Opinion ID: 1992864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Willing and ready contingency

Text: Wesley next contends that the court abused its discretion by conditioning resumption of visitation on a recommendation by the therapist that the children are willing and ready for visitation. He argues that by imposing this condition, the court improperly modified the best interest standard that is applicable to determinations of parental rights and responsibilities. We agree. Pursuant to statute, a court making an award of parental rights and responsibilities must apply the best interest of the child standard. 19 M.R.S.A. § 752(5) (Supp.1995). That standard requires the court to consider the following factors: A. The age of the child; B. The relationship of the child with the child's parents and any other persons who may significantly affect the child's welfare; C. The preference of the child, if old enough to express a meaningful preference; D. The duration and adequacy of the child's current living arrangements and the desirability of maintaining continuity; E. The stability of any proposed living arrangements for the child; F. The motivation of the parties involved and their capacities to give the child love, affection and guidance; G. The child's adjustment to the child's present home, school and community; H. The capacity of each parent to allow and encourage frequent and continuing contact between the child and the other parent, including physical access; I. The capacity of each parent to cooperate or to learn to cooperate in child care; J. Methods for assisting parental cooperation and resolving disputes and each parent's willingness to use those methods; K. The effect on the child if one parent has sole authority over the child's upbringing; K-1. The existence of domestic abuse between the parents, in the past or currently, and how that abuse affects: (1) The child emotionally; and (2) The safety of the child; K-2. The existence of any history of child abuse by a parent; and L. All other factors having a reasonable bearing on the physical and psychological well-being of the child. Id. § 752(5)(A)-(L) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this statute, Mandy and Missy's willingness to visit their father is one of many factors that must be considered by the court in determining whether visitation with him is in their best interest. The court, however, gave determinative significance to their preference by making future visitation with their father contingent on their willingness to see him. Although the unusual circumstances of their father's incarceration might justify the court attaching special significance to the preference of the children in fashioning a future visitation order that serves their best interest, the court's elevation of this preference to a determinative factor is a misapplication of a statute that requires the court to assess the children's best interest in light of the numerous factors listed above, including but not limited to their preference. The court also erred in making future visitation contingent on the certification of the therapist that the child is ready for visitation. As stated by the court, that contingency transfers the court's responsibility for determining the best interest of the child to the therapist. Although the court can consider the expression of such an expert opinion by a therapist, the court cannot make the visitation outcome dependent upon that opinion.