Opinion ID: 1154934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Opinions on Intent and EED.

Text: We next consider whether the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Janzer's opinions as to whether defendant's act in killing his wife was intentional and as to whether defendant in fact acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. OEC 704 provides: Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. OEC 704 does not provide that an opinion embracing an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact is admissible; rather, it states that such an opinion is not objectionable solely for the reason that it embraces an ultimate issue. An opinion still may be objectionable on other grounds. The commentary to OEC 704 (adopting the commentary to the identical federal rule) observes that: The abolition of the [prohibition on testimony regarding an ultimate issue] does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rule[s] 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and [under Rule 403 they must not unfairly prejudice, confuse or delay the proceedings]. These provisions    stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. Thus the question, `Did T[estator] have capacity to make a will?' would be excluded, while the question, `Did T[estator] have sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution?' would be allowed. McCormick § 12. L. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 466-67 (2d ed 1989) (third bracket in original). The commentary to the Oregon Evidence Code, while not binding on this court, provides useful guidance as to legislative intent. State v. Phillips, 314 Or. 460, 468 n. 9, 840 P.2d 666 (1992). Here, we conclude that opinions as to whether defendant killed his wife intentionally and as to whether defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance are, in the words of the commentary to OEC 704, opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. The terms intentional and extreme emotional disturbance are statutorily defined legal terms [10] whose meanings may or may not coincide with the meanings that a medical professional or lay person otherwise would give them. Banta v. Leffler, 204 Or. 538, 284 P.2d 348 (1955), presented the example alluded to in the commentary to OEC 704 and further supports our conclusion in this regard. In that case, this court held: We have on numerous occasions stated, and correctly so, that it is improper for a witness to give his opinion `that the testator had capacity to make a will,   , for that is the identical problem before the court.'    [T]he vice of permitting this conclusion of the witness to be given is    that it assumes a witness is fully conversant with the requisite mental capacity necessary to make a will; thus there is presented to the witness a question of law as well as a question of fact, and the unknowing witness is left to fix his own standard of mental capacity to make a will. Id. at 545, 284 P.2d 348. (Citations omitted.) As in Banta v. Leffler, supra , testimony by Dr. Janzer in respect to whether defendant's act in killing his wife was intentional and whether he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constituted testimony in respect to a question of law as well as a question of fact. For the above reasons, the trial court did not err in excluding Dr. Janzer's opinions on intention and extreme emotional disturbance.