Opinion ID: 1202533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: charge of sexual abuse

Text: Defendant's fifteenth point is that he was improperly charged and convicted of sexual abuse of a child and that this error compels the reversal of his murder and aggravated kidnapping convictions. Defendant, by pretrial motion, sought to be charged with sexual exploitation of a minor [171] instead of sexual abuse of a child [172] in the case involving Graeme Cunningham. Defendant argued that the State's evidence would show only that defendant took nude photographs of Graeme, and therefore sexual exploitation was the more specific offense and the offense with the lesser punishment. Defendant also argued that the taking of nude photographs of Graeme did not constitute the taking of indecent liberties with a child for purposes of the sexual abuse statute. The State responded that defendant had mischaracterized its evidence, that the taking of nude photographs as proscribed in the sexual exploitation statute was different than the taking of lewd photographs under the enhancement provisions of the sexual abuse statute, and that the crime of sexual exploitation was designed to criminalize commercial production of child pornography. The court ruled that the motion was premature. Defendant renewed his motion at the conclusion of the State's case, and it was denied. Defendant relies on State v. Shondel ([W]here there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of the lesser.); [173] Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co. (When two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the more specific provision will govern over the more general provision.); [174] Murray City v. Hall (Where an irreconcilable conflict exists between new provisions and prior statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new provision will control.); [175] and State v. Clark (as long as the classifications are not arbitrary, the fact that conduct may violate both a general and a specific provision does not render the legislation unconstitutional, even though one violation is subject to a greater sentence) [176] in support of his contention that he should have been charged with sexual exploitation of a minor instead of sexual abuse of a child. In 1983, subsection 76-5a-3(1)(a) (amended 1985) provided: A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a child: When he knowingly produces, distributes or possesses with intent to distribute, material or a live performance depicting a nude or partially nude child for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person or any person's engagement in sexual conduct with the child. The legislature explicated the purpose of this statute in Utah Code Ann. ง 76-5a-1 (Supp. 1983) (amended 1985): The legislature of Utah determines that the sexual exploitation of children under the age of 14 is excessively harmful to their physiological, emotional, social, and mental development; that children under the age of 14 cannot intelligently and knowingly consent to sexual exploitation; that regardless of whether it is classified as legally obscene, material that sexually exploits children is not protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or by the First or Fifteenth sections of Article I of the Utah Constitution and may be prohibited; and that prohibition of and punishment for the distribution and production of materials that sexually exploit children is necessary and justified to eliminate the market for those materials and to reduce the harm to the child inherent in perpetuation of the record of his sexually exploitive activities. It is the purpose of this act to prohibit the production and distribution of materials which sexually exploit children under the age of 14, regardless of whether the materials are classified as legally obscene. Comparison of subsection 76-5a-3(1)(a) in light of its legislative purpose with the sexual abuse of a child statute [177] reveals that the two statutes were not designed to proscribe parallel conduct. The essence or gravamen of the sexual exploitation statute at issue is the production, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute materials depicting nude or partially nude children. The statute was intended, in substantial part, to eliminate the market for such materials by proscribing their manufacturing and marketing. Conversely, the sexual abuse statute proscribes conduct involving the touching of children and the taking of indecent liberties with children. In the instant case, the information charging defendant with sexually abusing Graeme additionally alleged that defendant used, showed, or displayed pornography or caused the victim to be photographed in a lewd condition during the course of the offense. This added circumstance was charged, with others, not because it was a substantive element of the crime of sexual abuse of a child, but rather, to support the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence. [178] Thus, although the sexual exploitation statute did include, in relevant part, the act of photographing nude children as part of the substantive offense, the sexual abuse of a child statute did not do so. Furthermore, we believe that the act of photographing nude children under the provisions of the sexual exploitation statute at issue is different from photographing young children in a lewd condition pursuant to the sexual abuse statute. In conclusion, the substantive portions of the two statutes in issue, subsections 76-5-404.1 and 76-5a-3(1)(a), do not overlap in the Shondel or Perry sense. Defendant, however, claims that it was error to submit the sexual abuse of a child charge to the jury because his conduct did not come within the phrase otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child. He argues that touching or conduct of some greater magnitude is required to support a conviction pursuant to the indecent liberties language in section 76-5-404.1 and that photographing Graeme was not serious enough to constitute such conduct. Conversely, defendant argues that the statements from his confession undisputedly indicate that he never touched Graeme while the boy was alive, nor did he admit that he had Graeme touch himself, defendant, or any other person. Thus, the contention is that since the statements from his confession, the nude photographs of Graeme, and the testimony of the other youths who were sexually abused by defendant were the only evidence to support the charge, he was improperly convicted thereon because that evidence does not establish that he touched Graeme while the child was alive. In view of defendant's argument, we must address whether his conduct fell within the substantive provisions of the Sexual Abuse of a Child Statute (whether the evidence is sufficient to support the sexual abuse conviction). The prosecution apparently relied exclusively on an indecent liberties theory at trial to establish proof of guilt on the sexual abuse charge: That leads us to the last crime charged, and again this crime is charged only as to Graeme Cunningham. Again, a change in the legislature [sic] made it possible to charge this particular crime, sexual abuse of a child. That's instruction No. 41. Let me just read part of it. These are elements of a crime of sexual abuse of a child: That on or about the 14th day of July, 1983, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Arthur Gary Bishop touched the buttocks or genitalia of Graeme G. Cunningham or otherwise took indecent liberties. I want to comment on that. You don't have to touch the buttocks or genitalia. You can take indecent liberties. And that's the key to the charge, indecent liberties. Accordingly, the question is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the sexual abuse of a child conviction on an indecent liberties theory. Defendant relies on In re J.L.S., [179] wherein this Court held, The momentary touching or grabbing of the clothed breasts of an adolescent [chambermaid] by a seventeen year old boy does not come within the phrase `otherwise takes indecent liberties with another.' [180] In so holding, we recognized: In an interpretation of Section 76-5-404(1) [forcible sexual abuse], the format of the statute is significant. In the first part, the legislature describes in detail the specific conduct proscribed, viz., the actor's touching the anus or genitals of another. In the second part, which is separated from the first by the disjunctive or the conduct condemned is set forth in generalized terms, viz., otherwise takes indecent liberties with another. The use of the disjunctive in combination with term otherwise is indicative of an intent to proscribe the type of conduct of equal gravity to that interdicted in the first part, although the acts are committed in a different way or manner than that set forth in the first part. [181] We followed In re J.L.S. in deciding In re L.G.W., [182] where we stated that the brief touching of the clothed buttocks of an adult woman did not amount to forcible sexual abuse. [183] Defendant has concluded that the analysis and holdings of the above authority support his view that an indecent liberty under the sexual abuse of a child statute must involve some touching of or by the victim. We disagree. Where young child victims have been involved, this Court has reviewed challenges by defendants convicted of forcible sexual abuse who claim that their conduct did not constitute an indecent liberty by viewing the defendant's acts in relationship to the surrounding circumstances; we have not merely determined whether a touching occurred. We applied this principle in State v. Thatcher, [184] where we affirmed a father's forcible sexual abuse conviction for having taken indecent liberties with his twelve-year-old daughter. [185] There, we held: The totality of the facts in this case at once suggests the inapplicability of those cases [ In re J.L.S. and In re L.G.W. ] on their facts. [186] The Court focused upon several factors in making this determination: (1) the nature of the victim's participation (whether the defendant required the victim's active participation), (2) the duration of the defendant's acts, (3) the defendant's willingness to terminate his conduct at the victim's request, (4) the relationship between the victim and the defendant, and (5) the age of the victim. [187] The reasons for considering, in addition to the defendant's acts, the characteristics of the victim and the relationship between the victim and the defendant in determining whether indecent liberties were taken with a young child are not difficult to understand. The younger the victim, the more susceptible he or she is to suffering long-term physiological, emotional, social, and mental harm. [188] Moreover, young child victims often do not understand that the behavior to which they are being subjected is both legally and morally wrong. The relationship between a young child victim and a defendant is particularly significant since the closer that relationship is, the more influence the defendant can exert over the victim. This influence may in fact be used by the defendant to prevent others from discovering his illegal acts. Finally, when the victim has a close relationship with the defendant and such acts are uncovered, the child feels that his or her trust has been betrayed. Even in J.L.S., where we dealt with the forcible sexual abuse statute (section 76-5-404), as opposed to the sexual abuse of a child statute (section 76-5-404.1), we recognized that a distinction existed in applying the phrase indecent liberties to young children: The term indecent liberties was used but in a different context in the prior Penal Code, which was repealed in 1973. Section 76-7-9 stated. Every person who shall assault a child, whether male or female, under the age of fourteen years, and shall take indecent liberties with or on the person of such child, without committing, intending or attempting to commit the crime of rape, upon such child, with or without the child's consent, is guilty of a felony. In defining the term indecent liberties under this prior statute this Court explained: ... the term indecent liberties, as used in the statute is clearly self-defining... . We think that every person of the most ordinary intelligence and understanding, who is familiar with merely the rudiments of the English language, understands what is meant when he, or anyone else, is charged with having taken indecent liberties with the person of a child. ... . In State v. Macmillan [ [189] ] this Court stated that in a statute like 76-7-9 the terms indecent liberties and []indecent assault were convertible. However, this statute dealt specifically with an indecent assault upon a child under the age of fourteen. This Court in stating the term indecent liberties was self-defining was determining the meaning within the context of the statute, viz., one of the elements of the crime was the age of the victim. Without reading the term indecent liberties, in conjunction with the age of the victim, the precision required for a penal statute would not be manifest; as indicated by this Court in its statement in Macmillan, viz., every person of ordinary intelligence understands what is meant when he is charged with having taken indecent liberties with the person of a child. In the present statute 76-5-404(1), the term indecent liberties cannot derive the requisite specificity of meaning required constitutionally, by being read in conjunction with the age of the victim, but if it be considered as referring to conduct of the same magnitude of gravity as that specifically described in the statute, the potential infirmity for vagueness is rectified. [190] Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that defendant's acts of inducing Graeme to disrobe for the illicit photo session, when viewed with the evidence of defendant's criminal intent, constituted taking indecent liberties with a child. [191] In so concluding, we note that defendant induced Graeme to remove his clothing and pose for the photographs, despite the fact that the boy was really reluctant and the fact that even after the youth had agreed to disrobe in exchange for a new skateboard, it took him a while to get the courage to ... undress or anything. The encounter between Graeme and defendant was not momentary or between strangers. [192] And if Graeme had not been so young, he may have not been so susceptible to defendant's inducements and his brutal attack. We conclude that the evidence supports defendant's conviction on the sexual abuse of a child charge and thus find his point to be without merit. Moreover, because defendant was properly charged and convicted of sexual abuse of a child and because this Court should hold that the testimony of the six boys was properly admitted, [193] defendant's aggravated kidnapping and murder convictions should be affirmed.