Opinion ID: 187180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis of the legal issues

Text: Before turning to the issues before the en banc court, we must determine whether the unzipping of appellant's jacket was, in fact, a search. Clearly it was. By zipping up his jacket, appellant unquestionably evidenced an intent to keep private whatever lay under it. The only question, then, is whether society is prepared to recognize such an expectation as reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). This question was unequivocally answered by the Supreme Court in Terry. At issue there was the touching of the outer surface of the defendant's overcoat. Terry, 392 U.S. at 7, 88 S.Ct. 1868. As the Court explained, even that limited action rose to the level of a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Because the opening of a fastened coat, like the opening of most other clothing, renders visible whatever lies underneath, such an action involves an even greater intrusion in precisely the same socially recognized expectation of privacy. And such an intrusion is particularly great when, as here, the opening takes place on a public street. In describing the level of personal intrusion occasioned by a public frisk, the Terry Court stated: [I]t is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a petty indignity. It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment. Id. at 16-17, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The undoing of clothing to reveal whatever is underneath to whomever happens to be on the street necessarily involves an even more serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. The involuntary opening of someone's clothing reveals to the world at large (not just to the searching police officer) what an individual obviously intends to keep private. As noted above, the Government did not dispute the characterization of the unzipping as a search during arguments before the panel. Before the en banc court, however, the Government refused to concede the point. Stating that it was only assum[ing], arguendo, that the unzipping of appellant's jacket was a `search,' Gov't En Banc Br. at 23 n. 11, the Government maintained that the police action did not actually amount to a search because the sweatshirt that the police expected to reveal presumably was widely visible when appellant was in indoor settings. Id. This argument is flawed in both its legal and factual premises. Relying primarily on United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973), the Government likens appellant's sweatshirt to a physical characteristic... constantly exposed to the public. Gov't En Banc Br. at 23 n. 11 (omissions in original). This analogy is inapt. In Dionisio, the Supreme Court held that production of a voice exemplar pursuant to a grand jury subpoena did not constitute a search, because [t]he physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to the public. Like a man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice is repeatedly produced for others to hear. 410 U.S. at 14, 93 S.Ct. 764. As the Court explained, while the content of a communication is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection ... the underlying identifying characteristicsthe constant factor throughout both public and private communications are open for all to see or hear. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (omission in original). Consequently, [n]o person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the world. Id. The same cannot be said of a piece of clothing when the only information that the police have about that clothing is that the wearer has chosen to shield most of it from public view. Contrary to the Government's assertion, there is nothing about a sweatshirt thatlike the characteristics of an individual's voice, handwriting, or facemust necessarily be revealed to the public in the course of daily life. An individual may choose to expose all or part of an article of clothing to the public or he may choose to keep all or part of that clothing covered. The only evidence presented by the Government regarding appellant's sweatshirt was that appellant had demonstrated an intent to shield most of it from public view. When a government agent unfastens, lifts, pulls down, pats, or otherwise manipulates clothing to reveal or determine what lies underneath, that manipulation necessarily involves the sort of `probing into an individual's private life' that the Court in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), characterized as the mark of a search or interrogation. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15, 93 S.Ct. 764 (quoting Davis v. Mississippi ). Citing Terry, the Dionisio Court reiterated that even the minimal intrusion involved in a Terry frisk of outer clothing necessarily amounts to a Fourth Amendment search. Contrasting the seizure of voice exemplars to permissible Terry pat downs, the Court explained that the former does not involve the severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, effected by the latter. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15, 93 S.Ct. 764 (quotation marks omitted). The Government's argument that the unzipping of appellant's jacket was not a search is also based on fundamentally flawed factual premises. First, the Government assumes that the unzipping of appellant's jacket would reveal only appellant's already partially visible sweatshirt. One need only consider the special medical needs of certain individuals, including those who are forced to use colostomy bags and heart monitors (to name a few) to recognize the fallacy of this assumption. Such devices frequently are attached to an individual's abdominal area and often require those wearing them to hike up the clothing around their midsection to accommodate the device. Second, many individuals wear clothing that is comfortable to them but would appear unseemly to others. In such circumstances, the individual who does not want the unseemly portions of his clothing publicly exposed will cover or partially cover that clothing with another garment. Appellant's fastening of his jacket effectively expressed a recognized and reasonable expectation of privacy. And its unfastening cannot be characterized as a non-search given the inability of the police to know what other information pertaining to appellant's private life that unfastening would reveal.