Opinion ID: 895218
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The Trust contends that Fernandez's pleading of facts supportive of standing vested the district court with subject matter jurisdiction over the Humble Oil bill of review case. We agree. Inherent in a court's jurisdiction is the authority to determine whether it can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the case, including determining standing. See Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex.2007); Camacho v. Samaniego, 831 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1992). Standing, which focuses on who may bring an action, is a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex.2001). To have standing to pursue a bill of review, a person generally must have been a party to the prior judgment or have had a then-existing interest or right that was prejudiced by the prior judgment. See, e.g., Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 94 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Lerma v. Bustillos, 720 S.W.2d 204, 205-06 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ). Fernandez contends that, because of her biological relationship to Kenedy, she has an interest in the Kenedy estate that was prejudiced by the 1949 Humble Oil judgment. It has long been the rule that a plaintiff's good faith allegations are used to determine the trial court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brannon v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 224 S.W.2d 466, 469 (1949). A court may presume the truth of allegations supportive of standing to determine standing and dispose of litigation through summary judgment. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993) ([W]hen a Texas appellate court reviews the standing of a party sua sponte, it must construe the petition in favor of the party. . . .); Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 305 n. 3 (Tex.2001) (Because standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction, we consider [it] as we would a plea to the jurisdiction, construing the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff.); see also Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex.1995) (assuming that petitioner had standing to affirm summary judgment against petitioner); O'Quinn v. State Bar of Tex., 763 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Tex.1988) (assuming that party had standing to decide that challenge lacked merit). In this case, Fernandez pled in her bill of review petition in district court that she is Kenedy's non-marital child and, because of that relationship, she is entitled to an intestate inheritance if the district court's 1949 judgment negating intestacy is set aside. For purposes of determining standing, then, the district court could presume that Fernandez is, as she alleges, Kenedy's biological child. The Trust favors such an assumption, and Fernandez, who is hardly in a position to challenge it, made no objection on this basis. [20] We reject Fernandez's peculiar argument that the district court should not have assumed her pleaded basis for standing to be true. The court of appeals believed that employing such a presumption amounts to conferring standing by estoppel. 267 S.W.2d at 81 (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443-46). In this case, the Trust did ask the district court to assume paternity for purposes of its summary judgment motion. But, as we have already discussed, Fernandez did not object to that request, and Fernandez's allegations, taken as true, were sufficient to establish standing. We have never said that presuming heirship in these sorts of cases amounts to conferring standing by estoppel or by agreement, or that this situation should depart from the general rule that the plaintiff's good faith allegations are used to determine jurisdiction. We see no reason to alter it now, as such a rule would prevent parties from ever stipulating to facts relating to parentage and would prevent courts from deciding dispositive motions not dependent on parentage (e.g., laches and limitations), without some sort of evidentiary inquiry into heirship claims. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.2000) (recognizing that plaintiffs do not have to put on their case simply to establish jurisdiction). In this case, we conclude that Fernandez's pleadings conferred standing, regardless of whether the alleged relationship was true or subject to rebuttal on the merits.
Because Fernandez's claims are a direct attack on the 1949 Humble Oil judgment, brought by bill of review, the district court had authority to determine Fernandez's standing to proceed, including whether she can establish heirship. A bill of review is brought as a direct attack on a judgment that is no longer appealable or subject to a motion for new trial. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.2003). Because it is a direct attack, a bill of review must be brought in the court that rendered the original judgment, and only that court has jurisdiction over the bill. See, e.g., In re The John G. & Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found., et al., 159 S.W.3d 133, 141, 146 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, orig. proceeding) (holding that Judge Herman not only erroneously concluded he had jurisdiction over these matters, but also actively interfered with the jurisdiction of the district courts); [21] Richards v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 81 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (Because a bill of review is a direct attack on a judgment, only the court rendering the original judgment has jurisdiction over the proceeding.); Solomon, Lambert, Roth & Assocs. Inc. v. Kidd, 904 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (The requirement that a bill of review be filed in the same court that rendered the judgment under attack is a matter of jurisdiction. . . .); Martin v. Stein, 649 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (per curiam) (A bill of review or a petition in the nature of a bill of review is a proceeding in equity that has for its purpose the reversal or modification of a prior judgment of the same trial court. It is not a means of appeal of a judgment of one trial court to another trial court.); cf. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.1973) (A direct attack is a proceeding instituted for the purpose of correcting the earlier judgment. It may be brought in the court rendering the judgment or in another court that is authorized to review the judgment on appeal or by writ of error. The purpose of a direct attack is to change the former judgment and secure the entry of a correct judgment in lieu of the earlier incorrect one.). Here, the district court that rendered the 1949 will construction judgment has exclusive jurisdiction over any attack on that judgment by bill of review. See In re Kenedy Mem'l Found., 159 S.W.3d at 143-44, 146 (holding that, because the bill of review cases in the underlying proceedings were properly filed in the courts that rendered the judgments under attack, jurisdiction attached in the district court). It follows that, under the facts of this case, all issues bearing on the validity of Fernandez's attack on that earlier judgment are necessarily resolvable by the district court as part of its determination of the bill of review. When the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim, Fernandez cannot procure relief in the probate court by characterizing the issue as solely one of heirship. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hill, 249 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. denied) (holding that district court had jurisdiction over partition action and rejecting argument that claim requiring determination of heirs' interest must be heard only in probate court); Trevino v. Lerma, 486 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1972, no writ) (holding that district court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear suit to set aside deed and that claimants could procure no relief in the probate court under the provisions of § 48 of the Probate Code).
The court of appeals believed that [t]he real jurisdictional problem plaguing the summary judgment is that it was rendered by a district court that did not have control over the heirship issues that are central to Fernandez's petition. 267 S.W.3d at 81. The court held that whether Fernandez had an interest in Kenedy's and East's estates is undoubtedly a probate question that must be resolved by the probate court and, in this case, cannot be resolved in the district court. Id. at 82. But the only given authority for this conclusion was a footnote in Palmer v. The Coble Wall Trust Co., Inc., 851 S.W.2d 178, 180 n. 3 (Tex.1992), which does not mention exclusive jurisdiction and does not hold that only a county court acting in probate has jurisdiction over heirship claims in the circumstances presented here. The cited footnote primarily addresses counties in which there is a statutory county court or a statutory probate court, id., which is not the case in Kenedy County. However, the footnote does go on to explain: To further complicate matters, the district courts exercise some probate jurisdiction. The Probate Code provides that [t]he district court shall have original control and jurisdiction over executors, administrators, guardians and wards under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. TEX. PROB.CODE § 5(a) (Supp.1992). In those counties where there is no statutory court exercising probate jurisdiction, most probate matters must be filed in the constitutional county court, id. § 5(b); however, the county judge may transfer contested matters to the district court, which may then hear them as if originally filed in district court. Id. In this situation the county court retains jurisdiction over the uncontested portions of the case. Id. The county judge may also request the assignment of a statutory probate judge to hear contested matters. Id. Palmer, 851 S.W.2d at 180 n. 3. Neither section 5(b) of the Probate Code nor the footnote in Palmer addresses the situation at hand, which involves attacks on district court judgments in cases where the estates were fully administered and closed decades ago. In fact, the Probate Code does not authorize probate courts to exercise jurisdiction in these circumstances, where a decedent died testate and his or her estate was fully administered and closed. In counties such as Kenedy with no statutory probate court, county court at law, or other statutory court exercising probate jurisdiction, all applications, petitions, and motions regarding probate and administrations shall be filed and heard in the county court, except that in contested probate matters, the contested portion can be assigned to a statutory probate court judge or transferred to district court. TEX. PROB. CODE § 5(b). [22] All courts exercising original probate jurisdiction shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an estate. Id. § 5(f). `[I]ncident to an estate'. . . include[s] the probate of wills, the issuance of letters testamentary and of administration, and the determination of heirship, and also include[s], but [is] not limited to, all claims by or against an estate, . . . all actions to construe wills, . . . and generally all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates of deceased persons. Id. § 5A(a). But we have said that a court empowered with probate jurisdiction may only exercise its probate jurisdiction over matters incident to an estate when a probate proceeding related to such matters is already pending in that court. Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist., 862 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex.1993); see TEX. PROB.CODE § 5A(a), (b). Therefore, the probate court in this case could exercise jurisdiction over Fernandez's heirship claim only if, before Fernandez brought that claim, a probate proceeding was already pending in that court. In this case, there is no open or pending estate in the probate court to which an heirship proceeding would be incident and, thus, the Probate Code does not authorize the probate court's exercise of jurisdiction to determine heirship. See Schwartz v. Jefferson, 520 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Tex.1975) (The mere filing of a bill of review does not affect the finality of the judgment which is sought to be set aside.); In re Kenedy Mem'l Found., 159 S.W.3d at 145 (acknowledging that the estates of Kenedy, his wife, and East were closed long ago and not reopened by the mere filing of the bills of review, so none of the estates were pending). Indeed, if the mere filing of a bill of review or an application for declaration of heirship were to reopen a closed estate and render it pending within the meaning of the Probate Code, no estate or probate judgment would ever truly be final because such judgments would always be subject to additional litigation in courts other than those that issued the judgments. Moreover, section 48 of the Probate Code provides that a proceeding to declare heirship may be filed in the probate court only when a person died intestate as to some or all of his or her property, when a will has been probated or estate administered but real or personal property was omitted, or when there has not been a final disposition. TEX. PROB.CODE § 48(a) (permitting suit for declaration of heirship [w]hen a person dies intestate and there shall have been no administration in this State upon his estate or when a will has been probated or an estate administered but property was omitted from such will or from such administration); see id. § 3(o) (defining heirs as those persons. . . who are entitled under the statutes of descent and distribution to the estate of a decedent who dies intestate). That is not the case here. Because Kenedy left a will that disposed of all his property, as determined by the district court in the Humble Oil suit, and because his estate was fully administered and closed, the Probate Code does not authorize the probate court to determine heirship. [23] See Cogley v. Welch, 34 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, judgm't adopted) (holding that court has absolutely no authority . . . to exercise jurisdiction to declare heirship when decedent died testate); McMahan v. Naylor, 855 S.W.2d 193, 194-95 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied) (recognizing that issue of intestacy should be determined before heirship); Guajardo v. Chavana, 762 S.W.2d 683, 684-85 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied) (holding that heirship is not justiciable before intestacy is established); Buckner Orphans Home v. Berry, 332 S.W.2d 771, 775-76 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that putative heirs would first have to annul the wills left by deceased before they had such interest as would entitle them to come into the probate court asking for a declaration of heirship, or claiming rights in the estate as heirs). Authority to decide Fernandez's heirship claims rests solely with the district court as part of its exclusive jurisdiction over the bills of review. [24]