Opinion ID: 626445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Compliance with FMVSS 109

Text: The Trenados argue that Cooper failed to offer any evidence of compliance with FMVSS 109 and thus was not entitled to a jury instruction regarding the presumption in § 82.008.4 A jury instruction regarding the presumption in § 82.008 is proper if there is some evidence that would permit a rational jury to find that the presumption applies. See FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1990) (“A party is entitled to an instruction only on claims supported by some evidence.” (citation omitted)); Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1468 (5th Cir. 1989). The Trenados stress that Cooper did not introduce FMVSS 109 into evidence and contend that the requirements to comply with FMVSS 109 were never fully explained. The Trenados concede that Cooper’s expert witness Lyle Campbell described tests that resembled those FMVSS 109 requires, but they assert that there was no evidence that the subject tire or its design prototype met mandatory federal safety requirements. Furthermore, although Campbell did testify at some length about Cooper’s high- 4 Counsel for the Trenados properly preserved this claim of error by objecting at trial. Thus, an abuse of discretion standard applies. 8 Case: 10-20675 Document: 00511807295 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/30/2012 No. 10-20675 speed testing, the Trenados contend that he provided little, if any, information about the other tests FMVSS 109 requires. Cooper, on the other hand, asserts that Campbell’s testimony did provide a basis for the jury to conclude that the subject tire complied with FMVSS 109. Campbell testified that the subject tire was marked with a Department of Transportation (“DOT”) number that reflected Cooper’s certification that the tire met all applicable DOT requirements. Campbell further testified that “DOT – Department of Transportation – No. 109 was the government regulation test” related to high-speed performance and indicated that a tire must meet the regulation’s requirements for the tire to be sold in the United States. Campbell also stated that Cooper conducts high-speed, endurance, strength, and beadunseating tests on its tires during the design process, on tires sampled from production batches before its tires can be shipped, and again as part of its quality assurance program (through a process called “surveillance testing”) on tires sampled from its warehouse. Campbell then testified in detail about the high-speed surveillance testing of tires made from the same specification as the subject tire in the 38th week of 2003 (two weeks before the subject tire was made) and the 43rd week of 2003 (three weeks after the subject tire was made). With regard to the tire made in the 38th week of 2003, Campbell testified that it was subject to high-speed, strength, and bead-unseating testing, and he agreed that the “tire met and exceeded all of the requirements, including Cooper Tire’s surveillance requirement.” The results of the surveillance testing were admitted into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit 51, which included the results of endurance testing as well. Although Cooper certainly could have gone to greater lengths to set out the requirements of FMVSS 109 and to demonstrate compliance with the regulation, we conclude that Campbell’s testimony was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that a mandatory federal standard governed tire durability and that the 9 Case: 10-20675 Document: 00511807295 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/30/2012 No. 10-20675 subject tire complied with that standard. Consequently, the district court did not err on this ground in instructing the jury on the rebuttable presumption under § 82.008. 5. Testimony Regarding the Risk FMVSS 109 Addresses5 The Trenados also contend that there was no testimony at trial establishing that FMVSS 109 governed the risk of harm alleged in this case. However, Campbell’s testimony again provided a reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that mandatory federal safety standards governed the risk of harm alleged (i.e., tire failure). As we discussed above, the subject tire’s alleged defect was often framed as a lack of durability. Campbell testified about strength, endurance, bead-unseating, and high-speed testing, which are related directly to tires’ durability. Moreover, in his detailed explanation of Cooper’s high-speed testing, Campbell testified that the testing is conducted until the tire fails. This testimony shows a direct link between tire failure and the tests the DOT requires. Thus, there was a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to conclude that the product risk in this case was tire failure and that Cooper’s testing was geared toward meeting federal safety standards governing that risk. Consequently, the trial court did not commit plain error by instructing the jury regarding § 82.008 on this ground. 6. Applicability of Safety Standards When the Subject Tire was Made6 The Trenados contend that the jury instruction on the presumption at issue was improper because there was no evidence presented to the jury that FMVSS 109 applied to the subject tire at the time it was made. However, as discussed above, Campbell examined testing done on tires made from the same 5 This ground was not raised in an objection before the district court and is thus reviewed only for plain error. 6 This ground was not raised in an objection before the district court and is thus reviewed only for plain error. 10 Case: 10-20675 Document: 00511807295 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/30/2012 No. 10-20675 specification as the subject tire both two weeks before and three weeks after the subject tire was made. Further, he expressly stated that, at the time the tire made in the 38th week of 2003 was tested, “Department of Transportation – No. 109 was the government regulation test.” Thus, we conclude that it was not plain error for the district court to instruct the jury on the presumption under § 82.008 based on a lack of evidence that FMVSS 109 applied to the subject tire. B. The Denial of the Trenados’ Motion in Limine “The grant or denial of a motion in limine is considered discretionary, and thus will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion and a showing of prejudice.” Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 643 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Buford v. Howe, 10 F.3d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1994)).7 “A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, even when evidence was admitted erroneously, we reverse only if the error “affect[ed] a substantial right of the parties.” Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994). The Trenados argue that compliance with FMVSS 109 is irrelevant, and thus the district court abused its discretion by denying their motion in limine seeking to exclude all evidence of such compliance. However, as set out above, FMVSS 109 governed the product risk in this case and was thus relevant to the 7 Cooper argues that we should review the denial of the Trenados’ motion in limine for plain error because Trenados did not object to the magistrate judge’s Memorandum and Recommendations regarding the Trenados’ motion for summary judgment, which was based on the same grounds as those raised in the motion in limine. However, the magistrate judge stated that her ruling was “not intended to infringe upon the right of the trial court to rule in any manner it deems proper on Plaintiffs’ pending motion in limine.” Thus, we review the district court’s denial of the Trenados’ motion in limine for abuse of discretion. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (predicating the application of plain error review on “notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object”). 11 Case: 10-20675 Document: 00511807295 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/30/2012 No. 10-20675 dispute. Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Trenados’ motion in limine.