Opinion ID: 502458
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cause of Action and Qualified Immunity

Text: 20 The magistrate determined that the complaint stated a cause of action for a violation of substantive due process of law. In her view, under Illinois law, a college or university has a contractual relationship with its students that amounts to a property right in their continued education. Although the college of nursing student handbook does not expressly state that students will be graded and evaluated fairly, it does provide procedures by which students may appeal grades they think are unfair. Such provisions constitute, concluded the magistrate, an implied promise that grading will not be arbitrary. 21 On the matter of immunity, the magistrate determined that the case law at that time did not clearly establish the substantive due process right to be free from arbitrary and capricious action on the part of university officials with respect to academic decisions. Accordingly, she recommended that, with respect to count I, the individual defendants in their individual capacities were entitled to qualified immunity.C. Summary 22 The magistrate summarized her recommendations as follows: 23 (1) The Board of Governors should be dismissed from the action; 24 (2) Count I (the federal claim alleging a violation of due process) should be dismissed to the extent that it seeks monetary damages from the individual defendants in their official capacities and against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. Akins v. Board of Governors, No. 85 C 5948, magistrate's report and recommendation at 14-15 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 2, 1986) [hereinafter Magistrate's report]; R.23 at 14-15. 25 (3) Count II (pendent state claim) should be dismissed as to the individual defendants in their official capacities. 26 Therefore, although the magistrate did not explicitly state which claims ought to survive, it appears that she recommended that only two claims survive. The claims are the count I allegations against the individual defendants in their official capacities to the extent that the appellants request injunctive relief, and the count II state law allegations against the individual appellees in their individual capacities. III The District Court's Judgment 27 In a terse docket entry, the district court noted that the court accepts and adopts the report and recommendation of the magistrate with the clarification noted on the reverse of this order and hereby grants the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Akins v. Board of Governors, No. 85 C 5948, docket entry at 1 (N.D.Ill. May 13, 1987) [hereinafter Docket entry]; R.27 at 1. The one-page clarification, which the district court captioned an order, amounts to a substantial revision of the magistrate's report and recommendation. For the sake of clarity, we shall set forth the district court's holding according to the organizational scheme utilized by the magistrate. A. Eleventh Amendment
28 The court noted that the plaintiffs did not object to the dismissal of this party on eleventh amendment grounds.
29
30 The district court further noted that the plaintiffs did not object to the dismissal of count I against the individual defendants in their official capacities to the extent that the plaintiffs sought monetary relief; nor did they object to the dismissal of count II as to the individual defendants in their official capacities. It then noted that the plaintiffs, in their objections to the report of the magistrate, had claimed that they are suing the defendant state officials in their individual capacities and not in their official capacities. Akins v. Board of Governors, No. 85 C 5948, order at 1 (N.D.Ill. May 13, 1987) (quoting Plaintiffs' Objections at 2) [hereinafter Order]; R.27 at 2. The district court therefore held that there was no outstanding request for injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities. 31
32 The district court did not explicitly address this issue. 33 B. The Cause of Action and Qualified Immunity 34 Unlike the magistrate, the district court did not address explicitly whether the complaint stated a cause of action. Rather, it held that both claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Because, as noted supra, the district court believed that the plaintiffs were suing the defendants only in their individual capacities, this analysis of the immunity issue was apparently limited to the individual capacity aspect of the case. In the district court's view, the holding of the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), requires such a result. Immunity from damages claims but not from claims for injunctive relief would make little sense; the individual defendants would still have to stand trial, and successors would not be bound by any injunction entered against individual defendants. Order at 1.