Opinion ID: 658352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disqualification of Defense Counsel

Text: 73 On February 3, 1987, the district court granted the government's motion to disqualify Dominic Cavallaro's counsel, Carl Martillaro, based on his prior representation of Crystal Channell. Channell, a key government witness, was Cavallaro's former girlfriend and a previous wife of defendant John Bonnenfant. Martillaro had represented Channell on felony narcotics charges in Nevada state court in 1981-82. Cavallaro waived any potential conflict arising from the prior representation, but Channell refused to waive her attorney-client privilege. Although Martillaro stated in his affidavit that he did not recall any confidential information obtained from Channell that could be used to impeach her testimony and that he was willing to limit his cross-examination of her to public record material and questions concerning her grant of immunity for her testimony, he acknowledged the possibility that he might remember privileged information during trial. Cavallaro argues that the district court's disqualification of Martillaro deprived him of his right to choice of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. We review a district court's pretrial disqualification of counsel for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kenney, 911 F.2d 315, 320 (9th Cir.1990). 74 Although a presumption exists in favor of a defendant's right to counsel of choice, 75 that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. The evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each case under this standard must be left primarily to the informed judgment of the trial court. 76 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1700, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Because [t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, id. at 162, 108 S.Ct. at 1699, 77 the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses. 78 Id. at 163, 108 S.Ct. at 1699; see United States v. Rewald, 889 F.2d 836, 857-58 (9th Cir.1989) (defendant's waiver of conflict is not dispositive; potential for conflict is determinative), amended, 902 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 819, 111 S.Ct. 64, 112 L.Ed.2d 39 (1990). 79 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Martillaro based on the potential for a conflict of interest. It was reasonable to presume that effective cross-examination of Channell would include questioning her ability accurately to recall, observe, and testify about Cavallaro's activities, and that her drug use would be a significant factor in this impeachment. That Channell's drug use was a matter of public record does not eliminate the possibility of an unwitting disclosure of confidential communications. Martillaro could thus have been faced with either exploiting his prior, privileged relationship with the witness or failing to defend his present client zealously for fear of misusing confidential information. 80 Cavallaro argues that no potential conflict existed because the facts underlying the charges against him were not substantially related to Martillaro's prior representation of Channell. See Nev.S.Ct.R. 159. Substantial relationship to the prior representation, however, turns not only on factual identity, but may be presumed where there is a reasonable probability that confidences were disclosed which could be used against the client in later, adverse representation. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir.1980). The district court found such a probability here. The disqualification of Martillaro was within the court's discretion and did not violate Cavallaro's Sixth Amendment rights.