Opinion ID: 1942822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Issue

Text: The present issue is, whether it was reversible error for the Court below to receive the report of a poll of the community in which the convicted felon resided at the time the survey was made, which poll, as ordered by the Court and as conducted by the probation-parole officer, indicated the recommendations of each person interviewed respecting the particular sentence he or she recommended as punishment to be meted out to the defendant, who, as they had been made aware, had been convicted of the crime of taking indecent liberties with the sexual parts of a young female child. We hold that the use of such polls, whether conducted as in the instant case in a selective and restrictive style without any effort to reach a cross-section of the inhabitants of the community or taken on a more sophisticated basis as in the manner the well-known Gallup and Harris polls are run, is impermissible as carrying within themselves an inherent potential of coercive influence upon the sentencing judge. Such a procedure would subject a defendant to the prejudicial whims of the populace, with no realistic opportunity to challenge the bias of the information obtained. People v. Sumner, 40 Ill.App.3d 832, 354 N.E.2d 18, 24 (1976). If such methodology were sanctioned in the criminal sentencing process, trial judges could effectively shun their personal responsibility in meting out punishment to convicted individuals, reverting, as it were, to procedures which gained overwhelming popularity during the French Revolution. Paraphrasing what we said in State v. Capitan, supra, at page 225, we emphasize again that specific sentencing recommendations, particularly if attended by publicity, and especially when coming from the people, are bound to put the sentencing authority under unwarranted and unfair pressures. We recognize that a heavy responsibility is entrusted to the trial judge, who must pass a value judgment upon a human being. In this, he represents the society at large. His task is rendered more difficult by reason of the fact that imperative standards, scientific or philosophical, do not exist to fix a particular punishment in a particular case. The Legislature, except in the case of mandatory sentences, has delegated the propriety of the particular sentence in a particular case to the sound discretion of the sentencing judge. There is undoubtedly a strong public interest in the imposition of a proper sentence and a court has a wide latitude of inquiry, when seeking adequate information to enable it to make an informed judgment respecting sentence. That judgment must be tailored to the individual case with the rights of the public duly protected at the same time. In order to help the court in meeting this problem, the Legislature has provided the investigatory services of a probation-parole officer for the purpose of furnishing the court with such pre-sentence information as will permit it properly to discharge its duty of administering a just punishment. [4] Since the statute failed to delineate the specific information which the probation-parole officer should present to the court in connection with the sentencing process, the Supreme Judicial Court implemented the statute by promulgating Rule 32, M.R.Crim.P., which requires in pertinent part as follows: (c) Pre-Sentence Investigation. (1) When Made. The court may in its discretion direct the State Board of Probation and Parole to make a pre-sentence investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation.   . (2) Report. The report of the pre-sentence investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information on his characteristics, his financial condition, and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other information as may be required by the court.   . (Emphasis additional) We agree that a sentencing judge may exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within the limits fixed by law, provided the settled course of procedure contemplated by Rule 32, M.R. Crim.P. be complied with. See Green v. State, Me., 247 A.2d 117 (1968). As stated in United States v. Harris, 558 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1977), [i]n determining an appropriate punishment, all the circumstances of the particular crime and the background of the individual offender must be considered. [footnote omitted] This individualized sentencing process requires `possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics,' citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). Although Rule 32(c), M.R.Crim.P., does not purport to be exclusive, since it provides, in the catch-all clause, the furnishing of such other information as may be required by the court, nevertheless, from the nature of the specific information it does prescribe, we conclude that the main objective of the judicial policy underlying the rule is to secure to the sentencing court an individualistic picture of the person to be sentenced with emphasis on circumstances about the person or in his personal background as may have an impact on his behavior. It is generally recognized that a trial court in imposing sentence should take into consideration the following factors: the gravity of the offense, its relation to the victim of the crime, if any, and the defendant's degree of culpability therein; the defendant's background, including his past record of criminal offenses and any history of undesirable behavior pattern; the defendant's personal characteristics, such as his personality, character and social traits, his age, educational background and employment record, his remorse, repentance and cooperativeness; the defendant's subjectivity to rehabilitation; the interest of the public in retribution and deterrence, and its right to protection against crime. There undoubtedly might be other factors germane to the task facing the sentencing court in assessing a just sentence, which at the same time should be the judgment of the judge and an adjudication tailored to the individual characteristics and deserts of the particular defendant, viewed in the light of the public interest in law and order. A poll of the members of the public for the purpose of obtaining sentence recommendations such as was conducted and reported in this case should not be used as a factor by the trial court in passing sentence, as in our view such procedure would be contrary to a sound judicial policy, would not be in the best interest of society and is outside the scope of Rule 32(c). Even though retribution, deterrence and protection of the public against crime and disorder are legitimate considerations to be taken into account in arriving at a just sentence in any particular case, such basic motivations should not be implemented by the sentencing justice in an atmosphere charged with personal spites, sectional prejudices and public likes or dislikes which polls are likely to produce. The instant poll demonstrates beyond a doubt the tremendous pressure which such procedural mechanism, if allowed, could bring to the sentencing process. Indeed, the recorded interviews of the twelve individuals, all of the more affluent social class in Livermore Falls except for the mother of the victim and the defendant's lady friend, as reported to the court by the probation-parole officer, produced strictly personal recommendations respecting the sentence to be imposed in the defendant's case, notwithstanding their apparent complete unacquaintance with Henri C. Samson, Sr. These recommendations ranged from the maximum sentence of imprisonment to a term of not less than five years and not more than ten years to such other biased exhortations as: A guy like that don't belong in the community; I would throw the book at him; If I were the Judge I would hang him by the balls of his feet in the middle of the park. We appreciate that the presiding Justice did say for the record that the court had no intention of relying upon a public opinion poll to determine the sentence to be imposed. But he also added for the record that it did seem to him to be significant to know in general what the attitude was for the particular type of offense. He thought, so he stated, the defendant's objection was a matter going to the weight to be given the overall report rather than its propriety. From the sentencing Justice's remarks for the record, it is not unreasonable to conclude that, in passing the sentence he did impose, he may well have been influenced, albeit unconsciously, by improper factors introduced as a result of the poll report. Any doubt in this regard must be resolved in favor of the defendant. See United States v. Harris, supra; State v. Nichols, 247 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 1976). The entry will be Affirmed in part. Judgment of conviction affirmed. Sustained in part. Sentence below vacated. Case remanded for resentencing by a Justice other than the Justice who imposed the original sentence. WEATHERBEE, J., sat at oral argument and participated in consultation, but died prior to the preparation of the opinion. DELAHANTY, J., did not sit.