Opinion ID: 2584138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grandparents' Appeal Falls Within the Public Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine.

Text: Mootness is one aspect of this court's prudential rules of justiciability concerned with ensuring the adjudication of live controversies. See Wong v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Hawai`i, 62 Haw. 391, 394, 616 P.2d 201, 204 (1980) (Judicial tribunals sit only for the determination of real controversies between parties who have a legal interest of at least technical sufficiency in the subject-matters embraced in the records of causes pending in courts.) (Quoting Castle v. Irwin, 25 Haw. 786, 792 (1921).). It is well-established in Hawai`i that [a] case is moot where the question to be determined is abstract and does not rest on existing facts or rights. Thus, the mootness doctrine is properly invoked where events . . . have so affected the relations between the parties that the two conditions for justiciability relevant on appealadverse interest and effective remedyhave been compromised. Okada Trucking Co., Ltd. v. Bd. of Water Supply, 99 Hawai`i 191, 195-96, 53 P.3d 799, 803-04 (2002) (citations omitted) (brackets in original) (ellipses in original). Synonymously, [a] case is moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if courts are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law. The rule is one of the prudential rules of judicial self-governance founded in concern about the properand properly limitedrole of the courts in a democratic society. We have said the suit must remain alive throughout the course of litigation to the moment of final appellate disposition to escape the mootness bar. Kaho`Ohanohano v. State, 114 Hawai`i 302, 332, 162 P.3d 696, 726 (2007) (emphasis removed) (citations omitted). In sum, [a] case is moot if the reviewing court can no longer grant effective relief. Id. (brackets in original) (emphasis removed) (citations omitted). Here, Mother asserts that the appeal is not moot for the following reasons: Whether the statute is constitutional remains a live question because the grandparents' right to visitation were never adjudicated in the related Family Court case. Furthermore, because the Family Court for the Third Circuit retains jurisdiction of the related Family Court case until the child reaches the age of eighteen, mother retains the right to seek a modification of the court order and an award of custody until that time. H.R.S. § 571-46. As such, both mother and the grandparents have a vested interest in a final determination of their rights in this matter. We disagree. Under the general rule stated, the transfer of custody of Child to Father destroyed the controversy created by the filing of the petition for visitation. Indeed, this court cannot grant Grandparents the remedy they seek on appeal  enforcement of the petition for visitation  inasmuch as the petition expressly requested court-ordered visitation from Mother and Mother no longer has legal custody of Child. See, e.g., Wong, 62 Haw. at 396, 616 P.2d at 205 (holding that the appeal was moot because there [was] nothing left to grant [the] appellant); Okada Trucking, 99 Hawai`i at 196, 53 P.3d at 804 (holding that the appeal was moot because the contract has already been completed and that the remedy was no longer available). Grandparents appear to accept this outcome inasmuch as they expressly state that they do not object to the dismissal of their appeal on mootness grounds. Hence, given the apparent lack of an adverse interest and an effective remedy, the continued vitality of the present appeal has been compromised. Nevertheless, this court has recognized several exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Of particular relevance here is the public interest exception clarified in Slupecki v. Admin. Dir. Of the Courts, 110 Hawai`i 407, 133 P.3d 1199 (2006). Therein, we stated that when the question involved affects the public interest and an authoritative determination is desirable for the guidance of public officials, a case will not be considered moot. Id. at 409 n. 4, 133 P.3d at 1201 n. 4. [4] See infra at 7. When analyzing the public interest exception, we look to (1) the public or private nature of the question presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for future guidance of public officers, and (3) the likelihood of future recurrence of the question. Kaho`ohanohano, 114 Hawai`i at 333, 162 P.3d at 727 (citing United Pub. Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO v. Yogi, 101 Hawai`i 46, 58, 62 P.3d 189, 201 (2002) (Acoba, J., concurring)) (brackets omitted). Here, there can be no question that it is in the public's interest for this court to review the family court's ruling that Hawaii's grandparent visitation statute is unconstitutional on its face. As to the first factor for consideration, the underlying proceedings are, at bottom, a private battle between Mother and Grandparents over whether Grandparents' access to Child is in Child's best interest. Nevertheless, the family court's wholesale invalidation of HRS § 571-46.3 injects the requisite degree of public concern. As Mother asserts, the family court's ruling stands to affect the fundamental rights of many Hawai`i families. With respect to the second factor, the present matter begs for an authoritative determination inasmuch as the shadow cast over this jurisdiction's grandparent visitation statute creates a significant degree of uncertainty for any public officer involved in the child custody and visitation processes. As to the third factor, there is a strong likelihood that the issue presented will recur. To wit, the family court found the statute unconstitutional on its face. Thus, the issue may arise where any custodial parent is confronted with a petition for visitation under HRS § 571-46.3. For these reasons, we hold that, notwithstanding the transfer of custody of Child to Father, the present appeal is not rendered moot in light of the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. See supra at 6.