Opinion ID: 177345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Factfinding for Apprendi Purposes

Text: Believing that the immediately preceding discussion establishes that petitioners' PFO sentencing involved a choice between sentencing ranges with different maximum sentences for Apprendi purposes, I turn to the next question: whether in petitioners' cases that choice was based on the sentencing judges' findings of facts beyond those found by the jury in the felony of conviction or admitted by the defendant. Whether the findings are sheltered by Almendarez-Torres is dealt with in the next subsection. Conspicuously absent from my colleagues' opinion is any clear denial that, in petitioners' cases, step twoconsideration of evidence relating to the character, history, and nature of the criminal conduct of the defendantinvolved factfinding beyond the multiple prior felonies. Instead the opinion is at pains to establish that, under the PFO sentencing statute, two prior felonies alone authorize [8] a Class A-I sentence, that defendants are eligible for [9] or subject to [10] a Class A-I sentence based solely [11] on two prior felonies; that two prior felonies are the sole determinant for whether a judge is authorized to impose a PFO sentence; [12] that no additional factfinding beyond the fact of two prior felony convictions is required [13] to impose a PFO sentence; that two prior felony convictions are necessary and sufficient [14] to impose the enhanced sentence; and that the second step findings are not necessary for [15] or essential to [16] a recidivist sentence. None of the quoted phrases purport to be mandatory, i.e., they do not state that two predicate felonies alone require a Class A-I sentence. All that the phrases purport to state is that the multiple predicate felonies alone: (i) trigger the PFO sentencing process, (ii) expose the defendant to the possibility of a Class A-I sentence, and (iii) may be sufficient in and of themselves to justify such a sentence. However, none of that is disputed, and none of that disposes of any of the appeals before us. All of the petitioners assert colorable claims that their Class A-I sentences were based on factfinding going beyond the predicate felonies, without which a second felony offender sentencing range with lower maximum sentences would concededly have been applicable. To put it another way, my colleagues have successfully defended the PFO statute against a facial attack by showing that the predicate felonies may alone justify a Class A-I sentence, while not addressing the claims before us that factfinding beyond the predicate felonies actually occurred and enhanced the sentences of the petitioners. Without linking their discussion to any relevant and identifiable constitutional theory, my colleagues also downplay the importance of the second step, describing it as procedural, one that merely informs the exercise of sentencing discretion. Maj. op. 90-91, 91. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly held that broad discretion to decide what facts may support an enhanced sentence, or to determine whether an enhanced sentence is warranted in any particular case, does not shield a sentencing system from the force of our decisions. If the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 290, 127 S.Ct. 856 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 & n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 2531). Regardless of whether the second step is labeled procedural or whether it informs discretion, the second step in the case of all petitioners involved which of two sentencing ranges was to be selected and the choice was between ranges with different maximum sentences. Conceding that facts beyond the felony convictions may be considered in the second step, [17] my colleagues also quote Rivera to the effect that defendants do not have a legal entitlement to have those facts receive controlling weight in influencing the court's opinion. Maj. op. 91 (quoting People v. Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d 61, 68, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194 (N.Y. 2005)) (emphasis omitted). Of course, the defendant has no legal entitlement to prevail at the second step or to have his or her evidence given controlling weight. No petitioner is arguing that showing up at a sentencing hearing and expressing remorse entitled him to sentencing as a second felony offender as a matter of law. Each is arguing only that judicial factfinding took place and unconstitutionally guided the choice between the two legally available sentencing ranges. My colleagues make a final attempt to downplay the second step. They describe the statutory requirement of a statement of reasons by the sentencing judge for imposing a Class A-I range sentence rather than a lower range sentence as intended only to facilitate[ ] an appellate review function that is distinct from the issue of whether the PFO sentence was lawfully imposed. [18] Maj. op. 86. That characterization is correct so far as lawfully imposed means only that once two prior felonies have been proven, a defendant is legally eligible for, subject to, etc. a Class A-I sentence. It cannot mean more than that because it is also conceded that an appellate court can overturn the lawfully imposed sentence and resentence (or order resentencing) to a legally available lower range. For example, no one claims that a mistaken finding of fact relating to a defendant's prior bad conduct on which a sentencing judge based a Class A-I sentence could not be the ground for overturning on appellate review a Class A-I sentence on appeal. If not, it can hardly be said that no significant factfinding takes place in the second step. My colleagues' avoidance of a definitive answer to whether factfinding beyond the predicate felonies may occur in the second step or to whether it did occur in the case of any of the petitioners, must be contrasted with the position taken by appellate counsel for the prosecution and by the Rivera decision itself. In the in banc oral argument, the New York Solicitor General conceded that facts were found in the sentencing proceedings of the petitioners. [19] Moreover, in Rivera, the New York Court of Appeals used the words fact or factfinding freely with regard to the second step. See e.g., Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d at 67-68, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194 (referring repeatedly to the sentencing court's consideration of facts found in the second step). The court neither limited the inquiry to predicate crimes nor downplayed the importance of the second step. The Court of Appeals described that step as one in which the sentencing court ... will consider holistically the defendant's entire circumstances and character, including traits touching upon the need for deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation unrelated to the crime of conviction. Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d at 69 n. 8, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194. With regard to the petitioners before us, the sentencing judges showed no signs of viewing the second step as anything but involving the consideration of evidence and the finding of facts. As noted, in Morris's case, the sentencing judge made extensive findings of fact and formally labeled them as such. See supra at 97-98. Finally, the constitutional significance of the second step is underscored by the statutory provision that the burden of proof is upon the people in this phase. N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 400.20(5). In the first step, the PFO predicate convictions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In the second step, [m]atters pertaining to the defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. All relevant evidence must be considered and the ordinary rules of evidence, save for those relating to privileges, do not apply. Id. In Rivera 's own words, the People retain the burden to show that the defendant deserves the [Class A-I] sentence. 5 N.Y.3d at 68, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194. My colleagues state that it is not entirely clear what this statement means. Maj. op. 91. In fact, it is a routine formulation pertinent to sentencing generallyincluding the federal system, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553 where a range of sentences is permissible. It means what it says. If the prosecution failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the petitioners deserve, a Class A-I sentence, the petitioner would have been sentenced to a range with a lower maximum. Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d at 68, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194. In short, however characterized, the second step with regard to the present petitioners involved the presentation of evidence upon which the sentencing judge found facts and chose between sentencing ranges with different maximum sentences. Nothing in my colleagues' opinion, save for the discussion of Almendarez-Torres, responds to the claim of each petitioner that factfinding altered the sentencing and applicable maximum range.