Opinion ID: 1843606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: D. Denying Judicial Restraint

Text: The majority opinion states that [m]oreover, despite the American judiciary's understandable preference for restraint in this complex area of litigation, it routinely does in addressing the constitutionality of state statutory schemesformulate guidelines of varying specificity within which it essentially requires the legislature to operate. 713 So.2d at 881. However, the reason for judicial restraint is not solely the complexity of the case. More importantly, the courts lack the legislative authority to make policy decisions that have been constitutionally assigned to the executive and legislative branches. The problem is that the courts are not elected, nor are they appointed, to write legislation. The majority fails to deal with this fundamental tenet of our constitutional democracy. Merely delaying the implementation of an unconstitutional court order for a year does not make that order any more constitutional. In fact, that very delay is a de facto retention of review by the circuit court of the act of the legislature. In other words, it is an attempt to hold the remedy order over the other two branches of government as a latent threat. Such a retention by the court of an open-ended final word is exactly what the Kentucky Supreme Court found objectionable in Rose.