Opinion ID: 2015103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Robbery Sentence: Double Enhancement

Text: Defendant next contends his 30-year extended sentence for robbery was based in part on an impermissible double enhancement. Because the victim was over the age of 60, the offense of robbery was enhanced from a Class 2 felony to a Class 1 felony. See 720 ILCS 5/18-1(b) (West 1992). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court mentioned the victim's age again as a reason for imposing an extended sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(4)(ii), 5-8-2(a)(3) (West 1992). Defendant asks us to vacate the robbery sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. It is settled that an element that is inherent to the criminal offense of which a defendant has been convicted cannot be used also to extend the prison sentence on the conviction. Using the same element that defines the offense also to impose an extended sentence constitutes an impermissible double use of a single factor. People v. Hicks, 164 Ill.2d 218, 235, 207 Ill.Dec. 295, 647 N.E.2d 257 (1995). The following principles are equally settled: `[R]eliance on an improper factor in aggravation does not always necessitate remandment for resentencing. Where the reviewing court is unable to determine the weight given to an improperly considered factor, the cause must be remanded for resentencing. [Citations.] However, where it can be determined from the record that the weight placed on the improperly considered aggravating factor was so insignificant that it did not lead to a greater sentence, remandment is not required. [Citations.]' People v. White, 114 Ill.2d 61, 67, 101 Ill.Dec. 879, 499 N.E.2d 467 (1986), quoting People v. Bourke, 96 Ill.2d 327, 332, 70 Ill.Dec. 734, 449 N.E.2d 1338 (1983). Applying these principles to the present case, we uphold defendant's 30-year extended sentence for robbery. Initially, defendant is correct that the trial court improperly mentioned the victim's age as an aggravating factor justifying an extended sentence. However, the trial court specifically gave two findings for the extended sentence: the fact that the victim was over 60 years old, and also that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 1992). Further, prior to finding the presence of those two aggravating factors, the trial court considered many other aggravating and mitigating factors. While so doing, the court again mentioned the serious harm that defendant caused the victim. The court also considered defendant's prior criminal activity in Mississippi and in Chicago. The trial court's findings in their entirety show that the improper aggravating factor of the victim's age did not lead to the extended sentence, and that other aggravating factors support the extended sentence for robbery. See People v. Hicks, 101 Ill.App.3d 238, 244, 56 Ill.Dec. 782, 427 N.E.2d 1328 (1981); People v. Devine, 98 Ill.App.3d 914, 926-27, 54 Ill.Dec. 73, 424 N.E.2d 823 (1981). Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute Defendant contends that the Illinois death penalty statute violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution for three reasons. However, this court has previously rejected these arguments in other cases; we see no reason to reach a different result here. First, the death penalty statute does not place an unconstitutional burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating circumstances. People v. Page, 155 Ill.2d 232, 283, 185 Ill. Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160 (1993); People v. Simms, 143 Ill.2d 154, 183-84, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947 (1991). Second, the death penalty statute is not invalid because it allows the sentencer to consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. People v. Perez, 108 Ill.2d 70, 97-98, 90 Ill.Dec. 932, 483 N.E.2d 250 (1985); People v. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d 22, 75, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840 (1984). Third, the death penalty statute sufficiently minimizes the risk of arbitrarily or capriciously imposed death sentences. This court has repeatedly reached this conclusion after considering various aspects of the statute separately or cumulatively. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 390, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138; Page, 155 Ill.2d at 283-85, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160; Simms, 143 Ill.2d at 185, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947.