Opinion ID: 1284689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ambiguity of Statute

Text: In resolving this issue raised in this appeal, we note that this Court has consistently acknowledged that statutes of limitations serve a significant function in the operation of the law. The basic purpose of statutes of limitations is to encourage promptness in instituting actions; to suppress stale demands or fraudulent claims; and to avoid inconvenience which may result from delay in asserting rights or claims when it is practicable to assert them. Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 149 W.Va. 783, 791, 144 S.E.2d 156, 161 (1965) (citations omitted). In Perdue v. Hess, 199 W.Va. 299, 484 S.E.2d 182 (1997), for instance, this Court reviewed the numerous cases in which this Court has encouraged strict compliance with statutes of limitations as a means of requiring the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time. 199 W.Va. at 303, 484 S.E.2d at 186. Where, however, the legislature has not expressed its intended statutes of limitation with clarity, such a laudable goal of strict compliance is unattainable. Although this Court has invariably recognized that clear and unambiguous statutes are not subject to interpretation, [6] we have also observed: Ambiguity is a term connoting doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning of indistinctness or uncertainty of an expression used in a written instrument. It has been declared that courts may not find ambiguity in statutory language which laymen are readily able to comprehend; nor is it permissible to create an obscurity or uncertainty in a statute by reading in an additional word or words. Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W.Va. 714, 718-19, 172 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1970). A finding of ambiguity must be made prior to any attempt to interpret a statute. As the Court stated in syllabus point one of Ohio County Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W.Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (1983), Judicial interpretation of a statute is warranted only if the statute is ambiguous and the initial step in such interpretative inquiry is to ascertain the legislative intent. Likewise, in syllabus point one of Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W.Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992), this Court further explained: A statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied. Our reading of West Virginia Code § 46A-5-101(1) compels the conclusion that the statute is ambiguous with regard to the distinction between open and closed-ended credit agreements and the statute of limitations applicable to those two types of credit. While the statute clearly states that the four-year statute of limitations is applicable to revolving charge accounts, revolving loan accounts, and sales as particularly defined, it also specifically subjects other consumer credit sales or consumer loans to a one-year statute of limitations period. While the Appellees and lower court contend that closed-ended credit sales must in included within other consumer credit sales or consumer loans, the Appellants argue that closed-ended credit sales come within the purview of sales to which the four-year statute of limitations is applicable. Both sides have presented compelling and persuasive arguments in support of their respective theories. Even if, however, this Court were convinced of the superiority of one theory over another, this Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature and significantly rewrite the statute. If, for instance, this Court agreed with the Appellees that the most rational method of dealing with statute of limitations issues would be to permit four years on open-ended loans, due to their longer term nature, and only one year on closed-ended loans, due to the finality of such constructs, this Court is not permitted to rewrite the statute to state such conclusion with clarity. The Court has expressed this prohibition concisely on numerous occasions. In Williamson v. Greene, 200 W.Va. 421, 490 S.E.2d 23 (1997), for instance, this Court stated: [i]t is not for [courts] arbitrarily to read into [a statute] that which it does not say. Just as courts are not to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were purposely included, we are obliged not to add to statutes something the Legislature purposely omitted. Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535, 546-47, 474 S.E.2d 465, 476-77 (1996) ( citing Bullman v. D & R Lumber Company, 195 W.Va. 129, 464 S.E.2d 771 (1995)). Id. at 426, 490 S.E.2d at 28 (citations omitted). A statute, or an administrative rule, may not, under the guise of `interpretation,' be modified, revised, amended or rewritten. Syl. Pt. 1, Consumer Advocate Division v. Public Service Comm'n, 182 W.Va. 152, 386 S.E.2d 650 (1989). In Hereford v. Meek, 132 W.Va. 373, 52 S.E.2d 740 (1949), this Court stated: A statute is open to construction only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning. Id. at 386, 52 S.E.2d at 747. We addressed a statute regarding annual salary increases for deputy sheriffs in Lawson v. County Comm'n of Mercer County, 199 W.Va. 77, 483 S.E.2d 77 (1996), and found that the statute in question was susceptible to differing constructions, to the extent that the term receive an annual salary increase could mean either an increase to become part of the annual salary or an increase in addition to the annual salary. Id. at 81, 483 S.E.2d at 81. Based upon the Court's finding that the statute could be read by reasonable persons to have different meanings, we found the language of the statute to be ambiguous. Id.