Opinion ID: 1502420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction of Courts of Equity Relative to Costs.

Text: I. It is well established that the jurisdiction to award costs as between solicitor and client has for several centuries existed in the English Court of Chancery, and has been exercised in a variety of cases. In Stallo v. Wagner (C. C. A.) 245 F. 636, 638, the court, in referring to the historical basis of the power of the equity courts in awarding costs, said: It was enacted by 17 Rich. II, c. 6, that the Chancellor should award damages according to his discretion against persons bringing vexatious and unfounded suits in chancery. And `damages,' as used in this statute, has been understood as including costs. Since the enactment of the statute the power of adjudging costs has become apparently so far inherent in the equity court as to be inseparable from the exercise of its judicial authority. It has frequently been said that the power of a court of equity to give costs is wholly inherent in the court independent of any statutory authority, and solely according to the conscience of the court. `This view,' it is said in Street's Federal Equity Practice, vol. 2, § 983, `is too radical to be considered orthodox, but it seems correct to say that the power of the equity court to allow costs, though originating in statute, has become a common principle and incident of its judicial action, so that the mere establishment of a court of equity and the endowment of it with judicial authority necessarily imports a power in such court to adjudge costs. This idea is fully exemplified in the history of the subject of costs as dealt with in the federal courts.' Whether such jurisdiction had its origin in the Statute 17 Rich. II, c. 6, as some authorities hold, or existed before that time as inherent in the court, as others hold, is immaterial to our present inquiry, which is concerned only with the question of the existence of such jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of our United States Constitution. In the leading case of Andrews v. Barnes, L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 133, decided in 1888, the court said: The jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor in costs was essentially different from that at common law. `The giving of costs in equity,' said Lord Hardwicke in Jones v. Coxeter, 2 Atk. 400, `is entirely discretionary, and is not at all conformable to the rule at law.' `Courts of equity,' said the same great judge in another case, `have in all cases done it' [i. e., dealt with costs] `not from any authority' [i. e., as we understand, from any statutory or delegated authority], `but from conscience and arbitrio boni viri, as to the satisfaction on one side or other on account of vexation.' Corporation of Burford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 551. An examination of the older General Orders of the Court, made, not under any statutory authority, but from the general and inherent authority of the Lord Chancellor, will show that the court exercised a most wide discretion, not only as to the circumstances under which costs were to be awarded, but apparently as to the measure and fullness of the costs.    The records of the Court of Chancery during the last century show that in numerous cases it has exercised the right of giving costs between attorney and client, or, to use the more recent language of the cases, between solicitor and client. And after reviewing numerous authorities the court further said: From this consideration of the earlier authorities we conclude that there was inherent in the Court of Chancery at the time of its abolition a general and discretionary power to award costs as between solicitor and client to a successful party, as and when the justice of the case might so require. In Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 26, p. 798, the statement is made: The court has power by a special order to award costs as between solicitor and client to a successful party, where it is exercising its equitable jurisdiction, but not where it is exercising its ordinary common-law jurisdiction  citing Andrews v. Barnes, supra; Mordue v. Palmer, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 22; Eady v. Elsdon, 70 L. J. K. B. 701; Brown v. Burdett, L. R. 40 Ch. Div. 244; Johnson v. Telford, 3 Russ. 477; In re Brown, L. R. 4 Eq. Cas. 464; Eland v. Medland, L. R. 41 Ch. Div. 476; Davies, Jenkins v. Davis (1891) 64 L. T. 824. See also cases cited in margin. [1] The cases show, however, that costs as between solicitor and client have not been allowed by the English Chancery Court as a matter of course in equity cases. It is only in certain classes of cases, or when the peculiar facts warranted, that such costs have been allowed. A fair summary of the English cases in which such costs have been allowed, would, we think, include the following classes of cases: A. Where gross charges of fraud and misconduct have been made and not sustained. B. Where the main ground of the suit is false, unjust, vexatious, wanton, or oppressive, and so shown to be. C. Where a fiduciary relation exists, such as trustee and cestui que trust, pledgor and pledgee, or principal and agent, and the fiduciary is put to expense, either in defending an unfounded suit or in administering or protecting and preserving the trust property or pledged property. In all three classes of cases courts of equity have acted, as stated by Lord Hardwicke in Corp. of Burford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 551, from conscience and arbitrio boni viri. As expressed by Lord Chancellor Loughborough in Dungey v. Angove, 2 Ves. Jr. 304, 313, the courts have taken this course to do that which appertains to justice and that which appertains to example, and to vindicate the honor and justice of the court. Similar jurisdiction has been held to exist, and has been exercized, in the state courts of the United States, especially in those states where the courts of equity have remained distinct from those of law. See Danbury v. Robinson, 14 N. J. Eq. 324; Thome v. Allen (Ky.) 70 S. W. 410; Id. (Ky.) 71 S. W. 431. II. The United States courts of equity at the time of their creation became endowed with the powers, including that over costs, possessed by the English Chancery Court. See authorities cited in the margin. [2] They have exercised such power, and the power has never been taken from them. And not only the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts has its basis in the jurisdiction of the English Chancery Court, but the practice of those courts, when not governed by statutes of the United States or by rules of the Supreme and lower courts, has a like basis. Rule 90 of the old Equity Rules, promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1842, pursuant to R. S. § 917 (28 USCA § 730), read as follows: In all cases, where the rules prescribed by this court, or by the Circuit Court do not apply, the practice of the Circuit Court shall be regulated by the present practice of the High Court of Chancery in England, so far as the same may reasonably be applied consistently with the local circumstances and local convenience of the district where the court is held, not as positive rules, but as furnishing just analogies to regulate the practice. See 21 C. J. p. 31; Russell v. Farley, 105 U. S. 433, 437, 445, 26 L. Ed. 1060; Smith v. Burnham, Fed. Cas. No. 13,018. In Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430, 19 L. Ed. 260, the court said: The equity jurisdiction conferred on the federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses. In Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369, 384, 15 L. Ed. 80, the court said: The courts of the United States cannot exercise any equity powers, except those conferred by acts of Congress, and those judicial powers which the High Court of Chancery in England, acting under its judicial capacity as a court of equity, possessed and exercised, at the time of the formation of the Constitution of the United States. The distinction between the powers of federal courts of law and equity is often adverted to by the courts. In the early case of Parker v. Bigler, Fed. Cas. No. 10,726, Mr. Justice Grier, in disallowing certain items of costs in a law action, said: It is alleged that the Act of February 26, 1853, `to regulate fees and costs,' proposes to define what shall be hereafter the fees or compensation to be allowed to attorneys, marshals, witnesses, jurors, commissioners, and printers, which shall be taxed and allowed, and not to define absolutely what expenses of trial may be recovered from the losing party as costs of suit. Hence it is contended that this charge is not excluded by the enumeration of persons whose fees are limited by this act, and the expense incurred for models being necessary for the information of the court and jury should be paid by the losing party, as part of the `expensa litis.' This may be true in a court of chancery where the decree may include any expenses which have been necessarily incurred in the suit, for the information of the court and in order to a just decision of the cause. These may be imposed on either party or both as the conscience of the chancellor may dictate, yet, in courts of law no such discretion is given to the court. In Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 563, 14 L. Ed. 249, the court said: Chancery jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of the United States, with the limitation `that suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law.' The rules of the High Court of Chancery of England have been adopted by the courts of the United States. And there is no other limitation to the exercise of a chancery jurisdiction by these courts, except the value of the matter in controversy, the residence or character of the parties, or a claim which arises under a law of the United States, and which has been decided against in a state court. In exercising this jurisdiction, the courts of the Union are not limited by the chancery system adopted by any state, and they exercise their functions in a state where no court of chancery has been established. The usages of the high court of chancery in England, whenever the jurisdiction is exercised, govern the proceedings. This may be said to be the common law of chancery, and since the organization of the government, it has been observed. This case came before the Supreme Court a second time, on the question of taxation of costs. 18 How. 460, 15 L. Ed. 449. The court discussed the power of the federal equity courts to award costs both as provided by the statutes of the United States and as inherent in the courts of equity. In the course of its opinion it said (page 462): Original jurisdiction in equity, in a particular class of cases, conferred by the Constitution on this court, has been interpreted to impose the duty to adjudicate according to such rules and principles as governed the action of the Court of Chancery in England, which administered equity at the time of the emigration of our ancestors, and down to the period when our Constitution was formed. And when the Constitution of the United States conferred that jurisdiction on this court, it cannot be construed to exclude the power possessed and constantly exercised by every court of equity then known, to use its discretion to award or refuse costs, as its judgment of the right of the case, in that particular, might require. The court entertains no doubt of its power to award costs, and deny the application to file a bill of review. The costs awarded included expenses of taking testimony, expenses of surveys, examinations, and reports of an engineer. It is true that these expenses had been incurred by order of the court; but this fact emphasizes rather than throws doubt upon the power of the court over costs. This case has been recognized and approved in the late case of Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U. S. 78, 83, 44 S. Ct. 481, 483 (68 L. Ed. 909), where the court used the following language: The allowance of costs in the federal courts rests not upon express statutory enactment by Congress, but upon usage long continued and confirmed by implication from provisions in many statutes. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 316 [40 S. Ct. 543, 64 L. Ed. 919]; and see Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 460. In Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 40 S. Ct. 543, 64 L. Ed. 919 (a law case), the court considered the question of the power of the court over costs both in actions at law and in equity causes, and by analogy allowed as costs in the particular case the expense of an auditor, though no such item was authorized by statute of the United States or of the state of New York, where the action was tried. In its opinion the court said (pages 316, 317 [40 S. Ct. 548]): The allowance of costs in the federal courts rests not upon express statutory enactment by Congress, but upon usage long continued and confirmed by implication from provisions in many statutes. Mr. Justice Woodbury in Hathaway v. Roach [Fed. Cas. No. 6,213], 2 Woodb. and M. 63; Mr. Justice Nelson in Costs in Civil Cases [Fed. Cas. No. 18,284], 1 Blatchf. 652; The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377 [19 L. Ed. 463]. In Hathaway v. Roach, p. 67, it is said to have been the usage of the federal courts `to conform to the state laws as to costs, when no express provision has been made and is in force by any act of Congress in relation to any particular item, or when no general rule of court exists on this subject.' And in The Baltimore, pages 390, 391, this court stated that `the costs taxed in the Circuit and District Courts were the same as were allowed at that time in the courts of the state, including such matters as travel and attendance of the parties, fees for copies of the case, and abstracts for the hearing, compensation for the services of referees, auditors, masters and assessors, and many other matters not embraced in the fee bills, since passed by Congress.' Neither the Act of February 26, 1853, c. 80, 10 Stat. 161, Rev. Stats. § 983 [28 USCA § 830] nor any later act of Congress or rule of court, deals expressly or by implication with the subject of taxing as costs the expense of an auditor. The practice, if any, governing in this respect the courts of New York would, therefore, be followed in the federal courts. See Huntress v. Town of Epsom [C. C.] 15 Fed. Rep. 732. But, so far as appears, the preliminary hearing before an auditor in aid of jury trials is not a part of the judicial machinery of that state. The nearest analogy to it is the reference had in actions at law on long accounts as a substitute for a jury trial. The expense of the compulsory reference in such actions is so taxable. Code Civ. Proc. § 3256. As there is no statute, federal or state, and no rule of court excluding auditors' fees and the expense of his stenographer from the items taxable as costs, no reason appears why they may not be included, like other expenditures ordered by the court with a view to securing an intelligent consideration of a case. See, also, State of Missouri v. State of Illinois, 202 U. S. 598, 26 S. Ct. 713, 50 L. Ed. 1160. Many statutes and rules have been passed from time to time relative to costs in the federal equity courts. An exhaustive review of them would serve no useful purpose at this time. A number of the earliest statutes and rules are reviewed in Costs in Civil Cases, Fed. Cas. No. 18,284; The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377, 19 L. Ed. 463; Jordan v. Agawam Woollen Co., Fed. Cas. No. 7,516. Later provisions are to be found in the statute of 1853 (10 Stat. 161, c. 80, § 1); also in R. S. §§ 823, 824, 983, 984 (U. S. C. tit. 28, §§ 571, 572, 830, 831 (28 USCA §§ 571, 572, 830, 831); and in new Equity Rules 20, 50, 51, 58, 59, 67, 68, 76. These statutes and rules, however, are not the exclusive source of power in the federal equity courts touching the matter of costs, including solicitor's fees. This is plainly apparent from the authorities. In Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra, the power of the court to allow as costs an item not covered by either statutes or rules was made to depend upon local custom. And a long line of cases exists where allowances in the way of counsel fees have been made, although such allowances were not covered by rules or by statutes. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 6 L. Ed. 111, was a libel brought by the master of the French ship Apollon against the collector of the district of St. Mary's for damages on account of an alleged illegal seizure of ship and cargo. Various items of damages were recovered, including one for $500 for necessary counsel fees. In reference to this item the Supreme Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, said (page 379): The fifth item, allowing $500 as counsel fees, is, in our opinion, unexceptionable. It is the common course of the admiralty to allow expenses of this nature, either in the shape of damages or as part of the costs. The practice is very familiar on the prize side of the court; it is not less the law of the court in instance causes  it resting in sound discretion to allow or refuse the claim. To the same effect, see Canter v. Insurance Companies, 3 Pet. 307, 7 L. Ed. 688. See, also, The Elizabeth Frith, Fed. Cas. No. 4,361. It is true that in The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377, 19 L. Ed. 463, the opinion was expressed by Mr. Justice Clifford that, after the passage of the Act of February 26, 1853, counsel fees, except as provided in that act, were not allowable as costs in admiralty, and in the course of his opinion he referred to the Apollon and Canter Cases and said (page 393): Reference is made to two cases where counsel fees were allowed, but it is a sufficient answer to those cases to say that they were decided before the act of Congress under consideration was passed. But the scope of this statement must be restricted to the particular class of cases under discussion, for the practice of allowing counsel fees as costs in proper cases was not abrogated by the Act of February 26, 1853. In United States v. Waters, 133 U. S. 208, 212, 10 S. Ct. 249, 250 (33 L. Ed. 594), the court, speaking of this practice, said: Both before and since the enactment of the statute of 1853, courts in the exercise of their discretion have allowed counsel fees in many cases without question when reviewed by this court. In The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 379 [6 L. Ed. 111], and in Canter v. American and Ocean Insurance Companies, 3 Pet. 307, 319 [7 L. Ed. 688], the allowance of counsel fees by the court below was affirmed by this court as a matter within the sound discretion of the court before whom the cause was tried, and those decisions were cited with approval in Elastic Fabrics Co. v. Smith, 100 U. S. 110 [25 L. Ed. 547], and Paper Bag Cases, 105 U. S. 766, 772 [26 L. Ed. 959]. See, also, Ex parte Jaffray, Fed. Cas. No. 7,170; Spaulding v. Tucker, Fed. Cas. No. 13,221; Cuyler v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. (C. C.) 132 F. 570. The Act of February 26, 1853, covered party and party costs, but not solicitor and client costs. In Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 535, 536, 26 L. Ed. 1157, the court said: The feebill is intended to regulate only those fees and costs which are strictly chargeable as between party and party, and not to regulate the fees of counsel and other expenses and charges as between solicitor and client, nor the power of a court of equity, in cases of administration of funds under its control, to make such allowance to the parties out of the fund as justice and equity may require.    And the act contains nothing which can be fairly construed to deprive the Court of Chancery of its long-established control over the costs and charges of the litigation, to be exercised as equity and justice may require, including proper allowances, to those who have instituted proceedings for the benefit of a general fund. And see 15 C. J. p. 20, § 1; 5 Encyc. Pl. & Pr. pp. 224-225; In re Paschal, 10 Wall. 483, 493, 19 L. Ed. 992; Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Clark (C. C.) 16 F. 20. It is true that federal courts of equity have refused to allow attorney's fees to be taxed as costs in many cases. Among them the following may be cited: Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306, 1 L. Ed. 613; The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 377, 19 L. Ed. 463; Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211, 21 L. Ed. 43; McIntosh v. Ward (C. C. A.) 159 F. 66; New York C. & H. R. Co. v. Bank of Holly Springs (C. C. A.) 195 F. 456; Leary v. United States (C. C. A.) 257 F. 246. But such refusals were based, not upon any lack of power in the court, but because it was not deemed wise policy to allow attorney's fees to be taxed as costs in ordinary equity cases. There are also many cases in which federal courts of law have refused allowance of costs as between solicitor and client, but we have not considered them as apposite to the present inquiry. We think it may be safely stated, however, that whenever there have come before federal courts of equity cases in which special facts showed that, in accordance with established principles of right and equity, costs as between solicitor and client ought to be allowed, the courts have not refused to make such allowances. The most common classes of cases, though by no means exclusive, in which such cost allowances have been made in equity, are: Foreclosures of mortgages, as illustrated by Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U. S. 451, 12 S. Ct. 728, 36 L. Ed. 501; Meddaugh v. Wilson, 151 U. S. 333, 14 S. Ct. 356, 38 L. Ed. 183; Cowdrey v. Galveston, etc., R. Co., 93 U. S. 352, 23 L. Ed. 950; Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 4 S. Ct. 638, 28 L. Ed. 559; Phinizy v. Augusta & K. R. Co. (C. C.) 98 F. 776; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Hutchison Chemical & Alkali Co., 221 F. 63 (C. C. A. 8). Receiverships, as illustrated by Stuart v. Boulware, 133 U. S. 78, 10 S. Ct. 242, 33 L. Ed. 568; Eames v. H. B. Claflin Co. (C. C. A.) 231 F. 693; Presidio Mining Co. v. Overton (C. C. A.) 286 F. 848; J. C. Turner Lumber Co. v. Toomer (C. C. A.) 275 F. 678; City of New Orleans v. Malone (C. C. A.) 12 F. (2d) 17. Suits by stockholders to preserve the property rights of their corporation, as illustrated by Cuyler v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., supra; McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 F. 103, 7 Ann. Cas. 287 (C. C. A. 8); Colley v. Wolcott, 187 F. 595 (C. C. A. 8); Thompson v. Bomar, 258 F. 339 (C. C. A. 8); Hutchinson Box, etc., Co. v. Van Horn, 299 F. 424 (C. C. A. 8); Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining Co. (D. C.) 8 F.(2d) 777. Suits by one or more creditors to preserve and bring into court for administration a fund in which they are interested, as illustrated by Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 26 L. Ed. 1157; Central R., etc., Co. v. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116, 5 S. Ct. 387, 28 L. Ed. 915; Harrison v. Perea, 168 U. S. 311, 18 S. Ct. 129, 42 L. Ed. 478; Central Trust Co. v. Ingersoll (C. C. A) 87 F. 427; Burden Central, etc., Co. v. Ferries, etc., Co. (C. C. A.) 87 F. 810; Central Trust Co. v. U. S. Light & Heat Co. (C. C. A.) 233 F. 420; Muskegon Boiler Works v. Tenn. Valley I. & R. Co. (D. C.) 274 F. 836. Certain classes of proceedings in connection with bankruptcy matters, as illustrated by Ex parte Jaffray, supra; Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533, 23 S. Ct. 710, 47 L. Ed. 1165; Beach v. Macon Grocery Co. (C. C. A.) 125 F. 513; Receivers of Vir. Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Staake (C. C. A.) 133 F. 717; In re Lacov (C. C. A.) 142 F. 960; In re Schocket (D. C.) 177 F. 583; In re Stewart (C. C. A.) 179 F. 222; In re Wentworth Lunch Co. (C. C. A.) 191 F. 821; In re J. F. Pierson, Jr., & Co. (D. C.) 225 F. 889; Bramble v. Brett, 230 F. 385 (C. C. A. 8). Closely akin to the foregoing classes of cases are those involving allowances made to a pledgee for expenses and attorney's fees in preserving and defending the pledged property. In 31 Cyc. p. 826, the author states the rule as follows: The pledgee has a lien on the property for any expenses, including the attorney's fees, reasonably incurred by him in keeping and caring for the property pledged, protecting it against liens, taxes, and assessments, or otherwise protecting the pledgor's rights, in making sale for the enforcement of the pledge, in collecting choses in action, and other expenses incurred in rendering the pledged property available for the payment of his debt, although not for any expenses incurred by reason of his own wrongful act. And see Jones on Collateral Securities (3d Ed.) § 400; Raley v. Ross, 59 Ga. 862; Planters' Rice-Mill Co. v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 78 Ga. 574, 3 S. E. 327; Hurst v. Coley (C. C.) 22 F. 183; Gregory v. Pike (C. C. A.) 67 F. 837; Danbury v. Robinson, supra; Ballingall v. Hunsberger, 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 117; Ely-Walker Dry Goods Co. v. Colbert, 58 Tex. Civ. App. 561, 124 S. W. 705; Parker v. Watkins, Johnson's Reports (Eng.) 133, 137. The case of Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Amusement Syndicate Co., 178 F. 519 (C. C. A. 8), though not falling under any of the foregoing classes, is interesting and instructive. Actions had been commenced by the appellee in the state court of Kansas against several insurance companies on fire insurance policies. Several of the insurance companies removed their cases to the federal court, and thereupon two of the companies filed therein a bill in equity, making as parties defendant all of the other insurance companies and the insured, and setting up that an accounting and contribution was necessary if liability should be found to exist. The other insurance companies by answers and cross-bills made similar allegations. The insured by cross-bill set up the same facts that it had set up in the complaints in the state court. Recovery was had by the insured. A statute of Kansas provided that in suits on insurance policies a reasonable attorney's fee could be recovered as part of the costs. This court not only allowed as costs a reasonable attorney's fee, but went further and allowed the costs in the actions pending in the state court. The court said (page 534): The insurance companies invoked the aid of a court of equity and in courts of equity the payment of costs by the respective parties is a proper matter of equitable distribution. It is true that in most of the cases where costs as between solicitor and client have been allowed, there has been a fund in court out of which the allowance was ordered paid. But this fact has not conditioned the jurisdiction of the court to make such allowance. There is no statute or rule to that effect, nor has such been the practice. It does not appear that there was any fund in court in Pennsylvania v. Bridge Co., supra, nor in Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Amusement Syndicate Co., supra, nor in Re Schocket, supra. In Beach v. Macon Grocery Co., supra, in Re Lacov, supra, and in Re Wentworth Lunch Co., supra, although there was a fund, yet costs and expenses of a receivership were ordered paid by the losing parties. And see Burnrite Coal Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 208, 47 S. Ct. 578, 71 L. Ed. 1002. Furthermore, in cases where a trustee has been brought into court by a cestui que trust upon charges of maladministration which have proved to be unfounded, costs as between solicitor and client have been allowed the trustee, though there has been no fund in court. Perry on Trusts (6th Ed.) § 894, states as follows: The general rule is, that trustees shall have their costs either out of the trust fund, or from the cestuis que trust personally. If there is a fund within the control of the court, they may have their costs as between solicitor and client. Where there is no fund within control of the court, if the cestuis que trust bring the trustees before it to obtain a direction as to the rights of the parties, or the mode of administration, and the trustees are free from all blame or fault, they are entitled to costs against the cestuis que trust personally, to be taxed as between solicitor and client. The reason involved in the rule is this: Trustees have no beneficial interest in the trust property. They hold it for the accommodation and benefit of others. If they perform their duties faithfully, and are guilty of no unjust, improper, or oppressive conduct, they ought not in justice and good conscience to be put to any expense out of their own moneys. If, therefore, they are brought before the court without blame on their part, they should be reimbursed all the expenses that they incur, and allowed their costs as between solicitor and client for this purpose.