Opinion ID: 1153279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: plaintiffs' cause of action against david new drilling falls within the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the workmen's compensation act.

Text: In order to avoid the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act, this Court has set out the two elements that must be met: (1) the injury must be caused by the willful act of the employer or another employee acting in the course of employment and in the furtherance of the employer's business, and (2) the injury must be one that is not compensable under the act. Griffin v. Futorian Corp., 533 So.2d 461, 463 (Miss. 1988), citing Miller v. McRae's Inc., 444 So.2d 368, 371-372 (Miss. 1984). In the complaint it was alleged that David New Drilling willfully disregarded its duties to Jimmy Wilcoxson, intentionally failed to repair the brakes on the tractors and trailers, acted with gross and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of the public in general and particularly of Plaintiffs' decedent and with knowledge of substantial certainty of injury. Despite these allegations, the overwhelming language and facts point to negligence, including gross negligence. The appellants cite to several cases in other jurisdictions for the proposition that the facts presented justify an inference of actual intent on the part of David New Drilling to injure Wilcoxson and thus the case should have been submitted to a jury. In McNees v. Cedar Springs Stamping Co., 184 Mich. App. 101, 457 N.W.2d 68 (1990), the plaintiff offered proof that the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur at the press machine operated by the plaintiff and that the employer nevertheless instructed the plaintiff to operate the press. Subsequent to the accident, the employer destroyed all the defective foot pedals in the shop. The Michigan court held that summary judgment for the employer was improperly granted and that the allegation if proved would amount to willfully forcing an employee to work in the face of a known and certain danger with respect to the specific machine that caused the accident. Id. 457 N.W.2d at 70. Under Michigan law, if the employer had actual knowledge that injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge, the employer was deemed to intend injury. In another case, Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.1989), the plaintiffs alleged that their employer ordered them to scrub the floors of the employer's mill without protective clothing after a transformer failure that released toxic levels of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) onto the floor of the mill and after attempts to reduce the PCB level to non-toxic had been unsuccessful. The employees later discovered that they had acquired body levels of PCBs which were hazardous to their health. The court held that a jury could conclude that the intent to injure ... was deliberate where the employer had an opportunity to weigh the consequence and to make a conscious choice among possible courses of action. Id. at 196-197. While noting that the exception to the exclusivity of the workers' compensation statute should be strictly construed, the court went on to say that this bar would not apply where the evidence is sufficient to support an inference the employer deliberately instructed an employee to injure himself. Id. at 197. The appellants have also cited Mandolidis v. Elkins Ind., Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978), as support. That court consolidated three cases for consideration. Mandolidis was injured operating a 10-inch table saw not equipped with a safety guard. The employer had actual knowledge of the consequences of running the machine without a guard because of previous injuries as a result of a lack of the guard. It was well known that running the machine without the guard constituted a violation of federal and state safety laws and accepted industry standards. Mandolidis had objected to operating the saw without the guard and was told to operate it or be fired. After Mandolidis' injury, federal inspectors cited the employer for OSHA violations because there was no guard. In the second consolidated case, Snodgrass was injured when the platform he was working on became dislodged causing him to fall. Alleged were violations of numerous safety laws, rules and regulations and improper construction of the platform. The third case involved a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and is not relevant to this present case. In the rebuttal brief, the appellants also cite Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc., 59 Ohio St.3d 115, 570 N.E.2d 1108 (1991). The employee asserted that he was injured as a result of his employer deliberately removing a safety guard from a conveyer system which the employee was required to operate and which created a substantial risk of harm to the employee. The court noted that the Workers' Compensation statute that defined what constituted an intentional tort had been amended and, while the statute was not to be applied retroactively, it could be considered as a statement of public policy. Each of the cases cited has clear differences from the present case. The employers had been forewarned that the hazard to which they were exposing the employee had a strong potential for or certainty of injury. In Gulden, the employer knew without a doubt that the employees would be injured by exposure to PCBs. In that case the court distinguished that situation from cases where the employee was injured by improperly maintained machinery or by a truck with defective brakes. Gulden, 890 F.2d at 197. In Fyffe and Mandolidis the deliberate removal of safety devices constituted evidence of the requisite intent to injure. As noted in McNees, where an employer allows a braking system to become defective, provides inadequate safety features on equipment and/or supplies inadequate braking material, this constituted negligence only, not an intentional tort. 457 N.W.2d at 69. Mississippi cases also support the proposition that the present case does not come within any intentional tort exception to the rule. Griffin v. Futorian Corp., 533 So.2d 461 (Miss. 1988), involved a tort action by an employee against his employer for injuries while operating a large lumber machine saw in the course and scope of his employment. Griffin alleged that the employer willfully, consciously and intentionally ordered him to continue working in and around those dangerous conditions which were substantially certain to cause grievous and horrible injuries. Id. at 463. Griffin alleged that he had warned the plant manager of the unsafe working conditions. This Court found that the action against the employer was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act. The Court stated: Dunn, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation, (3d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1984), notes that in order for a willful tort to be outside the exclusivity of the Act, the employee's action must be done with an actual intent to injure the employee. It is not enough to destroy the immunity that the employer's conduct leading to the injury consists of aggravated negligence or even that the conduct goes beyond this to include such elements as knowingly permitting hazardous conditions to exist or willfully failing to furnish a safe place to work or knowingly ordering the employee to perform a dangerous job. [Footnote omitted]. Id. at § 22. 533 So.2d at 464. Griffin absolutely bars an intentional tort claim even where the probability of gross negligence exists. Thus, in the case sub judice, even if the appellants could prove that David New Drilling was guilty of gross negligence, such a finding would remain insufficient to create an intentional tort and accordingly remove the appellants' claim from under the Workmens' Compensation Act. A mere willful and malicious act remains insufficient to give rise to the exception under the Act. In Stevens v. FMC Corp., 515 So.2d 928 (Miss. 1987), the employee was injured when a small chip of metal broke off the four pound hammer he was using to place parts into conveyor rollers. The employee had been ordered to grind out the hammer heads once they became mushroomed, although this was against the manufacturer's warnings. The Court held that Stevens had only asserted a cause of action for negligence and was barred by the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. In McCain v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 484 So.2d 1001 (Miss. 1986); Luckett v. Mississippi Wood, Inc. and The Western Casualty and Surety Co., 481 So.2d 288 (Miss. 1985); and Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Holland, 469 So.2d 55 (Miss. 1984), this Court recognized exceptions to the exclusivity of the Act but only when based on tortious conduct subsequent to the work place injury. These cases involved bad faith refusal to pay benefits. Other instances in which this Court has found an intentional tort claim are also clearly different from the present case. See Royal Oil Co., Inc. v. Wells, 500 So.2d 439 (Miss. 1986) (common law claims of alleged intentional torts allowed based on malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest and slander of a convenience store cashier on embezzlement charges which were no billed by the grand jury) and Miller v. McRae's, Inc., 444 So.2d 368 (Miss. 1984) (intentional tort claim allowed for claim of false imprisonment where employer used threats of force to detain a cashier to question her about missing funds). Looking at the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the appellants, there is no evidence which establishes that the employer acted with actual intent to injure. At most, the employer was guilty of gross negligence. There is no support for finding that this case involved an intentional tort and is outside the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation Act. The appellants have not successfully shown that they can meet the first part of the test outlined in Miller that there was a willful or malicious act of the employer. The appellants also fail in meeting the second part of Miller. In each of the cases where this Court has allowed a claim for intentional tort, the injury has been something other than physical injury or death, which are compensable under the Act. The appellants have not shown that the relief they are seeking is not of the kind for which compensation is normally granted under the Act. This assignment of error is without merit.