Opinion ID: 1658346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: was it error to deny weeks a change of venue?

Text: Weeks filed a supplemental assignment of error alleging that he should have been granted a change of venue and relying upon our recent decisions in Fisher and Johnson, (cited hereafter) Weeks filed his motion on February 10, 1984. In Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195 (Miss. 1985), Johnson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Lauderdale County despite his request for change of venue. We restated the rule that the decision to grant a motion for change of venue rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge; however, it was pointed out that such discretion may be abused. We quoted from Eddins v. State, 110 Miss. 780, 783, 70 So. 898, 899 (1916), as follows: the person on trial for his life is but asking for his rights when he requests a change of venue. Johnson, 476 So.2d at 1210, (emphasis added). We further said:  Eddins would require a change based on the showing that the empaneling of an impartial jury is merely doubtful. Seals [208 Miss. 236, 44 So.2d 61 (1950)] indicates that such doubt is automatically implicit when public opinion is saturated with bias, hatred and prejudice against the defendant. We adopted the following rule: [T]he accused has a right to a change of venue when it is doubtful that an impartial jury can be obtained; upon proper application [motion supported by the affidavits of two witnesses with knowledge], there arises a presumption that such sentiment exists; and, the state then bears the burden of rebutting that presumption. Id. at 1210-1211. We further noted that normally such a presumption can be rebutted during voir dire. However, there may be some circumstances when the pretrial publicity is so damaging, the presumption so great, that no voir dire can rebut it. Id. [citing Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed. 663 (1963)]. In Johnson, fifteen witnesses were produced. They included representatives of the media who testified as to the extensive media coverage. Some testified that because of the media coverage, the extradition problems, the nature of the crime, and the character of the victims, that Johnson could not receive a fair trial. The prosecution's witnesses were hardly impressive and all were either related to, or knew, in some way the victim, or were involved in the investigation, or both. One of the state witnesses based his testimony on his belief that basically everybody in Lauderdale County was honest, and therefore he felt that Johnson could receive a fair trial. We held that Johnson had made a prima facie case of community prejudice and we further said that the presumption was then raised to an irrebuttable level, pursuant to Rideau, by the testimony of the fifteen defense witnesses who stated the specific reasons Johnson could not receive a fair trial. Id. at 1213. We then reviewed the question of what circumstances, when present, would indicate that a defendant has a right to a change of venue as a matter of law. From a review of prior cases the court noted certain elements: 1. The preponderance of the cases were capital cases; heightened standard of review is employed on appeal where the defendant's life is at stake. 2. Crowds threatening violence toward the accused. 3. Extensive media exposure. 4. Serious crimes against members of prominent, influential families; serious crimes such as mass or serial murders. 5. Crimes committed by a black upon a white victim. 6. Inexperienced defense counsel. When these circumstances, and similar ones, exist, particularly in combination, the Court said it is better to change venue. We quoted from Hill v. State, 72 Miss. 527, 534, 17 So. 375, 377 (1895), wherein it was said that in criminal prosecutions the fair way is the safe way, and the safe way is the best way. But the discretion rule in change of venue cases was left intact. In Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203 (Miss. 1985), we reiterated that the decision for change of venue is subject to the sound discretion of the trial court but we added that it was not to be made in his unfettered discretion. Id. at 215. In Winters v. State, 473 So.2d 452, 457 (Miss. 1985), we said In reviewing the assigned error that a trial judge has abused his discretion in denying a change of venue, we look to the completed trial, particularly including the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors, to determine whether the accused received a fair trial. We pointed out in Fisher that absent unusual circumstances the trial judge should rule on the motion at the conclusion of the venue hearing and in any event prior to summoning prospective jurors. We said in essence that the trial judge should not wait to see if voir dire cures doubts created at a venue hearing. It is not reversible error to do otherwise, however. Most recently, in Cabello v. State, 490 So.2d 852 (Miss. 1986), which was a capital case resulting in a life sentence, we said the following: Recent decisions of this Court have reminded the public that when it is doubtful that a fair and impartial jury can be obtained in the county where the homicide has been committed, an accused on trial for his life `is but asking for his rights when he requests a change of venue'. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 220 (Miss. 1985). Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195 (Miss. 1985). [A] motion for change of venue ordinarily should be granted where, under the totality of the circumstances it appears reasonably likely that, in the absence of such relief, the accused's right to a fair trial may be lost. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 220. This Court has often held that the decision regarding a change of venue in a criminal proceeding is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Winters v. State, 473 So.2d 452 (Miss. 1985); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332 (Miss. 1985). However, Fisher demonstrated that the venue question is in the sound discretion, not the unfettered discretion, of the trial judge. The question now to be answered is whether the trial judge abused his sound discretion in refusing to grant the defendant's change of venue motion. Id. at 854. In Cabello we held that there was no abuse of discretion. This decision was based on the voir dire where none of the prospective jurors indicated that they had formed an opinion as to the facts of the case, even though some admitted that they had heard about the case. The defendant there presented no evidence whatsoever to show that an impartial jury could not be found in Alcorn county. We have reviewed the newspaper articles and the video tapes of the newscasts introduced as evidence at the hearing in this case. The type of saturation media coverage which existed in Fisher does not exist here. With the exception of one article, the January 5, 1984, issue of the Enterprise-Tocsin the articles and newscasts were typical and objective media coverage. Most seemed favorable to Weeks' version of what happened. Nor do any of the other elements, where there is a right to a change of venue as a matter of law as set out in Johnson, exist. Furthermore, this record does not contain the voir dire of the prospective jurors. Therefore it must be assumed that the 12 jurors who were seated stated that they could give Weeks a fair trial. See Winters, 473 So.2d at 457; but see Fisher at 220. Applying the Eddins-Johnson/Fisher analysis, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in overruling the motion for change of venue and there is no merit to this assignment of error. We therefore find that the conviction of manslaughter and sentence of fifteen (15) years in the custody of the Department of Corrections with five (5) years suspended of Stanley Doyle Weeks should be and is affirmed. CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN (15) YEARS WITH FIVE (5) YEARS SUSPENDED AFFIRMED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.