Opinion ID: 1161125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mistake of Fact Instructions

Text: The court refused to give requested instructions that directed the jury to acquit Franklin of the rape and kidnaping if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether Franklin reasonably and genuinely believed that Miss B. freely consented to her movement from the grocery store to his apartment and to sexual intercourse with him. Franklin contends that the court thereby erred. The Attorney General argues that the court properly refused to give the instructions because mistake of fact instruction[s] as to consent should be rejected as against the law and public policy. Penal Code section 207 provides, Every person who forcibly ... takes ... any person in this state, and carries him into ... another part of the same county, ... is guilty of kidnaping. Penal Code section 261 provides, Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, under either of the following circumstances: ...; 2. Where she resists, but her resistance is overcome by force or violence; 3. Where she is prevented from resisting by threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution.... There is, of course, no kidnaping `when one, ... with knowledge of what is taking place ..., voluntarily ... consents to accompany another ...' (see People v. Rhoden, 6 Cal.3d 519, 526 [99 Cal. Rptr. 751, 492 P.2d 1143]), and similarly there is no rape if a female of sufficient capacity consents to sexual intercourse (see People v. Nash, 261 Cal. App.2d 216, 223 [67 Cal. Rptr. 621]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes (1963) § 173, p. 165, § 288, pp. 265-267). (5) Penal Code section 26 recites, generally, that one is incapable of committing a crime who commits an act under a mistake of fact disproving any criminal intent. Penal Code section 20 provides, In every crime ... there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence. The word intent in section 20 means wrongful intent. (See People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d 798, 801, fn. 2 [299 P.2d 850].) So basic is this requirement [of a union of act and wrongful intent] that it is an invariable element of every crime unless excluded expressly or by necessary implication. ( Id., at p. 801.) In People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.2d 529 [39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673, 8 A.L.R.3d 1092], we considered the matter of intent within a context similar to that presented in the instant case. The defendant in Hernandez was convicted of statutory rape under former subdivision 1 of Penal Code section 261, which provided Rape is an act of sexual intercourse, accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator.... 1. Where the female is under the age of eighteen years. On appeal the defendant contended that the court erred in excluding evidence that he had in good faith a reasonable belief that the prosecutrix was 18 years or more in age, and in Hernandez we upheld the contention. Hernandez emphasized that we gave recognition to the legislative declarations in Penal Code sections 20 and 26 when we held in People v. Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798, that a [reasonable and] good faith belief that a former wife had obtained a divorce was a valid defense to a charge of bigamy arising out of a second marriage when the first marriage had not in fact been terminated. Hernandez quoted from Vogel, `Nor would it be reasonable to hold that a person is guilty of bigamy who remarries in good faith in reliance on a judgment of divorce... that is subsequently found not to be the judgment of a competent court.... Since it is often difficult for laymen to know when a judgment is not that of a competent court, we cannot reasonably expect them always to have such knowledge and make them criminals if their bona fide belief proves to be erroneous.' Hernandez then declared, Certainly it cannot be a greater wrong to entertain a bona fide but erroneous belief that a valid consent to an act of sexual intercourse has been obtained. Hernandez had theretofore noted that, although in one sense the lack of the female's consent is not an element of statutory rape, in a broader sense the lack of consent is deemed to remain an element but the law creates a conclusive presumption of the lack thereof. (61 Cal.2d at p. 535.) Hernandez further stated, Equally applicable to the instant case are the following remarks [in Vogel ]: `The severe penalty imposed for bigamy, the serious loss of reputation conviction entails, ... and the fact that it has been regarded for centuries as a crime involving moral turpitude, make it extremely unlikely that the Legislature meant to include the morally innocent to make sure the guilty did not escape.' [¶] We are persuaded that the reluctance to accord to a charge of statutory rape the defense of a lack of criminal intent has no greater justification than in the case of other statutory crimes, where the Legislature has made identical provision with respect to intent.... Hernandez also indicated that the defendant's belief must be, inter alia, reasonable in order to negate criminal intent. (61 Cal.2d at pp. 534-536.) (6) Although Hernandez dealt solely with statutory rape (former subd. 1, Pen. Code, § 261), its rationale applies equally to rape by means of force or threat (Pen. Code, § 261, subds. 2 & 3) and kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207). Those statutory provisions, like that involved in Hernandez, neither expressly nor by necessary implication negate the continuing requirement that there be a union of act and wrongful intent. The severe penalties imposed for those offenses (Pen. Code, § 207 [1 to 25 years in prison (see Pen. Code, § 208)]; Pen. Code, § 261, subds. 2 & 3 [3 years to life (Pen. Code, §§ 264, 671)]) and the serious loss of reputation following conviction make it extremely unlikely that the Legislature intended to exclude as to those offenses the element of wrongful intent. If a defendant entertains a reasonable and bona fide belief that a prosecutrix voluntarily consented to accompany him and to engage in sexual intercourse, it is apparent he does not possess the wrongful intent that is a prerequisite under Penal Code section 20 to a conviction of either kidnaping (§ 207) or rape by means of force or threat (§ 261, subds. 2 & 3). In reaching the foregoing conclusion, we reject several contrary arguments advanced by the People. The Attorney General relies on People v. Sheasbey, 82 Cal. App. 459 [255 P. 836], and People v. Trawick, 78 Cal. App.2d 604, 606 [178 P.2d 45], as establishing the general proposition that no state of mind or belief on the part of the defendant is part of the crime of kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207) or a defense thereto. However, it is clear from the statements in Sheasbey, when read in their entirety, and from the authority relied upon by Trawick that neither case indicates that a wrongful intent on the part of the defendant is not required for kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207). The Attorney General urges that the Legislature did not make the state of mind or belief on the part of the perpetrator of rape relevant as a defense to that crime except as to the circumstances set forth in subdivisions 4 and 5 of section 261. Those subdivisions do require specified mental states on the part of the accused. However, it is implicit in Hernandez that the absence of such a requirement in other subdivisions of section 261 does not warrant the conclusion that the Legislature intended the accused's state of mind to become irrelevant in prosecutions under the other subdivisions. The Attorney General further argues that a defense based on mistake of fact as to the prosecutrix' consent in prosecutions for kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207) or rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subds. 2 & 3) should not be permitted because it will promote greater resistance by the victim to assure there is no misunderstanding as to consent and that such resistance could result in harm to the victim. The Attorney General notes that utmost resistance by the female to establish lack of consent to intercourse is not required. (See, e.g., People v. Ogden, 41 Cal. App.2d 447, 453-455 [107 P.2d 50].) Such an argument, in our view, invokes a policy consideration for the Legislature  adoption of the argument would result in effective nullification of Penal Code sections 20 and 26 when applied to cases of kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207) and rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subds. 2 & 3). The Attorney General next argues that, even if instructions regarding mistake of fact as to consent are appropriate in some cases of kidnaping (Pen. Code, § 207) and rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subds. 2 & 3), here the court properly determined that the evidence did not warrant such instructions. However, Franklin's testimony summarized above could be viewed as indicating that he reasonably and in good faith believed that Miss B. consented to accompany him to the apartment and to the subsequent sexual intercourse. In addition, part of Miss B's testimony furnishes support for the requested instructions. It appears from her testimony that her behavior was equivocal. Although she did not want Franklin to think she was consenting, her act and admitted failure physically to resist him after the initial encounter or to attempt to escape or obtain help might have misled him as to whether she was consenting. We by no means intimate that such is the only reasonable interpretation of her conduct, but we do conclude that there was some evidence deserving of ... consideration which supported his contention that he acted under a mistake of fact as to her consent both to the movement and to intercourse. It follows, accordingly, that the requested instructions, if correctly worded, should have been given. (See People v. Carmen, supra, 36 Cal.2d 768, 773.) The People's final argument on the point is that the instructions are erroneous on the theory that the burden resting on the defendant to prove mistake of fact as to consent is not satisfied by merely raising a reasonable doubt as to that issue. The People err in this regard. In People v. Vogel, supra, 46 Cal.2d 798, 801-803, we concluded that the burden was on the defendant to prove as a defense to a bigamy charge that he had a bona fide and reasonable belief that facts existed which left him free to remarry. (7) Similarly here the burden was on Franklin to prove that he had a bona fide and reasonable belief that the prosecutrix consented to the movement and to sexual intercourse. As to that issue, he was only required to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether he had such a belief. (See People v. Hardy, 33 Cal.2d 52, 63-66 [198 P.2d 865]; People v. Thomas, 267 Cal. App.2d 698, 705-709 [73 Cal. Rptr. 590]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 212, subd. (2), p. 193; Law Revision Com. comments to Evid. Code, §§ 500 & 501; but see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) § 343, p. 335.) The requested instructions so providing are thus correct, and the court erred in refusing to give them. In People v. Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730, we held that [a] defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence. Regardless of how overwhelming the evidence of guilt may be, the denial of such a fundamental right cannot be cured by article VI, section 4 1/2 [now 13], of the California Constitution, for the denial of such a right itself is a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of that provision. In Modesto an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense of which the defendant could have been convicted was held to be a denial of that right. (In accord, People v. Hood, 1 Cal.3d 444, 450 [82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].) An erroneous failure to give other instructions has also been viewed as a denial of that right. (E.g., People v. Wilson, 66 Cal.2d 749, 764 [59 Cal. Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820] [instruction on unconsciousness]; cf. People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 584-585 [51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353] [giving of instruction that relieved the jury of the necessity of finding malice].) In People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 720, we expressly reaffirmed the above quoted holding of Modesto. (See also People v. Horn, 12 Cal.3d 290, 300-301 [115 Cal. Rptr. 516, 524 P.2d 1300].) Sedeno overruled a second facet of Modesto which had declared that the error in failing to instruct on a material issue cannot be cured by examining the verdict in the light of the instructions given and finding that the jury necessarily resolved, although in a different setting, the same factual question that would have been presented by the missing instruction. (10 Cal.3d at p. 721.) In the instant case, however, while the verdicts impliedly found that the victim did not consent to accompany Franklin to the apartment or to the subsequent intercourse, no claim is made, nor does it appear, that the jury by its verdicts in the light of the instructions given necessarily rejected the evidence supporting Franklin's assertion that he believed reasonably and in good faith that she had so consented. (8) We conclude, accordingly, that under the rule in Modesto, reaffirmed in Sedeno, the erroneous refusal to give the mistake of fact instructions was prejudicial. Insofar as People v. Bowens, 229 Cal. App.2d 590 [40 Cal. Rptr. 435] interpreted the Modesto rule as limited to manslaughter instructions in murder cases, it is inconsistent with cases such as People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 721-724, People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d 444, 450-451 and People v. Wilson, supra, 66 Cal.2d 749, 764. To that extent, People v. Bowens, supra , is hereby disapproved. Insofar as People v. Moseley, 240 Cal. App.2d 859, 862-863 [50 Cal. Rptr. 67] and People v. Thomas, supra, 267 Cal. App.2d 698, 708 state a different rule regarding reversible error for failing to instruct on mistake of fact than the rule stated herein, they are disapproved.