Opinion ID: 2623194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delay in the Prosecution

Text: McCullough's murder occurred in September 1990. On December 4, 1990, while defendant was still at large, the district attorney filed a complaint charging defendant and his brother, Steven Horning, with the murder. (The charge against Steven Horning was later dismissed.) On March 22, 1991, defendant was arrested in Arizona on other charges. He was convicted of crimes in that state in May 1991 and received four consecutive life sentences. In a letter dated November 26, 1991, Detective Mayoya of the San Joaquin County Sheriff's Department informed the Arizona Department of Corrections that defendant was accused of McCullough's murder. Detective Mayoya stated that the district attorney had decided not to extradite him due to the fact that Horning was sentenced to four consecutive life terms for the crimes relating to the bank robbery in Winslow. Horning to my understanding will have to serve 100 years before he is eligible for parole. Detective Mayoya asked to be notified of any change of his sentence, due to appeal or retrial, as a reduction in sentence may warrant extradition to California. The letter attached a copy of the arrest warrant for use as a detainer. In May 1992, defendant escaped from custody in Arizona and committed additional crimes. He was rearrested in Arizona in July 1992. On July 22, 1992, the district attorney filed an amended complaint that again charged defendant with McCullough's murder. As of August 1992, however, the district attorney had not yet decided to extradite him. On May 12, 1993, another amended complaint was filed against defendant, charging him with McCullough's murder and, for the first time, alleging special circumstances. Defendant appeared in court on this charge for the first time on May 20, 1993. Defendant moved in the superior court to dismiss the charges due to the delay before he was arraigned on May 20, 1993. The court denied the motion. Defendant contends the court erred and that the two-and-a-half-year delay between the filing of the first complaint in December 1990 and his arraignment in May 1993 violated his rights under both the United States and California Constitutions. [3] We disagree. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the defendant's right to a speedy trial. (See People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 512, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521.) Defendant argues that the complaint filed on December 4, 1990 (while he was still at large) triggered his federal speedy trial rights. He is incorrect. Under the federal Constitution, ... the filing of a felony complaint is by itself insufficient to trigger speedy trial protection. [Citation.] The United States Supreme Court has defined the point at which the federal speedy trial right begins to operate: `[I]t is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.' ( United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468.) ( People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 750, 754-755, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 996 P.2d 32.) Thus, the complaint filed in December 1990 did not trigger defendant's federal speedy trial right. Defendant also argues that at least the letter from Detective Mayoya to the Arizona authorities, dated November 26, 1991, which attached an arrest warrant for use as a detainer, triggered his federal speedy trial protection. That letter was not a formal indictment or information. It also did not cause defendant's actual restraint on these charges. He was not extradited at that time, and he remained incarcerated in Arizona due to conviction of charges in that state. The letter did not cause the government to arrest[] him and thereby commence[ ] its prosecution of him. ( Dillingham v. United States (1975) 423 U.S. 64, 65, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205.) Accordingly, the federal protection attached only when he was actually restrained on these charges in May 1993. Defendant does not complain of delay after that time. Even assuming that, as the trial court found, defendant's federal speedy trial protection attached when Detective Mayoya sent the November 26, 1991, letter to the Arizona authorities, he would not be entitled to relief. The United States Supreme Court has noted that unreasonable delay between formal accusation and trial threatens several harms, including `oppressive pretrial incarceration,' `anxiety and concern of the accused,' and `the possibility that the [accused's] defense will be impaired' by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence. ( Doggett v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 ( Doggett ); see People v. Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 512, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521.) In deciding whether to grant relief due to unreasonable delay in the prosecution, courts must consider what the high court refers to as the four Barker factors ( Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101): whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result. ( Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) The first of these is actually a double enquiry. Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from `presumptively prejudicial' delay.... If the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.... [T]he presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time. ( Id. at pp. 651-652, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) The court indicated that postaccusation delay is considered presumptively prejudicial at least as it approaches one year. ( Id. at p. 652, fn. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686; see also id. at p. 658, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) The high court has explained that in this context, the term presumptive prejudice simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry. ( Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 652, fn. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) [A]ffirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim, because excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria [citation], it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. ( Id. at pp. 655-656, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) The court also noted that pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable. The government may need time to collect witnesses against the accused, oppose his pretrial motions, or, if he goes into hiding, track him down. We attach great weight to such considerations when balancing them against the costs of going forward with a trial whose probative accuracy the passage of time has begun by degrees to throw into question. ( Id. at p. 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) `[D]ifferent weights [are to be] assigned to different reasons' for the delay. ( Id. at p. 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) [T]o warrant granting relief, negligence unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have lasted longer than negligence demonstrably causing such prejudice. ( Ibid. ) The Doggett court found the accused in that case entitled to relief due to an extraordinary 8 ½ year delay, of which six years was attributable to the Government's inexcusable oversights. ( Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 652, 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) When the Government's negligence thus causes delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to trigger judicial review ..., and when the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified, is neither extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence, ... nor persuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief. ( Id. at p. 658, 112 S.Ct. 2686, fns. omitted.) Applying these factors to this case, defendant is not entitled to relief even if we assume his federal speedy trial protection attached in November 1991. Some of the delay was fully justified. Defendant was in hiding for some of the time. The trial court also found that he was unavailable for prosecution in California after his arrest in Arizona until prosecution there was completed in May 1991. Another part of the delay was at least understandable, even if we assume, without deciding, that it was not fully justified under high court precedent. Because defendant was sentenced to prison for life in Arizona, the district attorney originally made the practical decision that it was not worthwhile expending the necessary resources to extradite him to, and prosecute him in, California. But after defendant escaped from prison in Arizona and committed numerous other horrific crimes, ending with his rearrest in July 1992  which both showed that he remained a danger to society and made this a much stronger capital case  the district attorney reasonably decided it was then appropriate to prosecute him. We think this delay is at least a more neutral reason that should be weighed less heavily in the balancing process. ( Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182.) The reasons for the additional delay between defendant's rearrest in Arizona in July 1992 and the formal bringing of charges in May 1993 are unclear. Presumably, defendant was prosecuted in Arizona for his new crimes, which may explain some of the delay. In any event, the delay after July 1992 was considerably shorter than the one-year period the high court has identified as triggering inquiry into the Barker factors. Even if we were to find the delay after the district attorney originally decided not to extradite defendant not fully justified, neither was it totally inexcusable. And even if we include the time from November 1991 (or even May 1991 when it appears California could first have demanded his extradition) until his escape in May 1992 to the period of unjustified delay, the total delay is still not considerably greater than the minimum necessary to trigger the Barker inquiry. In examining the Barker factors, we find that the delay, even viewed in its worst light, was not extraordinarily long. Defendant's actions contributing to the delay  going into hiding, committing crimes in Arizona that caused authorities in that state to prosecute him after his arrest, escaping from custody and being at large again, then committing numerous new crimes in Arizona  are far more blameworthy than any government-caused delay. Defendant does not claim he asserted his right to a speedy trial. But the record is unclear whether he had formal notice of the charges before May 1993 or any real way to demand he be prosecuted in California. So this factor carries little weight either way. (See Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 653-654, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) Regarding prejudice, defendant was either at large or incarcerated in Arizona for crimes committed there during the period of delay. Accordingly, he cannot complain of oppressive pretrial incarceration. ( People v. Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 513, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521.) Defendant suggests he was prejudiced by his inability to gain concurrent sentencing. Because he faced four consecutive life sentences in Arizona and received the death penalty here, this was not significant prejudice. Defendant does not show that he suffered great anxiety and concern. If, as we do, we discount the significance of his failure to assert his right to a speedy trial, so too must we discount the possibility of anxiety and concern. ( Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) This brings us to possible prejudice to defendant's ability to defend against the charge, the most serious of the types of prejudice that delay can cause. ( Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) As explained, under the federal Constitution, if the delay is extraordinary, prejudice is presumed. But such presumptive prejudice does not alone entitle a defendant to relief; it is only part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. ( Id. at p. 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686.) The delay here pales in comparison to the government-induced delay in Doggett. It was not so egregious as to entitle defendant to relief solely due to presumptive prejudice. ( People v. Roybal, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 513, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521.) Defendant has also failed to show any particularized prejudice. In the trial court, he asserted the delay prejudiced him because he was unable to locate certain alleged witnesses. But, as the trial court noted in finding no prejudice, he failed to show that any of these persons were relevant to the case or could help him in any way. Accordingly, we find no violation of defendant's federal constitutional speedy trial rights. The United States Supreme Court has also indicated that delay in bringing charges might violate a defendant's federal due process rights if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to [his] rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused. ( United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 324, 92 S.Ct. 455; see People v. Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 765, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 996 P.2d 32.) Defendant has not shown that the delay was intended to gain a tactical advantage. As explained above, he has also failed to show prejudice. Accordingly, we also see no violation of defendant's federal due process rights. Defendant also claims the delay violated his state constitutional rights. Under the state Constitution, the filing of a felony complaint is sufficient to trigger the protection of the speedy trial right. ( People v. Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 754, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 996 P.2d 32.) Accordingly, defendant's state constitutional speedy trial rights attached as of the filing of the complaint on December 4, 1990. However, when a defendant seeks dismissal based on delay after the filing of the complaint and before indictment or holding to answer on felony charges, a court must weigh `the prejudicial effect of the delay on defendant against any justification for the delay.' [Citations.] No presumption of prejudice arises from delay after the filing of the complaint and before arrest or formal accusation by indictment or information [citation]; rather, the defendant seeking dismissal must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice [citation]. ( Id. at pp. 766-767, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 996 P.2d 32.) As discussed above, defendant has shown no prejudice. Moreover, much of the delay, at least, was justified, especially the time when defendant was in hiding. Accordingly, we see no violation of defendant's state constitutional speedy trial rights. Defendant also argues that at least the special circumstance allegations, which were first added in May 1993, should have been dismissed. He asserts that if he had been brought to California earlier to answer the charges he could have pleaded guilty to murder without special circumstances. But a complaint or even information can generally be amended to add special circumstance charges. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 827, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436; Talamantez v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 629, 634-635, 176 Cal.Rptr. 800.) The district attorney added the special circumstance charges before defendant was first arraigned and could easily have done the same if he had prosecuted defendant earlier. We see no basis to assume that the district attorney would not have added the special circumstance allegations before the actual prosecution, whenever it might have begun. We find no more reason to dismiss the special circumstance allegations due to delay in the prosecution than to dismiss the other charges.