Opinion ID: 1246501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Defendant's claim of laches.

Text: Defendant contends that plaintiffs are barred by laches from complaining of such a breach by their apparent acquiescence from 1953 to 1970. In order to constitute laches there must have been full knowledge of all of the facts, concurring with a delay for an unreasonable length of time, and laches does not start to run until such knowledge is shown to exist. Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Or. 70, 89, 96 P. 528 (1908); Kelly v. Tracy, 209 Or. 153, 172, 305 P.2d 411 (1956). In addition, the delay must result in substantial prejudice to the defendant to the extent that it would be inequitable to afford the relief sought against the party asserting laches as a defense. Dahlhammer and Roelfs v. Schneider Exec., 197 Or. 478, 498, 252 P.2d 807 (1953); Hanns v. Hanns, 246 Or. 282, 305, 423 P.2d 499 (1967). Thus, the doctrine of laches is not an inflexible rule, but its application depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. McIver v. Norman, 187 Or. 516, 544, 205 P.2d 137, 213 P.2d 144 (1949). See also Willis v. Stager, 257 Or. 608, 618-619, 481 P.2d 78 (1971). We hold that these requirements were not satisfied in this case. Defendant failed to show that Mrs. Stephan acquired the required full knowledge of all of the facts at any time prior to 1970. We have already discussed some of these facts. In addition, the trial court found that she was unaware until 1970 of defendant's lack of legal authority to administer a trust. We agree with that finding. Defendant also failed, in our opinion, to show that the delay in this case would result in substantial prejudice to the extent that it would be inequitable to afford to plaintiffs the relief sought by them.