Opinion ID: 355357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discharge of Tipton

Text: 59 We believe the Board is on firmer ground in its conclusion with respect to the discharge of employee Tipton on October 9. The ALJ found no concrete evidence that a rule had been promulgated prohibiting employees from leaving the work area on the lunch break. There is specific testimony that Foreman Pate had never been informed of such policy, and had never brought the existence of such a policy to the attention of Tipton or other crew members. We also find ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the Company's reference to Tipton's violation of this alleged rule was merely a pretext, and that the real reason for Tipton's discharge was his circulation of a petition protesting the October 8 layoff. While there is some evidence that might support a contrary conclusion, we also find substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole to support the ALJ's conclusion, affirmed by the Board, that nothing in Tipton's circulation of the petition would undermine the Union's status as the bargaining representative, or be so serious a threat to stable relations to cause Tipton's act to lose its protected character. This finding is in marked contrast to the corresponding finding in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 95 S.Ct. 977, 43 L.Ed.2d 12 (1975), a case heavily relied on by the Company. In that case, the Trial Examiner and the Board found that the employees were discharged for attempting to bargain with the Company over the terms and conditions of employment as they affected racial minorities. Id. at 60, 95 S.Ct. at 984. 6 60 The activities of the discharged employees in Emporium Capwell were of a far different character than Tipton's in this case. The Emporium Capwell employees, specifically informed by the Union and the California Fair Employment Practices Committee of the availability of a contractual grievance procedure and advised to follow it, refused to participate in the grievance procedure; read a statement objecting to reliance on that procedure; walked out of a hearing; held a press conference at which they denounced the store's employment policy as racist; picketed the store and distributed handbills urging customers not to patronize the store; rebuffed the repeated urging of a union official that they rely on the grievance process and instead pressed their demand to deal directly with the Company president; and, after written warnings that a repetition of the picketing or public statements about the Company could lead to their discharge, repeated that conduct the following week. Id. at 54-56, 95 S.Ct. at 981-82. In contrast, Tipton merely circulated a petition during his lunch and work breaks concerning the layoff of fellow members of his work crew. We, like the Supreme Court in Emporium Capwell, believe it is important to have firmly in mind the character of the underlying conduct, id. at 60, 95 S.Ct. at 984, to which we apply the principles of labor policy. 61 Peaceful circulation of a petition for presentation to an employer for redress of employee grievances is a protected concerted activity. NLRB v. KDI Precision Products, Inc., 436 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1971); see NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 82 S.Ct. 1099, 8 L.Ed.2d 298 (1962). It is also well settled that a protest of the suspension of a fellow employee is protected activity. NLRB v. Imperial Bedding Co., 519 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Holcombe, 325 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 1963). We have recognized, of course, that certain concerted activities may lose their protected character when in conflict with a union's status as exclusive bargaining representative. NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1970). 7 But we explicitly did not hold 62 that there cannot be circumstances in which an employee or a minority group of employees may engage, without reference of the matter to union processes, in action which is protected under Section 7 though there is an agreement in force . . . . 63 Id. at 791. The Seventh Circuit has recently addressed, in comprehensive fashion, the circumstances in which the Act does not protect concerted employee activity which abandons established grievance procedures and attempts instead to bargain with the employer regarding working conditions on separate terms. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1976). The court noted that 64 (t)he activity of a single employee in enlisting the support of his fellow employees for their mutual aid and protection is as much concerted activity as is ordinary group activity, 65 Id. at 328, quoting Owens-Corning Fiberglass v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969), and that the protections of Section 7 are not withheld from persons who engage in concerted activity stemming from a purpose contemplated by the Act, but who act neither through nor on behalf of unions, 544 F.2d at 328, unless the employee deliberately spurns Union auspices and instead attempts to directly initiate negotiations with his employer regarding working conditions. Id. at 326, citing Emporium Capwell. The Seventh Circuit upheld the decision of the Board that the discharge of an employee who proceeded alone in his leafletting, without Union sponsorship, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Id. at 328. 66 We believe the circumstances of Tipton's discharge require a similar conclusion. Despite the Company's attempt to portray Tipton's activity as that of a dissident deliberately spurning union auspices, the ALJ and a unanimous Board found that nothing in the circulation of the petition would undermine the Union's status as the bargaining representative or pose any serious threat to stable relations. The record does not mandate a contrary finding. 67 We note that under Emporium Capwell, the right of an employee or group of employees to present grievances to their employer is not a protected right in the sense that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to entertain such a presentation. 420 U.S. at 61 n. 12, 95 S.Ct. at 984. But we find nothing in Emporium Capwell or the cases cited therein which indicates that an employer may with impunity discharge an employee for the simple acts of presenting a grievance or peacefully gathering signatures, without resort to coercion, in preparation for presentation of a grievance. Given the Board's finding, supported by substantial evidence, that Tipton's circulation of the petition was not in derogation of the Union's status as exclusive bargaining agent, we agree that Tipton's conduct was protected concerted activity and that the Company's action in discharging him for that conduct was in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. We enforce that portion of the Board's order relevant to the discharge of Tipton.