Opinion ID: 267171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Furnish Financial Information.

Text: 23 At the first negotiating session, held on November 26, the employer's position was that it was unable to agree to a wage increase or to any greater monetary benefits because of the insufficiency of its earnings. The Union accepted the company's offer to prove financial inability, and said that it would arrange to have the union's auditor go over the company's books. 24 At the second meeting, on December 12, the employer repeated that it did not have the money to grant wage increases. Union negotiator Murphy pointed out that, if the claim was made in good faith, the company should permit the union to examine its books to enable it to decide whether or not to drop the wage demands. The company, however, refused to permit such examination on the ground that it 'was involved in a program in which it was seeking capital investment.' 25 The company persisted in its refusal to allow inspection of its books until after the union filed unfair labor practice charges. Thereafter inspection was allowed. 26 The Board deemed the evidence sufficient to show that the refusal to furnish financial information constituted a lack of good faith bargaining, relying on the well settled rule that, when an employer claims financial inability to grant a demanded wage increase, he must, upon the union's request, furnish financial data to substantiate his claim. National Labor Relations Board v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 76 S.Ct. 753, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956). 27 The employer now asserts that during the negotiations it resisted a wage increase not on the basis of financial inability but as a matter of sound business judgment. Therefore, it maintains, the Truitt rule is inapplicable. 28 It would be difficult to reconcile the shifting positions taken by the company. If it asserts inability to meet the union's demands and offers to establish the fact, it cannot avoid its duty to afford substantiation by then drawing a subtle distinction between inability to pay and refusal to pay as a matter of 'sound business practice.' Whatever basis there might be in other circumstances for such a distinction, we have no occasion to deal with it here, since the Trial Examiner's conclusion, adopted by the Board, was supported by substantial evidence that it was not until the union filed charges that the company took the position that it was not 'pleading poverty.' 29