Opinion ID: 1785702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimonial Statement

Text: While Crawford did not establish a precise definition of the term testimonial, the Supreme Court did provide some guidance, holding that, at a minimum, statements are testimonial if the declarant made them at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and [in] police interrogations. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Following Crawford, the Supreme Court has provided further guidance in determining when statements made in the course of police interrogations are testimonial. As the Supreme Court explained in Davis v. Washington , the distinction rests on the primary purpose of the interrogation. 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74. Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. Id. at 2273. In contrast, such out-of-court statements are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Id. at 2273-74. Davis left open the question of whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are `testimonial.' Id. at 2274 n. 2. However, the Supreme Court did conclude that even where 911 operators are not law enforcement officers they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers. Id. Other courts have concluded that a child's spontaneous statement to a friend or family member is not likely to be testimonial. See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 927-28 (Colo.2006) (holding that an excited utterance a child made to his father and his father's friend immediately after a sexual assault was not testimonial); Mencos v. State, 909 So.2d 349, 351 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (concluding that child victim's statements to her mother that were overheard by a police detective were not testimonial and thus did not violate the Confrontation Clause); Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So.2d 66 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (finding that statements made by child victim to her mother and father about sexual contacts with the defendant were not testimonial); Somervell v. State, 883 So.2d 836 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that statements mother overheard her autistic child make were not testimonial); Purvis v. State, 829 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005) (holding that a ten-year-old victim's statements made in response to his mother's boyfriend's questions posed immediately after the sexual abuse occurred were nontestimonial; noting that the statements were elicited to find out what had occurred and whether the child had been harmed), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1026, 126 S.Ct. 1580, 164 L.Ed.2d 310 (2006); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n. 1 (8th Cir.2004) (noting comments made to loved ones or acquaintances . . . are not the kind of memorialized, judicial-process-created evidence of which Crawford speaks). Such spontaneous statements to someone other than law enforcement personnel are not made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Courts have also concluded that a child victim's statements to a medical professional are not testimonial when the statements regard the nature of the alleged attack or the cause of the child's symptoms and pain. See, e.g., Vigil, 127 P.3d at 921-924 (concluding that child victim's responses to questions by examining physician were not testimonial statements because questioning was intended to gather information in order to reach a medical diagnosis; statements identifying the defendant as the perpetrator were not admitted because immaterial to doctor's opinion); State v. Saunders, 132 Wash.App. 592, 132 P.3d 743, 749 (2006) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation in admitting statements victim made to paramedic and emergency room physician during course of receiving medical care because purpose of giving statements was to obtain appropriate care), review denied, 159 Wash.2d 1017, 157 P.3d 403 (2007). In each of the cited cases the statements were not made to a person in authority for the purpose of accusing someone, or in the words of the Supreme Court, to bear testimony against someone. But see State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284, 291 (2004) (concluding that child victim's statement to emergency room physician identifying the defendant as the perpetrator of abuse was not testimonial because made for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis). In contrast, courts have ruled that statements by child victims to police officers or members of child protection teams are testimonial in nature. See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal.App.4th 1396, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 753, 757-58 (2004) (holding that statements by child victim to responding officer and to trained forensic interviewer at special center for suspected child abuse victims were testimonial in nature); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314, 326 (2005) (finding that statements by child victims to social worker employed by Child Protective Services were testimonial because children were interviewed for express purpose of developing testimony in child sexual abuse case); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 880 (Mo.2006) (holding that statements by a child molestation victim to sex abuse counselors were testimonial because the counselors, although not government employees, were government agents, and the circumstances indicate that [the interviews'] primary purpose was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution); Flores v. State, 121 Nev. 706, 120 P.3d 1170, 1179 (2005) (concluding that child witness's statements to child abuse investigator and protective services investigator were testimonial because both of these individuals were either police operatives or tasked with reporting instances of child abuse for prosecution); State v. Mack, 337 Or. 586, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (2004) (finding that the Confrontation Clause prohibited a human services caseworker from testifying to statements made to her by a three-year-old witness during a police-directed interview, where the caseworker was serving as a proxy for the police during these interviews). As the Supreme Court explained in Crawford, [t]he involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police or other government officers serving an investigative and prosecutorial function. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The interviews of complainants of sexual abuse by members of child protection units and similar personnel are motivated in large part by the search for evidence and the personnel of these units have been treated as members of the extended prosecutorial team. John F. Yetter, Wrestling with Crawford v. Washington and the New Constitutional Law of Confrontation, Fla. B.J., Oct. 2004, at 26, 29; see also § 39.303(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005) (providing that one of the purposes of the Child Protection Teams is to provide [e]xpert medical, psychological, and related professional testimony in court cases); id. § 39.303(1)(j) (stating that CPT assessments shall include forensic interviews); id. § 39.306 (requiring CPTs to enter into agreements with local law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute child sexual abuse cases). As explained by the Fourth District, the facts of the instant case show that the coordinator of the Child Protection Team, while working with the county sheriff, took a statement from the victim regarding the allegations of sexual molestation. Contreras, 910 So.2d at 902. The interview was conducted and videotaped at a local shelter for victims of domestic violence. While the law enforcement officer was not in the room during the interview, he was connected electronically to the CPT coordinator in order to suggest questions. Id. at 902-03. In light of the police presence and the electronic connection, we conclude that the CPT coordinator was serving as a police proxy in this interview. This is reinforced by the statutory connection of the CPT to such investigations and prosecutions. Thus, we agree with the Fourth District that [t]his kind of interview by a CPT is indistinguishable from an ordinary police interrogation. Id. at 905. Moreover, the primary, if not the sole, purpose of the CPT interview was to investigate whether the crime of child sexual abuse had occurred, and to establish facts potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution. Based on the above, we agree with the Fourth District's conclusion that the child victim's statements to the CPT interviewer were testimonial. Thus, the statements had to meet the two requirements of Crawford in order not to violate the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation.