Opinion ID: 1602343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Purposefulness and Flagrancy of the Police Conduct

Text: ¶ 91 The third Brown factor is the purposefulness and flagrancy of the police conduct. This factor is particularly important because it goes to the heart of the exclusionary rule's objective of deterring unlawful police conduct. Phillips, 218 Wis.2d at 209, 577 N.W.2d 794 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254). In Brown , the Court determined that an illegal detention was purposeful because the detectives arrested the defendant in the hope that something might turn up, in a manner that [gave] the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion. Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Police conduct may be purposeful or flagrant if the impropriety of the official's misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that his conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless. United States v. Carter, 573 F.3d 418, 425 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir.2006)). This court has considered whether there is evidence of some degree of bad faith exploitation of the situation on the part of the officer. Richter, 235 Wis.2d 524, ¶ 53, 612 N.W.2d 29. Conversely, courts frequently hesitate to find that an officer's violation of the law was `purposeful' or 'flagrant' when the officer broke the law acting in good faith. United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir.2004). ¶ 92 In this case, the officers entered the house based upon their belief that exigent circumstances existed. Their belief in exigent circumstances was based, in turn, on observations that Detective Davila made from within the curtilage of Artic's residence. Accordingly, we must examine the nature of Davila's presence in the curtilage. ¶ 93 Curtilage is the land immediately surrounding a house. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). Because curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the `sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,' it is considered part of the home itself under Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. at 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735 (Powell, J., concurring). The curtilage is defined by factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private. Id. The existence of a fence is an important factor in delineating the curtilage of a home. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 n. 4, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987); Martwick, 231 Wis.2d 801, ¶ 37, 604 N.W.2d 552 (noting that the owner did not erect a fence when determining that plants were not within the curtilage of the home). ¶ 94 In this case, the fenced-in area immediately adjacent to the back of Artic's house must be regarded as curtilage. The general rule is that law enforcement may not search this area of a private residence without a search warrant (or some exception to the warrant requirement). Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir.2001). Here, Detective Davila did not have a warrant to enter the fenced-in area to position herself near the rear door. She did not know whether anyone was in the house. Consequently, she did not have probable cause to believe that someone would try to escape from the house. ¶ 95 Nevertheless, we recognize that officers may sometimes enter curtilage to further a legitimate law enforcement objective when the restriction upon a person's privacy is limited. United States v. Weston, 443 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir.2006). The officer's reason for entering the curtilage must be unconnected with a search of the premises directed against the accused. United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1100 (4th Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir.2006). An officer may, for example, come within the curtilage in order to serve civil process on the homeowner. United States v. Raines, 243 F.3d 419, 421 (8th Cir.2001). Some courts have also defined an exception permitting officers to enter the curtilage when engaging in a knock and talk investigation. See Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp., 461 F.3d 646, 654 (6th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir.2008) (holding that a knock and talk is a reasonable investigative tool when officers seek to gain an occupant's consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect criminal activity). Several courts have extended this exception to permit officers to enter the back yard in search of a homeowner when nobody answers the front door. [15] ¶ 96 In this case, Detective Davila's purpose for entering the curtilage was not to search the area or investigate the back of the house but to prevent any person in the house from trying to escape. ¶ 97 Detective Davila's entry into the curtilage of Artic's house was not permitted by the Fourth Amendment on the basis of information she had at the time. However, we are not required to determine that her presence in the fenced-in portion of Artic's back yard was lawful or that her observations there permitted other officers to break in the front door based on exigent circumstances as a prerequisite to our conclusion that police conduct was not flagrant or purposeful. Securing the rear door by entering the curtilage was not, under the circumstances, flagrant conduct. Entering the curtilage advanced a legitimate law enforcement objectivesecuring the premises in preparation for an anticipated search warrant and preventing an escape if someone in the house tried to escapewithout an undue invasion of privacy. See United States v. Scheets, 188 F.3d 829, 840 (7th Cir.1999) (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984)) (Law enforcement officers may seize an area to avoid the destruction or removal of evidence when probable cause to search the area exists.); United States v. Ruiz-Estrada, 312 F.3d 398, 404 (8th Cir.2002) (The act of securing [an] apartment while awaiting a search warrant comports with the Fourth Amendment.). ¶ 98 When Detective Davila noticed the upstairs light go out as police announced their presence at the front door, and when she heard the phone ringing and scurrying movement inside the house, she drew the reasonable inference that the occupants of the house did not wish to be seen and could very well be involved in trying to destroy evidence. While the resulting entry through the front door was illegal, it was neither illogical nor unnatural under the circumstances. ¶ 99 Once Davila relayed her information to the other officers, those officers acted on a reasonable belief that evidence might be destroyed. They had reason to believe drugs were in the residence based on the fact that Rob had left the residence moments before his arrest. Wagner observed a camera near the front door of the house, which was characteristic of houses he had investigated for drugs and drug offenses. [16] Wagner knocked and announced loudly enough that Artic could hear him. At this point, Davila relayed her observations about the light turning off, phone ringing, and scurrying footsteps on the stairs. Wagner testified that the officers' forced entry was based upon their belief that evidence was being destroyed, and nothing in the record suggests that this belief was not genuine. The fact that Davila's observations were made unlawfully from within the curtilage rendered the officers' subsequent entry illegal, but it did not make the entry purposeful or flagrant for the purposes of attenuation analysis. ¶ 100 The officers did not enter the house after Rob's arrest because they were targeting his father. Davila did not go to the back of the house to search for evidence against him. This was not a circumstance in which she went in merely to see if there was anything worth getting a warrant for. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 540 n. 2, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). Events played out in an unexpected fashion. Similar to Richter , where the officer was pursuing a fleeing burglar, there was no evidence that [the officer] entered Richter's home with ulterior motives, to undermine Richter's rights, to pressure him to consent, or to otherwise exploit the situation in hopes of finding evidence against Richter .  Richter, 235 Wis.2d 524, ¶ 54, 612 N.W.2d 29. ¶ 101 Artic compares the facts of this case to Bermudez , in which the court of appeals held that the facts suggest[ed] an orchestrated attempt to collect further incriminating evidence. Bermudez, 221 Wis.2d at 357, 585 N.W.2d 628. In Bermudez , however, the facts were inconsistent with the officers' stated purpose for the entry. [17] Id. at 356-57, 585 N.W.2d 628. That is not the case here. ¶ 102 Nothing in the record suggests the officers acted in bad faith or under a pretext. The officers testified extensively regarding their initial investigation, and the police presence was consistent with these activities. Although the observations supporting their belief in exigent circumstances were made illegally, the officers' behavior upon entering the residence was consistent with their goal of preventing the destruction of evidence. Furthermore, they were specifically investigating Artic's son, not Artic himself. They did not know that Artic was a resident of the building and, in fact, were surprised to encounter him. [18] ¶ 103 Finally, Artic argues that the officers' illegal activity was purposeful and flagrant because the officers forced entry into the house. He relies on language in Phillips noting that the agents in that case did not gain entry by breaking through, unlocking, or even opening a window or door. Phillips, 218 Wis.2d at 211, 577 N.W.2d 794. Although the fact that the officers forced entry certainly makes their entry more flagrant than it would be if they had simply opened a door, the flagrancy is mitigated by the fact that the officers forced entry into the building generally, not into Artic's upstairs living quarters. ¶ 104 Artic cites United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d 679 (7th Cir.2003), which is instructive on this point. In Robeles-Ortega , the Seventh Circuit found the officers' activity flagrant where they literally broke down the door, without exigent circumstances and without a warrant, and at least five agents rushed into the apartment with guns. Id. at 684. The officers then ordered the occupants to lie on the ground. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the manner of the entry gave the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion. Id. (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. 2254). ¶ 105 While the officers here did break down the front doors to the building, there is nothing in the record to suggest that their actions were calculated to surprise, frighten, or confuse Artic, whom they did not realize was an occupant of the house. The officers were furthering a legitimate law enforcement purpose, see Scheets, 188 F.3d at 840, acting on a reasonable belief that evidence might be destroyed, and not specifically targeting Artic. In sum, the record simply does not suggest bad faith exploitation of the situation on the part of the officer[s]. Richter, 235 Wis.2d 524, ¶ 53, 612 N.W.2d 29. Therefore, their actions were neither purposeful nor flagrant, and this factor weighs in favor of attenuation.