Opinion ID: 1775415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the State's Discovery Violation Render Refreshed Recollection Testimony Inadmissible?

Text: Detective Eriksen testified he was present at a pre-indictment lineup where the prosecutrix identified Livingston, but on cross examination he could not recall whether Livingston was the only person the lineup who was wearing blue shoes or who was clean shaven. On redirect the prosecution sought to introduce a photograph depicting the persons in the lineup, apparently taken during the lineup. It supposedly showed that Livingston was not wearing blue shoes and he was not the only clean shaven person. Livingston objected on the ground that the photograph was not disclosed pursuant to a discovery order entered by the trial court. The record is clear that the prosecution was not aware of the photograph until after trial began, but the photograph was part of a police file. The trial court agreed that it should have been disclosed and the prosecution withdrew its request to admit the photograph. At the prosecution's request, however, Detective Eriksen refreshed his recollection of the lineup outside the jury's presence using the photograph. When the jury returned, Detective Eriksen testified on redirect that he had refreshed his memory and that Livingston was not the only clean shaven person in the lineup and more than one person had on dark shoes. Livingston objected to this testimony on the grounds it went outside the scope of redirect examination. The court overruled this objection. Livingston was given the opportunity to see the photograph and to ask additional questions on re-cross examination but did not avail himself of the opportunity. On appeal Livingston argues that a discovery violation and the subsequent use of the non-disclosed material to refresh Detective Eriksen's memory presents reversible error. We disagree. First, Livingston may not have preserved this error for review. Livingston only objected on the grounds that the testimony was outside the scope of cross examination; he did not present to the trial court the question of whether Detective Eriksen should be allowed to refresh his recollection using the photograph. Since Livingston argues the testimony was inadmissible on grounds different from those he presented to the trial court, he is barred from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. See Williamson v. State, 330 So.2d 272, 276 (Miss. 1976). See M.R.E. 103(a)(1); see also United States v. Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir.1983). Alternatively, were we to reach the merits of Livingston's claim, we still find it to be without merit. First, we note that Livingston was tried in December 1985, before the effective date of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Our pre-Rules of Evidence precedent allowed a witness to refresh his recollection from a memorandum. See Gardner v. State, 455 So.2d 796, 799 (Miss. 1984); Cutshall v. State, 203 Miss. 553, 35 So.2d 318 (1948). Our new Rule 612, M.R.E., incorporates and in some respects broadens our pre-Rules precedent. See official comment to Rule 612, M.R.E. The necessary predicate is that it must appear that the witness has no present memory and that the present memory may be refreshed from the writing. Scott v. State, 446 So.2d 580, 585 (Miss. 1984). The memorandum may be used even though it would not be admissible. Gardner, 455 So.2d at 799. Here Detective Eriksen testified that he had no present memory but that his present recollection was refreshed by looking at the photograph. This meets the predicate. Here, however, Detective Eriksen used a photograph instead of a written memorandum. We have not previously held that a witness may use a photograph, but such is generally considered to be acceptable. The federal rule has been interpreted to also include a song, a scent, a photograph, all allusion, even a past allusion, even a past statement known to be false. U.S. v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806, 67 S.Ct. 501, 91 L.Ed. 688 (1947) (emphasis added) (quoted in 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, P. 612[01](2) [1987]). See also McCormick on Evidence, § 9 at 19 (Cleary ed. 1984); M.R.E. 612. We see no reason not to adopt a similar position as part of our common law of evidence. But, Livingston argues, the photograph was not admitted because of a discovery violation, and, under Thomas v. State, 488 So.2d 1343, 1344 (Miss. 1986), when physical evidence is not disclosed as required, such physical evidence `and testimony concerning (it) [is] ... inadmissible.' The distinction here is that Detective Eriksen was not testifying concerning the physical evidence, but was instead testifying from his own refreshed memory. The memorandum itself need not be admissible. Gardner, 455 So.2d at 799. It is true that the court has an obligation to prevent witnesses from `putting into the record the contents of an otherwise inadmissible writing under the guise of refreshing recollection.' ... [However,] [w]hen there is careful supervision by the court, the testimony elicited through refreshing recollection may be proper, even though the document used to refresh the witnesses' memory is inadmissible. United States v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.1983) (citing Thompson v. United States, 342 F.2d 137, 140 [5th Cir.1965]). See 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 416 (1972). Scott dealt with a nearly identical factual situation to the case at bar where undisclosed discoverable writings were used to refresh a witness's recollection. Though Scott was decided based on Fed.R.Evid. 612, we find it persuasive. Under both our pre-Rules evidentiary practice and under M.R.E. 612, the opposing party is afforded the opportunity to examine the document used to refresh recollections. See P. Williams and C. Ellis, Mississippi Evidence § 4.9 (1984). Here, Livingston had the opportunity but did not cross examine Detective Eriksen after viewing the photograph. We hold that where the trial court properly supervises the witness's testimony, and the opposing party is given the opportunity to review the material and cross examine the witness, and is able to introduce relevant portions of the document into evidence, the fact that the item or document is inadmissible because of a discovery violation does not necessarily prevent a witness from using it to refresh his recollection. On this record we cannot say that Detective Eriksen's testimony was an attempt to put the photograph into evidence. There was no error.