Opinion ID: 1709625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: People v. Young

Text: James Curenton was with a group of friends on the evening of September 7, 1991. Dondrea Smith and Joseph Broom, two of Curenton's friends, testified that a man wearing a ski mask and carrying a gun came out of an alley. Mr. Smith testified that he thought nothing [9] of this pedestrian until the gunman started shooting. At that point, the witness and the rest of the friends ran. The gunman chased Curenton and shot at him. After Curenton was on the ground, the perpetrator took a gold chain from the victim's neck and rummaged through his pockets. On September 9, 1991, defendant was arrested for the murder of James Curenton. Defendant was placed in a holding cell for the night. At approximately 9:20 a.m. the next morning, Mr. Young was questioned about the shooting by Sergeant Lee Caudill of the Detroit Police homicide unit. According to testimony given at the evidentiary hearing, defendant was apprised of his Miranda rights and voluntarily agreed to waive them before questioning. At the initial interview, defendant denied all involvement in the killing. At 2:00 p.m., defendant was taken from the police station to the police crime laboratory for a polygraph examination. The defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights, and agreed to take the polygraph examination. During the examination, Caudill received a telephone call indicating that an attorney was at the police station requesting to see Bryce Young. [10] The defendant was not notified of this and the examination continued. At 6:40 p.m., defendant confessed. The defendant's motion to suppress the statement was denied. After a two-day bench trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; MSA 28.549, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to twelve to thirty years for the murder conviction and two years for the felony firearm violation. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction. 212 Mich.App. 630, 538 N.W.2d 456 (1995). We remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bender, and for a determination whether that decision should be applied retroactively to this case. 453 Mich. 976, 557 N.W.2d 315 (1996). On remand, the Court of Appeals held that Bender was to be given complete retroactive effect because it could not be said that Bender overruled clear and uncontradicted case law or that it was unexpected or indefensible in light of People v. Wright, supra. 222 Mich.App. 498, 565 N.W.2d 5 (1997).
The issue in this case is whether our decision in People v. Bender, supra , should have retroactive application. As a question of law, the standard of review is de novo. People v. Carpentier, 446 Mich. 19, 521 N.W.2d 195 (1994). Resolution of the matter in turn rests on the decisional basis of the holding. In Bender, we held that the police must inform a suspect when retained counsel is available for consultation, failing which any statement made by the defendant after the attorney's arrival would be suppressed. However, the ultimate holding of the Court was not that the rule was required by either Const 1963, art 1, § 17 [11] or § 20. [12] In an opinion by Chief Justice Brickley, joined by Justices Levin, Cavanagh, and Mallett, the majority expressly refrained from justifying Bender by interpreting constitutional provisions. Rather, the majority felt that it would be more appropriate to approach the law enforcement practices that are at the core of this case in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court approached the constitutional interpretation task in Miranda ...; namely, by announcing a prophylactic rule. [Bender at 620-621, 551 N.W.2d 71.] [13] This new per se rule of criminal procedure was implemented to insure that our system of criminal justice remains accusatorial and not inquisitorial in nature. Id. at 623, 551 N.W.2d 71.
In Griffith v. Kentucky, [14] the United States Supreme Court held that a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions applie[s] retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a `clear break' with the past. However, Griffith is not applicable to the cases at bar because it applies only to rules of criminal procedure that are grounded on the United States Constitution. In Griffith, the issue was whether the Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky [15] should be applied retroactively. In Batson, the Court held that a state criminal defendant could establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis of prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike members of the defendant's race from the jury. Once the defendant made the prima facie showing, the burden shifted to the state to establish a racially neutral explanation for the exclusions. Thus, Griffith dealt with the retroactive application on direct review [16] of a rule of criminal procedure that was constitutionally mandated. [17] The Court explicitly accepted Justice Harlan's view of distinguishing between cases that have become final and those that have not, and for applying new rules retroactively to cases in the latter category.... [18] The Court stated that failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication. [19] This Court's holding in Bender is not a rule of criminal procedure that is mandated by the United States Constitution. To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) specifically held that failure of the police to inform a defendant of a lawyer's efforts to contact him does not violate either the Fifth Amendment right to silence or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The conclusion that Griffith mandates retroactive application only with respect to rules that emanate from the federal constitution is in accord with the approach adopted in both federal and state courts. [20] In Commonwealth v. Waters, [21] the issue before the Massachusetts Supreme Court was whether a new rule announced in Commonwealth v. Allen, [22] should be applied retroactively. In Allen, the court announced a rule requiring a judicial determination of voluntariness whenever the issue was raised, even if the statement in question was made to a private citizen. Declining to apply Allen to a case pending on direct review at the time the opinion was issued, the court in Waters held that Griffith does not require this court to give retroactive application to rules that are not based on the Federal Constitution. [23] In People v. Erickson, [24] one of the issues before the Illinois Supreme Court was whether the decision in Daley v. Hett, [25] should have retroactive application. The defendant's position was that Hett prohibited death penalty questioning of prospective jurors where the sentencing jury is waived before trial. The court held that the issue was left open in Hett. Declining to address the unanswered issue, the court found that even if Hett stood for the defendant's proposition, it would not be applied retroactively to the defendant's case. The court stated: Our reading of Griffith leads us to conclude that retroactivity is triggered when two factors are present: (1) the case to which the new rule is to be applied was not final or was pending on direct review when the rule was declared and (2) the rule to be applied retroactively is of constitutional dimension. [26] The court reasoned that the right to a sentencing jury in a capital case was a statutory rather than a constitutional right, and stated that because Griffith addresses a rule which pertains to a constitutional right and the defendant herein seeks retroactive application of a rule which pertains to a statutory right, we do not deem Griffith controlling. [27] After finding Griffith inapplicable, the court applied a three-part test of retroactivity first adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Laws. [28] The three-part test applied in Erickson [29] is substantively indistinguishable from the test of retroactivity we applied in People v. Hampton . [30] Because Griffith is not controlling, this Court is free to prescribe the parameters of retroactivity. The United States Supreme Court held in Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. [31] that the Federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject. A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. While we acknowledge the reasoning and rationale of Griffith, [32] we decline to apply it to the cases before us today. [33] Instead, we find the analysis in Stovall v. Denno , [34] to be more persuasive. [35] In Stovall, the United States Supreme Court addressed the retroactivity of United States v. Wade. [36] Wade required the exclusion of an in-court identification that was based on a prior lineup conducted without counsel unless the in-court identification had an independent origin or was harmless error. The Stovall Court cited the unusual force of the countervailing considerations in holding that the Wade rule was to have total prospective application. The Court made no distinction between final convictions, convictions on direct review, and convictions at various stages of trial, holding that the factors of reliance and burden on administration of justice were paramount. [37] In addressing the equity argument, the Court observed that [i]nequity arguably results from according the benefit of a new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But we regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making. [38] In determining the scope of prospective application, Professors LaFave and Israel submit that reliance is a critical factor. If non-retroactive application is to be geared to reliance, the critical point for application of the new ruling must be the operative event regulated by that ruling, rather than the finality of the conviction. Where the new ruling was directed at a police practice, it would be applied only to police action occurring after the date of the new ruling.[ [39] ] In holding that Bender is to be given prospective application only, we agree with the Stovall Court that no distinction should be made between final convictions, convictions on direct review, and convictions at various stages of trial. [40] We simply decline to extend Bender `s court-made exclusionary rule to cases in which its deterrent purpose would not be served. [41]
In People v. Hampton , we recognized a three-part test of retroactivity that assesses (1) the purpose of the new rules; [42] (2) the general reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice. [43] We hold that the application of these three factors to the rule in Bender precludes retroactive application.
As noted above, the purpose of the Bender rule is to provide prophylactic protection against potential Miranda violations by mandating suppression as a deterrence to police misconduct. [44] The Bender majority held that [i]f it is deemed to be important that the accused be informed that he is entitled to counsel, it is certainly important that he be informed that he has counsel. [45] Miranda warnings are not constitutionally mandated. Rather, the United States Supreme Court in Miranda created a prophylactic set of warnings to ensure protection of Fifth Amendment rights. [46] The Supreme Court has further held that Miranda is to have prospective application only. [47] Furthermore, the Bender rule is not relevant to the ascertainment of guilt or innocence and does not implicate the integrity of the fact-finding process. In People v. Young, [48] the Court considered whether the Court of Appeals had correctly applied People v. Fountain, [49] which required that a prosecutor who knows of a defendant's prior felony record proceed against the defendant as an habitual offender in the adjudication of the current felony offense, failure of which reverses the defendant's conviction as an habitual offender. The Court observed that the rule was based on this Court's supervisory powers over the practices and procedures used in our courts [50] and concluded: When a decision of this Court involves a rule which concerns the ascertainment of guilt or innocence, retroactive application may be appropriate. People v. Hampton, supra . Conversely, a new rule of procedure adopted by this Court which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given prospective effect.[ [51] ] Because the doctrinal foundation for the Bender rule is prophylactic and aimed at preventing police misconduct that does not affect the truth-finding process, it is amenable to prospective application. Because the police acted in full compliance with the law as it existed at the time, the purpose of preventing police misconduct will in no way be served by retroactive application. The rule, by its nature, can only have a prospective effect on police conduct.
Because the amount of past reliance will often have a profound affect on the administration of justice, the second and third factors are often dealt with together. [52] When a decision overrules settled law, more reliance is likely to have been placed in the old rule than in cases in which the law was unsettled or unknown. [53] Judicial decisions are generally given complete retroactive effect unless the decisions are unexpected or indefensible. [54] The defendants in this case argue that Bender was foreshadowed by People v. Wright, supra . Because of the holding in Wright, the defendants argue, the decision in Bender cannot be deemed to be unexpected. In Wright, four members of the Court held that the defendant's confession could not be admitted into evidence. Justice Mallett, joined by Justice Levin, held that the Michigan Constitution, art 1, § 17, required the police to inform the defendant of in-person efforts by his retained attorney to contact him. [55] Chief Justice Cavanagh agreed with Justice Mallett's interpretation of the Michigan Constitution, but wrote separately to further cite defendant's right to assistance of counsel under Const 1963, art 1, § 20. [56] Chief Justice Cavanagh also held that the rule should not be limited to apply only to in-person efforts to contact. [57] Justice Brickley concurred that the confession should be suppressed. However, Justice Brickley wrote separately to base his conclusion on a rationale distinct from that of Justices Mallett, Levin, and Cavanagh. [58] Justice Brickley did not reference any provision of our constitution, but relied on a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to find that the coercive nature of the defendant's interrogation precluded a voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent. [59] Given that the majority in Wright did not agree that failure to allow retained counsel access to the client-mandated exclusion of the statements as a matter per se it cannot be said that Wright foreshadowed Bender. In announcing a rule of exclusion per se, Bender is a complete break with past precedent. As this Court held in People v. Anderson: [60] The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the Court must agree on a ground for decision in order to make that binding precedent for future cases. If there is merely a majority for a particular result, then the parties to the case are bound by the judgment but the case is not authority beyond the immediate parties. Therefore, even after Wright, there was no established rule that mandated the exclusion of evidence when the police failed to apprise a defendant of retained counsel's attempts at contact. Bender could not have been foreshadowed by Wright where the case established no precedential value under the principle of stare decisis. While the police could not rely on Wright, they could rely on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine, supra . As noted in Moran, the Court held that a defendant's knowledge of his attorney's presence is irrelevant to the voluntariness of a waiver. Under Moran, the proper focus is on the voluntariness of the defendant's decision to speak with the full awareness and comprehension of all the information Miranda requires the police to convey. Whether a statement is deemed voluntary is to be determined using a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. As this Court said in People v. Cipriano: [61] In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the trial court should consider, among other things, the following factors: the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. In view of the earlier reliance on Moran and Cipriano and the lack of foreshadowing by Wright, before Bender the police could legitimately rely on the fact that an inculpatory statement would not be automatically excluded when they failed to inform a suspect of the presence of counsel hired by a third party. This legitimate reliance was reinforced through subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeals, which held that Wright did not establish a binding principle regarding rationale. [62] Furthermore, subsequent Court of Appeals decisions expressly refused to impose a requirement per se that the police inform a suspect of counsel's presence. These opinions correctly employed a traditional totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in determining whether the defendant's statements were voluntary. [63] In Bender, the Court announced for the first time that police must inform a suspect of an attorney's attempted contact, failing which the suspect's Miranda waiver is invalid per se and the resulting statement suppressed. Because Bender is a new rule of law, it is uniquely susceptible to prospective application. As to the third factor, we find that retroactive application of Bender would be extremely disruptive to the administration of justice. Convictions would be called into question and evidence excluded that was obtained in full compliance with the law extant at the time the statement was given. The ultimate result might undermine the validity of a large number of convictions and burden the criminal justice system with numerous retrials. Accordingly, we hold that the decision in Bender is to be given prospective application only.
Defendants Sexton and Young also claim that their inculpatory statements should have been suppressed because they were not voluntary. As noted above, whether a statement is deemed voluntary is to be determined using a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. [64] While the voluntariness of a confession is a question for the trial court, an appellate court must examine the entire record and make an independent determination of voluntariness. [65] The decision of the trial court will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. [66] As to defendant Young, review of the record shows that the trial court did not err in finding Bryce Young's statement voluntary under the circumstances. Defendant maintains that his statement was involuntary because he was not informed that counsel was attempting to contact him and because he was deprived of food and sleep for twenty-one hours. As noted above, defendant's not being informed of the presence of counsel is merely a factor in the determination of voluntariness. Defendant was arrested at 9:00 p.m. on September 9. He was given a soft drink and a snack cake at approximately noon on September 10, which was the first and only occasion defendant complained about being hungry. According to defendant's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, he specifically requested a soft drink. He further testified that he spoke with his lawyer for approximately an hour and then ate a hot meal. Any delay in eating due to speaking with counsel is certainly not attributable to the police. Furthermore, defendant's testimony at the evidentiary hearing reveals that his lack of sleep was principally attributable to his being scared rather than any coercive tactics on the part of the police. Under the totality of the circumstances, we hold that defendant Young's statement was voluntary. As to defendant Sexton, the matter was not addressed by the appellate court. Therefore, we remand the issue to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
In all three cases before us, the inculpatory statements of the defendants were ordered suppressed pursuant to Bender. Because we hold that the decision in Bender is to apply only to interrogations that occurred after July 23, 1996, the inculpatory statements of the defendants should not be suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for proceedings consistent with this opinion.