Opinion ID: 22209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity Is Inapplicable in Official-Capacity Actions

Text: 19 Appellants contend that the district court erred in not holding that the Houma Board and its members 7 were entitledto absolute quasi-judicial immunity in their official capacities. 8 This argument misconstrues the distinction between immunities available for individual-capacity 9 and official-capacity suits under § 1983. Finding that the district court applied the correct immunity principle for official-capacity suits, we seek only to reaffirm this distinction as it applies to the cases in this circuit. 20 Official-capacity suits . . . 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.' Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Accordingly, a § 1983 suit naming defendants only in their official capacity does not involve personal liability to the individual defendant. Concomitantly, defenses such as absolute quasi-judicial immunity, that only protect defendants in their individual capacities, are unavailable in official-capacity suits. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) ([T]he only immunities available to the defendant in an official-capacity action are those that the governmental entity possesses.); see also Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 998 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989) (Immunity does not bar suits against defendants in their official capacities.); Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999). 21 The Supreme Court clarified this distinction in Kentucky v. Graham and again in Hafer v. Melo, finding immunity to be inapplicable in § 1983 suits against government officials in their official capacity. 22 As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself. 23 Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (citations omitted); see also Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (reiterating the reasoning of Graham); Burge, 187 F.3d at 466 (Unlike government officials sued in their individual capacities, municipal entities and local governing bodies do not enjoy immunity from suit, either absolute or qualified, under § 1983.). 10 24 Appellants' contention that the Houma Board members should be granted absolute quasi-judicial immunity in their official capacities derives from a misreading of the case law in this circuit. To be fair, this circuit has not been explicit in articulating which capacity we have granted absolute quasi-judicial immunity; however, a precise reading of the cases relied on by appellants demonstrate that the holdings in Graham and Hafer have been consistently applied in this circuit and offer no support for the appellants' argument. 25 Appellants primarily rely on Mylett v. Mullican, 992 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity applies to civil service boards and their members in both individual and official capacities. Mylett was a Texas police officer who was suspended from the police force. Mylett alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as they related to the disciplinary proceedings surrounding his suspension. A 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 suit was brought against the police chief, three fellow police officers, the members and director of the civil service commission, and seven members of the city council. The civil service commissioners were sued in their individual and official capacities. The district court dismissed the personal-capacity claims against the civil service members on the basis of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Importantly, the suit against the municipality and the police chief was not dismissed and was tried to a jury. 26 In upholding the district court's dismissal on absolute quasi-immunity grounds, this court held that the individual Commissioners are entitled to absolute immunity for the performance of their official duties. Mylett, 992 F.2d at 1353 (emphasis added). Appellants erroneously interpret this to mean that the Houma Board members are immune in their official capacities. 27 The performance of official duties creates two potential liabilities, individual-capacity liability for the person and official-capacity liability for the municipality. Mylett only discussed the former, never addressing the latter because Mylett's suit against the municipality had already gone forward to the jury. In essence, his official-capacity suit against the members of the Civil Service Commission had already been accepted and had gone to the jury as a suit against the city. Because an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity, Graham, 473 U.S. at 166, and the entity at issue was the municipality, the court was not required to make a determination regarding the official-capacity action. The court's discussion was necessarily cabined to the open question of individual-capacity immunity. 11 Wetherefore read Mylett as governing only individual-capacity claims, and remaining consistent with Graham and Hafer, do not accept appellants' interpretation of official-capacity immunity. 28 Courts discuss immunity defenses without clearly articulating to whom and in which capacity those defenses apply, 12 resulting in confusion which has an obvious cause. In any case in which a defendant government official is sued in his individual and official capacity, and the city or state is also sued, there potentially exists an overlapping cause of action. The official-capacity claims and the claims against the governmental entity essentially merge. Thus, when the suit against the city or state fails for a jurisdictional, procedural, or pleading defect, the remaining immunity discussion by the courts necessarily concerns only the personal liability of individuals sued in their individual capacities. 29 Appellants' failure to grasp this point is evidenced by their reliance on cases that have granted an unspecified immunity to individuals, but have also recognized a separate action against the city on the same facts. 13 We read these cases as discussing only individual-capacity immunity because a grant of official-capacity immunity would also have barred the claim against the city, contrary to Monell and its progeny. Cf. Thomas v. City of Dallas, 175 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1999). 30 Appellants also erroneously rely on discussions of immunity in cases granting absolute individual immunity in § 1983 suits against the state. In these cases, there can be no official-capacity immunity suit, because the entity of the state cannot be sued without abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity. 14 Thus, the discussion of immunity in these cases must center around individual immunity and not, as the appellants claim, individual and official immunity. 15 These cases, therefore, add nosupport to appellants' reading of our official-capacity immunity cases. 16 31 Finally, appellants place great emphasis on the history and doctrinal development of absolute quasi-judicial immunity as it relates to quasi-judicial entities. See e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1871); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). We take no issue with this argument as it relates to individuals being sued in their individual capacities. Reliance on these cases for official-capacity claims, however, blurs the distinction between the types of liability, and thus immunity defenses, that arise from an individual-capacity suit and the lack of liability and resulting lack of immunity in official-capacity suits. Pointedly, we note that the above Supreme Court cases and all of the post-Graham cases cited by the appellant involve the personal liability of defendants sued in their individual, not official, capacities under § 1983. We therefore find no merit in appellants' argument.