Opinion ID: 6323363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Paschall’s Sexual Harassment Claim

Text: “Hostile or abusive work environments are forms of sex discrimination actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Lapka v. Chertoﬀ, 517 F.3d 974, 982 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). To establish a claim of hostile work environment based on sex, a plaintiﬀ “must establish that ‘she was (1) subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct, advances, or requests; (2) because of her sex; (3) that were severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; and (4) that there is a basis for employer liability.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir. 2006)). “These elements are evaluated in light of the ‘particular facts and circumstances’ of the case.” Id. (quoting Longstreet v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 276 F.3d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 2002)). Here, however, we do not decide whether a hostile work environment existed because the question of whether Tube Processing took prompt and eﬀective remedial action is dispositive. No. 21-1853 11 Whether there is a basis for employer liability depends on whether the harasser is the victim’s supervisor or co-employee. Parkins v. Civ. Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998). “When a supervisor is the harasser, the employer is strictly liable for his or her conduct, subject to any aﬃrmative defenses that may preclude its liability.” McPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032). There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Benash was Paschall’s supervisor, and she does not argue that he was. When a coworker is the harasser, however, “[t]he employer is liable … only when the employee shows that h[er] employer has ‘been negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment.’” Mason v. S. Ill. Univ. at Carbondale, 233 F.3d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032). “An employer’s legal duty in co-employee harassment cases will be discharged if it takes ‘reasonable steps to discover and rectify acts of sexual harassment of its employees.’” Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032 (quoting Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir.1997)). Tube Processing was not negligent in discovering or remedying the alleged harassment. After Benash made his lewd comments to Paschall, she immediately reported them to Combs. Combs then assigned Paschall to a diﬀerent job for the rest of the day. See Lapka, 517 F.3d at 984 (“The emphasis is on the prevention of future harassment.” (citing McKenzie v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir.1996))). Paschall never reported Benash again for any sexual harassment, before or after Tube Processing reprimanded him. 12 No. 21-1853 Simply put, after Tube Processing “receive[d] notice that some probability of sexual harassment exist[ed] … [it] adequately respond[ed] to that information within a reasonable amount of time.” Erickson, 469 F.3d at 606. No reasonable factﬁnder could conclude that Tube Processing was negligent in preventing future harassment. B. Paschall’s and Ragland’s Race Discrimination Claims “Hostile work environment claims based on racial harassment are reviewed under the same standard as those based on sexual harassment.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 n.10 (2002) (citing Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786–87, 787 n.1 (1998)). “To prove a claim for hostile work environment based on race, an employee must show that: ‘(1) he [or she] was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on his [or her] race; (3) the harassment was severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the employee’s work environment by creating a hostile or abusive situation; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.’” Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ., 838 F.3d 888, 895–96 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2009)). Claims under Title VII and § 1981 are analyzed in the same manner, and therefore case law addressing one type of claim applies to both types. Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 544 (7th Cir. 2011). Paschall and Ragland argue that they were subjected to a hostile work environment because of their race. Most of their allegations, however, fail to support a claim for a hostile work environment because they cannot show that the alleged harassment was based on their race. No. 21-1853 13 “To support a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiﬀ need not show that the complained-of conduct was explicitly racial, but must show it had a racial character or purpose.” Yancick, 653 F.3d at 544. “Although a connection between the harassment and the plaintiﬀ’s protected class need not be explicit, ‘there must be some connection, for “not every perceived unfairness in the workplace may be ascribed to discriminatory motivation merely because the complaining employee belongs to a racial minority.”’” Cole, 838 F.3d at 896 (quoting Zayas v. Rockford Mem’l Hosp., 740 F.3d 1154, 1159 (7th Cir. 2014)). “Nevertheless, forms of harassment that might seem neutral in terms of race … can contribute to a hostile work environment claim if other evidence supports a reasonable inference tying the harassment to the plaintiﬀ’s protected status.” Id. (citing Landrau–Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 614 (1st Cir. 2000)). Paschall and Ragland contend that they had to do harder jobs than white employees, were not allowed to bid for other jobs, were denied overtime or opportunities for bonuses, had to work as temporary employees longer than others did, and were generally treated more harshly than white employees. But they do not provide suﬃcient evidence to support these assertions. Cf. Yancick, 653 F.3d at 548 (“If the subjective beliefs of plaintiﬀs in employment discrimination cases could, by themselves, create genuine issues of material fact, then virtually all defense motions for summary judgment in such cases would be doomed.” (quoting Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1058 (7th Cir. 2006)). That is, the evidence shows that the above identiﬁed harassment was not connected to their race. Moreover, Ragland does not provide suﬃcient evidence to support his contention that Combs reprimanded him based 14 No. 21-1853 on his race for wearing headphones, a hooded sweatshirt, or for stealing. According to Tube Processing policy, employees are not allowed to have headphones. Tube Processing policy also prohibits employees from wearing hooded sweatshirts. The undisputed facts show that Combs caught numerous white and Black employees wearing headphones and informally reprimanded them. Ragland also could not point to any evidence suggesting that he was accused of stealing because of his race. Furthermore, Ragland does not show that his altercation with Benash was connected to race. He simply does not show that the complained-of conduct had a racial character or purpose. Id. at 544. Paschall and Ragland also assert that Benash’s and Odom’s use of the N-word created a hostile work environment. In analyzing whether the use of racial epithets create a hostile work environment, our case law has distinguished between supervisors and coworkers. See Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] supervisor’s use of the term impacts the work environment far more severely than use by co-equals.”); Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chi., 916 F.3d 631, 640 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted) (stating that in analyzing the severity of the use of racial epithets, courts must “address the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences between supervisors and co-workers and between direct and indirect harassment that are important in hostile work environment cases”). Our case law has also, on occasion, been concerned with the number of times a racial epithet was used. For instance, we have held that “the one-time use of a racial epithet is not severe enough to trigger liability.” Nichols v. Mich. City Plant No. 21-1853 15 Plan. Dept., 755 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2014). But if an employee is “repeatedly subjected to hearing the word ‘n[]ger,’” that is enough to create a hostile work environment. Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2004). There is, however, no spectrum when it comes to the use of a racial epithet in the workplace. Cf. Cerros v. Steal Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1047 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that “there is no ‘magic number’ of slurs that indicate a hostile work environment”). Put diﬀerently, we should not be concerned with the number of times a racial epithet is used. What matters is looking to the totality of the circumstances when determining whether the conduct is suﬃciently severe or pervasive to be actionable. For that reason, there may well be a situation in which the one-time use of the N-word can be found to be severe enough to warrant liability. This is because “the word ‘n[]ger’ is pure anathema to African-Americans.” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2001). “No other word in the English language so powerfully or instantly calls to mind our country’s long and brutal struggle to overcome racism and discrimination against African–Americans.” AyissiEtoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). But we do not resolve that issue today because Paschall’s and Ragland’s arguments fail for the same reasons Paschall’s hostile work environment claim based on sex failed—because Tube Processing took prompt and eﬀective remedial action. Paschall has not demonstrated a basis for employer liability. Paschall acknowledges that she only complained to Tube 16 No. 21-1853 Processing management about Odom’s use of the N-word and about Benash’s behavior. Accordingly, Tube Processing reprimanded both Odom and Benash. Odom was suspended for three days and warned that if she ever used racially inappropriate language again, she would be terminated. Paschall never heard Odom use the N-word again after Odom was suspended. Benash was also reprimanded and warned to keep his comments to work-related topics and to not use profane or provocative language around coworkers or further disciplinary actions could result. Tube Processing’s actions were reasonably likely to prevent future harassment. See Sutherland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 632 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2011) (“To avoid liability, the employer must respond in a manner reasonably likely to end the harassment.”). Ragland has also not demonstrated a basis for employer liability. He did not personally witness Odom’s use of the N- word or any of Benash’s conduct. To be actionable, the harassing conduct would have had to be directed at him, and it was not. See Smith v. Ne. Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 567 (7th Cir. 2004); Yancick, 653 F.3d at 545 (“[T]he more remote or indirect the act claimed to create a hostile working environment, the more attenuated the inference that it had an eﬀect on the terms and conditions of the plaintiﬀ’s workplace.” (citing Yuknis v. First Student, Inc., 481 F.3d 552, 555–56 (7th Cir. 2007)). Finally, Paschall and Ragland assert that confederate ﬂag and political attire contributed to a hostile work environment. But, here, they also fail to demonstrate a basis for employer liability because they did not report these matters to Tube Processing management or human resources. See Hrobowski, 358 F.3d at 478 (“Generally, the law does not consider an No. 21-1853 17 employer to be apprised of the harassment ‘unless the employee makes a concerted eﬀort to inform the employer that a problem exists.’” (quoting Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 807 (7th Cir. 1999))); Yancick, 653 F.3d at 549 (“An employer is not liable for co-employee racial harassment ‘when a mechanism to report the harassment exists, but the victim fails to utilize it.’” (quoting Durkin v. City of Chi., 341 F.3d 606, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2003))). The evidence also does not support that Tube Processing was negligent in discovering or rectifying this issue—that political attire was creating animosity among several of its employees. See Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032 (“An employer’s legal duty in co-employee harassment cases will be discharged if it takes ‘reasonable steps to discover and rectify acts of … harassment of its employees.’” (quoting Perry, 126 F.3d at 1013)).