Opinion ID: 2801766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Victim’s Statements to EMT

Text: [¶27] Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(4), hearsay statements are admissible if they are “made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably 15 pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”6 For statements to be “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment,” reasonableness in the mind of the doctor or medical personnel, not the declarant, is required. Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 803.4 at 479 (6th ed. 2007). It may be necessary for medical personnel to ask a victim about the source of the victim’s injuries when the victim is “interested in accurately relating . . . symptoms and the cause for them in order to receive the appropriate treatment.” State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 26, 837 A.2d 101 (holding that a murder victim’s prior statement to a nurse practitioner regarding her relationship with the defendant was admissible as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment). “[T]he fact that an examination proves helpful to a party’s case does not detract from its medical nature.” Ames v. Ames, 2003 ME 60, ¶ 16, 822 A.2d 1201. Accordingly, the victim’s statement to the EMT that “she was grabbed in the head and was slammed into the floor multiple times” was admissible, as it related directly to the “cause or external source” of her head injury in a manner “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” M.R. Evid. 803(4). 6 The restyled Maine Rules of Evidence now in effect split the medical diagnosis or treatment exception into two factors. See M.R. Evid. 803(4)(A)-(B) (restyled Rules); Introductory Advisory Committee Note to the restyled Maine Rules of Evidence (stating that the restyled Rules are not intended to change the meaning of the superseded rules). 16 [¶28] Kimball argues that the victim’s statement to the EMT is testimonial because it was made after the police had secured the victim’s residence and subsequent to police questioning. That argument appears to confuse excited utterance issues with issues pertaining to statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made to medical personnel that fit within the hearsay exception need not be made while an emergency is ongoing. Such statements are, by their definition, not made “for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” to be used at a later trial, but rather must be for the immediate purposes of—and reasonably pertinent to—diagnosis or treatment. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; see M.R. Evid. 803(4).7 [¶29] Although ensuring reliability of evidence is no longer the sole inquiry in Confrontation Clause analysis, see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-68, statements admitted pursuant to Rule 803(4) bear unique indicia of reliability that help such evidence to meet this “ultimate goal” of the right of confrontation, see id. at 62; 7 Although the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the potential for overlap between the hearsay exception for medical treatment and diagnosis, M.R. Evid. 803(4), and the Confrontation Clause, it has noted that medical reports created for treatment purposes “would not be testimonial” under its holding in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312 n.2 (2009) (holding that affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis were testimonial in nature). Several other states have recently declined to extend the confrontation right to exclude such testimony. See, e.g., State v. Muttart, 875 N.E.2d 944, 957 (Ohio 2007) (“Statements made to medical personnel for purposes of diagnosis or treatment . . . are not even remotely related to the evils that the Confrontation Clause was designed to avoid.”); State v. Miller, 264 P.3d 461, 488 (Kan. 2011) (stating that “inquiries made for the sole purpose of medical treatment, or even for a dual purpose that includes treatment, may produce nontestimonial statements, depending on other circumstances”); State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 303-04 (Tenn. 2008). 17 Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 26, 837 A.2d 101 (“The rationale behind [Rule 803(4)] is the patient’s strong motivation to be truthful.”). [¶30] Additionally, based on the specific facts of this case, there is no indication that the EMT was interrogating the victim for the purpose of gathering evidence. Although the EMT was employed by the local fire department, he assisted the victim in his capacity as an EMT paramedic. The objective scope of his questioning was for diagnosis and treatment of the victim’s untreated injuries. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. On the briefs: Darrick X. Banda, Esq., Law Offices of Ronald W. Bourget, Augusta, for appellant Richard J. Kimball Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Tyler LeClair, Stud. Atty., Kennebec County District Attorney’s Office, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine At oral argument: Darrick X. Banda, Esq., for appellant Richard J. Kimball Tyler LeClair, Stud. Atty., for appellee State of Maine Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CR-2013-1061 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY