Opinion ID: 2615014
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count 2: Special Action in Abril v. Harris

Text: Count 2 of the bar complaint alleges that respondent's filing of a petition for special action in the court of appeals from the award of attorney's fees in favor of Harris on summary judgment in the Abril litigation violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. The committee found that the special action was frivolous and totally lacking in merit because [a]t the time the Special Action was filed the trial court had not entered a final order on the issues complained of.... The commission also found the special action frivolous, but disagreed with the committee's reasons: Respondent correctly recognizes that special action proceedings do not require a final judgment.... However, special action proceedings do require the existence of an order, whether the order grants or denies the requested relief. The trial court, when Respondent filed the special action petition, had not entered any order against Respondent which required that he pay fees.... Under these circumstances, the Commission does not believe the appellate court had anything to review. On appeal to this court, respondent argues that both the committee and the commission erred in finding his special action frivolous on these grounds. We agree. Respondent sought special action relief from the trial court's minute entry ruling that [b]ecause a majority of the case was brought without substantial justification, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349, defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney[']s fees to be assessed against plaintiff's counsel. (Emphasis added.) The primary issues raised in the special action, besides the contention that the claims were not frivolous, were whether the trial court could apply A.R.S. § 12-349 to a cause of action that arose before the effective date of that statute, and whether a judgment for attorney's fees could be imposed against plaintiff's counsel, who was not a party to the action. Although the minute entry ruling had not been reduced to formal written judgment at the time the special action was filed, the minute entry clearly set forth an intent to impose fees against respondent personally. Special action jurisdiction could properly be invoked to review that intention. We therefore disagree with the committee that the special action required a final order, and we disagree with the commission that the special action required a ruling on an application for actual fees. Furthermore, the issue whether an attorney may appeal as a party to the litigation when attorney's fees are personally assessed against him had not yet been decided. This was later resolved as a matter of first impression on appeal in Abril v. Harris, 157 Ariz. 78, 754 P.2d 1353 (App. 1987). At the time the petition was filed, special action relief was an objectively reasonable basis to seek relief from a minute entry ruling that attorney's fees were to be awarded against plaintiff's counsel pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-349, on the basis that the trial court was threatening to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority. See Rule 3(b), Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions; see also Jacobson v. Superior Court, 1 Ariz. App. 342, 402 P.2d 1018 (1965) (extraordinary relief now encompassed in special action procedure is a preventive measure). We find no clear and convincing evidence of improper motive or bad faith on the record regarding the filing of the special action, and we therefore find no violation of E.R. 3.1 or 4.4 on count 2.