Opinion ID: 774020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eyewitness Identifications and Due Process

Text: 112 Due process requires that criminal trials proceed consistently with 'that fundamental fairness' which is 'essential to the very concept of justice.' Dunnigan v. Keane, 137 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir.) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 840 (1998). When the prosecution offers testimony from an eyewitness to identify the defendant as a perpetrator of the offense, fundamental fairness requires that that identification testimony be reliable. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-14 (1977); id. at 114 (reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony); see also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981) (It is the reliability of identification evidence that primarily determines its admissibility....). 113 When the defendant objects to identification testimony to be given by a witness who has identified him prior to trial, a sequential inquiry is required in order to determine whether either the prior identification or an in-court identification of the defendant at trial is admissible. The court must first determine whether the pretrial identification procedures unduly and unnecessarily suggested that the defendant was the perpetrator. See Part II.A.1. below. If the procedures were not suggestive, the identification evidence presents no due process obstacle to admissibility, see, e.g., Jarrett v. Headley, 802 F.2d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 1986); no further inquiry by the court is required, and [t]he reliability of properly admitted eyewitness identification, like the credibility of the other parts of the prosecution's case is a matter for the jury, Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442 n.2 (1969). If the court finds, however, that the procedures were suggestive, it must then determine whether the identification was nonetheless independently reliable. See Part II.A.2. below. In sum, the identification evidence will be admissible if (a) the procedures were not suggestive or (b) the identification has independent reliability. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 126 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1112 (1999).
114 A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228. Suggestive identification procedures increase the likelihood of misidentification, and [i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process. Neil v.Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198; see generally Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (right to due process includes the right not to be the object of suggestive police identification procedures that create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967) (examining whether procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [defendant] was denied due process of law); Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515, 524 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 973 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233 (1991). 115 A lineup is unduly suggestive as to a given defendant if he meets the description of the perpetrator previously given by the witness and the other lineup participants obviously do not. Lineups in which suspects are the only participants wearing distinctive clothing or otherwise matching important elements of the description provided by the victim have been severely criticized as substantially increasing the dangers of misidentification. Israel v. Odom, 521 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1975). For example, where eyeglasses were the outstanding feature of the assailant's appearance to the victim and an integral part of the description provided the police, a lineup in which the defendant was the only person wearing eyeglasses was unnecessarily suggestive. Id.; see also United States v. Williams, 469 F.2d 540 (D.C. Cir) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 872 (1972); id. at 547 (opinion of Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, and joined in pertinent part by remainder of panel: Where the prior description of the gunman indicated that he did not wear a hat, [t]he showing in a lineup of four individuals wearing hats, along with a fifth, who was the prime suspect... and who was bareheaded was clearly improper and unnecessarily suggestive. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)); id. at 541-42 & n.7 (for a witness who had stressed the youth and short stature of the perpetrator, a lineup in which the appellant was one of only two participants who could reasonably be characterized as short, and in which the other short participant was demonstrably much older, was unduly suggestive, for the differences in physical appearance among the participants in the lineup had the predictable effect of focusing [the witness's] attention on appellant); id. at 541 (majority opinion stating that the lineups described in Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion would certainly not pass muster under the principles enunciated in, e.g., Wade and Stovall). In Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1183 (2d Cir. 1981), this Court found the pretrial identification procedures suggestive where, inter alia, an assailant had been described as 5'7 tall and weighing 145 pounds and a lineup was held in which the defendant, who was 5'6 tall and weighed 130 pounds, was the only person near that description--all but one of the other participants being four-to-six inches taller than the defendant and the remaining participant, though only two inches taller than the defendant, being 65 pounds (i.e., 50%) heavier. 116 A lineup may be suggestive to one viewer even though it is not to another. Where one witness has emphasized a particular characteristic of the perpetrator in giving a description to the police, a lineup in which only the defendant has that characteristic may well taint the identification of the defendant only by that viewer. In United States v. Williams, for example, in which the main eyewitness had stressed that the young robber was only slightly taller than 5'1, the lineup containing only one young man who was very short was suggestive to that witness, see 469 F.2d at 546 (opinion of Bazelon, C.J.) ([w]e all agree that the Williams lineup was suggestive), though it was not suggestive to other witnesses who were not struck by the shortness of the offender, id. at 542 n.7. 117 The defendant's protection against suggestive identification procedures encompasses not only the right to avoid methods that suggest the initial identification, but as well the right to avoid having suggestive methods transform a selection that was only tentative into one that is positively certain. See, e.g., Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d at 1185. While a witness is entitled to become surer of an identification, due process precludes the generation of that increased certainty through a suggestive lineup. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 383; Dickerson v. Fogg, 692 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1982); Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d at 1185; cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 240 41.
118 If the pretrial process was unduly suggestive, the court must then weigh the corrupting effect of the suggestive[ness] against other factors indicating that the identification may be independently reliable, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, for even a suggestive procedure does not in itself intrude upon a constitutionally protected interest if it did not contribute significantly to the identification of the defendant, id. at 113 n.13. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1970) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (no relief warranted by fact that one of the attackers wore a hat and defendant Coleman was the only participant in the lineup to wear a hat, where it d[id] not appear that [the witness's] identification of Coleman at the lineup was based on the fact that he remembered that Coleman had worn a hat at the time of the assault). 119 In determining whether a witness's in-court identification of the defendant has reliability independent of the unduly suggestive identification procedures, the court looks generally to the factors set out in Neil v. Biggers, taking into account [1] the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, [2] the witness' degree of attention, [3] the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199 200; accord Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114. A good or poor rating with respect to any one of these factors will generally not be dispositive, see, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 377 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 856 (1993), and in each case, the question of independent reliability must be assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances, see, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. at 4 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 302.