Opinion ID: 734910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: limiting scope of examination

Text: 9 We undertake a two part inquiry to determine whether there was in fact error and, if so, if that error was harmless. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 10 Here, the district court committed no error by limiting the scope of the defense examination. The Sixth Amendment does not empower a defendant to pursue irrelevant inquiries or exercise complete control over the examination of a witness. U.S. v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir.1991). A defendant may not call witnesses for the sole purpose of compelling them to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury. U.S. v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 624 (9th Cir.1979). 11 Here, the judge disallowed questioning only into subjects which the witness had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege not to answer; defendant was free to question Labertew as to all other relevant matters. Because the defense was only prohibited from inquiries which it knew the witness would not answer, it was not denied the opportunity to expose the jury to facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. The district court's limitation was not error. 12 In any event, any error here is subject to harmless error analysis, Id. at 680. The defense sought only to elicit testimony to impeach Labertew's credibility. However, the prosecution elicited no information from Labertew, and the defense did not choose to examine him on any point relating to Bennallack. Because Labertew gave no harmful testimony, impeachment would not have mattered. Even assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were realized, the limitation on examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 684.