Opinion ID: 2243679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defendant's plea of guilty

Text: Defendant contends that his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was wrongfully denied by the trial court. He urges this court to vacate his plea of guilty and remand for a new trial. Whether to permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn is within the sound discretion of the trial court. (134 Ill.2d R. 604(d); People v. Hillenbrand (1988), 121 Ill.2d 537, 545, 118 Ill.Dec. 423, 521 N.E.2d 900.) However, [when] it appears that the plea of guilty was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or of the law, or in consequence of misrepresentations by counsel    or the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused, or where the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury, or where the ends of justice will be better served by submitting the case to a jury, the court should permit the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and allow the accused to plead not guilty. ( People v. Morreale (1952), 412 Ill. 528, 531-32, 107 N.E.2d 721.) As will be shown, none of these justifications is present in the instant case. Defendant offers three reasons for his contention that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea: first, his confession was not voluntary; second, his plea was the result of misunderstanding his lawyer's advice; and third, he was not adequately aware of the consequences of his plea. We address these three arguments in turn. Defendant suggests that his plea should be vacated because it was not made voluntarily, but rather out of fear for his safety. If this were true, the plea should be withdrawn under Morreale, as it would be a defense worthy of consideration. Defendant states that he pled guilty because he felt that he would not receive a fair trial in Montgomery County and also because of racial intimidation at the Montgomery County jail. He felt that he was being harassed by three white inmates because he was the only black inmate. His idea was that after his plea was entered he would get a new lawyer who would get the plea withdrawn and get a new trial in a different county. However, there is nothing in the record to support defendant's claim of harassment except defendant's self-serving testimony. In fact, there were 38 blacks held in the Montgomery County jail while defendant was there, and the defendant was held in his own cell for the duration of his confinement and isolated from all the other inmates. Neither defendant nor his attorney complained to jail authorities of any threats. Further, defendant's plea of guilty was perfectly harmonious with all of his actions up until that time. This was not a man who had protested his innocence and then abruptly changed his mind. Rather, this is a man who was caught in the midst of his illegal actions and who has never denied his guilt. Except for this appeal, defendant has done nothing inconsistent with an intent to confess to his crimes. He has admitted his culpability at every stage, from arrest to conviction. He may now regret being so forthcoming. But regret in hindsight does not render a confession involuntary. Defendant's second argument that his plea should have been withdrawn is that it was entered due to a misunderstanding of his lawyer's advice. Under Morreale, this would justify withdrawal of the plea. The alleged misunderstanding stemmed from defense counsel's explanation of what would happen following a plea of guilty. Defendant's lawyer told defendant that if he pled guilty there would be an automatic appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, since it would be a capital case, and that his appeal would be handled by the State Appellate Defender. Defendant acknowledges in his brief that this is what was told to him, but nevertheless claims that he took this to mean that he would receive a new trial with new lawyers. Defendant cites People v. Hale (1980), 82 Ill.2d 172, 44 Ill.Dec. 501, 411 N.E.2d 867, for the proposition that misunderstanding counsel's advice is grounds for vacating a plea of guilty. Since Hale said the opposite, defendant apparently wishes to distinguish that case. Hale involved a man who pleaded guilty to armed robbery. His plea was entered after a full recitation of the consequences of that plea, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 402. The defendant later tried to withdraw the plea, stating that he would not have pled guilty had he known he could not change his mind. When asked about what led him to this mistaken belief, he answered, My attorney. This court ruled that whether to vacate a plea of guilty is within a trial court's sound discretion and that evidence of defendant's subjective impression of his attorney's advice, standing alone, is not enough to require the withdrawal of a guilty plea. Since there was no objective proof to show he was reasonably justified in his alleged mistake, there was no abuse of discretion. Hale, 82 Ill.2d at 176, 44 Ill.Dec. 501, 411 N.E.2d 867. Hale is indistinguishable from the instant case. Defendant was fully informed of the consequences of his plea, and Rule 402's requirements were completely satisfied. Defendant can show nothing more than his own allegation of a mistaken subjective impression. Defendant's final proffered reason that his guilty plea should have been withdrawn is that he was not adequately aware of the consequences of his plea. In particular, he claims that he was unaware that by entering into it, he was admitting his eligibility for death. If this were true, the guilty plea would be properly withdrawn under Morreale. However, the record belies defendant's contention. The record establishes that defendant was warned of the possibility of the death sentence no less than eight times in open court. At the hearing where he first offered his guilty plea, the trial judge asked him: Do you understand, sir, that the possibility exists that in the event I were to accept pleas of guilty to these charges that conceivably you could be sentenced to death? THE DEFENDANT: I understand that. THE COURT: And knowing and understanding that, it is still your desire to offer open pleas of guilty to these three these four charges, is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. The judge then entered a continuance of the proceedings so that defendant would have time to think about the consequences of his plea. When the proceedings recommenced, again to confirm that defendant understood the nature of his actions, the court admonished defendant that, [i]n the event you were to plead guilty or be found guilty of this offense, you would be guilty of first degree murder for which you could be punished by an imposition of penalty of death. After hearing the warnings of the consequences of pleading guilty, the defendant signed a jury waiver and a plea of guilty. Before the trial court accepted it, it asked defendant, Do you understand that as a result of [the] sentencing hearing [that would follow his plea of guilty] it is possible that you could be sentenced to death? Defendant answered yes. The State then offered a statement of a full factual basis, but the defendant denied its accuracy. The pleas were therefore rejected, and a trial date was set. Before the trial date, defendant requested a chance to be heard in court. At that time, he indicated that he again wished to plead guilty. The trial court warned him of the death penalty in the same manner as before, and defendant decided he wanted a bench trial. The same trial date that had been set the last time he had tried to plead guilty was kept. That trial did not occur because defendant again indicated his desire to plead guilty. Again, his awareness of the consequences of his plea was tested by the judge in the same manner as in the first two proceedings. The defendant then signed a jury waiver and plea of guilty, which included the warning [t]he Defendant is first admonished by the Court that the punishment for [first degree murder] is [t]he imposition of the death penalty [or terms of imprisonment]. After the State provided a factual basis for the pleas, the judge accepted them. The defendant then waived his right to have a jury determine his sentence. The judge admonished him at length of his right to a jury for sentencing, and that all 12 jurors would have to agree on the death sentence before it could be imposed. When defendant persisted, the judge accepted his waiver. The record demonstrates that Judge Eberspacher was very diligent in his efforts to make sure defendant knew the consequences of pleading guilty. Defendant's claim that he was unaware of the possibility of the death sentence is totally without merit. Moreover, there is no question as to defendant's guilt; he was caught in the act of molesting the girls minutes after the murder. The ends of justice will not be better served by submitting this case to the jury. If given a trial, this defendant would assuredly be found guilty. Thus, there are no Morreale justifications in this case, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to withdraw defendant's plea.