Opinion ID: 1952083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admissibility of Nicole Brown's Statement

Text: Pursuant to Section 3507, out-of-court statements made by a witness become admissible as substantive evidence. The witness must testify on direct examination, however, concerning both the events perceived or heard and the out-of-court statements. Ray v. State, Del.Supr., 587 A.2d 439, 443 (1991). There is no requirement that the witness offer consistent trial testimony. 11 Del.C. § 3507(b). In this case, the Superior Court relied upon Section 3507 to admit into evidence Nicole Brown's out-of-court statement to Detective Spell that Flowers had told her that he saw Demby shoot Brown. This Court examined the operation of Section 3507 in Ray v. State, Del.Supr., 587 A.2d 439 (1991). In Ray, the defendant was charged with sexually abusing the five-year-old daughter of his girlfriend. Id. at 440. During the course of the police investigation, the victim told the police that Ray was the person who abused her. She also told the same thing to her aunt. However, at trial, the victim declined to tell the jury what Ray did to her. The victim did testify that she told her aunt and the police what happened to her, but declined to testify about what she told them. Id. at 443. Over the defense's objection, the Superior Court admitted into evidence the prior out-of-court statements made by the victim to her aunt and the police officer. Id. at 443. In Ray, this Court held that the victim's out-of-court statements, i.e., what she told the police and her aunt, did not qualify for admission under Section 3507, stating: But the use of hearsay statements under section 3507 must be carefully circumscribed in order to avoid, as occurred here, the only direct evidence concerning the commission of the offense against a child being presented through the testimony of third parties relating what the victim stated on a prior occasion. The statute becomes meaningless if there is no opportunity to test the truth of the statements offered. Id. at 444. In Ray, the child victim refused to testify about the events she perceived. Id. at 443-44. This Court held that, in view of the limited foundation presented, the admission of the child victim's out-of-court statements was a violation of the defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. The concern expressed by this Court in Ray centered on the absence of the foundation needed before the admission of any Section 3507 statement. The foundation required for the Section 3507 statement to be admissible was necessary in order to comply with the confrontation requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Demby's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights are also paramount in analyzing the admissibility of Nicole Brown's testimonial evidence. In the case sub judice, Nicole Brown had no first-hand knowledge concerning the shooting. She was only repeating to Detective Spell what she had been told by Flowers. The fact that Nicole Brown testified from the witness stand that Flowers never told her that he saw Demby shoot Brown does not change the hearsay nature of her out-of-court statement to Detective Spell about what Flowers said. Nicole Brown's out-of-court statement telling Detective Spell what Flowers allegedly told her, was hearsay within hearsay. D.R.E. 805. Under D.R.E. 805, the statement attributed to Flowers is inadmissible hearsay included within hearsay unless it conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule. D.R.E. 805 (emphasis added). If double hearsay is being offered into evidence, each aspect must qualify independently as an exception to the hearsay rule. D.R.E. 805. [9] In this case, we have held that the statement attributed to Flonnory on the Lehman videotape was admissible hearsay within admissible hearsay. [10] The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause was not implicated because the Lehman videotape and Flonnory's statement were being presented as evidence by the defendant. Any testimonial evidence offered against the defendant by the State, however, is subject to the defendant's confrontation rights that are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). The Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to guarantee that accusatory hearsay statements which do not come within a firmly rooted hearsay exception are presumptively inadmissible unless they are supported by a showing of a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 818, 110 S.Ct. at 3148. The Confrontation Clause, in other words, bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 814, 110 S.Ct. at 3146 (emphasis added). The State argues that since Nicole Brown and Flowers both testified, and were available for cross-examination, Demby's Confrontation Clause rights are not an issue. Nevertheless, Nicole Brown could not testify from the witness stand about what Flowers told her, unless his statement to her was admissible pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 818, 110 S.Ct. at 3148. Similarly, any hearsay within Nicole Brown's Section 3507 statement was inadmissible unless it was permitted by an exception to the hearsay rule. A fortiori, Nicole Brown's pretrial recitation of Flowers's hearsay statement could not be admitted as an inconsistent statement by her, if she could not give that testimonial evidence at trial. D.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A); see GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 6.4, at 230 (3d ed. 1996) (Prior Statements of a Witness). The State argues that in this case, because Flowers had already testified, the portion of Nicole Brown's out-of-court statement, regarding what Flowers had allegedly told her, was admissible non-hearsay as a prior inconsistent statement by Flowers pursuant to D.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A). The admissibility of Nicole Brown's pre-trial statement of what Flowers said to her, as a prior inconsistent statement by Flowers, should be decided by the Superior Court in the first instance in the context of its presentation at Demby's next trial. The standards for admissibility under the Sixth Amendment, Section 3507, and the Delaware Rules of Evidence are set forth in this opinion. An application of those standards, however, is dependent upon the testimonial evidence presented by Flowers at Demby's next trial and the State's proof in support of its theory of admissibility, as either non-hearsay or as a hearsay exception. See, e.g., D.R.E. 613, 801(d)(1)(A), 801(d)(1)(C), 803, 804; see also GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 6.4 (3d ed. 1996) (Prior Statements of a Witness).