Opinion ID: 163645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the surprise testimony of kravchuk's co-participant

Text: 21 We review a district court's decision not to grant a mistrial or new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir.2002); United States v. Austin, 231 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir.2000). A mistrial may only be granted where a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial has been impaired. Caballero, 277 F.3d at 1242. 22 At trial, a witness against Kravchuk spontaneously revealed that the defendant had threatened that if we open our mouths he would kill us. Tr. at 81. The defense moved for a mistrial on the basis of prejudice. But the district court found that Kravchuk was not entitled to a new trial for two reasons. First, the witness's statement had been spontaneous so it would have been impossible for the prosecution to have warned the defense that it was coming in advance under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Second, in the context of the rest of the evidence presented at trial, the witness's statement had not caused prejudice so as to violate Kravchuk's substantive rights. 23 On appeal, Kravchuk admits that the prosecutor did not know what the witness would say, but nonetheless argues against both of the district court's findings. He continues to assert that (1) he, as the defendant, should have been given warning about the statement because it related to a prior bad act under Rule 404(b); 6 and (2) the statement was so prejudicial as to have tainted the entire trial in violation of Rule 403. 7 We disagree. 24 Kravchuk's argument under Rule 404(b) fails for two reasons. First, the district court correctly read the notice requirement in Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) as being triggered only when the government intends to solicit testimony of prior bad acts. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) ([The government must provide] reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any ... evidence it intends to introduce at trial.); see also United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.1999) (To make [a determination under Rule 404(b)], we must look at two things: (1) did the government intend to introduce this evidence at trial; and (2) if so, did it provide reasonable notice.). In Kravchuk's case, the government did not know about the witness's testimony so as to warn the defendant, and therefore Rule 404(b)'s notice provision cannot apply. Second, Rule 404(b) applies only to prior bad acts extrinsic to the crime charged. United States v. Arney, 248 F.3d 984, 992 (10th Cir.2001). The act that the witness described here was part and parcel of the events for which Kravchuk was on trial. 25 Kravchuk's argument under Rule 403 that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial and so should be grounds for a mistrial also fails for two reasons. First, Rule 403 is not the correct standard for evaluating whether a defendant should be granted a mistrial. Under Tenth Circuit precedent, a mistrial should only be granted when a defendant's fundamental right to a fair and impartial trial has been impaired. Caballero, 277 F.3d at 1242. Evidentiary rulings under Rule 403 may be merely harmless error, see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir.1996), and therefore do not necessarily reach fundamental rights. And nothing about the witness's unplanned comment changed the basic nature of Kravchuk's trial. As the district court found, the cumulative evidence presented at trial of the defendant's participation in the robbery was overwhelming. Second, even if Rule 403 applied, there was no error in the district court's conclusion that the evidence was relevant to the case and not unfairly prejudicial. The witnesses's statement gave important insight into Kravchuk's actions in directing the commission of the crime and in keeping control over his co-participants. 26 Accordingly, we will not reverse the district court's refusal to grant a mistrial or new trial.