Opinion ID: 2521897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review for determining whether ms. tripp voluntarily consented to the blood draw search

Text: ¶ 25 The State argues first that the court of appeals erred by imposing a burden of proof greater than that required by the Fourth Amendment. According to the State, the court of appeals demanded a standard of clear and convincing by using the language of clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given. State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ¶ 14, 197 P.3d 99 (quoting State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 293 (Utah Ct.App.1998)). The State misreads this language and misinterprets its effect on the proper standard. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision. ¶ 26 The Fourth Amendment ensures [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Blood tests plainly constitute searches of `persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures of `persons.' Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the search falls within one of the few `specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). A search conducted pursuant to consent is an established exception. Id. [F]or a consent search to be valid, consent must have been given voluntarily.... State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ¶ 43, 37 P.3d 1073. ¶ 27 In determining whether voluntary consent was given for a warrantless search, we have a two-prong analysis. A consent is valid only if `(1) the consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of [a] prior illegality.' State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 47, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993)). As illustrated by our analysis of this first prong in Hansen, for a defendant to voluntarily consent to a search the defendant must (A) actually consent to the search and (B) consent must be voluntary. See id. ¶¶ 47, 48, 51. ¶ 28 Because the court of appeals held that consent was not given voluntarily, it did not need to address the second prong of police exploitation. We likewise analyze only the first prong of voluntary consent. But unlike the court of appeals, we analyze separately the underlying parts to the first prong of voluntary consent and address (A) whether Ms. Tripp actually consented and (B) whether Ms. Tripp's consent was voluntary. See Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ¶¶ 14-17, 197 P.3d 99. In doing so we clarify the standard of review as to voluntariness.
¶ 29 The court of appeals concluded that Ms. Tripp did not give clear indication of her consent to the blood draw. Even though the court of appeals conflated consent and voluntariness into one analysis, we agree with its decision. The findings of fact that state Ms. Tripp consented are clearly erroneous given the testimony presented to the trial court at the suppression hearing. ¶ 30 Before a court addresses whether consent was voluntary, it must first determine that there was consent. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 48, 63 P.3d 650. The existence of consent is a factual finding, and it is based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. In making factual findings, the trial court is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence. Id. Accordingly, an appellate court should defer to the factual findings of the trial court unless the findings are clearly erroneous. See id.; see also State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ¶ 11, 100 P.3d 1222. ¶ 31 In this case, the trial court made seventeen factual findings. Two factual findings are clearly erroneous under the testimony presented to the trial court at the hearing on Ms. Tripp's motion to suppress. Specifically, the trial court found: 15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the defendant voluntarily extended her arm. 16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tried to withdraw her arm and she never said no or stop. ¶ 32 Although the court of appeals did not expressly hold that these two findings of fact were clearly erroneous, it focused on the interaction between Mr. Davis and Ms. Tripp at the time of the blood draw. See Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ¶¶ 16-17, 197 P.3d 99. The testimony at the suppression hearing reveals that Ms. Tripp did not voluntarily extend her arm when asked to consent to the draw. Rather, Ms. Tripp extended her arm only in response to Mr. Davis telling Ms. Tripp, You know, just let me put the tourniquet on your arm, see if we can find a spot that would be easy to do this. The court of appeals noted that Mr. Davis then made the ambiguous statement, [W]e can go ahead and [take] care of this. Id. ¶ 16 (second alteration in original). The State, however, argues there was no ambiguity because at about this same time Ms. Budd told Ms. Tripp not to look at the needle ... and [to] take a deep breath, and Officer Monson shielded Ms. Tripp's eyes so she would not look at the needle. Yet, as the court of appeals emphasized, Mr. Davis testified that he did not think Ms. Tripp knew he had all his blood-drawing equipment ready. See id. The testimony also contradicts the finding that [Ms. Tripp] never tried to withdraw her arm. Officer Monson testified that Ms. Tripp looked upset and terrified, and that [s]he was pulling away .... [and] was crying. Given this testimony, the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Ms. Tripp did not clearly consent. Furthermore, even if we assume Ms. Tripp consented, she did not do so voluntarily.
¶ 33 In reviewing whether Ms. Tripp voluntarily consented, the court of appeals imposed `the totality of the circumstances' standard. Id. at ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 56, 63 P.3d 650). The court of appeals further noted that it `look[s] to see if there is clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given.' Id. (quoting Bredehoft, 966 P.2d at 293). The State interprets this language as requiring a clear, positive, and unequivocal standard of proofa standard stricter than that required under the Fourth Amendment. The State misreads this language and disregards the actual standard utilized by the court of appeals. ¶ 34 The State points out that the clear, positive, and unequivocal language stems from a test in State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct.App.1996). The Ham test consisted of three parts: (1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given; (2) the government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)(alteration in original) (emphasis added). ¶ 35 The State argues correctly that we rejected the Ham test in Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶¶ 54-55, 63 P.3d 650. But the State reads our rejection too broadly. In Hansen, we rejected the intelligently given portion of the first prong because it could imply that a person must have knowledge of the right to refuse consent. Id. ¶ 54. We noted that the Supreme Court in Schneckloth forbade this because the knowledge of the right to refuse is not a prerequisite to establish voluntary consent, but is rather a factor to be taken into account. See id. Also, we rejected the third prong of the Ham test because a waiver is incongruous with Schneckloth. See id. ¶ 55; see also Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ¶¶ 44-46, 37 P.3d 1073. However, we did not reject the remaining portions of the test. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶¶ 54-55, 63 P.3d 650. Yet insofar as the clear, positive, and unequivocal language causes confusion, we clarify the standard. ¶ 36 The voluntariness of consent to a search is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness. Id. ¶ 51. The appropriate standard to determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances test, and the burden of proof [faced by the prosecutor] is [the] preponderance of the evidence. Id. ¶ 56. There is no burden of proof that directly corresponds to a standard of clear, positive, and unequivocal. Rather, the language of clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given goes not to the standard of proof, but to the type of testimony. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ¶ 14, 197 P.3d 99 (internal quotation marks omitted)(emphasis added). This type of testimony is but one factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances; its presence or absence is not itself determinative. ¶ 37 The totality of the circumstances requires careful scrutiny of the details of the detention, and the characteristics of the defendant. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 56, 63 P.3d 650. And [t]he totality of the circumstances must show consent was given without duress or coercion. Id. We have identified five factors that may show a lack of duress or coercion: (1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; (3) a mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and (5) the absence of deception or trick[ery] on the part of the officer. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 38 Turning to the court of appeals' decision, we hold that it properly applied the totality of the circumstances standard. Indeed, our review demonstrates that the court of appeals considered the factual findings and the testimony from the suppression hearing and found them wanting. ¶ 39 At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor did not present clear and positive testimony that Ms. Tripp unequivocally and freely gave her consent to the blood draw. Rather, as the testimony above reveals, the circumstances surrounding the blood draw were equivocal. This is only one factor of the analysis, but other factors demonstrate that Ms. Tripp's consent was the result of coercion and duress. ¶ 40 The police made more than a mere request to draw Ms. Tripp's blood. Different officers requested on at least four separate occasions that Ms. Tripp submit to a blood draw. Ms. Tripp refused. Though the first request by Officer Saunders may have been a mere request, the latter three requests were not. Within the course of forty-five minutes, Detective Roberts requested three times that Ms. Tripp submit to a blood draw. At least one time, he made the request with two other officers present. Each time she refused. ¶ 41 The State argues that Ms. Tripp refused solely because she feared needles. Also, the State stresses that Ms. Tripp agreed to submit to a urinalysis. Nonetheless, the State ignores that the police rebuffed Ms. Tripp's offer of cooperation; neither her fear nor her agreement to another test demonstrate her agreement to a blood draw. Ms. Tripp refused to submit to the blood draw; her motives did not negate her refusal. ¶ 42 Furthermore, the police exhibited force when Detective Roberts illegally arrested Ms. Tripp and threatened to force the blood draw with a warrant. When Ms. Tripp adamantly refused, Detective Roberts, without identifying any reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause, arrested her. Officer Monson acknowledged that he did not know why Detective Roberts arrested Ms. Tripp. Detective Roberts said he arrested Ms. Tripp because she became more defiant and he was losing control of the situation when Ms. Tripp's family and friends intervened. But Officer Monson testified that Ms. Tripp herself never interfered. When pressed, Detective Roberts explained that Ms. Tripp's family and friends interfered by telling Ms. Tripp not to answer his questions and that the police could not take her blood. Thus, Detective Roberts arrested Ms. Tripp and threatened to force the blood draw with a warrant because she refused to waive her constitutional right. ¶ 43 Detective Roberts placed Ms. Tripp into custody. Although he did not handcuff Ms. Tripp, he secured her in the back of his unmarked car and asked Officer Monson to watch her. At no time did Detective Roberts or any other officer read Ms. Tripp her Miranda rights. Officer Monson secluded Ms. Tripp from all outside contact. ¶ 44 Finally, although it is unclear whether the police deceived or tricked Ms. Tripp, we are concerned by the police's use of Ms. Budd and Mr. Davis. Ms. Budd is a victim advocate. In this case, however, she appears to have been acting as an agent of the police. Ms. Budd focused her efforts on Ms. Tripp. Upon meeting Ms. Tripp, Ms. Budd informed Ms. Tripp that she was there for her support. Ms. Budd then smelled the odor of alcohol in the husband's car and reported it to an officer. Ms. Budd comforted Ms. Tripp for roughly two hours. Her vigilance continued even after Detective Roberts arrested Ms. Tripp. While the police isolated Ms. Tripp from family and friends, Ms. Budd remained by Ms. Tripp's side in the backseat of Detective Roberts's car. Also, Detective Roberts testified that after he grew concerned that Ms. Tripp might be impaired, he asked Ms. Budd to calm Ms. Tripp and help her become more relaxed to the idea of having a blood draw. Ms. Budd testified that this was not [her] job. Still, she told Ms. Tripp that the blood technician was very good, very gentle, and that Ms. Tripp did not have to look at the needle. She held Ms. Tripp's hand during the blood draw and told her not to look at the needle ... and [to] take a deep breath. ¶ 45 Similarly, although Mr. Davis is a blood technician, he followed the officers' direction. Upon Mr. Davis's arrival, Detective Roberts abandoned any attempt to secure a warrant in favor of letting Mr. Davis work around [Ms. Tripp's] fear of needles. Mr. Davis testified that he and Detective Roberts agreed that if Mr. Davis talked to Ms. Tripp she might give her consent because he was not ... a police officer or involved in any of the original investigation [and] that she might be easier with [his] demeanor. ¶ 46 Weighing these factors under the totality of the circumstances test, it appears that the near constant police pressure and coercive tactics overcame Ms. Tripp's will. The court of appeals imposed the proper standard, and it correctly concluded that under the totality of the circumstances, the State failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Ms. Tripp voluntarily consented to the blood draw. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision, which reversed the trial court's denial of Ms. Tripp's motion to suppress. [1]