Opinion ID: 2995336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sex Discrimination in Staffing of

Text: Brouwer Case Bilow claims that the firm discriminated against her by requiring her to try the Brouwer case with only the help of local counsel. Male employees, she asserted, were never required to try similarly complex cases without substantial assistance. Both parties concede, and we agree, that there is no direct evidence of discrimination with regard to the Brouwer staffing decision. That leaves Bilow with the familiar indirect method of proof established for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the plaintiff must state a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Id. at 802. To establish this prima facie case, she must prove, among other things, that similarly situated male employees were treated more favorably than she was treated. Id. Bilow has not pointed to any cases at the firm similar to Brouwer in which male attorneys received more staffing assistance. The cases on which male attorneys seemingly received more assistance were cases that were either more complex, or were not contingent fee cases, or took place in Chicago and therefore did not entail the same travel expenses. Bilow did not have a problem when the only help she was receiving came from Stuart and she has not established that sex discrimination had anything to do with the firm’s assessment that Baker was as competent as Stuart for the task at hand. To the contrary, Freed told the Management Committee that Baker was a seasoned trial lawyer who was chosen by the Brouwer judge as lead counsel for the class. Finally, Bilow was only required to try the case alone (in the sense of having no help from Much Shelist); prior to trial and during trial she still had the opportunity to obtain assistance from firm lawyers in Chicago. Even if Bilow had established her prima facie case, the firm’s decision was justified by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The firm had already invested $3 million of its services in the case, and so far, after the dismissal of several defendants, had recouped only $800,000. In order to cut costs, it needed to reduce staffing on the case. Freed told the Management Committee that Bilow, with the help of local counsel, could adequately try the case since most of the defendants had been dismissed and the case against one of the defendants did not warrant any more time. A need or desire to cut costs is a legitimate nondiscriminatory justification for an adverse employment action. See Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1999). Additionally, Freed told the Management Committee that he believed that the remaining issues were not complex and that Bilow and Baker could handle the case alone. Once the firm articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the staffing decision, the burden shifted to Bilow to show that the given reason was a pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. That she has not done. Her disagreement with Freed’s analysis of the staffing demands on the case in no way indicates that Freed himself did not honestly believe that two lawyers were enough. See Crim v. Bd. of Educ. of Cairo Sch. Dist. No. 1, 147 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 1998) (employee must show that reason for discharge was a lie or not grounded in fact, not just that it was mistaken). She also points to a voice mail tape, made a year before the staffing decision, in which Freed said that Brouwer was a long, hard case. But this vague statement is not only unhelpful, it is completely irrelevant to the state of the case a year after the statement was made and after several defendants were dismissed.