Opinion ID: 2357440
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AUSA Rosen

Text: At trial, when the government informed the court that it intended to call AUSA Rosen to testify, defense counsel objected, stating, I'm going to move to disqualify the U.S. [A]ttorney's [O]ffice from prosecuting Mr. Coleman. The trial judge denied the motion, and Coleman now argues that the trial court's ruling amounts to reversible error. [17] We do not perceive any error. AUSA Rosen did not prosecute the case before the jury, and we are aware of no authority that prohibits the government from calling a material witness in a case merely because he is a member of the office responsible for prosecution. Coleman relies primarily on Robinson v. United States, 32 F.2d 505 (8th Cir.1928), where the Court of Appeals reversed a defendant's conviction because an AUSA testified for the government. The case is readily distinguished, however, because in Robinson the testifying prosecutor was the same person trying the case before the jury. Coleman's reliance on Rule 3.7(a) of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct is also inapt because, like Robinson, the rule is concerned with instances where trial counsel takes the witness stand. [18] We cannot discern any impropriety in having an AUSA, who is not personally trying the case, testify as a witness to material facts within his or her personal knowledge. [19] Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in permitting AUSA Rosen to take the stand.