Opinion ID: 4543430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merits of Flowers’ First Step Act Motion

Text: While a defendant may be eligible for relief under the First Step Act, this does not mean that he is entitled to it. In fact, the act specifically says that “[n]othing in [section 404 of the First Step Act] shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.” No. 19-3742 United States v. Flowers Page 8 § 404(c). Thus, “[t]he First Step Act ultimately leaves the choice whether to resentence to the district court’s sound discretion.” Beamus, 943 F.3d at 792; see also Maxwell, 800 F. App’x at 378 (“The First Step Act merely unlocks the door to resentencing . . . . But it is still up to the district court to open that door.”). In exercising this discretion, the district court must consider the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the defendant’s amended guidelines range, and then ensure that the sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing. United States v. Boulding, No. 19-1590, --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 2832110, at –8 (6th Cir. June 1, 2020);3 United States v. Foreman, 958 F.3d 506, 513–14 (6th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Allen, 956 F.3d 355, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the First Step Act contemplates a review of the defendant’s sentence under the § 3553(a) factors). Flowers points to three things that—according to him—demonstrate the district court abused this discretion in denying his First Step Act motion. Specifically, Flowers says the district court erred (1) in its treatment of the change in Ohio law with respect to his career offender status, (2) by noting that it had not relied on the mandatory minimum when imposing the original sentence, because his then-mandatory guidelines range was higher than that mandatory minimum, and (3) by discounting his in-prison education. None of these amounts to an abuse of discretion. First, Flowers claims that the district court “concluded it could not consider the current state of the law as a factor in deciding whether to exercise its discretion and grant a sentence reduction.” (Appellant Br. at 18–19.) But this is not what the district court said. In his motion below, Flowers said because of the change in Ohio law, he “is not a career offender” and so should be sentenced in line with a significantly reduced guidelines range. (Mot. to Reduce Sentence, R. 39, at PageID #117–18.) The court addressed this argument by noting that Ohio’s change in law was not retroactive and thus did not impact Flowers’ sentencing range under the guidelines. Flowers, 2019 WL 3068204, at . Nowhere did the court say it lacked the authority to consider whether Ohio’s change in law reflected a change in community beliefs as to the 3In Boulding, we held that the defendant must have “an opportunity to present his objections to [the district court’s] calculation of his amended guideline range,” 2020 WL 2832110, at , but Flowers makes no such procedural argument. Nor does he argue that his guideline range has changed from his original sentencing. No. 19-3742 United States v. Flowers Page 9 seriousness of Flowers’ crimes. Indeed, the court expressly noted that it considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in deciding to maintain Flowers’ existing sentence. Id. at –2.4 Second, the district court, in the course of explaining why it denied Flowers’ motion, noted that it “did not consider the mandatory minimum statutory sentence in effect at the time of his original sentencing as a substantial factor in determining his [original] sentence.” Id. at . According to Flowers, because the guidelines were mandatory at the time of his original sentencing, the court had no authority to consider this lower statutory minimum, and so it should not have noted that as a reason for denying his First Step Act motion. This argument again misconstrues the import of the district court’s comment and the scope of relief afforded by the First Step Act. As noted above, the purpose of the act is to retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing Act, and so courts are discretionarily permitted to “impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” First Step Act § 404(b) (citation omitted); accord Alexander, 951 F.3d at 707–08. If, when a court originally imposed a sentence, it specifically relied on a mandatory minimum that was later amended by the Fair Sentencing Act, that fact would be a strong reason to grant resentencing under the First Step Act, since it in turn suggests that the sentencing court might have imposed a lower sentence were it not for that mandatory minimum. So, by noting that this was not the case, the district court was simply ruling out one reason why it might have granted the motion, rather than relying on this as an independently adequate reason to deny it.5 See Flowers, 2019 WL 3068204,  (noting several factors the court considered, including the § 3553(a) factors, in deciding that Flowers’ existing sentence “is the same sentence that [the court] would have imposed if the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed”); cf. Chavez-Meza v. United 4Flowers also notes that the court should have considered amendments to the non-career-offender sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine as further evidence of a change in community opinions about the seriousness of his offense, but this fails for the same reason as his argument about Ohio law. 5Flowers’ argument that the district court was wrong to point out that his statutory maximum sentence was unchanged fails for the same reason. No. 19-3742 United States v. Flowers Page 10 States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965–67 (2018) (discussing the extent to which the district court must explain its reasoning in a sentence-reduction case).6 Finally, Flowers says the district court’s statement that “there is no evidence of anything significant in [Flowers’] post-conviction behavior that would warrant a change in his original sentence,” Flowers, 2019 WL 3068204, at , was factually erroneous because of his significant prison educational accomplishments and minimal disciplinary record. This argument confuses factual findings—which are reviewed for clear error—and the importance the district court places on those findings—which here is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cf., e.g., Holt v. City of Battle Creek, 925 F.3d 905, 910–11 (6th Cir. 2019) (discussing the clear error standard for review of factual findings). In this case, the district court found that Flowers “has apparently taken advantage of some education courses, but has also been the subject of minor disciplinary infractions,” finding in sum that this post-conviction record was not significant enough to warrant a lower sentence. Flowers, 2019 WL 3068204, at . The First Step Act gives the district court broad discretion in deciding whether a given fact is significant enough to merit a reduction in sentence, and it did not abuse this discretion by deciding that Flowers’ record failed to fit this bill. See, e.g., Landrum, 813 F.3d at 334 (requiring “a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment” before reversing for an abuse of discretion (quoting Burrell, 434 F.3d at 831)).