Opinion ID: 2598530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Discussion of Decision

Text: The Commission found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Apker's conduct, which was deemed admitted by default, violated Rule 42 of the Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court, specifically, ER 1.15(b) (receipt of third party funds), 1 violation ER 8.4(b) (commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer), 1 violation ER 8.4(d) (engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1 violation SCR 43(d) (Guideline 1.c)(trust account/guideline authority) 1 violation Respondent was summarily suspended on April 28, 2000, for non-payment of dues and he remains suspended. In Count One, Respondent was hired by MCO Properties to hold trustees' sales to foreclose against parcels of realty. Respondent ordered and obtained from TSG Title Agency, Inc., two trustee sale guarantee reports, for which TSG billed Respondent in the amount of $4,646. MCO paid Respondent the money owed to TSG; however, he failed to promptly notify TSG and failed to promptly deliver funds to TSG in violation of 1.15(b) and 8.4(d), failed to have internal controls to safeguard fund held in trust in violation of Rule 43(d) (Guideline 1.c.) and committed theft, [4] in violation of 8.4(b) by using the money to pay himself and other creditors. Count Two addresses the Respondent's prior discipline. Although not alleged by the State Bar, the Commission notes that Respondent violated Rule 31(c) 3, when he moved and did not notify membership at the State Bar, and he violated ER 8.1(b) and Rules 51(h) and (i) by not responding. In determining the appropriate sanction, out Supreme Court considers the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ( Standards ) a suitable guideline. In re Kaplan, 179 Ariz. 175, 877 P.2d 274 (1994). The Supreme Court and the Commission are consistent in utilizing the Standards to determine appropriate sanctions for attorney discipline. In imposing a sanction after a finding of misconduct, consideration is given to the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. See Standard 3.0. A review of Standard 4.0 indicates that suspension is the presumptive sanction for Respondent's particular misconduct. Standard 4.0 addresses Violations of Duties Owed to Clients, with 4.12 specifically providing: Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. Respondent knowingly violated his duties owed to the client by failing to deliver funds to the title company causing actual injury. In addition the Supreme Court has stated that a lawyer's failure to respond to the State Bar inquiries borders on contempt for the legal system. In re Galusha, 164 Ariz. 503, 794 P.2d 136 (1990). The Commission, having concluded that suspension is warranted, reviewed Standards 9.22 and 9.32, aggravating and mitigating factors, respectively. The Hearing Officer found five (5) aggravating factors present in the record, 9.22(a)(prior disciplinary offenses), [5] (b)(selfish motive), (e)(bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency), (g)(refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct), and (i)(substantial experience in the practice of law). [6] The State Bar also argued for (h) (vulnerability of the victim), (j)(indifference in making restitution) and (k) (illegal conduct). The Commission agrees. The Commission, as well as the Hearing Officer, found one (1) factor present in mitigation, 9.32(m)(remoteness of prior offense). The Commission considered the proportionality analysis provided and found the following cases instructive. In Matter of Fletcher, SB 99-0090-D (200), the respondent was censured and placed on probation for violating Ers 1.15(b) and 8.1(b). Fletcher failed to pay investigators and consultants and did not timely respond to State Bar inquiries. There was no aggravation or mitigation. In Matter of Jones, 169 Ariz. 19, 816 P.2d 916 (1991), the respondent was disbarred and ordered to pay restitution for violating DR 1-102(A)(3) & (6), DR 9-102(b) and Ers 1.15(b) and (c). Jones failed to remit insurance proceeds, which belonged to a client, failed to safeguard client property and converted funds.