Opinion ID: 2391925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Banther's Statements Properly Admitted

Text: Banther filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all his statements made to the Delaware State Police and Maryland State Police. Banther gave tape recorded statements to the police on February 25, 1997, February 26, 1997, March 5, 1997, two statements on March 6, 1997, March 13, 1997, March 14, 1997, July 30, 1997 and a videotaped statement at the homicide scene on July 30, 1997. In addition, on March 12, 1997, Banther took the police to the body of Dennis Ravers which was buried in a shallow grave in North Carolina. On that day, Banther gave an oral, unsolicited statement to Timothy Thayer of the North Carolina Bureau of Investigation. Banther told Thayer that he and Schmitz had met Ravers in Harrington, Delaware and that when an argument ensued, Schmitz hit Ravers in the head with an axe. The Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing on Banther's pretrial evidence suppression motion. Over the course of six days, Delaware State Police Detectives John Evans and Gary Cicchini, several Maryland State Police officers, and Banther testified. Banther argued that his statements should be suppressed because they were the product of illegal seizures of his person and his vehicle; he had not been promptly presented to a magistrate; the statements were taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona; [36] and the statements were involuntary. On appeal, Banther argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion in not suppressing all of his statements. Specifically, he now argues that his numerous statements were made after the police failed to honor his repeated clear, unambiguous and unequivocal attempts to invoke his right to remain silent and right to counsel, promised Banther that they would recover for him the property that had been stolen from him by Ravers and that he would receive favorable treatment in terms of a `deal,' threatened him with the imposition of the death penalty and ultimately, physically assaulted Banther in a persistent and unrelenting effort to induce Banther to provide them with statements regarding the death of Dennis Ravers. The Superior Court suppressed the first statement made by Banther on February 25, 1997, but denied Banther's motion as to all of the remaining statements. [37] The Superior Court ruled that although the February 25, 1997 statement by Banther was voluntary, it was taken after Banther had invoked his right to silence and must be suppressed during the State's case-in-chief. Banther continues to challenge the trial judge's determination that his February 25 was voluntary and the product of Banther's free will. Since Banther elected not to testify at trial or to present any defense witnesses, however, the State made no attempt to introduce the February 25 statement for purposes of impeachment at trial. [38] Thus, that statement is not an issue on appeal. Banther also argues that his attempts to contact an attorney should have been redacted from the statements that were admitted into evidence, as well as his numerous attempts to exercise his right to cut off questioning until a deal had been formalized. The trial court ordered redaction of Banther's February 26 statement regarding advice he had received from an attorney. As to the remainder of the redaction requests the trial judge ruled that there is no unequivocal invocation of rights in this statement. The trial judge found that Banther's references to an attorney were in the context of allegedly attempting to recover his property from Ravers. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that seeing a lawyer about a civil matter is not prejudicial. After considering the suppression hearing testimony of the Delaware and Maryland police officers and listening to all of the recorded and unrecorded statements, the trial judge found that Banther made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights each time he spoke to the police after February 25, 1997. The trial judge ruled as follows: After the initial questioning ceased, Banther initiated the subsequent interviews with Sergeant Boardman and the Delaware detectives. Banther was given Miranda warnings before each new interview. After each set of warnings, it is clear that Banther understood his rights and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived them. A trial judge's suppression ruling is reviewed de novo on appeal because it involves mixed questions of fact and law. The Superior Court's factual findings as to all of the claims asserted on appeal by Banther are supported by the testimony presented during the six days of the pretrial suppression hearing and the taped statements themselves. These factual findings are not clearly erroneous. [39] The trial judge also applied the proper legal analysis to these factual findings. Accordingly, all of the Superior Court's rulings on Banther's pre-trial Motion to Suppress Evidence are affirmed on the basis of the reasons set forth in its opinion. [40] On the fifth and sixth days of trial, Banther raised an objection under D.R.E. 410, on the basis that portions of his statements were inadmissible as part of plea negotiations to resolve the North Carolina charges and to avoid being charged with murder in Delaware. Banther's argument on appeal is that the trial judge erred, as a matter of law, in rejecting his D.R.E. 410 argument. According to Banther, he had an actual, subjective expectation to negotiate the disposition of potential criminal charges when he made his March 5 and 6, 1997 statements to Detectives Evans and Cicchini and Sergeant Boardman. In denying Banther's motion, the trial judge reasoned: In this case I find that no plea was offered nor was the defendant reasonably expecting to negotiate a plea with the police. Further, it was clear from the totality of the circumstances that the Delaware State Police did not make a deal or attempt to negotiate a plea agreement, nor was there improper overreaching by them. Rather, they made it clear to the defendant that they could not tell him what was going to happen to him. Rule 410 does not apply to the facts before the Court under this analysis. Even if it arguably did, the policies underlying the rule would not be furthered by protecting voluntary, deliberate and untruthful statements. The trial judge's decision rejecting Banther's D.R.E. 410 argument was legally correct.