Opinion ID: 2975066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bessent’s Procedural Due Process Claim

Text: Bessent next claims that the Defendants deprived her of a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause because stigmatizing comments regarding her termination were publicly -6- No. 06-5305 Bessent v. Dyersburg St. Cmty. Coll. et al. disseminated. Specifically, she points to: (1) DSCC officials’ repeated accusations at board meetings that she committed crimes during her employment; and (2) Dr. Bowyer’s comments to the local newspaper regarding Bessent’s termination. Bessent contends that she was entitled to a nameclearing hearing because she claims she was deprived of a liberty interest. “[A] person’s good name, reputation, honor, and integrity are among the liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 (6th Cir. 1989). Defamation alone, however, is insufficient to invoke due process concerns. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976). “Some alteration of a right or status ‘previously recognized by state law,’ such as employment, must accompany damage to reputation.” Quinn v. Shirey, 293 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-12). A non-tenured public employee is entitled to a name-clearing hearing when he shows that he has been stigmatized by the public dissemination of false information during the decision to terminate his employment. Paul, 424 U.S. at 709-10. Five elements must be satisfied to implicate a liberty interest in one’s reputation: (1) the stigmatizing comments must be made in conjunction with the plaintiff’s termination; (2) plaintiff’s employer must do more than allege merely improper or inadequate performance, incompetence, neglect of duty or malfeasance; (3) the stigmatizing statements must be made public; (4) the plaintiff must claim that the statements made against her were false; and (5) the public dissemination must have been voluntary. See Ludwig v. Bd. of Trs. of Ferris State Univ., 123 F.3d 404, 410 (6th Cir. 1997). “Once a plaintiff has established the existence of all five elements, [she] is entitled to a name-clearing hearing if [she] requests one.” Quinn, 293 F.3d at 320. -7- No. 06-5305 Bessent v. Dyersburg St. Cmty. Coll. et al. Bessent claims that numerous false and defamatory statements about her were published by various DSCC board members during public DSCC board meetings and by Dr. Bowyer to the local newspaper. With respect to the alleged defamatory statements publicized during the DSCC board meetings, Bessent produced no evidence that the board meetings were, in fact, open to the public. Bessent fails to mention this issue on appeal despite the district court’s finding this lack of evidence dispositive. She cannot meet the publication requirement without evidence of publication, so her claim with respect to these statements must fail. The only statement for which Bessent brought forth evidence of publication was Dr. Bowyer’s statements in the June 19, 2005 State-Gazette article. In the article, Dr. Bowyer was quoted as saying, “There were some recurring problems with the management of the grant, and we have decided to change the leadership of that program.” Additionally, Dr. Bowyer stated that there were “some basic policies that weren’t being followed.” Although these statements were publicized, they do not give rise to a liberty interest. Under our precedent: [A] plaintiff is not deprived of his liberty interest when the employer has alleged merely improper or inadequate performance, incompetence, neglect of duty or malfeasance . . . . Rather, to implicate the Due Process Clause, the employer must have made a statement in the course of the employee’s discharge “that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community” or that might impose “on him a stigma or other disability that [would] foreclose[] his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” A moral stigma such as immorality or dishonesty is required to show a deprivation of liberty. Ludwig, 123 F.3d at 410 (internal citations omitted). Here, Dr. Bowyer’s comments impose no such stigma of immorality or dishonesty. Bessent claims that after reading the article several friends -8- No. 06-5305 Bessent v. Dyersburg St. Cmty. Coll. et al. contacted her and said that it sounded like she had stolen money. However, Dr. Bowyer’s statements make no mention of criminal allegations, but merely focus on Bessent’s job performance. Her comments are nothing more than statements of improper and inadequate performance. Moreover, there is nothing inherent in the comments that would foreclose Bessent’s freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. To the contrary, Bessent admitted that she was currently employed as an insurance agent and was the 2004-2005 President of the Tennessee Literacy Coalition Board of Directors. This fact cuts against her claim of any stigma or disability. See, e.g., Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding no due process violation where plaintiff made no showing that definite range of opportunities is no longer open). AFFIRMED. -9-