Opinion ID: 786696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Overton's Claim

Text: 48 Overton asserts that his Title VII claim is different from those asserted by the plaintiffs in Luckett, Brown, Fisher, and Mier. In all of those cases, the plaintiffs challenged decisions regarding their military status in the National Guard. Because a military decision was at the core of each case, it was ultimately easy to conclude that whatever the test, section 2000e-16 did not override the operation of the Feres doctrine. But Overton's claim focuses on Fletcher's behavior toward Overton on weekdays during business hours, when both were performing what Overton asserts were purely civilian duties not integrally related to the military's unique structure. We disagree with Overton's characterization and therefore conclude that in the factual circumstances of this case, section 2000e-16 does not overcome the Feres bar. 49 To be sure, at the time the conduct of which Overton complains took place, his status was civilian. He was then being paid by the USAF to perform the nominally civilian portion of his Guard-Technician duties. At the same time, however, Overton's suit, if permitted to proceed, would likely affect his military relationship with Fletcher. The defendants' alleged misconduct occurred while Overton worked on a military base to assure the military's airlift capacity, while wearing a military uniform, under the direct supervision of Fletcher, who was also his immediate military superior. Overton's closely related dual roles engendered closely related military and civilian relationships with Fletcher. The nominally civilian, yet distinctly military, relationship between the two was thus central to Overton's military mission and the military's unique structure of command. Any attempt surgically to dissect and analyze the civilian relationship between Overton and Fletcher, with its military dimensions, moreover, would itself threaten to intrude into their military relationship. 15 Courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that... [such an] intrusion upon military authority might have. 16 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305, 103 S.Ct. 2362. 50 Because Overton's suit would likely intrude into and have an impact upon his military relationship with Fletcher, we conclude that Overton challenges conduct integrally related to the military's unique structure, and that the relationships and behavior that are the subject of his suit were not purely civilian. Overton therefore cannot pursue his Title VII claim in federal court. At the end of the day, we find nothing in the text or history of section 2000e-16(a) or its judicial interpretation to convince us that it constitutes a clear statutory command not to apply the Feres doctrine to Overton's claims. See Roper, 832 F.2d at 248 (noting that [i]n the absence of some express indication in the legislative history that Congress intended Title VII to apply, the Feres doctrine bars suits that affect military hierarchy and command). 51 We see no reason and the government does not seek to persuade us, 17 however, that there can be no situation in which a Guard Technician would have a justiciable Title VII claim with respect to his or her purely civilian employment by the federal government, even in circumstances where the Feres doctrine is otherwise applicable. We need not and do not speculate as to what circumstances, if any, might give rise to such a claim.