Opinion ID: 814977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Imminence of Injury

Text: Kirkwood and the government also argue that SUWA’s injuries are not actual or imminent because Kirkwood’s leases are considered by the BLM to be suspended and Kirkwood currently does not hold drilling permits to conduct oil and gas development on its leaseholds. Kirkwood contends in addition that SUWA cannot show imminent injury because “BLM’s 2006 and 2007 Decisions did not approve any of Kirkwood’s CHL applications, or issue any oil and gas leases or suspend any existing oil and gas leases. There has been no ‘irretrievable commitment of resources’ because BLM has not issued the combined hydrocarbon leases to Kirkwood.” Kirkwood Br. at 31 (citing New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 718 (10th Cir. 2009)). “Although ‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic concept,” its purpose in the standing formulation “is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes – that the injury is ‘certainly impending.’” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2. The doctrines of standing and ripeness substantially overlap in many cases, Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d at 887. Such is the case here, where the question of whether SUWA faces an imminent injury involves similar concerns as whether SUWA’s suit is ripe for adjudication. “The standing question thus bears close affinity to questions of ripeness – whether the harm asserted had matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention.” Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. at 499 n.10. -25- But there are also important differences between the two doctrines, as our sister circuit has explained, When determining standing, a court asks whether these persons are the proper parties to bring the suit, thus focusing on the qualitative sufficiency of the injury and whether the complainant has personally suffered the harm. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.4.1 (1989). When determining ripeness, a court asks whether this is the correct time for the complainant to bring the action. See id. Wilderness Soc. v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996); see also 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532.1 (3d ed. 2008) (“As compared to standing, ripeness assumes that an asserted injury is sufficient to support standing, but asks whether the injury is too contingent or remote to support present adjudication.”). The question here is not whether SUWA is a proper party to challenge BLM’s decision, but when it can do so. Given the overlap between the doctrines of standing and ripeness, and given that SUWA is a proper party to bring this action if this is the correct time to do so, we think this case is more appropriately decided under the ripeness doctrine, which has been “characterized as standing on a timeline.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Wright & Miller, supra, § 3532.1 (“Both ripeness and mootness, moreover, could be addressed as nothing but the time dimensions of standing.”). Accordingly, rather than further analyzing the standing issue, we turn to the question of ripeness. -26-