Opinion ID: 2112694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonable Grounds Issue.

Text: Iowa's implied consent law is set out in section 321J.6, which pertinently provides: Implied consent to test. 1. A person who operates a motor vehicle in this state under circumstances which give reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been operating a motor vehicle [while intoxicated] is deemed to have given consent to the withdrawal of specimens of the person's blood, breath, or urine and to a chemical test or tests of the specimens for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration or presence of drugs, subject to this section. The with drawal of the body substances and the test or tests shall be administered at the written request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle [while intoxicated], and if any of the following conditions exist: .... (Emphasis added.) Clearly, as the italicized portions of this provision confirm, the implied consent statute cannot be invoked unless the officer first has reasonable grounds to believe the driver had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. A similar requirement must be met for a test result revocation under Iowa Code section 321J.12. The department contendscontrary to the district court's conclusionthat Hayward possessed reasonable grounds to believe that Reed had operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated. This is a fact question. On appeal, an agency's factual findings are binding if supported by substantial evidence in the record made before the agency when that record is viewed as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f). Evidence is substantial when a reasonable person could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. Norland v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 913 (Iowa 1987). Conversely, evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. Id. Nor is evidence insubstantial because of the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from it. The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding but whether the evidence supports the findings actually made. Ward v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 237-38 (Iowa 1981). So under this limited scope of factual review, we ask only if the evidence submitted supports the factual findings actually made by the agency. Norland, 412 N.W.2d at 908. In implied consent proceedings the driver has the burden to prove why the license should not be revoked. Downing v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 415 N.W.2d 625, 627 (Iowa 1987). Reed, then, had the burden to prove Hayward lacked reasonable grounds to believe Reed had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Reasonable grounds exist if the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time action was required would have warranted a reasonable person to believe that an offense had been committed. State v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1988). In view of the department's finding that Hayward had such grounds, Reed had to prove otherwise as a matter of law. See Ward, 304 N.W.2d at 238 (agency finding binding on appeal unless contrary result demanded as matter of law). This is a heavy burden and one that Reed falls short of meeting. The record from the contested case hearing is not well developed on the reasonable grounds issue. That is not surprising given Reed's action in not focusing on it as critical. Nevertheless we think the record is adequate to resolve the issue. Reed testified that no PBT was ever administered to him by any officer or any other person at any time. He also testified he was never asked to do any field sobriety tests. This is all the evidence Reed presented on the issue. The department relied on Hayward's written request for a specimen and notice of revocation. See Iowa Code §§ 321J.6, 321J.12. In addition the department relied on Hayward's testimony. The request and notice contain Hayward's verified statementmade shortly after the PBT was administeredthat reasonable grounds existed to believe Reed had operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated. In addition Hayward testified that Stout had told him about the circumstances surrounding Stout's arrest of Reed at the scene. From Stout, Hayward learned that Reed had failed to dim his high beam headlights and had crossed the highway center line twice. He also learned that there was an odor of an alcoholic beverage on Reed's breath and that Reed was unsteady on his feet. Reed apparently thinks that Hayward's second-hand knowledge of Stout's observations is not sufficient to constitute reasonable grounds to believe Reed had operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Clearly, this is not the law. We have said so on several occasions. See State v. Schubert, 346 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Iowa 1984) (when police officers are acting in concert, the knowledge of one is presumed to be shared by all); accord Owens, 418 N.W.2d at 342 (officer asking driver to take a PBT is presumed to have had knowledge of alcoholic odor on the driver's breath, even though officer knew of it only through another officer). We agree with the department that its evidence was by no means insubstantial, especially when compared to the minimal and uncorroborated testimony of Reed. We think the record more than adequately supports the department's finding that Hayward had reasonable grounds to believe Reed had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The district court erred when it decided otherwise.