Opinion ID: 626317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Saltses are entitled to relief under Holloway.

Text: Holloway 's rule  not Cuyler 's actual-conflict standard  controls the Saltses' joint-representation claim in this case because the Saltses timely objected to their joint representation. Their newly retained attorney, Mr. Waide, objected to the representation before trial began, before the jury was selected and sworn. This objection was not untimely or made for dilatory purposes, and it was sufficient to trigger the trial court's duty to investigate the propriety of the joint representation. [51] Because the trial court failed to investigate, reversal is required under Holloway. The Saltses did not retain attorney Waide until several days before their trial was scheduled to begin. The timing of their retention of Waide coincided with their previous counsel announcing to the court that he was not prepared to try the case. On the Monday morning trial was scheduled to begin, after spending the weekend reviewing the Saltses' case, Waide moved to dismiss the charges against them, or in the alternative, to continue the trial setting so they could retain separate counsel. The motion informed the court of an obvious conflict of interest between the Defendants, given that they both denied any knowledge of the alleged embezzlement. Further, the motion explained that during various time periods one Defendant operated the business and during other times the other Defendant operated the business. Waide elaborated on this motion in open court the morning trial was scheduled to begin: Your honor, the indictment in this case charges embezzlement. It charges both defendants with embezzlement. There's extensive discovery in the case, boxes of materials, but I can't see anything that identifies which defendant is charged with embezzlement at which times. And I also know that the proof is going to show that at various years, it goes on for 17 years, but at various times one of the defendants wouldn't even been working in the business during some of those times. There's an obvious conflict of interest. It's obvious that one attorney should represent one defendant and should argue that they haven't shown that my defendant was even working there at that particular time. So there's an obvious conflict of interest, and the prosecution knowing this case has gone on for 17 years and investigating it would have certainly known that from time to time which one of them was active in the business. And one lawyer can't very well point the finger at one defendant and not at the other one and say, Well my  for example, I might say the last three or four years, Mr. Salts has been working outside the business, hasn't even been involved in the business. But its hard to make that argument representing both. Waide's motion to the trial court was sufficiently detailed to alert the court to a potential conflict of interest, thus triggering the trial judge's duty under Holloway to either allow for separate counsel or investigate further to ensure no conflict existed. [52] The State urges that Waide's motion did not trigger a duty to investigate under Holloway because the motion was not timely. It is true that the Supreme Court in Holloway clarified that [w]hen an untimely motion for separate counsel is made for dilatory purposes, our holding does not impair the trial court's ability to deal with counsel who result to such tactics. [53] But the record here does not support a conclusion that Waide's motion was an untimely motion ... made for dilatory purposes. [54] The Supreme Court in Holloway did not explicitly define the phrase untimely motion... made for dilatory purposes. However, the Court did note that, in that case, all of the defendant's objections to the joint representation were timely, even a motion made on the morning trial was scheduled to begin, before the jury was empaneled. [55] The motion in Holloway is difficult to distinguish from Waide's motion in this case. Like the defendant's attorney in Holloway, Waide objected the morning trial was scheduled to begin, before the jury was selected and sworn. [56] For Waide, this was the earliest opportunity he had to object to the joint representation. Perhaps more important than the precise timing of Waide's motion in this case is that there is no indication whatever that it was made for dilatory purposes. Waide objected to the Saltses' joint representation at the earliest possible opportunity: when he appeared in court the Monday after the Saltses retained him. The record here indicates that the Saltses retained Waide on Thursday, and that he spent the weekend reviewing their case, including seventeen boxes of documents. Waide determined promptly that the Saltses had conflicting interests and brought this conflict to the court's attention when it opened for business Monday morning. Moreover, although the Saltses were represented for a two-year period prior to trial, in which time their previous counsel filed a number of continuances, there is no indication in the record that the Saltses themselves were the source of the delay. [57] Rather, the record reflects the delays were largely the result of illnesses in the family of the Saltses's previous counsel and courthouse construction. Finally, there is no indication that Waide's objection was meritless or was based on a misrepresentation offacts. [58] Our conclusion that Waide's objection was not untimely ... [or] made for dilatory purposes should not be read to suggest that an objection to a joint representation made in the hours before trial begins will always pass muster under Holloway. Rather, our holding reflects the unique circumstances surrounding this case. The Saltses retained Waide at the last minute, after their previous counsel announced to the court that he was unprepared to try their case on account of serious illness in his family. Our conclusion that Waide's motion was not made for dilatory purposes might be different if he himself had represented the Saltses for longer, and yet had waited until the last minute to object to the joint representation, or where the record reflects that the defendants themselves have been the cause of delay. In sum, the state court's decision was contrary to law because it applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases. Under the proper rule, the Saltses are entitled to relief on their ineffective-assistance claim stemming from joint representation. [59] We thus AFFIRM the district court's conditional grant of habeas relief, vacating the Saltses' convictions and providing the State a window of 120 days in which to commence a new prosecution.