Opinion ID: 445297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seamen Exemption

Text: 12 Seamen are exempt from the overtime requirements of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 213(b)(6). Appellants contend that the district court erred in its finding that they were seamen under this provision. 13 The standard of review of exemptions under the FLSA is not clear. Compare Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545, 550, 67 S.Ct. 883, 91 L.Ed. 1088 (1947) with Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947) (interpreted in Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.1983), as support for a de novo standard) and Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 931, 91 L.Ed. 1158 (1947) (applied in Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir.1984)). In Walling, the Supreme Court applied a Rule 52(a) clearly erroneous standard to a section 213(a)(1) exemption. 14 The lower courts have been inconsistent in applying Walling, even to questions arising under section 213(a)(1). See, e.g., Paul v. Petroleum Equipment Tools Co., 708 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir.1983) (Without citing Walling, court noted uncertainty in the standard.); Skipper v. Superior Dairies, Inc., 512 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir.1975) (Without citing Walling, court reapplied regulation and reversed district court.); but see, Hoyt v. General Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir.1957) (applying Walling ) and Wainscoat v. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co., 471 F.2d 1157, 1161-62 (9th Cir.1973) (ultimate question of fact). 15 In Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d at 248, we applied a de novo standard of review to an exemption arising under section 213(b)(1), relying on Levinson. The Levinson Court expressly recognized the distinction between an exemption which is measured by regulations promulgated by the Wage and Hour Administrator and an exemption whose scope is determined by interpretation of another act. Levinson, 330 U.S. at 676-77 & n.19, 67 S.Ct. 931. 16 We have held also that determination of employer under Sec. 203(d) is a question of law but the clearly erroneous standard applies to review of the underlying facts. Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1469. The regulations underlying Sec. 203(d) are merely illustrative, not specific as are those underlying Sec. 213(a)(1). Compare 29 C.F.R. Sec. 791.2(a) & (b) with 29 C.F.R. Sec. 541.1. 17 Walling does not necessarily control the outcome of the standard of review question in this case. First, Walling dealt with review under Sec. 213(a)(1). Second, the Court of Appeals in Walling had reversed the district court based on its reevaluation of conflicting testimony of witnesses. Walling, 330 U.S. at 550, 67 S.Ct. 883. These facts are undisputed. See Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1146-47 (3d Cir.1984) (review of a summary judgment). 18 The regulations interpreting Sec. 213(b)(6) are illustrative and general, more closely paralleling those underlying Sec. 203(d). Compare 29 C.F.R. Sec. 783.31-.37 with 29 C.F.R. Sec. 791.2(a) & (b). For that reason, we apply a de novo standard of review to the application of the exemption to the facts and review the facts under a clearly erroneous standard. See Donovan v. Weber, 723 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (8th Cir.1984) (Sec. 203(r)); Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 969-70 n.4 (5th Cir.1984) (Sec. 203(r)); Gilreath v. Daniel Funeral Home, Inc., 421 F.2d 504, 508-10 (8th Cir.1970) (establishment under Sec. 213(a)(2)); Homemakers Home & Health Care Services, Inc. v. Carden, 538 F.2d 98, 107 (6th Cir.1976) (McCree, J., concurring) (retail concept under Sec. 213(a)(2)). See also United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984) (ultimate facts usually reviewed de novo ). 19 The FLSA does not define seamen. The term has, however, been interpreted both in regulations and by the courts. Whether one is a seaman depends not on the job title or the location of the worksite, but on the character of the work performed. Walling v. W.D. Haden Co., 153 F.2d 196, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 866, 66 S.Ct. 1373, 90 L.Ed. 1636 (1946); 29 C.F.R. Sec. 783.33. 20 The Wage and Hour Administrator has promulgated regulations which define a seaman as one who performs service primarily to aid in the operation of a vessel as a means of transportation. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 783.33; accord, Walling v. Sternberg Dredging Co., 64 F.Supp. 758, 761 (E.D.Mo.), aff'd, 158 F.2d 678 (8th Cir.1946). Reasoned interpretations of an act by the agency charged with administering it are entitled to deference. Markair, Inc. v. C.A.B., 744 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir.1984). This circuit relied on the regulation's definition in Donovan v. Nekton, Inc., 703 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1983). There we held that marine and electronic technicians whose primary duties aboard a research vessel did not aid the operation of the vessel as a means of transportation were not seamen exempt from the FLSA's overtime provisions. Id. at 1151. 21 One does not become a seaman under the FLSA merely by performing services aboard a vessel on navigable waters. For example, bargehands whose primary duties are loading and discharging cargo and who only rarely perform services which aid the vessel as a means of transportation are not seamen. Knudsen v. Lee & Simmons, Inc., 163 F.2d 95, 96 (2d Cir.1947); accord, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 783.36. 22 Similarly, employees whose duties on movable dredges are primarily industrial but who occasionally perform maritime duties are not seamen. Sternberg Dredging Co. v. Walling, 158 F.2d 678, 681 (8th Cir.1946). The critical factor is whether the employee's duties primarily aid navigation of the vessel. 23 The record indicates, and Icicle's counsel conceded at oral argument, that the Arctic Star remained anchored most of the time. During these periods, the appellants primarily monitored, maintained and repaired the processing machinery and electric power generators. Although some of their work may have been of a maritime character, the dominant employment was industrial maintenance. The maritime work was incidental and occasional, taking but a small portion of the work time. 24 We conclude that these employees, while working on a barge anchored in navigable waters, are principally employed not as exempt seamen but as industrial maintenance employees.