Opinion ID: 584989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hearsay Issue

Text: 11 We reject Adams' claims of error on this issue for two reasons. First, if we were to credit each instance pointed out by Adams as an alleged violation of the hearsay rule and consider them cumulatively, we would still conclude that such evidentiary errors were harmless as a matter of law due to the overall strength of the government's case against Adams. 1 12 Second, many of the alleged evidentiary errors were not errors at all, but rather involved statements which were not hearsay by definition. Many of the statements objected to involved statements made by Adams himself or by one of his codefendants during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) and (E). 13 Adams appears to argue that much of the allegedly objectionable testimony from co-conspirators was obtained before it was clearly established that there was a conspiracy. Assuming this to be true, no error results. A trial judge may admit co-conspirators' testimony as long as the government ultimately shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed and that the statements in question were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). In a case in which a conspiracy is charged and proved, as is the case here, there is less likely to be a Vinson problem. 2 The government, of course, proceeds at its peril in offering evidence which is only conditionally admitted. 14 The trial judge rejected some of the evidence objected to and gave cautionary instructions. The evidence which was admitted over objection was found by the judge to come from persons who were co-conspirators and involved statements made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. We agree.