Opinion ID: 6930059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Knipe v. United States

Text: The complaint filed in Knipe v. United States, which was based on the same facts as Knipe v. Skinner, alleged “negligent supervision and training by [FAA officials] of those DOT, FAA and NTSB employees engaged in rulemaking and regulatory enforcement activities.” As in Knipe v. Skinner, the complaint relied in large part upon previously rejected legal theories challenging the validity of the FAA enforcement procedures. Dismissing the complaint on grounds of res judicata, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and immunity of the United States under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, the district court stated, “it’s clear ... that what you [Smith] are doing is simply attempting another creative avenue to beat a dead horse.... Attempting to disguise the [same] arguments as an action sounding in tort does not cloak them with validity.” In Knipe v. United States, 151 F.R.D. 24 (N.D.N.Y.1993), the district court imposed sanctions against Smith, concluding that in filing the complaint four days after dismissal of Knipe v. Skinner, Smith had “violated Rule 11 by interposing a pleading which has no good faith basis in the law for an improper purpose.” Id. at 26. We hold that the district court’s ruling that Smith violated Rule 11 was not an abuse of discretion. In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir.1986), the Ninth Circuit held that, “[w]ithout question, successive complaints based upon propositions of law previously rejected may constitute harassment under Rule 11.” It also held, however, that if a complaint is well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law, it cannot be considered harassing under Rule 11. Id.; accord National Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. National Fed’n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir.1988). In this case, we need not reach the issue of whether a complaint that is warranted by existing law may be sanctionable if filed for the improper purpose of harassment, because we agree with the district court that plaintiffs’ complaint was both lacking a good faith basis in law and intended to harass the FAA. Knipe v. United States recasts many of Knipe v. Skinnefs claims as tort claims, in large part relying upon the same arguments respecting FAA enforcement procedures rejected in Rochna, Tearney, Komjathy, and Go Leasing. Although an attorney should not be deterred by Rule 11 from seeking to raise in one circuit an argument rejected in another, reasserting those arguments in a new complaint in a district court four days after that court has rejected those arguments in the context of the same factual circumstances affords grounds for finding that the new pleading was interposed for an improper purpose. Smith’s failure to distinguish the underlying legal theories rejected in Knipe v. Skinner from the theories advanced in Knipe v. United States evidences a lack of a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. We also agree with the district court that the filing of the second complaint on the heels of the dismissal of Knipe v. Skinner reveals an improper purpose. Smith offered no reason why his theory of liability under the FTCA could not have been included in his first complaint, nor has he offered any reason why his arguments respecting the validity of FAA enforcement procedures would receive more favorable treatment the second time around. Thus, the district court’s conclusion that Smith appears to be “pursuing a personal agenda against the FAA” is supported by the record. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the Knipe v. United States complaint lacked a good faith basis in law and was filed for an improper purpose. The district court therefore properly imposed sanctions under the Rule 11 in effect at the time of its decision.