Opinion ID: 1386250
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to the 1978 Death Penalty Sentencing Scheme

Text: (32) Defendant contends that the 1978 death penalty law violates the due process clause of the federal Constitution because it fails to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the factual predicates necessary for a death sentence, namely, that the circumstances in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation. Although defendant concedes that in several cases we have held that such proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not constitutionally compelled (see People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1068 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680]; People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 787 [251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260]; People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 147, 189; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779), he contends that we have rejected only challenges brought under the Eighth Amendment and that we have never considered whether due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant misreads the cases. We have specifically rejected the claim on both Eighth Amendment and due process grounds ( People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1201 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 778, fn. 15), and decline to reconsider it here. (33) Defendant also challenges the validity of allowing the jury to return a verdict of death without reaching unanimous agreement on those aggravating circumstances that support imposition of the death penalty. We consistently have held that there is no constitutional requirement for the jury to reach unanimous agreement on the circumstances in aggravation that support its verdict. ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d 618, 692; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 233 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 777.) Defendant ignores these holdings. Instead, he describes the aggravating circumstances supporting a death verdict as elements of the offense, and contends that allowing the jury to determine penalty without reaching agreement on which circumstances support its verdict violates the jury trial right guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. We reject this contention. Because the Sixth Amendment provides no right to jury sentencing in death penalty cases ( Hildwin v. Florida (1989) 490 U.S. 638, 640 [104 L.Ed.2d 728, 732, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 2057]), it does not require jury unanimity. In Hildwin v. Florida, supra, 490 U.S. 638, 640 [104 L.Ed.2d 728, 732, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 2057], the United States Supreme Court, in discussing the Florida death penalty, rejected the premise underlying the argument that defendant makes here: [T]he existence of an aggravating factor here is not an element of the offense but instead is `a sentencing factor that comes into play only after the defendant has been found guilty.' ( Ibid., quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania (1986) 477 U.S. 79, 85-86 [91 L.Ed.2d 67, 76, 106 S.Ct. 2411], italics added.) Under the Florida statute involved in Hildwin, the judge, not the jury, made the factual determination of circumstances in aggravation. Nonetheless, the high court found no constitutional infirmity in this process, noting that `there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact.' ( Ibid., quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, supra, at p. 93 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 81].) In California too the mitigating and aggravating circumstances are sentencing factors rather than elements of the capital offense. (See People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 778.) Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment does not require the jury to reach unanimous agreement on the sentencing factors underlying its choice of penalty. (See Hildwin v. Florida, supra, 490 U.S. 638, 640 [104 L.Ed.2d 728, 732, 109 S.Ct. 2055, 2057].) (34) Defendant further contends that the terms criminal and violence as used in section 190.3, factor (b), are unconstitutionally vague because they do not focus the jury's attention on specific aggravating conduct, thereby rendering the jury unable to make a principled distinction between those who deserve the death penalty and those who do not as required by the Eighth Amendment. ( Lewis v. Jeffers (1990) 497 U.S. 764, ___ [111 L.Ed.2d 606, 619, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3099], citing Spaziano v. Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447, 460 [82 L.Ed.2d 340, 352-353, 104 S.Ct. 3154].) Factor (b) allows the jury to consider [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence when deciding penalty. (Italics added.) We have defined criminal activity in factor (b) as evidence that demonstrates the commission of an actual crime, a requirement easily verified under the definitional guidelines established by legislative bodies in this and other jurisdictions. ( People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) Moreover, we have limited admissibility of evidence of criminal activity involving force or violence under factor (b) to that involving the defendant's use of, or threatened use of, force or violence to any person.... ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 776.) Under decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Eighth Amendment's vagueness evaluation that defendant asks us to undertake has been applied only to statutes that govern those circumstances that make a criminal defendant `eligible' for the death penalty. ( Lewis v. Jeffers, supra, 497 U.S. 764, ___ [111 L.Ed.2d 606, 619, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3099].) The statute at issue here, section 190.3, does not govern those circumstances. Under the California death penalty scheme, the determination that a defendant is eligible for the death penalty is made when the jury finds the special circumstance allegation to be true. (งง 190.1, 190.2.) Section 190.3 does not govern the circumstances making a defendant eligible for the death penalty but instead pertains to the sentencing stage at which the jury decides from among that class [of persons eligible for the death penalty], those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. ( Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 878 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 251, 103 S.Ct. 2733].) Because the high court has found no constitutional defect in a statute that at the sentencing stage granted the jury unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed ... ( id. at p. 875 [77 L.Ed.2d at p. 248]; People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 773, fn. 5), we reject defendant's contention that the language of factor (b) must be evaluated under the Lewis v. Jeffers standard. (35) Defendant also contends that the 1978 death penalty law cannot withstand Eighth Amendment scrutiny based on its failure: (1) to designate which factors listed in section 190.3 are mitigating and which are aggravating, (2) to require a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt finding that death is the appropriate penalty, and (3) to require written findings of the aggravating circumstances selected by the jury. As defendant concedes, we have earlier rejected identical arguments. ( People v. Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d 200, 233; People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 898-899 [258 Cal. Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294]; People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 160 [255 Cal. Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1285 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115]; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779.) Defendant presents no persuasive reason for us to reconsider them here.