Opinion ID: 849107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: solicitation to commit third-degree criminal sexual conduct

Text: 1. ANALYSIS Defendant was additionally charged, on the basis of his Internet conversations with Bekka, with solicitation to commit third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant maintains that it was legally impossible for him to have committed this crime, because the underlying felony requires the existence of a child under the age of sixteen. [17] The Court of Appeals panel agreed, concluding that it was legally impossible for defendant to have committed the crime because the underlying form of third-degree criminal sexual conduct charged, M.C.L. § 750.520d(1)(a), required the existence of a person under the age of sixteen. The panel further concluded that it was legally impossible for defendant to have committed the crime for the additional reason that he did not solicit[ ] another person to commit a felony as proscribed by the solicitation statute. Our solicitation statute, M.C.L. § 750.157b, provides as follows, in relevant part: (1) For purposes of this section, solicit means to offer to give, promise to give, or give any money, services, or anything of value, or to forgive or promise to forgive a debt or obligation.
(3) ... [A] person who solicits another person to commit a felony, or who solicits another person to do or omit to do an act which if completed would constitute a felony, is punishable as follows: (a) If the offense solicited is a felony punishable by imprisonment for life, or for 5 years or more, the person is guilty of a felony.... [Emphasis supplied.] The Court of Appeals erred to the extent that it relied on the doctrine of impossibility as a ground for affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the solicitation charge. As we have explained, Michigan has never adopted the doctrine of impossibility as a defense in its traditional attempt context, much less in the context of solicitation crimes. Moreover, we are unable to locate any authority, and defendant has provided none, for the proposition that impossibility is a recognized defense to a charge of solicitation in other jurisdictions. [18] Nevertheless, the solicitation charge was properly dismissed for the reason that there is no evidence that defendant in our case solicited anyone to commit a felony or to do or omit to do an act which if completed would constitute a felony as prohibited by M.C.L. § 750.157b. Pursuant to the plain statutory language, the prosecution was required to present evidence that defendant requested that another person perform a criminal act. The evidence here shows only that defendant requested that Bekka engage in sexual acts with him. While the requested acts might well have constituted a crime on defendant's part, Bekka (or Liczbinski) would not have committed third-degree criminal sexual conduct had she (or he) done as defendant suggested. As the Court of Appeals properly concluded: What is lacking here is defendant's request to another person to commit a crime. Bekka, the fourteen-year-old online persona of Deputy Liczbinski, was not asked to commit a crime. That is, while it would be a crime for defendant to engage in sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year-old girl, a fourteen-year-old girl is not committing a criminal offense (or at least not CSC-3) by engaging in sexual intercourse with an adult. Thus, whether we look at this case as defendant asking fourteen-year-old Bekka to engage in sexual intercourse with him or as defendant asking Deputy Liczbinski to engage in sexual intercourse with him, he did not ask another person to commit CSC-3.... For the above reasons we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the charge of solicitation to commit criminal sexual conduct. [241 Mich.App. at 111, 614 N.W.2d 674.] Accordingly, while the concept of impossibility has no role in the analysis of this issue, we agree with the panel's conclusion that an element of the statutory offense is missing and that the solicitation charge was therefore properly dismissed.