Opinion ID: 1886550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Effect of Exclusion of Telephone Records on Scott's Defense

Text: Turning to appellant Scott, he argues that his convictions of ADW and PFCV must be reversed because of the erroneous exclusion of the records of the cellular telephone calls between Scott and Ms. Barnes. The government now concedes the trial court erred in refusing to admit the cellular telephone records, but argues that it was not reversible error. The Constitution, whether in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause or in the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process and Confrontation Clauses, guarantees a criminal defendant a fair and meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. McDonald v. United States, 904 A.2d 377, 380 (D.C.2006) (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986)). Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Our well-established rules of evidence serve the purpose of limiting evidence to that which is logically probative of some contested fact and does not lead to a confusion of the issues, mislead the jury or unfairly prejudice a party. See ( Markus ) Johnson v. United States, 960 A.2d 281, 293 (D.C. 2008); see also FED.R.EVID. 403. Our task here is greatly simplified by the government's well-advised concession that the trial court erred in excluding the records of the telephone calls made to the cellular telephone taken from Scott. This concession permits us to focus on whether the error was of such magnitude as to require reversal. See ( James ) Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 366 (D.C. 1979). To that end we will examine the contents of the proffered cellular telephone records.