Opinion ID: 778993
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of the Right

Text: 72 The right to counsel embodied within the Sixth Amendment carries as its corollary the right to proceed pro se. These rights are both respected within our jurisprudential tradition, although, since a person cannot secure the right to proceed pro se without sacrificing the right to counsel, we have required defendants to assert the right to proceed pro se affirmatively and unequivocally, and we have placed on the court the burden of establishing that the defendant who does so acts voluntarily, and that he understands both the scope of the right sacrificed and the restrictions and challenges that he will face. Peppers has asserted the right to proceed pro se. 73 As the Supreme Court explained in the seminal case in this area, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Sixth Amendment 74 speaks of the `assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant — not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. 75 Id. An unwanted counsel `represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution; for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense. 8 Id. at 821. Thus, a defendant who chooses to represent himself must be allowed to make that choice, even if it works ultimately to his own detriment. Id. at 834. 76 In Faretta, the court had initially, though reluctantly, allowed the defendant to proceed pro se, but reserved the right to revoke Faretta's privilege to represent himself if it later appeared that Faretta was unable adequately to represent himself. Id. at 808, 811 n. 4. After querying the defendant as to the number of exceptions to the hearsay rule and the number of and grounds for challenging jurors for cause, the court concluded that the ends of justice and requirements of due process require that the prior order permitting the defendant to represent himself in pro per should be and is hereby revoked. Id. at 811 & n. 4. 77 Noting that the right of self-representation has been protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation, the Supreme Court found that the right of self-representation was supported by both the structure of the Sixth Amendment itself and the jurisprudence that gave rise to it. Id. at 812, 818. It specifically rejected the trial court's paternalistic determination that it should ensure that the defendant was capable of defending himself well in order to be allowed to defend himself. 78 We need make no assessment of how well or poorly Faretta had mastered the intricacies of the hearsay rule and the California code provisions that govern challenges of potential jurors on voir dire. For his technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. 79 Id. at 836. 80 The Court noted approvingly that Faretta's request was made weeks before trial and was clear and unequivocal, and that it was evident from the record that Faretta was literate, competent, and understanding. Id. at 835. 81