Opinion ID: 2372039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Speech or Debate Statute

Text: Dorsey also sued Councilmember Carol Schwartz, apparently because she served as Chair of the Committee on Public Works and the Environment, which exercises oversight of the Department of Motor Vehicles. He accused her of dereliction of duties because she supported Bill 15-141 [3] and because she refuses to repeal 18 DCMR 1040, [4] which, he alleges, contradicts the Code. Citing D.C.Code § 1-301.42 (2001), the Superior Court dismissed the complaint against Ms. Schwartz, explaining that she was acting within the scope of her legislative duties. We are publishing this opinion to explain why the court properly dismissed the complaint against Councilmember Schwartz. D.C.Code § 1-301.42 (2001) provides that [f]or any speech or debate made in the course of their legislative duties, the members of the Council shall not be questioned in any other place. [5] Patterned after the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, this statute was enacted in part to provide Council members with the same protection afforded to members of Congress against civil actions and criminal prosecutions that threaten to delay and disrupt the legislative process. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY AND CRIMINAL LAW, REPORT ON BILL 1-34, THE LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE ACT OF 1975, at 2 (Dec. 4, 1975). See Gross v. Winter, 277 U.S.App. D.C. 406, 414-15, 876 F.2d 165, 173-74 (1989) (discussing purpose of D.C. statute, which previously was codified at D.C.Code § 1-223 (1981)). The Supreme Court has read the Speech or Debate Clause broadly to effectuate its purposes. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975). Thus, it is not just actual speech or debate on the floor of the legislative chamber which is protected. Dominion Cogen, D.C., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 878 F.Supp. 258, 263 (D.D.C. 1995). [T]he Speech or Debate Clause was designed to protect Congressmen `not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves.' Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 508, 99 S.Ct. 2445, 61 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979) (quoting Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967)). Accordingly, the Clause provides protection against civil actions brought by private individuals. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. at 502, 95 S.Ct. 1813. [A] private civil action, whether for an injunction or damages, creates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Id. at 503, 95 S.Ct. 1813. It is clear that voting by Members . . . [and] a Member's conduct at legislative committee hearings . . . may not be made the basis for a civil or criminal judgment against a Member because that conduct is within the `sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). Accord, Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-12, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973). This court has not had occasion to interpret the District's Speech or Debate statute, and we do not now attempt to define the limits of its protections. However, we have no difficulty in concluding that it clothes D.C. City Council members with immunity from lawsuits . . . for conduct undertaken in their legislative capacities. Dominion Cogen, 878 F.Supp. at 262 (construing the D.C. statute). Ms. Schwartz's support for Bill 15-141 and her refusal to repeal 18 DCMR § 1040 clearly fall within the scope of her legislative duties. Therefore, the Superior Court properly dismissed the complaint insofar as it pertained to her.