Opinion ID: 1196921
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Superior Court Abuse Its Discretion in Allowing the Borough to File a Third Motion for Summary Judgment?

Text: Taranto argues that allowing the borough's third motion for summary judgment to raise the actual malice defense encourages piecemeal litigation. [7] She claims that the borough's answer raised actual malice as a defense nearly four years before, and that the borough's two earlier summary judgment motions could have argued the defense. The borough counters that the timing of motion practice is within the trial court's discretion. Taranto did not oppose the borough's request for an extension in which to file dispositive pre-trial motions, and the borough filed its last summary judgment motion within the thus-extended time period. We consequently conclude that Taranto waived any procedural objection to filing this summary judgment motion. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in reaching the same conclusion. Moreover, the law is contrary to Taranto's argument. Alaska Civil Rule 56 addresses the timing of motions for summary judgment. It provides that parties defending against claims may, at any time, move for a summary judgment. [8] Rule 56 does not limit the number of times a party may move for summary judgment. This court has never limited the number of times a party may move for summary judgment. As the borough notes, the cases Taranto cites to establish a doctrine of avoiding piecemeal litigation concern the avoidance of multiple appeals or the relitigation of issues, not successive summary judgment motions. [9] Because Rule 56 and Alaska case law do not preclude successive motions for summary judgment, and because Taranto waived her right to object, we hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the borough to file its final summary judgment motion.