Opinion ID: 3133690
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dow’s Reply

Text: Dow’s reply preliminarily pointed out that its motion for partial summary judgment had become, in effect, a motion for summary judgment, because the four other plaintiffs who were not the subject of the partial motion for summary judgment were in the process of dismissing their claims against the defendants. As to whether the Carcamo/Delgado class action tolled the statute of limitations on the Plaintiffs’ complaint, Dow argued that American Pipe, Crown, Cork, and Levi do not support the Plaintiffs’ argument that a class action pending in one jurisdiction tolled the statute of limitations in another jurisdiction. Dow argued that those cases involved subsequent claims brought by members of a putative class in the same jurisdiction. Dow argued that a majority of jurisdictions do not allow cross-jurisdictional tolling. Moreover, even assuming cross-jurisdictional tolling applied, Dow pointed out that any such tolling ended when class certification in Carcamo/Delgado was denied by the Texas district court’s July 11, 1995 order. That order denied “all pending motions in [the consolidated cases] not otherwise expressly addressed in this Memorandum and Order” as moot. 14  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Delgado, 890 F.Supp. at 1375. Dow attached the state court docket sheet for Carcamo as an exhibit to its reply to show that plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was pending when the Texas district court issued its July 11, 1995 order. The parties stipulated that the six named Plaintiffs in the instant case were putative class members in the Carcamo case. Lastly, Dow argued that Plaintiffs cannot rely on class action tolling after having filed the Abarca action while a motion for class certification in Carcamo/Delgado was still pending. The parties stipulated that the six named Plaintiffs were named parties in Abarca. 5. Hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment At the hearing on Dow’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the parties focused on whether the July 11, 1995 order denied class certification in the Carcamo/Delgado case clearly enough to restart the Hawaii statute of limitations. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the July 11, 1995 order did not dispose of the Carcamo motion to certify a class action, because “that housekeeping order didn’t reference class certification specifically,” and “it wasn’t clear that [there] was a pending motion [for class certification]. It hadn’t been set for hearing. It hadn’t been briefed. It wasn’t argued.” Dow’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that the July 11, 1995 order was “the original denial of the motion [to certify the class] 15  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  and the original dismissal of the [Carcamo/Delgado] action”; therefore, the July 11, 1995 date set the limitations clock ticking once again. It became clear, however, that the circuit court intended to grant the partial motion for summary judgment in Defendants’ favor because it considered the filing of the Abarca case to be an effective “opt-out” of the Carcamo/Delgado class action. 6. Order Granting Dow’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Final Judgment; Notice of Appeal The circuit court granted Dow’s motion for partial summary judgment in an order dated July 30, 2009, as well as codefendants’ joinders in that motion. The circuit court filed its judgment on July 26, 2010, and the Plaintiffs timely appealed. 7. The ICA Appeal
On appeal, Plaintiffs focused on the significance of the Abarca filing, as that formed the basis of the circuit court’s order granting Dow’s motion for partial summary judgment on limitations grounds. The Plaintiffs argued that the filing of the Abarca complaint, which was never served and later voluntarily dismissed, did not commence an action for statute of limitations purposes, and did not manifest an intent to opt-out of the Carcamo/Delgado class action. Plaintiffs argued that, 16  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  because the putative class action in Delgado was not finally dismissed until September 2007, and because class certification was not denied in Carcamo until June 2010, Plaintiffs had two years from those dates from which to file a timely action; therefore, the Plaintiffs’ October 1997 Complaint was timely filed. The Plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ approach would frustrate the purposes of the class action tolling doctrine by forcing plaintiffs to prematurely commence individual actions out of an abundance of caution rather than relying on class actions to protect their interests. The Plaintiffs requested that the ICA reverse the circuit court’s judgment and order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
Only Dow filed a substantive Answering Brief, while other defendants filed joinders to it. Dow first argued that the Texas district court’s July 11, 1995 order in Carcamo/Delgado denied a pending class certification motion as moot; therefore, the Hawaii two-year statute of limitations began running on that date, and Plaintiffs’ October 3, 1997 Complaint was time-barred. Second, Dow argued that the ICA should not recognize crossjurisdictional tolling. Third, Dow argued that the Plaintiffs opted out of the Carcamo/Delgado class action by filing individual claims in the Abarca complaint. Moreover, the filing 17  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  of the Abarca action in June 1995 demonstrated that the Plaintiffs were aware of their claims at that time, over two years before they filed the instant complaint, and thus, beyond the Hawaii two-year statute of limitations governing their claims. Dow requested that the ICA affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
In their Reply, the Plaintiffs argued that the July 11, 1995 order was a “routine housekeeping order” incidental to the district court’s f.n.c. dismissal, which “did not specifically refer to the [Carcamo/]Delgado plaintiffs’ motion for class certification” when it ruled that “all pending motions” were moot. The Plaintiffs also argued that the ICA could recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling, as this court’s Levi opinion left open that possibility.
The ICA affirmed the circuit court’s Judgment. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., No. 30700 (App. Mar. 7, 2014) (mem.) at 21. The ICA concluded [A]ll claims asserted by the Six Plaintiffs that have a two-year statute of limitations are time barred. The Abarca action establishes that the Six Plaintiffs were aware of their claims at least by June 9, 1995, when the Abarca complaint was filed. Moreover, even if we assume that class action tolling applied, such tolling ended on July 11, 1995, when [the Texas district court’s order] was issued, and the complaint in this case was filed more than two years later, on October 3, 1997. 18  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Id. at 15.