Opinion ID: 604510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Collateral Attack on the Prior Conviction

Text: 21 Bustamante's final claim concerns the application of the career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. In 1973, Bustamante was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. The district court counted this conviction for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Bustamante argues both that the district court erred in not allowing him to collaterally attack the constitutionality of this prior conviction, and that the district court erred in entertaining his challenge but rejecting it. 22 We need not address Bustamante's argument that the district court erred in not entertaining his collateral attack since the lower court in fact allowed the attack. The district court continued sentencing for five weeks to permit the parties to explore the validity of the prior conviction, and the parties fully briefed the issue. Without specifically addressing the merits of the collateral challenge, the district court proceeded to sentence Bustamante as a career offender. We interpret this action to reflect a, albeit implicit, judgment that Bustamante had not met his burden of showing that his prior conviction was constitutionally invalid. This case is therefore unlike United States v. Vea-Gonzales, No. 91-30469 (Feb. 1993). 23 The question remaining for us is whether the district court erred in finding that Bustamante's prior conviction was constitutionally valid. We must accept the district court's finding of facts unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Wilson, 900 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir.1990). 24 Bustamante argues that his 1973 conviction is constitutionally invalid because neither his trial nor his appellate counsel objected to a three year delay between the commission of the offense and Bustamante's prosecution. Bustamante argues that this failure to object to the delay demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel, because the law regarding impermissible delay was in such a state of flux that (1) any competent defense attorney would have challenged the pre-indictment delay, and (2) such a challenge stood a reasonable probability of resulting in a dismissal of the indictment or a reversal of the conviction. 25 To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Bustamante must show that the attorney's actions fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and that there [was] a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1414 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1046 (1989). 26 At the time of Bustamante's sentencing, the district court had before it the unpublished opinion of the California appeals court which had heard Bustamante's appeal from his 1973 conviction. In its statement of facts, the California appeals court noted that Bustamante had been arrested for assault with a deadly weapon shortly after the 1970 shooting of the victim, but that the District Attorney declined to prosecute him. Three years later, Bustamante was arrested on a traffic warrant. After being advised of his Miranda rights, he volunteered that he had shot Mrs. Keened, the victim of the 1970 shooting. Following this confession, the prosecution was revived and Bustamante was tried and convicted. 27 Although the law was somewhat influx, it appears that Bustamante would have to establish that the government was at least negligent in failing to bring charges against him earlier, in order to have had a potentially meritorious challenge to the delay. Jones v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 734, 738 (1970). These facts, which were not disputed by Bustamante at his sentencing hearing, do not suggest that the government was negligent in waiting to file charges against him. Rather, the government's original decision not to prosecute Bustamante apparently stemmed from its conclusion that it had insufficient evidence. Conversely, in 1973 the government was armed with a confession. 28 Bustamante has not shown that he had a reasonable probability of succeeding on a challenge of prosecutorial delay. Nor do the facts show that it was outside the range of professional competence for an attorney to decline to challenge the delay, under the circumstances. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that Bustamante failed to show that the 1973 conviction was constitutionally invalid. The sentence is affirmed. 29 AFFIRMED.