Opinion ID: 2159715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Denial of the Motion for Leave to Interview Jurors

Text: Defendant argues that the denial of his PCR petition must be reversed and his case remanded to the PCR court so that jurors from the sentencing retrial can be interviewed. Defendant maintains that statements made by an alternate juror to counsel indicate that the jurors considered extraneous information and misunderstood the jury instructions. The facts in respect of defendant's claim are these. Three years after defendant's sentencing retrial, an alternate juror, Margaret Whittaker, stated to defendant's appellate counsel that the jurors did not want to come down `that way,' but felt that they had no choice because of the way the judge gave the instructions. Based on that information, defendant moved for permission to interview the jurors. The motion court denied the request, stating that the claim hung on the thinnest of threads. Several months later, PCR counsel renewed the motion before the PCR court. Counsel represented in an affidavit that Whittaker called him several times, unsolicited, and provided him with more information about the deliberating jurors. The jurors allegedly relayed to Whittaker that one or more of them believed that: (1) defendant would not be executed, even if sentenced to death, because the appellate process takes so long; (2) defendant was facing serious criminal charges in New York, although the jury was not told of any charges; (3) defendant had visited the victim's pizza parlor on occasions prior to the murder; and (4) during deliberations, one or more jurors believed that to return a life verdict, the jury had to be unanimous for life, and because the jurors would not unanimously find for life, some just went along with the death verdict. The PCR court denied defendant's renewed motion. The court reasoned that Whittaker was not in the deliberating room, and thus the information was mere hearsay; that Whittaker's communications were stale given that Whittaker waited three years to make her first overture to counsel; that there was no indication in respect of how many jurors made the troubling statements to Whittaker; and that the substance of the statements were not sufficient to overcome the presumption against interviewing jurors. The law in this area is well settled. Calling back jurors for interrogation after they have been discharged is an extraordinary procedure which should be invoked only upon a strong showing that a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct. State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 250, 216 A. 2d 369 (1966). See also R. 1:16-1 (instructing that jurors may not be interviewed, examined, or questioned [e]xcept by leave of court granted on good cause shown). The requirement that a defendant make such a strong showing is intended to prevent juror harassment and avoid chilling jury deliberations. State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 154, 716 A. 2d 458 (1998), cert. denied sub nom. Harris v. New Jersey, 532 U.S. 1057, 121 S.Ct. 2204, 149 L.Ed. 2d 1034 (2001); Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 280, 690 A. 2d 1. Defendant first argues that Whittaker's statement relating to the length of the appellate process indicates that the jury may have believed incorrectly that it was not responsible for the verdict. We disagree. Nothing in the affidavit recounting Whittaker's statements indicates that the jurors considered the lengthy appeals process during deliberations. The same is true in respect of Whittaker's second statement regarding pending charges against defendant in New York. Although the jury knew from testimony that defendant had been arrested in New York, DiFrisco II, supra, 137 N.J. at 492-94, 645 A. 2d 734, there is no evidence that the jury improperly considered other-crimes evidence during deliberations. With regard to Whittaker's third statement, that defendant had previously visited the pizza parlor, defendant argues that the jury may have concluded that his actions were more premeditated than was supported by the evidence. Defendant's argument is misplaced. Defendant's diagram of the restaurant, which was introduced at the retrial, depicts the parking lot behind the pizzeria, the stairs, the back and rear doors of the pizzeria, and the bus stop on the corner. In our view, the evidence presented supports a reasonable inference that defendant may have visited the pizzeria before the murder. Therefore, if the jury had drawn that inference it would not have been improper. Defendant's final argument is that the jury erroneously believed that to return a life verdict, a unanimous decision was required. That argument, based on Whittaker's fourth statement, also is without merit. Whittaker did not say that the jury ultimately misunderstood the court's instructions on unanimity. Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the verdict sheet explicitly allowed for a non-unanimous verdict, and the trial court gave instructions on the issue of unanimity (which we reviewed in DiFrisco II, supra, 137 N.J. at 483-89, 645 A. 2d 734). Defendant seeks the exceptional remedy of interviewing jurors not because a deliberating juror presented an affidavit alleging misconduct, see State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 95, 118 A. 2d 812 (1955), but based on statements of an alternate juror as conveyed through PCR counsel's affidavit. In State v. Koedatich, we denied a similar motion because the contents of a single newspaper article, indisputably hearsay, cannot be the sole basis for the extraordinary procedure of a post-trial jury interrogation. 112 N.J. 225, 289, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988). Our conclusion is the same here. Defendant has not made the strong showing necessary to warrant the extraordinary procedure of post-trial interrogation of the retrial jurors. E.