Opinion ID: 2177201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Error in Admission of Evidence.

Text: Applicant argues the postconviction court erred in holding he was not denied effective assistance of appellate counsel in his criminal case when the latter failed to pursue certain fourth amendment issues preserved by trial counsel. We avoid any prejudice to applicant by proceeding directly to consideration of these issues for the reasons set out in division I. The criminal trial record discloses the victim arrived at the Ankeny service station in applicant's car shortly before the Des Moines police were notified of the sexual abuse complaint and dispatched to that point. At about the same time applicant was in the vicinity of Peggy's, reporting to police his car was stolen, and it contained a Thompson semi-automatic machine gun and a .410 gauge shotgun pistol, together with ammunition for both. The information about the guns was broadcast on police radio. Applicant told the police he was worried that someone might get shot. About fifteen minutes later, while still sitting in the police car, he heard the Ankeny police report the car had been spotted. When Des Moines policeman Howell arrived in Ankeny, the victim told him of her abduction, rape, and escape in the car, and pointed out the vehicle. When Howell approached the car he saw a .410 shotgun pistol, two shells and a pair of handcuffs lying on the back seat. He unloaded the pistol, and kept it and the shells, leaving the handcuffs. After the car had been impounded in Des Moines, officer Jones searched the car because [i]t was part of the crime scene and because applicant was adamant about there being a machine gun in that vehicle, and I wanted to insure or at least know that there was one or not one. He admitted he was not making an inventory search. He seized for evidence the handcuffs and some shells for the pistol. The pistol, shells, and handcuffs were received in evidence, over trial counsel's fourth amendment objections. Trial court admitted the pistol under the plain view doctrine, see State v. Harlan, 301 N.W.2d at 720, and the handcuffs and shells on the basis of the inventory exception, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). Applicant, with respect to the Ankeny search and seizure, argues the plain view doctrine cannot apply because the discovery was not inadvertent: It was planned because Howell had been told by the victim that the pistol and handcuffs were in the car. Applicant asserts the Jones search and seizure of the handcuffs and shells was not an impoundment search and that a proper warrant should have been obtained. Preliminarily, we note trial court's rulings will be sustained if other justifications exist for admitting the disputed evidence. See Harlan, 301 N.W.2d at 720 (We will uphold the conclusion of the trial court, even if we do not adopt its reasoning.). Although we view the first search and seizure as justified on several grounds, it is easily supported by the exigency of the situation. The car was located in a public place, exposed to public entry, with the pistol plainly visible. The police had been informed there were weapons and ammunition inside. The kidnapper had not been identified and presumably was at large. In these circumstances we hold officer Howell was justified in removing the pistol, unloading it, and preserving it for evidence. Ample support for this conclusion is found in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 423-24, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2844-45, 69 L.Ed.2d 744, 748-49 (1981); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-43, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527-29, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 713-16 (1973); Chambers v. Moroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 426-27 (1970); State v. Cullor, 315 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 1982); State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 736-37 (Iowa 1981); and State v. Dixon, 241 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Iowa 1976). The seizure of the items found in the second search, after the car was impounded, was no less justified. Applicant was insisting he also carried a Thompson submachine gun in the vehicle, and it had not been located. The search was valid because exigent circumstances existed when the police initially located the vehicle, and the probable cause continued to exist. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 737; see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807, n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2163, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 582-83 (1982); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68-69, 96 S.Ct. 304, 305, 46 L.Ed.2d 209, 211-12 (1975); Cady, 413 U.S. at 447, 93 S.Ct. at 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d at 718; Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428-29; Cullor, 315 N.W.2d at 810-11; State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 218-19 (Iowa), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 530, 66 L.Ed.2d 290 (1980). Finally, we note in passing any prejudicial impact of the contested evidence was minimized by the evidence of applicant's reports to the police concerning the guns and ammunition he had in the car, and by his trial testimony that he owned the pistol, ammunition and handcuffs. See Whitfield, 315 N.W.2d at 755 ([A]n accused who testifies and admits certain facts is deemed not prejudiced by the erroneous admission of other evidence of those same facts.).