Opinion ID: 2083154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Conversations.

Text: During the trial, the Commonwealth sought to introduce as evidence various conversations involving Reinstein and others at which Borans was not present. The judge ruled that the testimony was admissible under either of two theories: (1) that Borans was involved in a joint criminal enterprise with Reinstein and others; and (2) that Borans was charged with being an accessory after the fact to a felony committed by Reinstein. Borans maintains that [n]either of the two justifications offered ... for the admissibility of this hearsay evidence stands up under close scrutiny. [26] We disagree. Borans' initial objection is directed to the judge's decision to admit evidence of conversations involving Reinstein and Turiello and Reinstein and the Worcester contractor which occurred prior to the date on which Sharigian was initially solicited for a kickback. According to Borans, these early conversations, relating to kickback solicitations of Turiello and the Worcester contractor, occurred prior to the commencement of any joint criminal enterprise to solicit a kickback from Sharigian and have no relevance to the crimes for which Borans is charged. It is well settled that, to be admissible against a defendant, the out-of-court statements of coconspirators or joint criminal venturers must have been made during the pendency of the criminal enterprise and in furtherance of it. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. 703, 708-709 (1976); Commonwealth v. Flynn, 362 Mass. 455, 477 (1972) (the same general rule of evidence applies to cases where a conspiracy or common enterprise is shown to exist even though not charged). However, [t]he relation of parties charged with conspiracy is not an immaterial matter, and, unless too remote, acts and transactions prior to the alleged date of the commencement of the conspiracy are relevant. The date when a conspiracy is alleged to have begun is not, in effect, a wall behind which the court and jury may never look for the purpose of discovering facts that have a bearing upon the fact of the conspiracy itself. Commonwealth v. Beal, 314 Mass. 210, 227 (1943). See Commonwealth v. Wampler, 369 Mass. 121, 123 (1975); Commonwealth v. Stasiun, 349 Mass. 38, 50 (1965). The conversations between Reinstein and Turiello, commencing the month after Reinstein took office as mayor of Revere, tended to show that from the outset of Reinstein's administration, Reinstein planned to solicit a kickback payment from the person who held the contract as specifier for the interior design and furnishings of the new Revere high school. When Turiello failed to cooperate, a replacement was sought. The Worcester contractor was solicited for the position. During a meeting at which Borans was present, Reinstein informed the contractor that in order to obtain the contract as specifier for the new high school, the contractor would be required to pay Reinstein $10,000 in cash. [27] After the contractor failed to respond, a search for a suitable contractor was undertaken and the successful solicitation of Sharigian commenced. [T]he government had a right to show the whole history of the conspiracy from its commencement to its consummation.... [The evidence] tended to show the preparations made by [the principal] and the beginning and development of his scheme. It was like the evidence which always has been held to be competent that one charged with a crime had made preparations for its commission, or had by word or deed manifested an intention to commit that crime. Commonwealth v. Stuart, 207 Mass. 563, 570 (1911). See Commonwealth v. Butynski, 339 Mass. 151, 152 (1959) (The consistency of the ... conduct ... tended to show ... relevant background ... [and] that it was part of a general purpose and course of operations); Commonwealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507, 512-513 (1914). Accord, Commonwealth v. Eagan, 357 Mass. 585, 589 (1970) (the mere fact that evidence tends to prove the commission of some other crime does not render it inadmissible as long as it is relevant to the crime being tried). In any event, the conversations to which Borans objects are also admissible to show that Borans was the accessory after the fact to a felony. [T]o convict him, it was necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ... the alleged principal ... was guilty. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 338 Mass. 130, 135 (1958). See Commonwealth v. Eagan, supra at 590; Commonwealth v. Tilley, 327 Mass. 540, 546 (1951). Thus evidence relevant to show the actual commission of a felony by Reinstein, [28] including his preparations therefor, are admissible against Borans, who is charged as accessory after the fact to Reinstein's felony. [29] Accord, Commonwealth v. Eagan, supra at 589-590.