Opinion ID: 1803783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Single Object Requirement

Text: As cited above, La. Const. art. XIII, § 1(B) provides a proposed amendment shall ... be confined to one object. This provision was adopted in the 1974 Constitution of Louisiana as a restatement of the theretofore existing single object rule, which was partially a creature of the jurisprudence arising from the interpretation of various provisions of earlier state constitutions. These earlier provisions provided: When more than one amendment shall be submitted at the same election, they shall be so submitted as to enable the electors to vote on each amendment separately. See, La. Const. art. 21, § 1(1921); La. Const. art. 325 (1913); La. Const. art. 321 (1898); La. Const. art. 256 (1879); [21] see also, LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE, 196 (1991); Graham, 3 So.2d at 782-83; Hotard, 35 So.2d at 755; Miller, 74 So.2d at 389-90. Although none of the various Louisiana state constitutions prior to the 1974 Constitution expressly required that every constitutional amendment be confined to one object, Louisiana courts had consistently ruled that constitutional amendments could not pertain to more than one object in their interpretation of the separate votes for separate amendments provisions noted above. See Graham, 3 So.2d at 782-84, 786-87 (O'Niell, C.J. dissenting); Hotard, 35 So.2d at 755; Miller, 74 So.2d at 390. It was this jurisprudential interpretation that the people sought to continue in their adoption of the first sentence of La. Const. art. XIII, § 1(B). See 9 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention Transcripts 3155 (1977) (The basic requirement that a bill should be confined to one object includes that acts and joint resolutions should be confined to one object. That is traditional; it is sensible; it has been interpreted by the courts, and we ought to continue that same philosophy.) (Mr. Jenkins speaking). The two leading cases from this Court addressing this rule are Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 So.2d 761 (1941), [22] and Miller v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Com'n, 225 La. 1095, 74 So.2d 387 (1954), which we will discuss in turn. In Graham v. Jones , this Court addressed the validity of 1940 La. Acts 384, a joint resolution of the Legislature proposing a constitutional amendment, which made various changes to state government, including abolishing the Legislative Bureau and reorganizing the executive department. Graham, 3 So.2d at 766; see also HARGRAVE, supra. Moreover, as in the instant case, the amendment at issue in Graham was approved by the electorate. In its holding, this Court found the Act was without effect because it was not constitutionally adopted, applying a rather narrow construction of the single object rule. In its discussion, the Graham court explained the single object rule in light of the determination of whether one or more constitutional amendments were contained in a single proposition: If the different changes contained in the proposed amendment all cover matters necessary to be dealt with in some manner, in order that the Constitution, as amended, shall constitute a consistent and workable whole on the general topic embraced in that part which is amended, and if, logically speaking, they should stand or fall as a whole, then there is but one amendment submitted. But, if any one of the propositions, although not directly contradicting the others, does not refer to such matters, or if it is not such that the voter supporting it would reasonably be expected to support the principle of the others, then there are in reality two or more amendments to be submitted, and the proposed amendment falls within the constitutional prohibition. Nor does the rule as stated unduly hamper the adoption of legitimate amendments to the Constitution. Such a document was presumably adopted deliberately, after careful preparation, as a harmonious and complete system of government. Changes suggested thereto should represent the free and mature judgment of the electors, so submitted that they cannot be constrained to adopt measures of which in reality they disapprove, in order to secure the enactment of others they earnestly desire. [quoting Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 36 P.2d 549, 554 (1934)]    This provision of the Constitution is a wise one, and is intended to prevent several inconsistent and conflicting propositions from being submitted to the voters in the same amendment, and forcing the voter to approve or reject such amendment as a whole. In other words, it prevents burdening a meritorious proposition with a vicious one, and alike prevents a vicious proposition from having the support of a meritorious one, and gives to the voter the right to have each separate proposition submitted to him in order that he may express his will for or against each separately without being compelled to accept a provision to which he is opposed in order to have adopted a provision which meets his favor. [quoting McBee v. Brady, 15 Idaho 761, 100 P. 97, 101 (1909)]    Numerous cases from other jurisdictions are cited on behalf of relators in which the general rule has been laid down that a constitutional amendment embracing several subjects all of which are germane to the general subject of the amendment, under the requirement for separate submission where more than one amendment is proposed, may be submitted to people as a general proposition. The question in this case is not whether the rule is sound, but whether it is applicable to the proposed amendment under review by the Court. Graham, 3 So.2d at 776-77. [23]