Opinion ID: 4271283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Commentary on Witness Testimony

Text: Saad argues, with some justification, that the prosecution's closing argument contained inappropriate and prejudicial statements about the credibility of Saad's and Moseley's testimony. Saad argues that it was improper for the prosecution to, inter alia, label Saad as a good storyteller, say that Saad's testimony was malarkey, and call Saad's third alibi an insult to [the jury's] intelligence. Saad also takes issue with the prosecution calling Moseley an unmitigated liar and accusing him of perjury. Our circuit said the following some time ago about similar comments by a prosecutor in closing argument: [t]hat these statements were improper is so clear as not to brook serious discussion. United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 121 (1st Cir. 1992). That is because a prosecutor's obligation to desist from the use of pejorative language and inflammatory rhetoric is every bit as solemn as his obligation to attempt to bring the guilty to account.2 Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 2 We have never approved of a prosecutor calling defendants or defense witnesses liars, contrary to the government's characterization of Obershaw v. Lanman, 453 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006). Obershaw was a habeas petition from a state court conviction. Id. at 57. There, the prosecution had called the defendant a liar in its closing argument, and we had to determine whether the prosecutor's comments . . . form[ed] a basis for habeas relief. Id. at 66. We held that they did not because, - 18 - F.2d at 159. Such statements can threaten the fairness of a trial, since, when a prosecutor directly accus[es] a defendant of lying . . . jurors could believe the government has knowledge outside the evidence about the defendant's veracity. United States v. Garcia, 818 F.2d 136, 144 (1st Cir. 1987). We recognize that different circuits more recently have taken different views on a prosecutor accusing the defendant or defense witnesses of lying. Some circuits though have still noted the word liar itself carries even greater risks. See United States v. Phillips, 704 F.3d 754, 767 (9th Cir. 2012) (It is clear that stating that the defendant lied by making a particular statement is less problematic than calling him a liar in general, since, in certain circumstances, the latter could have the tendency to overtake the role of the jury as the arbiter of credibility.). All circuits agree that the prejudicial effect of the prosecution's use of liar in closing argument depends on context. See United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 916 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Manos, given the facts of that case, it was reasonable [for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court] to view [the prosecutor's comments] as comments based on the evidence. Id. We did not hold that the prosecutor's statements were proper. - 19 - 848 F.2d 1427, 1436-37 (7th Cir. 1988); Houston v. Estelle, 569 F.2d 372, 383 (5th Cir. 1978). The government, at oral argument, asked us to bless the use of the term liar. Times change, but we do not condone the use of that term. As the Fourth Circuit has said: When a prosecutor comments on the veracity of a witness, the prosecutor's statement presents two discrete risks: (1) of improperly suggesting to the jury that the prosecutor's personal opinion has evidentiary weight; and (2) of improperly inviting the jury to infer that the prosecutor had access to extra- judicial information, not available to the jury. The gravity of these risks is amplified in the case of a criminal defendant exercising his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. United States v. Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Moore, 710 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1983)). We also agree with the reservations expressed by the Third Circuit in Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2008): [i]f a defendant testifies on his own behalf . . . a prosecutor may attack his credibility to the same extent as any other witness. This does not mean, however, that a prosecutor may express his personal belief in the credibility of a witness or the guilt of a defendant. Id. at 203 (citations omitted). - 20 - The defendant argues on appeal that the prosecutor went beyond fair commentary on the evidence and so prejudiced him as to violate his due process rights. See United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1999) (granting new trial based on prosecution improperly calling the defendant a liar numerous times). Saad argues the statements were prejudicial because they pervaded the prosecutor's closing argument, the statements were targeted at key witnesses, and the government's case was circumstantial and weak. Saad did not object to the statements before the district court, so we review for plain error. United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011). Under this demanding standard of review, Saad must show (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)). Even if we were to assume that prongs (1) and (2) were met, Saad fails the third and fourth prongs of plain error review because he cannot establish a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different without the challenged comments. United States v. De La Paz-Rentas, 613 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 2010). Reviewing the government's case as a whole, we are satisfied that, despite Saad's arguments, the result would not - 21 - have been different absent the prosecutor's inappropriate comments. In addition to the evidence against Saad being overwhelming, the prosecutor's statements criticizing the witnesses' credibility were based on the inconsistency and outlandishness of their stories, making it less likely that the jury would infer that the prosecutor had private knowledge of the defendant's guilt that unfortunately cannot be shared with the jury. United States v. Gomes, 642 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2011). While this absence does not mean that the prosecutor's comments were appropriate, it makes it less likely that the comments were prejudicial. Importantly, the district court's jury instructions made it clear that the jurors were to make their own credibility determinations, despite the defense's failure to object to the prosecution's statements. We presume that the jury followed those instructions. United States v. Spencer, 873 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Ponzo, 853 F.3d 558, 584 (1st Cir. 2017)). The jury had ample opportunity to draw its own conclusions about the witness[es'] veracity, given that it saw and heard [them] testify at length. United States v. RodriguezAdorno, 695 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2012).