Opinion ID: 1154282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: QUESTION 2(b)

Text: In answer to question 2(b), we hold that the jury instructions on negligence, particularly Jury Instruction No. 27, quoted supra, p. 6, adequately incorporated many though not all the principles common to comment k and negligence law as discussed above. [13] Like comment k, Instruction No. 27 imposed on Lederle not the requirement of clairvoyance, but only the duty to act reasonably given the foreseeable risk of harm to potential users in light of then current scientific or medical knowledge and discoveries. While the instruction did not explicitly establish a balancing between utility and risk, as we noted earlier, such a balancing is implicit in the instruction's requirement that the manufacturer exercise ordinary and reasonable care not to expose the potential consumer to an unreasonable risk of harm from the use of its products. See Stephens, supra, 106 Idaho at 257, 678 P.2d at 49. Certainly the following admonition invited the jury to consider the benefits of the vaccine as well as its risks: The failure to meet this standard of due care [not to expose the potential consumer to an unreasonable risk of harm] in the light of all the attendant circumstances will constitute negligence... . R., Vol. II, p. 90 (Jury Instruction No. 27) (emphasis added). Further, the instruction clearly indicated that the fact the vaccine caused Kevin's injury by itself did not justify a finding of negligence: The fact that the consumer's injuries were proximately caused by the manufacturer's product does not in and of itself constitute a sufficient basis upon which to predicate the manufacturer's liability. Id. Thus instructed, the jury undoubtedly considered the state of scientific knowledge and the utility of the vaccine before assigning negligence. Apparently, the jury was convinced that Lederle was negligent for having manufactured and marketed the whole cell vaccine instead of a safer alternative. However, the negligence principles common to comment k and Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 291-93 (1965) could have been stated more explicitly. Had Lederle requested an instruction based on Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 291-93, such an instruction would have accurately reflected Idaho law.