Opinion ID: 1613471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Request a Mistrial.

Text: Breitbach next contends that his trial counsel neglected to perform an essential duty, in derogation of his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, when he failed to request a mistrial after two of the arresting officers testified concerning their belief that Breitbach was in custody prior to his departure. At trial, the following colloquy ensued between counsel for the State and officer Chapman, one of the arresting officers: Question: And after you told the defendant that he was under arrest and told him what he was under arrest for, you asked him to step outside? Answer: Yes. Question: And did he submit to that authority? Answer: Yes. He came with us. Question: Okay. So he was in your custody at that point? Answer: Yes, he was. Similarly, another of the arresting officers, Thomas Fessler, was asked the following: Question: After the defendant was told that there was a warrant for his arrest and that he would have to come with the police, was the defendant in custody? Officer Fessler responded in the affirmative to this question. Defense counsel made timely objections to each of these exchanges on the ground that they called for a legal conclusion. Although the first objection was overruled, the district court sustained the second objection, stating: I'm going to sustain the objection, and the similar objection that was made in regard to officer Chapman's testimony, which I should have sustained, and you should consider it sustained. Custody is a matter that will be submitted to you and is a term that relates to the issue of whether or not there was an arrest in this case. The objection is sustained. Breitbach now argues that this cautionary instruction by the court was insufficient to dissipate the taint that arose as a consequence of the officers' testimony. Consequently, Breitbach maintains that trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial, and, had such a motion been made, there was a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different. As an initial matter, we note that the testimony above is inadmissible because it invades the province of the jury. That is, [w]hen a standard, or a measure, or a capacity has been fixed by law, no witness whether expert or nonexpert, nor however qualified, is permitted to express an opinion as to whether or not the person or the conduct, in question, measures up to that standard. On that question the court must instruct the jury as to the law, and the jury must draw its own conclusion from the evidence. Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 361, 5 N.W.2d 646, 663 (1942); see also State v. Nimmo, 247 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Iowa 1976) (opinion testimony regarding defendant's intent to deliver controlled substances is improper); State v. Ogg, 243 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Iowa 1976) (opinion evidence concerning defendant's guilt on one of the essential elements of crime is improper); State v. Maurer, 409 N.W.2d 196, 197-98 (Iowa App.1987) (opinion testimony regarding ultimate fact of accused's guilt or innocence is not permitted). Since custody is a standard fixed by law and a matter upon which the jury will ultimately have to draw its own conclusion, conclusory expert testimony on this matter is not admissible. Cf. Iowa R.Evid. 704 (opinion testimony otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by trier of fact). However, this is not to say that a cautionary statement to the jury asking them to disregard the officer's testimony concerning custody will not suffice to mitigate the prejudice that would otherwise arise. On the contrary, cautionary instructions are sufficient in all but the most extreme cases. State v. Belieu, 288 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Iowa 1980); State v. Jensen, 216 N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1974); see also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 484 (1968) (not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions); United States v. Kilcullen, 546 F.2d 435, 437 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1175, 51 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977) (noting strong presumption that appropriate limiting instructions will reduce potential prejudice). In short, [a] defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. at 1627, 20 L.Ed.2d at 484. In Belieu, we identified a number of considerations that are important in determining whether the prejudicial impact of inadmissible evidence can be adequately mitigated by the use of a cautionary instruction. 288 N.W.2d at 895. We noted that the degree to which the defendant is able to protect himself against the prejudicial impact is a highly relevant consideration. Id. at 901 (concluding that where codefendants in a joint trial testify as to defendant's prior criminal activity, no way existed for defendant to combat the evidence without compounding the prejudice); see also Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136, 88 S.Ct. at 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d at 485 (holding that cautionary instructions were insufficient to shield defendant from prejudice of codefendant's confession due to inability to cross-examine the nontestifying codefendant). Another important factor is the extensiveness of the challenged testimony and the promptness with which it is stricken from the record. Belieu, 288 N.W.2d at 901. Finally, to the extent that the State's evidence on the matter in question is strong, the prejudicial effect of the challenged testimony will be correspondingly less, and, therefore, a cautionary instruction will suffice to insure the defendant receives a fair trial. Id. Applying these considerations to the case at hand, we conclude that the cautionary instruction given by the court was sufficient to redress any prejudice to Breitbach that might otherwise have arisen as a consequence of the officers' testimony. First, Breitbach was free to adduce any circumstantial facts that might lend support to his contention that he was not in custody as of the time he left the officers. Moreover, Breitbach was free to crossexamine any of the arresting officers as to their version of the events. Second, we note that the challenged testimony was rather brief in duration and promptly followed by an appropriate cautionary instruction. Finally, we think it important that the State's evidence, as detailed under subdivision two, on the subject of custody is quite strong. As a consequence, we are unable to conclude that the cautionary instruction given was insufficient to remedy any prejudice that might have otherwise arisen. Accordingly, Breitbach was not entitled to a mistrial on the basis of the challenged testimony and thus cannot claim prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to so move.