Opinion ID: 2971831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the ALJ's findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. Our review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings. Duncan v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 851 (6th Cir. 1986). 'Substantial evidence' means 'more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Kirk v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). We are to defer to an agency's decision even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997). We must not endeavor to resolve conflicting evidence in the record or to examine the credibility of the claimant's testimony, but instead, must decide only whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision finding Robinson not disabled and therefore ineligible for disability benefits. See Gaffney v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 98, 100 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 8
With respect to procedural claims, Robinson argues that the Appeals Council did not issue a remand order following the district court’s remand of January 26, 1998 and that, without such an order, a jurisdictional defect arises which renders the ALJ’s second decision a nullity. Second, Robinson contends that the ALJ violated internal procedures and Robinson’s due process rights when he obtained additional post-hearing information from Dr. Tansey and Dr. Beard without prior notice to Plaintiff. Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not complete a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (“PRTF”) in violation of SSA rules. The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s procedural claims regarding the absence of a Remand Order, the failure of the ALJ to complete a PTRF, and the ALJ’s decision to include in the record the post-hearing consultation of Dr. Beard, were not presented to the district court and have been waived for appeal purposes. These claims are based upon circumstances known to the Plaintiff during the time of the district court proceedings. Having had knowledge of the circumstances underlying these claims, Plaintiff should have presented them to the district court. Because Plaintiff did not present these issues to the district court, and because Plaintiff has not presented exceptional circumstances why we should allow such claims to be asserted for the first time here, we could find that Plaintiff has waived these issues. Taft Broad Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 243-245 (6th Cir. 1991). However, even when assessed on the merits, we find these claims without merit. Although the Appeals Council must give notice of its intended actions, Culberton v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 1994), the Commissioner’s motion to remand, the district court’s Order granting that motion, and the notice of setting of the evidentiary hearing before the 9 ALJ provided ample notice of the action the Commissioner intended to take. The Appeals Council serves as the Commissioner’s designee. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown any prejudice due to the Appeals Council’s alleged failure to provide a notice or order of remand. As to whether Plaintiff’s due process rights were violated when the ALJ twice sought post-hearing assessments in this case after the October 16, 1998 hearing, we acknowledge that due process principles do apply to Social Security proceedings. Perales v. Richardson, 402 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1971). The Commissioner has a procedural manual referred to as the “HALLEX” that sets forth safeguards and procedures for these administrative proceedings. In one decision, we have found the HALLEX to provide due process. Adams v. Massanari, 55 Fed. Appx. 279, 2003 EL 173011 at -8 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2003). The HALLEX allows for post-hearing consultation proceedings referred by the ALJ, subject to the right of a party to submit interrogatories to the consultant (See Appellant’s Brief, Appendix “B” ). Robinson does not contest that he was afforded the opportunity to submit questions to Dr. Tansey, after the ALJ sent him a letter dated January 4, 1999 providing notice of the additional information he had secured from Dr. Tansey. The ALJ again sent Plaintiff’s counsel a letter on May 18, 1999, providing notice that he had secured additional information from Dr. Beard, and affording Plaintiff the opportunity to respond. On this occasion, Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a supplemental deposition from Dr. King and made a request for Dr. Beard’s curriculam vitae. Thus, in line with protections afforded by due process, Robinson had notice of and an opportunity to respond to Dr. Beard’s report, as well. We do not discern any reversible error. The ALJ’s failure to complete a Psychiatric Review Technique Form can constitute reversible error, Montgomery v. Shalala, 30 F. 3d 98, 100-01 (8th Cir. 1994), but in the Sixth 10 Circuit, reversal is warranted only if the plaintiff shows “significant evidence of a possible impairment that allegedly prevented the Plaintiff from working.” Marcum v. Commissioner, SSA, 205 F.3d 1341m 2000WL92262 at  (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 2000) (citations omitted). To qualify as exhibiting a severe mental impairment, Plaintiff must prove an issue or IQ of sixty to seventy, coupled with physical or other mental limitations. Daniels v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2003 WL 21774004 at , n. 1 (6th Cir. 2003). Robinson’s IQ is 80 and he does have a work history. Thus, there is no reversible error on this point.
As to Robinson’s substantive claims, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the medical opinion and limitations set forth by Dr. King, Robinson’s treating physician. Robinson argues that the ALJ erred in relying upon the assessment of Dr. Rapier who completed his independent medical evaluation on August 22, 1994, and on one-time consultative examiners Drs. Zadeh, and Beard. The ALJ concluded that Dr. King’s findings were inconsistent with those of the consultative examiners in that Dr. King opined that Robinson was limited to the sedentary range of exertion, while Drs. Zadeh and Beard found milder limitations, suggesting an ability to perform medium exertion. The ALJ also concluded that Dr. King had taken undue consideration of Robinson’s sleep problems in assessing that Robinson’s non-restorative sleep pattern was causing him additional pain. Finally, the ALJ found that Dr. King’s finding of radiculopathy was inconsistent with the reports of the other doctors. Accordingly, the ALJ rejected Dr. King’s assessment of Robinson’s impairments, and instead relied upon Dr. Rapier’s assessment of Plaintiff’s abilities. The ALJ asked the vocational 11 expert (“VE”) whether a person with Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience could perform any jobs if he were limited to light exertion, and had the following non-exertional impairments: is limited to lifting twenty pounds occasionally, ten pounds frequently; has the ability to sit or stand for no more than one hour at a time, but less than six hours out of an eighthour day; can never climb a ladder, rope, or scaffold; can occasionally climb, balance, stoop, crouch, crawl, or kneel; can do no over-the-shoulder lifting and has limited ability to push and pull with his upper extremities; must avoid unprotected heights, moving machinery, and vibratory tools; and may not engage in forward twisting and turning at the waist. The VE found that there were a significant number of jobs available in the regional and national economy that a person with the aforementioned limitations could perform. In Dr. King’s October 9, 1998 assessment of Robinson’s physical ability to do workrelated activities, he opined that Robinson could stand and walk a total of less than three hours in an eight-hour workday, and only thirty minutes without interruption. Dr. King also assessed that Robinson could spend less than three hours of an eight-hour workday sitting, and that he could sit for only thirty minutes without interruption. When asked, the VE concluded that an individual with the limitations presented by Dr. King could not be competitively employed in any job. Robinson makes several arguments against the ALJ’s reliance on Dr. Rapier’s assessment of Robinson’s ability to engage in work-related activities. First, Plaintiff argued below that Dr. Rapier’s testimony regarding Robinson’s sitting and standing restrictions were ambiguous. Plaintiff argued to the district court that the doctor was really indicating that Robinson could not stand or sit for more than six hours total in an eight-hour day, rather than the ALJ’s 12 interpretation of six hours standing and six hours sitting. The District Court concluded that Dr. Rapier’s statement could be interpreted in more than one way, and that if there was error in the ALJ’s interpretation, then it was harmless because the ALJ could have relied on Dr. Tansey’s opinion that Plaintiff was capable of sedentary lifting and sitting for up to eight hours a day, with non-exertional restrictions consistent with the hypothetical question posed to the VE. On appeal, Plaintiff asserts that the district court’s finding that any error, if it existed, was harmless is incorrect because Dr. Tansey’s review was secured in violation of Robinson’s due process rights. We concluded above that Plaintiff was given notice each time the ALJ sought to include additional post-hearing evidence into the record, and was also given an opportunity to respond on both occasions. As we opined that there was no reversible error in the ALJ’s securing post-hearing information for Drs. Tansey and Beard, we now find Plaintiff’s argument without merit. Dr. Tansey assessed that “prolonged standing for more than 30-40 minutes or walking more than one hour would be painful” but found that Robinson could sit for between six and eight hours total in an eight-hour workday, and up to eight hours without interruption. Thus, the ALJ’s finding that Robinson’s limitations were less severe than reported by Dr. King is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff also asserts that Dr. King’s opinion is consistent with the opinions of other doctors who are specialists, and should have been accorded deference. The opinions of treating physicians are accorded great weight if supported by sufficient clinical findings. Cutlip v. Secretary of H.H.S., 25 F.3d 284 (6th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). A treating physician’s opinion may be rejected if that opinion is unsupportable or contrary to objective medical evidence. More weight is generally given to a specialist whose opinion is within his or 13 her specialty, as compared to the opinion of a physician who is not a specialist. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5). None of the consultative examiners found any evidence of nerve root impingement, which was the primary factor that Dr. King gave to support his assessment. There was also a lack of evidence of significant nerve root compression or radiculopathy in Dr. Dempsey’s treatment records. Dr. Tchou’s records reflect that the MRI of Robinson’s cervical spine showed no evidence of nerve root compression, nor did the other test reveal evidence of lumbar radiculopathy or lower extremity neuropathy. Dr. Tansey also concluded that “the electrodiagnostic studies reveal no evidence of a lumbar radiculopathy or lower left leg neuropathy.” Additionally, Dr. Tansey reported bulging at the C3-C4 level without nerve root compression. Thus, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination that Dr. King’s assessment was inconsistent with the record. We find no error, therefore, in the decision not to accord special deference to his opinion. While there are limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to move, Drs. Dempsey, Tchou, Block, and Beard did not impose any work restrictions. The VE considered Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a route salesman to be semi-skilled work. Plaintiff’s borderline intelligence did not interfere with his ability to perform previous jobs. Thus, under Daniels, Plaintiff’s proof of performing in the borderline range of intellectual functioning does not rise to the level of a serious mental impairment. Thus, the ALJ could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff could perform some sedentary work.