Opinion ID: 1311731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: litigation costs

Text: Respondent shall pay $220 of petitioner's attorney's fee for services rendered in trial court. Respondent here asserts the foregoing awards of alimony and legal fees are inequitable under the circumstances. I. The guidelines set forth in Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968), save and except the fault concept eliminated by In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 345-346 (Iowa 1972), are here involved. Despite respondent's contention to the contrary we are not persuaded trial court entertained the now proscribed fault factor in fixing the aforesaid alimony award. II. As a preface to further discussion it is understood our review is de novo. See In re Marriage of Moorhead, 224 N.W.2d 242, 246 (Iowa 1974); In re Marriage of Ried, 212 N.W.2d 391, 392-393 (Iowa 1973); Iowa R.Civ.P. 334, 344(f)(7). Mindful thereof we turn now to a consideration of the issue presented. At the outset Section 598.21, The Code 1973, states, in relevant part: When a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to   property    and the maintenance of the parties as shall be justified. This does not mean an alimony award is mandatory. See Kjar v. Kjar, 261 Iowa 334, 338, 154 N.W.2d 123 (1967). Rather, a just determination as to any right thereto and, if allowed, the amount thereof, is to be determined on an ad hoc basis under the facts peculiar to each case. See In re Marriage of Matson, 215 N.W.2d 358, 359 (Iowa 1974). Briefly stated, the parties hereto commenced their marital relationship with relatively little property and terminated same in substantially the same position. In light of the foregoing factual situation this statement in Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265, 267 (1937) is of more than minimal significance: As a general rule a young couple, married a short time, who break up with no children, would call it a misadventure in matrimony, and unless the wife has suffered more than the ordinary wear and tear of matrimony or stands by the divorce to lose substantial material benefits in economic status or loss of inheritance, no alimony ordinarily will be given. Where, as in many of these cases, the swains start with no assets except earning power and end with no assets except that earning power it would place an unwarranted burden on the young husband to help him support, or partially support, the wife after they have split up. See also In re Marriage of Maskel, 225 N.W.2d 115, 120 (Iowa 1975); In re Marriage of Zoellner, 219 N.W.2d 517, 524 (Iowa 1974); In re Marriage of Downing, 210 N.W.2d 436, 437-438 (Iowa 1973). Upon a weighing of all circumstances peculiar to this case it is to us evident trial court's aforesaid alimony award to petitioner, in any form or amount, was inequitable and must be deleted. On this issue we reverse. III. Finally, respondent challenges that portion of trial court's decree which ordered he pay $220 to apply on the petitioner's attorney's fees. A discussion of this subject will serve no useful purpose. Under existent conditions we now hold no inequity attends trial court's attorney fee award. IV. Petitioner-appellee's application for allowance of attorney fee on this appeal is denied. Costs on appeal are taxed equally to petitioner and respondent. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for entry of decree consistent with this opinion.