Opinion ID: 874085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inapplicability of Merger

Text: In its initial decision, the district court determined that the Easement Agreement was a collateral stipulation to the Sale Agreement and, therefore did not merge with the Sanders-Henry Deed. On reconsideration, the district court ruled that the Sanders-Henry Easement Agreement was not a collateral stipulation and, therefore, the Easement Agreement did merge with the Sanders-Henry Deed. In both its initial decision and on reconsideration, the district court relied on the merger doctrine as set forth in Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 414 P.2d 879 (1966). The relevant considerations of the merger doctrine as it applies to a real estate purchase agreement and deed have recently been explained in Fuller v. Callister: [T]he acceptance of a deed to premises generally is considered as a merger of the agreements of an antecedent contract into the terms of the deed, and any claim for relief must be based on the covenants or agreements contained in the deed, not the covenants or agreements as contained in the prior agreement. [ Jolley, 90 Idaho at 382, 414 P.2d at 884.] However, [t]here is a generally recognized exception to the foregoing rule which exception relates to collateral stipulations of the contract, which are not incorporated in the deed. Id. If a stipulation makes reference to title, possession, quantity or emblements of land it will generally be considered to inhere to the subject matter of a warranty deed, and shall be considered merged and, thus, not a collateral stipulation. Id. at 383, 414 P.2d at 885. 150 Idaho 848, 853, 252 P.3d 1266, 1271 (2011). Both district court level decisions considered whether the Easement Agreement was a collateral stipulation to the Sale Agreement between the Sanders and Henry. The Easement Agreement, dated June 6, 1988, purports to grant certain easements on the Belstler Property from the predecessor in title, Kenneth L. Henry, to the Conines' predecessor Linda Merwin. The Easement Agreement was recorded on June 8, 1988, subsequently numbered one instrument number after the Sale Agreement between Sanders and Henry. The Easement Agreement contains no language mentioning the Sale Agreement. The Sanders-Henry Deed was recorded on June 9, 1989, after the remaining balance of the purchase price was paid. The Sanders-Henry Deed did not make reference to the Easement Agreement or the easements therein, but did include language that it was subject to all easements of record and easements of ingress and egress. Both judges' interpretation of the Easement Agreement as a collateral stipulation to a real estate purchase agreement was unnecessary. This Easement Agreement was for the benefit of a third party stranger to the sales contract (Merwin) and this is collateral to the Sale Agreement. No argument was offered to show how the doctrine of merger would even apply to an easement between Henry and Merwin. Additionally, at oral argument, counsel could not come up with a single instance of where an agreement between a non-party and a vendee of a sales contract would merge with a deed. Merwin was not a party to the Sale Agreement between the Sanders and Henry, and the Easement Agreement does not state it was in consideration of, or was a stipulation of, or incorporated into, the Sale Agreement. In the case at bar, no presumption arises that the acceptance of the deed was an execution of the Sale Agreement AND the Easement Agreement. In fact, as shown by the record, the Easement Agreement was between the Sanders, Henry, and Merwin, whereas the Sanders-Henry Deed was only between the Sanders and Henry. It hardly will be contended that the acceptance of the deed by Henry superseded his grant of the easements to Merwin; there was no merger that could operate to undo the easements.