Opinion ID: 2594539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The jury instructions regarding intent to aid or abet attempted murder

Text: Instruction No. 11 defined the elements of attempted murder as follows: The elements of ATTEMPTED MURDER which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in this case are that on or about the 18th day of November, 1998, the defendant did: 1) in Washoe County, State of Nevada; 2) willfully, unlawfully, with premeditation, deliberation, and malice aforethought; 3) directly attempt to kill AMIT RANADEY; 4) or aid, abet, counsel or encourage another person or persons to attempt to do so. Thus, as noted above, the State alleged that Sharma either directly committed attempted murder, or that he aided or abetted an attempted murder. Each theory required the State to prove separate elements. With respect to the first theory, the State was required to show that Sharma acted with the deliberate intention unlawfully to kill another person, and that the act tended, but failed, to kill that person. [23] Under the second theory, the State was required to show that Sharma, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted another person in the commission of an act that tended, but failed to kill the victim. [24] Because the State proceeded on these alternate theories, the jury should have been clearly instructed on both. [25] Instruction No. 11, however, inadequately and incorrectly instructed the jury with respect to the second theory. It failed to inform the jury that to convict Sharma of aiding and abetting an attempted murder, Sharma must have aided and abetted the attempt with the specific intent to kill. The State concedes this point, [26] but argues that Instruction Nos. 15, 18, and 19 cured the defect. We disagree. Instruction No. 15 provided: If you believe that at the time of the shooting in this case that the defendant intended to kill any person, or to aid and abet one of his co-defendants to kill any person, it is of no legal consequence that he or one of his co-defendants mistakenly injured a different person. His intent to kill transfers to the person actually harmed. This is a transferred intent instruction; its purpose was to address evidence that Ranadey may not have been the intended victim. It did not cure the failure of Instruction No. 11 to properly define the elements of aiding or abetting attempted murder. Instruction No. 19 provided: Every person concerned in the commission of a felony, whether he directly commits the act constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission, and whether present or absent; and every person who, directly or indirectly counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces or otherwise procures another to commit a felony is a principal, and shall be proceeded against and punished as such. This instruction also did not cure the defect in Instruction No. 11. It simply explained the law set forth in NRS 195.020 providing that an accomplice is as culpable as the person who actually perpetrates the offense. The instruction contains no language addressing intent. Instruction No. 18, on the other hand, did specifically address the mental state of an accomplice. It provided in part that [e]very person who ... willfully participates in the commission of a crime may be found to be guilty of that offense. It also instructed that the jury must find the defendant voluntarily participated in [the crime] with the intent to violate the law. Again, however, this instruction inadequately defined the requisite mens rea. Under this instruction, the jury could have convicted Sharma of attempted murder based on a finding that he acted voluntarily and with the intent to act unlawfully, but not necessarily with the specific intent to kill. Therefore, we conclude that the other instructions did not cure the defect in Instruction No. 11. We further conclude that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [27] Sharma spent substantial portions of his case disputing that he harbored the specific intent to kill at the time of the shooting. He repeatedly testified that the group went to the desert so that Barela and Ranadey could engage in a fistfight. He also emphasized that he did not think that anyone intended to kill Ranadey. Further, the subject of Sharma's intent occupied a large portion of both parties' closing arguments. Because Sharma presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he did not act with the specific intent to kill Ranadey, and because the instructions did not clearly explain that the jury had to find that he aided or abetted with the specific intent to kill, we conclude that the error was not harmless. [28]