Opinion ID: 202710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ADA Reasonable Accommodation Claims

Text: 42 On appeal, Freadman claims that Metropolitan failed to accommodate her disability on two occasions — June 2, before her presentation to the officers group, when she requested time off, and June 26, when she asked to work at home for an additional day. 10 43 The definition of discrimination under the ADA includes not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the] covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [entity's] business. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Higgins, 194 F.3d at 264. In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on a reasonable accommodation claim, the plaintiff must produce enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) he was able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable accommodation, and (3) [the defendant], despite knowing of [the plaintiff]'s disability, did not reasonably accommodate it. Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir.2003).
44 Freadman alleges that Metropolitan knew of her disability yet failed to reasonably accommodate it after she told Smith that she needed to take some time off because [she was] starting not to feel well and that some of [her] symptoms may be returning. 45 The ADA imposes liability for an employer's failure to accommodate  known physical or mental limitations of an employee. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Ordinarily, the employer's duty to accommodate is triggered by a request from the employee. Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir.2001); see also 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 313 (3d ed.1996); 1 H. Perritt, Jr., Americans with Disabilities Act Handbook § 4.17, at 121 (3d ed.1997). That is because an employee's disability and concomitant need for accommodation are often not known to the employer. Reed, 244 F.3d at 261. Thus, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that she sufficiently requested the accommodation in question. 11 Id. at 260. The employee's request (1) must be `sufficiently direct and specific,' and (2) must explain how the accommodation requested is linked to some disability. Id. at 261 (quoting Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir.1992)); see also Estades-Negroni, 377 F.3d at 64 (requiring request to be express and linked to a disability). 46 In addition to making a sufficient request concerning a known limitation, the plaintiff must also show that the proposed accommodation is reasonable — that it would enable her to perform the essential functions of her job, and that at least on the face of things, it is feasible for the employer under the circumstances. Reed, 244 F.3d at 259; see also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002); Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 148 (1st Cir.2006). 47 If the plaintiff can make these showings, the defendant then has the opportunity to show that the proposed accommodation would impose an undue hardship. Reed, 244 F.3d at 259; see also Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402, 122 S.Ct. 1516. We need not address the questions of reasonableness or undue hardship because Freadman has failed to show that her request for time off was for time off before the June 9 presentation. 48 As to the link between Freadman's request and her disability, Freadman and the EEOC argue that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Metropolitan knew that Freadman's June 2 request was related to her disability. Metropolitan disputes this. The appropriate inquiry is whether defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the reason for Freadman's request was her disability. See Wynne, 976 F.2d at 795 (addressing a claim brought under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794). 12 49 We agree that there was sufficient evidence to create a triable issue on the link between Freadman's June 2 request and her disabling colitis. Taking the evidence in plaintiff's favor, Smith knew that Freadman took medical leave from March 1999 to July 1999 in order to receive treatment for her colitis. While Freadman was recovering, Smith acknowledged plaintiff's need for more reasonable hours and a better work/life balance. Further, when one of Freadman's subordinates left Metropolitan in March 2000, Freadman notified Smith that she needed to hire a replacement or else risk impairing her health. When Smith responded that there were concerns that the home office was getting too big, Freadman objected, I'm basically killing myself to keep this [project] on track, and I'm going to get sick again. Smith replied, I know. I know. All right. All right. Just [hire a replacement] quick. This is not a situation, as in Soileau, where the employer's mere knowledge of medical leave over three years prior was insufficient to put it on notice of a present disability. 105 F.3d at 14, 16. 50 Freadman's accommodation claim nevertheless founders due to her failure to produce evidence that would permit a jury to conclude that the employer was put on notice of a sufficiently direct and specific request for her desired accommodation. She argues it was clear that her request was to take time off starting on June 2, rather than at some unspecified time. However, Freadman told Smith that she needed to take some time off because [she was] starting not to feel well (emphasis added). Plaintiff expressed merely a need to take some time off without specifying when she would need that time off. Freadman, who had better knowledge than Smith of her condition and symptoms, had some burden to be specific about the accommodation she required. See Reed, 244 F.3d at 260-62; see also Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1136-37 (7th Cir.1996) (recognizing that liability for a failure to accommodate claim may turn on whether missing information is of the type that can only be provided by one of the parties). No rational jury could conclude that Smith reasonably should have known that Freadman was requesting time off before the presentation on June 9. The employer has no duty to divine the need for a special accommodation where the employee fails to make an adequate request. Reed, 244 F.3d at 261. 51 Smith, in response to Freadman's request, reasonably suggested that Freadman take time off after the presentation, only a week later. To the extent plaintiff adequately requested time off at some unspecified point in the future, defendant granted a reasonable accommodation. If this was not what Freadman sought, she could have clarified that she needed time off immediately. She never did so. 52 There was no transgression of the employer's responsibility to help determine what would constitute a reasonable accommodation. The federal regulations implementing the equal employment provisions of the ADA state: 53 To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations. 54 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( o )(3). Once a qualified individual with a disability has requested provision of a reasonable accommodation, the employer must make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation. Id. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9. 13 The employer has an obligation upon learning of an employee's disability to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the employee to find the best means of accommodating that disability. Tobin, 433 F.3d at 108. The employee also has an obligation: The appropriate reasonable accommodation is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer and the [employee] with a disability. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9; see also Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 24. 55 Here, there was an informal process. But Freadman failed to be sufficiently specific, and Metropolitan granted the request it thought had been made. Under the circumstances, Metropolitan offered plaintiff a reasonable accommodation, and Freadman cannot now argue that the company should have offered something different. Cf. Webster v. Methodist Occupational Health Ctrs., Inc., 141 F.3d 1236, 1238 (7th Cir.1998) (An employee cannot refuse reasonable accommodations during the interactive process ..., and then after dismissal suggest something different. . . .). 56 In a final attempt to salvage the June 2 reasonable accommodation claim, Freadman — but not the EEOC — argues that her failure to clarify her request was excusable due to intimidation: she believed she would be punished if she pursued her request for time off. We reject plaintiff's proposition that employees who make requests have no obligation to further clarify their needs once the employer offers an accommodation the employee believes is insufficient. There may well be instances in which an employee has made a clear request, the employer has denied the accommodation or offered an unsatisfactory accommodation, the employee has become too intimidated to continue seeking a satisfactory accommodation, and the employer reasonably should have understood that dynamic. This will depend on the particular facts of the case. Here, plaintiff has not made a plausible, objective case of intimidation. See Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 515 (1st Cir. 1996); accord Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135-36. Before June 2, Metropolitan had granted Freadman several months of time off for treatment of her ulcerative colitis. The employer even made exceptions to company work rules and hiring freezes. Moreover, Smith had given Freadman two raises and a high performance evaluation since her return from medical leave in 1999. Smith did in fact reasonably respond to the request made of him. No reasonable juror could find that there was intimidation so as to excuse Freadman from clarifying her request. Summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan on Freadman's June 2 reasonable accommodation claim is appropriate.
57 Freadman alleges that Metropolitan knew of her disability, yet failed to reasonably accommodate it, when on June 26 she informed Smith that she was still feeling sick and then asked if she could work from home an additional day. Smith's response was, No, you have to come in the office today. You have two choices. You go out on disability or you come in the office. There's changes in the department that affect you. 58 Freadman decided to go into the office rather than go out on disability. She explained that no one wants to go out on disability unless . . . they absolutely have to, and she additionally explained that normally, you have to use a certain number of sick days prior to going out on disability. Smith, for his part, said that he had told Freadman, [I]f you are not feeling well, then you should consider taking, you know, [paid time off] or going out on disability; if you are going to work, whether it's from home or in the office, then you need to come in. 59 It is far from clear that any accommodation claim can be maintained when an employee argues she should not, after having taken unauthorized leave, be put to the choice of taking disability leave or coming into the office to arrange working at home. Further, Freadman does not claim to have suffered any particular harm from going into the office on June 26. 60 If this claim is meant to color the June 2 accommodation claim, it adds nothing. Metropolitan's response to the June 26 request was entirely reasonable. 61 If the claim is meant to demonstrate that Freadman was entitled to work at home, 14 it was still reasonable for the employer to have her come into the office to arrange that. 62 Summary judgment on the June 26 failure to accommodate claim is affirmed.