Opinion ID: 767339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Makarova was an Employee of the Kennedy Center

Text: 20 Pointing to the choice of law provision in the contract, the United States argues, and the district court found, that the question of whether Makarova was an employee is governed by New York law. 21 For her part, Makarova contends that the contract's choice of law provision should not be triggered until we first determine under District of Columbia law whether she was a party to an employment contract. She also maintains, that in any event, she was not an employee of the Kennedy Center under either New York or District of Columbia law. 22 These competing contentions conjure up the mystical doctrines of dpeage and renvoi, and we decline to enter that bog for the very practical reason that Makarova was an employee under the law of both New York and the District of Columbia.
23 Under New York law, there is no absolute rule for determining whether one is an independent contractor or an employee. Mace v. Morrison & Fleming, 44 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (3d Dep't 1943). However, the typical test of whether one is an independent contractor lies in the control exercised by the employer, and in who has the right to direct what will be done and when and how it will be done. See id. See generally 2A N.Y. Jur. 2d Agency and Independent Contractors 379 (1998). 24 Applying these principles, Makarova was an employee rather than an independent contractor. She was: (1) required to play a specific part in a specific musical; (2) required to meet a contractually specified rehearsal and performance schedule; (3) contractually obligated to have her hair styled in accord with the time period of the show; (4) required to wear shoes and make-up provided by the Kennedy Center; and (5) obligated to provide her exclusive services to the Kennedy Center during the term of her contract. Although Makarova had a significant say over her own dancing and acting, the director and the Kennedy Center maintained artistic control over the show, including Makarova's performance. 25 Indeed, New York courts have repeatedly found performance artists to be employees. A performer who has entered into a written contract with a producer for a stipulated sum and a time certain, with the time and place of work to be determined by the producer, has been held to be the producer's employee. See Jack Hammer Assocs. v. Delmy Prods., 499 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419-20 (1st Dep't 1986) (holding that an actor was an employee); see also Berman v. Barone, 88 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (3d Dep't 1949) (holding that a ballet dancer was an employee). As long as the employer exercises control over such aspects of the workers' employment as the dates and times of performances and the work to be performed, New York law would appear to treat him or her as an employee. See Challis v. National Producing Co., 88 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (3d Dep't 1949) (affirming New York Workman's Compensation Board's holding that a clown was an employee on grounds that he was under some degree of supervision and control). The Kennedy Center exercised sufficient control over Makarova to render her an employee as a matter of New York law.
26 Under District of Columbia law, an employee is every person . . . in the service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, in the District of Columbia. D.C. Code Ann. 36-301(9)(1981). 27 Makarova satisfied this definition. She is a person, who was in the service of another, performing for the Kennedy Center in the District of Columbia. Makarova was also under a contract of hire, having agreed to play a specific role in On Your Toes for a specific amount of time. 28 The Kennedy Center also qualified as Makarova's employer under the District of Columbia Workers' Compensation Act, because it was an individual, firm, association, or corporation . . . using the service of another for pay. D.C. Code Ann. 36-301(10) (1981). The Kennedy Center was the producer of On Your Toes, and paid Makarova to perform in it. 29 We agree with the district court that Spackman v. D.C. Dep't of Employment, 590 A.2d 515 (D.C. Ct. App. 1991), is inapposite. There, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services that the plaintiff, a singer in a production of a Mozart opera produced for, but not by, the Washington Opera was an independent contractor. The Washington Opera's relationship with Spackman was crucially different from that between the Kennedy Center and Makarova. Its stage manager and director, themselves independent contractors, not the Washington Opera, controlled and directed the singer's performance. Id. at 517. Spackman was therefore not in the service of the Opera. As we have noted, the Kennedy Center consistently maintained full artistic control over On Your Toes and Makarova. She was thus in the service, and therefore an employee, of the Kennedy Center.
30 Moreover, there are equitable considerations compelling the conclusion that Makarova was an employee of the Kennedy Center - she had earlier accepted the benefits of being one. On that occasion, Makarova hurt her chin during a rehearsal. Part of the medical treatment that she received for that injury was paid for by the Kennedy Center's workers' compensation insurer, which covered the Kennedy Center's Players, Entertainers or Musicians and all other employees. Having accepted the workers' compensation benefits of being a Kennedy Center employee, Makarova cannot now argue that she should be free of the strictures of that same workers' compensation regime. 31 Makarova maintains that she was paid by the Kennedy Center as an independent contractor. The evidence of this, however, is equivocal. It is unclear whether Makarova was paid as an independent contractor, an employee, or both, because the Kennedy Center's payroll records prior to 1983 are not in the record. In 1983, after she had rejoined the cast of On Your Toes while it was touring, Makarova was listed haphazardly as both an independent contractor and a regular employee by the Kennedy Center. Makarova did receive an IRS form 1099 in 1982, listing $1275.00 in nonemployee compensation. However, that amount represented less than her salary from the Kennedy Center for a single two-week pay period. Such a modest sum of nonemployee compensation does not establish whether Makarova was classified by the Kennedy Center as an employee or an independent contractor for its payroll purposes. In any event, the occasional characterization of Makarova as an independent contractor in the Kennedy Center's records would be insufficient to classify her under either New York or District of Columbia law as an independent contractor rather than an employee. 32 Makarova tenders other considerations which she believes make her an independent contractor, including the argument that she was a star, which somehow apparently makes her something less of an employee. None of these arguments are persuasive. We conclude that Makarova was an employee of the Kennedy Center and, as such, was covered by its workers' compensation insurance. She could not have brought suit against a private employer in Washington, D.C., and therefore, under the FTCA, she could not have done so against the government. 33 For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err when it granted the government's motion to dismiss Makarova's complaint.