Opinion ID: 1960166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review of Trial Court's Finding

Text: Our statute defines harassment as follows: Harassment means any repeated act of intimidation, harassment, physical force or threat of physical force directed against any person, family or their property or advocate with the intention of causing fear or intimidation or to deter free exercise or enjoyment of any rights or privileges secured by the Constitution of Maine and the United States Constitution. This definition does not include any act protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4651(2) (1989). [4] In order to establish a claim of harassment pursuant to section 4651, Smith had to show that Welch acted with the requisite intent. State v. Hills, 574 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Me.1990) ([a] defendant is protected against an overly broad application of the statute by its requirement that the conscious object of [a] defendant's conduct be to harass the complainants.); cf. State v. Ilsley, 595 A.2d 421, 423 (Me.1991) (Ilsley also argues that the State failed to prove that he had the requisite intent to harass Poland). [In such a harassment suit, t]he question of ... intent is a matter of concern for the factfinder. Hills, 574 A.2d at 1359. The trial court found, on the evidence presented, that Smith had not proven the intent required by section 4651(2). [5] We review this factual finding for clear error and find none. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.