Opinion ID: 1060312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Procedure and Forum For Contempt Proceedings

Text: The second and third portions of the certified question from the district court ask us to determine who may bring an action for contempt, and the appropriate tribunal wherein an action of contempt for a violation of Rule 9, section 25 may be heard. We begin by setting forth the relationship between the Board and this Court. Rule 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, among other things, established the Board of Professional Responsibility. The Board, its authority, and all of its functions are derived from the Supreme Court. Fletcher v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 915 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). As such, the Board of Professional Responsibility is an agent of the Supreme Court. In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tenn.1995). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the actions of the Board. Id. This jurisdiction is grounded in the Court's inherent power to review the actions of its boards, commissions, and other agencies. Id. Despite the broad powers granted to the Board under Rule 9, they are not without limit. For instance, the Board does not have the power to hold an individual in contempt. Indeed, only [t]he courts of Tennessee have inherent authority to order punishment for acts of contempt. Reed v. Hamilton, 39 S.W.3d 115, 117 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (perm. app. denied February 12, 2001) (citing Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tenn.1996); Thigpen v. Thigpen, 874 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993)). However, courts may only punish as contemptuous the types of acts described in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102. See Black, 938 S.W.2d at 397-98; State v. Turner, 914 S.W.2d 951, 955 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995). Section 29-9-102 provides: [t]he power of the several courts to issue attachments, and inflict punishments for contempts of court, shall not be construed to extend to any except the following cases: (1) The willful misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; (2) The willful misbehavior of any of the officers of such courts, in their official transactions; (3) The willful disobedience or resistence of any officer of the [sic] such courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of such courts; (4) Abuse of, or unlawful interference with, the process or proceedings of the court; (5) Willfully conversing with jurors in relation to the merits of the cause in the trial of which they are engaged, or otherwise tampering with them; or (6) Any other act or omission declared a contempt by law. (Emphasis added). The plain language of section 29-9-102(3) states that the willful disobedience of a lawful rule of a court of this State may be considered a contemptuous act. In that respect, the language of Rule 9, section 13.2 is instructive. This provision states that a violation of the confidentiality requirement is regarded as contempt of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis added). The foregoing provisions are unambiguous. Any person, including a non-lawyer such as the respondent, who violates the confidentiality mandate embodied in section 25 of Rule 9 may be charged with contempt. To hold otherwise would undermine the confidentiality of the proceedings and invite willful disregard of this Court's inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. Having determined that an action for contempt is the appropriate sanction for a violation of Rule 9, section 25, we necessarily distinguish between civil and criminal contempt in order to definitively state who may bring such an action. We have on numerous occasions stated that a contempt may either be civil or criminal in nature. See Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d 898, 906 (Tenn.1998) (Birch, J., dissenting); Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398-401; Turner, 914 S.W.2d at 954. Civil contempt occurs when a person does not comply with a court order and an action is brought by a private party to enforce rights under the order that has been violated. See Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398; Robinson v. Air Draulics Eng'g Co., 214 Tenn. 30, 377 S.W.2d 908, 912 (1964); Turner, 914 S.W.2d at 995. Punishment for civil contempt is designed to coerce compliance with the court's order and is imposed at the insistence and for the benefit of the private party who has suffered a violation of rights. See Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398; Turner 914 S.W.2d at 955; Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 786 n. 4 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992). Also, in civil contempt cases, the quantum of proof necessary to convict is a preponderance of the evidence. On the other hand, criminal contempts are intended to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity and authority of the law, and the court as an organ of society. Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398. Punishment for criminal contempt is both punitive and unconditional in nature and serves to adjudicate an issue between the public and the accused. Id. In criminal contempt proceedings, the defendant is presumed to be innocent and must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Shiflet v. State, 217 Tenn. 690, 400 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1966). Therefore, in accord with well-established case law of this State, we hold that a charge of contempt arising from a violation of Rule 9, section 25 is criminal in nature and may be brought by the complainant or respondent whose rights of confidentiality have been violated. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, or its agent the Board, may bring an action for contempt to vindicate the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court, our rules, and orders. Finally, we address the appropriate forum wherein an action for contempt may be brought. At the outset, it is necessary to reiterate that [w]e are not fact finders and do not assess the credibility of the testimony or weight of the evidence. State v. Flake, 88 S.W.3d 540, 553 (Tenn.2002). This responsibility rests with the trial courts of this State and the juries empowered thereunder. However, as the Court of Appeals stated in State v. Gray, 46 S.W.3d 749, 750 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (perm. app. denied April 16, 2001), the general contempt statute does not deal with the question of whether a court may punish contempts of another court's order. As a general rule, the power to punish for contempt is reserved to the court against which the contempt is committed, i.e. the court whose order is disobeyed. Gray, 46 S.W.3d at 750 (citing Chaffin v. Robinson, 187 Tenn. 125, 213 S.W.2d 32 (1948)). Thus, [o]ne tribunal may not punish for contempt of another. Chaffin, 213 S.W.2d at 32. Additionally, a contempt proceeding is sui generis and is considered incidental to the case out of which it arises, and often stems from an underlying proceeding that is not complete. See Bowdon v. Bowdon, 198 Tenn. 143, 278 S.W.2d 670, 672 (1955); Graham v. Williamson, 128 Tenn. 720, 164 S.W. 781, 782 (1914); Hall v. Hall, 772 S.W.2d 432, 435-36 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989). In light of the foregoing principles, we hold that the formal charge of contempt against a person in violation of Rule 9, section 25 shall be filed in this Court. Upon receipt, this Court shall appoint a special master who shall conduct an evidentiary hearing, make findings of fact, and return the record and its findings to this Court. Upon review, this Court shall make a determination as to whether a contemptuous act has been committed and what, if any, punishment will follow.