Opinion ID: 2364015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Arbitrator's Interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement

Text: The sole remaining question is whether the arbitrator's resolution of the dispute on the merits was based on an arguably correct interpretation of the provisions of the Contract. The Committee does not challenge the arbitrator's finding of fact that there was no just cause for it to deny renewal of Dawson's extracurricular contract. Instead, the Committee argues that the arbitrator erred in construing Article VI(B)'s just cause requirement to apply to extracurricular, as well as continuing teacher, contracts. The Committee's position is by no means unpersuasive. In keeping with prior practice in the Westbrook schools, Dawson signed two different contracts covering the 1977-78 school year. The first was a two-year Teacher's Continuing Contract, signed in 1976, which applied to his regular positions as guidance counselor and athletic director. Second was a one-year contract covering his extracurricular coaching assignment. The fact that the parties employed a separate contract for the extracurricular assignment and that the coaching assignment was for only one year instead of two might suggest that the parties intended to allow considerable flexibility in the hiring and firing of athletic coaches, an inference that matches, in the view of the Superior Court justice, the custom of the community. In short, if the task of interpreting the Contract had fallen upon this court, we might have decided, as did the Superior Court, that the just cause provision applied to continuing contract teachers serving as teachers, not as athletic coaches. However, as we noted in our general discussion of the relation of the courts to arbitration, it is not for the Superior Court (or the Law Court) to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. The court may reverse an arbitrator's award only if all fair and reasonable minds would agree that the construction of the contract made by the arbitrator[s] was not possible under a fair interpretation of the contract. In the case at bar we cannot say that any such basis exists for reversing the arbitrator's decision in Dawson's favor. It is undisputed that Dawson is a continuing contract teacher. Although it is unclear whether the term contract in Article VI(B) refers to extracurricular contracts as well as continuing teacher contracts, the arbitrator was entitled to draw upon his knowledge of the field and of the bargaining relationship between the parties to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the Association. Similarly, while coaching a football team is not directly related to the teaching profession as commonly defined, ability to coach proven by actual experience is an additional credential that would increase Dawson's employability as a high school teacher. Conversely, the nonrenewal of his coaching contract might well be a negative factor in his employment file. Consequently, coaching can be viewed as a professional advantage in that it might aid Dawson in getting and retaining subsequent employment in his teaching profession. We must conclude that the arbitrator's resolution of this dispute by applying Article VI(B) of the Contract to extracurricular as well as regular teaching contracts survives the court's limited review. In summary, the Superior Court lacked justification for concluding that the dispute over the nonrenewal of Dawson's teaching contract was nonarbitrable. Furthermore, once it was apparent that the arbitrator's decision on the merits was based on an arguably correct interpretation of Article VI(B) of the Contract, the Superior Court's power to review that decision ceased. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court's vacation of the arbitrator's award, which had ordered that Dawson be reinstated to his former position as football coach and full-time guidance counselor at Westbrook High School. The entry must be: Appeal sustained. Judgment of Superior Court set aside. Remanded to Superior Court for entry of judgment confirming the arbitrator's award. Costs on appeal allowed to appellant.