Opinion ID: 1715519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: guidelines for asserting claims of attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine

Text: Wal-Mart next asserts that the district court erred in ordering it to produce certain documents that it claims were protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-503 (Reissue 1995) (attorney-client privilege) states in pertinent part: A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (a) between himself or his representative and his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or ... (e) between lawyers representing the client. See, also, Canon 4, DR 4-101, of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Neb. Ct. R. of Discovery 26(b)(3) (rev. 1996) (work product doctrine) states in summary that a party may refuse to disclose documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial. This court has not previously been called upon to set out the burden of proof or the standard of review with regard to the applicability of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. We determine that the party asserting the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine has the burden of proving that the documents sought are protected. See, McCarthy v. Klein, ___ A.D.2d ___, 656 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1997); Dietz v. Doe, 131 Wash.2d 835, 935 P.2d 611 (1997). See, also, Branch v. Wilkinson, 198 Neb. 649, 256 N.W.2d 307 (1977) (addressing burden of proof with regard to physician-patient privilege). It is true that on appellate review, decisions regarding discovery are generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See, Blair v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 242 Neb. 652, 496 N.W.2d 483 (1993); In re Interest of R.R., 239 Neb. 250, 475 N.W.2d 518 (1991). However, because the application of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine presents a primarily legal question, we determine our standard of review to be independent of the lower court's ruling. See, In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9(MIA), 899 F.2d 1039 (11th Cir.1990); Tornay v. U.S., 840 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir.1988). Having set forth the burden of proof and the standard of review, our next task is to set forth the procedures and guidelines for asserting and addressing claims of the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. Although we have not adopted a rule equivalent to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 26(b)(5), a number of federal courts have addressed the problems inherent in the mechanics of asserting the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. The dilemmas faced by courts were succinctly addressed in Snowden by and Through Victor v. Connaught Lab., 137 F.R.D. 325, 333-34 (D.Kan.1991): [T]he question remains as to how the court can verify that what a party claims is attorney opinion work product is, indeed, what he claims it is. To put it another way, must the court accept, without inquiry, investigation or verification, the defendant's word that documents, records and other writings are, or contain, attorney opinion work product? To ask the question is to answer it. Thus, in establishing procedures and guidelines, courts must balance the asserting party's interest in not revealing protected material and the requesting party's interest in not being precluded from discovering material based solely upon the asserting party's unsubstantiated claims. The procedures that some courts have incorporated in an attempt to achieve this balance include the use of privilege logs, indexes, in camera review, et cetera. In an attempt to balance these competing interests, we set forth the following procedures and guidelines. In response to a motion to compel production, the asserting party must make out a prima facie claim that the privilege or doctrine applies. In order to fulfill this burden, the asserting party must submit a motion for protective order, in affidavit form, verifying the facts critical to the assertion of the privilege or doctrine. See Neb. Ct. R. of Discovery 26(c). The motion for protective order must (1) verify that it accurately describes each of the documents in question; (2) list the documents and provide a summary that includes (a) the type of document, (b) the subject matter of the document, (c) the date of the document, (d) the author of the document, and (e) each recipient of the document; and (3) state with specificity, in a nonconclusory manner, how each element of the asserted privilege or doctrine is met, to the extent possible, without revealing the information alleged to be protected. The party requesting the material must be given a full and fair opportunity to respond to the motion for protective order. Then, if the district court determines that the party asserting the privilege or doctrine has failed to make out a prima facie claim, it shall order the asserting party to produce the documents. Conversely, if the district court determines that the asserting party has made out a prima facie claim, then it shall (1) order the alleged protected material produced to the court, (2) order the asserting party to submit an index directing the court to the specific portions of each of the listed documents that allegedly constitute protected material, (3) privately review the material outside the presence of all counsel, (4) make a determination of whether the material is protected, and (5) seal the material for purposes of appellate review. In the instant case, neither the affidavit of Glisson nor that of Lee asserts that the information contained in the requested documents includes confidential communications, as required by the attorney-client privilege. Thus, there is no basis for asserting the attorney-client privilege. The affidavits do state that the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation by Wal-Mart's attorneys, as required by the work product doctrine. However, the mere conclusory assertion of the privilege or doctrine in the words of the statute or rule is not sufficient. See, e.g., CSX Transp. Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 93-132-CIV-J-10, 1995 WL 855421 (M.D.Fla. July 20, 1995); Ventre v. Datronic Rental Corp., No. 92 C 3289, 1995 WL 42345 (N.D.Ill. Feb.2, 1995); IBM v. Phoenix Computers Associates, Civ. No. 5-92-CV-340, slip op. (D.Conn.1993); Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., Nos. 90 CIV. 6291(JMC), 90 CIV. 6292(JMC) & 92 CIV. 1667(JMC), 1992 WL 367070 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.20, 1992). In order to make out a prima facie claim of the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, the asserting party must state with specificity, in a nonconclusory manner, how each element of the privilege or doctrine is met, to the extent possible, without revealing the alleged protected information. From our independent review, we conclude that Wal-Mart failed to assert a prima facie claim of the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine and that thus, the district court was not obligated to privately review the documents or seal them for appellate review. Accordingly, the district court did not err in ordering the documents produced during discovery.