Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Plain Error Review in This Case

Text: Capano argues that the limits placed on his allocution were error in light of Shelton. Neither Capano nor his counsel objected to the limits placed on his allocution. Under plain error review, [463] the Court will grant relief only if the error complained of is so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. To establish plain error, Capano has the burden of showing actual prejudice. [464] As noted above, Shelton was not decided until after Capano was sentenced. Nevertheless, the State concedes that the limitations placed on Capano's right of allocution were too restrictive in light of Shelton. [465] Although it thus concedes error, the State argues that the trial judge's limits on allocution were not plain error in this case. First, the State seems to contend that Shelton should not be applied because it was decided after Capano was sentenced. The rationale of the State's argument is that because the scope of the right of allocution was unclear before Shelton was decided, and was an issue of first impression in Shelton, the error in this case cannot have been plain  i.e., obvious. This argument misconceives the nature of plain error review. Plain errors must be apparent on the face of the record. [466] As suggested by this language, the issue is whether the error is apparent from the vantage point of the appellate court in reviewing the trial record, not whether it was apparent to the trial court in light of then-existing law. [467] In this case, it is apparent, and conceded by the State, that the limitations imposed on the right of allocution accorded Capano are inconsistent with the right of allocution established in Shelton. The trial judge in the case before us was, of course, unaware when he imposed limits on Capano's allocution of what we were later to decide in Shelton. His error, therefore, was understandable. Accordingly, the fact that Shelton was decided after Capano's penalty hearing is not itself a bar to a finding of plain error, but that analysis requires a showing of unfairness and substantial prejudice to Capano. The State also contends that there is no plain error because this Court has not definitively declared allocution a substantial right. Shelton held that on the facts of that case the defendant had not shown that he was prejudiced by the limits placed on his allocution. Shelton was carrying out his own strategy  however misguided that strategy might have been  not to discuss the facts of the case as developed in the guilt phase. We held in Shelton that it does not follow, however, that a trial judge's setting of parameters on allocution similar to this one [in Shelton's case] would not be reversible error in a proper case where objection to the limitation was preserved, where there was plain error, or where there was a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel and resulting prejudice to the defendant. [468] We also noted  although determination of the point was not necessary to the decision in Shelton  that the right to allocution is arguably a substantial right of a capital defendant. [469] We also held that whether the right of allocution is a substantial right in a given case, it is not a constitutional right under the state or federal constitution. This Court stated in Shelton that the right to allocution is not a right granted by either the federal or state constitutions, [but rather] ... a right that is grounded solely on the Superior Court Criminal Rule, the Delaware death penalty statute and Delaware decisional law. [470] In the context of plain error review, the defendant must show that the error affected substantial rights. [471] Under the federal plain error rule, the phrase affecting substantial rights means in most cases ... that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the [trial] court proceedings. [472] To say that a right is not substantial may be merely another way of saying that the defendant cannot have been prejudiced by an erroneous abridgment of that right. We need not engage in an abstract analysis of whether allocution is a substantial right. Rather, consistent with this Court's plain error jurisprudence, we must decide whether the error that occurred in this case prejudiced Capano when viewed in the total context of the record relating to the allocution issue. [473]