Opinion ID: 490514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the september 30, 1983, cutoff date

Text: 13 This case presents an additional dilemma. The Act provides that [s]ubstitute projects under this paragraph may not be approved by the Secretary under this paragraph after September 30, 1983, and the Secretary shall not approve any withdrawal of a route under this paragraph after such date.... 23 U.S.C. Sec. 103(e)(4). 7 It is not totally clear whether the FHWA's September 29, 1983 letter, conditionally approving the withdrawal of I-420 funds and the substitute project concepts (including Georgia 400), constituted a withdrawal and substitution approval under Sec. 103(e)(4), or whether the necessary approval did not actually take place until the September 11, 1984, letter stating that the conditions had been removed. J.A. at 92, 125. Although it did not explicitly address this issue in either the 1983 or 1984 letters, the FHWA obviously acted on the assumption that its 1983 conditional approval of both the I-420 withdrawal and the substitute project concepts met the deadline. See, e.g., J.A. at 111 (internal memorandum discussing Atlanta's continued resistance to I-420 withdrawal if the funds would go to Georgia 400; describing as the [w]orst case the re[s]cission of our conditional approval with loss of withdrawal option because the withdrawal deadline has passed). The question of whether the cutoff date was met in this case boils down to whether a conditional approval meets the statutory definition of an approval. Although plaintiffs have argued that the deadline was missed, they do not suggest what relief a court could grant other than reinstating the status quo as of September 30, 1983, which would necessitate that the funds be used for I-420, a result desired by no one. 8 Defendants have not raised this issue on appeal; the District Court did not address it in its opinion. 14 Nor do we decide at this time whether the September 29, 1983 conditional approval followed by the September 11, 1984 removal of those conditions constituted withdrawal and substitution within the statutory timetable. As we discussed above, the Department has never explained how its substantial support regulation applies in the context of this case, nor, for that matter, why Atlanta's failure to concur in an unconditional I-420 funds withdrawal was a problem in 1983 but not in 1984. In the course of explaining its rationale on these matters, the Department should also elucidate its construction of the September 30, 1983, statutory deadline for withdrawal of funds and substitution of other projects with regard to the facts of this case. 15 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the District Court with instructions to order the Department to reconsider the matter in light of this opinion. 16 It is so ordered.