Opinion ID: 852992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Charging Discretion

Text: We now turn to Dugan's second argument. Based on the contention that Dugan violated § 7.1-5-5-2, the State charged Dugan with official misconduct pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-44-1-2, which provides in pertinent part: A public servant who: (1) knowingly or intentionally performs an act that he is forbidden by law to perform; ... commits official misconduct, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, the court held the official misconduct statute was not the appropriate statute with which to charge Dugan. Dugan, 769 N.E.2d at 238. It said that while Ind.Code § 35-44-1-2 may generally apply to a person who violates Ind.Code § 7.1-5-5-2, Ind.Code § 7.1-5-1-8 is intended to cover violations of Title 7.1 that do not have a specific penalty already attached. Id. Because § 7.1-5-5-2 does not provide a specific punishment for the prohibited conduct, the Court of Appeals held that § 7.1-5-1-8 was the appropriate statute with which to charge Dugan. Indiana Code § 7.1-5-1-8 provides: A person who violates a provision of this title for which no other penalty is provided commits a Class B misdemeanor. The State contends that it has discretion concerning the filing of charges. We agree. Where multiple statutes are applicable under given circumstances, the State has the discretion of prosecuting under any or all of the applicable statutes. See Hendrix v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind.2001); Skinner v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind.2000); Adams v. State, 262 Ind. 220, 314 N.E.2d 53, 56 (1974). Here, both Ind.Code §§ 7.1-5-1-8 and 35-44-1-2(1) can apply. The State chose to charge Dugan under the latter statute, which proscribes official misconduct. Although the language of Ind. Code § 35-44-1-2(1) is broad and general, the heart of the issue in an official misconduct charge is explicit: whether the act was done by a public official in the course of his official duties. See Daugherty v. State, 466 N.E.2d 46 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (Judge Ratliff concurring). There must be a connection between the charge and the duties of the office. A charge for misconduct must rest upon criminal behavior that is related to the performance of official duties. See e.g. State v. Schultz, 71 N.J. 590, 367 A.2d 423 (1976) (forgeries of endorsements on checks received in payment of traffic fines which forgeries were done by clerk receiving the checks). Needless to say, if the misconduct bears no relation to the official duties, there is no official misconduct. Id. See e.g. Kauffman v. Glassboro, 181 N.J.Super. 273, 437 A.2d 334 (Ct.App.Div.1981) (burglary by a police officer held unrelated to official duties). In the case at bar, Dugan was employed as a state excise police officer for the Indiana ABC. The Indiana State Excise Police is the enforcement arm of the ABC, charged with the primary responsibility of policing the alcoholic beverage industry in Indiana. [4] The excise police enforce the laws that regulate permit holdersthose who are legally permitted to sell and serve alcoholic beverages, as well as those not legally entitled to sell alcoholic beverages. [5] Indiana Code § 7.1-5-5-2 makes it unlawful for an officer of the commission to receive a gratuity from a person applying for or receiving a permit to sell alcoholic beverages. A violation of Ind.Code § 7.1-5-5-2 obviously bears a significant connection to the official duties of an excise officer. That there is another equally applicable statute is of no consequence. Therefore, it was appropriate and within the State's discretion to decide to charge Dugan with official misconduct.