Opinion ID: 2074738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Uncommunicated Threats

Text: Appellant cites error in the trial court's exclusion of evidence of the decedent's threats against him, communicated only to a third party. He claims that such testimony was necessary to demonstrate Bennett's state of mind regarding appellant in support of his assertion of self-defense. [15] The rule adopted in the District of Columbia is as follows: When a defendant claims self-defense and there is substantial evidence, though it be only his own testimony, that the deceased attacked him, evidence of un-communicated threats of the deceased against the defendant is admissible. [ Griffin v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 174, 183 F.2d 990, 992 (1950).] In Evans v. United States, 107 U.S.App. D.C. 324, 277 F.2d 354 (1960), a murder conviction was reversed because evidence of the deceased's character and belligerancy, although unknown to the defendant, was excluded. The court found that the testimony was admissible to corroborate . . . the defendant's testimony that the deceased was the aggressor, as a logical extension of the rule in Griffin v. United States, supra . The court also recognized the admissibility of evidence of specific acts of violence as well as a general reputation for cruelty and violence in support of a self-defense theory, all of which were permitted in the case at bar. Where our case differs, however, is in the requirement for substantial evidence that the deceased was the attacker. The defendant in Evans testified that the deceased had grabbed her, ripping her clothing, after she had repelled his sexual assault. We have no such substantial evidence present in this case to permit the introduction of the uncommunicated threats under the rule of Griffin. Appellant testified that the deceased reached toward his side or turned slightly, but no attack directly followed this movement. Appellant testified that the deceased then ran toward the parked car, demanding a shotgun, but that was only after appellant had fired his first shot. We cannot find that the deceased, regardless of his reputation for violence, was the first attacker before or after appellant fired his gun in the decedent's direction. Finding no substantial evidence, as required under Griffin, we hold that the trial court's ruling of inadmissibility regarding the testimony of a third party of uncommunicated threats was proper.