Opinion ID: 562300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Protection

Text: 25 The Haslip decision states that an award of punitive damages violates due process unless the procedure used in assessing and reviewing the award imposes a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of the factfinder. Although the amount of an award of punitive damages is left to the unique discretion of the factfinder, this discretion is not absolute. An award of punitive damages is unconstitutional unless reasonable procedural safeguards control the discretion of the factfinder. Examples of effective procedural safeguards include, but are not limited to, the following: comprehensive jury instructions that explain the nature of punitive damages, state laws that limit the amount or applicability of punitive damages, and rigorous systems of appellate review of punitive damages. 26 Like the reasonableness aspect of the due process analysis, the procedural protection adequate to support the constitutionality of a punitive damages award varies with the circumstances. A smaller punitive damages award might require fewer procedural safeguards than a larger award. Comprehensive jury instructions, for instance, may afford sufficient procedural protection in a case in which the jury recommends a small award of punitive damages, but not in a case in which the jury recommends a large award. Whether an award is large or small, however, the procedural protection need not be exhaustive. As long as there is some meaningful procedural assurance that the amount of the award is not an impulsive reaction to the wrongful conduct of the defendant, the award survives the procedural protection aspect of the due process analysis in Haslip. In the instant case, we conclude that the procedure used in assessing and reviewing the amount of the punitive damages award was constitutionally sufficient. 27 Mississippi law limits the amount of punitive damages that a trial court can impose against a defendant. The trial court does not possess unbridled discretion to fashion the amount of a punitive damages award. Rather, under Mississippi law, the trial court determines an appropriate amount of damages with reference to the following factors: 28 (1) Such amount as is necessary for the punishment of the wrongdoing of the defendant and deterring defendant from similar conduct in the future; 29 (2) Such amount as is reasonably necessary to make an example of the defendant so that others may be deterred from the commission of similar offenses; 30 (3) The pecuniary ability or financial worth of the defendant. 31 Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254, 278 (Miss.1985). The court should also consider the degree of the offense, the presence or absence of malice, the motive behind the actions, the injury intended, and the public sense of justice and propriety. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Wesson, 517 So.2d 521, 532 (Miss.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043, 108 S.Ct. 2035, 100 L.Ed.2d 620 (1988). 32 Without question, these criteria leave the trial court significant discretion in its determination of punitive damages. But this discretion is not unlimited. It is confined to the policies of deterrence and retribution. Cf. Haslip, 111 S.Ct. at 1044 (concluding that instructions which limit jury discretion to the policies of deterrence and retribution are adequate). Perhaps in some cases trial courts might ignore, or at least overlook, the criteria that the Mississippi courts have established to guide discretion in the imposition of punitive damages. The district court in this case, however, did not. In an exhaustive opinion, the district court carefully examined the deterrent and retributive effects of its award of punitive damages. The court tailored its award to reflect the least severe amount adequate to serve the policies of deterrence and retribution. 33 This Court concludes that, under the circumstances of this case, these criteria governing the proper assessment of the amount of punitive damages imposed a meaningful and definite constraint on the discretion of the district court. We emphasize that a significant factor in this conclusion is the fact that the parties tried their case before the court, rather than a jury. 13 In bench trials, the judge--sitting as factfinder--must explain the conditions that require a particular award of punitive damages. Thus, a judge, unlike a jury, must justify the amount of punitive damages imposed against the defendant. Under the circumstances of the instant case, this requirement was an important procedural safeguard. The judge in this case was familiar with the complicated legal concepts that pervade the Mississippi law governing punitive damages, and he applied these concepts with due care. 34 Reserve Life argues that the procedure used in assessing and reviewing the award of punitive damages was inadequate because appellate review of punitive damages under Mississippi law is narrow. Certainly, the standard of appellate review in Mississippi is more forgiving than the Alabama standard that the Supreme Court approved in Haslip. Unlike the Alabama appellate courts, which apply a series of substantive standards to determine whether an award of punitive damages is excessive, an appellate court in Mississippi will set aside a punitive damages award only if it evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d at 278. Nonetheless, in the instant case, we cannot conclude that the deferential nature of the standard of appellate review in Mississippi requires reversal. 35 Again, Reserve Life misunderstands the fact intensive nature of the due process analysis articulated in Haslip. The fact that the Mississippi appellate courts apply a deferential standard of review might be a significant factor in a case, for example, in which the trial court did not instruct the jury concerning the appropriate criteria for assessing an award of punitive damages. In such a case, the deferential standard of review might not act as an adequate check on the discretion that the jury would exercise in assessing damages. In the instant case, however, other procedural safeguards have controlled the discretion of the factfinder. The district court completed a rigorous examination of the appropriateness of the punitive damages it imposed against Reserve Life, and in fact, the court applied many of the substantive standards that the Supreme Court approved in its review of the Alabama procedural process in Haslip: the relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm that occurred, the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the financial position of the defendant, the costs of litigation, etc. Haslip, 111 S.Ct. at 1045. We conclude that, under the circumstances of the instant case, the procedure used in assessing and reviewing the award of punitive damages imposed a definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of the district court.