Opinion ID: 2437439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Attorney's Privilege

Text: The Restatement of Torts (Second) § 586 provides: An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding. The appellee cites many cases from many jurisdictions holding consistently with § 586. In response, Dr. Selby cites only our cases holding that we are circumspect as to summary judgments because they are drastic. We adopted the principle of § 586 in Pogue v. Cooper, 284 Ark. 202, 680 S.W.2d 698 (1984). There we held that absolute privilege attached to allegations made by an attorney in a pleading filed with the court, as long as the statements alleged to be defamatory were relevant and pertinent to the issues in the case. We relied heavily on our earlier decision of Mauney v. Millar, 142 Ark. 500, 219 S.W.1032 (1920), in which we recognized the absolute privilege of an attorney to make statements in pleadings regardless of their truth or the existence of actual malice on the part of the attorney so long as the statements were relevant and pertinent to the pleadings. We have no difficulty extending the privilege to statements by an attorney made, as § 586 says, preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding. The section obviously covers communications made during investigation of a claim. Comment e. to § 586 is as follows: As to communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding the rule stated in this Section applies only when the communication has some relation to a proceeding that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. The bare possibility that the proceeding might be instituted is not to be used as a cloak to provide immunity for defamation when the possibility is not seriously considered. Other jurisdictions have held the privilege extends to such communications. See, e.g., Sriberg v. Raymond, 345 N.E.2d 882 (Mass.1976); Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646 (6th Cir.1968) (applying Ohio law); Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.1966) (applying Iowa law). See also Friedman v. Alexander, 70 A.D.2d 627, 433 N.Y.S.2d 627 (App.Div.1980). Although the privilege is absolute where it applies, we consider it to be a privilege narrowed closely by the relevancy and pertinency requirements, and we note that while the privilege will prohibit an attorney from being subject to litigation it will not make him immune from professional discipline, see Theiss v. Scherer, supra , when it is appropriate. We make no suggestion that any professional discipline is called for in this case. It was correct for the court to find no liability with respect to the allegations of statements made by Gary Eubanks, as the discovery documents showed his publication of the allegedly slanderous statement occurred preliminary to or in the course of litigation, and that the statements he allegedly made were relevant and pertinent to that litigation.