Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Refusal to instruct the jury as to Solvang's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, or the prosecutor's sole authority to grant immunity

Text: As noted above, Solvang's name frequently was mentioned in the course of evidence that properly came before the jury: The record showed that Solvang collected $800 that apparently was designed to deter Terry Guillory from testifying, and that Solvang was present at Donna Guthrie's home on the evening prior to the preliminary hearing and spoke with defendant, who asked Solvang, Anything ever work out?  an apparent reference to the status of the effort to prevent Guillory's testimony. In addition, Inspector Sjostrand testified that, based upon information supplied by Solvang, the prosecution searched unsuccessfully in a deep reservoir or pond for defendant's bloodstained shoes and the murder weapon. Also as noted above, the parties stipulated, outside the presence of the jury, that if Solvang were called to testify he would exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege to decline to do so. Defendant expressed concern that because of Solvang's assertedly high profile in the prosecution's case against him, the jury might infer from Solvang's absence at trial that if Solvang were to testify, he would provide further evidence unhelpful to defendant. Accordingly, defendant made a motion requesting the trial court to instruct the jury that it should draw no inference from Solvang's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. [25] Defendant relied upon Evidence Code section 913, which provides: (a) If in the instant proceeding or on a prior occasion a privilege is or was exercised not to testify with respect to any matter, or to refuse to disclose or to prevent another from disclosing any matter, neither the presiding officer nor counsel may comment thereon, no presumption shall arise because of the exercise of the privilege, and the trier of fact may not draw any inference therefrom as to the credibility of the witness or as to any matter at issue in the proceeding. [¶] (b) The court, at the request of a party who may be adversely affected because an unfavorable inference may be drawn by the jury because a privilege has been exercised, shall instruct the jury that no presumption arises because of the exercise of the privilege and that the jury may not draw any inference therefrom as to the credibility of the witness or as to any matter at issue in the proceeding. The trial court denied defendant's motion, concluding that because there was no evidence before the jury that Solvang had exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege, and because the jury would be instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.11, that [n]either side is required to call as a witness all persons who may have been present at any of the events disclosed by the evidence or who may appear to have some knowledge of these events, defendant had no right to the proposed instruction. Defendant acknowledges in his reply brief that we have held in previous decisions that no error results from a trial court's refusal to advise a jury that an individual's failure to testify was due to his or her invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (See, e.g., Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th 585, 619-620, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635, and cases cited.) Although defendant asserts those decisions should be revisited, we see no reason to do so. The prosecutor, arguing against defendant's motion, aptly observed that defendant essentially was asking that the jury be told, Here's something irrelevant [under Evidence Code, section 913, subdivision (a) ].... Now that I've told you about, it, don't consider it. On appeal, the People assert, [i]f the jury has never been told [or observed] that the privilege has been exercised, then there is no possibility that an `unfavorable inference may be drawn by the jury because a privilege has been exercised.' We agree that under the circumstances presented, Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (b) did not afford defendant a right to the instruction he sought. In any event, there is no reasonable probability that the result in this case would have been different had the requested neutralizing instruction been given. As recounted above (pt. II.C), the evidence of defendant's guilt was very strong. On this record, we agree with the People that even if the jury were to speculate why the defense did not call Solvang as a witness and to speculate further that the defense had failed to call him because he might provide further damaging evidence to [defendant], such speculation would [have been] only consistent with the uncontradicted affirmative evidence of record that Solvang was involved with [defendant's] plot to suppress Guillory's testimony and that Solvang had other information about tangible evidence that might be damaging to [defendant]. Defendant also asserts that even if no instruction pursuant to Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (b) was required, comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument required the court to instruct the jury that only the prosecution possessed the power to confer immunity in order to compel the testimony of a witness. For the reasons set forth below, we again disagree. During the defense closing argument, defense counsel questioned Terry Guillory's testimony that Guillory had seen defendant peek out from the Pillow home on the night of the killings. In the process of making that point, counsel referred to Kennie Bryant. Guillory claimed he had spoken to Bryant on July 4, 1989, and had told him that he had seen defendant at the Pillow home on the previous day. Counsel asked: Kennie Bryant, where's Kennie Bryant? If there's any question about the veracity of Terry Guillory ... then bring in Kennie Bryant. In response to this defense argument that the prosecution had failed to call Kennie Bryant as a witness, the prosecution subsequently asserted in its rebuttal argument: And by the way, folks, it's not a one way street. If there was anything there that defense counsel suggests was inconsistent in the statements of those witnesses made to the police officers on the Fourth of July, they can call them. If Kenneth Bryant  if the defense thinks that Kenneth Bryant is going to impact on this testimony. At that point defense counsel objected in light of the record in this case. The court noted the objection, and the prosecutor continued: [I]f Kenneth Bryant has anything to offer that in any way contradicts what Terry Guillory said, he's available to the defense as much as he is to us. Shortly thereafter, defense counsel interjected, Your Honor, I'm going to have to ask the Court to instruct on who grants immunity. The court responded that it would consider that request later, prior to instructing the jury. The prosecutor continued with his argument: If Kenneth Bryant is available  he's as much available to the defense as he is to us, make no mistake of it. So you can't infer from the suggestions of defense counsel that somehow because a witness wasn't called, that means the People have something to hide. Because not only is that not fair, it's not accurate. At the subsequent hearing on the defense motion for an instruction advising the jury that the prosecution possessed the sole authority to confer immunity, the prosecutor asserted that his challenged comments concerning Kenneth Bryant did not warrant such an instruction, because those comments had been very specifically directed to a very specific suggestion by defense counsel [as to] why the People didn't call Kenneth Bryant since this was the first [person to whom] Terry Guillory said he saw [defendant peeking] out the door. I very specifically responded [that] Ken Bryant was as much available to the defense as he was to the prosecution. My comment went no further than that. The court agreed, noting, I'm not aware of any claim of privilege by that person [Kenneth Bryant]. Indeed, defense counsel conceded that there was no such claim concerning Bryant, but suggested nevertheless that an instruction specifying the prosecution's sole authority to confer immunity would clear up misapprehension in the minds of the jurors. The Court responded that it had understood counsel's argument, but that it would not further instruct concerning the power to confer immunity. Defendant now claims that the prosecutor's rebuttal argument was designed to, and was likely to, mislead the jury into believing that defendant easily could have produced Solvang's testimony if defendant thought that doing so would assist him, and that the absence of defendant's requested instruction invited the jury to speculate that Solvang's testimony would only harm defendant, by confirming that indeed he had accepted money to keep Terry Guillory from testifying. But neither the language used by the prosecutor, nor the context in which the words were uttered (a response to specific charges made by defense counsel concerning Kenneth Bryant) suggests any attempt by the prosecutor to imply that the defense could have called Solvang as a witness and compelled him to testify. Moreover, as noted above, the properly admitted evidence  (i) from witness Jacqueline Coghlan, concerning the cash delivery from defendant to Solvang; (ii) concerning the telephone conversation that Inspector Sjostrand recorded on the eve of the preliminary hearing, in which defendant asked Solvang, Anything ever work out?; (iii) concerning defendant's letter to Donna in which he referred to the cookie (a reference to Guillory) and told Donna to [r]emind me when I talk to you to explain to you how one little mess can be cleaned; and (iv) from Inspector Sjostrand, concerning Solvang's tip relating to the possible location of the murder weapon  considered as a whole, provided the jury with an ample basis upon which to infer that Solvang in fact had accepted money as part of a plot to silence Terry Guillory, and that Solvang learned of the disposal of the murder weapon from his contacts with defendant. Accordingly, even if the jury were to have speculated from Solvang's absence that his testimony might have been unfavorable to defendant in these respects, the evidence properly before the jury already provided an independent and strong basis for the jurors to reach these same conclusions. We agree with the trial court's determination that no special instruction concerning the prosecution's exclusive authority to confer immunity was required under these circumstances, and further conclude that, in any event, there is no reasonable probability that the result in this case would have been different had the requested instruction been given. Finally, we also reject defendant's cursory argument, presented in a footnote, that his federal constitutional rights to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him were violated by the trial court's refusal of the requested instructions. Relying upon Namet v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278, defendant asserts that such a constitutional violation occurred because, he claims, critical weight was added to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination. ( Id., at p. 187, 83 S.Ct. 1151.) In Namet, however, the high court did not adopt or endorse such a test. ( Ibid. ) Indeed, Namet expressly concerned only a claim of evidentiary trial error and [n]o constitutional issues of any kind. ( Id., at p. 185, 83 S.Ct. 1151.) In any event, we cannot conclude that any inference that the jury may have drawn from Solvangs failure to testify added critical weight to the prosecutions case because, as explained above, the facts that the jury might have inferred from Solvangs failure to testify for example, that indeed he had participated in a plan created by defendant to prevent Terry Guillory's testimony, and that he had knowledge, gained from defendant, concerning the location of the murder weapon were already the subject of independent and strong evidence at trial, and hence any inference drawn from Solvangs failure to testify did not provide critical weight to the prosecutions case.