Opinion ID: 578193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Second Motion for New Trial

Text: 25 The jury returned the verdict in this case on December 10, 1990. On December 13, Haddock filed a timely motion for new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. That motion did not raise the Ex Post Facto Clause and ineffective assistance claims that Haddock argues on appeal. On February 7, 1991, the court entered an order denying Haddock's motion for new trial. On February 11, Haddock--represented by new counsel--filed a motion for leave to supplement his motion for new trial and to extend the time for filing his motion for new trial. On February 19, Haddock filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, to arrest judgment and for a new trial. In this motion, Haddock asserted additional grounds to justify a new trial, including that his conviction under Count 10 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Based on the rationale that it lacked jurisdiction to grant either motion, the district court denied both of these motions. 26 On appeal, defendant argues that the district court erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider and grant these two motions. We review de novo a district court's determination that it had no jurisdiction to address a party's motion or claim. See Walden v. Bartlett, 840 F.2d 771, 772-73 (10th Cir.1988). 27 Haddock contends that, under United States v. Miller, 869 F.2d 1418 (10th Cir.1989), the district court had jurisdiction to consider the two motions. In Miller, we held that a motion to reconsider the denial of a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 is timely if filed within ten days of the entry of judgment or order. Id. at 1421 (emphasis added). In this case, however, neither of defendant's motions--dated February 11 and February 19--was tantamount to a motion to reconsider the court's denial of the initial motion for new trial. Instead, the two motions were an attempt to have the court consider a new motion for new trial that asserted numerous grounds not asserted in the original new trial motion. Rule 33 clearly states that a motion for new trial not based on newly discovered evidence must be filed within seven days after a jury's verdict. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. Because these two motions were filed some two months after the jury's verdict, we agree with the district court that they were not timely under Rule 33. 28 Haddock also argues that the district court had jurisdiction to hear his ineffective assistance of counsel claim even though the claim was not raised in a motion for new trial within seven days after the verdict. He asserts that evidence of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel should be considered newly discovered evidence under Rule 33, thereby allowing a defendant to raise the claim in a new trial motion any time within two years after the verdict. Although Haddock correctly points out that the circuits are split over the issue, he fails to note that in United States v. Miller--a case that he cites elsewhere in his brief--we held that [i]neffective assistance of counsel may not serve as the basis for a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence under Rule 33 where the facts alleged in support of the motion were within the defendant's knowledge at the time of trial. 869 F.2d at 1421. All other circuits except one that have addressed the issue have arrived at the same conclusion. See United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 488-89 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Lema, 909 F.2d 561, 565 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Ugalde, 861 F.2d 802, 806 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1097, 109 S.Ct. 2447, 104 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1989); United States v. Brown, 742 F.2d 363, 368 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Dukes, 727 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Lara-Hernandez, 588 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1978). But see United States v. Brown, 476 F.2d 933, 935 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1973). Based on Miller, we hold that Haddock's ineffective assistance claim was not raised in a timely motion for new trial. 29 Haddock further argues that the jurisdictional bar imposed by Rule 33 should not apply to his second motion for new trial because the motion refers to facts not known to him at the time of trial. We disagree. The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this case was that counsel failed to raise several legal defenses, failed to effectively cross-examine witnesses, and generally failed to perform effectively at trial. These facts, related to the adequacy of counsel's trial performance, were available to defendant at the time of trial. See Miller, 869 F.2d at 1422. 30 Haddock contends that even if the ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not survive the jurisdictional bar of Rule 33, we should not dismiss this action but instead remand the case to allow him to collaterally attack the conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We find no basis--and defendant provides us with none--for his request that we remand the case for collateral attack on these grounds. Haddock must seek collateral review of the conviction in a separate action. 31 The district court's failure to address defendant's Ex Post Facto Clause claim was harmless error. With respect to the remainder of the arguments raised in defendant's post-trial motions of February 11 and February 19, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the motions as untimely under Rule 33.