Opinion ID: 2408540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inadequacy of Motion Court's Initial Judgment Rejecting 29.15 Motion

Text: A more detailed discussion of the judge's actions in ruling on the 29.15 motion is helpful in understanding the basis of my disagreement with the majority. The 29.15 motion was filed following a second penalty phase trial at which the jury again recommended the death penalty and the judge again sentenced Kenley to death. At the 29.15 hearing, Kenley's counsel argued that his penalty phase counsel had been ineffective in failing to present additional evidence of his mental condition and diminished capacity which might have mitigated his punishment. Counsel presented three expert witnesses on these issues and further presented the testimony of Karen Kraft, who along with co-counsel had represented Kenley during his second penalty-phase trial. The only issue at the 29.15 hearing was whether penalty phase counsel was ineffective in failing to present this mitigating evidence and in committing other errors which might have affected the jury and judge's decisions to impose the death penalty. Following the 29.15 hearing, the State asked the motion court whether it could prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court informed both parties that it would prepare its own ruling and did not require proposed findings from either party. In accordance with this direction of the court, neither party initially prepared proposed findings. Six days after the conclusion of the 29.15 hearing, the court issued a four-page judgment. The vast majority of the judgment simply recited the allegations of error raised by Kenley and the standard which counsel must meet in a 29.15 proceeding to show entitlement to a new trial. The total of the court's analysis of the issue whether penalty phase counsel was ineffective and whether that ineffectiveness may have affected the decision to impose the death penalty was as follows: Clearly, counsel made certain choices at trial. Under the law of Strickland , this court is unable to find a constitutional inadequacy in Movant's defense at trial. Movant presented the testimony of two psychologists and a psychiatrist at this hearing. The thrust of their testimony was that Kenneth Kenley came from a dysfunctional family and had a difficult childhood. Such is hardly a defense to intentional murder. One of the two defense counsel testified. She obviously was very distressed that her client had received the death penalty. However, her testimony failed to show that there was inadequate performance of counsel. A brief mention of the facts of the offense indicated Mr. Kenley took a gun into a bar and killed a man who looked at him because he was afraid the man would be able to identify him. It is difficult to imagine a more cold blooded, needless act. The motion of the Movant and all parts thereof is denied. This ruling was clearly inadequate, and had it stood, it would have been reversed on appeal for this reason. It failed to deal with most of the issues raised by Kenley and gave those issues it did address such a broad-brush treatment that review of the ruling is rendered extremely difficult. Toney v. State, 730 S.W.2d 295 (Mo.App.1987) (judgment which denies post-conviction relief based on conclusory statements that movant is not entitled to relief without addressing all issues presented is inadequate and must be remanded). From the limited information which can be gleaned from the ruling, however, it appears that the judge did not adequately understand either the facts of the case or the relevant law. In regard to the facts, the judge stated that Kenley killed the victim because Kenley was afraid the victim would be able to identify him. To the contrary, and as the majority notes, the evidence showed that Kenley shot the victim to establish his control over the bar when he saw that the victim and others failed to immediately obey him. There was absolutely no evidence that a desire to avoid identification motivated the killing. Indeed, there was no evidence of previous acquaintance of Kenley and the victim, and there were dozens of other people in the bar with Kenley and the victim who could and did later identify Kenley. While, had the judge accurately determined Kenley's motive for the killing, he may still have ruled that it was difficult to imagine a more cold blooded and needless act, such a determination should, and must, be made on the actual facts, not on inaccurate ones. The court's analysis of the defendant's extensive expert testimony was equally inadequate. He summarized the thrust of that testimony as being that Kenneth Kenley came from a dysfunctional family and had a difficult childhood. Such is hardly a defense to intentional murder. Indeed, the court was right that a difficult childhood is not a defense to intentional murder. The issue the court was to address, however, was not whether Kenley had a defense to intentional murder but whether he received ineffective assistance in the penalty phase trial, a trial addressed not to Kenley's guilt or innocence but to whether he should receive the death penalty or life imprisonment. The fact that Kenley came from a dysfunctional family and had a difficult childhood is very relevant to whether he should receive the death penalty. In fact, it was in large part due to the very failure to present evidence addressed to these issues in the first trial that the Eighth Circuit ordered that the State either sentence Kenley to life imprisonment or hold a second penalty phase trial. Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298, 1308 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Delo v. Kenley, 502 U.S. 964, 112 S.Ct. 431, 116 L.Ed.2d 450 (1991). The focus of the evidence at Kenley's second penalty phase trial was purposely addressed to his dysfunctional family and difficult childhood. In the 29.15 hearing, the defendant's position was that this testimony would have been strengthened by further expert evidence as to his deficient psychological and allegedly brain-damaged state at the time of the crimes and as to his alcohol and drug abuse problem. If believed, then this is the very type of evidence which might, indeed, be a defense to imposing death as the penalty for Kenley's intentional murder of the victim. Yet, the trial court thought it was irrelevant since it was not a defense to Kenley's guilt of the murder itself.