Opinion ID: 397842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 9 We first consider EPA's contention that petitioners' challenge to the exclusion of fugitive emissions from the ambit of the final BOPF opacity standard and the regulations of which it became a part is out of time jurisdictionally. In support of this position, EPA relies upon former Section 307(b)(1) of the Act, which provided that petitions for review of performance standards formulated under Section 111 must be filed within 30 days from the date of such promulgation. 39 EPA asserts that the decision not to regulate fugitive emissions was made on March 8, 1974, when the final mass standard for BOPF primary emissions was promulgated, and urges that the time for judicial attacks on that decision has long since expired. EPA does not dispute that the petition for review was filed within the statutorily-prescribed period following promulgation of the final opacity standard; instead, the agency argues that because the opacity standard is merely an additional tool for monitoring compliance with the previously-established particulate standard for stack emissions, 40 petitioners were on notice as early as 1974 that the opacity standard, whenever issued in final form, would not encompass fugitive emissions. Thus, EPA says, having failed to litigate the proper scope of the final mass standard, petitioners are foreclosed from now doing so in the guise of a challenge to the final opacity standard. 10 While EPA's theory has a modicum of surface appeal, it does not withstand scrutiny. Were petitioners merely attempting, as EPA insists, to attack collaterally a decision they could and should have resisted years earlier, we would not hesitate to dismiss the petition for review as untimely. 41 The agency ignores, however, the final words of Section 307(b)(1), which unambiguously proclaim that petitions may be filed after the 30-day limit if based solely on grounds arising after such 30th day. 42 We have had occasion in the past to consider this proviso, as well as the legislative history that gave it birth, 43 and have noted the congressional purpose in allowing later review based upon new information: 11 (I)t would not be in the public interest to measure for all time the adequacy of a promulgation of any standard or regulation by the information available at the time of such promulgation. In the area of protection of public health and environmental quality, it is clear that new information will be developed and that such information may dictate a revision or modification of any promulgated standard or regulation established under the act. The judicial review section, therefore, provides that any person may challenge any promulgation whenever it is alleged that significant new information has become available. 44 12 Moreover, EPA itself has set forth in laudable detail procedures, which this court has explicitly endorsed, 45 for seeking revision of a preexisting performance standard: 13 (1) The person seeking revision of a standard of performance, or any other standard reviewable under § 307, should petition EPA to revise the standard in question. The petition should be submitted together with supporting materials, or references to supporting materials. 14 (2) EPA should respond to the petition and if it denies the petition, set forth its reasons. 15 (3) If the petition is denied, the petitioner may seek review of the denial in this court pursuant to § 307. 46 16 Here, petitioners presented to EPA considerable evidence that the technology of capturing and controlling secondary emissions had advanced since the agency decided in 1974 to omit fugitive emissions from coverage by the regulations. 47 The validity of that decision is now disputed on the ground that it is no longer based on the best emission reduction technology available, as the Act requires. 48 We are mindful that this evidence was submitted in the form of comments on the proposed final BOPF opacity standard, rather than in a formal petition to revise the preexisting mass standard, and whether a presentation of that sort always will satisfy the statutory and agency procedures, for revising regulations and standards is a question we need not now decide. Whatever EPA's future response to such submissions might be, it appears here to have taken heed of petitioners' comments on fugitive emissions and to have acted in consonance with them, for in issuing the final opacity standard the agency addressed them as follows: 17 EPA recognizes that fugitive emissions from BOPF shops are an important problem. However, it was not within the scope of this evaluation to consider an opacity standard for fugitive emissions.... EPA will be reviewing the standards of performance for new BOPF's in accordance with the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. 49 This review will address the need for limits on fugitive emissions as well as any revisions of the particulate concentration and opacity standards. 50 18 And, as we noted above, 51 EPA subsequently announced its intention to propose amendments to the BOPF standards, including revisions intercepting fugitive emissions. 19 We conclude, then, that petitioners' failure to mount a judicial challenge to the exclusion of fugitive emissions from coverage by the regulations when originally promulgated did not preclude them from later seeking judicial review of the agency's subsequent refusal to revise the standard on the basis of new information.
20 EPA also asserts that its decision to promulgate by early 1982 new BOPF performance standards that will extend to fugitive emissions moots the instant controversy. 52 In light of the protracted nature of these agency proceedings, 53 and continuing uncertainty as to when revised regulations will finally be adopted, 54 we believe the case still exhibits the requisite level of liveliness. 55 Despite EPA's projected publication of proposed new regulations by April, 1981, 56 they have yet to come forth. Indeed, EPA recently notified the court of its estimate that a proposed standard on fugitive emissions will not be available before January, 1982, 57 and we have no real assurance that even that will be the case. 58 Accordingly, we proceed to consider the merits of petitioners' claims.
21 Treating petitioners' challenge as a petition to revise, our task is to determine whether EPA has acted arbitrarily in responding to new information that petitioners and others have brought to its attention. 59 Petitioners asked EPA to put fugitive emissions within the purview of the final BOPF opacity standard promulgated on April 13, 1978; 60 in effect, they sought to have the agency revise the preexisting BOPF performance standard to include secondary emissions. Petitioners did so, however, in the context of rulemaking proceedings designed only to consider and formulate an opacity standard for primary emissions, 61 and on that account EPA denied their request. 62 22 Given the history behind bifurcation of the rulemaking proceedings leading to BOPF performance standards, 63 as well as the agency's prior explanations of the then unfeasibility of trying to develop a fugitive emission standard 64 and the functional relationship between the particulate and opacity standards, 65 we find little merit in petitioners' assertions that EPA failed either to support its decision to omit fugitive emissions or to explain adequately its reasons therefor. Moreover, when EPA published the final opacity standard, it simultaneously gave notice of its intention to inaugurate another rulemaking proceeding for the purpose of devising an amended standard that would accomplish precisely what petitioners sought. 66 Petitioners have not pointed to anything that would suggest that the agency is not now preparing to do just that. 67 23 Having decided upon an effort to broaden its regulations to control fugitive emissions-the very relief petitioners demanded-EPA cannot soundly be charged with arbitrariness merely because it chose a separate rulemaking proceeding as the process for proposing a revised standard in lieu of an undertaking to do so in the narrower context of the opacity standard proceedings as petitioners requested. 68 And in view of the extensive testing problems presented and the complex and evolving fugitive emission control technology implicated, 69 we think it was reasonable for the agency to establish the separate rulemaking agenda it did. The order under review is accordingly 24 Affirmed. SEPARATE STATEMENT OF CIRCUIT JUDGE ROBB