Opinion ID: 618626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Robles's Remaining Issues

Text: Robles also argues that his conviction should be reversed based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he alleges his counsel erred in failing to pursue the possibility of juror misconduct and in failing to challenge the admissibility of evidence that Garcia sought the help of an alleged Mexican witch to protect him from Robles. [G]enerally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are better left for post-conviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Cook, 356 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir.2004)). We will not hear ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal unless the record is fully developed and our failure to act would be a plain miscarriage of justice or the counsel's errors are readily apparent. See United States v. Orr, 636 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir.2011); United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir.2006). The record is devoid of facts needed to enable the court to evaluate Robles's claim against his attorney. To properly evaluate Robles's claim that his attorney erred in failing to contest the possible juror misconduct and in failing to object to Garcia's witch-related testimony, we would need to hear testimony from the attorney explaining his decision not to pursue those issues. The attorney's failure to pursue the issues may very well have been correct, as pursuing them may have been frivolous and possibly detrimental to the defense strategy. We need further information to determine whether the attorney erred in failing to pursue the issues and whether that failure was prejudicial to Robles. Where the evaluation of an ineffective assistance claim requires development of facts outside the record, those claims are not appropriately considered on direct appeal. United States v. Looking Cloud, 419 F.3d 781, 788-89 (8th Cir.2005). Because we would have to look outside the record to evaluate Robles's claims, we cannot appropriately consider it on appeal. Additionally, Robles argues that his two concurrent sentences of 600 months imprisonment are cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. It is exceedingly rare for an offense that does not have a capital sentence to violate the Eighth Amendment, which forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Wiest, 596 F.3d 906, 911 (8th Cir.2010)). In evaluating whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, we address the gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the penalty. United States v. Paton, 535 F.3d 829, 837 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Weis, 487 F.3d 1148, 1154 (8th Cir.2007)). The Supreme Court has found that a state may enforce a punishment of life imprisonment for possession of 650 grams of cocaine with intent to distribute without violating the Eighth Amendment. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 988, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Certainly then, a sentence of 600 months for Robles's possession of five kilograms of cocaine does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Additionally, [a] sentence within statutory limits is generally not subject to review under the Eighth Amendment. United States v. Murphy, 899 F.2d 714, 719 (8th Cir.1990). Robles was convicted of conspiring to distribute over 5 kilograms of cocaine and over 50 grams of methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. § 841. The applicable portion of the statute provides for punishment between ten years and life imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The kidnapping statute under which Robles was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1201, allows for punishment of up to life imprisonment. Robles's two 600 month terms were well within the punishments prescribed by statute. For these reasons, we conclude Robles's sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the crimes he committed.