Opinion ID: 41659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence Claim Against Blake

Text: Worthington next claims that the magistrate judge erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Blake on her negligence claim. The magistrate judge concluded that Blake was entitled to state-agent immunity under Alabama law. We agree. Pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Alabama Constitution, “the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.” The Alabama Supreme Court has extended this sovereign immunity to municipal boards of education, as local agencies of the state, and to a person who acts as an agent of such a board if the act was committed while that person was performing certain types of duties that are “discretionary” or require the exercise of judgment. See Carroll v. Hammett, 744 So. 2d 906, 910-11 (Ala. 1999) (stating that “a person 13 who acts as an agent of a county board of education shares in the State’s sovereign immunity if the act complained of was committed while that person was performing a discretionary act” and defining a “discretionary” act as one that “requires exercise in judgment and choice and involves what is just and proper under the circumstances”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Historically, the Alabama Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the supervision of students is an act involving discretion and judgment, and that persons engaged in such supervision are entitled to immunity from negligence suits. See, e.g., Carroll, 744 So. 2d at 911 (“It is well established that the supervision of students is a discretionary function.”) (citations omitted); Kroger v. Davis, 622 So. 2d 303, 304 (Ala. 1993) (“In supervising the students during recess, the defendant teachers were performing a discretionary function and are therefore immune from liability.”) (citation omitted); Coyle v. Harper, 622 So. 2d 302, 303 (Ala. 1993) (holding that teacher who was monitoring the halls when student was injured in her classroom was performing a discretionary function and therefore entitled to immunity). In 2000, the Alabama Supreme Court restated the rule of state-agent immunity, establishing that the agent is entitled to immunity when the claim is based on certain categories of duties, including where the agent is “exercising 14 judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students.” Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000) (emphasis added). The Alabama Supreme Court has since granted immunity not only to teachers in school, but also to persons supervising other school-related activities. For example, in 2003, the Alabama Supreme Court granted immunity to a high school baseball coach where a student alleged the coach was negligent in allowing players to stand without helmets in an area where they could be hit by batted balls. Ex parte Nall, 879 So. 2d 541, 545-46 (Ala. 2003). The Alabama Supreme Court stated that “it is undisputed that [the coaches], in conducting the baseball practice session, were discharging their duties in educating students.” Id. at 545. In addition, in Ex parte Blankenship, 806 So. 2d 1186, 1186-90 (Ala. 2000), the Alabama Supreme Court granted state-agent immunity to a band director and school principal in a suit by a minor band member’s mother alleging that the defendants negligently supervised her daughter by allowing her to leave after an out-of-town band trip with her older boyfriend, resulting in her statutory rape. Neither the minor nor the boyfriend was a student at the high school, yet the band director’s supervision of the minor was deemed to fall within the exception for exercising discretion in educating students. Id. at 1190. 15 Here, Worthington’s claim against Henry Blake arises out of his conduct in supervising the ITPC students while driving them to their bus stops. His performance of that task involved the exercise of judgment in supervising publiceducation students while driving the bus.6 Thus, Blake was “exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in . . . educating students” and is entitled to immunity under Alabama law. Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405 (emphasis added). We acknowledge that in Horton v. Briley, 792 So. 2d 432, 434 (Ala. Ct. Apps., 2001), the Alabama Court of Appeals applied Cranman and concluded that a bus driver was not entitled to state-agent immunity with respect to a claim based on a vehicular accident. In that context, the Court of Appeals noted that “characterizing as a discretionary function conduct remote from the execution of governmental policy would perpetuate an erroneous construction of the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 404) (brackets and ellipsis omitted). However, Horton is inapplicable here because the conduct at issue is 6 Worthington argues that Blake’s supervision was ministerial and not discretionary, relying on one 1982 Alabama Supreme Court case, DeStafney v. Univ. of Ala., 413 So. 2d 391 (Ala. 1981), in which the court denied immunity to a daycare worker who was supervising a toddler when the toddler was injured. However, in that case, the day care worker was not simply supervising the child; she had actively placed the child on the equipment from which the child fell, incurring injuries. In any event, as described above, the great weight of authority establishes that the supervision of children involves the exercise of discretion and judgment. Thus, we reject this argument. 16 entirely different. Here, the conduct at issue is not the driving of schoolchildren but the supervision of students in the public education system. While the driving of schoolchildren may be “remote from the execution of governmental policy,” Alabama Supreme Court precedent clearly indicates that the supervision of children in the public education system is exactly the sort of conduct protected by state-agent immunity.7 Thus, Horton does not affect Blake’s entitlement to stateagent immunity as this case does not involve a vehicular accident. In any event, even if the Alabama Supreme Court were to decide that the supervision of students by bus drivers is not protected by state-agent immunity, Worthington has pointed to no evidence that Blake was negligent. As discussed previously, there is no indication that either student did anything to get Blake’s attention, and he was driving the bus at the same time he was supervising them. Further, as discussed previously, Worthington points to no evidence that J.M. had previously committed a sexual assault or was a known threat to do so, much less that Blake, a substitute bus driver, was aware or should have been aware that J.M. posed such a risk. Assuming the alleged incident occurred, the mere fact that J.W. was assaulted while Blake was driving the bus does not establish that Blake was 7 We note that in Ex parte McWhorter, 880 So. 2d 1116, 1117 (Ala. 2003), the Alabama Supreme Court did grant state-agent immunity to a deputy for a vehicular accident that occurred when he was on duty. 17 negligent in supervising the students. Thus, the magistrate judge did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Blake.