Opinion ID: 2240184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Habitual Offender Procedure

Text: Murphy alleges several procedural errors which he argues require a reversal of the habitual offender finding. His first claim rests on the State's filing of the habitual offender charge, without objection, the day before Murphy's trial began. Murphy now argues that the late filing prejudiced him and that the State should have been foreclosed from prosecuting him as an habitual offender. This Court confronted a similar argument in Wilson v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 717. The habitual offender charge was filed on the first day of Wilson's trial. He did not seek a continuance. Through discovery Wilson had been provided documentation of the criminal convictions alleged in the habitual offender information. This Court held that Wilson may have been entitled to a continuance under the circumstances but not to dismissal of the habitual offender charge. In this case, Murphy did not object to the filing nor did he seek a continuance. He has thus waived the issue. Locke v. State (1984), Ind., 461 N.E.2d 1090, 1091. Furthermore, he received documentation of his previous convictions and does not contend that any of the evidence presented at the habitual offender hearing was unknown to him. Murphy does claim that he did not have time to investigate these prior convictions to determine whether there were grounds for collateral attack. However, he does not suggest that those grounds even existed. His bald assertions of prejudice are not sufficient to merit reversal of the habitual offender finding. Thus, following the precedent set by Wilson, we find no error. Murphy next challenges the form of the habitual offender charge. While the habitual offender charge is not a separate offense under Indiana law, it is subject to the rules governing charging of criminal offenses, including Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5(c). State v. Hicks (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 1014; Hutchinson v. State (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 955. Murphy claims that the State did not seek the leave of the court to amend the information to add the habitual offender count as required by Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5(c), which provides: Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court may, at any time before, during, or after the trial, permit an amendment to the indictment or information in respect to any defect, imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. The State implicitly moved to add the habitual offender count when it filed the amended information, which was not effective until the trial court accepted it. Therefore, we find no error. Murphy also contends the State filed the habitual offender count as a separate and distinct charge, rather than as an enhancement of the underlying offense. The habitual offender count was typed on a separate piece of paper attached to a page labeled Amended Information which recounted the four underlying offenses. The habitual offender charge should always be attached to the original information on a separate page. Sears v. State (1983), Ind., 456 N.E.2d 390. The form of the habitual offender charge filed against Murphy was proper. Next, Murphy contends he was never arraigned on the habitual offender charge. The record establishes that he was. Murphy's final argument is that the trial court improperly impaneled another jury when the original jury could not reach a unanimous finding. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8 requires that the same jury which hears the evidence on the underlying offenses be the first to attempt to determine the habitual offender question; however, the statute does not preclude a different jury from determining the issue after the first jury fails to reach an agreement. State v. McMillan (1980), 274 Ind. 167, 409 N.E.2d 612. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and PIVARNIK and DICKSON, JJ., concur. DeBRULER, J., concurs in result.