Opinion ID: 2746353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: John Saraya

Text: {¶ 122} According to Thompson, plain error occurred when John Saraya testified because he was not qualified as an expert in blood-spatter analysis and his testimony lacked the requisite scientific basis. {¶ 123} At trial, Saraya identified himself as a special agent for the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (“BCI”) with 12 years of experience in the crime-scene unit. Saraya testified that as part of his training, he “attend[ed] a 40-hour blood spatter school.” He summarized the history and science of blood-spatter analysis for the jury. Saraya then testified regarding his analysis of the blood spatter that had been found on Thompson’s shoes and opined that the stains had come from a blood source no more than one foot away. The blood source had been in front of and almost parallel to the shoes when the shoes were spattered. {¶ 124} Thompson raises multiple objections to this evidence. First, he says that the trial court erred by allowing Saraya to testify because the state never formally tendered him as an expert and the court never formally qualified him as an expert. We have repeatedly found that no plain error occurs when the state fails to formally tender an expert. See, e.g., State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 285-288, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (2001); Baston, 85 Ohio St.3d at 422-423, 709 N.E.2d 128. {¶ 125} Further, Thompson’s objection that the trial court never engaged in a threshold analysis of Saraya’s expert qualifications is unpersuasive. During Saraya’s testimony, the trial court clearly stated that Saraya had “been qualified as an expert.” Thus, Thompson knew that the court regarded Saraya as an expert but never objected to his qualifications or testimony. Under these circumstances, Thompson’s first argument fails. {¶ 126} Second, Thompson argues that Saraya was not qualified to testify as an expert. “Under Evid.R. 702, an expert may be qualified by knowledge, 33 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO skill, experience, training, or education to give an opinion which will assist the jury to understand the evidence and determine a fact at issue.” State v. Beuke, 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 43, 526 N.E.2d 274 (1988). Here, Saraya testified that he had completed a 40-hour course on blood spatter and had been a member of BCI’s crime-scene unit for 12 years. He also referred to his experience with bloodspatter analysis in other investigations. {¶ 127} Thompson says Saraya’s knowledge and experience were inadequate, compared to other cases in which blood-spatter experts testified. But a “witness need not be the best witness on the subject” to be qualified as an expert.” Scott v. Yates, 71 Ohio St.3d 219, 221, 643 N.E.2d 105 (1994). Instead, the witness simply “must demonstrate some knowledge on the particular subject superior to that possessed by an ordinary juror.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Here, Saraya’s training and experience qualified him to provide expert testimony on blood-spatter analysis. See, e.g., Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d at 285-288, 754 N.E.2d 1150. {¶ 128} Third, Thompson argues that “the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the reliability of the science of blood spatter.” He claims that “blood spatter evidence may be misleading and confuse the jury.” But we have already “recognized that blood-spatter analysis is a proper subject for expert testimony.” Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, at ¶ 56. {¶ 129} Fourth, Thompson objects that Saraya “did not give his opinion in terms of a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.” We have “held that expert witnesses in criminal cases can testify in terms of possibility rather than in terms of a reasonable scientific certainty or probability.” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 77, citing State v. D’Ambrosio, 67 Ohio St.3d 185, 191, 616 N.E.2d 909 (1993). In the criminal context, questions about certainty go not to admissibility but to sufficiency of the evidence; they are 34 January Term, 2014 matters of weight for the jury. Id. at ¶ 77. Thus, no error occurred when Saraya testified in terms of possibilities. {¶ 130} Fifth, Thompson argues that Saraya’s unreliable scientific evidence violated his rights to confront the witnesses against him and to present a complete defense. See Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Thompson reasons that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because a criminal defendant cannot “confront a scientifically unreliable possibility.” We rejected a similar argument in Lang at ¶ 83 and likewise reject Thompson’s argument now. Thompson’s attorney did cross-examine Saraya, and the defense had the opportunity to introduce contrary scientific evidence. {¶ 131} Sixth, Thompson argues that Saraya’s blood-spatter evidence was either not relevant and thus inadmissible under Evid.R. 401 and 402, or, even if relevant, was unfairly prejudicial under Evid.R. 403(A). Thompson offers no support for his claim that this testimony was not relevant. To the contrary, this evidence was relevant because it indicated that Thompson shot Miktarian in the head from a distance of no more than one foot, while Miktarian was lying on the ground. This evidence corroborated the coroner’s statement that Miktarian was shot four times in the head, twice from a distance of two or three feet and twice when the gun was touching his skin. Accordingly, the trial court properly admitted Saraya’s testimony under Evid.R. 401 and 402. {¶ 132} The trial court also did not err in failing to exclude Saraya’s testimony under Evid.R. 403. Evid.R. 403 provides that relevant evidence “is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Here, Thompson asserts that Saraya’s testimony, his courtroom reenactment, and the prosecutor’s “exploitation of that testimony in closing argument” were prejudicial. But he does not explain how that testimony was unfairly prejudicial or why the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the 35 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO probative value of the testimony. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by admitting this evidence under Evid.R. 403, let alone plainly err. {¶ 133} Finally, even if any of Thompson’s above objections had merit, we would still find no plain error. Saraya indicated that Miktarian’s head (the blood source) was probably no more than one foot away from Thompson’s shoes when the blood spatter was created. But the coroner also testified that Miktarian was shot at close range—twice from a distance of two or three feet, and twice with the gun touching his skin. And, consistent with Saraya’s testimony, Sergeant Gina McFarren testified that Miktarian was probably lying on the ground when the final three shots were fired because “he had the one shot in the head and then the three shots in the side of the head.” Likewise, Thompson’s own witness, Danielle Roberson testified that the officer was on the ground when the last shots were fired. Thus, Thompson cannot show that Saraya’s testimony necessarily affected the trial outcome.