Opinion ID: 715669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sanctions against Broderick.

Text: 36 In sanctioning Broderick, the district court relied upon both 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and its inherent supervisory powers. Section 1927 provides: 37 Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 38 This provision is designed to deter unnecessary delays in litigation by imposing upon attorneys an obligation to avoid dilatory tactics. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir.1991). Sanctions under § 1927 require a finding of bad faith, which can be inferred  'when the attorney's actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay.'  Id. (quoting Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 1373, 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987)). The district court's imposition of sanctions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc. (Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs.), 931 F.2d 222, 230 (2d Cir.1991). 39 On the last day of the contempt hearing, Broderick insisted on viewing an entire hour-length videotape, even though there was no relevant matter on the tape that was not cumulative of its first fifteen minutes. Although Broderick claims not to have known what would be revealed by the videotape, he had several prior opportunities to view the tape outside of court. His failure to do so may not be condoned. See Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 886 (11th Cir.1987) (One of the primary duties defense counsel owes to his client is the duty to prepare himself adequately prior to trial.). 40 Nor is there merit to Broderick's contention that his clients had a right to have recorded evidence displayed in its entirety in open court. Both the mandate of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that those rules be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, the dictate of Rule 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that those rules be construed to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and the allowance in Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence for complex evidence to be presented in summary form should be read to preclude an absolute right of a litigant to command that a videotape be shown in full, or every word of a document be read, in open court. Under these circumstances, the district court was entitled to infer that Broderick's conduct was undertaken in bad faith, and did not abuse its discretion in finding that this conduct so unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings as to warrant sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See Koppell II, 1994 WL 557057 at  2. Because we uphold the sanctions pursuant to § 1927, we do not reach the issue whether the sanctions were independently justified under the district court's inherent powers.