Opinion ID: 201039
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Executing the Arrest Warrant

Text: 20 Santoni also argues, however, that even if Desrosiers was authorized to swear out and receive the complaint, he had no authority to carry out the arrest of Santoni. Once an arrest warrant is issued, only an officer authorized by law may execute that warrant. Me. R.Crim. P. 4(c)(1). As noted, postal inspectors are not among those officers authorized under Maine law to execute arrest warrants. 25 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 1502-A. Santoni argues that Desrosiers also had no authority to execute the arrest in his capacity as a private citizen. Therefore, he claims that the district court's conclusion that Desrosiers was authorized as a private person to arrest Santoni was clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 21 Santoni is correct that Maine law does not authorize private citizens to make an arrest for a Class E crime not committed in their presence. See 17-A Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 16; cf. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d at 398 (postal inspector's arrest of individual for carrying a concealed weapon was valid under Nebraska law that authorized private citizens to make an arrest for a felony committed in their presence). However, the district court held that Santoni's arrest was lawful, not because Desrosiers had state law authority to execute the warrant, but because Deputy Sheriff Wing participated in the arrest. In light of Wing's knowing participation in the arrest, the court explained that it would be elevating form over substance to conclude that the validity of the arrest depended on which of the two men uttered the words `You are under arrest,' or placed the Plaintiff in handcuffs. 22 We agree with the district court's conclusion that Santoni's arrest was lawful because it was carried out under Wing's lawful authority. Under Maine law, an arrest warrant shall be executed by any officer authorized by law. Me. R.Crim. P. 4(c)(1). Deputy Sheriff Wing was clearly authorized — and indeed, required — by law to arrest Santoni under 15 Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 602, which provides that [i]t is the responsibility of all police and sheriff departments and their officers to use all reasonable efforts to execute the outstanding arrest warrants of which they are aware. See also Kane v. Anderson, 509 A.2d 656, 657 (Me.1986) (concluding that the execution of an arrest warrant is a ministerial rather than a discretionary function); Carroll v. City of Portland, 736 A.2d 279, 283 (Me.1999) ([A] ministerial act is mandatory and requires no personal judgment or choice.) (emphasis in original). It is undisputed that Wing accompanied Desrosiers at Desrosiers' request to Santoni's residence where Santoni was arrested and then transported by Wing and Desrosiers to the Somerset County Sheriff's Department. Based on these facts, the district court appropriately concluded that Wing was aware of the outstanding arrest warrant and had a legal duty to execute it. Desrosiers' presence at the arrest, for the purpose of assisting Wing in the execution of the warrant, did not render that arrest unlawful under state law or constitutionally infirm. Cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (holding that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant). 23 For the first time on appeal, Santoni argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because it is reasonable to infer that Wing was not aware of the warrant and therefore had no obligation to execute it. This argument relies on statements made by Wing in a deposition taken on January 31, 2003, five months after the entry of summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants. As Santoni acknowledges, however, this transcript was not available to the district court and therefore is not part of the record on appeal. Moreover, Santoni never argued below that Wing was unaware of the warrant. Indeed, his complaint suggested that Wing knowingly participated in the arrest, with a reference to the illegal arrest of Santoni by defendants  and the claim that Defendants DeLong and Wing did not have probable cause to arrest Santoni (emphasis added). Similarly, in his opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Santoni alleged that Desrosiers arrested plaintiff without authority to do so and that the other defendants knew it was unlawful but agreed to participate (emphasis added). Because Santoni failed to raise below his theory that Wing had no obligation to arrest Santoni because he did not know about the warrant, this argument is now procedurally defaulted. See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1992) (If any principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.). 24 In sum, Desrosiers had valid authority to swear out the criminal complaint and receive the complaint and warrant for Santoni's arrest, and Wing had valid authority to execute that warrant. Therefore, we agree with the district court that Santoni's arrest was lawful under Maine law and that it did not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.