Opinion ID: 1116146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Class II Insureds Can Stack UM Coverage

Text: In the current case, Larry was using a covered vehicle(s) with consent at the time of the accident and was, therefore, a Class II insured. This Court's interpretation of statutory uninsured motorist coverage has always been shaped by the template of public policy upon which this statute is based  to provide protection to innocent motorists injured by financially irresponsible drivers up to the extent of their injuries. Stevens, 345 So.2d at 1043. To this end, this Court has consistently recognized and allowed the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage by Class II insureds. See Cossitt v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 551 So.2d 879 (Miss. 1989), [1] (Class II insured/church employee was allowed to stack three policies issued to the church on the bus involved in the accident and two other buses owned by the church); Wickline v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 530 So.2d 708 (Miss. 1988), (allowed a Class II insured to stack the four vehicles insured under a single personal policy which covered the vehicle in which she was a passenger); Brown v. Maryland Casualty Company, 521 So.2d 854 (Miss. 1987), (allowed a Class II insured to stack both vehicles which were covered by a single personal policy issued to the owner of the vehicle which she was driving with permission at the time of the accident). See also Curry v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 728 F. Supp. 1299 (S.D.Miss. 1989), (Injured taxi driver, a Class II insured, was allowed to stack uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to his employer's single business policy). This Court has observed that the Uninsured Motorist Act must be construed liberally to provide coverage and strictly to avoid or preclude exceptions or exemptions from coverage. Mississippi Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrett, 487 So.2d 1320, 1323 (Miss. 1986). To jurisprudentially designate Steel's policy a large, commercial fleet policy for the purpose of aligning our views on stacking with those jurisdictions which have precluded stacking under these type policies, would create, rather than preclude, an exception from coverage. Such a construction is foreign to our UM statute. As we recognized in Wickline, we are bound by our statute, not the jurisprudence of foreign jurisdictions.