Opinion ID: 196054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: D'Arcy's Performance

Text: 133 Matthews concedes that the central issue in the case was the identity of the attacker. What he challenges is D'Arcy's decision to use the dreadlocks defense to attempt to persuade the jury that Barbosa had misidentified Matthews, rather than focusing on the apparent inconsistencies of her prior statements and her failure to report the alleged rape immediately. D'Arcy's decision to employ the dreadlocks strategy was not a professionally reasonable choice, Matthews claims, because D'Arcy possessed no evidence that Barbosa had picked Matthews's photograph out because of his hairstyle. D'Arcy had no knowledge of how many pictures of men with dreadlocks Barbosa had seen before identifying Matthews, and the police report contains no indication that Barbosa had mentioned dreadlocks in her initial description of the attacker, thus undermining the argument that the hairstyle was the predominant feature. Therefore, Matthews argues, instead of concealing the fact that Barbosa did not mention dreadlocks initially, D'Arcy should have driven this point home to the jury and called into question Barbosa's powers of observation. Furthermore, Matthews maintains, D'Arcy should have questioned Barbosa about the discrepancy between the police report's version of when she initially saw her attacker, and her own testimony--i.e., whether she was awakened by a man entering her bedroom and jumping on top of her, or whether she heard the door, and thus had a longer time to view her attacker--and he should have called into question Barbosa's truthfulness generally by impeaching her regarding her delay in reporting the alleged rape. Finally, Matthews argues, D'Arcy should have marshalled an effective closing argument underscoring the inconsistencies in Barbosa's prior statements, rather than delivering a disjointed speech that, Matthews claims, bordered on an invitation to convict. 134 We disagree that D'Arcy's strategic choice to employ the dreadlocks defense was professionally unreasonable. That it was not ultimately a winning strategy is of no moment in assessing its reasonableness at the time, see United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 310 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 986, 117 L.Ed.2d 148 (1992). D'Arcy had little to work with, given the persuasive power of Barbosa's identification testimony and the inherent weakness of Matthews's alibi, and he chose what he thought was a reasonable line of argument that carried with it little risk of alienating the jury. A strategic choice that would have included more direct attacks on Barbosa's credibility and, inevitably, her character, would have carried with it a far greater risk of offending the jury. Thus, we hold that, in choosing to emphasize Matthews's dreadlocks as the reason that Barbosa identified him as her attacker, rather than highlighting alleged inconsistencies in Barbosa's trial testimony and her prior statements, D'Arcy employed a professionally reasonable strategy and did not, by virtue of that choice alone, deprive Matthews of effective assistance of counsel. 135 Matthews also argues, however, that D'Arcy did in fact challenge Barbosa's credibility--by questioning her about her apparent failure to report immediately that she was raped, and by arguing this point to the jury--and that therefore D'Arcy's failure to impeach Barbosa more directly, or at least to introduce the impeaching evidence through another witness, cannot be deemed a strategic choice. We agree that the record makes clear that D'Arcy did attempt to elicit from Barbosa an admission that she did not immediately report the rape. Indeed, D'Arcy successfully forced Barbosa to change her testimony and admit that she had not, in fact, told Detective Ingersoll about the rape. The question we must address, however, is whether, once Barbosa went on to testify that she had told the police who had initially responded to her call that she was raped, and that it's right in the report, D'Arcy's failure to demonstrate to the jury that these statements were apparently untrue constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Put another way, the issue is whether it may be considered acceptable trial strategy to have questioned Barbosa about her delay in reporting the rape without impeaching her when the answers she gave were not favorable to Matthews. 136 Bearing in mind that the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that D'Arcy's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, we are unable to come to any conclusion other than that Matthews has not done so here. To be sure, there were points to be scored against Barbosa's credibility after she insisted that she had in fact immediately told police that she had been raped. D'Arcy could have confronted her with the incident report containing no mention of a rape, or he could have asked her about her testimony at the probable cause hearing. He also could have questioned Ingersoll about when he first learned that Barbosa claimed to have been raped. But, as D'Arcy made clear to the trial judge at a sidebar conference following the close of the prosecution's case, Matthews's primary defense remained that Barbosa had picked out the wrong assailant, and not that she had not been attacked at all. While Barbosa's delay in reporting that she was raped might have affected the jury's assessment of her overall credibility as a witness, we think this would be much more likely if the primary issue had been consent. Here, the primary issue, and the heart of the defense's theory, was not whether a crime occurred but rather who committed it. Moreover, the record makes apparent that Barbosa was quite obviously upset on the witness stand as she retold her experience; this circumstance, along with Barbosa's youth (rendering her failure to report a rape immediately all the more explicable), diminishes the likelihood that the jury would doubt that such an attack occurred simply because Barbosa delayed in reporting it. D'Arcy had to balance the limited evidentiary value of Barbosa's delay against the danger of the jury misperceiving an impeachment attempt as badgering or callously tarnishing Barbosa. Another lawyer might have struck a different balance, but we do not find that D'Arcy's on-the-spot decision to let Barbosa's answer stand and argue the inference he had raised to the jury was beyond the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 3 137 The other alleged inconsistencies in Barbosa's statements that Matthews claims D'Arcy should have raised are trivial, and thus D'Arcy's decision not to question Barbosa about them was a sound tactical choice. That the incident report, prepared immediately after the attack, contains no mention of dreadlocks, is inconsequential in light of the fact that Barbosa told Ingersoll before viewing any photographs that her attacker had dreadlocks. Furthermore, to point out this inconsistency would have only weakened D'Arcy's argument that it was the dreadlocks that had in fact caused Barbosa to pick Matthews's picture out of the photograph books. As for the inconsistency between when Barbosa initially told police she was awakened and her testimony in court, we note that the incident report's statement that while [Barbosa] was sleeping the suspect entered the victim's bedroom and jumped on top of her is a hearsay account of what Barbosa said immediately after the attack, and, even if true, would only have deprived her of a few seconds of the time she claimed to have viewed her attacker. She still was able to view him while he was on top of her; at various times while he searched the apartment; and when he returned to Barbosa's home on the weekend. Thus, D'Arcy's decision to eschew questioning on these matters was a sound trial tactic. 138 Finally, we address the grounds on which the district court actually granted the writ: D'Arcy's failure to call John Wornum, or to request a continuance so that he could do so. Here, we disagree with the district court's conclusion; we cannot see how Matthews was prejudiced. Wornum's testimony would have corroborated Matthews's testimony in general--i.e., that there actually was a Crossing Auto Body Shop, and that Matthews actually worked there, and perhaps even that he generally opened the shop early in the morning--which would have taken some of the wind out of the sails of the prosecutor's closing argument, in which he cast doubt on the entirety of Matthews's testimony. Wornum's affidavit makes clear, however, that he could not provide an alibi for Matthews on the particular day of the crime. Matthews argues that Wornum's testimony is all the more credible because he does not pretend to be able to say for sure where Matthews was on a particular morning several years ago. That may be true, but it is far less probative of Matthews's innocence. Moreover, a jury might have drawn a negative inference from the things that Wornum's affidavit does not indicate he is willing to testify to: namely, the identity of the purchaser of the car Matthews says he was rebuilding around the time of the crime, or any other information regarding the car's purchase and sale. Thus, while Wornum's testimony might have been, on balance, of marginal utility to Matthews, his affidavit does not create in us any belief that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had he testified. 4