Opinion ID: 2395051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Dr. Rines' Testimony

Text: The defendant contends that the justice who heard the in limine motion erred in excluding as inadmissible character evidence the testimony proffered by clinical psychologist, Dr. Brian Rines, about the defendant's tendency to puff up or exaggerate his participation in the crimes involving Paula Roberts. The issue arises because the defendant, while incarcerated prior to his trial, made to his fellow inmates several incriminating statements that were received in evidence. We agree that the presiding justice erred in excluding the expert medical testimony as character evidence offered to impeach the validity of extra-judicial statements of the defendant but conclude that the defendant was not thereby prejudiced. The defendant's offer of proof elicited from Dr. Rines his diagnosis that the defendant had a classifiable personality disorder. In Dr. Rines' opinion, Philip made statements describing sexual abuse of the corpse in order to exaggerate the importance of his involvement in these crimes and to puff up or enhance his or others' views of him. Relying upon State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d 932 (Me.1980), the trial justice excluded Dr. Rines' expert opinion as psychological testimony offered to impeach the truthfulness of the defendant. However, a comparison of the nature of the proffered testimony in Arnold with that in the case before us reveals that this reliance was misplaced. In Arnold, the psychologist sought to testify solely about the defendant's character for truthfulness. We held there that because the evidence proffered by the defendant was not reputation evidence of his character for truthfulness, it was inadmissible under Rule 405(a) of the Maine Rules of Evidence, which provides the exclusive method of proving a trait of character. [1] Here, the proffered testimony was not merely a generalized description of [the defendant's] disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172 (Me.1984) (quoting Field & Murray, Maine Evidence, § 406.1, at 75 (1976)), but was medical testimony concerning a puffing syndrome, which, like the expert testimony of the battered child syndrome in Conlogue, cannot fairly be called `character evidence' within the meaning of the rule. State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d at 172; cf. State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.1981) (battered wife syndrome). [2] Just as a description of the battered child syndrome would have allowed the jury in Conlogue to weigh the credibility of a witness's confession and subsequent retraction, so would a description of the puffing syndrome related to Philip's personality disorder have allowed the jury here to assess the credibility of his incriminating declarations to fellow jail inmates. The defendant has `wide latitude' to present all evidence relevant to his defense, unhampered by piecemeal rulings on evidence.' State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d at 172 (citation omitted). Philip was therefore entitled to show the [c]ircumstances tending to lessen the probative effect of his admissions. Field & Murray § 801.5, at 193. Accordingly, Dr. Rines' testimony should have been admitted. Although the justice erred in excluding this testimony, we conclude that such error was harmless. M.R.Crim.P. 52(a). We are persuaded that on this record, exclusion of the expert testimony made no difference to the end result of the trial. See State v. Reeves, 499 A.2d 130, 137 (Me.1985); State v. Rytky, 476 A.2d 1152, 1155 (Me.1984) (refusal to admit evidence of victim's reputation in community for truth, though error, was harmless when it was highly improbable error affected judgment in the case); State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467 (Me.1981). It is undisputed that the statements made by the defendant to the inmates were incriminating. However, at least five of the inmates who testified at trial agreed that there is a pecking order in jail that leads the inmates to puff up, brag or make untrue statements about their crimes to impress the tough guys or the bosses. Moreover, some of the inmates testified about the different and at times inconsistent stories Philip told. Philip Willoughby himself testified about the pecking order that goes by crimes. He said he tried to get into the little cliques by bragging about his crime and saying anything they wanted to hear. Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Rines' testimony concerning the puffing syndrome was cumulative to that of the defendant and inmates. Furthermore, that the defendant may have exaggerated particularly the sexual details of his involvement in the crime does not change the fact that he admitted the commission of the crime. Had the jurors heard testimony about Philip's tendency to exaggerate from this expert witness, it is still highly probable that their judgment would have been the same. The defendant therefore takes nothing on his first argument on appeal.