Opinion ID: 1592271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hoefer's suit against WEAIT and the union.

Text: A. Procedural issue. Before challenging the merits of the adverse judgment, Hoefer contests the way in which the matter came before the court. A brief procedural history is required to understand plaintiff's claim. Hoefer prevailed against defendants' motions to dismiss filed in 1986, and again prevailed when the defendants moved for summary judgment in July 1988. These latter motions were heard by Judge Dewey Gaul who first sustainedand on further consideration, overruledthe movants' request for judgment as a matter of law. The case was then scheduled for trial in September 1989 before Judge Richard Vipond. When Judge Vipond reviewed the file in anticipation for trial, he decided that the defendants' unsuccessful summary judgment motions should be set for rehearing and reconsideration. During the intervening year additional discovery had occurred. Each party was allowed to brief and argue the issues anew. Judge Vipond ruled adversely to Hoefer who now claims the judge had no authority to reverse Judge Gaul's earlier ruling. While it may be uncommon for a district court to reconsider a motion sua sponte, Iowa adheres to the general rule that a district court judge may review and change a prior interlocutory ruling of another district judge in the same case. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Lagle, 430 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1988); State v. Wrage, 279 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1979); State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975); Kuiken v. Garrett, 243 Iowa 785, 793, 51 N.W.2d 149, 154 (1952). When exercised with discretion, the rule enhances the court's integrity by refusing to give either party a vested right to require the court to perpetuate its mistake. Kuiken, 243 Iowa at 793, 51 N.W.2d at 154. Moreover, we have concluded that a change of judges makes little difference since it is the same court. Richards, 229 N.W.2d at 233. Hoefer urges us to abandon the rule on grounds that it fosters judge-shopping, creates mini-appellate courts within the districts, causes unnecessary delay, and breeds uncertainty in decision making. We fully recognize that, taken to the extreme, the rule could lead to the evils Hoefer predicts. Such a case is not before us, however. None of the litigants sought out Judge Vipond to obtain a more favorable ruling. Once he made the decision to reconsider Judge Gaul's ruling, he gave the parties time to brief the issues anew. Substantial time had elapsed since the earlier ruling; additional discovery arguably altered the complexion of the case. Finally, no delay occurred because the judge's final decision was rendered prior to the date originally set for trial. For all these reasons, we are convinced that Judge Vipond acted within the discretion granted him in these circumstances. No ground for reversal appears.