Opinion ID: 1247201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: admission of defendant's prior criminal record

Text: Defendant is charged with murder in the first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (1978, Supp. 1988). That section provides: (1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances: ... . (h) The actor was previously convicted of first or second degree murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person. (Emphasis added.) It is alleged that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of his son and that he had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person. Defendant complains that reading to a jury that he allegedly had been earlier convicted of a felony as part of the charging information before presentation of any evidence will be prejudicial because of the tendency of the jury to convict because he is a bad person rather than because he has been proved guilty of capital homicide. In other contexts, the legislature has recognized the prejudicial impact of presenting prior convictions of a defendant before a jury and has taken necessary precautions to insure that such prejudice based upon a defendant's status as a previously convicted felon will not taint a jury's factfinding task. Our habitual criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1002(2), (3) (1978) provides: (2) If the defendant is bound over to the district court for trial, the county attorney shall in the information or complaint set forth the felony committed within the state of Utah and the two or more previous felony convictions relied upon for the charge of being  a habitual criminal. If a jury is impaneled, it shall not be told of the previous felony convictions or charge of being a habitual criminal. The trial on the felony committed within the state of Utah shall proceed as in other cases. (3) If the court or jury finds the defendant guilty of the felony charged, then the defendant shall be tried immediately by the same judge and jury, if a jury was impaneled, on the charge of being a habitual criminal, unless the defendant has entered or enters a plea of guilty to the charge of being a habitual criminal. Thus, the court is prohibited from reading a habitual criminal charge to a jury before guilt on the substantive offense is determined. Only if a verdict of guilty is returned can the jury, in a bifurcated proceeding, be presented evidence of past convictions. See State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985), where we held it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to deny a timely filed motion by a criminal defendant to separately try him on burglary and theft charges from a charge that he unlawfully possessed a firearm while he was a prison inmate housed in a halfway house. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (1978, Supp. 1988). The basis of our decision was to avoid any tendency on the part of the fact finder to convict him of burglary and theft because of the prior crime for which he was incarcerated. We affirm that evidence of prior crimes is generally presumed prejudicial and that absent a reason for the admission of the evidence other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded. Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741. In order to avoid prejudice to the defendant in the instant case while the jury is deciding his guilt of the offense charged, we exercise our inherent supervisory power over trial courts and adopt the bifurcated approach advanced in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 498 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result), and apply it to section 76-5-202(1)(h). The jury is not initially to be presented with mention or evidence of defendant's prior conviction. If the jury finds him guilty of an intentional and knowing killing, it may then be instructed on the prior conviction if the trial court determines that it qualifies under section 76-5-202(1)(h). The jury should then return to deliberate the existence or nonexistence of the prior conviction, which will, in turn, determine whether the homicide is first or second degree murder. It is especially appropriate that we exercise that supervisory power to require certain procedures when fundamental values are threatened by other modes of proceeding. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 499. Justice Zimmerman wrote: The legitimate interests of the state and the accused can easily be accommodated through a bifurcated procedure. When the underlying crime is charged, and enhancing circumstances involving other crimes or bad acts factually related to the underlying criminal episode are also charged for the purpose of increasing the severity of the punishment for the underlying crime, the trial court must divide the trial into separate segments. First, evidence regarding the underlying crime should be admitted, and the jury should be asked to determine guilt or innocence based on that evidence alone. Second, if a guilty verdict is returned on the underlying charge, then evidence regarding the enhancing circumstances should be heard by the same jury for the purpose of determining whether those circumstances have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 498. We reverse the order denying defendant's motion for a change of venue and grant the same. The trial court is directed to remove the case to another county free from the objection in accordance with section 77-35-29(e)(ii). There, the trial of defendant shall proceed in accordance with this opinion. HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.