Opinion ID: 617008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Prior Acts of Molestation

Text: Russell first challenges the district court's decision to allow Jane Doe 1 to testify that he had touched her inappropriately. He contends that the prior incidents of touching were not probative of any material fact, were remote in time and dissimilar in nature to the charged offenses and their prejudicial impact far outweighed any arguable probative value. Russell Br. 11. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this evidence. We begin with the statute pursuant to which Russell was charged. In relevant part, section 2251(a) provides: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct. . . shall be punished . . . if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). As we have noted, sexually explicit conduct is defined to include, among other acts, the lascivious display of one's genitals or pubic area. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v). Thus, when a photographer persuades or induces a minor to pose for a photograph in such a way that she lasciviously displays her genital or pubic area, he violates the statute, assuming there is the requisite link to interstate or foreign commerce. In this case, the subsequent discovery of the charged images on a computer in Canada, as well as Russell's use of a camera that had been manufactured in Japan to produce the charged images, demonstrated sufficient links to interstate or foreign commerce. There was no dispute that Jane Does 1 and 2 were minors, and the defense essentially conceded that Russell had persuaded, induced, or enticed them to be photographed in the nude. The sole question for the jury was whether the charged photographs reflected sexually explicit conduct. The statute does not define what constitutes a lascivious display of the genitals or pubic area. Generally speaking, as we noted earlier, a lascivious display is one that calls attention to the genitals or pubic area for the purpose of eliciting a sexual response in the viewer. United States v. Knox, supra, 32 F.3d at 745; United States v. Steen, supra, 634 F.3d at 828. And, as we have also noted, more than nudity is required to render a photograph lascivious; rather, the focus of the image must be on the genitals or the image must be otherwise sexually suggestive. United States v. Griesbach, supra, 540 F.3d at 656 (coll. cases). Beyond that, no settled test has emerged in the more than forty years since section 2251 was enacted to ascertain what renders a photo sexually suggestive so as to be deemed lascivious. Instead, the question is left to the factfinder to resolve, on the facts of each case, applying common sense. See United States v. Frabizio, 459 F.3d 80, 85-86 (1st Cir.2006). As we have also noted, the jury in this case was instructed to consider the factors articulated in United States v. Dost, supra, 636 F.Supp. at 832, which include the following: (1) whether the focal point of the picture is the minor's (or another person's) genitalia; (2) whether the setting or pose is customarily associated with sexual activity; (3) whether the minor's pose is unnatural given his or her age; (4) whether the minor is fully or partially nude; (5) whether sexual coyness or willingness to engage in sexual activity is suggested; and (6) whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. R. 40 at 13-14; R. 79 at 101-02 (Instruction No. 8.) These factors have been approved, to a limited degree, by a number of circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 250-53 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir.2001); United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 789 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1999); Knox, 32 F.3d at 745-46 & n. 10. However, as the First Circuit noted in Frabizio, 459 F.3d at 88-90, the adequacy and application of these factors have been the subject of considerable discussion among the courts. See also Steen, 634 F.3d at 828-29 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). This court has held that it is not plain error to instruct a jury on the Dost factors, United States v. Noel, 581 F.3d 490, 499-500 (7th Cir.2009), but we have otherwise abstained from endorsing them or rejecting them, id. at 500. Neither party to this appeal has questioned the propriety of these factors, and we note that the district court quite properly admonished the jury that it was not confined to these factors in its evaluation of the charged photographs, that the government was not required to prove that each of these factors was present, and that it was for the jury to decide the importance of any one factor. R. 40 at 13-14; R. 79 at 101-02 (Instruction No. 8). In the absence of any argument to the contrary, we are satisfied that the jury was given adequate and accurate guidance in assessing whether the charged photographs reflected a lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic areas of Jane Does 1 and 2. Although the primary focus in evaluating the legality of the charged photographs must be on the images themselves, see, e.g., Griesbach, 540 F.3d at 656; Amirault, 173 F.3d at 31, the cases reveal that the intent and motive of the photographer can be a relevant consideration in evaluating those images. For example, although it is the sexually suggestive nature of a photograph of a minor which distinguishes a depiction of simple nudity from a lascivious exhibition of the genitals, Griesbach, 540 F.3d at 656, children typically are not mature enough to project sexuality consciously; instead, as the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, it is often the photographer who stages the picture in such a way as to make it sexually suggestive. United States v. Arvin, 900 F.2d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir.1990). This Circuit held in United States v. Burt, 495 F.3d 733, 741 (7th Cir.2007), that prior acts of molestation were admissible to show that the defendant was not simply a legitimate photographer who happened to have taken non-sexual photographs of nude children, as his counsel suggested in his opening statement, but rather had deliberately created sexually suggestive photographs that were meant to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. Burt illustrates one way in which the photographer's motive or reason for creating an image can be a relevant factor for the factfinder to consider in deciding whether that image reflects mere nudity or a lascivious display of the genitals. In a like vein, the sixth Dost factor asks whether the charged image was intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, and although certain aspects of the image itself will often speak to that question (for example, the setting, and the pose assumed by the minor and any other persons depicted), the photographer's state of mind may also inform this assessment. See id. (noting that the jury was instructed on this same factor). This is simply to say that a defendant's intent or motive in creating an image are potentially relevant considerations, as the Ninth Circuit said in Arvin, 900 F.2d at 1391. The relevance of a defendant's motive and intent will turn on the facts of the case. But at least in some circumstances, evidence of motive and intent will help to place an image in context, especially where, as here, there is evidence that the photographer posed the minor in such way that her genitals are visible but has disclaimed any intent to create a sexually suggestive image. On that very point, we note that Russell's attorneys themselves originally cited the sixth Dost factor as a reason why the full range of testimony and other evidence that he proposed on nudism should be admitted into evidence: Another factor the jury will be invited to consider in determining whether the images depict lascivious exhibition of the genitals is whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response. . . . In one breath, the government expresses its intent to introduce allegations of prohibited sexual contact between Defendant and Jane Doe 1 as highly probative to the issues of [Defendant's] intent and motive in taking the pictures. Govt. Trial Brief, p. 3. In the next breath, they ask this Court to rule that Defendant's views toward nudity and the art that influenced his photography be barred as confusing to the jury. Precluding such evidence keeps the jury in the dark as to precisely that which the government admits is crucial: Defendant's state of mind. The government cannot have it both ways. R. 29 at 6-7 (citation omitted). Although Russell's counsel later abandoned this position and insisted that his state of mind was wholly irrelevant to the jury's evaluation of the photographs, our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the defense opened the door to evidence bearing on his motive and intent, regardless of whether such evidence was relevant in the first instance. As we understand Russell's defense, one of the reasons why Russell testified about his own practice of nudism was to establish that he viewed nudity as a perfectly natural, normal, and wholesome state of beingfar less unusual, evocative, and suspect than others might consider it to be. And when Russell testified that his daughters had attended nude resorts with him and his wife and had joined him in the practice of nudism, he evidently did so in order to suggest that it was not at all unusual or suspect for his daughters to be nude in settings where other people would be clothed. Similarly, when Russell testified that he took many thousands of photographs annually, among them many photographs of his daughters, both nude and clothed, the point of his testimony was to suggest that there was nothing unique or suspect about him taking photographs of his daughters in the nude. This, we surmise, was the background and context that Russell meant to establish with his testimony about nudismthat to be nude, to be seen in the nude, and to be photographed in the nude in settings where prevailing social norms would expect one to be clothedis not necessarily meant to convey a sexually provocative message. Apart from the testimony regarding nudism, Russell made certain assertions during his own testimony, and his counsel asked certain questions in cross-examining Russell's daughters, that also placed into question his state of mind in taking the charged photographs. First, when Russell was questioned on cross-examination about the video and photographs he took of Jane Does 1 and 2 at the gymnasium, he maintained that it was his daughters' idea to take their clothes off. R. 77 at 199, 230. His testimony on this point directly contradicted the testimony of Jane Does 1 and 2, who said that it was their father who told them to disrobe, R. 74 at 101; R. 77 at 33-34, and if Russell's testimony is credited it would suggest that he, at least on that occasion, was indifferent to whether the girls were nude. Second, and as we mentioned earlier, when Russell was cross-examined about a number of the nude photographs he took of his daughters, he denied that he had directed the girls to assume any particular pose. For example, when asked about the photographs underlying Count Three, depicting Jane Doe 2 just emerged from the shower, Russell testified, I did not stage the scene, no. R. 77 at 225. See also R. 77 at 217-223. Again, his testimony on this subject was contrary to that of his daughters, see, e.g., R. 74 at 111, 126; R. 77 at 30, 35, and it suggested that Russell was not directing the girls to pose in ways that could be viewed as sexually suggestive. Finally, during the cross-examination of Jane Does 1 and 2, Russell's counsel sought to establish that Russell had not directed the girls while photographing them in the nude in any different way than he had when photographing them clothed. R. 74 at 120; R. 77 at 55-56. Those questions were clearly aimed at conveying to the jury that Russell's purpose in photographing his daughters nude was not to create sexually suggestive images. Given all of this, we agree with the district court that the door was opened to evidence that would cast a different light on Russell's motive and intent in taking the charged photographs. Russell may have a point when he emphasizes that he structured his case in compliance with the court's decision [to initially exclude the molestation evidence] and with its prior holdings that he was entitled to testify to the fact that he practices nudism, that he has included his children in nudist activities and that his photographs were part of that pattern and not otherwise violative of the statute. Russell Br. 16. Although rendered separately, the district court's pre-trial rulings allowing him to testify on the subject of nudism, while barring evidence of the prior acts of inappropriate touching, seemed to envision that Russell could testify that the charged photographs were consistent with his own practice of nudism and his daughters' participation in nudist activities and that the photos were not inappropriate, sexually charged images, without opening the door to evidence that he had previously touched Jane Doe 1 inappropriately. But in retrospect, we doubt that there was any way in which Russell could have testified as envisioned on the subject of nudism without calling into question his purpose and motive in taking the charged photographs. Although defense counsel repeatedly characterized Russell's testimony on this subject as mere background and context, it was necessarily meant to explain how and why Russell could be posing and photographing his daughters in the nude without intending or understanding the resulting photographs to be sexually explicit images. This is the only sense in which the testimony about nudism could possibly have been relevantto the extent it was relevant at alland to our mind it necessarily opened the door to other evidence bearing on Russell's motive and purpose in creating the charged images. In any case, the district court could not know to what extent Russell might be placing his state of mind in issue until it heard the testimony elicited by the defense on the subject of nudism. By eliciting testimony not only that the photographs were consistent with the practice of nudism by Russell and his daughters, that he took many photographs of his daughters both clothed and in the nude, that in the case of the photographs taken at the gymnasium, it was his daughters who chose to be naked, that some of the poses his daughters assumed when photographed without clothes were not his doing, and that, to the extent he did give his daughters direction when photographing them in the nude, he did so in the same manner as he did when they were clothed, and that he believed there to be nothing inappropriate about the photographs, the defense did much more than elicit generic evidence as to his background and character. The defense undeniably sought to suggest that Russell had no motive or intent to create sexually provocative photographs of his daughters. We note that the government relied on both Rule 404(b) and Rule 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in seeking the admission of the molestation evidence. Rule 404(b), of course, allows evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts for purposes other than to show the defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense, including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Rule 414, which applies to cases in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestationdefined broadly to include the types of sexual exploitation proscribed by section 2251(a), see Rule 414(d)(2)authorizes the admission of evidence that the defendant has committed other acts of child molestation for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant, including a defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense. Rule 414(a) (emphasis supplied). In this case, however, the court appears to have relied on Rule 404(b) alone in admitting the molestation evidence, as it gave an instruction advising the jury that it could consider this evidence only on issues of motive, intent, identity, or absence of mistake or accident in reference to the offenses charged in the indictment. R. 40 at 26; R. 79 at 108 (Instruction No. 18). As we believe the molestation evidence was relevant to Russell's motive and intent in taking the charged photographs, we agree that Rule 404(b) supported the admission of this evidence. Russell contends that because this evidence related to alleged acts of molestation, which obviously were different from the charged offense of creating and distributing child pornography, the evidence was inadmissible. But a prior act need not be the same as the charged offense in order to be relevant under Rules 404(b) or 414. See, e.g., United States v. Tylkowski, 9 F.3d 1255, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993). Indeed, we recognized in United States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir.2006), that where a defendant is charged with an offense involving child pornography, prior acts of molestation can be relevant to his motive. The defendant in Sebolt was charged with, among other offenses, advertising child pornography online, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A). At trial, the district court admitted evidence that he had molested, and attempted to molest, multiple minors (including one of his relatives). We deemed that evidence relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b) because it was strong evidence of his motive to advertise child pornography online. Id. at 917. Prior instances of sexual misconduct with a child victim, we reasoned, may establish a defendant's sexual interest in children and thereby serve as evidence of the defendant's motive to commit a charged offense involving the sexual exploitation of children. Id. (citing United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir.1996)); see also United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir.2009) (repeating the same point). We acknowledged that [t]he motive to molest children does not completely overlap with the propensity to possess, transport, or advertise child pornography. Sebolt, 460 F.3d at 917. Yet, the conceptual gap between molestation and child pornography is not so wide as to `induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis . . . rather than on the evidence presented.' Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir.2003)). Sebolt disposes of Russell's argument on this point. Although the incidents of inappropriate touching were removed in time from the creation of the charged photographs by one to two years, we do not agree with Russell that these acts were so temporally remote as to deprive the acts of touching of their relevance. The passage of one to two years might well render a defendant's prior acts non-probative in another case, but we are not convinced that was true here, given the purpose for which they were offered. See, e.g., United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 487-88 (7th Cir.2005) (defendant's sexual assault of minor twelve years prior to charged offense of conspiring to travel in foreign commerce with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct supported inference that defendant was a pedophile and was therefore probative of his knowledge and intent vis-à-vis resort for pedophiles he and co-defendant established); United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 917 & n. 14 (7th Cir.1999) (portion of threat letter sent to judge, referencing defendant's stabbing of correctional officer some eighteen months earlier, was probative of defendant's intent to instill fear in his victim). The inference that the government wished the jury to draw from Jane Doe 1's testimony that her father had touched her sexually was that Russell is a pedophile. We agree, as the district court did, that her testimony supports that inference. See Julian, 427 F.3d at 488. And that inference in turn supports the government's theory that Russell enticed and persuaded his daughters to pose in the nude for the purpose of creating sexually suggestive photographs that he could sell to or otherwise share with other pedophiles on the Internet. That the inappropriate touching Jane Doe 1 reported had occurred one to two years before Russell photographed his daughters did not defeat that inference or render it less plausible. Pedophiles do not suddenly stop being pedophiles. See, e.g., Pessimism About Pedophilia, 27 Harvard Mental Health Letter No. 1, at 1 (July 2010) (Like other sexual orientations, pedophilia is unlikely to change.); Ryan C. Hall, M.D. and Richard C. Hall, M.D., A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82 Mayo Clinic Proc. 457, 465 (April 2007) ([T]the urges can be managed, but the core attraction does not change.). Even if Russell had not molested either of his daughters in the intervening year or two, it is highly unlikely that his desire to engage in sexual contact with them or with other young girls had suddenly dissipated in that period of time. Russell also contends that Jane Doe 1's testimony on this subject was devastating to his defense, but in view of the strict limits that the district judge imposed on this testimony, we do not believe it was so unduly prejudicial as to require its exclusion. The jury knew nothing other than that Russell, according to Jane Doe 1, had touched her inappropriately. It knew none of the particulars, including how many incidents of touching there had been. Consequently, although the jurors knew enough to draw the inference that Russell was sexually interested in Jane Doe 1 and had touched her in a sexual way, it knew none of the disturbing and inflammatory details that Jane Doe 1 had recounted to the prosecution. The district court thus did everything it could to cabin the prejudicial impact of the testimony by limiting Jane Doe 1's testimony to the one point that was relevant: her father had touched her inappropriately. By contrast, the district court did give Russell's counsel appropriate leeway to explore on cross-examination of Jane Doe 1 the belated nature of her disclosure of the molestation. Given that Jane Doe 1 had previously (and repeatedly) denied any sexual contact between her father and herself, and then reported the incidents only weeks before the trial commenced, it is possible, as Russell suggests, that her testimony was fabricated. But given how traumatic sexual molestation is, it is by no means unusual for a child to deny that her parent has abused her when, in fact, he has. See, e.g., Leadership Council on Child Abuse & Interpersonal Violence, Eight Common Myths About Child Sexual Abuse, http://www.leadershipcouncil.org/1/ res/csa_myths.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (Contrary to the popular misconception that children are prone to exaggerate sexual abuse, research shows that children often minimize and deny, rather than embellish, what has happened to them.); Thomas D. Lyon & Elizabeth C. Ahern, Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: Implications for Interviewing, in THE APSAC HANDBOOK ON CHILD MALTREATMENT 233, 234-38 (John E.B. Myers, ed.) (3d ed. 2011). Whether Jane Doe 1's testimony on this subject was true or not was a question for the jury. The district court enabled Russell's counsel to establish the chronology of her inconsistent statements on this subject, thus allowing the jury to weigh her testimony appropriately.