Opinion ID: 1360370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonableness of the Jury's Verdicts

Text: The Nolans contend that they were entitled to a new trial because no reasonable jury could have entered a verdict for Anderson and Henry on their assault and battery claims. Under Tennessee law, assault is defined as any act tending to do corporal injury to another, accompanied with such circumstances as denote at the time an intention, coupled with the present ability, of using such actual violence against that person. Huffman v. State, 292 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Tenn. 1956) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tenn. 1989)); see also Vafaie v. Owens, No. 92C-1642, 1996 WL 502133, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 1996) (same). Battery is defined as a touching of the person [of an individual] or something intimately associated with, or attached to, his person for an unlawful purpose. Lewis v. Metro. Gen. Sessions Ct. for Nashville, 949 S.W.2d 696, 703 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (quoting Huffman, 292 S.W.2d at 742). By statute, a public school teacher in Tennessee is permitted to use corporal punishment in a reasonable manner against any pupil for good cause in order to maintain discipline and order within the public schools. Tenn. Code Ann. §XX-X-XXXX. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that if corporal punishment is moderate and is inflicted with a proper instrument the teacher is as a rule, not liable civilly for assault and battery. Marlar v. Bill, 178 S.W.2d 634, 635 (Tenn. 1944) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding teacher who searched a student and principal who inflicted slight punishment with a ruler were not liable for assault and battery.) If the punishment is excessive, however, a teacher is potentially subject to civil liability. See, e.g., id. at 635 (stating [o]f course, there must be no malice and there must be reasonable ground and the punishment must not be excessive); Paul v. McGhee, 577 F.Supp. 460, 461 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (noting that Tennessee law preserves the right of the child not to be subjected to excessive punishment). The determination of whether corporal punishment was administered in a reasonable manner is a question of fact for the jury. Hargrove v. York, No. 01-A-01-9202-CV00065, 1993 WL 18267, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1993). The Nolans argue that any reasonable juror was compelled to find that Henry committed assault and battery because Henry admitted that he paddled Martin for non-disciplinary reasons, including failure to perform basketball skills properly and poor grades. With respect to Anderson, they point out that Martin testified that Anderson punched him in the chest with a closed fist and repeatedly paddled him painfully. They also note that, even though Anderson could not specifically recall paddling Martin, Superintendent Johnson testified that she believed Anderson violated the school's corporal punishment policy by paddling basketball players for missing shots during games and suspended him from coaching as a result. (ROA Tr. 147-48.) We first address the assault and battery claim against Henry. Henry admitted that he paddled Martin on a few occasions [sic] teacher referrals and misbehavior during a practice, and I guess not focusing on the practice itself. Not focusing meant not paying attention to what was going on or what he should be doing and . . . some of the kids were his friends and they might be horsing around while in the middle of functions or drills. Henry also admitted paddling Martin infrequently for not using the proper technique in performing a basketball maneuver after he had been shown the technique several times. Henry additionally testified: Q.[By plaintiffs' counsel] Okay. Now have you  let's see, first off, other reasons that paddlings were administered, are you aware or did you yourself administer paddlings because of poor grades or poor conduct grades? A. One or two occasions I had to give Martin corporal punishment because teachers had sent him to me.    Q. Okay. Now my question again is, did you ever administer corporal punishment to Martin because of his report card, because his grades or poor conduct on his report cards? A. In the three years maybe once or twice. Q. So the answer is yes? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And have you ever witnessed Ted Anderson administering paddlings to Martin for bad grades or bad conduct grades on his report card? A. Conduct yes, grades I believe so. [Colloquy establishing that Henry observed this more than one time over three years, but could not say more than five times, because he just didn't know.]    Q. [By defense counsel] And this last year that Martin Nolan was at Hamilton, that 2003-2004 year, were you in an administrative position at Hamilton in addition to your coaching duties? A. Yes, sir.    Q. All right. Was Martin ever sent to you by a teacher to be paddled for something that he had done in class? A. Yes, sir. Q. And would you administer the punishment? A. Yes, sir.    Q. What  did  did you have a philosophy or a method of your own coach or coaching style? A. Yes, I do. I believe that all kids are born smart, they learn to do things that get them in trouble, that's including the coaching aspect. I'm pretty patient and I let them make mistakes because that's how they learn. If you shoot a ball and you miss, that's a part of it. But working with the technique, even with that I give you an opportunity to self correct or self adjust after I've told you, pointed out things.    Q. Were  were there occasions when you would have Martin leave a practice? A. Yes. On several occasions toward the end of his  well, in [the] middle of his junior year after I would talk to Martin and try to get him to do his best all the time and see  saw that it was not working, I would say, well, Martin, when you get ready, you let me know, but right now go get dressed, you don't have to practice today.    Q. Do you know how many times during the three years that Martin Nolan was part of the Hamilton basketball program that you actually administered a paddling to him? A. Maybe ten times in two and a half years. Q. All right. How many of those would have been related to basketball as opposed to a teacher sending you a note regarding something happening in school? A. Maybe 70 percent basketball, 30 percent teacher referrals. Taken as a whole, the jury could have understood this testimony to mean that Henry paddled Martin on several occasions because Martin was referred by teachers based on his conduct during class, that Henry might have paddled him once or twice for a bad conduct grade on his report card, and that he also paddled him occasionally for improper basketball techniques when he perceived the improper techniques were the product of Martin's not paying attention or horsing around during practice. The jury could have rejected Martin's account of the paddlings and concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Henry paddled Martin for bad academic grades, as distinguished from bad conduct grades, or for deficiencies in his basketball performance unrelated to issues of discipline and order during practice. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial as to the assault and battery claim against Henry. As to Anderson, the evidence was not sufficient to show that Anderson violated the school's policy on corporal punishment. Plaintiffs were required to show that Anderson committed the tort of assault and battery on Martin. After admitting that he and Henry administered paddlings for bad grades on report cards to emphasize the importance of academics, Anderson testified: Q.[By plaintiffs' counsel] But you did paddle Martin on several occasions for bad grades, correct? A. Several, maybe several, but I paddled Martin very rarely because Martin was a good kid, and I presume still is, Martin didn't cause a lot of problems. I sit [sic] here yesterday in disbelief with the number of paddlings that we were accused of. I rarely had to paddle Martin. Martin was a good kid, he didn't get into trouble and he made good grades, so there wouldn't have been any reason for me to paddle him.    Q. Okay. Now so how often, since we got a little bit of reverse testimony here, Martin saying two or three times a week and you saying rarely, about how often did you paddle Martin according to you? A. Maybe three times during his whole tenure at Hamilton High School. Q. During three years from the ninth to the eleventh grades you paddled him three times? A. I'm saying three, sir. I actually right here don't even recall having ever paddled Martin, I really don't, because Martin never got in  I wouldn't have had any reason to paddle Martin. Martin was a good kid, he never got in any trouble, not a teacher every [ sic ] sent me anything that I can recall on Martin.    Q. So now it's your testimony that you don't recall ever paddling Martin? A. I don't recall it, but I may have. I mean, I can't just remember a time  this is a time that I remember getting  paddling Martin, I just can't pick a time out of my head that I remember paddling Martin. But I  I would say that I probably did, you know, but I don't know, you know, as far as in excess of any exorbitant number, no, sir, I didn't.    Q. And your program includes paddling the basketball players, correct? A. It includes paddling the basketball players for misbehaving mostly, yes, sir. If they misbehave, yes, sir. As with Henry, the jury could have rejected Martin's account of the paddlings, and reasonably concluded that Anderson's admissions did not establish that he in fact paddled Martin for non-disciplinary reasons. As to the paddlings themselves, there was ample evidence presented at trial suggesting that Anderson and Henry's administration of corporal punishment was not excessive and, therefore, did not give rise to civil liability for assault and battery. [1] As a threshold consideration, the jurors were free to credit Anderson's testimony that he never punched Martin and that he only paddled Martin at most three times in a two-and-a-half year period. Similarly, Henry testified that he only paddled Martin a total of ten times during Martin's tenure at Hamilton. The jury could also find credible Anderson and Henry's testimony that they never struck a student, including Martin, more than three times in a paddling session and Henry's assertion that he did not hit hard. Furthermore, the Nolans stipulated that Martin was not seriously injured from the paddlings, which supports the conclusion that the paddlings were not excessive. The defense also presented evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Anderson and Henry did not paddle Martin out of malice. See Hargrove, 1993 WL 18267, at  (noting that a teacher may be liable where he abuses his disciplinary power as a cover for malice). Anderson testified that basketball players were primarily paddled for misbehavior, that he paddled students for poor grades because of the great importance of academics to the basketball program, and that he very rarely paddled for poor performance. (ROA Tr. 249-52, 283-84.) He also testified that he paddled Martin very rarely because Martin was a good kid . . . he didn't get into trouble and he made good grades. (ROA Tr. 251.) Henry testified that he paddled Martin based on misbehavior at practice, bad grades or conduct on his report card, and teacher referrals for misbehavior in other classes. (ROA Tr. 168-69, 172-73.) Finally, the record supported that Anderson and Henry administered corporal punishment with a proper instrument, i.e., a wooden paddle known as the wood. (ROA Tr. 168, 233-34.) From all of the evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that the paddlings administered by Anderson and Henry were for disciplinary purposes, and were not excessive in severity, frequency, motivation, or means. Therefore, the district court acted within its discretion by denying the Nolans' motion for a new trial because a reasonable juror could have found that Anderson and Henry were not liable for assault and battery.
The Nolans argue that they should have been granted a new trial because no reasonable juror could have entered a verdict for defendants Anderson, Henry, or the Memphis City Schools on their substantive due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The threshold question in a § 1983 claim is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws. Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. Of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979), internal quotation marks omitted). Like all individuals, public school students have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in freedom from bodily injury. Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987). To demonstrate that Anderson and Henry's use of corporal punishment at school violated Martin's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights, however, the Nolans were required to prove that the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience. Id. ; Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 699 (6th Cir. 2006). As discussed supra, the severity and frequency of, as well as the motivation for, Martin's paddlings were contested at trial. On appeal, the Nolans argue that Anderson's and Henry's administration of corporal punishment cause[d] severe injury to Martin, including both physical pain and psychological injury. (Appellants' Br. 21.) At trial, however, the Nolans stipulated that Martin was not seriously injured. (ROA Tr. 555.) They also failed to produce medical evidence that any physical injury resulted from the paddlings. Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence presented to support the jury's conclusion that Anderson's and Henry's actions did not cause severe, conscience-shocking injury, were not motivated by malice, and, therefore, did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. Anderson and Henry both testified that they rarely paddled Martin and that when they did so they never exceeded a three lick maximum number of blows. Henry explained that when he paddled students he did not hit hard. Anderson testified that he never punched Martin, did not swear at him excessively, and that he apologized to Martin and his family in the one instance where he did swear at Martin. Anderson also testified that if Martin's father had complained about the paddling or if he thought that the paddling was harming Martin, he would have stopped paddling him. (ROA Tr. 263.) Martin's testimony contradicted Anderson's and Henry's, but Martin himself admitted that he never sought medical treatment for physical injuries resulting from the paddlings and that in all but one instance, when he needed to ice his hand, he was able to participate in basketball practice following a paddling. (ROA Tr. 67, 110-11.) The Nolans also produced scant evidence of significant psychological injury stemming from the paddling. Dr. Scott testified that Martin came to see her not only because of issues regarding the basketball team, but also because he was concerned about his relationship with his father. (ROA Tr. 215-16.) Based on her testimony, then, the jury could have made the reasonable inference that Martin's symptoms were as least partially attributable to his parental relationship, rather than a pure result of his experiences with Coaches Anderson and Henry. Additionally, Dr. Scott testified that Martin was suffering from symptoms that are common among teenagers, i.e., mild depression, low self-esteem, and low confidence. (ROA Tr. 217, 223.) Moreover, she gave him a diagnosis which indicated that she expected those symptoms to last no longer than six months. (ROA Tr. 217, 221.) Next, plaintiffs argue that the application of force by Anderson and Henry was disproportionate because there was no need to apply force for non-disciplinary reasons. Even if the jury believed that Martin was paddled for a non-disciplinary reason, however, it could still reasonably conclude from the evidence presented that the paddling did not shock the conscience and that the resulting injury was too minor to rise to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Lillard, 76 F.3d at 725-26 (even though it was made for no legitimate purpose, teacher's single slap of a student did not result in physical injury and did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation); compare Webb, 828 F.2d at 1154, 1159 (allegation that high school principal broke down a student's door, threw the student into a wall, threw her onto the floor, and slapped her sufficient to survive summary judgment on substantive due process claim) and Pendergrass, 455 F.3d at 700 (allegations that substitute teacher grabbed an elementary student, slammed her head into the blackboard, threw her on the ground, and choked her for a full minute for forgetting to bring a pencil to class, after which the student exhibited petechiae, neck contusions, and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, could meet the shocks the conscience standard); with Archey v. Hyche, Nos. 90-5631, 90-5863, 1991 WL 100586, at -4 (6th Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs failed to state a claim for substantive due process violation where fifth grade student received five swats with a paddle for humming in the boy's bathroom, resulting in severe bruises and an impaired gait). From a review of the record, a reasonable juror could have concluded that the paddlings that Martin endured at the hands of Anderson and Henry did not result in a severe injury and did not amount to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power that shocks the conscience. Therefore, the district court properly denied the Nolans' motion for a new trial based on its § 1983 claims against Anderson, Henry and the Memphis City Schools.
The Nolans also argue that no reasonable juror could have found for defendants Anderson and Henry on their outrageous conduct claims. To establish a claim for outrageous conduct, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society; and (3) the defendant's conduct resulted in serious mental injury. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). Malicious intent alone is insufficient to constitute a violation. Id. at 623. Rather, to constitute outrageous conduct a defendant's act must have been so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, at to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Id. The Nolans contend that paddling a high school student for a non-disciplinary reason cannot be tolerated in a civilized society. The jury, however, was entitled to draw a different conclusion. Strickland, 142 F.3d at 357. As with the § 1983 claims, which are evaluated under a comparably demanding standard, the jury in this case was free to believe the defendants' version of events and could reasonably conclude that the paddlings administered by Anderson and Henry were not outrageous. The Nolans claim that the paddlings resulted in mental injury serious enough to warrant the diagnosis of a mental disorder. (Appellants' Br. 19-20.) But, given Dr. Scott's testimony, it would not have been unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Martin's mild depression and low-self esteem were at least equally a result of his relationship with his father. Similarly, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the mental injury diagnosed by Dr. Scott was not serious, as her diagnosis pointed to relatively short-lived and mild symptoms that were common among teenagers. Moreover, the jury could have simply taken the Nolans at their word as Martin's father admitted that Martin was not seriously injured. (ROA Tr. 555.) There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Anderson's and Henry's conduct was not outrageous and that Martin did not suffer a serious mental injury. Accordingly, the district court's denial of a motion for new trial on the outrageous conduct claims was proper.
The Nolans also argue that they were entitled to a new trial because no reasonable juror could have entered a verdict for the Memphis City Schools on their negligence claim. The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act immunized from suit any injury resulting from the activities of governmental entities, subject to statutorily enshrined exceptions. Tenn. Code Ann. §XX-XX-XXXX(a); Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 79 (Tenn. 2001). A negligence claim may be brought against a governmental entity, such as the Memphis City Schools, pursuant to section 29-20-205. Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 79. That section states in pertinent part: Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is removed for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the scope of his employment except if the injury arises out of: (1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function whether or not the discretion is abused; (2) . . . infliction of mental anguish, invasion of right of privacy, or civil rights . . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205. In this case, any injury suffered by Martin was caused by Anderson's and Henry's intentional infliction of corporal punishment. A governmental entity is only liable for the intentional torts of its employees where the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by its negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care to protect [the plaintiff] from the foreseeable risk of an employee's intentional [tort]. Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 76. The Nolans argue that Principal Hicks was negligent in failing to prevent Anderson and Henry from paddling Martin and that his negligence is attributable to the Memphis City Schools. In support, they point to Henry's testimony that basketball players had been paddled at Hamilton for 40 years and that Hicks had been at Hamilton for 12-15 years. Despite Henry's testimony, the evidence at trial was not so one-sided that it precluded a judgment in favor of the Memphis City Schools. Principal Hicks testified that he had no knowledge that basketball players were being paddled for other than disciplinary reasons during the time that Martin was on the Hamilton team. (ROA Tr. 371-73.) Both Mr. Nolan and Martin testified that they did not complain to Principal Hicks or any other Hamilton administrator regarding the paddlings before Martin stopped playing basketball for Hamilton. (ROA TR. 82-83, 347, 349-50, 352.) Principal Hicks testified that the first complaint he ever received regarding Anderson's techniques came from Martin in December of 2003 following the Los Angeles incident. (ROA Tr. 378.) He also testified that he instructed faculty to follow Hamilton's corporal punishment policy and worked to enforce the policy. (ROA Tr. 379.) Furthermore, Mr. Nolan testified that he was satisfied with the response he received from Hicks when he met with him following the Los Angeles incident. (ROA Tr. 352.) Mr. Nolan also admitted that after he met with Hicks to voice his concerns regarding Anderson's use of bad language, Anderson never again used foul language to Martin or administered corporal punishment to Martin. (ROA Tr. 356.) A reasonable juror could have concluded that, based on the lack of any complaints regarding Anderson's and Henry's conduct, and the other testimony described above, Principal Hicks, and therefore the Memphis City Schools, had no reason to foresee that Anderson or Henry posed a danger to Martin and that Principal Hicks exercised reasonable care in protecting Martin from improper corporal punishment. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Nolans' motion for a new trial on the negligence claim.