Opinion ID: 2350429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Burden on Georgetown's Religious Exercise

Text: The first stage of our inquiry is to decide whether state compulsion to distribute, without regard to sexual orientation, various tangible benefits associated with University Recognition  use of a mailbox, access to the Computer Label Service, mailing facilities, and the ability to apply for (but not necessarily to receive) funding  would interfere with Georgetown's practice of the Roman Catholic religion. See, e.g., Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 1964, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985); United States v. Lee, supra, 455 U.S. at 256-57, 102 S.Ct. at 1054-55. The parties have not fully developed the extent of the burden that would be imposed on Georgetown's religious exercise by compulsion to grant the tangible benefits without University Recognition. This case has been litigated on the all or nothing basis reflected in the trial court's construction of the Human Rights Act. It is nevertheless undisputed that Georgetown has consistently refused to furnish the additional tangible benefits to the student groups, and throughout has linked its refusal to Roman Catholic teachings. Georgetown is apparently opposed to extending the additional tangible benefits because of its belief that establishing another normative lifestyle conflicting with the moral norms would violate its obligations as a Roman Catholic institution. This objection is not so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in nature as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause. Thomas v. Review Board, supra, 450 U.S. at 715-16, 101 S.Ct. at 1431. Thus, while the threat of a direct endorsement has been defused, and Georgetown's primary religious fear abated accordingly, it would be inappropriate to dwell exclusively on that fact and conclude that no burden had been shown. From the record, particularly its correspondence with the student groups, we conclude that Georgetown's sincere religious objections go beyond the direct, intangible endorsement and extend to distribution of the contested tangible benefits even without a grant of University Recognition. In these circumstances, especially given the all or nothing manner in which this case has been litigated, we accept that the threat of enforcement of the Human Rights Act with regard to the tangible benefits imposes a burden on Georgetown's religious practice sufficient for it to invoke the Free Exercise Clause.