Opinion ID: 165204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Tom Walton

Text: 43 McKenzie also argues that the district judge should have excluded the testimony of Officer Walton because it was not relevant. Again, we do not agree. This court reviews the admission or exclusion of expert testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Arney, 248 F.3d 984, 990 (10th Cir.2001). We give substantial deference to the district judge's application of Daubert. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) ([T]he trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable). The abuse of discretion standard assures that a trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. McEwen, 926 F.2d at 1553-54 (10th Cir.1991). The Daubert test ensures that the proffered evidence is both `reliable' and `relevant.' Hollander, 289 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786). Reliability is judged by examining whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Relevance is evaluated based on whether [that] reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. 44 On appeal, McKenzie here focuses on the district court's application of the relevance prong of the Daubert inquiry. Brief of Appellant at 44, 47. We do not feel that the district judge abused his discretion in finding that Officer Walton's testimony could be applied to the facts in issue in this case. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. As mentioned above, Rule 702 ... requires that the evidence or testimony `assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.' This condition goes primarily to relevance. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786. `Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.' Id. (quoting 3 Weinstein & Berger ¶ 702[02], p. 702-18). See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3rd Cir. 1985) (An additional consideration under Rule 702—and another aspect of relevancy—is whether expert testimony proffered in the case is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute). The consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of `fit.' Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (quoting Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242). Rule 702's `helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92, 113 S.Ct. 2786. 45 Officer Walton is a Deputy Chief of the Patrol Division in the Chicago Police Department. V App. 786. At the time of the trial, Officer Walton had served nearly thirty years with the Department, including twenty-two years in patrol operations, four years as a director of training and education, and held the position of certified police instructor. V App. 786. We agree with the defendant that the district judge could consider Officer Walton's testimony, V App. 791-97, regarding the duties, responsibilities, and rigors of the law enforcement profession as helpful to the jury in determining whether McKenzie was a qualified individual or whether it was objectively reasonable for defendant to not consider rehiring McKenzie. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 650, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (holding that objective reasonableness is a relevant inquiry). 46 Further, Officer Walton's testimony was also relevant to the jury's examination of whether McKenzie was a direct threat to herself or others. In Jury Instruction No. 21, 3 which concerned direct threat, the jury was asked to determine the duration, magnitude and likelihood of the potential harm posed by McKenzie. Brief of Appellee at 67-68. We believe that Officer Walton's testimony regarding the dangerous nature of law enforcement, and the need for good judgment and self-control, was relevant in assisting the jury in making this determination. V App. 796-97. 4 Thus, we hold that the district court did not err in admitting Officer Walton's testimony. 47 3. The claim that there was error by instructing the jury that it was McKenzie's burden to prove she did not pose a direct threat to herself or others 48 McKenzie argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury that in cases involving an inherently dangerous job, an individual with a disability bears the burden of proving that she did not pose a direct threat. We do not agree. 49 This court reviews de novo a timely challenge to a jury instruction to determine whether, considering the instructions as a whole, the jury was misled. Wilson v. Muckala, M.D., 303 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir.2002). In reviewing such allegations, this court examines the record as a whole to determine whether the instructions state the applicable law and provide the jury with an appropriate understanding of the issues and the legal standards to apply. Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, 3 F.3d 1419, 1424 (10th Cir. 1993). 50 McKenzie asserts that failing to accurately describe the elements of a prima facie case and shifting the burden of proving absence of an affirmative defense is reversible err [sic]. Brief of Appellant at 31. She takes issue with the district judge's instruction to the jury that for Plaintiff to establish her claim of unlawful discrimination by Defendant, she had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, inter alia, Plaintiff, at the time she sought re-employment with the Natrona County Sheriff's Office, did not pose a direct threat to herself or others. Brief of Appellant at 30-31 (quoting Jury Instruction No. 8, 6 App. 972). Additionally, McKenzie objects to Jury Instruction No. 20, which stated: 51 In order to show that she is qualified to work in an inherently dangerous occupation, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she did not pose a direct threat to herself or others. 52 Jury Instruction No. 20, 6 App. 984. 53 McKenzie contends that whether an employer may justifiably exclude an otherwise qualified individual with a disability because that person poses a `direct threat' to the health and safety of others is an affirmative defense the burden of proof of which lies with the defendant employer. Brief of Appellant at 3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir.1997); McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967 (10th Cir.2001)). 54 This circuit first considered the question of direct threat under the ADA, as codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3) and §§ 12113, in Den Hartog, 129 F.3d 1076, supra. In Den Hartog, we categorized the existence of a direct threat as an affirmative defense to a charge of disability discrimination, and noted that: [w]ithout running afoul of the ADA, an employer may define a qualification for any job that `an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of [the individual himself] or other individuals in the workplace.' Id at 1088 (emphasis added). We did not address which party bears the burden of proving direct threat. In analyzing Den Hartog, however, we discussed both the arguments raised by defendant asserting that plaintiff did constitute a direct threat, and the arguments by plaintiff refuting that position. Id at 1089. 55 We revisited the direct threat question three years later in Borgialli v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2000). There, this court discussed the split among the federal appellate courts regarding which party bears the burden of proof on the presence or lack of a direct threat. Id at 1291-94. However we did not expressly state which rule we would follow. We noted some precedent which placed the burden of proof at all times on the employee. See Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir.1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 1118, 117 S.Ct. 964, 136 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997) (the employee retains at all times the burden of persuading the jury either that he was not a direct threat or that reasonable accommodations were available.) On the other hand, we have relied on the Fifth Circuit's Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc., which stated that it is unclear from the statutory scheme who has the burden on this issue. It may depend on the facts of the particular case. 213 F.3d 209, 213, n. 4 (5th Cir.2000). Rizzo suggests, and Borgialli, 235 F.3d at 1294, concurs that the burden may fall on the employer, but with an exception: where the essential job duties necessarily implicate the safety of others, [then] the burden may be on the plaintiff to show that she can perform those functions without endangering others.... Rizzo, 213 F.3d at 213, n. 4 (citations omitted). 56 In connection with performance of essential job functions, we note the following analysis in E.E.O.C. v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997): 57 Where those essential job functions necessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions in a way that does not endanger others. There may be other cases under Title I where the issue of direct threat is not tied to the issue of essential job functions but is purely a matter of defense, on which the defendant would bear the burden ... 5 58 The instant case does not involve some of the circumstances of Amego, Inc., such as the safety of others where the essential functions of a job involve the care of others unable to care for themselves. 110 F.3d at 143. However here there is a special risk to others, co-workers and the public, who are exposed to the danger of a firearm in the control of McKenzie. Moreover McKenzie's erratic instances of behavior must be considered as well. We are, therefore, persuaded that it is proper for the defendant-employer here to consider the direct threat factor in connection with possible re-employment of McKenzie. And, likewise, we are convinced it was not error for the trial judge to instruct the jury that McKenzie bore the burden of proof on not being a direct threat. The job qualifications here properly included the essential function of performing McKenzie's duties without endangering her co-workers or members of the public with whom she came in contact. 59 We dealt with the direct threat question in our earlier consideration of the facts of this instant case. In McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, supra, we reversed a summary judgment for defendant-employer Dovala, then Sheriff of Natrona County, concluding that McKenzie had successfully made out her prima facie case under the ADA and submitted sufficient evidence to raise issues of material fact appropriately determined by a jury. We cited our earlier opinion in Borgialli, 235 F.3d at 1295, and stated that it held that a disabled plaintiff, to show she is qualified to work in an inherently dangerous job, must show that she does not pose a direct threat to others. McKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d at 974. 60 On remand of this case, the parties agreed to stipulate that the occupation in question was inherently dangerous. Aplt.App. vol. 4 p. 618. Then, over plaintiff's objection, the district court adopted a jury instruction placing the burden of showing she would not be a direct threat on the plaintiff McKenzie. 61 We hold that the district court did not err in placing that burden on the plaintiff here. The notion that an employee might constitute a direct threat to persons in the workplace, and the permissible conduct of an employer in such circumstances, is discussed in the ADA at sections 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), § 12113(b), § 12111(3), and also in related language at § 12112(b)(6). Section 12113(a), under the heading Defenses, states the following: 62 It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under this subchapter. 63 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). 64 Thus direct threat is addressed under Defenses. However, the statute further states that [t]he term `qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace. Id. § 12113(b). Moreover the plaintiff had demonstrated clearly reckless use of her department issued off duty firearm when she fired six shots into her father's grave. McKenzie's irresponsible conduct could have tragic consequences if it reoccurred while she was on duty. In addition, evidence was presented at trial of McKenzie engaging in violent conduct which had the potential to be a direct threat to others and which, in fact, led to physical harm to herself. 6 As a result, not only was the occupation in question inherently dangerous, as stipulated by the parties, but McKenzie demonstrated particularly reckless and dangerous conduct. We hold that under these circumstances, the district court did not err by instructing the jury that the burden rested on the plaintiff to prove that she did not pose a direct threat to others in the workplace. 65 AFFIRMED.