Opinion ID: 2120348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: January 30, 2001, to May 21, 2001 (111 days)

Text: This period actually contains two, overlapping periods that are both excludable under Rule 28.3. The first period is that from January 30, 2001, to March 27, 2001. The record reflects that during Appellant's arraignment, on December 4, 2000, the trial court appointed the public defender's office to represent Appellant and enter his plea of not guilty. Thereafter, the trial court asked the case coordinator for a trial date. The case coordinator gave the date of January 30, 2001. Counsel appearing on behalf of the public defender informed the court that because this was a capital-murder case, the attorney who would likely be assigned to Appellant's case would need more time to prepare. The trial court then set the trial for March 27, 2001. The State asked that speedy trial be tolled from January 30 to March 27. The trial court declined to rule on the issue, noting that we got plenty of time. The trial court then observed that the issue could be taken up at a later date. Eventually, the trial court took up the issue of the excludability of this time period at a hearing on February 11, 2002. At that hearing, the State argued that the time was excludable because the delay was attributable to the defense, who had asked for more time to prepare the case. The trial court agreed with the state and excluded the time. Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's motion; however, he did ask whether this excludable period was reflected on the docket itself. The trial judge responded that his notes reflected as much. Defense counsel made no further inquiry. This court has repeatedly held that delays resulting from continuances requested by the defendant or defense counsel are excluded from the calculation of the speedy-trial period. See, e.g., Gamble v. State, 350 Ark. 168, 85 S.W.3d 520 (2002); Miles, 348 Ark. 544, 75 S.W.3d 677; Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001). Appellant contests whether this period may actually be called a continuance. He suggests that the first trial date, January 30, 2001, would not have given defense counsel time to prepare for the capital-murder trial, as he claims it was only one month from the date that the public defender's office was appointed. We are not persuaded by this argument for two reasons. First, Appellant is wrong in suggesting that the date of January 30 would only have given the defense one month to prepare. The date was set at the December 4 arraignment, which would have given counsel almost two months to prepare. Second, Appellant is wrong to suggest that just because the word continuance was not used by the public defender, we should not consider this period as a delay requested by the defendant. Were we to accept this argument, we would be placing form over substance. The record reflects that the public defender informed the trial court that because it was a capital case, the attorney likely to be assigned the case was probably going to need more time to prepare. Clearly, this is a request by defense counsel to continue the trial date. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling that this period, from January 30 to March 27, is excluded from the calculation of speedy trial. The next period of delay overlaps the previous period, as it runs from March 1, 2001, to May 21, 2001. The record reflects that on February 12, Appellant changed his plea from not guilty to not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. On March 1, the trial court entered an order that Appellant be evaluated by the Arkansas State Hospital. The state hospital's evaluation report was filed of record on May 21. This court has consistently held that the time necessary to complete a mental examination requested by a defendant, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-305 (Repl.1997), is excluded from the one-year period for speedy trial. See Rule 28.3(a); Camargo, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255; Scott v. State, 337 Ark. 320, 989 S.W.2d 891 (1999). The excludable period resulting from a defendant's request for a mental examination runs from the date the exam is ordered to the date the report is filed with the trial court. Id. Here, the order for evaluation was entered on March 1, [1] and the report was filed with the trial court on May 21. Accordingly, this period was properly excluded from the calculation of speedy trial. We thus affirm the trial court's exclusion of the combined time of these two periods, which ran from January 30, 2001, to May 21, 2001.