Opinion ID: 844263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Prosecution Expert Witness as Expert Witness for the Defense

Text: Detective Scott Lusk, a homicide detective from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, testified as an expert witness for the prosecution concerning the Puente gang. Trial counsel for Soliz asked permission to call Lusk as his own witness and question him as an expert in photographic lineups on the issue of whether the photographic six-pack lineups had been properly prepared. The trial court denied the request as invading the province of the jury. The trial court stated that counsel could argue the point that the lineups were improperly prepared, but could not ask Lusk to express his opinion as to whether they were unduly suggestive. Later, during the defense case, counsel for Soliz questioned Sergeant Holmes, the officer who prepared the photographic lineup of Soliz. Sergeant Holmes testified that in preparing it, he chose photographs of people who had hair like Soliz's. In response to counsel for Soliz's question whether he would agree the photograph of Soliz showed the shortest hair of the six subjects in the lineup, Sergeant Holmes answered no and stated that two of the other subjects had the same length hair and the rest had hair slightly longer. (9) Citing People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 [208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709], Soliz, joined by Gonzales, contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow Lusk to be questioned as an expert on the photographic lineups used in the case. In McDonald, we reiterated that in the usual case the appellate court will continue to defer to the trial court's discretion . . . in excluding expert testimony. ( Id. at p. 377.) We held, however, that it will ordinarily be error to exclude expert testimony on eyewitness identification when eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury . . . . ( Ibid. ) Initially, we note the record does not establish that Lusk had any particular expertise on the psychological factors involved in eyewitness identification. The only basis Soliz's counsel offered for soliciting Lusk's opinion about photographic lineups was that Lusk was currently a homicide investigator, an assignment he had held for the previous six months out of his 18 years as a sheriff's deputy, and that he had prepared some photographic lineups in that capacity. Lusk had not prepared any of the photographic lineups in defendants' case. As recounted, the officer who had prepared the photographic lineup of Soliz, Sergeant Holmes, was examined by the defense about the procedures he followed. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Lusk could be considered an expert on eyewitness identification, McDonald does not apply when an eyewitness identification is substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability. ( People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 377.) Here, Judith Mejorado's identification of Soliz as the shooter constituted substantial, independent corroboration because she personally knew both defendants before the shooting, and her identification of Soliz was therefore not based on the challenged photographic lineup.