Opinion ID: 2520889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to suppress the DNA evidence

Text: On December 3, 2001, Hauge filed a motion to suppress evidence of [a]ny and all laboratory tests and/or analysis conducted upon any and all items of evidence recovered under HPD XX-XXXXXX, which have been examined and have been determined to contain [Hauge's] DNA and/or genetic profile. In support of his motion, Hauge argued that the submission of ... [his] blood and hair for DNA analysis and comparison, in the burglary matter, exceeded the limited, authorized purpose for which the search warrant was issued, [ i.e., ] the investigation of the robbery. Hauge contended that use of his blood and hair samples, other than specified in the application in support of the search warrant, and the warrant itself, violated ... Hauge's legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy... that the government would not keep... a DNA databank of it's [sic] citizens, which the government could delve into at the government's convenience ..., without judicial review. Hauge also asserted that there are no procedures, no guidelines as to what HPD is authorized to do with a person's DNA once they obtain it by way of a search warrant. Based on the foregoing reasoning, Hauge argued that he was entitled to judicial review by way of an application to the court [to determine whether there was probable cause] to conduct additional tests on the evidence, or [that he was entitled] to an adversarial hearing to determine the necessity for the intrusion into [his] legitimate expectation of privacy. In response, the prosecution advanced several arguments in support of its position that the circuit court should deny Hauge's motion to suppress. The prosecution first contended that, because the Honorable Rhonda Nishimura had the authority to issue the search warrant authorizing the search of [Hauge] for the blood and hair samples [in connection with the robbery investigation,] ... all the evidence recovered pursuant to the search warrant is admissible in the instant case. The prosecution emphasized the importance of DNA testing within the criminal justice system and stated that there are no express statutory limitations on the collection of blood samples for DNA testing or on the dissemination of the results of DNA testing at the Hawai'i Criminal Justice Data Center, such that, once Hauge's blood sample [was] lawfully obtained, [it] may be recorded, preserved, and disseminated.... Moreover, the prosecution argued that, [o]nce lawfully obtained, [Hauge] can no longer assert any privacy interest in ... blood held by law enforcement and asserted that courts have held that law enforcement agencies may compare validly obtained DNA samples for use in subsequent unrelated criminal investigations. (Citations omitted.) The prosecution further represented that Hauge's blood was obtained pursuant to a search warrant in the robbery case for the purpose of DNA testing, arguing that DNA testing will always be the same, regardless of when and how many times the testing is done. In the alternative, the prosecution asserted that Hauge lacked standing to challenge the use of his DNA in the investigation of the present matter, inasmuch as his DNA was used to create a profile, [and] that profile became the property of the crime lab and the police department ... [such that Hauge] has no possessory interest or any other interests in the records kept by the crime lab or by the police department. In this regard, the prosecution argued that [p]rivacy concerns are no longer relevant once the sample has already been lawfully removed from the body and the scientific analysis does not involve any further search and seizure of a defendant's person. The prosecution urged that, because [t]he closest analogue to retention of DNA testing is the fingerprint databank..., retention of a DNA profile is not an unreasonable invasion of any private area of life. Lastly, the prosecution made the common sense argument that [i]t is less intrusive to obtain one blood sample than to have a search warrant ordered for the withdrawal of a blood sample from [Hauge] in every investigation [in which Hauge was a suspect]. On February 4, 2002, after the circuit court heard arguments on the motion to suppress the DNA evidence but prior to the court's ruling on the motion, Hauge filed additional motions (1) to suppress evidence based on a lack of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for the blood sample in connection with the robbery investigation and (2) to return his property ( i.e., the samples of his blood and hair). Hauge argued that probable cause was lacking at the time Detective Kon filed for a warrant, because Kon [did not] confirm[ ] that HPD was in possession of bodily fluid left at the scene of the robbery. In support of this argument, Hauge cited the fact that, as of February 4, 2002, ... [he] ha[d] yet to be charged with any crime surrounding Kon's January 23, 2001 robbery investigation. Although Hauge acknowledged that it is unclear... what standard of review a lower court should apply ... [he nevertheless suggested that t]he logic of de novo appellate review ... appears applicable to a circuit court review of a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant. The circuit court did not require that the prosecution respond by written memorandum. Nevertheless, the prosecution argued at the hearing on the motion that the four corners of the search warrant ... [indicate adequate] probable cause. The prosecution further contended that the circuit court's review of the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant would be inappropriate peer review. In ruling on Hauge's second motion to suppress, the circuit court first noted that, while [the initial investigation regarding Hauge] started as a robbery investigation, it ended up as a murder case, and there is no statute of limitation in murder cases, and the State is not required to charge anyone, regardless of whether there is probable cause or not. The circuit court therefore rejected Hauge's arguments on that subject. On the issue of whether the circuit court could review the magistrate's decision, the circuit court ruled that there is no authority for a court to review [the issuance of search warrants, which are within the jurisdiction of the district court], but did so anyway for the sake of clarifying what the probable cause [was] with respect to the search. After discussing the affidavits supporting the warrant authorizing the drawing of Hauge's blood in connection with the robbery investigation, the circuit court concluded that on its own independent review ... there [was] probable cause for the execution of the search warrant[]. Thus, the circuit court denied both Hauge's motion to suppress for alleged lack of probable cause and his motion to return property. The circuit court instructed the prosecution to prepare a written order, although the prosecution failed to do so. On February 20, 2002, the circuit court announced its ruling on Hauge's first motion to suppress. The circuit court orally placed its findings of fact (FOFs) and conclusions of law (COLs) on the record; although the court instructed the prosecution to submit a written order for approval based on its ruling, again, none was prepared. The oral FOFs included many of the relevant facts adduced in the memoranda submitted by the parties, but it is most noteworthy that the circuit court entered no FOFs or COLs touching upon the submission of two samples of Hauge's blood to Cellmark ( i.e., the first, pursuant to the search warrant in connection with the initial robbery investigation, and the second in connection with the burglary investigation). Invoking its ruling on the second motion to suppress ( i.e., that the search warrant authorizing the drawing of Hauge's blood was lawful and based on probable cause), the circuit court concluded that legitimate use of the DNA profile [was not] limited to just the robbery matter. The court agreed with the prosecution that, [o]nce Hauge's blood was lawfully drawn from his body, he no longer ha[d] a possessory interest in that blood, and ruled that DNA analysis in the present matter did not require any additional chemical analysis which might infringe upon any privacy interest Hauge might have in the blood. Citing extrajurisdictional authority in support of its ruling, the circuit court noted that [a] blood sample is like other tangible property which is subject to a battery of scientific tests and concluded that [t]he closest analogue to retention of DNA is the fingerprint databank. Regarding Hauge's person, the circuit court found that the intrusion was minimal... [, and, o]nce identifying markers [of Hauge's DNA were] determined, there [was] no need for further and multiple intrusion for the purpose of extracting blood for every future comparison. Lastly, the court specifically ruled that the underlying basis and scope for the recovery of blood sampling [in connection with the robbery investigation] was limited to DNA testing for comparison purposes and concluded that the use of Hauge's blood in connection with the burglary investigation was not, therefore, [in] excess of the scope of the basis upon which [the blood] was obtained. Based on the foregoing reasoning, the circuit court denied Hauge's motion to suppress the DNA evidence.