Opinion ID: 807042
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Likelihood of Success on Preemption Claim

Text: Our Constitution provides Congress with the power to preempt state law, see U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, and that preemption may be express or implied. Although preemption law cannot always be neatly categorized, we generally recognize three classes of preemption. See Browning, 522 F.3d at 1167 (recognizing the doctrines of express, field, and conflict preemption). The first, express preemption, is not at issue in this appeal.9 The second, field preemption, “occurs when a congressional legislative scheme is ‘so pervasive as to make the reasonable inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.’” Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 9 The absence of an express preemption provision in federal law does not bear on the question of whether a challenged state statute is impliedly preempted. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386–88, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2301–02 (2000). 17 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 18 of 33 1152 (1947)). To determine the boundaries that Congress sought to occupy within the field, we look to “‘the federal statute itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative history.’” De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 n.8, 96 S. Ct. 933, 938 (1976) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 78–79, 61 S. Ct. 399, 410 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting)). The third, conflict preemption, may arise in two ways. First, conflict preemption can occur “when it is physically impossible to comply with both the federal and the state laws.” Browning, 522 F.3d at 1167. It may also arise “when the state law stands as an obstacle to the objective of the federal law.” Id. The court utilizes its judgment to determine what constitutes an unconstitutional obstacle to federal law, and this judgment is “informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2294 (2000). In determining the extent to which federal statutes preempt state law, we are “guided by two cornerstones.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009). First, “‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.’” Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996)). Second, we presume “that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was 18 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 19 of 33 the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id. at 565, 116 S. Ct. at 1194–95 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012). With these considerations in mind, we turn to the merits of whether sections 7 and 8 are preempted by federal law.
As explained previously, section 7 creates three distinct state criminal violations: (1) transporting or moving an illegal alien, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200(b); (2) concealing or harboring an illegal alien, id. § 16-11-201(b); and (3) inducing an illegal alien to enter the state of Georgia, id. § 16-11-202(b). Each of these offenses requires that the accused also be engaged in another criminal activity, and each further requires that the accused know of the illegal status of the subject. The State Officials argue that the district court erred in finding that section 7 is preempted by the criminal provisions of the INA, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1324. We disagree. To determine the intent of Congress, we first look to the text of the relevant federal statutes. The INA provides a comprehensive framework to penalize the transportation, concealment, and inducement of unlawfully present aliens. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)–(iv), it is a federal crime for any person 19 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 20 of 33 to transport or move an unlawfully present alien within the United States; to conceal, harbor, or shield an unlawfully present alien from detection; or to encourage or induce an alien to “come to, enter, or reside in the United States.”10 Any person who conspires or aids in the commission of any of those criminal activities is also punishable. Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v). Section 1324(c) permits local law enforcement officers to arrest for these violations of federal law, but the federal courts maintain exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute for these crimes and interpret the boundaries of the federal statute. See id. § 1329. Subsection (d) of § 1324 further dictates evidentiary rules governing prosecution of one of its enumerated offenses, and subsection (e) goes so far as to mandate a community outreach program to “educate the public in the United States and abroad about the penalties for bringing in and harboring aliens in violation of this section.” Rather than authorizing states to prosecute for these crimes, Congress chose to allow state officials to arrest for § 1324 crimes, subject to federal prosecution in federal court. 10 As early as 1917, Congress determined that it was necessary to enter the field of regulating the harboring and concealment of unlawfully present aliens. See United States v. Sanchez-Vargas, 878 F.2d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 1989). By 1952, Congress expanded its regulation to cover both the transport of unlawfully present aliens and the inducement of their entry into the country. See id. at 1169; see also Pub. L. No. 82-283, 66 Stat. 26; Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163, 228. Since then, the federal interest has not diminished through repeal of the provisions or any additional legislation that detracts from its original force. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502–04, 76 S. Ct. 477, 480–81 (1956) (chronicling the history of federal sedition law to support an inference that the field was dominated by federal regulation). 20 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 21 of 33 See id. §§ 1324(c), 1329. In the absence of a savings clause permitting state regulation in the field, the inference from these enactments is that the role of the states is limited to arrest for violations of federal law. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 363, 96 S. Ct. at 940. The comprehensive nature of these federal provisions is further evident upon examination of how § 1324 fits within the larger context of federal statutes criminalizing the acts undertaken by aliens and those who assist them in coming to, or remaining within, the United States. Regarding the aliens themselves, § 1325, for example, imposes civil and criminal penalties for unlawful entry into the United States. Congress has similarly authorized criminal penalties for individuals who bring aliens into the United States, id. § 1323, aid the entry of an inadmissible alien, id. § 1327, and import an alien for an immoral purpose, id. § 1328. In enacting these provisions, the federal government has clearly expressed more than a “peripheral concern” with the entry, movement, and residence of aliens within the United States, see De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360–61, 96 S. Ct. at 939, and the breadth of these laws illustrates an overwhelmingly dominant federal interest in the field. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. United States provides an instructive analogy. Section 3 of Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 (S.B. 1070) added 21 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 22 of 33 a “state-law penalty for conduct proscribed by federal law”—the failure to complete and carry alien registration documents as required by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a). Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501. The Court explained the comprehensive nature of the current federal registration scheme, which holds aliens to certain standards of conduct and penalizes their willful failure to register with the federal government. Id. at 2502. Based on the breadth of federal regulation, the Court concluded that “the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration” and therefore found impermissible “even complementary state regulation” within that field. Id.; see also id. (“Even if a State may make violation of federal law a crime in some instances, it cannot do so in a field . . . that has been occupied by federal law.”). The Supreme Court dismissed the state’s argument that its goal of concurrent enforcement was appropriate in a field occupied by federal regulation. Id. at 2502–03. Like the federal registration scheme addressed in Arizona, Congress has provided a “full set of standards” to govern the unlawful transport and movement of aliens. Id. at 2502. The INA comprehensively addresses criminal penalties for these actions undertaken within the borders of the United States, and a state’s attempt to intrude into this area is prohibited because Congress has adopted a calibrated framework within the INA to address this issue. See id. at 2502–03. 22 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 23 of 33 Our conclusion also finds support in the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 76 S. Ct. 477 (1956). In Nelson, the Court held that Pennsylvania’s sedition act, which “proscribe[d] the same conduct” as the federal sedition statute, was preempted by federal law. Id. at 499, 76 S. Ct. at 479. As it did in Arizona, the Court rejected the state’s argument that its purported supplementation of federal law shielded the state statute from federal preemption. See id. at 504, 76 S. Ct. at 481; see also Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604, 35 S. Ct. 715, 717 (1915) (“When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.”). The Court later discussed that the federal statute’s preemptive effect was implied because it occupied “the specific field which the States were attempting to regulate.” De Canas, 424 U.S. at 362, 96 S. Ct. at 940. The finding of preemption in Nelson was further justified because, like here, Congress had not sanctioned concurrent state legislation “on the subject covered by the challenged state law.” Id. at 363, 96 S. Ct. at 940. We are further convinced that section 7 presents an obstacle to the execution of the federal statutory scheme and challenges federal supremacy in the 23 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 24 of 33 realm of immigration.11 By confining the prosecution of federal immigration crimes to federal court, Congress limited the power to pursue those cases to the appropriate United States Attorney. See 8 U.S.C. § 1329; Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503 (explaining that if the state provision came into force, states would have “the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal policies”). As officers of the Executive Branch, U.S. Attorneys for the most part exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with the established enforcement priorities of the Administration they serve. The terms of section 7, however, are not conditioned on respect for the federal concerns or the priorities that Congress has explicitly granted executive agencies the authority to establish. See Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2149 (2009) (requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to “prioritize the 11 We reject the State Officers’ characterization of section 7 as an exercise of its police power wholly removed from the federal immigration scheme. Even if we accept this basic premise (which is problematic given (1) the criminal provisions of section 7 are modeled after those found in the federal Immigration and Nationality Act and (2) the Georgia legislature codified them in a new article entitled “Offenses Involving Illegal Aliens”), legislation in a field where states traditionally have power does not defeat a claim of federal preemption. E.g. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350, 121 S. Ct. 1012, 1018 (2001) (holding that federal law preempted state tort regulation); see also Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co., 237 U.S. at 604, 35 S. Ct. at 717 (“The legislation is not saved by calling it an exercise of the police power . . . .”). 24 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 25 of 33 identification and removal of aliens convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime”). Indeed, the State Officers have taken the position that an individual driving an unlawfully present alien to the supermarket could be prosecuted under section 7 and under the similar provisions of the INA. (There has been, to our knowledge, no reported federal conviction premised on that type of ordinary conduct.) This contention illustrates the State Officers’ misunderstanding of the nature of federal immigration law and the reach of state authority in the realm of immigration-related law enforcement. Along those same lines, interpretation of the section 7 crimes by state courts and enforcement by state prosecutors unconstrained by federal law threaten the uniform application of the INA. Each time a state enacts its own parallel to the INA, the federal government loses “control over enforcement” of the INA, thereby “further detract[ing] from the integrated scheme of regulation created by Congress.” Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288–89, 106 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (1986) (quotation marks omitted); see also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503 (addressing dilution of federal power in the context of the alien registration scheme); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265, 49 S. Ct. 108, 110 (1929) (“The national purpose to establish uniformity necessarily excludes state regulation.”). Given the federal primacy in the field of 25 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 26 of 33 enforcing prohibitions on the transportation, harboring, and inducement of unlawfully present aliens, the prospect of fifty individual attempts to regulate immigration-related matters cautions against permitting states to intrude into this area of dominant federal concern. The conflict that exists is exacerbated by the inconsistency between section 7 and provisions of federal law. For one, Georgia’s enticement provision creates a new crime unparalleled in the federal scheme. Federal law prohibits an individual from encouraging or inducing an alien to “come to, enter, or reside in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). Once inside the territory, though, it is not (and has never been) a federal crime for a person to encourage an alien to migrate into another state. The Supreme Court has indicated that such additional regulation conflicts with federal law, at least when federal interests dominate. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67, 61 S. Ct. at 404 (“[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in th[e immigration] field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation . . . , states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” (emphasis added)). Similarly, the criminal acts of harboring and transporting unlawfully present aliens constitute an impermissible “complement” to the INA that is inconsistent with 26 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 27 of 33 Congress’s objective of creating a comprehensive scheme governing the movement of aliens within the United States. See id. Although the State Officers argue that the objectives of federal law and section 7 are the same, “[i]dentity of ends does not end our analysis of preemption.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379 n.14, 120 S. Ct. at 2298 (citing Gould, 475 U.S. at 286, 106 S. Ct. at 1061). In Crosby, the Court found preempted a Massachusetts statute that, according to the state, shared the federal government’s goal of economically pressuring the Burmese government. Id. at 378–79, 120 S. Ct. at 2297. The state law at issue there imposed restrictions on the capacity of state agencies to purchase goods and services from companies that conducted business with Burma, id. at 367, 120 S. Ct. at 2291, while federal law imposed both mandatory and conditional economic sanctions on Burma, id. at 368, 120 S. Ct. at 2291. The Court found no merit in the state’s argument that the shared goals and the possibility of compliance with both federal and state law rendered the Massachusetts law a constitutional complement to federal law. See id. at 379–80, 120 S. Ct. at 2297–98. The Court also explained that a conflict between federal and state law “‘is imminent’ when ‘two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity.’” Id. at 380, 120 S. Ct. at 2298 (quoting Gould, 475 U.S. at 286, 106 S. Ct. at 1061). That statement is instructive here, where section 7 imposes 27 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 28 of 33 criminal penalties on conduct that the INA in most instances already regulates. The end result of section 7 is to layer additional penalties atop federal law in direct opposition to the Court’s direction in Crosby. In light of the foregoing, we are convinced that Plaintiffs have met their burden to show a likelihood of success on the claim that section 7 is preempted by federal law.
Section 8 authorizes police officers to investigate the immigration status of individuals who cannot produce adequate identification to prove citizenship, provided probable cause exists that the individual has committed a crime. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b). In implementing this investigatory provision, officers are not permitted to “consider race, color, or national origin . . . except to the extent permitted by” the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Id. § 17-5- 100(e). In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court approved of a similar state provision, and in light of that holding we likewise conclude at this stage of litigation that Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the claim that section 8 is preempted by federal law. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–10. In Arizona, the Supreme Court rejected a preenforcement challenge to section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, which requires state officers to make a reasonable 28 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 29 of 33 attempt to determine the immigration status of a person stopped, detained, or arrested if there exists reasonable suspicion that the detained individual is an unlawfully present alien. 132 S. Ct. at 2507; see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-1051(B). The Arizona statute contains three limitations: production of certain identification renders an individual presumptively lawfully present, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 111051(B); officers may not consider race, color, or national origin except as authorized by the United States and Arizona Constitutions, id.; and the statute must be implemented consistently with federal law and in a manner protective of civil rights, id. § 11-1051(L). Arizona clarified the principle that “[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system.” 132 S. Ct. at 2508. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10), state officers may permissibly communicate with the federal government about “the immigration status of any individual,” even absent a formalized agreement between the locality and federal government. Moreover, Congress has set up a system to provide assistance to state officers and has mandated that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) respond to state inquiries concerning the immigration status of individuals. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508. Above all, Congress has “encouraged the sharing of information about possible immigration violations,” and federal law permits “a policy requiring state 29 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 30 of 33 officials to contact ICE as a routine matter.” Id. The state’s failure to incorporate or reference federal enforcement priorities in its immigration-inquiry statute is irrelevant. Id. The Court also explained in Arizona that a preenforcement challenge to the scope of detention authorized by the state statute is premature. Id. at 2509–10. It noted the potential problems with a state statute that would permit detention “solely to verify [an individual’s] immigration status” but noted that the state’s interpretation of its statute could remedy these concerns. Id. at 2509. In sum, if all the state statute requires is that state officers conduct an immigration inquiry “during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely would survive preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives.” Id. Notably, the Court left open the possibility that the interpretation and application of Arizona’s law could prove problematic in practice and refused to foreclose future challenges to the law. Id. at 2510. The Supreme Court’s holding and explanation apply with full force to section 8, and we reject the current preenforcement challenge to its validity. First, we note that section 8 is less facially problematic than the provision at issue in Arizona. Unlike Arizona’s section 2(B), which is a mandatory investigation 30 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 31 of 33 provision, section 8 authorizes—but does not require—state officials to conduct an inquiry into immigration status whenever a detained individual cannot produce satisfactory identification.12 Furthermore, section 8 has the same three built-in limitations as the Arizona statute. See O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b) (providing that certain documentation is sufficient to establish immigration status); id. § 17-5- 100(d) (prohibiting use of race, color, or national origin in implementing the provision); Ga. L. 2011, p. 794, § 1(c) (requiring implementation consistent with “federal laws governing immigration and civil rights”). Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the state of Georgia emphasized that section 8 authorizes arrest and detention only to the extent permitted by federal law. This interpretation is consistent with the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(e). We are therefore reluctant to conclude that the state statute “will be construed in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. As a result, Plaintiffs cannot establish that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their preemption argument in this preenforcement challenge to section 8. 12 At the same time, we recognize arguments of Plaintiffs and amici that the nonmandatory nature of section 8 invites a host of other problems, namely racial profiling. Reliance on race, color, or national origin that is constitutionally prohibited, however, is expressly forbidden by the Georgia statute. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(d). It is inappropriate for us to assume that the state will disregard its own law, and we therefore reject the argument in this respect, keeping in mind that unconstitutional application of the statute could be challenged in later litigation. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510. 31 Case: 11-13044 Date Filed: 08/20/2012 Page: 32 of 33