Opinion ID: 1450589
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Award of Damages, Costs, and Fees

Text: Having concluded, as a matter of law, that Bellevue was liable under the FLSA for Barfield's overtime compensation, the district court awarded her compensatory overtime in the amount of $887.25. See Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2006 WL 2356152, at , . Further, having observed that nothing in the record indicated that defendants had made any effort to ensure that their employment of temporary health care workers complied with the FLSA, see Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 432 F.Supp.2d at 395, the district court ordered defendants to pay Barfield liquidated damages in an equal amount, for a total damages award of $1,774.50, see Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2006 WL 2356152, at , . [5] Insofar as Barfield also sought costs and fees, the district court directed defendants to pay costs in the amount of $6,565.79, see id. at , but it declined to award attorney's fees in the requested amount of $340,375. In determining for itself what constituted a reasonable fee for the case, the district court found that Barfield's counsel's hourly rate of $350 was consistent with his level of experience. See id. at  1. Nevertheless, the court imposed a 25 percent reduction on almost 400 hours that counsel charged to the case because the vague nature of many of the entries made it impossible to determine whether the number of recorded hours expended in pursuit of this litigation was reasonable. Id. Indeed, the district court found it obvious that the total of nearly 400 hours that plaintiff's counsel says he spent on this case seems entirely disproportionate to the time the case reasonably should have involved. Id. The court further determined that 5.75 hours billed by counsel involved tasks that should have been performed by a paralegal; consequently, it concluded that this time should be compensated at only $75 per hour. See id. at . Similarly, the district court determined that 2.3 hours of travel time by counsel should be compensated at half-rate, in accordance with established court custom, and that 4 spent on administrative tasks should not be compensated at all. See id. Finally, the district court rejected defendants' request to eliminate from consideration all time spent by Barfield's counsel in seeking to certify the case as an FLSA collective action, finding that plaintiff's certification application was inextricably intertwined with her successful motion for summary judgment as both involved a `common core of facts' and a `related legal theory.' Id. (quoting Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1998)). Nevertheless, after determining the lodestar figure, the district court invoked its authority to adjust the lodestar to reflect a number of factors, including the results obtained. Id. The district court concluded that plaintiff's primary aim in this litigation, as reflected in both the complaint and in the first four months of litigation before this Court, was collective action certification. Id. Because plaintiff (and her counsel) had failed in this objective, the district court concluded that Barfield had achieved only limited success in the litigation as a whole, which justified a 50 percent reduction in the lodestar. Id. at  (explaining that award of full lodestar amount would be tantamount to awarding a fee as if plaintiff had prevailed on her collective action motion, a result which would hardly encourage counsel to vigorously litigate such motions and could encourage counsel to bring them even when there is little basis for doing so). Accordingly, the district court awarded $49,889 in attorney's fees, which, when added to the compensatory and liquidated damages and costs, yielded plaintiff a total award of $58,229.29. See id. The parties filed cross appeals, Barfield challenging the judgment awarding attorney's fees and defendants challenging the summary judgment determination liability.