Opinion ID: 403656
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Reemployment Rights Claim

Text: 10 Count I of Ray's complaint also alleged that the TVA had violated Ray's reemployment rights under the Veteran's Preference Act. We find this claim barred for two reasons. First, Ray has admittedly known of the reemployment rights claim since his original complaint in 1974. In fact, Ray asserts as part of his malpractice claim against Drake that Drake failed to raise the reemployment rights issue in the 1974 lawsuit. As we noted above, application of res judicata requires the existence of four elements. Once a court determines that these elements exist, however, res judicata bars subsequent litigation not only in respect of every matter which was actually offered and received to sustain the demand, but also as to every ground of recovery which might have been presented. Jones v. Texas Tech University, 656 F.2d 1137, 1141 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Stevenson, 516 F.2d at 108-09 (emphasis added)); Commercial Box & Lumber v. Uniroyal, Inc., 623 F.2d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 1980). After reviewing the record, we conclude that Ray's breach of contract claim and the alleged violation of his Veteran's Preference Act rights are substantially the same cause of action. We also find that substantially the same facts would be involved in support of each cause of action. See Stevenson, supra, 516 F.2d at 109. The claim under the Act, therefore, is an alternative theory of recovery for his termination from TVA, and Ray's failure to incorporate this theory into his earlier lawsuit bars the claim under res judicata principles. 11 Second, even if Ray's claim was not subject to the bar of res judicata, it is untimely. Numerous Supreme Court and former Fifth Circuit precedents have reiterated the rule that when a federal statute granting a cause of action fails to include a limitations period, a federal court should look to the state statute of limitations governing the state action most closely analogous to the federal action. E.g., United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1562, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981); Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1794-95, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); Vigman v. Community National Bank & Trust Co., 635 F.2d 455, 459 (5th Cir. 1981); Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1261-62 (5th Cir. 1977). Of course, if the state limitations period is so short as to interfere with federal policies, it will not be applied to the federal action. Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2454, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977); Franklin v. City of Marks, 439 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1971). 12 Here, Ray's claim that the TVA violated his rights under the Veteran's Preference Act is most analogous to state actions for injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract, which in Alabama are subject to a one-year limitations period. Ala.Code § 6-2-39(a)(5). See Rubin v. O'Koren, 621 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980), on rehearing, 644 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1981) (one-year limitations period applies to civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Sewell v. Grand Lodge of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 445 F.2d 545, 548-50 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024, 92 S.Ct. 674, 30 L.Ed.2d 674 (one-year period applies to suit under the federal labor laws for wrongful discharge); United Klans of America v. McGovern, 453 F.Supp. 836, 839-40 (N.D.Ala.1978), aff'd, 621 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980) (one-year period applies to claims by Ku Klux Klan that FBI officers violated its constitutional rights). Moreover, we conclude on the basis of these precedents that the one-year limitations period of Alabama law is not so short as to frustrate federal policy. Cf. Franklin v. City of Marks, supra, 439 F.2d at 669 (court refused to adopt 10-day limitations period for a § 1983 action). From the record in this case, the fact is undisputed that Ray knew of his reemployment rights claims in 1974. Hence even if Ray's claim was not prohibited by res judicata, the time for filing his claim lapsed in 1975 and is now barred by the applicable statute of limitations.