Opinion ID: 670647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lapsed Appropriations and Mootness

Text: 8 The District Court granted summary judgment for HUD on mootness grounds, a ruling we review de novo. See, e.g., Nikoi v. Attorney General of United States, 939 F.2d 1065, 1068 (D.C.Cir.1991). Because we agree that this case was mooted by the expiration of the relevant appropriation, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide moot cases because their constitutional authority extends only to actual cases or controversies. Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70, 104 S.Ct. 373, 374-375, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983) (per curiam). The instant case is moot because the panel can offer no relief which can redress [appellant's] asserted grievance, id.--namely, the denial of over $2.6 million in CDBG funds. 9 Funds appropriated for an agency's use can become unavailable in three circumstances: if the appropriation lapses; if the funds have already been awarded to other recipients; or if Congress rescinds the appropriation. 4 [I]t is an elementary principle of the budget process that, in general, a federal agency's budgetary authority lapses on the last day of the period for which the funds were obligated. At that point, the unobligated funds revert back into the general Treasury. West Va. Ass'n of Community Health Ctrs. v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1570, 1576 (D.C.Cir.1984) (citation omitted). There is an equitable doctrine, however, that permits a court to award funds based on an appropriation even after the date when the appropriation lapses, so long as the lawsuit was instituted on or before that date. Id. (emphasis added). This exception was noted in National Association of Regional Councils v. Costle, 564 F.2d 583 (D.C.Cir.1977): 10 [T]he equity powers of the courts allow them to take action to preserve the status quo of a dispute and protect their ability to decide a case properly before them. In such situations, the courts simply suspend the operation of a lapse provision and extend the term of already existing budget authority. If, however, budget authority has lapsed before suit is brought, there is no underlying congressional authority for the court to preserve. It has vanished, and any order of the court to obligate public money conflicts with the constitutional provision vesting sole power to make such authorization in the Congress. Equity empowers the courts to prevent the termination of budget authority which exists, but if it does not exist, either because it was never provided or because it has terminated, the Constitution prohibits the courts from creating it no matter how compelling the equities. 11 Id. at 588-89 (footnote omitted). As can be seen from the foregoing quotation, the equitable exception is narrow, and [i]t is beyond dispute that a federal court cannot order the obligation of funds for which there is no appropriation. Rochester Pure Waters Dist. v. EPA, 960 F.2d 180, 184 (D.C.Cir.1992). 12 Indeed, even if a plaintiff brings suit before an appropriation lapses, this circuit's case law unequivocally provides that once the relevant funds have been obligated, a court cannot reach them in order to award relief. In West Virginia Health Centers, for example, we acknowledged the equitable doctrine permitting courts to award funds after an appropriation has lapsed, if a suit is timely filed (as that case was), but held that no relief was available for one of the fiscal years in question because all of these funds ha[d] been awarded by the Secretary to various recipients. 734 F.2d at 1577. We have relied on similar reasoning in at least two other cases. See Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974, 986 (D.C.Cir.1982) (Once the chapter 1 funds are distributed to the States and obligated, they cannot be recouped. It will be impossible in the absence of a preliminary injunction to award the plaintiffs the relief they request if they should eventually prevail on the merits.); Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1081 (D.C.Cir.1986) (quoting Ambach and West Virginia Health Centers, and noting that if the government in the instant case is permitted to distribute the $10 million to other organizations, the appeal will become moot.). Thus, to avoid having its case mooted, a plaintiff must both file its suit before the relevant appropriation lapses and seek a preliminary injunction preventing the agency from disbursing those funds. 13 It is plain that Houston's case is moot on two independent grounds. HUD provided an affidavit in the District Court in support of its motion for summary judgment, stating that on or before September 30, 1988--more than six months before Houston filed its Complaint--the agency contractually obligated its entire [fiscal year] 1986 CDBG entitlement appropriation from Congress, either through initial allocations or reallocations. Declaration of James R. Broughman, Director of Entitlement Cities Division, HUD, Joint Appendix at 87. Appellant in no way disputes this statement. It is also undisputed that the fiscal year 1986 CDBG appropriation lapsed on September 30, 1988, and that Houston did not seek a stay of the appropriation's expiration prior to that date. 14 Houston contends that even if its claim would be otherwise moot, the panel should reach the merits under the exception to the mootness doctrine that permits federal courts to consider cases that are capable of repetition, yet evading review. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). This exception has no force in this case, however. As noted above, our decisions specifically provide that if a case is timely filed, a court may grant a preliminary injunction so that funds from an appropriation that is about to lapse will remain available pending a dispute's resolution. Here, however, Houston filed its Complaint more than two years after HUD reduced its grant, and over six months after the 1986 CDBG appropriation expired. If appellant had acted expeditiously, it could have preserved its rights. The situation presented in the instant case is perhaps capable of repetition, but it can be reviewed in the future if Houston or another city files a timely suit and seeks a preliminary injunction. Because a stay of the lapse of the 1986 appropriation was potentially available, the duration of the challenged action was not too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975) (per curiam). 15