Opinion ID: 1113494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 3 (1974)

Text: There is great difficulty in distinguishing the two constitutional challenges to Article 1493. Indeed, the arguments to this court in brief, in law review articles on the subject, and by the majority, when it continually refers to equality of heirship, frequently appear to commingle the two issues. In addressing whether Article 1493 is a violation of equal protection, we should look only at what the provision says and does on its face, and that is to provide certain classes of heirs, those under 23 or physically infirm or mentally incapable, with a right to a forced portion of their parents' estates, while not providing that to other heirs. The trial judge in this case found Article 1493, as amended, to be in violation of Article I, Sec. 3 of the Louisiana Constitution. Section 3 states in pertinent part: No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. The Louisiana Constitution differs from the United States Constitution with respect to equal protection in that our constitution specifically enumerates which classifications receive particular levels of scrutiny. [48] Because of this and because the jurisprudential analysis used under the U.S. Constitution is inconsistently applied, we rejected federal analysis as our model for interpreting Louisiana's constitutional guarantee of equal protection in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 477 So.2d 1094 (La.1985). In Sibley, this court stated that when a classification is based on birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, its enforcement shall be refused unless the state or other advocate of the classification shows that the classification has a reasonable basis. [49] This level of review provided for in our constitution was intended to be similar to the intermediate scrutiny test applied to the Federal Constitution. [50] The primary difference, however, is that while the United States Supreme Court chooses to apply the intermediate scrutiny analysis to an extremely limited category of classifications, based on the Court's changing assessment of social policy, our constitution provides that such review shall be afforded when a particular, enumerated classification is involved. Because Article 1493 on its face discriminates on the basis of age and physical condition, [51] both enumerated classes under our constitution, it is necessary to determine whether the classifications are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. [52] To avoid a finding of unconstitutionality, a classification based on physical condition or age must substantially further[] a legitimate state purpose. [53] In furthering the state purpose, the classification must not be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. In analyzing the classifications found in Article 1493, the first inquiry must be a determination of the state interests leading to the classification. Implicit in the article is the balancing by the State of two independent interests. First, the State obviously intended to permit greater freedom of testation. While the abolition clause of Article 12, Section 3 of the constitution limits the legislature's ability to provide total freedom of testation, expansion of freedom of testation within those confines is a legitimate purpose. To the contrary, Article 1, Section 4 provides in part: Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. Article 1, Section 1 describes these rights as inalienable and provides further that they shall be preserved inviolate by the state. Therefore I believe that enhanced freedom of testation is indeed a legitimate state interest. The second state interest applicable here stems from the legislature's recognition that there is a category of descendants who traditionally have a greater dependence on familial support. Certainly, providing assistance to those who may be otherwise incapable of supporting themselves is a legitimate state purpose. [54] As Justice Marcus noted in Talley, the focus is not on the general purpose[s] of the statute, but on the state interest purportedly promoted by treating [persons] differently. [55] In this case, the reason for creating the classifications is found in the balancing of these two seemingly contradictory state interests. In other words, the legislature sought to achieve the greatest degree of freedom of testation possible while at the same time providing the protection of forced heirship to those heirs most likely to need it. Because the two goals are legitimate state interests when standing alone, I believe the legislature had a legitimate, permissible purpose when it sought to balance these two interests in order to provide a system of support to certain heirs while at the same time increasing freedom of testation. Having determined the legislature had a legitimate, permissible state purpose in creating the classifications based on age and mental incapacity or physical infirmity, the next issue to be addressed is whether the classifications chosen substantially further that state purpose. In reducing the class of forced heirs from all heirs to those under 23 and those who are mentally incapable or physically infirm, the legislature has obviously substantially furthered its permissible goal of greater freedom of testation. [56] By providing that children under the age of 23 and children of any age who are mentally incapable or physically infirm will be forced heirs entitled to a certain amount of each parent's estate, the legislature has clearly chosen a means which substantially furthers its legitimate state interest of providing protection to those heirs most likely to need it. Further, the classifications chosen are not arbitrary or capricious, or unreasonable. [57] If the legislature's only goal was freedom of testation, and if it did not have an alternative goal of protecting those heirs incapable of providing for themselves, then the classifications based on age and physical condition would be completely arbitrary. However, such a finding would ignore the dual purposes of the article as explained above. Therefore, a determination of whether the classes created are arbitrary or capricious in light of the legislative intent to create a system of protection for these heirs is proper. In balancing the dual interests of freedom of testation and protection of those children most likely to need it, the legislature limited the class of forced heirs to children under the age of 23, or any other child who is mentally incapable or physically infirm, because it found those children were most likely to be unable to provide for themselves at the time of their parents' deaths. A finding that children who are 23 or older and not mentally incapable or physically infirm are capable of providing for their own support is not marked by whim but rather is supported by reason. The legislative conclusion that by the time a child reaches the age of 23, he or she is either completing or has completed his college education, or has had time to obtain gainful employment following secondary education is reasonable. The reasonableness of making those who are physically infirm or mentally incapable forced heirs is obvious. It is true that there might be a few children 23 or older who are not mentally incapable or physically infirm who may nevertheless be in necessitous circumstances. However, the legislature's classification is not based on need, but rather on the ability of a child to provide for himself or herself when he or she is 23 or older and not physically infirm or mentally incapable. It is not unreasonable for the legislature to believe that persons in this class are capable of providing for themselves. Additionally, in the area of economics and social welfare, a legislature does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.... [A classification] does not offend the constitution simply because the classification is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 484 (La.1981). Any age that the legislature ever chooses for a classification necessarily lacks empirical precision and can never fully effectuate the legislature's intent behind the classification. [58] However, the constitution only requires that the state purpose be substantially furthered. Thus, the fact that this classification might exclude some children 23 or older who are mentally and physically competent but who for some reason are not capable of providing for their own support does not render the classification unreasonable where it nevertheless substantially furthers the state purpose of providing for those incapable of providing for themselves. The legislature's decision to make this particular class of people forced heirs was, therefore, not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. [59]