Opinion ID: 1733341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Need for Greater Appellate Review of Sentences.

Text: In People v Burton, 396 Mich 238, 243; 240 NW2d 239 (1976), this Court stated: We appreciate that a strong case can be made for appellate review of sentencing. This Court is not, however, yet prepared to take that step. Since this Court is now taking a step toward that goal, it is incumbent upon us to examine the arguments both for and against expanding the current scope of appellate review of sentencing. Those in favor of a wider scope of appellate review of sentencing argue that the network of protections and safeguards attendant to the determination of a defendant's guilt should not vanish at the conclusion of the guilty plea or conviction. The amount of time in loss of liberty which a defendant faces is also of critical importance both to the defendant and the people of this state, yet, currently, sentencing is discretionary with the trial judge, checked only by the statutory boundaries set down by the Legislature. [22] A product of such unchecked discretion is alleged to be a denial of the defendant's procedural due process rights which include an appeal as a matter of right from the final judgment of the trial court. [23] Such an appeal was intended to include the right of appeal of sentences. This argument continues that to foreclose the traditional checks and balances on the trial court and to allow the exercise of the court's discretion on so fundamental an issue as sentencing to go unreviewed constitutes a fundamental unfairness and violates a defendant's rights to due process of law under the Michigan Constitution. As previously discussed, appellate review of a defendant's sentence, though limited, already exists in this state. Defendant's due process right to be sentenced to an ascertainable term of punishment within statutory limits which do not constitute cruel or unusual punishment has been carefully guarded by the appellate courts. In addition, this Court has protected a defendant's procedural due process right to be sentenced on the basis of legally valid considerations. We do not agree that the constitutionally guaranteed right of appeal mandates review of the trial court's exercise of discretion in sentencing in order to comport with due process of law. The expansion of the scope of appellate review of sentencing is a matter of public policy within this Court's power to adopt; it is not constitutionally required. Those who favor a broader appellate review of sentencing argue that another product of the unchecked discretion exercised by the trial courts is the imposition of an unjust sentence, which may be excessively severe, excessively lenient, or excessively disparate in relation to similarly situated defendants who have committed similar crimes. The result of such sentences is said to be a feeling of betrayal on the part of the defendant and the public, with confidence in the criminal justice system correspondingly diminished. [24] The excessively severe sentence is one which far exceeds what all reasonable persons would perceive to be an appropriate social response to the crime committed and the criminal who committed it. However, when such a sentence falls within the statutory maximum term, a defendant has rarely been able to obtain relief on the ground that the sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment. In contrast, the excessively lenient sentence is one which falls far short of what all reasonable persons would perceive to be an appropriate social response to the crime committed and the criminal who committed it. Despite the significant public outcry usually generated by such a sentence, relief has not been obtainable to vindicate the perceived wrong done to the public. Those who favor restricted sentence review argue that there are only a very small number of sentences imposed each year which, because of being too harsh or too lenient, shock the conscience of the community. Opening the appellate doors to review of all sentences will allegedly result in a great wave of burdensome appeals, creating additional great public expense. In addition, because of all the factors which contribute to a trial court's decision on sentencing, meaningful review of judicial discretion in this area will be extremely difficult. In order for an appellate court to review a sentence, it must have before it every factor which the trial court considered, a virtually impossible task. Thus, if sentence review is to be made available in every case, the burden upon the already overloaded appellate system will be enormous. We are not convinced that expanding the appellate scope of review to include a limited review of the trial court's exercise of discretion will result in a flood of appeals. Many defendants now appeal their convictions simply because of their dissatisfaction with the severity of their sentences, not because they want to contest the finding of guilt. Their appeals must presently be based upon the subterfuge of attacking their convictions rather than directly attacking what concerns them most, the appropriateness of their sentences. Moreover, such defendants sometimes win because the appellate judges agree that their sentences are inappropriate and strain the law to reach the desired relief. As noted by the American Bar Association, in the Introduction to ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences (2d ed), p 20.5: Overt appellate review [of sentences] serves to focus appeals on what is really at stake, to the benefit both of future sentences and of the doctrine of harmless error. It also avoids an unnecessary retrial where only the sentence is defective. We believe that a wider scope of sentence review will promote honesty and clarity in criminal appeals rather than unduly burden appellate courts with an increasing number of appeals. In addition, even if the number of sentences reviewed under a broader standard which would warrant relief are few, any injustice committed is still deserving of a remedy. Although it is argued that a defendant may request relief from the Governor from an excessively severe sentence, we believe that there should be some means by which the judiciary can correct an injustice inflicted by the improper actions of one of its officials. The continued life of the judicial process depends upon the maintenance of public confidence in the courts, and such confidence depends upon the perception that the courts will dispense justice. The excessively severe and the excessively lenient sentences are not the only ones which have been identified as being in need of appellate review. Another type of sentence alleged to constitute an injustice is the sentence which is significantly disproportionate to the sentences generally imposed upon similarly situated defendants who have committed similar crimes. For any one offense there is often a wide range of sentences available, and sentencing judges have demonstrated a significant variety of attitudes when it comes to deciding what constitutes an appropriate sentence. Thus, it is possible to find two defendants within the same prison system who have similar backgrounds, who were convicted of the same crime under similar facts and circumstances, and yet one is serving a disproportionately longer term of imprisonment. Such disparity in sentences, it is argued, does not merely result from permissible factors such as the culpability and background of the defendants; rather, it often arises from impermissible considerations such as the race of the defendant, his economic status, or the personal bias and attitude of the individual sentencing judge. Increased uniformity in sentencing similarly situated defendants is said to be in keeping with our constitutional concept of a unified judiciary in this state. [25] This argument is not without its vocal critics. The idea that sentences should be uniform throughout the state is argued to be inconsistent with the traditional views of the function of sentencing in the criminal process. The effect of a crime on the community in which it occurred and the deterrent effect of the resultant punishment on the persons who live and work in that community have always been considered relevant factors to be weighed by the trial judge. It is suggested that the interplay between society and crime varies greatly from community to community and that it is not reasonable to believe that every community in this state has, or should have, the same interest in preventing and punishing each type of crime. We are not prepared at present to decide whether disparity in sentencing may result from the different priorities of the community in which a defendant committed an offense. However, we do agree that disparity in sentences which results from considerations such as the race or economic status of a defendant or the personal bias and attitude of an individual sentencing judge is unjustified and impermissible. Unjustified disparities promote disrespect for the criminal justice system and resentment among prisoners, thus impairing their morale and motivation for rehabilitation. [26] We conclude that such sentences should be subject to appellate review and relief when warranted.