Opinion ID: 853370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Statute as a Redefinition of the Mens Rea Requirement

Text: Because we conclude that a statute may properly impose criminal liability for some actions without a mens rea element, the question becomes whether the statute before us does that. We think Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996), is instructive on that point. Four Justices constituted the plurality sustaining the Montana statute in Egelhoff on the ground that a state may exclude relevant evidence if its exclusion does not offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Id. at 43, 116 S.Ct. 2013 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). After examining the history of voluntary intoxication in much more detail than is recounted here, the Court then concluded that a voluntary intoxication defense is not a fundamental right protected by federal due process. Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and O'Connor, in individual concurrences or dissents, agreed that a state could constitutionally define the mental element of a crime to be satisfied by voluntary intoxication. Justice Ginsburg thought that this was the proper view of the Montana statute and concurred on that basis. Id. at 59-60, 116 S.Ct. 2013. Justice Souter also thought the statute seemed to do that, but felt constrained by the Montana Supreme Court's position that the statute prevented the introduction of relevant evidence and therefore violated due process. Id. at 73-74, 116 S.Ct. 2013. Justice O'Connor agreed that a state could constitutionally define mens rea, but read the statute to exclude relevant evidence, and, therefore, to deny procedural due process. Id. at 71-73, 116 S.Ct. 2013. Unlike the Montana Supreme Court, we read the Indiana statute as redefining the elements of crimes, and not as excluding relevant evidence. As a matter of form, the statute does not speak in terms of admissible evidence. It was added to the Indiana Code as a new section for Chapter 35-41-2, which is entitled Basis of Criminal Liability, itself a part of Article 35-41, entitled Substantive Criminal Provisions. This reading is reinforced by our knowledge that the Indiana statute was adopted after Egelhoff, and with the benefit of its analysis and the knowledge that the result in Egelhoff turned on Justice Ginsburg's reading of the Montana statute. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, pointed out that reading the Montana statute as equivalent to a redefinition of the mental elements of crimes has some potentially anomalous results. Id. at 79, 116 S.Ct. 2013. He asks why, if this were the intended result, would the legislation not have done so explicitly. Id. at 80, 116 S.Ct. 2013. We think Egelhoff itself suggests the answer to that question for Indiana. The language of the Indiana statute is essentially identical to the Montana version, which had already passed federal constitutional muster in Egelhoff. That is a good enough reason for the Indiana legislature to stick with the tried and true. Second, and less important, the criminal laws of this state are filled with various mens rea provisions. An attempt to redefine all in a single provision would fit poorly with the codification effort to group statutes in logically related categories, and amending these crimes piecemeal would be a much more daunting drafting task. Because we view the voluntary intoxication statute as defining the elements of crimes in this state, we do not find it offensive to either the federal due process clause or any notion of fundamental fairness embedded in our state constitution. Because the statute does not exclude relevant evidence, it does not necessarily proscribe evidence of the defendant's use of alcohol or drugs. Rather, as occurred in this case, this evidence may be admissible as general background, [13] or as relevant to something other than lack of mens rea, e.g., identity. Perhaps it may also be relevant to a claim of accident under other circumstances. But none of these issues are raised here. This is not to say, as the concurrence contends, that other rules of evidence, specifically, Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b), may not preclude use of this evidence if the defense objects. To the contrary, Swanson v. State, 666 N.E.2d 397, 398-99 (Ind.1996), cited by the concurrence, holds that Rule 404(b) may preclude evidence of other bad acts. We think this holding is fully consistent with our ruling today. Here, evidence of defendant's intoxication was admitted and embraced by the defendant. If such evidence is admitted, the instruction given by the trial court is proper. Moreover, the trial court may properly exclude evidence of blood alcohol content, as was done in this case, if it finds that it bears solely on the degree of intoxication. The concurrence purports to agree with Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Egelhoff. But as already noted, although Justice O'Connor readily agreed with the plurality that a state could constitutionally redefine the mens rea elements to elevate voluntary intoxication, she felt bound by the Montana Supreme Court's view of the Montana statute. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 71-73, 116 S.Ct. 2013. Because we construe our statute as redefining the requisite mens rea, we assume Justice O'Connor would agree that the Indiana statute is constitutional under federal law. In sum, we agree with the concurrence that the State is obligated to prove all elements of a crime. And we agree that a defendant has a right to present relevant evidence to negate an element of any charged offense. But we disagree with the concurrence that the voluntary intoxication statute denies this right. The statute redefines the requirement of mens rea to include voluntary intoxication, in addition to the traditional mental states, i.e., intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly. Thus, evidence of voluntary intoxication does not negate the mens rea requirement, as the concurrence contends. Rather, it satisfies this element of the crime.