Opinion ID: 1451124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Personal Opinions and Testimony of Prosecutor

Text: Jefferson next contends that the prosecutor offered improper personal opinions and testimony during closing argument. Following is the relevant colloquy: DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: The second element we're going to talk about is whether or not the act of Trooper Carthron's death was under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm 38 years old and I've been Mr. Long's Deputy for several years now, and in my role as a prosecutor, I've seen some bad, bad stuff. But I have never, as long as I have been prosecuting, seen or witnessed anything DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, may I approach? BENCH CONFERENCE: DEFENSE COUNSEL: This is improper argument for him to give his personal opinion. His personal opinion is specifically forbidden and certainly to reminisce about other cases that he's had that are not in evidence, not before the jury and notand I, again, move for a mistrial and without waiving that, and even though it's our position that admonition is insufficient, I would move for an admonition, assuming you deny the mistrial. THE COURT: Motion for mistrial is denied, and I don't see an admonition necessary in this, based on his arguments. We have stated many times that the trial court is given broad discretion to control counsel in closing arguments, and we do not interfere with that discretion absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Tryon, supra ; Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 5 S.W.3d 448 (1999); Lee v. State, 326 Ark. 529, 932 S.W.2d 756 (1996). Although it is not good practice for counsel to inject their personal beliefs into the closing arguments, mere expressions of opinion by counsel in closing argument are not reversible error so long as they do not purposely arouse passion and prejudice. Neff v. State, 287 Ark. 88, 94, 696 S.W.2d 736, 740 (1985). Furthermore, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the potential for prejudice based on the prosecutor's remarks. Tryon, supra ; Leaks, supra . Here, in the context of arguing that Jefferson's actions were committed under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, the prosecutor stated that, in his experience, I've seen some bad, bad stuff. But I have never, as long as I have been prosecuting, seen or witnessed anything[.] When the prosecutor made the comment, the jury had already viewed a video graphically showing the incident from several angles of the troopers' vehicle cameras. The State points out that the prosecutor had previously stated that this case was unique in that the aggravated robbery, the high-speed chase, and the resulting tragedy were on video. The prosecutor immediately moved on to argue that the video itself evidenced that Jefferson acted with extreme indifference. Therefore, the State contends, the prosecutor's comment was an expression of his opinion about viewing a person getting hit by a car and was not sufficiently prejudicial under the circumstances. We agree. Further, we note that, while the circuit court did not provide a curative instruction to the jury, the court had, of course, already instructed the jury that closing arguments were not evidence. For these reasons, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jefferson's motion for mistrial or in failing to admonish the jury upon Jefferson's objection. See, e.g., Tryon, supra .