Opinion ID: 2224924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800; 102 S Ct 2727; 73 L Ed 2d 396 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that subjective evidence of an officer's good faith is no longer relevant to an analysis of qualified immunity. As stated in Harlow: Qualified or good faith immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official. Gomez v Toledo, 446 US 635 [100 S Ct 1920; 64 L Ed 2d 572] (1980). Decisions of this Court have established that the good faith defense has both an objective and a subjective aspect. The objective element involves a presumptive knowledge of and respect for basic, unquestioned constitutional rights. Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308, 322 [95 S Ct 992; 43 L Ed 2d 214] (1975). The subjective component refers to permissible intentions. ... The subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz [ v Economou, 438 US 478; 98 S Ct 2894; 57 L Ed 2d 895 (1978)], that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.... In the context of Butz' attempted balancing of competing values, it now is clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials. Not only are there the general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial  distraction of officials from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service. There are special costs to subjective inquiries of this kind.... Judicial inquiry into subjective motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues. Inquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government. Consistently with the balance at which we aimed in Butz, we conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Procunier v Navarette, 434 US 555, 565 [98 S Ct 855; 55 L Ed 2d 24] (1978); Wood v Strickland, 420 US at 322. [ Harlow at 815-818. Emphasis added.] Harlow set the stage for a new era in the law of qualified immunity. After Harlow, qualified immunity is a purely legal question, to be decided by the judge prior to trial. [8] As stated in Harlow at 818-819: Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment. On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to know that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective factors. [Emphasis added.] Under the test set forth in Harlow, § 1983 defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow rejected the subjective element of the qualified immunity test in favor of a purely objective standard. We are bound by the United States Supreme Court's construction of § 1983. [9] However, I do not apply the Harlow analysis to these facts because the defendant forfeited any entitlement to qualified immunity by failing to move for summary judgment. [10] Harlow had been decided over a year prior to the start of trial. [11] In Harlow, the Court determined that qualified immunity was a threshold question to be resolved on a motion for summary judgment prior to trial. [12] Notwithstanding defendant's awareness of Harlow, [13] defendant did not file a motion for summary judgment prior to trial. The importance of filing a motion for summary judgment in § 1983 actions was reemphasized by the Court in Mitchell v Forsyth, 472 US 511; 105 S Ct 2806; 86 L Ed 2d 411 (1985). In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court held: The entitlement [to qualified immunity] is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.[ [14] ] [ Id. at 526.] In Kennedy v City of Cleveland, 797 F2d 297 (CA 6, 1986), cert den 479 US 1103; 107 S Ct 1334; 94 L Ed 2d 185 (1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered whether a pretrial denial of qualified immunity was immediately appealable. In resolving this issue, the court interpreted Mitchell as describing two stages at which the doctrine of immunity may be interposed in a motion for summary judgment. The first instance arises when the complaint is insufficient to describe a violation of a clearly established and objectively well-known statutory or constitutional right, while in the second instance the complaint may be sufficiently descriptive, yet the claim upon which it is based is insubstantial. In contrast to Mitchell, Kennedy further stated that decisions with respect to dismissal of summary judgment, if adverse, do not preclude the interposition of the defense of immunity as a defense to liability on the merits. 797 F2d 300. Accordingly, to the extent that Kennedy alludes to the defendant's right to raise the qualified immunity defense at any point during the trial, it is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell and thus, I do not consider it precedent. In accordance with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Mitchell, we hold that Smith effectively lost any right to a qualified immunity defense when the case proceeded to trial. To avoid this result, defendants in a § 1983 suit must specifically plead qualified immunity in their first responsive pleading as an affirmative defense [15] and move for summary disposition prior to trial. If summary disposition is denied, defendants may pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial. [16] Accord, Mitchell, at 14-15. [17] Defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' proofs. This was insufficient to preserve the qualified immunity defense because defendant had already begun to defend the action at trial. By this time, defendant had effectively lost his qualified immunity from suit. [18]