Opinion ID: 183769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application to Legal Framework

Text: Kyle-Eiland contends that the district court erred in “effectively conduct[ing] a mini-trial on the paper record,” instead of construing all evidence to the benefit of the nonmoving party, as is required in summary judgment review.11 (Pl.’s Br. 44.) Defendant argues that Kyle-Eiland has failed to set forward a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation against Neff, and “moreover, even if she could present a prima facie case against Neff, Kyle-Eiland fails to demonstrate that Neff’s stated reasons for removing her were pretextual.” (Def.’s Br. 14.) We find that, with all record evidence weighed her favor, Kyle-Eiland has failed to present a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. We therefore hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant. 1. Exercise of Protected Rights Known to Defendant There is no evidence in the record to support a finding that Neff knew of Kyle-Eiland’s OCRC charges during the period between her hire into CLEX and her termination from OSU. Neff squarely denies any knowledge of any OCRC complaints filed by Kyle-Eiland at any time. KyleEiland presents no evidence to suggest otherwise. 11 While Kyle-Eiland’s brief acknowledges that “the court below made no specific finding as to whether evidence presented by Kyle-Eiland in support of her claims against Neff established a prima facie [sic],” (Pl.’s Br. 48), Kyle-Eiland does not now endeavor to set forth the prima facie case, but instead only focuses on the issues of causation and pretext. Nonetheless, because we find that Kyle-Eiland has failed to set forth such a case, we conduct a full analysis of the facts herein. -13- No. 09-3965 Kyle-Eiland instead argues that Weber’s knowledge of her OCRC complaints (as evidenced through Weber’s conversation with Naber) can be imputed to Neff, because Neff consulted with Weber regarding placing Kyle-Eiland on a PIP. But Weber testified that she had no knowledge of Kyle-Eiland’s OCRC complaints at the time that she assisted Neff in preparation for the PIP; Weber does admit that she later learned of the OCRC complaints. Absent any evidentiary showing to the contrary, it is impossible for Kyle-Eiland to support her contention that Weber told Neff about her history with the OCRC. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the OCRC contacted Neff, or anyone at OSU, regarding the complaints at or around the time at which they were filed. Nor is there anything to suggest that the complaints would have been placed in Kyle-Eiland’s personnel file or in any other location where they would have been accessible to Neff, Weber or other OSU employees. Therefore, Kyle-Eiland has failed to raise a material factual dispute regarding whether her protected activity was known to Neff. 2. Adverse Employment Action or Harassment An “adverse employment action” requires a showing that “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which . . . means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal citations omitted). We have held that “de minimis employment actions are not materially adverse and, thus, not actionable.” Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has limited “adverse -14- No. 09-3965 employment actions” to something more than “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68. Kyle-Eiland has presented evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the PIP constituted an adverse employment action. Normally, “a negative performance evaluation does not constitute an adverse employment action, unless the evaluation has an adverse impact on an employee’s wages or salary.” Tuttle v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 322 (6th Cir. 2007). But a negative performance evaluation may rise to the level of an adverse action if the employee can “point to a tangible employment action that she alleges she suffered, or is in jeopardy of suffering, because of the downgraded evaluation.” Morris, 201 F.3d at 789. In this case, the PIP may have led directly to Kyle-Eiland’s dismissal from CLEX.12 3. Causal Connection Between Activity and Adverse Action Kyle-Eiland argues that “the temporal proximity of [her] complaints of discrimination, as evidenced by Weber’s knowledge of the charge filing in her conversation with Marcie Naber, combined with the heightened scrutiny of her performance shortly before her discharge, is sufficient to demonstrate the causal nexus needed to establish a prima facie case.” (Pl.’s Reply at 2.) In support, Kyle-Eiland cites this Court’s decision in Hamilton v. General Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2009). 12 Kyle-Eiland’s termination from CLEX clearly constitutes an adverse employment action. But this claim is not before this Court as a result of Plaintiff’s failure to administratively exhaust, as it was covered by no recorded EEOC/OCRC charge. We again note problems with OCRC’s recordkeeping , however, and acknowledge that Kyle-Eiland asserts that she filed a charge covering the termination of her position. As discussed below, even if we entertained this claim, Kyle-Eiland cannot show Neff’s reasons for firing her to be pretext. -15- No. 09-3965 The case now before us is easily distinguishable from Hamilton. In Hamilton, the first three elements of the prima facie case were undisputed, but defendants claimed that the plaintiff failed to establish the requisite causal connection. Id. at 435. The Court held that “the combination of . . . increased scrutiny with the temporal proximity of [plaintiff’s] termination occurring less than three months after [plaintiff’s] EEOC filing is sufficient to establish the causal nexus needed to establish a prima facie case.” Id. at 435-436. In so determining, we built upon our precedent in Mickey v. Zeider Tool & Die Co., where we held that “[w]here an adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, such temporal proximity between the events is significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation.” 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). In this case, Kyle-Eiland submits no evidence to indicate that Neff ever knew about her OCRC filings, either before or after he began the alleged period of “heightened scrutiny.” Instead, Kyle-Eiland merely raises an accusation that Weber and Naber may have known of the OCRC charges during the relevant timeframe, which by way of “common sense” implicates Neff. Unfortunately, Kyle-Eiland points to no evidence to support this theory. And because there is no evidence that speaks to when Neff may have learned about the OCRC charges, if he ever did, KyleEiland is unable to establish temporal proximity to the time of her termination. Kyle-Eiland is also unable to show heightened scrutiny. In fact, Kyle-Eiland states that she knew of many people at CLEX who “had problems with Al Neff,” including more than one white employee. (Kyle-Eiland Dep. 228.) And there is additional evidence to show that Neff placed more -16- No. 09-3965 than one person on a PIP during his tenure at CLEX.13 This evidence implies that Neff subjected many employees, regardless of race or exercise of protected activity, to intense scrutiny. 4. Non-discriminatory Reasons for Employment Decisions Assuming, for argument’s sake, that Kyle-Eiland meets her initial burden of production, Neff offers several non-discriminatory reasons for his employment decisions. Neff points to Kyle-Eiland’s inability to create financial reports in the style requested; complaints he received about her interpersonal skills from at least one project director; her failure to complete assigned tasks (such as a kitchen inventory and the creation of a key system); her timeliness and absences from the office; and her late payments to several vendors as reasons for her termination. 5. Pretext for Discrimination Kyle-Eiland argues that the court can make a “reasonable inference from Neff’s lack of any clear direction, training or progressive, or corrective action followed by his assertion of frivolous grounds for assessing her performance as deficient . . . prior to her termination,” that his stated nondiscriminatory reasons for Kyle-Eiland’s termination are pretextual. (Pl.’s Br. 44.) Kyle-Eiland asserts that the district court therefore erred when it “weighed and rebutted that reasonable inference,” instead of allowing the issue to be considered by a jury. (Pl.’s Br. 49.) 13 There is evidence, in the form of testimony from Neff, to indicate that several other employees were placed on PIPs during the same general time period. Amongst these employees was Carolyn Vesely, a white employee whom Kyle-Eiland references on several occasions as not being disciplined for actions similar to her own. -17- No. 09-3965 Kyle-Eiland’s argument demonstrates a certain misunderstanding of the standard of review for summary judgment. The standard requires that “evidence in the record” be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; it does not require that all bald assertions, opinions, or even genuinely held beliefs asserted by the nonmoving party be adopted wholeheartedly by a court, even when such assertions are completely unsupported by the record. Nonetheless, Kyle-Eiland outlines the following material facts as remaining in dispute: “the absence of progressive discipline and [the] conflicting testimony about whether the requested financial reports were produced by Kyle-Eiland for Neff.” (Pl.’s Br. 49.) Kyle-Eiland further argues, plainly stated, that Neff’s assertion that he was disappointed with the form of the financial reports is completely fabricated. (Pl.’s Br. 50.) (implying that Neff “predetermine[d] a result and then construct[ed] a process and adopt[ed] criteria that produce[d] that result.”) An examination of the record reveals that the question of progressive discipline is not a disputed issue for at least three reasons. First, as an unclassified at-will employee, Kyle-Eiland was not covered by OSU’s Corrective Action & Involuntary Termination Policy, and was not guaranteed the benefit of “progressive corrective action.” Because she was unclassified staff, she was instead employed “at the discretion of [her] appointing authority” and could be terminated, under certain conditions, with no advance notice at all. Secondly, there is no record evidence to indicate that unclassified employees were routinely granted the benefit of progressive discipline, which might support the implication that providing such discipline was the practice, if not the written policy, of CLEX or OSU. -18- No. 09-3965 Lastly, the record makes clear that Kyle-Eiland actually received some form of pretermination discipline in the form of a written reprimand, a written PIP, a follow-up PIP, and several disciplinary meetings with Neff, though none of these actions were specifically required by OSU policy. Kyle-Eiland offers no articulation of, nor any document outlining, what other forms of corrective action she believes would have been necessary to satisfy the requirement of “progressive discipline.” Because there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Kyle-Eiland was guaranteed progressive discipline or otherwise subject to OSU’s progressive corrective action policy, and because there is no disagreement about the forms of discipline that she did receive before her termination, this issue does not pose a material factual dispute. Moving on to the issue of the financial reporting also reveals no disputes of material fact. The question here is not whether Kyle-Eiland believed that her work performance was acceptable; it is whether Neff was satisfied that Kyle-Eiland had properly produced the requested financial reports. The record shows that Neff consistently, from May 2006 until May 2007, expressed his dissatisfaction with the reports provided by Kyle-Eiland. He also approved Excel training courses for Kyle-Eiland and set up training meetings between Kyle-Eiland and Fultz, both of which suggest that he was unhappy with the reports and was attempting to facilitate Kyle-Eiland’s improvement. There is also evidence on the record to show that Neff, on at least one occasion, sent Kyle-Eiland’s reports to a third party to be either re-formatted or completely re-done, which further supports his claim that he not pleased with her reports. Kyle-Eiland presents no evidence to dispute any of these -19- No. 09-3965 facts. Instead, Kyle-Eiland merely asserts that she believed that she was producing reports in the manner requested.14 As highlighted above, Kyle-Eiland also implies that pretext should be found because Neff is just not very believable. Kyle-Eiland challenges Neff’s credibility by arguing, for example, that “Neff’s deposition testimony makes clear he has little understanding of the reports and budget documents he professed Ms. Kyle-Eiland had not sufficiently mastered.” (Pl.’s Br. 21.) In addition to mischaracterizing Neff’s deposition testimony, Kyle-Eiland incorrectly interprets the Burdine burden shifting requirement in this argument. Under the burden shifting framework, Neff is not required to forward a preponderance of evidence (or meet any standard of evidence at all) to prove a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification; he must only articulate a reasonable justification. At that point, the burden shifts back to Kyle-Eiland to forward evidence of pretext. Furthermore, any disputes of fact regarding whether and how financial reports were produced would not be material, because the disposition of those questions would not affect the outcome of the case. As the district court found, Neff has offered multiple legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging Plaintiff. In addition to the problems with the reports that Plaintiff eventually generated, Plaintiff had failed to pay the Concourse Hotel and the cleaning service as required. There is also no evidence that Neff knew that Plaintiff had created a key system as required, if indeed she did create such a system. (Dist. Ct. Op. 16.) 14 Notably, Kyle-Eiland does not assert that she was ever producing reports in the manner requested by Neff. On the contrary, she asserts only that she produced reports as directed by Stump, and that she produced reports in accordance with the training she received from Fultz. -20- No. 09-3965 Because Kyle-Eiland calls into question none of these other, non-discriminatory reasons for her termination, even if there were some dispute about whether Neff eventually became satisfied with her financial reporting, Neff’s decision to dismiss her would still be based on legitimate grounds. Because Kyle-Eiland concedes all pretext arguments other than those related to progressive discipline and financial reporting, and because these arguments are unpersuasive, we find that KyleEiland has failed to present any material factual disputes supporting a finding of pretext.