Opinion ID: 2206708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Power to make increase in support retroactive.

Text: Section 598.21(8) does not specify the time at which modifications in the amount of child support are to become effective. The defendant argues the district court could not make the increase in child support retroactive to the date of the plaintiff's application for modification, at least in the absence of manifest injustice. He relies upon this language from Wren v. Wren, 256 Iowa 484, 489, 127 N.W.2d 643, 646 (1964): Modification of a decree for support payments operates prospectively and not retrospectively. The right to modify does not authorize the court to divest the parties of rights accrued under the original decree. Even where a decree is modified and a change is made payments that have accrued up to that time cannot thereby be affected. (Citations omitted.) See Delbridge v. Sears, 179 Iowa 526, 532-33, 160 N.W. 218, 221 (1916). Wren, however, did not establish when payments could be considered to be retroactive, viz., at the time of the filing of the application or at the time of the filing of the modification decree. This question was answered in Spaulding v. Spaulding, 204 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Iowa 1973), where the court stated a parent's duty to pay increased child support as a result of a modification proceeding can be made retroactive to . . . the date [of the filing of] the application for modification . . . . See also Delbridge, 179 Iowa at 530, 533-34, 160 N.W. at 221 (a dissolution decree is a finality until the power of the court [is] invoked to make changes and modifications; the right to modification must date from the application for modification). We find no reversible error. AFFIRMED.