Opinion ID: 302892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Delay in Issuance of the Indictment

Text: 35 Appellants claim that the amount of time which elapsed between the dates of the offenses charged and the issuance of the indictment was prejudicial. In his findings the trial judge stated that there was neither unnecessary delay nor substantial prejudice. It is clear to this court that the findings of the trial judge are amply supported by the record. 36 As we have expressed earlier, this case is a highly complex one. There were six defendants at the trial level in an action involving 17 separate transactions transpiring over a period of 16 months. A case of this magnitude by its very nature requires sufficient time to investigate and examine prior to the seeking of an indictment. The record discloses that Metro Project was formed early in 1963, however, it was not until December 1965 that the investigators first became aware of the actual events regarding the straw transactions. At that time investigators first learned that the names appearing on the loan applications filed by appellants were used without the knowledge or permission of the purported loan applicants. Metro Project investigators finished interviewing putative borrowers and receiving affidavits from these unsuspecting parties in March 1966. By the time the evaluation of all the material received had been completed it was no longer possible to go before the grand jury then in session. All of its time had been allocated to other matters. When the new grand jury convened in March 1967 the Government brought this case before the grand jurors within a month. The facts support the Government's contention that [t]here was no plan to delay in bringing it before the grand jury and there was no unnecessary delay in seeking the indictment. Brief for the Government at 25. 37 When there is a showing of substantial delay in a case the Government must show that such delay did not act to substantially prejudice the defendants. A delay is deemed substantial when its length is of greater duration than usually attributable to the normal processes of the judicial system. Williams v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 250 F.2d 19 (1957), wherein we quote from the Supreme Court decision in Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87, 25 S.Ct. 573, 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905): 38 The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice. 39 Williams involved a 7-year delay in prosecution, during which time appellant was adjudicated incompetent and was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital for mental treatment. In establishing guidelines for trying an appellant seven years after the crime, the court stated: 40 [T]he government must show two things, in [our] view: (1) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice, and (2) that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay. 41 Williams v. United States, supra, 120 U.S.App.D.C. at 53, 250 F.2d at 21. 42 While the appellants herein base their appeal on the delay between the offenses charged and the issuance of the indictment rather than on a denial of a speedy trial the considerations which this court must make are essentially the same. As the District Court said in United States v. Parrott, 248 F.Supp. 196, 202 (D.D.C.1965): 43 There are four factors in a speedy trial consideration which appear to be crucial: (1) time involved; (2) who caused the delay; (3) the purposeful aspect of the delay; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 44 The Sixth Amendment right to swift justice is not confined to trial. [T]he constitutional guarantee protects against undue delays in presenting a formal charge as well as delays between indictment and trial. Mann v. United States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 29 n. 4, 304 F.2d 394, 396 n. 4 (1962). 45 In Parrott the court expressed the belief that logically . . . the computation [of occurrence to trial] should begin with the date on which the Government considered the defendants' action to be 'criminal'. Parrott v. United States, supra, 248 F.Supp. at 202. Hanrahan v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 134, 348 F.2d 363 (1965) involved a conviction in a highly-complex case four years after the issuance of the indictment. 46 Rule 48(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., if not the Sixth Amendment, in terms requires the prosecutor to proceed without unnecessary delay. The prosecutor's responsibilities under these provisions begin, not when the indictment is returned, but when the prosecution is begun.    [T]he critical question in this case is, not when was the indictment filed, but when was the prosecution commenced. (Citations and footnotes omitted.) 47 121 U.S.App.D.C. at 137, 348 F.2d at 366. While the record indicates that Revenue Agent Evangelist learned about the forgeries from Freeman at a relatively early date, it is not clear that these matters were immediately brought to the attention of his superiors. The judge in the District Court held that his superiors did not learn of the forgeries until later and we have no reason to upset his determination. In addition, where a case is as complex as the matter before us, the Government will be allowed more time in bringing an indictment than in a case which contains only simple issues. United States v. Orsinger, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 428 F.2d 1105 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831, 91 S.Ct. 62, 27 L.Ed.2d 61 (1970); Nickens v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 323 F.2d 808 (1963). 48 We find no prejudice by the time lapse in this case. Appellant Stamp does claim to have destroyed some files which would have been the basis of his defense prior to the bringing of the indictment but it is unclear to us as to what aid those files would have been to him and he makes no assertion as to their content or the exonerating effect they would have had with respect to his defense. 49