Opinion ID: 2162170
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Heading: Age-based hostile environment claims under the DCHRA

Text: The DCHRA provides in part: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to do any of the following acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon the ... age ... of any individual: (1) By an employer. To fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, any individual; or otherwise to discriminate against any individual, with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, including promotion; or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee. . . . D.C.Code § 1-2512(a)(1) (1997 Supp.). [13] Relying significantly on federal cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1994), [14] this court in Howard University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 981 (D.C.1984), held that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of sexual harassment [under the DCHRA] upon demonstrating that unwelcome verbal and/or physical advances of a sexual nature were directed at him/her in the workplace, resulting in a hostile or abusive working environment. See also, e.g., Estate of Underwood v. National Credit Union Administration, 665 A.2d 621, 640 (D.C.1995) (citing Best ); Norman v. Gannett Co., 852 F.Supp. 46, 49 (D.D.C.1994). We conclude that the same test should apply, mutatis mutandis, in any DCHRA case in which a plaintiff alleges unlawful discrimination that takes the form of a hostile or abusive working environment. In other words, applying the Best standard more generically, a plaintiff such as Mr. Breiner has a viable hostile environment claim if he can demonstrate (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he has been subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) that the harassment was based on membership in the protected class, and (4) that the harassment is severe and pervasive enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Best, 484 A.2d at 978. [15] More than a few isolated incidents must have occurred, and genuinely trivial occurrences will not establish a prima facie case. Id. at 980 (citations and footnote omitted). However, [n]o specific number of incidents, and no specific level of egregiousness need be proved. Id. Whether the plaintiff has met his burden depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 980-981. This means that in determining whether the DCHRA has been violated, the trier of fact should consider... the amount and nature of the conduct, the plaintiff's response to such conduct, and the relationship between the harassing party and the plaintiff. Id. at 981. Before applying the Best standard to this case, we must address two threshold issues: whether recent Supreme Court decisions modifying the elements of a hostile work environment claim under Title VII should be applied similarly to cases arising under the DCHRA, and whether a hostile environment theory is even appropriate for age-based claims. We shall consider each in turn. As to the first issue, the parties disagree on whether actual emotional damage must be shown by a plaintiff when proving a hostile work environment claim under the DCHRA. Daka, relying on Howard University v. Best, supra , argues that Breiner not only must prove that a reasonable person would have found the work environment hostile and abusive, but also must present objective evidence of actual emotional damage. See Estate of Underwood, supra, 665 A.2d at 640. In Daka's opinion, a requirement of a showing of psychological harm is particularly important with age-based claims because age remarks, by their nature, are less invidious than remarks about other protected groups. Breiner maintains, to the contrary, that two post- Best decisions of the Supreme Court, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), have superseded Best in this respect. Harris and Meritor hold that a plaintiff in a Title VII action need not prove a tangible psychological injury in order to prove the existence of a hostile work environment. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64, 106 S.Ct. at 2404). [16] The rationale for this holding is that abusive work environments, even those that do not seriously affect an employee's emotional well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 371. Thus a plaintiff has an actionable hostile work environment claim under Title VII [w]hen the workplace is permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult'. . . that is `sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment'.... Id. at 21, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405). Under this standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate both an objectively hostile or abusive environment, i.e., one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and a subjective perception by the plaintiff that the environment is abusive. But the plaintiff need not prove, in addition, that he or she suffered an actual psychological injury. Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive . . . there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 371 (citation omitted). A quite persuasive argument can be made that Harris has put a significant gloss on Best, or even that Harris has superseded Best to the extent that the two cases are inconsistent. We note first that this court, in deciding issues arising under the DCHRA, consistently relies upon decisions of the federal courts in Title VII cases as particularly persuasive authority. See, e.g., Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1301-1302 (D.C.1994); Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361 n. 17, 367-368 (D.C.1993); American University v. District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights, 598 A.2d 416, 422 (D.C.1991). Even in Best itself we applied Title VII principles in resolving the plaintiff's discrimination claim. See 484 A.2d at 977-982. Second, the primary purpose of the DCHRA, to eradicate all employment discrimination, [17] would be furthered by our following Harris and Meritor because the burden upon a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case would be a little less heavy than it was under Best, in that the plaintiff would no longer have to prove actual psychological injury. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 370. Third, such a holding would be compatible with recent hostile environment cases brought in the District of Columbia under Title VII. See Park v. Howard University, 315 U.S.App. D.C. 196, 198, 71 F.3d 904, 906 (1995) (citing Harris ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 57, 136 L.Ed.2d 20 (1996); Gary v. Long, 313 U.S.App. D.C. 403, 408-409, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396-1397 (1995) (citing Harris and Meritor ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011, 116 S.Ct. 569, 133 L.Ed.2d 493 (1995); Stoeckel v. Environmental Management Systems, Inc., 882 F.Supp. 1106, 1114 (D.D.C. 1995) (citing Harris ). Moreover, in the only reported Superior Court decision since Harris, the court followed Harris after assuming that this court would apply a similar standard and approach to the interpretation of the reach of the [DCHRA]. Drake v. Henkels & McKoy, Inc., 123 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2217, 2223 (D.C.Super.Ct.1995). Having said all this, however, we conclude that we need not decide the point here. We note instead that the trial court's instructions in this case, which were based on Harris and not Best (and therefore said nothing about actual psychological injury), elicited no complaint from either side. We therefore hold that Daka waived any objection it might have had to any arguable omission from the instructions. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 31 (requiring specific objection to instructions before the jury retires). Turning to the other preliminary question whether an age-related hostile environment claim is viable under discrimination statutes such as the DCHRAwe find that only a few courts have considered this issue or anything close to it. Federal courts have done so under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1994), and have unanimously held that hostile work environment claims are equally cognizable in an ADEA case as they are under Title VII. See, e.g., Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College District, 934 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir.1991); Young v. Will County Dep't of Public Aid, 882 F.2d 290, 294 (7th Cir.1989); Eggleston v. South Bend Community School Corp., 858 F.Supp. 841, 845-852 (N.D.Ind. 1994); Spence v. Maryland Casualty Co., 803 F.Supp. 649, 671 (W.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd, 995 F.2d 1147 (2d Cir.1993); Drez v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 674 F.Supp. 1432, 1436-1437 (D.Kan.1987). These courts have concluded that, with no material difference between the ADEA and Title VII, [18] there is no reason to differentiate between age discrimination claimants and members of other protected groups when considering a hostile environment claim. An ADEA plaintiff's rights are simply protected by a different statute, but any claim that those rights have been violated is comparable in substance to a civil rights claim under Title VII. See, e.g., Drez, supra, 674 F.Supp. at 1436-1437. The only state court decision we have found that addresses this issue under a state discrimination statute, Kelly v. Bally's Grand, Inc., 285 N.J.Super. 422, 667 A.2d 355 (1995), reached a similar conclusion by adapting New Jersey's sexual harassment hostile environment analysis to fit an age animus claim.... Id. at 434, 667 A.2d at 362. [19] Thus, under New Jersey's equivalent of the DCHRA, a plaintiff claiming age discrimination would have to establish that: (1) the complained-of conduct would not have occurred but for her age; (2) the conduct was severe or pervasive; (3) enough to make a reasonable older-aged person . . . believe that; (4) the conditions of employment have been altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive. Id. (citation omitted). Like New Jersey's anti-discrimination statute, the DCHRA was enacted to eliminate all discrimination in the workplace, not just sexual or racial discrimination. See D.C.Code § 1-2501 (statute is intended to secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination for any reason  (emphasis added)). Since the elements of a prima facie discrimination claim may be reformulated according to the facts of each particular case, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 n. 13, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), we see no reason why age-based hostile environment claims should be treated differently from any other harassment claims under the DCHRA. Daka argues that Breiner's hostile environment claim based on age-related harassment is novel and unprecedented, and should not be considered on the same footing as claims based on racial or sexual harassment because spoken remarks about age are less invidious than racial epithets or sexual slurs. Daka maintains that age-based harassment is less objectionable because everyone progresses into the protected groupin other words, we will all grow old sooner or later. On this point, Daka states in its brief: Unlike a hostile environment sexual harassment claim that typically involves conduct, photographs, and even sexual advances, Breiner's age-related hostile environment claim is based solely on verbal remarks. In this regard, it is more akin to claims arising from remarks or slurs denigrating a person's race or national origin. But even so, age-related claims still stand apart, because membership in the protected age group is not membership in a minority group. To the contrary, everyone fortunate enough to enjoy a modicum of longevity will become a member of the protected age group. Thus, Daka says, even if references to Breiner as `old man' or `old fart' may have been impolite, they simply cannot be given the same legal significance as calling a woman a `bitch' ... or using ... derogatory or hateful slurs and epithets against members of another race. We reject this argument, mainly because it is made in the wrong forum. The DCHRA prohibits all discrimination based on thirteen listed factors, including race, sex, and age. D.C.Code § 1-2512(a). It does not draw any distinction among these thirteen factors, nor does it even hint that certain types of discrimination are deemed more serious than others. On the contrary, it makes unlawful all discrimination in the workplace in any of the thirteen categories. Since the Council of the District of Columbia has not seen fit to classify different types of discrimination in the manner suggested by Daka, this court is not free to declare that some kinds of discrimination are more or less unlawful than other kinds. If Daka (or anyone else) believes the statute should so provide, the place to seek recourse is the legislature, not the courts.