Opinion ID: 1589857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: ravvin's deposition was admissible evidence

Text: Walton contends that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence Ravvin's deposition testimony based on its conclusion that Walton failed to show that Ravvin was unavailable pursuant to § 27-804(1)(e) and (2)(a). Walton maintains that the deposition is admissible because Ravvin's attendance could not be procured by other reasonable means. For different reasons, we agree that Ravvin's deposition testimony was admissible. Section 27-804(2)(a) of the Nebraska rules of evidence provides that a deposition may be admitted only if it was taken subject to cross-examination by the party opponent and only if the witness is unavailable. Unavailability, as relevant to the hearsay exception, requires that the deponent be absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other reasonable means. [5] But Neb. Ct. R. § 6-332 allows the admission of a deposition where the deponent is either more than 100 miles from the site of the trial or beyond the trial court's subpoena power at the time of trial. The disjunctive language of § 6-332 allows the admission of the deposition where the deponent is more than 100 miles away from the place of trial, regardless of the use of process or other reasonable means [6] to secure the deponent's appearance. In Maresh v. State, [7] we were confronted with the conflict between the Nebraska discovery rules and the Nebraska hearsay rules regarding the admission of deposition testimony at trial. In Maresh, the trial court allowed the deposition testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness to be read into evidence. The State argued that the trial court erred in this respect because the plaintiff did not make a preliminary showing of unavailability as required by § 27-804(2)(a). Conversely, the plaintiff argued that the deposition was properly admitted under the Nebraska discovery rules. The plaintiff maintained that because the deponent resided more than 100 miles from the trial court site, under what is now codified as § 6-332, his deposition testimony was admissible without further inquiry. We held that under our rules, depositions were hearsay and, as such, were admissible only if they fit within a hearsay exception. [8] We explained that the unavailability requirement of § 27-804 must be read into § 6-332 so that an independent exception to the hearsay rule was not created by the Nebraska discovery rule. [9] Therefore, we concluded that to be admissible under the Nebraska discovery rule, the requirements of § 27-804 must also be met, and a mere showing that the deponent lived farther than 100 miles from the trial and was beyond the subpoena power of the court was insufficient. In so concluding, we reasoned that the court had no power, pursuant to Neb.Rev. Stat. §§ 27-802 and 25-1273.01 (Reissue 1989), to create in the Nebraska discovery rules an independent exception to the hearsay prohibition of § 27-802. At the time Maresh was decided, § 27-802 provided that hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the statutes of the State of Nebraska. We noted that § 27-802 was consistent with § 25-1273.01, which then stated, The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of procedure for discovery in civil cases, which rules shall not be in conflict with laws governing such matters. But in 2000, the Legislature amended §§ 27-802 [10] and 25-1273.01. [11] Section 27-802 was amended to read, Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, by other rules adopted by the statutes of the State of Nebraska, or by the discovery rules of the Supreme Court. Section 25-1273.01 was amended by adding the following italicized language: The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of procedure for discovery in civil cases, which rules shall not be in conflict with laws governing such matters. Rules which provide for the admissibility of depositions shall not be considered as conflicting with the Nebraska Evidence Rules. (Emphasis supplied.) We adhere to the general presumption that the Legislature, in adopting an amendment, intended to make some change in the existing law and that we should give effect to that change. [12] Furthermore, in construing a statute, appellate courts are guided by the presumption that the Legislature intended a sensible rather than absurd result in enacting the statute. [13] An appellate court will place a sensible construction upon a statute to effectuate the object of the legislation, as opposed to a literal meaning that would have the effect of defeating the legislative intent. [14] In construing a statute, a court must look to the statutory objective to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be served, and then must place on the statute a reasonable or liberal construction that best achieves the statute's purpose, rather than a construction that defeats the statutory purpose. [15] The language added to § 25-1273.01, in combination with the amendment made to § 27-802, indicates a clear intention by the Legislature to abrogate the holding in Maresh that the Nebraska Rules of Discovery do not create an independent avenue to admit deposition testimony. Based on these amendments, the Legislature validated § 6-332, which allows deposition testimony to be admitted independent of the Nebraska hearsay rule. In other words, § 6-332 creates an exception to the hearsay rule, and a deposition need no longer satisfy the requirements of § 27-804(2)(a) to be admissible under the rules of discovery. And when a party attempts to introduce deposition testimony under § 6-332, it is unnecessary to show that reasonable efforts were made to procure the attendance of the witness. Based on the foregoing, we conclude the district court erred when it reasoned that the deposition was inadmissible because Walton failed to prove that Ravvin was unavailable. The fact that Ravvin is Walton's paid witness is irrelevant. Likewise, the fact that Walton could have chosen a less expensive witness is immaterial. Section 6-332 merely requires that the deponent reside more than 100 miles from the site of the trial, regardless of whether the proponent has made reasonable efforts to obtain the witness but could not do so. In the present case, it is undisputed that Ravvin resided more than 100 miles from the trial and was outside the court's subpoena power. Because this is all Walton was required to show to admit the deposition testimony under § 6-332, the district court erred in overruling her motion. The district court also erred in concluding that the deposition was inadmissible because it was a discovery deposition. Neither our rules nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure distinguish between a deposition taken for use at trial and one taken for discovery purposes. [16] In fact, the federal courts have universally rejected a `discovery-use' dichotomy as a criterion for the admissibility of a deposition taken during the discovery phases of a trial. [17] Nothing in the Nebraska rules of evidence or the rules of discovery makes such a distinction. Thus, a deposition taken during discovery may be used at trial so long as it is otherwise admissible.