Opinion ID: 1209868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying wersland's motion to strike from the presentence report the statements of the two injured passengers and their parents.

Text: Wersland claims that the district court should not have allowed the two girls who were injured in the auto accident in which Angela Jackson was killed, Michelle Revels and Jori Sexton, and their respective parents, to submit statements to be included in the presentence report. Our standard of review on this issue is whether the district court acted with manifest disregard for I.C.R. 32 by permitting the inclusion of the statements of the girls and their parents in the presentence report. We must determine whether these statements were beyond the scope of I.C.R. 32 and whether the court abused its discretion by relying upon this information at sentencing. Wersland contends that the statements of Michelle Revels, Jori Sexton and their parents should not have been included in the presentence report because they were not victims of Wersland's crime as that term is defined in I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e). This section governs restitution for crime victims. It defines victim as a person or entity, named in the complaint, information or indictment, who suffers ... injury as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct and shall also include the immediate family of a minor. I.C. § 19-5306 governs the rights of victims during the investigation and prosecution of a crime and allows for victims of felonies to have included in presentence reports a statement of the impact the defendant's criminal conduct has had upon the victim. I.C.R. 32 sets forth the standards and procedures governing presentence investigations and reports. I.C.R. 32(b) provides that whenever a full presentence report is ordered by the district court, it shall contain the victim's version of the offense where relevant to the sentencing decision. Wersland argues that pursuant to these two code sections and the above rule, the only victims allowed to provide impact statements for the presentence report are Jackson's parents, step parents and grandparents, as they represent Jackson's immediate family. She argues that pursuant to the definition of victim in I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e), since Jori Sexton and Michelle Revels were not named in the complaint and information, they are not victims for purposes of contributing to the presentence report. The state argues that for purposes of the presentence investigation and report, the term victim is not limited to the definition of victim under I.C. § 19-5304. We agree with the state and affirm the district court's order denying Wersland's motion to strike the statements from the presentence report. I.C. § 19-5304 does not prevent Jori Sexton, Michelle Revels and their parents from being characterized as victims. The definition of victim in I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e) governs the restitution for crime victims, and does not by its terms apply to presentence investigations governed by I.C.R. 32. Wersland's argument that the girls riding in Jackson's car were not victims is without merit. They were injured and hospitalized as a result of Wersland's criminal conduct (driving under the influence of alcohol) and were also witnesses to the death of their friend. Further, the fact that these girls were not named in the complaint and information is irrelevant for purposes of their impact statements. Jackson was the only victim named because Wersland was charged with vehicular manslaughter, a crime in which a death must have occurred, and Jackson was the only one in the car who died. Jori Sexton and Michelle Revels are still victims of Wersland's crime of driving under the influence of alcohol. I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8006. Thus, pursuant to I.C.R. 32(b)(1), the information contained in the presentence report conformed with the requirements of Idaho law. Wersland also argues that the district court's discretionary decision to deny her motion for an order striking from the presentence report all input from other than Jackson's family was based upon an erroneous legal principle. Wersland claims that she based her motion on I.C.R. 32(b)(1) and that the district court denied the motion based upon I.C.R. 32(e). She argues that I.C.R. 32(e) serves as a modifier of 32(b), i.e., that while I.C.R. 32(b) sets forth the contents of the presentence report, I.C.R. 32(e) provides that within the contents of the presentence report, information of a hearsay nature may be included, if reliable, and that the sentencing judge has the discretion to consider material contained in the presentence report that would have been inadmissible under the rules of evidence applicable at trial. Wersland argues that what I.C.R. 32(e) does not do is empower the district court with discretion to modify the contents provision of I.C.R. 32(b) by allowing non-victims' statements to be included in the presentence report. We disagree. Contrary to Wersland's assertion, nowhere does the record before the Court reflect that the district court denied her motion to strike based upon I.C.R. 32(e). This is an erroneous statement. Second, Wersland's argument that the district court's discretionary decision was based upon an erroneous legal principle is irrelevant because of this Court's holding above that Michelle Revels and Jori Sexton are victims of Wersland's crime, and that they and their parents' statements were properly included in the presentence report and considered by the district court.