Opinion ID: 1248286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Eng Passes the First Amendment Retaliation Test

Text: Applying this five-step First Amendment retaliation test, we conclude the allegations here demonstrate that Eng's First Amendment rights were violated with respect to both Eng's comments about the leak to the IRS and Geragos's statements on Eng's behalf to the press.
The Defendants did not argue below and have not argued on appeal that Eng's statements did not address a matter of public concern. Accordingly, any such argument is waived. See, e.g., Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 642 (9th Cir.2008) (defendant waived this argument by failing to raise it either in the district court or in his brief on appeal (citing Nw. Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 923 (9th Cir.1988))). In any event, there is little doubt that Eng's speech did address matters of public concern. `[C]ommunication[s] on matters relating to the functioning of government'... are matters of inherent public concern. Johnson v. Multnomah County, Or., 48 F.3d 420, 425 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (plurality opinion))). The leaking of information (whether true or false) about the School District's lease-purchase agreements to the IRS was therefore a matter of public concern insofar as it led to the need for additional, more expensive financing for the public school complex. Speech that is `relevan[t] to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies' also addresses matters of public concern. Freitag, 468 F.3d at 545 (quoting Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2003)). Here, the leaking of such statements, as well as Geragos's statements to the Los Angeles Times regarding the retaliatory prosecution against Eng, were certainly `relevan[t] to the public's evaluation of the performance of' the District Attorney's office. Freitag, 468 F.3d at 545 (quoting Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 973-74). We therefore conclude Eng's speech addressed matters of public concern.
The Defendants expend great effort arguing that Eng's speech with respect to the IRS leak was inextricably related to his work, and therefore that his speech was not protected because it was uttered in his capacity as public employee. But the district court determined that there is a genuine factual dispute between the parties regarding whether Eng's speech about the IRS leaks was made as part of his Task Force duties or as a private citizen. The district court's determination that the parties' evidence presents genuine issues of material fact is not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. Lee, 363 F.3d at 932. Once again, [w]here disputed facts exist,... we can determine whether the denial of qualified immunity was appropriate [only] by assuming that the version of the material facts asserted by the non-moving party is correct. Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 903. Here, there can be no doubt that Eng's version of the facts plausibly indicates he had no official duty to complain about any leak to the IRS or to authorize Geragos to speak to the press about the retaliation being taken against him.
As a threshold matter, we must consider the full range of adverse employment actions alleged in the complaint. Although the Defendants correctly note that the district court determined Eng was barred by the statute of limitations from recovering for any adverse employment actions taken before January 1, 2003, [4] whether any specific acts complained of are time-barred is (like the third-party standing question) collateral to the limited, interlocutory qualified immunity inquiry. Whether a plaintiff brings an action in time to challenge certain conduct is irrelevant, that is, to the logically independent question whether the state violated the plaintiff's clearly established rights. The applicability of the statute of limitations is therefore not before us, and we will consider the full range of adverse employment actions stated in Eng's complaint. The Defendants do not dispute that the initial investigations and first suspension were motivated by Eng's protected speech. They argue only that Eng's transfer to the juvenile division was not motived by any subject speech and that any argument by [Eng] that the 2003 suspension was motivated by his attorney's statements [to the press] was unsupported by the evidence. These assertions ignore, however, that we must assume resolution of the disputed facts in Eng's favor. Eng's account of the meeting with Livesay and Sowders, for example, plainly undermines the Defendants' contrary assertion that the systematic investigations, prosecution, suspensions, and demotion of Eng were not motivated by his speech. Eng's further accounts of Cooley's meetings with his staff to discuss a method of forcing David Eng out of the District Attorney's Office, and Sowders's threats to both Eng and Geragos following publication of the Los Angeles Times article, all also indicate that Eng's speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action.
Eng having passed the first three steps of the First Amendment retaliation test, the burdens of evidence and persuasion now shift to the Defendants to show that the balance of interests justified their adverse employment decision. But the Defendants did not argue before the district court, and do not argue before us now, that their interest in regulating Eng's speech was sufficient to outweigh Eng's free speech interest. They have therefore waived this argument. See, e.g., Butler, 528 F.3d at 642. In any event, Eng's allegations show that the District Attorney lacked adequate justification for treating Eng differently from other members of the public. The Defendants have neither alleged nor offered any evidence to support a conclusion that investigating, suspending, prosecuting, or transferring Eng for his speech was necessary for [the District Attorney's office] to operate efficiently and effectively. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684). Rather, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Eng, the full range of adverse employment action appears to have been a politically-motivated effort to silence Eng, who stood to embarrass Cooley by undermining a central plank in his campaign platform. On the record before us at this stage in the case, the Defendants have not met their burden under the Pickering balancing test.
Rather than addressing Pickering, the Defendants argue that they would have reached the same [adverse employment] decision even in the absence of [Eng]'s protected conduct. Thomas, 379 F.3d at 808 (quoting Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 976-77). They assert, for example, that Eng's suspensions would have been approved regardless of his protected speech because they were in fact due to the information gathered from three separate internal investigations involving separate and independent allegations of misconduct. This argument ignores Eng's allegations that the investigations and apparently baseless charges were themselves motivated by his exercise of his First Amendment rights. The Defendants further assert that Eng's performance on a promotability review undermines a but-for connection between his speech acts and his having been passed over for promotion. But Eng alleges he received a low score on the promotion review in part because his record contained accusations of sexual harassment and misuse of office computers accusations themselves motivated by his exercise of his First Amendment rights. Taking Eng's version of the facts as true, the Defendants have therefore not met their burden to show that Eng's protected speech was not a but-for cause of the adverse employment actions taken against him. In sum, Eng has properly alleged a violation of his constitutional rights.