Opinion ID: 1628838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Murder Verdict Directors

Text: Gill's primary argument is that the trial court erred in submitting Instructions 8 and 11, the verdict directors for first and second-degree murder, because they attributed the conduct elements of shooting Mr. Lape in the disjunctive to either Gill or Brown. He alleges that the jury should have been instructed that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown was the shooter, with no reference to the possibility that Gill was the shooter because, according to Gill, there was no evidence that Gill was the shooter. This Court disagrees. Instruction 8, the verdict director for first-degree murder, provided in pertinent part: A person is responsible for his own conduct and he is also responsible for the conduct of another person in committing an offense if he acts with the other person with the common purpose of committing that offense or if, for the purpose of committing that offense, he aids or encourages the other person in committing it. As to Count I, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First that on or about July 7, 2002, the defendant or Justin M. Brown caused the death of Ralph L. Lape, Jr., by shooting him, and Second that defendant was aware that his or Justin M. Brown's conduct was practically certain to cause the death of Ralph L. Lape, Jr., and Third, that beginning in Cape Girardeau County, Missouri, and ending in New Madrid County, Missouri, the defendant or Justin M. Brown caused the death of Ralph L. Lape, Jr. after deliberation, which means cool reflection upon the matter for any length of time no matter how brief, then you are instructed that the offense of murder in the first degree has occurred, and if you further find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: Fourth, that with the purpose of promoting or furthering the death of Ralph L. Lape, Jr., the defendant acted together with or aided Justin M. Brown in causing the death of Ralph L. Lape, Jr., and did so after deliberation, which means cool reflection upon the matter for any length of time no matter how brief, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count I of murder in the first degree. . . . (emphasis added). The pertinent portions of this instruction are identical to Instruction 11, the verdict director for second-degree murder. Whenever there is an MAI-CR instruction applicable under the law and Notes on Use, the MAI-CR instruction is to be given to the exclusion of any other instruction. State v. Ervin, 835 S.W.2d 905, 922-23 (Mo. banc 1992). This instruction was based upon MAI-CR3d 304.04, Note on Use 5(c), which is to be used [w]here the evidence is not clear or conflicts as to which person (in a group including the defendant) engaged in the conduct constituting the offense. In such situations, Note 5(c) instructs the court to ascribe the conduct elements to the defendant or the other person. Gill contends that the court should have used instead the language from Note 5(a), which provides that [w]here the evidence shows the conduct elements of the offense were committed entirely by someone other than the defendant and the sole basis for defendant's liability is his aiding the other person. . . all of the elements of the offense . . . should be ascribed to the other person or persons and not to the defendant. Gill claims that the only evidence of who shot Ralph Lape came from his confessions, which unequivocally stated that Justin Brown shot Ralph Lape. Because there was no evidence that he was the shooter, Gill argues, the verdict director should have named Brown as the shooter, rather than stating that the defendant or Justin M. Brown shot Mr. Lape. This Court rejected a similar argument in State v. Dulany, 781 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Mo. banc 1989), and affirmed the use of a disjunctive instruction because the evidence was unclear as to whether it was the defendant or her accomplice who killed the victims. In that case, the defendant and her accomplice were the last people in the victims' house while they were alive. The defendant admitted that she held a gun on the victims, got rope to bind them, and carried out the empty cans of roofing cement that was poured over the victims and set ablaze. The defendant also admitted to fleeing Missouri immediately after these events. In addition, the defendant named a different person responsible for the killings in each of her two confessions. Similarly, in State v. Gilbert, 103 S.W.3d 743, 747-49 (Mo. banc 2003), this Court held that a verdict director nearly identical to the instruction given here was properly submitted because the evidence was unclear as to who shot the victims. The Court's reasoning was based on the fact that the defendant had given inconsistent statements about his involvement in the murder. He testified that he tied one of the victims' hands behind her back and led her down the stairs to the basement, but was upstairs when his accomplice shot the victims. At the time of his arrest, however, he claimed that he was in the victims' basement with his accomplice when the shots were fired. Likewise, the verdict directors in this case were properly submitted because the evidence was not clear as to whether it was Gill or Brown who shot Mr. Lape. As in Dulany and Gilbert , Gill admitted to deep involvement in the crime. He admitted to planning the murder, abducting Mr. Lape, tying him up, driving him to a secluded location, digging his grave, and being present when he was shot and killed. And, as in Dulany , Gill fled Missouri after the crime. In addition to these admissions, Gill was wholly self-serving in stating that Brown pulled the trigger. Obviously, Gill had incentive to try to decrease his level of culpability in the hope that he would be treated less harshly if it were determined that he was not the shooter. Under these circumstances, the identity of the actual shooter  whether Gill or Brown  was unclear. This conclusion is bolstered by Gill's several inconsistent statements. For instance, Gill initially denied any role in Mr. Lape's disappearance and claimed that he had permission to use Mr. Lape's ATM card. It was only later that he admitted to taking part in Mr. Lape's abduction and murder. Although Gill claimed that it was Brown who pulled the trigger, he also stated that when they accosted Mr. Lape in the garage, I knew what I was fixin' to do, I was going to hell. Gill's statements were also inconsistent with the physical evidence. As noted, the autopsy revealed that Mr. Lape had a skull fracture that was not caused by the bullet, three bruises on his head, bruising to his chest, and one of his ribs was completely broken in two. Gill denied that he beat Mr. Lape and the only explanations he could provide for these injuries were that he restrained Mr. Lape in a bear hug type hold in the garage and that Brown stepped on Mr. Lape's head to make it fit in the grave. The medical examiner, however, concluded that Mr. Lape was beaten before his death. He testified that the bruises on Mr. Lape's head were caused by a minimum of three blows to the head, and that it would have taken a solid punch or kick or something similar to have broken his rib completely in two. The medical examiner also concluded that one stomp would not have bruised three separate areas of the head, bruised the chest, and broken the rib. Gill's self-serving account of the murder and the many inconsistencies in his story brought his credibility into issue, and as a result, the jury was not bound by Gill's statement that Brown was the shooter. Dulany, 781 S.W.2d at 55. Because the evidence was unclear as to whether it was Gill or Brown who actually shot Mr. Lape, the trial court did not err by submitting the conduct elements in the disjunctive. Furthermore, Gill could not have been prejudiced by the disjunctive submission. As this Court held in Dulany : Even if there had not been enough evidence for the jury to find defendant committed the acts, the disjunctive submission would not have been reversible error. When the aider is found to have purposely aided in capital murder and thus has the same intent of the active participant, all other things being equal, they are liable to the same degree as the active participant. Defendant's admitted affirmative actions advanced the criminal enterprise and rendered her just as guilty as if she alone committed the acts. Id. at 56 (internal citations omitted); see also Gilbert at 748.