Opinion ID: 2479330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Negligent Training

Text: Plaintiff also alleges that Kinko's was negligent in its training of Albear. Initially, we note that plaintiff has not argued that Kinko's breached a generalized duty to provide training. Instead, plaintiff has alleged that Kinko's was negligent because the training Kinko's did provide was insufficient or defective in several enumerated ways. In other words, although plaintiff acknowledges that Kinko's provided training, it argues that Kinko's did so negligently. Kinko's responds that its liability for training should be limited in light of the voluntary undertaking doctrine, relying on Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 153 Ill.2d 26, 178 Ill.Dec. 763, 605 N.E.2d 557 (1992). In Frye, this court addressed the question of whether a pharmacist who was under no duty to attach warning stickers to dispensed medication could be liable for negligence when she undertook to attach stickers. Frye, 153 Ill.2d at 28-29, 178 Ill.Dec. 763, 605 N.E.2d 557. The plaintiff alleged that the pharmacist was negligent because she attached a sticker indicating that the medication may cause drowsiness, but she did not attach a sticker indicating that the medication should not be taken with alcohol, although she knew that drinking alcohol with the medication was dangerous. Frye, 153 Ill.2d at 29, 178 Ill.Dec. 763, 605 N.E.2d 557. This court noted that, although the pharmacist was initially under no duty to warn patients, [p]ursuant to the voluntary undertaking theory of liability, one who gratuitously or for consideration renders services to another is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to the other by one's failure to exercise due care or `such competence and skill as [one] possesses.' Frye, 153 Ill.2d at 32, 178 Ill.Dec. 763, 605 N.E.2d 557, quoting Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Services, 82 Ill.2d 313, 317, 45 Ill.Dec. 121, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980); Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill.2d 69, 86, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964). The court also applied section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides: § 323. Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965). Kinko's argues that, because it was under no duty to train its notary public employees, the training program it provided should be subject to the provisions of Frye and section 323. We disagree for several reasons. First, both the Restatement and Frye contemplate the liability of a service provider for the provision of services. In our view, the training of an employee cannot reasonably be viewed as the employer's render[ing] services to an employee. Moreover, section 323 and our precedents explicitly limit themselves to situations in which the plaintiff has suffered physical or bodily harm. In the present case, plaintiff has suffered only economic damages. Finally, section 323 provides for liability of the service provider in favor of the person to whom the services were negligently rendered. Here, even if we could view Kinko's training as providing a service gratuitously or for consideration, that service was clearly not provided to plaintiff. [6] We therefore reject Kinko's argument that plaintiff's negligent training claim is controlled by Frye or section 323 of the Restatement. Instead, whether and to what extent Kinko's had a duty to train its notary employees is best analyzed under principles generally applicable to negligence cases. As we have stated, whether a duty exists in a particular case is a question of law, which we review de novo. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 Ill.2d 179, 186, 262 Ill.Dec. 815, 766 N.E.2d 1118 (2002), quoting Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill.2d 132, 140, 143 Ill.Dec. 288, 554 N.E.2d 223 (1990); Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill.2d 274, 280, 309 Ill.Dec. 361, 864 N.E.2d 227 (2007). The touchstone of the duty analysis is to ask whether the plaintiff and defendant stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposes on the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff. Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, 238 Ill.2d 215, 226, 345 Ill.Dec. 1, 938 N.E.2d 440 (2010). The inquiry involves four factors: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury; (2) the likelihood of the injury; (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury; and (4) the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill.2d 422, 436-37, 305 Ill.Dec. 897, 856 N.E.2d 1048 (2006). Initially, we note that the Act imposes no duty on the employer of a notary public, except to refrain from consenting to the notary's misconduct, as discussed above. Consistent with the Act's overall emphasis on the personal responsibility of the notary, the notary's employer is not charged with providing training, supplies, or any other assistance to the notary. Indeed, the notary is not required to undergo any special training before or during his or her tenure as a notary. Moreover, plaintiff has not asked us to impose a general duty on employers to train notary employees; as noted above, plaintiff has alleged that Kinko's training was negligent, not that Kinko's breached a general duty to train. We therefore express no opinion on whether a general duty to train exists, and we move instead to defining the scope of the employer's duty once training has been provided. Plaintiff urges us to adopt a duty that would require employers to train notary employees in the best practices of notaries generally, as expressed in Closen's testimony. Closen based his testimony almost entirely on the Model Notary Acts of 1984 and 2002, opining that Kinko's was negligent for failing to teach Albear about several practices required under the Model Acts but not mentioned in the Illinois Notary Public Act, including maintaining a logbook and destroying the notary seal when he resigned his commission. However, the legislature of Illinois has never adopted the Model Notary Act. Though it could have done so when it considered and revised the Act in both 1986 and 2008, it did not enact any of the provisions of the Model Acts into law. The stated purpose of the Act includes to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing notaries public, and the legislature may well have declined some of the more stringent requirements, including those in Closen's testimony, in the interests of simplicity and clarity. 5 ILCS 312/1-102(b) (West 1996). We note also that the Act's reduced requirements makes it easier to obtain a notarization, thus allowing more of the public access to notary services. If we were to impose a duty on employers who provide training that required such training to teach proposed and model standards rather than the standards selected by our legislature and expressed in the Act, we would be undermining the legislature's careful determination of what should be required of a notary. This we will not do. Instead, we hold that where an employer provides training to notary public employees, it has a duty to ensure that its training conforms to the provisions adopted by the Illinois legislature in the Act. This holding is consistent with the four factors we have enumerated: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury; (2) the likelihood of the injury; (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury; and (4) the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant. First, where an employer trains notaries as part of a program to offer that notary's services to its customers, it is highly foreseeable that errors in the training program could lead to injuries such as those that occurred in this case. With respect to the second factor, where the training is incorrect or misleading, the likelihood of a resultant injury is also relatively high. Notary publics are routinely asked to witness instruments of great legal and financial significance, including loan documents, mortgages, and property transactions. The potential for fraud in such transactions is great, and parties to the transactions rely on the proper performance of the notary. If the employer provides incorrect or inadequate instruction, the potential for injury is present. Furthermore, where the employer has already undertaken to provide training, the burden imposed on the employer by requiring that the training comply with the Act is minimal. The Act should be the starting point of any training program for notary publics in Illinois, and we expect that any employer who seeks to train Illinois notaries would attempt to conform the training to the Act. The last factor, the consequences of placing this burden on employers of notaries, is similarly not a concern. Although some employers may decide not to provide training programs to their notary employees, notary publics are not required to undergo any training under the Act. Having determined that once Kinko's undertook training, it had a duty to train its employees consistently with the Act, we next evaluate plaintiff's claim that Kinko's breached its duty. Breach of duty is a finding of fact, which we will reject only when it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill.2d 144, 151-52, 298 Ill.Dec. 201, 839 N.E.2d 524 (2005). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill.2d 228, 252, 269 Ill.Dec. 80, 779 N.E.2d 1115 (2002). The trial court found that Kinko's failed to meet the necessary standard of care. However, it did not directly explain the factual findings that led it to this conclusion. Instead, the court reviewed several portions of Professor Closen's testimony, noting that the testimony was not impeached and that Kinko's offered no expert witness of its own. The court specified several ways in which Closen opined that Kinko's failed to meet the standard of care: the instructor of the notary training program, Yamnitz, was not a notary at the time he trained Albear and had never been a notary; Yamnitz did not teach Albear that information regarding notarizations was to be kept in a journal; Yamnitz did not teach notaries about steps to take to secure the notary seals and journal; Yamnitz did not instruct Kinko's notaries on the need to preserve the notary seal and logbook; and Yamnitz did not properly train Albear about the procedures for identifying document signers. [7] First, Kinko's was not under a duty to provide notary training classes taught exclusively by notaries. As we have stated, all that was required of Kinko's training program was that it teach notaries in a manner consistent with the Act. The credentials of the trainer are therefore irrelevant, so long as he or she teaches the class in conformity with this duty. With respect to the journal, we note that both Albear and Yamnitz testified that Albear was taught to maintain a journal of his notarizations, and Professor Closen referred to their testimony on the matter when he opined that the journal Albear kept was insufficient. Thus, the court's finding that Kinko's breached its duty by failing to teach Albear to keep a journal is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Even if it were not, however, the Act did not require notaries to maintain a journal or logbook of any kind in 1995. Therefore Kinko's was under no duty to train Albear to keep one. Similarly, Kinko's was under no duty to train its notary employees to secure or preserve the logbook. With respect to the security and preservation of the seal, the Act contains no requirements about either. Although section 7-107 of the Act makes it a misdemeanor to unlawfully possess a notary's seal, the Act makes no command, specific or general, about the need to secure the seal. The Act also contains no requirement that the seal of a notary who resigns his commission be preserved or destroyed, as Closen suggested was required. Finally, the trial court also found that Kinko's breached its duty because Yamnitz did not properly train Albear about identifying document signers. Although Professor Closen found several faults with Albear's identification process, the court repeated just one such deficiency in its summary of Closen's testimony: Albear did not require photo identification from a document signer. Where the language of a statute is clear, it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill.2d 1, 26, 293 Ill.Dec. 657, 828 N.E.2d 1155 (2005). In addition, the statute should be read as a whole with all relevant parts considered. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill.2d 178, 189, 149 Ill.Dec. 286, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1990). As we have already discussed, the notary public gives his or her personal seal and signature when completing a notarial act, and in so doing he or she assumes personal liability for the accuracy of his or her notarization. 5 ILCS 312/3-101, 3-102 (West 1996) (setting forth the requirements for the notary's official seal and signature); 5 ILCS 312/6-105 (West 1996) (setting forth the requirements for certificates of notarial acts); 5 ILCS 312/7-101 (West 1996) (A notary public and the surety on the notary's bond are liable to the persons involved for all damages caused by the notary's official misconduct). It is in this context that the Act provides that a notary must determine, either from personal knowledge or satisfactory evidence, that the person seeking notarization is the person whose true signature is on the document. Satisfactory evidence is generally defined as [e]vidence that is sufficient to satisfy an unprejudiced mind seeking the truth. Black's Law Dictionary 639 (9th ed.2009). Thus, under the Act a notary public, whose inherent function is to serve as an unprejudiced witness, must satisfy himself of the truth of a signer's identity. The specific manner in which the notary should do so is left to the notary, but as noted above, the Act establishes that a notary who does so in a negligent or reckless manner has committed official misconduct and is liable for any damages so caused. 5 ILCS 312/7-101 (West 1996). Closen cited the Model Notary Act of 1984 as establishing that a photograph was required, and the appellate court accepted this assertion, noting that Illinois courts have occasionally turned to such persuasive authority to define a statutory term. See Lohr v. Havens, 377 Ill.App.3d 233, 316 Ill.Dec. 319, 879 N.E.2d 386 (2007); Hasemann v. White, 177 Ill.2d 414, 226 Ill.Dec. 788, 686 N.E.2d 571 (1997). Thus, the appellate court indicated that reading in the requirements of the Model Notary Act was appropriate to help define satisfactory evidence. In our view, however, adopting the Model Notary Act's approach in this manner would not merely define satisfactory evidence, a term that is clear as it is used in the Act, but would instead supply additional requirements not indicated by the statute's plain language. Where the Act did not specify that only photographic identification could provide satisfactory evidence of identity, we decline to read in such a requirement. We therefore find that under the 1991 Illinois Notary Public Act, Albear was not required to obtain photographic identification to have satisfactory evidence of a person's identity, and the trial court's reliance on Closen's testimony to the contrary was incorrect as a matter of law. Instead, the Act required Albear to satisfy himself of the signer's identity in a nonnegligent manner, either by personal knowledge or on the basis of identification documents. As a result, Kinko's was not under a duty to teach its notary employees that a photo identification was required; its duty was simply to teach notaries that they could use identification documents to fulfill their statutory obligation to receive satisfactory evidence of identity. The evidence clearly establishes that they did so. Yamnitz testified that he instructed his notary students to look for a photo, saying: Typically what I told my students or my participants was to ask for a state ID, driver's license, or some type of ID that had a picture, a description, and the signature on it so that they could use a picture to verify, use a description to more or less verify height and weight, and then be able to compare the signature. Although Albear testified that he was taught a photograph was not required, he nonetheless corroborated Yamnitz's claim that he was taught to ask for identification. He testified, I ask for identification. The majority of the times I ask people for a driver's license. If at that time there were driver's licenses with photos on it, that is what I received. If not, then I received other identification. Albear's testimony was corroborated by Boatwright, who testified that on December 20, 1995, when he approached the counter for the notarization of his signature, Albear asked him to show a driver's license. Albear also testified that Kinko's trained him to make sure the person whose signature he was notarizing was the person appearing before him. When asked So you wouldn't notarize a signature unless that person was physically in your presence? Albear responded, That is the way we were taught. Moreover, although he acknowledged that the Act permitted him to personally identify a signer or to allow a person known to him to swear or affirm an identification, he testified that he always asked for identification because he felt more comfortable that way. He also testified that he asked all of his customers to swear or affirm that they were who they claimed to be, because that was his preference. Closen also expressed concerns about one answer Albear gave in which he stated that his job was merely to verify [a] signature based on the identification provided, not to determine that the person providing the identification was the person whose name appeared on the identification. After positing a hypothetical situation in which counsel appeared before Albear and provided a social security card for identification, counsel asked, How would you know that I am actually Richard Hirsh? and Albear responded, Well, that is not my job. My job is to verify your signature based on what I have in front of me. Closen criticized this answer, noting that Albear's focus on signature rather than identification was inappropriate. However, in Albear's next answer, he clarified his statement, saying, Well, my job was to receive identification and verify based on the signature and the signature on the identification that it was the person they said they were. The evidence at trial therefore supports Kinko's claim that it fulfilled its duty to ensure that its training program complied with the requirements of the Act. To the extent that the trial court found that Kinko's breached its duty, we conclude that such a finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thus, the trial court's finding of liability against Kinko's for negligent training is reversed.