Opinion ID: 2633783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: May the Department Decide a Constitutional Claim?

Text: In the administrative hearing, Martin sought a decision on the merits of his constitutional challenge to Wilson's decision to pull him over. Martin alleged that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, as it must be under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. See K.S.A. 22-2402(1); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Schultz, 252 Kan. 819, 824, 850 P.2d 818 (1993) (§ 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights identical in scope to Fourth Amendment). In Cross v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 501, 110 P.3d 438 (2005), this court set out a comprehensive overview of the provisions of Kansas' Implied Consent Law, K.S.A. 8-1001 et seq., of which K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2)(A)-(H) is a part. We need not repeat that overview here. Rather, we note only that, when a driver refuses or fails a test to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs in the driver's body, a law enforcement certification must be prepared and signed by one or more officers. Cross, 279 Kan. at 504-05, 110 P.3d 438 (citing K.S.A. 8-1002[a][2] ). The Department's Division of Vehicles reviews the certification to ensure that all requirements were met; if so, it will suspend the driver's license. K.S.A. 8-1002(e), (f); K.S.A. 8-1013(c); Cross, 279 Kan. at 505, 110 P.3d 438. The driver may then request an administrative hearing to determine whether suspension is appropriate. K.S.A. 8-1020(a)-(d); Cross, 279 Kan. at 505, 110 P.3d 438. K.S.A. 8-1020 governs the administrative hearing. Cross, 279 Kan. at 505, 110 P.3d 438. Subsections (e) and (f) limit the documents and materials subject to discovery; subsection (g) limits the witnesses who may testify; and subsection (h), as quoted above, lists the issues for decision. Under subsection (k), the driver bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts set out in the certification are false or insufficient and that the suspension should therefore be dismissed. If a driver is unsuccessful in challenging a license suspension at the administrative level, he or she may petition the district court for trial de novo, as Martin did in this case. K.S.A. 8-1020(p); see Cross, 279 Kan. at 506-07, 110 P.3d 438. The driver bears the burden of proving to the court that the agency decision should be set aside. K.S.A. 8-1020(q). If the Department can decide the merits of a Fourth Amendment or § 15 claim such as that raised by Martin here, it must be empowered to do so either because K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2) permits it or, failing that, because the federal or state constitution demands it. We turn first to the statute. We agree with the Court of Appeals panel that K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2)(A)-(H) is clear and unambiguous and that its list is exclusive. To the extent this is so, Martin attempts to persuade us that the issue of whether reasonable grounds to believe a driver was under the influence under K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2)(A) is equivalent to the issue of whether reasonable suspicion existed to support the traffic stop. In other words, he asserts, the issue he wished to have decided in the administrative hearing was among those the statute permitted to be pursued there and then. We are unmoved by this argument. Reasonable grounds to believe a driver is under the influence and reasonable suspicion sufficient under constitutional law are distinct legal concepts. The first demands consideration of the behavior of a driver before, during, and after he or she is behind the wheel. The relevant time period for determination of reasonable suspicion, in contrast, ends at the moment the stop is effected. In addition, we observe that K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2)(A) was enacted in 2001, long after the reasonable suspicion standard arose in United States Supreme Court constitutional analysis and long after we employed it in Kansas. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Boone, 220 Kan. 758, 556 P.2d 864 (1976). Because we presume our legislature knows the law in existence at the time of an enactment, see In re Tax Appeal of American Restaurant Operations, 264 Kan. 518, 524, 957 P.2d. 473 (1998), we consider it significant that it did not choose to mimic the reasonable suspicion language from cases when it drafted K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2)(A). Instead, it deliberately decided to enunciate a different standard. The statute's exclusion of Martin's issues from the list that may be decided by the Department by means of an administrative hearing also is consistent with several of our cases arising out of challenges to Board of Tax Appeals decisions and other agency actions. In those cases, we have repeatedly recognized that administrative agencies are not empowered to decide constitutional questions; courts are. See In re Appeal of Weisgerber, 285 Kan. 98, Syl. 1, 169 P.3d 321 (2007); In re Tax Appeal of CIG Field Services Co., 279 Kan. 857, 864, 112 P.3d 138 (2005); In re Tax Appeal of Sprint Communications Co., 278 Kan. 690, 700-02, 101 P.3d 1239 (2004); U.S.D. No. 443 v. Kansas State Board of Education, 266 Kan. 75, 81-82, 966 P.2d 68 (1998); Zarda v. State, 250 Kan. 364, 370, 826 P.2d 1365 (1992); In re Residency Application of Bybee, 236 Kan. 443, Syl. ¶ 4, 691 P.2d 37 (1984). Does due process otherwise demand that the Department be empowered to decide a Fourth Amendment or § 15 claim raised by a driver subject to license suspension? We have previously recognized that limited due process applies in such matters. See Barnes v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 238 Kan. 820, 824, 714 P.2d 975 (1986) (possession of driver's license regulated privilege; deprivation . . . by the State constitutes a deprivation of property sufficient to necessitate application of the due process clause, citing Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 [1979]; Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 [1977]); compare State v. Heironimus, 262 Kan. 796, 803, 941 P.2d 1356 (1997) (license not inherent fundamental right); Popp v. Motor Vehicle Dept., 211 Kan. 763, 766, 508 P.2d 991 (1973) (The driver's license . . . privilege is granted to those who are qualified, who comply with reasonable police power requirements in the interest of public safety and welfare, and is withheld from those who do not.); Agee v. Kansas Highway Commission, 198 Kan. 173, 180, 422 P.2d 949 (1967) (license to drive motor vehicle on public streets not natural right but privilege, subject to reasonable regulation in public interest); Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961) (driver's license not natural, unrestrained right; license privilege subject to reasonable regulations by State under police power in interest of public safety, welfare). But the outcomes in the administrative agency cases cited above suggest the answer to this question is no. In addition, in the peculiar context of alcohol and/or drug-related driver's license suspensions, we have recently held more than once that delaying full argument and decision of a particular aspect of a casepreventing its pursuit at the administrative level and deferring it to later court appealdoes not run afoul of due process. See Kempke v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 281 Kan. 770, 133 P.3d 104 (2006); Cross, 279 Kan. 501, 110 P.3d 438. In Kempke, the driver argued that due process was offended because he was not permitted to call the officer who administered the preliminary breath test as a witness at the administrative license suspension hearing. We disagreed, holding that suspension did not finally take place until after de novo appeal to district court and that the driver's ability to call the officer as a witness on appeal satisfied due process. 281 Kan. at 799-800, 133 P.3d 104. In Cross, we rebuffed an as-applied due process challenge to the statute limiting witnesses at administrative hearings on driver's license suspensions. 279 Kan. at 513, 110 P.3d 438. In view of the fact that a driver's license is a privilege rather than a right, and in view of our approach in Kempke, we hold that the exclusion of Fourth Amendment and § 15 issues from Department decision in administrative suspension hearings under K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2)(A)-(H) does not violate procedural due process.