Opinion ID: 317142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: right to confront and cross-examine witnesses

Text: 29 Plaintiffs also contend that they were denied due process at their GTF Board hearings since they were not afforded the opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Because we have held that certain plaintiffs are entitled to new hearings before the GTF Board, we consider whether due process requires confrontation and cross-examination at such new hearings. 34 30 The issue of whether inmates should be permitted to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at disciplinary hearings has been one of the most controversial issues in the field of prisoners' rights and has prompted substantial disagreement among the federal courts. 31 Many courts 35 and commentators, 36 in weighing the countervailing interest of the inmate and prison administration, have concluded that the prison's interest in security must yield to the inmate's right to confront and question his accusers. 37 Nevertheless, in light of the facts of the present case, we have concluded that the plaintiff inmates were not denied due process in being refused the right to confrontation and cross-examination. The factual circumstances of the charges made against the plaintiffs make it clear that the right to present witnesses in their own behalf afforded plaintiffs ample opportunity to present their defense or explain their conduct. The circumstances surrounding the failure to present grievances were largely, if not exclusively, within the knowledge of the committee members, and the plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to present the committee members as witnesses in their behalf. Likewise, the plaintiffs charged with attempting to incite a work stoppage had the opportunity to call as witnesses in their behalf observers of the speeches on February 15, the first day of the work stoppage. This limited right to present and examine witnesses afforded plaintiffs the opportunity to provide sufficient testimony to enable the fact-finder to make a rational determination of the facts. Accordingly, we cannot say on this record that the plaintiffs were denied due process in not being allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 38 In reaching this conclusion, we reiterate the admonition of the court in Braxton v. Carlson that: 32 'Our expertise is limited; our knowledge of the extensive day to day prison problems is minimal; our ability to foresee the effect of procedural changes on treatment, rehabilitation and programmatic process is imperfect.' 483 F.2d at 942. 33 The Seventh Circuit recently manifested a similar reluctance to impose affirmative action upon prison administrators unless absolutely necessary: 34 'The judiciary cannot avoid its ultimate responsibility for interpreting the constitutional requirements of due process. Certainly that responsibility cannot be delegated to prison authorities. But neither should their expertise nor their assistance in accurately identifying and evaluating the interests at stake be ignored. These cases represent a stage in the development of an extremely important phase of constitutional law. It is appropriate that the development proceed with full deliberation.' 35 United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719 (7th Cir. 1973).