Opinion ID: 2650062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rodriguez’s Consent

Text: The district court also did not clearly err in finding that Rodriguez freely and voluntarily gave consent to search the home. 1 A warrantless search is “presumptively unreasonable” unless the Government shows that the search fell within an exception to the warrant requirement such as consent or plain view. United States v. Aguirre, 664 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 2011). Consent must be freely and voluntarily given. United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1997). “The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined from a totality of the circumstances” and is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 436 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We apply a six-factor test to determine voluntariness: 1) the voluntariness of the defendant’s custodial status; 2) the presence of coercive police procedures; 3) the extent and level of the defendant’s cooperation with the police; 4) the defendant’s 1 Rodriguez’s motion to suppress below also argued that Lowe did not give consent to a search. The district court did not address this argument having found that Rodriguez had given consent. Accordingly, only Rodriguez’s consent is at issue on appeal. 7 Case: 12-51062 Document: 00512465816 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/10/2013 No. 12-51062 awareness of his right to refuse consent; 5) the defendant’s education and intelligence; and 6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be found. United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509, 523 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “[N]o single factor is determinative.” Id. Rodriguez cites United States v. Galberth, 846 F.2d 983, 988 (5th Cir. 1988), in arguing that no evidence demonstrates he has sophisticated, or even rudimentary, knowledge about his rights regarding searches. He further argues that his custodial status was not voluntary in light of the large number of heavily armed officers who stormed in, the weapons that were pointed at his children, and the officers’ threat to have the minor children placed into state custody. The district court, in applying the six-factor test, agreed with Rodriguez on at least one point, finding that “the evidence makes clear in this case that the defendant’s custodial status was not voluntary.” Additionally, the district court found that “[Rodriguez] likely knew that incriminating evidence would be found, yet chose to consent to the search anyway.” In light of these facts, factors one and six favor Rodriguez, and we find no reason to disagree. The remaining factors, however, tend to support the Government’s position, and the district court did not clearly err in these factual findings. To begin, many of the district court’s factual findings defuse Rodriguez’s other arguments. The district court found that Rodriguez was able to read the admonishments and indicated to the officers that he understood them, and that “his testimony at the hearing displayed that he is not lacking in the intelligence necessary to understand the implication of the consent on his Constitutional rights.” Rodriguez does not challenge this factual finding, which weighs factor five in the Government’s favor. Similarly, Rodriguez does not challenge the district court’s factual finding, applicable to factor two, that the testimony as 8 Case: 12-51062 Document: 00512465816 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/10/2013 No. 12-51062 to whether there were threats to remove the children was incredible and contradicted by Rodriguez’s signature on the consent to search form. Nor does Rodriguez challenge the district court’s finding that “there was no evidence that any officer threatened any person with a firearm.” Rodriguez does not contend that the district court clearly erred in finding these facts; his arguments on appeal simply re-urge his and Lowe’s testimony in the hope that this Court re-weighs the factors in his favor. His arguments are unavailing. Indeed, this Court is “particularly deferential” to such findings as they are based on live oral testimony that “the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” Aguirre, 664 F.3d at 612 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found additional facts further demonstrating that Rodriguez freely and voluntarily gave consent: he was Mirandized and made aware of his right to refuse consent, but nevertheless signed the consent (factor four); he cooperated with the officers throughout the entire process and claimed ownership of anything the officers found (factor three); the police procedures were not especially coercive in light of the circumstances (factor two); and the firearms found in the residence suggest that Rodriguez was comfortable around firearms so as not to be especially intimidated (factor two). Again, Rodriguez does not challenge these factual findings on appeal. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, as the prevailing party below, the totality of the circumstances weigh in favor of finding that Rodriguez freely and voluntarily gave consent to a search of the home. Accordingly, the district court, weighing each of the factors, did not clearly err in ruling that Rodriguez freely and voluntarily gave consent.