Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coffman: Failure to Define Implied Malice

Text: Coffman contends that the trial court's failure to instruct the sentencing jury on the definition of implied malice, given the lack of such an instruction in the guilt phase as well, resulted in grave uncertainty whether the jury rendered an individualized penalty based on Coffman's own personal conduct and responsibility, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's requirement of reliability in capital sentencing. She argues that the jury might have been so confused by the instructions actually given, including the definition of murder under section 187, a definition of first degree felony murder, and an instruction on murder liability predicated on an aiding and abetting theory, that it might have imposed the death sentence based on a belief that Coffman was guilty of murdering Lynell Murray even if it also concluded she lacked the intent to kill. The contention lacks merit. The evidence relating to Lynell Murray's killing was properly admitted as other violent criminal conduct under section 190.3, factor (b). When the prosecution has introduced evidence, during the penalty phase, of a defendant's other violent criminal conduct, the trial court is not required, absent a request, to instruct on the elements of specific crimes that such evidence tends to prove. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 987, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 72, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) Here, Coffman never requested an instruction defining implied malice, and the trial court thus had no duty so to instruct. Given the abundant evidence, including Coffman's own guilt phase testimony, showing her active participation in the murder and other offenses against Lynell Murray, we see no reasonable likelihood the jury was confused by the lack of an instruction defining implied malice. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 801-802, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.)