Opinion ID: 29434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Oatman’s Section 510 ERISA Claim

Text: Under Section 510 of ERISA, it is unlawful to “discharge . . . or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled.” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. To survive summary judgment, the employee must demonstrate genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether the employer terminated the employee with the “specific intent” to interfere with the employee’s ERISA rights or to otherwise retaliate against the employee for exercising her rights under the ERISA plan. See Stafford v. True Temper Sports, 123 F.3d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1997); Hines v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1995). The employee is not required to show that the employer’s sole motivation was to interfere with ERISA rights, but rather that a specific intent partly motivated the employer. See Nero v. Industrial Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 1999). To meet this burden, absent direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff must present a prima facie case of discrimination. See Bernal v. Randall’s Food & Drugs, Inc., No. CA 3-96CV-3464-R, 1998 WL 246440, at  (N.D. Tex. March 24, 1998). If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to Fuji to present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory conduct, at which point the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under ERISA, a plaintiff must establish -6- that his employer fired him in retaliation for exercising an ERISA right or to prevent attainment of benefits to which he was potentially entitled under an employee benefit plan. See Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 260 (5th Cir. 2001); Stafford, 123 F.3d at 295. In addition, this court requires the Plaintiff to show that he was physically qualified for the position sought. See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 260-61. The district court found that, because Oatman was unable to show he was physically qualified for his prior position –as required under Holtzclaw– Fuji was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim under Section 510 of ERISA. Oatman argues that Holtzclaw is not dispositive of this case because the employee in Holtzclaw admitted that he could not perform his job, even with an accommodation. The Holtzclaw court found that, “Because Holtzclaw has not shown he is qualified for the position he seeks, either with or without an accommodation, he can pursue his ERISA claim no further.” See Holtzclaw, 255 F.3d at 261. Oatman argues that the district court’s judgement on this claim should be reversed because the summary judgment evidence established issues of material fact regarding the Plaintiff’s ability to perform the job if provided with reasonable accommodations. The summary judgment evidence Oatman refers to, however, fails to establish an issue of material fact regarding his ability to perform the job, with or without reasonable accommodations. Plaintiff relies solely on his Declaration to support the assertion that he would be able to perform his job with reasonable accommodations. Oatman’s Declaration, however, directly contradicts his prior sworn interrogatory responses and deposition testimony. As discussed earlier, Oatman does not deny that he was unable to perform the essential functions of his job as of the day he asserts his FMLA leave would have expired. In fact, he testified under oath that this -7- was the case. Furthermore, Oatman testified that he did not believe there was any other job at Fuji he could he have performed, that he had not even looked for a job because of his condition, and that he did not think he would be able to perform any job between the date of his deposition and the age of 65 as a result of the problems with his knee. “It is well settled that this court does not allow a party to defeat a motion for summary judgment using an affidavit that impeaches, without explanation, sworn testimony.” S.W.S Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1996); Thurman v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 952 S.2d 128, 137 n.23 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 845 (1992); Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 236-37 (7th Cir. 1991)(nonmovant cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by contradicting his own earlier statements unless he offers a plausible explanation for the incongruity). Oatman fails to offer any explanation for this contradiction and therefore his Declaration is not competent summary judgment evidence. According to the Plaintiff’s own testimony, he could not physically perform the essential functions of his former job. Because Plaintiff is unable to show that he is physically qualified for his prior position, he cannot establish an element of his prima facie case. Fuji is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Oatman’s claim under Section 510 of ERISA.