Opinion ID: 1705013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Juxtaposition of the Statute Against the Amendment

Text: We turn to the question whether in enacting the statute some express clause of the constitution was clearly disregarded. Ex parte Selma & Gulf R.R., 45 Ala. at 728. The landlords contend that the collection powers conferred on Jefferson County by the amendment expired with the payment of the last bond outstanding. They refer to the unambiguous provision terminating Jefferson County's authority to issue bonds pursuant to the amendment on December 31, 1958. They then contend that the phrase in the amendment, it being the intent and purpose of this amendment that the expenses of needed improvements and extensions and maintenance and operation of the sewers and sewerage treatment and disposal plants and no other expenditures shall be paid from such service charges and rentals, requires the conclusion that all power to collect charges for the maintenance and operation of the sewer system financed by the bonds ceased upon the payment of the bonds. Specifically, the landlords state: It follows, then, that since the County has no powers of issuance today, and since no bonds issued under [the amendment] are outstanding, the County can have no collection powers thereunder today. (Landlords' brief, p. 19.) The landlords' construction, however, contradicts the plain language of the amendment. The cessation of the authority to issue bonds and the cessation, of the authority to collect sewer charges are not inexorably linked as the landlords contend. The last paragraph of the amendment speaks directly to cessation of the authority to issue bonds. The first sentence of that paragraph, dealing solely with issuance of bonds, states: The authority to issue bonds shall cease December 31, 1958. The next sentence in that paragraph deals exclusively with the separate subject of the authority to collect certain charges. It provides: The authority to levy and collect sewer charges and rentals shall be limited to such charges as will pay the principal of and interest on the bonds and the reasonable expense of extending, improving, operating and maintaining said sewers and plants (Emphasis added.) Obviously, operation and maintenance are activities that do not necessarily terminate upon the payment of the last of the bonded indebtedness. The necessity for operation and maintenance of the sewer system continues today. Speaking directly to what occurs after the bonds have been paid off, the amendment provides: [S]ervice charges and rentals shall be accordingly reduced, it being the intent and purpose of this amendment that the expenses of needed improvements and extensions and maintenance and operation of the sewers and sewerage treatment and disposal plants and no other expenditures shall be paid from such service charges or rentals. (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the amendment does not contemplate the elimination of charges; in fact, it contemplates the continuation of the collection of service charges and rentals after the payment of the last of the bonded indebtedness. As this Court stated in Shell v. Jefferson County, 454 So.2d 1331, 1335-36 (Ala. 1984), construing the amendment: [W]e do not agree that the language of the last paragraph of [the amendment] refers to a sewerage system frozen in time. We return to the statute, § 35-9-14, which provides:  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any bill for sewer service received in the name of a tenant or tenants, shall be the sole responsibility of the tenant or tenants and shall not constitute a lien on the property where the sewer service was received. (Emphasis added.) As previously noted, the amendment provides: [S]uch charges or rentals [for, among other things, the cost of operating and maintaining the sewers and sewerage treatment and disposal plants] shall be a personal obligation of the occupant of the property the sewerage from which is disposed of by such sewers or treated in such plants and shall also be a lien upon such property, enforceable by a sale thereof. (Emphasis added.) It is axiomatic that the inclusion in a statute of the phrase notwithstanding any provision of law cannot trump a constitutional provision. See Opinion of the Justices No. 206, 287 Ala, 337, 341, 251 So.2d 755, 759 (1971) (We have said that `no legislation may restrict or alter a self-executing constitutional provision.' In re Opinion of the Justices [No. 94], 252 Ala. 199, 40 So.2d 330 [(1949)], and authorities cited; Opinion of the Justices [No. 164], 269 Ala. 127, 111 So.2d 605 [(1959)].). See also City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So.2d 1061, 1092 (Ala.2006)(opinion on second application for rehearing) (However, `[w]hen the Constitution and a statute are in conflict, the Constitution controls. . . .' Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 446 (Ala.1987).). The provision of the statute depriving Jefferson County of the right to impose liens on landlords for charges for sewer services incurred in the name of a tenant clearly conflicts with the amendment, and the amendment controls.