Opinion ID: 1090418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of Negligent Supervision of Personnel Asserted Against Ross

Text: Additionally, Ross contends that the trial court exceeded the scope of its discretion in refusing to grant him State-agent immunity with regard to T.W.'s claim that he was negligent in his supervision of school personnel. Ex parte Cranman provides that an agent of the State is protected from liability for decisions made while exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of the State when assigning or supervising personnel. 792 So.2d at 405. In Hill v. Allen, 495 So.2d 32 (Ala.1986), this Court held that a school principal, who was accused of negligent supervision of teachers and aides who had allegedly assaulted mentally retarded students, was entitled to State-agent immunity. In Hill, the students maintained that the principal knew or should have known of the alleged abuses inflicted upon them, yet failed to prevent them. This Court held that the principal was entitled to immunity because he was exercising his judgment in supervising the teachers at the time of the assaults and that he did not exceed the scope of his authority because the students did not allege or establish that the principal had acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Here, like the principal in Hill, Ross exercised discretion within his authority when he assigned Trottman to check students in and out of school. T.W. did not present any evidence to establish that at the time Ross assigned Trottman, under his supervision, to check students in and out of school Ross acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith or beyond his . . . authority. Therefore, Ross is entitled to State-agent immunity with regard to T.W.'s claim that he negligently supervised Trottman. Finally, T.W. argues that Ross is not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she says, he exceeded the scope of his discretion by failing to formulate and enforce proper checkout procedures at Mount Olive Elementary School. Ex parte Cranman specifically provides that a State agent is entitled to immunity when formulating policies. 792 So.2d at 405. In Louviere v. Mobile County Board of Education, 670 So.2d 873 (Ala.1995), this Court held that a principal of an elementary school was entitled to State-agent immunity on a claim that he negligently failed to exercise proper safety measures, to monitor school equipment, to maintain safety precautions, and to institute safety measures. 670 So.2d at 877. In Louviere an elementary school student was severely burned when she stepped into a hole and her feet and ankles were burned by hot water or steam, which allegedly was caused by an underground boiler pipe. This Court held that the principal was immune from liability, stating: Whatever her action might have been, any decision she might have made was related to the performance of her duties as principal, and called for `personal deliberation[s], decision[s] and judgment[s]' in the performance of her job. Thus, in making that decision she was engaged in the performance of discretionary functions for which she possessed constitutional immunity. 670 So.2d at 877. Like the principal in Louviere, Ross is also entitled to State-agent immunity. The development of a checkout policy at Mount Olive Elementary School was within Ross's discretion in making decisions as principal for the school. T.W. did not present any evidence indicating that in formulating the checkout policy Ross acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his . . . authority. Therefore, Ross is entitled to State-agent immunity on this claim.