Opinion ID: 460947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: suppressed conversation

Text: 16 Several arguments of the defendants focus on a fifty second to three minute portion of a tape recording. During the July 9, 1979 meeting, Hauser left his brief case that was fitted with a recorder in Grubbs office while he went to the men's room. While he was gone, Grubbs and Fricks entered the office and engaged in a conversation with incriminating overtones that the hidden device recorded. The conversation included reference to $50,000 which they would receive if the deal went through. The trial court found the recorded conversation was non-consensual and suppressed it. 17 Grubbs argues the non-consensual recording which the court had earlier ordered suppressed should not have been used to impeach him. The suppressed portion of the tape was admitted into evidence for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of Grubbs. Grubbs does not dispute that unlawfully intercepted conversations may be used for impeachment purposes. United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir.1973). Instead, Grubbs makes two distinct arguments. First, Grubbs asserts that he did not open the door during direct examination to questions on cross-examination regarding the suppressed conversation. Second, Grubbs claims his own testimony was not false and thus could not properly be subjected to impeachment. 18 As to the first argument, Grubbs argues that the trial court erred in its application of United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980). In Havens, the Supreme Court rejected a rule that illegally seized evidence may be used to impeach only defendant's direct testimony. The Court opted for a broader rule and held that a defendant's statements made in response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination are subject to otherwise proper impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is inadmissible on the government's direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt. 446 U.S. at 627, 100 S.Ct. at 1917, 64 L.Ed.2d at 566 (emphasis added). As this Court stated in United States v. Hernandez, 646 F.2d 970, 977 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082, 102 S.Ct. 638, 70 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981), the proper inquiry is whether the cross-examination which elicits the statements to be impeached by the illegally seized evidence is 'proper,' i.e., whether it is within the scope of direct evidence. 19 Grubbs testified on direct that he was a licensed insurance agent, and the services he performed for Hauser were in this legitimate capacity. He insisted he was legally entitled to the money received from Hauser. On cross-examination, Grubbs testified as follows: 20 Q. When Mr. Fricks arrived at your office on July 9, 1979, and Mr. Hauser was out of the room, did you have a conversation with Mr. Fricks? 21
22 Q. The very first one. 23 A. I don't recall. 24 Q. Did you tell him that there was $50,000 it in for us if we give this guy the bid package? 25 A. I testified before the Grand Jury I don't recall that. 26 Q. You testified before the Grand Jury that never happened, not that you didn't recall it; didn't you? 27 A. I testified before the Grand Jury that I didn't--that it never happened. But I don't recall it ever happening. 28 Grubbs contends that his statements did not warrant the questioning on cross-examination. We find this contention fails. Grubbs emphasized the legality of his business dealings with Hauser on direct. The government could properly question him about the conversation covered by the recording which indicated Grubbs knew the deal was not legitimate. This line of questioning was reasonably suggested by Grubbs's direct examination. 29 In his second argument, Grubbs claims that he did not deny the existence of the conversation, only that he could not remember it. 3 In other words, a denial of recollection cannot be regarded as inconsistent. The federal courts are not in agreement as to whether lack of memory can be impeached. The Second and Eighth Circuits have held that the trial judge, in his discretion, determines whether a claim of faulty memory is inconsistent with statements previously given. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 2182, 53 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1170 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841, 91 S.Ct. 83, 27 L.Ed.2d 76 (1970). These courts rely upon the reasoning of Dean Wigmore: [an] unwilling witness often takes refuge in a failure to remember, and the astute lier is sometimes impregnable unless his flank can be exposed to an attack of this sort. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 1043, 1061 (Chadbourn Rev.1970). 30 We have held, however, that a claim of faulty memory does not constitute an inconsistent statement. United States v. Balliviero, 708 F.2d 934, 940 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939, 104 S.Ct. 351, 78 L.Ed.2d 316 (1983). In Balliviero, the defense counsel asked the witness if he recalled making a certain statement. The witness said he did not. The defense counsel then asked the witness if he denied making the statement. The witness replied: I don't deny it, but I don't remember making it. We stated: Since there is no denial that the statement was made, there is clearly no rationale for the introduction of a prior 'inconsistent' statement about the incident. Id. 31 The instant case is distinguishable from Balliviero. Grubbs did more than say he did not remember the conversation. He admitted he had denied the existence of the conversation to the grand jury. This situation more closely resembles a flat denial than a claim of faulty memory, and we treat it as such. Thus, the trial court did not err in allowing Grubbs to be impeached by the suppressed conversation. 32 Even if it was error to impeach Grubbs with the suppressed conversation, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It is inappropriate to reverse a lower court conviction on account of errors which do not affect the substantial rights of the part[y] asserting that error. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2111; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). To determine whether an error in a criminal case is harmless, we must examine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] might have contributed to the conviction. United States v. Lay, 644 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 869, 102 S.Ct. 336, 70 L.Ed.2d 172 (1981). The tape was admitted only for impeachment purposes and the court carefully instructed the jury on this point. In addition to this portion of the tape, there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of Grubbs's guilt. 33 Next, Grubbs claims that all evidence obtained after the July 9th non-consensual recording was fruit of the non-consensual recording and should have been suppressed at trial. Grubbs's argument is without merit. The bulk of the evidence introduced against the defendants consisted of taped conversations between the defendants and government agents. None of the conversations between the defendants and government agents that occurred after the July 9th non-consensual recording were derived from the suppressed conversation. We agree with the district court's finding that no evidence was seized, either directly or indirectly, as a result of the illegal seizure of the non-consensual recording. 34 Grubbs's contention that the case should be dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct in obtaining evidence is also without merit. Grubbs claims the government's obtaining and using the non-consensual recording constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. This contention has no independent stature beyond the obtaining and use of the recording dealt with above, and we reject it. 35 Finally, Grubbs and Fricks contend that the prosecutor made certain remarks about the suppressed tape during his closing argument that constitute fundamental error. The prosecutor told the jury that the July 9th conversation between Grubbs and Fricks regarding $50,000 would not be included in the transcripts that would accompany them to the jury room because the conversation was non-consensual and thus had been suppressed. The prosecutor added it was able to introduce this conversation into evidence only because Grubbs and Fricks had lied on the stand. 4 The prosecutor referred to this suppressed conversation again in rebuttal during closing argument, but this time emphasized to the jury that the conversations could not be considered as substantive evidence. 5 Neither defendant made a timely objection to the government's closing argument. The next day the defendants moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion. 36 In the absence of a timely objection at trial, this Court must determine if the error rises to the level of plain or fundamental error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 217 (5th Cir.1972). We must evaluate the claim of plain error in the context of the entire record. United States v. Young, --- U.S. ---, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1047, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). If we find the prosecutor's comments undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice, those comments constitute plain error. Id. 105 S.Ct. at 1047. 37 The prosecutor's remarks were improper. The prosecutor may only base his argument on the evidence. United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.1978). The fact that the conversation was suppressed was not evidence, and he should not have mentioned it in his closing argument. His argument also exceeded the proper bounds by giving the jury the impression the tape was substantive evidence, not strictly limited to impeachment purposes. It was unlikely, however, that the jury was lead astray. Young, 105 S.Ct. at 1045. The prosecutor later admonished the jury to not consider the conversation to determine guilt. It was sufficiently clear to the jury that this evidence was to be used only for impeachment. The prosecutor's comments did not have the requisite detrimental effect on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly. Young, 105 S.Ct. at 1045. We hold that the prosecutor's argument did not rise to the level of plain error.