Opinion ID: 2590326
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective Juror Margaret P.

Text: In responding to the jury questionnaire about her views on the death penalty, Prospective Juror Margaret P. indicated she had mixed feelings about it and that jurors should not have the burden of deciding if another person lives or dies. She further indicated she had told her husband that she never wanted to be on a trial where a death penalty was determined by a jury. She concluded by writing, Even if I agreed to a guilty verdict, I would find it very difficult to impose the death penaltyit is a decision I would rather not make. During sequestered voir dire, Margaret P. reaffirmed her responses to the death penalty questions in the jury questionnaire. She told the trial court she felt very strongly that jurors should not have to make a decision involving the death penalty; that she did not know if she could do it; and that she would rather have the judge determine the appropriate sentence. When asked by the court if she would follow the law regardless of her feelings, she responded, I honestly don't know. When asked by the prosecutor if she could as a personal decision that you need to make ever vote for the death penalty in an appropriate case, she replied, The way I feel about it, I could not make that decision. (2) The high court has explained that even where a juror gives ambiguous or conflicting answers to inquiries about his or her views on the death penalty, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate those responses, and its determination as to the juror's actual state of mind is binding on appeal. ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 428-429; see People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 234 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 991 P.2d 145]; Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1147.) Any ambiguities in the record are to be resolved in favor of the trial court's determinations, and the reviewing court determines only whether the trial court's findings are fairly supported by the record. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 122 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 417-418 [243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) Manifestly, neither of these two prospective jurors was improperly excused for cause. [9]