Opinion ID: 2543365
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellate Counsel in Carter I.

Text: ¶ 48 In analyzing Carter's claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we turn to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Banks v. Reynolds: When a habeas petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal, we examine the merits of the omitted issue. Failure to raise an issue that is without merit does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because the Sixth Amendment does not require an attorney to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal. Thus, counsel frequently will winnow out weaker claims in order to focus effectively on those more likely to prevail. However, an appellate advocate may deliver deficient performance and prejudice a defendant by omitting a `dead-bang winner,' even though counsel may have presented strong but unsuccessful claims on appeal. 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). In describing what type of claim qualifies as a dead-bang winner, the Banks court described it as an issue which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal. Id. at 1515 n. 13. We accept the reasoning of Banks. Therefore, we examine the merits of the issues Carter claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising to determine whether Carter's appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. ¶ 49 Carter first argues that appellate counsel in Carter I was ineffective for failing to argue that the reasonable doubt instruction given at his original trial was unconstitutional because it erroneously described the reasonable doubt standard. The instruction Carter complains of provides, in part, But if after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt such as you will be willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. Because this court rejected the weighty and important matters language in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380 (Utah 1989), Carter claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this instruction on appeal in Carter I. ¶ 50 We disagree. First, this court did not announce the rule in Ireland until 1989, a year after Carter filed his last brief in Carter I. Appellate counsel had no way of knowing that this language would later be rejected by this court. Second, although in Ireland we held that the weighty and important matters language should be omitted from any future reasonable doubt instruction, we acted only prospectively and did not grant appellate relief to Ireland. Therefore, even if on direct appeal in Carter I Carter's counsel had argued that we should have rejected the weighty and important matters language, we would have done so only prospectively, as we did in Ireland, and Carter would not have been granted appellate relief. ¶ 51 Carter also argues that appellate counsel should have challenged the language in the instruction that states [a] reasonable doubt must be a real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely possible or imaginary. However, after reviewing this claim, we find no constitutional deficiency in the instruction. [4] Therefore, this is not an issue that was likely to result in reversal on appeal, and appellate counsel in Carter I did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to raise it. ¶ 52 Carter next argues that appellate counsel in Carter I was ineffective for failing to argue that the prosecution withheld material evidence from Carter. We find no merit to this argument. There is no support in the record for the claim that the prosecution withheld any evidence. In fact, in Carter II, we specifically pointed out that the State had an open file policy, allowing Carter to access any information the State had regarding Carter's case. Carter II, 888 P.2d at 640. Therefore, it is unlikely that a claim that the prosecution withheld evidence would have succeeded on direct appeal and Carter's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it. ¶ 53 Carter next claims that Carter I appellate counsel was ineffective because he should have argued that Carter was denied a psychiatric expert at trial and that trial counsel's failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance. This claim involves the following facts: During Carter's original trial, Carter was examined by two alienists. Although one alienist found some evidence that Carter had an anti-social personality disorder, there was no evidence that Carter suffered from a major psychological disorder. Furthermore, both alienists concluded that at the time of the murder Carter could distinguish right from wrong, he understood the nature of his actions, and he was in control of his actions. Following these examinations, Carter specifically instructed trial counsel not to pursue an insanity defense, and counsel moved to withdraw the notice of the defense of insanity. In considering the motion to withdraw the insanity defense, the trial court examined Carter to assure that this was his wish, which Carter confirmed. The court then granted the motion. ¶ 54 In Carter's first supplemental brief in Carter I, Carter argued that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because counsel waited until fourteen days before trial to request that mental status evaluations be performed and then recommended that Carter withdraw the defense of insanity after receiving the results of the evaluations. However, in Carter's second supplemental brief in Carter I, Carter withdrew this argument saying that he did not authorize the insanity defense, anyway, and he had instructed his [trial] counsel to argue to the jury that he was not guilty because he did not do the act, not because he was insane.... ¶ 55 Based on these facts, we do not find any merit to Carter's claim that Carter I appellate counsel should have argued that Carter was denied a psychiatric expert. Because Carter specifically instructed trial counsel not to pursue the insanity defense, and because there is no evidence that Carter lacked the capacity to make this decision, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. ¶ 56 Carter also assails Carter I appellate counsel for failing to assure the existence of a complete record by pursuing supplementation of the record. Carter does not, however, point out what information was missing from the record or what information should have been supplemented. In addition to failing to show how counsel's performance in this regard was deficient, Carter also fails to show how he was prejudiced. Therefore, Carter's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assure the completeness of the record must be rejected. ¶ 57 Carter next argues that appellate counsel in Carter I was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that the Information charging Carter with capital homicide was defective. However, in making this argument Carter does not provide any explanation regarding how he believes the Information was lacking. Carter merely alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the defectiveness of the Information. Because Carter does not point out, nor has our review of the record uncovered, any specific deficiencies in the Information, this claim was not likely to succeed on direct appeal and counsel was therefore not ineffective for failing to raise it. ¶ 58 Finally, with regard to appellate counsel in Carter I, Carter argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective. This argument necessarily fails because appellate counsel in Carter I did in fact raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on appeal in Carter I. In Carter's first supplemental brief in Carter I, he argued that counsel during the 1985 trial was ineffective for (1) failing to seek any pretrial discovery from the State, (2) failing to conduct any investigation into the crime, and (3) failing to request appointment of a psychiatric expert to assist in Carter's defense. Furthermore, the ACLU also raised a number of issues regarding the ineffectiveness of counsel at trial, issues that Carter later adopted in his second supplemental brief. Because appellate counsel in Carter I did in fact argue that Carter's trial counsel was ineffective, Carter's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to make such an argument must be rejected. See Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994).