Opinion ID: 1186195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Fourth Issue: Did the sentencing court improperly refuse to sentence James to life in prison?

Text: This issue only involves James' sentence. The sentencing court found James' court-martial was constitutionally valid. The court ruled the court-martial did, count toward his offender score. It appears the court recognized the court-martial was comparable to a most serious offense. Nonetheless, the court forbade the State, on equitable grounds, from seeking persistent offender status for James. The sentencing court's authority to make such an order is questionable. Under the language of the Persistent Offender Accountability Act, the sentencing court is required to impose a life sentence if the defendant's criminal history qualifies the defendant as a persistent offender. RCW 9.94A.120(4) (A persistent offender shall be sentenced to a term of total confinement for life without the possibility of parole....) (emphasis added); see State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 768, 921 P.2d 514 (1996) (The Persistent Offender Accountability Act does not grant discretion to either the judiciary or the prosecutor in the sentencing of persistent offenders.) (footnote omitted). The SRA simply does not give the court the discretion to ban the State from seeking persistent offender status. The sentencing court's equitable concerns are more appropriately addressed by allowing James to withdraw his guilty plea, as argued by the State. Before a sentencing court can allow withdrawal of a guilty plea, several factors must be considered. Under CrR 4.2(d), the trial court is required to correctly inform a defendant who pleads guilty as to the maximum sentence on the charge, and any additional punishment which may be required as a result of prior convictions. In re Personal Restraint of Baca, 34 Wash.App. 468, 471, 662 P.2d 64 (1983) (citing In re Personal Restraint of Williams, 21 Wash. App. 238, 240, 583 P.2d 1262 (1978)). When a defendant is misinformed of the potential sentence, numerous factors must be analyzed when fashioning an appropriate remedy: (1) whether the error was inadvertent or the product of bad faith on the part of the State; where bad faith is found to exist, the court should give considerable weight to the choice of remedy sought by defendant; (2) whether retrial of petitioner on the original charges would be frustrated by absence of witnesses of either the State or the defendant; (3) whether the discrepancy between the sentence imposed and the one anticipated by the plea agreement is great or small; (4) the seriousness of the offenses to which pleas were entered; (5) whether the particular remedy selected will, in a fair way, restore defendant to the position he would have been in had the violation of CrR 4.2(d) not occurred. In re Baca, 34 Wash.App. at 472, 662 P.2d 64 (quoting State v. Pope, 17 Wash.App. 609, 614-15, 564 P.2d 1179 (1977)). These factors support allowing James to withdraw his guilty plea. The sentencing court found no bad faith on the State's failure to discover the court-martial. It appears James failed to disclose the court-martial to the State, but the sentencing court held this failure was not fraud, since James and his defense counsel could have reasonably expected courts-martial did not constitute a part of a defendant's criminal history. Even if James was misled as to whether a court-martial constitutes prior criminal history, the appropriate remedy is to allow James to withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Wakefield, 130 Wash.2d 464, 467, 925 P.2d 183 (1996); see also State v. Aronson, 82 Wash.App. 762, 763-64, 919 P.2d 133, (1996) (mentioning the defendant was given a chance to withdraw his guilty plea after the court ruled defendant's court-martial would be included in the offender score, increasing the sentencing range by nearly five years). In conclusion, we affirm Morley's sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole, and we remand State v. James to allow James the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea in light of his qualifying as a persistent offender. DURHAM, C.J., and SMITH, GUY and TALMADGE, JJ., concur.