Opinion ID: 2785351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tormey’s Counterclaims4

Text: Tormey next contends the district court erred by granting judgment as a matter of law on his counterclaims. The district court found Tormey’s counterclaims were 4 Because Tormey and Tormedco appear collectively for this portion of the appeal, we refer to them simply as Tormey. -10- barred by the statute of limitations, and Tormey failed to present sufficient evidence to toll the period based on a theory of estoppel. On appeal, Tormey argues he reasonably relied on the “walk-away agreement” until at least May 2009 and asserted his claims in February 2011, which resulted in his claims being filed within the twoyear statute of limitations provided in the representative agreement. Consequently, Tormey asserts his counterclaims were not time-barred. Contrary to Tormey’s assertion, we find the district court did not err by granting judgment as a matter of law on Tormey’s counterclaims. Although Tormey does not specify the particular theory of estoppel upon which he relies, based on the claims he alleges and cases he cites, we find he is relying on promissory estoppel to toll the statute of limitations. See Bracewell v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 748 F.3d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding “[a] claim is more appropriately analyzed under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, not equitable estoppel, where representations upon which the plaintiff allegedly relied are more akin to statements of future intent than past or present fact”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under Minnesota law, oral promises which constitute a credit agreement within the ambit of § 513.33 cannot be enforced under a theory of promissory estoppel; the promises must be in writing. See Bracewell, 748 F.3d at 796 (affirming the dismissal of a complaint alleging promissory estoppel because the claim of an oral agreement was barred by the Minnesota Credit Agreement Statute); BankCherokee, 779 N.W.2d at 903 (affirming summary judgment because the appellant could not assert promissory estoppel as an affirmative defense on the basis of an oral promise which constituted a credit agreement under § 513.33); Christensen v. PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1044 (D. Minn. 2013) (citing cases standing for the proposition that allowing parties to assert promissory estoppel as a mechanism to enforce an alleged oral promise would constitute an “end run” around the writing requirements of § 513.33). As a result, Tormey cannot assert promissory estoppel on the basis of the “walk-away agreement” to toll the statute of limitations because there -11- is not a writing evidencing the “walk-away agreement.” We therefore find the district court properly determined Tormey’s counterclaims were time-barred.