Opinion ID: 195159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: enhancement of sentence for leadership role

Text: 7 In calculating Martnez' sentence, the district court imposed a two level enhancement for being a leader and organizer pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(c). 2 Martnez claims the court erred because the presentence report contains insufficient facts necessary to support a finding that Martnez organized, managed or directed the activities of his codefendants in committing the charged offenses. 8 We review the district court's role in the offense determination for clear error. United States v. Schultz, 970 F.2d 960, 963-64 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1020 (1993); United States v. Veilleux, 949 F.2d 522, 524 (1st Cir. 1991). A leadership role enhancement is warranted where the defendant has exercised control or directed the actions of at least one other person in committing the crime. The sentencing court can take into account such factors as the exercise of decision making authority and the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1 comment note 3; Schultz, 970 F.2d at 964; United States v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 261 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 220 (1992). 9 The evidence from the PSR is sufficient to support the sentencing judge's determination that Martnez was a leader and organizer of this little business [to sell cocaine] that he had and that Martnez had working for him Ventura Morales and Interpediz [sic]. According to the PSR, Holske purchased the cocaine from Martnez or negotiated with Martnez during all three of the drug transactions. During the July transaction, Martnez arranged to be met at a certain location and later displayed a sample of cocaine for Holske. On two occasions, Martnez first met with Holske and then placed a telephone call after which the cocaine was delivered. When considered together, this evidence is sufficient for the judge to conclude that Martnez arranged and planned each sale and directed the activities of his codefendants who served as assistants or couriers for Martnez' operation. 10 Martnez insists that the evidence in the PSR is, at most, only sufficient to support a finding that he was an intermediary. There is nothing, Martnez claims, to show he gave any orders or directions to anyone or otherwise exercised decision making authority. He further asserts that there is no evidence, beyond the bald statement that Holske purchased cocaine or negotiated with Martnez, to support the conclusion that Martnez set terms and conditions, made the arrangements, or profited from the sale. 11 While the actions reported in the PSR (making the initial contact with the buyer and placing phone calls before each drug delivery) may be consistent with those of an intermediary, they are also consistent with those taken by a leader or organizer. When we factor in Holske's statements that Martnez negotiated the deal and arranged the meeting location, we find ample support for the court's inferences that Martnez was making decisions about terms and conditions when he met with Holske, and exercising control over his codefendants when he made the telephone calls.  'Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.'  Veilleux, 949 F.2d at 525 (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). The sentencing judge, in fact, explicitly rejected Martnez' alternative version of events when he stated that Martnez had not been completely candid with the Court nor with the Probation Counsellor trying to give the impression that he was really working for somebody else, but he wasn't. 12 Martnez also claims that the sentencing judge failed to make reasonably specific factual findings to support the upward adjustment. This objection is groundless. The sentencing court's explicit rejection of Martnez' alternative version of events, together with its statements that, based on the evidence in the PSR, Martnez was a leader of his own business to sell cocaine, 3 constitutes specific factual findings which support the upward adjustment. See Schultz, 970 F.2d at 963 n. 7; United States v. Wells Metal Finishing, Inc., 922 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1991). As we discuss below, any objections to the evidentiary basis for the court's specific factual findings are waived.