Opinion ID: 691962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Good Faith Requirement

Text: 37 We briefly address LaFond's argument on appeal that the district court erred by imposing a requirement of good faith under Sec. 31-51m(b). As an alternative ground for granting summary judgment in favor of General Physics, the district court held that Sec. 31-51m(b) imposes a requirement of good faith, which it concluded LaFond lacked because it found that LaFond's sole and admitted purpose in notifying public bodies of suspected violations of law was to obtain the Act's protection when it became clear that his extortionate scheme had failed and his job would be in jeopardy if he were found out. LaFond, No. 2:92CV571, slip op. at 17. 38 We agree with the district court that a measure of good faith is required under Sec. 31-51m(b). Section 31-51m(b) states on its face that its provisions are not applicable when the employee knows that such report is false. Conn.Gen.Stat. Sec. 31-51m(b). Furthermore, caselaw elsewhere has imposed a requirement of good faith when construing whistleblower statutes generally. See, e.g., Wolcott, 691 F.Supp. at 1063, 1065 (where an employee filed an action under Michigan's whistleblower statute alleging that he was fired in retaliation for lodging complaints against his employer with state agencies, and had written a letter to his employer and threatened to mail it to authorities if his demands were not met, the court found that the employee was not entitled to whistleblower protection because his intention was to report the alleged violations only if his demands were not met and there was no indication that good faith played a role in his decision to go to the authorities); Melchi, 597 F.Supp. at 583 (where Michigan's whistleblower statute limited its protection by excluding reports that were known to be false, the court found that [b]y precluding protection to those acting in bad faith, the legislature clearly implied that only those acting in good faith are entitled to protection.). Nonetheless, we conclude that summary judgment was improper on the facts of this case because we find that genuine questions of material fact exist regarding whether LaFond lacked good faith when seeking the protections of Sec. 31-51m(b).