Opinion ID: 2010460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial court had a duty to inquire into the propriety of the representation.

Text: Every criminal defendant is presumed to be innocent and is entitled to a fair trial. [87] The trial judge has a duty to see that a defendant is denied no necessary incident of a fair trial. [88] This includes ensuring that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. [89] By refusing to address Cooke's express opposition to his counsel's pursuit of a guilty but mentally ill verdict, the trial court failed to protect Cooke's right to a fair trial. [90] The decision to pursue a verdict of not guilty and assert his factual innocence belongs to the defendant. [91] The record before us reflects that Cooke was deprived of the opportunity to meaningfully oppose the prosecution's case. [92] His counsel's strategy to pursue a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, which included introducing a confession Cooke disputed, undermined Cooke's right to plead not guilty, to testify at trial and assert his innocence, and to present his chosen plea to the jury. [93] We have previously concluded that this strategy constituted attorney error which effectively denied Cooke the assistance of counsel and his fundamental trial rights. [94] The trial judge also erred by failing to intervene and provide a remedy for this error, notwithstanding Cooke's explicit requests. [95] Even though the trial court knew that Cooke had entered a plea of not guilty, opposed the guilty but mentally ill strategy, and wanted to testify that he was innocent so that he could receive the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard in a trial by a jury, the trial court permitted defense counsel to seek a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, introduce Cooke's disputed confession, and concede Cooke's guilt to the jury, so that the only jury issue was whether Cooke was mentally ill. The inherent prejudice to Cooke, and defense counsel's prediction of a disastrous happening as a result of their conflict with Cooke, required intervention by the trial court. Defense counsel's strategy, and the trial court's refusal to address their conflict with Cooke, resulted in complete chaos at trial. [96] Cooke's counsel sat at one side of the defense table, arguing that Cooke was guilty but mentally ill, and Cooke sat at the other side, arguing that he was factually innocent and not mentally ill. Cooke repeatedly stated that he was not guilty, and that he did not want his attorneys to present evidence to support a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. He was entitled to have his attorneys follow these directions. [97] Instead, the prosecutors and his own counsel simultaneously opposed him. The trial court was aware of these significant issues as early as the pre-trial conference. The conflict between Cooke and his attorneys manifested itself throughout the trial through Cooke's numerous outbursts, culminating in his testimony during the guilt/innocence phase, when he stated: These counsel have misrepresented me so bad. They have railroad me through this whole thing.... I been got rid of these public defenders. I fired them a long time ago. The judge allowed me to keep them. When defense counsel decides to concede not only guilt, but also eligibility for the death penalty over the defendant's express objection, the trial judge has an obligation to inquire into the propriety of counsel's representation. A strategy that Cooke was guilty but mentally ill is incompatible with factual innocence. In this instance, the trial judge's obligation to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial required the trial judge to instruct counsel not to pursue a verdict of guilty but mentally ill against Cooke's wishes. The trial court's failure to provide this remedy denied Cooke his right to a fair trial. Finally, we respectfully address our colleagues' dissent which concludes (1) that a Strickland analysis applies, and (2) that under that analysis, counsel satisfied Cooke's Sixth Amendment right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. We agree with the Dissent that Florida v. Nixon does not reach the facts of this case. [98] We also recognize, as the Dissent does, the challenges defense counsel face in a capital case. Indeed, a capital case is the most challenging of criminal cases for everyone involved. But these challenges cannot justify infringement of a defendant's personal and fundamental right to plead not guilty, to testify in his own defense, and to have the issue of guilt determined by an impartial jury. Only the defendant may waive these rights, which are personal to him. If we focus, as the Dissent has, upon the reality of a capital murder trial, that reality includes the likelihood that no jury will give fair consideration to a defendant's plea of not guilty, his sworn denial of guilt, or enforce the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, when a defendant's own counsel act against his wishes and argue he is guilty, introduce evidence that incriminates him, and thereby prove his eligibility for a death sentence. The plain language of the Sixth Amendment confers the right to the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. Cooke was effectively left without counsel during his testimony and throughout the proceedings on the critical issues of his guilt and his eligibility for the death penalty. In our view, the wide range of reasonable professional assistance allowed under Strickland does not contemplate such a structural defect so inherently prejudicial to the adversarial process and a fair trial. Instead, Cronic applies and the rationale of that case requires us to reverse. [99] The Dissent's assertion that Cronic does not apply to the facts of this case is primarily based on its analysis of five factors that the Dissent contends are relevant to analyzing whether counsel failed to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing: time afforded for investigation and preparation; experience of counsel; gravity of the charge; complexity of possible defenses; and accessibility of witnesses. The Dissent's reliance on these factors is misplaced. In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court criticized the Sixth Circuit's use of the factors (which were created by the Sixth Circuit), and later explained that, while relevant to an evaluation of a lawyer's effectiveness in a particular case ... neither separately nor in combination do they provide a basis for concluding that competent counsel was not able to provide this respondent with the guiding hand that the Constitution guarantees. [100] Moreover, to the extent Cronic could be read as endorsing these factors, the Court addressed them only in the context of whether circumstances surrounding the [defendant's] representation justified a presumption that his conviction was insufficiently reliable to satisfy the Constitution. [101] They were expressly not applied to analyze whether the defendant was denied the presence of counsel at a critical stage of the prosecution or whether based on the actual conduct of the trial, that there was a breakdown in the adversarial process. [102] While we agree that death is different, we do not agree with the Dissent's analysis that the wide discretion given defense counsel permitted the strategy in this case against Cooke's wishes. Cooke's ultimate authority to exercise his fundamental rights under Jones was personal to him. It is all the more important in a capital case for the court to protect these fundamental rights, otherwise, all defendants but capital defendants would have them. Cooke's attorneys were constitutionally bound to respect the choices Cooke was entitled to make under Jones. We also disagree with the Dissent's public policy argument. The short answer to the detrimental public policy considerations enumerated by the Dissent is that the fundamental rights we have explained are personal to the defendant and are not subject to these considerations. Every defendant, including Cooke, is entitled to a fair trial with the assistance of counsel necessary to justify reliance on the outcome. The Dissent describes the evidence as overwhelming but [w]hether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which ... denial of counsel has made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of certainty, that the defendant's case was adequately presented. [103] Given the failure of the adversarial process in this case, there is no other alternative except to grant a new trial.