Opinion ID: 2508094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: ISSUE 1: Did the district court err in denying Denney's motion to correct an illegal sentence?

Text: Denney argues that his sentence in 93 CR 1343  like his sentence in 88 CR 744  should have been converted to a determinate one. Accordingly, he claims it is an illegal sentence. The State responds that such a conversion is not allowed by statute. The issue of whether a criminal sentence is illegal is a question of law. Our review of questions of law is unlimited. State v. Harper, 275 Kan. 888, 889, 69 P.3d. 1105 (2003). As K.S.A. 22-3504(1) states: The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. The defendant shall receive full credit for time spent in custody under the sentence prior to correction. The defendant shall have a right to a hearing, after reasonable notice to be fixed by the court, to be personally present and to have the assistance of counsel in any proceeding for the correction of an illegal sentence. Criminal statutes and penalties in effect at the time of a criminal offense are controlling. State v. Mayberry, 248 Kan. 369, Syl. ¶ 15, 807 P.2d 86 (1991). The statute which governs the issue of sentence conversion in the instant case is K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-3717(f). That statute, which was substantially amended in 1994, provided at subsection (f): If an inmate is sentenced to prison for a crime committed after July 1, 1993, while on parole or conditional release for a crime committed prior to July 1, 1993, the old sentence shall be converted into a determinate sentence and will run consecutive to the new sentence as follows: (1) Twelve months for class C, D or E felonies or the conditional release date whichever is shorter; (2) 36 months for class A or B felonies or the conditional release date whichever is shorter. Denney was on parole in 87 CR 944 when he committed the crimes in 93 CR 1268 and 93 CR 1343. The statute requires that the old sentence, in 87 CR 944, be converted from an indeterminate sentence to a determinate one. While the crimes charged in 93 CR 1343 were indisputably committed prior to July 1, 1993 (in October 1992), Denney was not on parole or conditional release in that case when he committed the crimes in 93 CR 1268 (July 16, 1993). Therefore, K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-3717(f) does not provide for the sentence in 93 CR 1343 to be converted to a determinate one. Moreover, K.S.A. 22-3504 does not automatically require a full hearing upon the filing of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. As we stated in State v. Mebane, 278 Kan. 131, 138, 91 P.3d 1175 (2004). Rather, when a defendant files such a motion, the district court has a duty to make a preliminary examination of the motion to determine if substantial issues of law or fact are raised. If there are none, the court may summarily dismiss the motion. Only if the court finds that the motion raises substantial issues of law or fact must the court then hold a hearing in the presence of the defendant with defense counsel. State v. Duke, 263 Kan. at 196. Since the language in K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-3717(f) regarding conversion is clear, there were no substantial issues of law or fact raised by Denney's argument. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing his motion. Denney next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to apply his jail time credit earned in 87 CR 944 to his sentences in 93 CR 1343 and 93 CR 1268. He calculates this credit to be 6 years, 3 months, and 8 days. The DOC's Inmate Data Summary for Denney states: 9/20/02 Sent. reviewed and recertified. The inmates [ sic ] sentence begins date on the 36-life was computed from court orders. The old indeterminate is considered to be satisfied per Mandate. Since old sentence is not aggragated [ sic ] with the new sentence (being satisfied) there is no Prior Penal Credit. Denney relies on Payton v. State, 22 Kan. App. 2d 843, 923 P.2d 1059 (1996), to support his argument. Payton, while on parole for an aggravated battery committed in 1991, committed robbery and possessed narcotics after July 1, 1993. Pursuant to K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-3717(f), he had his old indeterminate sentence converted to 12 months, which was to run consecutive to his new sentence. As the court stated: This gave Payton a new sentence of 69 months' incarceration [57 (new) + 12 (original then converted)]. 22 Kan. App. 2d at 844. Payton argued in a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 that he should receive 3 years' jail time credit against the converted 12-month sentence, which effectively meant his sentence had been fully served. The trial court, however, held that only the unused portion of the sentence had been converted, and Payton still owed the 12 months. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that inmates whose sentences are converted are not required to serve the KSGA sentence in addition to the time already served, but are released if the jail time credit already exceeds the inmate's KSGA converted sentence. 22 Kan App. 2d at 847. Accordingly, Payton is entitled to conversion of his entire indeterminate sentence, and given his time served, he has completed his sentence for the crimes committed in 1991. 22 Kan. App. 2d at 847. Payton is of no assistance to Denney, however. The Court of Appeals expressly noted: This decision, of course, does not affect the 57-month sentence imposed for the robbery and possession of narcotics convictions. 22 Kan. App. 2d at 848. Campbell v. State, 223 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 2, 575 P.2d 524 (1978), is more blunt: A defendant is not entitled to credit on a sentence for time which he has spent in jail upon other, distinct, and wholly unrelated charges. See also State v. Calderon, 233 Kan. 87, 97, 661 P.2d 781 (1983) (The provisions of K.S.A. 21-4614 are mandatory and require that a criminal defendant sentenced to incarceration be given credit for all time spent in custody solely on the charge for which he is being sentenced.). Denney's indeterminate sentence was converted to a determinate one of 36 months in 87 CR 944. Because Denney had already served more than 36 months on that sentence, he had nothing left to serve on it. His jail time credit from that sentence, however, does not apply to sentences for other crimes in his other cases, 93 CR 1343 and 93 CR 1268. Clearly, no hearing with Denney and an appointed counsel present was needed to make this determination.