Opinion ID: 1793829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. McGee's Testimony Regarding the Intent of Ms. Bauer's Assailant

Text: Appellant's second claim of error concerns Dr. McGee's testimony that he believed Ms. Bauer's assailant intended to kill her rather than merely assault her. Appellant contends that it was prejudicial error to admit such testimony. The defense, however, failed to make a timely objection to this testimony. Generally, failure to object to evidence    constitutes waiver of those issues on appeal unless appellant shows that admission of the evidence was plain error. Van Buren v. State, 556 N.W.2d 548, 551 (Minn.1996). To establish plain error, appellant must show that the ruling (1) was error, (2) was plain, and (3) affected appellant's substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1998). With respect to the first two factors, the state argues that this issue is controlled by State v. Bowers, 482 N.W.2d 774 (Minn.1992), where we held that there was no error in permitting a medical examiner to testify that the depth of a stab wound indicated that the stabbing was an intentional act. Id. at 778. In so holding, we recognized that the medical examiner was only stating the obvious. Id. Likewise, in State v. Parker, 585 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. 1998), we held that a medical examiner's conclusion that a stabbing was deliberate and not accidental is proper when based on the physical nature of an injury. Id. at 406. Contrary to the state's assertions, however, resolution of this issue is governed by our decision in State v. Chambers, 507 N.W.2d 237 (Minn.1993). There, we held that it was error to allow a pathologist to give an expert opinion that the killing was intentional, reasoning that the determination of the requisite mens rea should be left to the jury. Id. at 239. Like Dr. McGee in the present case, the pathologist in Chambers gave an opinion as to whether the assailant intended the result of his actsi.e., the victim's death. In contrast, the experts in Bowers and Parker testified as to whether the acts themselvesi.e., the stabbingswere intentionally as opposed to accidentally inflicted. Chambers acknowledges this distinction: A pathologist may appropriately testify to things such as the number and extent of the wounds, the amount of bleeding,    whether the wounds could or could not have been the result of accident, the cause of death, and so forth, but the pathologist should not be allowed to make an expert inference of intent to kill from these matters. 507 N.W.2d at 239 (emphasis added). Here, because Dr. McGee testified as to the assailant's intent to kill, Chambers controls and the admission of the testimony was error. However, even if admission of the evidence was error, to satisfy the third prong of the plain error analysis, the appellant has the heavy burden of showing that the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741. With respect to whether appellant has satisfied this third prong, Chambers is again instructive. There, we held that admission of the pathologist's opinion, although error, was not prejudicial. Chambers, 507 N.W.2d at 239. In so holding, we noted that [t]he main argument of the defense was not that the killing was unintentional. Id. at 238. We then reasoned, [g]iven the number and nature of the wounds, the jury readily could have found that whoever inflicted the wounds did so with an intent to kill. Thus, we do not think the admission of the pathologist's opinion testimony prejudiced defendant, particularly given the nature of defendant's defense. Id. Like the appellant in Chambers, appellant in the present case did not assert that Ms. Bauer's killing was unintentional. Rather, his defense consisted entirely of asserting that someone else killed Ms. Bauer. Moreover, as in Chambers, the method of Ms. Bauer's killingstrangulation by two ligatures wrapped tightly around her neck and then securedprovided a separate basis from which a jury could readily conclude that the assailant inflicted the wounds with an intent to kill. Accordingly, we hold that although admission of Dr. McGee's testimony that Ms. Bauer's assailant intended to kill her was error, it did not substantially affect appellant's rights and thus was not prejudicial.