Opinion ID: 1716776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cause of action on intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Text: The trial court incorrectly ruled that the second cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress to Mrs. McKissick was barred by the statute of limitations. The court ruled that the first allegations on this cause of action were contained in the fifth complaint which did not come into existence until March 29, 1971, and that this was more than three years after the relevant incident occurred on August 2, 1967. However, it appears from the record that Lois McKissick was attempting to allege a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress as early as the second complaint which was served on counsel for the defendants on November 21, 1969. In this second complaint, Lois McKissick alleged that, in addition to her shock, she was also frightened by the activities of the Defendant, Ralph C. Schroeder, and other agents, of the Defendant City of Milwaukee, causing her to sustain severe and permanent personal injuries, consisting of a complete shock to her nervous system, and other injuries incidental thereto, causing her to experience great pain, suffering, mental anguish and grief, which she still suffers and will continue to suffer in the future . . . . These allegations attempt to state a cause of action for infliction of emotional distress and at a time within the statute of limitations. [6] The defendants argue that, since the March 29, 1971, order dismissed all prior complaints and provided for service of the fifth complaint, it effectively nullified all prior complaints, and they cannot be said to have tolled the statute of limitations. This is the same argument made by the defendants in Wurtzler v. Miller [7] and rejected by this court in that case. A subsequent dismissal of a complaint for certain defects or by stipulation of the parties does not have the effect of eliminating the tolling of the statute of limitations, which stops running when that summons and complaint are served, even if the complaint is afterwards dismissed. Our final inquiry as to the second cause of action is addressed to the sufficiency of Lois McKissick's allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint, as finally amended, states as follows: That at the time of the wrongful death of her minor son, plaintiff, Lois McKissick, was in the home of the parties and immediately after Clifford was shot, the plaintiff, Lois McKissick, went to his assistance and then to the back door to plead for help from the police officers who were shooting in the direction of the house, that upon information and belief, while at said door, defendant, Ralph C. Schroeder, and other police officers shot at plaintiff, Lois McKissick; whereupon she returned into the house to assist her son; that the police came into the house, refused to aid her in calling for help for her son, made her march into the kitchen with her hands up and questioned her at length in the presence of her dying son without calling for or rendering aid to said son; that as a result of the aforementioned actions of the defendants, plaintiff, Lois McKissick, was caused to sustain severe and permanent personal injuries, consisting of a complete shock to her nervous system, and other injuries incidental thereto, causing her to experience great pain and suffering, mental anguish and grief, which she still suffers and will continue to suffer in the future, all to her past, present and future damage and detriment . . . . In Alsteen v. Gehl [8] this court set forth four factors which must be established to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. These are (1) that the defendant's conduct must be intentional, (2) that it must be extreme and outrageous, (3) that it must be the causein-fact of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) that the plaintiff must have suffered an extreme disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct. There is no question that the third and fourth factors have been sufficiently alleged in this complaint. In regard to the first factor, an intent to cause emotional distress can reasonably be inferred from the allegations regarding outright refusal to allow Mrs. McKissick to call for medical assistance for her dying son, and extensive questioning of her in the presence of her dying son. In regard to the second factor, these allegations are such that it can be said that the average member of the community [would] regard the defendant's conduct in relation to the plaintiff, as being a complete denial of the plaintiff's dignity as a person. [9] The recent case of Slawek v. Stroh [10] also supports the conclusion that these allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Slawek, a woman had claimed that a man whose child she had borne and who remained romantically interested in her repeatedly telephoned her and her family at all hours of the day and night, and tried to see her in public and private by the use of ruses, stories, and false names. The Slawek court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to meet the four Alsteen criteria and to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In terms of the first two factors, the conduct alleged in this complaint is at least as intentional and as extreme as that in Slawek. By the Court. Order reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.