Opinion ID: 2807047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opinion in the Accident Report

Text: Next, the plaintiff argues that the circuit court erroneously excluded the responding police officer’s opinion on fault that was stated in the accident report. Upon a careful review of this issue, we find no abuse of discretion. Following the accident, Officer Miller completed the accident report in which he wrote that the defendant had failed to yield the right-of-way. The defendant moved in limine to redact this portion of the report and to prelude the officer from offering this particular opinion at trial. The defendant relied upon the officer’s deposition testimony, during which he admitted he was not present when the accident occurred, he had no knowledge as to which party had the green light, and it was just as possible that it was the plaintiff who had failed to yield the right-of-way.9 Officer Miller also conceded during his deposition that he was not an expert in accident reconstruction. During trial, the officer 9 The plaintiff has failed to include this deposition transcript in the record on appeal, but he has not disputed these representations of the officer’s testimony. Further, the circuit court quoted some relevant portions of the deposition transcript in its order denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. 17 confirmed that he did not know who “had the light” and he did not know “the series of lights or the turn of events that happened[.]” The trial court heard arguments on the defendant’s motion in limine on the morning of the first day of trial. After a brief recess, the court granted the motion, ruling that Officer Miller could “testify to his investigation, not the opinion.” The court explained, “[y]ou can’t put together an opinion from nothing and whatever opinion [Officer Miller] expressed [in the accident report][,] he took it back in his deposition. He basically denied it and took it back. . . . But even if he has some degree of expert[ise], he has to have something and I don’t think there is anything there.” In the written order denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, the court said that “[i]n light of his clarification in his deposition,” the officer’s assessment of fault in the accident report was unreliable, erroneous, prejudicial, and not probative. The court acknowledged Officer Miller’s admissions that he had not personally witnessed the accident and was not an expert on accident reconstruction. However, the court concluded that “even assuming arguendo that [now-]Deputy Miller would qualify as an expert witness, he still should not have been permitted to offer an opinion on who was at fault because such an opinion would have been speculation, unreliable, and more prejudicial than probative.” 18 Although Officer Miller is not an expert in accident reconstruction, the plaintiff argues that Officer Miller was nonetheless qualified to render an expert opinion on who was at fault for this accident. West Virginia Rule of Evidence 70210 and Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995),11 allow a witness to be qualified as an expert on the basis of training and experience. The plaintiff argues that by virtue of Officer Miller’s training and experience,12 he was sufficiently qualified to render an opinion in the area of automobile accident investigations. Thus, the plaintiff argues that the opinion on fault stated in the accident report should have been admitted into evidence as an expert opinion. 10 When this matter went to trial in 2013, Rule of Evidence 702 provided that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” 11 Gentry v. Mangum provides as follows: In determining who is an expert, a circuit court should conduct a two-step inquiry. First, a circuit court must determine whether the proposed expert (a) meets the minimal educational or experiential qualifications (b) in a field that is relevant to the subject under investigation (c) which will assist the trier of fact. Second, a circuit court must determine that the expert’s area of expertise covers the particular opinion as to which the expert seeks to testify. Syl. Pt. 5, Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995). 12 At the time of this accident, Officer Miller had completed four months of training at the State Police Academy, which included a component on vehicle accident investigations, and he was a certified law enforcement officer. He had worked as a police officer for six months and his duties included responding to automobile accidents. 19 We are wholly unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s argument. Moreover, he misconstrues the trial court’s ultimate reason for excluding the evidence. Although there was discussion about the officer’s qualifications to serve as an expert, the court nonetheless assumed that the officer had “some degree of expert[ise][.]” Despite this assumption, the court ruled that the opinion had to be excluded because the officer withdrew it during his deposition. As the court explained, Officer Miller “basically denied it and took it back[.]” Because the officer admitted that it was just as likely that the plaintiff had failed to yield, the officer no longer had an opinion to render on the issue of fault. Accordingly, even accepting the plaintiff’s contention that Officer Miller was qualified to render an expert opinion in the area of automobile accident investigations, the fact remains that he retracted his opinion before trial. Even when a witness is qualified as an expert, the admissibility of his or her testimony is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court. Syl. Pt. 6, Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269, 406 S.E.2d 700 (1991); State v. McKinley, 234 W.Va. 143, __, 764 S.E.2d 303, 322 (2014). The circuit court determined that Officer Miller’s retracted opinion would be unfairly prejudicial and not probative. See W.Va. R. Evid. 401­ 403. The court did not need to study the formerly-held opinion or its underlying methodology to determine its irrelevance and prejudice. The officer himself, by his admissions in the deposition, indicated its unreliable and speculative nature. As such, the 20 withdrawn opinion would not have assisted the jury in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. See W.Va. R. Evid. 702. Under the unique circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s ruling.13