Opinion ID: 161778
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion Based on the Substance of the Evidence

Text: 25 Mr. Adams also challenges the exclusion of the psychologist's report on the basis of its substance. Mr. Adams sought to introduce the psychological evidence in order to diminish the credibility of his earlier statements to the police. R.O.A. Supp. Vol. I at 4-5. On appeal, he indicates that [t]he proffered testimony . . . showed Adams' neurocognitive impairment and dependent personality structure [and] support[s] the possibility the statements he gave to the police were false. Aplt. Br. at 14. 26 Mr. Adams cites Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), as precedent for allowing expert testimony bearing on the credibility of prior testimony or a confession. Aplt. Br. at 15-16. Crane did distinguish pretrial inquiries into the voluntariness of a confession from a defendant's challenge to the reliability of the confession during the course of the trial. Crane, 476 U.S. at 687. Even after a confession is deemed voluntary, evidence concerning the physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession can also be of substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 689, 106 S. Ct. 2142. The blanket exclusion of evidence regarding the circumstances of a confession precludes a fair trial. Id. at 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142. Crane did not address, however, whether the physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession, id. at 689, 106 S. Ct. 2142, includes the psychological makeup of the confessor, or when expert testimony should be admitted to address that element. Only two circuit courts have dealt with the question of the admissibility of expert testimony concerning credibility, and both, under the facts of those cases and the manner of presentation, concluded that the respective trial court committed error in excluding such testimony. United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1346 (7th Cir. 1996). 27 A district court may allow expert testimony [i]f [the expert] scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed. R. Evid. 702. 2 The Supreme Court has held that Rule 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that all expert testimony, even non-scientific and experience-based expert testimony, is both relevant and reliable. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993). 28 We have said that [t]he credibility of witnesses is generally not an appropriate subject for expert testimony. Toledo, 985 F.2d at 1470. Though Crane prohibits categorical exclusion of this type of evidence, it does not require its categorical admission the rules of evidence still apply. There are a variety of reasons that evidence related to the credibility of a confession may be excluded. First, expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another witness encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations, and therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact' as required by Rule 702. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Rule 702). See also United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1406 (10th Cir. 1997) (testimony concerning credibility is often excluded because it usurps a critical function of the jury, which is capable of making its own determinations regarding credibility); United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 705 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981). Also, a proposed expert's opinion that a witness is lying or telling the truth might be inadmissible pursuant to Rule 702 because the opinion exceeds the scope of the expert's specialized knowledge and therefore merely informs the jury that it should reach a particular conclusion. Shay, 57 F.3d at 131. Yet another rationale for exclusion is that the testimony of impressively qualified experts on the credibility of other witnesses is prejudicial, unduly influences the jury, and should be excluded under Rule 403. Toledo, 985 F.2d at 1470; cf. Call, 129 F.3d at 1406 (polygraph results may be excluded under Rule 403 because jury may overvalue scientific results as indication of truthfulness). 29 In this case, Mr. Adams defended on the basis that the repeated, incriminatory statements he gave to law enforcement were untrue, made only to protect his girlfriend, who he believed at the time to be pregnant. R.O.A. Vol. II, at 208-09. The expert concluded that Mr. Adams's low neurocognitive functioning and dependent personality structure strongly raise[] the possibility, given the conflicting explanations made by Mr. Adams and others, that he was not telling the truth when he made incriminating statements to Wichita Police Officers and ATF agents. His statements that he was protecting a girlfriend when he confessed to possession of the firearm is consistent with his personality and cognitive state, and indicative of his difficulty making appropriate and reasoned choices. Report at 5 (emphasis added). 30 The district court was careful to recognize that, in some circumstances, credibility testimony by an expert might be allowed, however, it did not abuse its discretion in excluding it here. R.O.A. Supp. Vol. I, at 8. The psychologist, in light of the conflicting explanations and his evaluation of Mr. Adams, concluded that Mr. Adams's account (that he lied to protect his pregnant girlfriend) was plausible, albeit misguided. We have reviewed the report, and find the district court within its discretion in holding that the report was little more than a professionally-trained witness testifying that, based upon his history, Mr. Adams is the type of person who would have lied about his involvement to the police. Id. at 7. This case is readily distinguishable from Hall, 93 F.3d at 1341, where the defendant claimed that a personality disorder caused him to confess during interrogation and sign a statement in order to gain approval of his interrogators, and Shay, 57 F.3d at 129-30, where the defendant claimed that his confession was the product of a mental disorder characterized by an extreme form of pathological lying. In this case, there simply is no question about the voluntariness of the confessionsand defendant's recantation that he lied in order to protect his girlfriend is precisely the type of explanation that a jury is capable of resolving without expert testimony. The offered testimony does little more than vouch for the credibility of another witness and thereby encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations. Charley, 189 F.3d at 1267. The judge was well within his discretion in determining that the evidence lacked relevance and would not assist the trier of fact as required by Rule 702. Id.