Opinion ID: 612350
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impeachment of Officer Siner

Text: At the preliminary examination, Officer Siner testified that in the “take down” of the Expedition, he and his partner ran up to the Expedition, yelled for petitioner to show his hands, removed petitioner from the vehicle by pulling on his arm, and secured petitioner with his hands up on the Expedition. Petitioner argues that although the transcript from the 6 The habeas petition claimed that evidence was seized from petitioner in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court properly denied the claim since a court cannot reexamine a petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim that evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal search or seizure when the state provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim prior to trial. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976); Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 2000). No. 09-1294 17 preliminary examination was available prior to the suppression hearing, Attorney Henry made no attempt to impeach Officer Siner about the extent of force used to detain petitioner when Siner testified that he “asked the driver to step out and to put his hands on top of the car.” Petitioner argues that Siner’s “more polite” description of the detention impacted the trial court’s determination that the seizure did not constitute an immediate arrest. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the denial of petitioner’s suppression motion, finding “no merit” to petitioner’s argument that he was initially arrested, not just detained, by the police when he was removed from his vehicle. The state court found that the detention and removal of petitioner from his vehicle was justified under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981), and this court’s application of Summers in United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 339 (6th Cir. 1991). The state court explained in pertinent part: We find no merit to defendant’s argument that he was initially arrested, not detained, by the police. In People v. Zuccarini, 172 Mich. App. 11, 13-15 [] (1988), this Court found that the defendant was only detained under Summers, not arrested, when, for safety reasons, he was handcuffed outside a house that was being searched after the officer handcuffing him thought she heard a lot of people running inside the house. A search for narcotics may give rise to sudden violence, and minimizing the risk of harm to the police and the occupants by exercising unquestionable command over the situation is a legitimate interest that must be considered when evaluating if detention is justified. Id. at 14. In this case, the facts show that defendant was initially detained by the police. He was not arrested until an officer observed cocaine in his coat pocket. Accordingly, the police did not need to justify the initial stop of defendant with probable cause. Once defendant was detained under Summers, the police could properly check defendant for weapons under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 [] (1968), for the safety of the officers involved in conducting the raid. Under Terry, the police may conduct a “limited patdown search for weapons if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed, and thus poses a danger to the officer or to other persons.” People v. Custer, 465 Mich. 319, 328 [] No. 09-1294 18 (2001). In this case, the police had information that defendant had committed violent crimes in the past with firearms and that he carried a firearm. The police were justified in ordering defendant to exit the vehicle to determine if he possessed a weapon. Once defendant was ordered out of the vehicle, an officer observed a plastic bag containing an off-white substance that appeared to be cocaine. That substance was properly seized under the plain-view exception. People v. Champion, 452 Mich. 92, 101-103 [] (1996). For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. Anderson, 2006 WL 2787878, at -3. The Michigan Court of Appeals also found, albeit without much discussion, that “[a]lthough defense counsel did not explore at the evidentiary hearing or trial certain matters that were raised at the preliminary examination, this was a matter of trial strategy and defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that counsel exercised sound strategy.” Id. at . Furthermore, the state court concluded that petitioner “ha[d] not demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different had the matters in question been raised or explored below.” Id. Whether or not this can be said to be a matter of trial strategy, we agree with the state court’s assessment that the failure to impeach Officer Siner with his prior testimony that he “yelled” for petitioner to show his hands and “pulled on his arm” to remove him from the vehicle would not have impacted the determination that petitioner was lawfully detained under Summers. The testimony at the suppression hearing established that petitioner had been identified as the driver of the Expedition, was seen exiting the residence to be searched as the raid team was en route, was the target of the search, was known to have prior convictions for assault with a firearm, and was believed to be staying at the residence to be No. 09-1294 19 searched. Even if defense counsel had succeeded in getting Officer Siner to repeat his preliminary examination testimony, the difference in the description of the “take down” would not have been sufficient to establish that the initial detention was a full-blown arrest. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98-99 (2005) (holding that officers may use reasonable force to effect a Summers detention). Moreover, keeping in mind the deference due the state court’s determination, we cannot conclude that the state court’s decision on this issue was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. b. Error of Fact in Order Denying Motion to Suppress The trial court’s order appears to incorrectly attribute the two controlled purchases of cocaine to petitioner in discussing both whether there was probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant—a conclusion not contested in the state court or here—and whether the seizure of petitioner was permitted under Summers. Petitioner faults defense counsel for failing to “correct” this misstatement of fact. Assuming that this claim, raised as part of the now-abandoned Fourth Amendment claim, is fairly viewed as asserting a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, we cannot conclude that the failure to file a motion for reconsideration on this basis would warrant habeas relief. Whether oversight or trial strategy, there is no reasonable probability that but for the failure of counsel to correct the trial court on this point the result would have been different. It is clear that the state court did not rely on the prior drug sales at all in finding that the seizure of cocaine from petitioner was not the result of an illegal search and seizure. Nor does petitioner offer any theory under which the correction of this fact would be No. 09-1294 20 determinative of the Fourth Amendment claim urged in the suppression motion.7 c. Failure to Present Coherent Argument under Summers Finally, petitioner contends that Attorney Henry failed to present a coherent argument that petitioner’s detention was not authorized under Summers because the officers manipulated the circumstances of the search by waiting for petitioner to return before executing the search warrant. Petitioner asserts that but for counsel’s error, the cocaine seized from his person would have been excluded from evidence. On the contrary, counsel elicited the critical testimony that petitioner was the target of the search and argued that the decision to wait to execute the search warrant precluded reliance on Summers. This same argument was squarely raised and explicitly rejected on the merits by the Michigan Court of Appeals following a de novo review of the suppression motion, reasoning as follows: It is undisputed that the police were executing a search warrant when they stopped defendant. In Michigan v. Summers, [] the Supreme Court held that “a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted” (footnote omitted). In United States v. Cochran, [] the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the detention of a defendant was justified under Summers where the defendant was stopped after driving a short distance from his home. . . . .... The detention of defendant in this case was similarly justified under 7 The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the claim that trial counsel failed to properly challenge the search warrant affidavit, stating: “Defendant concedes, however, that the affidavit was sufficient. He explains that he raises this argument only to show that counsel did not comprehend all the rules of criminal procedure. Because defendant concedes that he was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged error, he cannot establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this basis.” Anderson, 2006 WL 2787878, at  7. No. 09-1294 21 Summers and Cochran. Although the police waited until defendant returned to the residence to execute the search warrant1 and then stopped him approximately twenty yards from the residence, the circumstances do not suggest that the police manipulated the situation in order to search defendant. During the time defendant was gone, another occupant of the house, Shaniqua Broom[e], frequently came to the doorway and looked outside. It was reasonable for the officers to believe from Broom[e]’s conduct that defendant was expected to return shortly. For the officers’ safety, it was not unreasonable for them to wait until defendant returned and then detain him instead of risking beginning the search and having defendant return while many of the officers were inside conducting the search. The facts do not demonstrate a bad-faith effort by the police to manipulate the circumstances surrounding the search of the residence to include defendant, who was a target of the search warrant, although he was identified only by a nickname. Under Summers and Cochran, the police were justified in detaining defendant and removing him from his vehicle while conducting the search, regardless of whether he had engaged or was about to engage in criminal activity. 1 Defendant had been seen by a surveillance officer leaving the residence in a vehicle about one hour before execution of the warrant. Anderson, 2006 WL 2787878, -2. Petitioner does not suggest any argument or authority that should have been cited beyond Summers and Cochran.8 Keeping in mind that we may not reexamine the merits of the motion to suppress, we find that defense counsel’s failure to persuade the state court that the detention was invalid under Summers does not establish either deficient performance or prejudice. See Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 942-44 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing authority to detain under Summers). 8 The “manipulation” argument comes not from Summers but from Cochran, where the majority opinion found that the initial detention a short distance from the premises to be searched was proper under Summers. It was only in discussing the further search of the vehicle that the court added that “the facts and evidence do not suggest that the police attempted to manipulate the circumstances in order to search defendant’s car. Indeed, it was defendant’s acts, not those of the police, that led to the search of the automobile.” Cochran, 939 F.2d at 339 (emphasis added). No. 09-1294 22 3. Counsel’s Errors at Trial Petitioner claimed that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at trial by failing to introduce the search warrant into evidence, failing to elicit supposedly “exculpatory” evidence raised at the preliminary examination, eliciting unfavorable testimony from petitioner’s mother and Officer Janczarek, and failing to object to the field testing of the cocaine during trial. These arguments were presented and rejected by the Michigan Court of Appeals on the merits. “There is a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than ‘sheer neglect.’” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 790 (quoting Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)). “In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel’s performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 791. Rather, Strickland requires that petitioner show that it is reasonably likely that the result would have been different. Id. at 792. a. Search Warrant Defense counsel planned to refer to an enlargement of the search warrant during closing argument, but the prosecutor anticipated the attempt and objected before closing arguments because the warrant had not been admitted into evidence. The state court found there was no showing that petitioner was prejudiced by the inability to refer to the warrant in closing. Petitioner now argues that he was prejudiced because counsel “promised” in No. 09-1294 23 opening that the jury would see the warrant and then failed to introduce it, which created a negative inference that could have led the jury to conclude that the warrant named him. In particular, petitioner relies on our comment that “‘little is more damaging than to fail to produce important evidence that had been promised in an opening.’” English v. Romanowski, 602 F.3d 714, 729 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). It is far from clear that the warrant was “important evidence” or that the failure to introduce it into evidence was prejudicial. First, there was no suggestion at trial that the warrant was anything but a warrant to search the premises. Second, the point of the reference in opening statement was to suggest bad faith by the officers who waited for petitioner to return before executing the search warrant. Third, the affidavit accompanying the warrant, which the prosecutor would have insisted also be admitted, named “Smiley” as the target of the drug trafficking investigation. Petitioner has not shown a reasonable probability that the result would have been different if counsel had introduced the warrant. Petitioner cannot establish prejudice under Strickland, much less that it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that no prejudice resulted.