Opinion ID: 1690639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Schofield's Alleged Confessions

Text: At Jones' 1992 evidentiary hearing, the trial court also considered as newly discovered evidence testimony from a number of individuals who had served time with Schofield [9] that Schofield confessed to the murder of Officer Szafranski. One of Schofield's former girlfriends, Patricia Owens Ferrell, testified that Schofield confessed to her as well. The trial court concluded that none of these alleged hearsay confessions would be admissible as substantive evidence under the exception for declarations against penal interest because Schofield was available to testify, although neither party called him. However, at Jones' most recent evidentiary hearing, Schofield did testify that he did not kill Officer Szafranski and that he never told anyone he did. He further acknowledged that he went to Jones' apartment earlier that evening to exchange some cocaine for some heroin. Although the times vary, this testimony is consistent with Jones, Hammonds, and Corbett's testimony placing Schofield at the apartment the night of the murder. Louis Reed, Carnell Grayer, Jasper Ray Kirtsey, and Dwayne Hagans, inmates at various state prisons, testified at the most recent hearing that Schofield told them he killed the officer. The trial court treated this testimony as prior inconsistent statements of Schofield and considered it as impeachment evidence, rather than substantive evidence of Schofield's culpability. See §§ 90.608(1), 90.614(1), 90.801(1)(c), 90.802, Fla. Stat. (1997). Jones claims that the trial court erred in not admitting the statements as substantive evidence and in failing to address their impeachment value. We first consider whether these statements should have been admitted as substantive evidence. Pursuant to section 90.804(2), Florida Statutes (1997), in order for a confession to be admissible as a declaration against penal interest, the declarant must be unavailable as a witness and there must be corroborating circumstances to show the trustworthiness of the statement. The requirement of unavailability parallels Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), as well as the evidence rules of the vast majority of state court jurisdictions. See McCormick on Evidence § 320 (John Strong ed., 4th ed.1992). Because Schofield was available and in fact testified at the most recent proceeding, section 90.804(2) precludes a consideration of the hearsay testimony as substantive evidence. [10] Jones does not attack the constitutionality of section 90.804(2). He concedes that section 90.804(2) applies but asserts that due process considerations set forth in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), require that this testimony be evaluated as substantive evidence. In Chambers, the Supreme Court relied on the following factors to justify the admission of the hearsay confessions of a third party, despite state evidentiary rules to the contrary: (1) each confession was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance after the murder occurred; (2) each confession was corroborated by some other evidence in the case; (3) each confession was self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest; and (4) if there was any question as to the truthfulness of the statements, the declarant was available for cross-examination. See id. at 300, 93 S.Ct. at 1048. As the Supreme Court observed about the statements: The hearsay statements involved in this case were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability. Id. We have previously explained the facts and circumstances of Chambers: Another individual made three verbal confessions to this crime and one written confession which he later repudiated. The prosecution did not call this declarant as a witness so the defense did. At that time, under the voucher rule in Mississippi, one could not impeach one's own witness. Therefore, the defense was not allowed to have the verbal confessions admitted into evidence for that purpose. In addition, the hearsay rule prevented the testimony from being heard and Mississippi had no exception to the rule based on declarations against penal interest. Card v. State, 453 So.2d 17, 21 (Fla.1984). In Gudinas v. State, 693 So.2d 953, 965 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 345, 139 L.Ed.2d 267 (1997), we recently characterized Chambers as limited to its facts due to the peculiarities of Mississippi evidence law which did not recognize a hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest. The Supreme Court stated in Chambers that it was establishing no new standards of constitutional law, nor was it diminishing the authority of the states over their own trial rules. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049. Rather, under the specific facts of [ Chambers ], where the rejected evidence bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness, its rejection denied the defendant a trial in accordance with due process standards. Card, 453 So.2d at 21 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049). We considered and rejected these same arguments in Jones' prior 3.850 appeal, finding that unlike the statements made in Chambers, Schofield's alleged confessions did not bear persuasive assurances of trustworthiness. Jones, 678 So.2d at 315. Jones asserts, however, that the circumstances have changed since the 1992 3.850 hearing and ensuing appeal because of additional evidence discovered since his last evidentiary hearing. He claims that because of this additional evidence Schofield's confessions now bear sufficient indicia of reliability. We disagree. None of the additional evidence requires that we disregard the plain language of section 90.804(2). The issue of whether or not the confessions bear sufficient indicia of reliability affects the admissibility as substantive evidence only if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. See § 90.804(2). Unlike Chambers, where the oral confessions were not allowed for any purpose at the defendant's original trial, in this last evidentiary hearing, Judge Johnson considered the confessions as impeachment evidence because Schofield testified. Moreover, unlike the confessions in Chambers, the alleged confessions in this case lack indicia of trustworthiness. The fact that more inmates have come forward does not necessarily render the confessions trustworthy. [11] The confessions were not made prior to the original trial in circumstances indicating trustworthiness, such as spontaneously to a close acquaintance as in Chambers, or to his own counsel or the police shortly after the crime, see, e.g., Wilkerson v. Turner, 693 F.2d 121 (11th Cir.1982); United States ex rel. Gooch v. McVicar, 953 F.Supp. 1001 (N.D.Ill.1997), but were made to a variety of inmates with whom Schofield served prison time. All of the statements were allegedly made after Jones had been sentenced to death; in many cases more than a decade elapsed before the inmate came forward to testify as to Schofield's alleged statements. As to the five inmate witnesses who testified at the most recent hearing, none came forward until after Jones' most recent death warrant was signed, waiting anywhere from four to fifteen years to report their information. Except for Schofield's former girlfriend, the witnesses were all prison inmates with extensive felony records. However, it is not their felony records alone that cast doubt on the witnesses' credibility. Judge Soud's observations in his 1992 order, wherein he analyzed the reasons the confessions were not particularly reliable, are equally valid here even in light of the testimony of the additional witnesses. Like the witnesses in 1992, the witnesses who testified at the most recent evidentiary hearing spoke only in general terms of Schofield's possible involvement in the murder of Officer Szafranski. No witness testified to any unique details surrounding the murder. In fact, none of the witnesses related specific details of the crime. Even with their lack of detail, the alleged confessions are somewhat contradictory. For example, while one inmate testified that Schofield told him he threw the rifle in the river, another testified Schofield asked him to hold down the rifle for him. Three witnesses claimed that Schofield told them he shot Officer Szafranski because Szafranski was fucking with Schofield or that he was a bad cop who had been taking money from drug dealers. While it may be that the inmates were testifying falsely, it may also be that Schofield bragged about a killing he did not commit. An individual's alleged confession to a capital murder would generally be considered to be against one's penal interest. However, in a prison environment, statements concerning involvement in the murder of a police officer may be viewed differently. We noted in Jones' previous 3.850 appeal that a statement by one criminal to another criminal ... is more apt to be jailhouse braggadocio than a statement against his criminal interest. Jones, 678 So.2d at 314 (quoting United States v. Seabolt, 958 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir.1992)). In fact, one inmate testified that Schofield told him that he got his stripes by killing a police officer. As Judge Soud observed in his 1992 order, among prisoners a claim of involvement in a police officer's murder may in fact elevate the inmate's status or reputation. Therefore, whether we consider the alleged confessions as impeachment or substantive evidence, we do not find that this evidence requires a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.