Opinion ID: 2444991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: adequacy of the record for review of claims pertaining to the patdown search of the defendant

Text: Given the fact sensitive nature of constitutional suppression inquiries, we begin with the state's claim that the Appellate Court improperly considered the fact of an illegal patdown search in agreeing with the defendant's contention that his consent to search the Altima was tainted by the previously performed illegal search. The state notes that the issue was not raised in the defendant's motion to suppress or litigated during the suppression hearing, and relies on State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212, 127 S.Ct. 1328, 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007), and State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 636 A.2d 351 (1994), to contend that the record is, therefore, inadequate for review of this unpreserved claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). In response, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court properly considered evidence in the record of the suppression hearing because the trial court failed to make detailed findings of fact, and emphasizes that he complied with his obligation to ensure a record adequate for appellate review by filing a motion for articulation, the trial court's denial of which was upheld by the Appellate Court. We conclude that the defendant's failure to litigate the validity of the patdown during the suppression hearing rendered the record inadequate for Golding review of this issue, and that the Appellate Court improperly considered any impropriety with respect to the patdown in its analysis of the defendant's claims. The record reveals the following additional relevant facts and procedural history. When the defendant moved the trial court to suppress the narcotics found in the Altima, he claimed that the evidence was the fruit of an illegal search and seizure, namely, his detention for an extended period without probable cause or a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in illegal activity. . . . In his motion, the defendant contended that, [a]t no time did [he] voluntarily consent to the search of his vehicle, any consent obtained was tainted by the illegal action of [the] officers, and that he did not feel free to leave or decline to answer any questions posed by the officer due to the circumstances of the time of day, the number of officers called to the scene, and the fact that [he] was alone. The defendant did not mention or question the legality of the patdown in his motion to suppress. Following the suppression hearing, at which Morgan testified briefly about the patdown, [15] the parties briefed and then argued the case orally before the trial court. In his memorandum of law, the defendant mentioned the patdown search in the statement of the facts, and then noted only that the extended detention of the defendant and the warrantless search of his vehicle were not conducted to promote officer safety or to preserve evidence. . . . Morgan failed to articulate what crime he had reason to suspect the defendant was committing and stated that at the time of the patdown search, he did not suspect that the defendant was carrying a weapon. These factors, which must be considered when determining whether the seizure of the defendant was reasonable under the circumstances, do not balance in favor of governmental intrusion into the defendant's liberty. The defendant did not mention the patdown in examining the totality of the circumstances and arguing that his consent was not voluntarily given. [16] The state did not mention the patdown in its memorandum in opposition, nor did the trial court discuss the patdown in its memorandum of decision. After the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, he contended specifically that, (1) even if his consent to search the vehicle had been voluntary, it was tainted by a prior, unconstitutional search of his person, (2) the state failed to establish that he actually consented to the search of the vehicle, (3) any consent to search was not given voluntarily and (4) any consent to search was obtained by a violation of the Connecticut constitution by the police improperly converting a traffic stop into a criminal investigation. [17] (Emphasis added.) State v. Jenkins, supra, 104 Conn. App. at 423-24, 934 A.2d 281; see also id., at 427-28, 934 A.2d 281 (the defendant's relevant claim on appeal relates to whether Morgan improperly expanded the scope of the stop by questioning the defendant about whether he was engaged in unrelated illegal activity and then performing a search of the defendant's person and his car, after the initial purpose for effectuating the stop had been achieved). In connection with seeking Golding review of this claim, the defendant moved for an articulation seeking to have the trial court answer, inter alia: After the defendant was ordered from his car, did . . . Morgan search the defendant's person and, if so, for what purpose? . . . Did the court find that the search of the defendant was reasonable? Did the court consider the search of defendant's person in determining whether the subsequent search of the defendant's car was constitutional? The state did not take a position on the defendant's motion, but the trial court denied it. Thereafter, the Appellate Court granted the defendant's motion for review of that denial, but denied the relief requested. [18] Subsequently, the Appellate Court agreed with the state's argument that the issue of whether the defendant's person was illegally searched was not raised in the trial court and that the record is inadequate to establish whether the defendant consented to the search of his person, and noted that, even if we assume arguendo that an illegal search of the defendant's person occurred, this, in and of itself, does not necessarily invalidate the search of the defendant's car. State v. Jenkins, supra, 104 Conn.App. at 428 n. 11, 934 A.2d 281. Nevertheless, after determining that the defendant's consent followed an unlawfully prolonged detention, the Appellate Court, in applying the three factor attenuation test articulated in Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 603-604, 95 S.Ct. 2254; see footnote 13 of this opinion; the third factor of which considers the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct; Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254; stated that: Morgan testified that he conducted a patdown search of the defendant although he did not believe that the defendant was armed. While the record is inadequate to determine whether the defendant's person was illegally searched, it is disconcerting that the officer testified that he conducted such a patdown without any justifiable basis.  (Emphasis added.) State v. Jenkins, supra, at 436, 934 A.2d 281; see also id., at 428 n. 11, 934 A.2d 281 (as discussed herein, the fact that the defendant was patted down prior to the search of his car is relevant to whether his consent was tainted). Before this court, the defendant renews his argument, accepted by the Appellate Court, that, under Brown v. Illinois, supra, 422 U.S. at 603-604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, the illegal patdown demonstrates that Morgan had engaged in flagrant misconduct by extending the stop. The defendant also relies on the patdown in support of his alternative ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, namely, that his consent was involuntary because the search of [the defendant's] person signified that he was already being treated as if he were under arrest, and the patdown violated a fundamental principle of constitutional law that [the] police may not touch a citizen without justification. The defendant's various claims in this certified appeal are an amalgam of issues both preserved and unpreserved in the trial court. With respect to those issues that are unpreserved, he seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. at 239-40, 567 A.2d 823, under which a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions, the defendant's claim will fail. To the extent that the defendant relies on the patdown in support of his constitutional claims, the legality of the frisk itself implicates the Golding rule because the defendant did not raise that issue before the trial court. Our recent case law addressing whether a record is adequate for review under the first prong of Golding makes clear that this preservation exception operates in a very restrictive manner, particularly in the fact sensitive context of illegal search and seizure claims. The leading recent decision on this topic is State v. Brunetti, supra, 279 Conn. at 42, 901 A.2d 1, wherein we declined to review the defendant's claim, made for the first time on appeal, that he was entitled to a new trial because, even though his father had consented to the search [of the defendant's home], the search was constitutionally infirm because the defendant's mother, who was present when the police obtained the father's consent, declined to consent to the search. Specifically, before the trial court, the defendant's motion to suppress bloody clothing found in the home where he had lived with his parents, and the confession that followed his arrest, focused solely on the validity of his father's consent to the search, on the ground that his father had been improperly induced to agree to the search. Id., at 48-49, 901 A.2d 1. The suppression hearing transcript subsequently revealed that the defendant's mother had refused to sign the written consent form proffered by the police, but neither the state nor defense counsel inquired further about the mother's refusal to sign the consent form, despite the fact that she had testified at the hearing. Id., at 49-50, 901 A.2d 1. The trial court's ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress concluded that the defendant's father's consent to search was knowing and voluntary, and, therefore, constitutionally valid. Id., at 50, 901 A.2d 1. After the defendant was convicted of murder and filed an appeal, he moved for articulation of numerous questions, including whether his mother `decline[d] to give her consent for a search of the house?' Id., at 52, 901 A.2d 1. The trial court denied the motion for an articulation, and we subsequently declined to order it to issue the requested articulation. Id., at 53-54, 901 A.2d 1. We thereafter concluded that the record was inadequate for review of the defendant's joint consent claim under the first prong of Golding. Id., at 56-64, 901 A.2d 1. We rejected his argument that the trial court's statement, in ruling on his suppression motion, that [i]t is clear that at least one of the parties, one of the parents, declined to consent to [the] search, perfected the record for review because it [constituted] a finding, supported by [the] evidence, that the defendant's mother had declined to consent to the search. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 56, 901 A.2d 1. We disagreed with the defendant's reliance on testimony that his mother had declined to sign the consent form, and emphasized that, the act of declining to sign a consent to search form is not tantamount to a refusal to consent to the search; rather, it is simply one of several relevant factors that a court considers in determining the validity of a consent to search.... Because the refusal to sign a consent to search form is one of several factors to be considered in determining the validity of consent, such refusal does not vitiate consent otherwise found to be valid in light of all of the circumstances. (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. Most importantly, we emphasized that, because the defendant's motions to suppress did not implicate the mother's consent or lack thereof, the state was not on notice that it was required to establish, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant's mother had consented to or acquiesced in the search. In such circumstances, the state bears no responsibility for the evidentiary lacunae, and, therefore, it would be manifestly unfair to the state for this court to reach the merits of the defendant's claim upon a mere assumption that the defendant's mother had declined to consent to the search. [19] (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 59, 901 A.2d 1; see also id., at 62, 901 A.2d 1 (because the state had no obligation or incentive to adduce any evidence regarding the mother's consent or lack thereof, no conclusion indeed, no inference reasonably can be drawn from her failure to sign the form [emphasis added]). Accordingly, we concluded that the defendant has failed to satisfy the first prong of Golding because the facts revealed by the record are inadequate to establish whether the alleged constitutional violation did, in fact, occur. [20] Id., at 64, 901 A.2d 1. Our other recent case law is consistent with Brunetti and makes clear that we consistently have declined to grant Golding review to fourth amendment claims wherein the predicate factual record was not completely developed before the trial court. See State v. Dalzell, 282 Conn. 709, 721, 924 A.2d 809 (2007) (This court declined to decide whether pretextual traffic stops violate the state constitution because the trial court ... made no findings regarding [the officer's] motivation for stopping the defendant's vehicle. Furthermore, to allow this claim to be presented for the first time on appeal would work a grave injustice on the state as it did not have any opportunity to develop a factual record to dispute the defendant's claim of pretext.); State v. Canales, 281 Conn. 572, 582, 916 A.2d 767 (2007) (following Brunetti and finding record inadequate for review of claim that defendant's statements were product of illegal arrest because the defendant did not argue at the suppression hearing that the arrest lacked probable cause, [and] the state did not offer evidence concerning probable cause); accord State v. Batts, 281 Conn. 682, 694, 916 A.2d 788 (defendant could not prove constitutional violation under third prong of Golding with respect to claim that state should bear heightened standard of proof for justifying stops based on racial profiling because record was entirely devoid of evidence of racial profiling), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1047, 128 S.Ct. 667, 169 L.Ed.2d 524 (2007). Thus, we agree with the state that the Appellate Court improperly considered any illegality attendant to Morgan's patdown of the defendant. Given the fact that the state was not alerted to the need to develop a factual record concerning whether potentially permissible bases, such as consent, [21] existed for the patdown search, we conclude that it was improper for the Appellate Court to label the patdown negatively or to draw any adverse inferences from it on the basis of Morgan's testimony, which may not have presented a complete picture of what had occurred with respect to the pat-down. Thus, we decline to consider the patdown as anything other than a historical fact, and ascribe to it no legal significance.