Opinion ID: 1196789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Anderson appeals his conviction, first arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions for wire fraud and failure to appear. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, we examin[e] the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and giv[e] the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences. United States v. Foxx, 544 F.3d 943, 949 (8th Cir.2008). The standard of review of an appeal concerning the sufficiency of the evidence is very strict, and the verdict of the jury should not be overturned lightly. United States v. Scott, 64 F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir.1995). Because Anderson did not move for acquittal at the close of evidence, we review the district court's entry of judgment for plain error. See United States v. Milam, 494 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir.2007). Plain error exists when (1) there is error (2) which is plain and (3) affects substantial rights, and we should only exercise our discretion to correct such error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. We will find error only if, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable fact-finder could have found Anderson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Londondio, 420 F.3d 777, 786 (8th Cir.2005).
To convict a defendant of wire fraud, the Government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant [1] voluntarily [participated in] a scheme to defraud another out of money, [2] that he did so with intent to defraud, [3] that it was reasonably foreseeable interstate wire communications would be used, and [4] that interstate wire communications were used. United States v. Slaughter, 128 F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir.1997). Anderson disputes the sufficiency of the Government's evidence on the third elementthe reasonable foreseeability that interstate wire communications would be used. He contends that although the loan proceeds were transferred interstate from AgCountry's Minnesota branch to his bank in North Dakota, the Government presented no evidence that he should have foreseen such an interstate transfer, as opposed to an intrastate transfer from AgCountry's North Dakota branch to his North Dakota bank. The Government presented evidence that Anderson used AgCountry's online banking system to receive and transfer money to his bank account. An AgCountry employee testified that upon AgCountry's approval of the loans, Anderson initiated the wire transfers by accessing AgCountry's online customer account and directing the transfer of the loan proceeds to his bank account in North Dakota. The loan proceeds were then wired from AgCountry's branch in Minnesota to Anderson's North Dakota bank account. In United States v. Goodson, 155 F.3d 963 (8th Cir.1998), we held that interstate wire transfers were reasonably foreseeable to a defendant because his deposit statement contained the notation `EFT,' an abbreviation for `electronic funds transfer,' id. at 966. Similarly, in this case, because the Government presented evidence that Anderson used AgCountry's electronic banking system to transfer the loan proceeds into his account, a reasonable jury could determine that it was reasonably foreseeable to Anderson that the loan proceeds would be transferred interstate by wire. See id. at 966-67. Accordingly, because the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Anderson's conviction for wire fraud, the district court committed no error, much less plain error, in failing to sua sponte direct a judgment of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. See Londondio, 420 F.3d at 787 (italics omitted).
To convict Anderson of failure to appear, the jury instructions stated that the Government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [1] [Anderson] was on pretrial release; [2] [Anderson] was required to be in Court for his scheduled jury trial; [3] [Anderson] was aware of this required appearance; and [4] [Anderson] willfully failed to appear. [2] Cf. United States v. Ray, 768 F.2d 991, 994 (8th Cir.1985) (observing that notice and willfulness are two essential elements of a failure to appear charge), overruled on other grounds, Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). Anderson challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the second elementthat he was required to be in court for his scheduled jury trial on September 4, 2007. [3] He argues that because the district court dismissed the jury and continued the trial on a day-to-day basis, his trial date was no longer set for September 4, 2007, and, therefore, he had no obligation to appear in court. We conclude that the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in failing to sua sponte direct a judgment of acquittal because there was sufficient evidence to support Anderson's conviction for failure to appear. Although the district court dismissed the jury before the scheduled September 4 trial date, the court did not vacate the actual trial date. During the status conference in which the court inquired about Anderson's whereabouts, the district court specifically stated that it would dismiss the jury but  leave the trial date so if [Anderson] shows up we'll figure out where to go at that point. (Emphasis added.) The district court's order did not relieve Anderson of his obligation to appear for trial. Rather, the court explained that it dismissed the jury for fiscal prudence reasons but that if Anderson had shown up voluntarily on September 4, the trial would have begun and jury selection would have begun shortly thereafter. Anderson relies on United States v. Fisher, 137 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir.1998), in support of his argument. Fisher, however, is clearly distinguishable from the present case. When Fisher failed to appear for his pretrial hearing, the district court vacated his upcoming trial date. Id. at 1163. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Fisher was required to appear for the vacated trial date. Id. at 1162. In this case, the district court did not vacate Anderson's September 4 trial date, meaning that Anderson was not relieved of his obligation to appear. Thus, based on all of the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could conclude that Anderson was required to appear for trial on September 4.