Opinion ID: 196931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence Damages

Text: 5 Air Safety contends that the jury's negligence awards far exceed the record evidence of damage. It maintains that the RCAB established only $21,672 in damages, while the jury awarded $235,000. It further claims that the Institute's proven damages totaled only $85,894, compared with a jury award of $138,000. The district court rejected Air Safety's request through a motion for new trial to revisit the issue of negligence damages, and Air Safety now urges us to find that that ruling was erroneous. 6 Our review is narrow. A district court's denial of a motion for new trial may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 780 (1st Cir.1996).  'In a challenge to a jury award, [the appellate court] is limited to examining whether evidence in the record supports the verdict. If the jury award has a rational basis in evidence, we must affirm it.'  Nydam v. Lennerton, 948 F.2d 808, 810-11 (1st Cir.1991) (quoting O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067, 1076 (1st Cir.1986)). Under Massachusetts law, uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not bar their recovery, see Stuart v. Town of Brookline, 412 Mass. 251, 587 N.E.2d 1384, 1387 (1992), but a plaintiff  'must establish [its] claim upon a solid foundation in fact, and cannot recover when any essential element is left to conjecture, surmise or hypothesis,'  Snelling & Snelling of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Wall, 345 Mass. 634, 189 N.E.2d 231, 232 (1963) (quoting John Hetherington & Sons, Ltd. v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 95 N.E. 961, 964 (1911)). See also Hendricks & Assocs., Inc. v. Daewoo Corp., 923 F.2d 209, 217 (1st Cir.1991); Puritan Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Cashman, 413 Mass. 167, 596 N.E.2d 1004, 1013 (1992). 7 Despite the confines of our inquiry, our examination of the trial transcript requires us to conclude that the negligence awards cannot stand. The evidence in the record fails to substantiate the amounts imposed; even a generous reading of the testimony supports only a small portion of the damages beyond those conceded by Air Safety on appeal. We discuss separately the results of our study with respect to each defendant. 8 The RCAB. Air Safety contends that the record supports only $21,672 in damages for the cost of a temporary boiler at St. Theresa's school. The jury awarded $235,000. Our search revealed three additional items that the jury could have attributed to Air Safety's negligence: extra clean-up work by custodians at St. Theresa's for which Rev. Helmick testified that he paid a lot; damage to a clock and bell system; and $7,400 for painting at St. William's school. No amounts for either the custodial time or the clock repair were presented to the jury, although the district court reported in a June 20, 1990 Order on the parties' summary judgment motions that those items were alleged to cost $4,377 and $272.50, respectively. 9 We think it within reason for the jury to choose to compensate the RCAB for these asserted harms, despite the lack of testimony on specific dollar amounts. 6 This is not the sort of conjecture barred by Massachusetts law in calculating damages, but simply a matter of imprecision with respect to the amount for a specifically identified harm. The gap challenged by Air Safety, however, is far greater than any reasonable figure attributable to these additional harms. We think an appropriate recovery for them would be the amounts previously identified by the RCAB, totaling $12,049.50. 10 The RCAB points to one additional expense that the jury may have attributed to Air Safety: the $57,971.80 difference between the contract price for Mission High School and the combined amount of Air Safety's account stated claim for Mission and the amount paid to a new contractor to complete the work left unfinished by Air Safety. In other words, the RCAB contends that the record showed that it paid nearly $58,000 more for asbestos removal at Mission High School than the Air Safety contract price. 11 We have two problems with this contention. First, this differential amount between the original contract price and the amount actually expended to get the job done is classically breach of contract damages. The jury, however, awarded no damages for the breach. 7 12 Second, and more significantly, there was no testimony or argument at trial concerning the $58,000. In closing, the RCAB's attorney pointed out (consistent with Rev. Ryan's testimony) that it cost $105,000 to complete the contract work left unfinished by Air Safety; he did not assert, however, that that amount represented higher charges for work Air Safety had contracted to perform for less. Although the original contract amount and Air Safety's account stated claim both were contained in trial exhibits, there was no basis for the jurors to have made the calculation now offered by the RCAB to undergird its award without the crucial $58,000 figure having been explained to them. 13 We think it likely that the huge discrepancy between the damages actually proven and the amount awarded stems from the jury's effort to compensate the RCAB and the parents and students attending the five affected schools for the trouble caused by Air Safety's negligent work. Beyond the fact that the RCAB has no claim to damages for discomfort suffered by others is the fact that this case involves property damage, not personal injury. See generally Guaranty-First Trust Co. v. Textron, 416 Mass. 332, 622 N.E.2d 597, 599 (1993) (under common law, if injury to property is reasonably curable by repairs, the expense of repairs, if less than diminished market value, is the measure of recovery); Michael B. Bogdanow, Massachusetts Tort Damages § 9.03 (1995). It goes without saying that a breach of contract or the negligent performance of a contractual obligation will impose burdens on the wronged party, but compensation is limited to making that party whole. 8 14 Moreover, even if harm in the nature of pain and suffering were compensable in this context, such damages would be rank speculation here. No testimony was presented of specific intangible injuries to the RCAB or its officials as a result of Air Safety's conduct. The general reference in counsel's closing argument to frustration, aggravation, and inconvenience--by-products of any tort or breach of contract--is far from the solid foundation in fact, Snelling & Snelling, 189 N.E.2d at 232, necessary to support an award of damages. 9 15 We therefore conclude that, unless the RCAB agrees to a remittitur of $201,278.50--reducing its negligence damages to $33,721.50--Air Safety is entitled to a partial new trial. See Anthony, 17 F.3d at 495 (appellate court has the option of selecting a reduced damages figure or remanding to district court to determine damages). 16 The Institute. Air Safety acknowledges that the record supports an award of $85,894 in damages for a number of specific problems at Catholic Memorial High School, 10 but contends that no other figures were provided to explain the additional $52,106 awarded by the jury. Our review turned up three additional items for which the jury properly could have awarded compensation: replacing gymnasium light frames, repairing a broken piano leg, and replacing paneling in two rooms. The piano leg and light frames were the subject of testimony by Rev. Sheehan, and the need for repaneling was noted in Exhibit 58, to which the jury's attention was directed. 11 17 One more aspect of the Institute's harm warrants attention. Air Safety concedes responsibility for the $12,570 cost of repairing the gymnasium floor at Catholic Memorial. Kevin Murphy, whose company did the floor repair, testified that the process of sanding removes wood, and the gymnasium floor therefore was, to some degree, in worse condition after the repair than before the damage was done. When asked whether the deficiency would limit the use of the floor in future years, he responded that it would, considerably down the road. 18 We believe this testimony permitted the jury to award damages for the premature loss of use of the floor. Unfortunately, no value was placed on either this harm or the three items of damage listed above. Without question, however, the approximately $50,000 questioned by appellant is far in excess of the appropriate amount. The evidence was that a new floor would have cost $50,000 to $60,000; from that knowledge, we are confident that compensation for reducing the old floor's life-span considerably down the road could not reasonably amount to more than several thousand dollars. The other items, all of which appear to be relatively minor, might generously add up to $5,000. 19 Because our task is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, see Velazquez, 996 F.2d at 428, we conclude that the record supports a maximum award of $95,000 for all damages to the Institute. Thus, unless the Institute consents to a remittitur of $43,000, Air Safety is entitled to a partial new trial.