Opinion ID: 2734172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: For his first point on appeal, Curtis asserts that the Commission erred in its decision because it lacked jurisdiction over his case, erroneously shifted the burden of proof to Curtis, refused to rule on the applicability of Arizona law, and erroneously applied the exclusivity provision of the Act. In sum, Curtis urges us to reverse the Commission’s decision based on lack of jurisdiction. First, we addressed a similar jurisdiction issue in Miller v. Enders, 2010 Ark. 92, at 1-3, (Miller I), and explained, Subject-matter jurisdiction is an issue that can and, indeed must, be raised by this court sua sponte. See Brock v. Townsell, 2009 Ark. 224, 309 S.W.3d 179 (citing Viravonga v. Samakitham, 372 Ark. 562, 279 S.W.3d 44 (2008)). If the [lower court] lacked jurisdiction, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Brock, supra; Clark v. State, 362 Ark. 545, 210 S.W.3d 61 (2005); Koonce v. Mitchell, 341 Ark. 716, 19 S.W.3d 603 (2000). Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-105 provides in relevant part: (a) The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer. . .. This court has held that: 4 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 [T]he exclusive remedy of an employee or her representative on account of injury or death arising out of and in the course of her employment is a claim for compensation under § 11-9-105, and that the commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the facts that establish jurisdiction, unless the facts are so one-sided that the issue is no longer one of fact but one of law, such as an intentional tort. VanWagoner v. Beverly Enters., 334 Ark. 12, 16, 970 S.W.2d 810, 812 (1998) (internal citations omitted). In adopting this rule, we have explained that the Commission has vast expertise in this area, and that the goals of uniformity, speed, and simplicity would best be achieved by granting the Commission the exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Carter v. GeorgiaPacific Resins, Inc., 368 Ark. 19, 242 S.W.3d 616 (2006) (citing Johnson v. Union Pac. R. R., 352 Ark. 534, 541, 104 S.W.3d 745, 748 (2003). Therefore, when a party to a lawsuit raises a question of whether a person enjoys immunity as an employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Commission must first decide the issue. See McCarthy v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, Sixth Div., 366 Ark. 316, 235 S.W.3d 497 (2006) (citing Moses v. Hanna’s Candle Co., 366 Ark. 233, 234 S.W.3d 872 (2006); Stocks v. Affiliated Foods Southwest, Inc., 363 Ark. 235, 213 S.W.3d 3 (2005)). In McCarthy, supra, an employee died of injuries he suffered in an airplane accident while returning home from a business trip. At the time of the accident, McCarthy, who had served as the pilot, was president of the company that employed the deceased. The wife of the deceased employee argued that McCarthy was a third person who did not enjoy immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and this court held that the Commission had exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine whether McCarthy was an employer under the circumstances presented in that case. See id. Similar facts are presented here in Curtis’s case. Curtis argues that Lemna, as a co-employee who drove the golf cart during the accident that occurred in Arkansas, is a third person who does not enjoy immunity under the Act. We further note that Curtis could seek workers’ compensation benefits under Arkansas law because his injury occurred while he was working in Arkansas and the Commission had a legitimate interest in the injury. See Williams v. Johnson Custom Homes, 374 Ark. 457, 461–62, 288 S.W.3d 607, 610 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (“[T]he law has been well 5 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 settled that all states having a legitimate interest in the injury have the right to apply their own diverse workers’ compensation rules and standards, either separately, simultaneously, or successively. Claims for compensation benefits may be instituted in both states having jurisdiction of the claim. Of course, there can be no double recovery. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not preclude successive workers’ compensation awards, even if one statute or the other purports to confer an exclusive remedy on the claimant.”). Accordingly, Curtis could file for benefits in both states because both Arizona and Arkansas maintained jurisdiction of the claim. However, the record demonstrates that Curtis stipulated that he was not seeking benefits in Arkansas; rather, he filed a tort action in the Benton County Circuit Court. In response to his lawsuit, Lemna filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter and that our exclusivity statute required Curtis to file his action with the Commission. The circuit court agreed and dismissed Curtis’s action without prejudice. Subsequent to the dismissal, although Curtis could have appealed the order of dismissal, he did not do so. Ark. R. App. P. – Civ. 2(a) (2013); see also Rossi v. Rossi, 319 Ark. 373, 374, 892 S.W.2d 246, 246 (1995) (“[T]he failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.”) Rather, in his hearing brief, Curtis filed an action before the Commission and “commenced [the] proceeding for the purpose of an adjudication as to whether Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105 is applicable as an affirmative defense to his common law tort claim against Lemna.” Further, Curtis stated “[a]lthough this question has relevance only to tort claims, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that the Commission has exclusive 6 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 jurisdiction to adjudicate the applicability of this defense.” On May 11, 2011, before the Commission, Curtis and Lemna both stipulated that the issues to be litigated were as follows: (1) application of the Workers’ Compensation Act; (2) whether Curtis and Lemna were acting in the course and scope of their employment on August 8, 2007; (3) whether Lemna can claim immunity under the Act; and (4) whether an employer’s tort immunity under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105 can be extended to a co-employee consistent with the limitations of article 5, section 32, of the Arkansas Constitution. In sum, Curtis sought relief through the Commission, did not prevail, and on appeal he asserts that Arkansas lacks jurisdiction and that the Commission erroneously applied the Act. However, Curtis filed a tort claim in Benton County, Arkansas, and then specifically requested a hearing before the Commission and requested that the Commission determine the applicability of our workers’ compensation laws. Therefore, we hold that the Commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine that issue and that jurisdiction is proper. Scope of Employment and Co-Employee Immunity Scope of Employment For his second point on appeal, Curtis asserts that the Commission erred in finding that there was substantial evidence to support its decision that Curtis and Lemna were acting within the scope of their employment. Curtis also contends that the golf cart was not a work site and the two were golfing for pleasure and not to further Dial’s interests. He further argues that the Commission erred by extending immunity to Lemna as a co-employee acting 7 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 as the employer with the duty of providing a safe environment. Stated differently, Curtis asserts that the Commission erred in finding that Lemna was not a third party for purposes of the tort claims. The crux of Curtis’s second point on appeal is that when Curtis’s injury occurred, Curtis and Lemna were acting outside the scope of their employment. Accordingly, because the event was outside the scope of their employment, immunity cannot be extended to Lemna as an arm of the employer. Lemna responds that we should affirm the Commission. The two men were acting within the scope of their employment because they were conducting business for Dial during the sales meeting and team-building event. Thus, Lemna contends that he is entitled to immunity from Curtis’s suit in tort because he was providing a safe work place for Curtis when the accident occurred. In reviewing workers’ compensation claims, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision and affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000). “Substantial evidence exists if fair-minded persons could reach the same conclusion when considering the same facts.” Id. at 809, 20 S.W.3d at 903. Further, “[t]he question of the correct application and interpretation of . . . statute is a question of law, which this court decides de novo.” Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys., Inc., 2012 Ark. 14, at 3, 386 S.W.3d 385, 388. At issue are Ark. Code Ann. sections 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii), and 11-9-105. Ark. Code Ann. Section 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii) provides: 8 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 “Compensable injury” means: (ii) An injury . . . arising out of and in the course of employment if it is not caused by a specific incident or is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence . .. Subsection (B)(ii) provides that a “compensable injury” does not include: (ii) Injury incurred while engaging in or performing or as the result of engaging in or performing any recreational or social activities for the employee’s personal pleasure. ... Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105 provides in pertinent part: (a) The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee, . . . to recover damages from the employer, or any principal, officer, director, stockholder, or partner acting in his or her capacity as an employer. . . . No role, capacity, or persona of any employer . . . other than that existing in the role of employer of the employee shall be relevant for consideration for purposes of this chapter, and the remedies and rights provided by this chapter shall in fact be exclusive regardless of the multiple roles, capacities, or personas the employer may be deemed to have. In reviewing Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-9-102 and 11-9-105, we construe the statutes so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. Miller v. Enders, 2013 Ark. 23, at 6-7, 425 S.W.3d 723, 726–27 (“Miller II”). “When interpreting statutes, our review is de novo, as it is for this court to decide what a constitutional and statutory provision mean.” Ark. Hotels and Entm’t, Inc. v. Martin, 2012 Ark. 335, 423 S.W.3d 49. “In considering the meaning of a statute, we consider it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning.” Nelson v. Timberline Int’l, Inc., 332 Ark. 165, 176, 964 S.W.2d 357, 362 (1998). However, when we construe the workers’ compensation statutes, we must strictly construe them. Ark. 9 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 2012). See Miller II. “The doctrine of strict construction requires this court to use the plain meaning of the language employed.” Stewart v. Ark. Glass Container, 2010 Ark. 198, at 6, 366 S.W.3d 358, 361–62. We have previously examined these statutes with regard to activities that were within the scope of employment for purposes of a compensable injury and also examined the claims against co-employees and whether such employees were immune from suit as is at issue here. See Miller II. First, with regard to whether the golf outing was within the scope of employment, “the test is whether the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee [was] carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer’s interest directly or indirectly.” White v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 478, 6 S.W.3d 98, 100 (internal citations omitted). In Hudak-Lee v. Baxter County Regional Hospital, 2011 Ark. 31, at 5-8, 378 S.W.3d 77, 80–81, we explained, A compensable injury does not include an injury that is inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services are not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11- 9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2009). The phrase ‘in the course of employment’ and the term ‘employment services’ are not defined in the Workers’ Compensation Act. Texarkana Sch. Dist. v. Conner, 373 Ark. 372, 284 S.W.3d 57 (2008). Thus, it falls to the court to define these terms in a manner that neither broadens nor narrows the scope of the Act. Id. An employee is performing employment services when he or she is doing something that is generally required by his or her employer. Id.; Pifer v. Single Source Transp., 347 Ark. 851, 69 S.W.3d 1 (2002). We use the same test to determine whether an employee is performing employment services as we do when determining whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of employment. Jivan v. Econ. Inn & Suites, 370 Ark. 414, 260 S.W.3d 281 (2007). The test is whether the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee was carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer’s 10 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 interest, directly or indirectly. Id. . . . The critical inquiry is whether the interests of the employer were being directly or indirectly advanced by the employee at the time of the injury. Moreover, the issue of whether an employee was performing employment services within the course of employment depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Id. We turn to our review of the record in the present case. Marc Mollere, VicePresident of Dial, Team Leader for Wal-Mart and Sam’s, arranged and coordinated the August 2007 sales meeting. Mollere testified that he was responsible for setting up the meeting, making arrangements for the meeting to be held at the Pinnacle Country Club Board Room, making arrangements for food to be served, and making arrangements for golf as well. Mollere further testified that the purpose of the meeting was to review all of Dial’s business operations, financials, sales opportunities, and sales plans. Mollere testified that the agenda for the sales meeting included representation and presentation from Dial’s headquarters from operations and sales planning. Mollere further testified that the golf outing was a “team building exercise,” and he planned to bring personnel from headquarters to the area and allow local Dial personnel access among the group that normally did not have as much access to each other. Mollere testified that the golf outing was a team building exercise and the purpose of the golf was to allow the “free flow exchange of - - of thoughts and idea[s] around the business [to] . . . take place that weren’t necessary [sic] a specific part of the business meeting agenda that I had laid out” and to promote “dialogue . . . [to] occur that maybe wouldn’t otherwise”, “allow people to let their guard down a little bit”, and allow ideas to the business that wouldn’t normally come out of an organized meeting. The golf outing was not required, but the 11 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 majority of attendees participated in the outing. Mollere further testified that Dial paid for all the expenses related to the meeting, including golf-club rental, golf-cart rental, and golf greens’ fees. Mollere also testified that page one of the two-page agenda for the August 8, 2007 meeting included meetings from 7:30 a.m. until noon, lunch, and a team dinner with spouses at 6:00 p.m. The second page entitled “Dial Team Building Golf Outing” provided tee times that were assigned by “random draw” for the afternoon. Finally, Mollere testified that, as a team building exercise, the golf outing was “absolutely” beneficial to Dial. Curtis testified that at the time of the accident he was working for Dial in its finance department, was invited to do a presentation at the August 8, 2007 meeting, and traveled to northwest Arkansas for the meeting. Curtis testified that his trip was one of many sales trips he was making across the nation to field sales offices to explain customer profitability. Curtis also testified that Dial paid for all of the expenses of the trip. He further testified that the majority of people in the morning sales meeting played in the team-building golf event. Curtis said that he received an August 1, 2007 email with an agenda that included “Team Building - we will be playing golf” at 1:00 p.m. He also said that he received an email on August 7, 2007, with an updated email that again stated golf was on the agenda of the meeting, “We will begin at 7:30 a.m. so please arrive a few moments earlier so we can start on time. We have a full agenda and will be challenged to get through it on the fun activity. . . . We do not have any flexibility on when to tee off for golf.” He also testified that he considered the golf a fun activity that was a perk of his employment. 12 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 Lemna testified that he traveled with Curtis to northwest Arkansas to meet with the Wal-Mart team. The event was a Dial sponsored event. Lemna testified that Dial paid for all the expenses related to the trip, including the golf outing. Lemna further testified that, in his opinion, the golf phase of the meeting was mandatory because it was “part of the agenda,” and it was on “the list of things to do.” He further testified that all the activities were there together at the clubhouse. He stated that he plays golf three to four times a year and “they’re all for company functions.” Finally, Lemna testified that he played golf that day because it was part of the agenda. In sum, the testimony demonstrates that neither Curtis nor Lemna resided in the State and but for their employer’s sales meeting, neither would have been at the Pinnacle golf course. Further, the testimony demonstrates that the two men were there for a sales meeting, which included lunch and the continued discussion and free flow of ideas regarding Dial’s business while playing golf and having a team dinner with spouses. Based on our standard of review, the Commission’s decision that Curtis’s injury occurred within the scope of his employment is supported by substantial evidence. Finally, Curtis asserts that the golf cart was not a place of work and cannot therefore be considered within the scope of employment. However, in Barnes v. Wilkiewicz, 301 Ark. 175, 177, 783 S.W.2d 36, 38 (1990), “we expanded the definition of the work place, determining that such a place was not static in the sense of being limited to the employer’s physical premises or actual place of business.” Brown, 326 Ark. 691, 697, 932 S.W.2d 769, 773; see also Miller II, 2013 Ark. 23 at 6, 425 S.W.3d at 727. Accordingly, we reject Curtis’s 13 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 argument that the golf cart was not a place of work. Co-Employee Immunity Next, because we have held that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision that the event was within the scope of employment, we must review whether the Commission’s decision that Lemna was entitled to immunity was supported by substantial evidence. Curtis contends that although Dial paid for the event, Curtis was injured during a fun, voluntary event and Lemna was not charged with providing a safe work place; thus, the Commission erred in extending immunity to Lemna. Stated differently, Curtis argues that the men were not at work on the golf course, but golfing for pleasure. Again, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105 provides an employer immunity from liability for damages in a tort action brought by an injured employee. “This rule, known as the exclusivity doctrine, arises from Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-105(a) (Repl. 2012), which provides that ‘[t]he rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee.’” Porocel Corp. v. Cir. Ct. of Saline Cnty, 2013 Ark. 172, ___ S.W.3d ___ (internal citations omitted). We recently examined our case law for negligent or injurious actions by co-employees in the context of whether such employees were third parties not immune from suit based on the duties they were performing or the roles they were undertaking at the time. In Miller II, 2013 Ark. 23 at 6–8, 425 S.W.3d 723, 727–28, we reaffirmed our case law and recounted our law regarding co-employee immunity and explained: 14 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 We have previously examined these statutes with regard to claims against co-employees and whether such employees were third parties immune from suit as is at issue here. Brown, 326 Ark. 691, 932 S.W.2d 769. We have a long line of cases that have reviewed co-employee immunity. In King v. Cardin, 229 Ark. 929, 319 S.W.2d 214 (1959), we held that a negligent co-employee is a third party and that our workers’ compensation law does not prevent an employee from maintaining an action for the negligence of a fellow employee. Then, in Neal v. Oliver, 246 Ark. 377, 438 S.W.2d 313 (1969), we held that an employer cannot delegate its duty to provide a safe work place to an employee. See also Allen v. Kizer, 294 Ark. 1, 740 S.W.2d 137 (1987). Next, in Simmons First National Bank v. Thompson, we held that a supervisory employee was immune from suit for failure to provide a safe workplace. 285 Ark. 275, 686 S.W.2d 415 (1985). We then extended that immunity to nonsupervisory employees who failed to provide a safe place to work when the injury occurred. Allen, supra. In Barnes v. Wilkiewicz, 301 Ark. 175, 177, 783 S.W.2d 36, 38 (1990), “we expanded the definition of the work place, determining that such a place was not static in the sense of being limited to the employer’s physical premises or actual place of business.” Brown, 326 Ark. at 697, 932 S.W.2d at 773. In Brown, we also held that co-employees who are fulfilling the employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace are immune from suit under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105, and we distinguished our holding in King supra, because the third party in King was not fulfilling the duties of his employer of providing a safe workplace. Brown, 326 Ark. at 698, 932 S.W.2d at 774. Brown is directly on point for purposes of Miller and Bratt’s appeal. In that case, the co-employee, Finney, was operating a vehicle at the direction of his employer, just as Enders was operating the helicopter. Brown and Finney were part-time co-employees who were employed to catch chickens for their employer. Neither party had any supervisory duties. Finney was delegated the job of driving the employees to the site, or farm, where the chickens were located. While Finney was driving, an accident occurred, and Brown was injured. Brown recovered worker’s compensation and then sued Finney on a tort claim. The circuit court dismissed Brown’s claim, and we affirmed, holding that Finney was performing the duty of his employer, to provide safe transportation, and was immune from liability under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105. In Miller II, we affirmed the Commission and held that “Enders was neither Miller and Bratt’s supervisor nor their employer or employee. The record demonstrates that Enders was a co-employee charged with the employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace. Enders’s sole responsibility was to operate the workplace, a roving helicopter, in a safe manner and to 15 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 safely transport patients. . . . Further, as the pilot-in-command, Enders was delegated the authority concerning matters of flight safety and aircraft operation. Accordingly, Enders’s only job was to provide safe air ambulance transportation for EMS patients and employees.” Id. Curtis asserts that Miller II is distinguishable from his case because in Miller II the tortfeasor, Enders, was charged with providing a safe workplace and here, Curtis was not. Enders’s sole job was to transport patients safely– because it was a roving workplace but here, Curtis contends that there is no evidence to support that Dial charged Lemna with the responsibility of a safe workplace or that his sole responsibility was to safely operate a roving workplace. Rather, he asserts that the golf outing was just for fun. Lemna responds that Miller II is on point and Lemna, like Enders in Miller II, acted as an extension of the employer to provide a safe work place on the golf course. This court has consistently interpreted Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105 to extend immunity to co-employees, such as Lemna, for actions arising from the alleged failure to provide a safe workplace because those employees are charged with the employer’s nondelegable duty of providing a safe workplace. Here, Lemna drove the golf cart for the two men to participate in Dial’s “team building golf outing.” Stated differently, Lemna drove their work vehicle that day and maintained the duty to provide on behalf of his employer, the nondelegable duty of the employer to provide a safe work place. As in Brown, supra, and Miller II, supra, the co-employees both drove vehicles; here, Lemna likewise drove a vehicle on behalf of his employer in the course of his employment on the day of the 16 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 accident. Regardless of whether Lemna had other duties and responsibilities as an employee, based on the record before this court, Lemna had the duty to provide a safe environment while he operated the vehicle during the team-building activity as an arm of the employer. The record demonstrates that Lemna was delegated the job of driving the vehicle at the time of the accident and was therefore charged with providing a safe work place. Accordingly, in reviewing the Commission’s decision, we hold that it is supported by substantial evidence. Based on the discussion above and our standard of review, we hold that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision that Lemna was entitled to immunity, and we affirm the Commission’s findings. Constitutionality of Co-Employee Immunity For his third point on appeal, Curtis asserts that the extension of employers’ tort immunity pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105 is in contravention of article 5, section 32, of the Arkansas Constitution. However, the parties agree that our decision in Miller II, 2013 Ark. 23, 425 S.W.3d 723, disposes of Curtis’s third point on appeal. We agree and therefore do not reach the merits of this third point on appeal because we addressed this claim in Miller and held “In reviewing the statute and art. 5, § 32, we find no error in the Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. We have consistently afforded immunity to co-employees that are acting as an arm of the employer. This extension does not limit recovery; it cloaks certain co-employees in limited fact scenarios with immunity as an employer when they are fulfilling their employer’s duties to provide a safe work place.” Affirmed; court of appeals’ opinion vacated. 17 Cite as 2014 Ark. 377 HANNAH, C.J., and CORBIN and DANIELSON, JJ., dissent.