Opinion ID: 4116908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Public Rights to Willow Street

Text: [¶26] Because the lower court erred in its application of subsection 3031(1) to pre-1987 subdivision plans, its conclusion that the incipient public rights to Willow Street expired by 1940 was error. Willow Street was recorded prior to September 29, 1987, and therefore the public rights to the way were subject to section 3032. It is undisputed that Willow Street has never been accepted as a way by the town of Rumford. Pursuant to section 3032 it is therefore considered vacated as of September 29, 1997, if it was not “constructed or used as a way.” 23 M.R.S. § 3032(1-A)(A). The issue therefore becomes a factual one that hinges on whether Willow Street was “constructed or used as a way” so as to prevent its automatic vacation and therefore termination of the public’s rights to it pursuant to section 3032. 17 [¶27] Willow Street was depicted on the Ninth Addition Plan, which was recorded on August 4, 1920. Dumas alleges that by the 1970s there existed a gravel road over Willow Street which was used for foot and vehicle traffic to access the Dumas Parcel for logging purposes. Specifically, Dumas submitted two affidavits with his statement of material facts alleging use of Willow Street during the 1970s and 1980s. The first, an affidavit sworn by Rachel Meisner, alleges that during the 1970s and 1980s, Meisner visited her husband while he worked for Boise Cascade in an area to the south of the Dumas Parcel. According to Meisner, Willow Street was passable by car and on foot, and was “already a constructed way” prior to her husband’s work there. A second affidavit, sworn by Brian Milligan, a former forester for Boise Cascade who supervised wood harvesting at the site, states that Willow Street was an existing gravel road at the time he harvested there in the 1970s and 1980s, and that some work was done to repair the gravel and add a culvert in the 1970s. Neither affidavit specifies the years of use, nor alleges any use after the 1980s. [¶28] Rather than disputing Dumas’s allegations of the use of Willow Street in the 1970s and 1980s, Carignan objects only to the admissibility of affidavits alleging its use in the 1970s and 1980s. The trial court noted, and we 18 agree, that the affidavits upon which Dumas relies are admissible. See supra, n.1. [¶29] By contrast, Carignan asserts in her statement of material facts that Willow Street was never developed or improved, which Dumas admits to the extent that Willow Street was not developed or improved by the Town prior to 1940. As we previously noted, Dumas also admitted to Carignan’s asserted fact that “[a]t no time was there use or construction of the easterly side of Willow Street at any time meaningful to this cause of action.” According to the Ninth Addition Plan, Carignan’s parcel abuts the easterly side of Willow Street. While it seems implausible that only one half of Willow Street was ever “constructed or used as a way,” because a fact-finder would need to decide between these competing versions of the truth—whether, at what times, and to what extent Willow Street has been used or constructed within the meaning of section 3032—and accepting either Carignan’s or Dumas’s version of events would yield different results pursuant to the relevant law, there is a genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment as to the deemed vacation of public rights in Willow Street was improper. See Angell v. Hallee, 2014 ME 72, ¶ 17, 92 A.3d 1154. 19