Opinion ID: 397385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seizure and Search of the CENTAURUS

Text: 12 The government contends that the seizure and boarding of the CENTAURUS were lawful upon a theory either that the customs officers and marine police had statutory authority to stop and board a vessel, or that the seizure and boarding were reasonable, and hence constitutional, under the fourth amendment. The subsequent search of the CENTAURUS was legal, it asserts, because Sergeant Sciukas' recognition of the pungent odor of marijuana while climbing on board the CENTAURUS supplied probable cause for the search and because the mobility of the vessel created exigent circumstances excusing the acquisition of a warrant. We find lawful the initial stop of the CENTAURUS and agree that the warrantless search was legal because the officers had probable cause and faced exigent circumstances at the time it occurred. 13 The justification for the seizure and search of the CENTAURUS lies in both the statutory powers of the customs officers and state marine police and the reasonableness of the seizure and search under the fourth amendment. These sources of authority are not separate, however, as the government would seem to suggest, but are instead interrelated. The applicable statutes vested the officers with the authority to stop and search the boat. The fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness, however, limited their statutory authority in these circumstances to that of making a brief investigatory stop upon a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity and searching the boat only upon probable cause. 14 The statutory authority of customs officers to stop, board, and search a vessel is found in 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), which reads in pertinent part: 15 Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel ... at any place in the United States or within the customs waters ... and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel ... and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel ... and use all necessary force to compel compliance. 16 Maryland marine police officers' statutory authority to stop, board, and search a vessel is similarly broad; Md.Nat.Res.Code Ann. § 8-727 (1974) reads: 17 A natural resources police officer or any law enforcement officer enforcing the provisions of this subtitle (the State Boat Act) may stop, board, or inspect any vessel subject to this subtitle. 2 18 By their terms, these statutes appear to grant customs officers and the Maryland marine police and other state law enforcement officers unfettered authority to stop and search a vessel. The statutory language must be read, however, in light of the fourth amendment's requirement that seizures and searches be reasonable, 3 for no statute can authorize a violation of the Constitution. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2539, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). 19 The initial question before us is whether the stop of the CENTAURUS was a reasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. The requirements that the fourth amendment's reasonableness standard imposes upon a vessel seizure vary greatly according to that vessel's geographic location. A coast guard stop of a vessel on the high seas under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a), for instance, is the equivalent of a border stop and therefore is reasonable even absent any suspicion of criminal activity on board. See United States v. Harper, 617 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887, 101 S.Ct. 243, 66 L.Ed.2d 113 (1980). The seizure of a vessel by customs officers or the coast guard in customs waters, including the territorial waters running from the coast to the three mile border at sea, may also be reasonable as a border stop requiring no probable cause, if the vessel came from international waters and crossed the territorial border. See, e. g., United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1072 n.2 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 3018, 65 L.Ed.2d 1117 (1980) (dictim); United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1976). 20 Our case, however, concerns the seizure of a vessel on inland waters, the Potomac River, with no allegation that the vessel crossed an international border. Under these circumstances, we conclude in accordance with the district court that the fourth amendment requires the customs officers and state police to have had at least a reasonable suspicion that the CENTAURUS was engaged in illegal activity and to have limited the seizure to a brief investigatory stop. This is the prevailing standard of reasonableness under the fourth amendment with respect to a vessel seizure in inland waters, made without sufficient evidence of a border crossing. See United States v. D'Antignac, 628 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967, 101 S.Ct. 1485, 67 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981); United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 2945, 64 L.Ed.2d 826 (1980); United States v. Odneal, 565 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952, 98 S.Ct. 1581, 55 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978). 21 The officers on board the marine police Whaler clearly had a reasonable suspicion that the CENTAURUS was engaged in smuggling marijuana: the evidence of a smuggling operation underway at Smith Point, the sighting by a reliable informant of a sailboat riding low in the water, and the discovery of a heavily laden sailboat of similar description, were, as the district court found, objective and articulable facts creating a reasonable suspicion of illegality which justified a brief investigatory stop. 22 The defendants do not protest that the officers had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to support the stop. They do, however, argue that an investigatory vessel stop does not include a boarding and that, by commencing to board the CENTAURUS without probable cause to support a search, Sergeant Sciukas exceeded the limits of the stop. We are persuaded that a boarding is a necessary element of many vessel investigatory stops, given the sound and motion of water, the often significant size differential between the government's boat and the investigated vessel, and the extreme mobility of water craft. At least two other circuits have concluded that an investigatory stop of a vessel permits a boarding. See United States v. D'Antignac, 628 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967, 101 S.Ct. 1485, 67 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981); United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 2945, 64 L.Ed.2d 826 (1980). We caution that license to board a vessel during an investigatory stop, however, is not license to wander all over the boat or to search for evidence of illegality: the boarding is a part of a brief investigation and the investigating officers' actions must be limited accordingly. A boarding, nevertheless, can be an appropriate part of an investigatory stop, and we hold that in this case it was. Sergeant Sciukas was therefore still acting within the confines of a brief investigatory stop when he started to board the CENTAURUS. 23 While he was in the process of boarding, Sergeant Sciukas smelled the odor of marijuana. The smell supplied probable cause for the state officers and customs officials to act upon their statutory authority and conduct a search of the boat. See, e. g., United States v. Rivera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1979). The officers then undertook a warrantless search of the CENTAURUS, the exigent circumstances arising out of the boat's mobility justifying the conduct of the search without a warrant. See United States v. Hensler, 625 F.2d 1141, 1142 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981); United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1073 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 3018, 65 L.Ed.2d 1117 (1980). During the course of this search, they discovered numerous bales, some with marijuana residue sprinkled on top, in the two open hatches of the boat, as well as the marijuana in the galley. 24 The defendants raise an additional challenge to both the seizure and the search: they argue that the officers' professed intention at the outset to conduct far more than a brief investigatory stop of the CENTAURUS-they had planned to search the CENTAURUS thoroughly, even without probable cause-tainted the stop and search with illegality. We are not persuaded by the argument. However ill intentioned the officers, we must restrict our review to the objective circumstances of the detention in determining its lawfulness. Just as courts should not validate an objectively unreasonable search or seizure on the basis of an officer's good faith intentions, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), so should they steer clear of excluding evidence discovered by objectively lawful means, even if the officers harbored bad faith intent. Reliance upon objective facts and not subjective intentions in judging the legality of a search or seizure best promotes the protections of the fourth amendment. The seizure and search of the CENTAURUS in all objective respects comported with the requirements of the fourth amendment: a reasonable suspicion that the CENTAURUS contained a large quantity of marijuana allowed the officers to stop and detain the CENTAURUS briefly and to board her for investigatory questioning of the crew; the aroma of marijuana supplied probable cause to search the boat; and the exigencies of the situation eliminated the need for a warrant prior to conducting the search. Whatever the officers may have intended to do had probable cause to search not arisen, it is clear that objective circumstances made the seizure and search entirely lawful. 25 Finding no merit in the defendants' arguments, we conclude, as did the district court, that the seizure and search of the CENTAURUS was lawful and that the resulting evidence of marijuana importation and possession offenses should not have been suppressed on this ground.