Opinion ID: 2633504
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for new trial on damages

Text: Domke initially asserts that the superior court erred by denying him a new trial on the issue of damages. A dissatisfied litigant may move for a new trial in the interests of justice under Alaska Civil Rule 59(a). Denial of a motion for a new trial lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. [1] We will affirm a denial order entered under Rule 59(a) if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, provides any basis for the jury's decision. [2] Conversely, we will reject a jury's award of damages and order a new trial only when the evidence supporting the jury's conclusion is so completely lacking or slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. [3] Here, the jury awarded Domke $10,000 in economic damages for Champion's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and Disbrow's interference with Domke's employment contract. Comparing this award to his monthly salary, Domke reasons that the jury awarded him only two months' back pay. He protests that the evidence fails to support such a small award for back pay because he was a valuable employee with a reasonable expectation of further employment. In Domke's view, then, the jury must have mistakenly speculated that Domke's employment contract with Champion would have naturally expired on or about December 23, 1998 had Disbrow not interfered with this contract. Champion responds that the jury's award makes sense. It posits that [t]he jury could have found [that] there was no unlawful interference [by Disbrow] prior to October 1, 1998, but that Disbrow interfered between October 1 and November 2, 1998, when Disbrow's objection to Domke in Valdez resulted in early termination. Pointing to evidence that Champion had assigned Domke to work on BPO-213 only until the end of December 1998, and that it had agreed to employ him after that only if it found him another position, Champion argues that the jury could reasonably have found that Domke would not likely have worked beyond December in any event, so any interference only resulted in two months' lost wages. Champion's argument finds support in the record. The parties agreed that Domke was an at-will employee. On October 1, 1998 Disbrow sent Knickrehm an e-mail that Knickrehm interpreted as requesting that Domke be removed from the Alyeska contract. Knickrehm asked for ninety days to find another position within Champion for Domke. Knickrehm testified that he told Domke that Domke was being removed from the Alyeska project after ninety days, and that Champion would have to try and find another job for him after that. Domke himself acknowledged understanding that at the end of the 90 days if Mr. Knickrehm could not find another position for me, that my job was over. Moreover, Knickrehm testified that he had located and offered Domke other available positions outside Alaska  including an international position in which Domke could have worked thirty days on and thirty days off  but that Domke had rejected all these offers, refusing to accept any positions outside Alaska. The jury further heard evidence that Disbrow had pressed Knickrehm to terminate Domke in late October 1998. As Domke put it, Disbrow went ballistic again and demanded that I be pulled off the contract immediately. Domke was terminated on November 2, 1998. Based on this evidence, it would not have been irrational for the jury to find that Domke was unfairly fired in early November but that his employment with Champion likely would have expired at the end of December 1998 in any event because Champion might not have been able to find a new job that met his satisfaction. Because the evidence here was not so completely lacking or slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust, [4] we decline to reverse the superior court's order denying a new trial on the damages issue. [5]