Opinion ID: 3002024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Leon Question

Text: On appeal Woolsey renews his argument that he was entitled to suppression because, according to Woolsey, Leon’s good-faith exception cannot save the search warrant. The government takes up the Leon question as well but does not probe whether probable cause supported the warrant—the preceding question. A faulty warrant and an illegal search do not necessarily entitle a defendant to suppression of evidence. United States v. Mykytiuk, 402 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court announced in Leon, 468 U.S. at 923-26, that suppression is inappropriate if the police officers who executed a later-invalidated search warrant did so in good faith. Leon’s rationale is plain: the exclusionary rule is designed to deter future unlawful police misconduct. Inherent in Leon’s exception to the exclusionary rule is “the view that permitting people to get away with crime is too high a price to pay for errors that . . . stem from negligence rather than disdain for constitutional requirements.” United States v. CazaresOlivas, 515 F.3d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 2008). An officer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence of good faith. United States v. Otero, 495 F.3d 393, 398 (7th Cir. 2007); Mykytiuk, 402 F.3d at 777. A defendant may rebut this presumption by showing that the judge who issued the warrant abandoned his neutral, detached role and acted as a rubber stamp for the police, or that the affiant intentionally or recklessly misled the judge, or that the supporting affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that an officer’s belief in its existence would have been entirely unreason12 Nos. 06-4058 & 06-4213 able, or that the warrant itself is so facially deficient that the executing officers could not reasonably have believed it to be valid. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; Otero, 495 F.3d at 398. We review de novo the legal conclusion that a law enforcement officer reasonably relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. See United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 865 (7th Cir. 2002). Woolsey contends that Babcock could not have ob- tained the warrant in good faith because his affidavit conveys false information and omits significant facts that undermine probable cause—all in an effort to deceive the issuing judge. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. Woolsey identifies two allegedly false statements in the affidavit: that Tuell provided Chastain information about Woolsey’s supplier and that he also reported the presence of marijuana in Woolsey’s home. Woolsey’s brief catalogues a number of purported omissions as well: that Chastain and Babcock threatened Tuell with arrest before he provided any information, that Tuell was a known drug dealer, and that Tuell’s earlier cooperation with law enforcement was an isolated incident over a decade ago. Woolsey’s list is not enough to win his appeal, however. In order to prevail, a defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the affidavit contained false or misleading information, that the deceptive information was included intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, and that the information in question was essential to the finding of probable cause. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56; United States v. Hoffman, 519 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2008). Because material omissions can be equally deceptive, a defendant may also challenge an affidavit by showing Nos. 06-4058 & 06-4213 13 that the affiant intentionally or recklessly omitted material information. See Hoffman, 519 F.3d at 675. Woolsey’s challenge falters because he did not establish any intentional or reckless falsehood or omission in the affidavit. Woolsey argued before the district court that the statements about marijuana and about Woolsey’s drug source are false because, at the suppression hearing, Tuell denied making them to Chastain. But Chastain testified at the same hearing that Tuell did tell him about the marijuana and Woolsey’s source. And the district court did not choose to credit one account over another because the court found that any erroneous information included in Chastain’s affidavit was inadvertent and not reckless. On this point Woolsey is silent, and we are unpersuaded by his suggestion that the court clearly erred in its finding. See United States v. Biggs, 491 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Salyers, 160 F.3d 1152, 1161-62 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing that judge’s credibility determination at Franks hearing is “entitled to a great deal of deference”). As to the omissions, Woolsey also failed to develop any argument before the district court that Babcock intentionally or recklessly deceived the issuing judge. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56; United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 648-49 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Garey, 329 F.3d 573, 577-78 (7th Cir. 2003). Indeed, some of Woolsey’s proposed omissions are factually infirm. For example, at the suppression hearing Babcock, Chastain, and Tuell denied any threat of arrest. More importantly, Woolsey did not examine, in any depth, whether the omitted information would have been material to the determination of probable cause. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 15514 Nos. 06-4058 & 06-4213 56. Instead Woolsey identified three facts—some of them disputed—that he believes Babcock should have included in the affidavit. Woolsey then assumes that their omission was a deliberate act that deceived the issuing judge into a finding of probable cause. We require more to rebut the presumption of good faith. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56; Garey, 329 F.3d at 577-78. Woolsey had a second suppression theory before the district court, although he abandoned it prematurely. His argument was, essentially, that the affidavit did not establish probable cause and therefore suppression was appropriate. But that ignores Leon altogether. The very point of that decision is that suppression does not necessarily follow from a determination that probable cause was lacking. The question of probable cause is only the first step, and on this question the district court agreed with Woolsey that probable cause was absent. The next step for Woolsey was to argue that the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that an officer’s belief in its existence would have been completely unreasonable. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; Koerth, 312 F.3d at 868. Woolsey never made this argument, but it would have failed in any event. A defendant can establish unreasonable reliance only if courts have clearly held that a materially similar affidavit previously failed to establish probable cause under facts that were indistinguishable from those presented in the case at hand [or] the affidavit is so plainly deficient that any reasonably well-trained officer would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant. Nos. 06-4058 & 06-4213 15 Koerth, 312 F.3d at 869 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The first possibility is out. We cannot say that courts have clearly held that this affidavit—which states that a reliable informant spied a specific quantity of drugs inside of a drug dealer’s residence within the past week and police officers corroborated at least some of the informant’s allegations—is insufficient. Cf. United States v. Garcia, 528 F.3d 481, 486-88 (7th Cir. 2008); Owens v. United States, 387 F.3d 607, 608 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 757-58 (7th Cir. 2003). Nor can we say that the affidavit is so plainly deficient that Babcock should have known that it would not amount to probable cause. Again, the document conveys considerable detail, including the extent to which Chastain and Babcock had corroborated Tuell’s statements, the firsthand observations of Tuell, and the amount of time that had passed since Tuell saw the drugs. See Koerth, 312 F.3d at 868.