Opinion ID: 2972982
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smith’s “bodily injury” claim

Text: Although the district court found that Lonnie’s conduct was “reprehensible and offensive,” it concluded that Smith had not suffered a “bodily injury” for which there was coverage under the Wilsons’ State Farm policy. The court reached this conclusion after finding that “actual physical harm” was required in order for an injury to be cognizable under a policy that defines bodily injury as “physical injury, sickness, or disease.” State Farm had no duty to defend or indemnify the Wilsons in Smith’s underlying state-court action, the district court reasoned, because the Wilsons and Smith had “failed to set forth any support for their contention that unwanted and offensive -6- Nos. 04-4263/4264 State Farm v. Wilson physical contact alone constitutes an actual physical injury,” and because “Smith did not sustain any cuts, bruises, sprains, broken bones, or any other physical injuries.” The Wilsons and Smith concede that the State Farm policy requires a “physical injury” for coverage to exist. But they argue that the district court defined the term too narrowly when it concluded that the harm Smith suffered as a result of Lonnie’s assault was not a “physical injury.” They claim that Smith suffered “significant, external violence” when she “was forced to put her fingers within her vagina under threat of death by Lonnie” and when Lonnie spread her legs apart, rubbed himself against her, and attempted to kiss her. Such external violence, they contend, constitutes a “physical injury” under the policy. The argument advanced by the Wilsons and Smith is premised on the assumption that the words “physical injury” as used in the State Farm policy are ambiguous. Smith, in particular, contends that the term “physical injury” is ambiguous because the term “injury” is not defined in the policy. She suggests that the court resolve this purported ambiguity by referring to the definition of injury found in Black’s Law Dictionary; namely, “[t]he invasion of any legally protected interest of another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 785 (6th ed. 1990). Based on this definition, she argues that “the term injury does not require any physical sequelae.” Smith correctly observes that the term “physical injury” is not defined in the State Farm policy. But “[t]he mere absence of a definition in an insurance contract does not make the meaning of the term ambiguous.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 652 N.E.2d 684, 686 (Ohio 1995) (finding that the word “employee,” which was undefined by the insurance policy in question, had a plain and ordinary meaning and was therefore not ambiguous). In the absence of a -7- Nos. 04-4263/4264 State Farm v. Wilson definition, we “must give undefined words used in an insurance contract their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id.; see also King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 519 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ohio 1988) (holding that insurance coverage should be determined “in conformity with the intention of the parties as gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language employed”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The word “injury” in the State Farm policy at issue is preceded initially by the word “bodily” and later by the word “physical.” Even if, as a general matter, a harm need not be physical in order to be considered an “injury,” the policy language in the present case explicitly restricts coverage to harms that are in fact “physical” in nature. The case of David v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 665 N.E.2d 1171 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), is closely analogous to the present circumstances. In David, the court was called upon to determine the ordinary meaning of the term “bodily injury.” The insurance carrier in David refused to defend or indemnify its insured in the underlying litigation, which involved a woman who had sued the insured for making “‘repugnant’ sexual remarks to [her], . . . “grabb[ing] her breast, and . . . expos[ing] his penis to her.” Id. at 1172. She “suffered emotional distress and received counseling from a psychologist” as a result of the incident. Id. After observing that “[t]he Ohio Supreme Court has held that ‘bodily injury’ usually indicates an injury brought on by external violence,” the Ohio appellate court ruled that there was no coverage under the policy for the emotional distress caused by the insured’s actions. Id. at 1173 (citing Tomlinson v. Skolnik, 540 N.E.2d 716 (Ohio 1989)); see also Reichard v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 13392, 1992 WL 361829, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1992) (unpublished) (surveying the caselaw and concluding -8- Nos. 04-4263/4264 State Farm v. Wilson that most “courts hold that the term ‘bodily injury’ denotes actual physical harm arising from corporeal contact”). Interpreting the term “bodily injury” to require something more than physical contact, as the court held in David, comports with the common understanding of this phrase as well. See King, 519 N.E.2d at 1383 (stating that the definition of an unambiguous term in an insurance contract may be “gathered from the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the language employed”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). State Farm argues that, if this court were to accept the definition of “physical injury” urged by the Wilsons and Smith, a person who is bumped into by someone in a crowd would have sustained a “bodily injury.” We agree with State Farm that the phrase “physical injury” cannot be read as synonymous with every instance of physical contact, as Smith argues. Nor can the phrase be read to encompass any injury, whether tangible or not, arising out physical contact, as the Wilsons argue. Indeed, as commonly understood, contact with another results in a “physical injury” only where a tangible harm to the body is ascertainable as a result of the contact. Despite Lonnie’s highly offensive and humiliating conduct, the district court properly found that “Smith did not sustain any cuts, bruises, sprains, broken bones, or any other physical injuries.” The Wilsons’ State Farm policy specifically excludes coverage for “emotional distress, mental anguish, humiliation, mental distress, mental injury, or any similar injury unless it arises out of actual physical injury.” In finding that Smith had suffered emotional harm, but that this harm had not arisen from “an actual physical injury,” the district court was influenced by the following exchange in Smith’s deposition: -9- Nos. 04-4263/4264 State Farm v. Wilson Q: What injuries are you claiming you sustained as a result of the incident? A: Just—I’m claiming that I’m just as stressed and physically, mentally exhausted, just—just—I’m not myself anymore. Q: What kind of physical ailment are you claiming to have? A: I’m not claiming to have any. I have been diagnosed with depression. My blood pressure has gone sky high since then. There is no question in the present case that Smith was seriously harmed by Lonnie’s egregious conduct, and that any person in a similar position would have felt terrified and humiliated. Smith has been unable to return to work since the assault, continues to require the treatment of a psychiatrist for her emotional distress, and has developed high blood pressure as a result of her experience. But the fact that Smith’s emotional trauma was the direct result of physical contact—both when Lonnie touched Smith and when he forced her to touch herself—does not mean that she sustained a physical injury. See Dickens v. Gen. Accident Ins., 695 N.E.2d 1168, 1169-70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (finding that “physical symptoms stemming from . . . emotional distress,” such as “nausea, stomach pains, headaches, anxiety, mental torment, body pain, and other adverse health effects,” did not qualify for coverage “[b]ased on the commonly accepted definition[] of ‘bodily injury’”) (internal citation omitted). We therefore conclude that the emotional harm suffered by Smith, though unquestionably serious, was not a “bodily injury” for which coverage is provided under the Wilsons’ State Farm policy. - 10 - Nos. 04-4263/4264 State Farm v. Wilson C. State Farm’s “willful and malicious acts” defense Finally, we note that another argument advanced by State Farm—one not addressed by the district court—provides an independent ground for affirmance. State Farm argued before the district court that Lonnie’s conduct fell within the category of “willful and malicious acts” by the insured—acts that the policy expressly excludes from coverage. Although our conclusion regarding the interpretation of the term “bodily injury” obviates the need for further elaboration on this argument, we read Ohio caselaw as fully supporting State Farm’s contention. One case directly on point is Reitz v. Mathews, No. 94APE01-15, 1994 WL 504383 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1994) (unpublished), in which a young man was charged with kidnapping and raping a fifteen-year-old acquaintance. He pled guilty to the lesser charge of gross sexual imposition—one of the offenses with which Lonnie was charged in the present case—and the victim sued for damages. The victim eventually tried to collect from State Farm, the perpetrator’s insurer, but the Ohio Court of Appeals held that the language exempting “willful and malicious acts” from coverage released State Farm from any liability resulting from the acts of gross sexual imposition to which the insured had pled guilty. Id. at ; cf. Young v. All Am. Ins. Co., 611 N.E.2d 421, 425 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a mother’s actions that aided and abetted the sexual abuse of her daughter “constituted intentional conduct . . . to cause harm” that fell within the insurance policy’s intentional-injury exclusion); Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115, 1120 (Ohio 1996) (holding that public policy bars insurance coverage for intentional acts of sexual molestation of children). The reasoning of these cases provides an additional basis for affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm. - 11 - Nos. 04-4263/4264 State Farm v. Wilson