Opinion ID: 1058988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Willful and Wanton Negligence Punitive Damages

Text: As we recently explained, A claim for punitive damages at common law in a personal injury action must be supported by factual allegations sufficient to establish that the defendant's conduct was willful or wanton. Huffman v. Love, 245 Va. 311, 314, 427 S.E.2d 357, 359-60 (1993); Booth v. Robertson, 236 Va. 269, 273, 374 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1988); see Alfonso v. Robinson, 257 Va. 540, 546-47, 514 S.E.2d 615, 619 (1999). Willful and wanton negligence is action undertaken in conscious disregard of another's rights, or with reckless indifference to consequences with the defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct probably would cause injury to another. Id. at 545, 514 S.E.2d at 618; Harris v. Harman, 253 Va. 336, 340-41, 486 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1997). Each case raising an issue concerning the sufficiency of a claim of willful and wanton negligence must be evaluated on its own facts. Alfonso, 257 Va. at 545, 514 S.E.2d at 618; Harris, 253 Va. at 341, 486 S.E.2d at 102; Huffman, 245 Va. at 315, 427 S.E.2d at 360. Woods v. Mendez, 265 Va. 68, 76-77, 574 S.E.2d 263, 268 (2003). The difference between ordinary negligence and gross negligence is one of degree; however, the difference between any form of negligence and causes of action for willful and wanton conduct, reckless conduct, or intentional misconduct is a matter of kind. Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 239 Va. 572, 582, 391 S.E.2d 322, 327 (1990). Negligence conveys the idea of heedlessness, inattention, inadvertence; willfulness and wantonness convey the idea of purpose or design, actual or constructive. Boward v. Leftwich, 197 Va. 227, 231, 89 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1955). Additionally, in Infant C. we explained the difference between willful and wanton conduct and intentional misconduct where we stated: An actor guilty of intentional misconduct must intend to cause harm to another ... An actor guilty of willful and wanton conduct intends his act, but not the resulting harm. 239 Va. at 582, 391 S.E.2d at 328 (citation omitted). Ill will is not a necessary element of willful and wanton negligence. Id. at 581, 391 S.E.2d at 327. In this case, plaintiff has alleged willful and wanton conduct in support of a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff's proof requires evidence of actual or constructive consciousness that injury will result from the act done or omitted. Alfonso v. Robinson, 257 Va. 540, 545, 514 S.E.2d 615, 618 (1999). Upon review of the record in this case in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the trial court did not err in striking the evidence with regard to the claim of willful and wanton conduct. The same evidence that supports a jury question on gross negligence does not necessarily support a jury question on willful and wanton conduct. Harris v. Harman, 253 Va. 336, 340-41, 486 S.E.2d 99, 101-02 (1997). On the facts presented, we agree that no reasonable juror could find that Ingram had actual or constructive knowledge that Green was on the other side of the door. His training required him to act as if there were people in the room, but there is no evidence of actual or constructive knowledge on Ingram's part that there were people in the room. The plaintiff's evidence does not rise to the level where a reasonable jury could find that Ingram had conscious awareness of the danger, and probable consequences of his actions, and recklessly decided to proceed notwithstanding that awareness.