Opinion ID: 1988810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Petition and Hearing for Post-Conviction Relief

Text: In June 2000, defendant filed a petition for PCR alleging he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and the penalty phases of his trial. With respect to the guilt phase, defendant claimed his trial counsel were deficient for pursuing a denial defense instead of a passion/provocation manslaughter defense, and for failing to request a general accomplice charge. With respect to the penalty phase, defendant claimed his trial counsel were deficient for failing to: (1) use Dr. Gerald Cooke, a psychologist, as an expert witness in support of the mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a); (2) present evidence in support of the mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(b); (3) present evidence to show that defendant had no history of violent crimes; and (4) request a limiting instruction. A hearing was held on defendant's petition. Both trial counsel testified. Terrance Toner, Esquire, a former Middlesex County Assistant Prosecutor, who had participated in approximately twenty criminal-defense trials, was primarily responsible for handling the guilt phase at trial. Pamela Brause, Esquire, was assigned to assist Toner and primarily handled the penalty phase of the trial. Brause previously had represented other defendants in murder trials, but this was her first capital case. Toner recalled that defendant said he was taking medication at the time he gave his January 23, 1993, statements to the police. As a result, Toner decided to explore the possibility of attacking the admissibility of those statements based on the medication. To develop that defense, Toner hired Dr. Robert J. Pandina. Two months later, Toner received a copy of a report from the State's expert, Dr. Reng Lang Lin, who reported that he found no trace of alcohol or drugs in defendant's blood sample taken on January 14, 1993. Toner gave Dr. Lin's report to Dr. Pandina to review. Dr. Pandina subsequently informed Toner that Dr. Lin's report was contrary to what defendant had informed him. Thus, Dr. Pandina refused to testify on defendant's behalf because he questioned defendant's credibility. Based on a police report regarding the quantity of medication defendant received while in custody, Toner changed tactics and argued that the police wrongfully withheld defendant's medications. He decided to use Dr. Lin's report, which found no trace of alcohol or drugs in defendant's blood, to attack the credibility of Charette and Borden, who told police that they had smoked marijuana with defendant on January 12,1993. Toner and Brause also developed a defense strategy concerning the phone number with the name Joe Martin found written on a piece of paper in Bowman's pocket. Toner tried to call the number and discovered it was disconnected. Because the prosecutor's report indicated that Detective Kerwin investigated the incorrect phone number, Toner questioned the thoroughness of the police investigation. Toner, however, conducted no further investigation of Joe Martin or the phone number because he believed the information he had gathered namely, that the number had been disconnected comported with the defense theory that someone else murdered Bowman. Toner and Brause decided to pursue a denial defense. They based their decision on Dr. Lin's report, the State's investigation of the wrong phone number, and Mecalco's statement that he saw a man who looked nothing like defendant struggling with Bowman. Toner explained they did not pursue a passion/provocation defense because: [T]o go with passion/provocation manslaughter, we would have had to tell the jury that he did it, he killed this girl. He and Brause viewed the two defenses as mutually exclusive: [W]e couldn't really say that it wasn't Mr. Chew, but if it was, he was upset. Toner also stated that the State's evidence that defendant planned to kill Bowman for the insurance proceeds undermined a manslaughter defense. Toner recalled that shortly before the trial was scheduled to begin, the prosecutor informed him that Dr. Lin's conclusions in his report related solely to the twenty-four hour period before the blood was extracted. Hence, because defendant's blood was drawn on January 14, 1993, the absence of narcotics related back to January 13, 1993, the date Bowman's body was discovered. Toner had not questioned Dr. Lin concerning his report and did not recall having defendant's blood tested independently. He realized that this information neutralized part of his contemplated avenue of cross-examination. Toner recollected that after jury selection the prosecutor had informed him that detectives discovered that the phone number had been disconnected in August 1992. Toner immediately sought postponement of the trial, but his request was denied. Toner explained that if he had known earlier about the phone number being disconnected in the summer of 1992, he would have altered his argument slightly to eliminate any significance to that evidence. Toner testified there were many reasons for pursuing a denial defense. He did not concede the defense would have been different had he known before trial about the disconnected phone number and the time limitation on Dr. Lin's toxicology results. He stressed that Mecalco was an independent witness who saw a man in defendant's car who looked nothing like defendant. Toner explained that the strategic advantage of that independent witness played a major role in his tactical decision to proceed with a denial defense. Toner wanted the defense to stand on its own, meaning either defendant did or did not commit the murder. A passion/provocation manslaughter defense would have required defendant to admit guilt. Although Toner acknowledged he could have pursued more than one defense, he claimed that doing so would have required him to minimize the weight of the State's most damaging evidence on defendant's pre-meditation. He reasoned that it would not have been wise to argue to the jury that defendant was impassioned when he slit Bowman's throat. Toner explained that he considered all the evidence when he contemplated and chose defendant's defense. He noted that he discussed the defense with defendant many times, and defendant agreed with a denial defense. All discovery was provided to defendant, and Toner reviewed it with him at least once a week. Although Toner did not recall whether he discussed the possibility of asserting a passion/provocation defense with defendant, he did note that he had asked for and received a passion/provocation manslaughter charge during the guilt phase of the trial. Beth Kelly, the defense investigator, testified that in June 1994, she contacted the pager company that issued the phone number found in Bowman's pocket. She learned the number was disconnected in August 1992. Kelly was sure she discussed this information with Toner. Kelly also interviewed defendant's friend, Lisa Paturzzio, who said she visited defendant's home in January 1993 and saw Bowman handling cocaine. Paturzzio also testified at the hearing. She recalled seeing a lot of cocaine in the kitchen of defendant's home in January 1993. She was informed that defendant and Bowman expected to sell the cocaine to a man named Joe for $25,000. Paturzzio recalled talking to Kelly and defendant's lawyer. She admitted visiting defendant in jail several times before the trial began in 1995. Around the time of the trial, she received a telephone call and was informed she would not be called as a witness, because it would be difficult to corroborate her story of seeing drugs in defendant's home. Brause testified she had explored the argument that medications that were needed by defendant were withheld from him at the time he gave his January 23, 1993, statements to police. In addition, she investigated the possibility of obtaining an independent testing of defendant's blood to determine whether he was intoxicated at the time of the attack. Brause met with Dr. Lin, who told her that narcotics remain in the bloodstream for twenty-four hours. Later, she met with Dr. Pandina, who informed her that marijuana could remain in the bloodstream for up to thirty days. Brause claimed she and Toner had relied on Dr. Lin's report in devising their strategy. Consequently, she requested an adjournment once she realized Dr. Lin's conclusions only pertained to a twenty-four hour period prior to the day defendant's blood was taken. She felt that the blood issue was under-investigated and that Dr. Lin's report should have been provided to Dr. Pandina prior to the completion of his report. Brause never understood why Toner thought the phone number was important. She believed defendant had no real viable defense at the guilt phase because the State's evidence was overwhelming. In preparation for the possibility of a penalty phase trial, Brause retained Dr. Cooke to conduct a psychological-intellectual-organic screening of defendant and to assess any mitigating psychological factors. Brause learned from Charette that she had an incestuous relationship with defendant. Brause was aware that the State's mental health expert, Dr. Daniel Greenfield, had interviewed Charette. Although Brause never asked Charette whether she informed Dr. Greenfield about the incestuous relationship, Brause believed Charette had done so. Brause never requested a copy of Dr. Greenfield's report, if any, nor did she recall asking Dr. Cooke if the incestuous relationship would have altered his opinion. Brause decided not to call Dr. Cooke as a witness at the penalty phase for fear the incestuous relationship would be revealed to the jury. On cross-examination, Brause outlined the reasons why she elected not to call Dr. Cooke as a witness at the penalty phase: (1) she did not want Dr. Greenfield to examine defendant, because she was sure the doctor would diagnose him a sociopath and thus expose defendant's anti-social and criminal behavior; and (2) she feared Dr. Greenfield knew of the incestuous relationship and would reveal that and other damaging information to the jury. Brause explained that there had been allegations that as a child, defendant had harmed animals and molested a young neighbor. She explained that she did not want Dr. Greenfield to have an opportunity to discuss those acts and defendant's incest with Charette because she felt the jurors might become upset with this kind of behavior and be more death-prone. Jacqueline Turner, a deputy public defender, who assisted Brause on legal issues during the trial and who represented defendant in his direct appeal, testified that she talked with Brause about requesting an accomplice liability charge. Turner assumed Brause understood that the accomplice charge should be included as part of the murder charge. After Brause informed her that the trial court refused to give an accomplice liability charge, Turner advised Brause to at least try to have the accomplice liability charge somewhere in the jury instructions. Lois Nardone, a social worker who testified for the defense at the penalty phase trial, described defendant's family background of chaos, violence, sexual abuse, sexual promiscuity, beatings, excessive drinking, and lack of love and support. Nardone also testified at trial concerning defendant's juvenile and adult criminal history. She recounted defendant's juvenile arrests and juvenile convictions for various acts of breaking and entering, larceny, forgery, writing bad checks, thefts and drug possession. Nardone further testified that defendant's brother, Robert Chew, had been convicted of assault and rape. Nardone claimed that if she were investigating defendant's case anew, she would seek to show his prior crimes were all non-violent. Dr. Cooke outlined his diagnoses of defendant as: (1) personality disorder (NOS), mixed with dependent, histrionic, and antisocial features; (2) drug dependency; (3) depressive disorder; and (4) developmental reading disability. He believed there was support for the mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a), that defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. He stated that Brause never told him about the incestuous relationship between defendant and Charette nor asked him whether that relationship would have changed his diagnosis. Dr. Cooke explained he was aware that an aunt had sexually abused defendant as a child and that there was general sexual promiscuity within the family. However, he was unaware of the allegations that defendant, as a child, engaged in cruelty to animals and molested a young boy. Dr. Cooke claimed that that information would have strengthened his conclusions because it documented an even greater depth of pathology than he had been aware of previously. On cross-examination, Dr. Cooke acknowledged that defendant exhibited signs of potential violence as a child, such as setting his grandmother's house on fire and cruelty to animals. Dr. Cooke also acknowledged that defendant fit several of the criteria for anti-social personality disorder, including conduct disorder before the age of fifteen, failure to conform to society's norms as an adult, a pattern of deceit evidenced by defendant's convictions, which implied conning on his part, and financial irresponsibility, evidenced by defendant's buying drugs. Dr. Cooke conceded that defendant met the minimum requirement of three criteria under the Diagnostic Statistic Manual (DSM) for anti-social personality disorder. He explained that at the time he examined defendant in 1995, the DSM required that six or seven out of fifteen criteria be met for a diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder. Following the PCR hearing, the PCR court requested written submissions. Later, the PCR court rendered a written decision that focused on the three issues raised by defendant in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) a denial defense should not have been used, but rather, a passion/provocation manslaughter defense should have been developed; (2) counsel should have requested a general accomplice charge; and (3) counsel failed to call Dr. Cooke to establish the mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a). The PCR court concluded that while there may have been some deficiencies in the trial preparation by defense counsel, the defense team made a strategic decision to employ a denial defense, there was no deficiency in failing to request a general accomplice charge, and whatever the positive effects of finding the mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a) might have been if Dr. Cooke had testified, they would have been nullified by the negative features of such testimony. Defendant appeals to this Court as of right. R. 2:2-1(a)(3).