Opinion ID: 362246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Grand Jury Investigation

Text: 3 The Special November 1975 Grand Jury indicted the defendants on June 21, 1977, after a year-long investigation of alleged welfare fraud among government employees in Illinois. Because of the complexity of the welfare laws and the broad coverage of the investigation, the grand jury used computer experts, accounting technicians, and welfare eligibility experts to aid in the investigation. The defendants argue that the disclosure of grand jury evidence to these agents violates the secrecy requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e). 1 At a later stage of the investigation, federal agents interviewed the defendants and at these interviews presented documents obtained by grand jury subpoena. The defendants object, also on the basis of Rule 6(e), to the disclosure of these documents to them. As a remedy for these alleged violations of Rule 6(e), the defendants request that we dismiss their indictments or, in the alternative, suppress their confessions. Because the arguments of the parties are best understood with a full knowledge of the course of the grand jury investigation, we shall first summarize the facts pertaining thereto. 4 During the first stage of the investigation, the grand jury subpoenaed the employee lists of various federal and local governmental agencies. 2 These lists were to be fed into IDPA computers for interfacing with lists of recipients of IDPA benefits. On October 26, 1976, prior to receiving the subpoenaed employee lists, the grand jury swore as agents an IDPA employee with expertise in the use of the IDPA computer and an FBI special agent. On November 19, 1976 Chief Judge Parsons issued a disclosure order under Rule 6(e) permitting disclosure to employees of IDPA. On December 3, 1976 the grand jury swore another FBI special agent and three more IDPA employees as agents of the grand jury. The grand jury received the subpoenaed employee lists on the same day and presented the lists to the IDPA employees for the interfacing process. 5 The second stage of the grand jury investigation commenced in January 1977 when the grand jury received under subpoena additional employment records from the various federal and local government agencies. In late January, the grand jury swore FBI accounting technicians as agents for the purpose of examining these records. 6 When the IDPA employees completed the computerized interfacing of employee lists and IDPA beneficiary lists, the grand jury began the third stage of its investigation. The list of individuals simultaneously employed and receiving IDPA benefits required the scrutiny of IDPA quality control experts to determine whether any of the recipients were ineligible for benefits. The grand jury therefore swore several of these experts from the IDPA as agents between February 25, 1977 and March 18, 1977. These experts eventually presented worksheets to the grand jury on those persons from the list who were ineligible to receive benefits. 7 Prior to the final stage of the investigation, Chief Judge Parsons entered two more disclosure orders under Rule 6(e). The first of these, entered March 19, 1977, permitted disclosure of transcripts and subpoenaed materials to federal officers and Illinois Department of Law Enforcement personnel. The second of these orders, issued May 2, 1977, permitted disclosure to IDPA employees. 8 During the final stage of the investigation, agents of the FBI, the Postal Inspection Service, and the Illinois Bureau of Investigation interviewed many individuals who were suspected of welfare fraud. All of the defendants were interviewed during this stage. During these interviews the agents confronted each of the defendants with IDPA applications and redetermination of eligibility forms, warrants from the Illinois Comptroller, and employment records. 3 All of the documents used at each interview were obtained by grand jury subpoena, 4 but pertained only to the defendant interviewed. The purpose of presenting these documents was to verify the signatures and to discover the state of mind of each defendant when making the application for and receiving benefits. The defendants were given Miranda warnings at the beginning of the interviews, and each of them signed a written confession. 9 We shall discuss first the defendants' objection to the disclosures made to them during these interviews. The grand jury did not obtain an order under Rule 6(e) permitting disclosure of the subpoenaed documents to the defendants, and the defendants argue that showing these documents to them without this judicial imprimatur violates Rule 6(e). 10 Underlying the defendants' argument is the assumption that Rule 6(e) shields every item of evidence considered by the grand jury, whether or not obtained by subpoena, with an impenetrable cloak of secrecy. The defendants' theory requires a court order to expose every item of evidence once it has appeared before the grand jury. 5 This argument does restate the general rule, See United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958); In re Holovachka, 317 F.2d 834, 836-37 (7th Cir. 1963), but neither the language nor the purpose of Rule 6(e) requires the secrecy to be absolute. 11 The restrictions of Rule 6(e) apply only to disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury. Unless information reveals something about the grand jury proceedings, secrecy is unnecessary. 12 Thus, when testimony or data is sought for its own sake for its intrinsic value in furtherance of a lawful investigation rather than to learn what took place before the grand jury, it is not a valid defense to disclosure that the same documents had been, or were presently being, examined by a grand jury. 13 United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960). Unlike testimony, documents are created for purposes other than the grand jury investigation; they are therefore more likely to be useful for purposes other than revealing what occurred before the grand jury. See Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 552 F.2d 768, 772 n.2 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889, 98 S.Ct. 262, 54 L.Ed.2d 174 (1977). 6 Persons may have a legitimate interest in documents so that disclosure to them does not constitute disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury. See United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.) Cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 95 S.Ct. 2655, 45 L.Ed.2d 693 (1975); United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, supra; In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F.Supp. 1299 (M.D.Fla.1977); Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. First Minnesota Construction Co., 405 F.Supp. 929 (D.Mass.1975); In re Hearings Before Committee on Banking and Currency, 19 F.R.D. 410 (N.D.Ill.1956). 14 The disclosures challenged here revealed nothing about the grand jury investigation, and the disclosures were made only to persons legitimately connected with the documents. The documents revealed to the defendants were not described by the agents during the interviews as grand jury documents. 7 Each defendant was shown only his or her own employment file, his or her own welfare applications, and his or her own endorsement on the warrants. For these reasons, the disclosure falls outside of the scope of Rule 6(e). Because the documents shown were not otherwise sheltered from the defendants' inspection by any form of privilege, Cf. United States v. Weinstein, supra, at 627; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 210 F.Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y.1962), the defendants' challenge to these disclosures must fail. 15 The defendants also urge that Rule 6(e) did not permit the disclosures without a court order to FBI agents and accounting technicians. 8 The version of Rule 6(e) applicable to this case permitted disclosure without a court order only to attorneys for the government. Rule 54(c) 9 defines this term, and the defendants would have us limit disclosure to those persons described. We do not agree that the drafters intended to inflict so rigid a restriction on disclosure and hold that disclosure to these FBI personnel without a court order was permissible. 16 One of the purposes of providing government attorneys access to grand jury materials is to aid the grand jury in its investigation. See In re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260, 265 - 267 (7th Cir. 1978); In re April 1956 Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1956). In an extremely complex investigation like this one, the United States Attorney requires the assistance of experts. Here the expertise came from the FBI, another Justice Department agency under the same control as the United States Attorney. When the grand jury takes precautions to preserve secrecy, as it did here by swearing the FBI personnel as agents and cautioning them about the need for secrecy, we see no reason to put an additional barrier between the grand jury and the evidence by interpreting Rule 6(e) to require a disclosure order. United States v. Evans, 526 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1976); Coson v. United States, 533 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1976). See United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1125 n.7 (3d Cir. 1977); Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F.Supp. 1098, 1123-27 (E.D.Pa.1976). 17 The defendants argue that the disclosures to state and federal personnel pursuant to court order under Rule 6(e) were also objectionable for two reasons: a grand jury investigation is not a judicial proceeding within the meaning of the Rule 6(e) provision for disclosure orders, and the court orders were overbroad. Both of these arguments are without merit. 18 Rule 6(e) permits disclosure orders not only in connection with but also preliminarily to a judicial proceeding. Although a grand jury proceeding may not itself be determinable by a court, Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, 490 F.2d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1973), Quoting Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1958), it is nevertheless preliminary to such proceedings. See United States v. Universal Manufacturing Co., 525 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975); In re Special February 1971 Grand Jury v. Conlisk, supra. Furthermore, we cannot say that the decision to grant these assistants access to the grand jury materials was an abuse of discretion by the district court. In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, supra. 19 The disclosure orders were not overbroad. 10 Although the orders did not describe individually the recipients of the materials, which admittedly would have been a preferable practice, 11 the orders limited the use of the materials to the purpose of the investigation, thus guarding against the most likely form of abuse. See In re April 1956 Grand Jury, supra, at 271. The record also shows that the grand jury followed a general practice of cautioning individually those persons granted access to the materials, describing with specificity their tasks, and inquiring about security measures. That the orders here did not compromise the secrecy of the grand jury investigation is demonstrated by the defendants' failure to show any misuse of the materials. See Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue,supra, at 1113. 20 In sum, viewing the various grand jury contentions collectively, and to some considerable extent individually, our acceptance of them could substantially nullify, particularly in a case of any complexity, one of the basic purposes of this body, that of thorough, knowledgeable investigation of the matters before it. This group of lay persons should not be locked into a position which lacks full comprehension of the factual situations as to which they are inquiring. Being of the opinion that the secrecy requirements have not dictated this result here, we decline to do so by judicial gloss. 21 Finally, the defendants object to the investigation on the ground that the grand jury was unlawfully convened. The Special November 1975 Grand Jury which indicted the defendants was convened pursuant to the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-962 (1970). 12 This Act also provides for the creation of a National Commission on Individual Rights, comprising members of Congress, the Senate, and persons appointed by the President from outside the government. 13 The President has never appointed anyone to this Commission, and the defendants argue that this failure requires dismissal of their indictments on both statutory and constitutional grounds. We disagree. 22 The appointment of Commission members pursuant to Title XII of the Act is not a condition precedent to the enforcement of the rest of the Act. Title XIII of the Act contains a severability clause, 14 and the Commission's existence is not coextensive with the operation of the rest of the Act, 15 which resolves all doubt about the applicability of the severability clause to this situation. Furthermore, whether appointment of the Commission would have protected the defendants' or anyone else's rights is speculative. 16 The argument that convening the Special Grand Jury without the Commission violated the defendant's due process rights therefore is without merit.