Opinion ID: 613956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statutory Gates to FAA Interception, Including Judicial Review, Make Plaintiffs' Interception Particularly Speculative

Text: Plaintiffs' standing burden is, in fact, heavier in this case than in those confronting our sister circuits. In each of those cases, the challenged programs involved intelligence surveillance conducted under executive authority without congressional authorization or judicial review. By contrast, the powers of all three branches of the federal government are united to support FAA surveillance. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 121 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). More to the point for purposes of standing, when Congress authorized FAA surveillance, it erected a number of statutory gates through which the executive must pass before it can intercept any communications. At each gate, the sphere of possible interceptions can be narrowed, whether by limitations on targeting, minimization requirements, judicial review, or a Fourth Amendment mandate. Thus, to demonstrate that they are subject to actual or imminent FAA surveillance, plaintiffs must show not only that it is certain that the executive will target their foreign contactswhich plaintiffs cannot dobut also that interception of these particular contacts (and, coincidentally, plaintiffs themselves) is certain to take place despite required targeting limits, minimization, judicial review, and the statute's overarching Fourth Amendment mandate. The decision in In re FISA Section 105B Directives, 551 F.3d at 1013-14 & n. 7, demonstrates why plaintiffs cannot show that their interception is certain notwithstanding the targeting and minimization procedures required by the FAA. As for judicial review, the panel's dismissal of that intermediate step notably fails to mention the FISA court's obligation to make an independent Fourth Amendment finding before issuing any FAA order. Instead, the panel implies that FISA court judges will simply rubber stamp FAA surveillance applications and, in support, cites empirical evidence showing that, in 2008, FISA court judges approved 2,081 of 2,082 surveillance applications. See Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d at 140 (acknowledging that evidence does not indicate how many of these applications, if any, came after the FAA was enacted on July 10, 2008). I respectfully disagree. The statistics merit little consideration; they could just as easily reflect the executive's scrupulous compliance with statutory requirements before submitting applications for judicial review. See generally In re FISA Section 105B Directives, 551 F.3d at 1007 (recognizing that executive was more protective than PAA required in conducting warrantless surveillance under that statute). More important, the panel fails to tell the whole story when it states that the FISA court must order FAA surveillance if the executive's certification conforms to the statutory requirements. Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d at 139. To be sure, the FISA court must find that the executive's certification contains all the required elements. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A). But it must further find for itself that the executive's targeting and minimization procedures conform to all statutory requirements and are consistent with the fourth amendment. Id. Far from cabining judicial review, this provision was intended to ensur[e] FISA Court involvement in any aspect of the new procedure for targeting foreigners outside the United States that could involve U.S. persons. 154 Cong. Rec. S6181 (daily ed. June 26, 2008) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller, then-Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence); see also 154 Cong. Rec. S6389 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (sectional analysis of FAA presented by Sen. Bond) (explaining that if FISA court determines that targeting and minimization procedures are inconsistent with FAA's requirements or Fourth Amendment, then it shall order the Government, at its election, to correct any deficiencies or cease, or not begin, the acquisition). [20] There is no reason to think that the Article III judges who serve on the FISA court will be timid in exercising this review authority. Well before the FAA was enacted, the FISA Court of Review ruled that FISA court judges were authorized to scrutinize government applications, including certifications, and to seek more information as warranted to ensure compliance with statutory requirements. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735-36 (FISA Ct.Rev. 2002). Thus, they can be expected to do the same in conducting the constitutional review mandated by the FAA. See generally In re FISA Section 105B Directives, 551 F.3d at 1008 (noting that, in reviewing constitutional challenge to PAA, FISA court handed down a meticulous opinion). [21] In sum, plaintiffs fail to establish standing because they can only speculate that they will ever be intercepted by FAA surveillance.