Opinion ID: 7041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: plaintiffs' overtime claims

Text: The FLSA requires any employee working over 40 hours in a week to be paid overtime, premium compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay.12 An employee's regular rate of pay is the hourly rate actually paid the employee for the normal, non-overtime workweek for which he is employed.13 For salaried employees, the regular rate is determined by converting their annual pay rate to its non-overtime hourly equivalent by simply dividing one by the other.14 While § 207(a) mandates time and a half for hours worked over 40 per week, § 207(k) sets higher hourly standards for public safety employees like fire fighters.15 In the 21 day period Wichita Falls uses, fire fighters are required to be paid overtime only when they work more than 159 hours.16 Working 24 hours on and 48 hours off, the fire fighters were scheduled for 168 hours in each 21 day work period. Thus, they would be entitled to overtime compensation for 9 hours of work during a normal 21 day work period. The fire fighters were considered salaried employees and were paid 11 The reported opinion of the district court contains a thorough and detailed evaluation of the evidence, 856 F.Supp. at 1194-1201, which we find unnecessary to repeat here. 12 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 13 Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 425, 65 S.Ct. 1242, 1245, 89 L.Ed. 1705 (1945). 14 29 C.F.R. § 778.113. 15 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a), (k). 16 29 C.F.R. § 553.230. bi-weekly. On average, the fire fighters worked 6 hours of scheduled overtime in each two-week pay period, or 3 overtime hours per week. At trial, Ms. Stricklin, the City's Director of Personnel, demonstrated how the City recalculated and lowered the fire fighter's nominal hourly rate of pay so that overtime could be paid without increasing personnel costs to the City. To summarize, the number of non-overtime hours each fire fighter works in a year was added to one and one-half times the number of regularly scheduled overtime hours each fire fighter works in a year. This number was then divided into each fire fighters' annual salary to derive his new regular hourly rate. This hourly rate was then used to calculate the premium rate for scheduled and unscheduled overtime. The recalculation was designed to keep the fire fighters at exactly the same level of annual compensation for regularly scheduled hours.17 Plaintiff argues that the City should have determined the fire fighter's regular rate of pay by dividing their annual salary by their regularly scheduled hours, including overtime hours, pursuant to Department of Labor regulations.18 Plaintiffs are correct that the Department of Labor regulations provide a method for calculating an employee's regular rate from the employee's salary. Plaintiffs also 17 Using a lieutenant's pay for fiscal year 1986, the calculations went as follows: 1) The fire fighters' average number of scheduled work hours per week was multiplied by the number of weeks in the year. 56 × 52 = 2912. This is the total number of hours that the fire fighters actually worked per year. 2) Next, the number of non-overtime hours was multiplied by the numbers of weeks in the year. 53 × 52 = 2756. 3) The number of regularly scheduled overtime hours worked in a week was multiplied by the number of weeks in the year and then by 1.5. 52 × 3 × 1.5 = 234. The City labelled this the number of half time hours of pay at the regular rate due the fire fighters. 4) The number computed in step 3 was added to the number of non-overtime hours. 234 + 2756 = 2990. 5) The number obtained in step 4 was then divided into the fire fighter's annual salaries to obtain the artificial rate. $26,144.04/2990 = $8.74 per hour. The regular rate of $8.74 was then used by the City to compute the fire fighters' scheduled and unscheduled overtime. 18 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.233, 778.113. demonstrate that the method used by the City was contrary to the relevant regulations. However, it is clear that the FLSA and accompanying regulations did not apply to Wichita Falls in May of 1985 when the City calculated the plaintiffs' regular rates and began using its adjusted pay system. After the Supreme Court extended FLSA coverage to state and municipal employers, Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to retroactively give these newly affected public employers a grace period to adjust their pay schemes to comply with the statute. Congress' amendments, enacted on November 13, 1985, excluded cities from the FLSA and its regulations retroactively from February 19, 1985, the date Garcia was announced, until April 15, 1986.19 Therefore, the calculation of the plaintiffs' regular rat e that the City performed in May of 1985 could not have violated the FLSA because the FLSA simply did not apply. The plaintiffs attempt to avoid this problem by arguing that the recalculation somehow constituted a continuing violation of the FLSA. The record indicates that following the City's adjustment in May of 1985, the City kept appropriate records of the hours actually worked by each fire fighter, and paid the required overtime premium for regularly scheduled and unscheduled overtime hours based on the calculated regular rate. The plaintiffs do not contest these facts. Rather, the plaintiffs contend t hat the City's use of the calculated rate constituted a violation of the FLSA each time the fire fighters were paid, and thus there were repeated violations of the Act after April 15, 1986. The continuing violation theory, however, is inapplicable in this case. For there to be a continuing violation, there must be at least a violation. The plaintiffs' argument assumes that the City's calculation of the regular hourly rate, which was lawful in May of 1985, somehow became unlawful after April 15, 1986. The plaintiffs cannot attack the application of the City's pay system after April 15, 1986, so their attack is necessarily focused on the original calculation. Clearly, the City's May 1985 adjustment in bookkeeping was allowed by the Congressional amendment of the 19 29 U.S.C. § 203 note; see Knight v. Columbus, Ga., 19 F.3d 579, 583-84 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 318, 130 L.Ed.2d 280 (1994); Anderson v. City of Bristol, Tenn., 6 F.3d 1168, 1170 (6th Cir.1993); Wethington v. City of Montgomery, 935 F.2d 222, 226 (11th Cir.1991). FLSA following Garcia. We cannot use a continuing violation theory to make a discrete lawful act unlawful upon a change in the applicable law. Therefore, the plaintiffs' arguments must fail.