Opinion ID: 2373626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied the appellant's motion for mistrial based upon the jury watching a redacted videotaped interview of the victim?

Text: [¶ 33] The appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied the appellant's motion for mistrial based on the district court's admission of a redacted videotaped interview of the victim. The crux of the appellant's argument is that he believed that based on earlier conversations the entire videotape was going to be played to the jury but, once most of it had been played in court, the prosecutor objected to some of the content on the remainder of the videotape. The portions objected to by the prosecutor were then redacted by order of the district court. The appellant claims that the only reason he made the decision to play any part of the videotape, which contained unfavorable material, was because he thought the prosecutor and district court were going to allow him to play the videotape in its entirety. The appellant then moved for mistrial based on the grounds just described, which motion was denied. More of the facts regarding this issue will be discussed below. [¶ 34] We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Yellowbear v. State, 2008 WY 4, ¶ 66, 174 P.3d 1270, 1295 (Wyo.2008). [A]n abuse of discretion occurs where the district court could not have reasonably concluded as it did. It is important to remember that there is a distinction between the role of this Court and the role of the district court in regard to a motion for mistrial. Id. at ¶¶ 66-67, at 1295 (citations omitted). The district court is not applying a standard of review when it determines the motion. Rather, in the case of a motion for mistrial, the district court is governed by the following principles: Granting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not be served by proceeding with trial. (Emphasis added.) Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo.1995). Id. at ¶ 67, at 1295. [¶ 35] The appellant implies that at the time when the videotape was initially accepted into evidence, it was clear to the appellant, his counsel, the prosecutor, and the judge that the whole videotape would be played for the jury and no further objections would be forthcoming. However, the record does not support this scenario. The district court did a thorough job of discussing the possible issues relating to the admission of this videotape. We will not quote the entire transcript pertaining to this issue, but we will note that this issue was discussed for approximately twenty pages of transcript, wherein the district court made clear that notwithstanding the potentially harmful things that the jury may see and hear on the videotape that the appellant still wanted to play it. The record is clear that the reason the appellant initially wanted to play the videotape is because the defense's strategy was to claim that the victim's testimony was influenced by the victim witness coordinator and the videotape helped prove that, because it allegedly contained inconsistencies in the victim's story. Prior to playing the videotape, the appellant's trial counsel requested that a portion of the videotape, which contained a statement regarding the appellant's prior sexual assault conviction, be redacted. The district court and prosecutor agreed that that should occur. The following colloquy demonstrates, in part, that the appellant had notice not only of the dangers of playing the videotape, but also that the only objection that the prosecutor was waiving regarding the videotape was the order in which it was being played, but was explicitly reserving his right to make further objections regarding the substance and content of the videotape: [By Appellant's Counsel]: Your Honor, on behalf of [the appellant] and with his involvement in this, we do request that the tape be played except for that one reference, that one area referenced by Ms. Gavagan to some other conduct, and we believe that we can redact that off of this pretty easily. We're just talking about one area, that one reference that would need to be . . . . [By Appellant's Counsel]: And, Your Honor, what I would do, I would certainly give [the prosecutor] notice by tomorrow morning if there's something more that we would want to redact and have the Court make a determination as to whether that's appropriate or let the Court know if there is something else that we're intending to redact.... The objection that I don't want to have is that it should have been dealt with at the time of cross as opposed to on our case, and it sounds like they're not going to object to us doing it.... . . . . [By The Prosecutor]: ... And with that ruling from the Court, we would make no such objection as to the timeliness of her playing it at that point. If she's going to play it in her case in chief, I'm not going to say that she should have done that when [the victim] was on the stand. I won't make any objection along those lines. . . . . [By Prosecutor]: Your Honor, not having really thought this through, I'll just put on the record what my thought process is regarding my tentative statements. I promised that I will not object during their case in chief that she should have done this during [the victim]'s cross-examination. . . . . ... I may have another objection that may come to mind, but it certainly won't be because [the victim] won't be there to . . . . I don't have some trick or trap in mind to keep it out because of what they're doing now. I may get a light bulb that says this shouldn't come in because of this reason, and I don't want to be precluded from it, but it won't be because [the victim] isn't on the stand. THE COURT: We can cross that bridge when we come to it. [¶ 36] During the appellant's case-in-chief, the videotape was played. With approximately 20 minutes remaining in the video, the prosecutor objected on relevancy grounds regarding certain portions of the video. Specifically, the prosecutor objected to playing portions of the videotape that discussed the victim's prior contacts with law enforcement when she was a juvenile, and a portion discussing issues the victim had with her mother which also addressed the victim's sexual history. The district court agreed to further redact the videotape to exclude the additional objectionable content. In response, the following colloquy occurred: [By Appellant's Counsel]: The other concern that I haveand it's a fairly large concern, Your Honoris that when you asked me to make sure with my client and had me go through the particular determination and strategy as to whether this tape should be usedand for the record, this is the tape that's provided to us by the State. It's their evidence that they gave us in discovery. I had played the tape for my client. He was present when we had discussions about what would and would not be on the tape. We asked that the entire tape come in. The State was fine with that. You indicated that you were concerned because there was something in it you [sic] that you felt you'd heard that was going to be so prejudicial that you had concerns about whether that should simply be redacted. We agreed that, yes, that needs to be redacted. We found one other reference to prison, which we informed the Court of when we got here this morning, as well as the bathroom break that we felt could be removed from it. My concern at this point, quite honestly, is that my clientthat this was athat in terms of strategy, this was not an easy determination to make on behalf of my client. I indicated this morning that my client had been involved in talking with me about that. And one of the thingsone of the things thatone of the factors, obviously, and strong factors, that he took into account was that the entire tapebecause there's much prejudicial information against him in it, but he felt that overall to have the jury hear everything that was going to be on that tape, that he decided strategywise [sic] with me that would be to his benefit. THE COURT: I understand that, but to the extent that I thought that I was going to allow you to play something that was improper, I never would have allowed you to ask a witness that question. You may not have advised your client properly. . . . . ... I think common sense would tell you that you would not allow that kind of information to come before the jury. It doesn't relate to the reasons that it's being played. The appellant then moved for a mistrial, which was denied. In denying the appellant's motion for mistrial, the district court stated: THE COURT: I think everything that you played so far you made a choice to play. And the portions that I'm not going to allow are so clearly improper that if there was any hope that that would be heard by the jury, it was pretty unrealistic. And in addition, nothing's happened at this point that I think would so erode the fabric of this trial that it would require a mistrial. So I'm going to deny that motion. [¶ 37] The appellant is essentially requesting that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his motion for mistrial based on the district court's refusal to admit inadmissible evidence. As demonstrated above, the appellant was not tricked into playing the videotape. The appellant made a conscious decision to play the videotape knowing the risks. The prosecutor explicitly reserved his right to object to admission for any reason other than the order in which the tape was played. As the district court pointed out, the information the appellant intended to present to the jury is generally inadmissible and it should not have come as any surprise to the appellant that the district court prohibited him from showing those portions of the video. See W.R.E. 609(d) (Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule.); and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312 (LexisNexis 2009) (governing the admission of sexual history evidence of sexual assault victims). Consequently, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for mistrial. [¶ 38] In the alternative to arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial, the appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for initially introducing the video and believing that every portion of the video would be played, and therefore the remedy should be a new trial. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted. Strickland [ v. Washington ], 466 U.S. [668,] 687, 104 S.Ct. [2052,] 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 [(1984)]; Starr [ v. State, 888 P.2d 1262,] 1266 [(Wyo.1995)] [ overruled on other grounds by Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 691 (Wyo. 1995)]; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo.1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 1986); Frias [ v. State ], 722 P.2d [135,] 145 [(Wyo.1986)]. In other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel's deficiency prejudiced the defense of [the] case. Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo.1990). The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 6, 18 P.3d 1164, 1168-69 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Grainey v. State, 997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo.2000)). [¶ 39] Although the district court prohibited the appellant's counsel from showing portions of the videotape, the original purpose for which counsel sought to play the videotape was not frustrated: i.e. to show inconsistencies in the victim's stories from which to draw an inference supporting the defense's theory that the victim witness coordinator had influenced the victim. We have repeatedly stated that we will not second guess trial tactics. Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 48, 228 P.3d 874, 890 (Wyo. 2010). Furthermore, the appellant points us to no specific prejudice that the appellant suffered as a result of his trial counsel's decisions. As a result, we cannot say that counsel rendered ineffective assistance to the point that we cannot trust that a just outcome resulted.