Opinion ID: 1186189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey[55] and Progeny

Text: ¶ 29 Until 1989, when it decided Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, [56] the United States Supreme Court resisted attempts to undermine Roe. [57] Relying on its previous holdings that neither the states nor the federal government was required to expend public funds for nontherapeutic abortions, the Webster Court reasoned that a state could prohibit the use of public hospitals for nontherapeutic abortions as well. [58] The Court also upheld a statute requiring a doctor who believes a woman to be twenty or more weeks pregnant to conduct a battery of tests to determine viability. ¶ 30 In 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided Casey and, while receding from Roe, refused to overrule it. [59] Although leaving a great deal of uncertainty, Casey made clear: (1) a state may ban nontherapeutic abortions after the fetus becomes viable, [60] (2) the fact that a regulation increases the cost or decreases the availability of an abortion is insufficient to invalidate the regulation, [61] (3) a state may not impose a regulation that has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus, [62] (4) a state may enact necessary regulations to protect the health of a pregnant woman so long as the regulations do not impose an undue burden on the right to have an abortion, [63] and (5) regulations not reasonably related to the goal of protecting the health of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus unduly burden the woman's right to abortions. [64] ¶ 31 Applying these principles to the statutes at issue and overruling previous holdings including parts of Akron, the Casey Court upheld a requirement that 24 hours before an abortion, a doctor was to inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and childbirth, and the `probable gestational age of the unborn child,' make available printed materials, and obtain the woman's written consent. [65] The Court struck down a spousal notification requirement citing statistics on spousal abuse and finding that the requirement was likely to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortions. [66] In contrast, the Court found that parental consent provisions were constitutional provided there were adequate judicial by-pass procedures. [67] It also upheld recording-keeping and reporting requirements. [68] ¶ 32 A review of the Casey opinion shows that legal findings regarding the constitutionality of the statutes at issue were based on the record before the Court and on the evidence of the effect of the statutes on a woman's right to seek an abortion. [69] Upholding a provision requiring the physician provide certain information to the pregnant woman, the Court relied on the fact that there [was] no evidence on [the] record that requiring a doctor to give the information . . . would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion. [70] Then in upholding a 24-hour waiting period, the Court noted that even though the statute had the effect of increasing the cost and risk of delay of abortions, the district court did not find this negative effect amounted to substantial obstacles. Likewise, the Court based its decision that the spousal notification requirement was unconstitutional on extensive evidence of spousal abuse and the abuse's effect on a woman's right to seek an abortion. [71] Thus, the opinion made clear the decision was based on the record before it. [72] ¶ 33 Since the 1992 decision in Casey, the United States Supreme Court has upheld a statute requiring either that a minor's parent be notified or a court finding that notification is not in the minor's best interest before an abortion can be performed. [73] Even before Casey, the Court held that a state may fund childbirth without funding abortion, [74] and, after Casey, upheld an Arkansas statute prohibiting the expenditure of public funds except to preserve the life of the pregnant woman. [75] ¶ 34 In 1997, the United States Supreme Court decided Mazurek v. Armstrong. [76] In Mazurek, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement of a statute requiring abortions to be performed by physicians only. In denying a preliminary injunction, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the claim. The Court found the plaintiffs had failed to make a clear showing that the statute had an unlawful purpose and noted that there was insufficient evidence that it caused an undue burden on the right to abortion. [77] The teaching of Mazurek is that a state has wide latitude in regulating abortion so long as the regulation's purpose is not to prevent abortions and the regulation does not present a substantial obstacle in obtaining an abortion.