Opinion ID: 1107651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Resolving the Conflict: Applying Perkins to BOLEO

Text: The Third District has held that BOLEO does not involve the use or threat of physical force or violence when it is committed by intentionally touching a law enforcement officer. The First, Second, and Fourth Districts have held that BOLEO involves the use or threat of physical force or violence, without exception. We apply the Perkins statutory elements test to resolve the conflict. That test is designed to determine whether an offense involves the use or threat of physical force or violence. In applying the Perkins test, we analyze the elements of the battery statute from which BOLEO derives its conduct element. See § 784.07, Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 784.03 defines battery as (a) actually and intentionally touching or striking another person against the will of the other; or (b) intentionally causing bodily harm to an individual. Therefore, three separate acts may constitute BOLEO: (1) actually and intentionally touching a law enforcement officer against his will; (2) actually and intentionally striking a law enforcement officer against his will; or (3) intentionally causing bodily harm to a law enforcement officer Under Perkins, for BOLEO to constitute a forcible felony, all three alternatives must involve the use or threat of physical force or violence. If one of the elements does not, then BOLEO can be committed without the use or threat of physical force or violence, and BOLEO would fail the Perkins test. Neither party in this case disputes that intentionally causing bodily harm involves the use or threat of physical force or violence. It is also difficult to argue that intentionally striking a law enforcement officer does not involve the requisite level of physical force or violence contemplated by the forcible felony statute. This leaves intentional touching as the conduct element most likely to fail the Perkins test. We must determine whether intentionally touching a law enforcement officer necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force or violence as described in the final clause of section 776.08. If it does not, then BOLEO cannot be a forcible felony. The State asserts that any intentional touching of a law enforcement officer necessarily involves the use or threat of physical force, even if only a de minimis amount of such force is used. (Pet. Br. at 12). The State argues that the fact that only a very slight amount of physical force is used to accomplish a touching does not negate the fact that physical force is used. Id. Essentially, the State argues that any physical contact suffices to make BOLEO a forcible felony. The weight of authority contradicts the State's argument. Existing case law makes it clear that any intentional touching, no matter how slight, is sufficient to constitute a simple battery. See, e.g., D.C. v. State, 436 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) ([I]t is clear from Section 784.03 that any intentional touching of another person against such person's will is technically a criminal battery.); L.D. v. State, 355 So.2d 816, 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) ([I]t is clear that the force used in criminal battery need not be sufficient to injure.). Therefore, BOLEO, like battery itself, may be committed with only nominal contact. As Respondent argues, if BOLEO were considered a forcible felony based on its intentional touching element, it could lead to potentially outrageous results. For example, tapping a law enforcement officer on the shoulder without consent would constitute a forcible felony. A child shooting a spitball at a school police officer would be guilty of a forcible felony. The possibilities are limited only by the imagination. But such minor infractions are incompatible with the level of force the forcible felony statute contemplates. The felonies enumerated in section 776.08 include murder, treason, carjacking, home-invasion robbery, arson, kidnapping, discharging of a destructive device or bomb, and aircraft piracy. § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2006). Merely touching a law enforcement officer is not in the same league. This reasoning is supported by the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis, which states that when a general phrase follows a list of specifics, the general phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed. See Fayad v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 899 So.2d 1082, 1088-89 (Fla.2005). Therefore, the general phrase any other felony involving the use or threat of physical force or violence should be interpreted to include only offenses which involve a level of physical force or violence comparable to that of the enumerated felonies. Id. We also note that simple battery is a misdemeanor offense and can never be a forcible felony. BOLEO involves the exact same conduct as misdemeanor battery, the only difference being the victim's status. Yet if BOLEO were to count as a forcible felony, the ramifications would be significant. The maximum punishment a defendant can receive for committing misdemeanor battery against an ordinary citizen is one year in prison. § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2005). If the same conduct committed against a law enforcement officer is considered a forcible felony, the offense could be used to enhance a defendant's sentence to life in prison. Such a disparity in sentencing, stemming from the exact same conduct, seems out of proportion. We also note that the forcible felony statute specifically enumerates two types of battery: aggravated battery and sexual battery. See § 776.08, Fla. Stat. (2006). BOLEO is not among them. Under the canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. Young v. Progressive Southeastern Ins. Co., 753 So.2d 80 (Fla.2000). Had the Legislature intended to include all types of battery as forcible felonies, it would have listed simply battery rather than only the specific types enumerated. BOLEO's absence from the list of enumerated felonies lends further support to the conclusion that BOLEO is not a forcible felony.