Opinion ID: 1465135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reference to Insurance

Text: In the course of his testimony Silva, in what appears to have been an attempt to explain Clarke, Sr.'s apparent lack of concern about the failure to procure insurance, quoted Clarke, Sr., as saying  w]e're protect [ sic ] for our own mistakes.' Defense counsel immediately moved to pass the case on the ground that the only meaning the jury could reasonably attribute to that comment was, 'we have liability insurance to cover us in the event we make mistakes at the agency.' In deciding a motion to pass a case after insurance coverage has been mentioned, a trial justice must first consider the comment in context and then either (1) pass the case, if satisfied that the reference to insurance so prejudiced the minds of the jurors as to render them incapable of reaching a fair and impartial verdict; or (2) give an appropriate cautionary instruction either when the reference to insurance is made or when he charges the jury, if he believes that such an instruction will eliminate the possibility of prejudice in the jurors' minds and that they can reasonably be expected to return a verdict based solely on the evidence, uninfluenced by the reference. Cochran v. Dube, 114 R.I. 149, 152, 330 A.2d 76, 78 (1975); Lewis v. Allard, 108 R.I. 534, 537, 277 A.2d 744, 746 (1971); Harrod v. Ciamciarulo, 95 R.I. 504, 506-07, 188 A.2d 459, 460 (1963). Here, in the trial justice's judgment, the possibility that Silva's remark would create irreparable prejudice to defendant was not substantial enough to require passing of the case; he concluded that he would not have passed the case even if Silva had quoted Clarke, Sr., as stating that `[w]e have insurance to protect ourselves.' He recognized, however, that Silva's repetition, in broken English, of the statement, `[w]e're protect [ sic ] for our own mistakes,' while susceptible to different interpretations, might be construed to mean that defendant was protected by insurance against errors and mistakes and that, so construed, the statement might influence the jury. Accordingly, and in order to avoid highlighting a remark that the jury might otherwise have ignored, he allowed defendant to decide whether or not a cautionary instruction should be given. In opting against such an instruction, defense counsel said I certainly waive any request, and expressly request that the Court, at this time, not make any instruction to the jury. In assigning as error both the trial justice's refusal to pass the case and his failure to give a cautionary instruction, defendant now attempts to renege on his counsel's trial strategy. This we will not permit.