Opinion ID: 791768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Proceedings Before the Court of Federal Claims

Text: 21 The trial court determined that the primary issue before it was whether the 1996 FAIR Act created a property interest vested in a peanut quota holder that was eliminated by the 2002 Act. The Members asserted a regulatory taking of their alleged property right in the peanut quota created by the 1996 FAIR Act. 11 They argued (1) that the 2002 Act rendered valueless expenditures made in reliance on their peanut quotas for the 2002 growing season; (2) that by establishing a program of marketing loans open to peanut producers who actually grew peanuts, the statutory changes deprived them of their entitlement to price supports under the 1996 FAIR Act; and (3) that the buyout payments established under the 2002 Act did not approximate the fair market value of the repealed peanut quota. 22 The trial court determined that while the Members hold protected property interests in farm land and equipment, those property interests do not extend to the crop marketing quotas established by the 1996 FAIR Act. The trial court reasoned that [a] citizen does not possess the `right to exclude' when he voluntarily enters an area subject to government control. Peanut Quota Holders Ass'n, 60 Fed.Cl. at 528. The trial court found support for this conclusion from our holding in Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d 212, 216 (Fed.Cir.1993). Relying on Mitchell Arms, the trial court reasoned that the expectation of a poundage quota share was merely a collateral interest incident to the Members' ownership of farm land. Peanut Quota Holders Ass'n, 60 Fed.Cl. at 529. The trial court concluded that [b]ecause Congress has the right to modify or terminate a federal program, the benefits of such a program do not constitute a property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id. Accordingly, the trial court awarded summary judgment in favor of the government. The Members appeal the trial court's decision. 23 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).