Opinion ID: 2035760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Jury's Responsibility

Text: Defendant next alleges that the prosecutor's closing arguments to the sentencing jury improperly diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty in violation of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985), 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (the prosecution's argument that the jury's decision to impose death was not final and was automatically reviewable by the State supreme court violated the eighth amendment because it led the jury to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rested elsewhere). The State points out that defendant failed to object to the complained-of comments at the sentencing hearing; as such, the issue is waived on review. ( Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186-87, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) This waiver rule applies during both the trial and sentencing hearing. However, because this issue involves the fairness of a capital sentencing hearing, we will review the propriety of the prosecutor's statements. Johnson, 146 Ill.2d at 147, 165 Ill.Dec. 682, 585 N.E.2d 78; see Fields, 135 Ill.2d at 56, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791. Defendant's first claim of error regarding the alleged shifting of responsibility pertains to the prosecutor's remarks during closing and rebuttal argument. The prosecutor argued that the decisions have been made by the lawmakers and that the law makes the decision for you based upon this evidence. Defendant argues that the State's comments led the jury to believe that the responsibility for imposing the death penalty rested with the lawmakers and the law. We disagree. Where the prosecutor's argument focuses on the jury's duty to follow and enforce the law, such an argument is proper. Here, the prosecutor noted that the lawmakers enacted laws, and that if the jurors did not find sufficient mitigation to preclude death it was their responsibility to follow the law and sentence defendant to death. These comments did not tend to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty. Defendant next asserts that the State placed the responsibility for imposing the death penalty upon defendant himself. Defendant relies on the following comments made by the prosecutor in rebuttal: [Y]our decision was made for you by the Defendant, by the choices he made in committing the crime.       The defense is telling you don't kill Renaldo Hudson. They want you to feel guilty for the decision you have to make. You are not killing anyone. It's the Defendant that committed the conduct, which under the laws of [the] State of Illinois, our law stays [ sic ] that he should be sentenced to death. These comments were in response to comments made by the defense counsel during closing argument. Defense counsel's argument contained repeated emotional pleas imploring the jury not to kill defendant. When the prosecutor's comments are read in context, it is clear that he was informing the jurors that they should not feel guilty for imposing death. This court has previously held that the prosecutor's argument to the jury not to feel guilty for enforcing the law was proper. ( Mahaffey, 128 Ill.2d at 429, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 539 N.E.2d 1172.) Moreover, there is no prejudice where comments are invited by defendant's argument. (See Ramey, 151 Ill.2d at 556, 177 Ill.Dec. 449, 603 N.E.2d 519.) In this case, the jury was not misled regarding its responsibility for the sentencing decision. Defendant's final claim of error regarding the alleged shifting of responsibility concerns the prosecutor's remarks during rebuttal: The only way to give this law the special dignity to which it is entitled is to allow the law to impose the ultimate penalty which in fact our society has done. We are impowered [ sic ] to impose the ultimate penalty for the ultimate crime. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's reference to we indicated that the prosecutor shared the responsibility for imposing the death sentence with the jury. Defendant relies on this court's decision in People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill.2d 502, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369. In Yates, this court vacated the death penalty because the prosecutor told the jury that he personally would assume responsibility for imposing the death sentence. ( Yates, 98 Ill.2d at 536-38, 456 N.E.2d 1369.) In the case at hand, the prosecutor never made such an argument. The prosecutor's reference to we was made in the context of our society. Viewing the prosecutor's argument in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding, we conclude that the challenged remarks did not mislead the jury or reduce its sense of responsibility in determining whether the death penalty was appropriate. The prosecutor repeatedly pointed out to the jurors that it was their responsibility and decision whether or not to sentence defendant to death. In addition, the jury was twice instructed by the trial court that it was responsible for imposing the death sentence. Both the jury instructions and the verdict forms informed the jurors that defendant would be sentenced to death if the jurors unanimously found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the death penalty. We find that the jury was fully aware of its role in imposing the death penalty. Consequently, we conclude that the prosecutor's comments did not result in a Caldwell violation.