Opinion ID: 352419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Absolute Counsel Immunity

Text: 179 Still another reason that the majority advances for considering witness immunity inapt is that, for all practical purposes, Goodwin could readily have given the same answer from the counsel table, as an officer of the court, 114 as he gave from the witness stand. There should be no difference, the majority contends, in the scope of immunity conferred for the same statement whether the prosecutor is on the witness stand or at the counsel table. With that last general statement I am in agreement, for the prosecutor from the counsel table, as an officer of the court, is under no less of an obligation to tell the truth than a prosecutor on the witness stand. But the problem with the majority's conclusion that the witness here, therefore, should not have absolute immunity is that there is also an established absolute immunity for all relevant statements made by counsel in court. In other words, if Goodwin had made the same statement from the counsel table rather than from the witness stand, he would have absolute immunity as counsel in a judicial proceeding, even apart from whatever protection is available under Imbler. Goodwin did make the statement in the momentary capacity of a witness, so this dissent has taken up that immunity in some detail, but if the majority wishes to contend that the witness immunity here should be the equivalent here of counsel immunity, I am willing to contend as well that absolute counsel immunity would extend to Goodwin's statement from the table, if that had happened instead. 180 As with judges and witnesses, the common law afforded absolute immunity to action taken by counsel in judicial proceedings. Indeed, as Prosser explains, 115 the privilege covers anything that may be said in relation to the matter at issue, whether it be in the pleadings, in affidavits, or in open court. In common with the other immunities, absolute counsel immunity was and is based on the policy of protecting the judicial process. And with the other immunities, it is equally as well settled. 116 In the context of a § 1983 or Bivens -type suit, this absolute immunity at common law should carry over, even as against constitutional torts, precisely because of the compelling interest, as illustrated by the common law, in protecting the judicial process. I have explained these interests and policies in more detail in my argument earlier that the absolute witness immunity of common law should also be available in § 1983 and Bivens -type suits, 117 and need not repeat them here. Suffice it to say that Goodwin would surely have been acting as counsel in the case if the judge had asked him a question during a grand jury proceeding, even apart, of course, from whether he was acting as a prosecutor in the Imbler sense. At common law, as noted, all relevant statements of counsel, be they termed advocacy or investigation, within the confines of the courtroom process were entitled to absolute protection. If counsel immunity is to be carried over for constitutional torts, as would be expected under the unwavering protection afforded the judicial process by the Supreme Court, then there is simply no basis for assuming that Goodwin's statement, if made from the counsel table instead, would be entitled to only qualified immunity. 118 III. REVIEWABILITY OF THE WITNESS IMMUNITY ISSUE 181 While the above concludes my dissent, Judge Robinson and I are of the view that the question of absolute witness immunity is before us for decision at this point under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although Judge McGowan's opinion does set out the basic reasoning for why the collateral order doctrine may be thought to be present here, it is necessary for us in the majority on this point to amplify this reasoning in somewhat more detail, not only to provide greater dimension to the summary description presently available but also to respond to the reservations of Judge McGowan in dissent on this point. 182 As Judge McGowan's opinion explains in more detail, 119 the District Court in this case certified the question of absolute prosecutorial immunity for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) but did not so certify the question of absolute witness immunity. For reasons of his own, 120 Judge McGowan believes that review of the question of absolute witness immunity should be declined at this point and should instead await appeal from any final judgment in this action. 183 In the recent case of Abney v. United States, 121 the Court was asked to review the pretrial dismissal of petitioners' claims that their retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court accepted review of the pretrial dismissal as it amounted to a final decision on the jeopardy claims under the practical construction that had been given that term. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 122 The rights conferred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Chief Justice stated for a unanimous Court, would be significantly undermined if review of their claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence. Obviously, the Chief Justice noted, 123 much protection would be lost with postponed review: 184 (E)ven if the accused is acquitted, or, if convicted has his conviction ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has still been forced to endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prohibit (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 185 Because the double jeopardy claims met the other requirements of the collateral order rule, viz., that the pretrial dismissal had fully disposed of the question, and that the question was collateral, or separate from the principal issue of the trial (guilt or innocence), the Court considered the pretrial orders as final decisions and proceeded to review them. 186 The analogy between Abney and the instant case is close and striking. As with the Double Jeopardy Clause, the purpose behind absolute immunity is as much to protect the relevant persons from a trial on their actions as it is to protect them from the outcome of trial. In the classic statement of Judge Learned Hand: 124 187 The justification for (absolute immunity) is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. 188 To wait until after the trial for the appellate review of claims of absolute immunity subverts a basic rationale of the doctrine, as Judge Hand has set it out, that is, to prevent the chilling of the free exercise of discretion by not subjecting an official in the protected capacity to a trial for damages on his action. 189 Judge McGowan responds that interlocutory review nevertheless is inappropriate on this absolute immunity question because the question is preserved in the record and will be available for review upon appeal of any final judgment in the action. This is literally true, of course, but for that matter, so would the double jeopardy claim in Abney have been preserved in the record for review from conviction and sentence. Instead, however, the Abney Court inquired into whether the relevant rights that were the subject of the pretrial order would be significantly undermined if appellate review had to await final action in the case. Applying this inquiry here, it is clear and Judge McGowan does not contest the point that the full protection of absolute immunity would be irreparably lost if review had to await final judgment. 125 To paraphrase Abney, even if the defendant here is held not liable in damages, or, if held liable, has his liability ultimately reversed on absolute witness immunity grounds, he has still been forced to endure a trial that the (doctrine of absolute immunity) was designed to prohibit. 190 As his second objection to interlocutory review of absolute witness immunity, Judge McGowan contends that because the District Court declined to certify this question under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the collateral order doctrine should not be invoked as a vehicle for appellate revision of the essential determination committed by Congress to the District Court. 126 I would agree with Judge McGowan that in the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958 Congress meant to make unreviewable the decisions of the District Court about whether to certify a question for interlocutory appeal. 127 However, I submit that a refusal to certify an order for appeal under § 1292(b) has not necessarily been read, and should not necessarily be read as forever foreclosing that order from interlocutory appeal by another route. 191 Imagine, for example, if the petitioners in Abney had sought (as they did not) certification of their double jeopardy claims from the trial court and had been denied it. I agree that there could be no review of the denial of certification, e. g., for abuse of discretion, but I cannot agree that on that account there could be no interlocutory review through another means of the double jeopardy claims. Indeed, the authority cited by Judge McGowan takes the view that the denial of § 1292(b) certification should not be read so harshly. Speaking of the developing doctrine of supervisory mandamus, Professor Moore notes: If a § 1292(b) certificate is sought and denied, mandamus will then lie in an appropriate case, not to compel issuance of the certificate, but to review the order for which the certificate was sought. 128 The Supreme Court has instructed us that interlocutory review by supervisory mandamus of nonfinal orders may be necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system. 129 When the circumstances require that supervisory mandamus be exercised, mandamus of the underlying order should not be barred solely because the trial court refused to certify it. For, as another commentator suggested, 192 (Section) 1292(b) does not obviate the need for advisory mandamus. . . . (C) ertification is limited by the discretion of the district judge; while enlightened judges may well see the necessity of rapid determination of a difficult problem, the policies favoring mandamus should not be bent to the will of individual district court judges. 130 193 Similarly, when the policies behind the collateral order doctrine call for the interlocutory appeal of a final pretrial order, those policies favoring immediate review, as in the Abney situation, for example, should not be bent to the will of individual district court judges. Since the discretion of the trial judge whether to certify is itself unreviewable, the value of immediate review in the small class of cases where it is warranted under the collateral order doctrine could be irretrievably lost if Judge McGowan's view, that denial of certification per se bars interlocutory review, were to prevail.CONCLUSION 194 In summary, the errors and misconceptions of the majority opinion are: 195 1. The underlying principles of Imbler v. Pachtman in granting absolute immunity to the prosecutor there must be applied to Goodwin here. If this is done, the Supreme Court's principles compel the same absolute immunity for this prosecutor. Efforts to distinguish Imbler are based upon factors that are immaterial under the very terms of Imbler and are inappropriate for the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. 196 2. The majority has engaged in a particularistic inquiry here, as to the duties at a single moment of this particular prosecutor in these particular circumstances. All the Supreme Court decisions on immunity show the Court applying a balancing test, with reference to common law precedent, on broad categories of public officials to determine the immunity appropriate. 197 3. The majority has sought to draw a line between the prosecutor as an advocate before the court or with the grand jury in its deliberative function, and the prosecutor with the grand jury in its investigative function. The prosecutor's duties with the grand jury cannot be so divided, legally or practically, and the majority has not been so bold as to claim that the prosecutor is deprived of his absolute immunity at all times when he steps from the courtroom into the grand jury room. 198 4. Even apart from how his relation to the grand jury is characterized, it is undeniable that Goodwin's statement was made as a sworn witness in a judicial proceeding, a function which itself is a source of absolute immunity. 199 In summary, these are the unfortunate consequences which will flow from the majority's decision: 200 1. The time-honored absolute quasi-judicial immunity of the prosecutor (and other counsel) in every courtroom situation will be replaced by a qualified immunity in every situation, in or out of the courtroom. For under the particularistic analysis of the majority opinion, it will always be possible to contend that what the lawyer did under those particular circumstances was entitled only to a qualified immunity. Thus, counsel will be effectively subjected to harassing suits, as Goodwin has been here, until the highest court available finally determines whether absolute or qualified immunity applies. This illustrates the vast practical difference between absolute and qualified immunity, pointed out by Mr. Justice Powell in Imbler. 201 2. The number of instances in which counsel, especially prosecutors, are called to the witness stand will take a quantum leap. Now so rare an occurrence that all our research has not been able to find an appellate case similar to Goodwin's, in the future defense lawyers will be unable to resist the temptation to call the prosecutor to the stand, to force him to hedge or qualify the government position on some important point, at all times with the threat of a possible subsequent civil suit hanging over him if he does not do so. Trial judges can curb this only at the risk of giving the defense another arguable point on appeal. 202 3. All witness immunity as such is struck down. Now, under the majority opinion, all immunity relating to testimony will be determined by the witness' function (not even his regular duties or position), considered in the particular circumstances of the individual case. This brings into contemplation a nightmare of inconsistent variable rules and applications. 203 4. All of the above represents a deadly blow at nearly all the common-law recognized quasi-judicial absolute immunities prosecutor, counsel and witness. Jurors, and then judges, will doubtless be next. 204 For all these reasons, and for those more fully set out in my opinion earlier, I must respectfully dissent.