Opinion ID: 2747260
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discretion of Officers

Text: Piper argues that the July 14, 2012, checkpoint subjected motorists to the unfettered discretion of officers in the field, because the plan was “not formulated by a person at the policy making level, but by a person involved in the field.” See brief for appellant at 15. She cites to State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 277, 383 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1986), in which we held that a checkpoint subjected motorists to the “unfettered discretion of officers in the field” and was thus unconstitutional, because “there was no plan formulated at the policymaking level.” Piper acknowledges that the plan for the July 14, 2012, checkpoint was approved by a supervisor within the State Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. PIPER 379 Cite as 289 Neb. 364 Patrol. But she argues that this approval was not sufficient to make the checkpoint at which she was stopped constitutional. She alleges that the plan was not “formulated” at the policymaking level, because it was written by a nonsupervisor, and that [m]erely having the formality of rubber stamping a plan at the supervisory level is insufficient. A plan must start at the top and work its way down to officers in the field, not vice-versa. When the officer’s [sic] in the field create the plan and seek approval, it is an unconstitutional checkpoint. See brief for appellant at 15. In effect, Piper argues that as it was used to describe the unconstitutional checkpoint in Crom, the term “formulated” meant “conceived” or “created.” But in the context of Crom, “formulated” refers to acts which would make a plan binding, such as approval and endorsement by an individual at the policymaking level. Crom did not hold, as Piper argues, that the plan for a checkpoint must be conceived at the policymaking level in order for the checkpoint to pass the test for unfettered discretion. Any question as to the meaning of “formulated” in Crom was clarified by State v. One 1987 Toyota Pickup, 233 Neb. 670, 447 N.W.2d 243 (1989), overruled on other grounds, State v. Spotts, 257 Neb. 44, 595 N.W.2d 259 (1999). There, we considered whether a checkpoint that was operated according to a plan created by an officer in a nonsupervisory capacity met the test established in Crom. If “formulated” meant “conceived” or “created,” the fact that the checkpoint plan in One 1987 Toyota Pickup was created by a nonsupervisor would have been the determinative fact in our analysis. But it was not. Instead, in holding the checkpoint unconstitutional, we focused on the fact that the officers conducting the checkpoint had deviated from the plan by changing the date, time, location, and type of checkpoint without obtaining “reapproval.” See id. at 674, 447 N.W.2d at 246. We read “formulated” as meaning “approved.” [18] In addition to clarifying the meaning of “formulated,” One 1987 Toyota Pickup established that a highway checkpoint must be both authorized by an approved plan and Nebraska Advance Sheets 380 289 NEBRASKA REPORTS conducted in a manner that complies with the plan and the policy established by the authority at the policymaking level. As such, to determine whether the discretion of the officers operating a checkpoint was sufficiently constrained, we consider whether the checkpoint was approved and whether it was operated in accordance with the approved plan and State Patrol policy, as well as any other circumstances that may indicate the exercise of unfettered discretion. In the instant case, the checkpoint did not involve the exercise of unfettered discretion. As we explain below, the discretion of the officers conducting the checkpoint was limited by an approved plan that conformed to State Patrol policy. Operation of the checkpoint did not deviate from the plan or the policy. The existence of a valid checkpoint plan limited the discretion of the officers conducting the checkpoint. The plan was valid, because as required by paragraph II(A)(2) of policy No. 07-29-01, the decision to conduct the checkpoint was made by “a neutral source, such as a supervisor who is not involved in conducting the operation in the field.” Korell made the decision to operate the checkpoint by approving and signing the plan. And he was a “neutral source,” because he was a supervisor and did not participate in conducting the checkpoint. The approved plan established the date, time, location, and duration of the checkpoint, as well as the pattern for placement of signs and flares. In operating the checkpoint, the officers did not deviate from the plan. All remaining aspects of the checkpoint were delineated by State Patrol policy No. 07-29-01. The policy specified that “[a]ll vehicles must be stopped and checked” except when there was heavy traffic flow or there were more than three waiting vehicles per officer. It required that each stopped vehicle be checked for 10 specific items, including driver’s license, vehicle registration, proof of insurance, and “driver’s condition.” The policy prohibited officers from asking motorists to get out of their vehicles unless “violations of the law [were] detected or reasonably suspected.” Thus, the policy significantly constrained the exercise of discretion by the officers administering the checkpoint. Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. PIPER 381 Cite as 289 Neb. 364 Piper argues that the checkpoint violated paragraph II(A)(7) of policy No. 07-29-01, because the officers conducting the checkpoint “made a decision not to stop every car.” See brief for appellant at 16. Piper is referring to the fact that in the case of vehicles that approached the checkpoint on multiple occasions, the officers “did not recheck them after they had already been checked once.” This occurred with either one or two vehicles. They were stopped on their initial approach to the checkpoint. But after the initial stop, the officers waved the repeat vehicles through the checkpoint once they had ascertained that it was the same driver. No evidence was adduced about the reason these vehicles approached the checkpoint on multiple occasions. However, at trial, the parties’ attorneys suggested that the vehicles were driven by designated drivers for a local celebration that was going on at the time. The fact that these vehicles were stopped only on their first approach to the checkpoint did not violate State Patrol policy No. 07-29-01. Paragraph II(A)(7) of the policy required “[a]ll vehicles” to be “stopped and checked.” At the July 14, 2012, checkpoint, all vehicles were stopped and checked. Each vehicle that approached the checkpoint was stopped without exception. Vehicles that were waved through the checkpoint had been stopped and inspected on their first pass through the checkpoint. Thus, no vehicle escaped being stopped and checked at the checkpoint. Piper does not argue that the checkpoint violated any other provisions of the policy, and we find no evidence of any violations. As such, we find that operation of the checkpoint complied with State Patrol policy.