Opinion ID: 1778548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: inquiry of jury

Text: Consistent with Brasfield, the courts in this state which have addressed the issue hold that it is error for the trial judge to seek the jury's numerical division on the merits of the verdict when the jury has reached an impasse. See Rodriguez, 559 So.2d at 679; McKinney v. State, 640 So.2d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). [3] In Rodriguez, the following colloquy occurred: THE COURT: ... Ladies and gentlemen, you have been deliberating since about twenty to five. It's twenty after seven. This has been a three-witness case. Can I ask of you, please, can you tell me how far apart you are. I'm not asking whether you're voting guilty or not guilty, how far apart you are. In other words, five/one, four/two, three/three, that type of situation? [THE FOREMAN]: At the present time we're probably four/two and it's not closed at this point. . . . . [A JUROR]: Your Honor, is there any way we can have the court reporter replay some of what we have heard? THE COURT: I have already ruled on that. 559 So.2d at 679. Fifteen minutes after this colloquy occurred, the Rodriguez jury returned a verdict of guilty. The third district opinion quoted the rule in Brasfield and held that inquiry into the jury's numerical division was fundamental error requiring reversal. Rodriguez, 559 So.2d at 679, 680. However, the Rodriguez opinion also found error in the trial court's comment about the case being a three witness case, and in the refusal to honor the jury's request for a read back of testimony. Id. Similarly, the second district in McKinney found error in the trial court's polling the jury as to its numerical division on the verdict and in giving a modified and improper dynamite or Allen [4] charge. McKinney, 640 So.2d at 1187. Based on the combined effect of these two errors, the court held that the errors were not harmless. Id. As noted in the district court's opinion here, other states are divided on whether judicial inquiry into a jury's numerical division constitutes error. [5] Some hold that inquiry into numerical division when the jury has reached an impasse is improper. See State v. Lautzenheiser, 180 Ariz. 7, 881 P.2d 339, 342 n. 5 (1994) ([I]mproper influence by a judge upon a jury is always inappropriate and usually harmful.); Lowe v. People, 175 Colo. 491, 488 P.2d 559 (Colo.1971); People v. Eppinger, 293 Ill.App.3d 306, 227 Ill.Dec. 844, 688 N.E.2d 325, 329 (Ct.1997) (relying on People v. Golub, 333 Ill. 554, 165 N.E. 196 (1929)); State v. Hutchins, 43 N.J. 85, 202 A.2d 678, 684-85 (1964), overruled on other grounds by State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 413 A.2d 593 (1980); State v. Rickerson, 95 N.M. 666, 625 P.2d 1183, 1185 (1981); State v. Boogaard, 90 Wash.2d 733, 585 P.2d 789, 793-94 (1978); State v. McMahon, 186 Wis.2d 68, 519 N.W.2d 621, 630 (Ct.App.1994) (relying on Mead v. City of Richland Ctr., 237 Wis. 537, 297 N.W. 419, 422 (1941)); cf. White v. State, 95 Nev. 881, 603 P.2d 1063, 1065 (1979) (finding no error in judicial inquiry where no answer was given, conversation was limited to substantial changes in balloting during deliberations, and judge did not urge jury to reach a verdict). Other courts hold that mere inquiry into the jury's numerical division, absent circumstances indicating coercion, does not constitute error. These courts reason that inquiry is permissible where it serves such purposes as determining the timing for recesses, whether there has been progress toward a verdict or agreement among the jurors, or whether the court should declare a mistrial when a jury is at an impasse. See Hardin v. State, 225 Ark. 602, 284 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Ark.1955); People v. Proctor, 4 Cal.4th 499, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100, 1122 (1992), aff'd sub nom. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994); Peppers v. State, 261 Ga. 338, 404 S.E.2d 788, 791 (1991); Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591, 596 (Miss.1976); State v. Baker, 293 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Mo.1956). The State urges us to accept this approach. However, as Judge Gross, writing for the majority in the opinion below, reasoned: The fallacy in this approach is that it equates the state of numerical division with the stage of deliberations. For this reason we align ourselves with our sister courts, the federal courts and those state courts that have held that a trial judge should not inquire into the numerical division of the jury. For whatever reason, whether to gauge the time for an evening recess or to decide whether to give the jury a deadlock charge, if a trial judge inquires into the sensitive area of the possibility of a verdict, the better practice is to admonish the jury at the outset not to indicate how they stand as to conviction or acquittal. The reasons for the rule precluding a judge from delving into the jury's numerical division are those articulated in Brasfield: the inquiry serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained through less intrusive questions; the inquiry has a tendency to be coercive; and it interferes with the proper relation of the judge to the jury. 272 U.S. at 450, 47 S.Ct. at 135-36. A principal aim of a jury trial is the receipt of a verdict that fairly reflects the considered judgment of each juror. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 2.09. Maintaining the secrecy in jury deliberations is important to insure an open and uninhibited exchange of ideas among the jurors. When combined with comments that belie the judge's feelings, or with instructions such as the jury deadlock charge, disclosure of the jury's numerical division risks conveying the message that the court believes that the majority should prevail, creating the doubly coercive effect of melting the resistance of the minority and freezing the determination of the majority. [ People v. ] Wilson, [390 Mich. 689], 213 N.W.2d [193] at 195 [(Mich.1973)]. Scoggins, 691 So.2d at 1187-88 (citations and footnote omitted). We concur and agree with this reasoning. We conclude that the potential for harm is inherent in an inquiry as to numerical division. The deliberations of a jury are extremely sensitive, and nothing should be done by the trial court to directly or indirectly influence a jury's deliberations, especially in a way that might divide or cast one juror or group of jurors against the others. Even ambiguous and subtle influences upon a minority quantified or identified by number can disturb the sensitive process by which jurors attempt to decide the case and resolve their differences. It is one thing for there to be a division that may occur and change naturally during the course of confidential deliberations. It is quite a different thing to identify and focus on the division in open court, outside the give and take exchange among jurors during their confidential proceedings. To permit otherwise would risk tainting the outcome of the trial by shifting the jury's focus from the law and evidence before it to the judge's motivation in inquiring into the status of a verdict. As Judge Gross noted, if the judge must inquire into the possibility of a verdict, the better practice is to admonish the jury at the outset not to indicate how they stand as to conviction or acquittal. Scoggins, 691 So.2d at 1188.