Opinion ID: 1059103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Zoning is a valid exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth. West Brothers Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 281, 192 S.E. 881, 885 (1937). Zoning ordinances, of necessity, regulate land use uniformly within large districts. It is impracticable to tailor such ordinances to meet the condition of each individual parcel within the district. The size, shape, topography or other conditions affecting such a parcel may, if the zoning ordinance is applied to it as written, render it relatively useless. Thus, a zoning ordinance, valid on its face, might be unconstitutional as applied to an individual parcel, in violation of Article 1, § 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. Because a facially valid zoning ordinance may prove unconstitutional in application to a particular landowner, some device is needed to protect landowners' rights without destroying the viability of zoning ordinances. The variance traditionally has been designed to serve this function. In this role, the variance aptly has been called an escape hatch or escape valve. A statute may, of course, authorize variances in cases where an ordinance's application to particular property is not unconstitutional. However, the language used in Code § 15.1-495(b) [now § 15.2-2309(2) ] to define unnecessary hardship clearly indicates that the General Assembly intended that variances be granted only in cases where application of zoning restrictions would appear to be constitutionally impermissible. Packer v. Hornsby, 221 Va. 117, 122, 267 S.E.2d 140, 142 (1980) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Therefore, the BZA has authority to grant variances only to avoid an unconstitutional result. We said in Commonwealth v. County Utilities, 223 Va. 534, 290 S.E.2d 867 (1982): All citizens hold property subject to the proper exercise of police power for the common good. Sanitation Commission v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 1148, 87 S.E.2d 153, 158 (1955). Even where such an exercise results in substantial diminution of property values, an owner has no right to compensation therefor. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 [48 S.Ct. 246, 72 L.Ed. 568] (1928), Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 [36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348] (1915). In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 [98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631] (1978), the Supreme Court held that no taking occurs in the circumstances unless the regulation interferes with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole. Id. at 542, 290 S.E.2d at 872 (emphasis added). The BZA, when considering an application for a variance, acts only in an administrative capacity. See Gayton Triangle v. Henrico County, 216 Va. 764, 222 S.E.2d 570 (1976). [2] Under fundamental constitutional principles, administrative officials and agencies are empowered to act only in accordance with standards prescribed by the legislative branch of government. To hold otherwise would be to substitute the will of individuals for the rule of law. See e.g., Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 379, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (1930); Bell v. Dorey Electric Company, 248 Va. 378, 380, 448 S.E.2d 622, 623 (1994); York v. City of Danville, 207 Va. 665, 672, 152 S.E.2d 259, 264 (1967); Assaid v. City of Roanoke, 179 Va. 47, 50, 18 S.E.2d 287, 288 (1942). The General Assembly has prescribed such standards regulating the authority of the BZA to grant variances by enacting Code § 15.2-2309(2) which provides, in pertinent part: Boards of zoning appeals shall have the following powers and duties: . . . . (2) To authorize ... such variance as defined in § 15.2-2201 from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, when, owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions will result in unnecessary hardship;. . . as follows: ... where by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary situation or condition of the piece of property... the strict application of the terms of the ordinance would effectively prohibit or unreasonably restrict the utilization of the property or where the board is satisfied, upon the evidence heard by it, that the granting of the variance will alleviate a clearly demonstrable hardship approaching confiscation, as distinguished from a special privilege or convenience sought by the applicant... . No such variance shall be authorized by the board unless it finds: (a) That the strict application of the ordinance would produce undue hardship ... . Adhering to the rule in Packer, we construe the statutory terms effectively prohibit or unreasonably restrict the utilization of the property, unnecessary hardship and undue hardship in that light and hold that the BZA has no authority to grant a variance unless the effect of the zoning ordinance, as applied to the piece of property under consideration, would, in the absence of a variance, interfere with all reasonable beneficial uses of the property, taken as a whole. [3] County Utilities Corp., 223 Va. at 542, 290 S.E.2d at 872.