Opinion ID: 2585410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of offer to plead guilty

Text: Appellant argues that the district court committed reversible error in admitting evidence surrounding his withdrawn offer to plead guilty in the preceding criminal case. Based on the plain language of NRS 48.125(1), we conclude that this argument lacks merit. See Crowley v. Duffrin, 109 Nev. 597, 603, 855 P.2d 536, 540 (1993) (quoting Union Plaza Hotel v. Jackson, 101 Nev. 733, 736, 709 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1985)) (stating that this court is `not empowered to go beyond the face of a statute to lend it a construction contrary to its clear meaning'). NRS 48.125(1) only limits the admissibility of guilty pleas or offers to plead guilty in criminal proceedings, but makes no mention of their inadmissibility in civil proceedings. Further, because civil proceedings are mentioned in subsection 2 of NRS 48.125 but omitted from subsection one, we do not construe the statute as prohibiting the admission of guilty pleas and offers to plead guilty in civil proceedings. See Pasadena Police Officers v. Pasadena, 51 Cal.3d 564, 273 Cal. Rptr. 584, 797 P.2d 608, 614 (1990) (stating that [w]hen the Legislature `has employed a term or phrase in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded') (citations omitted); see also SIIS v. Wrenn, 104 Nev. 536, 539, 762 P.2d 884, 886 (1988) (stating that this court will not imply provisions not expressly included in [a] legislative scheme). Accordingly, we hold that evidence of a guilty plea or offer to plead guilty from a prior criminal proceeding is admissible in a subsequent civil proceeding, subject to NRS 48.035(1).