Opinion ID: 2586049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Krafchick breached his contract to Mazon

Text: ¶ 33 In its eagerness to announce its broad rule, the majority conflates Mazon's causes of action and unwittingly attacks the freedom to contract. Even if an attorney can be specially insulated from his professional responsibilities, surely he must be at least held to his contracts. Mazon and Krafchick explicitly agreed to bear and divide the responsibilities, costs, and profits of their joint venture. CP at 26. Mazon agreed to prepare the complaint and Krafchick agreed to serve it. Mazon held up his end of the bargain; Krafchick breached his. ¶ 34 When a contract is breached, the nonbreaching party is generally entitled to expectation damages. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts entitles Mazon to: (a) the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus (b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less (c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347, at 112 (1981), quoted with approval in Eastlake Constr. Co. v. Hess, 102 Wash.2d 30, 46, 686 P.2d 465 (1984). Krafchick breached his promise to serve the complaint, costing Mazon any fee he would have earned. The majority does not address Mazon's contractual claims and suggests no reason why breach of the contract should also be excused. The Court of Appeals rejected Krafchick's contract claims because it claimed the agreement created the specter of a divided duty of loyalty. But there was no inconsistency here between serving the interests of the client and the cocounsel. If an attorney cannot hold cocounsel liable for a breach of contractual obligations between them, contracts become meaningless scraps of paper. The law holds Krafchick must be held to his contract, but the majority's decision threatens the integrity of any cocounsel agreement.