Opinion ID: 1834428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discriminatory Motive.

Text: Boelman makes several complaints with respect to the trial court's analysis of and conclusions concerning the bank's motivation for his termination. He claims (1) the trial court should have used a mixed-motive analysis to determine whether the defendants illegally discriminated against him; (2) the evidence established that he was fired, at least in part, because of his MS, unrelated to its effect on his performance; and (3) the court erred in concluding that he was not terminated because of his disability. A. Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability solely by reason of his disability. [4] 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. II 1990). [5] Boelman claims that because the court found his performance problems were causally connected to his MS, it erred in concluding that the defendants did not discharge him because of his disability under section 504. We agree. Where an employer fires an employee based on conduct shown to be causally connected to the employee's disability, the termination is solely by reason of the disability for purposes of section 504. Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 515-16 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 54, 121 L.Ed.2d 24 (1992). Nevertheless, this error by the district court is not a ground for reversal. To establish a claim under section 504, Boelman also had to show that he was qualified for his position. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2367, 60 L.Ed.2d 980, 988 (1979); Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278 (11th Cir.1994); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1386, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994). The trial court found he was not. Because, as we hold later, this finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court's error in holding that the defendants did not discharge Boelman because of his disability was not prejudicial. B. Chapter 601A. In deciding whether Boelman had proved that the defendants discriminated against him, the district court analyzed whether Boelman had proved a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. See Smith v. ADM Feed Corp., 456 N.W.2d 378, 385 (Iowa 1990). The court used a pretext analysis. See HyVee Food Stores v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 453 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1990) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting pretext analysis to a chapter 601A claim). Boelman contends the court should have applied a mixed-motive analysis. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246-47, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1799, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, 285 (1989) (applying mixed-motive analysis in title VII case). A mixed-motive analysis is appropriate when the employment decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives. Id., 490 U.S. at 247, 109 S.Ct. at 1788, 104 L.Ed.2d at 285-86; Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 448 (8th Cir.1993). Once the employee proves a mixed motive, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motive. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45, 109 S.Ct. at 1788, 104 L.Ed.2d at 284; Radabaugh, 997 F.2d at 448. Here Boelman attempted to prove that his termination was based, at least in part, on the mere fact that he had MS, unrelated to its effect on his performance. [6] The defendants claimed that he was fired because of poor performance. The district court found that Boelman's MS caused his performance problems. Consequently, no matter whose version of the facts we accept, Boelman's disability clearly motivated his termination. Because Boelman's disability was the only reason for his discharge, the facts of this case simply do not show a termination based on mixed motives. The issue here was not whether the defendants would have fired Boelman regardless of his disability. Obviously, they would not have fired him since the only reason they offered for his termination was disability-related. The issue here, as we shall discuss later, was whether Boelman's disability made him unqualified for his job. Under these circumstances, a mixed-motive analysis is inapplicable. Boelman next argues that the district court erred in concluding that the evidence he introduced showing the defendants fired him because of his failing health did not generate a prima facie case under a pretext analysis. As we discuss later, the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework is not appropriate for a case such as this where the employer acknowledges reliance on a disability-related reason for its action. Even if a pretext analysis were applicable, it requires Boelman to prove that he was qualified for his job as an element of his prima facie case. Henkel Corp. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 471 N.W.2d 806, 809 (Iowa 1991). As we discuss next, he failed to prove that he was qualified. Therefore, Boelman did not prove a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis.