Opinion ID: 1207969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of estoppel.

Text: State Farm asserts that the trial court should have granted its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding of estoppel. We disagree. In Lewis the Court stated: This Court, recognizing the character of the written insurance contract, has long held, where a policy holder is induced to enter into contract in reasonable reliance on promises of or agreements with the soliciting representative of that insurance company thereby leaving the insured person or property otherwise unprotected, and the company profits from that change of position, that the insurance company is estopped to deny the liability for which it actually contracted by raising provisions from its own printed policy form. 93 Idaho at 351, 461 P.2d at 246 (footnote omitted). In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury in substantially this manner. State Farm contends that as a matter of law the Youngs did not satisfy the requirement that the reliance on the oral promises or agreements be reasonable. State Farm argues that the Youngs' reliance on Harold's conversation with the agent was unreasonable as a matter of law in the face of three years of written documentation showing that the Youngs did not have underinsured motorist coverage. In Foster v. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 685 P.2d 802 (1984), the Court emphasized that for estoppel to apply an insured's reliance on an agent's oral representations must be reasonable under all the circumstances. The reasonableness of the insured's reliance presents a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 68, 685 P.2d at 809. In Foster the Court focused on the inadequacy of the trial court's instructions on this issue, noting that where facts exist which tend to indicate the insureds should have been aware that the policy excluded coverage contrary to the representations of the agent, the trier of fact should consider those facts as bearing on the issue of reasonableness. Id. at 67, 685 P.2d at 808. The Court then listed several factors the jury should have had the opportunity to consider: (1) the length of time between the receipt of the policy and the accident; (2) the opportunities to verify the coverage under the policy; and (3) the type of policy involved and the likelihood of the coverage existing in light of industry norms and common experience. Id. In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury that it should consider the circumstances listed in Foster in determining whether the Youngs knew or reasonably should have known that State Farm's policy did not provide underinsured motorist coverage. In reviewing the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we review the record and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Hoglan v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 120 Idaho 682, 684, 819 P.2d 100, 102 (1991). The standard we apply to make this determination is whether we can say `that there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable minds could have reached.' Id. at 685, 819 P.2d at 103 (quoting Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986)). The Youngs presented substantial evidence through Harold's testimony of their initial reasonable reliance on the agent's representation. Having done so, they were not foreclosed as a matter of law from continuing their reliance because of the subsequent written documents. The Court inherently rejected this approach in Foster when it said, [w]hile some jurisdictions have held that an insurer can only be estopped from denying coverage where the insured has not received a copy of the policy before the loss occurs, that is not the law in Idaho. 107 Idaho at 67, 685 P.2d at 808 (citation omitted). The clear implication of this statement is that the receipt of a copy of the policy or other written documents may be considered by the jury on the issue of reasonable reliance, but it does not foreclose as a matter of law the jury's consideration of estoppel. The reasonableness of the insured's reliance remains a question of fact for the jury to resolve. The trial court instructed the jury that one of the circumstances the jury should consider in determining the reasonableness of the Youngs' reliance was the opportunity and general obligation one has to read contracts to which he or she is a party. It was for the jury to weigh the circumstances, including this one, in determining the reasonableness of the Youngs' continued reliance on the agent's representation. We decline State Farm's invitation to address whether the burden of proof for estoppel in insurance cases should be clear and convincing evidence. This issue was not raised before the trial court. Also, we see no issues of public policy that dictate a reformulation of estoppel as it applies to insurance cases, as State Farm suggests.