Opinion ID: 2639144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the district judge properly granted medical center's motion for summary judgment on some issues but erred in granting the motion on the violation of public policy claim

Text: A. Thomas Failed To Preserve Certain Material Issues On Appeal In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is required to identify legal issues and provide authorities supporting the arguments in the opening brief. I.A.R. 35. [T]his Court will not review the actions of the district court which have not been specifically assigned as error[,] [e]specially where there are no authorities cited nor argument contained in the briefs upon the question. Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483, 490, 927 P.2d 873, 880 (1996) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, this Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief. State v. Killinger, 126 Idaho 737, 740, 890 P.2d 323, 326 (1995). 1. Waiver Thomas argues that the procedural defects of his termination by Medical Center and the individual directors constituted breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, violation of Idaho Code § 30-1-821, interference with an existing contract and intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage. The district judge concluded that Thomas' action in executing the March 10, 1998, purchase agreements and accepting the additional consideration paid waived any technical defects in the termination procedure and ratified the action of the corporation. Under the law of waiver, a party generally cannot accept a benefit from a procedure or action and then claim that the procedure or act is invalid. Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 401, 700 P.2d 19, 23 (1985). The first agreement provided for Thomas' resignation as a shareholder. The second effectuated his withdrawal from the partnership and the sale of his partnership interest. Both agreements stated that Thomas' employment had been terminated, and Thomas received over $23,000 in consideration pursuant to the agreements. The district judge also found that Thomas waived any procedural irregularities of his termination as a corporate director under Idaho Code §§ 30-1-823 and 30-1-824(4). Regardless of whether this ruling is correct, Thomas has not argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding that he waived his rights and ratified the termination procedure. Thomas simply argues that the termination procedure was flawed. [1] Even if flawed, if waived and ratified, it is effective. Because not raised on appeal, the district judge's ruling that Thomas waived and ratified the termination procedure that Medical Center used to terminate him is affirmed. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993). The district judge ruled that Thomas' breach of contract claim was barred by waiver, and the remainder of Thomas' claims were dismissed on the merits. However, Thomas argues that the procedural irregularities (the same conduct the district judge found he waived) impacted his claims for breach of good faith and fair dealing, interference with an existing contract, and interference with an economic advantage, and Idaho Code § 30-1-821. Because these claims are barred by waiver, there was no error in dismissing them as well. 2. Employment At-Will The district judge ruled that Thomas was an at-will employee. Unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment, or limits the reasons why the employee may be discharged, the employee is `at-will.' Nilsson v. Mapco, 115 Idaho 18, 22, 764 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct.App.1988). An at-will employee can be terminated for any reason or no reason at all. Id. On appeal, however, Thomas did not raise the issue of whether the district judge was correct in determining that he was an at-will employee, and this Court will not consider the issue on appeal. Thomas only uses the term at-will in passing in his opening brief, stating that [i]f this court finds that Thomas is an employee `at-will,' the tort of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage is applicable to individual defendants. Thomas does not argue or present authority showing that the district court erred in finding that Thomas was an at-will employee. Thomas does state that he could only be terminated for reasons that were deemed to be in the `best interests' of Medical Center . . . upon an affirmative vote of ninety percent (90%) of the corporate directors. This argument, however, only goes to the procedural irregularities of the termination, not to whether there were substantive limitations imposed by the best interests clause, which would make Thomas an employee other than at-will. As to the tortious interference claim, it is clearly established that a party cannot tortiously interfere with his own contract. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993) (citations omitted). Because Medical Center's actions with respect to Thomas concerned Thomas' employment and arose out of his employment contract, Thomas has not stated a claim for tortious interference with contract. B. The District Judge Properly Granted Summary Judgment On The Misrepresentation Claim The waiver and ratification ruling does not bar Thomas' claim for misrepresentation because it relates to prior statements by Medical Center, not the procedural irregularities of his termination. However, the district judge properly granted summary judgment on the merits of the misrepresentation claim. Actionable misrepresentation requires: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that the representation be acted upon by the hearer; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance that the statement was true; (8) the hearer's right to rely on the truthfulness; and (9) the hearer's proximate injury. Faw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 389, 613 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1980). Thomas asserts that Medical Center made representations to him that: (1) Medical Center would require its physicians to perform services for its patients at the applicable standard of care; (2) Medical Center would maintain appropriate quality control measures; and (3) Medical Center would enforce the requirements that its physicians meet the applicable standard of care. The district court ruled that the representations made were not actionable because they were: (1) policy statements; and (2) statements of future conduct. An action for fraud or misrepresentation will not lie for statements of future events. Mitchell v. Barendregt, 120 Idaho 837, 843, 820 P.2d 707, 713 (Ct.App.1991) (citing Sharp v. Idaho Investment Corp., 95 Idaho 113, 122, 504 P.2d 386, 395 (1972)). The law requires the plaintiff to form his or her own conclusions regarding the occurrence of future events. Id. Thomas was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Medical Center had no present intention of following through on the representations he complains of at the time the statements were made in order for the statements to be actionable. Thomas presented no such evidence; therefore, the district judge's dismissal of his misrepresentation claim is affirmed. Moreover, Thomas had been working for Medical Center and making complaints about the Doctor's conduct for over a year prior to entering into the 1994 employment agreement in which the alleged misrepresentations occurred. The record demonstrates that Thomas was aware that Medical Center was taking no action as a result of his complaints, thus, Thomas has failed to demonstrate reliance on any representations made in the written contracts he signed. C. The District Judge Erred In Granting Summary Judgment On The Wrongful Termination/Retaliatory Discharge In Violation Of Public Policy Claim The determination of what constitutes public policy sufficient to protect an at-will employee from termination for whistle blowing should be considered a question of law. See generally Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 944 P.2d 695 (1997) (determination of what constitutes a violation of public policy in invalidating the terms of a contract is a question of law). The district judge in this case noted that once defined, the issue of whether the conduct in question violates public policy becomes an issue for the jury. The district judge found that Thomas' memo dated February 17, 1998, constituted a conditional threat, as Thomas implied that he would remain silent if Medical Center acceded to his demands. The district judge concluded that such conduct as a matter of law . . . does not constitute conduct protected by the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in Idaho; thus, Thomas' conduct precluded his ability to claim public policy exception. On appeal this Court conducts a two-part inquiry. First, the Court asks whether there is a public policy regarding reporting medical irregularities sufficient to create an exception to the employer's right to terminate an at-will employee. Second, the Court decides whether the behavior complained of by Thomas is protected under the public policy exception, and whether a jury could reasonably find that Thomas acted in a manner sufficiently in furtherance of that policy. 1. The Conduct Thomas Complained of Falls Under the Public Policy Exception In order for the public policy exception to apply, the discharged employee must: (1) refuse to commit an unlawful act; (2) perform an important public obligation; or (3) exercise certain rights or privileges. Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 118 Idaho 664, 668, 799 P.2d 70, 74 (1990). The public policy exception has been protected in Idaho on several occasions. E.g., Watson v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps., Inc., 111 Idaho 44, 720 P.2d 632 (1986) (protecting participation in union activities); Ray v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117, 814 P.2d 17 (1991) (protecting reports of electrical building code violations); Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 923 P.2d 981 (1996) (protecting compliance with a court issued subpoena). This Court has also indicated that the public policy exception would be applicable if an employee were discharged, for example for refusing to date her supervisor, for filing a worker's compensation claim, or for serving on jury duty. Sorensen, 118 Idaho at 668, 799 P.2d at 74 (citations omitted). In Sorensen, the Court stated that if the reported conduct constituted a statutory violation, it would be more likely fall under the protection of the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. Id. Thomas asserts that a fellow doctor falsified medical records and performed unnecessary operations on patients to bolster his income. Thomas asserts that his conduct in reporting the Doctor's actions falls under the exception listed in Sorensen for performing an important public obligation. Granting all reasonable inferences to the nonmoving party, this Court must accept that the Doctor's conduct occurred as alleged by Thomas. Reporting such misconduct falls under the public policy exception because the conduct alleged by Thomas is unlawful and it involves the health and welfare of the public. Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175, 178, 16 P.3d 272, 275 (2000). Employees are protected under the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine for reporting the falsification of medical records and the performance of unnecessary operations to bolster a physician's income. 2. Thomas' Conduct of Reporting the Violation Falls Within the Exception Medical Center argues that Thomas was required to report the conduct to an outside entity in order to be protected under the public policy exception. In Crea, the plaintiff sought protection under the public policy exception following termination of his employment by FMC. Crea argued that he was fired because he disclosed to his supervisors documents indicating that activities of FMC had caused serious contamination, including arsenic that threatened ground water. This Court concluded that Crea's claim for wrongful discharge would fall under the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine if facts supporting the claim were established. Id. at 178, 16 P.3d at 275. Thus, an employee who reports wrongful conduct that is protected under the public policy exception is protected by reporting the conduct to superiors within the company. Even if the Court were to require reporting to an outside entity, the February 17, 1998 memo was addressed to the chief executive officer and president of Mercy Medical Center. Sending the memo to the CEO of a hospital with whom Medical Center worked would satisfy any outside reporting requirement. Once the court defines the public policy, whether the public policy was violated is a question for the jury. Questions of fact remain as to whether Thomas' conduct in reporting what he considered the Doctor's misconduct, and whether his writing and distribution of the February 17, 1998, memo were in furtherance of the above defined public policy. There are also questions of fact regarding whether Thomas was terminated for acting in the furtherance of the public policy. 3. Unclean Hands Finally, Medical Center presents an unclean hands argument with regard to Thomas's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, contending that Thomas was required to report the allegations of misconduct to the Idaho Board of Medicine under Idaho Code § 54-1818, and his failure to do so precludes his claim of discharge in violation of public policy. Idaho Code § 54-1818 does require physicians to report violations by other physicians, but there is an ambiguity in the statute as to what violations are to be reported. The statute requires physicians to report violations of Idaho Code § 54-1810, but next to where the statute indicates that Idaho Code § 54-1810 is the appropriate provision, there are brackets containing Idaho Code § 54-1814, suggesting that it is the violation of this statute that must be reported. Compiler's notes to I.C. § 54-1818 state that the bracketed section number § 54-1814' was inserted by the compiler since § 54-1810 as it related to grounds for revocation or suspension of licenses was repealed and § 54-1814 now deals with such subject matter. This Court interprets statutes according to the plain, express meaning of the provision in question and will resort to judicial construction only if the provision is ambiguous, incomplete, absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws. Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 742, 979 P.2d 605, 615 (1999). This Court disfavors statutory amendment by implication absent clear, unequivocal legislative intent. Wilkins v. Fireman's Fund American Life Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 1006, 695 P.2d 391 (1985). However, the evidence indicates that the legislature intended Idaho Code § 54-1818 to refer to Idaho Code § 54-1814. Idaho Code § 54-1818 was passed in 1976 as the reporting statute for malpractice as then defined by Idaho Code § 54-1810. Idaho Code § 54-1818 has not been amended since 1976. However, in 1977, the legislature undertook an extensive rewriting of the Idaho Medical Malpractice Act, repealing, along with many other sections, Idaho Code § 54-1810. In its place, the legislature passed Idaho Code § 54-1814, which is clearly the successor statute of Idaho Code § 54-1810 given their substantially, almost exactly, identical provisions. Also, current Idaho Code § 54-1810 merely demands that all licensed physicians take a written exam to be certified, and does not address what constitutes malpractice. Determining that Idaho Code § 54-1818 still refers to Idaho Code § 54-1810 would frustrate and almost completely nullify the effectiveness of Idaho Code § 54-1818 and the responsibility of the medical field to police itself. The compiler's notes state an accurate correction of the statute. Idaho Code § 54-1818 requires licensed physicians to report the conduct of other licensed physicians that violates the provisions of Idaho Code § 54-1814. As for Thomas's failure to report the allegations of misconduct to the Idaho Board of Medicine, the failure of Thomson to report the allegation of misconduct does not constitute a defense for the Medical Center. Under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, the Court has the discretion to evaluate the relative conduct of both parties and to determine whether the party seeking equitable relief should in the light of all the circumstances be precluded from such relief. Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 941 P.2d 350 (1997). While Thomas had a duty to report to the Medial Board, it is the prerogative of the Medial Board itself to censure such a failure. Thomas's failure to report the alleged misconduct to the Medical Center Board may be evidence of an intent to coerce the Medical Center to acquiesce to his demands, but the failure to meet his responsibilities to the Medical Board is not enough to preclude him from asserting his claim of discharge against public policy against the Medical Center. Issues of material fact exist regarding whether Thomas is entitled to relief for discharge in violation of public policy. He has provided sufficient evidence on the disputed issues to survive summary judgment, and the district judge's order is therefore reversed and remanded on this claim.