Opinion ID: 682811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority of District Attorney McCoy to Apply for Order

Text: 5 Defendant first contends that the application and order were invalid because the district attorney who applied for the wiretap order lacked jurisdiction to do so. Because an order must conform to all provisions of the Oklahoma Act, an improper application results in an invalid order. See Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 13, Sec. 176.7 (West 1994). 6 The Oklahoma Act establishes a two-step application process for wiretap orders. Id. First, the district attorney for the jurisdiction in which the interception will take place must file an application with the state's attorney general. The attorney general then applies for an order from the presiding judge of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Id.; see also Sec. 176.2(9) (defining a judge of competent jurisdiction as the presiding judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals). Upon the submission of an application by the attorney general, the presiding judge may issue an order authorizing interception of wire ... communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the judicial district of the district attorney requesting the order. Sec. 176.9(C). 7 The application in the instant case sought authorization to intercept the communications from two specific telephone numbers. The application identified the same Atoka County, Oklahoma address for both telephone numbers. Atoka County is within the territorial jurisdiction of Oklahoma Judicial District 19. The district attorney for Oklahoma Judicial District 21, J. Tully McCoy, applied for the order. District 21 includes Cleveland County, the county in which law enforcement officers listened to the conversations. 8 Because the tapped telephones were physically located in District 19, defendant argues that the district attorney for District 21 did not have authority to apply for the order. Defendant further contends that, without such authority, the wiretap order was invalid and the district court should have suppressed all evidence obtained from the taps. See Sec. 176.6. 9 Defendant's argument is contradicted by the language of the Oklahoma Act. Section 176.9(C) authorizes the interception of wire ... communications within the territorial jurisdiction ... of the district attorney requesting the order. The Oklahoma Act defines intercept as the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire ... communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device. Sec. 176.2(8).  'Aural acquisition' means obtaining knowledge of a communication through the sense of hearing which is contemporaneous with the communication. Sec. 176.2(2). Thus, the statutory definition of interception includes the place where the contents of the communication are first heard by law enforcement officials; that is, where officials aurally acquire knowledge of the communication. 10 Although courts have not previously interpreted this provision of the Oklahoma Act, we note that our interpretation is in accordance with federal court interpretations of the similarly worded federal statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(3). Section 2518(3) authorizes a federal judge to approve the interception of wire communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting. The Second Circuit has held that for purposes of Sec. 2518(3)'s jurisdictional requirement, a communication is intercepted not only where the tapped telephone is located, but also where the contents of the redirected communication are first to be heard. United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 140, 121 L.Ed.2d 92 (1992); accord United States v. Burford, 755 F.Supp. 607, 611 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (Jurisdiction vests either in the location where the conversations are actually heard or where the mechanical device is inserted.). 1 11 We hold that the location of an interception for purposes of section 176.9(C) includes the place where the intercepted communication is heard. 2 12