Opinion ID: 2339712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Plaintiff's Burden to Demonstrate Meeting the Statutory Requirements for Class Certification

Text: In a class action lawsuit, the named representatives of the plaintiff class assume the burden of proving the total class-wide damages rather than the individual damages of each member of the class. Gilley v. Kansas Gas Service Co., 285 Kan. 24, 29, 169 P.3d 1064 (2007). The district court held that plaintiff has the evidentiary burden of proving each class certification factor, and because class certification comes before merits discovery is complete, the burden is light or prima facie. The district court would only consider evidence from the defendant that was undisputed, and it would not determine factual disputes or judge credibility. Taranto contends that the district court misstated the governing burden of proof. Taranto directs us to the rigorous analysis language of Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, Inc. ( Dragon I ), 277 Kan. 776, 783, 89 P.3d 908 (2004), to support its argument that plaintiffs must present more than a prima facie case for class certification. There is, however, a difference between rigorous analysis of statutory factors and a heavy burden of proof on plaintiffs. There is little dispute over certain essential facts. Taranto arranged for mass fax transmissions without regard to whether the targets had an established business relationship with Taranto or had given permission to receive fax advertising. Such fax transmissions violate federal law. The only factual disputes involve identifying who the fax targets were and winnowing out those who gave consent or who had an existing business relationship with Taranto. These are not trivial matters, but they are explicit factual matters susceptible to review by this court based on the factual record. We do not read our holding in Dragon I to require that a district court conduct a mini-trial with extensive fact-finding before certifying or denying certification to a class. The district court must rigorously analyze the proffered evidence to determine whether the plaintiffs have met or are likely to meet the statutory requirements for certification. In Display South v. Express Computer Supply, 961 So.2d 451, 455 (La.App. 2007), the court held: It is not necessary for [the plaintiff] to prove the facts of the underlying cause of action. Class certification is purely procedural. Therefore, the issue at a class certification hearing is whether the class action is procedurally preferable, not whether any of the plaintiffs will be successful in urging the merits of their claims. [Citation omitted.] The major evidentiary stumbling blocks for the class will be determining to whom the fax transmissions were sent and whether those parties had given consent or had an established business relationship with the sender. These are not inherent barriers to class certification. Although there is no evidence that Taranto intentionally destroyed records in order to defeat litigation, a defendant cannot escape liability simply by losing or destroying the list of its victims. See, e.g., Appleton Electric Co. v. Advance-United Expressways, 494 F.2d 126, 139 (7th Cir.1974) (Class actions cannot be defeated by destroying records.). In Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC., No. 07C 2973, 2008 WL 2224892, at  (N.D.Ill.2008), the plaintiffs accused the defendants of sending out junk faxes in violation of the TCPA and sought class certification. In response, the defendants claimed numerosity was not satisfied because the list of potential plaintiffs had been destroyed and the class size was speculative because the list of fax numbers no longer existed. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that a good faith estimate can be sufficient where the class members are not readily ascertainable. The court found that common sense allowed the inference that a significant number of the junk faxes allegedly sent by the defendant were sent unlawfully and that denying class certification would unfairly punish the victims, especially where the missing list of recipients was last in the defendant's possession. See also Smith v. Greystone Alliance LLC, No. 09C5585, 2010 WL 2680147, at  (N.D.Ill. 2010) (failure to maintain a list of contacts will not defeat class action; otherwise, debt collectors could freely violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by electing not to record their messages); Herkert v. MRC Receivables Corp., 254 F.R.D. 344, 348-49 (N.D.Ill.2008) (master list of potential class members not essential for class certification if class members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria). We agree with the reasoning set out in Sadowski and the related cases, and we conclude that it was unnecessary for the district court to require the plaintiff to prove at the time of certification that all or most of the potential class were entitled to damages under the TCPA. It is not necessary that class description identify every individual member of the class from the outset. It suffices that the description identifies a group of plaintiffs by describing a set of common characteristics such that a member of the group may demonstrate a right to recovery based on the description. The plaintiff presented sufficient evidence and reasonable allegations based on that evidence and the statutory scheme to allow the district court to conclude that class certification was appropriate, analyzing each factor in light of the proffered evidence. The district court fulfilled its requirement to engage in a rigorous analysis of the factors for certification without conducting a trial within a trial to determine the relationship of each potential class member with the defendant.