Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guilt trial evidentiary issues

Text: The prosecution presented testimony by physicians who treated the Mishells in the immediate aftermath of defendant's assaults. This testimony indicated, among other things, the following: Both victims suffered multiple depressed skull fractures, and both required surgery to relieve injury-related, and life-threatening, pressure on their brains. Barbara Mishell emerged from her trauma-induced coma with right-side paralysis, difficulty in swallowing, and an inability to read, write, or speak. By the time she left the hospital, she still could not walk, talk, or feed herself. It appeared she would need extensive rehabilitative therapy, and her prognosis was not good. Subsequently, defense counsel advised the court it understood the prosecution intended to present Dr. Price, a neuropsychologist, who had supervised both victims' long-term rehabilitative therapy and continued to treat them at the time of trial. Counsel anticipated Dr. Price's testimony would concern the couple's rehabilitative progress over the two or three years since their release from the hospital. Counsel objected that such evidence was irrelevant (Evid.Code, § 210, 350) and cumulative, in that medical witnesses had already established the serious and extensive nature of the Mishells' injuries. Counsel also asserted that this evidence should be excluded as more prejudicial than probative. ( Id., § 352.) Alluding to the complaint's allegation that the Mishells had suffered great bodily injury (GBI), the prosecutor responded that I don't think the law says ... we have to stop as soon as the minimum burden for [GBI] is met, and I think the jury has a right to understand the full scope of [those] injuries. He insisted that Dr. Price's testimony would differ from that already presented, because it would describe the long-term impact of the blows defendant had inflicted. The court advised the prosecutor that I think [counsel is] trying to say, does that help you to prove intent to kill or premeditation. [¶] Why are you doing this? The prosecutor again asserted that I'm doing this to prove the extent of the [GBI] and to prove intent to kill and to show the full extent of the injuries [Barbara] suffered, and I think the law entitles me to do that. Suggesting that the evidence might be able to show the issue of the necessary mental state in assault with a deadly weapon or attempted murder, the court overruled the objection but directed the prosecutor to keep his presentation brief. In his testimony, Dr. Price reported that Robert Mishell had largely regained his cognitive function, but would have difficulty resuming his career as an immunology professor because he retained deficits in the areas of memory and visual spatial functioning. Dr. Price also discussed the characteristics of posttraumatic amnesia as they might apply to Robert's recall of the events surrounding the attacks. Dr. Price related that Barbara continued to exhibit emotional and behavioral instability related to brain damage, as well as profound aphasiathe inability to speak or understand speech. He said her prognosis for regaining the functional use of language was poor. On appeal, defendant claims Dr. Price's testimony was irrelevant to the elements of the attempted murder charges. He urges it was cumulative to the extensive evidence already produced about the nature and extent of the Mishells' injuries, served only to inflame the jury, and should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. The court's error, he asserts, additionally violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The evidence was properly admitted. Information about the full extent of the Mishells' conditions resulting from the attacks was directly relevant and probative as to the allegation, not formally conceded by defendant, that he inflicted GBI on the victims. Nor was the evidence cumulative insofar as it focused on the long-term effects of the Mishells' injuriesinformation not provided by other prosecution witnesses. As below, the People correctly observe that they were not required to withhold evidence of the full extent of the Mishells' injuries once a minimum threshold necessary to prove the GBI allegation had been passed. The prosecution need not sap the force of its case by presenting only the most antiseptic evidence, even in the face of a defense offer to stipulate. (E.g., People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222 ( Marks ); Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) A fortiori, where, as here, the prosecution must convince the factfinder, beyond reasonable doubt, of charges and allegations the defendant has not conceded, it need not sanitize its case by presenting only enough evidence to meet bare legal sufficiency. Moreover, evidence that the victims, and in particular Barbara Mishell, suffered not only severe acute trauma, but also substantial long-term deficits and disabilities, as the result of defendant's vicious attack was not unduly prejudicial for purposes of Evidence Code section 352. For this purpose, prejudicial means uniquely inflammatory without regard to relevance. (E.g., People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1121, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450.) Dr. Price's testimony was logically related to the issues, and was presented in a nonsensational way, through the testimony of an expert witness. The court acted well within its broad discretion under section 352 (e.g., People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 654, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224; Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th 879, 913, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93) when it ruled the evidence admissible. Defendant invokes the premise that, when the trial court rules on an Evidence Code section 352 objection, the record must affirmatively show the court weighed prejudice against probative value. (See, e.g., People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 656, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84 ( Mickey ).) [14] Defendant insists the instant trial court failed to satisfy this requirement, or to exercise its discretion correctly, when it used a mistaken legal theorythat the evidence was relevant to his culpable mental stateto assess the probative value of the evidence. Whatever the technical merits of this argument, the evidence was manifestly admissible, over a section 352 objection, for other reasons presented by the prosecutor to the trial court. Indeed, under a correct analysis, the probative value of Dr. Price's testimony so clearly exceeded its prejudicial effect that the court might well have abused its discretion by excluding the evidence. In any event, admission of the evidence was harmless by any applicable standard. The jury heard conclusive evidence that defendant was the perpetrator of a vicious assault against the Mishells, in which they each suffered multiple life-threatening head injuries leading, in Barbara's case, to severe brain damage from which she was unlikely to recover. Under these circumstances, additional evidence confirming the couple's long-term deficits and disabilities could not, beyond a reasonable doubt, have influenced the guilt or penalty outcome. No basis for reversal is demonstrated.
Defendant claims Robert Mishell's memory of the events of January 31, 1988, impaired by both his head injuries and his preexisting bipolar disorder, was unreliable. Hence, defendant urges, Robert's testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code sections 702 (evidence of witness lacking personal knowledge is inadmissible) and 352 (evidence may be excluded as more prejudicial than probative). Admission of the evidence, defendant insists, violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As evidence of Robert's faulty recollection, defendant points to inconsistent details related by Robert at various times, including in his preliminary hearing testimony and in his interviews with police officers in the hours and days following the assaults. Perhaps most significantly, defendant notes, Robert's trial testimony that defendant arrived at the Mishell residence with a toolbox, thus suggesting he brought with him the weapon used in the attacks, was contradicted by what he told the police hours after the attacks. The claim is forfeited because defendant did not object at trial to the introduction of Robert's testimony. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 622, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 [defendant must raise claim of testimonial incompetence at trial].) At the preliminary hearing, defendant was permitted to examine Robert on the issue of his competency to testify. Following that examination, the preliminary hearing court found Robert qualified to testify from his personal knowledge. Absent a ruling or stipulation that an objection to such testimony would be deemed renewed at trial, defendant's failure to renew it means the issue was not preserved for appeal. ( People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 623-624, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127 [objection made in prior trial, but not renewed]; cf. People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941 ( Pompa-Ortiz ) [denial of substantial right at preliminary hearing no basis for appellate reversal of conviction following fair trial].) In any event, the claim lacks merit. The principles governing exclusion of testimony on grounds of the witness's lack of capacity are well settled. Under ... current [law], every person is qualified to testify except as provided by statute. (Evid.Code, § 700.) A person is disqualified as a witness only if he or she is `[i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself [understandably] concerning the [testimonial] matter' ( id., § 701, subd. (a)(1)... ), or is `[i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth' ( id., ... subd. (a)(2) ... ) ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 572-573, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 ( Anderson ), italics omitted.) These issues are preliminary fact[s] to be determined exclusively by the court.... (Evid.Code, § 405, subd. (a)....) ( Anderson, supra, at p. 573, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Even if a witness is not entirely disqualified for incapacity to communicate understandably or grasp the duty to tell the truth, his or her testimony on a particular matter is inadmissible if he or she lacks personal knowledge of the subject matter. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a).) The capacity to perceive and recollect particular facts is subsumed within the issue of personal knowledge. ( Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 573, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347, and authorities cited.) But, under Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (a)(2), personal knowledge, including the capacity to perceive and recollect particular events, is determined in a different manner from fundamental capacity to act as a witness. Evidence may be excluded for lack of personal knowledge `only if no jury could reasonably find that [the witness] has such knowledge.' ( Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 573, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347, italics omitted.) Thus, `if there is evidence that the witness [can perceive and recollect the events at issue], the determination whether he [or she] in fact perceived and does recollect is left to the trier of fact.' ( Id. at pp. 573-574, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347, italics omitted.) Defendant has never claimed Robert was fundamentally disqualified as a witness. Here, as below, he asserts only that Robert's testimony about the events of January 31, 1988, was inadmissible because he lacked the capacity to perceive and recall those events. But the record contains ample evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that Robert did perceive and independently recollect the attacks and their surrounding circumstances, and correctly identified defendant as the assailant. At trial, Robert gave a coherent and entirely plausible account of these events, which account was consistent with the physical evidence. During an extensive cross-examination, he admitted that, before and since the attacks, he suffered from chronic bipolar disorder, controlled by medication, but denied that this condition affected his memory. He conceded he had suffered posttraumatic amnesia during the two weeks following the attacks, and other instances of forgetfulness were revealed. Yet the lengthy cross-examination, in which defense counsel took the witness through an exhaustive review of his preliminary hearing testimony and his several police statements, indicated only minor variations in these versions. That Robert's various accounts were inconsistent in some respects, or that his testimony revealed lapses in memory, is no basis for a determination that he was fundamentally unable to perceive or recollect the testimonial events. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 357, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 574, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) In sum, there was no substantial basis for the exclusion of his testimony. It was up to the jury to decide whether his recollections were accurate. ( Lewis, supra, at p. 358, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34; Anderson, supra, at p. 574, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) No error occurred.
During her testimony for the People, Celebration Oberman read to the jury, without defense objection, passages from two letters, previously marked for identification as People's exhibits 72 and 73, that defendant had written her from jail. From exhibit 73, postmarked December 4, 1989, Oberman read: `If any of your friends attack me, tell them that you like your toy boys to be darkly handsome and charming and dangerous, hackers, murderers, pirates, and that I fit the bill.' From exhibit 72, postmarked December 19, 1989, Oberman read: `Sorry I don't know more about kitchens. I do know about hacking, however; and I could easily hack you a cart to make pizzas.' At the conclusion of the People's case, defendant objected on relevance grounds, and under Evidence Code section 352, to admission of these letters, and in particular to admission of the pages containing the passages Oberman had readpages now marked for identification as People's exhibits 72-A and 73-A, respectively. Counsel urged that the term hacking in exhibit 72-Athere used in connection with making a pizza cartdid not pertain to any trial issue, but was highly prejudicial given the facts of the case. As to exhibit 73-A, in which defendant said he fit the bill as a hacker[ ], murderer[ ], [and] pirate[ ], counsel asserted that even if hacker[ ] was not related to the pizza cart reference in exhibit 72-A, its use next to the word murderer[ ] produced a prejudicial effect far in excess of its probative value. The court ruled that exhibit 72-A, the pizza cart passage, would be excluded on 352, in that the hacking reference there, read in context, appeared not connected to the case. However, the court admitted exhibit 73-A as an admission of guilt, i.e., that defendant was a murderer, a hacker, that kind of stuff, and [t]hat's why it's going in. In his trial testimony, defendant stated that hacker was a computer term which had come to have a pejorative connotation, but originally meant a person who would elegantly solve a problem by hacking at it but persistently trying to find a solution. He said that while he and Oberman were in Palm Springs, he had read to Oberman, a computer illiterate, from a book about hackers as computer heroes, and as a result, she had come to call defendant her little hacker. Defendant now urges that, by admitting exhibit 73-A, the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352. He asserts the trial court admitted this exhibit even though it recognized that hacker was not used in a murderous context. In particular, he insists, by placing before the jury defendant's self-reference as a hackeran inflammatory term for purposes of this particular casethe court denied him his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable capital trial. We find no abuse of discretion. At the outset, defendant is mistaken that the trial court saw no sinister implication to defendant's use of hacker in exhibit 73-A. On the contrary, as indicated above, while the court considered that the hacking reference in exhibit 72-A was probably innocent, it ruled that the hacker reference in exhibit 73-A could be considered an admission of guilt. The court properly concluded that exhibit 73-A was probative on this issue. Though the meaning of the disputed passage was perhaps open to interpretation, a sinister construction was reasonable. Under these circumstances, it was for the jury to make the determination. (See, e.g., People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1032-1035, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68 ( Kraft ).) Nor, as the trial court implicitly found, was the evidence so uniquely inflammatory that its potential for unfair prejudice clearly outweighed its probative value. Indeed, by admitting this letter excerpt, the prosecution simply asked the fact finder to interpret the defendant's own bragging words. There is no basis to conclude the trial court erred by admitting exhibit 73-A. Moreover, any error was harmless by any applicable standard. The jurors had already heard the disputed passages, read to them from the witness stand by Oberman. Under these circumstances, and beyond a reasonable doubt, later admission of exhibit 73-A into evidence cannot have affected the guilt or penalty outcome. No basis for reversal appears.
On August 7, 1992, prior to jury selection, the prosecution notified the defense it intended to offer in evidence Luis Reyna's April 5, 1988, tape-recorded interview with the police. In this interview, Reyna stated that, during a conversation between the two men, defendant had admitted his responsibility for the Mishell assaults; Reyna also indicated that defendant had attempted to enlist Reyna's help in establishing an alibi for those offenses. The notice asserted that the statement was admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Evidence Code section 1350. This statute provides a hearsay exception, in a serious felony case, for properly memorialized, authenticated, trustworthy, and corroborated statements made to a law enforcement officer by a declarant who thereafter became unavailable as a court witness because, by clear and convincing evidence, he or she was kidnapped or killed, with the defendant's participation or at his behest, for the purpose of preventing the defendant's arrest or prosecution. [15] Defendant moved in limine to exclude the tape, urging that it did not meet the requirements of Evidence Code section 1350interpreted in light of the federal confrontation clause's ban on untrustworthy hearsay [16] and was more prejudicial than probative (Evid.Code, § 352). The court denied the defense motion. Among other things, the court correctly noted that the corroboration requirement set forth in Evidence Code section 1350 applied only to the Mishell assaultsthe only charges as to which Reyna's statement was offered for its truth, and was thus subject to the hearsay rule (see Evid. Code, § 1200). [17] After confirming it had reviewed a transcript of the taped statement, and had read the preliminary hearing transcript, the court ruled that I am going to admit the recorded statement under [section] 1350 on the ground there is evidence, clear and convincing, [that] [Reyna's] unavailability was caused by the defendant and the statement which concerns the assault is corroborated by the evidence. Defendant renewed his objection prior to the prosecution's opening statement, this time explicitly invoking the confrontation clause as well as Evidence Code section 1350, and again in midtrial, before the introduction of the taped statement. Subject to certain redactions for other evidentiary reasons, these objections were again overruled. The tape recording of Reyna's April 5, 1988, police statement, as redacted, was played for the jury. On appeal, defendant again contends the prosecution failed to satisfy the prerequisites for the admission of Reyna's statement under Evidence Code section 1350. The claim lacks merit. We review evidentiary rulings, including those involving hearsay issues, for abuse of discretion. (E.g., People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46 ( Waidla ).) Under that standard, the record considered by the trial court amply supports its conclusion that the statement was admissible under this statute. Defendant first insists that, at the time of the court's evidentiary ruling, there was not clear and convincing evidence defendant knowingly caused Reyna's death for the purpose of preventing defendant's arrest or prosecution. [18] But the taped statement itself was evidence of Reyna's status as a potential, and significant, prosecution witness in the Mishell assault case. [19] Moreover, the preliminary hearing disclosed evidence that defendant knew of the threat posed by Reyna. There Reyna's sister Yolanda testified, as at trial, that the night before he disappeared, Reyna told defendant on the telephone he was not afraid of defendant and intended to testify against him. [20] There was also strong evidence that, within a day after receiving this news from Reyna, defendant killed him. At the preliminary hearing, Reyna's mother Helen testified, as at trial, that on the morning after his telephone conversation with defendant, Reyna left the family home, with some trepidation, to meet defendant face to face, and that Reyna never returned. Other preliminary hearing witnesses recounted the discovery, days after Reyna's disappearance, of his decapitated and dismembered body in an isolated location, as well as physical and forensic evidence linking defendant to the homicide. This included testimony that bloodstains on the exterior and interior of defendant's abandoned truck included samples consistent with the victim's blood. Under these circumstances, a strong inference arose that defendant had murdered Reyna, and had done so to prevent the testimony Reyna threatened he would give. The trial court was amply justified in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant knowingly caused Reyna's death for this purpose. Defendant also asserts there were insufficient indicia of trustworthiness surrounding Reyna's police statement to satisfy either Evidence Code section 1350 or the confrontation clause. We discuss below (fn. 21, post ) any argument defendant may be understood to advance under the federal Constitution. For purposes of Evidence Code section 1350, evidence that the statement was trustworthy is very strong. At the time of his statement, Reyna was not in custody, nor a suspect in any crime, but a citizen witness. At the outset of the police interview, he agreed that he was at the police station of [his] own free will and that the police had not made [him] any promises or guarantees or set any conditions on his statement. Reyna indicated that he and defendant were friends and colleagues on the Berkeley Waterfront Commission. Reyna then gave a detailed account of his conversations and encounters with defendant over several months about the anonymous telephone calls defendant was receiving, his suspicions that a professor and his wife were responsible, his determination to handle the matter his way, his ultimate account of his attack on the Mishells, and his efforts to enlist Reyna's help in constructing an alibi. At one point, the interviewer, Detective Gustafson, observed that Reyna was consulting notes he had made of his contacts with defendant over this period. The record disclosed no motive for Reyna to lie about what his colleague and erstwhile friend had told him. Indeed, the preliminary hearing testimony of Reyna's mother and sister suggested that he later resisted defendant's efforts to dissuade him from testifying despite concern for his personal safety. Defendant urges Reyna's statement should have been deemed untrustworthy because Gustafson testified at the preliminary hearing that Reyna provided no significant new information, and that, prior to his statement, at least some details, contained in a previously sealed search warrant affidavit, had become public when the media obtained a copy of the affidavit. Defendant also notes from the preliminary hearing transcript that Reyna told several persons, including defense investigator Cramer, that defendant often teased him and he did not necessarily believe defendant's claim of responsibility for the assaults. But Reyna never varied from the substance of what defendant had told him. Moreover, his uncertainty, before going to the police, about what he should do with the information, and his subsequent effort to convince Cramer that newspaper reports had taken his statement out of context, actually support the statement's reliability. Reyna spoke to the police despite his deep conflict about his public responsibility, his friendship for defendant, his willingness to give defendant the benefit of the doubt, and his concern for his own safety. Ample evidence thus supports the trial court's implicit finding that the statement was made under circumstances indicating its trustworthiness. Finally, defendant disputes that, at the time of the evidentiary ruling, Reyna's statement was corroborated by other evidence linking defendant to the Mishell assaults. But such corroboration was present in the preliminary hearing testimony of Robert Mishell, who, as at trial, implicated defendant as his attacker. The trial court's finding on this issue was not an abuse of its discretion. [21] Defendant argues, confusingly, that he suffered prejudice insofar as the jury may have considered Reyna's statement both for its truth in the Mishell attempted murder case and as evidence of defendant's motive to kill Reyna. But having surmounted the hurdle of Evidence Code section 1350, the statement was admissible for its truth, despite its hearsay character, as evidence of defendant's responsibility for the attacks on the Mishells. Without regard to the hearsay rule, it was also admissible in the murder case, not for its truth, but to demonstrate defendant's motive to kill Reyna as a potential witness against him. Because the statement was thus admissible for all the purposes defendant cites, no possibility of juror confusion, or unfair prejudice, is shown. For similar reasons, there is no merit to defendant's argument that the undue risk of confusion and prejudice should have led to exclusion of the statement under Evidence Code section 352. [22]
At the conclusion of jury selection, the court turned to the admission of photographic evidence proffered by the prosecution. The court first noted that the People had submitted 15 photographs of various parts of Reyna's dismembered body. The court indicated it had culled [these 15 photos] down ... to five. Citing Evidence Code section 352, the defense objected to only two of the remaining fiveone, five by seven inches, depicting an arm minus a hand, and the other, also five by seven inches, depicting a severed hand held next to a handless arm to demonstrate a match. The court ruled that the photograph of the arm-hand matchup could be admitted, but reserved judgment on the other disputed photo. The arm-hand matchup photo was later marked as People's exhibit 59 and admitted in evidence. The coroner, Dr. Daugherty, and a forensic anthropologist, Dr. Heglar, each testified that exhibit 59 showed how they had matched the hand to the wrist by comparing similar cuts in the appropriate locations. The prosecution did not introduce the remaining photo to which defendant had objected. Defendant also sought, under Evidence Code section 352, to exclude seven photographs, five by seven inches each, taken at different angles of Robert and Barbara Mishell in their hospital beds, their heads shaved, with the gashes and stitches in their scalps visible. The three pictures of Barbara showed her apparently unconscious, with a breathing apparatus in her mouth. The trial court accepted the People's argument that the photos were relevant to demonstrate the extent of the Mishells' injuries, and were not cumulative or unduly inflammatory. It ruled the photos admissible. They were later admitted in evidence collectively as People's exhibit 5. The Mishells' physicians used exhibit 5 to illustrate their testimony about their treatment of the victims' wounds. Finally, defendant moved, under Evidence Code section 352, to exclude eight five-by-seven-inch photos showing the Mishell kitchen as a crime scene, apparently after the Mishells had been transported to the hospital. Several of the photos showed blood spots and bloody footprints on the kitchen floor, and one showed a substantial quantity of pooled blood on the floor. One showed an overturned kitchen stool; one showed a black robe strewn on the floor; and one showed blood on the telephone Robert apparently used to call for assistance. The prosecutor urged that each picture would be relevant to testimony about what happened on the morning of the assaults, that he had culled these from many more, and that he had kept them modestly sized to reduce their inflammatory nature. The motion was denied. The photos, displayed on a board, were subsequently admitted collectively as People's exhibit 15. They were used by various witnesses to illustrate how the kitchen and various evidentiary items in it appeared after the crimes. On appeal, defendant contends again that Evidence Code section 352 required exclusion of People's exhibits 5, 15, and 59, because neither the nature and extent of the Mishells' injuries, nor the identity and dismemberment of Reyna's body, were disputed. Hence, he urges, the pictures were irrelevant, and served only to inflame the jury. The error, he asserts, violated his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable adjudication at all stages of a capital trial. The claim fails, for no error occurred. Relevant evidence includes all evidence... having any tendency in reason to prove ... any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid.Code, § 210.) Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible. ( Id., § 351.) As the People suggest, the photos illustrated the nature and extent of the Mishells' injuries, the scene of the murderous assault on the Mishells, and the condition of Reyna's body when found, indicating that it had been dismembered and scattered by human hands to hamper its identification. These details bore on matters the prosecution was obliged to establish beyond a reasonable doubtthat Reyna died by homicide, that the Mishells suffered an attack with murderous intent, and that they sustained great bodily injury as a result. Hence, the evidence had a tendency in reason to prove material facts in the case. Though defendant suggests these issues were not disputed, he never stipulated, or offered to stipulate, to any of them. Even if he had, the prosecution was not required to accept defense concessions as a sanitized alternative to the full presentation of its case. As we have repeatedly said, the prosecution need not prove the details of the charges solely from the testimony of live witnesses ( Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 243, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 706, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887) nor `accept antiseptic stipulations in lieu of photographic evidence.' ( Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1199, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130, quoting Pride, supra, at p. 243, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; see also Crittenden, supra, at 9 Cal.4th 83, 133, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) The jury was entitled to see how the physical circumstances of the crimes supported the prosecution's theories. ( Pride, supra, at p. 243, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; Turner, supra, at p. 706, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887.) Nor was the trial court's decision to admit the photographs an abuse of its discretion under Evidence Code section 352. `The admission of photographs ... lies within the broad discretion of the trial court when a claim is made that they are unduly gruesome or inflammatory. [Citations.] The court's exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is outweighed by their prejudicial effect. [Citations.]' ( People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 453-454, 46 Cal. Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64 ( Ramirez ), quoting Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 133-134, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) As detailed above, the trial court carefully considered each proffered photograph. Sensitive to the condition in which Reyna's body was found, the court, on its own motion, excluded 10 of the 15 murder scene photos originally submitted by the prosecution in order to avoid undue cumulative effect. The prosecutor also culled through the many photos of the Mishell crime scene to present the minimum he deemed necessary to illustrate his case. The multiple-angle photos of the injured Mishells showed the many wounds they had sustained on various parts of their heads. All the proffered pictures were presented in a modest size, as normal snapshots, to minimize sensationalism. There can be no doubt that all parties were acutely aware of the duty to refrain from presenting unfairly inflammatory evidence. [23] We have examined the photos. They are unpleasant, but `[v]ictim photographs... in murder cases always are disturbing. [Citation.]' ( Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th 398, 454, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64, quoting Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 134, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) The photographs at issue here are gruesome because the charged offenses were gruesome, but they did no more than accurately portray the shocking nature of the crimes. ( Ramirez, supra, at p. 454, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64.) The jury must be protected from sensationalized illustrations of a crime, but the jury cannot be shielded from an accurate depiction of the charged crimes that does not unnecessarily play upon the emotions of the jurors. ( Ibid. ) People's exhibits 5, 15, and 59 did not cross the prohibited line. The photographs were properly admitted.
Before trial, defendant moved to strike the witness-murder special circumstance allegation on grounds this special circumstance only applies to a victim who was an eyewitness to a prior offense, not simply one to whom the defendant had made incriminating admissions. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant renews his argument as a claim of insufficient evidence to support the witness-murder special-circumstance finding. Noting that Reyna's only relationship to the Mishell case was as the recipient of defendant's incriminating admissions, defendant claims Reyna was thus not a witness to a crime  (italics added) as the special circumstance requires. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10).) As defendant concedes, we have rejected this precise contention. ( Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 1018, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 535, 550, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 42, 917 P.2d 1165; see Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121, 1151, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 149, 5 P.3d 203; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1236-1244, 1273-1274, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115; People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 853, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380.) In Jones, we indicated that nothing in the language of the applicable special circumstance or in our decisions applying this special circumstance supports the suggestion that the special circumstance is confined to the killing of an `eyewitness,' as opposed to any other witness who might testify in a criminal proceeding. ( Jones, supra, at p. 550, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 42, 917 P.2d 1165.) Defendant asks that we reconsider this holding. He advances no compelling reason to do so. The evidence supports the true finding on the witness-murder special circumstance.