Opinion ID: 2234450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Andrew N.B.

Text: On April 20, 2001, the City of Urbana filed a complaint in the Champaign County circuit court against 12-year-old Andrew N.B., alleging that he had committed theft in violation of the municipal code. See City of Urbana Code of Ordinances § 15-32(a)(1) (1980). Specifically, Andrew stole a hundred dollar bill from his grandmother. A violation of this ordinance is punishable by a fine not exceeding $500, by restitution, or by court supervision as defined in the Unified Code of Corrections. See City of Urbana Code of Ordinances §§ 1-10(b), (f), (g) (1980). Andrew, accompanied by his father, appeared with an unspecified number of others, both minors and adults, charged with ordinance violations at a Champaign County circuit court call referred to as city court. The trial court told the assembled defendants, I'm going to advise you as to what the charges are, what the possible penalties are, and then I'm going to need to know what you wish to doplead guilty or not guilty. The court directed those who wanted to plead guilty to read a document detailing their rights. When the court called Andrew's case, it described the charge against him and the range of punishments: a fine of up to $500, community service, and other conditions, such as attending school, as ordered by the court. Andrew pleaded guilty. After admonishing him about the consequences of his plea, the trial court accepted it. The City recommended a sentence of one year of court supervision under standard conditions of minding the household rules, attending school without unexcused absences and without any disciplinary problems. The City acknowledged that Andrew had returned $90 to his grandmother, but asked for restitution of the remaining $10, as well as an apology letter. The court followed the City's recommendation and added: What you need to understand is that if you don't do these things and come back here, the City can ask that you be held in contempt. And that's different than what you're here for. You can't be locked up right now. But if you're found to be in contempt of court, I can put you in the Detention Center for six months.    And you have to go to school there, and you won't be late to school there. So you have a choice to make. You're either going to do it the way you should do it or you're going to do it anyway except you're going to be locked up. Andrew chose the latter option within a week. He skipped school on May 4, 7, and 8 and visited Springfield on May 8 without his mother's permission. The City filed an indirect criminal contempt petition and waived any detention greater than six months or any fine greater than $500, and the trial court appointed counsel for Andrew. Andrew filed a motion to dismiss the City's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Andrew asserted that the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 is implicated once a minor faces incarceration. Under the Act, the court must conduct an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the minor should be made a ward of the court before sentencing the minor to detention. Here, according to Andrew, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it lacked the power to determine whether the minor should be adjudged a ward of the court.    The contempt power may not be used to enforce supervisory orders on a minor until the minor has been adjudicated a ward of the court. The trial court denied Andrew's motion, stating, We are not proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act. We are proceeding in a violation of an appropriate order which the court can enforce. That is the contempt power. It is the inherent power of the court. It is not a criminal law violation. It is not categorized as a felony or misdemeanor or anything else.    Because the defendant violates an otherwise valid court order, does that now meanI think what the defendant is arguing is you have to drop back and file a juvenile petition in this matter for contempt and I don't believe that that's what the Juvenile Court Act says to be able to have somebody incarcerated. And I think the court inherently can enforce its orders without having a juvenile petition filed. The court then found Andrew in contempt for violating the terms of his court supervision and sentenced him to 12 months' probation and 180 days' detentioneight days to be served immediately, and the remainder subject to remission. For subsequent violations of the court's order, Andrew served an additional 47 of the 180 days. Andrew appealed, arguing, inter alia, that section 5-125 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-125 (West 2002)), which allowed the City to file its own ordinance violation complaint rather than ask the State to file a delinquency petition, violates equal protection and due process. The appellate court affirmed. 335 Ill.App.3d 180, 269 Ill.Dec. 293, 780 N.E.2d 765. The court held that section 5-125 does not violate equal protection. 335 Ill.App.3d at 187, 269 Ill.Dec. 293, 780 N.E.2d 765. The court posited two minorsone subject to a delinquency petition and one subject to a municipal ordinance violation complaintand stated: The two minors are [not] in the same situation. Unlike the minor in the city's case, the minor in the juvenile case faces a possibility of detention for up to 30 days [citation], removal from the custody of his or her parents or guardians [citation], and placement into the custody of some other person or agency [citation].    The legislature could have reasonably concluded that the minor in juvenile court should have the right to appointed counsel and the other minor should not, because the minor in juvenile court faces weightier potential consequences. 335 Ill.App.3d at 186-87, 269 Ill.Dec. 293, 780 N.E.2d 765. The appellate court further held that section 5-125 does not violate due process. 335 Ill.App.3d at 188, 269 Ill.Dec. 293, 780 N.E.2d 765. The court noted that, although the City prosecuted Andrew for theft, the trial court did not sentence him to incarceration for that offense, and incarceration was not even a possibility under the ordinance. 335 Ill.App.3d at 188, 269 Ill.Dec. 293, 780 N.E.2d 765. Supervision was not imprisonment, and because the sixth amendment bestows a right to counsel only when the defendant receives a sentence of actual imprisonment, due process did not require appointed counsel when Andrew entered his guilty plea. 335 Ill.App.3d at 188, 269 Ill.Dec. 293, 780 N.E.2d 765. We granted Andrew's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315.