Opinion ID: 2623034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was farmer's confession voluntary?

Text: Detectives George and Richstatter interrogated Farmer for approximately an hour and a half the morning after he was arrested. The detectives did not handcuff or shackle Farmer in the interview room. The interrogation was recorded on both videotape and audiotape. The detectives took a 15-minute break during the interrogation and provided Farmer with coffee, water, and blankets upon his request. Farmer was advised of his Miranda rights and waived them prior to speaking with the detectives. Farmer did not ask for an attorney or request an opportunity to speak with anyone else. Although Farmer spoke softly, he did not appear to be confused or under the influence of drugs or alcohol during the interview. When Farmer advised the detectives that he drank some alcohol and smoked a marijuana cigarette dipped in PCP the night before, the detectives requested samples of Farmer's blood and urine to test. The results indicated that Farmer had PCP and marijuana in his urine but only marijuana in his blood. There is no evidence that Farmer's decision process was impaired. Initially, Farmer admitted to having a fight with Hayes but denied any knowledge of shooting Neal. A few minutes later, Farmer admitted seeing Neal drive into the parking lot and talking to him. Farmer asked the officers, Did I shoot him? One of the detectives responded, Do you think you shot him? After the detectives encouraged Farmer to do the right thing and tell the truth, Farmer admitted to the detectives that he shot Neal. He also disclosed inculpatory information about the fight with Hayes, admitting that he hit him with his gun. Farmer argues that the detectives coerced the confession from him by telling him that God would forgive him if he confessed. Farmer claims that the district court should have suppressed his involuntary confession. He argues that the police used unfair interrogation tactics when they appealed to his religious beliefs to obtain a confession. Specifically, Farmer takes issue with the following statements: Whatever you did, whatever happened, okay, the most important thing to remember is that God can forgive everything, but. . . . To do that, you have to be honest. God wants you to tell the truth, Darrell. That's the most important thing. God wants you to be honest and help yourself. It sounds kinda corny, kinda cliché, but the truth will set you free. An appellate court reviews the admission of a confession using a dual standard of review. First, the court reviews the factual findings using a substantial competent evidence standard. Giving deference to the trial court's factual findings, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of witnesses. Second, the court analyzes the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from the trial court's factual findings using an unlimited standard of review. State v. Harris, 279 Kan. 163, 167, 105 P.3d 1258 (2005). Coercion can be mental or physical. Therefore, analyzing whether a defendant's confession is voluntary requires the appellate court to evaluate the totality of the circumstances as outlined by the following six factors: (1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused to communicate on request with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused's fluency with the English language. State v. Walker, 283 Kan. 587, 596-97, 153 P.3d 1257 (2007). Farmer does not raise any issues regarding the duration or manner of the interrogation; his ability to communicate with the outside world; his fluency; or his age, intellect, or background. Farmer's argument concerns the fairness of the officers' interrogation. On that issue, the district court specifically found that Richstatter asked Farmer some questions. Richstatter, however, was unaware of any religious beliefs that Farmer held. Richstatter did not know if Farmer attended church, or regularly read the Bible. This factual finding is supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Farmer, however, focuses his argument on Detective Richstatter's comments as to Farmer's religious beliefs, claiming that the comments were unfairly coercive because they caused him to consider a higher will instead of focusing on his own interests. We note that the Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in State v. Cobb, 30 Kan.App.2d 544, 43 P.3d 855, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1115 (2002). During a homicide interrogation, a police officer made numerous religious references, asking the defendant, Artis Cobb, if the Lord would prefer truth or lies and if Cobb thought that God would be pleased with what Cobb was saying. Cobb then initiated the discussion of religious themes during the interrogation, stating that God would see him through the situation. Cobb argued that his confession was coerced by the officer's improper appeals to his religious beliefs. Although it considered the case to be a close one, the Cobb court upheld the admission of Cobb's confession. The court relied on Cobb's enthusiastic participation in the religious discussion and suggested that persons of deep religious faith should [not] be presumed to be more gullible and easily manipulated than those with deeply held secular beliefs or opinions. 30 Kan. App.2d at 559, 43 P.3d 855. In reaching its conclusion, the Cobb court analogized the officer's use of religious comments to the technique of feigning agreement with and enthusiasm for the defendant's worldview. 30 Kan.App.2d at 559, 43 P.3d 855. Farmer questions the Cobb court's statement about the gullibility of religious persons, claiming that the Cobb court had misfocused on the gullibility of the person under interrogation where it should have focused on the propriety of the officer's interrogation technique. This argument overlooks the Cobb court's analogy to the interrogation technique of feigning agreement with the defendant's worldview. The Cobb court's holding does not rely on gullibility, rather it refuses to suggest that religious people are more susceptible to coercion when interrogators feign agreement with the defendant's worldview. Farmer does not argue that Detective Richstatter's comments in this case are more egregious than those in Cobb. Although the statements in this case are similar in nature to the statements in Cobb, the religious comments were more pervasive in Cobb. Thus, Cobb supports the district court's conclusion that Farmer's confession was not coerced by the officers' references to Farmer's religious beliefs. Farmer's attempt to distinguish Cobb based on the court's comments as to Farmer's gullibility is without merit. Farmer also relies on People v. Montano, 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 277 Cal.Rptr. 327 (1991); People v. Adams, 143 Cal.App.3d 970, 192 Cal.Rptr. 290 (1983), disapproved on other grounds People v. Hill, 3 Cal.4th 959, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984 (1992); and Carley v. State, 739 So.2d 1046 (Miss.App. 1999), for the proposition that any reference to the defendant's religious beliefs is coercive. We note that none of these cases stand for the broad proposition suggested by Farmer and are factually distinguishable from this case. Montano involved a confession by an 18-year-old illegal Mexican immigrant who was questioned using a police officer as an interpreter. Although the defendant repeatedly told the police officers that he did not want to talk to them, the police officers did not respect the defendant's right to silence and continued to ask him questions. The Montano court noted that the officers aggravated the situation by using a common religion to conjure up in defendant's mind the picture of confessing to avoid going to hell, but held the defendant's confession involuntary based on the officers' failure to respect the defendant's repeated attempts to invoke his right to silence. 226 Cal.App.3d at 935-37, 277 Cal.Rptr. 327. The Adams case involved a 32-year-old defendant who was acquainted with the sheriff who interrogated her. The sheriff, who knew the defendant through her participation in his church and her employment in a Christian book store, quoted the Bible and told the defendant that God would turn his back on any person who refused to submit to God and that people who stopped living according to God's law were required to suffer some form of discipline. The sheriff further stated to the defendant that she was a candidate for a nervous breakdown because she was not telling the truth. The Adams court concluded that the sheriff's remarks were not purely intellectual persuasion but an overwhelming and calculated appeal to the emotions and beliefs, focusing appellant's fears in an area the sheriff knew appellant to be particularly vulnerable. 143 Cal.App.3d at 986, 192 Cal.Rptr. 290. The Adams court's analysis relied on the sheriff's exploitation of his friendship with the defendant and the sheriff's use of her known vulnerabilities and fears. 143 Cal.App.3d at 989, 192 Cal.Rptr. 290. A dissenting judge disagreed with the majority's analysis, noting there was evidence that showed the defendant to be devious and scheming, which refuted the theory that she was a helpless, easily pressured victim of sophisticated police interrogation. 143 Cal.App.3d at 1003-05, 192 Cal.Rptr. 290. Carley involved a confession by a mentally ill 14-year-old boy with learning disabilities who had not taken his anti-psychotic medications for 4 days. The Carley court reversed the boy's conviction for murder, holding that his confession was induced by the investigating officers' invocation of the deity, references to Heaven and Hell, and promises of leniency and religious salvation. 739 So.2d at 1054. The only commonality between this case and Montano, Adams, or Carley is the reference to religion. Here, there are no other aggravating factors found in Montano, Adams, or Carley. We note that Farmer is not a mentally ill juvenile and does not have problems understanding the English language. Farmer did not attempt to invoke his right to silence. The interrogating officers did not have previous relationships with Farmer, so they could not have exploited that relationship or known of Farmer's religious background or his vulnerabilities and fears. The Montano, Adams, and Carley cases are not helpful in analyzing this issue. Prior Kansas case law does not restrict police officers from encouraging people to tell the truth during interrogations. In State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 227, 61 Pac. 805 (1900), the police told the defendant that he would feel better if he told the truth. The Kornstett court concluded that mere advice or admonition to the defendant to speak the truth, which does not import either a threat or benefit, will not make a following confession incompetent. 62 Kan. at 227, 61 Pac. 805. Here, interrogating detectives repeatedly encouraged Farmer to tell the truth but did not threaten him if he would not. Cf. State v. Elnicki, 279 Kan. 47, 105 P.3d 1222 (2005). Likewise, the detectives made no promise of leniency for Farmer's honesty. Although Detective Richstatter's comments be honest and help yourself and the truth will set you free may imply a benefit, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, the comments do not indicate any promises in return for Farmer's confession. When Farmer asked what would happen to him, Detective George informed him the case was still under investigation, then reminded Farmer that he was in jail and that he would be charged. Detective George told Farmer that she would talk to the county attorney and attempt to find out what the charges would be but did not indicate that she would try to influence what the county attorney charged. Farmer informed the detectives that his statements to them did not result from force or their promises. When viewed in the totality of the circumstances, Farmer has failed to establish how the detectives' conduct during the interrogation unfairly deprived him of his free and independent will. We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that Farmer's confession was voluntary and properly admitted it at his trial. MUST A DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE BE PROVEN TO A JURY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT PRIOR TO SENTENCING? Finally, Farmer asserts that his sentence is illegal because the trial court used his criminal history score, which had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. The court uses a de novo standard to review the legality of Farmer's sentence under the sentencing guidelines. See State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46, 41 P.3d 781 (2002). We note that this issue has been previously decided in Ivory, where this court held that the defendant's criminal history score does not have to be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury to satisfy Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Farmer argues that Ivory should be overruled and, for support, quotes language from Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We have reaffirmed Ivory after the United States Supreme Court's post-Apprendi decision in Blakely, as well as the decisions in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). State v. Gonzalez, 282 Kan. 73, 145 P.3d 18 (2006); State v. Lackey, 280 Kan. 190, 120 P.3d 332 (2005). Moreover, we note that in 2007, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the fact of a prior conviction does not have to be found by a jury. See James v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 1600 n. 8, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). Farmer's claim that his sentence improperly relies on his criminal history score in violation of Apprendi is without merit. Affirmed. DAVIS, J., not participating. GREENE, J., assigned. [1] BEIER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that, in theory, convictions for felony murder and discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle are not multiplicitous. I also agree that defendant Darrell L. Farmer's confession was voluntary, and that the district judge properly determined his criminal history score. I disagree with the majority's analysis and result on Farmer's sufficiency claim. It is painfully obvious that the State pursued a first-degree felony-murder theory that the undisputed facts of this case could not support obvious because there is zero evidence that Farmer shot at the vehicle in which DeAundrey Neal happened to be sitting rather than at Neal himself; painfully because the prosecution's mistake requires reversal of both the firearm conviction and the necessarily dependent felony-murder conviction, despite ample evidence that Farmer killed Neal in cold blood. I understandand ruethe bitterness of this pill. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the statute compels us to swallow it. The crime at issue requires discharge of a firearm at an occupied . . . motor vehicle. K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4219(b). The phrase, at [a] . . . motor vehicle, does not look or sound ambiguous to me. Shooting at a motor vehicle is one thing; shooting at a person is something else. Regardless of whether the State's or the defendant's version of events is relied upon here, Farmer shot only at Neal. Evidence of where Farmer may have been standing when he fired, of where Neal may have been sitting when he was hit, or of where two shell casings may have fallen after being ejected from Farmer's weapon, is interesting but not determinative. Even assuming that at [a] . . . motor vehicle, as used in the statute, is ambiguous, I still cannot reach the majority's result. The available legislative history, as our Court of Appeals has previously recognized in cases involving discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling, demonstrates that the crime defined by K.S.A. 21-4219(b) was intended to cover malicious and willful acts of shooting into occupied spaces that did not fit under other felony statutes. See State v. Taylor, 25 Kan.App.2d 407, 419-20, 965 P.2d 834 (1998); State v. Caldwell, 21 Kan.App.2d 466, 468, 901 P.2d 35, rev. denied 258 Kan. 860 (1995). The new crime was designed to address the situation when aggravated assault and aggravated battery fail[ ] to cover the act. Malicious and willful shooting at an occupied building or vehicle, but where the individual is not placed in immediate apprehension of bodily harm, is a class D felony. This is the same class of felony as aggravated assault and will cover the situation where aggravated assault would fail. The willful and malicious shooting at an occupied building or vehicle which results in bodily injury is a class C felony. This is the same class felony as aggravated battery and will cover those situations where the requisite intent to injure, required for battery, cannot be shown. Report of Subcommittee, House Judiciary Committee on Drive-by Shooting (H.B.2709), February 25, 1992. As the Court of Appeals wrote, [t]he [legislative] subcommittee's objective was to fill the gaps in the law prohibiting the full prosecution of drive-by shootings. . . . In a situation where the defendant announced his presence and intent to [do] harm to the occupants of the building prior to discharging gunfire into the building, and all those within the building heard and appreciated the danger, full prosecution of the crime was possible by charging aggravated assault as to each occupant who was not injured and aggravated battery as to each occupant who was injured in the gunfire. Where, however, the defendant discharged a firearm into an occupied building but no occupant was aware of the threat prior to the gunfire, no one was injured, and the property damage was negligible, the law as it existed prior to the enactment of the drive-by shooting statute limited the State to charging misdemeanor criminal damage to property, which was clearly insufficient as a punishment or as a deterrent. The drive-by shooting statute filled this gap in the law by establishing a felony statute prohibiting the wanton and willful act itself without regard to the state of mind of the shooter, the victims, or the amount of property damage. Taylor, 25 Kan.App.2d at 420-21, 965 P.2d 834. In other words, the statute had a specific purpose. It was not intended to capture and cannot capture conduct punishable as a felony because it already fit the definition of aggravated assault or aggravated battery. Here, again, Farmer shot only at Neal. This dictated particular legally viable charging options for the State. It could have pursued Farmer's conviction on first-degree felony murder based on aggravated battery, either because Neal was killed during the commission of Farmer's act of intentionally causing great bodily harm under K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(A) or because Neal was killed during the commission of Farmer's act of intentionally causing bodily harm with a deadly weapon under K.S.A. 21-3414(a)(1)(B). Additionally or alternatively, it could have pursued Farmer's conviction on first-degree premeditated murder. Instead, the State chose none of the aboveperhaps in part to avoid application of the merger doctrine to felony murder and aggravated battery, perhaps in part to avoid the higher evidentiary burden of proving premeditation by a PCP-using defendant. It matters not. This court should not be in the business of correcting for the State's charging choice, whether it grew out of strategic miscalculation or mere mistake. Ample precedent from this court and our Court of Appeals supports the limited role of an appellate court in such a situation. See State v. Dickson, 275 Kan. 683, 693-95, 69 P.3d 549 (2003) (conviction reversed without remand for new trial where evidence proved violation of subsection of statute different from one charged); State v. Schad, 247 Kan. 242, 244-47, 795 P.2d 406 (1990) (conviction reversed without remand, where evidence could have supported other charges but was insufficient to establish crime charged); State v. Houck, 240 Kan. 130, 135-36, 727 P.2d 460 (1986) (conviction reversed without remand, where evidence did not support conviction of offense charged; accused cannot be found guilty of some other offense which State did not see fit to charge); State v. Stewart, 31 Kan. App.2d 357, 65 P.3d 555 (2003) (conviction reversed without remand; where evidence insufficient; defendant's unlawful actions did not conform to crime charged); State v. Robinson, 27 Kan.App.2d 724, 8 P.3d 51 (2000) (conviction reversed without remand on sufficiency claim; prosecution proved one theory of crime but instructed jury on other theory). Given all of the above, I would reverse Farmer's convictions on criminal discharge of a firearm into an occupied motor vehicle and on felony murder. JOHNSON, J., joins in the forgoing concurring and dissenting opinion.