Opinion ID: 616881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Secretary Williams

Text: We turn now to the merits of Secretary Williams's appeal. To overcome Secretary Williams's defense of qualified immunity, Mr. Brown must allege facts showing that Secretary Williams, either through his personal participation in Mr. Brown's treatment or the promulgation of a policy, violated a clearly established constitutional right. He has not done so in his Complaint. Personal liability under § 1983 must be based on Secretary Williams's personal involvement, and supervisory liability must be based on his Policy. The Complaint alleges neither. Indeed, the Complaint's only explicit reference to Secretary Williams is the following: At all relevant times herein, Defendant Joe R. Williams was acting under color of state law as the Secretary of Corrections for the State of New Mexico, charged with notifying sex offenders of their duty to register and administering sex-offender registration and probation programs under state law. Defendant Williams is sued in his individual capacity with respect to Plaintiff's claims for damages and in his official capacity with respect to Plaintiff's claims for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. Complaint, para. 7. The Complaint refers to actions of Defendants, but that is not sufficient to show how Secretary Williams might be individually liable for deprivations of [Mr. Brown's] constitutional rights. See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250. It is not enough for the Complaint to lump the four named defendants and presumably the 1-50 John Does into the collective term Defendants and allege that they directed Mr. Brown to register and serve probation as a sex offender. See, e.g., Complaint, para. 23. The need for individualized allegations is especially important where, as here, each of the defendants had different powers and duties, but the Complaint fails to identify specific actions taken by particular defendants that could form the basis of a constitutional violation. See Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532 (10th Cir.1998). As we recently reiterated, it is particularly important in a § 1983 case brought against a number of government actors sued in their individual capacity . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom . . . as distinguished from collective allegations. See Kansas Penn, 656 F.3d at 1215 (quoting Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249-50). Because the defendants here are mistakenly grouped in a single allegation, the Complaint fails to isolate the allegedly unconstitutional acts of Secretary Williams. [9] See id. at 1250. Mr. Brown's Complaint cannot be the basis for personal liability because it does not specifically allege how Secretary Williams acted in Mr. Brown's case or even that he knew about it. Although the Complaint alleges that Secretary Williams was charged with notifying sex offenders of their duty to register, it does not specifically allege that Secretary Williams told Mr. Brown to register or directed anyone else to make Mr. Brown register. Instead, it alleges that Officer Montoya and Deputy Sheriff Aguilar directed Mr. Brown to register. See Complaint, para. 33. Mr. Brown argues in his brief that Secretary Williams is liable as a supervisor because he signed the Policy on which Officer Montoya allegedly relied to classify Mr. Brown as a sex offender. See Aple. Br. at 40. But the allegations in Mr. Brown's Complaint do not meet the standard for supervisory liability. To establish supervisory liability, Mr. Brown would have to show that (1) Secretary Williams promulgated or was responsible for a policy that (2) caused the constitutional harm and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199. The Complaint fails on the first step because it does not even mention the Policy. Mr. Brown only attached the Policy to his memorandum in response to Secretary Williams's motion to dismiss and asked the district court to take judicial notice of the Policy. We have held that notwithstanding the usual rule that a court should consider no evidence beyond the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court may consider documents referred to in the complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff's claim and the parties do not dispute the documents' authenticity. Alvarado v. KOB-TV, LLC, 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Cnty. of Santa Fe, N.M. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 311 F.3d 1031, 1045 (10th Cir.2002) (considering a document outside the complaint in reviewing a motion to dismiss because it is a document referred to in the complaint and it is a document that is central to the plaintiff's claim whose authenticity is not in dispute.). Because Mr. Brown's Complaint does not refer to the Policy, we do not consider it. Without specifically alleging Secretary Williams's personal involvement or anything about the Policy, Mr. Brown has alleged no connection between Secretary Williams and any constitutional violation. He has thereby failed to overcome Secretary Williams's qualified immunity defense. We therefore reverse the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss Mr. Brown's individual capacity claims against Secretary Williams. Because our decision disposes of Mr. Brown's claims against Secretary Williams in his individual capacity, we need not address whether Secretary Williams is protected by absolute legislative immunity.