Opinion ID: 719584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Definition of a Jurisdictional Dispute

Text: 27 The critical issue in this case is whether the dispute between Local 14 and the SPI employees was jurisdictional. In Alaska Timber, we indicated that, as a general matter, there is no jurisdictional dispute when (1) one of two potentially competing employee groups explicitly disclaims a demand for the work, (2) one of the competing employee groups renounces its claim to the work, or (3) the competing claims have been resolved. Id. Further, we noted that the quintessential jurisdictional dispute involves a conflict between rival groups of employee[s] where the employer ordinarily stands aloof, with no particular interest in the outcome. Id. at 923-24; see also CBS, 364 U.S. at 579, 81 S.Ct. at 334 ([I]n most instances, [the quarrel] is of so little interest to the employer that he seems perfectly willing to assign work to either [group of employees] if the other will just let him alone.). Thus, we summarized the model jurisdictional dispute as one embod[ying] two characteristics: first, the employer faces a jurisdictional dispute that is not of his own making and in which he has no interest; second, the dispute is between two employee groups. Alaska Timber, 781 F.2d at 924. 28 Local 14 argues for a very rigid application of the two-prong model laid out in Alaska Timber. According to the Union, the Board had no authority to award the button-man work to SPI employees because, far from being disinterested, SPI actually instigated this dispute by moving its wood-chip operations to the 14th Street Dock, and because the SPI employees themselves were not in a dispute with the Union employees over the work. Indeed, the Union asserted that the SPI employees would lose nothing (at least not in the short-term) if the Union took over the button-man work. 29 The problem with the Union's position is that it reads too much into Alaska Timber. That decision does not, as the Union would have it, set an absolute standard or state the final word on when disputes qualify as jurisdictional. Rather, as the court makes clear, the Board must decide whether cases that do not precisely fit the model ... are nevertheless sufficiently like that two-part model to warrant intervention by the Board. Id.; see also Highway Truckdrivers & Helpers, Local 107 (Safeway Stores, Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1323 (1961) (The Board noted that the normal section 10(k) situation was one where the employer is willing to assign the work to either group if the other will just let him alone, but noted that it did not mean to suggest that this is the only kind of situation where Section 10(k) is applicable.). Thus, this issue, like a number of others arising under the NLRA, is one in which the Board must use its expertise to determine, on a case-by-case basis, how to apply the law. And, pursuant to the precepts of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), we must defer to the Board's reasonable judgments regarding applications of the NLRA. 30 Given this deference, we have no difficulty upholding the Board's determination in this case. The Board rightly recognized that, as Alaska Timber itself acknowledged, there is no absolute requirement that a jurisdictional dispute involve two competing unions. See 781 F.2d at 924 (citing Millwrights, Piledrivers, Divers, Highway Construction, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 1026, 266 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051, 1983 WL 25039 (1983)); see also CBS, 364 U.S. at 584, 81 S.Ct. at 337 (The Court acknowledged the fact that § 10(k), like § 8(b)(4)(D), extends to jurisdictional disputes between unions and unorganized groups.). Moreover, the fact that one group of employees is actually doing the work in question can reasonably be considered evidence of their claim to that work. See Alaska Timber, 781 F.2d at 924 (citing International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 926, 254 N.L.R.B. 994, 996, 1981 WL 20177 (1981)). Further, just because SPI employees may not have voiced a concern about keeping the button-man work does not indicate that they would not protest if that work were actually taken from them. In the instant case, if the origins of the dispute are considered, see Alaska Timber, 781 F.2d at 925, it is clear that there was sufficient evidence for the Board to conclude that Local 14 and SPI employees were rivals for the button-man work. The Board was not required to elicit testimony from SPI employees (as suggested by the Union) to prove more. 31 Consideration of the origins of this dispute not only bolsters the Board's finding that there was a de facto dispute between employee groups, but also demonstrates that the Board reasonably concluded that the conflict was not truly instigated by SPI, as that concept has evolved in the case law. The reason why there is any concern over employer instigation is because, in instances where a union's claim really is focused on work preservation (and not a jurisdictional dispute), it would be unfair to allow an employer to seek redress under sections 10(k) and8(b)(4)(D), and thus deny the union a right to use economic weapons otherwise available to it. But this concern can be carried too far, for it is often the case that an employer has an interest in the outcome of a jurisdictional dispute. So if the notion of instigation is somehow construed to be coterminous with an employer's interest in the outcome, the Board would be hard-pressed to find any jurisdictional disputes except in those rare cases in which the employer truly had not one iota of preference as to the outcome. Such a result would be absurd and analytically dissatisfying. 32 Thus, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has recognized that an employer's interest in the outcome of a jurisdictional dispute varies in every case. See Plasterers', 404 U.S. at 124, 92 S.Ct. at 366 (It may be that in some cases employers have no stake in how a jurisdictional dispute is settled.... Other employers ... are not neutral and have substantial economic interests in the outcome of the § 10(k) proceeding.). According to the Court, sections 10(k) and 8(b)(4)(D) were enacted to protect employers who are partisan in a jurisdictional dispute as well as those who are neutral. Id. at 130, 92 S.Ct. at 369. 2 A necessary corollary is that an employer need not be indifferent to the outcome of a labor dispute in order for the dispute to be deemed jurisdictional. 33 In this case, SPI admits that it would prefer for its own employees to perform the button-man work, noting that allocation of that task to Union members would be less efficient and more costly. Its move to the 14th Street Dock was driven by similar concerns, because, by eliminating the middleman in marketing its wood chips, SPI could realize substantial savings. The fact that SPI made a business decision to expand its operations in a search for profits, and thereby prompted a labor dispute, does not mean that SPI cannot be afforded the protection of the Act. As this court stated in Sea-Land, if every action taken, no matter how natural or inevitable a business step, which gives rise to a dispute between rival groups of employees, disqualified an employer from section 8(b)(4)(D) relief, that section would become a dead letter. 884 F.2d at 1412. 34 SPI's move to the 14th Street Dock is no different from the employer's decision in Sea-Land to move to a new dock in order to eliminate inefficiencies due to overcrowding. See id. Just as the employer in Sea-Land was free to choose between its own Teamster employees and the Longshoremen's union when staffing its new dock, SPI was also free to choose either its own employees or Local 14 members to operate the chip loading machinery once it made the unassailable decision to relocate. SPI's decision to use its own employees was a logical extension of its previous decision to avoid the middleman in its chip business. SPI was not looking to do battle with Local 14; rather, it sought to improve its operations and save money by creating a new position. Local 14 was not supplanted, because the work it sought was not work that it had ever done before. 35 Although the facts presented in this case also bear some resemblance to those presented in Alaska Timber, where this court overruled the Board's finding of a jurisdictional dispute, there is at least one critical difference. In Alaska Timber, the employer unilaterally changed the long-standing loading practices at its own dock, thereby replacing longshoremen with its own employees. See 781 F.2d at 920-21. As this court subsequently explained, [t]he Alaska employer's shift in business practice seems to have been designed totally to supplant the Longshoremen with its own employees. Sea-Land, 884 F.2d at 1411. Here, there is no evidence that SPI changed its operations in order to avoid the Union. Indeed, SPI had no direct relationship with the Union in this case. 3 36 Finally, we also reject the contention that Local 14's picketing was somehow protected by the Act as a work preservation effort. Although Union members loaded chips dropped off by SPI at L-P's dock, they had never loaded chips at the 14th Street Dock. Further, SPI is not a member of the PMA, nor is it a party to the PCLCD. Thus, the button-man work at issue was new work that did not belong to the Union by prior practice or contract. See, e.g., Bloomsburg Graphic Communications Union, Local 732-C, 308 N.L.R.B. 1190, 1192 n. 4, 1992 WL 277383 (1992) (The Board found that, when an employer moved bookbinding work to a new location, the assignment of related work was an original assignment of new work.). 4 37