Opinion ID: 1801800
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims of Prosecutorial and Trial Court Misconduct

Text: Defendant asserts that DeSoto lied when he testified that he had neither been promised, received nor expected any benefit in return for testifying and that any pre-trial communication he had with Mr. Hoff [the prosecutor] had solely concerned protection of his safety, because the prosecutor's undisclosed notes of telephone calls with and concerning DeSoto would have revealed that DeSoto had in fact been impliedly assured by Hoff, and expected, that the testimony he gave would likely result in benefit to him with respect to charges pending against him. Thus, according to defendant, Hoff suborned DeSoto's perjured testimony to the extent DeSoto denied expecting or receiving any benefits for his testimony and the trial court committed misconduct when, after reviewing Hoff's telephone notes in camera, it declined to provide them to the defense. The existence of the prosecutor's telephone notes was revealed during a discussion of whether the prosecution had complied with discovery. Defense counsel requested that the prosecutor be ordered to search his records for evidence of benefits promised to Penny Baxter or DeSoto. Specifically, defense counsel alleged that there's been an exchange of letters between the prosecution and Mr. DeSoto or  and/or the prison authorities to afford him certain reasonable benefits and accommodations. We would like to have copies of any of those letters to and from. The prosecutor responded that he had no knowledge of any letters with the Department of Corrections but that he had received phone calls from the department about DeSoto's status as a witness for purposes of classification and placement. Defense counsel then requested any record of telephone conversations. The prosecutors said he generally made notes of his telephone conversations and would search his files. The following day, the prosecutor said he had spoken to someone in the Department of Corrections about whether DeSoto would be testifying and whether he would be in any danger if he did so. When defense counsel asked for a copy of the note memorializing that conversation, the prosecutor objected. The trial court sustained the objection on the grounds that I don't think this document comes within the discovery order or the Penal Code statute, so I'm not going to order to produce it. The prosecutor indicated he was still going through his records and the court asked him to complete his search by the following day. The next day the prosecutor brought in a file of 57 items consisting of notes of his telephone conversations as well as letters he had written to prison or law enforcement personnel concerning DeSoto. He objected to turning over notes of his telephone conversations without a preliminary inspection by the trial court to determine whether they were discoverable. The file was designated exhibit C. The trial court reviewed the file as well as the transcript of the original discovery hearing before another judge and concluded that I do not see where these notes would fall within any of the discovery orders that are provided in there or provided for in the Penal Code. In response to a defense counsel request that any exculpatory material in the notes be turned over pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194], the trial court responded, I have reviewed them with that in mind, and I found nothing in this file that would so qualify. At trial, DeSoto conceded that his purpose in contacting the prosecution was to secure its help in the case for which he was in custody in Los Angeles County. He testified, however, that no promises of help were made to him by either the district attorney's investigators or by the prosecution and that the investigators told him they had no jurisdiction over proceedings in a different county. With respect to his calls with Prosecutor Hoff, DeSoto testified that the purpose of those calls was not to secure a benefit in his Los Angeles case but, rather, It [ sic ] would have been my safety. (4) A prosecutor's misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it `infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.' [Citations.] In other words, the misconduct must be `of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.' [Citation.] A prosecutor's misconduct `that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair' violates California law `only if it involves `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.'' [Citations.] ( People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 242 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 106 P.3d 895].) `Under well-established principles of due process, the prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity of which it is aware in the evidence it presents . . . . [Citation.]' ( People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1014.) As the Attorney General points out, there is no perjury unless the challenged testimony was actually false. (§ 118, subd. (a).) Defendant fails to persuasively point to testimony by DeSoto that fits this description. Instead, his argument relies on a general claim that the picture presented to the jury about whether DeSoto received any benefits was false. According to defendant, the jury was led to believe that although DeSoto had initially been induced to inform law enforcement of incriminating facts about [defendant] because of his wish to obtain bail and other benefits with respect to disposition of his pending charges in Long Beach, (1) he had been quickly disabused of any such hope, (2) the only benefit he received was protection from retaliation for his cooperation with law enforcement, (3) his testimony at [defendant's] trial was not influenced by any expectation of reward, other than a vague hope, and (4) the phone conversations that DeSoto had with prosecutor Hoff concerned nothing beside[s] his continued security in jail. [¶] That picture was false because neither Mr. Hoff nor the trial judge disclosed to the defense or the jury that DeSoto had lied about the nature of his phone calls with Hoff and whether, notwithstanding [the district attorney's investigators] telling him that he would get no benefit with respect by cooperating, DeSoto had consistently demonstrated his expectation of reward if his testimony was useful to the prosecution and been assured that his cooperation would be made known to authorities in Long Beach, where his case was pending. This deception was especially egregious since prosecutor Hoff, having been a party to those phone calls, knew that it was false and deliberately suborned the perjurious testimony. Defendant attempts to support this claim with an extensive analysis of the prosecutor's notes of his telephone calls to and about DeSoto. We have reviewed the prosecutor's notes and letters and find defendant's analysis utterly unconvincing. There are four letters from Prosecutor Hoff in exhibit C. The first two letters, both dated December 5, 1989, are addressed respectively to a correctional counselor at the state prison at Chino and to DeSoto himself. They were apparently written in response to a letter to Hoff from DeSoto in November 1989 in which DeSoto expressed concern for his safety should he testify and asked Hoff to confirm his status as a witness with prison officials. Hoff's letter to the correctional counselor confirmed that DeSoto would be called as a witness in defendant's trial and, in view of possible threats to his safety from defendant, stated his belief that DeSoto's welfare and safety may be in danger. Therefore, I request that you consider this information in the classification and placement of Mr. DeSoto in your institution. His letter to DeSoto simply confirmed that he had talked to officials at Chino regarding DeSoto's classification and placement. Another letter, dated April 2, 1990, to a correctional counselor at Corcoran state prison similarly informed the counselor that DeSoto had cooperated with law enforcement in defendant's case, expressed concern for his safety, and supported DeSoto's request to be transferred to another facility. The letter was written in response to a letter from DeSoto reporting a confrontation with other inmates over his role in defendant's prosecution. The fourth letter, undated, is addressed to the deputy district attorney in charge of DeSoto's case in Los Angeles County at Long Beach. In it, Hoff stated that DeSoto provided information in the Curl case that had been corroborated and had agreed to testify. Hoff went on: He has never requested nor has he received any promises in exchange for his information other than a promise from me that I would notify, in writing, the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, his attorney and/or the Court that he has cooperated with Fresno authorities in the Curl case. [¶] I believe Mr. [DeSoto's] past and anticipated future cooperation should be considered by your office in assessing his own criminal prosecution, and I ask you to give whatever weight you deem is appropriate to this matter. Hoff's notes confirm the information in the letters: many of his conversations with DeSoto revolved around DeSoto's concern for his safety because of his cooperation in defendant's prosecution and, notwithstanding DeSoto's attempts to secure some benefit from that cooperation, the only guarantee Hoff made was that he would inform the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office of DeSoto's cooperation. For example, in a note dated May 26, 1988, Hoff stated: I am making no deals w/[DeSoto] except to convey to L.A.D.A. that [DeSoto] appears to be giving truthful info and said he would cooperate and testify. [¶] I asked DeLong [the Los Angeles prosecutor] to handle his case on its merits w/o consideration of my use of [DeSoto] as a witness . . . . In a note dated June 1, 1988, Hoff records a conversation with DeSoto in which DeSoto asked for help with getting a continuance and bail reduction and Hoff told him, I could not control that matter. Hoff notes he called the Los Angeles prosecutor, did not reach him, but was later informed that DeSoto's case had been continued and bail remained the same. In a note dated November 11, 1988, Hoff recorded that he had spoken to the Los Angeles prosecutor about his intention to use DeSoto as a witness and that there is no deal/consideration being extended to [DeSoto] in exchange for his testimony and DeLong can deal w/[DeSoto's] case on its merits. To the same effect were notations on November 18, 1988, November 28, 1988, February 17, 1989, May 22, 1989, June 6, 1989, and June 21, 1989. Each note confirms that Hoff made no promise or inducement to DeSoto for his testimony except that he would inform the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office of DeSoto's cooperation. (5) This record does not support defendant's claim that DeSoto perjured himself when he testified that he had not received any benefits in exchange for his testimony, much less that Hoff suborned perjury. Defendant maintains that the fact that DeSoto received a reduced sentence on the Los Angeles charges, and that the sexual assault charge was dismissed, is evidence that he lied about not having received any benefit for his testimony at defendant's trial. But there is nothing in the record before us that supports his claim that Prosecutor Hoff engineered the reduction in the sentence and the dismissal of the charge. The record is to the contrary  Hoff's notes consistently demonstrate that he did not offer DeSoto any inducements or benefits for his testimony. [12] Nor do we agree with defendant that DeSoto perjured himself when, in response to being asked about his telephone conversations with Hoff, he said they involved his safety. [13] Defendant claims this was misleading because DeSoto left out the fact that he had sought assistance with bail reduction and a continuance from Hoff, leaving the impression that his safety was the only topic of discussion. We do not read the record in so narrow a fashion; moreover, the jury learned from cross-examination that DeSoto had sought other benefits in exchange for his testimony. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant also asserts the trial court committed misconduct, apparently because the trial court declined to furnish Hoff's notes to the defense at trial after determining the notes were not discoverable pursuant to either the discovery order in this case or section 1054.1. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion. (See People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3] [We generally review a trial court's ruling on matters regarding discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.].) A fortiori, we find no misconduct.