Opinion ID: 2827979
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District’s Custom Caused the

Text: Constitutional Violation We next determine whether a District custom or policy caused the violation of Suggs’s constitutional rights. Harvey may establish such causation by showing that a District policymaker’s ignoring of a practice was “consistent enough to constitute custom.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 16 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Or he may show that the District responded to a need “in such a manner as to show ‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional violations.” Id. (quoting Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306). The “deliberate indifference” standard for establishing a municipal policy is distinct from that required to show an underlying constitutional violation. It is an objective standard, “determined by analyzing whether the municipality knew or should have known of the risk of constitutional violations, but did not act.” Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 601 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if a municipal policy was “so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,” and the need to change the policy “so obvious,” could “policymakers of the city . . . have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). The District maintains that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Harvey because he failed to show that it is the District’s policy or custom to subject those enrolled within its development disability programs to constitutional violations. We disagree. The District has a longstanding practice of deliberate disregard of the medical needs of involuntarily committed mental patients. In 2000, the District, in litigation stemming from the 1976 class action by Forest Haven residents, admitted that its “system of support for individuals with developmental disabilities . . . represent[s] one of the most serious breakdowns in the District government over the last two decades.” Evans v. Williams, 139 F. Supp. 2d 79, 96 (D.D.C. 2001). It acknowledged that it “fundamentally failed its obligation to disabled persons,” and that its programs were “highly dysfunctional” and “seriously broken.” Id. at 97–98. 17 The District was aware of these failures, but did not act. In 1996, a federal district court found that the District had, “for over two years, chronically and unapologetically violated” its agreement to ensure that the needs of the intellectually disabled are met. Evans v. Barry, No. 76-cv293, 1996 WL 451054, at  (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1996). In 1997, a court monitor found that Evans class members “are frequently denied necessary health services and/or adaptive equipment, sometimes resulting in physical injury.” Report to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Evans v. Barry, No. 76-0293 (Oct. 1, 1999), Joint Appendix 381. The District has acknowledged it was “aware of problems of poor care provided at group homes” and its “systemic failures.” Evans, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 97. The District argues that the legislature’s enactment of the intellectual disabilities rights statute in 1979 is sufficient to rebut evidence that it had a policy of deliberate indifference. The District’s statutory policy is of “little value,” where, as in this case, “there is evidence . . . that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the policy’s violation.” Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In the absence of evidence of actual enforcement of its paper policy, the District has failed to create an issue of triable fact. The District also argues that while it was aware of systemic failures in its care for the intellectually disabled, it was not aware that these failures “could lead to threats to the life and safety of disabled individuals.” Evans, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 97. Regardless of whether the District had actual knowledge of constitutional violations, the evidence establishes that the District should have known that its policy of deliberate indifference was likely to result in the violation of rights of the committed person. As noted above, in 1996, a federal district court warned the District that intellectually 18 disabled individuals are “ill-equipped” to “defend against the city’s failure to assist their care providers in giving them the care and treatment they desperately need.” Evans v. Barry, 1996 WL 451054, at . The District’s own compliance monitor warned that class members are “physical[ly] injur[ed]” because of the denial of health care services. The evidence shows that the District knew that its “entire mental retardation and developmental disabilities system was fundamentally unable to deliver even the most basic services,” Evans v. Williams, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 97, but did not act to cure the problem. Under these facts, we conclude that the District had a custom or policy of deliberate indifference to the needs of the intellectually disabled, and that this policy caused the violation of Suggs’s constitutional rights.