Opinion ID: 776585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ruling on motion to suppress

Text: 24 This matter involves the detention of mail when it is suspected that a controlled substance is contained therein.
25 A district court's decision to deny a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed de novo and the district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). A warrantless seizure and detention presents a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo. United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir.1990) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207, 111 S.Ct. 2802, 115 L.Ed.2d 975 (1991).
26 First-class mail, such as letters and sealed packages, is protected by the Fourth Amendment from unreasonable search and seizure. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970). Postal authorities may seize and detain packages if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Aldaz, 921 F.2d at 229 (citations omitted). A reasonable suspicion is formed by specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person [or object] detained is [involved] in criminal activity. United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir.2000) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 5 27 Gill contends that the detention of the package was not supported by a reasonable suspicion and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. However, by the time Officer Jaworowski detained the package long enough to send it to Officer Erdahl in Seattle, a reasonable suspicion existed. The excessive wrapping of the package, the furtive movements of the mailer, the use of aliases as to the sender and addressee, and the fact that the sender resided at a different address than the return address all contributed to a reasonable suspicion for detention of the package. 28 Gill also argues that the length of time the package was detained before a search warrant was obtained was unreasonable. Gill contends that the fact that the package was sent by express mail is yet another reason why the length of the delay was unreasonable. 29 Here, the package was mailed on late Thursday afternoon and was opened pursuant to a search warrant on the following Wednesday morning. Although Gill maintains that this delay was particularly egregious because the package was sent by express mail, this Court has stated that the main Fourth Amendment interest in a mailed package attaches to the privacy of its contents, not the speed with which it is delivered. United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692, 696 (9th Cir.1984) (nine hour delay reasonable) (citation omitted). See also Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 253, 90 S.Ct. 1029 (29 hour detention of packages sent by first class mail not unreasonable); Aldaz, 921 F.2d at 229-31 (five day delay not unreasonable). 30 Gill places great reliance on United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414, 414-15 (9th Cir.1988), where this Court ruled that delays ranging from 7 to 23 days were unreasonable. In Dass, suspicious packages at various Hawaii post offices were collected for dog sniffs and once the presence of marijuana was detected, the packages were detained until search warrants could be obtained. The district court suppressed the evidence, finding that the delays could have been much shorter (36 hours) if the police had acted diligently. Dass, 849 F.2d at 415. This Court affirmed the district court. 31 This case bears little resemblance to Dass. Although Gill argues that the investigation was conducted at a leisurely pace, it is difficult to objectively view this investigation as leisurely. The postal officers tracked down various leads, confirmed motor vehicle, utility, and criminal records, verified addresses and phone numbers, and contacted the postal worker who delivered mail to the address to which the package was being sent. One of the investigators testified that 1930 he believed that the regular postal employee charged with delivering the mail to the recipient's address did not work on Fridays and could not be contacted until Monday. Nor is it though insignificant that the investigation began the end of one week and was completed at the beginning of the following week. The AUSA indicated that the search warrant application would be reviewed over the weekend and a magistrate judge was not available to issue the search warrant on Tuesday, August 10th. 32 Even with express mail, Gill's predominant interest was in the privacy of the package and not merely prompt delivery. On these facts, the delay was not unreasonable.