Opinion ID: 853289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inquiry into Motive and Comparison with Other Cases

Text: The Court of Appeals concluded that the Commission's decision was `arbitrary and capricious' ... in light of the true motive behind the Commission's decision [and] their discriminatory treatment of Equicor's proposed primary plat as compared to similarly situated plats. Equicor, 732 N.E.2d at 223. Chief Judge Sharpnack dissented, concluding that it was improper for the majority to find arbitrary action based on inconsistency with prior Commission decisions. Id. at 224. An inquiry into the motive of an agency action may be proper in some circumstances, notably where there is a claimed violation of rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, in the context of a zoning administrative action, [a] violation of substantive due process rights is demonstrated if the government's actions were not rationally related to a legitimate state interest or were motivated by bias, bad faith, or improper motive. John E. Long, Inc. v. Borough of Ringwood, 61 F.Supp.2d 273, 280 (D.N.J.1998). [A] plaintiff must show that the state administrative agency has been guilty of `arbitrary and capricious action' in the strict sense, meaning `that there is no rational basis for the ... [administrative] decision.' Brody v. City of Mason, 250 F.3d 432, 438 (6th Cir.2001) (holding city's grant of permit to operate business in residential neighborhood not arbitrary and capricious); accord Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir.1989). An improper motive may also be demonstrated by evidence of extreme partisan political considerations, personal conflicts of interest and gain, or invidious discriminatory intent. Long, 61 F.Supp.2d at 283. In some sense, if an agency's unstated reason for its action is incorrect as a matter of law, the action may be viewed as based on an improper motive. We think the improper motive required to permit examination of the agency's reasons is more restrictive than that. In significant part this conclusion is driven by practical considerations. If motivation is open to question in every case where the agency is claimed to have cited an incorrect factor for its decision, it raises the prospect of discovery of each member of the agency as a routine step toward judicial review of administrative action. This in turn escalates the potential cost and delay by an order of magnitude. The Administrative Orders and Procedures Act [1] was designed to preclude this sort of obstacle to agency action. Cf. Thompson v. Med. Licensing Bd., 180 Ind.App. 333, 337, 389 N.E.2d 43, 46 (1979) (By enacting the Administrative Adjudication Act (the Act) in 1947 the Indiana legislature recognized the basic need for unfettered action by administrative agencies operating within the sphere of their authority.). The common thread of the cases examining motive is a contention that the decision was based on considerations personal to either the applicant (e.g., race or gender discrimination) or personal to one or more members of the agency (e.g., bribery or political retaliation). We conclude that a bona fide claim of violation of due process or equal protection rights, or their state law counterparts, is required before an inquiry into the subjective motivation of the agency may be launched. Equicor plausibly contends that opposition to cluster housing was the real reason for rejecting its plat. But Equicor does not claim that the agency was motivated by malice or improper outside influence. Rather, the contention is that parking designation is pretextual, and plats with similar parking designations have been approved in the past. Therefore, Equicor argues, the action is arbitrary and capricious. In support of this view, Equicor cites the Commission's support for suspension of Section 110 as evidence that the real reason for disapproval was hostility to cluster housing. This contention boils down to a claim that the agency cited a proper factor but was really motivated by a consideration that could constitutionally have been written into the ordinance but was not. This is a claim of error, but not of denial of due process or equal protection. In the absence of a claim that the decision was the product of constitutional violation, the test of arbitrary and capricious action is whether there is no reasonable basis for the action. Ind. Civil Rights Comm'n v. Delaware County Circuit Court, 668 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind.1996). We think this is an objective standard, and does not turn on the subjective motivation of the agency. In this case, the Commission was objectively correct in pointing to the failure of the plat to designate the parking spaces with specificity even if, as Equicor contends, anyone with common sense could figure out that there were indeed the required number of spaces. As a result, even if failure to designate parking was not the real reason for disapproval, the Commission's motivation is irrelevant as a matter of law. We also believe past approval of similarly situated plats does not establish that the Commission's decision was reversible as arbitrary and capricious. If the basis for denial is a failure to meet a requirement of the governing ordinance, albeit one previously enforced laxly or not at all, the inquiry is not whether there are prior inconsistent decisions, but rather whether there is substantial evidence supporting the agency's decision. As Chief Judge Sharpnack pointed out, if the administrative agency is, in effect, estopped by its prior decisions, it becomes unable to correct its errors in subsequent determinations. In short, past weak enforcement does not invalidate an otherwise valid requirement, and inquiry into the Commission's subjective motivation is improper unless there is a claimed denial of due process or equal protection.