Opinion ID: 887918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue 1. Did the District Court err in denying Munson's motion to suppress statements she made to the Officers?

Text: ¶20 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution provide that no person shall be compelled in a criminal proceeding to testify or be a witness against himself or herself. We discussed this privilege against self-incrimination in State v. Olson, 2003 MT 61, 314 Mont. 402, 66 P.3d 297, explaining that the prosecution may not use statements that stem from a custodial interrogation of a defendant unless the defendant is warned, prior to questioning, that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. [ Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966).] These warnings are often referred to as Miranda warnings. Olson, ¶ 13; accord State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, ¶ 17, 318 Mont. 150, ¶ 17, 79 P.3d 270, ¶ 17; State v. Wrzesinski, 2006 MT 263, ¶ 29, 334 Mont. 157, ¶ 29, 145 P.3d 985, ¶ 29; see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004) (Opinion of Souter, J.) ([F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver of rights before custodial questioning generally requires exclusion of any statements obtained.); State v. Grey, 274 Mont. 206, 211-14, 907 P.2d 951, 954-56 (1995) (holding that Grey's confession was inadmissible due in part to the fact that the police had not given him adequate Miranda warnings). Accordingly, if Munson was subject to a custodial interrogation, then she was entitled to the Miranda warnings before the Officers questioned her, and because Munson indisputably did not receive those warnings, her statements could not be used by the State in prosecuting her. ¶21 There are two separate components to the custodial interrogation determination: (1) whether the individual was in custody and (2) whether the individual was subjected to an interrogation. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299-301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689 (1980); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2397 (1990). With respect to the former, a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda if they have been deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way or their freedom of action has been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 27, 302 Mont. 228, ¶ 27, 14 P.3d 456, ¶ 27 (citing State v. Dawson, 1999 MT 171, ¶ 30, 295 Mont. 212, ¶ 30, 983 P.2d 916, ¶ 30, in turn quoting United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1994)). The determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the questioning, not on the subjective views harbored by the officer(s) and the individual being questioned. See Evans v. Montana Eleventh Judicial Dist. Court, 2000 MT 38, ¶ 21, 298 Mont. 279, ¶ 21, 995 P.2d 455, ¶ 21; Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994) (per curiam). Thus, an officer's undisclosed view that the individual may (or may not) terminate the interview and leave has no bearing on the question whether the individual was in custody at the time; rather, the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the individual's position would have understood his or her situation. See Elison, ¶ 31; Evans, ¶ 21; see also Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25, 114 S. Ct. at 1529-30; Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (1984). ¶22 The Supreme Court has articulated [t]wo discrete inquiries that are essential to the in custody determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: [was] there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995) (alteration in original, footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶23 The federal courts have identified a variety of circumstances that are pertinent to the first inquiry, including the language used by the officers; the location or physical surroundings where the questioning occurs; whether the individual consented to speak with the officers; the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual; whether the individual was moved to another area; whether the officers informed the individual that he or she was not under arrest and was free to leave or could ask the officers to leave; whether there was a threatening presence of several officers; whether the officers used coercive tactics such as hostile tones of voice, the display of weapons, or physical force; the duration of the detention; and the extent to which the individual was confronted with evidence of guilt. See United States v. Hernandez, 476 F.3d 791, 796 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Barker, 467 F.3d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 359-60 (3rd Cir. 2006); United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663-65, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149-50 (2004). We have recognized some of these same considerations. See e.g. Elison, ¶ 28 (identifying the time and place of the questioning, the length and mood of the questioning, and the presence of other persons during the questioning as relevant considerations); State v. Rushton, 264 Mont. 248, 256, 870 P.2d 1355, 1360 (1994) (same), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hermes, 273 Mont. 446, 449, 904 P.2d 587, 589 (1995). [1] ¶24 None of the foregoing circumstances is dispositive. See Czichray, 378 F.3d at 827 (When the factors are invoked, it is important to recall that they are not by any means exclusive, and that `custody' cannot be resolved merely by counting up the number of factors on each side of the balance and rendering a decision accordingly.). Rather, they must be considered together in determining whether a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112, 116 S. Ct. at 465; see also Elison, ¶ 28 ([W]hile consideration of these factors might be useful, the ultimate inquiry is . . . whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. (internal quotation marks omitted)). ¶25 With respect to interrogation under Miranda, this term refers not only to express questioning, but also to `any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.' Olson, ¶ 18 (quoting State v. Flack, 260 Mont. 181, 186, 860 P.2d 89, 92 (1993), in turn quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90); accord In re Z.M., 2007 MT 122, ¶ 42, 337 Mont. 278, ¶ 42, 160 P.3d 490, ¶ 42; State v. McKee, 2006 MT 5, ¶ 31, 330 Mont. 249, ¶ 31, 127 P.3d 445, ¶ 31. The primary focus in determining whether an incriminating response was reasonably likely to be elicited from the suspect is on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than on the intent of the police. Olson, ¶ 18; Z.M., ¶ 42; McKee, ¶ 31. ¶26 With these principles in mind, we now consider the circumstances surrounding the Officers' visit to Munson's apartment and whether those circumstances amount to a custodial interrogation.