Opinion ID: 1910676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(e) to This Case [16]

Text: Having determined the legislature, by its use of the word perivascular, intended to place claimants who suffered strokes while at work within the purview of La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(e), we must now determine whether plaintiff has met his burden of proof under that statute. In order for his stroke to be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) his physical work stress was extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the physical work stress experienced by the average employee in that occupation, and (2) that the physical work stress and not some other source of stress or a preexisting condition was the predominant and major cause of the stroke. The hearing officer, referring to Dr. Paul Comeaux's deposition, found plaintiff did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that his physical work stress and not a preexisting condition caused the stroke. Furthermore, the hearing officer also found that plaintiff made no showing that at the time of the accident his physical work stress was extraordinary in comparison to the other workers doing the same job. The findings of fact of a hearing officer are subject to the manifestly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., White v. La. Public Service Commission, 259 La. 363, 250 So.2d 368 (1971) and Virgil v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co., 507 So.2d 825 (La.1987). Thus, a reviewing court must review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court's finding was clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Rosell v. Esco, 549 So.2d 840, 844-45 (La.1989). Dr. Comeaux, plaintiff's routine physician and his physician at the hospital, described the cause of plaintiff's stroke: It is my impression that the cerebrovascular accident on June 25, 1990, was not caused by his employment as a construction worker, but his untreated hypertension may have been aggravated by it. The doctor also stated that in his opinion the stroke was primarily caused by severe hypertension, but that the exertion at work could have been a precipitating factor. Clearly, the doctor concluded that plaintiff's preexisting hypertension and not plaintiff's physical work exertion was the predominant and major cause of plaintiff's stroke. Although this finding alone is sufficient for us to find that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof, we also note plaintiff admitted at trial that on the morning of the accident the work he was doing was no different from the work being performed by his co-workers. Our review of the record reveals the hearing officer's factual findings were indeed reasonable based on the evidence, and therefore, not clearly wrong. Consequently, we hold plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof under La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(e). [17]