Opinion ID: 2630190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 1: The district court erred in classifying LaBelle as a persistent sex offender and in ultimately doubling his sentence.

Text: LaBelle claims under K.S.A. 22-3504 that he received an illegal sentence because the district court improperly classified him as a persistent sex offender. Our standard of review is as follows: The question of whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. An illegal sentence is a sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction, a sentence which does not conform to the statutory provision, either in character or the term of the punishment authorized, or a sentence which is ambiguous with regard to the time and manner in which it is to be served. State v. Deal, 286 Kan. 528, Syl. ¶ 1, 186 P.3d 735 (2008). Accord State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, Syl. ¶ 11, 218 P.3d 432 (2009). As a threshold matter, the State claims that LaBelle stipulated to his criminal history score at sentencing and cannot complain about the score on appeal. It cites State v. McBride, 23 Kan.App.2d 302, 304, 930 P.2d 618 (1996). There, the defendant stipulated to the criminal history worksheet at sentencing. After pronouncement of sentence, he filed a motion to correct clerical and arithmetic errors, claiming a prior juvenile conviction was a nonresidential burglary and not a residential one. The district court denied the motion, the defendant appealed, but the Court of Appeals found his appeal untimely. After noting that a sentence can no longer be modified after its pronouncement, the court rejected defendant's claim that his motion to correct clerical and arithmetic errors effectively was a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which can be raised at any time. 23 Kan.App.2d at 304, 930 P.2d 618. The court opined that defendant invited the error by stipulating to the criminal history score and could not complain or take advantage of such error on appeal. We disagree with the State. Unlike McBride, LaBelle does not dispute the accuracy of the amended PSI. More specifically, he does not challenge the amended PSI's computation of his criminal history. Rather, he appeals the district court's particular use of his prior crimes when classifying him as a persistent sex offender. We recognize that LaBelle's attorney acknowledged at sentencing that the amended PSI provided a criminal history score of B and that LaBelle met the requirements of a persistent sex offender. We further recognize that a litigant may not invite and lead a trial court into error and then complain of the trial court's action on appeal. State v. Kirtdoll, 281 Kan. 1138, Syl. ¶ 8, 136 P.3d 417 (2006). But this rule does not preclude LaBelle's motion to correct an illegal sentence. As fully discussed below, LaBelle does qualify as a persistent sex offender, and his attorney's statement at sentencing did not invite the error. Simply put, his admission did not anticipate the grounds upon which the district court would classifyand sentencehim as a persistent sex offender, which is the basis for his appeal. Finally, there is no dispute that LaBelle timely filed his motion to correct an illegal sentence, and we do not face a jurisdictional dilemma similar to McBride. See K.S.A. 22-3504(1) (The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.). Having rejected the State's threshold argument, we now turn to the merits. The amended PSI computed LaBelle's criminal history as B by using his six prior adult convictions, including 91 CR 1043. LaBelle's prior juvenile adjudications, including 88 JV 1252, were listed but not used in the history computation. K.S.A. 21-4704(j) requires courts to double the sentence of persistent sex offenders. The statute defines persistent sex offender as a person who: (A)(i) Has been convicted in this state of a sexually violent crime, as defined in K.S.A. 22-3717 and amendments thereto; and (ii) at the time of the conviction under (A)(i) has at least one conviction for a sexually violent crime, as defined in K.S.A. 22-3717 and amendments thereto in this state or comparable felony under the laws of another state, the federal government or a foreign government.... LaBelle pleaded guilty in the instant case to sexual exploitation of a child, which is a sexually violent crime as defined in K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(2)(H). To qualify as a persistent sex offender, LaBelle therefore must have at least one prior conviction for a sexually violent crime. LaBelle's prior criminal determinations in 91 CR 1043 and 88 JV 1252 were both for indecent liberties with a child, in violation of K.S.A. 21-3503. Of his numerous prior crimes, these are the only ones that qualify as sexually violent crimes. See K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(2)(B) (sexually violent crime includes indecent liberties with a child in violation of K.S.A. 21-3503). We recognize that either of these prior criminal determinations, when combined with LaBelle's guilty plea in the present matter, could potentially satisfy the conditions for his classification as a persistent sex offender under K.S.A. 21-4704(j). However, our inquiry does not end here. Because the record is unclear whether the district court classified LaBelle as a persistent sex offender based upon 91 CR 1043 or instead upon 88 JV 1252, we address each in turn to determine if either could have been properly used.