Opinion ID: 2814318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crook’s Prosecution

Text: ¶8. At the trial, it was established that Crook owned residential property located at 127 Cypress Drive, within the City of Madison, Mississippi. It was undisputed that Duke Swyers lived at the residence from 2007 through 2009, and Tammy Thompson lived there from March 2010 until September 2010. Crook testified that he had option-to-purchase agreements with Swyers and Thompson under which rental payments would go toward the purchase price. He argued that these agreements removed his property from the dictates of RIPLA. However, both Swyers and Thompson testified that they had been renting and never had planned to purchase the property. ¶9. On August 14, 2008, the City sent notifications letters concerning RIPLA to all owners of rental property in the City. The letter informed the owners of the steps needed to comply with RIPLA. The City sent Crook a copy of the letter based upon City officials’ belief that 127 Cypress Drive was rental property. On October 20, 2008, the City sent Crook a letter stating that it had not received his licensing fee and informing him of the consequences of renting property without a rental license. On February 12, 2009, Crook filled out and signed an application for a rental license and paid a $100 licensing fee. The application contained the following statement above Crook’s signature: “[a]pplication is hereby made for an inspection to determine if the existing building described is in compliance with codes and ordinances adopted by the City of Madison.” But because Crook 5 never posted a bond, collateral, or letter of credit, the City never issued a rental license for 127 Cypress Drive. On March 11, 2009, Angie Gelston, a code-enforcement officer, filed charges against Crook for violating RIPLA. Gelston alleged Crook, despite notice, had continued to rent 127 Cypress Drive without a license. On March 26, 2010, Crook sent the City a letter requesting return of the licensing fee and stating that he personally would be occupying 127 Cypress Drive, thus removing the property from the scope of RIPLA. ¶10. On May 20, 2010, the building official, Bill Foshee, sent Crook a letter alleging Crook was in violation of RIPLA for renting the property without a rental license, and that all utilities would be disconnected if Crook did not comply within fifteen days. On June 1, 2010, Crook responded, stating that RIPLA did not apply to the property because Thompson had an option to purchase it and it was not rental property. Foshee reported the violation to the Madison Police Department. On October 6, 2010, Crook was arrested for having rented 127 Cypress Drive without a rental license in violation of RIPLA. ¶11. On January 13, 2011, the Madison Municipal Court convicted Crook of two counts of violating RIPLA. He appealed to the County Court of Madison County and filed motions to dismiss, alleging that (1) RIPLA is facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied; (2) the arrest warrants were invalid due to lack of probable cause; and (3) RIPLA violates a state statute that bars municipalities from directly or indirectly regulating the amount of rent charged for private residential property. See Miss. Code Ann. 21-17-5(2)(h) (Rev. 2007). The county court denied the motions to dismiss, held a trial, and affirmed his convictions. Crook appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed. 6 ¶12. Before the Court of Appeals, Crook raised his arguments from the motions to dismiss and also challenged the weight and sufficiency of the evidence by arguing that RIPLA did not apply to his property due to the option contracts. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Crook v. City of Madison, 2014 WL 4823656,  (Miss. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014). The Court of Appeals found that the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. at . The Court of Appeals found that the City had presented sufficient evidence that Crook had rented the property to Swyers and Thompson and that the purported option contracts had been attempts to disguise these rental relationships. Id. at . But the Court of Appeals found that Crook’s arrest for RIPLA violations was improper. Id. at . The Court of Appeals held that RIPLA does not violate Mississippi Code Section 21-17-5(2)(h). Id. at . The Court of Appeals also held that RIPLA does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches because RIPLA mandates that the building official obtain a warrant if the owner or tenant does not consent to an inspection. Id. at . ¶13. This Court granted Crook’s petition for certiorari. We limit our review to the Court of Appeals’ holding that the warrant provision renders RIPLA constitutional. M.R.A.P. 17(h). Because we find that RIPLA’s warrant provision is insufficient to safeguard landlords’ and tenants’ right of freedom from unreasonable searches, we find RIPLA’s inspection provisions to be unconstitutional.