Opinion ID: 2829984
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Forfeited These Claims

Text: As explained, ante, in order to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection to the alleged misconduct and request the jury be admonished to disregard it. (People v. Pearson, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 426; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 820.) Defendant acknowledges his failure to object to the prosecutor‘s comments but argues that he should be excused from complying with this basic precondition to appeal because, for two reasons, an objection would have been futile. (Hill, supra, at pp. 820–821.) First, in denying defense objections to the prosecutor‘s crossexamination of defendant‘s wife, Lefea ―Lucy‖ Masefau, the trial court signaled that it would not have sustained any defense objections to the prosecutor‘s argument based on an improper appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury.12 We disagree that the prosecutor‘s examination of Masefau excused defendant from the requirement of a timely and specific objection to the prosecutor‘s opening statement. Masefau‘s cross-examination occurred more than two weeks after the prosecutor‘s opening statement. Defense counsel could not, at the time of the 12 Defendant relies on this exchange during cross-examination of defendant‘s wife: ―Q. [Prosecutor Backers] You didn‘t hear about [the crime] during that whole week? ―A. No. ―Q. This sweet Filipino boy with interviews from his family all over the news. ―MR. CIRAOLO: Your honor, objection. ―THE COURT: Overruled. ―MS. BACKERS: Q. You never saw it on the news? ―A. No. ―Q. You never saw how traumatized his family was on the news? ―MR. CIRAOLO: Same objection, your honor. ―THE COURT: Overruled. ―THE WITNESS: No.‖ 51 opening statements, have known what objections the trial court would later sustain or overrule. Nor can we say, based on the trial court‘s overruling of counsel‘s objection during Masefau‘s testimony, that it would necessarily have overruled counsel‘s objection to the prosecutor‘s closing argument. Significantly, defendant‘s objection to Masefau‘s cross-examination did not explain the basis of the objection. Accordingly, to conclude the prosecutor‘s cross-examination of Masefau and the prosecutor‘s closing argument were objectionable for the same reason, such that defendant should now be excused from objecting to the later argument, is unjustified. As a second reason to support his assertion that an objection to the prosecutor‘s argument would have been futile, defendant analogizes to People v. Bandhauer (1967) 66 Cal.2d 524. He argues the prosecutor‘s ―various appeals to passion and prejudice [were] scattered in incremental amounts throughout the arguments in this case,‖ and that the grounds for an objection were not fairly apparent until it was too late to permit an objection and corrective admonition to counteract the prejudice. As he argues: ―Once the Pandora‘s box was opened, no admonition could restore the contents and close it.‖ In People v. Bandhauer, supra, 66 Cal.2d 524 (Bandhauer), the prosecutor emphasized his position as a public officer sworn to act with fairness and seek justice. But he also opined that in his career he had seldom seen a more depraved character than the defendant. (Id. at p. 530). This court concluded the latter assertion was improperly testimonial because ―[i]t was not related to the evidence in the case and was not subject to cross-examination. It presented to the jury an external standard by which to fix the penalty based on the prosecutor‘s long experience. The error was aggravated by the prosecutor‘s telling the jury that he would recommend life imprisonment in a proper case, for he thus made clear that 52 his request for the death penalty was based on his personal judgment and belief.‖ (Id. at p. 530.) Turning then to the People‘s argument that the Bandhauer defendant had forfeited the issue for appeal by failing to object on this ground, this court rejected it, explaining: ―The argument on the public responsibility of the prosecutor was not by itself subject to objection. The testimonial statements were injected gradually into the argument so that it was not until the prosecutor made the clinching assertion that he had seldom seen a more depraved character that grounds for objection were apparent. It was then too late to cure the error by admonition, and any effort of the prosecutor to cure the error by formally retracting what he obviously believed would only have compounded it. Under these circumstances defendant is not precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal.‖ (People v. Bandhauer, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 530.) Apart from the unique facts in Bandhauer, the notion that an appellate court should overlook a defendant‘s failure to alert the trial court to a prosecutor‘s improper argument if the impropriety is revealed gradually and incrementally has not taken root in our law. We begin by noting the rule requiring claims of prosecutorial misconduct be preserved for appellate review by a timely and specific objection and request for admonition is well established (see, e.g., People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1205; People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 52; People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 960; People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 305; People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 800; People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1201; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 820; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 794) and long settled (see, e.g., People v. Brice (1957) 49 Cal.2d 434, 437; People v. MacDonald (1914) 167 Cal. 545, 551; People v. Ah Fook (1883) 64 Cal. 380, 383). More than a century ago this court declined to review forfeited claims of prosecutorial misconduct, noting: ―It is now 53 well settled that an appellate court will not consider a claim as to the misconduct of counsel in argument unless objection is so made.‖ (People v. Fleming (1913) 166 Cal. 357, 377.) ―The reason for this rule, of course, is that ‗the trial court should be given an opportunity to correct the abuse and thus, if possible, prevent by suitable instructions the harmful effect upon the minds of the jury.‘ ‖ (People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27, quoting People v. Simon (1927) 80 Cal.App. 675, 679.) Although two cases have discussed the substantive merits of the misconduct at issue in Bandhauer, supra, 66 Cal.2d 524 (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 776 [―In the present case, unlike Bandhauer, the prosecutor did not purport to rely on his own personal experience, his ‗many, many years‘ as prosecutor, or any other facts outside the record.‖]; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 772 [same]), only one case has acknowledged Bandhauer‘s procedural holding that a failure to object may be excused if the objectionable material is injected into a prosecutor‘s argument slowly and incrementally. (People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 716–717, disapproved on other grounds in Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 383, fn. 8.) But that case distinguished Bandhauer, saying: ―[I]n this case, unlike Bandhauer, a timely objection by the defense would have prevented the most harmful comments from ever reaching the jury[;] and an appropriate instruction could have prevented those remarks which did reach the jury from exerting any impact beyond that of defense counsel‘s own statements. Under such circumstances, an objection may not be made for the first time on appeal.‖ (People v. Modesto, supra, at pp. 716–717.) At base, Bandhauer‘s rationale is that, due to the incremental nature of the improper argument, by the time the basis of an objection was apparent it would have been ineffective to counteract the prejudice flowing from the misconduct. In other words, an objection would have been futile, which is an established 54 exception to the rule requiring an objection. (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 820–821.) We thus read Bandhauer narrowly to illustrate an unusual application of the futility exception, one in which supporting facts are presumably rare, but which, if shown, could support a finding that an objection would have been futile. The instant case is not one of those rare cases. From the outset it was clear the prosecutor intended to frame the case as the brutal killing of a man on the eve of his wedding, which understandably resulted in extreme anguish for the bride, the wedding party and the victim‘s family and friends. The prosecutor may have intended to sway the jury to her side as an emotional matter, but her argument was based on the facts of the case, not on her opinion of the defendant as depraved. This was, therefore, not a situation in which the true basis of an objection was unclear until the prosecutor uttered a final clinching comment. As in People v. Modesto, supra, 66 Cal.2d 696, we conclude a timely objection would have been effective in preventing the harm that could have resulted from the alleged improper argument, and the failure to object thus forfeited the issue for appeal. (ii) The Prosecutor’s Reliance on the Wedding Theme Were we to address defendant‘s claim of prosecutorial misconduct for relying on a wedding theme despite its forfeiture, we would find no error. ― ‗The purpose of the opening statement is to inform the jury of the evidence the prosecution intends to present. . . .‘ [Citation.] ‗Nothing prevents the statement from being presented in a story-like manner that holds the attention of lay jurors and ties the facts and governing law together in an understandable way.‘ ‖ (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 168, quoting People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 137.) In turn, ―[c]losing argument presents a legitimate opportunity to ‗argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record‘ ‖ (People v. 55 Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 212), and a ― ‗prosecutor has a wide-ranging right to discuss the case in closing argument. [She] has the right to fully state [her] views as to what the evidence shows and to urge whatever conclusions [she] deems proper. Opposing counsel may not complain on appeal if the reasoning is faulty or the conclusions are illogical because these are matters for the jury to determine.‘‖ (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 526.) In neither instance is it proper to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury. ― ‗[A]n appeal for sympathy for the victim is out of place during an objective determination of guilt.‘‖ (People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1130; see People v. Pensinger (2001) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1250 [argument urging the jury to imagine the crime had happened to their own child held an improper appeal to the passion and prejudice of the jury]; People v. Talle (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 676 [closing argument asking for a guilty verdict based on sympathy for the victim was prosecutorial misconduct].) The prosecutor‘s reliance on a wedding theme in her opening statement and closing argument did not violate these rules. At the time of the prosecutor‘s opening statement, she could reasonably have anticipated the jury would be presented with evidence that police found the victim‘s engagement ring and his Movado watch, inscribed with his wedding date, in defendant‘s shirt pocket when he was arrested. Such evidence served to link defendant to the crimes against Pamintuan. The prosecutor could also anticipate she would present to the jury evidence showing police found Pamintuan‘s jacket in the outbuilding where defendant lived, and that the jacket clearly belonged to the victim because police found Pamintuan‘s wedding ―to do‖ list in the pocket. Therefore, the prosecutor‘s comments during her opening statement describing the victim as a bridegroom who was focused on renting tuxedos and preparing for his wedding the next day when defendant robbed, kidnapped and murdered him, and her comments 56 regarding his bride‘s gift of the Movado watch as the ―trophy‘‘ of a murderer, were fairly based on evidence the prosecutor reasonably intended to present. When the prosecutor made similar comments during her closing argument, evidence supporting the comments had in fact been introduced. Her argument was thus fair comment on the evidence and did not suggest ―that emotion may reign over reason‖ or invite ―an irrational, purely subjective response.‖ (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 284.) (iii) Invoking the Victim We reach a slightly different conclusion with regard to defendant‘s second contention, that the prosecutor acted improperly by asking the jury to view the crime through the eyes of the victim. In closing argument, the prosecutor began describing defendant‘s actions, and those of Tony Iuli, Jay Palega and Tautai Seumanu, during the last moments of Nolan Pamintuan‘s life, saying: ―Paki starts telling him to give it up, give up everything you‘ve got. Give up whatever you have on him. And Nolan was saying he didn‘t have anything. Then Tautai and Paki took his wallet and stuff. They are stripping him of his belongings. They were telling him to take his stuff off. ―Paki is starting to go through the wallet. Tautai gets the watch off his wrist, the Gucci watch. Both of them are mad. ―Imagine begging for your life, begging to be let go, being held captive at the end of a shotgun by these four frightening men, and they get mad at you because you only have a little cash.‖ (Italics added.) The prosecutor later returned to this theme: ―Nolan gives the $300 to Paki. Not to anybody else, but to Paki. ―Now they are sitting there at the curb with the sliding door closed and these men, Paki and Tautai and Jay, tells you — actually all four of them got angry 57 at Nolan because they thought he could get more. They still weren‘t satisfied with the amount of money he got out of the machine. ―And he says: We were all in agreement that he was lying, that he could have gotten more. And we were angry at him. And Nolan was saying he wasn‘t lying, that he took out the most he could get out of the machine. ―So Paki is yelling at him calling him a liar, telling him to stop lying to us. ―Imagine trying to save your own life, giving them the most you can give them, and you are being called a liar and having a gun pointed at you.‖ (Italics added.) As is apparent, the prosecutor‘s argument improperly asked the jury to view the crime through Pamintuan‘s eyes. ―We have settled that an appeal to the jury to view the crime through the eyes of the victim is misconduct at the guilt phase of trial; an appeal for sympathy for the victim is out of place during an objective determination of guilt.‖ (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057, revd. on other grounds in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318; cited with approval in People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 969–970; see also People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1406–1407.) Despite this misstep, however, we find the prosecutor‘s misconduct in making a few remarks in a much longer closing argument, and an even longer trial, could not have prejudiced defendant, especially given the strong evidence of his guilt. (See People v. Leonard, supra, at p. 1407 [finding the misconduct was harmless because ―the prosecutor‘s passing remark could not have prejudiced defendant, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt‖]; People v. Stansbury, supra, at p. 1057 [finding the misconduct was harmless because ―we do not believe a brief statement of this sort would sway the jury over that long a period‖].) 58 (iv) The Prosecutor’s Clients The third instance in which defendant contends the prosecutor improperly appealed to the passion and prejudice of the jury came in opening statements, when the prosecutor referred to the victim and his family as her ―clients.‖ At that time, the prosecutor noted that the jury had been introduced to the two defense attorneys and their client, defendant Ropati Seumanu. The prosecutor continued: ―I have a client too. The chair next to me appears to be empty, but his name is Nolan. And I would like to introduce you to him. [¶] This is Nolan Pamintuan.‖ Later, in closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned some of the victim‘s family, although she did not refer to any of them specifically as her ―clients.‖ Defendant argues the prosecutor‘s assertion the victim was her client was an untrue statement (see People v. Von Villas (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 201, 250 [it is a ―venerable and long-standing principle that the district attorney represents the People of the State of California in criminal proceedings‖]), and ―[h]er argumentative purpose [in making such an argument in her opening statement] . . . was to cast the prosecution as a private vindication for a terrible loss in order to exploit the emotion inherent in such a vivid personalization.‖ Later, defendant claims, the prosecutor continued her ―personalization and exploitation of sympathetic factors‖ in closing argument. Were we to address this claim despite its forfeiture, we would find the prosecutor‘s argument was impermissible and thus misconduct. ―The nature of the impartiality required of the public prosecutor follows from the prosecutor‘s role as representative of the People as a body, rather than as individuals. ‗The prosecutor speaks not solely for the victim, or the police, or those who support them, but for all the People. That body of ―The People‖ includes the defendant and his family and those who care about him. It also includes the vast majority of citizens who know nothing about a particular case, but who give over to the prosecutor the 59 authority to seek a just result in their name.‘ ‖ (People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 589–590.) But we also conclude that, for several reasons, the prosecutor‘s misconduct was harmless. First, as explained, ante, the evidence of guilt was strong. Second, the jury was instructed that it ―must not be influenced by sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the People and a defendant have a right to expect that you will consciously consider and weigh the evidence, apply the law, and reach a just verdict, regardless of the consequences.‖ Third, the jury was also informed that the arguments of counsel are not evidence (see CALJIC No. 1.02; CALCRIM No. 222), and we assume it followed this instruction. (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 559.) Contrary to defendant‘s argument that absent the prosecutor‘s alleged appeal to the jury‘s passions and prejudices, ―it is reasonably probable that [he] would have been acquitted,‖ we find the prosecutor‘s arguments, although encouraging the jury to identify with the victim to an improper degree, did not render the trial fundamentally unfair or otherwise infect the trial with such unfairness as to violate defendant‘s constitutional rights. (People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44.) d. Allegedly Attempting to Elicit Inadmissible Evidence from Tautai Seumanu Defendant argues the prosecutor committed further prejudicial misconduct by attempting to elicit inadmissible information from Tautai Seumanu on crossexamination. Tautai had recanted his previous statement to police identifying defendant as Pamintuan‘s killer, pleaded guilty to the charges, and by the time of his testimony had been sentenced to 28 years to life in prison. At trial he asserted that defendant was not Pamintuan‘s killer, and that in fact he (Tautai) was the triggerman. During Tautai‘s cross-examination by the prosecutor, he admitted 60 that, as a juvenile, he could not get any additional time in prison for taking the blame for the murder. The following colloquy then occurred: ―Q. [by Prosecutor Backers] So when you took the deal, you knew Tony [Iuli] was going to testify against you? ―A. [by TAUTAI SEUMANU] Yes. ―Q. And your big brother [i.e., defendant]? ―A. Yes. ―Q. And you knew that all three of you had said that your big brother was the triggerman in ‘96? ―A. Yes. ―Q. And you asked me for the same deal to testify against your big brother, didn‘t you? ―MR. CIRAOLO [defendant‘s counsel]: Objection. Hearsay, privileged communications. ―THE COURT: Overruled. ―MR. CIRAOLO: No foundation. ―THE COURT: Overruled. ―THE WITNESS: When did I ask you this? ―MS. BACKERS: Q. You wanted the exact same deal that Tony [Iuli] and Jay [Palega] got, and I said no way. ―MR. CIRAOLO: Your honor, objection. Counsel is testifying and no foundation. ―THE COURT: Overruled. ―MS. BACKERS: Q. You were willing to come in and say that your big brother was the triggerman if you could get the ‗L‘ [i.e., life term] taken off of your sentence, weren‘t you? ―A. I didn‘t. 61 ―Q. You didn‘t want the same deal Tony and Jay got? ―A. Hell no. ―Q. Hell no? ―A. No. ―Q. You wanted to go down for life? ―A. No. ―Q. You never wanted to get out of jail? ―A. No. ―Q. No, you don‘t want to get out of jail? ―A. No. ―Q. Are you telling this jury that you did not ask me for the same deal Tony and Jay got so you could testify against your big brother? ―MR. CIRAOLO: Same objection, your honor. [¶] Could we approach the bench on this? ―THE COURT: Sure.‖ At side bar, out of the jury‘s hearing, defense counsel made clear the nature of his objection: ―MR. CIRAOLO: Your honor, I am objecting. No foundation. Counsel is trying to establish there was a direct communication between the defendant, who is represented by counsel, with her. ―THE COURT: I don‘t hear him say it didn‘t happen. I don‘t see — Mr. Daley is [Tautai‘s] lawyer. You cannot assert a privilege. ―MR. CIRAOLO: I am objecting there is no foundation. ―THE COURT: She asked him if it happened. He said no. I don‘t see anybody else asserting any privilege. ―The objection is overruled.‖ 62 Sometime later, outside the jury‘s presence, Tautai‘s attorney, Mr. Daley, objected to the questioning: ―MR. DALEY: . . . My concern is the questions addressed to my client about whether or not he had requested a deal. Obviously, he had no communication with [the prosecutor], at least none that I am aware of. I don‘t think they ever exchanged any words. ―I can say that I did make an inquiry, and was abruptly turned down. And without getting into confidential communications, I can say I did it without any instructions from my client just to see if it was available. ―And I think I communicated that to [the prosecutor] at the time. Of course, we are going back four or five months at this point. ―There was the implication in the record, at this point — ―THE COURT: Well, Mr. Daley, I didn‘t hear you objecting at the time. ―MR. DALEY: The objection was whether my client had any communications and requested an offer and he answered no, which is true. ―THE COURT: Okay. So — ―MR. DALEY: The implication — ―THE COURT: Mr. Daley, I can‘t deal with implications if you sit there and don‘t say anything, okay? So you didn‘t say anything, he answered no, so that is the end of that story as far as I am concerned.‖ Based on these exchanges, defendant contends the prosecutor committed three different types of misconduct: (1) She asked questions she knew called for inadmissible evidence (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 943, disapproved on another ground in People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459); (2) ―her questions contained representations she knew would not be confirmed by Tautai and could not be proved otherwise‖ (see People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 80; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 562); and (3) she knowingly asked 63 questions containing false representations of fact (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 633). Assuming for argument that defendant preserved these claims for appeal by making a timely and specific objection, and further assuming the prosecutor committed misconduct, we conclude no prejudice resulted. Regarding the claim that the prosecutor sought to elicit inadmissible evidence, although the wording of the prosecutor‘s questions implied that Tautai unsuccessfully sought a plea deal, the witness vehemently denied doing so; when asked whether he wanted the same deal as Iuli and Palega, he replied tersely: ―Hell no.‖ Thereafter, the prosecutor did not present any evidence suggesting that such plea negotiations ever occurred. Prior to its deliberations, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 1.02, which states in pertinent part: ―Statements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence‖ and ―Do not assume to be true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it helps you to understand the answer.‖ We assume the jury followed this instruction (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 559), rendering it unlikely under any standard that defendant was prejudiced by the prosecutor‘s allegedly improper attempt to elicit inadmissible evidence. (See People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 182 [relying on CALJIC No. 1.02 to find prosecutorial misconduct harmless]). These same jury instructions undermine defendant‘s further argument that additional questions constituted prejudicial misconduct. Although he claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking Tautai questions containing ―representations she knew would not be confirmed by Tautai and could not be proved otherwise,‖ as well as questions that included false representations of fact, these were mere insinuations by the prosecutor that, when not backed up by actual evidence, were bound to be disregarded by the jury. We conclude that to the 64 extent, if any, the prosecutor‘s cross-examination of Tautai crossed an ethical line, any misconduct was not prejudicial.