Opinion ID: 4236698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Granting Immunity

Text: We reject Hager’s argument that the district court should have granted his motion to order the Government to grant his wife immunity. 2 This court has repeatedly held that “district courts have no inherent power to grant immunity.” United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 711 (5th Cir. 2012) (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1992)). “A district court may not grant immunity simply because a witness has essential exculpatory evidence unavailable from other sources. At most this Court has left open the possibility that immunity may be necessary to stem government abuse.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The exercise of this authority requires “extraordinary circumstances.” United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 258 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985). Since Hager did not preserve this argument below, we review only for plain error, United States v. Comrie, 842 F.3d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 2016). Here, the only evidence of government misconduct Hager submitted is the Government’s response to his motion. Specifically, the Government stated that 1 Because we conclude that Hagar was properly convicted under the mail and wire fraud statutes, we need not address the Government’s argument that he could still be convicted under the money laundering charge if he were improperly convicted on the fraud charges. 2 Hager’s wife instead invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege and declined to testify at trial. 9 No. 16-51330 his wife might have participated in the wrongdoing, so she was “not the kind of witness that would be granted immunity.” We discern no evidence of government abuse from this exchange, nor does it present the sort of extraordinary circumstances that might justify the exercise of the court’s power to grant immunity.