Opinion ID: 1749555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err in overruling griffin's motion to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy?

Text: This appeal presents the single issue of whether, under the state and federal constitution the rule in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), and Sanders v. State, 429 So.2d 245 (Miss. 1983), an acquittal for aiding and abetting jury tampering presents a double jeopardy bar to a later prosecution based upon the same conduct and charging conspiracy to jury tamper. The Mississippi Constitution, Article 3 § 22 provides: No person's life or liberty shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense; but there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on the merits to bar another prosecution. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States also protects an accused against double jeopardy, and this protection against double jeopardy is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1190-91, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 471 (1970). The language of the federal double jeopardy clause is substantially the same as the Mississippi double jeopardy clause. This Court enforces rights secured to its citizens by the Constitution of the United States. Sanders v. State, 429 So.2d 245, 248 (Miss. 1983); Bolton v. City of Greenville, 178 So.2d 667, 672 (Miss. 1965). In the former jury tampering prosecution, Willie Griffin was charged with influencing prospective juror Beverly Powe Hogan. The State attempted to prove the offense by showing that Willie was present in Milton Tutwiler's home when Willie's brother, Melvin, attempted to enlist Tutwiler's assistance in influencing the juror. There was also evidence that Melvin told Tutwiler that they had been by to juror Beverly Powe Hogan's house en route to Tutwiler's house. The jury was instructed in the former case that the crime was obstruction of justice by an attempt to tamper with a juror. The jury was instructed that it could convict if it found that Griffin did  any act which is an element of the crime, or immediately connected with it, or leading to its commission, [he] is as much a principal as if he had himself committed the whole offense. (Emphasis added). The jury acquitted Griffin. In this conspiracy prosecution, the State seeks to introduce the same factual circumstance; the State admitted that the sole evidence it had to implicate Griffin in the conspiracy was proof that he had allegedly attempted to tamper with juror Beverly Powe Hogan. The same facts and testimony had been pursued by the State in the prior prosecution against Griffin which resulted in his acquittal. The double jeopardy question raised [1] is whether this prosecution is foreclosed by the prior acquittal. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), held that the State cannot put on proof that conflicts with or questions the findings of fact implicit in a prior acquittal because the Fifth Amendment's guaranty against double jeopardy protects a man who has been acquitted from having to run the gauntlet a second time. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446, 90 S.Ct. at 1195; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 205 (1957). The State is forbidden to treat a first trial, at which the defendant is acquitted, as a dry run for a second prosecution. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 447, 90 S.Ct. at 1196. The disposition of this case is controlled by the Ashe rational jury test, which is what a rational jury could and could not have decided based upon an examination of what was presented and argued to the jury. Sanders v. State, 429 So.2d 245, 248 (Miss. 1983). As stated in Ashe, Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this approach requires a court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. The evidence in the jury tampering prosecution at most suggested that Griffin was an accessory before the fact. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-3 (1972). The only rational explanation for the jury verdict in the jury tampering prosecution was that the jury believed that there was insufficient proof that Griffin did any act connected with or leading to the crime of attempting to influence juror Beverly Powe Hogan sufficient to make him an accessory. As a matter of common sense that which on the record before us may have suggested that Willie Griffin was a conspirator would similarly have compelled a finding that he was an accessory. Peoples v. State, 501 So.2d 424, 429 (Miss. 1987); Malone v. State, 486 So.2d 360, 363 (Miss. 1986). Because Griffin has been acquitted of the accessory/jury tampering charge, it follows that he may not now be prosecuted for conspiracy to jury tamper consistent with the double jeopardy clause. The State, by pursuing this conspiracy prosecution, seeks a result which would be irreconcilable with the prior acquittal. By basing its evidence of Griffin's membership in a conspiracy upon his alleged attempt to tamper with juror Beverly Powe Hogan, the State seeks to have Griffin convicted of the exact conduct for which he has been acquitted. The second prosecution, therefore, is barred by double jeopardy, and the trial court erred in denying Griffin's motion to dismiss based on the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Therefore, the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss should be reversed and rendered. The conspiracy indictment against Griffin should be quashed, and the defendant discharged. DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS REVERSED AND RENDERED; CONSPIRACY INDICTMENT QUASHED AND DEFENDANT DISCHARGED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, and BLASS, JJ., concur. PITTMAN, J., not participating.