Opinion ID: 292202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Selection of an Alternate Juror

Text: 5 Appellee contends that the three veniremen subjected to voir dire examination in the selection of an alternate juror were also improperly excluded. The questions propounded to these veniremen were as follows: 6 CLERK — Howell Dalton 7 MR. COOK — Are you conscientiously opposed to capital punishment? 8 JUROR — Yes, sir. 9 MR. COOK — Beg you pardon. 10 JUROR — Yes, sir. 11 COURT — For no reason, would you return a verdict to inflict death upon the defendant? 12 JUROR — No. 13 COURT — You may leave the jury box.    CLERK — Mrs. W. W. McDaniel 14 MR. COOK — Are you conscientiously opposed to capital punishment? JUROR — Yes, sir. 15 MR. COOK — For cause. 16 COURT — You may leave the jury box.    CLERK — Harvey Morgan 17 MR. COOK — Are you conscientiously opposed to capital punishment? 18 JUROR — Yes, sir. 19 MR. COOK — For cause, your Honor, conscientiously opposed to capital punishment. 20 COURT — You may leave the jury box.    21 Obviously, only the first of these (Mr. Dalton) was asked the additional question whether he would never return a verdict to inflict the death penalty under any circumstances. His exclusion, as the lower court ruled, was clearly correct, but the court remanded because the exclusion of the last two veniremen (Mrs. McDaniel and Mr. Morgan) did not comply with the requirements of Witherspoon and Boulden. 22 The question we must answer is whether Witherspoon and Boulden apply to the selection of the alternate jurors in the instant case. To our knowledge, no similar question has ever been raised in a federal appellate court. Appellee asserts that the mere presence and association of this biased and prosecution prone alternate juror with the regular jurors influenced the final verdict. Yet there is no indication of such influence in the case sub judice. The alternate juror did not participate in the deliberations or the verdict and he was properly instructed by the state trial judge not to discuss the case with anyone. 4 23 A federal district court faced a problem similar to the one before us in the case of Woodards v. Maxwell, 303 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.Ohio 1969). Out of twenty-seven persons given a voir dire examination, twenty-four were prospective regular jurors, while the remaining three were examined for their qualifications as alternate jurors. The court stated that [b]ecause none of the alternate jurors participated in the deliberations or verdict at the conclusion of petitioners' trial, the Court will not consider their examination relevant in the discussion of the Witherspoon issue. 303 F.Supp. at 693. 24 A few courts, mostly at the state level, have faced the question of whether the erroneous exclusion of a single juror, or a few jurors, constitutes reversible error, and they have reached conflicting results. See, e. g., New Jersey v. Mathis, 52 N.J. 238, 245 A.2d 20, 27 (1968); People v. Schader, 71 A.C. 797, 80 Cal. Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841 (1969). The Tenth Circuit, however, in Bell v. Patterson, 402 F.2d 394, 399 (10th Cir. 1968) has held that 25 [i]t cannot be said that the exclusion of two prospective jurors whose testimony did not indicate a pre-trial commitment to irrevocably vote against the death penalty resulted in a jury that failed to reflect the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'    Hence, viewing the jury selection process in its entirety by weighing the responses of the excluded jurors, it cannot be said that `the State crossed the line of neutrality' and entered the domain of the impartial jury proscribed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 26 In the instant case, there was an effort to select a fair jury, and there is no indication in the record of an attempt to compose a hanging jury. 27 We therefore hold that the Witherspoon and Boulden exceptions do not void the death sentence as long as the alternate juror selected is not needed, does not sit in on the deliberation or participate in the verdict, and provided that there is no indication that he influenced the regular jurors or prejudiced the rights of defendant. There is no language in either of these cases which suggests an intent that their requirements extend to nonparticipating alternate jurors. On the other hand, the Court in Witherspoon was concerned with the specific verdict as imposed, for it stated: Specifically, we hold that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. 391 U.S. at 521-522, 88 S.Ct. at 1776-1777 [emphasis added]. 28 Finally, we would be more sympathetic to appellee's contentions if there were suggestions in the record of prejudice to his rights. There was no effort by his attorneys to demonstrate any undue influence exercised by the alternate juror. We will not presume prejudice based on a mere theoretical fear that the alternate juror disobeyed the judge's instructions and tried to pressure the other jurors. See United States v. Ellenbogen, 365 F. 2d 982, 989 (2d Cir. 1966). His presence apart from anything else during a portion of the trial does not vitiate the jury's verdict. 29 The state court verdict and judgment contained no constitutional infirmities under Witherspoon, supra. It was error for the district court to set them aside. Accordingly, while the judgment of the district court is Affirmed regarding its ruling that the eight regular panel jurors were correctly excluded, the ruling regarding the alternate jurors is Reversed.