Opinion ID: 4587745
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Childhood-Trauma Mitigator

Text: Craft next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning little weight to the mitigating circumstance of childhood trauma, the same weight assigned to the mitigating circumstance that Craft exhibited good behavior during trial. We “review[] a trial court’s assignment of weight to mitigation under an abuse of discretion standard,” Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505, 521 (Fla. 2008), and “will not disturb the sentencing judge’s determination as to ‘the relative weight to give to each established mitigator’ where that ruling ‘is supported by competent - 14 - substantial evidence,’ ” Gill v. State, 14 So. 3d 946, 964 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 412-13 (Fla. 2000)). Here, the trial court found that testimony from Craft’s penalty-phase witnesses and the PSI established that he experienced a traumatic childhood. However, the trial court assigned this mitigating circumstance little weight based on its findings that “there was no showing that these experiences diminished [Craft’s] ability to know or understand right from wrong” and that “the evidence presented was not sufficient to establish that [Craft’s] childhood and adolescence had an ill effect on [Craft].” Although Craft argues that the weight assigned to the childhood-trauma mitigator was arbitrary and unreasonable because the trial court also assigned the same weight to the mitigating circumstance that Craft exhibited good behavior during trial, the sentencing order reflects that the trial court independently considered and weighed both mitigating circumstances, and the trial court’s findings with respect to both circumstances are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Moreover, as the State points out, the trial court did not simply arbitrarily assign all mitigation the same weight. Rather, based in large part on the competency evaluations by the mental health experts, the trial court more heavily weighted the mitigating circumstance of “general mental health mitigation,” assigning it “some weight.” Because we cannot say on the facts of this case that no reasonable trial court would have failed to assign the childhood- - 15 - trauma mitigating circumstance more than little weight, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 3. Failure to Inquire of the State, Call Witnesses, or Appoint Special Counsel Third, Craft argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the death penalty without requiring the State to present all mitigating evidence in its possession and without calling mitigating witnesses or appointing special counsel. We disagree. Regarding Craft’s argument pertaining to the State, this Court has explained that “[t]he trial court should . . . require the State ‘to place in the record all evidence in its possession of a mitigating nature such as school records, military records, and medical records.’ ” Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464, 491 (Fla. 2015) (quoting Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 363-64 (Fla. 2001)). However, Craft does not identify any mitigation allegedly in the State’s possession but not in the record. Cf. Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 364 n.11 (explaining that requiring the State to place such items in the record “is consistent with the prosecutors’ existing obligations” under the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct). Moreover, the record shows that the prosecutor stated during the penalty-phase proceeding that because he had not anticipated that Craft’s family members would testify, he “did [his] best to come up with a range of non-statutory mitigators” based “on the PSI, all the family statements attached to the PSI, both - 16 - mental health evaluations and other facts gleaned from the entirety of the court file.” The State plainly attempted to aid the trial court in its consideration of mitigation. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to inquire of the State about additional mitigation. We also reject Craft’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to call mitigating witnesses or appoint special counsel. See Robertson, 187 So. 3d at 1214 (“Whether to appoint special counsel was a matter within the court’s discretion.”); see also Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 364 (recognizing that “the trial court has the discretion to call persons with mitigating evidence as its own witnesses”). As we have already explained, as a competent defendant, Craft had the right to control the mitigation presented in his case. See Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 804. Moreover, Craft does not identify the additional witnesses he now claims that the trial court should have known to call based on the information in the record. Further, the trial court ordered a PSI and two competency evaluations, and Craft’s prior criminal history is in the record. Consequently, the record contains a substantial amount of information about the circumstances of Craft’s offense and Craft’s character and background in addition to the mitigation presented by Craft during the penalty-phase proceeding. Cf. Robertson, 187 So. 3d at 1214 (“[T]he [trial] court had before it all the documents and background information from which mitigating evidence could have been derived had Robertson allowed such - 17 - evidence to be presented, particularly as Robertson has spent most of his adult life in prison and was incarcerated as a juvenile before that.”). On these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 4. Failure to Consider Mitigation Fourth, Craft argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider all believable and uncontroverted mitigation in the record. Specifically, Craft points to nine items of alleged mitigation that he contends the trial court failed to consider, namely (1) Craft was born with the umbilical cord around his neck and was blue and not breathing; (2) Craft’s mother failed to obtain proper mental health treatment for Craft and felt that she could “beat it out of him”; (3) by age four, all of Craft’s baby teeth were rotten because of malnutrition, and at times, Craft’s mother would starve the children; (4) Craft was designated “emotionally handicapped” and a “slow learner,” classified as “mentally retarded,” 4 and was enrolled in special education classes; (5) Craft began drinking beer and smoking marijuana around age ten or twelve, and later began using crystal 4. Craft’s aunt, Barbara Chapple, was interviewed for the PSI, and she stated that Craft “was classified as ‘mentally retarded’ before the age of 12.” Craft’s other aunt, Michelle Griggs, was also interviewed, and she “stated that the ‘mental retardation’ designation as a child was due to his learning disabilities.” One of Craft’s competency evaluation reports includes the mental health expert’s finding that Craft “appears to function at or near the average range of general intelligence.” No argument has been advanced that Craft is intellectually disabled. - 18 - methamphetamine; (6) Craft had previously worked, including repairing vehicles, welding, tree service, carpentry, and painting/remodeling; (7) as an adult, Craft saved a fellow inmate’s life while they were both in jail 5; (8) Craft immediately, and repeatedly, confessed to killing the victim; and (9) Craft later pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. The trial court’s sentencing order reflects that Florida law requires the sentencing court to “ ‘consider all mitigating evidence’ [found] anywhere in the record.” Gill, 14 So. 3d at 955 (quoting Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363); see also Robinson, 684 So. 2d at 177 (explaining that this requirement applies to available mitigation that is “believable and uncontroverted”). The sentencing order further explains that the trial court “considered the testimony and observed the demeanor of all witnesses, reviewed all exhibits introduced into evidence, weighed the argument by counsel and the Defendant, reviewed Defendant’s two mental health evaluations, and reviewed the [PSI].” Then, as authorized by Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 194 (Fla. 2010), the trial court “group[ed] into categories proposed mitigating factors that are related in content,” conducted a detailed analysis, and assigned weight to each of the four categories it found, which were childhood 5. The PSI indicates that, while in jail, Craft saved the life of a fellow inmate who allegedly intended to commit suicide. - 19 - trauma, close family ties, general mental health mitigation, and good behavior during trial. At oral argument, the State conceded that the trial court failed to consider items 6 and 7, Craft’s prior employment history and that Craft had saved a fellow inmate’s life. Our review of the sentencing order confirms that neither of these mitigating circumstances can be fairly assigned to any of the four categories of mitigation found by the trial court. However, we reject Craft’s argument that the trial court erred with respect to the remaining seven items. Items 1-5 all relate to the mitigating circumstances of “childhood trauma” or “general mental health.” Moreover, the sentencing order expressly mentions Craft’s confession and guilty plea (items 8 and 9), indicating that rather than overlook these items as potential mitigation, the trial court did not consider them mitigating based on the facts of this case. Cf. Agan v. State, 445 So. 2d 326, 328-29 (Fla. 1983) (rejecting, in a case where the defendant “declined to present any evidence in mitigation,” the claim that the trial court erred by failing to find the defendant’s “willingness to cooperate by confessing . . . and pleading guilty” as a mitigating circumstance where it was “apparent that the trial judge did consider and reject this willingness to cooperate as a mitigating circumstance” based on the finding in the sentencing order that the defendant “shows no remorse but seeks rather a chance to kill again” if he receives a life sentence). - 20 - 5. Cumulative Error Because we agree with Craft that the trial court erred in failing to consider the believable and uncontroverted mitigation of Craft’s prior employment history and that Craft had saved a fellow inmate’s life, see Robinson, 684 So. 2d at 177, we address Craft’s last mitigation-related argument, namely that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors entitle him to relief from his sentence of death. In light of the substantial aggravation in this case—including the HAC, CCP, and prior-violent-felony aggravators, which are three of the most serious and weighty aggravators in the capital sentencing scheme, see Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 215 (Fla. 2020)—we hold that there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court’s failure to consider the additional mitigation of Craft’s prior employment or his having saved a fellow inmate’s life contributed to the sentence. See Ault, 53 So. 3d at 195 (setting forth the harmless-error standard that applies where the trial court errs in rejecting proposed mitigation, namely “whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the sentence”) (citing State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986)); Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 890 (Fla. 2019) (concluding that the trial court’s error in failing to find a proposed mitigating circumstance that was supported by the record “was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there is no reasonable possibility that the trial court would have imposed a life sentence” but for the error in light of the weighty aggravating - 21 - circumstances).6 Accordingly, Craft is not entitled to relief as a result of the trial court’s failure to consider these two mitigating circumstances.