Opinion ID: 1986133
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Introduction of Evidence of Prior Drug Use.

Text: Jon Gross, who helped Crawley cash the check, testified Crawley used drugs and used the check proceeds to buy drugs. Crawley did not object at trial to this evidence, but he argues on appeal that this evidence was also bad acts evidence prohibited by rule 404(b). He contends his failure to object at trial is excused because of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. After his conviction, Crawley was represented by a new attorney who raised the issue as a ground for a new trial. At the hearing on his motion, Crawley's new counsel examined Crawley's trial attorney but made no record regarding any strategic reason for failing to object to the drug evidence. Nevertheless, even if we assume there was no strategic reason for this failure, we reject the argument because the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence. In State v. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1988), we said: In determining whether evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible, the trial court must employ a two-step analysis. The court must first decide whether the evidence is relevant. If the court finds that it is, the court must then decide whether the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.... In the process of employing the two-step analysis, the trial court must exercise its discretion. We will reverse its decision only when we find a clear abuse of discretion. In State v. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1994), the district court admitted extensive evidence of the defendant's past drug dealing, although the charge against Liggins was murder. The State attempted to justify the drug evidence under Iowa Rule of Evidence 404(b) as going to the issues of identity and plan and also to show the entire circumstances surrounding the crime. Liggins, 524 N.W.2d at 188. We rejected that argument, saying the evidence was both not relevant and inherently prejudicial; therefore, the court abused its discretion in admitting it. Id. Crawley relies on Liggins to support his argument. Liggins, however, cannot be read so broadly as to hold that references to drugs in all circumstances is irrelevant for purposes of rule 404(b). Here, the testimony was that the motive for cashing the check was to obtain drugs, and credible authority supports the admissibility of such evidence under those circumstances. One authority states: Evidence of other crimes has been admitted to show the likelihood of defendant having committed the charged crime for money, particularly for money to buy drugs; for sex; for goods to sell; because he was filled with hostility, sought to conceal a previous crime, or wanted to escape; because he intended to silence a potential witness, required assistance in a criminal scheme, or needed to protect himself in the commission of another crime. Weinstein ¶ 404[14], at 404-86 to 404-90 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). This proposition is not without controversy; recent cases are divided on the issue. See United States v. Brooks, 125 F.3d 484, 500 (7th Cir.1997) ([T]he district court properly weighed the rule 404(b) factors before admitting evidence that the defendants used crack cocaine and that their desire to obtain more cocaine motivated this bank robbery.); Adams v. State, 272 Ga. 115, 527 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2000) ([E]vidence that [the defendant] purchased crack cocaine after the armed robbery and murder of [the victim]... was relevant and admissible to show [the defendant's] motive in committing the crimes ... [as a] reasonable fact finder can infer connection between armed robbery and purchase of cocaine because association between high cost of drugs and need for funds to purchase them is well recognized.); Sykes v. Mississippi, 749 So.2d 239, 244 (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (defendant's admission that he smoked crack cocaine prior to the burglary and entered building in search of money with which to purchase more crack cocaine admissible as material to prove motive); State v. Barnett, 141 N.C.App. 378, 540 S.E.2d 423, 431 (2000) ([E]vidence elicited on cross-examination about defendant's drug use ... was admissible under Rule 404(b) because it permits the inference that defendant committed this robbery and murder to obtain money he needed to support his drug habit.); Massey v. State, 826 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex.Ct.App.1992) (evidence defendant discussed burglary, selling hot tires, and other ways to come up with quick money leads to fair inference defendant wanted to obtain money to buy additional intoxicants and was admissible to show defendant's motive for the robbery). But see generally State v. Mazowski, 337 N.J.Super. 275, 766 A.2d 1176 (2001) (citing numerous cases, including cases from California, Michigan, and Washington, that unfair prejudice completely overwhelmed the evidence's probative value as to motive). In Liggins we said: Evidence of other offenses should never be admitted when the other offense is committed wholly independent of the one for which the defendant is on trial. 524 N.W.2d at 188. In the present case, the drug use was not wholly independent of the crime for which the defendant was being tried, as it was in Liggins. It was clearly relevant as to motive: The State's witness testified that the need to obtain money with which to buy drugs was the reason the forgery was undertaken. Even if defense counsel had objected, the court would not have abused its discretion in admitting it or in concluding its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Iowa Rule of Evidence 403.