Opinion ID: 2039833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dworman v DHCR

Text: In the first case, Leona Dworman and her husband, both retired, have not filed income tax returns since 1993. In March 1995, Dworman's landlord sent her an ICF, which Dworman timely returned, certifying that her income was below $250,000 for the previous two tax years (1993 and 1994). The landlord filed a petition with DHCR challenging the ICF, and Dworman timely responded to DHCR's notice, stating that neither she nor her husband had sufficient income to file New York State tax returns for 1993 or 1994. More than a year later, on November 1, 1996, DHCR dismissed the landlord's petition. In March 1996, while the 1995 petition was still pending before DHCR, the landlord sent Dworman a second ICF. Once again, Dworman timely responded, stating that neither she nor her husband had sufficient income in the relevant tax years (1994 and 1995) to file an income tax return. In a petition received by DHCR on June 13, 1996, the landlord once again contested Dworman's certification. On August 13, 1996, DHCR sent Dworman notice of the petition and a request for verification. At that time, however, Dworman and her husband were vacationing in Europe, and they did not return until on or about October 1, 1996. Dworman sent the verification form back to DHCR on October 23, 1996-71 days after the notice had been sentagain affirming that she had no taxable income for 1994 or 1995. Dworman alleges that she returned the form immediately after discovering it among three months of accumulated mail, which the doorman had collected for her while she was in Europe. On November 1, 1996, DHCR entered an order dismissing the landlord's 1995 petition. The order bore the docket number assigned to the 1995 petition (ZJF-410691-LD), but did not otherwise state that it related to the 1995 petition, rather than the 1996 petition, also pending at that time. One week later, on November 8, 1996, DHCR sent Dworman a letter requesting proof of timely filing of her answer to the 1996 petition. Like the November 1 order, however, the November 8 letter did not specify which petition it concerned, although it bore the docket number of the 1996 petition (KF-410275-LD). Confused about which petition the November 8 letter concerned, Dworman on November 11 responded that she did not understand the November 8 letter because the petition had just been dismissed. On January 6, 1997, DHCR sent Dworman a final request for additional information, explaining that the November 1, 1996 dismissal order applied to the 1995 petition. Dworman promptly responded that her financial condition had not changed since the previous year and that she and her husband had no income aside from Social Security. On February 27, 1997, the Rent Administrator issued an order of deregulation, stating that Dworman did not answer the owner's petition or has failed to provide certain information required to verify household income. Dworman filed a Petition for Administrative Review (PAR), which DHCR denied on October 23, 1997. The Division ruled that the Act required Dworman to respond to its notice within 60 days, that this limit was  statutory in nature (emphasis in original), and that it was outside the discretion and purview of DHCR to change this statutory time-limit. Thus, the Division concluded, because Dworman did not respond to its August 13, 1996 notice until October 23, 1996-71 days laterher response was untimely, and the Division was required to issue an order of deregulation. Dworman then filed the instant CPLR article 78 petition, which Supreme Court dismissed, noting that Dworman had responded to DHCR's petition eleven days late. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that DHCR's ruling was arbitrary and capricious because Dworman had responded to the notice a mere 11 days late but months before DHCR's determination, Dworman's income had been verified as being below the statutory threshold, and the landlord and DHCR suffered no prejudice from the brief delay. The Appellate Division remanded the case to DHCR for a determination on the merits (261 AD2d 139, 140). We granted DHCR leave to appeal.