Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Alleged Violation of Defendant's Rights of Confrontation and Cross-examination

Text: Before the elder Inez Blanco was called to testify, the trial court, on its own motion, appointed counsel to advise her of her privilege against self-incrimination. Several days later, the prosecutor called Inez Blanco as a witness at a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury. After answering a few preliminary questions, she declined to testify further, pursuant to the advice of her counsel, on the ground she might incriminate herself. A hearing was held to determine whether the prosecution would be permitted to introduce into evidence a transcript of the testimony given by Inez Blanco at the preliminary hearing. (Evid. Code, ง 402.) Defendant called as a witness David Stanley, the attorney who represented defendant at the preliminary hearing. Stanley testified that because of delays in obtaining discovery from the prosecution, and the press of other work, he had had insufficient time to prepare for the preliminary hearing. Stanley recalled that at the time of the preliminary hearing, the charges against defendant included two alleged special circumstances: murder for hire or financial gain, and murder committed during the course of a robbery. (ง 190.2, subds. (a)(1), (a)(17).) Defendant also was charged, in a separate complaint, with unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, ง 10851, subd. (a)). One of Stanley's primary goals was to eliminate the special circumstances allegations, if possible, and he believed the allegation of murder for hire or financial gain was particularly weak. He understood the prosecution's theory to be that Inez Blanco had procured the services of defendant to commit the murder. When the prosecution completed its direct examination of Inez Blanco at the preliminary hearing, Stanley concluded there was no direct evidence whatsoever which would support an inference that there had been a murder for hire, and only very weak circumstantial evidence that would in any way associate [defendant] with the killing.... Determining, therefore, that there was no need to contest Blanco's credibility, Stanley focused instead (in his cross-examination of the witness) on not inadvertently revealing evidence supportive of the murder-for-hire allegation. Stanley's view was that if he didn't blunder and bring out some damaging evidence that the prosecution had not brought out, that when [Blanco] departed from the witness stand, the allegation of [murder for] financial gain was going to fall by the wayside. That was certainly my goal. Stanley also was aware that, should a penalty phase of the trial ensue, Blanco was as close a family member as defendant had, and it therefore was very important ... not to alienate her by any kind of rude or roughshod tactics in examining her, but rather to maintain a positive kind of relationship with her in the speculation of maintaining her cooperation.... At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the allegation that the murder was committed for financial gain. Subsequently, the charge of unlawfully taking a vehicle was dismissed on the People's motion. Based upon Inez Blanco's invocation of her privilege against self-incrimination, the trial court found she was unavailable. (Evid. Code, ง 240.) Defendant argued that despite Blanco's unavailability, her preliminary hearing testimony was inadmissible, because that testimony is unreliable and defendant's motive for cross-examining Blanco at the preliminary hearing differed from his motive for cross-examining her at trial. The trial court ruled that the transcript of her testimony at the preliminary hearing was admissible except for her testimony that she did not give defendant permission to take her automobile, because in dismissing the Vehicle Code section 10851 charge the prosecution stated it no longer believed that portion of her testimony was true. Following the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, the transcript of Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. (22a) Defendant contends that the admission at trial of this testimony violated Evidence section 1291, as well as his right of confrontation under the federal and state Constitutions. Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a), provides, in pertinent part: Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: [ถ] ... [ถ] (2) The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing. Defendant contends that his motive for cross-examining Blanco at the preliminary hearing differed materially and substantially from his motives at trial, because (1) defense counsel feared that extensive cross-examination at the earlier hearing might reveal damaging evidence regarding the special circumstance allegation of murder for financial gain which the prosecution had failed to prove and which subsequently was dismissed, and (2) he did not wish to alienate Blanco because she might be a crucial witness during a possible penalty phase. [6] (23) Frequently, a defendant's motive for cross-examining a witness during a preliminary hearing will differ from his or her motive for cross-examining that witness at trial. For the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness to be admissible at trial under Evidence Code section 1291, these motives need not be identical, only similar. ( People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 784 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192].) Admission of the former testimony of an unavailable witness is permitted under Evidence Code section 1291 and does not offend the confrontation clauses of the federal or state Constitutions โ not because the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing is considered an exact substitute for the right of cross-examination at trial (see Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 725 [20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260, 88 S.Ct. 1318]), but because the interests of justice are deemed served by a balancing of the defendant's right to effective cross-examination against the public's interest in effective prosecution. ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 64 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 606, 100 S.Ct. 2531]; People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1, 24.) (22b) Defendant's interest and motive for cross-examining Inez Blanco during the preliminary hearing were sufficiently similar to those existing at trial so as to permit the admission of Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony. On both occasions, Blanco's testimony relating her contacts with defendant the day preceding the murder, defendant's need for money, and the disappearance of Blanco's automobile near the time of the murder, had the same tendency to establish defendant's guilt. Defendant's interest and motive in discrediting this testimony was identical at both proceedings. Defense counsel's testimony that he chose, for strategic considerations, not to vigorously cross-examine Blanco does not render her former testimony inadmissible. As long as defendant was given the opportunity for effective cross-examination, the statutory requirements were satisfied; the admissibility of this evidence did not depend on whether defendant availed himself fully of that opportunity. ( People v. Green, supra, 3 Cal.3d 981, 990; People v. Sul (1981) 122 Cal. App.3d 355, 367 [175 Cal. Rptr. 893].) Defendant relies upon the decision in United States v. Salerno (1992) 510 U.S. ___ [120 L.Ed.2d 255, 112 S.Ct. 2503], in which the trial court precluded the defendant from introducing testimony given before the grand jury by two witnesses who refused to testify at trial on the ground they might incriminate themselves. Defendant asserts: The Salerno opinion is important because it demonstrates that a prosecutor may not have a `similar motive' in examining a witness in front of a Grand Jury as might exist at trial. Defendant is mistaken, because the high court in Salerno expressed no opinion on the question. Instead, the court remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals for consideration of this issue. ( Id. at p. ___ [120 L.Ed.2d at p. 264].) Defendant additionally asserts the trial court's reasoning in overruling defendant's objection to this evidence was seriously flawed, because the court stated the evidence would be admissible even if defendant's interests in cross-examining Blanco at the preliminary hearing and at trial were entirely different. We need not, and do not, determine whether this single comment reflects a misunderstanding on the part of the trial court as to the requirements for admission of former testimony of an unavailable witness. (24) `No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.' [Citation.] ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19 [112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10].) (22c) The trial court's ruling admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of Inez Blanco was correct because, as explained above, defendant's motive and interest for cross-examining Inez Blanco at the preliminary hearing and at trial were, as a matter of law, sufficiently similar to satisfy the requirements of Evidence Code section 1291.