Opinion ID: 723519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: R.P.C. 1.7(b).

Text: 14 Wade's counsel induced RCA to agree to a $3,000 settlement, intimating that it might use the debtor list to solicit new clients. Then, when RCA agreed to settle, Wade's counsel demanded an additional $30,000 to stop its use of the list. This exorbitant demand inevitably ended settlement negotiations and prevented Wade from receiving the $3,000 and benefiting from the settlement of the litigation. If counsel believed that the demand would not adversely affect its representation of Wade, its belief was unreasonable. Also, counsel has not indicated that it had Wade's consent to this separate settlement offer. We agree with the district court that counsel had a conflict of interest in violation of Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct. 15 Counsel responds by citing an ABA ethics opinion that says that a lawyer cannot agree to refrain from representing present or future clients against a defendant pursuant to a settlement agreement on behalf of a current client. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-371 (1993). RCA did not, however, seek to bar counsel from representing those on the list. It sought only to prevent the use of the list, a product of discovery, beyond the scope of the suit for the solicitation of new clients. 16 Counsel asserts that it intended to use the list for the salutary purpose of informing the alleged debtors that RCA had violated the FDCPA and Idaho's Consumer Protection Act and letting them know of their available remedies. But for $30,000, it was willing to forego this effort. The demand for cash and the admissions that it intended to use the list to solicit new clients belie counsel's eleventh-hour claims that it sought to provide a public service. 17 The district court gave good reasons for the protective order, and we find no abuse of discretion. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, Inc., 62 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir.1995). 2. District Court's Award of Attorneys Fees 18 Counsel for Wade argues that the district court erred in granting attorneys fees to RCA. The court based this discretionary decision on the same reasons given for the protective order. This reasoning is sound and the court did not abuse its discretion. Franklin Fin. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 53 F.3d 268, 271 (9th Cir.1995). 3. Attorneys Fees on Appeal 19 RCA seeks attorneys fees on appeal. We have discretion to award them as a sanction for bringing a frivolous appeal. Fed.R.App.P. 38. An appeal is frivolous if the result is obvious or the arguments of error are wholly without merit. Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1489 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1400 (1995). 20 Counsel appealed the district court's well-grounded decision granting the protective order and imposing attorneys fees, knowing that we review such decisions under the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard. Counsel's arguments of error are wholly without merit. We grant reasonable attorneys fees to RCA in connection with the appeal of these issues and assess them against counsel's firm, Ellsworth, May, Sudweeks, Stubbs, Ipsen & Perry. 21 AFFIRMED.