Opinion ID: 1217589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Cook's Confession to His Father

Text: Cook's father was an FBI agent at the time of Cook's arrest. After his arrest, Cook asked to see an attorney and his father, and Cook was given no Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Cook's father also asked that he and Cook be allowed to speak to each other, and they were allowed to do so. On direct appeal, this Court held that Cook's confession to his father without Miranda warnings was properly admitted into evidence. We held that such cases must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, by viewing the totality of the circumstances, in order to determine if the law enforcement parent was acting as a parent or as an agent of the state when speaking with his or her arrested child. Cook, 270 Ga. at 827(2), 514 S.E.2d 657. In applying that standard, we noted that Cook's father had not been part of the investigative team, that the FBI did not have jurisdiction over the case, that Cook had asked to speak to his father, that Cook's father had asked to speak to Cook after his arrest without the prompting of anyone involved in Cook's case, that the father's motive was to help Cook get a favorable plea bargain, and that the conversation was accompanied by crying and hugging. Id. at 827-828(2), 514 S.E.2d 657. Accordingly, we held that Cook's father was acting in the role of father rather than officer. Id. at 828(2), 514 S.E.2d 657. We further noted that the conversation was devoid of any trickery, deceit, or other psychological ploy and that Cook would not have felt coerced to incriminate himself, and we held, accordingly, that the conversation was not accompanied by government coercion. Id. Cook argued in the habeas court that his trial counsel was deficient in conducting the motion to suppress his statements to his father. In support of that argument, Cook introduced a letter from his father to counsel; however, the contents of the letter are inadmissible hearsay and cannot be considered for the truth of the matters asserted therein. See Waldrip, 279 Ga. at 828, 620 S.E.2d 829(II)(A) (refusing to consider inadmissible hearsay on appeal despite the absence of any objection). Cook also introduced testimony from his father indicating, like the letter, that a file on the Lake Juliette murders had been opened by the FBI, that the FBI had assisted local officials on the case, and that he had actively participated in a supervisory capacity on several occasions as the relief supervisor. He added, however, that as an investigative agent, [he] never actually physically worked on this case. Because his habeas testimony does not reveal that he had an actual investigative role, it is consistent with his testimony in the trial court that, although he knew his office had done some work to assist in the case, he had not personally worked on the case and knew details about the case only from what he had read in the paper. Although his habeas testimony, if presented at trial, would have led this Court to modify its statement that the FBI did not have jurisdiction to investigate the case, it would not have changed the outcome of our analysis regarding whether Cook's father was acting as an FBI agent or as a father at the time of his conversation with Cook. Cook, 270 Ga. at 827(2), 514 S.E.2d 657. Accordingly, even assuming trial counsel performed deficiently regarding this issue, no prejudice to Cook's defense resulted. Accordingly, this individual claim in Cook's cross-appeal cannot help support Cook's overall ineffective assistance claim. See Holsey, 281 Ga. at 812, n. 1, 642 S.E.2d 56 (holding that the combined effect of trial counsel's various professional deficiencies should be considered).