Opinion ID: 853269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Confinement Sentence

Text: Gates argues the trial court violated Indiana Code § 35-38-1-6 and Article I, § 14 of the Indiana Constitution when it sentenced him for criminal confinement. (Appellant's Br. at 5-6.) The code section in question prohibits the court from entering judgment and sentencing on both an offense and an included offense. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-38-1-6 (West 2000). Article I, § 14 of the Indiana Constitution ensures that [n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Certainly, one who commits rape or criminal deviate conduct necessarily confines the victim at least long enough to complete such a forcible crime. Without pausing to elaborate on the statutory or constitutional frameworks, Gates' entitlement to relief depends upon whether the confinement exceeded the bounds of the force used to commit the rape and criminal deviate conduct. Gates' specific contention is that the confinement was a means used to commit the rape and criminal deviate conduct because F.T. was bound only during the commission of the charged offenses. (Appellant's Br. at 7.) He relies on Griffin v. State, 583 N.E.2d 191 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), and Harvey v. State, 719 N.E.2d 406 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). In both Griffin and Harvey, the court found the confinement charge to be a lesser included offense because it was confinement by force. In Griffin, the defendant confined the victim by holding her on the ground while he attempted to rape her, and that act was also charged as evidence of the attempted rape. Griffin, 583 N.E.2d at 195. In Harvey, the defendant was charged with confinement by detaining the clerk while he robbed a liquor store. Harvey, 719 N.E.2d at 408, 412. In neither case did the perpetrator attempt to confine the victim through any means or actions beyond those inherent in the commission of the crime. In each of these cases, neither the crime nor the attempt could have been accomplished without employing the restrictive force charged. In the instant case, despite a similar duration, Gates' confinement of F.T. was distinct and elevated from the restraint necessary to commit the other charged crimes. The State charged that Gates tied F.T.'s hands with twine while armed with a knife. (R. at 30.) The elements of confinement and use of force were distinct in this case. See Harvey, 719 N.E.2d at 411. Gates threatened F.T. with the knife during the commission of each crime with which he was charged. [2] The tying of F.T.'s hands was not an essential element of the rape or criminal deviate conduct. The State provided evidence that Gates approached F.T. while armed with a knife and tied her hands behind her back with twine. (R. at 254-55.) There was also testimony and photographic evidence showing marks on F.T.'s wrists made by the twine, (R. at 351, 365, 380, 382-85, 458), and showing that twine was found in a trash can in F.T.'s home after the rape, (R. at 277, 460). Such evidence portrays the confinement as an independent crime. The tying of F.T.'s hands was not a necessary part of the rape and criminal deviate conduct. Such restriction is not integral to the force or limitations inherent in those charges. Because Gates used additional methods to restrict F.T.'s freedom, the trial court properly sentenced him on the criminal confinement count.