Opinion ID: 2818186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against Donaghy

Text: We begin by addressing Donaghy's contention that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Morales's Fourth Amendment claim. We review de novo a district court's denial of a federal officer's qualified immunity defense. See Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 -8- F.3d 91, 97 (1st Cir. 2013). To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, we generally proceed through a two-part analysis, considering whether (1) the facts alleged show the defendant[']s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the contours of this right are 'clearly established' under then-existing law so that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct was unlawful. Santana v. Calderón, 342 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2003). Donaghy makes two arguments with regard to Morales's Fourth Amendment claim. His first argument implicates only the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. He contends that the law was not clearly established in 2009 that an ICE agent needed probable cause when issuing a detainer. His second argument implicates both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis. He argues that, if probable cause was required, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that he had probable cause, and, moreover, the law was not clearly established in 2009 that these facts fell short of probable cause. We address each argument in turn.
A government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, [t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would . . . underst[and] that what he is doing violates that right. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 -9- (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). There does not need to be a case exactly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Id.; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) ([O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.). Donaghy issued the immigration detainer against Morales pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. That regulation authorizes an ICE official to issue a detainer to another law enforcement agency to seek[] custody of an alien presently in custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). Once the alien has completed her criminal custody and is not otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, the detainer instructs the agency to maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays[,] in order to permit assumption of custody by [ICE]. Id. § 287.7(d); see also id. § 287.7(a) (noting that a detainer is a request that [another law enforcement] agency advise [ICE], prior to release of the alien, in order for [ICE] to arrange to assume custody of the alien). Thus, the sole purpose of a detainer is to request the continued detention of an alien so that ICE officials may assume custody of that alien and investigate whether to initiate removal proceedings against her. -10- Longstanding precedent establishes that [t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968)); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) ([D]etention for custodial interrogation -- regardless of its label -- intrudes so severely on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safeguards against illegal arrest.). In Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court applied this wellestablished principle to determine what standard of proof, if any, an immigration officer must apply to stop and detain individuals to investigate their immigration status. See 422 U.S. at 880-82. In that case, the government argued that, within 100 miles of the border, it had authority to stop moving vehicles and question the occupants about their citizenship, even when its officers have no reason to believe that the occupants are aliens or that other aliens may be concealed in the vehicle. Id. at 877. The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument. The Court stated that, just as in the criminal context, an immigration officer must have a reasonable suspicion to justify briefly stopping individuals to question them about their citizenship and immigration status . . . but any further detention . . . must be based on . . . probable -11- cause. Id. at 881-82 (emphasis added) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 29); see also id. at 884 ([T]he Fourth Amendment . . . forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens.). Guided by this Supreme Court precedent, we have also required that immigration officers have reasonable suspicion to briefly stop individuals to question them regarding their immigration status and probable cause for any further arrest and detention. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez-de Jesus, 85 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (recognizing that Brignoni-Ponce stands for the principle that an individual may not be [briefly] detained for questioning about citizenship absent reasonable suspicion that the person is an illegal alien); Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that detention to inquire about an individual's immigration status is a seizure and implicate[s] the [F]ourth [A]mendment (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-17 (1984); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)); Navia-Duran v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 568 F.2d 803, 809 n.7 (1st Cir. 1977) (recognizing that an immigration arrest and detention needs to be supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion). It was thus clearly established well before Morales was detained in 2009 that immigration stops and arrests were subject to -12- the same Fourth Amendment requirements that apply to other stops and arrests -- reasonable suspicion for a brief stop, and probable cause for any further arrest and detention. Moreover, there could be no question in 2009 that detention authorized by an immigration detainer would require more than just reasonable suspicion. Although the line between an arrest that requires probable cause and a temporary detention for interrogation which does not is not always clear, pre-2009 cases did clearly show that 48 hours of imprisonment -- which is what the detainer requests, see 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) -- falls well on the arrest side of the divide. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court had never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here based solely on reasonable suspicion, and cannot do so on the facts presented by this case); Manzanarez v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1148 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining that it was unable to find any case in any circuit upholding a detention of longer than 90 minutes based on reasonable suspicion); see also Au Yi Lau v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 445 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (whether an immigration stop of several minutes could be justified based solely on reasonable suspicion was a difficult[] question, but upholding the stop as it was minutes rather than hours). This clear law establishing that the Constitution requires probable cause for the immigration detention that a -13- detainer requests is further reinforced by cases interpreting the statute authorizing immigration detainers. Under federal law, immigration officers may arrest and detain an alien pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States if a warrant [is] issued by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Statutory authority for warrantless enforcement actions, including the issuance of detainers, is provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1357. Without a warrant, immigration officers are authorized to arrest an alien only if they have reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any [immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest. Id. § 1357(a)(2) (emphasis added); see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i) (An arrest shall be made only when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense against the United States or is an alien illegally in the United States. (emphasis added)). The provision specifies that in order to issue a detainer for aliens who have violated controlled substances laws, immigration officers require a reason to believe that the alien may not have been lawfully admitted to the United States or otherwise is not lawfully present in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d)(1) (emphasis added). Courts have consistently held that the reason to believe phrase in § 1357 must be read in light of constitutional -14- standards, so that 'reason to believe' must be considered the equivalent of probable cause. Au Yi Lau, 445 F.2d at 222; see, e.g., Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980) (The phrase 'has reason to believe' [in § 1357] has been equated with the constitutional requirement of probable cause.); United States v. Cantu, 519 F.2d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 1975) (The words [in § 1357] of the statute 'reason to believe' are properly taken to signify probable cause.); see also United States v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 2010) (Because the Fourth Amendment applies to arrests of illegal aliens, the term 'reason to believe' in § 1357(a)(2) means constitutionally required probable cause.). Based on the robust consensus of cases [and] persuasive authority discussed above, al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084, it is beyond debate that an immigration officer in 2009 would need probable cause to arrest and detain individuals for the purpose of investigating their immigration status. Nevertheless, Donaghy contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because there were no cases in 2009 that specifically held that law enforcement officials required probable cause in the difficult and unique circumstance of issuing a detainer. In his view, the issuance of a detainer is factually distinct from other immigration detentions because [a]n immigration detainer does not itself constitute an arrest, and he -15- was not himself in a position to control what happened to Morales after he issued the detainer. Appellants' Br. at 27, 28. First, we pause to note the reason why there were likely no cases in 2009 directly addressing immigration detainers. The government had conceded for years that a detainer must be supported by probable cause. For example, in 1985, the Immigration and Naturalization Service stipulated that a detainer may only be authorized . . . when the officer has determined that there is probable cause . . . . Cervantez v. Whitfield, 776 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1985). Because the government had agreed that the issuance of a detainer required probable cause, there was never any case or controversy requiring a court to make a determination on this issue. See Cnty. Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2002) (The Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction only over live cases or controversies. (citing U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.)). A ruling in favor of Donaghy would create a perverse incentive that would allow the government to avoid liability by conceding an issue for decades and subsequently arguing that the law was not clearly established on that issue because there were no cases directly on point.3 3 In recent years, the government has begun contesting whether a detainer needs probable cause, and courts have uniformly held that probable cause is required. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Osterberg, No. 8:13CV65, 2014 WL 3784141, at  (D. Neb. July 31, 2014); Gonzales v. ICE, No. 13-04416, Dkt. 42, at  (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2014); Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12–cv–02317–ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at -11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Uroza v. Salt -16- As to Donaghy's latter point, while a detainer is distinct from an arrest, it nevertheless results in the detention of an individual. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. Morales alleges that after her criminal custody had terminated, she was detained for 24 additional hours based solely on the detainer issued by Donaghy. Because Morales was kept in custody for a new purpose after she was entitled to release, she was subjected to a new seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes —- one that must be supported by a new probable cause justification. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509 (2012) ([D]elay[ing] the release of some detainees for no reason other than to verify their immigration status . . . would raise constitutional concerns.). Moreover, although Morales continued to be detained by ACI officials, and not by Donaghy himself, it was also clearly established that a law enforcement officer is responsible for the natural consequences of his actions. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)); see also id. at 344-45 (holding that an officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest can be held liable for the arrest where the warrant application is Lake Cnty., No. 2:11CV713DAK, 2013 WL 653968, at  (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2013); Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10–cv–06815, 2012 WL 1080020, at ,  (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) rev'd on other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014). -17- so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable); Torres Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that an officer who knowingly processed an invalid warrant could be held liable for the subsequent unlawful arrest). The natural consequence of Donaghy issuing the detainer was that Morales would be detained for up to 48 hours. Donaghy cannot argue otherwise. The detainer he issued, on its face, instructed ACI officials to detain the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours. Donaghy also never explains why detainers present such difficult and unique circumstances as to allow him to circumvent the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. Indeed, we do not understand why it would be more difficult to obtain the facts necessary to establish probable cause for an individual who was detained in criminal custody than for an individual who was walking freely in the community. Arguably, it would be easier to establish probable cause in the case of detainers, because immigration officers would have easier access to interview and obtain records from an individual detained in criminal custody. Here, although federal regulations permit an immigration officer to ask questions of anyone as long as the immigration officer does not restrain the freedom of an individual, 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(1), Donaghy admits that he never met or even talked to Ms. Morales before issuing an ICE detainer against her. Appellants' Br. at 33. -18- Donaghy's argument implies that a reasonable officer in 2009 could have issued an immigration detainer against an individual for any reason -- or no reason whatsoever. Notably, Donaghy does not argue that reasonable suspicion or some other lower evidentiary standard applied to detainers in 2009. Instead, he contends that it was not clearly established that the Fourth Amendment would apply at all. Donaghy states that a reasonable officer in 2009 could have thought that the constitutional standards . . . were not applicable to the issuance of the detainer. Id. at 27. This unprecedented proposition is contradicted by longstanding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 214-15 (Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions.'). Donaghy's contention simply has no support in our case law. To the contrary, the law was clearly established that Donaghy required probable cause to detain Morales pursuant to an immigration detainer. Cf. Suboh v. Dist. Attorney's Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81, 94 (1st Cir. 2002) (We have no doubt that there is a clearly established constitutional right at stake, although we have found no case exactly on all fours with the facts of this case.). -19-
Donaghy contends that, even if probable cause was required, he is entitled to qualified immunity because he had probable cause when issuing the detainer against Morales, or, at the very least, the law was not clearly established in 2009 that the circumstances applicable to the issuance of the detainer did not constitute probable cause. Donaghy's argument relies on sworn declarations that he attached to his motion for summary judgment and reply brief in the district court. In those declarations, Donaghy contends that he made the decision to issue the detainer after reviewing various state and federal computer databases and determining that Morales was a non-citizen who had entered the United States without inspection and [was] present in the United States without authorization. Donaghy Decl., Dkt. 20-3 at 2, No. 1:12-cv-00301-M-DLM (D.R.I. filed Sept. 4, 2012). In particular, Donaghy asserts that he analyzed the ACI's database and two federal databases, the Central Index System and the National Crime Information Center databases. After reviewing these databases, he concluded that Morales was born in Guatemala, that she had made no claim of being a United States citizen, and that there was probable cause to issue an ICE detainer against her. Second Donaghy Decl., Dkt. 47-1 at 2, No. 1:12-cv-00301-M-DLM (D.R.I. filed Jan. 19, 2013). -20- As we have said time and again, [w]e have jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity only insofar as the appeal rests on legal, rather than factual grounds. Cady, 753 F.3d at 350 (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995)); Goguen v. Allen, 780 F.3d 437, 438 (1st Cir. 2015) (dismissing interlocutory appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction because defendants' arguments take issue with the district court's factual assessments and do not present a pure issue of law for this court's consideration); Penn v. Escorsio, 764 F.3d 102, 111 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that jurisdiction for interlocutory appeal was lacking where defendants' arguments rested on factual, not legal, grounds). In this case, Morales disputes that Donaghy and his fellow ICE agents conducted a sufficient database search with regard to her citizenship status. The complaint alleges that federal immigration authorities maintain records of naturalization applications in their databases, and ICE could easily have accessed the information in its possession and confirmed that Ms. Morales was a U.S. citizen before subjecting her to a detainer in 2009. Compl. ¶ 40. She specifically alleges that Donaghy failed to sufficiently investigate Ms. Morales’s immigration status before issuing the detainer. Id. ¶ 38. She adds that Donaghy could have easily conducted further research to verify whether Ms. Morales was a U.S. citizen, but he failed to do so. Id. ¶ 39. -21- Also, Morales has not had the opportunity to conduct any discovery to assess the credibility of the assertions that Donaghy made in his declarations. Therefore, Donaghy would like us to grant him qualified immunity based on his own version of the facts, even though the district court did not accept Donaghy's version of the facts. He fails to understand that in exercising our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, we are required to take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed when it denied summary judgment. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319. Because Donaghy's argument clearly rests on factual grounds and does not present a pure issue of law, his appeal on this ground must be dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction.4 Goguen, 780 F.3d at 438; see also Johnson, 515 U.S. at 317 (stating that an interlocutory appeal . . . makes unwise use of appellate courts' time when it forc[es] them to decide in the context of a less developed record, an issue very similar to one they may well decide anyway later, on a record that will permit a better decision).
Donaghy also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Morales's Fifth Amendment equal protection claim. 4 Donaghy does not make any argument that probable cause existed even on the facts that the district court assumed to be true. -22- Morales alleges that Donaghy based his decision to issue a detainer against her solely on her Guatemalan origin and/or her Spanish surname, which violated her Fifth Amendment equal protection right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin. Donaghy contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because, on the facts of this case, he did not detain Morales solely on the basis of these protected traits, and, therefore, did not violate her clearly established Fifth Amendment rights. Relying once again on the declarations he attached to his motion for summary judgment and reply brief in the district court, Donaghy argues that he issued the detainer against Morales based primarily on the database searches that he conducted. He stated that he issued the detainer after determining she was born in Guatemala [b]ecause there was no record [that Morales had] any prior encounter with ICE, no record of Morales applying for immigration benefits, including naturalization, and evidence of at least one alias with multiple social security numbers. Donaghy Decl., Dkt. 20-3 at 2. Donaghy added that he did not issue the detainer to discriminate against Morales on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin, or on any other basis. Id. He contends that this appeal involves solely a question of law regarding whether an officer may constitutionally rely, in part, on an individual's birth in a foreign country in determining -23- whether to issue a detainer. Appellants' Reply Br. at 25 (emphasis added). Donaghy's contention misses the point. His argument that he only relied in part on Morales's foreign birth is based entirely on his self-serving declarations. Donaghy requests that we reject the district court's finding that he issued the ICE detainer solely because Ms. Morales was born in a foreign country, Appellants' Br. at 33, based on his declarations even though the district court did not credit those declarations in denying Donaghy's motion for summary judgment. We simply do not have appellate jurisdiction to entertain Donaghy's argument at this time. See Escorio, 764 F.3d at 111 (stating that we have no basis on which to exercise jurisdiction because nowhere in the defendants' brief does there appear any developed argument that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment even if the district court's conclusions about the record were correct (internal quotation marks omitted)).