Opinion ID: 4520640
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence considered

Text: In granting summary judgment to Nike, the district court considered only the instances where the supervisor mocked Dugandzic’s accent or manner of speech as conduct based on Dugandzic’s national origin. The district court did not consider allegations that the supervisor followed Dugandzic, asked for him over the intercom, blew in his face, failed to greet him, or yelled “Boo” at him as evidence of harassment. In concluding that the alleged harassment Dugandzic suffered was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an actionable hostile work environment, the district court determined the supervisor’s mocking of Dugandzic’s accent between 10 and 15 times was neither frequent nor severe enough to alter the terms and conditions of employment. Therefore, because Dugandzic could not satisfy the prima facie case of harassment on the severe or pervasive factor, the district court granted summary judgment to Nike. Dugandzic argues that only considering the instances where his supervisor mocked his accent and manner of speech in determining whether the conduct was severe or pervasive was error. He contends the district court failed to perceive the motivation behind each act of harassment as being related to his national origin and therefore disregarded portions of evidence that should have been considered, and 5 Case: 19-11793 Date Filed: 03/30/2020 Page: 6 of 12 that the district court’s failure to consider the other pieces of evidence had a direct impact on its subsequent severity factor analysis. He also asserts that contrary to Nike’s argument, his supervisor’s “purported ignorance” of his Croatian background did not preclude recovery on his hostile work environment claim and that his national origin and accent are “inextricably intertwined.” He asserts the evidence established a material fact as to whether all his supervisor’s conduct was motivated by his national origin because she admitted she perceived him as having a “foreign accent.” He contends the cumulative effect of his supervisor’s discriminatory conduct creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the harassment was severe or pervasive. We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same legal standard used by the district court. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the evidence before the court shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 1023 (quotations omitted). Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person with respect to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 6 Case: 19-11793 Date Filed: 03/30/2020 Page: 7 of 12 individual’s . . . national origin.” 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff may show that: (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) the employer is responsible for such environment under a theory of vicarious or of direct liability. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). The requirement that the harassment be “severe or pervasive” contains an objective and a subjective component. Id. at 1276. To be actionable, behavior must result in “both an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and an environment that the victim subjectively perceives . . . to be abusive.” Id. (quotations omitted). In determining the objective severity of the harassment, we employ a totality of the circumstances approach by considering four factors: “(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the 1 The FCRA similarly prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person with respect to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” based on an individual’s national origin. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). Because the FCRA is patterned after Title VII, cases construing Title VII are applicable to claims brought under the FCRA. See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 834 (11th Cir. 2007). 7 Case: 19-11793 Date Filed: 03/30/2020 Page: 8 of 12 employee’s job performance.” Id. Courts should examine the conduct in context, not as isolated acts, and determine under the totality of the circumstances whether the harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of the plaintiff’s employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The district court erred when it considered only the 10 to 15 instances where his supervisor mocked Dugandzic’s accent and linguistic mannerisms as harassment based on his national origin. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Dugandzic, based on his supervisor’s mocking of Dugandzic’s accent, it is a permissible view of the evidence that his supervisor’s other allegedly harassing conduct was also motivated by his national origin. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023 (explaining all evidence and factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment). The district court erred in dismissing out of hand any evidence of alleged harassment that was not facially based on Dugandzic’s national origin. Further, we reject Nike’s argument that because Dugandzic’s supervisor did not know that Dugandzic was Croatian she could not have discriminated against him based on his national origin. If she was mocking his “foreign accent,” it 8 Case: 19-11793 Date Filed: 03/30/2020 Page: 9 of 12 follows that she could be harassing him based on his national origin even if she did not know the specific national origin. Because the district court did not consider all the relevant evidence and the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether Dugandzic could make a prima facie case of harassment, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nike on this issue, and remand for the district court to consider, using all the relevant evidence, whether the conduct is sufficient to meet the severe and pervasive prong of a prima facie case of harassment in the first instance.