Opinion ID: 1273760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Addendum on Rehearing

Text: In the instant case there was only one issue of fact which the trial court was called upon to determineall other issues were issues of law. All other material facts were admitted. The jugular vein of the plaintiff's case was the issue of fact raised by the following allegations contained in the complaint, which were denied in the answer:   ; that plaintiff's annexation to defendant city, and compliance with the conditions of Section 2 E (1) of said ordinance No. 1987, as amended were all done involuntarily and against the will and intent of plaintiff, and for the sole purpose of securing defendant's approval of said plat and for the protection of plaintiff's investment in said land, and because of the economic duress and business compulsion being exerted on plaintiff by defendant as more fully hereinafter set forth. (From paragraph X of the complaint.) It was further alleged in the complaint that by reason of numerous specified acts on the part of the city, , the plaintiff was placed in a servient position and the defendant in a dominant position and by reason of the powers incident thereto and hereinabove set forth, defendant was able to exercise, and did exercise, and still exercises dominion, control, coercion, duress and undue influence over plaintiff against its will and intent, and involuntarily, was induced, coerced and compelled to, and did pay to defendant said sum of $25,378.08 as demanded by defendant   ; that, plaintiff did not give nor loan, nor owe said money to defendant, but was coerced and induced into paying the same to defendant solely and exclusively by reason of business compulsion and economic duress exerted over plaintiff by defendant, in order that plaintiff could use and develop said tract of land, and to protect and preserve the business interests and investments of plaintiff therein; (From paragraph XI of the complaint.) The foregoing allegations of the complaint were denied by paragraph III of the answer. The affirmative defenses pleaded by the city serve only to emphasize the point that the single question of fact to be determined in the entire controversy was whether the payment in question was a voluntary payment or whether it was a payment made under compulsion and duress. No one with the slightest conception of applicable legal principles would contend that a recovery by the plaintiff could be had in this case upon any theory whatever except upon the determination as a matter of fact that the payment was involuntarily made. The parties to the action, their attorneys, and the trial court thoroughly understood this situation. They fully realized that if the payment by the plaintiff was involuntarily made under business compulsion it could be recovered. They all recognized that if the payment was voluntarily made and was free from duress the plaintiff could not recover! This was the issue of fact upon the determination of which the plaintiff would succeed or fail. This issue was decided by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff! Upon this single, all important issue the trial court said in its findings, The Court finds that plaintiff has not by agreement or waiver, lost its right to attack the validity or constitutionality of this ordinance   Notwithstanding this clear and unambiguous statement that no agreement prevented the plaintiff from asserting his constitutional rights, the majority opinion, in some mysterious and wholly unexplained manner, reaches the amazing conclusion that the plaintiff agreed to make the payment. In entering the judgment for the plaintiff upon the issues framed by the pleadings the court necessarily and specifically found exactly the opposite. When a litigant succeeds in establishing by competent evidence the one controlling fact upon which his entire case depends, to the satisfaction of the trial court, it is indeed a tragic thing and a travesty upon justice when an appellate court takes away from him all of the facts which have been adjudicated in his favor, and enters opposite findings of its own for which there isn't the slightest justification in the record of the case. Thus the majority opinion in this case has deprived the plaintiff of due process of law as guaranteed by the constitution of the United States and of Colorado, and has permitted the City of Colorado Springs to seize 8% of its property for public purposes without compensation. If the majority opinion is sound, due process of law in Colorado is dead, and the constitution is an empty shell which affords protection to no one against demands by agencies of government which fundamental law commands shall never be made.