Opinion ID: 1318070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Charge on Self-Defense

Text: Defendants first argue that because Clarke and Jones  the two men directly responsible for the murder of Ramel Flowers  arguably shot Flowers in self-defense, a properly charged jury could have found that there was no murder or intentional killing to provide the basis for defendants' convictions on Count Two (engaging in a narcotics conspiracy resulting in murder). In other words, because defendants' convictions on Count Two were based on the Pinkerton theory of co-conspirator liability, a successful self-defense claim as to Clarke and Jones would have eliminated the predicate murder upon which Pinkerton liability for all defendants under Count Two was based. Defendants contend that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the availability to Clarke and Jones of this defense, as defendants had requested. We review a district court's refusal to issue requested jury instructions de novo. United States v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.2005). A conviction will not be reversed on this basis unless the requested instruction was legally correct, represent[ed] a theory of defense with [a] basis in the record that would lead to acquittal, United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and the charge actually given was prejudicial, Gonzalez, 407 F.3d at 122. In support of their claim that Clarke and Jones killed Flowers in self-defense, defendants point to Clarke and Jones's testimony that they shot Flowers because they thought he was reaching for a gun and were afraid that he was going to shoot them. As Clarke put it, I reacted because I didn't want to be shot. In response, the government argues that Clarke and Jones have no right to self-defense because they were the initial aggressors in the conflict, and it is the law in this circuit that an aggressor in a conflict resulting in death may not claim self-defense. DeLuca v. Lord, 77 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir.1996). As the defense asserted at trial, there was at least minimal evidence that, even if they were the initial aggressors, Clarke and Jones withdrew and attempted to communicate their withdrawal from the conflict with Flowers before Flowers reached for his gun. Clarke testified on direct examination that when Flowers burst into the third floor stairwell, I put my hand up to my lips. Tell him to be quiet. . . . I told him  I push him away, like, go ahead. But he stood there. Started reaching for a gun. On cross-examination, Clarke testified that he motioned to [Flowers] to leave so he would get out of the area because he was going to let him go, at which point Flowers started to reach for a gun. Clarke further testified that he motioned for [Flowers] to shut up and be quiet . . . . to tell him, go ahead, and mind his business. . . . I push him away, and he claimed that he had no intention of shooting Flowers at that time because the plan was just to shoot Yanni. The government counters that the record does not adequately demonstrate that Clarke and Jones withdrew and communicated this withdrawal to Flowers because Clarke's hand gesture to Flowers was ambiguous and was made while Clarke was still holding his gun. See Appellee's Br. at 59 (arguing that Clarke's gesture alone did not necessarily convey to Flowers that his life had been spared, and that there were signs to the contrary as well). We stated in United States v. Thomas that [i]t has long been accepted that one cannot support a claim of self-defense by a self-generated necessity to kill. The right of homicidal self-defense is . . . denied to slayers who incite the fatal attack. . . . 34 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir.1994) (omissions in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(1)(b) (providing that the justification of self-defense is not available to an initial aggressor). Only in the event that he communicates to his adversary his intent to withdraw and in good faith attempts to do so is he restored to his right of self-defense. United States v. Taylor, 510 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C.Cir.1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(1)(b) (providing an exception whereby an initial aggressor may claim self-defense if the actor has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident). In this case, it is undisputable that Clarke and Jones were the initial aggressors when they entered Building 2 armed, respectively, with a handgun and a shotgun, for the purpose of killing Yanni and possibly other members of his crew. Defendants argue, however, that the two men shot Flowers in self-defense after they indicated their desire that he leave and after he drew a weapon on them. We need not decide whether, to warrant a self-defense jury charge, there was enough evidence that Clarke and Jones withdrew from the encounter with Flowers and adequately communicated that withdrawal to him. This is because, in the context of this case, for a self-defense justification to be available, (1) the shooters had to have withdrawn from the confrontation with Flowers and communicated that fact, and (2) the dangerous situation they had created by setting out to kill Yanni or his affiliates had to have dissipated. Even if the evidence unequivocally demonstrated that Clarke and Jones had done the first of the two, they failed to show that at the time the violent encounter with Flowers occurred, the dangerous situation that they had created by entering Building 2 armed and with the purpose of killing Yanni or his associates had ended. Because the law pertaining to self-defense is a matter of federal common law, see United States v. Butler, 485 F.3d 569, 572 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007) (noting that the justification defense has been developed by drawing on common law), we find it appropriate to look to state court decisions for guidance on the novel question we now address, see Wallace v. United States, 162 U.S. 466, 471-73, 16 S.Ct. 859, 40 L.Ed. 1039 (1896) (drawing on, inter alia, state court decisions in fashioning federal self-defense doctrine); Thomas, 34 F.3d at 48 (citing state statutory and case law on self-defense). Those decisions suggest that a defendant who initiates a violent crime, such as an armed robbery, that results in a fatal shooting may not claim self-defense absent a showing that, at the time the shooting occurred, the dangerous situation created by the initial crime had dissipated. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 909-10 (Alaska 1970) (holding that the defendant, an armed robber, had forfeited his right to claim self-defense because the perilous situation created by the armed robbery continued to exist at the time the shooting occurred, and that [w]here, as in this case, the defendant commits a felony which includes an immediate threat of violence, he has created a situation so fraught with peril as to preclude his claim of self-defense to any act of violence arising therefrom). The loss of this right holds even if the defendant, in good faith, withdraws from the immediate confrontation and communicates that withdrawal. See, e.g., State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 253 P.2d 203, 214-16 (1953), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 486 P.2d 82 (1971). As long as the defendant remains engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the crime that he initiated, he cannot be excused for taking the life of his antagonist to save his own. In such a case it may be rightfully and truthfully said that he brought the necessity upon himself by his own criminal conduct. Id. at 216, 486 P.2d 82 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As evidence that the dangerous situation created by a defendant's initial crime persisted, courts in armed robbery cases have cited the fact that the defendant was still inside the robbed premises at the time of the shooting and that his gun was always in his hand, prepared to shoot. See, e.g., Gray, 463 P.2d at 910 (concluding, based in part on these facts, that the defendants were still engaged in the armed robbery at the time of the shooting); State v. Diggs, 219 Conn. 295, 592 A.2d 949, 952 (1991) (As long as a person keeps his gun in his hand prepared to shoot, the person opposing him is not expected or required to accept any act or statement as indicative of an intent to discontinue the assault. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Owen, 253 P.2d at 215 (The deceased was not required to accept [the defendant's] command to `stand still and let me out of here,' as conclusive of his intention to abandon the hold-up. He was still being menaced by the flaming gun in [the defendant's] hand . . . .); see also State v. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P. 865, 869 (1905) ([S]o long as [the defendant] kept his gun in his hand prepared to shoot, [the victims] were neither expected nor required to construe and accept any act or statement of his as an intent on his part to discontinue the assault and surrender himself as a prisoner.). From this body of law, we conclude in this case that before defendants could obtain a jury instruction on self-defense, they must offer evidence from which a jury could find not only that Clarke and Jones had demonstrably withdrawn from the immediate confrontation with Flowers, but also that the dangerous situation created by their initial undertaking to kill Yanni no longer existed. Defendants have not met that burden. There is no doubt that Clarke and Jones entered Building 2, armed with loaded guns, for the purpose of killing Yanni and possibly other members of his crew. It makes no difference whether, as Clarke testified, the plan was just to shoot Yanni, or, as Jones claimed, Dent had ordered them to shoot Yanni or any member of his crew that they encountered. When they encountered Flowers in the stairwell, they had already created a dangerous situation, by virtue of their active participation in a conspiracy to commit murder. Cf. Owen, 253 P.2d at 216 ([W]hen these men entered the store, both armed with loaded guns, for the avowed purpose of robbery, they bargained for violence.). And because the risk of just such an encounter was precisely what made their conduct so dangerous, the shooting was an[] act of violence arising therefrom. Gray, 463 P.2d at 910. There was no evidence whatsoever that at the time Clarke and Jones shot Flowers, the dangerous situation had abated or that Clarke and Jones had lowered their guns. Indeed, Clarke testified that at the time he gestured to Flowers, he still ha[d] [his] gun out. Plainly the danger from the conspiracy to kill Yanni or his crew still loomed at the time of Flowers's murder. Under these circumstances, the right of self-defense was not available to Clarke and Jones, and no such right could therefore be claimed by defendants. The district court did not err in denying the requested jury charge.