Opinion ID: 3154135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ALJ’s Assessment of Mr. Lee’s Credibility

Text: The ALJ found that Mr. Lee’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms were not fully credible. Mr. Lee challenges this conclusion on two grounds. First, he contends ALJ Stults’ signature of the decision for ALJ Wampler violated the SSA’s requirements, which prejudiced him because ALJ Stults had no opportunity to observe his demeanor at the hearing. Second, he argues that the ALJ failed to appropriately address his pain and other nonexertional impairments. Mr. Lee contends that ALJ Stults’ substituted signature violated the Commissioner’s internal procedures set forth in the Hearing, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”) § I-2-8-40 (“Administrative Law Judge Conducts Hearing But is Unavailable to Issue Decision”).2 This section of the HALLEX establishes procedures to be followed where an ALJ has conducted a hearing in a case and either (1) is unavailable to issue a decision because of death, retirement, resignation, or extended illness, in which case the case will be assigned to another ALJ for further proceedings, including another hearing, if necessary; or (2) has approved a final decision draft but is unavailable to sign, in which case the Hearing Office Chief ALJ 2 See http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-02/I-2-8-40.html (last visited November 10, 2015). 7 may sign the decision if the authoring ALJ has given him written authorization to do so. The notice accompanying the decision, sent in ALJ Wampler’s name, states that “I carefully reviewed the facts of your case and made the enclosed decision.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 12, 14. Both this language, and the format of ALJ Stults’ signature on behalf of ALJ Wampler, suggest that ALJ Wampler approved a final decision draft but was unavailable to sign the final decision. Mr. Lee argues that if this is the case, the signature violated the HALLEX requirements because there is no showing that (1) ALJ Stults signed the decision as Hearing Office Chief ALJ; and that (2) ALJ Wampler provided prior affirmative written authorization, in the form required by the HALLEX, for ALJ Stults to do so. But even if the signature did not technically meet HALLEX requirements, this would not necessarily require reversal. Assuming without deciding that we can grant relief for violations of HALLEX procedures,3 we agree with the Fifth Circuit that only prejudicial violations of HALLEX provisions entitle a claimant to relief. See Shave v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 592, 597 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying prejudice standard for alleged HALLEX violation). Mr. Lee suggests that he has demonstrated the required prejudice because “the signing ALJ did not have the opportunity to observe his demeanor at the hearing.” 3 The Ninth Circuit has stated that the HALLEX does not create judicially enforceable rights. See, e.g., Lockwood v. Comm’r, 616 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2010) (“HALLEX does not impose judicially enforceable duties on either the ALJ or this court.”). 8 Aplt. Opening Br. at 18. As we have indicated, however, the evidence reflects no more than a substituted signature, not a decision prepared ab initio by a substituted ALJ. ALJ Wampler had the opportunity to observe Mr. Lee at the hearing. We find no reversible error in the alleged failure to follow HALLEX procedures. Mr. Lee next argues that the ALJ failed to adequately assess his pain and associated nonexertional impairments because he relied on boilerplate language rather than using the specific credibility factors we outlined in Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995). We disagree. In his decision, the ALJ made extensive credibility findings that satisfied the requirements outlined in Kepler. See Aplt. App., Vol. II at 21-23. Although these findings primarily concerned Mr. Lee’s complaint of disabling seizures, the findings concerning Mr. Lee’s positive drug and alcohol tests, his choice to purchase alcohol rather than medications, the inconsistency in his hearing testimony concerning his prior incarceration, his criminal history, and the physical activities described in the medical records in excess of what would be expected from a claimant with allegedly disabling impairments, provided substantial evidence for a generalized finding of diminished credibility. We discern no error in this aspect of the ALJ’s credibility analysis. Mr. Lee also complains that the ALJ’s RFC determination failed to account for his pain. We disagree. Given that the ALJ found that Mr. Lee’s lower back pain was a severe impairment, more specific references to that specific pain in the RFC analysis would have been desirable. But we cannot conclude that the ALJ committed harmful error. The record contains very limited references to lower back pain. 9 See Aplt. App., Vol. III at 345, 347 (consulting examiner’s April 2010 report noting “history of chronic lower back pain” for which Mr. Lee had received no medical treatment, and observing that upon testing both cervical and thoracic spine were non-tender with full range of motion, that lumbar-sacral spine had full range of motion, and that straight leg raising was negative bilaterally in both sitting and supine positions); Vol. IV at 631 (January 2007 hospital record noting “no pain” with circled zero on zero-to-ten pain scale), 651-59 (August 2006 hospital record noting lower back pain with radiculopathy but negative x-ray findings resulting from recent accident when bull pinned Mr. Lee against a wall). The ALJ’s RFC determination, limiting Mr. Lee to light work, adequately accounted for this limitation and was consistent with the medical evidence. III. ALJ’s Failure to Obtain VE Testimony/Use of Grids The ALJ considered Mr. Lee’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, and found there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform. To define the basic mental demands of “competitive, remunerative unskilled work,” the ALJ cited SSR 85-15, which states that such demands “include the abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes in a routine work setting.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 25 (citing SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at  (1985)). He further cited the notes following Medical-Vocational Rule 202.00, see Aplt. App., Vol. II at 25, which state that “the primary work functions in the bulk of unskilled work relate to working with 10 things (rather than with data or people).” 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 2, § 202.00(g). The ALJ concluded that “[Mr. Lee] retains the mental skills for unskilled work,” noting his “capacity for work with routine supervision and work-related contact,” and that his “non-exertional limitations had little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled light work.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 25. “The mere presence of a nonexertional impairment does not preclude reliance on the grids.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1993). Reliance on the Grids is appropriate where “the claimant can perform a substantial majority of the work in the designated RFC category.” Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995). Although an ALJ may determine that a nonexertional impairment has only a negligible effect on the range of jobs available, “he must back such a finding of negligible effect with the evidence to substantiate it.” Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987). Here, the ALJ supported his use of the grids by discussing Mr. Lee’s mental impairment, its effect on his job performance under SSR 85-15 and § 202.00(g) of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, and Mr. Lee’s continuing ability to perform a substantial majority of light unskilled work. Although he did not expressly discuss the effect of Mr. Lee’s need to avoid hazards on the light unskilled job base, the omission was harmless. See SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at  (“A person with a seizure disorder who is restricted only from being on unprotected elevations and near dangerous moving machinery is an example of someone whose environmental restriction does not have a significant effect on work that exists at all exertional 11 levels.”). The ALJ’s discussion was sufficient to meet his step-five obligations. See Mitchell v. Astrue, 498 F. App’x 757, 760 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming ALJ’s reliance on SSR 85-15 and the grids in case involving both exertional and nonexertional mental impairments). We affirm the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner’s final decision denying Mr. Lee’s application for SSI benefits. Entered for the Court Jerome A. Holmes