Opinion ID: 1973885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Theories of Liability and the Duty to Warn

Text: A product manufacturer's or seller's failure to warn the user of foreseeable risks associated with use of the product may give rise to a cause of action sounding in either negligence or strict liability. Russell v. G.A.F. Corp., 422 A.2d 989, 991 (D.C.1980) (per curiam). Under a strict liability theory, recovery is predicated on findings that the product entered the stream of commerce with a design or manufacturing defect rendering it unreasonably dangerous. The failure to warn branch of strict liability recognizes that some products, even if perfectly designed and manufactured, cannot be made completely safe for their intended use. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment j (1965). In such cases, the defect and unreasonable danger is the failure to attach adequate warnings to a product that, as designed and manufactured, may in certain circumstances cause injury. Payne v. Soft-Sheen Products, supra, 486 A.2d at 725. A failure to warn can also result in liability for negligence, as the supplier of a product is liable to expected users for harm that results from foreseeable uses of the product if the supplier has reason to know that the product is dangerous and fails to exercise reasonable care to so inform the user. Id. at 721. The duty of the manufacturer or seller, however, is the same under both theories: essentially one of ordinary care. Russell, supra, 422 A.2d at 991. The seller or manufacturer of a product whose use could result in foreseeable harm has a duty to give a warning which adequately advises the user of attendant risks and which provides specific directions for safe use. Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1086 (D.C.1976) (emphasis in original). The plaintiff may seek damages for a negligent failure to warn, or invoke strict liability arising from the same failure, or both. Payne, supra, 486 A.2d at 721 n. 9, citing Russell, supra, 422 A.2d at 991 n.. Here, the claim of failure to warn was put before the jury as an independent cause of action, and it is unclear which theory of liability underlies it. For purposes of appellants' principal argument that they either owed no duty to Pineda or, in any event, did not breach it, the distinction is immaterial. Almost the only significance of a finding of a breach under the different theories lies in the effect on availability of certain defenses. [5] Contributory negligence is not a defense to a strict liability claim, but assumption of the risk bars recovery under either theory. See Payne, supra, 486 A.2d at 721 n. 9, quoting Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 838-39 (1966). Here the jury found no assumption of risk by Pineda, and appellants do not dispute that finding.