Opinion ID: 2009898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Assault with a Dangerous Weapon Convictions

Text: Appellant argues (Brief at 44-45) that there was insufficient evidence to support his two convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon, [12] asserting: [T]here was insufficient evidence for a jury reasonably to conclude that one or more shots were intentionally fired at Michelle Royster or Ronald Moten.... Moten and Ms. Royster were not the targets or intended victims of assaults. Since no shots or other assaultive actions were intentionally directed against them, and they were not physically injured, appellant Ruffin must be acquitted of assaulting them. To convict on a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon the prosecution must prove each of the elements of assault in addition to proving that the assault was committed with a dangerous weapon. Parks v. United States, 627 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C.1993) (citing Williamson v. United States, 445 A.2d 975, 978 (D.C.1982)). The three elements of simple assault are: (1) an act on the part of the accused (which need not result in injury); (2) the apparent present ability to injure the victim at the time the act is committed; and (3) the intent to perform the act which constitutes the assault at the time the act is committed. Id. (citations omitted); see CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.07 (4th ed. 1993). [13] The intent element of assault is the general `intent to perform the acts which constitute the assault.' Smith v. United States, 593 A.2d 205, 207 (D.C.1991) (quoting Williamson, supra, 445 A.2d at 978). Thus, the weapon need not be used with a conscious purpose to inflict injury. Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036, 1044 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979). It is not the secret intent of the assaulting party, ... that is material, but what his conduct and the attending circumstances denote at the time to the party assaulted.... It is the outward demonstration that constitutes the mischief which is punished as a breach of the peace. Id. (citation omitted). Although appellant admits (Brief at 41) that assault with a dangerous weapon is a general intent crime, he maintains that a conviction may be had only where the defendant intentionally directs some hostile action against the particular person who is the victim of the crime. (Emphasis added.) While there was no direct evidence presented that he observed either Mr. Motten or Ms. Royster in Younger's car, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury's reasonable inference that appellant was cognizant that Younger was not alone. See Jones, supra, 477 A.2d at 246 (no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence). Knowledge of the passenger's presence rather than a particular intent to harm them is sufficient under the circumstances presented here. [14] Niles Dabney, who was seated in the rear of the car in which appellant was a passenger, testified that five seconds before the shooting began he saw that there were passengers in Younger's car. There was evidence that appellant was looking in the direction of Younger's car at the time Dabney made this observation. Tr. I, 825-31. George Jeffries, who was seated in the driver's seat across from appellant, saw a passenger in the front seat of Younger's car. Tr. I, 633. Two bystander eyewitnesses also noted that more than one person was visible through the untinted windows of Younger's car. One bystander saw a passenger in the front seat, and the other bystander said that there were at east three persons in Younger's car. Tr. 1, 287, 316 The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that appellant, who was seated in the front passenger seat of the shooters' car, was as able as either Jeffries or Dabney to see inside Younger's car. The evidence showed that Jeffries veered the shooters' car to the left to pull up alongside Younger immediately prior to the group opening fire. Therefore, appellant was extremely close to the Younger car before they began shooting at it. Evidence supporting the inference that appellant could see three persons in Younger's car as he joined in unloosing a hail of gunfire at the vehicle is sufficient to sustain his convictions for the general intent crime of assault with a dangerous weapon against Mr. Motten and Ms. Royster. This is so even if appellant and the other assailants did not specifically aim at them or intentionally seek to harm them. Appellant's knowledge that others in addition to Younger were in his car constituted a potential for serious bodily harm through the reckless use of dangerous weapons, which is one of the concerns underlying the prohibition on assault with a dangerous weapon. See Parker v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 346, 359 F.2d 1009, 1012 (1966). Moreover, the pertinent inquiry in an assault case is whether the assailant acted in such a manner as would under the circumstances portend an immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility. Sousa, supra, 400 A.2d at 1044 (quoting Anthony v. United States, 361 A.2d 202, 206 (D.C.1976)). In this case, the intentional firing of multiple shots into the confined space of a small passenger vehicle could sustain an assault charge on each occupant of the car, even if the assailant did not have actual knowledge that such passengers were present.