Opinion ID: 2631230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sex Discrimination under the Human Rights Act

Text: {39} Garcia-Montoya alleged that she was transferred on the basis of her sex in violation of Section 28-1-7(A) of the Human Rights Act. In analyzing claims of unlawful discrimination under the Act, we have found guidance in the federal courts' interpretation of unlawful discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). See Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 517, 787 P.2d 433, 436 (1990) (Our reliance on the methodology developed in the federal courts, however, should not be interpreted as an indication that we have adopted federal law as our own.). In particular, we have applied the evidentiary methodology articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this methodology, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case; once the prima facie case is established, the employer bears the burden of producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action; and finally, a plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to rebut the employer's proffered reason. Gonzales v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 2000 NMSC 029, ¶ 21, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550. One method of establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is for a plaintiff to show that he or she is a member of [a] protected group, that he [or she] was qualified to continue in his [or her] position, that the employer removed him or her from the position, and that his [or her] position was filled by someone not a member of the protected class. Smith, 109 N.M. at 518, 787 P.2d at 437 (noting that [a] prima facie case may also be made out through other means). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, there is a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. Tex. Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). However, the presumption drops from the case if the defendant satisfies the burden of producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action. Id. at 255 & n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089. {40} In this case, the STO produced evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Specifically, the STO claimed that it transferred Garcia-Montoya based on the Table of Organizational Listings (TOOL), a document describing the organizational structure of the agency. According to the STO, Garcia-Montoya's TOOL number placed her within the investment division of the agency rather than the administrative services division. As a result, the STO claimed that it was necessary to reassign Garcia-Montoya to the proper division. Additionally, the STO asserted that Garcia Montoya was reassigned to the position of acting director of the local government investment pool in order to oversee a program that was expanding due to new legislative mandates. In response to these claims, Garcia-Montoya introduced evidence suggesting that the STO's proffered reason was false. She stated in an affidavit that her State employment classification was not inconsistent with her former position and that administrative services was merely a subunit of a different division in the STO during Montoya's term of office. Garcia-Montoya also claimed that Montoya made numerous personnel decisions from January 1995 through September 1995 without regard to the TOOL and, even more specifically, that her replacement did not have the correct TOOL for the director of administrative services position. Despite Garcia-Montoya's contention that the proffered reason was false, the STO argued to the district court that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). [3] {41} In St. Mary's, the United States Supreme Court elaborated on the burden-shifting methodology of McDonnell Douglas . The plaintiff in St. Mary's established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, and the employer then introduced evidence of two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions: the severity and the accumulation of rules violations committed by the plaintiff. Id. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742. However, based on a showing by the plaintiff, the trial court found at the close of a bench trial that the employer's proffered reasons were not the real reasons for [the plaintiff's] demotion and discharge because other employees in equivalent positions were not disciplined for committing similar or even more severe rules violations. Id. at 508, 113 S.Ct. 2742. Despite the trial court's rejection of the employer's proffered reason, the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to carry his ultimate burden of proving that his race was the determining factor in [the] decision first to demote and then to dismiss him, and entered judgment in favor of the employer. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that proof that an employer's proffered reason is false entitles the plaintiff in a discrimination case to judgment as a matter of law. Id. {42} The Supreme Court reversed and determined that the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test would effectively substitute ... the required finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination [with] the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable. Id. at 514-15, 113 S.Ct. 2742. [T]he Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff ... ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the `ultimate burden of persuasion.' Id. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742. {43} The STO argues that Garcia Montoya's claim fails as a matter of law because, once the STO satisfied its burden of production, she did not introduce any additional evidence of discrimination beyond the evidence discrediting the STO's proffered reason for the employment action. The STO's argument is likely based on the Supreme Court's statement that a reason cannot be proved to be `a pretext for discrimination ' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742. In fact, a number of federal Courts of Appeals interpreted St. Mary's in accordance with the STO's position. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2104-05, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (noting a conflict among the federal courts and listing cases). In granting the STO's motion for summary judgment, it appears that the district court accepted this construction of St. Mary's and determined that Garcia-Montoya's failure to introduce additional evidence of discrimination was fatal to her claim. {44} Since the district court's ruling, the United States Supreme Court has specifically addressed the issue raised in the STO's motion for summary judgment and has resolved the conflicting applications of St. Mary's by the federal Courts of Appeals. In Reeves, the Supreme Court clarified the evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. 120 S.Ct. at 2108. The Court reviewed its decision in St. Mary's and determined that, under the holding of that case, it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation. Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2108. Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it might be quite persuasive. In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.... Moreover, once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Id. at 2108-09 (citations, quotation marks, and quoted authority omitted). {45} The Court's opinion in Reeves clarifies that, to avoid an adverse judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiff ordinarily need not introduce additional evidence of discrimination beyond evidence establishing a prima facie case and evidence of the falsity of the proffered reason for the employment action. The Court therefore rejected the interpretation of St. Mary's offered by the STO in this case. We believe the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Reeves is in accord with the intent of the Legislature with respect to Section 28-1-7(A). See Smith, 109 N.M. at 518, 787 P.2d at 437 ([T]he purpose of the [ McDonnell Douglas ] test is to allow discriminated-against plaintiffs, in the absence of direct proof of discrimination, to demonstrate an employer's discriminatory motives.). {46} It appears that the district court, not having the benefit of the Supreme Court's opinion in Reeves, based its ruling on the STO's mistaken interpretation of the law. As a result, we believe it is prudent to vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of the STO. We do not conclude, however, that the district court's ruling was necessarily erroneous. The Supreme Court also explained in Reeves that its interpretation of St. Mary's does not mean that evidence establishing a prima facie case and the falsity of the employer's proffered reason will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred. Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2109. {47} In this case, we believe that Garcia-Montoya created more than just a weak issue of fact concerning the falsity of the STO's proffered reason. Garcia-Montoya's evidence, if believed by a factfinder, suggests that the STO may have been dissembling to cover up its true motive in transferring her. However, the record also suggests that, if the STO's proffered reason was false, the STO may have been concealing a motive other than discrimination on the basis of sex. Almost all of the material submitted by Garcia-Montoya on summary judgment focuses on political affiliation as the motivation for her transfer. Indeed, Garcia-Montoya averred that Montoya told her directly that he transferred her because he did not trust any of you, which she interpreted as a comment about political affiliation. Additionally, Garcia-Montoya alleged that her replacement was a political ally of Montoya. Based on this evidence, it may be that the STO asserted a false justification for Garcia-Montoya's transfer in order to obscure a decision based on political affiliation. [4] {48} Nonetheless, rather than this Court addressing the issue in the first instance, we believe it is more appropriate in this case to allow the district court to consider initially whether the record conclusively reveal[s] some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision and, if necessary, to permit the parties to develop more fully the facts relevant to the legal analysis established in Reeves. [O]n appeal, when the trial court's grant of summary judgment is grounded upon an error of law, the case may be remanded so that the issues may be determined under the correct principles of law. Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 1997 NMSC 041, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 752, 945 P.2d 970. Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary judgment in favor of the STO and remand for reconsideration of the motion based on Reeves.