Opinion ID: 2575864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Incidents Between Defendant and His Mother

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court should have exercised its discretion to exclude, as inflammatory and lacking in probative value, the evidence that on one occasion he pushed and spit on his mother, and on another occasion he approached with raised arm as if to strike her and threatened to kill her and shoot up the house. He further argues that admission of this evidence violated his statutory and due process right that the penalty evidence admitted against him be limited to evidence relevant to a factor listed under section 190.3, and his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to due process, a fair penalty trial, and reliability in the determination of capital punishment. We reject the argument that defendant's conduct toward his mother was not admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), as criminal activity that involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. Defendant does not argue that his conduct did not violate a penal statute, nor does he argue that it did not involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. Instead, he argues that the evidence was not the kind of evidence that justified sentencing [him] to execution, because it is unfortunately not that uncommon for a teenager or a nineteen-year-old to have such confrontations with his parents. But the admissibility of section 190.3, factor (b), evidence does not depend on how common or uncommon the criminal conduct is, or whether viewed in isolation it would be sufficient to justify a death sentence. The evidence met all statutory requirements for admission under section 190.3, factor (b). We reject also defendant's argument that the trial court should have exercised its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude the evidence on the ground that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. As we have explained, Evidence Code section 352 does not give the trial court discretion to exclude all evidence of a criminal incident that is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1017, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 586, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 542-543, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Nor are we persuaded by defendant's constitutional arguments, which are based on the unrealistic perspective of viewing this evidence in isolation from all the other evidence offered in aggravation and mitigation at the penalty phase, including the circumstances of the capital offense. In the context of the entire penalty determination process, we find nothing improper or unfair about allowing the jury to consider each occasion during defendant's life when he violated a penal statute by conduct that involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.