Opinion ID: 303342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Objections to the Jury Panel

Text: 3 Appellants made a pretrial motion pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 21 for a change of venue either to a different place of holding court within the Middle District of Pennsylvania or to a different district. They contended that it was impossible to obtain a fair and impartial jury in the Lewisburg vicinage (1) because of local pretrial publicity, (2) because of the dominant position in the local economy of the Lewisburg Penitentiary, and (3) because Lewisburg jurors would be antipathetic to them as Black Muslims. The district court denied this motion without prejudice to its renewal at the voir dire. It was renewed at that time, and the court conducted a thorough examination of the prospective jurors. It granted defendants' challenges for cause with extreme liberality, and it permitted each defendant four peremptory challenges. The motion for a change of venue was denied. 4 There is no reason to suspect that the jury was anything but fair and impartial. In the first place the nature of the pre-trial publicity to which the court's attention was directed was not at all like that involved in Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L. Ed.2d 1250 (1959); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963), or Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). It consisted of news reports of the riot and of the injuries suffered by the guards, made at the time of the events, and of a brief report that the trial was about to commence and that the United States Marshal had undertaken the problem of courtroom security. We have made an independent evaluation of the circumstances. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362, 86 S.Ct. 1507. We conclude that there was no substantial likelihood that the media reports which are disclosed in the record would interfere with the obtaining of a fair and impartial jury. We have taken into consideration not only the nature and content of the media reports relied upon but also the fact that at the voir dire few of the prospective jurors had any prior knowledge of the case. There was no reasonable likelihood that in the absence of a change of venue a fair trial could not be had, and these motions were properly denied. See Standard 3.2(c), Change of venue or continuance, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice (1966). 5 As to the contentions of actual antipathy against Black Muslims, and of prejudice arising from the dominant position of the penitentiary in the economic life of Lewisburg, the extensive voir dire examination completely dispels any suspicion that either factor influenced the jury. 6 Defendant Swanson advances a refinement of the foregoing contentions. Prior to trial he moved under Fed.R. Crim.P. 23(a) to be tried without a jury. He contended that the three factors already discussed plus the fact that the jury must inevitably know from the nature of the charges that he was a convicted felon, made it mandatory that his request for a non-jury trial be granted. The Government took the position that it had no objection to a trial without jury if all defendants would waive a jury, but that because of the enormous expense and the serious security problems involved in a trial in which the defendants and many witnesses were inmates of various federal penitentiaries it would not consent to a severance. Under these circumstances the denial of this motion was proper. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965). A different issue might have been presented had we concluded that there was a substantial likelihood that pre-trial publicity had tainted the jury panel. Cf. Standard 3.3, Waiver of jury, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, supra. A different issue might also have been presented had Swanson been willing to be tried simultaneously, with the court deciding his guilt and the jury deciding the guilt of the others. We express no view as to how such a request should have been disposed of. The record is clear that Swanson's motion was advanced in hopes of obtaining a severance. In these circumstances it was properly denied. 7 One other contention with respect to the jury panel arose out of an incident which took place during the voir dire. A prospective juror in the presence of other members of the jury panel, volunteered the information that his wife had advised him that one defendant had pleaded guilty. Defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial. Relying upon United States v. Restaino, 369 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1966) the district court declined to grant a mistrial, but instead gave an appropriate cautionary instruction based on that suggested in Restaino, 369 F.2d at 546 n. 3. This course was, in the circumstances disclosed in this record, entirely proper. 8 We conclude that the defendants were tried by a fair and impartial jury.