Opinion ID: 1259336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial court's application of the termination statute

Text: Termination of parental rights is governed solely by A.R.S. § 8-533. Abandonment is one of the enumerated grounds for termination. [10] Although this statute leaves abandonment undefined, § 8-546, in the same chapter, defines abandonment and applies the definition to all sections within the chapter. We conclude, therefore, that the court of appeals incorrectly held that the § 8-546 abandonment definition does not apply to § 8-533. Pima County Juvenile No. S-114487, 144 Ariz.Adv.Rep. at 49, 1993 WL 276801. Abandonment is defined in § 8-546(1) as: [T]he failure of the parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child, including the providing of normal supervision, when such failure is accompanied by an intention on the part of the parent to permit such condition to continue for an indefinite period in the future. Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six months shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment. Our courts have generally not applied this statutory definition to termination proceedings, resorting instead to a common-law definition. Over the years, in trying to clarify abandonment by addressing intent and conduct, our courts have adopted two tests: settled purpose and conscious disregard. [11] The settled purpose doctrine focuses on parental intent and has been defined as: [C]lear and convincing evidence of intentional conduct on the part of a parent that evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 4, 804 P.2d 730, 733 (1990) (emphasis added). Although the quoted language was probably dicta, it closely follows the language of our holding in In re Appeal in Pima County Severance No. S-1607, 147 Ariz. 237, 238, 709 P.2d 871, 872 (1985). Neither case, however, involved an unwed father who had never even seen his child. Rather, both cases concerned parental relationships that had matured or existed through marriage. Other courts have applied a conscious disregard test that addresses the parent's conduct, intentional or not, and its impact on the child in determining whether parental rights should be terminated. The conscious disregard test looks at: [C]onduct on the part of the parent which implies a conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to his child, leading to the destruction of the parent-child relationship. In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action No. S-1182, 136 Ariz. 432, 433, 666 P.2d 532, 533 (Ct.App. 1983) (emphasis added). These two concepts have been variously applied, often in the same case. [12] As the father argues, the conscious disregard test cannot be applied because here he could not form a parent-child relationship, let alone disregard it. And if the settled purpose doctrine applies, then no grounds for termination exist because the trial judge specifically found that  [i]n this case, that purpose cannot be found.  First Order at 1 (emphasis added). The father accurately points out that no evidence rebutting the factual basis for this conclusion was presented at the second hearing. We believe, however, that in cases such as this one, abandonment cannot turn on a bright line formula developed to determine whether a parent abandoned an existing relationship. In this case, the father had assumed no parental duties and no parental relationship had come into existence. There was, in short, nothing to relinquish. The key to this case is the statute defining abandonment, which we apply in common-sense terms, with its meaning in this factual context derived from Quilloin and Lehr. [13] Abandonment is defined by § 8-546(A)(1) as the failure ... to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact ..., including ... normal supervision, when such failure is accompanied by an intention on the part of the parent to permit such condition to continue for an indefinite period in the future. What constitutes reasonable support, regular contact, and normal supervision varies from case to case. It is often difficult, as in the present case, for the unwed father to provide support or supervision, or to even maintain contact. Nonetheless, the father must take concrete steps to establish the legal or emotional bonds linking parent and child. This is Lehr' s message.
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship.... Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62, 103 S.Ct. at 2993. In defining the father's liberty interest, the Court characterized the rights of the parents [as] a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed. Id. at 257, 103 S.Ct. at 2991. Only if paternity is legally established and the unwed father seeks custody does he have the right to provide emotional support and receive the corresponding benefits of a parental relationship. See A.R.S. § 25-331(C). Thus, because the unwed father has no immediate and obvious legal ties to the child, he must act to establish his parent-child relationship. Lehr, and cases interpreting it, provides insight into the important conduct under § 8-533. The father's immediate and persistent actions are central. See In re Appeal of H.R., 581 A.2d 1141, 1160 (D.C.Ct. App. 1990) (lead opinion); Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070 (Okla. 1987). When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by `com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. at 2993 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392, 99 S.Ct. at 1768). Thus, in whatever manner we apply the statute's language to termination proceedings against an unwed father with no parental relationship, the message, put simply, is this: do something, because conduct speaks louder than words or subjective intent. [14] When, as in the present case, circumstances prevent the unwed father from exercising traditional methods of bonding with his child, he must act persistently to establish the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his legal rights to the extent necessary. In re Raquel Marie X, 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 559 N.E.2d 418, 428 (1990) (the qualifying interest of an unwed father requires a willingness himself to assume full custody of the child  not merely to block adoption by others), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984, 111 S.Ct. 517, 112 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990). Only then is a biological link transformed into a parental relationship deserving full constitutional protection. Although these tests may be an appropriate interpretation of the statute in cases in which there is an existing parental relationship, adhering to settled purpose or conscious disregard concepts in these cases in which no such relationship exists defeats the essential goal: prompt finality that protects the child's interests. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266, 103 S.Ct. at 2996. As a matter of sound jurisprudence, this goal is paramount. Otherwise a young child languishes in limbo  surrendered by the mother, unclaimed by the father, and bonding with others  from which the law cannot extricate the child without lengthy proceedings compounding the harm. Therefore, when determining whether an unwed father who has never had a relationship with his child has protected his rights, we judge abandonment by conduct, not by subjective intent. We believe the statute allows such an application as a matter of constitutional principle and text. The termination statute permits us to consider the needs of the child. § 8-533(B). [15] Implicit in this is the requirement that the father act, and act quickly, for those needs include a reasonably prompt determination of where and by whom the child is to be raised and nurtured. The law favors rapid placement so that the child can bond with those who will be the legal parents and not with those from whom the child may be taken. This sound policy benefits the child, the natural parents, the prospective adoptive parents, and society.