Opinion ID: 167809
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: G ood Faith

Text: Third, M s. Saurini challenges the district court’s Instruction No. 15. The instruction stated: In this case, Plaintiff contends her contract was not renewed because of child abuse reports she made that were protected by the First Amendment. The child abuse reports made by M s. Saurini do constitute statements protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution if they were made in good faith and were based on reasonable suspicion. Aplt. App. at 2579. M s. Saurini argues that abuse reporting is, “as a matter of law, speech protected by the First Amendment” and that the jury could have “erroneously determined that the speech w as not protected by the First -10- Amendment.” Aplt. Br. at 41. As we understand her briefs, she is not challenging the relevance of good faith and reasonable suspicion to the First Amendment inquiry, but only that those issues are for the judge to decide. W e recognize that M s. Saurini objected on the record to this instruction. But we still must apply plain-error review because she did not clearly raise on the record below the issue she now raises on appeal. Her only objection on the record to this instruction, which had been tendered by the defendants as No. 33.DM , was as follow s: [M S. SAURINI’S COUNSEL]: W e would like to object to 33.DM and specifically the last sentence to that and also to 3.D for the record. THE COURT: Can I just inquire, I don’t have it in front of me. W as 33.D what the refused— did you give me a refused on that or is that just an objection? [M S. SA URINI’S COUNSEL]: W e are objecting to that [instruction] in the sense that it’s in good faith and based on reasonable suspicion part of that. THE COURT: Okay. [M S. SA URINI'S COUNSEL]: In the sense that it involves the Pickering balancing test. THE COURT: Anything else? [M S. SAURINI'S COUNSEL]: That’s it. -11- Aplt. App. at 2259. This objection is incoherent and hence inadequate. Perhaps after being present at the instruction conference the district court and both parties understood precisely what M s. Saurini was objecting to, but we must decide this case on the record, and we cannot conclude that this obscure objection would alert anyone to the alleged problem in the instruction to be given. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1) requires an objecting party to “stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection”; the objection failed this standard. W e will assume that M s. Saurini is correct that the issues of good faith and reasonable suspicion should have been decided by the judge, although the defendants make an interesting argument that these are “subsidiary fact issues” that should be decided by a jury. Aplee. Br. at 33. But under plain-error review she must also establish that the error w as “prejudicial” and that reversal is required to avoid a “fundamental injustice.” Abuan, 353 F.3d at 1173. Thus, M s. Saurini must show that the district court would likely have resolved the issues of good faith and reasonable suspicion differently than the jury. Nothing in the record suggests that would have happened. Because the claim of prejudice is speculative, we reject it.