Opinion ID: 78335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Parker's Intoxication and Impairment at the Time of Statement

Text: Parker maintains that his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to address his impairment at the time of his statement and failed to hire expert witnesses who could specifically address this impairment in testimony at the suppression hearing. During the suppression hearing, Fountain testified that she had been with Parker the entire day of the arrest and that he had begun drinking beer and smoking marijuana early in the day. Fountain said that Parker drank at least six to eight beers and had smoked at least [f]ive to six joints of marijuana that day. Exh. Vol. 2 at 238-239, 248. She commented that he had also been shooting up Talwin, but she did not recall seeing him do so on the day of the arrest. Id. at 238-39, 248. May testified that Parker asked to speak with him sometime after 5:45 in the afternoon on 31 March 1988. May met with Parker and, after advising Parker of his Miranda rights, Parker made his statement. May explained that he was trained to look for evidence of drug or alcohol use during interrogations but that he did not detect any signs of drug or alcohol impairment on Parker and that Parker appeared to understand what he was saying. May testified at trial that, after Parker began his initial statement, he asked Parker whether he was telling the truth and Parker changed his story. Dr. James Edward Crowder, a local clinical psychologist, testified. Based on the evidence of Parker's alcohol and drug use at the time of his arrest, Crowder opined that Parker would have had a reduction in his ability to withstand pressure [and] frustration and ... would have had to some extent an impairment in his judgment. Exh. Vol. 2 at 259-60. On cross-examination, he conceded that an experienced drinker could develop a tolerance to alcohol that would permit him to function with a higher level of alcohol. Crowder explained that, if Parker's judgment was impaired by alcohol or drugs, he might be inclined to act in a manner not in his best interest. Id. at 262. He conceded that evidence of Parker's requests for visits with investigators in the days following his first interview might indicate that his judgment had not changed much between his first and subsequent visits. During the post-conviction hearing, Dr. Peter Breggin testified as an expert in psychiatry, forensic psychiatry, and drug abuse, and Dr. Emanuel Hriso as an expert of neuropsychiatry and addiction. Based on the evidence of Parker's alcohol and drug use on the day of his arrest [26] , Breggin opined that by the time of his statement at 5:30 P.M., Parker would have been in a mixed state of alcohol and marijuana intoxication and alcohol withdrawal. He explained that Parker would have been suffering from anguish, desperation, discomfort, and pain as a result of alcohol withdrawal compounded by his inability to inject Talwin. Breggin stated that the combination of withdrawal, brain damage, and neuropsychological deficits would have altered Parker's judgment and made it more difficult for him to control his impulses. He explained that, driven by a combination of intoxication[,] addiction withdrawal[,] and memory problems more than his will, he may have understood the basic questions but would have felt an extreme amount of urgency to say yes to anything that he thought would get him... home. Exh. PC Vol. 11 at 202-03. He noted that the sedative drugs that Parker was using, alcohol and marijuana, would have acted as a truth serum to loosen his control over his own willful processes. Id. at 203-06. Hriso commented that Parker's alcohol and marijuana use could sedate and impair Parker's judgment so that he could not control his normal defenses and would not be unable to make correct declarations. Exh. PC Vol. 14 at 717-18. He also noted that Parker would have been vulnerable to Talwin withdrawal, to an impaired judgment, and to an inability to understand the exact meaning of words spoken to him. Hriso explained that, because erratic behavior was expected in such a state, it was understandable that Parker would have asked to speak to May and had confessed to the crime. The determination of a confession's voluntariness requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances and ultimately requires an inquiry into whether the statement was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice. Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F.3d 1245, 1252-53 (11th Cir.2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We consider a number of factors, and the presence of one alone is not determinative. Id. at 1253. A confession that was not the product of free will and rationale intellect or that was made when the individual's will was overborne by physical, psychological, or drug-induced means, is inadmissible. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307, 83 S.Ct. 745, 754, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1717, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). In determining whether or not a confession is constitutionally voluntary, the truth or lack thereof of the statement is irrelevant. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 81 S.Ct. 735, 741, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961). In Alabama, although a confession will be deemed inadmissible if the defendant's mind was substantially impaired at the time of the confession, [i]ntoxication, short of ... impairment of the will and mind as to make the individual unconscious of the meaning of his words, will not render a statement or confession inadmissible. Free v. State, 495 So.2d 1147, 1156 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The voluntariness determination is a matter of law for the trial court, and that court's decision will not be reversed unless it is manifestly wrong or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Id. The state courts rejected this claim because there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the suppression hearing would have been different with the experts' testimony or that the exclusion of Parker's statement would have changed the jury determination of guilt. The state trial judge found that [n]othing presented at the [post-conviction] hearing is of such nature that this Court would have ruled differently on [Parker's] suppression motion if this Court had been presented with this evidence at trial. Exh. PC Vol. 3 at 527. The state appellate court held that Parker failed to show that he was prejudiced by his attorneys' failure to call expert witnesses at the suppression hearing and therefore failed to show that his attorneys were ineffective. The district court correctly held that this conclusion was objectively reasonable. None of Parker's post-conviction experts examined Parker on the day of his statement; their testimony was based on his medical history and their opinions that Parker would have been suffering withdrawal or impairment. May did not detect any signs of impairment when Parker made his statement, and Crowder indicated that Parker's subsequent contact with the officers might indicate that he was no more impaired than he had been during his first statement. Parker was cognizant of his situation when he began his statement, and drove himself, Fountain, and a law enforcement officer to the courthouse. [27] The state court's factual determination that Parker exercised his free choice was not objectively unreasonable or disproved by clear and convincing evidence. The district court correctly held that the state court reasonably applied Strickland in finding no prejudice. Parker also failed to prove deficient performance. His trial attorneys did present evidence regarding the effects of his drug use at the suppression hearing. Any additional evidence would have been merely cumulative.