Opinion ID: 2342716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's Challenge To His Assault With Intent To Kill While Armed and Aggravated Assault While Armed Convictions

Text: Nixon contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal on three of the assault with intent to kill while armed (AWIKWA) charges  those pertaining to Mr. Taylor, Jones and Ball. He asserts that the government failed to show his specific intent to kill these three individuals. The government argues that the evidence was sufficient to establish specific intent with respect to all of the AWIKWA offenses, and thus, that the trial court did not err in denying Nixon's motion for judgment of acquittal. We agree with the government's position. `In reviewing [the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal based on] the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine if it was sufficient to permit reasonable jurors to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Zanders v. United States, 678 A.2d 556, 562 (D.C.1996) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 697, 704 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting Dyson v. United States, 450 A.2d 432, 436 (D.C. 1982) (citation omitted))). Moreover, `it is only where the government has produced no evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that this court can reverse a conviction.' Id. (quoting Gayden v. United States, 584 A.2d 578, 580 (D.C.1990) (citation omitted)). To prove the AWIKWA charges with respect to Mr. Taylor, Jones and Ball, the government had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Nixon: (1) made an assault on the three men; and (2) did so with specific intent to kill; (3) while armed. D.C.Code §§ 22-501, -3202. Reasonable jurors could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Nixon made an assault on the three men because he shot at the back, front and sides of Mr. Taylor's car in which the men were seated as the firing began. To prove a specific intent to kill, the government is not required to show that the accused actually wounded the victim. Bedney v. United States, 471 A.2d 1022, 1024 (D.C.1984) ([A] lethal intent can be demonstrated without showing that the assailant succeeded in wounding his intended victim.) (citations omitted). Nor must testimony be presented by the victim at trial since specific intent may be shown through circumstantial evidence. See Jones v. United States, 516 A.2d 929, 931 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 2193, 95 L.Ed.2d 848 (1987). In this case, Nixon and the men who occupied Mr. Taylor's car, were having problems. Although the windows of Mr. Taylor's car were tinted, the tint was light and Nixon could look into the car and see its occupants. Moreover, when Nixon started to fire at Mr. Taylor's car, he placed all of its occupants in a zone of harm. In Ruffin v. United States, 642 A.2d 1288 (D.C.1994), we recognized that: [w]here the means employed to commit the crime against a primary victim created a zone of harm around that victim, the factfinder can reasonably infer that the defendant intended that harm to all who are in the anticipated zone. Ruffin, supra, 642 A.2d at 1298 (citation omitted). In short, sufficient evidence was presented by the government at trial to satisfy the element of specific intent to kill Mr. Taylor, Jones and Ball beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, we affirm Nixon's convictions for assault with intent to kill these men while armed. Nixon also challenges his aggravated assault while armed convictions with respect to Mr. Jones and Mr. Ball on the ground that the government failed to prove an essential element of aggravated assault while armed  serious bodily injury. To prove aggravated assault while armed beyond a reasonable doubt, the government had to show that Nixon: (1) caused serious bodily injury to Mr. Jones and Mr. Ball; and (2) either knowingly or purposely cause[d] serious bodily injury to [them]; or [u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life,. . . intentionally or knowingly engage[d] in conduct which create[d] a grave risk of serious bodily injury to [them], and thereby cause[d] serious bodily injury; (3) while armed. D.C.Code § 504.1, -3202. The term serious bodily injury is not defined in § 22-504.1. However, the term is defined in a statute pertaining to sentencing for a sex offense, § 22-4101(7) as: bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. The factors of substantial risk of death, disfigurement, and impairment of the functions of a bodily member or organ, appear in statutes in the majority of states that define serious bodily injury, and also in the Model Penal Code. [5] For example, Texas defines the term to mean: [B]odily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the functions of any bodily member or organ. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 1.07(a)(34). The Minnesota definition reads: [B]odily injury which creates a high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily harm. Minn.Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (1982). The Connecticut definition is: [P]hysical injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious physical disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. Conn. General Statutes § 53a-3 (4). The pertinent Alabama statute defines serious bodily injury as: Physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. Code of Alabama § 13A-1-2 (9) (1975). The Model Penal Code states: Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which (1) creates a substantial risk of death; (2) causes serious permanent disfigurement; or (3) causes protracted loss or impairment of the functions of any bodily member or organ. Model Penal Code, MPC § 210.0(3). In sum, the majority of jurisdictions that define serious bodily injury require an injury that causes a substantial risk or high probability of death; or a serious permanent or physical disfigurement, or a protracted loss or impairment or serious impairment of the functions of a bodily member or organ. Since the definition of serious bodily injury which appears in § 22-4101(7) of the District's sexual abuse statute, infra, [6] is consistent with that followed in the majority of jurisdictions, we adopt it for the purpose of determining whether the government met its burden to prove serious bodily injury under the aggravated assault statute. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the only evidence presented as to the injuries of Mr. Jones and Mr. Ball came during the testimony of Mr. Taylor. He stated that he saw two holes on Mr. Jones' body, including a hole coming out behind his ear [with] blood coming out; and that Mr. Ball was grabbing his shoulder and the back of his shirt was bleeding like he got hit in the back of his neck or his shoulder. Both men were able to run after the shooting and thus were not unconscious and did not manifest immobilizing pain. Neither Mr. Jones nor Mr. Ball testified, and no medical evidence was introduced through health professionals who treated either man, or through any of their medical records. Thus, the record on appeal is silent as to how the holes on Mr. Jones' body affected him. In the case of Mr. Ball, the record reveals no direct evidence that he suffered any bullet wound. However, given Mr. Taylor's testimony that Mr. Ball was grabbing his shoulder and the back of his shirt was bleeding, the government is entitled to an inference that he was shot. Nonetheless, no evidence presented at trial permitted a reasonable juror to infer that his injury, or those suffered by Mr. Jones, posed a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. D.C.Code § 22-4101(7). In Williams v. State, 696 S.W.2d 896 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), the court reversed a conviction for aggravated assault due to the insufficiency of the evidence even though hospital records revealed two bullet wounds and one hole on the victim's person. The court stated: A knife wound, or a gunshot wound, although caused by a deadly weapon such as a knife or gun, is not, per se, serious bodily injury. The shooting of an individual is a serious and grave matter. Yet, it is the burden of the State to prove that such an act created a substantial risk of death, or caused death, a serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the functions of any bodily member or organ. See V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 1.07(a)(34). 696 S.W.2d at 898. In Reyes v. State, 1997 WL 81260 (Tex.App.-San Antonio1997), the court affirmed a conviction for aggravated assault where a bullet was not removed from the victim's abdomen due to his fear of surgery, and uncontroverted medical testimony stated that the bullet wound to the victim's abdomen was serious and that, given the legal definition of serious bodily injury, ... [it] constituted serious bodily injury. 1997 WL 81260 at . The court affirmed a conviction in Haslerig v. State, 474 So.2d 196 (Ala.Crim. App.1985) where the victim testified that he was shot in the chest, hospitalized, unable to work for five weeks due to pain and weakness, unable to sleep for four weeks without medication because of pain, and where two obvious scars appeared on the victim's body at the point bullets entered and exited. In that case, a thoracic surgeon testified that the victim could be in pain for a couple of months and possibly would have a lot of scar tissue, although gross disfigurement might not result. In Jones v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 1218, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), a case involving the federal carjacking statute, a victim was found to have suffered serious bodily injury because petitioner's gun caused profuse bleeding in [the victim's ear], and ... a physician . . . concluded that [the victim] had suffered a perforated eardrum, with some numbness and permanent hearing loss. In light of these cases, and under the definition of serious bodily injury as set forth in § 22-4101(7), the government in this matter failed to present sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Jones's and Mr. Ball's injuries involved a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the functions of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. Nor did the government present sufficient evidence to satisfy the definition of serious bodily injury adhered to in a minority of jurisdictions that have defined the term. [7] Simply put, due to the absence of testimony from Mr. Jones or Mr. Ball, or from health professionals who treated them, or medical records detailing the nature and extent of their injuries, the government failed to sustain its burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jones and Mr. Ball suffered serious bodily injury due to the multiple shots Nixon fired at the car in which they were seated. Therefore, we are constrained to reverse the convictions of Nixon for aggravated assault while armed on Mr. Jones and Mr. Ball.