Opinion ID: 887449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Physical and Mental Condition as it may Affect His Ability to Withstand Influence

Text: ¶ 26 Under the second and third criteria, the District Court found that Charlie consistently resisted suggestions about what to do with his property and that Charlie was healthy, self-sufficient, alert, oriented, and aware. Testimony at trial supported the District Court's findings. For example, Dr. Scofield testified that Charlie's occasional confusion was related to diabetes medication and that the medication had no permanent effects on Charlie's mental abilities. Dr. Scofield expressed to Johnson that despite his symptoms of Alzheimer's disease, Charlie was competent to engage in estate planning. Johnson testified that in all his meetings with Charlie, that Charlie recognized him, was aware of previous conversations, understood the content of the meetings, did not drift, and never asked Dennis for any assistance or information. Johnson testified that Charlie was clean, well-groomed, and dressed appropriately. Moreover, testimony at trial indicated that Charlie resisted efforts to sell portions of the ranch. ¶ 27 The Contestants point out that the foregoing findings were made by the District Court in the context of evaluating Charlie's mental and physical capacity. They observe that factors two and three from Bradshaw, however, are directed at condition, not capacity  particularly the physical [and mental] condition of the donor as it may affect his or her ability to withstand influence. Bradshaw, ¶ 13. The Contestants contend a proper analysis of undue influence requires evaluation of a weakness of mind or a mind susceptible to influence pursuant to § 28-2-407(2), MCA, as [p]roof of undue influence does not necessarily depend upon a showing of mental incapacity on the part of the donor. Luke v. Gager, 2000 MT 377, ¶ 38, 303 Mont. 474, ¶ 38, 16 P.3d 377, ¶ 38, overruled in part on other grounds, Bradshaw, ¶ 16. Contestants further rely on the case of Matter of Estate of Aageson, 217 Mont. 78, 702 P.2d 338 (1985), to attempt to differentiate between testamentary capacity and weakness of mind with respect to undue influence. Specifically, Contestants interpret the rule from Aageson as a mentally competent person may still have a weakness of mind which renders him susceptible to undue influence and that Charlie fit into this category. Contestants argue that despite finding that Charlie was competent to execute his will, the District Court erred in not evaluating Charlie's alleged weakness of mind to properly determine whether undue influence occurred. ¶ 28 Contestants are correct in their interpretation of Aageson and are also correct that the District Court misstated the Bradshaw factors by evaluating Charlie's mental and physical capacity rather than Charlie's mental and physical condition. The District Court did, however, make a finding of fact specifically in regards to Charlie's mental and physical condition as it may affect his alleged weakness of mind. The court found that Charlie consistently resisted anyone's suggestions about what he should do with his property . . . and further, that he was healthy and self-sufficient, alert, oriented, and aware. These findings were made directly in line with the second and third elements of the Bradshaw test and address Charlie's alleged weakness of mind and any undue influence that may have come from it. Contestants mischaracterize the District Court's findings as applying only to testamentary capacity. Although the District Court's observations concerning Charlie's capacity are distinguishable from the issue of mental condition, the court nevertheless made the requisite findings contemplated by Bradshaw under factors two and three. We hold that these findings are supported by substantial credible evidence and are not clearly erroneous.