Opinion ID: 2220781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: verdict form ii-a

Text: As to the claims of the plaintiff, David Pasquale, as Administrator of the Estate of Diana Pasquale, for the benefit of himself, we, the jury, find in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, Speed Products Engineering and assess plaintiff's damages in the sum of $150,000.00. The jury also returned a verdict of $500,000 in favor of Wesley Law. F & B did not object to the three separate verdicts. Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered separate judgments, nunc pro tunc, on the several verdicts. F & B did not object to entry of these separate judgments. F & B subsequently filed a post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict which requested, in the alternative, a setoff of $961,789 against what it termed the total jury verdict of $2,150,000. This latter amount was comprised, apparently, of the separate verdicts for Samantha, David and Law. More specifically, F & B requested that $861,789 be set off against the jury verdict for Samantha Pasquale and David Pasquale. F & B additionally recommended that $100,000, paid in the Great Lakes settlement to Law, be applied as a setoff to the verdict in his favor against Speed. The trial court denied F & B's motion, but granted a setoff of $430,894.50, representing that part of the settlement distributed to Samantha, against the judgment against F & B and Speed in Samantha's benefit. The trial court found that the amount distributed to David, also $430,894.50, acted as a setoff against the judgment against Speed for his benefit. After application of these setoffs, F & B and Speed remained jointly and severally liable for $1,069,105.50 on Samantha's claim; Speed's obligation on David's claim was fully satisfied. On appeal, F & B argued that the $1.5 million judgment against it should have been reduced to $788,211 by a setoff of the entire settlement amount of $861,789. The appellate court agreed. According to the court, the plain language of the Contribution Act provides that the consideration paid by Great Lakes for the settlement reduced the recovery against F & B on any claim against it. (Emphasis in original.) (252 Ill.App.3d at 733, 191 Ill.Dec. 899, 624 N.E.2d 1277; see Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 70, par. 302(c).) The court further reasoned that, although the case was necessarily presented to the jury as two separate and distinct actions against Speed because David's claim against F & B was barred, there existed, nonetheless, a single cause of action by Samantha and David against Speed. In support of its reasoning, the court relied on authorities holding that the Wrongful Death Act creates no individual right of action in its beneficiaries. The appellate court found that the trial court should have combined the two separate verdicts for Samantha and David into a single judgment. [T]hen the trial court should have granted a setoff of $861,789 against the joint portion of the judgment, leaving a total amount owed on the combined judgment of $788,211, for which F & B and Speed would be jointly and severally liable for $638,211 and Speed only would be liable for the remaining $150,000. (252 Ill.App.3d at 733-34, 191 Ill.Dec. 899, 624 N.E.2d 1277.) The appellate court accordingly remanded for the trial court to combine the two verdicts into a single judgment, and grant F & B a setoff of $861,789 against the $1.5 million portion of the judgment for which it stands jointly and severally liable. The court directed that the remaining sums were to be distributed pursuant to section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 70, par. 2), taking into consideration the sums David already received pursuant to the order distributing the proceeds of the settlement. 252 Ill.App.3d at 734, 191 Ill.Dec. 899, 624 N.E.2d 1277. In summary, according to the logic of the appellate court, the following setoff calculations should have resulted at the trial level: Step One: $1,500,000 -verdict against Speed/F & B for Samantha + 150,000 -verdict against Speed for David = $1,650,000 -combined into one judgment Step Two: $1,500,000 -joint portion of combined judgment for which Speed/F & B stand jointly and severally liable reduced by $861,789 -amount of settlement for benefit of Samantha and David =$638,211 -remaining amount of combined judgment for which F & B stand jointly and severally liable. $150,000 -remaining amount of combined judgment for which Speed alone stands liableno setoff applied. The parties dispute the correctness of the trial and appellate court's setoff applications. Plaintiff claims that the trial court's application was correct. Relying on Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525, plaintiff contends that judgments under the Wrongful Death Act are not considered indivisible, and that according to Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co. (1978), 73 Ill.2d 58, 22 Ill.Dec. 394, 382 N.E.2d 784, under the Act individual rights are now recognized as belonging to the deceased's beneficiaries. In contrast, F & B claims that the appellate court's resolution of setoff was correct. Relying on Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co. (1923), 310 Ill. 38, 141 N.E. 392, F & B contends that there are no separate verdicts for the individual beneficiaries in wrongful-death actions. Therefore, there should only have been one verdict rendered for the benefit of both Samantha and David against which the entire settlement should have been set off. F & B also contends that the Wrongful Death Act does not create an individual right in a beneficiary to bring the suit (see Rodgers v. Consolidated R.R. Corp. (1985), 136 Ill.App.3d 191, 90 Ill.Dec. 797, 482 N.E.2d 1080). Rather, the right of action accrues to the administrator, not to the beneficiary (see Addison v. Health & Hospital Governing Comm'n (1977), 56 Ill.App.3d 533, 14 Ill.Dec. 7, 371 N.E.2d 1060), who must bring a single action on behalf of the class beneficiaries to avoid multiple lawsuits. See Hall v. Gillins (1958), 13 Ill.2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352. The Wrongful Death Act provides in pertinent part: Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person, and    the amount recovered    shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person and    the jury may give    damages    with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to the surviving spouse and next of kin   . Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 70, par. 2. The Wrongful Death Act permits a recovery for the death of an individual by wrongful act, neglect, or default, where none existed at common law. ( Wilson v. Tromly (1949), 404 Ill. 307, 310, 89 N.E.2d 22.) The absence of a satisfactory justification for the common law rule against such an action has been extensively discussed, however, by this court. (See Wilbon, 73 Ill.2d at 61-66, 22 Ill.Dec. 394, 382 N.E.2d 784; Hall v. Gillins (1958), 13 Ill.2d 26, 28-29, 147 N.E.2d 352.) Nevertheless, the Act is viewed, traditionally, as creating the cause of action, which must be brought in the name of the representative, for the pecuniary losses which a surviving spouse and next of kin may have sustained by reason of the death of the injured person. (See Li Petri v. Turner Construction Co. (1967), 36 Ill.2d 597, 224 N.E.2d 841; Hall, 13 Ill.2d at 28, 147 N.E.2d 352; Nudd, 7 Ill.2d at 612, 131 N.E.2d 525; In re Estate of Edwards (1982), 106 Ill.App.3d 635, 638, 62 Ill.Dec. 407, 435 N.E.2d 1379.) The purpose of the Act is to provide such compensation. (See Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157.) The statute alone is the source of the right to sue, and the act should be strictly construed. ( Wilson, 404 Ill. at 310, 89 N.E.2d 22.) Construction of the Act, however, should not be so technical as to defeat the intention of the Act or the beneficial results thereof when all material provisions have been complied with. See McDavid v. Fiscar (1951), 342 Ill.App. 673, 97 N.E.2d 587. Because the action is viewed as a creature of statute, its conditions of liability proscribe the right of action itself and not merely the remedy alone. One such condition of liability is the time limitation period during which a wrongful-death action must be brought. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 70, par. 2 (two-year limitation period); see Wilson, 404 Ill. at 310, 89 N.E.2d 22; Bruce v. Halterman-Flynn (1987), 162 Ill.App.3d 248, 250-51, 113 Ill.Dec. 601, 515 N.E.2d 410.) Similarly, the bringing of the suit in the name of the personal representative has been held to be a condition precedent to the right to recover damages. See Friend v. Alton R.R. Co. (1936), 283 Ill.App. 366. The personal representative must bring a single action on behalf of the class beneficiaries to avoid multiple lawsuits. Hall, 13 Ill.2d at 30, 147 N.E.2d 352; see also Pruitt v. Jockisch (1992), 228 Ill.App.3d 295, 169 Ill.Dec. 438, 591 N.E.2d 942 (requirement that action be brought by representative serves dual purpose of ensuring that interests of all beneficiaries are protected and of avoiding multiplicity of actions). However, that the right of action in wrongful-death accrues to, and suit must be brought by, a representative does not answer whether the intended beneficiaries are also significantly entitled under the Act. Nor does the fact that a single wrongful-death action is required to be brought to avoid multiple lawsuits answer whether and to what extent individual beneficial recoveries are allowed under the Act to accommodate other purposes. These dual, related themes (the significance as well as the separability of beneficial rights) are resolved upon review of case law pertaining to certain defenses under the Act. F & B cites to Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 Ill. 38,141 N.E. 392, which concerned whether the contributory negligence of one beneficiary acted as a defense to bar a wrongful-death action brought by the representative on behalf of that beneficiary and other non-negligent beneficiaries. Relying principally on the notion that there existed a single, inseparable cause of action for recovery in a single gross amount, the Hazel court held that the action was completely barred. According to Hazel, while the contributory negligence of a beneficiary barred the action, rather than that of the plaintiff representative (see VanMeter v. Goldfarb (1925), 317 Ill. 620, 622, 148 N.E. 391 (right of action is one for benefit of next-of-kin, or real party in interest)), the single-action requirement meant that the beneficiaries possessed but a single, indivisible right to recover. (See also Rost v. F.H. Noble & Co. (1925), 316 Ill. 357, 147 N.E. 258.) Nudd, 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525, revisited the issue and decided otherwise. In Nudd, the court referred to the then most recent amendment of the Act, which had become effective after the cause arose. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 70, par. 2 (it shall not be a defense that the death was caused in whole or in part by the contributory negligence of one or more of the beneficiaries).) The court concluded the amendment demonstrated that the concept of the indivisibility of a wrongful-death judgment, which formed the cornerstone of Hazel, was fictitious rather than real. ( Nudd, 7 Ill.2d at 615, 131 N.E.2d 525.) Relying on that conclusion as well as additional authorities, Nudd held that the contributory negligence of the beneficiary did not bar the action, but only precluded his particular right to recover for pecuniary loss. Nudd thus made clear that the beneficiaries' right of recovery was separable where one of the beneficiaries proved to be contributorily negligent. (See also Ill.Rev. Stat.1979, ch. 70, par. 2 (the amount of damages given shall not include any compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to such contributorily negligent person or persons); Sheley v. Guy (1975), 29 Ill.App.3d 361, 366, 330 N.E.2d 567.) Nudd also specifically overruled Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co . and other cited cases insofar as they were inconsistent with the decision. See Nudd, 7 Ill.2d at 616, 131 N.E.2d 525. Nudd, nonetheless, allowed that it was the real party in interest's contributory negligence, the beneficiary's, rather than the plaintiff personal representative's, which was significant for purposes of the defense. See also Knierim v. Izzo (1961), 22 Ill.2d 73, 78, 174 N.E.2d 157 ([t]he persons entitled to recovery under the Wrongful Death Act are the widow and next of kin (emphasis added) and the new cause of action affords protection to the family unit particularly when the beneficial plaintiffs are the widow and lineal kinsmen); cf. Strong v. Hodges (1951), 344 Ill.App. 306, 100 N.E.2d 667 (release by sole Wrongful Death Act beneficiary barred action by administrator). In Wilbon, 73 Ill.2d 58, 22 Ill.Dec. 394, 382 N.E.2d 784, the court addressed whether the intended beneficiaries' minority tolled the Act's two-year limitation period. (See Ill. Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 70, par. 2.) The Wilbon court found that, although the limitations period was a condition precedent to the existence of the statutorily created right, the legislature, in enacting the limitations provision, intended to incorporate within it certain well-recognized common law exceptions regarding the status of minority. Wilbon thus held that a beneficiary's minority tolled the two-year limitations period. ( Cf. Dachs v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hospital (1987), 156 Ill.App.3d 465, 468, 108 Ill.Dec. 793, 509 N.E.2d 489 (minor beneficiaries' interests in wrongful-death claims toll limitations period in medical malpractice statute).) According to Wilbon, a then recently enacted amendment to the Act, which provided that a beneficiary's minority tolled the two-year limitations period (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 70, par. 2), merely stated the law as it already existed. In reaching its decision, the Wilbon court addressed both the significance of the beneficial interests as well as the interests' potential separability. The Wilbon court referred to the Act's history, which demonstrated that although the action is to be brought `by and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person,' the legislative intent is that the claims are those of the individual beneficiaries. ( Wilbon, 73 Ill.2d at 68-70, 22 Ill.Dec. 394, 382 N.E.2d 784; Foster v. Kanuri (1992), 241 Ill.App.3d 677, 681, 180 Ill.Dec. 886, 608 N.E.2d 8; see also In re Estate of Faught (1983), 111 Ill.App.3d 1043, 1045, 67 Ill.Dec. 762, 445 N.E.2d 54 (emphasizing that while real parties in interest are the surviving spouse and next of kin, action is to be brought by personal representative).) The Wilbon court further noted that the contributory negligence of one beneficiary serve[d] to bar only his claim, and that a beneficiary's ultimate recovery after distribution was made on an individualized basis. Wilbon, 73 Ill.2d at 69, 22 Ill.Dec. 394, 382 N.E.2d 784. The Wilbon court also referred to the fact that the legislature had rejected amending the Act to allow the minority of the personal representative to toll the limitations period. The adopted amendment, instead, allowed a beneficiary's minority to toll the period. See also Flores v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital (1986), 149 Ill.App.3d 371, 103 Ill.Dec. 854, 502 N.E.2d 1 (holding that minor beneficiaries' claims against additionally named defendants were not barred by running of two-year limitations period); Gaudette v. Webb (1972), 362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (beneficiaries' minority tolled the running of two-year limitations period as to their right to recover through representative just as if their right of action were direct). On this point, the cases on which F & B relies do little to advance its position. Addison, decided prior to Wilbon, concerned whether a minor beneficiary in a wrongful-death action against a governmental entity was obligated to timely comply with the one-year notice requirement in the Governmental Tort Immunity Act. Finding Fanio v. John W. Breslin Co. (1972), 51 Ill.2d 366, 282 N.E.2d 443, dispositive, Addison held that the minor beneficiary was obligated. Addison reasoned that, since the burden of bringing the suit was imposed on the plaintiff representative, that party's failure to comply, rather than the beneficiary's, barred the action. (See Fanio, 51 Ill.2d at 368-69, 282 N.E.2d 443 (commenting that the reasons inherent in removing minors from the scope of Governmental Tort Immunity Act notice and limitations requirements were totally lacking in the wrongful-death action where a representative brings the suit).) Wilbon, however, later called that reasoning into question. Cf. Girman v. County of Cook (1981), 103 Ill.App.3d 897, 59 Ill.Dec. 534, 431 N.E.2d 1291 (rejecting Addison on similar facts and, instead, following Wilbon). Rodgers, 136 Ill.App.3d 191, 90 Ill.Dec. 797, 482 N.E.2d 1080, also relied on by F & B, merely applies the correlative of the rule that the right of action accrues to the representative, that is, a beneficiary possesses no individual right to bring his or her own suit. The Hazel decision, as mentioned previously, was overruled with respect to the notion that the wrongful-death action is one which is indivisible. See Nudd, 7 Ill.2d at 616, 131 N.E.2d 525. Courts in other jurisdictions, in deciding whether a beneficiary's minority tolled the limitations period, have expressly relied on the concept that each wrongful-death beneficiary has an independent and separate right to recovery. In Cross v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1964), 60 Cal.2d 690, 388 P.2d 353, 36 Cal.Rptr. 321, the court stated that, although the recovery is in the form of a lump sum, the amount is determined in accordance with the various beneficiaries' separate interests in the deceased's life and the loss suffered by each by reason of the death. Therefore, each beneficiary was to be regarded as having a personal and separate cause of action. Since that concept supported the settled rule that the contributory negligence of one beneficiary barred his recovery, but not that of others (see Nudd, 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525). Cross held that the running of the limitations period against adult heirs did not affect the rights of minor heirs. Parker v. Chrysler Motors Corp. (1972), 88 Nev. 560, 502 P.2d 111, reasoned and held similarly. The Parker court pointed out that the Nevada wrongful-death statute did not create a joint cause of action, that the thrust of the statute was merely to have all beneficiaries joined in one action, and the mere fact that the judgment was to be in a lump sum did not destroy the separability of the beneficial interests, since either the beneficiaries or the court might apportion the award. Parker held that a defense good against the claim of one heir was not fatal to the others and, thus, the running of the limitations period did not bar the rights of the minor beneficiaries. See also Hun v. Center Properties (1981), 63 Haw. 273, 279, 626 P.2d 182, 187; Switzer v. Reynolds (Utah 1980), 606 P.2d 244; cf. Hogan v. Hermann (1980), 101 Idaho 893, 898, 623 P.2d 900, 905 (Bistline, J., specially concurring). While F & B is correct in asserting that the right of action for a wrongful death accrues to the personal representative, our review convinces us that the Act's beneficiaries yet possess a distinct, but complementary, right of recovery. Furthermore, we conclude that the logical implication which follows from the allowance of minority tolling and the operation of contributory negligence as but a partial bar to recovery is that the beneficiaries' rights to recovery in such instances are separate and divisible. Further, where the beneficiaries' rights to recovery are separate due to the operation of minority tolling in the face of time-barred adult beneficiary claims, that separation is substantive under the Act, rather than merely procedural. In the case of a limitations period in a statute, such as the Act, which creates a substantive right unknown to the common law and in which time is made an inherent element of the right, such a time period is more than an ordinary statute of limitations: it is a condition of the liability itself and not of the remedy alone. Such a provision is a condition precedent and as such may extinguish the cause of action itself. Such a provision goes to subject matter jurisdiction and is not merely mandatory. See Fredman Brothers Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 109 Ill.2d 202, 209, 93 Ill.Dec. 360, 486 N.E.2d 893; Haakanson v. Wakefield Seafoods, Inc. (Alaska 1979), 600 P.2d 1087, 1091 (discussing traditional view that wrongful-death limitations period is limitation on the right not the remedy and therefore not subject to disabilities tolling ordinary limitations). Thus, in instances, as in the present case, where the limitations period precludes an adult beneficiary's claim against a particular defendant, that beneficiary's very cause of action against that defendant is nonexistent. Certainly then, it is clear that a minor beneficiary's claim against that same defendant, which survives the bar, cannot constitute substantively the same claim as that of the adult beneficiary against any other party defendant. Here, the fact that the liability owed the minor is also shared by one such other party defendant results in no contrary outcome. Speed's shared liability with F & B in benefit of Samantha was joint and several and, therefore, substantively indivisible. We therefore disagree with the appellate court. (252 Ill.App.3d at 733, 191 Ill.Dec. 899, 624 N.E.2d 1277.) Speed's liability to Samantha did not constitute Speed's liability to David. Accordingly, we conclude that the wrongful-death claim brought by the plaintiff representative in benefit of Samantha was a separate claim from that brought for the benefit of David. Our inquiry, however, is not yet completed. We must consider these separate claims in the context of setoff under the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 301 et seq.). Section 2(c) of the Contribution Act provides that when a settlement release is given in good faith to one tortfeasor liable in wrongful death, it does not discharge the liability of any of the other tortfeasors for the same wrongful death, but reduces the recovery on any claim against them to the extent of the amount stated in the release or actually paid for it. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 70, par. 302(c).) Section 2(c) reflects the long-recognized principle in Illinois that a plaintiff shall have only one satisfaction for an injury. (See Dial v. City of O'Fallon (1980), 81 Ill.2d 548, 558, 44 Ill.Dec. 248, 411 N.E.2d 217.) A double recovery is a result which is condemned and is exactly what section 2(c) of the Contribution Act was intended to prevent. Wilson v. The Hoffman Group, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill.2d 308, 321-22, 137 Ill.Dec. 579, 546 N.E.2d 524; Popovich v. Ram Pipe & Supply Co. (1980), 82 Ill.2d 203, 208, 45 Ill.Dec. 167, 412 N.E.2d 518. The provision reflects as well the public policy of protecting the financial interests of nonsettling parties in a settlement. ( Wilson, 131 Ill.2d at 322, 137 Ill.Dec. 579, 546 N.E.2d 524.) Allowing setoff ensures that a nonsettling party will not be required to pay more than its pro rata share of the shared liability. Thus, under section 2(c), it has been held that a settlement between one tortfeasor and the plaintiff will result in an equal setoff in amount against the recovery a nonsettling tortfeasor receives. (See Patch v. Glover (1993), 248 Ill.App.3d 562, 188 Ill.Dec. 13, 618 N.E.2d 583; Higginbottom v. Pillsbury Co. (1992), 232 Ill.App.3d 240, 173 Ill. Dec. 219, 596 N.E.2d 843; Nguyen v. Tilwalli (1986), 144 Ill.App.3d 968, 99 Ill.Dec. 183, 495 N.E.2d 630; cf. Dial v. City of O'Fallon, 81 Ill.2d at 558, 44 Ill.Dec. 248, 411 N.E.2d 217 (confirming the previously recognized common law right to a setoff).) Further, a nonsettling defendant may claim as a setoff any amount which the plaintiff recovered in a prior settlement with settling defendants, even if the resultant judgment is thereby reduced to zero dollars. See Foster v. Kanuri (1992), 241 Ill.App.3d 677, 180 Ill.Dec. 886, 608 N.E.2d 8; Nguyen, 144 Ill.App.3d at 973, 99 Ill.Dec. 183, 495 N.E.2d 630. Under section 2(c), while a nonsettling tortfeasor might seek to utilize the entire amount of a prior settlement as a setoff, the only amounts that may normally be applied are those which compensated for the same injury or wrongful death for which the tortfeasor was ultimately found liable. (See Patton v. Carbondale Clinic, S.C. (1994), 161 Ill.2d 357, 366, 204 Ill.Dec. 203, 641 N.E.2d 427.) The determination as to which of several claims a settlement award should be attributed to is considered a matter within the trial court's discretion. (See Gramse v. Royal Crest Enterprises, Inc. (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 100, 55 Ill.Dec. 468, 426 N.E.2d 614; see also Dick v. Gursoy (1984), 124 Ill.App.3d 185, 189a-89b, 83 Ill.Dec. 896, 471 N.E.2d 195 (supplemental opinion).) The Contribution Act permits contribution (or setoff) where co-tortfeasors are concurrent or successive as long as the same injury or wrongful death is involved. (See Nguyen, 144 Ill.App.3d at 971-72, 99 Ill.Dec. 183, 495 N.E.2d 630; Giordano v. Morgan (1990), 197 Ill.App.3d 543, 550, 143 Ill.Dec. 875, 554 N.E.2d 810.) Generally, the party seeking the setoff bears the burden of proving what portion of a prior settlement was allocated or is attributable to the claim for which he is liable. (See Kipnis v. Meltzer (1993), 253 Ill.App.3d 67, 192 Ill.Dec. 360, 625 N.E.2d 320 (nonsettling tortfeasor denied setoff of entire settlement amount for failure to establish what portion of settlement was attributable to claim for which it found liable).) This court, however, has found that where a plaintiff recovers for several injuries in a previous lawsuit and fails to apportion damages accordingly, a subsequent defendant may be relieved of this burden. See Patton, 161 Ill.2d at 370, 204 Ill.Dec. 203, 641 N.E.2d 427. The Contribution Act, however, provides little guidance as to what constitutes the same injury. ( Giordano, 197 Ill. App.3d at 550, 143 Ill.Dec. 875, 554 N.E.2d 810 (in order for contribution [or setoff] to lie, at least some type of culpable conduct must exist which contributed to plaintiff's injuries).) It is clear, however, that the entire amount of a settlement which compensated for a single indivisible injury can be set off against a recovery based on that injury, notwithstanding the plaintiff's assertion of two distinct theories of recovery. (See Hall v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (1988), 122 Ill.2d 448, 459, 120 Ill.Dec. 556, 524 N.E.2d 586.) It is also clear that a setoff is inappropriate where sought to be applied against a recovery for injuries separate and distinct from those for which the plaintiff was already compensated through settlement. See Patton, 161 Ill.2d at 366, 204 Ill.Dec. 203, 641 N.E.2d 427, citing Borowski v. Von Solbrig (1975), 60 Ill.2d 418, 431-32, 328 N.E.2d 301. Thus, in Barkei v. Delnor Hospital (1990), 207 Ill.App.3d 255, 266-67, 152 Ill. Dec. 175, 565 N.E.2d 708, where a pretrial settlement compensated plaintiffs for bodily injuries, medical expenses and loss of society, setoff was found to only have been appropriate to the extent that the settlement compensated plaintiffs for medical expenses, which was the sole basis of the nonsettling tortfeasor's liability. Similarly, in Eaton v. Jackson (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 893, 84 Ill.Dec. 122, 471 N.E.2d 651, a setoff against a recovery for the plaintiff husband's personal injuries was limited to that part of settlement attributed by the trial court to his claim, to the exclusion of that part attributed to the plaintiff wife's loss-of-consortium claim. ( Cf. Patch v. Glover (1993), 248 Ill.App.3d 562, 188 Ill.Dec. 13, 618 N.E.2d 583 (remanding for a setoff limited to that portion of settlement allocable only to wrongful-death claim).) Also, where a particular element of damages (ongoing and future loss of wife's services and consortium) partially comprises a wrongful-death settlement, and that element is subsequently eliminated from the ultimate total damage award, a rational setoff of those damages is impossible if the particular damage element is unallocable within the settlement. See Dolan v. Gawlicki (1994), 256 Ill.App.3d 153, 157, 195 Ill.Dec. 724, 628 N.E.2d 1188. On the issue of allocation of settlement proceeds, Foster v. Kanuri (1992), 241 Ill. App.3d 677, 180 Ill.Dec. 886, 608 N.E.2d 8, cited by F & B, is somewhat unclear. In Foster, the plaintiff's complaint alleged both wrongful-death and survival claims against several defendants. Prior to trial, two of the defendants settled with the plaintiff. The trial court entered a good-faith finding regarding the settlement and determined the two beneficiaries' percentages of dependency under the Wrongful Death Act. Presumably, the court also distributed the proceeds accordingly. The jury subsequently returned a verdict which included damages for both the two beneficiaries' wrongful-death claims and the survival claim. The nonsettling defendant sought to set off the entire amount of the prior settlements against the verdict. The trial court, however, both limited the setoff to that portion of the prior settlements attributable to the wrongful-death claims and applied the allocated settlement amounts as setoff to the beneficiaries' distinguishable recoveries. The appellate court reversed. Despite that there appears little indication that the prior settlement included both the wrongful-death and survival claims, the appellate court spoke approvingly of allowing the defendant to set off the entire settlement ( Foster, 241 Ill.App.3d at 680-81, 180 Ill.Dec. 886, 608 N.E.2d 8). The appellate court then remanded for a re-allocation of the settlement in accordance with the separate nature of the initially alleged claims. While Foster spoke to settlement allocation in the case of distinct causes of action, it offered no opinion concerning allocation and setoff in the case of timely and barred wrongful-death claims. We believe that defendant may draw little support from Foster. In the present case, by virtue of the operation of minority tolling, there was not a single and indivisible wrongful-death action such that the individual beneficiaries' pecuniary injuries were inseparable for purposes of setoff. ( Cf. Klier v. Siegel (1990), 200 Ill.App.3d 121, 127, 146 Ill.Dec. 620, 558 N.E.2d 583.) The limitation which barred a claim for David against F & B goes to subject matter jurisdiction, affecting not merely the remedy, but the right of action itself. Based on Nudd, Wilbon, and the Act's minority tolling provision, we conclude that a wrongful-death claim which is barred as untimely where brought for an adult beneficiary, but tolled where brought for a minor beneficiary, is a separate and distinct claim from that brought solely for the adult. Therefore, the claim against F & B and Speed in benefit of Samantha (count I) was substantively separate and distinct from the claim asserted against Speed in benefit of David (count II). Because of the minority tolling and the consequent joint and several joinder, the case at trial involved two separate and distinct claims, only one of which was successfully asserted against F & B. Although the Great Lakes settlement was unallocated by the parties themselves, it was obviously intended to compensate both Samantha and David for their respective claims for pecuniary loss. Under the Contribution Act, F & B was entitled to a setoff reducing its liability because it was also obvious that the Great Lakes settlement extinguished liability for the same injury (pecuniary losses suffered by Samantha) for which F & B owed a recovery. However, because F & B's request for a setoff necessarily rests on the premise that it paid more than its pro rata share of the shared liability for Samantha's injury, F & B bore the burden of establishing how much of the Great Lakes settlement was intended to compensate for her loss. (See Barkei, 207 Ill.App.3d 255, 152 Ill.Dec. 175, 565 N.E.2d 708; Kipnis, 253 Ill.App.3d 67, 192 Ill.Dec. 360, 625 N.E.2d 320; see also Houser v. Witt (1982), 111 Ill.App.3d 123, 125, 66 Ill.Dec. 799, 443 N.E.2d 725.) This is not a case like Patton where the defendant was not a party to the suit underlying the prior settlement. In the absence of such proof, the trial court reasonably considered that its determination of Samantha's and David's percentages of dependency supported an allocation of the settlement between their respective claims. See Bart v. Union Oil Co. (1992), 236 Ill.App.3d 964, 966, 177 Ill.Dec. 296, 603 N.E.2d 77 (trial court has discretionary authority in allocating settlement amount between various claims); see also In re Estate of Flake (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 535, 536, 92 Ill.Dec. 388, 484 N.E.2d 1243 (division of an award in a wrongful-death action is left to discretion of trial court). Moreover, the trial court's dependency determination did not control the allocation of the settlement so much as it reflected merely the obvious: that because there were two family member claimants, it was reasonable that half of the settlement was intended by Great Lakes to compensate Samantha and half was intended for David. Regardless of any disparity between Samantha's and David's later recoveries as a result of trial, we cannot say that based on this record the trial court abused its discretion by allocating the settlement with reference to the beneficiaries' equally shared dependency. Considering that reasonable allocation and the fact that two separate claims resulted in verdicts reflecting assessments of Samantha's and David's individual pecuniary losses, the trial court correctly declined to set off the entire settlement and limited F & B's setoff to Samantha's part only. (See Johnson v. Belleville Radiologists, Ltd. (1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 100, 163 Ill.Dec. 596, 581 N.E.2d 750 (amounts apportioned to separate claims in settlement agreement should not operate as single setoff against verdict based on separate claims).) It is manifest that David's part of the settlement did not extinguish Great Lakes' potential liability for the same pecuniary injury for which F & B was found liable. Furthermore, the trial court's setoff application will not result in a double recovery for Samantha and David. Like any other plaintiffs seeking tort damages, Samantha and David were compensated by Great Lakes for their respective claims. The jury subsequently returned verdicts in their favor against certain defendants, which were reduced by amounts paid to them by other potentially liable parties. F & B's problem with the trial court setoff is not so much that Samantha will recover twice. F & B's problem is that Speed's minimal liability to David was fully satisfied, and no part of the larger settlement attributable to David's claim can be used to offset F & B's shared liability with Speed to Samantha. This sort of disparity results, however, in every tort action with distinct and separate claims where prior settlements are disproportionate to the eventual jury verdicts. However, in such cases, a settlement in contemplation of one claim is simply not available to offset recovery on an entirely different claim and a plaintiff is not considered to have received a double recovery. In contrast to the trial court here, the appellate court first stated that the two separate verdicts for Samantha and David must be combined into one judgment ($1.65 million), but then it paradoxically directed setoff of the entire settlement amount against only that portion of the judgment for which F & B and Speed were jointly and severally liable ($1.5 million). The appellate court apparently interpreted the Contribution Act to provide literally that any setoff reduce the recovery on any claim to which all the nonsettling tortfeasors were exposed. (See Ill.Rev. Stat.1991, ch. 70, par. 302(c) (reduces the recovery on any claim against the others).) As a result, the entire settlement, including that which reasonably extinguished Great Lakes' liability to David, would be applied against a recovery to which David was substantively barred. Also, no part of the settlement utilized to extinguish David's claim would then be available for setoff against the separate verdict for David's benefit against Speed. F & B would thus not only be enabled to obtain a reduction of its liability by virtue of settlement amounts paid for claims to which it was not exposed, but it would also be unfairly advantaged at Speed's expense. Therefore, to the extent that the appellate court held that the setoff of the entire settlement was to be applied against the joint and several liability of F & B and Speed to Samantha, we conclude that the determination was incorrect. In summary, we agree with the plaintiff that Samantha is entitled under the Contribution Act to realize her full recovery despite application of setoff. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 70, par. 304.) We conclude that the trial court appropriately allocated Samantha's share of the settlement and correctly applied a setoff against the recovery which was in her benefit only. We conclude also that the trial court correctly set off the recovery due David by Speed.