Opinion ID: 76586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Refusal to Give Willfulness Jury Instruction

Text: 10 Polar first argues that the district court erred in failing to give his proposed instruction on willfulness. Polar argues that § 1546(a) requires proof of specific intent and that the district court therefore should have instructed the jury that willfulness was an element of the offense. 11 We review a district court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir.2000). This refusal constitutes reversible error only if (1) the instruction is substantially correct, (2) the instruction was not addressed in the charge actually given, and (3) the failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present an effective defense. United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1298 (11th Cir.2001). 12 We find the first prong — the requirement that the rejected instruction was a substantially correct statement of the law — to be dispositive here. Neither the language of the statute nor case law interpreting it supports Polar's novel contention that § 1546(a) requires proof of willfulness. The statute reads, in relevant part: 13 Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any ... document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States, or utters, uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any such ... document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States, knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made ... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned.... 14 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (emphasis added). Nothing in this language suggests a scienter requirement beyond that the requirement that the defendant acted knowingly. Indeed, under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the statute's inclusion of the word knowingly tilts against any possibility that Congress intended any additional scienter requirement. Polar does not cite to us, nor does our own research reveal, any cases interpreting the statute to include a willfulness element. 15 Polar, however, cites the Eleventh Circuit pattern jury instruction for § 1546(a), which does require the jury to find that the Defendant acted willfully and with knowledge that the passport had been counterfeited. Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases), Special Instruction No. 58. 3 According to Polar, this instruction makes plain [that] willfulness is an element of the crime with which Mr. Polar was charged. Appellant's Br. at 18. Pattern jury instructions, however, cannot trump the plain language of a statute. As we have noted elsewhere, pattern jury instructions are not precedent and cannot solely foreclose the construction of the necessary elements of a crime as stated in the statute. See United States v. Ettinger, 344 F.3d 1149, 1158 (11th Cir.2003). 4 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Polar's proposed instruction on willfulness. 16