Opinion ID: 379272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Request for Subclass Certification

Text: 54 Sanchez moved for the certification of a subclass, with himself as class representative, to include those class members who would be directly affected by the school closure provisions of the desegregation plan. 13 The District Court denied this certification motion simultaneously with its approval of the plan, finding, inter alia, that there was no longer any need for a subclass formed to object to school closures because the issue was decided on the merits by the approval of the plan, and, furthermore, the subclass description was vague. We agree with the District Court that after the August 11th order, the need for the subclass disappeared. 55 Subclasses must meet the same requirements as a class. Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1200 (6th Cir. 1974). Just as the determination of class certification rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 186 (9th Cir. 1979); Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d 250, 255 (9th Cir. 1978), so, too, does the determination of the need for a subclass. It is appropriate to invoke subclassification when there are or may be divergent views among class members and when the Court believes that subclasses would materially improve the presentation of all relevant considerations. 56 Sanchez's arguments that the District Court erred in denying his motion for subclass certification stem principally from his misunderstanding of the Court's August 11th order. As discussed in section II-B above, the August 11th order finally decided on the merits the question of whether the schools sought to be closed by the School District would in fact be closed. Thereafter, the role that the school closures were to play in the settlement hearing became second order: Their existence could be considered in terms of the overall fairness of the settlement, but the fact of the closures themselves were no longer open to objection. Thus, the substantive question of whether those three schools would or could be closed was not, contrary to Sanchez's argument, present at the settlement hearing. 57 The foreclosure of this issue from the settlement strikes at the heart of the subclassification motion. The need for the subclass was premised upon the desire to prevent the schools from being closed, a desire apparently shared by a significant number of parents whose children attended those schools. However, it is not at all clear where the proposed subclass stood on the overall fairness of the settlement, given as irrevocable the decision to close the schools under the District's plan. Nor is it clear that their views on this question differ from the interests of the class as a whole. Finally, it does not appear that the District Court was deprived of any material viewpoints, objections, or information for want of a subclass at the settlement hearing. 58 For the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court's denial of Sanchez's subclass motion.