Opinion ID: 4458453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guardianship Proceeding

Text: On September 14, 2015, Respondent filed a Motion for Emergency Order of Guardianship in the family court.5 In her motion, Respondent noted that Petitioner and F.A. were both incarcerated and that Petitioner’s half-sister, K.E, and K.E.’s parents, were caring for B.A. Respondent alleged that she was the paternal grandmother of B.A., that K.E.’s family had no blood relation to the child, and that Petitioner had only known K.E. for a short period of time, although they were half siblings. She contended that B.A. had no prior contact with K.E. and her parents prior to his placement with them, and that K.E.’s family had an inability to focus on B.A.’s needs because of the number of other children in their home. In that same petition, Respondent alleged that she had had substantial contact with B.A., and had also provided babysitting services for him since his birth. She further asserted that neither of the biological parents has maintained any employment, with the paternal grandmother, paternal grandfather, and paternal step-grandmother “providing 5 On this same day, Respondent also filed a Petition for Appointment of Guardian and/or to Establish Grandparent’s Visitation which was identical to the Emergency Motion for Guardianship, but added an extra sentence that contended that visitation between B.A. and the Petitioner should have no effect on the child’s relationship with Petitioner and F.A. 5 all of the care, nurturing, financial support and emotional support required and needed by the infant child.”6 Respondent’s motion cited Syllabus Point 1 of Whiteman v. Robinson,7 which states: while the Court has continually recognized the right of a parent to the custody of their children, the Court has also recognized and considered parents to be unfit, thereby losing their right to custody, because of misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment or other dereliction of duty or otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody. Relying on David M. v. Margaret M.,8 a divorce case, Respondent also asserted that to be considered fit, the primary caretaker parent must: (1) feed and clothe the child appropriately; (2) adequately supervise the child and protect him or her from harm; (3) provide habitable housing; (4) avoid extreme discipline, child abuse, and other similar vices; and (5) refrain from immoral behavior under circumstances that would affect the child.[9] Respondent argued that it was in the best interests of the child for her to be appointed guardian. On September 17, 2015, the criminal complaint against Petitioner was dismissed without prejudice when the complaining officer failed to appear at the preliminary hearing. 6 Emphasis added. 7 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960). 8 182 W. Va. 57, 385 S.E.2d 912 (1989). 9 Syl. Pt. 5, in part, Id. 6 So, Petitioner was released from jail, after she had been incarcerated for approximately thirty days. In her response filed after her release, Petitioner stated that it would be inappropriate to appoint a guardian for her child over her objection since she had not abused or abandoned her child or been “proven to be in any way unfit,” and B.A. had been returned to her care. Petitioner did not object to some “temporary visitation for [Respondent] pending [F.A.’s] release from incarceration,” noting that she would “like to control the schedule of the visitation.” Following a hearing on October 8, 2015,10 the family court ordered that Petitioner would have primary custodial responsibility for B.A. on a temporary basis, with Respondent having grandparent visitation from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Monday at 10:00 a.m., unless the parties were able to agree on other days of the week of equal time. F.A. was not permitted contact with the child without the supervision of Respondent. The record suggests that later, the guardian ad litem filed a motion for reconsideration and for an emergency hearing to “make sure mom was seeing the child.”11 10 The transcript for the October 8, 2015 hearing referenced in parties’ briefs was not submitted as part of the appendix on appeal. 11 At some point, Della Cline-Gentile was appointed as guardian ad litem by the family court. That order was not submitted as part of the appendix on appeal. While the guardian ad litem’s motion for reconsideration was also not submitted as part of the appendix on appeal, the hearing transcript concerning this motion is contained in the record. 7 Despite Petitioner maintaining legal custody of B.A. under the family court’s prior order, the transcript of a hearing on November 12, 2015 reflects that the circumstances had, at some point, changed, as Respondent alleged during the hearing that Petitioner didn’t have a home and she “ended up keeping the child all the time because they couldn’t locate her.”12 Petitioner’s counsel stated at this hearing that Petitioner “ha[d] not had much contact for the past week or so,” but did “get a visit” the day prior to the hearing. At the November hearing, temporary physical custody was granted to Respondent, giving Petitioner an opportunity to get “back on her feet” and find an apartment, get moved in, and get a job. At the hearing, the family court told Petitioner: This doesn’t take any rights whatsoever you have of that baby, ok? Just for right now, he’s just going to live with Grandma until – because we want you to have him, you know, you’re his Mom. You’re always going to be his mom and we want you to be the one taking care of him. But this is just going to help you get on your feet. 12 (Emphasis added). West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 (Repl. Vol. 2015) provides, in pertinent part, that a “neglected child” means a child: (A) Whose physical or mental health is harmed or threatened by a present refusal, failure or inability of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care, or education, when that refusal, failure, or inability is not due primarily to a lack of financial means on the part of the parent, guardian, or custodian; (B) Who is presently without necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision because of the disappearance or absence of the child’s parent or custodian[.] (Emphasis added). 8 The court ordered that Petitioner “shall have as much visitation as possible, at least two times per week, with the infant child,” and set the next hearing date for January 7, 2016. Prior to the January 7, 2016 hearing, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to the charges of identity theft that had previously been dropped but were later re-filed, and a sentencing order was entered on December 15, 2015.13 Petitioner was incarcerated until April 2016. After the January 7, 2016 hearing, the family court entered a temporary order that did not restrict Petitioner’s visitation with B.A. Petitioner’s husband, F.A., who had been released from jail, appeared at the hearing and consented to Respondent having temporary guardianship. A Final Order of Appointment of Guardian was entered by the family court on March 18, 2016, while Petitioner was still incarcerated. In this brief order, the family court concluded that it was in the best interest of the child that Respondent serve as guardian. The order noted that “the guardianship appointment made herein shall remain in effect until such time that the appropriate conditions, as applicable are reached and satisfied pursuant to West Virginia Code § 44-10-3(c) and (d), and any other pertinent provisions 13 Petitioner represents that she was sentenced to one year, given credit for 40 days served, and committed immediately to the Regional Jail. She remained incarcerated for approximately four months, until April 2016. 9 arising under state law.”14 The order gave F.A. supervised visitation, but was silent as to Petitioner’s visitation rights. 14 West Virginia Code § 44-10-3 (Repl. Vol. 2019) provides, in pertinent part: (c) All proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Minor Guardianship Proceedings. (d) Any responsible person with knowledge of the facts regarding the welfare and best interests of a minor may petition for an appointment of a guardian except a parent or other person whose rights to the minor have been terminated. No guardianship petition may be considered if the child who is the subject of the petition is involved in another court proceeding relating to custody or guardianship or if the petitioner is a parent seeking custodial rights adverse to the other parent. .... (f) The court may appoint a guardian for a minor if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the appointment is in the minor’s best interest and: (1) The parents consent; (2) The parents’ rights have been previously terminated; (3) The parents are unwilling or unable to exercise their parental rights; (4) The parents have abandoned their rights by a material failure to exercise them for a period of more than six months; or (5) There are extraordinary circumstances that would, in all reasonable likelihood, result in serious detriment to the child if the petition is denied. (g) Whether or not one or more of the conditions of subsection (f) have been established, the court may appoint a temporary guardian for a minor upon a showing that an 10 immediate need exists or that a period of transition into the custody of a parent is needed so long as the appointment is in the best interest of the minor. The temporary guardian has the authority of a guardian appointed pursuant to subsection (f) but the duration of the temporary guardianship may not exceed six months. A temporary guardianship may be extended beyond six months upon further order of the court finding continued need in the best interest of the minor. (h) Any suitable person may be appointed as the minor’s guardian. A parent shall receive priority subject only to the provisions of subsections (d) and (f) above. However, in every case the competency and fitness of the proposed guardian must be established and a determination made that the appointment is in the best interest of the child. (i) The court, the guardian or the minor may revoke or terminate the guardianship appointment when: (1) The minor reaches the age of eighteen and executes a release stating that the guardian’s estate was properly administered and that the minor has received the assets of the estate from the guardian; (2) The guardian or the minor dies; (3) The guardian petitions the court to resign and the court enters an order approving the resignation; or (4) A petition is filed by the guardian, the minor, a parent or an interested person or upon the motion of the court stating that the minor is no longer in need of the assistance or protection of a guardian due to changed circumstances and the termination of the guardianship would be in the minor’s best interest. (j) For a petition to revoke or terminate a guardianship filed by a parent, the burden of proof is on the moving party to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a material change of circumstances and that a revocation or termination is in the child’s best interest. 11 Petitioner was released from jail in April 2016. Within a month of her release, she attempted to make contact with Respondent by telephone and requested visitation with B.A. Respondent refused and told Petitioner she would have to go back to court prior to getting access to B.A. Respondent later testified that she was afraid she would lose custody of B.A. if she permitted the Petitioner to start visitation without a court order. B. Motion to Modify and/or Terminate Appointment of Guardian On June 30, 2017, fourteen months after her release from jail, Petitioner sought modification and/or termination of the guardianship order, arguing that she had a material change in circumstances because she had been released from jail. In response, Respondent asserted that she and her ex-husband, L.A. (B.A.’s paternal grandfather) and T.A., his wife, had provided the sole care for the infant since he was five months old and that the child knew only them as his parents. Respondent asserted that Petitioner made absolutely no effort to make contact with the child or support the child and did not remember his birthdays or other holidays. (k) A guardianship may not be terminated by the court if there are any assets in the estate due and payable to the minor. Another guardian may be appointed upon the resignation of a guardian whenever there are assets in the estate due and payable to the minor. 12 Respondent asserted that the child suffered and continued to suffer from severe and debilitating injuries sustained in the short time he was in the care of the Petitioner. Respondent alleged various injuries sustained by B.A. such as numerous cockroach bites, breathing problems, physical problems, dental problems, and vision problems as the result of Petitioner’s “neglect, abuse and maltreatment.”15 Respondent alleged that Petitioner had unsuitable housing and filthy, unfit living conditions. She also asserted that Petitioner had an older twelve-year-old son with whom she had no contact. Respondent alleged that Petitioner never paid child support for B.A. and never spent time helping him reach his milestones or nurturing him during that process. Respondent alleged that because the child was so young and did not know Petitioner, it would be psychologically and emotionally damaging for B.A. to be subjected to contact with Petitioner because he did not recognize or remember her. Alleging that she, her ex-husband, and his wife were the child’s psychological parents, Respondent asserted that Petitioner had effectively abandoned the child. Respondent relied again on the two cases cited in her initial motion for guardianship, Whiteman16 and David M. v. Margaret M.,17 regarding the parent’s duty of fitness. She 15 Emphasis added. 16 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691. 17 182 W. Va. 57, 385 S.E.2d 912. 13 also cited a provision contained in our adoption statute, West Virginia Code § 48-22-306 (Repl. Vol. 2015), “Conduct presumptively constituting abandonment,” which provides: (a) Abandonment of a child over the age of six months shall be presumed when the birth parent: (1) Fails to financially support the child within the means of the birth parent; and (2) Fails to visit or otherwise communicate with the child when he or she knows where the child resides, is physically and financially able to do so and is not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having the care or custody of the child: Provided, That such failure to act continues uninterrupted for a period of six months immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition. L.A. and T.A. also filed a motion to intervene following Respondent’s motion and asked that the Court place B.A. in their care, custody and control if Respondent was unable to care for him. During an extensive hearing held on September 12, 2017, the family court asked the parties whether there was ever a referral made to CPS and if any findings of abuse and neglect were made. Respondent stated that “No, there was nothing like that filed on it. I know, well, one of the troopers had went up to check at the apartments where she had him once before, and he said it was the most roach infested place he had ever been in.” Petitioner’s counsel indicated that her goal was simply to obtain visitation, and that she was not, at that stage, seeking a termination of guardianship. The family court noted the serious allegations of maltreatment by the Petitioner and stated, “that’s one of the reasons that you establish a visitation now, and when these allegations are proven, and we do have 14 serious allegations to deal with, then that kind of complicates the matter.” Petitioner’s counsel argued that no attempt to terminate the parental rights had been made, so there were due process issues at stake. The family court agreed and stated, [B]ut I have to agree, the Department would not have sought to terminate her rights because child’s with Grandma. Hey, the Department, I’m not knocking them, I’ve worked with them. I love them all, but a child (unintelligible) going down the road, I mean, that’s just how CPS is. The child could have been abused for years, but that child’s now with Grandma. She’s safe. The Department goes down the road. You know what I’m saying? So I would like to know what these allegations are and if she did abuse and neglect this child before I begin to view this. During the hearing, Respondent’s counsel discussed the various allegations of Petitioner’s neglect and unfitness with the family court. The court noted that it was very troubled by the fact that Petitioner had gone for over a year without making any sort of legal efforts to ensure visitation with her child once Respondent refused visitation. The Court appointed the current guardian ad litem at that hearing and set the matter for a final hearing to be had at a later date.18 The order appointing the guardian ad litem specifically stated: The Court FINDS a Guardian ad litem is necessary in that the allegations before the Court are as follows: 18 For reasons unclear from the record, the prior guardian ad litem, Della ClineGentile, was subsequently replaced with the current guardian ad litem, Marsha WebbRumora. 15 A. The Court has reasonable cause to suspect the parenting issues involve the child’s safety. B. That [S.H.] has made allegations of abuse & neglect against [A.A.].19 C. The parties disclosed that there was a CPS investigation at the time the Petition for Guardianship was filed. D. Further, the Court FINDS an additional investigation is warranted so that the infant child’s safety is protected. The report of the guardian ad litem filed on March 6, 2018 provided a history of the parties at the time of the Petitioner’s incarceration and detailed Respondent’s allegations of abuse and neglect. The report detailed the guardian ad litem’s interviews of various family members, including Petitioner, Respondent, L.A., and T.A., who provide care for B.A. while Respondent works, and Petitioner’s own parents. She also noted that Petitioner’s older son,20 who is not the subject of this appeal, was living with his biological father’s21 mother under a guardianship order and that Petitioner reported visiting with that child every couple of months. The guardian ad litem described her visit to Petitioner’s home, which had concrete floors and no heat other than a gas stove. Her interview of Petitioner’s own parents revealed allegations that Petitioner was asked to leave the homeless shelter where 19 (Emphasis added). 20 The name of Petitioner’s older son is identified inconsistently in the record as both C.L. and T.L. To prevent confusion, we will not reference the older child by initials in this Opinion. 21 F.A. is not the biological father of Petitioner’s older child. 16 she was staying with B.A. due to “association with known drug users.”22 She also reported that when the police went into Petitioner’s home before she went to jail, it was found to be infested with roaches. The guardian ad litem also referenced various medical records she had in her file, which were not provided in the record here, substantiating medical treatment that the child purportedly received as a result of the injuries he sustained while in the Petitioner’s care. The guardian ad litem’s report noted that Petitioner’s mother stated that she (Petitioner) should not have custody of him and she does not need to visit with him. She believed it “would be best if he did not know her.” The guardian ad litem’s report also discussed the emotional toll that Petitioner’s neglect allegedly had taken on her older 12-year-old son. She mentioned that he too was put into a guardianship because of filthy living conditions and neglect. She stated that Petitioner has visitation rights with the older child, but she fails to visit him. The guardian ad litem reported that the older child is therefore confused and asks why Petitioner doesn’t want to see him. Based on all of this, the guardian ad litem concluded that visitation was not appropriate for B.A.’s emotional well-being and recommended that Petitioner’s request be denied. 22 This assertion appears to be contradicted by a CPS report in the record stating that Petitioner was no trouble at the shelter and the workers would welcome her back after incarceration. 17 During a hearing on March 8, 2018, the family court heard extensive arguments from the parties. The family court noted: It doesn’t matter to me that she, she doesn’t have to be charged with a domestic charge. She doesn’t have to be charged with abuse from, of, of those children. She doesn’t have to be charged with someone from CPS of all three of the children.23 I’m looking at what kind of mother [she] has been to the other two. Nothing. Has nothing to do with those kids. So why in the world would I let her interrupt a three-year-old child’s life? Because Petitioner had nothing to do with the child for at least six months following her release from jail, the family court made a finding of abandonment. The court also noted that the Petitioner had an older son with whom she had visitation rights, but chose not to visit. Due to time constraints, the family court continued the hearing to a later date. On May 10, 2018, the parties reconvened for continued argument on the Petitioner’s motion. The parties presented their arguments concerning Petitioner’s right to visitation, and there was lengthy testimony by both Petitioner and Respondent concerning the allegations of unfitness and neglect. Respondent argued that for purposes of West Virginia law, abandonment is essentially unfitness. And, Respondent contended that there were other issues rising to the level of unfitness, including Petitioner’s pattern of behavior 23 The family court was mistaken about the number of children the Petitioner had. 18 established with her older child and failure to have contact with him. Testimony was also presented that Respondent and L.A. and T.A. were essentially psychological parents of the child. The court acknowledged that it was not considering termination, but rather determining the “best interests of the child.” The court stated that once it is determined that a person rises to the level of being unfit, then the best interest of the child enters the analysis. The court noted that while Petitioner argued that the initial petition for guardianship was granted solely because Petitioner went to jail, “that was not the only reason. It was the other factors as well.” Despite this acknowledgement, the family court found that its continued jurisdiction was proper. On May 22, 2018, the family court denied Petitioner’s request for visitation or any other relief. The order, which contains no references to statutes or case law, relies heavily on the guardian ad litem’s allegations of maltreatment, as represented by Respondent and Petitioner’s mother, finding that Petitioner had made no changes in her circumstances which would lead the Court to find that she is now stable, in that she has no transportation, no driver’s license, no job, no GED, no home fit for habitation by children and she has abandoned not only the subject infant child, but her older child, as well. Petitioner appealed the family court’s order to the circuit court, which upheld the ruling of the family court without a hearing. Noting that the guardian ad litem’s report outlined issues of “abandonment, neglect which has resulted in continuing physical issues for the infant child, a lack of a stable living environment and employment along with other 19 dereliction of duties,” the circuit court, citing the best interests of the child, found that “there has been no substantial and material change in the [Petitioner’s] circumstances that would warrant a modification of custody.” It is from this order that Petitioner now appeals.