Opinion ID: 1977162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Duty Under Statute

Text: Ms. Gourdine, alternatively, argues that the duty between Lilly and Mr. Gourdine is prescribed by statute and refers us to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or the Act), 21 U.S.C. Section 321, et seq., which prohibits drug manufacturers from placing a misbranded product into interstate commerce. A duty may be established by statute `when the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute was designed to protect and the injury was of the type the statute was designed to prevent.' Pendleton, 398 Md. at 466, 921 A.2d at 207, quoting Remsburg, 376 Md. at 584, 831 A.2d at 27; Erie Ins. Co. v. Chops, 322 Md. 79, 84, 585 A.2d 232, 234 (1991). Furthermore, the statute must set forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole. Id., quoting Remsburg, 376 Md. at 584, 831 A.2d at 27; Ashburn, 306 Md. at 635, 510 A.2d at 1087. See also Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 483, 869 A.2d 837, 847 (2005) (To make out a prima facie case in a negligence action based on the breach of a statutory duty, a plaintiff must show `(a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of.'); Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70, 78, 835 A.2d 616, 620-21 (2003) (Moreover, where there is an applicable statutory scheme designed to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff, another well-settled Maryland common law rule has long been applied by this Court in negligence actions. That rule states that the defendant's duty ordinarily `is prescribed by the statute' or ordinance and that the violation of the statute or ordinance is itself evidence of negligence.). In Horridge, 382 Md. at 170, 854 A.2d at 1232, we considered whether the Department of Social Services (DSS) statute created a duty to a child who had been the subject of many reported child abuse incidents; the statute at issue, Section 5-706 of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (2003), required DSS, promptly after receiving a report of child abuse, to make a thorough investigation in order to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the child. DSS contended that the governing statute imposed upon it a duty to the public at large, and not to a particular class of individuals. We rejected this argument, recognizing that the statutory duties imposed are far more specific and focused, and that the statute makes clear in several places that the sole and specific objective of the requirement is the protection of a specific class of children  those identified in or identifiable from specific reports made to DSS and those also found in the home or in the care or custody of the alleged abuser. This is not an obligation that runs to everyone in general and no one in particular. It runs to an identified or identifiable child or discrete group of children. Id. at 189-90, 854 A.2d at 1243. In contrast, in Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447, 499-500, 805 A.2d 372, 403 (2002), we determined that the statutory duty imposed on 911 operators and supervisors to protect the safety and well-being of the citizens of Maryland was owed to the public at large rather than to an individual citizen, and in Ashburn, 306 Md. at 631, 510 A.2d at 1085, we noted that a police officer's statutory duty to follow certain procedures when stopping or detaining a driver under suspicion of intoxication did not create a duty to a pedestrian injured by the drunk driver where the officer detected the driver's condition before the accident but failed to stop and detain him because the underlying concern of the statute was the safety of the public and not a particular class of persons. Also, in Remsburg, 376 Md. at 585, 831 A.2d at 28, we held that statutes regulating hunting licenses, hunting seasons, endangered species and the number and type of wildlife and game that may be hunted did not create a duty on the part of the leader of a hunting party to protect third parties from being shot by members of his hunting party because [a]bsent from these statutes ... is any mention of a duty placed upon a leader of a hunting party, by virtue of his or her position as such, to protect all other hunters or landowners from the negligent acts of members of his or her hunting party. Moreover, in Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 253, 492 A.2d 1297, 1306 (1985), we concluded that probation officers who failed to seek the revocation of probation of an individual, although aware that the individual had committed a number of drunk driving offenses during the probationary period, owed no duty to the parents of a child severely injured by the probationer, because the officers' statutory duty to report violations to the court only was owed to the court. Ms. Gourdine, nevertheless, alludes to the Act's prohibition of the placement of misbranded products into interstate commerce by drug manufacturers. See 21 U.S.C. Section 331(a)-(b) (The following acts and the causing thereof are prohibited: (a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded. (b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic in interstate commerce.); 21 U.S.C. Section 352(a) (stating that a drug or device shall be deemed to be misbranded ... [i]f its labeling is false or misleading in any particular). She also refers to several federal regulations prohibiting misleading advertising and requiring certain information to be disclosed. See 21 C.F.R. Section 201.56(b) (The labeling shall be informative and accurate and neither promotional in tone nor false or misleading in any particular.); Id. at Section 201.57(f)(2) ([T]he labeling shall contain the following subsections as appropriate for the drug: ... (2) Information for patients. This subsection of the label shall contain information to be given to patients for safe and effective use of the drug, e.g., precautions concerning driving or the concomitant use of other substances that may have harmful additive effects.); Id. at Section 202.1(e)(5)(ii)-(iii) (An advertisement does not satisfy the requirement that it present a `true statement' of information in brief summary relating to side effects, contradictions, and effectiveness if: (i) It is false or misleading with respect to side effects, contradictions, or effectiveness; or (ii) It fails to present a fair balance between information relating to side effects and contradictions and information relating to effectiveness of the drug....). These statutes and regulations, however, are framed to protect the public in general, see United States v. An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798, 89 S.Ct. 1410, 1418, 22 L.Ed.2d 726 (1969) (noting that the Act's overriding purpose [is] to protect the public health), and, as we have heretofore stated, a statutory obligation which runs to everyone in general and no one in particular cannot impose a duty between two parties. Horridge, 382 Md. at 190, 854 A.2d at 1243. Therefore, we decline to find that a statutory basis supports the imposition on duty on Lilly to Mr. Gourdine.
Ms. Gourdine, in Count 3, asserts a claim based in fraud, alleging that Lilly knowingly published untrue statements about the dangers and risks associated with Humalog and Humulin N, that Ms. Crews and her physician relied on these misrepresentations, resulting in the accident that killed Mr. Gourdine. This claim was also resolved on the grant of summary judgment in favor of Lilly. Ms. Gourdine argues that because Lilly owed a duty to Mr. Gourdine, her fraud claim is viable, while Lilly, conversely, contends that the Circuit Court's decision was correct because there was no duty owed by Lilly to Mr. Gourdine, and regardless, there were no misrepresentations made to Mr. Gourdine. To prevail on a claim for fraud, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff, (2) that its falsity was either known to the defendant or that the representation was made with reckless indifference as to its truth, (3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and had the right to rely on it, and (5) that the plaintiff suffered compensable injury resulting from the misrepresentation. Maryland Env'tal Trust v. Gaynor, 370 Md. 89, 97, 803 A.2d 512 (2002); VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation, 350 Md. 693, 703, 715 A.2d 188, 192-93 (1998); Nails v. S & R, 334 Md. 398, 415, 639 A.2d 660, 668 (1994). [13] Each of these elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Gaynor, 370 Md. at 97, 803 A.2d at 512; VF Corp., 350 Md. at 703, 715 A.2d at 192-93; Nails, 334 Md. at 415, 639 A.2d at 668. Clearly, in order to sustain a cause of action based on fraud or deceit, the defendant must have made a false representation to the person defrauded. Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 867 A.2d 276 (2005); Gaynor, 370 Md. at 97, 803 A.2d at 512; VF Corp., 350 Md. at 703, 715 A.2d at 192-93; Nails, 334 Md. at 415, 639 A.2d at 668. In Bachrach v. Washington United Cooperative, Inc., 181 Md. 315, 29 A.2d 822 (1943), a corporation filed suit to set aside a foreclosure sale on the ground of fraud, alleging that the mortgagee's assignee acted with malice to harm the corporation. We rejected the corporation's arguments and dismissed the complaint, stating that [w]here the loss to the complaining party was not caused by any breach of legal or equitable duty, it is damnum absque injuria, id. at 323, 29 A.2d at 826, or [l]oss or harm that is incurred from something other than a wrongful act and occasions no legal remedy. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). In the case sub judice, Lilly did not owe a duty to Mr. Gourdine; [14] moreover, Mr. Gourdine was not a party to the alleged misrepresentations made by Lilly to Ms. Crews. As a result, the Circuit Court did not err in entering summary judgment in Lilly's favor on the fraud claim.