Opinion ID: 1699144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tripp Meets Eldridge

Text: In Eldridge, we construed the statutory provision applicable here in a case that involved true split sentences of prison and probation imposed for a number of offenses. See 760 So.2d at 889. We held that upon revocation of community control or probation imposed as part of a true or probationary split sentence for a single offense, both the trial court and the DOC have the authority to forfeit gain time. See id. at 892. We had previously explained, in Forbes v. Singletary, 684 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla.1996), that the trial court's authority derives from language in section 948.06(6) providing that upon revocation of the probationary or community control portion of a split sentence, the offender may be deemed to have forfeited all gain time earned up to the date of his release. We held in Eldridge that pursuant to section 944.28(1), the DOC may forfeit the gain time even if the trial court chooses to retain it. See 760 So.2d at 891. We recognized in Eldridge that actual time served and gain time are not the same when it comes to awarding credit to a defendant upon revocation of probation. While the award of gain time reduces an inmate's release date, just as actual time spent incarcerated, it is clearly not synonymous with actual time served. On the contrary, gain time is time not served. Id. The DOC explained that the authority to award and forfeit gain time (as opposed to the trial court's authority to award credit for time served) is used to encourage good behavior in prison and on supervision. Id. at 890. We observed that it was the Legislature that provided for the award of gain time in the first place and it made the retention of that gain time conditional upon the satisfactory completion of the inmate's supervision. Id. at 892. Thus, under Eldridge, when a defendant is sentenced to a prison term upon revocation of probation imposed as part of a split sentence for a single offense, the DOC has the complete authority to forfeit all gain time previously awarded. As in the single-unit sentence scenario addressed in Tripp, the effect of this forfeiture on single-offense sentences is to require the offender to serve either the forfeiture penalty or the new sentence less time previously served, whichever is greater. In this case, the First District concluded that the sanctions initially received by Gibson were a probationary split sentence within the meaning of Eldridge. See Gibson, 828 So.2d at 423. Relying on Tripp, Horner, Hodgdon , and Eldridge, Judge Lewis elaborated on this conclusion in his separate concurrence: [E]ven though he was convicted of multiple offenses, Gibson received only one sentence because the offenses were scored on a single scoresheet and considered together in forming his scoresheet sentence. As Gibson received only one sentence for his three cases, his initial sentence constituted a probationary split sentence. Thus, pursuant to Eldridge, the Department had the authority to forfeit any accrued gain time upon revocation of probation. Id. at 424-25 (Lewis, J., specially concurring). Judge Lewis's analysis correctly applies our precedent in this area. We conclude that the DOC's application of section 944.28(1) to the single-unit sentence structure first addressed in Tripp is consistent with our prior case law in which we have recognized the continuing relationship among guidelines sentences that were originally imposed in relation to one another. Application of section 944.28(1) to single-unit sentences also serves the Legislature's purpose of penalizing offenders for violation of probation through the forfeiture of gain time. We conclude that extending the interrelationship of single-unit guidelines sentences to gain-time forfeiture does not violate the requirement in section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(12) that the offender receive a sentence for each offense. An offender sentenced for multiple offenses receives a separate sentence for each offense, even though the sentences for offenses scored on a single scoresheet are viewed as a single unit out of concern for fairness and uniformity in sentencing. So long as each sentence remains within the statutory and guidelines maximums, the application of the gain-time forfeiture does not turn separate sentences into an unauthorized general sentence. Viewed from the perspective of fairness and uniformity, an offender sentenced upon revocation of probation that was imposed as part of a single-unit sentence should not be exempt from the gain-time forfeiture penalty of section 944.28(1) while an offender sentenced upon revocation of probation imposed as part of a split sentence for a single offense is subject to the forfeiture penalty. Allowing the forfeiture penalty to be applied to single-offense split sentences while precluding application of the penalty to single-unit sentences on which the offender received Tripp credit would result in disparate treatment based solely on sentence structure rather than for any purpose served by either Tripp or section 944.28(1). We recognize that the DOC's application of section 944.28(1) to single-unit sentences will in some cases counteract much of the benefit of Tripp credit. However, if we were to hold that section 944.28(1) does not extend to single-unit sentences, the credit for unforfeited gain time applied to sentences imposed upon revocation of probation would give offenders such as Gibson a windfall in comparison to those sentenced to prison upon violating probation imposed as part of a single-offense split sentence. As we stated in Hodgdon,  Tripp was never intended to provide a sentencing boon or windfall to defendants upon violation of probation. 789 So.2d at 963.