Opinion ID: 237217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coverage A — Liability:

Text: 20 To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law, or the liability of others assumed by him under written contract relating to the Premises, for damages, including damages for care and loss of services, because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person or persons, and for damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof. 21 II. Defense; Settlement; Supplementary Payments: 22 As respects such insurance as is afforded by the other terms of this Policy under Coverage A the Company shall 23 (a) defend in his name and behalf any suit against the Insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the Company shall have the right to make such investigation negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as may be deemed expedient by the Company. 24 The case was tried by the Court, in the absence of a jury. From a Final Judgment for the Hannas awarding damages for these items in the amount of $6,872.75, Aetna took this appeal. The judgment is based on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed by the trial Judge, which are bottomed upon the following Conclusion of Law: 25 1. The occurrence of an injury causing destruction to property rights of another creating an obligation by law to compensate therefor determines the liability of an insurer thereof, rather than the election of remedies pursued by the party injured; and the injury in this case suffered by the adjoining lot owners was covered by the provisions of the policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs. 26 For reasons we will attempt to set forth, we entirely disagree. 27 An insuring obligation is a contract, and coverage exists only if assumed by the terms of the policy. 1 To determine the question of coverage and duty to defend, we should look to the policy to see if coverage is provided against mandatory injunctive orders. We conclude: that it is not; that to so construe the policy is to do violence to its plain and unambiguous provisions, and to wholly ignore large portions of the context in which words are used. 28 Insofar as coverage is concerned, the obligation is solely to pay, not to remove fill dirt, rocks and boulders, under Court order or otherwise. It is equally unreasonable to view the obligation as providing reimbursement to the Insured, for the undertaking is to pay on behalf of the Insured whatever he shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law    for damages because of injury to or destruction of property,   . 29 Clearly, the policy covers only payments to third persons when those persons have a legal claim for damages against the Insured on account of injury to or destruction of property. The obligation of the insurer to pay is limited to damages, a word which has an accepted technical meaning in law. Black's Law Dictionary (3d Ed.) p. 499 defines damages as: 30 A pecuniary compensation or indemnity which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment or injury, whether to his person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another 31 This is a far cry from the cost to unsuccessful litigants of complying with an injunctive decree. It is equally a far cry from the expenses incurred by those litigants in resisting a Chancery suit seeking such a decree. 32 Again, in Florida, as in most common law states, the measure of damages in an action for trespass to lands, (or trespass quare clausum fregit, as the old form of action was called) is the difference in value of the lands before and after the trespass. 2 So, if the Martins had elected to sue Dr. and Mrs. Hanna at law, for damages, giving rise under the policy coverage to an obligation by Aetna to pay (and hence to defend), this would have been the measure of damages applied, not the cost of removing the rocks and other fill materials, and building a bulkhead. The complete dissimilarity is obvious. Indeed, for aught that appears in this record, the Martin lands may have been more, rather than less, valuable after the accretion of materials from Dr. Hanna's lot. In this case, the Martins, of course, would have been denied any damages other than nominal. 33 It need hardly be pointed out that under the quoted policy provisions the obligation to defend is limited by, and coextensive with, the obligation to pay. The obligation here is to defend in his name and behalf any suit against the Insured alleging such injury,    and seeking damages on account thereof,   . Therefore, it may not be successfully contended that the costs incurred in defending the Chancery suit are recoverable even though the costs and expense of complying with the injunction are not. 34 Appellant has cited to us a well-reasoned case recently decided by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Desrochers v. New York Casualty Co., 99 N. H. 129, 106 A.2d 196. It is on all fours with the case at bar, and the policy provisions, insofar as quoted, are identical. In the interest of space, we do not quote Desrochers, but we cite with approval its reasoning and the result reached. 35 One additional matter requires comment. When the Martins' suit against the Hannas was transferred to the law side for ascertainment of damages, as pointed out earlier in this opinion, no notice thereof was given to Aetna until after verdict and judgment. 36 We conclude, first, that no obligation to defend ever existed, since the refusal to comply with the injunction was an intentional act, and the damages sought were expressly for failure to comply. Intentional injury was excluded by the terms of the policy, in this language: 37 Exclusions 38 This policy does not apply: 39 (c) to injury, sickness, disease, death or destruction caused intentionally by or at the direction of the Insured. 40 We conclude, further, that if the policy provisions conceivably are broad enough to cover a defense of this action, the failure to notify Aetna when the case was transferred to the law side, and the Hannas' defense of the action on the law side on their own initiative, clearly breached the notice and cooperation provisions of the policy. In this respect, the policy provided: 41 3. Notice of Claim or Suit Coverage A 42 If claim is made or suit is brought against the Insured, the Insured shall immediately forward to the Company every demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative. 43 4. Assistance and Cooperation of the Insured Coverage A. 44 The Insured shall cooperate with the Company and, upon the Company's request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of suits. The Insured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense other than for such immediate medical and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time of the accident. (Emphasis supplied.) 45 No waiver or condonation of this breach appears from the record. 46 For either, or both, of the two reasons given, it is clear that as to the portion of the Hannas' recovery based upon the costs and expenses incurred in litigating this phase of the State Court suit, no differentiation should be made. The Hannas are no better off as to this portion than as to the balance of their judgment. 47 This, then is to say that no part of the Hannas' recovery under the judgment below may be permitted to stand. The judgment of the trial Court is reversed and remanded, with directions to dismiss plaintiffs'-appellees' suit, and to enter Final Judgment for the defendant-appellant, Aetna. 48 Reversed.