Opinion ID: 870353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Actual Reason Behind Condemnation 2 was to Avoid Liability Under the Development Agreement

Text: As to Coupe's first assertion that [a]t the time County was considering and adopting Resolution 31-03, the Development Agreement ... appeared to be in full force and effect[,] neither the County nor Oceanside argues to the contrary. However, the fact that the Development Agreement existed at the time that Condemnation 2 was instituted, as discussed supra, does not in and of itself require a finding of pretext. While Coupe asserts that the County's true purpose in proceeding with Condemnation 2 was to comply with its obligations under the Development Agreement, the court's Supplemental FOF 19 of its Supplemental FOFCOL as to Condemnation 2 found that [n]o evidence supporting this contention was presented at trial. Coupe challenges this finding, arguing that it does not reflect the undisputed evidence in the record of overwhelmingly private benefit, and lack of public benefit from Condemnation 2. However, other than Coupe's assertion, there is no support in the record on remand that complying with the Development Agreement predominated over the public purpose of building a traffic corridor for the public at large traveling through the Kona area. Instead, the record suggests that at least some of the council members believed that the County was not in breach of the Development Agreement and that Condemnation 2 was necessary to build the Bypass for the general public. For example, the minutes of the January 7, 2003 public hearing on Resolution 31-03, reflect that one council member stated: I'm going to vote against [Resolution 31-03] [], although the need for the road is enormous, the people in Kona do need it. What I see is that we're being having [sic] to pay multiple times for this road. We've carried out our portion of the development agreement. I think that we don't need to carry out any further parts of this. The ball should be in Hokulia or [Oceanside's] court, and they should be taking care of these costs. Thank you. (Emphasis added.) Another council member asserted: I'll be supporting the resolution. We need to get this road moving; and if it requires that the County condemn and pay for some of the property in order to get this road done in the interest of the general public so that we have an alternative highway, because of the terrible traffic conditions in Kona; I think that we need to do this; and that we need to show our resolve in getting this road built. (Emphasis added.) Further, another council member declared: I, too, will be supporting [Resolution 31-03]. When I ran for election, part of my promise was that I'd do everything that I could to improve the road situation in Kona; and believe me, when I was going door to door, that was the biggest concern of the people. And to not do everything we can do would be derelict, in my opinion; and particularly for me, since this is in the heart of my district. (Emphasis added.) As noted before, Coupe argues that even if saving County from breach of the Development Agreement was only a `side' benefit[,] an unrevealed side benefit is sufficient to show that the County's professed reason for Condemnation 2 was not the actual reason[.] However, Coupe cites no authority for this proposition. [G]reat weight is accorded to legislative findings and declarations of public use and a heavy burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that the use was clearly and palpably of a private character. Coupe I, 119 Hawai'i at 374-75, 198 P.3d at 637-38 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Consequently, the argument that a side benefit[,] even if not advanced[,] should automatically establish that the government's professed reason for condemnation is not the actual reason, is not persuasive.