Opinion ID: 2304352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Search Violated Procedures

Text: By agreeing to probation, individuals sacrifice some of their privacy rights in exchange for freedom from incarceration. [32] Nevertheless, probationers do not surrender all of their privacy rights, and probation officers can only conduct searches when they have a reasonable basis to do so. [33] In Culver we held that Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 requires probation officers to assess any `tip' relayed to them and independently determine if a reasonable suspicion exists that would, in the ordinary course of their duties, prompt a search of a probationer's dwelling. [34] In Sierra's case, no such independent investigation occurred. Instead, Officer Cronin relied on an unidentified DOJ employee's assessment that the C.I. was reliable. A call from an unidentified Department of Justice employee, based upon information received from an unidentified C.I., is not enough to meet the requirements of Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19. Officer Cronin should have independently examined the information to assess the reliability of the C.I.'s tip. As in Culver, the information presented in Sierra's case did not comport with the requirements of Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 and could not sustain a reasonable suspicion to search Sierra's residence. Since no independent assessment of the tip leading to the search of Sierra's residence occurred, pursuant to Culver, the violation of Procedure 7.19 was not harmless, and we hold the evidence gained during that search must be suppressed. [35] As we stated in Culver, to allow evidence obtained in violation of Procedure 7.19 would render 11 Del. C. § 4321 and the regulations promulgated under it meaningless. [36] We also hold that the search of Sierra's residence without reasonable suspicion violated his Fourth Amendment rights as a probationer pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Griffin v. Wisconsin. [37]