Opinion ID: 2382556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: And Gary. [38]

Text: To terminate parental rights, the superior court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has not within a reasonable time remedied the conduct or conditions that placed the child at substantial risk so that returning the child to the parent would place the child at substantial risk of physical or mental injury. [39] Acknowledging that it was a close[ ] call, the superior court found that Barbara had not remedied her conduct. Although she had formally complied with her case plan, completing substance abuse treatment, staying sober since Gary's birth, and completing domestic violence and parenting education, the court believed that she had not internalized what she ha[d] learned and there [was] no real assurance that [she would] not fall back into her old dysfunctional ways. We agree that this is a close question and believe that the deference accorded to a superior court's factual findings is particularly appropriate in close cases. Our review of the record does not leave us with a firm conviction that the superior court made a mistake in finding that Barbara failed to remedy her conduct. Initially, Barbara argues that because she complied with the recommendations of her OCS case plan, the superior court erred in finding that she had not adequately remedied her conduct. Even if Barbara had completed every element of her case plan, completion of a case plan does not guarantee a finding that she has remedied her conduct. [40] The question instead is whether she had remedied the problems that placed her children at risk and gained the necessary skills so that the children could be safely returned to her care. The superior court found that she had not. First and most significant to the superior court was its finding that Barbara had not adequately addressed her mental health problems and had failed to engage in consistent treatment as recommended by Dr. Long. The trial court found that Barbara's sporadic visits to Hammaker did not provide the kind of treatment recommended by Dr. Long. The trial court was further concerned about Barbara's false claim that she had seen Hammaker regularly since February 2006. The trial court concluded: Given [Barbara's] significant mental health and substance abuse history, the court found extremely troubling Ms. Hammaker's apparent position in testimony that there were no real concerns with respect to [Barbara's] mental health or that any treatment need only occur upon request by [Barbara]. The court also found troubling the fact that Ms. Hammaker would not communicate with the OCS workers in any meaningful manner, even though Ms. Hammaker's most recent evaluation of [Barbara] (May 12, 2009) indicated a continuing need for therapy, treatment, and support. The court accordingly concludes that Dr. Long's evaluation still is relevant and important and that [Barbara] has not received adequate services through Ms. Hammaker to address the concerns laid out in that evaluation. And until [Barbara] does so, she will not have remedied the substantial mental health issues that must be remedied before she can have full custody of her children. Barbara argues that the court incorrectly favored Dr. Long's testimony over Hammaker's and suggests that she is willing to continue to work with Hammaker or another mental health professional. But the superior court made its finding after weighing the testimony of both Dr. Long and Hammaker, as well as listening to Barbara. We cannot say that its finding was clearly erroneous. With respect to domestic violence, the superior court found that Barbara had not fully integrated what she has learned with respect to domestic violence. The court credited Dr. Long's conclusion that Barbara was predisposed to entering into volatile and abusive relationships, noting that notwithstanding her graduation from the WRRAP program, there had not been a concomitant change in [Barbara's] overall thinking, and she has yet fully to acknowledge the abuse she suffered. Indeed, the superior court questioned whether Barbara had permanently ended her relationship with Leo, finding it quite possible that [they] will re-initiate their relationship. Again, reviewing the record, we cannot say that the superior court's finding that Barbara failed to remedy her condition related to domestic violence was clearly erroneous. [41] With respect to substance abuse, the superior court found: [N]otwithstanding her graduation from substance abuse treatment, [Barbara] has not regularly attended 12-step meetings, maintained regular contact with a sponsor, or surrounded herself with individuals leading a lifestyle conducive to sobriety. And as noted above, she continued to minimize and even deny her drug use and abuse in her testimony. Under these circumstances, [Barbara] will require an extended period to prove her sobriety before it can reasonably be concluded that she really can and will live a clean and sober life. The superior court's finding that Barbara had been sober at least since Gary's birth, slightly less than six months preceding her termination trial, [42] does not preclude a finding that she had failed to remedy her substance abuse problem. For example, in Sherry R. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Division of Family & Youth Services, we affirmed a trial court's finding that a mother did not remedy her conduct related to drug use despite the fact that she had been sober for approximately a year before the termination trial, had been regularly attending AA meetings, and had maintained clean urinalysis results during that time period. [43] There, as here, the trial court properly relied on the mother's history of relapses and the questionable degree to which she accepted that she had a substance abuse problem. [44] The superior court's finding that Barbara had not remedied her conduct with respect to substance abuse was not clearly erroneous.
When terminating parental rights, OCS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to provide family support services designed to prevent out-of-home placement or enable the safe return of the child to the family home. [45] The superior court determined that OCS had made reasonable efforts, including: in-person reviews of the requirements of the case plan, referrals for substance abuse assessments and substance abuse treatment, drug testing, parenting classes, and domestic violence education, and consistent visitation, beginning immediately after Michael was taken into emergency custody. The superior court found that OCS's efforts fell short in two respects: it had at times been unable to provide Barbara with drug tests to prove her sobriety and it made absolutely no effort to provide visitation to [Leo] while he was incarcerated, a failure the court described as inexcusable. Despite these shortcomings, the court found that OCS had met its burden of reasonable efforts when looking at its reunification efforts in their entirety. While Barbara challenged this finding as a point on appeal and complains generally about OCS's failure to increase her visitation, she does not pursue this challenge in her briefing. Leo argues that given the superior court's finding that OCS's failure to provide him with visitation while he was incarcerated was inexcusable, it was error for the court to find that OCS had satisfied its burden of making reasonable efforts to reunify him and his children. He testified that he made numerous requests for visits while he was incarcerated, but OCS failed to provide these visits because of its lack of resources. In reviewing whether OCS made reasonable efforts, a court considers the state's reunification efforts in their entirety. [46] The court must first identify the problem that caused the children to be in need of aid and then determine whether OCS's efforts were reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. [47] Michael was first taken into OCS custody and adjudicated a child in need of aid based on substance abuse and domestic violence between Barbara and Leo. After Michael was removed, OCS developed a case plan for Leo that identified these problems and steps Leo should take to remedy them and made referrals for a mental health evaluation, a substance abuse assessment, drug testing, domestic violence classes, and parenting classes. Leo did not take advantage of these efforts and made little progress in completing his case plan requirements. OCS regularly updated the case plan, discussed its requirements with Leo, and continued to make referrals as well as arranging for supervised visits. Leo completed the parenting classes and substance abuse assessment, but not the domestic violence classes or substance abuse treatment. After Leo was incarcerated in September 2008, parenting and possibly domestic violence classes were available to him through the prison system. [48] Leo's only argument is that OCS failed to make reasonable efforts because, as the superior court found, OCS made no effort to provide Leo with visitation with his children when he was incarcerated between September 2008 and May 2009. While we agree with the superior court that OCS should make every reasonable effort to coordinate visitation where possible between incarcerated parents and their children, its failure to do so in this case does not preclude a finding that it made reasonable efforts for several reasons. First, the scope of OCS's duty to make reasonable efforts is affected by a parent's incarceration. In the context of an ICWA case where OCS bears a higher burden of making active reunification efforts, we have held: A parent's incarceration significantly affects the scope of the active efforts that the State must make to satisfy the statutory requirement. While neither incarceration nor doubtful prospects for rehabilitation will relieve the State of its duty under ICWA to make active remedial efforts, the practical circumstances surrounding a parent's incarcerationthe difficulty of providing resources to inmates generally, the unavailability of specific resources, and the length of incarcerationmay have a direct bearing on what active remedial efforts are possible. Thus, while the State cannot ignore its ICWA duties merely because of [the parent's] incarceration, his incarceration is a significant factor in our evaluation of the adequacy of the State's efforts in this case. [49] Moreover, we have affirmed a finding that OCS made reasonable efforts overall even when its efforts were not reasonable during a particular period of time. [50] And OCS made substantial efforts to help Leo address the specific problems that led to the removal of his children and now support the termination of his parental rightsdomestic violence and substance abuse. Given Leo's current incarceration, OCS's efforts to provide Leo with family support services when he was not in prison, and Leo's failure to make any changes necessary to achieve reunification, the superior court did not clearly err in finding that OCS's reunification efforts in their entirety were reasonable despite its failure to provide visitation in prison.
When terminating parental rights, a court shall consider the best interests of the child. [51] The court may order termination only if OCS proves by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. [52] The superior court found that terminating the parental rights of Barbara and Leo would promote the best interests of the children. In making this finding, the court relied on the fact that the children have spent most of their lives in foster care and [n]either of them have any real sense of their parents as parents, they are well bonded with their foster parents and think of their current placement as their `home,' and it would be traumatic to remove them from their present placement. The court found that neither parent was ready and able safely to parent these children at the conclusion of the termination trial, that they would not be ready within a reasonable time thereafter, and that returning either [child] to either parent would place them at risk of physical or mental injury. Given the children's need for permanency, the court concluded that it was in the children's best interests to terminate the parental rights of Barbara and Leo. Barbara argues that the superior court erred by failing to consider the best interest factors enumerated in AS 47.10.088, [53] which she contends weigh against termination. She also points to testimony by social workers that a bond exists between Barbara and her children as a result of regular and positive visits and that the termination of that bond would be traumatic. She takes issue with OCS's reliance on the fact that the children have spent most of their lives in foster care, given her view that OCS has not truly attempted to reunify her and her children. Leo argues that OCS failed to present evidence of the children's mental or emotional status or needs and that there was evidence presented of both the children's bond with Leo and Barbara and the parents' determination to change. The best interest factors listed in the statute are not exclusive and the superior court need not accord a particular weight to any given factor. Rather, the superior court is directed to consider the best interests of the child when deciding whether to terminate parental rights [54] and is permitted to consider any fact relating to the best interest of the child, including the statutory factors, when evaluating whether a parent has remedied his or her conduct. [55] The superior court properly considered the children's need for permanency, a crucial need for young children. [56] [T]he fact that a child has bonded with [the] foster parent can [also] be a factor in considering whether it is in the child's best interests to terminate a parent's rights. [57] The superior court did not err in determining that the termination of Barbara's and Leo's parental rights was in the best interests of Michael and Gary based on their need for permanency, the stability they enjoy in their foster home, and the fact that it found neither Barbara nor Leo would be ready to care for the children on a full-time basis within a reasonable period of time. [58]
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the superior court's termination of Barbara's and Leo's parental rights.