Opinion ID: 1834950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the lineup so suggestive as to violate due process of law?

Text: Wilson argues first that the actual live lineup was a per se violation of his due process rights because Manuel had failed to identify Wilson from any pictorial lineup administered prior to the live lineup. The record indicates that the photograph used in the pictorial lineup was eight years old and there was testimony at the trial that Wilson's appearance had changed since that photo was taken. In Robinson v. State, 473 So.2d 957, 961 (Miss. 1985), a witness was unable to identify a defendant from a photograph on the night of the robbery but subsequently did identify the defendant in a photographic lineup. We ruled that these grounds were insufficient to prevent an in-court identification by the witness. In Magee v. State, 542 So.2d 228, 232-33 (Miss. 1989), a robbery victim was unable to identify the defendant from a live lineup. The next day she positively identified the defendant from a photographic lineup. In spite of the fact that the defendant was the only person who appeared in both the photo lineup and the actual lineup, we found no merit to the contention that the trial court erred in allowing the victim's identification testimony. We followed United States v. O'Neal, 496 F.2d 368, 372 (6th Cir.1974), and said: The initial misidentification on the part of these eyewitnesses to a crime did not completely destroy the value of their testimony or render it inadmissible. The jury was fully advised of the original mistake and had it as well as the subsequent testimony identifying appellant before them to weigh. The weight to be given this evidence was for the jury to determine. We have already rejected the rationale upon which Wilson bases his argument that the trial court committed a per se violation of due process and we reject it again. As a second point, Wilson argues that Manuel's identification of Wilson cannot stand in light of Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 411 (1972). We have recognized many times that the Biggers factors come into play only if the identification procedure utilized was impermissibly suggestive. Jones v. State, 504 So.2d 1196, 1199 (Miss. 1987). In York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372, 1383 (Miss. 1982), we discussed at length allegedly suggestive pre-trial procedures and their effect on in-court identification: Only pretrial identifications which are suggestive, without necessity for conducting them in such manner, are proscribed. A lineup or series of photographs in which the accused, when compared with the others, is conspicuously singled out in some manner from the others, either from appearance or statements by an officer, is impermissibly suggestive. (citations omitted.) An impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification does not preclude in-court identification by an eyewitness who viewed the suspect at the procedure, unless: (1) from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it (2) the identification was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Even if testimony is proffered of the out-of-court identification itself, the same standard exists as to the above, with the omission of the word `irreparable'. An unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial identification does not prevent an in-court identification by an eyewitness ... unless from the totality of the circumstances the identification was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1087 (Miss. 1987); Goggins v. State, 529 So.2d 649, 652-53 (Miss. 1988); Wash v. State, 521 So.2d 890, 895 (Miss. 1988); York v. State, 413 So.2d 1372, 1383 (Miss. 1982). Upon reviewing a photograph of the lineup participants, we find nothing that would distinguish Wilson from the other participants in the lineup. Nothing in the trial record indicates that Wilson was singled out in any way. The identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive and therefore, the Biggers factors do not even come into play. Assuming arguendo, that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive, Manuel's identification does not have to be excluded if upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification. Lannom v. State, 464 So.2d 492, 494 (Miss. 1985). The standards to be considered under these circumstances are: (1) Opportunity of the witness to view the accused at the time of the crime; (2) The degree of attention exhibited by the witness; (3) The accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal; (4) The level of certainty exhibited by the witness at the confrontation; (5) The length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Nixon, 533 So.2d at 1087; Goggins, 529 So.2d at 652-53; Wash, 521 So.2d at 895-96; Lannom, 464 So.2d at 494-95; York, 413 So.2d at 1383; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140, 154 (1977); Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382, 34 L.Ed.2d at 411. With these standards in mind, we note: