Opinion ID: 2591905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cases from Other States

Text: Every case outside of California of which I am aware (neither defendant nor the majority cite any to the contrary) that has considered this or a closely similar equal protection contention has found no violation in treating civilly committed sex offenders less favorably than persons committed under other civil commitment programs. I discuss some of the cases in alphabetical order by state. The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to an equal protection challenge to Arizona's version of the SVPA despite the fact that personal liberty is involved: We conclude that the rational basis test applies. Petitioners have viewed too expansively the interest at stake.... [T]hey have not pointed us to, and we have not found, a fundamental right to have particular procedures apply. The courts that have analyzed equal protection challenges based upon the application of differing sets of rules have applied the rational basis test, even in cases such as this one, where liberty may ultimately be at stake. [Citations.] ( Martin v. Reinstein (Ct.App. 1999) 195 Ariz. 293 [987 P.2d 779, 796].) The court also rejected an equal protection challenge to the Arizona act's treating sex offenders differently from those committed under Arizona's general civil commitment statutes. Noting that the Arizona legislature has found that members of Petitioners' class [i.e., sex offenders] tend to repeat their criminal acts and pose a higher risk of danger to the public than do other classes of mentally ill or mentally disabled persons, the court held that it was not irrational or unreasonable for the legislature to create a different classification for Petitioners. ( Id., 987 P.2d at p. 797.) The Florida Supreme Court also rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to an equal protection challenge to the Ryce Act, Florida's version of the SVPA, despite the fact that personal liberty is involved: [Petitioner] contends that his fundamental right to liberty is at issue here and, thus, strict scrutiny is the proper standard by which the statute should be measured. However, we conclude that [petitioner] mischaracterizes the nature of his equal protection claim. Even though [petitioner's] liberty may ultimately be at stake, his claim challenges the Legislature's decision to create a special classification for sexually violent predators and to apply special procedures to such involuntary civil commitments. Thus, we conclude that [petitioner's] equal protection claim should be evaluated under the rational basis test. ( Westerheide v. State (Fla. 2002) 831 So.2d 93, 111, citing Martin v. Reinstein, supra, 987 P.2d at pp. 795-798.) The Florida Supreme Court also rejected an equal protection challenge to the Ryce Act's treating sex offenders differently from those subject to the Baker Act, another civil commitment program. The Ryce Act serves the dual state interests of providing mental health treatment to sexually violent predators and protecting the public from these individuals. Further, the act applies equally to all members of the statutory class of `sexually violent predators.' [Petitioner's] equal protection argument rests on the false premise that individuals subject to commitment under the Ryce Act are similarly situated to mentally ill persons committed under the Baker Act. The Legislature has clearly stated the reasons for distinguishing sexually violent predators from other mentally ill persons. ( Westerheide v. State, supra, 831 So.2d at p. 112, italics added.) After citing legislative findings comparable to those concerning California's SVPA, the court conclude[d] that the specialized treatment needs of sexually violent predators and the high risk that they pose to the public if not committed for long-term control, care, and treatment justify the Legislature's separate classification and treatment scheme. Thus, we find no equal protection violation .... (831 So.2d at p. 112.) The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois equivalent of California's SVPA is subject to the rational basis test.... The statutory classifications assailed by defendant are not based on race, national origin, sex or illegitimacy, nor do they implicate fundamental rights. ( In re Detention of Samuelson (2000) 189 Ill.2d 548 [244 Ill.Dec. 929, 727 N.E.2d 228, 236].) It also rejected an equal protection challenge to Illinois's treating sex offenders differently than those subject to commitment under a broader civil commitment act. It held that those who qualify as sexually violent persons present different societal problems than those whose conduct is subject to the larger, more inclusive class as defined by the broader civil commitment act. ( Id., 727 N.E.2d at p. 237.) Accordingly, we cannot say that the classification formulated by the legislature is unreasonable. ( Ibid. ) The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the argument that strict scrutiny applies to an equal protection challenge to Iowa's version of the SVPA, despite the fact that personal liberty is involved: As the Arizona Court of Appeals recently observed, governmental classifications of the mentally ill have historically been analyzed under the rational basis test even when individual liberty was at stake. ( In re Detention of Williams (Iowa 2001) 628 N.W.2d 447, 453, citing Martin v. Reinstein, supra, 987 P.2d at p. 796.) It also rejected an equal protection challenge to Iowa's treating sex offenders differently from those subject to commitment under other laws. The legislation under review plainly states the reasons for distinguishing between mentally ill sex offenders and other mentally ill persons. ( Williams, supra, at p. 453.) After citing legislative findings comparable to those concerning California's SVPA, the court concluded that the distinction between sexually violent predators and those committed under another provision dictates different treatment, both in method and duration. As this court noted in [another case], `[t]he particularly devastating effects of sexual crimes on victims, and the offenders' need for specialized treatment provide a rational basis for the classification.' [Citation.] So also here, the specialized treatment needs of [sexually violent predators], when compared to others who suffer from different mental abnormalities, justify the different classification and treatment chosen by the legislature. ( Williams, at p. 454.) The Missouri Supreme Court was one of the few to subject a law comparable to the SVPA to strict scrutiny because it affects the fundamental right of liberty. ( In re Care and Treatment of Coffman (Mo. 2007) 225 S.W.3d 439, 445.) Nevertheless, the court rejected an equal protection challenge similar to the one here. In that case, the petitioner, who had already been determined to be a sexually violent predator, sought to be released from civil commitment. Under the Missouri law, in order to obtain a jury trial, he had to either (1) receive authorization from the director of the department of mental health, or (2) show by a preponderance of the evidence that he should be released. ( Id. at p. 443.) The petitioner argued that the requirement that he demonstrate his entitlement to release by a preponderance of the evidence violates equal protection because `[n]o other person involuntarily civilly committed must make a preliminary showing to a trial court of facts warranting a second trial[.]' ( Id. at p. 445.) The court disagreed. This argument ignores the fact that persons who are committed as sexually violent predators are committed because they are `distinctively dangerous' to society. [Citation.] Because the basis for commitment of sexually violent predators is different from general civil commitments, there is no requirement that sexually violent predators be afforded exactly the same rights as persons committed under the general civil standard. [Citation.] The requirement that a sexually violent predator demonstrate his initial right to release by a preponderance of the evidence is narrowly tailored to the state's interest in keeping people committed if it is more likely than not that they will commit sexually violent crimes if released. The ... statute does not violate the equal protection clause. ( Ibid. ) The North Dakota Supreme Court did not decide what level of scrutiny North Dakota's equivalent of the SVPA should receive because the North Dakota law survives [the] equal protection challenge under even the highest level of scrutiny. ( In re P.F. (2008) 2008 ND 37 [744 N.W.2d 724, 731].) There are important differences between those committed because the court has determined they are sexually dangerous and those committed because of mental illness or chemical dependency. ( Id., 744 N.W.2d at pp. 731-732.) The potential level of danger these two groups pose to society is different. Sexually dangerous individuals are distinctively dangerous due to the high probability that they will commit further acts of sexually predatory conduct if not confined in a secure facility. ( Id. at p. 732.) The State has a compelling interest in protecting the public, and that interest justifies treating sexually dangerous individuals differently. ( Ibid. ) The heightened risk sexually dangerous individuals pose and the State's compelling interest in protecting the public justify the classification and differences in the treatment of sexually dangerous individuals, and the distinct procedures and safeguards further the State's interest in protecting the public. ( Id. at p. 733.) Accordingly, the court found no equal protection violation in treating sexually dangerous persons differently than others. ( Ibid. ) The South Carolina Supreme Court applied the rational basis test to an equal protection challenge to South Carolina's equivalent of the SVPA. ( In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh (2002) 351 S.C. 122 [568 S.E.2d 338, 351].) Citing with approval In re Detention of Williams, supra, 628 N.W.2d 447, the court also rejected the challenge. To require the Legislature to treat the two groups [sexually violent predators and those committed under another civil commitment process] similarly would require overruling a rational determination that sexually violent predators have certain characteristics which make their treatment needs different from other involuntarily committed individuals. The potential danger to the community provides a rational reason why sexually violent predators should be treated differently than other committed patients. The classification is not plainly arbitrary, but, instead, is reasonable in light of the differences between the two groups. [Citation.] ( Luckabaugh, supra, at p. 352.) Washington applies the rational basis test to equal protection challenges to its version of the SVPA. ( In re Detention of Stout (2007) 159 Wn.2d 357 [150 P.3d 86, 96].) The Washington Court of Appeals rejected an equal protection challenge quite similar to the one of this case. [Appellant] argues that the differences ... in the release procedures violate his right to equal protection.... [¶] There is a rational basis for treating sexually violent predators and other mentally ill persons differently with respect to release procedures.... [D]ifferences in dangerousness, treatment methods, and prognosis for the mentally ill and violent sex offenders justify treating the two groups differently. [¶] ... [A]llowing those committed under [the civil commitment statute for other mentally ill persons] to be released solely on the recommendation of the superintendent but requiring a show cause and a full evidentiary hearing before sexually violent predators are released does not violate equal protection. ( Petersen v. State (2000) 104 Wn.App. 283 [36 P.3d 1053, 1057], fns. omitted.) The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to decide whether strict scrutiny or rational review applies to an equal protection challenge to Wisconsin's version of the SVPA because it was not necessary to do so. ( State v. Post (1995) 197 Wis.2d 279 [541 N.W.2d 115, 130].) It considered an equal protection challenge to the release procedures that apply in Wisconsin to sexually violent persons, which are closely similar to the California procedures challenged in this case, and which, like the analogous California procedure, are more stringent than the procedures under Wisconsin's general civil commitment statute. ( Id., 541 N.W.2d at p. 128, fn. 22.) It then rejected that challenge: [T]he people can choose, through their duly elected representatives, to address complex social problems in more than one way.... [¶] ... The legislature has determined that, as a class, persons predisposed to sexual violence are more likely to pose a higher level of danger to the community than do other classes of mentally ill or mentally disabled persons. This heightened level of dangerousness and the unique treatment needs of sexually violent persons justify distinct legislative approaches to further the compelling governmental purpose of protection of the public. ( Id. at p. 130.)