Opinion ID: 796898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The employee-defendants' claims of immunity

Text: 73 Employee-defendants Daly, Parrott, Pfalzgraf, Tobias, and Utz appeal the district court's order denying their respective motions for summary judgment on the basis of immunity under Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code. The district court only briefly addressed their immunity defense, again quoting from its December 2004 order: 74 An exception found in section 2744.03 of the Ohio Revised Code, serves to eliminate the immunity of the individual defendants — specifically sub-sections 6(a & b). . . . 75 The actions of the individual County employees, if true, clearly were manifestly outside the scope of their employment or official responsibilities. As such, the individual County employees, named as Defendants in this case can not claim immunity under Chapter 2744. 76 Chesher v. Neyer, 392 F.Supp.2d 939, 962 (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). The court went on to explain that [a]s the above quotation from the Court's earlier Order clearly states, the Court relied upon the exceptions found at . . . 2744.03[A] (6)(a & b) to find the . . . individual County Defendants liable for IIED [intentional infliction of emotional distress], NIED [negligent infliction of emotional distress], and Civil Conspiracy. (Bracketed material added.) Thus, the court appeared to rest its denial of immunity on both the § 2744.03(A)(6)(a) exception for acts or omissions manifestly out-side the scope of employment and the 2744.03(A)(6)(b) exception for reckless acts or omissions. 77 The likely explanation for the district court's brief treatment of the employee-defendants' motions for summary judgment based on statutory immunity is that the court had essentially already performed the requisite analysis earlier in its order. Just as the § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) exception requires wanton or reckless acts, the employee-defendants' motions for summary judgment as to the sufficiency of Chesher's evidence regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress similarly required the court to consider whether each defendant acted in an extreme and outrageous manner, thus recklessly causing Plaintiffs' emotional distress. Chesher, 392 F.Supp.2d at 956. The court determined, after undertaking a lengthy analysis of the facts, that Chesher's allegations supported a finding of recklessness in the case of each defendant. Given those conclusions, § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) would preclude immunity for those same acts earlier found to be reckless. For the reasons addressed below, however, we are of the opinion that the district court's application of the § 2744.03(A)(6)(a) exception for acts manifestly outside the scope of employment was erroneous. 78 Perhaps not surprisingly, no court has considered the applicability of Ohio's sovereign-immunity statute to facts sufficiently similar to Chesher's allegations to control the outcome in this case. Several recent cases, however, shed light on Ohio's interpretation of whether a defendant's acts are sufficiently egregious to sever the employer-employee relationship under § 2744.03(A)(6)(a) or to amount to recklessness under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). 79 The Ohio Court of Appeals interpreted an immunity statute similar to Chapter 2744 in Caruso v. State, 136 Ohio App.3d 616, 737 N.E.2d 563 (2000). In Caruso, the court considered whether, under Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 9.86, an employee of the Ohio State University Medical Center could be held liable for berating and threatening to slap his administrative assistant. The court reviewed several cases in which Ohio courts had found that arguably more egregious conduct did not amount to recklessness, and reached the same conclusion in the case before it. Caruso, 737 N.E.2d at 568. Among the cases cited were Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dep't, 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 639 N.E.2d 31, 35-36 (1994) (holding that a police chief's failure to maintain certain safety devices, which resulted in a police officer's injury when a prisoner set fire to his mattress, did not constitute wanton conduct); Fuson v. Cincinnati, 91 Ohio App.3d 734, 633 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1993) (concluding that the failure of emergency medical personnel to transport an uncooperative injured person to a hospital did not rise to the level of wanton misconduct where the medics had checked for vital signs, no request for transport was made, and the medics had instructed the family to come to the hospital if the condition worsened); and Jackson v. Butler City Bd. of Comm'rs, 76 Ohio App.3d 448, 602 N.E.2d 363, 366-68 (1991) (determining that a state agency's placement of a child with her father and its failure to check up on the child face-to-face prior to the child's being beaten to death was not reckless where the father was not a known placement risk that the agency disregarded). 80 The court in Caruso next addressed the question of whether the defendant's assault on his assistant fell manifestly outside the scope of his employment. Caruso, 737 N.E.2d at 566. At the outset of its discussion, the court cited Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991), for the principle that, in order for an intentional tort to be within the scope of employment, the conduct giving rise to the tort must facilitate or promote the business for which the employee was employed or at least be calculated to do so. Id. at 567, 565 N.E.2d 584. The court determined, based on this principle, that whether immunity attached required an examination of the motives behind the alleged assault. Id. If the defendant's assault was merely to gratify his own personal feelings of animosity and resentment, the court noted that he would not be entitled to immunity. Id. Ultimately, the court held that the defendant's outburst was instead motivated, at least in some misguided way, by his work-related concern for preventing needless interruptions by his assistant. Id. at 567-68, 565 N.E.2d 584. The assault thus fell within the scope of his employment and immunity attached. Id. This holding corresponds with the Ohio Supreme Court's statement that the scope of employment turns on the agency-law question of whether the conduct at issue was initially motivated by a desire to promote the master's business. Martin, 590 N.E.2d at 417. 81 More recently, in Thompson v. Bagley, No. 11-04-12, 2005 WL 940872 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr.25, 2005), the Ohio Court of Appeals considered whether Drew Altimus, a physical education teacher, could be held liable for a child's drowning death in the school's swimming pool during a swimming class. Thompson alleged that Altimus had noticed the child floating face-down in the pool, but had simply assumed that the child was only joking around. Id. at . Rather than rescuing the child himself, Altimus sent three different students in succession to attempt to pull the drowning student out of the water. Id. Finally, after the third student succeeded, Altimus began to perform CPR, but could not save the child. Id. The plaintiff produced an aquatic safety expert who testified that Altimus had failed to properly provide for the child's safety. Id. at . Ultimately, the court denied Altimus's motion for summary judgment based on statutory immunity, noting that [w]hether such actions rises [sic] to the level of recklessness is normally a question to be determined by the trier of fact. Id.; see also Fabrey, 639 N.E.2d at 35 (noting that the issue of wanton misconduct is normally a jury question). 82 With these principles of Ohio's statutory-immunity law in mind, we turn to the individual defendants' motions for summary judgment regarding Chesher's claim that they intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the class plaintiffs. A review of the employee-defendants' briefs in support of their motions reveals that they moved for summary judgment based on statutory immunity only as to Chesher's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims and her conspiracy claim. They specifically argued that [i]n the absence of [the § 2744.03(a)(6) exceptions] . . . it is appropriate for this Court to grant summary judgment to the individual County Defendants . . . on Plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy. Because these defendants did not assert statutory immunity as a grounds for summary judgment regarding Chesher's negligent -infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, the issues associated with that claim are beyond the scope of this interlocutory appeal. Our treatment of the facts in the following sections views them most favorably to the plaintiffs, as required by the summary-judgment standard of review, but should not otherwise be taken as an acceptance of that version.
83 Daly, like Parrott, attended the meetings at which Condon expressed an interest in undertaking an art project. Furthermore, Daly acknowledged in his deposition that it was his understanding that Condon's art project would involve taking photographs of dead bodies in posed positions. Condon also allegedly stated at his sentencing hearing that he provided Daly at some point with a list of Symbolic Objects To Be Used And Their Intended Meanings that is included in the record, although Daly denies ever having seen such a list. Finally, Parrott assigned Daly to be in charge of the logistics regarding the proposed film project. 84 Nothing in the record suggests that Daly acted outside the scope of his employment, particularly given Parrott's direct assignment for him to work with Condon. Subsection 2744.03(A)(6)(a) thus does not preclude Daly's immunity defense for reasons discussed more fully below in connection with Parrott. The record could, however, permit a jury finding that Daly perversely disregard[ed] a known risk. See Webb v. Edwards, 165 Ohio App.3d 158, 845 N.E.2d 530, 536 (2005). Although Daly was an administrative aide rather than a doctor at the Morgue, Parrott nonetheless assigned him a lead role in dealing with Condon. Daly's deposition testimony reflects that he had every reason to know that Condon intended to take the offending photographs, but never warned anyone despite his role as the project coordinator. We thus conclude that Daly is not entitled to statutory immunity because the record would permit a jury finding that his conduct falls within the § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) exception for wanton or reckless conduct.
85 Chesher alleges that Parrot, like the other employee defendants, both intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress on the class plaintiffs by facilitating Condon's access to the Morgue and by covering up the County's actions. In support of her claims, Chesher points out that Parrott attended the two introductory meetings with Condon prior to the preliminary work on the video project in August of 2000. Both Daly and Waits have stated that, during one of the meetings, Condon apprised Parrott of his intent to pursue an art project at the Morgue. Daly and Waits also testified in their depositions that Parrott made no objection to such a project at the time, noted that he had seen things like that before, and indicated that he would consider it. 86 Contrary to the advice he received from the Prosecutor's Office, Parrott allegedly placed no limits on Condon and permitted him to take photographs without obscuring identifiable characteristics and without a plan to secure the photographs. As chief policymaker, Parrott was also in charge of the trust-based security policy at the Coroner's Office that permitted Condon to enter the facility even after Parrott claims to have cancelled the video project. Parrott does not specifically recall giving his staff any notice that he had cancelled the project, and his staff does not recall receiving such a notice. 87 Chesher also identifies several instances of an ongoing relationship between Parrott and Condon during Condon's continued presence at the Coroner's Office from August of 2000 to January of 2001. During Parrott's reelection campaign, for example, Condon received and distributed yard signs supporting Parrott's candidacy. Condon also sent Parrott a Christmas card and sent the Coroner's Office a spiral-sliced ham for its holiday party. Chesher further alleges that following the discovery of the offending photographs in January of 2001, Parrott engaged in a conspiracy with the prosecutors and others to cover up the involvement of the County with Condon's activities. 88 Our first task is to decide whether the district court erred in determining that Parrott's conduct as summarized above fell manifestly outside the scope of his employment. We conclude that the record does not support the district court's ruling. To the contrary, Parrott sought out and directed Condon's work in an effort to create an instructional video that was a legitimate work-related goal. Like the defendant in Caruso, Parrott's actions in this regard were motivated, even if in a misguided manner, toward promoting a state purpose rather than strictly personal concerns. Caruso, 737 N.E.2d at 567. We thus conclude that Parrott's actions fell within the scope of his employment under § 2744.03(A)(6)(a). 89 This leaves the question of whether Parrott's actions were wanton or reckless under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). The essence of Chesher's claim against Parrott is that he knew of Condon's desire to take artistic photographs and that Parrott's acts and omissions gave Condon free rein over a prolonged period of time to take such photographs, against the legal advice that Parrott had obtained from the Prosecutor's Office. Based on the existing record, a factfinder could reasonably determine that Condon's desire and ability to take artistic photographs amounted to a known risk. In the face of this danger, Parrott — the self-described top policymaker — permitted Condon to photograph Morgue subjects without restrictions or viable security measures in place, and failed to inform his staff that the video project had been cancelled. 90 We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Parrott's summary judgment motion regarding the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because, as the court in Thompson concluded, a jury could find that Parrott's actions amounted to the disregard of a known risk substantially greater than that necessary to make the conduct negligent. 2005 WL 940872, at  11. The Coroner's Office has a duty to hold bodies placed in its custody in a safe and respectful manner. Unlike the state agency in Jackson that was not on notice of the father's dangerous propensities when it gave him custody of his child, Parrott knew of the great risk that Condon's artistic photography posed in the most straightforward possible way: Condon allegedly told Parrott of his intent and showed him examples of similar photographs. See 602 N.E.2d at 366-367 91 We thus leave the determination of whether Parrott's actions amounted to wantonness or recklessness under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) to a jury. See Fabrey, 639 N.E.2d at 35 (noting that the issue of wanton misconduct is normally a jury question). This conclusion is not at odds with the separate determination that Parrott's actions fell within the scope of his employment. See Floyd v. Thomas, No. CA99-07-016, 2000 WL 864990, at  (Ohio Ct.App. June 26, 2000) (Although [the defendant] is correct in her statement that media statements are within the scope of her employment, the exception to immunity found in [Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b)] for acts committed with malicious purpose, in bad faith and in a wanton and reckless manner would still apply.).
92 Pfalzgraf, like Parrott and Daly, attended the initial meetings with Condon at which the art project was discussed. As the deputy chief coroner, Pfalzgraf was assigned a supervisory role regarding Condon's activities. The district court concluded that a jury could find that Pfalzgraf also acted recklessly because (1) Pfalzgraf was Tobias's supervisor and did not require Tobias to note Condon's presence at the autopsies he witnessed, and (2) Pfalzgraf allowed Condon to witness the autopsy of Brady, during which Condon photographed Brady with a dollhouse ladder propped against his open skull. In his defense, Pfalzgraf explained that he left the room at certain points during the Brady autopsy and that he never saw Condon using any props or taking any propped photographs. He also said that he never had any contact with Condon after the Brady autopsy on August 16, 2000. 93 There is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Pfalzgraf, like Daly and Parrott, knew of Condon's plan to take the offending photographs due to Pfalzgraf's attendance at the initial meetings. Pfalzgraf also would have known of the instructions from the Prosecutor's Office to obscure identifiable features of any bodies photographed for the same reason. Once Parrott assigned Pfalzgraf to work with Condon, however, Pfalzgraf took no steps to ensure that any safeguards were followed and in fact testified that he left Condon alone in the autopsy suite. A factfinder could thus reasonably find that Pfalzgraf wantonly or recklessly permitted Condon to take offending photographs in the course of Brady's autopsy. We therefore conclude that Pfalzgraf's actions, although within the scope of his employment under § 2744.03(A)(6)(a), could be found by a jury to fall within the § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) exception for recklessness. As a result, we affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment as to Chesher's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Pfalzgraf.
94 Chesher alleges that Tobias, like Parrott, had knowledge of Condon's art project and yet continued to meet with Condon and permit him access to the Morgue and to Tobias's autopsy subjects. Tobias's own deposition testimony confirms that he likely had even greater knowledge of Condon's intentions than did Parrott because, on two separate occasions, Condon actually exhibited his offending photographs to Tobias. Nonetheless, Tobias did not object to Condon's continued access to the Morgue and to Tobias's autopsy subjects. In particular, Tobias acknowledged that even after seeing the offending photographs, he left [Condon] alone in the morgue in the course of conducting Senteney's autopsy. 95 Tobias not only permitted Condon to continue accessing the Morgue after viewing the offending photographs, but also began developing his own crime scene photographs at Condon's studio. Parrott questioned the propriety of these photographs by stating that they simply shouldn't have been in a commercial photographer's studio. Although Tobias contends that his photographs were not improper and that Parrott permitted him to develop photographs at Condon's studio, Parrott disputes both of these assertions. In particular, he stated that Tobias's crime-scene photographs and his work at Condon's studio could be seen as collecting souvenirs or an attempt at art. 96 The record contains sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that Tobias acted recklessly under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) with regard to both his own and Condon's photographs. He disregarded the great risk of harm posed by permitting Condon to continue the art project and by entrusting his own highly sensitive crime-scene photographs to Condon. Tobias asserts by way of defense that he consulted Parrott and Utz as his supervisors, that he warned Condon about taking the offending photographs, and that he permitted Condon to continue only because of what he perceived to be the approval of Parrott and Utz. Nevertheless, a jury could reasonably find that Tobias's continued acquiescence to Condon's presence at the Morgue, his act of leaving Condon alone with an autopsy subject even after viewing his offensive photographs, and his entrustment to Condon of the crime-scene photographs amounted to wanton or reckless conduct. 97 At the very least, we cannot say as a matter of law that no reasonable jury could make such a finding. This is where we disagree with our dissenting colleague. He concedes that Tobias may have been negligent (Dissenting Op. at 20), but has determined as a matter of law that no reasonable jury could find that Tobias's conduct crossed the line from negligence to recklessness. But such distinctions are almost always left for a jury — rather than appellate judges — to decide. Whitfield v. Dayton, 167 Ohio App.3d 172, 854 N.E.2d 532, 540 (2006) ([W]hether particular acts demonstrate the presence of wantonness, recklessness, or merely negligence is normally a decision for the jury, based on the totality of the circumstances.). We see no basis on this record to take that determination away from the jury. 98 In reaching a contrary conclusion, our dissenting colleague focuses on the fact that Tobias held a relatively low-level position at the Coroner's Office. We fail to discern, however, why Tobias's position would have hindered his ability as a qualified physician to recognize the risks posed by Condon's alleged art project at the Morgue. Similarly, the dissent does not explain why Tobias's position should mitigate his responsibility for acts within the limited scope of his authority, such as allegedly leaving Condon alone to photograph Tobias's own autopsy subject after having seen examples of Condon's offending photographs. The district court thus properly denied Tobias's motion for summary judgment based on statutory immunity as to Chesher's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. 99 Just as Parrott's acts fell within the scope of his employment under Caruso and Martin, however, so too did Tobias's. See Caruso, 737 N.E.2d at 563; Martin, 590 N.E.2d at 417. Even though Tobias permitted Condon to continue taking the photos after Tobias realized that some of them were troubling, he likely believed that Condon was also conducting legitimate business. Tobias's actions cannot be said to have been personally motivated, as the court in Caruso required, particularly in light of Parrott's acknowledged failure to notify the staff that Condon's project had been cancelled. See 737 N.E.2d at 622. Similarly, Tobias's own crime-scene photos and his work at Condon's studio can be seen as work-related or, in any event, not motivated by strictly personal concerns. See Jackson, 602 N.E.2d at 366-367.
100 Like Tobias, Utz also knew of the risk posed by Condon's artistic photography. Utz admits that Condon showed him several propped photographs sometime after December 25, 2000. According to Tobias, Utz responded by telling Condon that he thought the photographs were kind of cool, which a jury could reasonably view as encouragement. Utz again described a particular propped photograph as cool-looking in an audiotaped conversation with Daly following the public discovery of the photographs. After seeing some of Condon's offending photographs, moreover, Utz did not object and in fact later permitted Condon to take additional photographs of an autopsy that Utz performed on Christina Folchi. 101 Utz admits that he saw the photograph of John Brady with a dollhouse ladder propped against his open skull, but claims that he thought it had been digitally enhanced. He further contends that he meant to inform Parrott about this photograph, but that he failed to do so because he was either busy or sick. These explanations may well be true, but for the purposes of summary judgment we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Chesher as the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Application of that standard leads to the inferences that Utz (1) knew of Condon's offending photography, (2) encouraged Condon by referring to the photographs as cool, (3) continued to permit Condon to photograph his autopsies, even after seeing the offending photographs, and (4) never reported Condon's offending photographs to any superior or law-enforcement authority. 102 For the same reasons as set forth above with regard to Parrott's and Tobias's claims, we affirm the district court's denial under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) of Utz's motion for summary judgment on the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Chesher's allegations against Utz are sufficient to support a jury finding that he acted in a wanton or reckless manner and thus outside the bounds of Ohio's statutory grant of immunity. For the same reasons addressed above in discussing Parrott's immunity, however, we conclude that Utz's actions were not personally motivated and thus not manifestly outside the scope of his employment for the purposes of § 2744.03(A)(6)(a).