Opinion ID: 870424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: There was sufficient evidence to support Kalaola's conviction for failure to disperse

Text: The reversal of a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence constitutes a determination by the appellate court that the defendant should have been acquitted in the trial court in the first instance because, as a matter of law [ ] the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty. See State v. Bannister, 60 Haw. 658, 660, 594 P.2d 133, 135 (1979). When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial, this court has explained that: evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Jones, 96 Hawai`i at 181, 29 P.3d at 371 (emphasis added) (quoting Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 145, 938 P.2d at 576). In the instant case, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a conclusion that Kalaola failed to disperse from the second floor of ATM when ordered to do so by Officer Alapa. However, this evidentiary insufficiency does not bar retrial of Kalaola on his alleged failure to disperse from the first floor, for which there was clearly sufficient evidence. Because there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact, i.e., that Kalaola was guilty of the charged offense of failure to disperse, double jeopardy does not bar retrial with regard to the events on the first floor. See id. In Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 5, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a defendant may be tried a second time when a reviewing court has determined that in a prior trial the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. The Court analogized an appellate court's determination that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction to a verdict of acquittal, noting: It is unquestionably true that the Court of Appeals' decision represente[d] a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. By deciding that the Government had failed to come forward with sufficient proof of petitioner's capacity to be responsible for criminal acts, that court was clearly saying that Burks' criminal culpability had not been established. If the District Court had so held in the first instance, as the reviewing court said it should have done, a judgment of acquittal would have been entered and, of course, petitioner could not be retried for the same offense. Consequently, as Mr. Justice Douglas correctly perceived in Sapir [ v. United States, 348 U.S. 373, 75 S.Ct. 422, 99 L.Ed. 426 (1955) ], it should make no difference that the reviewing court, rather than the trial court, determined the evidence to be insufficient. The appellate decision unmistakably meant that the District Court had erred in failing to grant a judgment of acquittal. To hold otherwise would create a purely arbitrary distinction between those in petitioner's position and others who would enjoy the benefit of a correct decision by the District Court. Id. at 10-11, 98 S.Ct. 2141 (internal citations and footnote omitted; some brackets in original and some added; first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). The Court further explained that [t]he [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. Id. at 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141. The Court also distinguished reversal for evidentiary insufficiency from that for trial error: In short, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished. Id. at 15, 98 S.Ct. 2141 (emphasis added). The court identified, inter alia, the failure to dismiss a faulty indictment[,] improper instruction, absence of the accused during a portion of the trial, improper hearsay testimony received, and failure to record jury instructions, as trial errors. Id. at 14 & n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 2141. Relying on Burks, this court has determined that [t]he prohibition against double jeopardy applies where the reversal is based on insufficiency of evidence[.] Bannister, 60 Haw. at 660, 594 P.2d at 135. In Bannister, this court reversed the defendant's conviction for first degree theft due to a lack of admissible evidence that he had committed theft of property or services the value of which exceeds $200[,] and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 659-60, 594 P.2d at 134-35 (quotation marks omitted). This court explained that: Since we necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal no matter how erroneous its decision it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying the defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty. [ Burks, 437 U.S. at] 16[, 98 S.Ct. 2141]. However, the prohibition does not apply where judgment is reversed for a trial error because the effect of the decision does not constitute a failure of the government to prove its case. Id. at 10[, 98 S.Ct. 2141]. The prohibition against double jeopardy where reversal is based on insufficiency of evidence is absolute. The appellate court cannot remand the case even where a new trial appears equitable. Id. at 11 n. 6[, 98 S.Ct. 2141]. Furthermore, this prohibition applies only where the insufficiency of evidence is such that the appellate court finds that the government failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 16 n. 10[, 98 S.Ct. 2141]. Id. at 660, 594 P.2d at 135 (emphasis added); see also State v. Hamala, 73 Haw. 289, 293, 834 P.2d 275, 277 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai`i 405, 984 P.2d 1231 (1999). In the instant case, there was substantial evidence that Kalaola failed to disperse on the first floor. Thus, the determination that there was not substantial evidence that Kalaola failed to disperse on the second floor does not constitute a failure of the government to prove its case. See Bannister, 60 Haw. at 660, 594 P.2d at 135. To the contrary, our conclusion demonstrates that there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact[,] i.e., that Kalaola was guilty of the charged offense of failure to disperse. See Jones, 96 Hawai`i at 181, 29 P.3d at 371. Moreover, our determination that there was insufficient evidence that Kalaola failed to disperse on the second floor does not constitute a determination that Kalaola should have been acquitted in the trial court, since the jury could properly have returned a verdict of guilty on the charged offense based on the events that took place on the first floor. Our determination therefore implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of [Kalaola] with regard to the charged offense of failure to disperse. See Burks, 437 U.S. at 15, 98 S.Ct. 2141. This analysis is consistent with our holding in Jones, 96 Hawai`i at 183-84, 29 P.3d at 373-74. The defendant in Jones was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault relating to the 14 year old complaining witness (CW). 96 Hawai`i at 163-64, 29 P.3d at 353-54. Each count related to a specific act of sexual penetration or sexual contact; in other words, the State did not rely on multiple acts of sexual conduct to support a single count, and thus Jones was not a multiple acts case. Id. at 172, 29 P.3d at 362. However, the State did rely on alternative means of proving the consent element of each offense, i.e., it argued both that the CW did not consent, and that if she did, her consent was invalid for various reasons. Id. at 164, 174, 29 P.3d at 354, 364. The circuit court instructed the jury both on lack of consent, and on four different grounds by which it could find that any consent by the CW was invalid, pursuant to HRS § 702-235. Id. at 164-65, 29 P.3d at 354-55. Although the prosecution presented considerable argument and some evidence regarding two of the four grounds, this court found that there was insufficient evidence supporting any of the four grounds. Id. at 183, 29 P.3d at 373. There was, however, sufficient evidence to establish lack of consent by the CW. Id. at 182, 29 P.3d at 372. We then phrased the issue as follows: in an alternative means case where it is impossible to tell which alternative the jury's verdict is based upon, does due process require that each of the alternative means presented to the jury be supported by legally sufficient evidence? Id. at 178, 29 P.3d at 368. We considered, but rejected, the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991), where the Court held that due process did not require that each alternative presented to the jury be supported by sufficient evidence, since it could be assumed that the jury had rejected any alternative that was not so supported. Id. at 178-81, 29 P.3d at 368-71. We concluded that unanimity is not required where alternative means of establishing an element of an offense are submitted to the jury, provided that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was based on an alternative unsupported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 181, 29 P.3d at 371 (emphasis in original). We emphasized that the trial court had instructed the jury that it could find that the consent element was satisfied if any one of four alternative theories of ineffective consent was established by the State, and observed that based on that instruction being given, the jurors understandably might believe that there must be some evidence to support that theory. Id. at 183, 29 P.3d at 373 (quoting Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 422 Mass. 634, 664 N.E.2d 833, 837 (1996)). We also noted that there was some evidence and argument to the jury supporting some of the grounds of ineffective consent[,] Jones, 96 Hawai`i at 167, 178, 29 P.3d at 357, 368 (emphasis in original), but that the evidence adduced in support of those grounds was legally insufficient[,] id. at 178, 29 P.3d at 368. Thus, we concluded that the instruction as to ineffective consent prejudicially affected Defendant's right to due process[,] and added that the erroneous jury instruction regarding ineffective consent was not harmless because there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict was based on an alternative that was unsupported by legally sufficient evidence. Id. In sum, this court determined that: (1) the jury was instructed that it could convict Defendant based on the absence of consent or any of the four grounds of ineffective consent, (2) there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict was based upon at least one of the four grounds of ineffective consent, and (3) there was legally insufficient evidence to support any of the four grounds of ineffective consent presented to the jury. Id. (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). Accordingly, we determined that the defendant's conviction could not stand. Id. However, despite determining that there was a possibility that the verdict was based on an alternative means of establishing guilt not supported by legally sufficient evidence, this court concluded that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial on the means of establishing guilt for which there was sufficient evidence presented at trial because the error in this case was trial error. Id. at 184 n. 30, 29 P.3d at 374 n. 30. It is well-settled that, even where this court finds trial error, challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence must always be decided on appeal. This is because `the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause bars retrial of a defendant once a reviewing court has found the evidence at trial to be legally insufficient to support a conviction.' State v. Malufau, 80 Hawai`i 126, 132, 906 P.2d 612, 618 (1995), vacated in part on other grounds on reconsideration, 80 Hawai`i 126, 134-38, 906 P.2d 612, 620-24 (1995). Although this court determined that there was trial error in Jones, double jeopardy would have barred retrial had this court found that the evidence at trial [was] legally insufficient to support a conviction. Jones 96 Hawai`i at 184 n. 30, 29 P.3d at 374 n. 30. Thus, Jones is not distinguishable on the ground that the outcome was based on trial error. [10] A careful reading of this court's discussion of double jeopardy in Jones is instructive: The double jeopardy clause bars retrial of a defendant once a reviewing court has found the evidence at trial to be legally insufficient to support a conviction. However, retrial is not barred when the reviewing court reverses a case due to trial error, such as erroneous jury instructions. Although our holding in this case is based, in part, on our conclusion that the jury instruction regarding ineffective consent raised the possibility that the verdict was based on an alternative means of establishing guilt not supported by legally sufficient evidence, it is undisputed that there was legally sufficient evidence of the other alternative of establishing guilt and, thus, the error in this case is trial error. Accordingly, the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial on the means of establishing guilt for which there was sufficient evidence presented at trial. Id. at 184 n. 30, 29 P.3d at 374 n. 30 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This court's reasoning indicates that because there was sufficient evidence of one of the alternative means of establishing guilt but insufficient evidence of the other, the error in Jones was properly analyzed under the double jeopardy principles applicable to trial error. Put another way, the double jeopardy clause was not implicated because there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction. [11] Id.; see also Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 33 n. 40, 928 P.2d at 875 n. 40. Similarly here, the double jeopardy clause is not implicated with regard to Kalaola's failure to disperse from the first floor of ATM since there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction based on those acts. Arceo is not to the contrary. Arceo was charged with one count of sexual assault in the third degree (Count I), and one count of sexual assault in the first degree (Count II). 84 Hawai`i at 2-3, 928 P.2d at 844-45. Count I involved multiple acts of sexual contact between Arceo and his six-year-old son (the minor). Id. at 3-4, 928 P.2d at 845-46. Count II involved multiple acts of sexual penetration with the minor. Id. At trial, the minor testified inconsistently concerning the number of sexual assaults he was subjected to. Id. at 24 n. 25, 928 P.2d at 867 n. 25 (the [m]inor purported to recall seven separate, distinct, and specific sexual assaults); id. at 10, 928 P.2d at 852 (the minor acknowledged telling a detective that his father had touched him approximately twelve times). With regard to Count I, the minor testified at trial that [Arceo] put his penis on mine I think once. Id. at 8, 928 P.2d at 850. The minor clarified, [m]aybe it's more or maybe it's once. The minor further testified that Arceo put his penis on the minor's back. Id. at 9, 928 P.2d at 851. With regard to Count II, the minor testified that [Arceo p]ut his finger in my butt [t]wice I think[,] and that [Arceo] put his penis in my butt[.] Id. The minor further testified that Arceo touched the minor's penis with his mouth [t]wice, I think. Id. at 9, 928 P.2d at 851. On cross-examination, the minor acknowledged telling a detective that his father had touched him approximately twelve times, but that, at trial, he could only guess as to the number of separate instances because he could not presently remember. Id. at 10, 928 P.2d at 852 (emphasis added). This court held, inter alia: that when separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count charging a sexual assault-any one of which could support a conviction thereunder-and the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged offense, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless one or both of the following occurs: (1) at or before the close of its case-in-chief, the prosecution is required to elect the specific act upon which it is relying to establish the conduct element of the charged offense; or (2) the trial court gives the jury a specific unanimity instruction, i.e., an instruction that advises the jury that all twelve of its members must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, this court concluded that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury a specific unanimity instruction, and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 33, 928 P.2d at 875. We therefore vacate[d] Arceo's judgment of conviction and remand[ed] the matter for a new trial[.] Id. We further concluded that, [b]ecause our disposition of the present appeal is grounded in `trial error' and the evidence adduced at trial was clearly sufficient to support Arceo's convictions, double jeopardy concerns are not implicated by a new trial. Id. at 33 n. 40, 928 P.2d at 875 n. 40 (emphasis added). Our opinion in Arceo clearly states that we found the evidence presented at trial sufficient to support Arceo's convictions [,] 84 Hawai`i at 33 n. 40, 928 P.2d at 875 n. 40 (emphasis added), and did not address whether there was sufficient evidence to support each and every act presented to the jury. [12] There is no indication that this court concluded, based on the minor's equivocal testimony, that there was substantial evidence to support, for example, the twelve acts of sexual contact the minor reported to the detective, id. at 10, 928 P.2d at 852, more than one incident of Arceo putting his penis on the minor's penis, id. at 8, 928 P.2d at 850, more than one incident of Arceo putting his finger in the minor's butt, id. at 9, 928 P.2d at 851, or more than one incident of fellatio, id. at 9, 928 P.2d at 851. [13] In the instant case, the evidence presented at trial concerning Kalaola's conduct on the first floor of ATM was clearly sufficient to support a conviction for failure to disperse. Accordingly, the double jeopardy clause is not implicated with regard to Kalaola's failure to disperse from the first floor of ATM, since there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction based on that act. [14] However, double jeopardy precludes the State from again seeking a conviction of Kalaola based on his failure to disperse from the second floor of ATM. In order to obtain a conviction on retrial based on that act, the prosecution would necessarily be required to introduce additional evidence beyond that presented in the first trial. In the circumstances of this case, where the prosecution specifically argued that Kalaola's conduct on the second floor could independently support conviction, allowing the prosecution an opportunity to present necessary evidence that it failed to muster in the first proceeding would implicate double jeopardy. See Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 140, 938 P.2d at 571 ([t]he Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. This is central to the objective of the prohibition against successive trials.) (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 187, 78 S.Ct. 221); cf. Jones, 96 Hawai`i at 184 n. 30, 29 P.3d at 374 n. 30 (the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial on the means of establishing guilt for which there was sufficient evidence presented at trial).