Opinion ID: 2544698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The R.A.V. Case

Text: In R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, the defendant, who had allegedly burned a cross in an African-American family's yard, was charged with violating a St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance that prohibited the placing `on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender....' ( Id. at p. 380, 112 S.Ct. 2538.) The Minnesota courts had interpreted the ordinance as proscribing only fighting words. ( Ibid. ) The high court unanimously agreed the ordinance violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, but it divided as to the reasons. As the Court of Appeal recently summarized, the R.A.V. majority invalidated the ordinance as unlawfully discriminating on the basis of content. According to the high court, its previous statements that the Constitution does not protect certain categories of expression were not to be taken literally, but meant only that `these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.' ([ R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 383-384, 112 S.Ct. 2538], original italics.) Thus, while certain categories of speech and expressive conduct may be regulated, such regulation may not discriminate within that category on the basis of content. For example, `the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.' ([ Id., at p. 384, 112 S.Ct. 2538], original italics.) The ordinance in R.A.V. was facially unconstitutional as content-based discrimination because it discriminated among fighting words based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender. ( Id., at p. [391, 112 S.Ct. 2538].) ( In re Steven S. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 598, 610, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 644.) Defendants aptly summarize their argument why section 148.6 is unconstitutional under R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305: ... California may choose to ban all defamation proscribable under [ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710] and [ Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 64, 67, 85 S.Ct. 209], regardless of its subject matter or target. Alternatively, California may choose to provide an absolute privilege for all citizen complaints, including speech critical of peace officers. What the state may not do, without running afoul of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, is to apply one defamation rule to citizen complaints against peace officers, and a different rule to those made against other public officials. That, however, is precisely the content- and view-point-based distinction created by Penal Code section 148.6. In other words, defendants argue the Legislature may proscribe all knowingly false allegations of misconduct or none, but it may not proscribe some of them. As we explain, defendants misread R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305. That decision does not require such an allor-nothing approach. [4] In response to criticism by the minority, the R.A.V. majority denied that it was requiring the proscription of either all speech or no speech. In our view, the First Amendment imposes not an `underinclusiveness' limitation but a `content discrimination' limitation upon a State's prohibition of proscribable speech. ( R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 387, 112 S.Ct. 2538.) Even the prohibition against content discrimination that we assert the First Amendment requires is not absolute. It applies differently in the context of proscribable speech than in the area of fully protected speech. The rationale of the general prohibition, after all, is that content discrimination `raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace,' [citations]. But content discrimination among various instances of a class of proscribable speech often does not pose this threat. ( Id. at pp. 387-388, 112 S.Ct. 2538.) The high court identified three categories of content discrimination that do not threaten to drive ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace and hence are permissible. ( R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 388-390, 112 S.Ct. 2538.) Contrary to defendants' argument and the Court of Appeal's conclusion, we find that all three categories apply here. First, When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. ( R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538.) The Court of Appeal noted that this language can best be understood by way of a concrete example provided by R.A.V. We agree, but the Court of Appeal overlooked the most pertinent example: [T]he Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that are directed against the President, see 18 U.S.C. § 871since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to the person of the President. [Citation.] But the Federal Government may not criminalize only those threats against the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities. ( R.A.V., supra, at p. 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538.) This example applies here. The reason the entire class of speech at issueknowingly false statements of factis proscribable has special force ( R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538) when applied to false accusations against peace officers. When a person makes a complaint against a peace officer of the type that section 148.6 governs, the agency receiving the complaint is legally obligated to investigate it and to retain the complaint and resulting reports or findings for at least five years. (§ 832.5.) Thus, the potential harm of a knowingly false statement is greater here than in other situations. The State's desire to redress these perceived harms provides an adequate explanation for its criminalizing these particular false statements of fact over and above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases. ( Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) 508 U.S. 476, 488, 113, S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 [rejecting a constitutional challenge under R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, to law punishing bias-motivated crimes more severely than crimes committed for other reasons].) Accordingly, just as the government may criminalize only threats of violence against a specific victim, the President, so too may the Legislature criminalize only knowingly false accusations against a class of victims, peace officers. To complete the analogy, what the Legislature may not do is criminalize only knowingly false accusations of illegal racial profiling. Second, Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even a content-defined subclass of proscribable speech is that the subclass happens to be associated with particular `secondary effects' of the speech, so that the regulation is ` justified without reference to the content of the ... speech,' [citations]. ( R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 389, 112 S.Ct. 2538.) This basis also applies here. Knowingly false accusations of misconduct against a peace officer have substantial secondary effectsthey trigger mandatory investigation and record retention requirements. Complaints directed at other persons do not receive this special treatment. This requirement of an investigation, and the resulting investigation itself, can have substantial effects. Public resources are required to investigate these complaints, resources that could otherwise be used for other matters; the complaints may adversely affect the accused peace officer's career, at least until the investigation is complete; and the complaints may be discoverable in criminal proceedings. (See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 8-10, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 52 P.3d 129; Aguilar v. Johnson (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 241, 249 250, 247 Cal.Rptr. 909.) These secondary effects justify the regulation on a neutral basis without reference to the content of the speech. (See Morascini v. Commissioner of Public Safety (1996) 236 Conn. 781, 675 A.2d 1340, 1348-1351 [cost of speech that the state must bear for reasons unrelated to its content is a secondary effect].) The third category is a catchall. There may be other or ... bases as well. Indeed, to validate such selectivity (where totally proscribable speech is at issue) it may not even be necessary to identify any particular `neutral' basis, so long as the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot. ( R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 390, 112 S.Ct. 2538.) Here, we see no realistic possibility of official suppression of ideas. In finding to the contrary, the Court of Appeal stated, The explicit legislative intent of the law is to suppress a specific class of speech: citizen complaints of police misconduct. Were that statement accurate, our task would be easy indeed. Complaining of police misconduct is a quintessential right in this country. But that is not what is afoot here. The Legislature is not suppressing all complaints of police misconduct, only knowingly false ones. Defendants argue that section 148.6 impermissibly targets a disfavored subject ]. (Quoting R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538.) On the contrary, the targeted subjectformally filed complaints of misconduct against a peace officeris, in other respects, favored. Those complaints are subject to mandatory investigation and record retention requirements. If a person wants to file a complaint in a way that forces an investigation, that person may not knowingly tell a factual falsehood. The Legislature may elevate the status of a category of complaints that are particularly sensitivelike those of misconduct against peace officersand require their investigation and retention of records, and at the same time penalize those who invoke that status with knowingly false complaints. No one has a constitutional right to make a complaint of misconduct knowing both that the complaint must be investigated and that it is false. Defendants suggest that the requirement of section 148.6, subdivision (a)(2), that the complainant read and sign an admonition explaining the right to make a complaint, the investigation and record retention requirements, and the criminal sanction for knowingly false complaints, shows that official suppression of ideas is indeed afoot. We disagree. That admonition merely advises complainants of the law and impresses on them the significance of the formal complaint. Warning people of the consequences of a knowingly false complaint is no more impermissible than advising people they are signing a document or testifying under penalty of perjury. The explanation and admonition do not invalidate the statute. Some of the arguments that the defendants and the Court of Appeal below employ do not match the purported reason they claim section 148.6 is invalid. In its concluding remarks, the Court of Appeal stated, In our country, we expect and tolerate an infinite variety of expression. The statement is both true and irrelevant. In our country, we do not expect, and the Constitution does not require us to tolerate, knowingly false statements of fact. Defendants argue that section 148.6 has a chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional rights. The Court of Appeal echoes this argument: But section 148.6 might well stifle the registering of legitimate complaints made by the remaining 30 to 40 percent of citizens. But they do not explain, and we do not see, how extending section 148.6 to all complaints of public employee misconduct would reduce this supposed chilling effect. As defendants necessarily concede, however, so extending section 148.6 would cure any violation of the rule of R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305. Thus, the chilling effect argument has nothing to do with whether section 148.6 is invalid under R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305. Rather, the chilling effect argument relates to another common constitutional objection to legislation regulating speechthat it is overbroad because it threatens protected as well as unprotected speech. A statute is facially overbroad if it may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. ( Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973) 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830; see In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 709, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365.) To succeed, a constitutional challenge based on asserted overbreadth ... must demonstrate the statute inhibits a substantial amount of protected speech. ( New York v. Ferber (1982) 458 U.S. 747, 768-769, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113.) `[Overbreadth ... must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' ( Broadrick v. Oklahoma, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 615 [93 S.Ct. 2908].) ( In re M.S., supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 710, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 355, 896 P.2d 1365.) Section 148.6 is not overbroad. The high court explained in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, and Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, that a statute regulating all false statements of fact would be overbroad because it would inhibit protected speech. But section 148.6 proscribes only knowingly false statements. As noted in another case that rejected a chilling effect argument regarding section 148.5, The statute prohibits only knowing falsehoods. This requirement of scienter protects witnesses who honestly misperceive facts. Those who knowingly give false information to police officers should be discouraged from doing so. ( People v. Lawson (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 60, 68, 161 Cal.Rptr. 7.) Moreover, section 148.6 applies only to formally filed accusations that the agency must investigate, not to more casual speech. Such formal accusations are akin to statements or declarations made under penalty of perjury which, if knowingly false, are punishable as a felony. (§§ 118, 126.) Accusations that section 148.6 covers are not as formal as statements made under penalty of perjury, but the punishment for such accusations that are knowingly false is also not as serious. Section 148.6 has no more of an impermissible chilling effect than California's perjury laws. [5] Defendants cite a series of state and federal district court decisions declaring Civil Code section 47.5 [6] unconstitutional ( Gritchen v. Collier (C.D.Cal.1999) 73 F.Supp.2d 1148, revd. on jurisdictional grounds (9th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 807; Haddad v. Wall (C.D.Cal.2000) 107 F.Supp.2d 1230; Walker v. Kiousis, supra, 93 Cal. App.4th 1432, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 69), and a federal district court order declaring Penal Code section 148.6 unconstitutional ( Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino (C.D.Cal. 2000) 107 F.Supp.2d 1239). Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d 1239, contains almost identical analysis as Haddad v. Wall, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d 1230, filed the same day by the same court. All of these cases rely on R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305. We find them either inapposite or unpersuasive. The first, Gritchen v. Collier, supra, 73 F.Supp.2d 1148, was reversed on appeal when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide the question. ( Gritchen v. Collier, supra, 254 F.3d 807.) Although, as defendants note, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision because the district court should not have decided the constitutional question rather than because it decided it incorrectly, the reversal certainly weakens its precedential value. To the extent the later decisions rely on the reversed decision (see Haddad v. Wall, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1233-1234, 1237-1238; Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1243-1244, 1246-1247; Walker v. Kiousis, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1437, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 69), they are accordingly also weakened. But we need not consider in detail the extent to which the reversal of Gritchen v. Collier, supra, 73 F.Supp.2d 1148, undermines these cases. We express no opinion on the validity of Civil Code section 47.5 because the issue is not before us. For the reasons stated, we respectfully disagree that Penal Code section 148.6 is invalid. Hamilton v. City of San Bernardino, supra, 107 F.Supp.2d 1239, overlooks the circumstance that complaints subject to the criminal sanction of Penal Code section 148.6 have, in some ways, a favored status that justifies the regulation without reference to the content of the speech, and the other reasons we have identified why the statute is valid.