Opinion ID: 1277356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Erred in Failing Sua Sponte to Provide Clarifying Instructions Regarding the Sodomy-murder Special Circumstance

Text: At trial, the prosecution's theory of the case was that defendant's effort to entice the girls into his vehicle and drive them to a remote area was part of a premeditated plan to commit rape, and that the murder of Diane was committed in the course of perpetrating rape. As noted, the defense did not deny that defendant was the man who took the girls to the remote area and assaulted them, killing Diane; instead, defense counsel argued to the jury that the evidence suggested Diane had been killed in the course of defendant's having committed, or having attempted to commit, sodomy, and therefore supported no more than a verdict of second degree felony murder. (See fn. 2, ante. ) The trial court instructed the jury on the law of murder (CALJIC No. 8.10 (1983 rev.)), further explaining the elements of first and second degree murder as well as felony murder. With respect to the latter theory, the trial court instructed the jury that under the law applicable at the time, a killing committed during the course of a rape or attempt to commit rape was first degree felony murder, and that a killing committed during the course of a sodomy, or attempt to commit sodomy, was second degree felony murder. Defendant did not object to any of these instructions. Defendant now contends that the jury instructions were impermissibly ambiguous and that the trial court failed to fulfill its sua sponte duty to offer clarifying instructions informing the jury that a first degree murder could not be based upon the underlying felony of sodomy or attempted sodomy, even though first degree murder committed in the commission of such crimes could support a special circumstance finding. Defendant's failure to request such a clarifying instruction at trial, however, waives his claim on appeal. (See People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627, [A party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.]; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 218, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285 [same].) Moreover, the jury instructions were not ambiguous. The jurors were instructed that if they found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, then they were to determine whether either special circumstance was true. The jurors also were instructed to decide each special circumstance separately. These instructions correctly stated the law; if defendant wanted additional, clarifying instructions, he should have requested them. No ambiguity appearing, the trial court complied with its duty to fully instruct the jury on the law applicable ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, overruled on other grounds, People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531) and had no duty to further instruct the jury. [24] Relying upon Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809, defendant further contends that the trial court had a duty to instruct specially on partial verdicts and to provide separate verdict forms as to possible levels of murder, in order to ensure that the jury considered the rape and sodomy special circumstances separately. Defendant's reliance upon Stone is misplaced, however, as that case involved a jury that was unable to reach a verdict. (31 Cal.3d at pp. 507-509, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809.) In the present case, there was no indication of a deadlocked jury.