Opinion ID: 2463705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutionality of Section 17-27.5-104 as Applied to Townsend's Conduct

Text: Like the court of appeals, we doubt that Townsend properly preserved his as-applied constitutional challenge to section 17-27.5-104 at trial. In Townsend's motion to dismiss, he asserted that the statute was facially unconstitutional unless the term extended limits on confinement in the statute referred to the Denver Metro Area or had some other ambiguous meaning that the trial court was obliged to construe as the Denver Metro Area. On appeal, he argued instead that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because he had not received timely written notice that he could be liable for escape for failing to report to his residence of record upon his release from jail on March 3, 2005. We will not consider constitutional arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Martinez v. People, 244 P.3d 135, 139 (Colo.2010). Even affording Townsend the benefit of the doubt that he somehow preserved this argument, we find it unavailing because it is yet another thinly veiled attempt to revisit his argument that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he knowingly failed to report to his residence of record. Again, the court of appeals rejected this argument, and we denied certiorari review and decline to address it further here. Accordingly, we have no premise upon which to conclude that section 17-27.5-104 is unconstitutional as applied to Townsend's actions, and will not reverse his conviction on that basis.