Opinion ID: 62992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuance or Abeyance of Removal Proceedings

Text: Masih contends that he demonstrated good cause for a continuance of his removal proceedings and that the BIA's denial was an abuse of discretion because (1) he was statutorily eligible for adjustment of status when he filed his I-485 application and remains so at this time, and (2) OI 245.4(a)(6) and BIA precedent, especially Matter of Ho, dictate that his removal proceedings should have been held in abeyance. [5] The government counters that Masih has failed to point to any authority demonstrating that he is entitled to a continuance or abeyance. Moreover, the government insists that the BIA acted within its discretion when it denied Masih's request, considering, inter alia, Masih's disregard of United States immigration laws and the lengthy and indefinite duration of his removal proceedings. Even though we are reluctant to encroach on the province of the BIA, and we do not condone Masih's prolonged illegal stay in the United States, we are constrained to hold that, under the precise circumstances of this case, the BIA abused its discretion in denying Masih's request for a continuance or abeyance of his removal proceedings so that he could pursue adjustment of his status.
To better assess Masih's contentions that he demonstrated good cause for a continuance and that the BIA abused its discretion in denying it, we must begin with a brief overview of the three-step process through which aliens seek legal status based on employment. [6] First, the alien's prospective employer in the United States must petition, on the alien's behalf, for labor certification with the Department of Labor (DOL). [7] If the DOL approves the petition, the prospective employer is then required, at step two of the process, to file an I-140 petition with the DHS for an employment-based visa for the alien. [8] If the I-140 petition is approved, the date on which it was filed becomes the alien's priority date for allotment of a visa number. [9] The third and final step of the process for aliens who, like Masih, reside in the United States, is to file with the DHS an I-485 application for adjustment of status, which, if approved, would result in the adjustment of the alien's status to lawful permanent resident. [10] To be eligible for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2), the applicant must show that: (A) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence; and (B) an immigrant visa is immediately available to the alien at the time the application is filed. [11] Masih is the beneficiary of an approved labor certification application and of an approved I-140 petition; and, most significantly to his case, he had a visa priority date that was current at the time he filed his I-485 adjustment application. An immigrant visa is considered immediately available for purposes of § 1255(i) if the Bulletin shows that visa numbers for applicants in the alien's category are current. [12] Accordingly, Masih was statutorily eligible for adjustment of status at the time he filed his I-485 application and he has remained so ever since, notwithstanding the government's insistence  and the IJ's conclusion  to the contrary. For an alien in Masih's circumstances to be statutorily eligible for adjustment, the plain language of § 1255(i)(2)(B) requires only that an immigrant visa be immediately available to the alien at the time the application for adjustment of status is filed. [13] The BIA even recognized that Masih appeared to have satisfied the requirements for adjustment when it originally remanded his case to the IJ. That the applicable visas regressed after Masih filed his I-485 adjustment application had no effect whatsoever on his eligibility for adjustment. Furthermore, that Masih was  and remains  statutorily eligible for adjustment of status distinguishes this case from Ali v. Gonzales [14] and Ahmed v. Gonzales, [15] two cases relied on by the government. In each of these cases, we concluded that the petitioner seeking a continuance lacked good cause because he was statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status: Ali was ineligible because his labor certification application had not been timely filed; [16] and Ahmed was ineligible because only a labor certification application had been filed on his behalf. [17] Even if that application had been approved, Ahmed would still have needed for a prospective employer to file an I-140 employment-based visa petition on his behalf; and only if that petition were approved and a visa were immediately available to Ahmed when he filed his I-485 application would he have then been eligible for adjustment of status. [18]
Operations instructions are not binding on the BIA; however, the BIA has recognized that they are often persuasive. [19] OI 245.4(a)(6) specifies that [w]hen a properly filed application [for adjustment of status] cannot be completed solely because visa numbers became unavailable subsequent to the filing, the application will be held in abeyance until a visa number is allocated. Even though OI 245.4(a)(6) was cited by Masih and is obviously applicable to the circumstances here at issue, there is no indication in their respective rulings that either the BIA or the IJ even considered it. This apparent oversight is compounded when viewed in the light of prior cases in which the BIA decided to apply OI 245.4(a)(6), most notably Matter of Ho. [20] In Matter of Ho, the alien had conceded removability because she had remained in the United States beyond her authorized length of stay. [21] She had, however, (1) been granted labor certification, (2) been approved for an employment-based visa, and (3) applied for adjustment of status at a time when a visa number was immediately available to her. [22] Thereafter, though, there occurred a regression, i.e., the applicable visa numbers had become completely unavailable. [23] The BIA ruled that OI 245.4(a)(6) was applicable even when an alien applies for adjustment of status after having been placed in deportation proceedings, and that the IJ should take into consideration OI 245.4(a)(6) when it decides whether to grant the alien's request for a continuance. [24] Despite the fact that BIA decisions are binding on IJs in their administration of United States immigration laws, [25] we find no indication in either of his rulings that the IJ considered Matter of Ho. Moreover, the BIA itself is required to follow its own precedent unless overruled or modified; [26] yet here, after acknowledging Matter of Ho in its opinion, the BIA ultimately concluded that the decision did not restrict an [IJ's] discretionary determination to continue or not continue proceedings, citing Ahmed as support for its conclusion. We observe again, though, that Ahmed is clearly distinguishable and inapposite: Unlike Masih, the petitioner in that case was statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status. Given that (1) the IJ erred as a matter of law when he ruled that Masih was ineligible for adjustment of status, which error the BIA failed to recognize (or at least to acknowledge), (2) the BIA and the IJ apparently failed to consider OI 245.4(a)(6) in their rulings denying Masih relief, despite that regulation's clear applicability and Masih's express reliance on it, and (3) the BIA's cursory  and curious  disregard of Matter of Ho, we hold that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Masih's request for a continuance or abeyance of his removal proceedings. As we are reluctant to infringe on the discretion of the BIA and the IJ, we remand this matter to the BIA for it to remand to the IJ with instructions to reconsider Masih's request ab initio, giving due consideration to this opinion and to OI 245.4(a)(6) and Matter of Ho.