Opinion ID: 1768458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was it error to refuse to permit appellant's expert testimony on mental health defense at guilt phase?

Text: The appellant argues that he was denied due process of law when the trial court refused to admit evidence of his mental state through a psychologist, Dr. Phillip Johnson. He claims that his defense at trial was based upon Dr. Johnson's testimony concerning Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED). Sanborn filed notice of his intent to rely upon EED at trial and provided copies of Dr. Johnson's reports to the prosecution. Upon receipt of these reports, the Commonwealth took measures to recruit Dr. Victoria Skelton of KCPC to rebut the expert testimony of Dr. Johnson. At trial, however, the prosecution, citing Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112 (1990), objected to Dr. Johnson as a witness, claiming the expert testimony was inadmissible because no proper foundation was laid for the testimony. Furthermore, the prosecution objected because the testimony was a hearsay recitation of what the appellant told the doctor during interviews, especially since the appellant did not testify at trial subject to cross-examination. The trial court sustained the objection, and Dr. Johnson was not allowed to testify during the guilt phase. The appellant contends that the prosecution's objection was waived because it was not timely filed. Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 148, 149 (1980). He further contends that a proper foundation existed for Dr. Johnson's testimony to be admitted and that the statements made by him to Dr. Johnson were not hearsay. The appellant attempted to introduce Dr. Johnson to testify about the triggering event of the EED that caused him to act in the manner that he did. He now argues that the trial court erred in excluding this testimony because sufficient independent evidence of the surrounding circumstances existed upon which Dr. Johnson could base his expert opinion that appellant was influenced by EED. However, the trial court excluded the testimony because the defense counsel conceded that the expert's information regarding the triggering event and his reaction thereto were based only on what the defendant/appellant had told him. The trial court ruled that Dr. Johnson would be allowed to testify but that he could not testify as to a triggering event related by the appellant to him but unsupported by the slightest of independent evidence. The independent evidence alluded to by the appellant as providing a foundation for the expert testimony on EED does not tend to establish the existence of either a triggering event or intoxication to the extent that the appellant did not know what he was doing. The only evidence which existed to support the appellant's claim of a triggering event were his own uncorroborated statements to Dr. Johnson that the victim refused his romantic advances and mocked his stuttering. The appellant, during the investigation before trial, told several different versions of the events that took place on the night of the murder. Furthermore, Dr. Johnson testified that testimony by other witnesses regarding events which happened prior to the murder could be indicative of mental illness or an antisocial personality as well as EED. Dr. Johnson also testified that he did not believe the events as told to him by Parramore Sanborn. Therefore, what was claimed to be the triggering event may never have occurred. There is no independent evidence of the existence of this triggering event, but only the self-serving, hearsay statements made by Sanborn to his psychologist, Dr. Johnson. For these reasons, the trial court was justified in refusing to allow Dr. Johnson to testify as to what the appellant told him was the triggering event. The appellant's brief also makes mention of the fact that an expert may base his opinion on hearsay evidence if it is of a type reasonably relied upon by others in the field. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, 3rd edition, § 6.15, 297-298. However, it cannot be said here that the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the expert to testify as to what the appellant had told him, especially considering the expert's statement that he doubted that the appellant was telling him the truth.