Opinion ID: 1913515
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: nature of sudden quarrel

Text: A sudden quarrel is a legally recognized and sufficient provocation which causes a reasonable person to lose normal self-control. See Savary v. State, supra . It does not necessarily mean an exchange of angry words or an altercation contemporaneous with the unlawful killing and does not require a physical struggle or other combative corporal contact between the defendant and the victim. See State v. Vosler, 216 Neb. 461, 345 N.W.2d 806 (1984). In the instant case, there is very little dispute about the facts. Both parties agree that a fight occurred between Lyle and Gould about 20 minutes prior to the shooting. But this fact alone does not convert the crime from murder to manslaughter. See State v. Cave, 240 Neb. 783, 484 N.W.2d 458 (1992). It is not the assault or provocation alone that reduces the grade of the crime, but, rather, the sudden happening or occurrence of the provocation so as to render the mind incapable of reflection and obscure the reason so that the elements of malice and deliberation necessary to constitute murder are absent. State v. Clough, 327 Mo. 700, 38 S.W.2d 36 (1931). The question is whether there existed reasonable and adequate provocation to excite one's passion and obscure and disturb one's power of reasoning to the extent that one acted rashly and from passion, without due deliberation and reflection, rather than from judgment. State v. Cave, supra ; Savary v. State, supra . See State v. Morrow, 237 Neb. 653, 467 N.W.2d 63 (1991). The test is an objective one. State v. Cave, supra . It is well established that if one had enough time between the provocation and the killing to reflect on one's intended course of action, then the mere presence of passion does not reduce the crime below murder. U.S. v. Bordeaux, 980 F.2d 534 (8th Cir.1992). See Collins v. United States, 150 U.S. 62, 14 S.Ct. 9, 37 L.Ed. 998 (1893). The true inquiry appears to be whether the suspension of reason, if shown to exist, arising from sudden passion, continued from the time of provocation till the very instant of the act producing death took place, and if, from any circumstances whatever shown in evidence, it appears that the party reflected and deliberated, or if in legal presumption there was time or opportunity for cooling, the provocation can not be considered by the jury in arriving at their verdict. Savary v. State, 62 Neb. at 175-76, 87 N.W. at 38. Or, put another way, the question is whether, under all the facts and circumstances, a reasonable time had elapsed from the time of the provocation to the instant of the killing for the passion to subside and for reason to resume control of the mind. Savary v. State, supra . Where the time between the provocation and the killing is short, the practically universal doctrine is that all the circumstances may be considered. State v. Robinson, 353 Mo. 934, 185 S.W.2d 636 (1945). They include not only extraneous facts, such as the length of the cooling period and the violence of the assault, but also the showing made as to the effect on the accused as an average person. Id. In the absence of some provocation, a defendant's anger with the victim is not sufficient to establish the requisite heat of passion. U.S. v. Bordeaux, supra . See, State v. Parker, 358 Mo. 262, 214 S.W.2d 25 (1948) (law will not afford relief of any kind to one who, sufficient time for reflection elapsing, permits his anger to cause him to do wanton and cruel acts against another); Braunie v. State, 105 Neb. 355, 180 N.W. 567 (1920) (evidence that victim provoked defendant to anger, by itself, is insufficient as matter of law to reduce murder to manslaughter); Morrison v. State, 588 N.E.2d 527 (Ind.App.1992) (fact defendant was angry, without evidence that victim provoked defendant, does not show sudden heat). Nor does evidence of a string of prior arguments and a continuing dispute without any indication of some sort of instant incitement constitute a sufficient showing to warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction. U.S. v. Bordeaux, supra . See United States v. Lynch, 800 F.2d 765 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1022, 107 S.Ct. 1907, 95 L.Ed.2d 513 (1987).