Opinion ID: 198347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 26 Parsons Avenue Search

Text: 8 In May 1995, Boston police notified East Providence police that a man known as Don Miley, alias Dwayne Owens, 1 was wanted for homicide in Boston, and that an accomplice of this man was cooperating with the police. This accomplice gave Boston police information about the suspect's drug trafficking activities and described his residence in East Providence. On May 18, 1995, East Providence Police Captain Joseph Broadmeadow submitted an affidavit in support of an application for a warrant to search Owens's home at 26 Parsons Avenue. 2 The warrant was granted and authorized police to search for a black male, age 32, known as Don Miley, alias Dwayne Owens, alias [sic] with a date of birth of 6-9-63, also firearms, ammunition. The police executed the warrant on May 19, during Owens's absence from the residence, and seized extensive evidence including not only guns, ammunition, illegal drugs, and drug paraphernalia, but also personal documents, some of which were found in manila folders and envelopes. 9 Owens's motion to suppress the fruits of this search argued (1) that the warrant application failed to establish probable cause and the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply; and (2) that the police exceeded the scope of their search. As an adjunct to his suppression motion, he also moved for a Franks hearing. 10 The district court granted in part and denied in part Owens's suppression motion, ruling that the warrant application established probable cause to search for firearms and ammunition, and that even if probable cause to search did not support the warrant, most of the items seized were admissible under the good-faith exception recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (holding that evidence seized in reasonable good-faith reliance on a search warrant, which is later found defective, may be admitted at trial). As to the scope of the search, the court determined that certain evidence was properly seized because it was in plain view and immediately apparent as evidence of a crime or as evidence that would help lead to the apprehension of Owens, whom the officers reasonably believed was a fugitive. Although the court granted Owens's motion with respect to some items seized during the search, ruling that these documents were not immediately apparent as relevant evidence, in the end, it admitted most of the seized items, including the drugs, drug paraphernalia, and certain personal documents. The court denied Owens's request for a Franks hearing, finding that Owens failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that Officer Broadmeadow's affidavit contained any deliberately false or recklessly false statements.
11 On appeal, Owens renews the two arguments made in his motion to suppress. He also contends that the district court improperly denied his request for a Franks hearing. We disagree. 12
13 Assuming arguendo that the warrant for 26 Parsons Avenue was not supported by probable cause, we agree with the district court that the executing officers reasonably relied in good faith on a facially valid warrant. We therefore need not assess the constitutionality of the warrant and simply hold that the district court committed no error in denying the motion to suppress. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 925, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (courts have discretion to consider the issue of officers' good faith without first addressing Fourth Amendment issue). 14 There are four exclusions to the Leon good-faith exception: (1) when the magistrate ... was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his [detached and neutral] judicial role; (3) where the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient--i.e. in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized--that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Owens contends that the 26 Parsons Avenue search implicates the first and fourth exclusions. 15
16 According to Owens, the affidavit improperly misled the magistrate in three respects. First, it claimed that the Boston police had a murder warrant for Don Miley when in fact the murder warrant identified the suspect only as Dwayne Owens. Second, it misstated that business records indicated Be Be's Barbecue was owned and incorporated by Don Miley when Don Miley was only listed in corporate documents as Vice President. And third, its statement that phone number 436-6658 was located at 26 Parsons Avenue improperly omitted that the number listed was in the name of Johnny Stephens, not Don Miley. 3 17 Owens's claims fail because he cannot establish that these misstatements were either knowingly false or reckless. At most, Broadmeadow's errors resulted from negligence, and [a]llegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674. 18 Moreover, even if any of the misstatements were knowingly false or reckless, we do not see how they were material. See United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 662-63 (D.C.Cir.1996) (warrant valid under Leon because false statement not material). The affidavit's statement that a warrant existed for Miley, rather than Owens, was immaterial because the affidavit also indicated that the subject known as Miley used the alias Owens. Nor can the statement that Miley was named in business records as owner rather than Vice President be characterized as material because, in either event, the suspect was linked to Be Be's Barbecue. Cf. State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204, 210 (Iowa 1982) (stating that defendant owns land on which marijuana is growing, rather than that he farms the land, is not materially false). Finally, the affidavit's failure to recite that telephone number 436-6658 was listed in the name of Johnny Stephens was not material under the circumstances. Police questioning of the landlord of 26 Parsons Avenue had already established that a man known as Miley was living at that address. It was immaterial whether Miley was living there alone or with others. 19
20 According to Owens, it was unreasonable for the executing officers to rely on a warrant that he characterizes as so facially deficient as to be bare bones. In particular, Owens complains that the affidavit demonstrated neither the recency of the information relied upon nor a nexus between the firearms and 26 Parsons Avenue. We disagree. 21 Despite Owens's complaints, the affidavit was sufficiently current because it stated that an active warrant existed for Owens, that an informant is cooperating (emphasis added) with Boston police, and that the informant described a Cole Street address as being used (emphasis added) by Owens in his drug business. From this, the executing officers could reasonably have inferred that the informant's data were recent and described an ongoing drug operation and access to firearms. Cf. United States v. Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir.1996) (affidavit not stale because references by informant were in the present tense and therefore implied regular ongoing transactions); United States v. Schaefer, 87 F.3d 562, 568 (1st Cir.1996) ([I]t is common ground that drug conspiracies tend to be ongoing operations, rendering timely information that might, in other contexts, be regarded as stale.). 22 Owens's complaint that the affidavit failed to establish any nexus between the firearms and 26 Parsons Avenue similarly fails. The affidavit recited that Owens was wanted for murder, had numerous firearms, and rented a house at 26 Parsons Avenue. Based on this information, it was reasonable for the executing officers to believe that firearms would be found at 26 Parsons Avenue. Cf. United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir.) (nexus between evidence of crime and address to be searched sufficiently established where affidavit recited that suspect lived at that address), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1046, 117 S.Ct. 620, 136 L.Ed.2d 543 (1996). 23
24 Owens concedes that if the police were lawfully present at 26 Parsons Avenue, as we have just concluded, then the firearms and ammunition were properly seized within the scope of the search warrant, and the drugs and paraphernalia were properly seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine. He contends, however, that the police officers exceeded the proper scope of the search when they seized various personal documents which were not in plain view. 25 A plain view seizure is lawful if (1) the seizing officer has a prior justification for being in a position to see the item in plain view and (2) the evidentiary value of the item is immediately apparent. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). According to Owens, the officers improperly seized various personal documents because the evidentiary value of these documents was not immediately apparent. In particular, Owens contests the seizure of the following documents, which were introduced as evidence at trial: address books, telephone bills, papers containing names and numbers, money order receipts, documents regarding gun purchases by Andrea Frith Jones, a photograph of himself with a pile of money, and a birth certificate for Donald Miley. Together, these documents helped the government establish that Owens had engaged in years of drug trafficking; had access to and used guns in connection with his drug enterprise; had access to large amounts of money; and used an alias. 26 Owens's argument that the seizure of these items exceeded the scope of the authorized search is not without force. But, assuming arguendo that the seizure of various documents was unlawful, the admission of such evidence at trial was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372-73, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (stating that where the jury, in addition to hearing erroneously admitted testimony, is presented with overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt, error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). The seized documents merely corroborated the damaging and voluminous testimony which the government introduced at trial. Four participants in the enterprise testified that Owens and his colleagues engaged in years of drug trafficking. Eight witnesses variously testified that they had purchased weapons for Owens; Owens carried a weapon with him almost all the time; Owens was seen with weapons on various occasions; and Owens kept numerous weapons in his apartment. Five witnesses testified that they had seen Owens with large amounts of cash on a number of occasions. And finally, the testimony of three witnesses amply established that Owens used the alias Don Miley. In admitting the documents, the district court's error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 27
28 Owens also contends that the court improperly denied his motion for a Franks hearing. As we have stated, under Franks, a defendant may overcome the presumption that a warrant affidavit is valid by making a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit. 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674. For the reasons discussed supra at Part II-B-2-a-i, we see no clear error in the district court's determination that Owens failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit contained knowingly false or reckless statements. See United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 46 (1st Cir.1990) (a district court's determination that the requisite showing for a Franks hearing is reviewed for clear error). 4 Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of Owens's motion for a Franks hearing.