Opinion ID: 63252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecutor's Allegedly Improper Remarks

Text: The district court found that Geiger was entitled to habeas relief based on remarks made by the prosecutor during trial; remarks the district court concluded were so prejudicial as to render Geiger's trial fundamentally unfair. During voir dire, the following exchange took place before the jury: Prosecutor: I do want to talk to you about lay witnesses. Jason Gross is the State's only eyewitness that we have access to. He's about Defense: I'm going to object. I think we're getting a little bit into the facts of the case more than is proper in voir dire. Court: Ah, as to that one comment, I would overrule the objection, note the objection for the Defense. During opening argument, the following occurred: Prosecutor: Let me tell you what you're going to hear. You're going to hear that on October 9th around 12:00 p.m., someone named Jason Gross, whom you will hear from, and someone named Sarah Lenard, whom you will not hear from because I can't get my hands on her Defense: Objection, your honor. This is completely Court: I couldn't hear what you said. Please, ma'am, I apologize. Because I could not what? Prosecutor: Cause I can't get my hands on her. Cause I can't produce her. It's a fact. Court: You'reyou're intending to present evidence that you cannot reach her? Prosecutor: Oh, yes. Court: Then I would overrule that as to what the lady intends to offer. Defense: Based on the fact Court: I'm not saying that's correct or not. The following occurred during closing argument: Prosecutor: Do I wish I had Sarah Lenard to corroborate Jason Gross' account of what happened? You better believe I do. Did I take the necessary actions against her? You better believe I have. Defense: I'm going to object to this. Arguing Court: Yeah, I would sustain that on theon the representation that she would corroborate. I'm not here to say that she would or wouldn't. The district court concluded that these remarks warranted habeas relief because they jeopardized Mr. Geiger's right to be tried solely on the evidence presented at trial, which amounted to prejudicial error. According to the district court, the prosecutor inappropriately suggested that Lenard would have corroborated Gross' testimony, which is significant given that Gross was the only State witness able to identify Geiger as a perpetrator. Pursuant to the AEDPA, our task is to determine de novo whether the district court was correct in finding that the state court's treatment of Geiger's prosecutorial misconduct claim was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. See § 2254(d)(1). Under this standard, we will affirm the district court only if the prosecutor's remarks `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). To satisfy this requirement below, Geiger was required to show that the [prosecutor's] misconduct [was] persistent and pronounced or that the evidence of guilt was so insubstantial that the conviction would not have occurred but for the improper remarks. Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 356 (5th Cir.1988). Respondent argues on appeal that the prosecution's statements as to Lenard's unavailability were not improper. Even assuming arguendo that the prosecution's remarks were improper, they do not warrant habeas relief, as they were not persistent or pronounced, and the admissible evidence of guilt was not insubstantial. Gross witnessed what happened; Geiger does not dispute this. Gross testified that he saw Geiger and Panter kill the victim. Notwithstanding the suspect nature of accomplice testimony, the jury was entitled to believe Gross, and it was not unreasonable in doing so. In addition, although no other State witness could with credible certainty identify Geiger specifically as one of the two killers, the State did elicit from Officer Carmouche testimony corroboratingalbeit not overwhelminglyGross' narrative. According to Officer Carmouche, as he approached the group to cite them for trespassing, he observed Geiger and Panter, the very two people Gross inculpated, washing their hands in the river. The jury could have reasonably viewed this as confirming Gross' testimony that Geiger and Panter, after disposing of the victim's body, washed the victim's blood from their hands and arms in the river. A prosecutor's case need not be perfect in order to persuade reasonable jurors. Even assuming that the prosecution's remarks were intended to, and did, have the effect of suggesting to the jury that Lenard would have corroborated Gross' testimony, the jury nevertheless could have reasonably found Geiger guilty absent the allegedly improper statements. Thus, Geiger did not establish below that the evidence of guilt was so insubstantial that the conviction would not have occurred but for the improper remarks, id., and therefore Geiger was not denied due process.