Opinion ID: 1352691
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Material and False Statements

Text: Salim first contends that his motive for attempting to attack his lawyers was not material because he only pleaded guilty to attacking Pepe and not to any offense based on his alleged plan to assault his lawyers. This argument relies on an impermissibly narrow notion of materiality. `Material,' for the purposes of the obstruction enhancement, means evidence, fact, statement, or information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.  U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 n. 6 (emphasis added). The issue under determination was whether the terrorism enhancement applied, i.e., whether the attempted murder of Pepe was calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). In short, the district court had to determine the purpose of Salim's attack. See Salim I, 287 F.Supp.2d at 290 (The purpose of the Fatico hearing was to adduce facts sufficient to establish Defendant's intent in attacking Officer Pepe on November 1, 2000.). Absent Salim's statements, the district court could have concluded, for example, that the assault on Pepe was an isolated incident, fueled by anger at Magistrate Judge Eaton's recent adverse recommendation and Judge Sand's prior refusal to substitute counsel. Testimony that the assault was part of a larger plan and statements alleging a credible motive for such a plan would, if believed, undoubtedly make the district court less likely to draw this conclusion, and therefore less likely to conclude that Salim attacked Pepe in retaliation for government conduct (a motive warranting application of the terrorism enhancement). They are therefore material. As to the element of falsity, the district court found that Defendant's testimony that he believed substitution of counsel would have occurred but for the lawyers themselves is incredible. Defendant clearly did not believe his attorneys could unilaterally withdraw or resign from his case-Defendant sent letters to Judge Sand, requesting substitution of counsel ... and Defendant repeatedly interrupted proceedings in 98-CR-1023 [the embassy bombings proceeding] to address his requests to substitute counsel to Judge Sand. Salim I, 287 F.Supp.2d at 304. These conclusions represent findings of fact on the falsity of Salim's statements. Thus, we can only reverse them if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Agudelo, 414 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir.2005). Salim contends that his testimony at the Fatico hearing was consistent, rather than evasive and contradictory, Obstruction Order at 7. We disagree. The record supports the district court's characterization of falsity: Salim knew that Judge Sand had the authority to change his lawyers but had denied Salim's request to do so, and that Judge Eaton had recommended denying Salim's most recent request. However, Salim denied believing that the judge would have no choice but to appoint new lawyers if Salim attacked them. Moreover, Salim testified that he planned to attack his lawyers in order to obtain substitute counsel, but, during re-direct, he stated that he would never have attacked his lawyers in a hostage-taking scheme because [i]n Islam it is not permissible for me to attack any lawyer as long as he represents me. Faced with such conflicting indicia of motive and belief, it would not be clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that, for example, Salim made a false statement when he stated his belief that Judge Sand had no problem giving me other lawyers, but the problem was the lawyers themselves, they didn't want to resign. Salim I, 287 F.Supp.2d at 287. In his reply brief, Salim argues that his testimony on the issue of attorney substitution or withdrawal was certainly plausible in light of both the chronology of court proceedings in the Embassy Bombing case, and an examination of a court transcript containing language by Judge Sand that if remedial attempts by the court to ameliorate the relationship between Salim and his attorneys was not working, the court would consider whether new counsel should be appointed. Appellant's Reply Br. at 8. Even if we accept this contention, it would not establish clear error. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Accordingly, this argument fails.