Opinion ID: 844211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Subdivision (c)

Text: Plaintiffs offer a contrary reading of subdivision (c) of section 340.1, contending that the first sentence, with its one-year revival of lapsed claims, applies to discovered claims that have lapsed, whereas the second sentence governs claims such as theirs that had not been discovered prior to the effective date of the 2002 amendments. Plaintiffs contend that the only plausible interpretation of the second sentence is that it refers to claims by persons who were 26 years of age or older as of January 1, 2003, but who had not yet discovered the connection between the childhood abuse and their injuries. We are not persuaded. We have concluded that any claim by persons who were 26 years of age or older as of 1998 was time-barred prior to the 2002 amendment, whether the claims had been discovered or not. Accordingly, we disagree that the second sentence of section 340.1, subdivision (c), referring to claims that are not time-barred, applies to such claims. Rather, the language to which plaintiffs refer appears to invoke the rule we have discussed above, that an enlarged limitations period is said to apply prospectively, and properly, to claims that have not lapsed as of the effective date of the enactment. Justice Corrigan's dissent also turns to the second sentence of section 340.1, subdivision (c), concluding that under that sentence, undiscovered claims that previously were time-barred are not subject to the one-year limitation appearing in the first sentence. As noted, that sentence provides: Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed to alter the applicable statute of limitations period of an action that is not time barred as of January 1, 2003. ( Ibid. ) According to Justice Corrigan's dissent, plaintiffs' claims were not time-barred as of January 1, 2003, because on that date they benefittedfor the first timefrom the discovery provision of subdivision (a) that had been newly extended to the new subcategory of defendant. Her dissent would conclude that the second sentence of subdivision (c) means that undiscovered claims, no longer being time-barred under the newly amended statute, are revived, and are not subject to the restriction of the one-year revival clause. We are not persuaded that the inferences drawn by Justice Corrigan's dissent are supported by the language of the enactment. Again, the first sentence of the subdivision provides that  any claim for damages [that is permitted under the 2002 amendment] to be filed ... that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2003, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is revived, and, in that case, a cause of action may be commenced within one year of January 1, 2003. (§ 340.1, subd. (c), italics added.) This sentence plainly states that any claim that is barred by the limitations period is revivedbut in that case, i.e., the case of any barred but revived claim, the action must be brought within the one-year period. The applicable statute of limitations period for plaintiffs' claims lapsed no later than 1998, and the applicable ... period was not subject to extension by virtue of their delay in discovery that their adult injuries were caused by childhood abuse. The conclusion of Justice Corrigan's dissent seems to depend upon an assumption that as of January 1, 2003, plaintiffs' claims were not time-barred because subdivision (a) of section 340.1 itself operates to revive claims, but we have found no such language in that provision. Prior to January 1, 2003, however, plaintiffs' claims had already become time-barred. The 2002 amendment extending the limitations period until three years after discovery did not change that fact, in the absence of express language of revival. Subdivision (a) of section 340.1 did not provide such language, nor did the new language of subdivision (b). The dissent by Justice Corrigan points to the phrase as of January 1, 2003, in the second sentence of section 340.1, subdivision (c). (Dis. opn. of Corrigan, J., post, at p. 992.) But the first sentence reviving lapsed claims also refers to claims that would be barred as of January 1, 2003, but for the new law. The two sentences do not seem to us to be speaking of different categories of claims requiring revival, nor does the subdivision expressly differentiate between discovered and undiscovered claims. Rather, in our view the second sentence of subdivision (c) states solely what the one-year revival period does not do. It is a savings clause that makes plain in the statute a principle that exists in the case lawthat an enlarged limitations period is considered to apply prospectively and appropriately to actions that are not already barred even if the conduct occurred prior to the enactment. (See Andonagui, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.) The second sentence of subdivision (c) specifies that the limited one-year revival clause should not be interpreted to cut off claims that have not lapsed and that need no revivalclaims, for example, of a plaintiff who was under age 26 when the amendment was enacted and that had not been barred under the 1998 amendment, or claims as to which the running of the statutory period may have been tolled by operation of law (see, e.g., §§ 352 [tolling during minority or insanity], 352.1 [two-year tolling beyond accrual for incarcerated persons], 354 [tolling during war]). Similar language had been used in 2000 when the Legislature enacted a provision reviving certain otherwise time-barred insurance claims arising from the 1994 Northridge earthquake. (§ 340.9, subd. (a), added by Stats. 2000, ch. 1090, § 1, p. 8476.) The enactment revived any claim which is barred as of the effective date of this section solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expiredbut only for one year. ( Ibid. ) Like the revival clause in section 340.1, section 340.9 did nothing more than reopen the filing window, for a one-year period, to those otherwise viable [ claims ] that had become time-barred. ( Rosenblum v. Safeco Ins. Co. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 847, 858 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 427].) In language nearly identical to that found in the second sentence of section 340.1, subdivision (c), section 340.9 also provides: Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the applicable limitations period of an action that is not time barred as of the effective date of this section [(i.e., Jan. 1, 2001)]. (§ 340.9, subd. (c).) The Court of Appeal in Cordova v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 89 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 170] believed that the language of subdivision (c) of section 340.9an almost exact parallel of the language of the second sentence of section 340.1, subdivision (c)was merely intended to ensure that the one-year limit contained in the new statute's revival provision did not restrict a plaintiff who, prior to the effective date of the new enactment, already had a viable claim. ( Cordova, supra, at p. 98.) More colloquially, the Cordova decision explained: [I]t is difficult to imagine a purpose for subdivision (c) other than to say, in effect, if you could have sued your insurer without the benefit of this statute nothing in this statute limits your right to do so. ( Ibid. ) Plaintiffs in the present case could not have sued defendants without the benefit of the 2002 amendments. Not only were they all over the age of 26 in 1998, they could not in any case have extended the limitations period on the ground now asserteda delay in discovery that their adult injuries had been caused by childhood abuse. Without the benefit of the 2002 amendments, plaintiffs did not have a defense to defendant's claim that their suit was barred by the running of the statute of limitations. Significantly, there is evidence that the Legislature had section 340.9, subdivision (c) in mind as it drafted the 2002 amendment to section 340.1. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1779 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 17, 2002, p. 4 [noting § 340.9 as [p]recedent for extending a limitations period and reviv[ing] certain time-barred actions for a one-year window period]; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1779 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 6, 2002, p. 7 [noting that § 340.9 provides victims of the 1994 Northridge earthquake an additional year to file claims by reviving any insurance claim for quake-related damages which would otherwise be barred].) Even though the Legislature could not have been aware of the Cordova opinion's interpretation when it adopted the 2002 amendments to section 340.1, the court's interpretation of the meaning of the language the Legislature chose to use in both instances is quite persuasive. In supplemental briefing filed after oral argument, plaintiffs have asserted that such an interpretation of section 340.1, subdivision (c) is inconsistent with this court's decision in Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 655, 73 P.3d 517]. They reasoned that in that case we concluded that section 337.15, with its 10-year limit (measured from completion of construction) on latent construction defect claims, was phrased in such absolute terms as to preclude application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, By analogy, plaintiffs contended, because the age 26 cutoff contained in section 340.1 was so absolute prior to the 2002 amendment that there would be no possibility that claims prior to 2002 would have been tolled under statutory tolling provisions, accordingly the second sentence of subdivision (c) must not refer to such an eventuality. Our decision in Lantzy is inapposite. It did not speak to the issue of statutory tolling (31 Cal.4th at p. 383, fn. 17), but to the judicial rule permitting equitable tolling when the plaintiff has given notice of the claim and tolling would not prejudice the defendant. Such a tolling rule would have been inconsistent with various aspects of section 337.15 not found in section 340.1. Nor did the statute under review in Lantzy contain language such as is found in section 340.1, subdivision (c).