Opinion ID: 4525104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count 2: dangerous crimes against children

Text: enhancement ¶59 Allen argues he was incorrectly sentenced on count 2 (conspiracy to commit child abuse) as a dangerous crime against children in the first degree under § 13-705(D). He contends he should have been sentenced under § 13-705(J) as a dangerous crime against children in the second degree. We agree. Section 13-705(O) provides that “[a] dangerous crime against children is in the first degree if it is a completed offense and is in the second degree if it is a preparatory offense.” We have stated that “[b]ecause § 13-705 does not itself define ‘preparatory offense,’ the phrase is best understood as referencing the offenses identified in Title 13, chapter 10 (‘Preparatory Offenses’) of the criminal code—attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, and facilitation.” Wright v. Gates, 243 Ariz. 118, 120 ¶ 10 (2017). ¶60 Allen was convicted on count 2 for conspiracy, a preparatory offense under A.R.S. § 13-1003, to commit child abuse, an enumerated dangerous crime against children under § 13-705(P)(1)(h). Allen’s offense was therefore a dangerous crime against children in the second degree, § 13-705(O), and he should have been sentenced under § 13-705(J). The maximum sentence under that section is fifteen years’ imprisonment, and Allen was sentenced to twenty-four years’ imprisonment. The trial court must resentence Allen on count 2 under the proper subsection. 20 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court B. Counts 2, 4–5: propriety of aggravated sentences ¶61 The trial court imposed the maximum prison term on count 5 and imposed aggravated prison terms on counts 2 and 4. Allen argues that insufficient aggravating factors supported these sentences. ¶62 A trial court may impose a maximum prison term only if one or more statutory aggravating factors are found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. A.R.S. § 13-701(C). The court may impose an aggravated sentence only if two or more statutory aggravated factors are found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. A.R.S. §§ 13-702(C) (first time offenders), -703(E), (F), (K) (repetitive offenders). Section 13-701(D) provides a list of specific aggravators and one “catch-all” aggravator, § 13701(D)(27). The “catch-all” aggravator is “[a]ny other factor that the state alleges is relevant to the defendant’s character or background or to the nature or circumstances of the crime.” Id. ¶63 A maximum or aggravated sentence cannot be based solely on one or more “catch-all” aggravators because doing so would violate due process. The “catch-all” aggravator is “patently vague” and would “give[] the sentencing court virtually unlimited post hoc discretion to determine whether the defendant’s prior conduct is the functional equivalent of an element of the aggravated offense.” State v. Schmidt, 220 Ariz. 563, 566 ¶¶ 9–10 (2009). But the “catch-all” aggravator may be used to guide the sentencing judge’s discretion in deciding whether to impose a sentence “within a properly determined maximum range” established by specific aggravators found consistently with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Id. ¶ 11; see also State v. Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. 371, 373 ¶ 9 (2013).
¶64 On count 2, conspiracy to commit child abuse, the jury found that A.D. was a child under the age of fifteen. The presumptive sentence under § 13-705(D) for dangerous crimes against children in the first degree was seventeen years, but the trial judge imposed a maximum sentence of twenty-four years’ imprisonment. (And, as stated above, the court should have sentenced Allen for a dangerous crime against children in the second degree.) Allen argues the court illegally imposed a maximum sentence because the victim’s age is not a specific aggravator under § 13-701(D). Therefore, he asserts, A.D.’s age can only be considered a “catch-all” 21 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court aggravator, which is insufficient alone to support a sentence greater than the presumptive sentence. ¶65 The State makes two arguments supporting imposition of a maximum sentence. First, it asserts Allen had a prior conviction (count 5), which is a specific aggravator, § 13-701(D)(11), sufficient to support the sentence. Although the trial court did not refer to the prior conviction as a basis for imposing a maximum sentence, it was not required to do so to properly use A.D.’s age as a “catch-all” aggravator. See Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. at 373 ¶ 10. And Apprendi allows the judge, rather than the jury, to find the existence of a prior conviction. 530 U.S. at 490. But Allen’s conviction on count 5 does not constitute an aggravator under § 13-701(D)(11). That provision applies to felony convictions entered “within the ten years immediately preceding the date of the offense.” Allen was not convicted on count 5 before he committed the offense underlying count 2, and § 13701(D)(11) is therefore inapplicable. ¶66 The State also notes the trial court found that the crime underlying count 2 was “heinous” and argues this established the aggravator listed in § 13-701(D)(5) sufficient to support the sentence. The court’s statement during sentencing on count 2 that the crime was a “heinous act” did not constitute a finding that the crime was “especially heinous” as provided in § 13-701(D)(5). And even if the court made such a finding, it would violate Apprendi to use it to impose the maximum sentence because the jury did not make the finding. 530 U.S. at 490; see also Bonfiglio, 231 Ariz. at 373 ¶ 9; Schmidt, 220 Ariz. at 566 ¶ 11. We disagree with the State that no reasonable jury could fail to find that the aggravator exists. Allen’s count 2 conviction was conspiracy to commit child abuse. Although the jury determined that the first degree murder, count 1, was especially heinous or depraved, it does not necessarily follow it would also find conspiracy, an inchoate crime, to be especially heinous or depraved. For all these reasons, the trial court could not have correctly based a maximum sentence on the heinousness aggravator, § 13-701(D)(5). ¶67 We vacate Allen’s sentence on count 2 and remand for resentencing.
¶68 The trial court sentenced Allen to an aggravated sentence of 3.75 years’ imprisonment on count 4, intentional child abuse, as a class 4 felony with one prior conviction, non-dangerous and repetitive. The 22 STATE V. ALLEN Opinion of the Court presumptive sentence was 2.5 years’ imprisonment. § 13-703(H). The jury found one aggravating circumstance—that the crime was committed in the presence of an accomplice—which is an aggravator listed in § 13-701(D)(4). But the court could not impose an aggravated sentence unless “at least two aggravating circumstances listed in § 13-701, subsection D apply.” § 13703(E). The State contends a prior conviction under § 13-701(D)(11) constitutes the second aggravator. But as discussed in conjunction with count 2, Allen’s conviction under count 5 does not qualify as an aggravating factor for a prior conviction. See supra ¶ 65. ¶69 We vacate Allen’s sentence on count 4 and remand for resentencing.
¶70 Allen was convicted of reckless child abuse, a class 3 felony, for conduct that occurred in the months leading up to A.D.’s murder. The jury found that the crime was “especially cruel,” which is an aggravator listed in § 13-701(D)(5). The trial court sentenced Allen to an aggravated sentence of 8.75 years’ imprisonment pursuant to § 13-702(D) for first-time offenders. ¶71 The State argues that an aggravated sentence is proper because the court also found as two “catch-all” aggravating factors that A.D. was only 10 years old and that Allen subsequently repeated his actions by confining A.D. in the box, which ultimately led to her death. An aggravated sentence requires two specific aggravators. See § 13-702(C). Because the jury did not find a second specific aggravator, we vacate the sentence on count 5 and remand for resentencing.