Opinion ID: 654622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Denial of McCarthur's Motion to Suppress

Text: 12 In advance of trial, McCarthur moved to suppress the three kilograms of cocaine found in her tote bag, contending that the police had seized her person and her property without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that she had committed or was committing a crime. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion. Both Bobko and Abbott testified at that hearing, and McCarthur presented her version of events in a brief affidavit. Based on the evidence presented, the district court found that the initial encounter between McCarthur and the police had been consensual, and thus did not need to be supported by any degree of suspicion. The district court acknowledged that the consensual encounter became an investigatory stop when McCarthur withdrew her consent to a search of the tote bag and the police told her that they would detain it for a canine sniff. However, explicitly crediting the testimony of Bobko and Abbott, the district court determined that the officers possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a brief detention of McCarthur's tote bag for a canine sniff. The court accordingly denied McCarthur's motion. 13 On appeal, McCarthur argues that at the time the police officers indicated that they would detain her tote bag for a canine sniff, she had submitted to a show of police authority sufficient to constitute an arrest under California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). Because the police did not have probable cause to arrest her at that point, McCarthur argues, the cocaine subsequently discovered in her tote bag should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal seizure. See generallyWong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); United States v. Ingrao, 897 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.1990). In the alternative, McCarthur argues that the cocaine was discovered during an illegal investigatory stop. Because police lacked reasonable suspicion that McCarthur was involved in criminal activity at the time they detained her and her bag, McCarthur contends, the cocaine was obtained in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights and should have been suppressed. 14 We will not overturn the district court's denial of a motion to suppress unless the decision was clearly erroneous. United States v. Withers, 972 F.2d 837, 841 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506, 1508 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1051, 111 S.Ct. 764, 112 L.Ed.2d 783 (1991); United States v. Edwards, 898 F.2d 1273, 1276 (7th Cir.1990). Because the Fourth Amendment inquiry is primarily a factual one,  'we give particular deference to the district court that had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witnesses.'  United States v. Williams, 945 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting Edwards, 898 F.2d at 1276). 15 It is well-established that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Edwards, 898 F.2d at 1276. Moreover, not all encounters between police officers and citizens constitute seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. SeeWithers, 972 F.2d at 841 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Edwards, 898 F.2d at 1277). In Johnson, and more recently in Withers, this court reviewed the three categories of police-citizen encounters and the Fourth Amendment requirements imposed on each of them: 16 The first category is an arrest, for which the Fourth Amendment requires that police have probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime. The second category is an investigatory stop, which is limited to a brief, non-intrusive detention. This is also a Fourth Amendment 'seizure,' but the officer need only have specific and articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime. The third category involves no restraint on the citizen's liberty, and is characterized by an officer seeking the citizen's voluntary cooperation through non-coercive questioning. This is not a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 17 Withers, 972 F.2d at 841 (quoting Johnson, 910 F.2d at 1508). 18 The test for determining whether a seizure has occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is expressed in objective terms:  '[A] person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'  Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.)); United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d 316, 321 (7th Cir.1989). Although this inquiry is highly fact-specific and requires a court to view the facts and circumstances confronting the individual in their totality, certain factors have emerged as being probative of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. These include: whether the encounter took place in a public area or whether police removed the person to another location, seeUnited States v. Adebayo, 985 F.2d 1333, 1338 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2947, 124 L.Ed.2d 695 (1993); Withers, 972 F.2d at 842; United States v. Sterling, 909 F.2d 1078, 1083 (7th Cir.1990); whether the police informed the person that she was not under arrest and was free to leave, seeEdwards, 898 F.2d at 1276; whether police indicated to the person that she was suspected of a crime or was the specific target of police investigation, seeAdebayo, 985 F.2d at 1339 (explaining United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 893 (1986)); whether the person was deprived of documents without which she could not continue on her way, such as a driver's license or a train ticket, seeFlorida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 503, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 1327, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion); Borys, 766 F.2d at 310; and whether there was physical touching, display of weapons, or other threatening behavior on the part of police that would communicate to a reasonable person that she was not free to end the encounter, seeFlorida v. Bostick, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); Adebayo, 985 F.2d at 1338; Johnson, 910 F.2d at 1509. Thus, when police approach a person in a train station, identify themselves as police officers in a non-threatening manner, and ask that person questions regarding her identity, destination, or travel plans, or even request permission to search the person's baggage in a tone that does not imply that her cooperation will be compelled, there is no seizure requiring Fourth Amendment scrutiny. SeeBostick, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2386 (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 103 S.Ct. at 1323); Withers, 972 F.2d at 842; Johnson, 910 F.2d at 1508-09; Edwards, 898 F.2d at 1276. 19 The district court's determination that the initial encounter between Bobko, Abbott and McCarthur was consensual, and thus did not need to be justified by any degree of articulable suspicion, is amply supported by the record. McCarthur was approached by two officers in nonconfrontational manner in a public concourse of the train station during the late afternoon, when the station was filled with commuters. She was not asked to move to a private area of the station until the first package of cocaine was later retrieved from her bag. Bobko and Abbott were in plain clothes and did not display any weapons. They conducted the interview in a non-coercive manner. Bobko identified himself and requested permission to speak with McCarthur--he did not demand it. When McCarthur voluntarily took her ticket to Detroit from her purse and showed it to Bobko, Bobko glanced at it and immediately returned it to her. Although Bobko noticed that the Social Security card that later dropped from McCarthur's purse did not bear the same name as her used ticket stub, he did not attempt to retain the card. Moreover, Bobko specifically informed McCarthur that she was not under arrest and could leave if she chose, that their investigation was entirely routine, and that no one had tipped them that she was arriving on Train No. 4. The most common factors that may objectively indicate police coercion are therefore absent. The circumstances of the encounter, viewed in their totality, would not have communicated to a reasonable person that she was not free to end the questioning and continue on her way. 20 We agree with the district court that the encounter developed into an investigatory stop, and thus a Fourth Amendment seizure, when Bobko told McCarthur that her tote bag would be detained for a canine sniff. SeeWithers, 972 F.2d at 842-43. But we reject McCarthur's contention that this seizure amounted to a full-fledged arrest, and not merely an investigatory stop. McCarthur argues that at the moment her bag was detained for a dog sniff, she submitted to the officer's show of authority by allowing Bobko to search her bag, and that the seizure therefore meets the definition of an arrest as announced in Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628, 111 S.Ct. at 1551-52. 21 The issue of whether an officer's show of authority amounts to an arrest, like the issue of whether an encounter is voluntary or constitutes a seizure, must be resolved according to objective criteria. Seeid. at 627-28, 111 S.Ct. at 1551. Thus, if the officers' actions in this case do not objectively amount to a show of authority sufficient to constitute an arrest, no amount of submission to that authority by McCarthur can convert the investigatory stop into an arrest. As a general rule, where the nature and extent of an intrusion on a person's Fourth Amendment rights may properly be described as minimal, that intrusion is not an arrest requiring probable cause. SeeUnited States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-04, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642-43, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). 22 Here, after McCarthur withdrew her initial consent to the search of the tote bag, the officers simply told her that the bag would be detained for fifteen minutes for a sniff by a narcotics detection dog. Bobko noted to McCarthur that her train to Detroit was not due to leave for another hour, and he offered to give McCarthur a receipt for the bag if she preferred not to wait while the canine inspection was conducted. In addition, before McCarthur finally consented to the search, Bobko reiterated that she did not have to allow it. Thus, contrary to McCarthur's contention, the circumstances did not amount to an arrest requiring probable cause. SeeAdebayo, 985 F.2d at 1339 (when agents asked suspect whether he was carrying drugs and if they could search his briefcase, seizure was at most an investigatory stop); Withers, 972 F.2d at 839, 842-43; cf. United States v. Verrusio, 742 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (7th Cir.1984) (arrest took place when suspect was escorted by several agents to small inner room of police office and continuously interrogated for one hour). 1 23 Moreover, although the encounter had ripened into an investigatory stop when Bobko advised McCarthur that they planned to detain her bag for a canine sniff, that fact alone did not vitiate her consent to a search of the bag. See generallyRoyer, 460 U.S. at 501, 103 S.Ct. at 1326 (in context of proper Terry stop, defendant's voluntary consent to search of suitcases would render search valid). See alsoUnited States v. Robinson, 984 F.2d 911, 914 (8th Cir.1993) (detective's statement that luggage would be detained for canine sniff did not render defendant's consent to search involuntary); Borys, 766 F.2d at 314-15 (the agents' statement to Borys that they meant to try to secure a search warrant for his luggage if he did not consent cannot by itself invalidate Borys' consent). The record reveals that McCarthur's assent to the search was voluntary, untainted by any coercive conduct on the part of either Bobko or Abbott. 2 24 The sole question remaining is whether Bobko and Abbott had the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative detention under Terry. To answer that question, we consider the totality of the circumstances as they were presented to the officer at the time of the encounter. SeeUnited States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)); Sterling, 909 F.2d at 1083. Included in this picture are the officer's experience and his knowledge of the typical behavior of persons involved in drug smuggling. SeeSokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 & n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1587 & n. 6 (noting DEA use of the drug courier profile); Withers, 972 F.2d at 843; Sterling, 909 F.2d at 1083-84. 25 We find the record to be replete with articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that McCarthur might be carrying narcotics. McCarthur arrived from Los Angeles, a known source city for cocaine, on Train No. 4, also known as a major means of transporting narcotics to Chicago. SeeSterling, 909 F.2d at 1084; Edwards, 898 F.2d at 1277. She attracted the attention of both Bobko and Abbott, who noticed that her gait was unusually slow and her posture rigid, that she struggled with her tote bag, and that she repeatedly glanced over her shoulder and flicked her nostrils. Once Bobko and Abbott approached her, they noticed that she appeared to be very nervous and that her hands were shaking as she spoke to Bobko. SeeWithers, 972 F.2d at 843. They were soon able to determine that she had bought her ticket from Los Angeles with cash, seeEdwards, 898 F.2d at 1277, and that it had probably been purchased under an alias. Discrepancies in the most mundane details of McCarthur's trip, such as where she stayed and what she did, began to emerge almost immediately, and Bobko knew at once that the reason she gave for not purchasing a direct ticket from Los Angeles to Detroit was false. SeeWithers, 972 F.2d at 843. When McCarthur's Social Security card fell from her purse, she first claimed that it belonged to her sister, then immediately changed her story and said that it belonged to a friend. As Bobko turned his attention to the tote bag, McCarthur became visibly more nervous, claiming that her boyfriend had placed some things in it before she packed it, yet also insisting that she was aware of all of its contents. See id.; Edwards, 898 F.2d at 1277. She initially consented to a search of the bag, then quickly withdrew her consent. The officers were entitled to interpret McCarthur's behavior and her contradictory and evasive responses to Bobko's questions in light of their extensive experience in narcotics interdiction and, given the degree to which the circumstances reasonably suggested that McCarthur was carrying contraband, a limited detention within the confines of Terry was warranted. SeeSterling, 909 F.2d at 1084. 3 26 The officers' decision to detain McCarthur's tote bag for a canine sniff was likewise justified. A narcotics detection dog would have quickly confirmed or dispelled the officers' suspicion that the bag contained narcotics without causing undue embarrassment or disturbing its other contents. SeePlace, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. at 2644 (as an investigatory method, the canine sniff is sui generis, since it does not involve rummaging through luggage or exposing noncontraband items to public view); Royer, 460 U.S. at 505-06, 103 S.Ct. at 1328-29. Moreover, the proposed detention would have lasted no more than approximately fifteen minutes. SeeEdwards, 898 F.2d at 1277; cf.Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10, 103 S.Ct. at 2645-46 (ninety-minute detention of luggage unreasonable); Moya v. United States, 761 F.2d 322, 327 (7th Cir.1984) (three-hour detention of luggage unreasonable). Where the scope of the detention and the investigative technique employed is so carefully tailored to its underlying justification, Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, 103 S.Ct. at 1325, there is no Fourth Amendment violation. 27