Opinion ID: 2356269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: June 12 Statements

Text: Flanagan begins by arguing that all statements made at the police station on June 12, 2004, and all statements made subsequently, should suppressed because she was unlawfully seized and unreasonably detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Ark. R.Crim. P. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, and 3.5. Flanagan states she was unreasonably seized when Officer Williams asked her to remain at the crime scene. Further, Flanagan states that, even if she was not immediately seized by Officer Williams, she was certainly seized by Officer Wilkins of the Game and Fish Commission when he denied her request to leave. Wilkins, who had been on the scene directing traffic, testified that Flanagan asked him if she could leave to go tell Beverly Coats that they had found her husband's body. He stated that he told her she could not leave because she was at the scene when the officers first arrived and she would need to stay to talk to investigators. Flanagan contends that she was seized because a reasonable person would not believe she was free to leave. In United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), the Supreme Court stated: We adhere to the view that a person is seized only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals. United. States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification. .... We conclude that a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. We first note that we agree with the State's contention that Flanagan was not seized or unreasonably detained simply because officers who initially arrived and found her, and Christy Wood on the scene asked them to move the van back from the crime scene and stay and talk to investigators. Officer Williams, the first to arrive at the scene, testified that he asked Flanagan to stay, and that she agreed. However, when Flanagan asked Wilkins if she could leave and was told that she could not, it was reasonable for her to believe that she was not free to go. At that point, Flanagan was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Still, while we agree that Flanagan was seized when she was told she could not leave, we do not believe that the seizure was unreasonable such that it requires suppression of her statements. The circuit court found that [i]n light of the remoteness of the crime scene and the circumstances existing at the time, requesting the defendant to remain at the crime scene was reasonable. Further, Flanagan's statements at the crime scene were not incriminating. According to Wilkins, Flanagan said that she had last seen the victim the night before when he got into a van with some other people to go and drink beer. Next, Flanagan turns to statements she made after officers requested that she go to the police station. She states that the fact that she complied at the time when Officer Varner requested that she go to the police station does not render these encounters voluntary. Further, she argues that Varner had a duty to make clear that she was not obligated to go to the police station. Pursuant to Rule 2.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure: If a law enforcement officer acting pursuant to this rule requests any person to come to or remain at the police station... he shall take such steps as are reasonable to make clear that there is no legal obligation to comply with such a request. The rule does not require an explicit statement that one is not required to accompany the police; rather, the police only need to take such steps as are `reasonable to make clear that there is no legal obligation to comply' with the request to come to, the police station. Shields v. State, 348 Ark. 7, 14, 70 S.W.3d 392, 395 (2002). The circuit court found that there was no indication that upon Flanagan's refusal of Varner's request, compliance would be compelled. Officer Varner testified that Flanagan was very cooperative and never hesitated when asked to accompany the officers to the police station. He said that Flanagan was not handcuffed and that he did not demand that she go with him. Varner stated that at the station, the officers asked her what she had seen, and that at no point during the conversation did she say that she wanted to leave or act like she was tired of the questions or things of that nature. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was, no unreasonable seizure or detention that justifies suppression of Flanagan's statements at the station. Thus, it follows that we disagree with Flanagan's argument that all subsequent statements should have also been suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree, pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
Flanagan also argues that the suppression of the June 12 statements is warranted because she was not Mirandized prior to making the statements. The State contends that Flanagan was not in custody when she made the statements on June 12; therefore, the Miranda warnings were not necessary. In Hall v. State, 361 Ark. 379, 206 S.W.3d 830 (2005), we stated: This court has held that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest. The Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. A person is in custody for purposes of the Miranda warnings when he or she is deprived of his freedom by formal request or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. In resolving the question of whether a suspect was in custody at a particular time, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's shoes would have understood his situation. The initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being interrogated. Hall, 361 Ark. at 389, 206 S.W.3d at 836 (internal citations omitted). Here, while Flanagan may have been a suspect at the time she made the statements, she was not deprived of her freedom by formal request or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest. As previously noted, Flanagan was asked, not ordered, to go the police station, she was not handcuffed, and she was described as being, very cooperative. Flanagan was not in custody at this time; therefore, the Miranda warnings were not required. We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying Flanagan's motion to suppress her June 12 statements.