Opinion ID: 2234021
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: step jury instruction

Text: Bormann's final assignment of error claims the trial court erred in giving a step jury instruction that deprived him of his due process right to have the jury consider his defense to the charges. The jury was given the following instruction: Under Count I of the Information, depending on evidence which you find that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you may find ... Bormann: (1) Guilty of murder in the first degree; or (2) Guilty of murder in the second degree; or (3) Guilty of manslaughter; or (4) Not guilty. The instruction included three sections, each of which spelled out the material elements for the three grades of homicide. Each instruction then stated that if the jury found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that each and every one of the material elements set out in that section was true, the jury should find the defendant guilty of that crime. Each instruction went on to state: If, on the other hand, you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the material elements in that section, the jury should find Bormann not guilty of that crime. The instruction then directed the jury to proceed to consider the lesser-included offense. Bormann's theory of defense was that he lacked the intent to kill and that, therefore, he could only have been found guilty of manslaughter. He claims that the step instruction violated his due process rights because it did not allow the jury to consider his theory. The determination of whether procedures afforded an individual comport with constitutional requirements for procedural due process presents a question of law. State v. Goodwin, 278 Neb. 945, 774 N.W.2d 733 (2009). On questions of law, a reviewing court has an obligation to reach its own conclusions independent of those reached by the lower courts. Id. In State v. Goodwin, supra , we recently addressed an argument similar to Bormann's argument. We agreed with other courts which have held that so-called acquittal first step instructions are not constitutionally deficient. As with State v. Goodwin, supra , the step instruction given in this case did not prevent the jury from considering the critical issue of whether Bormann had formed an intent to kill when he fired the fatal shot. Bormann was not precluded from offering evidence to support his theory of defense, nor was his counsel restricted from arguing that Bormann did not have the intent to kill and should therefore be found guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter. There was no prejudice to Bormann when the jury acquitted him of first degree murder. Pursuant to the step instruction, the jury was then required to consider whether the State had proved all the elements of second degree murder. Once the jury found that the State had proved each element of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, Bormann's defense of manslaughter was no longer relevant. The jury found that Bormann intentionally killed Williams. The step instruction did not violate Bormann's constitutional right to present a complete defense. It was perfectly logical for the jury to conclude that when Bormann pointed and fired his high-powered rifle at Williams, he possessed the intent to kill.