Opinion ID: 1425683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Request for Intercase Proportionality Review

Text: Defendant asks us to undertake intercase proportionality review of his sentence of death. But Because the United States Constitution does not require such review [citation] and defendant fails to set forth compelling reasoning or authority in support, we decline his request. ( People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 158 [249 Cal. Rptr. 320, 756 P.2d 1348].) In any event, as stated above, Unless the state's capital punishment system is shown by the defendant to operate in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the fact that such defendant has been sentenced to death and others who may be similarly situated have not does not establish disproportionality violative of constitutional principles. ( People v. McLain, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 121.) The required showing has not been made. We have considered the evidence to which defendant has directed our attention concerning assertedly similarly situated persons. (34) (See fn. 11.) That evidence, however, does not show that in this sense the capital punishment system operates arbitrarily or capriciously. [11]
During pendency of his appeal, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking the judgment of death. He claimed, inter alia, that his right to the effective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution was violated when trial counsel failed to attempt to bar reference to certain assertedly prejudicial statements he had made to a prosecution psychiatrist, Dr. James R. Richmond, during a pretrial interview, in the event Richmond testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase. He alleged that during the interview he stated, for example, that he had engaged in a number of incidents of violence as a child and youth; he had wanted to kill his father; and he had been trained in jungle fighting by certain groups he refused to name. It turned out that Dr. Richmond did not testify. No reference was made to the statements in question. Defendant also claimed that a juror introduced extraneous law into the penalty deliberations and thereby engaged in prejudicial misconduct. He alleged that during deliberations Juror Richard Gildez informed the jury ... [that he had a] background in law enforcement, and that the lack of evidence did not mean the defendant has no criminal background, because juvenile records are automatically sealed at 18 years of age. We ordered the Director of the Department of Corrections to show cause why defendant should not be granted relief on the two grounds referred to above. The director filed a return through the Attorney General. And defendant filed a traverse. (35) We first consider defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To succeed, defendant must establish: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., `counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional norms'; and (2) counsel's deficient performance subjected the defense to prejudice, i.e., `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839] [discussing both federal and state constitutional rights], quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 688, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-694, 697-698, 104 S.Ct. 2052] [discussing federal constitutional right].) (36a) In an attempt to establish deficient performance, defendant argues that it was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel not to have attempted to obtain a ruling from the court, or a formal and unequivocal commitment from the prosecutor, barring reference to the assertedly prejudicial statements he made to Dr. Richmond. The argument is unpersuasive. First, defendant does not appear to show that there was a meritorious basis on which trial counsel could have sought the ruling in question. Prior to trial, counsel moved to suppress defendant's interview with Dr. Richmond on Miranda grounds. He was unsuccessful: the court determined, inter alia, that defendant had been properly advised of his rights under Miranda; had effectively waived those rights; and had voluntarily given the interview. Defendant now maintains that trial counsel should have moved to bar reference to the statements in question on other grounds. One such ground on which defendant says counsel should have relied is that his detention at the time of the interview was illegal: he should have been arraigned by that time, but had not been. (37) But an illegal detention does not automatically render a confession [or other statement] inadmissible.... ( People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 323 [261 Cal. Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121].) Under the rule of People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883], a defendant must show the detention `produced the admissions' or there was `an essential connection' between the two events.... ( People v. Carrera, supra, at p. 324, quoting People v. Thompson, supra, at pp. 329-330.) (36b) Defendant states that the alleged delay in arraignment denied him the prompt appointment of counsel and thereby deprived him of counsel's expected advice not to consent to the interview. But by so stating he asserts nothing more than a `but for' relationship between his prearraignment detention and the [interview]. His argument would, contrary to the rule in Thompson, [citation], render inadmissible virtually every statement obtained during the period of an illegal detention, for in each such case the defendant could argue that but for the delay, counsel would have been appointed and would have advised against the making of any statement. ( People v. Carrera, supra, at p. 324.) Another such ground on which defendant says counsel should have relied is that the statements in question were irrelevant or in any event substantially more prejudicial than probative. But he simply does not show that the statements would not have been relevant and indeed highly probative as to the basis of any opinion Dr. Richmond might have given on the witness stand. Second and determinative, the record establishes that trial counsel did in fact obtain a commitment from the prosecutor barring reference to the statements in question. Evidently at an unreported conference in chambers, counsel moved to preclude the statements or at least took the position that they were inadmissible. Later in open court, the prosecutor declared on the record that he would make no reference to the statements. Whether his commitment is labeled formal and unequivocal is of no consequence here. It was unmistakably clear and definite. Accordingly, we cannot find deficient performance on the part of trial counsel in the matter of which defendant now complains. Therefore, we must reject the ineffective assistance claim. We next consider defendant's claim of jury misconduct. (38) To succeed, defendant must show misconduct on the part of a juror; if he does, prejudice is presumed; the state must then rebut the presumption or lose the verdict. (See, e.g., In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 396-402 [220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260].) (39a) Defendant has sufficiently alleged misconduct. As noted, during penalty deliberations Juror Gildez informed the jury ... [that he had a] background in law enforcement, and that the lack of evidence did not mean the defendant has no criminal background, because juvenile records are automatically sealed at 18 years of age. By declaring that juvenile records are automatically sealed at 18 years of age, Gildez introduced into the jury room extraneous law, i.e., law not given to the jury in the instructions of the court ( In re Stankewitz, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 397). By so declaring, he also introduced erroneous law. Contrary to the comment's clear implication, evidence of juvenile criminality is not barred from the penalty phase of a capital trial as a matter of law: section 190.3, factor (b), making evidence of criminal activity involving force or violence admissible as a factor in aggravation, [includes] criminal activity of juveniles ( People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 862 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270]). Of course, the introduction of extraneous law, whether erroneous or not, constitutes misconduct. ( In re Stankewitz, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 399-400.) The Attorney General argues to the contrary. We agree with his major premise. The introduction of much of what might strictly be labeled extraneous law cannot be deemed misconduct. The jury system is an institution that is legally fundamental but also fundamentally human. Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and experience. That they do so is one of the strengths of the jury system. It is also one of its weaknesses: it has the potential to undermine determinations that should be made exclusively on the evidence introduced by the parties and the instructions given by the court. Such a weakness, however, must be tolerated. [I]t is an impossible standard to require ... [the jury] to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed from any external factors. ( Rideau v. Louisiana (1963) 373 U.S. 723, 733 [10 L.Ed.2d 663, 669, 83 S.Ct. 1417] (dis. opn. of Clark, J.).) Moreover, under that standard few verdicts would be proof against challenge. But although we agree with the major premise of the Attorney General's argument, we cannot agree with the minor. Gildez's comment simply cannot be characterized as a general statement about the law that finds its source in everyday life and experience. Gildez declared that it was the law that juvenile records are automatically sealed at 18 years of age. And he vouched for his declaration on the strength of his background in law enforcement. Whether or not the presumption of prejudice raised by juror misconduct is rebutted must now be addressed. We believe that the question should be resolved through the following prejudice analysis. (40) A judgment adverse to a defendant in a criminal case must be reversed or vacated whenever ... the court finds a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was influenced by exposure to prejudicial matter relating to the defendant or to the case itself that was not part of the trial record on which the case was submitted to the jury. (2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 8-3.7 (2d ed. 1980) p. 8.57; see, e.g., In re Winchester (1960) 53 Cal.2d 528, 534 [2 Cal. Rptr. 296, 348 P.2d 904] [implying that the issue is whether a juror might have been improperly influenced by extrinsic material]; United States v. Vasquez (9th Cir.1979) 597 F.2d 192, 193 [stating that the key question is whether there exists a possibility that [extrinsic] information influenced the verdict].) This rule has significant support in the case law (2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra, std. 8-3.7, Commentary, p. 8.58), both within California (see People v. Stokes (1894) 103 Cal. 193, 198-199 [37 P. 207]) and without (see State v. Kociolek (1955) 20 N.J. 92, 100 [118 A.2d 812]). (See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Stds. Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press (Approved Draft 1968) std. 3.6, Commentary, p. 148.) The ultimate issue of influence on the juror is resolved by reference to the substantial likelihood test, an objective standard. In effect, the court must examine the extrajudicial material and then judge whether it is inherently likely to have influenced the juror. (2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, supra, std. 8-3.7, Commentary, p. 8.58.) Such prejudice analysis is different from, and indeed less tolerant than, harmless-error analysis for ordinary error at trial. The reason is as follows. Any deficiency that undermines the integrity of a trial  which requires a proceeding at which the defendant, represented by counsel, may present evidence and argument before an impartial judge and jury  introduces the taint of fundamental unfairness and calls for reversal without consideration of actual prejudice. (See Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 577-578.) Such a deficiency is threatened by jury misconduct. When the misconduct in question supports a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that at least one juror was impermissibly influenced to the defendant's detriment, we are compelled to conclude that the integrity of the trial was undermined: under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the jury was impartial. By contrast, when the misconduct does not support such a finding, we must hold it nonprejudicial. (39b) In this case, the presumption of prejudice has been rebutted. Juror Gildez's misconduct could not have produced any significant effect. As noted, Gildez merely attempted to explain why evidence of criminal background, if any, had not been introduced. It is true that his comment supported an inference that defendant might have had a criminal background even though evidence of such background was not presented. But such an inference was immaterial under the penalty charge given. The court did not instruct that defendant did not have a criminal background. Rather, as related above, it instructed that evidence of such background was absent and hence that mitigation was present as a matter of law: There has been no evidence presented of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. This circumstance should therefore be viewed as a circumstance in mitigation. [¶] There has been no evidence presented that defendant has been convicted of any prior felony. This circumstance should therefore be viewed as a circumstance in mitigation. Defendant claims that Juror Gildez's comment had a tendency to occasion speculation that he had a criminal background, and that evidence of that background had been barred by a legal technicality. In support he directs our attention to the following written question sent to the court by the jury: During the penalty phase, does the prosecution have a right to present witnesses that were not called by the defense? We are not persuaded that defendant's claim is in fact supported by the jury's question: Gildez's comment and the jurors' query do not appear to be connected. In any event, as explained above defendant's criminal background vel non was immaterial under the penalty charge given. Moreover, any possible speculation would have been checked by the court's written response: Yes. [¶] During the penalty phase both the prosecution and the defense may present any additional evidence that the law allows as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Neither side need present any additional evidence at the penalty phase if they choose not to. Defendant argues that the response would in fact have fueled speculation. The jurors, he says, would have understood the words, any additional evidence that the law allows as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as though they were, any additional evidence, which the law allows, as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance. And understanding the words thus, he maintains, the jurors might have incorrectly inferred the existence of a legal technicality barring evidence of juvenile criminality. We do not agree. Surely, the jurors would have understood the words, as they were written, to mean any additional evidence that the law recognizes as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Such an understanding is supported, if not compelled, by the final sentence of the response  Neither side need present any additional evidence at the penalty phase if they choose not to. That sentence clearly implies that the prosecution is permitted to present any additional evidence it chooses to. In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the misconduct in question does not support a finding that there is a substantial likelihood that any juror was impermissibly influenced to the defendant's detriment. Therefore, we must hold the misconduct to be nonprejudicial.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the appeal must be rejected and the judgment affirmed in number S004713 (Crim. No. 25438), and that the petition for writ of habeas corpus in number S009001 must be denied. It is so ordered.