Opinion ID: 2424378
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maryland Law Before Priet

Text: In State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 275, 424 A.2d 349, 353 (1981), we summarized Maryland law regarding the validity of guilty pleas before the promulgation of Maryland Rule 731(c), the predecessor to current Rule 4-242: Consistent with the requirements of due process, the decisions of this Court have always required that a guilty plea, to be valid, must be entered voluntarily and intelligently. The fundamental rule outlined in our cases is that a plea of guilty may be entered under circumstances showing a voluntary desire on the part of the accused to do so, with an intelligent understanding of the nature of the offense to which he is pleading guilty and the possible consequences of such a plea. It was the law of this State, prior to the adoption of Rule 731 c, that no specific ritual was required to be followed by the trial judge in order to satisfy himself of the voluntary character of the plea and of the fact that the defendant understands the nature and effect of a plea of guilty. [We have said]. . . that it [i]s the duty of the trial judge to ascertain that the guilty-pleading defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of a guilty plea. In discharging this duty, the trial judge is not required . . . ritualistically and personally [to] advise the accused of these matters, it being sufficient if the defendant is made aware of the consequences of his guilty plea regardless of the source whence the information comes. (Emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, in Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 114, 361 A.2d 113, 119 (1976), decided a year before the effective date of Rule 731(c), we stated that trial judges need not enumerate certain rights, or go through any particular litany, before accepting a defendant's guilty plea; rather, . . . the record must affirmatively disclose that the accused entered his confession of guilt voluntarily and understandingly. In Davis we recognized that in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), the Supreme Court opined that [t]he standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. Davis, 278 Md. at 115, 361 A.2d at 120 (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S.Ct. at 164, 27 L.Ed.2d at 168). In determining whether a guilty plea meets this bar, courts usually [have] looked to the totality of the circumstances as reflected in the entire record. Davis, 278 Md. at 109, 361 A.2d at 116. Against this historical backdrop, the Court adopted Rule 731, which became effective on 1 July 1977. See Priet, 289 Md. at 277, 424 A.2d at 354 (Rule 731 c. . . plainly comports with the constitutional requirement that guilty pleas must be voluntarily and intelligently entered.). The version of Rule 731 with which the Court in Priet, supra , was concerned, provided, in pertinent part: c. Plea of Guilty The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first questioning the defendant on the record to determine that the plea is made voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. . . .