Opinion ID: 1735417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Proposed Jury Instructions D-12 and D-14.

Text: ś 132. This Court's standard of reviewing the denial of jury instructions is well settled. The Court does not single out any instruction or take instructions out of context; rather, the instructions are to be read together as a whole. Thomas v. State, 818 So.2d 335, 349 (Miss.2002). A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions which present his theory of the case. Id. This entitlement is limited, however, in that the court is allowed to refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Id. Parks v. State, 884 So.2d 738, 746 (Miss. 2004). Furthermore, [a] trial judge is under no obligation to grant redundant instructions. Ellis v. State, 790 So.2d 813, 815 (Miss.2001) (citing Bell, 725 So.2d at 849). The refusal to grant a jury instruction that is similar to one already given does not constitute reversible error. Laney v. State, 486 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Miss. 1986). ś 133. Walker argues that the trial court erred in not granting jury instructions D-12 and D-14. Proposed jury instruction D-12 states: The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the evidence in this case that the alleged confession or statement of the Accused was untrue, you should disregard it; or if you believe from the evidence that it was made under the influence of hope or fear, you may take this into account in determining what weight or credit, if any, you decide to attach to it as evidence. Proposed jury instruction D-14 states: The Court instructs the Jury that evidence has been presented that the Accused acted under duress in committing the crime. Duress is the exercise of unlawful force upon a person whereby he is compelled to do some act that he otherwise would not have done. In order for duress to be a defense to a criminal charge, the impelling danger must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce in that person a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A person having a reasonable opportunity to avoid committing the crime without undue exposure to death or serious bodily harm cannot invoke duress as a defense. If the State has failed to prove the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Accused acted voluntarily in committing the crime and was not under duress, then you shall find the Accused NOT GUILTY. ś 134. During the objections to the proposed jury instructions, the State argued that D-12 was thoroughly covered in the trial court's instruction [18] to the jury that they are the sole judge's of fact, and they must give what weight and credibility to the evidence as it deserves. The State further argued that there was no evidence to support D-12 because each of the witnesses who took the stand testified that he was calm, relaxed, and factual, and was not promised anything or given any hope of reward and was not threatened to get his statement. Walker offered no proof to support the granting of D-12, and the trial judge correctly refused D-12. ś 135. In regard to proposed jury instruction D-14, there was no evidence to support the instruction because Walker offered nothing more than an allegation in his statements that he crossed a guy, without name or description, and this unidentified guy forced him to kill Richardson by a threat to kill his parents, some weeks before. No testimony or proof was offered that the alleged threat of impelling danger was present, imminent, and impending, or that Walker did not have a reasonable opportunity to avoid committing the crime. ś 136. Walker claims he requested the instructions to keep the jury from from making the decision in a vacuum. Walker cited Thomas v. State, 426 So.2d 795 (Miss. 1983), for the proposition that the proposed instructions supported the evidence. However, we find Thomas to be distinguishable. In Thomas, the defendant testified at trial, and the jury was never given the general instruction from the court that they were the sole judges of the weight and credibility of the evidence and witnesses. Id. at 795. Consequently, in Thomas, this Court found that the failure to give the general instruction necessitated the giving of the defendant's requested instruction regarding his confession. Id. Here, the jury was given the general instruction by the court. ś 137. In regard to the duress Walker alleges to have been under, he could not provide the identity or offer any description of the guy. During testimony, Officer Davis stated: We tried to get into it a little deeper, tried to get him to identify this person, but he couldn't â he couldn't produce anything on that. All other parts of Walker's statement were corroborated at trial except for the part of his statement that he crossed a guy and was under duress. Assuming arguendo that this guy actually threatened Walker, Walker provided no evidence that there was any imminent danger to him if he did not kill Richardson, such that Walker would have a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm. Walker also contradicts himself. Initially, in his statement to the police, Walker stated that he did not know who the guy was that threatened to kill his relatives. Later in the statement, Walker stated: I called the guy that had me do this[,] but his mother said it was too late to talk. Although Walker claims that he does not know the guy, he has his phone number and spoke with his mother. Walker did not reveal the phone number to law enforcement to investigate his claims. ś 138. If the defendant presents sufficient evidence in the record to support his theory of the case, he should then be given an instruction on his theory of the case. There needs not be even a plausible explanation. Whether he has met this standard is a matter of law and not a matter of fact for the jury to decide, unless he has presented sufficient evidence in the record to support same. Walker has not meet this standard to be given such an instruction. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing the instruction. ś 139. We find that Walker has presented no evidence to support his claim that either of his proposed instructions should have been granted. We find that proposed jury instruction D-12 was redundant, and proposed jury instruction D-14 was properly denied for a lack of evidence presented to support duress.