Opinion ID: 164972
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing to Seek Prospective Relief

Text: 21 Appellant Allen has standing to seek prospective relief. Allen has established that she is under a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. Allen has used the fixed-route bus service in Wichita for many years and has averred an intent to use Wichita Transit's bus system for personal transportation several times per year in the future. In the past, her travels were delayed because of a lift malfunction. The record shows that historically, a frequent Wichita Transit fixed-route bus rider experienced lift malfunctions twenty to thirty percent of the time. Under these circumstances, Allen has established that she is under a realistic threat of experiencing a lift malfunction 11 during at least twenty percent of her several yearly attempts to use Wichita Transit's buses. This suffices to establish an injury in fact. 22 Moreover, Allen's averred intent to use Wichita Transit's buses several times per year is not a mere someday intention. Speculative, someday intentions do not support standing to seek prospective relief. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 500-01 (D.C.Cir.1994) (holding that intent to undertake research at some unidentified future time is not sufficiently imminent to support standing to seek an injunction). Allen's testimony of an intent to use buses several times per year suggests a concrete, present plan to use Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses several times each year, including the year in which she made that statement. In contrast, the plaintiffs in Defenders of Wildlife, whom the Supreme Court held did not show an injury in fact, had merely expressed a desire to someday visit places halfway around the world. See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184, 120 S.Ct. 693 (discussing Defenders of Wildlife ); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Unlike Allen, those plaintiffs had neither present concrete plans nor any specification of when someday would be. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Allen's intent to use Wichita Transit's buses several times per year cannot be equated with the Defenders of Wildlife plaintiffs' mere intent to return to foreign countries at some indefinite future time. 12 Id. at 564 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Thus, Allen has established an injury in fact that is sufficiently impending to support standing to seek prospective relief. 23 Furthermore, Allen's injury in fact is traceable to Wichita Transit's challenged conduct. It is self-evident that any threat of future lift malfunctions is traceable to Wichita Transit's alleged failure to maintain the lifts in operable condition. Thus, Allen has met the threshold standing requirement of traceability. 13 24 Finally, Allen's injury is redressable by the requested prospective relief. It can scarcely be doubted that, for a plaintiff who is injured or faces the threat of future injury due to illegal conduct ongoing at the time of suit, a sanction that effectively abates that conduct and prevents its recurrence provides a form of redress. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185-86, 120 S.Ct. 693. Both injunctive and declaratory relief can effectively abate Wichita Transit's alleged injurious conduct and prevent its recurrence. It is therefore likely, and not merely speculative, that an injunction or a declaratory judgment would remedy Allen's injury in fact. Thus, Allen has standing to seek prospective relief.
25 This court need not resolve the question whether Beltz had initial standing to sue for prospective relief because it concludes, infra, that his claims for prospective relief have been mooted by his death. 26 Goupil's claim for prospective relief, on the other hand, is not moot. As explained above, disabled riders who intend to ride Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses several times per year are under a realistic threat of experiencing a lift malfunction. 27 Unlike Allen, however, Goupil does not intend to use Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses for personal transportation. Instead, he averred that he will test Wichita Transit's fixed-route bus system several times per year starting in May 2002. The question whether testers have standing to sue under the Rehabilitation Act and under Title II of the ADA is an issue of first impression. 28 The Supreme Court has held that the Fair Housing Act (FHA) supports `tester' standing. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374-75, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). In Havens Realty, the Supreme Court held that an African-American tester who was given misinformation about the availability of a rental property had alleged sufficient injury in fact to support standing to sue under the FHA. 455 U.S. at 374, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The Havens Realty tester never intended to rent the apartment. Id. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The tester's sole purpose was, like the testers in this case, to determine whether defendant engaged in unlawful practices. Id. 29 The Havens Realty Court held that congressional intention cannot be overlooked in determining whether testers have standing to sue under a particular statutory scheme. Id. The Court reasoned that the actual or threatened injury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of a congressional statute creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, the injury underlying tester standing stems from the denial of the tester's statutory rights. Id. at 374-75, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Critical to the Havens Realty Court's conclusion that the statutory provisions at bar supported tester standing was the language of those provisions. Id. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. FHA § 804(d), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), which is enforceable through § 812, id. § 3612(a), makes it unlawful for a firm covered by the act to misrepresent the availability of a dwelling to any person because of race. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114 (emphasis in the original). The Court reasoned that this broad statutory language, alongside the FHA's purpose of eliminating racial discrimination in housing, evinced a congressional intent to confer standing to the full limits of Article III, which includes tester standing. Id. at 372-74, 102 S.Ct. 1114. 30 Circuit courts have followed the Supreme Court's reasoning in Havens Realty to hold that tester standing exists under other anti-discrimination statutory provisions. See, e.g., Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir.2004) (relying on Havens Realty to conclude that disabled testers who sue under § 3604(f)(2) of the FHA and who have experienced the dignitary harm of observing discriminatory conditions have standing); Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir.2000) (relying on Havens Realty to conclude that employment discrimination testers who were discriminated against had standing to sue under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Watts v. Boyd Props., Inc., 758 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir.1985) (relying on Havens Realty to conclude that fair housing testers had standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1982). Each of these circuits relied upon the statutory provision's broad language and anti-discriminatory purpose in concluding that testers had standing to sue. See Smith, 358 F.3d at 1103-04; Kyles, 222 F.3d at 297-99; Watts, 758 F.2d 1482, 1484-85. 31 Consistent with Havens Realty and other circuits' application of that holding to similarly broad language in other anti-discrimination statutes, this court holds that tester standing exists under Title II of the ADA. The Havens Realty Court emphasized FHA § 804(d)'s use of the phrase any person in concluding that this statutory language created legal rights, the invasion of which constitutes the actual or threatened injury required by Article III. 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. The language of Title II of the ADA parallels in all important respects the language of FHA § 804(d). Title II of the ADA states that  no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in ... the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added). The plain language of Title II evinces Congress' intent to confer upon a qualified individual with a disability a legal right not to be excluded from participation in the services of a public entity by reason of her or his disability. Title II's words no and shall function like § 804(d)'s phrase any person because, read in context, these words clearly proscribe discrimination against any person who is a qualified individual with a disability. 32 The propriety of our construction of Title II's language is reinforced by Title II's enforcement provision. The enforcement provision extends the remedies, procedures, and rights under the statute to  any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of [Title II]. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (emphasis added). Moreover, the ADA, like the FHA provisions at issue in Havens Realty, embodies a congressional intent to eradicate discrimination. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities....). Thus, the totality of Title II's plain language, the plain language of its enforcement provision, and the statutory scheme's anti-discriminatory purpose lead this court to conclude that Congress intended Title II to confer standing to the full limits of Article III. Cf. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 372-74, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Therefore, we hold that testers have standing to sue under Title II of the ADA. 33 Likewise, tester standing exists under the Rehabilitation Act. The language of the Rehabilitation Act also evinces Congress' intent to confer standing to the outer limits of Article III. Like Title II of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act states that [n]o ... qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from [] participation in ... or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.... 29 U.S.C. § 794 (emphasis added). This language, which parallels the language of Title II of the ADA, shows Congress' intent to confer upon a qualified individual with a disability a legal right not to be excluded from participation in any program receiving federal funds. The Rehabilitation Act, like Title II of the ADA, uses the words no and shall to proscribe discrimination against any person who is a qualified individual with a disability. This creates a legal right, the invasion of which confers standing. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 1114. Thus, tester standing exists under the Rehabilitation Act. 14 34 The parties stipulated that Goupil and all appellants and cross-appellees in this case are qualified individuals with a disability within the meaning of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, all appellants would have standing as testers if they satisfy the constitutional requirements of Article III. See id. . 35 Goupil has tester standing to seek prospective relief. He established the requisite injury in fact because he is under a real and immediate threat of experiencing a lift malfunction. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Goupil averred that he intends to test Wichita Transit's fixed-route services several times per year, starting in May 2002. The record shows that historically, a frequent Wichita Transit fixed-route bus rider experienced lift malfunctions twenty to thirty percent of the time. At the time this case was filed, the expected arrival of Wichita Transit's new bus fleet in April 2002 had no impact on the likelihood or frequency of continuing lift malfunctions. Thus, Goupil has established that, as a tester, he is under a real and immediate threat of experiencing lift malfunctions in at least twenty percent of his several yearly attempts to use Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses. 36 This injury in fact is traceable to Wichita Transit's allegedly wrongful failure to maintain its lifts in operable condition. It is redressable by a declaratory judgment stating the wrongfulness of lift malfunctions or an injunction requiring fully functioning lifts. Therefore, Goupil has standing to seek prospective relief.
37 Donnell has standing to seek prospective relief against the unavailability of Braille schedules, directories, and signage at the transit centers. She has established that she is under a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. Donnell averred that she intends to test Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses several times per year. At the commencement of this case, Wichita Transit's transit centers did not house any Braille materials and had limited Braille signage. Donnell's intended tests of the fixed-route buses would have brought her to the transit centers. Thus, Donnell was under a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. 38 Donnell also satisfied the traceability and redressability prongs of the standing inquiry. Her injury in fact is causally connected to Wichita Transit's allegedly wrongful failure to provide Braille materials and adequate Braille signage at the transit centers. Donnell's threatened injury can be remedied by declaratory or injunctive relief, both of which would likely propel Wichita Transit to provide more Braille materials and signage at the transit centers. Therefore, Donnell has standing to seek prospective relief. 39 Donnell also sought prospective relief against the driver's failure to call out stops and failure to offer her a designated seat. Wichita Transit's drivers, however, are trained to call out stops. Furthermore, the drivers are obligated, under Wichita Transit's policies, to call out stops. Donnell's past exposure to a driver who failed to call out stops in violation of Wichita Transit's policies does not suffice to establish standing to seek prospective relief against such conduct. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-06, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (holding that to establish imminent future injury, plaintiff would have to allege either that all police officers always engaged in wrongful conduct against all citizens, or that defendant had ordered or authorized them to act wrongfully). Such an injury is too speculative even in light of the evidence that Wichita Transit's drivers often fail to call out stops. See id. Likewise, Donnell has neither demonstrated that drivers are authorized to decline to offer disabled passengers designated seats, or that all drivers always fail to offer disabled passengers designated seats. Thus, Donnell has no standing to seek prospective relief requiring drivers to call out stops or to offer designated seats.
40 Garnett has no standing to seek prospective relief. At the summary judgment stage of litigation, the elements of standing must be set forth by affidavit or other evidence. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Mere allegations do not suffice. Id. Unlike the other appellants, Garnett submitted no affidavit stating an intent to utilize Wichita Transit's fixed-route buses in the future. He merely alleged, in the complaint, that he desires to use Wichita Transit's fixed-route bus system. Because of this case's summary judgment posture, Garnett's mere allegation does not suffice to establish that he is under a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. Therefore, Garnett has no standing to seek prospective relief.
41 Jeffries does have standing to seek prospective relief because she established that she is under a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. Past exposure to wrongful conduct bears on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660. Jeffries has averred that Wichita Transit's TDD line never worked when she called it several times in the past. Although Wichita Transit has presented evidence that it had a TDD service, Jeffries' affidavit suffices, at this stage of litigation, to show that the service has been consistently out of order. Jeffries testified that she intends to call the TDD line once per month in the future. In light of Jeffries' testimony that the TDD system never worked when she called it, her intent to call it once per month establishes a real and imminent threat of repeated injury. Id. 42 Jeffries' injury is traceable to Wichita Transit's alleged failure to maintain an operative TDD service. It is redressable by prospective relief. Thus, Jeffries has standing to seek prospective relief.