Opinion ID: 853233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Judge's Reading of Question from Jury

Text: At trial, a juror inquired of the court whether the jury can ask questions. The judge responded that any juror who has a question may submit it in writing to the trial judge, who would consult with the parties' counsel and determine whether the question is appropriate under the rules of evidence. [3] While submitting a series of questions propounded by the juror, the trial judge, apparently inadvertently, slightly rephrased a juror's question. The defendant claims that the particular nature of this mistake violated his federal constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence and due process of law and the Indiana constitutional right of the jury to determine the law and the facts. [4] The juror presented a compound question: Did [the witness] make an eye contact with the shooter as she drove south on Pennsylvania? and Did he start to run? and And if so, was he in the light? Record at 180. The judge presented these questions to the witness in the following colloquy: [Judge]: Okay, did you make eye contact with the shooter as you drove south on Pennsylvania Street? [Witness]: Yes, ma'am. [Judge]: Did the defendant then start to run? [Witness]: Yes. [Judge]: Was he in the light? [Witness]: He was in the headlights of the victim's truck. Record at 181-82 (emphasis added). Although the judge used the word defendant instead of shooter or he as presented by the juror, the defendant did not lodge any objection. As a general rule, the failure to object at trial results in a waiver of the issue on appeal. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (Ind.2000). On rare occasion, Indiana appellate courts have addressed claims challenging a judge's trial comments absent a contemporaneous objection during trial. Id. at 1235. This exception to the waiver rule will apply only if the claimed error satisfies our extremely narrow fundamental error exception. Id. at 1235-36. To qualify as fundamental error, an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible. Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 444-45 (Ind.1999) (citations omitted). To be fundamental error, the error must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process. Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987). See also Ford v. State, 704 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Ind.1998)(This Court views the fundamental error exception to the waiver rule as an extremely narrow one, available only `when the record reveals clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles [of due process], and the harm or potential for harm [can]not be denied.') (quoting Warriner v. State, 435 N.E.2d 562, 563 (Ind.1982)). Mitchell, 726 N.E.2d at 1236 (Ind.2000). Under the circumstances presented, the claimed error is not fundamental, and procedural default bars further consideration of the issue.