Opinion ID: 1242354
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jim's appeal

Text: On appeal, Jim argues that the superior court erred in ordering him to pay the $79,300 DTC note and the $12,400 Fidelity note. He contends that the superior court's decision to enforce the promissory notes relating to the DTC and Fidelity stock is inconsistent with the court's finding that Robin and Jim knowingly transferred the DTC and Fidelity stock in November 1979 from the Wold Trust to themselves as individuals. We agree. Once the superior court concluded that Robin and Jim knowingly participated in the November 1979 stock transfers, that it was the parties' intent to hold the stock jointly, and that the transfers were gifts from Robin to the marital estate, there was no theory under which the promissory notes would be enforceable. The promissory notes were executed well after the November 1979 stock transfers and were not consideration for the transfers. Robin concedes that neither the Fidelity nor DTC stock transfers occurred for consideration. She also agrees that she signed the certificates purporting to make the transfers. Nevertheless, she asserts that she did not intend Jim to acquire any personal interest in the stock. Instead, Robin contends that she assumed that transfer of the [stock] from `Sigurd Wold and Robin L. Dodson as trustees of Sigurd Wold Trust' to `James L. Dodson, and Robin L. Dodson,' was necessary to put James' name on the stock, since he was recently appointed to act as a co-trustee in place of Sig. [5] We will generally accept the determination of witnesses' credibility that are made by the court as a trier of fact, since the court heard and observed the witnesses first hand. Demoski v. New, 737 P.2d 780, 784 (Alaska 1987). The superior court concluded that Robin's testimony about her intentions in authorizing the 1979 transfer was not completely accurate. Specifically, it found that Robin was fully aware that property from the Trust was being transferred to the Dodsons individually. It based its finding upon the plain language of the stock transfer documents and upon evidence that Robin had actively participated in managing trust and family finances. The superior court's findings are supported by the record. First, the stock transfer documents plainly indicate that Robin and Jim as co-trustees authorized the 1979 transfers. The absence of the title trustee or a similar term next to Jim's and Robin's names in the transferee portion of the documents is conspicuous and undermines Robin's position. Second, although Jim appears to have been primarily responsible for the family's financial affairs, record evidence of Robin's past participation in the Wold Trust's business affairs supports the superior court's conclusion that Robin would have been able to understand the nature of what she was signing. For example, the record supports the superior court's finding that Robin worked extensively with the attorney for the Wold Trust to transfer all of Sig Wold's assets to the trust or into joint ownership with right of survivorship with her. [6] In light of the plain language of the transfer documents and evidence of Robin's past participation in the trust's affairs, we conclude that the superior court did not err when it found Robin to have been fully aware that she was authorizing transfer of the DTC and Fidelity stock from the Wold Trust to the Dodsons as individuals. Therefore, we reverse the superior court's decision to enforce the promissory notes against Jim as his separate debt and in favor of Robin as her separate property. [7]