Opinion ID: 2460096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(b)

Text: Finally, Roberts suggests a different conclusion is compelled in Kansas because the Kansas Legislature has recognized that there can be an acquittal before a trial. He points to K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(b), which bars trying the case in a subsequent prosecution if a first attempt [w]as terminated by a final order or judgment, even if entered before trial, which required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction. (Emphasis added.) This provision, which is based on the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 1.09(2) (1985) (adopted May 24, 1962), codifies the principle of res judicata and has its source in the United States Supreme Court's decision of United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916); see State v. Lee, 210 Kan. 753, 756, 504 P.2d 202 (1972) (discussing legislative history and noting the subsection expressly codifies the principle of res judicata in criminal cases); Com. v. Stephenson, 82 S.W.3d 876, 885-86 (Ky.2002) (discussing substantially similar provision and noting source is Model Penal Code and Oppenheimer ). In Oppenheimer, the defendant was reindicted for the same offense that had been dismissed because the statute of limitations barred the prosecution. In the second prosecution, the defendant raised the defense of double jeopardy, and the State countered that the question was an issue of res judicata which does not apply in criminal cases. The Court agreed with the State that the defendant had made an argument based on res judicata rather than double jeopardy principles. However, the Court disagreed with the argument that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to criminal proceedings. See Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. at 87-88, 37 S.Ct. 68. Clearly, the effect of Oppenheimer and K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(b) is to bar a subsequent prosecution, but that is a different situation from the question of whether double jeopardy principles would bar the State from challenging a pretrial ruling on appeal. Roberts does not cite any opinion in which a court has held that the State cannot appeal from an order that the State seeks to overturn. There is authority that is contrary to Roberts' position, however. Specifically, courts in other jurisdictions that have the same statutory provision have indicated that to avoid the application of res judicata in the subsequent prosecution, `a timely amendment of the order of dismissal or an appeal from that order was required. Upon [the government's] failure to take steps to obtain such relief, the order of dismissal became final and subsequent litigation was thereby barred.' (Emphasis added.) Stephenson, 82 S.W.3d at 885; see also People v. Newell, 83 Ill.App.3d 133, 137, 38 Ill.Dec. 544, 403 N.E.2d 775 (1980) (noting that even though pretrial order in first prosecution might have been erroneous, that issue was not raised in timely appeal and subsequent prosecution was barred). In other words, consistent with the doctrine of res judicata, the order of dismissal would not be final until the opportunity for an appeal had expired or was exhausted; only then would the order have preclusive effect. See K.S.A. 60-2105 (An appellate court shall render such final judgment as it deems that justice requires, or direct such judgment to be rendered by the court from which the appeal was taken.); State v. Flores, 283 Kan. 380, 384, 153 P.3d 506 (2007) (Res judicata requires prior final judgment on the merits.). Implicitly, these courts recognize a right to appeal the order of dismissal. These decisions are consistent with the Serfass holding, i.e., that the right to appeal is impacted only if jeopardy has attached. It is particularly noteworthy that the Court in Serfass, as quoted above, cited to Oppenheimer in its analysis. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 392, 95 S.Ct. 1055. Yet, the Court did not suggest that the holding in Oppenheimer prevented the government's appeal of the order at issue in Serfass. Instead, it cited Oppenheimer for the proposition that the word `acquittal' has no talismanic quality and then reiterated that the critical point is whether jeopardy has attached. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 392, 95 S.Ct. 1055. As a result, we conclude that K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(b) does not preclude the State from appealing an order of dismissal if the appeal is otherwise statutorily authorized. In summary, under the facts of this case where an order of dismissal was entered before trial, meaning before jeopardy had attached, the order was not a judgment of acquittal and the State's appeal was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court on the issue subject to our review are affirmed. JAMES A. PATTON, District Judge, assigned.