Opinion ID: 1941054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion in Limine Regarding Testimony of Trooper Monkelis

Text: Appellant claims that the trial court erred in not granting his motion in limine to exclude his statement to State Police Troopers that: This is a death penalty case and I don't want the needle, life for life. Tell the [District Attorney] I will plead guilty to life. I would have killed myself if I knew Michelle was dead. Appellant argues that this statement did not constitute a confession, was not relevant, and had no probative value. He contends that the true intent of the statement was to initiate plea negotiations. The Commonwealth accurately responds that appellant has failed to explain how this statement was irrelevant or why it is not a confession. The Commonwealth notes that appellant was captured in a field after a manhunt. He had been hiding in the woods for a period of time and emerged disheveled and carrying a loaded handgun. Appellant had a violent past and had been imprisoned during his adult life in both Pennsylvania and Ohio. According to the Commonwealth, appellant's statement at the State Police barracks was spontaneous, voluntary and relevant, and therefore admissible at trial. The trial court found appellant's statement to be an admission that was properly admitted into evidence at trial. The court noted that statements tending to show guilt are by their very nature prejudicial, but they are also extremely probative of and relevant to a defendant's participation in the crime charged. Thus, the court found the statement to be explanatory of the issues at trial and tending to prove appellant's guilt. Again, the admissibility of evidence is a matter within the trial judge's discretion and evidentiary decisions will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Brown, 925 A.2d at 154. We have consistently held that spontaneous, volunteered statements like appellant's statement to police in this instance are admissible against constitutional exclusionary rule challenges. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 564 Pa. 505, 769 A.2d 1116, 1125 (2001). Here, appellant does not argue that his statement was inadmissible on constitutional grounds. Moreover, the content of the statement obviously was relevant: it was an admission of guilt. In addition, the statement had substantial probative value in that appellant in effect admitted that he knew precisely what he had done including the potential consequences of his conduct. That awareness, in turn, was relevant to rebut his trial claims of voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity. Appellant nevertheless contends that his statement was made in an attempt to initiate plea negotiations, and that statements made in furtherance of plea bargaining are not admissible. [5] The trial court stated in a footnote that, while statements made in connection with an offer to plead guilty are inadmissible, voluntary, unsolicited statements by a defendant to authorities are not considered to be made in furtherance of striking a plea bargain, citing Commonwealth v. Calloway, 313 Pa.Super. 173, 459 A.2d 795, 801 (1983). Rule 410 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provides that statements made during plea negotiations are not admissible in evidence against the defendant participating in the plea negotiations. Here, however, there is no suggestion that plea negotiations were ongoing at the time appellant made his statement to police. Rather, he had been apprehended a short time before spontaneously making the challenged statement to police. Appellant takes an absolute position on this, resting upon his suggestion that the statement was a negotiation. But the very word negotiation posits the participation of two parties and not unilateral conduct. Here, there was no such negotiation, and thus, Rule 410 exclusion is not implicated. In the absence of appellant's proffering some measure by which Rule 410 would be implicated as a practical matter, we will, for purposes of this decision, look to the Fifth Circuit's standard for determining whether plea negotiations are underway, a standard our Superior Court approved in Calloway: Initially, however, it must be determined in such cases whether or not the statement or statements made by an accused are in connection with plea negotiations. U.S. v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1978) provides a workable analytical framework to determine the appropriate characterization: ... first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. Id. at 1366. Of primary importance in assessing an accused's subjective expectation of negotiating a plea is whether the Commonwealth showed an interest in participating in such discussions. In line with this reasoning, voluntary, unsolicited statements uttered by an accused to authorities cannot be said to be made in furtherance of striking a plea bargain. Calloway, 459 A.2d at 800-01. This standard is consonant with our above recognition that negotiation presupposes the participation of two parties. Here, there is no allegation by appellant, nor is there any evidence in the record suggesting that, at the time of appellant's statement, when he had just been apprehended for a murder witnessed by several people, the Commonwealth had conveyed any interest in negotiating a plea. Appellant's statement was a voluntary, unsolicited confession to the State Police troopers, not a statement made in furtherance of non-existing plea negotiations. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion in limine.