Opinion ID: 1109615
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Jurisprudence

Text: Our interpretation of federal law governing jurisdiction over Logan's injuries is corroborated by our own prior cases dealing with this question. While the Jensen doctrine was rigidly applied by several of this Court's early decisions, our more recent cases have followed the federal trend of attempting to ameliorate its harsh consequences. In the 1957 case of Richard v. Lake Charles Stevedores, 95 So.2d 830 (La. App. 1st Cir.1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 952, 78 S.Ct. 535, 2 L.Ed.2d 529 (1958), the First Circuit, in an opinion by then Judge Tate, held state court jurisdiction was proper over the claim of a longshoreman injured in the hold of a vessel moored on navigable waters. In so doing, it followed U.S. Supreme Court rulings permitting state jurisdiction over claims by workers engaged in repairing vessels on navigable waters. 95 So.2d at 831. [16] The holding in Richard is significant for two reasons. First, it obviously lends great support to our decision here. In addition, however, it establishes Louisiana's trend of extending the protection of its workers' compensation laws to the greatest extent permissible. We find evidence of this trend in subsequent cases. [17] In Umbehagen v. Equitable Equipment Co., 329 So.2d 245 (La.App. 4th Cir.1976), the Fourth Circuit anticipated the Supreme Court's Sun Ship decision, holding state remedies were not preempted by the LHWCA in claims for injuries of land-based employees covered by the federal act. In Poche v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 339 So.2d 1212 (La.1976), we permitted third party negligence actions to proceed under Louisiana law despite the availability of a federal remedy under the LHWCA. [18] In the 1982 case of Thompson v. Teledyne Movible Offshore, Inc., this court found state subject matter jurisdiction existed over an injury sustained on a drilling platform outside territorial waters, despite the fact Thompson was entitled to LHWCA benefits. 419 So.2d 822 (1982). The fixed platform of Thompson is closely analogous to the dry dock, an extension of the land. [19] The state's interest is not less in extending the protection of its law to Logan, injured over inland waters, than to workers injured outside its territorial waters on the Outer Continental Shelf. The facts here warrant a similar finding of subject matter jurisdiction. In Beverly v. Action Marine Services, Inc., 433 So.2d 139 (1983), this Court again extended the boundaries of concurrent jurisdiction. Beverly died while working on a barge moored in navigable waters. The Third Circuit found federal preemption (422 So.2d 623 (1982)) and this Court reversed. We extended state jurisdiction to afford the deceased's relatives a remedy under state workers' compensation law since none existed under the LHWCA. In attempting to distinguish Beverly, the Court of Appeal makes much of the fact that the Beverly plaintiffs had no federal remedy. We find this reasoning is flawed. First, Sun Ship indicated the presence or absence of a federal remedy was not dispositive of the question of whether or not state concurrent jurisdiction was proper. Second, the Court of Appeal concluded the  Jensen line stated a constitutional wall beyond which state jurisdiction could not pass. If this second premise were true, the absence of a federal remedy was irrelevant and Beverly 's conclusion is wrong. Only by saying the presence or absence of a federal remedy controls the availability of a state remedy seaward of the  Jensen line can the Fourth Circuit's reasoning be upheld. We decline to create such a restrictive test. There is no basis for returning to the pre- Davis bright line interpretation of Jensen. Nor is there basis for finding, contrary to Sun Ship, that the presence of a federal remedy requires a finding of federal preemption. Here, as in Beverly, we conclude Louisiana workers' compensation law supplements existing federal law and jurisdiction was properly exercised by the trial court.