA relied on the Department of State's country profile dated April 1996, which noted that the Macedonians have been more tolerant and equitable in dealing with the Albanian minorities and that the Macedonian government has been careful to respect human rights and political freedom. However, the BIA also noted that the country profile stated that [a]lthough[ ] there has been an increasing tension between the Macedonians and Albanian minorities, the government has attempted to diffuse this problem by maintaining a dialog with Albanian leaders and by permitting Albanian studies to be taught at the university and Albanian language to be offered in elementary and high schools. Asani, at 3 (citing Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Department of State, Former Yugoslavia Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions, at 16 (April 1996)). Believing the situation in Macedonia to have changed dramatically since Asani left in 1988, the BIA observed that the communist regime has been replaced by a parliamentary democracy. Thus the BIA concluded that we do not find that a reasonable person in respondent's circumstances[ ] would have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id. at 3. 27 Although Macedonia is no longer part of Yugoslavia and a new government has emerged there, Asani emphasized that in his hometown of Kicebo the local Macedonian authorities are the same persons who had held power under the Yugoslavian government. In addition, Asani testified that he believed that if he were to go back to Macedonia, he again would be persecuted for his pro-Albanian activities, noting that as of 1996, the Macedonian authorities still were searching for him, going to his house in Macedonia and sending letters there requesting that he report to the police station in Macedonia, and making threats against him and his son in the United States. 28 While on the basis of the present record Asani may not have shown a substantial risk of future persecution, see Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619 (7th Cir.1997), we need not decide this issue because conditions in Macedonia have changed since the time of the IJ's decision in 1996. See Chris Hedges, Macedonia's Albanians Are Restive, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1998, at A6 (emphasizing the deterioration of the position of the Albanian minority in Macedonia; stating that [t]he nationalism that sowed the savage wars in Croatia and Bosnia and has set Kosovo alight is spilling with alarming speed into the civil life of this sleepy backwater   . Macedonia    has been unable to stanch the ideological mutations that lead to ethnic conflict, and noting that [t]he Government has begun to crack down on the militants, sentencing the Mayor of Gostivar to seven years in prison for flying the Albanian flag in front of city hall and inciting separatism). 29 Since we do not have jurisdiction to consider matters outside the record, we order a limited remand to permit Asani to file a motion, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c), to reopen the asylum issue before the BIA on the basis of newly discovered evidence of changed circumstances in his home country. 3 See Demirovski v. INS, 39 F.3d 177 (7th Cir.1994); Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d 594, 599 (8th Cir.1997). 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 provides that an asylum applicant may petition the Board to reopen her case to present new evidence between the time the BIA renders a decision and the time she is directed to depart the United States.    [W]here the motion to reopen presents evidence sufficient to call into question the Board's decision, the Board would then reopen the asylum proceeding to allow for a more extensive inquiry into the disputed facts. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 597 (7th Cir.1991). Such a mechanism is necessary because [w]e continue to be distressed that 'asylum cases move so sluggishly through the administrative and judicial process that by the time they reach us, the relevant political circumstances may have significantly changed.'  Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 166 (7th Cir.1992) (citing Balazoski, 932 F.2d at 643) (where this Court was concerned that the BIA's decision was based on stale information regarding the current state of affairs in Sri Lanka, we stressed that petitioner could bring new evidence of changed circumstances to the attention of the Board by filing a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2); see also Borca, 77 F.3d at 217 (where we reversed the BIA's conclusion that Asani failed to meet the definition of a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) and remanded, anticipating that the BIA will wish to revisit the subject of the current conditions in Romania, in light of the time that has elapsed and the evolving nature of the Romanian political scene). 30 Thus we order a limited remand to enable Asani to file a motion to reopen with the BIA. If he does so, we are confident that the Board will give that evidence full and fair consideration. In the event that on remand Asani does not receive relief, this panel retains jurisdiction, and his petition for review in this Court will be reactivated.
31 Based on the foregoing, we remand for the BIA to apply the proper standard for past persecution and to reconsider the evidence presented in light of that standard, noting that the cases relied upon by the BIA are distinguishable from Asani's situation and emphasizing that Chen is not the benchmark for past persecution in a situation where an alien relies on past persecution plus a well-founded fear of future persecution in his or her application for asylum. We also order a limited remand to permit Asani to file a motion to reopen the asylum issue based on changed circumstances. Thus we vacate the BIA's conclusion that Asani has failed to meet the definition of a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) and remand this part for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.