Opinion ID: 2544942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial and Juror Selection Issues

Text: Defendant and McMains were initially charged as codefendants. In December 1994, the matter was set for a jury trial to begin on April 3, 1995. Thereafter, the trial court granted severance of defendant's trial, and subsequently continued his trial to July 24, 1995. McMains's trial proceeded first, but did not conclude by July 24. Consequently, defendant's trial was put over one week until July 31. The jury rendered a guilty verdict in McMains's trial on July 28, 1995, three days before defendant's trial was scheduled to commence. Meanwhile, on July 27, 1995, defendant filed a motion to continue his trial for seven weeks to September 18, 1995. Defendant sought the continuance so he could conduct a public opinion survey to assess the impact of the media's recent coverage of McMains's trial. In support of the motion, defense counsel filed a declaration stating that he had contacted an expert to conduct and complete a survey by September 5, that he expected the survey, to show defendant could not receive a fair trial in Tulare County given the recent publicity, and that he would file a motion to change venue to be heard by the September 5 date. [4] The prosecution filed opposition on the grounds that nine previous continuances in the case had already caused undue delay, that defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for another continuance, and that a continuance would work a hardship to the People with regard to forty potential witnesses subpoenaed for the trial, some of whom were out of state. On July 31, 1995, the date set for trial, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to continue, at which time defendant challenged the prosecution's contentions regarding undue delay and lack of good cause. Defendant, however, made no reference to the People's claimed hardship regarding subpoenaed witnesses. After hearing arguments from both sides, the trial court denied defendant's motion, explaining it could best evaluate defendant's ability to get a fair trial in the county through the juror voir dire process. The court, however, expressed an open mind on the matter, stating it certainly would agree that if we cannot find twelve jurors to sit here neutrally and listen to the case, then counsel's motion may be well taken. The court reiterated this point in making its ruling: If we begin picking a jury [and] it turns out we cannot get twelve people that can be fair in this case, then, obviously, we'll have to back up and reconsider what's going on. Short of that, I'm going to deny the motion at this time. . . . Later that same day, defendant's trial commenced. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a 35-day (five-week) continuance. [5] Although a survey is not required in order to make or support a motion to change venue (see ante, fn. 4), defendant claims he needed a survey to demonstrate that the media coverage of the pretrial proceedings and McMains's just-concluded separate trial had tainted the jury pool. He asserts his continuance motion was diligently made, supported by good cause, and necessary to establish grounds for a venue change, but the trial court denied the motion based solely on its desire to try defendant immediately after McMains. That ruling, he argues, deprived him of his federal constitutional rights to present witnesses, a fair trial, due process of law, an impartial jury, effective assistance of counsel, and a reliable penalty determination. As defendant acknowledges, the decision whether or not to grant a continuance of a matter rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 1003, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1171, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) The party challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of establishing an abuse of discretion, and an order denying a continuance is seldom successfully attacked. ( People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1003, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) Under this state law standard, discretion is abused only when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered. (See People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 318, 70 Cal. Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890; People v. Froehlig (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 260, 265, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 858.) Moreover, the denial of a continuance may be so arbitrary as to deny due process. (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1013, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) However, not every denial of a request for more time can be said to violate due process, even if the party seeking the: continuance thereby fails to offer evidence. ( Ungar v. Sarafite (1964) 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921.) Although a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality[,] . . . [t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. (Id. at pp. 589-590, 84 S.Ct. 841.) Instead, [t]he answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Id. at p. 590, 84 S.Ct. 841; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1172, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315 [quoting same].) Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that defend ant was diligent in bringing his motion given the recent publicity in McMains's case, [6] we find ample support in the record for the trial court's decision to deny the requested continuance and to proceed with voir dire as a means for evaluating whether defendant could obtain a fair trial in Tulare County. Defendant's trial had been scheduled to begin that very day, and the prosecution had already issued subpoenas to its 40 potential witnesses. At the hearing, defendant did not refute the prosecutor's claim that the requested delay would cause hardship with regard to these witnesses, some of whom were out of state. [7] By that time, moreover, the trial court and the parties had already developed a juror questionnaire that took into account the recent completion of McMains's trial and posed questions relating to the pretrial publicity of the case. As the court pointed out, the questionnaire would ask potential jurors whether they had heard of and/or formed any opinions about the case, and then they could be questioned regarding their responses. The court essentially reasoned that, once it engaged in or completed the voir dire process, it would be in a better position to determine whether defendant could receive a fair trial because it would know the extent to which the selected jury had actually heard of defendant's case and the prejudicial impact of the pretrial publicity regarding defendant and his alleged crimes. (Accord, Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 943-944, 187 Cal.Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225.) Under the circumstances presented, we cannot say the trial court's refusal to continue the trial for seven (or five) weeks constituted a judicial abuse of discretion or denied defendant due process. [8] In reaching this conclusion, we do not suggest that trial courts may deny motions to change venue solely on the theory that jury voir dire is a better method of assessing the need to change venue. As defendant points out, all defendants have the right to seek a change of venue under section 1033, and we do not hold the mere availability of jury voir dire is sufficient to deprive a defendant of that right. (Cf. Groppi v. Wisconsin (1971) 400 U.S. 505, 511, 91 S.Ct. 490, 27 L.Ed.2d 571 [finding unconstitutional a state law that categorically prevented a change of venue for misdemeanor jury trials, regardless of the extent of local prejudice against the defendant charged].) Here, however, defendant did not actually move for a change of venue; rather, he moved for a seven-week continuance on the eve of trial in order to explore the need for a venue change. The record does not establish a violation of defendant's rights under section 1033. In any event, we observe defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges and did not object to the jury's final composition. Under settled case law, such omissions are deemed to signify a recognition that the jury as selected was fair and impartial, and are decisive in rejecting claims alleging improper denial of a motion to change venue. ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 854, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.) It therefore follows that when a defendant unsuccessfully moves for a continuance in order to investigate and prepare for a motion to change venue, his subsequent failure to exhaust peremptory challenges and failure to object to the jury's final composition signify a similar recognition regarding the jury as impaneled and likewise support rejection of the claims alleging wrongful denial of the continuance and related constitutional violations. (Cf. People v. Parker (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 100, 106, 44 Cal.Rptr. 909 (Parker) .) The facts before us are substantially similar to those in Parker, supra, 235 Cal. App.2d 100, 44 Cal.Rptr. 909, in which the defendant, at the opening of his trial for embezzlement, requested a continuance of the trial on the ground that adverse publicity appeared prominently in the newspapers, television, and radio regarding the fact of his conviction of theft by false pretenses in a separate trial that concluded just the day before. (Id. at pp. 102-103, 44 Cal.Rptr. 909.) In Parker, the trial court noted that both sides were ready to proceed on the trial date originally set, that the defendant had received newspaper publicity preceding and throughout the first trial, that the publicity's effect upon the forthcoming trial could be investigated by means of the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, and that the motion for a continuance would be denied `at this time.' (Id. at p. 103, 44 Cal.Rptr. 909.) After the voir dire examination had concluded, defense counsel left half of his peremptory challenges unexercised, and notwithstanding the trial court's denial of the continuation request `at this time,' counsel did not renew his motion or object to continuing with the trial. (Id. at pp. 105-106, 44 Cal.Rptr. 909.) In light of these circumstances, the appellate court found there was no abuse of discretion in the rejection of the continuance request and no denial of a fair trial. (Id. at p. 106, 44 Cal.Rptr. 909.) We note Parker contrasted the offenses charged there, which were economic in nature and not particularly `juicy,' with other types of offenses that, for example, involve lurid violence or rampant sexuality and thereby attract vastly more attention and tend to excite more public hostility. ( Parker, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d at p. 105, 44 Cal.Rptr. 909.) Here, however, even assuming the first degree murder and torture charges against defendant fall within this latter category of offenses, we find Parker's reasoning  which upheld the denial of the continuance request after taking into account the timing of the two trials, the trial court's willingness to explore the matter of pretrial publicity during the voir dire process and to leave the door open for a renewed motion, and the defendant's failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges or to voice objection to continuing with the trial after the voir dire  fully supports our conclusion that a similar result is warranted here. Relying principally on Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (Sheppard ), and Williams v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 584, 194 Cal.Rptr. 492, 6.68 P.2d 799 (Williams) , defendant makes the related contention that the trial court violated its duty to take all reasonable measures to ensure a fair and impartial jury when it initially scheduled his trial to immediately follow McMains's trial and then failed to continue the trial on its own motion. The violation of this duty, he claims, impaired his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a reliable penalty determination. We reject these related claims for the reasons already given, and additionally on the ground that a trial court generally is under no obligation to continue a matter for the defense in the absence of a request. (E.g., People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 739, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 782, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192.) Sheppard, supra, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, and Williams, supra, 34 Cal.3d 584, 194 Cal.Rptr. 492, 668 P.2d 799, do not compel otherwise. The facts of this case do not compare to those in Sheppard, in which the United States Supreme Court looked beyond the pretrial publicity generated in the defendant's case to find that the massive, pervasive, and inflammatory publicity that attended the actual trial, coupled with the carnival atmosphere at the trial itself, prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial consistent with the federal due process clause. (See Sheppard, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 355, 86 S.Ct. 1507 [bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the 'trial, especially Sheppard], p. 356-357, 86 S.Ct. 1507 [much of the inflammatory material broadcasted or printed during the trial was never heard from the witness stand but nonetheless reached some of the jury].) Moreover, the procedural posture of this case is different from that in Williams, where the defendant actually moved for a change of venue and sought writ relief based on the trial court's denial of his motion. ( Williams, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 587, 194 Cal.Rptr. 492, 668 P.2d 799.) Although Williams's analysis perhaps suggests that factors supporting a continuance or a venue change may have been present here, that decision does not stand for the proposition that pretrial publicity may require a continuance of a trial without a defense request, or that a reversal on venue-related grounds may be compelled even though the defendant failed to-exhaust his peremptory challenges and neglected to object to the jury's final composition.
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously refused to excuse six biased jurors for cause, thereby denying his federal constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury, due process of law, and a reliable penalty determination. `To preserve a claim of trial court error in fading to remove a juror for bias in favor of the death penalty, a defendant must either exhaust all peremptory challenges and express dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected or justify the failure to do so.' ( People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 448, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64; see also People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 539, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1,133 P.3d 1076.) Here, defendant did not make a peremptory challenge to any of the six jurors (K.H.; D.B.; R.O.-H.; B.C.; M.A.; S.S.) who he claims should have been excused for cause; neither did he exhaust his available 20 peremptory challenges. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 231, subd. (a).) Defendant did not express displeasure with the jury as selected, and he did not object to the jury's composition. Moreover, he makes no attempt to justify his failure to do so. Accordingly, this issue has not been preserved for review. Even assuming the claim had been properly preserved, we would find it lacking in merit. Apart from R.O.-H., none of the five other allegedly biased individuals actually served on defendant's jury and so they could not have possibly affected the jury's fairness. ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 540, 43 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076; see People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 133, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) With regard to Juror R.O.-H., the governing law provides: `A prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath.' [Citations.] `Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. [Citation.]' [Citation.] On appeal we will uphold the trial court's decision if it is fairly supported by the record, and accept as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has given conflicting or ambiguous statements. [Citations.] ( People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 132, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988, fn. omitted.) Although some of Juror R.O.-H.'s comments during the voir dire process could be construed as suggesting she might automatically vote for death at the penalty phase, other remarks she made indicated an ability and a willingness to be fair and open-minded. For instance, after candidly saying she initially had formed an opinion of defendant's guilt after reading a newspaper story about McMains's trial, R.O.-H. stated: But. after listening to the judge speak earlier about the duties of a juror, I don't know if I hold the same opinion or not. She also commented that [a] newspaper article, I know isn't written  I know it's not, you know, the truth. Finally, although she stated in response to defense counsel's questioning that she would need to hear evidence to overcome her suspicion of defendant's guilt, she later expressed her understanding that, under the law, everyone is presumed innocent until proven guilty. She also promised to base her decision solely upon the evidence that is presented and to follow the law as the judge instructs. Given R.O.-H.'s conflicting statements, and the trial court's unique opportunity to evaluate her credibility as she spoke, we shall defer to that court's determination regarding her true state of mind. Indeed, the defense evidently agreed at the conclusion of voir dire questioning that R.O.-H.'s views would not prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror, for it declined to exercise an available peremptory challenge against her.