Opinion ID: 1442923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The DEA Chemist Issue

Text: Mr. Howard argues that [b]y allowing the government to make its case without the live testimony of [the DEA chemist] who performed . . . [the] analysis [of the substance in the ziplock bags found on the ground], the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof and denied [Mr. Howard] his Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment. He relies on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) which he maintains trumped our decision in Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.1984). The government argues that D.C.Code § 48-905.06, [5] which establishes the procedures for the admission of a chemist's report into evidence, was not invalidated by Crawford; but that [e]ven if [the chemist's report] is a `testimonial' statement, D.C.Code § 48-905.06 does not violate the Confrontation Clause. The government also contends that, [b]ecause he never contested the chemist's findings at trial, [Mr. Howard] suffered no actual prejudice from his inability to have the government present the chemist's findings via live testimony. In October 2004, the government filed a notice of compliance with § 48-905.06, stating that: The United States of America, by its attorney, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, herewith is serving upon the defense and filing with the Court copies of the official reports of chain of custody and of analysis of a controlled substance relevant to this case, together with a certificate of legal custody. Section 48-905.06 specifies that the official report of chain of custody and of analysis of a controlled substance . . . shall be admissible in evidence as evidence of the facts stated therein and the results of that analysis. The statute also provides that if a defendant wants to cross-examine the chemist who prepared the reports, the defendant or his or her attorney [may] subpoena[ ] the chemist for examination. . . . And, the subpoena shall be without fee or cost. . . . The notice filed by the government requested that the defense follow specified procedures should [it] elect to subpoena the chemist for examination. . . . The defense was silent about the government's notice of compliance with § 48-905.06 until February 1, 2005, two days before trial, when it filed a motion in limine to exclude the report of analysis, known as the DEA-7 (Certified Report of Controlled Substance Analysis Prepared By the Drug Enforcement Administration), asserting that Mr. Howard's rights under the Confrontation Clause would be violated if the report was admitted into evidence. The government opposed the motion. On February 3, 2005, defense counsel argued that the chemist's report is testimonial evidence and the defense should have the ability to cross-examine the chemist; and further, that the burden was on the government to produce the chemist for examination. The government argued that: [A]s far as the confrontation clause goes, there is a self-help provision in the statute. All the defendant has to do is subpoena the chemist and [he will] come and testify and . . . can be crossed on all these issues, that's a simple matter. [The defense] had plenty of time to do that and somebody did not avail [himself] of that opportunity. The trial court took the position that Howard had not been overruled, and denied the defense motion to exclude the DEA-7. Mr. Howard never challenged the results of the chemist's analysis. He objected only to the admission of the chemist's worksheet, which was excluded, but not the certification showing 10 grams of a measurable amount of marijuana in the six ziplock bags removed from Mr. Howard's jacket pocket by Officer Siebert. Where there is no challenge to the results, the spirit of § 48-905-06 does not mandate that the chemist be called to testify. In that regard, we said in Howard, supra : Supported by the `business records' exception to the hearsay rule, D.C.Code [§ 48-905.06] was enacted to `relieve . . . chemists from the requirement of making. . . personal appearances' at trials where the results of chemical analyses are not in dispute. Id. at 838 (quoting COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT OF COMM. ON JUDICIARY, D.C. Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1981 (April 18, 1981)). Not only did Mr. Howard not contest the results of the chemist's analysis, but he also did not subpoena the chemist for examination at trial, as § 48-905.06 permits. Under these circumstances, we do not need to address whether the DEA-7 is testimonial. The Supreme Court observed in Crawford that [t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. 541 U.S. at 38, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (footnote omitted). Thus, [w]here testimonial evidence is at issue . . ., the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Here, there is no indication in the record that the chemist who performed the chemical analysis admitted at Mr. Howard's trial was not available to present himself for examination. Moreover, nothing in § 48-905.06 places the burden on the government to present the chemist for cross-examination, where the defense chooses not to subpoena the chemist. Indeed, the statute singles out the defendant, or his or her attorney as the person who will subpoena the chemist, and even mandates that the subpoena shall be without fee or cost. Had the defense served a subpoena on the chemist, as the statute permits, the government could have presented him in its case in-chief, and the chemist then would have been available for cross-examination by the defense. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that Mr. Howard waived his right to confront the chemist. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered.