Opinion ID: 2748545
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against PNC Bank

Text: Finally, the Shavers challenge the district court’s dismissal of PNC from the suit under the “two dismissal” rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). Whether the dismissal was proper raises only questions of law and is reviewed de novo. See Cabot Golf CL-PP 1, LLC v. Nixon Peabody, LLP, No. 13-40912, 2014 WL 3043727, at  (5th Cir. July 7, 2014). Rule 41(a)(1)(B) states that “if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or After the district court dismissed their claims, the Shavers instituted what they call 8 a “private administrative process.” They claim that NCM’s failure to respond to this extrajudicial document is a default and an admission that the Shavers’ claims are accurate. We can find no court that has recognized “private administrative process” as a substitute for discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it is not enforceable by this court. 14 Case: 14-20107 Document: 00512826599 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/05/2014 No. 14-20107 including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B). Rule 41(a)(1)(B) applies to these facts. The Shavers’ first voluntary dismissal occurred when they dismissed claims against NCM in the second lawsuit that was filed in state court and removed to federal court. This first dismissal was appropriately granted without prejudice. The Shavers’ second voluntary dismissal occurred when they filed their amended complaint in the current action, dismissing all claims against NCM. By Rule 41(a)(1)(B)’s plain language, this operates as a dismissal with prejudice. See 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2368 (3d ed). As such, the Shavers could not bring further claims based on the same facts against NCM. Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he well-known legal consequence of two voluntary dismissals is an inability to re-file the complaint.”). Since PNC is NCM’s corporate successor the Shavers may not maintain claims against PNC either. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Grp., Inc. v. Pacific Malibu Development Corp., 933 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal under two-dismissal rule when defendant was “substantially the same” as the previously-dismissed defendant); Manning v. S. C. Dep’t of Highway & Pub. Transp., 914 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal under two-dismissal rule when defendant was in privity with earlier defendant). At the time of each voluntary dismissal, the Shavers were on notice that NCM and PNC were the same entity. Rule 41(a)(1)(B) does not permit them to maintain an action for the same claims against the same corporate entity. The Shavers do not contest that PNC is NCM’s successor. They object to the district court’s conclusion that the two-dismissal rule applies because the current suit is based on the same claims as the second lawsuit. The district court did not err in determining that the claims in the second and third suits were the same. The Shavers’ only other argument against application of Rule 15 Case: 14-20107 Document: 00512826599 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/05/2014 No. 14-20107 41(a)(1)(B) is that PNC had notice of suit and was not harmed by being added in the amending complaint. However, notice is not a factor in applying Rule 41(a)(1)(B)’s two-dismissal rule. Moreover, PNC indeed may be harmed from the prolongation of the Shavers’ serial litigation, as PNC has been unable to evict the Shavers and recoup its investment. The district court did not err in dismissing the claims against PNC under the two-dismissal rule.