Opinion ID: 1127405
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cocounsel Toton

Text: On July 26, 1988, the last day of testimony in the guilt and special circumstances phase of trial, an article titled Bakersfield Attorney Faces Disbarment appeared on the front page of the morning edition of the Bakersfield Californian. The article noted that Toton, attorney for triple killer Ted Sanchez, faced potential disbarment for allegedly failing to (1) notify his clients of receipt of funds, (2) turn over funds in a timely manner, (3) provide an accounting of receipts, and (4) communicate with his clients. In addition, the article observed that Toton was scheduled to appear before the California State Bar's Review Department, which would thereafter make its disciplinary recommendation. Toton alone was aware of the proceedings prior to the article's publication. The court met in chambers with Ryals, Toton, Frank, and defendant to discuss the article. Ryals requested the court make inquiry as to [defendant], as to his knowledge of the problems Mr. Toton is facing, of whether or not we are being rushed through this trial for Mr. Toton's benefit, if there is so much as a rush.... After Frank agreed to discuss the disciplinary proceedings with defendant that evening, the court agreed to meet in camera with the defense the following morning. When Frank and defendant met with the court in camera the next morning, Frank indicated that he had met with defendant and learned that defendant had read the July 26 article, and that Frank had no knowledge of the disciplinary proceedings prior to reading the article. The following colloquy then occurred: THE COURT: One of the things that concerns me about this incident is the fact of the date of August 25th and the fact that a jury trial was waived in this case, and now we're at that stage of the case where a [Penal Code section] 1118.1 is under submission. And I suppose somebody reviewing this case could say one of the reasons maybe that Mr. Toton suggested that the jury trial be waived was the fact that the trial could be completed prior to the time that the Californian suggests that there's going to be some kind of a ruling in his case. As  and clearly if we had had a jury, we would still have been going at that time, and I really seriously doubt whether we would have been in a position even to have begun to take evidence as of the 25th day of August. That situation worried me a little bit. And I wonder if you have discussed this with your client. MR. FRANK: Yes, your Honor. I advised [defendant] that the article certainly did imply that Mr. Toton's motivation for pursuing the presentation of the case in the manner in which he has, at least indicated, that perhaps he did that because of his own personal problems, plans or agenda. I advised [defendant] that he had the right to be represented by an attorney who was completely and absolutely free from any sort of conflict, that [defendant] had the right to have an attorney whose decision-making process was unfettered by any of his own personal plans or problems, and that he had the right to have an attorney whose representation and whose decision-making process was based not on any of the attorney's considerations but on the best interests of [defendant], the client in this case. The court then questioned defendant to verify that he had spoken to Frank about the disciplinary proceedings, that he had read the Bakersfield Californian article, and that he was unaware of any disciplinary action against Toton prior to the date of the article. The court asked defendant if he believed the article implied that one reason Mr. Toton was pushing this case forward was because of his own personal time considerations. Defendant replied: Not really sir, because we had discussed  you know, this was part  I wanted to go this way in the beginning anyway. So there was really  I never really felt that he was doing it for his own incidences [ sic ]. The court confirmed defendant's earlier position that it was his idea alone to waive the jury under any circumstances. The court next asked defendant if he wanted to make a motion for mistrial and for certain other motions in view of the publicity that this has gotten? The following discussion ensued: THE COURT: What I'm concerned [about] is that something will happen down the line and then you will say, gee, I didn't know what I was doing; I should have asked for a mistrial at that point in time. That would probably be too late, because I'm probably getting an indication that you want to waive any problems that Mr. Toton's difficulties might have in this case. Is that right? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: I didn't make that very clear. THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: What I'm saying is, I don't want you to go down the line and then all of a sudden say, gee, I've changed my mind. THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: Probably you can't do that. You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that. THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the state of the record at this point? THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir. I'm very satisfied. THE COURT: Nobody threatened you to get you to say this? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.... THE COURT: Are you satisfied, sir, that Mr. Toton's dilemma with the State Bar had nothing to do with the waiver of the jury trial? MR. FRANK: I am, yes. THE COURT: And are you, Mr. Sanchez? THE DEFENDANT: I am too. The parties agree Toton was not disbarred until March 31, 1989, well after defendant's trial was completed. Against this background, we address below defendant's several arguments regarding Toton's disbarment and its effect, if any, on the fairness of defendant's trial.
(11a) Defendant first asserts that on learning of the pending disciplinary action against Toton, the court was required to terminate Toton's appointment as defendant's counsel. Defendant claims that the court's failure to remove Toton as counsel denied him his right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, denied him due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprived him of a reliable determination of penalty under the Eighth Amendment. We are not persuaded. (12) In order to establish a violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was inadequate when measured against the standard of a reasonably competent attorney, and that counsel's performance prejudiced defendant's case in such a manner that his representation so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692-693, 104 S.Ct. 2052] [hereafter Strickland ]; Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 575.) Moreover, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 699].) Prejudice is shown when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257 [259 Cal. Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164]; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 697-698].) If defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance, we may reject his ineffective assistance claim without determining whether counsel's performance was inadequate. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 699-700].) To support his federal constitutional argument, defendant relies on two Illinois cases, in which the appellate courts reversed sentences of murder in cases where the same defense attorney was subject to disciplinary proceedings during separate murder trials for the same crime. ( People v. Williams (1982) 93 Ill.2d 309 [67 Ill.Dec. 97, 444 N.E.2d 136] [hereafter Williams ]; People v. Rainge (1983) 112 Ill. App.3d 396 [68 Ill.Dec. 97, 445 N.E.2d 535] [hereafter Rainge ].) In Williams, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and sentenced him to death. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence, over his protest that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. While the defendant's petition for rehearing on the appeal was pending, the defendant's attorney appeared before the same court in a disciplinary action in which the Hearing Board and Review Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended that the attorney be disbarred because of misconduct in handling the estate of a client. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered the attorney disbarred. ( In re Weston (1982) 92 Ill.2d 431 [65 Ill.Dec. 925, 442 N.E.2d 236].) Based on the information presented to it in the attorney disciplinary action, the Williams court granted the defendant's petition for rehearing. After reconsidering the effectiveness of counsel in light of the disbarment, the court reversed the defendant's conviction and sentence. The court held that even though the evidence supported defendant's conviction, in light of the disbarment it no longer can say, with any degree of assurance, that [the defendant] received the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution. ( Williams, supra, 444 N.E.2d at p. 142.) In reversing the conviction, the Williams court cited numerous examples of inaction by counsel that it believed demonstrated ineffective assistance, including the failure to make a motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from [defendant's] car  evidence which was perhaps crucial to the State's case; the failure to object to the testimony concerning the Canadian study on hair comparisons; the failure to object to prejudicial material received by [the defendant's] jury ...; the failure to object to testimony concerning the good character of the decedents.... (444 N.E.2d at pp. 142-143.) The court admitted that it had originally examined in the appeal the more significant errors... and found no plain error. ( Id., at p. 143.) But in light of counsel's disbarment, the court reconsidered its original affirmance of the conviction. The court stated: [W]e are now aware, for the first time, of the unique circumstances under which counsel in this case was operating at the time of the capital trial. In light of these facts, we can no longer characterize counsel's decision not to make the motion to suppress ... evidence or to take other action on his client's behalf as professional misjudgments made with full knowledge of the applicable law and the facts.... [¶] It is apparent to us that the unique facts in this case require that we forgo application of either of the established tests, normally applied in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. [Citations.] As we originally indicated, the voluminous record here shows that there were many instances where counsel made able and vigorous objections and presentations, and we cannot characterize his performance as actual incompetence or as of such a low caliber as to reduce the trial to a farce or sham. We believe, however, considering the unique circumstances and sequence of events in this capital case, which will rarely, if ever, be duplicated, that the interests of justice require that ... Williams be granted a new trial. ( Ibid. ) Defendant Williams's two codefendants, Rainge and Adams, were separately tried and also found guilty of the above murders and sentenced to life imprisonment. ( Rainge, supra, 445 N.E.2d 535.) Defendant Rainge was represented by the same attorney who had represented Williams. The Illinois Court of Appeal held in abeyance its decision in the Rainge case pending the decision in Williams, supra, 444 N.E.2d 136, because numerous issues raised in the supreme court by Williams, were common issues based upon the same record which were raised in the instant appeal by Rainge and Adams. ( Rainge, supra, 445 N.E.2d at p. 544.) Thereafter, the Rainge court reversed Rainge's murder convictions because the similar interests of Williams and Rainge and the similar issue raised on the same record require that defendant Rainge be granted a new trial. As in [ Williams ], we base our decision upon `the unique circumstances and sequence of events in this capital case which will rarely, if ever, be duplicated.' ( Rainge, supra, 445 N.E.2d at p. 547, quoting Williams, supra, 444 N.E.2d at p. 142; but see People v. Neal (1984) 123 Ill. App.3d 148 [78 Ill.Dec. 695, 462 N.E.2d 814, 816] [distinguishing Williams and Rainge and finding same counsel not incompetent in noncapital case].) (11b) Defendant asserts that we should follow the Williams and Rainge courts and find that on the unique facts of this case, the State Bar proceedings against Toton tainted his representation of defendant and compromised the constitutionality of the conviction and sentence. But unlike Williams, who had asserted numerous instances of inaction by counsel to demonstrate he was denied the effective assistance of counsel ( Williams, supra, 444 N.E.2d at p. 142), defendant points to no instances of inaction that, in light of the pending discipline, would allow the court to characterize Toton's representation as incompetent. Indeed, the record is clear that defendant agreed to the guilt phase submission on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts even though factual issues remained in the case. Although the Williams court had found no plain error prior to learning of the disciplinary action pending against counsel, once the court became aware of the disciplinary matter, it lost confidence that counsel's decision not to make the motion to suppress [certain evidence] or to take other action on his client's behalf as professional misjudgments made with full knowledge of the applicable law and the facts. ( Id., at p. 143.) By contrast, defendant herein does not assert that Toton's pending discipline prejudiced his case. The record would not support such an argument. Toton vigorously cross-examined prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing and during the guilt phase, made several defense motions, including one for appointed assistant counsel, which was granted, and motions for pretrial discovery, severance and additional motions that indicated he was vigorously representing his client. In addition, Toton made a comprehensive closing argument at the guilt phase. Thus, there is no indication on the record that counsel's representation was anything less than competent, and defendant fails to persuade us that counsel's representation was ineffective solely on the basis of the disciplinary action pending against him.
Defendant next asserts that even if we find no federal constitutional violation, he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution which states that a defendant in a criminal case has the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense.... Defendant relies on our decision in In re Johnson (1992) 1 Cal.4th 689 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 170, 822 P.2d 1317] (hereafter Johnson ) to support his argument that Toton was unfit to represent him during his capital trial. In Johnson, the defendant was convicted in July 1989 of selling cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352. ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 694.) Unknown to the defendant, his counsel had been suspended from the practice of law prior to the representation pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6102, following a conviction under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (committing a lewd or lascivious act against a child using force or fear). In May 1989, while State Bar disciplinary proceedings were pending against counsel, he resigned. We accepted the resignation in September 1989. ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 694.) Although we refused to presume that a suspended attorney lacks professional competence (1 Cal.4th at p. 699), we nonetheless reversed the Court of Appeal judgment denying habeas corpus relief. We held that representation by one who has resigned from the State Bar denies effective counsel, and observed: Representation by a person who has never been admitted to the practice of law or has fraudulently procured admission denies a defendant his rights under article I, section 15, as a matter of law. So too does representation by a person who, although formerly licensed, has resigned from the State Bar. The court will not examine the quality of the representation in such cases since an essential element of the constitutional right to counsel is counsel's status as a member of the State Bar. ( Id., at p. 701, fn. omitted.) Thus, we held, once an attorney resigns from the State Bar with charges pending, and is immediately transferred to inactive status, that attorney, for all purposes, is no longer considered a member of the bar and is not licensed to practice law. Such an attorney's representation of a defendant, therefore, violates article I, section 15, and denies the defendant effective assistance of counsel. (1 Cal.4th at p. 701.) In reversing Johnson's conviction on ineffective assistance grounds, however, we emphasized that mere suspension of an attorney from practice under Business and Professions Code section 6102 upon conviction of any felony or other offense involving moral turpitude does not alone create a presumption of incompetence or deprive the defendant of his right to counsel under article I, section 15. ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 699.) Indeed, we observed that even a suspension of an attorney pursuant to section 6102 does not establish, as a matter of law, that the attorney is unfit to practice law, and a conclusion that an attorney who has committed an offense of moral turpitude is unfit to practice law is not necessarily a judgment on the attorney's professional competence. ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 699.) We have not previously addressed whether, as in this case, disciplinary proceedings that are pending during an attorney's representation of a criminal defendant render the assistance of counsel ineffective when there is no suspension of the attorney or placement on inactive status. But under Johnson 's reasoning, we can conclude that the fact disciplinary proceedings were pending against counsel Toton did not automatically render Toton's performance inadequate or prejudice defendant's right to effective counsel. (See also Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 696 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 699].) As the People observe, While representing [defendant], defense counsel Toton was not even subject to suspension under Business and Professions Code section 6102 because he had not been convicted of any crime. In an attempt to establish the denial of his right to counsel, [defendant] equates defense counsel Toton's alleged failure to challenge the State Bar proceedings with the attorney's resignation from the State Bar in Johnson.  In fact, unlike the attorney in Johnson, Toton was a member of the State Bar at all times during his representation of defendant. `Erring morally or by a breach of professional ethics does not necessarily indicate a lack of knowledge of the law.' ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 699.) We simply are not persuaded that Toton's unrelated disciplinary problems in any way influenced his representation of defendant or otherwise rendered him unfit as a matter of law. (See Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 699-702.)
Defendant's claim that Toton's disciplinary proceedings rendered him incompetent `is no more persuasive if considered under the rubric of conflict of interest. (13) A criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by both the state and federal Constitutions, includes the right to representation free from conflicts of interest. ( Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 271 [67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1097]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1134 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) To establish a violation of the right to unconflicted counsel under the federal Constitution, `a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' [Citation.] To establish a violation of the same right under our state Constitution, a defendant need only show that the record supports an `informed speculation' that counsel's representation of the defendant was adversely affected by the claimed conflict of interest.' ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1009 [30 Cal. Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248].) In People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757] (hereafter Jones ) we also observed that [c]onflicts of interest may arise in various factual settings. Broadly, they `embrace all situations in which an attorney's loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or a third person or by his own interests.' ( Id., at p. 1134, quoting People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 853 [254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460] [hereafter Bonin ].) (14a) Defendant contends that the alleged conflict of interest between himself and Toton was caused by Toton's own interest in expediting the trial prior to his disbarment, to the defendant's prejudice. Defendant asserts that the fact of the pending disciplinary action gave Toton a strong incentive to finish defendant's case as quickly as possible, implying that Toton's desire to end the case led to a constitutionally deficient performance. Based on the appellate record, we are not persuaded by defendant's arguments. As we have observed, the record shows that Toton was not disbarred until eight months after the court and defendant learned of the proceedings against him, and one month after completion of the penalty phase of defendant's trial. There is no indication that the disciplinary proceedings influenced the pace of Toton's representation, and, indeed, there is substantial evidence on record that would support the opposite conclusion. First and foremost, it was Toton who advised defendant not to plead guilty and instead to submit the guilt and special circumstance issues on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts. This alternative to a guilty plea allowed counsel to contest the People's case, present various defense motions to the court, and generally make a stronger case for defendant than would have been available following a guilty plea. Thus, counsel Toton actually prolonged the trial notwithstanding defendant's desire to proceed directly to the penalty phase. Moreover, even if we were to perceive either an actual conflict of interest, as required by federal law, or to conclude the record supports an informed speculation of a conflict as required under our state Constitution, defendant intentionally and knowingly waived any conflict on the record. ( Ante, at pp. 38-39.) In addition, defense counsel Frank informed the court he was satisfied that Toton's pending discipline had nothing to do with the waiver of the jury trial. At a later in camera hearing attended by defense counsel Frank, defendant admitted that, in partially submitting his case, it was his desire to waive jury trial under any circumstances, that he had had a lengthy discussion regarding his rights with defense counsel Frank, and that he wanted to maintain the status quo. The fact that defendant did not discuss Toton's pending discipline with him does not assist defendant's conflict claim. Here, defendant asserts that his discussion with Frank could not substitute for a discussion with Toton. By his own admission, Frank knew nothing about his cocounsel's impending [discipline] until the news appeared on the front page of the Bakersfield newspaper.... Toton hid this important fact from his own assistant counsel until the news became public. Nothing in the record indicates that Frank knew any more about the [discipline] than did the readers of the Bakersfield Californian. Frank simply was not able to speak for Toton in discussing the impact of the [disciplinary proceedings] on the future conduct of the defense [nor was] Frank in [a] position to discuss with [defendant] how the [disciplinary] proceedings already might have affected Toton's guilt phase strategy. Defendant fails to show, however, how Toton's assurances or perspective would have assisted him in determining whether he wanted to waive the conflict, or how Toton would have provided him with a better explanation than that given by the court about the potential drawbacks of Toton's continued representation. Defendant next asserts that the trial court failed in its duty to ensure that he knowingly and intelligently waived any conflict with counsel. (15) When a trial court knows or should know that defense counsel has a possible conflict of interest with his client, it must inquire into the matter [citations] and act in response to what its inquiry discovers [citation]. ( Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1136.) If the court determines that a waiver of a conflict is necessary, it must satisfy itself that `(1) the defendant has discussed the potential drawbacks of [potentially conflicted] representation with his attorney, or if he wishes, outside counsel, (2) that he has been made aware of the dangers and possible consequences of [such] representation in his case, (3) that he knows of his right to conflict-free representation, and (4) that he voluntarily wishes to waive that right.' ( Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 837, quoting People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 110 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835].) A trial court's failure to inquire into the conflict or to adequately respond to its inquiry amounts to reversible error if the defendant can show that an actual conflict of interest existed and that that conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. ( Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 837-838; cf. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 692 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 696-697].) (14b) Defendant asserts that the trial court never asked [defendant] in clear, unambiguous language whether he was willing to waive his right to unimpaired counsel. He also complains of the court's failure to determine whether [Toton's] alleged misuse of client funds might indicate that Toton had financial difficulties which might affect his work or handling of funds in [defendant's] case, [nor did the court] ask Toton about the timetable of state bar proceedings [or ask] how the bar proceeding might affect, or might have affected, Toton's conduct of [defendant's] case. In deciding whether a defendant understands the nature of a possible conflict of interest with counsel, the trial court need not explore each foreseeable conflict and consequence. ( Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1137.) Nor does a defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel extend merely to matters discussed on the record. ( Ibid. ) As we observed in Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 621 [180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248, 18 A.L.R.4th 333], [r]ules that are that strict seem neither necessary nor workable. (See also People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 140 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561] [waiver found adequate even though all conceivable ramifications of conflict not explained].) Thus, looking at the whole record, we must determine whether defendant was aware of the potential drawbacks and possible consequences of retaining Toton, and whether he understood his right to conflict-free counsel and knowingly waived that right. It is clear that the record belies defendant's argument. The court's response to the asserted conflict of interest was appropriate under the circumstances; it was immediate and informed petitioner of his rights under the facts. As the record indicates, the court discussed the conflict with the parties, was careful to ensure defendant was aware that a conflict existed, and confirmed that his waiver of the conflict was voluntary and knowing. ( Ante, at pp. 37-40.) Defendant even declined the court's invitation to make a motion for mistrial, emphasizing that he was satisfied with the state of the record. Thus, in light of all the circumstances, we conclude the court gave defendant an opportunity to declare a mistrial, to relieve counsel, and to voice his objections on the record. In our view, the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the conflict, and we are satisfied that defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary. (See Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1137-1138.)