Opinion ID: 888519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror E.F.

Text: ¶ 34 During voir dire, the prosecutor asked E.F. whether he had heard anything about the case. The following exchange ensued: MR. CORN: . . . [W]e'll start with you, [E.F.]. Have you heard anything about the case? [E.F.]: Yes, I read about it in the papers and discussed it with the family. MR. CORN: That was about six months ago or seven months ago? [E.F.]: That was after the incident occurred. MR. CORN: Is there anything that you recall from your  from that time that would prevent you from reserving judgment until all the evidence came in in this case? [E.F.]: No. Whitlow claims that Shockley rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to inquire into E.F.'s statement that he discussed the incident with the family. ¶ 35 As a threshold matter, there is some confusion as to whether the family referred to E.F.'s family or to the victim's family. In his petition for postconviction relief, Whitlow misquoted the voir dire transcript and then claimed that Shockley had failed to question E.F. about the statement that [E.F.] had discussed the alleged rape and aggravated kidnaping [sic] with the victim's family (emphasis added). However, upon reading the transcript at the evidentiary hearing Shockley stated, The way I read the transcript, he's talking about [E.F.]'s own family. When asked whether he assumed it was E.F.'s own family, Shockley replied, I don't recall, but if I was hearing this today, that's what I would have thought. Finally, as the State points out, during voir dire the prosecutor read off the names of several witnesses  including the victim and the victim's mother, aunts, and uncle  and asked the jurors whether they knew any of these individuals. E.F. never gave any indication that he knew the victim or her family. We agree with the State that this fact, along with the actual transcript of E.F.'s questioning, demonstrates that E.F. was referring to his family, not the victim's family. ¶ 36 Nonetheless, Whitlow asserts that even assuming E.F. was referring to his family, Shockley should have asked what E.F. said to them and what his family said in response. Whitlow claims that doing so would have revealed any preconceptions or biases that [E.F.] brought to the courtroom. Whitlow claims that there was no tactical reason for leaving E.F. on the jury. In support of this, Whitlow provides Shockley's testimony in which Shockley acknowledged that it would have been reasonable for him to inquire into what E.F. said to his family and what they said to him. Also, when asked whether he had made a tactical decision about E.F., Shockley again replied, Not that I recall. ¶ 37 The State argues that Whitlow's claim is based on speculation and pure hindsight and that Whitlow fails to demonstrate that Shockley's performance fell below the range of reasonable professional assistance. Furthermore, the State claims that even if Shockley had questioned E.F. further about the conversation with his family, E.F. would not have been subject to removal for cause because E.F. stated that what he learned about Whitlow's case would not prevent him from reserving judgment until all the evidence came in. ¶ 38 We agree with the State that Whitlow has failed to demonstrate that Shockley's conduct with respect to E.F. fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. He has not shown that under prevailing professional norms, it was unreasonable for Shockley not to ask further questions about what E.F. discussed with his family. Thus, Whitlow has failed to overcome the strong presumption that Shockley's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. We hold that Shockley's performance in voir dire with respect to E.F. has not been shown to be constitutionally deficient. ¶ 39 Because Whitlow has failed to demonstrate that Shockley's conduct with respect to both J.B. and E.F. fell below an objective standard of reasonableness measured under prevailing professional norms and in light of the surrounding circumstances, we need not address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Adams, ¶ 22.