Opinion ID: 201324
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Rodriguez argues that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support two counts of his conviction, the drug conspiracy charge (count one) and the aiding and abetting murder of a witness charge (count four).4 We review a sufficiency of the evidence claim de novo, eschewing credibility judgments and 3 While Rule 12(e) allows a reviewing court to grant relief from this waiver for good cause, we see no basis for doing so here. 4 Rodriguez did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his conviction on count five, aiding and abetting the murder (of Llaurador) in furtherance of a drug crime. -18- drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, to ascertain if a rational jury could have found that the government proved each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1173 (1st Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
To prove the elements of the crime of conspiracy, the Government must show the existence of a conspiracy, the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy, and the defendant's voluntary participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Llinas, 373 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Proof of the defendant's participation in the conspiracy must include proof that he intended to commit the underlying substantive offense. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1173. Such proof may consist of circumstantial evidence, including inferences from surrounding circumstances, such as acts committed by the defendant that furthered the conspiracy's purposes. The government need not prove that a co-conspirator knew all of the details or participated in all of the objectives of the plan. Llinas, 373 F.3d at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since Rodriguez does not contest the existence of a drug conspiracy, we need only consider whether the government proved his participation in the conspiracy. Rodriguez claims that the only evidence linking him to the drug conspiracy was Soto's testimony that Rodriguez was present -19- at the May 1997 meeting with Angela Ayala, when she and ValleLassalle negotiated the details of a two thousand kilogram cocaine shipment. He argues that while he was at her house during the meeting, he played pool, listened to music, and did not participate in that meeting. This argument reflects a highly misleading view of the evidence adduced at trial. In fact, Soto testified that ValleLassalle offered to allow Rodriguez to participate in this particular drug smuggling operation if he murdered Llaurador. Prior to the meeting, Soto told Rodriguez that Rodriguez's share of that drug shipment could be twenty to thirty thousand dollars, and Rodriguez remarked that he expected to receive a good position in the drug organization for committing the murder. His claim that he was innocently playing pool at Ayala's house without knowledge that a major narcotics deal was being negotiated simply does not withstand scrutiny. Given this testimony, we have no difficulty concluding that a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodriguez was part of the drug conspiracy.
Rodriguez also claims that the evidence that the government introduced to prove that he murdered Llaurador was insufficient to establish a violation of the Witness Protection Act, which states: [W]hoever kills . . . another person, with intent to (A) prevent the attendance or -20- testimony of any person in an official proceeding [or] . . . (C) prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense . . . shall be punished . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1). The government argues that Rodriguez killed Llaurador to prevent him from communicating with authorities regarding federal offenses. To establish a crime under the law enforcement officer section of the Act, the government must prove that:
a person; (2) the defendant was motivated by a desire to prevent the communication between any person and law enforcement authorities concerning the commission or possible commission of an offense; (3) that offense was actually a federal offense; and (4) the defendant believed that the person in (2) above might communicate with the federal authorities. United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 918 (3d Cir. 1996). The Act explicitly relieves the government from having to prove that the defendant suspected that the witness would communicate to federal, as opposed to state, officials regarding the crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g) (stating that [i]n a prosecution for an offense under this section, no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance . . . that the law enforcement officer is an officer or employee of the Federal Government); therefore, the fourth prong may be proven, among other ways, by demonstrating that the underlying offense was a federal offense and that the federal -21- authorities had begun an investigation prior to the informant's murder or attempted murder. United States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 (3d Cir. 1997). The government easily met its burden here. Although Rodriguez repeatedly refers to Caballo's murder as a Commonwealth offense, the second superseding indictment lists the murder as a charged offense and identifies it as an overt act in furtherance of the federal drug conspiracy. The federal government, through the DEA, had opened an investigation into this conspiracy and had interviewed Llaurador prior to his murder. Rodriguez's claim that he did not realize that he was helping to conceal a federal crime by murdering Llaurador is irrelevant. See United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 687 (3d Cir. 1999) (All that [a parallel provision in the Witness Protection Act] requires is that the government establish that the defendants had the intent to influence an investigation that happened to be federal.).