Opinion ID: 2227977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Restriction on Ability to Contract

Text: The appellants claim the district court erred when it refused to find the family member exclusion was an impermissible and unconstitutional restriction on the ability of the parties to freely contract. They argue this court's willingness to allow tort claims between family members was premised on the assumption that insurance would be available to cover such risks but family member exclusions prevent insurance consumers from obtaining such coverage. Our decision to abrogate interspousal immunity was not based on any presumption that insurance coverage would be available. In fact, we expressly stated that the absence of insurance would not detract from the arguments favoring the recognition of interspousal claims. See Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 619-20 (Iowa 1979). Furthermore, we specifically noted that to the extent insurers feared such claims might lead to fraud or collusive actions, they could limit the scope of the coverage they provided. Id. at 620. Similar to our decision in Principal Casualty Insurance Co., we note this is not a case in which there is an obligation for a consumer to obtain automobile liability insurance which would cover interfamily tort claims. To the extent a party wants to obtain such coverage, Shelter correctly points out that it is available through the acquisition of uninsured motorist coverage. See Rodman, 208 N.W.2d at 910 (family member exclusion not applicable to uninsured motorist coverage). The defendants' claim of an unconstitutional restriction on their right to contract is without merit, and summary judgment was appropriate.