Opinion ID: 1119447
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: The implied malice jury instruction.

Text: The jury was instructed regarding implied malice according to the statutory definition provided in NRS 200.020(1) and (2). [9] Doyle contends that the instruction created a mandatory presumption in favor of the State and improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. In Ruland v. State, 102 Nev. 529, 728 P.2d 818 (1986), this court expressly held that the above-mentioned jury instruction does not constitute an impermissible mandatory presumption. See also Guy v. State, 108 Nev. 770, 839 P.2d 578 (1992) (identical instruction held proper, although mandatory presumption issue not discussed). This court concluded that the instruction was constitutionally permissible because the instruction merely defines implied malice rather than directing the jury to find any presumed fact against the accused. Ruland, 102 Nev. at 533, 728 P.2d at 820-21. Doyle notes that the opposite conclusion was reached in Fulghum v. Ford, 850 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1013, 109 S.Ct. 802, 102 L.Ed.2d 793 (1989), a case that involved statutory language identical to that contained in NRS 200.020. In Fulghum, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal found that the implied malice instruction, standing alone, would have been constitutionally infirm. 850 F.2d at 1534 (citing Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024, 103 S.Ct. 1276, 75 L.Ed.2d 496 (1983)). However, the court concluded that any ambiguity regarding the State's burden of proving malice beyond a reasonable doubt was cured by the presence of a strong circumstantial evidence instruction. Fulghum, 850 F.2d at 1535 (citing Lamb ); see also Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 318-19, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1973-74, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) ([T]he jury charge taken as a whole . . . explained the proper allocation of burdens with sufficient clarity that any ambiguity in the particular language challenged could not have been understood by a reasonable juror as shifting the burden of persuasion.). In Fulghum, the jury instructions provided: To warrant a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused. 850 F.2d at 1535. The jury instructions in the present case contained no such language. Jury Instruction No. 32, however, provided that [t]he defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged. We believe that this court's reasoning in Ruland remains sound. We also believe that, taken as a whole, the jury instructions in this case were sufficient to cure any ambiguity that may have existed in the challenged jury instruction regarding the State's ultimate burden of proving malice beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we conclude that under either Ruland or Fulghum, the challenged instruction was not improper. Finally, we agree with the State that, even if this court finds that the instruction regarding implied malice impermissibly shifted the State's burden of proving implied malice, the error was harmless because it is clear in this case that the jury actually rested its verdict on the ample evidence of express malice. See Scott v. State, 92 Nev. 552, 556, 554 P.2d 735, 738 (1976) (The jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree. They must have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] murdered [the victim] deliberately, willfully, and with premeditation. These elements of the crime conclusively established express malice. . . . Thus, implied malice played no part in this case.); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); see generally Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1893, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991) ([T]he issue under Chapman is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the presumption.). [10]