Opinion ID: 107160
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The 1952 Patent Act.

Text: The Act sets out the conditions of patentability in three sections. An analysis of the structure of these three sections indicates that patentability is dependent upon three explicit conditions: novelty and utility as articulated and defined in § 101 and § 102, and nonobviousness, the new statutory formulation, as set out in § 103. The first two sections, which trace closely the 1874 codification, express the new and useful tests which have always existed in the statutory scheme and, for our purposes here, need no clarification. [5] The pivotal section around which the present controversy centers is § 103. It provides: § 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made. The section is cast in relatively unambiguous terms. Patentability is to depend, in addition to novelty and utility, upon the non-obvious nature of the subject matter sought to be patented to a person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art. The first sentence of this section is strongly reminiscent of the language in Hotchkiss. Both formulations place emphasis on the pertinent art existing at the time the invention was made and both are implicitly tied to advances in that art. The major distinction is that Congress has emphasized nonobviousness as the operative test of the section, rather than the less definite invention language of Hotchkiss that Congress thought had led to a large variety of expressions in decisions and writings. In the title itself the Congress used the phrase Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter  (italics added), thus focusing upon nonobviousness rather than invention. [6] The Senate and House Reports, S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reflect this emphasis in these terms: Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a condition which exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason of decisions of the courts. An invention which has been made, and which is new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not be patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was known before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent. That has been expressed in a large variety of ways in decisions of the courts and in writings. Section 103 states this requirement in the title. It refers to the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented. That provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases. H. R. Rep., supra, at 7; S. Rep., supra, at 6. It is undisputed that this section was, for the first time, a statutory expression of an additional requirement for patentability, originally expressed in Hotchkiss. It also seems apparent that Congress intended by the last sentence of § 103 to abolish the test it believed this Court announced in the controversial phrase flash of creative genius, used in Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U. S. 84 (1941). [7] It is contended, however, by some of the parties and by several of the amici that the first sentence of § 103 was intended to sweep away judicial precedents and to lower the level of patentability. Others contend that the Congress intended to codify the essential purpose reflected in existing judicial precedentsthe rejection of insignificant variations and innovations of a commonplace sortand also to focus inquiries under § 103 upon nonobviousness, rather than upon invention, as a means of achieving more stability and predictability in determining patentability and validity. The Reviser's Note to this section, [8] with apparent reference to Hotchkiss, recognizes that judicial requirements as to lack of patentable novelty [have] been followed since at least as early as 1850. The note indicates that the section was inserted because it may have some stabilizing effect, and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be worked out. To this same effect are the reports of both Houses, supra, which state that the first sentence of the section paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and definiteness. We believe that this legislative history, as well as other sources, [9] shows that the revision was not intended by Congress to change the general level of patentable invention. We conclude that the section was intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition, with congressional directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability.