Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motions for Continuance (Oliver)

Text: Oliver contends the trial court violated state law in denying his various requests for a continuance during the guilt phase. He claims the rulings had the additional legal consequence of violating his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and the state Constitution, and to effective representation under the Sixth Amendment and the state Constitution. We disagree. For context, we note that Oliver first moved for a continuance on Monday, February 8, 1993. Such motion occurred one week after defendants' assault on counsel (which happened on February 1, 1993), and four days after the prosecution rested its case on Thursday, February 4, 1993. Of relevance here is that on Thursday morning, February 4, the trial court asked Lewis's counsel if he was ready to proceed. Counsel for Lewis replied he would be ready on the following Monday morning, i.e., February 8. Oliver's counsel said he would be ready when [Lewis's counsel] finishes. Lewis's counsel informed the court that his case-in-chief would take at the most ... probably a day. Thus, before noon on Thursday, Oliver's counsel knew that he must be ready to present his case on Monday, because Lewis's case might take less than an entire day. [22] That Monday, February 8, 1993, Oliver's counsel broke his promise to begin calling witnesses. He did so even though the trial court granted multiple recesses to allow him to call and find them, or to otherwise decide how to proceed. Lewis had just concluded his case. Lewis decided not to testify, and Lewis's counsel could not locate his sole other witness, Larry Brown, the parishioner accosted by defendants outside the church. At that point, counsel for Oliver volunteered that his client also considered Brown an essential witness in our case, but admitted that Oliver had never served him. The court observed that [t]his case is three years old. Do you expect me to sit and wait for another three years on the chance he might come in? It was at this juncture that Oliver's counsel announced that, despite his promise to be ready when Lewis's case concluded, he was not prepared to proceed. Oliver's counsel admitted he had not decided whether Oliver should take the stand, the first of several such equivocations by Oliver's counsel or Oliver himself. The trial court proposed doing an in limine hearing on another witness for Oliver, one Shon Yokely. Oliver's counsel agreed, but then moved for a continuance so that he could start presenting evidence to the jury on the following day. The court denied the motion, saying: No, sir. That's not going to happen.... Mr. Turner, you were on notice we would be starting today. [¶] You had the weekend plus the entire day Friday plus almost an entire day on Thursday. We are proceeding today. Oliver's counsel started to make excuses about the nonappearance of certain witnesses. The trial court and Oliver's counsel attempted to begin the in limine hearing on Shon Yokely, the previously mentioned witness for Oliver. Yokely entered the courtroom. Oliver's counsel then announced that Yokely was awaiting sentencing elsewhere in the courthouse and, exercising his Fifth Amendment rights, might not wish to testify. Oliver's counsel had not called Yokely's counsel to ensure that Yokely would testify. Yokely said, I plead the Fifth, and refused to testify. Oliver's counsel complained that the court had not given him enough time to interview Yokely. The court reminded him that he had had several days in which to do so. At that point, Oliver's counsel renewed his request for a one-day continuance. The court again denied the motion. Oliver's counsel mentioned fingerprint expert Lee Smith, another witness he planned to present on Oliver's behalf. The court inquired whether Smith had been subpoenaed. Oliver's counsel admitted that he had not done so, offering instead that I talked to him on the phone Thursday and he expressed to me he would be here tomorrow. The trial court said that, without a subpoena, it would not find good cause to grant a continuance. After making some phone calls, Oliver's counsel again moved for a continuance. The trial court again denied the motion. Oliver's counsel asked again some minutes later, and the court answered, You had two years. You don't have the rest of the day. Don't ask me again, I am not going to let you have a continuance. Eventually, during the course of the morning, Oliver's counsel located his witnesses, namely Maggie Crenshaw, Patricia James, and Lee Smith. He presented their testimony later that day. The court also allowed Oliver to reopen his case-in-chief on Tuesday, February 9, 1993, following the prosecution's rebuttal case, to present the testimony of Larry Brown. As noted, Brown was the witness Oliver's counsel had described as essential, but who had not been located on Monday or served with a summons. The court indicated that it was willing to let Oliver present a second witness during his reopened case-in-chief, one Maurice Rhodes. However, Oliver's defense team still had not been able to find Rhodes. We review a ruling on a motion for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 352, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1171-1172, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) In order to show the court abused its discretion in denying a continuance in the midst of trial, the defendant must demonstrate, among other things, that he diligently attempted to secure the attendance of witnesses. ( Howard, supra, at p. 1171, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Far from being diligent, the efforts of Oliver's defense team to subpoena and ensure the attendance of witnesses were tardy and inadequate. Yet, the trial court accommodated Oliver by allowing him to reopen his case to present the testimony of Larry Brown, a witness Oliver was inexplicably unprepared to call earlier, when he knew his case was set to begin. In sum, Oliver's counsel was not ready to proceed at the promised time despite ample notice and opportunity to do so. However, the trial court's response to the problem did not cause him to lose valuable witnesses as a result. Contrary to Oliver's further claim, the court's denial of a continuance did not impair his right to testify. Both Oliver's counsel and Oliver himself repeatedly declined to say on February 8, 1993, that Oliver would testify. The court never stated or implied that Oliver could not exercise that right if he chose to do so. As for the ineffective assistance claim, it has not been sustained. Even assuming counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, it appears Oliver presented all witnesses available to him. He does not indicate what additional evidence, if any, he would have presented on his own behalf had counsel behaved differently. There was no reasonable probability of an adverse effect on the outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.)