Opinion ID: 883903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: proper purposes for the admission of evidence of other acts

Text: In its Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Other Acts, the State asserted that the evidence of other acts was admissible to prove identity and common scheme. It is undisputed that, pursuant to Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid., these are permissible purposes. See e.g. State v. Kordonowy (1991), 251 Mont. 44, 49, 823 P.2d 854, 857 (identity); State v. Brooks (1993), 260 Mont. 79, 83, 857 P.2d 734, 737 (common scheme). Henderson is correct when he recognizes that merely reciting an allowable purpose is not sufficient if the evidence does not further that purpose or that purpose is not an issue in dispute. Keys, 258 Mont. at 317, 852 P.2d at 625. However, we do not find that to be the case here. Henderson protested his innocence, and alleged that another man committed the acts of sexual abuse. When he asserted this defense, identity became a disputed issue in the case. The State, therefore, was properly allowed to introduce the evidence of other acts to prove that Henderson was, in fact, the perpetrator of the charged offense. We conclude that the evidence of other acts made it more likely that A.B. was not mistaken about Henderson's identity when she accused him of the crime with which he was charged. We also find merit in the State's second asserted purposecommon plan or scheme. The evidence of other acts helped establish the existence of a common scheme in which Henderson sexually abused and manipulated the children for his own sexual gratification. We conclude that the evidence of other acts was properly admitted to prove Henderson's identity and common scheme. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence of other acts satisfied the third requirement of the modified Just rule.