Opinion ID: 2379273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to new counsel?

Text: Appellant testified that he requested the circuit judge to dismiss Messrs. Ted. M. Henson, Sr. and Ted M. Henson, Jr., his court-appointed counsel, and appoint new lawyers for him, because he wanted a jury trial and all my lawyers wanted to do was to cop out. By cop out he meant to plead guilty. Appellant testified that at the start he told the attorneys that he wanted to go to trial, and they talked to him urging that he take a plea; that appellant's mother said it would be better; that everybody talked to me to go the other way. Finally, this exchange took place: Q That was after he [Mr. Henson, Jr.] had talked to you, these various discussions with you, you then voluntarily, in your own mind, decided to plead guilty, is that right? A After all of them talked me into it. This indicates that appellant's decision to plead guilty was voluntary. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the court-appointed attorneys were derelict in their duties or that they did or omitted to do anything which would warrant their dismissal or entitle accused to the assignment of new counsel. On the contrary, it appears that they discharged their duties diligently and with professional competence and that the advice they gave appellant was well-reasoned and lawyerlike. The fact that the accused disagreed with the advice given him by his attorneys is no sufficient basis upon which to entitle him to a change of lawyers. The constitutional right to counsel does not mean that an accused is entitled to any particular attorney, or that during trial he can arbitrarily discharge his attorney without reason or justification. State v. Williams, Mo.Sup., 419 S.W.2d 49, 54. The court did not err in refusing to discharge appellant's counsel. Judgment affirmed. WELBORN, and HIGGINS, CC., concur.