Opinion ID: 2800624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: References to the Defendant's Silence.

Text: We turn next to the plaint that the prosecutor improperly adverted in summation to the defendant's silence. This claim of error targets two separate statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. After cataloging the government's evidence, the prosecutor stated during the initial portion of his summation: Ladies and gentlemen, the testimonies of Agent Gonzalez and Agent Serrano stand uncontested, uncontested. During his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor added: The testimony of Agent González and Agent Serrano stands uncontested. The only witnesses that have entered through that door and sat here and provided testimony that were actually there that night, that were actually present at the time of the arrest, are only Agents González and Serrano. Everybody else had no knowledge of what happened that night, nothing. The Fifth Amendment prohibits prosecutors from commenting on a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 30 (1988); Griffin v. -10- California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). A prosecutor can transgress this prohibition through indirect allusions to a defendant's silence. See United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 978 (1st Cir. 1995). References made during closing arguments are of particular concern because such arguments represent the parties' last, best chance to marshal the evidence and persuade the jurors of its import. Id. at 977. It is too well settled to warrant citation of authority that a prosecutor, in his closing argument, may try to convince the jury of the force (or lack of force) of the testimony of particular witnesses. There is sometimes a fine line, however, between a permissible critique of witness testimony and an impermissible comment on the defendant's silence. For that reason, we have warned that prosecutors should tread with caution in this area. See id. at 979; United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1186 (1st Cir. 1993). In considering whether a prosecutor has sailed too close to the wind, we first must situate his comments within the context of the surrounding proceeding. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1187; United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300, 307 (1st Cir. 1992). We then ask whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1187 (internal quotation marks omitted). -11- In the absence of meaningful indicia of impropriety, we will not interpret ambiguous comments in their most pernicious sense. After all, a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974). This principle takes on added force where, as here, the complaining party has failed to interpose a timely objection. See Taylor, 54 F.3d at 979. In such circumstances, it seems fair to give the arguer the benefit of every plausible interpretation of her words. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1187. Nothing in the record of this case indicates that the prosecutor's statements, taken in context, were deliberate references to the defendant's silence. Nor is there any reason to believe that the jury would have treated them as such. Indeed, the two most likely interpretations of the challenged comments are both innocuous. To begin, it seems likely that the prosecutor was simply arguing that his witnesses, but none of the defense witnesses, were present at the time of the arrest. Thus, the defense witnesses were unable to contradict the officers' version of what transpired at El Trapiche. -12- Careful perscrutation of the record strongly supports this interpretation. During trial, the prosecutor cross-examined each defense witness who claimed to have seen the defendant on the evening of March 29 about whether he or she had been at El Trapiche when the defendant was arrested. Each witness admitted to being elsewhere. Since the trial lasted only two and one-half days, these admissions would have been fresh in the jurors' minds. The remainder of the prosecutor's closing argument provides supporting context. During his rebuttal, the prosecutor summarized the testimony of the defense witnesses, arguing: None of those four witnesses were present at El Trapiche. None . . . were there at the time of the incident, and none of them can tell you that the defendant did not in fact throw that fanny pack. That line of argument was followed shortly by the prosecutor's second challenged statement, which pointed out that none of the testimony offered by those witnesses directly contested the on-thescene observations of the police officers. Viewed in the context of the record as a whole, the prosecutor's statements do not come close to plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that comment on failure of defense to counter testimony presented does not violate Fifth Amendment); United States v. Wade, 931 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1991) (similar). -13- Alternatively, the jury might have construed the challenged remarks (or, at least, the second of them) as an attempt to shore up the credibility of the government's witnesses. In his closing, defense counsel argued that the testimony of the two officers had diverged on certain details; that Serrano previously had made inconsistent statements about how the defendant discarded the fanny pack; and that the police version of the events was incredible. The prosecutor was entitled to counter those arguments, see Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1187, and we think that the jury may well have interpreted what he said as fair comment to that effect. To sum up, the challenged statements were neither manifestly intended nor of a character such that the jury would naturally and necessarily take [them] to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). Here, moreover, the district court twice instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proof, that the defendant was presumed innocent, and that no adverse inference could be drawn from the defendant's decision not to testify. Any possibility that the jury might have put an untoward spin on the prosecutor's isolated statements was diminished by these clear instructions. See Taylor, 54 F.3d at 980. In an effort to blunt the force of this reasoning, the defendant suggests that there were improper insinuations lurking -14- beneath the prosecutor's words. He says that because he was the only person (apart from the officers) who was actually [at El Trapiche] that night, the prosecutor's comments ineluctably drew the jury's attention to his failure to testify. But even though we have recognized that references to evidence being uncontradicted may cause constitutional concern if the defendant is the only person who logically could contradict that evidence, see Bey, 188 F.3d at 9; United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 881-82 (1st Cir. 1971), that is not the case here. Defense counsel noted during his summation that there were fifty people in the area, and that at least six young people were sitting at a table near the defendant. In addition, the testimony established that a bartender was working in the general vicinity of where the defendant sat. Even if the defendant might have had trouble tracking down other patrons, the record discloses no reason why the bartender could not have been called as a witness.2 The fact that the jury was aware that other potential witnesses were present takes the sting out of the prosecutor's comments and puts them outside the realm of naked finger-pointing at the defendant. United States v. Stroman, 500 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2007); see United States v. Ayewoh, 627 F.3d 914, 925 (1st 2 Indeed, during his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that it would hear testimony from the bartender to the effect that he never saw [the defendant] throw a fanny pack, and . . . never heard a fanny pack land on the floor of the bar. The record is silent as to why the defense reneged on this commitment. -15- Cir. 2010); United States v. Glantz, 810 F.2d 316, 323 (1st Cir. 1987).