Opinion ID: 410398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pro Se Defense.

Text: 31 Fulford also contends that he was unconstitutionally denied the right to defend pro se, either with or without the assistance of counsel, in violation of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). If our remand results in a finding that Fulford was competent during his trial, the question of his right to defend pro se will resurface. Therefore, to avoid the possibility of yet another appeal, we now address this issue. 32 An examination of Faretta reveals its inapplicability to the present action. There the defendant, from the outset, refused court appointed counsel and indicated his preference to defend in proper person. The trial judge was aware of Faretta's decision several weeks before trial but nevertheless ordered him to be represented by the office of the public defender. Here, Fulford retained his own attorney and did not express his desire to defend in proper person until after the jury had been selected and sworn. 33 While this circuit has not definitively ruled on the present issue, we find nothing in Faretta to suggest that the Court intended to overrule the numerous decisions holding that the trial court may properly deny a defendant's motion to defend pro se when it is not made until the day of trial. Accordingly, it is our view that once trial begins the right to defend in the proper person ceases to be absolute. At that point it lies within the trial court's discretion whether to permit the accused to proceed pro se. In reaching its decision, the trial court must balance whatever prejudice is alleged by the defense against such factors as disruption of the proceedings, inconvenience and delay, and possible confusion of the jury. Sapienza v. Vincient, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir.1976); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321 (4th Cir.1979). We will review such a determination only for an abuse of discretion. Id. 34 We note that ordinarily a dialogue between the court and the defendant will help effectuate consideration of the reasons underlying an accused's request. Such a dialogue will also assist in determining the trial court's probable reasoning in the grant or denial of an accused's motion where, such as here, the court has not expressly stated its reasons. On the present facts the absence of such a dialogue is not fatal. The trial court was presented with a pro se motion made by a defendant who, the previous day, had requested a competency hearing. Since trial had commenced, the resolution of that motion was solely within the sound discretion of the trial court. We find no abuse. 35