Opinion ID: 163124
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutionality of Excluding Dr. Bebensee's Testimony

Text: 168 As previously stated, United States v. Scheffer is closely in point. In that case, eight members of the Court affirmed the exclusion of a polygrapher's testimony regarding the truthfulness of the subject of a polygraph test. See 523 U.S. at 317 n. 13, 118 S.Ct. 1261 (emphasizing that polygraph testimony is opinion testimony, not factual evidence). But the Court did not hold that rules of evidence could always bar expert opinion on veracity. That is not to say that the Court did not come close to so ruling. Justice Thomas's plurality opinion, joined on this matter by three other justices, said: 169 It is equally clear that Rule 707 [barring polygraph evidence] serves a second legitimate governmental interest: Preserving the court members' core function of making credibility determinations in criminal trials. A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that the jury is the lie detector. United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (C.A.9 1973) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 959, 94 S.Ct. 1976, 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974). 170 Id. at 312-13, 118 S.Ct. 1261. 171 This view, however, did not muster majority support. The basis for the majority opinion — the portion of Justice Thomas's opinion joined by seven other justices — was that exclusion of the polygraph testimony was constitutionally permissible for a combination of two reasons. One, exclusion of the evidence did not implicate any significant interest of the accused. Id. at 316-17, 118 S.Ct. 1261. Two, the reliability of the evidence was questionable. Id. at 309-12, 118 S.Ct. 1261. 172 We therefore examine those factors here. We begin with the first factor — failure to implicate any significant interest of the accused. The term significant interest is used in a special sense in Scheffer. In ordinary usage, a party's inability to use favorable polygraph testimony would be considered an injury to a significant interest of the party. The discussion in Scheffer, however, indicates that the significant interest of concern is the right to put on factual evidence. Scheffer emphasizes that the court members [at the court-martial] heard all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective of the accused and the accused was not precluded from introducing any factual evidence. Id. at 317, 118 S.Ct. 1261. The Court particularly stressed that Scheffer was not restricted in testifying on his own behalf. Id. All that Scheffer was precluded from presenting was merely ... expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility. Id. In contrast, the defendant in Washington was denied the opportunity `to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed[,]' id. at 316, 118 S.Ct. 1261 ( quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920); in Rock the defendant was prohibited from testifying to her own version of events, id. at 315-16, 118 S.Ct. 1261; and in Chambers the defendant was barred from supporting his contention that the true culprit was a man named McDonald by cross-examining McDonald or questioning the men to whom McDonald had allegedly confessed, id. at 316, 118 S.Ct. 1261. 173 Under the Court's meaning of significant interest, we doubt that any significant interest of Petitioner was implicated by exclusion of Dr. Bebensee's testimony. Dr. Bebensee had no fact-based knowledge; in fact, she apparently had not even talked to anyone with firsthand knowledge. All she could contribute was opinion testimony — opinion testimony that amounted to a conclusion that the Victim's account was not credible. 174 Moreover, in determining whether there has been a violation of the right to present a defense, the significance factor must be weighed against the second factor — the reliability of the evidence. An astrologer or palm reader may have testimony that could sway the jury, but no court could say that a defendant has the constitutional right to present such evidence. 175