Opinion ID: 2629943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Do the facts of this case fall within Rankin?

Text: ¶ 21 In Rankin we held, under article I, section 7 [of the Washington Constitution], law enforcement officers are not permitted to request identification from a passenger for investigatory purposes unless there is an independent basis to support the request. Rankin, 151 Wash.2d at 699, 92 P.3d 202. Rankin further stated, a mere request for identification from a passenger for investigatory purposes constitutes a seizure. Id. at 697, 92 P.3d 202. [5] An independent basis is an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 699, 92 P.3d 202. ¶ 22 The State cites numerous pre- Rankin cases, but these no longer apply. The State claims that Rankin appears to be in direct conflict with those prior cases, see State v. Young, 135 Wash.2d 498, 957 P.2d 681 (1998); State v. Armenta, 134 Wash.2d 1, 948 P.2d 1280 (1997); State v. Aranguren, 42 Wash.App. 452, 711 P.2d 1096 (1985). However, as the State observes, in Rankin we specifically distinguished Young, a case which involved a pedestrian, by noting that a passenger faced with undesirable questioning by the police does not have the realistic alternative of leaving the scene as does a pedestrian. Rankin, 151 Wash.2d at 697, 92 P.3d 202. [6] ¶ 23 The State attempts to distinguish Rankin by arguing that whether a person is seized depends on whether an officer requested identification and took it away or otherwise told or suggested that the person must remain. Resp. to PRP at 26. Rankin makes no distinction regarding an officer's taking identification away. Rankin clearly holds that it is the request for passenger identification, without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity, that results in an unconstitutional seizure under article I, section 7. The distinction proposed by the State would vitiate the greater protection afforded by the Washington Constitution, since an officer can investigate an individual by running a warrants and records check without actually taking a driver's license or ID card. ¶ 24 The State makes a variation of the same argument by noting that the officer didn't ask for Brown's license, but only his name. Again, Rankin holds that it is the request for identification that violates the constitution, not the removal of a driver's license or other ID card. [7] The State concedes that the officer asked Brown for his name and his date of birth and the state in which he lived. [8] ¶ 25 Rankin is our most recent case to discuss the seizure of a vehicle passenger by means of an officer's request for identification. The officer requested Brown's name, birth date, and state of residence in order to run a record check, which included driver status and warrants. Under Rankin Brown was clearly seized when he was asked to identify himself for investigative purposes so the officer could conduct a warrants and records check. ¶ 26 The State claims that even if Brown was seized, the officer had an articulable suspicion that the vehicle Brown was riding in was stolen. However, as part of this argument the State bootstraps the fact that the name Brown provided did not produce any records. [9] Since the officer was required to have an articulable suspicion of criminal activity before he seized Brown by asking Brown to identify himself, that information cannot be factored into the articulable suspicion equation. ¶ 27 To determine whether the officer had an articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing we must examine the reasonableness of the officer's actions in view of the facts he knew. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wash.2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). Officer Watson knew: (1) the vehicle had not been reported stolen; (2) the driver had a current license and no outstanding warrants; (3) the license plate matched the description of the vehicle; (4) the vehicle was not registered to the driver; (5) the vehicle had an Oregon license plate with a temporary tag on it; (6) the vehicle had a valid Oregon trip permit, which was apparently not valid to drive on Washington's highways; (7) the vehicle had either been flagged sold or just expired, but the officer could not recall which on the witness stand; ¶ 28 In order to find that the officer had an articulable suspicion that the car was stolen, this court would have to conclude that merely driving a borrowed vehicle that may have an expired plate or may have just been sold raises an articulable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen, even when the vehicle has not been reported stolen. These facts simply do not raise an articulable suspicion of criminal activity as required by Rankin to seize a passenger.