Opinion ID: 1441049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Professional malpractice in filing the personal injury claim (Count I)

Text: While expert evidence is generally required in a legal malpractice case to establish the attorney's breach of care, an exception exists in cases where the breach of care or lack thereof is so obvious that it may be determined by the court as a matter of law or is within the ordinary knowledge and experience of laymen. Wilkinson v. Rives, 116 Cal.App.3d 641, 172 Cal.Rptr. 254, 256 (1981); Walker v. Bangs, 92 Wash.2d 854, 601 P.2d 1279, 1282 (1979). See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to Standards of Practice and Negligence in Malpractice Action Against Attorney, 14 A.L.R.4th 170 (1982). The situation whereby an attorney has allowed the statute of limitations to run against his or her client's cause of action is an example of the sort of negligence so apparent as to make expert evidence as to the standard of care and deviation therefrom unnecessary. Little v. Matthewson, 114 N.C.App. 562, 442 S.E.2d 567, 571 (1994), aff'd, 340 N.C. 102, 455 S.E.2d 160 (1995); George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 377-78, 600 P.2d 822, 829 (1979). In this case, the applicable statute of limitations was clear and unambiguous. Additionally, the accrual date of the claim was also not subject to question or interpretation. Therefore, whether the attorney was negligent in failing to file the claim before the statute of limitations expired was an issue that was within the ordinary knowledge and experience of a layman. We caution, however, that if the applicability of the statute at issue was uncertain, if significant questions regarding the accrual date of the claim existed, or if issues regarding tolling of the statute existed, the case might extend beyond the realm of ordinary experience and knowledge of the layman, thus requiring an expert witness to establish the attorney's breach of the duty of care. The elements for a claim of legal malpractice are the existence of an attorney-client relationship, a duty owed to the client by the attorney, breach of that duty, and the breach as proximate cause of the client's damages. Semenza v. Nevada Med. Liability Ins. Co., 104 Nev. 666, 667-68, 765 P.2d 184, 185 (1988). We note that while an expert witness may be required to prove the causation issue, we need not reach that issue here. The district court also made findings of fact which it claimed supported its order for summary judgment; however, these findings of fact are, in critical part, clearly erroneous. Most importantly, the district court resolved a material disputed fact, concluding that McDonald actually informed Allyn that she would not file the personal injury action and therefore entered the order for summary judgment in favor of McDonald. However, the record when viewed in the light most favorable to Allyn, the non-moving party, presents genuine issues of material fact on this issue. McDonald claims that she informed Allyn that she would not file the personal injury action; however, she produced no concrete evidence of such a communication. Conversely, Allyn denies that McDonald so informed her and claims that McDonald told her on several occasions that she would file the action at the conclusion of the divorce proceedings. Because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether or not McDonald promised Allyn that she would file the personal injury action, it was premature for the district court to decide any breach of promise issues on summary judgment.