Opinion ID: 852981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Changed Landscape of Blacklisting Law

Text: Had these events occurred two years later, our disposition would be quite simple. In 1993, Indiana's blacklisting statute read about the same as it had upon initial enactment in 1889, namely: A person who, after having discharged any employee from his service, prevents the discharged employee from obtaining employment with any other person commits a Class C infraction, and is liable in penal damages to the discharged employee, to be recovered by a civil action; but this section does not prohibit a person from informing, in writing, any other person to whom the discharged employee has applied for employment, a truthful statement of the reasons for discharge. If any railway company or any other company or partnership or corporation in this state shall authorize, allow or permit any of its or their agents to black-list any discharged employees, or attempt by words or writing, or any other means whatever, to prevent such discharged employee, or any employee who may have voluntarily left said company's service, from obtaining employment with any other person, or company, said company shall be liable to such employee in such sum as will fully compensate him, to which may be added exemplary damages. Ind.Code Ann. §§ 22-5-3-1, 2 (West 1991). In 1995, however, the General Assembly added an important exception: An employer that discloses information about a current or former employee is immune from civil liability for the disclosure and the consequences proximately caused by the disclosure, unless it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the information disclosed was known to be false at the time the disclosure was made. Ind.Code Ann. § 22-5-3-1(b) (West 2002). Brazauskas does not claim that any of the alleged disclosures that led to her denial of the PCL position were false. She would therefore have no claim for blacklisting under the revised statute. She would likewise not have a claim for tortious interference, because in Indiana this tort requires some independent illegal action. See, e.g., Watson Rural Water Co., Inc. v. Ind. Cities Water Corp., 540 N.E.2d 131 (Ind.Ct.App.1989). Brazauskas' only other allegation of illegal conduct is the blacklisting claim (Appellant's Br. at 18) so both would fail with no need to reach the Diocese defendants' constitutional argument.