Opinion ID: 4533276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Speech

Text: Medlin asserts that “[h]e had an absolute right to speak out on matters of public concern.” Medlin Br. at 28. Medlin argues that “Harris had grown paranoid and upset about the Appellant’s apparent growing influence with the city council” and that Harris believed Medlin should not be “communicating or fraternizing with the city council members.” Id. Medlin claims that “the true motivation of his discipline and termination . . . was retaliation for the exercise of his right guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Id. at 25. Again, this court considers three elements in a retaliation claim: A plaintiff seeking to establish a case of retaliation for speech protected under the First Amendment must point to evidence sufficient to establish three elements: 1) the plaintiff engaged in constitutionally protected speech; 2) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse action or was deprived of some benefit, and 3) the protected speech was a “substantial” or a “motivating factor” in the adverse action. Brandenburg, 253 F.3d at 897 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). Regarding the first element, this court employs a two-part test. Id. “The first part of the test requires the court to ask whether the speech at issue addressed a matter of public concern.” Id. “Next, the court must decide whether ‘the interest of the employee as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern, outweighs the employer’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’” Id. at 897–98 (quoting Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 604 (6th Cir. 2000)). To determine whether speech addressed a matter of public concern, “we will consider (1) the point or focus of the speech in question and (2) whether the point ‘relat[es] to any matter -20- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. of political, social, or other concern to the community.’” Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 600 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). The Supreme Court has “instructed that ‘[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement.’” Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48). Defendants argue that “Medlin does not identify any ‘speech’ that is a matter of public concern.” Algood Br. at 46. The evidence that Medlin spoke to city-council members regarding a matter of public concern is limited to Medlin’s testimony that he would speak to Norris about city business and frequently about Harris, his appointment as the chief of police, and the termination of that employment. “[T]he employee bears the burden of proving his or her actions were constitutionally protected in the particular circumstances.” Brandenburg, 253 F.3d at 897. Medlin has not provided enough evidence to begin the analysis. The record does not disclose, and Medlin does not explain, “the content, form, and context” of the allegedly protected statements. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. With only a vague description of the topics he discussed with Norris, we cannot conclude that Medlin’s speech addressed a matter of public concern. “When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.” Id. at 146.