Opinion ID: 2066033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does an inmate have a property interest in prison allowances?

Text: The core issue is whether Love has a protected property interest in his earned prison allowances, thereby invoking a due process right to a predeprivation hearing. See Walters I, 525 N.W.2d at 831-32; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Walters I is not dispositive of this issue because that decision only addressed an inmate's property interest to private or outside funds. See Walters I, 525 N.W.2d at 832. An inmate does not have a constitutional right to prison wages. Hrbek, 787 F.2d at 416. Therefore, any property interest is granted and its limits are defined by the grace of the state legislature. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972)); accord Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 261 (2d Cir.1996) (New York law creates an entitlement to prison wages but no statutory grant to prompt payment of those wages); Jennings v. Lombardi, 70 F.3d 994, 995 (8th Cir.1995) (Missouri law did not create a property interest in prison wages for its prisoners incarcerated in other states); Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892, 894 (8th Cir.1994) (state statutes did not provide an inmate a property interest to a higher wage scale); Turner v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 624 F.Supp. 318, 320 (D.Nev.1985) (property interest in prison wages subject to statutory deductions under Nevada law). For a state law or regulation to create a liberty interest, it must contain explicit mandatory language and place substantive limitations or specific substantive predicates on the exercise of official discretion. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-63, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909-10, 104 L.Ed.2d 506, 516-17 (1989). Therefore, we must look to the statutory provisions governing prison allowances to determine what property interest, if any, was granted by the legislature. The pertinent statutes in force prior to the December 1994 hearing are Iowa Code sections 904.701 and 904.702 (1993). Section 904.701 provides in part: The director may when practicable pay the inmate an allowance as the director deems proper in view of the circumstances, and in view of the cost attending the maintenance of the inmate. The allowance is a gratuitous payment and is not a wage arising out of an employment relationship. The payment shall not exceed the amount paid to free labor for a like or equivalent service. (Emphasis added.) Section 904.702 provides in pertinent part: If allowances are paid pursuant to section 904.701, the director may deduct an amount established by the inmate's restitution plan of payment or an amount sufficient to pay all or part of the court costs taxed as a result of the inmate's commitment.... The director may deduct an amount, not to exceed ten percent of the amount of the allowance, unless the inmate requests a larger amount, to be deposited into the inmate savings fund.... The director may deduct and disburse an amount sufficient for industries' programs ..., including an amount to pay all or part of the cost of the inmate's incarceration. The director may pay all or any part of remaining allowances paid pursuant to section 904.701 directly to a dependent of the inmate, or may deposit the allowance to the account of the inmate, or may deposit a portion and allow the inmate a portion for the inmate's personal use. (Emphasis added.) These provisions clearly vest considerable discretion in the director to determine whether to pay prison allowances, and if such allowances are paid, what deductions may be made therefrom. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in addressing our predecessor statutes regarding prison allowances, Iowa Code sections 218.42 and 218.43 (1985), [2] determined the Iowa legislature did not grant inmates a property interest to the full amount of prison wages. Hrbek, 787 F.2d at 416-17. Analogous to sections 904.701 and 904.702, section 218.42 granted the director the discretion to pay a wage and section 218.43 specifically authorized the deduction of certain costs from that wage. Id. at 416. The court stated: [A] state legislature may grant a favor to a convicted criminal, but it may also attach such conditions to the granting of the favor as it deems proper. This is exactly what the Iowa Legislature has chosen to do ... and we infer from that express statutory language that the state did not intend to confer property rights on those wages in the constitutional sense. Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Hrbek court concluded an inmate did not possess a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause to the full amount of the prison wages. Id. at 417. Our review of sections 904.701 and 904.702 reveals the legislature placed considerable conditions on the payment of inmate allowances. First, we note the director of the institution is not required to pay an allowance, and if any allowance is paid, it is considered gratuitous. Moreover, the legislature has, in section 904.702, detailed how the director may exercise discretion in allocating the allowance. The director, however, does not have unfettered discretion to control the allowances and may only make deductions that are provided by statute. See Lankford, 544 N.W.2d at 641. Our decision in Lankford, coupled with the statutory provisions authorizing deposit of the allowance into an inmate's savings or general account and granting the director the option of giving a portion to the inmate for personal use, militate against finding the inmate has no property interest in the allowance. Conversely, the gratuitous nature of the allowance and the various discretionary statutory deductions is inconsistent with a finding that an inmate has full property rights to the allowance. We conclude the legislature did not intend to give an inmate a property interest in full prison allowances. Essentially, the legislature granted inmates the favor of providing a mechanism for receipt of gratuitous payments for work performed and has attached certain conditions thereto. See Hrbek, 787 F.2d at 417; Webb v. Maynard, 907 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Okla.1995). Although the payments are gratuitous, once the director has decided to pay the allowance, an inmate has a property interest subject to the numerous deductions authorized by the legislature in section 904.702. Because the director was authorized to deduct restitution payments from Love's prison allowances pursuant to section 904.702, Love did not have a due process right to a predeprivation hearing and is not entitled to reimbursement of those funds pursuant to Walters II.