Opinion ID: 854398
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Damage suffered by plaintiff [as a result].21

Text: Later in its argument, however, the State cites the Oxford English Dictionary to argue that “[d]eceit is ‘the action or practice of deceiving someone by concealing or misrepresenting the truth.’” The State then contends that under this definition, subsection (f)’s exception for misrepresentation by a government employee would be superfluous if subsection (b) covers deceit by government employees only. Appellants reply that under the dictionary definition the State provides, “the State could never be sued for negligence that could somehow be tied to the misrepresentations of a non-governmental employee.” ¶13 We clarify that subsection (b) contemplates only the intentional tort of deceit. It appears in a list of other intentional torts. Furthermore, Rapp v. Salt Lake City analyzed the deceit exception in subsection (b) and found immunity because a “review of plaintiff’s complaint compels a conclusion that it is a tort action, alleging deceit.”22 Jones, Waldo, which set out the elements in the intentional tort of deceit, quoted Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner.23 Tenneco Oil examines the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Prosser, the Law of Torts to 21 Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 22 527 P.2d 651, 655. The court quoted section 525 of the Restatement (First) of Torts to define deceit: “One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act [or] refrain from action in reliance thereon in a business transaction is liable to the other for the harm caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.” Id. 23 2003 UT 9, ¶ 74. 7 VAN DE GRIFT v. STATE Opinion of the Court clarify that there is a difference between “[f]raud or deceit, in an intentional sense” and “negligent misrepresentation.”24 In the Governmental Immunity Act, subsection (f) is broader than subsection (b). Subsection (f) covers misrepresentation by a government employee, even if it is negligent or does not amount to deceit. Deceit in subsection (b) refers to the intentional tort of deceit, not any action that could colloquially be described as deceitful. ¶14 While this statutory construction is required by the text, it leads to some anomalous results in application that are worth noting. For one thing, the statute as written—immunizing all deceit but only some misrepresentation—puzzlingly affords greater immunity for the more culpable misconduct. That seems backwards. And even if that anomaly could be explained—e.g., by the notion that more culpable conduct might predictably cause greater harm and thus implicate a greater need to minimize governmental liability—the statute as written implicates another anomaly that is even more troubling: It retains immunity for employee misrepresentations, but not for non-employee ones. ¶15 We see no rational policy basis for this application of the Governmental Immunity Act. It cannot be explained by any difference in the degree of harm, as the employee and non-employee cases both involve the same misrepresentation (and thus presumably the same harm). The only difference is the identity of the underlying tortfeasor, and it seems backward to provide immunity in the circumstance where the government retains greater control (over its employees) but not where its control is minimal (as with nonemployees). ¶16 These anomalies do not rise to the level of absurdities justifying a decision to override the statutory text. But they are sufficiently troubling that they seem worth flagging for consideration by the legislature in the event it sees fit to revisit the statute. 24 Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner, 696 F.2d 768, 773 (10th Cir. 1982). 8 Cite as: 2013 UT 11 Opinion of the Court C. The Analysis of the Permit Exception in Francis v. State is Distinguishable ¶17 Appellants next contend that Francis v. State,25 which applied a separate subsection of the Governmental Immunity Act, compels the conclusion that the status of the tortfeasor matters. ¶18 In Francis, the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR) classified a bear that disrupted a campsite located on federal land as a “Level III nuisance” but gave up searching for it without alerting the people at the campsite of the danger.26 When the bear killed a boy at the campsite, his parents sued the State for negligence. The DWR argued that it was immune from suit under Utah Code section 63G-7-301(5)(c), which provides that governmental entities retain immunity “if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.” The State argued the permit exception applied because the boy’s death “arose out of the State’s negligent failure to ask the [United States Forest Service] to close the site where the attack occurred.”27 ¶19 The Francis court conducted a plain language analysis and concluded that “to fall within the permit exception, the governmental entity claiming immunity must have either (a) issued, denied, suspended, or revoked or (b) failed or refused to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke” a permit.28 Appellants argue that because in Francis the entity that issued the permit mattered, the entity that commits the intentional tort should also matter. But Francis specifically distinguished its subsection (c) permit analysis from case law analyzing subsection (b).29 Furthermore, Francis explained that “the federal government had exclusive control over any authorization to use the campsite in question.”30 “[T]he federal government was the only entity that had the authority to issue, deny, suspend, or 25 2010 UT 62, 248 P.3d 44. 26 Id. ¶ 6. 27 Id. ¶ 8. 28 Id. ¶ 15. 29 Id. ¶ 17. 30 Id. (emphasis added). 9 VAN DE GRIFT v. STATE Opinion of the Court revoke any permit . . . or similar authorization related to the campground . . . [and] the State did not perform any act that falls within the scope of the permit exception.”31 The negligence alleged in Francis was therefore completely unrelated to the permit exception. In contrast, the complaint in this case alleges that absent the State’s negligence, no deceit would have occurred. ¶20 Finally, we acknowledge that some subsections of the Governmental Immunity Act contemplate injury caused only by government actors, while others do not. For example, subsection (u) applies to any injury that arises out of “unauthorized access to government records, data, or electronic information systems by any person or entity,” clearly contemplating injuries caused by nonemployees.32 On the other hand, subsection (f) explicitly applies to misrepresentation “by an employee.”33 Subsections (b) and (c) are not so explicit. But Francis and Ledfors are reconcilable because an exception for permits and authorizations clearly contemplates government action while an exception for assault, battery, or deceit does not. D. Subsection (b) Applies Even Though Appellants’ Causes of Action Allege Negligence, not Deceit ¶21 Appellants next argue that none of the waiver exceptions apply because they “are suing for negligent supervision and failure to warn,” not deceit, and the Governmental Immunity Act “does not immunize the State from its negligence simply because there may be another proximate cause of the harm suffered.” In Ledfors, we found “no merit” to the “argument that the injuries alleged . . . arose from the failure to supervise rather than from a battery.”34 And we have consistently “rejected claims that have reflected attempts to evade these statutory categories by recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury.”35 Taylor held that subsection (b)’s “language demands only that there be some causal relationship between the injury and 31 Id. ¶ 16. 32 UTAH CODE § 63G-7-301(5)(u). 33 Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(f). 34 Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1166. 35 Id.; see also Taylor, 927 P.2d at 163. 10 Cite as: 2013 UT 11 Opinion of the Court the risk provided for.”36 Subsection (b) applies in this case because, but for Mr. Higgins’s deceit, Appellants’ injuries would not have occurred.37 ¶22 We also reject Appellants’ contention that Doe v. Arguelles38 “recogniz[ed] the viability of claims against the State for negligent supervision of a parolee” without restriction. That case nowhere mentions the assault or battery exceptions, nor was an argument addressing those exceptions presented in the parties’ briefs. Malcolm v. State, on the other hand, established immunity under the assault or battery exceptions in a case alleging negligent supervision of a parolee.39