Opinion ID: 166242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: The underlying dispute concerns a parcel of real property located in Provo, Utah. Plaintiffs allege that they are the owners of the property. They assert that the appellees (all defendants except the bankruptcy judge and trustee) deprived them of their rightful interest in the property through orders entered in a Utah state court. They filed this action in a Nevada federal district court seeking an order to set aside the Utah state court’s ruling that they were not the owners of the real property in question. The plaintiffs also alleged in their federal lawsuit that the appellees conspired in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to deprive them of their interest in the property. The Nevada federal district court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the appellees, and transferred the case to the Utah federal district court. At about the same time as the transfer, Holli Lundahl, a defendant and cross-claimant in this case, filed for bankruptcy in Utah and attempted to have the bankruptcy court take jurisdiction over the parties’ disputes regarding the Provo real property. The bankruptcy court dismissed Ms. Lundahl’s case on January 9, 2004, without ruling on the Provo property issue. 2 Meanwhile, in the underlying Utah federal court action, the appellees filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court 2 The bankruptcy court’s orders are not before us in this appeal. -3- directed plaintiffs to address the issue of jurisdiction, R. Vol. V, doc. 40, but they did not do so. The district court then dismissed the case, holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested the federal court of jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ challenge to the Utah state court’s orders in its quiet title action, as well as plaintiffs’ other claims that were inextricably intertwined with the state-court case. 3 Id. doc. 45. Following the dismissal order, plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), arguing that the district court violated the automatic bankruptcy stay by dismissing the case three days after the bankruptcy case was dismissed, and challenging the court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, plaintiffs assert (1) the order dismissing their case was void because it was issued while the automatic bankruptcy stay was in effect; (2) the Utah federal district court should have consolidated the instant case with Ms. Lundahl’s bankruptcy case; (3) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply; (4) the district court abused its discretion in denying their Rule 59(e) motion because, even though they did not file a jurisdictional brief as directed, their Rooker-Feldman argument could have been found in the pleadings they did file; 3 The district court also dismissed Ms. Lundahl’s cross claims, but since her cross appeal has been dismissed, we limit our discussion to plaintiffs’ claims. -4- and (5) they obtained service of process on defendant Berrett and Associates, despite that defendant’s claim to the contrary. Legal Framework We first address plaintiffs’ claim that we must apply the law of the jurisdiction in which they filed their complaint, which was the Ninth Circuit. The case was transferred to the Utah federal court because the Nevada court lacked personal jurisdiction; therefore, we apply the choice-of-law principles of the transferee court, which is the Tenth Circuit. Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp. , 90 F.3d 1523, 1532 (10th Cir. 1996). 4 Utah choice-of-law principles require application of Utah substantive law. See Peck v. Horrocks Engineers, Inc. , 106 F.3d 949, 952 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs are representing themselves on appeal, so their pleadings will be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Plaintiffs’ pro se status does not excuse them, however, from following the rules of court. Murray v. City of Tahlequah , 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002). We review de novo the district court’s order dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union , 314 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 2002). We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s 4 Plaintiffs did not, and do not, challenge the Nevada district court’s conclusion that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. -5- decision not to consolidate this case with the bankruptcy case. Shump v. Balka , 574 F.2d 1341, 1344 (10th Cir. 1978). The district court’s order denying the Rule 59(e) motion is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Minshall v. McGraw Hill Broadcasting Co. , 323 F.3d 1273, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003).