Opinion ID: 1985001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issue 2 Motion to Dismiss Habitual Offender Charge

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the habitual offender count for the reason that defendant was not arraigned nor advised of the charge pending against him. Indiana law requires that a defendant be arraigned on all charges including a habitual offender charge. Lawrence v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830. In Griffin v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 160, ( modified on other grounds, Bailey v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 1260), we affirmed the Lawrence holding, and its progeny, that the allegations of habitual criminal must contain all of the procedural matters and safeguards of the original and underlying charges in that they are brought by sworn affidavit contained in an information and endorsed by the prosecuting attorney, setting out the facts sufficient and adequate for the defendant to defend himself and giving the defendant an opportunity to plead to such allegations. Habitual offender allegations must be charged in the same manner as a criminal offense. Sears v. State (1983), Ind., 456 N.E.2d 390. However, when a defendant proceeds to trial and fails to object to the fact that he has not been formally arraigned on a separate habitual offender charge, he waives the right to arraignment. Northern v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 520; Radford v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 219. The informations charging defendant with burglary and possession of stolen property were filed October 8, 1985. The habitual offender count was filed October 31, 1985, and trial commenced December 30, 1985, without defendant having been arraigned on the habitual offender information. The jury guilty verdicts for burglary and possession of stolen property were returned December 30, 1985, at which time the proceedings were recessed and the jury was instructed to return the following day for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant is a habitual offender. When court resumed the next day, defense counsel orally moved to dismiss the habitual offender count on the basis that defendant was not timely served with a copy of the habitual offender information, alleging that he had only received a copy of the face side of the information the previous day, which excluded the reverse side upon which the names of witnesses were endorsed. Defendant's motion to dismiss at trial did not refer to or complain of any lack of arraignment. Similarly, we are not persuaded that defendant's alleged lack of receipt of a copy of the habitual offender count operated to deny him knowledge of the charges or opportunity to defend himself thereon. Defendant was represented by counsel at the time the habitual offender count was filed. From that time through the setting and commencement of the bifurcated trial, the record fails to evidence any objection or surprise of defendant regarding the existence of habitual offender charges. Similarly, at the conclusion of the first phase of the trial, defendant did not manifest surprise or make objection when the jury was informed of the habitual offender proceeding to follow. We find it significant that at no time during the trial proceedings or in his brief to this Court does defendant allege lack of actual knowledge of the pendency of the habitual offender charge. He complains only that he failed to timely receive a copy thereof. Even if lacking actual knowledge, however, defendant's trial counsel had constructive knowledge of the habitual offender count from the time approximately two months before trial began. Defendant has not demonstrated reversible error on this issue. Judgment affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.