Opinion ID: 1443143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jail's Method of Dispensing Prescription Medication

Text: The other official practice Grieveson challenges is the method by which the Marion County Jail dispensed prescription medications. He argues that the jail maintained a customary practice of failing to control inmate prescriptions such that inmates were given entire bottles of medication at once. Grieveson attests that he had his medications stolen from him by other inmates at least four times. To survive summary judgment on this official-capacity claim against the Sheriff, Grieveson again has to present evidence demonstrating that the method of prescription distribution was undertaken pursuant to an official jail policy or widespread custom. Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir.2002). Grieveson must point to either an express policy which caused the injury, a widespread practice that is so well-settled as to amount to a policy, or [show] that the sheriff had the final policymaking authority for the decisions regarding the medical treatment [he] received. Id. He must also present evidence demonstrating that the method of prescription dispensing amounts to an unconstitutional practice. See Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1427; see also Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 381 (7th Cir.2005) (stating the inquiry into official-capacity liability to be whether the County employs an impermissible method of operation). Grieveson makes a widespread custom argument  that jail officials would give out an inmate's entire prescription at one time, in full view of other prisoners, placing in harm's way the prisoner with the prescription. Grieveson specifies in his affidavits four instances in which jail guards gave him his entire prescription at once, and he explains the consequences he suffered as a result ( e.g., On January 2, 2002, the medication that was given to me (Ultram) was taken from me with force (100 pills). Yes, a trained medical staff and officers gave me the whole bottle of pain medication to keep with me in the cell-block. I was slapped in the mouth then the medication was taken by two other inmates, this time I never put up any fight.). A January 9, 2001 jail medical record shows that Grieveson complained about the method of prescription dispensing, and asked for his pills one at a time. Grieveson does not, however, present any evidence relating to inmates other than himself, aside from the general statement in his June 30, 2004 affidavit: If and when a prisoner was prescribed a medication, pain pills, etc., even a narcotic, the jail staff  not the medical staff  would pass out the medication (narcotics) in front of all the prisoners to see who got what. And Defendants would give the prisoner the whole prescription at times, sometimes the whole bottle of pills.... The question then is whether Grieveson provided enough evidence of custom and practice to permit an inference that the County has chosen an impermissible way of operating. Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 381. A practice of dispensing full bottles of prescription medicine to inmates may be an impermissible manner of operating under the Constitution  though Grieveson did not present expert evidence or caselaw addressing the effects of dispensing entire drug prescriptions at once. From the little we know, the alleged practice provides inmates with quantities of medicine that could potentially allow them to overdose and that could place them at risk for having their needed medication stolen. But we need not decide whether the practice is unconstitutional, because Grieveson has not put forth adequate evidence showing that the alleged practice was widespread and reflective of a policy choice by the Marion County Sheriff, which is the pivotal requirement of a § 1983 official capacity claim. See id; Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 789-90 (7th Cir.2006). Grieveson's allegation about jail officers providing full prescriptions to other prisoners does not indicate the frequency of the practice, nor suggest that it is wide-spread. We do not know the alleged number of inmates involved, and we do not know how many such disbursements Grieveson witnessed. One broad, vague statement about an occurrence affecting other inmates in a detention facility does not support the inference of a widespread custom. See Phelan v. Cook County, 463 F.3d 773, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2006) (The unifying theme in these decisions is the acknowledgment that the word `widespread' must be taken seriously.). Turning to Grieveson's personal experiences, we note that it is not impossible for a plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of an official policy or custom by presenting evidence limited to his experience. Id. (Generally speaking, we do not believe that a plaintiff should be foreclosed from pursuing Section 1983 claims where she can demonstrate that repeated actions directed at her truly evince the existence of a policy.). However, it is necessarily more difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate an official policy or custom based only on his own experience because `what is needed is evidence that there is a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event.' Id. (quoting Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 380). In his pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials, and affidavits, Grieveson presented four incidents in which he was given his full prescription at one time, and a medical record shows that he asked, on one occasion, to receive his pills one at a time. In Estate of Moreland v. Dieter , an inmate's observation of three incidents of improper pepper-spraying was not sufficient to support allegations of a widespread practice. 395 F.3d at 760. Two incidents of placing black inmates in unsafe gladiator cell blocks was not enough to survive summary judgment on a widespread practice claim in Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir.2003). Likewise, Grieveson's evidence of four incidents that he alone experienced fails to meet the test of a widespread unconstitutional practice by the Jail's staff that is so well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law. Id. at 595-96. This simply is not enough to foster a genuine issue of material fact that the practice was widespread  from that evidence alone an inference does not arise that the county itself approved, acquiesced, or encouraged the disbursement of entire prescriptions at once. See Jones v. City of Chicago, 787 F.2d 200, 204 (7th Cir.1986) ([T]here must be some knowledge or an awareness  actual or imputed  of the custom and its consequences showing the municipality's approval, acquiescence, or encouragement of the alleged unconstitutional violation.).