Opinion ID: 2974809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Designation as an Armed Career Criminal

Text: 2 Petitioner contends on appeal that “[t]here was no evidence whatsoever that [he] was selling or intended to sell any marijuana or that he had the 33 grams of marijuana for any other purpose than personal use.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. Petitioner’s state guilty plea is to the contrary, and he may not use the instant habeas petition to effect a collateral attack on his conviction under Tennessee law. - 12 - No. 03-6250 James v. United States Petitioner additionally argues that he was incorrectly designated an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which provides increased penalties for a felon in possession of a firearm who “has three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a). The Government offered five prior offenses at sentencing to establish that Petitioner is an Armed Career Criminal: 1) possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, Virginia state court, conviction 1983; 2) sale of Schedule II drugs, Tennessee state court, committed May 24, 1984; 3) sale of Schedule II drugs, Tennessee state court, committed June 10, 1984; 4) introducing contraband into prison, Tennessee state court, conviction 1987; and, 5) third-degree burglary, Tennessee state court, conviction 1977. The district court below ruled that at least three of these prior convictions, the second, third, and fifth, qualify as violent felonies or serious drug offenses. Petitioner concedes that the first offense counts toward Armed Career Criminal status, but contends that the second and third offenses are not “separate and distinct criminal episodes” and that therefore only one can be counted. He also contends that his 1977 offense, the fifth above, does not fall under the definition of burglary for federal sentencing purposes. Therefore, he claims, he does not have the three predicate offenses required for Armed Career Criminal status. For purposes of designating an Armed Career Criminal, a “violent felony” is “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” or “is burglary . . . or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). A “serious drug offense” includes “an offense under State law, involving - 13 - No. 03-6250 James v. United States manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Petitioner is correct in concluding that the first of the five above offenses qualifies as a serious drug offense. He was convicted in 1983 of possession with intent to distribute 1.89 ounces of marijuana, which is a Class 5 felony under Virginia law. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-248.1(a)(2). Class 5 felonies are punishable by up to ten years’ incarceration. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-10(e). Marijuana is a controlled substance under both Virginia and federal law. Donahue v. Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 768, 769 (Va. 1983); 21 U.S.C. § 812 Schedule I(c)(17). The second and third offenses above are also serious drug offenses. The sale of a “Schedule II controlled substance” in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(3), (c) is at least a Class C felony, and is punishable by up to 10 years’ incarceration or more.3 Therefore, as Petitioner does not 3 In United States v. Morton, 17 F.3d 911, 915 (6th Cir. 1994), this court held that the maximum sentence prescribed by law for a prior drug offense counted under § 924(e) is determined based on the sentencing laws of the relevant state at the time of the Armed Career Criminal sentencing – thus, in this case, 1995, rather than 1985. Under Tennessee’s “comprehensive penal and sentencing reform legislation,” which took effect in 1989, the difference between statutory minimum and maximum sentences is divided into “ranges” based on the offender’s criminal record. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-112, 40-35-101 Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. The Morton court thus held, “At the time defendant was being sentenced in this case, the State of Tennessee did not consider trafficking less than .5 grams, when the defendant has no more than one prior felony conviction, serious enough to impose a ten-year sentence.” 17 F.3d at 915. In this case, by contrast, Petitioner already had more than one prior felony conviction in 1985; he was considered an “especially aggravated offender” based on his prior record and was sentenced to 14 years’ incarceration for the two sales of Schedule II drugs, the sentences to run concurrently. “Especially aggravated offender” status triggers a “Range II” sentence under Tennessee’s current system. Wallen v. State, 863 S.W.2d 34, 36 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Cook, 816 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tenn. 1991). For a Class C felony, Range II is six to ten years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112(b)(3). For a Class B felony (for sale of more - 14 - No. 03-6250 James v. United States dispute, it qualifies as a serious drug offense under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). See United States v. Roach, 958 F.2d 679, 683 (6th Cir. 1992) (counting the sale of schedule II controlled substances in violation of Tennessee law as a prior conviction for a serious drug offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)). However, Petitioner argues that his two 1984 distribution offenses cannot be counted separately. This court reviews de novo the question of whether offenses were committed on occasions different from one another under § 924(e)(1). United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2006). Offenses are committed on different occasions if they “are not ‘components of a single act of criminality.’” United States v. Anderson, 76 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1990)). Petitioner sold cocaine to a police informant in Tennessee on May 24 and June 10 of 1984. He contends that these sales were not on occasions different from one another because the sales were to the same informant, one warrant was issued and one arrest made for both, both convictions arose from the same proceeding, and the sentences were served concurrently. As an initial matter, a “defendant’s receipt of concurrent sentences for . . . [multiple] prior felony drug convictions does not mean that the convictions were part of the same criminal episode.” United States v. Anderson, 76 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1996). In United States v. Brady, 988 F.2d 664, 666 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), this court held that offenses were committed on different occasions although they occurred approximately forty-five than .5 grams), Range II is twelve to twenty years. Id. § 40-35-112(b)(2). Thus, under the rule in Morton, the maximum sentence prescribed by Tennessee law for sale of Schedule II drugs at the time of sentencing for Petitioner’s current felon in possession offense was ten years or more. - 15 - No. 03-6250 James v. United States minutes apart on the same evening, and the police clearly were unable to arrest the defendant for the first offense before he committed the second. Thus, the fact that Petitioner was not arrested between the two drug sales does not mean that the two sales formed a single episode. The rest of Petitioner’s arguments were all raised and rejected in Roach. This court held in that case that sales of drugs to the same undercover agent, just over two weeks apart, for which the defendant was indicted on the same day and later convicted on the same day, were separate criminal episodes for § 924(e)(1) purposes. 958 F.2d at 683-84. Likewise, Petitioner’s two 1984 sales here were not part of a single act of criminality, and the district court properly counted both toward Petitioner’s designation as a Armed Career Criminal. Thus, Petitioner has at least three qualifying prior offenses. Therefore, this court need not reach the question of whether Petitioner’s conviction for third-degree burglary under Tennessee law qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of Armed Career Criminal status. The sentencing court properly determined that Petitioner qualified for an offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), (c)(2). Although the district court used different offenses to find that Petitioner had three prior felonies, the district court correctly ruled that Petitioner’s sentencing guidelines were properly calculated. Insofar as Petitioner’s claims regarding his sentencing calculations are to be construed as allegations that counsel was ineffective for failing to object at sentencing, they are also not meritorious. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to object to what was properly done. United States v. Sanders, 404 F.3d 980, 986 (6th Cir. 2005).