Opinion ID: 1092278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reduction to Part-time Status

Text: The trial court, sitting without a jury, heard ore tenus evidence, and found for A & P on all counts. On appeal, this Court will review the trial court's findings with a presumption of correctness ... if these conclusions were based totally or in part on oral testimony. This Court will not disturb the trial court's conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence. First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. Martin, 425 So.2d 415, 425-26 (Ala.1982). Where the evidence before the trial court [is] undisputed the ore tenus rule is inapplicable, and the Supreme Court will sit in judgment on the evidence de novo, indulging no presumption in favor of the trial court's application of the law to those facts. Stiles v. Brown, 380 So.2d 792, 794 (Ala.1980). The elements of proof in an ADEA action have recently been announced by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In order to make out a prima facie case, plaintiff must show `facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that discrimination has occurred.' McCorstin v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir.1980). Such an inference is generally established by proving that the plaintiff 1) belongs to the statutorily protected age group; 2) was qualified for the job; 3) was discharged; and 4) was replaced by a person outside the protected age group. Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (11th Cir.1982). [O]nce a prima facie case has been established, the employer has the burden of producing evidence tending to show that the employee's discharge was for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason such as good cause. 675 F.2d at 1224. If the employer comes forward with a nondiscriminatory reason, then the employee must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's asserted legitimate reason for the discharge is merely pretextual. Id. The nondiscriminatory defense must be one allowed by the ADEA. Plaintiff need not show that age was the sole reason for his discharge or reduction, but only that age was a determinative factor in the employer's decision to fire him. Id. at 1224. See, Pace v. Southern Ry. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383, 1387 (11th Cir.1983). Plaintiff must produce some evidence that an employer has not treated age neutrally, but has instead discriminated based upon it. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129-30 (5th Cir.1981). Regardless of these elements and burdens, plaintiff still carries the ultimate burden of proof. In a Title VII case, the United States Supreme Court stated, The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.... It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. The Court added, The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Applying these rules to the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that A & P did not discriminate against appellants on an age basis in the time reduction decision. The undisputed evidence shows that A & P eliminated all full-time checker positions in order to increase efficiency and reduce costs. Eight of the eleven reduced employees were younger than 40 years old. In scheduling appellants' work hours, management gave both of them as many hours as other reduced workers, or more hours. A & P did not hire full-time checkers to replace appellants; instead, A & P hired part-time workers who averaged fewer hours per week than appellants. On the basis of this evidence, it would appear that A & P did not discriminate at all with respect to appellants. Among all the checkers, appellants were treated most favorably. Testimony was presented at trial that suggested A & P targeted appellant Burroughs for mistreatment. This issue was disputed at trial and cannot serve as a basis for reversal. Even so, appellants did not present any evidence that age discrimination was the basis for, or a factor in, A & P's policies or decisions. With the burden of persuasion under the ADEA always resting with plaintiff to prove age was a determinative factor in the employment decision, this Court will not reverse the trial judgment when the evidence is in dispute. We find substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that A & P did not discriminate in the time reduction decision. [3]