Opinion ID: 150472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The CFRA's Solicitation Bans

Text: As set forth above, the CFRA prohibits contractors and lobbyists from solicit[ing] contributions on behalf of candidates for state office. See Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 9-610(h), 9-612(g)(2). That prohibition applies to current state contractors, prospective state contractors, and the principals of current and prospective state contractors, as well as to the spouses and dependent children of covered lobbyists and contractors. See id. §§ 9-601(24), 9-610(h), 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2). Unlike laws limiting contributions, which present marginal speech restrictions that lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expression, Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (quotation marks omitted), a limit on the solicitation of otherwise permissible contributions prohibits exactly the kind of expressive activity that lies at the First Amendment's core. That is because the solicitation of contributions involves speech to solicit contributions on behalf of a candidate is to make a statement: You should support this candidate, not only at the polls but with a financial contribution. Whatever may be said about whether money is speech, see, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___ n. 3, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2778-79 n. 3, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part), speech is speech, even if it is speech about money, see, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) ([O]ur cases long have protected speech even though it is ... in the form of a solicitation to pay or contribute money....). Speech `uttered during a campaign for political office,' moreover, requires the `fullest and most urgent application' of the protections set forth in the First Amendment. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 898, 130 S.Ct. 876 (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989)) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the CFRA's provisions banning the solicitation of contributions are [l]aws that burden political speech and are, as a result, `subject to strict scrutiny,' which requires the Government to prove that the restriction `furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.' Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464, 127 S.Ct. 2652, 168 L.Ed.2d 329 (2007) (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.)). [17] The state attempts to justify the CFRA's solicitation bans, like the CFRA's contribution bans, as a means to combat corruption and the appearance of corruption. Although the anticorruption interest has been held sufficiently important to justify restrictions on contributions, see, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143, 124 S.Ct. 619; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26, 96 S.Ct. 612, in reviewing limits on campaign expenditures under the strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the anticorruption interest is not a compelling government interest, see, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 908-09 (striking down a restriction on corporate independent expenditures); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45, 96 S.Ct. 612 (striking down a different restriction on independent expenditures). As we observed above, moreover, [w]hen Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 909, 130 S.Ct. 876. It is easy to see how a large contribution[ ] can be given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, 96 S.Ct. 612. That is the hallmark of corruption: dollars for political favors. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985). It is far more difficult to see how an individual might secure a political favor by recommending that another person make a campaign contribution, if for no other reason than that the third person must exercise his own free will to make a contribution. Nevertheless, the District Court upheld the CFRA's solicitation bans based primarily upon its finding that contractors and lobbyists could exert improper influence over state officials by bundling campaign contributions made by their clients or employees. Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 343 n. 33. The threat posed by bundling is that contractors and lobbyists will promise to deliver large numbers of coordinated contributions to a state official in exchange for political favors. A prospective state contractor, for instance, might promise to organize a large fundraising event in exchange for a candidate's assistance in securing a lucrative state contract. There are good reasons to think that the threat of bundling does not provide a compelling justification for the solicitation bans, especially with regard to lobbyists. But even assuming, without deciding, that the threat of bundling makes the anti-corruption interest compelling in this context, the CFRA's ban on solicitations is by no means narrowly tailored to address that threat. In order to narrowly tailor a law to address a problem, the government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand, and the government must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted regulation. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 265, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). The government must prove that there is no less restrictive alternative to the law in question, for [i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). Here, the state has not met its burden to show that the CFRA's solicitation ban is narrowly tailored to address the problem posed by bundling, for the ban prohibits a wide range of activity unrelated to bundling, and there are several less restrictive alternatives that would more directly address the perceived bundling threat. For one thing, the CFRA prohibits small-scale solicitation efforts that could not possibly be deemed bundling. A state contractor, for instance, is prohibited under the CFRA from advising his mother about whether she should contribute to a particular gubernatorial candidate. A less restrictive alternative to address the problem of bundling would be to ban only large-scale efforts to solicit contributionsfor example, a ban on state contractors organizing fundraising events of a certain size. In addition, the problem with bundling, according to the District Court, is that lobbyists will bundle contributions by their deep-pocketed clients and state contractors will bundle contributions from their many employees and subcontractors. Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 343. If that is the case, then a less restrictive means to address the bundling problem would be simply to ban lobbyists from soliciting contributions from their clients and contractors from soliciting contributions from their employees and subcontractors. The CFRA, however, bans all solicitation efforts by lobbyists and contractors even those not directed at clients, employees, or subcontractors. Finally, insofar as the CFRA's solicitation ban was intended to combat corruption and the appearance of corruption caused by bundling, the state has not adequately explained why it could not simply outlaw bundling itself. Indeed, the CFRA currently defines the term solicit to include, among other things, bundling contributions, see Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-601(26), and the SEEC has issued a decision that defines the term bundling, see Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 297 (citing SEEC Declaratory Ruling 2006-1, at 4). The problem is that, in addition to banning bundling, the CFRA also bans many other activities that often do not involve bundling. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-601(26) (broadly defining solicit to include, among other things, requesting that a contribution be made and serving as ... deputy treasurer of a political committee). We are not, of course, called upon here to determine the constitutionality of other, hypothetical laws. Our conclusion is only that less restrictive alternatives exist, and thus the state has not met its burden of showing that the CFRA's solicitation ban is narrowly tailored. We hold, therefore, that on this record, the CFRA's bans on the solicitation of contributions, see Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 9-610(h), 9-612(g)(2), violate the First Amendment.