Opinion ID: 2516260
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: White's Claims Are Barred by Res Judicata.

Text: The superior court, applying the doctrine of res judicata, found White's action precluded by this court's ruling in White. [17] Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment in a prior action operates as a bar to a subsequent action if (1) the prior judgment was a final judgment on the merits, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction rendered the prior judgment, and (3) the same cause of action and same parties or their privies were involved in both suits. [18] White acknowledges that our decision in White was a final judgment and that the present case and White involve the same parties. White argues, however, that the issues raised in his former action and decided in White are not identical to his present claims for breach of contract and inverse condemnation. But res judicata precludes subsequent actions not only on claims actually raised in a prior proceeding, but also on related claims arising out of the same transaction that could have been raised in that proceeding. For purposes of res judicata, the prior judgment extinguishes `all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction ... out of which the action arose.' [19] What factual grouping constitutes a `transaction' is determined by `whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation,' and `whether they form a convenient trial unit.' [20] Hence, to determine if two claims comprise the same cause of action, we compare their underlying facts and the transactions from which they arose, not the precise legal theories that their proponent selects to describe them. [21] The legal theory that White advanced in his original administrative actionthe theory we ultimately rejected in White was that the Weiss injunction was a force majeure that entitled him to extend his leases because it stalled his efforts to transfer portions of his lease interests, thereby preventing him from developing the leases before their original expiration date. Although White's subsequent contract and condemnation claims advance new legal theories, they challenge the same departmental actionsthe department's failure to process White's transfer as a result of the Weiss injunction and evolve from the same basic factual setting as his earlier force majeure claim. For purposes of res judicata, then, White's current action arises from the same transaction that he litigated to final judgment in White. White does not dispute that he was aware of the department's alleged breach of contract when he raised his force majeure theory in the earlier administrative action. Moreover, he concedes that his inverse condemnation claim stems directly from this breach. White nevertheless insists that he could not have raised his breach of contract claim in the administrative proceeding because the department lacked jurisdiction to decide whether it breached its own contract. But this argument lacks merit. White's contract and inverse condemnation claims fit comfortably within the scope of an ordinary administrative claim. The department's regulations require oil and gas lessees to pursue all grievances through administrative remedies, making no exception for contract claims. [22] The commissioner is the final administrative adjudicator of such grievances. [23] In other contexts, we have recognized the authority of administrative agencies to consider breach of contract claims in which the agencies were parties. [24] And White advances no persuasive reasons to treat his claims differently. Moreover, White chose to press an administrative claim raising only his force majeure theory. After an adverse agency decision, White appealed to the superior court, but made no attempt to raise his contract claim then. [25] He likewise failed to mention his breach of contract claim in appealing the superior court's decision to this court. Having elected to pursue one narrow legal theory to final judgment in his administrative action, White was no longer free to reopen the litigation simply by reshaping his claim to fit a new and broader legal mold. [26] The final judgment in White extinguished all the issues that were or could have been considered by the agency and the superior court in that case. [27] White further asserts, however, that he had no inverse condemnation claim to assert until the department's refusal to transfer the leases became final. Because White bases his inverse condemnation claim on the department's inaction, White reasons that he would have suffered no damages if the department had eventually agreed to extend his leases. Thus, White contends, the improper taking could not have occurred until sometime after the expiration date of the leases. [28] To support this argument, White cites Ehrlander v. State, Department of Transportation and Public Facilities. [29] But Ehrlander is inapposite. There, a borough platting board preliminarily rejected Ehrlander's application to subdivide his property. In a subsequent inverse condemnation action filed directly in superior court, the superior court ruled that Ehrlander had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, because he neglected to appeal the platting board's decision to the borough's planning commission. In reversing the superior court's ruling, we simply observed that Ehrlander could reasonably have elected not to appeal to the planning commission on the ground of inverse condemnation, since the platting board had expressly indicated that it would take a second look at his application to subdivide in approximately six months. [30] In the present case, by contrast, the department responded to White's September 1990 request to extend his leases by unequivocally stating that it would refuse to take action to transfer or extend White's leases unless he first obtained a modification of the Weiss injunction from the court presiding over that case. In so responding, the department firmly adopted its position on the issues of lease transfer and extension. Moreover, White had already put the agency on notice that he considered it to be in breach of his lease contracts. Thus, by his own account, White had already lost the economic advantages of ownership. [31] Accordingly, assuming that a viable inverse condemnation claim might arise from this set of circumstances, the claim by then would have fully accrued. Yet despite the obvious ripeness of his claims for breach of contract and inverse condemnation, White neither appealed the department's decision nor attempted to relax the Weiss injunction; he simply let his leases expire and, months later, filed an administrative action. When he filed that action, White could have asserted at least three alternative legal theories force majeure, breach of contract, and inverse condemnationthat might have yielded two alternative forms of reliefan extension of his leases or an award of damages. Although White elected to pursue only his force majeure claim, nothing prevented him from simultaneously asserting all three theories in his administrative action, or from seeking both forms of alternative relief. White therefore had ample opportunity to litigate these claims in the procedural context of his initial administrative action; the fact that he chose not to, whether because of a strategic decision or ignorance or other reason, does not exempt him from the principles of res judicata. [32] To hold otherwise would defeat the doctrine's underlying goal of judicial finalitythat there shall be a termination of litigation and the participants [shall not be] vexed twice for the same cause. [33]