Opinion ID: 1901509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Appropriate Sixth Amendment Standard of Review.

Text: In its seminal decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court stressed that, A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This is so because it is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel, and all too easy for a court to deem a particular act or omission unreasonable merely because counsel's overall strategy did not achieve the result his client desired. Id. See also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) ( Strickland Court adopted the rule of contemporary assessment because it recognized that from the perspective of hindsight there is a natural tendency to speculate as to whether a different trial strategy might have been more successful); Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir.1995) (nothing is clearer than hindsightexcept perhaps the rule that we will not judge trial counsel's performance through hindsight). Accord Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588, 819 A.2d 33, 51 (2002). Citing to separate opinions filed in this Court's non-majority decision in Commonwealth v. Jones, 572 Pa. 343, 815 A.2d 598 (2002), the Majority suggests that there are competing approaches to the Sixth Amendment standard for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Majority then quotes at length from Madame Justice Sandra Newman's Concurring Opinion in Jones for the absolute, bright-line proposition that appellate counsel can never be effective in failing to raise a meritorious claim. Majority op. at ___-___, 898 A.2d at 575. That broad test, as stated, apparently would deem irrelevant any consideration of the reasonableness of counsel's actual performance: if the appellate claim seemed to have merit in hindsight, appellate counsel would be deemed per se ineffective. In resolving the instant claim, however, the Majority ultimately does not employ the per se approach of the Jones concurrence, but instead, very briefly discusses appellate counsel's PCRA testimony and concludes that, because counsel articulated no strategic reason for failing to raise the claim at issue on appeal, the performance prong of the Strickland test is satisfied. In my view, the question of the appropriate standard for assessing claims of appellate counsel has been answered by the the U.S. Supreme Court, which has made clear that the Strickland performance and prejudice test governs Sixth Amendment claims concerning appellate performance. Moreover, the High Court has recognized the special considerations which govern a review of the reasonableness of decisions by appellate counsel. That authority has been summarized as follows: To prove [appellate counsel] ineffective under the Sixth Amendment, PCRA counsel would have had to prove not only the underlying merit of each waived claim ... but satisfy the entire Strickland standard. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) (petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). Moreover, ... even identifying an issue of arguable merit does not prove that appellate counsel acted unreasonably, or that prejudice ensued. This is so because, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, appellate counsel is not constitutionally obliged to raise every conceivable claim for relief. Counsel may forego even arguably meritorious issues in favor of claims which, in the exercise of counsel's objectively reasonable professional judgment, offered a greater prospect of securing relief. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-54, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983); see also Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 ([A]ppellate counsel . . . need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal.). Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome. Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir.1986) (quoted with approval in Robbins, 528 U.S. at 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756).    The High Court has explicitly recognized that appellate counsel is not constitutionally obliged to raise any and all nonfrivolous claims; to the contrary, the Court has, on repeated occasions, emphasized that vigorous, effective appellate advocacy requires the exercise of reasonable selectivity in deciding upon which claims to pursue. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756; Barnes, 463 U.S. at 750-54, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987. This process of `winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on' those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy. Smith, 477 U.S. at 536, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (quoting Barnes, 463 U.S. at 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987). See also Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 174 (3d Cir.1999) [(per Alito, J.)] (One element of effective appellate strategy is the exercise of reasonable selectivity in deciding which arguments to raise.). Barnes emphasized that [t]here can hardly be any question about the importance of having the appellate advocate examine the record with a view to selecting the most promising issues for review. 463 U.S. at 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987. Jones, 815 A.2d at 613, 614 (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court by Castille, J.). I recognize that focusing on an academic and non-contextual consideration of issues as theoretical absolutes would certainly streamline the inquiry; but such an approach would violate the constitutional standard and ignore the reality of appellate advocacy. Appellate claims do not arise in the abstract; they arise from the concrete, ever-changing circumstances attending actual cases. Any lawyer with a modicum of appellate litigation experience knows that appellate court decisions in all but the most routine of appeals are unpredictable. I do not indulge the fiction that appellate judges merely reveal immutable and indisputable truths awaiting a proper caption for exposure of these truths. Jurisprudential principles and standards emerge from the crucible of fact-bound litigation of actual cases and controversies, and the ultimate resolution often still may prove debatable among reasonable jurists. No matter how confident, or how unsure, an appellate advocate is in the claims he has raised, he will find that they indeed proved meritorious, or not, only upon receipt of the court's opinion(s) and a counting of the votes. It is not uncommon for a lawyer to find himself vindicated on an issue at trial, rejected on post-verdict motions, vindicated again on direct appeal, then rejected again on discretionary appeal. It is not uncommon that the most brilliant, focused and novel appellate arguments suffer through multiple rejections before finally being accepted. In short, there are strategic decisions to be made by counsel on appeal, no less than at trial. An analysis of the performance of appellate counsel must assess the actual reasonableness of counsel's performance in light of the contemporaneous real-world concerns which framed their advocacy.