Opinion ID: 1408211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant DuPont's Duty and Opportunity to Warn

Text: Although the court of appeals remanded the case for further proceedings as against defendants Lawco and Armour, it affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant DuPont. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals relied primarily on case law holding that a bulk supplier of raw materials which are not themselves inherently dangerous has no duty to warn ultimate users of the manufactured product. House, 886 P.2d at 554 (citing, among others, Veil v. Vitek, Inc., 803 F.Supp. 229, 234-37 (D.N.D.1992) (bulk supplier of raw material not inherently dangerous has no duty to warn consumer of finished product)). Accordingly it found that because the undisputed facts showed that DuPont merely supplied the KEVLAR fibers which would then be woven into ballistic fabrics according to the design specifications of the individual vest manufacturers, DuPont was solely a bulk supplier of KEVLAR and thus had no duty [or] opportunity to warn the ultimate vest user about the levels of protection afforded by vests woven from KEVLAR. Id. at 553-54. Plaintiff, however, claims that this holding constituted error because DuPont was more than a mere bulk supplier of the KEVLAR; it was actively engaged in testing, advertising, and promoting the body armor made out of KEVLAR. In support of her argument, plaintiff refers to (1) DuPont's involvement in the Personal Protective Armor Association (PPAA), which, among other things, developed labeling and testing standards for vest manufacturers; (2) DuPont's funding of studies, including three conducted by The Brand Consulting Group to study police officers' attitudes and their understanding of soft-body armor; and (3) DuPont's funding of promotional advertising such as a poster depicting a bullet bouncing off the chest of a super hero. However, the facts show that DuPont did not substantially engage in any of these activities until the mid-1980s, a few years after Lt. House received his vest. [7] Thus, at the time Lt. House received his vest, DuPont did not have an opportunity or any duty to warn of the limitations of the Armour vests. As a result, we hold that the court of appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to DuPont.