Opinion ID: 1464920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discretionary Function Exception to the Stafford Act

Text: We must determine whether the district court properly dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the United States has not waived sovereign immunity for its decisions related to its provision of disaster relief services under the NRP. We review a district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.  Stiles v. GTE Sw., Inc., 128 F.3d 904, 906 (5th Cir.1997). In our de novo review ..., we apply the same standard as does the district court .... Wagstaff v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 663 (5th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under our traditional explication of the standard applied by the district court, the district court has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981). Here, the district court did not resolve any disputed facts, so we, as did the district court, consider the allegations in the plaintiff[s'] complaint as true. Id. at 412. [O]ur review is limited to determining whether the district court's application of the law is correct and, to the extent its decision [was] based on undisputed facts, whether those facts are indeed undisputed. Id. at 413. We then ask if dismissal was appropriate. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (`accept[ing] all of the factual allegations in [the plaintiff's] complaint as true' and ask[ing] whether the allegations state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. 1954)). Plaintiff[s] bear[] the burden of showing Congress's unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. St. Tammany Parish v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. 08-30070, 2009 WL 146582, at  (5th Cir. Jan. 22, 2009). At the pleading stage, plaintiff[s] must invoke the court's jurisdiction by alleging a claim that is facially outside of the discretionary function exception. Id. at  & n. 3 (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324-25, 111 S.Ct. 1267). The basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983); see also Williamson v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir.1987) (The doctrine of sovereign immunity is inherent in our constitutional structure and ... renders the United States [and] its departments... immune from suit except as the United States has consented to be sued.). Because [s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), Congress's waiver of [it] must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will not be implied, Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (internal citation omitted); see also Petterway v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 495 F.2d 1223, 1225 n. 3 (5th Cir.1974) (It is well settled ... that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be specific and explicit and cannot be implied by construction of an ambiguous statute.). Plaintiffs have alleged claims under the FTCA for failure to provide due care in the provision of emergency aid pursuant to the NRP. The FTCA authorizes suits against the United States for damages arising from: injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Thus, the FTCA waives sovereign immunity and permits suits against the United States sounding in state tort for money damages. In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir.2006). As long as state tort law creates the relevant duty, the FTCA permits suit for violations of federal statutes and regulations. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 728 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc) (If the requisite relationship and duty exist, then the statutory or regulatory violation may constitute or be evidence of negligence in the performance of that state law duty.). [8] The FTCA, however, excepts discretionary functions and duties from this waiver of sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The FTCA's discretionary function exception provides that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 1346(b) does not apply to: Any claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. Id. The discretionary function exception is thus a form of retained sovereign immunity. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). [9] The government promulgated the NRP under authority granted, in part, by the Stafford Act. Although the Stafford Act does not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity, it does contain a discretionary function exception to governmental liability nearly identical to the one contained in the FTCA. St. Tammany Parish, No. 08-30070, 2009 WL 146582,  (internal citation omitted) (citing Graham v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 149 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir.1998)). The Stafford Act's discretionary function exception provides that the United States will not be liable for: any claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Federal Government in carrying out the provisions of this chapter. 42 U.S.C. § 5148. The Stafford Act's discretionary function exception exists, despite the lack of an express waiver of sovereign immunity, to protect the government from liability for claims based on its discretionary conduct brought pursuant to the FTCA, [the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.], or other statutes of general applicability. St. Tammany Parish, No. 08-30070, 2009 WL 146582, . Nonetheless, this provision `preclude[s] judicial review of all disaster relief claims based upon the discretionary actions of federal employees.' Id. at  (citing Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.1987)). The parties begin by disputing the meaning of the Stafford Act's discretionary function exception as it applies to the claims alleged in this case. In a companion case in which we addressed the same issue, we held that `discretionary function or duty' has the same meaning in § 5148 as its does in § 2680(a). St. Tammany Parish, No. 08-30070, 2009 WL 146582, . We reached this conclusion after reviewing the nearly identical texts of the two provisions and the legislative history of the Stafford Act and after rejecting the government's counterargumentswhich were the same arguments that the government maintains in this case. See id. ; accord In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d at 188-89 (holding that the FTCA's and Stafford Act's discretionary function exceptions employ practically identical language: both provide protection for the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a [F]ederal agency or an employee of the [Federal] Government. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alterations in original)). Thus, we may rely on precedent interpreting the phrase discretionary function or duty under the FTCA's discretionary function exception to provide meaning to the Stafford Act's discretionary function exception in this case. See St. Tammany Parish, No. 08-30070, 2009 WL 146582, . [10]