Opinion ID: 2021492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Secretary of State's Denial of Gumma's Petition for Rescission Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

Text: Although we have determined that the Secretary of State was not prevented by collateral estoppel from admitting the breath-analysis test results at the summary suspension hearing, we must now decide whether the breath-analysis test results were inadmissible for other reasons, as Gumma asserts, and, if so, whether the Secretary of State's denial of Gumma's petition for rescission was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Gumma petitioned for rescission of his driver's license suspension claiming, pursuant to section 11-501.8(e), that he had submitted to testing, but that the testing did not indicate a blood alcohol level greater than 0.00. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e)(5) (West 1998). At the administrative hearing, then, Gumma had the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case for rescission. See Arvia, 209 Ill.2d at 542, 283 Ill.Dec. 895, 809 N.E.2d 88 (in both zero-tolerance and DUI suspension hearings, person challenging the suspension bears the initial burden of proof). Because it is undisputed that Gumma had submitted to a breath-analysis test which registered a blood-alcohol level greater than 0.00, Gumma had the burden of making a prima facie showing that the breath-analysis test administered to him at the Barrington police station on September 22, 2000, was invalid and, therefore, inadmissible to establish his blood-alcohol concentration. The initial question before us, then, is whether Gumma met this burden. The zero-tolerance statute provides in section 11-501.8(b)(i) that [c]hemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, to be considered valid under the provisions of this Section, shall have been performed according to standards promulgated by the Department of Public Health in consultation with the Department of State Police by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by that Department for this purpose. [9] (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(b)(i) (West 2000). In People v. Emrich, 113 Ill.2d 343, 101 Ill.Dec. 632, 498 N.E.2d 1140 (1986), this court interpreted language in section 11-501.2(a) which is identical to the above-quoted language in section 11-501.8(b)(i) and stated that the statute provides that the standards have to be complied with for a blood analysis `to be considered valid.' The obvious corollary is that the analysis will not be considered valid, and will be inadmissible, absent such compliance. Read as a whole,    compliance with the standards is a prerequisite to admissibility on a DUI charge. Emrich, 113 Ill.2d at 350, 101 Ill.Dec. 632, 498 N.E.2d 1140. In People v. Hamilton, 118 Ill.2d 153, 160, 113 Ill.Dec. 53, 514 N.E.2d 965 (1987), we extended our holding in Emrich to hold that compliance with section 11-501.2 is mandatory for summary suspension purposes, [and] noncompliance will render test results invalid and inadmissible. Although Hamilton dealt with a challenge to a statutory summary suspension imposed under section 11-501.1, we find that, because the language in section 11-501.8(b)(i) is identical to the language in section 11-501.2, admissibility of blood-alcohol concentration evidence at a zero-tolerance suspension hearing is also contingent upon its validity. Thus, a petitioner in a zero-tolerance rescission hearing may present a prima facie case for rescission by presenting evidence that the test is invalid due to a failure to comply with Department of Health rules and regulations. In the case at bar, Gumma established at the administrative hearing that, shortly after submitting to a breath-analysis test at the Barrington police station, he requested the logbook for the breath-analysis instrument used to test his breath, as well as any other documents which would establish that the Barrington police department complied with Department of Health rules concerning the certification of breath-analysis equipment. The police department did not produce this information. Although Gumma did not subpoena these documents or Officer Basel at the administrative hearing, Officer Basel's Sworn Statement of Breath Test Operator affirmatively established that the Barrington police department was unable to locate [the] record. By establishing that there was no record that the instrument used to test his breath had been properly maintained, tested and certified accurate, as required by Department of Public Health rules and regulations, Gumma made a prima facie showing that the breath-test results were invalid. Because Gumma presented a prima facie case, the burden shifted to the Secretary of State to produce evidence establishing the validity of the breath test. Importantly, the admissibility of the breath-test results, as recorded in the officer's sworn report and on the test strip, became contingent upon the Secretary of State's ability to lay a proper foundation, by establishing the validity of the breath test. See Orth, 124 Ill.2d at 340, 125 Ill.Dec. 182, 530 N.E.2d 210 (once motorist made a prima facie case, the State can only avoid rescission by moving for the admission of the test into evidence and laying the required foundation). Thus, in the case at bar, the Secretary of State could avoid rescission only by producing evidence that the breath-analysis instrument had been properly maintained, tested and certified accurate in accordance with the Department of Public Health rules and regulations. Here, however, the only evidence submitted by the Secretary of State in this regard was the sworn statement by Officer Basel dated August 24, 2001. In this statement Officer Basel attested that the instrument had been tested and certified accurate on 7/13/01. This date, however, was long after any 45-day period which would have included September 22, 2000, the date when Gumma's breath test was administered. Thus, the Secretary of State produced no evidence that the instrument used to test Gumma's breath was functioning properly on September 22, 2000. A proper foundation for the admission of the breath-test results was not made. Therefore, the breath-test results were inadmissible and could not be relied upon to support the zero-tolerance summary suspension. The Secretary of State argues that, even though Gumma was able to show that the Barrington police department violated the Department of Public Health rules, he did not make a prima facie showing that the breath-test results were unreliable in light of other evidence that he consumed some amount of alcohol. The Secretary of State contends that it is immaterial that Gumma was able to show that the breath-analysis instrument may not have been accurate because the precision of the Breathalyzer result is of far less consequence in a zero tolerance proceeding (as opposed to a DUI statutory proceeding) since, in a zero-tolerance proceeding, summary suspension may be based on the consumption of any amount of alcohol. This argument misses the point. It is clear from the language of the zero-tolerance statute that evidence of a driver's submission to testing which discloses an alcohol concentration greater than 0.00, or evidence that he refused to submit to testing, is a necessary prerequisite for the imposition of a summary suspension pursuant to this provision. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(d) (West 1998). In other words, when a driver under the age of 21 is arrested for committing a traffic violation, summary suspension may not be imposed pursuant to section 11-501.8 of the Code, even when probable cause exists to believe that the driver has consumed some amount of alcohol, unless there is evidence that the driver submitted to testing, or that the driver refused to submit to testing. The officer's observations, which suggest that the driver has consumed some amount of alcohol, while important for the establishment of probable cause, are insufficient to support a summary suspension pursuant to the zero-tolerance provision. In the case at bar, Gumma sought rescission of his zero-tolerance summary suspension and, at the administrative hearing, made a prima facie showing that the breath-analysis test he took was invalid. Therefore, the test results were inadmissible unless the Secretary of State was able to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the breath-test results. The Secretary of State failed to do so. The Secretary of State could not show that the instrument used to test Gumma's breath had been maintained in compliance with Department of Public Health rules and regulations. For this reason, the test results were not admissible and the Secretary of State had no valid evidence that Gumma did submit to and complete the test or tests that determined an alcohol concentration of more than 0.00. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(e)(5) (West 1998). Accordingly, Gumma's zero-tolerance summary suspension should have been rescinded. The Secretary of State's denial of Gumma's petition was against the manifest weight of the evidence.