Opinion ID: 1354899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: kentucky constitution section 77.

Text: The Governor's pardoning power was defined in the Third (1850) Constitution of Kentucky as follows: He shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, grant reprieves and pardons, except in cases of impeachment. In cases of treason, he shall have power to grant reprieves until the end of the next session of the General Assembly, in which the power of pardoning shall be vested; but he shall have no power to remit the fees of the clerk, sheriff, or Commonwealth's Attorney, in penal or criminal cases. Ky. Const. art. III, § 10 (1850). On September 8, 1890, the delegates elected to the 1890 Constitutional Convention assembled in Frankfort to begin more than a year of deliberations and debates that would culminate in the approval of our present (1891) Constitution. Among those delegates were the then-sitting governor, Simon Bolivar Buckner, delegate from Hart County, and a former governor, J. Proctor Knott, delegate from Marion County. Their presence is mentioned because they were the only members of the convention to have ever exercised the pardoning power, and both opposed amending the language in Article III, § 10, of the 1850 Constitution. 1 Debates 1090-91, 1322. Nevertheless, the language was amended and the following was adopted as Section 77 of the 1891 Constitution (amendatory language in bold face): He shall have the power to remit fines and forfeitures, commute sentences, grant reprieves and pardons, except in cases of impeachment, and he shall file with each application therefor a statement of the reasons for his decision thereon, which application and statement shall always be open to public inspection. In cases of treason, he shall have power to grant reprieves until the end of the next session of the General Assembly, in which the power of pardoning shall be vested; but he shall have no power to remit the fees of the clerk, sheriff, or Commonwealth's Attorney, in penal or criminal cases. To understand the significance of the amendment, it is necessary to document both the constitutional environment in which the amendatory language was added and the debates that led to the amendment. [I]n construing constitutional provisions, [the courts] will look to the history of the times and the state of existing things to ascertain the intention of the framers of the constitution and the people adopting it .... Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 192 (Ky.2006) (quoting Shamburger v. Duncan, 253 S.W.2d 388, 390-91 (Ky.1952)). Further, [i]t is a familiar aid in the interpretation of a provision of a constitution to examine the proceedings of the convention. If they clearly reveal the purpose of the particular provision the debates will be accepted as an indication of [their] meaning. . . . Id. at 190 (quoting Barker v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 287 Ky. 340, 152 S.W.2d 953, 956 (1941)). None of the first three Constitutions of Kentucky contained language identical to that found in Article II, section 2, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution. Both the 1792 and 1799 Kentucky Constitutions contained the additional limiting language now found in Section 77 that reserves to the General Assembly the power to pardon treason. Ky. Const. art. II, § 10 (1792); Ky. Const. art. III, § 11 (1799). The 1850 Constitution, quoted supra, added the limitation denying the power to remit the fees of the clerk, sheriff, or Commonwealth's Attorney in penal or criminal cases. As of 1890, only one of the forty-three state constitutions then enacted, Vermont's, granted its governor a pardon power nearly as broad as that contained in Article II of the U.S. Constitution. But even Vermont denied its governor the power to pardon treason. Vt. Const. ch. 2, § 11 (1836). [28] The Constitution of Connecticut granted its governor only the power of reprieve, not pardon. [29] Conn. Const. art. IV, § 10 (1818). The power to pardon had been reserved to the General Assembly by the former colony's charter of 1662. The constitutions of seven states reserved to the legislature the right to determine how the governor's pardoning power should be exercised. [30] Sixteen state constitutions reserved to the legislature the right to adopt regulations with respect to applications for pardons. [31] Five state constitutions established pardon boards to consider or approve pardons. [32] Three state constitutions required the governor to obtain the advice and consent of council (presumably a form of pardon board). [33] Two state constitutions required the governor to obtain the consent of the state senate. [34] Four state constitutions required public posting of applications for pardons. [35] Four state constitutions required the governor to report his pardons to the legislature. [36] Most importantly to the delegates to the 1890 convention, the constitutions of thirty-four of thirty-nine states that granted pardoning power to the governor and did not reserve to the legislature the authority to regulate that power limited any exercise of the governor's pardoning power to after conviction. [37] Of the remaining five states, two, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, withheld from the governor the power to act unilaterally. Pa. Const. art. IV, § 9 (1873) (requiring that the pardon be recommended in writing by the Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Attorney General, and Secretary of Internal Affairs, or any three of them, and only after full hearing and due public notice and in open session); R.I. Const. art. VII, § 4 (1854) (requiring consent of the Senate). That left only three state constitutions, those of Delaware, Maryland, and Vermont, in addition to Kentucky, that did not limit the unilateral right of their governors to exercise the pardoning power to after conviction. There are no cases from Delaware, Maryland, Vermont, Pennsylvania, or Rhode Island even suggesting that their governors could validly issue a pre-indictment pardon under their constitutions. In fact, no state court has ever held that a pardon could be validly issued before indictment. Until today. Pertinent to the reasons the individual states declined to adopt or keep the broad pardoning power granted by Article II of the U.S. Constitution is the explanation in State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20 (1857), for the substantial restrictions placed on Indiana's pardoning power by the Constitution of 1851: The new Constitution differs from the old in few points more widely than upon this of the pardoning power. Two lines in the old, stood in the place of half a page in the new. . . . We know the object of the change. The granting of pardons, remissions, etc., had become an abuse and it was the intention to arrest that abuse. Id. at 23. Delegates to the 1890 convention were aware of the pardon provisions contained in other state constitutions, and a number of proposed drafts were premised upon other states' provisions. E.g., [W]hen I came to the Convention I was strongly inclined to give the Governor of Kentucky a Board of Pardons, as they have in other states. 1 Debates 1091 (remarks of Delegate H. Cox, Carroll County). Delegate Curtis F. Burnam, Madison County, later commented on the number of state constitutions that limited gubernatorial pardons to post-conviction and the number of states that required presentation to the legislature of relevant facts that justified the pardon. Id. at 1247-49. Delegate Charles J. Bronston, Lexington, noted (mistakenly, it seems) that there were but four States left in this Union of ours that have failed to incorporate these same provisions in their Constitutions. Those four states are Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky and Mississippi, thereafter noting that the Constitution of Mississippi had been amended on November 1, 1890, leaving only three. [38] Id. at 1323. JUSTICE JOHNSTONE's opinion states that the pre-indictment pardon was not particularly debated at length during the 1890 convention. Ante at 359. In fact, it was not debated at all. [39] And for good reason: it would never have occurred to the delegates that a valid pardon could be issued before indictment or formal charge. The great debate at the convention was whether the constitution should be amended to preclude a pardon before conviction. The intent and understanding of the delegates that pardons would be granted only after formal charge and only upon application by the person seeking to be pardoned is apparent from the amendments they proposed and from the statements they made during the debates. It should first be noted that there was substantial discontent with the notion of any power to pardon. If there has been any one thing discussed more than another in the country from which I come, it is the exercise of this [pardoning] power by the Governor. Unintentionally, I have no doubt, but it has encouraged violations of the criminal law. Offenders against the criminal law, in every branch, have been pardoned, or fines and forfeitures have been remitted, as we all know. . . . . . . . That [sentiment that the pardon power is abused and secretive] was repeated by the then distinguished Delegate from the county of Bourbon, Mr. Davis, who said: I have heard such complaints ever since my boyhood, that the exercise of this power under our Constitution has been subject to some abuse, and some considerable abuse, too. I do not know how the present Executive has exercised this power to remit fines and forfeitures, and to grant pardons, but in a single instance, and that through publications in the newspapers; but for twenty-five years I have heard frequent and constant complaints of the abuse of this power.... Id. at 1102-03 (remarks of Delegate Labon T. Moore, Boyd and Lawrence Counties). Delegate H.G. Petrie, Todd County, remarked: I am utterly opposed to constituting the Governor of the State a Criminal Court. Take jurisdiction from the regularly organized Court and try cases upon ex parte testimony without even the sanction of an oath.... You cannot better destroy the confidence of the people of the State in the laws and institutions of our country than to take from their midst a man who has been accused of an atrocious crime, and without a hearing so far as they are concerned, and without their knowledge, pardon him, and he goes back a free man without any investigation.... Parties have a right to apply to him for pardons. A man accused of a crime comes with his friends and attorney, present to the Governor what they say are the facts in the case. They are influential men, they are the friends of the Governor. He cannot, without an insult to them, say: I doubt what you say. He cannot question the facts they present. He must act upon this ex parte statement for the accused man and his friends and relatives, and upon that he grants a pardon without any notice to the people of the community where the alleged crime occurred. Id. at 1110 (emphasis added). Delegate J.T. Funk, representing the Seventh District of Louisville, remarked: Let us throw every safeguard around the exercise of the pardoning power we possibly can.... Id. at 1294. Delegate Bronston, the Commonwealth's Attorney for Fayette County, noted: Now, one single suggestion on the other branch of it and that is as to whether or not experience has taught us that there should be some limitation placed upon the pardoning power. Do not the people complain that too often the guilty has been pardoned, and by pardoning the guilty crime has been encouraged. If that has been the experience of the Delegates, the next question is what limitation shall be imposed. Id. at 1089. Delegate George Washington, Campbell County, the president of the convention, was concerned about future corrupt governors: I am opposed to lodging this great power in the hands of the Governor for several reasons. One of the first and most important of these reasons is its extreme liability to abuse. We may have just the kind of a Governor today that we ought to have and that we would like to have. What kind of a Governor we may have next year or in the future, no man is prophet enough to tell. It is not given to any man to penetrate the veil which conceals from our vision the future.... I can very easily conceive of a condition of circumstances when, in the agitation of the times, some man might be lifted to the Executive chair who is totally unworthy of it.... The very application for a pardon implies quilt. How is it going to be investigated? By what compulsory process shall he enforce the attendance of witnesses? How shall the peculiar circumstances surrounding each case be made to apply to it? I believe it has already been suggested by some gentleman that the examination would necessarily be ex parte; that one side in many instances would be entirely unheard.... To say that such a power as that is liable to abuse is simply to give expression to what is perfectly self-evident. It goes without saying. Id. at 1112-13 (emphasis added). Thus, in addition to opposing the pardoning power, Delegate Washington also anticipated the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition in Burdick , twenty-five years later, that application for a pardon confesses guilt; thus, the only person entitled to make such application is the person to whom the confession will be attributed. Certainly, one party cannot confess another's guilt. Delegate J.G. Forrester, Harlan, Perry, Bell, and Leslie Counties, also expressed concern that a future governor might abuse the pardoning power: I hope that this power will be taken from the Governor, not that I believe that he has exercised it wrongfully, but that he may do it hereafter. Some circumstances that we cannot foresee may actuate him to do it when it should not be done. Id. at 1121. However, Delegate W.M. Beckner, Clark County, felt that future governors, elected by citizens cleansed by advances in education and Christian ideals, would be less likely to abuse the power than those in the past. Gentlemen say it may be abused, but that is presuming that the Commonwealth will elect men unfit to exercise the power. I have faith that the people of the future will do better than they have done in the past, because there will be the influences of the Christian religion, and the power of a better system of education to improve the people of the future, and to make them better than the people of the past or of the present have been or are; and I take it for granted that the people of that greater future will elect better men even than the people of the past have done. Id. at 1116. Finally, Delegate Burnam, anticipating the magnitude of the convention's decision on this issue, expressed the hope of all: But whatever the result of the vote may be, let us all hope the Commonwealth will not suffer wrong  `ne quid detrimentum respublica capiat.' Id. at 1250. On September 18, 1890, Delegate Burnam introduced a resolution that the Committee on the Executive prepare a report on an amendment to Article III, § 10, of the 1850 Constitution as to: whether the governor of this Commonwealth shall be permitted by the Constitution to pardon crimes before conviction of parties charged with same, and upon the propriety of establishment of a Board of Pardons. . . . 1 Debates 144 (emphasis added) (evidencing his assumption that no person would be pardoned before being charged). On September 23, 1890, Delegate J.M. Wood, Green and Taylor Counties, introduced the following resolution: Resolved, That section 10, article 3, of the Constitution, be amended as follows: By adding to said section the words, The Governor shall communicate to the Legislature, at the beginning of every session every case of fine or forfeiture remitted, or reprieve, pardon or commutation granted, stating the name of the convict, the cause for which he was convicted, the sentence, its date and the date of its remission, commutation, pardon or reprieve. Id. at 217 (emphasis added). On September 26, 1890, Delegate S.P. Hogg, Clay, Jackson, and Owsley Counties, introduced the following resolution: Resolved, That the Governor shall have power to remit, after conviction, all forfeitures, fines and penalties, and grant reprieves and pardons, except in case of impeachment upon such condition and with such restriction as may seem proper, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law; and he shall communicate to the Legislature at each session thereof, each case of reprieve, remission of penalty, or pardon granted, stating the name of the convict, the crime of which he was convicted, the sentence and its date of reprieve, remission of fine or pardon, and the condition, if any, upon which the same was granted. Id. at 267 (emphasis added). This resolution contained three restrictions found in other state constitutions: (1) no pardon may be issued before conviction; (2) the legislature retains authority to determine how the pardoning power will be exercised; and (3) the Governor must report his pardons to the General Assembly at every session. On November 7, 1890, Delegate Moore proposed to amend Article III, § 10 to add after forfeitures the words [u]nder such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law, and after conviction . . . and . . . [h]e shall indicate to the General Assembly at their regular session each case of reprieve, commutation of pardon granted, the reasons therefor, stating the name of the convict, time of sentence, its date, and the day of reprieve, commutation or pardon. Id. at 1086-87 (emphasis added). This was the first proposal that would require the governor to state his reasons for the pardon. On the same day, Delegate Bronston submitted the following proposed amendment: The Governor shall have the power to grant reprieves, remissions, pardons and commutations of sentence after convictions for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may think proper. Upon conviction of treason the Governor shall have power to suspend the execution of the sentence until the case shall be reported to the General Assembly at its next meeting, when the General Assembly shall either pardon, direct the execution of the sentence or grant a further reprieve. The Governor shall communicate to the General Assembly at the beginning of every session every case of reprieve, remission, pardon or commutation of sentence, stating the name of the person convicted, the crime for which he was convicted, the sentence, its date, the date of the pardon, reprieve, remission or commutation and the reason for granting the same; but the Governor shall have no power to remit the fees of the Clerk, Sheriff, or Commonwealth's Attorney in penal or criminal cases. Id. at 1087 (emphasis added). Under Bronston's proposal, the General Assembly would not retain the right to determine how the pardoning power would be exercised, but the proposal would limit pardons to after conviction and require the Governor to report his actions to the General Assembly and give his reasons therefor. Moore then withdrew his amendment in favor of Bronston's. Id. Bronston then suggested that the Governor be required to keep on file the petitions and letters on which he grants pardons or remissions, and furnish the same to the Legislature at its next session. Id. On November 14, 1890, Delegate W.R. Ramsey, Laurel and Rockcastle Counties, proposed the following amendment to Bronston's proposal: Provided, however, That the General Assembly may, by law, constitute a Council, to be composed of officers of the State, without whose advice and consent the Governor shall not have power to grant pardons in any case, except such as may be left to his sole power. Id. at 1250. Presumably, the except clause would allow the General Assembly to enact statutes giving the governor the power to grant unilateral pardons in certain cases. Governor Buckner, who opposed the after conviction restriction, [40] related an incident that occurred during his term of office in which a great disturbance arose in one county. He reported it to the legislature, which unanimously recommended that he exercise the  Constitutional power given to the Governor to pardon those under indictment.  Id. at 1090-91 (emphasis added). Thus, Buckner, like Bramlette before him, evidenced an understanding that the pardon power existed only after indictment. Though arguing against any restrictions on the governor's pardoning power, Delegate Auxier also anticipated Burdick and further evidenced his understanding that each pardon would be premised upon an individual application by the guilty party: Whenever a man applies to the Chief Executive for pardon, it is tacitly admitting that he is guilty. It is not the innocent man who applies to the Governor for pardon. It is the guilty man; it is the man who, by the strict and rigid rule and letter of the law, has been guilty of some violation of the law; and yet there are considerations connected with his offense that entitle him to Executive clemency. . . . If he is innocent, he does not have to apply to the Governor at all. It is presumed, if he is innocent, he can go before a Court and jury, and there vindicate himself, and establish his innocence. Consequently, there is no necessity for a pardon for an innocent man.... . . . . . . . I believe it would be well enough, although no amendment of that kind has been offered, it might be a good thing to provide that in this Constitution, before any petition should be acted upon by the Governor, that the applicant for pardon should advertise in the county newspapers, where the offense was committed, at least two weeks, that he intended to make an application to the Governor for pardon, or if there be no newspaper in the county, that he advertise on the Court-house door for at least two or three weeks, so that his neighbors and acquaintances and civil authorities should have notice that application for the pardon was going to be made. Such a restriction as that I would be in favor of. That would give every citizen who is interested the power to send up a remonstrance against the exercise of this pardoning power, if they thought proper to do so. Id. at 1096-98 (emphasis added). Auxier subsequently offered such an amendment. Id. at 1123. Auxier also referred to relieving  the defendant from the penalty of law, id. at 1099 (emphasis added), indicating that any pardon would issue at the earliest after indictment. Delegate Emery Whitaker, Mason County, also evidenced an understanding that a pardon would issue only to a guilty person and that a Governor could not unilaterally declare a person guilty by issuing a pardon before a grand jury indictment. The argument seems to be, that a man is presumed to be innocent by the law (which is true) until he is proven to be guilty; and, therefore, whenever the Governor is asked to pardon before conviction, he is asked to say that the man is guilty without a trial, for none need pardon except the guilty, and that to pardon a man from a charge of crime is reversing the law, which presumes him to be innocent, because if innocent he needs no pardon. I look on that question in a different light from what it has been discussed. No man in the Commonwealth of Kentucky can be charged with crime save by a grand jury of sixteen men. That grand jury sit [sic] by themselves as the inquisitorial power sworn to do justice and right as much so as a petit jury when they try the question of guilt or innocence. They accuse a man of crime upon what? Not upon rumor, not upon their own volition, but upon legal testimony delivered to them upon the oaths of witnesses. Upon that they charge a man with crime.... You say he shall not have the power to pardon a man from what? From a charge of crime. That is what he is pardoned from, [41] on proof which is competent and truthful that the man is not guilty. Id. at 1104 (emphasis added). Whitaker also expressed his understanding of the nature of an application for a pardon. Now, when a person presents his petition to the Governor, what does he present? Not a mere petition to be pardoned. He sets forth the circumstances that can be shown by reliable witnesses of the vicinage that there has been a mistake in the charge of crime against him, and he asks the Governor to excuse him. Id. (Note that Nighbert's application for pardon stated no reasons whatsoever.) Delegate James Blackburn, Woodford County, also expressed his understanding that the application for pardon would occur after formal charge: How stands the case? A party is charged, either by warrant or indictment, with a violation of the law, a misdemeanor or a felony, if you please. Id. at 1118 (emphasis added). On November 8, 1890, P.P. Johnston, Fayette County, offered a proposed amendment that would subsequently be adopted in part: Amend section 10 by inserting after the word impeachment, in the third line, the words,  And he shall file with each application a statement of the reasons for his decision thereon, which shall always be open to public inspection.  Id. at 1123 (emphasis added). It seems no coincidence that this proposal followed closely on the heels of comments in the debate indicating that the delegates understood that the application would be made personally by the party seeking the pardon. In the debate over this provision, the delegates' primary concern was the need for transparency, i.e., that the application furnish to the governor accurate information and that the governor furnish to the citizens the reasons for granting the pardon. Mr. A. is charged with crime. He does not want the expense and disgrace of a trial. He goes to the Governor and makes to him certain representations. How is that Governor to know whether those statements are true or not? No witness is sworn; it is entirely ex parte; no one can be sworn. All the statements the Governor receives are those from friends of the accused, without the sanction of an oath. . . . . . . . ... It is my judgment that when twelve men out of sixteen have made a presentment, twelve other unbiased and unprejudiced men on their oaths, after a full investigation, say the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial Judge approves of that finding, I say, when the Governor of the Commonwealth annuls that verdict and judgment he ought to have reasons for it and the people have a right to know those reasons. Id. at 1261-62 (remarks of Delegate Joseph Blackwell, Owen County). Applications for clemency are almost universally ex parte statements, seldom giving the facts which were proved in the case, and very often are misrepresentations. Id. at 1268 (remarks of Delegate W.R. Ramsey, Laurel and Rockcastle Counties, quoting from Governor Buckner's Message to the Legislature during its 1887 session). What is the real evil as disclosed by the speeches made upon this floor? It seems to me to be this: That the Governor acts upon the statements coming from one side; that it is an ex parte proceeding. The accused or the convicted presents his side of the case, and, of course, he and his friends will present it as strong as they possibly can, and the other side is not heard. Id. at 1289-90 (remarks of Delegate J.A. Brents, Clinton and Cumberland Counties). On November 15, 1890, Delegate J.F. Montgomery, Adair County, offered the following proposed amendment of Article III, § 10: The Governor shall, in each case of reprieve, remission, pardon or commutation of sentence, cause to be prepared a written statement of the reasons for granting the same, a record of which shall be kept by the Secretary of State in a book to be kept for that purpose as a public record, and a copy of said written statement shall be transmitted to the Court in which the prosecution is pending or judgment was rendered, which shall be filed and noted of record in said Court. Id. at 1273 (emphasis added). Note again the invariant assumption that the pardon would not precede an indictment. In arguing in support of his amendment, Montgomery remarked: The statements are often presented to the Governor of men of character and influence, who are personally known to him, and who are appealed to on account of their influence and their position, and they yield on account of their desire to curry favor with the person who makes the application . . . . Id. at 1288 (emphasis added). Note again the assumption that the person seeking the pardon would make the application though third parties might speak in support of it. Likewise, in speaking in favor of his proposal, Delegate Bronston remarked: An application is made to the Executive for a pardon. What does the Executive do? He says,  This citizen of the Commonwealth of Kentucky is charged with having violated a law. I must determine one of two things: first, upon the case as presented to me, is he guilty? Or if he be guilty, is it a case where I should exercise mercy? Id. at 1326 (emphasis added). Bronston's proposed amendment that would have included the after conviction language and the requirement of a report to the General Assembly failed by a vote of 41-36 (23 absent)with both Governor Buckner and former Governor Knott voting nay. Id. at 1347. Johnston's proposed amendment requiring the governor to file with each application a statement of the reasons for his decision thereon which shall always be open to public inspection was adopted, though the record of the debates does not reflect the yeas and nays. Id. at 1344. However, on November 22, 1890, Delegate George C. Harris, Simpson County, noted that under the adopted language the governor could destroy the application and thereby preclude the public from knowing on what grounds the application for pardon was premised. Harris moved to further amend the amended provision by inserting after the word which the words application and statement. 2 Debates 1520. The amendment was adopted, id. at 1520-21, thus completing the language of what is now Section 77. Former Governor Knott was absent when the vote was taken. Id. at 1521. Again, Governor Buckner voted nay, id., indicating that he considered the requirements of application and statement of reasons to be a new and additional restriction on the pardon power. [42] From this detailed examination of the constitutional climate and the 1890 debates, I conclude that the convention delegates did not intend that the pardoning power be exercised before indictment or formal charge; that they did intend that each person seeking a pardon would submit his or her own individual application, stating the reasons therefor; that the governor would state written reasons for granting the pardon; and that the governor would retain together for public inspection both the application and the pardon. Posey, 185 S.W.3d at 190, 192. Absent the requirements of an indictment, an individual application, and specificity (as discussed in Part II-D of this opinion, supra ), a governor could, upon application of, e.g., the lieutenant governor, avoid even the empaneling of a grand jury to investigate alleged corruption within the administration by simply issuing an executive pardon every Friday afternoon of any and all persons in my administration who have committed, or may be accused of committing, any offense up to and including the date hereof, including but not limited to any violation of the Kentucky Penal Code and KRS [fill in the blank].