Opinion ID: 1237084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Member of a Social Group

Text: We have defined social group, for purposes of asylum, as any group united by 1) a voluntary association which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to the members' identities, or 2) an innate characteristic which is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members they either cannot or should not be required to change it. Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir.2007). In determining whether a social group exists, we consider, among other factors, whether a group's shared characteristic gives members social visibility and whether the group can be defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership. Id. at 944-45. Petitioner argues that he is eligible for asylum because he is a member of a particular social group, namely, a group of government informants. Petitioner argues that, having given incriminating information about two individuals to the police, he is a member of such a group. He reasons that membership in the group is unchangeable because he already has given the information to police and because the individuals about whom he told the police know his identity. We have not previously considered whether government informants are a particular social group for immigration purposes. The BIA has held in a precedential opinion that noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel, who act out of a sense of civic duty and moral responsibility, do not constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes. In Re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 959 (B.I.A.2006). We accord Chevron deference to that decision, Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 859(9th Cir.2009), but such deference does not quite answer the question in this case. Here, we face a criminal government informant who neither acts from altruistic motives nor turns in participants in a drug cartel. We therefore turn more specifically to the decision below. In this case, the BIA has held that a group comprised of government informants is not a valid social group for asylum purposes. This court gives Skidmore deference to that holding, Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1011, and our own case law accords with the BIA's ruling. In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1572, 1577(9th Cir.1986), we held that a purported social group of young, working class males who have not served in the military of El Salvador was too all-encompassing [a] grouping to constitute that type of cohesive, homogeneous group to which we believe the term `particular social group' was intended to apply. A key to establishing a particular social group is ensuring that the group is narrowly defined: Major segments of the population of an embattled nation, even though undoubtedly at some risk from general political violence, will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group for the purposes of establishing refugee status. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to extending refugee status to every alien displaced by general conditions of unrest or violence in his or her home country. Id. at 1577. Moreover, [i]ndividuals falling within the parameters of this sweeping demographic division naturally manifest a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings. Id. In Ochoa, we relied on the reasoning in Sanchez-Trujillo to reject a claim that a social group comprised of business owners in Colombia who rejected demands by narco-traffickers to participate in illegal activity was a particular social group because the group was not defined narrowly enough. Ochoa, 406 F.3d at 1170. We reasoned that [t]here is no unifying relationship or characteristic to narrow this diverse and disconnected group. This category is too broad to qualify as a particularized social group for the purposes of asylum and withholding of removal. Id. at 1171. Finally, in Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 745-46 (9th Cir.2008), we rejected a claim that a group of young men in El Salvador resisting gang violence comprises a social group for purposes of asylum. We held that the purported group is too loosely defined to meet the requirement for particularity and that it is composed of a variety of different individuals who may be victims of civil unrest, but who do not form a cohesive or particular social group. Id. In addition, the purported group lacks social visibility. Id. at 746. We held that [s]ocial visibility requires that `the shared characteristic of the group should generally be recognizable by others in the community.' Id. (quoting In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 586 (B.I.A.2008)). Those cases lead us to conclude that a government informant is not a member of a particular social group for purposes of asylum. Just like the young men who failed to serve in the El Salvadoran military in Sanchez-Trujillo, the business owners in Ochoa, and the young men who refused to join gangs in Santos-Lemus, a government informant, as Petitioner defines it, is not a cohesive, homogeneous group. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577. A person who identifies as a government informant can be anyone of any demographic description who passes information to government authorities for any purpose. There is no innate characteristic which is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of government informants that identifies them as a particular social group. Arteaga, 511 F.3d at 944. The purported group, therefore, naturally manifest[s] a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings. Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1577. Accordingly, we hold that government informants do not comprise a particular social group within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). We therefore deny Petitioner's applications for asylum and withholding of removal. With regard to Petitioner's CAT claim, Petitioner must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). There is no evidence showing a likelihood of torture by gang members if Petitioner were to return to the Philippines. Importantly, Petitioner did not present any evidence demonstrating that he would be subject to torture committed by or with the consent of Filipino government officials. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief. Petition DENIED.