Opinion ID: 2135461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the State engage in selective prosecution in violation of W.Y.B.'s right to equal protection under the laws?

Text: The first issue raised by W.Y.B. is that his right to equal protection under the law has been violated due to selective prosecution by the State. [2] Specifically, W.Y.B. who is a Native Americanpoints to evidence that other non-Native males also poked T.T. in the buttocks with a stick, but they were not prosecuted. This court has previously discussed the nature of the basis for the charge of selective prosecution. We stated: The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause prohibits selective enforcement based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. [Citations omitted.] To avoid prosecution for a criminal offense upon equal protection grounds, a defendant must show that the government exercised selective enforcement of the law upon an invidious discriminatory basis.... To demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a defendant must prove selective enforcement based upon an arbitrary classification such as race, sex or religion. State v. Secrest, 331 N.W.2d 580, 583 (S.D. 1983), appeal dismissed, Secrest v. South Dakota, 464 U.S. 802, 104 S.Ct. 47, 78 L.Ed.2d 68 (1983) (dismissed for want of a substantial federal question) (citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit has clearly set forth the two elements required to establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution. See United States v. Matter, 818 F.2d 653, 654-55 (8th Cir.1987); United States v. Hintzman, 806 F.2d 840, 842 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Holmes, 794 F.2d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir.1986). These elements are (1) that the defendant has been singled out for prosecution while others similarly situated have not been prosecuted for similar conduct; and (2) that the government's action in singling out the defendant was based on an impermissible motive such as race, religion, or the exercise by the defendant of constitutional rights. Matter, 818 F.2d at 654-55; Hintzman, 806 F.2d at 842; Holmes, 794 F.2d at 347-48. The defendant's burden is a heavy one, and because we afford broad discretion to prosecuting authorities, we require `a showing of intentional and purposeful discrimination.' Absent this prima facie showing, the prosecution will be presumed to have been undertaken in good faith. Hintzman, 806 F.2d at 842 (citing United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287, 1290 (8th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003, 105 S.Ct. 1864, 85 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985))); United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943 (8th Cir.1976). W.Y.B. has simply failed to make the prima facie showing of intentional and purposeful discrimination. Although W.Y.B.'s brief asserts that no distinction exists between those charged and those not charged is their race, the record reveals otherwise. No testimony was offered that anyone other than W.Y.B. (and G.H.A., who was also charged) were involved in restraining T.T. on a desk while poking her in the buttocks with a stick. Also, there was no testimony that anyone other than W.Y.B. ever grabbed T.T.'s breasts. While the conduct of the other male students was not laudatory, they were not similarly situated to W.Y.B. It is not improper for the State to choose to prosecute those whose violations appear to be most flagrant. See Nebraska v. Katzman, 228 Neb. 851, 424 N.W.2d 852, 856-57 (1988). We find no error on this issue.