Opinion ID: 766937
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitable Estoppel within the Section 1132(a)(1)(B) Context

Text: 21 In its earlier order, the district court stated that [w]hile [Mrs. Katz] may not assert equitable estoppel as a separate claim, this does not prohibit her from asserting principles of equitable estoppel as a theory for recovery of benefits in Count I. Kane, 893 F.2d at 1285-86. Mrs. Katz complied. She thereafter vigorously argued that ALLTEL, as plan administrator, was estopped to assert the active service and effective date provisions because of the assurances Mr. Katz received from ALLTEL and CIGNA during his disability that he, as Senior Vice President, would receive $620,000 in life insurance benefits under the CIGNA policy. 21 22 In its second order, the district court examined the merits of Mrs. Katz' equitable argument under ERISA. Upon review of the CIGNA policy, the district court had previously concluded that its active service provision was an unambiguous provision. See Part IV.B.1. supra. Mrs. Katz could, therefore, not rely on any alleged oral modifications under the principle of equitable estoppel. Kane, 893 F.2d at 1285-86. Any alleged representations that Mr. Katz was insured under the policy amounted to an impermissible extension of coverage to an employee not in active service. Id. at 1285 n. 3. 23 We agree. This circuit has created a very narrow common law doctrine under ERISA for equitable estoppel. Glass v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 1341, 1347 (11th Cir.1994), citing Kane, 893 F.2d at 1285-86. It is only available when (1) the provisions of the plan at issue are ambiguous, and (2) representations are made which constitute an oral interpretation of the ambiguity. Id. As the active service provision of the CIGNA plan was unambiguous, equitable estoppel is unavailable to Mrs. Katz as to her claim for ERISA benefits under Count I. Id. The August 26, 1998, order of the district court is correct and affirmed.