Opinion ID: 1664333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Resentencing as a New Proceeding

Text: In both capital and noncapital cases, we have held that resentencing is a new proceeding. In death penalty cases, we have stated that [t]he basic premise of sentencing procedure is that the sentencer is to consider all relevant evidence regarding the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant to determine appropriate punishment. Wike v. State, 698 So.2d 817, 821 (Fla.1997). Thus, we have recognized that a resentencing must proceed as an entirely new proceeding, id., and that a resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence. Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1986). In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights. Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 367-68 (Fla.2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 525 (Fla.2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a `clean slate,' meaning that the defendant's vacated sentence becomes a `nullity' and his `resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.' (citation omitted)); Walker, 33 Fla. L. Weekly at D44, ___ So.2d at ___ (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) (Generally, courts have held that once a defendant successfully challenges his sentence on appeal and the cause is remanded for resentencing, the resentencing is a `de novo' proceeding, at which either side may present evidence anew regarding the appropriate sentence.). The principle of de novo sentencing often benefits the defendant. See, e.g., Galindez, 955 So.2d at 525 (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (In fact, because resentencing is de novo, the State was required to produce evidence on sentencing issues even if the State established the fact at the original sentencing.); Tubwell v. State, 922 So.2d 378, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (As this resentencing proceeding was de novo, the state was not relieved of its burden to prove the prior offenses. (citations omitted)); Rich v. State, 814 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that because resentencing following reversal is a new proceeding, the State must introduce evidence that the defendant qualifies for enhanced sentencing, even though such evidence was introduced in the previous sentencing hearing); Mills v. State, 724 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing, law-of-the-case principles do not insulate the State from proving them at resentencing); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (agreeing that because resentencing is a new proceeding, the defendant may challenge the accuracy of prior convictions included on his scoresheet, even though he did not challenge them at the original sentencing). We have also recognized that because a resentencing is a new proceeding, the court is not limited by the evidence originally presented. See Lucas v. State, 841 So.2d 380, 387 (Fla.2003) ([A] resentencing court is not limited by evidence presented (or not presented) in ... the original... sentencing phase.); Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984) (recognizing that where a remand directs a new sentencing proceeding, both sides may present additional evidence). Our decision in Mann illustrates this principle. At Mann's original capital sentencing proceeding, the State introduced a Mississippi burglary conviction and presented testimony from the victim that Mann committed sexual battery. 453 So.2d at 785. Based on this evidence, the trial court found that the aggravating circumstance of previous conviction of a violent felony had been established. Id. On appeal, we held that the trial court erroneously found this aggravating circumstance because the judgment of conviction did not disclose that it involved violence. Mann v. State, 420 So.2d 578, 581 (Fla.1982). We also held that the trial court erroneously found another aggravating circumstance and that we could not determine what the trial court found regarding mitigation. Id. We therefore vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing without a jury. Id. On resentencing, in addition to the evidence presented at the first sentencing, the State introduced a copy of a Mississippi indictment charging Mann with burglary both with the intent to commit unnatural carnal intercourse and that he did commit that crime. 453 So.2d at 786. The trial court again found that the Mississippi conviction established the prior violent felony aggravator. Id. at 785-86. On appeal from the resentencing, we rejected Mann's argument that our previous opinion precluded the State from presenting additional evidence to establish the previous conviction: Our remand directed a new sentencing proceeding, not just a reweighing. In such a proceeding both sides may, if they choose, present additional evidence. Moreover, as we stated previously: We are not presented with a copy of the Mississippi charge document and, thus, cannot determine whether it alleged, and the jury convicted him of, a breaking with intent to commit a crime of violence. The state remedied this omission on resentencing, and the proofthe indictment, the conviction, and the victim's testimonyestablishes a prior conviction of a violent felony. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mann, 420 So.2d at 581). We affirmed the death sentence. Id. [5] As we did in Mann regarding evidence establishing an aggravating factor (a case with the ultimate stakes for the defendant), we conclude that because a resentencing is a new proceeding, the State may present additional evidence on remand to prove the defendant qualifies for habitual felony offender sentencing. Our decision furthers the purpose of the habitual felony offender statute. See Richardson, 915 So.2d at 88 (recognizing that the purpose of section 775.084 is to protect society from habitual criminals who persist in the commission of crime after having been theretofore convicted and punished for crimes previously committed) (quoting Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806, 30 So.2d 304, 306 (1947)).