Opinion ID: 624233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Calhoun

Text: Calhoun was convicted of conspiracy to distribute powder cocaine (Count 1), 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, conspiracy to utter counterfeit securities, (Count 12), 18 U.S.C. § 371, and unlawful use of a telephone (Counts 48, 50 & 55), 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Calhoun was acquitted of the portion of Count 1 related to the distribution of crack cocaine. He was sentenced to 160 months in prison on the drug conspiracy conviction and to lesser concurrent terms on the remaining convictions. On appeal, Calhoun raises five alleged errors. First, he 13 contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of participating in the counterfeiting conspiracy. Second, he contends that there was a material variance between the charged conspiracy and the conspiracy he allegedly participated in. Third, and relatedly, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of participating in the drug conspiracy relevant to him. Fourth, he contends that the sentencing court failed to make the appropriate individualized findings at the sentencing hearing. Lastly, he contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Prior to resolution of these issues, additional background regarding the charged conspiracy and Calhoun’s activities is necessary. The indictment specifically alleged that from on or about January 2000 to January 2008, Calhoun conspired with seven other individuals (including Campbell and Carpenter) to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of powder cocaine and 50 grams or more of crack cocaine in Birmingham, Alabama. For his part, Calhoun was convicted of conspiring to distribute less than 500 grams of powder cocaine. Calhoun was also convicted of participating in the counterfeiting conspiracy. The facts giving rise to Calhoun’s conspiracy convictions are that Campbell sold cocaine to Calhoun. Calhoun was a cocaine user, but also resold some of the 14 cocaine to others in Birmingham. More specifically, the evidence presented at trial was that from 2004 to 2008 Calhoun made between eight and ten purchases from Campbell of up to 1/4 kilogram of cocaine at a time. Campbell testified that he believed that Calhoun resold the cocaine to others about “[n]inety percent of the time.” In a recorded telephone call between Calhoun and Campbell, Calhoun can be heard to offer to “split the profit” with Campbell. Additionally, Calhoun complained to Campbell that a delayed drug sale between the two men prevented Calhoun from obtaining any drugs for his customers. In another recorded telephone conversation, Calhoun and Campbell discussed the exchange of counterfeit money, including that Calhoun would pay Campbell $12,000 of legitimate money in exchange for $40,000 of counterfeit funds. A. Sufficiency of Evidence Related to the Counterfeiting Conspiracy Here, Calhoun argues that the government’s evidence against him consisted of a single telephone call with Campbell. In that call, Calhoun inquires about obtaining counterfeit funds from Campbell and appears to set a date for the exchange. While Calhoun acknowledges that the conversation occurred, he contends that it does not evidence that he actually purchased counterfeit funds from Campbell or that he participated in an alleged conspiracy to exchange the counterfeit funds in the marketplace. 15 As noted above, “[w]e review de novo a defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the light most favorable to the government.” Anderson, 289 F.3d at 1325. There are three essential elements required to be shown in support of a counterfeiting conspiracy: an agreement; knowing participation; and an overt act. United States v. U.S. Infrastructure, Inc., 576 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence related to Calhoun’s participation in the counterfeiting conspiracy was sufficient. The telephone call between Campbell and Calhoun clearly shows an agreement between them to exchange counterfeit money. The call also shows that Calhoun knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy and the commission of an overt act, namely the discussion about the exchange of money and the setting of a time and date for it. It is immaterial whether proof exists to show that the deal was consummated. See United States v. Elledge, 723 F.2d 864, 869 (11th Cir. 1984) (“That the plan was not ultimately completed or executed does not negate the crime of conspiracy.”). Accordingly, Calhoun’s counterfeiting conspiracy conviction is affirmed. B. Drug Conspiracy and Sentencing Issues 16 Calhoun argues that there was a material variance between the charged drug conspiracy and the evidence presented at trial. Specifically, Calhoun argues that what the government attempted to prove at trial was the existence of “two separate and distinct drug conspiracies”: (1) the massive Southern Boyz conspiracy, which was the charged conspiracy, and (2) the smaller Campbell-Calhoun conspiracy. Calhoun contends that there was no evidence linking him to the Southern Boyz conspiracy or any large-scale drug distribution scheme as charged in the indictment. Calhoun argues that the jury transferred evidence of the larger conspiracy to him, making his conduct appear more significant than it actually was. In determining whether a conviction must be reversed because of a material variance between the crime charged in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial, we employ a two-step analysis. First, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and consider whether a reasonable jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that a single conspiracy existed. United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1327 (11th Cir. 1997). “Second, we determine whether any substantial prejudice resulted to the defendant[] if more than one conspiracy did in fact exist.” United States v. Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 633 (11th Cir. 1994). 17 The first step of the analysis requires the court to consider the following factors: “(1) whether a common goal existed; (2) the nature of the underlying scheme; and (3) the overlap of participants.” United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1366 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, while there was evidence of a common goal among the defendants, namely the sale and distribution of drugs in Birmingham through the aid of Campbell, the remaining factors fall decidedly in Calhoun’s favor. Evidence at trial demonstrated that Southern Boyz pooled assets and resources among Campbell, Johnson, Carpenter, and their fellow members and associates. For example, when Johnson needed assistance with converting powder cocaine to crack cocaine and Campbell was unavailable, another Southern Boyz member helped him. There was also evidence that Campbell would loan or swap drugs and money with other co-conspirators to fill orders. This overarching scheme stands in stark contrast to the evidence detailing the relationship between Campbell and Calhoun. There is no evidence that Calhoun was a member of or affiliated with Southern Boyz. Moreover, there is also no evidence that members of Southern Boyz, besides Campbell, assisted Calhoun in the sale or distribution of drugs. Indeed, while Campbell and other members of Southern Boyz were under police surveillance over a multi-year 18 period, Calhoun was never identified with anyone other than Campbell. Moreover, it is significant that the jury acquitted Calhoun (but not Johnson or Carpenter) of any allegation that he distributed crack cocaine as part of his conduct. A review of the evidence reveals that the scheme underlying the Southern Boyz conspiracy involved frequent transactions between a variety of sellers and buyers for large quantities of drugs (i.e., kilograms of powder and crack cocaine) over a long period of time. By contrast, the Campbell-Calhoun conspiracy involved infrequent transactions between two men for smaller quantities of drugs (i.e., grams of powder cocaine only) during a shorter period of time. In summary, there was insufficient evidence linking Calhoun to the scheme underlying the Southern Boyz conspiracy and, other than Campbell, there was no overlap between co-conspirators in the Southern Boyz conspiracy and Calhoun. Although “[i]t is irrelevant that particular conspirators may not have known other conspirators,” the evidence must suggest that the defendant knowingly joined the conspiracy and participated in its underlying scheme. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007). “It is clearly not sufficient simply to say that the defendants each shared a common goal, to-wit: profit from the sale of cocaine. In order to constitute a single conspiracy there must be a 19 single enterprise which sets up a common goal connecting each defendant.” United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 769 (1946) (concluding that it was error to “confuse[] the common purpose of a single enterprise with the several, though similar, purposes of numerous separate adventures of like character”). Insofar as Calhoun is concerned, we conclude that no reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that a single conspiracy existed in this case. As such, we agree that there was a material variance between the conspiracy charged and the evidence presented at trial. “The finding that two conspiracies existed does not end the analysis. We next inquire whether this variance prejudiced the defendant[’s] substantial rights.” Coy, 19 F.3d at 634. Prejudice is usually found when “there are so many defendants and so many separate conspiracies before the jury that there is a substantial likelihood that the jury transferred evidence from one conspiracy to a defendant involved in another conspiracy.” Id. In other words, a material variance prejudices a defendant when it creates “a legitimate concern that a defendant who operated on the periphery of a large, overarching conspiracy will be unfairly grouped in with a larger conspiracy than he intended to join.” United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279, 1291 (11th Cir. 2008). 20 Here, we are convinced that Calhoun was not prejudiced by the material variance. Although there was a large amount of evidence presented at trial that related exclusively to the Southern Boyz conspiracy, neither conspiratorial scheme was particularly complex. In addition, Calhoun was fairly apprised of the evidence against him, namely that he participated in a conspiracy with Campbell to sell and distribute cocaine. Campbell’s testimony about his drug distribution relationship with Calhoun and the admission of the recorded telephone conversations regarding their relationship were unimpeached on the record. See Glinton, 154 F.3d at 1252 (finding no prejudice from material variance where evidence clearly linked defendants to a specific conspiracy). Moreover, the jury utilized special verdict forms for each defendant and returned different verdicts on different counts for each defendant, including an acquittal of Calhoun as to distribution of crack cocaine. See id. (finding it persuasive that jury acquitted defendant of one conspiracy count, but not the other conspiracy count, despite the material variance). “Such individual treatment of the defendants by the jury demonstrates the absence of confusion and improper transfers of evidence.” Coy, 19 F.3d at 635. In other words, “[t]hese divergent verdicts indicate the jury . . . had no difficulty compartmentalizing the evidence presented. [When such is the case, w]e conclude there [is] no prejudicial variance 21 . . . .” Glinton, 154 F.3d at 1252. In the alternative, Calhoun argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of participating in the Campbell-Calhoun conspiracy because there was no evidence that he had an agreement with Campbell. Specifically, Calhoun cites to the testimony of Campbell wherein he expressly testified that no agreement existed between the two men “to distribute drugs” or “to go out and commit crimes together.” Viewing this challenge de novo and in the light most favorable to the government, see Anderson, 289 F.3d at 1325, we find that there was sufficient evidence to convict Calhoun of participating in a drug conspiracy with Campbell. The two men conducted between eight and ten drug deals over a four-year period, at times discussing whether to split the profit. Moreover, Calhoun purchased more than just an amount that could be attributed to his personal use and, in fact, Calhoun specifically told Campbell that he was reselling at least a portion of the drugs he purchased from Campbell to third parties. This type of ongoing conduct between buyer and seller provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to find Calhoun guilty of participating in a drug conspiracy. See United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1089 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that it “is well-established in this Circuit [that] where there are repeated transactions buying 22 and selling large quantities of illegal drugs, that is sufficient evidence that the participants were involved in a conspiracy”); United States v. Mercer, 165 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding conspiracy conviction where “evidence show[ed] a continuing relationship that result[ed] in the repeated transfer of illegal drugs to the purchaser”). Accordingly, Calhoun’s drug conspiracy conviction is affirmed. Despite the validity of the conviction, in light of our holding that the government only proved that Calhoun participated in the smaller CampbellCalhoun conspiracy, Calhoun’s sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. See, e.g., Coy, 19 F.3d at 637 (“Having found that two separate conspiracies existed, we necessarily conclude that the district court erred in attributing the total amount of [cocaine] involved in both conspiracies to the defendant[].”). This decision obviates the need to resolve Calhoun’s final claims related to his sentence. AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED in part. 23