Opinion ID: 713017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jury Instructions Regarding the Conflict-of-Interest Counts.

Text: 46 Counts 18-28, 31, 36-37, and 40 all charged Vebeliunas with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1006. 2 In charging the jury on these counts, the district court read the statute to the jury and then broke it down into four elements that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Vebeliunas was an officer, agent or employee of Kasa; (2) [T]he Kasa accounts were insured by the [NCUA]; (3) Vebeliunas acted with intent to defraud Kasa and/or an examiner of the [NCUA]; and (4) Vebeliunas participated in, shared in or received money, property, [or] benefits through transactions, loans and acts of [Kasa]. 47 The district court then explained each of the four elements to the jury. In explaining the fourth element, Judge Amon said: [T]he fourth element is, that the government must show that the defendant received directly or indirectly, or caused another person or entity to receive, some benefit in loan transactions with Kasa [emphasis added]. In fact, the emphasized portion of the district court's explanation does not correspond to the language of either § 1006 or the indictment. 48 Vebeliunas argues that Judge Amon's explanation of the fourth element improperly broadened the conduct upon which he could be convicted for violations of § 1006. He argues that because the instruction allows a conviction if Vebeliunas conferred a benefit upon another person, and not upon himself, the charge effected a constructive amendment of the indictment in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be convicted only for crimes indicted by a grand jury, see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-18, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273-74, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), and indeed allowed him to be convicted for conduct that did not even constitute a violation of § 1006. 49 A constructive amendment occurs when the government's presentation of evidence and the district court's jury instructions combine to modify essential elements of the offense charged to the point that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged by the grand jury. United States v. Clemente, 22 F.3d 477, 482 (2d Cir.) (collecting cases), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 258, 130 L.Ed.2d 178 (1994). Constructive amendments are per se violations of the [F]ifth [A]mendment that require reversal even without a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Id. (collecting cases). 50 An alternative, and even more fundamental, basis for reversal is presented by Vebeliunas' claim that the district court's instruction allowed him to be convicted for conduct that not only was not charged in the indictment, but is not even proscribed by § 1006. We may not uphold a criminal conviction if it is impossible to ascertain whether the defendant has been punished for non-criminal conduct. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 237 n. 21, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 1119 n. 21, 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980) (collecting cases). 3 51 Vebeliunas is correct that the language or caused another person or entity to receive, if read in isolation, would seem to enlarge the proscribed behavior beyond the language of both the indictment and § 1006. The grammatical placement of this language suggests that it is an alternative to a benefit to Vebeliunas, as Vebeliunas contends. 52 Nevertheless, we must examine the district court's instruction in its entirety and 'not on the basis of excerpts taken out of context.'  Clemente, 22 F.3d at 483 (quoting United States v. Mollica, 849 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir.1988)); see also Chalmers v. Mitchell, 73 F.3d 1262, 1267-68 (2d Cir.1996). In our view, when Judge Amon's explanation of the misapplication counts is examined in full, the challenged language is properly regarded as simply emphasizing the permissibility of convicting even though the benefit to Vebeliunas was indirect. 53 It is significant that Judge Amon twice correctly told the jury that Vebeliunas must personally benefit either directly or indirectly for them to convict him on the conflict of interest counts. When Judge Amon first read the statute to the jury, she did not mention an alternative allowing conviction if Vebeliunas conferred a benefit upon a third party, and when she broke the statute down into its elements, she again said that Vebeliunas must personally benefit. Only in her subsequent parsing of these elements did Judge Amon make the challenged statement. 54 This distinguishes the present case from the cases that Vebeliunas cites in support of his position. In Stirone, for example, the district court's instruction improperly allowed conviction for the unlawful obstruction of interstate transportation of either sand or steel, the latter of which was not charged in the indictment. See Stirone, 361 U.S. at 214, 80 S.Ct. at 271-72. The jury instruction in Mollica permitted conviction if the jury found a conspiracy to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, while the indictment was limited to income tax fraud. 849 F.2d at 728. There was no ambiguity about the meaning of the court's charge in those cases; the only issue was whether the instruction broadened the indictment. 55 In contrast, the instant case presents the primary question of what interpretation to give to the district court's instruction. In the context of the jury charge as a whole, we believe that the challenged language in Judge Amon's instruction simply served to underscore the fact that the money could go to entities under Vebeliunas' control rather than having to go directly to Vebeliunas personally. 56 The plausibility of this interpretation is further strengthened when considered in the context of the facts of the case. Vebeliunas was charged with looting Kasa principally to fund real estate ventures on behalf of a group of companies under his control. The district court undoubtedly felt it necessary to emphasize the fact that benefiting another ... entity under Vebeliunas' control would count as an indirect[ ] benefit to Vebeliunas himself for purposes of § 1006. The evidence would not support a claim that the sham borrowers who applied for loans from Kasa on behalf of Vebeliunas and his controlled companies were principals for whose independent benefit the loan proceeds were to be applied. 57 In light of the overall evidence and the language of Judge Amon's instruction taken as a whole, we conclude that there was not a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged by the grand jury, Clemente, 22 F.3d at 482, or for conduct that is not proscribed by § 1006. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that unlike Mollica, for example, where the defendant vigorously objected to the disputed instruction upon which we premised reversal, see 849 F.2d at 728, no objection was taken in this case to the instruction that is now challenged on appeal. Thus, as Vebeliunas concedes, he may prevail on this argument only by establishing plain error. 58 To satisfy this standard, the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (collecting cases). Further, when no objection was made below and plain error is accordingly at issue, [i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. Id. Even if we perceived significant ambiguity in the challenged instruction when read in context, it is clear that in view of the overall evidence presented to the jury, Vebeliunas has not established that the instruction prejudiced him. 59 In sum, both because the challenged jury instruction, read in context, neither constructively amended the indictment nor allowed Vebeliunas to be convicted for noncriminal conduct, and because in any event Vebeliunas has not established that he was prejudiced by the instruction, we perceive no basis for reversal of the § 1006 convictions. 60