Opinion ID: 181605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction: The Supplemental Jurisdiction Doctrine

Text: Although the parties have not questioned subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims at issue, a court has an obligation to inquire sua sponte into its subject matter jurisdiction, and to proceed no further if such jurisdiction is wanting. In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1002 (1st Cir.1988). In her complaint, Godin asserts federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 et seq. as to the claims against the school system, and that there exists a common nucleus of operative facts between the state claims and her federal claims sufficient to establish supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. With certain exceptions not applicable here, a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that are so related to claims in the action within [a court's] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. [4] 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). While it might be questioned whether Godin's state-law claims that her job termination was caused by defamatory comments from the individual defendants arise out of the same transaction as her federal claim that the schools did not afford due process in reaching the termination decision, that is not the test. See Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon New England Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 88 (1st Cir.2010) (No Supreme Court case had ever established the same transaction-or-occurrence test as the boundary of Article III case-or-controversy requirement. (citing United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966))). We conclude it would not offend the Constitution to assert supplemental jurisdiction over Godin's state-law claims. [5] Accordingly, supplemental jurisdiction exists over Godin's state-law claims under § 1367(a).