Opinion ID: 3028935
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The identity, testimony or credibility of

Text: prospective witnesses, except that the lawyer or law firm may announce the identity of the victim if the announcement is not otherwise prohibited by law; 5. The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or a lesser offense; 6. Any opinion as to the accused’s guilt or innocence or as to the merits of the case or the evidence in the case. W.D.PA.LR 83.1(C). 10 About two months after entry of the Pretrial Order, the government notified the District Court about statements that Wecht’s attorneys made to the press. For example, regarding the possibility of a superseding indictment, lead counsel Jerry McDevitt told a television station that “[i]f you ever lived on a farm, you know that if you take a bunch of cow manure and you put it on an existing pile of cow manure, all it does is make a bigger smell.” Wecht Br. at 19. And Mark Rush, another of Wecht’s attorneys, commented to a newspaper that “when [Agent Orsini’s] truthfulness is put to issue, those search warrants will fall.” JA 277. The government requested that the Court “address this matter” at the upcoming status conference “by reminding counsel of the provisions of the [Pretrial Order] and enforcing those provisions.” JA 278. At the conference, the Court reminded the parties of their obligations under the Pretrial Order and suggested that either party could move for contempt if either believed opposing counsel was violating the order. McDevitt argued that the Rule was unconstitutional, and the parties, including the media outlets, subsequently submitted briefs on the issue. The District Court determined that the Rule struck “a wise and permissible balance between the rights of all parties to a fair trial, by an untainted jury, and the rights of attorneys to speak to the media.” JA 37. On appeal, Wecht and the media contend that the Rule violates the First Amendment by imposing overly broad restrictions on speech. In addition to defending the constitutionality of the Rule, the government argues that Wecht and his counsel have waived any First Amendment claims because they agreed to the proposed Pretrial Order. The government contends that this waiver also precludes the media companies from asserting third-party standing. The media outlets, by contrast, assert that they have third-party standing to bring First Amendment claims on behalf of the public, irrespective of Wecht’s possible waiver. They claim that the public has a strong interest in hearing counsel’s views about criminal cases, particularly high-profile prosecutions such as this one, and they note that it is well-established that the First Amendment protects potential recipients of speech as well as speakers. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“Freedom of speech presupposes 11 a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both.”) (footnote omitted). 1. Third-Party Standing We previously addressed the standing of third parties to challenge gag orders in FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834 (3d Cir. 1996).5 There, we noted that “putative recipients of speech usually have standing to challenge orders silencing would-be speakers,” but that “plaintiffs still must show that the gag orders have caused them injury in fact and that their injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 838. Accordingly, we held that “third parties have standing to challenge a gag order only when there is reason to believe that the individual subject to the gag order is willing to speak and is being restrained from doing so.” Id. at 838-39. The government contends that Wecht’s attorneys cannot be “willing” speakers because they agreed to include the language of Local Rule 83.1 in the Pretrial Order. This argument however, misconstrues the purpose of the “willing speaker” rule as well as the requirements for standing. We have previously determined that media outlets have “standing to challenge protective orders and confidentiality orders” as long as they can demonstrate that the order is an obstacle to their attempt to obtain access. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). In Pansy, we held that intervenor newspapers had standing to challenge a confidentiality order over a settlement agreement. Because the newspapers might have gained access to the settlement agreement through the common law right of access or the Pennsylvania Right to Know Act, it did not matter that the litigants in the underlying matter had not objected to the confidentiality order when it was entered. 5 We exercise plenary review over standing issues. Biener v. Calio, 361 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 2004). Although Local Rule 83.1 may not be a “gag order” as that term is typically used, the same third-party standing principles apply. 12 Physical documents like the settlement agreement in Pansy are, of course, not the same as speech that may or may not be uttered. Unlike obtaining redress through access to existing documents, the only way a third party challenging a gag order can show that it will receive the information it seeks is by demonstrating that there is a willing speaker. The purpose of the “willing speaker” requirement, therefore, is not to tie the third party’s interests to those of the speaker, but to ensure that there is an injury in fact that would be redressed by a favorable decision. Here, it is undisputed that Wecht’s attorneys are willing to speak about the case and that Local Rule 83.1 limits their ability to do so. To the extent that an occasion arises in the future where defense counsel desires to make public statements about the case, we believe the media and public have a legitimate interest in those comments not being inhibited by overly restrictive limitations. Accordingly, we hold that the consent of the parties to an order limiting speech is irrelevant to third-party standing analysis as long as the third party can demonstrate that an individual subject to the order would speak more freely if the order is lifted or modified. That Wecht’s attorneys consented to a Pretrial Order incorporating Local Rule 83.1 is of no consequence as long as the media outlets can show that counsel want to speak about the case and believe that the Rule limits their ability to do so. The media outlets have satisfied this requirement and have standing to challenge the constitutionality of Local Rule 83.1.6 Contrary to the government’s assertions, we believe that cases decided by other courts of appeals support our holding. See, e.g, In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 605-08 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that parties consenting to a gag order can nevertheless be willing speakers). The government cites Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988), in which a group of public health organizations represented by Public Citizen sought access to discovery materials produced by a tobacco company. The government focuses on the Court’s observation that plaintiffs in the underlying case had “opposed the protective order at every stage.” 6 We need not reach the question of whether Wecht also has standing since he raises the same arguments as the media. 13 Id. at 787 n.12. The government ignores, however, that this statement was made to support the conclusion that “[b]ecause obtaining a modification of the protective order will, as a practical matter, guarantee Public Citizen access to documents in the plaintiffs’ possession, Public Citizen has standing to seek the modification.” Id. Employing similar reasoning to reach the opposite result, the Court in Oklahoma Hospital Ass’n v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 748 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1984), denied a publishing company standing because it was unlikely it “would succeed in obtaining the redress it seeks—access to the documents—were [the Court] to lift the protective orders.” Id. at 1425.7 We read these cases as supporting our conclusion that the standing inquiry should focus on whether third parties would obtain the information they seek if successful on the merits of their claims. 2. Modification of the Local Rule Having determined that the media outlets have standing, we next address the substance of their challenge. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), the Supreme Court determined that a local rule prohibiting attorney speech that had a “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” on a criminal trial did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 1063. The media outlets assert that Local Rule 83.1 is unconstitutional because it prohibits comments that have a “reasonable likelihood of prejudice,” a standard that the Supreme Court in Gentile described as being “less protective of lawyer speech” than the one it upheld. Id. at 1068. The media outlets also argue that Section C of the Rule 7 The government also cites American Library Association v. Odom, 818 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1987), in which researchers sought access to documents housed in a library. The Court applied a “willing speaker” test and determined that there was not “a solid basis on which to conclude that plaintiffs’ interests and the Library’s . . . [were] congruent,” and that the Library had “not been shown to be a willing communicator.” Id. at 87. We read Odom as relying upon the researchers’ failure to demonstrate that they would gain access to the documents even if successful on the merits of their claim. 14 impermissibly creates prohibitions on all speech concerning issues such as the defendant’s prior criminal record or reputation, the existence of a confession, the identity of prospective witnesses, the possibility of a guilty plea, and the merits of the case. The government, on the other hand, contends that the reasonable likelihood standard satisfies the First Amendment’s requirements. See In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 1999).8 In addition, the government suggests a limiting construction, under which comments about the subjects in Section C are only considered presumptively prejudicial. We find it unnecessary to address the parties’ constitutional arguments. Instead, we choose to invoke our supervisory authority over the application of a local rule of practice and procedure. As the Supreme Court has noted, courts of appeals are authorized to “mandate ‘procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although in nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution.’” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1985) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)); see also United States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 843 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]here is no doubt that this Court has supervisory power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the better administration of the judicial process.”). We have invoked this supervisory power in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Eastern Med. Billing, Inc., 230 F.3d 600, 607-12 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing our invocation of supervisory power to prohibit certain jury instructions); Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, 193 F.3d 210, 214 (3d Cir. 1999) (exercising supervisory power over attorney-client fee arrangements); Dunbar v. Triangle Lumber & Supply Co., 816 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1987) (invoking supervisory authority and mandating certain pleading and notice requirements when parties seek dismissal based on counsel’s 8 The government asserts the Second Circuit upheld a reasonable likelihood standard in United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995). The Court, however, did not address the constitutionality of the standard. At the outset of its discussion, the Court held that because defendant had not taken previous steps to appeal the relevant order, he could not now argue the restraints were unconstitutional. See id. at 832-33. 15 apparent default). Accordingly, we now exercise our supervisory authority to require that district courts apply Local Rule 83.1 to prohibit only speech that is substantially likely to materially prejudice ongoing criminal proceedings.9 Although “our supervisory authority should not be invoked lightly,” Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir. 1991), we believe it appropriate to do so here for a number of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, both the Supreme Court and this Court have previously approved the “substantial likelihood” standard. As the Supreme Court explained in Gentile, limitations on attorney speech “are aimed at two principal evils: (1) comments that are likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial, and (2) comments that are likely to prejudice the jury venire, even if an untainted panel can ultimately be found.” 501 U.S. at 1075. The Supreme Court specifically noted that the “substantial likelihood” standard is narrowly tailored to achieve those objectives. The regulation of attorneys’ speech is limited—it applies only to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; and it merely postpones the attorneys’ comments until after the 9 This holding applies to the local rules of all the district courts in our Circuit. Presently, Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 53.1 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Local Rule 83.2 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania contain “reasonable likelihood” standards. The District of New Jersey, in Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 101.1, already sets out a “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard, as does the District of the Virgin Islands, where Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.2 incorporates Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.2 which adopts the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The District of Delaware appears not to have a local rule governing attorney communications in criminal cases, though a Local Rule of Civil Procedure 83.6(d)(2) does adopt the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct for civil proceedings. 16 trial. While supported by the substantial state interest in preventing prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding by those who have a duty to protect its integrity, the Rule is limited on its face to preventing only speech having a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing that proceeding. Id. at 1076. Although we have not had occasion to address the constitutionality of a more restrictive rule, we have stated that the substantial likelihood standard “fairly balances the integrity of the justice system with attorneys’ constitutional rights.” United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 93 (3d Cir. 2001). In addition, the substantial likelihood standard is consistent with the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.6 (2002); Standards for Crim. Justice 8-1.1 (3d ed. 1992). The ABA adopted a reasonable likelihood standard in 1968, but amended its recommendations over the years in response to developments in the law.10 In the wake of the ABA’s Model Rules and the Gentile decision, every state,11 as well as a majority of 10 According to the District Court, Local Rule 83.1 has remained the same since it was first adopted in 1971 without any objections from attorneys or the public. 11 Forty-five states currently apply a “substantially likely to materially prejudice” standard, including each of the eleven states identified by the Gentile Court as having a reasonable likelihood standard at the time. Of the five states that do not, two apply similar standards: Maine prohibits speech that “poses a substantial danger of interference with the administration of justice,” Me. Bar. R. 3.7(j); Virginia prohibits communications that “will have a substantial likelihood of interfering with the fairness of the trial by a jury,” Va. Sup. Ct. R. 6:2-3.6(a). The three other states apply standards that appear to be even more protective of attorney speech. Illinois prohibits speech that “would pose a serious and imminent threat to the fairness of an adjudicative proceeding.” Ill. Sup. Ct. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.6. New 17 federal district courts,12 now apply rules that are more protective of speech than the reasonable likelihood standard. Moreover, the changes we impose on the federal courts in Pennsylvania will make their rules on trial publicity consistent with the rules of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania13 and other district courts in our circuit. Among other benefits, lawyers practicing in multiple jurisdictions will now be subject to the same standards.14 Mexico prohibits statements that are “false; or [that] create[] a clear and present danger of prejudicing the proceeding.” N.M. R. Prof. Conduct 16-306. And in Oklahoma, lawyers are prohibited from making public statements that “will have an imminent and materially prejudicial effect on the fact-finding process in an adjudicatory proceeding relating to the matter and involving lay fact-finders or the possibility of incarceration.” Okla. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.6. 12 Our research discloses that of the ninety-four federal district courts, there are forty-nine that, either through their own local rules or by adopting state or ABA rules, apply standards that are more protective of speech. Of these, forty-three apply substantial likelihood standards, while six prohibit comments that would pose a serious and imminent/immediate threat or clear and present danger to the administration of justice. Thirty-six district courts, including the three in Pennsylvania, apply reasonable likelihood standards or rules that are less protective of speech. Seven districts have only some categorical restrictions on speech, and two districts appear not to have a rule addressing trial publicity. 13 Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 largely adopts the language of the ABA Model Rule, as do rules of professional conduct in New Jersey and Delaware. N.J. Ct. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.6; Del. Ct. R., Lawyers’ R. Prof’l Conduct 3.6. 14 We also note that the government stated at oral argument that it “would have no objection whatsoever” to a substantial likelihood standard, only that it did not believe we should declare a rule unconstitutional without good reason. Oral Arg. Tr. 35, Sept. 12, 2006 (“Tr.”). 18 Finally, we note that neither party defends the categorical restrictions of Section C. Consistent with the ABA Model Rule and the rules in most jurisdictions, we will read Section C to provide attorneys with examples of subjects that are likely to be materially prejudicial if spoken about.