Opinion ID: 1138725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Article VIII Clauses History and Analysis

Text: Section 15 of article VIII of the Alaska Constitution provides: No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for the purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the State. Section 3 of article VIII provides: Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use. Section 17 of article VIII provides: Laws and regulations governing the use or disposal of natural resources shall apply equally to all persons similarly situated with reference to the subject matter and purpose to be served by the law or regulation. Although the ramifications of these clauses are varied, they share at least one meaning: exclusive or special privileges to take fish and wildlife are prohibited. Section 15 states this explicitly with respect to fisheries. The proceedings of our Constitutional Convention show that the same meaning was intended with respect to sections 3 and 17. A memorandum of the Constitutional Convention Committee on Resources expresses the view that the common use clause has as one of its purposes a prohibition on exclusive grants or special privileges. The memorandum states: The expression `for common use' implies that these resources are not to be subject to exclusive grants or special privileges as was so frequently the case in ancient royal tradition. Alaska Constitutional Convention Papers, Folder 210, Papers Drafted by Committee on Resources, entitled Terms. The Committee on Resources commentary with respect to the uniform application clause states: This section is intended to exclude any especially privileged status for any person in the use of natural resources subject to the disposition of the state. 6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 84 (Dec. 16, 1955). In Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988), we observed that the article VIII provisions were designed to ensure to the public the broadest possible access to wildlife. We noted that the common use clause impose[s] upon the state a trust duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for the benefit of all the people. Id. at 495 (emphasis added). [A] minimum requirement of this duty is a prohibition against any ... special privileges. Id. at 496. In State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1191 (Alaska 1983), we observed that the common use and no exclusive right of fishery clauses reflected anti-exclusionist values. Appellants contend that the rural residency requirement amounts to an exclusive or special privilege prohibited explicitly by section 15 and implicitly by sections 3 and 17. They focus on Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 69 S.Ct. 968, 93 L.Ed. 1231 (1949), a case which interpreted section 1 of the White Act, former 48 U.S.C. §§ 220-224 (1941), under which Alaska fisheries were regulated before statehood. In Hynes, the Supreme Court held that the White Act prohibited granting a preferential right to fish to Native residents of the Karluk Reservation. Id. at 123, 69 S.Ct. at 989. This case is of precedential importance, they contend, because section 15 was based on section 1 of the White Act. In response, the state agrees that the first sentence of section 15 is based on section 1 of the White Act. However, the state distinguishes Hynes on the grounds that the exclusive right to fish there was available to a closed class. In contrast, it argues there is no closed class here because people may become eligible to participate in subsistence uses by establishing their domicile in a rural area. Further, the state relies on Kenai Peninsula Fishermen's Cooperative Association v. State, 628 P.2d 897, 904 (Alaska 1981) which held that section 15 does not bar differential treatment between commercial, sport, and subsistence fishermen. The intervenors' argument in response relies exclusively on this case. The parties correctly agree that the no exclusive right of fishery clause is based on section 1 of the White Act. The commentary concerning the exclusive right of fishery clause prepared by the Committee on Resources of the Constitutional Convention states: This section is intended to serve as a substitute for the provision prohibiting the several right of fisheries in the White Act. Instead of using the terminology of that Act the purposes sought by it are given expression in a prohibition of exclusive right or special privileges of any person to the fisheries of the state. 6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention Proceedings at 87 (Alaska Legislative Council). The language of the White Act, for which the no exclusive right clause is meant to be a substitute, is as follows: Provided, that every such regulation made by the Secretary of the Commerce shall be of general application within the particular area to which it applies, and that no exclusive or several right of fishery shall be granted therein, nor shall any citizen of the United States be denied the right to take, prepare, cure, or preserve fish or shellfish in any area of the waters of Alaska where fishing is permitted by the Secretary of the Commerce. Act of June 6, 1924, ch. 272, § 1, 43 Stat. 464. The appellants' reliance on Hynes as an explanation of the meaning of the bar on exclusive rights and special privileges is apt. At issue in Hynes was a regulation of the Secretary of the Interior [11] prohibiting commercial salmon fishing in all waters within 3,000 feet of the shores of the Karluk Reservation. 337 U.S. at 92, 69 S.Ct. at 973. The Secretarial Order made an exception which allowed Natives residing on the Reservation and their licensees to fish in these waters. Id. The Supreme Court held that this exception in favor of the Native residents and their licensees violated section 1 of the White Act. The court stated: [W]e think it clear that its proviso, that no exclusive or several right of fishery shall be granted therein, applies to commercial fishing by Natives equally with fishing companies, nonresidents of Alaska or other American citizens and so applies whether those Natives are or are not residents on a reservation. We find nothing in the White Act that authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant reservation occupants the privilege of exclusive commercial fishing rights... . Exclusive, as used in Section 1 of the White Act, forbids not only a grant to a single person or corporation but to any special group or number of people. The legislative history set out above shows this. The offending regulations which brought about the enactment of the proviso in § 1 of the White Act were administered so as to limit fishing to those who had been using the fisheries before the regulations. 337 U.S. at 122, 69 S.Ct. at 988. [12] As noted above, the state seeks to distinguish Hynes on the ground that Hynes involved a closed class of recipients of a special privilege, whereas the 1986 subsistence law does not because anyone who wants to hunt and fish for subsistence purposes can move to a rural area. We find this argument unpersuasive. If it were valid, virtually any discrimination based on residence would be justified  the residents of the disfavored area could simply move. Such a rationale is inconsistent with the prevailing approach in territorial discrimination cases, which is to subject territorial classifications to scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Gilman v. Martin, 662 P.2d 120, 125 (Alaska 1983); Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U.Pa. L.Rev. 261, 274-75 (1987). The state's and the intervenors' reliance on Kenai Peninsula is also off the mark. That case merely affirmed what article VIII, section 4 [13] says explicitly  that preferences among beneficial uses of fish and game may be legislatively or administratively established. We stated in Kenai Peninsula: While section 15 does prohibit granting monopoly fishing rights, that section was not meant to prohibit differential treatment of such diverse user groups as commercial, sport, and subsistence fishermen. To conclude that, because a certain species is made available for sport fishing in a given area, commercial fishing of the same species must also be allowed, would be to go far beyond the purpose of the section. 628 P.2d at 904 (footnote omitted). The state may, indeed must, make allocation decisions between sport, commercial, and subsistence users. That authority, however, does not imply a power to limit admission to a user group. [14] Section 1 of the White Act guaranteed equal access to fisheries regardless of residence. The language of the Act and Hynes make this clear. [15] Alaska's constitutional framers were aware of Hynes. [16] As noted, section 15 of article VIII was meant to be a substitute for section 1 of the White Act and to further its purposes. [17] It follows that section 15 likewise was meant to ensure an equal right to participate in fisheries, regardless of where one resides. Although section 15 pertains only to fisheries, the prevention of grants of exclusive or special privileges with respect to fish and game is also one purpose of the common use and the uniform application clauses. [18] It follows that the grant of special privileges with respect to game based on one's residence is also prohibited. We therefore conclude that the requirement contained in the 1986 subsistence statute, that one must reside in a rural area in order to participate in subsistence hunting and fishing, violates sections 3, 15, and 17 of article VIII of the Alaska Constitution. [19]
The conclusion we have reached does not mean that everyone can engage in subsistence hunting or fishing. We do not imply that the constitution bars all methods of exclusion where exclusion is required for species protection reasons. We hold only that the residency criterion used in the 1986 act which conclusively excludes all urban residents from subsistence hunting and fishing regardless of their individual characteristics is unconstitutional. We are not called upon in this case to rule on what selection criteria might be constitutional. It seems appropriate, however, to note that any system which closes participation to some, but not all, applicants will necessarily create a tension with article VIII. In such cases, assuming that the exclusionary criterion is not per se impermissible, our decisions suggest that demanding scrutiny is appropriate. We alluded to this in State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983) in discussing the interplay between the constitutionally allowed limited entry system, which was permitted by amendment to article VIII, section 15, and the common use and no exclusive right of fisheries clauses. We stated: [S]ince the common use clause of section 3 and the no exclusive right of fishery clause of section 15 remain in the constitution, the premise of the argument is that whatever system of limited entry is imposed must be one which, consistent with a feasible limited entry system, entails the least possible impingement on the common use reservation and on the no exclusive right of fishery clause. The argument concludes that free transferability does not entail the least possible impingement on the anti-exclusionist values which these provisions reflect. ... [T]he premise of this argument is logical. Id. at 1191. We expressed the same theme in Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 758 P.2d 1256 (Alaska 1988) concerning the obligation of the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission to establish an optimum number of entry permits. We stated in Johns: In [ Ostrosky ], we noted that there is a tension between the limited entry clause of the state constitution and the clauses of the constitution which guarantee open fisheries. We suggested that to be constitutional, a limited entry system should impinge as little as possible on the open fishery clauses consistent with the constitutional purposes of limited entry, namely, prevention of economic distress to fishermen and resource conservation. Ostrosky ... . The optimum number provision of the Limited Entry Act is the mechanism by which limited entry is meant to be restricted to its constitutional purposes. Without this mechanism, limited entry has the potential to be a system which has the effect of creating an exclusive fishery to ensure the wealth of permit holders and permit values, while exceeding the constitutional purposes of limited entry. Because this risk of unconstitutionality exists, the [Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission] should not delay in embarking on the optimum number process, except where there is a substantial reason for doing so. Id., 758 P.2d at 1266 (footnote omitted). Most recently in Owsichek, we suggested that section 17 of article VIII, the uniform application clause, may require `more stringent review' of a statute than does the equal protection clause in cases involving natural resources. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 498 n. 17 (quoting Gilman v. Martin, 662 P.2d 120, 126 (Alaska 1983)). We also cited with approval Justice Rabinowitz's dissent in Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1196 which employs a least restrictive alternative approach in view of the highly important interest running to each person within the state by virtue of the common use clause. 763 P.2d at 492 n. 10. In reviewing legislation which burdens the equal access clauses of article VIII, the purpose of the burden must be at least important. The means used to accomplish the purpose must be designed for the least possible infringement on article VIII's open access values. Ostrosky, supra at 1191, Johns, supra at 1266. We employ this method of analysis in the present case as an alternative ground of decision. Using this approach, we conclude that the rural-urban residency criterion is unconstitutional for the reasons that follow. One purpose of the 1986 act is to ensure that those Alaskans who need to engage in subsistence hunting and fishing in order to provide for their basic necessities are able to do so. This is an important interest. [20] However, the means used to accomplish this purpose are extremely crude. There are, as noted above, substantial numbers of Alaskans living in areas designated as urban who have legitimate claims as subsistence users. Likewise, there are substantial numbers of Alaskans living in areas designated as rural who have no legitimate claims. A classification scheme employing individual characteristics would be less invasive of the article VIII open access values and much more apt to accomplish the purpose of the statute than the urban-rural criterion. We note that several other jurisdictions have struck down intrastate residential preferences in fish and game statutes. These authorities support our view that the equal access clauses of article VIII, which are a special type of equal protection guaranty, bar the residential discrimination imposed in this case. [21] Lewis v. State, 110 Ark. 204, 161 S.W. 154 (1913) contains an excellent historical statement: When it becomes necessary for the propagation and preservation of wild game and fish for the use of the public, the people acting in their sovereign capacity, through their lawmaking power, may pass laws to regulate the right of each individual which he enjoys in common with every other member of the community to use of same. But when the sovereign undertakes to regulate or restrain the individual in its right as a member of the community to enjoy the right to take and use this common property of all, it must do so upon the same terms to all members of the community alike. The common right, which one individual of the whole community is entitled to enjoy as much as another, cannot be made by law the exclusive privilege of the people of a certain class or section upon terms and conditions that do not apply to the whole people alike. This right which one individual has in common with every other individual in the community to take and use fish and game, ferae naturae, is one that has existed from the remotest times, and, although at one time in England after the Norman Conquest the right to take fish and game was claimed as a royal prerogative to the exclusion of the people, it was restored to them by the Barons at Runnymede in 1215, and was declared in the great charter which they wrested from King John. The rights, says Green, which the barons claimed for themselves they claimed for the nation at large. Green's History of the English People, vol. 4, pp. 252-254. These rights were confirmed and established ever thereafter in England by acts of Parliament, and they have come down to us from the laws of England and may be regarded as a common heritage of the English-speaking people. See Parker v. People, 111 Ill. 581, 53 Am. Rep. 643. Also Geer v. Conn., 161 U.S. 519, 16 Sup.Ct. 600, 40 L.Ed. 793; Martin v. Waddell, [41 U.S.] 16 Pet. 367, 10 L.Ed. 997. The only justification for a law regulating and restricting the common right of individuals to take wild game and fish is the necessity for protecting the same from extinction, and thus to preserve and perpetuate to the individual members of the community the inalienable rights which they have had from time immemorial. While the state, holding the title to game and fish, so to speak, in trust for every individual member of the community, may pass laws to regulate the rights of each individual in the manner of taking and using the common property, yet, as we have already stated, this must be done, under the Constitution, upon the same terms to all the people. No special privileges or immunities can be conferred. Where the necessity for the preservation of the wild game and fish exists in certain territories of the state, that territory may be segregated for the purpose of regulating the right to taking game and fish therein; but the privilege of taking and using same must be extended to the people of the state outside of the territory upon the same terms that are given to those who are residents of the territory embraced in the legislation. Hayes v. Territory, 2 Wash.T. 286, 5 Pac. 927. In the cases of State v. Higgins, 51 S.C. 51, 28 S.E. 15, 38 L.R.A. 561, and Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 South. 226, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 794, 19 Ann.Cas. 235, the question here involved was considered and determined in accord with the doctrine we have announced. Id. 161 S.W. at 155-156 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).