Opinion ID: 785473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: UCIL's Plant Operations and Storage of Toxic Wastes

Text: 4 The portion of the amended complaint whose dismissal was vacated in Bano I alleged principally that residents of and near Bhopal suffered physical injury and property damage caused by pollution that emanated from the site of UCIL's operations in Bhopal and entered the residents' water supply. For purposes of the present appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment and its decision that the Bhopal organizations lacked standing as a matter of law, we view the record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the parties against whom summary judgment was granted. 5 UCIL's Bhopal plant commenced operation in 1969 on two noncontiguous tracts of land, totaling 88 acres, leased at various times from the Indian State of Madhya Pradesh. At the plant, pesticides imported from a Union Carbide facility in West Virginia were converted into a marketable product for sale in India. In 1979 or 1980, UCIL began to manufacture at its Bhopal plant the pesticides that it previously had been importing. As a byproduct of the expanded operations, hazardous wastes were produced. UCIL kept these wastes in tanks and pits at the plant site, as well as in three solar evaporation ponds constructed on the noncontiguous leased property some 800 meters north of the plant. 6 A UCIL document indicates that in March 1982, UCIL was aware of leakage from one of the evaporation ponds and that another pond showed signs of leakage. In April 1982, a UCIL document noted that continued leakage from [an] evaporation pond [was] causing great concern and that repairs were being planned with the assistance of consultants. Immediately following the 1984 gas-release disaster, operations at the UCIL plant were discontinued, and the plant was closed in early 1985. Thereafter, the Indian government took control of the unit responsible for the production of methyl isocyanate. Apparently it is undisputed that the plant never resumed normal operations and that no effluent was added to the solar evaporation ponds after 1984. 7 In 1989, the Madhya Pradesh government asked the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI), an Indian governmental organization, to conduct a study of the environmental damage caused by the solar evaporation ponds in order to help determine whether the land where those ponds were located was suitable for alternative industrial uses. In April 1990, NEERI issued a report stating that its study found no evidence of certain chemicals that would be indicative of pollution in test wells dug within a one-kilometer radius of the solar evaporation ponds and found that the water quality met local standards in test wells dug within a 10-kilometer radius of the ponds. ( See NEERI, Assessment of Pollution Damage Due to Solar Evaporation Ponds at UCIL, Bhopal (1990) (First NEERI Report or First Report) at xiv-xv.) Its 8 [i]nvestigations revealed that the land and water environment have not been contaminated due to the provision of flexible membrane liner in the pond and [the] presence of low permeable plastic clay below [the solar evaporation ponds]. 9 ( Id. at unnumbered Foreword page.) The overall conclusion of the study [wa]s that no contamination of soils and ground water was observed due to the impoundment of wastewater in solar evaporation ponds. ( Id. at xvii.) However, the First NEERI Report recommended remediation of the waste sites, to wit, excavation of the sediment, residue, and contaminated soil from two of the solar evaporation ponds and their containment in a secure landfill in the third pond. ( See id. at xviii.) UCIL thereafter undertook these tasks, but work to close and cap the secure landfill was not completed until July 1998. 10 In the meantime, there were additional environmental studies and a change in UCIL's corporate ownership. In September 1994, Union Carbide sold all of its shares in UCIL, which was subsequently renamed Eveready Industries India Limited (EIIL). EIIL succeeded to UCIL's lease, which required EIIL to use the land for industrial purposes. EIIL retained NEERI to assess environmental conditions on the plant premises in 1994. 11 In October 1997, NEERI responded with a report entitled Assessment of Contaminated Areas Due to Past Waste Disposal Practices at EIIL, Bhopal (1997) (Second NEERI Report). The Second NEERI Report stated that NEERI had found contamination within the former UCIL plant site at the waste disposal areas. ( See id. at unnumbered pages 5-7 of Executive Summary.) However, it reaffirmed the First Report's finding of no groundwater contamination in and around the plant site. ( See id. at unnumbered page 5 of Executive Summary.) A July 1998 press release by the government of Madhya Pradesh reported that the Madhya Pradesh Pollution Control Board had also collected and analyzed samples from drinking water sources in the areas around the former UCIL premises. ( See Government of Madhya Pradesh, Directorate of Public Relations, Safe Disposal of Wastes in Union Carbide Premises: No Contamination of Ground Water or Soil from Wastes (July 28, 1998) at 1.) That study found no traces of chemicals in the water sources that may be linked to the chemicals used in the Union Carbide factory or the wastes there. ( Id. ) 12 EIIL made efforts to remediate the plant sites and was to develop a proposal for industrial activity on the property. When it failed to come up with such a proposal, it was eventually required to surrender the land. The State of Madhya Pradesh took control of the land in September 1998. 13 In November 1999, Greenpeace Research Laboratories, Department of Biological Sciences, University of Exeter (Greenpeace or Greenpeace Research Laboratories), issued a report based on its independent testing of soil and water in Bhopal. ( See I. Labunska et al., Greenpeace Research Laboratories, The Bhopal Legacy: Toxic Contaminants at the Former Union Carbide Factory Site, Bhopal, India: 15 Years After the Bhopal Accident (1999) (Greenpeace Report).) That report recounted findings of substantial and, in some locations, severe contamination of land and drinking water supplies with heavy metals and persistent organic contaminants both within and surrounding the former UCIL pesticide formulation plant. (Greenpeace Report at 4.) B. Bi's Pollution Claims and the Motion To Dismiss 14 The Bhopal organizations and several other entities who are not parties to this appeal commenced the present action in November 1999; an amended complaint, adding Bi as a plaintiff, was filed in January 2000. The amended complaint added claims alleging, to the extent pertinent to this appeal, that the individual plaintiffs and other similarly situated residents of and near Bhopal suffered physical injury and property damage caused by pollution emanating from the UCIL property and entering the residents' water supply (collectively the pollution claims). The amended complaint alleged that the Greenpeace Report confirm[s] scientifically that massive environmental contamination, including contamination of the drinking water of residents in the nearby communities, entirely unrelated to the Bhopal Disaster, has taken place at the UCIL site where large amounts of toxic chemicals and by-products from the factory's original manufacturing processes continue to pollute the land and water. (Amended Complaint ¶ 95.) 15 According to an affidavit submitted by Bi, Bi has, since 1990, resided in Atal Ayub Nagar, India, a residential community in the immediate vicinity of the [former] UCIL plant site. (Affidavit of Haseena Bi dated September 26, 2002 (Bi Aff.), ¶ 4.) Within a few weeks of moving to Atal Ayub Nagar, Bi and her family began to experience health problems, which included skin rashes, severe nausea, and headaches, and which, over time, worsened into severe abdominal pain and bleeding rashes. ( Id. ¶¶ 5, 6.) Bi's family members ultimately attributed their health problems to water taken from the handpump water well near where [Bi] live[s] ( id. ¶ 6), which they used for drinking, cooking, bathing, and cleaning. According to Bi, [a]ll of the handpump wells in the nearby residential areas ... seem to be contaminated because the water has the same strong noxious smell of chemicals with an oily layer on top, and others using those wells have complained to [Bi] of similar symptoms. ( Id. ¶ 8.) Because she has no access to an alternative water supply, Bi continues to be exposed to the contaminated water. ( See id. ¶¶ 7, 9; Amended Complaint ¶ 8.) 16 The Bhopal organizations were described in the amended complaint principally as grass-roots, self-help, or advocacy organizations whose members were victims, or survivors of victims, of the gas-release disaster. ( See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 28, 30-32.) The amended complaint alleged that the vast majority of members of BGPMUS and BGPMSKS continue to reside in residential colonies surrounding the former UCIL plant site and continue to be exposed to pesticides, toxic chemicals and other by-products which have contaminated the soil and water near the facility. ( Id. ¶¶ 28, 30.) The plaintiff organizations asserted claims for money damages on behalf of their members for personal injury and property damage based on theories of negligence and strict liability ( see id. ¶¶ 180-85, 194-200), as well as public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass ( see id. ¶¶ 186-93, 206-09). The amended complaint also sought relief in the form of remediation of the former UCIL plant site, of community wells, and of plaintiffs' own properties ( see id. ¶ 213), and recov[ery of] the costs of a medical monitoring program for residents exposed to the chemicals ( id. ¶ 205). 17 Defendants Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, its former chief executive officer (collectively Carbide), moved to dismiss the pollution claims pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and/or 56. They contended, inter alia, that Bi's damages claims for personal injury and property damage arising out of her alleged exposure to contaminated water were barred by the three-year statute of limitations governing latent injuries, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(2). As to the plaintiff organizations, Carbide moved to dismiss for lack of standing, arguing that they could not meet the prerequisite that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested require[] the participation of individual members in the lawsuit, Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). 18 With respect to plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief, defendants argued that an order requiring Union Carbide to remediate the former UCIL site would be infeasible and inappropriate given that possession of the site had been returned to its owner, the State of Madhya Pradesh. Carbide contended that any order that the site be remediated would thus entail insurmountable problems of judicial supervision and would interfere with India's national interest in its environmental regulation. Carbide also argued that a program of medical monitoring for the estimated tens of thousands of individuals who resided in Bhopal at any time in the more than 30 years since the UCIL plant commenced operations would be extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, for a court in the United States to administer, especially since the amended complaint failed to identify any particular diseases or injuries believed to be caused by the chemicals. 19 In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Bi contended that she alleged patent rather than latent harms and that her claims should thus be analyzed under CPLR § 214 rather than CPLR § 214-c. She argued that under CPLR § 214 her action was not barred because the groundwater contamination constituted a continuing nuisance and continuing trespass, causing repeated harms that gave rise to successive causes of action and entitled her to seek damages for harms to her person and property incurred within the three years immediately prior to the filing of the amended complaint, despite the fact that the tortious conduct had begun at an earlier time. Bi also contended that, irrespective of whether her claims would otherwise be barred by CPLR § 214 and CPLR § 214-c, principles of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel should preserve her claims because Union Carbide had affirmatively misrepresented to the public that chemicals from the UCIL plant caused no contamination of the surrounding area. 20 The Bhopal organizations opposed Carbide's motion to dismiss their claims for lack of standing, arguing that Hunt and its progeny were distinguishable because they involved associations seeking to bring damages claims on behalf of their members in a non-class-action context, whereas the Bhopal organizations sought to pursue their members' monetary claims as putative class representatives. They argued that in these circumstances, the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, rather than the Hunt test, should govern whether an association is a suitable plaintiff. 21 Finally, plaintiffs challenged Carbide's contention that the equitable relief requested in the amended complaint would present the district court with insurmountable difficulties. They argued that there would be no interference with local governance because (a) the Madhya Pradesh authorities had already sought a continuation of on-site rehabilitation efforts from UCIL's successor, (b) the State of Madhya Pradesh wants Union Carbide to rehabilitate the site, and (c) an injunction could incorporate the environmental standards of India. As to the requested medical monitoring program, the Bhopal organizations argued that the program would encompass only persons currently residing in Bhopal and currently exposed to chemicals from the former UCIL plant, a population that could be defined as individuals currently living in 10 neighborhoods affected by groundwater contamination, and that the program could screen for cancers and immune deficiencies caused by exposure to the groundwater contaminants identified in the Greenpeace Report. 22 C. The Dismissal of the Pollution Claims: Bano II 23 Following limited discovery by Bi and the Bhopal organizations, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11329(JFK), 2003 WL 1344884 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.18, 2003) ( Bano II ). At the outset of its discussion, the court noted that, whereas the original complaint had alleged that plaintiffs' claims arose under the laws of India, their amended complaint abandoned reliance on Indian law and asserted instead that plaintiffs had no remedy under those laws ( see Amended Complaint ¶ 139). The court concluded that plaintiffs' environmental claims should be addressed under New York law. See Bano II, 2003 WL 1344884, at  (New York law applies in cases in which the harm occurs abroad, and where there is no conflict with the law of the foreign jurisdiction.). Further, as federal jurisdiction of the action was premised on diversity of citizenship, the district court ruled that the timeliness of plaintiffs' claims was governed by the New York statutes of limitations. See id. at . 24 As to the statute-of-limitations prong of defendants' motion, the district court ruled that Bi's personal injuries were properly classified as latent rather than patent in light of the assertions in her affidavit, because, although the period between exposure and manifestation was not of great duration, the injuries did not manifest themselves immediately, id. at -5. Accordingly, the district court concluded that CPLR § 214-c(2) applied and that the limitations period began when an injury first manifested itself. See id. at . Bi's injuries having first manifested themselves in 1990, the court found that the three-year limitations period provided by CPLR § 214-c expired before Bi filed her personal injury claims in 2000. See id. 25 The court also found that Bi's personal injury claims were not made timely by CPLR § 214-c(4), which contains an exception to § 214-c's three-year limitations period where technical, scientific or medical knowledge and information sufficient to ascertain the cause of his injury had not been discovered, identified or determined prior to the expiration of the period within which the action or claim would have been authorized, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-c(4). In such circumstances, where the discovery of the cause of the injury is alleged to have occurred less than five years after discovery of the injury ... an action may be commenced or a claim filed within one year of such discovery of the cause of the injury. Id. Assuming arguendo the applicability of CPLR § 214-c(4), the district court concluded that Bi's personal injury claims would be time-barred because that section, allowing suit to be brought at most six years after the discovery of her injury, would have required that her claims, first asserted in 2000, be asserted not later than 1996. See Bano II, 2003 WL 1344884, at . 26 The court rejected Bi's claims of property damage for most of the same reasons, stating that 27 Bi's personal injury and property claims both stem from groundwater contamination. It is nonsensical to assert that Bi's personal injuries which manifested themselves in 1990 and to which she attributes the cause to be the well water should be viewed separately from her property damage claims. 28 Id. at . 29 Finally, the district court found that even if the harms alleged by Bi were deemed patent, so that CPLR § 214 rather than CPLR § 214-c would control, her claims would still be time-barred. The court rejected Bi's contention that her claims for personal injuries were timely under continuing nuisance or continuing trespass doctrines, concluding that such doctrines could preserve claims only of property damage, not of personal injury. See id. at . And the court concluded that the continuing tort doctrines did not make Bi's property damage claims timely because those doctrines apply only to property damage claims seeking injunctive relief, not monetary relief. See id. 30 The district court rejected Bi's claim of fraudulent concealment, concluding that Union Carbide's alleged concealment does not rise to the requisite level of misrepresentation. Id. at . It also ruled that tolling the statute of limitations based on equitable estoppel would be inappropriate because Bi possessed, within the limitations period, sufficient factual information to give her a duty to investigate the cause of her injuries. See id. 31 As to the Bhopal organizations, the district court found that they lacked standing to press claims for money damages because a determination of the residents' damages would require individualized proof and the individual participation of each of the organizations' members. See id. at . The court implicitly rejected the organizations' contention that the standing requirements articulated in Hunt should be relaxed where an organization seeks to maintain the suit as a class action. 32 Finally, the district court ruled that plaintiffs' request for an injunction requiring remediation of the former UCIL plant site would be infeasible, both because the court did not wish to direct a foreign government as to how that state should address its own environmental issues, and because the court was concerned that it would have no control over any remediation process ordered. Bano II, 2003 WL 1344884, at . The court ruled that the medical monitoring program proposed by the Bhopal organizations would be infeasible because of the impossibility of [l]ocating thousands of people who have resided 8,000 miles away in Bhopal, India, over a span of more than thirty years. Id. at . The court stated that the effort required to identify those citizens to be monitored would be limitless. Id. In addition, noting that Union Carbide had already funded a hospital in Bhopal with proceeds from the sale of its UCIL stock, the district court stated that [t]his contribution goes far to satisfy any further obligation defendants have to the citizens of Bhopal. Id. The court concluded that balancing the request for medical monitoring expenses, an extraordinary remedy requiring extensive factual research and impos[ing] a potentially indefinite duty upon defendants to care for a population for which [Union Carbide] has already made substantial efforts, against the fact that Union Carbide had funded the hospital in Bhopal shows this request not to be equitable. Id. 33 Judgment was entered dismissing the amended complaint. Bi and the four Bhopal organizations described above (BGPMUS, BGPMSKS, BGPSSS, and BGIA) have appealed. The other plaintiffs have not appealed.