Opinion ID: 2360372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: An Appealable Interlocutory Order

Text: Generally, a party has the right to appeal from a final judgment. See Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. There are several exceptions to the general rule, including taking an appeal from certain interlocutory orders: A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered by a circuit court in a civil case:       (3) An order:       (x) Depriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order[.] Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 12-303(3)(x) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. In In re Samone H., supra , this Court held that the trial court's denial of a mother's motion for an independent clinical assessment to determine whether a bond existed between her and her children was not an appealable order under § 12-303(3)(x) because the order did not of deprive the mother of the care and custody of her children or change the terms of the prior order to detrimentally impact the mother's fundamental rights. 385 Md. at 315-16, 869 A.2d at 390. In 1997, the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (BCDSS) assumed custody of Samone and Marchay, after two unsuccessful placements with a relative. Id. at 286-87, 869 A.2d at 372-73. In 1998, a permanency plan was established, which provided that both children were to live with relatives. Id. at 287-88, 869 A.2d at 373. In 1999, the court revised the permanency plan for placement with a relative or adoption. Id. at 288, 869 A.2d at 373-74. In 2000, after a periodic review, the judge modified the permanency plan with the goal toward adoption. Id. at 288-89, 869 A.2d at 374. In 2002, during an annual review hearing, a representative of the BCDSS testified that the children had developed a strong attachment with the foster family, although the visits with the natural mother were going pretty well. Id. at 289, 869 A.2d 370. In 2003, the natural mother filed a motion for an independent clinical study to assess her relationship with the children and to determine whether removal of the children from foster care would be harmful. [20] Id. at 291, 869 A.2d at 375. The trial court denied the natural mother's motion and reaffirmed the permanency plan. Id. at 296, 869 A.2d at 378. The mother in In re Samone requested a study which the trial court denied; however, the permanency plan for adoption remained unaltered. The trial judge affirmed the previous plan, the original plan was not changed and the order did not result in a deprivation of the mother's fundamental right to care and custody of her children. We held that the bonding study may have been beneficial in assisting the court in its ruling; however, the denial of the motion for a bonding study was not an appealable interlocutory order or final judgment. Id. at 316, 869 A.2d at 390. In In re Billy W., supra , we held that an order continuing a previously established permanency plan was not immediately appealable because the order did not detrimentally affect the parents' custody rights or visitation with the children. 386 Md. at 691-92, 874 A.2d at 433. In the case sub judice, the Court of Special Appeals relied on In re Billy W. to support its holding that the concurrent permanency plan order was not an appealable interlocutory order. That case, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. In In re Billy W., four children were removed from their home and placed initially in emergency shelter care. Id. at 677, 874 A.2d at 424. Subsequently, the court conducted a hearing, as a result of a petition requesting judicial approval of the placement of the children in shelter care, and ordered DSS custody of the children, and shelter care for them, pending an adjudicatory hearing. Id. Allegations of child sexual abuse and neglect were the genesis of the order for shelter care and the subsequent adjudicatory hearing. All four children had resided previously with Tammy B., their mother, and Tammy B.'s husband, Michael B., also father of George B., the youngest of the four children. As a result of an adjudicatory hearing, [the] children were declared to be children in need of assistance (`CINA') and committed to the care and custody of the Baltimore County Department of Social Services (BCDSS). Id. at 677-78, 874 A.2d at 424-25. At the February 2002 adjudicatory hearing, the court established a permanency plan of reunification providing Tammy B. and Michael B. with unsupervised and supervised visitation with the children. The three older children were eventually placed in foster homes. See id. at 678-80, 874 at 425-26. In June 2003, the juvenile court changed the youngest child's (George B.) permanency plan from reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption. [21] In addition, at the June permanency plan hearing, the trial court increased the amount of unsupervised visits for the mother with three of her four children. Id. at 680, 874 A.2d at 426. After the November 2003 permanency plan six-month review hearing, the mother and her husband separately appealed, raising the issue that hearsay evidence was inappropriately considered by the trial court. Id. at 682, 874 A.2d 423. The subsequent review in this Court resulted from the six-month periodic permanency plan hearing in November 2003. Id. at 681, 874 A.2d 423. The mother appealed the time allocated for supervised and unsupervised visits with her children as provided by the plan. Id. at 682, 874 A.2d at 427-28. There was no request for review in this Court of the June 2003 order amending the permanency plan from reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption. The issue that was before us in In re Billy W. is unlike the issue before us in the present case. Here the order establishing the concurrent permanency plan is the subject of the dispute before this Court. In In re Billy W., the order of June 2003, which amended the permanency plan from reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption, was similar to the concurrent plan in the present case, but was not the subject of appellate review in this Court. Moreover, changes to the visitation provisions of the permanency plan, in In re Billy W., emanated from the November 2003 order and were deemed by this Court not to constitute an appealable order because court orders arising from a periodic review hearing that maintain the permanency plan[ ]. . . do not constitute final judgments. Id. at 689, 874 A.2d at 431. The modifications made to the permanency plan in November 2003 involved maintenance of an existing plan. That plan was previously amended in June 2003, from a plan for reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption. Thus, any orders continuing the permanency plan for the children in In re Billy W., after June 2003, did not detrimentally affect Tammy B.'s custody rights or visitation with the children, even though Tammy B. had sought full custody. Id. at 692, 874 A.2d at 433. Our holding in In re Billy W., was limited to whether the orders of November 2003 were immediately appealable interlocutory orders. We held that to be appealable, court orders arising from the permanency plan review hearing must operate to either deprive Tammy B. of the care and custody of her children or change the terms of her care and custody of the children to her detriment. Id. at 691-92, 874 A.2d 423 (citing In re Samone H., 385 Md. at 282, 869 A.2d at 380; In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 438, 765 A.2d at 628). In the present case, the intermediate appellate court, erred in its interpretation of In re Billy W. and our narrow holding in that case. The Court of Special Appeals also distinguished In re Damon M., supra , from the present case, on the ground that the trial court's orders terminated reunification efforts. The Court of Special Appeals opined that in In re Damon M., the permanency plans were amended from reunification to either long-term foster care or adoption. The . . . [trial] court['s] orders terminated reunification efforts, and thus, detrimentally affected the parent's custodial rights. In re Karl H., 163 Md.App. at 545, 881 A.2d at 1179. Ultimately, the Court of Special Appeals held that [o]rdering the necessary preliminary steps toward the possible outcome of terminating parental rights did not deprive [Petitioner] . . . of the care and custody of [his] children such that the juvenile court orders were appealable interlocutory orders under CJP section 12-303(3)(x). Rather, the juvenile court's orders simply imposed additional work on CCDSS to lay the foundation for potential adoption proceedings, including filing the guardianship petitions, serving [Petitioner] . . . with required notice of the guardianship proceedings. . . and seeking to identify and approve a qualified family for adoption[. S]ee COMAR 07.01.12.04(C)(2). In re Karl H, 163 Md.App. at 544-45, 881 A.2d at 1179 (alterations added) (citations omitted). We reject the assertion that a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption is not an appealable interlocutory order and does not deprive parents of their rights to care and custody of their children. In In re Damon M., we held that an order amending a permanency plan calling for reunification to foster care or adoption is immediately appealable. 362 Md. at 438, 765 A.2d at 628. That case involved four consolidated cases where seven children were committed to the care and custody of the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Services (MCDHHS) and all seven children had been in foster care for at least one year. Id. at 430, 765 A.2d at 624. In three of the cases, the trial court's order amended the permanency plan from reunification to either long-term foster care or permanent foster care. [22] Id. at 430-31, 765 A.2d at 624-25. The fourth case, In re Marcello K., Lenny M., and Keshya K., involved three children. The trial court at the initial permanency plan hearing established a permanency plan of adoption. Id. at 431-32, 765 A.2d at 625. The four cases were appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. In a reported opinion, that court dismissed In re Damon M., 131 Md.App. 449, 749 A.2d 231 (2000), holding that the order was not a final order. Citing the intermediate appellate court's holding in In re Damon M., that court dismissed the other three appeals, in unreported opinions. In re Damon M., 362 Md. at 432, 765 A.2d at 625. We acknowledged in In re Damon M. the facts in In re Marcello, an unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. The order appealed from in In re Marcello was for adoption and stemmed from the permanency planning hearing. We did not, however, distinguish the facts in In re Marcello from the facts in In re Damon M. when we said that [t]he amendment of the permanency plan to long-term or permanent foster care and adoption is a change in the terms of the custody order, whenever it was passed. The respondent acknowledges as much when it argues: In the absence of the permanency planning orders appealed here, the previous commitment orders would have remained in effect and all of these children would have remained in the Department's custody. The respondent asserts . . . that an order approving or revising a permanency plan is not appealable. Id. at 437, 765 A.2d at 628. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that this Court focused not only on orders that revise a permanency plan, but also on orders that approve a permanency plan when considering the question of appealability of an interlocutory order. Further indications that we acknowledged an order approving or revising a permanency may be immediately appealable is our discussion in In re Damon M., with regard to respondent's contention in that case, that other states have addressed this issue, and concluded that an order approving or revising a permanency plan is not appealable. Id. We distinguished the cases cited by the respondent in support of that proposition on the basis that [t]here apparently was no counterpart to § 12-303(3)(x) in any of the States. Id. In determining whether an interlocutory order is appealable, in the context of custody cases, the focus should be on whether the order and the extent to which that order changes the antecedent custody order. It is immaterial that the order appealed from emanated from the permanency planning hearing or from the periodic review hearing. If the change could deprive a parent of the fundamental right to care and custody of his or her child, whether immediately or in the future, the order is an appealable interlocutory order. We hold that a concurrent permanency plan that includes the option of adoption is sufficiently far enough along the continuum of depriving a parent of a fundamental right and is immediately appealable. Whether the concurrent permanency plan was ordered at the permanency planning hearing or, subsequently, at the periodic review hearing, the detrimental effects are the same. Reunification and adoption are mutually exclusive goals, and are directly contradictory goals. Reunification gives a parent the opportunity for reconciliation. The goal of adoption, however, guarantees that, under § 3-823(g) of the Family Law Article, after thirty days at the earliest, a petition will be filed to terminate a parent's rights along with the hope of reunification. The DSS's role is an important one in these matters  to secure a permanent, secure, and safe home for a child. The Department is required to facilitate and accelerate the process to ensure that a child is not left languishing in limbo for years. In Petitioner's case, in March 2004, it was determined that his children required emergency shelter care. By December 2004, a secure placement was obtained for the children and they were happy and thriving. Meanwhile, Petitioner was unsuccessful in completing the tasks set forth by CCDSS, such as getting clean and sober, staying clean and sober, and providing a home for his two children. We are not unmindful of the need for a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption; however, we find that the implementation of those goals are not parallel. When the option of adoption enters into a permanency plan, whether alone or with a concurrent vision, under § 3-823(g) the local department must file a petition for TPR within thirty days (or sixty days if the local department does not support the plan). A parent is deprived of a six-month review of the permanency plan. The six-month review is replaced with a TPR hearing when adoption is a component of the permanency plan. See § 3-823(g). An interlocutory order which includes adoption as a possible outcome has the potential both to accelerate the termination and to terminate a parent's custodial rights; therefore, such orders adversely affect a parent's rights to care and custody and entitle the parent to an immediate appeal. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS AND COSTS IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO ABIDE THE RESULT.