Opinion ID: 406087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prima Facie Case, Presumption or Inference of Discrimination?

Text: 18 In McDonnell-Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the United States Supreme Court set forth one common order of proof occurring in a suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 19 The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 20 .... 21 The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.... (Plaintiff) must then be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that (the employer's) assigned reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext.... 22 Id. at 802-803, 805, 93 S.Ct. at 1824 (emphasis added). 23 This court has held that the McDonnell-Douglas elements of a prima facie case constitute a prima facie ADEA case 7 as well. Marshall v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977). Accord, Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 127 (5th Cir. 1981). We have further articulated the effect of proof of these elements: The phrase (prima facie) simply refers to evidence sufficient for a finding in plaintiff's favor unless rebutted. United States v. Wiggins, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 334, 347, 10 L.Ed. 481, 488 (1840). Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d at 735. 24 This articulation of the effect of the prima facie case gave rise to two questions concerning the evidentiary posture of a discrimination trial. The first question was whether, upon a plaintiff's proof of a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to prove legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action or whether only the burden of production of evidence sufficient to raise a fact question on that issue shifted to the defendant. 25 The Supreme Court answered this question in the context of a Title VII case: 26 The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. See (Board of Trustees of Keene State College v.) Sweeney, supra, (439 U.S.) at (24) 25, 99 S.Ct. (295) at 296 (58 L.Ed.2d 216). It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. 27 Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (emphasis added). 8 This court has applied the Burdine burden shifting in suits brought under the ADEA. Smith v. Farah Manufacturing Co., Inc., 650 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1981) (Like the Title VII employer, the ADEA defendant must respond to a prima facie case by going forward with evidence, not by carrying the burden of persuasion.). 28 A second question flows from the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the nature of the burden which devolves upon the defendant and is the question which concerns us today. What special effect, if any, does the existence of a prima facie case (with its concommitant quantum of evidence) have upon a determination, after a defendant has produced evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons, whether there exists substantial evidence to support a jury verdict? That is, is the evidence introduced to establish the prima facie case always substantial enough to raise an inference of discrimination and require submission of the case to the jury? 29 Reeves asserts that evidence sufficient to prove the elements of a prima facie case raises an inference of intentional discrimination and that, because a jury may find wholly incredible the defendant's articulated reasons for the discharge, this evidence sufficient to establish the prima facie case is necessarily substantial enough to require sending the case to the jury and refusing a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. General Foods claims that evidence sufficient to prove the prima facie case is not, after rebuttal, necessarily the equivalent of substantial evidence from which a jury could infer intentional discrimination. It asserts that, in order for there to be even an inference of discrimination which would justify sending the case to the jury, Reeves was required to introduce substantial evidence of General Foods' intent to discriminate on the basis of age, not just evidence of the elements of the prima facie case (age, qualification, discharge, replacement). General Foods, of course, argues that there was no such substantial evidence. We agree with General Foods' legal argument but disagree that there was not substantial evidence of intent upon which the jury's verdict could be sustained. 30 A careful review of Burdine as it adopted traditional common law rules of evidence, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n.8, indicates that evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case creates only a legally mandatory rebuttable presumption. Burdine, supra, at 254 n.7, 101 S.Ct. at 1094 n.7. (A presumption, generally defined, is a rule of law that deals with the assumption-at least temporarily-of a certain factual situation based upon proof of other usually logically related facts. Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 Vanderbilt Law Review 1205, 1222 (1981).) If the defendant carries the burden of production of nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge, this presumption drops from the case. Burdine, supra, at 255 n.10, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 n.10 (Although the trier of fact may consider evidence previously introduced by plaintiff to establish the prima facie case in its drawing of inferences, a satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the (presumption) of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. (emphasis added)). Moreover, the quantum of evidence which gives rise to the rebuttable presumption (and which would require a directed verdict for the plaintiff in the absence of rebuttal) is not necessarily sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden (absent the presumption) of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. Id. 9 The initial evidence introduced to support the prima facie case may or may not be adequate, after the presumption has disappeared, for a jury to draw a permissible inference of intentional discrimination. Id. 10 After the defendant has articulated a legitimate reason for the discharge, the evidence initially introduced is simply to be evaluated as is evidence in any other case where intentional discrimination must be proved. 11 The fact that the prima facie case once existed is no longer of special benefit to the plaintiff. The presumption has disappeared; the quantum of evidence had never, simply because it was sufficient to prove a prima facie case, been deemed sufficient to raise an inference of intentional discrimination. 31 We have detailed this analysis in order to sharpen the focus of our review of the evidence in this case. We now conduct that review.