Opinion ID: 6111308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Civil-Rights Claims

Text: For his second point on appeal, Yang argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on his section 1983 claims. Specifically, Yang contends that the City violated his son's civil rights because (1) the City failed to provide competent emergency services, thereby depriving his son of his life and liberty interests; (2) the City's water rescue operations policy prevented rescue attempts by anyone other than a designated water rescue unit, and that policy deprived his son of his life and liberty interests; (3) his son had a substantive property right to rescue services, and as a result, he was deprived of due process; and (4) his son's estate has a procedural due-process right to a post-taking process of some kind. Section 1983 provides a cause of action for individuals who have sustained a deprivation of rights secured by the United States Constitution or by federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . To establish a violation of section 1983, Yang must show that the deprivation (1) was a right secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States and (2) was caused by the City's acting under the color of state law. Early v. Crockett , 2014 Ark. 278 , 436 S.W.3d 141 . State employees have qualified immunity from suit under section 1983 similar to the immunity that applies to them under Arkansas law. Id. , 436 S.W.3d 141 . Courts evaluating a claim of immunity must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and, if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. , 436 S.W.3d 141 .
We first address Yang's contentions that the City (1) failed to provide competent emergency services, (2) violated his son's substantive due-process rights because he had a property right in those services, and (3) violated his son's procedural due-process rights. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that individuals do not have a constitutional right to governmental aid.  DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 489 U.S. 189 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). The Court stated that [its] cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual. Id. at 196 , 109 S.Ct. 998 . The Court further stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional violation. Id. at 202 , 109 S.Ct. 998 . Government generally has no constitutional duty to provide rescue services to its citizens, and if it does provide such services, it has no constitutional duty to provide competent services to people not in its custody. Salazar v. City of Chicago , 940 F.2d 233 , 237 (7th Cir. 1991) ; see also DeShaney , 489 U.S. 189 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 ; Archie v. City of Racine , 847 F.2d 1211 , 1220-23 (7th Cir. 1988). Given this precedent, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the City had no constitutional duty to provide rescue services for Yang's son. Nor does the record reflect that the City acted under color of state law during its rescue efforts. Furthermore, Yang failed to attach any affidavits or supporting documentation to his response to the City's motion for summary judgment. He merely asserted in a footnote that the City's motion for summary judgment did not seek dismissal of his claims against the City under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and that he will not address how the execution of the City's policies and customs proximately caused a deprivation of Le Yang's constitutional right to life, liberty, and property. More significant, in his motion requesting modification of the circuit court's order, Yang failed to present any constitutional arguments on his civil-rights claims. Thus, Yang did not meet proof with proof on his civil-rights claims. We conclude that Yang's contentions lack merit because no constitutional violation had occurred at the time of the City's rescue efforts.
Next, Yang contends that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because his section 1983 claims fall under the state-created-danger exception. He asserts that the City's water-rescue-operations policy prevented any rescue attempts by others and that this policy deprived his son of his life and liberty interests. There are two exceptions to the general rule that the government has no constitutional duty to render aid: (1) the special-relationship exception and (2) the state-created-danger exception. Johnson v. City of Seattle , 474 F.3d 634 , 639 (9th Cir. 2007). Under the state-created-danger exception, there is a duty to protect when the state official affirmatively places an individual in a position of danger that [the person] would not otherwise have faced. Repking , 2010 Ark. 356 , at 9, 377 S.W.3d at 218 . In Ross v. United States , 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990), a mother brought an action against the city and others after her son fell into Lake Michigan at the tip of the breakwater. Emergency personnel arrived at the scene. One of the deputies ordered civilian scuba divers to cease their rescue efforts. Thirty minutes later, the authorized divers retrieved the boy's body, and he was pronounced dead the following morning. His mother filed suit. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the deputy. The Seventh Circuit stated, Absent a constitutional duty to provide these rescue services, ... the city cannot be held liable. On this point, we need do no more than cite the line of precedent from the Supreme Court and this court, holding that the government's failure to provide essential services does not violate the Constitution. See  DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs. , 489 U.S. 189 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) ; Doe v. Milwaukee County , 903 F.2d 499 , 502 (7th Cir. 1990) ; Archie v. City of Racine , 847 F.2d 1211 , 1220-23 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1338 , 103 L.Ed.2d 809 (1989). The plaintiff's allegations of municipal policy cannot surmount the main obstacle to her claim: the city simply had no constitutional obligation to save William's life. Id. at 1428. In Ross , the court held that the county's policy-not the city's-of arbitrarily cutting off private sources of rescue without providing a meaningful alternative ... led to the deprivation of William's constitutionally protected right to life, [and Ross's] claim is cognizable under section 1983. Id. at 1431. Ross is distinguishable from the present case because Yang did not present any evidence that a rescue attempt by any person, whether official or civilian, was arbitrarily prohibited by the City. Here, unlike the circumstances in Ross , there were no reasonable alternative avenues of rescue, and the City did not arbitrarily cut off any private source of rescue. By failing to offer proof with proof, Yang did not demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact that the City, during its rescue efforts, affirmatively placed Yang's son in a position of danger that he would not otherwise have faced. Repking , 2010 Ark. 356 , at 9, 377 S.W.3d at 218 . Because the state-created-danger exception does not apply, we hold that, as a matter of law, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on Yang's civil-rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed.