Opinion ID: 2208459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Batson Claim Relating to the State's Use of a Peremptory Challenge

Text: During the selection of the jury, counsel for the state exercised a peremptory challenge to an African-American juror. Counsel for the defense objected to this challenge based upon the principles enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The defense argued that this challenge was based upon racial discrimination. We recently defined the obligation of a trial justice when faced with a Batson issue: `Under the Batson rule, when confronted with an objection to a challenge of a prospective juror made on the [issue] of race, the trial justice must first determine whether there is a prima facie showing that the challenge was motivated by race.' State v. Price, 706 A.2d 929, 935 (R.I.1998). `Upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to articulate its race-neutral reason(s) for challenging that particular juror.' Id. `The trial [justice] is then left to determine whether the defendant has carried his or her burden of proving purposeful racial discrimination.' Id. `[T]he decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.' State v. Holley, 604 A.2d 772, 778 (R.I.1992) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 409 (1991)). `[T]he trial justice's evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind is accorded great deference.' Id.  State v. Lopez, 721 A.2d 837, 838-39 (R.I.1998) (per curiam). We earlier had stated in State v. Holley, 604 A.2d 772, 778 (R.I.1992) that a challenge of even a single juror may be sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination. The experienced trial judge in this case required the prosecution to articulate its race-neutral reasons for challenging that particular juror. The prosecution did so with the following comment: MR. YOUNG: Serving on juries is difficult, to say the least, and myself and Mr. Stone struck Mr. Madyun. We talked about it. It was a juror we would have strucken irregardless of his race, and it certainly was not because of his race in any event. I was also struck by the question that Mr. Mann posed at the end, which I objected to and was sustained, and that bothered me because a seed was planted in this young man's mind that they might be susceptible to retribution. Certainly that wasn't what Mr. Mann had in mind with that question which was objected to and sustained. [2] I was struck by his answer that he listens to his boss. I, frankly, don't think his age and his abilities would make him agood juror. That's from the State's point of view for us to strike. It was not categorically because of his race. After the prosecutor's explanation, the burden was upon defendant to establish that the challenge was based upon the race of the juror and not for race-neutral reasons. A colloquy occurred between counsel for the state and counsel for the defense in which defendant's counsel argued that there was no real reason to challenge this potential juror because of his age or his possible fear that his findings as a juror might cause him to be looked upon with disapproval by his neighbors and friends. The trial judge considered the comments of both counsel and noted our comments in Lopez, supra, which had been derived from Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). In accordance with his obligation, the trial judge considered all the factors, including the fact that there were two other African Americans on the jury, and determined that the explanation of the prosecutor and his race-neutral basis for challenge was credible. As we said in Lopez, 721 A.2d at 838-39, `[t]here will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.'    `[T]he trial justice's evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind is accorded great deference' and is reviewed for clear error. It should be borne in mind that a peremptory challenge need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause. Consequently, the reasons set forth by the attorney who made the challenge always are subject to disagreement about their weight and persuasiveness. However, under the deferential standard of review established by our own Court in conformity to the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States, we cannot say that the trial justice was clearly wrong in accepting the explanation of counsel for the state and finding that defendant had failed to prove that the challenge was racially motivated. Consequently, defendant's argument on this issue does not prevail.