Opinion ID: 767661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miller's Pregnancy Discrimination Claim

Text: 18 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or to otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex. 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e- 2(a). In 1978, Congress amended Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1998). This amendment, known as the PDA, provides that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(k); see Kennedy, 140 F.3d at 722. An unlawful employment practice is established whenever pregnancy is a motivating factor for an adverse employment decision. Kennedy, 140 F.3d at 722 (citing 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(m)). 19
20 The 300-day time period for Miller to file her discrimination claim excluded any alleged discriminatory acts that occurred before December 12, 1995. To get around the statute of limitations, Miller seeks use of the continuing violation doctrine, under which a plaintiff may get relief for a time-barred act by linking it with an act that is within the limitations period. Speer v. Rand McNally, 123 F.3d 658,663 (7th Cir. 1997). Miller argues this doctrine applies to her because American Family continued to discriminate against her in terms of her salary after December 12, 1995. As a result, she contends, it engaged in a continuing violation within the limitations period which she can link to American Family's pre-December 12, 1995 discrimination to bring this otherwise time- barred activity within the limitations period. See id. (For purposes of the limitations period, courts treat such a combination as one continuous act that ends within the limitations period.). 21 Relying on our decision in Jones v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 42 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 1994), the district court rejected Miller's argument. It noted that we have recognized three variations of the continuing violation doctrine and put forth the covert continuing violation theory as the variant which best fit Miller's case. Id. at 1058. Under this variation, the plaintiff can only realize that she is a victim of discrimination after a series of discrete acts has occurred. The limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff gains such insight. Id. But if the plaintiff knew, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence would have known after each act that it was discriminatory and had harmed her, she must sue over that act within the relevant statute of limitations. Id. 22 The district court noted Miller admitted that by January 1995, she knew she was the lowest-paid person in her unit and suspected it was because of her pregnancies. Miller, by her own account, then directly confronted Ann Knapstein (then her immediate supervisor) with this suspicion. According to Miller, Knapstein responded by simply turn[ing] around, mad, and slamm[ing] one of the drawers on her desk. The district court reasoned that because Knapstein did not deny Miller's charge, her response (or lack thereof) was ambiguous. If Miller was bothered by that response, she had a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to inquire further whether American Family was in fact discriminating against her. Miller, however, did not do so. Instead, she continued working as if nothing had happened; she did not act at that point and exercise reasonable diligence to root out an actual answer. Because Miller was alerted to a possible problem at the time of the encounter with Knapstein and yet did nothing, the district court held that Miller could not avail herself of the continuing violation theory to bring time- barred activity within the limitations period. See Jones, 42 F.3d at 1058. 23 On appeal, Miller argues that Knapstein's response was not ambiguous, but was clearly a denial that the pregnancies were a problem. We agree with the district court, however, about the ambiguity of Knapstein's response. Knapstein did not say no or shake her head negatively. On the one hand Knapstein's reaction could be attributed to her being angry that she got caught in alleged discriminatory behavior (a tacit admission of discrimination). On the other hand, it could be attributed to her frustration at what she perceived as Miller's ingratitude--the body language equivalent of after all I've done for you (promotions, raises, four maternity leaves totaling 30 weeks), this is the thanks I get (an implicit denial of discrimination). While the latter interpretation may be the more likely one, it is certainly not conclusive that this was the meaning of Knapstein's reaction. In short, Knapstein's reaction was ambiguous, and as a result, Miller should have pressed the issue of the discrimination she apparently suspected. Because she did not, she cannot invoke the continuing violation doctrine to save her time- barred claims. 24
25 With respect to Miller's discrimination claims that survive the statute of limitations (those occurring on and after December 12, 1995), [w]e must determine whether [Miller] presented a question of fact as to whether [American Family]treated her less favorably because of her pregnanc[ies]. Marshall v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 157 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 1998). There are two ways in which Miller could do so. Id.; see also Kennedy, 140 F.3d at 722. She could proceed under the 'mixed motives' or direct method . . . by producing sufficient evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to create a triable issue as to whether pregnancy was a motivating factor in her discharge. Id. Alternatively, Miller could avoid summary judgment by using the indirect, burden-shifting approach. See id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). 26 In the district court, Miller employed both methods. Before us, she argues only the direct method. She relies on King's alleged statement of April 16, 1996 (You just have to stop having kids, and I'll get you up to mid-range in a couple of years.) as direct evidence that American Family violated the PDA from December 12, 1995 until her termination. 5 27 When a plaintiff proceeds under the direct proof method, allegedly discriminatory statements are relevant, as the district court correctly recognized, only if they are both made by a decisionmaker and related to the employment decision at issue. Stopka v. Alliance of American Insurers, 141 F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir. 1998). As we said in Chambers, 17 F.3d at 1004, there has to a be a link between the alleged prejudice of the manager and the adverse action at issue: 28 Liability under Title VII does not turn on the bigotry of company managers unless that bigotry resulted in injury to the plaintiff. . . . There therefore needs to be a link between an [American Family] manager's alleged prejudice, and the decisions that [Miller] is challenging. 29 In this case, the district court put this principle succinctly when it noted, even if King were a bigot, [Miller] cannot make a claim unless his bigotry harmed her. 30 American Family made its decisions on Miller's 1994 and 1995 salaries before King arrived. Thus, even if these salaries were unlawfully low, King could not have been responsible for them. As a result, his April 1996 statement has no probative value for the legality of those earlier salaries. See Kennedy, 140 F.3d at 724 ([E]ven if Goldberg's comment could be viewed as discriminatory, it does not serve as evidence plaintiff was terminated for discriminatory reasons because Goldberg, even though plaintiff's supervisor, was not a decision maker as to the decision at issue.); see also Gleason, 118 F.3d at 1140. 6 31 That leaves only two compensation decisions for which King was responsible: Miller's April 16, 1996 raise (when he made the not having kids remark) and his July 1996 refusal to give her an even bigger raise. As to the first, Miller's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that Miller did not advise her supervisors that she was pregnant with her latest child until mid-May, one month after King told her about her raise. Her claim of pregnancy discrimination with respect to her April 1996 raise cannot be based on her being pregnant if King did not know she was. It must, instead, be predicated on a more general displeasure with women who have missed work because of past pregnancies. Given that American Family is 64% female and its employees frequently take maternity leaves (indeed, Miller took four, totaling 30 weeks), we are skeptical the evidence would support the existence of such a claim. 32 But even if it would have, Miller's April 1996 raise was the biggest in her unit. King cannot be guilty of pregnancy discrimination--of treating Miller less favorably than her heretofore-non- pregnant co-workers--by giving her a raise that was bigger than the raises he gave all her non- pregnant colleagues. As the district court put it, even if [King's] statement is evidence of discriminatory motive, the job action to which the comment was tied was not adverse; concurrently with the comment, [Miller] received the largest [raise] of any employee in the department. This is fatal to Miller's claim, for without a materially adverse job action, discrimination is not actionable. See Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 488; see also Chambers, 17 F.3d at 1004 (Liability under Title VII does not turn on the bigotry of company managers unless that bigotry resulted in injury to the plaintiff.). 33 What remains, then, is Miller's argument that King discriminated against her by not agreeing to her July 1996 demand for even more money. The district court also rejected this argument, observing that not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Smart v. Ball State University, 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). It noted that in Rabinovitz, we held that the loss of a bonus is not an adverse employment action in a case . . . where the employee is not automatically entitled to the bonus, 89 F.3d at 488-89, and that here, Miller has not argued that she was automatically entitled to an even larger raise. It reasoned that this case was in line with Rabinovitz: If, absent entitlement, failure to receive any bonus or [raise] is not a material adverse job action, it follows that King's discretionary decision to award plaintiff the largest [raise] in her department[, but not to give her the even larger raise she demanded,] cannot be a material adverse job action. . . . whatever [King's] personal beliefs. We find the district court's reasoning entirely sound. 34 Miller similarly complains that King's failure to make a good faith effort to obtain more funds from which to give her an even bigger raise (allegedly because of his anti-pregnancy bias) is an adverse action. After meeting with Miller on June 27, 1996, King spoke with the Human Resources Division about obtaining more funds for Miller but did not press his inquiry. We do not find it remarkable, however, that King did not vigorously try to obtain more money for Miller after their meeting. She had just finished calling him--her supervisor--incompetent and a political hack, and she did so in the presence of his supervisor (whom she also called incompetent) before threatening to quit if she did not get her way. Given Miller's unusual strategy, it is surprising that King made any effort to garner more funds. 35 Nevertheless he did, and we do not fault American Family for King's efforts, even if he did not go to the mat for Miller. King had a limited pool of money from which to award raises. From this limited pool, he gave Miller the largest raise in her unit. Then, after she threatened to quit and personally insulted him, he still made an effort (albeit a relatively minor one) to obtain even more money for her. 7 Under company procedures, King would then have had to have gone to his Vice-President to obtain more money for Miller, no doubt requiring an extraordinary request for a subordinate who had just insulted him in front of his boss. Under these circumstances, not taking that extra step was not an adverse action. See Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 488-489, supra. 8