Opinion ID: 2611818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does Retrial Violate Defendants' Right Against Double Jeopardy?

Text: Defendants contend that the circuit court erred in denying their motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice because a retrial would violate their constitutional right against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. On appeal, the issue whether a defendant's constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated unless the indictment is dismissed is a question of law. United States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir.1987). We review a question of law under the right/wrong standard. In re Estate of Holt, 75 Haw. 224, 857 P.2d 1355, reconsideration denied, 75 Haw. ___, 863 P.2d 989 (1993). Article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution and the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provide that no person shall twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense. Although [it] is generally accepted that in jury trials, jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn, State v. Miyazaki, 64 Haw. 611, 617, 645 P.2d 1340, 1345 (1982), the guarantee provided by the double jeopardy clause is not absolute. Generally, double jeopardy rights are deemed waived when a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial. State v. Hoke, 69 Haw. 44, 46, 731 P.2d 1261, 1262 (1987) (quoting State v. Miyazaki, 64 Haw. 611, 618, 645 P.2d 1340, 1346 (1982)). However, the general rule is subject to an exception. In State v. Pulawa, 58 Haw. 377, 569 P.2d 900 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 2818, 56 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978), we held that retrial is barred where the defendant's mistrial motion is the necessary response to judicial or prosecutorial misconduct designed to avoid an acquittal, or is necessitated by deliberate misconduct which has for its intended purpose the denial of the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial[.] Pulawa, 58 Haw. at 382, 569 P.2d at 905; accord State v. Hamala, 73 Haw. 289, 834 P.2d 275 (1992); State v. Hoke, 69 Haw. 44, 731 P.2d 1261 (1987). Against this background, Defendants contend that the Prosecutor intentionally asked improper questions during cross-examination to provoke Defendants into moving for a mistrial to avoid an acquittal. In Pulawa, we stated that the inquiry necessarily centers upon the Prosecutor's conduct prior to the mistrial in order to determine if there was prosecutorial misconduct designed to avoid an acquittal. See Pulawa, 58 Haw. at 383-84, 569 P.2d at 905-06. If such intentional misconduct is found, a second trial is barred by the double jeopardy clause notwithstanding the fact that the Defendants requested the mistrial. Id. In this regard, we recognize that [ultimately], the determination of whether or not the Prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial is a factual finding which the trial court is in the best position to make. People v. Copeland, 129 Misc.2d 250, 255, 492 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1985). Accord Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 669 n. 1, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2086 n. 1, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). Thus, we apply the clearly erroneous standard to the circuit court's factual findings. AMFAC, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 115, 839 P.2d 10, 27, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992). As evidence of the Prosecutor's intentional misconduct, Defendants contend that the Prosecutor directly violated the trial court's directive that he seek a ruling from the court prior to asking questions regarding the forced prostitution claim. Defendants also assert that the Prosecutor's question violated the trial court's in limine ruling because the question raised an issue of a prior bad act or other crimes. To support their position, Defendants rely on a number of cases in which the court found prosecutorial overreaching where the Prosecutor had knowingly violated a ruling on a motion in limine or other admonition of the court. See United States v. Broderick, 425 F.Supp. 93 (S.D.Fla.1977) (barring retrial after Prosecutor in opening statement mentioned prohibited testimony; reasoning that testimony was clearly prohibited, since the prosecutor agreed not to elicit such testimony and had been twice cautioned not to do so because of its prejudicial and hearsay nature); Copeland, 129 Misc.2d at 255, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 857 (barring retrial where prosecutor persisted in introducing evidence the court found objectionable and for pursuing a line of questioning with a rebuttal witness after having been explicitly instructed to desist from that type of inquiry); People v. Cavallerio, 104 Misc.2d 436, 428 N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1980) (barring retrial where prosecutor intentionally violated a prior court order prohibiting reference to defendant's criminal background and made deliberate comments regarding defendants' failure to take the stand and testify). However, after considering the totality of circumstances prior to the mistrial, the circuit court determined there was no prosecutorial overreaching. In denying Defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, the court found in relevant part: Now, as Mr. Wolff points out, when we began this trial a motion in limine was filed pertaining to various items of other evidence which was recovered in the search of this particular house.       However, the particular issue relating to this question asked which resulted in the mistrial was not in issue at that time when the motion in limine was heard and ruled upon. As counsel know in this case, particularly through the testimony of Mr. Maxfield, began to uncover or disclose various factual matters which the Court thought unusual regarding the background of the organization of Moore [sic] University and of the kinds of courses and the areas of study that the university offered. I would note that at the beginning of the cross examination [the prosecutor] did delve into these areas and questioned Mr. Maxfield about various courses in regard to sexuality. And we did have a bench conference regarding those matters. And at the end of that discussion Mr. Wolff did withdraw his objection to examination in those areas.... Mr. Maxfield did indicate that the Steeles, Hannah and Wayne Steele, had left the house in [Hawai`i] and left with so-called bad feelings. And the reference to those bad feelings then was cross examined ... and ultimately led to this question, this question being the question which led to the mistrial. Under the circumstances the Court can understand how it is that [the trial prosecutor] reached this question, although it was not a proper question.... [T]he Court believes that given the nature of the evidence being elicited at that time, the Court believes that it was carelessness and negligence on the part of [the prosecutor] and that there was no intention to invite an acquittal or to cause denial of the defendants' constitutional right to a fair trial. Consequently, the circuit court stated that although the [Prosecutor] was careless and negligent when it asked the improper question which resulted in the mistrial ... this incident did not amount to a deliberate intent to invite a mistrial or to deny the Defendants Baranco their constitutional right to a fair trial. Defendants contend, however, that the circuit court erred in concluding that the Prosecutor was careless and negligent, and maintain that the Prosecutor intentionally asked the improper question to force Defendants into moving for a mistrial. Defendants point out that the Prosecution had possessed the newspaper article for months prior to the trial; had highlighted it with a marker; had possessed the article in the courtroom during the cross-examination; and had last read the article on the morning of the cross-examination. In addition, the prosecutor admitted that he had read the article with some degree of care such that he noticed it referred to a person named Allan Steele. Nevertheless, the circuit court stated in its Findings of Fact that it accepts [the prosecutor's] testimony that he neglected to check the newspaper article carefully before asking the question which lead [sic] to the mistrial. [5] Moreover, the record provides ample evidence to support the trial court's findings. During the hearing on Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Prosecutor testified that [i]t was a mistake there. It was a slip, and I should have stopped and double checked my notes to make sure. 1/6/93 Transcript (Tr.) at 15. The Prosecutor further stated that I didn't intend to ask that question, but I asked it anyway. And by the time I asked it, it was too late. But I thought that was the same Steele mentioned in the trial at that time. 1/6/93 Tr. at 25. Further, the court stated in its Conclusions of Law (COL) that: [g]iven the unusual nature of the facts which were elicited regarding the Defendants Baranco and their association with More University and Mr. Maxfield's testimony of the hard feelings between the Defendants Baranco and Wayne and Hannah Steele, the Court understands how the State neglected to carefully check the first names of the Steeles before asking its question. In addition, the record indicates that the Prosecutor actually resisted the motion for mistrial. During the bench conference that followed Defendants' motion for mistrial, the Prosecutor suggested that the court issue a cautionary instruction to the jury, rather than grant a mistrial. Therefore, while the Prosecutor may have been careless and negligent, we have previously stated that simple negligence falls far short of the prosecutorial overreaching requisite to the imposition of the double jeopardy prohibition to a retrial. Pulawa, 58 Haw. at 384, 569 P.2d at 905-06. Finally, Defendants contend that the trial court's COLs misstate the supreme court's opinion in Hoke. The court stated in pertinent part: 4. In State v. Hoke, 69 Haw. 45 [44], 731 P.2d 1261 (1987), the Hawaii Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did not prohibit the retrial of the defendants after three incidents of alleged misconduct during the trial.       5. In this case, there is no continuing course of misconduct by the State to suggest a deliberate intention to cause a mistrial. Based on the facts and standard set forth in Hoke, this Court finds that the State's misconduct in this case does not satisfy the requirements for a dismissal. Defendants maintain that Hoke neither involved three incidents of misconduct nor required a continuing course of misconduct to prove a deliberate intention to cause a mistrial. Although it appears that the court misconstrued the facts of Hoke, the court nevertheless applied the controlling law in this jurisdiction and therefore its error is harmless. See Matter of Kaohu, 1 Haw.App. 469, 477, 620 P.2d 1082, 1083 (1980) (holding that if the trial court reached the right conclusion, its decision will not be disturbed on grounds that reasons it gave for its action were erroneous).