Opinion ID: 1436510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Family Court Act

Text: Although we are satisfied that the plain meaning of § 8-10-3(a) is sufficient to determine that appropriate authority resides in the Family Court to entertain the parties' complaint and counterclaim, we also find support for such authority outside the statutory language. The fact that the commonly accepted meaning of the word marriage in 1961, the year the Family Court Act was enacted, referred to a union between a man and a woman does not alter the analysis. [24] It would have been quite extraordinary indeed if the original drafters of the act had anticipated or even contemplated same-sex marriages. Such a concept would have been as foreign to the General Assembly in 1961 as would have been the advent of the Internet to the drafters of the commerce clause in the United States Constitution. [25] See Simmons v. State, 944 So.2d 317, 331 (Fla. 2006) (the Internet `represents an instrument of interstate commerce, albeit an innovative one') (quoting American Libraries Association v. Pataki, 969 F.Supp. 160, 173 (S.D.N.Y.1997)). Nevertheless, [i]n attempting to apply a statute to a situation that was not intended by its drafters, the interpreting court should not rely on literalisms, technical constructions, or so-called formal rules of interpretation, but rather should rely on the breadth of objectives of the legislation and the common sense of the situation. [26] A brief examination of the context of § 8-10-3 clearly demonstrates that the Family Court possesses the authority to hear the parties' divorce. The General Assembly created the Family Court in 1961 and infused it with broad and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of domestic relations. Opinion to the Governor, 93 R.I. 211, 213, 172 A.2d 596, 597 (1961) (the [L]egislature intended to divest the [S]uperior [C]ourt of all existing jurisdiction over divorces and all matters of domestic relations generally and to vest that jurisdiction exclusively in the [F]amily [C]ourt on and after September 1, 1961). We first observe that § 8-10-2 expressly provides that the Family Court Act shall be liberally construed to the end that families whose unity or well-being is threatened shall be assisted and protected, and restored, if possible, as secure units of law-abiding members   . Surely that language encompasses a family whose well-being is best served by severing its legal relationship. See Von Schack v. Von Schack, 893 A.2d 1004, 1011 (Me.2006) (Maine has a unique interest in assuring that its citizens are not compelled to remain in such personal relationships against their wills   .).