Opinion ID: 4426324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: One significant interest at stake was Mrs. Heffington’s privilege against selfincrimination. Petitioners argue that her testimony at her deposition waived the privilege, and the circuit court, in denying the motion to stay, found that there was “a good likelihood” that she waived the privilege “to a certain extent.” Because the question of whether Mrs. Heffington waived her Fifth Amendment privilege is a legal one, we review it de novo to determine its effect on the motion to stay. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is read broadly “to extend to witnesses in civil litigation where the answer to interrogation might tend to subject the witness to criminal prosecution.” Robinson, 328 Md. at 514–15, 615 A.2d at 615 (emphasis added). The privilege may be invoked in the discovery stage as well as at trial. North River Ins. Co., Inc. v. Stefanou, 831 F.2d 484, 486–87 (4th Cir. 1987); Kramer v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 575, 582, 558 A.2d 760, 764 (1989). But when a witness testifies to a subject, she waives the privilege for the rest of the “proceeding” to the extent necessary to cross-examine her on that subject. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 1311–12 (1999) (noting that “[i]t is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details.”); Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529, 542–43, 560 A.2d 1108, 1114 (1989) (holding that 18 ______________________________________________________________________________ when a witness answers “incriminating questions” at trial, she waives the privilege as to that subject). The rule aims to prevent “self-selected testimony” from distorting the facts. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 322, 119 S. Ct. at 1312. Without it, a witness could testify to her version of events, then assert her Fifth Amendment privilege when confronted with conflicting information later in the same proceeding. In the words of the United States Supreme Court, the Fifth Amendment would be “a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell.”3 Id. For Fifth Amendment purposes, a deposition and the trial in the same matter are stages of the same proceeding. United States v. Parcel of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 1990); Creative Consumer Concepts, Inc. v. Kreisler, 563 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2009). In the instant case, Mrs. Heffington testified at her deposition to the details of the events underlying her claims. Her statements were “testimonial,” meaning that they were made voluntarily under oath in the context of the same judicial proceeding. They were “incriminating,” meaning that they did not merely deal with matters “collateral” to the events surrounding commission of a crime. These statements, which were both 3 In considering the test for a testimonial waiver of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, Judge Learned Hand wrote in United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S. Ct. 910 (1943), the following: “It must be conceded that the privilege is to suppress the truth, but that does not mean that it is a privilege to garble it; although its exercise deprives the parties of evidence, it should not furnish one side with what may be false evidence and deprive the other of any means of detecting the imposition. The time for a witness to protect himself is when the decision is first presented to him; he needs nothing more, and anything more puts a mischievous instrument at his disposal.” 19 ______________________________________________________________________________ “testimonial” and “incriminating,” contained information that Mrs. Heffington was privileged not to reveal. Plainly, she had reason to know that her statements would put her in jeopardy, and thus it is not unfair to find that she waived her privilege. By testifying to that subject within the same proceeding, she waived her Fifth Amendment privilege and would be unable to invoke it at trial, at least to the extent necessary for petitioners to crossexamine her on it. The Court of Special Appeals held that Mrs. Heffington did not waive her Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying at her deposition and not claiming the privilege. The court declined to address whether her testimony in the deposition was part of the same “proceeding,” holding instead that “[b]ecause [Mrs. Heffington]’s indictment created ‘new grounds for apprehension,’ one cannot reasonably infer from her pre-indictment deposition testimony a waiver of her Fifth Amendment privilege post-indictment.” Heffington, 238 Md. App. at 530–31, 192 A.3d at 912 (internal citations omitted). The court reasoned that at the time of her deposition, Mrs. Heffington knew only that the police might be investigating her conduct. The indictment followed her deposition testimony and gave her a new reason to assert the privilege against self-incrimination, citing and relying on In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 165 (6th Cir. 1983), as support. We disagree. It should be clear to any person in Mrs. Heffington’s situation that any testimony that she gave might tend to subject her to criminal prosecution, especially since the police investigation had not been closed. We believe Morganroth to be inapposite in evaluating appellant’s claim of privilege for several reasons. First, Morganroth involved clearly different proceedings, not the same 20 ______________________________________________________________________________ proceeding. And as we have noted, waiver of the privilege at a deposition waives the privilege at the trial of the same case. Morganroth testified voluntarily in a 1979 civil deposition, answering questions about his involvement in a loan transaction. Id. at 163. He testified subsequently at a grand jury proceeding, where he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, and the government gave him immunity, thereby compelling his testimony. Id. Then, in 1981, he was deposed in a separate civil action but refused to answer questions about the transaction. Id. at 164. His 1979 and his 1981 depositions were not part of the same proceeding. Second, the Court of Special Appeals held, based on Morganroth, that the criminal indictment created “new grounds for apprehension” and, hence, permitted or revived the privilege. Notably, Morganroth articulated the new grounds for apprehension—he alleged that he was apprehensive of providing incriminating evidence in regard to a possible perjury charge stemming from his responses in an earlier proceeding under oath. Id. at 167. Significantly, the Morganroth court required more than that assertion, noting that before Morganroth would be entitled to remain silent, there must be a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 167. The court made clear that a blanket assertion of the privilege is not sufficient, that the privilege cannot be claimed in advance of the questions, and that it must be asserted by a witness with respect to particular questions. Id. And in each instance, the witness must testify under oath to a “sound basis” for the new apprehension of prosecution. Id., see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S. Ct. 814, 818 (1951) (requiring a witness claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege to do so for specific questions for which “the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend 21 ______________________________________________________________________________ danger from a direct answer”). The court must determine the propriety of the refusal to testify. Morganroth, 718 F.2d at 167. Nothing of the sort occurred here. Mrs. Heffington’s counsel simply stated to the court that Mrs. Heffington intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege. She did not testify under oath that she had any new basis for apprehension of criminal prosecution and never mentioned fear of a criminal charge of perjury.4 She did not assert the privilege as to particular questions but merely, through counsel, asserted a blanket privilege. Morganroth is no aid to respondents.