Opinion ID: 2430934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Two-Prong Test.

Text: The first prong essentially asks whether the municipal agent acted with a culpable state of mind which resulted in injury. Thus, the plaintiff must first show that the actor engaged in willful, wanton, malicious or grossly negligent conduct. The usual test for gross negligence is the one set out by this court in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex. 1981). To be entitled to exemplary damages a plaintiff must show: That entire want of care which would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result of conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the person or persons to be affected by it ... In other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrated that he didn't care. Burk Royalty at 920. The court of appeals in the present case cited Burk Royalty for the proposition that gross negligence may result from a series of negligent acts or omissions and many circumstances and elements may make up indifference amounting to gross negligence. 708 S.W.2d at 527; Burk Royalty, 616 S.W.2d at 920. In the context of exemplary damages against a municipality, however, we agree with the reasoning used by the Fifth Circuit in Peace v. City of Center, 372 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.1967). There, the court held that liability will result only if it is pleaded and proved that the acts giving rise to the claim were committed with such malice or evil intent, or such gross negligence as to be equivalent to such intent. Peace at 650. Thus, in order to recover the plaintiff must show at least that amount of conscious indifference which would tend to show malice or evil intent on the part of the actor.
To impute tortious actions to the City, it must be shown that the acts were expressly authorized by the municipal government or that they were done bona fide in pursuance of general authority to act for the municipality on the subject to which they relate. Christopher v. City of El Paso, 98 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex.Civ.App. El Paso 1936, writ dism'd). In a recent en banc 5th Circuit case interpreting Texas law, the court remarked that Liability must rest on official policy, meaning the city government's policy, and not on the policy of an individual official. The policy is that of the city, however, where it is made by an official under authority to do so given by the governing authority ... City policymakers not only govern conduct; they decide the goals for a particular city function and devise the means of achieving those goals. Policymakers act in the place of the governing body in the area of their responsibility; they are not supervised except as to the totality of their performance. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir.1984). Even more recently, the 5th Circuit extended its earlier reasoning by holding that culpable acts or policy are attributable to the governing body only when made or done by an official to which the governing body has given authority to act or to make policy. Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185, 192 (5th Cir.1984).
To begin with, the present city manager of Gladewater, H.R. Macomber, testified that one of the responsibilities as city manager was to oversee the operation of the cemetery. The cemetery charter gives absolute charge over the cemetery to the city manager, subject only to the recommendations of the city council. The manager had the veto power over any sale of lots and was explicitly given the duty of keeping accurate records showing the place and date of burials and the identity of those buried in the cemetery. Under these facts, there seems to be little question that the city manager had been vested with the power to act and make policy with reference to the cemetery by the City government. Therefore, his failure to properly carry out this duty should be attributed to the City government, thus fulfilling one prong of the test. The problem arises in determining the culpability of the several successive city managers in their failure to fulfill their duties. The testimony of city officials showed that they failed to keep required records despite their duty to do so, and revealed that no one could rely on the records to locate a specific decedent. They never disputed the fact that the failure to keep records occurred continuously for nearly thirty-five years. However, even with all of the above facts being true, we are unable to uphold the jury verdict because there is no evidence which shows maliciousness or evil intent on the part of the city officials involved. At best it is a showing of indifference, and from the record as it stands we cannot find even the slightest inference that such indifferent conduct by the officials was malicious, evil or even conscious. It appears to be only simple negligence and as such will not support the award of exemplary damages under the second prong of the test.