Opinion ID: 760927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Stage

Text: 55 Here again, the essence of Mr. Cooks' claim is Mr. Hilliary's alleged failure to adequately investigate and prepare. With regard to the sentencing stage, Mr. Cooks focuses primarily on mitigating evidence he claims was available at trial, but which Mr. Hilliary, for no apparent strategical reason, failed to develop and present to the jury as a reasonable explanation for Mr. Cooks' criminal conduct. Mr. Cooks identifies the following mitigating evidence in support of his claim: 56 1. Mr. Cooks was a person of limited intellectual capacity;2. he had endured an unhappy and deprived childhood; 57 3. he had a severe drinking problem, which began at an early age; 58 4. he had severe psychological and mental problems at the time of the offense; 59 5. his mental problems were compounded at the time of the offense by excessive drinking and use of the drug commonly called PCP, which altered his ordinarily peaceful, nonviolent disposition; 60 6. he was a good worker during intermittent periods of sobriety; 61 7. during periods when he was drug free and sober, he was a responsible, caring and nonviolent person; 62 8. he repeatedly expressed remorse and shame in connection with the incident that resulted in the death of Ms. Ridling; 63 9. he had enlisted in the Navy at the age of eighteen, but was honorably discharged after four months and twenty days because of ineptitude. 64 Mr. Cooks argues such evidence would have presented [a] powerful case in mitigation ... that ... could have resulted in a life sentence, just as Mr. Masters, the codefendant, received. 65 The obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel unquestionably extends to a capital sentencing hearing. Davis v. Executive Director of Dep't of Corrections, 100 F.3d 750, 756 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1215, 117 S.Ct. 1703, 137 L.Ed.2d 828 (1997); Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1365 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 115 S.Ct. 2564, 132 L.Ed.2d 817 (1995). Indeed, we have recognized a need to apply even closer scrutiny when reviewing attorney performance during the sentencing phase of a capital case.  '[T]he minimized state interest in finality when resentencing alone is the remedy, combined with the acute interest of a defendant facing death, justify a court's closer scrutiny of attorney performance at the sentencing phase.'  Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1116 n. 1 (10th Cir.1998) (Brorby, J dissenting) (quoting Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 626 n. 12 (10th Cir.1988)). Having carefully reviewed the trial and 1995 evidentiary hearing transcripts with these principles in mind, we agree with Mr. Cooks his attorney was ineffective at the sentencing stage. 66 Mr. Hilliary waived his opportunity to make an opening statement at the outset of the sentencing hearing, called no witnesses, and presented no evidence on Mr. Cooks' behalf. Although he briefly cross-examined the prosecution's two witnesses, Mr. Hilliary did not cross-examine Mr. Cooks' co-defendant, Mr. Masters, who told the jury he did not strike Mrs. Ridling, tie her up or participate in raping her. Mr. Masters nevertheless expressed remorse over Mrs. Ridling's death and testified he had no prior felony convictions, had trouble in school and an unstable home life, and had consumed a case of beer and about four pints of rum prior to breaking into Mrs. Ridling's home. Mr. Masters characterized himself as a follower rather than a leader. At the end of his testimony, Mr. Masters told the jury he thought some useful purpose could be served if he was given life imprisonment and asked the jury to spare him from the death penalty. Aside from the limited cross-examination of the State's witnesses, Mr. Cooks' sentencing stage defense consisted solely of Mr. Long's 6 brief (three transcript pages) and generic closing argument reminding the jury of the seriousness and finality of their sentencing decision and asking them to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. 67 When invited to explain his sentencing stage strategy during the 1995 evidentiary hearing, Mr. Hilliary stated he understood the importance of the sentencing stage and attempted to develop a second stage strategy. Mr. Hilliary further testified he and Mr. Long attempted to gather and glean evidence that would have been helpful to Mr. Cooks in the second stage of the trial. Notably, however, Mr. Hilliary never articulated a strategy and later admitted there was not much second[ ] stage defense put on.Indeed, we are unable to glean from the record any second stage strategy developed to defend Mr. Cooks against the death penalty. What is more, by all accounts, Mr. Hilliary's investigative efforts were minimal. Mr. Hilliary spoke to Mr. Cooks' wife on several occasions before and during trial, and to Mr. Cooks' mother and two of his brothers during trial recesses. However, by Mr. Hilliary's own admission, he did not speak to Mr. Cooks' stepfather; did not investigate Mr. Cooks' school records or speak to Mr. Cooks' teachers; did not investigate Mr. Cooks' military records; and, because he was aware the Department of Corrections questioned the credibility of the state hospital's mental evaluations, did not review any records concerning Mr. Cooks' mental evaluation or introduce as evidence a letter from the state hospital stating Mr. Cooks was not considered dangerous to himself or society. Mr. Hilliary further admitted he was not aware of Mr. Cooks' abusive childhood environment prior to trial. Mr. Hilliary testified he and Mr. Long discussed the possibility Mr. Cooks' documented good behavior during a prior incarceration could be used as mitigating evidence, but he left the decision whether to present such evidence to Mr. Long. On cross-examination, Mr. Hilliary admitted he should have used that evidence during the sentencing stage. Perhaps most troubling is the fact Mr. Hilliary stated he knew Mr. Cooks was remorseful, but offered no reason, strategic or otherwise, to explain why he did not consider putting Mr. Cooks on the witness stand during the sentencing stage. 68 This is not a case in which the defendant refused to testify or otherwise influenced the reasonableness of counsel's actions. See Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1369-70. Nor could counsel argue the available mitigating evidence conflicted with the trial defense. See Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1563 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1099, 115 S.Ct. 1830, 131 L.Ed.2d 751 (1995). This also is not a case in which counsel reasonably investigated the defendant's background, but found no one willing to testify, see, e.g., Nguyen, 131 F.3d at 1348-49, or determined the mitigating evidence Mr. Cooks now relies on could do more harm than good. 7 See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 790-91, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1367. Rather, this is a case in which counsel admitted his investigation was limited, admitted he should have presented certain mitigating evidence and, most important, offered no strategy, reasonable or otherwise, to explain his performance during the sentencing stage. Even applying the presumption of adequate performance, we cannot help but conclude counsel failed under these circumstances to satisfy his duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Accordingly, we hold Mr. Cooks was denied effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing stage of his trial. 69 We must now determine whether Mr. Hilliary's substandard performance prejudiced Mr. Cooks at the sentencing stage. Mr. Cooks seems to argue the circumstances of his case warrant application of the presumption of prejudice acknowledged in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). According to Mr. Cooks, his counsel's inaction during the sentencing stage transformed that phase of trial into a proceeding dominated exclusively by the State, and thus failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. If the adversary process during the penalty phase failed, Mr. Cooks argues his death sentence was rendered presumptively unreliable. 70 The Supreme Court in Cronic recognized that in rare instances it may be appropriate to presume prejudice without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial, because the circumstances are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658, 662, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Circumstances that justify a presumption of prejudice include the absence of counsel at a critical stage of trial, the denial of the right to effective cross-examination, and the complete failure to subject the prosecution's case to adversarial testing; but, as the Supreme Court points out, a presumption of prejudice is the exception, not the rule. Id. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. 71 Although we agree Mr. Hilliary was ineffective during the sentencing stage, his failures do not amount to the kind of actual or constructive denial of counsel necessary to trigger a presumption of prejudice. Mr. Hilliary was present in the courtroom. He conducted limited cross-examination, made evidentiary objections, and gave a closing argument. Hence, this case falls outside the narrow Cronic exception. 72 Since Cronic does not apply, Mr. Cooks must affirmatively prove actual prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As applied to the sentencing stage of his trial, Mr. Cooks must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Mr. Cooks has not met this standard. 73 In evaluating prejudice, we must keep in mind the strength of the government's case and the aggravating [circumstances] the jury found as well as the mitigating factors that might have been presented. Castro, 138 F.3d at 832 (internal quotations omitted). Here the jury found three aggravating circumstances to support Mr. Cooks' death sentence: (1) his previous conviction of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; (2) the heinous, atrocious or cruel nature of Mrs. Ridling's murder; and (3) the continuing threat Mr. Cooks presented to society. As discussed above, the government presented abundant evidence to support each of these circumstances. The mitigating evidence Mr. Hilliary could have presented to counterbalance these aggravating circumstances centered on Mr. Cooks' troubled childhood, borderline I.Q., and history of alcohol and drug abuse. The jury also would have learned Mr. Cooks was nonviolent when sober, but was intoxicated on the night of the crime, and he was remorseful over Mrs. Ridling's death. 74 While we are troubled by Mr. Hilliary's failure to discover and/or present available mitigating evidence without good reason, the benchmark for evaluating Mr. Cooks' ineffectiveness claim during the sentencing stage remains whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Applying this standard, we conclude there is no reasonable probability the available mitigating evidence would have led the jury to a different result. Mr. Cooks' background, together with the nature and circumstances of Mrs. Ridling's death, presented a strong case in support of the three determinative aggravating circumstances. Mr. Cooks was a convicted felon who, by his own admission, broke into the home of a handicapped, elderly woman, bound and gagged her, raped her, robbed her, and left her lying on her bed, partially clothed, to slowly suffocate. The available mitigating evidence simply did not outweigh these aggravating circumstances. Consequently, counsel's substandard performance did not so undermine the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the sentencing proceeding cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Mr. Cooks' request for habeas relief on this ground fails.