Opinion ID: 6331449
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Review

Text: Following the magistrate judge’s decision, C.M. filed a motion for review by an associate judge of the Superior Court. 3 C.M. argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the findings of neglect under either subsection (9)(A)(ii) or (9)(A)(iv), because her two failures to pick Z.M. up from day care did not show a lack of care or concern for the child or an unwillingness or inability to assume parental responsibility. 2 The magistrate judge stated, “I find the mother’s testimony troubling in terms of sitting here today, not understanding that there were two incidents where her child went into CFSA’s custody because she failed to properly plan for someone to pick up . . . I’m not sure that you make plans for someone who you don’t know their last name to pick up this child on two different occasions . . . [it] happening again shortly thereafter, leaves me to believe that she doesn’t really understand the circumstances that she finds herself in . . . .” 3 See D.C. Code § 11-1732(k); Sup. Ct. Gen. Fam. R. (D)(e)(1)(A). 11 When reviewing a magistrate judge’s judgment after a bench trial, an associate judge acts in an appellate capacity, applying the same standards this court applies in reviewing trial court decisions. 4 The reviewing judge may not set aside the judgment “except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” 5 The burden is on the District in a child neglect proceeding to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is neglected within the meaning of D.C. Code § 16-2301. 6 In considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a magistrate judge’s finding of neglect, the reviewing judge, like this court, “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the District and draw every reasonable inference in the District’s favor.” 7 4 In re Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670 (D.C. 1993); Weiner v. Weiner, 605 A.2d 18, 20 (D.C. 1992). 5 D.C. Code §17-305(a) (2012 Repl.); see, e.g., In re A.B., 999 A.2d 36, 44 (D.C. 2010). Accordingly, while questions of law are subject to de novo consideration on review, the magistrate judge’s credibility assessments and factual findings must be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous. 6 In re N.P., 882 A.2d 241, 247 (D.C. 2005). 7 In re E.H., 718 A.2d 162, 168-69 (D.C. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 In this case, the reviewing judge held the magistrate judge was “plainly wrong” in adjudicating Z.M. a neglected child under either subsection (9)(A)(ii) or subsection (9)(A)(iv) for three reasons: First, the reviewing judge reasoned, “[t]o evaluate the child’s condition for a neglect finding under subsection (ii), the trial court’s inquiry must go beyond simply examining the most recent episode, or a single snapshot, and instead must consider the entire mosaic in making its determination.” 8 But here, the reviewing judge found, “[t]he trial court did not consider, and nowhere was it presented with, the ‘entire mosaic’ of the child’s care.” Rather, the magistrate judge found Z.M. neglected based on only “[t]wo incidents in ten days,” which the reviewing judge characterized as “the very definition of a ‘snapshot’ rather than a mosaic.” The government failed, the judge held, to shoulder its “burden to show a broader picture of neglect.” Second, the reviewing judge stated, “[e]ven assuming these two instances were serious enough to constitute neglect under D.C. Code § 16-2301, the record lacks any detail of the child’s condition as a result,” i.e., “the actual effect these 8 Quoting In re P.B., 54 A.3d 660, 666 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 13 incidents had on Z.M.” A “neglect finding under D.C. Code § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii),” the judge reasoned, “is to remedy the effect on the child, not to punish the mother.” Third, the reviewing judge concluded that the magistrate judge erred by finding that Z.M. was a neglected child within the meaning of subsection (9)(A)(iv) without having evidence and making a finding that C.M. herself (as opposed to the day care center) had stated an intention to discontinue caring for Z.M. Dismissing the magistrate judge’s finding that “the mother, by failing to pick her child up, ‘demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to provide care,’” the reviewing judge said “[t]hat may be a logical inference from her actions, but it is not a stated intention.” Accordingly, the reviewing judge granted C.M.’s motion for review and vacated the magistrate judge’s order. Pursuant to D.C. Code § 16-2317(b)(2), the court dismissed the neglect petition and ordered Z.M. released to live with C.M. However, the District filed a timely appeal.