Opinion ID: 792809
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: false voir dire responses

Text: 104 Reviewing the District Court's denial of Rule 33 relief based on alleged juror bias, we are mindful of the principle that 105 [o]ne touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact — a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). Voir dire examination serves to protect that right by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror being excused for cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their peremptory challenges. The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obvious. 106 McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). These concerns are reflected in the McDonough standard for analyzing allegations that a juror's false voir dire concealed bias that affected the fairness of the trial: a party alleging unfairness based on undisclosed juror bias must demonstrate first, that the juror's voir dire response was false and second, that the correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845. The District Court observed that this Court has never found reason to overturn a verdict on the basis of juror nondisclosure under McDonough and only once, see United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.1989), has remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the matter. See United States v. Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d 432, 437 (S.D.N.Y.2004). Our ruling here does not change those statistics. 107 Prompted by the extensive publicity surrounding this case, the District Court undertook a two-step voir dire process. First, prospective jurors completed a questionnaire drafted by the parties. Then, following for-cause challenges based on the questionnaire responses, those persons remaining in the jury pool were questioned individually. The questionnaire probed prospective jurors' prior involvement with the justice system by asking about court appearances and whether the individual or someone close to him or her had filed criminal charges, had been the victim of a crime, had been sued, accused of wrongdoing on a job, or questioned by law enforcement or accused of, charged with, or convicted of any crime. 108 Hartridge's questionnaire reflected that he had appeared in court in connection with a dispute with his landlord, but he gave negative responses to the other questions described above. He returned for individual questioning and was subsequently empaneled. Shortly after the jury's verdict was announced, Hartridge and several other jurors discussed their experience as jurors with the press. According to Defendants, at that time the defense received information calling into question the manner in which Hartridge got on the jury. 109 In their motions for a new trial, Defendants alleged that Hartridge's failure to disclose the following five matters on his questionnaire concealed probable bias: (i) an arrest and arraignment for assault of a former girlfriend; (ii) civil suits against Hartridge and members of his family; (iii) his son's conviction for attempted robbery; (iv) an accusation of embezzlement in his capacity as a Little League volunteer treasurer; and (v) termination for cause from employment with Citibank. As support, Defendants proffered affidavits, only one of which was based on personal knowledge, and court records. The District Court found that the majority of Defendants' allegations did not satisfy the first prong of the McDonough test because they rested on little more than hearsay, speculation, and in one instance, vague allegations made by a person who refused to identify himself. Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d at 438. The District Court also found that certain ambiguities in the voir dire questions developed by the parties made it unclear that Hartridge's responses deliberately concealed the truth. Id. As to those alleged failures to disclose, this was not the type of showing that constitutes reasonable grounds for investigation. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234. 110 The District Court credited Defendants with raising serious questions concerning deliberate concealment of two matters that Hartridge did not disclose, namely, the conviction of Hartridge's son for attempted robbery in 2000 and a civil judgment against Hartridge and his wife in 1997, both of which were supported by objective evidence. Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d at 441-42. But the District Court found that none of the alleged omissions satisfied the second part of the McDonough test, which requires the party seeking a new trial to demonstrate that the correct answer at jury selection would have provided a valid basis to challenge the prospective juror for cause. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845. To do so, the district court must determine if it would have granted the hypothetical challenge. United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir.2002). Its determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion and, in that regard, we have noted that `[t]here are few aspects of a jury trial where we would be less inclined to disturb a trial judge's exercise of discretion, absent clear abuse, than in ruling on challenges for cause in the empanelling of a jury.' Id. at 172 (quoting United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 n. 4 (2d Cir.1972)). 111 Defendants contend that the juror's multiple failures to disclose background information indicate a suspicious pattern sufficient to raise doubts about his impartiality which justifies further inquiry in a hearing. For this proposition, Defendants cite a decision in which the Ninth Circuit observed that certain false statements that might be harmless in isolation may present a much more sinister picture when viewed as a whole. Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 678 n. 10 (9th Cir.2000). The assertion that Hartridge engaged in a pattern of lies ignores the District Court's finding, which is not clearly erroneous, that only two of the alleged intentional omissions were supported with the type of evidence that justifies further inquiry. In Green, the Ninth Circuit found error in the trial court's finding of no bias where the juror not only lied twice about his background but gave misleading and false explanations when confronted with the lies and also made comments ( i.e., that he knew the defendant was guilty on first sight) that left little doubt as to his inability to render a fair verdict. Id. at 677-78. In this case, the allegations form a pattern that might create destructive uncertainties about Hartridge's indifference if they were proved, id. at 676 (quoting Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir.1998) (in banc)), but the Defendants' proffer is insufficient as to all but two of those allegations. 7 The significant factor, however, is that the District Court found that even if it were established that Hartridge's responses were false as alleged, none of the correct answers would have supported an inference that he was biased or prejudiced against Stewart and Bacanovic or had prejudged the evidence. See Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d at 443. 112 Nor is Colombo to the contrary. In Colombo, a district court's decision to refuse Rule 33 relief on the basis of alleged false voir dire responses was vacated and the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Colombo, 869 F.2d at 150. The alleged false responses asserted by Stewart and Bacanovic differ distinctly from the ones at issue in Colombo. There, the defendant's Rule 33 motion was supported by an alternate juror's affidavit, which stated that one of the jurors (i) confided that she failed to disclose that her brother was a government attorney because she feared the relationship would make her ineligible to serve on the jury and (ii) asserted familiarity with one of the conspirators' meeting places as a hang out for gangsters. Id. In Colombo, it was not simply that the lies in question were deliberate, but that the deliberateness of the particular lies evidenced partiality.  Greer, 285 F.3d at 172-73 (discussing Colombo ). Thus, where the Colombo affiant specifically asserted that the juror admitted not only concealment, but concealment of facts from which specific bias could be inferred, the alleged lies, if established, would demonstrate both dishonesty and partiality and would satisfy both prongs of the McDonough test. Id. That is not the case here. 113 Defendants note that all of the jury bias cases cited by the District Court involved post-trial hearings. See Greer, 285 F.3d at 166; United States v. Shaoul, 41 F.3d 811, 814-15 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir.1993). In the present case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to conduct a hearing because it found that even if all of the allegations were established by competent evidence, none would provide valid grounds to challenge for cause Hartridge's membership on the jury. While an evidentiary hearing is not held to afford a convicted defendant the opportunity to `conduct a fishing expedition,' Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234 (quoting United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d Cir.1978)), it is possible, even plausible, that a district court's decision to hold a hearing under these circumstances would not have licensed such an expedition. We therefore caution district courts that, if any significant doubt as to a juror's impartiality remains in the wake of objective evidence of false voir dire responses, an evidentiary hearing generally should be held. Cf. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 634 (D.C.Cir.1992) (recommending that an evidentiary hearing be held under most circumstances, including a juror's lying about his felony status, but declining to hold that any false statement or deliberate concealment by a juror necessitates an evidentiary hearing). Such a hearing is often the most reliable way for discerning the true motivations behind a juror's false replies. See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940 ([T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.). Here, however, although we might have ruled differently on the hearing request in the first instance, we cannot say that the District Court's decision was an abuse of discretion. See Moon, 718 F.2d at 1235.