Opinion ID: 1447881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Prospective Juror Kosmatka

Text: (20a) The prosecutor challenged prospective juror Gary Kosmatka for cause, and the trial court excluded him. Defendant contends Kosmatka's exclusion compels reversal of the judgment of death. We reject the contention. (21) When the prosecution seeks to exclude a prospective juror for cause because of the juror's views on capital punishment, under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, the trial court must determine whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 851].) `Under Witt, therefore, our duty is to examine the context surrounding [the juror's] exclusion to determine whether the trial court's decision that [the juror's] beliefs would `substantially impair the performance of his duties ...' was fairly supported by the record.' ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 587 [280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 129 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].) (20b) Here, the trial court's determination that prospective juror Kosmatka's beliefs would substantially impair his performance as a juror is fairly supported by the record; thus the juror was properly excused for cause. During voir dire, Kosmatka was extensively questioned by the trial court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel. The court asked Kosmatka whether, if he believed the special circumstance of robbery-kidnapping to be true, he would vote not true in order to avoid the death penalty issue. Kosmatka replied he was a Catholic, explaining, I do not know if I can reconcile a death penalty along with my faith. In response to a question by the court regarding a hypothetical premeditated murder of a nun to eliminate her as a witness, Kosmatka said he did not think he could vote for the death penalty in that case. In later questioning, Kosmatka said he could possibly vote for the death penalty in a case that was outrageous and involved the murder of a member of his family or a close friend, but that would involve violating his beliefs. Finally, the trial court asked Kosmatka: [Y]ou are saying `Judge, I am telling you I have charged my conscience and I know at this point that I would not vote for the death penalty in this case. Period, end of report.' Are you telling me that? Kosmatka answered, Yes. In this instance, we perceive no violation of the standards of Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. [6]