Opinion ID: 657191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: substantive and procedural requirements of the act

Text: 18 The standard of review for actions brought under the Act is a modified de novo review. In Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982), the Supreme Court indicated that a complete de novo review is inappropriate. Quoting Rowley, this Court has held, that the language in the Act is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.... Thomas, 918 F.2d at 624. This Court has determined that Rowley requires a de novo review [of the due process hearing] but that the district court should give due weight to the state administrative proceedings in reaching its decision. Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 196, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983). 19 This Court has determined that appellant and his parents bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the IEP devised by the Board is inappropriate. Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1469 (6th Cir.1990); see also Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir.1990).
20 Appellant and his parents contend that the proposed IEP violated the procedural requirements of the Act. We are satisfied that the district court's analysis met the standard set forth in Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d at 1190, where this court held courts must subject IEPs to strict review when determining whether they are procedurally deficient. We find no error in that analysis, 3 and we do not see that a revisitation of it would be beneficial.
21 The IDEA requires that a state provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to all handicapped children within its jurisdiction, as a condition for receiving federal funds. While the Supreme Court has held that states are not required to maximize the potential of handicapped children, Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 102 S.Ct. at 3042; accord Thomas, 918 F.2d at 626, this Court has held that the educational benefits the state does provide must be more than de minimis in order to be appropriate. Doe By and Through Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1341 (6th Cir.1989). The Act provides no more than a basic floor of opportunity ... consist[ing] of access to specialized institutions and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201, 102 S.Ct. at 3048; Doe, 879 F.2d at 1341. 22 The question with which we are now faced, and which we consider under the modified standard of de novo review laid out above, is whether the IEP proposed by the Board was reasonably calculated to enable [appellant] to receive educational benefits. Appellant and his parents assert that the proposed IEP is woefully inadequate to meet appellant's needs. We disagree. 23 The IEP proposed by the Board appears to be a good-faith effort to propose an educational program reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. Specifically, the M-Team recommended, 24 that a comprehensive physical, psychological and intellectual testing of the plaintiff be done at the Vanderbilt University Medical Center; that an in-service program on learning disabilities be held for all school staff members involved in implementing plaintiff's IEP; that oral testing be used for the plaintiff with regard to essay, lengthy written assignments and projects, but that he continue to take objective tests and short answer response tests; that plaintiff utilize a tape recorder for recording class lectures; that plaintiff be provided one hour of language therapy each day, planned by a qualified speech/language pathologist; that a school guidance counselor be available before, during or after school to provide individual counseling sessions, initially twice per week; that counseling services be provided after school hours by a non-school system employee experienced in counseling disabled teenagers; that a home-bound teacher be available for plaintiff if he missed more than ten consecutive school days; that computer-assisted instruction be utilized for plaintiff in English and Mathematics; that word processing be introduced to the plaintiff to help compensate for his written language deficiencies; that an IEP coordinator monitor the implementation of the program; that monthly conferences be held to review progress, plan course work for the next four weeks, and discuss learning strategies; and that tutorial services be available four days per week after regular school hours. 25 This IEP is aimed at addressing the particular disabilities from which appellant suffers. While the Brehm School undoubtedly can provide superior services aimed exclusively at helping learning-disabled children such as appellant, this is not what the Act requires. This is especially true where, as here, the IEP was never given a chance to succeed. Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d at 1191. 26 The Act requires that the Tullahoma schools provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable Chevrolet to every handicapped student. Appellant, however, demands that the Tullahoma school system provide a Cadillac solely for appellant's use. We suspect that the Chevrolet offered to appellant is in fact a much nicer model than that offered to the average Tullahoma student. Be that as it may, we hold that the Board is not required to provide a Cadillac, and that the proposed IEP is reasonably calculated to provide educational benefits to appellant, and is therefore in compliance with the requirements of the IDEA. 27
28 Title 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(5)(B) requires states to ensure that handicapped children are educated to the maximum extent appropriate with children who are not handicapped. The Tennessee statute provides that [t]o the maximum extent practicable, handicapped children shall be educated along with children who do not have handicaps and shall attend regular classes. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 49-1-103 (1990). 29 The district court held that the IEP developed for appellant by the M-Team represented a less restrictive alternative for him than the Brehm School. Appellant contends that the district court misapplied the mainstreaming requirement by assuming that it is absolute. 30 In Roncker on Behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.1983), this Circuit set out its interpretation of the mainstreaming requirement of the federal Act: 31 The Act does not require mainstreaming in every case but its requirement that mainstreaming be provided to the maximum extent appropriate indicates a very strong congressional preference. The proper inquiry is whether a proposed placement is appropriate under the Act. 32 However, this Court recognizes that even though the preference for mainstreaming is very strong there are still situations in which, 33 some handicapped children simply must be educated in segregated facilities either because the handicapped child would not benefit from mainstreaming, because any marginal benefits received from mainstreaming are far outweighed by the benefits gained from services which could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated setting, or because the handicapped child is a disruptive force in the non-segregated setting. 34 Id., at 1063. 35 Appellant does not fall within any of these categories. The record does not support a finding that the benefits to appellant from mainstreaming would have been marginal or that the specific services which he needed could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated setting, much less that the benefits to appellant from such services provided in a segregated setting would far outweigh the benefits from mainstreaming. Indeed, the feasibility of providing those services in the non-segregated setting is demonstrated by the specialized and detailed IEP created by the M-Team. Finally, there is no mention in the record of appellant's being a disruptive child. Under these circumstances, the Act mandates that among appropriate placements the least restrictive alternative must be chosen. 36 While the Brehm school is certainly an appropriate, and in some respects even a superior, placement, it is clearly far more restrictive than the IEP proposed by the Board. All students at the Brehm School are learning disabled, handicapped children; that school therefore provides a child no opportunity for educational interaction with non-handicapped students. 37 The school system's proposed placement, on the other hand, offers the child an appropriate placement in a setting that is essentially a modified mainstream educational setting, allowing maximum contact with non-handicapped children. The district court did not err in holding that the IEP proposed by the Board was the least-restrictive, appropriate placement for appellant.
38 Finally, we turn to whether appellant's parents are entitled to reimbursement for the cost of tuition for the Brehm School. With regard to reimbursement for private school tuition, the Supreme Court held: If the court[ ] ultimately determine[s] that the IEP proposed by the school officials was appropriate, the parents would be barred from obtaining reimbursement.... Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 2004, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). This Court stated in Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d at 1192: 39 Because we have determined that appellant's IEP was appropriate, he is not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of private schooling. Appellant's parents removed him from the free public school and placed him in a private school at their own peril. They are responsible for the cost of doing so. 40 Appellant's parents assumed the risk of the responsibility for the cost of appellant's private education by removing appellant from the Tullahoma schools without ever giving the proposed IEP a chance. We find the IEP was adequate and the Tullahoma public schools are an appropriate placement. As a result, appellant's parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the tuition expenses of the Brehm School.