Opinion ID: 3065796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Conviction of Violent Crime — 1981

Text: Manslaughter West contends that had the Illinois judge in 1981 known West suffered from PTSD, he would not have convicted him, and therefore the prior Illinois conviction should not have been considered by the Arizona court. The Supreme Court has held “that once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid.” Lackawana Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403 (2001). The Court noted a possible exception to this rule in a case where, “after the time for direct or collateral review has expired, a defendant may obtain compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, and which he could not have uncovered in a timely manner.” Id. at 405 (emphasis added). West has not presented “compelling evidence” of actual innocence. In support of this argument, he submitted a letter from the Illinois judge (unsworn, but declared to be “true to the best of [the judge’s] information and belief”) in which, 30 years after the fact, the judge states “I may well have acquit- ted Mr. West at that bench trial had I known that he suffered from PTSD at the time of the shooting.” This evidence is insufficient to meet the “compelling evidence” standard for at least two reasons. First, there is no evidence establishing that West suffered from PTSD at the time of the 1981 shooting.3 Second, the evidence on which this 3 Both Dr. Smith and Dr. Allender opine that West was suffering PTSD in 1987. Neither states that he suffered PTSD prior to 1987 in general, or specifically in 1981 at the time he shot and killed Billy Oldham at a party (because another girl was beating up his girlfriend). 9718 WEST v. RYAN argument rests, the physical and emotional abuse and sexual abuse, was known to West since 1981. Even if PTSD was not a recognized diagnosis in 1981, it was in 1983. See State v. Jensen, 735 P.2d at 784 (noting that the “American mental health community” recognized PTSD as a diagnostic mental disorder in 1983). West failed to contest the conviction for 30 years. Most importantly, however, is the requirement that “the challenged prior conviction must have adversely affected the sentence that is the subject of the habeas petition.” Coss, 532 U.S. at 406. West cannot show that his prior manslaughter conviction had the requisite adverse affect on his current sentence. In affirming West’s death sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court accepted “the trial judge’s finding that the cir- cumstances of defendant’s previous manslaughter conviction were not mitigating,” but nonetheless stated that “we believe this to be an appropriate death penalty case even if it be assumed that the Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction was not properly proved.” State v. West, 862 P.2d 192, 211, 212 n.4 (Ariz. 1993).