Opinion ID: 2320317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Erred By Finding Word Displayed What Appeared To Be A Deadly Weapon

Text: Word's one claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by finding that he displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon during the robbery of the Sovereign Bank. Word asserts that his actions constituted only second degree robbery and that this Court should reverse and remand for resentencing for second degree robbery. The sole issue in this case requires us to review the trial court's factual findings and its legal application of those facts to the statutory definition of first degree robbery. This Court reviews the trial court's legal determinations for errors in formulating or applying legal precepts, and reviews the trial court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by sufficient evidence and are the result of a logical and orderly deductive process. [6] This Court will sustain Word's conviction for first degree robbery if after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [7] A person is guilty of robbery second degree when, in the course of committing theft, he threatens the immediate use of force against another to compel that person to surrender or deliver up the property. [8] To elevate that offense to robbery first degree, the State must prove the elements of second degree robbery plus one additional statutory element. [9] For example, a defendant may be convicted of first degree robbery if, in the course of committing the robbery, the defendant displays what appears to be a deadly weapon. [10] Accordingly, in seeking a conviction for first degree robbery, the State had to prove that Word displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon during the robbery of the Sovereign Bank. After viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Word passed the bank teller a note stating I am armed, and (2) Word's hand was hidden in the bag that he placed on the teller's counter. [11] But, the element that Word displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon is not supported by this record. The bank teller never testified that she believed Word had a weapon in the bag or that she perceived an objective manifestation of a weapon by Word. Rather, the bank teller merely testified that she thought Word had a weapon only because Word's note stated, I am armed. In 1998 in Deshields v. State, [12] this Court issued its most recent opinion analyzing the displays what appears to be a deadly weapon element of first degree robbery. [13] In the process of robbing a convenience store, DeShields asked for the money in the cash register, reached underneath his tee-shirt and belt with his right hand and then pointed something heavy and bulky at [the store clerk] from under his shirt. [14] As a result of DeShields' actions, the store clerk testified that she thought he had a gun. [15] In finding that DeShields displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon, this Court reaffirmed that the terms `displays' and `appears' must be construed with a view toward the victim's perception. [16] Thus, because `display' includes ... that which is manifested to any of the victim's senses, [17] those terms encompass the robber who actually physically displays a deadly weapon on to the victim as well as the robber `who intimidates by otherwise manifesting the presence of such a weapon even though it is not seen by the victim.' [18] But, as we stated in Deshields, there must be more than the victim's fear of the existence of a deadly weapon [19] to establish the displays what appears to be a deadly weapon requirement of first degree robbery. The victim's subjective belief that the defendant possessed a deadly weapon must be accompanied by an objective physical manifestation that the robber appears to be displaying a deadly weapon. [20] Accordingly, in this case, the State had to prove that: (1) the bank teller subjectively believed that Word was armed, and (2) the bank teller's belief was objectively reasonable because the defendant either actually produced what appeared to be a deadly weapon or made another objective physical manifestation of such a weapon. The State disagrees and relies on our order in McKamey v. State, in which we found that the State demonstrated that McKamey `displayed' a gun while robbing the [victim] cab driver by showing that McKamey sat behind the driver in the moving cab and told the driver that he had a gun. [21] This Court upheld McKamey's conviction for first degree robbery. The State argues that, under McKamey, Word committed first degree robbery because Word's note read, I am armed and the victim reasonably believed or feared that Word actually had a weapon. We do not, however, read our summary order in McKamey that was entered before our Deshields opinion as reliable precedent to permit a finding of the element of displays what appears to be a deadly weapon where the victim did not perceive any display or physical manifestation of a weapon. This Court has consistently addressed the displays what appears to be a deadly weapon element of first degree robbery, we have interpreted 11 Del. C. § 832(a)(2) to require an objective physical manifestation of a weapon, in addition to the victim's subjective belief that the defendant had a weapon, to support a conviction. [22] Accordingly, the two-pronged standard we apply to determine whether Word displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon is not new but rather is based on clear precedent dating back to our first interpretation of this statutory element of first degree robbery in State v. Smallwood. [23] While the State proved in this case that the bank teller subjectively believed that Word was armed with a deadly weapon, the undisputed evidence shows that the bank teller based this belief solely on Word's note stating, I am armed, not on any objective physical manifestation of a weapon. This case thus is analogous to Johnson v. State, [24] which we cited favorably in Deshields. [25] In Johnson, we reversed the Superior Court's judgment convicting the defendant of attempted first degree robbery, because we found the defendant had not displayed what appeared to be a deadly weapon. [26] Johnson had told the manager of a jewelry department to give me those diamonds and, This is a holdup, give me the rings. [27] The victim testified that Johnson had one hand down where she could not see it, but that she thought his hand was inside his jacket. [28] The victim also stated: I just thought he had something in  afraid he had something in his hands, a knife or gun or something. I was afraid he had something there because he said `This is a holdup.' [29] The State argued that even though the victim never actually saw a weapon, Johnson's use of the term holdup accompanied by the victim's subjective reaction was sufficient to establish the first degree robbery element of displays what appears to be a deadly weapon. [30] This Court disagreed and held: While we agree that a mere physical appearance [of a weapon] will suffice, there must be more than the victim's belief in the existence of a weapon. Here there was no evidence that the victim saw any bulge or other suggestion that the defendant's clothing contained a weapon. Indeed, the evidence is clear that the victim never saw the defendant's hand but only `thought it was inside his jacket.' [31] After noting that the sole suggestion of a weapon in this case was in the victim's apprehension that a weapon existed, [32] this Court overturned the defendant's conviction and held that subjective belief, unaccompanied by a physical manifestation of a weapon, is insufficient to establish that necessary element of Robbery First Degree. [33] As in Johnson, the bank teller did not perceive any objective manifestation of a weapon but rather believed that Word had a gun solely because his note read, I am armed. Likewise, the sole suggestion of a weapon in this case was the victim's apprehension that a weapon existed. Such a subjective belief unaccompanied by a physical manifestation of a weapon is insufficient to establish the displays what appears to be a deadly weapon element of first degree robbery.