Opinion ID: 1435973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Expert Testimony of Robert Hazelwood

Text: Robert Hazelwood testified as the State's expert witness on the subject of violent sexual crimes to aid the prosecution in identifying defendant as the murderer of Melissa Padilla. Hazelwood presented impressive credentials. He served thirty-three years in law enforcement, including twenty-three years at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During his tenure with the FBI, Hazelwood was a member of the Behavioral Science Unit, where he studied serial sex offenders and killers. By his own account, Hazelwood had participated in more than 7,000 violent crime investigations, the majority of which were sex-related. He had authored forty articles in peer-reviewed journals on violent crime and five books on criminal and sexually-deviant behavior, and had lectured on such subjects to law enforcement agencies and as an adjunct faculty member at several universities. Upon being qualified as an expert, Hazelwood compared what he claimed were the unique and distinctive characteristics of defendant's sexual assault on Trooper Gardner to those of Padilla's murder for the purpose of allowing the jury to infer that only one person committed both crimes. Hazelwood stated that he had never seen, heard, or read of this combination of behaviors in any other crime. Relying on Fortin I, supra, 162 N.J. 517, 745 A. 2d 509, defendant contends that Hazelwood never produced a database of cases from which he made his comparisons and derived his conclusions, as ordered by this Court as a pre-condition to his testimony. Accordingly, defendant argues that the trial court should not have permitted Hazelwood to testify in light of his failure to comply with this Court's discovery order. Without the database, defendant concludes that he was denied, in essence, his constitutional right to confront Hazelwood on the terms required by this Court and, therefore, his right to a fair trial. In assessing defendant's claim, our review begins with Fortin I. In State v. Fortin, supra , the Appellate Division held that the sexual assault of Trooper Gardner was admissible to prove identity under N.J.R.E. 404(b) and that Hazelwood was not qualified to give expert testimony through the use of linkage analysis. 318 N.J.Super. at 580, 724 A. 2d at 820. This Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the proposed expert testimony of Hazelwood concerning linkage analysis lack[ed] sufficient scientific reliability to establish that the same perpetrator committed the Maine and New Jersey crimes. Fortin I, supra, 162 N.J. at 525, 745 A. 2d at 513. Linkage analysis is the comparison of two or more crimes for common characteristics of a unique or distinctive nature that permits a trained investigator to conclude that the same perpetrator committed the crimes. Id. at 522-23, 745 A. 2d at 511-12. This Court concluded that linkage analysis had not attained a sufficient level of scientific reliability to warrant its admissibility at trial. Id. at 525, 745 A. 2d at 513. This Court found that it is a field in which only Hazelwood and a few of his close associates are involved. Id. at 527, 745 A. 2d at 514. As such, there are no peers to test his theories and no way in which to duplicate his results. Ibid. On the other hand, this Court concluded that Hazelwood, based on his experience, could testify as an expert in criminal investigative techniques and, as such, could discuss similarities between the crimes, provided he did not draw[ ] conclusions about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Id. at 528, 745 A. 2d at 515. [5] Hazelwood specifically was enjoined from testify[ing] on the ultimate issue of whether the person that assaulted Trooper Gardner [was] the same person that murdered Melissa Padilla. Id. at 528-29, 745 A. 2d at 515. This Court recognized the potential for reflexive acceptance and misuse of Hazelwood's testimony given his authoritative credentials and the seeming application of scientific-like analysis that undergirded his opinions. Id. at 533, 745 A. 2d at 518. Nevertheless, this Court reasoned that Hazelwood's testimony could be helpful to a jury in showing that the evidence established an unusual pattern, provided the witness can from a reliable database offer evidence that a combination of bite marks on the breast, bite marks on the chin, and rectal tearing inflicted during a sexual attack is unique in his experience of investigating sexual assault crimes. Id. at 532, 745 A. 2d at 517-18 (emphasis added). This Court emphasized that Hazelwood's testimony required a foundation: If there is such a database of cases, the witness's premise can be fairly tested and the use of the testimony invokes none of the concerns that we have expressed about the improper use of expert testimony. Id. at 533, 745 A. 2d at 518 (emphasis added). This Court clearly set the production of a reliable database as an essential qualifier to Hazelwood's testimony. The approach outlined by the Fortin I Court would ensure that his crime-scene comparison techniques would be subject to verification, allowing the defense a fair opportunity to test his methods and credibility in the crucible of cross-examination. The issue now to be resolved is whether Hazelwood provided to the defense the database that was contemplated in Fortin I. After the decision in Fortin I, the defense requested a comprehensive listing of the 4,000 cases referred to in Hazelwood's motion testimony, including the names of the cases, their locations, copies of police reports, the evidence reviewed by Hazelwood, and copies of his interviews. The defense also requested a listing of the crime scenes Hazelwood had visited and any database he had relied on in formulating his opinion on the unique characteristics between the Gardner and Padilla crimes. Hazelwood responded, through the prosecutor, that he neither had a list of the files of those cases that he had investigated during his years in law enforcement, nor access to them, and that [n]o database, evidence or scientific studies were reviewed in forming [his] opinion. He professed to have relied upon [his] experience, education and training in arriving at [his] opinion. The prosecutor explained that Hazelwood's opinion would be based on his life's work as a military policeman, FBI special agent, violent crime analyst, sex crimes specialist, behavioral scientist, author, consultant on violent sex crimes around the world and distinguished national and international lecture[r] on violent sex crimes. Defendant responded by moving for either the production of the database or the preclusion of Hazelwood's testimony. At a hearing addressing the defense's discovery request, the trial court expressed the view that it was entirely reasonable that Hazelwood did not have a list of cases, just as any lawyer would be hard pressed to go back and provide a list of cases in which he had been counsel from the beginning of his career. The court noted that experts often testify from their experience without having to provide lists or details of their previous cases. The court stated that it interpreted Fortin I 's reference to reliable database, to mean a trustworthy database, and that defendant's argument addressed the weight to be accorded Hazelwood's testimony, not its admissibility. The trial court emphasized that defense counsel could cross-examine Hazelwood about the number of cases he had reviewed that involved strangulation and bite marks. In his trial testimony, Hazelwood identified seventeen similarities in the modus operandi and five ritualistic behaviors similar between the Gardner and Padilla crimes. See supra Part I. In his trial testimony Hazelwood defined modus operandi as the behaviors necessary to commit the crime and the consequences of those behaviors. Modus operandi is a learned behavior that develops based on the criminal's ongoing experience, education, maturity, and the demands of the crime. Hazelwood claimed that he had never seen all 17 of these [ modus operandi ] characteristics together other than in the Gardner and Padilla crimes. According to Hazelwood, ritualistic behaviors are static and repeated patterns of behaviors ... designed for one single purpose, psychosexual gratification. Hazelwood found five ritualistic behaviors that were similar between the two crimes. See supra Part I. Hazelwood had never encountered that combination of ritualistic behaviors before or a bite mark to the chin in all of the 7,000 cases that [he had] worked on over more than 30 years. Hazelwood had never seen, read, or heard of such similarities in modus operandi and ritualistic behaviors in any other crime. Although that conclusion came perilously close to a prohibited ultimate-issue opinionan opinion as to the guilt of defendant Fortin I permitted such testimony provided that Hazelwood was able from a reliable database to say that the combination of factors were unique in his experience of investigating sexual assault crimes. See Fortin I, supra, 162 N.J. at 532, 745 A. 2d 509. The missing link here was the failure of Hazelwood to produce any database before or during his testimony. This Court clearly stated in Fortin I that a database of cases would permit Hazelwood's assumptions to be fairly tested. Id. at 533, 745 A. 2d at 518. We cannot accept the State's argument that Hazelwood provided a reliable database to support his opinion by reference to his expert report, his curriculum vitae, his publications, and his pretrial testimony, all of which were known to this Court at the time of Fortin I. See id. at 521, 745 A. 2d at 511 (discussing Hazelwood's credentials). Had any of those items qualified as the reliable database, this Court undoubtedly would have said so. Defendant was not required, as suggested by the State, to assemble Hazelwood's database by researching his publications and tracking down all or some portion of the relevant 7,000 cases that he investigated over the course of his law enforcement career. Surely, Hazelwoodan author of five books and scores of articles, a university adjunct faculty member, a frequent lecturer, a former FBI agent, and former member of the FBI Behavioral Science Unit could have compiled some manner of database of cases on which he had based his conclusions. We cannot agree with the trial court that Hazelwood's reference to his experience, training, and education was a substitute for a database of cases or that the failure to provide such case information only went to the weight to be given to his opinion, rather than its admissibility. Hazelwood's testimony, although presented as the application of criminal investigative techniques, was couched in the aura of science, more particularly, behavioral science. He was permitted to testify to his understanding of the state of mind of the perpetrator, who he described as impulsive, motivated by anger, and driven by the need for psychosexual gratification. A very thin line demarcated the boundary between linkage analysis, which this Court found not to have achieved an acceptable level of scientific reliability, and the uniqueness analysis that this Court permitted as a subject of expert testimony. In Fortin I, this Court was concerned about providing some means by which to test the validity of Hazelwood's conclusions. The database was to serve as the means by which those conclusions would be subject to verification on cross-examination. We cannot ignore the fact that Hazelwood's testimonythat he had never seen, read, or heard of two crimes with the same characteristics in commoncame close to identifying defendant as the murderer without uttering the words. That powerful testimony was presented through the quasi-science of uniqueness analysis. Hazelwood was offered as a respected authority. The danger that the Trooper Gardner assault could be used as propensity evidence, despite the best-crafted limiting instruction, was a grave concern. In Fortin I, this Court also recognized the danger that a jury could be swept along by testimony that drew even a facile connection between the two gruesome crimes. Id. at 534, 745 A. 2d at 518 (citing State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 309, 558 A. 2d 833, 844 (1989)). Although Hazelwood's uniqueness analysis may not sound strictly in scientific method, there are enough common elements to invoke the principles and, therefore, the protections of State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984). In Kelly, this Court cautioned that [t]he technique or mode of analysis used by the expert must have a sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results so as to contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth. Id. at 210, 478 A. 2d at 380; see also State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 516, 443 A. 2d 1020, 1024 (1982) ([E]xpert testimony is admissible only if the expert has sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony and the testimony itself is sufficiently reliable.). The Rules of Evidence, contrary to the State's assertions, do provide the basis for the production of a database before an expert testifies. N.J.R.E. 705 states, The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. (Emphasis added). Fortin I, supra, unmistakably required prior disclosure of a reliable database to ensure the validity of Hazelwood's testimony and to allay this Court's concerns about its improper use. 162 N.J. at 533, 745 A. 2d at 518. The Fortin I Court provided two examples of a reliable database to validate an expert's testimony. Id. at 532, 745 A. 2d at 517-18. In State v. Zola, the State sought to prove that the defendant had sexually assaulted the victim by presenting the testimony of a forensic chemist, who opined that his tests on a vaginal sample from the victim indicated the presence of saliva. 112 N.J. 384, 408-09, 548 A. 2d 1022, 1034-35 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1146, 103 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1989). To support his opinion, the expert referred to his logbook of test results from approximately 1,644 other vaginal samples. The Court held that the State's failure to make the database of those samples available to the defense before trial was harmless error. Id. at 410-12, 548 A. 2d at 1035-36. As a second example of a reliable database, this Court cited a table entitled Incident Characteristics by Homicide Type, 1976-95 (in Percent), in James Alan Fox and Jack Levin, Multiple Homicide: Patterns of Serial and Mass Murder, 23 Crime & Just. 407, 435 (1998). As the name suggests, that table tabulates thousands of homicides and displays incident characteristicsweapon used, victim-offender relationship, and circumstances broken down by type of homicide. The database supported the authors' conclusion that the firearm is the most effective means of mass destruction and the weapon of choice in both mass-murder incidents and single victim crimes. Id. at 434-35. Surely if thousands of murder cases and hundreds of tests performed on bodily fluids can be tabulated in a database, the basic information for a database in this case can be compiled as well. Hazelwood's database should have consisted of violent sexual assault cases that he had investigated, studied, or analyzed during his professional career, and the peculiar modus operandi and ritualistic characteristics of those crimes. Such a database would have provided some basis for verifying the frequency of sexual assaults in which perpetrators bite the faces or breasts of their victims, or manually strangle them, or engage in high risk attacks, to name but a few of the characteristics Hazelwood found distinctive in this case. If Hazelwood was correct about the unique combination of characteristics that the Gardner and Padilla assaults had in common, the database would have strengthened and validated his conclusions. The jury also was entitled to know if there were any flaws in his analysis. We do not suggest that the database had to be comprised of all of the cases investigated, studied, or analyzed by Hazelwood, or even a majority of them. We understand that it might be overly burdensome or impossible to construct such a record if he were not keeping such records on a running basis and if he truly were denied access to the records by other law enforcement authorities. Hazelwood, however, holds himself out as an expert in this field and presumably has kept records for the purpose of conducting research, publishing articles and books, and presenting lectures. We believe that if he had the will to do so, he could provide some credible database for submission to the trial court. The database, at a minimum, must permit an acceptable basis for comparison. We are not prepared on the present record to say what number of cases would constitute a sufficient database. That determination we leave to the trial court, which must conduct a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing. At that hearing, the trial court must determine what number of cases can be reconfigured within reason and what number of case comparisons are necessary to give the opinion validity. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting Hazelwood to testify absent the production of a reliable database. On remand, the trial court will conduct a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing consistent with this opinion.