Opinion ID: 781399
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The April 1997 IEP

Text: 19 G first contends that the district court erred in finding that the April 1997 IEP proposed a FAPE. Whether an IEP is `appropriate' for purposes of the IDEA (i.e., whether it meets the relevant statutory definition of a FAPE) is a question of fact in our circuit. DiBuo v. Bd. of Ed. of Worcester County, 309 F.3d 184, 188 n. 8 (4th Cir.2002). 20 After reviewing the April 1997 IEP's terms, the district court concluded that [t]he school cured its deficiencies [in the May 1996 IEP] at the April 1997 IEP meeting and [in the] subsequently-issued plan ..., and thus offered G a FAPE. (J.A. at 183.) In reaching this conclusion, the district court noted that the April 1997 IEP reflected significant modifications and changes made to address concerns expressed by [G's] mother after submission of the November 18, 1996 letter. (J.A. at 183 (quoting Appeals Board opinion).) G asserts that the district court erred in employing the federal FAPE standard rather than the more stringent state standard, and further, assuming the district court applied the correct law, that it erred in finding the April 1997 IEP sufficient under the federal standard because FBDS did not have personnel with the training or experience necessary to implement the IEP.
21 Under § 1401(a)(18)(B) a FAPE is defined as including special education and related services that ... meet the standards of the State educational agency.... 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(18)(B). The Supreme Court held in Rowley that 22 a court's inquiry in suits brought under [§ 1414(e)(2)] is twofold. First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more. 23 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (emphasis added); see also id. at 201, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (noting that the IDEA's FAPE definition, via its incorporation of related services, expressly requires the provision of such ... supportive services ... as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education) (emphasis in Rowley ). Thus, federal law establishes a minimum baseline of educational benefits that states must offer students with disabilities. States are free, however, to set a higher standard for provision of educational services to those students, and North Carolina has taken this approach. 12 24 G argues that the North Carolina standard governs the services FBDS must provide because FBDS's schools are located in North Carolina and thus North Carolina's standards are the standards of the State educational agency referred to in 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(18)(B). See generally Gill v. Columbia 93 School Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1035 (8th Cir.2000) (If state legislation implementing the IDEA creates a higher standard than the federal minimum, an individual may bring an action under the federal statute seeking to enforce the state standard.). FBDS argues that the North Carolina standard does not apply to it, both because Congress did not clearly express an intent to make federally run schools subject to state standards and because Congress elsewhere has provided by statute that the Department of Defense is responsible for setting substantive educational standards for Department of Defense Elementary and Secondary Schools. We review the district court's conclusion that the federal standard applies de novo. 25 For a federal installation to be subject to state laws, there must be a clear, unequivocal, federal statutory requirement that the entity be so subject. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 48 L.Ed.2d 555 (1976) (stating also that an authorization of state regulation [of a federal entity] is found only when and to the extent there is `a clear congressional mandate,' `specific congressional action' that makes this authorization of state regulation clear and unambiguous); see also EPA v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 211, 96 S.Ct. 2022, 48 L.Ed.2d 578 (1976) (Federal installations are subject to state regulation only when and to the extent that congressional authorization is clear and unambiguous.). 26 As we have noted, the definition of a FAPE under the IDEA requires that educational services meet the standards of the State educational agency. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(18)(B). A school run by a state or political subdivision of a state, then, must meet the standards established by the governing state educational agency, which in turn must meet or exceed the IDEA's minimum requirement. The statement that a FAPE consists of education and related services that meet the state agency's standard, however, does not explicitly address the situation here — a federal entity operating a school within the borders of a state. Under the IDEA, a state educational agency is the agency primarily responsible for State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools.... 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(17). But in the case of FBDS, there is no state agency responsible for  state supervision of the schools. Thus, G's central argument on this issue fails. 27 Moreover, the federal statutes relating to rights of children in Department of Defense schools, 10 U.S.C.A. § 2164(f) 13 and 20 U.S.C.A. § 241(a) (West 1992) (repealed in 1994), 14 provide no clear indication that Congress intended a federal institution such as FBDS to be subject to FAPE standards established by state regulators, as state standards are not specifically mentioned in either § 2164 or § 241. Further, the Department of Defense has promulgated regulations that mirror the substantive standards expressed in the IDEA and requires its schools to abide by those standards. 15 See 32 C.F.R. § 80.4(a). 28 We find that § 241(a)'s requirement of comparability to the maximum extent practicable and its reference to the rights of children with disabilities does not amount to the clear and unequivocal federal statutory requirement necessary to incorporate the FAPE standard of the state in which a Department of Defense school is located. Section 241(a) refers only to qualitative standards of schools in comparable communities, such as the compensation, tenure, leave, hours of work, and other incidents of employment of personnel hired to operate those schools, as areas in which Department of Defense schools should be comparable. It is thus a reasonable conclusion that § 241(a) was meant to compare schools operated by the Department of Defense to schools in comparable communities only in more general terms such as the conditions under which school personnel are employed to provide education to all, rather than only disabled, students. Section 2164(f)(2)'s reference to the rights of children with disabilities under § 241(a) may reasonably be read as indicating that § 2164(f)(1), in requiring that the IDEA's protections be extended to children with disabilities in schools operated by the Department of Defense, does not relieve the Department of Defense of its burden, applicable with respect to the education of all its students, to ensure that the education those children receive remains generally comparable to education provided in comparable communities, as measured by indicators such as compensation, tenure, hours of work, and other incidents of employment. 16 29 In sum, G has not identified, nor have we found, any clear expression of congressional intent to subject federal entities to state FAPE standards in providing education under the IDEA. Statutory references to substantive rights and procedural safeguards under the IDEA do not unequivocally refer to FAPE standards enacted by the states, because as the Supreme Court made clear in Rowley, the IDEA itself contains a substantive FAPE standard. We conclude that the federal standard embodied in the IDEA, then, rather than North Carolina's full potential standard, governs G's IEPs.
30 Having determined that the federal standard applies, we must next address the question of whether G's April 1997 IEP was reasonably calculated to provide G meaningful educational benefit. The parties agree that on paper — that is, in the instructional methods and activities proposed — the April 1997 IEP is reasonably calculated to provide G educational benefit, but dispute whether FBDS is able to implement the IEP. 17 We conclude that the record before us is insufficient to permit a reasoned conclusion as to whether FBDS could implement the April 1997 IEP as proposed in a way that would provide educational benefit to G. 31 As we have noted, G asserts that FBDS is unable, without the involvement of a Lovaas-certified consultant, to implement the April 1997 IEP in a way that would provide him educational benefit. G contends that the April 1997 IEP is deficient because it does not propose that the necessary role of the Lovaas consultant will be filled by anyone with comparable training or experience. In support of this argument, G relies primarily on the finding of the IHO that [t]he Lovaas Consultant is the heart of the Lovaas program. (Appellant's Br. at 29 (citing IHO decision, J.A. at 93).) In response, FBDS casts the substantive dispute with respect to the April 1997 IEP — whether or not a Lovaas-certified consultant was necessary to provide G a FAPE — as a dispute over the choice of educational methodology included in the IEP, an area ill-suited to judicial second-guessing. 32 After an extensive hearing, the IHO found that the April 1997 IEP was insufficient because [n]either G's current therapists nor his special education teacher during 1995-96 are presently able to adequately perform the function of ... a Lovaas consultant based on their current qualifications. (J.A. at 93.) The IHO explained that 33 the Lovaas consultant is the heart of the Lovaas program. Lovaas is not simply a methodology that any educator may employ with success, but rather, the experience, insight, and adaptability that the consultant brings to the chair are what is essential. 34 (J.A. at 93.) 35 The IHO's decision was reversed by the Appeal Board, which found that the April 1997 IEP had proposed a FAPE. The Appeal Board reasoned that the IHO had given insufficient deference to the educational professionals who created the IEP, that the IHO erred by comparing the April 1997 IEP to the Lovaas program, and that the April 1997 IEP was not merely a repetition of the May 1996 IEP, which the IHO had already found inadequate. (J.A. at 126-27.) The district court affirmed the Appeal Board's decision, finding that the April 1997 IEP proposed a FAPE because it reflected significant modifications and changes made to express concerns expressed by [G's] mother, including an increase in the number of Pre-Academic Skills Goals listed. (J.A. at 182-83.) Neither the Appeal Board nor the district court considered evidence apart from that assessed in the first instance by the IHO. 36 While we ordinarily would owe deference to FBDS's simple assertion that it is capable of implementing the April 1997 IEP, see MM ex rel. DM v. School Dist. of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2002), in this case the IHO, after considering extensive evidence, concluded that FBDS personnel who were not Lovaas-certified and did not have comparable training or experience could not adequately implement the teaching methods called for in the April 1997 IEP. The IHO's determination, however, does not appear to have been based on an evaluation of the evidence under the proper standard. Rather than assessing FBDS's ability to provide G educational benefit under the April 1997 IEP, the IHO assessed FBDS's ability to replicate the complete Lovaas therapy. That is, the IHO's conclusion was premised not on an analysis of whether the April 1997 IEP was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to G, but instead on examination of whether that IEP would replicate the benefit to G of the complete Lovaas therapy, which had been successful for him. (J.A. at 93 (The April 1997 IEP does not propose to continue the complete behavioral therapy program for G although it has been proven empirically to work with G as well as some other autistic preschool-age children.... As has sometimes been observed, if it isn't broken, don't `fix' it.)); id. (noting that without the consultant, there would be no assurance that the Lovaas curriculum, including daily documentation, would be consistently followed). 37 Neither the Appeal Board nor the district court addressed FBDS's ability to implement the April 1997 IEP as proposed (that is, absent a Lovaas-certified consultant's involvement) or provided an independent assessment of the educational benefit G would receive from that IEP. This is thus an unusual case in that, even after the conclusion of the administrative process and a trial of the issues in the district court, none of the decisions below reflect a thorough assessment of the evidence under the proper standard — that is, whether the April 1997 IEP, as proposed, was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to G. Having examined the record and the parties' arguments thoroughly, we conclude that they are not sufficient to support a reasoned analysis and conclusion in this court on the issue of FBDS's ability to implement the April 1997 IEP as proposed. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment on this issue and remand for such further proceedings as are required to resolve the parties' conflict under the proper standard.