Opinion ID: 535288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative History of the CSRA

Text: 17 Our understanding of Congressional intent regarding review of reassignment orders is further informed by the Supreme Court's exposition of the legislative history of the CSRA in Fausto. The Court found that the CSRA was designed to effect a complete overhaul of the 'outdated patchwork of statutes and rules built up over almost a century' that was the civil service system, S.Rep. No. 95-969, p. 3 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, p. 2723. Fausto, 484 U.S. at 444, 108 S.Ct. at 671. In particular need of such revision was the framework for obtaining administrative and judicial review of personnel action which had grown without any coordinating impulse to comprise a haphazard array of statutes. This cumbersome system was widely criticized for inhibiting needed disciplinary action against employees, for allowing wide variations in the disposition of the same matters heard on review by different courts, and for permitting redundant review of agency action in the district courts and the courts of appeals. Congress responded to these criticisms in the CSRA by setting out in detail and with deliberate regard for both the legitimate interests of federal employees and the need for sound and efficient administration, the procedures to be followed by the agencies and the courts in remedying violations of rights accorded employees in the Act. 18 With this understanding of Congress' perception of the law that it was shaping or reshaping, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1839, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (footnote omitted), any lingering doubt that Congress intended the CSRA to function as the exclusive avenue for review of agency personnel actions may be put to rest. To hold, as plaintiff asks us here, that personnel actions are reviewable in federal courts under general jurisdictional statutes enacted before the CSRA would mean a return to the chaotic conditions which the CSRA was specifically crafted to remedy. 19 In short, the text of the CSRA, the structure of review it establishes, and the legislative history of the Act, all lead ineludibly to the conclusion that Congress intended review of agency reassignment decisions to be confined to the specific procedures set out in the text of the CSRA. Our refusal in Gilley to restrict judicial review absent clear and convincing evidence has been answered definitively by Fausto 's determination that Congress' intention is fairly discernible, and ... 'the presumption favoring judicial review ... [has been] overcome by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory scheme as a whole.'  484 U.S. at 452, 108 S.Ct. at 676 (citation omitted).C. Jurisdiction Under the Mandamus Act 20 Plaintiff's argument that the district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1361, to issue a writ of mandamus compelling his reinstatement deserves individual attention to emphasize the fact that such relief would not lie even without regard to the exclusivity of the CSRA. A brief recital of the requirements of the Mandamus Act suffices to show that they are not met by the facts of this case. Section 1361 provides: 21 The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff. 22 The prerequisite that a duty be owed to the plaintiff has been read narrowly to require that the officer or employee of the United States owe a ministerial duty that [is] compelled by law. 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3655 (2d ed. 1985). As we explained in Maczko v. Joyce, 814 F.2d 308, 310 (6th Cir.1987): 23 For there to be a duty owed to the plaintiff within the meaning of section 1361, there must be a mandatory or ministerial obligation. If the alleged duty is discretionary or directory, the duty is not 'owed.'  Short v. Murphy, 512 F.2d 374, 377 (6th Cir.1975). A duty is not owed unless the obligation is  'plainly defined and peremptory.'  24 (Citations omitted). Clearly, the reinstatement requested by Ryon cannot be characterized as a ministerial act. Decisions of the DMA concerning where to assign personnel are highly discretionary, requiring supervisors to determine how best to deploy employees in light of the myriad objectives of the agency. Factors too numerous to mention here must all be taken into account by experienced experts in formulating assignment decisions, making mandamus improper under these circumstances regardless of the exclusive role assumed by the CSRA. 25 The plaintiff did not request the district court to issue a writ of mandamus against the OSC for failure to investigate his claim. Whether or not such relief would be appropriate where necessary to compel the OSC to perform an adequate investigation of an employee's complaint is therefore beyond the scope of this opinion. 3 26 AFFIRMED.