Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court's Response to the Penalty-Phase Jury's Inquiry Concerning the Use of Mitigating Evidence

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court's response to a jury inquiry erroneously limited his right to have the jury consider his experts' testimony when determining whether the alleged aggravating factors existed. According to defendant, that error denied him his due-process right to a reliable sentencing procedure and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. During the penalty-phase deliberations, the jury sent the following inquiry to the court: (A) Are the expert witnesses' written reports available or (B) are we only to consider their testimony for mitigating factors? In response to the inquiry the following colloquy ensued at sidebar: [THE COURT:] With counsel's approval I will advise the jurors that only those items that were marked into evidence are available and, two, that as to `b' that the testimony of Dr. Musikoff, Dr. Greenfield and Ms. Aviv is to be considered for mitigating factors? Any objections? [PROSECUTOR]: No. [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Judge, wait, if I can. I have a question on that aspect. When I first heard the question I had a different assumption on it. But if they're asking if it can only be interpreted for mitigating factors maybe they're still trying to determine if there's an existence [sic] of an aggravating factor and they're looking to weigh the testimony in opposition of [sic] an aggravating factor instead of in favor of an aggravating factor. THE COURT: I can't speculate as to what they might have in mind. All I can do is answer the questions they pose to us. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Understandable. But the response that it's only going to be utilized for a mitigating factor, what happens if the proofs that were being utilized, meaning that thought process in the beginning because they're still asking to differentiate between the guilt phase an the penalty phase, that as to the diminished capacity aspect of it, whether or not that existed. Because we do have case law that has told us if they had a lingering doubt in the first trial, that could be utilized as well as another factor, as a mitigating factor. THE COURT: Mr. Van Rye, you're reading more into it than the question itself asks. They want to know are they totally to use the testimony for mitigating factors, and I'm going to answer the question they've asked. Thereafter, the court answered the jury inquiry with the following remarks: You have a question at 3:18, `(A) are the expert witnesses' written reports available?' Ladies and gentlemen, they're not available. Only those items that were admitted into evidence are available to you. You'll have to rely on your recollection of the testimony with reference to what was contained in the reports. `(B) Are we only to consider their testimony for mitigating factors?' They were presented as far as Ms. Aviv, Dr. Musikoff, their testimony was presented to establish mitigating factors. You can utilize also Dr. Greenfield's testimony if you see that supporting any mitigating factors. That's what they were presented for and that's how you're to consider their testimony for those purposes. Defendant argues that the second part of the trial court's answer was erroneous and prejudicial because it impermissibly limited the jury's ability to use the experts' testimony not only to establish mitigating factors but also to decide the existence or weight of aggravating factors. Defendant asserts that his experts' testimony could have raised doubts in the minds of the jurors about the intent elements of both aggravating factors alleged by the State. That was particularly true of Dr. Greenfield's testimony, which defendant relied on in both phases of the trial to counter the State's proofs regarding defendant's mental state during the kidnapping and murder. We recognize that that use of the mitigating evidence on the part of the jury was possible. The State disagrees entirely with defendant's interpretation of the jury note. It contends that despite the fact that the court answered the note as if it posed two questions, it actually posed only one: could the jurors consider as mitigating evidence the defense experts' written reports in addition to their testimony. The State's reading of the note is premised on the jurors' use of the disjunctive or rather than the conjunctive and to link the two parts of the inquiry. Thus, the State contends that the jury's only question was whether it could go outside the testimonial evidence of the expert witnesses and also review their written reports when considering whether mitigating factors existed, not whether that evidence should be used solely to determine the existence of those factors and not the aggravating factors. We agree that the State's interpretation of the note is most likely the accurate one. However, we do not accept the State's conclusion that the trial court's response to the inquiry could be construed only as a directive limiting the jurors' deliberations to the testimony of defendant's experts without consideration of their written reports. Regardless of the jury's intended inquiry, the trial court's response is what may have caused prejudice. At best, the court's instruction was ambiguous. Plainly, however, the response, standing on its own, could have been understood by the jurors to limit their ability to use defendant's mitigating evidence when determining if the alleged aggravating factors existed. However, because the response cannot be read in isolation, we examine all of the trial court's penalty-phase instructions and conclude that the jury was adequately informed of the proper role of mitigating evidence and that any harm caused by the court's error was harmless. Defendant admits that the difference between allowing jurors to use evidence to establish mitigating factors but not allowing them to use it to rebut or neutralize the weight of aggravating factors is a very refined distinction. Defendant asserts, however, that it is one fraught with significant constitutional concerns. Had the erroneous answer been the only instruction jurors were given on this point, their deliberations would probably have been tainted. Defendant is entitled to submit mitigating evidence that serves three purposes: (1) to weaken the State's proofs concerning the existence of aggravating factors; (2) to establish the existence of mitigating factors; and (3) to bolster the weight of those mitigating factors found to exist in an attempt to have those factors outweigh the aggravating factors found to exist during the jurors' ultimate deliberation. Permitting the jury to apply mitigating evidence in those fashions comports with our insistence that juries must be allowed to consider all mitigating circumstances advanced by defendant at trial. Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 53, 594 A. 2d 172; State v. Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 169, 548 A. 2d 887. We find, however, that the challenged instructions in this case did not inhibit defendant's ability to use his experts' testimony effectively during the jurors' penalty-phase deliberations. That `portions of a charge alleged to be erroneous cannot be dealt with in isolation but the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect.' is well-settled. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 135, 586 A. 2d 85 (quoting State v. Wilbely, supra, 63 N.J. at 422, 307 A. 2d 608). In several instances the court correctly informed that jury of the proper use of mitigating evidence. The court previously instructed the jurors with respect to the aggravating factors that the evidence to be considered by you includes that material presented by both sides at both phases of the trial, all of the witnesses and all of the physical evidence. The court also had instructed the jurors that [w]ith respect to the aggravating factors I've discussed and the mitigating factors I'm about to discuss, remember that in determining the factors including the defendant's state of mind you must consider all of the circumstances. With respect to the mitigating factors the court informed the jurors that [y]ou can use anything that you've heard, even if it's not presented by counsel as a mitigating factor, if you believe it is true. At the penalty-phase proceeding, defense counsel had ample opportunity to rebut the aggravating-factor evidence that the State had presented. Indeed, during his summation defense counsel argued at length against the existence of those factors, referring to the evidence presented in both phases of the trial. Moreover, the disputed response to the jurors' inquiry did nothing to inhibit the proper use of mitigating evidence during the process of weighing the aggravating factors found to exist against the mitigating factors so found. During the jurors' weighing process, the jurors could consider defendant's expert witnesses' testimony about defendant's mental state. The jury was thus free not merely to decide the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, but to evaluate the evidence supporting those factors in making the `unique, individualized judgment' regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty. Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 163, 548 A. 2d 887 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2755, 77 L.Ed. 2d 235, 265 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). Defendant's argument that the court's response to the jury inquiry resulted in a violation of the holding in Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed. 2d 256, is unsupportable. In Penry, the penalty-phase jury in a capital proceeding was given only three questions to answer; each asked if a specific aggravating factor existed. Id. 492 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at 2942, 106 L.Ed. 2d at 272-73. The jury was told that if it answered all three affirmatively the sentence imposed would be death. Ibid. The jury was never instructed that it could consider the evidence offered by [the defendant] as mitigating evidence and that it could give mitigating effect to that evidence in imposing sentence. Id. at 320, 109 S.Ct. at 2947, 106 L.Ed. 2d at 279. The court agreed with the defendant that his mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse ha[d] relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the alleged aggravating factors and should have been considered by the jury. Id. at 322, 109 S.Ct. at 2948, 106 L.Ed. 2d at 280. Thus, the court found that without any jury instructions on mitigating evidence, the death sentence was reached with out an expression of the reasoned moral response of the jurors. Ibid. The same is not true of sentence in this case. The record shows that jurors were well informed that they might consider any of the evidence presented at trial except defendant's own statements to his expert, which they were forbidden to use to determine the existence of the alleged aggravating factors. The trial court's inclination on this point, although not expressed in terms of legal precedent, was correct and intended to protect defendant. For the jury to use defendant's own statements submitted in the mitigating evidence to support the existence of an alleged aggravating factor would have been improper. Martini was permitted to argue to the jury the existence of four statutorily-delineated mitigating factors, including a catch-all factor, c(5)(h), open to any evidence the jury believed to be of mitigating value. In addition, the jurors were repeatedly instructed about the role of mitigating evidence and their obligation to weigh any aggravating factors found to exist against any mitigating factors found exist. We find that the jurors were not precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffer[ed] as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 990.