Opinion ID: 2978752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Atkins’s prior convictions

Text: In addition to his claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his motion to sever, Atkins argues that the district court erred in permitting the prosecutor to question -8- Nos. 08-2182, 08-2304 United States v. McDonel; United States v. Atkins him about his prior convictions for breaking and entering and for armed robbery. The district court had ruled prior to Atkins’s testimony that this evidence was inadmissible under Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. But shortly thereafter, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and Atkins during cross-examination: Q. Now, you wouldn’t want your face to be seen holding a gun at a robbery scene, would you? I mean, let’s be truthful, you wouldn’t want that, right? A. No, sir. I mean, anybody wouldn’t want that. Q. All right. So you can recognize that a ski mask can conceal a person’s face, can’t you? A. Yes. Q. You can recognize—and you wouldn’t want your fingerprints to be found at the scene of a crime, right? A. I guess not. Depends on the scene of the crime. Q. Oh, so an opportunistic crime, you don’t mind your fingerprints being there? A. I don’t do crimes, sir. The prosecutor then requested permission to question Atkins about his prior convictions. Overruling trial counsel’s objection, the district court reasoned that the prosecutor could inquire into Atkins’s criminal history because Atkins had “opened the door” by providing the voluntary response that “I don’t do crimes.” We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472, 483 (6th Cir. 2009). Atkins challenges the district court’s -9- Nos. 08-2182, 08-2304 United States v. McDonel; United States v. Atkins ruling under Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides that “[f]or the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness, . . . evidence that an accused has been convicted of [a felony] shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” Essentially, Atkins asserts that the prejudicial nature of his past convictions, due to their similarity to the crimes with which he was charged in the present case, outweighs the probative value of these convictions regarding his truthfulness. But, as the district court found, the probative value of this evidence outweighed its potential prejudice once Atkins “opened the door” to inquiries about the convictions by stating that he did not “do crimes.” See United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 385 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[W]here one party has ‘opened the door’ on an issue, the opponent, in the trial court’s discretion, may introduce evidence on the same issue to rebut any false impression that may have been created by the earlier admission of evidence.”). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to inquire as to Atkins’s prior convictions to rebut Atkins’s statement to the effect that he had never been involved in criminal activity. E. McDonel’s and Atkins’s Eighth Amendment claims Finally, McDonel and Atkins challenge their sentences as violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Both men were convicted on multiple counts of interference with commerce by threats or violence in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951. McDonel received a one-month sentence for each of his five convictions under this statute, with the sentences to run concurrently, and Atkins was sentenced to a 60-month prison term for each of his -10- Nos. 08-2182, 08-2304 United States v. McDonel; United States v. Atkins three convictions, to run concurrently. (Atkins’s sentence was higher because he had two prior burglary convictions and one prior armed robbery conviction.) In addition, both men were convicted of brandishing a firearm during each of the robberies in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The mandatory-minimum sentence under this statute is 7 years for the first conviction and a 25-year consecutive sentence for each subsequent conviction. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (C), (D). Because McDonel was convicted on five counts under § 924, he received an additional 1,284 months, for a total sentence of 1,285 months (107 years and one month). Atkins, who was convicted on 3 counts under § 924, received an additional 684 months, for a total sentence of 744 months (62 years). As specified in § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), the district court ordered that each of the § 924(c) gun convictions run consecutively. Both men argue that their sentences amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. McDonel notes his youth at the time of the crime spree as well as the fact that he had no prior felony convictions, never fired his gun during the robberies, and was trying to provide for his girlfriend and their child. Similarly, Atkins emphasizes that because he was 40 years old in 2006, his sentence essentially amounts to a lifetime in prison. He further points out that were he sentenced pursuant to Michigan state law, his sentence would be approximately 40 years less. Because McDonel and Atkins failed to challenge their sentences at their sentencing hearings, the plain-error standard of review is applicable. See United States v. Watkins, 509 F.3d 277, 282 (6th Cir. 2007). We have previously rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to consecutive sentences imposed pursuant to § 924(c). In Watkins, for example, the defendant received a 1,772-month prison sentence for his participation in six armed robberies. The district court sentenced Wakins to 188 -11- Nos. 08-2182, 08-2304 United States v. McDonel; United States v. Atkins months of imprisonment for his robbery and conspiracy convictions, and then added an additional 1,584 months pursuant to § 924(c) for the firearms violations. Id. This court rejected Watkins’s Eighth Amendment claim on appeal, noting that “[t]his circuit has never held that the consecutivesentence requirement in § 924(c) is unconstitutional.” Id. Although we acknowledged that “the Eighth Amendment places an outer limit on criminal penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the offense,” Watkins’s sentence was “not such a case,” given the “numerosity and seriousness of [his] offenses,” the consecutive-sentence requirement under § 924(c), and the fact that this court had upheld comparable sentences in similar circumstances. Id. at 282-83 (citing United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 536-37 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming an 858-month prison sentence resulting largely from convictions pursuant to § 924(c)); United States v. Marks, 209 F.3d 577, 581, 583 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenges to sentences of 1,395 and 2,242 months of imprisonment under § 924(c) for two defendants who committed six and nine armed bank robberies, respectively)). Because neither McDonel nor Atkins have presented any contrary authority for departing from this precedent, we reject their Eighth Amendment claims.