Opinion ID: 723861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the evidence of uncharged conduct

Text: 7 Melvin claims that while his indictment charged him with participating in only three of the Fieler Enterprise schemes, the Government nevertheless introduced evidence of other uncharged schemes against him at trial. This included evidence relating to Melvin's own JEM Corporation, as well as other Fieler Enterprise schemes not listed on the indictment. The district court's decision to admit evidence of other crimes or bad acts under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Houser, 929 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir.1990). 8 Melvin claims that evidence relating to JEM Corporation should have been excluded because the business was never proven to be fraudulent. However, if this scheme was indeed legitimate, he cannot assert that it prejudiced the jury, or that it was inadmissible evidence of other bad acts. 2 He argues that evidence of the JEM scheme and of the other uncharged schemes does not satisfy the four-part test for admissibility as laid out in Houser, 929 F.2d at 1373. 9 Rule 404(b) allows for the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove motive, intent, preparation, or plan even though it is inadmissible to prove character. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Evidence of acts admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b) must still meet a four-part test. Such evidence must: (1) be based on sufficient evidence; (2) be not too remote in time from charged crimes; (3) bear some similarity to charged acts; and (4) prove an essential element of the charged offense. Houser, 929 F.2d at 1373; United States v. Bibo-Rodriguez, 922 F.2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2861, 115 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1991). 10 The evidence in question related to a Fieler Enterprises ad for the George Davis scheme which was a compilation of several other fraudulent schemes, most of which are referred to in Melvin's indictment. The ad proved that Melvin intended to forward the larger conspiracy, and shows intent, motive, and method of operation. Applying the Houser test, we conclude that there was sufficient proof of the other schemes because Melvin's co-conspirators had already pled guilty to them. The other schemes were not too remote, because they were taking place at the same time, and executed in a similar manner to the charged schemes. The uncharged schemes were similar in nature to the get-rich-quick schemes for which Melvin was charged. Finally, these other schemes were admitted to show intent, motive, and method of operation of the conspiracy. We therefore find the evidence admissible under Rule 404(b). 11 Finally, Houser requires that the probative value of the evidence outweigh its prejudicial effect under Fed.R.Evid. 403. 929 F.2d at 1373. As noted above, the evidence clearly showed Melvin's intent, method, and plan. The fact that his schemes were referenced in another Fieler ad shows that he was closely involved with the larger conspiracy. The prejudicial effect of this added evidence was outweighed in this case by its probative value. Id. at 1373. The evidence was properly admitted. 12 Melvin contends that even if the evidence were properly admitted under Rule 404(b), the district court nevertheless committed plain error in not, sua sponte, giving the jury a limiting instruction and a specific unanimity instruction with respect to uncharged schemes. When there is no objection to a jury instruction at the time of trial, this court reviews for plain error. United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 830 (9th Cir.1995). Plain error is a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial rights. United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 975, 112 S.Ct. 1598, 118 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992). 13 Melvin relies on United States v. Echeverry, 698 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.1983), modified 719 F.2d 974 (9th Cir.1983), for the proposition that when there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion, a general unanimity instruction is insufficient. He contends that a specific unanimity instruction was required to ensure that jurors were not convicting him for schemes not in the indictment. In Echeverry, the jury's written questions indicated their confusion as to multiple conspiracies. Id. at 975. Melvin's jury did not submit questions indicating confusion as to the multiple schemes. 14 The schemes in this case were distinctly named and thus easily classified. In the main, the only schemes discussed in detail were the five substantive schemes in the indictment. Evidence of uncharged schemes was introduced to show Melvin's involvement, but the jurors were expressly told that Melvin needed to be found guilty of the substantive counts in order to be convicted of the racketeering and racketeering conspiracy counts. Thus, there is no evidence of an ambiguous instruction which could lead to juror confusion, nor is there evidence of any actual juror confusion. We therefore find no manifest injustice that would suggest plain error. The instructions given were sufficient. 15