Opinion ID: 1387247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Christopher Beaver's False Statements

Text: Christopher Beaver next challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) for falsely stating to Special Agent Freeman that neither he, nor Beaver Materials, participated in the price-fixing conspiracy. Specifically, Christopher argues that the government did not prove that his statements were material as a matter of law. As he explains, the government needed to show at trial that his statements to Freeman were material, see 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1); United States v. Moore, 446 F.3d 671, 677 (7th Cir.2006), meaning that the statements had the tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing, the FBI's investigation of the price-fixing conspiracy, see United States v. Brantley, 786 F.2d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1266 (7th Cir.1979); cf. United States v. Fernandez, 282 F.3d 500, 508 (7th Cir.2002) (explaining materiality in context of federal mail-fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346). [4] According to Christopher, his false statements could not have influenced the FBI's investigation because his attorney, Sheeks, contacted the Department of Justice to correct the statements before they could lead the FBI astray. Before we weigh the merits of Christopher Beaver's argument, however, we must take a moment to alleviate the confusion that apparently exists regarding his challenge. Specifically, Christopher mischaracterizes the issue of his false statements' materiality as a matter of law. But the materiality of false statements is not a legal determination; it is, rather, a factual determination that is made by the jury only. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant's right to have a jury decide each and every element of the offense with which he is charged, including the element of materiality when the defendant is charged with making false statements. See also United States v. Ringer, 300 F.3d 788, 791-92 (7th Cir.2002); Waldemer v. United States, 106 F.3d 729, 730-31 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1538-39 (7th Cir.1996). Indeed, the jury in Christopher's trial was instructed specifically to determine whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the false statements he made to Special Agent Freeman were material, and, by virtue of its guilty verdict, concluded that they were. Accordingly, Christopher's argument that the government failed to prove that his false statements were material requires us to examine whether the government introduced sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion. See. Moore, 446 F.3d at 676-80; United States v. Kosth, 257 F.3d 712, 718-20 (7th Cir.2001); see also Ringer, 300 F.3d at 791-92. The government, in turn, contends that Christopher Beaver has waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his false-statements conviction. As the government points out, Christopher did not challenge the evidence showing that he lied to Special Agent Freeman either when he moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case, or when he renewed his motion after the jury's verdict; instead, he challenged only the evidence supporting his pricefixing-conspiracy conviction. Thus, the government asserts, Christopher intentionally relinquished the argument that insufficient evidence supported his falsestatements conviction by failing to raise it specifically before the district court, and that such a waiver precludes our review of this argument. The government is correct that Christopher Beaver waived his sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument regarding his false-statements, conviction. See United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 311, 324 (7th Cir.2006); United States v. Buchmeier, 255 F.3d 415, 419 (7th Cir.2001); see also 2A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal § 466 (3d.2000). However, the government incorrectly asserts that Christopher's failure to raise the point in his motion for a judgment of acquittal prevents us from addressing the argument on appeal; as we have stated many times, we review sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments that were not presented in a motion for a judgment of acquittal under the plain-error standard. See, e.g., Groves, 470 F.3d at 324; United States v. Allen, 390 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir.2004); United States v. Baker, 40 F.3d 154, 160 (7th Cir.1994). In this regard, the failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence is perhaps more precisely characterized as forfeiture rather than waiver. Cf. United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir.2007) (differentiating between waiver and forfeiture in context of Fed.R.Crim.P. 12). Compare Groves, 470 F.3d at 324 (stating that sufficiency-ofevidence argument not presented in motion for judgment of acquittal is waived, but nevertheless reviewed under plain error), with United States v. Moore, 425 F.3d 1061, 1069 n. 5 (7th Cir.2005) (`Waiver precludes appellate review, but forfeiture permits review for plain error.' (quoting United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir.2005))). But regardless of what we call Christopher's failure to raise his challenge before the district court, we nevertheless proceed with a plain-error analysis, see Groves, 470 F.3d at 324; Allen, 390 F.3d at 947, meaning that Christopher can prevail only if he can show that, absent reversal, a manifest miscarriage of justice will result, Allen, 390 F.3d at 947; see also United States v. Rock, 370 F.3d 712, 714 (7th Cir.2004). Under this most demanding standard, reversal is warranted only `if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, or if the evidence on a key element was so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.' Allen, 390 F.3d at 948 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593, 597-98 (7th Cir.2000)). Moving (finally) to the merits of Christopher Beaver's argument, we reject his assertion that his false statements were not capable of influencing the FBI's investigation because his attorney, Sheeks, contacted the Department of Justice to correct the statements before the FBI could actually be influenced by them. In fact, the argument fails for several reasons. First, the record does not even support Christopher's contention that he attempted to correct his false statements. The letter Sheeks sent to the Department of Justice did not say that Christopher made false statements to the FBI; the letter merely stated that one of the employees of Beaver Materials misstated that he was not at a meeting at Nuckols's horse barn. This correction could be understood as referring to Christopher, Ricky Beaver, Allyn Beaver, or any employee at Beaver Materials that spoke with FBI agents on May 25, 2004, but not as an admission by Christopher, himself, that he misled the FBI. Instead, the letter's vague language perpetuated Christopher's lies by implying that someone else had misled the FBI. Moreover, Christopher Beaver is incorrect that he can avoid a conviction under § 1001 by correcting his false statements days after he spoke them. Contrary to Christopher's suggestions, § 1001 contains no recantation defense. See United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir.2001). Christopher nevertheless attempts to impute such a defense by citing one case in which a circuit court of appeals held that a criminal defendant can escape prosecution under § 1001 by correcting false statements almost immediately United States v. Cowden, 677 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir.1982). But Christopher did not attempt to cure his false statements almost immediately; Sheeks did not send the letter on Christopher's behalf to the Department of Justice until three days after Christopher lied to. Special Agent Freeman. Cf. United States v. Salas-Camacho, 859 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing Cowden and declining to find false statements immaterial when defendant corrected statements only when confronted by federal agents); United States v. Fern, 696 F.2d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.1983) (distinguishing Cowden and declining to find false statements immaterial when defendant corrected statements only once Internal Revenue Service became suspicious). Christopher's reliance on Cowden is thus misplaced, and absent any further support he essentially asks us to interpolate a recantation defense into § 1001. But given, Congress's silence on the issue, we decline his invitation to do so. See Sebaggala, 256 F.3d at 64 ([W]e see no basis for writing into section 1001 a recantation defense that Congress chose to omit. After all, `courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for doing so.' (quoting Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408, 118 S.Ct. 805, 139 L.Ed.2d 830 (1998))). Because § 1001 contains no recantation defense, the materiality of Christopher Beaver's false statements must be assessed at the moment he uttered them. See United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir.2004); United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301, 307 (4th Cir.1998) (stating that not measuring materiality of false statement at time of utterance would allow witnesses who lie under oath to escape prosecution if their statements before a grand jury are obviously false). And in so assessing the false statements, we conclude that they were material. Special Agent Freeman testified that Christopher denied meeting with any of Beaver Materials's competitors to develop discount limits or pricing constraints. According to Freeman, Christopher went so far as to say that the only time that he saw Beaver Materials's competitors was at Indiana Ready-Mix Association meetings. Because Christopher's statements concealed his actual role in the conspiracy, they could have hindered the FBI's investigation by directing its attention away from the October 2003 meeting at Nuckols's horse barn, away from Beaver Materials as a company involved in the cartel, and away from himself as an individual participant in the conspiracy. Thus, we see no fault with the jury's determination that Christopher's false statements were material, much less can we say that we are shocked by his conviction. See Moore, 446 F.3d at 676-80; Allen, 390 F.3d at 948; Kosth, 257 F.3d at 718-20. [5]