Opinion ID: 6500338
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lewis’s Citizenship

Text: Lewis also argues that the district court erroneously determined that he was a citizen of Indiana—not Missouri—on November 1, 2018. Therefore, he maintains, complete diversity is lacking. “[D]iversity jurisdiction requires ‘complete diversity, that is where no defendant holds citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.’” Eckerberg v. Inter-State Studio & Publ’g Co., 860 F.3d 1079, 1084 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hubbard v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 799 F.3d 1224, 1227 (8th Cir. 2015)). We measure “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship . . . by the ‘facts that existed at the time of filing.’” Id. (quoting Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 571 (2004)). A party may challenge subject-matter jurisdiction “at any time prior to final judgment.” Id. (quoting Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 571). We review de novo a district court’s determination of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. “[B]ut we rely on the district court’s findings of fact underlying its domicile determination unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. Lewis “argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this case because both [he] and [Wagstaff] were citizens of Missouri at the time of filing.” Id. Because Lewis—the defendant—has challenged the jurisdictional allegations, Wagstaff—the plaintiff—bears “the burden of establishing jurisdiction by competent proof and by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Russell v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 325 F.2d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1964)). “For purposes of federal jurisdiction, ‘domicile’ and ‘citizenship’ are synonymous terms.” Id. at 1086 (quoting Ellis v. Se. Contr. Co., 260 F.2d 280, 281 (8th Cir. 1958)). “To establish domicile, an individual must both be physically present -11- in the state and have the intent to make his home there indefinitely.” Id. at 1085 (quoting Yeldell v. Tutt, 913 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 1990)). “[O]bjective factors” instruct our determination of a litigant’s intent; those factors include “declarations, exercise of civil and political rights, payment of taxes, obtaining of licenses, location of business or occupation, and ownership of property.” Id. (quoting Bruton v. Shank, 349 F.2d 630, 631 n.2 (8th Cir. 1965)). “A litigant’s self-serving ‘[s]tatements of intention are entitled to little weight when in conflict with facts.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Russell, 325 F.2d at 999).3 We agree with the district court that the objective factors weigh in favor of Lewis being domiciled in Indiana as of November 1, 2018. See Eckerberg, 860 F.3d at 1085. Lewis offered only self-serving statements of intention to relocate to Missouri. The district court properly accorded them little weight when contrasted with objective facts. See id. The court noted facts such as Lewis’s filed address with the Indiana Supreme Court, Indiana bar license, Indiana litigation records, his voting registration and voting record, property tax, and his published personal information, all supporting a conclusion that Lewis was domiciled in Indiana at the time of the filing of case. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Lewis is domiciled in Indiana and that complete diversity exists. 3 Lewis argues that he is not the party “required to establish his change of domicile” because he is not the “party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Br. at 35. He contends that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 301, he does not bear the burden of proving his change in domicile. We conclude that even if Wagstaff bears the burden of proof on Lewis’s change in domicile, it has succeeded in showing that Lewis remained domiciled in Indiana. See infra. -12- B. Dismissal of Counterclaims and Second Amended Answer Lewis next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for leave to dismiss counterclaims without prejudice and motions for leave to file his second amended answer (R. Doc. 57 and 97). Lewis asserts that the district court’s denials of these motions were “based on a mistaken belief that [his] challenge of subjectmatter jurisdiction was in bad faith.” Appellant’s Br. at 42.4 He also asserts that the district court should have granted his second motion for leave to file his second amended answer because “the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s sua sponte ruling of October 24, 2019, regarding quantum meruit demonstrates that Lewis’s attempt to plead quantum meruit as an affirmative defense was not futile.” Id. at 45. 1. Dismissal of Counterclaims When we evaluate “whether a district court abused its discretion in denying a Rule 41(a)(2) motion,” “[w]e consider the following factors”: (1) the [counter] defendant’s effort and the expense involved in preparing for trial, (2) excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the [counter claimant] in prosecuting the action, (3) insufficient explanation of the need to take a dismissal, and (4) the fact that a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the [counter] defendant. 4 Further, Lewis contends that the denials were “also partially based on the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s mistaken belief . . . that Lewis did not make a specific pre-litigation offer of settlement to Wagstaff before this action was filed.” Id. at 43 (citing R. Doc. 57, at 3 (“Upon learning of the settlement, Lewis began making non-specific demands for payment of his purported attorney’s fee. He refused, however, to state how much he believed he was entitled to and what legal basis would support such a fee.”); R. Doc. 57, at 4 (“Completely absent from any of these numerous filings is a sum certain to which Lewis claims he is entitled.”)). But the district court made these statements as part of its factual findings; they were not part of the court’s analysis of Lewis’s motion for leave to dismiss his counterclaims. -13- Witzman v. Gross, 148 F.3d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Paulucci v. City of Duluth, 826 F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 1987)). We conclude that the district court properly analyzed the aforementioned factors and did not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis’s motion for leave to dismiss his counterclaims without prejudice. First, the record supports the district court’s conclusion that Wagstaff “has gone to great lengths and expense to prosecute its claims and defend against the counterclaims in the short time this case has been pending.” R. Doc. 57, at 5. Prior to Lewis seeking dismissal of his counterclaims, Wagstaff had filed two motions to dismiss Lewis’s counterclaims and moved for summary judgment. The district court also found the presence of excessive delay, noting that Lewis did not move to dismiss his counterclaims until March 27, 2019—almost five months after the case was filed. And, the district court appropriately found that Lewis provided an “insufficient explanation of the need to take a dismissal.” Id. In Lewis’s motion, he provided no reason for seeking leave to dismiss his counterclaims. See R. Doc. 43. It was only after Wagstaff responded to Lewis’s voluntary-dismissal motion that Lewis argued in reply that “[c]ounterclaims are not compulsory in an action solely for declaratory judgment” and therefore Lewis sought “to dismiss the counterclaims without prejudice to avoid the possibility of triggering claim preclusion.” R. Doc. 54 at 2–3 (emphasis omitted). Lastly, Wagstaff had filed a summary-judgment motion on December 12, 2018, that remained pending at the time that Lewis sought to voluntarily dismiss his counterclaims. See Witzman, 148 F.3d at 992. 2. Second Amended Answer Lewis also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for leave to file a second amended answer. We find no abuse of discretion. See Hartis v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 935, 946 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review). The court denied relief after reasonably concluding that Lewis was “acting in bad faith in attempting to amend his answer, which necessarily unduly prejudices -14- [Wagstaff].” R. Doc. 57, at 6; see also Sherman v. Winco Fireworks, Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 715 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A district court appropriately denies the movant leave to amend if ‘there are compelling reasons such as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the non-moving party, or futility of the amendment.’” (quoting Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1065 (8th Cir. 2005))). The record shows that Lewis was “attempt[ing] to change some admissions to denials on material allegations made in the [c]omplaint, reassert[] his quantum meruit counterclaim as an affirmative defense, and seek[] his own declaratory judgment on certain issues.” R. Doc. 57, at 6. (citing R. Doc. 45-1).5 C. Abstention Lewis additionally contends that the district court erroneously applied the abstention doctrine in denying his motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action without prejudice. He also asserts that the court erred in denying his motion to reconsider the denial of that dismissal motion. He maintains that this court’s “precedent requires discretionary dismissal when a declaratory plaintiff raises chiefly affirmative defenses, and granting declaratory relief could effectively deny an allegedly injured party [like himself] his otherwise legitimate choice of forum and time for suit.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. As a general rule, “a federal district court must exercise its jurisdiction over a claim unless there are exceptional circumstances for not doing so.” Lexington Ins. Co. v. Integrity Land Title Co., 721 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “[t]his general rule . . . yields to practical considerations and substantial discretion when the federal complaint seeks a declaration pursuant to the 5 For the same reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis’s second motion for leave to file a second amended answer. See R. Doc. 97, at 9–10. -15- Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).” Id. A district court has “unique and substantial” discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)). On this record, we have no difficulty concluding that the district court properly acknowledged and applied the appropriate factors for use of the abstention doctrine in a declaratory-judgment action as identified and explicated in Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 998. See R. Doc. 97, at 8. D. Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment or Relief from Judgment Finally, Lewis argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, relief from judgment. First, he asserts that the district court erroneously ruled that he “abandon[ed] his potential right to recover from Wagstaff in quasi-contract or in tort (with compensatory damages potentially measured in quantum meruit) for his damages related to his deprivation of attorney fees for legal services in the [wrongful death] case.” Appellant’s Br. at 47 (emphasis omitted). According to Lewis, he “abandoned only his potential claim to the funds in Wagstaff’s trust account derived from the [wrongful death] case when he explicitly stated his desire to pursue his claims against Wagstaff in tort, rather than in quasi-contract.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Therefore, he concludes, the district court erroneously denied his motion to alter or amend the judgment. Second, Lewis argues that the district court erroneously denied its motion for relief from final judgment because Wagstaff acted with unclean hands. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a party may file a motion to alter or amend the judgment. “Motions under Rule 59(e) serve the limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence and cannot be used to introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which could have been offered or raised prior to entry of judgment.” Cont’l Indem. Co. v. IPFS of New York, LLC, 7 F.4th 713, 717 (8th Cir. 2021) -16- (internal quotation marks omitted). We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion. Id. “[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 60(b) provides for extraordinary relief which may be granted only upon an adequate showing of exceptional circumstances.” In re Levaquin Prod. Liab. Litig., 739 F.3d 401, 404 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the rule, a party may file a motion for relief from final judgment based on “fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). “To prevail on [a] Rule 60(b)(3) claim, [the moving party] must show by clear and convincing evidence that [the opposing party] engaged in fraud or other misconduct and that this conduct prevented [the moving party] from fully and fairly presenting its case.” In re Levaquin Prod. Liab. Litig., 739 F.3d at 404 (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court is afforded “wide discretion in ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion[,] and we will only reverse for a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lewis’s motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, relief from judgment. We conclude that the district court reasonably interpreted Lewis’s response to Wagstaff’s third summary judgment motion as an abandonment of his quantum meruit claim. See R. Doc. 144, at 33–34. In addition, Lewis has not sustained his burden of proving that Wagstaff has engaged in misconduct that prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case.