Opinion ID: 2525113
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medicare and Medicaid Benefits

Text: Despite Loncar's challenge, we affirm the superior court's exclusion of evidence regarding Loncar's Medicare and Medicaid benefits. [15] Under Evidence Rule 403, exclusion is appropriate if the evidence's probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. The superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying this standard to exclude Medicaid evidence. Loncar asserts that she should have been allowed to introduce evidence of her Medicaid coverage for two reasons. First, she claims that the humiliation of accepting public assistance was part of her pain and suffering, and relevant to damages. Second, she argues that the defense opened the door to Medicaid evidence by eliciting from one of Loncar's own witnesses testimony that Medicaid had covered some of Loncar's bills. Loncar claims that she was prejudiced by this evidence because the jury never learned that she was in fact obligated to repay Medicaid benefits out of her award from this lawsuit. [16] Loncar raised the same arguments before the superior court, but the court rejected the arguments and excluded evidence of Medicaid benefits.
Loncar argues that Medicaid evidence should have been admissible because accepting public assistance caused her additional emotional distress and pain and suffering. The superior court gave Loncar broad leeway to introduce evidence on this claim, explaining: Ms. Loncar can testify about her medical condition, she can testify about her medical bills she has had, she can testify about her difficulty in obtaining medical care, she can testify about her bills and the amount that [has] been run up without mentioning insurance. But if Loncar were permitted to introduce evidence of Medicaid payments, the court continued, the door would be opened to evidence from both sides on the larger issue of insurance paymentsand this potentially very large body of evidence would create more confusion of the issues than ... any probative value it may have. The superior court's conclusion on this issue is not unreasonable and certainly is not an error [that] affected the substantial rights of a party; [17] we therefore affirm its ruling on this issue.
There was potential for prejudice against Loncar because the jury heard a reference to her Medicaid coverage, but never learned that Loncar had to repay some benefits out of her recovery in this case. [18] However, the court issued a jury instruction to cure this prejudice, and Loncar did not request any other appropriate relief. Therefore, we will not reverse on these grounds. The collateral source rule exclud[es] evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury's judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages. [19] Under this rule, the superior court appropriately excluded Medicaid evidence at the beginning of the trial. The jury learned of Loncar's Medicaid coverage, however, when Gray asked one of Loncar's doctors about outstanding bills, and the witness mentioned that Medicaid covered some of them. Loncar's concern is that the jury's exposure to incomplete information about her Medicaid benefits led it to believe that her bills were already covered and that her damages should be reduced accordingly. But Loncar failed to object when the witness testified. Instead she requested two possible cures, which we discuss below, shortly thereafter. The superior court denied one request and granted the other. We find no error in its actions. At trial, Loncar argued that Gray had opened the door to further Medicaid evidence, and that she should be permitted to question the witness further on the subject in order to correct any jury misimpressions. She renews the argument in this appeal. But the superior court found that the door was not open to this evidence, and we agree. Gray did not open the door, because he did not make insurance coverage an issue in the case: [20] He neither directly questioned any witnesses about Loncar's insurance [21] nor hinted to the jury that Loncar had another source of funding for her medical bills. Instead, Loncar's witness mentioned Medicaid sua sponte. Given that it was not the defense that brought the Medicaid issue into the trial, we cannot conclude that the superior court abused its discretion in continuing to exclude Medicaid evidence. At trial, Loncar also requested that the superior court explain in the jury instructions that Loncar was obliged to repay Medicaid. The court agreed that a curative instruction was warranted, and instructed the jury to award the full amount of necessary medical expenses ... regardless of whether they have been paid or who actually paid the bill. Following the trial, the law provides procedures to ensure that this issue is properly addressed. The instruction did not explicitly detail Loncar's repayment obligations, but Loncar did not object to the form of this instruction at the time that it was proposed. Nor did she propose any alternative instruction. Thus, to the extent that her appeal complains of this instruction, we reject her argument. We see no abuse of discretion in the superior court's treatment of the Medicaid evidence, and therefore decline to overturn these evidentiary decisions.