Opinion ID: 6346970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: True Motivation

Text: Rafee next suggests that Volvo’s proffered reason for terminating him was not the true motivation behind his termination because the record shows that Volvo shifted its reasons for his termination. In general, “[s]hifting justifications over time calls the credibility of those justifications into question.” Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 592 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing Corp., 749 F.3d 530, 541 (6th Cir. 2014). The facts in Cicero illustrate this rule. When employer Borg-Warner fired employee, Cicero, it had “never said [it] discharged [him] for poor work performance.” Cicero, 280 F.3d at 592. After suit was filed, “[i]n answering interrogatories, Borg-Warner for the first time said it fired Cicero because of poor performance.” Id. During depositions, however, the manager explained that Cicero was fired because Borg-Warner fired his entire team for “fail[ing] to sell the Romulus facility as planned.” Id. As it turned out, “Borg-Warner, . . . did not fire all of the . . . team members.” Id. At summary judgment, the employer “again shifted its position,” claiming that it did not fire Cicero’s entire team, but “only those members who dealt with the company’s headquarters in Chicago.” Id. We concluded that “[w]hen the justification for an adverse employment action changes during litigation, that inconsistency raises an issue whether the proffered reason truly motivated the defendants’ decision.” Id. -9- No. 21-5891, Rafee v. Volvo Group North America, LLC Rafee explains that Volvo improperly shifted its reasons as follows: During the EEOC process it was clearly the incident involving Mr. Brock [that motivated his termination]. In fact, the Appellee clearly told the EEOC that Mr. Brock was the individual who made the initial complaint against the Appellant. However, when it came time to file the motion for summary judgment . . . , this rationale morphed into a series of unreported violent outburst[s] on the part of the Appellant. It is worth noting that some of these alleged incidents were claimed to have been witnessed by Mr. Johnson who did not see any need to mention them until some two years after the termination of the Appellant. (Appellant Br. at 24–25) But here, unlike in Cicero, Volvo’s reason for terminating Rafee has remained consistent over time and over the course of this litigation: Rafee was fired due to his altercation with Brock. Rafee’s explanation does not amount to a material departure that would call into question Volvo’s motivation. Indeed, the additional conduct that Rafee contends motivated the termination (and amounted to a departure from the initially proffered reason) is not determinative because “additional, non-discriminatory reasons that do not conflict with the one stated at the time of discharge does not constitute shifting justifications.” Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 988 F.3d 318, 328 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 891 (6th Cir. 2020)). It is also unclear whether Volvo relied on that additional information as part of its reasoning for terminating Rafee—as Rafee suggests—or whether it relied on that information to corroborate the allegations that ultimately led to Rafee’s termination—as Volvo asserts. On this record Rafee has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that calls into question Volvo’s proffered reason for terminating him. -10- No. 21-5891, Rafee v. Volvo Group North America, LLC Because Rafee has not established that Volvo’s proffered reason for his termination was a pretext for age discrimination, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Volvo.