Opinion ID: 1227123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: this conduct warrants a two-year and one day suspension, and imposition of costs.

Text: Before we may impose discipline upon an attorney, the allegations must be established by clear and convincing evidence. [2] In a bar disciplinary proceeding, this court as a licensing court exerts exclusive original jurisdiction. Accordingly, while the trial panel's recommendations are afforded great weight, it is ultimately this Court's responsibility to make the final determination. Our review is de novo in considering the record presented as well as the trial panel's disciplinary recommendation. [3] The Bar Association offered evidence that the client's money was never deposited into a trust account, and that no check was sent from the trust account to the bank for the $800.00. Kessler continues to assert that the check was mailed to the bank. He also contends that a response was sent to the bar. Apparently, neither were ever received. The imposition of discipline is warranted for violation of Rule 1.15 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Rule 1.4 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings relating to the use of client funds. [4] Kessler has been previously disciplined by this Court. On January 19, 1978, Kessler was suspended for eighteen months for failure to preserve the identity and property of a client. The Bar Association requests that we disbar Kessler. Kessler contends that the relationship of the parties; the amount of money involved; the return of most of the money; and the overall circumstances do not warrant a five year suspension. He admits that he may have technically violated the rules, but the punishment should match the violation. He seeks a one year suspension. The Trial Panel recommended that he be suspended for five years. In cases involving similar conduct the discipline has extended from six-month suspension to disbarment. [5] In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assoc. v. Gasaway, 810 P.2d 826 (Okla. 1991), Gasaway commingled client funds with his own and utilized client monies for purposes other than those approved. He also failed to make a full and fair disclosure to the Bar concerning the grievance. In Gasaway, we imposed a one-year suspension. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assoc. v. Moss, 794 P.2d 403, 411 (Okla. 1990), we held that Moss' improper use of a client's money and failure to preserve another client's money in an identifiable separate account warranted a two year suspension. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assoc. v. Schlegel, 808 P.2d 670 (Okla. 1991), this Court disbarred Schlegel because: he had never maintained an attorney trust account; clients' money was placed in a personal account; he committed fraud upon the court; and he also had a scheme of inflating attorney fees due co-counsel in order to obtain money from a trust of which he was a co-trustee. Kessler's transgressions are very similar to those committed by Gasaway and Moss rather than Schlegel. However, we must consider the enhancement alleged by the Bar Association because of Kessler's prior discipline. The Bar urges this Court to follow the discipline imposed in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assoc. v. McCurtain, 767 P.2d 427, 429 (Okla. 1989). McCurtain was under suspension for neglect of a legal matter, and he had been disciplined three other times, 1981, 1986, and 1987, when another complaint was filed for a neglect of a legal matter. We found that this continued behavior warranted disbarment. However, we are not faced with an attorney who has a current pattern of disciplinary problems. Kessler's previous discipline occurred eleven years ago. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assoc. v. Geb, 494 P.2d 299, 301 (Okla. 1972), this Court found that Geb had been privately reprimanded two years before the current complaint. Geb was suspended for one-year and required to pay costs of the disciplinary action for commingling client funds and failing to remit the funds in a timely fashion. Upon a de novo review of the record, we find that the client was not displeased with Kessler's representation of him in the foreclosure action until Kessler failed to deliver the check to the bank. Kessler returned all but $300.00 of the client's money which he applied to overdue attorney fees. It was only after Kessler wrote his client and told him that he would no longer represent him that the complaint was filed. We find that a two year and one day suspension is more in line with similar cases than the Trial Panel's five year suspension. [6] The Bar submitted an application to assess costs of $1,790.62 on June 26, 1991. We find that the costs are itemized and are appropriate. Kessler is responsible for the assessment of costs. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS IMPOSED. LAVENDER, DOOLIN, HARGRAVE, ALMA WILSON and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.