Opinion ID: 1465114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Funding Decision

Text: We now determine the applicability of the discretionary function exception under § 5148 of the Stafford Act to this case by turning to the well-established precedent defining discretionary conduct under § 2680(a) of the FTCA. We hold that under that precedent, FEMA's decision not to approve funding for sediment dredging in the Coin du Lestin canals is discretionary and that § 5148 therefore bars the Parish's current claims. The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test for determining whether agency conduct qualifies as a discretionary function or duty under this exception. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 1954). First, the conduct must be a matter of choice for the acting employee. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954. The exception covers only acts that are discretionary in nature, acts that `involv[e] an element of judgment or choice.' Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954) (alteration in original). Thus, `it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor' that governs whether the exception applies. Id. (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813, 104 S.Ct. 2755). If a statute, regulation, or policy leaves it to a federal agency to determine when and how to take action, the agency is not bound to act in a particular manner and the exercise of its authority is discretionary. See id. at 329, 111 S.Ct. 1267. On the other hand, [t]he requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied and the discretionary function exception does not apply if a `federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow,' because `the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.' Id. at 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954). Second, even `assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment,' we must still decide that the `judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.' Id. at 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954); see also Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813, 104 S.Ct. 2755. Because the purpose of the exception is to `prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort,' when properly construed, the exception `protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.' Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. 1954). In this regard, if a regulation allows the employee discretion, the very existence of the regulation creates a strong presumption that a discretionary act authorized by the regulation involves consideration of the same policies which led to the promulgation of the regulations. Id. at 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267. In this case, plaintiff argues that the Stafford Act, regulations promulgated pursuant to it, Recovery Policy 9523.13, the Ward Memorandum, and PW 2981.1 created a nondiscretionary duty on FEMA to fund its requested debris and sediment removal in the Coin du Lestin canals to a depth of eight feet. Under the first prong of the Berkovitztest, plaintiff asserts that these authorities prevented FEMA from exercising any choice in whether to fund the dredging. Plaintiff's claim is predominately based on two deductionsfirst, that once FEMA declared debris removal from private property in the Parish to be in the public interest, it had no discretion to deny funding for the Parish's request in this specific case; and second, that once FEMA engineers determined that some threat existed to improved property, public health, or safety, it lacked discretion to deny funding for the debris removal. We conclude that, in this case, the cited authorities do not create a nondiscretionary duty mandating that FEMA fund the Parish's requested dredging of the Coin du Lestin canals. Sections 5170b and 5173 of the Stafford Act grant FEMA authority to fund debris removal from private property in designated disaster areas. Those provisions, however, are cast in discretionary terms. Section 5107b states that: Federal agencies may on the direction of the President, provide assistance essential to meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major disaster. § 5170b(a) (emphasis added). Section 5173, likewise, states that [t]he President, whenever he determines it to be in the public interest, is authorized ... to make grants to any State or local government ... for the purpose of removing debris ... resulting from a major disaster from publicly or privately owned lands and waters. § 5173(a)(2) (emphasis added). The uses of the words may and is authorized indicate that government approval of assistance for debris removal is discretionary. See, e.g., Neuwirth v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 845 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir.1988) (stating that the use of the word may shows a legislature's intention to bestow discretion on an agency). Nor do the corresponding federal regulations create a mandatory duty. The regulations permit FEMA to provide assistance for removal of eligible debris if in the public interest, but they do not mandate assistance even where that eligibility criterion is met. See 44 C.F.R. § 206.224(a) (Upon determination that debris removal is in the public interest, the Regional Director may provide assistance for the removal of debris and wreckage from publicly and privately owned lands and waters. (emphasis added)); see also Lockett, 836 F.Supp. at 854 (holding that [e]ven where an applicant meets the requirements of eligibility, the language, by including the term `may,' signifies that FEMA has the discretion to award that assistance (citation omitted)). Similarly, Recovery Policy 9523.13, the Ward Memorandum, and PW 2891.1 do not mandate that FEMA fund the Parish's request for dredging. Recovery Policy 9523.13 states that FEMA has authority to fund debris removal, § 6(A), and that debris removal from private property may be in the public interest and thus may be eligible for reimbursement, § 6(C) (emphasis added). [11] Thus, under Recovery Policy 9523.13, funding decisions remain discretionary. Through the Ward Memorandum, FEMA favorably exercised its authority to label the Parish eligible for public-interest-based debris removal funding; however, the Ward Memorandum does not create a nondiscretionary duty to fund any or every request for debris removal. In addition, PW 2891.1, even if viewed as an agency confirmation that some threat to improved property, public health, and safety existed, does not create a nondiscretionary duty to fund the debris removal presently sought by the Parish. While PW 2891.1 concludes that funding to remove the C & D debris, the boat, and the submerged vehicle was necessary to eliminate the threats to improved property, public health, and safety from further flooding, it provides no basis to conclude that additional dredging of sediment and marsh grass was necessary to reduce those threats. Finally, we note that, viewed as a comprehensive regulatory scheme, the combined import of these sources does not give rise to a nondiscretionary funding mandate. [12] Thus, we conclude that under the first prong of the Berkovitz test, FEMA was under no nondiscretionary duty to fund dredging. Under the second prong of the Berkovitz test, we hold that funding decisions related to the extent of debris removal that is necessary to protect improved property, public health, and safety are exactly the type of public policy considerations that § 5148 shields from judicial scrutiny. See Sunrise Vill. Mobile Home Park, 960 F.Supp. at 286 ([T]he Government's decisions on when, where, and how to remove debris after a major disaster are exactly the sort of policy-imbued decisions that fall within the second prong of the discretionary function exception.). Here, FEMA engineers determined that removal of C&D debris, the boat, and the submerged vehicle was necessary to protect the community but that dredging was not necessary. Eligibility determinations, the distribution of limited funds, and other decisions regarding the funding of eligible projects are inherently discretionary and the exact types of policy decisions that are best left to the agencies without court interference. Thus, we hold that in this case, the Stafford Act, its regulations, and related agency guidance do not give rise to a mandatory duty. They instead permit discretionary, policy-oriented choices that cannot be the basis for the court's subject matter jurisdiction. As a result, FEMA's decision not to approve funding for sediment dredging in the Coin du Lestin canals is discretionary, and § 5148 therefore bars the Parish's current claims. [13]