Opinion ID: 1928943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Collateral Estoppel Double Jeopardy

Text: Finally, Ford claims that, because his motions for judgments of acquittal were granted as to certain counts relating to certain victims, the trial court improperly allowed similar counts relating to other victims to go to the jury. Ford relies on the collateral estoppel form of double jeopardy for this argument, claiming that the subsequent convictions violated both the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Maryland common law. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the federal rule of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is incorporated in the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy. In Ashe, four armed men robbed six others who were playing poker. The defendant was indicted and tried for robbery of one of the six victims. He was acquitted of this charge, but then indicted for robbery of another victim of the poker game robbery. The Supreme Court determined from the record that when the jury acquitted the defendant based on insufficient evidence, it had concluded that the defendant was not one of the perpetrators. The Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as incorporated in the Fifth Amendment, prohibited retrial of this issue of ultimate fact decided in the first trial and integral to a conviction on another robbery charge in a subsequent trial. Id. at 442-43, 90 S.Ct. at 1193-94, 25 L.Ed.2d at 475. Maryland common law also recognizes the collateral estoppel form of double jeopardy. This common law collateral estoppel prevents the State from litigating a second time an issue of ultimate fact where there has already been a final determination of that issue in the accused's favor. Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 398, 354 A.2d 825, 834, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027, 97 S.Ct. 652, 50 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976) (citing Ashe ). The collateral estoppel form of double jeopardy is not based on two offenses being the same, but on two criminal charges having a common necessary factual component. Apostoledes v. State, 323 Md. 456, 463, 593 A.2d 1117, 1121 (1991). It may apply both to subsequent trials and within the same trial. Brooks v. State, 299 Md. 146, 155, 472 A.2d 981, 986 (1984). Ford relies on Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986), where the trial judge granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the felonies underlying a felony murder count, ruling that there is not sufficient evidence to require the Defendant to put on a defense with respect to the felony counts. Id. at 556, 515 A.2d at 1159. At the close of the defense's case, however, the trial judge decided to submit the felony murder count to the jury, which convicted the defendant of felony murder. This Court reversed the conviction, noting that the rule is not limited to the situation where the government attempts to institute a wholly new prosecution on the same charge after a judgment in an earlier prosecution. Rather, the acquittal on the merits terminates the initial jeopardy on a charge, normally precluding any type of further criminal proceedings on the same charge or, in some instances, on a related charge. Id. at 563, 515 A.2d at 1162-63; see also Brooks, 299 Md. at 155, 472 A.2d at 986 (also reversing conviction where trial judge first granted motion for judgment of acquittal, but then decided to send case to jury, which convicted defendant). In Wright we held that in applying collateral estoppel principles, [t]he critical question is whether the trial court's action at the close of the State's case constituted `a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.' Wright, 307 Md. at 569, 515 A.2d at 1166 (quoting Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 71, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2183, 57 L.Ed.2d 43, 58 (1978)) (other citations omitted). The analysis focuses on what the fact finder did find or must have found. Apostoledes, 323 Md. at 464, 593 A.2d at 1121. When a defendant claims that a judge's acquittal on one count has collaterally estopped further prosecution of a related count, the reviewing court may examine the judge's express basis for the ruling in order to determine if the judge resolved in the defendant's favor an ultimate factual issue essential to both counts. Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 320 Md. 17, 29-32, 575 A.2d 1227, 1233-34 (1990)). When a reviewing court undertakes this analysis, it must examine the substance of what occurred, not merely its procedural form. Wright, 307 Md. at 569-70, 515 A.2d at 1166. We also note that, on appeal, we are not concerned with whether the trial court was right or wrong in granting a judgment of acquittal. See id. at 562-63, 515 A.2d at 1162 (an acquittal on merits is final and precludes further trial proceedings, and [t]his is true even if the acquittal is based upon an error of law or an incorrect resolution of the facts.). Our only concern is whether the judgment reflects resolution of factual elements of the charged offenses. With this introduction, we turn to Ford's double jeopardy claims. Ford first asserts that the granting of judgments of acquittal on the counts of assault with intent to disable certain victims in a vehicle was necessarily a finding that he lacked the specific intent to commit the crime against any victims in that vehicle. Specifically, he claims that the judgments of acquittal with respect to the counts of aggravated assault on Norma Bennett, Leanne Ekberg, and John Miller should have precluded his conviction on the same charge with respect to Destiny Morris, who sat between Bennett and Ekberg in the front seat of the truck. A careful examination of the trial judge's reasoning, however, shows that these judgments of acquittal did not resolve an ultimate fact favorable to Ford. In fact, the judge explicitly found that the State had made out a prima facie case with respect to the passengers in the Miller truck, but was concerned that the jury might overreach on the potentially confusing theory of transferred intent. The judge stated: I have to err on the side of caution with respect to those type of charges and the defendant before the Court, and although the State has made out a prima facie case with respect to their evidence at this juncture, I have a great concern about overreaching with respect to the doctrine of transferred intent .. . and taking out [these counts] ... is not going to change anything because the defendant's statement is already in this case. (Emphasis added). Thus, the judge's ruling did not resolve in Ford's favor an ultimate factual issue which would preclude his conviction on similar charges as to other victims. One might even conclude that, by dismissing these counts, the trial judge actually protected Ford from potentially erroneous convictions. In an attempt to ease the jury's burden, the judge merely eliminated the charges he felt were surplusage. Ford next turns from intra-vehicle issues to counts relating to occupants of different vehicles. He claims that because the trial judge granted motions for judgments of acquittals of assault with intent to disable as to passengers in some vehicles, he could not be convicted of the same crime with respect to passengers in other cars. Specifically, he claims his acquittal of aggravated assault of Michelle Bazilio, Dontue Peoples, and Pongee Johnson, passengers in three separate vehicles, necessarily negated his intent to disable Rodney Marbury and LaShonda Thompson, passengers in two other vehicles. Similarly, he contends that because he was acquitted of assault with intent to disable three of the vehicles' drivers, he could not be convicted of assault with intent to disable the drivers of seven other vehicles. The Court of Special Appeals answered this charge succinctly and, we think, quite correctly: Each instance of rock throwing was a separate action by appellant, and, therefore, each separate action supported individualized consideration. For that reason alone, granting a motion for acquittal on some counts alleging attacks on other vehicles did not implicate at all the separate behavior and evidence necessary to support guilty verdicts on other counts. Ford, 90 Md. App. at 698, 603 A.2d at 895. Finally, the trial judge granted judgments of acquittal on all charges flowing from attacks on the cars driven by Tonia Wilkins and Patricia Jones. These included malicious destruction of the vehicles and assault and battery upon Wilkins, Jones, and Jones' passenger, Kim Mazacapa. Mazacapa did not testify and neither Wilkins nor Jones, who did testify, saw anyone throwing rocks. Ford contends that if these occupants' failure to see the perpetrators warranted judgments of acquittal, then judgments of acquittal should likewise have been granted on all charges involving two other vehicles whose occupants also did not testify that they saw anyone throwing rocks. The judge made clear at trial, however, that the facts made the Wilkins and Jones vehicles unique. The Jones vehicle was the first to be hit by rocks, and Patricia Jones testified that she did not see where the rocks came from or who the rock throwers might be. The court ruled that, from this testimony, the jury could make one inference in favor of Ford and one favorable to the State, and stated: But in my courtroom ties go to the runner. Although other persons had identified the rock throwers by the colors they were wearing, those identifications were for actions occurring after the Jones incident. Thus, the trial judge opined that the jury would have to speculate that the same rock throwers threw at Jones' car. Accordingly, the judge granted the motion as to all of the counts concerning Jones' car. The trial judge's reasoning distinguished the Jones vehicle from the others. Thus, there was no ruling in Ford's favor on an ultimate fact that would collaterally estop convictions on other counts. Wilkins' vehicle was perhaps even more unique than the Jones vehicle, because Wilkins did not realize at all that her car had been hit by a rock. She testified at trial that, as she drove on the Beltway, she heard a big thump on my side of the car. She kept driving and did not notice the dents on her car until the next morning. She never observed any rock throwers. Thus, the evidence as to Wilkins' vehicle was the weakest of all. In granting judgments of acquittal on charges relating to Wilkins' vehicle, the court again based its reasoning on its unwillingness to let the jury overreach. There was no finding of ultimate fact in Ford's favor, but merely an attempt by the trial judge to sort out complicated charges and to treat the defendant fairly. Since there was no resolution of an ultimate fact in Ford's favor, collateral estoppel principles were not implicated. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals on these and the preceding counts. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. McAULIFFE, RODOWSKY and KARWACKI, JJ., concur. McAULIFFE, Judge, concurring. I concur in the result, and join in the Court's opinion except as to the dictum concerning the doctrine of transferred intent, found in Part IV C. The Court holds that the defendant failed to preserve the alleged error of instructing the jury about transferred intent, and that in any event, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions on other grounds. The Court then proceeds by way of dictum to discuss the doctrine of transferred intent, and to invalidate a portion of that doctrine that we recently and specifically approved in State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988). Specifically, the Court states that the doctrine cannot apply: 1) to a crime requiring a specific intent to cause a specific type of harm to a specific person; and, 2) where the crime intended has actually been committed against the intended victim. Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, the first limitation on the use of the doctrine was not approved in Wilson, 313 Md. at 606 n. 3. Although of dubious validity, the first limitation is not the part of the Court's dictum that prompts this opinion. Rather, I am concerned with the Court's unnecessary, and in my opinion ill-advised, acceptance of the second limitation. The Court cites three decisions of California Courts of Appeal in support of the second limitation. A California case not cited by the majority, People v. Carlson, 37 Cal. App.3d 349, 112 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1974), appears to be to the contrary. In that case, the defendant killed his pregnant wife under circumstances sufficient to support a finding of manslaughter. Although the defendant may have had no intention to kill the unborn child his wife was carrying, the California court found that he would be criminally liable for his wife's death and the death of the fetus under the doctrine of transferred intent. Id. at 325. The rationale of the Carlson case was adopted and approved by the Court of Appeals of Michigan in People v. Lovett, 90 Mich. App. 169, 283 N.W.2d 357, 360 (1979). In 1989, the Supreme Court of California referred to two of the cases cited by the majority, and to Carlson, stating that although it had approved the rule of transferred intent in cases involving homicides, the court had not considered application of the doctrine where both the intended and the unintended victims were killed or injured. People v. Hunter, 49 Cal.3d 957, 264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 379, 782 P.2d 608, 620 (1989). Other courts have taken a different view of the applicability of the doctrine of transferred intent where both the intended and unintended victims were injured or killed. In State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 569 A.2d 1314 (1990), the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the defendant's argument that it should follow the rationale of the California courts relied upon by the majority here. The court said: When a defendant contemplates or designs the death of another, the purpose of deterrence is better served by holding that defendant responsible for the knowing or purposeful murder of the unintended as well as the intended victim. Hence, we reject defendant's argument that the successful killing of the intended victim prevents the `transfer' of that intent to an unintended victim. Id. at 1325. The New Jersey court also noted that federal courts have likewise applied the principle of transferred intent in cases where the intended victim is killed by the same act that kills the unintended victim, citing United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 674 (D.C. Cir.1980), and United States v. Weddell, 567 F.2d 767, 769-70 (8th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919, 98 S.Ct. 2267, 56 L.Ed.2d 761 (1978). Id. Recently, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated: We adopt the view announced by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Worlock . ... Robinson v. State, 1992 WL 426439, 620 A.2d 859 (Del.Supr. 1992) (unpublished). The Delaware court found that view entirely consistent with the statute of that state dealing with transferred intent, which provides: The element of intentional or knowing causation is not established if the actual result is outside the intention or the contemplation of the defendant unless: (1) The actual result differs from that intended or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person ... is injured or affected.... 11 Del.C. § 262. The Delaware statute essentially tracks § 2.03 of the Model Penal Code (1962). The Court's newly announced limitation on the doctrine of transferred intent is likely to present some interesting problems. Assume, for example, that the defendant, intending to kill A, shoots and wounds him, but the bullet passes through A and kills B. Under the Court's theory, I assume the defendant would be guilty of the murder of B, although also guilty of attempted murder or assault with intent to murder A. If A had also died, the Court would hold that the defendant could not be convicted of the murder of B, but only of battery, or perhaps manslaughter. What happens, then, if the defendant is convicted of the murder of B while A is still alive, but A dies of wounds received in the assault within a year and a day of the shooting? In my judgment, the Court goes too far in its attempt to limit the utilization of the doctrine of transferred intent in criminal cases. I would simply excise that dictum from the opinion. RODOWSKY and KARWACKI, JJ., join in this opinion.