Opinion ID: 1901712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Denial of Defendant's Motion to Exclude Evidence of his Prior Convictions

Text: The defendant's third argument on appeal is that the trial justice erred in denying his motion in limine, whereby he sought an order that would bar the prosecution from using his prior convictions as grounds for impeachment under Rule 609 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence if he chose to testify at trial. That motion sought to exclude evidence of all of defendant's prior convictions (which included a 1994 conviction for first-degree sexual assault, a 1992 conviction for possession of cocaine, a 1990 conviction for breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, and a 1989 conviction for assault), but the motion primarily focused on defendant's 1994 conviction for first-degree sexual assaultthe commission of which crime defendant acknowledges also involved the use of a knife. Following a pretrial hearing, the trial justice denied defendant's motion in limine. Under Rule 609, evidence of a witness's prior convictions may be used for impeachment purposes unless the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. [9] Rule 609 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record. (b) Discretion. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if the court determines that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the probative value of the conviction. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the trial justice has broad discretion in deciding whether or not to admit evidence of prior convictions under Rule 609. State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 204 (R.I.2003) (There is no question that the standard used by this Court in reviewing a trial justice's ruling to admit or exclude [evidence of a witness's prior convictions] is one of abuse of discretion. In construing Rule 609    the trial justice has broad discretion.); see also State v. Rocha, 834 A.2d 1263, 1266 (R.I.2003) (This Court uses an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial justice's ruling on the admissibility of evidence of previous bad acts, convictions, or character.). We will not disturb a trial justice's ruling in this regard absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1357 (R.I. 1996) (This Court will not disturb a trial justice's finding regarding the admissibility of prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes unless our review of the record reveals an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial justice.). In the present case, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial justice's ruling denying defendant's motion in limine, which sought to preclude the prosecution from using evidence of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes if he chose to testify. It is our opinion that the trial justice acted well within his broad discretion in not concluding at the in limine stage that the prejudicial effect of said evidence would substantially outweigh its probative value. See Rule 609. Accordingly, we will not disturb this ruling of the trial justice on appeal. Having disposed of that issue on the merits, we now take this occasion to adopt a new policy with respect to appeals that challenge Rule 609 rulings by the trial court. We shall henceforth follow the practice established by the United States Supreme Court for the federal courts in the case of Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). In Luce, 469 U.S. at 43, 105 S.Ct. 460, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that, in order to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify. In reaching that conclusion the Court reasoned that [r]equiring that a defendant testify in order to preserve Rule 609(a) claims will enable the reviewing court to determine the impact any erroneous impeachment may have had in light of the record as a whole   . Luce, 469 U.S. at 42, 105 S.Ct. 460 (emphasis added). [10] According to the Supreme Court in Luce, if the defendant does not testify during the trial, [a]ny possible harm flowing from a district court's in limine ruling permitting impeachment by a prior conviction is wholly speculative. Id. at 41, 105 S.Ct. 460. Without the benefit of defendant's actual trial testimony, the appellate court would have no way of knowing whether or not, in the vital context of the trial, the trial judge would have actually allowed the prosecution to attack the witness's credibility using the prior conviction [11] or whether the prosecution would have even sought to impeach the witness with the prior conviction. Id. at 41-42, 105 S.Ct. 460. Moreover, a reviewing court would be handicapped in its ability to evaluate the trial justice's weighing of the probative value of the prior conviction against its prejudicial effect (as is required by Rule 609) if it did not know the precise nature of the defendant's testimony. [12] Luce, 469 U.S. at 41, 105 S.Ct. 460. In addition, the Court in Luce perceptively stated as follows: Even if these difficulties could be surmounted, the reviewing court would still face the question of harmless error.    Were in limine rulings under Rule 609(a) reviewable on appeal, almost any error would result in the windfall of automatic reversal; the appellate court could not logically term `harmless' an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying. Luce, 469 U.S. at 42, 105 S.Ct. 460. After considerable reflection, we find ourselves in agreement with the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Luce. Accordingly, we shall act similarly with respect to Rule 609 of our own Rules of Evidence. In order to preserve for appeal a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction under Rule 609, the defendant must testify at trial. We do not disagree with the statement in the defendant's reply brief in the case at bar that [w]hen a trial justice denies a defendant's motion in limine to exclude prior convictions from evidence should he testify, the defendant faces a serious dilemma. However, criminal defendants are not unique in having to face serious dilemmas: the fact is that serious dilemmas are part and parcel of the life of every person. In Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000), the United States Supreme Court spoke as follows about the need for a defendant to make a choice in the face of the above-referenced dilemma: [B]oth the Government and the defendant in a criminal trial must make choices as the trial progresses. For example, the defendant must decide whether or not to take the stand in her own behalf. If she has an innocent or mitigating explanation for evidence that might otherwise incriminate, acquittal may be more likely if she takes the stand.    But once the defendant testifies, she is subject to cross-examination, including impeachment by prior convictions, and the decision to take the stand may prove damaging instead of helpful. Id. at 757, 120 S.Ct. 1851. We are in full agreement with the Supreme Court that there is nothing unfair about requiring a defendant to choose whether or not to testify in accordance with the normal rules of trial, even though the prosecution's ability to impeach him or her by the use of a prior conviction may deter a defendant from taking the stand. Id. at 759, 120 S.Ct. 1851.