Opinion ID: 4543682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Force (Count III)

Text: As with the inquiry into probable cause, determining “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989). Relevant are (1) “the severity of the crime at issue”; (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others”; and (3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest.” Id. at 396. Ultimately, “[w]hether the force was excessive turns on its objective reasonableness under 7 Case No. 18-2432, Richards v. Cty. of Washtenaw, et al. the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 395–96. Because genuine disputes of fact exist as to some of the factors, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity for this count. Richards says he was neither swinging at Johnson nor physically intimidating him when Berent entered the medical area. He was only attempting to pull away after Johnson had grabbed his arm and refused to let him leave. Berent also acknowledged that he did not order Richards and Johnson to desist before immediately moving in to subdue Richards. Richards did not continue to pose a threat after the officers arrived, but twenty-five seconds later he was on the ground with his head bleeding. A genuine dispute thus remains as to whether Richards was actively resisting. An officer’s use of force is excessive when an arrestee is compliant. Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2009) (denying qualified immunity when, in a nonthreatening situation, officers immediately took a man to the ground prior to issuing any verbal commands). The situation in Harris is particularly illuminating. Officers arrested Harris after a traffic stop and took him to the Circleville City Jail. Inside the jail’s “drunk tank,” officers attempted to take Harris’s jewelry and belt, which prompted Harris to step back and verbally object. Without warning or further instruction, the officers immediately “kicked Harris’s leg out from under him and pushed him in the back, causing him to fall and hit his head.” Id. at 366. Harris was then lifted back onto his feet and was led out to the booking area. An officer then instructed Harris to “kneel down” even though he could not physically comply as another officer was forcefully pulling up on his arms which had been handcuffed behind his back. Again, without further instruction, the officers used a takedown maneuver to take Harris to the ground. Ibid. Harris suffered a spinalcord injury as a result. Id. at 362. Based on those facts we concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from Harris’s excessive-force claim. 8 Case No. 18-2432, Richards v. Cty. of Washtenaw, et al. Richards’s situation is similar to Harris’s in that it is disputed whether the officers in Richards’s situation failed to issue any verbal commands before using strong physical force to subdue him. Richards says he was never told he was under arrest and there was not enough time for him to have resisted the officers as they immediately converged on him upon entering the medical area. Berent acknowledges that he did not order Richards to stop before moving in for the arrest; and while Berent stated that he told Richards to “stop resisting” several times before the officers took Richards to the ground, Richards denies this fact. Richards further testified that, while he was on the ground, he could not comply with any commands to place his hands behind his back as his arms were pinned beneath him. Our “prior opinions clearly establish that it is unreasonable to use significant force on a restrained subject, even if some level of passive resistance is presented.” Meirthew v. Amore, 417 F. App’x 494, 499 (6th Cir. 2011). We have also repeatedly held that, “[t]he right to be free from excessive force during an arrest is clearly established.” Rudolph v. Babinec, 939 F.3d 742, 752 (6th Cir. 2019). See also Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 784 (6th Cir. 2006); Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 641 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on this count.