Opinion ID: 1176257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: constitutionality of the minimum mandatory sentencing scheme

Text: Shickles also challenges the constitutionality of § 76-5-301.1(4), which provides for a minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of five, ten, or fifteen years and that may be for life. He contends that the statute is unconstitutional because (1) it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in that the sentences are disproportionate to the crime of kidnapping, (2) it infringes on inherent judicial power and authority, (3) it invades the province of the Board of Pardons, and (4) the sentencing scheme is unconstitutionally vague. Defendant's first three arguments were addressed and rejected in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986), where we sustained the constitutionality of § 76-5-403.1 (Supp. 1987) (minimum mandatory sentencing required upon conviction of sodomy upon a child). Bishop specifically concluded that the harshness of the statutory sentencing scheme is not so disproportionate that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, that the Legislature of this state has the sole power to fix punishment, and that the power of the Board of Pardons to grant parole contained in article VII, section 12 of the Constitution of Utah is explicitly subject to conditions established by the Legislature. 717 P.2d at 263-65, 267-72. See also State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55 (1988); State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558 (Utah 1987); State v. Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987). Defendant's remaining challenge to the constitutionality of the sentencing statutes is grounded upon vagueness. Similar vagueness challenges were rejected in State v. Egbert and State v. Bell . Egbert and Bell both held that the provisions of § 76-5-405(2) (Supp. 1985) (amended 1986) are not unconstitutionally vague. For analytical purposes, sentencing under §§ 76-5-405(2) and 76-5-301.1 is identical. See State v. Bishop . Child kidnapping is punishable by imprisonment for a minimum mandatory term of five, ten, or fifteen years. Upon conviction, § 76-3-201(5) [11] comes into consideration, and it is likewise couched in clear, unequivocal language. It mandates imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime, whereupon the sentence of either the highest or the lowest severity must be considered. Based on our earlier cases, defendant's arguments are without merit.