Opinion ID: 1850917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: suspension of prescription in medical malpractice actions

Text: Pursuant to La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 927(B), prescription must be specifically pled by a defendant and cannot be supplied by the court. The burden of proving prescription ordinarily lies with the party raising the exception, but when prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the action has not prescribed. Carter, 04-0646 at 9, 892 So.2d at 1267. Evidence may be presented at the hearing on the exception. Id. In this case, prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings. The injection that allegedly caused Ms. Noe's injuries and damages occurred on June 11, 2001, more than a year prior to March 12, 2003, the date on which she filed her medical malpractice complaint. Thus, Ms. Noe had the burden of proving at the hearing on the defendants' exception of prescription that the claim had not prescribed. However, as a general rule, courts are required to strictly construe prescriptive statutes against prescription and in favor of the obligation sought to be extinguished, and therefore, of two possible constructions, to adopt the one that favors maintaining, as opposed to barring, the action. Id. at 10, 892 So.2d at 1269. Further, this court stated as follows in Guitreau v. Kucharchuk, 99-2570 (La.5/16/00), 763 So.2d 575: The one-year prescriptive period for a medical malpractice action will not begin to run at the earliest possible indication that a patient may have suffered some wrong. Prescription should not be used to force a person who believes he may have been damaged in some way to rush to file suit against every person who might have caused his damage. Id. at 6, 763 So.2d at 579-80, citing Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp., 509 So.2d 420, 423 (La.1987). Prescription in medical malpractice actions is governed by La.Rev.Stat. 9:5628(A), which provides as follows: No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, chiropractor, nurse, licensed midwife practitioner, dentist, psychologist, optometrist, hospital or nursing home duly licensed under the laws of this state, or community blood center or tissue bank as defined in R.S. 40:1299.41(A), whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought unless filed within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date of discovery of the alleged act, omission, or neglect; however, even as to claims filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such claims shall be filed at the latest within a period of three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect. This court has previously recognized that La.Rev.Stat. 9:5628 is a tripartite prescription provision that sets forth two prescriptive periods within which a patient may bring a medical malpractice action: (1) one year from the date of the alleged act, or (2) one year from the date of discovery with a three-year limitation from the date of the alleged act. See Carter, 04-0646 at 10, 892 So.2d at 1268, and cases cited therein. The reality is that, despite the above statute, which establishes a one-year prescriptive period for filing a medical malpractice action, medical malpractice lawsuits are virtually never actually filed in courts of competent jurisdiction within one year of the alleged act of malpractice. Rather, a medical malpractice plaintiff must first provoke a medical review panel, as his ability to file suit is constrained by the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(1). That statute provides as follows: All malpractice claims against health care providers covered by this Part, other than claims validly agreed for submission to a lawfully binding arbitration procedure, shall be reviewed by a medical review panel established as hereinafter provided for in this Section. As this court stated in LeBreton v. Rabito, in addition to provoking a review panel, a medical malpractice plaintiff must . . . receive an opinion from it before he can file suit in a court of law. 97-2221, p. 6 (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 1226, 1229, quoting Everett v. Goldman 359 So.2d 1256, 1263 (La.1978). Because this requirement makes it difficult, if not impossible, for medical malpractice plaintiffs to actually file suit within a year of an alleged act of malpractice, a number of suspension principles have been invoked to extend the one-year prescriptive period set forth in La.Rev.Stat. 9:5628. Generally, prescription is suspended when the law, as a favor to somebody, prevents it from running. 1 Marcel Planiol & George Ripert, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil, No. 2697 (12th ed.1939), reprinted in 1 Marcel Planiol & George Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law, part 2, 593 (La. St. Law Inst. Trans. 1959). The reasons for the suspension principle were set forth as follows by Planiol and Ripert: Suspension of prescription is a measure of equity, invented through regard for certain persons who are not in a position to interrupt prescription when it is running against them. The law comes to their help by holding, in derogation to general principles, that all the time they remain in such state does not count. The result is that everybody has the normal prescriptive delay within which to interrupt prescription by asserting his rights. Id. at No. 2698, Treatise on the Civil Law, part 2 at 594. Two situations that operate to suspend prescription in medical malpractice cases are expressly established by La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The filing of the request for a review of a claim shall suspend the time within which suit must be instituted, in accordance with this Part, until ninety days following notification, by certified mail, as provided in Subsection J of this Section, to the claimant or his attorney of the issuance of the opinion by the medical review panel, in the case of those health care providers covered by this Part, or in the case of a health care provider against whom a claim has been filed under the provisions of this Part, but who has not qualified under this Part, until ninety days following notification by certified mail to the claimant or his attorney by the board that the health care provider is not covered by this Part. The filing of a request for review of a claim shall suspend the running of prescription against all joint and solidary obligors, and all joint tortfeasors, including but not limited to health care providers, both qualified and not qualified, to the same extent that prescription is suspended against the party or parties that are the subject of the request for review. The first sentence of the above provision expressly suspends the one-year prescriptive period for filing a medical malpractice action in a court of competent jurisdiction until 90 days following notification of the issuance of the medical review panel's opinion. The second sentence expressly suspends prescription against all joint and solidary obligors/tortfeasors to the same extent prescription has been suspended against one or more other joint or solidary obligors/tortfeasors when a timely request for review has been filed against that obligor/tortfeasor. In addition to the two statutory provisions that suspend prescription in medical malpractice actions, set forth in La.Rev. Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), Louisiana courts have developed a number of jurisprudential exceptions to offset the sometimes harsh results of prescriptive statutes. Carter, 04-0646 at 11, 892 So.2d at 1269. These exceptions are called contra non valentem non currit praescriptio, which literally means prescription does not run against a person who could not bring his suit. Id. The four categories of contra non valentum recognized by this court are as follows: (1) where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiff's action; (2) where there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; (3) where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action; and (4) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though this ignorance is not induced by the defendant. Id. at 11-12, 892 So.2d at 1268. These jurisprudential exceptions to prescription are designed to allow courts to weigh the `equitable nature of the circumstances in each individual case' to determine whether prescription will be tolled. Id. at 12, 892 So.2d at 1269. The continuous treatment doctrine adopted by this court in Carter is based on the third category of contra non valentum listed above, which applies when the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his cause of action. Id. at 12, 892 So.2d at 1269. In fact, this court noted before Carter in In re Medical Review Panel for the Claim of Moses, 00-2643 (La.5/25/01), 788 So.2d 1173, that a suspension of prescription premised on the continuation of a special relationship is always based on the third category of contra non valentum. Id. [3] The doctrine also applies to situations where an innocent plaintiff has been lulled into a course of inaction in the enforcement of his right by reason of some concealment or fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendant, or because of his failure to perform some legal duty whereby plaintiff has been kept in ignorance of his rights. Id. at 12, 892 So.2d at 1269. Proper consideration of the prescription issues raised by this case requires consideration of both of the statutory prescription principles set forth in La.Rev.Stat. 47:1299.47(A)(2)(a), as well as the jurisprudential suspension principle embodied in the continuous treatment doctrine. I will apply those principles to the two distinct issues raised by this case. First, I will analyze whether Ms. Noe's Medical Malpractice Complaint against Dr. Hill and IMG Healthcare qualified as a timely filing of [a] request for review of a claim such that, pursuant to the first sentence of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), the one-year prescription period for filing a medical malpractice action in a court of competent jurisdiction was suspended until ninety days following notification of the issuance of the medical review panel's opinion. In order to reach that decision, I will consider whether prescription was suspended pursuant to the continuous treatment doctrine. Second, I will analyze whether the prescriptive period during which Ms. Noe could amend her Medical Malpractice Complaint to name Nurse Hahn as a defendant jointly liable with Dr. Hill and IMG Healthcare was suspended pursuant to the second sentence of La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a), such that her amended complaint was timely filed.