Opinion ID: 801832
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rivera's Challenges on Appeal

Text: Rivera claims that the district court improperly denied the introduction of extrinsic impeachment evidence in the crossexamination of government witness Barreira and that this violated his constitutional right to confront the witness against him. Rivera sought to impeach Barreira with a sworn affidavit given to state prosecutors upon his arrest. The affidavit contained Barreira's sworn assertions that the gun that was confiscated from him on the day of his arrest -- the .357 Magnum that he had taken from Chito -- was the same gun used for the drive-by shooting and, consequently, the murder of Torres.5 Subsequent ballistic evidence 5 Rivera also sought to admit certain certified translations of audio recordings of testimony given by Barreira in state court proceedings. Counsel for Rivera admittedly failed to submit the transcripts to the court below as rejected impeachment material for the record, and Rivera's briefing on appeal is bereft of any -9- revealed, however, that the confiscated .357 Magnum was not a match for the one used in the murder. Accordingly, Barreira's testimony at trial acknowledged that he had made a mistake in his earlier statements by incorrectly assuming that [the .357 Magnum] was the revolver that was used in the Torres murder. Barreira stated that he had made this assumption because [] the day that [he] asked Chito to give [him] the revolver was the same day that Valdo ordered [him] to take the revolver from Chito in connection with the botched drive-by. Rivera argues that Barreira's prior sworn statements establish a discrepancy regarding the gun that makes his testimony at trial less credible, and his prior statements more significant for impeachment purposes. We disagree. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment secures a right to cross-examination in order to test 'the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony.' United States v. González-Vázquez, 219 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Carty, 993 F.2d 1005, 1009 (1st Cir. 1993)). However, as we have explained, this right is not unlimited. When a witness's credibility is at issue, the trial court may limit crossexamination as long as the court allows 'sufficient leeway to description whatsoever of what, if any, material statements those transcripts contain. We nonetheless assume, based on the nature of Rivera's argument on appeal, that they contain parallel misstatements by Barreira as to the gun in question and would therefore have a similar effect upon the question on appeal. -10- establish a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation.' Id. (quoting United States v. LaboyDelgado, 84 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, on appeal from a trial court's decision to impose such limitations, we first review the record de novo to ascertain whether the court, overall, gave the defendant a reasonable chance to develop the whole picture. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d at 28 (emphasis added). If we determine that the defendant's opportunity to impeach adverse witnesses met or exceeded this constitutionally-guaranteed threshold, we review for abuse of discretion the district court's decision to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination in order to avoid confusion of the issues or extended discussion of marginally relevant material. United States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Barreira's testimony at trial acknowledged that he had made a prior statement in which he had mistakenly characterized the confiscated revolver as the murder weapon. Barreira's acknowledgment at trial of the discrepancy between his prior statement and the subsequently-gleaned ballistics information clarified to the jury the precise conflict that Rivera was interested in highlighting through the affidavit. The district court's failure to allow Rivera to introduce Barreira's prior sworn -11- statement as extrinsic evidence therefore did not prevent the jury from obtaining a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d at 28 (quoting United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st Cir. 1990)). Defense counsel had ample opportunity to explore this avenue of impeachment and to ensure[] that the jury understood [Rivera's] concerns about the witness, at which point the district court was entitled to move the trial forward. Byrne, 435 F.3d at 22. See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 478 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting no Confrontation Clause issue [was] presented where reasonable opportunity to test [the witnesses'] veracity and motives was offered). We therefore hold that the district court did not deprive Rivera of his confrontation rights by denying his request to admit prior statements by Barreira as impeachment material. Moreover, we conclude that the district court's decision was not an abuse of discretion. While the previous statement might be superficially inconsistent with Barreira's testimony at trial, his explanation upon questioning by both parties, i.e., mistaken belief, did away with the inconsistency; and so the trial court found. See United States v. Martin, 694 F.2d 885, 888 (1st Cir. 1982) (alleged inconsistent statement of witness made prior to trial not allowed as extrinsic impeachment evidence where defendant-appellant was unable to demonstrate that the offered -12- testimony was in fact inconsistent with statements made at trial); see also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (A basic rule of evidence provides that prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness. As a preliminary matter, however, the court must be persuaded that the statements are indeed inconsistent.).
Rivera next argues that the government's evidence at trial established an impermissible variance from the charges listed in the indictment against him. Specifically, he submits that any facts pertaining to drug trafficking in the area of Quebrada del Agua, introduced through Barreira's testimony, are outside of the charged conspiracy and are, in fact, related to a separate conspiracy led by Valdo and an individual known as Lipo. Rivera bases this contention on testimony at trial to the effect that Lipo was running the drug point at Quebrada del Agua, which distributed marijuana to the adjacent town of Peñuelas, and that this drug point was not owned by Martínez, nor did Lipo work for him. Rivera particularly emphasizes the fact that neither Quebrada del Agua nor Peñuelas were mentioned in the indictment.6 6 The district court denied Rivera's motion in limine in this regard and his direct objection to Barreira's Quebrada del Agua testimony; it also denied Rivera's subsequent motion for a mistrial during the cross-examination of Barreira based on the same argument. The argument was again raised in Rivera's various Rule 29 motions, which were also denied. -13- Rivera's claim requires us to determine whether a variance occurred and, if so, whether that variance prejudiced [his] substantial rights.7 See United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2003). This doctrine is also meant to protect against the prejudicial spillover effect that may occur in cases involving multiple defendants. See United States v. Tormos-Vega, 959 F.2d 1103, 1115 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 582 (1st Cir. 1981) (If the Government proves more conspiracies than the one charged in the indictment, a defendant involved in one conspiracy may not be convicted on the basis of evidence that relates only to a separate conspiracy.). It is this last claim that Rivera attempts to raise on appeal. When, as here, a defendant asserts a claim of variance that is premised on the notion that multiple conspiracies existed and that his activities were not part of the charged conspiracy, the initial question . . . is one of evidentiary sufficiency. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7. We must first determine whether the government was able to prove the conspiracy charged in the indictment by applying the typical framework for the review of sufficiency challenges in criminal cases. See id. Accordingly, we canvass the evidence (direct and circumstantial) in the light 7 Our review in this sense is de novo. See United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 124 (1st Cir. 2011) (We review de novo the question whether a variance affected a defendant's substantial rights. (quoting United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 774 (1st Cir. 1996)) (emphasis added). -14- most agreeable to the prosecution to assess if the evidence, including all plausible inferences extractable therefrom, enables a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime. Id. (quoting United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490, 494 (1st Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we resolve all credibility issues in favor of the verdict, and [w]e must reject [Rivera's] claim as long as a plausible reading of the record supports the jury's implied finding that he knowingly participated in the charged conspiracy. Id. (citing United States v. Alicea, 205 F.3d 480, 483 (1st Cir. 2000) and United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1173 (1st Cir. 1993)).8 8 Thus, we are required to address the issue of variance only if we find that the evidence establishes agreements different from those charged. United States v. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 18 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004). See Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 773 (explaining the framework for analyzing when a variance between the conspiracy charged and the conspiracy proven constitutes reversible error). That phase of the inquiry focuses on whether there is sufficient evidence to permit a well-instructed jury to convict the defendant of a similar related conspiracy, and if so, whether the variance between the two conspiracies affected his or her substantial rights. See United States v. Glenn, 828 F.2d 855, 858 (1st Cir. 1987); Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 773 (Put differently, '[s]o long as the statutory violation remains the same, the jury can convict even if the facts are somewhat different than charged -- so long as the difference does not cause unfair prejudice.') (quoting United States v. Twitty, 72 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1995)). Because we find that the evidence in this case was sufficient to support the finding of a single conspiracy, however, we need not reach these additional steps in our analysis. See, e.g., Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 18 n.1; Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7. -15- In order to determine whether a single conspiracy was proved by the government, we look at the totality of the evidence with various factors in mind, none of which, standing alone, i[s] necessarily determinative. United States v. Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2008). These factors include (1) the existence of a common purpose, . . . (2) the interdependency of various elements in the plan, . . . and (3) the degree of overlap among the participants. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 18-19. The government does not need to prove that each conspirator knew of or had contact with all other members, nor that the conspirators knew all of the details of the conspiracy or participated in every act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 19 (citing United States v. Mena–Robles, 4 F.3d 1026, 1032 (1st Cir. 1993)). Here, in order to find the single conspiracy charged, with Martínez at its head, it must have been possible for the jury to infer from the acts and statements of the witnesses a single ongoing 'agreement' that embraced [Rivera] and other co-conspirators. United States v. Jones, 674 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 2012). Rivera concedes that the trial evidence is sufficient to support an overlapping of participants between Martínez's operation and the Quebrada del Agua operation, particularly as it relates to Valdo. His concern instead is that the objective of the Quebrada del Agua drug point owned by Lipo was different and separate from any of the charged conspiracy's concerns because it focused on -16- selling marijuana in neighboring Peñuelas (an area not specifically mentioned in the indictment) and the evidence reflects that Lipo did not work for Martínez. Given, however, the wide breadth of the 'common goal' requirement, Rivera's argument does not take him far. See Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d at 29 (citing United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d 411, 421-22 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that 'goal of selling cocaine for profit' or 'furthering the distribution of cocaine is . . . sufficient evidence' of a common goal (quoting Portela, 167 F.3d at 695)). The evidence shows that the activities that took place at Quebrada del Agua were in fact linked to Martínez's operation. Barreira testified that Valdo was in charge of distributing Martínez's cocaine and that, while he was still an enforcer for Martínez's operation, [Barreira] left the heroin point to go help Valdo with the cocaine kilos at [] Quebrada del Agua. Fairly read, Barreira's testimony reflects that, while Lipo's marijuana distribution operation ran separately from Martínez's, Valdo ran his cocaine laboratory from the Quebrada del Agua residence owned by Lipo's sister, where he kept a press for packaging the kilos of cocaine. Barreira also indicated that, although he personally would not get [any] profits out of [Lipo's marijuana operation], [] [he] would provide safety and security for the marijuana . . . stash[ed] at the house. -17- We also note that another of the government's witnesses, an unindicted co-conspirator named Gerardo Fontánez (Fontánez), testified that he saw Rivera working the marijuana, crack, and cocaine processing table with both Lipo and Valdo. Fontánez testified that he was residing in the same house in Quebrada del Agua when these events took place. In testimony that will also become relevant in our subsequent analysis, Fontánez indicated that on one occasion he saw Lipo take a gun from Rivera and another from Chito around the time of the Torres murder.9 The evidence, therefore, could support a rational inference that, at the very least, Lipo's drug point shared a common defense with the Martínez operation and that Martínez's cocaine supply depended, at least in part, upon Valdo's successful processing of the substance at the Quebrada del Agua residence. See Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 19 (indicating that interdependency can be shown where the success of an individual's own drug transactions depends on the health and success of the drug trafficking network that supplies him); Portela, 167 F.3d at 695 (Establishing interdependence among the participants requires determining whether the activities of one aspect of the scheme are 9 Rivera challenges Fontánez's testimony as having been inconsistent and incredible, but it is the prerogative of the jury to give credence to and interpret the combined testimony of the various government witnesses and draw any reasonable conclusions from the same. See United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 92 (1st Cir. 2004) (indicating credibility of witnesses is the sole function of the trier of fact). -18- necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Such interdependence 'makes it reasonable to speak of a tacit understanding between [a core conspirator] and others upon whose unlawful acts' his success depends. Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d at 29 (quoting Glenn, 828 F.2d at 858). Because the jury reasonably could have concluded that the Quebrada del Agua activities shared a common purpose with Martínez's operation, had the requisite degree of interdependency, and were thus a subset of Martínez's master conspiracy, we must reject Rivera's argument that there was a variance in this regard. See United States v. LiCausi, 167 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir. 1999) (Whether a single conspiracy or a multiple conspiracy exists is, of course, a question of fact for the jury.); see also United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 204 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that [j]urors are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from proven facts). As we stated before, not every difference between the indictment and the proof justifies relief. United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 773 (1st Cir. 1998). Although Quebrada del Agua and Peñuelas are not specifically listed in the indictment, [t]he government need not recite all its evidence in the indictment, nor is its trial proof limited to the overt acts specified therein. Id. It was established at trial that Quebrada -19- del Agua is located in Ponce, and the indictment mentioned that the drug points associated with the conspiracy were located in Ponce, Puerto Rico. In addition, aside from overt act #27, discussed further infra, Rivera was generally charged as a drug point owner, drug processor, and as an enforcer for the conspiracy. To this end, the indictment specified that Martínez's subordinates were tasked, inter alia, with accompanying him to purchase kilograms of narcotics in Ponce and San Juan, Puerto Rico, and other locations for further distribution at the drug points, as well as concealing drugs at their residences. Although the indictment did not spell out every single location at which activities related to the conspiracy took place, it gave a sufficient description of the manner and means of the same to put Rivera on notice of the charges against him. See, e.g., Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 477-78 (rejecting claim of variance because, although certain evidence presented encompassed acts not listed in the indictment, [t]he evidence complained of [] f[ell] squarely within the scope of th[e] alleged conspiracy, both temporally and substantively). We find that Rivera cannot credibly claim surprise and, therefore, the asserted variance does not warrant setting aside the verdict. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d at 773.
Rivera's final challenge to his conviction is another attack on the district court's evidentiary rulings. He contends -20- that any statements made by Chito or Valdo to Barreira in relation to the murder of Torres -- overt act #27 -- were inadmissible hearsay. Because Rivera preserved his challenge to the district court's admission of these statements,10 we review his claim for abuse of discretion. United States v. Díaz, 670 F.3d 332, 348 (1st Cir. 2012). Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) classifies as nonhearsay statements made by a defendant's co-conspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. As such, these statements if admitted, may be considered for the truth of the matter asserted. United States v. Colón-Díaz, 521 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 2008). Their admissibility turns on four elements: (1) the existence of a conspiracy, (2) the defendant's membership in that conspiracy, (3) the declarant's membership in the same conspiracy, and (4) that the statement be made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 35-36. A district court faced with a challenge to the admission of a co-conspirator's statement must provisionally admit the statement and then wait until the end of the trial to consider whether, in light of all the evidence, [these] four conditions are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence. Díaz, 670 F.3d at 348 (citing United States v. 10 During trial, the district court denied Rivera's motion in limine requesting that it exclude evidence in relation to overt act #27 and Rivera presented an overruled objection in this respect during Barreira's direct testimony. -21- Vázquez–Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 62 (1st Cir. 2008) and United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977)). The preponderance of the evidence required in this context must necessarily comprise more than the weight of the statement itself, requiring some corroborating extrinsic evidence. Portela, 167 F.3d at 703 (quoting Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d at 1181-82). Rivera contends that the following statements are inadmissible because they were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy: (1) Chito's confession to Barreira about the murder of Torres and his reasons for committing the same, i.e., that the target had stolen five kilos of cocaine from Valdo, and (2) Valdo's statements to Barreira in reaction to the news of the botched drive-by, i.e., his irritation and instruction that Barreira confiscate Chito's weapon. We find there was no error as to the latter of these statements because Barreira's testimony regarding Valdo's reaction was not hearsay. The government offered Valdo's out-of-court statements to establish the role that Valdo played as supervisor over both Chito and Rivera. In addition, we have noted that [o]ut-of-court statements providing directions from one individual to another do not constitute hearsay. Díaz, 670 F.3d at 346 (citing United States v. Bailey, 270 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2001)). We therefore proceed to assess only the admissibility of Chito's statements to Barreira. -22- Rivera's argument here essentially reasserts his variance claim. Because Barreira's conversation with Chito and Rivera about the botched drive-by took place at Quebrada del Agua, and none of the activities at Quebrada del Agua had to do with the charged conspiracy, so Rivera's argument goes, Chito's statements were inadmissible. Having dismissed Rivera's premise by finding that the government in this case was able to prove that a single conspiracy existed, we need not delve too deeply in assessing this claim. The first two elements of the test outlined above are met. We have already discussed the government's evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that a conspiracy to distribute drugs operated under Martínez's leadership in the area of Ponce, that the Quebrada del Agua operation was part and parcel of the same drug ring, and that Rivera was a member of the conspiracy by virtue, inter alia, of his drug processing activities. As to the third element -- whether Chito, the declarant, was also a member of the conspiracy -- there is evidence on the record, aside from Barreira's own testimony, that Chito was a runner for the group, that he was seen arriving at Quebrada del Agua in the company of Rivera, that the two of them were seen meeting with Lipo, and that the latter then took a gun from Rivera and another from Chito. This testimony was given by government witness Fontánez and serves as independent corroboration of the -23- fact that Chito was an active member of the charged conspiracy. See, e.g., Díaz, 670 F.3d at 348 (identification by other witnesses of the declarants as co-owners of the drug point and related testimony as to their activity there considered sufficient as evidence other than the out-of-court statements at issue). Finally, the fourth element is satisfied because Chito's statement to Barreira, that he and Rivera had performed a (botched) drive-by in retaliation for the theft of cocaine from Valdo's stash, pertained to the defense of Martínez's drug trafficking ring. See United States v. Rodríguez, 525 F.3d 85, 101 (1st Cir. 2008) (A statement is in furtherance of the conspiracy if it tends to advance the objects of the conspiracy as opposed to thwarting its purpose. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). At the very least, the district court could reasonably have determined that the conversation between Barreira, Chito, and Rivera about the murder of Torres served to keep the members of the conspiracy upto-date on important developments relating to the organization. See Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d at 1180 (noting as common ground -- and common sense -- that the reporting of significant events by one coconspirator to another advances the conspiracy); see also United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1983) (Statements between conspirators which provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among them, or inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the conspiracy -24- and are admissible so long as the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are met.). Thus, the district court did not err when it admitted the co-conspirator statements at issue.11 We move on to consider González's claims on appeal.