Opinion ID: 1213852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: any error of the trial court in submitting miranda issues to the jury was harmless.

Text: Molina and Ayon assert that the trial court, not the jury, should have decided whether any waivers of their Miranda rights were knowing and voluntarily made. We conclude that any error the trial court may have committed was harmless. Counsel for Molina, Ayon, and Lau filed a pretrial motion to suppress their post-arrest statements. The motion was supported by counsel's affidavit, which stated: [T]he Defendants have informed affiant that at least two of them have given statements to the officers who arrested them, that to the best of their recollection they do not recall being advised of their right to remain silent and to have an attorney present.... The trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which the trial court decided not to suppress the statements, stating: It's a question of fact for the jury. If [the arresting officer] testifies under oath that  that he gave it [the Miranda warning] to them, and they say they don't understand it, that becomes an issue for the jury. Not for me to decide.... [I]f your clients are  want to rebut that, or whatever they want to say that's up to them; but it's no basis to dismiss these cases. It's no basis to suppress it either. At trial the interviewing officer testified that he read Molina his Miranda rights in English and read Ayon his rights in Spanish. According to the officer, both men indicated they understood their rights. The officer then related to the jury Molina's and Ayon's statements, which were given without the presence of counsel, in which both men admitted buying the cocaine in Los Angeles and bringing it to Idaho to sell. Neither Molina nor Ayon testified, and the officer's testimony was not rebutted. The state contends there is an insufficient record on appeal for the Court to decide whether the motion to suppress was improperly denied. The record contains the motion, the affidavit quoted above, the court minutes, and two pages of the transcript from the hearing. Based on this record, the factual basis for the motion is sketchy. The defendants, however, are challenging the denial on the purely legal ground that it was inappropriate for the judge to permit the jury to decide whether Molina and Ayon knowingly and voluntary waived their Miranda rights. The record on this issue is sufficient to permit our review. This Court has clearly held that whether an arrestee's Miranda waiver or statement is knowingly and voluntarily given is a question to be decided by the judge, not the jury. In State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 709-10, 471 P.2d 553, 564-65 (1970), cert. denied Dillon v. Idaho, 401 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 947, 28 L.Ed.2d 223 (1971), this Court adopted the so-called Massachusetts rule, which provides that the trial court in the absence of the jury resolves the issue of voluntariness and then determines the admissibility of a criminal defendant's statements. See also State v. Mitchell, 101 Idaho 108, 109, 609 P.2d 175, 176 (1980); State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 495, 660 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1983), cert. denied Mitchell v. Idaho, 461 U.S. 934, 103 S.Ct. 2101, 77 L.Ed.2d 308 (1983). At a suppression hearing where voluntariness is an issue, the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986) (quoting People v. Lawler, 9 Cal.3d 156, 107 Cal.Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621, 623 (1973)). In the present case, the trial court did not determine voluntariness as mandated by the caselaw. Because we do not know what the trial court's ruling on voluntariness would have been, we first consider the possibility that the trial court might have denied suppression when the statements should have been suppressed. If so, we must then ask whether the error in doing so would have been harmless pursuant to I.C.R. 52 (1994) (Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.). To hold an error harmless, this Court `must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that [the] evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.' State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 976, 829 P.2d 861, 866 (1992) (quoting State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034, 1043 (1980)). The evidence at issue is the officer's testimony that Molina and Ayon admitted bringing five kilograms of cocaine to Idaho to sell. Valdez, Carreon, and the INS agents all testified to Molina's and Ayon's involvement. The jury was shown a videotape of Molina removing the cocaine from the automobile at the restaurant. The fingerprints of both men were found on the packages of cocaine. Molina and Ayon also conceded at trial that they brought the cocaine to Idaho, although that may have been a tactical choice based on the fact they could not get their confessions suppressed. They relied solely on an entrapment defense, which failed. Given these circumstances, even if the officer's testimony regarding their confessions should have been suppressed, we believe beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable possibility that the testimony of the officer concerning the confessions contributed to the convictions. Therefore, any error was harmless.