Opinion ID: 1676875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: gang activity

Text: In addressing this issue on direct appeal, We stated: Appellant further claims error on the assertion that he was prohibited from introducing relevant exculpatory evidence regarding the participation of Anthony Wayne Oden and members of his family in a local gang called the Outlaw Posse. The question was posed by defense counsel during cross-examination of Sergeant Kirtley Brown of the City of Covington Police Department. Brown was one of the officers who arrived at the scene of the shooting. Whether the proffered testimony was relevant to appellant's state of mind cannot be reviewed as there was no specific offer of his [Sergeant Brown's] answer to the question requested out of the presence of the jury as required by RCr 9.52. Caudill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 924 (1989). Davis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 90-SC-059-MR at 3-4 (1990). We reiterate, before there can be ineffective assistance of counsel, there first must be counsel error. In this case, the alleged defense counsel error is failure to place testimony in the record by avowal to preserve an alleged trial court error for appellate review. The alleged trial court error in this case was exclusion of evidence that the victim and his family were members of a gang. Defense counsel's failure to preserve the issue for review only can be error if the trial court erred in excluding the evidence. The Court of Appeals did not address the issue of whether the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, rather it held: Davis alleged that he feared the victim because of the victim's involvement in a gang. In attempting to question a police officer on this point, counsel failed to pursue the interrogation when the trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to questions put to the police officer. The Supreme Court noted counsel's omission to make an offer of proof by avowal pursuant to RCr 9.52. Once again, we find recourse to an evidentiary hearing on this point wholly appropriate as it would have had direct bearing on the reasonableness of the belief in the need for self-preservation and therefore on the issue of self-defense. Davis v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 96-CA-2620-MR at 11 (1997). The relevant portion of the record is as follows: Defense Counsel: As a matter of fact, the [victim's family], some members of it, belonged to the Outlaws. You know that, don't you? Commonwealth Attorney: Objection. Trial Court: Sustained. Do not answer. It is immaterial. Defense Counsel: What was your ruling Judge? Trial Court: I said it is immaterial. We discussed this prior to trial. Defense Counsel: Well Judge, I have to begin somewhere to connect it up. Trial Court: Whether or not this deceased was a member of any gang is immaterial to the events of that evening. Defense Counsel: I will take an exception to the Court's ruling. Defense Counsel: Was [the victim] a member of the Outlaw Gang? Trial Court: Don't answer. Commonwealth Attorney: Objection. Trial Court: Sustained. I told you... the way to prove whether he was or was not a member of a gang, the way to prove character is by general reputation in the community and not by specific acts or anything else. Commonwealth v. Davis, Kenton Circuit Court, 89-CR-167, Transcript of Evidence at 147-48 (1989). Therefore, in order to determine whether defense counsel erred in failing to preserve the issue for review, we must first determine whether the trial court erred in excluding the evidence. In so doing, we assume that Sgt. Brown would have testified favorably to Davis, i.e., he would have testified that the victim and his family were known gang members. In a homicide case where the defendant claims self-defense, evidence of the victim's character can be introduced to show: (1) who was the aggressor in the encounter between the defendant and the victim; and (2) that the defendant had a justifiable fear of the victim at the time of the encounter. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 880 S.W.2d 877, 878 (1994). When offered to show who was the first aggressor, the character of the victim may only be introduced through testimony concerning the victim's general (bad) reputation in the community for peace and quietude. Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 477 S.W.2d 159, 161 (1972); see also KRE 405(a). However, a defendant can introduce evidence of particular violent acts of an alleged victim, evidence of threats by the victim, and evidence of hearsay statements about such acts or threats, all of which tends to show the defendant had a justifiable fear of the victim at the time of their encounter. Wilson, 880 S.W.2d at 878. In the case at bar, Davis claimed that the victim was the initial aggressor and that he was afraid of him. Thus, for the sake of argument, we assume that Davis should have been able to present both reputation testimony concerning the victim and evidence of specific acts and threats made by the victim. Consequently, we assume that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony in question on grounds that the victim's character could only be shown by testimony as to his general reputation in the community. However, the trial court also excluded the testimony on grounds that the evidence was not relevant. Testimony that the victim was a member of a gang does not fit either category outlined above. It is not general reputation testimony, nor is it evidence of specific acts or threats. It is merely evidence of the victim's status. Moreover, Davis himself was allowed to testify that he knew that the victim and his family were members of a gang and that he was afraid of the victim because of this. Thus, Sgt. Brown's testimony that the victim had gang member status would have bolstered Davis's testimony that the victim was a member of a gang. However, his testimony would not have been relevant to Davis's testimony that he was afraid of the victim because the victim was a member of a gang. In other words, Sgt. Brown's testimony that the victim was a member of a gang, in and of itself, would not have tended to show that Davis had a justifiable fear of the victim at the time of their encounter. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence on relevancy grounds. Consequently, we conclude that failure to preserve Sgt. Brown's testimony by avowal as to the victim's gang status could not have been ineffective assistance of counsel. We note that there appears to be no case law in the Commonwealth on the admissibility of a victim's involvement in a gang or gang activity in a homicide case where the defendant claims self-defense. We do not hold today that such evidence is always irrelevant. Nor do we hold that this evidence is always inadmissible because it fits neither method of proving an alleged victim's character. Our holding on this issue is limited to the particular facts of the case at bar.