Opinion ID: 2060789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Actions For Declaratory Judgment

Text: As noted, the circuit court dismissed Post's and Bregman's respective actions for declaratory judgment on the ground that, by entering judgment on Bregman's breach of contract claim, the actions for declaratory judgment were moot. If the issue raised in an action for declaratory judgment is truly moot, the action may properly be dismissed, for, as we held in Reyes v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 279, 289 n. 5, 380 A.2d 12, 18 n. 5 (1977), the declaratory judgment process is not available for the decision of purely theoretical questions which may never arise, questions which have become moot and abstract questions and should not be used where a declaration would neither serve a useful purpose nor terminate a controversy. Nonetheless, when an action for declaratory judgment does clearly lie, as it did in this case, it is ordinarily not permissible for a court to avoid declaring the rights of the parties by entering judgment on another pending count. Compare Popham v. State Farm, 333 Md. 136, 140 n. 2, 634 A.2d 28, 29 n. 2 (1993), where, though noting that the resolution of another claim in the same action rendered moot the need for a declaratory judgment, we also observed that the order purporting to dismiss the declaratory judgment action also declared the rights of the parties. We understand the constraints under which trial judges must operate and can well appreciate the court's desire to avoid the extra effort necessary to draft a declaratory judgment when, in its view, the entry of judgment on the breach of contract action essentially decides the issue. Nonetheless, we have historically enforced the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act and insisted that courts declare the rights of the parties when presented with an action properly susceptible to a declaratory judgment. Rarely, we have held, is it permissible to dismiss an action for declaratory judgment in lieu of declaring the rights of the party seeking the judgment. See Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461, 494 A.2d 934 (1985). We have made clear that, as a general rule, courts will not entertain a declaratory judgment action if there is pending, at the time of the commencement of the action for declaratory relief, another action or proceeding involving the same parties and in which the identical issues that are involved in the declaratory action may be adjudicated. Waicker v. Colbert, 347 Md. 108, 113, 699 A.2d 426, 428 (1997). We have not, however, except in the peculiar circumstance of Popham v. State Farm, supra, 333 Md. 136, 634 A.2d 28, generally blessed the dismissal of a proper action for declaratory judgment because of a ruling on an alternative claim in the same action. The existence of another remedy, at law or in equity, does not ordinarily defeat a party's right to seek and obtain a declaratory judgment. Turner v. Mfrs. Casualty Ins. Co., 206 Md. 601, 112 A.2d 670 (1955); Glorius v. Watkins, 203 Md. 546, 102 A.2d 274 (1954). This case, in particular, was appropriate for declaratory judgment. Post, indeed, objected to the court's refusal to declare his rights. After the court announced its intended decision, he argued his right to a declaration and asked that the court, in writing, define the contract (which was in dispute), state whether MLRPC Rule 1.5(e) applied to the contract, and declare whether he was or was not entitled to the relief he sought. This was not an ordinary breach of contract action. As is the case with many lawyers, both parties used fee-sharing agreements in their practices, and they sought a specific determination of whether MLRPC Rule 1.5(e) applied to their fee-sharing agreement, and, if so (1) whether the Rule was violated in this case, and (2) if the Rule was violated, what the effect of that violation was on the contract. They were entitled to a specific written declaration, not just oral rulings or implicit determinations, on those matters. It is the judgment that must declare the rights of the parties. Robert T. Foley Co. v. W.S.S.C., 283 Md. 140, 389 A.2d 350 (1978). As we shall be directing a remand of the case because of our disagreement with the substantive ruling of the court on the application of Rule 1.5(e) in any event, the court will have an opportunity to correct this deficiency and declare the rights of the parties.