Opinion ID: 2219142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: ISSUE SIXâ ADMISSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE

Text: ś 157. Knapp filed a motion under State v. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1984), to admit evidence of other potential suspects including the victim's husband, Brunner. Knapp sought permission to introduce the evidence of Maas's conduct, and the observation of Brunner's truck at Maas's residence through the testimony of Farrell. Farrell was a close friend of Borchardt who described his personal observations right after the homicide. Borchardt cannot personally testify because he is deceased, and he was not interviewed prior to his death. ś 158. The circuit court ruled the statement by Borchardt to Farrell regarding his observations of Maas's behavior admissible, but the court excluded Borchardt's statement that Maas mumbled something about getting rid of some clothing. (R. 92:6; Def. App. 108-09). ś 159. The State argues that the circuit court erred in admitting the testimony regarding Borchardt's personal observations of Maas because: (1) it does not qualify as other suspect evidence under Denny; (2) it was not admissible as a statement of recent perception; and (3) the court erred in relying on Chambers because it is not critical evidence as contemplated in Chambers. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). ś 160. The State maintains that the circuit court erred in ruling that item 21(a) of Knapp's Offer of Proofâ an unreliable hearsay statement with no genuine tendency to prove that the victim's husband may have committed the murderâ would be admitted at trial. Moreover, the State contends that the circuit court erred in its application of Denny, 120 Wis. 2d 614, in that, the challenged evidence did not constitute third party suspect evidence. The Denny standard indicates that such evidence is admissible only if it creates a `legitimate tendency' that the third person could have committed the crime. Id. at 623. ś 161. The State argues that even if Knapp can show that Brunner had a motive to kill his wife, and that he had a general opportunity to do so, the fact that he and Maas stopped by the Borchardt house on the night of the crime does not create a direct connection to his wife's murder. ś 162. The State argues that the offered evidence is inadmissible under Wisconsin's Rules of Evidence. The circuit court concluded that Borchardt's statement to Farrell on his observations of Maas were only arguably admissible as a statement of recent perception under Wis. Stat. § Rule 908.045(2). Defense counsel acknowledged that they lacked definiteness and certainty as to when Borchardt made his statement. (R. 110:65.) ś 163. Next, the State argues that the circuit court erred in its application of and reliance upon Chambers. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Chambers held that a mechanistic application of the law of hearsay should not defeat a defendant's right to obtain a fair trial through the presentation of reliable hearsay evidence. Id. The evidence relating Borchardt's observation of Brunner's truck is hardly the type of evidence contemplated in Chambers. ś 164. Knapp disagrees with the State's arguments and asks that this court uphold the ruling of the circuit court that allowed Knapp to present hearsay testimony set forth in item 21(a) of Knapp's Offer of Proof implicating a third party in the homicide. ś 165. The State argues that the evidence in this case does not satisfy the Denny standard. Under Denny, evidence that a third party had the motive to commit the crime is admissible if it can be demonstrated that there was a legitimate tendency that the other suspect may have committed the crime. ś 166. The State concedes that motive and opportunity have been established. Third party connection to the crime is at issue. Knapp contends that the evidence at issue connects Brunner and Maas to the crime in a number of ways: (1) The evidence puts Brunner in Watertown in relative proximity to the homicide at the time of the murder. (2) It also establishes that he lied to investigators about his whereabouts at the time of the murder. (3) Maas was with Brunner at the time his wife was murdered, and Maas was observed a short time after Resa's murder carrying a paper bag and getting into Brunner's waiting truck. ś 167. Knapp argues that the circuit court appropriately looked first at all the evidence to determine whether it sufficiently established Brunner's motive, opportunity, and connection to the crime. The circuit court then analyzed each of the offers of proof to determine the evidentiary basis for admissibility. The circuit court applied the proper legal standard and appropriately exercised its discretion in admitting this evidence under Denny. ś 168. Next, Knapp argues that the evidence is admissible as a statement of recent perception. As noted before, the State argues that even if the evidence is admissible under Denny, the court erred in ruling it was an admissible statement of recent perception pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2) because the evidence was unreliable and lacked sufficient detail as to the exact time Borchardt made the statement to Farrell. The State concedes that there is no evidence to indicate that Farrell was untruthful. (R. 110:76; Def. App. 315). However, Knapp contends that the reliability of Farrell's testimony is heightened by corroborating evidence: (1) other independent witnesses place Brunner at the scene of the homicide at the exact time the murder was committed; and (2) other times, when according to his alibi, he was supposed to be miles away. ś 169. Knapp states that the lack of specificity as to when Borchardt made his statement is a product of the State's failure to interview Borchardt before his death, and the State had ample opportunity to do so. Knapp points out that the circuit court found that the lack of specificity was due to the failure to interview Borchardt and the conscious decision of the police not to prosecute Knapp until 12 years had passed and critical witnesses had died. ś 170. The circuit court held that the police should not profit from its own blunders. (R. 110:75-76; Def. App. 314-15). In State v. Stevens, 171 Wis. 2d 106, 119, 490 N.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1992), the temporal relationship between an event and a statement describing the event is not as critical when dealing with a statement of recent perception as it is with other hearsay exceptions, such as a statement of present sense impression. The fact that the circuit court denied the double-hearsay statement, Knapp argues, goes to show that the court carefully considered and correctly exercised its discretion. ś 171. Knapp argues that the evidence is critical to the defense and subject to Chambers. [28] The right to present a defense is grounded in the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7, of the Wisconsin Constitution. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 645, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). A defendant's right to present a defense may in some cases require the admission of testimony that would otherwise be excluded under applicable evidentiary rules. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, 302; Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 648. See also State v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 663, 575 N.W.2d 475 (1998). The right to present a defense is not absolute, but rather is limited to the presentation of relevant evidence whose probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 646. ś 172. The State argues that this evidence is hardly the type contemplated by Chambers. (Pl.-Appellant Br. at 34). Chambers did not limit its rule only to evidence labeled critical, instead it stated: where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Thus, Knapp's constitutional right to present a defense includes the right to demonstrate Brunner and Maas were seen in Watertown at the time of the murder, and that Maas was actually seen trying to get rid of clothing she had been wearing. This evidence directly affects the determination of guilt in this case.