Opinion ID: 4545148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: FMLA Discrimination

Text: It is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise” any rights under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). “A discrimination claim ‘arises when an employer takes adverse action against an employee because the employee exercises rights to which [s]he is entitled under the FMLA.’” Hudson v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 787 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pulczinski v. Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012)). Button alleges that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of CP on Button’s FMLA discrimination claim. Button argues that CP discriminated against her because she used FMLA leave. She relies on CP’s decision to terminate her in the RIF while she was on FMLA leave in February 2016. “To avoid summary judgment, [Button] must present sufficient 6 Button also states that CP failed to follow its own policies, but she does not identify any policy that CP failed to follow. And, she alleges that she was similarly situated to male Operations Supervisors, but she fails to point to any particular male who was similarly situated. See Wierman v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 994 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he individuals used for comparison must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” (internal quotation omitted)). Button mentions that Michael Welch, another Operations Supervisor, also had a rule violation; however, he is not similarly situated because he reported to a different supervisor, and he did not require additional training. -13- evidence for a jury to find that [CP’s] decision to terminate her was motivated by her exercise of rights under the FMLA.” Malloy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 756 F.3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2014). “Using FMLA leave does not give an employee any greater protection against termination for reasons unrelated to the FMLA than was available before.” Hudson, 787 F.3d at 866 (internal quotation omitted). Button does not offer any direct evidence that CP terminated her in the RIF for exercising her FMLA rights, so we must analyze her claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. at 866. To establish a prima facie case of FMLA discrimination, Button “must show that: 1) she engaged in protected conduct; 2) she suffered a materially adverse employment action; and 3) the materially adverse action was causally linked to the protected conduct.” Wierman, 638 F.3d at 999. CP does not dispute the district court’s assumption that Button established a prima facie case; therefore, “[w]e will assume without deciding that [Button] presented a prima facie case establishing a causal connection between” Button’s use of FMLA leave in February 2016 and CP’s decision to terminate her the same month. Lovland v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 674 F.3d 806, 813 (8th Cir. 2012). Based on the record, we agree with the district court that CP put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for including her in the RIF—Button was one of the least qualified Operations Supervisors at the time of the RIF. See id. Because CP proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Button, to survive summary judgment she must provide evidence that creates a genuine dispute of material fact that CP’s stated reason was mere pretext for FMLA discrimination. Wierman, 638 F.3d at 999. [Button] may prove pretext by demonstrating that [CP]’s proffered reason has no basis in fact, that [she] received a favorable review shortly before [s]he was terminated, that similarly situated employees who did not engage in the protected activity were treated more leniently, that -14- [CP] changed its explanation for why it fired [her], or that [CP] deviated from its policies. Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2006). First, Button points out that she received a favorable review shortly before being terminated. This constituted a thank you letter and a gift card for completing the previous year without any incidents. A recent favorable review may be used as evidence to show that an “employer’s proffered explanation for the adverse action had no basis in fact or was not actually important to the employer.” Smith v. Allen Health Sys., Inc., 302 F.3d 827, 834 (8th Cir. 2002). However, Button’s letter from CP is not evidence of pretext because it does not undermine CP’s reasoning for terminating her in the RIF. She may have done well by avoiding incidents and deserved commendation, but her qualifications still compared unfavorably with other Operations Supervisors. See id. at 834–35 (rejecting argument that evidence of a favorable review was pretextual because the employee’s high score for acknowledging gifts did not rebut the employer’s separate reason for firing her after learning that she was behind on sending out receipts). Button also attempts to point out a pattern of FMLA discrimination by CP against employees who take FMLA leave. She relies on Hite v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co. for support. See 446 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2006). Hite held that a plaintiff demonstrated a pattern of discrimination when two employees testified that they were retaliated against for taking FMLA leave. Id. at 868. However, Hite does not help. The supervisor in that case regularly complained that FMLA was bad for the company and explicitly told the plaintiff that she needed to be at work. See Ebersole v. Novo Nordisk, Inc., 758 F.3d 917, 927 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing Hite). This case contains no such evidence. -15- Button also fails to show that other similar CP employees had suffered FMLA discrimination. Two of the employees that Button points to never took FMLA leave. And, the other two employees were terminated for different reasons: CP terminated one of the employees two years earlier in a different RIF and fired the other for disciplinary reasons. Further, it is undisputed that CP decided to keep three Operations Supervisors considered in the RIF who had also taken FMLA leave. Button fails to point out a pattern of FMLA discrimination. Finally, Button again argues that CP’s shifting explanations and failure to follow policy are evidence of pretext. But, these arguments fail for the same reasons they did so in her gender discrimination claim—“a lack of sufficient evidence to cast doubt on [CP’s] legitimate, [nondiscriminatory] reason for terminating [Button].” See Wierman, 638 F.3d at 1001. The record evidence does not support Button’s claim CP used the RIF as pretext for FMLA discrimination. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of CP on Button’s FMLA discrimination claim.