Opinion ID: 2466701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Purpose and effect of EHM

Text: ¶ 22 Because CrR 3.2 is not punitive in its intent, we next turn to whether the purpose or effect of imposing presentencing EHM is so punitive as to overcome that intent. See Catlett, 133 Wash.2d at 365, 945 P.2d 700. Determining whether a state has imposed a punishment can be extremely difficult and elusive of solution. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). That a government action has a deterrent effect does not automatically render the action punitive. See McClendon, 131 Wash.2d at 866, 935 P.2d 1334. Nor is an action punitive because the defendant perceives it to be so. Id. at 866-67, 935 P.2d 1334. A defendant must present clear proof that a sanction not labeled as punitive is still so punitive as to be subject to the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple penalties. See Catlett, 133 Wash.2d at 367-68, 945 P.2d 700. ¶ 23 When determining whether a defendant is constitutionally entitled to credit for presentencing time spent subject to restrictive conditions, this court has recognized a clear distinction between jail time and nonjail time. See In re Pers. Restraint of Knapp, 102 Wash.2d 466, 471, 687 P.2d 1145 (1984). For example, a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to credit for nonjail time served on probation, despite possibly severe restrictions imposed on the defendant's liberty. In re Pers. Restraint of Phelan, 97 Wash.2d 590, 597-98, 647 P.2d 1026 (1982) ( Phelan I); Knapp, 102 Wash.2d at 471, 687 P.2d 1145. Also, this court has acknowledged that credit for home detention time might not be constitutionally required. Speaks, 119 Wash.2d at 207, 829 P.2d 1096 (While the Court of Appeals conclusion that presentence home detention is not constitutionally mandated may well be correct, we deem it unnecessary to reach that issue in this case since state statutes [the SRA] resolve the question. (footnote omitted)). ¶ 24 In contrast, principles of equal protection and double jeopardy demand that all defendants receive credit for time spent in incarceration prior to sentencing. Reanier v. Smith, 83 Wash.2d 342, 351-52, 517 P.2d 949 (1974). [11] Time in incarceration includes mandatory time spent in a state mental hospital. See Knapp, 102 Wash.2d at 475, 687 P.2d 1145 ([L]ike confinement in a prison or jail, a person committed to a mental hospital pursuant to a valid criminal conviction is subject to a massive curtailment of liberty.). But see Makal v. Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.1976) (holding time spent in a state mental hospital was not intended as punishment for the commission of a crime and, thus, was not confinement and did not require credit). ¶ 25 Thus, for purposes of requiring credit for nonjail time, our case law reveals a constitutional distinction between liberty restrictions equal to time spent in jail or prison, see Knapp, 102 Wash.2d at 475, 687 P.2d 1145, and less substantial liberty curtailments. See Phelan I, 97 Wash.2d at 597-98, 647 P.2d 1026 (rejecting argument that defendant must be credited for time on probation, despite possibly severe restrictions); see also United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir.1989) (holding a defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in custody only when the custody imposed both a severe restriction of liberty and the punishment of incarceration). [12] ¶ 26 The Court of Appeals has held that EHM is not equivalent to incarceration for purposes of the speedy trial rule because the conditions of release essentially eliminate[ ] the hardships associated with incarceration. Perrett, 86 Wash.App. at 318, 936 P.2d 426. The defendant in Perrett was allowed to visit his attorney to help prepare his defense and to do personal errands on those trips. Id. at 318-19, 936 P.2d 426. The defendant, though confined to his home because he was unemployed, was free to live largely as he had before he was charged, and he suffered neither the stigma nor the discomfort of jail while on EHM. Id. ¶ 27 The record does not describe the specific conditions of Harris's time on EHM. Other than asserting EHM constitutes punishment because it imposes liberty restrictions, Harris does not explain how his time on EHM was so punitive in effect as to overcome its intended nonpunitive purpose. [13] Harris's conditions of EHM release appear to be equivalent to those in Perrett where the Court of Appeals found the defendant's conditions of release on EHM easily distinguishable from incarceration. In fact, by moving for delayed sentencing, Harris voluntarily extended his time on EHM, permitting him to continue to live his life largely as he had prior to being charged, subject to conditions that restricted his movement outside his home and that prohibited him from using drugs and alcohol. [14] ¶ 28 Double jeopardy principles require that punishment already exacted must be fully `credited' against a defendant's sentence. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19, 89 S.Ct. 2089, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Harris has not shown that his presentencing time on EHM was so punitive as to trigger double jeopardy's prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense. Federal and state constitutional prohibitions against multiple punishments do not require misdemeanor sentencing courts to grant credit against a defendant's jail sentence for presentencing time served on EHM.