Opinion ID: 2058897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pommells v Perez

Text: Plaintiff Anthony Pommells was in a three-car accident on March 15, 1998. Days later, on his lawyer's referral, plaintiff visited the North Bronx Medical Center where he had a neurological exam and began a course of daily physical therapy, which he continued for six months, while he remained out of work. Plaintiff initiated suit on June 24, 1998, alleging that he suffered serious injury under Insurance Law § 5102 (d). [2] Plaintiff sought no further medical treatment or review of his alleged accident-related injury for more than three years, when, on January 11, 2002, he consulted with the physician who furnished a report in this case. In the course of his deposition, plaintiff revealed that in July 2000more than two years after the accidenthe experienced severe pain in his back and side, sending him to a hospital emergency room where doctors inserted a stent in his kidney. After four weeks, doctors determined that surgery was necessary. Plaintiff's kidney was removed on August 18, 2000, and he again was out of work for six months. Defendants sought summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claim for failing to raise a triable issue of fact as to the existence of serious injury. In support of their motion, defendants submitted three doctors' reports. Neurologist Michael J. Carciente, based on an October 22, 2001 examination of plaintiff and plaintiff's medical records (including the unsworn MRI report and consideration of plaintiff's kidney problem), opined that there was no evidence of a cervical or a lumbosacral spine radiculopathy and no evidence of a causally related neurologic disability. Radiologist Steven Brownstein, after also reviewing plaintiff's MRI, reported that plaintiff suffered [n]o diffuse bulge or focal disc protrusion and stated that he could detect only a muscle spasm in plaintiff. Radiologist Richard Rafal reported plaintiff suffered [n]o gross acute pathology. In response, plaintiff submitted an unsworn report by Dr. Leonid Slutsky [3] from the March 1998 examination, which, based on a stated series of range of motion tests, revealed limitations in mobility and recommended a course of follow-up medical treatment, including physical therapy, chiropractic treatment, painkilling medication and neurological examinations. Plaintiff also offered a May 11, 1998 unsworn report by Dr. Robert Kronenberg relying on somatosensory evoked potentials (or SSEPs), and which, based on nerve stimulations and recorded limitations in movement, recommended physical therapy, but did not opine as to injury or causation. Finally, plaintiff submitted the sworn report of orthopedist Louis C. Rose, based on the range of motion tests he performed on January 11, 2002 (detailed in the report), opining that plaintiff had MRI documented evidence of a herniated lumbar disk with clinical evidence of radiculopathy and was at risk of development of osteoarthritic changes in an advanced fashion due to the destabilization and micromotion of the cervical and lumbar spine. Dr. Rose noted that plaintiff's symptoms were causally related to the history as stated, which included both the 1998 car accident and plaintiff's past medical history, notably [s]ignificant for right-sided nephrectomy which was undertaken on 8/18/00. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary dismissal and the Appellate Division affirmed, two Justices dissenting, bringing this appeal before us as a matter of right (CPLR 5601 [a]). We now affirm. Proof of a herniated disc, without additional objective medical evidence establishing that the accident resulted in significant physical limitations, is not alone sufficient to establish a serious injury. Defendants initially made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's alleged injuries did not satisfy No-Fault's serious injury threshold, leaving for plaintiff the burden to present objective medical proof of a serious injury causally related to the accident in order to survive summary dismissal. While plaintiff submitted objective evidence regarding physical limitations, his history revealed two interrupting factors: cessation of treatment six months after the accident and a kidney condition. We first address the gap in treatment noted by the trial court and Appellate Divisionthe period of time between the end of plaintiff's physical therapy in 1998 and his visit to Dr. Rose to obtain an expert medical report in 2002. [4] Defendants argue that the gap both renders the medical expert's later opinion on causation speculative and places into question the seriousness of the injuries themselves. In the present case, the so-called gap in treatment was, in reality, a cessation of all treatment. Plaintiff ended his physical therapy six months after the accident and sought no other treatment until years later, when he visited Dr. Rose in connection with this case. While a cessation of treatment is not dispositivethe law surely does not require a record of needless treatment in order to survive summary judgmenta plaintiff who terminates therapeutic measures following the accident, while claiming serious injury, must offer some reasonable explanation for having done so. Here, plaintiff provided no explanation whatever as to why he failed to pursue any treatment for his injuries after the initial six-month period, nor did his doctors ( see Franchini v Palmieri, 1 NY3d 536 [2003]). Further, plaintiff failed to address the effect of his kidney disorder on his claimed accident injuries. Dr. Rose's reportthe only competent evidence supporting plaintiff's response to the summary judgment motion ( see Grasso v Angerami, 79 NY2d 813 [1991])in fact noted the kidney surgery in plaintiff's medical history and then relied on that medical history in opining as to causation. Plaintiff's submission left wholly unanswered the question whether the claimed symptoms diagnosed by Dr. Rose were caused by the accident ( see Franchini, 1 NY3d at 537; see also Simms v APA Truck Leasing Corp., 14 AD3d 322 [1st Dept 2005]; Blackwell v Fraser, 13 AD3d 157 [1st Dept 2004]; Mooney v Edwards, 12 AD3d 424 [2d Dept 2004]; Shaw v Looking Glass Assoc., LP, 8 AD3d 100 [1st Dept 2004]; Shinn v Catanzaro, 1 AD3d 195 [1st Dept 2003]; Lagois v Public Adm'r of Suffolk County, 303 AD2d 644 [2d Dept 2003]; Pajda v Pedone, 303 AD2d 729 [2d Dept 2003]; Monette v Keller, 281 AD2d 523 [2d Dept 2001]). On this record, we conclude that defendants' motion for summary dismissal of the complaint was correctly granted.