Opinion ID: 441667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Killer Stepfather

Text: 26 On direct appeal De La Rosa argued that the conviction should be reversed because juror Franklin withheld information during voir dire. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that no question was calculated to bring out the information that Franklin allegedly withheld. In his state habeas petition, De La Rosa argued that Franklin held a highly prejudiced opinion that motivated him to withhold information and that De La Rosa was thereby precluded from exercising a challenge for cause pursuant to article 35.16(a)(9), Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. (Vernon 1966), or a remaining peremptory challenge. The trial court rejected the claim, adopting the reasoning of the state appellate court--Franklin did not withhold information, no juror misconduct occurred, and no new evidence was received by the jury. 658 S.W.2d at 164-65. 27 On appeal from the federal district court's denial of habeas relief, De La Rosa now argues that Franklin's statement concerning his stepfather's experience during jury deliberations demonstrates that Franklin was actually biased and that such prejudice denied De La Rosa of his right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. 28 We cannot conclude that juror Franklin harbored actual bias merely because he omitted mentioning the story about his stepfather. The interrogation of Franklin during voir dire cannot be viewed as necessarily eliciting information concerning that experience. We have no indication that Franklin was dishonest when he answered that there was no reason whatsoever that he could think of that would keep him from being a fair and impartial juror. As noted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the question that came closest to eliciting the relevant information was a two-part question asked by the prosecutor. 29 Have you ever had the occasion to be interested in the outcome of a criminal case? Have you ever had a particular case that caught your eye and you followed it, and watched the papers, and read about it? The answer to this question was: 30 Well, I can't recall anything that I followed through. I read occasionally but just didn't follow through on it. 31 It is apparent that the second question qualified or replaced the first, and that the juror answered the second question, not the first. It does not appear there was a diligent effort to learn whether the juror had any relative who had been convicted of a crime. The juror did not withhold facts about his stepfather (who had died approximately thirty years before). 32 De La Rosa, 658 S.W.2d at 165. 33 When defense counsel asked Franklin whether he had any close friends or associates involved in law enforcement, he mentioned that his grandson's uncle was on the San Antonio police force. In response, defense counsel noted that Franklin was being very thorough with his answers. Franklin later replied that he had no associations that would affect his ability to serve on the jury and that he would be able to render a verdict according to the law and the case. After mentioning that his house had been burglarized, Franklin indicated that such an incident would not cause him to have any special feelings that would affect him in rendering a verdict. At the end of defense counsel's voir dire, Franklin affirmed that he would be true to the law and to the facts. He later told the trial judge that he understood that his verdict was to be based on the evidence heard from the witness stand under oath and nothing else. 34 At the hearing on the new trial motion, Franklin admitted that he related the story about his stepfather, but noted that it was a casual remark made in conversation. Foreman Hrncir testified that he indicated to Franklin that such a comment was not appropriate. No further discussion ensued. 35 The trial judge denied the motion for new trial without comment, as provided by article 40.07, Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. (Vernon 1979), which does not permit any summation, discussion, or comment on the evidence in granting or refusing a new trial. This curious procedure would invite problems if a simple denial could as well have been based upon one finding as another and where the choice between the alternatives affects the resolution of a constitutional claim. In the present case, by looking to De La Rosa's contentions and to Texas law, the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial after the hearing must be taken as deciding that no extrinsic evidence was introduced during jury deliberations and that no jury misconduct occurred depriving De La Rosa of a fair and impartial trial. See, e.g., McIlveen v. State, 559 S.W.2d 815, 819-20 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). 36 Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Such determinations may properly be made at a hearing like that ordered in Remmer [v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450 [98 L.Ed. 654] (1954),] and held in this case. 37 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 at 217, 102 S.Ct. 940 at 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). 38 This is not a case in which we presume juror prejudice, see e.g., Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372, 1378-81 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. O'Keefe, 722 F.2d 1175, 1180 (5th Cir.1983), nor is it an exceptional case requiring application of an implied or inferred bias doctrine, see Rushen v. Spain, --- U.S. ----, ----, n. 3, 104 S.Ct. 453, 456 n. 3 (1983); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948-49 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); United States v. Winkle, 587 F.2d 705, 715 n. 20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827, 100 S.Ct. 51, 62 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979). This jury was initially cloaked with a presumption of impartiality. See O'Keefe, 722 F.2d at 1179; Winkle, 587 F.2d at 714. Because De La Rosa demonstrated a colorable showing of extrinsic influence, the trial court properly investigated the alleged impropriety by conducting a hearing. See id. It was incumbent upon De La Rosa to prove the existence of juror prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. See McMillon v. Estelle, 523 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir.1975); United States v. Robbins, 500 F.2d 650, 652-54 (5th Cir.1974); Williams v. United States, 418 F.2d 372, 376-77 (10th Cir.1969). The extensive hearing, with all jurors testifying, did not reveal prejudice or bias against De La Rosa. The trial judge implicitly found either that no jury breach had been demonstrated or that the prosecution demonstrated the harmlessness of the breach, if any, to De La Rosa. In light of the hearing and the denial of the motion for new trial, the brevity of the statements, and the foreman's corrective instructions, we do not perceive any genuine possibility that De La Rosa was prejudiced during the sentencing deliberations.