Opinion ID: 407759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 54 All appellants except Frank challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. Fantauzzi relies principally upon the fact that the DEA had never heard of her prior to her arrival at the apartment with Frank and Gleckler on May 13. That is so, but her arrival in not so innocent circumstances, the one-half pound of 86% pure cocaine in her purse along with $5,000 in cash, and the fact that she was listed along with the other conspirators in Frank's records, surely weighs heavily against her. The jury could have readily concluded that Fantauzzi was involved in the ongoing transactions and was transporting pure cocaine to a narcotics headquarters where it would be cut into quantities of lesser purity and readied for ultimate distribution. The sheer quantity of the cocaine and the presence of cash along with her association with Frank and Gleckler surely allowed the jury to conclude she was more than an innocent courier, compare DeNoia v. United States, 451 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1971), and more than an unfortunate associate who was present on the scene but who had engaged in no criminally purposeful behavior, United States v. Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 823-24 (2d Cir. 1975). 55 Even if the proof against Fantauzzi showed only a single act, DeNoia, supra, the nature of this conspiracy was such that a single act of the kind proven here supports an inference of guilt. The conspiracy was inherently narrow and centered around Frank. Under these circumstances, the proven possession and apparent transportation forms a larger proportion of the entire scheme. United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1124 (2d Cir. 1974). Viewed in context, therefore, the qualitative nature of the act permits the inference of knowledge of the broader conspiracy (since) the single act itself shows so much familiarity with or high level participation in the overall conspiracy, ... Id. 56 The case with respect to Gleckler is equally strong. Although he casts himself in the role of an innocent friend collecting for Frank, the evidence clearly permitted a contrary finding. Gleckler stayed in the Frank apartment for much of the night of May 12 and was persistent in pressing Erbacher to deliver money owed to Frank's sources. He made these pleas as Barlin and Cuccio stood nearby, demanding payment for previously delivered narcotics, or so the jury could have found. The next day, Gleckler arrived with Fantauzzi, the latter carrying drugs and cash. In Gleckler's wallet were notes which included notations such as $Herbie4000, $7500-Herbie, and $5000-me. Finally, he possessed a key to a safe deposit box registered to Barlin. Under these circumstances, imputing knowledge of, and participation in, the conspiracy to Gleckler is hardly impermissible. 57 In Barlin's case, the evidence is perhaps less direct but still quite sufficient. Frank had verbally identified one of his sources as Ron and his records contained numerous references to a Ron. Barlin admitted to having been in and out of the apartment all night, justifying an inference that he was waiting for Frank, who was carrying over $50,000, either as the source or the strongman. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), the proof against Barlin was sufficient. 58 Cuccio's case is closer. Had his presence throughout the night of May 12 and through the morning of May 13 not been established, his activity on the afternoon of the 13th might lack any purposeful cast. Johnson, 513 F.2d at 823-24; see also United States v. Burgos, 579 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1978). However, his presence through that tense night, together with an apparent attempt to grab a shotgun after the agents arrived and the presence of the phone numbers of the other defendants in his wallet, is sufficient to support an inference that Cuccio was one of the visitors seeking to collect, or aid in collecting, money for delivered narcotics.