Opinion ID: 2508322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense special instructions

Text: At the time of trial, Bruce Davis, a prosecution witness and the brother of Olin Davis, was in jail facing six counts of robbery. Robert Williams, another prosecution witness, testified at trial that he had been originally charged with four felony counts stemming from his May 4, 1987, altercation with Olin Davis, but the day after he testified at defendant's preliminary hearing three of these counts were dismissed. Williams pleaded guilty to one count of assault with a deadly weapon and, in 1989, was sentenced to 18 years in state prison. He was serving his sentence at the time of trial. Defendant requested, but the trial court refused, this special instruction (special instruction C): The testimony of a witness who provides evidence against a defendant in the hope or expectation of leniency in his punishment must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care than would be applied to the testimony of an ordinary witness. [¶] The jury should examine such testimony to determine whether it is colored in such a way as to place guilt on the defendant in order to further the witness' own interest, for such a witness, confronted with the realization that he can secure leniency or freedom by incriminating another has a motive to falsify. In requesting this special instruction, defense counsel explained it focused on the expectation of leniency by Bruce Davis and Robert Williams and the effect of such expectation on their testimony. In refusing the instruction, the court noted that the requested instruction was overspecialized, and that CALJIC No. 2.20 adequately focused the jury's attention on the existence or nonexistence of bias, interest, or other motive of a witness. Defendant contends the court erred in so ruling, and thereby violated his right to a fair trial. We have suggested that `in appropriate circumstances' a trial court may be required to give a requested jury instruction that pinpoints a defense theory of the case.... ( People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 558, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) But a court need not give a pinpoint instruction if it merely duplicates other instructions. ( Ibid.; see also, e.g., People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 191, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664 [no error in refusing to give a special instruction that would have cautioned the jury to examine with greater care the testimony of an informer, for the jury received adequate standard instructions on the credibility of witnesses].) Here, the jury received instructions on the credibility of witnesses in general (CALJIC No. 2.20) and on the credibility of a witness who has been convicted of a felony (CALJIC No. 2.23). Together, these instructions adequately informed the jury that the existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive and a witness's prior conviction of a felony were factors it could consider in determining the believability of a witness. Defendant cites no authority to support his argument that these instructions were inadequate, and we find none. Accordingly, the court did not err in refusing to give defendant's special instruction C. Thus, defendant's right to a fair trial was not violated.
Defendant also requested, but the trial court refused, this special instruction (special instruction D): If a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce a witness whose testimony would be material on any matter in issue, the fact that he does not creates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable to that party. In requesting this instruction, defense counsel noted that the prosecution had the power to produce Richard Johnson and Olin Davis's roommate Moe but did not do so, and claimed that their testimony would have been material to the murders themselves and to defendant's admission to the murders. In refusing the instruction, the trial court noted it was not satisfied that the requested instruction correctly stated the law. Defendant contends the court's refusal to give this instruction violated his right to a fair trial. Defendant argues that special instruction D reflects the provisions of Evidence Code section 412. That section provides: If weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within the power of the party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust. We need not decide whether special instruction D is consistent with Evidence Code section 412, for instruction on this issue was inapplicable in any event. It was undisputed at trial that the prosecution tried to locate Johnson for trial but could not do so. As for the purported application of the requested instruction to Moe, from the record it appears that no one had any information about him beyond his first name. Thus, the prosecution did not have enough information about Moe to produce him as a witness. Further, there was no evidence that Moe was present at the scene of the murders or when defendant made his admission to Davis. Davis testified that Moe was in the room when defendant came to his house a day or two after the murders, but that Davis and defendant walked out to the porch before defendant admitted to Davis that he killed Thompson and Robinson. Davis also testified that Moe was present when defendant returned to the house the next day with the newspaper clipping of the double murders, but that he was not present when defendant and Davis further discussed the murders. Therefore, even if the prosecution could have found Moe, his testimony would not have been material. Accordingly, the court did not err, under state or federal law, in refusing to give special instruction D.