Opinion ID: 70729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The July Trial and Direct Appeal

Text: 19 At Venson's second trial on the same charges in July 1993, he was convicted on Count One charging the sexual battery of McNeeley, but acquitted on Counts Two and Three, involving Pressley and Shockley. Before the second trial, Venson's attorney filed a plea of former jeopardy in which he argued that no manifest necessity existed for declaring a mistrial with respect to Counts One and Two based on the improper question put to the complaining witness on Count Three. The trial court denied the motion, responding: 20 ... As to Count 3, I think that the order that the Court entered on the mistrial states my position. 21 As to the issue of whether the counts could have been separated, I don't know. You may have a point. I'm not willing to tackle that at this point. If need be, that will go up to the Court of Appeals.... 22 (R.Ex. A, Second Trial, Vol. I at 6). 2 23 On direct appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the question asked by Venson's attorney was improper and that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in granting the mistrial. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied certiorari.