Opinion ID: 1536940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal to Let the Jury Consider Punitive Damages

Text: The jury awarded Wood compensatory damages on her claims of trespass and abuse of (criminal) process. However, the jury did not consider punitive damages, because Judge Anderson ruled that there was not enough evidence and not the type of behavior that would justify sending this to the jury on the punitive damages count. Wood argues that Judge Anderson's ruling was error, but we disagree. Punitive damages are appropriately reserved only for tortious acts which are replete with malice, Zanville v. Garza, 561 A.2d 1000, 1002 (D.C.1989); they are properly awarded only where the act of the defendant is accompanied with fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, willful disregard of the plaintiff's rights, or other circumstances tending to aggravate the injury. Franklin Inv. Co. v. Smith, 383 A.2d 355, 358 (D.C.1978) (citation omitted). To be entitled to punitive damages, a plaintiff not only must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a tortious act, but also must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the act was accompanied by conduct and a state of mind evincing malice or its equivalent. Croley v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 759 A.2d 682, 695 (D.C.2000). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 24 (D.C.2005) (citations omitted). Wood argues that the Neumans acted in willful disregard of her rights. However, Judge Anderson found, having review[ed] every single document that went into evidence, that it seems pretty clear that the Neumans didn't think that they were impinging upon a right that Ms. Wood had. They believe that the [Duddington Condominium] Board had the ability to give them the authority to access the limited common area. We agree with Judge Anderson's assessment; viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wood, see District of Columbia v. Jackson, 810 A.2d 388, 396 (D.C.2002), we are satisfied that no reasonable juror could have found by the `more stringent' proof requirement of clear and convincing evidence that the Neumans acted with the malice required to justify punitive damages. Id. Wood argues that evidence of malice was lacking only because the trial court precluded her from introducing such evidence. She cites first Judge Anderson's refusal to admit as evidence Judge Kravitz's December 17, 2003 bench ruling in which he explained his declaratory judgment that the Neumans had no easement of necessity with respect to the area of Wood's garden/patio. We can find no error in this ruling. A trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence which is only slightly probative if its introduction would confuse and mislead the jury by focusing its attention on collateral issues.. . . Moore v. United States, 387 A.2d 714, 715 (D.C.1978) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted). Judge Anderson repeatedly expressed to counsel her concern that the slow pacing of their presentations was causing the jury to lose interest and wane in attentiveness. We cannot say that Judge Anderson's refusal to add Judge Kravitz's 40-page ruling to the jury's burden was error. [3] Moreover, the jury was made aware that the Neumans' expert knew of no judicial decision recognizing an easement of necessity for repairs and maintenance. Thus, the 40-page bench ruling essentially was cumulative of information that was before the jury. Additionally, in his ruling, Judge Kravitz made no finding about whether the Neumans had made their claim to an easement in good faith (or, instead, in willful disregard of Wood's right to exclusive use of the garden/patio area), and his lengthy analysis of the easement-of-necessity claim implies that he did not regard the Neumans' claim as frivolous. And, even assuming that Judge Kravitz's bench ruling would have shown the jury thatin Wood's wordsan easement such as the Neumans claimed had never been found anywhere at any time, that would not have been enough to enable a reasonable jury firmly to believe that the Neumans were acting in willful disregard of Wood's rights in asserting their claim to an implied easement. Cf. Ginsberg v. Granados, 963 A.2d 1134, 1138 (D.C.2009) (The mere fact the plaintiff did not prevail before the trial court does not necessarily imply that its conduct was vexatious or wanton) (internal citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). Judge Anderson could reasonably conclude that any probative value the bench ruling had was outweighed by the danger of confusing the jury by diverting their attention to issues not before them. Wood also complains that the court precluded her from introducing into evidence a 1991 letter (which the court excluded on the ground that it pre-dated the parties' dispute) which Wood contends shows that the Neumans falsely asserted a deed easement and threatened an escalation of conflict if Wood followed through with a plan to erect translucent screens in her garden. Evidentiary rulings by a trial judge are highly discretionary decisions that will be upset on appeal only upon a showing of grave abuse. M. Pierre Equip. Co. v. Griffith Consumers Co., 831 A.2d 1036, 1040 (D.C.2003) (citation omitted). We can find no grave abuse here. Moreover, exclusion of the letter was almost certainly harmless. The letter details the Neumans' efforts to accommodate Wood's interest in privacy and to avoid any escalation of conflict, efforts that Wood herself acknowledged in her reply letter. Also, the trial transcript contains testimony that, in referring to easements in our deed, the Neumans may have had in mind a provision in their deed that states that the conveyance was of their townhouse property and all the easements thereto. [4] Even if the excluded letter's inaccurate reference to easements in our deed weighed in favor of a finding that the Neumans had fabricated their claim to an easement and were acting in disregard of Wood's rights, our assessment is that the countervailing evidence in the record would have precluded the jury from finding by clear and convincing evidence that the Neumans' actions warranted an award of punitive damages. Another ruling that Wood argues hindered her from proving malice is the court's refusal to permit her to obtain[] and introduce[] into evidence the file of Thomas Mauro, the Neumans' counsel during the bench trial. Wood also complains of a pre-trial ruling by Judge Blackburne-Rigsby that Wood would not be permitted to call Mauro as a witness. Mauro had advised the Duddington Board via a letter that the Neumans had an easement for limited access to the area of Wood's garden/patio to perform maintenance work on their property. Wood sought to examine Mauro, and to introduce his files, to: show that his opinion was without foundation, and thus that the Neumans' claim to a right to access Wood's garden/patio was in bad faith. Judge Blackburne-Rigsby explained that [t]rial counsel may not be called as a witness by the opposing party, and thus made subject to disqualification, unless the opposing party shows a genuine, need for the evidence. [5] She found that Wood had not demonstrated a need to call Mauro as a witness, because the testimony she sought to elicit from the Neumans' attorney was available through documents that had been produced during discovery. Wood has not shown us that this ruling was erroneous. Judge Anderson held that certain materials that Wood sought to introduce were privileged attorney-client communications. But, as Wood correctly notes, [w]here a party asserts as an essential element of his defense reliance upon the advice of counsel, the party waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to all communications, whether written or oral, to or from counsel concerning the transactions for which counsel's advice was sought. Wender v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 434 A.2d 1372, 1374 (D.C.1981) (internal citations, ellipses, and quotation marks omitted). Thus, to the extent that the Neumans cited advice of counsel in defending against Wood's claims, they may have waived any claim of attorney-client privilege and Wood's request to introduce Mauro-Neuman attorney-client communications should not have been denied on the basis of such privilege. [6] But, even assuming that it was error to exclude the Mauro documents in question, Wood has not demonstrated that her case was harmed by this error. Her brief acknowledges that, in addition to Mauro, another lawyer, Richard Schmitt, wrote an opinion letter to the Duddington Board asserting that the Neumans had an implied easement for maintenance and repair. Judge Anderson similarly observed that the record indicated that there was legal advice floating out there from other sources to the effect that the Neumans had a right of some sort with respect to the land in dispute. Those sources included a January 2000 memorandum to the Duddington Board from lawyer Morris Battino (who advised that the Duddington or Wood would likely not prevail if they sought to prevent access by the Neumans). [7] Thus, even if arguendo Mauro's documents had enabled Wood to show that Mauro never advised the Neumans with respect to an easement, or advised them that their claim to an easement lacked merit, or advised them without having adequately researched the issue, there was evidence that the Neumans were aware of legal advice from other counsel supporting their easement theory. Thus, even absent a ruling that certain Mauro documents were off-limits because of attorney-client privilege, we are not persuaded that Wood would have been able to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Neumans acted in willful disregard of her rights. [8] Wood argues in addition that her questioning of the Neumans on the issue of malice was hampered by Judge Anderson's ruling that the Neumans were not necessarily hostile witnesses and therefore could not be asked leading questions during Wood's direct case. This ruling was error. Under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 43(b), [a] party may call an adverse party. . . and interrogate the witness by leading questions and contradict and impeach the witness in all respects as if the witness had been called by the adverse party. But, having carefully reviewed the portions of the record that Wood cites to support her argument that the court's ruling enabled the Neumans to evade questions, volunteer non-responsively and volunteer hearsay, and avoid giving direct answers regarding their abuse of their easement claims, we are unable to discern what testimony Wood believes she was rendered unable to elicit or what damaging non-responsive answers were permitted. To obtain a reversal, an appellant must show that the erroneous ruling resulted in substantial prejudice to her case. See Pyne v. Jamaica Nutrition Holdings, 497 A.2d 118, 126 (D.C.1985). Here, we are unpersuaded that the limitation the court imposed made a difference in Wood's ability to show the malice that was necessary to sustain a claim for punitive damages.