Opinion ID: 490900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the secretary's argument on appeal

Text: 53 As the history of the relevant case law indicates, the Secretary's argument that section 105(c)(1) of the Act prohibits operators from considering MSHA training in making hiring decisions has repeatedly been rejected. 38 In each case, he has lost on his essential point that individuals are miners even before they are hired. Prior to losing before the Tenth Circuit, however, the Secretary had consistently maintained, as he stated in the 1983 memorandum, that the Act prohibited operators from considering training status in making all employment decisions; it did not matter, for example, whether a job applicant was a new hire or had been laid-off and was awaiting recall. The Secretary therefore embraced a very broad interpretation of the term miner, in contrast to the narrower interpretations offered by the Commission (one becomes a miner only upon being hired) and by the ALJ who presided over the Peabody cases below (one remains a miner while on layoff where there are sufficient indicia of an ongoing employment relationship). 54 In its Emery decision, the Tenth Circuit soundly rejected the Secretary's broad interpretation of the term miner. When turning his attention to the appeal before us, therefore, the Secretary was seemingly confronted with a difficult choice. If he held steadfast to his broad interpretation of miner, the Secretary would have to persuade us to reject the Tenth Circuit's analysis. A less risky undertaking would be to distinguish Emery from this case, as did the ALJ in the Peabody cases below, by arguing that the ongoing employment relationship between the operators and individuals on layoff qualified the latter as miners, whereas the new hires in Emery had formerly been strangers to the mining industry. 55 In fact, the Secretary has taken neither approach in this court. Instead, he has tried to distinguish Emery without adopting the ALJ's distinction. On the contrary, the Secretary has joined the Commission in rejecting that distinction: 56 The Secretary agrees completely with the Commission in its reading of the term miner, i.e., that miners on layoff do not possess a right to receive Section 115 training during the course of the layoff. However, any safety and health training required under the Act is appropriately given after the miner is recalled and before he begins work. In other words, individuals become miners when they are recalled, not when they physically report to work. Congress expected operators to make their employment decisions without reference to federal training status, and then supply any necessary training. After being recalled, laid-off individuals are again miners within the meaning of Sections 3(g) and 115 who are then due to receive the requisite training before going to work. 57 Brief for Appellant Secretary of Labor, at 37. 58 As this passage makes clear, although the Secretary adopted the Commission's interpretation of miner, he nonetheless ignored the seemingly inevitable conclusion that, because the passed over individuals were not recalled (at least not until they obtained new miner training on their own), they did not qualify as miners under section 115 and therefore could not have been discriminated against in violation of section 105(c)(1). 39 It is not unlikely that, after submitting his briefs, the Secretary realized this deficiency, for at oral argument he further refined his interpretation of the term miner, realigning himself somewhere between the Commission and the ALJ in the Peabody cases: 59 Secretary: ... these complainants were miners even under a literal application of the definitional term at the time that they required training. By contract, when they reached the top of the recall list, they were entitled to the job, and at that point Section 115 came into play and they were-- 60 Court: Excuse me. At what point: when they reached the top of the recall list or when they had been recalled? 61 Secretary: Well, when they reached the top of the recall list, they were entitled as a matter of contract to employment. 62