Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grant of prosecutorial challenges

Text: Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly sustained several of the prosecutor's challenges for cause to prospective jurors who exhibited reluctance to vote for the death penalty but who also indicated that they would follow the law and were not invariably opposed to the penalty. Defendant contends that, as a result, the jury panel had a predominance of pro-death jurors.
Prospective Juror K. demonstrated his hostility to the death penalty in the course of the initial Hovey questioning by the trial court. Asked whether he would refuse to find defendant guilty or to find a special circumstance true in order to avoid having to discuss the death penalty with the other jurors, Prospective Juror K. indicated that he was extremely uneasy about this subject and did not believe he could cope with voting in favor of the death penalty. Asked whether he had any opinion about the death penalty that would prevent him from being a fair and impartial juror and following the law, he responded that sending anybody to the death penalty would bother him. The trial court asked whether, if defendant were proven guilty, Prospective Juror K. could discuss the death penalty with the other jurors and state that although he did not want to impose it, the facts of the case warranted that punishment. The prospective juror responded that he did not know but also indicated that he could follow the law. Questioned by defense counsel whether he could consider the death penalty and whether he could conceive of circumstances so egregious that the death penalty would be appropriate, Prospective Juror K. stated that he did not know. Questioned by the prosecutor whether he thought it would be difficult to be a juror in the present case, given his views, he stated that it would. Asked by the trial court whether he could look at defendant and inform him that he had decided defendant should die, Prospective Juror K. responded, No. Asked by the defense whether he could vote for death if the facts established guilt, Prospective Juror K. stated that he did not want to go through it, and asked to be placed on another trial and taken away from this. It is readily apparent that Prospective Juror K.'s views in opposition to the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) The trial court did not err in granting the prosecutor's challenge for cause.
Questioned by defense counsel whether he could think of any circumstances in which someone deserved the death penalty, Prospective Juror G. could not think of any. He indicated he could handle the task of deciding whether defendant lived or died, and could look him in the eye and tell defendant he had to die. Questioned by the prosecutor whether he would vote in an election to instate the death penalty, Prospective Juror G. initially indicated he did not know and subsequently indicated that perhaps he would not vote in favor of it. Asked how he felt about the death penalty, Prospective Juror G. did not want anyone to die, but might feel differently if the victim were a family member. Asked whether, presuming defendant had been found guilty of murder and the evidence demonstrated defendant's bad life, he could state that he believed defendant should die, Prospective Juror G. did not think so. He agreed when the prosecutor stated that the juror had indicated both that he could and could not vote for the death penalty. The trial court did not err in granting the prosecutor's challenge for cause. The court determined that the prospective juror was extremely indecisive on the death penalty. The only possible circumstance that he thought deserved the death penalty was when the victim was a family member. That possibility did not establish his ability to follow the law. (Cf. People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 652-653, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80 [prospective juror properly excused who was opposed to death penalty but possibly could apply it in the event the victim were a family member or close friend]; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1061-1062, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277 [prospective juror properly excused who could not imagine applying death penalty in any circumstance].)
In response to the standard Hovey questions, this prospective juror told the court that she believed in the death penalty and would like to see it applied more often but was not certain whether personally she could vote for it. Asked by the prosecutor to state whether she could look defendant in the eye and tell him she had voted for death, she did not know whether she could carry out that responsibility. Asked whether she could carry out her duty as a juror in this case, Prospective Juror Ni. did not believe she could, would not be good on the jury at all, and would have a problem being impartial. Despite believing in the death penalty, she could not put someone to death. Although both prosecution and defense counsel passed for cause, on its own motion the trial court excused this juror on the basis that she was very confused and believed in the death penalty without being able to apply it herself. The trial court properly excused the prospective juror on the basis that she could not personally impose the death penalty despite viewing it as an appropriate punishment. ( People v. Rodngues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1147, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 & fns. 51 & 52; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 44-6, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388.)