Opinion ID: 1409199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: use of inconsistent prior statements

Text: As to the issue of the use of prior inconsistent statements, this dissent is based primarily on the same reasoning enunciated in the dissent to State v. Collins, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 409 S.E.2d 181, 195 (1990). It is also important to note that during the in camera hearing on defendant's motion for directed verdict, the lower court stated the following with regard to the reason the prior statements were admitted: Those written statements can be used to impeach, and effectively impeach, but whether or not they are substantive evidence standing alone that would warrant a conviction when the witness is saying something entirely different I have grave question about, and if that's all you had count one would fly out the window .... (emphasis added). Quite clearly, those prior statements were admitted by the court for their impeachment value only. The record reflects that this was also abundantly clear to the defendant's attorney who during the same in camera hearing stated [i]f we do not accept the prior statements as substantive evidence, there is then today an overwhelming amount of evidence that contradicts the testimony given by Steven P. Defense counsel could have requested a limiting instruction, but failed to do so. In addition, the lower court did properly instruct the jury at the close of the evidence as to witness credibility and the nature of impeachment: You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. As used in these instructions, the credibility of a witness means the truthfulness or lack of truthfulness of the witness. The weight of the evidence means the extent to which you are or are not convinced by the evidence. The number of witnesses testifying on one side or the other or an issue is not alone the test of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. If warranted by the evidence, you may believe one witness against a number of witnesses testifying differently. The tests are: How truthful is the witness and how convincing is his or her evidence in the light of all the evidence and circumstances shown. In determining the credit and weight you will give to the testimony of any witness who has testified before you, you may consider, if found by you from the evidence: The good memory or lack of memory of the witness; the interest or lack of interest of the witness in the outcome of the trial; the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witness, the opportunity and means, or lack of opportunity and means, of having knowledge of the matters concerning which the witness testified; and the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such testimony. From these considerations and all other conditions and circumstances appearing from the evidence, you may give to the testimony of the witness such credit and weight as you believe it entitled to receive. If you believe that any witness in this case has knowingly testified falsely as to any material fact, you may, after considering and weighing the testimony of such witness, disregard the whole of the testimony of such witness or give it, or any part thereof, such weight and credit as you believe it to be entitled to receive. The only additional commentary on this issue with regard to the instant case is that the prior statements here were not used sparingly, as they were in Collins and as the majority contends is required under State v. Spadafore, 159 W.Va. 236, 220 S.E.2d 655 (1975). However, as was pointed out in the Collins dissent, Spadafore dealt with a witness who claimed in court that he couldn't remember making the prior statement. Despite the fact that there was no inconsistent testimony in court, the Court in Spadafore seemed to go on to apply the concepts enunciated therein to all out-of-court statements. They swept too broad a brush if that case is now being used for the proposition that prior inconsistent statements cannot be used to fully impeach in-court testimony. As discussed in the Collins dissent, the modern trend is to broaden, not restrict, the use of out-of-court statements if the declarant is present and available for cross-examination.