Opinion ID: 1587472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior judgment.

Text: Appellant next argues that his sentence must be set aside because the 1994 McCracken Circuit Court conviction that was used for PFO first-degree enhancement was invalid. Specifically, while the 1994 judgment recites that Appellant's conviction was of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, a Class C felony, KRS 218A.1412(2), the 1993 indictment on which that judgment was premised, did not charge him with that offense but with trafficking in a schedule II non-narcotic, a Class D felony. KRS 218A.140(1) (amended, 1992 Ky. Acts, ch. 441, § 5); KRS 218A.990(2)(a) (repealed, 1992 Ky. Acts, ch. 441, § 30). The error probably relates to the facts that the Controlled Substances Act was substantially amended by the 1992 General Assembly, 1992 Ky. Acts, ch. 441, effective July 14, 1992, and that some of the offenses charged in the 1993 indictment were committed before July 14, 1992, and others were committed after that date. The trafficking offense was committed on July 7, 1992, which explains why the indictment was under the subsequently repealed statutes. Appellant is obviously correct in his assertion that the 1994 judgment recites a conviction for an offense for which he was not indicted. Nevertheless, (1) the sentence imposed for that conviction was five years imprisonment, which falls within the penalty range for either a Class D or Class C felony, KRS 532.060(2)(c) and (d); (2) the same judgment also contains two additional felony convictions for trafficking in marijuana (more than eight ounces, less than five pounds), Class D felonies, KRS 218A.1421(3)(a) (offenses committed after July 14, 1992), the validity of which Appellant does not contest; and (3) a prior judgment of conviction is valid until set aside by the court that entered it and cannot be collaterally attacked in a PFO proceeding. Webb v. Commonwealth, Ky., 904 S.W.2d 226, 229 (1995). Thus, even if Appellant's 1994 conviction of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree were invalid (an issue we do not reach), such does not affect the validity of the PFO first-degree enhancement of his present conviction. In fact, the trial judge did not instruct the jury at the penalty phase of the trial sub judice that it could find Appellant to be a PFO first-degree on the basis of his 1994 conviction of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree but only on the basis of his conviction in the same judgment of trafficking in marijuana (more than eight ounces, less than five pounds). The only remaining issue in this respect is whether Appellant could have been prejudiced by the prosecutor's reference to Appellant's prior conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance during his opening remarks at the penalty phase. The trial court cured any possible error by giving the following admonition: A moment ago, [the prosecutor] stated in his opening statement that Mr. Riley had among his convictions, a conviction for, I think he said, first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance. That was not correct. He did not have that conviction. You will be given the evidence here in a minute of what his actual convictions were. Regardless, even though the 1993 indictment charged Appellant with trafficking in a schedule II non-narcotic, the actual name of the offense was trafficking in a controlled substance, KRS 218A.140(1) (now amended), and the identification of the substance as a schedule II non-narcotic only affected the penalty to be imposed upon conviction of that offense. KRS 218A.990(2)(a) (now repealed). See, e.g., Palmore & Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) §§ 7.16, 7.17 (4th ed. Anderson (interim rev.) 1990).