Opinion ID: 2981262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Parham’s Jury Instructions

Text: An allegedly faulty instruction “may not be judged in artificial isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 464 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). In Clark v. Jago, this Court held that an “isolated portion of the charge relieved the state of its burden” to prove the defendant’s mens rea by improperly stating that “purpose to kill” could be found in the mind of the defendant “and/or” his accomplice. 676 F.2d 1099, 1104 (6th Cir. 1982). Habeas relief was granted because the jury was never instructed that such a mens rea must be established for the defendant himself. Id. at 1105. By contrast, this Court denied habeas relief when an arguably confusing instruction on accomplice liability was coupled with additional language, which required the jury to find that the defendant had the appropriate mental state. O’Neal v. Morris, 3 F.3d 143, 146-47 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated on other grounds sub nom. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995) (discussing standard of review, not whether jury instruction was erroneous). This Court explained that “an unartful boilerplate reiteration” of state complicity law simply “reminded” the jury of different verdict options shortly after the trial court’s “unequivocal statement” of the appropriate mens rea. Id.; see also Thompson v. Konteh, 170 F. App’x 945, 952 (6th Cir. 2006) (aiding-andabetting instruction not confusing when considered within context of other instructions). The Michigan Court of Appeals reached a similar result in People v. Allen, No. 246419, 2004 WL 2290483, at  (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004) (holding that “any misstatement by the court [on aiding and abetting] was minor in light of the lengthy and repetitive instructions concerning the specific intent requirement”). - 10 - No. 09-2510 Parham v. Warren As in O’Neal and Thompson, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the underlying offense, including the mens rea requirement that the “intent to kill was premeditated; that is, thought out beforehand,” and thoroughly explained that conviction for first-degree premeditated murder “requires proof of a specific intent . . . to kill.” These instructions were immediately followed by a discussion of the second-degree murder charge and the challenged instruction on aiding and abetting. Although clarification of the relationship between the principal offenses and aiding and abetting would have been helpful, the jury was sufficiently instructed that it must find every element of the principal offense in order to convict. See O’Neal, 3 F.3d at 146. The court’s jury instructions, when read in their entirety, properly required the jury to find Parham had a specific intent to kill. Moreover, the jury received further explanation during deliberations after sending the judge the following note: “Does aid and abet apply to second degree or only first murder? [sic]” The judge returned a message indicating it applies to both. Although Parham argues this question reveals that the jurors “were concerned about that law regarding aiding and abetting,” it also suggests the jury correctly recognized that “aiding and abetting is not a separate substantive offense.” See Robinson, 715 N.W.2d at 47. In any event, the court’s answer should have resolved any ambiguity.