Opinion ID: 4564893
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Presented by Brown

Text: Standard of Review: The trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 494 (6th Cir. 1991). When there is no contemporaneous objection, we review the trial judge’s conduct during trial for plain error. United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 957–58 (6th Cir. 2006).
Brown first argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to introduce an exhibit that, in three different variations, he tried to introduce several times. Brown faced the problem that his forging of the receipts had thrown into doubt the validity of the Nos. 19-5483/5550/5551/5562 Hanover Am. Ins. Co. v. Tattooed Page 11 Millionaire Ent’mt, et al. inventory of Business Personal Property (i.e., studio gear) that he had sent to Hanover. His attorneys therefore hit upon the idea of using a combination of photographs and video stills that they had introduced showing the pre-fire state of the studio, testimony from Brown, and testimony from appraiser Ronnie Joe Bean, to recreate the list. While the idea might have had some merit—the judge eventually concluded that, had he been properly asked, he would have admitted Bean as an expert and that the methodology of the proposed list might have been sound—it ran into several problems. First and foremost was timing. Brown’s attorney first sought to introduce the exhibit on re-cross (really a re-direct) of Brown.6 The judge correctly ruled that the document, being part of Brown’s case-in-chief, should have come in on direct and that it was now outside the scope of the “re-cross” under Federal Rule of Evidence 611. Brown tried to introduce the document repeatedly on the following day of trial, during Bean’s testimony. Here, deeper problems emerged. As the district court explained, any such list would be a summary, under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, of materials too voluminous to be introduced into court. But that Rule requires that the “proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for examination . . . by other parties . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 1006. In the court’s view, Brown could not satisfy that requirement, because the original list that had been submitted to the insurance company was tainted all the way through by Brown’s fraud.7 See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Brown might have been able to recreate (or re-substantiate) the list by identifying pieces of equipment from photographs of the studio that were available, but Brown had not been asked to do so when he first testified. Not all the photographs that Brown wished to rely on had been introduced into evidence. Finally, in order to testify to values in this way, Bean would have to be declared an expert witness, which under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 meant he would 6 Due to the cross-suits, each party was required to defend and prosecute at once. Hanover, moreover, called Brown adversely as part of its case-in-chief, though his testimony was also part of his own case-in-chief. His testimony was therefore given (as was that of the three other defendants) in the following format: direct examination by Hanover’s attorney (who was permitted to examine as if on cross), followed by “cross-examination” by Brown’s own attorney, then questioning from the other defendants’ attorneys, then “re-direct” from Hanover, and finally recross by Brown’s attorney. It was not until this very last examination that Brown’s lawyer sought to introduce the document. 7 We note, however, that no limiting instruction was given when this document was admitted. Nos. 19-5483/5550/5551/5562 Hanover Am. Ins. Co. v. Tattooed Page 12 Millionaire Ent’mt, et al. have had to submit a report prior to testimony. So, the judge summed up, the proposed exhibit now had problems under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 1006. As the district court observed, Brown’s lawyer was trying to “build the ship as we sail,” and it was too late. In the midst of trying to address these issues—and realizing at least some of his mistakes—counsel sought to reopen Brown’s testimony after he was done with Bean. The district court denied this, ruling that nothing had precluded Brown from properly putting on this evidence the first time around. It is not entirely clear which of these decisions Brown now appeals. His brief complains primarily of the judge’s refusal to allow Brown’s counsel to re-cross Brown, not the refusal to admit the documents per se. Brown also briefly addresses the judge’s refusing to allow Brown’s testimony to be reopened, but he does not make arguments regarding the Bean testimony or the evidentiary rulings as to the proposed exhibits themselves. In any event, none of these decisions can be said to be an abuse of discretion. Hanover points to the case of Wyatt v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 59 F.3d 172 (6th Cir. 1995) (table), in which we upheld, as not an abuse of discretion, a trial judge’s refusal to allow a litigant to introduce an affidavit in redirect examination as outside the scope of the previous examination. That citation is well taken. But more than that, the multiple evidentiary problems with Brown’s proposed course of action, at the time he proposed it, make it clear that the trial judge was well within his discretion in ruling as he did.
Brown also argues that the trial court committed plain error by imposing a time limit on Brown and not (according to him) placing one on Hanover. He makes this argument conclusorily, in two paragraphs without a meaningful citation. Even before reaching the law on this argument, the argument is not supported by the facts. The trial judge imposed a two-hour time limit on each side for questioning Brown as a witness. Our review of the record, moreover, shows that the district court was acting sensibly to try to rein in and channel lawyers on both Nos. 19-5483/5550/5551/5562 Hanover Am. Ins. Co. v. Tattooed Page 13 Millionaire Ent’mt, et al. sides who were being argumentative, circuitous, or did not have a firm grasp on their case, the Rules of Evidence, and the Rules of Procedure. (See infra Section II.C.) “[A] district court has broad discretion to place limits on the presentation of evidence to prevent delay, waste of time, and needless presentation of cumulative material.” Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 40 F. App’x 104, 108 (6th Cir. 2002). The district court operated well within that broad discretion in this case.
Brown’s third argument is that the district court denied him a fair trial by intervening excessively to question witnesses himself, thus impermissibly interfering with Brown’s ability to put on a case. This claim also has no merit. Brown relies on United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir. 1979), in which we disapproved of extensive judicial intrusion into the case via the questioning of witnesses. But in Hickman, the judge interrupted the defense counsel more than 250 times over the course of a one-day trial. Id. at 932. A review of the record in the case before us reveals nothing even close to that. Indeed, Brown cites not one specific instance in his brief, much less 250. To be sure, the judge interrupted Brown a few times. (Hanover estimates five or six.) But the character of these interruptions is far from the prejudicial interference that Hickman was worried about. The court’s interruptions in this case were designed to get to the point or help Brown’s counsel in his attempt to introduce evidence—interventions that must be classified as either neutral or helpful, and are consonant with the proper role of the trial judge. Nor were such interruptions unique to Brown’s counsel. In general, the judge had to intervene with several of the lawyers so that they would develop evidence in ways that were consistent with the Rules and common practice, or occasionally to question witnesses himself. There was no abuse of the trial judge’s role here, much less plain error. Brown has raised three issues to no avail. We AFFIRM the decision of the district court in Brown’s case, No. 19-5550/-5551. Nos. 19-5483/5550/5551/5562 Hanover Am. Ins. Co. v. Tattooed Page 14 Millionaire Ent’mt, et al.