Opinion ID: 2114836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether District Court's Award Can Vary from the Hourly Rate Specified in the Contract

Text: The Iowa Code specifies that the amount of compensation to be paid a contract attorney shall be determined in accordance with the contract. Iowa Code § 815.10(3). [1] Winjum's contract to provide indigent defense contained the following provision: The Contractor will be paid on an hourly basis pursuant to the schedule attached hereto, which schedule is incorporated herein by this reference, for reasonably necessary services performed under this Contract. Any fee guidelines that have been o[r] may be promulgated by the Iowa Supreme Court shall be complied with by the Contractor and the Contractor's fee claim shall not exceed the maximum fee allowed by such guidelines unless the Contractor shall have filed a timely application with the Court to exceed the said fee guidelines. A file-marked copy of the Application to Exceed and the Court Order allowing same must be attached to the contract fee claim when submitted for payment. (Emphasis added.) Winjum's contract specifically incorporates by reference the fee guidelines we have issued for the compensation of court-appointed counsel. See 1985 Iowa Sup.Ct. Supervisory Order, In re Costs of Court-Appointed Counsel [hereinafter Supervisory Order]. Our guidelines are read in tandem with the statutory provisions that address the compensation of court-appointed counsel. See Halverson, 532 N.W.2d at 797. The guidelines address two distinct aspects of attorney compensationthe hourly rate and the maximum amount established for particular categories of cases. [2] With respect to the latter, the guidelines set out certain amounts which cannot be exceeded without prior approval of the court. Supervisory Order at ¶ 4(b); Postma v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 439 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Iowa 1989). The State Public Defender contends a contract attorney's hourly rate is fixed by the contract and only the maximum amount established for a particular category of cases may be varied by the court. It is the cardinal principle of contract construction that the parties' intent controls, and except in cases of ambiguity that intent is determined by what the contract itself says. Iowa Fuel & Minerals, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 471 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 1991). When a contract is not ambiguous, it will be enforced as written. Id. at 862-863. Winjum's contract expressly incorporated this court's guidelines for court-appointed attorney's fees. Accordingly, it is appropriate to consider both the material provisions of the contract as well as those parts incorporated by reference. See Porter v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 217 N.W.2d 221, 228 (Iowa 1974). Paragraph 4(b) of our guidelines specify that an attorney must obtain advance district court approval for anticipated compensation in excess of the amounts established for particular categories of cases. For example, an attorney must seek court approval to exceed the $2500 cap established for class A felonies. However, nothing in the guidelines indicates court approval can be obtained for a variance in the hourly rate to be paid. When read in conjunction with this court's fee guidelines, the plain and unambiguous meaning of the contract requires a district court to apply the hourly rate imposed by the contract. The district court did not have the authority to approve a higher rate. The writ is sustained, and this case is remanded for the entry of a fee award consistent with this opinion. WRIT SUSTAINED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.