Opinion ID: 771682
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Do CRLC and CRG Have Standing to Challenge 103(7), (10)(a), and (11)?

Text: 60 We construe the district court's order of June 18, 1997, as a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction -- i.e., for lack of standing -- under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo, applying the same standard used by the district court. Sac & Fox Nation of Okla. v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2657 (2000). Accordingly, we review the district court's interpretation of 103 de novo, Houston v. Norton, 215 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 2000), and construe the allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in favor of Plaintiff[s]. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (applying same standard of review to sua sponte dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). 61 The district court described Plaintiffs' arguments in the following terms: CRG and CRLC contended at the hearing that, although they were not a political committee and they did not engage in independent expenditures as defined by the statute, the provision[s] of the statute, when read together, made them 'political committees' and brought them within the purview of the statute. 2 J.A. 289 (Order, June 18, 1997). Our review of the record indicates that this characterization of Plaintiffs' arguments was inaccurate. At the hearing referenced by the district court, Plaintiffs' counsel cogently stated that both plaintiffs [CRG and CRLC] do have expenditures which unambiguously refer to candidates for state political office. Therefore, they are deemed to have under the statute made an independent expenditure and therefore are deemed to be a political committee. 13 J.A. 2819 (Tr. of H'rg on Mot. for Prelim. Inj., March 14, 1997). These claims were consistent with the allegations in the complaint. CRLC et al. Compl. at 9-10 (Dec. 10, 1996), attached to CRLC et al. Br. at A166-67 (Dec. 16, 1999). Thus, we do not agree that Plaintiffs conceded that the 103 definitions were inapplicable to their organizations. Indeed, taking all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construing all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of Plaintiffs, we find that the plain language of 103(7), (10)(a), and (11) is clearly applicable to CRG and CRLC and that the organizations face a credible threat of prosecution under the FCPA. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in denying CRG and CRLC standing to challenge the definitions. 62 a. Are Subsections 103(7), (10)(a), and (11) Applicable to CRG and CRLC and Their Activities? 63 The district court deferred to Colorado's narrow construction of the statute, which the court deemed reasonable in light of both [the statute's] purpose and its plain language. 2 J.A. 289 (Order, June 18, 1997). Colorado's construction focuses on the emphasized portions of the following four clauses in 103: (1) the definition of political message as a message . . . which advocates the election or defeat of any candidate or which unambiguously refers to such candidate, see Colo. Answer Br. at 19 (Jan. 14, 2000); (2) the provision that '[i]ndependent expenditure' includes expenditures for political messages which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office, see id. at 15-18; (3) the definition of political committee, in part, as two or more persons who . . . have associated themselves . . . for the purpose of making independent expenditures, see id. at 14-15; and (4) the exception in the definition of independent expenditure for expenditures made by persons, other than political parties and political committees, in the regular course and scope of their business and political messages sent solely to their members. See id. at 17. 64
65 Because the definition of independent expenditure incorporates the definition of political message, we begin our analysis with the definition of political message. Under 103(11), a political message is a message delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material which advocates the election or defeat of any candidate or which unambiguously refers to such candidate. Colorado urges us to adopt its reading of 103(11). Under the state's construction, the disjunctive phrase advocates the election or defeat of . . . or . . . unambiguously refers to . . . is read as if it were written in the conjunctive, thereby rendering the statute inapplicable to organizations -- like CRLC and CRG -- who do unambiguously refer to candidates, but do not expressly advocate their election or defeat. See Colo. Answer Br. at 16, 19 (Jan. 14, 2000). In other words, Colorado asks as to construe the fourth or in the definition as signifying and. We are unable to do so. 66 We interpret state laws according to state rules of statutory construction. Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1071 n.23 (10th Cir. 1995). The goal of Colorado courts in interpreting the meaning or scope of any statutory term . . . is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774, 778 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (citations omitted). [W]e look first to the language of the statute itself to determine the legislative intent. Id. at 778. Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous on its face, there is no need to apply rules of statutory construction because it may be presumed that the legislature meant what it clearly said. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause & Summary for 1999-2000 No. 219, 999 P.2d 819, 820 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). Although 103 was originally proposed via ballot initiative, Colorado courts employ the general rules of statutory construction when interpreting citizen-initiated measures. Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215, 228 n.10 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). 67 The definition of political message in 103(11) is clear and unambiguous. In re 1999-2000 No. 219, 999 P.2d at 820. We may therefore presume[] that the legislature meant what it clearly said, i.e., that all four uses of the word or in 103(11) were intended to signify or -- not sometimes or and sometimes and. Id.; cf. Foutz v. United States, 72 F.3d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1995) (The word or . . . is not a fertile word which is subject to varied constructions.). We need not look to the State's construction for assistance with this interpretation; our inquiry ends with the plain language of the statute. We hold that the use of the disjunctive term or in 103(11) renders the definition of political message applicable to messages which unambiguously refer to a candidate, even if such messages do not also advocate the election or defeat of that candidate. In sum, to qualify as a political message under 103(11), a message need only: (1) be delivered by telephone, any print or electronic media, or other written material, and (2) either (a) advocate the election or defeat of any candidate or (b) unambiguously refer to such candidate. 68 Colorado's next argument focuses on the definition of independent expenditure in 103(7). The first sentence of the definition provides that a payment is an independent expenditure when it is (1) made for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of a candidate, and (2) not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. The second sentence provides that '[i]ndependent expenditure' includes expenditures for political messages which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office. Colorado argues that the second sentence does not expand upon the first, but merely clarifies its meaning. Colo. Answer Br. at 16 (Jan. 14, 2000). Again, we disagree. 69 Colorado is among the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that read the word includes as a term of extension or enlargement when used in a statutory definition. Colo. Common Cause v. Meyer, 758 P.2d 153, 163-64 (Colo. 1988) (en banc). Therefore, [t]he use of 'includes' in the statutory definition . . . connotes that something else is encompassed by the definition beyond what was previously covered by the immediately preceding language. Id. at 164 (citation omitted, emphasis added). In this case, that something else is expenditures for political messages which unambiguously refer to any specific public office or candidate for such office. 70 As noted above, our standard of review requires us to accept as true the factual allegations underlying Plaintiffs' challenges. See Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1231-32; Apple, 183 F.3d at 479. In their complaint, CRLC and CRG each allege that 71 [the organization's] purposes are to educate the public on issues relating to abortion, to restore protection of the life for [sic] unborn children, and to promote the sanctity of all innocent life. Its major purpose is not to nominate, elect, or defeat candidates, or to pass or defeat ballot measures, and it does not engage in express advocacy. As part of its issue advocacy, CRLC distributes voter guides prior to state elections which educate the voting public on the positions of candidates on issues of public concern. CRLC's voter guides unambiguously refer to specific candidates but do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of any candidate. 72 CRLC et al. Compl. at 9 (Dec. 10, 1996), attached to CRLC et al. Br. at A166 (Dec. 16, 1999); see also id. at 10 (same allegations with respect to CRG). Accepting these allegations as true, as we must, we hold that the voter guides distributed by CRLC and CRG clearly constitute political messages, as defined in 103(11). CRLC and CRG also allege that they are not associated with any political candidate, political party, or campaign committee. Id. at 9-10. In light of our obligation to accord CRLC and CRG the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we infer from this allegation of independence that the distribution of voter guides is not controlled by, or coordinated with, any candidate or any agent of such candidate. Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-103(7). We therefore conclude that the funds expended by CRLC and CRG to produce and disseminate voter guides are subject to regulation as independent expenditures, as the term is defined in 103(7). 73
74 Colorado's next argument relates to the definition of political committee in 103(10)(a), and relies heavily on Common Sense Alliance v. Davidson, 995 P.2d 748 (Colo. 2000). In that case, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted an analogous FCPA provision, 103(8), which defines issue committee, in part, as [t]wo or more persons who are elected, appointed, or chosen, or have associated themselves, for the purpose of accepting contributions and making expenditures to support or oppose any ballot issue or ballot question . . . . Colo. Rev. Stat. 1-45-103(8)(I) (2000) (emphasis added). In response to the certified question of whether an organization formed for other purposes may later become an issue committee as defined by the FCPA, Common Sense Alliance, 995 P.2d at 749, the court held that the phrase for the purpose of must be read to include only those issue committees that were formed for the purpose of supporting or opposing a ballot initiative. Organizations that form for another purpose and later commit to ballot issue activity are not within the clear ambit of the statute. Id. at 758 (emphasis added). 75 This court is bound by the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of 103(8). Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (Neither this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State.); Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1106 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 525 U.S. 182 (1999). Although Common Sense Alliance construed for the purpose of in 103(8) rather than 103(10)(a), it is a well-settled rule that identical words or phrases in the same statute have the same meaning. Colo. Common Cause, 758 P.2d at 161 ([W]hen . . . the legislature employs the same words or phrases in different parts of a statute, then, in the absence of any manifest indication to the contrary, the meaning attributed to the words or phrases in one part of the statute should be ascribed to the same words or phrases found elsewhere in the statute.). Thus, we hold that a political committee is formed when two or more persons associate themselves with the original purpose of making independent expenditures. 76 CRLC, CRG, and Citizens for Responsible Government State Political Action Committee (CRGS-PAC) filed their initial complaint on December 10, 1996. See 1 J.A. 3 (Docket for No. 96-S-2844). The district court dismissed their 103 claims on June 18, 1997. 2 J.A. 288-90. Common Sense Alliance was decided almost three years later, on March 13, 2000. It is therefore not surprising that Plaintiffs' complaint only sets forth the organizations' present purposes, without specifically alleging the purposes for which they were originally formed. Giving Plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we surmise that the organizations' current purposes are consistent with their original purposes, and that they would be permitted to amend their complaint accordingly. Thus, CRLC and CRG are political committees, as the term is defined in 103(10)(a), and the district court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous. 7 Accordingly, 103(7)'s exception for expenditures made by persons, other than political parties and political committees, in the regular course and scope of their business does not apply to CRG or CRLC. 77 b. Do CRLC and CRG Face a Credible Threat of Prosecution Under the FCPA? 78 A plaintiff need not await and undergo a criminal prosecution in order to challenge a statute on constitutional grounds. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973)). Article III standing exists [w]hen the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder . . . . Id. The plaintiff need not demonstrate to a certainty that it will be prosecuted, Vt. Right to Life, 221 F.3d at 382, only that it has an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against [it]. Id. (quoting Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 393). 79 Throughout this litigation, Colorado has insisted that under the State's construction of 103(7), (10)(a), and (11), organizations like CRLC and CRG will not be prosecuted under the FCPA. E.g., Colo. Answer Br. at 13-21 (Jan. 14, 2000). Such representations, however, are insufficient to overcome the chilling effect of the statute's plain language. In this sense, this case presents an even more compelling threat of prosecution than the plaintiff faced in Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2000). The statute challenged in Vermont Right to Life established content requirements for political advertisements -- including advertisements that only implicitly advocate[d] the success or defeat of a candidate. Id. at 380 (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, 2881). The statute required all such advertisements to clearly designate the name of the candidate, party or political committee by or on whose behalf the same is published or broadcast. Id. (quoting Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, 2882) (emphasis added). The State read on whose behalf to mean only as the agent or representative of; the plaintiff read the phrase to include any advertisement supporting a viewpoint with which a candidate is associated or with which his or her opponent takes issue . . . . Id. at 383. While suggesting that the State's construction was perhaps even better, the Second Circuit deemed the plaintiff's construction reasonable enough to support a legitimate fear of prosecution. Id. In this case, we need not defer to either side's construction. As discussed above, CRG and CRLC are clearly covered by the plain language of the statute. 80 This case is also distinguishable from Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183 (7th Cir. 1998), in which the court denied the plaintiff standing to challenge an ambiguously worded statute because the interpretive mandate sought in the lawsuit was already codified in an advisory opinion by the Wisconsin Attorney General and in regulations promulgated by the Wisconsin Election Board. Id. at 1185. The court therefore held that the plaintiff's fear of prosecution was not well-founded, id. at 1186, characterizing the lawsuit as an attempt to resolve a controversy that has not yet arisen and may never arise. Id. at 1187-88. In the present case, we are aware of no such administrative regulations, and the Secretary's representations in this litigation are not binding on this or future administrations. See Am. Booksellers', 484 U.S. at 395 ([A]s the [State] Attorney General does not bind the state courts or local law enforcement authorities, we are unable to accept her interpretation of the law as authoritative.); accord Vt. Right to Life, 221 F.3d at 383-84 (citations omitted). We therefore hold that the fear of prosecution alleged by CRLC and CRG is sufficiently well-founded to support Article III standing. 81