Opinion ID: 1127542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment.

Text: In Christy v. Carlisle, 94 Nev. 651, 654, 584 P.2d 687, 689 (1978), this court stated: It is our underlying policy to have each case decided upon its merits. With this in mind, we approve the observation ... that a default judgment normally must be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party. (Citation omitted.) This court has also stated that a trial court's exercise of discretion in granting or denying a motion to set aside a default judgment will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Minton v. Roliff, 86 Nev. 478, 481, 471 P.2d 209, 210 (1970) (citations omitted). The overriding issue in the instant case is whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment against Gassett. NRCP 4(e)(1)(i) allows service by publication when the person to be served resides out of state or after due diligence cannot be found within the state. Gassett argues that Snappy did not exercise due diligence in trying to serve her and that the service by publication was ineffective. We agree. The defective service rendered the district court's personal jurisdiction over Gassett invalid and the judgment against her void. For a judgment to be void, there must be a defect in the court's authority to enter judgment through either lack of personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction over subject matter in the suit. Puphal v. Puphal, 669 P.2d 191 (Idaho 1983). In Price v. Dunn, 106 Nev. 100, 787 P.2d 785 (1990), the plaintiff attempted to discover the defendant's address through the telephone book, inquiries at the power company, and a conversation with the defendant's stepmother. This court concluded that although the plaintiff complied technically with NRCP 4(e)(1)(i), her actual efforts, as a matter of law, fall short of the due diligence requirement to the extent of depriving [the defendant] of his fundamental right to due process. Price, 106 Nev. at 103, 787 P.2d at 787. Additionally, the court stated that [w]here other reasonable methods exist for locating the whereabouts of a defendant, plaintiff should exercise those methods. Id. at 103, 787 P.2d at 787; see also McNair v. Rivera, 110 Nev. 463, 874 P.2d 1240 (1994) (concluding that one attempt to serve defendant during a six month extension of time for service was not sufficient for a showing of due diligence). Snappy's attempt at service consisted of one visit to an old address and service by publication. No attempt was made to locate Gassett through her attorney even though Snappy knew Gassett had been represented by Bernstein. Based on Price, we conclude that Snappy's attempt at service fails to demonstrate due diligence. Therefore, the default judgment was void due to a failure of jurisdiction. Snappy argues that the defective service on Gassett is irrelevant because she waived her right to complain of such jurisdictional issues. In its order, the district court found that Gassett made a general appearance through her motion to set aside the default judgment. In her motion, Snappy claims, Gassett requested relief additional to that necessary to protect her from defective service, thus waiving her right to complain about the defect. The district court relied on Doyle v. Jorgensen, 82 Nev. 196, 414 P.2d 707 (1966). In Doyle, this court assessed whether a defendant who was not properly served prior to an entry of default made a general appearance when he sought relief for the improper service and also sought relief on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. This court concluded that [w]ithout proper service, the judgment against [the defendant] was void. [The defendant] could have moved to set aside the judgment pursuant to NRCP 60(b)(3); alternatively, he could have sought a setting aside combined with permission to answer to the merits pursuant to NRCP 60(c). [The defendant], however, did not confine his pleadings to these jurisdictional matters of defective service or void judgment. Rather, he also sought relief on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect as provided by NRCP 60(b)(1). [The defendant] therefore made a general appearance. Id. at 201, 414 P.2d at 710 (citations omitted; footnotes omitted). In dicta, the court in Doyle considered whether a waiver such as Snappy claims was made by Gassett may be applied retroactively to cure initial defects in service and render proper an otherwise void judgment. Id. at 201-02, 414 P.2d at 710. The court suggested that in some cases, a general appearance could apply retroactively to cure initial defects. [T]here are certain minescule [sic] irregularities in procedure which will be overlooked regardless ... if ... such an overlooking will best serve the ends of justice. In contrast, other procedural errors are deemed so prejudicial that they are never overlooked, but instead are said to render the proceeding void. This does not mean, however, that these defects cannot be waived.... Id. at 202-03, 414 P.2d 710-11 (citations omitted). We now hold that the filing of a motion to set aside a void judgment previously entered against the movant shall not constitute a general appearance. See, e.g., Dobson v. Dobson, 108 Nev. 346, 349, 830 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1992). We will no longer allow a retroactive application such as this to make an otherwise void judgment valid. To the extent that this is contrary to Doyle, we now overrule it. Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that Gassett's later general appearance retroactively waived her right to complain of the initially defective service.