Opinion ID: 703230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Based on McKinney's Conduct

Text: 9 Although McKinney's rape and sexual assault of Brock is sufficient to establish a claim of sexual discrimination, that conduct also constitutes more than sexual discrimination. In Arnold v. United States, 816 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.1987), and Otto v. Heckler, 781 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.) amended by 802 F.2d 337 (9th Cir.1986), we held that Title VII is not the exclusive remedy for federal employees who suffer highly personal wrongs, such as defamation, harassing phone calls, and physical abuse. See Arnold, 816 F.2d at 1311 (Remedy for unconstitutional actions other than employment discrimination, even if arising from the same core of facts, is not barred by Title VII.); Otto, 781 F.2d at 756-57 ([H]ighly personal violation[s] beyond the meaning of 'discrimination' [are] separately actionable.) (quoting Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F.Supp. 891, 895 (D.D.C.1982)). 10 Just as every murder is also a battery, every rape committed in the employment setting is also discrimination based on the employee's sex. In both instances, however, the ability to characterize the ultimate harm suffered as including a lesser offense (i.e., battery or discrimination) does not change the nature or extent of the ultimate harm. When the harms suffered involve something more than discrimination, the victim can bring a separate claim. Otto, 781 F.2d at 756-57. 11 The Government concedes that if Brock sought state tort remedies against McKinney individually, Title VII would not bar those claims. The Government contends, however, that Brock's case is distinguishable from Otto and Arnold because she is suing for negligent supervision under the FTCA, and because she is not suing McKinney directly. Therefore, the Government concludes, Title VII bars her claim. 12 The court was persuaded by this argument and rested its judgment on its inability to distinguish between a sexual harassment claim asserted directly against the United States under Title VII and negligence claims against the United States under the FTCA[.] In reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that an individual defendant should not escape personal liability for damages cased by his infliction of 'highly personal' harm, beyond discrimination (i.e. assault, battery ...). However, by concluding that Title VII bars Brock's FTCA claim, the court disregarded the distinction it had just drawn and erroneously redefined the underlying wrongs suffered by Brock as simply discrimination. For example, it concluded that [t]he factual predicate for [Brock's FTCA] claim is the sexual harassment which formed the basis for her pre-complaint EEOC proceedings under Title VII. The court further noted that Brock's FTCA claim and her Title VII claim sought redress for the same harm as a Title VII action--sexual discrimination in the form of sexual harassment. McKinney's attacks on Brock cannot simultaneously extend beyond discrimination for the purposes of a suit against McKinney individually, and reduce to simple sexual discrimination for the purposes her suit against the Government under the FTCA. 13 Rape can be a form of sexual discrimination, but we cannot say to its victims that it is nothing more. This fact does not change when the defendant of the suit is the Government instead of the individual rapist. If the type of harm is highly personal, then under Otto and Arnold Title VII is not the victim's exclusive remedy, see Arnold, 816 F.2d at 1311; Otto, 781 F.2d at 756-57, regardless of the identity of the defendant. 14 Since our holding is based on the highly personal nature of the harms inflicted on Brock by McKinney, the Government's reliance on Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.1982), is misplaced. In Nolan, the alleged wrongdoing was wholly eclipsed by Title VII. Allegations of discriminatory failure to promote, retaliation for discrimination complaint, and constructive discharge do not state more than an employment discrimination claim and are therefore not separately actionable. Id. at 814-15. Accordingly, we hold that, because the conduct alleged in Brock's complaint is highly personal violation beyond the meaning of discrimination, the complaint states a claim that is separately actionable under the FTCA. See Arnold, 816 F.2d at 1311; Otto, 781 F.2d at 756-57. 15 Any contrary result would contravene the basic purposes of Title VII. For example, under a contrary rule, a federal employee whose claim involved an assault that was not precipitated because of her gender--and therefore was not also sexual discrimination--would be able to sue under the FTCA. Meanwhile, a federal employee who was assaulted because of her gender would not be able to bring suit under the FTCA because that employee's assault would also be sexual discrimination, and thus precluded by Title VII. As a result, for cases in which the United States negligently supervised, it could escape liability for damages if the misconduct at issue was both assaultive and discriminatory, but not if it was solely assaultive. This result would turn Title VII on its head. 2