Opinion ID: 181925
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether extortion was relevant conduct under 1B1.3(a)(2).

Text: The District Court concluded that extortion was relevant conduct to the unlawful possession of a firearm offense, but it did not clarify whether it was relevant conduct under §§ 1B1.3(a)(1) or (a)(2). Both parties suggest that § 1B1.3(a)(2) applies here. Relevant conduct is defined in § 1B1.3(a) as: (1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. (2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and (1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. (3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions. § 1B1.3(a). In Jansen v. United States, 369 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir.2004), we established a general rule for determining whether §§ 1B1.3(a)(1) or (a)(2) applies to certain conduct. We held that if both sections could apply to the facts of a case, we must apply Section (a)(2). Id. at 247-48. Moreover, we held that Section (a)(2) applies when the offense of conviction is a groupable offense, regardless of the nature of the alleged relevant conduct. [4] Id. at 248. Kulick's offense of conviction, unlawful possession of a firearm, is a groupable offense. [5] See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). Accordingly, we apply Section (a)(2) to determine whether extortion was relevant conduct to Kulick's unlawful possession of a firearm. For an act to qualify as relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(2), three conditions must be met: (1) it must be the type of conduct described in § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) and (B) (`all acts and omissions committed ... by the defendant'); (2) grouping would be appropriate under § 3D1.2(d); and (3) it must have been `part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan' under § 1B1.3(a)(2). United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir.2009). The first two conditions are easily satisfied. In accordance with the District Court's findings and the text of § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), Kulick committed both offenses. Moreover, grouping is appropriate because unlawful possession of a firearm is a groupable offense under § 3D1.2(d). See Jansen, 369 F.3d at 248. The third condition, whether the two offenses were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme, requires a more fact-intensive analysis and is the main issue here. The Guidelines' commentary defines the same course of conduct as those offenses that are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses. § 1B1.3 cmt. n. 9(B). The commentary also defines a common scheme or plan as being at least two offenses that are substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.  Id. at cmt. n. 9(A). In order to determine whether offenses are part of the same course of conduct, and thus relevant conduct, the Guidelines' commentary provides a three-prong test. The sentencing court must look to: (1) the temporal proximity between the two offenses; (2) the similarity of the offenses; and (3) the regularity of the offenses. United States v. Wilson, 106 F.3d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir.1997) (quoting § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 9(B)). Importantly, the test is a sliding scale, so [e]ven if one factor is absent, relevant conduct may be found where at least one other factor is strong. Id. Therefore, [a]lthough there is no bright-line rule defining what constitutes `the same course of conduct,' the relative strengths of the three prongs must be individually assessed. United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1484 (6th Cir.1996). This factual determination is for the District Court to determine in the first instance, and we review for clear error. United States v. Harrison, 357 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds. Therefore, we turn to the three-prong test to determine whether the District Court properly concluded that extortion was relevant conduct, bearing in mind that [t]his test is especially important in cases where the extraneous conduct exists in `discrete, identifiable units' apart from the conduct for which the defendant is convicted. United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 911 (9th Cir.1992).
The time interval between Kulick's extortion offense and the unlawful possession of a firearm offense, twenty-seven months, is substantial. [6] We are wary to stretch the limits of the temporal inquiry because § 1B1.3 could not reasonably have been intended to cause a court to convert a single possession conviction into a sweeping tool to gather in all of the otherwise unrelated criminality of a defendant which occurred contemporaneously with the charge-offense. Ritsema, 31 F.3d at 567. Therefore, although the relevant conduct provision permits a sentencing court to consider events occurring before, during, and after the offense conduct, it is limited by temporal proximity to prevent absurd results ... especially in the context of possession crimes. Id. Our sister courts of appeals have issued several opinions that are instructive to this inquiry. As a general principle, [v]arious courts have found that a period of separation of over one year negated or weighed against [a finding of] temporal proximity. United States v. Wall, 180 F.3d 641, 646 (5th Cir.1999); see also Hill, 79 F.3d at 1484. For example, in Hahn, the Ninth Circuit held that a five-month gap between two offenses was relatively remote and would require a strong showing of similarity and regularity to constitute relevant conduct. 960 F.2d at 910-11. Hahn was convicted of four counts related to the unlawful possession of a firearm and slightly less than one gram of methamphetamine. The sentencing court adopted the PSR and considered evidence of Hahn's prior methamphetamine dealing and carrying of firearms spanning over a year prior to the offenses of conviction. This year-old evidence was used as relevant conduct to greatly increase Hahn's sentence. The Ninth Circuit held that there must be a strong showing of substantial similarity if the uncharged conduct is both solitary and temporally remote. Hahn, 960 F.2d at 911. It remanded the issue to the district court for consideration. Over two years passed between Kulick's offense of conviction and the extortion offense. The offenses were temporally remote, and as a general rule, where the conduct alleged to be relevant is relatively remote to the offense of conviction, a stronger showing of similarity or regularity is necessary to compensate for the absence of temporal proximity. § 1B1.3 cmt. n. 9(B). With this in mind, we turn to the next two prongs.
The similarity between the two offenses is also very weak, as there are significant differences between the offenses of extortion and unlawful possession of a firearm. In evaluating this prong, a court primarily should consider the degree of similarity between the offenses, but can also look to the commonality of victims, the commonality of offenders, the commonality of purpose, and the similarity of modus operandi. § 1B1.3 cmt. n. 9(A), (B); see also Wilson, 106 F.3d at 1144. When evaluating offenses under the similarity prong, a court must not do so at such `a level of generality that would render worthless the relevant conduct analysis.' Wilson, 106 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Hill, 79 F.3d at 1483). Therefore, the acts in question must exhibit commonalities of factors sufficient to allow for a reasonable grouping of the separate, individual acts into a larger, descriptive whole. It is not enough, however, that the acts stand in close temporal relation to one another. Rather, the similarities of the acts must arise from the character or type of the acts. United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 865 (3d Cir.1997). To find relevant conduct, we require a strong showing of similarity, even where the temporal proximity was strong. For example, we held that possession of drugs for personal use is too dissimilar, and therefore not relevant conduct, to possession of drugs with intent to distribute, even when the drugs were found contemporaneously. Jansen, 369 F.3d at 247. Here, Kulick's offense of conviction was unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, while the allegedly-relevant conduct was extortion. The two offenses are dissimilar, as the only commonality is the fact that possession of a gun is a required element of both charges. The government mischaracterizes the similarity inquiry by arguing that the similarity prong is satisfied simply because Kulick used the same Beretta pistol in both offenses. In support of this proposition, the government relies on decisions issued by several courts of appeals, which found sufficient similarity where a defendant was charged with multiple counts of unlawful possession of a firearm. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 516 F.3d 479 (6th Cir.2008); United States v. Brummett, 355 F.3d 343 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Santoro, 159 F.3d 318 (7th Cir.1998). However, these cases merely stand for the proposition that one count of unlawful possession of a firearm is similar to a second count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and is therefore relevant conduct. For example, in Phillips, the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's enhancement of the defendant's offense level for a 2004 unlawful possession of a firearm offense. It found that the defendant's unlawful possession of firearms in 2002 and 2006 was relevant conduct to the offense of conviction. 516 F.3d at 483-85. The court reasoned that the contemporaneous, or nearly contemporaneous, possession of uncharged firearms is... relevant conduct in the context of a felon-in-possession prosecution. Id. at 483 (quoting United States v. Powell, 50 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir.1995)). In so ruling, however, the court relied heavily on the fact that the offenses in 2002, 2004, and 2006 were identical: unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. at 485. Moreover, the court reasoned that Phillips's repeated possession of firearms was for a common purpose: self-defense. Id.; see also § 1B1.3, cmt. n. 9(A) (encouraging sentencing courts to consider whether there is a common purpose for two or more offenses). Similarly, in Brummett, 355 F.3d 343, the Fifth Circuit found relevant conduct where the defendant possessed four firearms on three separate occasions within a nine-month period. In Santoro, 159 F.3d 318, the Seventh Circuit also held that the defendant's possession of an assault rifle, within six to nine months prior to his arrest for unlawful possession of a firearm, was part of a common course of conduct. Both Brummett and Santoro drew on a third case, United States v. Windle, for the proposition that a pattern of unlawfully possessing firearms over a relatively short period of time met the same course of conduct requirement. 74 F.3d 997, 1000-01 (10th Cir.1996). None of these cases is applicable to the facts here, but instead merely establishes that unlawful possession of a firearm in one year may be relevant conduct to unlawful possession of a firearm in another year. Kulick's case is readily distinguishable because the two counts are for different offenses, and there is no allegation or finding of a common purpose.
The regularity inquiry, which considers the number of repetitions of the offenses, is not satisfied on these facts. § 1B1.3(a)(2) cmt. n. 9(B). The government contends that even though extortion was an isolated occurrence, regularity is strong because possession of a firearm is a continuing offense. See United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 146 (3d Cir.2006) (Ackerman, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Jackson, 479 F.3d 485, 491 (7th Cir.2007); United States v. Blizzard, 27 F.3d 100, 102 (4th Cir.1994). In support of its argument, the government relies on a First Circuit decision, Powell, for the proposition that the contemporaneous, or nearly contemporaneous, possession of uncharged firearms is, in this circuit, relevant conduct in the context of a felon-in-possession prosecution. Powell, 50 F.3d at 104. The sweeping language in Powell permitted the defendant's prior unlawful possession of a firearm to be relevant conduct for his underlying unlawful possession of a firearm conviction offense. It did not, however, permit an unrelated count to be relevant conduct solely because of the continuous possession of a firearm. The District Court never explicitly found that Kulick possessed a Beretta pistol throughout the twenty-seven month period between the extortion and unlawful possession of a firearm offenses. It suggested as much, however, by stating that Kulick maintained control of the firearms, including a Beretta handgun, which according to witnesses he carried and at least on one occasion used to threaten an employee. (App. at 100.) Kulick even conceded this point. (Blue Br. at 16-17 n. 12, 25 n. 21.) Regardless of whether Kulick's possession was continuous for the entire twenty-seven months, we have never held that continuous possession of a firearm is sufficient to automatically render two offenses relevant conduct, and we decline to do so now.