Opinion ID: 758687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: determination to be made on remand

Text: 52 (A) Standard of Review 53 Having concluded that a judicial hearing is required under these circumstances, we must determine the standard of review to be applied by the district court. Generally, due process challenges are analyzed under either a strict scrutiny or a rational basis standard. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.6, at 347-48 (5th ed.1995). Government action that burdens a fundamental right will survive a substantive due process challenge only if it can survive strict scrutiny, i.e., if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to infringement on fundamental right to privacy in abortion context). If the government's action does not burden a fundamental right, however, it will survive such a challenge if rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2297, 138 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997) (applying the rational basis standard of review to uphold New York's statutes outlawing assisted suicide, which neither infringe fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications). 54 Deciding the appropriate standard of review is crucial, because the ultimate decision in a case is often shaped by the standard applied. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L.REV. 961, 964 (1998) (positing that strict scrutiny has been applied so that essentially no governmental interest sufficed to justify infringement, making strict scrutiny ... 'fatal in fact,'  and that rational basis review has been applied so that even the flimsiest governmental justification would suffice.); but see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236-37, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995)(stating that strict scrutiny involves a most searching judicial inquiry, but is not fatal in fact in a case involving an equal protection challenge to a federal program designed to provide highway contracts to disadvantaged businesses), Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992)(holding that a Tennessee statute prohibiting solicitation of votes and display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrance to a polling place was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud, as required by the First Amendment), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996)(applying rational-basis review in equal protection context to strike down an amendment to Colorado's Constitution that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination). 55 The proposed treatment in the present case affects a non-dangerous pretrial detainee's fundamental right to be free from bodily intrusion. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 221, 110 S.Ct. 1028 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980)). Therefore, the government's request to forcibly medicate Brandon must be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir.1984) (pre-Harper case adopting a strict-scrutiny approach in deciding whether a pretrial detainee may be forcibly medicated to make him competent to stand trial). 56 This standard does not conflict with Harper 's application of rational-basis review in its decision to forcibly medicate a dangerous convicted felon. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 223, 110 S.Ct. 1028. Harper 's rationale is based upon the premise that if the government's action focuses primarily on matters of prison administration, then the action is proper if reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, even if it implicates fundamental rights. Id. (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987)); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ([M]aintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.). 57 In contrast, the decision in the present case is whether to medicate a non-dangerous pretrial detainee in order to render him competent to stand trial, rather than to protect his safety or the safety of those around him while he is confined. The decision to be made here thus relates solely to trial administration rather than to prison administration. To forcibly medicate Brandon, therefore, the government must satisfy strict-scrutiny review and demonstrate that its proposed approach is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. See Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1395; Woodland v. Angus, 820 F.Supp. 1497, 1509 (D.Utah 1993)(the reduced standard of review applied by the Court in Harper is not appropriate in resolving th[e] case where the government seeks to medicate an individual in order to render him competent to stand trial); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154, 93 S.Ct. 705. 58 We do not find the Supreme Court's opinion in Riggins determinative as to the appropriate standard of review to apply in this case. On the one hand, the Court seems to have alluded to a strict-scrutiny approach by stating: 59 Nevada certainly would have satisfied due process if ... the district court had found ... that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of others. 60