Opinion ID: 619929
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Requirement

Text: At its most basic level, defendants' argument is that FISA's significant purpose standard is unconstitutional because it allows the government to conduct electronic surveillance upon a lesser showing than the ordinary criminal requirement that searches conducted pursuant to a warrant must be supported by a reasonable belief that the target of the search has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.); see also Appellants' Joint Opening Br. 58-59 (citing and quoting Berger and Mayfield v. United States, 504 F.Supp.2d 1023 (D.Or.2007)). [7] While that requirement certainly applies to searches that are conducted solely for law enforcement purposes, the Fourth Amendment is more flexible than defendants' argument allows. Specifically, the Supreme Court has indicated that the standards governing a warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Supreme Court has explained that, [i]n cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, `probable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). In other words, the critical Fourth Amendment requirement, for purposes of this case, is that the statutory standard for obtaining a warrant must be reasonable. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 122 (2d Cir.2010) (The benchmark for judicial review of the constitutionality of warrant requirements established by Congress is reasonableness....). What is reasonable, in turn, depends on the nature of the search: [t]o apply this standard, it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35, 87 S.Ct. 1727. So, for example, in the criminal context, where the objective of a search may be to recover specific stolen or contraband goods, a warrant to search for such goods is `reasonable' only when there is `probable cause' to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling. Camara, 387 U.S. at 535, 87 S.Ct. 1727. But in the administrative context, where searches might be aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for private property, id. at 535, 87 S.Ct. 1727, the reasonableness of the warrant will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge related to a particular property, id. at 539, 87 S.Ct. 1727; it may be based, instead, on a judicial determination that the city has adopted a reasonable system of inspections and is not targeting citizens for irregular or malicious reasons, United States v. Wen, 477 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir.2006) (describing Camara ). The government's interests in security and intelligence are entitled to particular deference. As the Supreme Court has explained, [w]here ... the risk against which the Government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government's goal. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674-75, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989). Thus, the Court has indicated that mandatory, suspicionless searches of passengers and luggage at airports may be deemed reasonable `so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or other like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.' Id. at 675 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir.1974)); see also United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179-80 (3d Cir.2006) (holding airport checkpoint searches constitutional, in part because there can be no doubt that preventing terrorist attacks on airplanes is of paramount importance and such searches advance the public interest (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has not addressed the reasonableness of the standards set forth in FISA (or of any searches conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence), but it has specifically suggested that different probable cause standards for intelligence surveillance may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 2125. As in the above examples, the key is whether such standards are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. Id. at 322-23, 92 S.Ct. 2125. Thus, we must determine whether FISA's significant purpose standard is reasonable given the government's special interest in collecting foreign intelligence information. On that key question, we do not write on a blank slate.