Opinion ID: 536108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ability to Perform Past Work

Text: 13 After finding that appellant had not established presumptive disability, the ALJ then considered whether appellant had established disability when vocational factors were considered. Under this standard, if a claimant has a severe impairment, residual functioning capacity and ability to perform past work are considered. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(a). A claimant whose alleged impairment is an I.Q. of 70-79 inclusive has alleged a severe impairment and may be considered disabled after consideration of vocational factors. Webber v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 784 F.2d 293, 298 n. 7 (8th Cir.1986). 14 Although the ALJ found that appellant's I.Q. constituted a severe impairment, he concluded that appellant could perform his past work as a janitor. Appellant argues that this conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. First, appellant contends that the ALJ improperly concluded that his blindness in one eye was not a disabling impairment preventing him from performing a janitor job. He argues that his vision in the other eye might deteriorate over time. There is absolutely no evidence in the record to suggest a possibility of vision deterioration. Appellant's eye condition has remained unchanged since birth and appellant had held several jobs despite this condition. See Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir.1982) (court upholds ALJ's finding that blindness in one eye had not interfered with previous work). 15 Appellant next argues that the ALJ improperly required objective medical evidence to substantiate his subjective complaints of lower back pain and stomach problems. In determining whether appellant could perform his past work, the ALJ found that [t]he claimant was generally a credible witness although his complaints were not generally documented by the objective medical record. ALJ Order at 6. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, the ALJ erred in requiring objective medical evidence to verify appellant's subjective complaints of pain. An ALJ may not disregard a claimant's subjective complaints of pain solely because there is no objective medical evidence to support them. O'Leary v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 1334, 1342 (8th Cir.1983); Simonson v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 426, 429 (8th Cir.1983) (Simonson); Brand v. Secretary of H.E.W., 623 F.2d 523, 526 (8th Cir.1980). 16 While appellant bears the burden of proving that his alleged disability results from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, direct medical evidence of the cause and effect relationship between the impairment and his pain need not be produced. Reinhart v. Secretary, Health & Human Services, 733 F.2d 571, 573 (8th Cir.1984) (Reinhart ); Simonson, 699 F.2d at 427. This rule stems from the recognition that the physiological, functional, and psychological consequences of illness and injury vary with each individual. Simonson, 699 F.2d at 429. A given injury may affect one individual in an inconsequential way, whereas the same disorder may severely disable another person who has a greater sensitivity to pain or whose physical condition is deteriorated. Id. See Landess v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 1187, 1190 (8th Cir.1974). 17 The absence of objective medical evidence is only one factor that the adjudicator should consider in evaluating complaints of pain. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.) (Polaski) (order), supplemented, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir.1984), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1167, 106 S.Ct. 2885, 90 L.Ed.2d 974 (1986), adhered to on remand, 804 F.2d 456 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 927, 107 S.Ct. 3211, 96 L.Ed.2d 698 (1987) (Polaski). In Polaski, this court held that the adjudicator must examine the entire record in evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints of pain, giving specific consideration to evidence relating to the following factors: 18
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23 Id. See Folks v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 825 F.2d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir.1987). In the present case, the ALJ failed to consider these factors in analyzing appellant's claim. 24 The ALJ suggests that appellant's complaints were disregarded because appellant failed to establish a physical impairment. The ALJ held that [a]lthough claimant has complained of lower back pain and stomach problems, this record fails to demonstrate by objective medical evidence that the claimant suffers from a physical impairment. ALJ Order at 4. However, appellant has established a severe impairment of mental retardation and he has also been diagnosed as mildly depressed. The Social Security Act recognizes that a psychological disorder may cause disabling pain. The ALJ erred in requiring evidence of a physical impairment to verify complaints of pain. See Reinhart, 733 F.2d at 573 (8th Cir.1984); Cook v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir.1984). The ALJ made no findings concerning whether the impairments appellant established could reasonably be expected to cause pain. Nor did the ALJ find that appellant's complaints were not credible because of inherent inconsistencies in his testimony or other circumstances. See Reinhart, 733 F.2d at 573; Simonson, 699 F.2d at 428. Rather, the ALJ found that appellant was generally a credible witness. Other than the lack of objective medical evidence proving the existence of disabling pain, the ALJ did not note any inconsistencies in the record undermining appellant's claims of pain. 25 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's affirmance of the Secretary's denial of presumptive disability, but reverse and remand with directions to the district court to remand this case to the Secretary to reassess appellant's allegations of subjective pain, by evaluating all of the evidence pursuant to the five factors set forth in Polaski.