Opinion ID: 865191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecution’s conflict of interest

Text: ¶7. Brenda F. Mitchell, an assistant district attorney in Bolivar County, Mississippi, participated in Scott’s prosecution.1 Two and a half years prior to Scott’s capital murder trial, Mitchell worked as an attorney at North Mississippi Rural Legal Services. While employed with Legal services, Mitchell represented Scott at a hearing before an administrative law judge at the Social Security Administration. At the time of the social security hearing, Scott was 15-years old. He was declared mentally retarded and mentally disabled and awarded supplemental security income. 1 Scott alleges that Mitchell participated in the case from indictment in 1996, through the end of trial in October 1998. Her participation included, but was not limited to, responding to defense motions, submitting discovery disclosures, conducting direct examination of witnesses at trial and delivering closing argument. 5 ¶8. Scott asserts Mitchell’s participation in his prosecution was an impermissible conflict of interest where the criminal prosecution was substantially related to the prior civil suit and where Mitchell used confidential information gained through her prior representation of Scott. Gray v. State, 469 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Miss. 1985); Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591, 594 (Miss. 1976). ¶9. Scott asserts the social security proceedings concerned his mental capacity, which was a central issue at his murder trial. Scott claims that as his attorney in the social security proceedings, Mitchell had access to his confidential files, records, mental health evaluations, and medical reports, as well as, access to his mother, aunt, and other family members. Scott asserts Mitchell had an ongoing obligation to maintain the confidentiality of attorney-client privilege. Scott also points out that, as his advocate, Mitchell argued Scott suffered from mental retardation. ¶10. Scott asserts that the State cannot show that Mitchell had absolutely no participation in the case, divulged no confidential information, and notified the defense promptly of this conflict. ¶11. Scott argues this claim is properly raised for the first time in the petition for postconviction relief where the conflict was first discovered by post-conviction counsel in April, 2005. Scott asserts the conflict entitles him to relief where this Court has ordered new trials in cases involving lesser sentences for such conflicts. See Gray, 469 So. 2d at 1255; Sharplin, 330 So.2d at 596; Aldridge, 583 So.2d 203 (Miss. 1991). See also Wilkins v. 6 Bowersox, 933 F. Supp. 1496 (W.D. Mo. 1996), aff’d, 145 F.3d 1006 (8 th Cir. 1998). Lastly, Scott argues that the prosecution’s failure to disclose this conflict is a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). ¶12. The State argues this issue is procedurally barred pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 9939-21(1) because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal. The State asserts, too, that failure to move for Mitchell’s disqualification acts as waiver. The State notes there was testimony at trial regarding Scott’s testing for social security disability and argues Scott’s assertion that Mitchell’s involvement in the Social Security Administration proceeding is newly discovered is incredible.2 ¶13. The State argues that Scott has failed to show a substantial relationship between the two representations and has failed to show disclosure of confidential information. The State also points out that, at the time of Scott’s prosecution, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002), had not been decided. As such, neither Mitchell nor the district attorney had any reason not to seek the death penalty based on mental retardation. ¶14. Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-39-21(1) provides: Failure by a prisoner to raise objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors either in fact or law which were capable of determination at trial and/or on direct appeal, regardless of whether such are based on the laws and the Constitution of the state of Mississippi or of the United States, shall constitute 2 Scott points out in his rebuttal that while the 1992 Region One Mental Health Center report was a part of the evidence at trial, Mitchell’s representation of Scott (documents related to the SSA proceedings) were not part of the record at trial. 7 a waiver thereof and shall be procedurally barred, but the court may upon a showing of cause and actual prejudice grant relief from the waiver. The record reflects that Scott did not raise this issue on his direct appeal and is now procedurally barred pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-39-21(1). That being said, we will now examine the merits of the case. ¶15. In Carr v. State, 873 So. 2d 991, 997 (Miss. 2004), this Court held: The purpose of post-conviction proceedings is to bring forward facts to the trial court that were not known at the time of the judgment. Williams v. State, 669 So. 2d 44, 52 (Miss. 1996). The procedure is limited to those facts and matters which could not or should not have been brought at trial or on direct appeal. Id.; Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-1 to -29 (Rev. 2000 & Supp. 2003). If newly discovered evidence would likely produce a different result or verdict and the proponent shows that the evidence was discovered since the trial, that it could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence, that it is material to the issue, and that it is not merely cumulative, or impeaching then such evidence warrants a new trial. Ormond v. State, 599 So. 2d 951, 962 (Miss. 1992). ¶16. Further, in Carr, this Court held: To succeed on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the petitioner must prove that new evidence has been discovered since the close of trial and that it could not have been discovered through due diligence before the trial began. Meeks v. State, 781 So. 2d 109, 112 (Miss. 2001) (citing Smith v. State, 492 So. 2d 260, 263 (Miss. 1986)). In addition, the petitioner must show that the newly discovered evidence will probably produce a different result or induce a different verdict, if a new trial is granted. Id. This requires a showing that the evidence is material and is not merely cumulative or impeaching. n3 Id. 867 So. 2d at 203-04. Since Mitchell’s prior representation is not newly discovered information, this issue is not proper for post conviction relief. However, this Court will revisit this issue under an ineffective assistance of counsel argument which will be discussed 8 in Issue IV of this opinion. Trial counsel knew of Mitchell’s representation and chose not to file a motion to disqualify Mitchell. ¶17. Scott claims that his new counsel on post-conviction relief learned of Mitchell’s representation of him on a social security matter. It is clear that Scott’s counsel at trial was aware of Mitchell’s representation at trial. An e-mail from Scott’s trial counsel, Raymond Wong, to post-conviction relief counsel indicated that his trial lawyer knew about Mitchell’s former representation of Scott. The e-mail stated: Ms. Brenda Mitchell was with Rural Legal Services at the time of Kevin Scott getting his disability check (SSI check - basis: learning disability) which was I believe 4 or 5 years before the murder of Richard Lee. At the time of trial, I was aware of the above fact but did not file any motion since she was neither the lead attorney nor assisting the State in prosecution of Scott’s case; I think the attorneys for the prosecution were Laurence Y. Mellen (DA) and Glenn Rossi (ADA). (Emphasis added). Notwithstanding this information and as mentioned above, Scott also never filed a motion to disqualify Mitchell. ¶18. In addition, Scott cannot make a claim that this information is newly discovered evidence as it was known to Scott. Scott also had an expert testify and use the testing information performed for Social Security disability qualification during the sentencing phase of the trial. ¶19. Further, at the time of Scott’s 1998 trial, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, had yet to be decided, and therefore, there was no prohibition against execution of individuals that were mentally retarded. The prosecution had no reason at the time of Scott’s 1998 trial not to seek 9 the death penalty since mental retardation had no impact on a prosecutor seeking the death penalty. This Court finds this issue to be procedurally barred and without merit.