Opinion ID: 202335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Barron's Presence at Counsel Table

Text: 45 A district court's decision on whether to sequester a witness is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25, 30 (1st Cir.1991). Its decision will not be questioned absent a showing of prejudice. United States v. Jewett, 520 F.2d 581, 584 (1st Cir.1975) (citation omitted). 2 46 Charles makes two related claims in his argument that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Barron, the case agent, to sit at the government's counsel table: first, that it was error under Fed. R.Evid. 615 to allow him to sit at counsel table and second, that doing so was a violation of Charles's constitutional right to due process. Both arguments fail. 47
Fed.R.Evid. 615 reads: 48 At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party who is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's case, or (4) a person authorized by statute to be present. 49 Charles argues that Barron was permitted to sit at counsel table only if he was indispensable to trying the case, but this is incorrect because Rule 615 provides an exception for the presence of case agent (an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney). See United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 953 & n. 2 (1st Cir.1989) (rejecting defendants' argument that court abused its discretion in not sequestering the government's case agent because [t]he majority view . . . is that Fed.R.Evid. 615(2) has severely curtailed the discretion of the trial court to sequester the government's case agent, but noting that [w]e are not holding . . . that the rule withdraws all discretion from the trial court to exclude a case agent in an exceptional case) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 126 (1st Cir.) (no error in permitting agent to sit at counsel table), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1069, 124 S.Ct. 2405, 158 L.Ed.2d 974 (2004). 50 Charles argues, incorrectly, that the case agent can sit at counsel table only if he is indispensable. Charles focuses on Rule 615(3), which provides for an indispensable person to sit at counsel table, but does not address Rule 615(2), a separate provision providing for a case agent at counsel table without reference to indispensability. The government notes that the Senate Report on Rule 615 admits that it would be difficult to demonstrate that a case agent is indispensable. The report concluded: 51 This problem [of whether to allow the case agent at counsel table] is solved if it is clear that investigative agents are within the group specified under the second exception made in the rule, for an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney. It is our understanding that this was the intention of the House committee. It is certainly this committee's construction of the rule. 52 Fed.R.Evid. 615, Advisory Committee Notes, 1974 Enactment (quoting Sen. Rep. No. 93-1277 (1974)) (emphasis supplied). 53 Rule 615 is about the sequestration of witnesses, and its purpose is to discourage and expose fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. Opus 3 Ltd. v. Heritage Park, Inc., 91 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). The concerns addressed by Rule 615 are not implicated here because, as the district court explained, Barron testified first before joining the government's attorney at counsel table. We find there was no abuse of discretion by the district court in its application of Rule 615 here. 54
55 Charles argues finally that, apart from Rule 615, the district court failed to recognize the prejudice inherent when a victim sits at counsel table, claiming that Barron's presence at counsel table improperly bolstered Agent Barron's credibility and infused prejudice rising to a constitutional level into the proceeding. He challenges the fact that the district court's ruling focused primarily on Barron's identity as a case agent, not as the victim in the case, and questions the court's statement in its ruling that because defendant was sitting at his counsel table, there was balance with Barron's presence at government counsel table. Charles argues that due process requires that any activity that may pose a threat to the `fairness of the factfinding process' . . . be subjected to `close, judicial scrutiny,' Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)), and that there was no compelling reason to have the case agent present at counsel table. Charles relies on Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), in which the Supreme Court reiterated its holding that when a court, without adequate justification, orders a defendant to wear shackles in front of the jury, that defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice in order to make out a due process violation. Charles's reliance is misplaced here, however, as neither the Supreme Court nor inferior appellate tribunals, to our knowledge, have held that the presence of a victim case agent at counsel table is inherently prejudicial in the same way found by the Supreme Court in Deck, nor can we see any prejudice of that magnitude. 56 Charles contends that the presence of Barron at government counsel table implicitly bolstered the credibility of the agent's testimony, but he provides no convincing reasons to believe, on this record, that he suffered any prejudice as a result of Barron's presence at the table. See United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1115 (7th Cir.1979) (In the absence of any specific showing of prejudice to appellant . . . from the action of the trial court [in allowing case agent to sit at counsel table and testify after hearing other witnesses testify], we find no abuse of discretion.). The government argues that Barron's presence at counsel table in no way bolstered his credibility since, even though Barron testified that Charles had struck him and left a large bruise, the jury acquitted Charles of the indictment count alleging injury, instead convicting him only of the lesser included offense of assault with physical contact. Charles points to nothing indicating that Barron behaved at counsel table in such a way as to somehow evoke special sympathy for his status as a government victim. 57 The only case of which we are aware in this Circuit to discuss in any great detail the seating of a case agent at counsel table is United States v. Anagnos, 853 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1988). We held there that it was error for a district court, when requested, not to ask potential jurors on voir dire whether they thought a police officer was more likely to tell the truth than a civilian. We observed that the potential prejudice of the situation had been compounded by the court's allowing the case agent to sit at counsel table. Id. The witness's presence at counsel table had not been objected to, and we did not find plain error in his sitting at the table, noting to the contrary that [i]t is understandable that in some cases trial counsel may need assistance other than an associate or paralegal. Whether this should include a witness, particularly an important one, must be in the court's discretion. Id. at 4-5. We concluded, however, that his presence at the table clearly accentuated the importance of the voir dire inquiry. Id. The instant case is easily distinguishable from Anagnos. Here, the district court asked the jurors during voir dire whether they had any bias for or against law enforcement officers and instructed them not to weigh more heavily any testimony by an officer. We are satisfied that the court's decision in these circumstances to allow Barron to sit at counsel's table was well within its discretion. 3 58 The government also points out that victims' rights statutes have allowed victims to sit in courtrooms (albeit not addressing the issue of their sitting at counsel table). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(3) (victim has [t]he right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding). See also § 3661(a)(5) (victim has right to confer with government attorney). While these statutes are perhaps of some help to the government's overall argument, they are not conclusive by themselves. The main point is that we see no general constitutional principle, such as the Deck court relied upon, rendering it impermissible for a case agent who was also the victim in the case from sitting at counsel table, nor, in the circumstances of this case, do we see any indication of specific prejudicing factors such as might, in an exceptional set of circumstances, prevent the district court from exercising its discretion in favor of allowing the case agent to sit there. As noted in Anagnos, the matter is ordinarily one within the district court's sound discretion. 59 The court here carefully considered the issue of whether Barron's presence at counsel table could be prejudicial and took care to instruct the jury not to give his testimony greater weight than that of any other witness. In no way did it abuse its discretion in allowing Barron to remain at government counsel's table. 60 Affirmed.