Opinion ID: 1899053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Town's Authority

Text: [¶ 7] Nugent argues that neither 38 M.R.S.A. § 7 (Supp.1997) nor the Town's Harbor and Waterways Ordinance authorizes the Town to regulate his employees' parking on the public landing because such regulation has nothing to do with an activity occurring within Camden Harbor. The meaning and construction of statutory language presents a question of law. See Community Telecomm. Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 684 A.2d 424, 426 (Me.1996). The meaning of terms or expressions in an ordinance also presents a question of law. See Roberts v. Town of Phippsburg, 642 A.2d 155, 156 (Me.1994). We review such questions de novo. See H.E. Sargent, Inc. v. Town of Wells, 676 A.2d 920, 923 (Me.1996). [¶ 8] Pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. § 7, a municipality may enact ordinances to regulate the assignment or placement of moorings and other activities in their harbors.  (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Town has enacted its Harbor and Waterways Ordinance, which states in Article I, § II that two of its objectives are to minimize user conflicts and maximize the efficient use of both the water space and the town-owned waterfront and to preserve public access to and use of the Harbors waters. Article V, § III of the Ordinance then authorizes the Town's Board of Selectmen to elect to rent or lease space on the town float, and states that [i]n reviewing and acting upon an application for a lease or rental agreement, the Board of Selectmen may, among other things, consider. . . the availability of and effect on parking and traffic. [¶ 9] In addition, the Town has enacted a Parking Ordinance which governs parking in the Town generally. Chapter VIII, Schedule 12 of the Parking Ordinance more specifically authorizes a permit for one space [on the public landing] for each daysailer using the Town floats, when the vessel is in commercial use. Nugent does not dispute the Town's authority to regulate the flow of traffic and parking within its borders. See State v. Rush, 324 A.2d 748, 755 (Me.1974). Rather, he contends that the Town may not coordinate its authority to regulate parking with its harbor control authority. [¶ 10] Nugent, however, points to no authority forbidding a municipality from rationally coordinating its regulatory actions. The Town's authority to regulate daysailers' parking is properly drawn from two ordinances, both of which are fully within the Town's authority to enact. The resulting inclusion of paragraph 5(G) in the 1996 Daysailer License Agreements is consistent with the objectives of the Town's ordinances and well tailored to meet those objectives without overreaching. The court therefore committed no error in granting summary judgment to the Town on Nugent's claim challenging the Town's authority. [4]