Opinion ID: 205003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Prohibition on Possessing Sexually Explicit Materials Condition [8]

Text: Mike contends that this condition is unrelated to his criminal history and the goal of preventing recidivism, is overly broad, and effects a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. Mike did not object to the imposition of this condition in his brief to the district court. Nevertheless, Mike now argues that his claim should not be subject to plain error review because the district court understood him to be objecting to all of the sex offender conditions imposed. We disagree. If Mike wanted to preserve his objections to this condition, he should have raised them in the same brief that he raised his objections to six of the other conditions the court imposed. Because he failed to do this, our review is for plain error. Mike's first argument fails. This argument is premised upon the fact that there is no evidence that Mike has ever abused or even possessed pornography in the past, much less that it is likely to lead him to commit a sexual offense in the future. Two circuits have held in circumstances similar to those presented here that such a ban is impermissible. See United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 75-79 (1st Cir.2009); United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 150-53 (3d Cir.2007). However, at least one circuit has reached a different conclusion. See United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232, 1234-35 (9th Cir.1998). [9] Therefore, in light of this split, and Mike's background, namely the psychosexual evaluations performed in 2004 and 2005, the 2008 mental health assessment, and the gruesomeness of his 1997 sex offense, we cannot say that it is obvious or clear that the ban on his possession of sexually explicit materials is not reasonably related to any of the factors discussed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thus, the court did not plainly err. Mike's second and third arguments are, in essence, the same. Therefore, we will review them together. According to Mike, this condition is overly broad and imposes too great of a deprivation of liberty because it prohibits him from possessing a copy of his presentence report, which discusses his sexual assault offense, writings that may be required for his court-ordered sex offender treatment, and adult pornography. Mike cites Cope, 527 F.3d 944, in support of his contention that the said condition includes his presentence report and writings from treatment. In Cope, the Ninth Circuit found that a condition similar to the one at issue here was overly broad because it straightforwardly applie[d] to the defendant's own presentence report, copies of statutes and cases that the defendant might need were he to bring a collateral challenge to an aspect of his sentence once he is released from prison, and a sexual autobiography that may be a required element of the defendant's sex offender treatment program. 527 F.3d at 957-58. Because of this breadth, the court vacated the condition. We find the Ninth Circuit's approach for interpreting release conditions to be overly technical, and opt instead for a more commonsense one. See United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 234 (5th Cir.2009) (reviewing a condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials in a common-sense way). Applying a commonsense approach, we do not find that the condition at issue includes Mike's presentence report or any writings that may be part of his treatment. Therefore, we will not vacate on this ground. We also will not vacate the condition because of its prohibition on Mike possessing adult pornography. Given the current state of the law, we cannot say that it is clear or obvious that the imposition of a condition prohibiting a defendant, who has committed a sexual offense, but not a sexual offense involving pornography, from possessing legal, adult pornography is a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. Compare Bee, 162 F.3d at 1234-35 (upholding a condition prohibiting the possession of pornography under a similar attack), and United States v. Carpenter, 280 Fed.Appx. 866, 869 (11th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (stating that a condition banning the possession of sexually explicit materials involving adults was not overly broad), with Voelker, 489 F.3d at 153 (vacating a similar condition). As a consequence, Mike's overbreadth and greater deprivation than is necessary arguments fail.