Opinion ID: 1682303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Metropolitan Dade County Test

Text: Based upon this determination that section 776.013 constitutes a substantive change in the statutory law, a presumption of prospective application must therefore underlie the further analysis of this legislation. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Chase Federal Housing Corp., 737 So.2d 494, 499 (Fla.1999) (The general rule is that in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a law affecting substantive rights, liabilities and duties is presumed to apply prospectively.). To rebut this presumption against retroactive application, such legislation is generally subjected to the following two interrelated inquiries: The first inquiry is one of statutory construction: whether there is clear evidence of legislative intent to apply the statute [retroactively]. If the legislation clearly expresses an intent that it apply retroactively, then the second inquiry is whether retroactive application is constitutionally permissible. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Due to the clear constitutional prohibition against retroactive application of section 776.013, which is more fully described below, we do not address the first inquiry of legislative intent as to whether the presumption against retroactive application is rebutted here. The Florida Constitution imposes a restriction on retroactive application of criminal legislation. Article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution has the following language: Repeal or amendment of a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution or punishment for any crime previously committed. (Emphasis added.) As the State correctly argues, this constitutional provision precludes section 776.013 from applying retroactively to pending cases. [4] The key determination is that section 776.013 qualifies as a criminal statute. With regard to article X, section 9, the term criminal statute is defined in a broad context. In Washington v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 601, 109 So. 588 (1926), this Court provided the following definition for the words criminal statute: [A]n act of the Legislature as an organized body relating to crime or its punishment . . . defining crime, treating of its nature, or providing for its punishment . . . [or] deal[ing] in any way with crime or its punishment. Id., 109 So. at 591. In the instant matter, section 776.013 qualifies as a criminal statute, because it has a direct impact on the prosecution of the offense of murder in Florida. Cf. State v. Watts, 558 So.2d 994, 999-1000 (Fla. 1990) (holding that article X, section 9 did not prevent retroactive application of the legislation, because the parties could still be prosecuted and punished in the same manner) (quoting Ex parte Pells, 28 Fla. 67, 9 So. 833, 834-35 (1891)). Unlike the defendant in Watts, Smiley could not be prosecuted in the same manner because retroactive application of section 776.013 would provide him with a new affirmative defense to the first-degree murder charge (i.e., he had no duty to retreat before he used deadly force in self-defense in his taxi). [5] Therefore, article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution makes it constitutionally impermissible for section 776.013 to receive retroactive application.