Opinion ID: 3016490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified Immunity Jurisdiction

Text: The Supreme Court has also held that a District Court’s pretrial denial of a claim for qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable interlocutory order. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530; Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court stated that “[g]overnment officials performing discretionary, non-prosecutorial functions are shielded from liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established Constitutional rights of which a reasonable 7 person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). An order denying a motion for summary judgment made by a public official who claims to be entitled to qualified immunity is appealable where there are no disputes of fact material to the public official’s qualified immunity claim and the sole issue presented on appeal is whether the official’s conduct violated a legal norm that was clearly established at the time of the allegedly illegal conduct. Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002); Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 127-132 (3d Cir. 1986). Under Ziccardi and Harlow, this case is appealable if there are no disputes of fact material to the public official’s qualified immunity claim and if the sole issue on appeal is whether the facts identified by the District Judge establish that the official’s conduct violated a clearly established legal norm that a reasonable person would have known. The District Court stated that “Plaintiff’s evidence has shown sufficient personal involvement in its closure with respect to all of the Defendants to preclude immunity on its substantive due process claim” and “the only issue is whether the individual Defendants would have reasonably been aware of the alleged violations.” Lonzetta Trucking and Excavating Co. v. Schlan, et al., No. 3:02-18, (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2004). Therefore, whether the official’s conduct violated a clearly established law, and whether they knew of the violation is at issue. However, this is not the sole issue. The District Court also stated that “[w]e agree that material facts remain as to the conduct of all Defendants, and will adopt the 8 Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny their request for qualified immunity.” Lonzetta Trucking and Excavating Co. v. Schlan, et al., No. 3:02-18, (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2004). Consequently, because there are disputes of fact material with respect to the public official’s qualified immunity claim, the District Court’s denial of summary judgment regarding qualified immunity is not appealable.