Opinion ID: 2074514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Because Cobb Was Accused of a Civil Infraction Subjecting Her to the Imposition of a Fine, the Statute is Penal and Must be Construed Strictly Against the Board

Text: [¶ 55] The statute governing counseling professionals provides that a violation of the chapter constitutes a civil infraction subjecting the violator to the imposition of a fine. 32 M.R.S. § 13854(3) (2005). It is a well recognized principle of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be construed strictly and that a criminal offense cannot be created by inference or implication[.] State v. Ashby, 1999 ME 188, ¶ 6, 743 A.2d 1254, 1257 (quotation marks omitted). We have said that the purpose of statutes that provide for the revocation of a professional license is to protect the public from improper conduct on the part of the [professional,] Me. Real Estate Comm'n v. Kelby, 360 A.2d 528, 532 (Me.1976), and is not penal, Me. Real Estate Comm'n v. Anderson, 512 A.2d 351, 353 (Me.1986). Here, however, unlike the real estate broker statutes in Kelby and Anderson, section 13854 authorized, and the Commission imposed on Cobb, a fine. To that extent, the statute is penal and must be strictly construed. See Chittim, 2001 ME 125, ¶ 5, 775 A.2d at 383 (stating that a civil fine for a traffic infraction is penal); see also Pike v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 303 F.2d 353, 357-58 (8th Cir.1962) (stating that although revocation of a license is remedial rather than penal, the imposition of a civil penalty is certainly punitive for purposes of the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed); Mansfield v. Ward, 16 Me. 433, 435-36, 438 (1840) (holding that a statute is penal when recovery is not to compensate the plaintiff but to punish the offender and can be maintained without proof of actual injury). When we construe a statute strictly, all doubt must be resolved against the imposition of the penalty. [¶ 56] Here, the Court's assessment notwithstanding, the record demonstrates great uncertainty as to the meaning of the statute. The Legislative history sheds no light on the Legislature's intent. [12] In light of this uncertainty, the interpretation of the statute should be resolved against the penalty. Because, at best, there is only an implication in the statute that a LPC may not diagnose and treat, we should not countenance the creation of an offense and the imposition of a penalty by implication or inference. See Ashby, 1999 ME 188, ¶ 6, 743 A.2d at 1257.