Opinion ID: 2765947
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claimant’s Credibility

Text: After stating the residual functional capacity, the ALJ wrote: After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment. 2 Claimant also argues that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to adhere to Social Security Ruling 96-8p when setting forth her residual functional capacity. Claimant waived that argument by failing to raise it before the district court. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1063 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007). In any event, we have considered the argument and found it unpersuasive. 8 BURRELL V. COLVIN The ALJ’s decision then drifts into a discussion of the medical evidence; it provides no reasons for the credibility determination. Sifting through the ALJ’s decision, the government finds three reasons for the adverse credibility determination, albeit dispersed in seemingly random places in the decision. We address those reasons in turn.
The ALJ noted, three single-spaced pages after the adverse credibility determination, in the midst of an analysis of medical sources, that “the claimant’s self-reports to the physical therapist do not indicate the degree of limitation suggested by the medical source statement, and indeed is inconsistent with the claimant’s testimony at [the] hearing.” Inconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and the claimant’s reported activities provide a valid reason for an adverse credibility determination. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). But the ALJ did not elaborate on which daily activities conflicted with which part of Claimant’s testimony. The only mention found in the ALJ’s decision is five pages earlier, when summarizing Claimant’s testimony: “Although she testified she was unable to use a vacuum, she reported to the physical therapist that she did use the vacuum and was able to perform most housekeeping activities.”3 As to vacuuming, Claimant stated at the hearing in December 2009: 3 The latter part of this finding—concerning most household chores—is plainly consistent with Claimant’s testimony. She testified at the hearing, consistent with her reports to the physical therapist, that she can perform most household chores. BURRELL V. COLVIN 9 Vacuuming and I don’t get along well at this point. It hurts to do the stretching and pulling. I occasionally sweep with a broom and dustpan, wipe down the kitchen counters, sometimes load the dishwasher. It takes longer because I have to use my right hand to do it. The ALJ cited six worksheets that asked Claimant whether her impairments affected her ability to do chores such as, specifically, vacuuming. In those worksheets, which span the period March 2009 to June 2009, Claimant checked the box “Yes, Limited a little” five times, and she once checked the box for “Yes, Limited a lot.” Also in June 2009, the physical therapist reported, without elaboration, that Claimant “can push the vacuum.” Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s determination that there is a conflict concerning Claimant’s ability to vacuum. Claimant consistently reported to the physical therapist that she had trouble vacuuming, which is entirely consistent with her testimony at the hearing that stretching and pulling, which are required to vacuum, cause her pain. Claimant did not testify that she never could vacuum; she stated that vacuuming was difficult for her “at this point.” (Emphasis added.) Perhaps recognizing the flaw in the ALJ’s reasoning about vacuuming, the government declines to mention vacuuming. Instead, the government identifies other alleged inconsistencies between Claimant’s hearing testimony and her reported daily activities, such as knitting and lace work. But the ALJ did not identify those inconsistencies. “We are constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.” Connett 10 BURRELL V. COLVIN v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). Our decisions make clear that we may not take a general finding—an unspecified conflict between Claimant’s testimony about daily activities and her reports to doctors—and comb the administrative record to find specific conflicts. “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). “To support a lack of credibility finding, the ALJ was required to point to specific facts in the record . . . .” Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 592 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the ALJ stated only—in passing and in a different section than the credibility determination—that Claimant’s selfreports were inconsistent in some unspecified way with her testimony at the hearing. That finding is insufficient to meet “our requirements of specificity.” Connett, 340 F.3d at 873.
The government argues that Claimant’s testimony that she has, on average, one or two headaches a week conflicts with the medical record. As an initial matter, the ALJ never connected the medical record to Claimant’s testimony about her headaches. Although the ALJ made findings—discussed below—concerning Claimant’s treatment for headaches, he never stated that he rested his adverse credibility determination on those findings. For that reason alone, we reject the government’s argument that the history of treatment for headaches is a specific, clear, and convincing reason to support the credibility finding. Moreover, the ALJ’s findings concerning Claimant’s treatment history are plainly erroneous. The ALJ stated that, BURRELL V. COLVIN 11 “[d]uring the period under review, there is a gap in treatment from September 7, 2007, when the claimant was seen to obtain a work excuse for family medical leave, until September 2, 2008.” As the government concedes, that statement is contrary to the record. Claimant was treated on November 1, 2007, November 8, 2007, November 29, 2007, and May 19, 2008. The ALJ apparently overlooked significant medical records when assessing whether the medical record conflicted with Claimant’s testimony. The ALJ also stated that “[t]here is no record of primary care for headaches, neck, or back pain subsequent to October 2008 other than the medical source statement dated November 9, 2009 and a MRI report dated October 14, 2009.” Yet four different medical records from that period contain reports of headaches or neck pain.4 See Report dated April 21, 2009 (although Claimant’s neck pain was much improved, her migraine headaches continued and were no better than before her surgery); Report dated May 5, 2009 (ongoing headaches without improvement); Report dated August 2, 2009 (head pain); Report dated September 23, 2009 (“neck pain no change”). In sum, the ALJ did not make a specific finding linking a lack of medical records to Claimant’s testimony about the intensity of her back, neck, and head pain and, in any event, the record does not support the ALJ’s findings. 4 Only one of those reports was before the ALJ but, as discussed above, we review all the evidence submitted to the Appeals Council as if it had been before the ALJ. Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1163. 12 BURRELL V. COLVIN
The ALJ stated that, “although the claimant testified she missed work due to pain, her primary care physician, Dr. Riley, noted on July 13, 2007, that the claimant ‘does not like work, has mentioned several times she does not care if they fire her’ and questioned whether there was an issue of secondary gain.” The ALJ is correct that Claimant testified that she missed work due to pain. Dr. Riley’s note stated that Claimant “apparently does not like work much and has mentioned to me several times that she does not care if they fire her, and apparently there is some sort of conflict there. I am not sure if there is any secondary gain, but she is certainly not enamored of her job.” As an initial matter, the fact that Claimant did not like her job is not, without more, a valid reason to discredit her testimony about why she missed work. One can dislike (or like) a job and yet be forced to miss some days from work because of illness or pain. Rather, the ALJ apparently read Dr. Riley’s note as questioning whether Claimant was exaggerating her symptoms in order to miss work that she disliked.5 Read in that way, substantial evidence arguably supports the ALJ’s finding. But even if we were to read Dr. Riley’s note thus, we conclude that this one weak reason is 5 If that is what Dr. Riley meant, he expressed the thought inartfully. “Malingering” or “exaggerating” is the appropriate term. “Secondary gain” means “external and incidental advantage derived from an illness, such as rest, gifts, personal attention, release from responsibility, and disability benefits.” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 721 (29th ed.). Secondary gain is not the same as malingering; secondary gain is an incidental advantage derived from an actual illness. That is, Claimant’s illnesses and pain allowed her to miss work that she may have disliked. But that conclusion does not necessarily mean that she was malingering. BURRELL V. COLVIN 13 insufficient to meet the “specific, clear and convincing” standard on this record. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112; see also Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “we must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Dr. Riley treated Claimant for several years, and this is the only statement of its type. Moreover, Dr. Riley merely suggested that perhaps there was an issue of secondary gain—he did not affirmatively find that Claimant was exaggerating or malingering. Because the ALJ’s other reasons—discussed above—are not supported by substantial evidence, and because this reason is weak on this record, we conclude that the ALJ erred in discrediting Claimant’s testimony. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that, when the ALJ errs, we must inquire “whether the ALJ’s decision remains legally valid, despite such error”).