Opinion ID: 6352896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Standard in Superior Court

Text: We begin our analysis by addressing what standard the Superior Court should have applied to an appeal pursuant to § 45-24-71. We must determine whether the review should have been de novo or whether the City Council’s decision to approve the Amendment was entitled to legislative deference. The plaintiffs contend that “legislative deference should not apply to a § 45-24-71 challenge” because “the oversight and review that § 45-24-71 contemplates does not implicate the concerns that animate legislative deference.” They further posit that § 45-24-71 “does not contain any suggestion that the Superior Court should apply a deferential standard,” and they point out that the Supreme Court case law stating that a presumption of validity should apply predates the enactment of the CPLURA and the ZEA. They further aver that those - 22 - two acts altered the law in “material ways.” They contend that the language of § 45-24-71(c) demands a “more exacting review   .” In order to address plaintiffs’ contentions that the hearing justice erred by according deference to the City Council’s decision to approve the Amendment, we must look first to the language of the operative statutory section. Section 45-24-71(c) provides as follows: “The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury. The court shall first consider whether the enactment or amendment of the zoning ordinance is in conformance with the comprehensive plan. If the enactment or amendment is not in conformance with the comprehensive plan, then the court shall invalidate the enactment or the amendment, or those parts of the enactment or amendment which are not in conformance with the comprehensive plan. The court shall not revise the ordinance to conform with the comprehensive plan, but may suggest appropriate language as part of the court decision.” We have stated that “when a statutory section is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute and we need not delve into any further statutory interpretation.” Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482, 489 (R.I. 2018). “It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we apply the rules of statutory construction and examine the statute in its entirety to determine the intent and purpose of the Legislature.” State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We end the process of statutory construction upon concluding that a statute has a plain meaning because our ultimate goal is to - 23 - give effect to the General Assembly’s intent and we have repeatedly observed that the plain language of the statute is the best indicator of [legislative] intent.” Id. at 550 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our reading of the operative statutory language leads us to the determination that the statute is silent as to the standard of review to be applied by the Superior Court. It is true that the statute makes invalidation of a zoning amendment mandatory if it is found by the Superior Court not to conform with the comprehensive plan, but it does not contain any indication of what standard is to be applied in determining whether or not a particular amendment is in conformance with a comprehensive plan. Rather, it merely instructs the Superior Court what to do once that determination is made. This Court opined on numerous occasions prior to the 1991 enactment of § 45-24-71 that “amendments to zoning    ordinances[] enjoy a presumption of validity.” Johnson & Wales College v. DiPrete, 448 A.2d 1271, 1279 (R.I. 1982); see also Skelley v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of South Kingstown, 569 A.2d 1054, 1058 (R.I. 1990); Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 R.I. 134, 146, 364 A.2d 1277, 1286 (1976); Willey v. Town Council of Town of Barrington, 106 R.I. 544, 557, 261 A.2d 627, 634 (1970). We also explained that “[t]his presumption of validity includes the presumption that the zoning enactments were in accordance with a comprehensive plan   .” D’Angelo v. Knights of Columbus Building - 24 - Association of Bristol, R.I., Inc., 89 R.I. 76, 83, 151 A.2d 495, 498-99 (1959) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Camara v. City of Warwick, 116 R.I. 395, 407, 358 A.2d 23, 31 (1976). And we have stated that the “challengers of the amendment, have the burden of proving that it was not made in accordance with a comprehensive plan.” Camara, 116 R.I. at 407, 358 A.2d at 31. In addition, since the enactment of § 45-24-71, we have explained that “actions taken by a city or town council involving the amendment or repeal of zoning ordinances are purely legislative.” Maynard v. Beck, 741 A.2d 866, 872 n.3 (R.I. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Willey, 106 R.I. at 557, 261 A.2d at 634. And, “[t]his Court has consistently afforded deference to legislative enactments, which we presume are constitutional and valid.” Smiler v. Napolitano, 911 A.2d 1035, 1038 (R.I. 2006); see also Rhode Island Economic Development Corp. v. The Parking Co., L.P., 892 A.2d 87, 100 (R.I. 2006); In re Advisory Opinion to House of Representatives (Casino II), 885 A.2d 698, 702 (R.I. 2005); Parkway Towers Associates v. Godfrey, 688 A.2d 1289, 1293 (R.I. 1997). We have also stated that legislative rules “have the force and effect of law, and the party challenging a legislative rule must rebut the presumption of validity [which] attaches to [the]    rule.” Chariho Regional School District v. Gist, 91 A.3d 783, 791 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). What is more, we have “recognize[d] that a municipality has discretion in choosing options for - 25 - conforming its ordinances or land use decisions to its comprehensive plan   .” N & M Properties, LLC v. Town of West Warwick ex rel. Moore, 964 A.2d 1141, 1147 (R.I. 2009). When faced with a statute that is silent as to this issue, we see no error of law in the hearing justice’s decision not to deviate from this Court’s consistent precedent on this issue.10 Indeed, we note that the General Assembly “is presumed to be aware of the state of existing relevant law when it enacts or amends a statute” and thus, presumably, was aware of the state of the law with respect to legislative deference when it enacted the ZEA and the CPLURA. P.J.C. Realty, Inc., 811 A.2d at 1206. The General Assembly chose not to provide for a different, less deferential standard of review in § 45-24-71(c).11 We shall not now read one into that statutory section in contravention of our consistent precedent. See Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1, 10 (R.I. 2015) (“[I]t is not within our power to read language into a statute which the General Assembly chose not to put there.”); see also Dodd 10 The plaintiffs rely heavily on a decision of the Superior Court in the case of Sullivan v. Carney, No. WC 05-744, 2008 WL 693616 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 2008), which came to the opposite conclusion with respect to the standard of review to be applied pursuant to cases under § 45-24-71. Sullivan, 2008 WL 693616, at  12. However, we are not bound by that decision, nor do we find it to be persuasive. 11 Our conclusion is not altered by plaintiffs’ contention that the enactment of the ZEA and the CPLURA materially altered the state of the law. The enactment of those statutes did not change this Court’s consistent precedent, nor did it change the fact that § 45-24-71 does not expressly provide for a less deferential standard of review. - 26 - v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (stating that a court is simply “not free to rewrite [a] statute that Congress has enacted”). We shall proceed to address the specific contentions of plaintiffs with respect to alleged error on the part of the hearing justice, keeping in mind the hearing justice’s determination that the Amendment was due legislative deference.