Opinion ID: 1191657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Text and the Substantive Connection Requirement

Text: Before considering Caraballo's argument that a killing must further some drug-related purpose to support a § 848(e)(1)(A) conviction, we review the statutory text, considering the ordinary or natural meaning of the words chosen by Congress, as well as the placement and purpose of those words in the statutory scheme. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). We then discuss the judicial gloss on that text, including our recent decisions regarding the engaging in element of § 848(e)(1)(A).
Section 848(e) provides, in relevant part, as follows: (1) In addition to the other penalties set forth in this section  (A) any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) of this title or section 960(b)(1) of this title who intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual and such killing results, shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death. . . . 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). Upon a literal reading of the statute, then, a § 848(e)(1)(A) offense can be committed in one of three ways. First, such an offense is committed when a person kills while engaging in . . . a continuing criminal enterprise. Id. Section 848(c) specifically defines how one engage[s] in a continuing criminal enterprise, namely, by committing a continuing series of felony drug crimes in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom the defendant occupies a position of management and from which the defendant obtains substantial income or resources. Id. § 848(c); see Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). Those fitting this definition are commonly referred to as drug kingpins. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991); United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 75 (2d Cir.1989). Second, a § 848(e)(1)(A) offense is committed when a person kills while working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise. This phrase is not statutorily defined, but, in accordance with settled principles of interpretation, courts have given the phrase its commonly understood meaning, i.e., working to promote or advance the interests of a continuing criminal enterprise. United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1165 (7th Cir.1994); accord United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1102-03 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Jones, 101 F.3d 1263, 1266-67 (8th Cir.1996). This language signals Congress's intent to broaden the scope of liability under § 848(e), beyond liability only for homicidal drug kingpins  a relatively limited class of high-level drug traffickers  to all who kill while working in furtherance of a [continuing criminal enterprise], United States v. Walker, 912 F.Supp. 646, 652 (N.D.N.Y.1996), aff'd 142 F.3d 103 (2d Cir.1998), including hired henchmen . . . who commit murder to further a drug enterprise in which they may not otherwise be intimately involved, United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1103; accord United States v. Ray, 238 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir.2001). Third and finally, a § 848(e)(1)(A) offense is committed when a person kills while engaging in an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) . . . or section 960(b)(1) of Title 21, e.g., while manufacturing, distributing, or importing large quantities of drugs, see id. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 960(b)(1), or conspiring to do so. As noted, Caraballo was convicted of violating this prong of § 848(e)(1)(A), and he does not argue that the government failed to prove that the predicate drug conspiracy was ongoing at the time he and his confederates killed Fernandez.
Section 848(e) was enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-690, § 7001, 102 Stat. 4181, 4387-88. As prosecutions commenced under this provision, a question promptly arose not expressly answered by the plain text: whether the killing in question must be related in some way to the continuing criminal enterprise or drug offense that the defendant is charged with engaging in or working in furtherance of, or whether it is sufficient that the killing occur contemporaneously with the conduct specified in the statute. Courts universally concluded that a substantive, and not merely temporal, connection is required in order to sustain a conviction under § 848(e)(1)(A). See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 101 F.3d at 1267 (requiring a substantive connection between the killing and the [continuing criminal enterprise]); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 887 n. 13 (4th Cir.1996) ([A] substantive connection [between the murder and the drug offense] must be implied as an essential element of § 848(e).); United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1096 (11th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Tidwell , No. Civ. A. 94-CR-353, 1995 WL 764077, at  (E.D.Pa. Dec.22, 1995) (same); United States v. Pitera, 795 F.Supp. 546, 554 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (same); United States v. Whiting, 771 F.Supp. 476, 477 (D.Mass. 1991) (same). Courts required a substantive connection between the defendant's drug activities and the charged killing in part to address the concern that, absent such a requirement, § 848(e)(1)(A) would be subject to constitutional challenge on Commerce Clause grounds. See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401, 36 S.Ct. 658, 60 L.Ed. 1061 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score.); United States v. Martinez-Martinez, No. 01 Cr. 307, 2001 WL 1287040, at  (S.D.N.Y. Oct.24, 2001) (noting that requiring relationship between drug conspiracy and killing avoids . . . potential constitutional infirmities under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995)); United States v. Tidwell, 1995 WL 764077, at -5 (analyzing defendant's Lopez challenge to § 848(e)(1)(A) and concluding that a nexus requirement between the murder and the continuing criminal enterprise must be implied); United States v. Pitera, 795 F.Supp. at 554 (observing, pre- Lopez, that prosecution of a drug kingpin who killed his spouse in a domestic dispute unrelated to his drug dealing would be jurisdictionally suspect); see also United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d at 111 (rejecting defendant's Lopez challenge to § 848(e)(1)(A) in light of Congress's findings, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801, that local narcotics activity substantially affects interstate commerce); United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1461 n. 20 (6th Cir.1996) (citing with approval case interpreting § 848(e)(1)(A) to avoid commerce power difficulties); cf. United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1120 (10th Cir.2007) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to § 848(e)(1)(B) charge because [a]n intentional killing in violation of this statute . . . is intertwined with the commission of an underlying federal drug trafficking crime). In addition, the substantive connection requirement comports with the statutory structure, namely, the placement of § 848(e) within the Controlled Substances Act. See United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d at 111 (noting this placement). Further, the legislative history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act demonstrates that both proponents and opponents of the legislation recognized that the statute was designed to target drug-related killings. See, e.g., 134 Cong. Rec. 32,638 (Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Sen. McConnell) (The drug bill also authorizes the death penalty in drug-related killings.); id. at 32,649 (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (describing § 848(e) and advocating [t]he death penalty for drug-related killings); id. at 33,269 (statement of Rep. Hayes) (I am opposed to the provision which would provide for a Federal death penalty for drug related murders.); id. at 33,274 (statement of Rep. Vento) ([T]he numerous arguments against the death penalty do not lose their merit simply because the nature of the crime is drug-related rather than non-drug-related.). [3] This court has had three prior opportunities to address the nature of the required substantive connection between the killing and the drug offense under § 848(e)(1)(A). In United States v. Walker, we upheld a § 848(e)(1)(A) conviction for killing while working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise in the face of the defendant's assert[ion] that the evidence was insufficient to show that the [charged] murder was related to any continuing criminal enterprise or drug conspiracy. 142 F.3d at 112. In doing so, we did not address the nature of the required relationship; we concluded simply that the challenged conviction was adequately supported by evidence that the purpose of the murder was to obtain drugs and money to be used in furtherance of the continuing criminal enterprise. Id. at 112-13. In United States v. Desinor , we upheld a § 848(e)(1)(A) conviction for killing while engaging in a narcotics conspiracy, and we rejected defendant's contention that the government was required to prove that `a motive meaningfully related to the . . . narcotics conspiracy was at least as important as any other influencing factor.' 525 F.3d at 201 (quoting defendant's proposed jury charge (emphasis omitted)). Drawing on both the district court's analysis in Walker and the Eighth Circuit's endorsement of the substantive connection standard in United States v. Jones, we concluded as follows: To convict a defendant of engaging in a narcotics conspiracy resulting in murder. . . under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), the government need only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one motive for the killing (or conspiracy to kill) was related to the drug conspiracy. The existence of other motives does not affect the government's ability to satisfy the engaging in element, as long as there is a substantive connection between the defendant's role in the murder (or murder conspiracy) and his participation in the drug conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Jones, 101 F.3d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir.1996) (construing § 848(e)(1)(A) as requiring the jury to find a substantive connection between the killing and the [narcotics conspiracy] (emphasis added)). The government has no burden to establish that a drug-related motive was the sole purpose, the primary purpose, or even that it was equally as important as any non-drug-related purpose, as long as it was one purpose. Id. at 202. Finally, in United States v. Santos , we again rejected a challenge to a § 848(e)(1)(A) conviction for killing while engaging in a drug conspiracy, reaffirming that the nexus between a murder and a drug offense need not be more than the `substantive connection' described in United States v. Desinor ,  and that proof of a drug-related motive fully satisfies whatever `nexus' requirement might be implied by the language of section 848(e)(1)(A). 541 F.3d at 65, 69. [4]