Opinion ID: 167962
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ex Post Facto Clause and D ue Process

Text: After Terrell committed the federal offenses, but prior to sentencing, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, one majority held that under the Sixth Amendment “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 244. A second majority issued Booker’s “remedial” holding, “correct[ing] the Sixth Amendment error created through mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines by severing the statutory section that required district courts to sentence within the Guidelines range.” United States v. Payton, 405 F.3d 1168, 1172-73 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Booker, 543 U .S. at 245). As a result, after Booker, the guidelines are still in effect, but merely advisory. Terrell wants it both w ays. He contends Booker's constitutional holding — mandatory enhancements based on judge-found facts violate the Sixth Amendment — applies to his case. However, he also argues that applying the remedial holding and allowing the district court to sentence him based on judge- -14- found facts under an advisory guideline scheme for an offense that pre-dated Booker would violate the Ex Post Facto C lause. He claims the district court’s consideration of eighty-six kilograms of cocaine (an amount not found by the jury) is error. Article I of the United States Constitution provides that neither Congress nor the states shall pass an “ex post facto Law.” See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Although the Ex Post Facto Clause limits the legislature instead of the judiciary, “limitations on ex post facto judicial decisionmaking are inherent in the notion of due process.” Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456 (2001). “An Ex Post Facto violation occurs only when a law retroactively alters the definition of crimes or increases the punishment for criminal acts.” United States v. Andrews, 447 F.3d 806, 809 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted). W e easily dispose of Terrell’s argument as every circuit, including this one, has considered and rejected it. United States v. Rines, 419 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 2005) (“W e decline Defendant's invitation to hold that the Supreme Court ordered us to violate the Constitution . . . . The only difference between the Booker regime under which his sentence is -15- determined and the regime he would have anticipated at the time of his offense is that the guidelines are not mandatory.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1089 (2006). 8 A FFIRME D. Entered by the C ourt: Terrence L. O ’Brien