Opinion ID: 1899579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: class c crime

Text: purportedly pursuant to Rule 7(c), M.R. Crim.P., [4] reduces the defendant's claimed misgivings by confining the accusation through such reference to the only two possible subsections which under section 253 carry the Class C crime penalties, to wit, sub- 253(2)(B) or sub- 253(2)(D). See 17-A M.R.S.A.  253(5). The State concludes that the reference caption sufficiently informed the defendant of the crime charged, so that she could adequately prepare her defense and, if convicted, use the conviction as a basis for a plea of double jeopardy, should the occasion arise. [5] State v. Wing, Me., 426 A.2d 1375 (1981). We disagree. The statutory citation, captioned as it is in this case outside the body of the charge found by the grand jury, will not save an otherwise fatally defective indictment. The caption of an indictment is no part of the grand jury's finding. State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78 (1854). The entries therein form no part of the indictment and neither add to nor take away from the legal effect of the charge as contained in the body of the indictment. United States v. Nixon, 235 U.S. 231, 35 S.Ct. 49, 59 L.Ed. 207 (1914); Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 18 S.Ct. 92, 42 L.Ed. 509 (1897). Considering the indictment without reference to its caption as we must, we find it fatally deficient in not alleging the attendant circumstances which form an integral part of the definition of the crime of gross sexual misconduct and serve to identify the particular crime with which the accused is charged and the distinct penalty to which she is exposed on conviction. Although technical procedural requirements have been greatly simplified by our rules of criminal procedure, there was no intent in their formulation to abandon the requirement that the essential constituting facts of a crime be stated in the complaint or indictment. See State v. White, Me., 280 A.2d 810 (1971); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 766, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). Undoubtedly, the language of a statute may be used in the general description of an offense, but it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged. Russell v. United States, supra, 369 U.S. at 765, 82 S.Ct. at 1048, and cases cited. In State v. Tracy, Me., 400 A.2d 758, 759 (1979), we said: In view of the careful draftsmanship of the Maine Criminal Code, Title 17-A, and the emphasis on precise definitions, it is both reasonable and desirable that the statutory language be used in criminal pleadings, provided that sufficient additional facts are alleged to apprise the accused adequately of the criminal act charged. (Emphasis added). In State v. Colson, Me., 405 A.2d 717 (1979), we concluded that section 253 under the label gross sexual misconduct defined several separate and distinct crimes, depending upon the particular attendant circumstances involved in the prohibited criminal activity. At page 719, we said that the Code drafters specified exactly what kinds of threats operating as the coercive agent compelling sexual intercourse or sexual acts must be alleged and proved to support a conviction of rape or the related section 253 crime. (Emphasis added). This is consistent with the provisions of 17-A  5, which in pertinent part reads as follows:  5. Pleading and proof 1. No person may be convicted of a crime unless each element of the crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Element of the crime means: The forbidden conduct; the attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the crime; the intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence as may be required; and any required result. (Emphasis supplied). We note that we said in State v. Luce, Me., 394 A.2d 770 (1978) at p. 774, that facts which define the severity of an offense are not elements of the crime. But we added that those additional facts which in Luce affected the severity of the offense charged, though they should be pleaded [they were not pleaded in the instant case], do not establish the parameters of the offense nor define the basic crime with respect to what is necessarily included therein. The problem in Luce was different and we hold that the quoted generalized statement is not applicable to the instant case. A person accused of crime has a constitutional right to know from the face of the criminal pleading the exact offense charged against him. The language of the formal accusation must be such that the identity of the criminal statute allegedly violated may be readily ascertained; compliance with this constitutional requirement is not achieved if the indictment does not aver all the essential elements of the crime charged, including punishment-enhancement factors, explicitly or by the use of equivalent terms. See State v. Smith, Me., 277 A.2d 481 (1971); State v. Ward, 156 Me. 59, 158 A.2d 869 (1960); State v. Beckwith, 135 Me. 423, 198 A. 739 (1938); State v. Crouse, 117 Me. 363, 104 A. 525 (1918). See also State v. Satow, Me., 392 A.2d 546 (1978). From the language of this indictment, Sandra Van Buren had no indication whatsoever of the specific type of gross sexual misconduct she was being accused of participating in as an accomplice. Without more specificity respecting the attendant circumstances, she could be faced at trial with proof of aiding in the commission of gross sexual misconduct by Pierce in any one of the diverse types of the prohibited misbehavior, whether of the Class A, Class B or Class C crime variety, with exposure to a wide range of gradated penalties, if convicted. Principles of fundamental fairness decry the use of such process in a criminal justice system. The availability of a bill of particulars or the feasibility of discovery under Rule 16, M.R.Crim.P. will not save a fatally defective indictment. State v. Toppi, Me., 275 A.2d 805 (1971). Cf. State v. Wing, Me., 426 A.2d 1375 (1981). The constitutional insufficiency of an indictment to charge a criminal offense is regarded by this Court as a jurisdictional matter. State v. Lunney, Me., 400 A.2d 759 (1979); State v. Porter, Me., 384 A.2d 429, 433 (1978). Nor can the Van Buren indictment be upheld because of the Pierce indictment. It was not necessary that the State try these two defendants together. A defendant's indictment must inform that defendant adequately of the crime charged and the nature thereof. State v. Charette, 159 Me. 124, 188 A.2d 898 (1963). The Van Buren indictment, standing alone, does not meet this test. Furthermore, the general rule is that each count in a single indictment must be regarded as if it were a separate indictment and must be sufficient in itself; in other words, each count must stand or fall upon its own allegations without reference to other counts, unless the necessary averments contained in the other counts are clearly and specifically incorporated by explicit reference in the count under attack. Walker v. United States, 9th Cir., 176 F.2d 796 (1949); Martinez v. People, 163 Colo. 503, 507, 431 P.2d 765, 767 (1967). Since each count of a single indictment against a lone defendant must embody a distinct and complete accusation of the crime it purports to charge, i.e. must be sufficient in itself, a fortiori each indictment against different individuals, although tried together, must be tested for legal sufficiency on its own without reference to the other.