Opinion ID: 1585773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was it error to allow the default judgment?

Text: Vining is charged with, among other things, the violation of Disciplinary Rule 6-101 of Code of Professional Responsibility. DR6-101 reads as follows: (A) A lawyer shall not:       (3) neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. There are other charges but this is the gravamen of the more serious of the complaints against Vining. The undisputed evidence presented to the Complaint Tribunal was that Vining accepted employment and then neglected the case though he regularly told his client that he was handling the matter. As a result nothing was done in the case and the statute of limitations ran. Vining argues that the Complaint Tribunal would have dismissed his claim because, among other things, his actions caused no harm to his client and he had told his client that the case was not a good one and to seek other counsel in the beginning. We will never know the truth of this assertion as Vining also neglected to defend himself before the Tribunal. Disciplinary proceedings by the State Bar are regulated by the Rules of Discipline from the Mississippi State Bar. However, Rule 81 of the Miss.R.Civ.P., recognizes where there is a conflict between the Rules of Civil Procedure and any other rules that govern proceedings of this nature, the Rule of Civil Procedure will not govern and the special rules shall be applicable. See Miss.R.Civ.P. 81. There are no specific procedures concerning entry of default judgment in disciplinary actions by the State Bar Committee and therefore we hold that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Rule 12(h)(2) of the Miss.R.Civ.P. provides that any motion seeking to dismiss an action for failure to state a cause of action must be presented before the close of the trial. Vining did not do this. Rule 55(a) of the Miss.R.Civ.P. provides that a default judgment shall be entered if a party has failed to plead or otherwise defend a claim asserted against him as provided by the rules. See Miss.R.Civ.P. 55(a). A party seeking a default judgment must make a written application to the court. If the non-moving party has failed to appear in any manner or capacity, default judgment may be entered by the clerk. Smith v. Everett, 483 So.2d 325 (Miss. 1986); Miss.R.Civ.P. 55(a). However, if such a party has appeared, he must be given three days notice prior to a hearing on the application of the default judgment. Failure to give this notice will render the entry of a default judgment invalid. See Smith, supra ; State Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 498 So.2d 825 (Miss. 1986); Miss.R. Civ.P. 55(b). However, the entry of a default judgment is a drastic step and should be applied only in extreme circumstances. See State Sec., supra ; Wheat v. Eakin, 491 So.2d 523 (Miss. 1986). In this case, Vining's answer to the formal complaint was due twenty (20) days after service of process. See Rules of Discipline 8.3. Vining received the formal complaint and filed his waiver of service of process and entry of appearance on June 8, 1985. His answer was due on June 28, 1985, but was never filed, nor was any other responsive pleading filed. On July 3, 1985, the motion for default judgment was filed and sent to and received by Vining. This motion was sustained on July 17, 1985, and the default judgment was entered by the Complaint Tribunal on August 21, 1985. No responsive pleadings were filed at any time. We hold that the granting of the default judgment under these circumstances was proper. Vining was given three days notice prior to a hearing on the motion for default judgment. The complaint specifically set forth the facts of the case and the Disciplinary Rules that he had allegedly violated. Any motion to dismiss the complaint or cause should have been filed within twenty (20) days of the service of process. There is no merit to the first assignment of error.