Opinion ID: 889187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during closing argument by shifting the burden of proof to the defense?

Text: ¶ 24 During the State's rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor directed the jury's attention to the defense's failure to call three witnesses who allegedly observed Hughes following Kolb, Hogsett, and Johnson out into the motel parking lot after the robbery: [T]hey keep talking about maybe these three witnesses that were there. Well, [defense counsel] has subpoena power also, did he bring those people in? If he knew they were going to say something different, and this is a very important At that point, counsel for the defense objected that the defense had no obligation to prove anything, and the court commented, Well, I've told the jurors about that. The prosecutor then proceeded with another line of argument. Kolb did not move for a mistrial. ¶ 25 Kolb contends the prosecutor's remark constitutes reversible error under State v. Newman, 2005 MT 348, 330 Mont. 160, 127 P.3d 374 (Nelson, J., specially concurring). We disagree. ¶ 26 In Newman, two members of this Court voted to reverse the criminal conviction based on a conclusion that prosecutorial comments during closing argument had deprived the defendant of a fair trial by referring to the defense's failure to present witnesses to support his theory of the case. Because it represents the view of just two members of the Court, the concurring opinion in Newman does not constitute controlling authority. See Doll v. Major Muffler Cntrs., Inc., 208 Mont. 401, 408, 687 P.2d 48, 51-52 (1984). ¶ 27 Additionally, the prosecutor's comment must be placed in context. See State v. Roubideaux, 2005 MT 324, ¶ 15, 329 Mont. 521, ¶ 15, 125 P.3d 1114, ¶ 15. In Roubideaux, the prosecutor commented in closing argument that, as a result of the defense's presentation of an alternative theory of the events underlying the charges, all [the jury] ha[d] to do [wa]s decide who is telling the truth. Roubideaux, ¶ 9. The prosecutor also clearly referred in closing argument to the State's burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt. In that context, we ruled the prosecutor's statement was not improper. Roubideaux, ¶ 15. Here, like in Roubideaux, the prosecutor acknowledged during closing argument that he bore the burden of establishing his case beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 28 Moreover, in the present case, it was defense counsel who first introduced at trial the matter of the three witnesses from the parking lot. During his opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that three witnesses saw the men come running out of the motel and did not see a gun. Then, during cross-examination of Hughes, defense counsel asked if it was true that three witnesses had observed him running after and yelling at Kolb, Hogsett, and Johnson as they ran across the parking lot outside the motel. Finally, in his closing argument, Kolb's counsel pointed out the prosecution had failed to call any of the parking lot witnesses. ¶ 29 We hold that, placed in context, the prosecutor's comment was not improper. Thus, we need not consider whether the comment prejudiced Kolb's right to a fair trial. ¶ 30 Affirmed. We Concur: PATRICIA COTTER, JOHN WARNER, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART and JIM RICE, JJ.