Opinion ID: 1164042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: alleged racial discrimination in jury selection

Text: Neither jury contained a black person. Malvo argues on appeal that this is a prima facie case of systematic and intentional exclusion of her peers so as to be a violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial. It is well established that the right to an impartial jury trial guaranteed in criminal proceedings by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution [4] and article 1, section 11, of the Alaska Constitution [5] embraces the concept of trial by a jury constituting a fair cross-section of the community. If prospective jurors are not drawn from that fair cross-section, the constitutional standard of impartiality is not met. Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 898 (Alaska 1971). See also Green v. State, 462 P.2d 994 (Alaska 1969). Although the contours of a fair cross section of the community are elusive and, indeed ... may not be susceptible of precise definition, Alvarado, supra, 486 P.2d at 898-899, any method of jury selection which is in reality a subterfuge to exclude from juries systematically and intentionally some cognizable group or class of citizens in the community is clearly invalid. [6] Green v. State, 462 P.2d 994, 998 (Alaska 1969), citing Chance v. United States, 322 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir.1963). Malvo rests her argument solely on the fact that there were no blacks on either jury. While neither this court [7] nor the United States Supreme Court [8] has clearly held that the fair cross-section standard is constitutionally compelled in civil trials, in the instant case, Malvo has not met her burden of proving a systematic and intentional exclusion even under the strict criminal trial standards of impartiality. Under such standards for a constitutional defect to exist in a jury, it is well settled that the method of choosing the jury must be one that purposefully and systematically excludes an identifiable portion of the community, and it is not sufficient to show simply that the particular jury in question does not include a representative from all segments of the local population. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205, 85 S.Ct. 824, 827, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 764 (1965), the United States Supreme Court held: [P]urposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely asserted... It must be proven, ... the quantum of proof necessarily being a matter of federal law. (Citations omitted.) The court went on to note at 380 U.S. 208, 85 S.Ct. 829, 13 L.Ed.2d 766: [A] defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally entitled to demand a proportionate number of his race on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury roll from which petit jurors are drawn... . `[S]ince there can be no exclusion of Negroes as a race and no discrimination because of color, proportional limitation is not permissible.' (Citations omitted.) While the courts have recognized that the only practical way a litigant may prove systematic and intentional discrimination is by showing a consistent lack of proportional representation through proof of objective results of the jury selection process, [9] these cases all involved proof of objective results over a long period of time and with reference to a large number of juries. Under Malvo's argument the mere fact that there were no blacks on either jury in her case would establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimination. Such a result would be directly contra to the well-established principle that ... the constitutional fair- and impartial-jury guaranty does not require that every economic, racial, or ethnic class shall be represented on every jury venire or panel. Nolan v. United States, 423 F.2d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir.1969). See also Swain v. Alabama, supra at 380 U.S. 208, 85 S.Ct. 829, 13 L.Ed.2d 766. Thus, Malvo has failed to sustain her burden of proving that the method by which the jury was selected was one that is in reality a subterfuge to exclude from juries systematically and intentionally some cognizable group or class of citizens in the community. Green v. State, 462 P.2d 994, 998 (Alaska 1969). [10]