Opinion ID: 676060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: this decree modification proceeding

Text: 48 After we suggested that the United States could not collaterally challenge the decrees but could seek modifications, see In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d at 1501, the parties began discussing modification as a possible means of resolving their outstanding differences. With that prospect in mind, the plaintiffs from the reverse-discrimination case moved to intervene in this, the original consent-decree, case and to consolidate this case with the reverse-discrimination case. On May 25, 1990, the district court denied the reverse-discrimination plaintiffs' motion to consolidate, but allowed them to intervene in this case for the limited purpose of participating in any litigation regarding potential modification of the consent decrees. Subsequently, in an effort to gather all interested parties in a single proceeding, the district court certified both a class of [a]ll present and future black and female employees ... [and] applicants for employment with the City (the Bryant class), and a class, represented by several of the plaintiffs from the parallel reverse-discrimination case, of [a]ll present and future male, non-black employees ... [and] applicants for employment with the City of Birmingham (the Wilks class). 49 On May 3, 1990, the United States moved to modify the consent decrees. The United States urged the district court: 50 (1) to replace the existing long-term goals (which [were] ... based on civilian labor force figures) with the long-term goal of developing lawful selection procedures; 51 (2) to replace the current interim goals with interim goals based on applicant flow data that would terminate upon the implementation of lawful selection procedures; 52 (3) to require the Personnel Board to develop nondiscriminatory selection procedures in a timely manner ...; 53 (4) to require the City of Birmingham to cooperate with the Board in the Board's efforts to develop nondiscriminatory selection procedures and for the City to demonstrate that any selection procedures it has implemented in addition to those of the Personnel Board, are lawful; and 54 (5) to strengthen the current recruitment mechanisms. 55 In an accompanying proposed order, the United States requested the court to give the Board three years to develop lawful tests and to require the Board to stop crediting applicants with seniority points to the extent that use of such points violated Title VII. The United States asserted that [t]hese modifications are appropriate in light of changed circumstances, emerging case law, and the experience of the parties under the decrees over the past nine years, and to move this matter toward a conclusion where continuing court jurisdiction will no longer be required. 56 The Wilks class soon submitted its own modification proposals, which requested the court: 57 (1) to vacate all long-term and annual goals; 58 (2) to enjoin the City and Board from making employment decisions based solely on race or gender; and 59 (3) to terminate both the decrees and all court supervision of City and Board employment practices within four years. 60 The City, the Bryant class of blacks and women, and the Board filed responses to these modification motions in July 1990. For its part, the City acknowledge[d] that limited modification ... [was] appropriate because of changed circumstances, including the City's achievement of some of its long-term goals and the fact that the selection procedures employed by the Personnel Board continue to have an adverse impact upon blacks and have not been demonstrated to be valid selection procedures. With these developments in mind, the City proposed the following modifications:(1) Where long term goals have been met, but selection devices which create an adverse impact on blacks remain ..., replace the current interim annual goals [based on fixed percentages set out in the City decree] with interim annual goals based on representation in the qualified applicant pool. 61 (2) Modify long term goals which are demonstrated to be inconsistent with the qualified applicant pool to reflect representation of the qualified pool, rather than representation in the general labor force. 62 (3) Terminate the Decree, in whole, or in part by job classification[ ], upon motion of any party, and a finding by the Court that a lawful selection procedure is in place for appointment to that job classification and the long term goal for such classification(s) has been achieved. 63 The Bryant class of blacks and women joined in these recommendations and also agreed with the United States that a reasonable timetable should be established for the development of lawful selection procedures by the Board. 64 The Board, too, accepted the need to develop lawful tests, but vehemently opposed the United States' proposed three-year timetable as both unrealistic and unnecessary. The Board rested its contention that a timetable was unnecessary on its assertion that it had already made significant progress toward eliminating adverse impact from its selection procedures. The Board also opposed the United States' call for an end to seniority-point enhancements, noting that the federal guidelines on enforcement of Title VII do not disallow the use of seniority points. Cf. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-2(h) (1981 & Supp.1993) ([I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ....). 65 After holding a hearing on these issues, the district court ordered several modifications to the decrees. The court began by noting that the decrees had: 66 in conjunction with a city administration whose ... leaders have reflected the majority-black voting population within the city, served to reduce, if not eliminate, discriminatory employment practices against blacks and females and, indeed, to enhance the opportunities of such persons for employment and promotion. Nor can it be denied that, in so doing, the decrees have impaired some employment or promotional opportunities of whites and males .... 67 In the police and fire departments, the two departments at the core of the original litigation, black employment had more than doubled, from twenty to forty-one percent in the Police Department and from ten to twenty-six percent in the Fire Department. The percentage of blacks and females in many promotional positions had also increased significantly. Overall, forty-five percent of the City's full-time employees were black and twenty-three percent were female as of September 1990. Blacks and women held jobs in approximate proportion to their presence in the general labor force for about half of the City's classified positions. 68 After reciting these facts, the district court noted that [a]ll parties agree that some modifications have become appropriate. Guided by its view of the underlying purposes of the decrees, remedying past and preventing future discrimination, the district court ordered the following modifications to the City decree: 69 (1) The City must stop using annual goals for any particular job classification once the long-term goal for that classification is met. 70 (2) The City must stop using annual goals for any promotional position once the long-term goal is met for the position from which the promotional candidates are normally chosen, except that the City should continue to promote blacks and women to high-level police and fire positions in proportion to those groups' representation in the position from which promotions are normally made until the long-term goal is reached with respect to the high-level positions. 71 (3) The City must stop using annual goals for any particular job classification once the Board develops lawful screening procedures for that job. 72 (4) The City should group similar jobs together for the purpose of determining whether a particular goal has been met. 73 (5) The district court will, in 1996, reconsider the appropriateness of continuing the City decree. 74 The district court made only one modification to the Board decree. This modification requires that, until the Board develops a lawful test for a particular position, it must, at the City's request and subject to the availability of qualified applicants, certify black and female candidates for that position in proportion to their representation among applicants--even after the City has met its long-term goal (and thus has stopped following the annual goal) for that position. The district court viewed this modification as necessary to avoid a situation in which the City would be obligated to appoint or promote only on the basis of certifications made from [the] discriminatory testing devices employed by the Personnel Board. 7 75 The district court acknowledged that long-term goals tied to black and female representation in the general labor force do[ ] not provide an accurate estimate of the pool of persons potentially qualified for particular City jobs. As a result, the court conceded that these goals would not pass muster under current legal standards as a valid measure of a discrimination-free job force. However, noting that the long-term goals were largely hortatory, the court said that the consequences of this potentially inappropriate measure would be partly reduced by other modifications to the City decree. The court therefore declined to rewrite the decrees' inherently suspect long-term goals to reflect the proportion of qualified blacks and women in the relevant labor pool. The court also refused to impose deadlines on the Board for the development of lawful selection procedures that would displace the long-term goals. The court agreed that the use of such testing procedures would be desirable, but reasoned that specific development and review requirements would be unrealistic, unworkable, and unwise--particularly if accompanied by a judicially-imposed timetable. Finally, the district court rejected the United States' request for an order mandating strengthened recruitment of blacks and women because the parties were already in general agreement that recruitment efforts should be increased. 76 After the district court issued its initial modification order, the Wilks class moved for an interim award of attorneys' fees for its efforts in both the parallel, reverse-discrimination case and the modification proceeding. The class argued that the court's modification order meant that the class had, in part, prevailed in both cases. The district court denied the request, but expressly permitted the class to renew its application in the reverse-discrimination case. 77 Both the United States and the Wilks class now appeal. The United States claims that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting any requirement that the City and Board develop lawful, nondiscriminatory selection procedures to replace the existing numerical goals. The Wilks class takes a bolder position, arguing that there is insufficient evidence of past discrimination to give the City and Board a compelling interest in any affirmative action plan. In addition, both the Wilks class and the United States argue that the decrees' appointment goals fail the narrowly tailored test, established by City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989), because these goals are tied to general labor force statistics rather than to a more accurate measure of the pool of qualified applicants. Finally, the Wilks class challenges the district court's denial of fees and its refusal to accept certain deposition testimony in evidence. The City, the Board, and the Bryant class contend on appeal that the district court orders were within the district court's discretion and should be affirmed in their entirety.