Opinion ID: 863764
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: ¶3. Rebecca E. and John H. Peterson were married on November 20, 1967 in Las Vegas, Nevada. There were four children born to their marriage, Cheryl, John, Sharon, and Benajah. ¶4. On May 27, 1988, John H. Peterson (hereinafter Mr. Peterson) filed a complaint for divorce before the Chancery Court of Jefferson County, Mississippi. The alleged ground for divorce was cruel and inhuman treatment. Unusual to this type of divorce complaint, the complaint included a recitation that the parties were submitting an agreement as to child support, child custody, alimony, and property division. This language made the complaint appear to be for irreconcilable differences. For this reason, Mrs. Peterson alleges that she believed she was entering into a no-fault divorce. The same day, May 27, 1988, a property settlement and child custody agreement was filed with the chancery court. The following day, May 28, 1988, a waiver of process and entry of appearance was filed with the court. The final decree of divorce was entered into on May 31, 1988, on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment. Three days after the divorce was final, Mrs. Peterson and Mr. Peterson signed and filed an amended property settlement agreement. Approximately seven months later, Mrs. Peterson petitioned the court to set aside that property settlement agreement. Mrs. Peterson claimed that she signed both the property settlement and the child custody agreement under duress, coercion, intimidation, and as a result of certain threats made against her. She also claimed that the property settlement agreement was void due to lack of consideration. ¶5. The chancellor, who was originally assigned to this case, recused himself on July 1, 1991, and a special chancellor was appointed. Mr. Peterson moved for summary judgment on September 14, 1992 and the motion was denied. A hearing was held on January 25, 1993. Then, the court signed the judgment on February 4, 1993 which dismissed Mrs. Peterson's motion to set aside a property settlement agreement and other relief sought pursuant to M.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) and 60(b)(4). ¶6. Accordingly, Mrs. Peterson filed her notice of appeal on March 11, 1993, in the Chancery Court of Jefferson County, Mississippi. The issue presented to this Court on her first appeal was whether a waiver of process and entry of appearance form signed on the same day the divorce was filed, but dated the following day, was simply an irregularity or whether it failed to meet the requirements of M.R.C.P. 4(e) and serves to void the divorce and property settlement. On November 17, 1994, this Court reversed and remanded the case holding that this failure, along with other irregularities, did warrant a reversal and the divorce was void. A petition for rehearing was then filed on November 30, 1994. This Court modified its original opinion on January 19, 1995 and added that a party may go beyond the record when attacking a waiver of process and entry of appearance. ¶7. During the pendency of the remand, on November 18, 1996, the parties secured a divorce in Louisiana. On May 14, 1997, Mrs. Peterson filed her Notice by Defendant Rebecca E. Peterson that She Withdraws Her Agreement to Any Property Settlement and/or Child Custody Agreement. Prior to the hearing following remand, the parties agreed that the only issue to be heard was whether the property division agreement should be set aside. The chancellor held that Mrs. Peterson failed to carry the burden of persuasion establishing duress, coercion, and intimidation and upheld the property settlement and child custody agreement. ¶8. The chancellor denied Mrs. Peterson's M.R.C.P. Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, and Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict under M.R.C.P. Rule 50. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Chancery Court of Jefferson County, Mississippi, Mrs. Peterson raises the following issues in her appeal: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SETTING ASIDE THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AFTER THE WIFE ATTEMPTED TO WITHDRAW FROM IT. II. THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS GROSSLY INADEQUATE AND UNCONSCIONABLE. III. THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED BY DURESS. IV. THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS AN UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT AND SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED IN EQUITY.