Opinion ID: 2635455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the victim's mother, the victim's sister, the examining doctor, and the investigating police officer to testify about the victim's prior consistent statements?

Text: [¶ 5] The appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting two separate statements by the examining doctor as well as statements by the victim's mother, the victim's sister, and the investigating police officer. We have stated as follows: The standard for reviewing a trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence is well known. Such decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Determining whether the trial court abused its discretion involves the consideration of whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether it acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. A trial court's evidentiary rulings are entitled to considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal so long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling.... Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S.Ct. 1620, 149 L.Ed.2d 483 (2001). The appellant bears the burden of proving an abuse of discretion. Even where a trial objection has been made to the admission of evidence, error cannot be found unless a substantial right of the party is affected.... W.R.E. 103(a)(1). These general rules apply to rulings on the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶¶ 11-12, 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo.2002) (some internal citations omitted). [¶ 6] The appellant's first argument is that the district court abused its discretion by admitting two statements from the doctor's testimony. The first statement relates to a comment by the victim to the nurse about who had sexually assaulted her, which statement was then relayed from the nurse to the doctor. At trial, the State asked the doctor to repeat what the nurse had told him about the victim's statement. The appellant objected to admission of the statement as hearsay. [1] The district court allowed the testimony on the ground that the identity of the person who committed the alleged assault was information that a doctor generally relies on in reaching his conclusions. Although the district court did not expressly state that it was relying on the medical exception to the hearsay rule found in W.R.E. 803(4), we assume, as do the parties, that that is what the district court meant by its statement in admitting the evidence. The appellant also claims the district court abused its discretion when it overruled the appellant's hearsay objection to testimony by the doctor about a statement made directly from the victim to the doctor about who had sexually assaulted her. The district court did not provide any grounds for admitting this statement. Finally, the appellant contends that the district court committed an abuse of discretion when it admitted testimony from the victim's mother, the victim's sister, and the investigating police officer relating to the victim's prior consistent statements pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). [¶ 7] The appellant argues that the district court improperly admitted the doctor's statements under W.R.E. 803(4), which governs the admission of hearsay statements made for medical diagnosis and treatment. However, we have repeatedly stated that [a] district court judgment may be affirmed on any proper legal grounds supported by the record. Feeney v. State, 2009 WY 67, ¶ 9, 208 P.3d 50, 53 (Wyo.2009). Accordingly, we do not need to determine whether the doctor's testimony relating to the victim's statements about who she claimed had sexually assaulted her was admissible under W.R.E. 803(4) because it was admissible under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). [¶ 8] Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. W.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute. W.R.E. 802. However, statements classified as prior consistent statements under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) are not hearsay and thus are not subject to the hearsay exclusionary rule. See Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 13, 43 P.3d at 87; W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) states: (d) Statements which are not hearsay A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.... We have stated that [f]our requirements must be satisfied before a prior consistent statement will be properly admissible: (1) The declarant testifies at trial; (2) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the prior statement; (3) the prior statement is consistent with the declarant's trial testimony; and (4) the prior statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 26, 157 P.3d 923, 929 (Wyo.2007) (citing Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 17, 43 P.3d at 88). [¶ 9] Applying these requirements to the facts in the case at hand, it is clear that all of the statements were properly admitted as prior consistent statements. The first two requirements are easily satisfied because the declarant victim did in fact testify and was subject to cross-examination. As to the third requirement that the prior statements be consistent with the declarant's testimony, we have stated, that it is the consistency, rather than the substance of the consistent statement, which takes such a statement out of the realm of objectionable hearsay and tends to prove the value of the original statement. Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 17, 43 P.3d at 88-89 (quoting Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo.1995)) (emphasis in original). The testimony provided by the declarant, that the appellant sexually assaulted her, the way in which the abuse occurred, and the circumstances surrounding the abuse were all consistent with her prior statements to the other witnesses. The victim testified that the appellant would call her on her cell phone, usually when she was at work, and have her come over to the appellant's house when no one else was home, and that the sexual abuse occurred in the kitchen. The witnesses all testified to similar consistent circumstances based on what the victim had told them about the sexual assaults. [¶ 10] For instance, the victim's mother testified that the victim told her that the appellant called the victim and asked her to come over to the appellant's house, and that she went to the appellant's house where the appellant sexually assaulted her. The victim's sister testified that she was with the victim when the victim became upset after her phone rang, and when the victim's sister asked what was wrong, the victim told her that the appellant had just called her and that the appellant had previously touched her breasts and vaginal area. The examining doctor testified that the victim told him and the nurse that the appellant had sexually assaulted her. Finally, the investigating police officer testified that the victim told him that she had received a phone call from the appellant because he wanted her to come to his house to have sex with him and that she and the appellant previously engaged in sex in his kitchen. [¶ 11] Finally, the fourth requirement that the prior statements be offered to rebut an express charge of recent fabrication on the part of the declarant is also satisfied. We have stated that the fourth requirement does not mandate a specific allegation during cross-examination; rather, it may be made by implication or innuendo, and it may be found in the `thrust' of the defenses and testimony presented. Martin, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 26, 157 P.3d at 929 (citing Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d at 89). The appellant relied on the defense of fabrication throughout the trial; in a pre-trial discussion with the judge and the State's attorney regarding the admissibility of the statements, the appellant's counsel noted that fabrication is certainly something we will argue. The appellant's defense at trial was largely based on allegations of fabrication and thus the final requirement of the admissibility of prior consistent statements is satisfied. Accordingly, all of the statements were properly admissible as prior consistent statements pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). [¶ 12] Inasmuch as the testimony provided by these witnesses was admissible as prior consistent statements, the only question remaining is the purpose for which the testimony could be admitted. Testimony admitted pursuant to W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) can be used as substantive evidence or in certain situations may be limited to rehabilitating the credibility of the declarant who testifies at trial. Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 14, 76 P.3d 805, 811 (Wyo.2003). The determination as to whether the testimony is admissible as substantive evidence, or is limited to rehabilitative purposes, focuses on when the alleged fabrication, improper influence or motive to lie occurred in relation to when the consistent statements were made. Id. If the consistent statements occurred before the alleged motive to fabricate arose, then the statements are admissible as substantive evidence for the truth of the matter asserted. Dike v. State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1024 (Wyo. 1999). However, if the prior consistent statements occurred after the alleged motive to fabricate arose, then they are only admissible to rehabilitate the credibility of the declarant. Id. If the testimony is admitted only for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the credibility of the declarant, a limiting instruction must be given to that effect, if requested. Id. [¶ 13] We cannot find an abuse of discretion by the district court, for failing to limit the prior consistent statements to rehabilitation of the victim, where the appellant failed at trial either to identify when an alleged motive to fabricate arose, or to request a limiting instruction. If the appellant had established when the motive to lie arose, he may have been entitled to a limiting instruction to the effect that the prior consistent statements were admissible only for the purposes of rehabilitating the credibility of the declarant and not as substantive evidence of the appellant's guilt. Dike, 990 P.2d at 1024. However, the appellant failed to request such an instruction and absent a request, the district court had no duty to provide one. Id. Because there was no request for a limiting instruction, we must assume that the jury used the evidence for whatever purpose it chose, including substantive evidence of guilt. Nevertheless, there having been no request that use of the evidence be limited, we cannot find error resulting therefrom. Alicea v. State, 13 P.3d 693, 699 (Wyo.2000). Under the particular facts of this case, we are particularly so inclined because the prosecutor carefully limited his own use of the evidence in closing argument to rehabilitation of the victim, thereby lessening any risk of prejudice: Throughout [the victim]'s testimony on this, she indicated the same thing over and over and over. She was consistent throughout. She told her sister initially. She then told her parents. She told a doctor and nurse what had taken place. She told law enforcement. She then went in for an interview with the children's advocate. You watched that [interview]. The same consistent statement throughout. And a year later she sat on this stand and told you the exact same situation what [sic] had occurred. The defense would have you believe that this is all a big lie. [The victim] made this up. She is telling lies. Her parents were asked questions about does she ever lie, and they were honest. Yes, she does. She is a child. Children lie. We all know that. But they lie to get out of trouble, not to try to get into trouble or cause great trouble, and they don't make elaborate lies. They make lies about did I break something. Did I hit my brother. That is the kind of lies [sic] a child makes, not this. You're the one who has to determine the truth in this one, because as the judge has instructed you, you're the ones who are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses. You have seen both [the victim] and [appellant] on the stand. You need to make your decision as to who you believe, but you need to do that with common sense. [¶ 14] The appellant relies on Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 16, 76 P.3d 805, 811-12 (Wyo.2003), where we emphasized that, upon a proper objection, district courts should consider whether having numerous authority figures trained to recognize sexual abuse appear at trial is actually a trial strategy of preparing a multitude of self-serving, biased, inflammatory, video, audio, and written statements for trial; having the witness testify; and then introducing into evidence these consistent statements made prior to testifying. Our concern in Seward was not so much the repetitious nature of the testimony, as it was the State using W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) as a tool for impermissible trial tactics by having a victim repeat accusations to authority figures for the direct purpose of using those statements later at trial as prior consistent statements. Id. Specifically, we focused on the direct testimony and videotape interview by a forensic interviewer with the victim. [2] Id. at ¶ 17, at 812. The appellant in that case urged this Court, notwithstanding precedent to the contrary, to adopt a temporal requirement to the admission of this type of evidence. Id. at ¶ 14, at 811. In other words, the appellant asked this Court to prohibit the admission of these types of statements unless they predate a charge of fabrication or motive to lie. Id. We expressly refused to revisit whether W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) should mirror its federal counterpart, in that F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) does not allow consistent statements made after the charge of fabrication to be used for any purpose, including rehabilitative purposes. Id. We did, however, acknowledge that W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) is susceptible to abuse and we take this opportunity to repeat that concern. Id. at ¶ 16 n. 6, at 812 n. 6. In fact, we even cautioned district courts regarding admitting this type of testimony without first considering why the interviews occurred and the probative value of admitting such evidence. Id. at ¶ 17, at 812. However, the concerns that we discussed in Seward do not exist here. The victim made her statements to the witnesses in a manner that would be expected from a victim in the early stages of a typical sexual assault investigation, rather than in a manner resembling trial preparation tactics, as was our concern in Seward. Accordingly, the prior consistent statements were properly admitted. [¶ 15] The appellant also relies upon Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 11-14, 74 P.3d 699, 706-08 (Wyo.2003), wherein we reversed a conviction under somewhat similar circumstances. A reading of that entire opinion reveals, however, that the focus of our concern was, as in Seward, the vouching nature of the questioned testimony, and its resultant prejudice. Furthermore, the nature of discretionary review emphasizes the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. Id. at ¶ 13, at 707. In the instant case, we cannot say that the district court was unreasonable in concluding that the challenged testimony was not unduly prejudicial, and therefore was admissible. [3]