Opinion ID: 615207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Temporary Removal of Work Equipment

Text: Colón, relying on the testimony of co-worker Adela Otero, asserts the Municipality eliminated her essential working tools in retaliation for her October 2006 request for a parking spot. Otero testified in her deposition that sometime after Colón returned to work following a health-related absence (unclear from the record as to when), Colón had to work without a telephone for approximately two to three months. Otero also testified that the Municipality failed to provide Colón with tools with which to carry out her work (also unclear as to when), and in 2008, following a health-related absence, Colón's computer was taken away for several weeks, requiring her to complete all work manually. Colón's supervisor, Rodríguez, testified that no tools were withdrawn from a worker's desk unless it was for short periods of time and for purposes of repair, such as an out-of-order phone or malfunctioning computer. Otero's testimony does not contradict Rodríguez's assertions. Otero testified that Colón was without a computer and then they were cleaning the machines. . . . Colón argues the district court improperly inferred from this testimony that employee work equipment sometimes was removed for the overall maintenance purpose of cleaning. We disagree. The record shows that Otero's statement was in response to the question, you say that when [Colón returned to work in 2008], that's when she was without a computer? Otero's testimony directly links the removal of Colón's equipment to the Municipality's maintenance practices. Rodríguez's testimony further compliments and clarifies Otero's testimony. And both testimonies establish that any such removal of Colón's office equipment was temporary. Additionally, even if the record did not clearly show a non-retaliatory purpose for the removal of Colón's office equipment, Colón offers no evidence, aside from Otero's testimony, showing that any removal of her work equipment was motivated by retaliatory intent. See Randlett v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 857, 862 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that for plaintiff to prevail on summary judgment, she must show that any alleged adverse action was taken for the purpose of retaliating and point to some evidence of retaliation) (emphasis in original). At most, Colón asserts there is no evidence that prior to [her] request for reasonable accommodation, her computer and telephone were taken away for months for cleaning purposes, and that the elimination of [her] working tools were part of the pattern of retaliatory acts against her. This is insufficient for purposes of establishing a genuine issue of material fact. See Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991) (Not every discrepancy in the proof is enough to forestall a properly supported motion for summary judgment. . . . On issues where the nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence.).