Opinion ID: 173039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for DNA Testing

Text: The IPA requires the court that entered the defendant's judgment of conviction to order post-conviction DNA testing of specified evidence if ten prerequisites are met. 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(1)-(10). Most relevant to this appeal, § 3600(a)(8) provides that the applicant seeking DNA testing under the IPA must show that [t]he proposed DNA testing of the specific evidence may produce new material evidence that would... raise a reasonable probability that the applicant did not commit the offense. Mr. Jordan suggests that DNA testing of the shank, the cloth, and the bloody glove may reveal Mr. Riker's DNA on those objects, and that this evidence would raise a reasonable probability that Mr. Jordan did not stab Mr. Stone. We disagree. Such evidence would only show that Mr. Riker handled those items at some point, which is not at all inconsistent with the government's theory of the case such that it calls into question the strength of the evidence against Mr. Jordan. Cf. United States v. Fasano, 577 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir.2009) (ordering DNA testing under the IPA when favorable results would cause a strong case against the defendant to evaporate[]). Indeed, we fail to see how the presence of Mr. Riker's DNA on the murder weapon or other items would undermine the strength of the government's case in any meaningful way. Two eyewitnesses testified that Mr. Jordan stabbed Mr. Stone; no eyewitness testified that someone else committed the crime. Three prison employees also testified, and Mr. Jordan does not dispute, that after the stabbing Mr. Jordan chased Mr. Stone and later threw the murder weapon onto a housing unit. Furthermore, Mr. Jordan made suspicious statements after the incident and there was evidence of a plausible motive. The strength and reliability of this evidence would not be diminished by the presence of Mr. Riker's DNA on the murder weapon or the other items because such evidence would demonstrate, at most, that Mr. Riker touched or handled those items at some point. It would not, however, suggest that Mr. Jordan could not have similarly handled them or that he could not have used them to commit the murder. Indeed, Mr. Jordan appears to concede that he handled the shank by claiming that Mr. Riker forced the weapon on him. Furthermore, the presence of Mr. Riker's DNA on these items would not explain away the evidence of Mr. Jordan's motive, his curious statements after the crime, the uncontested fact that he chased the victim and then discarded the murder weapon, or the eyewitness testimony that Mr. Jordan stabbed Mr. Stone. Moreover, the government never relied on DNA evidence as part of its case, and the jury was explicitly informed that a third person's DNAand not Mr. Jordan'swas discovered on the shank and cloth. [1] Under these circumstances, we fail to recognize how the identification of that third person would exculpate Mr. Jordan. Finally, we note that the district judge considering a motion under § 3600 is most often the judge who presided over the defendant's trial, see 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), and is therefore in a unique position to assess the evidence against the defendant and to evaluate whether new DNA testing may produce evidence which would raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit the offense. For all these reasons, we agree that Mr. Jordan has failed to meet that prerequisite under the IPA and thus affirm the denial of his motion for DNA testing. [2]