Opinion ID: 1703138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preempted Claims

Text: If it were not for its decision regarding the statute of limitations, the district court's holding would have been to reverse and remand the case for a new trial because the Carters were allowed to introduce testimony and evidence at trial which alluded to evidence that was preempted by the 1969 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. See Brown & Williamson, 723 So.2d at 836. Again, we agree with the trial court and quash the district court's decision on the preemption issue. In 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, which required all cigarette packages to contain the warning: Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health. Pub.L. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282. The purpose of the Labeling Act was to adequately inform the public about the dangers of cigarette smoking and to protect the national economy from the imposition of diverse and confusing warning requirements regarding cigarettes. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 514, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). Four years later, Congress enacted the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which amended the 1965 Act to require the following warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health. Pub.L. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87. The 1969 Act included the following provision: (b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act. Pub.L. 91-222, § 5 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994)). In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), the United States Supreme Court was asked to consider whether state common law actions filed against tobacco companies for failure to warn, breach of warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy were preempted by either the 1965 or 1969 Acts. A plurality of the United States Supreme Court held that the 1965 Act only preempted state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements and did not preempt state-law damages actions. See id. at 519-20, 112 S.Ct. 2608. However, the Court came to a different conclusion regarding the 1969 Act. The plurality addressed each of the claims separately. First, the plurality held that the 1969 Act expressly preempts post-1969 failure-towarn claims that cigarette advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings. Id. at 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608. The plurality added that the [1969] Act does not, however, pre-empt petitioner's claims that rely solely on respondent's testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion. Id. at 524-25, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Next, the plurality concluded that express warranty claims were not preempted by the 1969 Act because liability for express warranty is not imposed under state law but rather by the warrantor's express actions. See id. at 525-27, 112 S.Ct. 2608. The plurality also concluded that the 1969 Act does not preempt fraudulent misrepresentation claims because fraudulent misrepresentation claims are based on a state law duty not to deceive rather than a state law duty based on smoking and health. Id. at 528-29, 112 S.Ct. 2608. Finally, the plurality concluded that the 1969 Act does not preempt conspiracy to defraud claims because such claims are based on a duty not to conspire to commit fraud rather than a duty based on smoking and health. Id. at 530, 112 S.Ct. 2608. The district court below stated that the trial court made two separate errors concerning the preemption issue. First, the district court held that the trial court erred in denying Brown & Williamson's pretrial motion for partial summary judgment. Second, the district court found that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Allan Feingold, an expert witness for the plaintiff, to testify regarding a proposed package insert. We disagree with the district court on both of these points. Prior to trial, Brown & Williamson sought partial summary judgment as to any claim that post-1969 cigarette warning labels were inadequate. In response, the Carters argued that the 1969 Act only preempted claims regarding ATC's post-1969 advertising or promotions, but that according to the language of Cipollone itself, the 1969 Act does not preempt their claims that rely solely on ATC's testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 525, 112 S.Ct. 2608. The Carters also attached a number of so-called advocacy statements of the cigarette industry to its motion, as well as the affidavit of Professor Richard Polley. Polley stated in the affidavit that in numerous instances, major cigarette manufacturers conducted public relations campaigns, including but not limited to purchasing newspaper space for making public statements [and] issuing press releases. Polley stated that such mass communications are not considered advertising or promotion, as the statements did not contain the cautionary label which were federally required on all advertisements or promotions. In its order denying the motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court cited to Polley's affidavit and concluded that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the general usage of the terms `advertising or promotions.' Brown & Williamson argues that this decision paved the way for the Carters to introduce a proposed package insert. In reversing the trial court on this issue, the district court stated: We agree that [the trial court's ruling on the motion for partial summary judgment] was in error. The courts have made it clear that, in the context of the labeling act, advertising or promotion encompasses all forms of communication directed to a mass market. See, e.g. Griesenbeck v. American Tobacco Co., 897 F.Supp. 815 (D.N.J.1995). We, however, are not persuaded that the Griesenbeck court's broad interpretation of the terms advertising or promotion is necessarily correct. Certainly, the plain language of the Cipollone opinion itself demonstrates that the Supreme Court envisioned that there were other forms of communication unrelated to advertising or promotion. See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that Massachusetts statute requiring manufacturers of tobacco products to disclose additives and nicotine-yield ratings for their products to a state agency did not violate the 1969 Act, as such communication did not amount to advertising or promotion). Nevertheless, as stated above, summary judgment should not be granted unless the facts are so clear and undisputed that only questions of law remain. Based on Polley's affidavit, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying Brown & Williamson's motion for partial summary judgment. More importantly, any such error on this issue would be harmless, as our review of the record reveals that the Carters' claims were clearly limited to injuries which allegedly resulted from the defendant's failure to provide adequate warnings prior to 1969, as explained below. The district court held that the trial court also erred in permitting plaintiffs' expert Dr. Feingold to introduce a proposed package insert: More significantly, we agree that Dr. Feingold's proposed package insert implicated post 1969 warnings and that the impact of this proposed insert was pervasive and not remedied by the jury instruction that the 1969 labeling requirements could not be challenged. During the trial of this case, Dr. Feingold, the plaintiffs expert, exhibited to the jury and testified concerning his proposal for an adequate warning about the dangers of cigarette smoking, in the form of a detailed illustrated proposed package insert. In our view, this extensive proposed package insert undoubtedly would run afoul of the federal preemption of state causes of action for inadequate warnings. The presentation of the insert, and testimony about it, strongly implied to the jury that appellant's post 1969 labeling was inadequate. Appellees assert that the federal labeling law only preempts some state law causes of action, and only preempts failure to warn claims after 1969. They contend Dr. Feingold's package insert was relevant to support their strict liability claim by demonstrating that the product was unreasonably dangerous, and also to rebut Brown & Williamson's defense that no warning would have deterred Grady from smoking. Further, they assert that the primary objection is to the evidence itself rather than to a federal preemption issue. Appellant's argument is persuasive. The testimony and exhibit were extensive, and the substance of the proposed package insert was not limited to a particular time period. In fact, it appears that some of the information contained in the insert was not available until after 1969. Significantly, as noted later in this opinion, Carter testified that additional information, such as that contained in the package insert, might have affected his smoking. We believe the presentation strongly implied that additional warnings should have been given, without limitation as to time period. Brown & Williamson, 723 So.2d at 837. We disagree. During the trial, the Carters' counsel asked Dr. Feingold about a proposed package insert which Dr. Feingold stated should have been prepared by the cigarette industry, and in particular, ATC. The defense objected, arguing that the package insert was preempted by the 1969 Act. The Carters' counsel argued at sidebar that the insert was only being offered to support the Carters' pre-1969 claims. The trial court overruled the defense's objection and permitted the introduction of the insert, but assured the defense that the jury would be specifically instructed regarding which dates to be considered by them with respect to warnings. Subsequently, at the end of the trial, the trial court gave the jury the following instruction: The federal law does not limit the liability of [a] defendant against the claim of a failure to warn before July 1, 1969. However, you are not to base any findings of liability on a determination that after July 1, 1969, the defendant should have included additional or more clearly stated warnings in the advertising or promotion of its cigarettes or that the defendant, through its advertising or promotional practices, neutralized, minimized, or undermined the effect of the federally mandated warnings during that time. Absent a finding to the contrary, juries are presumed to follow the instructions given them. See Sutton v. State, 718 So.2d 215, 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Even assuming that some of the information in the proposed insert was not available until after 1969, we do not find that this prejudiced Brown & Williamson, as this information was not the focus of Dr. Feingold's testimony. Hence, we disapprove the district court's analysis and conclusion on this issue.