Opinion ID: 1479756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: interaction of (a) the fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy, (b) the sixth amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, and (c) the fifth and sixth amendment right to retain counsel of choice

Text: Emphasizing appellant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, the government argues there was manifest necessity for a mistrial because Bar Counsel's investigation of appellant's complaint against Kane necessarily undermined the adequacy of appellant's legal representation. Had the trial gone forward, says the government, a resulting conviction would have been vulnerable on appeal. Appellant responds in three ways: first, he denies that Bar Counsel's inquiry into the pretrial bond reduction dispute compromised Kane's ability to provide effective representation at trial. Second, he stresses that, even if Kane were not conflict-free, Judge Hannon completely ignored  or arbitrarily rejected, without serious consideration  the less drastic alternative of permitting a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Finally, appellant asserts that Judge Hannon's decision to disqualify Kane over objection necessarily infringed on his Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of choice. While acknowledging that the right to counsel of choice is not absolute, appellant stresses that this right is significant enough to prevent the trial court from rejecting a criminal defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel solely because the court itself perceives that a waiver would not be in the defendant's best interest. We conclude that: (1) The record supports a finding that Kane's conflict of interest could have compromised his ability to render effective assistance to appellant during the remainder of the trial. Therefore, unless a reasonable, less drastic alternative was available, the trial court was justified in declaring a mistrial. (2) Given appellant's and Kane's expressed desire to go forward with trial, the court should have considered a feasible alternative to a mistrial: a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel. (3) The record provides no basis for concluding that a waiver of conflict-free counsel would have been unavailing, especially in light of appellant's constitutional right to counsel of choice.