Opinion ID: 611597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: New Trial Based on Government's Discovery Violation

Text: 54 Arias-Villanueva argues that the district court should have granted his motion for a new trial because the government withheld discoverable information until after trial. We review this ruling for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Steel, 759 F.2d 706, 713 (9th Cir.1985). We review alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), de novo in order to determine whether the suppression of Brady material might have affected the outcome of the trial. United States v. Lai, 944 F.2d 1434, 1440 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 947, 117 L.Ed.2d 116 (1992). 55 The information about which Arias-Villanueva complains appears in his presentence report. It states in relevant part that: 56 Arias-Villanueva's name first became known to investigators during the latter part of 1989 when information was received from San Diego, California that Arias-Villanueva had been taken into custody by the Mexican Federal Police.... [S]everal kilograms of heroin and approximately $125,000 in currency was [sic] seized.... Arias-Villanueva admitted that he worked for Carlos Orantes-Arriaga and during the preceding week he had forwarded approximately seven kilograms of heroin across the border at Tijuana into the United States. 57 The district court found that the information was not discoverable and that its nondisclosure was not prejudicial. 58 This information, which came from an unidentified informant, is blatant hearsay that would have been inadmissible at trial. It also tends to inculpate, not exculpate, Arias-Villanueva. Furthermore, this evidence was not presented as a part of Arias-Villanueva's prior criminal record. Therefore, it was not discoverable under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 or Brady. Since the information certainly would not have changed the result of the trial even if it had been disclosed, the district court also did not err in denying the new trial motion. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). 59 J. Severance Motion Based on Antagonistic Defenses 60 Orantes-Arriaga argues that the district court should have severed his trial from one of his codefendants, who presented a duress defense based on Orantes-Arriaga's alleged coercion. Orantes-Arriaga contends that their defenses were mutually exclusive and that severance was required. See United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1553 (9th Cir.1986). 61 Generally, defendants jointly charged are jointly tried. United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 334, 121 L.Ed.2d 252 (1992). The district court's denial of severance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and a defendant seeking reversal has the burden of proving clear, manifest or undue prejudice from a joint trial. United States v. Joetzki, 952 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). The evidence of prejudice must demonstrate that Orantes-Arraiga was denied a fair trial. See id. (citation omitted). 62 Orantes-Arriaga relies on his codefendant's presenting evidence supporting her duress defense that he, both directly and through others, coerced her into joining the conspiracy by threatening her and her family's lives. In Zafiro v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993), the Supreme Court held that severance is warranted only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 938. In Orantes-Arriaga's case, a severance is not warranted under Zafiro. The evidence introduced by his codefendant would have been admissible against Orantes-Arriaga even if he had been tried separately. Orantes-Arriaga, therefore, was not denied a specific trial right. 63 Additionally, it is clear that, at minimum, Orantes-Arriaga must show that acceptance of his codefendant's defense would preclude his acquittal. See United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1362 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 419, 121 L.Ed.2d 342 (1992); United States v. Buena-Lopez, 987 F.2d 657, 661 (9th Cir.1993). Orantes-Arriaga's defense was limited to his testimony on his torture by the Mexican Federal Police, allegedly with the Drug Enforcement Administration's complicity, and his counsel's closing argument. He submitted no theory of the defense jury instructions. Moreover, Orantes-Arriaga did not deny the existence of a conspiracy but merely disputed the extent of his involvement and contended that he should not be prosecuted based on his being tortured. Thus, Orantes-Arriaga's and his codefendant's defenses were not irreconcilable--both could have been either acquitted or convicted based on their theories of defense. While his codefendant's defense, if believed, could have inculpated Orantes-Arriaga, the desire of one to exculpate [herself] by inculpating the other does not generate the kind of prejudice that requires severance. Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1363 (citation omitted). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Orantes-Arriaga's severance motion. K. Mistrial Based on Improper Argument 64 Orantes-Arriaga argues that the district court erred in not granting a mistrial because the prosecutor argued evidence not presented to the jury, in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (holding that the admission of a confession against a criminal defendant in a joint trial violated the codefendant's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause). 65 In ruling on Orantes-Arriaga's motion in limine to exclude Arias-Villanueva's confession, the district court ordered that the witness who took the confession could only testify as to Arias-Villanueva's knowledge of Orantes-Arriaga and nothing more. The witness testified before the jury to the following on direct examination: 66 Q. Did you ask [Arias-Villanueva] if he knew Carlos Orantes? 67
68 Q. How long did he say he knew Carlos Orantes? 69 A. Three years. 70 Q. Did you ask him if he had personally trafficked heroin? 71 A. Yes. I did. 72 Q. What did he say? 73 A. He said, no. He didn't. That was done by others. 74 In characterizing this testimony during his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Arias-Villanueva admitted that he had known Orantes for three years. When asked if he dealt heroin with Orantes, he said no, that is done by others. 75 While severance is required where a nontestifying codefendant's confession is put in evidence, Bruton, 391 U.S. at 142, 88 S.Ct. at 1631, and such a confession is admissible only if all references to implicated codefendants are redacted, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208-09, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707-08, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), the testimony did not violate Bruton. It only established that Orantes-Arriaga and Arias-Villanueva knew one another; this is not substantially incriminating. See Richardson 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1708; United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1362. Moreover, Orantes-Arriaga did not object to this testimony. See United States v. Longee, 603 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir.1979) (noting that Bruton claim not raised at trial is reviewed for plain error). There certainly is no plain error in the district court's admission of the testimony. 76 The problem is with the prosecutor's argument, not the underlying testimony. The closing argument's characterization of Arias-Villanueva's confession explicitly incriminated Orantes-Arriaga, and had the confession itself done so, Orantes-Arriaga's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation would have been violated. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1708. The characterization also constitutes improper argument, as it refers to matters outside of the record. See United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2168, 109 L.Ed.2d 497 (1990); United States v. Vargas-Rios, 607 F.2d 831, 838 (9th Cir.1979). However, while incriminating, the fact that Orantes-Arriaga was a heroin dealer was presented to the jury through many other pieces of evidence. Such an error is harmless under either a Bruton or improper argument analysis. See Herd, 800 F.2d at 1529; Sherlock, 962 F.2d at 1364. L. Orantes-Arriaga's Cross-Examination 77 Orantes-Arriaga argues that the district court erred in allowing broad cross-examination when he only testified on direct concerning his torture by the Mexican Federal Police. We review the district court's ruling on the scope of cross-examination for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). 78 Orantes-Arriaga contends the following topics explored by the government constitute improper cross-examination: (1) his relationship with Arias-Villanueva; (2) his subsequent return to the United States; (3) his dealing drugs in Mexico; (4) his having assets or money in the United States; (5) his dealing drugs with Arias-Villanueva; and (6) his knowledge of the sale, manufacture or distribution of heroin. The government contends that all of these topics are reasonably related to the subject matter of Orantes-Arriaga's direct testimony. 79 Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b) states that [c]ross examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of [a] witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. We have held that the trial court may permit cross-examination as to all matters reasonably related to the issues ... put in dispute by [a witness'] testimony on direct. United States v. Vasquez, 858 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 847, 102 L.Ed.2d 978, and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 1161, 103 L.Ed.2d 220 (1989) (citation and internal quotation omitted). In Vasquez we held that the defendant's direct testimony about the leaving his apartment on the day he was arrested allowed the government to cross-examine him concerning the evidence seized from his apartment. While these are obviously different topics, both direct and cross-examination concerned the apartment and were thus reasonably related. Id. at 1392. 80 This case is similar to Vasquez. All of the disputed areas into which the prosecutor inquired on cross-examination were reasonably related to Orantes-Arriaga's direct testimony. Orantes-Arriaga's relationship with Arias-Villanueva related to his testimony that he was forced to call Arias-Villanueva by the Mexican Federal Police and showed that he may have had myriad voluntary reasons to call his close associate. His voluntary return to the United States in 1990 related to his testimony that he believed the DEA and the Mexican government were conspiring for his return to the United States. His dealing drugs in Mexico related to his testimony detailing his lack of knowledge about drug dealers and drugs. The whereabouts of his money and assets related to his testimony regarding his release and payment of a ransom. His dealing drugs with Arias-Villanueva also related to his testimony regarding his lack of knowledge about drug dealing and his being interrogated about dealing drugs with Arias-Villanueva in Seattle. Finally, his knowledge of selling, making or distributing heroin also related to his asserted lack of knowledge about drug dealing. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that all of these areas were reasonably related to Orantes-Arriaga's testimony. 81 Orantes-Arriaga's reliance on United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.1981), to support his argument that the scope of cross-examination was impermissibly broad is misplaced. Green states that [to] the extent that evidence of the appellants' relationships with the other principals involved in the case answered relevant questions raised but left unanswered by [their testimony], it was within the embrace of direct examination and properly admissible. Id. at 594 (footnote omitted). While Green excluded cross-examination testimony violating Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404, those rules are not implicated by Orantes-Arriaga's cross-examination. None of the cross-examination referred to any prior crimes. 82 M. Acquittal Motion on False Identification Charge 83 Orantes-Arriaga contends that the evidence against him was insufficient to support convictions on the counts charging him with aiding and abetting in the production of false identification, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(1) and (2), because there is no evidence that he aided and abetted in the production of five or more false identifications. This argument is without merit. There is no requirement that a defendant produce five or more false identifications; while section 1028(a)(3) makes the possession of five or more false identifications a federal offense, there is no basis for implying that restriction to provisions where Congress itself did not include it. 84 N. Acquittal Based on Improper Jurisdiction and Venue 85 Orantes-Arriaga argues that the district court erred in denying his acquittal motions with respect to the counts charging him with violating 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), use of a communications facility in the commission of a felony. Orantes-Arriaga contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction and venue was improper for these charges. According to Orantes-Arriaga, he should be acquitted of these counts because he did not make the calls, but only received them. Furthermore, he argues that he received them outside of the United States, and therefore the crime was not committed in the United States. See United States v. Rodgers, 575 F.Supp. 246 (N.D.Ill.1983). 86 The district court had jurisdiction over Orantes-Arriaga because his offense was committed in the United States. To establish a violation of section 843(b), the government must establish knowing and intentional use of a communications facility ... [Use] occurs when a defendant either personally uses a telephone or instructs someone else to use one. United States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820, 827 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 210, 121 L.Ed.2d 150 (1992). That Brian Boyer, a government informant, made the calls to Orantes-Arriaga outside the United States is immaterial. Use of a telephone to facilitate the commission of a crime occurs at both ends of the line. Andrews v. United States, 817 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857, 108 S.Ct. 166, 98 L.Ed.2d 120 (1987). Orantes-Arriaga's use of the telephone falls within the scope of section 843(b). 2 87 For the same reason, Orantes-Arriaga argument that venue was improper also fails. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 states prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed. Since under section 843 the use of the telephones was committed both where the call was made and received, venue in Oregon was proper. The district court properly denied Orantes-Arriaga's mistrial motion.