Opinion ID: 852209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Informed Guilty Plea

Text: Diaz urges that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in violation of his constitutional rights. (Appellant's Br. at 12). His theory is that because he was not provided with accurate interpreting of the guilty plea proceedings, he did not understand exactly what charges he was pleading guilty to. (Appellant's Br. at 14.) His central contention is that he thought he was pleading guilty to one count, not two. The long-standing test for the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). In furtherance of this objective, the Indiana Code provides that the court accepting the guilty plea determine that the defendant: (1) understands the nature of the charges; (2) has been informed that a guilty plea effectively waives several constitutional rights, including trial by jury, confrontation and cross-examining of witnesses, compulsory process, and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without self-incrimination; and (3) has been informed of the maximum and minimum sentences for the crime charged. Ind.Code § 35-35-1-2 (2008). In assessing the voluntariness of the plea, this Court reviews all the evidence before the post-conviction court, including testimony given at the post-conviction trial, the transcript of the petitioner's original sentencing, and any plea agreements or other exhibits which are part of the record. State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1266 (Ind. 1997). The State acknowledges that there is some evidence of a mix up' in the translation at the guilty plea hearing.... (Appellee's Br. at 8.) It contends that the evidence taken as a whole demonstrates that Diaz understood the guilty plea hearing. It cites evidence that Diaz had several conversations with his defense counsel at the jail, the fact that Diaz declared on at least three occasions that he did not have difficulty understanding the interpreter after being asked by the trial court, and Diaz's testimony during the sentencing hearing vouching for his own understanding. (Appellee's Br. at 8-9.) In particular, the State points out that Diaz acknowledged more than once that he understood the translation provided during his guilty plea hearing. (Appellee's Br. at 8-9.) The State also notes that Diaz was asked again at the beginning of his sentencing hearing whether he had any trouble understanding the court at the time of his plea. (Appellee's Br. at 8-9.) Although Diaz answered that he did not, one may fully understand and even acknowledge to others an understanding of what is in actuality an inaccurate interpretation of the proceedings. Put another way, one can understand perfectly the words spoken by an interpreter who tells you the wrong thing. More than twenty years ago, we held that [a]n indigent defendant who cannot speak or understand English has the right to have his proceedings simultaneously translated to allow for effective participation. Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind.1989). As for how proceedings should be translated, Diaz invites us to consider People v. Cunningham, 215 Mich.App. 652, 546 N.W.2d 715, 716 (1996). (Appellant's Br. at 13.) In Cunningham, a defendant appealed convictions for criminal sexual conduct, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because the interpreter interfered with his right to cross-examine a witness. 546 N.W.2d at 716. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, being persuaded that inadequate interpreting of the complainant's cross-examination denied the defendant his right to confront the witness. Id. at 717. The court reasoned the interpreter did not interpret each question and answer, but instead had a conversation with the witness that was not conveyed to the trier of fact. Id. at 716. The court also determined that the accuracy of the interpreting was lacking and it appeared that the interpreter directly responded to some questions on the basis of her understanding of the witness's prior testimony. Id. at 717. On such occasions, the court rightly said, summaries of what was stated will not do. An interpreter must give the witness the precise form and tenor of each question propounded, and ... in like manner translate the precise expressions of the witness. Id. If an interpreter converses with the witness in his or her own fashion, the court cannot tell which testimony is genuine or what may be admissible. Id. [5] Still, occasional lapses in translation will not render a proceeding fundamentally unfair. Id. We think these concepts represent important best practices, and indeed these principles and others are reflected in Indiana's regime for certifying interpreters. [6] We recently highlighted the importance of having qualified interpreters, pointing out that the court system is difficult enough for native English speakers. Arrieta v. State, 878 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (Ind. 2008). Having a capable interpreter is crucial when a defendant is entering a guilty plea and it would act to limit questions of the type that now surround Diaz's plea. One need not denigrate the value of experts hired by the litigants to understand the helpful role of a court's own appointed expert. Just as our procedures contemplate appointment of independent psychologists or psychiatrists when a court has reasonable grounds to doubt a defendant's competence to stand trial, when a court has reason to believe there is an interpretation issue the court may need to appoint its own competent, disinterested expert. [7] We conclude the evidence before the post-conviction court does not reveal whether Diaz was provided with accurate interpreting. We therefore direct the trial court to commission its own translation of the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing. It should then rehear such evidence as the parties find pertinent to the question of whether Diaz's plea was voluntary and intelligent. On this point, the interpreting at the guilty plea hearing is important but not necessarily dispositive. As Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show that an accused waived his rights with intelligence and understanding. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962). Thus, on the key question of whether Diaz understood he was pleading guilty to two counts in return for forbearance about other offenses, evidence about what occurred during the guilty plea hearing, and during the sentencing hearing, and in his lawyer's office, and in writing, and otherwise, is all probative.