Opinion ID: 203230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NRC Decisions

Text: The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes this court to displace the Commission's decisions only to the extent that they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 878 F.2d 1516, 1522 (1st Cir.1989). This general posture of deference toward agency decision-making is particularly marked with regards to NRC actions because [t]he [AEA] is hallmarked by the amount of discretion granted the Commission in working to achieve the statute's ends. Massachusetts, 878 F.2d at 1523 (quoting Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir.1978)). This principle is applicable in the context of licensing decisions, where statutory directives are scant and the AEA explicitly delegates broad authority to the agency to promulgate rules and regulations. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2134(b). This court must also be mindful of the substantial deference required when an agency adopts reasonable interpretations of regulations of its own creation. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 1155, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2008); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997). We must accept the agency's position unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (quoting Robertson v: Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission's decision to deny party status to the Commonwealth in the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee license renewal proceedings is reasonable in context, and consistent with agency rules. As the Commonwealth has conceded, the pool fire contention it raised in its hearing requests does not apply solely to the Pilgrim or Vermont Yankee plants and instead challenges a Category 1 GEIS finding. Where environmental impacts of an NRC action are not plant-specific, the Supreme Court has endorsed [t]he generic method . . . [as] clearly an appropriate method of conducting the hard look required by NEPA. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 101, 103 S.Ct. 2246 (citing Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 535 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1197). Administrative efficiency and consistency of decision are both furthered by a generic determination of these effects without needless repetition of the litigation in individual proceedings, which are subject to review by the Commission in any event. Id. The NRC's procedural rules are clear: generic Category 1 issues cannot be litigated in individual licensing adjudications without a waiver. 10 C.F.R. § 2.335; see also Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc. ( Millstone Nuclear Power Station ), 54 N.R.C. 349, 364 (2001); Turkey Point, 54 N.R.C. at 12; Duke Energy Corp. ( Oconee Nuclear Station ), 49 N.R.C. 328, 343 (1999). If the Commonwealth or any citizen wishes to attack the agency's rule on such an issue, it must petition for a generic rulemaking. Turkey Point, 54 N.R.C. at 12. NEPA does impose a requirement that the NRC consider any new and significant information regarding environmental impacts before renewing a nuclear power plant's operating license. However, NEPA does not require agencies to adopt any particular internal decisionmaking structure. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 100, 103 S.Ct. 2246. Here, the NRC procedures anticipate a situation, such as that alleged here by the Commonwealth, in which a generic finding adopted by agency rule may have become obsolete. In such a situation, the regulations provide channels through which the agency's expert staff may receive new and significant information, namely from a license renewal applicant's Environmental report or from public comments on a draft SEIS, and the NRC staff may seek modification of a generic Category 1 finding. The Commonwealth has already chosen the available option of a rulemaking petition. But the rulemaking petition may not move quickly enough to address the Commonwealth's safety concerns before the Commission renders re-licensing decisions regarding the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee plants. The Commonwealth argues that the NRC acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it channeled the Commonwealth's pool fire concerns into a generic rulemaking without any assurances that the result of the rulemaking would apply to the individual licensing proceedings for the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee plants. Central to the Commonwealth's argument is its assumption that [u]nder the NRC's present process, the Commonwealth does not even have a right to request the agency to exercise its discretion to stay the individual proceedings so that the results of the rulemaking may be applied to Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee. Pet'r Br. 35. The Commonwealth's concern is apparently based on a misreading of the NRC's position. Both in its decisions in the administrative proceedings and before this court, the NRC has outlined at least one path by which the Commonwealth may establish a connection between the rulemaking and the licensing proceedings. That path consists of two stages. First, the Commonwealth may participate in the licensing proceedings not as a party with its own contentions, but as an interested governmental body under 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c). [6] Second, in the rulemaking proceedings, the Commonwealth may invoke 10 C.F.R. § 2.802(d), which provides that a rulemaking petitioner may request the Commission to suspend all or any part of any licensing proceeding to which the petitioner is a party pending disposition of the petition for rulemaking. This stay procedure would, the agency argues, allow the Commonwealth an opportunity to influence the order and timing of the agency's final decisions in the rulemaking and licensing proceedings. But, since the Commonwealth has as yet done neither of those things, there is no final order and those issues are premature. The Commonwealth asserts the agency is changing positions before this court regarding the availability of the § 2.802(d) mechanism. Again, we think this is based on a misunderstanding. The Commonwealth quotes a passage from the NRC's denial of the motion for reconsideration: [U]nder NRC regulations, the [Commonwealth] currently has no right to request that the final decisions in the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee license renewal proceedings be stayed until the rulemaking is resolved. Pet'r Br. 36 (quoting Vt. Yankee III, 65 N.R.C. at 214) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission's decision goes on to explain, however, that the Commonwealth could not currently request a stay under § 2.802(d) because at the time of the NRC's decision, the Commonwealth had neither been admitted as a party to the licensing proceedings nor asserted interested governmental entity status under § 2.315. [7] Vt. Yankee III, 65 N.R.C. at 214-15. The Commission further represented that the Commonwealth could attain interested governmental entity status even now. Id. at 215 n. 16. [8] The Commonwealth seizes upon a textual mismatch in the regulations to argue that an interested State participating in a licensing proceeding under § 2.315(c) is distinct from a party, and therefore could not invoke the § 2.802(d) procedure. Compare 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c) (making participant status available to a governmental body which has not been admitted as a party) with id. § 2.802(d) (allowing petitioner in pending rulemaking to request suspension of a licensing proceeding to which the petitioner is a party). While we recognize what may be tension between the wording of these two regulations, we decline to adopt the Commonwealth's preclusive reading of the term party in the face of a contrary and reasonable reading by the agency. Dispositive here is the agency's own reasonable reading of the term, which treats an interested governmental entity as the equivalent of a party for purposes of § 2.802(d). Party can both be defined in one context as a term of art, e.g., as one who has demonstrated standing and whose contention has been admitted for hearing in a licensing adjudication, see 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(a), and deployed in its more general sense of one who participates in a proceeding or transaction, see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1648 (1993) (defining party to include one who takes part with others in an action or affair or an individual involved in the case at hand). The NRC has not defined the term party uniformly throughout its regulations. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 2.4 (containing regulatory Definitions, but not including one for party). We must pay deference to this agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905. The Commonwealth charges that the NRC has adopted this interpretation for the first time before this court [i]n an effort to avoid judicial review. Pet'r Supplemental Reply Br. 5. This is not a mere litigation position. The Commission explicitly stated in its January 22, 2007 affirmance of the ASLB rulings that an interested governmental entity participating under § 2.315(c) could request a suspension under § 2.802(d). Vt. Yankee II, 65 N.R.C. at 22 n. 37. We thus take the NRC's proffered reading of how § 2.315(c) and § 2.802(d) interact to be consistent with the agency's practice generally, as well as its litigation position in this court. In sum, the NRC acted reasonably when it invoked a well-established agency rule to reject the Commonwealth's requests to participate as a party in individual re-licensing proceedings to raise generic safety concerns and required that the Commonwealth present its concerns in a rulemaking petition. The agency is also within the bounds of its authority to interpret its regulations to afford the Commonwealth an opportunity to participate in the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee licensing proceedings under § 2.315(c) and thereby qualify to request a suspension of those proceedings under § 2.802(d). We note, however, that these conclusions rely on our deference to the agency's interpretations of its own regulations. By staking its position regarding procedural avenues available to the Commonwealth in this case, both in its administrative decisions and in its representations before this court, the agency has, in our view, bound itself to honor those interpretations. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-51, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). Further, if the agency were to act contrary to these representations in this matter, a reviewing court would most likely consider such actions to be arbitrary and capricious. Timing is a factor in this case. Section 2.315(c) affords interested states an opportunity to participate in licensing hearings, but the agency has not stayed the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee proceedings pending the outcome of this court's decision, and the hearing schedule in at least the Pilgrim proceedings may be coming rapidly to a close. We therefore stay the close of hearings in both plant license renewal proceedings for fourteen days from the date of issuance of mandate in this case [9] in order to afford the Commonwealth an opportunity to request participant status under 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c), should it desire to do so. What remains is the Commonwealth's objection that accepting the NRC's recommended procedural vehicle subjects the Commonwealth's rights under NEPA to the NRC's unfettered discretion to grant or withhold a stay of the licensing proceedings. Pet'r Br. 36. Again, although NEPA does impose an obligation on the NRC to consider environmental impacts of the Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee license renewal before issuing a final decision, the statute does not mandate how the agency must fulfill that obligation. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332; Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 100-01, 103 S.Ct. 2246; Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548, 98 S.Ct. 1197. Beyond the statutory minima  imposed by NEPA, Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 548, 98 S.Ct. 1197, the implementing procedures are committed to the agency's judgment. In theory, what fetters the agency's decision-making process and ensures ultimate compliance with NEPA is judicial review. The NRC does not take the position that the Commonwealth is not entitled to judicial review in the future. We turn next to the question of whether a meaningful opportunity to seek judicial review would be available to the Commonwealth should it pursue the procedural course advanced by the agency.