Opinion ID: 2036121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: procedure to determine status of attorney-client information

Text: While information like that the trial court sought here might have been the type which an attorney could not refuse to disclose upon court order, there must first be some showing that the information sought is in fact subject to disclosure. We now address the issue of what steps a trial court must take in determining whether such information is subject to disclosure. These steps will serve to ensure that those communications which are in fact privileged will not be subject to revelation. It is at this point that the appellate court's analysis stopped, and is thus where it erred. Before an attorney can be compelled to disclose client information, the party opposing the attorney-client privilege must first establish that the information is not privileged. Only then may the information be compelled: The party opposing the attorney-client privilege has the burden of bringing the communication in question within the crime-fraud exception.    Once the attorney-client privilege is defeated by the application of the crime-fraud exception[,]    discovery of, or testimony regarding, the information in question may be compelled. Note, The Impact of the Zolin Decision on the Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 24 Ga.L.Rev. 1115, 1121-22 (1990). The question arises, however, as to what type of a burden the opposing party must meet to prove that certain communications fall within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. In Clark v. United States (1933), 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 993, the United States Supreme Court stated: There are early cases apparently to the effect that a mere charge of illegality, not supported by any evidence, will set the confidences free. [Citations.] But this conception of the privilege is without support in later rulings. `It is obvious that it would be absurd to say that the privilege could be got rid of merely by making a charge of fraud.' [Citation.] To drive the privilege away, there must be `something to give colour to the charge'; there must be `prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in fact.' [Citation.] ( Clark, 289 U.S. at 15, 53 S.Ct. at 469, 77 L.Ed. at 1000.) Another court has discussed the burden of proof required to establish the exception to the privilege: [T]here need only be presented a reasonable basis for believing that the objective was fraudulent. In [a previous case], we referred to the burden on the party seeking to overcome the privilege in terms of showing probable cause to believe that a crime or fraud had been committed and that the communications were in furtherance thereof. [Citation.] Other circuits have referred to the burden in terms of the need to make a prima facie showing. [Citations.] As a practical matter, there is little difference here between the two tests. Both require that a prudent person have a reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a crime or fraud, and that the communications were in furtherance thereof. [Citation.] In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (2d Cir.1984), 731 F.2d 1032, 1039. While the opposing party must thus make some initial evidentiary showing to establish the exception, the question arises next as to what type of evidence the opposing party may use to prove the exception. It is often difficult to prove the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege using only evidence independent of the communication itself. The best, and often only, evidence of whether the exception exists is the allegedly privileged communication. However, if the communication itself is used to make the initial determination of whether the crime-fraud exception applies, the privilege is violated and the protected interest suffers because of the forced public revelation. See Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communications Privileges, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 730, 737 (1964). The United States Supreme Court recently addressed this dilemma in United States v. Zolin (1989), 491 U.S. 554, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469. At issue in Zolin was whether the crime-fraud exception applied to an assertion of the attorney-client privilege with respect to audio tapes. The Internal Revenue Service asked the district court to listen to the tapes in camera and determine whether the crime-fraud exception applied. The district court refused to listen to the tapes in camera and subsequently found the tapes protected by the attorney-client privilege, and that no crime-fraud exception existed. In addressing the issue, the Supreme Court posed two questions: (1) whether in camera inspection of allegedly privileged information could ever be allowed; and (2) if so, would such inspections always be permissible, or would there first have to be some initial evidentiary showing. In response to the first question, the Supreme Court concluded that Federal courts could view the allegedly privileged materials in camera to determine whether information was in fact privileged. In concluding this, the Supreme Court noted that disclosure of such material to the trial court in such a manner does not waive or terminate the privilege. The Court also noted that the policies underlying the privilege and its exceptions were better fostered by permitting such review. The Court believed that the cost of an absolute bar of in camera viewing of such material would be intolerably high and too great an impediment to the adversarial system, as many blatant abuses of privilege cannot be substantiated by extrinsic evidence alone. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 568-69, 109 S.Ct. at 2629, 105 L.Ed.2d at 488-89. After making this determination, the Court addressed its second question and concluded that before an in camera inspection of allegedly privileged material could be made to determine whether the crime-fraud exception existed, there first had to be some threshold evidentiary showing to trigger such review. In concluding this, the Supreme Court noted that the trial court's view of the material itself may jeopardize the security the privilege was meant to protect. Moreover, the Court was concerned that unrestricted use of in camera inspections would result in due process violations and would burden Federal courts with review of large evidentiary records. The Court was also concerned that fishing expeditions by the opposing side would take place, with the district courts acting as the opposing side's unwitting and unwilling agents. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 571, 109 S.Ct. at 2630, 105 L.Ed.2d at 490. Concerning the evidentiary threshold required to hold the in camera inspection, the Supreme Court noted that because an in camera inspection would be a smaller intrusion upon confidentiality than public disclosure, a lesser evidentiary showing would be needed to trigger the in camera inspection than to ultimately prove the crime-fraud exception. Thus, the Court stated that a `judge should require a showing of factual basis adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person,' [citation] that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572, 109 S.Ct. at 2631, 105 L.Ed.2d at 490, quoting Caldwell v. District Court (Colo. 1982), 644 P.2d 26, 33. The Supreme Court went on to note that once an adequate threshold showing has been made, the trial court then has the discretion to conduct the in camera inspection. In making this determination, the trial court should consider such things as the volume of materials it is asked to review, the relative importance of the information to the case, and the likelihood that in camera review of the material, along with other evidence, will support the crime-fraud exception. The trial court may also defer the in camera review if it believes other information, not allegedly privileged, will turn up later and support the crime-fraud exception. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572, 109 S.Ct. at 2631, 105 L.Ed.2d at 491. We adopt the approach espoused in Zolin as a sensible solution to the problem of establishing the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. In doing so, however, we caution and instruct the trial courts of this State in a few areas. Because of the inherent problem involved in a trial court's viewing information that may in fact be privileged, and then later ruling on an issue which the privileged information may affect, it would be prudent, where possible, to have another trial judge conduct the in camera inspection once the initial threshold has been met and the court has determined that an in camera inspection is proper. We also caution that the trial court's in camera questioning should be as limited as possible to initially keep the actual information itself confidential. Thus, once the initial threshold has been met by the party advocating the crime-fraud exception, the in camera questioning by the judge should begin with a narrow question such as: Did your client ask your advice on how to commit this [specific illegal] act, knowing it to be unlawful? The answer to this question would subject the information to minimal disclosure, and an affirmative answer would remove the privilege for that information. (See Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communications Privileges, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 730, 738 (1964).) Finally, we note, as did the appellate court, that in some circumstances, such as here, contempt procedures are an appropriate method by which to test orders which are collateral to the principal action. (204 Ill. App.3d at 572, 150 Ill.Dec. 197, 562 N.E.2d 1000.) Thus, when the attorney's refusal to disclose such information is in good faith, trial courts should consider staying any contempt order pending appellate review, as was done here. In the instant case, the trial court erred in several ways when it ordered contemnor to disclose information concerning her client's intent to commit a crime. First, the trial court sua sponte questioned contemnor concerning her client after it had already denied petitioner's request to modify custody and her request to compel disclosure of information contained in her motion and subpoena. At this time, the court had disposed of all matters before it and had no basis to proceed and question contemnor. The court proceeded on the mistaken belief that contemnor had an affirmative duty under Rule 4-101(d)(3) (107 Ill.2d R. 4-101(d)(3)) to disclose any intent of her client to commit a crime. Regrettably, the dissent concludes that the trial court had not disposed of petitioner's request for information contained in her motion at the time the trial court ordered contemnor to disclose any information concerning her client's intent to commit a crime. The transcript of the hearing, however, belies this assertion. The trial court, as well as contemnor, treated the motion to compel disclosure of information and the subpoena as the same request. In making her argument to the court concerning petitioner's request, contemnor asserted that the subpoena involving emergency motion [was] very broad in its scope. Contemnor then informed the court what information she believed petitioner sought in her motion, including any intent of her client to commit a crime, and asked the court to rule on petitioner's motion by ruling on contemnor's motion to quash. The trial court responded to contemnor's argument by addressing the request in petitioner's motion to compel disclosure of information. After reading that part of petitioner's motion into the record, the court stated that the request was too broad and general, and was possibly violative of the attorney-client privilege. The trial court then stated: So as to that, I think the motion to quash the subpoena for that is well taken. The trial court accordingly denied petitioner's request to compel disclosure of information by stating that he was quashing the subpoena. The transcript further reveals that both the trial court and contemnor proceeded on the belief that the trial court had denied petitioner all relief (except for the information concerning respondent's automobile and property addresses which contemnor stated she did not have). After denying petitioner's requests, the trial court informed petitioner's counsel that he could not order contemnor to do any more. However, proceeding on the incorrect assumption that contemnor had an affirmative duty to inform the court and petitioner's counsel of any intent of respondent to commit a crime, the court informed contemnor that she should disclose such information to the court. Upon this request, contemnor asked the court to proceed correctly. By this, contemnor meant that the trial court should have first reversed its ruling quashing the subpoena so that the trial court would have had a basis for its order. Contemnor wanted the order to be done on the record. The trial court disagreed with contemnor, but never informed her at the hearing that it was proceeding on petitioner's request in her motion to compel disclosure of information. The trial court further erred by failing to find at the emergency hearing that an evidentiary threshold had been met which would require an in camera inspection of allegedly privileged material. While the dissent notes that the trial court stated that it found reasonable grounds to believe a crime had been committed, this finding was entered in the court's written order, after the hearing. Thus, the court never informed contemnor of this finding before ordering her to disclose information, offering her an in camera inspection, and holding her in contempt. The trial court's finding in its written motion further does not indicate that it suspected respondent informed contemnor of his intention to commit a crime, or what crime had been committed. The court's written order only found reasonable grounds to believe a crime had been committed. Also, contrary to intervenor's and the dissent's assertion that the question posed to contemnor by the trial court was narrow, the question was extremely broad: [A]re you in possession of statements by Mr. Decker of his intention to commit a crime ? (Emphasis added.) Allowing such an inquiry, without any finding of fact or limiting language, would allow any trial court, at any time in any proceeding, to ask any attorney whether her client had informed her of an intent to commit a crime. Such a fishing expedition is precisely what the Supreme Court warned of in Zolin. We finally note here that the court's order was also in error because it ordered contemnor to disclose information pursuant to Rule 4-101(d)(3) (107 Ill.2d R. 4-101(d)(3)), a rule which gave contemnor the discretion to inform the court of such information. The court had previously dismissed Rule 4-101(d)(2) (107 Ill.2d R. 4-101(d)(2)), the required by law or court order exception to the rule of confidentiality, as being inapplicable in that situation. We now address intervenor's claim that contemnor never properly invoked the attorney-client privilege since one who claims to be exempt by reason of privilege from the general rule which compels all persons to disclose the truth has the burden of showing the facts which give rise to the privilege. ( Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority (1956), 8 Ill.2d 37, 42, 132 N.E.2d 532; see also Consolidation Coal Co., 89 Ill.2d at 119, 59 Ill.Dec. 666, 432 N.E.2d 250.) Intervenor is correct in alleging that a mere assertion that a matter is confidential and privileged will not suffice to prove the privilege, if at all challenged by the opposing party. (See Krupp, 8 Ill.2d at 42, 132 N.E.2d 532.) In this case, the court implicitly accepted the contemnor's assertion of attorney-client privilege by failing to contest it during the hearing, claiming only that the crime-fraud exception to the privilege was applicable. We conclude that when there is an attorney-client relationship in which an attorney and client have communicated in a professional capacity, as occurred in this case, there is a rebuttable presumption that their communication is privileged. (See Adam, 51 Ill.2d at 49, 280 N.E.2d 205.) If, however, the opposing party challenges the presumption, then the proponent of the privilege must prove the existence of the essential elements giving rise to the privilege. Because there is no evidence in the record that petitioner or intervenor has challenged the existence of the privilege, this argument is waived. As a result, we will not address whether the elements of the privilege were present, but will accept the presumption that they were. Because we reverse and vacate the trial court's finding of contempt for the foregoing reasons, we need not address contemnor's claim that the court's contempt order violated her due process rights. Moreover, since the briefs indicate that the matter against respondent has been completed, we see no need to remand this cause for further proceedings. We thus do not decide whether the facts of this case presented sufficient evidence for petitioner to meet the initial evidentiary threshold required to conduct an in camera inspection of any communication between respondent and contemnor to determine whether the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege existed. The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are reversed. Appellate court reversed; circuit court reversed.