Opinion ID: 691981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of Sudden and Accidental

Text: 7 As with many commercial liability policies issued in the 1970's, the policies at issue in this case all contain the so-called pollution exclusion clause, which reads: 8 This insurance does not apply; ... (j) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutant into or on land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental. 9 This clause, with its sudden and accidental language, has created enormous amounts of litigation. 10 Indeed, we have already interpreted this clause under Kentucky law. Id. In Star Fire Coals, this Court declared: 11 We believe the everyday meaning of the term sudden is exactly what this clause means. We do not believe that it is possible to define sudden without reference to a temporal element that joins together conceptually the immediate and the unexpected. It must also be emphasized that the focus of this sudden and accidental exception to the general pollution exclusion clause is on the nature of the discharge of the pollution itself, not on the nature of the damages caused. 12 .. Thus, we believe that such pollution exclusion clauses apply to the release of wastes and pollutants taking place on a regular basis or in the ordinary course of business. 13 Id. at 34-35. 14 Defendant attempts to avoid the effects of Star Fire Coals by arguing that the Kentucky Supreme Court would not reach this same conclusion. In support of its argument, defendant points to a 1991 decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court: James Graham Brown Foundation v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273 (Ky.1991). 1 According to defendant, in Brown Foundation, the Kentucky high court displayed an inclination toward interpreting liability policies broadly. 15 We have reviewed Brown Foundation and conclude that it does not provide support for defendant's position. In that case, the Kentucky Supreme Court was faced only with interpreting the occurrence clause in a liability policy; the policy at issue did not contain a pollution exclusion clause to limit the scope of the occurrence clause. Moreover, in Brown Foundation, the Kentucky Supreme Court reiterated the interpretation principles relied on by this Court in Star Fire Coals. 16 We see no meaningful distinction between Star Fire Coals and the present case. In both cases, the insured had deliberately discharged waste over a period of years. Accordingly, defendant cannot claim the protection of the sudden and accidental language, and the District Court correctly concluded that the pollution exclusion clause bars coverage in this case.