Opinion ID: 1238699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Basis in Fact Standard to this Case

Text: On appeal, the Army argues that there are four bases in fact to support the denial of Watson's application. [6] First, the timing of Watson's application, as his residency was ending and active duty was approaching, indicates that his professed belief was merely expedient, rather than sincerely held. Appellant's Br. 30. Second, the application and supporting materials make clear that Watson does not truly oppose war in all forms, but is specifically opposed to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Third, Watson's application explains the development of [his] conscientious objection by what can reasonably be characterized as a grab-bag of references to various political and religious figures. Appellant's Br. 37. Fourth, Watson purportedly delayed between the time his conscientious objector views crystallized in the early summer of 2005 and the time his application for discharge as a conscientious objector was initially filed, in January 2006. [7] As to the timing of Dr. Watson's application, when he submitted his application for discharge as a conscientious objector, Watson was in the last year of his residency, but had not yet received orders to report for active duty. Moreover, the timing of an application alone is never a sufficient ground for disapproval of an application. Army Reg. 600-43, ¶ 1-5a(5)(c); see also Ferrand v. Seamans, 488 F.2d 1386, 1390 (2d Cir.1973). As to Watson's true opposition being to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and our current national policy rather than to war in any form, the Army officers in Watson's chain of command pointed to Watson's written application, his testimony and opening statement before Colonel O'Neill, and the ten letters submitted on his behalf. Two officers also focused on the fact that the peace march in Washington D.C. in which Watson participated was specifically focused on opposition to the war in Iraq as opposed to all wars. J.A. 139; see also Appellant's Br. 31-37. Pursuant to Army regulation, [a] person who desires to choose the war in which he or she will participate is not a conscientious objector under the regulation. His or her objection must be to all wars rather than a specific war. Army Reg. 600-43, Glossary, Section II, Terms. Watson's written application and the ten supporting letters submitted on his behalf indicate that September 11, 2001, and America's subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, were for Watson profound catalysts for introspection and radical turning points in his life, which caused him to reconsider his views on life, God, and religion, and come to conscientious objection. The application and supporting letters do not provide any objective support for the view that Watson's introspection led him only to oppose the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither does the fact that Watson marched, in September 2005, to stop the war in Iraq. Opposing the war in Iraq is obviously not inconsistent with opposing all war. See, e.g., United States ex. rel . Lehman v. Laird, 430 F.2d 96, 99 (4th Cir.1970); see also Army Reg. 600-43, ¶ 1-5a(3) (Applicants who are otherwise eligible for conscientious objector status may not be denied that status simply because of their views on the nation's domestic or foreign policies.). Finally, Watson's testimony before Colonel O'Neill does not substantially blur the picture painted by Watson, that his discomfort with our country's policies in Iraq and Afghanistan was a profound catalyst for introspection that led him to oppose all violence and war. Indeed, after conducting the hearing, Colonel O'Neill concluded that after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, and our military strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq, Watson had an epiphany, reevaluated his life, his beliefs, and his morals, and became opposed to all armies. [G]reat weight must be accorded to favorable observations and recommendations of sincerity submitted by officers who have, pursuant to regulation, personally interviewed a conscientious objector applicant. Ferrand, 488 F.2d at 1390. Therefore, Watson's testimony at the hearing before Colonel O'Neill does not constitute objective evidence affording a rational basis for the [DACORB's] refusal to accept the validity of [Watson's] claims. Checkman, 469 F.2d at 778. As to the grab-bag argument, according to the Army, Watson's application: is punctuated throughout by block quotes from various figures that seem to have little or no relevance to the subject of the application. Watson's kitchen sink approach creates the appearance that he appealed to a smorgasbord of sources in the hopes that at least one of his claimed sources of inspiration would find resonance with the Board. Appellant's Br. 37-38. Any fair reading of the application does not support this view. In response to a question on the application form asking for what sources and training had caused the development of Watson's conscientious objector beliefs, Watson cited to or quoted from Dr. King, Gandhi, the Dalai Lama, the Christian Bible, the Qur'an, Hinduism, Islam, Buddha, Confucius and Lao-Tse. These quotations were relevant to the question at hand. Then, in response to a question regarding how his future plans had changed as a result of his beliefs, Watson stated that he would strive to teach his son religious tolerance, and would expose his son, at an early age, to the heroes it had taken him his entire life to discover. Watson then quoted from those heroes: Dr. King, Gandhi, Jesus Christ, Buddha, Krishna, the Dalai Lama and Lao-Tse. This does not constitute a basis in fact for denying his application. As to Watson's purported delay between the time his conscientious objector views crystallized in the early summer of 2005 and the time his application for discharge was initially filed, in January 2006, this is not an objective fact to support the DACORB's denial. Army Regulation 600-43 instructs the investigating officer to [q]uestion the sincerity of the applicant if an applicant has delayed for a significant period of time after the crystallization of his or her beliefs to submit an application. Army Reg. 600-43, Appendix D-2(i) (emphasis added). The six month period between the summer of 2005 and January 2006 is not a significant period of time when the breadth and depth of the required application for discharge is taken into account. The regulations also provide: [i]f it appears. . . that the applicant delayed his or her application to complete a Government-sponsored educational program, this delay may be grounds for questioning his sincerity. Id. Appendix D-2(h); see also United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1971) (finding a basis in fact for denial of conscientious objector application where the applicant, a student at West Point, waited until after final examinations to file his application, even though he admitted that his beliefs against war had crystallized several months earlier, because he feared that if he submitted his application during the semester he would not be permitted to finish the school year, as during that time he continued to serve in an establishment and learn and teach things he then claimed to find intolerable as a matter of conscience and basic conviction.). In this case, Watson was not participating in any Government sponsored educational program and certainly did not fear that he would be removed from his civilian residency program if he filed an application for discharge from the Army as a conscientious objector. Moreover, during the fall of 2005 Watson did not serve in any establishment that he later claimed to find intolerable as a matter of conscience. Donham, 436 F.2d at 754. Therefore, any purported delay during the fall of 2005 does not constitute a concrete fact for disbelieving Watson's sincerity. We now consider whether the remaining reasons and facts suggested by the Army officers in Watson's chain of command and by the military Chaplain who interviewed Watson, but abandoned by the Army on appeal before this Court, can constitute a basis in fact for denial of Watson's application: (1) Watson's assertion that he would not treat soldiers wounded in battle contradicted his claim that he deeply believed in the sanctity of human life and the Hippocratic Oath; (2) Watson did not demonstrate that his beliefs governed his actions in word and deed; (3) Watson's application was well counseled and well written and closely traced the language of prior conscientious objector opinions; (4) Watson never asked to be removed from an abortion procedure. First, Watson's assertion that he would not treat soldiers wounded in battle did not contradict either his belief in the sanctity of human life or the Hippocratic Oath. Watson did not say that he believed that soldiers wounded in battle should not be treated or should be left to die, only that he would leave the task of treating them to someone who was not opposed to war in any form. Therefore, this assertion does not constitute a basis in fact for denial of Watson's application. Second, in his written application, Watson explained that as a result of his beliefs he had become more introspective, curious, questioning and resolute; set aside time each day for reflection; participated in a peace march in Washington D.C.; joined Physicians for Social Responsibility; and decided to pursue a career in oncology imaging and intervention. He also wrote that he would strive to teach his son religious tolerance and to introduce his son, while he was still a child, to the thinkers that had such an enormous impact on Watson's own life. None of this constitutes evidence affording a rational basis for the Army to refuse to accept Watson's claimed beliefs. Third, the fact that Watson's application was well-counseled is not an objective basis for disbelieving his sincerity. An applicant . . . is clearly entitled to be represented by counsel in [conscientious objector] proceedings, and . . . it is impermissible to allow any negative inference about an applicant's sincerity to be drawn from his attempts to procure legal advice from whatever source. Goldstein v. Middendorf, 535 F.2d 1339, 1344 (1st Cir.1976) (citation omitted). Finally, as to the Chaplain's suggestion that he would have been inclined to believe in Watson's sincerity had Watson asked to be removed from an abortion procedure, it is undisputed that the Chaplain never actually asked Watson about his views on abortion. The record contains no basis in fact to support the denial of Watson's application for discharge as a conscientious objector. Therefore, we hold that remand to the DACORB for an adequate statement of reasons would be futile.