Opinion ID: 546224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the statement of the unidentified woman

Text: 36 We next consider the argument, advanced vigorously by defendants at trial as well as on appeal, that the statement of the unidentified Hispanic female should have been excluded. Velez testified that the woman said she needed the keys to 5100 because there were two things in 5100. Velez also heard her say that the police had just raided Rene's house. The primary question is whether the woman's statement is admissible as a co-conspirator declaration. 10 Our review is plenary. 11 37 Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) allows into evidence out-of-court statements, offered for the truth of the matter asserted, if they are statement[s] by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 12 However, [b]efore admitting a co-conspirator's statement ... [t]here must be evidence that there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the nonoffering party. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). In coming to the necessary preliminary factual conclusion as to the existence of the conspiracy, the court may evaluate the hearsay statement itself. Congress has decided that courts may consider hearsay in making ... factual determinations. Id. at 178, 107 S.Ct. at 2780. The Supreme Court has explained the reasoning behind this rule as follows: 38 [I]ndividual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts. Taken together, these two propositions demonstrate that a piece of evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative when corroborated by other evidence. A per se rule barring consideration of these hearsay statements during preliminary factfinding is not therefore required. Even if out-of-court declarations by co-conspirators are presumptively unreliable, trial courts must be permitted to evaluate these statements for their evidentiary worth as revealed by the particular circumstances of the case. 39 Id. 483 U.S. at 179-80, 107 S.Ct. at 2781. 40 In this case, the district court admitted the unidentified female's statement because it furnished evidence of a conspiracy between the women and Guzman. 13 At first blush, evidence of a conspiracy between the unidentified women and Guzman might seem irrelevant in Cruz and Alverio's trial. Guzman was not a defendant here; therefore a statement by Guzman's co-conspirator could not come into a trial in which someone else (i.e., Cruz and/or Alverio) was the defendant, unless there was also evidence linking the actual party/defendants to the same conspiracy. Upon review, see supra note 12, we find that the record does contain enough evidence linking Cruz and Alverio to the conspiracy, and hence we hold that the statement was properly admitted. 14 41 In analyzing the evidence, it is helpful to break the conspiracy down into two groupings: the woman and Guzman, and the woman and Cruz and Alverio. If there is evidence supporting both of these conspiracies, and both conspiracies involve the same drugs, then there is evidence of one larger conspiracy involving everyone. 42 The connection between the woman and Guzman is evident from the text of the statement, particularly in light of the fact that it was made while the police raid was going on. The unidentified female said that the police had just raided Rene's [Guzman's] house. The statement was made in the immediate vicinity of the house while the raid was still going on. Additionally, she stated that she needed the keys to 5100. Admittedly, Cruz and Alverio would not be implicated by these statements unless there was evidence linking them to either Rene's house or 5100. Without such evidence, these comments would have been both hearsay and irrelevant because, although they would show evidence of a conspiracy between the woman and Guzman, absent the Alverio/Cruz connection, such evidence would have nothing to do with defendants' conspiratorial activities. 43 However, the fact that Cruz and Alverio went to 5100 Whitaker Avenue immediately after the unidentified female made this statement, and acted so suspiciously at that location, provides evidence of the necessary Alverio/Cruz connection. 15 The woman's statement indicates that she felt that someone must get to 5100 right away, and, right away, Cruz and Alverio were there. This activity implicates them in conspiratorial involvement with the woman because it suggests that they heard or learned of the woman's statement and then responded to it. Because the woman's statement indicates that the need for the urgency at 5100 stemmed from the recent police raid of Guzman's house, Cruz and Alverio's activity also links them to Guzman and the drug activity at Guzman's house. Hence, the totality of the evidence establishes, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a conspiracy. 44 Once that conspiracy is established, the statement can come in as the declaration of a co-conspirator, and if it can come in as the statement of a co-conspirator, there is no violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182, 107 S.Ct. at 2782 (citing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986)). We so hold. We add that defendants' claim that the statement was not relevant clearly cannot withstand the foregoing analysis. The statement was not only relevant, it was pivotal in establishing the conspiracy for which Cruz and Alverio were convicted. 16