Opinion ID: 161020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the funding formula

Text: 16 The Citizen Potawatomi challenge Defendants' determination that the 1988 formula is static. Because the Citizen Potawatomis' action may alter the future funding for the absent tribes, the tribes can claim interests relating to the subject of the action. See Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir. 1977) (The financial and other benefits to the Tribe under the Exxon agreement give the tribe sufficient interest to satisfy the requirements of Subsection (a)(2)(i).). In Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Collier, 17 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 1994), we noted that for purposes of Rule 12(b)(7) necessary party analysis the Rule does not protect inchoate interests. Here, however, the tribes have already agreed to the use of the formulas in question. As the district court noted, Order at 6, II App. at 407, here the five tribes entered in an agreement regarding a funding formula in 1988. We feel this transforms the funding decisions from a mere expectation, which is unprotected, into an interest which is protected. 17 The Citizen Potawatomi argue, however, that they do not challenge the use of the 1988 formula as a basis for funding, but rather how the Defendants implement the formula, and that under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990), absent tribes are not necessary in such circumstances. We are not persuaded. That case presented a challenge brought by the Makah to regulations of the Secretary of Commerce governing quotas on tribal ocean fishing for various tribes. The court held that the other tribes were not necessary to the action because all of the tribes have an equal interest in an administrative process that is lawful. Id. at 559. The Citizen Potawatomi make the same argument in this action, contending that the remaining tribes do not possess a legitimate interest in continuing to receive funding allocations that are not fairly distributed. Brief For Appellant at 15-16. 18 We do not agree. Makah focused on the underlying merits of the litigation - all tribes have an interest in a lawful administrative process. As we have made clear, the underlying merits of the litigation are irrelevant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a): 19 Plaintiffs' narrow interpretation of the term legally protected interest inappropriately presupposes Plaintiffs' success on the merits. Under the interpretation advanced by Plaintiffs, the Tribe would have no legally protected interest in the monies used to fund Judgment Fund Programs that exclude the Estelusti Seminoles only if Plaintiffs prevail on the merits. Consequently, if this court adopted Plaintiffs' interpretation of the term legally protected interest, the district court would be required to determine the merits of Plaintiffs' Judgment Fund Award claim before ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss. Such an approach is untenable because it would render the Rule 19 analysis an adjudication on the merits. The term legally protected interest thus cannot mean what Plaintiffs would like it to mean. 20 Davis, 192 F.3d at 958. 21 We thus noted that Rule 19, by its plain language, does not require the absent party to actually possess an interest; it only requires the movant to show that the absent party `claims an interest relating to the subject of the action.' Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)). Consequently, Rule 19 excludes only those claimed interests that are `patently frivolous.' Id. at 959 (citing Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis in original). Applying Davis to the instant case, we are convinced that the Citizen Potawatomi have not demonstrated that the absent tribes' defense of the current funding methods would be patently frivolous. Thus, even if the Citizen Potawatomi would otherwise prevail on the merits, the absent tribes can nevertheless validly claim an interest in the subject of the action. 22 We are likewise unpersuaded by Citizen Potawatomis' reliance on Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1996), for the proposition that the United States can adequately protect the absent tribes' interest and that therefore they are not necessary parties. Brief For Appellant at 16. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did note in Ramah, 87 F.3d at 1351, that the United States may adequately represent a tribe's interests; however, it made it clear that this representation is permissible only so long as no conflict exists between the United States and the nonparty beneficiaries. Id. (emphasis added). In the instant case, however, some tribes may gain, while some tribes may lose if the Citizen Potawatomi prevail. Thus, we agree with the district court here that the United States cannot adequately represent these varied and potentially conflicting interests. Order at 10-11, II App. at 411-12. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding absent Tribe was indispensable and distinguishing Ramah as a case in which the government had no conflicting obligations to the nonparty tribes); see also Makah 910 F.2d at 560 ([T]he absent tribes had no proper representative because potential intertribal conflicts meant the United States could not represent all of them.). 23 In sum, Defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that the absent tribes can claim an interest in the application of the funding formulas and that Defendants cannot adequately represent their varied interests. Accordingly, we are convinced that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the absent tribes were necessary for purposes of the Citizen Potawatomis' claim concerning the funding formula.