Opinion ID: 2444929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scott's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Text: On appeal, Scott raises twelve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. [24] Each of these claims is addressed below.
Scott first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the admission of Kelly and Ester Oster's medical records documenting their injuries and treatment, when neither witness testified at trial. Although the jury found Scott not guilty of the assault charges involving Kelly and Ester Oster, Scott argues that his counsel's failure to object prejudiced him, because the medical records contradicted his defense of extreme emotional distress. That contradiction, Scott contends, caused the jury to convict him of having a reckless disregard for human life, i.e., second-degree murder. [25] Scott's claim fails for two reasons. First, the trial court properly admitted Kelly and Ester Oster's medical records into evidence as hearsay exceptions under Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence (DRE) 803(4) and 803(6). [26] Therefore, Scott's counsel would not have successfully prevented the admission of these documents, regardless of whether the Osters testified. Moreover, Scott was acquitted of the two assault charges involving Kelly and Ester Oster. His second-degree murder conviction rests on a totally separate basisthe injuries he inflicted on Edna Crown, resulting in her death. Because Scott cannot show actual prejudice, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying Scott's claim.
Next, Scott claims that the police obtained a nighttime search warrant based on a false police affidavit, and that his counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the defective warrant. Specifically, Scott claims that the police knew that Kelly Oster did not reside at the searched apartment, even though the police affidavit stated otherwise. [27] This claim cannot succeed either. Under Franks v. Delaware , suppression is an appropriate remedy only if the false statement was included in the affidavit knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, and the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause. [28] Here, the Superior Court accepted the Commissioner's conclusion that the search warrant established probable cause regardless of whether Kelly Oster was a resident. Scott has not shown that the affidavit misstatement regarding Oster's residency was necessary to the finding of probable cause. Equally important, Scott's counsel did, in fact, move to suppress the evidence based on a lack of exigent circumstances for a nighttime search warrant. The trial court denied counsel's motion, and this Court affirmed on direct appeal. [29] Because Scott cannot succeed on either the deficient performance or the actual prejudice component of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying that claim.
Scott next claims that his counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress his statements to the police when they handcuffed him. He urges that the statements would have been suppressed because he was neither told that he was under arrest nor advised of his Miranda rights. This claim also lacks merit. Miranda warnings are required when a defendant is subject to custodial interrogation. [30] Scott, however, made his statements voluntarily and spontaneously as he was being taken into custody by the police. [31] Because there was no interrogation by the police, Miranda is inapplicable. Scott's counsel, therefore, did not perform deficiently by not moving to suppress Scott's spontaneous statements, and the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying Scott's third claim.
Scott's fourth claim is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to insist on a voir dire examination of a juror after the juror informed the court that she was taking pain medication. Scott argues that because most prescription pain relievers contain narcotics, the juror was impaired and preoccupied with her pain during the trial and, therefore, could not be fair and impartial. This claim also fails. The juror was questioned about her medical issue, and told the trial judge that it would not interfere with performing her duty as a juror. [32] The judge, defense counsel, and counsel for the State were sufficiently satisfied to allow the juror to continue to serve. Because Scott's contention that his counsel performed deficiently or that he was actually prejudiced lacks merit, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying Scott's claim.
Scott's fifth claim is that counsel's performance was ineffective for failing to move to suppress all of Scott's statements to the police on the ground that, due to his history of intoxication and drug use, he was unable to understand the Miranda warnings given to him. As discussed above, Scott's statements to the police at the time of his arrest were voluntary and spontaneous, and not a result of police interrogation. Therefore, Miranda does not apply to these statements. Nor can Scott argue that, because of his prior drug and alcohol use, he was incapable of understanding the Miranda warnings given to him during a later taped interview with the police, because he did invoke his right to remain silent and the trial court granted defense counsel's motion to suppress those taped interview statements. Scott's counsel did not perform deficiently, and the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by rejecting this claim.
Scott's sixth claim is that both his trial and appellate counsel erred by failing to object to the admission of his statements to the emergency medical technician (EMT), on the ground that those statements were inadmissible hearsay. Scott's counsel did not err, because under DRE 801(d)(2), those statements were not hearsay. Rather, they were admissions by Scott, [33] for which reason Scott's trial and appellate counsel had no basis to object to their admission into evidence. Because Scott cannot succeed either on his claim that his counsel performed deficiently or that he suffered prejudice, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in rejecting that claim.
Next, Scott argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not appealing the trial judge's ruling that limited scope of the cross-examination of the State's psychiatric expert witness, Dr. Weiss, who testified adversely to Scott's defense of extreme emotional distress. [34] Scott contends that his counsel should have been allowed to cross-examine Dr. Weiss about testimony Dr. Weiss gave in a previous (unrelated) Pennsylvania case. In that case, Dr. Weiss testified that an accurate psychiatric evaluation can be made only if there is a trusting relationship between the therapist and the patient. Scott argues that because he and Dr. Weiss did not have a trusting relationship, Dr. Weiss could not have evaluated him accurately, and counsel should have been allowed to develop that fact in cross-examination. Scott's counsel did not err by not raising this argument on appeal. In Jones v. Barnes , the United States Supreme Court held that although a defendant has the final authority to make certain fundamental decisions such as whether to plead guilty or to take an appeal, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel his counsel to raise issues that counsel, in exercising his own independent and professional strategic judgment, decides not to present. [35] Scott's counsel stated in his affidavit that he did not argue this issue because [he] did not believe that there was any chance that [this Court] would reverse based on the circumstances of the ruling. Moreover, Scott's trial counsel did, in fact, cross-examine Dr. Weiss on the underlying issue of whether an accurate evaluation required a patient to trust the psychiatrist. Dr. Weiss' response was that in Scott's case, that trust was not required. Scott's appellate counsel did not perform deficiently by choosing not to raise this particular argument on direct appeal, nor has Scott demonstrated actual prejudice. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying Scott's claim.
Scott's eighth claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a hearsay objection to a police officer's testimony about statements he overheard Scott make while leaving the courthouse. Scott's eighth claim fails for the same reason as his sixth. Under DRE 801(d)(2), Scott's statements are treated as a party admission, and are not hearsay. [36] Because there was no basis for raising a hearsay objection, Scott's counsel did not perform deficiently by not objecting. The trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion in denying this claim.