Opinion ID: 1355714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the trial court's decision acquitted collins even if it was incorrect

Text: The majority also argues that, while the trial judge stated his ruling albeit in language that reflected a ruling it was not a ruling because he heard further argument and changed his mind. Majority, at 308. This, like the argument refuted above, is meant to suggest that Dowling is indefinite and difficult to apply. In fact, it amounts to saying that the trial court had the power to grant a motion to reconsider because it granted a motion to reconsider  which plainly begs the question. The question before us is whether the trial court could proceed at all beyond the point at which it determined that the State had not met its burden. If the defendant was acquitted at that point, the court could proceed no further without placing her in double jeopardy. To say that the trial court did so proceed is no argument for the proposition that it did so properly. The majority's argument sounds plausible only because the trial court's initial decision to dismiss apparently was incorrect. It is well established, however, that double jeopardy is prohibited even where the defendant has been acquitted in error. For double jeopardy purposes, an acquittal is defined as: a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 97 S.Ct. 1349 (1977). For example, in Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 7 L.Ed.2d 629, 82 S.Ct. 671 (1962), the trial court interrupted the questioning of the government's fourth witness and directed a verdict of acquittal on the ground that the government's witnesses were not credible and because the United States Attorney allegedly had committed prosecutorial misconduct. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, however, reinstated the original judgment of acquittal: The trial did not terminate prior to the entry of judgment, as in Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 [6 L.Ed.2d 901, 81 S.Ct. 1523 (1961)]. It terminated with the entry of a final judgment of acquittal as to each petitioner. The Court of Appeals thought, not without reason, that the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation. Nevertheless, [t]he verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed ... without putting [the petitioners] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 [41 L.Ed. 300, 16 S.Ct. 1192 (1896)]. 369 U.S. at 143. The same reasoning applies here. If the trial court committed an error in ruling that the State had not proven its case against Collins  an error far less obvious than that in Fong Foo  the State could not remedy that error by a motion to reconsider. The consideration of that motion itself, like an appeal, would constitute double jeopardy. The fact that the trial court recognized its own mistake has no bearing on the effect of its earlier ruling. Regardless of the brief period of time intervening between the trial court's ruling and the State's motion, Collins was acquitted at the time the court first ruled, and was beyond the power of the State. The acquitted defendant is an innocent woman and cannot be made guilty by the majority.