Opinion ID: 2119366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admission of Photographs in Penalty Phase

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibits 14 and 15 into evidence during the penalty phase of his trial. These exhibits were photographs of the deceased victim's body as discovered in the woods approximately thirty days after her death. The two photographs depicted close-ups of the body from two different angles, and showed the stick found lying on the ground between the victim's legs. The defendant claims the photographs were not relevant or material because the jury had already convicted defendant of felony murder; thus, the State's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance was satisfied. Moreover, defendant claims that even if the photographs were relevant and material, those characteristics were greatly outweighed by the prejudicial and inflammatory nature of the photographs. The State responds that the photographs of the decomposed body were relevant because they revealed the placement of a stick in the victim's vaginal area. [3] In Spranger v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 931, 937, reh'g denied, 500 N.E.2d 1170, cert. denied (1987), 481 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 1965, 95 L.Ed.2d 536 (quoting Richardson v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 497, 500), we said: [P]hotographs are admissible if they provide relevant evidence and their relevance is not outweighed by their tendency to inflame and impassion the jury against the defendant. The question necessarily becomes one of balancing these concerns, and thus the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether such photographs should be admitted in a particular case. The trial judge's decision to admit photographic evidence will be reversed only where an abuse of discretion is shown. Boyd, 494 N.E.2d 284; Crane v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 299, 380 N.E.2d 89. The defendant must clearly show the tendency of the photographs to improperly influence the jury before we will disturb the trial judge's discretion. Akins v. State (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 232. The death penalty count charged that the defendant intentionally killed Woods while committing or attempting to commit rape, child molesting, or criminal deviate conduct. The jury's verdict of guilty on the felony murder count did not necessarily establish whether criminal deviate conduct was found to have been committed. As previously addressed above, the felony murder verdict could have resulted from a determination that the defendant committed only aiding rape. The verdict thus did not foreclose further evidence showing the commission of crimes other than rape as alleged aggravating circumstances. We therefore decline to find an abuse of discretion in the admission of these photographs.