Opinion ID: 1859815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court erred in denying the appellant's pro se motion to dismiss, thereby violating his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

Text: ¶ 6. Brengettcy's first issue arises from a pro se motion to dismiss the charges against him which was denied by the trial court. Although Brengettcy states that the trial court erred in denying his pro se motion to dismiss, his motion may be more accurately viewed as a demand for a fast and speedy trial. At the conclusion of his brief in support of this motion, Brengettcy prays for dismissal of the charges against him. ¶ 7. Alleged speedy trial violations are examined and determined on a case-by-case basis due to the factual specifics of each action. Sharp v. State, 786 So.2d 372, 377 (Miss.2001). A defendant's right to a speedy trial is secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788, 789 (Miss.1986). The Mississippi Code also provides a statutory right to a speedy trial, stating: Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are present to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (2000). This statutory right, often referred to as the 270 day rule, attaches at arraignment rather than at arrest. Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671, 674 (Miss.1990). The 270 day rule is satisfied when the defendant has been brought to trial. Id. at 674. ¶ 8. Even when that trial results in a mistrial or hung jury, the time of retrial remains within the discretion of the trial court, although a substantial delay may still violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Id. Because this case involves two trials, an analysis of Brengettcy's speedy trial claim requires the calculation of three time periods: (1) the time between the arrest and the first trial for constitutional purposes; (2) the time between arraignment and the first trial for 270 day rule purposes; and (3) the time between mistrial and retrial for constitutional purposes. ¶ 9. A chronology of the relevant dates in this case is as follows: Aug. 31, 1997 Crime Occurs Sept. 1, 1997 Brengettcy and co-defendants arrested Feb. 19, 1998 Indictment filed against all four defendants March 16, 1998 Counsel appointed for Brengettcy April 10, 1998 Brengettcy's Motion for Discovery filed July 23, 1998 Order to Transport Brengettcy from Parchman on or before August 8th July 31, 1998 Motion to Sever filed Aug. 18, 1998 Agreed Order of Continuance Sept. 16, 1998 Order of Continuance and Resetting of Trial Date for March 8, 1999 Nov. 20, 1998 Brengettcy's pro so motion to dismiss filed March 3, 1999 Brengettcy's Waiver of Arraignment and Entry of Plea March 8, 1999 Brengettcy's first trial resulting in a hung jury March 10, 1999 Notice that jury was unable to reach unanimous verdict in first trial March 12, 1999 Order of Continuance and Setting 2nd Trial for August 9, 1999 August 9, 1999 Brengettcy's second trial
¶ 10. In reviewing such a constitutional challenge, we have not set a specific length of time as being per se unconstitutional, but instead have applied the four-part balancing test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Handley, 574 So.2d at 674. The four Barker factors to consider are: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. None of the four factors is determinative; rather, a totality of the circumstances test is used. Beavers, 498 So.2d at 790. We are mindful indeed that no one factor is dispositive of the question. Nor is the balancing process restricted to the Barker factors to the exclusion of any other relevant circumstances. McGhee v. State, 657 So.2d 799, 802 (Miss.1995).
¶ 11. The first Barker factor is the length of the delay. In Beavers, this Court identified the relevant dates used to calculate the length of the delay as being the arrest date and the trial date. Id. Although all the factors are relevant for the balancing test, this Court has recognized that a delay of eight months or more is presumptively prejudicial. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989). Where the delay is not presumptively prejudicial, there is no need to review the remaining Barker factors. Handley, 574 So.2d at 677. ¶ 12. Brengettcy was arrested on September 1, 1997, and first brought to trial on March 8, 1999, for a total of 554 days or more than 18 months. This delay is presumptively prejudicial and requires an analysis of the remaining Barker factors. The length of time between the disposition of his first trial and the commencement of his second trial is only 154 days, which is not presumptively prejudicial, and there is no need to consider the remaining factors with regard to Brengettcy's retrial.
¶ 13. The second Barker factor requires determination of the reason for the delay and the party to whom the delay is attributable. Delays which are attributable to one party count against that party. Beavers, 498 So.2d at 791. Furthermore, the risk of non-persuasion rests with the prosecution, and where the record is silent as to the cause of a delay, this factor must weigh in favor of the defendant. Id. ¶ 14. The docket in Brengettcy's case reflects that he was indicted by the first grand jury convened following his arrest. The Yalobusha County Circuit Court, First Judicial District, has only two terms of court each year, each consisting of only 12 days. This dearth of available dates for trial necessarily makes it virtually impossible to expeditiously hear cases, whether civil or criminal. The 172 days prior to the indictment should not be counted against either side. During the 180 days between the indictment and the first agreed continuance, routine activities including appointment of counsel and discovery were conducted with regard to all four defendants. No severance was requested by Brengettcy or his three co-defendants until July 31, 1998, (162 days after indictment), and it understandably took longer because there were four attorneys to be appointed and four sets of discovery to be completed. ¶ 15. The decision to sever the first of Brengettcy's co-defendants was not made until August 18, 1998, and the trial of that severed defendant began that day. An Agreed Order of Continuance signed and approved by Brengettcy's lawyer was filed that same day. A second Order of Continuance pertinent to Brengettcy and the two remaining co-defendants was filed on September 16, 1998. The trial judge noted that the trial of the severed codefendant was not concluded until August 19, leaving only two days remaining in the term for all other court matters, and that Brengettcy and the two other co-defendants were unable to be tried during this term of court due to docket congestion and the trial of co-defendant Bland. Citing statutory good cause, the trial judge reset the trial of Brengettcy and the two other defendants for the next term of court, on March 8, 1999. This delay of six months, until the next term of court, should not be charged against the State. A congested docket is considered good cause for delay if the continuance is actually granted for that reason. Sharp v. State, 786 So.2d at 378. ¶ 16. Brengettcy's first trial began on March 8, 1999, the day set by the court in its September order of continuance. That trial ended with no verdict due to the Jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict and, on March 12, 1999, the trial judge again signed an Order of Continuance and Resetting of the Trial Date which set a second trial of Brengettcy for the next term of court, on August 9, 1999. This order was entered nunc pro tunc on June 11 and filed on June 17, 1999. These continuances appear to have resulted due to the fact that the four defendants were severed one by one, and due to the six months period of time between court terms. The record is silent with regard to any request from Brengettcy that a special term of court be scheduled. These continuances should not be counted against the State in the Barker analysis. See Armstrong v. State, 771 So.2d 988, 994-95 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (applying the severance reasoning in affirming conviction of one of Brengettcy's co-defendants). Furthermore, the third continuance came after Brengettcy's first trial, and so has no effect on the constitutionality of the delay preceding that trial. However, the length of time between Brengettcy's arrest and the first continuance is 352 days which is still presumptively prejudicial even without considering the delay due to the continuances.
¶ 17. The third Barker factor to consider is whether the defendant asserted his right before the trial. A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial.... Still he gains far more points under this prong of the Barker test where he has demanded a speedy trial. Jaco v. State, 574 So.2d 625, 632 (Miss.1990). However, a demand for a speedy trial is distinct from a demand for dismissal due to violation of the right to a speedy trial. Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1994). See also Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 169-70 (Miss.1991)(holding that demand for dismissal coupled with demand for instant trial is insufficient to weigh third Barker prong in defendant's favor where motion came after bulk of delay had elapsed). ¶ 18. The record reflects that Brengettcy filed a pro se motion entitled Motion To Demand Fast and Speedy Trial accompanied by a pro se Brief in Support of Motion [1] on November 20, 1998, which was 323 days after his arrest on September 1, 1997 and 108 days before his first trial. In this brief, Brengettcy prays for dismissal, and in his brief to this Court, he refers to the pro se brief as a Motion to Dismiss. In response, the State argues that Brengettcy should not have filed a Motion to Demand Fast and Speedy Trial but rather should have filed a Motion to Dismiss. The State further argues that Brengettcy's motion, whatever its proper form, is procedurally barred because he did not pursue it to a hearing and ruling. The State is incorrect. While failure or delay in raising a speedy trial claim may cost a defendant points in the Barker analysis, there is no procedural bar solely for failing to properly pursue the claim in open court. ¶ 19. Ultimately, however, the issue of whether Brengettcy sought to demand a speedy trial or merely dismissal for lack of a speedy trial is moot, as the record shows that his pro se motion was not submitted until three months after the defendants were severed and the original trial date had passed, at which point any further delays in starting Brengettcy's trial were attributable to him anyway. This issue weighs against Brengettcy.
¶ 20. The final prong of the Barker analysisprejudice to the defendant has two aspects: (1) actual prejudice to the accused in defending his case, and (2) interference with the defendant's liberty. Perry, 637 So.2d at 876. The Supreme Court has identified three main considerations in determining whether the accused has been prejudiced by lengthy delay: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182. On appeal, Brengettcy has not identified any particular prejudice suffered due to the State's delay in bringing him to trial. On the contrary, in his Brief in Support of Motion which accompanied his pro se motion, Brengettcy indicates that, while awaiting trial, he was already incarcerated on an unrelated charge. Obviously, if Brengettcy was already in jail on unrelated charges, any prejudice that could have arisen merely from interference with his liberty is alleviated, and since Brengettcy did not show any actual prejudice to the defense of his case, this factor cannot weigh in his favor. ¶ 21. In conclusion, while this Court is troubled by the lengthy delays between the various steps in Brengettcy's prosecution, it is cognizant that a rural court with only two terms each year, for a total of 24 days per year, faces unique difficulties which should not be charged against the State or the defendant. Here, Brengettcy's failure to assert his right in a timely manner and his failure to show any real prejudice outweigh the delays which resulted from the court schedule. There is no evidence of deliberate delay on the part of the State.
¶ 22. In addition to the constitutional rights afforded by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and by Article 3 of the Mississippi Constitution, Brengettcy also has the statutory right to a speedy trial arising from § 99-17-1. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (2000). Under this provision, where the accused is not tried within 270 days of his arraignment, the defendant is entitled to dismissal. Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760, 761 (Miss.1985). In the case sub judice, the court docket reflects that each of the four co-defendants waived arraignment, with each waiver being entered on different dates. There is no mention of arraignment with regard to Brengettcy in the record, until his waiver of arraignment and entry of plea was filed on March 3, 1999, just five days before his first trial. The 270 day rule was not violated.