Opinion ID: 25431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Meade’s Section 1983 Claim Against Dillard’s

Text: Meade alleges that Dillard’s violated her rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against those who, under the color of law, subject others to deprivations of certain rights, privileges, or immunities secured by either the Constitution or the laws of the United States. To assert a claim under § 1983, Meade must show (1) that she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and (2) that the conduct complained of was 5 committed by a person acting under the color of law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978); Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir. 1988). In this action, Meade attempts to establish that Dillard’s acted under the color of state law based on the actions of Walker, who, during the incident in question, was an off-duty police officer hired by Dillard’s as a security guard. Although private entities are not generally considered state actors, it is “without doubt that the actions of a private citizen can, and in some circumstances do, become the actions of the state . . . for purposes of § 1983.” Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970). In Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), the Supreme Court held: Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting ‘under color' of law for purposes of [1983]. To act 'under color' of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents. Id. at 152. The district court found that Meade had sufficiently alleged deprivation of constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the district court stated that Meade failed to met the second prong for asserting a § 1983 claim that Dillard’s was acting under the color of law. Meade has alleged facts that could support a finding that Walker, a Dillard’s employee, acted under the color of state law. The relevant allegations are that Walker wore an official police uniform and threatened to arrest Meade when she complained about her encounter with Ratliff. Similar facts have been found to be sufficient to support a finding that there was state action under color of law. See Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964) (state action where amusement park security guard wore a deputy sheriff badge and arrested patrons who failed to leave the park in response to his order). However, under Adickes, in order for Meade to state a § 1983 claim against Dillard’s, a 6 private entity, Meade must show that Dillard’s jointly participated in prohibited acts along with Walker. Meade has not asserted that there is a “customary plan” between Dillard’s and Walker (or the police generally) that resulted in a deprivation of Meade’s rights. See Smith v. Brookshire Bros., Inc., 519 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir. 1975). Other than the implied allegation that there was an employment relationship between Dillard’s and Walker, which is by itself insufficient to state a § 1983 claim against an employer,3 Meade does not allege any connection between Dillard’s and Walker that even suggests joint action. Therefore, Meade fails to make the requisite allegation for asserting a § 1983 claim against Dillard’s. Meade relies heavily on Laughlin v. Olszewski, 102 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1996). In Laughlin, this court affirmed the principle that an off-duty police officer may act under the color of state law for § 1983 purposes. However, unlike this case, Laughlin involved a suit directly against the police and the municipality. Laughlin does not relieve Meade from pleading that Dillard’s jointly engaged with the state officials in violating Meade’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, Meade has failed to demonstrate that Dillard’s acted under the color of state law for § 1983 purposes, and the district court did not erroneously dismiss her claim.