Opinion ID: 1703204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: part ii: survivor's annuity

Text: Ms. Coleman argues that the court of appeal further erred in affirming the trial court's denial of her right to be designated as the beneficiary of the survivor's annuity. This obligation is contained in the Agreement at paragraph 6. The paragraph is divided into three subparts and concerns Mr. Robinson's obligations of support and maintenance to Ms. Coleman. Paragraph 6, in relevant part, reads: Wife waives any and all rights to support and maintenance, except as set forth as follows: (A) Husband has paid to Wife as alimony the sum of Two Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($2,000) per month, commencing January 1, 1987, and the Husband shall pay to the Wife as alimony the sum of Two Thousand One hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($2,100.00) commencing the first month next subsequent to the execution this Agreement, until the Wife shall die or remarry.... (B) During the period that Husband shall have a duty to make alimony payments to the Wife, he shall keep his life insured in an amount equal to one year's salary earned by Husband, with Wife named as beneficiary.... (C) In the event Husband shall predecease Wife, alimony shall cease; however, Husband agrees to choose Option B of the Government Retirement Plan providing for Wife to receive retirement checks pursuant to government regulations. Louisiana Civil Code article 2046 sets forth a general rule of construction, providing that [w]hen the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent. The underscored word further in this article signifies the true nature of contractual interpretation. The determination that the language contained in a contract is clear and explicit, in itself, involves an interpretive process. For that reason, La Civ.Code art.2046 emphasizes that the process involves no further interpretation, as opposed to no interpretation at all. Expose' Des Motifs of the Project of Titles III and IV of Book III of the Civil Code of Louisiana, p. 67 (1984); R. MacLean, Judicial Discretion in the Civil Law, 43 La.L.Rev. 45, 55-56 n. 28 (1982). La Civ.Code art. 3073 contains a supplementary rule of construction governing the interpretation of the operative language, and the determination of the scope, of a compromise agreement. La Civ.Code art. 3073 provides that a compromise agreement extends only to those matters that the parties expressly intended to settle and that the scope of the transaction cannot be extended by implication. See Comment, Compromise in Louisiana, 14 Tul. L.Rev. 282, 283 (1940). In applying the rule of construction set forth in La Civ.Code art. 3073, courts are guided by the general principle that the contract must be construed as a whole and in light of attending events and circumstances. Succession of Teddlie, 385 So.2d 902, 904 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ refused, 393 So.2d 742 (La. 1980); La Civ.Code art. 2050. Thus, the intent which the words of the compromise instrument express in light of the surrounding circumstances at the time of execution of the agreement is controlling. The meaning and intent of the parties to a written instrument, including a compromise, is ordinarily determined from the four corners of the instrument. Maltby v. Gauthier, 526 So.2d 455, 457 (La.App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 531 So.2d 474 (La.1988); Smith v. Leger, 439 So.2d 1203 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). It is axiomatic that courts construe ambiguities of an agreement against the drafter of an agreement. However, this depends on whether there are any ambiguities present. Reading the Agreement as a whole we will find that Mr. Robinson only intended to provide support and maintenance for his former wife on a limited bases. Paragraph 6(A) of the Agreement specifically states that alimony would be paid until the wife shall die or remarry. Subsection C would provide support, via the survivor annuity, should he predecease her. The purpose of Mr. Robinson's having to choose Option B was to provide plaintiff with some sort of income to replace the alimony she would lose should he predecease her. However, Mr. Robinson's obligation to pay alimony ceased when Ms. Coleman remarried. Thus, it follows that he was no longer required to choose Option B of the Government retirement plan when she remarried. Such an agreement does not frustrate the public policy of Louisiana. Moreover, under Louisiana the termination upon remarriage is permitted. Brignac v. Brignac, 96-1702 (La.App.3 Cir. 6/18/97); 698 So.2d 953. La.Civ.Code art. 114 provides that an award of periodic support may be modified if the circumstances of either party change, and shall be terminated if it has become unnecessary. In La.Civ.Code art. 115, the obligation of spousal support is extinguished by, among other things, the remarriage of the obligee or a judicial determination that the obligee has cohabited with another person of either sex in the manner of married persons. While it is true that Mr. Robinson should have elected Option B during the years between the divorce and Ms. Coleman's second marriage, this obligation extinguished upon Ms. Coleman's remarriage, in October 14, 1988. This now a moot issue. Consistent with the provisions of the pension plan, after her second marriage, Mr. Robinson was free to choose whomever he wanted to receive his portion of the annuity upon his death. As such, it would be beyond this Court's authority to read into the Agreement that Mr. Robinson intended to contract away his survivor annuity in favor of his former wife. The courts below did not find this to be the case and we shall follow their wisdom as well. Alternatively, if we accept that Mr. Robinson intended to designate his former wife as beneficiary, then we must ask whether his designation was proper. After review of the record we find that there is some question whether Mr. Robinson choose his beneficiary according to the government regulation. It appears that Mr. Robinson corresponded with Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regarding the proper way to name a beneficiary for the survivor annuity. OPM related to Mr. Robinson that in order to name his beneficiary it must be done pursuant to a court order. There nothing in the record that shows Mr. Robinson obtained a court order to choose his beneficiary as per government regulation. As such, its apparent that Mr. Robinson did not possess the legal authority to contract away his survivor annuity benefits without meeting the standards put forth by the federal government. Thus, we find the trial court's ruling and the court of appeal's affirmation without error. This portion of the ruling is affirmed.