Opinion ID: 8487230
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of Joinder

Text: Sanquan and Bost argue that the trial court wrongly concluded that the shooting of Howe “logically” led to the South Capitol Street murders because the two incidents were standalone crimes, and that the majority of the government’s proffered evidence was unique to each incident. They also argue that the South Capitol Street murders only occurred as a result of the attempt on Orlando’s life by Howe’s friends, and that “[a]n uncharged offense committed by individuals other than those named' in the indictment cannot serve as the exclusive basis for joining two otherwise unrelated conspiracies in one indictment.” Ultimately, the issue boils down to whether the relationship between the two conspiracies is more akin to the “unbroken chain of causation” of events as seen in Scheve or more like the . “unrelated” incidents that this court addressed in Settles. This issue is not necessarily an easy one; many of the facts alleged in the government’s indictment here are similar to the facts in cases where we have concluded that joinder was improper. For example, in Settles, we emphasized that the “two incidents were not closely connected in time or place” because they occurred a week apart from one another. Settles, supra, 522 A.2d at 353. Further, the two incidents in Settles “involved different victims.” Jackson, supra note 19, 623 A.2d at 580. Yet, there is one critical difference between the facts of this’ case and the facts involved in our previous cases, such as in Settles, Davis, and Jacks.on, in which we concluded that there was misjoinder under Rule 8 (b). In each of those cases, the defendants were alleged to have committed several operationally similar, but ultimately isolated and unrelated crimes. 26 Rule 8 (a) allows for the joinder of offenses where a single defendant is charged with multiple crimes that are of “the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction .... ”, Rule 8 (b), on the other hand, pertains to the joinder of defendants. The similarity of the modus operand! for each criminal incident cannot fulfill the requirements of Rule 8 (b), Jackson, supra note 19, 623 A,2d at 580, and the fact that the same group of individuals may have committed multiple crimes of the “same or similar” nature, without more, is insufficient for purposes of joining the defendants and offenses under Rule 8 (b). In other words, in those misjoinder cases there was “no logical development of or relationship between the offenses because no crime necessarily led to or caused the subsequent offenses.” Davis, supra, 367 A.2d at 1263. This case is different. Unlike the indictments in Settles, Davis, or Jackson, the shooting of Howe and the shootings of Nelson and the individuals on South Capitol Street cannot be considered isolated or “entirely, unrelated.” Settles, supra, 522 A.2d at 353. Rather, the indictment alleges “an unbroken chain of causation,” Scheve, supra, 184 F.2d at 696, from the theft of Sanquan’s bracelet, to his retribution that led to the death of Howe, to Howe’s friends immediately seeking revenge by shooting Orlando, to Orlando’s plan to kill “as many friends and associates of Jordan Howe as they possibly could,” and lastly to the execution of his plan. While Howe’s friends attack on Orlando may not have been an “inevitable result,” it is fair to characterize it as a sequel to the Alabama Avenue shooting. Bush, supra, 516 A.2d at 192. The chain of events here is also akin to the second retaliatory conspiracy alleged in Velasquez, which the Seventh Circuit concluded would have been a permissible basis for joinder. 772 F.2d at 1354. Further, “[t]here is nothing in the language of the rule itself which requires that a person participate in more than one phase of a ‘series’ of acts to come within the rule’s coverage.” Bush, supra, 516 A.2d at 191. The “sequel” conspiracy in this case took place a week after the underlying offense occurred, rather than mere minutes such as in Scheve, supra, 184 F.2d 695, or Ball, supra, 26 A.3d 764. However, while close spatial and temporal connection between the two . offenses may be a consideration, it is not the only or determinative element. See, e.g., Medley, supra, 104 A.3d at 120 (joinder is proper where the two assaults involving the same victim transpired “a year apart from each other”). 27 Further, there was a close connection between the victims of the two conspiracies — -the intended targets of the South Capitol Street murders were the relatives and friends of Howe, who was the victim of the first conspiracy. In addition, the co-conspirators murdered Nelson for the specific purpose of stealing his weapon in order'to carry out the drive-by shooting on South Capitol Street. Both Sanquan and Bost attempt to distinguish this case by arguing that there existed an intervening event — the attempt on Orlando’s life by Howe’s friends — that broke any chain of causation between the two'conspiracies. Scheve defeats this argument. In that case, like here, there existed an intervening event between the charge of operating an illegal gambling' house and the subsequent assault — Rick-er’s wife’s attempt to demand her husband’s money back. 184 F.2d at 696. We have further stated that the subsequent offenses nbed not “inevitablíy] result [from] the commission of the underlying crimes” for the offenses- to be a “sequel to those crimes.” Bush, supra, 516 A.2d at 192 (emphasis added). 28 Howe’s murder may not have “inevitably” led his friends to attempt to kill Orlando, thereby provoking Orlando to organize the South Capitol Street murders, but we conclude that Howe’s murder did ultimately “lead” to Orlando’s revenge plot, and accordingly, the latter was a “sequel” to the first crime. Bush, supra, 516 A.2d at 192. Ultimately, we conclude that join-der of the two conspiracies was not improper because the second conspiracy can be considered a “sequel” to the first conspiracy, and therefore part of the same “séries of acts or transactions.” Super. Ct. Crim. R. 8 (b). Having concluded that join-der was not improper, we must next decide whether, nonetheless, appellants’ motions for severance should have been granted. 29