Opinion ID: 848690
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: plaintiffs' foia proceedings

Text: Plaintiffs are the parents of a high school student who was prohibited from participating in a ski meet sponsored by the MHSAA because he had previously participated in an unsanctioned event in violation of MHSAA rules. Plaintiffs filed a request under the FOIA seeking information related to that decision. The MHSAA refused to comply with the request, asserting that it was not a public body and was therefore not subject to the FOIA. The trial court granted summary disposition to plaintiffs, holding that the MHSAA is primarily funded by or through state or local authority within the meaning of § 232(d)(iv) because the vast majority of its funding comes from gate receipts at the athletic events it sponsors. The trial court held that the gate receipts that comprised the majority of the MHSAA'S revenue were received through the schools because the MHSAA essentially `enjoys the schools' moneymaking capacity as its own,' quoting Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the MHSAA was not a public body under either § 232(d)(iv) or § 232(d)(iii). 255 Mich.App. 567, 581-582, 583, 662 N.W.2d 413 (2003). The majority first addressed plaintiffs' argument that the MHSAA was created by state or local authority under § 232(d)(iv). The majority held that, although it was originally created under such authority, the modern incarnation of the MHSAA was a unique, private entity that had ceased being the official athletic association for the state. This unique entity was not created by state or local authority. The majority further rejected the trial court's conclusion that the MHSAA is primarily funded by or through state or local authority. The panel noted that the state provides no financial resources to fund the MHSAA'S activities, and that the MHSAA actually paid fees for the use of host facilities. Member schools pay no fees or dues to the MHSAA. The MHSAA is a private, nonprofit organization that hires and trains its own officials and pays its own employees; furthermore, its revenues are derived from the sale of its own tickets for its own events. The majority further noted that schools are not forced to join the MHSAA and that member schools voluntarily chose to engage the MHSAA'S services. The individual schools have authority over their own interscholastic events and have no independent authority over the MHSAA. Finally, the majority rejected plaintiffs' argument that the MHSAA is an agent of the state and therefore subject to the FOIA under § 232(d)(iii). The majority looked to Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.), where agency was defined as [a] fiduciary relationship created by express or implied contract or by law, in which one party (the agent ) may act on behalf of another party (the principal ) and bind that other party by words or actions. The majority further noted that, pursuant to St. Clair Intermediate School Dist. v. Intermediate Ed. Ass'n, 458 Mich. 540, 558 n. 18, 581 N.W.2d 707 (1998), an agency relationship arises only where the principal `has the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him.' (citations omitted). The majority held that the MHSAA was governed by its board of directors, not the individual schools who voluntarily became its members. No one school or district could control the MHSAA, because it was controlled by its own board. Therefore, the majority held, the MHSAA was not an agent of its member schools. Judge Jansen dissented, opining that the public policy behind the FOIA favored disclosure and that the MHSAA was primarily funded by or through state or local authority because its gate receipts came to it only through or by means of the schools' authority to regulate sporting events. Judge Jansen opined that the majority's holding was contrary to two cases, State Defender Union Employees v. Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n of Detroit, 230 Mich.App. 426, 432, 584 N.W.2d 359 (1998), and Kubick v. Child & Family Services, 171 Mich.App. 304, 429 N.W.2d 881 (1988), in which the Court of Appeals had held, respectively, that (1) funded for purposes of the FOIA definition of public body meant the receipt of a governmental grant or subsidy and (2) funding that amounted to less than half the total funding of a corporation did not amount to primary funding. Judge Jansen opined that the gate receipts remitted to the MHSAA were the functional equivalent of a grant or subsidy and that virtually the entire budget of the MHSAA came from gate receipts. Finally, Judge Jansen opined that the majority's holding was contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Brentwood that the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA), an organization that is allegedly analogous to the MHSAA, was a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. We granted plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal. 469 Mich. 952 (2003).