Opinion ID: 1651813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the actions of the court in allowing the state to try the appellant on two separate charges of sale of marijuana before the same jury rather than sever such charges was an abuse of discretion

Text: ¶ 15. Ott argues prior to trial, the trial judge incorrectly denied his ore tenus motion to sever the counts of the indictment against him. When a multi-count indictment has been returned and the defendant requests severance, a hearing should be held on the issue. Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 772 (Miss.1991). The State bears the burden of a prima facie showing that the offenses are within the language of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-7-2 (1994), which allows multi-count indictments. Corley, 584 So.2d at 772. If this burden is met by the State, the defense may rebut by showing that the offenses were separate and distinct acts or transactions. Id. The trial court should consider the time period between the offenses, whether evidence proving each offense would be admissible to prove the other counts, and whether the offenses are interwoven. Id. If this procedure is followed, this Court will give deference to the trial court's findings on review, employing the abuse of discretion standard. Corley, 584 So.2d at 772. Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852, 861 (Miss.1995) (footnote omitted). ¶ 16. Section 99-7-2 of the Mississippi Code provides: (1) Two (2) or more offenses which are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment with a separate count for each offense if: (a) the offenses are based on the same act or transaction; or (b) the offenses are based on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. (2) Where two (2) or more offenses are properly charged in separate counts of a single indictment, all such charges may be tried in a single proceeding. (3) When a defendant is convicted of two (2) or more offenses charged in separate counts of an indictment, the court shall impose separate sentences for each such conviction. (4) The jury or the court, in cases in which the jury is waived, shall return a separate verdict for each count of an indictment drawn under subsection (1) of this section. (5) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit the court from exercising its statutory authority to suspend either the imposition or execution of any sentence or sentences imposed hereunder, nor to prohibit the court from exercising its discretion to impose such sentences to run either concurrently with or consecutively to each other or any other sentence or sentences previously imposed upon the defendant. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-7-2 (1994). [2] ¶ 17. Ott first argues the exchange that took place in chambers after his ore tenus motion was made does not constitute a hearing. The motion to sever was made in chambers before the start of the trial. The trial judge asked the State to state its position on the motion for the record. The State explained what it expected the evidence to show. Ott was then given an opportunity to rebut the State's explanation. ¶ 18. Ott next argues that the State failed to make a prima facie showing that the charged offenses met the requirements of § 99-7-2. The State proffered what it believed the evidence would show concerning the two alleged buys. The State explained that the evidence would show (1) the first buy took place on the morning of September 6, 1997 around eleven o'clock; (2) Ott was contacted by a pager; (3) Ott drove to the McDonalds where the buy took place; (4) Ott had a large quantity of marijuana in his car; (5) Ott sold a bag of marijuana to Agent Harvey (6) based on information from the first buy the agents set up a second buy; (7) for the second buy, Ott was again paged and came to the McDonalds; (8) the second buy took place at 5:13 p.m.; (9) a different purchaser was used for the second buy; (10) when Ott left the second buy, Officer Roberts was dispatched to stop him and a chase ensued; (11) Ott was arrested; (12) evidence from both crimes would be admissible if the two were tried separately. ¶ 19. Ott's rebuttal was (1) the sales took place at different times; (2) the sales involved two different purchasers; and (3) the agents did not intend to set up a second buy until after the first buy was completed. ¶ 20. After the exchange, the trial judge issued his decision: It's the Court's opinion that the evidence at least proffered to the Court is sufficient in my mind to proceed under Rule 7.07(a) of two or more offenses constituting part of a common scheme or plan or connected together. This defendant is charged with possession with intent to deliver or sell apparently within a few minutes prior to that arrest on the possession charge an alleged sale transaction occurred and that at approximately five [3] hours prior to that in the same vehicle and the same container of marijuana allegedly was retrieved to sell at approximately 11 a.m. in the morning. I see them sufficiently connected together to be part of a common scheme which would allow you [the State] to try them all under the same jury. So I am going to deny your motion for a severance. ¶ 21. The trial judge properly conducted a hearing on the ore tenus motion to sever. The judge required the State to state its position for the record and then afforded Ott an opportunity to rebut. The State met its burden of making a prima facie case showing the two counts were connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan as required by § 99-7-2. Based on the State's proffer, the two alleged buys were sufficiently connected to meet the requirements of the statute. Ott's rebuttal does not satisfy the requirement of a showing the offenses were separate and distinct acts or transactions as required by Corley. Alone, the seven hour time lapse between the two sales is not enough to satisfy the requirement, nor is Ott's assertion that the sales involved two different purchasers enough to make the crimes separate and distinct. Ott cites Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316 (Miss. 1989) and McCarty v. State, 554 So.2d 909 (Miss.1989), as authority for his proposition that because the crimes took place seven hours apart and involved two different victims the crimes are separate and distinct. ¶ 22. In Gray this Court held an indictment improperly joined eight counts of making harassing telephone calls where the indictment charged the defendant with two different crimes on two different dates against two different victims. Gray, 549 So.2d at 1323. In McCarty, this Court held two burglaries could not be charged in the same indictment where the burglaries were committed on two different days and at least two days apart, the two houses involved in the burglaries belonged to different individuals and were miles apart, and nothing in the record indicated that there was a plan involved in burglarizing the houses. McCarty, 554 So.2d at 915-16. In McCarty, this Court went on to say a multi-count indictment is proper only where the charged offenses arise from a common transaction or occurrence or when the occurrences are at different times, where that time period is insignificant. Id. at 915 (emphasis added). ¶ 23. For Ott's case neither the time period nor the different victims is significant because Ott's common plan or scheme was to sell marijuana to callers who paged him and met him at the Meridian McDonalds. A seven hour time period between two sales of marijuana under the same conditions involving two different police informants, is insignificant. ¶ 24. Although in his ruling the trial judge did not address the mutual admissibility of evidence of the crimes, the evidentiary question was addressed during the hearing on the ore tenus motion. The State argued that evidence of the two sales would be admissible in separate trials under Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other offenses is admissible to prove intent, preparation and plan. Miss. Rule Evid. 404(b). Ott did not address this point in his rebuttal. If the counts were tried separately, under 404(b) evidence of the other crimes would be allowed. See Smith v. State, 656 So.2d 95, 98-99 (Miss.1995) (stating evidence of prior drug sales is admissible to prove intent when accompanied by a limiting instruction under 403). ¶ 25. The final component of the Corley scheme is the interwoven element. In the case sub judice, the second buy was a direct result of information gained during the first buy. If the agents had not heard from Agent Harvey that Ott kept a brown case containing marijuana in his car, they would not have set up the second buy. Thus, the trial judge's finding that the crimes were interwoven was justified. ¶ 26. The trial judge properly held a hearing on severance and then applied the proper review. In doing so, he did not abuse his discretion. This assignment has no merit.