Opinion ID: 6929865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other unfair labor practice findings

Text: The Board concluded that Beverly had committed over 130 violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act at 33 sites. Beverly has petitioned for review of 19 of these findings and conclusions. The General Counsel has cross-petitioned for enforcement of the Board’s unfair labor practice findings and conclusions. Beverly does not contest the majority of the Board’s unfair labor practice findings and conclusions, and the Board is entitled to summary affirmance of those findings and conclusions. NLRB v. Vanguard Tours, Inc., 981 F.2d 62, 67-68 (2d Cir.1992). Beverly does contest nineteen of the Board’s findings of unfair labor practices. It is against the background of acknowledged violations that we consider those findings. NLRB v. Pace Motor Lines, Inc., 703 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir.1983) (per curiam); NLRB v. Clark Manor Nursing Home Corp., 671 F.2d 657, 660 (1st Cir.1982). We deny enforcement as to three unfair labor practice findings and grant enforcement as to the rest. ■The Board’s findings of fact must be supported by “substantial evidence” on the record as a whole. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Abbey’s Transp. Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.2d 575, 579 (2d Cir.1988). A reviewing court may not “displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 465. Nonetheless, substantial evidence must be “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 477, 71 S.Ct. at 459 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). We turn now to the contested findings. 1. Mount Lebanon Manor Convalescent Center The Board concluded that Beverly violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by denying Diane Mead, an employee at Beverly’s Mount Lebanon Manor Convalescent Center, a tuition reimbursement. This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. Firing or otherwise adversely affecting an employee’s employment on account of that employee’s union activities violates Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. In unlawful discharge and other adverse employment action cases, the determinative issue is the employer’s motivation. Abbey’s Transp. Services, Inc., 837 F.2d at 579. The General Counsel must first persuade the Board that anti-union animus contributed to the employer’s decision. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 395, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2471, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983) (describing the Board’s decision in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enf'd, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 1612, 71 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982)). If the General Counsel establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the same employment action would have been taken in the absence of the protected conduct. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. at 395, 103 S.Ct. at 2471. Beverly’s Mount Lebanon facility had a tuition reimbursement program under which full-time employees could receive 75% of their tuition and book expenses up to $750 each year to defray the costs of their work-related classes. For purposes of the reimbursement program, the year ran from the date of employment. Diane Mead was a part-time nursing assistant at the Mount Lebanon facility. When Mead complained about her raise in August 1986, then-facility-administrator Harry Slaeum told her that she should apply to the tuition reimbursement program despite the fact that she was only a part-time employee. Mead did so and was subsequently reimbursed about $130 for a course she had taken that summer and $750 for classes she enrolled in for the upcoming fall semester. Slaeum apparently allowed Mead to receive the tuition reimbursement despite her part-time status by interceding with a letter on her behalf to Divisional Vice-President George Putnam. Because Mead started work on July 1, 1985, the $130 reimbursement fell within her first year of employment and the $750 reimbursement fell within her second. From November 1986 to January 1987, Mead openly participated in an unsuccessful union campaign at the facility. Mount Lebanon administrators knew that Mead was pro-union. In January 1987, Mead submitted a tuition reimbursement request for classes she planned to take in the spring semester. Her request was denied. Under the Board’s Wright Line test, the General Counsel must first demonstrate that protected conduct contributed to the employer’s actions. The employer’s knowledge of Mead’s union activities and other instances of unfair labor practices at the facility permit the inference of unlawful motivation, although, by Mead’s own admission, the employer continued to award tuition reimbursements to other vocal union supporters. Under Wright Line, however, the employer is not liable so long as it can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the adverse employment action would have occurred even in the absence of the unlawful motivation. Here, overwhelming evidence supports the conclusion that Mead would not have been reimbursed for her last tuition request. Under company rules, Mead was not entitled to the tuition reimbursement on grounds other than her part-time employment. Employees were entitled only to be reimbursed up to $750 per year. When Mead filed the contested January 1987 request, she was in the middle of her second annual period (July 1, 1986 — July 1, 1987). However, she had already been reimbursed $750 for her tuition and books for the fall semester pursuant to her request in August 1986. Therefore, Mead had already received her yearly allowance of reimbursement. In addition, the- letter from Slaeum to Putnam recommending approval of Mead’s tuition request suggests that the offer was for one time only. The Board nonetheless concluded that Beverly violated the Act when Mead’s tuition assistance was “withdrawn.” Even if the union had established that Slaeum’s offer of tuition reimbursement was meant to be ongoing, even Mead does not contend that Slacum had offered to waive the $750 yearly cap for her benefit. The Board in essence found that Beverly withdrew a non-existent benefit. Accordingly, the Board’s conclusion cannot stand. 2. Provincial House Total Living Center The Board found that Beverly violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging nurse’s aide Linda Johnson. The Board’s finding that union activity contributed to Johnson’s discharge is not supported by substantial evidence. The Board acknowledged that Johnson’s discipline record was “bad.” Between May 1985 and June 1986, Johnson received six written warnings and one oral warning. The warnings covered such offenses as excessive absenteeism, excessive tardiness, loitering, and disrespect to superiors. Her last warning in June 1986 explicitly stated that her next violation would result in her dismissal. In November 1986, Johnson received another written warning from her supervising nurse, Ann Williams, this time for failing to shave two patients. In response to receiving this warning, Johnson both orally and on the employee comment section of the facility’s written warning form attributed the discipline to Williams’ singling her out on account of her race. Johnson claimed that later that day she learned from Pauline Bailey, a fellow employee who discovered the shaving violations, that Williams had asked Bailey to check only on Johnson’s patients. Johnson related this claim to facility administrator Sonja Scarf later that day as part of her claim that Williams was prejudiced. When Williams and Bailey denied that Williams ever told Bailey this, and Bailey also denied telling Johnson that Williams had said this, Johnson was fired for making a false statement about a fellow employee. Johnson had participated in an unsuccessful union campaign at the Provincial facility from around May to August 1986. In addition, Johnson’s signature on an open letter to all employees at the facility and the testimony of her husband strongly suggest that Beverly knew of Johnson’s pro-union stance. On this evidence, the Board held that Johnson’s dismissal was in violation of Section 8(a)(3), emphasizing that the facility administrators “leaped” to the conclusion that Johnson had lied and maintaining that other employees discharged or punished for making false statements had presented more serious cases. There is not substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that an improper motive contributed to Johnson’s discharge. Evidence of anti-union animus at the facility was extremely weak. The Board found no unfair labor practices in connection with the union campaign at Provincial. The only unfair labor practice found at the facility was a later de minimis Section 8(a)(3) violation based on a failure to allow a special exemption from the working hours for a union supporter. In addition, Johnson admitted that none of her superiors had said anything to her about her union activities. Beverly also introduced evidence that other employees had been given written warnings and fired for making false statements. Johnson’s own words belie the Board’s finding that anti-union animus motivated Johnson’s discharge. Johnson stridently maintained both orally at the time she was reprimanded and on her discipline form that' she was being singled out on account of race, not because of her union activities. The only mention of the union throughout the series of reprimands and meetings that preceded Johnson’s discharge was on her written warning, where after making a lengthy complaint about Williams’ alleged race discrimination, she added “and also she picks on me because of the Union.” In fact, the Board itself seemed to believe that Johnson’s statement accusing Williams of singling her out was false but speculated that this mistake was made in good faith by Johnson and then faulted the employer for not recognizing that Johnson could have been making a good faith mistake. Even if anti-union animus contributed to Johnson’s firing, Beverly also proved its affirmative defense under Wright Line that she would have been fired anyway. The Board apparently felt that Beverly should have realized that Johnson was making a good faith mistake (if in fact she was), and therefore should have chosen not to fire her. The Board’s reasoning, however, ignores Johnson’s lengthy disciplinary record, as well as the substantial disruption her eoncededly false accusations created in the workplace. We do not think that the Act allows second-guessing of an employer’s decision to fire an employee with an extensive disciplinary record who seeks to avoid the consequences of her latest dereliction by groundlessly accusing her supervisor of racial prejudice. 3. Fayette Health Care Center It is an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(5) and (d) of the Act for an employer to fail to bargain in good faith with the employees’ representative. The Board in this case found that Beverly’s negotiators’ lateness in arriving at the initial bargaining session with the employees’ representative from Fayette Health Care Center was an “act of extraordinary discourtesy [that] rises to the level of an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(5)....” Beverly’s representatives arrived at 7:20 P.M. for a 3:30 P.M. meeting. According to the Board, Beverly violated the Act “by being late and deliberately not notifying the Union that it would be late.” Although extreme tardiness in conjunction with other conduct may amount to a failure to bargain in good faith, see generally Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir.1974), an essential factual premise of the ALJ’s conclusion on this point is not supported by substantial evidence. The Board explicitly relied on the fact that Beverly’s negotiator, Judy Mollinger, “deliberately” did not notify the union that she would be late. However, the union’s negotiator, Tom DeBruin, admitted that Mollinger had told him that she might be late because of her travel plans. Mollinger also testified that she called DeBruin’s office on the day of the meeting to tell him that she would not be arriving until around 7:00 P.M. DeBruin acknowledged that the day after the negotiating session he discovered that Mollinger had left such a message at his office. DeBruin also admitted that he had not told his office where he would be so that they could relay messages to him and that he could not reach his office after 5:00 P.M. Given the uncontradicted evidence that Mollinger did in fact leave a message for DeBruin stating that she would be late, the Board’s essential finding that Mollinger “deliberately” failed to notify the union of that fact is not supported by substantial evidence. 4. Beverly Manor of Monroeville The Board found a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) based on unilateral changes in vacation, medical insurance and absenteeism policies following the union’s victory. We agree. The Board found that Beverly violated the Act by unilaterally adding to all its medical plans “MedView,” a private screening company that employees have to consult before having elective surgery or staying in the hospital more than twenty-four hours. Beverly defends its action on the grounds that its insurance carrier made it change the plans. However, Beverly points to nothing in the record to support this assertion. Beverly, citing Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir.1973), also defends' its action on the grounds that the adoption of MedView did not “vitally affect” the terms and conditions of employment. The Board’s contrary conclusion, however, was certainly permissible. Beverly also contests the Board’s finding on the grounds that the Board made this finding only because it misread the ALJ’s decision as having done so. Beverly, however, has waived this argument by not mentioning it until their reply brief. See Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993). Beverly does not contest that a new absenteeism policy was adopted right after the election and that the changes were substantial enough to support the Board’s finding that they “vitally affected” the terms and conditions of employment. Beverly also claims that no new vacation policy was implemented. Beverly argues that Office Manager Cathy Eaton merely mistakenly explained the old vacation policy in an employee meeting held to clarify the vacation rules and did not announce a new policy. However, Eaton’s explanation for why she held the meeting was implausible, and Beverly has introduced no evidence that Eaton or other managers in any way attempted to correct the “mistake.” There is thus substantial evidence to support the Board’s determination. 5. Fayette Health Care Center The Board found that Fayette administrator Jim Filippone assaulted employee Wilma Franks and union representative Ashley Adams during grievance meetings in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Whether the assaults occurred were essentially credibility disputes, and there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision in both cases. Beverly also challenges the Board’s findings on the grounds that Filippone was found not guilty of assaulting Franks and Adams in a state court criminal trial. However, Beverly’s attempt to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel must fail. The state court acquittal of Filippone is not binding on the Board because of the difference in the degree of the burden of proof in criminal and civil trials. See Neaderland v. C.I.R., 424 F.2d 639, 640-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827, 91 S.Ct. 53, 27 L.Ed.2d 56 (1970). 6. Carpenter Care Center The Board found that Beverly committed violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by adverse employment actions against three employees at the Carpenter facility. We agree. The Board found that Beverly’s suspension of employee Marie Meador, ostensibly for arguing loudly with a nurse’s aide, was in retaliation for her union activities. Beverly challenges the finding, emphasizing the wrongdoing that led to the suspension. The Board, however, while acknowledging that Meador had violated workplace rules, inferred from substantial circumstantial evidence that the severity of Meador’s punishment was attributable to her union activities. Beverly has offered nothing beyond its own inferences to rebut the finding that Meador’s discipline was related to her union activities. We thus have no grounds on which to conclude that the Board’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The Board found that Beverly fired employee Erika Evans and issued a written warning to employee Lynn Smith because of their union activities. Beverly defends these actions as taken solely as a result of Evans’s “grossly insubordinate” act in “mooning” a superior, and Smith’s “failure to comprehend the seriousness of the misconduct” by laughing at the incident. The Board, however, found that Evans’s “‘mooning’ was partial and over in an instant” and furthermore came in response to Evans’s and Smith’s mistaken but sincere belief that their supervisor had just playfully challenged Evans to “bare it, baby.” The Board was faced with conflicting testimony as to what happened and how it was perceived. The Board was thus free to accept one party’s characterization of the incident. Given the equivocal nature of the evidence, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s interpretation of the events. 7. Duke Convalescent Center The Board found that Beverly violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by firing union supporter Lucille Lucas. Beverly challenges the Board’s finding on the grounds that Lucas had committed sufficient disciplinary violations under the facility’s progressive discipline policy to warrant her discharge. The Board’s finding that there was an improper motivation, however, was supported by substantial evidence. Although the company’s policy allowed them to fire Lucas for this conduct, its practice at this facility was not to resort to discharge in analogous cases. Lucas’s union ties were minimal, but the ALJ credited testimony that the facility’s managers were looking to fire employees who even talked to the union. 8. Meyersdale Manor The Board found that Beverly violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by firing employee Suzanne LaFramboise at the Mey-ersdale Manor facility. Beverly argues that there were lawful reasons for LaFramboise’s discharge. As in the discharge cases above, however, Beverly has introduced no evidence that other employees who engaged in similar conduct were also fired. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that Beverly failed to establish its affirmative defense under Wright Line. 9. Stenton Hall Nursing and Convalescent Center The Board found that Beverly committed two separate violations of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally restricting the activities of union delegates and by refusing to execute a collective bargaining agreement reached with the facility’s union. Beverly contests the Board’s finding that it unilaterally changed the terms of employment by advising the union in a memo that union delegates would be permitted to discuss union activities with employees only during non-work time and in non-work areas. Beverly protests that this memo did not constitute a change because an “equally plausible” interpretation of the existing contract between the union and the facility authorized this action. Beverly’s interpretation of the contract is not “equally plausible,” however. Beverly’s memo transgressed the limitations allowed by the contract by banning the union delegates from discussing business with other employees during work time and on the premises in a way that did not interfere with the operations of the employer. Beverly’s objections to the Board’s finding that Beverly unlawfully refused to execute the collective bargaining agreement are also meritless. While there is evidence that Beverly’s negotiator had a mistaken impression of what the contract terms were, it is undisputed that the contract itself was unambiguous, and there is no claim that the union should have known that Beverly was making a mistake. Because enforcement of the order will not “be oppressive or result in hardship or an unequal exchange,” see Freight, Constr., Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local 287, 272 N.L.R.B. 348 (1984), Beverly must bear the burden of its unilateral mistake. 10. North Park Manor and Greene Health Care Center ^e Board found that Beverly violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by firing employee Geraldine Bubna at North Park Manor and Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to bargain with the union over the effects of the sale of these two facilities. As to Bubna, Beverly does not contest that the General Counsel established a prima facie case under Wright Line but argues that Bubna’s discharge was authorized under the facility’s strict absenteeism policy. Beverly stresses that many other employees were either disciplined or fired for violations of this policy but offered no evidence that the other employees it fired for absenteeism pursuant to the policy had the legitimate excuses that Bubna had. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding. Beverly disputes the finding that Beverly failed to engage in effects bargaining over the sale of these two facilities. However, there is substantial evidence that Beverly’s negotiator avoided the union during September, as she had been instructed to do, when the union sought effects bargaining. 11. Sherman Oaks Care Center The Board found that Beverly violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to provide the union with a copy of Beverly’s “Infection Control Manual.” Beverly protests that its delay was caused only by reasonable concerns about securing guarantees from the union to insure the document’s confidentiality. However, Beverly did not suggest it had confidentiality concerns until five months and several meetings after the union requested the information. Moreover, when Beverly finally gave the union the information, it did not insist on any definite commitment by the union to keep the information confidential. Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that Beverly unreasonably delayed producing the manual. 12. Ridgeview Manor Nursing Home The Board found that Beverly violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by failing to reinstate employee Charisse Bryant, and by firing employee Shirley Niswonger. Beverly challenges the Board’s finding that it violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by failing to reinstate Bryant after she returned from a personal leave of absence. Beverly claims that the Board lacked a legitimate basis in the record to infer that unlawful anti-union animus motivated this action. The Board, however, legitimately relied on circumstantial evidence to establish Beverly’s knowledge of Bryant’s union activities. See Abbey’s Transp. Services, 837 F.2d at 579. Contrary to Beverly’s argument, the Board did not rely on protected expression to infer anti-union animus as forbidden in Holo-Krome Co. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 1343, 1344-47 (2d Cir.1990). The Board merely considered Beverly’s anti-union efforts to infer knowledge of Bryant’s pro-union stance. There is thus substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding. Beverly contests the Board’s finding that it unlawfully discharged employee Shirley Niswonger because of union activities on the grounds that the evidence did not establish that Beverly acted out of unlawful anti-union animus and that Beverly had a legitimate reason to fire Niswonger. First, Beverly stresses that over five months had passed since Niswonger’s last union activity. Although this is true, there remains ample reason to infer unlawful motivation despite the time lapse. Niswonger’s last union activity was participation in a failed union election campaign. Since the union had lost elections two years in a row and Beverly acknowledged that it knew Nis-wonger was the employee who initiated union campaigns each of these years, there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that Beverly acted out of unlawful anti-union animus. Likewise, Beverly’s claim that Niswonger would have been fired for her conduct absent her union affiliation is unconvincing. 13. Parkview Gardens Care Center The Board found that Beverly violate ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by implementing a vacation buy-out policy following an impasse in contract negotiations. Beverly claims that the new policy was “reasonably comprehended” within its earlier offer to the union. Beverly admits, however, that the implemented policy contained a different buy-out date than the earlier offer. The Board reasonably found that the one-month delay in the payment date was a substantially different term than the buy-out date contained in its earlier proposal.