Opinion ID: 2130437
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: summary disposition motion alonda freeman

Text: The Court of Appeals held that the policy exclusion requires application of a two-part test. [21] The exclusion in the Allstate policy provided: Exclusions  Losses We Do Not Cover 1. We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or which is in fact intended by an insured person. [Emphasis added.] The Court of Appeals held that Allstate may obviate its duty to defend and indemnify under the exclusion if it can prove that (1) the insured acted either intentionally or criminally, [22] and (2) the resulting injury was reasonably expected to result from such intentional or criminal conduct. However, Alonda Freeman contends that under the second prong, the Court of Appeals erred in not requiring Allstate to prove Alonda Freeman intended to injure Kelly and, alternatively, that her subjective expectation controls. We find neither argument proffered by Alonda Freeman persuasive. We note first that neither party contends that the exclusion is ambiguous as it applies to Alonda Freeman. [23] We agree with this conclusion. The provision, under a conspicuous heading entitled, Exclusions  Losses We Do Not Cover, sets forth, in plain English, a two-part test. We do not find the terms, reasonably be expected, intentional, or criminal ambiguous. Moreover, several recent decisions interpreting the identical exclusionary clause in this case have failed to find any ambiguity. See Barton v Allstate Ins Co, 527 So 2d 524 (La App, 1988); Allstate Ins Co v Talbot, 690 F Supp 886 (ND Cal, 1988); Allstate Ins Co v Foster, 693 F Supp 886, 888 (D Nev, 1988) (citing Freeman, supra ); Allstate Ins Co v Gilbert, 852 F2d 449 (CA 9, 1988). Applying the exclusionary language that we find unambiguous to the facts in this case, we are persuaded, as was the Court of Appeals, that Alonda Freeman's conduct satisfies the first element of the exclusionary language as either an intentional or criminal act. The uncontroverted testimony showed that Alonda Freeman left the scene of the fight and reentered her home. However, rather than remaining safely inside, she reappeared with a loaded .38 caliber gun and fired it towards Kelly who was approximately three to six feet away. As the Court of Appeals stated, there is ... no dispute that [Alonda Freeman] pointed a loaded gun in the direction of Kelly and fired it at her at close range. Freeman, supra at 356. Under these circumstances, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that Alonda Freeman acted intentionally. [24] In her second argument, Alonda Freeman asserts that the exclusion does not apply because she did not intend to injure Kelly. See, e.g., Morrill, supra ; Putman, supra . We rejected the same argument involving a slightly different exclusion in DiCicco, supra. In so doing, we distinguished expected from intended injuries within the context of an exclusion which excluded injuries either expected or intended, and held that expected required a lesser degree of proof than intended. Accordingly, we held that an insurer could satisfy either the expected or intended portion of the exclusion by proving that injury resulted as the natural, foreseeable, expected, and anticipated result of [the insured's] intentional act[s]. Jenkins, supra at 468; Morelli; Yother; Wright, supra . Similarly, the Allstate exclusion requires an intentional or criminal act. We find our analysis of expected injuries in DiCicco equally applicable in the context of this case. Therefore, we hold that expected, within the context of reasonably be expected, connotes the same meaning as it does in expected or intended. An insurer may obviate its duty to defend and indemnify under the exclusion in the present case if the resulting injury was the natural, foreseeable, expected, and anticipated result of the intentional or criminal conduct. Alonda Freeman further argues that we must determine expectation from her subjective viewpoint. While there is a line of authority which appears to support this view under the expected or intended exclusion in other jurisdictions, we do not choose to follow it. [25] Rather, we find that reasonably be expected is unambiguous, and therefore, requires application of an objective standard of expectation. In support of this conclusion, we find that the exclusion also excludes coverage for injuries actually intended by an insured person. In our opinion, this section of the exclusion requires application of a subjective standard. As we stated in DiCicco, we will give effect to all words in an insurance contract if they serve a reasonable purpose. We are persuaded that Allstate included both phrases in order to reinforce its intent to exclude both objectively expected injuries and subjectively intended injuries. Therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that, under the Allstate exclusion, reasonably be immediately preceding expected, in addition to the omission of from the standpoint of the insured, requires application of an objective test of expectation. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a reasonable person would expect injury to result from the shooting incident in this case. As the Court of Appeals stated, we agree with the principle that `some acts ... are so nearly certain to produce injury that intent or expectation to injure should be inferred as a matter of law.' Freeman, supra at 356; MacKinnon v Hanover Ins Co, 124 NH 456, 460; 471 A2d 1166 (1984); Barton v Allstate Ins Co, supra . For example, Barton involved a shooting incident and implicated the identical exclusionary clause involved in this case. The insured and wife were separated. At 4:00 A.M. one morning, he went to her home and found a man hiding in her bathroom. The insured took out his .357 magnum revolver and shot through the bathroom door, injuring the man. However, the insured claimed he intended to open the door and not to injure the boyfriend. The court held that the exclusion applied because it found that the insured intentionally (intentional act) fired the gun and, therefore, he should have been aware that it was substantially certain [reasonably be expected] that the person behind the door would be injured. Id. at 526. Similarly, the shooting incident in this case constitutes such an act. The uncontroverted testimony showed that after the initial fight with Kelly ended, Alonda Freeman reentered her home, retrieved a loaded .38 caliber handgun, and returned outside to confront Kelly. Then, without issuing a warning, Alonda Freeman shot towards Kelly from a close distance. A motion for summary disposition is proper under the facts of the instant case. MCR 2.116(C)(10). It would be patently disingenuous to say that injury would not be reasonably expected from the shooting incident. Freeman, supra at 356; Linebaugh, supra at 760-761; Cannon, supra at 34. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that under the intentional-act exclusion of the Freemans' policy, Allstate had no duty to defend or indemnify Alonda Freeman.