Opinion ID: 2637986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Circuit Court's Evidentiary Rulings

Text: A police search of Culkin's house uncovered a number of forged identifications. [11] In connection with this discovery, Culkin was charged with one count of second degree forgery, and was scheduled for trial on that charge after the murder trial. The prosecution filed a motion indicating its intent to confront Culkin with evidence: (1) of a checking account with the Bank of Hawai`i that Culkin allegedly opened using the name of Harold Cross; (2) that, in May 1997, Culkin used that same name to rent his house; and (3) of several identification cards discovered during the search of Culkin's house. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that Culkin was facing an upcoming forgery trial based on the opening of a checking account under the name Harold Cross. She argued that to question Culkin on this matter would potentially force him to assert his fifth amendment privilege in front of the jury, which would be extremely prejudicial. The circuit court ruled that if Culkin took the stand, the prosecution could question him about use of the State Harold Cross identification to open the bank account and to rent the house, but precluded questioning about other identification cards. At trial, Culkin took the stand and testified that he used the name Harold Cross, who was a real person, to open a checking account and rent the house in which he lived. Culkin explained that he used the Harold Cross identification because he wanted a house big enough to start up a printing business, but that his own credit was bad. During Culkin's testimony, the following exchange occurred: Q. [by Prosecutor] Do you remember doing this, making this ID card? A. [by Culkin] Yes. Q. Do you remember putting six foot tall, 225 pounds? A. I remember sitting for the picture. I didn't fill out the ID, though. But (shrugs) Q. You did not fill out the ID. Who filled out the ID? A. My brother made the ID, typed in all the information. Q. Your brother makes your ID to rent the house, to open the bank account .... Q. Did you say in your answer your brother made this ID for you? A. I said my brother made the ID for me, yes. Q. All you did was sit for the picture? A. Right. The circuit court then ruled that Culkin had opened the door for the prosecution to impeach him with evidence that he also possessed other identification cards. Culkin advised the court that, due to the pending forgery trial, he would invoke his fifth amendment privilege if questioned about other identifications. Nevertheless, the court permitted the prosecution to question Culkin about a federal identification under the name Harold Cross and a state identification under the name Paul Polinski. In response to questions, Culkin asserted his privilege against self-incrimination six times. [12] The trial court cautioned the jury to not draw any inference prejudicial to the defendant by his choosing to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights. Culkin contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine him regarding false identification cards uncovered at his house, thereby forcing him to invoke his fifth amendment privilege on the witness stand. We agree. A defendant who elects to testify in his own defense is subject to cross-examination as to any matter pertinent to, or having a logical connection with the specific offense for which he is being tried. State v. Pokini, 57 Haw. 17, 22, 548 P.2d 1397, 1400 (1976). In this regard, a defendant may be cross-examined on collateral matters bearing upon his credibility, the same as any other witness. State v. Napulou, 85 Hawai`i 49, 57, 936 P.2d 1297, 1305 (App.1997) (citing Pokini, 57 Haw. at 22, 548 P.2d at 1400). Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 608(b) (1993) instructs in relevant part that [s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility, if probative of untruthfulness, may be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness and, in the discretion of the court, may be proved by extrinsic evidence. While HRE Rule 608 invests the trial judge with discretion to admit extrinsic evidence, the HRE Rule 403 balancing test will dictate exclusion of that extrinsic evidence in certain cases. HRE Rule 608-1992 Supplemental Commentary; see also Addison M. Bowman, Hawai`i Rules of Evidence Manual § 608-2B(2) (2d ed.1998). Initially, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the prosecution to question Culkin about the state Harold Cross identification. [13] Inasmuch as there were no witnesses to the stabbing, this case turned in large part on Culkin's credibility. The possession of false identification cards, and assorted activities undertaken therewith, were probative of untruthfulness. The circuit court's subsequent ruling, however, which occasioned Culkin to invoke his fifth amendment privilege in front of the jurors, presents an entirely different problem. We can perceive of no calculation by which the probative value of the prosecution's unanswered questions outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice engendered by compelling Culkin to assert his fifth amendment privilege in front of the jury. [14] Culkin's credibility had already been attacked by questioning about the Harold Cross identification card. Culkin testified that he made the identification card so that he could adopt Harold Cross's identity. He testified that he used the identification card to open a checking account and that he processed approximately $22,000.00 through the account during a five-month period, although he professed to being unemployed at the time. Similarly, the prosecution questioned Culkin about the rental application, revealing numerous untruths asserted thereon. The additional questions, leading to Culkin's invocation of privilege, were allowed to rebut Culkin's assertion that Thomas was primarily responsible for manufacturing the identification. Accordingly, the marginal probative value of the latter questions with respect to Culkin's untruthfulness would have been slight. In this case, however, the potential probative value of the questions evaporated when Culkin advised the court that he intended to give no answers. Meanwhile, the risk of unfair prejudice occasioned by compelling a criminal defendant to invoke the fifth amendment privilege in front of jurors is substantial. Generally, claims of privilege must be made outside of the presence of the jury in order to avoid `[t]he layman's natural first suggestion ... that the resort to the privilege in each instance is a clear confession of crime.' 2 J. Weinstein, M. Berger & J. McLaughlin, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 513[02] at 513-6 (1996). Inasmuch as the prosecution was advised that Culkin would not answer, we can only conclude that the prosecutor deliberately sought to compel Culkin to invoke the testimonial privilege in the hope that the jurors would, in fact, interpret Culkin's invocation as a clear confession of crime. Moreover, the circuit court appears to have paid little heed to HRE Rule 513(b), which is quite explicit that, to the extent practicable, claims of privilege should not be made in front of the jury. Both Culkin and his attorney advised the circuit court that he would not answer questions about other identification cards and would invoke his fifth amendment privilege if asked. With advanced warning, it was certainly practicable for the circuit court to avoid this prejudicial questioning. Nor are we persuaded by the prosecution's argument that any error in this regard was harmless because the circuit court admonished the jurors to draw no prejudicial inferences from Culkin's refusal to answer questions. We have repeatedly emphasized that such limiting instructions do not always adequately safeguard the defendant's rights. See State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 258, 492 P.2d 657, 660 (1971). We thus hold that because the circuit court was put on advance notice that Culkin intended to invoke his fifth amendment privilege, the circuit court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to question Culkin about the latter identifications. [15]
Culkin also argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by precluding admission of certain character evidence about Thomas. HRE Rule 404(a)(2) provides an exception to the general rule that character evidence is not admissible to show conformity therewith and allows [e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused[.] This exception allows the defense to introduce general character evidence as well as specific prior acts. State v. Basque, 66 Haw. 510, 514, 666 P.2d 599, 602 (1983). Culkin contends that the circuit court committed reversible error by excluding: (1) evidence that Thomas had been in prison; and (2) testimony about Thomas's prior reckless use of the handgun that was stored in Culkin's bedroom on the morning of the stabbing. [16]
Culkin contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that Thomas was incarcerated in federal prison for ten years. [17] Thomas was apparently convicted of a drug offense and released approximately nine months prior to the stabbing. At an evidentiary hearing, defense counsel argued that the prison time demonstrated that Thomas had a belief system obtained from being with hard core federal inmates. She argued that this hard core belief system was relevant to show Culkin's reasonable apprehension that, once the fight began, Thomas would not stop and that, [i]f you crossed him, he was going to take you down. Although not expressly setting forth the basis for its ruling, the circuit court disallowed any reference to Thomas being in prison. Initially, it is not apparent that the fact that Thomas had spent time in prison was relevant to the reasonableness of Culkin's apprehension or the issue of first aggressor. No offer of proof was made to the effect that prison automatically instills a hard-core belief system in all those who enter its walls. Although defense counsel suggested that Thomas engaged in assorted violent conduct while imprisoned, she made no offer of proof in this regard. See HRE Rule 103(a)(2) (1993). Assuming, however, that such evidence was relevant, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding it in this case. Absent any offer of proof as to violent conduct while in prison, the probative value of Thomas's imprisonment is questionable. And the circuit court declined to allow defense witnesses to testify about Thomas's belief system, opting instead to permit testimony about specific instances of conduct from which jurors could draw their own inferences. Meanwhile, the danger of undue prejudice from such evidence is readily apparent. The fact of imprisonment raises the possibility that jurors might believe the victim was a bad person who got what he deserved. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence at 572 (3d ed.1984). Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion.
Culkin also contends that the circuit court erred by excluding testimony about four instances in which Culkin witnessed Thomas act in a reckless manner with the handgun that Culkin was holding for Thomas on the morning of the stabbing. [18] The circuit court allowed testimony about Thomas's behavior during these episodes, but permitted no reference to the revolver. The court's decision apparently turned on its determination that the revolver was not relevant to the encounter between Culkin and Thomas. On appeal, Culkin argues that his testimony regarding Thomas's dangerous and irrational use of the revolver was critical to substantiate his concern that Thomas might obtain the weapon and also to explain why Culkin removed the weapon from the bedroom following the stabbing. A trial judge's determination of relevancy is reviewed on appeal under the right/wrong standard. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai`i 97, 183, 9 P.3d 409, 495, reconsideration denied, 94 Hawai`i 97, 9 P.3d 409 (2000); State v. Staley, 91 Hawai`i 275, 281, 982 P.2d 904, 910 (1999); State v. Hanapi, 89 Hawai`i 177, 181, 970 P.2d 485, 489, reconsideration denied, 89 Hawai`i 177, 970 P.2d 485 (1999); State v. Richie, 88 Hawai`i 19, 36, 960 P.2d 1227, 1244 (1998); State v. Alston, 75 Haw. 517, 538, 865 P.2d 157, 168 (1994). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. HRE Rule 401 (1993). The reasonableness of Culkin's apprehension that Thomas might seriously harm him was certainly a fact in issue. See section III.A.1, supra. To demonstrate that his fear was reasonable, Culkin sought to admit evidence of Thomas's prior conduct. The circuit court permitted Culkin to testify, and Culkin did testify, about specific instances of conduct. For example, Culkin testified about an incident in which Thomas locked himself inside Culkin's bathroom for two hours. When Culkin finally gained entrance, he discovered not only drug paraphernalia, but that the windows were shut, the blinds were down, and the room was like a steam bath. Thomas was standing next to the window, peering out, advising Culkin to be quiet because somebody's up on the roof. Certainly the fact that Thomas was also armed with a loaded revolver was significant. Even if Thomas was not armed on the morning of July 27, 1997, Culkin's knowledge of Thomas's past conduct when under the influence of drugs, combined with the risk to life that Thomas posed, was certainly relevant to the reasonableness of Culkin's claimed apprehension on that morning. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred by ruling that Thomas's past use of the handgun was not relevant. [19]