Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Instructing the Jury on Weighing Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

Text: (40) Defendant contends that error in failing to give an expanded factor (k) instruction was compounded by giving the pre- Easley version of CALJIC No. 8.84.2 which, at the time, told the jury to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors upon which you have been instructed and if it found aggravating factors outweighed mitigating, you shall impose a sentence of death. We have noted before that the ambiguity of the unexpanded factor (k) instruction may be compounded by CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (see Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 284). As we noted in Brown, it is incorrect to inform a jury that if aggravating factors outweigh mitigating, imposition of the death penalty is mandatory. ( Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 538-544; see also Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 883-884.) We have explored in several cases the nature of the error which may occur due to CALJIC No. 8.84.2's mandatory wording. The instruction might suggest a mechanical counting of factors rather than an evaluation of the moral or sympathetic value of each aggravating and mitigating factor. ( Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1204; Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 541.) The wording might also mislead the jury into believing it should impose the death penalty without regard to each juror's personal view as to the appropriateness of that sentence. ( Myers, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 273-276; Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1276-1277.) Given the context of this case and the arguments of counsel, however, we conclude the jury was not misled as to its responsibility and authority to determine which penalty was appropriate. ( Id. at p. 1279.) The prosecutor told the jurors they were selected as representatives of the community to decide the case since they could call upon their diverse philosophies, views, and experiences. He also repeated the language of CALJIC No. 8.84.2 that if aggravating factors outweigh mitigating, they will impose or shall impose the sentence of death. But he stressed that the jurors had the ultimate responsibility for determining what sentence should be imposed. He argued: It is not an automatic decision. [ถ] It is not based upon general philosophies of an individual as to what the ultimate punishment, the ultimate protection of society, or the ultimate deterrents in general. [ถ] We have, in selecting the representatives of our community to decide this, told them you decide it as to this individual, as to what the ultimate protection shall be, or the ultimate deterrent shall be as to this person. The prosecutor went on: Depending upon the cultural backgrounds, philosophical views, religious attitudes, thoughts concerning psychiatry, thoughts concerning religion, thoughts concerning sociological theories, behavior motivation, things like this, decide based upon certain circumstances what is an aggravation and what is a mitigation, and then, if one outweighs the other, impose one or the other of the ultimate sentences. He stressed: Depending on how you view these factors, as applied to this defendant, you decide. What should you do. Certainly defense counsel was quick to correct any misconception that jurors might have as to whether they should vote solely as representatives of the community. He agreed that their votes would represent your own individual conscience. As he said You don't represent the community at all. What you do, you represent each one of you individually.... He told the jury it took the vote of 12 individuals to sentence defendant to death and if any one juror decides he should not die, he would not die. If the death sentence was imposed and carried out, You have to live with that. Defense counsel then argued that mitigating factors outweighed aggravating and the appropriate punishment was life without possibility of parole. The prosecutor agreed with defense counsel's remarks that the jury should not just count factors but rather should examine the quality of factors and determine the proper penalty which in their view should be imposed on this defendant. We conclude from a review of all these remarks that the jurors could not have been misled as to their discretion and responsibility in making the penalty decision. (And see People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 581-582 [247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 754 P.2d 1306].)