Opinion ID: 6928544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Distinctiveness of Marks

Text: The scope of judicial protection against infringement depends upon the mark’s distinctiveness. Certain marks are deemed inherently distinctive, and afforded the greatest protection, because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2757, 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992). Fanciful, arbitrary and suggestive marks are considered “inherently distinctive.” Id. A fanciful mark is a coined word or phrase, such as Kodak, invented solely to function as a trademark. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F.Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y.1989). An arbitrary mark consists of common words arranged in an arbitrary way that is non-descriptive of any quality of the goods or services. See Stork Restaurant Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 365 (9th Cir.1948) (“[The Stork Club] is in no way descriptive of the appellant’s night club, for in its primary significance it would denote a club for storks.”). A suggestive mark, such as 360° for sneakers, requires imagination to make a connection between the mark and an attribute of the product. Rodeo Collection Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir.1987); Tanel Corp. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 774 F.Supp. 49, 51 (D.Mass.1990). In contrast to fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks, a descriptive mark is not inherently distinctive. Two Pesos, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2757. When used to describe a product, a descriptive mark does not inherently identify a particular source, and therefore cannot be protected. Id. It may nevertheless be entitled to protection if it has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning. Id. A mark acquires secondary meaning if customers associate the mark with a particular source. See Rodeo Collection, 812 F.2d at 1218. Steak & Brew, for example, is descriptive of a restaurant’s fare, but was held to have acquired secondary meaning, and is therefore entitled to trademark protection, because customers associate the mark with a particular restaurant chain. Longchamps, Inc. v. Eig, 315 F.Supp. 456, 458 (S.D.N.Y.1970). The generic name of a product—what it is—can never serve as a trademark. Surgicenters of America, Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir.1979). “A mark answers the buyer’s questions ‘Who are you? Where do you come from?’ ‘Who vouches for you?’ But the name of a product answers the question What are you?’ ” 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 12.01 (3d ed. 1992).