Opinion ID: 2172803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether certiorari is an appropriate remedy for appellants in this action?

Text: A writ of certiorari is an equitable remedy to be granted only in very limited circumstances. It follows, therefore, that the P.U.C. must have exceeded [its] jurisdiction and there is no writ of error or appeal, nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the appellants in order for the writ to issue. SDCL 21-31-1. Moreover, it is undisputed that certiorari will not lie to review technical lack of compliance with law or be granted to correct insubstantial errors which are not shown to have resulted in prejudice or to have caused substantial injustice to the appellants herein. (See Save Centennial Valley Ass'n, Inc. v. Schultz, 284 N.W.2d 452, 454 (S.D.1979) quoting 14 Am.Jur.2d Certiorari § 10, at 786). We agree with the trial court that all appellants had an adequate remedy at law and, therefore, the writ of certiorari was properly denied. Appellants-Johnson, on December 14, 1984, petitioned to intervene in the P.U.C. proceedings. Since appellants-Johnson had previously filed a separate action in their behalf in Gregory County, Sixth Judicial Circuit (Civ. # 84-54), the Commission properly denied appellants' petition on January 2, 1985, upon the ground that they had elected to pursue their remedy in circuit court as provided in SDCL 49-3-23. This statute affords two avenues of relief for a complainant. The first is to make a complaint to the P.U.C., and the second is to bring suit on his own behalf for the recovery of damages for which any common carrier may be liable under the provisions of Chapters 49-3 to 49-13. The statute specifically declares, however, that such person shall not have the right to pursue both of such remedies at the same time. Beyond the civil action pending by appellants-Johnson in Gregory County, they also had the right of appeal from the P.U.C. order denying them intervention, which right appellants failed to pursue. The denial of the writ of certiorari requested by appellants-Johnson was clearly proper under this record. On January 2, 1985, appellants-Olson mailed to P.U.C. a petition to intervene. It was on this very day that the P.U.C. had approved its settlement agreement with Northwestern Bell. P.U.C. received the petition on January 3, 1985. Since the settlement agreement had already been finalized the day before, the P.U.C. denied appellant-Olson's petition for failure to timely file the petition. No formal order denying intervention was filed by the P.U.C. as in the case of appellants-Johnson, however, appellants-Olson were notified of the petition denial by letter from a member of the P.U.C. staff. Appellants-Olson did not appeal from the denial of the petition claiming there was nothing to appeal from since no formal denial order had ever been entered by P.U.C. In accordance with SDCL 49-1-19, [a]ll appeals from any determination, decision or order of the public utilities commission shall be conducted in the manner prescribed by chapter 1-2[6] which sets forth administrative procedure and rules. SDCL 1-26-30 provides in pertinent part: A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within any agency or a party who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter.... This section does not limit utilization of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, or relief, when provided by law. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. Consonant with SDCL 1-26-30.2, [a]n appeal shall be allowed in the circuit court to any party in a contested case from a final decision, ruling or action of an agency. An aggrieved party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the circuit court under chapter 1-26 by appeal to the Supreme Court. SDCL 1-26-37. This court has relied on the definition of aggrieved party set forth in Barnum v. Ewing, 53 S.D. 47, 53, 220 N.W. 135, 138 (1928), which includes those persons who can affirmatively show that they are aggrieved in the sense that by the decision of the board they suffer the denial of some claim of right, either of person or property[.] In Application of Northern States Power Company, 328 N.W.2d 852, 855 (S.D.1983), the Barnum definition was utilized to determine who were aggrieved parties for purposes of appeal under SDCL 1-26-30. In the case at bar, after the P.U.C. denied the appellants' petition to intervene, they became aggrieved parties within the meaning provided in Barnum, supra . As such, they could have appealed the Commission's decision pursuant to SDCL ch. 1-26 which prescribes a speedy and adequate remedy for appellate review. The appellants' own failure to appeal to the circuit court, therefore, precludes them from now obtaining the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Analogous to the instant case, is this court's decision in Walker v. Bd. of County Com'rs of Brule, 337 N.W.2d 807 (S.D. 1983). In Walker, the Brule County Commissioners terminated Walker's employment as Brule County Jailer. Walker responded by the application of a writ of certiorari to the circuit court which was temporarily granted. However, an order quashing the writ was subsequently granted from which order Walker appealed. This court held that Walker had a right of appeal from the decision of the County Commissioners which he forfeited. The court continued in pertinent part: Commissioners had adopted a resolution terminating Walker's job. Walker was duly served with notice of this action of Commissioners. Walker's plain, speedy and adequate remedy at that time was to appeal that action to the circuit court[.] Id. at 808. Applying the Walker rationale to the case at bar, the appellants had the right of appeal from the P.U.C.'s denial of their petition to intervene pursuant to SDCL 1-26-30 and SDCL 1-26-30.2. We agree, therefore, with the trial court's ruling that the appellants' failure to pursue their remedy at law bars granting the writ of certiorari. The trial court likewise found cogent the appellants' failure to appeal the P.U.C.'s approval of the settlement agreement to the circuit court. As set forth above, the Commission entered into an order approving the settlement with Northwestern Bell on January 2, 1985. As the appellants were aggrieved parties under SDCL 1-26, any one of them could have appealed the Commission's order approving the settlement as provided in SDCL 1-26-30. Had the appellants availed themselves of this right to appeal, this action would have also triggered an administrative review by the circuit court. Furthermore, appellants-Olson along with Sheila Paschke on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, have presently pending a suit against Northwestern Bell Telephone Company and AT & T Information Systems in Pennington County of the Seventh Judicial Circuit. Appellants-Olson having elected under SDCL 49-3-23 to pursue their damage claim in the trial court, clearly have an adequate remedy at law and the writ of certiorari was properly denied as to them as well. At this juncture, it is appropriate to note that all appellants contend the action by the P.U.C. violated their class action status. As a matter of fact, the P.U.C. did not reach the settlement with Northwestern Bell based on class action status of any of the complainants. In appellants-Johnson's case in Gregory County, the trial court has entered an order denying class action status in that case. In appellants-Olson's case in Pennington County, the trial court has yet to rule on the class action status of that case. This being so, appellants' class action argument is not pertinent to our discussion here. We conclude, therefore, that the P.U.C. did not do some act prohibited by law or neglect to do some act required by law which resulted in substantial injustice to any of the appellants. The appellants herein have all refused the offer of $55.00 pursuant to the P.U.C.-Northwestern Bell agreement. This right of refusal was clearly afforded to each of them under the settlement agreement. Appellants have chosen instead, and in accord with SDCL 49-3-23, to commence actions in circuit court against Northwestern Bell and AT & TIS. Therefore, the trial court was correct in finding that appellants have shown no substantial injustice or prejudice, since they are not bound by the settlement and are pursing actions for damages in circuit court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to deny the appellants the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. See Save Centennial Valley Association, Inc. v. Schultz, supra. We affirm the trial court. FOSHEIM, C.J., HENDERSON, J., and DOBBERPUHL and BERNDT, Circuit Judges, concur. DOBBERPUHL, Circuit Judge, sitting for MORGAN, J., disqualified. BERNDT, Circuit Judge, sitting for WUEST, J., disqualified.