Opinion ID: 61700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: vi(b

Text: Relying primarily on McKenzie v. Renberg's Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996), the district court found that an employee does not file a complaint under Section 215(a)(3) unless that employee somehow steps outside of his normal job role. In McKenzie, the Tenth Circuit explained the stepping outside the role requirement as follows: Despite our expansive interpretation of § 215(a)(3), we have never held that an employee is insulated from retaliation for participating in activities which are neither adverse to the company nor supportive of adverse rights under the statute which are asserted against the company.... [I]t is the assertion of statutory rights ( i.e., the advocacy of rights) by taking some action adverse to the company  whether via formal complaint, providing testimony in an FLSA proceeding, complaining to superiors about inadequate pay, or otherwise  that is the hallmark of protected activity under § 215(a)(3). Here, McKenzie never crossed the line from being an employee merely performing her job as personnel director to an employee lodging a personal complaint about the wage and hour practices of her employer and asserting a right adverse to the company. McKenzie did not initiate a FLSA claim against the company on her own behalf or on behalf of anyone else. Rather, in her capacity as personnel manager, she informed the company that it was at risk of claims that might be instituted by others as a result of its alleged FLSA violations. In order to engage in protected activity under § 215(a)(3), the employee must step outside his or her role of representing the company and either file (or threaten to file) an action adverse to the employer, actively assist other employees in asserting FLSA rights, or otherwise engage in activities that reasonably could be perceived as directed towards the assertion of rights protected by the FLSA. Here, McKenzie did none of these things. Indeed, McKenzie testified that her job responsibilities included participating in wage and hour issues. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that McKenzie was asserting any rights under the FLSA or that she took any action adverse to the company; rather, the record reflects that McKenzie's actions in connection with the overtime pay issue were completely consistent with her duties as personnel director for the company to evaluate wage and hour issues and to assist the company in complying with its obligations under the FLSA. McKenzie therefore lacks an essential ingredient of a retaliation claim; that is, she did not take a position adverse to her employer or assert any rights under the FLSA. Accordingly, McKenzie did not engage in activity protected under § 215(a)(3) .... Id. at 1486-87 (footnote omitted). We find the logic of McKenzie to provide a correct and balanced approach in requiring an employee to step outside his or her role of representing the company by either filing (or threatening to file) an action adverse to the employer, by actively assisting other employees in asserting FLSA rights, or by otherwise engaging in activities that reasonably could be perceived as directed towards the assertion of rights protected by the FLSA. Id., 94 F.3d at 1486-87. This rule is eminently sensible for management employees like Hagan, because a part of any management position often is acting as an intermediary between the manager's subordinates and the manager's own superiors. The role necessarily involves being mindful of the needs and concerns of both sides and appropriately expressing them. Voicing each side's concerns is not only not adverse to the company's interests, it is exactly what the company expects of a manager. If we did not require an employee to step outside the role or otherwise make clear to the employer that the employee was taking a position adverse to the employer, nearly every activity in the normal course of a manager's job would potentially be protected activity under Section 215(a)(3). An otherwise typical at-will employment relationship could quickly degrade into a litigation minefield, with whole groups of employees  management employees, human resources employees, and legal employees, to name a few  being difficult to discharge without fear of a lawsuit. For those reasons, we agree that an employee must do something outside of his or her job role in order to signal to the employer that he or she is engaging protected activity under Section 215(a)(3). Of course, whether an employee has stepped outside the role depends on what that role is and whether special circumstances are present. For instance, in York v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 944 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1991), also cited by the district court and discussed by both parties at oral argument, a fire department battalion chief showed the Fire Chief a memo discussing Garcia [v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985)] and asked if the fire fighters were due any overtime pay under Garcia.  [13] The battalion chief was both a public employee of the fire department and the president of the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 2186. [14] The district court and the Fifth Circuit both agreed that this act constituted an assertion of FLSA coverage, which was deemed to fall within Section 215(a)(3) under a note to Section 215 added by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, § 8, relating solely to public agencies. [15] Because York relied on the asserted coverage language of that statutory note, it is not directly applicable to our inquiry here concerning whether Hagan filed a complaint. Yet the York court's rationale is informative: The district court construed the assertion of coverage language as nothing more that a notice requirement. However, such a liberal construction is not consistent with the plain language of § 8. Because § 8 prohibits an employers' retaliatory acts because an employee asserts coverage, the employee must take some actions which a reasonable employer would consider an assertion that employees are entitled to the overtime pay or other benefits conferred by the FLSA. The evidence indicated that Broyles asked the Fire Chief if the fire fighters were entitled to overtime pay because of the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia. This inquiry, if proved on remand, could constitute a reasonable assertion of coverage. York, 944 F.2d at 241 (internal citation omitted). There are at least two major ways that York is distinguishable. First, of course, York took place within a public agency, and the case was decided under a specific public agency amendment to the FLSA that is not at issue in this case. Second, and more relevant, the employee making the assertion of rights in York was also the president of the union. Under a McKenzie analysis, although the battalion chief may not necessarily have stepped outside his role as an employee when speaking up on behalf of the fire fighters, his role as president of the local chapter of the fire fighters union automatically placed him in a position at least partially adverse to the fire department. [16] A union president, even if also an internal manager, is a special case. Thus, York does not apply to the situation before us, where there was no evidence that Hagan was either a union representative or otherwise had any role adverse to the company. Hagan was simply a typical Echostar manager. Based on the above analysis, the essence of the inquiry, properly formulated by the district court, is whether Hagan stepped out of his role as an Echostar field service manager, either to complain to his employer in behalf of the technicians, or in his own behalf, about a supposed violation or irregularity under or related to the FLSA. Hagan, 2007 WL 543441, at . As explained above, the only remaining issue is whether Hagan's asking Human Resources Manager Love to answer his technicians' unspecified legal question constitutes protected activity under Section 215(a)(3). The district court found that there is no evidence of conduct by Hagan that reasonably could or should have been construed or understood by the employer as a positive assertion of rights against Echostar under or related to the FLSA either in Plaintiff's behalf or in behalf of the technicians. The evidence is uncontroverted that Plaintiff as a field service manager sought help to compensate for his own perceived sense of inability correctly to answer questions in behalf of Echostar, and at no time in his encounter with Love did Plaintiff say or do anything that would constitute even an informal complaint by Plaintiff against his employer or a departure from his duties as a field service manager representing the company over to a role as an advocate for the technicians voicing a complaint to the company. Id., at . Given the undisputed facts before the district court, its determination on this issue is legally correct. There is nothing in the facts to suggest that Hagan was personally advocating on behalf of his technicians' statutory rights. Although Hagan clearly did care about the size of his technicians' paychecks, he admittedly did not believe that their legal question had any merit. In fact, he took so little evident interest in his technicians' legal question that he did not inform himself of the answer or even stay around to listen to Love's answer. In short, there was nothing in Hagan's behavior to suggest that he had taken a position adverse to the company with respect to his technician's statutory rights. Hagan did not step outside the role of manager in passing along his technicians' legal question and so did not engage in protected activity under Section 215(a)(3).