Opinion ID: 725501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guidelines Section 5K1.1

Text: 15 The government's practice of relying on the interviewing of informers is an old one, recognized in the common law, where it was called approvement. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries  324. The government has always solicited the help of cooperating witnesses to prosecute its cases, see, e.g., Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 595, 25 L.Ed. 399 (1878); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 930, 948 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1070, 114 S.Ct. 1646, 128 L.Ed.2d 365 (1994), and cert. denied sub nom. Gotti v. United States, 511 U.S. 1070, 114 S.Ct. 1645, 128 L.Ed.2d 365 (1994), and these witnesses, in turn, have traditionally been shown leniency at sentencing. See Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. at 595 ([S]uch a party, if called and examined by the public prosecutor ..., will not be prosecuted for the same offence, provided it appears that he acted in good faith and that he testified fully and fairly.). Cooperating witnesses provide important information for ongoing investigations and often furnish the most damaging testimony against the accused at trial, see, e.g., Locascio, 6 F.3d at 930, that which is key to winning convictions, see, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 363 (2d Cir.1995). While the public benefits from the conviction of the guilty, the cooperating witness, by providing inside information about his past criminal activities, receives an opportunity to have his sentence reduced. 16 A crucial part of the process by which a cooperating witness gives information and assistance to the government and is in turn promised a reward at sentencing is the debriefing session. The usefulness to the prosecutor of the defendant's cooperation in debriefing usually determines whether the government will make a § 5K1.1 motion. In order to appreciate the stakes involved at such an interview, we analyze the impact and utility of § 5K1.1 motions on sentencing. 17 The Sentencing Guidelines obviously have altered the way the sentencing process works, see United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 588 (2d Cir.1990), and the effect on the cooperating witness scenario is no exception. Under the Guidelines, a § 5K1.1 letter allows the district court one of the few opportunities it has to depart downwardly from the Sentencing Guidelines' somewhat rigid grid. Most significant, of course, is the fact that the United States Attorney must first make a motion for § 5K1.1 relief. Only after a motion is made can the district court consider such factors as the usefulness, truthfulness, timeliness, and extent of the cooperating witness's assistance, and any injury or danger suffered by the witness and his family as a result of such assistance. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. These factors are weighed by the sentencing judge, but only in determining what the appropriate reduction in the cooperating witness's sentence should be. Id. 18 Before the promulgation of § 5K1.1, district judges, not prosecutors, had discretion to decide whether to reduce a sentence based on a defendant's assistance. Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681, 1712 (1992). Under the Guidelines this sentencing power--of such great moment to a cooperating witness--was transferred from the sentencing court to the prosecutor. See United States v. Reina, 905 F.2d 638, 641 (2d Cir.1990). An amendment to empower district judges to act sua sponte was proposed, see 57 Fed.Reg. 90, 112 (1992) (proposed January 2, 1992), but never enacted. 19 While prosecutors are uniquely fit to decide whether substantial assistance has been rendered, United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046, 110 S.Ct. 845, 107 L.Ed.2d 839 (1990), it is equally true that a sentencing court is particularly well-positioned--because of its experience--to evaluate the moral worthiness, contrition, and rehabilitation of a defendant. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1103; see also United States v. Agu, 949 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 942, 112 S.Ct. 2279, 119 L.Ed.2d 205 (1992). Even so, a downward departure for a cooperating witness may not be granted sua sponte by a trial court. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1; Wade, 504 U.S. at 185, 112 S.Ct. at 1843-44; see also Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the Guidelines: A Call For Cooperation, 101 Yale L.J. 1755, 1770 (1992). 20 Prosecutors have made use of this discretionary power as a tool in managing their heavy caseloads and the increased reliance on cooperation agreements is a part of this trend. Graham Hughes, Agreements For Cooperation In Criminal Cases, 45 Vand. L.Rev. 1, 2-4, 68 (1992). Yet, the absence of any visible standards to guide the prosecutor's exercise of discretion, see Freed, supra, at 1711-12, has made the transfer of authority from judges to prosecutors especially troubling. The Supreme Court has noted that the breadth of discretion that our country's legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual and institutional abuse. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365, 98 S.Ct. 663, 669, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). But cf. United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir.) (noting that cooperation agreement limits the government's discretion because of its implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 969, 111 S.Ct. 433, 112 L.Ed.2d 417 (1990); Huerta, 878 F.2d at 93 (perceiving no danger of prosecutorial wrongdoing in determining whether defendant has rendered substantial assistance). 21 As the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies, Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1919, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993), the Guidelines have the force of law, and courts are obliged to enforce them accordingly. Nor may judges interfere with the prosecutor's decision either to make or not to make a § 5K1.1 motion, as prosecutorial discretion is traditionally exclusive and absolute. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3100, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1869). Of course, there are constitutional limits upon the prosecutor's exercise of her authority. See United States v. Resto, 74 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir.1996). Judges have an obligation to exercise supervision over the administration of criminal justice in federal courts, a responsibility that implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943). 22 The decision to move for a downward departure for substantial assistance rests in the exclusive discretion of federal prosecutors. Courts, in order to balance this broad executive discretion, must be especially vigilant to preserve a cooperating witness's procedural rights. By exercising supervisory authority in this area, we place a check on the prosecutor's discretion and reduce the danger of prosecutorial over-reaching in what is essentially a relationship tilted heavily towards the government. While we are foreclosed from requiring the government to acknowledge substantial assistance where it honestly believes that such assistance has not been provided, we can take steps to protect the cooperating witness in the debriefing interview.