Opinion ID: 2550923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Alleged Dangers Associated with the Landing Area Itself

Text: Plaintiffs submit that, under the Richardson rule, the State, as the owner and occupier of Ke`anae Landing, had a duty to Plaintiffs to take reasonable steps to eliminate unreasonable risks or warn them against the risks associated with the landing area itself. The State argues that, if, as Plaintiffs urge, Act 190 is interpreted such that it does not apply to the present case because Ke`anae Landing was a contributing factor, the statute would be inapplicable under almost any situation. Significantly, under Plaintiffs' proposed interpretation, it could be argued in almost any situation involving a drowning that the natural ocean conditions were not the sole proximate cause, but that a beach or ocean access was a contributing factor, and that Act 190 therefore should not apply. In response, Plaintiffs assert that [t]he court was ... required to bifurcate the State's duties between the duty to warn of dangerous natural conditions in the ocean[] and the duty to warn of or protect against the dangers of Ke`anae Landing itself. Act 190 protects the State only against the former. The trial court specifically found in FOF No. 17 that the landing and surrounding area was neither defective nor dangerous. [7] Plaintiffs assert that FOF No. 17 is: (1) contrary to FOF No. 86 and (2) contrary to the substantial evidence in the record. FOF No. 86 states: According to Dr. Grigg, if a person was walking down the landing area, that person would see the landing as it exists and that there was no guard railing. Dr. Grigg further stated that a person would also see that there was nothing to protect him or her if that person were at the bottom of the landing. Plaintiffs submit that, [t]o the extent that FOF 86 implies that the dangerous conditions at Ke`anae Landing were open and obvious, it is contrary to FOF 17. Plaintiffs also argue that they presented evidence at trial that there were dangerous conditions at the landing area itself and that the State failed to eliminate those risks: Dr. Richard Grigg testified that if the State did not wish to erect warning signs, it could eliminate the risks of waves sweeping over the lower platform by restricting access thereto or removing the structures. Both Mr. [Herbert] Bogert and Mr. [Patrick] Durkin [Plaintiffs' expert witnesses] testified as to how Ke`anae Landing is dangerous and what the State could do to eliminate those dangers, such as railings, barriers, cables, and demolition.... [T]he State intended for Meghal to use the landing just as he was; however, such use was dangerous to him and others. The State had superior knowledge of this danger, yet it did nothing to eliminate the risk, although it could have easily done so. (Citations to record omitted.) The State asserts, inter alia, that there was substantial contradictory evidence, including but not limited to the court's own site inspection conducted pursuant to [] Plaintiffs' request. [8] Plaintiffs' challenge to FOF No. 17 is without merit. As this court has noted, even where testimony as to particular facts is uncontradicted, questions of fact always involve a question of credibility to be resolved by the trier of facts. Siko v. Seguirant, 51 Haw. 118, 119, 452 P.2d 447, 448 (1969). This court must, therefore, generally accept the determination of the court which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the direct and cross-examinations. Id. at 119-20, 452 P.2d at 448. Moreover, the admissibility and weight to be given to expert testimony dealing directly with an ultimate question which the trial court, as the trier of fact, was required to decide is ordinarily left to the discretion of the trial court. Friedrich, 60 Haw. at 38, 586 P.2d at 1041. This court's analysis in Friedrich is particularly illuminating: We need not consider what limitations may exist on the freedom of a trier of fact to reject uncontradicted expert testimony. Here the testimony offered by [plaintiff-appellant] went only to the question whether a guardrail or a warning sign was necessary to make the pier reasonably safe for sightseers. The opinion of [plaintiff-appellant]'s experts on this issue dealt directly with an ultimate question which the trial court was required to decide as the trier of fact. We have said that such testimony is ordinarily inadmissible and in any event its admission is largely within the discretion of the trial court. Sherry v. Asing, 56 Haw. 135, 147-48, 531 P.2d 648, 657-58 (1975). Although the testimony was admitted by the trial court, the weight to be accorded to it was clearly to be determined by the court. We conclude that [plaintiff-appellant]'s challenges to the findings of fact are without merit. Id. at 38, 586 P.2d at 1041. Likewise, in the present case, the trial court, as the trier of fact, was faced with the question whether railings, barriers, cables, and/or demolition of the landing were necessary to make Ke`anae Landing reasonably safe for visitors. Implicit in the trial court's finding that the landing and surrounding area was neither defective nor dangerous is the trial court's apparent belief that any remedial modifications to the landing area, including demolition, were not necessary. The trial court's finding is premised upon its own viewing of Ke`anae Landing and several pictures exhibiting the conditions of the landing area seconds before Meghal was seen in the ocean. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the landing area was neither defective nor dangerous. See State v. Pauline, 100 Hawai`i 356, 375, 60 P.3d 306, 325 (2002) (holding that a jury view, whether by a jury or a judge as the trier of fact, constitutes independent evidence). Thus, we hold that the trial court's finding that the landing area was neither defective nor dangerous was not clearly erroneous.
On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that FOF No. 3 is erroneous. FOF No. 3 states in relevant part: Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint against Defendant State on May 6, 1999, alleging that Defendant State had a duty to warn of dangerous ocean conditions at [] Ke`anae Landing. Plaintiffs contend that this finding is erroneous to the extent that it disregards Plaintiffs' claim that the State failed to protect them from the dangers at Ke`anae Landing. Plaintiffs argue that they asserted claims for both the State's failure to warn of unreasonable risks and its failure to eliminate those risks, and, as a result, the trial court failed to enter any FOF or COL with respect to Plaintiffs' failure to eliminate risks claim. Thus, Plaintiffs submit that the trial court erred when it entered final judgment as to all claims in favor of the State. In response, the State argues that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the landing area itself was unreasonably dangerous. Based on the analysis provided supra, we agree. The allegation in Plaintiff's amended complaint at issue here specifically stated: [O]n or before January 30, 1997, knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that wave, water or other aquatic conditions of or in the Pacific Ocean adjacent to ... Ke`anae Landing, was/were potentially dangerous to visitors of the area, including [the decedents]; further, said defendants, and/or any of them, failed to adequately warn or protect plaintiffs or any of them, or others, of or from the aforesaid dangerous aquatic conditions. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs, on appeal, incorrectly characterize the claims they alleged in their complaint. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendants failed to adequately protect plaintiffs from the aforesaid dangerous aquatic conditions. (Emphasis added.) Inasmuch as aquatic means living or growing in water, Plaintiffs actually alleged that the defendants failed to protect them from water-related conditions, not the man-made conditions of the landing area itself, as they argue on appeal. The Random House College Dictionary 67 (1st ed.1979). Additionally, the trial court concluded that Act 190 relieves the Defendant State of any liability to Plaintiffs. COL No. 107. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that, although Act 190 does relieve the State of its duty to warn Plaintiffs, it does not relieve the State of its alternate duty under common law premises liability `to take reasonable steps to eliminate the unreasonable risk.' However, the landing area itself was found to be neither defective nor dangerous, and, as discussed supra, such finding was supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, we hold that FOF No. 3 is not clearly erroneous and that COL No. 107 is correct.