Opinion ID: 2378315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Paul Nelson

Text: Nelson signed his contract for lot 775 on June 25. He, like Young, saw the plat which placed the west boundary at the 715 foot contour line, but he was told that the final survey would locate that line at the river bed. There is no contention that Irvin was dishonest in what he told these purchasers. He testified at the trial that the testimony of the purchasers was correct and that he agreed that all of them would get lots extending to the river bed. He is still selling lots in this subdivision. Apparently his superiors changed their plans or he had misunderstood them. We assume for purposes of this opinion that the officers of the corporation which owned the land were aware of the oral agreement between Irvin and the purchasers and that any mistake of Irvin was the mistake of the corporate officers. The trial court asked the jury to answer special issues for each of the five purchasers. For Kenneth Cain, Donald Yarbrough, and Irene Yarbrough, the issues inquired whether the parties were mutually mistaken in the belief that the descriptions used in the sales contracts were sufficient to describe a particular and identified lot which would be at least 100 × 125 feet above the 715-foot contour line and extending westerly into the lake to the channel of the old river? The issue pertaining to Richard Young inquired if the parties were mutually mistaken in the belief that the descriptions used in the sales contracts were sufficient to describe lots Nos. 771 and 772 and the extensions thereof westerly into the lake to the channel of the old river. The issue relative to Paul Nelson made the same inquiry as that of Richard Young, except that Nelson's question was whether the contract was sufficient to describe Lot No. 775 and the extensions thereof westerly into the lake to the channel of the old river? The jury answered all of these issues in favor of the purchasers and the trial court entered judgment reforming the contracts to describe tracts of land by metes and bounds which placed the west boundaries at the river bed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, thinking that the result was in accord with Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.1972). The statute of frauds, V.T.C.A., Bus. & C., § 26.01, is no bar to the reformation of a contract for the sale of land where the parties had an agreement and by their mutual mistake failed to state the agreement in the writing. The one who seeks to have equity change the writing must satisfy two requirements. First, he must prove the true agreement of the parties, for it is not enough to show that both parties were mistaken about some feature of their bargain. Mistakes of that nature may warrant rescission but not reformation. For example, in Continental Oil Co. v. Doornbos, 402 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.1966), the grantor and grantee both thought that the grantor owned all of the mineral estate except 3/32 royalty interest and that after reserving another 1/32 royalty to the grantor, the grantee would then be entitled to all royalty above an eighth of production if provided by any subsequent lease. They were mistaken; the effect of a prior deed entitled the prior grantee to take ¼ of all royalty, regardless of whether the lease paid 1/8 or more. There was a mistake, but there was no agreement to substitute for that of the written conveyance. The second requirement for reformation is that the provision erroneously written (or included or omitted) into the instrument was there by mutual mistake. It is not enough that the writing differed from the oral agreement. Estes v. Republic National Bank of Dallas, 462 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.1970); Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex. 540, 84 S.W.2d 447 (1935). The province of reformation is to make a writing express the bargain which the parties desired to put in writing. 13 Williston on Contracts § 1549 (3rd ed. 1970). These requirements were both met by the purchaser in Shotwell v. Morrow, 498 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.Civ.App.1973, writ ref'd n. r. e.). Both seller and purchaser had identified all four corners and boundary lines prior to the time they signed the contract, and they both thought that the description in the deed was legally sufficient to describe that very tract. The trial judge shared their mistake on that score when the case was first heard on the purchaser's attempt to obtain specific performance of the contract as written. In the first phase of the case, the Supreme Court held the description to be inadequate, but remanded the case for this reason: There is in the record strong evidence that the parties intended to describe a particular and identified tract of 12.375 in their contract, and that they were mutually mistaken in the belief that the description used was legally sufficient for that purpose. If that be a fact, Morrow would have been entitled to reformation of the contract had he sought it. Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex.1972). Following the second trial, where the purchaser's evidence and the findings met these requirements stated by the Supreme Court, the second appeal by the seller was correctly disposed of by the Court of Civil Appeals with the explanation that no mistake had been made in the identity of the property itself, but the mutual mistake was made in the misdescription in the written contract. 498 S.W.2d 432, 434. The answer to the suit of Cain et al. is that no precise land beyond the 715 foot contour line was ever identified by the parties. They agreed upon a general area or site. This neither satisfies the express requirements for reformation stated in Morrow v. Shotwell, nor would it satisfy the statute of frauds if the contract were reformed to that effect. A tract of land is not identified for these purposes by the location of a single stake and the agreement to adjust future plat lines to include a certain point or stand of trees. Three of the purchasers signed contracts at a time when no corner or boundary line was known. The other two were definite only about the lot lines above the 715 foot elevation; there was no agreement that the north and south lines would be extended due west or on the very same bearing as the existing line (straight from the road to the river bed) or that the purchaser himself was to elect exactly how to extend the lines westerly. The acreage below the 715 foot elevation was to be located after all of the written contracts were signed. The surveyor subsequently employed by the purchasers did more than produce descriptive fieldnotes for the trial court's judgment; he located the lines below the 715 foot elevation for the first time. Surely these parties were mutually mistaken. They thought that, when the surveying was completed, lots in this area would extend to the old river bed. Perhaps they were mistaken about the law, thinking that the oral agreements could be enforced and that equity would complete the surveying and locate lot lines in substantial accord with those agreements. These mistakes are no basis for reformation. The parties had no agreement for the sale of tracts with specifically defined boundaries and they could not have thought that the recitations on the sales deposit receipts described tracts so particular and identified. The seller has stood ready throughout this litigation to rescind the contracts. The cause will therefore be remanded to the trial court to allow each purchaser to obtain rescission or to stand upon his contract as written. The judgments of the courts below are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court. SAM D. JOHNSON, J., notes his dissent.