Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Counsel's Alleged Failure to Investigate Adequately Mitigating Evidence.

Text: Shelton argues that a postconviction investigation of his past revealed substantial potential mitigating factors which trial counsel was unaware of due to his failure to adequately prepare. [198] In support of this claim, he provides psychiatric reports, opinions from outside counsel, and a comprehensive psychosocial investigation of his background, school performance, and prior criminal history. [199] He contends that defense counsel improperly limited his investigation to discussions with his family members, who were ill-equipped to provide sufficient mitigating evidence. As a result, Shelton argues, he was unable to make a strategic decision on the presentation of mitigating evidence because defense counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of such pertinent factors. At the outset, we find no merit in this argument because it was Shelton who demanded that counsel not explore mitigating evidence for the penalty hearing. In fact, if Shelton had it his way, he would have had neither the benefit of counsel nor the opportunity to present any mitigating evidence during the penalty hearing. Contrary to his argument, it is trial counsel and the court whom Shelton should credit for convincing him to present mitigating evidence in the first place. We are struck by the irony that Shelton now blames counsel for the paucity of mitigating evidence explored and presented. In reviewing Shelton's motion for postconviction relief, the Superior Court conducted an exhaustive 56-page analysis of Shelton's claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in preparing for the penalty phase. [200] As the Superior Court noted, the trial record is replete with testimony showing that Shelton made a deliberate strategic decision to limit the mitigating evidence he would present at the penalty hearing. [201] We have reviewed that analysis and do not find any error in it. In addition, immediately after the jury rendered its guilty verdict on February 23, 1993, Shelton expressed his desire to terminate counsel's assistance and sought to represent himself. [202] Only on February 26, 1993, after a series of discussions among Shelton, counsel and the court, did Shelton change his mind and allow counsel to continue representation as stand-by counsel. [203] On the day preceding the penalty hearing, Shelton again changed his mind and requested that trial counsel continue representation, provided that counsel do his wishes. [204] Nevertheless, Shelton made it clear that he ultimately controlled the scope of his defense during the penalty hearing. On February 24, 1993, after the jury rendered its verdict and Shelton fired trial counsel, the following colloquy occurred: The Court: Mr. Willard, independent of your client's wishes in connection with whether to present mitigating evidence or not to present mitigating evidence, have you done any investigation regarding presenting mitigating witnesses? Mr. Willard: Yes, I have, Your Honor. The Court: Can you describe for me what you've done? Mr. Willard: Well, Your Honor, I've just spent the last three and a half hours with his family, his mother and his sister. They were my original plan. They are two witnesses that I originally intended to call in his behalf. The Court: What were they going to say? Mr. Willard: Your Honor, they were going to talk about his life, what kind of kid he was, what kind of upbringing he's had, all the difficulties in his life, what kind of a family ... The Court: I'm sorry. I have to make a record. Shelton: It's none of your business what my family has to say in my behalf. The Court: I have to make a record. Numerous court opinions have made that quite clear. What would they have gone into [to Steven's trial counsel]? Mr. Willard: Your Honor, his childhood, his upbringing, his life, their relationship with him. The Court: Based on your discussion with them, were there any other witnesses or areas that you might have wanted to explore such as schooling or things like that? Mr. Willard: Nothing like that, Your Honor, no. There would be a real strong possibility that if I had my way, if my client would have so allowed me, I would be calling also his nieces. The Court: For what purpose? Mr. Willard: And perhaps his stepbrother for the same reason, Your Honor, to show the family relationship, their love for him. The Court: Are they all available; mother, sister, nieces and step-brother? Mr. Willard: Your Honor, his sister who was present in [the] courtroom until half an hour ago, Your Honor, when we finally broke, she advises me that she has discussed the possibility of her children testifying with her husband and that he has tentatively agreed to that. I didn't discuss with them a day possibly because I, quite frankly, don't know when my time would come exactly. They would have to make arrangements for schooling and so forth, but it's my understanding that in all likelihood the nieces would be called. [205] As the colloquy continued, counsel and the court discussed counsel's investigation and plans for mitigating witnesses. Counsel made it clear to the court that Shelton instructed him not to talk to his mother and not to talk to his sister. [206] Counsel also informed the court that Shelton wants to remove himself from those people. He does not wish to have them be put in here and be put through this. That's his sincere and honest wishes, Your Honor. [207] Shelton told the court that he understood that the failure to present mitigating evidence could increase the chances of a death sentence. [208] Despite Shelton's desire to present no mitigating evidence, the next day counsel provided the State with a letter setting forth 43 mitigating circumstances, as required by 11 Del. C. § 4209(c). [209] On February 26, 1993, the court discussed the contents of the letter with Shelton. Shelton told the court he had reviewed the letter and that he understood that by not presenting mitigating evidence, none of the issues in the letter would be presented to the jury. [210] The February 25, 1993 letter further convinces us that defense counsel thoroughly prepared for the penalty hearing. The letter sets forth an extensive list of factors that could be used to mitigate the death sentence, but for Shelton's insistence that he control and limit the mitigating evidence presented on his behalf. On March 1, 1993, the day the penalty hearing was to begin, Shelton and defense counsel informed the court that Shelton had changed his mind and that he wanted counsel to continue to represent him through the penalty hearing. [211] Nevertheless, Shelton retained the right to instruct counsel on which witnesses he would call and which questions to ask and not to ask. [212] Before the penalty hearing commenced, the following colloquy occurred: The Court: [Trial counsel] has indicated there are some matters of the forty-three he listed in his letter of potential mitigating circumstances here, mitigating factors, that you do not want some of them presented to the jury. Is that correct? Shelton: That's correct. The Court: And you would like him to stay in this case as our attorney, and have him represent you, but on the condition that you be able to decide to present certain of those matters but to not present other matters. Is that correct? Shelton: That is correct. Only what I instruct him to bring up is basically all that I would want him to bring out. I understand [trial counsel]'s position against the death penalty, and I respect that decision, as he respects my decision, and I feel that I'm not doing nothing unethical in his belief as far as his representation of me. The Court: How, if you retain the right to not present some or any, shall we say, of the forty-three items he's listed in the letter, okay, do you understand that you may or you are  may be or you are keeping from the jury and from me certain potential mitigating factors? Shelton: I understand that completely.     The Court: And do you understand that in the weighing process, that could harm you in terms of the jury's decision and my decision? Shelton: Yes, I do. The Court: And do you understand that the harm could be a death sentence? Shelton: I understand that. [213] Three witnesses ultimately testified on Shelton's behalf: his older half-brother, Edward, a half-sister, Dorothy, and a half-sister, Louise. Combined, they described a very dysfunctional family, physical and mental abuse by the father, the father's severe industrial accident, the father's long-standing alcoholism, and many other family problems. There was testimony about Shelton's trouble in school, difficulty coping in a mixed racial neighborhood, and his many fights. According to the witnesses, Shelton's father was the reason Shelton began drinking at a very early age. These witnesses also described the positive side to Shelton's life. Namely, they testified as to Shelton's happy early childhood and several pleasant family experiences. Louise described how in 1991 Shelton had visited her and her children and how they had favorably responded to the affection he showed them. Louise described repairs he did for her older sister. They commented on how Shelton lived with his mother and helped her with the bills. We agree with the Superior Court that Shelton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. Shelton's strategy, which he had planned for months, significantly limited the scope of trial counsel's investigation during the penalty hearing. Ironically, it appears that trial counsel was the only reason that Shelton presented the mitigating evidence that he did. Therefore, given his strategy, Shelton now has no basis to argue ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. [214] Accordingly, we are not persuaded by the reports and records that Shelton now offers on post-conviction appeal. [215] While they contain substantial information that might have been useful in preparing for the penalty phase, the record is clear that Shelton did not desire, nor allow, counsel to pursue those avenues. The Superior Court correctly summarized the situation as follows: Steven placed significant limitations on trial counsel on what he wanted presented. At first he was not going to present any mitigating evidence. As the record shows, this decision was not rash. He had thought about it for months. Steven had decided that if convicted, he would not present any evidence, not beg for mercy and take his chances with the jury and the Court. Steven had communicated this decision to trial counsel months before the guilty verdict. Trial counsel strongly disagreed with it, in part, because of his personal opposition to the death penalty. Steven knew this. In other words, while it has been argued that trial counsel, out of professional prudence, should have prepared for the penalty hearing before trial (guilt phase), it is undisputed that long before the trial Steven had hamstrung trial counsel's approach to the penalty hearing. He did not even want his family to testify.       Steven placed clear limitations on trial counsel, but while disagreeing with his limitations, the Court was more than satisfied Steven knew what he was doing. The Court was also satisfied that Steven appreciated the increased risk created in proceeding as he had told counsel he wished. Even after he relented and allowed counsel to remain and put on several family members, he still restricted witnesses and questioning. Thus, this Court is not prepared to say trial counsel's actions were the result of a lack of due diligence. Clearly, Steven significantly limited trial counsel's ability to present witnesses and the approach to be taken at the penalty hearing. Steven had originally decided months before the trial that if he were found guilty, he did not want to present any mitigating evidence. He told trial counsel this, who vigorously disagreed with Steven's approach. Only just before the penalty hearing began did Steven relent but then only so slightly. He is not and should not be in a position to now argue that trial counsel should have done more. [216] Shelton has failed to prove that trial counsel acted unreasonably in investigating and preparing for the penalty phase. Therefore, we need not consider how counsel's alleged ineffective assistance would have prejudiced Shelton. [217]