Opinion ID: 1634436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Louisiana Court lack jurisdiction to render the default judgment against appellants, F.L. Cappaert and Wren C. Way?

Text: The first point of error concerns the jurisdictional aspect of the issue of whether or not the default judgment rendered in Louisiana against Cappaert and Way should be entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of this State. The United States Constitution requires the courts of this State to give full faith and credit to all final judgments of other states and federal courts unless: (1) The foreign judgment was obtained as a result of some false representation without which the judgment would not have been rendered, or (2) The rendering court did not have jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter. Davis v. Davis, 558 So.2d 814, 817 (Miss. 1990). Thus, if Cappaert and/or Way can show that the Louisiana court lacked jurisdiction over them, then the trial court would have been in error in granting full faith and credit to the Louisiana judgment against one or both of them. Effective September 1, 1987, the Louisiana legislature amended the Louisiana long arm statute to provide that: A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the Constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United States. La. R.S. 13:3201(B). In Superior Supply v. Associated Pipe and Supply, 515 So.2d 790, 792 (La. 1987), the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that this amendment was designed to ensure that the long arm jurisdiction of a Louisiana court extends to the limits allowed under considerations of constitutional due process as set forth by the United States Supreme Court. The standards for constitutional due process in the context of personal jurisdiction as set forth by the United States Supreme Court are familiar. A defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. A defendant's contacts with the forum state must be such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490. With regard to Cappaert, the due process requirements are clearly met, given that the record indicates that he held a mortgage interest on the realty and personalty of KNEK in Louisiana and provided Price with hundreds of thousands of dollars in funds to operate said radio station. Furthermore, Cappaert conceded on cross-examination that radio station KNEK was purchased pursuant to the joint venture agreement reached between the parties and that he furnished a great deal of funds for the operation of said radio station. It is unclear whether the agreement to undertake a joint venture entered into among the parties was sufficient to create a partnership among these men, and this issue would have presumably been the primary one at trial if Cappaert and Way had elected to defend against the suit on open account in Louisiana. It is clear, however, that Cappaert made deliberate, substantial, and sustained contacts with Louisiana in order to further his business interests there and that he was properly subjected to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana courts. Cappaert argues that, while he may have had minimum contacts with Louisiana, the dispute in the present case nevertheless did not arise out of these contacts and he should thus not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana courts in the present case. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984), the United States Supreme Court noted that: When a controversy is related to or arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum, the Court has said that a relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 [97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580, 53 L.Ed.2d 683] (1977). Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the state and the foreign corporation. Contrary to Cappaert's protestations, the suit in question did in fact arise out of his activities in Louisiana. The legal services performed by Walker, Bordelon involved, at least to a large degree, the operations of the radio station KNEK, which Cappaert financed and whose operations he closely monitored. As mentioned earlier, Walker, Bordelon prepared the legal documentation for the mortgage agreement by which Cappaert lent money to Price, and said work clearly related to the contacts which Cappaert had with Louisiana. Even assuming, arguendo, that the lawsuit in question did not arise out of Cappaert's activities in Louisiana, said activities were nevertheless sufficient to give rise to a finding that Cappaert had engaged in systematic and continuous activities in Louisiana which properly subjects him to the general jurisdiction of Louisiana courts under Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct. at 1872. Cappaert's business activities in Louisiana were not transitory, but rather took place over a period of years and constituted systematic and continuous contacts with Louisiana. The issue of whether Way had minimum contacts with Louisiana presents a much closer issue, but it appears that the circuit judge was nevertheless correct in ruling that Way did have such minimum contacts. The judge noted in his ruling that Way responded to Walker, Bordelon's demand letters to Cappaert and Way with a letter stating that the venture with Mr. Price includes only stations WOKL, KBRA, and KNEK. This letter contributed to the judge's conclusion that Way was engaged in a venture which included KNEK in Louisiana. The circuit judge stated in his ruling that the testimony at trial indicated that both Cappaert and Way disbursed funds and monitored the financial status of KNEK. Way denies that he did in fact monitor the financial status of KNEK, and his precise role in the joint venture is less than clear. Ashton Hardy noted in his testimony that Way had worked intensively with our firm, to prepare, to be sure that the documents (with regard to the Louisiana radio station) were all prepared and in order, and it thus appears that Way offered his legal expertise in assisting the joint venture. The review of jurisdictional matters by this Court is on a de novo basis, but the jurisdictional issues in the present case center largely around findings of fact on the part of the circuit judge with regard to the extent of Cappeart and Way's involvement in the joint venture. It is clear that the circuit judge who heard the testimony of Way was in a much better position than this Court to gain a feel for the extent to which Way actually did participate in the joint venture. Way testified extensively about the extent of his contacts with Louisiana and the circuit judge found said contacts to be sustained and deliberate. While Way's contacts with Louisiana were not as extensive as Cappaert's, the circuit judge found that his sustained involvement with KNEK over a period of years was sufficient to subject him to the jurisdiction of Louisiana courts. This Court cannot say that the judge was in error in so ruling. Accordingly, this point of error is overruled.