Opinion ID: 1763781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurors Alleged to be Improperly Excused.

Text: Hunt contends that three jurors were excused for cause because they expressed that they could not impose the death penalty when, actually, they had only imposed hesitancy to impose the penalty and, accordingly, should not have been excused. The three jurors were Juror 96, Juror 42, and Juror 24. The leading United States Supreme Court cases on death qualification, i.e., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); and Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), address the circumstances under which a potential juror may be excused for cause because of the juror's bias against imposition of the death penalty. Witherspoon held that strikes for cause could not be employed to empanel a jury predisposed to return a verdict of death, 391 U.S. at 521-23, 88 S.Ct. 1770; and that [u]nless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, id. at 515 n. 9, 88 S.Ct. 1770, it cannot be assumed that such is that person's position simply because the juror expressed reservations or scruples about the death penalty. Id. Although Witherspoon also states [t]hat the most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, id. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, Adams, supra , explained that  Witherspoon is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror. It is rather a limitation on the State's power to exclude. 448 U.S. at 47-48, 100 S.Ct. 2521. [T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844 (quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521). If so, the removal of so-called ` Witherspoon -excludables' serves the State's entirely proper interest in obtaining a single jury that could impartially decide all the issues in [a death penalty] case. McCree, 476 U.S. at 180, 106 S.Ct. 1758; Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 654 (Ky.2003). During his voir dire questioning, Juror 96 stated on several occasions unequivocally that he could not give the death penalty. Under questioning by defense counsel, the hypothetical was posed that if he were on the jury and the judge ordered him to consider the death penalty, would he; and the juror responded that he would consider it but would not vote for it. However, under further questioning, he again stated he could consider it. Because of the inconsistency, the trial court followed up with a question again asking the juror if he could impose the death penalty and he stated that he could not. In light of Juror 96's plainly expressed firm conviction against the death penalty, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking him for cause. During her voir dire questioning, Juror 42, when asked if she would have problems voting for any of the possible punishments, responded I don't know about death. When asked if she could impose the death penalty under any circumstance she responded I don't know, I don't know and I would struggle with death and I don't think I could. Under further questioning, she responded I don't think I could do death ... I just don't think I could, and again I just don't think I could. Under later questioning she again stated that she would have a problem considering death; and she would really struggle if required to consider death. Nevertheless, Hunt points to Juror 42's response to the hypothetical question of what would she do if she were on the jury and the trial court ordered her to consider the death penalty. The juror responded well if I am in that room, I am going to have to. Though her response to the hypothetical question could be interpreted as a willingness to give proper consideration to the death penalty, in light of the overall tone and tenor of her other answers expressing severe difficulties in giving consideration to the death penalty, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Juror 42 for cause. In her voir dire questioning, Juror 24 on several occasions, expressed straightforwardly that she could not consider the death penalty as a possible sentence. Upon questioning by defense counsel, she answered to a hypothetical question that maybe she could consider it. She then reverted to her position that she could not consider the death penalty. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking this juror for cause. In summary, we find no reversible error occurred as a result of the various claims raised by Hunt relating to voir dire and jury selection issues.