Opinion ID: 4509848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Colorable Federal Defense

Text: The remaining issue of law is whether Avondale asserted a colorable federal defense to Latiolais’s claim. See, e.g., Bell v. Thornburg, 743 F.3d 84, 89–91 (5th Cir. 2014). It was briefed, but not decided, in the district court, and we may reach the issue as a matter of discretion. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2877 (1976); see also Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[T]o the extent the issue is presented with sufficient clarity and completeness and its 9 IntegraNet Physician Res., Inc. v. Tex. Indep. Providers, L.L.C., 945 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2019); Legendre v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 885 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2018); Zeringue v. Crane Co., 846 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2017); Savoie v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 817 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2016). 14 Case: 18-30652 Document: 00515319928 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/24/2020 No. 18-30652 resolution will materially advance the progress of this already protracted litigation, we should address it.”). To be “colorable,” the asserted federal defense need not be “clearly sustainable,” as section 1442 does not require a federal official or person acting under him “to ‘win his case before he can have it removed.’” Jefferson County, 527 U.S. at 431, 119 S. Ct. at 2075 (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407, 89 S. Ct. at 1816). Instead, an asserted federal defense is colorable unless it is “immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” See Zeringue, 846 F.3d at 790; see also Bell, 743 F.3d at 89–91 (deeming an asserted federal defense colorable simply because it satisfied the “causal connection” requirement). Certainly, if a defense is plausible, it is colorable. Compare Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009) (plausible claim survives a motion to dismiss), with Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (1998) (“It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.”), and Montana-Dakota Utils Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249, 71 S. Ct. 692, 694 (1951) (“If the complaint raises a federal question, the mere claim confers power to decide that it has no merit, as well as to decide that it has.”). 10 In this case, Avondale asserts the federal defense outlined in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988). This defense 10 It may well be that courts, “in resolving a motion to remand, should first ask if the defendant offers a colorable federal defense.” See Legendre, 885 F.3d at 405 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). Still, in doing so, courts must avoid premature merits determination. See id. Thus, even if a federal defense makes “sharp demands,” id., a court should not base removal on whether the defendant actually meets those demands. Only a colorable assertion of the federal defense is necessary. 15 Case: 18-30652 Document: 00515319928 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/24/2020 No. 18-30652 extends to federal contractors an immunity enjoyed by the federal government in the performance of discretionary actions. Zeringue, 846 F.3d at 790.11 Accordingly, federal contractors are not liable for design defects if “(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.” Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512, 108 S. Ct. at 2510 (quoted in Zeringue, 846 F.3d at 790). Furthermore, “the government contractor defense does not necessarily apply only to claims labeled ‘design defect.’” Bailey v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 989 F.2d 794, 801 (5th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[w]hether it will apply to a particular claim depends only upon whether Boyle’s three conditions are met with respect to the particular product feature upon which the claim is based.” Id. at 801–02. In this case, Avondale offered evidence that the three Boyle conditions are met. First, Avondale submitted one affidavit and deposition testimony alleging that the Navy required installation of asbestos on the Tappahannock, as well as another affidavit alleging that the Navy generally required Avondale to install asbestos and to comply with certain related safety practices. These documents make colorable that the government approved reasonably precise specifications about the installation of asbestos. Second, Latiolais does not challenge that Avondale complied with those specifications, if they existed. Indeed, Latiolais himself testified that Avondale used asbestos in refurbishing the Tappahannock. Third, Avondale’s evidence tends to support that the federal government knew more than Avondale knew about asbestos-related 11 As the Boyle Court explained, “[i]t makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production.” 487 U.S. at 512, 108 S. Ct. at 2510 (quoted in Zeringue, 846 F.3d at 790). 16 Case: 18-30652 Document: 00515319928 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/24/2020 No. 18-30652 hazards and related safety measures. From such evidence, it is colorable that Avondale did not omit warning the government about any dangers about which the government did not know. In light of the evidence submitted, Avondale’s assertion of a federal defense is not wholly insubstantial and frivolous. We, of course, do not speculate on what further evidence may come to light as the case proceeds and conclude only that Avondale has a colorable federal defense.