Opinion ID: 1452936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: motion for judgment of acquittal as to blazo charge

Text: Budd argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on Count 4, which charged him with violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of pretrial detainee Steven Blazo by using excessive force amounting to punishment in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. This court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Meyer, 359 F.3d 820, 826 (6th Cir.2004). The issue is `whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. (quoting United States v. Humphrey, 279 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Bell v. Wolfish and its progeny govern whether Budd's behavior represented excessive force amounting to punishment. Under Wolfish, in the absence of an expressed intent to punish, the question is whether the challenged practice or behavior is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective. 441 U.S. at 538, 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861; see also Thompson v. County of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir.1994). If the action is arbitrary or purposeless[,] a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Although retribution and deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive purposes, id. at 539 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 1861, the maintenance of security and order at detention facilities is, id. at 540, 546-47, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. Id. at 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (citing cases). Budd's brief identifies no legitimate non-punitive purposes for his actions; rather, he argues, correctly, that de minimis injuries do not support a constitutional violation, even if intentionally inflicted. Although a pretrial detainee's injuries must be more than de minimis to support a constitutional violation, they need not be serious or significant, cf. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-10, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (convicted prisoner); see also United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47-48 (2d Cir.1999) (pretrial detainee), as long as there is some degree of actual injury, Walsh, 194 F.3d at 50. In this case, the prosecution introduced testimony that Budd rammed Blazo's head into at least two different doors, slammed his head into a table, and repeatedly shoved him into a wall. Although the prosecution introduced no medical evidence of the extent of Blazo's injuries, Blazo testified that he requested medical attention, albeit unsuccessfully, and that he had bumps on his head and bruising on his body. In Hudson v. McMillian , the Supreme Court held that the prisoner's minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate were not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes. Id. at 4, 10., 112 S.Ct. 995 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence indicates that Blazo's injuries here are comparable to those of the prisoner in Hudson.