Opinion ID: 2224519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: child labor statute preemption.

Text: Sections 3 and 12 of F.L.S.A. are substantively similar to SDCL 60-12-3. Section 12 [5] prohibits employing oppressive child labor in commerce, and Section 3 [6] provides employment of a child under the age of sixteen by any non-parent constitutes oppressive child labor unless the Secretary of Labor provides by regulation or by order that the employment of children between fourteen and sixteen years of age in occupations other than mining or manufacturing does not constitute oppressive child labor. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203( l ), 212(c) (1988). An employer violating F.L.S.A. is subject to substantial criminal and civil penalties. 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-217 (1988). [7] Subpart E-1 of Chapter 5 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations addresses occupations in agriculture particularly hazardous for the employment of children below the age of 16. According to the Secretary of Labor, [o]perating a tractor of over 20 PTO horsepower, or connecting or disconnecting an implement or any of its parts to or from such a tractor[ ] is particularly hazardous employment [for] children below the age of sixteen. 29 C.F.R. § 570.71(a)(1) (1990). Thus, employment of a child under sixteen years of age by a nonparent in such an occupation would normally constitute oppressive child labor. Pertinent exemptions do exist to the general rule stated above. Those exemptions are contained in 29 C.F.R. § 570.72 (1990): (b) Federal Extension Service. The findings and declaration of fact in [section] 570.71(a) shall not apply to the employment of a child under 16 years of age in those occupations in which he has successfully completed one or more training programs described in paragraph (b)(1), (2), or (3) of this section provided he has been instructed by his employer on safe and proper operation of the specific equipment he is to use; is continuously and closely supervised by the employer where feasible; or, where not feasible, ... his safety is checked by the employer at least at midmorning, noon, and mid-afternoon. Subparagraphs (1)-(3) of 29 CFR § 570.72(b) describe various training programs, all of which require an employee or potential employee (1) to be fourteen years of age or older; (2) to complete a training program on safe operation of machinery; (3) to successfully complete a written examination covering safety; and (4) to demonstrate his or her ability to operate machinery safely. In addition, the regulation requires the employer to keep on file a certificate stating the child has completed all the required training and testing. Where a child obtains certification pursuant to such a program, as Tyler did, an employer may hire him to operate tractors of greater than twenty PTO horsepower or other machinery without subjecting himself to criminal and civil penalties under F.L.S.A. Christians contends this statutory and regulatory scheme preempts South Dakota's child labor statute. We disagree. We have held whether employment is dangerous to the child's life, health or morals is a question of fact for the jury. Koenekamp v. Picasso, 64 S.D. 567, 570, 269 N.W. 74, 77 (1936). Accord Dillman v. Madsen, 688 F.Supp. 1402, 1405 (D.S.D. 1988). Section 2 of F.L.S.A. states the policy of F.L.S.A. is to correct labor conditions detrimental to the health and wellbeing of workers. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988). Section 18 further indicates Congress' intent was to provide a minimum floor for child protection, not a ceiling beyond which states could not exceed. 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1988). See also 48A Am.Jur.2d Labor and Labor Relations § 2210 (1979). Section 18 provides: [N]o provision of this Act relating to the employment of child labor shall justify noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a higher standard than the standard established under this Act. 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1988). Accord 29 C.F.R. § 570.50(a) (1990). Indeed, regulations promulgated pursuant to F.L.S.A. expressly state: [C]ompliance with [F.L.S.A.] ... does not relieve any person of liability under other laws that establish higher child labor standards than those prescribed by or pursuant to the act. 29 C.F.R. § 570.129 (1990). Thus, if an individual state where a child is employed has a stricter child labor code and standard of employment, the federal law will adopt and apply the state's stricter standard. P. McGovern, Childrens Rights and Child Labor: Advocacy on Behalf of the Child Worker, 28 S.D.L.Rev. 293, 297-98 (1983). Permitting an employer to be held liable for civil damages which result from his violation of SDCL 60-12-3 would not create an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of F.L.S.A.'s child labor provisions. See Fidelity Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3024, 73 L.Ed.2d 664, 677 (1982) (actual conflict exists between regulations promulgated by Federal Home Loan Bank Board and state court decision); Doctors Hospital, Inc. v. Silva Recio, 558 F.2d 619, 622 (1st Cir.1977). Indeed, F.L.S.A. provides no private federal cause of action for its violation. Jensen v. Sport Bowl, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 370, 373 (S.D.1991); Breitwieser v. K.M.S. Industries, Inc., 467 F.2d 1391, 1394 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 969, 93 S.Ct. 1445, 35 L.Ed.2d 705 (1973). Therefore, the Secretary of Labor's findings regarding employment of safety trained fourteen to sixteen-year-olds did not preempt the jury's conclusion that Christians employed Tyler in an occupation dangerous to life, health, or morals. See Jensen, 469 N.W.2d at 373 (F.L.S.A. does not preempt South Dakota's worker's compensation law); Maccabees Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Perez-Rosado, 641 F.2d 45, 46 (1st Cir.1981) (F.L.S.A. does not prohibit state legislation in the area of wages or working conditions, nor does it implicitly prohibit state regulation by occupying the whole field and leaving no room for supplementary state provisions); Divine v. Levy, 36 F.Supp. 55, 57-58 (D.C.La.1940). The Secretary's findings merely placed Christians' act of employing Tyler to operate a tractor with greater than twenty PTO horsepower outside F.L.S.A.'s prohibitions against oppressive child labor.