Opinion ID: 778298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review and Procedural Posture

Text: 43 We review de novo a district court's decision to grant a writ of habeas corpus. Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir.2001). Before the district court granted the writ, however, it had to determine both that the underlying constitutional claim advanced by Cox had been exhausted, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (precluding federal habeas relief unless the petitioner has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State of conviction); and that it was not procedurally barred by an independent and adequate state ground, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (noting that the independent and adequate state ground doctrine bars federal habeas corpus relief if a state court declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement). We agree with the district court that neither exhaustion nor procedural default precluded its consideration of Cox's constitutional claim on the merits.
44 1. Principles of Law. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) requires persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court to exhaust[] the remedies available in the courts of [that] State before a federal court may grant them habeas corpus relief. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (collecting cases); Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F.2d 186, 190-91 (2d Cir.1982) (in banc) (same). To exhaust a federal claim, a petitioner must `fairly present[]' to the state courts the `substance' of that claim. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 275, 92 S.Ct. 509). This means, in essence, that in state court the nature or presentation of the claim must have been likely to alert the court to the claim's federal nature. Daye, 696 F.2d at 192. 45 In Daye we said that a petitioner may fairly present a constitutional claim, even without citing chapter and verse of the Constitution, in at least four ways: 46 (a) reliance on pertinent federal cases employing constitutional analysis, (b) reliance on state cases employing constitutional analysis in like fact situations, (c) assertion of the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected by the Constitution, and (d) allegation of a pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation. 47 Id. at 194; see also Ramirez v. Attorney General, 280 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir.2001) (same; quoting Daye ). 48 2. Analysis. The district court concluded that Cox's arguments to the Appellate Division fairly presented the issue he now raises as grounds for habeas relief. Cox II, 154 F.Supp.2d at 792. We agree. In his brief to the Appellate Division, Cox cited, inter alia, the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Griffin v. Coughlin, 88 N.Y.2d 674, 649 N.Y.S.2d 903, 673 N.E.2d 98 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1054, 117 S.Ct. 681, 136 L.Ed.2d 607 (1997). See Pet.'s Br. to App. Div. at 43. In Griffin, the court found that doctrinally and as actually practiced in the 12-step methodology, adherence to the A.A. fellowship entails engagement in religious activity and religious proselytization. Id. at 683, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 908, 673 N.E.2d at 103. Relying on Griffin and other caselaw, Cox argued that A.A. is a religious organization for constitutional purposes, Pet.'s Br. to App. Div. at 42, and that the cleric-congregant privilege should extend to communications made between members of A.A., see id. at 41-49. Cox also argued that his arrest violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the evidence supporting probable cause derived from inculpatory statements made by fellow A.A. members. Id. at 50-52. 49 To be sure, as the appellant argues, Cox's brief focused primarily on persuading the Appellate Division of the policy rationales for extending New York's cleric-congregant privilege to A.A. But a petitioner need not expressly cite chapter and verse of the Constitution, Daye, 696 F.2d at 194, to present an issue `in such a way as to make it probable that a reasonable jurist would have been alerted to the existence of a federal question,' Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting Scarpa v. DuBois, 38 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1994)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1129, 115 S.Ct. 940, 130 L.Ed.2d 885 (1995). Considered as a whole, Cox's brief sufficed to alert the Appellate Division to the existence of a potential constitutional defect in an interpretation of New York's cleric-congregant privilege that excluded from its scope A.A., which the New York Court of Appeals deems to be a religious organization for at least some Establishment Clause purposes. Cf. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (observing that because identical grounds [for relief] may often be supported by different legal arguments, or couched in different language, doubts about whether two grounds are different or the same ... should be resolved in favor of the applicant) (internal citations omitted).
50 1. Principles of Law. The independent and adequate state ground doctrine precludes federal review of any state court decision that rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment; and this rule applies whether the state law ground is substantive or procedural. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546; see also Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210, 56 S.Ct. 183, 80 L.Ed. 158 (1935). We presume, however, that no procedural bar exists where the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 734-35, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) ([A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.) (internal punctuation omitted); Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that [a]bsent a plain statement in the decision of the state court that its rejection of a claim rests on a state procedural ground, federal courts conclusively presume otherwise). 51 2. Analysis. The appellant notes that the proceedings in the state trial court provided grounds for the Appellate Division to find Cox's claim procedurally barred. For example, the appellant observes that defense counsel failed to move to suppress the A.A. members' inculpatory statements based on an alleged privilege in his pretrial omnibus motion, as required by N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law §§ 255.10(1)(f) and 255.20(1), thereby waiving this claim. But we see nothing in the decision of the Appellate Division to suggest, let alone state plainly, that it viewed this claim as waived. The court said only that Cox's remaining contentions, which included whatever constitutional arguments he made, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Cox I, 264 A.D.2d at 854, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 178. The Appellate Division did not clearly and expressly state that its rejection of Cox's federal claims rested on a state-law procedural bar. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 734-35, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Absent a plain statement, we presume that it did not. See Jones, 229 F.3d at 118. 52 We therefore conclude that Cox's constitutional claim is neither unexhausted nor procedurally barred, and proceed to consider the appropriate standard of review to be applied to it under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
53 The standard of review applicable to the Appellate Division's decision on Cox's privilege claim depends on whether that court disposed of the claim on the merits rather than on a procedural, or other, ground. Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir.2001). If the Appellate Division adjudicated Cox's claim on the merits, then we may not grant the writ under AEDPA unless that adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (explaining the contrary to and unreasonable application clauses). If the Appellate Division did not adjudicate Cox's claim on the merits, we review it de novo. See Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir.2001). 54 The Appellate Division held that Cox's remaining claims, including his cleric-congregant privilege claim, were either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Cox I, 264 A.D.2d at 854, 696 N.Y.S.2d at 178. The district court evidently assumed that the Appellate Division rejected Cox's federal claims on the merits because it applied AEDPA deference to some of them. See Cox II, 154 F.Supp.2d at 792-93. While we conclusively presume that a claim is not procedurally barred absent a clear statement to the contrary, Jones, 229 F.3d at 118, to determine whether a state court adjudicated a claim on the merits, we would ordinarily apply the distinct analysis adopted by our decision in Sellan, see 261 F.3d at 314 (adopting the adjudicated on the merits analysis set forth in Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir.1999)). Here, however, we find it unnecessary to perform that analysis. As in Washington, 255 F.3d at 55, our disposition of this appeal would be the same whether we were to review the petitioner's claim de novo or with AEDPA deference. 55 The appellant, assuming AEDPA deference applies, observes that the Supreme Court has never addressed the relationship between the clergy privilege and the First Amendment or between [A.A.] and the First Amendment. Appellant's Br. at 32-33. It therefore argues that we cannot find the Appellate Division's decision either contrary to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). This argument misconceives the potential constitutional question presented here. The issue is not whether the First Amendment mandates a cleric-congregant privilege. Cox does not make that argument. The issue is whether, assuming that A.A. must be treated as a religion in this context and in light of the New York legislature's choice to enact a cleric-congregant privilege, courts may, under the Establishment Clause, interpret the privilege to extend to some religions but not to A.A. Cox claims, in other words, that New York's privilege officially discriminates against the religion of A.A. We need not and do not reach that issue to resolve this appeal. But we note that the prohibition of official discrimination against religions is undoubtedly clearly established. See, e.g., Larson, 456 U.S. at 244, 102 S.Ct. 1673 (The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994) ([G]overnment should not prefer one religion to another or religion to irreligion.).