Opinion ID: 4188856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retroactivity Under Suesz

Text: In the en banc briefing in Suesz, the debt collector argued that it and other debt collectors had been relying on our prec‐ edent in Newsom to choose preferred venues among the dif‐ ferent small claims courts within the county. It argued that if we were to overrule Newsom, we should give that decision only prospective effect. We rejected that argument, holding that the new rule adopted in Suesz would apply in Suesz itself. 757 F.3d at 649–50. The general rule, we explained, is that judicial decisions are given retroactive effect, unlike legislation, which ordinar‐ ily is not. We acknowledged that the Supreme Court has left itself some room to give its rulings in civil cases only prospec‐ tive effect “to avoid injustice or hardship to civil litigants who have justifiably relied on prior law.” Id. at 649, quoting Har‐ per v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 110 (1993) (Ken‐ nedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), quoting in turn American Trucking Ass’ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 199 (1990) (plurality opinion), and endorsing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). We were not persuaded to impose a prospective‐only rule in Suesz. We noted that the Supreme Court had reversed a state court’s decision to give a United States Supreme Court decision only prospective effect. Suesz, 757 F.3d at 649, citing Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 753–54 (1995). We also observed that a prior decision of one intermediate appellate court does not ordinarily produce the degree of certainty concerning an issue of federal law that might justify a rare prospective‐only ruling. We said that a prospective‐only ruling would be “impermissible unless the law had been so well settled before the overruling that it had No. 15‐2516 9 been unquestionably prudent for the community to rely on the previous legal understanding.” Id. at 650. To illustrate the point, we considered a different scenario, one in which we as a circuit court of appeals had continued to follow Newsom but the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Suesz and reversed. Neither our prior decision in Newsom nor the panel’s decision in Suesz, we said, would have justified the Supreme Court giving its decision only prospective effect. Id. Also, the Supreme Court’s FDCPA decisions against debt collectors have not given any sign of applying their holdings only prospectively. See Jerman, 559 U.S. 573; Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 294 (1995) (Act applies to lawyers collecting debts through litigation). The panel opinion in this case declined to apply the Suesz holding on retroactivity. The panel wrote that Suesz “did not specify the scope of its retroactivity,” but the panel assumed without deciding that the Suesz retroactivity holding would apply to the debt collector in this case. Oliva II, 825 F.3d at 790– 91. The panel in this case then considered the FDCPA safe har‐ bor for good‐faith mistakes under § 1692k(c), which had not been argued in Suesz.3 We turn to that rationale next. 3 In the en banc oral argument in Suesz, the debt collector was asked why it did not rely on § 1692k(c) to argue for prospective‐only application if Newsom were to be overruled. Counsel explained, in apparent reference to Jerman, that the Supreme Court had previously held that the safe harbor did not apply to good‐faith mistakes of law. Since the party in a position to argue the point had not argued it, we did not address Jerman in the en banc opinion. 10 No. 15‐2516