Opinion ID: 1366847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Stoddard's Involvement

Text: In this case, there is no evidence that Dr. Stoddard was substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application for the '326 patent. Specifically, there is no evidence to even suggest that Dr. Stoddard had any knowledge of the technical details or legal merits of the application for the '326 patent while it was being prepared or prosecuted. I find it significant that no document or testimony shows that Dr. Stoddard participated in any inventor meeting with patent counsel, received a draft of the application prior to filing, or received any draft response of an office action to the PTO during prosecution or was otherwise apprised of the technical details or legal merit of the application. In fact, Robert Malm, the prosecuting attorney of the '326 patent, testified that Dr. Stoddard was not substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the patent. J.A. 14100, 14104 (Malm's testimony stating that he did not have any conversations with Dr. Stoddard about patent prosecution matters and that no individual at Avid reviewed responses before they were filed with the PTO). The majority cites two communications as evidence sufficient to support the district court's inference that Dr. Stoddard was substantively involved in the '326 application. Majority Op. at 974-75. Neither of these documents actually related to the '326 application. The first memo, addressed to Dr. Stoddard from a named inventor of the '326 patent, mentioned only the possible effect of Avid sales on a European patent application. The second memo, which indicated that Dr. Stoddard was provided a copy, was addressed to a patent attorney who was never involved in the '326 patent application and included new material for an unspecified patent application. This memo did not give any indication that it was in any way related to the '326 patent application. These documents do not support the conclusion that Dr. Stoddard had any awareness of the details or merits of the '326 application. The majority incorrectly points to Dr. Stoddard's involvement in Avid's research and development as a factor indicating that he was substantively involved in the preparation of the patent application relating to that research. Majority Op. at 974-75. Dr. Stoddard's research activities are simply evidence that Dr. Stoddard was associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c)(3). Because it is the actual substance of the application that defines what constitutes material information that the individual must disclose to the PTO, Rule 56 requires more than just this association. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1), (c)(3). The majority also ascribes significance to the fact that Dr. Stoddard was personally responsible for certain prior art demonstrations. Majority Op. at 975-76. However, this fact does not contribute to a finding that Dr. Stoddard was substantively involved in the patent application. While employees who perform product demonstrations may well be the individuals most likely to have knowledge of prior art, that knowledge, in itself, does not give rise to a duty of disclosure to the PTO. See Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro S.A. de C.V., 464 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2006) (affirming district court's refusal to find inequitable conduct based on the failure of an employee scientist not a named inventorto disclose a prior art reference noting that he was only tangentially involved in prosecution of the patent). Unless such an individual also has knowledge of the technical details or legal merits of the patent application and is engaged in the preparation or prosecution thereof, he is not bound by Rule 56. Moreover, while the district court found Dr. Stoddard's testimony on the issue of prior art demonstrations was less than candid, that neither shows that he was involved in the '326 patent application nor demonstrates that whatever involvement he may have had was substantive in any way. Finally, Dr. Stoddard's signature on the small entity status affidavit, declaring that Avid is a small business concern eligible for reduced patent application fees, provides no evidence that he had any knowledge of the substantive details contained in the patent application. The small entity status document relates only to information about the corporation and not to anything material to patentability. The majority states that Dr. Stoddard is substantively involved in the application for the '326 patent based on the entirety of the evidence in the record. However, as noted above, none of the individual pieces of evidence the majority cites as the basis for this findingDr. Stoddard's role in the company, the two memos regarding patent prosecution, the small entity status affidavit, Dr. Stoddard's involvement in the product demonstrations, or Dr. Stoddard's lack of credibility at trialshow that Dr. Stoddard was even peripherally involved with the actual application at issue. Simply combining the evidence does not change the fact that there is nothing in the record showing that Dr. Stoddard had anything at all to do with the application for the '326 patent. For the foregoing reasons, it is my view that the evidence does not support a finding that Dr. Stoddard was substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the '326 patent. He was neither engaged in the preparation or prosecution of the '326 patent application nor sufficiently apprised of its technical details or legal merits to allow him to assess what information would be considered material to its patentability. Because the district court misapplied Rule 56(c)(3) and clearly erred in extending the duty of disclosure to Dr. Stoddard, I would reverse the finding that the '326 patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.