Opinion ID: 8312469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Supreme Court's Order Precludes Granting the Majority of Plaintiffs' Requested Relief

Text: A preliminary injunction is designed to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held. Tex. Children's Hosp. , 76 F.Supp.3d at 235 (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 , 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830 , 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) ). Here, Plaintiffs request that the court alter the status quo by: (1) finding that the State Department's policy set forth in its cable is illegal; (2) enjoining the State Department from implementing the policy; and (3) ordering the State Department to process and issue visas despite the Executive Order and the Supreme Court's order. (Mot. at 10; Pls. Mot. Em. Conf. at 3-4). The court declines to alter the status quo and grant these specific requests for injunctive and mandamus relief while the legality of the Executive Order is currently before the Supreme Court. See, e.g. , Aamer v. Obama , 742 F.3d 1023 , 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction enjoining the government's force-feeding protocol where the Supreme Court [could] later determine[ ] that the petitioners' claims lacked merit.). Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's stay of the injunctions in Trump does not preclude the court from granting the relief they request, since the issue before the Supreme Court is entirely about the ability to enter the country and the claims before the Supreme Court are distinct from the issues here. (ECF No. 26 (Pls. Rep.) at 7, 8). In support of these arguments, Plaintiffs cite to sentences throughout the Court's Order in Trump that discuss entry into the United States, rather than the issuance of visas. ( Id . at 7). Plaintiffs also argue that the cases before the Supreme Court only consider whether the Executive Order violates the Establishment Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act, whether the scope of injunctive relief ordered by the lower court was appropriate, and whether the cases are now moot. ( Id . at 8). However, the court agrees with Defendants that the Supreme Court is currently considering the validity of the Executive Order, and ... has already balanced the equities in determining how that Order may be implemented pending its consideration. (ECF No. 24 (Defs. Opp.) at 15). Although it did not explicitly address this issue, the Supreme Court appears to have considered the Executive Order's implementation with respect to both entry and visa issuance. In the two cases before the Supreme Court, appellate courts upheld the lower courts' injunctions as to section 2(c) of the Executive Order. In IRAP , the Fourth Circuit held that section 2(c) likely violates the Establishment Clause. IRAP , 857 F.3d at 605 . In Hawaii , the Ninth Circuit held that portions of the Executive Order, including section 2(c), likely exceeded the President's authority under the INA. Hawaii , 859 F.3d at 779 . The Supreme Court ordered the injunctions in IRAP and Hawaii to remain in place for parties similarly situated to Doe, Dr. Elshikh, and Hawaii. Trump , 137 S.Ct. at 2088 . The two individual plaintiffs found to be entitled to injunctive relief-Doe # 1 and Dr. Elshikh-are individuals whose injuries and standing arose solely from the Executive Order's likely effect on their family members' abilities to obtain visas. John Doe # 1, one of the plaintiffs in IRAP , is a lawful permanent resident of the United States whose wife, at the time Doe # 1 sought an injunction, was currently awaiting her consular interview in  order to obtain a visa . 6 IRAP , 857 F.3d at 582 . Similarly, Dr. Elshikh, one of the plaintiffs in Hawaii , is an American citizen who alleged that [the Executive Order] will prevent his mother-in-law from obtaining a visa to reunite with her family in the United States. Hawaii , 859 F.3d at 762 (emphasis added). In light of the fact that the Supreme Court ordered that individuals similarly situated to Doe # 1 and Dr. Elshikh, with a bona fide relationship to the United States, were exempt from the Executive Order, it necessarily follows that an individual without a bona fide relationship is not exempt from the Executive Order, even with respect to visa issuance. 7 Moreover, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, in upholding the lower courts' injunctions, specifically mentioned the issuance of visas. In Hawaii , the Ninth Circuit found that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that Section 2(c) of the Order, in suspending the issuance of immigrant visas and denying entry based on nationality, exceeds the restriction of § 1152(a)(1)(A) [of the INA]. Hawaii , 859 F.3d at 779 (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit, although ultimately declining to decide whether the Executive Order violates the INA, noted that [s]ection 2(c)'s 'short pause' on entry effectively halts the issuance of visas for ninety days. IRAP , 857 F.3d at 583 (emphasis added). Similarly, the lower courts drew no distinction between entry and visa issuance when they enjoined enforcement of the Executive Order, finding that the Executive Order impermissibly delayed both issuance of visas and entry into the United States for individuals from the affected countries. The Supreme Court thus considered these findings when it granted the government's applications for stays of the injunctions, and the Court's order precludes this court from determining the legality of the State Department's implementation of the Executive Order. The court is unconvinced by Plaintiffs' argument that no future development in the Supreme Court litigation will have an impact on this case. (Pls. Rep. at 8). As explained above, the Supreme Court's decision to stay the injunctions appeared to consider the Executive Order's applicability to visa issuance. Until the Supreme Court rules on the legality of the Executive Order, this court must abide by the Supreme Court's order, and therefore Plaintiffs' request for relief is denied.