Opinion ID: 852961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Practice of the Executive and Legislative Branches Under Section 14

Text: The clarity Plaintiffs claim is called into question by at least two decades of practice by both governors and the legislature. The State argues that the Governor and General Assembly's actions indicate their understanding of the constitution and reflect the practice of at least three governors and the legislature dating at least to 1982. In addition to the pay bill discussed above, a variety of other laws are claimed to have been vetoed by the same process and could be resuscitated by the Plaintiffs' success here. [7] Plaintiffs respond, and we agree, that past practice of the governor and the General Assembly cannot validate an unconstitutional process. They note that Mass Transportation so held in condemning the pocket veto that was the subject of that case. The pocket veto, however, involved a practice that arguably directly contravened the constitutional requirement that the governor face the veto issue and take responsibility for it by signing a veto and returning the bill. Accountability and visibility of the governor's torpedo are plainly legitimate objectives of the framers. Here we have an entirely different issue. We are faced with interpretation of a provision that is susceptible to different readings. No one advances any policy that was frustrated by the practice of physical delivery during adjournment, producing a bill that is returned at all times after delivery, including on the first day of the next session. The actions of both governors and the General Assembly, rather than flouting the constitution, may be taken simply to evidence their understanding of the constitutional requirement over some two decades, with no suggestion from either branch or by any court that the practice was questionable. [8] Both sides cite the practice of prior governors and legislatures as an aid to the construction of Section 14. The Governor and the Attorney General argue that past veto messages show a consistent pattern that reflects the understanding of governors and legislators over at least twenty years that the procedure followed with respect to House Enrolled Act 1866 conformed to the constitution. In all of these cases, the Messages After Adjournment section of the journals reflects veto messages, and in most cases the message bears a date within ten days after adjournment and before the next session. A few are undated. The fact that the messages appear in the Messages After Adjournment section of the old session, rather than in the journal for the new session, suggests that the messages were indeed received by the legislature before the new session convened, but this is merely an inference. Similarly, some of these messages stated that the governor was vetoing and returning the bill on the date of the message, which also suggests delivery on that date. But, that also is inconclusive as to the timing of delivery of the vetoes. In other cases, the message stated simply that I have vetoed the bill, and said nothing about its delivery. [9] Plaintiffs point out that in some instances the veto message appears in the journal for the first day of the ensuing session, and contend that this shows the legislature received some messages on the first day of reconvening. From this, they argue that there has been no consistent practice of delivering veto messages before the first day of the following session. This argument seems to proceed from a fallacious premise. The journal entries of veto messages in the ensuing session in most cases appear on the date of the override vote, not the date the governor delivered the veto message. The entries do not purport to establish that the messages were delivered on the first day, and it is clear that in many cases the entries were not the date of delivery. [10] It is true that in the instances the Plaintiffs cite the veto message appears on the first day. But in almost all of those cases, the first day was also the day the bill was subject to an override vote. The veto messages appear in various formulations. Although it is clear from the journal entries when the governor signed each message, and some recite that the return is concurrent with the veto, we are directed to no independent evidence of the date on which the message was delivered to the legislature. As a result, although it is clear that a substantial number of these bills, and perhaps all, were vetoed by the procedure used to veto House Enrolled Act 1866, in several instances we are unable to determine with confidence whether the veto is or is not in that category, and in some it seems likely the bills were delivered on the first day. Nevertheless, it is clear that for many years, beginning within a decade of the effective date of the current Section 14, at least some vetoes were delivered before the next session without objection by the legislature. The State contends that this history demonstrates that the practice of delivery before the first day is consistent with the constitution. There is certainly support for the view that legislative or executive practice can build a patina on the constitutional framework. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) ([A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned ... may be treated as a gloss on `executive Power' vested in the President....); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474, 35 S.Ct. 309, 59 L.Ed. 673 (1915) (noting that a president's long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress creates a presumption that the practice is a proper exercise of the president's power); Lutz v. Arnold, 208 Ind. 480, 508, 193 N.E. 840, 851 (1935) (In determining whether the Legislature had the constitutional right to enact certain legislation, the Legislature's interpretation of its power is entitled to great weight, and especially where acquiesced in for a long period of time.). Regardless of whether the message was delivered before the first day in every case, the constant delivery of vetoes before the first day is a salient fact here and evidences approval of the practice over most of the life of current Section 14. The State also notes that Section 14 was amended in 1990 without change in the language at issue here. For at least several years before 1990, governors had begun the practice of physical delivery of vetoed bills before the onset of a new session. See Appendix A. Though there may be no consistent practice of delivery early or waiting for the first day of session, either was deemed acceptable by the governor and acted upon by the General Assembly without protest. Amendment of a constitutional provision without change to eliminate current practice has been cited as one factor suggesting that the interpretation is permissible. Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 539-40 (Ind. 1998). Like prior practice, a subsequent amendment does not justify disregard of the constitution, but a subsequent amendment without change in language that has been construed in practice suggests satisfaction with the governors' and the General Assembly's view of how the provision applies. That is the case with Section 14.