Opinion ID: 775498
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cockrel's Motion to Reconsider

Text: 29 As defendants note in their brief, Cockrel failed to respond to their motion for summary judgment within the requisite time period. 3 The district court, without benefit of any response by plaintiff, issued its memorandum and order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on January 28, 2000. On February 2, 2000, Cockrel filed a motion with the district court asking it to reconsider and set aside the issuance of its order granting summary judgment in light of the parties' agreement to enlarge time an additional thirty days so that plaintiff could respond to defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court denied this motion, stating that [i]t remains clear to this Court that Plaintiff's selection of industrial hemp as part of her classroom curriculum is not a form of speech entitled to protection by the First Amendment. J.A. at 41 (Dist. Ct. Order, Feb. 14, 2000). The court further stated that, in light of the law discussed in its memorandum granting summary judgment, [p]ermitting Plaintiff to file a belated response would be an exercise in futility. J.A. at 42. 4 30 Motions for reconsideration filed within ten days of the district court's final judgment, as this one was, are generally treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §59.30[7] (3d ed. 2000). While this court generally reviews the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment for an abuse of discretion, a de novo standard of review is applied when the Rule 59(e) motion seeks review of a grant of summary judgment. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1999). 31 Indeed, because the district court was not exercising its discretion in refusing to allow Cockrel's response, but instead was stating, as a matter of law, that any response by the plaintiff would be futile, we apply a de novo standard of review to this legal conclusion. We now turn to the merits of the case in order to evaluate the district court's finding of futility. As will be discussed later, not only is it clear that Cockrel's decision to bring in speakers advocating the use of industrial hemp is protected speech under the First Amendment, but her First Amendment retaliation claim is strong enough to survive the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Thus, the district court's denial, on futility grounds, of Cockrel's Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider its judgment was error. 32