Opinion ID: 2611902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Magnitude of Consequences for Potential Conservatees

Text: Although not a criminal proceeding, conservatorship proceedings under the LPS Act may result in a massive curtailment of liberty ( Humphrey v. Cady (1972) 405 U.S. 504, 509 [31 L.Ed.2d 394, 402, 92 S.Ct. 1048]) as severe as that faced by a criminal defendant. [2] As Justice Brennan emphasized, [p]ersons incarcerated in mental hospitals are not only deprived of their physical liberty, they are also deprived of friends, family, and community. Institutionalized mental patients must live in unnatural surroundings under the continuous and detailed control of strangers. They are subject to intrusive treatment which, especially if unwarranted, may violate their right to bodily integrity.... Furthermore ... persons confined in mental institutions are stigmatized as sick and abnormal during confinement and, in some cases, even after release. ( Parham v. J.R. (1979) 442 U.S. 584, 626-627 [61 L.Ed.2d 101, 133-134, 99 S.Ct. 2493] (conc. & dis. opn. of Brennan, J.), fn. omitted.) Because involuntary confinement for mental illness, whether civil or criminal, involves a loss of liberty and substantial stigma, we have extended many of the same protections to potential conservatees as to criminal defendants. Thus, we have required that the facts triggering confinement be proved to a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Conservatorship of Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d 219; Conservatorship of Hofferber (1980) 28 Cal.3d 161, 178 [167 Cal. Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836].) Similarly, a proposed conservatee has the right to confront witnesses and to introduce evidence, and the right to appointed counsel and to free transcripts if indigent. ( Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 542, 550 [200 Cal. Rptr. 262]; Waltz v. Zumwalt (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 835, 839 [213 Cal. Rptr. 529].) Wende review ( People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 [158 Cal. Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071]) is also required if appointed appellate counsel finds no arguable issues or describes the appeal of an LPS Act conservatee as frivolous. ( Conservatorship of Besoyan (1986) 181 Cal. App.3d 34, 38 [226 Cal. Rptr. 196].) The rationale for these decisions derives, in part, from our recognition that the interests involved in civil commitment proceedings are no less fundamental than those in criminal proceedings and that liberty is no less precious because forfeited in a civil proceeding than when taken as a consequence of a criminal conviction. ( In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 307 [96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201].) The LPS Act and decisional law thus contemplate an adversarial proceeding in which the potential conservatee who opposes conservatorship is entitled to the assistance of counsel and many of the procedural rights of a criminal defendant. The majority's conclusion that there is no similarity between the aims and objectives of the act and those of criminal law is inconsistent with our repeated recognition that involuntary commitment proceedings involve similar considerations to criminal process because, like criminal defendants, potential conservatees are threatened with loss of liberty and social stigma. Moreover, the fact that conservatorship proceedings are designed to protect rather than punish the conservatee does not detract from the serious curtailment of liberty that results from a finding of grave disability under the LPS Act. `Regardless of the purposes for which the incarceration is imposed, the fact remains that it is incarceration. The rehabilitative goals of the system are admirable, but they do not change the drastic nature of the action that has been taken.' ( Conservatorship of Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 225, quoting Breed v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519, 530, fn. 12 [44 L.Ed.2d 346, 536, 95 S.Ct. 1779].) In addition to the possibility of indefinite placement in a locked psychiatric facility  possibly the same facility used to house criminal defendants  a conservatee faces the loss of important legal rights and privileges, including the rights to enter contracts, to vote, to refuse or consent to medical treatment, including routine medical treatment for conditions unrelated to the conservatee's grave disability, and the privilege of possessing a driver's license. (§ 5357.) In the analogous case of People v. Moore , we expressly rejected the argument that violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments should be condoned because involuntary commitment (in that case for narcotic addicts) was beneficent rather than punitive. ( People v. Moore, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 682.) We concluded that to hold unconstitutionally obtained evidence admissible in commitment proceedings would furnish an incentive to conduct unreasonable searches and seizures. Accordingly, we held that the exclusionary rule applied to narcotics addict proceedings. ( Ibid. ) I can see no principled basis for distinguishing Moore from the present case. I am unpersuaded by the majority's attempt to distinguish Moore on the ground that imposition of a conservatorship does not depend on a charged or uncharged criminal act. Moore did not turn on the possibility that a narcotics addict was engaged in criminal activity. Instead, we applied the exclusionary rule on the basis that involuntary civil commitment under section 3000 et seq. has some of the features pertinent to a criminal case in view of the facts that the state is the defendant's opponent, that the proceeding is commenced on petition of the district attorney ..., that the defendant is entitled to be present at the hearing and to be represented by counsel at all stages of the proceeding ..., that if he is financially unable to employ counsel he is entitled to appointed counsel ... and that his liberty is at stake. ( People v. Moore, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 681, citations omitted.) Each of these features  along with other features analogous to criminal proceedings discussed, ante  is present in LPS conservatorship hearings. Thus, under the LPS Act a person may be taken into custody by a police officer or designated health officer on probable cause (§ 5150 [cf. § 3100.6]); the establishment of a conservatorship is initiated by the state, with the conservatorship proceedings being brought by the district attorney (§ 5114 [cf. § 3100]); potential conservatees are entitled to appointed counsel (§ 5364 [cf. § 3104]) and free appeal transcript ( Waltz v. Zumwalt, supra, 167 Cal. App.3d 835 [cf. People v. Moore, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 681]); and the liberty of potential conservatees is clearly at stake (§ 5358 [cf. § 3106]). An additional consideration in LPS proceedings is the high risk of error. We have repeatedly stressed the uncertainties that surround psychiatric diagnoses and the concomitant risk that a person will be wrongly subjected to the loss of liberty and reputation in commitment proceedings. ( Conservatorship of Roulet, supra, 23 Cal.3d 219, 230; People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 327 [121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352].) Federal courts, too, have expressed concern about the high risk of error in involuntary commitment proceedings. The risk of error in all mental health decisions is substantial. Even when a standard requires a specific finding of dangerousness, there is great risk of error.... As Chief Justice Burger wrote in his concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson ... `[t]here can be little responsible debate regarding the uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment.' ( Doe v. Gallinot (C.D.Cal. 1979) 486 F. Supp. 983, 992, affd. 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.1981), quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563, 584 [45 L.Ed.2d 396, 412, 95 S.Ct. 2486] (conc. opn. of Burger, C.J.); see also Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Court-room (1974) 62 Cal.L.Rev. 693; Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law (1978) 51 So.Cal.L.Rev. 527; Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered (1982) 70 Cal.L.Rev. 54.) In People v. Burnick , I quoted Professor Wigmore's observation that `[t]he mental condition of one whose mind is so deranged as to require imprisonment for his own and others' good is indeed pitiable. But the mental attitude of one who is falsely found insane and relegated to life imprisonment is beyond conception. No greater cruelty can be committed in the name of the law.' (14 Cal.3d at pp. 309-310 (opn. by Mosk, J.), quoting 5 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev. 1974) § 1400, p. 201).) That observation remains apt despite the efforts by the Legislature to include safeguards for individuals subjected to involuntary commitment proceedings under the LPS Act. (See also Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places (1973) 13 Santa Clara L.Rev. 379, 382-384; Morris, Conservatorship for the Gravely Disabled: California's Nondeclaration of Nonindependence (1978) 15 San Diego L.Rev. 201.) As the Court of Appeal held below, the subjective nature of the criteria pertinent to the decision to begin a commitment procedure, as well as the uncertain relationship between mental disorder and legal incompetence, increase the possibility that the administrative decision to conduct a search may be misguided or result from caprice or ... personal or political spite ( Eaton v. Price (1960) 364 U.S. 263, 271 [4 L.Ed.2d 1708, 1713, 80 S.Ct. 1463]) or be a subterfuge for a criminal investigation. (See Abel v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 217, 239-240 [4 L.Ed.2d 668, 686-687, 80 S.Ct. 683].) Thus, application of the exclusionary rule in LPS Act conservatorship proceedings would deter governmental intrusions on personal privacy that may be just as pernicious as the activities the exclusionary rule is designed to deter in criminal cases.