Opinion ID: 787097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vargas's Due Process Claim.

Text: 21 Vargas's due process claim is another matter. He contends that his due process rights were violated because Appellees waited for almost three (3) years before prosecuting him for using excessive force, apparently in violation of NYPD regulations and practice [that] require[ ] ... disciplinary proceedings against Police officers [to] be conducted within eighteen (18) months, or the charges to be dropped. Compl. ¶¶ 53-54. (A 12) Moreover, he contends that the District Court erred in dismissing this claim because it was starkly different than the due process claim he raised in the Article 78 proceeding and therefore was not subject to the Rooker-Feldman preclusive effect. Appellant's Rep. Br. at 7. (Gray 7) This may be, but the question is academic because the District Court did not find Vargas's due process claim barred by Rooker-Feldman. Instead, it held that he had not established that the procedural safeguards established by the state [we]re insufficient to protect his rights. Vargas II, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2850, at ; see Gudema, 163 F.3d at 724 (A deprivation of liberty or property through the conduct of a state employee whose acts are random and unauthorized, however, does not constitute a procedural due process violation so long as the state provides a meaningful remedy thereafter.). We have held that an Article 78 proceeding, in circumstances such as these, provides a meaningful remedy where violations of due process by a local governmental entity are alleged. Gudema, 163 F.3d at 724-25. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Vargas's due process claim.