Opinion ID: 1768734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Closed Court Presumption in Juvenile Proceedings

Text: Petitioners advocate that a presumption of openness should be extended to TPR proceedings which, they argue, can only be overcome if the court determines on a case-by-case basis that the best interest of the child outweighs the public's right of access to the proceedings and that any such order of closure should be narrowly tailored to that end. [I]n determining whether a particular proceeding is presumptively open, the Court examines whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and public and whether public access plays a significant role in the functioning of the process. In re N.H.B. 769 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986)). Petitioners present the lengthy history and rationale of the open court presumption in criminal cases. We agree with petitioners that criminal matters are traditionally open proceedings. However, we do not agree that the presumption of openness in criminal proceedings is or should be extended to juvenile proceedings. The foundation of the juvenile system is to `preserv[e] and promot[e] the welfare of the child,' which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (citation omitted). Although juvenile proceedings are civil proceedings, Ostrum v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 663 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), and although the presumption of openness has generally been extended to civil proceedings, juvenile proceedings have historically been closed to the public in furtherance of the overriding interest in, among other things, protecting the child from stigma, publicity, and embarrassment and promoting rehabilitation. It is a hallmark of our juvenile justice system in the United States that virtually from its inception at the end of the last century its proceedings have been conducted outside of the public's full gaze and the youths brought before our juvenile courts have been shielded from publicity. See H. Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States 131-133 (1927); Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 101, 102, 116 (1958). Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). All fifty states have some form of shield law to limit public access to proceedings involving juveniles. Id. at 99, 99 S.Ct. 2667. We have found no case that holds that the presumption of openness is a constitutional requirement in the context of juvenile proceedings. Indeed, the history of the juvenile justice system indicates the contrary, that it is in the best interest of the child to protect the child from publicity in certain proceedings and that this protection outweighs the public's right to access. We do not agree with petitioners that in TPR proceedings a presumption of openness is constitutionally required. A presumption that juvenile proceedings be closed to the public is consistent with the history and tradition of the juvenile justice system and furthers the sound and practical purposes of that system.