Opinion ID: 1723780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred in requiring dr. turpin to pay approximately four thousand seven hundred fifty dollars towards the joint visa account?

Text: ¶ 14. As this Court stated in Magee v. Magee, 661 So.2d 1117, 1122 (Miss. 1995): Our scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited by our familiar substantial evidence/manifest error rule. Stevison v. Woods, 560 So.2d 176, 180 (Miss. 1990). This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Miss. 1990). See also Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss. 1994); Faries v. Faries, 607 So.2d 1204, 1208 (Miss. 1992). In other words, [o]n appeal [we are] required to respect the findings of fact made by a chancellor supported by credible evidence and not manifestly wrong. Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511, 514 (Miss. 1990). See also Dillon v. Dillon, 498 So.2d 328, 329 (Miss. 1986). This is particularly true in the areas of divorce, alimony and child support. Tilley v. Tilley, 610 So.2d 348, 351 (Miss. 1992); Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So.2d 766, 781 (Miss. 1989). The word manifest, as defined in this context, means unmistakable, clear, plain, or indisputable. Black's Law Dictionary 963 (6th ed. 1990). ... . In White v. White, 557 So.2d 480, 483 (Miss. 1989), we listed several factors to be considered by the chancellor in determining whether or not to award lump sum alimony and the amount of the award. These factors, commonly referred to as the Cheatham factors, are also found in Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So.2d 435, 438 (Miss. 1988). Additionally, a spouse who has made a material contribution toward the acquisition of an asset titled in the name of the other spouse may claim an equitable interest in such jointly accumulated property. Jones v. Jones, 532 So.2d 574, 580-81 (Miss. 1988). Magee v. Magee, 661 So.2d 1117, 1123 (Miss. 1995) In reviewing the chancellor's decision, we are constrained by the rule that [i]n the case of a claimed inadequacy or outright denial of alimony, we will only interfere where the decision is seen to be oppressive, unjust or grossly inadequate so as to evidence an abuse of discretion. Monroe v. Monroe, 612 So.2d 353, 357 (Miss. 1992). Magee v. Magee, 661 So.2d 1117, 1124 (Miss. 1995) ¶ 15. As was stated in Draper v. Draper 627 So.2d 302, 304, 305 (Miss. 1993): A chancellor's decision will not be reversed if the finding of fact is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Hammett v. Woods, 602 So.2d 825, 827 (Miss. 1992) (citing Clark v. Myrick, 523 So.2d 79, 80 (Miss. 1988)). This Court will not disturb those findings, unless manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Faries v. Faries, 607 So.2d 1204, 1208 (Miss. 1992) (citing Hill v. Southeastern Floor Covering Co., 596 So.2d 874, 877 (Miss. 1992)). It is well-established by this Court that the chancery court has the authority to order an equitable division of property that was accumulated through the joint efforts and contributions of the parties. Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 690 (Miss. 1990). However, there is no automatic right to an equal division of jointly-accumulated property, but rather, the division is left to the discretion of the court. Id. at 691. The chancellor in a divorce case now has the authority to divest title from one spouse, and vest it in the other spouse, when equitably dividing the marital assets. ¶ 16. Additionally, as the Court stated in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 930 (Miss. 1994) (emphasis added): Property division should be based upon a determination of fair market value of the assets, and these valuations should be the initial step before determining division. Therefore, expert testimony may be essential to establish valuation sufficient to equitably divide property, particularly when the assets are as diverse as those at issue in the instant case. All property division, lump sum or periodic alimony payment, and mutual obligations for child support should be considered together. Alimony and equitable distribution are distinct concepts, but together they command the entire field of financial settlement of divorce. Therefore, where one expands, the other must recede. LaRue v. LaRue, 172 W. Va. 158, 304 S.E.2d 312, 334 (Neely, J., concurring). Thus, the chancellor may divide marital assets, real and personal, as well as award periodic and/or lump sum alimony, as equity demands. To aid appellate review, findings of fact by the chancellor, together with the legal conclusions drawn from those findings, are required. In the final analysis, all awards should be considered together to determine that they are equitable and fair. Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Miss. 1990). In other words, [o]n appeal this Court is required to respect the findings of fact made by a chancellor supported by credible evidence and not manifestly wrong. Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511, 514 (Miss. 1990). This is particularly true in the areas of divorce and child support. Nichols v. Tedder, 547 So.2d 766, 781 (Miss. 1989). We have long recognized that, incident to a divorce, the Chancery Court has authority, where the equities so suggest, to order a fair division of property accumulated through the joint contributions and efforts of the parties. Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 690 (Miss. 1990). In Draper, 627 So.2d at 305, this Court held that the chancery court has authority to effect the divesting of title to real estate to achieve an equitable distribution of marital assets. This is a matter committed to the discretion and conscience of the court, having in mind all of the equities and other relevant facts and circumstances. Bowe v. Bowe, 557 So.2d 793, 794 (Miss. 1990). Moreover, the Chancery Court has the authority to order an equitable division of jointly accumulated property and in doing so to look behind the formal state of title. Johnson v. Johnson, 550 So.2d 416, 420 (Miss. 1989). ¶ 17. With the aforementioned principles of law in mind, and applying the proper standard of review, there does not appear to be an issue before the Court in this case warranting reversal. The divesting and awarding of title to the two properties is clearly supported by Draper and appears to be equitable. The award of $55,000 and the $137,000 home with a $89,000 remaining mortgage to be paid by Jimmie appears to be equitable in light of the parties respective estates and contributions to the marriage. ¶ 18. Both Jimmie and Thomas intermingled their separate money and property into their marital union. Although, Jimmie did not contribute as much money during the marriage, it is not sufficient to devalue the importance of her contributions. Thomas is left with a retirement account of approximately $160,000 and a separate stock account valued at approximately $60,000. Thomas is correct that Jimmie did not contribute to the balance of his retirement and stock accounts prior to marriage, however Thomas did not present any evidence to indicate the balance of his retirement and stock account prior to the marriage. ¶ 19. Although the chancellor did not make specific findings of fact to support his decision, this issue is without merit. Thomas has failed to show that the chancellor committed manifest error in awarding $55,000 to Jimmie. ¶ 20. As for the second issue surrounding the credit card debt, this appears without merit as well. The total debt for the jointly held and used credit card was $17,000. Seventy-five hundred was taken off the top and required to be paid by Jimmie as it was undisputably her debt alone. The card was jointly named and used up until the parties separated. Each were required to pay half of the remaining balance which does not appear to be a manifestly erroneous decision in light of the fact that an itemization of who spent what for whom on the remaining balance was not presented to the court.