Opinion ID: 220832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Dispositions, Evidentiary Hearings, and AEDPA

Text: The majority's central holdingthat Borden's claims were adjudicated on their merit when the Alabama state court dismissed them for failing to meet Rule 32.6(b)'s specificity requirementraises another important concern. Borden was never afforded an evidentiary hearing. The state court summarily dismissed his claims without granting him an opportunity to develop the factual record. The majority decides that these Rule 32.6(b) dismissals were on the merits, triggering deferential review under AEDPA, because they were the substantive equivalent of dismissals under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the Habeas Rules) in federal court. Puzzlingly, however, in applying that deference, the majority never once engages with, or even mentions, the substantive pleading burden enforced by Habeas Rule 4. See Habeas Rule 4, advisory committee's note ([T]he petition is expected to state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. (internal quotation marks omitted)). All adjudications on the meritsincluding summary dismissalsare entitled to deference under AEDPA. But not all adjudications on the merits decide the same thing. Habeas claims may be dismissed at the pleading stage, for example, because, as pled, they are so `vague (or) conclusory' as to warrant dismissal for that reason alone, Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962)); or when viewed against the record, they may be shown to be so palpably incredible, so patently frivolous or false, as to warrant summary dismissal, id. at 76, 97 S.Ct. 1621 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). If claims survive these threshold inquiries, they may still be susceptible to summary judgment because there remains no genuine issue of material fact to resolve in further proceedings. Id. at 80-81, 97 S.Ct. 1621 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), (f)); [17] see also Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.7(d). Alternatively, when claims are denied at the proof stage i.e. after the proceedings have run their full coursethe court has simply decided that the petitioner failed to carry his or her burden of proof. For many habeas claims, the distinctions among these different dismissals or denials at the various stages of habeas litigation are distinctions without a difference, because those claims do not require any factual development in order for the judge to conclusively evaluate the petitioner's entitlement to relief. Other types of claims, however, are not similarly susceptible to summary proceedings. See Machibroda, 368 U.S. at 494-95, 82 S.Ct. 510 (The factual allegations contained in the petitioner's motion . . . related primarily to purported occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could, therefore, cast no real light.). That is why federal law prohibits summary dismissals where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief. . . . Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969). So long as a petitioner has raised such a possibilitythat, if the facts are fully developed, there is reason to believe that he or she may be able to demonstrate a constitutional violationit is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry. Id.; see id. at 298, 89 S.Ct. 1082 (Petitioners in habeas corpus proceedings . . . are entitled to careful consideration and plenary processing of their claims including full opportunity for presentation of the relevant facts.); see also Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 82 n. 25, 97 S.Ct. 1621 (But before dismissing facially adequate allegations short of an evidentiary hearing, ordinarily a district judge should seek as a minimum to obtain affidavits from all persons likely to have firsthand knowledge of the existence of any plea agreement.); Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (Even Franklin's undeveloped allegations satisfied the requirement of Blackledge v. Allison , that a habeas petition must `state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error.' (citation omitted)). [18] Federal courts reviewing § 2254 petitions must recognize exactly what federal law requires of habeas petitioners at each stage of habeas litigation. AEDPA mandates deference for all state court adjudications on the merits. But it does so in light of what is required under clearly established Federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). Under that provision, it is our job to determine whether a state court's merits adjudication falls outside the wide range of objectively reasonable resolutions permissible under that clearly established federal law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-10, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). We simply cannot conduct that analysis unless we understand both what burden the state court determined the petitioner failed to carry and what federal law requires of habeas petitioners at that particular stage in the proceedings. The majority finds Borden's allegations lacking in prejudice. It does so by briefly comparing Borden's allegations, as pled, against the evidence of prejudice relied upon by the Supreme Court to find petitioners deserving of habeas relief on similar claims. Majority Op. at 68-69 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005)). But the evidence of prejudice in those cases had been developed during the very proceeding Borden was denied: an evidentiary hearing. And the state court adjudications being reviewed were decisions that the petitioners had failed to prove their entitlement to relief after full proceedings. [19] Here, conversely, we are reviewing a pleading-stage dismissal. And based on the majority's own authority for finding Borden's claims adjudicated on their merits, the question we must ask under § 2254(d) is whether fairminded jurists could disagree that Borden pled facts demonstrating a real possibility of constitutional error. We are not asking whether Bordenlike Wiggins and Rompillahad actually proven his entitlement to habeas relief beyond any objectively reasonable dissent. If that were the question, the majority would surely be correct to deny relief on all countsas would virtually any federal court reviewing the dismissal of claims naturally relying on non-record evidence at the pleading stage. Without the aid of legal process and a developed record to rely upon, it would be virtually impossible for any petitioner to carry his or her ultimate burden of proof, let alone to demonstrate that he or she is entitled to habeas relief in federal court under AEDPA's doubly deferential standard of review. See Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403. [20] Therefore, when applying § 2254(d) to summary dismissals of such claims in state court, we should not expand the already exceedingly broad sweep of AEDPA deference by enforcing the wrong burden against habeas petitioners. Instead, we must recognize the important distinctions among the different merits adjudications made at different stages in habeas litigation and review a particular state court merits adjudications in light of the decision that court actually made.