Opinion ID: 2148855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Waiver of Jury for Fitness Hearing

Text: The defendant charges that the trial court committed reversible error in accepting his waiver of a jury for the fitness hearing. We find no error in this regard. The defendant's fitness hearing was set to begin on March 2, 1994. At the start of proceedings on that date, defense counsel appeared for the defendant and stated that a jury had been requested for the hearing. One of the prosecutors then informed the trial judge that the defendant had indicated, during one of his fitness examinations, that he wished to proceed without a jury. The trial judge questioned the defendant on this issue: THE COURT:    I am going to ask him. You have a right, not a constitutional right, Mr. Haynes, to have this issue concerning whether you are legally competent mentally to stand trial in this criminal case to be decided by a jury of six persons, this is a civil proceeding, or whether you want to presentwhether that issue can be presented to the Court sitting without a jury. The decision is yours to make, and I am asking you to make that decision. Do you want six people seated in this jury box to hear evidence from your doctors and other persons concerning your mental status and your legal competence to stand trial, or do you want to have the Court make that decision without the jury? Tell me. THE DEFENDANT: I wish the Court to make that decision. The defendant thereafter executed a written waiver of a jury for the fitness hearing. The defendant now contends that the trial court incorrectly accepted his jury waiver when defense counsel had already demanded a jury for the proceeding. There is no constitutional right to a jury at a hearing to determine fitness to stand trial. People v. Manning, 76 Ill.2d 235, 239, 28 Ill.Dec. 544, 390 N.E.2d 903 (1979). Our legislature, however, has made provisions for a jury to determine the issue of a defendant's fitness under some circumstances. 725 ILCS 5/104-12 (West 1992). Section 104-12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides: Right to Jury. The issue of the defendant's fitness may be determined in the first instance by the court or by a jury. The defense or the State may demand a jury or the court on its own motion may order a jury. However, when the issue is raised after trial has begun or after conviction but before sentencing, or when the issue is to be redetermined under Section 104-20 or 104-27, the issue shall be determined by the court. (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/104-12 (West 1992). The defendant's argument rests upon the wording of this statutory provision. The defendant asserts that section 104-12, by use of the term the defense, gives the right to demand or waive a jury to defense counsel and not to the defendant himself. In most cases, the defendant reasons, defense counsel's decision on this issue will coincide with the defendant's wishes. However, the defendant posits, in the rare situation such as that presented here, where defense counsel has demanded a jury and the defendant expresses a desire to waive a jury, defense counsel's decision predominates. In essence, the defendant argues that the defendant does not personally have the right to waive a jury for the fitness determination. The defendant's contention is without merit. This court has held [i]t is clear that an accused may waive a jury in a proceeding to determine his competency. People v. Lyons, 42 Ill.2d 437, 440, 250 N.E.2d 133 (1969); see also People v. Brown, 43 Ill.2d 79, 82, 250 N.E.2d 647 (1969). The defendant acknowledges this holding and concedes that, at the time of that holding and up until the legislature enacted the current version of the fitness jury statute in 1979, a defendant had the statutory right to waive a jury for his fitness hearing. He argues, however, that the legislature altered that rule in enacting the current version of section 104-12. The defendant emphasizes that, prior to the 1979 change, the fitness jury provision provided that the defendant (in addition to the State or the court) could demand a jury. Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 1005-2-1(d). In 1979, the section was changed to provide, as noted above, that the defense may demand a jury. The defendant contends that, in substituting the defense for the defendant, the legislature intended to take away from the defendant the right to demand or waive a jury and to give that right to defense counsel instead. The defendant's interpretation of the statute is erroneous. In construing a statute, a court's duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Parker, 123 Ill.2d 204, 209, 121 Ill.Dec. 941, 526 N.E.2d 135 (1988). In determining that intent, a court must look first to the language of the statute and interpret that language in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Ross, 168 Ill.2d 347, 350, 213 Ill.Dec. 672, 659 N.E.2d 1319 (1995). We find that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase the defense, as used in section 104-12, does not exclude the defendant. The defense, as used in this context, is commonly considered to connote the team or the side that is defending. This definition does not exclude the defendant, but clearly encompasses him as a part of the defense team. We note that, in other sections of article 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the article pertaining to fitness matters, the legislature expressly referred to the attorney for the defendant or defendant's counsel where it sought to refer to defense counsel. See 725 ILCS 5/104-23(a), 104-27(c) (West 1992). Had the legislature intended, in section 104-12, to grant the right to demand or waive a jury solely to defense counsel, to the exclusion of the defendant, it would have used specific language to that effect. We thus conclude that the plain language of section 104-12 does not evince an intent to alter the defendant's right to demand or waive a jury for the fitness determination. The legislative history surrounding the 1979 change in the fitness jury provision confirms our conclusion. This change was effected as part of a major overhaul of the statutory provisions governing fitness for trial and sentencing. Public Act 81-1217, effective December 28, 1979, repealed previous provisions regarding fitness (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 1005-2-1, 1005-2-2), and replaced them with sections 102-21 and 104-10 through 104-29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The new sections provided detailed procedures to be employed in determining fitness and dealing with unfit defendants. Thus, changing the defendant to the defense was not the only, and was certainly not the most significant, change wrought by Public Act 81-1217. Moreover, the debates in the legislature leave little doubt as to the motivating factor behind the legislative overhaul. The legislators' comments reveal that the primary purpose of the act was to address situations such as that in the much-publicized case of Donald Lang. This court issued an opinion in Lang's case in May 1979. People v. Lang, 76 Ill.2d 311, 29 Ill.Dec. 87, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979). As noted in that opinion, Lang was an illiterate deaf-mute with virtually no communicative abilities who, over the course of 14 years, had been twice charged with murder, but had been found unfit for trial and not civilly committable. According to the House debates, Public Act 81-1217 was the result of the Lang case and was intended to bridge a glaring gap in the statutory framework for dealing with unfit defendants. 81st Ill.Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, June 19, 1979, at 75 (statements of Representative Daniels). Under the then-existing framework, persons such as Lang went into a procedural limbo, and the bill was intended to alleviate that problem by creating a comprehensive statute that covered defendants who are found not fit to stand trial and sets up a series of hearings and treatments for such persons. 81st Ill.Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, July 1, 1979, at 61 (statements of Representative Daniels). Accordingly, the relevant legislative history provides no support for the defendant's interpretation of section 104-12. The 1979 act was primarily intended to address the concerns raised by the Lang case. According to this court's opinion in that case, it does not appear that the Lang case involved any issue relating to the waiver of a jury for fitness. We thus find no basis for holding that, in changing the defendant to the defense, the legislature sought to effect the change suggested here by the defendant. The more rational explanation for this very minor change in wording is that the drafters used the word defense to allow defense counsel to speak on the defendant's behalf to inform the court of the defendant's wishes on this issue. We therefore reject the defendant's contention that section 104-12 grants only defense counsel, and not the defendant, the right to demand or waive a jury. The defendant nonetheless argues that logic compels the rule he proposes. The defendant asserts that, where a bona fide doubt of a defendant's fitness has been raised (as there must be for a fitness hearing to take place), it is not logical to allow that potentially unfit defendant to personally make the decision whether to have a jury decide his fitness. This court rejected this precise argument in People v. Brown, 43 Ill.2d 79, 82, 250 N.E.2d 647 (1969), stating: Defendant asserts, however, that it is inconsistent to try a person's competency to stand trial and at the same time accept his tendered jury waiver as being understandingly made. This argument has some surface appeal, but we do not think it makes a tendered jury waiver a nullity as defendant contends. The other side of the coin is that it would be reversible error for the trial court to deny a competent defendant's jury waiver. Brown, 43 Ill.2d at 82, 250 N.E.2d 647. The defendant acknowledges the holding in Brown, but urges a different result here. We see no reason not to adhere to the Brown court's resolution of this issue. The defendant concedes that, up until 1979, the legislature expressly granted defendants in this situation the right to demand or waive a jury, apparently finding no lack of logic in that procedure. We have held that the 1979 change in the fitness jury statute did not take away that right. We therefore continue to adhere to the Brown court's rejection of this argument. We find no inherent inconsistency in upholding the legislature's grant to defendants of the right to decide whether a jury will determine their fitness for trial. In a related argument, the defendant contends that the acceptance of his jury waiver was improper because it was based upon the trial judge's unsubstantiated personal belief that the defendant's judgment was not impaired even if he was mentally ill. Having found that the defendant possessed the statutory right to decide whether to have a jury determine fitness, we agree with the State that there is no need to consider the trial court's reason for accepting the defendant's waiver. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly held the defendant's fitness hearing without a jury.