Opinion ID: 1648183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Use of Incriminating Statement on Remand

Text: In determining that introduction of the breath test result was harmless error, the court of appeals relied upon Moorehead's admission at the police station that he was drunk as hell. On further review, Moorehead argues the Vietor exclusionary rule should apply to this statement and asks that it be suppressed on remand. We remand for a hearing to decide whether the statement was made spontaneously. By its terms, Iowa Code section 804.20 does not include an exclusionary rule. Instead, violation of the statute is a simple misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 804.20. In an early case interpreting section 804.20, we simply read the statute as written and declined to create an exclusionary rule in the absence of a legislative directive to do so. See State v. Heisdorffer, 164 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Iowa 1969). Our decision in that early case is consistent with the general rule, recognized in our cases, that application of an exclusionary rule is ordinarily only warranted if explicitly expressed in the statute. See State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Iowa 2003) (equating treaty with statute and for this reason declining to create exclusionary rule absent specific reference). It is also important to remember that Iowa Code section 804.20 was enacted in 1959 and thus predates much of the modern federal exclusionary rule jurisprudence. 1959 Iowa Acts ch. 373, § 1; see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961) (a landmark exclusionary rule decision). But see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345, 63 S.Ct. 608, 615, 87 L.Ed. 819, 826 (1943) (when construing a federal statute, implied exclusionary rule mandates incriminating statement obtained during an unlawful detention is inadmissible). More than twenty-five years ago we changed course and overruled Heisdorffer. In State v. Vietor , a man suspected of drunk driving asked to call an attorney but was denied his statutory right to do so. 261 N.W.2d at 830. The suspect ultimately refused to take a chemical test absent consultation with the attorney. Id. We overruled Heisdorffer and held evidence of [the suspect's] refusal to take [the] chemical test shall be inadmissible at a later criminal trial. Id. at 832. Our holding in Vietor may be reconciled with the general presumption against implied statutory exclusionary rules on the theory that an exclusionary rule is warranted for violations of those statutes, including section 804.20, which involve fundamental rights or have constitutional overtones. See, e.g., Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d at 46 (indicating exclusionary rule may be warranted when statute involves a fundamental right); State v. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d 195, 198 (Iowa 1994) (Neuman, J., dissenting) (Such an extraordinary remedy should be reserved, I believe, for situations evidencing bad faith by the State's agents or violation of a statute with constitutional overtones, as in Vietor. ); cf. Armenta v. Superior Ct., 61 Cal.App.3d 584, 132 Cal.Rptr. 586, 592 (1976) (requiring exclusion for transgression of statutes embodying constitutional standards). In State v. McAteer, 290 N.W.2d 924 (Iowa 1980), another drunk driving case, we expounded further upon our holding in Vietor. McAteer was arguably distinguishable from Vietor because McAteer involved a request to speak with a family member, not an attorney. The State attempted to avoid the exclusionary rule on this basis. We held: We believe the right, given by section 804.20, to communicate with a family member is neither more nor less qualified than the right given to communicate with an attorney. We know of no reason why the exclusionary rule should be applied to a violation of one right and not to that of the other. The trial court was right in suppressing the evidence. McAteer, 290 N.W.2d at 925 (emphasis added). In McAteer the suppressed evidence included a breath test result, as opposed to testimony the defendant had not taken the test. Id. at 924. In a generation's worth of cases decided after Vietor and McAteer we have not explicitly decided whether the Vietor exclusionary rule bars introduction of evidence not relating to a breath test but likewise obtained after a violation of Iowa Code section 804.20, such as Moorehead's post-test-result statement that he was drunk as hell. See Bowers, 661 N.W.2d at 541-42. But see 1981 Iowa Op. Att'y Gen. 6-1(L) (remarking shortly after Vietor and McAteer were decided that evidence obtained in violation of the right is subject to exclusion in a subsequent criminal proceeding). We see no reason why the Vietor exclusionary rule should now be limited to statements regarding breath tests. Nothing in Vietor or our subsequent cases specifically restricts the exclusionary rule to such evidence. This is not surprising or without justification. On its face Iowa Code section 804.20 is a statute of general application. There is no indication in the statute that it is only concerned with the implied consent doctrine or the administration of breath tests. But see Krebs, 562 N.W.2d at 426 (As we stated in [ Vietor ], this statutory right is limited for persons arrested for OWI.). Nothing in Vietor or McAteer so holds. The State proposes that in cases such as this one we should let the jury decide whether the incriminating statement was made voluntarily. See, e.g., Tornquist, 254 Iowa 1135, 1150, 120 N.W.2d 483, 492 (1963) (in pre- Vietor case, opining in dictum that such an instruction would be warranted); State v. Cameron, 254 Iowa 505, 511, 117 N.W.2d 816, 819 (1962) (same), overruled by Bowers, 661 N.W.2d at 543. On this theory, denial of a defendant's section 804.20 rights would not always result in the exclusion of a confession elicited in consequence of that violation; instead the fact the defendant's section 804.20 rights were violated would be but one factor for the jury to consider. The State proposes we craft a jury instruction to this effect. We decline to do so. The State's proposal no longer encapsulates the proper roles of judge and jury in contemporary criminal procedure. Indeed, we recently disapproved of such an instruction. Bowers, 661 N.W.2d at 543, overruling State v. Cameron, 254 Iowa at 511, 117 N.W.2d at 819. The case the State primarily relies on, Tornquist, 254 Iowa at 1150, 120 N.W.2d at 492, cites Cameron for support. Having overruled Cameron in Bowers we now likewise disavow our dictum in Tornquist. A jury instruction on voluntariness is simply not consistent with our present practice and precedents. Bowers, 661 N.W.2d at 543. In the alternative, the State argues suppression of Moorehead's incriminating statement is not appropriate in this case because the deputy read Moorehead his Miranda rights before he confessed he was drunk as hell and argues these warnings should rectify any concerns about the voluntariness of his statement. Miranda warnings, however, do not address the right to contact a family member. We reiterate the right to contact a family member under section 804.20 is neither more nor less qualified than the right to contact an attorney. McAteer, 290 N.W.2d at 925. Lastly, the State contends the I'm drunk as hell statement should be admissible because it was spontaneous. We agree to the extent that if the statement was spontaneous, the Vietor exclusionary rule should not apply. Cf. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 608 (Iowa 2001) (under Miranda doctrine, statements made freely, voluntarily, and spontaneously are admissible); State v. Brown, 176 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Iowa 1970) (same). Because the district court did not decide whether Moorehead's statement was spontaneous, however, we decline to rule on this issue for the first time on appeal. See Sager v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W.2d 8, 15 (Iowa 2004). On remand, the district court shall decide whether the I'm drunk as hell statement was spontaneous. If the court finds it was spontaneous, the statement should be admitted into evidence because the exclusion of such statements is not implicated by a violation of Iowa Code section 804.20. If the court finds it was not spontaneous, the statement should be suppressed because it was obtained after unnecessary delayin this case after a breath test was administered. Iowa Code § 804.20; see Vietor, 261 N.W.2d at 832 (unnecessary delay when defendant not afforded phone call by the time breath test was administered). Moorehead also argues that with the statement suppressed there would be insufficient evidence to convict him. For obvious reasons, we need not address this claim.