Opinion ID: 795247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FAAct

Text: 33 As noted, many of Drake's state-law claims are based on the defendants' alleged violations of applicable federal regulations. Under federal law, Drake's limited remedies for violations of those regulations derive from the FAAct rather than from the regulations themselves. See 49 U.S.C. § 46101; Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d at 69-70. The defendants-appellants argue that the remedial provisions of the FAAct are intended to provide the exclusive remedies for violations of the FAA regulations, and that Drake's attempts to seek state-law remedies for such violations are therefore preempted by the Act. 34 But the FAAct explicitly provides that [a] remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law. 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c). The version of this clause in effect at the time of Drake's dismissal stated: Nothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies. 49 U.S.C. Appx. § 1506 (1993). 9 This saving clause clearly indicates that the Act's remedies are not intended to be exclusive and that the Act therefore does not itself preempt Drake's claims for state-law remedies for violations of the FAA regulations. See Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir.1999) (concluding, based on the FAAct's saving clause, that the traditional state and territorial law remedies continue to exist for violations of federal regulations regarding aviation safety).