Opinion ID: 1604196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erred in allowing the statement of the defendant to be admitted into evidence in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the united states as well as article three, sections 14 and 26 of the mississippi constitution.

Text: Ricky Chase was interrogated for several hours after his arrest on the evening of August 14, 1989 and gave a statement to the police concerning the events earlier that day. Prior to trial, Chase moved to have this statement suppressed, but the trial court, after a hearing, found that the statement was admissible. Chase argues that his statement was not free and voluntary and was the result of promises and threats. The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily, and not as the result of any promises, threats or other inducements. Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1989). The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. Haymer v. State, 613 So.2d 837, 839 (Miss. 1993); Kirkland v. State, 559 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1990). The burden is met and a prima facie case made out by testimony of an officer, or other persons having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 761, 763 (Miss. 1991). In Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1031 (Miss. 1992), this Court set out the standard of review on voluntariness of confessions: This point generally presents a fact question which is to be resolved by the trial judge according to the correct legal standards. In making this determination, the trial judge must absolutely resist any inclination to consider whether the confession is truthful or authentic; the focus must be limited to the voluntariness of the confession. Powell [v. State], 540 So.2d [13] at 15 [Miss. 1989]. Once the trial judge has determined the confession to be voluntary, this court will only reverse if convinced that such a finding is manifestly wrong and/or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, except that our scope of review is less constrained where detailed and specific findings by the trial court are lacking on the critical issue(s). McCarty v. State, 554 So.2d 909, 912 (Miss. 1989); Chisolm, 529 So.2d at 634. Chase was brought to the Sheriff's office in Hazlehurst around 8:00 p.m. Chief of Police Thomas Quarles advised Chase of his rights. Ralph Fick, a criminal investigator with the Mississippi Highway Patrol, was also present and he confirmed that Chase was read his rights. Chase had no questions about his rights and Quarles did not feel it necessary to go into any more detail. Quarles had known Chase eight to ten years. After being advised of his rights, Chase denied Chief Quarles permission to search the car Chase had been driving at the time of his arrest. Quarles stated that his purpose in talking with Chase was not to question him about Elmer Hart's murder but to get permission to do the search. Quarles did not ask Chase to waive his rights and was not present during the questioning of Chase, except to walk in and tell him that the owner of the car had been found and asked Chase if he had anything to say before the search of the car began. Bob Clower, deputy sheriff of Copiah County, and Fick were present when Chase read out loud the rights form and the waiver and then signed a waiver. Fick asked Chase if he understood what he had read and Chase said that he did. This process concluded at 8:25 p.m. Fick testified that he did not know of any reason why Chase could not have made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights. Chase's statement was then recorded and a transcript was made later. The statement concluded at 9:50 p.m. Fick said that Chase was not abused or mistreated and was not promised any leniency or hope of reward if he talked. According to Fick, Chase did not ask for an attorney or ask not to be questioned any further. Clower was present during the entire time the statement was being taken. When asked if he or Bob Clower or anyone else told Chase that Robert Washington had put this case off on him, Fick said, I did not at the time, I don't think. Clower confirmed that Chase had been read his rights and that, in Clower's opinion, Chase waived his rights. He also testified that Chase was not mistreated or abused and that Chase was not promised anything if he would make a statement or waive his rights. Clower also testified that on two subsequent occasions Chase initiated conversations with him in which Chase wanted to show him where Washington had hidden jewelry and money taken from the Harts. On August 15, Chase again contacted Clower and wanted to talk, but Clower was going out on a call. Clower gave Chase a pencil and paper, and Chase wrote down what he wanted to tell Clower. Clower testified that this statement was initiated by Chase without any solicitation. On cross-examination Clower testified as follows: Q Isn't it true that y'all told Ricky [Chase] that Robert Washington was laying it all off on him? A We could have told him that, yes, sir. Q And it'd be best for him to tell y'all to help himself? A Yes, sir. Q So he confessed, he gave this statement, he helped y'all find all this property, not because he understood he was waiving his rights, but because he thought that was the way to help himself in this situation? A I imagine he might have figured that. ... . Q And Ricky had become so cooperative because y'all told him he needed to cooperate? A Yeah, he was cooperating, sure was. Q Did you tell him if he did cooperate that it would be better for him and help him in the long run? A All we told him on that was, yeah, it would not hurt him, that anything he could help us get back and all that belonged to them, it could help him. Later on redirect, Clower testified as follows: Q Was he at any time promised by you that things would be better for him, and you would be more lenient, if he would make a statement? A No, sir. Q Did you ever indicate in any way that if he would talk with you things would be better for him and you would be more lenient if he did not say anything at all? A No, sir. At the hearing Chase testified that Quarles read from the rights card only after he had refused to let him search the car. Chase also stated that Clower told him that Robert Washington was blaming it all on him. He said that Clower and Flick told him it would be to his benefit to talk to them. He claimed that he had not signed the waiver prior to some questioning, but prior to the taping of his statement. Chase claimed not to know what waiver meant and did not exactly understand his rights. Chase used the word waiver himself. However, on cross-examination Chase contradictorily testified that this statement was certainly voluntary because he had signed his waiver of rights away. Chase also contended that he was tape recorded twice. The double taping was denied by Fick on rebuttal. The lower court overruled the motion to suppress. The court noted that Chase appeared to be above average in intelligence, read quite well and convinced the court that he had an understanding of his constitutional rights. The court concluded that Chase made a knowing, informed waiver of his right to remain silent and right to have an attorney. The court also found no evidence of force or compulsion, no physical intimidation or threats and no psychological overreach of the free will of the defendant... . The issue was again raised during the trial. At the close of the State's case, defense counsel again moved to exclude the statement. The court made a specific finding regarding Clower's testimony: Insofar as the motion to exclude the statement of Ricky Chase, I do not find that the free will and voluntariness on the part of the defendant was overreached by the actions of the interrogating officers, and the statement that was made I feel was voluntary by the defendant as having been warned as to his constitutional right to remain silent and right against self incrimination, and had been advised as to his Sixth Amendment right of counsel, and that he made a knowing and informed waiver of those rights as required under Miranda versus Arizona. I do not find that the statement by Mr. Bob Clower with reference to the co-defendant having made a statement implicated the defendant Ricky Chase, and caused the statement of Ricky Chase to be involuntary. Therefore, I'm going to overrule the motion to exclude the statement. Chase argues that the case of Miller v. State, 243 So.2d 558 (Miss. 1971) is almost identical to the case at bar. In Miller, the sheriff testified that he told Miller it would be better for him to tell the truth about the thing. Id. at 559. Under the circumstances of that case, this Court concluded that the confession was not voluntarily made and inadmissible. The circumstances the Court looked at in Miller were the defendant's youth, good reputation, and lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system. Additionally, the Court considered that the confession was made to the sheriff, the highest officer of the county, a representative of the State, speaking in his official capacity to a youth accused of a crime Id. Similarly, in Dunn v. State, 547 So.2d 42, 46 (Miss. 1989), this Court found that a defendant who was personally acquainted with the interrogating officer, worked with the officer's wife, and had great confidence and trust in the officer was induced to confess by the officer's statement that he would do what ever was legal with my realms to help. Some of the circumstances found in these earlier cases are present in the current case. Some are not. Chase was the same age as Miller, and Chase also had no prior criminal record. Evidence of Chase's good reputation was presented during the sentencing phase but not prior to the suppression hearing or the court ruling on the motion to suppress. Evidence of Chase's intelligence, or lack thereof, was also not before the court. The trial judge knew that Chase had a tenth grade education and that he could read well. There was no evidence presented that Chase was emotionally unstable, and it is unclear whether the trial judge was aware that Chase had attempted suicide while in jail or that this was relevant. In Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 668 (Miss. 1991), this Court clearly explained, The determination of whether a statement by an officer to an accused is a mere exhortation or an inducement to confess generally depends on the specific circumstances surrounding the confession. Willie found both Miller and Dunn inapplicable to the facts of that case. Specifically, the Court found that although he was twenty-two, unlike Willie, Dunn had prior experience with the criminal justice system. The Court further found that while Willie knew the sheriff, Willie's acquaintance with the sheriff was more in his official capacity rather than a friendship or personal relationship. The Court found two other circumstances weighing against Willie: his statement was a denial rather than a confession, and no specific promises were made to induce the statement. The facts of the present case require the conclusion of Willie rather than that of the earlier cases. Clower's comments were exhortations rather than inducement to confess. Although Chase was young, there was no evidence before the court of his good reputation or that he was naive about the criminal justice system. Chief of Police Quarles testified that he knew Chase by seeing him on the streets, seeing him around his house and that he had talked to him some as a deputy sheriff. Significantly, Quarles was not the one who questioned or took the statement from Chase. Even the most liberal reading of Clower's testimony does not show any specific promise of leniency or reward for making a statement. At the time of the questioning no charges had been made against Chase. Most importantly, Chase's statement was not a confession that he shot Hart; Chase put the blame on Washington. This Court must address a remaining question: would Chase have given his statement without Clower's telling Chase, It'd be best for him to tell us to help himself and that Washington had placed the blame entirely on Chase? Chase was given Miranda warnings orally on two occasions, and he read aloud a waiver of rights form which he subsequently signed. Chase also wrote out another statement, unsolicited by law enforcement officers, but rather, given at his own insistence. On cross-examination Chase testified: Q But no one abused you or mistreated you or threatened you or anything like that, did they? A No one really abused me or threatened me. I was getting some real harsh words, which would scare any man, you know. Nobody wants to be in jail, but physically I wasn't abused. I never told anyone that. No officer abused me. Q And you had been read your rights at the time you gave a statement? A Yes, at the time I made my statement  I made several statements. Q I'm talking about the taped statement. A Yes, I was. Yes sir. Q I believe you said you understood those rights and you were able to recite them for us. A Yes, sir. Q And when you made that statement it was voluntary, wasn't it? A Uhh  . Q You told them what you wanted to tell them? A I didn't tell them  yes, sir, I did. I told them what I wanted to tell them. Q And it was voluntary so far as what you told them? A Yes, sir, it was certainly voluntary because I had signed my waiver of rights away. Chase was also questioned on cross-examination concerning why he gave statements to the law enforcement officers: Q And why did you give a statement? A Why did I give a statement? Q Yes, sir. A Because I was told that everything was put on me, and which I know it didn't happen like that. That's why I gave the statement I gave. Q And if no one had told that to you, you wouldn't have said anything at all? A If no one had told that to me I would have told it anyway, just as I was at first going to confess to what had happened. This Court, in Smith v. State, 465 So.2d 999, 1002 (Miss. 1985), held that the resolution of conflicting testimony regarding voluntariness is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial judge at the suppression hearing. In determining voluntariness, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 169 (Miss. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 797 (1990). Chase received his Miranda warning two times, and read aloud his rights from a waiver form. Chase could read and write very well, and obviously understood his constitutional rights. He refused Chief Quarles permission to search the car he had been driving at the time he was arrested. Subsequently, Chase gave permission for officers to search his own room at his mother's home. Chase's statement placed the blame for everything on Washington. However, Chase admitted to being present during the murder and to being with Washington before and after the commission of the crime. Neither the taped statement nor the written statement was introduced into evidence. However, testimony about the circumstances and facts surrounding Chase's statement was allowed as evidence for whatever weight and credibility the jury might give it. Chase blamed all events on Washington, maintaining he was a mere observer and only a slight participant. Chase told several different versions of events which caused wild goose chases for law enforcement officials before Chase finally came clean on some of these events. His stories about where Washington had thrown the murder weapon and where Washington had placed the $400 cash from Mrs. Hart's purse are prime examples of these chases. Although Chase blamed everything on Washington, the whereabouts of all the money and property taken from the Harts' home was eventually located solely by the assistance of Chase, not Washington. When he gave a statement on August 18, except for the four long guns sold to the fence Willie Minter, Washington did not know where any of the stolen property or money was located. Washington did tell officers where to find the plastic garbage bag of clothing he and Chase had worn and subsequently tossed beside a roadway. Chase's statement was a denial, not a confession. No specific promise was made to Chase by a law enforcement officer. Also, Chase maintained that he would have told the truth anyway regardless of Clower's comments to him. We hold that from a totality of all the circumstances the lower court was well within the realm of substantial evidence in finding that Chase's statement was admissible and not the product of improper inducement. Chase made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights. All law enforcement officers' testimony, as well as Ricky Chase's own testimony, constitutes proof that Chase was advised of his constitutional rights, that he understood those rights, and that regardless of Clower's statement to him, Chase voluntarily and without inducement, gave several statements or admissions to law enforcement officers. More importantly, as Chase put it, I would have told the truth anyway. This assignment of error is without merit.