Opinion ID: 75672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facial Challenge Based on Vagueness

Text: 53 The district court's preliminary injunction was based on its conclusion that Horton had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that Section 22-9 is unconstitutionally vague. The district court, however, did not apply the proper legal standard for facial challenges based on unconstitutional vagueness. 54 A facial challenge, as distinguished from an as-applied challenge, seeks to invalidate a statute or regulation itself. United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2000). The general rule is that for a facial challenge to a legislative enactment to succeed, the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). The fact that [a legislative act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid. . . . Id. This heavy burden makes such an attack the most difficult challenge to mount successfully against an enactment. Id. 11 55 Applying Salerno's general rule, we conclude that Horton has not established that Section 22-9 is unconstitutionally vague on its face. Section 22-9, both before and after the amendment, identifies with specificity no less than eight types of street performances that come within its prohibition acting, singing, playing musical instruments, pantomime, mime, magic, dancing, and the sale of visual art and wares. Section 22-9 is not facially invalid under Salerno because circumstances exist under which it clearly would not be unconstitutionally vague i.e., when a person begins to sell oil paintings or stages a magic show within the prescribed area. 56 We recognize that 'the Salerno rule' has been subject to a heated debate in the Supreme Court, where it has not been consistently followed. Frandsen, 212 F.3d at 1236 n.3 (listing Supreme Court's decisions and discussing Justices' disagreement over how high the threshold should be set for facial invalidation). Because certain inroads into Salerno's rule have developed, we discuss them as well. 57 In its most recent discussion of facial challenges based on vagueness, the Supreme Court did not apply Salerno's unconstitutional-in-every-conceivable-application rule but upheld a facial challenge to a criminal law that had no mens rea requirement and infringe[d] on constitutionally protected rights in large part because vagueness so permeated the text of that law. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999). In Morales, the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance banning gang members from loitering in public places after being ordered to disperse. Id. at 45-47, 119 S. Ct. 1849. The ordinance defined loitering as to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose. Id. at 47 n.2, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (emphasis supplied). This definition was vague in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. Id. at 60, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (quotation and citation omitted). No conduct or overt act was identified to distinguish innocent loitering from criminal loitering, and the ordinance fail[ed] to give the ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is permitted. Id. at 60. The ordinance also did not provide specific limits on or adequate guidelines for the enforcement discretion of the police. Id. at 63-64, 119 S. Ct. 1849. Thus, if one's purpose was not apparent to the police officer, then one was loitering. As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the ordinance provided impermissible absolute discretion to the police to decide whether a citizen was loitering or not. 58 In contrast, vagueness does not permeate Section 22-9. The restricted four-block area is precisely identified, and the conduct that constitutes a prohibited performance is specified in detail. In fact, given its definition of perform, an individual, whether a police officer, tourist, or casual observer, walking in the four-block area will be readily able to discern who is or is not engaged in a street performance. For purposes of a facial challenge, the definition of perform enables the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law. As opposed to Morales' description of loitering, the definition of perform does not render the ordinance invalid, but adequately gives notice of the activities that will be considered performances. Indeed, Section 22-9 uses ordinary terms that have common usage and understanding. 59 Further, Section 22-9 does not authorize or encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Unlike the essentially unbridled discretion afforded by no apparent purpose in Morales, Section 22-9 provides adequate guidelines for what constitutes a street performance. We have no doubt that officers are able to determine whether persons are playing musical instruments, acting, singing, dancing, or selling defined wares in the clearly enumerated restricted areas, and thus whether they are violating the law in issue. The phrase includes, but is not limited to in the initial definition of perform also does not change our conclusion under either Morales or Salerno. That phrase must be read and placed in the context of the overall law and conveys only that perform is not limited to the examples listed. Section 22-9 prohibits street performances in a four-block area, and, if anything, the use of the phrase includes, but is not limited to in the definition of perform notifies the public that street performance is any kind of street performance in addition to those specifically listed. See Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding drug paraphernalia law containing phrase includes, but is not limited to not to be unconstitutionally vague); Gatena v. County of Orange, 80 F. Supp.2d 1331, 1333, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (same regarding public nudity ordinance), aff'd, 226 F.3d 649 (11th Cir. 2000). In sum, following the analysis used in Morales, we conclude that Section 22 9, as enacted or as amended, is not unconstitutionally vague on its face. 12