Opinion ID: 767873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Maine Clean Election Act: Matching Funds for Independent Expenditures

Text: 69 The Stearns appellants challenge the per se constitutionality of that part of the matching funds provision, also known as a trigger, that grants funds to participating candidates based on independent expenditures made either against their candidacy or on behalf of their non-participating opponent. Appellants contend that this practice violates the First Amendment rights of non-participating candidates and those who wish to make independent expenditures by chilling as well as penalizing their speech. Essentially, their argument boils down to a claim of a First Amendment right to outraise and outspend an opponent, a right that they complain is burdened by the matching funds clause. 70 Appellants further argue that independent expenditures should not be treated as campaign contributions by the statute because independent expenditures have traditionally been afforded broader protection. See, e.g., Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 904 (expenditure restrictions are a direct restraint on speech while contribution limits are only marginal restrictions on speech (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21) (footnote omitted)); National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 497 (noting the fundamental constitutional difference between money spent to advertise one's views independent of the candidate's campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on his campaign). Appellants also maintain that their freedom of association is eclipsed by this provision because it forces them to be associated with candidates they oppose by in effect facilitating their speech. They urge that even if the Act is found constitutional on whole, this particular provision should be struck. 71 We review the challenged provision of the statute to determine whether it burdens First Amendment rights, and if it does, whether it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 496 (determining that there was no sufficiently strong governmental interest to support a limit on independent political committee expenditures); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 967 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that restrictions on independent expenditures are content-based and therefore subject to most exacting scrutiny (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 72 Direct limitations on independent expenditures have been found impermissibly to burden constitutional rights of free expression. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44; New Hampshire Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 18-19 (lst Cir. 1996) (invalidating New Hampshire statute limiting independent expenditures to $1,000 per election). Such cases are of limited application, however, because they involve direct monetary restrictions on independent expenditures, which inherently burden such speech, while the Maine statute creates no direct restriction. 73 Moreover, the provision of matching funds does not indirectly burden donors' speech and associational rights. Appellants misconstrue the meaning of the First Amendment's protection of their speech. They have no right to speak free from response - the purpose of the First Amendment is to 'secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (citations omitted); see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (there exists no right to speak free from vigorous debate). The public funding system in no way limits the quantity of speech one can engage in or the amount of money one can spend engaging in political speech, nor does it threaten censure or penalty for such expenditures. These facts allow us comfortably to conclude that the provision of matching funds based on independent expenditures does not create a burden on speakers' First Amendment rights. 74 Appellants rely heavily on Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), in which the Eighth Circuit invalidated Minnesota's campaign finance statute, which increased a participating candidate's expenditure limit based on independent expenditures made against her or for her major party opponent and under some circumstances matched such independent expenditures. See id. at 1359-62. 25 The court held that [t]o the extent that a candidate's campaign is enhanced by the operation of the statute, the political speech of the individual or group who made the independent expenditure 'against' her (or in favor of her opponent) is impaired. Id. at 1360. We cannot adopt the logic of Day, which equates responsive speech with an impairment to the initial speaker. 26 75 Further, merely because the Fund provides funds to match both campaign donations and independent expenditures made on behalf of the candidate does not mean that the statute equates the two. 27 Finally, appellants' freedom of association is not burdened because their names and messages are not associated - in any way indicative of support - with the candidate they oppose.
76 The Daggett appellants, and notably not the Stearns appellants, challenge the twenty-plus-year-old requirement that independent expenditures aggregating more than $50 for a single election be reported, see 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1019. They contend that the reporting requirement, which was modified slightly by the voter referendum, is overly cumbersome and will have a chilling effect on independent speakers in violation of the First Amendment. 77 A disclosure statute requiring revelation of contributions in the political arena is subject to exacting scrutiny and survives only if: (1) the statute as a whole . . . serve[s] a compelling governmental interest, and (2) a substantial nexus . . . exist[s] between the served interest and the information to be revealed. Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 32. In other words, there must be a 'relevant correlation' or 'substantial relation' between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65 (footnotes omitted). 78 In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld a reporting requirement for independent expenditures in excess of $100 in a calendar year, identifying three sufficiently important governmental interests: providing the electorate with information as to who supports a candidate and where political funding comes from, deterring corruption and the appearance thereof by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity, and gathering data essential to detect violations of contribution limits. See id. at 66-68. In Vote Choice, we explained that the state has a compelling interest in keeping the electorate informed about which constituencies may command a candidate's loyalties. Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 32. 79 The challenged statute requires reporting of expenditures totaling more than $50 in an election, to include the date and purpose of each expenditure and the name of each payee or creditor (if total expenditures exceed $500), an explanation of whether the expenditure was in support of or opposition to a candidate, and a statement under oath or affirmation as to whether the expenditure was made in concert with, or with the coordination or suggestion of, any candidate. See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1019. 80 The Daggett appellants contend that no government interest is served by the reporting requirement in this case, because the threshold amount is too low and the State's interest in deterring corruption, in particular, is not met because expenditures of only $50 could not possibly lead to corruption. We find, however, that the interests defined in Buckley and Vote Choice are present to support Maine's statute. The reporting requirement allows voters access to information about who supports a candidate financially and it allows the Commission to effectively administer the matching funds provision of the Act. Further, it deters corruption and its appearance. Whether a $100 threshold would be equally effective, we cannot say; as we explained in Vote Choice, such determinations are best left to legislative discretion and will be deferred to unless 'wholly without rationality.' See Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 32 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83). Moreover, the reporting requirements have a relevant correlation or a substantial relation to the government interests; the modest amount of information requested is not unduly burdensome and ties directly and closely to the relevant government interests. We remain unconvinced, as was the district court, that, if $100 was an appropriate threshold for requiring the reporting of independent expenditures in federal elections in Buckley, $50 is an illegitimate threshold for Maine elections.