Opinion ID: 2176972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due-Process Claim

Text: The Governor next contends that the revolving-door legislation violates due process as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 2, of the Rhode Island Constitution. The Governor first avers that the revolving-door legislation violates due process by relying on an irrebuttable presumption that certain public officials are not appropriate candidates for state employment. The Governor contends that irrebuttable legislative presumptions are constitutionally disfavored. In support of his position the Governor cites a number of cases, principally, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973). Upon a review of Vlandis, and the other cases cited in support of the Governor's position, we note that the deprivations questioned in the cases upon which the Governor relies are of a more permanent nature than the deprivation that is now before us. In Vlandis, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that provided, that if a student's address was outside the state at the time of his or her application to a state university, that person remained a non resident so long as he or she remained at the state university. See id. We hold only that a permanent irrebuttable presumption    is violative of the Due Process Clause   . (Emphasis added.) Id. at 453, 93 S.Ct. at 2237, 37 L.Ed.2d at 72; see also Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), summarily affirmed, 401 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 1231, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 (1971) (upholding Minnesota's residency requirement because the student could rebut the presumption, after having lived in the state for one year, by presenting some evidence of residency status). The Governor's irrebuttable-presumption argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the presumption in the revolving-door legislation is not permanent; rather, it is for a limited duration, a one-year period. Second, the presumption is rebuttable as the legislation so provides. Section 36-14-5, subsections (n) and ( o ), provides that the commission is authorized to grant exemptions in situations in which the exemption would not create an appearance of impropriety. Regulation 36-14-5006 provides the commission with the opportunity to grant an exemption if the denial of the questioned employment would create a substantial hardship. The presumption contained in the revolving-door legislation is either rebuttable, temporary, or both. Consequently the revolving-door legislation does not violate due process because it does not contain an irrebuttable presumption. The Governor contends that the revolving-door legislation also violates due process because it is arbitrary and irrational. In his initial memorandum the Governor did not explicitly state whether he was challenging the revolving-door legislation on a substantive or on a procedural due-process basis but rather relied on cases from both constitutional realms. In his subsequent reply memorandum the Governor clarified his position and stated that he was not raising a procedural due-process challenge. When local economic or social regulation is challenged as violating substantive due process, courts consistently defer to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory schemes. Unless a state law trammels fundamental personal rights, we are to presume that state legislatures have acted within their constitutional power and are to require only that the law `bears a reasonable relation to the state's legitimate purpose.' (Emphasis added.) The Oklahoma Education Association v. The Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission, 889 F.2d 929, 935 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 575 (10th Cir.1984) and Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 125, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 2213, 57 L.Ed.2d 91, 99 (1978)); see also In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 519 A.2d 578, 582 (R.I. 1987) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) and Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976)). The Governor avers that the sweeping stigmatization of a significant pool of candidates for public office lacks a rational relationship to any legitimate state purpose and violates due process. The Governor readily admits that the level of judicial scrutiny in the due-process arena is the rational-relationship test. Our holding in the first part of this opinion under our equal-protection analysis applies equally to the Governor's due-process claim. Because the revolving-door legislation does not affect any fundamental right, a deferential rational-relationship test applies, and the revolving-door legislation passes constitutional muster under a substantive due-process analysis. ( See rational-relationship analysis at part II A of this opinion.) From our conclusion under equal protection, however, it follows a fortiori that the [revolving-door legislation] does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. 12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659, 673 n. 12 (1981). Because the Governor challenges the revolving-door legislation on the grounds that it arbitrarily denies a person the opportunity for individual consideration of his or her qualifications and cited both substantive and procedural due-process cases in his initial memorandum, we deem it appropriate to respond to this clouded challenge on what we perceive to be a procedural due-process vein. [P]rocedural due-process requires certain minimal standards of notice, hearing, and opportunity to respond adequately before a governmental agency may effectively deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property. State v. Manocchio, 448 A.2d 761, 764 n. 3 (R.I. 1982); see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). [C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government[al] function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-49, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230, 1236 (1961). Because the Governor has not specifically identified what deprivation of life, liberty, or property interest is unconstitutionally affected by the revolving-door legislation, our analysis appears meaningless. It is our position that the Governor does not propose a clear enough claim for this court to analyze it under a procedural due-process examination. In rejecting a similar procedural due-process challenge, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the proponents of the argument misunderstood the nature of procedural due process. When the legislature passes a law which affects a general class of persons, those persons have all received procedural due process  the legislative process. 2 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, 2nd § 17.8 at 646 (1992). The purpose of procedural due process is to provide a hearing to ensure that the statute's commands are fairly and not erroneously applied to an individual.    But `there is no requirement of a procedure to determine the basis for a[] [state] action which affects an individual where there are no factual issues in dispute.' The Oklahoma Education Association, 889 F.2d at 936. In Oklahoma Education Association state employees sued the Alcoholic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission, seeking a declaration that a state constitutional provision precluding state employees from working in the liquor industry was unconstitutional. The Oklahoma Education Association court rejected the state employees' claim that individualized hearings were necessary to redress the arbitrariness of the challenged statute on the grounds that it was nothing more than a veiled challenge to the substance of the [statute]. Id. at 936. The court held that it was undisputed that the state employees were in fact state employees and therefore were expressly prohibited from obtaining liquor licenses in the state. Id. Our Legislature and the commission have rejected the individualized-hearing approach and have instead adopted a flat one-year waiting period. Had we a sufficient claim upon which to analyze the revolving-door legislation under a procedural due-process inquiry, we are inclined to believe that we would have followed the analysis outlined in the Oklahoma Education Association decision and thus would have rejected any procedural due-process challenge.