Opinion ID: 74019
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retention of the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy

Text: 13 The Industry's first challenge to the Standard is addressed to the retention of the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from the prior standard. 3 The Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy reflects a general preference for engineering controls, which eliminate or arrest pollution at the source, over respirators in reducing employee exposure to airborne contaminants. Although it comprehensively revised those aspects of the prior standard relating to the manner and conditions of respirator use, OSHA altogether excluded the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from the rulemaking proceeding. Consequently, the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy was not open to comment or scrutiny. In the issuing release for the Standard, OSHA explained its position in the following way: 14 By leaving paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the final rule unchanged from the corresponding paragraphs of the respiratory protection standard that has been in effect since 1971, OSHA . . . . continues the protection that employees have relied on, . . . . retains the language that employers are familiar with, . . . . [and] allows OSHA and the affected public to continue to rely on OSHA interpretations . . . . 15 . . . . 16 The unchanged language of paragraph (a)(1) was included in the language of the proposed rule only to enable interested parties to view the rule as it would ultimately appear in the Code of FederalRegulations in its entirety. Since OSHA neither proposed nor adopted modifications to proposed paragraph (a)(1), the Agency believes that it is not legally required to reconsider this issue at this time. OSHA has the authority to identify which regulatory requirements it is proposing to revise and which issues are to receive regulatory priority. Limiting this rulemaking to issues concerning respirator programs is appropriate because such programs are the exclusive focus of this rulemaking and to collect comments and data on additional issues would divert resources from the task at hand. 17 63 Fed. Reg. at 1180. The Industry, for its part, contends that this position is unsupportable because it allows OSHA selectively to insulate favored aspects of a standard from public scrutiny and judicial review. The Industry also contends that since 1971, when the original Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy was adopted, the factual circumstances have changed dramatically and now respirators may be every bit as effective as engineering controls. The Industry also notes that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy was originally adopted as part of a 6(a) standard, which means that it has never been subject to the notice and comment procedures and scrutiny attendant to most rulemakings. 18 Thus, the legal issue for our consideration is whether OSHA, when it was comprehensively revising those aspects of the Standard relating to the manner and conditions of respirator use, could exclude the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from the rulemaking proceeding. Logic dictates that an agency must have some discretion in setting an agenda for rulemaking and excluding some matters categorically. Otherwise rulemaking would be very difficult because an agency would be unable to concentrate its scarce resources on a particular problem. Our decision in AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992), is instructive on this issue. In AFL-CIO, this Court reviewed OSHA's Air Contaminants Standard, a comprehensive set of permissible exposure limits (PELs) for 428 toxic substances. The notice of proposed rulemaking for the Air Contaminants Standard proposed to issue new or revised PELs for a number of substances, but limited the scope of [the] rulemaking to those substances for which [a private standard-setting organization] recommended limits that were either new or more protective than the existing PELs. Id. at 969 (citing the notice of proposed rulemaking). After issuance of the Air Contaminants Standard, industry and labor unions attacked it from both sides in this Court. 19 The unions in AFL-CIO argued that by limiting the rulemaking to those substances that either (1) had no existing PEL, or (2) for which the standard-setting organization had recommended a limit more protective than the existing PEL, OSHA had violated the command of the OSH Act that it set standards  'which most adequately assure[] . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.'  Id. at 984 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5) (alterations in original)). The court rejected this argument: 20 [W]e [do not] find a requirement that OSHA include all possible substances in one rulemaking. OSHA has never claimed that the Air Contaminants Standard constituted the entire universe of substances needing regulation, and it seems reasonable that some limit needed to be set as to what substances could be considered in this rulemaking. The list of [the standard-setting organization's] recommendations is a rational choice as the source for that limitation. [Those] recommendations are well known to industry and the safety and health community. Therefore, we find that the agency's choice to so limit this rulemaking is a valid exercise of OSHA's authority to set priorities for rulemaking. 21 Id. 22 The union brought a separate challenge to a decision by OSHA to defer issuing standards for monitoring and medical surveillance of the new PELs until a laterrulemaking. Id. at 985. Under 6(b)(7) of the OSH Act, occupational safety and health standards are required to provide for monitoring or measuring employee exposure, and to prescribe medical examinations and tests, where appropriate. 29 U.S.C. 665(b)(7). The union claimed that OSHA violated this requirement by promulgating the Air Contaminants Standard without simultaneously promulgating monitoring and medical surveillance rules with respect to that standard. We also dismissed this argument, holding that this was purely a matter of regulatory priority with respect to which the agency had ample discretion. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 985. Thus, OSHA was permitted to wait and address monitoring and medical surveillance at another point. 23 While AFL-CIO suggests that the agency's chosen scope of rulemaking is a matter subject to judicial review, it also stands for the proposition that such review is rather limited and deferential in nature. With respect to avoiding consideration of substances for which the private standard-setting organization had not recommended a more protective PEL, we held that it was reasonable for OSHA to confine its rulemaking in that manner. With respect to monitoring and medical surveillance, we allowed OSHA to postpone consideration of those issues until a later date. AFL-CIO did not precisely define the standard of review of an agency's choice of scope for a particular rulemaking, and we need not do so today. It is clear, however, that the standard of review is at least as deferential as a reasonableness standard. 24 We hold that the decision to exclude the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from revision was reasonable. The Standard deals with appropriate measures for employers to take with respect to respirator use; for example, training, maintenance, quality of device, etc., are included within its ambit. These matters are not necessarily factually intertwined with the propriety of implementing engineering controls, if feasible, rather than resorting to respirators. The Industry has presented nothing to this Court to lead us to believe that the alleged technological improvement in respirators substantially alters the comparative benefits of engineering controls versus respirators. To the contrary, it appears that the major rationale for engineering controls is that they make respiratory protection automatic, while respirators are dependent on use and constant attention and are subject to human error. Of course, technological improvement in respirators is not likely to reduce substantially the risk of human error, and in any event no such suggestion has been made in this case. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for OSHA to determine that allowing submission of evidence about the relative merits of engineering controls and respirators would have distracted attention from and clouded the essential issues before it, namely, how respirators should be used if they are used. 4 Like the AFL-CIO court, we hold that the agency's choice to so limit this rulemaking by excluding the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy from consideration is a valid exercise of OSHA's authority to set priorities for rulemaking. AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 984. The Industry has failed to demonstrate that OSHA's decision was unreasonable. 25 We also conclude that the fact that the original Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy was promulgated pursuant to 6(a)'s abbreviated procedures, rather than the usual 6(b) notice-and-comment proceedings, bears no special significance in this analysis. Section 6(a), 29 U.S.C. 655(a), authorized OSHA for a limited time (through 1973) to adopt existing national consensus standards as occupational safety and health standards without the rigors of notice-and-comment proceedings. The Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy, having been originally adopted pursuant to 6(a), has thus never undergone public scrutiny, unlike most of the standards that are in effect today. The Industry makes much of the fact that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy has eluded comment and scrutiny for 28 years in this manner. Although this situation may be undesirable from a public policy standpoint, 5 it is fully consistent with the language Congress used for 6(a). The plain language of 6(a) causes it to operate [w]ithout regard to . .. the other subsections of this section. 29 U.S.C. 655(a). Further, although OSHA's authority to promulgate standards under 6(a) expired in 1973, there is no statutory provision causing standards adopted under 6(a) themselves to expire at any time. 6 Rather, a 6(a) start-up standard continues in effect until it is modified or revoked by a new rulemaking initiated under 6(b). 7 See AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 968-69 (referring to the possibility of updating a 6(a) standard, the court pointed out that the statute provides two mechanisms to revise existing standards, i.e., a 6(b) proceeding or, in the case of a need for an emergency temporary standard, a 6(c) proceeding). Because the statute treats 6(a) standards and 6(b) standards as having equal force of law once they are promulgated, the fact that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy originated under 6(a) rather than under 6(b) does not affect our analysis of whether OSHA was bound to reconsider it here. 26 The Industry also implies that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy has outlived its validity under 6(a) because it no longer represents a national consensus standard. This argument is without merit because the Industry has proffered no evidence that the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy no longer represents the national consensus standard. To the contrary, the most recent national consensus standard, ANSI Standard Z88.2-1992, 4.2, retains the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy. 8 Thus, theIndustry has failed to demonstrate that OSHA's decision to limit the instant rulemaking to issues relating to the manner and conditions of respirator use was unreasonable. 27 For the foregoing reasons, we reject the Industry's challenge to the retention of the Hierarchy-of-Controls Policy. 28