Opinion ID: 511014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of Involuntary Election

Text: 37 Johns-Manville argues that section 1500 is not applicable where the plaintiff cannot elect to bring all its theories of recovery in one court. In the instant appeal both tort and contract theories cannot be brought in one court, since the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction of tort actions against the United States and the Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction of contract actions exceeding $10,000 against the United States. 11 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(a)(2), (b), 1491 (1982). However, the legislative history and the cases indicate section 1500 was enacted for the benefit of the government and was intended to force an election where both forums could grant the same relief, arising from the same operative facts. See supra statement of Senator Edmunds, author of the original version of section 1500, stating [t]he object is to put that class of persons to their election either to leave the Court of Claims or to leave the other courts. See also Brown, 358 F.2d at 1005; Casman, 135 Ct.Cl. at 649. 38 The Court of Claims held in Wessel, 124 F.Supp. at 638, that a plaintiff has no vested right to proceed in two courts. In Wessel, as in the instant appeal, the plaintiff filed in two courts alleging jurisdiction under two separate Acts of Congress 12 arising from the same operative facts. As in the instant appeal, the plaintiff in Wessel argued section 1500 should not bar the Court of Claim's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491. That is, section 1500 should not apply since filing in only one court on one Act of Congress might result in the statute of limitations expiring under the other Act of Congress. 13 The Court of Claims rejected this argument and stated: 39 Although plaintiff's desired result is an appealing one, we believe the language of 28 U.S.C. 1500 is quite explicit and to defer action in this court would foster just the type of occurrence which section 1500 was enacted to prevent, i.e., the maintaining of two suits against the United States on the same claims and at the same time in two different courts. 40 124 F.Supp. at 637-38. 41 The court in Wessel additionally reasoned that where a statute was solely jurisdictional, as is section 1500, the tribunal affected could make no exceptions by granting jurisdiction. Quoting De La Rama S.S. Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 386, 390, 73 S.Ct. 381, 383, 97 L.Ed. 422 (1953), the court stated: 42 When the very purpose of Congress is to take away jurisdiction, of course it does not survive, even as to pending suits, unless expressly reserved.    If the aim is to destroy a tribunal or to take away cases from it, there is no basis for finding saving exceptions unless they are made explicit. 43 124 F.Supp. at 638. The issue of whether section 1500 may or may not have caused unexpected results by forcing an election between courts on only one theory or the other does not affect the efficacy of section 1500. The Supreme Court in Insurance Co. v. Ritchie stated: 44 It is clear, that when the jurisdiction of a cause depends upon a statute the repeal of the statute takes away the jurisdiction. And it is equally clear, that where a jurisdiction, conferred by statute, is prohibited by a subsequent statute, the prohibition is, so far, a repeal of the statute conferring the jurisdiction. 45 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 541, 544, 18 L.Ed. 540 (1866) (footnote omitted). 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491(a)(1) (1982) states, [t]he United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction ... upon any claim against the United States founded ... upon ... any express or implied contract with the United States.... (Emphasis added.) 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500 (1982) states, [t]he United States Claims Court shall not have jurisdiction of any claim ... which the plaintiff ... has pending in any other court ... against the United States.... (Emphasis added.) 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1491(a)(1) clearly grants jurisdiction and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500 just as clearly takes jurisdiction away where the stated condition is met. There is no justifiable reason why the rule expressed by the Supreme Court in Ritchie is not applicable where the repeal is conditional rather than absolute. 46 Johns-Manville cites no authority for rules of statutory construction negating the efficacy of section 1500. Instead, Johns-Manville stresses principles of equity. It argues barring jurisdiction would be fundamentally unfair, contrary to a 'reasonable and just construction,'  would force Johns-Manville to elect, at its peril, a  'harsh' and 'literal interpretation.'  Principles of equity do not support finding jurisdiction exists. A court may not in any case, even in the interest of justice, extend its jurisdiction where none exists. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., --- U.S. ----, ----, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178-79, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (vacating a decision by the Federal Circuit for lack of jurisdiction). 47 Appellant next argues that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2), (b), creating parallel jurisdiction with the Claims Court and district courts in contract claims under $10,000 but exclusive jurisdiction in district courts in all tort claims, was enacted after the original versions of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500. Thus, it is argued that Congress created an implicit exception to section 1500. This argument is without merit. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2), (b) is no limitation on the jurisdiction of the Claims Court. It only creates district court jurisdiction. Nor does section 1500 bear on the jurisdiction of the district courts. 14 48 The possibility that the statute of limitations may run on one theory while the other theory is being prosecuted is the only substantive basis for Johns-Manville's argument that section 1346(a)(2), (b) is repugnant to section 1500. As already discussed, Court of Claims precedent which is binding on us has expressly rejected this argument. Wessel, 124 F.Supp. at 636. The Supreme Court has also rejected this argument. In Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 U.S. 537, 44 S.Ct. 156, 68 L.Ed. 431 (1924), the Court affirmed a dismissal by the Court of Claims under section 154 of the Judicial Code, section 1500's predecessor. In Corona, as in the instant appeal, the plaintiff argued that the actions were brought to stop the statute of limitations from running. The Supreme Court stated: 49 But the words of the statute are plain, with nothing in the context to make their meaning doubtful; no room is left for construction, and we are not at liberty to add an exception in order to remove apparent hardship in particular cases. 50 Id. at 540, 44 S.Ct. at 156 (citations omitted). 51 Thus, the Court of Claims in Wessel and the Supreme Court in Corona have considered and rejected the ex necessitate rei statute of limitations argument. Johns-Manville's reliance on Prillman v. United States, 652 F.2d 70, 220 Ct.Cl. 677 (1979); Allied Materials & Equip. Co. v. United States, 210 Ct.Cl. 714 (1976); and Brown v. United States, 358 F.2d 1002, 178 Ct.Cl. 343 (1966), for the contrary proposition is not persuasive. In both Brown and Prillman section 1500 was not applicable because of the Casman exception which applies where a different type of relief is sought in the district court (equitable) from that sought in the Court of Claims (money). See Casman v. United States, 135 Ct.Cl. 647 (1956). In the present case, however, the relief sought from both courts is money, but under different theories. The operative facts of the claims are the same. 52 In Brown the plaintiff originally sought monetary damages and equitable relief in the district court. However, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's monetary claim for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, only the equitable count remained in the district court, a cause over which the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction. Also, in Prillman the plaintiff requested from the district court both equitable and monetary relief. The request for back pay was in excess of $10,000. Prillman, 652 F.2d 70, 220 Ct.Cl. at 678. As stated in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2) and as recognized by Prillman, id. at 679, a district court's concurrent jurisdiction with the Claims Court is limited to claims not exceeding $10,000. Thus, both Brown and Prillman merely follow the exception to section 1500 originating in Casman and do not support any other exception to section 1500. The Court of Claims stated in Allied: 53 Since we have no jurisdiction of suits under the Anti-Trust laws, suits under state common law for tortious interference with contracts, or suits under 40 U.S.C. Sec[s]. 488 and 489, and the District Court by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(2), has no jurisdiction of breach claims over $10,000, plaintiff has no election. In neither court could it combine all its claims. In these circumstances Sec. 1500 does not support the so-called motion to dismiss. 54 210 Ct.Cl. at 715-16. 55 The precedent and rationale expressed by Allied indicates that decision was only following the established exception under Casman to section 1500. The Allied decision cites only two precedents, Matson Nav. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352, 52 S.Ct. 162, 76 L.Ed. 336 (1932), and Casman, 135 Ct.Cl. at 647. Matson held that section 1500's predecessor, section 154 of the Judicial Code of 1911, could not be expanded to bar pending suits on the same claim against the United States since the language of the section only referred to pending suits against agents of the United States. 15 56 It is not evident to us that Allied intended to extend the exception established in Casman to cover pending cases seeking monetary relief so long as the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction over the legal theories asserted in the district court. Allied does not state the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief in the pending district court cases. Nor does Allied discuss any of the precedents which would need to be overruled or distinguished before reaching the holding Johns-Manville argues Allied reaches. In summary, we find Johns-Manville's reliance on Allied unfounded since it does not clearly hold section 1500 is inapplicable where the pending suit seeks monetary relief in both courts on the same operative facts. 57 In conclusion, we hold that under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1500 the relief sought by Johns-Manville in the Robinson case is based on a claim for or in respect to the claims brought by Johns-Manville in the Claims Court in Nos. 465-83C, 688-83C, and 1-84C. 16 58