Opinion ID: 327527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 7 The construction of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) is not seriously in issue here. 7 It is clearly an essential element of a crime under that statute that the defendant had knowledge that the property he possessed was stolen from a bank. The question, rather, is whether there was sufficient evidence in this case for the jury to find the requisite knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 As a preliminary matter, we dispose of a point not specifically mentioned by the government here, but on which the district court relied in denying defendants' motions to dismiss the indictment at the conclusion of the government's case. The district court apparently held that, if any one defendant had the requisite knowledge, it could be imputed to the other defendants for purposes of the conspiracy count. Tr. 679-80. This is an erroneous statement of legal principle. Where a substantive offense requires specific knowledge, that same knowledge must be established before a defendant can be found to be a member of a conspiracy to commit that offense. United States v. Hysohion, 448 F.2d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 1971). This applies equally to an aider and abettor 8 as to a conspirator, and the requisite knowledge cannot be imputed from one aider and abettor or conspirator to another. United States v. Steward, 451 F.2d 1203, 1207 (2d Cir. 1971). 9 Therefore, if there was insufficient evidence of knowledge on the substantive count, the conviction on the conspiracy count is equally defective. 9 It is undisputed that, while the evidence tending to prove that the defendants knew the bills were stolen was overwhelming, there was no direct evidence that they knew they were stolen from a bank. However, placing primary reliance on Crone v. United States, 411 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,396 U.S. 896, 90 S.Ct. 195, 24 L.Ed.2d 173 (1969), the government contends, and the district court held, that such knowledge may be inferred from the unexplained possession of property recently stolen from the bank. In Crone, the court adopted a theory of multiple inferences, holding that unexplained possession of recently stolen goods gives rise to an inference of knowledge that the goods were stolen and also to an inference of participation in the theft, and that one who participated in the theft ipso facto has knowledge of where the goods were stolen from. 411 F.2d at 254. We have no occasion here to decide whether, in the abstract, the inference of participation in the theft from unexplained possession of recently stolen goods comports with due process requirements, 10 compare, United States v. Jones, 418 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1969) (inference disapproved), with McAbee v. United States, 434 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1970) (inference approved), since here, in light of the other evidence in the case, an inference of participation in the theft would verge on the irrational. 11 10 Of the three defendants, Poerio apparently was the closest link to whoever took the bills from the Morgan bank; it is clear, however, that there was at least one link between Poerio and the bank since Poerio had to call an unidentified person for permission to hold the bills overnight from March 3 to March 4. And given the nature of the thieves' market depicted by the government it would be the sheerest of speculation to say that Poerio's contact was the thief. If the evidence rebuts any inference that Poerio participated in the theft, it necessarily defeats that inference with respect to Daniels and Tavoularis as well, for they were both further down the chain. Moreover, Daniels' statement to Norman after a phone call to someone perhaps Poerio that the bills were still available, and that they were Treasury notes and not securities, is a clear indication that he was nothing more than a middleman; a participant in the theft would most likely have known what was stolen. As for Tavoularis, the evidence seems clear that he had no part in the operation until recruited by Berman. To infer participation in the theft would thus be irrational here with respect to each defendant, since that inference is totally inconsistent with the evidence adduced by the government. Crone, therefore is inapplicable. 12 11 Admittedly there was no direct evidence of the requisite knowledge, and we have held that such knowledge could not be inferred from the possession of the recently stolen bills. The question remains whether there was any other evidence sufficient to permit the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knew that the bills were stolen from a bank. We conclude that there was not. The serial numbers were not sequential and there was nothing on the face of the bills to indicate their source, 13 there is no evidence that any of the defendants were acquainted with the thieves, 14 nor can it be inferred from any statements of the defendants that they had been advised of the theft by the robber. 15 The most substantial argument in support of a finding that there was sufficient evidence of knowledge might be the claim that stolen Treasury bills are necessarily, almost as a matter of definition, Treasury bills that have been stolen from a bank. If we could accept this proposition we could, relying on Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970), hold that the evidence was sufficient. 16 However, that proposition must be rejected. This court is aware from its own cases 17 that Treasury bills are stolen from institutions other than banks, credit unions and savings and loan associations. Moreover, and more tellingly, there was testimony in this very case by Harold Connor, Morgan's Assistant Vice President in charge of the Custody Department, regarding purchases of Treasury bills aggregating $37 million by the Morgan bank from the securities firms of Aubrey G. Lanston & Co. and Francis I. duPont & Co. Tr. 42-44. Connor further testified that, to cover its losses after the disappearance of the bills involved here was discovered, the Morgan bank purchased Treasury bills in the open market. Tr. 55. 18 Thus, it is quite clear that Treasury bills are handled in substantial volume by institutions other than those listed in § 2113(c), and it cannot be said with any assurance whatever that stolen Treasury bills are, more likely than not, Treasury bills that have been stolen from a bank. 12 We conclude, therefore, that there was no evidence on which the jury could have based a finding that the defendants knew, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Treasury bills had been stolen from a bank. This failure of proof on an essential element of the crime requires that the judgments of conviction be reversed and the case remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment. 19 In view of this holding, we need not consider any of the additional arguments raised on this appeal. 20 13 We reverse these convictions with reluctance and regret. The evidence tending to prove that these defendants possessed stolen property knowing it to have been stolen was overwhelming. Unfortunately, the statute under which the government chose to bring this prosecution required more, and on that additional element the government failed and totally failed to prove its case. Our system of administering justice requires that a defendant, no matter how guilty he may be of some crime, cannot be convicted unless there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the particular crime with which he is charged. The prosecutorial branch of the law enforcement establishment is quite properly vested with considerable discretion in deciding what charges to bring against whom, but in this case the improvident exercise of that discretion not only in selecting the particular statute under which the case proceeded, but also, and more fundamentally, in pursuing this matter in federal court rather than turning it over to state authorities for prosecution in a more appropriate forum has caused the release of three proven criminals who ought to be in prison. 21 This is all the more distressing since the New York statute of limitations has most likely run, effectively barring state prosecution. 22 The blame for this unhappy but necessary result must be placed squarely on the shoulders of the Strike Force attorneys in charge of this case. 14 Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the indictment.