Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: objections to the state's rebuttal proofs.

Text: Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in permitting the State's psychiatrist to testify in rebuttal as to certain statements defendant made to him in the course of a psychiatric evaluation. The specific statements defendant complains of are that, in relating the details of the crime to him, the defendant had told [the State's rebuttal psychiatrist] both that [defendant] had kicked Mrs. Hazard twice after asking her where the money was, and that he did not know where the knife he had stabbed Mrs. Hazard with had come from. By way of contrast, defendant notes that, [i]n his statements to the police, the defendant had not stated that he had kicked Mrs. Hazard to obtain an answer as to money from her, and had maintained that [his alleged accomplice] had given him the knife. The State responds that its psychiatrist's testimony was proper rebuttal to defendant's evidence regarding the purported existence of . . . mitigating factors [c(5)(a) and c(5)(d) [20] ], and the trial court appropriately issued two limiting instructions concerning the jury's use of that evidence. Thus, the State concludes, [t]he trial court's evidentiary ruling was sound. During the direct examination of the State's psychiatrist's rebuttal testimony, defendant objected to certain statements attributed to defendant in the psychiatrist's report. The trial court allowed the psychiatrist to testify to those statements, subject to two conditions: that the testimony be limited to defendant's factual recitation of before the crime and after the crime and that the jury be instructed that this testimony is not being offered and cannot be considered by them as evidence on the existence of aggravating factors but only on whether a mitigating factor has been rebutted and to understand [the State's psychiatrist's] opinions and conclusions as to that issue. The trial court then issued the following cautionary instruction to the jury: Members of the jury, to understand my instructions that I'm about to give you, you have to understand where we are in the case at this point in time. You heard the State's direct proofs, you've heard the defense's direct case with regard to proofs with regard to the mitigating factors and to the extent that there was, in your recollection as well, any challenge to the aggravating factors. So we've had, State direct, defense direct, we're now on State rebuttal and that is before you and is going to be before you for a very limited purpose. This is not the opportunity for the State to reinforce claimed aggravating factors or establish new aggravating factors or to offer evidence on the existence of aggravating factors. It is not and cannot be used by you for that purpose. Rather, as [the State's psychiatrist] said at the beginning of his testimony, his purpose here was a limited one and that was to examine the defendant for a limited purpose and offer an opinion on the issues of extreme . . . let me get the exact words because I keep forgetting it . . . but defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, or that defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. So it's before you not  can't be used by you on the issue of whether aggravating factors exist or not, but to, on the State's behalf, offer evidence in rebuttal for your consideration, determination and evaluation as to whether or not those mitigating factors exist. So it is only before you and can only be used by you on the issue of the existence of mitigating factors. Defendant did not object to this cautionary instruction. The next day, the trial court again addressed the State's rebuttal psychiatric testimony in its charge to the jury: And you'll recall during the testimony of [the State's rebuttal psychiatrist] that an issue arose concerning aspects of his testimony and I'll remind you of the limitations upon the way you may use the testimony from [the State's rebuttal psychiatrist] regarding what was told to him in the course of his interview of [defendant]. As I told you then and as I'll remind you now, rebuttal testimony was not the opportunity for the State to reinforce claimed aggravating factors or to offer evidence on the existence of aggravating factors. It cannot be used by you for that purpose. Rather, as [the State's rebuttal psychiatrist] said at the beginning of his testimony, he examined the defendant for a limited purpose: to offer an opinion on the issue of whether the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance or whether defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication. So thus this evidence is before you only on the issue or the existence of mitigating factors and for no other purpose[, and it is] specifically not usable in the establishment of any alleged aggravating factor. Defendant also did not object to this charge.
It is a central tenet of our jurisprudence that we rel[y] upon the ability of jurors to faithfully follow a trial judge's instructions in deliberating on a defendant's guilt, and, in the capital context, the appropriate sentence. State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 52, 678 A. 2d 164 (1996). We acknowledge that [w]hile there is no way to assure that a jury adheres scrupulously to the mandate of a limiting instruction, there is no reason to believe that jurors will not act responsibly in performing their duty. Ibid. On the contrary, [t]he entire structure of the penalty phase of capital cases is premised on the belief that jurors will use evidence only for its proper purpose. Ibid. In the context of instructions concerning the admissibility of evidence, we provide that a trial court's evidentiary rulings are entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment. State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147, 784 A. 2d 1244 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, an appellate court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court, unless the trial court's ruling was so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. Ibid. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Applying those standards, we reject defendant's attack on the statements made by the State's rebuttal psychiatrist for several, interrelated reasons. First, the complained of statements were those of defendant himself, statements that were otherwise admissible hearsay pursuant to N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1). Second, defendant's statements to the State's rebuttal psychiatrist concerning defendant kicking one of the victims and the location from which defendant secured the knife he admittedly used to kill both victims certainly were relevant to defendant's claimed mitigating factors. See N.J.R.E. 401 (`Relevant evidence' means evidence having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action.). Finally, we note the diligence with which the trial court twice  once when the proofs were adduced and again in its final charge to the jury  cautioned the jury as to the appropriate use of that testimony, instructions we must presume the jury strictly observed. In light of the foregoing, the trial court's exercise of discretion to allow these statements was neither an abuse of discretion, nor a clear error of judgment, nor so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted. We therefore reject defendant's challenge to the admission of his statements to the State's rebuttal psychiatrist.