Opinion ID: 2180253
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration of Invalid Statutory Aggravating Factors at the Second Stage Sentencing Hearing

Text: Defendant, however, argues that, under People v. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d 508, 38 Ill. Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181 (1980), and People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992), the jury's consideration of invalid aggravating factors at the second stage of sentencing requires that her death sentence be vacated. In Brownell, this court held that the defendant was entitled to a new second stage sentencing hearing because the jury had considered an invalid aggravating factor at that stage. The defendant was convicted of the murder, rape, and aggravated kidnapping of Louise Betts. The circuit court found defendant eligible for the death penalty under the felony-murder and murder of a witness statutory aggravating factors. The circuit court had determined that, because Betts was a witness to defendant's crimes, her murder satisfied the requirements of the murder of a witness statutory aggravating factor. This court reversed the circuit court's eligibility finding, holding that the legislature intended the murder of a witness eligibility factor to apply only when the murder victim is a witness in a separate offense. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d at 525-26, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181. Although the Brownell court upheld the circuit court's eligibility finding based on the felony-murder factor, it concluded that a new second stage sentencing hearing was required because the circuit court had weighed an aggravating factor that the Brownell court concluded figured erroneously in the court's sentencing decision. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d at 536, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181. In cases decided after Brownell, this court has held that the jury's consideration of invalid statutory aggravating factors at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing is subject to a harmless error analysis. See, e.g., People v. Cole, 172 Ill.2d 85, 103, 216 Ill.Dec. 718, 665 N.E.2d 1275 (1996); People v. Bounds, 171 Ill.2d 1, 69, 215 Ill.Dec. 28, 662 N.E.2d 1168 (1995); see also Shaw, 186 Ill.2d at 345, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161 (applying a harmless error analysis to the jury's consideration of evidence of a nonstatutory aggravating factor). For example, in Pasch, this court held that the felony-murder statutory aggravating factor was invalid because the evidence at trial did not support the predicate felony, but the jury's consideration of this factor at the aggravation-mitigation stage was harmless. In Pasch, defendant was found eligible for the death penalty under the felony-murder, multiple-murder, and murder of a police officer statutory aggravating factors. Aggravated kidnapping was the underlying felony for the felony-murder statutory aggravating factor. This court reversed defendant's conviction for aggravated kidnapping, finding insufficient evidence of the secret confinement element. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 187-88, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294. The court, therefore, held that the felony-murder aggravating factor was invalid. The Pasch court rejected, however, defendant's claim that the jury's consideration of this invalid factor at the second stage of sentencing required resentencing under Brownell. The Pasch court explained that, whereas in Brownell the sentencer had weighed a factor that was not warranted by the evidence, in the case before it, the jury did not rely on anything it should not have during the second phase of the hearing. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 190, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294. According to the Pasch court: Once it had been determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty, by virtue of his actions falling within one of the 10 aggravating factors detailed under section 9-1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 [citation], the jury could consider any aggravating factors. It was not limited to those set forth in subsection (b) in determining whether to impose the death penalty. [Citation.] As a result, even though the jury should not have considered defendant's restraint of [the victim] in terms of its being a felony, it was entirely proper to have considered defendant's identical conduct as an aggravating factor in determining whether to impose the death penalty. Therefore, the absence of a conviction for aggravated kidnapping should not have affected the jury's decision here, since the jury would have been able to consider the same aggravating and mitigating factors that the defendant claims it actually did consider. (Emphasis in original.) Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 190, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294. The Pasch court, therefore, held that no new sentencing hearing was required. See also, e.g., Williams, 181 Ill.2d at 321-22, 229 Ill.Dec. 898, 692 N.E.2d 1109; Cole, 172 Ill.2d at 103, 216 Ill.Dec. 718, 665 N.E.2d 1275; Bounds, 171 Ill.2d at 69, 215 Ill.Dec. 28, 662 N.E.2d 1168; Page, 156 Ill.2d at 270, 189 Ill.Dec. 371, 620 N.E.2d 339; Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 190, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294; Hampton, 149 Ill.2d at 92, 171 Ill.Dec. 439, 594 N.E.2d 291; Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 347, 135 Ill.Dec. 834, 544 N.E.2d 330; but see Shaw, 186 Ill.2d at 345, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161 (the jury's consideration of evidence of a nonstatutory aggravating factor required resentencing). In the case before us, we have held that defendant was properly found eligible for the death penalty on the basis that she murdered Joshua during an aggravated kidnapping. Even assuming, arguendo, the invalidity of the remaining statutory aggravating factors, we find that the jury's consideration of these factors at the second stage of sentencing does not require resentencing. See Williams, 181 Ill.2d at 321, 229 Ill.Dec. 898, 692 N.E.2d 1109 (assuming the invalidity of a statutory aggravating factor, finding that the jury's consideration of this factor did not require resentencing); Page, 156 Ill.2d at 269, 189 Ill.Dec. 371, 620 N.E.2d 339 (same); Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 345-46, 135 Ill.Dec. 834, 544 N.E.2d 330 (same). At the second stage of sentencing, the jury was instructed that it could consider, as aggravation, the factors it had found at eligibility. The State also briefly argued that aggravating factors the jury could weigh included those that the jury had found at eligibility. As in Pasch, however, even if the jury should not have weighed the challenged statutory aggravating factors, it could have properly considered the conduct underlying these allegedly invalid factors. An examination of this underlying conduct, as well as the other evidence presented at the aggravation-mitigation stage, supports the conclusion that the jury's consideration of the challenged factors, even if improper, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Aggravating evidence at the second stage hearing included evidence that defendant had planned to take the unborn child of her friend Debra in order to satisfy her and her boyfriend's desire for a light-skinned baby boy. She attempted to obtain a gun and ascertained when Edwards would be absent from the apartment. After Caffey shot Debra, defendant stood next to Caffey as he ripped Elijah from Debra's womb. Defendant did nothing to help Debra or Samantha, and concerned herself only with Elijah, the baby she wanted. To conceal these crimes, defendant hid Joshua at her friend's apartment. Upon learning that Joshua could identify her, defendant swore at him and attempted to poison him by forcing him to drink iodine, a substance that contributed to his death. She participated further in the torture of this terrified little boy, who tried in vain to get help for his little brother who had been left alone in the apartment with his brutally murdered mother and sister. She helped to strangle Joshua, retrieved a knife to stab him, held him while Caffey stabbed him, and eventually left him to die alone in an alley, half-dressed, in November. Other evidence presented at the aggravation-mitigation stage showed that such violent conduct by defendant was not an isolated incident. She had previously stabbed Caffey, puncturing a lung, and an object fashioned into a shank was found in her jail cell as she awaited trial in this case. Defendant had a criminal history, including possession of stolen property and forgery, and was on probation at the time of the murders in this case. The evidence in mitigation was that defendant had dropped out of school when she became pregnant in her sophomore year of high school, she was a good mother, she had a below-average IQ, her boyfriends had physically abused her, and she was psychologically vulnerable to predatory males and more susceptible to coercion than the average person. The defense also presented evidence that Ward wanted the baby Debra was carrying, and Ward had admitted responsibility for Debra's injuries to another inmate. This mitigating evidence did little to explain or excuse defendant's involvement in the horrific crimes against the Evans family. She was accountable for Ward's conduct and, although she may have been abused in the past and was susceptible to coercion, there was no evidence that coercion or physical threats caused her acts on November 16. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that defendant was motivated by her own desire for a baby and acted apart from and contrary to Caffey's instructions at times. In light of the overwhelming aggravating evidence supporting the imposition of the death penalty, we find that any error resulting from the jury's consideration of allegedly invalid statutory aggravating factors was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.