Opinion ID: 526048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: government's use of perjured testimony

Text: 10 At trial, the government elicited the opinion of Fire Marshal George W. Powell that the fire of August 25, 1981, the basis of predicate act one, had been intentionally set. He testified that he reached this conclusion because he smelled gasoline on the clothes of Angel Guzman, who died in the fire and whose remains were found during the excavation. The defendants maintain that this testimony was false, that the government knew it to be such, and that, accordingly, the conviction must be reversed and a new trial granted. They premise their argument that Powell's testimony was palpably false on his failure to state in reports of his investigation of the fire or in earlier testimony that he had smelled gasoline on Guzman's clothing. This argument lacks merit. 11 Powell's earlier silence provides an insufficient basis upon which to find that the later testimony was false. At most, Powell's testimony differed from, but did not contradict, what he said earlier. However, even if this testimony had conflicted directly with that given previously, the difference alone would not constitute perjury. 12 Presentation of a witness who recants or contradicts his prior testimony is not to be confused with ... perjury. It was for the jury to decide whether or not to credit the witness. 13 United States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d 1018, 1019 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831, 99 S.Ct. 108, 58 L.Ed.2d 125 (1978). See also United States v. Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir.) (inconsistencies between witness's statements before grand jury and at trial do not warrant inference that government knowingly used false testimony), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1218, 104 S.Ct. 2666, 81 L.Ed.2d 371 (1984); United States ex rel. Burnett v. Illinois, 619 F.2d 668, 674 (7th Cir.) (Contradictory testimony does not constitute perjury.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880, 101 S.Ct. 229, 66 L.Ed.2d 104 (1980). Nor does the fact that Powell's testimony conflicted with that of the defendants' expert at an earlier trial support an inference of perjury. 3 Cf. United States v. Miranne, 688 F.2d 980, 989 (5th Cir.1982) (differing testimony of two government witnesses presented at most a credibility question for the jury), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109, 103 S.Ct. 736, 74 L.Ed.2d 959 (1983); United States v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 827 (5th Cir.1981) (proof that testimony is challenged by another witness or is inconsistent with prior statements is insufficient to establish due process violation). Powell's failure to report the smell of gasoline on Guzman's clothing earlier was at most a point for the defense counsel to place before the jury for its resolution. 14 Moreover, even if Powell's prior silence were to establish that his testimony was perjured, the defendants could not prevail because there is no evidence that the government knew or should have known the testimony to be false. 4 United States v. Holladay, 566 F.2d at 1019 (affirming conviction where there was no evidence that prosecution knew or believed testimony to be false); United States v. Miranne, 688 F.2d at 989 (reversal not warranted where there was no evidence that government had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged perjury).