Opinion ID: 1467547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Lea's Claim of Release

Text: The defendant Lea claims that the factual release of his codefendant, Emery Associates, to the extent of the plaintiff's recovery of the insurance proceeds in the sum of $53,388.43 should operate as discharging him of liability to the plaintiff in an equal amount. The justice below ruled otherwise and we agree. Lea bases his entitlement to this partial release upon the provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 163, which state as follows: Whenever a person seeks recovery for a personal injury or property damage caused by 2 or more persons, the settlement with or release of one or more of the persons causing the injury shall not be a bar to a subsequent action against the other person or persons also causing the injury. Evidence of settlement with a release of one or more persons causing the injury shall not be admissible at a subsequent trial against the other person or persons also causing the injury. After the jury has returned its verdict, the trial judge shall inquire of the attorneys for the parties whether such a settlement or release has occurred. If such settlement or release has occurred, the trial judge shall reduce the verdict by an amount equal to the settlement with or the consideration for the release of the other persons. The rule at common law is that the release of one of several tortfeasors releases the others. Gilpatrick v. Hunter, 24 Me. 18, 19, 41 Am.Dec. 370 (1844); Mitchell v. Libbey, 33 Me. 74 (1851); Wells v. Gould and Howard, 131 Me. 192, 194, 160 A. 30 (1932). This is true though the wrongdoers are severally, rather than jointly, liable for the injury. Wells, 131 Me. at 194, 160 A. 30. Cleveland v. Bangor, 87 Me. 259, 264-65, 32 A. 892 (1895). But see Steeves v. Irwin, 233 A.2d 126, 134, 135-36 (Me.1967). See also Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 A. 883, 884-85 (1915). The textual language of 14 M.R. S.A. § 163 indicates a clear intent on the part of the Legislature to modify the rule at common law that a release of one joint tortfeasor operates as a discharge of the other joint tortfeasors. The overall scheme and purpose of this section is undoubtedly to promote settlements in multiple-party tort cases by depriving such settlements or releases of one tortfeasor of their commonlaw characteristic of absolutely discharging all other joint and several tortfeasors, permitting a subsequent action against the other parties causing the injury to be tried without the evidence of the settlement or release being disclosed to the trier of facts, and, after favorable verdict in favor of the injured party-releasor, having that verdict against the other tortfeasor reduced by an amount equal to the consideration received in the prior settlement or release. The statute, by providing a mechanism of mandatory set-off of the consideration paid to the injured party by one tortfeasor in settlement or release of all claims against the amount received in a subsequent verdict against one or more of the other tortfeasors indicates that the Legislature did not intend the statute to be applicable to anticipatory damage releases such as contractually entered into in the instant case by Emery Waterhouse and Emery Associates some three years before the damage occurred, but shows that the specific legislation contemplated settlements or releases made or entered into by the parties after the damage has occurred. Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed, and the Legislature will not be presumed to intend any innovation upon the common law further than the necessity of the case requires. See Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 290, page 374. Palmer v. Town of Sumner, 133 Me. 337, 340, 177 A. 711, 713 (1935). See also Blier v. Inhabitants of Town of Fort Kent, 273 A.2d 732, 734 (Me.1971). It is a well-settled rule in the construction of statutes that legislative enactments will be construed to alter the common law only to the extent that the Legislature has made that purpose clear. Knowles v. Ponton, 96 R.I. 156, 190 A.2d 4, 6 (1963); Saunders v. First National Realty Corporation, 245 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C.App. 1968); Davis v. Walker, 170 Neb. 891, 104 N.W.2d 479, 489 (1960). Hence, we hold that Lea was not entitled to have the amount of the verdict rendered against him in favor of Emery Waterhouse reduced, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 163, by the amount set off to Emery Associates against their own judgment liability by reason of the anticipatory mutual releases contained in their lease agreement with Emery Waterhouse. The trial justice was correct in his ruling on that score.