Opinion ID: 1824168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: malice is a requisite element of second degree murder

Text: We have stated for over a decade that malice is an element of second degree murder. State v. Grimes, 246 Neb. 473, 519 N.W.2d 507 (1994); State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994); State v. Franklin, 241 Neb. 579, 489 N.W.2d 552 (1992); State v. Dean, 237 Neb. 65, 464 N.W.2d 782 (1991); State v. Trevino, 230 Neb. 494, 432 N.W.2d 503 (1988); State v. Ettleman, 229 Neb. 220, 425 N.W.2d 894 (1988); State v. Moniz, 224 Neb. 198, 397 N.W.2d 37 (1986); State v. Rowe, 214 Neb. 685, 335 N.W.2d 309 (1983). For an information to be sufficient to charge a defendant with second degree murder, the information must allege that the accused caused the death of another purposely and maliciously. State v. Plant, supra ; State v. Eggers, supra ; State v. Ladig, 246 Neb. 542, 519 N.W.2d 561 (1994); State v. Manzer, 246 Neb. 536, 519 N.W.2d 558 (1994). If the information for second degree murder did not include malice, the defendant was not charged with a crime. The failure to include the element of malice in a jury instruction on second degree murder is prejudicial error. State v. Plant, supra ; State v. Eggers, supra ; State v. Williams, 247 Neb. 931, 531 N.W.2d 222 (1995); State v. Grimes, supra ; State v. Myers, supra . In this case, jury instruction No. 5 informed the jury that it could find Lowe guilty of murder in the second degree, guilty of manslaughter, or not guilty. Instruction No. 5 also defined the material elements of the crimes of second degree murder. The record reflects that the material element of malice was omitted from the trial court's instruction on second degree murder. The record also reflects that the element of malice was not included in the information. Therefore, Lowe's conviction of second degree murder must be reversed. The State argues that while malice per se was not defined or set forth in the jury instructions, the instructions nonetheless conveyed the concept of malice. Jury instructions must be read together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and the evidence, there is no prejudicial error necessitating a reversal. Hamernick v. Essex Dodge Ltd., 247 Neb. 392, 527 N.W.2d 196 (1995); Scharmann v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 247 Neb. 304, 526 N.W.2d 436 (1995); Sindelar v. Canada Transport, Inc., 246 Neb. 559, 520 N.W.2d 203 (1994). Here, as in State v. Myers, supra , the jury was instructed on the law of self-defense. The State apparently argues that the instruction regarding self-defense, when read with the instruction regarding second degree murder, correctly states the law, including the element of malice. However, in Myers, the failure to include the essential element of malice in the second degree murder jury instruction was prejudicial error, and such error was not cured by the presence of the instruction regarding self-defense. Therefore, the fact that the jury was instructed regarding self-defense in this case does not cure the prejudicial error resulting from the failure to instruct on malice.