Opinion ID: 3010594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Insular Cases

Text: Kole's assertion as to her right to a jury trial implicates a debate that the Supreme Court discussed in Board of Engineers v. Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1975). There, the Court had to determine the constitutionality of a provision of the law of Puerto Rico that prevented anyone who was not a United States citizen from obtaining a license as a civil engineer in Puerto Rico. In the course of striking down the provision, the Court noted the doctrines of incorporated and unincorporated territories that emerged from the holdings in the Insular Cases. Under those holdings, the Constitution applied with full force to[t]erritories destined for statehood from the time of acquisition . . . . Id. at 601. However, only  `fundamental' constitutional rights were guaranteed to the inhabitants of [t]errirtories not possessing that anticipation of statehood. Id. Since Puerto Rico was not acquired with the anticipation that it would become a state, the Constitution was held not to extend Ex Proprio vigore to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. Id. Here, we must decide whether the Constitution applies Ex Proprio vigore to the Philippines. As we note below, that 9 question was answered in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904). However, a brief discussion of the historical context in which Dorr was decided, and the background of the legal protections afforded under Philippine law will assist our inquiry into whether using Kole's Philippine conviction to enhance her current sentence is consistent with Congress' intent in enacting S 851(c)(2).