Opinion ID: 2615040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: competency at trial and sentencing

Text: Harkness argues the trial court abused its discretion in determining he was competent to stand trial and to be sentenced. The defendant claims that, because of this abuse of discretion, he was deprived of his liberty without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if, because of mental illness or defect, that individual is unable [t]o understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him [or her] or to make or assist in making his [or her] defense. K.S.A. 22-3301(1). In State v. Holloway, 219 Kan. 245, 254, 547 P.2d 741 (1976), we stated that our incompetency standard is in accord with Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, 80 S.Ct. 788 (1960). According to the Dusky Court, the `test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' 362 U.S. 402. Additionally, K.S.A. 22-3302(1) provides: At any time after the defendant has been charged with a crime and before pronouncement of sentence, the defendant, the defendant's counsel or the prosecuting attorney may request a determination of the defendant's competency to stand trial. If, upon the request of either party or upon the judge's own knowledge and observation, the judge before whom the case is pending finds that there is reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial the proceedings shall be suspended and a hearing conducted to determine the competency of the defendant. On appeal, the reviewing court's inquiry on a trial court's determination that a defendant is competent to stand trial is whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Perkins, 248 Kan. 760, Syl. ¶ 4, 811 P.2d 1142 (1991). `Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.' [Citation omitted.] State v. Grissom, 251 Kan. 851, 931, 840 P.2d 1142 (1992). On July 15, 1981, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a psychiatric evaluation to determine his competency to stand trial and ordered the defendant committed to the Larned State Security Hospital. On September 4, 1981, the trial court ruled that Harkness was not competent to stand trial. The court indicated its ruling was based upon Larned's report that on occasions Mr. Harkness was unable to maintain a coherent conversation, was hallucinating, appeared to be confused, somewhat disoriented and bewildered, schizophrenic paranoid with acute exacerbation. Concentration was disrupted, attention span inadequate. The court ordered his return to Larned for continued treatment and pharmaceutical assistance. The defendant's competency was to be reevaluated within three months. On December 3, 1981, the trial court ruled that Harkness was competent to stand trial. According to the court, this time the report from Larned concluded that Harkness had been restored to capacity and was able to participate in the preparation of his defense and the assistance of counsel in his defense. The reports upon which the trial court based its December 1981 ruling are not part of the record on appeal. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in so ruling. An appellant has the burden of furnishing a record which affirmatively shows that prejudicial error occurred in the trial court. In the absence of such a record, we presume that the action of the trial court was proper. State v. Edwards, 250 Kan. 320, Syl. ¶ 7, 826 P.2d 1355 (1992). Additionally, Harkness raises for the first time on appeal the issue of whether there should have been a third evaluation of his competency to stand trial. The defendant was in receipt of the report upon which the trial court based its December 1981 ruling. He lodged no objection to the report or to the trial court's ruling and presented no evidence to rebut the report's conclusions. Harkness did not ask for a redetermination of competency at any time throughout the trial. He did not raise any due process concerns to the trial court. Where constitutional grounds for reversal are asserted for the first time on appeal, they are not properly before the appellate court for review. State v. Walker, 244 Kan. 275, Syl. ¶ 6, 768 P.2d 290 (1989). Harkness is arguing that, based upon the trial court's knowledge and observations, the trial court, sua sponte, should have ordered a new competency determination. See K.S.A. 22-3302(1). He contends there was ample evidence for the trial court to make a finding of incompetency and the court abused its discretion in failing to do so. The defendant advances several reasons to support his argument: his extensive prior psychiatric history; his behavior at arraignment and at trial during a discussion about readback testimony; and, most importantly according to the defendant, because he was on psychotropic medication, his competency was synthetically produced and, as such, should be invalid. Psychotropic has been defined as affecting the mind, denoting drugs used in the treatment of mental illnesses. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1288 (25th ed. 1990). The defendant's parents testified about his prior psychiatric history. Harkness had been in and out of counseling and mental facilities as well as on and off medication from the time he was an adolescent until committing these crimes in June 1981. He began experiencing problems in junior high: His grades began to drop; he was picked up on different occasions for using marijuana, drinking beer, and stealing a bicycle; he began getting into physical fights with other children; he began lying to his parents; and he became belligerent and refused to follow orders. He eventually dropped out of high school. According to his parents, Harkness began hearing voices. In response to these voices, on one occasion he walked about his parents' house with a loaded shotgun, which caused his parents to remove all guns from the house. He thought people were watching him and could hear what he was thinking. The defendant eventually believed the voices he heard were either God or Satan. He developed a pattern of going outside and praying at the top of his voice, sometimes on the roof of the house in the middle of the night. His mother referred to it as raving and hollering to God to forgive him for being a faggot. He generally was unable to hold a job for more than two or three days. His parents refused, based upon medical advice, to let him drive their car unless one of them was with him because he was unable to concentrate for any length of time. Considerable expert and lay testimony was presented concerning the defendant's mental health and his prior psychiatric history. A defendant is not incompetent to stand trial simply because that individual has received or needs psychiatric treatment. Van Dusen v. State, 197 Kan. 718, 725-26, 421 P.2d 197 (1966). With regard to his behavior, Harkness emphasizes that, at his arraignment, he attacked a female court reporter in a courtroom full of people. The defendant also points to his behavior after the jury requested a readback of the two experts' testimony. Defense counsel questioned the defendant about whether he wanted to be present at the readback or whether he wanted to waive his right to be present. The record reflects that Harkness was confused about his options and the ramifications of each and that he had a difficult time making a choice. The defendant also emphasizes defense counsel's response to his question about what he would be doing if he was present for the readback. Defense counsel said: Sitting there at the counsel table, just like you have been sitting all week, twiddling your thumbs while [the court reporter] reads. Harkness maintains this underscores the fact he was incapable of assisting in his own defense. The trial court also had the opportunity to observe Harkness' conduct, attitude, and demeanor at trial. It must be presumed the trial court considered all of this and did not find the defendant's competency wanting. Attacking a court reporter, showing confusion, having difficulty making decisions, and twiddling one's thumbs are not necessarily signs of incompetency. There are other plausible explanations. It is the trial court in whose mind a real doubt of sanity or mental capacity to properly defend must be created before that court is required to order an inquiry solely on its own initiative. The necessity for an inquiry under such circumstances addresses itself to the discretion of the court and its decision will not be disturbed in the absence of abuse of sound judicial discretion. Van Dusen, 197 Kan. 718, Syl. ¶ 6. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order a third evaluation of Harkness' competency or to find the defendant incompetent to stand trial because of his psychiatric history or behavior at trial. Harkness contends that, because he was on psychotropic medication, his competency was synthetically produced and, as such, should be invalid. The defendant argues competency should be based upon an accused's natural, undrugged state. His argument should not be confused with issues involving compelled competency, in which a defendant is or has been compelled to take medication against his or her will. See U.S. v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions?: Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 Kan. L. Rev. 957 (1990). Compelled competency is not an issue in this appeal. Although the defendant cites no authority to support his argument, commentators have addressed the issue. One commentator contends two issues arise if a defendant is under the influence of antipsychotic drugs: Is the defendant competent? Can a medicated defendant receive a fair trial? The commentator suggests a trial court should consider whether the defendant is suffering from side effects because of the medication and whether such side effects will prejudice the jury. A court also should consider if the defendant's appearance prejudices the jury. Note, Antipsychotic Drugs and the Incompetent Defendant: A Perspective on the Treatment and Prosecution of Incompetent Defendants, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1059 (1990); see Fentiman, Whose Right is it Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 1109 (1986). Another commentator contends a defendant synthetically restored to competency should not be presumed incompetent because the defendant is on medication. Instead, upon the defendant's return to court, the trial court should individually determine this defendant's competence. Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 Am. B. Found. Research J. 769, 815. See generally Wilkinson & Roberts, Defendant's Competency to Stand Trial, 40 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 171 §§ 1-25 (1984). Here, Harkness did not raise the issue to the trial court. Therefore, the trial court was not requested to make findings such as those just discussed. Furthermore, the use of psychoactive drugs to treat mentally ill persons and to restore competence is widespread. Winick, at 771. We hold a defendant is not per se incompetent because he or she has been restored synthetically to competency through the use of psychotropic or other medication. Cf. Holloway, 219 Kan. at 254 (the use of narcotics does not per se render a defendant incompetent to stand trial). To hold otherwise would cause unjust results. For instance, this defendant, and countless others with the same defect who are convicted of a felony requiring a 1-5 year sentence, could be confined in a mental institution for life because they might never be competent to be sentenced without being on medicine. It would be inhumane to deny the use of the medicine. Additionally, the statutory definition of competence does not preclude the use of psychotropic medication to restore the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings against him or her or to make or assist in making his or her defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Harkness competent to stand trial even though the defendant was taking psychotropic medication. With regard to sentencing, on June 28, 1982, the trial court, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3430 and K.S.A. 22-3431, ordered the defendant committed to Larned until further order of the court. In November 1990, the trial court determined, based upon reports generated by the staff at Larned and pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3431, that Harkness should be released from Larned and sentenced. The defendant was sentenced on January 2, 1991. K.S.A. 22-3430 authorizes a trial court, in lieu of imprisonment, to commit a defendant to a state mental institution if the defendant is in need of psychiatric care and treatment and [if] such treatment may materially aid in his rehabilitation and [if] the defendant and society [are] not likely to be endangered by permitting the defendant to receive such psychiatric care and treatment. K.S.A. 22-3431 provides, in pertinent part: Whenever it appears to the chief medical officer of the institution to which a person has been committed under K.S.A. 22-3430 and amendments thereto, that such person is not dangerous to self or others and that such person will not be improved by further detention in such institution, such person shall be returned to the court where convicted and shall be sentenced, committed, granted probation, assigned to a community correctional services program or discharged as the court deems best under the circumstance. Harkness contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because the reports from the Larned staff indicated he was dangerous to others. He argues K.S.A. 22-3431 requires that, before he is sentenced, it must be determined he is not dangerous to self or others and that [he] will not be improved by further detention in such institution. The October 23, 1990, letter to the trial court from Dr. G.W. Getz, clinical director at Larned, stated: Mr. Harkness has been cared for and treated, and his case was reviewed in a Forensic Staff Conference on September 12, 1990. The diagnoses of his condition were established as Schizophrenia, Paranoid, Chronic; Alcohol Abuse, in full remission; Cannabis Abuse, in full remission; and Psychoactive Substance Abuse Not Otherwise Specified. It is the opinion of the professional staff at State Security Hospital that Mr. Harkness has received maximum benefit from treatment in this facility. Since the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3430 are designed to allow convicted criminal defendants to receive needed psychiatric treatment in lieu of imprisonment, such defendant should only remain at State Security Hospital for as long as further psychiatric treatment may be of reasonable benefit. State v. Smith, 3 Kan. App.2d 179 (1979). Although the prediction of future human behavior can never be a matter of certainty, the staff concluded that Mr. Harkness is dangerous to others in the community due to the nature of the crimes committed. Because Mr. Harkness is seen as dangerous to others, it is recommended that you now consider having him sent to Lansing Correctional Facility where he will be kept apart from society for the time being. Eventually Mr. Harkness should be considered for a sex offenders treatment program, and such a program is not available at State Security Hospital at the present time. Harkness argues reliance upon State v. Smith, 3 Kan. App.2d 179, 591 P.2d 1098 (1979), is erroneous because the holding in Smith is contrary to the language of K.S.A. 22-3431. The defendant in Smith was committed to Larned upon conviction of felonious assault and criminal damage to property. Two years later, the clinical director at Larned informed the trial court `that Mr. Smith is not amenable to psychiatric treatment, that continued detention at State Security Hospital will not materially contribute to his rehabilitation, that he is a potentially dangerous person, that the Kansas State Penitentiary is the most suitable place for an individual with his particular behavior pattern, and that he is ready to be returned to your court for further legal disposition.' 3 Kan. App.2d at 179-80. In construing K.S.A. 22-3431, the Court of Appeals held: K.S.A. 22-3431 provides but one method whereby a person committed under 22-3430 may be returned to the court for further appropriate disposition. That statute does not preclude further orders of the court of jurisdiction with respect to the disposition to be made of defendant. Where the chief medical officer of an institution is unable to report that defendant is not dangerous to himself or others and that he would not be improved by further detention, but does indicate that defendant is not amenable to psychiatric treatment and that continued detention would not materially contribute to his rehabilitation, the trial court in which defendant was convicted is authorized to direct the return of defendant for sentencing. The district court in which a defendant is convicted and thereafter committed under the provisions of K.S.A. 22-3430 retains jurisdiction over the defendant, and may by its further order inquire into the merits of continued commitment for psychiatric care and treatment. If defendant is not found to be amenable to such care and treatment, that court may sentence or make such other provisions for defendant as provided by law and as may be warranted by the facts and circumstances disclosed. In doing so, the court must exercise the same discretion as in directing the initial commitment. 3 Kan. App.2d 179, Syl. ¶¶ 1-3. For our purposes, the language of the 1979 version of K.S.A. 22-3431 construed by the Smith court and the version applicable to this case is identical. If the legislature disagreed with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of K.S.A. 22-3431, the legislature has had 13 years to amend the statute accordingly and has not done so. It is obvious from the clinical director's letter that Larned relies upon this case in determining when to recommend that a defendant is ready to be sentenced. From a policy viewpoint, it makes little sense to keep a convicted defendant at a state security hospital after it has been determined the defendant will no longer benefit from the available treatment. Harkness offers no persuasive reason for this court to overrule Smith. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant rather than continuing his commitment even though Larned determined he was dangerous to others. The defendant again argues that, because his restoration to competence was induced through the use of psychotropic medication, the trial court abused its discretion in finding him competent for sentencing. We reject that argument for the same reasons stated concerning Harkness' competence to stand trial.