Opinion ID: 2590220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether errors in this case were harmless

Text: Banks argues that the State in this case was relieved of the burden of proving every element of the charge because the judge was not asked to consider whether the knowledge element was met beyond a reasonable doubt and did not address knowledge in the findings and conclusions. The errors, Banks contends, were not harmless because Banks was denied a trial in which he could argue a theory of the case based upon the correct elements of the charge. We disagree. The test to determine whether an error is harmless is `whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' Brown, 147 Wash.2d at 341, 58 P.3d 889 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827). Stated another way, An error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the error not occurred.... A reasonable probability exists when confidence in the outcome of the trial is undermined. State v. Powell, 126 Wash.2d 244, 267, 893 P.2d 615 (1995) (citations omitted). In Neder, the materiality element in a tax and bank fraud charge was not submitted to the jury, but instead was decided by the court against the defendant. 527 U.S. at 6, 119 S.Ct. 1827. An intervening case [1] held that the materiality element must be submitted to the jury. However, when the Supreme Court applied harmless error analysis, it held that because the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, the error was harmless. Id. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Banks asserts that Neder is distinguishable on the basis that the defendant in Neder had the opportunity to contest the evidence regarding materiality because the parties in that case knew that materiality was an element of the charges. Here the element was not argued or decided because the trial court and the parties were not aware that knowledge was an element. Banks suggests he may have made different arguments, other than those he advanced regarding constructive possession of the car and the jacket, had the element been identified. Further, at oral argument, counsel for Banks argued that knowledge had not been litigated because Banks did not present a defense based on unwitting possession. Banks contends that the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Jones, 106 Wash.App. 40, 21 P.3d 1172 (2001), applies here. Jones was appealed under similar circumstances to this case: after a jury trial for unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree, the Anderson decision was published. The to convict instruction had not included the knowledge element. The Jones court held that the omission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 106 Wash.App. at 44, 21 P.3d 1172. It based its holding, in part, on the fact that the defendant did not take the stand, stating that it would be an untoward act of speculation for this court to declare what the defense could or could not have done had it known of the element. Id. at 44-45, 21 P.3d 1172. Similarly, Banks asserts, it is too speculative for this court to determine what he would have argued if he had known the correct elements of the case. We find Banks' arguments unpersuasive. Initially, Jones is distinguishable because this court need not speculate regarding how Banks would have proceeded under different circumstances. Banks himself contested knowledge, despite ignorance of the element. Banks testified that the car, in which the jacket was found, was not his. He testified that the jacket, in which the gun was found, was not his. He testified that he did not know about the gun. And his attorney argued in closing that Banks did not know there was a gun in the jacket. In effect, he was advancing the defense of unwitting possession. Further, the trial court's finding that Banks actually picked up the gun clearly demonstrates that the court did consider Banks' knowledge. Because the trial court took Banks' knowledge into account, the State's failure to argue knowledge did not contribute to the outcome of this case. Similarly, it is unnecessary to remand for additional findings. The trial court's findings and conclusions, which Banks did not contest, necessitate an inference of knowledge. There is no reasonable probability that the outcome would differ if the State had argued the knowledge element or the court had entered an express finding on knowledge. We hold that, because the trial court's decision in Banks' trial would have been the same absent the errors, they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.