Opinion ID: 2188938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: exclusion of evidence concerning prior relationship with counsel

Text: The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in excluding the testimony of several witnesses who, defendant maintains, would have testified that on June 26, 1987, he was told by Attorney Joseph Nugent, Jr., and his mother that he was not to speak with the police without first consulting counsel. Ducharme claims that this admonition resulted from an incident on June 25, 1987, in which he was questioned by the Burrillville police about a house-breaking and was subsequently released. Additionally, defendant asserts that he had an attorney-client relationship with Joseph Nugent, Jr., dating back to the June, 1987 incident and maintains that it would be relevant to whether defendant in fact requested an attorney when he was arrested on October 8, 1987. We disagree with Ducharme's contentions and conclude that the trial justice properly excluded this evidence as irrelevant. Under Miranda and its progeny, if an individual requests an attorney before questioning or during questioning, any interrogation must cease. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 473-75, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28, 16 L.Ed.2d at 723. The right to counsel may only be asserted by the accused and the accused alone. State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 28 (R.I. 1982). In order for the right to attach, it must follow a clear assertion of the right to the assistance of counsel by the accused. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981). Consequently the trial justice must determine whether the police should have understood the individual in custody to be making an unequivocal request for an attorney. The focus of the trial justice's inquiry is upon the objective comprehension of the police at the time of the supposed request. Evidence of the accused's possible state of mind on another occasion or of previous experiences with the police is not directly probative of whether the accused in fact requested counsel in a particular instance. Under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, a trial justice may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The standard of review of a trial justice's determination of relevance is that he or she will be reversed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bibee, 559 A.2d at 620; Abbey Medical/Abbey Rents, Inc. v. Mignacca, 471 A.2d 189 (R.I. 1984); Kelaghan v. Roberts, 433 A.2d 226 (R.I. 1981). We conclude that admission into evidence of what Attorney Nugent and defendant's mother supposedly told defendant three months earlier confuses the proper focus of the inquiry as to whether counsel was requested at the time of interrogation, and would be misleading to the jury. This inquiry is fixed squarely upon the accused's actual statements in response to the required Miranda admonitions. Consequently the trial justice committed no error in excluding such evidence.