Opinion ID: 1124343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discovery Violations by the Prosecution

Text: On August 24, 1994, Defendant filed his first motion to compel discovery or in the alternative dismiss indictment. After a hearing, the trial court, on September 12, 1994, entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion. The trial court ordered, inter alia: [B]ecause any or all of these requested documents, exhibits, and/or evidence [used in the extradition proceedings in Japan] may be relevant to Defendant's appearance before this Court, it respectfully orders those items be given to the Defense.... This includes those items specifically within the possession of the State and those items which may be obtained through due diligence from the Japanese Government. (Emphasis added.) Subsequently, the defense complained that it was still uncertain as to what happened in Japan and that there were gaps in the information provided by the Prosecution. The trial court reminded the Prosecution of its duty to exercise due diligence in obtaining the extradition documents. The Prosecution responded that it did not have extradition documents in its possession and that it could not make a direct request to Japanese officials because, due to treaty provisions, such a request would have to be made through diplomatic channels. Subsequently, however, a deputy prosecuting attorney revealed to the trial court that she had had direct contacts with Japanese officials to clarify information that those officials had wanted in a supplemental affidavit. On February 21, 1995, the trial court asked the Prosecution to explain the apparent conflict with its prior statement. The trial court had understood the Prosecution to mean that any direct communication with Japanese officials was improper. The Prosecution explained that it had not meant that all direct contact was prohibited, but rather, that direct requests for documents were improper and such requests had to made through diplomatic channels. The trial court then ordered the Prosecution to make a direct request in writing to Japanese officials for the extradition documents. Subsequently, after the Prosecution complied with the trial court's order, the Japanese government formally protested the direct request. Nevertheless, the transcripts of the extradition hearings were sent to the United States Embassy. At a hearing on March 3, 1995, the Prosecution revealed that it had been informed in a note verbal ( i.e., a diplomatic note) delivered on January 26, 1995, that the Japanese government was prepared to release the extradition documents if it received assurances that the extradition proceedings would not be challenged. The Prosecution further explained that it had responded to the note by informing the Japanese government that it could not give assurances on behalf of the Defendant. As a result of this answer, further activity on the matter had ceased. When the trial court asked the Prosecution why it had failed to inform the court and the defense about the Japanese government's request for assurances, the Prosecution replied that it had been waiting for clarification from the Japanese government. Defendant also revealed that the Prosecution had failed to produce a letter from a Steven Shea that accused Reynold Hirazumi, the owner of Ala Moana Buy & Sell and a potential witness for the Prosecution, of keeping false books and buying and concealing stolen property. The Prosecution explained that, after the letter had been received, the police were asked to investigate the allegations contained therein. The letter was returned to the Prosecution in November or December 1994, but without having been investigated. The letter was then sent back to the police for the investigation that had originally been requested and was not finally returned to the Prosecution until December 22, 1994. The letter was turned over to the defense on December 27, 1994. Defendant eventually filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based on the Prosecution's alleged misconduct in committing repeated discovery violations. In its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the Prosecution had been remiss in disclosing the extent of its direct contact with the Japanese government. The trial court found that the court and the defense had been led to believe that direct contact between the Prosecution and the Japanese government had been minimal or non-existent. The trial court also found that, while it had been true that the Prosecution could not speak on behalf of the defense in responding to the Japanese government's request for assurances, the Prosecution could have at least notified the court and the defense and had been remiss in failing to do so. The trial court, however, found that due to the Japanese government's formal protest, it was true that requests for documents from Japan had to be made through diplomatic channels, that the Prosecution was bound by the requirements of diplomacy, and that the Japanese government controlled whether documents would be produced or not. [11] The trial court concluded that there was no intentional misconduct requiring dismissal of the case and/or mistrial and the motion was denied. Nevertheless, the trial court imposed sanctions in the amount of $300 on each of the two prosecutors involved, to be paid from personal funds, for failing to notify the court and the defense about the Japanese government's request for assurances. [12] Defendant subsequently filed a second motion to dismiss based on alleged discovery violations. Defendant argued that the Prosecution had failed to disclose certain documents obtained from Japan. These documents included: a paper addressing the exchange of information between the Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) and the Honolulu Police Department (HPD); a summary of Defendant's Japanese counsel's opinion of the extradition proceedings; and NPA background checks of Defendant, his girlfriend, and the Fujitas. In denying the motion, the trial court noted that the undisclosed documents confirmed that there had been direct contact between the Prosecution and the Japanese government. The trial court noted that, while there had been a direct exchange of information and documents, there was no evidence that the Prosecution had control over when and to what extent the Japanese government was willing to cooperate outside of diplomatic channels. The trial court additionally found that Defendant had suffered no prejudice and had not been deprived of a fair trial because the documents appeared to be of little evidentiary value, were neither inculpatory nor exculpatory, and did not appear to provide the Prosecution with any unfair advantage at trial. The trial court concluded that there had been no showing that Defendant's right to a fair trial had been prejudiced and that the recess in trial proceedings from March 7 to March 20, 1995 would allow the defense time to review the undisclosed documents and prepare for trial. Thus, the motion was denied. However, the trial court imposed a $250 sanction on one of the prosecutors for failing to disclose the documents. On appeal, Defendant notes that the defense strategy at trial involved Kototome's alleged connection with Japanese government officials and organized crime. Defendant argues that the State engaged in a pattern of delaying discovery and hindering Appellant's inquiries in this area. Thus, Defendant argues, he was deprived of his right to a fair trial and due process of law. The Prosecution argues in response, and in its own cross-appeal, see infra part II.B.1., that it was not obligated to produce the material sought by Defendant because such discovery was not authorized under Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 16. The Prosecution argues that HRPP Rule 16 does not extend to documents held by foreign governments. Furthermore, argues the Prosecution, Defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to produce the Steven Shea letter or the other undisclosed documents. We agree with the Prosecution. Before determining whether the alleged discovery violations warrant vacating the convictions, it must first be determined whether the underlying discovery orders were valid. If the trial court's discovery orders were not authorized under HRPP Rule 16, then the Prosecution's failure to comply with those orders cannot be a discovery violation. Cf. Lothspeich v. Sam Fong, 6 Haw.App. 118, 123, 711 P.2d 1310, 1314 (1985) (holding that, in an appeal from sanctions imposed for civil discovery violations, the appellate court will consider the propriety of the underlying discovery order). The scope of discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 216, 738 P.2d 812, 821 (1987). The trial court's order to obtain the documents through due diligence from the Japanese Government was apparently based on HRPP Rule 16(b)(2), which provides: Disclosure of Matters Not Within Prosecution's Possession. Upon written request of defense counsel and specific designation by defense counsel of material or information which would be discoverable if in the possession or control of the prosecutor and which is in the possession or control of other government personnel, the prosecutor shall use diligent good faith efforts to cause such material or information to be made available to defense counsel; and if the prosecutor's efforts are unsuccessful the court shall issue suitable subpoenas or orders to cause such material or information to be made available to defense counsel. (Underscoring of heading in original.) (Emphasis added.) Thus, the question is whether foreign government officials can be considered other government personnel within the meaning of the rule. The notes accompanying the 1975 proposed draft of the HRPP provide persuasive guidance in interpreting this provision: Both subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) [now combined into (b)(1) ] deal with matters within the prosecutor's possession or control. Subsection (b)(3) [now renumbered (b)(2) ] deals with matters which would be discoverable if they were within the prosecutor's possession or control but which are with some other state agency. This rule is directed to situations where the prosecutor is unaware of the evidence but the defense is, and the burden is therefore on the defense to specify exactly what and where the evidence is which it seeks to obtain. This rule is not intended to permit a fishing expedition through the prosecutor by means of requests phrased in general terms. This subsection is taken from ABA Standard 2.4, and requires the prosecutor to make diligent efforts to get the evidence and the court to issue a subpoena if the prosecutor is unsuccessful. Note to Rule 16, Proposed HRPP, at 134 (1975) (emphasis added). From this quotation, it is clear that the drafters of HRPP Rule 16 envisioned that subsection (b)(2) would apply only when documents are held by other state agenc[ies]. In the present case, the extradition documents were in the possession of agencies of the Japanese government. Obviously, agencies of a foreign government do not qualify as agencies of the State of Hawai`i or its subdivisions. Thus, the orders of the trial court relating to the extradition documents from Japan were not authorized under HRPP Rule 16, and the court abused its discretion in issuing the orders. Consequently, the Prosecution did not commit a discovery violation in failing to comply with them. Furthermore, there is no indication in the record that any other possible discovery violations warrant vacating the convictions. We have long recognized that `violation of Rule 16 does not warrant an immediate declaration of a mistrial by the trial court.' State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai`i 383, 401, 894 P.2d 80, 98 (1995) (quoting State v. Sugimoto, 62 Haw. 259, 262, 614 P.2d 386, 389 (1980)). [B]efore the [trial] court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation. State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742, cert. denied, 77 Hawai`i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994). In exercising its broad discretion as to sanctions, the trial court should take into account the reasons why the disclosure was not made, the extent of prejudice, if any, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant circumstances. Okumura, 78 Hawai`i at 401, 894 P.2d at 98 (quoting State v. Moriwaki, 71 Haw. 347, 355, 791 P.2d 392, 396, reconsideration denied, 71 Haw. 665, 833 P.2d 900 (1990)). In the present case, the Prosecution's disclosure of the Shea letter was tardy because the letter had been sent to the police in order to investigate the allegations contained therein. Furthermore, the apparent value of the Shea letter to the defense was that it impeached the credibility of Reynold Hirazumi. However, the Prosecution never called Hirazumi as a witness; instead, the Prosecution relied on the testimony of Calvin Woods, one of Hirazumi's employees. Also, the letter was disclosed to Defendant on December 27, 1994; insofar as Calvin Woods testified on April 12, 1995, the defense had ample time to investigate the letter. As for the other documents the Prosecution failed to disclose, they were not exculpatory, a recess was scheduled from March 7 to March 20, 1995 (during which the defense could have reviewed the documents), and the trial court imposed a $250 sanction on the Prosecution. Thus, under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss the charges. A discovery violation can also constitute a so-called Brady violation, which infringes upon the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. See Moriwaki, 71 Haw. at 356, 791 P.2d at 397. [T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. State v. Matafeo, 71 Haw. 183, 185, 787 P.2d 671, 672 (1990) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). However, in order to establish a Brady violation, an appellant must make a showing that the suppressed evidence would create a reasonable doubt about the [a]ppellant's guilt that would not otherwise exist. Okumura, 78 Hawai`i at 402, 894 P.2d at 99 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In the present case, the Shea letter had no tendency to create a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt. It merely collaterally impeached a witness, who in fact never testified before the jury. As for the undisclosed documents, they demonstrated that direct contact occurred between the Prosecution and Japanese officials. However, it was already known that such direct contacts took place, and the documents did nothing to create reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt. Therefore, we hold that the alleged discovery violations do not require vacating Defendant's convictions.