Opinion ID: 1522122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Diminished Capacity Instructions

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court's guilt-phase charge on diminished capacity effectively coerced a jury verdict of capital murder. He sought a jury instruction that diminished capacity will reduce murder to manslaughter where the defendant is found to have suffered trauma that impaired his ability to meet the requisite mental state for murder. The stated legal basis for defendant's request was that the diminished capacity defense is one of mitigation, not of acquittal, and that if the jury did not conclude that defendant had the requisite state of mind when he killed the victim  that is, knowingly or purposely  then diminished capacity would serve to mitigate the offense to manslaughter, regardless of whether defendant met the specific mental state required for manslaughter. The trial court rejected defendant's request, and instead charged the jury as follows: With respect to murder the requisite mental state is knowing or purposeful conduct. As to aggravated manslaughter the requisite mental state is a conscious disregard of the substantial and unjustifiable risk. The definition of reckless under the code of criminal justice specifically states that the jury is to consider the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him. Further, under the applicable definition defendant must have consciously disregarded an unjustifiable risk. Thus, should you find that the defense of diminished capacity is present in this case and the State has failed to sustain its burden of proving the requisite mental state as to murder, that is, purposeful or knowing conduct and as to aggravated manslaughter, a conscious awareness of an unjustifiable risk, then you would be obliged to acquit the defendant completely with respect to count one of the indictment. (Emphasis added.) The effect of this charge, according to defendant, was to direct a verdict of guilty to capital murder and to deprive him of a defense. We disagree. The statute that forms the basis for defendant's argument, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, reads: Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense. In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect which would negate a state of mind which is an element of the offense. Mental disease or defect is an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Hence a trial court is obliged to instruct the jury to consider relevant evidence tending to show that a defendant did not have the requisite state of mind to commit the offense charged. That the trial court here fulfilled that obligation is clear, as indicated in the above-quoted portion of the charge. The jury was properly instructed that if it did not find that the defendant acted with purpose or knowledge, it would consider whether defendant was guilty of aggravated manslaughter. The court specifically charged: To reiterate, should you find that the defendant by virtue of a mental defect did not purposely or knowingly kill Asaline Stokes, then you are to go on to consider whether he is nonetheless guilty of aggravated manslaughter and I will charge the elements of that offense. Defendant constructs an elaborate argument around his contention that diminished capacity is a mitigation defense. His brief argues that the defense of diminished capacity [should] be permitted to act as a substitute mens rea of recklessness in cases involving murder or manslaughter  that is, the jury should be permitted to find that defendant was guilty of a lesser included offense of aggravated manslaughter without the required consciousness of risk the manslaughter statute's mens rea of recklessness requires.... In cases other than homicide, defendant urges that diminished capacity should operate to reduce the offense to one a degree lower than the charged crime. This approach, says defendant, would achieve[] something of the result which attends the use of the voluntary intoxication defense. Defendant's argument might have some appeal were it being made to a legislative body that was formulating a new criminal code. But we deal with our Code as it comes to us. Unlike our pre-Code law, the Code itself defines the mens rea requirements for all offenses. See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2; 2 Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission 40 (1971). Before a defendant can be convicted of any offense, he must act with one of the states of mind set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b). There is, therefore, a state of mind for every offense save those that rest on strict liability. The mental disease or defect statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, makes admissible any relevant proof that defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect, for the purpose of demonstrating that defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense. Thus under the statute, diminished capacity either negates the state of mind required for a particular offense, if successful, or it does not. It either provides a complete defense, if successful, or it does not. A charge on a lesser-included offense cannot be automatically given to a jury when the defense of diminished capacity is raised by a defendant. The included offense statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e), specifically states as to lesser-included offenses that the court shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict convicting the defendant of the included offense. The trial court charged on aggravated manslaughter in this case not because diminished capacity could reduce the offense from murder to aggravated manslaughter, but because the evidence warranted consideration of aggravated manslaughter by the jury in the event it was unpersuaded that defendant had acted purposely or knowingly. The trial court determined, and we agree, that if the jurors did not find knowing or purposeful conduct, they should then appraise the evidence to determine whether defendant acted with a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference for human life, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4  the constituent elements of manslaughter. In sum, under N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, diminished capacity does not operate to transform an offense, it can only negate it. It leads not to a rational finding of some other crime but rather to an acquittal. [61] Defendant's strained analogy to the intoxication defense is unpersuasive. See State v. Warren, 104 N.J. 571 (1986); State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42 (1986). The trial court's charge in this regard was therefore without error. [62]