Opinion ID: 2100296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Preemption of Section 16-7

Text: We first address the State's claim that the appellate court incorrectly determined that the state's antipiracy provision of section 16-7 is preempted by federal law. The supremacy clause of article VI of the United States Constitution provides that the laws of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land    any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, state law is null and void if it conflicts with federal law. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 197 Ill.2d 112, 117, 258 Ill. Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 537 U.S. 51, 123 S.Ct. 518, 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002). Generally, there is a presumption that historic state police powers are not superseded by federal law. Sprietsma, 197 Ill.2d at 117, 258 Ill.Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75. This presumption does not apply, however, where the proscribed activity is also within the realm of traditional federal regulation and federal concerns predominate in the case. Sprietsma, 197 Ill.2d at 118-19, 258 Ill. Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75. Here, we do not believe that the presumption is applicable. Illinois first enacted a statute specifically protecting sound recordings on August 14, 1975, with the enactment of section 16-7. See Ill. Ann.Stat., ch. 38, par 16-7, Historical Note, at 224 (Smith-Hurd 1977). But Congress first protected sound recordings with an amendment to the Copyright Act in 1971. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552, 93 S.Ct. 2303, 2307, 37 L.Ed.2d 163, 171 (1973) (the amendment was passed to allow federal copyright protection of sound recordings fixed, published and copyrighted on and after February 15, 1972). It did so pursuant to its authority under the federal constitution, which grants Congress the power [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Despite this constitutional provision, the power to define and protect copyrightable property was regarded as concurrent, that is, shared by the federal and state governments; the constitutional provision did not, of itself, vest exclusive control of the field to Congress. See Hicks v. State, 109 Md. App. 113, 120-21, 674 A.2d 55, 59 (1996), citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 604, 8 L.Ed. 1055, 1060 (1834). Until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, federal law, for the most part, protected only certain kinds of published works; it was state law, to the extent that it existed at all, that protected unpublished works. See Hicks, 109 Md.App. at 121, 674 A.2d at 59. The constitutional authority of Congress to preempt state law has never been in question, but, since the first copyright law was enacted in 1790, Congress had simply chosen not to exercise that authority. Hicks, 109 Md.App. at 121, 674 A.2d at 59, citing Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 560, 93 S.Ct. at 2311, 37 L.Ed.2d at 176. Then, in 1976, Congress abolished the dual system by enacting a preemption provision in section 301 of the Act that was intended to create a single federal system. The legislative record indicates: Section 301, one of the bedrock provisions of the bill, would accomplish a fundamental and significant change in the present law. Instead of a dual system of common law copyright for unpublished works and statutory copyright for published works, which has been the system in effect in the United States since the first copyright statute in 1790, the bill adopts a single system of Federal statutory copyright from creation. Under section 301 a work would obtain statutory protection as soon as it is `created' or, as that term is defined in section 101, when it is `fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time.' Common law copyright protection for works coming within the scope of the statute would be abrogated, and the concept of publication would lose its all-embracing importance as a dividing line between common law and statutory protection and between both of these forms of legal protection and the public domain. By substituting a single Federal system for the present anachronistic, uncertain, impractical, and highly complicated dual system, the bill would greatly improve the operation of the copyright law and would be much more effective in carrying out the basic constitutional aims of uniformity and the promotion of writing and scholarship.       One of the fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the Constitution, as shown in Madison's comments in the Federalist, was to promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforcing an author's rights under the differing laws and in the separate courts of the various States. Today, when the methods for dissemination of an author's work are incomparably broader and faster than they were in 1789, national uniformity in copyright protection is even more essential than it was then to carry out the constitutional intent. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745. Because the question in this case is whether Congress has expressly preempted the field in an area where it unquestionably has always had at least shared concurrent jurisdiction (never mind the passage of an expressed preemption provision in 1976), and Illinois had not traditionally exercised authority in the area of sound recordings, we conclude that protection of sound recordings is more traditionally within the realm of federal protection in Illinois and, as we will explain more fully below, federal concerns predominate in this area. Accordingly, there is no presumption in favor of nonpreemption in this case. Federal law preempts state law under the supremacy clause in any one of the following three circumstances: (1) express preemptionwhere Congress has expressly preempted state action; (2) implied field preemptionwhere Congress has implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme in an area, thus removing the entire field from the state realm; or (3) implied conflict preemptionwhere state action actually conflicts with federal law. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 197 Ill.2d at 117, 258 Ill.Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75. Federal preemption presents a question of law that is subject to de novo review. City of Chicago v. Comcast Cable Holdings, L.L.C., 231 Ill.2d 399, 404, 326 Ill.Dec. 620, 900 N.E.2d 256 (2008). The key inquiry in any preemption analysis is to determine the intent of Congress. Comcast Cable Holdings, 231 Ill.2d at 405, 326 Ill.Dec. 620, 900 N.E.2d 256. Where the federal statute at issue contains an express preemption clause, our task begins with a focus on the plain wording, as it `necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent.' Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63, 123 S.Ct. 518, 526, 154 L.Ed.2d 466, 477 (2002) ( rev'g on other grounds 197 Ill.2d 112, 258 Ill.Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75 (2001)), quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1737, 123 L.Ed.2d 387, 396 (1993). Additionally, in the interest of a uniform body of precedent, we will give considerable weight to the decisions of federal courts that have addressed preemption of laws protecting copyrightable material. See Sprietsma, 197 Ill.2d at 120, 258 Ill.Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75. As we have repeatedly recognized, uniformity of decision is an important consideration when state courts interpret federal statutes. Sprietsma, 197 Ill.2d at 120, 258 Ill.Dec. 690, 757 N.E.2d 75 (citing Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 188 Ill.2d 415, 422, 242 Ill.Dec. 618, 721 N.E.2d 1149 (1999), Wilson v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 187 Ill.2d 369, 383, 240 Ill.Dec. 691, 718 N.E.2d 172 (1999), and Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill.2d 325, 335, 214 Ill.Dec. 831, 662 N.E.2d 397 (1996)). The parties argue this case from the perspective of express preemption based on section 301(a) of the federal Copyright Act, which provides in relevant part: On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). Courts have read the plain language of section 301 as establishing a two-part test in preemption cases. Under that test, a state statute is preempted (1) if the works at issue are fixed in tangible form and come within the subject matter of copyright as defined by section 102 of the Act (subject matter prong) and (2) the rights granted under state law are equivalent to any of those exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright that are provided by the Act in section 106 (equivalency prong). See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 (7th Cir.1986); Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1225-26 (11th Cir.1983). In other words, the first prong concerns whether the work that is the subject of the state prosecution falls within the subject matter of copyright, and the second prong looks at whether the elements of a cause of action for copyright infringement are equivalent to the elements of the state crime, exclusive of any scienter element. Crow, 720 F.2d at 1226. The extra element of the second prong not only must distinguish the state claim from federal copyright infringement, but must also change the state law so that it is qualitatively different from it. Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates, Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 229-30 (4th Cir.1993). As to the first prong, the sound recordings that defendant offered for saleand which are the subject of his prosecution under section 16-7 of the Codeclearly fall within the subject matter of copyright, as section 102(a)(7) of the Copyright Act provides protection for sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2000); Crow, 720 F.2d at 1226. Therefore, we need only assess whether the rights at issue are equivalent to the exclusive rights mentioned in section 106 of the Copyright Act. Before addressing the equivalency prong, however, we note that the State argues that Congress intended to preempt only state civil laws, not criminal laws, because section 301 of the federal Act provides only that no person is entitled to a right equivalent to copyright protection under state law. According to the State, criminal antipiracy laws protect society as a whole and not the copyright itself or the person holding the copyright. Therefore, according to the State, Congress preempted states from making the transfer of recorded sounds without the consent of the owner a civil wrong, but permitted states to make it a crime. Also, the State claims that Congress only intended to abrogate the dual system that had allowed states to address nonpublished works in the civil context. We believe that the State's argument is at odds with the language of the federal Act, the legislative history of the federal preemption provision and the federal and state case law interpreting the Act. First, we note that the United States Supreme Court has expressly declared that state, criminal antipiracy statutes like the one at issue in this case do provide copyright protection. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 550-51, 93 S.Ct. at 2306-07, 37 L.Ed.2d at 170. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Goldstein unequivocally recognized that this form of copyright protection by means of a state antipiracy law is nothing less than an exercise of the power to grant copyrights by the state. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 558-59, 93 S.Ct. at 2310-11, 37 L.Ed.2d at 174-75. Thus, the State's argument in the present case that this kind of law does not protect the copyright holder is not persuasive. In Goldstein, a California statute, similar to the one in the case at bar, made it a criminal offense to knowingly and willfully transfer recorded sounds with the intent to sell the article on which the sounds are transferred without the consent of the owner. As is the case under the Illinois statute, owner was defined under the California statute as the person who owns the master sound recording. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 548 n. 1, 93 S.Ct. at 2305 n. 1, 37 L.Ed.2d at 169 n. 1. Goldstein was argued and decided a full three years before the expressed preemption clause of section 301 was enacted by Congress and then took effect. Thus, the defendant in that case was limited to arguing under theories of implied conflict and field preemption. The crucial fact in Goldstein was that the sound recordings that were pirated by the defendant were all fixed before February 15, 1972. This is important because in 1971 Congress passed an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1909 thereby giving federal copyright protection to sound recordings for the first time. The 1971 amendment, however, only protected sound recordings `fixed, published, and copyrighted' on and after February 15, 1972, and was not in any way to be construed as affecting any rights with respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 552, 93 S.Ct. at 2307 37 L.Ed.2d at 171,. The Goldstein Court embarked on a discussion explaining why the 1971 amendment was inapplicable to recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, and why the Copyright Act of 1909 (without the 1971 amendment) did not apply to sound recordings and thus did not conflict with California's antipiracy statute. The Court concluded by stating that [u]ntil and unless Congress takes further action with respect to recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, the California statute may be enforced against acts of piracy such as those which occurred in the present case. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571, 93 S.Ct. at 2317, 37 L.Ed.2d at 182. In the case before us, the sound recordings at issue were copyrighted by artists of recent vintage, and there is no question that the recordings were fixed and published only after February 15, 1972. Moreover, since the Goldstein decision, Congress has enacted an express preemption provision. Congress was of course aware of the 1973 Goldstein decision when it amended the Copyright Act in 1976 with the preemption provision of section 301. The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn is that Congress intended to make it completely clear that it wanted to preempt all state law protection for sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972, but leave room for the states to deal with recordings fixed before that date. This is borne out by the legislative record. The Report of the House of Representatives (Report or House Report) states: The intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope of the Federal copyright law. The declaration of this principle in section 301 is intended to be stated in the clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively, and to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection.    All corresponding State laws, whether common law or statutory, are preempted and abrogated. (Emphases added.) H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746. The above language is a clear indication of Congress' intent to abrogate and preempt state antipiracy laws, but Congress made its intentions even more clear in another passage in the House Report where it specifically discussed the impact that section 301 would likely have on state antipiracy laws. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 133 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748-49. The House Report found that a unique and difficult problem is posed by the status of sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, the effective date of the amendment bringing recordings fixed after that date under federal copyright protection. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 133 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748-49. The Report noted that the Department of Justice had pointed out at hearings in 1975 that section 301 as then written could be interpreted as abrogating the antipiracy laws then existing in 29 states relating to pre -February 15, 1972, sound recordings on the grounds that these statutes proscribe activities violating rights equivalent to the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright. The Report further noted that such a result is not intended because it would lead to a resurgence in piracy of pre-February 15, 1972, recordings, given that they are not protected by federal copyright under the 1971 amendment. Based on this concern, section 301 was amended by the Senate at the suggestion of the Justice Department to exclude sound recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972 from the effect of the preemption. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 133 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5749. Importantly, there was no effort by Congress whatsoever to exclude from federal preemption sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972, or to express its intent to allow concurrent jurisdiction between the federal and state governments in the area of prosecuting antipiracy laws. Instead, the House Report noted only a concern that the Senate bill would offer pre-February 15, 1972, recordings perpetual protection. The Report concludes by noting the following: The result of the Senate amendment would be to leave pre-1972 sound recordings as entitled to perpetual protection under State law, while post-1972 recordings would eventually fall into the public domain as provided in the bill. The Committee recognizes that, under recent court decisions [read Goldstein ], pre-1972 recordings are protected by State statute or common law, and that should not all be thrown into the public domain instantly upon the coming into effect of the new law. However, it cannot agree that they should in effect be accorded perpetual protection, as under the Senate amendment, and it has therefore revised [the legislation] to establish a future date for the preemption to take effect. The date chosen is February 15, 2047, which is 75 years from the effective date of the statute extending Federal protection of recordings. [1] H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 133 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5749. The obvious import of this discussion is that the Congress had no problem with section 301 preempting state antipiracy laws relating to post-February 15, 1972, recordings. Indeed, Congress first felt compelled to add language exempting state antipiracy laws relating to pre-February 15, 1972, recordings from the effect of section 301 preemption because otherwise these recordings would be without any protection. It then realized that it wanted to preempt even those state laws at some point. Thus, it added section 301(c), which provides in relevant part that [w]ith respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2000). Perhaps in recognition that a state law that would attempt to legislate against piracy of post-February 15, 1972, sound recordings would be preempted, numerous state antipiracy laws expressly apply only to recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972. See, e.g., Cal.Penal Code § 653h(i) (West 2004); Md.Code Ann. Criminal Law § 7-308(b)(1) (West 2004); N.Y. Penal Law § 275.25 (McKinney 2004). We also note that Congress has decided to protect works subject to copyright both civilly and criminally. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 through 506 (2000). In enacting such legislation, Congress has addressed both individual and societal interests in copyright protection. Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 221-22, 105 S.Ct. 3127, 3135-36, 87 L.Ed.2d 152, 163-64 (1985). Thus, congressional intent was not only to cover the civil aspect, but the criminal aspect as well. See People v. Borriello, 155 Misc.2d 261, 269, 588 N.Y.S.2d 991, 997 (Sup.Ct.1992), citing Dowling, 473 U.S. at 222, 105 S.Ct. at 3136, 87 L.Ed.2d at 163-64. Given all the circumstances mentioned above, we believe that it would border on the absurd to hold that Congress preempted states from making unauthorized use of copyrighted material a civil wrong, but permitted the states to make the same conduct a crime. In sum, we hold that state antipiracy laws are a form of copyright protection, and we believe that Congress has clearly expressed an intent to abrogate such laws in section 301 of the Act. Our holding is in line with the great weight of authority on the topic. Nearly every, if not every, court nationwide that has considered preemption under section 301 has either expressly or impliedly concluded that preemption was intended to apply to state criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F.3d 100, 102 (9th Cir.1994) (implicit in its holding was a finding that a state statute criminalizing unauthorized duplication or bootlegging of sound recordings would `in and of itself... infringe one of the exclusive rights' listed in the copyright laws), quoting Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 635 (9th Cir. 1984); Crow, 720 F.2d at 1226 (applied two-part test and expressly found that a state criminal theft statute was preempted in prosecution involving bootlegged sound recordings); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 726, 739 (N.D.Ill.1983) (If the state law prohibits the very act of reproducing, performing, distributing, or displaying the protected matter, then it is preempted); Briggs v. State, 281 Ga. 329, 331, 638 S.E.2d 292, 295 (2006) (used the extra-element test to determine whether a sound recording labeling statute was preempted); Hicks, 109 Md.App. at 124, 674 A.2d at 61 (discussing Borriello and noting that antipiracy statutes would be preempted, but labeling statutes would not be preempted because they involve consumer protection and not the copyright related rights of the owner); Borriello, 155 Misc.2d at 264-65, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 994 (applied the two-part preemption test and found that New York criminal law banning sale of unauthorized recordings was preempted); State v. Perry, 83 Ohio St.3d 41, 42-45, 697 N.E.2d 624, 626-29 (1998) (invoked two-part test and held that state criminal prosecution for unauthorized downloading of copyright material was preempted by section 301); State v. Awawdeh, 72 Wash.App. 373, 376, 864 P.2d 965, 967 (1994) (applied the two-part preemption test to a state criminal statute banning the failure to disclose the origin of a recording). Of the above mentioned cases, Crow is paramount and has been cited and relied upon by numerous courts without any negative treatment relevant to the issues raised in the present case. In Crow, the defendant was convicted of selling bootleg eight-track tapes in violation of a Florida criminal statute that prohibited dealing in stolen property. The Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, first found that the legislative history of section 301 clearly evidences Congress' intent to overrule by statute cases such as Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 93 S.Ct. 2303, 37 L.Ed.2d 163 (1973) (holding that the Copyright Act of 1909 preempts only state laws conflicting or interfering with its provisions). (Emphasis in original.) Crow, 720 F.2d at 1225. The court then applied the two-prong, subject matter and equivalency test and held that the defendant's conviction was null and void because the federal Copyright Act preempted Florida's antipiracy statute in that case. Crow, 720 F.2d at 1227. We now turn to the second prong of the two-prong test of section 301, which examines whether the elements of copyright infringement under the federal Act are equivalent to the elements of the crime of unlawful use of recorded sounds under our Criminal Code. The State argues that section 16-7 contains two extra elements that distinguish it from the federal Act. First, the State asserts that section 16-7's consent element is conditioned on ownership in tangible property ( i.e., the master sound recording), whereas consent in the Copyright Act is conditioned on the intangible property of the copyright owner. The State contends that section 202 of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000)) makes ownership of a copyright distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied like a master recording. Second, the State claims that the for profit element of section 16-7 distinguishes it from the federal Act. We disagree with the State's contention that section 16-7 contains any additional elements that substantively distinguishes it from copyright infringement under the federal Act. The essential elements of a violation of section 16-7 correspond almost exactly to copyright infringement. As the appellate court noted, section 16-7(a)(2) forbids, among other things, the intentional, knowing, or reckless sale or use for profit of any sound recording without consent of the owner of the master sound recording. It is an affirmative defense if the sounds or images are within the public domain. The clear legislative purpose in enacting section 16-7 was to combat record piracy by prohibiting the unauthorized reproduction of sound recordings, and the United States Supreme Court has determined that such statutes afford copyright protection and are an exercise of the power to grant copyrights. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 558-59, 93 S.Ct. at 2310-11, 37 L.Ed.2d at 174-76. Thus, the State's argument that section 16-7 protects only tangible property, and therefore contains an extra element, must be rejected. The State's argument is erroneous for the additional reason that the Copyright Act itself extends copyright protection to original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression    from which they can be    reproduced    either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. (Emphasis added.) 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Sound recordings fall under this category. The State's insistence that the copyright statute covers only the interests of a copyright owner in intangible property is therefore not entirely accurate. While it is true that section 202 of the Copyright Act provides that [o]wnership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied, like the master recording on which the work was first fixed (see 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000); H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659), an examination of the purpose of this provision indicates that it does not give the State a way around the antipiracy provision of section 301. Rather, the purpose of section 202 has been stated as follows: [T]he bill would change a common law doctrine exemplified by the decision in Pushman v. New York Graphic Society, Inc., 287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942). Under that doctrine, authors or artists are generally presumed to transfer common law literary property rights when they sell their manuscript or work of art, unless those rights are specifically reserved. This presumption would be reversed under the bill, since a specific written conveyance of rights would be required in order for a sale of any material object to carry with it a transfer of copyright. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740. The fact that an owner of the master recording may not be a copyright holder does not take the Illinois statute out of the realm covered by the federal Act, where the statute in question is substantially a copyright infringement statute. A person who owns the master recording must still have a license from the copyright owner to legitimately consent to the distribution of the sound recording. The gravamen of section 16-7 is the protection of copyrightable works, whether the person or entity holding an interest in those works is the original copyright holder or one who has been licensed by the copyright holder to produce and distribute those works. Thus, we conclude that the fact that the owner of the copyright might not be the actual owner of the master recording does not create an extra element making section 16-7 qualitatively different from copyright infringement. If a statute is in reality a copyright statute, it will be deemed `equivalent.' Borriello, 155 Misc.2d at 265, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 994. Likewise the State's for profit argument is without merit. This is not an extra element because one form of criminal infringement under the federal Act requires a defendant to act for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain. 17 U.S.C § 506(a)(1) (2000). Accordingly, we conclude, as the appellate court did, that section 16-7(a)(2) is preempted by the federal Copyright Act.