Opinion ID: 1199813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: What Standard of Review Applies to the Decision Whether to Recirculate?

Text: It remains to be considered whether the trial court erred in not requiring recirculation. In reviewing an agency's determination, finding or decision under CEQA, a court must determine whether the agency prejudicially abused its discretion. (§ 21168.5.) [17] Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence. ( Ibid., italics added.) The Guidelines further define substantial evidence as enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached. (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a).) (6a) The Regents contend that the substantial evidence standard of review is mandated in this case by these authorities. By contrast, the Association advances several independent arguments, two of which are premised directly upon the language of section 21168.5, for applying a more stringent standard of review. We agree with the Regents that the appropriate standard is the substantial evidence standard. To counter our determination, the Association contends that, if a procedural violation of CEQA is shown, the substantial evidence prong of the statutory standard of review does not come into play. While the Association's contention may have merit in the abstract, it does not apply to the facts of the present case. (7) The Association first argues that the Regents failed to proceed as required by law, because they did not set forth express findings denying the Association's request that the final EIR be recirculated. We are not persuaded by the Association's claim. CEQA does not require an express order or finding on the subject of whether to recirculate a final EIR. (Cf. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 81, fn. 12 [finding requirement of written negative declaration implicit in certain statutory and regulatory language].) Furthermore, we are not faced in this case with an administrative record that is silent on the question of whether the recirculation request was considered by the decision maker. (Cf. City of San Jose v. Great Oaks Water Co. (1987) 192 Cal. App.3d 1005, 1017 [237 Cal. Rptr. 845] [agency did not consider whether change in source of water supply for development triggered the need for a subsequent EIR, a supplemental EIR or an addendum to the original EIR].) The Regents were aware of the requests by the Association and others to recirculate the final EIR. The final EIR contained a response to the request for recirculation. The response stated that, since the final EIR [did] not include significant new information about environmental impacts and did not require a fundamental reorganization of the [draft EIR], there [was] no need to recirculate the [f]inal EIR for an additional public review period. [18] The Regents certified the final EIR. By doing so, the Regents necessarily concluded that the final EIR did not contain significant new information requiring additional public comment. While express findings are preferable for the reason that they make the task of the reviewing court easier, there is no need in this case to remand for the Regents to clarify or expressly state their findings. The Association also contends that the Regents committed a separate procedural violation of CEQA by failing to recirculate the final EIR. Such an argument begs the question. The Association's position ignores the statutory mandate that only the addition of significant new information triggers recirculation. (§ 21092.1.) Barring unusual circumstances not present here, the agency necessarily must decide whether the information meets this statutory requirement. [19] A procedural violation cannot be found in this case unless the Regents' decision regarding the significance of the new information fails to pass muster under the applicable standard of review. (8) The Association next argues that, if the substantial evidence prong of the standard of review is applicable, then in deciding whether to recirculate the final EIR under section 21092.1, the fair argument test used to review the decision, pursuant to section 21151, to prepare a negative declaration, rather than an EIR, should apply. However, section 21151 commands that an EIR must be prepared whenever a project  may have a significant effect on the environment. (Italics added.) In No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pages 68, 75, 83-85, we interpreted section 21151 to require preparation of an EIR whenever it can be fairly argued on the basis of substantial evidence that the project may have significant environmental impact. (See also Friends of B Street v. City of Hayward (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 988, 1002 [165 Cal. Rptr. 514] [applying fair argument test to affirm judgment invalidating decision not to prepare an EIR].) [20] Our decision, however, expressly acknowledged that judicial review of agency decisions under CEQA is governed by sections 21168 (administrative mandamus) and 21168.5 (traditional mandamus) and, of course, did not purport to alter the standard of review set forth in those statutes. Rather, the fair argument test was derived from an interpretation of the language of, and policies underlying, section 21151 itself. For this reason, the fair argument test has been applied only to the decision whether to prepare an original EIR or a negative declaration. (E.g., Benton v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 226 Cal. App.3d 1467, 1481-1483 [277 Cal. Rptr. 481] [rejecting use of test to review decision of whether second negative declaration proper for modified project]; Bowman v. City of Petaluma (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 1065, 1071-1072 [230 Cal. Rptr. 413] [rejecting use of test to review decision under section 21166].) The Association has advanced no persuasive authority or reasons for taking this test out of the context of the statutory language of section 21151 and applying it to an agency's decision under section 21092.1. [21] (6b) We conclude that the substantial evidence standard set forth in section 21168.5 governs the Regents' decision not to recirculate the EIR in this case. [22] As we observed in Laurel Heights I, [i]n applying the substantial evidence standard, `the reviewing court must resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative finding and decision.' (47 Cal.3d at p. 393, quoting Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514 [113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12].) It is this standard of review that we apply to the Regents' determination that the new information in the final EIR was not significant pursuant to section 21092.1.