Opinion ID: 663141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony regarding acts of violence either witnessed or overheard by the victim.

Text: 19 In State v. Clark, 801 S.W.2d 701 (Mo.Ct.App.1990), the Missouri Court of Appeals rejected Clark's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and affirmed his conviction on the grounds that evidence of acts of violence committed by Clark, which were either witnessed or overheard by the victim, was admissible. Id. at 703-04 (Counsel is not considered ineffective for failing to make a nonmeritorious objection.). The admissibility of evidence in a state trial is a matter of state law. Glaze v. Redman, 986 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir.1993). When a petitioner's federal habeas corpus claim is based upon a theory which can be determined as a matter of state law, the federal court is bound by a state court's interpretation of state law. See Glaze, 986 F.2d at 1195; Williams v. Armontrout, 877 F.2d 1376, 1383 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082, 110 S.Ct. 1140, 107 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1990). Although the admissibility of evidence at a state trial is a matter of state law and ordinarily will not form the basis for federal habeas relief, a federal court may grant habeas relief when a state court's evidentiary ruling infringes upon a specific constitutional protection or is so prejudicial that it amounts to a denial of due process. Turner v. Armontrout, 845 F.2d 165 (8th Cir.1988). 20 After a full review of the facts, we do not find that the Missouri Court of Appeals' evidentiary ruling in State v. Clark infringed upon a specific constitutional protection or amounted to a denial of due process. 21 At the time of Clark's trial, the Missouri law regarding evidence of other crimes was as follows: 22 Generally evidence of other crimes is not admissible to prove the criminal character of a defendant. Such proof is admissible, however, if it has a legitimate tendency to establish guilt. Evidence of other crimes is, therefore, competent to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan or the identity of the person charged with the crime. 23 State v. Clark, 801 S.W.2d at 703. According to Clark, the Missouri Court of Appeals failed to apply that law correctly when it found the evidence of acts of violence either witnessed or overheard by the victim admissible. 24 That argument is flawed. The focus of Clark's argument is the Missouri Court of Appeals' statement that [i]t was proper for the state to present evidence which might supply a reason for the victim's silence. Id. at 703. Clark's interpretation of the evidentiary ruling in State v. Clark is that the Missouri Court of Appeals recognized a nonexistent exception to the general rule in Missouri that evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible. However, a closer look at the Missouri Court of Appeal's opinion reveals that the court was merely holding that evidence of acts of violence either witnessed or overheard was relevant under the circumstances: 4 25 Movant's trial counsel opened the door when he presented his theory of the case during his opening statement. It was proper for the state to present evidence which might supply a reason for the victim's silence. 26 .... 27 Here, the testimony relating to acts of violence was limited to incidents either witnessed by the victim or incidents which were close enough in proximity for her to overhear. Movant's trial counsel knew this evidence was responsive to his theory of the case. Any objection would have been meritless. Counsel is not considered ineffective for failing to make a nonmeritorious objection. 28 Id. at 703-04. Therefore, Missouri Court of Appeals neither erred in applying Missouri law nor committed an error of constitutional magnitude. 29 Because the Missouri Court of Appeals' evidentiary ruling did not infringe upon a specific constitutional protection or amount to a denial of due process, its ruling on the admissibility of the testimony regarding acts of violence either witnessed or overheard by the victim is binding on the federal courts. Therefore, for purposes of the first prong of the Strickland test, it was not unreasonable for Clark's trial counsel to fail to object to admissible evidence. 30