Opinion ID: 1060898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: JURY INSTRUCTION AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE (i)(5) TORTURE

Text: The defendant first argued that the jury instruction as to Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5)(1991)  the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance  was reversible error because the 1989 amendment was instructed to the jury rather than the statute as it existed at the time of the offense in 1987. At the time of the offense, the aggravating circumstance set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5)(1982) provided that [t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind. In 1989, the statute was amended to provide as follows: [t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) (1991). At the resentencing hearing, the trial judge instructed the jury in accordance with the 1989 amendment, rather than in accordance with the statute as it existed in 1987 at the time the offense was committed. Neither the defendant nor the State objected at trial. This Court has decided that a resentencing hearing must be conducted in accordance with the law in effect at the time of the offense. State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1020, 115 S.Ct. 585, 130 L.Ed.2d 499 (1994). We have also held that the 1989 amendment to aggravating circumstance (i)(5) is a substantive change which imposes not a different level of proof upon the State, but different factors of proof. State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 505 (Tenn.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 376, 139 L.Ed.2d 293 (1997). Obviously, the amended version substitutes the phrase serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, for the words depravity of mind. It is therefore obvious that the trial judge committed error in charging the jury with the 1989 version of the statute, rather than the statute as it existed at the time of the commission of the offense in 1987. Id. Assuming there is error, as we must, the next question is whether the error is harmless. We faced a similar position in Bush , a case where the victim was beaten and stabbed forty-three times in the face, neck, shoulders, and chest. Although the offense occurred before 1989, the trial court committed error by instructing the jury as to the law as changed in 1989, i.e., that the appropriate aggravating circumstance was set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, instead of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5), torture or depravity of mind. In spite of the error, we held that the defendant's treatment of the victim constituted torture, independent of the depravity prong in -203(i)(5) or the serious physical abuse prong of -204(i)(5). Moreover, we found that the evidence was sufficient to establish depravity of mind beyond a reasonable doubt, even though the jury was not instructed with regard to the definition of depravity of mind. Accordingly, we held that the trial court's error in failing to instruct on the pre-1989 version of the aggravating circumstance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 506. Following the Bush analysis, we must review the evidence in this case to determine whether it is sufficient to support the torture prong of the aggravating circumstance, independent of the depravity or serious physical abuse prong. In this case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the terms heinous, atrocious, and cruel as defined in State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 529 (Tenn. 1985). The trial judge also correctly instructed the jury that torture means the infliction of severe physical or mental pain upon the victim while he or she remains alive and conscious. Id. at 529. Applying these principles, we find that there is sufficient evidence in this record to establish the torture factor under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(5) or Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5), independent of the depravity or serious physical abuse prongs of the aggravating circumstances. The victim, Rosemary Smith, was placed in a closet, first enduring the mental anguish of her husband's murder in the next room. She then was raped twice, ridiculed, suffered through a bungled attempt at strangulation and strangled to death with a tourniquet device placed around her neck that caused massive damage to her throat and larynx. There was evidence that the victim struggled to save herself while still alive and conscious by attempting to release the pressure which was applied to her neck. After the blood supply was finally cut off at the end of the struggle, she may have lost consciousness in thirty seconds but remained alive for three to six minutes. See, e.g., State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 567, 139 L.Ed.2d 407 (1997) (mental and physical pain suffered by victim of strangulation constituted torture). Thus, we conclude that the proof of torture establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have sentenced the defendant to death, even had no weight been given to the invalid criteria of serious physical abuse. We also determined in Bush that had the jury been properly instructed, it would have found the evidence sufficient to establish depravity of mind beyond a reasonable doubt. [D]epravity is inherent in the state of mind of a murderer who willfully inflicts severe physical or mental pain on a victim prior to death or at a time very close to the victim's death. Bush, 942 S.W.2d at 506; Williams, 690 S.W.2d at 529. The evidence outlined above is sufficient to conclude in this case that had the jury been properly instructed regarding depravity of mind, it would have found the evidence sufficient to establish this factor. See also State v. O'Guinn, 709 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 244, 93 L.Ed.2d 169 (1986) (ligature strangulation constituted depravity of mind).