Opinion ID: 6353575
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Apache Stronghold’s Secondary RFRA

Text: Argument Apache Stronghold’s secondary argument is that the Land Exchange does in fact deprive its members of a benefit and subject its members to a penalty. Apache Stronghold contends that the Exchange deprives its members of “the use and enjoyment of ‘government’ land for religious exercise” APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES 47 and subjects them to penalties for “trespassing on now ‘private’ land.” We disagree. Turning first to Apache Stronghold’s argument that the Land Exchange denies its members a benefit, that argument has a problem. The government does not substantially burden religion every time it ends a “governmental benefit” that at one time went to religious beneficiaries. There must be an element of coercion: the government must “condition” the benefit upon conduct that would violate sincerely held religious beliefs. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1067. Consider this example. Suppose that for many years, the Forest Service has paid Apache Stronghold’s members to host educational sessions to teach local children about the Apache’s history and culture, including the Apache’s religious traditions. But this year, the Forest Service says to Apache Stronghold: “our budget’s been cut—we can’t renew your contract for more sessions next year.” Apache Stronghold’s members have just been deprived of a benefit—payment for the educational sessions that they previously held—but they have not been coerced to abandon their religious beliefs. We need not apply strict scrutiny to every contract cancellation or revision. Under this rubric, the Land Exchange thus presents no “substantial burden.” The Exchange does not “condition” any government benefits on the Apache violating their religious beliefs. Like the cancelled educational sessions in the hypothetical above, the Land Exchange does not force Apache Stronghold’s members to choose between following their religion and losing a benefit (the “use and enjoyment” of Oak Flat). The Land Exchange just incidentally keeps everybody—Apache Stronghold’s members included— from using Oak Flat: No conditioning of a benefit; no coercion. Were the rule otherwise, the federal government 48 APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES would substantially burden religion any time it cancels a contract with a religious entity or repeals a program that subsidized both parochial and secular private schools. Next is Apache Stronghold’s argument that the Land Exchange subjects its members to penalties: liability for trespassing on land that will be private after the Exchange. We also reject this argument. Turning first to criminal trespass liability, when a religious plaintiff has a “sufficiently realistic fear” that the government will punish him for exercising his religious beliefs, he can sue the government under RFRA to forestall any such prosecution. United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2016); see also O Centro, 546 U.S. at 425 (affirming “declaratory and injunctive relief” after a religious sect that used a prohibited hallucinogen in its ceremonies had been “threatened . . . with prosecution” under the Controlled Substances Act). If the government’s intended prosecution cannot satisfy strict scrutiny, RFRA “immuniz[es]” a religious adherent’s conduct “from official sanction—even though such conduct violated a law that is otherwise valid.” Christie, 825 F.3d at 1055. But Apache Stronghold’s argument faces two problems. For one, Apache Stronghold has not shown a “sufficiently realistic fear” of future criminal liability. Christie, 825 F.3d at 1055. Unlike in O Centro, there has been no threat of prosecution here. The record shows no imminent plans by Arizona state law enforcement (who are not defendants here and thus could not be subject to the requested preliminary injunction) or by the federal government to prosecute Apache Stronghold’s members for any trespasses that may or may not occur in the future. APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES 49 And even had Apache Stronghold shown a “sufficiently realistic fear” of criminal prosecution, it seeks relief that RFRA cannot provide. Injunctive relief “must be tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.” Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, that means that RFRA could give Apache Stronghold’s members “immun[ity]” from any criminal trespass charges brought against them for entering Oak Flat after the land passed into private hands unless the government can prove a compelling and narrowly tailored government interest. Christie, 825 F.3d at 1055. But Apache Stronghold does not ask for immunity. It asks instead that we enjoin a complex, multi-step land exchange that does much more than (potentially) subject Apache Stronghold’s members to criminal liability. RFRA does not authorize Apache Stronghold to enjoin the entire Land Exchange any more than RFRA authorized the O Centro plaintiffs to strike down the entire Controlled Substances Act. Next, when we consider potential civil trespass suits brought by Resolution Copper, we again see two problems with Apache Stronghold’s argument. 20 The first problem is factual. At this early stage in the litigation, it is not clear whether the Apache will in fact be subject to civil trespass liability. Even after the Land Exchange, Resolution Copper “will ensure ongoing public access to the Oak Flat Campground, recreational trails and climbing,” and will “accommodate requests to periodically close the campground to the public for traditional and ceremonial purposes.” Resolution Copper also committed to “permit 20 RFRA is not a defense in private litigation. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 1999). RFRA thus would not prevent Resolution Copper from pursuing private trespass actions against any would-be worshipers. 50 APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES harvesting of the Emory oak groves by individuals, or commercially through an authorization.” And the Apache need not rely on Resolution Copper’s goodwill alone. The Land Exchange Provision itself obligates Resolution Copper to “provide access to the surface of the Oak Flat Campground to members of the public, including Indian tribes.” 16 U.S.C. § 539p(i)(3). True, Resolution Copper may restrict access once “the operation of the mine precludes continued public access for safety reasons.” Id. But Resolution Copper is still “several years” and a “detailed feasibility study” away from any final decision as to whether to proceed with the mine at all. So the mine may never come to be, and Resolution Copper may never restrict access at all. At this preliminary injunction stage, these factual uncertainties prevent Apache Stronghold from showing a “likelihood” that Resolution Copper will subject Apache Stronghold’s members to trespass liability for using Oak Flat. 21 The second problem is legal. As with the (potential) criminal charges, even were the Land Exchange to subject Apache Stronghold’s members to the threat of civil trespass lawsuits, the substantial burden would be the lawsuits themselves, not Resolution Copper’s mining activities. Again, injunctive relief “must be tailored to remedy the 21 We also acknowledge the novelty of Apache Stronghold’s fallback argument. RFRA applies only to “[g]overnment” action that substantially burden religious exercise, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1, and it is far from clear that it constitutes “government” action for the Forest Service to transfer government land to a private entity which might (or might not) sue other private parties for trespassing on that land. Cf. Vill. of Bensenville v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 457 F.3d 52, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2006). But the parties sparsely briefed Apache Stronghold’s secondary argument and the government did not argue that there is no “government” action here, so we leave this issue for another day. APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES 51 specific harm alleged.” Lamb-Weston, Inc., 941 F.2d at 974. Even assuming Apache Stronghold’s members were subject to imminent civil trespass suits, we could at most require the government to negotiate with Resolution Copper an easement or a license giving Apache Stronghold’s members some access to Oak Flat even after the Land Exchange. We could not enjoin the entire Land Exchange as Apache Stronghold asks us to do. B. Apache Stronghold’s Free Exercise Clause Claim We next address Apache Stronghold’s claim that the Land Exchange would violate the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause. See U.S. Const. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). Under Employment Division v. Smith, a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if that law burdens religion. 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). But laws that are not neutral or are not generally applicable are subject to strict scrutiny. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). A law is not neutral if the law’s “object . . . is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation”; a law is not “generally applicable” if the law “impose[s] burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief” in a “selective manner.” Id. at 533, 543. Apache Stronghold argues that the Land Exchange Provision is neither neutral nor generally applicable and is thus subject to strict scrutiny. We are not persuaded. First, the Land Exchange is “neutral” in that its “object” is not to infringe upon the Apache’s religious practices. Id. at 533. The Land Exchange Provision never mentions religion, and when it comes closest to doing so, the Provision 52 APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES shows solicitude towards religion, not intent to infringe. See 16 U.S.C. § 539p(g) (designating a “special management area” “to allow for traditional uses of the area by Native American people”). And even though “[f]acial neutrality is not determinative,” Apache Stronghold has identified no “subtle departures from neutrality” here. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)). All the evidence suggests that the Land Exchange is meant to facilitate “mineral exploration activities.” 16 U.S.C. § 539p(c)(6)(A)(i). Nothing more and nothing less. Apache Stronghold disagrees, arguing that the Land Exchange “targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment.” As evidence, it posits that Congress must have known the adverse impact that the Land Exchange would have on the Apache. But even assuming that 535 distinct Congresspersons could have a single collective “knowledge” or “purpose,” Congress’s knowledge is not enough to prove its purpose. 22 It is one thing to pass a statute 22 Apache Stronghold cites, as “evidence of hostility” toward religion, a snippet from the Congressional record where a “bill sponsor criticized ‘the San Carlos Apache’ for ‘car[ing] more about some issues [i.e., religion] than they do about the prospect of employment,’ and called for ‘an end to’ religious ‘delays.’” (All alterations here are Apache Stronghold’s.) This argument has two problems. First, once Senator McCain’s remarks are shorn of all misleading editing, they show no hostility toward religion. See Resolution Copper: Hearing on H.R. 1904 and S. 409 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Nat. Res., 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statement of Sen. John McCain) (“So, the tribal leaders . . . obviously care more about some issues than they do about the prospect of employment for their tribal members . . . .”); id. at 4 (“Mr. Chairman, it is time for Congress to put an end to these delays.”). And second, Senator McCain’s remarks shed no light on how Congress as a whole perceived the Land Exchange’s purpose. They show only a single Senator’s frustration with impediments to the Exchange achieving APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES 53 with the knowledge that it could burden the Apache’s religious exercise. It is another entirely to pass a statute with the purpose or goal of creating that burden. Cf., e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.02 (distinguishing between actions made “knowingly” and actions made “purposely”). The Land Exchange is also generally applicable: it does not selectively “impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543. Rather, the Land Exchange will also burden all manner of secular activities on the areas to be transferred to Resolution Copper. After the Land Exchange, parts of the Tonto National Forest will “no longer [be] accessible to hikers, rock climbing enthusiasts, cyclists, equestrians, campers, hunters, and other recreational users.” Apache Stronghold responds that the Land Exchange is not generally applicable because it is “designed to apply to only one piece of land,” but this argument misconstrues the legal standard. We do not ask if the law was “designed to apply to only one piece of land.” Indeed, the statute challenged in Smith—and upheld there as neutral and generally applicable—was designed to apply to only one type of conduct: the “knowing or intentional possession of a ‘controlled substance.’” 494 U.S. at 874 (quoting Ore. Rev. Stat § 475.992(4) (1987)). The question under Smith is whether a government action “burdens only . . . conduct motivated by religious belief.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543; see also Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A law is not generally applicable if it, ‘in a selective manner, imposes burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.’” (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. the purpose that particular Senator had in mind: increased gainful employment. 54 APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES at 543)). And again, the Land Exchange does not impose such a selective burden. The Exchange affects not just the Apache but all “hikers, rock climbing enthusiasts, cyclists, equestrians, campers, hunters, and other recreational users” who wish to enjoy the areas to be conveyed to Resolution Copper. We thus hold that the Land Exchange Provision is a neutral and generally applicable law and passes muster under Smith. The district court properly found that Apache Stronghold is not likely to succeed on its Free Exercise claim. C. Apache Stronghold’s Trust Claim We last consider Apache Stronghold’s trust claim. As relevant background, the Apache and the U.S. government signed the Treaty of Santa Fe in 1852. In that treaty, the U.S. promised to “designate, settle, and adjust [the Apache’s] territorial boundaries, and pass and execute in their territory such laws as may be deemed conducive to the prosperity and happiness of [the Apache].” Importantly, however, Apache Stronghold has not adduced any evidence that the U.S. ever formally designated any such boundaries. Apache Stronghold nevertheless argues that this language created an enforceable trust obligation on the U.S. government’s part, and that the Land Exchange is “inconsistent” with the U.S.’s obligation to pass laws “conducive to the prosperity and happiness” of the Apache. The government responds that this trust claim fails for three reasons: 1) Apache Stronghold cannot bring a trust claim under the Treaty of Santa Fe because it is a non-profit group, not the Apache tribe that signed the treaty; 2) the Treaty of Santa Fe does not create an “enforceable trust duty”; and 3) the Land Exchange Provision abrogated the APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES 55 Treaty of Santa Fe by statute. We need address only the second reason, as it is dispositive here. 23 We agree with the government that on this record, Apache Stronghold has not established that the Treaty of Santa Fe imposes on the United States an enforceable trust obligation. As a general matter, the U.S. government shoulders a trust obligation with respect to an American Indian tribe when the U.S. government “takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies or properties.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 171, 183 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). But here, the government does not control or supervise tribal properties at Oak Flat. Oak Flat belongs to the government, a fact that Apache Stronghold does not presently contest. Apache Stronghold argues that title over Oak Flat is irrelevant, as it seeks not title but 23 The government phrases its first argument—that a non-profit like Apache Stronghold cannot bring claims under the Treaty of Santa Fe— in terms of “standing.” But the government does not assert that Apache Stronghold lacks Article III standing to bring this claim. Rather, the government argues that treaties between the U.S. and American Indian Tribes, like other “treaties between sovereigns,” “do not create privately enforceable rights.” The government thus claims that the Treaty of Santa Fe gives only the American Indian tribe that signed the treaty—and not individual members of that tribe—a cause of action upon which a court can grant relief. But this is a question of substantive law, not of Article III, and thus “is not a jurisdictional question.” Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 793 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 2015). We thus need not address the government’s first argument before considering its second argument: that the Treaty of Santa Fe creates no enforceable trust duty. And because we agree with that second argument, we need not address the government’s first argument at all. “[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” N. Cnty. Commc’ns Corp. of Ariz. v. Qwest Corp., 824 F.3d 830, 838 n.2. (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 56 APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES “usufructuary rights to use land for traditional purposes.” But the Treaty’s language explicitly tied any obligations that it created to the Apache’s title to land. The government promised to “designate, settle, and adjust [the Apache’s] territorial boundaries, and pass and execute in their territory such laws,” “their” referring to the Apache treaty signatories. Even assuming that Oak Flat was once Apache land according to historical maps, Apache Stronghold has not pointed to any evidence indicating that the government designated any boundaries of the Apache’s territory after the 1852 Treaty, let alone boundaries that encompass Oak Flat. Because Apache Stronghold points to no evidence establishing that the U.S. government “designate[d] . . . territory” on which the government has any obligation to “pass and execute” laws, it is not likely to prove that the government has assumed any Treaty-based trust obligations with respect to Oak Flat. This conclusion accords with how both we and other courts have interpreted identical treaty language in other cases. The Treaty with the Utah, just like the Treaty of Santa Fe, required the United States to “designate, settle, and adjust [the American Indians’] territorial boundaries, and pass and execute such laws, in their territory, as the [United States] may deem conducive to the happiness and prosperity of said [American] Indians.” Treaty with the Utah, Dec. 30, 1849, art. VII, 9 Stat. 984. But that language only “reserves for a future date the final delineation of boundaries.” Uintah Ute Indians of Utah v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 768, 788, 789 (Fed. Cl. 1993). The Treaty with the Utah “contains no obligations with respect to property” and created neither “a trust relationship [n]or trust protection,” at least not until “the Government established boundaries” that delineated American Indian land upon which the United States could have some obligations. Id. We agreed in Robinson v. Jewell APACHE STRONGHOLD V. UNITED STATES 57 when we held that the Treaty with the Utah did not “create[] any enforceable property rights.” 790 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2015); see also id. at 917. So too here. Apache Stronghold has not adduced evidence which establishes that the U.S. government implemented the Treaty of Santa Fe by designating any land or recognizing any title vested in the Apache. And without title vested in the Apache, there can be no trust relationship arising from the Treaty of Santa Fe and no trust obligations relating to “usufructuary rights.” Apache Stronghold’s trust claim is thus unlikely to succeed.