Opinion ID: 1134497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The majority's strong reliance on United States v. Herrera and State v. Carter is misplaced. Neither is in point.

Text: The majority relies strongly on certain language in United States v. Herrera, 584 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir.1978) and State v. Carter, 89 Wn.2d 236, 570 P.2d 1218 (1977). Without question material quoted from each case contains interesting language appearing to support the majority position. Neither case is in point, however. Insofar as the instant case is concerned, Herrera is dependent for its validity upon two New York opinions: People v. Capparelli, 29 App. Div.2d 1000, 289 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1968) decided by the Supreme Court Appellate Division Third Department and People v. Costello, 90 Misc.2d 431, 395 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1977) heard by the Supreme Court ( i.e., Superior Court of New York County). Both New York cases resolved the void for vagueness issue against the defendants. However, the point overlooked by the majority is that in each case the statute was found to pass the vagueness test because of judicial definitions or clarifications found in older cases decided considerably prior to the crimes being considered by those courts. In both cases it was clear the statute had been the subject of prior judicial definition which had become engrafted thereon as a part of the legislated act. Consequently, lack of prior notice because of subsequent judicial definition (an issue here) was not before either court. In this regard both cases fall within the exception discussed in footnote 5 above. Herrera itself, citing the two New York cases for a definition of the questioned statute, falls in the same category. Herrera involved the continuing crime of harboring illegal aliens who were thereafter employed as prostitutes. Both New York cases had been decided before completion of the crime charged in Herrera. Thus, the Herrera court was provided with a definition of the crime before the defendants therein had completed the acts for which they were charged. In each case there was prior notice of the standard in question. Such is not true of the instant case. Carter also has language, which in the abstract, appears to lend support to the majority. However, Carter was decided prior to the 1975 legislative enactment which gives rise to the current question. A portion of the case quoted by the majority provides its own differentiation between Carter and the instant case: The words `in any house of prostitution,' plus the chapter and section headings ... certainly provide a person of reasonable intelligence and understanding with notice immoral purposes meant sexually immoral purpose involving acts of prostitution. As pointed out above, not only does Carter deal with a repealed statute no longer applicable but RCW 9A.04.010(5) now specifically forbids the Carter method of statutory construction, i.e., the use of chapter and section headings for the purpose of statutory construction. Consequently, neither the statute nor the means of construction alluded to in Carter is applicable to this case. For the numerous reasons set forth above, any one of which is sufficient to reach a different result than the majority, I am compelled to dissent. HICKS, J., and RYAN, J. Pro Tem., concur with STAFFORD, J. Reconsideration denied June 18, 1979.