Opinion ID: 6107770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Court of Appeals' Mandate to Transfer Custody

Text: In its opinion, the Court of Appeals decreed that the children be delivered to Mother in Nevada by way of commercial air flight no later than twenty days following the entry of this order. C.W.H. , 2016 WL 6426731 , at . The court provided no reason for mandating an almost immediate transfer of custody without affording Father the opportunity to file a timely permission to appeal in this Court. Father petitioned for rehearing in the Court of Appeals with respect to execution of the court's mandate, or in the alternative, a motion for a stay to permit him time to file a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 11. Without explanation, the appellate court summarily denied Father's petition and motion. Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(a) provides: (a) Definition; Issuance; Stay on Petition for Rehearing. Copies, certified by the clerk of the appellate court, of the judgment, any order as to costs or instructions as to interest, and a copy of the opinion of the appellate court shall constitute the mandate. .... The clerk of the Court of Appeals and Court of Criminal Appeals shall transmit to the clerk of the trial court the mandate of the Court of Appeals or Court of Criminal Appeals, with notice to the parties, 64 days after entry of judgment unless the court orders otherwise. The timely filing of a petition for rehearing will stay the mandate until disposition of the petition unless the court orders otherwise. The mandate shall issue 64 days after denial of the petition for rehearing or, if the petition for rehearing is granted, 64 days after entry of judgment on rehearing. Clearly, the appellate courts' authority to alter the sixty-four day window for issuance of a mandate is within the ambit of the rule. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' apparent invocation of the exception contained in Rule 42 in this case. Here, the children had been in Father's custody since August 2013 and had remained with Father until the court issued its opinion in October 2016. This Court has warned against the potential harm involved when an intermediate appellate court expedites the issuance of its mandate or orders that the mandate not be stayed in child custody cases: For instance, if a trial court awards custody of a minor child to her mother, and later that the Court of Appeals reverses the trial court's decision and awards custody to the father and orders the immediate issuance of mandate, and the Supreme Court grants a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed by the mother and reverses the Court of Appeals' decision, custody of the child will have changed from the mother, to the father, and ultimately back to the mother. Such a chain of events would likely be harmful to the welfare of the child. While not expressly prohibited by Tenn. R. App. P. 42, we find that in a child custody case, such as this, the Court of Appeals' February 24, 1999 order directing that mandate be issued was ill-advised. Because the Father timely filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal, the issuance of mandate should have been stayed pending final disposition by this Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 42(b). Brooks v. Carter , 993 S.W.2d 603 , 610-11 (Tenn. 1999). This Court further explained:  Rule 42(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that mandate shall issue after the sixty-four day period  unless the court orders otherwise . (Emphasis added). We acknowledge that the rule is designed to enable the Court of Appeals to direct the immediate issuance of mandate if the context warrants such an order . For instance, if a child custody case involves a situation in which the Court of Appeals reasonably believed that a child would be in danger in the event that the parent awarded custody by the trial court retained custody while the issuance of mandate was stayed pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 42, the Court of Appeals may justifiably direct that mandate be immediately issued. In the present case, however, no risk of danger was alleged.... Id. at 610, n.6 (additional emphasis added). In this case, as in Brooks , there was no allegation of either potential or immediate danger if the children remained in Father's custody. We reiterate that in cases such as this, without allegations or evidence of abuse of or potential danger to the children or other compelling reason to expedite, it is error to order immediate issuance of an intermediate appellate court mandate.