Opinion ID: 564833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment5

Text: 19 Cassady contends with little elaboration that her stand-off with Tackett on January 13, 1988 shocks the conscience in a civilized society. The shock the conscience language of course comes from Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), where the Court held that police conduct in pumping a suspect's stomach in search of evidence violates due process standards. In support of her claim, Cassady cites only White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir.1979). There it was held that police abandonment of an arrestee's children on a highway late on a cold night shocked the conscience and deprived them of due process rights. 592 F.2d at 383-84. Because White presents entirely different facts, it seems that the shocks the conscience holding in that case has little if any relevance to the present one. Trying to apply White to this case highlights the inchoate nature of the shocks the conscience standard, but is otherwise unhelpful. In Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 224-25 (6th Cir.1990), this Circuit recently discussed this point in the context of a section 1983 suit against a police officer for false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution: 20 Applying the shock the conscience test in an area other than excessive force ... is problematic. Not only are there fewer instances in the case law, but the shock the conscience test is not as uniformly applied to cases where excessive force or physical brutality is not the basis of the claim. The shock the conscience standard, fuzzy under the best of circumstances, becomes fuzzy beyond a court's power to interpret objectively where there is a dearth of previous decisions on which to base the standard. We doubt the utility of such a standard outside the realm of physical abuse, an area in which the consciences of judges are shocked with some degree of uniformity. 21 Braley, 906 F.2d at 226. Since the present case, like Braley, does not concern physical abuse, we are reluctant to apply the shock the conscience standard. 6 22 In summary, Cassady has presented evidence from which a jury might find an illegal seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, her substantive due process claim falls short. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is REVERSED and the action REMANDED to the District Court for further proceedings. 23