Opinion ID: 2031969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Post-Conviction Motions

Text: In his final series of challenges to the resolution of his post-conviction petition, the defendant argues that the post-conviction court improperly denied a number of motions during the proceedings below. The defendant first argues that the post-conviction judge erred in denying a defense motion seeking funds for the appointment of certain experts. The defendant wished to retain, among others, a psychiatrist and a psychologist, and asked the court to appoint Dr. Henry Conroe, a psychiatrist, Dr. Alan Rosenwald, a psychologist, as experts in this case. In support of his request, the defendant submitted affidavits from the two men. They stated that, based on their review of certain portions of the trial transcript and of affidavits by defense counsel, and on discussions with defense counsel, they believed that the defendant might have been afflicted with organic brain damage. The defendant argues that their testimony would have been vital to the defendant's argument that counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of the defendant's mental and emotional problems as mitigating evidence at the second stage of the sentencing hearing. We find no abuse of discretion in the post-conviction judge's failure to appoint the expert witnesses. We have already determined that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to present, at the second stage of the sentencing hearing, evidence that would show that the defendant was laboring under a mental or emotional disturbance at the time in question here. As we have noted, testimony of that nature would have been at odds with the defense theory that the defendant was not guilty of the charged offenses. The defendant makes the related contention that, under Ake v. Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, the failure of the post-conviction court to appoint the proposed experts denied him equal protection. We do not agree. Discussing Ake, we have previously determined that there is no constitutional requirement that we duplicate the rights of a particular class of individuals in post-conviction proceedings. ( People v. Wright (1992), 149 Ill.2d 36, 61, 171 Ill.Dec. 424, 594 N.E.2d 276.) The post-conviction court here was not required to make the appointment; it was a matter of discretion. The defendant next alleges error in the denial of a defense motion for change of judge. The motion was originally presented to the post-conviction judge, Judge Block, who referred it to another judge, Judge Scott, for disposition. Judge Scott denied the motion after argument by the parties. The defendant bases the motion on certain comments made by Judge Block at a hearing on the post-conviction petition, in which Judge Block noted how convinced he had been of the defendant's fitness following the suicide attempt at the time of the sentencing hearing. The defendant contends that Judge Block's comments indicate that he was deciding the issue on the basis of his personal observations and knowledge outside the record. We find no error in Judge Block's comments, or in his limited reliance on his own observations of the defendant. (See People v. Titone (1992), 151 Ill.2d 19, 25-27, 175 Ill.Dec. 702, 600 N.E.2d 1160.) Moreover, unlike People v. Wilson (1967), 37 Ill.2d 617, 230 N.E.2d 194, on which the defendant relies, there was no suggestion in this case that Judge Block was a potential witness in a further proceeding. In argument before Judge Scott, who decided the motion for change of judge, defense counsel expressly disclaimed any intention of calling Judge Block as a witness. The defendant next argues that the post-conviction judge erred in denying a defense motion seeking to compel discovery depositions of witnesses to the defendant's suicide attempt. The defendant asserts that these persons might be able to provide additional evidence regarding the defendant's mental condition on the day of his suicide attempt. The defendant has not explained, however, what these potential witnesses might say. Given our conclusion that the trial judge committed no error in failing to conduct a fitness hearing, however, we must also conclude that the post-conviction court's denial of this motion was not an abuse of discretion. See People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald (1988), 123 Ill.2d 175, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131. In his final series of arguments, the defendant contends that the post-conviction court below erred in denying a defense motion to supplement the amended post-conviction petition with additional documentation. We find no abuse of discretion by the court in denying this motion. Counsel made the motion in November 1990, several weeks after the parties had presented arguments on the State's motion to dismiss the amended post-conviction petition. The additional documents that the defendant wished to present at that time consisted of the defendant's prison records, a letter from Donald Berlin, trial counsel's investigator, disclosing the location of his files in this case, a letter from a woman who was teaching the defendant how to read while he was incarcerated, and an affidavit from one of the defendant's sisters. We believe that the post-conviction court acted within its considerable discretion in denying the defendant's motion. We note that the defendant refers, in a footnote in his brief, to several other motions denied by the post-conviction judge. As he has done before, however, the defendant fails entirely to offer any argument or authority in support of the bare assertion that the post-conviction court erred in denying the additional motions. Accordingly, we decline to address these additional allegations of error.