Opinion ID: 2770506
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commenting on Killings' Right to a Jury Trial

Text: The following exchange took place during the prosecutor's closing arguments: You heard from, I believe everyone that was there, everyone that has information about the circumstances surrounding the murder of Mr. Jackson. The evidence is overwhelming that the defendant murdered Mr. Jackson on January 21, 2010. So why are we here with this kind of evidence, this kind of physical evidence and testimonial evidence, why are we here? We are here because the defendant was given an opportunity, he failed to accept responsibility for his homicidal act; and now that responsibility is passed along to you. 19 Your responsibility now is to hold him accountable for something of which he would not accept responsibility for. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I object to any acceptance of responsibility. That's not what we are here for. I think it is improper. THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, go ahead and move on. [THE PROSECUTOR]: You have the task at this point to hold the defendant accountable for his acts, and what can you consider in doing that? You can only consider the evidence that was presented over the last week and a half. What is that evidence? Well, it is the testimony of many witnesses. It is the admission of many exhibits, all of which, which shed light on the circumstances surrounding the homicide of Mr. Jackson. (Emphasis added.) Killings contends that the prosecutor's comment regarding his refusal to accept responsibility cast negative aspersions on him for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial. Killings likens the prosecutor's comment to impermissible comments regarding a defendant's postarrest silence. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976). A Doyle violation occurs when the government attempts to impeach a defendant's version of events offered at trial on the basis that the defendant remained silent after being advised of his or her Miranda rights and, thus, did not offer the information at an earlier point in the criminal investigation. 426 U.S. at 617-19; see State v. Kemble, 291 Kan. 109, 121-23, 238 P.3d 251 (2010). Killings' comparison of the prosecutor's statement here to a Doyle violation is unnecessary. There is already precedent in Kansas prohibiting a prosecutor from making disparaging comments about a defendant exercising his or her right to a jury trial. See State v. Snow, 282 Kan. 323, 336-39, 144 P.3d 729 (2006), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 267 P.3d 751 (2012); State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 91-92, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). Furthermore, unlike a defendant in a Doyle case, who exercises his or her right to remain silent during a post-Miranda warnings interrogation but later testifies at trial and provides an exculpatory version of events, Killings voluntarily 20 provided police with an explanation of his whereabouts during the time of the shooting. Later, however, he chose not to testify at trial. Accordingly, the facts of this case make it distinguishable from the typical Doyle-violation case. Killings makes the additional argument that the prosecutor's statement here is similar to the statement found to be improper in Tosh. In Tosh, the prosecutor asked the jury to think about why the defendant was bothering to do this (i.e., go through with a jury trial) when he had already confessed to committing the charged crimes. This court determined that the prosecutor's comment improperly injected a matter outside the evidence into the jury's deliberations and concluded that the comment was outside the wide latitude given to prosecutors. 278 Kan. at 91-92. Similarly, in Snow the defendant complained on appeal that the prosecutor denied him a fair trial by disparaging him for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial. As recounted in Snow: The prosecutor began her closing arguments by stating: '[M]embers of the jury, there may be some of you who are sitting there thinking, why have we given two days to listen to this evidence? And the answer is simply this: Everyone who's charged with a crime in this country has an absolute right to a jury trial if that's what they demand. The defendant has indicated he wants a jury trial, and now he's had it. Despite the amount of evidence that might be there against them, if he wants it, I have to put it on, and we've done that.' 282 Kan. at 337. The prosecutor closed her arguments stating: 'Now, the defendant wants his jury trial, he's had his jury trial, and it[']s time to put an end to this nonsense.' 282 Kan. at 337. 21 The Snow court ultimately concluded that the prosecutor's comments . . . injected a matter outside the evidence, inferring that Snow should have acceded to the State's evidence and waived his right to a fair trial because of the strength of the State's evidence against him. 282 Kan. at 338; see also State v. Nye, 46 Kan. App. 2d 182, 194-95, 261 P.3d 923 (2011) (finding prosecutor's statements that defendant knew when he refused to take breath test and during trial that he was guilty of DUI were improper because they impugned [the defendant's] right to contest the DUI charge and request a jury trial), rev. denied 293 Kan. 1112 (2012). Like the statements at issue in Snow and Tosh, the statement here injected a matter outside the evidence presented at trial by asking the jury, 'Why are we here?' i.e., going through with a jury trial when the evidence of Killings' guilt was so overwhelming. The prosecutor then answered his own rhetorical question by suggesting that he and the jury were enduring the burden of a jury trial because Killings 'failed to take responsibility for his homicidal act.' By making this argument, the prosecutor was clearly suggesting to the jury that Killings should have acceded to the State's evidence and waived his right to a jury trial because of the strength of the State's evidence against him. Accordingly, we find this statement outside the bounds of permissible argument. Because Killings complains of other statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments, we will analyze those statements before determining whether the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct during closing arguments. 22 2. Commenting on Killings' Failure to Present Evidence Next, Killings objects to a statement the prosecutor made near the beginning of his rebuttal arguments. To place the prosecutor's comments in context, it is necessary to first examine the arguments that defense counsel made during his closing arguments. Because the defense did not present any evidence at trial, defense counsel's closing arguments consisted of pointing out supposed weaknesses in the State's case identifying Killings as Jackson's murderer. In making these arguments, defense counsel identified pieces of evidence that the State could have procured but did not present at trial: • The photo that the detective showed to the manager at Footlocker to determine whether Killings was at the store at the time of the shooting. • Testing which would have identified the biological material (e.g., blood) on the magazine clip containing Killings' DNA. • Comparisons of the DNA found on the magazine clip to the DNA of other people who were at McCray's apartment on January 21. • Testimony from R.P., Jackson's alleged accomplice in the robbery of Killings. • The cell phone records for everyone who was at McCray's apartment on January 21. • Killings' prior convictions to establish that he had a history of engaging in violence (the district court sustained the State's objection to this argument). 23 Throughout his closing arguments, defense counsel suggested that the State did not present this evidence at trial because the evidence did not fit within its theory of the case, i.e., that Killings murdered Jackson in order to exact revenge for the prior robbery. Because this evidence was not presented at trial, defense counsel argued that the State had not carried its burden of proof. Near the beginning of the State's rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor stated: [Defense Counsel] wants you to pay attention to the things that weren't presented, and that's somehow if it wasn't presented it's because the State didn't want you to know about it, because it doesn't fit the theory of the case. Ladies and gentlemen, I don't know how many pieces of evidence that were admitted and it is not the amount of items that really ultimately matters; but I will tell you this, every item that was admitted was presented to you by the State. Every witness that testified that relayed their information to you was presented by the State. I tell you that because the State is not hiding anything. We put on everything we had. Everything that was available. (Emphasis added.) The prosecutor proceeded to explain why certain pieces of evidence were not presented and disputed defense counsel's suggestion that, without this evidence, the State had not carried its burden of proof. Killings contends that the italicized portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument above was improper because it implied that the defense had an obligation to present evidence at trial and failed to do so. In other words, the prosecutor attempted to shift the burden of proof to the defense. Kansas courts deem it 'improper for the prosecutor to attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defendant or to misstate the legal standard of the burden of proof.' 24 [Citations omitted.] But we grant prosecutors considerable latitude to address the weaknesses of the defense. [Citations omitted.] State v. Duong, 292 Kan. 824, 832, 257 P.3d 309 (2011); see State v. McKinney, 272 Kan. 331, 346, 33 P.3d 234 (2001) (where jury has been properly instructed that prosecution has burden of proof, a prosecutor may argue inferences based on the balance or lack of evidence), overruled on other grounds by State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 158 P.3d 317 (2006). Though this court has made clear recently that a prosecutor commits misconduct by making an improper argument, even if the improper argument is made in response to arguments or statements by defense counsel, State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 860, 281 P.3d 1112 (2012), the prosecutor's comment must still be evaluated in the context of which it was made. See State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 937-41, 329 P.3d 400 (2014). When a prosecutor's comment 'constitute[s] only a general question about the absence of evidence to rebut the State's witnesses . . . [and] not an impermissible remark about the defendant's failure to testify or an attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defense,' the comment is within the wide latitude afforded to the prosecution. [Citations omitted.] State v. Peppers, 294 Kan. 377, 397-98, 276 P.3d 148 (2012). Applicable here, this court has held that a prosecutor does not shift the burden of proof by pointing out a lack of evidence to support a defense or to corroborate a defendant's argument regarding holes in the State's case. See, e.g., Williams, 299 Kan. at 939 ([I]f a defendant asks the jury to draw an inference that the State's evidence is not credible because the State did not call a witness to corroborate other evidence, we have held that the State can refute the inference by informing the jury that the defense has the power to subpoena witnesses, including those who would be favorable to the defense.); State v. Wilson, 295 Kan. 605, 623-25, 289 P.3d 1082 (2012) (holding prosecutor's arguments that defendant had no explanation for his DNA found near crime scene did not improperly shift burden of proof; rather, it was comment on efficacy of defense and pointed jurors to lack of evidence supporting defendant's version of events); State v. 25 Cosby, 293 Kan. 121, 135-37, 262 P.3d 285 (2011) (finding prosecutor's statements asking jury if it had heard any evidence that suggested witness' testimony was wrong did not improperly shift burden of proof because prosecutor was only commenting generally on defendant's failure to rebut witness' testimony and not commenting on defendant's failure to testify); Duong, 292 Kan. at 832-33 (holding prosecutor's arguments questioning defendant's failure to present evidence of misidentification did not improperly shift burden of proof because prosecutor did not call upon defense to disprove crime's occurrence but rather pointed out that evidence supporting defense theory was thin); State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13, 18, 237 P.3d 1229 (2010) (finding prosecutor's statements that defendant had 'obstacles to overcome' were within considerable latitude granted to prosecutors to comment on weaknesses of defenses). Contrary to Killings' arguments, the prosecutor did not suggest or infer that Killings had the burden to show that he was not involved in Jackson's murder. Rather, the prosecutor, by merely noting that the State had presented all the evidence admitted at trial, was responding to defense counsel's argument that the State chose not to present certain pieces of evidence that did not fit within its theory of the case. As the cases cited above show, it would have been permissible for the prosecutor to go one step beyond his statement and explicitly note in rebuttal that the defense had the ability to present the missing evidence it identified as damaging to the State's case. Accordingly, the prosecutor's comments were not outside the wide latitude allowed in discussing evidence. 3. Commenting on the Credibility of Witnesses Lastly, Killings points to four instances during the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments which he argues constitute improper comments on the credibility of witnesses. 26 During the prosecutor's closing arguments, he discussed the testimonies of the people inside McCray's apartment when the shooting occurred: These people are not about the system, but they did their job. Did they run to the police and tell them what happened, no. They had to be found, except for Bobbie and Deborah stayed around where they are. They came down to the police station. They all gave their story, and when it first started they didn't say who did it. They didn't want to be involved in the homicide to begin with. They don't want to be involved in fingering anyone because they know they have to come to court and testify, but when push came to shove they told law enforcement who did it, and then they came in this courtroom and told all of you who did it, and I made each one of them point at the defendant and identify him. Because that's not easy to do, especially if that's not the person. They were cross examined by [defense counsel] thoroughly, hammered at times, rightfully so. The defendant has that right, but they never wavered, ladies and gentlemen. They told you what happened on the 21st day of January, 2010. (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel suggested during his closing arguments that the testimony of the witnesses inside McCray's apartment during the shooting, identifying Killings as the shooter, could not be trusted due to most of them admitting to consuming crack cocaine just before the shooting. He also suggested that these witnesses may have spoken to each other before speaking individually to law enforcement in order to concoct a story identifying Killings as the shooter. Though there was no evidence admitted at trial to support his allegations, defense counsel suggested that R.P., Jackson's alleged accomplice in the robbery of Killings, was the murderer and that the witnesses inside the apartment were protecting R.P. because he was their crack dealer. The prosecutor responded to these arguments during his rebuttal arguments by making the following statements: 27 • Now, to pull off this conspiracy [i.e., frame Killings for Jackson's murder,] as I indicated earlier, it is quite elaborate and quite involved, and it requires scientific expertise, the transference of DNA, knowing how to do that, and where to get it. It just boggles the mind to even imagine how Bobbie and Deborah and Renee and Bernard and Arlene and Ms. Moore could put this altogether and keep it together. If it's made up, if it's fabricated it is going to fall apart at some point. These people are not going to keep it together over time, and yet if they have. Why? Because that's what happened, it's easy to keep it together when all you are repeating and all you are telling is what you saw, what you heard and what you did. It is much harder when you fabricate things. (Emphasis added.) • I've heard no evidence and maybe you have, where RP was the [crack] dealer. I believe in saying that [defense counsel is] suggesting maybe RP was the murderer and all these witnesses are framing his client in order to protect RP. Now, the only evidence I've heard regarding the crack dealer is the defendant. That's where at least Bobbie McCray was going to buy her crack, in fact, traded for crack; and I think [defense counsel] is right. I think crack addicts wrongly so want to protect their dealer because that's the source of their supply, to feed their addiction; but ladies and gentlemen, even crackheads draw a line in the sand and he's dead. When push came to shove they realized what went down inside that apartment as much as they didn't want to be involved and as much as they initially did not want to cooperate with the law enforcement. I think in the end they even realized this crossed the line. Yes we are crack addicts. Yes, we've done things in the past we regret, but we are not murderers and they can't condone that. So I think in the end they realize and went above and beyond what is acceptable even with their lifestyle, and that's why they came in here and told you what they told you. Not because they are setting up Mr. Killings for a fall, because again they have really no interest in dealing with law enforcement or the courts because of what they do. They want to avoid that. But even they have a conscience. (Emphasis added.) 28 • [I] talked in detail about Ms. McCray, Ms. Metcalf, Ms. Stewart, a lot of the individuals, and there's one that I mentioned earlier which kinda stands out to me. I don't know why. I guess maybe it is the way she presented herself on the stand, and during her interview, Arlene Love. Now think for yourself as far as you want to pick apart, which you'll do. Arlene Love is a person that will have, if somebody told her to do something she didn't want to do or didn't believe, Arlene Love ain't doing it. She is a strong woman, admitted crack addict, a strong woman. She is not going to take the fall for anyone else. She is not going to fall into conspiracy of other people if it did happen, because she doesn't want the police up in her business. She does her thing, handles her business and moves along. You saw her. She never wavered from the time of the interview to the time she took the stand. She is a strong woman. (Emphasis added.) Killings argues that the italicized portions of the above statements constitute impermissible comments on the credibility of witnesses. It is improper for a prosecutor to offer his or her personal opinion as to the credibility of a witness, including the defendant. See State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 59-64, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005); State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 121-23, 61 P.3d 701 (2003); State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 506-07, 996 P.2d 321 (2000). A prosecutor, however, may explain the legitimate factors which a jury may consider in assessing witness credibility and may argue why the factors present in the current case should lead to a compelling inference of truthfulness. State v. Scaife, 286 Kan. 614, Syl. ¶ 5, 186 P.3d 755 (2008); see, e.g., State v. Huerta-Alvarez, 291 Kan. 247, 262, 243 P.3d 326 (2010) (finding that prosecutor's remarks in closing regarding victim's credibility were generally in the nature of reviewing what [the victim] said, asking the jury to assess the credibility of her statements, and querying the jury why she would not have made up a more convenient story if in fact she had fabricated the story at all). In commenting on the credibility of the witnesses to the shooting, the prosecutor never offered a personal opinion as to whether the witnesses were credible (e.g., I believe 29 Bobbie McCray is credible). Instead, the comments quoted above show that the prosecutor directed the jury to the evidence and factors he argued established the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, we conclude that the statements were not outside the wide latitude allowed to a prosecutor in discussing the evidence presented at trial. B. Did the Prosecutor Commit Reversible Misconduct? As determined above, we deem one comment to be improper—the prosecutor's comment regarding Killings' decision not to accept responsibility and instead exercise his right to a jury trial. We now move on to the second prong of the prosecutorial misconduct analysis. This involves a three-factor inquiry: (1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether it was motivated by prosecutorial ill will; and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of jurors. No one factor is controlling. State v. Crawford, 300 Kan. 752, Syl. ¶ 3, 334 P.3d 311 (2014); State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, 1012, 306 P.3d 244 (2013); State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 93, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). Before the third factor can ever override the first two factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the State can meet both the statutory harmlessness standard stated in K.S.A. 60261 and the constitutional standard stated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967). Crawford, 300 Kan. 752, Syl. ¶ 4; Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1012 (citing Tosh, 278 Kan. at 97); see State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶¶ 5-6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). We have observed that, as a practical matter, the result of the harmless error evaluation depends on the outcome of the Chapman constitutional standard. [B]oth the constitutional and nonconstitutional error clearly arise from the very same acts and omissions, and the constitutional standard is more rigorous. Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1015 (citing State v. Herbel, 296 Kan. 1101, 1111, 299 P.3d 292 [2013]). Thus, the State 30 necessarily meets the lower statutory standard under K.S.A. 60-261 if it meets the higher constitutional standard. 296 Kan. at 1111. With regard to the first factor—whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant— we consider whether the misconduct was repeated, was emphasized, violated a longstanding rule, violated a clear and unequivocal rule, or violated a rule designed to protect a constitutional right. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, Syl. ¶ 6. Here, the prosecutor only referred one time to Killings' decision to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial (i.e., [W]hy are we here?). Though we have held that it is improper for a prosecutor during closing arguments to impugn a defendant for choosing to exercise his or her right to a jury trial, see State v. Snow, 282 Kan. 323, 338, 144 P.3d 729 (2006), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Gruder, 293 Kan. 763, 267 P.3d 751 (2012); Tosh, 278 Kan. at 91-92, we have also held that it is proper for a prosecutor to argue that, based on the evidence, the defendant, by providing an implausible alibi, was not taking responsibility for the defendant's actions and that the jury should hold the defendant accountable. See State v. Finley, 273 Kan. 237, 244-45, 42 P.3d 723 (2002). A review of the prosecutor's statement shows that the bulk of the statement consisted of arguments that are proper under Finley. Accordingly, we find that the prosecutor's lone reference to Killings' decision to proceed with a jury trial was not gross and flagrant. In analyzing whether a prosecutor's misconduct was motivated by ill will, we consider whether the misconduct was deliberate, repeated, or in apparent indifference to a court's ruling. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, Syl. ¶ 7. Again, the prosecutor made a single reference to Killings' decision to proceed with a jury trial. The bulk of his statement, however, was proper under Finley. When defense counsel lodged an objection, counsel complained of the prosecutor's argument suggesting that Killings failed to accept responsibility. The district court did not make an explicit ruling on the objection but directed the prosecutor to go ahead and move on. The prosecutor proceeded to argue 31 that the jury, based on the evidence, should hold the defendant accountable—again, a proper argument under Finley. Accordingly, we conclude that there was no evidence of ill will on the part of the prosecutor. Finally, we turn to the third factor: Was the evidence of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of jurors? In answering this question, the State, as the party benefitting from the prosecutorial misconduct, bears the burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights, i.e., there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict. State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 431, 264 P.3d 81 (2011); see, e.g., State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, 918, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012) (finding prosecutor's misstatement did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record). As recounted above, the State presented overwhelming evidence (e.g., five eyewitnesses who identified Killings as the shooter and DNA evidence linking Killings to the ammunition magazine discovered outside of McCray's apartment door) establishing that Killings intentionally and with premeditation murdered Jackson inside McCray's apartment. Based on this evidence, we can conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the single improper comment in the prosecutor's closing argument affected the verdict. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct. RIGHT TO BE PRESENT Killings argues that an exchange between the district court judge and the jury foreman violated his constitutional and statutory rights to be present at all critical stages of his criminal prosecution. A claim that a defendant was deprived of his or her statutory 32 and constitutional rights to be present during a portion of the trial raises legal questions that are subject to unlimited review on appeal. State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 121, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). During a break while the jury was deliberating, the judge advised the attorneys and Killings of the following: I will advise you that just before the jury foreman approached me after all of the jurors had left, and he said I don't know if I can ask you this question or not, and he said there are only three ways this can go, is that correct? And I really didn't answer him. I just nodded, and I just, he said, you know, guilty, not guilty or hung? And I said if you have a question, I would like for you to write it down for me in a question format on the form; and he said, well, I just wanted to bring this up not in the presence of everyone. We haven't discussed that as an issue, but he was thinking about it, and I told him that I would advise you of what he said and if, if he felt that it was necessary to, the Court would like that in a written form from him if you wanted to ask that question, but I did not give him any response. Killings raised no concern about or objection to the judge's interaction with the jury foreman. In his motion for a new trial, Killings argued that the judge's encounter with the jury foreman constituted a conference between the judge and juror which required Killings' presence. The district court filed a memorandum decision and order denying Killings' motion. In the decision, the district court recounted the interaction with the juror: Just after jurors recessed for lunch, the Jury Foreman returned to Division 11, approached the Court and stated, 'I'm not sure if you can answer this question, but the way I see it is this thing could go three ways: guilty, not guilty, or hung.' The Court 33 instructed the foreman to submit his questions to the Court in writing on the form provided by the Court. The foreman then stated that although he wanted to bring up this point to the Court, he did not want to do so in the presence of the other jurors. He added that jurors had not discussed the matter, but he had been thinking of it. The Court advised the foreman that the Court would inform the parties of his question and of the Court's instruction. That concluded the interaction. The foreman never submitted written inquiry about this topic. The district court judge concluded that the exchange between the juror and herself did not constitute reversible misconduct. A criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be present at all critical stages of his or her trial. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, reh. denied 398 U.S. 915 (1970); K.S.A. 22-3405(1); State v. Bolton, 274 Kan. 1, 4-5, 49 P.3d 468 (2002). K.S.A. 22-3405(1) provides in relevant part: The defendant in a felony case shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by law. This court has interpreted K.S.A. 223405(1) to mean: [A] felony defendant must be present at any stage of the trial when the jury is in the courtroom or when the defendant's presence is essential to a fair and just determination of a substantial issue. The statutory command of K.S.A. 22-3405(1) is analytically and functionally identical to the requirements under the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution that a criminal defendant be present at any critical stage of the proceedings against him or her. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, Syl. ¶ 2. It is well settled that a conference between a trial judge and a juror is a critical stage of the trial at which a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present. State v. Mann, 274 Kan. 670, 682, 56 P.3d 212 (2002). Furthermore, K.S.A. 22-3420(3) 34 requires that any question from the jury concerning the law or evidence pertaining to the case must be answered in open court in the defendant's presence unless the defendant is voluntarily absent. See State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 353, 323 P.3d 853 (2014); State v. King, 297 Kan. 955, 967, 305 P.3d 641 (2013). To classify the exchange that took place in this case as a conference requiring Killings' presence is tenuous at best. Cf. Mann, 274 Kan. at 680-81 (court found it was error for trial judge, outside presence of defendant, to formally question four jurors about trial spectator whose conduct was making them uncomfortable); State v. Fulton, 269 Kan. 835, 844-45, 9 P.3d 18 (2000) (court found it was error for trial judge, outside presence of attorneys and defendant, to question two jurors about misconduct occurring during deliberations); State v. McGinnes, 266 Kan. 121, 127-28, 967 P.2d 763 (1998) (court found it was error for trial judge to have an ex parte communication with the jury advising it about why a witness did not testify at trial); State v. High, 260 Kan. 480, 48485, 922 P.2d 430 (1996) (court found it was error for trial judge, outside the presence of defendant, to question a juror about her business relationship with the victim's family); Crease v. State, 252 Kan. 326, 328-33, 845 P.2d 27 (1993) (court found it was error for trial judge to have an in chambers ex parte communication with at least one juror concerning juror's reluctance to apply felony-murder rule). Here, the jury foreman voluntarily approached the district court judge and attempted to ask the judge a question. The judge's description of the encounter, when viewed in its entirety, indicates that the judge, by nodding, did not give an answer to the juror's question but simply acknowledged that she had heard the juror's question. The judge then proceeded to advise the juror of the proper procedure for submitting a question to the court. The juror, however, never submitted the question. Consequently, the statutory mandate of answering a jury's question in open court in the presence of Killings 35 was never implicated because the district court judge never gave an answer to the jury foreman's question. Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the brief interaction the jury foreman initiated with the district court judge did not violate Killings' constitutional or statutory rights to be present at all critical stages of his criminal prosecution. CUMULATIVE ERROR Next, Killings asserts that even if the issues that he has raised do not rise to the level of reversible error individually, the cumulative effect of these errors operated to deny him a fair trial, requiring reversal of his conviction. Cumulative trial errors, when considered collectively, may require reversal of the defendant's convictions when the totality of circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant and denied the defendant a fair trial. If the evidence is overwhelming against the defendant, however, no prejudicial error may be found based upon this cumulative error rule. State v. Burns, 295 Kan. 951, 960, 287 P.3d 261 (2012). In the preceding analysis, we assumed the existence of one error—the district court's failure to instruct on second-degree intentional murder—and found the presence of another—the prosecutor's improper comment during closing arguments regarding Killings' decision to exercise his right to a jury trial. But based on the overwhelming evidence presented at trial establishing Killings' guilt for premeditated murder, we found both errors harmless. Considering the errors collectively, we conclude that they did not aggregate so as to deny Killings a fair trial. We reach this conclusion based on the errors being unrelated to one another and the overwhelming evidence presented at trial, which 36 included testimony from five eyewitnesses, establishing that Killings, with premeditation, murdered Jackson. In light of the record as a whole, we conclude there is not a reasonable possibility the combined errors affected the outcome of the trial. HARD 50 LIFE SENTENCE After Killings was found guilty of premeditated first-degree murder, the State sought a hard 50 life sentence, alleging Killings knowingly or purposely killed or created a great risk of death to more than one person (risk of death aggravator). See K.S.A. 214636(b). The evidence presented at trial established that Killings shot at Jackson multiple times, hitting him once, while Jackson and four other individuals were inside McCray's bedroom. Citing this evidence, the district court found Killings risked the lives of more than one person when he shot at Jackson. At sentencing, the State also asked that the district court consider Killings' actions while incarcerated and awaiting sentencing in determining whether to impose a hard 50 life sentence. Through the testimony of jail staff, the State presented evidence at sentencing that (1) Killings punched another inmate at the Shawnee County Detention Center; (2) he resisted officers' attempts to remove him from his cell and ultimately had to be tased (Killings' actions resulted in his sentencing hearing being continued to a later date); and (3) after being tased, jail staff searched Killings and found a shank tucked between two socks he was wearing on one foot. The district court judge stated that she also considered this evidence in imposing a hard 50 life sentence. Now on appeal, Killings raises three arguments for why his hard 50 sentence should be reversed: (a) The aggravating factors used to impose the sentence should have 37 been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt; (b) insufficient evidence supported the district court's finding of the risk of death aggravator; and (c) the district court erred in relying in part on a nonstatutory factor (behavior in jail while awaiting sentencing) to impose the hard 50 life sentence. In State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 120-24, 322 P.3d 334 (2014), this court analyzed Kansas' hard 50 life sentencing statute in light of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2160-63, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013). In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held that the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that any fact increasing a mandatory minimum sentence for a crime must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 133 S. Ct. at 2158. Applying Alleyne's holding to the statutory hard 50 sentencing scheme, this court in Soto determined that the process allowing a judge to find the existence of one or more aggravating factors, instead of requiring a jury to find those factors beyond a reasonable doubt, violates the Sixth Amendment. Soto, 299 Kan. at 122-24. In the present case, it is evident that the district court, pursuant to the statutory scheme then in place, made explicit factual findings that subjected Killings to an enhanced sentence. This was constitutional error. Based on Alleyne and Soto, we conclude that Killings' sentence was imposed in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Because the State failed to argue on appeal whether the hard 50/Alleyne error in this case could be declared harmless, we refrain from addressing that issue. Accordingly, we must vacate Killings' hard 50 life sentence and remand for resentencing. Consistent with Soto, and State v. Astorga, 299 Kan. 395, 401-02, 324 P.3d 1046 (2014), we refrain from addressing whether the amended hard 50 sentencing statute, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620, should be applied retroactively to Killings because such a question is not yet ripe for appeal. Accordingly, the decision in this case does not prevent the parties 38 from presenting their respective arguments to the district court at resentencing regarding application of the amended hard 50 sentencing scheme. With regard to Killings' argument that insufficient evidence supported the district court's finding of the risk of death aggravator, in Soto we addressed Soto's claim that the evidence of the aggravating factor was insufficient, in which case remand would have been inappropriate under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620(e). The Soto court stated: While we decline to decide at this juncture whether Soto could be resentenced under the amended hard 50 sentencing statute, we find it prudent to address Soto's claim that the evidence of the aggravating circumstance was insufficient. 299 Kan. at 129. We followed this same approach in several subsequent cases. See State v. Hayes, 299 Kan. 861, 866-69, 327 P.3d 415 (2014); State v. Lloyd, 299 Kan. 620, 642-45, 325 P.3d 1122 (2014); State v. DeAnda, 299 Kan. 594, 602-05, 324 P.3d 1115 (2014); Astorga, 299 Kan. at 397-404; State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 176, 201-06, 322 P.3d 367 (2014). Recently, in State v. Roeder, 300 Kan. __, 336 P.3d 831, 859 (2014), we reexamined this line of cases and concluded that [o]nce the court determined that Soto's sentence had to be vacated because of the unconstitutional sentencing scheme, the question of whether sufficient evidence existed to meet the requirements of the unconstitutional statute was rendered moot. In this case, like in Roeder, questions regarding the sufficiency of any aggravating factor evidence will be germane only if the prosecutor elects to seek resentencing of Killings under the retroactive provision of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620(e). And if the prosecutor so elects, the evidence—and even the aggravating factors relied upon—may differ from what was previously presented. Consequently, [w]hether the sentence might also have been subject to being vacated based upon an insufficiency of the evidence if the sentencing scheme had not been found unconstitutional is an academic question we need not answer. Roeder, 300 Kan. __, 336 P.3d at 859. 39 Consistent with our holding in Roeder, we do not address whether sufficient evidence supported the risk of death aggravator found by the sentencing court in this case. Furthermore, Killings' argument that the district court erred in considering a nonstatutory factor in imposing the hard 50 life sentence is rendered moot based on our decision to vacate his hard 50 life sentence and remand the case for resentencing. LIFETIME POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION Finally, Killings contends that the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision as part of his life sentence for his off-grid, premeditated firstdegree murder conviction. This court has previously decided this issue in Killings' favor, stating that '[a]n inmate who has received an off-grid indeterminate life sentence can leave prison only if the [Kansas Prisoner Review] Board grants the inmate parole. Therefore, a sentencing court has no authority to order a term of [lifetime] postrelease supervision in conjunction with an off-grid indeterminate life sentence.' State v. Summers, 293 Kan. 819, 832, 272 P.3d 1 (2012) (quoting State v. Cash, 293 Kan. 326, Syl. ¶ 2, 263 P.3d 786 [2011] ); see State v. Harsh, 293 Kan. 585, 590, 265 P.3d 1161 (2011) (parole is separate and distinct from the sentence; if defendant with hard 25 life sentence ever leaves prison, it will be because parole was granted). Based on the above caselaw, the district court erred in imposing lifetime postrelease supervision. At resentencing, if Killings receives an indeterminate life sentence for his premeditated first-degree murder conviction, the district court should impose lifetime parole in conjunction with the indeterminate life sentence. 40 Killings' conviction is affirmed, sentence vacated, and case remanded with directions. MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned. 1 1 REPORTER'S NOTE: Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 108,021 to fill the vacancy on the court created by the appointment of Justice Nancy Moritz to the United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616. 41