Opinion ID: 1179517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the law of contempt

Text: A considerable body of case law exists from which we shall select the principles of contempt law to resolve the issues presented. The Wyoming decisions which are particularly helpful are Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1989); Tracy, Green & Company v. Warner, 704 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1985); Anderson v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 660 (Wyo. 1983); Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial District, 647 P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 1982); and Garber v. United Mine Workers of America, 524 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 1974). Federal decisions which have been informative are Hicks on Behalf of Feoick v. Feoick, 485 U.S. 624, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988); Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 61 S.Ct. 810, 85 L.Ed. 1172 (1941); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Company, 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). As an appellate court we begin to fulfill our obligation and decide as a matter of law whether a contempt is civil or criminal by first considering a variety of factors. In Connors we said, The major factor    is the purpose for which the power is exercised. Connors, 769 P.2d at 343. Expressing the idea of that major factor somewhat differently, we said in Anderson, 667 P.2d at 662, we would determine the nature of a contempt based on the manner in which it occurred and the reasons why a particular penalty was imposed. Earlier, in Horn, 647 P.2d at 1372, we identified the decisional factor to be the type of punishment to be imposed. From the United States Supreme Court, we are informed that the critical features are the substance of the proceeding and the character of the relief that the proceeding will afford. Hicks, 485 U.S. at ___, 108 S.Ct. at 1429, 99 L.Ed.2d at 731. Character of relief and type of punishment are synonymous. In Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441, 31 S.Ct. at 498, 55 L.Ed. at 806, the Court stated that the character and purpose of the punishment imposed for the contemptuous act in question often help to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt. In that case, the Court offered a simple test by which to determine the character of the punishment: remedial punishment is punishment imposed because the contemnor refused to do an affirmative act but which will be discontinued as soon as the contemnor does the affirmative act required; punitive punishment is punishment imposed because the contemnor did something he was expressly ordered not to do. Id., 221 U.S. at 443, 31 S.Ct. at 498-99, 55 L.Ed. at 806. Conversely, punitive punishment treats the contemnor's doing what he had been expressly told not to do as being in defiance of the authority which issued the command. Id. The difficulty in classifying a particular contempt as either civil or criminal in nature is somewhat enhanced because each form of punishment/relief has incidental effects. Id., 221 U.S. at 443, 31 S.Ct. at 498, 55 L.Ed. at 806. Remedial punishment coerces the contemnor to perform the affirmative act required, but simultaneously vindicates the court's authority. Punitive punishment punishes the contemnor's completed act of disobedience and vindicates the court's authority, but also benefits the complainant-opposing party because the punished contemnor is less likely to repeat the disobedient act. Id. In summary, then, we must analyze the controlling facts on this issue with these factors in mind: 1. In what manner did the contempt happen, that is, did the contemnor refuse to do an affirmative act or did the contemnor do that which he was ordered not to do; 2. what was the substance of the proceeding; 3. what kind of punishment was imposed; and 4. for what reasons did the court impose that kind of punishment. Within some of these factors certain caveats exist. Thus, concerning the substance of the proceeding, that a private party initiates the contempt proceeding does not alter that which is found to be criminal in nature. Anderson, 667 P.2d at 663. And, that the court ordered the contemnor to make the contempt payment to the private party does not change that which is found to be criminal in nature. Id. Also, that the court suspended determinate punishment upon the condition of the contemnor's obedience of the court's orders does not make the punishment/relief civil in nature, because a suspended punishment, without more, remains determinate. Hicks, 485 U.S. at ___, 108 S.Ct. at 1433, 99 L.Ed.2d at 736 n. 11; and Garber, 524 P.2d at 579.