Opinion ID: 2200289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Property Interest Due Process Claim.

Text: No state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1. In Board of Regents v. Roth , the United States Supreme Court recognized that property interests are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.... Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972). In the context of public employee discharges, the Court looks to state law to determine whether a public employee has a property interest in continued employment. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684, 690 (1976). If a property interest in continued employment exists, then the employee is entitled to a pretermination hearing that comports with the requirements of due process. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 503-04 (1983); Note, Due Process Refocused: Implications for Public Employment in Iowa, 62 Iowa L.Rev. 1489, 1522 (1977). If no property interest exists, then the employee must rely on any procedural protections afforded by contract, ordinance, or state statute. The civil service law, Iowa Code chapter 400, which creates a property interest in continued employment, generally does not apply to cities having a population of 15,000 persons or less. Iowa Code § 400.6. It is undisputed in the record that the civil service law did not apply to Bennett's employment. Bennett had no contract of employment for a definite term. Bennett argues that Iowa Code section 372.15 creates a property interest in continued employment under state law by guaranteeing that he would not be discharged without just cause. This section provides: Except as otherwise provided by state or city law, all persons appointed to city office may be removed by the officer or body making the appointment, but every such removal shall be by written order. The order shall give the reasons, be filed in the office of the city clerk, and a copy shall be sent by certified mail to the person removed who, upon request filed with the clerk within thirty days of the date of mailing the copy, shall be granted a public hearing before the council on all issues connected with the removal. The hearing shall be held within thirty days of the date the request is filed, unless the person removed requests a later date. In Scott v. City of Waterloo, 190 Iowa 467, 180 N.W. 156 (1920), we discussed Iowa Code section 657 (Supp.1913), the predecessor to section 372.15. We held that the statute does not require that removal shall be for cause. Scott, 190 Iowa at 469-70, 180 N.W. at 157. We find no reason to alter the standard articulated in Scott. Bennett did not have a property interest in continued employment under state law. See, e.g., McBride v. City of Sioux City, 444 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1989).