Opinion ID: 6330934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court properly used erisa’s

Text: DEFINITION OF “EMPLOYER” Under the MPPAA, disputes between “employers” and “plan sponsors” over withdrawal liability go to arbitration. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1). The Fund is the “plan sponsor.” And the parties dispute J. Supor’s withdrawal liability. So if J. Supor is an “employer,” it must arbitrate. We start with the text’s plain meaning. An “employer” is “[o]ne who employs,” specifically “[o]ne who employs servants, workmen, etc. for wages.” Employer, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Under that definition, J. Supor might not be liable because it may have employed the drivers only indirectly. But the dictionary definition creates an immediate problem. It would cripple a core feature of the MPPAA: withdrawal liability for employers who exit multiemployer pension plans without covering their share. 29 U.S.C. § 1381. If that penalized only direct employers, others could easily evade it by hiring indirectly through third parties. See Carriers Container Council, Inc. v. Mobile S.S. Ass’n, 896 F.2d 1330, 1343 (11th Cir. 1990). And that would defeat one of the MPPAA’s chief innovations. 5 The dictionary definition of “employer” would also make withdrawal liability turn on minutiae. Is an entity an employer if it hires a pensioner as an independent contractor, not as an employee? What if it hires him through a subsidiary or subcontractor? Consider this case. On the record before us, even counsel are unsure whether J. Supor employed the truck drivers directly or through subcontractors. Oral Arg. 24:23– 25:23, 28:26–28:41. To avoid these thickets, every circuit to face this issue has adopted a more technical definition. All seven circuits define an “employer” as an entity “obligated to contribute to a plan either as a direct employer or in the interest of an employer of the plan’s participants.” Korea Shipping, 880 F.2d at 1537 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Resilient Floor Covering Pension Fund v. M&M Installation, Inc., 630 F.3d 848, 851–52 (9th Cir. 2010); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Int’l Comfort Prods., LLC, 585 F.3d 281, 284–85 (6th Cir. 2009); Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 85 F.3d 1282, 1287 (7th Cir. 1996); Seaway Port Auth. of Duluth v. Duluth-Superior ILA Marine Ass’n Restated Pension Plan, 920 F.2d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 1990); Carriers Container, 896 F.2d at 1343; see also Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. Hudson, 235 F.3d 207, 212 (4th Cir. 2000). This judicial consensus spans more than three decades. The technical approach draws that definition from Title I of ERISA, the law that the MPPAA amends. Title I defines an “employer” as “any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). Though Title I 6 definitions do not automatically apply elsewhere in ERISA, “they may … reflect the meaning” of terms in other titles. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 370 n.14 (1980). And here, a version of the Title I definition fits better than the dictionary definition. By covering both direct and indirect employers, it avoids punching a hole in the statutory scheme. But understanding the Title I definition in the MPPAA context presents a further puzzle. What kind of “relation” must an entity have to an employee-benefit plan to count as an employer? The MPPAA answers this question. It routinely describes an “employer” by its obligation to contribute to a pension. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A), (A)(i) (defining a “multiemployer plan,” in part, as “a plan … to which more than one employer is required to contribute”); id. § 1391(2)(A) (making withdrawal-liability computation turn on the “plan year[s] in which the employer has an obligation to contribute”) (emphases added). Thus, an entity “relat[es] to an employee benefit plan” if it must contribute to one. Cent. States, 585 F.3d at 285 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) and citing id. § 1381(a)) (emphasis omitted). Following this logic, our sister circuits define an “employer” by its obligation to pay into a pension, either as a direct employer or on behalf of one. Id. at 284–85. We adopt this definition too. It is plausible, protective of the statutory scheme, and supported by three decades of consensus. This technical definition is in good company. Congress routinely defines “employer” both more expansively than direct employment and “in relation” to something else. See, 7 e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii) (defining “employer” to include “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer”); id. § 203(d) (“ ‘Employer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”); id. § 2001(2) (“ ‘[E]mployer’ includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee or prospective employee.”); id. § 152(2) (“ ‘Employer’ includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly.”). This reading also fits with the MPPAA’s enacted statement of purpose and findings. In designing the MPPAA, Congress found that employers’ premature withdrawal from multiemployer pension plans “adversely affect[ed] the plan[s], [their] participants and beneficiaries, and labor-management relations.” Id. § 1001a(a), (4)(A). So the MPPAA imposed a penalty for employer withdrawal to fix that free-rider problem. That solution would unravel if an employer could free ride again by outsourcing pension contributions to third parties. Finally, our approach avoids creating a circuit split, something we are “generally reluctant” to do. Parker v. Montgomery Cnty. Corr. Facility/Bus. Office Manager, 870 F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is doubly so when there is a thirty-year consensus favoring another reading of the statute. True, we may have a “compelling basis” to depart from the consensus of other circuits when only one reading of the statute is plausible. Id. But that is not true here. Because this technical definition is plausible, we will follow our sister circuits’ consensus. 8 True, if Congress meant to define “employer” this way here, it could have done so expressly. But the MPPAA has no definitions section. So this reading draws from the definition section of the very Title that the MPPAA amends. See Nachman, 466 U.S. at 370 n.14. It reinforces ERISA’s statutory plan, buttressing withdrawal liability. And it eliminates the problem of employers evading withdrawal liability by outsourcing pension payments. We thus hold that under the MPPAA, an “employer” is any person obligated to contribute to a plan either as a direct employer or in the interest of one.