Opinion ID: 6498740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Collateral-Estoppel Effect of a Guilty Plea5

Text: ¶ 29. Petitioner contends that guilty pleas cannot have collateral-estoppel effect because issues resolved by guilty pleas are not “actually litigated.” He urges the Court to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Judgments which does not consider an issue to have been actually litigated in the first action “where the criminal judgment was based on . . . a guilty plea . . . .”6 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 cmt. b (1982); but see Pollander, 167 Vt. at 305, 706 A.2d at 1361 (citing Restatement § 28(4) which states that no preclusion applies where “party 5 For the purposes of this opinion, we use “collateral-estoppel effect” and “preclusive effect” interchangeably. 6 Comment b to § 85 reads as follows: The rule of this Section presupposes that the issue in question was actually litigated in the criminal prosecution. Accordingly, the rule of the Section does not apply where the criminal judgment was based on . . . a guilty plea . . . . A defendant who pleads guilty may be held to be estopped in subsequent civil litigation from contesting facts representing the elements of the offense. However, under the terms of this Restatement such an estoppel is not a matter of issue preclusion, because the issue has not actually been litigated, but is a matter of the law of evidence beyond the scope of this Restatement. 12 against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion with the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action”). ¶ 30. Courts are split on this issue. One line of cases, following an Iowa Supreme Court decision, Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Winker, adopts the view that there is no actual-litigation requirement. 319 N.W.2d 289, 291-96 (Iowa 1982) (explaining that courts relying on reasoning in Restatement to deny preclusive effect to guilty pleas do not read Restatement closely); see also James v. Paul, 49 S.W.3d 678, 686-87 (Mo. 2001) (en banc) (affirming issue preclusion following guilty plea and noting that “an almost equal number of states” give preclusive effect to guilty pleas as states that do not); see also Allen v. Martin, 203 P.3d 546, 562-563 (Colo. App. 2008) (same). Another line of cases adopts the opposite view: because the criminal prosecution did not proceed to trial, the issue was not actually litigated, and precluding the defendant from later relitigating the issue is unfair. See, e.g., Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI App 73, ¶¶ 17-21, 281 Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54, 61-63 (declining to follow Paul and Winker because under Wisconsin law “a defendant who pleads guilty need not admit the facts of a crime that has been charged as a precondition to a court accepting his or her plea” and therefore issue was not actually litigated); see also Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 375 P.2d 439, 441 (Cal. 1962) (in bank) (“When a plea of guilty has been entered in the prior action, no issues have been ‘drawn into controversy’ by a ‘full presentation’ of the case. It may reflect only a compromise or a belief that paying a fine is more advantageous than litigation. Considerations of fairness to civil litigants and regard for the expeditious administration of criminal justice . . . combine to prohibit the application of collateral estoppel against a party who, having pleaded guilty to a criminal charge, seeks for the first time to litigate his cause in a civil action.”). ¶ 31. Some prominent commentators also share the view that guilty pleas should not have preclusive effect. For example, Wright and Miller sharply criticize courts’ application of collateral estoppel to guilty pleas because “[t]he lack of actual adjudication is fatal to issue preclusion.” 18B 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4474.1 (3d ed. 2019). “Just as issue preclusion should not rest on civil judgments by consent, stipulation, or default, so it should not rest on a plea of guilty.”7 Id. ¶ 32. However, we reject the view that a guilty plea cannot have collateral-estoppel effect. We find the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Winker to be instructive. 319 N.W.2d 289. In that case, Winker, a law enforcement officer, shot and killed his estranged girlfriend while off-duty. Winker was covered by professional liability insurance at the time he committed the crime. The state charged him with first-degree murder, but he ultimately pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Later, the administrator of the decedent’s estate brought a civil action alleging wrongful death. In response, Ideal, Winker’s insurer, filed a declaratory action arguing that it was not required to defend him in the wrongful-death action nor indemnify him if the administrator prevailed. Ideal argued that criminal conduct was exempt activity under the policy and Winker’s “guilty plea conclusively established for purposes of the declaratory action that [he] had committed a criminal act.” Id. at 291. The trial court agreed. Winker appealed, arguing that he only entered the guilty plea “because of the risk of a first-degree murder conviction and not because he admitted second-degree murder.” Id. ¶ 33. In a close examination of the case law, the Restatement,8 and the work of several prominent commentators, the supreme court held that guilty pleas can have preclusive effect in 7 Petitioner, citing comment e to § 27 of the Restatement, argues that collateral estoppel should not apply to him because a guilty plea is a judgment obtained by “confession, consent, or default.” See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. e. However, as the quote from Wright and Miller suggests, this language in comment e does not refer to guilty pleas, ; it refers to civil actions. 8 The supreme court explained that the Restatement did not oppose the application of collateral estoppel to issues resolved by guilty pleas. Winker, 319 N.W.2d at 291-94. In the same comment petitioner points to while arguing the opposite, the Restatement explains that “[a] defendant who pleads guilty may be held to be estopped in subsequent civil litigation from contesting facts representing the elements of the offense.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 85 cmt. b. The Restatement treated “such an estoppel [as] not a matter of issue preclusion, 14 civil actions. The supreme court explained that the requirement for trial courts to first ascertain a factual basis for the guilty plea serves both to convince a court that a guilty plea is founded on fact and that “a judicial determination has thus been made with respect to the essential elements of the crime.” Id. at 295. Accordingly, a guilty plea satisfies the requirement that the “issue must have been raised and litigated in the prior action.” Id. at 294; see also In re Harwood, 2013 VT 89, ¶ 11, 195 Vt. 7, 86 A.3d 976 (“Preclusion is possible only if the issue was necessarily and essentially determined in a prior action.” (quotation omitted)). The supreme court noted that its conclusion squared with the Restatement’s underlying rationale that preclusion is only appropriate where “the parties have obtained a judicial determination of an issue following the exploration of that issue through the litigative process.” 319 N.W.2d at 296 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68 cmt. d). The court reasoned that just as judgments following trial, and dispositive motions such as motions to dismiss, all have issue-preclusive effect, there was no reason why the factualbasis requirement for a guilty plea should not also. Id. We agree. ¶ 34. Vermont has robust safeguards in place for trial courts to accept guilty pleas. The overarching goal of Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 is to ensure that a defendant voluntarily admits guilt before the court enters a guilty verdict. See In re Dunham, 144 Vt. 444, 451, 479 A.2d 144, 148 (1984). We recently clarified that Criminal Rule 11(f) requires the defendant to “personally admit[] to facts relating to the elements of the offense.” In re Bridger, 2017 VT 79, ¶ 22, 205 Vt. 380, 176 A.3d 489. By ensuring the defendant’s personal admission, “the court exposes the defendant’s understanding of the factual basis for each element on the because the issue has not actually been litigated, but [as] a matter of the law of evidence beyond the scope of this Restatement.” Id. The Winker court explained that the Restatement had to take this position because of its theory of actual adjudication. See 319 N.W.2d at 292 (“In sum, the [Restatement] recognizes that a guilty plea can be conclusive in a civil suit, but it is forced to conclude that this result is beyond the scope of issue preclusion to maintain consistency with its ‘actual litigation’ requirement.”). 15 record, which facilitates the court’s understanding of the facts and provides subsequent courts with the opportunity to review the record to establish that the defendant’s plea was truly voluntary.” 9 Id. We explained that strict adherence to Rule 11, including requiring the defendant to affirmatively acknowledge the factual basis underlying the charge against him, makes it less likely that false guilty pleas will occur. Id. Additionally, the Reporter’s Notes for Rule 11 explain that pleas of nolo contendere are permitted in part to allow defendants “to avoid the preclusive effect of a guilty plea or conviction upon a plea of not guilty in later civil or criminal litigation.” Reporter’s Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 11. ¶ 35. For these reasons, we conclude that a guilty plea may have collateral-estoppel effect in subsequent civil proceedings.10 We now turn to the Trepanier elements to determine whether the Board correctly applied collateral estoppel in this case.