Opinion ID: 612670
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Six-Element Test

Text: Applying the six-element test articulated above to Pérez-Cordero's claim, we find that summary judgment is unwarranted. First, there can be no doubt, and Wal-Mart does not dispute, that Pérez-Cordero is a member of a protected class. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (Title VII's prohibition of discrimination `because of ... sex' protects men as well as women. (alteration in original)). Second, Pérez-Cordero has presented sufficient evidence to raise several genuine issues of material fact with respect to the remaining elements.
Pérez-Cordero explained in his deposition testimony that he initially sought to avoid Santiago's attention by lying about his lunch locations, and that, when Santiago escalated her pursuit by overtly propositioning him, he twice responded with a clear and unequivocal rejection. We disagree with the district court that Pérez-Cordero's acquiescence to the customary greeting among employees  a kiss on the cheek  is in any way probative of his receptiveness to Santiago forcefully sucking on his neck. Additionally, the record contains no evidence that Pérez-Cordero welcomed the inequitable work assignments, public scolding, private threats, and attempted disciplinary action that constitutes much of the remainder of his claim.
We have previously explained that, when harassment is motivated by a failed attempt to establish a romantic relationship, the victim's sex is inextricably linked to the harasser's decision to harass. Forrest v. Brinker Int'l Payroll Co., 511 F.3d 225, 229 (1st Cir.2007). Moreover, Santiago's own comment to Benítez suggesting that she had sexually aroused Pérez-Cordero by sucking on his neck sufficiently conveys that her conduct was at least slightly sexual. Contrary to the implication in the district court's decision, Pérez-Cordero is not required to demonstrate that Santiago's act was motivated by sexual desire, Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, but merely that the harassment was gender-specific. Forrest, 511 F.3d at 229. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Pérez-Cordero, a jury could reasonably conclude that Santiago was attempting to humiliate Pérez-Cordero, as she had when she scolded him the previous day, through an unwelcome public act of sexual aggressiveness. Cf. Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 20 (1st Cir.2002) (considering, as evidence of a hostile work environment, that a supervisor criticized [the plaintiff's] work unfairly, sometimes embarrassing her by yelling at her in front of her co-workers). Thus viewed, Santiago's conduct is unquestionably a gender-specific form of harassment. Cf. Oakstone v. Postmaster Gen., 332 F.Supp.2d 261, 271-272 (D.Me.2004) (concluding that a false allegation of physical abuse filed by a female employee against her male co-worker was gender-specific harassment because it exploited sensitivities to male-on-female violence) (cited with approval in Forrest, 511 F.3d at 230 n. 5). The fact that not all of the complained-of conduct has obvious sexual connotations does not diminish the force of the evidence indicating gender-based animus. Rosario v. Dep't of the Army, 607 F.3d 241, 248 (1st Cir.2010).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the scope of Title VII's prohibition on sex-based discrimination covers more than `terms and conditions in the narrow contractual sense.' Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78, 118 S.Ct. 998). Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399. Nevertheless, harassment that does not directly result in tangible changes in employment  hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits, Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257  must be severe and pervasive enough to bring the complained-of conduct within Title VII's requirement that workplace sex discrimination affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69, 106 S.Ct. 2399. Although the district court properly identified relevant factors from our precedents when it concluded that there was no indication that Santiago's conduct was frequent, increased in severity, or interfered with Pérez-Cordero's work performance, it applied those factors far too rigidly. See Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 48 (1st Cir.2008). The district court's conclusions also reflect a basic misapprehension of Pérez-Cordero's claim. The single kissing incident on which the district court focused does not constitute the entirety of Pérez-Cordero's hostile environment claim, but rather stands as just one example of Santiago's retaliatory tactics  in this instance, an effort to humiliate him in front of a co-worker. At this stage in the litigation, it is our responsibility to evaluate Pérez-Cordero's claim of harassment in light of the record as a whole and mindful of the totality of the circumstances. Cf. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)). We have said that the hostility vel non of a workplace does not depend on any particular kind of conduct, Billings, 515 F.3d at 48 (holding that a supervisor's harassment of his employee was sufficiently severe and pervasive even though the conduct alleged did not include touching, sexual advances, or `overtly sexual comments to or about her'), and that [t]here is no precise formula for establishing sufficiently egregious conditions. Rosario, 607 F.3d at 246. Nor do particular factors that contributed to our finding a hostile work environment in prior cases set a baseline against which future cases must be measured. Accord Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 606 (2d Cir.2006). As set forth above, Pérez-Cordero offered evidence describing both an initial period in which Santiago pursued him romantically and a subsequent months-long campaign of retaliation by Santiago as punishment for his rejection of her advances. Santiago threatened Pérez-Cordero with a negative evaluation, attempted to initiate a formal disciplinary proceeding against him, supervised his work scrupulously, and berated his performance in front of his co-workers. Cf. Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2003) (finding sufficient evidence of severe and pervasive harassment in series of incidents of undeserved or excessive discipline); Marrero, 304 F.3d at 20 (same). She assigned to him tasks that were physically demanding and that excluded him from staff meetings and training opportunities. Cf. O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 729 (1st Cir.2001) ([W]here a plaintiff endures harassing conduct, although not explicitly sexual in nature, which undermines her ability to succeed at her job, those acts should be considered along with overtly sexually abusive conduct in assessing a hostile work environment claim.). Wal-Mart contends, however, that additional undisputed facts in the record clearly demonstrate that any harassment by Santiago was not severe or pervasive enough to interfere with Pérez-Cordero's performance of his work. In particular, Wal-Mart emphasizes that Pérez-Cordero was offered a promotion (which he declined), was eventually paid for his unused vacation time, and generally received positive performance evaluations. These actions do not negate the impact of Santiago's conduct on Pérez-Cordero's day-to-day work conditions. Nor does Pérez-Cordero's perseverance in staying on the job undermine his claim of sexual harassment. We have never required an employee to falter under the weight of an abusive work environment before his or her claim becomes actionable. See Billings, 515 F.3d at 51 (The fact that Billings managed to get her work done ... is by no means fatal to her hostile environment claim.). In short, the conduct described by Pérez-Cordero is sufficiently severe and pervasive to have altered the terms or conditions of his employment with Wal-Mart.
Santiago's harassment of Pérez-Cordero involved non-consensual physical contact, embarrassing sexual remarks, public scolding, exclusion from meetings and training opportunities, threats of discipline, and an assignment to him of those tasks generally regarded as least desirable. Pérez-Cordero's complaint, his deposition testimony, notes taken in the September 29, 2000, meeting, and other record evidence all reveal that Santiago's harassment caused Pérez-Cordero to suffer psychologically and emotionally. On September 28, he was sent home from work because he was not emotionally well. As early as September 29, he reported insomnia and stated that he was taking medication to enable him to sleep. He subsequently reported insomnia, anxiety, and depression to his doctor, began seeing a counselor, and was prescribed various medications to combat these symptoms. It is clear on the record before us that Pérez-Cordero experienced Santiago's conduct as genuinely offensive. We cannot say, as the district court did, that a reasonable person in his position would disagree with that subjective assessment. See id. at 47.
An employer is liable when a supervisor's conduct creates a hostile work environment for employees unless the employer can demonstrate that it is entitled to the Faragher-Ellerth defense. Agusty-Reyes, 601 F.3d at 53. The Faragher-Ellerth defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. We agree with the district court that Wal-Mart cannot make that showing here. In light of Pérez-Cordero's repeated and undisputed complaints to Wal-Mart's management throughout September and October of 2000, Wal-Mart cannot satisfy its summary judgment burden on the second element of the defense. Therefore, at this stage in the litigation, Pérez-Cordero has sufficiently demonstrated a basis for Wal-Mart's liability as Santiago's employer.