Opinion ID: 3065301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requirement of Corroboration.

Text: The main issue in this case is corroboration. Hassan Aden’s claim for asylum is that he was persecuted on account of being a member of the Bilisyar subclan of the Wardey clan. He offered his testimony as proof. The BIA did not find that Hassan Aden was not credible, nor did it find that he was. It concluded that he had not borne his burden of proof because he had failed to provide sufficient corroboration. The IJ recessed and continued his hearing so that he could provide corroboration, so there is no issue whether he should have been given notice of his need for it and time to provide it. He provided three “affidavits.” An affidavit is a sworn declaration,2 and the three documents were not sworn, so though labeled affidavits, they are properly characterized as letters. The BIA 1 Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). 2 Black’s Law Dictionary 66 (9th ed. 2009). 16638 HASSAN ADEN v. HOLDER wanted something more, such as “scholarly sources, ethnological studies, or witnesses.” [1] We have a line of circuit authority for the proposition that corroboration cannot be required from an applicant who testifies credibly. In Ladha v. INS, we “reaffirmed that an alien’s testimony, if unrefuted and credible, direct and specific, is sufficient to establish the facts testified without the need for any corroboration.”3 Kataria v. INS relied on Ladha in stating that “the BIA may not require independent corroborative evidence from an asylum applicant who testifies credibly in support of his application.”4 Kataria stated that “we must accept an applicant’s testimony as true in the absence of an explicit adverse credibility finding.”5 [2] Congress abrogated these holdings in the REAL ID Act of 2005.6 The statute says that the applicant’s credible testimony “may” be sufficient without corroboration, but the trier of fact may require corroboration (unless not reasonably obtainable) even for “otherwise credible testimony”7: The testimony of an applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee. In determining whether the applicant has met the applicant’s burden, the trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of record. Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide 3 Ladha v. I.N.S., 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2000). 4 Kataria v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). 5 Id. 6 Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). Hassan Aden applied for asylum after May 11, 2005, the effective date of the statutory changes. 7 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). HASSAN ADEN v. HOLDER 16639 evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.8 Thus the law on corroboration is different now from what it was when we decided Kataria and Ladha. The statutory phrase “may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration” implies that the testimony also may not be sufficient. The phrase “but only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee” means that there are three prerequisites before uncorroborated testimony may be considered sufficient: (1) the applicant’s testimony is credible; (2) the applicant’s testimony is persuasive; and (3) the applicant’s testimony refers to facts sufficient to demonstrate refugee status. Credible testimony is not by itself enough. Otherwise the other two requirements would be mere surplusage.9 [3] The statute additionally restricts the effect of apparently credible testimony by specifying that the IJ need not accept such testimony as true. The statute provides that the IJ may, in determining whether it satisfies the applicant’s burden of proof, “weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of record.”10 For example, if, hypothetically, the IJ said “you seem like an honest person, but the country report says that the Wardey clan is treated with great respect and never hindered in any way by the Darod and Hawiye clans,” he 8 Id. 9 See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 369 (1986) (rejecting the reading of a phrase that made a latter phrase surplusage); United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the same canon of statutory construction); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:06, at 181-94 (6th ed. 2000). 10 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 16640 HASSAN ADEN v. HOLDER would weigh persuasiveness in light of the whole record including such evidence. [4] The last sentence of the provision deals with inherent difficulty in providing corroborating evidence from a foreign country, especially if, as is often the case, the country is in turmoil and the applicant is from a disfavored group or the corroboration would have to be from his persecutors. Corroborating evidence “must” be provided where the trier of fact determines that it should be, “unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”11 This means that an applicant cannot be turned down solely because he fails to provide evidence corroborating his testimony, where he does not have and cannot reasonably obtain the corroboration. But it also means that he can be turned down for failing to provide corroboration where he does have it or could reasonably obtain it. [5] Congress has thus swept away our doctrine that “when an alien credibly testifies to certain facts, those facts are deemed true.”12 Apparently honest people may not always be telling the truth, apparently dishonest people may be telling the absolute truth, and truthful people may be honestly mistaken or relying on unreliable evidence or inference themselves. Congress has installed a bias toward corroboration in the statute to provide greater reliability. This is not very different from other litigation. In the most routine personal injury case, when a plaintiff credibly testifies that the collision caused $10,000 worth of damage to his car, $5,000 in medical expenses, and $10,000 in wage loss, the jury is likely to reject and is free to reject his damages testimony unless it sees the body shop invoice, the medical bills, and documentary evi11 Id. 12 Ladha v. I.N.S., 215 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2000). HASSAN ADEN v. HOLDER 16641 dence of wage loss. Congress thus made asylum litigation a little more like other litigation.13 Our sister circuits construe the new provision on corroboration as we do.14