Opinion ID: 2584741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Wheeler/Batson Inquiry

Text: (1) Both the federal and state Constitutions prohibit any advocate's use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 97; Georgia v. McCollum (1992) 505 U.S. 42, 59 [120 L.Ed.2d 33, 112 S.Ct. 2348]; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) Doing so violates both the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. ( People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 160 P.3d 84]; People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 541.) Here we couch our discussion, both general and particular, in terms of a challenge to the prosecutor's conduct. The principles, procedures and obligations, however, apply equally to all advocates. [7] (2) The Batson three-step inquiry is well established. First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge based on race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to demonstrate that the challenges were exercised for a race-neutral reason. Third, the court determines whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. ( Rice v. Collins (2006) 546 U.S. 333, 338 [163 L.Ed.2d 824, 126 S.Ct. 969].) The three-step procedure also applies to state constitutional claims. ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 341; People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 596 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292].) A prosecutor asked to explain his conduct must provide a `clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his `legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 20.) The justification need not support a challenge for cause, and even a `trivial' reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 136 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980], italics added.) A prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons. (See People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 165 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521]; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275.) Nevertheless, although a prosecutor may rely on any number of bases to select jurors, a legitimate reason is one that does not deny equal protection. ( Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 769 [131 L.Ed.2d 834, 115 S.Ct. 1769].) Certainly a challenge based on racial prejudice would not be supported by a legitimate reason. At the third stage of the Wheeler/Batson inquiry, the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor's demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy. ( Miller-El I, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 339.) [8] In assessing credibility, the court draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir dire. It may also rely on the court's own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even the common practices of the advocate and the office who employs him or her. (See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.) Review of a trial court's denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion is deferential, examining only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. ( People v. Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 341-342.) We review a trial court's determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor's justifications for exercising peremptory challenges `with great restraint.' [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.] ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1].) [9] The United States Supreme Court has also emphasized that a state trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent is a factual determination accorded great deference. ( Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 364-365.) Step three of the Batson inquiry involves an evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility, [citation], and `the best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.' [Citation.] In addition, race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke a juror's demeanor ( e.g., nervousness, inattention), making the trial court's first-hand observations of even greater importance. In this situation, the trial court must evaluate not only whether the prosecutor's demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror's demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor. We have recognized that these determinations of credibility and demeanor lie `peculiarly within a trial judge's province,' [citations], and we have stated that `in the absence of exceptional circumstances, we would defer to [the trial court].' [Citation.] ( Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1208].)