Opinion ID: 2632319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victim Impact Testimony and Argument

Text: [¶ 7] In Mr. Wilks' first claim of error, he asserts the trial court improperly permitted several instances of victim impact testimony and argument. With one exception, Mr. Wilks failed to object to the challenged statements at trial. We, therefore, review his claims under our three-part plain error standard: First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove a substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he has been materially prejudiced. Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 7, 30 P.3d 47, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001) (citations omitted). [¶ 8] Wyoming law permits the trial court to consider oral or written victim impact statements prior to imposing a sentence. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-21-101 to -103 (LexisNexis 2001). In this case, the allegations of improper victim testimony and argument arose at trial and, therefore, do not fall under §§ 7-21-101 through 7-21-103. The key inquiry on the admissibility of victim impact testimony during the guilt phase of a criminal trial is relevancy. McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 751 (Wyo.1993). Victim impact testimony must not be permitted unless there is a clear justification of relevance. Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Wyo. 1989). Such testimony may be irrelevant if offered during the guilt phase of the trial as proof of the victim's loss; the physical, emotional, or psychological impact on the victim; or the effect upon the family. Yet, it may be relevant if offered for another proper purpose. Id. at 1010. Mr. Wilks contends that either the testimony and argument were irrelevant or their probative value was outweighed by their prejudice. [¶ 9] Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. W.R.E. 401. In criminal cases, [e]vidence is always relevant if it tends to prove or disprove one of the elements of the crime charged. Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 809 (Wyo.1980); see also Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 42, 43 P.3d 80, ¶ 42 (Wyo.2002); Geiger v. State, 859 P.2d 665, 667 (Wyo.1993). Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. W.R.E. 403. For this court to conclude that the trial court admitted unduly prejudicial evidence in violation of W.R.E. 403, the appellant must demonstrate that the evidence had little or no probative value and that it was extremely inflammatory or introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury. Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo.1981). [¶ 10] First, Mr. Wilks challenges the testimony obtained from the victim's husband. He testified that he and the victim had breakfast together every morning they were married and, on the day she was murdered, she was in a good mood and was happy and normal. The state contends this testimony was relevant to establish a foundation for the husband's knowledge of the victim's mood on the day of the murder, which in turn related to the unlikelihood that she would have engaged in an argument with Mr. Wilks. The state bolsters its theory by directing our attention to the husband's rebuttal testimony wherein he recounted an incident in which the victim received a meager tip and immediately forgave the customer, assuming the small amount was all the customer could afford to give her. We agree that, on rebuttal, there may have been some limited relevance to this testimony in an effort to impeach Mr. Wilks' assertion that the victim bickered over the tip amount. However, we cannot see how the evidence was relevant in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The prosecutor is not allowed to bootstrap relevancy in the first instance by what it subsequently offers in rebuttal testimony. Although the victim's state of mind was not relevant when offered in the prosecution's case-in-chief, we cannot say the evidence was extremely inflammatory sufficient to warrant reversal. [¶ 11] The second instance of challenged testimony occurred when the prosecution questioned the husband about identifying the victim's body. As with several of his other contentions, Mr. Wilks makes no effort to explain how the prosecutor's question resulted in error or to point this court to any pertinent authority. Upon our own independent review, we cannot find any plain error in its admission. [¶ 12] Third, Mr. Wilks claims the trial court erred by permitting the introduction of a photograph of the victim taken while she was alive. At trial, the state showed the victim's photograph to the husband and asked him to identify it. Defense counsel objected arguing the defense was not contesting the victim's identification and the photograph was irrelevant and prejudicial because it tended to invoke sympathy for the victim. The state argues the introduction of the photograph was relevant to show that the victim was alive before Mr. Wilks took the actions for which he was on trial. The state's contention is wholly without merit. [¶ 13] We have said: Generally the question of admission of photographs is left to the reasonable discretion of the trial court. However, in any case of which we are aware in which a photograph was deemed properly admitted it had some probative value. This principle would seem to be applicable to the admission of any exhibit, for if that which is offered has no probative value there would appear to be no reason for its admission. Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo.1973) (citations omitted); see also Mayer v. State, 618 P.2d 127, 130 (Wyo.1980). We adopt the following test for the use of in life photographs of homicide victims: Photographs of homicide victims taken during life should be admitted to the jury only under very limited circumstances: Photographs of [homicide] victims [taken while alive] are inadmissible unless they are relevant to some material issue and their relevancy outweighs the danger of prejudice to the defendant.... [W]here there is no purpose in introducing such pictures into evidence, such admission invokes the sympathy of the jury and constitutes error. (FN83) [3] Valdez v. State, 900 P.2d 363, 380 (Okla.Crim.App.1995). Several witnesses testified that the victim was alive on the day of her murder. The state, therefore, did not need the photograph to establish this fact. However, an in life photograph is often relevant to establish the victim's identity. Although Mr. Wilks stipulated throughout trial to causing the victim's death and her identity was not in dispute, in every homicide case the state must establish the identity of the person killed. State v. Broberg, 342 Md. 544, 677 A.2d 602, 610-12 (1996). Since the prosecution has the burden of proving all the elements of a crime, relevant photographs do not become inadmissible because the defendant concedes the fact and cause of the victim's death. Seyle v. State, 584 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Wyo.1978). Admission of homicide victims' in life photographs is discouraged and should be permitted under only very limited circumstances where their relevancy outweighs the potential to inflame the jury. [¶ 14] Several jurisdictions that have considered the issue have held there is no inherent prejudice in the use of a victim's life photograph. This is especially true where the jury will also view autopsy or crime scene photographs showing the victim, as was the case in this instance. See Commonwealth v. Rivers, 537 Pa. 394, 644 A.2d 710, 716 (1994); Broberg, 677 A.2d at 610-12; People v. Thompson, 45 Cal.3d 86, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37, 54 (1988) (In Bank); People v. Hovey, 44 Cal.3d 543, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776, 791-92 (1988). Our review of the record reveals that the state did not spend a great deal of time introducing and discussing the photograph. Given the evidence against Mr. Wilks, there is no reasonable possibility the verdict might have been more favorable to him if the error had never occurred. Therefore, the introduction of the photograph was not prejudicial to Mr. Wilks. [¶ 15] Next, he complains that two Pizza Hut employees were permitted to testify that they never saw the victim alive again and such testimony was elicited to show the trauma caused to them. We think this testimony was relevant because it tended to show the timing of the victim's death. Both witnesses were examined as to the specific events of the evening up until the time they discovered her death. The prosecutor did not explore whether the witnesses were traumatized by never seeing the victim again, and they did not elaborate. The prosecutor was simply trying to establish a timeline for the events in question; therefore, the questioning was relevant and admissible. [¶ 16] Mr. Wilks additionally asserts that testimony elicited from the two Pizza Hut employees amounted to improper victim impact testimony. The prosecutor asked the employees whether they remained employees at Pizza Hut. The first witness responded in the negative and explained the reason for her departure: Because this totally scared the ba-jeebers out of me. I couldn'tI couldn'tI couldn't function normally like I used to. Iit just really threw me into, you knowI felt like I was going crazy, pretty much. The second witness replied that she no longer worked for Pizza Hut [b]ecause ofof the incident. I couldn'tI don't want to. We look to the analysis in Justice for guidance on how best to resolve this issue. In that case, the appellant argued the court erred in admitting the victims' testimony as to the impact of the crime upon them, and we held: It is clear that the testimony offered by the victims of this crime with respect to how it affected them in connection with their lives after the crime is absolutely irrelevant with respect to the issues before the jury. Their discussion of the impact of the crime upon them could not in any way serve to establish any of the elements of the crime of aggravated robbery. The only purpose must have been to attempt to arouse the passions of the jury. Consequently, we are satisfied that the admission of such evidence is error, and the trial courts are cautioned not to permit such evidence to be presented unless there is a clear justification of relevance. In the context of this case, however, we are persuaded that such evidence was harmless. Given the other evidence against Justice, which the trial court aptly described as overwhelming, the admission of the testimony about the impact on the victims did not constitute prejudicial error. Justice, 775 P.2d at 1010-11. Accordingly, we hold the admission of the employees' testimony was without a clear justification of relevance and was calculated to arouse the passions of the jury. However, while these individual isolated questions and answers may have been irrelevant and resulted in error, as a whole, the employees' testimony was relevant. See Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 656 (Wyo.1993) (holding certain answers by the victim amounted to irrelevant victim impact testimony; however, the testimony was harmless because, as a whole, it was clearly relevant). The first witness testified that she took Mr. Wilks' pizza order over the telephone, and the second witness arrived at the crime scene while searching for the victim. Therefore, in light of their entire testimony, the remarks by the two witnesses that amounted to irrelevant victim impact statements did not result in material prejudice to Mr. Wilks. [¶ 17] Finally, Mr. Wilks contends the prosecutor made several remarks in closing argument and rebuttal that amounted to impermissible victim impact remarks. We believe his argument essentially asserts claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and we will, therefore, address those claims in that section of this opinion.