Opinion ID: 2585200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of due process resulting from lack of meaningful hearing on competency

Text: Defendant urges that his competency trial suffered from so many procedural flaws as to have deprived him of his state and federal due process rights and a fair trial. (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const, art. I, §§ 7, 15.) Before addressing his specific claims of error, we review the basic legal principles governing competency to stand trial. A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while mentally incompetent. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) A defendant is mentally incompetent if, as a result of a mental disorder or developmental disability, he or she is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. ( Ibid. ) When the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence, due process requires that the trial court conduct a full competency hearing. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 804, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 377, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815.) Evidence is `substantial' if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant's competence to stand trial. ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 726, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618.) Although it arises in the context of a criminal trial, a competency hearing is a special proceeding, governed generally by the rules applicable to civil proceedings. ( People v. Skeirik (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 444, 455, 280 Cal.Rptr. 175.) The right to a jury determination of competency is statutory, however, not constitutional; thus, counsel may effectively waive it without a personal waiver from the defendant. ( People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 969, 972, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 679, 884 P.2d 136; see § 1369.) A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f); People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 881-886, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282.) On appeal, the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the trial court's finding. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible and of solid value. ( Ibid. ) Defendant contends the procedure followed in this case, i.e., submission of two written reports reaching opposite conclusions, did not constitute the full evidentiary hearing demanded by due process. Instead, he urges, the testimony of Dr. Trompetter and Dr. Berg should have been presented, subject to cross-examination by opposing counsel, along with documentary evidence of his past admissions to psychiatric facilities. A third expert's opinion also should have been presented as a tie-breaker, defendant argues. We disagree. In People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146 ( McPeters ), rejecting a similar claim where the trial court had employed a similar procedure in determining the defendant's competency, we noted: Although defendant's counsel, for understandable reasons, elected to waive certain available incidents of the hearing procedure, i.e., the right to jury trial and the rights to present oral testimony and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, defendant presented evidence and received an independent judicial determination of his competence to stand trial based on the stipulated record. ( Id. at p. 1169, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) Defendant attempts to distinguish McPeters on the basis that the trial court in that case appointed a third expert when the two previously appointed did not agree. ( McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1168, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) In McPeters, however, one of the experts apparently was unable to reach a conclusion as to the defendant's competency. ( Ibid. [Dr. Davis observed defendant was hostile and uncooperative and expressed the view he was either feigning mental illness or suffering from a psychosis of undetermined etiology].) Here, in contrast, both Dr. Trompetter and Dr. Berg made findings and reached conclusions, albeit opposing ones, concerning defendant's competency. [8] Contrary to defendant's argument, the trial court properly could assess the weight and persuasiveness of those findings and conclusions without having to resort to a third expert. `The chief value of an expert's testimony in this field, as in all other fields, rests upon the material from which his opinion is fashioned and the reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his conclusion; ... it does not lie in his mere expression of conclusion.' (Italics added.) [Citation.] In short, `Expert evidence is really an argument of an expert to the court, and is valuable only in regard to the proof of the facts and the validity of the reasons advanced for the conclusions.' (Italics added.) [Citations.] ( People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 141, 70 Cal.Rptr. 193, 443 P.2d 777.) Defendant further contends that section 1369, subdivision (a) compelled the appointment of a second expert. In pertinent part, that statute provides: In any case where the defendant or the defendant's counsel informs the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall appoint two  mental health experts. ( Ibid., italics added.) While implicitly acknowledging that neither he nor his counsel ever expressly so informed the court, defendant argues Judge Stone in fact was informed defendant was not seeking a finding of incompetence by virtue of his insistence on a court trial, a new lawyer, or the right to proceed in propria persona. Putting aside the absence from the record of any explicit acknowledgment by Judge Stone that he knew defendant was not seeking a finding of incompetence, we believe defendant misreads the statute. Section 1369, subdivision (a) plainly requires defendant or the defendant's counsel to inform[ ] the court that the defense is not seeking a finding of incompetence in order to trigger the required appointment of a second mental health expert. Defendant cites no case authority supporting his interpretation of the statute. [9] Defendant further contends the competency hearing should have been held before Judge Stone, who had observed defendant in court, heard his explanation of why he did not want lesbians and transvestites on his jury, and declared a doubt regarding his competency. Defendant acknowledges we have held that a competency hearing need not be held before the judge who initiated the proceeding by declaring a doubt. ( People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 113, fn. 2, 60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586.) Nevertheless, he urges that, under the totality of the circumstances of the present case, holding the competency hearing before Judge Pierson denied him due process because only Judge Stone had the experiential perspective to appreciate the findings of Dr. Trompetter and Dr. Berg. We disagree. Competency proceedings commonly are assigned for hearing to a judge different from the one who initiated them by declaring a doubt (see Waldon v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 809, 813, 241 Cal.Rptr. 123), and we are confident in the ability of our state's trial judges to preside over such hearings whether or not they have some prior personal experience of a defendant's in-court behavior. [10] Defendant also contends he had a liberty interest, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in the statutory right to jury trial on the question of his competency and thus that the judgment must be reversed in the absence of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver thereof. (See Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346-347, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175.) In People v. Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 972, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 679, 884 P.2d 136, however, we rejected the argument that the trial court was required to advise the defendant of his right to a jury determination of his competency, given the lack of a constitutional foundation for the right. From that premise it follows the trial court here did not err in failing to secure defendant's waiver of a jury. Defendant attempts to distinguish People v. Masterson on the basis that the defendant's attorney in that case stipulated to an 11 person jury, while in this case the question evidently was not raised on the record. We find the distinction unpersuasive and will not presume defendant's attorney was unaware of the availability of a jury. (Cf. Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 624-625, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683; People v. Anderson (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 419, 426, 158 Cal.Rptr. 727.) Defendant contends Judge Pierson's reliance on Dr. Trompetter's report, in finding defendant competent, violated due process in that the report was ambiguous on the question whether defendant could rationally assist defense counsel. Defendant further asserts Dr. Trompetter's conclusion that he was competent was inconsistent with findings from his examination and thus required inquiry and clarification from the court. Because defendant's contentions, at bottom, read certain remarks contained in Dr. Trompetter's report out of context, we disagree. As the Attorney General observes, Dr. Trompetter's reservation concerning defendant's ability to assist defense counsel rationally was limited to the matter of defendant's preference for a court trial over a jury trial, which Dr. Trompetter found derived from a mixture of rational tactical reasons and paranoid beliefs regarding lesbians and transvestites. The latter, Dr. Trompetter found, interfered] with defendant's ability rationally to choose the better alternative, but Dr. Trompetter clearly did not conclude defendant was incapable of rationally assisting defense counsel. To the contrary, he found that defendant's manner and attitude during the evaluation indicated he had the capacity to cooperate with defense counsel if he so cho[se]. As noted, Dr. Trompetter found defendant possessed a sophisticated understanding of the charges and their seriousness and of the roles of court and counsel; the content of his thinking contained nothing bizarre or grossly illogical; his intelligence was above average and he could concentrate and attend without difficulty; and he currently showed none of the symptoms of schizophrenia. In sum, Dr. Trompetter's findings supported his conclusion that defendant was competent, and, contrary to defendant's contention, the length of his interviews with defendant (a total of two and one-half hours) does not undermine the validity of his findings. (See People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 811-812, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481 [competency evidence of two medical experts who each spent about one hour with defendant deemed sufficient].)