Opinion ID: 1353387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The School Employee Case

Text: W.Va.Code, 18A-2-11 [1985], which applies to school personnel, states: If an employee shall appeal to a circuit court an adverse decision of either a county board of education or of a hearing examiner rendered in a grievance or other proceeding pursuant to provisions of chapters eighteen and eighteen-a of this code and such person shall substantially prevail, the adverse party or parties shall be liable to such employee, upon final judgment or order, for court costs, and for reasonable attorney's fees, to be set by the court, for representing such employee in all administrative hearings and before the circuit court and the supreme court of appeals, and shall be further liable to such employee for any court reporter's costs incurred during any such administrative hearings or court proceedings: Provided, That in no event shall such attorney's fees be awarded in excess of a total of one thousand dollars for the administrative hearings and circuit court proceedings nor an additional one thousand dollars for supreme court proceedings: Provided, however, That the requirements of this section shall not be construed to limit the school employee's right to recover reasonable attorney's fees in a mandamus proceeding brought under section eight, article four, chapter eighteen-a of this code. (Emphasis added.) W.Va.Code, 18-29-8 [1992], which applies to school personnel grievances, states: Any expenses incurred relative to the grievance procedure at levels one through three shall be borne by the party incurring such expenses except as to the costs of transcriptions as provided for in section six of this article. In the event an employee or employer appeals an adverse level four decision to the circuit court or an adverse circuit court decision to the supreme court, and the employee substantially prevails upon such appeal, the employee or the organization representing the employee is entitled to recover court costs and reasonable attorney fees, to be set by the court, from the employer. W.Va.Code, 18A-2-11 [1981] was originally enacted at a time when there was no comprehensive grievance scheme for school board employees. The statute limited attorney fees to $500.00 for circuit court proceedings and $500.00 for appeals to this Court. Acts of the Legislature 1981, ch. 95. In 1985, this statute was amended to establish caps of $1,000.00 for administrative and circuit court proceedings and $1,000.00 for appeals to this Court. Acts of the Legislature 1985, ch. 71. In 1985, the Legislature also enacted provisions of Chapter 18 that established a fourtier grievance process for school personnel, setting forth a specific right of appeal to the circuit court (and then to this Court) from administrative grievance decisions. W.Va. Code, 18-29-1 et seq. Acts of the Legislature 1985, ch. 71. Notably, in 1985 Chapter 18 did not make any provision for awards of attorney fee awards for court appeals, id., W.Va.Code, 18-29-8 [1985], thus apparently leaving the provisions of W.Va.Code, 18A-2-11 [1985] as solely speaking to such fee awards. Then, in 1992, the foregoing-quoted statutory language, specifically authorizing awards of reasonable (but not capped) attorney fees in grievance appeals, was added to W.Va.Code, 18-29-8 [1992], Acts of the Legislature 1992, ch. 62. At oral argument in the instant case, counsel for the school employee appellants statedwithout contradiction by the appelleesthat since W.Va.Code, 18-29-8 [1992] was enacted, it has been the consistent interpretation of the circuit courts in school board employee grievance cases that the reasonable-but-uncapped fee provisions of W.Va.Code, 18-29-8 [1992] are now applicable to such casesinasmuch as these provisions were added to the specific chapter that created and contains the new school employee grievance procedure scheme. The school employee appellants' counsel also stated at oral argument (again without contradiction) that the first time the applicability of the fee provisions of W.Va.Code, 18-29-8 [1992] was questioned in a circuit court case was after this Court stated in Wines v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 213 W.Va. 379, 386, 582 S.E.2d 826, 833 (2003) ( per curiam ), that the School Board's violation of Appellant's due process rights entitles her to an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000.00, as authorized by W.Va.Code, § 18A-2-11. [4] The general rule for interpreting differing statutory sections is that courts should attempt to harmonize them, if possible. Syllabus Point 9, Bailey v. Norfolk and Western Railroad Co., 206 W.Va. 654, 527 S.E.2d 516 (1999) states: A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith. However, where two distinct statutes stand in pari materia, and sections thereof are in irreconcilable conflict, that section must prevail which can properly be considered as the last expression of the law making power.... State ex rel. Pinson v. Varney, 142 W.Va. 105, 109, 96 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1956). The appellee School Board argues that the earlier-enacted language of W.Va.Code, 18A-2-11 [1985] supplements the attorney fee language of the later-enacted W.Va.Code, 18-29-8 [1992]. It is true that this Court must generally apply, when and where feasible, the principle of the harmonization of statutesand also the presumption that the Legislature is aware of previously enacted statutes. Bailey, supra . But it would strain the meaning of the word supplement to apply that term to a situation where purportedly supplemental language was enacted seven years earlier than the subsequent language that is said to be supplemented. Furthermore, it is also trueindeed, paramountthat this Court must presume that the Legislature has a new purpose in enacting a new statute. Id. In this regard, it appears that the specific addition in 1992 of a reasonable-but-uncapped attorney fee provision to Chapter 18 for court appeals of school personnel grievances would simply have been unnecessaryif the Legislature had intended the attorney fee award limitation provisions of W.Va Code, 18A-2-11 [1985] to govern such appeals. Additionally, we are mindful that statutes relating to school employees are generally to be construed in favor of employees, Syllabus Point 1, Morgan v. Pizzino, 163 W.Va. 454, 256 S.E.2d 592 (1979); and that specific statutes generally prevail over general statutes, Carvey v. W. Va. State Bd. of Ed., 206 W.Va. 720, 731, 527 S.E.2d 831, 842 (1999). Applying the foregoing principles, it simply cannot be reasonably concluded that the Legislature clearly intended the earlier-enacted fee-capping provisions of W.Va Code, 18A-2-11 [1985] to trump the specific provisions of the later-enacted, more specific statute, W.Va.Code, 18-29-8 [1992]to the detriment of the interests of school employees who pursue a successful grievance appeal in court. Absent such a conclusion, we are constrained to apply the clear meaning of W.Va.Code, 18-29-8 [1992] in the instant case. We therefore hold that in court appeals of grievance proceedings under W.Va. Code, 18-29-1 et seq., pursuant to W.Va. Code, 18-29-8 [1992] a prevailing employee is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs that are not subject to the attorney fee limitation set forth in W.Va. Code, 18A-2-11 [1985]. [5] Consequently, the appealed-from orders of the Circuit Court of Harrison County in Cases Nos. 31868 and 31944 regarding attorney fee awards are reversed, and those cases are remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Cases Nos. 31868 and 31944 Reversed and Remanded; Case No. 31859 Affirmed.