Opinion ID: 63035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: On appeal, Hernandez argues that sufficient evidence did not support his convictions because law enforcement officers searched him on multiple occasions but never caught him in possession of heroin. He asserts that his references to flyers were not coded references to heroin but true references to music flyers, and the evidence proved that theory. He also cites cases for the propositions that a mere buy and sell agreement cannot constitute a conspiracy, and an agreement to sell drugs for a buyer’s personal drug habit cannot prove a conspiracy. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accepting all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. United States v. Klopf, 423 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 12 2005). If a reasonable trier of fact could find that evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction even if evidence might also support a defendant’s theory of innocence. United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1122 (11th Cir. 2002). “In order to sustain a conviction for conspiracy with intent to distribute, the government must prove that an agreement existed between two or more persons to violate the narcotics laws, that the defendant knew of the conspiratorial goal, and that he knowingly joined or participated in the illegal venture.” United States v. Guerrero, 935 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir. 1991). The government may use circumstantial evidence to meet its burden of proof. Id. For example, “[t]he government may establish a defendant’s knowing participation in the conspiracy through proof of . . . acts committed by the defendant that furthered the purpose of the conspiracy.” Id. “The government does not have to prove that the alleged conspirator knew all of the details of the conspiracy or that he participated in every phase of the scheme.” Id. Evidence of a simple buy-sell relationship, even if continuing, would not support a conspiracy charge, just as evidence of an agreement to sell drugs only to “support the buyer’s personal drug habit is antithetical to a finding of conspiracy.” United States v. Dekle, 165 F.3d 826, 829-30 (11th Cir. 1999). However, a 13 conspiracy exists where the parties have a joint criminal objective, such as when a defendant is involved in series of drug transactions between mid-level drug distributors and street-level dealers with the “common goal of maximizing the cash returns of the business through the distribution of drugs.” Id. at 829. To support a conviction for a substantive charge of possession with intent to distribute drugs, the government “must establish that the defendant knowingly possessed the controlled substance with the intent to distribute it.” Guerrero, 935 F.2d at 192. Direct or circumstantial evidence may be used to prove these elements. Id. Sufficient evidence supported Hernandez’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute heroin. Regarding the conspiracy conviction, Padilla testified that Hernandez provided him with heroin on at least four and possibly up to nine occasions, which was evidence of an agreement to violate the federal drug laws. R9 at 1126-27. Additionally, the government captured Hernandez and Padilla engaging in coded phone conversations on 23 August 2005, where Hernandez spoke about showing Padilla some slides, and on 14 September, where Padilla talked about Hernandez getting something because another person was waiting on Padilla. R5 at 308-09, 327. Padilla confirmed that these conversations involved heroin sales. R8 at 963, 997-99. This evidence 14 demonstrated that Hernandez was knowingly selling heroin to Padilla, and he knew that Padilla was selling it to another buyer. Therefore, there was circumstantial evidence that Hernandez knew of the goal of the conspiracy, to maximize cash returns by distributing heroin, and he knowingly joined it. See Dekle, 165 F.3d at 829-30. The agreement was sufficient to support the conspiracy charge because it went beyond a simple buy-sell relationship regarding drugs purchased for personal use, and evidence showed that Hernandez understood that Padilla was re-selling the heroin to another buyer. See id. Regarding the possession with intent to distribute heroin conviction, the government presented coded phone conversations from 13 and 14 September, along with Bonner’s and Padilla’s testimony that Padilla negotiated and consummated a heroin deal with Hernandez on 13 September. R5 at 315-17; R8 at 970-71, 987-88. A reasonable juror could have concluded that Hernandez possessed heroin even though he was not caught with it because there was evidence that Hernandez obtained heroin and sold it to Padilla. Notably, the fact that some of the aforementioned evidence came from coded conversations does not render the evidence insufficient. The jury was free to draw inferences against Hernandez based on these conversations as well as Padilla’s and Bonner’s testimony, and reject Hernandez’s alternate interpretation. See Tinoco, 15 304 F.3d at 1122. Hernandez’s argument that evidence did not establish his possession of heroin, because he was not caught with heroin, must fail because ample circumstantial evidence established possession, which was sufficient to satisfy that element. See Guerrero, 935 F.2d at 192. Hernandez’s argument that the “flyers” were music flyers, and not heroin, also must fail because the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions, even though it also might have supported his theory of innocence. See Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1122. Because sufficient evidence supported the charges against Hernandez, we affirm his convictions.