Opinion ID: 22977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Exclusion of Recording

Text: 92 Reyes argues that the district court erred in excluding a conversation recorded May 4 between himself and Maldonado. We review the district court's admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2000). At trial, Reyes submitted that the recording was relevant (indeed essential) to his defense theory--namely, that the things he did and said during the investigation were part of his secret plan to scam the scammers. Reyes argues that the exclusion of the recording deprived him of the opportunity to put on an effective defense and therefore violated his right to due process. Further, he argues that the recorded conversation is not hearsay, and that even if it were so construed, it is excepted as a then-existing mental state. We reject each point. 93 At the outset, we note that the opportunity to present evidence, as part of the right to a meaningful defense, applies only to that evidence deemed competent. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)([W]e have never questioned the power of States to exclude evidence through the application of evidentiary rules that themselves serve the interests of fairness and reliability--even if the defendant would prefer to see that evidence admitted.). Here, the recorded May 4 conversation is hearsay, and it is not a statement of a then-existing mental state under Rule 803(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 803(3) permits admission of such statements where, among other things, the statements occurred contemporaneous with the event sought to be proved and the defendant did not have a chance to reflect (i.e., the defendant had no time to fabricate or misrepresent his thoughts). See United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 1315 (7th Cir. 1986); see generally 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 803.06 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2000). The recording in question was made after Maldonado was confronted by law enforcement and pledged to cooperate in their investigation. At trial, Reyes's attorney stated that Reyes by May 4 suspected that Maldonado was cooperating with authorities. The likelihood that the conversation was being monitored or recorded makes it probable that Reyes's recorded remarks were more self-serving than they were candid, and therefore their probative value is greatly diminished. See United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1991). Additionally, the duration between the recorded conversation and Reyes's last criminal act (February 20) is large enough for the district court to rightly conclude that the remarks had little or no probative value with respect to Reyes's then-existing mental state. See Colasanto v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 100 F.3d 203, 213 (1st Cir. 1996)(holding inadmissible state-of-mind evidence where dispute between litigants arose after material time but before evidence recorded). In short, we conclude that the district court acted well within its accorded discretion in excluding the May 4 recording.