Opinion ID: 2507433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The remainder of Washington's perjury statute can be upheld by severing and striking the offending language as directed in RCW 9A.04.010(4)

Text: ¶ 15 The State asks this court to sever and strike the clause whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law from RCW 9A.72.010(1) and uphold the balance of the perjury statute. ¶ 16 We have held that The basic test for severability of constitutional and unconstitutional provisions of legislation is set forth in Hall v. Niemer, 97 Wash.2d 574, 582, 649 P.2d 98 (1982) (quoting State ex rel. King County v. State Tax Comm'n, 174 Wash. 336, 339-40, 24 P.2d 1094 (1933)): whether the constitutional and unconstitutional provisions are so connected . . . that it could not be believed that the legislature would have passed one without the other; or where the part eliminated is so intimately connected with the balance of the act as to make it useless to accomplish the purposes of the legislature. Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash.2d 188, 197, 949 P.2d 1366 (1998) (alteration in original); see also State v. Anderson, 81 Wash.2d 234, 236, 501 P.2d 184 (1972). ¶ 17 With respect to the first requirement, [t]he presence of a severability clause . . . offers to the courts the necessary assurance that the remaining provisions would have been enacted without the portions which are contrary to the constitution. Anderson, 81 Wash.2d at 236, 501 P.2d 184. The preliminary article of Title 9A RCW contains the following broad severability clause: If any provision of this title, or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the title, or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected, and to this end the provisions of this title are declared to be severable. RCW 9A.04.010(4). ¶ 18 In addition to the inclusion of this express severance clause, punishing perjury when the materiality of a false statement is determined by a jury rather than a trial judge still comports with the general legislative intent in enacting Title 9A RCW. RCW 9A.04.020(1) declares: The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are: (a) To forbid and prevent conduct that inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests; (b) To safeguard conduct that is without culpability from condemnation as criminal; (c) To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense; (d) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses, and to prescribe proportionate penalties for each. The perjury statute punishes statements that undoubtedly inflict[ ] or threaten[ ] substantial harm to individual or public interests. RCW 9A.04.020(1)(a). The integrity of our judicial system depends largely on the truthfulness of statements made under oath, and strict perjury laws are necessary to deter and punish false declarations in court proceedings. That a jury rather than a judge determines materiality does not affect the primary purpose of the perjury statute. It is also unreasonable to believe the legislature would have decided against punishing perjurious statements if it knew materiality could not be determined by the trial judge. ¶ 19 With respect to the second part of the severability test, the clause whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law is not so intimately intertwined with the statute as to make the remainder of the act unable to accomplish its legislative purposes. Striking the offending portion in RCW 9A.72.010(1) will not affect the State's ability to punish perjury and thus forbid and prevent conduct that inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests. RCW 9A.04.020(1)(a). If the offending provision is severed, materiality will be determined by the jury along with the other elements necessary to convict of a perjury offense. [6] ¶ 20 To be severable, [t]he invalid provision must be grammatically, functionally, and volitionally severable. McGowan v. State, 148 Wash.2d 278, 295, 60 P.3d 67 (2002) (footnote omitted). The clause whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law is grammatically severable-it is separate and distinct and can be easily removed without affecting the other statutory provisions. That only part of RCW 9A.72.010(1) is invalid is not a bar to severing it from the remainder of RCW 9A.72.010(1) and from the rest of the statute. Id. ¶ 21 The offending language is also functionally separate from the rest of RCW 9A.72.010(1) because the clause whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law dictates procedure, while the preceding clause defining material false statement dictates substance. When this court has found procedural provisions to be unconstitutional in part, we have upheld the substantive remainder of those statutes. See, e.g., Household Fin. Corp. v. State, 40 Wash.2d 451, 244 P.2d 260 (1952) (holding that the invalidity of a provision for a de novo trial in superior court in the appeal section of an act did not affect the validity of the remainder of the appeal section); State ex rel. French v. Clausen, 107 Wash. 667, 182 P. 610 (1919) (declaring a statutory provision for appointment of legislators to a commission unconstitutional, but upholding the remainder of the statute so that private citizens could be appointed); Shook v. Sexton, 37 Wash. 509, 79 P. 1093 (1905) (upholding the remainder of a statute prohibiting animals running at large after finding portion pertaining to fines invalid). ¶ 22 The constitutionally infirm clause is also volitionally severable. A clause is volitionally severable if the balance of the legislation would have likely been adopted had the legislature foreseen the invalidity of the clause at issue. Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal.3d 805, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247 (1989). The language whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law is volitionally severable from the rest of the perjury statute because, as stated before, the remainder of the perjury statute still accomplishes Title 9A RCW's general legislative purpose, and it is not reasonable to believe that the legislature would have decided against punishing perjury if it knew that materiality would be determined by a jury and not a trial judge. ¶ 23 The trial court relied on State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 110 P.3d 192 (2005), and struck down the entire perjury statute as unconstitutional, asserting that the judiciary cannot set up a procedure transferring authority to the jury absent a legislative amendment. This case is distinguishable from Hughes. In Hughes, 154 Wash.2d at 150, 110 P.3d 192, the court was not being asked to sever a provision, but rather to create a procedure completely absent from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, whereby a jury could be empaneled on remand to find aggravating factors warranting an enhanced sentence. Here, however, no new procedure need be created. Elements are already determined by juries. It is undisputed that materiality is an element of perjury. A jury may determine materiality just as it does every other element in RCW 9A.72.020. In fact, Washington's pattern jury instructions already include materiality as an element of perjury. See 11A Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 118.02 (2d ed. 1994) (WPIC). Although the current pattern jury instruction defining material statement provides for determination of materiality by a trial judge, see WPIC 118.17, trial courts can easily use a different instruction defining materiality for the jury. [7] ¶ 24 In the instant case, severing offending language from the perjury statute so that juries may decide materiality is not a usurpation of legislative authority. The statute at issue contains a severance clause, and the constitutionally infirm language is easily severable from the remaining provisions. No new procedure needs to be created, and the balance of the statute can clearly carry out the legislative intent to punish perjury. ¶ 25 Additionally, severing the language whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law does not prevent a trial judge from dismissing perjury charges based on statements that are clearly not material. The trial judge still has the discretion to ensure that individuals are not harassed with frivolous perjury charges. ¶ 26 Moreover, the legislature has the authority to amend the remainder of the perjury statute to incorporate other language or other definitions of materiality if it is to be presented to untrained fact-finders as the trial court suggests or to expressly provide for the trial judge to make a preliminary determination of materiality. CP at 51. We, however, implement legislative intent, sever and strike the language whether a false statement is material shall be determined by the court as a matter of law from RCW 9A.72.010(1), and uphold the remainder of the perjury statute.