Opinion ID: 1818626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: What must be discovered?

Text: ¶ 48. Not all discovery rules are created equal. In analyzing what the plaintiff must discover in order to trigger the running of the statute of limitations, we ordinarily are guided by the wording of a statute's discovery provision. ¶ 49. For instance, in Powe v. Byrd, 892 So.2d 223 (Miss.2004), we applied a statutory discovery rule which states that medical-malpractice claims must be filed within two years from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36(1) (Rev.2003) (emphasis added). Pointing out that the plaintiff was aware of his injury as evinced by the two years of prior medical treatment, we specifically rejected the plaintiff's claim that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until he received an expert opinion. Id. at 227-28. ¶ 50. A different discovery rule controls claims subject to our catch-all statute of limitations, which incorporates language different from the discovery rule in Section 15-1-36(1). Section 15-1-49(2) states: In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Rev.2003) (emphasis added). ¶ 51. In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So.2d 704 (Miss.1990), we held that the discovery rule provided in Section 15-1-49(2) will be applied to products liability cases, and that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins at the time the plaintiff can reasonably be held to have knowledge of the injury or disease. Id. at 708-09. ¶ 52. Thus, comparing the discovery rules in the medical-malpractice statute and the catch-all statute, we have one which focuses on discovery of the date of the wrongful conduct, and another which focuses on the date of discovery of the injury or disease. It is simple enough to follow the dictates of these statutes, puzzling though their differences may be. The difficulty arises in applying, as we must today, a judicially-created discovery rule for which there is no statutory guidance. ¶ 53. We are left to rely on the language of Barnes which, as stated earlier, we view as having been incorporated into the MTCA through reenactment. In creating the discovery rule in Barnes, this Court held that: we find that justice is best served by applying a discovery standard to such cases. As we stated in Smith v. Sanders, 485 So.2d 1051 (Miss.1986): There may be rare cases where the patient is aware of his injury prior to the [expiration of the limitations period], but does not discover and could not have discovered with reasonable diligence the act or omission which caused the injury. In such cases, the action does not accrue until the latter discovery is made. Sanders, 485 So.2d at 1052-53. Such is the case here. Barnes, 733 So.2d at 205-06. Thus, we hold today that the limitations period for MTCA claims does not begin to run until all the elements of a tort exist, and the claimant knows or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of both the injury and the act or omission which caused it. [18]