Opinion ID: 430751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BANKRUPTCY ACT Sec. 17--WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS CONDUCT

Text: 27 The bankruptcy court held that appellant's debt was nondischargeable, falling within the exceptions to discharge provided in the Bankruptcy Act 11 U.S.C. Sec. 523 (Section 17). Specifically the act provides: 28 (a) A discharge under ... this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- 29 (6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity. 30 No definition is given in the statute for the terms willful and malicious, however, the notes of the committee as well as much case law has provided the meaning of those words. The committee notes provide that willful means deliberate or intentional. 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, Historical and Revision Notes. The courts have generally held that willful and malicious requires the intentional doing of an act which necessarily leads to injury. 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523 n. 253 and cases cited therein. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court cite a case from this court setting forth the generally accepted definition, Den Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72 (10th Cir.1955). Using this definition, the bankruptcy court found that the actions of appellant amounted to a willful disregard of that which he knew to be his duty, and a complete and total disregard of acceptable medical practice, Bankruptcy Opinion p. 8, and thereby constituted willful and malicious conduct. The bankruptcy court cites specific examples of appellant's actions which support such a finding, including the prescribing of an anesthetic without a patient history, the over induction of the patient with anesthesia, and the cover up of records relating to the surgery and subsequent cardiac arrest. While yet again this court must admit that the testimony is controverted, there is evidence in the record to support the conclusions reached by the bankruptcy court. Furthermore, the district court in reviewing this issue based upon the same standard, held that in the instant case, there is clear evidence of willful and malicious injury sufficient to make a debt nondischargeable. Memorandum Opinion Affirming Order of the Bankruptcy Court, p. 4, dated July 2, 1982. As the issue is brought before this court, no additional evidence to contradict the decision of the district court and bankruptcy court has been presented, save the appellant's own testimony that he did not intend for the injury to occur. By finding that this testimony is insufficient to contradict evidence of willful and wanton conduct, this court does not intend to imply that appellant performed the surgery in an effort to bring about the cardiac arrest which caused such drastic injury to Sanchez. However, there is little doubt that appellant intended the acts that he did perform, which acts performed in the manner and under the conditions present in this particular situation necessarily resulted in the injury. That is sufficient to support a finding of willful and malicious conduct. Appellant's actions, which were found by the bankruptcy court to have taken place do constitute willful and malicious conduct as that term is intended in the Bankruptcy Act. The decision of the bankruptcy court and the district court so holding must be affirmed.