Opinion ID: 2752896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Additional Mitigating Witnesses

Text: Mr. Tanzi contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present additional mitigating witnesses and for presenting incomplete testimony from his mother, Phyllis Whalen. Specifically, Mr. Tanzi argues trial counsel should have presented testimony from his “abuser, two former neighbors, an additional mental health expert, and a former camp counselor.” Tanzi II, 94 So. 3d at 492. Mr. Tanzi says these witnesses were available to testify about “valuable mitigation in its own right,” and would have been “supportive of the fact that Tanzi suffers from . . . XYY syndrome.” For example, Mr. Tanzi argues trial counsel should have presented the testimony of Shawn Martin (five years older than Mr. Tanzi), who sexually abused Mr. Tanzi when Mr. Tanzi was in elementary school. We know now what Mr. Martin might have said at trial, to the extent that he testified at the postconviction 25 Case: 13-12421 Date Filed: 11/19/2014 Page: 26 of 34 hearing on Mr. Tanzi’s case. Mr. Martin testified that Mr. Tanzi’s father was physically abusive to Mr. Tanzi. Mr. Martin also admitted that he himself engaged in sexual encounters with Mr. Tanzi “four or five” times. However, Mr. Martin minimized his sexual involvement with Mr. Tanzi, characterizing it as “just kids fooling around kind of thing.” Mr. Martin also testified that he and Mr. Tanzi saw the defendant’s mother having sex with her boyfriend several times and that Mr. Tanzi had access to pornographic magazines. With respect to Ms. Whalen, Mr. Tanzi emphasizes that trial counsel’s presentation of her penalty phase testimony “lacked significant detail and served only to minimize the mitigation that was otherwise presented.” For example, Mr. Tanzi argues that Ms. Whalen’s postconviction-hearing testimony “gave a more compelling and detailed history of Tanzi’s placements in mental health facilities.” The Florida Supreme Court rejected Mr. Tanzi’s argument that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting additional witnesses because Mr. Tanzi had failed to show either deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland. Tanzi II, 94 So. 3d at 492–93. To support its conclusion that trial counsel was not deficient, the Florida Supreme Court recounted the extensive and lengthy mitigation investigation undertaken by the defense team prior to trial: The trial record reflects that trial counsel sought and was granted the appointment of multiple mental health experts to assist with the defense. Further, during the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel explained that he sought out lay witnesses, school records, medical 26 Case: 13-12421 Date Filed: 11/19/2014 Page: 27 of 34 records, and psychological records. Trial counsel also explained that he and an investigator traveled to Massachusetts to uncover information regarding Tanzi’s background and possible mitigation evidence. And during the penalty phase, trial counsel presented the testimony of two mental health experts to support the proposed mitigator that Tanzi’s ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform it to the requirements of the law was impaired. The mental health experts, a social worker, and a homeless shelter counselor testified during the penalty phase about Tanzi’s history of mental problems and his stays in and diagnoses at various institutions. The witnesses also addressed the sexual abuse Tanzi suffered as a young child. Further, in an effort to humanize Tanzi, trial counsel presented the testimony of Tanzi’s mother along with photographs of Tanzi growing up. Thus, Tanzi has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s decision to not present all possible witnesses was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”); see also Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 474 (Fla. 2010) (“This Court has also consistently held that a trial counsel’s decision to not call certain witnesses to testify at trial can be reasonable trial strategy.”). Tanzi II, 94 So. 3d at 492–93 (alteration in original). The Florida Supreme Court’s decision finding no deficient performance is not inconsistent with Strickland or otherwise objectively unreasonable. This is not a case where trial counsel failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background; failed to discover physical abuse, sexual abuse, or significant mental health history; failed to seek and obtain relevant background records (such as school, social service, or mental health records); or failed to consult with appropriate mental health professionals and conduct appropriate mental health testing. On this record, it was reasonable for the 27 Case: 13-12421 Date Filed: 11/19/2014 Page: 28 of 34 Florida Supreme Court to follow Strickland and “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel’s decision to not present all possible witnesses “might be considered sound trial strategy.” See 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065 (quotation marks omitted); id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”). Trial counsel did a thorough and comprehensive background investigation that resulted in the presentation of substantial mitigation during the penalty phase. For example, the defense used investigators to collect large numbers of background records about Mr. Tanzi. Defense attorneys travelled to New York and Massachusetts (places where Mr. Tanzi used to live) to interview witnesses and collect records about Mr. Tanzi’s background, including Mr. Tanzi’s “many attempts to treat his mental illness.” Importantly, the defense obtained the expert opinions of numerous psychiatrists and psychologists who performed dozens of tests on Mr. Tanzi. While trial counsel did not call all possible witnesses to testify, there were good reasons not to call some of these witnesses. One defense psychiatrist who found Mr. Tanzi to be psychotic was not called by trial counsel as a witness because his diagnosis would have disclosed to the jury the worst kind of evidence—that Mr. Tanzi had committed a second homicide. Further, trial counsel 28 Case: 13-12421 Date Filed: 11/19/2014 Page: 29 of 34 did not call Hampton Perkins to testify—one of Mr. Tanzi’s former neighbors from Massachusetts who could have provided mitigation—because of Mr. Perkins’s advanced age and resistance to travel. Trial counsel’s decision not to call a reluctant witness or one that might be more harmful than helpful might reasonably be considered sound trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. In any event, “counsel is not required to present all mitigation evidence, even if the additional mitigation evidence would not have been incompatible with counsel’s strategy. Counsel must be permitted to weed out some arguments to stress others and advocate effectively.” Haliburton v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 342 F.3d 1233, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Florida Supreme Court’s decision that Mr. Tanzi failed to show his trial counsel was deficient in not presenting additional mitigating witnesses was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (“A state court must be granted a deference and latitude [under AEDPA] that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.”). Further, the Florida Supreme Court decided that Mr. Tanzi failed to show prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s failure to present additional mitigating witnesses. Tanzi II, 94 So. 3d at 493. There was no prejudice, the court explained, because presentation of the “witnesses who testified during the postconviction hearing ‘would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented 29 Case: 13-12421 Date Filed: 11/19/2014 Page: 30 of 34 to the sentencing judge.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S. Ct. 2071). The Florida Supreme Court gave several examples of how the postconviction evidence was “largely cumulative” to the evidence presented to the jury. See, e.g., id. (“Tanzi’s mother even acknowledged on cross-examination during the evidentiary hearing that there was nothing that she could add that was not provided to the defense originally.”). It then held, “because the additional evidence presented during the postconviction hearing was largely cumulative of the evidence presented during the penalty phase, Tanzi has not established a reasonable probability of a different result had trial counsel presented this additional evidence during the penalty phase.” Id. We have compared the mitigation evidence presented at the state postconviction hearing to that presented during the penalty phase. In doing so, we are mindful that “the United States Supreme Court, this Court, and other circuit courts of appeals generally hold that evidence presented in postconviction proceedings is ‘cumulative’ or ‘largely cumulative’ to or ‘duplicative’ of that presented at trial when it tells a more detailed version of the same story told at trial or provides more or better examples or amplifies the themes presented to the jury.” See Holsey v. Warden, 694 F.3d 1230, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). Although the evidence presented during the postconviction hearing is not identical to the evidence presented during the penalty phase—e.g., the jury never 30 Case: 13-12421 Date Filed: 11/19/2014 Page: 31 of 34 heard about Mr. Tanzi’s XYY genetic abnormality—the evidence is substantially the same in all relevant respects (albeit more detailed). To the extent the additional evidence related to Mr. Tanzi’s genetic abnormality may not be considered largely cumulative, we have previously explained why the absence of that evidence was not prejudicial. For all of these reasons, we cannot say the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that the additional evidence was “largely cumulative” was objectively unreasonable. Given that, it follows that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision finding no prejudice is well within the reasonable bounds of Strickland. See, e.g., Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1409 (finding no reasonable probability of a different sentence where the additional evidence presented in state habeas proceeding largely duplicated the mitigation evidence at trial); Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 22, 130 S. Ct. 383, 387–88 (2009) (finding no reasonable probability of a different sentence, in part, where portion of postconviction evidence “was merely cumulative of the humanizing evidence” that defendant presented at trial); Rose v. McNeil, 634 F.3d 1224, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[A] petitioner cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test with evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence already presented at trial.”).