Opinion ID: 2823164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Homestead Right

Text: We next address whether the trial court erred when it denied the petitioner’s request that the court enjoin the foreclosure, despite her assertion of her homestead right. See RSA 480:1 (providing that “[e]very person is entitled to $100,000 worth of his or her homestead, or of his or her interest 4 therein, as a homestead”). “The issuance of injunctions, either temporary or permanent, has long been considered an extraordinary remedy.” ATV Watch v. N.H. Dep’t of Resources & Econ. Dev., 155 N.H. 434, 437 (2007) (quotation omitted). “An injunction should not issue unless there is an immediate danger of irreparable harm to the party seeking injunctive relief, there is no adequate remedy at law[,] and the party seeking an injunction is likely to succeed on the merits.” Id. (quotation, ellipses, and brackets omitted). The trial court retains the discretion to decide whether to grant an injunction “after consideration of the facts and established principles of equity.” Id. at 437-38 (quotation omitted). “We will uphold the decision of the trial court with regard to the issuance of an injunction absent an error of law, unsustainable exercise of discretion, or clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Dupont v. Nashua Police Dep’t, 167 N.H. ___, ___, 113 A.3d 239, 243 (2015) (quotation and brackets omitted), petition for cert. docketed (U.S. May 26, 2015). The trial court determined that the petitioner was not entitled to a permanent injunction because she failed to establish that, if the foreclosure occurred, she was in “immediate danger of irreparable harm.” ATV Watch, 155 N.H. at 437 (quotation omitted). The court explained that the foreclosure proceeding itself would not result in the “automatic ejectment” of the petitioner, and, thus, her “right to remain in the premises is not jeopardized by the foreclosure proceedings,” and “her assertion of her homestead interest in the property is premature.” The petitioner does not challenge this determination directly. Instead, she argues that “[a]llowing [the Trust] to foreclose without assurance that [she] will receive the benefit of her homestead right is unjust,” and asks that we allow the injunction to remain in place so that she can be given “assurances about how [her] homestead right will be preserved.” She posits that “[i]f the injunction remains in place, she could either remain in the home indefinitely or an order could be issued mandating that the [respondent] pay [her] for her $100,000 homestead exemption as a condition of the injunction being lifted.” Proceeding in this manner, the petitioner contends, “fulfills the interest of judicial economy.” The petitioner’s arguments fail to persuade us that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion or erred as a matter of law when it denied her request that the court enjoin the foreclosure. As the Trust explains, assuming that the petitioner “brings and prevails in a proceeding under RSA 480:8-a, the fact that the foreclosure took place” will not impair her alleged homestead right. See RSA 480:8-a (2013) (empowering the superior court, “upon petition of the owner of a homestead or the wife or husband surviving such owner, or upon petition of a judgment creditor and such notice as it may order” to “appoint appraisers and cause the homestead right to be set off, and a record of the proceedings being made in the registry of deeds, the right shall be established as against all persons”). Nor will the foreclosure automatically 5 result in the petitioner’s removal from the home. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it determined that the petitioner failed to show that she would be in immediate danger of irreparable harm if the foreclosure were to proceed. Affirmed. HICKS, CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred. 6