Opinion ID: 1506719
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Heading: Contributory Negligence and the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

Text: In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff whose negligence contributes to his or her injury may not recover from a negligent defendant unless the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid injuring the plaintiff. Felton v. Wagner, 512 A.2d 291, 296 (D.C. 1986). The doctrine of last clear chance is well established in our jurisprudence. See, e.g., Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Blum, 54 App. D.C. 357, 298 F. 679 (1924). To prevail under the doctrine of last clear chance a plaintiff has the burden of establishing: (1) that the plaintiff was in a position of danger caused by the negligence of both plaintiff and defendant; (2) that the plaintiff was oblivious to the danger, or unable to extricate herself from the position of danger; (3) that the defendant was aware, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have been aware, of the plaintiff's danger and of her oblivion to it or her inability to extricate herself from it; and (4) that the defendant, with means available to him, could have avoided injuring the plaintiff after becoming aware of the danger and the plaintiff's inability to extricate herself from it, but failed to do so. Felton, supra, 512 A.2d at 296; see also District of Columbia v. Huysman, 650 A.2d 1323, 1326 (D.C.1994) (quoting Felton ); Robinson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1255, 1258 (D.C.1990) (same); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Jones, 443 A.2d 45, 51 (D.C.1982) (listing factors); Byrd v. Hawkins, 404 A.2d 941, 942 (D.C.1979) (same). The last clear chance doctrine applies to a defendant who with means available to him, could have avoided injuring the plaintiff after [defendant] became aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, the danger and the plaintiff's inability to extricate himself from it. Robinson, supra, 580 A.2d at 1258-59. The doctrine of last clear chance has been characterized as a transitional doctrine, preparing the way for a system of comparative negligence. See Malcolm M. MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L.REV. 1225 (1940); Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704 (1938). Various justifications have been offered for the last clear chance doctrine. One common explanation is that the plaintiff's negligence was not the proximate cause of the harm because the defendant had the last opportunity to prevent it. See J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW § 11.07, at 327 (Rev. ed. 1989) ([T]he doctrine is based on the notion that the last proximate cause of the injury is the real and legal cause.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 cmt. a (1965); [4] but see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 66, at 463 (5th ed.1984) (noting that this explanation runs contrary to the evolving ideas of proximate cause). Another justification involves an assessment of relative fault where the later negligence of the defendant involves a higher degree of fault.... KEETON ET AL., supra, at 463. This justification is especially applicable to situations where the defendant acts recklessly or intentionally or where the defendant has discovered a helpless plaintiff. Id. (noting that this rationale cannot explain other situations where the defendant's fault consists merely in a failure to discover the danger at all, or in slowness, clumsiness, inadvertence or an error in judgment in dealing with it (footnote omitted)). [5] Perhaps the real justification for the rule is a fundamental dislike for the harshness of the contributory negligence defense, KEETON ET AL., supra, at 464, which would explain why it seems particularly apt in situations where the defendant's negligence is seen as the final and decisive factor in producing the injury. RESTATEMENT, supra, § 479 cmt. a.