Opinion ID: 788572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construction of the Pro Se Complaint

Text: 14 Martin originally, and incorrectly, asserted in his petition that it was brought under § 2241. He did not challenge the terms or validity of his state prison term. Rather, he sought a transfer to a different prison facility for the purpose of medical treatment and civil damages resulting from the alleged delay and denial of that treatment. The district court recognized this, stating, Petitioner in this case appears to be asserting the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws by state prison officials. Such a claim is properly brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court then dismissed under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the District Courts, which allows the summary dismissal of a petition if it plainly appears from the face of the petition ... that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. Rule 4. This raises the second issue, also rare in this court: should a pro se motion be recharacterized by the court from an apparent habeas petition to a civil rights claim? Here, we answer no. 15 The leniency granted to pro se petitioners, which Martin would stretch to its fullest, is not boundless. Pro se plaintiffs are treated to less stringent standards, but they are not automatically entitled to take every case to trial. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.1996). Traditionally the leniency standard has still required basic pleading standards. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.1989). Arguably, hanging the legal hat on the correct peg is such a standard, and [l]iberal construction does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant's behalf. Erwin v. Edwards, 22 Fed.Appx. 579, 580 (6th Cir.2001) (dismissing a § 1983 suit brought as a § 2254 petition.) 16 Courts have recently dismissed cases similar to this one. In Erwin, 22 Fed.Appx. at 579-80, this Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing the § 2254 petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than construing the filing as a § 1983 suit. Similar habeas petitions have been dismissed without prejudice to a petitioner's potential § 1983 claims, allowing the prisoner to later bring any civil rights claims properly. See Stewart v. Tristan, 2002 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 3626, at  (N.D.Cal.2002) (Petition dismissed without prejudice to petitioner filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.); but see McGore v. Gundy, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11107 (W.D.Mich.2000) (ordering the conversion of § 2254 petition to a § 1983 action where petitioner was obviously familiar with § 1983 proceedings but purposefully filed action incorrectly, and ordering petitioner to file an amended complaint). 17 The uncounseled citation of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was an obvious mistake, yet the original dismissal of his habeas corpus petition was proper, as no grounds for habeas relief were established. And, although Martin is correct that substance, rather than labels, should control in legal proceedings, he does bear some responsibility for identifying his own claims before the court. Therefore, following the reasoning of Erwin, the district court should have dismissed the petition without prejudice to allow Martin to raise his potential civil rights claims properly as a § 1983 action. 18 The decision of the district court is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.