Opinion ID: 2169049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: continental's request for a new trial

Text: ¶ 80. Having concluded that the evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the determination of the jury, we now turn to the issue Continental presents to this court, namely whether Continental is entitled to a new trial because the exclusion of evidence of the covenant not to sue prejudiced the jury and resulted in an unfair trial. We conduct this analysis in two parts, first looking at the scope of a trial court's discretion in making evidentiary rulings and then turning to the circumstances under which this court will exercise its discretion to grant a new trial. [29-31] ¶ 81. The standard for reviewing a circuit court's evidentiary ruling requires us to determine whether the court exercised its discretion appropriately. Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 542, 570 N.W.2d 851 (1997) (citing State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983)). In Grube, we commented that when we are asked to review evidentiary rulings, we look not to see if we agree with the circuit court's determination, but rather whether the trial court exercised its discretion in accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance with the facts of record. Id. If the circuit court applied the proper law to the pertinent facts and provided a reasonable basis for its ruling, we will conclude that the court acted within its discretion. Id. ; see State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 48, 590 N.W.2d 918 (1999). Here, we conclude that the circuit court's decision to exclude the evidence of the covenant was an appropriate exercise of its discretion. ¶ 82. Wisconsin Stat. § 904.08 governs the admission of evidence of a settlement or agreement. The statute provides: Compromise and offers to compromise. (1) Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This subsection does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, proving accord and satisfaction, novation or release, or proving an effort to compromise or obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. This statute precludes the admission of settlement evidence to show liability or prove the invalidity of a claim at issue. The last sentence permits admission of settlement evidence if that evidence is offered for other enumerated purposes, but it does not require the admission of such evidence. ¶ 83. Consistent with this statute, a party may offer settlement evidence to prove the prejudice or bias of a witness. [12] Anderson v. Alfa-Laval Agri, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 337, 350, 564 N.W.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Hareng v. Blanke, 90 Wis. 2d 158, 167-68, 279 N.W.2d 437 (1979)). The party may demonstrate prejudice or bias by showing that a witness changed his or her testimony or that the posture of a settling party was significantly different as a result of the settlement. Id. ¶ 84. In this case, Continental argued to the circuit court that the testimony of the accident reconstruction expert, Shaw, changed as a result of the settlement because Shaw did not testify about the crashworthiness of the VW Vanagon. In response, the circuit court examined the last sentence of the rule and reasoned that there was no showing of witness bias by a change in testimony; rather, [t]he only thing that's been shown is the testimony has been omitted. After all, the court said, it was not appropriate for Shaw to testify about crashworthiness when no question about crashworthiness was put to him. Thus, the court allowed mention of the covenant only for the purposes of showing bias insofar as the testimony of a witness had changed. This colloquy demonstrates that the circuit court exercised its discretion appropriately by applying the proper law to the pertinent facts and by offering a reasonable basis for its conclusions. ¶ 85. Continental argues that the circuit court misconstrued the rule by reading it too narrowly. Continental maintains that Wis. Stat. § 904.08 should be read expansively to include the admission of settlement evidence for purposes other than those enumerated in the last sentence. Section 904.08 is a modification of Federal Rule of Evidence 408. The third sentence of § 904.08 is more expansive than Federal Rule 408 in that it adds the phrase proving accord and satisfaction, novation or release to the list of the enumerated purposes that justify the admission of settlement evidence. The Judicial Council Committee's Note to Rule 904.08 cites cases that admonish trial courts to be cautious in determining admissibility. 59 Wis. 2d at R91 (1973). Because the purposes enumerated in our rule already go beyond Federal Rule 408, § 904.08 should not be expansively construed. See also In Matter of Estate of Ruediger, 83 Wis. 2d 109, 127, 264 N.W.2d 604 (1978). Consequently, this court would find it hard to overrule a circuit judge who thoughtfully articulated a narrow construction of the rule. [32] ¶ 86. Continental also relies on Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976), a case in which this court concluded that the trial court should have allowed appellants to identify which insurance companies were aligned with which parties and to further introduce the fact of settlement to the jury. Id. at 300. Despite this observation, Johnson cautioned that admission of evidence pertaining to settlement details would undermine the purpose of § 904.08 and render the statute meaningless. Moreover, although the last sentence of § 904.08 authorizes circuit courts to admit settlement evidence under certain circumstances, the rule does not require a court to admit that evidence. Thus, when parties have the opportunity to question the consistency of a witness's testimony, the exclusion of settlement evidence can in no way be prejudicial. Id. at 301. In such cases, the error does not warrant sanction of a new trial. Id. ¶ 87. Having considered the discretion of the circuit court in making evidentiary rulings, we now turn to the circumstances under which this court will consider granting a new trial. This court approaches a request for a new trial with great caution. Grube, 213 Wis. 2d at 553. We are reluctant to grant a new trial in the interest of justice, and thus we exercise our discretion only in exceptional cases. Gonzalez, 137 Wis. 2d at 133; State v. Friedrich, 135 Wis. 2d 1, 35, 398 N.W.2d 763 (1987). Where, as here, the circuit court has denied the parties' motion for a new trial, we recognize that a circuit court is in a better position than an appellate court to determine whether confidence in the correctness of the outcome at the original trial or hearing has been undermined. State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 491, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). ¶ 88. Bearing this cautionary approach in mind, we concurrently acknowledge the inherent and express authority that this court has to review requests for a new trial independently. See id. at 491 n.13; Grube, 213 Wis. 2d at 553. In determining whether parties are entitled to a new trial, this court is not strictly limited by its erroneous exercise of discretion standard of review. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d at 491 n.13 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). Rather, Wis. Stat. § 751.06 grants us the authority to direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the case to the trial court for the entry of the proper judgment or for a new trial in a discretionary review of the case. Id. ; Wis. Stat. § 751.06. Under § 751.06, this court may grant a new trial under one of two prongs: If (1) it appears from the record that the real controversy has not been fully tried; or (2) it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried. [13] ¶ 89. We turn then to the first statutory prong and address whether the record reveals that the real controversy in this case was not fully tried. This court has recognized that there are two circumstances under which it is possible that the real controversy has not been fully tried: (1) when the jury was erroneously not given the opportunity to hear important testimony that bore on an important issue of the case; and (2) when the jury had before it evidence not properly admitted which so clouded a crucial issue that it may be fairly said that the real controversy was not fully tried. State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150, 160, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996). ¶ 90. In this case, Continental questions the decision of the circuit court to exclude the evidence of the covenant not to sue. We examine Continental's request for a new trial, beginning with the first possible circumstance of the first prong, namely that the jury was not given the opportunity to hear important testimony that bore on an important issue in this case. We find that the exclusion of the VW agreement did not diminish the jury's ability to hear testimony. ¶ 91. This case is distinguishable from those situations in which this court previously has found that the exclusion of evidence prevented a full trial of the real controversy. In Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 172, we held that a defendant in a sexual assault case was entitled to a new trial because the real controversy, which centered on the defendant's identity, had not been fully tried. In Hicks, the defense counsel failed to secure the DNA evidence that could have excluded the defendant as the donor of a hair specimen critical to the identification of the assailant. Id. at 152, 157. The DNA evidence, we concluded, bore substantially on the defendant's identity and therefore obscured an issue crucial to the case. Id. at 161. ¶ 92. The identity of the defendant was also at issue in Garcia v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 651, 245 N.W.2d 654 (1976). A witness identified Richard Garcia as the person who had been present at a shooting. Id. at 653. At trial, Garcia denied his presence and provided an alibi but did not disclose that a friend actually participated in the incident and that the friend would have testified that Garcia was not involved in the crime. Id. at 654. In granting a new trial, we held that the identification of the defendant and his alibi were central to the dispute and that the testimony of the participating friend therefore was very material and significant. Id. at 655-56. ¶ 93. In State v. Cuyler, 110 Wis. 2d 133, 327 N.W.2d 662 (1983), a sexual assault case, the central issue hinged on the credibility of the defendant vis-à-vis the credibility of the victim. The defendant in Cuyler testified on his own behalf, and his attorney attempted unsuccessfully to introduce the testimony of police officers who could address the defendant's character. Id. at 136. We held that the real controversy was not fully tried because the circuit court excluded critical testimony about credibility, a determinative issue in the case. Id. at 141. ¶ 94. Generally, this court does not grant a new trial unless it finds that the exclusion of the evidence so clouded a crucial issue that it prevented the jury from reaching a fair and just result. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 160. The facts of this case do not present the type of exceptional circumstances that clouded the issues in Hicks, Garcia, or Cuyler. Our decision to grant new trials in those cases bore immediately on the central, sole issue at hand. Here, evidence concerning the VW agreement did not go to the central issue in this case or prevent this case from being fully tried. We therefore find that under the first prong of the statutory test, this case does not present circumstances so exceptional that they warrant a new trial. ¶ 95. We next consider the second statutory prong for a new trial, under which this court may exercise its discretion to grant a new trial when it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried. To grant a new trial in the interest of justice, we must find that there has been an apparent miscarriage of justice and it appears that a retrial under optimum circumstances will produce a different result. Garcia, 73 Wis. 2d at 654. Thus, unlike the first statutory prong, this second prong requires an appellate court to find that there is a substantial probability of a different result on retrial. Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 16-17, 19. ¶ 96. We are not persuaded that admission of the evidence in this case would, under optimum circumstances, have produced a different result. In Wisconsin, our established case law provides that a covenant not to sue does not affect a nonsettling joint tortfeasor. Imark Indus., Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 148 Wis. 2d 605, 622, 436 N.W.2d 311 (1989). Rather, the whole cause of action simply remains against the nonsettling defendants. Id. The nature of the case against Continental did not alter as a result of the VW agreement. ¶ 97. Our review of the record does not reveal that admission of the VW agreement would have yielded a different result at trial. Even under optimum circumstances, it is not clear that the agreement with VW, the manufacturer of the vehicle, had any impact on the determination of the jury that Continental was negligent in the design or manufacture of the tires. ¶ 98. Continental argues that by failing to disclose the agreement, the circuit court deprived Continental of its opportunity to impeach the Mordens' witnesses. In particular, Continental points to the bias created by the fact that Shaw, the reconstruction expert, did not testify about the Vanagon's crashworthiness. We disagree. Shaw's pretrial opinions about the vehicle were before the circuit court, and Continental's lawyers could have asked Shaw whether he thought the roof or the tires caused the injuries. [14] At trial, Shaw testified that the roof of the Vanagon caved in, and Continental's lawyers could have used that testimony to probe into more about the vehicle. ¶ 99. Continental has not shown that admission of the VW agreement evidence would have produced a different result at trial. On the contrary, admission of the evidence could have had a prejudicial effect by implying that the Mordens had reached a monetary settlement with one defendant, making it less compelling to find in their favor as against Continental. [15] We therefore conclude that Continental has not satisfied the second statutory prong for a new trial. [33, 34] ¶ 100. The circumstances under which this court will exercise its discretion to grant a new trial are exceptional. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d at 161. Taking into account the appropriate discretion exercised by the trial court in its review of this evidentiary issue, we are not persuaded that this case presents circumstances exceptional enough to overcome our usual reluctance to grant a new trial.