Opinion ID: 1322365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intervening Events have Mooted the Environmental Groups' Scope-of-Consultation Claim

Text: We have no subject-matter jurisdiction if a case is moot. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259 v. Disability Rights Ctr. of Kan., 491 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 2007). We review questions of mootness de novo. R.M. Inv. Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 511 F.3d 1103, 1107 (10th Cir.2007). `Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.' Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr., 428 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir.1996)). `Without a live, concrete controversy, we lack jurisdiction to consider claims no matter how meritorious.' Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, 518 F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th Cir.2007)). Declaratory judgment actions must be sustainable under the same mootness criteria that apply to any other lawsuit. See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1147 (Actions seeking a declaratory judgment must comport with the same mootness principles as any other suit. (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we noted in Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., [i]t is well established that what makes a declaratory judgment action a proper judicial resolution of a case or controversy rather than an advisory opinion is the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff. 43 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1994) (brackets, en dash, and internal quotation marks omitted), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a), as recognized in Walker v. UPS Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1278 (10th Cir.2001). `The crucial question is whether granting a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world.' Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir.2000)).
The appellants challenge the district court's determination that the FWS's issuance of the 2003 B.O. did not moot the Environmental Groups' claims. [10] To determine whether any claim remains for review, we must ascertain what type of relief the Environmental Groups seek, and whether we can, at this juncture, afford them meaningful relief. [11] See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir.1997). The Environmental Groups essentially contend that, since the Minnow's listing as endangered, and continuing to the date of the filing of the third amended complaint, Reclamation has failed to fully consult. They prayed for a declaration [12] that the federal agencies are violating § 7(a)(2) by failing to consult on all discretionary aspects of the federal action, and for an injunction ordering full consultation. Because only the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. had been issued when the Environmental Groups filed their third amended complaint, we must therefore interpret their pleadings as directed at the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. The Environmental Groups' allegations of legal wrongdoing must be grounded in a concrete and particularized factual context; they are not subject to review as free-floating, ethereal grievances. See Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 251 F.3d 1007, 1010 (D.C.Cir.2001) (To determine whether anything remains of NMA's case, we need to identify which regulations NMA challenged and whether the new rules altered those regulations.). And only the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. were extant targets for their allegations. The problem for the Environmental Groups, however, is that neither the 2001 B.O. nor 2002 B.O. still exists. After the Environmental Groups filed their third amended complaint, the FWS issued the 2003 B.O., which superseded both of them. The 2003 B.O. establishes a new regulatory framework under which the propriety of Reclamation's actions must be judged. The Environmental Groups have not argued that the 2003 B.O. is a mirror image of the two biological opinions that it supplanted, nor could they. Nor have they asserted that the changes are only superficial[]. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 360 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.2004). We must conclude that the FWS's issuance of the 2003 B.O. mooted the Environmental Groups' prayer for both injunctive and declaratory relief. If we issued an injunction directing Reclamation to consult concerning the biological opinions at issue in this litigation, it would have no effect in the real world because those biological opinions have been superseded. Indeed, even as to the 2003 B.O., a consultation injunction would be meaningless because the federal agencies already have consulted. An injunction ordering consultation [using an expanded scope] is no longer warranted. There is no point in ordering an action that has already taken place. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 728. Furthermore, any declaration that the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. were insufficient due to Reclamation's failure to fully consult would be wholly without effect in the real world. The Environmental Groups insist that we are situated to provide some relief, especially declaratory relief regarding the scope of Reclamation's discretion in consultation. However, the Environmental Groups have not been able to point to some concrete ongoing injury. See Cox, 43 F.3d at 1348 ([T]his court has explained that a plaintiff cannot maintain a declaratory or injunctive action unless he or she can demonstrate a good chance of being likewise injured [by the defendant] in the future. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the regulations governing formal consultation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14, and reinitiation of formal consultation, 50 C.F.R. § 402.16, [13] demonstrate, the duty to consult is not itself an ongoing agency action subject to challenge. See Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 439-40 (5th Cir.1991) (Once an agency submits a plan that has been agreed to through the section 7 consultation process, the court then, applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, must approve or disapprove it.). In other words, the Environmental Groups cannot challenge the scope of consultation untethered from the federal agencies' efforts to develop a biological opinion. The consultation process culminates in the issuance of a biological opinion. [14] Water Keeper Alliance, 271 F.3d at 26. And, in this case, that biological opinion has now been issued (i.e., the 2003 B.O.). The Environmental Groups' concerns about whether Reclamation will appropriately consult with the FWS in response to changing water-demand conditions are far too speculative to support a claim for declaratory relief. Any such relief would amount to an advisory opinion regarding the scope of Reclamation's discretion and such an opinion would clearly be improper. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 730 (SUWA has not shown that the defendants are likely to violate section 7(a)(2) in the near future.); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.2007) (concluding that a claim for declaratory relief regarding allegedly improper regulatory policy was mooted by governmental agency's listing of killer whale species as endangered, which was ultimate objective of environmental advocacy appellants; the fact that agency employed the allegedly improper policy in effecting the listing did not alter the mootness calculus because it was too speculative that this policy in the future  might adversely affect listed species or affect  other  killer whale species); Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 04-3096-PA, 2007 WL 1072112, at  (D.Or. Apr.3, 2007) (Plaintiffs also argue that declaratory relief would be helpful to `ensure that the [new] BiOp complies with the law and does so in a timely manner' and that declaratory relief would `clarify and settle' defendants' legal obligations. I agree with defendants, however, such justifications are so vague as to make Article III's `case or controversy' requirement meaningless. Courts should not micromanage an agency's procedures under the guise of judicial review.). We addressed an analogous situation in Wyoming. There the State of Wyoming successfully brought a NEPA challenge before the district court against a rule of the U.S. Forest Service, commonly known as the `Roadless Rule,' that generally prohibited road construction in inventoried roadless areas on National Forest System lands. 414 F.3d at 1210. During the pendency of the appeal by certain environmental group defendant-intervenors, the Forest Service issued a final rule that replaced the Roadless Rule, and we concluded that the new rule has mooted the issues in th[e] case and dismissed the appeal. Id. In particular, we noted that [t]he portions of the Roadless Rule that were substantively challenged by Wyoming no longer exist. Id. at 1212. Furthermore, we reasoned that the alleged procedural deficiencies of the Roadless Rule are now irrelevant because the replacement rule was promulgated in a new and separate rulemaking process. Id. As in Wyoming, to the extent that the Environmental Groups seek a declaration that the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. are legally infirm due to Reclamation's failure to consult using the full scope of its discretion, we are not situated to issue a present determination with real-world effect because those regulations no longer are operationalfor all material purposes, they no longer exist. And, because of that fact, we likewise are not situated to cure any purported procedural irregularities in Reclamation's consultation behavior concerning those opinions. Thus, the Environmental Groups' claims are moot. See also Colo. Off-Highway Vehicle Coal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 357 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir.2004) (Plaintiff's challenge to the 1997 Decision Notice and its request for declaratory and injunctive relief is moot. The 1998 Routt Forest Plan and its accompanying [off-road vehicle] use policy now governs the Routt National Forest making Plaintiff's attack on the 1997 Decision Notice futile. (emphasis added)); cf. Camfield v. City of Okla. City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1223 (10th Cir. 2001) (Because parties have no legally cognizable interest in the constitutional validity of an obsolete statute, a statutory amendment moots a case to the extent that it removes challenged features of the prior law[.] (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). On these facts, cases of our sister circuits also are instructive. For example, in American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Service, the Ninth Circuit summarized plaintiffs' challenge as follows: The plaintiffs alleged that the 1994-1998 Biological Opinion [issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service] violated § 7(a)(2) of the ESA. Specifically, American Rivers contended that the federal defendants violated the ESA by relying on the transportation of Snake River smolts to conclude that the 1994-1998 operations of the River Power System are unlikely to jeopardize the continued existence of the listed salmon. 126 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir.1997) (footnote omitted). However, during the course of the litigation, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued a new biological opinion (1995 Biological Opinion) which superseded the [challenged] 1994-1998 Biological Opinion. Id. at 1123. With little difficulty, the Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' action was moot. Id. at 1124 ([T]he biological opinion in the present case has been superseded by the 1995 Biological Opinion. Therefore, any challenge to the 1994-1998 Biological Opinion is moot.). The D.C. Circuit reached a similar conclusion in National Mining Ass'n. At issue there was the validity of several federal regulatory requirements imposed on permit applicants, and the procedures for contesting the accuracy of information used to determine permit eligibility. 251 F.3d at 1009. The permits were issued under the Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., and its implementing regulations; no one could engage in surface coal mining without such a permit. Id. After oral argument, the Interior Department revised the regulations that governed some of the challenged regulatory requirements and procedures and, consequently, the D.C. Circuit was faced with additional questions concerning the extent to which the case is now moot. Id. After identifying the regulations that were the subject of appellant's challenge, the D.C. Circuit determined that the Interior Department's revisions to those regulations rendered appellant's attack upon them moot. Id. at 1010-11. In particular, the D.C. Circuit stressed that the revisions effected substantial changes to the previously existing regulatory regime, thus altering the real-world conditions and eliminating the possibility of meaningful relief. Id. at 1011. The court noted: The old set of rules, which are the subject of this lawsuit, cannot be evaluated as if nothing has changed. A new system is now in place. Id. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit determined that the revisions mooted appellant's challenge. See also Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir.2003) (holding ESA § 7 and § 9 claims moot when challenged permits were issued pursuant to superseded biological opinion); Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 446 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that the same rule of mootness applies where an agency would no longer be relying on the particular biological opinion that was being challenged, but rather upon a new opinion, and where an agency will be basing its ruling on different criteria or factors in the future). The relevant case law thus strongly counsels in favor of a conclusion of mootness here. Due to the FWS's issuance of the 2003 B.O., we can provide no effective relief. The Environmental Groups did not challenge the 2003 B.O., and it currently governs Reclamation's disposition of the water at issue. That B.O. has altered the real-world parameters within which Reclamation operates, creating a new regulatory context for assessing its compliance with its ESA obligations. The Environmental Groups' reliance on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Forest Guardians v. Johanns is unavailing. In that case, the Forest Service and the FWS engaged in comprehensive management and monitoring of lands used for grazing that ultimately allowed the Forest Service to presume that the FWS concurred each year in a no-jeopardy finding for parcels of land covered by its plan. Johanns, 450 F.3d at 458-59. When the Forest Service did not comply with the management and monitoring requirements, the plaintiff brought suit claiming that consultation should be reinitiated. See id. at 459-60. The Forest Service then reinitiated consultation and subsequently received the FWS's concurrence in its no-jeopardy finding. Id. at 461. In holding that the Forest Service's subsequent reinitiation of consultation did not moot the plaintiff's claims, the court distinguished our decision in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. The court observed that the monitoring requirements were on-going action that would extend through the lease term. Id. at 462. Additionally, the court determined that the Forest Service was likely to continue its practice of not complying with the monitoring requirements, especially because it argued that compliance was not required. Id. The court, therefore, determined that a [d]eclaratory judgment in favor of Forest Guardians would thus ensure that the Forest Service does not continue to fail to meet its monitoring responsibilities in the future and that it fulfills its duty under the ESA to consult with FWS when necessary. Id. Consequently, the court concluded that, although the plaintiff's request for an injunction was mooted by reinitiation of consultation, a declaratory judgment would, nevertheless, provide relief. Id. at 462-63. The absence of an on-going ESA violation makes this case distinguishable from Johanns and more akin to Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 728-30 (finding plaintiff's claim, seeking declaratory judgment for the Bureau of Land Management's alleged failure to consult with the FWS as required by § 7(a)(2), moot when agencies subsequently completed informal consultation). Unlike the Forest Service in Johanns, Reclamation is not currently engaged in the same behavior that was the subject of the Environmental Groups' objections. Instead, the FWS issued a superseding B.O. with which Reclamation is complying. Thus, we are constrained to conclude that the issuance of the 2003 B.O. mooted the Environmental Groups' scope-of-consultation claim under the ESA.
The Environmental Groups argue, and the district court held, that the scope-of-consultation claim was not mooted by the issuance of the 2003 B.O. because Reclamation voluntarily ceased the alleged objectionable behavior. We disagree. One exception to a claim of mootness is a defendant's voluntary cessation of an alleged illegal practice which the defendant is free to resume at any time. Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance v. Kempthorne, 545 F.3d 884, 892 (10th Cir. 2008). The rule that `voluntary cessation of a challenged practice rarely moots a federal case . . . traces to the principle that a party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior.' Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1149 (quoting City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 743, 148 L.Ed.2d 757 (2001)). In other words, this exception exists to counteract the possibility of a defendant ceasing illegal action long enough to render a lawsuit moot and then resuming the illegal conduct. Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 892. Voluntary actions may, nevertheless, moot litigation if two conditions are satisfied: (1) it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (internal quotation marks, elipses, and citations omitted). [V]oluntary cessation of offensive conduct will only moot litigation if it is clear that the defendant has not changed course simply to deprive the court of jurisdiction. Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam). The party asserting mootness bears the `heavy burden of persua[ding]' the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968)). In practice, however, Laidlaw 's heavy burden frequently has not prevented governmental officials from discontinuing challenged practices and mooting a case. [15] Thus, even when a legislative body has the power to re-enact an ordinance or statute, ordinarily an amendment or repeal of it moots a case challenging the ordinance or statute. See Camfield, 248 F.3d at 1223; see also Native Vill. of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1994) (A statutory change, however, is usually enough to render a case moot, even if the legislature possesses the power to reenact the statute after the lawsuit is dismissed. As a general rule, if a challenged law is repealed or expires, the case becomes moot.); 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3533.6, at 259 (The legislative rules established by statute or administrative regulation may shift as an action progresses. Ordinarily courts respond by applying the law in force at the time of decision. . . . Mootness may result because the change has removed any basis for a claim, or has fully satisfied the claim. (emphasis added)); 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3533.6, at 277 (Repeal . . . likewise moots attacks on a statute.). Indeed, in this governmental context, [m]ost cases that deny mootness rely on clear showings of reluctant submission [by governmental actors] and a desire to return to the old ways. 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3533.6, at 311 (emphasis added). More specifically, when a legislature repeals or amends a statute after it is judicially challenged, we have concluded that the voluntary-cessation exception has no application where there is no evidence in the record to indicate that the legislature intends to reenact the prior version of the disputed statute. Camfield, 248 F.3d at 1223-24. In Camfield, we distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982), where the Court determined that the action was not moot, by noting that Aladdin's Castle preclud[es] a mootness determination in cases challenging a prior version of a state statute only when the legislature has openly expressed its intent to reenact the challenged law. Id. Likewise, the [w]ithdrawal or alteration of administrative policies can moot an attack on those policies. Bahnmiller v. Derwinski, 923 F.2d 1085, 1089 (4th Cir.1991); see, e.g., Coliseum Square Ass'n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 246 (5th Cir.2006) (Corrective action by an agency can moot an issue.). And the mere possibility that an agency might rescind amendments to its actions or regulations does not enliven a moot controversy. Ala. Hosp. Ass'n v. Beasley, 702 F.2d 955, 961 (11th Cir.1983). A case cease[s] to be a live controversy if the possibility of recurrence of the challenged conduct is only a `speculative contingency.' Burbank v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744, 748 (7th Cir.1975) (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969)). Guided by these principles, we proceed to apply the two-part test of County of Los Angeles here. We conclude that the district court erred in applying the voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine in this case. Our de novo review of the record convinces us that the appellants have met their burden of establishing mootness. The first part of the test requires us to inquire whether we can say with assurance that `there is no reasonable expectation' that the alleged violation will recur. County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379. Our review of the record assures us that, in light of intervening events, there is no reasonable expectation that Reclamation will revert to using the same consulting process which resulted in the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. Although the district court's September 23, 2002 order no doubt played a role in the FWS's issuance of the 2003 B.O., the absence of evidence here that the federal agencies used the issuance of the new B.O. merely to defeat the district court's jurisdiction weakens the implication that they manipulated the system. See Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 893 (Nothing in the record presented to us indicates the BLM's termination of the leases at issue constitutes a `voluntary cessation' of illegal conduct made in an effort to evade judicial review or avoid judgment by temporarily altering questionable behavior.); Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325 (We will not require some physical or logical impossibility that the challenged policy will be reenacted absent evidence that the voluntary cessation is a sham for continuing possibly unlawful conduct.); see also 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3533.7, at 326 (noting that although governmental defendants might take action as a direct response to litigation, [a]t any rate, self-correction again provides a secure foundation for mootness so long as it seems genuine); cf. Save Greers Ferry Lake, Inc. v. Dep't of Def., 255 F.3d 498, 501 (8th Cir. 2001) ([W]hile the district court's preliminary injunction clearly had the salutary effect of prompting the Corps to reevaluate its issuance of the FONSI [Finding of No Significant Impact], withdraw the 2000 SMP [Shoreline Management Plan], and decide to prepare an EIS [Environmental Impact Statement], the injunction cannot continue in effect insofar as it purports to adjudicate the present or future legality of the withdrawn 2000 SMP and to order an EIS for the 2000 SMP.). [16] Moreover, we are not here presented with a mere informal promise or assurance on the part of the [governmental] defendants that the challenged practice will cease. Burbank, 520 F.2d at 748; see also 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3553.7, at 351-52 (noting that a conclusion of mootness ordinarily does not follow announcement of an intention to change or adoption of a plan to work toward lawful behavior). Instead, the FWS took the concrete step in 2003 of issuing a new biological opinion. This 2003 B.O. superseded and rendered obsolete the two biological opinions that provided the framework for the Environmental Groups' challenge to Reclamation's scope of discretion. This 2003 B.O. established a new regulatory context for assessing the propriety of Reclamation's conduct under the ESA. Therefore, there is no reasonable expectation that Reclamation's actions could give rise to the scope-of-discretion issue in the same (or essentially the same) manner that gave rise to the Environmental Groups' challenge. See County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 632, 99 S.Ct. 1379 (concluding that use of unvalidated civil service exam unlikely to recur because, following commencement of litigation, city instituted new method of screening job applicants and increasing minority representation in fire department). We do recognize that Reclamation has not abandoned its narrow view of the scope of its discretion. [17] Specifically, Reclamation provided for an option to achieve the 2003 B.O.'s RPAs that was consistent with its narrow view and contrary to the district court's rulings concerning the scope of its discretion. However, even if Reclamation's reservation of this narrow-discretion option suggests some possibility that it would revert to its narrow scope-of-discretion view should it avoid the precedential effects of the district court's ordersthrough, for example, a mootness determination and vacaturthat possibility likely would not be sufficient to warrant application of the voluntary-cessation exception. See Ala. Hosp. Ass'n, 702 F.2d at 961 (noting that the mere possibility that an agency might rescind amendments to its actions or regulations does not enliven a moot controversy). Moreover, even if we accorded that possibility some persuasive force on the voluntary-cessation question, we would recognize that if the scope-of-discretion issue does arise again it would be in a different regulatory context than that challenged by the Environmental Groups (i.e., the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O.). Consequently, the precise issue that was the subject of the Environmental Groups' action is no longer extant, and it would not be reasonably likely to recur through Reclamation's actions. See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1150 ([T]he `allegedly wrongful behavior' in this case is highly fact-and context-specific, rather than conduct that is likely to `recur' on similar facts and in the same context. In such a case, the `voluntary cessation' doctrine is inapplicable, because our review of future instances of `wrongful behavior' may be quite different than the complained-of example that already has ceased.). Moreover, significantly, the change effected by the 2003 B.O. is likely to be rather lengthy in duration. See Burbank, 520 F.2d at 748 (noting that the court was not faced with a situation where the order is of brief duration and the plaintiff may well be again confronted with the challenged conduct when the order terminates); see also 13C Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra note 15, § 3553.7, at 341 (noting that [t]emporary compliance with a decree pending appeal, for example, clearly should not moot a case). As noted, through Congress's enactment of the minnow riders, the ESA adequacy of the 2003 B.O.'s RPAs and ITS has been assured until March 2013. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the Reclamation would give up the protective shield constructed by the minnow riders during the ten-year period and revert to substantially the same discretionary approach that it followed in the 2001 B.O. and 2002 B.O. in consulting concerning a new biological opinion. The district court expressly concluded that the minnow riders did not militate against application of the voluntary-cessation exception. Significantly, however, in reaching this conclusion, the district court apparently did not consider the amendment to the 2004 minnow rider that had been enacted only three days before its ruling. Tellingly, the district court stated: Movants [federal agencies] have failed to establish that it is absolutely clear that they would not return to their wrongful use of an impermissibly narrow and limited scope of discretion in future ESA consultations. The 2004 minnow rider is conditional: it protects the 2003 BO only if the federal agencies comply with the ITS and RPA, and only to the extent that the 2003 BO is not amended. It is virtually a certainty that there will be more ESA consultations in the near future over water operations in the middle Rio Grande. . . . All the considerations that affect water operation decisions on minnow survival such as climate, water availability, the understanding of minnow biology, and so forth, are subject to change, meaning the issue of the scope of discretion is likely to recur. J.A. at 240-41 (emphasis added). The district court's application of the voluntary-cessation exception therefore appears to have been grounded on a false premise viz., that the minnow riders would ensure that Reclamation's actions pursuant to the 2003 B.O. comported with the ESA only so long as the 2003 B.O. was not amended. In fact, even through a series of amendments to the 2003 B.O. over the ten-year life span of the minnow riders, Reclamation's conduct can still remain insulated from ESA attack, so long as it conforms to that B.O. In sum, County of Los Angeles's first inquiry does not support a conclusion of voluntary cessation. The second part of the County of Los Angeles test requires little discussion here. Under that part, we examine whether interim events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379. After undertaking this inquiry, we can identify no lingering effects from the federal agencies' alleged violations of the ESA in connection with the issuance of the 2001 and 2002 biological opinions. As discussed at length supra Part II(A)(2), any injury inflicted upon the Environmental Groups by Reclamation's purported failure to consult to the full scope of its discretion in connection with the 2001 and 2002 biological opinions cannot be said to have survived the issuance of the 2003 B.O., which superseded and replaced those opinions. In bolstering its case against mootness, the Environmental Groups contend the scope-of-discretion issue is still significant and has a day-to-day impact on Reclamation's ability to effectively comply with the flow requirements of the 2003 B.O. See Aplees. Br. at 35 (The extent of the Bureau's authority to alter operations of El Vado Dam or the MRG Project diversion dams affects the success of its efforts every day to comply with the flow requirements of the 2003 BO. If the Bureau has broad discretion to control water operations, it is also more likely to be able to purchase necessary water, because water rights holders will know that, one way or another, the Bureau will have to obtain enough water to avoid jeopardy.). However, as the federal agencies correctly note, the Environmental Groups have not filed a claim or sought relief with respect to Reclamation's day-to-day activities in complying with the 2003 B.O. And ordinarily it would not be appropriate for a federal court to be in the business of monitoring such day-to-day compliance activities in any event. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 67, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) (The prospect of pervasive oversight by federal courts over the manner and pace of agency compliance with such [broad] congressional directives is not contemplated by the APA.); see also Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C.Cir.2006). In sum, we simply are unable to conclude that the FWS's issuance of the 2003 B.O., and Reclamation's adoption of it, provide the appropriate foundation for application of the voluntary-cessation exception of the mootness doctrine. Accordingly, this litigation is moot with regard to the scope-of-consultation claim, and the district court erred in denying the appellants' motions to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The dissent contends that we have incorrectly applied a de novo standard of review to the voluntary-cessation exception to the mootness doctrine. Dissent at 1134. In particular, the dissent asserts that we should review the district court's determination as to the effect of the federal agencies' voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal activities under the more deferential abuse of discretion standard.  Id. at 1135 (emphasis added). This standard leads the dissent to conclude regarding the issue of recurrence (i.e., the first part of the County of Los Angeles test) that we must agree with the district court and assume that the federal agencies may sidestep their self-mandated practices. Id. at 1137. Likewise, the dissent is guided by this deferential standard in resolving the question of whether interim events have comprehensively and irrevocably eliminated the effects of the alleged violation (i.e., the second part of the County of Los Angeles test). Indicative of this deference, the dissent states that it conclude[s] that the district court acted quite reasonably when it determined that the federal agencies cannot show that the effects of the ESA violation have been completely and irrevocably eradicated. Id. at 1138 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, we must disagree with our thoughtful colleague in dissent. In particular, we respectfully submit that the dissent's objection to the standard of review is misguided. It apparently overlooks the critical distinction between constitutional mootness and prudential mootnessonly the former kind of mootness is at issue here. Courts recognize two kinds of mootness: constitutional mootness and prudential mootness. See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-34, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953); Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir.1997); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727-28; Bldg. & Constr. Dep't v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 7 F.3d 1487, 1491-92 (10th Cir.1993); New Mexico ex rel. N.M. State Highway Dep't v. Goldschmidt, 629 F.2d 665, 668-69 (10th Cir.1980); see also Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C.Cir.1980) (per curiam) (The doctrine of mootness has two distinct branches.); 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533. 1, at 725 (3d ed.2008). Under the constitutional-mootness doctrine, a federal court has jurisdiction over only cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. [A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if a case is not constitutionally moot, a court may dismiss the case under the prudential-mootness doctrine if the case is so attenuated that considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court to stay its hand, and to withhold relief it has the power to grant. Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727 (stating that [p]rudential mootness addresses not the power to grant relief but the court's discretion in the exercise of that power (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). [P]rudential mootness arises out of the court's general discretion in formulating prospective equitable remedies. . . . Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492; see Chamber of Commerce, 627 F.2d at 291 (The cousin of the mootness doctrine, in its strict Article III sense, is a melange of doctrines relating to the court's discretion in matters of remedy and judicial administration.). This doctrine generally applies only to requests for injunctive or declaratory relief. Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492 (All the cases in which the prudential mootness concept has been applied have involved a request for prospective equitable relief by declaratory judgment or injunction.); see Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321; S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727. A voluntary-cessation evaluation may be an important component of the overall analysis with respect to both constitutional and prudential mootness. Under both Article III and prudential mootness doctrines, the central inquiry is essentially the same: have circumstances changed since the beginning of litigation that forestall any occasion for meaningful relief. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 110 F.3d at 727. Under both mootness doctrines, courts must assess the likelihood that defendants will recommence the challenged, allegedly offensive conduct. Compare Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 892 (noting in the constitutional context that this [voluntary-cessation] exception exists to counteract the possibility of a defendant ceasing illegal action long enough to render a lawsuit moot and then resuming the illegal conduct), with Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (noting as to prudential mootness that [a] court may refuse to grant relief where it appears that a change of circumstances renders it highly unlikely that the actions in question will be repeated), and Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492 (noting that, in cases involving prudential mootness, a court may decline to grant declaratory or injunctive relief where it appears that a defendant, usually the government, has already changed or is in the process of changing its policies or where it appears that any repeat of the actions in question is otherwise highly unlikely). Although we engage in similar factual inquiries to ascertain constitutional and prudential mootness, different standards of review apply to these doctrines. The constitutional mootness question is a threshold inquiry because a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. Our review of this question is de novo.  Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (citation omitted); see also Sample v. Johnson, 771 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1985) (We apply a de novo standard for reviewing a district court's decision on subject matter jurisdiction, and, concomitantly apply that standard in reviewing questions of mootness. (citation omitted)). By contrast, we review the district court's determination of prudential mootness for an abuse of discretion  because this doctrine is concerned with the court's discretion to exercise its power to provide relief. Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (emphasis added). As a component of the mootness analysis, it naturally and ineluctably follows that the voluntary-cessation inquiry will be subject to the same standard of review as the overarching mootness question at issuewhether constitutional or prudential. Compare Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1149-50 (tacitly applying de novo standard of review to contention of voluntary cessation in the constitutional-mootness context), with Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1524-25 (10th Cir.1992) (explicitly applying abuse-of-discretion standard of review to assertion of voluntary cessation in the prudential-mootness context). In this case, we apply a de novo standard of review because the case presents a question of constitutional mootness. If we had concluded that the Environmental Group's ESA claims survived this jurisdictional-mootness inquiry, it might well have been appropriate to conduct a prudential-mootness analysis, given that the Environmental Groups seek only injunctive and declaratory relief. E.g., Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492. However, we need not reach this issue or definitively opine on it, because we have determined that the Environmental Groups' ESA claims are constitutionally moot. The dissent mistakenly applies the abuse-of-discretion standardthat ordinarily is associated with the prudential-mootness doctrineto the question of constitutional mootness in this case. To support the application of an abuse-of-discretion standard, the dissent primarily relies on (1) the Supreme Court's opinion in W.T. Grant Co.; (2) the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell; and (3) opinions from other circuits. [18] Dissent at 1134-35. The dissent's reliance is misplaced. Despite its arguments, W.T. Grant Co. and Committee for the First Amendment actually are quite consistent with our opinion. The cases from the other circuits, moreover, are contrary to our precedent and otherwise unpersuasive. In W.T. Grant Co., the Supreme Court established the dual analysis of constitutional and prudential mootness. 345 U.S. at 632-34, 73 S.Ct. 894. Based upon our analysis below, we must respectfully conclude that the dissent has misguidedly relied upon W.T. Grant Co. 's analysis related to prudential mootness in arguing for use of an abuse-of-discretion standard in this casewhere only constitutional mootness is at issue. Under the constitutional-mootness doctrine, the Court held in W.T. Grant Co. that the defendants had not carried their heavy burden of showing that their voluntary cessation of illegal interlocking corporate directorates rendered the case moot. Id. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894. Although the defendants indicated that the interlocking corporate directorates no longer existed and disclaimed any intention to revive them, the Court reviewed the issue de novo and determined that this averment was insufficient to render the case moot. Id. (Such a profession [as offered by defendants] does not suffice to make a case moot although it is one of the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of granting an injunction against the now-discontinued acts.); id. at 638, 73 S.Ct. 894 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the constitutional-mootness ruling of the district court was now conceded [by the majority] to be erroneous). Once the Court rejected the constitutional-mootness claim, it considered prudential mootness. Id. at 633-34, 73 S.Ct. 894. It was in this context that the Court in W.T. Grant Co. used the language relied upon by the dissent, which noted the obligation of the government, as plaintiff, to demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for the District Judge's decision. Id. at 634, 73 S.Ct. 894; see Dissent at 1134 (quoting from W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633-34, 73 S.Ct. 894). More directly, under the prudential-mootness doctrine, the Court held that the government had not carried its burden of showing that the district court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case. See W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633-34, 73 S.Ct. 894; id. at 635-36, 73 S.Ct. 894 (We conclude that, although the actions were not moot, no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated in the trial court's refusal to award injunctive relief. (emphasis added)). To be sure, the Court in W.T. Grant Co. did not expressly label the different mootness doctrines. However, the opinion's language nonetheless clearly indicates that the Court applied two different mootness doctrineswith different standards of reviewin undertaking the voluntary-cessation inquiry. Commentators have explicitly noted the distinct constitutional and prudential components of W.T. Grant Co. 's mootness analysis. See 13B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3533.1, at 744 (discussing the Court's resolution of the constitutional-mootness question and noting that W.T. Grant Co. is [t]he most important single illustration of the remedial doctrines, i.e., principles of prudential mootness). And we have recognized expressly the prudential-mootness dimension of W.T. Grant Co. 's analysis. See Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492 (noting the Supreme Court's original formulation of the test for prudential mootness in W.T. Grant Co.); see also Goldschmidt, 629 F.2d at 669 (citing W.T. Grant Co. in discussing approvingly the proposition that even if some remnant of the original controversy be still alive, this is an instance where the courts, as a matter of prudence and sound discretion, should stay their hand and withhold drastic injunctive relief). Thus, we need not quarrel with the dissent's contention that the Court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard of review in W.T. Grant Co. The problem for the dissent, however, is that the Court applied this standard with respect to a mootness doctrine that is not germane to the resolution of this casethat is, the prudential-mootness doctrine. Therefore, we respectfully submit that the dissent's reliance on W.T. Grant in objecting to the application here of the de novo standard of review is misplaced; at issue here is constitutional mootness and that standard of review is appropriate. See, e.g., Chihuahuan Grasslands Alliance, 545 F.3d at 891-94; Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 491 F.3d at 1148-50. For similar reasons, the dissent hardly fares better with its standard-of-review objection by relying on our decision in Committee for the First Amendment. At bottom, that case involves application of the prudential-mootness doctrine; consequently, it was entirely appropriate for the court to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. In Committee for the First Amendment, Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive (and later monetary) relief against various defendants in response to a decision by the Board of Regents (Regents) of Oklahoma State University (OSU) suspending the showing of The Last Temptation of Christ.  962 F.2d at 1519 (footnote omitted). The film was shown on the scheduled dates and, during the course of the litigation, the university adopted a new policy concerning use of university facilities for expressive purposes including the showing of movies, which we noted effected major changes from the expressive-activity policy that plaintiffs initially challenged. Id. at 1524-25. The district court concluded that plaintiffs' claim for prospective relief (i.e., declaratory and injunctive relief) was moot. Id. at 1520, 1524. In providing background on the subject of mootness, we did briefly cite to cases associated with the constitutional-mootness doctrine, such as County of Los Angeles, and we noted their holdings. See id. at 1524-25. However, when assessing the viability of plaintiffs' specific claim for prospective relief, we clearly were focused on the issue of prudential-mootness. This is evident in our heavy reliance from the outset to the end of our mootness analysis on [t]he most important single illustration, 13B Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 3533.1, at 744, of the prudential-mootness doctrinethat is, W.T. Grant Co. Compare Comm. for the First Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1519 (quoting in the first paragraph of the opinion from W.T. Grant Co. 's prudential-mootness analysis, which notes that the quantum of contrition that should be expected from an offender ceasing challenged activity is `a question better addressed to the discretion of the trial court' (quoting W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 634, 73 S.Ct. 894)), with id. at 1525 (in the final paragraphs of its mootness analysis, quoting from W.T. Grant Co. 's prudential-mootness discussion, noting that Plaintiffs . . . simply have not met their burden with respect to `some cognizable danger of recurrent violations.' (quoting W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632, 73 S.Ct. 894)). More specifically, in Committee for the First Amendment, we set forth the prudential-mootness test from W.T. Grant Co. and indicated that we would review the district court's mootness ruling for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1524-25. Regarding whether the inquiry was one of prudential mootness, it is telling that we assessed whether the district court could have reasonably concluded in exercising its general discretion in formulating prospective equitable remedies, Bldg. & Constr. Dep't, 7 F.3d at 1492, that providing prospective relief here was not appropriate, by actually examining ourselves the contours of the specific relief sought by plaintiffs. See Comm. for the First Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1525-26 (What Plaintiffs seek is an injunction framed no more narrowly than requiring the Defendants to follow the First Amendment concerning future on-campus activities of every sort. No specific facts anchor such a command rendering enforcement problematic in a university environment where hundreds of decisions concerning extracurricular use of facilities are made every academic year.). In other words, our focus was on the district court's exercise of discretion in fashioning equitable remedies and not on whether there was [a]n actual controversy. Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055 (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion insofar as it determined that plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was moot. Comm. for the First Amendment, 962 F.2d at 1524; see id. at 1526. Thus, the flaw in the dissent's reliance on Committee for the First Amendment  a prudential-mootness case predicated on W.T. Grant Co. 's prudential-mootness analysisshould be readily apparent: this is not a prudential-mootness case. Accordingly, as with W.T. Grant Co., we have no basis to attack the dissent's contention that Committee for the First Amendment applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. But it did so with regard to a mootness doctrine that is not at issue hereprudential mootness. With respect to the mootness doctrine that is at issue, constitutional-mootness, our case law is clearthe standard of review is de novo. E.g., Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321. Finally, the dissent looks to cases from the Seventh and Second Circuits for support. Dissent at ___ (citing Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 592, 597 (7th Cir.1994); Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 59 (2d Cir.1992)). These cases, however, are unpersuasive and do not square with our own precedent (such as Fletcher ), which recognizes the distinction regarding the applicable standard of review between the doctrines of constitutional and prudential mootness and, more specifically, holds that only in the case of prudential mootness do we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review, because in such a case we are concerned with the [district] court's discretion to exercise its power to provide relief. Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321; cf. id. (The constitutional mootness question is a threshold inquiry because a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. Our review of this question is de novo.  (citation omitted)). In Kikumura, the Seventh Circuit appears to have fallen victim to the same mistake that we respectfully have attributed to the dissentmapping the prudential-mootness analysis of W.T. Grant Co. onto a case involving constitutional mootness. For example, in a mootness discussion that cites to W.T. Grant Co., the Seventh Circuit states that [d]etermining whether an official's voluntary cessation from engaging in conduct challenged as unconstitutional renders a case moot calls for an exercise of judicial discretion. Kikumura, 28 F.3d at 598. Kikumura may be at odds with other Seventh Circuit cases, which appear not to have made the same mistake, but instead have recognized that the constitutional-mootness questionincluding the subsidiary question of voluntary cessationimplicates the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts and is reviewed de novo. In Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, for example, the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo the question of whether to apply the voluntary-cessation exception to a constitutional-mootness issue. 326 F.3d 924, 928-31 (7th Cir.1996). In that context, the Seventh Circuit stated: Whether a case has been rendered moot is a question of law that we review de novo. . . . A question of mootness arises when, as here, a challenged ordinance is repealed during the pendency of litigation, and a plaintiff seeks only prospective relief. Id. at 929 (citations omitted); see Walsh v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 400 F.3d 535, 536-37 (7th Cir.2005) (noting that [w]e review the district court's decision [entering summary judgment on mootness grounds] de novo,  and proceeding to address the specific question of voluntary cessation de novo); cf. Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir.2008) (This case begins and ends with our determination of subject-matter jurisdiction.. . . [W]e review a district court's dismissal on mootness grounds de novo.  (citations omitted)); St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir.2007) (We review de novo the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which includes a dismissal on mootness grounds.). Irrespective of whether Kikumura is inconsistent with Seventh Circuit precedent, however, insofar as Kikumura calls for the application of an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the question of constitutional mootness it is inconsistent with our precedent, and we accordingly decline to follow it. For somewhat similar reasons, the Second Circuit's decision in Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors is contrary to our precedent and unpersuasive. There, like the Kikumura court, the Second Circuit mistakenly relied upon the language of W.T. Grant Co. concerning prudential mootness, in announcing the standard of review for a question of constitutional mootness. Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, 981 F.2d at 59. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the state's minority business program. Id. at 58. The state's passage of an emergency regulation that suspended enforcement of the program's goals presented an issue of voluntary cessation to the district court. Id. at 58-59. The district court ruled that the state's action mooted the plaintiffs' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 59. Citing W.T. Grant Co., the Second Circuit concluded that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review was appropriately applied to the district court's ruling, and it determined that [t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing [plaintiffs'] complaints as moot because the emergency regulation suspends application of the minority enterprise goals on state-funded contracts. Id. Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors is contrary to our precedent because-in mistaken reliance on the prudential-mootness analysis of W.T. Grant Co. it applies an abuse-of-discretion standard, rather than a de novo standard, to a question of constitutional mootness. Moreover, even if its application here was not barred by our precedent, we would be wary of adopting the rule of Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors. At least one Second Circuit case has intimated that the abuse-of-discretion standard articulated in Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors is limited to the context of voluntary cessation. See Irish Lesbian & Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 647 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1998) (The Defendants here have not voluntarily agreed to cease enforcing Section 10-110 against [plaintiff] or to grant [plaintiff's] permit requests in the future. Therefore, the abuse-of-discretion standard does not apply and we review the district court's determination of mootness under the customary de novo standard.). However, the Supreme Court has clearly held that voluntary cessation is part and parcel of the constitutional-mootness analysis and can result in a finding that an action or claim is moot. See County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379. Accordingly, voluntary cessation implicates the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts, and our circuit and also the Second Circuit have recognized that subject-matter-jurisdiction questionsincluding those involving mootnessare reviewed de novo. Compare Fletcher, 116 F.3d at 1321 (The constitutional mootness question is a threshold inquiry because a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. Our review of this question is de novo.  (citation omitted)), with Lamar Adver. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 377 n. 16 (2d Cir.2004) ([T]he condition of mootness is not a defense that could be waived by [a defendant], but rather is a condition that deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. (alterations in original and internal quotation marks omitted)); and United States v. New York City Transit Auth., 97 F.3d 672, 676 (2d Cir.1996) (A ruling that a case is not moot is reviewed de novo. This case is not moot unless no reasonable expectation remains that the policy will be reinstituted.). In sum, we respectfully conclude that the dissent's reliance on Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors is misplaced. The case is contrary to our precedent and otherwise unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we must disagree with our thoughtful colleague in dissent concerning the standard of review that is applicable to the mootness question in this case. We thus proceed to the issue of vacatur.