Opinion ID: 1236328
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Heading: Sanction for Contempt.

Text: Defendants concede they were in contempt for failing to provide handwriting exemplars ordered by the district court, but they contend the court selected an unauthorized sanction for their contemptindefinite continuance of their criminal trial. They point out that a continuance of a criminal case is not one of the contempt sanctions specifically authorized in Iowa Code chapter 665, the statute that governs contempt in Iowa. For authority they rely primarily on Wilson v. Fenton, 312 N.W.2d 524, 528-29 (Iowa 1981), where we held that Iowa Code chapter 665 includes a complete and exclusive reservoir of sanctions for contempt. Chapter 665 authorizes two types of sanction for contempt: section 665.4 lists the dollar amounts of fines and months or days of imprisonment that may be imposed for those contempts that are not otherwise specifically provided in the statute; and section 665.5, a contempt specifically provided, states in part: If the contempt consists in an omission to perform an act which is yet in the power of the person to perform, the person may be imprisoned until the person performs it. This specific sanction, imprisonment of indefinite duration, can be used forcefully to coerce compliance with a court order. See Coyle v. Sawyer, 198 Iowa 1022, 1028, 200 N.W. 721, 723 (1924). The section 665.5 sanction differs considerably from the primarily punishment-oriented sanctions listed in section 665.4. See Wilson v. Fenton, 312 N.W.2d at 528-29. It is the functional equivalent of the civil contempt sanction widely recognized at common law. See Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Court, 380 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Iowa 1986), (quoting Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 1534-35, 16 L.Ed.2d 622, 626-27 (1966)): When the petitioners carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets, the action is essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties and has quite properly been exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees. We find in section 665.5 statutory authority for the district court to retain defendants in jail and not schedule their trial until they had complied with its lawful order. Defendants' reliance on Wilson v. Fenton is misplaced. In Wilson we disallowed as a sanction payment of attorney fees and costs by the contemnor, since that was not authorized by any provision in chapter 665. 312 N.W.2d at 529-30. Here, in contrast, section 665.5 specifically provides for imprisonment of defendants to coerce compliance with the court order they readily could perform, and that was precisely the effect of the order continuing the case. The statute, after all, states that the contemnor may be imprisoned until he performs. Iowa Code § 665.5. Implicit in that language is authority to continue the trial of the contemnors already held in pretrial confinement until they furnish the evidence required by court order. In a case presenting very similar facts, United States v. Askew, 584 F.2d 960 (10th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132, 99 S.Ct. 1054, 59 L.Ed.2d 94 (1979), the court likewise found authority to continue a case until the defendant complied with an order requiring handwriting exemplars, explaining: A trial court must be empowered to continue proceedings until the defendant is purged of contempt, or the efficacy of the court's valid orders would be substantially vitiated. Id. at 584 F.2d at 962; see United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925, 98 S.Ct. 406, 54 L.Ed.2d 284 (1977); People v. Schmoll, 77 Ill.App.3d 762, 763, 33 Ill.Dec. 245, 247, 396 N.E.2d 634, 636 (1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 3026, 65 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1980). Iowa Code section 665.5 provided the district court the requisite authority to continue the criminal trial and thereby retain defendants in jail indefinitely to coerce their compliance with the order requiring handwriting exemplars.