Opinion ID: 2334690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plaintiff's Waiver of Her Abuse of Process Claim

Text: The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff waived her right to complain of abuse of process in this case by failing to object to the questions posed by the interrogatories and by failing to object to questions in her second deposition. To be certain, this issue is clearly present, along with an issue as to whether the plaintiff acted appropriately to mitigate her own damages. Nothing we have said today operates to relieve parties of any responsibility to preserve rights or to take reasonable steps to mitigate their own damages from such abuses. Cf. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Groves, 175 Tenn. 584, 594, 136 S.W.2d 512, 516 (1940) ([I]t is [a plaintiff's] duty to see that as little injury follows the act as possible, and if by ordinary care a particular injury may be avoided, [the plaintiff] cannot hold the wrongdoer responsible.); Ceramic Tile Distribs., Inc. v. Western Express, Inc., 40 S.W.3d 56, 59 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). [9] However, despite the possibility that the plaintiff may have waived any right to complain of abuse of process or that she may have failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate her claimed damages, we are hesitant to dismiss her complaint based upon the potential existence of a factual affirmative defense. In Anthony v. Tidwell, 560 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Tenn.1977), we held that a complaint is subject to dismissal under rule 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim if an affirmative defense clearly and unequivocally appears on the face of the complaint. We also noted that [i]t is not necessary for the defendant to submit evidence in support of his motion when the facts on which he relies to defeat plaintiff's claim are admitted by the plaintiff in his complaint. Therefore, when the affirmative defense involves only an issue of law, such as whether the statute of limitations has run, see Tidwell, 560 S.W.2d at 909; Dukes v. Noe, 856 S.W.2d 403, 404 & n. 1 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993), application of this standard is certainly appropriate. Nevertheless, when the affirmative defense relates primarily to an issue of fact, different concerns may often counsel against deciding the merits of the affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss. First, the liberal pleading requirements of Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 require a plaintiff only to set forth a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. See White, 33 S.W.3d at 718. As one commentator has noted, the very purpose of Rule 8.01 is defeated if a plaintiff must plead facts not strictly related to the prima facie claim solely to anticipate matters that may be set up as affirmative defenses. See Rhynette Northcross Hurd, The Propriety of Permitting Affirmative Defenses to be Raised by Motions to Dismiss, 20 Univ. Mem. L.Rev. 411, 415 (1990). Second, and more importantly, a court resolving a factual dispute only upon the complaint's allegations may not fully consider whether other evidence exists that defeats or mitigates the apparent defense. Consequently, an injustice may occur if a court dismisses a complaint on a factual affirmative defense merely because no rebuttal of that defense appears within the complaint's allegations. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the more appropriate course of action in this case is to permit the suit to continue so that the validity of these factual affirmative defenses may be tested by actual proof and not merely upon the potentially incomplete allegations of the complaint. Again, we are not concerned with whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail in her action, and we seek only to determine whether her allegations, if proven, would establish a prima facie case of liability. See White, 33 S.W.3d at 718. We hold that they would and that the resolution of any factual affirmative defenses should be made by the trial court only upon complete consideration of all the surrounding facts and circumstances. B. INDUCEMENT TO BREACH EXPRESS AND IMPLIED CONTRACTS OF CONFIDENTIALITY The plaintiff next alleges that her physician was bound by express and implied contracts to keep her medical information confidential and that the Richardson Firm, in its efforts to obtain this information, induced him to breach these contracts of confidentiality. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the Richardson Firm is liable for inducement to breach contracts of confidentiality by requesting medical records through the use of defective subpoenas and by initiating private conversations with her physician and other health care providers outside a formal deposition. Tennessee recognizes both a statutory and common law action for inducement to breach a contract, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-50-109 (2001); Polk & Sullivan, Inc. v. United Cities Gas Co., 783 S.W.2d 538, 543 (Tenn.1989), and both forms of the action protect contracts implied in fact, as well as formal, expressed contracts, Mefford v. City of Dupontonia, 49 Tenn.App. 349, 355, 354 S.W.2d 823, 826 (1961). Importantly, the elements for both forms of the action are identical, except that a plaintiff asserting a common law action may recover punitive damages, instead of the treble damages mandated by the statute. See Buddy Lee Attractions, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 13 S.W.3d 343, 360-61 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). In order to recover on a theory of inducement to breach a contract, a plaintiff must allege and prove seven elements: (1) that a legal contract existed; (2) that the defendant was aware of the contract; (3) that the defendant intended to induce a breach of that contract; (4) that the defendant acted with malice; (5) that a breach of the contract occurred; (6) that the breach was a proximate result of the defendant's conduct; and (7) that the breach injured the plaintiff. See Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tenn.1994); Baker v. Hooper, 50 S.W.3d 463, 468 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001).