Opinion ID: 2317020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Purview of the Housing Act

Text: In its written decision, the board found [t]hat the Town of Cumberland, pursuant to R.I.G.L. § 45-53-4 is not subject to the jurisdiction of the [housing act]. Indeed, on appeal to this Court the town advances the same: Because Cumberland properly had adopted an amended comprehensive plan that included a housing element that endeavored to attain the statutory low and moderate income housing quota of 10 percent, the board's decision was not susceptible to SHAB's consistent with local needs review since the board was privileged to deny JCM's application on the basis that the town had plans to meet the standard of ten percent (10%) of the units   [.] Section 45-53-4, as amended by P.L.2002, ch. 416, § 1. Therefore, the town maintains, the proper adoption of a comprehensive plan with a housing element that strives to attain the 10 percent low and moderate income housing quota places a town within a safe harbor wherein it has no obligation to meaningfully entertain a comprehensive permit application it summarily deems inconsistent with its comprehensive plan. At the outset we note that the board's conclusion  whether factual or legal  that its comprehensive plan removed the town from the jurisdiction of the housing act is unfortunate. A review of the housing act reveals no language to suggest that any town in the state could evade the housing act's purview by simply adopting a comprehensive plan that boasts a housing element generous to the plight of low and moderate income persons. Section 45-53-4 simply lists a qualifying plan as a basis for denial of a comprehensive permit application, to be cogently articulated in a written decision after a public hearing. Perhaps more troubling is that the town's interpretation of § 45-53-4 is directly at odds with our holding in Omni. It bears repeating that Omni designates as conclusively consistent with local needs only those decisions of zoning boards based upon ordinances imposed by a city or town council after a `comprehensive hearing,' and that community has met or exceeded its statutory minimum for low and moderate income housing units; and has adopted a comprehensive plan that includes a housing element that addresses the need for low and moderate income housing for that community. Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d at 898-99 (emphasis added). The fact that the town has adopted its comprehensive plan satisfies only one criterion to qualify for a conclusive presumption of consistency with local needs. Pursuant to Omni, the board's decision was still subject to SHAB's consistent with local needs analysis because Cumberland did not and, to date, has not met the 10 percent low or moderate income housing quota. Furthermore, the town's proposed construction of the housing act suggests that the General Assembly in fact intended SHAB to have less authority than Omni contemplates by expressly limiting the matters to which SHAB is capable of giving meaningful review. For support, it points to § 45-53-4: because the statute merely requires a local zoning board to review a comprehensive permit request, and then deny said application if the community has met or has plans to meet the standard of ten percent (10%) of the units[,] § 45-53-4, as amended by P.L. 2002, ch. 416, § 1 (emphasis added), then in those communities with plans to meet the 10 percent statutory low and moderate income housing quota, the town argues, zoning boards simply must make a passing comparison between an application and an approved comprehensive plan to determine their conformity with one another. The town continues that since it has an approved affordable housing plan in place, it has plans to meet the 10 percent low and moderate income housing quota, and the board's obligation was simply a cursory review of the JCM proposal. The town's construction implies that a local zoning board's duty to produce a detailed factual record ceases  or, at the very least, is drastically lessened  when a town locally has adopted some plan to eventually feature 10 percent of its housing as low or moderate income units. The town admits as much when it characterizes a zoning board's review of a comprehensive permit application as a type of confirming survey or inspection of the proposed petition. Certainly such a construction runs counter to the express language of the housing act and effectively strips SHAB of its authority to meaningfully review permit denials. As stated above, § 45-53-6(b) and Omni establish that SHAB has the authority to examine a zoning board's decision for consistency with local needs. Of course, a competent decision replete with factual findings is a prerequisite to SHAB's giving meaningful review to any decision of a zoning board. [7] In a recent commentary on the pitfalls of a stingy administrative record, we noted that our deferential standard of review    is contingent upon sufficient findings of fact by the zoning board. Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 8. [8] [A] municipal board, when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, must set forth in its decision findings of fact and reasons for the actions taken. Id. (quoting Sciacca v. Caruso, 769 A.2d 578, 585 (R.I.2001)). A satisfactory factual record is not an empty requirement. Detailed and informed findings of fact are a precondition to meaningful administrative or judicial review. Id.; Bernuth v. Zoning Board of Review of New Shoreham, 770 A.2d 396, 401 (R.I.2001). Furthermore, factual findings cannot be merely conclusional, and the application of the legal principles must be something more than the recital of a litany. Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 8 (quoting Bernuth, 770 A.2d at 401). In the absence of sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, the [C]ourt will not search the record for supportive evidence or decide for itself what is proper in the circumstances. Id. Recent amendments to the housing act support the conclusion that a zoning board's duty to produce a competent factual record is without exception. Section 45-53-4(a)(4)(v)(A-G), as amended by P.L.2004, ch. 286, § 11 and P.L.2004, ch. 324, § 11, requires that a zoning board of review, upon application for a comprehensive permit, make positive findings, supported by legally competent evidence on the record which discloses the nature and character of the observations upon which the fact finders acted, on a list of seven provisions, including whether a proposed development is consistent with local needs, is in compliance with town ordinances and regulations, is environmentally sound, and safeguards the health and safety of current and future residents of the community. The only plausible justification for including this language in the amended statute is to ensure that, on appeal, SHAB has something to meaningfully review. As SHAB noted in its order, the board's findings are nothing more than conclusions of law, entirely unsupported by competent findings of fact. This can hardly be the administrative record envisaged by the General Assembly when enacting the housing act. In light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that SHAB was well within its statutory authority to remand JCM's appeal to the board for further findings of fact. The board's first order of business on remand must be to determine whether JCM's comprehensive permit application was substantially complete as of February 13, 2004, using the criteria set forth in § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(A-J). See § 45-53-6(f)(1-2). If the board determines that JCM's application was not substantially complete as of February 13, 2004, the board may deny JCM's application, and JCM may resubmit or amend its petition pursuant to the requirements of amended § 45-53-4. If the board finds JCM's application substantially complete as of February 13, 2004, it must undertake its review pursuant to the housing act in effect on February 13, 2004, prior to the 2004 amendments. See § 45-53-6(f)(2).