Opinion ID: 2789345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority to Issue the Vacate Order

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court had no authority to order him to vacate his apartment. Judge Saddler specifically addressed that issue when denying his Rule 59 (e) motion, first noting that the Intrafamily Offenses Act explicitly authorized the stay-away provision of the protection order. See D.C. 5 Code § 16-1005 (c)(2) (2012 Repl.). She then recognized that it would be difficult to enforce the stay-away order because there was only one staircase in the apartment building, and appellee had to come within a few feet of appellant‟s apartment when going to and from her apartment. The stay-away provision would therefore be frustrated unless appellant vacated his apartment, and Judge Saddler concluded that ordering him to do so was a valid exercise of authority under the catch-all provision of the statute, D.C. Code § 16-1005 (c)(11). That provision provides, without elaboration, that a court may “[d]irect[] the respondent to perform or refrain from other actions as may be appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter . . . .” D.C. Code § 16-1005 (c)(11) (2012 Repl.). We have long recognized that the Intrafamily Offenses Act “is a remedial statute and as such should be liberally construed for the benefit of the class it is intended to protect.” Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C. 1993). Because a protection order “was designed to protect victims of family abuse from acts and threats of violence,” the act “gives the court „a wider range of dispositional powers than criminal courts in order to effect rehabilitation rather than retribution.‟” Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929 (D.C. 1991) (quoting 6 United States v. Harrison, 149 U.S. App. D.C. 123, 124, 461 F.2d 1209, 1210 (1972)). The catch-all and stay-away provisions of the current statute are nearly identical to their counterparts in the original act passed in 1970. Compare District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91358, § 131 (a), 84 Stat. 473, 547 (1970), with D.C. Code § 16-1005 (c)(2), (11) (2012 Repl.). At that time, the statute did not explicitly mention ordering a respondent to vacate a dwelling. In 1980, however, Judge Schwelb, then a judge of the Superior Court, opined that “[a]n order excluding [a] husband from the [marital] home would be well within the Court‟s discretion” under the stay-away provision. LaPrade v. LaPrade, 108 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 1773, 1779 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1980) (citing former D.C. Code § 16-1005 (c)(3) (1973)). He also noted that two other judges who handled the same case had come to the same conclusion. Id. Thus, at least some trial judges interpreted the original statute broadly enough to include the authority to issue orders to vacate. Notwithstanding the LaPrade decision, many critics asserted that the courts were interpreting their statutory power so narrowly that they were not issuing effective protection orders. D.C. Council, Report on Bill 4-195 at 10 (May 12, 7 1982). In response to that concern, the Council of the District of Columbia, in 1982, added six provisions to the portion of the act describing remedial measures. Id. at 6-7. One of those provisions was D.C. Code § 16-1005 (c)(4), which provides that a CPO may “[d]irect[] the respondent to refrain from entering, or to vacate, the dwelling unit of the petitioner” if the petitioner has one of four enumerated property interests in the unit. D.C. Code § 16-1005 (c)(4) (2012 Repl.). The committee report on the 1982 bill acknowledged repeated criticism “that the current interpretation of D.C. Code, sec. 16-1005 by the local courts has been extremely narrow . . . .” Id. at 10. It explained that the six remedial provisions added to the statute were “designed to meet the stated need in the public record for the court to be guided more specifically as to what remedies can be afforded to the public,” id., implying that those remedies were already authorized by the original statute. On the other hand, the report said that § 16-1005 (c)(4) was one of “six new statutory remedies” being “created for issuance as the court deems just and appropriate,” id., implying that they were new remedies. As a result, the legislative history of the 1982 amendments sends mixed signals about their purpose and effect. But nothing in the legislative history or the 8 amending language clearly states that the newly added subsection (c)(4) is the only source of the court‟s authority to order a CPO respondent to vacate his residence. This court has previously and consistently recognized that “the plain intent of the legislature [in amending the Intrafamily Offenses Act] was an expansive reading of the Act, which we think must be accorded to the catchall provision as well.” Powell v. Powell, 547 A.2d 973, 974 (D.C. 1988). Moreover, the committee report described the catch-all provision as “a very broad one,” and the provision itself remained unchanged. Report on Bill 4-195 at 10 n.. We conclude that the Council intended § 16-1005 (c)(4) to focus on the frequently occurring circumstances where the petitioner and respondent were living together. In this paradigmatic situation, the court often would have to decide whether the petitioner or the respondent should be required to leave the common dwelling. By regulating this situation so closely, however, the Council did not intend subsection (c)(4) to become the exclusive source of the court‟s authority to order a respondent to vacate a dwelling. Instead, situations that § 1005 (c)(4) did not specifically address—namely those where an order to vacate might be appropriate but the petitioner and respondent did not live together—remained within the purview of the stay-away and catch-all provisions of the statute. 9 The statute is no longer confined to intrafamily violence, but currently permits “any person who alleges . . . that he or she is the victim of interpersonal, intimate partner, or intrafamily violence, stalking, sexual assault, or sexual abuse” to request a protection order. D.C. Code § 16-1001 (12) (2012 Repl.). It thus reaches persons like Ms. Ramirez who have never lived with their assailant. Emphasizing that the Council has not expanded § 16-1005 (c)(4) when enlarging the class of petitioners covered by the statute, appellant argues that the remedy of ordering the respondent to vacate his residence is simply not available in these circumstances. It certainly is true that an order to vacate will most often be necessary when the petitioner and the respondent have been living together. However, when broadening the reach of the Intrafamily Offenses Act, the Council gave no indication that it intended to withhold any appropriate remedy from new classes of petitioners. Instead, it clearly intended that those changes would make the protections of the act available to more people. See, e.g., D.C. Council, Report on Bill 17-55 at 2 (Nov. 25, 2008) (amendment was designed to give petitioners relief even if they were not in an intrafamily relationship with the respondent). 10 Our task surely would be simpler if the legislature had specifically addressed situations like the one presented in this case. But it is understandable that the Council did not do so. It probably would have been futile to try to address in detail every situation that might come before the court, and the Council prudently left the catch-all provision intact to cover circumstances outside the normal pattern. Such provisions cover matters not specifically addressed by the legislature, see Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U.S. 848, 860 (2009), and “act as a safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief caused by violations that [the statute] does not elsewhere adequately remedy.” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996). In Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78 (D.C. 2005), this court recognized the broad authority conferred by the statute. In that case, the petitioner and respondent were a married couple who owned two neighboring houses. 886 A.2d at 79. The trial court ordered the husband to stay away from the home the two shared, but refused to order him to stay away from the neighboring house. Id. at 83-84. This court concluded that requiring the husband “to vacate the marital home, but allowing him to live right next door, seems inadequate to accomplish the broad remedial purpose of the Intrafamily Offenses Act, that is, to protect victims of . . . abuse from both acts and threats of violence.” Id. at 86. 11 Remanding the case so the trial court could re-evaluate the situation, we recognized that the statute “clearly envisions allowing safety concerns to trump property rights.” Id. at 86-87. We did not definitively interpret the statute, but we clearly implied that the statute was broad enough to allow a trial court to order a respondent to leave a dwelling that he did not share with the petitioner. Robinson may not control our decision, but it helpfully informs it. Given the history and broad remedial purpose of the Intrafamily Offenses Act, we hold that D.C. Code § 16-1005 (c)(11) authorizes a trial court to order a respondent to vacate his or her dwelling if that is necessary to effectuate a stayaway order. While we again emphasize that “ordering a person to vacate his or her home or denying the use of owned property is a serious step, not to be lightly undertaken,” Robinson, 886 A.2d at 86, it can be a necessary measure to ensure the effectiveness of a stay-away order issued under § 16-1005 (c)(2).