Opinion ID: 2510443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court's findings were sufficient to extend orr's probation.

Text: ¶27 Orr next argues that the district court's findings were inadequate to support the extension of his probation for two reasons: (1) in its written order, the district court did not expressly find that Orr violated his probation and (2) the district court did not find that Orr's probation violation was willful. ¶28 The Probation Statute provides that [p]robation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(i) (2003). After a hearing to extend probation, the court shall make findings of fact. Id. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(i). Nowhere in the Probation Statute is the district court required to make written findings of fact or to find that such violation was willful. See id. § 77-18-1. ¶29 We therefore focus our analysis on whether due process requires a district court to make written findings of fact or to find that a defendant has willfully violated the terms of his probation. We will address each of these issues before turning to the question of whether the district court's findings were sufficient to support its extension of Orr's probation.
¶30 One of the minimum requirements of due process is that a defendant receive a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973); United States v. Gilbert, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 33744, -8 (10th Cir. Dec. 4, 1995) (unpublished opinion). ¶31 Because the purpose of the written statement requirement is to provide a basis for review and encourage accurate factfinding, Black, 471 U.S. at 613-14; Gilbert, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 33744, at -8, a transcribed oral finding or district court order is sufficient to meet that requirement so long as it enables the reviewing court to determine the basis of the district court's decision. See Gilbert, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 33744, at -8; accord Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir. 1983) (We hold that written findings are constitutionally required only if the transcript and record before the judge do not enable a reviewing court to determine the basis of the judge's decision to revoke probation.); Morishita v. Morris, 621 P.2d 691, 693 n.2 (Utah 1980) (holding that findings were sufficient despite a lack of express written findings because the transcript revealed the judge's thought process and the conclusions he drew from the evidence). ¶32 We now turn to the issue of whether the district court was required to find that a probation violation was willful.
¶33 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant's probation, in some instances, may be revoked regardless of whether the defendant is at fault for violating the terms of his probation. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 669 n.9 (1983); see also United States v. Warner, 830 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1987) (If . . . probation's purposes have been frustrated, revocation is fair and appropriate even if the probationer did not willfully violate his probation conditions.). Failure to pay restitution is not one of those instances. Beardon, 461 U.S. at 668. The fundamental fairness requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the revocation of probation when a probationer has failed to pay restitution or a fine through no fault of his own. Id. ¶34 To revoke probation for failure to pay restitution, a court must find that the probationer willfully refused to pay or that he failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money. Id. If, however, a court finds that a probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, the court must consider whether adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are available. Id. at 668-69. Then, [o]nly if alternative measures are not adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and deterrence[,] may the court imprison a probationer. Id. at 672; 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 908 (1998). ¶35 It is not clear whether the willfulness requirement applies to the mere extension of probation for failure to pay restitution. We do not need to decide that issue here, however, because, as we discuss below, we find that the district court made sufficient findings of fact to support the extension of probation even under the standard for revoking probation. We now turn to the issue of whether the district court made findings of fact sufficient to support its extension of Orr's probation.
¶36 Applying the above rules to the facts of this case, we hold that the district court had authority to extend Orr's probation and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. First, although the district court did not specifically designate a portion of its order as written findings of fact, the record adequately reflected the evidence the district court relied on and its reasons for extending probation. It is clear from the record that the district found that Orr had violated the condition of his probation requiring him to pay restitution to his victims. For example, at the hearing the district court stated that Orr hasn't paid a nickel on his restitution since he thought probation was over. Then, in its written order, the district court stated The defendant's failure to pay the May and June installments of his restitution underscores the fact that the defendant is induced to repay his victims only when he is in the shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held over him. ¶37 Second, although the district court did not explicitly find that Orr's violation was willful, such a finding was implicit from its order, which stated that [Orr] is induced to repay his victims only when he is in the shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held over him and [Orr's] only incentive to continue making restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked. This language further shows that the court determined that other alternatives for punishing Orr were inadequate. Although it could be argued that the district court's failure to mention the possibility of bench probation [9] demonstrates that it did not consider other alternatives, in Black, the Supreme Court held that a district court is not required to explain on the record its consideration and rejection of alternatives to incarceration. 471 U.S. at 616. ¶38 We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in extending Orr's probation.