Opinion ID: 2648195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: China

Text: Notwithstanding Chonjor’s argument to the contrary, the agency did not err in finding that he failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in China based on his activities in the United States. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Put simply, to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the absence of any evidence of past persecution, an alien must make some showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities.”); see also Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2005). While Chonjor asserts that the agency ignored this potential ground for relief, the IJ explicitly noted the absence of any evidence indicating that authorities in China were aware of his activities in the United States. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the agency is presumed to have “taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Although Chonjor takes issue with the BIA’s finding that the record evidence did not reflect a pattern or 4 practice of persecution against Tibetans in China, the task of resolving conflicts in the record evidence lies “largely within the discretion of the agency.” Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2007) (“support for a contrary inference – even one more plausible or more natural – does not suggest error”). Where, as here, the agency’s inference “is tethered to the evidentiary record, we will accord deference to the finding.” Siewe, 480 F.3d at 169. Accordingly, because the evidence indicates that the repression of Tibetans varied in different regions of China, the agency reasonably determined that Chonjor failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of Tibetans in China, and, thus, the agency did not err by requiring Chonjor to show that he would be singled out for persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2); Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2007). Lastly, Chonjor’s contention that remand is warranted because the BIA has failed to provide sufficient guidance concerning the application of its pattern or practice standard is misplaced. In Mufied v. Mukasey, we remanded a Christian Indonesian alien’s proceedings to the agency for failure to consider his pattern or practice claim and 5 “encourage[d] the BIA to elaborate upon the ‘systemic, pervasive, or organized’ standard it has applied to analyzing such claims.” 508 F.3d at 89. However, where, as in this case, “the BIA explicitly discussed the pattern or practice claim and the record includes substantial documentary evidence regarding the conditions in petitioner’s homeland, we are able to reach the conclusion that the agency’s decision was not erroneous.” Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 111 n.1 (2d Cir. 2009). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED in part with respect to Chonjor’s claim of past persecution in Nepal and DENIED in all other respects. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 6