Opinion ID: 4543962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authorizing Award of Attorney Fees

Text: [¶20] We next address Pollack and Quirion’s contention that the court erred in authorizing an award of attorney fees to Fournier. They argue that the court did not have the authority to award attorney fees because the special motion was granted only “in part” and because Fournier did not provide any reasons to support an award of attorney fees.4 Fournier has not yet filed an application for attorney fees and, thus, the court has not calculated 4 an amount to be awarded. See M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(3). We therefore address only the court’s authority to award attorney fees when reviewing a special motion to dismiss and its determination, in the circumstances of this case, that an award of such fees is warranted. See 14 M.R.S. § 556. 12 [¶21] We review a court’s authority to award attorney fees de novo, see True v. Harmon, 2015 ME 14, ¶ 7, 110 A.3d 650; Gibson v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Me. 1996) (stating that “the court’s authority to award attorney fees is a matter of law”), and review a court’s decision to award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion, see Estate of Gagnon, 2016 ME 129, ¶ 15, 147 A.3d 356. “To the extent that interpretation of a statute is required in conjunction with the award or denial, we review the statutory construction de novo.” Kilroy v. Northeast Sunspaces, Inc., 2007 ME 119, ¶ 6, 930 A.2d 1060. [¶22] A trial court’s authority “to award attorney fees may be based on (1) a contractual agreement between the parties; (2) a specific statutory authorization; or (3) the court’s inherent authority to sanction serious misconduct in a judicial proceeding.” Sebra v. Wentworth, 2010 ME 21, ¶ 17, 990 A.2d 538 (quotation marks omitted). Section 556 provides that, “[i]f the court grants a special motion to dismiss, the court may award the moving party costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, including those incurred for the special motion and any related discovery matters.” [¶23] Here, Fournier requested an award of attorney fees in her special motion to dismiss, the court had the statutory authority to authorize an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 556, and the court did so only after 13 granting, in part, Fournier’s special motion to dismiss. Because “discrete claims within a single action may be individually dismissed pursuant to a special motion to dismiss,” Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 9, 143 A.3d 788 (emphasis omitted), we are not persuaded by Pollack and Quirion’s contention that attorney fees may be awarded only when a court grants, in full, a special motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court did not err in determining that it could award attorney fees to Fournier. See 14 M.R.S. § 556; Sweet v. Breivogel, 2019 ME 18, ¶ 23, 201 A.3d 1215 (“[T]he trial court is in the best position to observe the unique nature and tenor of the litigation as it relates to a request for attorney fees . . . .”). [¶24] Having previously concluded that the court erred in determining that Fournier’s service of the notice of claim (Count 1) was petitioning activity, an award of attorney fees as to that count is not authorized by section 556. However, the trial court did not expressly articulate whether its decision to award attorney fees was based in whole or in part on Count 1. Therefore, because the court was authorized to award attorney fees, and because the court did grant Fournier’s special motion to dismiss as to Count 3 and, in part, as to Count 4, we remand for the court to decide whether an award of attorney fees is warranted as to the two remaining counts and, if so, to determine an 14 appropriate award of attorney fees in proportion to them. See Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 2004 ME 53, ¶ 12, 847 A.2d 1169 (holding that a court may use the merit of a case “as a measure of whether attorney fees are appropriate . . . because the anti-SLAPP statute is aimed at preventing litigation that has no chance of succeeding on the merits”). The entry is: Judgment granting special motion to dismiss Count 1 of amended complaint vacated. Judgment affirmed in all other respects. Remanded for the court to determine attorney fees. Matthew Pollack, appellant pro se Jane Quirion, appellant pro se Daniel A. Nuzzi, Esq., and Nathaniel A. Bessey, Esq., Brann & Isaacson, Lewiston, for appellee Jessica Fournier Sagadahoc County Superior Court docket number CV-2018-24 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY