Opinion ID: 3035625
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial and Kindle’s Post-Verdict Motions.

Text: Kindler and Shaw were jointly tried for Bernstein’s murder in state court, and the jury convicted both of first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy. During the ensuing penalty hearing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances 7 pertaining to Kindler; viz, he killed Bernstein to prevent him from testifying, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(5), and he committed the killing while perpetrating a felony - kidnapping. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(6). Although the Commonwealth also argued that the “offense was committed by means of torture,” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(8), the jury did not find that aggravating circumstance. The jury found no mitigating circumstances in favor of Kindler. Thus, pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(iv), Kindler was given the death penalty.2 After the penalty hearing, but before the sentence was formally imposed, Kindler filed post-verdict motions with the assistance of new counsel.3 2 Shaw received a sentence of life imprisonment. 3 In Pennsylvania, the death sentence is received and recorded by the court after the jury determines the sentence. The court formally imposes the sentence sometime later. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(g). 8 On September 19, 1984, while the post-verdict motions were pending, Kindler escaped from a Philadelphia jail where he was being held. Following the escape, the Commonwealth immediately moved to dismiss his post-verdict motions because he was then a fugitive. The trial court granted that motion holding that Kindler had waived any right to have his postverdict motions considered by escaping. Kindler was eventually arrested on new criminal charges as well as on immigration violations in Canada. However, soon after his arrest there, he once again managed to escape. This time, he used bed sheets to create a makeshift rope to escape from the thirteenth floor of the facility in Montreal where he was being held. He was captured once again in New Brunswick Canada in 1988. Upon being returned to Philadelphia in 1991, Kindler moved to reinstate his post-verdict motions; the trial court 9 denied the motion. C. Kindler’s Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction Proceedings On October 3, 1991, the trial court formally imposed Kindler’s death sentence for the murder conviction, as well as a consecutive term of 10 to 20 years imprisonment for the kidnapping, and a concurrent term of five to 10 years for criminal conspiracy. Kindler appealed arguing that the trial court should have addressed the merits of his post-verdict motions upon his capture and return to Philadelphia. The Superior Court rejected the argument and upheld his conviction and sentence; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Kindler, 639 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1994). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had properly denied Kindler’s post-verdict motions without considering the merits because of Kindler’s escape. Id. at 3 10 (“[T]he action taken in dismissing the post-verdict motions was a reasonable response to [Kindler]’s ‘flouting’ of the authority of the court”). The Court concluded that the escape resulted in Kindler waiving all claims of error and preserving nothing for appeal. Nevertheless, given the death sentence, the court reviewed the record as required by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h)(3), and found no error.4 The Court therefore affirmed 4 At the time of Kindler’s direct appeal, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(h), titled “Review of death sentence,” provided as follows:
automatic review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules. (2) In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate the sentence of death and remand for further proceedings as provided in paragraph (4). (3) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; 11 the conviction and sentence. On October 11, 1994, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. On January 11, 1996, Kindler filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) in which he asked the court to adjudicate the merits of the claims he had (ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d); or (iii) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant. (4) If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be vacated because none of the aggravating circumstances are supported by sufficient evidence or because the sentence of death is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, then it shall remand for the imposition of a life imprisonment sentence. If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be vacated for any other reason, it shall remand for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to subsections (a) through (g). 12 raised on direct appeal. The PCRA court denied the petition without a hearing because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had already ruled that Kindler’s escape resulted in a waiver of all appellate claims he may otherwise have had. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently affirmed, agreeing that Kindler was ineligible for PCRA relief. Commonwealth v. Kindler, 722 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. 1998). The Court also concluded that Kindler’s claims had been previously litigated because he had challenged the dismissal of his post-verdict motions on direct appeal. The Court explained: “[t]o grant [Kindler] the relief he requests in his PCRA, an evidentiary hearing on claims already forfeited by his flight from captivity, would render meaningless all previous rulings of the trial court and of this Court.” Id. at 148. The Court rejected Kindler’s argument that Pennsylvania’s “relaxed waiver” doctrine permitted review of the merits of his claim. Although that doctrine allowed courts to look past a 13 procedural default and reach the merits of claims in a capital case, the Court reasoned that the doctrine did not apply to Kindler because it was “his own act of becoming a fugitive that resulted in the forfeiture of the right to review of those claims.” Id. at 148 n.13. The Court denied reargument on March 15, 1999. D. Kindler’s District Court Habeas Proceedings On March 13, 2000, Kindler filed a counseled § 2254 habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which he subsequently amended. The amended petition raised eleven grounds for relief. See Kindler v. Horn, 291 F. Supp. 2d 323, 337-38 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (summarizing the claims). In opposing relief, the Commonwealth claimed that the petition was untimely, and that Pennsylvania’s fugitive waiver rule was an “independent and adequate” state ground precluding federal habeas relief. The 14 Commonwealth also argued that the claims were meritless. The district court applied statutory tolling and ruled that Kindler’s petition was timely. The court concluded that Kindler’s petition for reargument before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, had tolled the period of limitations. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had denied that petition on March 15, 1999. The district court held that Kindler had one year from that date to file his habeas petition. Since he filed it on March 13, 2000, the district court concluded that his petition was timely. Kindler v. Horn, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39. Next, the district court relied in part on Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 1996), in rejecting the Commonwealth’s claim of procedural default. There, we had held that Pennsylvania’s fugitive forfeiture rule was not firmly established when Kindler escaped. Accordingly, “the fugitive forfeiture rule . . . [did] not provide an independent and adequate 15 basis to preclude federal review of [Kindler’s] habeas claims. . .”. Kindler v. Horn, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 343. In addressing the merits of Kindler’s claim, the district court rejected all of Kindler’s challenges to the guilt phase of his trial. However, the court agreed with Kindler’s challenge to the penalty phase, and concluded that the trial court’s jury instruction was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). The court also ruled that Kindler was entitled to relief because of the prosecutor’s argument during the penalty phase. The court concluded that the prosecutor had improperly introduced an aggravating circumstance and had also “vouched for the death penalty with respect to [Kindler] . . . in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.” Kindler v. Horn, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 367. The Commonwealth appealed the order granting a new 16 sentencing hearing (C.A. No. 03-9010), and Kindler appealed the denial of relief on his other claims. (C.A. No. 03-9011). The appeals were consolidated, and we granted a certificate of appealability to Kindler allowing him to raise counsel’s ineffectiveness at sentencing, and the district court’s failure to instruct the jury that he was not eligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment. Kindler v. Horn, No. 03-9011 (order entered Oct. 21, 2004). Before addressing the merits of either appeal, we must determine the threshold procedural issues, including whether Kindler’s habeas petition was timely filed. If Kindler’s claims are timely and not defaulted, we must then determine whether the district court erred in granting relief pursuant to Mills v. Maryland. In addition, we must determine whether the court erred in denying relief on Kindred’s claim that the trial erroneously failed to instruct the jury that he was ineligible for 17 parole, as well as Kindler’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial. As mentioned above, we decilne to address Kindler’s prosecutorial misconduct claims.