Opinion ID: 2708887
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of the district court’s approach

Text: The government sought a 120‐month sentence and Molton sought a guidelines sentence. The district court sentenced Molton to 108 months’ imprisonment, a $500 fine, a $100 special assessment, and three years of supervised release. The district judge explained his choice of sentence at the sentencing hearing and in a sentencing memorandum. At the sentencing hearing, the judge did exactly what we have encouraged judges to do: explain the relevance of the § 3553(a) factors to their sentencing decision. See, e.g., Hill, 645 F.3d at 905. For instance, the district judge considered this particular defendant’s criminal history (“this is Mr. Molton’s third felony involving a firearm”) as well as mitigating considerations (his “horrific childhood”), his characteristics (his “violent and dangerous” nature), and his respect for law (“He has shown little or no respect for the law beginning at a young age. He is only 23. He has criminal history category of four and three weapon offenses. He was on parole at the time of the instant offense and just 12 days earlier was on electronic monitoring.”). The district judge also considered specific deterrence (given Molton’s past, “I am afraid he is likely to recidivate”; “in felonious gun possession cases with [violent] individuals…, guideline sentences do not deter”). The judge determined that a guideline sentence was insufficient punishment for a twenty‐three year old convicted of his third firearm offense. Viewing this defendant in comparison to others, though, the judge declined to sentence Molton to the statutory maximum because that type of punishment “is reserved for the worst No. 13‐2525 11 of the worst.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (instructing district judges to sentence defendants so as to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). Molton argues that the district court did not appropriately consider his background and upbringing. But the judge did consider Molton’s “horrific childhood” and abuse. The judge chose to focus to a greater extent on Molton’s most recent six years of repeated crime, but this sort of weighing is not an abuse of discretion. The district court must impose a sentence that is “not greater than necessary,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but the judge’s concern that Molton would continue to recidivate is not unreasonable given his record, and is consistent with the § 3553(a) factors.2 Molton next takes issue with a thirty‐nine‐page sentencing memorandum that the district court filed after sentencing Molton. The memo first described East St. Louis’s history as primarily one of government corruption, scarce revenue, and crippling debt. It then relayed the city’s current realities: lack of economic opportunities, social services, and police presence; a declining population; and rampant crime, violence, and corruption. This memo presented extensive data on violent crime (murder, rape, assault, robbery, etc.) in East St. Louis compared to other American (and international) cities. Finally, the memo described forty‐five prominent public corruption cases in the last thirteen years. The memo mentioned Molton only three times in its thirty‐ 2 Molton also argues that the district court did not adequately consider his “positive” qualities, but Molton did not point to anything specific for the court to consider. No. 13‐2525 12 nine pages, where it repeatedly emphasized that Molton was not being blamed for the city’s decline. In light of this memo, Molton argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the court gave undue weight to irrelevant concerns like corruption and punished Molton for others’ crimes. The memo is somewhat unorthodox. However, we ultimately reject Molton’s argument because we find that—viewing the memo in conjunction with the court’s statements at the sentencing hearing—the court weighed each of the § 3553(a) factors and provided sufficient rationales for its sentence. The portion of the memorandum that describes the city’s history of corruption and its recent corruption cases is not especially relevant to Molton’s sentence—the memo provides no link between public corruption and gun‐related offenses or violent crimes more generally. If the district judge had commented only on corruption and not on Molton’s specific characteristics, we would need to remand; a district judge should consider general deterrence but must also hand down an “individualized” sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. But the judge’s sentencing memorandum also details violent crime in the city, and this consideration is valid as part of the general deterrence analysis. In fact, our cases have often viewed general deterrence as a means of preventing like or related crimes.3 Thus, the judge’s 3 For instance, we have approved of district judges considering other corruption convictions or data when sentencing a defendant of a corruption crime, or considering other violent crime convictions or data when sentencing a defendant of a violent crime. See, e.g., Hill, 645 F.3d at 911 (affirming a sentence in a corruption case where the court “pointed to the widespread corruption in East St. Louis and the need to deter No. 13‐2525 13 extended analysis of violent crime in East St. Louis ensured the relevance of the sentencing memorandum. True, this memo focuses on only one factor (general deterrence), but that was intentional. The memo merely buttressed the court’s analysis at the sentencing hearing, which appropriately considered the other § 3553(a) factors. Thus, when viewing the hearing and the memo together, we find that the district court considered each of the § 3553(a) factors and provided sufficient rationales for its sentence. In such a situation, “we must give deference to the district court’s determination that the [§ 3553(a)] factors justify” its above‐guidelines sentence. Taylor, 701 F.3d at 1175.