Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Alleged Problems with Penalty Phase Jury Instructions

Text: a. Rejection of instructions prepared by defense counsel Defendant prepared his own set of instructions for the jury, which he contends were far more comprehensive and comprehensible than the standard CALJIC instructions. He argues the trial court erred (and violated his constitutional rights) by rejecting them. We previously have explained that the standard CALJIC penalty phase instructions are adequate to inform the jurors of their sentencing responsibilities in compliance with federal and state constitutional standards. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1176-1177, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) Moreover, the general rule is that a trial court may refuse a proffered instruction if it is an incorrect statement of law, is argumentative, or is duplicative. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 560, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Instructions should also be refused if they might confuse the jury. ( People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 643, 244 Cal.Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836.) Although defendant speaks in terms of the set of proffered instructions as a whole, he identifies only four particular instructions he claims the trial court erred by refusing. First, he complains the trial court should have delivered his proposed instruction that the absence of mitigating evidence could not be considered aggravating. Although this was a correct statement of the law ( People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 289, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861), it was duplicative of an instruction delivered by the trial court that section 190.3, factors (d) through (k) can only be considered by you to be mitigating factors and that factors (a) through (c) of that section are the only factors that can be considered by you as aggravating factors. Second, defendant complains about the rejection of his proposed instruction that the jurors need not reach a verdict if they are not unanimous. We agree with respondent that such an instruction could have improperly diminished the jury's duty to deliberate and reach a verdict if possible. (Cf. People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1114-1115, 248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960 [instructing the jury on effect of a hung jury would have diminished the jurors' sense of duty to deliberate].) Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly refused that instruction. Third, defendant's proposed instruction informing the jury that Garrison was an accomplice as a matter of law was duplicative of an instruction the trial court gave. [33] As such, it was properly refused. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 560, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Fourth, defendant claims he was entitled to a pinpoint instruction pertaining to Garrison's status as an accomplice. A criminal defendant has the right to instructions that pinpoint the theory of the defense case. ( People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049.) As noted, however, the trial court delivered an instruction informing the jury that Garrison was an accomplice, so an additional pinpoint instruction was unnecessary. In addition, we reject the contention that refusal of this pinpoint instruction violated defendant's constitutional rights. b. Double-counting of section 190.3, factors (b) and (c) Defendant next claims the trial court's instructions on section 190.3, factors (b) (prior violent criminal activity) and (c) (prior felony convictions) improperly allowed the jury to double-count his prior crimes as aggravating evidence, and that his proffered instructions made it clear such double-counting was prohibited. [T]he standard instructions do not inherently encourage the double counting of aggravating factors ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1180, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384), and defendant does not point to anything, such as improper argument by the prosecutor, that might indicate the jury engaged in double counting. We thus reject the argument that the instructions given were inadequate, as well as the additional argument that failure to deliver counsel's proposed instructions violated defendant's rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. c. Davenport error Defendant next contends the instructions failed to inform the jury that the absence of evidence of one of the mitigating factors cannot be considered aggravating. ( People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 289, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) As noted, ante, the trial court essentially instructed the jury of this point by explaining that section 190.3, factors (a) through (c) were aggravating only and factors (d) through (k) were mitigating only. We thus perceive no error. d. CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.) Defendant contends CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.) (5th ed.1988) was defective in four ways. [34] First, it cuts the jury entirely free of the limited list of aggravating factors enumerated under the controlling statute. We have previously rejected the notion that the standard instruction defining an aggravating factor encourages juries to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 469-470, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388), and defendant does not attempt to explain why our prior cases were wrong on this subject. Second, he contends CALJIC No. 8.88 fails to inform the jury that unless the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones, it cannot impose the death penalty. Third, he attacks the instruction for failing to inform the jury it must return a sentence of life if it finds the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating ones. We have previously concluded that an instruction failing to make both these points is not impermissible so long as it otherwise adequately informs the jury of its role in weighing the circumstances of the case. ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 381, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) Because CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.) does so (see fn. 34, ante ), we reject these claims. Fourth, defendant contends the so substantial language in the instruction is impermissibly vague in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We previously have found this argument meritless, and defendant fails to explain why our prior cases were incorrect. ( People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 452, 110 Cal. Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131.)