Opinion ID: 4577666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jury Could Reasonably Conclude

Text: that Stricklan Touched E.D. ¶115 The dissent dismisses E.D.’s testimony concerning her previous reports of abuse as “a reference to an out-of-court statement in which E.D. claimed that Mr. Stricklan” touched her and “testimony regarding how others reacted to this claim.” Infra ¶ 170. ¶116 To characterize E.D.’s testimony as a “reference” ignores the reality of what the State presented to the jury. The jury heard E.D. confirm that she had twice told the police that Stricklan had touched her—once the night of the incident and another at the CJC interview. After E.D. watched her CJC interview outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor questioned E.D., in front of the jury, about the statements she had previously made to the detective. She was asked questions about what she told the detective. The State asked her to confirm that she had told the detective that Stricklan touched her “right at the bottom.” Although E.D. could not remember whether she had told the detective if Stricklan had touched her over or under her clothing, she confirmed that she had said that Stricklan touched her “on the back and chest area,” and she clarified that when she said “chest area” she meant her “boobs.” This is more than just a passing reference to a previous statement E.D. had made. ¶117 The dissent points out that the jury did not see E.D.’s demeanor when she made the out-of-court statements to the detective. Infra ¶ 173. But the jury did see the prosecutor question E.D. about her previous statements to the police that Stricklan touched her. And the jury heard E.D.’s trial testimony that Stricklan did not touch her, and it heard the testimony of other witnesses as described above. The jury was in the best position to weigh all the evidence and determine the credibility of that evidence. It may not 35 STATE v. STRICKLAN Opinion of the Court have had the advantage of seeing E.D. twice tell her original story that Stricklan touched her, but it was in a better position than the members of this court to weigh her testimony about what she had said against her recantation, as well as all the other evidence presented at trial. ¶118 The dissent spends a lot of time offering alternative interpretations of the evidence the jury heard. For instance, it claims that the fact that Mother “was crying when police arrived” was not inconsistent with E.D.’s recantation. Infra ¶ 175. And that Mother’s questioning Stricklan could have been the duty of a responsible mother and that “a mother is likely to investigate [an allegation of sexual abuse] even if she suspects it might not be true.” Infra ¶ 175. The dissent also says that when Stricklan said that he needed a ride because he “acted inappropriately” it is possible that the officer misheard Stricklan. Infra ¶ 178. Or, that even if the officer heard Stricklan correctly, it could be “reasonable to assume” that Stricklan’s reference to inappropriate acts was a reference to “his excessive drinking and not to any acts of sexual abuse.” Infra ¶ 180. 20 ¶119 And although the dissent paints a portrait of how a jury might have interpreted this evidence, that is not the entirety of our job when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. We review the evidence, “viewed in the light most favorable to the State, [to determine if] ‘some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 27, 345 P.3d 1168 (citation omitted). It is of no moment that we can offer alternative _____________________________________________________________ 20 The dissent also dismisses Stricklan’s concessions to police that E.D. had never lied to him and that he did not believe that she was making up her story. To the dissent, Stricklan’s admissions can be discounted because E.D. lied at least once “either in her out-of-court statement or under oath at trial.” Infra ¶ 176. This misses the mark. The importance of this testimony is not that the jury heard that E.D. had never lied to Stricklan, so the jury should think that E.D. always tells the truth. The importance is that the jury heard a detective, while interrogating Stricklan about the allegations E.D. had levelled against him, ask Stricklan, “So do you think she’s making this up?” And the jury heard Stricklan say, “no.” The jury could reasonably conclude that this not only corroborated E.D.’s reports of abuse but also that it was a functional admission of guilt. 36 Cite as: 2020 UT 65 Opinion of the Court explanations, or even that we would have reached a different conclusion had we served on the jury. The question is whether enough evidence existed to permit the jury to reach its verdict. For the reasons we have explained, the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Stricklan inappropriately touched E.D. And that conclusion ends our ability to second-guess what the jury concluded.