Opinion ID: 1986193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prolonged Detention and the Dog Sniff

Text: Jurisprudence in this area is fairly cleara dog sniff that occurs outside a vehicle is not a search under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. $404,905.00 in United States Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir.1999). See generally United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2644-45, 77 L.Ed.2d 110, 121 (1983) (providing a general legal discussion for all dog sniffs). Because it is not a search, neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion must be present to justify it. See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 3.2(b), at 58-59 (2d ed.1999). This issue prompts us to comment on a recent Supreme Court decision. Id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). In Kyllo, the Supreme Court invalidated the use of thermal imaging technology to gain information inside a home that would not otherwise be apparent without physical invasion. When sense-enhancing technology that is not in general use is utilized on the home, this constitutes a search protected by the Fourth Amendment. We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house. That line, we think, must be not only firm but also brightwhich requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.... Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Id. at ___, 121 S.Ct. at 2046, 150 L.Ed.2d at 106 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1382, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 653 (1980)). We find that this holding does not disturb the nearly twenty years of precedent regarding dog sniffs and vehicles. As recently as 2000, the Supreme Court held a dog sniff of a car is not a search. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40, 121 S.Ct. 447, 453, 148 L.Ed.2d 333, 342-43 (2000). Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics. Like the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by a dog that simply walks around a car is much less intrusive than a typical search. Id. (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. at 2644, 77 L.Ed.2d at 121). Kyllo specifically speaks to highly advanced technology that is not readily available to the general public used to search a home, arguably the most sacred of all places under the Fourth Amendment. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 585, 100 S.Ct. at 1379, 63 L.Ed.2d at 650 ([T]he `physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' (citation omitted)). Vehicles have not been given similar favored status where constitutional protections are concerned. Further, we are of the opinion that a drug sniffing dog is not technology of the type addressed in Kyllo to merit a divergence from the national and federal case law developed regarding vehicle dog sniffs. As such, we are persuaded by the following long-standing viewpoint. Having the trained dog sniff the perimeter of [defendant's] vehicle, which had been lawfully stopped in a public place, did not of itself constitute a search. United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir.1994). [T]he airspace around the car is not an area protected by the Fourth Amendment. Casey v. State, 246 Ga.App. 786, 542 S.E.2d 531, 535 (2000). Ohio courts have held that police need not have a reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity prior to subjecting an otherwise lawfully detained vehicle to a canine sniff. State v. Rusnak, 120 Ohio App.3d 24, 696 N.E.2d 633, 636 (1997) (citations omitted) (If a vehicle is lawfully detained, the exterior sniff by a trained narcotics dog to detect the odor of drugs is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.). To date, all that we have required in Iowa is that the dog sniff be conducted within a reasonable amount of time from the initial, lawful stop and that the stop is not unduly prolonged without a sufficient basis. State v. Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d 559, 563-64 (Iowa 1996); accord United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916-17 (8th Cir.1994). Here, the evidence is that the dog sniff occurred no more than a few minutes after Bergmann was pulled over. Although a dog sniff is not a search, police cannot unduly prolong their detention of an individual to secure a drug dog or for any other reason without additional suspicion of wrongdoing that warrants expansion of the stop. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1662 n. 25, 80 L.Ed.2d 85, 101 n. 25 (1984) (holding that while the subjection to a `dog sniff' Search Term End test [is] reasonable, the seizure [can become] unreasonable [if] its length unduly intrude[s] upon constitutionally protected interests). The fact that Officer Dill pulled Bergmann over for a mere traffic violation does not automatically invalidate the use of the drug dog. If, upon reasonable investigation surrounding the stop, the officer has a valid suspicion of other wrongdoing not the purpose of the stop, he can broaden the scope of the detention. We have held: Even if ... the trooper suspected drug trafficking from the outset, that alone would not invalidate an otherwise valid stop. Once a lawful stop is made, an officer can conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. This reasonable investigation includes asking for the driver's license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver about his destination and purpose. If, as here, the detainees' responses or actions raise suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, the officer's inquiry may be broadened to satisfy those suspicions. Aderholdt, 545 N.W.2d at 563-64 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 502 (8th Cir.1990); Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 915). In Aderholdt, we held that a fifty-minute detention to summon a drug dog and tow truck did not exceed the reasonable scope of the stop. Id. at 564. Aderholdt and his companions were pulled over for failing to wear their seatbelts and for having improperly tinted windows. While conversing with one of Aderholdt's companions in the back of the patrol car, the trooper became suspicious the companion was lying to him because the story he was telling the trooper did not make sense. Id. at 561. He was very nervous and agitated, speaking in a quick and stuttery matter, and making excited gestures with his hands. Aderholdt also became very nervous when asked by the trooper if he could search the car. At this point the trooper informed the men he was calling in a drug dog. We held that given these facts, it was reasonable for the trooper to broaden the scope of the detention. Id. at 564. Although Aderholdt does not state a level of suspicion that is required, other jurisdictions have held that an initial traffic stop can be expanded beyond the scope only when there is reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. United States v. Heir, 107 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1094 (D.Neb. 2000) (holding that evasiveness, nervousness, fidgeting, and inattentiveness in the conglomerate may support further detention for a drug dog); see also United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir.1994) (A trained officer may properly infer from a collection of circumstances, no one of which itself indicates illegal activity, that further inquiry is appropriate.). Other jurisdictions have also weighed in on this issue. The Tenth Circuit has held that where the sniff and detention to accomplish it were supported by reasonable suspicion based on ... the extreme nervousness of the passengers and the inconsistent statements about destination, the fifteen-minute detention to wait for the drug dog was justified. United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1350 (10th Cir. 1998). Likewise, a defendant's agitated demeanor and conflicting accounts of their itinerary given by the vehicle's occupants then gave the trooper reasonable suspicion to enlarge the scope of his investigation. The arrival of a drug-detection dog on the scene within minutes of the stop afforded the officer the opportunity to pursue[ ] a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel [his] suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. State v. Lopez, 772 So.2d 90, 93 (La.2000) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 616 (1985)). Further, some courts have been most interested in the length of the detention. In a similar Florida decision, the court noted and held: The stop was made at approximately 3:13 a.m. The drug dog arrived on the scene approximately 15 minutes later. The officer testified that he was still writing the ticket for the [traffic] violation when the dog arrived. We will not disturb the trial court's conclusion that the officer's testimony was credible and that the stop was not otherwise too lengthy. Sands v. State, 753 So.2d 630, 632 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.2000). In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court held that the twenty-minute detention to wait for a better-trained narcotics officer to arrive was reasonable given that the on-scene officer thought he smelled marijuana around the stopped vehicle. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 684-87, 105 S.Ct. at 1574-76, 84 L.Ed.2d at 614-16. We also note the contrast shown by those cases where courts did not find it was reasonable to call a drug dog. In United States v. Beck , the Eighth Circuit invalidated the extension of the scope of the detention once the purpose for the initial stop had concluded. United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1140 (8th Cir.1998). The court recognized: Because the purposes of [the officer's] initial traffic stop of Beck had been completed by this point, [the officer] could not subsequently detain Beck unless events that transpired during the traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion to justify [the officer's] renewed detention of Beck. Thus, we must consider whether [the officer] had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Beck's Buick was carrying contraband or that other criminal activity may have been afoot. Id. at 1136 (citations omitted). In Beck, upon his questioning, the officer did not receive any objectively reasonable facts to make him suspicious of other criminal activity. The answers provided by the defendant dispelled, rather than created, any further suspicion. For this reason, the Eighth Circuit held that the prolonged detention to wait for a drug dog was not reasonable. Id. at 1137. In the present case, the facts known to Officer Dill did reasonably create a suspicion to investigate further. Rather than dispel suspicion, Bergmann's answer created it by its verified untruthfulness. Dill's past experience with Bergmann, his recent presence in a known drug area with a reputed drug dealer, and Bergmann's nervousness being near the trunk of his car, combined to present a scenario more compelling than was present in Beck to make further detention reasonable in the present case. In another case, the Florida Court of Appeals invalidated a prolonged detention where the officer asked the defendant more than fifty questions prior to writing the citation for speeding in order to allow time for the drug dog to arrive. Maxwell v. State, 785 So.2d 1277, 1279-80 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.2001). The officer could point to no facts during the stop that made him suspicious that further criminal activity was afoot. Rather than write the speeding ticket, he engaged the defendant in conversation about his employment history, his marital status, and other questions that had nothing to do with the reason for the stop. The Florida court held that without reasonable suspicion that further investigation is necessary, a traffic stop cannot last any longer than the time it should take to write a citation. Id. If, however, a drug dog can be called within that time and sniff the vehicle, there is no constitutional violation. State v. Brown, 691 So.2d 637, 638 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997). In our case, the drug dog was called prior to the completion of the reason for the stop only after Officer Dill began to suspect additional illegality was afoot. Factors that created reasonable suspicion that further investigation was necessary were present and the drug dog arrived within minutes of a reasonable completion of the normal citation process. Perhaps the most persuasive case comes from the Texas Court of Appeals. Estrada v. State, 30 S.W.3d 599 (Tex.App.2000). This court held: Articulable facts and circumstances that come to an officer's attention during the course of a routine traffic stop may justify a continued detention and broader investigation. If the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the automobile contains narcotics, he may temporarily detain it to allow an olfactory inspection by a trained police dog. Id. at 603 (citations omitted). The facts present in Estrada that validated the extension of the scope were nervousness of the passengers, confusing and contradictory statements made between the individuals, and an air freshener and carpet cleaner visible in the car. This court held that these factors were enough to provide reasonable suspicion that further investigation was necessary and justified. Id. We find that our facts are equally persuasive given everything known to Officer Dill to satisfy the standard of reasonable suspicion. When the purpose for the initial stop has concluded, in order to expand the scope further, reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing must be present. We believe this standard was met in Aderholdt; our holding now is consistent with that case. The facts that supported reasonable suspicion for the pat down are the same facts which support the reasonableness of expanding the scope of the stop to wait for a drug dog to arrive. Bergmann's past contact with Officer Dill, his lying, his nervousness, his presence in a drug area, and his contact with a drug dealer were all facts known to Dill when he called for the drug dog. As such, Dill had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop beyond the license plate violation. Moreover, Dill called the drug dog prior to concluding the purpose for the initial stop, so any prolonged detention was extremely minimal.