Opinion ID: 1900982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: appellant floyd

Text: Appellant Floyd claims the award of fees and expenses in itself was improper under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 26(b)(1) and 37. He further claims that even if the court had authority to award sanctions, the award was improper as applied to him since he was a nonparty witness. Rule 26(b)(1) limits the scope of discovery to matters relevant to a pending action, and has been interpreted to preclude matters that are collateral to that action. [4] Appellant Floyd asserts that the discovery sought was on a matter collateral to the underlying action. Further, he claims that his conduct would become relevant and subject to deposition only after a determination that appellant Leftwich's removal of property from the marital home violated a court order. Last, he asserts that there was no pending action to support the court's discovery grant. We reject appellant Floyd's challenges based on Rule 26(b)(1). The discovery ordered herein, including appellant Floyd's deposition, was sought pursuant to a court action to enforce its March 17, order. Therefore, the scope of the discovery was proper. Appellant Floyd also contends that Judge Schwelb's December 17 order was not an order compelling discovery pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(a), and therefore, Rule 37(b) sanctions could not be imposed. We disagree. The December 17 order reads in part: FURTHER ORDERED, that the depositions of Doris Montgomery, Greenwood's Transfer and Storage Company, John C. Floyd, III and Paula G.P. Leftwich will be taken on December 22, 1980. . . . R. 63-64. This is an order to provide or permit discovery pursuant to Super.Ct. Civ.R. 37(b)(2). Therefore, the violation of this order is a proper basis upon which to ground Rule 37(b) sanctions, even though the violation is not pursuant to a motion to compel that discovery. However, Rule 37(b)(2) directs that reasonable expenses including attorney's fees be imposed against the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both (emphasis added). Super.Ct. Civ.R. 37(b)(2). Appellant Floyd is not a party to the underlying divorce action nor is he appellant Leftwich's attorney, even though he appeared on her behalf for a limited purpose in a prior proceeding. See supra note 2. There was no evidence that he advised appellant Leftwich not to appear. Thus, as a nonparty, appellant Floyd can be ordered either to be sworn or to answer questions pursuant to a Rule 37(a) motion to compel discovery, or he can be held in contempt, pursuant to Super.Ct. Civ.R. 37(b)(1), [5] for his violation of the December 17 order by his refusal to be sworn or to answer questions. Rule 37(b)(1) provides for the only sanction which is available against a nonparty, contempt. Therefore, we hold that the order awarding expenses and fees against appellant Floyd is improper and must be reversed. Accordingly, the order awarding expenses and attorney's fees against appellant Leftwich is vacated and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The award as against appellant Floyd is reversed. So ordered.