Opinion ID: 1700534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the ostensible justification

Text: The dissent attempts to justify the claimed need for a new rule with the claim that the criminal standard [for causation] should remain higher [than the civil standard]. Post at 118. This argument is a non sequitur; the dissent fails to explain why the longstanding criminal standard for causation should be heightened simply because the civil standard has been lowered (by the replacement of the contributory negligence defense with comparative negligence). The relevant rules of criminal causation have been the same for more than a century, and the dissenting opinion has failed to point to any circumstances, actual or hypothetical, in which they would allow an unjust conviction. In sum, the dissenting opinion fails to provide a single reason to change these rules and thereby reverse the conviction in Tims. The dissenting opinion relies heavily on Commonwealth v Root, 403 Pa 571; 170 A2d 310 (1961), for the proposition that criminal causation rules must be amended because they are tied to tort notions of proximate cause that have been liberalized substantially. See post at 119-122. This premise is simply incorrect. As a matter of historical fact, the rules of causation in criminal cases are not tied to the rules of causation in civil cases. For that reason, among others, [9] the rules of criminal causation have not changed a whit in the face of expanding civil liability. The relevant rules have been the same for at least a century. First, the defendant's conduct must be a cause of the harm sine qua non. See, e.g., People v Barnes, supra . Second, the harm must be a foreseeable risk of the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., People v Rockwell, 39 Mich 503 (1878) (the defendant hit the victim and left him lying in a field where a horse later trampled him to death; the conviction was reversed because the death was unforeseeable). In particular, the rule that the dissenting opinion would change  that foreseeable negligence by the victim is not a defense  seems to have been settled before 1930. See anno: Negligent homicide as affected by negligence or other misconduct of the decedent, 67 ALR 922 (collecting cases holding that a victim's negligence is no defense to negligent homicide). To the extent that Commonwealth v Root, supra , holds that a victim's contributory negligence can be a defense, and this is the commentators' reading of that case, [10] it is no longer the law even in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Commonwealth v Long, 425 Pa Super 170; 624 A2d 200 (1993) (holding that the victim's intoxication was not a defense to homicide as long as the victim's death is the natural and foreseeable consequence of the defendant's actions). Even if other jurisdictions have followed the Root rationale, post at 121-122, the dissenting opinion does not point to any jurisdiction holding that a victim's negligence can be a defense. As examples, the dissenting opinion cites decisions from New York and Maryland. Both states, however, follow the rule that the negligence of the victim is not a bar to criminal liability. [11] See People v Cruciani, 36 NY2d 304, 306; 367 NYS2d 758; 327 NE2d 803 (1975); People v Joseph, 11 Misc 2d 219, 237; 172 NYS2d 463 (1958); Wilson v State, 74 Md App 204, 213; 536 A2d 1192 (1988). Root has been criticized on other grounds as well. Regarding Root and Commonwealth v Redline, 391 Pa 486; 137 A2d 472 (1958), Professor LaFave explains that to the extent that these cases rely wholly or in part upon the requirement of legal cause as a means of limiting these doctrines, they tend to distort the meaning of legal cause. LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 3.12(h), p 298.