Opinion ID: 2612553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: trial court's jury instruction

Text: The trial court instructed the jury as follows with respect to the self-defense claim: When a defendant claims that he killed another in self-defense of his own person or property, the burden is upon that defendant to prove that the homicide was done in self-defense. It is not necessary for the defendant to prove this to you beyond a reasonable doubt nor by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant sustains his burden of proof, if, from a consideration of all the evidence in the case, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the injuries inflicted were done in self-defense. (Italics ours.) Clerk's Papers, at 67. The language of the above instruction was taken from a jury instruction on self-defense first approved by this court in 1930. State v. Turpin, 158 Wash. 103, 110-11, 290 P. 824 (1930). Interestingly enough, several recent Washington cases have invalidated jury instructions worded in language virtually identical to the instruction challenged here. See State v. Hanton, 94 Wn.2d 129, 131, 614 P.2d 1280 (1980); State v. Roberts, 88 Wn.2d 337, 345, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977); State v. Mayes, 20 Wn. App. 184, 187, 579 P.2d 999 (1978); State v. Stallworth, 19 Wn. App. 728, 733, 577 P.2d 617 (1978); State v. Modica, 18 Wn. App. 467, 479, 569 P.2d 1161 (1977); State v. Stepp, 18 Wn. App. 304, 308, 569 P.2d 1169 (1977). The italicized portions of the trial court's jury instruction erroneously indicated to the jurors that the petitioner had some burden of persuasion to carry which, if not met, would preclude their ability to acquit or find petitioner guilty of a lesser criminal act. As indicated above, there need only be some evidence of self-defense admitted in the case to raise the issue. An instruction requiring petitioner to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors places an unconstitutional burden of persuasion upon him. State v. Kroll, 87 Wn.2d 829, 839-40, 558 P.2d 173 (1976). [11] It remains to be determined whether the error in this case was prejudicial or harmless error. Since the error infringed upon a constitutional right of the petitioner, the error is presumed prejudicial, and the State has the burden of proving the error was harmless. State v. Stephens, 93 Wn.2d 186, 190-91, 607 P.2d 304 (1980). Constitutional errors cannot be deemed harmless unless they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967); State v. Evans, 96 Wn.2d 1, 5-10, 633 P.2d 83 (1981) (Brachtenbach, C.J., concurring); State v. Stephens, supra . An error in instructions is harmless if it is `trivial, or formal, or merely academic, and was not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and in no way affected the final outcome of the case.' State v. Savage, 94 Wn.2d 569, 578, 618 P.2d 82 (1980); State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 237, 559 P.2d 548 (1977); State v. Golladay, 78 Wn.2d 121, 139, 470 P.2d 191 (1970). The issue of misleading jury instructions was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979). In Sandstrom, the Court found the trial court's misleading instruction to be of constitutional proportions, but could not conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not reject the possibility that some jurors may have interpreted the challenged instruction as permissive, or, if mandatory, as requiring only that the defendant come forward with some evidence in rebuttal. However, the fact that a reasonable juror could have given the presumption conclusive or persuasion-shifting effect means that we cannot discount the possibility that Sandstrom's jurors actually did proceed upon one or the other of these latter interpretations. (Italics ours.) Sandstrom, at 519. The case was therefore remanded to the Montana Supreme Court for its determination of whether the instructional error was prejudicial or harmless. The same reasoning applies to the case before us as to the misleading self-defense instruction. A reasonable juror could have mistakenly concluded that the petitioner had not met his burden of proof to establish a reasonable doubt, and thus convicted him of first degree murder. Since the instruction in the present case could well have affected the final outcome of the case, the error cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Caldwell, 94 Wn.2d 614, 618-19, 618 P.2d 508 (1980). Accord, State v. Sandstrom, 603 P.2d 244, 245 (Mont. 1979) (on remand from Sandstrom v. Montana, supra ). The error must, therefore, be deemed prejudicial. Petitioner's conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial with proper jury instructions.