Opinion ID: 2982082
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure under Brady

Text: Bost also argues that as to the disclosure of the informant, the prosecution violated its Brady obligations by refusing to make the informant available to Bost. We generally review a district court’s determination regarding Brady evidence de novo. United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2004). In this instance, however, Bost’s counsel did not raise the question of a possible Brady violation. Accordingly, we review “at most for plain error.”3 Id. at 569. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the suppression of evidence by the prosecution “violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This rule applies to both impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence. Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 232 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1985)). In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show: “(1) that the evidence in question be favorable; (2) that the state suppressed the relevant evidence, either purposefully or inadvertently; (3) and that the state's actions resulted in prejudice.” Id. at 231 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). In order to establish prejudice, the defendant must show that the evidence was material. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999). Evidence is considered material “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to 3 The Sixth Circuit has also stated that because a defendant “did not raise the issue of a possible Brady violation in the district court, ‘[i]t could also be said that defendant waived his Brady claim, such that even plain error review is not required.’” United States v. Shaliwal, 464 F. App’x 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Crayton, 357 F.3d at 569). 13 No. 12-1780 United States of America v. Bost undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). A Brady violation, however, does not occur “if the defendant knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of the information in question, or if the information was available to him from another source.” Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Bost argues that the prosecution wrongfully denied him access to the informant, which hindered Bost’s defense. Bost claims that the informant was the only person with information about the conversations Bost had with the informant that could refute or color the testimony offered by Agent Hogan. Therefore, Bost claims that the non-disclosure of the informant led to the suppression of favorable information and, thus, established a Brady violation. We find, however, that the district court did not commit plain error, as no Brady violation occurred concerning the disclosure of the informant. First, Bost has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the non-disclosure of the informant. As mentioned previously, the evidence of the informant’s inducement was presented to the jury without the testimony of the informant, and Bost further testified to the informant’s frequent requests for drugs and guns. The informant not testifying to these same subjects does not undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict. Second, the information regarding the inducements and frequent requests was available to Bost from another source himself. Bost was obviously present for the conversations and the inducements that he claims are favorable to his defense. Accordingly, we find that a Brady violation did not occur. 14 No. 12-1780 United States of America v. Bost