Opinion ID: 324559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the in-trial identification

Text: 18 Our holdings that Ms. Butler's photographic 58 and lineup 59 identifications pass constitutional muster mean necessarily that her in-trial identification was free from any vitiating taint of illegality. 60 It does not mean, however, that inquiry into her capacity to undertake a courtroom identification is at an end. Appellant argues that inconsistencies in Ms. Butler's trial testimony 61 demonstrate that her in-trial identification was the product of the pretrial identification sessions rather than of observations at the time of the robbery, and as such was improperly allowed. In considering this contention, we deal not with a constitutional infirmity, but rather with the competence of the witness. 19 To be sure an identification of one as the perpetrator of a crime may rest only upon impressions gained from the singling out of the criminal--can be accomplished from no other source. Post-offense identification confrontations, photographic or corporeal, may provide corroboration for an identification, but they may not serve as its foundation. It does not follow, however, that inconsistencies in an identification witness' trial testimony necessarily reflect a disqualifying inability to independently recognize the offender. Untrustworthiness of a proffered identification, and of course its inadmissibility, depend upon how impaired or lacking the ability to do so may be. 20 The problem of witness-competence is accentuated in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be rested on an uncorroborated identification by a single witness. 62 For situations of that sort, we have advised caution by the trial judge in retaining the case for the jury's decision on guilt. 63 The test for sufficiency of the identification as the foundation for a verdict of guilty, we said, is whether the circumstances affecting it give rise to a substantial likelihood of mistaken identification. 64 In the case at bar, Ms. Butler's identification of appellant was extensively confirmed by other evidence; 65 surely her competence as an identification witness was not to be judged by a more exacting standard. 66 And applying essentially the same test in another context, 67 we have detected no appreciable likelihood of error in her attempt at identifying appellant. 21 Short of that risk, the credibility of Ms. Butler's identification was a matter for the jury. 68 In sum, the relatively minor inconsistencies in her testimony at trial 69 did not call for intervention by the judge. The jury, fully aware of those inconsistencies and deliberating under unchallenged instructions by the judge, accepted the identification. In the circumstances, it was its prerogative to do so.