Opinion ID: 203021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to State the Reasons for Defendants' Sentences

Text: Arango and Osorio both argue that their sentences should be vacated and their cases remanded for resentencing because the court did not state in open court, at the time of sentencing, its reasons for the sentences imposed, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). That provision also requires the court to explain why it imposed a sentence at a particular point within the range if the range exceeds twenty-four months, as it did here. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). A joint sentencing hearing was conducted in January 2006, approximately eight months after the conclusion of the fourteen-day evidentiary hearing on the defendants' involvement in the charged crimes. To explain our conclusion that no § 3553(c) error occurred with respect to either defendant, we begin by describing the sentencing proceeding in some detail.
Near the outset of the sentencing hearing, the district court explained that it would stay with the miscalculated $1.8 million figure for the money laundering count, see supra note 1, and it then engaged in a lengthy exchange with counsel about the defendants' request for a three-level, rather than two-level, adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The court considered carefully whether Osorio's Alford plea should make him ineligible for the acceptance of responsibility benefits, but it ultimately concluded that both defendants were entitled to the two-level credit. The court next explored Osorio's criminal history, which consisted of a drunk driving incident thirteen years earlier and his failure to complete payments on the related fine, and found that Osorio properly was placed in CHC II based on that episode. The court then proceeded to impose sentence on Arango. After confirming with both parties that it had properly calculated the Guidelines range to be 262 to 327 months, the court asked the government for its recommendation. The government proposed a term of 262 months and a $2 million fine. Defense counsel urged the court to accept that recommendation  the low end of the range  offering various reasons why his client should be treated leniently. [11] Arango also addressed the court personally, seeking to refute his leadership role in the conspiracy. [12] The government then asked for an opportunity at some point to just address the question of a guideline sentence versus a non-guideline sentence, the factors of 3553(a), and the court invited the prosecutor to do so immediately. The prosecutor spoke at length about the statutory factors, pointing out that the crime of drug trafficking is dangerous to users, their families, and American society as a whole, and that the court had heard evidence that Colombian drug traffickers are particularly dangerous. He detailed the leadership role played by the defendants and the extensive nature of the conspiracies. In examining the defendants' history and characteristics, the prosecutor acknowledged that [e]ach has a family and friends who love them and will miss them, but urged the court to take into account the evidence that they earned substantial income from dealing drugs in the United States, returning to Colombia to live fairly comfortably, but nonetheless continued to supervise and direct other people in the distribution of drugs here in the United States. The prosecutor also emphasized the need to send a message to other people who might think of doing the same things they are. He continued: It's necessary to let people know that if they're going to stay in Colombia and direct other people in distributing cocaine or other drugs in the United States, the government's going to find them, the government's going to extradite them, the government is going to get them back here, the government is going to prove its case; and they're going to be facing very long sentences, sentencing conceivably so long that it might make somebody think twice about whether or not it's worth ruining all that money given the length of the sentences they're going to be serving. That's why the government feels that the conservative sentence under the guidelines at the low end is at least what's called for as to these defendants, your Honor. Thereafter, the court, without explanation, imposed the 262-month term and a $2 million fine on Arango. The court then addressed Osorio's circumstances, rejecting the view that CHC II overstated his criminal history and finding that his sentencing range therefore was 292 to 365 months. The government again recommended the low end of the range  292 months. Osorio's counsel, stating that he had intended to seek a sentence of sixteen years, ultimately asked the court to just impose a sentence substantially less than the 292 months. He urged the court to take into consideration the § 3553(a) factors, noting that he had carefully consider[ed] the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed, and why the guidelines are much more than should be imposed on this case. He pointed to Osorio's separation from his family, including two young children, continuing threats from another member of the conspiracy, and his lack of prior criminal involvement. Osorio also spoke at length, asking forgiveness and addressing his family circumstances, his fear of an attack on his family by Vallejo, his difficult time in jail, and his view that Cruz had not told the truth about his involvement in the conspiracy. Osorio's counsel concluded the colloquy by asking the court to factor in his discussions with the government about Osorio's willingness to cooperate and the possibility of a so-called safety valve reduction, [13] for which he later was found ineligible. The court then announced its sentencing decision: I am not going to impose a guideline sentence. . . . [T]he low end of the guideline sentence is 292 months, which is I guess 30 months above the sentence that I've imposed on Mr. Arango, and that 30 months is a consequence of this criminal history category two, which is the drunk driving offense. And while I don't minimize that offense, the offense involved here of these two defendants as far as I can tell are not substantially different in commission of this offense. And it seems to me that they should not have a different outcome on the basis of that  that drunk driving offense in Mr. Osorio's case. So I'm going to  and also because I think that the 262 months that I've imposed on Mr. Arango, and which I propose to impose on Mr. Osorio, itself is sufficient to meet the sentencing factors outlined in the statute, and for that reason I'm going to impose that sentence as the term of imprisonment on Mr. Osorio.
Our description of this sentencing history makes it apparent that the district court gave no contemporaneous explanation at all for Arango's sentence. For Osorio, the court explained only why it did not impose a longer sentence, not why it had rejected a shorter one. In most circumstances, this approach would be inadequate to satisfy the court's obligation under § 3553(c) to state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence. Although we do not require that the sentencing court's explanation be precise to the point of pedantry, . . . the court ordinarily should identify the main factors on which it relies. United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40-41 (1st Cir.2006). Here, the court's only explanation was for Osorio, and it said nothing about why such a long sentence was appropriate, other than to say it was long enough to meet the sentencing factors outlined in the statute. Nonetheless, we have recognized that [e]ven silence is not necessarily fatal; `a court's reasoning can often be inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or contained in the presentence report with what the judge did.' Id. (quoting United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir.2006)); see also García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 134 n. 15 (1st Cir.2007) ([W]e reject any defense argument that we cannot uphold a reasonable sentence if the district court does not make an explicit statement of its reasons on the record. Our precedent is exceedingly clear that we can look to the record to clarify the judge's reasoning.). Multiple factors persuade us that the court's deficient explanation did not constitute error. First, neither defendant has challenged on appeal the reasonableness of his sentence. Even with the knowledge obtained from the statement of reasons contained in their written judgments of conviction, [14] they point to no factors the court allegedly over-emphasized or neglected, and do not argue that their sentences are disproportionate to their crimes. Indeed, Arango is foreclosed from making any such claims, having asked the court to impose the very sentence that he received. Given that the explanation requirement is primarily intended to ensure meaningful appellate review of the reasonableness of a sentence, see, e.g., United States v. Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2007), the need for an explicit statement is measurably reduced where  as in Arango's case  the court imposes the term the defendant has requested. With respect to Osorio, the court similarly may have believed that defense counsel's request for a below-Guidelines sentence was satisfied by the thirty-month downward variance and, for that reason, explained only why it rejected the higher term requested by the government. The absence of a reasonableness challenge by Osorio supports the logic of such an assumption. However, enabling the appellate court to assess the parties' arguments about reasonableness is only one purpose of the explanation requirement. An explanation in open court also furthers the weighty goals of transparency and credibility for the justice system. As the Third Circuit recently commented: The rationale by which a district court reaches a final sentence is important. It offers the defendant, the government, the victim, and the public a window into the decision-making process and an explanation of the purposes the sentence is intended to serve. It promotes respect for the adjudicative process, by demonstrating the serious reflection and deliberation that underlies each criminal sentence, and allows for effective appellate oversight. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 572 (3d Cir.2007) (en banc); see also United States v. Molina, 356 F.3d 269, 277 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that purposes of § 3553(c) include to enable the public to learn why defendant received a particular sentence). In every case, therefore, a purpose is served when the court publicly articulates its rationale for the sentence imposed, and our willingness to excuse summary explanations must therefore have limits. See United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 446 (1st Cir.2007) (While we have on occasion gone to significant lengths in inferring the reasoning behind, and thus in affirming, some less-than-explicit explanations by district courts, there are limits.) (citations omitted); cf. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 521 ([T]he district court's obligation to explain is not excused by our discretion to discern its reasoning from the record on appeal.) (Torruella, J., concurring). Such restraint is of no help to appellants, however, because we believe the court's reasoning was sufficiently transparent in the circumstances of this case that our limits were not transgressed. As our detailed description of the hearing reveals, the district court's sentencing decisions came after considerable deliberation. Before pronouncing sentence, the court addressed at length two significant issues that were specifically contested  the propriety of a three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility (including whether Osorio should be given any adjustment in light of his Alford plea), and Osorio's criminal history. The court's rulings on those issues immediately followed the colloquies in which the government and defense counsel set out their respective positions. Although the court did not explicitly say so, it clearly was persuaded by the government's argument that the timing of the defendants' pleas foreclosed the third point for acceptance of responsibility. The court did explain both why it granted Osorio the two point-reduction and why it refused to alter his criminal history category. [15] In addition, the court elaborated during the hearing on its earlier decision to use the miscalculated $1.8 million as the money laundering figure and confirmed the accuracy of its Guidelines calculations with all parties. The court heard extensive argument regarding the § 3553(a) factors from the government, and both Osorio and his attorney responded. Importantly, the court possessed detailed knowledge of the crimes from the fourteen-day evidentiary hearing that preceded the sentencing hearing. Indeed, the one issue personally challenged by both defendants at the sentencing hearing was their asserted leadership roles in the offense, but on that issue the court had explicitly made a finding at the end of the evidentiary hearing, ruling that they were leaders in the activity. [16] The full context makes it apparent that, in sentencing both defendants to the lowest term of imprisonment within the Guidelines range applicable to Arango, the court was acknowledging the defendants' arguments for leniency but rejecting their view that the § 3553(a) factors warranted a sentence outside the standard range for the crimes they committed. We previously have recognized that within-Guidelines sentences require a lesser degree of explanation than those that fall outside the guideline sentencing range, Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d at 41, and we think that observation is all the more true when the sentence is at the very bottom of the Guidelines range. [17] See United States v. Navedo-Concepción, 450 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir.2006) (The more obvious the reasons for a choice, the less that needs to be explained.). There was, in short, no ambiguity here; the court's reasoning can be readily inferred from the record. In sum, against the backdrop of a lengthy evidentiary hearing, acquiescence to the government's recommendation from one defendant, and a downward departure for the other defendant  and no challenge from either defendant to the reasonableness of the sentences imposed  we conclude that the district court sufficiently revealed in open court its reasons for imposing the particular sentences. [18]