Opinion ID: 4470175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice erred when he admitted evidence of the text messages based on the state’s failure to authenticate the messages under Rule 901. Specifically, defendant argues that, to authenticate evidence of text messages, the proponent must establish authorship through either direct or circumstantial evidence. According to defendant, to establish authorship through circumstantial evidence, the proponent must produce evidence of distinctive characteristics of the text messages. The defendant argues that, because the state did not produce either direct evidence or evidence of distinctive characteristics of the text messages, it did not establish that the text messages were authored by defendant and, therefore, did not properly authenticate the evidence in accordance with Rule 901. Reliability is the linchpin of the law of evidence. The authentication requirement of Rule 901 is a threshold requirement to establishing the reliability of a matter of evidence. O’Connor v. Newport Hospital, 111 A.3d 317, 322 (R.I. 2015). Rule 901 provides, in part: “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to Rule 4(b) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure (“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, sentence or order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.”); see also Toegemann v. City of Providence, 21 A.3d 384, 386 n.3 (R.I. 2011). -6- support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” R.I. R. Evid. 901(a). “The burden of proof for authentication, however, is slight.” Adams, 161 A.3d at 1199 (brackets omitted) (quoting O’Connor, 111 A.3d at 323). Indeed, to authenticate evidence under Rule 901, the proponent of such evidence does not face a high hurdle. “In making Rule 901 determinations, trial justices must decide whether there is enough support in the record to conclude that it is ‘reasonably probable’ that the evidence is what its offeror proclaims it to be.” Adams, 161 A.3d at 1199 (brackets and alteration omitted) (quoting O’Connor, 111 A.3d at 323). “If so, then the evidence’s [per]suasive force is for the jury to decide.” Id. (quoting O’Connor, 111 A.3d at 323). “Thus, a trial justice need not find that the evidence is necessarily what the proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that the jury ultimately might do so.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting O’Connor, 111 A.3d at 323). This Court has not yet spoken on the issue of authenticating text message evidence. But we have addressed the use of text message evidence in the context of a probation violation hearing and acknowledged that “[s]trict application of the rules of evidence is not required at a probation violation hearing.” State v. McLaughlin, 935 A.2d 938, 942 (R.I. 2007) (quoting State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I. 1998)). In McLaughlin, we held that a photograph of the complainant’s phone, which depicted text messages purportedly sent by the defendant, was properly authenticated by the testimony of a police officer who took the photograph. Id. We reasoned that the officer’s testimony that he examined the phone, and that he determined that the text messages were unaltered and had been sent from the same number that officers used to contact the defendant, was sufficient for authentication. Id. In O’Connor, this Court considered, as a matter of first impression, whether a printout of an e-mail was properly authenticated under Rule 901. O’Connor, 111 A.3d at 323. We stated -7- that an e-mail may be authenticated by direct evidence, “through the testimony of a witness with personal knowledge that the proffered exhibit is what it is claimed to be, such as the author or recipient of the email[,]” or by “circumstantial evidence, including ‘appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.’” Id. at 325 (brackets omitted) (quoting R.I. R. Evid. 904(b)(4)). Accordingly, we held that the testimony of a witness who was neither the sender nor the recipient of the e-mail, but who merely recited the identity of the purported sender and summarized the contents of the message, was insufficient for authentication. Id. There is, however, a fundamental difference between text messages, which generally are sent to one person known to the sender, and an e-mail. When, as here, the Rhode Island rule mirrors the federal rule, we look to decisions of federal courts for guidance. E.g., Chhun v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 84 A.3d 419, 422 (R.I. 2014); Hall v. Kuzenka, 843 A.2d 474, 476 (R.I. 2004); Heal v. Heal, 762 A.2d 463, 466-67 (R.I. 2000). In United States v. Davis, 918 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. 2019), for example, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the use of text messages and held that authentication of text message evidence under Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires “only a prima facie showing that the ‘true author’ is who the proponent claims it to be.” Davis, 918 F.3d at 402; see also United States v. Lewisbey, 843 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that, for purposes of authentication under Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the proponent need only produce enough evidence to support a finding that the person sent and received the text messages); United States v. Barnes, 803 F.3d 209, 217 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that conclusive proof of authorship is not required for authentication under Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). “And the prima facie showing ‘may be accomplished largely by -8- offering circumstantial evidence that the documents in question are what they purport to be.’” Davis, 918 F.3d at 402 (quoting United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 350 (4th Cir. 2009)). The Davis court determined that the proponent produced enough circumstantial evidence to properly authenticate evidence of text messages exchanged between the accused, who was charged with conspiracy, and a confidential informant. Davis, 918 F.3d at 402. First, the court reasoned, the context and purpose of the text messages—to arrange the location of the controlled buy and the price for the contraband—supported the conclusion that the defendant was the author of the text messages because the defendant was witnessed arriving at the agreed-upon location and engaging in the controlled buy. Id. Second, before the controlled buy, the defendant spoke on the phone with the informant, and the defendant testified at trial that the telephone call was made to “the same number that the informant was texting” to set up the controlled buy. Id. at 403 (brackets omitted). Finally, there was no evidence that the contact information linked to the number from which the text messages were sent referred to any person other than the defendant. Id.; see United States v. Fults, 639 F. App’x 366, 373 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that the content of the text messages and testimony about previous communications with the author using the same number were enough to properly authenticate the evidence). Here, unlike the proffered e-mail in O’Connor, the state produced evidence beyond a mere recitation of the author’s identity and summary of the contents of the proffered evidence. As in Davis, the state presented testimony about previous communications between Victoria and defendant and produced evidence as to the context and timing of the text messages to establish authorship. Both the incriminating context and timing of the text messages are not only probative of guilt, but highly relevant for authentication. Victoria also testified that defendant personally provided her with his cell phone number about a year before the assault and that she saved it in her contacts under “Steph.” Victoria exchanged text messages with the number -9- associated with “Steph” on multiple occasions prior to the date of the assault. For example, Victoria would text “Steph” to arrange transportation to and from school and Victoria’s therapy appointments. And, when Victoria texted “Steph” to pick her up, defendant picked her up. Additionally, the text messages depicted in the screenshot were not only apologetic in nature but were also sent to Victoria within hours of the assault. We conclude that the state produced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that the defendant authored the text messages. We therefore hold that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting the text messages, because the evidence was properly authenticated under Rule 901. Any doubt as to whether the defendant authored the text messages was for the jury to resolve.