Opinion ID: 551844
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Age Discrimination Under the A.D.E.A.

Text: 14 Spiller's age discrimination claim was ripe for summary judgment. The A.D.E.A. mandates that an aggrieved party present a claim to the E.E.O.C. within 180 days of the purported violation or lose the right to sue. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d)(1). This requirement is not jurisdictional, but is instead a pre-condition to filing suit in district court. Pruet Production Co. v. Ayles, 784 F.2d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir.1986); Coke v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640 F.2d 584, 595 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc). Spiller presented her age discrimination charge to the E.E.O.C. some 450 days after the alleged act of discrimination; on its face, the claim is thus untimely. 15 Finding that Spiller's claim was late does not, of course, end the inquiry because the 180-day filing limit for A.D.E.A. charges is subject to equitable tolling. Pruet, 784 F.2d at 1279; Coke, 616 F.2d at 595; see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982) (Title VII case 3 ). When Brown responded to appellee's motion for summary judgment on the age discrimination claim, his only argument in favor of tolling was the unsupported assertion that the Center had failed to post notices advising employees of their rights under the A.D.E.A. Brown has abandoned this ground on appeal and has instead raised a host of nebulous and confusing allegations. Clearly, tolling was not called for, and appellee was entitled to summary judgment on Spiller's age discrimination claim. 16