Opinion ID: 2756888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial court again denies Herring’s petition

Text: {¶ 59} On September 26, 2008, the trial court again denied Herring’s petition for postconviction relief. {¶ 60} After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court made the following ruling: Based on this evidence, it is abundantly clear that Thomas Hrdy never advised trial counsel that his investigation was not complete, and never asked them for additional time to complete it. Trial counsels [sic] decision 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO to present positive mitigation was reasonable, based on an objective review of counsels [sic] performance, measured with reasonableness under professional norms, including a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsels [sic] perspective at the time of that conduct. In addition, consistent with the Trial Court’s opinion that granted summary judgment to the State, “one can only speculate as to what effect, if any, negative evidence would have had in the jury’s deliberations.” F. Court of appeals orders a new sentencing hearing {¶ 61} On appeal following this ruling, the court of appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that trial counsel’s decision to present only positive mitigation evidence was reasonable. 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08MA-213, 2011-Ohio-662, ¶ 90. The court stated: “Trial counsel can make the decision to forego the presentation of evidence, but only after a full investigation.    Only after completing a full investigation can counsel make an informed, tactical decision about what information to present in their client’s case.” Id. at ¶ 55, citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), and Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389. {¶ 62} The court stated that information about Herring’s background in the postconviction affidavits brought to light appellant’s deeply troubled childhood, his complete lack of any positive role models, his substance abuse problems, his depression, his low IQ, and his possible organic brain impairment. These areas of 18 January Term, 2014 appellant’s life, had they been investigated and explored fully, are all very significant factors to be weighed and considered in determining what mitigation evidence to present. And counsel did not have this information before them when they made the decision to present only positive mitigation evidence. Id. at ¶ 79. The court then concluded that “counsel could not have made an intelligent strategic decision without the proper investigation before them.” Id. {¶ 63} The court also stated that investigations into mitigating evidence “ ‘ “should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence.” ’ ” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 82, quoting Wiggins at 524, quoting American Bar Association (“ABA”) Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 11.4.1(C) (1989). The court determined that trial counsel’s testimony showed that they had failed to meet this standard. Id. at ¶ 82. The court also noted that Hrdy admitted that his investigation was “substandard” and that he did not complete many of the tasks that he should have in investigating Herring’s background. Id. at ¶ 79. But the court stated that it was trial counsel’s duty to ensure that a complete investigation was conducted and that they could not simply rely on Hrdy’s investigation. Id. at ¶ 82. {¶ 64} In ordering a new sentencing hearing, the court of appeals stated that the undiscovered mitigating evidence “ ‘ “might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal” ’ ” of Herring’s culpability. Id. at ¶ 90, quoting Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389. The court of appeals also stated that “the probability of a different sentence if counsel had presented the evidence is ‘ “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” ’ reached 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO by the jury.” Id., quoting Rompilla at 393, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.