Opinion ID: 2971450
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the District Court Made a Proper

Text: Determination That Pacoda was Substantively Harmed 14 The school district argues that, even if the district court could properly conclude that a procedural violation occurred, it made no findings of fact or conclusions of law that the procedural violation constituted substantive harm. A procedural violation of the IDEA is not a per se denial of a [free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”)]. Rather, a procedural violation will constitute a denial of FAPE only if it causes substantive harm to the child or [her] parents; such as seriously infringing on the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process, depriving an eligible student of an IEP, or causing the loss of educational opportunity. Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 765-66 (6th Cir. 2001). Any error, if such there was, in the district court’s determination of whether Pacoda was substantively harmed as a result of the failure to hold a timely IEP meeting does not affect the outcome of this case. Having upheld the ALJ’s determination that the IEP, once adopted, was insufficient, it is not necessary for this court to address the district court’s decision regarding the effect of any procedural error that preceded the adoption of that IEP. C. Whether the District Court Gave Due Weight to the Administrative Decision A district court must give deference to the administrative findings under a “modified” de novo standard of review. See McLaughlin v. Holt Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 320 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The modified de novo standard of review applies to both procedural and substantive matters. . . . ‘[A] district court is required to make findings of fact based on a preponderance of the evidence contained in the complete record, while giving some deference to the fact findings of the administrative proceedings.’”) (quoting Knable, 238 F.3d at 764). “The amount of weight due to administrative findings is based on whether the finding was based on educational expertise.” Id. Less weight is due when the ALJ’s determinations are based on “matters 15 for which educational expertise is not relevant because a federal court is just as well suited to evaluate the situation.” Id. More weight is due to the ALJ’s determinations on “matters for which educational expertise is relevant.” Id. (citing Burilovich, 208 F.3d at 567). The school district argues that it presented the only educational expertise on the issue of the nature of Pacoda’s disabilities at the due process hearing; thus, the school argues, the district court failed to give due deference to the school district’s experts when it ruled in favor of the Bellamys. The school district’s argument presumes that its objection to the district court’s admission of the testimony of Kaas-Weiss and McGuire was well-taken. We have, however, concluded otherwise. That testimony having been admitted properly, it was also considered properly. When the district court considered that evidence in the course of upholding the ALJ, it did not fail to give due deference to the administrative decision. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the school district misreads McLaughlin. That case does not require the giving of deference to evidence; it requires, rather, that due weight must be given to “an administrative decision involving methodology and educational expertise.” 320 F.3d at 669 (emphasis added); see also Doe By and Through Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The fact that § 1415(e) requires that the reviewing court ‘receive the records of the [state] administrative proceedings’ carries with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these proceedings.”). Nothing in the district court’s proceedings or decision failed to comply with this obligation.