Opinion ID: 436346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial Comment on the Exercise of the Fifth Amendment Right.

Text: 9 Griggs' counsel, in both his opening and closing statements, repeatedly tried to discredit Kirschwing. In response to these continual attacks on Kirschwing's veracity and reliability, the prosecutor made the following remarks in his closing argument: 10 1. There is absolutely no evidence, there is no testimony, not a single person has said Mr. Griggs was afraid of an unjustified conviction. Mr. Thomas [Griggs' attorney] has just asked you to assume that even though the defendant has not testified about it and no one has testified about it. 11 Record at 426. 12 2. Now first of all, as to whether Butch is lying. First there is not any testimony at all to the contrary of what Mr. Kirschwing told you. 13 Record at 429. 14 3. When you consider all of the evidence, Mr. Kirschwing's testimony and the other testimony, supported on the tape, and the fact that there is no direct testimony against it, we submit you can believe Mr. Kirschwing. 15 Record at 435. 16 4. Now we have got Mr. Thomas saying that all that on the tape was just play acting because he is trying to catch Mr. Kirschwing. I submit to you that is the most far-fetched story of all. There is not a single piece of testimony that gives basis to that argument. It's based only on the stipulations I have read to you, which I have indicated is only what Mr. Thomas told me, not that it is truthful. 17 Record at 437. 18 5. The hard concrete, bedrock facts of this case are Kirschwing's testimony, which again there has been no direct testimony in contrary [sic] to, and the tape.... [T]he defendant knew that Kirschwing was the only witness with first-hand knowledge that could implicate Mr. Griggs. 19 Record at 444-45. 20 6. Only [Griggs] knows where he got the bills to start with, but for him selling them to Mr. Kirschwing none of this would have happened and we wouldn't be here. 21 Record at 447. 22 The fifth amendment prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination insures the right of all criminal defendants to decline to testify at trial. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Concomitant with that right is the prohibition of prosecutorial comment on its exercise. McGahee v. Massey, 667 F.2d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943, 103 S.Ct. 255, 74 L.Ed.2d 199 (1982). See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). Although this general rule is clear that the prosecution must refrain from specific comment on a defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment right, the prohibition is not absolute. [N]ot every statement that under some conceivable interpretation might draw attention to a defendant's decision not to testify is a comment on silence. United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). 1 Therefore, it becomes our task to determine when such comment transcends the bounds of constitutional acceptability. 23 At times, the prosecutorial infirmity is glaringly evident. See, e.g., United States v. Bates, 512 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.1975) 2 (you didn't hear from the culprit). For the most part, however, the line of demarcation between permissible and constitutionally unacceptable commentary is quite difficult to draw. 24 In the earlier cases on this subject, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sanctioned comment on the uncontradicted state of the evidence or the defendant's failure to produce testimony on any phase of the defense on which he relies. Garcia v. United States, 315 F.2d 133, 137 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 855, 84 S.Ct. 117, 11 L.Ed.2d 82 (1963). This expansive language was qualified, however, as especially true when the evidence against a defendant could be contradicted by someone other than himself. Id. See also United States v. Jennings, 527 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.1976). 25 The broad language of Garcia and its accompanying limitation eventually evolved into the notion that it is not error to comment on the failure of the defense, as opposed to the defendant, to counter or explain the evidence. United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 825 (5th Cir.1980) (emphasis original). See also United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 633 (11th Cir.1983) (where defendants chose not to testify at trial but records available to the defense might have existed which would have contradicted the government's theory of the case, prosecutorial comment on the failure of the defense to produce any evidence or testimony in rebuttal to the espoused theory held permissible), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1447, 79 L.Ed.2d 766 (1984); Duncan v. Stynchcombe, 704 F.2d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir.1983) (prosecutor's comment that there has been no evidence in this case from the defense at all that Duncan was not in that house held a proper reference to the failure of the defense to offer any alibi evidence as to defendant's whereabouts at the time of the crime). Consequently, if there is rebuttal evidence available in addition to the defendant's testimony, this circuit generally will not find error in a reference to the uncontradicted nature of the prosecution's evidence. 26 The applicability of the Bright-Stynchcombe-Johnson doctrine breaks down, however, in cases where the rebuttal testimony or evidence could come only from the defendant. Then, a failure of the defense to present evidence is equivalent to the failure of the defendant to testify. This is the situation here. 27 In United States v. Stuart-Caballero, 686 F.2d 890, 892 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1209, 103 S.Ct. 1202, 75 L.Ed.2d 444 (1983), our court adopted an alternative test to evaluate comment on the defendant's failure to testify in instances where he alone could provide contradictory evidence. Prosecutorial comment is improper if the defense can demonstrate either that (1) the prosecutor manifestly intended to comment on the defendant's silence, or (2) the character of the comment was such that a jury would naturally and necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant's silence. Id. at 892. 28 To begin our determination of the propriety of the remarks in question here, we turn first to an analysis of each comment under the prosecutorial intent prong of the Stuart-Caballero test. No manifest intent to comment is demonstrated if there exists another, equally plausible explanation for the remark. See United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1249 (5th Cir.1977). For example, when it is very possible that the comment stemmed from mere inadvertence, there is no error. See Samuels v. United States, 398 F.2d 964, 968 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021, 89 S.Ct. 630, 21 L.Ed.2d 566 (1969). Similarly, there is no infirmity when the comment is offered to rebut a defense attack on a prosecution witness' credibility. See Williams v. Wainwright, 673 F.2d 1182 (11th Cir.1982). 29 In Williams, the defendant was charged with armed robbery, an element of which is force. The prosecution planned to put the victim on the stand to testify to the use of force. The only person available who could dispute this assertion was the defendant, who chose not to testify. Nonetheless, in his opening statement, the defense counsel promised the jury that he would discredit the victim's testimony on cross-examination. 30 As planned, the victim testified to the defendant's use of force and underwent vigorous cross-examination. In closing, the prosecution pointed out that the evidence of force remained uncontradicted. The defense objected to this statement as a reference to the defendant's failure to take the stand. The court found, however, that the remark was intended only to rebut the defense's claim that the witness was incredible and highlight the fact that her testimony remained steadfast after cross-examination. 31 The bulk of the remarks to which Griggs objects fall into the rebuttal category. In his opening statement, the defense called Kirschwing a liar outright. See record at Vol. 7, pp. 51-59. Comments two, three and five simply respond to this and other attacks and represent attempts to reassert Kirschwing's credibility after denigration by the defense. In view of the factual similarity of the context in which these three remarks were made to that found in Williams, we conclude that these three comments constitute permissible rebuttal argument by the prosecution. 32 Acceptable rebuttal commentary may take other forms as well. For example in United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170, 103 S.Ct. 815, 74 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1983), in its opening statement, the defense attorney promised that he would show various facts favorable to his client's case. In closing, the prosecution stated: I don't recall any testimony about that.... Certainly none of them testified about that. Id. at 983. The Hartley court found both that these remarks were neither intended to be a comment on the defendant's silence, nor would the jury view them in such a fashion. The prosecutor's statements merely pointed out the fact that defense counsel made certain bold allegations in his opening statement that were unsubstantiated by the evidence. 33 The validity of prosecutorial rebuttal in the face of unsupported defense claims is also well-illustrated by the decision of United States v. Freeman, 660 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823, 103 S.Ct. 54, 74 L.Ed.2d 59 (1982). In Freeman, the appellants were charged with conspiring to import marijuana, largely because of their presence on the transport vessel. In his opening statement, the defense counsel claimed that his clients were basically innocent bystanders, whereas the government reasoned that, had they been innocent, they would have mutinied against the ship's captain. 34 After their lawyers argued that the defendants were coerced into participation, the prosecution stated: You haven't heard any evidence of coercion. Id. at 1037. Upon objection, the court held that [t]he prosecutor's comments are a comment on the failure to establish a coercion theory. As such, it is proper rebuttal. Id. 35 The doctrine espoused by the Freeman and Hartley courts operates as a check on allowing non-testifying defendants to testify through their attorneys. A defendant may choose to exercise his fifth amendment rights but once he does, he cannot then inject bold, unsubstantiated conclusions into the trial. The prosecution must be free to remind the jury that unsupported defense allegations by lawyers are not evidence. 36 The Hartley and Freeman decisions are quite pertinent to our evaluation of the first and fourth comments challenged by Griggs. In his opening statement, Griggs' attorney claimed that Griggs warned Kirschwing to lay low, merely because he was afraid of guilt by association, not because he was guilty of any crime. No evidence ever was presented to confirm this bare claim. We conclude that the prosecutor's first comment was intended merely to rebut this unsupported assertion. Similarly, Griggs' counsel alleged that Griggs acquiesced in the counterfeit bill scheme solely to trap Kirschwing for the government. Because the defense provided no evidence to prove this allegation either, it is a fair ground for rebuttal commentary by the government. 37 Finally, we conclude that the prosecutor's apparent motive in making the last comment to which Griggs objects was proper as well. The prosecution is entitled to refer to the fact that the defense has failed to rebut a natural inference that may be drawn from the facts in evidence. For example, in United States v. Ward, 552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 850, 98 S.Ct. 161, 54 L.Ed.2d 119 (1977), the defendant was charged with the theft of a brand new, stolen tractor that was found in his possession at the time of his capture. Because the defendant did not testify, the origin of the tractor was unknown. The prosecution argued: Now where did he get it? Well only he knows where he got it. We don't know. I don't know where he got it. You don't know where he got it. Id. at 1083 (emphasis omitted). In response to a fifth amendment challenge, the Ward court held that the prosecution's statements were a permissible reference to the fact that the defense never rebutted the natural inference that one in possession of stolen property either purchased it innocently or may very well have stolen it. 38 Comment six is factually quite similar to Ward. It is possible that Griggs obtained the counterfeit bills unwittingly in a poker game or knowingly through illegal means. The prosecutor's final comment simply points out that there was no evidence presented to support Griggs' exculpatory theory. 39 From the above discussion it is apparent that the prosecutor in this case had no manifest intent to comment on Griggs' failure to testify. 3 Our inquiry does not end here, however. The second part of the Stuart-Caballero test requires an inquiry into whether the jury perceived the comments in an impermissible way. 40 The standard for decision under the second prong of the Stuart-Caballero test is not whether the jury possibly or even probably would view the challenged remark in this manner but whether the jury necessarily would have done so. Williams v. Wainwright, 673 F.2d 1182, 1185 (11th Cir.1982) (emphasis original). Additionally, the notion that the courts traditionally have been quite slow to find a necessarily improper understanding on the part of the jury United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1250 (5th Cir.1977), militates in favor of the validity of the prosecutor's words. In light of these qualifications on the application of the second prong of the Stuart-Caballero test, we conclude that the jury would not have construed any of remarks two through six to be a comment on Griggs' failure to testify. Moreover, we note that the defense failed to object to any of these comments at trial. Therefore, we can hold these remarks to be error only if we deem them so grossly prejudicial that the harm could not be removed by objections or instructions. United States v. Harbin, 601 F.2d 773, 776 n. 2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 954, 100 S.Ct. 433, 62 L.Ed.2d 327 (1979), (quoting Benham v. United States, 215 F.2d 472, 473 (5th Cir.1954)). Since those five comments do not require reversal, even when evaluated under the usual standard of review, it is quite clear that they are not infirm under the heightened level of scrutiny necessitated by a failure to object. 41 Although we readily uphold the last five comments under the scrutiny of the second part of the Stuart-Caballero test, the first remark to which Griggs protests is far more troublesome. Griggs' counsel registered a timely objection to the statement. Therefore we judge it by asking whether the jury necessarily would have understood it to refer to Griggs' silence. 42 After careful consideration, we conclude that the phrase, the defendant has not testified about it is an unmistakable reference to Griggs' exercise of his fifth amendment privilege. The jury could not have failed to comprehend the remark in any other way. Because this statement infringes on Griggs' constitutional rights, we must reverse his conviction. Since a new trial would involve the other two issues which Griggs raises on this appeal, we examine those contentions as well.