Opinion ID: 662450
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motive Behind the Crime

Text: 18 We begin by reviewing de novo the district court's grounds for departing downward four levels from the applicable Guidelines range. The court cited, as a basis for its departure, its view that Seacott was not motivated by self-gain in misapplying Lampco's money, but rather by a desire to see one of Lampco's borrowers, the Glass Bar, remain financially viable. The district court reasoned that the framers of the Guidelines had not taken into account the possibility that a defendant would misapply funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 657 for other than his own pecuniary interests, and that therefore the Guidelines overstated the punishment appropriate to Seacott. This is a legally insufficient reason to depart downward from the applicable Guidelines range. 2 The drafters of the Guidelines demonstrated numerous times that when they thought it appropriate to adjust a sentence based on whether the defendant acted with a profit motive, they explicitly directed courts to consider that factor. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. Sec. 2G1.1 (Transportation for the Purpose of Prostitution or Prohibited Sexual Conduct), comment. (n. 1) (The base offense level assumes that the offense was committed for profit. In the infrequent case where the defendant did not commit the offense for profit and the offense did not involve physical force or coercion, the Commission recommends a downward departure of 8 levels.); U.S.S.G. Sec. 2H3.1(b)(1) (Interception of Communications or Eavesdropping) (If the purpose of the conduct was to obtain direct or indirect commercial advantage or economic gain not covered by U.S.S.G. Sec. 2H3.1(a)(2) above, increase by 3 levels.); U.S.S.G. Sec. 2H3.2(b)(1) (Manufacturing, Distributing, Advertising, or Possessing an Eavesdropping Device) (If the offense was committed for pecuniary gain, increase by 3 levels); see also U.S.S.G. Sec. 2L1.1(b)(1); U.S.S.G. Sec. 2L2.1(b)(1); U.S.S.G. Sec. 2L2.3(b)(1). Given the frequency with which the drafters of the Guidelines specifically adjusted offense levels based on whether the defendant was motivated by profit, we must assume that had they been interested in providing for such an adjustment for Sec. 2B1.1 crimes, they would have done so. 19 Seacott claims to find support in the commentary to Sec. 2B1.1 for the district court's reliance on his lack of a profit motive as a grounds for departure. Specifically, he points to language in the commentary to Sec. 2B1.1 which provides that the value of property taken plays an important role in determining sentences for theft offenses, because it is an indicator of both the harm to the victim and the gain to the defendant, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2B1.1, comment. (backg'd). 3 Seacott claims that this is evidence that the framers of the Guidelines assumed that in every Sec. 2B1.1 crime there would be harm to the victim as well as gain to the defendant. Because the latter is lacking here, Seacott argues, the district court properly departed downward from the applicable sentencing range. We disagree. The language Seacott cites from the commentary demonstrates that in crafting Sec. 2B1.1 the framers of the Guidelines considered, among other factors, harm to the victim and gain to the defendant. The formulation they believed best reflected these and other considerations was one based explicitly on loss (value of the property taken, damaged or destroyed): under Sec. 2B1.1, the greater the loss, the longer the prison term. The district court's focus on the defendant's lack of a profit motive in this case was thus in direct contravention to the Guidelines' command to sentence based on loss. 20 It is not surprising that the Guidelines direct district courts to sentence defendants convicted of crimes like Seacott's based on the value of the property they take, rather than on their motive for taking it. Persons in positions of authority at financial institutions are entrusted with vast sums of other people's money. It makes little difference to their victims if these financial managers illegally transfer funds to themselves, to third parties, or if they pile up the money in the parking lot and burn it. The same amount of money has been taken from the victim no matter what the fate of the funds. The aim of the criminal law in this area is to deter misapplication of funds for any reason. The language of Section 2B1.1 recognizes this reality by making the length of the defendant's prison term a variable based on the amount of property he takes. 21 Moreover, as we stated in footnote two, even if we agreed with the district court that the defendant's motive in misapplying the funds merits a downward departure, we would still reverse the defendant's sentence because the district court committed clear error in finding that Seacott acted entirely without any motive of self-gain. In order to offset some of the losses he incurred when he loaned his own money to Nichols and the Glass Bar, Seacott diverted to himself roughly $1,400 of the Lampco funds he fraudulently approved as loans. At least in this transaction, Seacott was misapplying Lampco's money not just to aid the Glass Bar, but to limit his own losses from the personal loans he had improvidently made. Moreover, Seacott may have been attempting to keep the Glass Bar afloat in order to avoid the delinquency of one of the loans he was supervising, thus protecting his reputation at Lampco. Seacott's own pecuniary interest thus did in fact play a part in his commission of his crime.