Opinion ID: 2809264
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Webb’s Fabrication-of-Evidence Claims

Text: Webb raises three fabrication-of-evidence claims: (1) Lucas and Metcalf falsely dated the N-17 recording as having occurred on October 13, 2005; (2) Lucas, Metcalf, and Cross tampered with the N-18 recording; and (3) Lucas made false statements in his DEA-6 report.
Among the evidence that was entered against Webb in his criminal trial was a phone conversation between Webb and Bray, titled N-17 and dated October 13, 2005, that was monitored and recorded by Metcalf. While DEA policy requires that a recorded call begin with a time-and-date header, that procedure was not followed in this case, and the recording was dated after the fact. The transcript of the recorded call does not contain any overt indications that Webb and Bray had arranged a drug deal. Instead, the two spoke about buying cars. Bray ended the conversation by telling Webb that he was going to “have a couple stacks tomorrow.” Lucas wrote in his DEA-6 report that “two stacks” tomorrow was code for $2,000 to purchase crack and testified the same to the grand jury. Webb, 2013 WL 1303776, at  (internal quotation marks omitted). Webb argues that Metcalf and Lucas fabricated evidence against him by misdating the call as occurring on October 13, 2005, so that it could be used as evidence of arranging the October 14, 2005, drug deal. Webb acknowledges that he had this conversation with Bray but denies that they discussed arranging a drug deal or that the conversation occurred on October 13, 2005. Bray indicated that the N-17 call was made on a Nextel phone given to him by the DEA, which is consistent with the recording’s transcript. He also insisted that the recorded Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 26 conversation did not occur on October 13, 2005. The DEA examined phone records and found no evidence of a call between Webb and Bray on that date. The district court granted summary judgment to Metcalf and Lucas on this issue because “it is undisputed that the date of the alleged October 13, 2005 conversation was not an issue or even disputed at Lucas’s criminal trial.” Webb, 2013 WL 1303776, at  (emphasis added). The fact that the United States did not contest the date of the call at a trial against its codefendant in this case, however, does not establish the date of the call or its materiality. Lucas and the United States also point out that the transcript is labeled “10-13-05.” United States’s Br. (14-3443) at 29; Lucas’s Br. (14-3443) at 39. This argument is circular and only establishes that the Defendants labeled the recording as such after the fact because it is undisputed that they did not follow standard protocol to create a time-and-date header at the time the recording took place. Webb demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact as to the date of the recording because phone records and Bray’s statements indicate that the recording did not occur on October 13, 2005. This factual dispute is material because, if the call did not occur on October 13, 2005, it would be unreasonable for anyone to believe that the participants planned to engage in a drug deal on October 14, 2005, even if Webb had unequivocally agreed to sell drugs in exchange for “two stacks” tomorrow. See Gregory, 444 F.3d at 757-58.
Exhibit N-18 is a recording of the transaction that occurred in Bray’s car between Conrad—in his capacity as Webb’s stand-in—and Lucas on October 14, 2005. Three forensic experts used spectrographic analysis and other advanced techniques to identify evidence that someone had tampered with the recording to delete material.4 The N-18 recording was recorded 4 The first expert examined a CD containing an “undercover body wire” recording and the recording device that made the original recording and identified five anomalies on the recording that could not have been created through the normal functions of the recording device. He highlighted three anomalies of greatest concern, each of which contained “sudden changes in ambient sound such as music[, which,] combined with a signature or anomaly is an indication of an edited or altered recording.” A second expert examined a copy of the recording and found the same three troubling anomalies. He was unable to determine their causes through the copied recording, and the original recording was no longer available. A third court-appointed expert examined a copy of the recording that was given to him by Cross and identified two deleted sections and concluded that both occurred before the main “drug conversation” and could have contained conversations between the “CI and his handlers.” Two other experts Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 27 on Lucas’s recording device. Metcalf made an “original copy” on a CD, and Lucas and Cross took custody of the CD from Metcalf until “it was submitted to the Cleveland Resident Office Non-Drug Evidence Custodian.” Webb alleges that one or more of these three Defendants fabricated evidence against him by tampering with the N-18 recording. Cross argues that he never had custody of the “original audiotape” that Lucas gave to Metcalf. United States’s Br. (14-3443) at 8. But the “original audiotape” was the storage card on Lucas’s recording device, and the forensic experts agreed that the recording device could not have been responsible for the deletions. Therefore, the deletions must have been made either when Metcalf created the “original copy” CD or after Lucas and Cross took custody of that CD. Lucas argues that any deletions to the N-18 recording would not have been material because loud music in Bray’s car made the deleted portions inaudible. See Lucas’s Br. (14-3443) at 47. But unaltered portions of the recording are comprehensible, and there is no way to know whether the deleted portions are inaudible because they were deleted, so this argument fails. Under such circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that one or more of Defendants who had custody of the recording deliberately tampered with the evidence. The district court nonetheless granted summary judgment to the Defendants because it concluded that Webb “has the burden to show some issue of fact as to what was deleted from the recording” but he “wholly fails to point to any evidence as to what would have been cut out or covered over.” Webb, 2013 WL 1303776, at . But it would surely be strange if Webb must furnish the content of the material excised from the recording when Webb was not a party to the recording, and the purpose of excising the material may have been to prevent Webb from accessing the material in the first place. Webb only needs to show that “a reasonable likelihood exists that the [tampered] evidence would have affected the decision of the jury.” Gregory, 444 F.3d at 737. The N-18 recording captured the entire drug deal for which Webb was charged. It was therefore reasonably likely that an altered recording would affect the jury’s decision. Willful spoliation of relevant evidence is generally punished by an adverse-inference jury instruction. See Automated Solutions Corp. v. Paragon Data Sys., Inc., 756 F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir. 2014); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Similarly, we relied on solely visual and aural techniques to examine the N-18 recording and concluded that it contained no anomalies. Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 28 presume that unexplained tampering with relevant evidence would have an effect on the jury’s decision. Because there is a dispute of fact as to whether one of the Defendants who had custody of the N-18 recording deliberately deleted portions that presumptively were reasonably likely to affect the jury’s decision, it was improper for the district court to grant summary judgment to Lucas, Metcalf, and Cross.
Finally, Webb alleges that Lucas’s DEA-6 report of October 14, 2005, contained false statements. Aside from allegedly falsely reporting the date of the N-17 recording, which was discussed above, these alleged falsehoods include the following: (1) Lucas reported that he and other officers met with Bray before the Webb drug buy, but the other officers stated that they did not meet Bray; (2) Lucas reported that he and Conrad/Webb exchanged money for drugs directly, but Bray and Conrad testified that Lucas exchanged money for drugs with Bray, then Bray passed the money to Conrad; and (3) Lucas falsely documented the person who sold him drugs as being 6’3” tall when he was only 5’9” tall. The district court determined that these “alleged fabrications do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Webb, 2013 WL 1303776, at . This conclusion is correct as to the first two items because those discrepancies were not reasonably likely to affect the jury’s decision. See Gregory, 444 F.3d at 737. But the misstatement about the suspect’s height may have affected the jury’s decision because truthfully reporting the height of the suspect as being 5’9” would have seriously undermined the case against a 6’3” defendant. Whether it was objectively reasonable for Lucas to mistake a 5’9” suspect to be 6’3” remains a factual question for the jury. Therefore, the district court improperly granted Lucas summary judgment with respect to this claim.