Opinion ID: 1309317
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Nighttime Search

Text: (1a) Defendant initially contends that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the search of his home and of Ortez's and Grant's homes. Although all three searches were conducted pursuant to warrants, defendant contends that the initial search of Ortez's home was an invalid nighttime search, and that all the evidence obtained thereafter was tainted fruit of that initial search. Defendant acknowledges that the magistrate who issued the search warrant for Ortez's home (hereafter the Ortez warrant) specifically authorized the execution of the warrant at any time of day or night, but he contends that the affidavit in support of that warrant did not contain sufficient facts to justify the magistrate's authorization of nighttime service, and thus he reasons that the search was nonetheless invalid. We conclude that defendant's contention is unfounded. At the pretrial hearing on the motion to suppress, the prosecution presented a two-pronged response to defendant's claim, maintaining, first, that the Ortez warrant had been properly endorsed for nighttime service, and, second, that, in any event, the search warrant had actually been executed during the daytime. In support of the latter claim, the investigating police officer testified that he had executed the Ortez warrant at 7:05 a.m. on August 16, five minutes after the beginning of daytime as defined by statute. (See § 1533.) The defense vigorously challenged the officer's testimony in this regard, pointing out that in at least three investigative reports written shortly after the search, the police officers had noted the time of the execution of the warrant as 6:30 a.m. [4] The trial court's comments in denying defendant's motion are somewhat ambiguous, but it appears that the court concluded that it did not need to resolve the conflict over the time at which the warrant was actually executed, because it found as a threshold matter that defendant had failed to demonstrate that the magistrate had abused his discretion in authorizing nighttime service of the warrant. [5] We agree with the trial court's ruling. Under the governing California statutes, although search warrants, as a general rule, are to be executed in the daytime, a magistrate may authorize nighttime service of a warrant in a particular case for good cause. (§§ 1529, 1533; Solis v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 774, 776-777 [48 Cal. Rptr. 169, 408 P.2d 945].) [6] (2) In recent years, a number of Court of Appeal opinions have offered different verbal formulations in an attempt to clarify the good cause standard in this context. [7] It is difficult, however, to anticipate all of the numerous factors that may justify the authorization of a nighttime search [8] and we think that the Sixth Circuit  in interpreting the comparable federal rule on nighttime searches [9]  adopted the proper perspective in suggesting that [t]he Rule requires only some factual basis for a prudent conclusion that the greater intrusiveness of a nighttime search is justified by the exigencies of the situation. The procedural requirements of the Rule ensure that the fact that nighttime search is contemplated by the police is brought to the attention of a magistrate and that he or she consciously decide[s] whether such a particularly abrasive intrusion is called for in a given situation. ( United States v. Searp (6th Cir.1978) 586 F.2d 1117, 1121, 58 A.L.R.Fed. 743, italics added.) (1b) In the present case, we cannot say that the magistrate erred in concluding that the exigencies of the situation  as revealed by the facts set forth in the affidavit in support of the search warrant (see, e.g., People v. Mardian (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 16, 35 [121 Cal. Rptr. 269])  justified the execution of the warrant either in the daytime or at night. The investigating officers completed the drafting of the affidavit in support of the warrant at approximately 6 p.m. on August 15, and reached the magistrate at his home at 7 p.m. The affidavit disclosed numerous facts from which the magistrate could reasonably conclude that the burglary at Beverly Stereo and the double homicide at the Margulies' residence were closely related and that evidence of both the burglary and the homicides might be found at Ortez's home. [10] Because the evidence consisted, in part, of recently stolen stereo equipment, the magistrate could reasonably infer that the persons who had stolen the property would attempt to dispose of it as quickly as possible, and this would be particularly true if  as it appeared  the offenders recognized that the equipment could connect them not only with a burglary but with two murders as well. Finally, in view of the nature of the homicides that were under investigation, the magistrate could reasonably conclude that there was an exceptionally compelling interest in permitting the police to expedite their investigation, in order to apprehend a dangerous killer or killers who remained at large. Under these circumstances, we find no basis for faulting the magistrate's decision to permit the execution of the warrant either in the daytime or at night, particularly in light of the established principle that  in close cases  [t]he reasonableness of an asserted justification ... is `largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.' ( United States v. Gibbons (10th Cir.1979) 607 F.2d 1320, 1327.) The fact that the officers did not serve the warrant until early the next morning in no way undermines the magistrate's implicit determination that the exigencies of the situation justified nighttime service. The officers testified that after obtaining the warrant it took several hours to assemble a group of officers and to plan the method of execution so as to minimize the potential danger to the officers and to others. Because the search warrant for Ortez's residence properly authorized the execution of the warrant at night as well as during the day, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress.