Opinion ID: 2491
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's VWPA Analysis

Text: We find no error in the district court's analysis of the statutory factors set forth in the VWPA. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in rejecting Battista's argument that VWPA restitution was improper because he is financially unable to make payments due to his current unemployment and that he has five minor children. We have previously indicated that [a] defendant's limited financial resources at the time restitution is imposed is not dispositive of whether restitution is proper, particularly where the defendant has a reasonable potential for future earnings. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d at 100 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Mortimer, 52 F.3d 429, 436 (2d Cir.1995) (Even an indigent defendant may be subject to the duty to pay restitution when and if funds are eventually acquired.). Here, the district court found that Battista possessed assets totaling $676,300. 570 F.Supp.2d at 422. The court further noted that Battista's sole liability was the $120,000 balance on his mortgage. Id. The court found the following additional facts about Battista's financial status: His household's monthly income is $1,800, which is the sum of his wife's salary and assistance from other family. His household's monthly expenses total $4,830, resulting in a monthly negative cash flow of $3,030. Currently, Battista stays home with his three children while his wife works. His wife has indicated that Battista has expressed interest in opening a catering business, and his presentence report reflects that he has previous experience in the restaurant business. Id. Battista does not challenge any of these factual findings on appeal, nor have we identified any basis for questioning them. In our view, the district court acted well within its discretion in determining that Battista has a reasonable potential for future income and that he should have sufficient resources to contribute to the payment of restitution to the NBA. Id. We further note that, in addition to the enumerated factors identified in Section 3663(a)(1)(B)(i), sentencing courts may also consider such other factors as the court deems appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II). The district court took note of its desire to accord equal treatment to similarly situated defendants. See 570 F.Supp.2d at 422-23. Under the circumstances presented in this case, two co-conspirators pled guilty to a crime clearly subject to mandatory restitution, and another co-conspirator (Battista), equally blameworthy in the eyes of the district court, pled guilty to a crime involving the same underlying criminal conduct that is not as obviously subject to mandatory restitution but plainly subject to discretionary restitution in the alternative. In our view, it was entirely proper for the district court  which concluded that the VWPA applied to Battista in the alternative  to recognize equal treatment as a factor supporting the imposition of restitution under that statute.