Opinion ID: 2253500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proposition 36 Eligibility

Text: Proposition 36 requires the court to grant probation and drug treatment to any defendant convicted of a nonviolent drug possession offense and prohibits incarceration as a condition of probation. ( [Pen.Code,] § 1210.1, subd. (a).) ( People v. Esparza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 691, 693, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 377.) When a defendant is eligible for Proposition 36 treatment, it is mandatory unless he is disqualified by other statutory factors, including refusing drug treatment. ( Id. at p. 699, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 377.) As relevant here, Penal Code section 1210.1, subdivision (b)(4), expressly disqualifies from Proposition 36 treatment [a]ny defendant who refuses drug treatment as a condition of probation. In People v. Guzman (2003) 109 Cal. App.4th 341, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 ( Guzman ), the defendant was granted and accepted probation under Proposition 36 but then failed to comply with any of the terms of his probation for the for the next five months. He ultimately appeared in court involuntarily after being arrested on a bench warrant. The trial court found that the defendant's complete failure to comply with any of the terms of his probation, and his having been brought back before the court involuntarily, demonstrated his intention to refuse drug treatment probation. The Court of Appeal agreed, finding first that Proposition 36 eligibility requirements continue to apply even after the initial grant of probation; and second, that Defendant's subsequent actions revealed the disingenuousness of his request for drug treatment.... [¶] ... This is a case in which defendant, by his acts and omissions, evinced a complete and unequivocal refusal to undergo drug treatment. ( Guzman, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at pp. 349-350, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 727.) In our case, appellant does not specifically claim that the analysis in Guzman does not apply. In other words, appellant is not arguing that his conduct could not have been considered a refusal under Guzman. Instead, we understand his contention to be that even if he did refuse drug treatment he did not refuse any drug treatment as a condition of probation because DEJ is not probation. [2] Appellant, therefore, contends the trial court had no discretion to deny him Proposition 36 probation. So the precise question is whether DEJ can be considered probation as that term is used under Proposition 36.