Opinion ID: 878870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Workers' Compensation Court had Jurisdiction to Award and Should Have Awarded a Dollar Amount for Domiciliary Care as a Medical Expense.

Text: Claimant's mother, Edith Ebert, has cared for the claimant since she was discharged from the hospital in October 1980. After a hearing in October 1983, the Workers' Compensation Court ruled on July 3, 1984 in conclusion of law no. 4 that the claimant was entitled to the reasonable value of domiciliary care by her mother from the date of discharge to the present and continuing so long as the care is needed. In arriving at its decision, the court discussed the difference between home nursing services and household tasks. The court adopted a slightly modified version of the factors set forth in Warren Trucking v. Chandler (1981), 221 Va. 1108, 277 S.E.2d 488 to test whether services provided in the home are compensable. The factors are: (1) The employer knows of the employee's need for medical services at home resulting from the industrial injury; (2) the preponderance of credible medical evidence demonstrates that home nursing care is necessary as a result of accident, and describes with a reasonable degree of particularity the nature and extent of duties to be performed by the family members; (3) the services are performed under the direction of a physician; (4) the services rendered are of the type normally rendered by trained attendants and beyond the scope of normal household duties; and (5) there is a means to determine with reasonable certainty the approximate value of the services performed. The Court found and the parties agree that the services Mrs. Ebert provided for her daughter passed the above test. The Workers' Compensation Court, however, ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to set a value on the services performed by Mrs. Ebert. The court ruled that the services constituted such other treatment under § 39-71-704, MCA, which we have quoted above, and as such the services must be approved by the Division of Workers' Compensation. The court left the decision of how much should be paid to Mrs. Ebert to the Division upon presentation to the Division of additional evidence. Claimant contends that the Workers' Compensation Court has the power to evaluate the services and make an award. Hartford claims that the amount of each award for domiciliary services in each case must be determined by the Division. The portion of § 39-71-704, MCA, which is applicable is that the employer must pay medical benefits for doctors, surgeons and hospitals and for such other treatment as may be approved by the Division for the injuries sustained. A literal reading of that portion of the Act would indicate that the other treatment to be compensable must be approved by the Division. Yet, in this case, the Workers' Compensation Court determined that the other treatment was necessary as a medical expense but declined to set the dollar amount. Section 39-71-2905, MCA, relates to the jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation judge. In pertinent part, it provides: ... If the dispute relates to benefits due a claimant under chapter 71, the judge shall fix and determine any benefits to be paid and specify the manner of payment. The workers' compensation judge has exclusive jurisdiction to make determinations concerning disputes under chapter 71... . The foregoing portion of § 39-71-2905, MCA is an excellent example of the legislature using interchangeably the term compensation and benefits. It is also an affirmation of the legislative purpose to grant to the Workers' Compensation judge exclusive jurisdiction in all matters relating to benefits recoverable under the Workers' Compensation Act. Medical payments constitute one form of such benefits. It is the policy of the law to avoid multifariousness in litigation. All issues involved in lawsuits should be tried in one trial. We, therefore, hold that once the Workers' Compensation Court has acquired jurisdiction of a dispute under the Act, it has jurisdiction to try and decide all of the issues that arise between the parties before him. In this case, the Workers' Compensation Court should have fixed a dollar amount of the domiciliary care to which the Workers' Compensation judge found that claimant Carlson was entitled. We do not know from the record before us the exact status of the claim for Carlson's claim for domiciliary care. If, following the Workers' Compensation order in this case, the Division is now considering that issue, then we order that the Division continue to consider and make a decision as to the dollar amount due Carlson subject to Carlson's right of appeal to the Workers' Compensation Court on that issue. If, however, the matter has not been referred to the Division, or is not being considered by the Division, then we remand the issue to the Workers' Compensation Court for the fixing of the dollar amount of domiciliary care.