Opinion ID: 221380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Insufficient Service of Process

Text: The Plaintiffs first argue that the district court erred in its consideration of their initial attempt to serve Officer Gallegos. They contend that they had properly served Officer Gallegos on May 9, 2008, and that we should reinstate their claims accordingly. We review de novo the district court's determination regarding the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' service of process. See uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 423-24 (7th Cir.2010); Williams v. Leach, 938 F.2d 769, 771 (7th Cir.1991). The Plaintiffs' contention that they properly served Officer Gallegos within 120 days as required by Rule 4(m) lacks merit. Their asserted belief that they properly served Officer Gallegos on May 9, 2008 as well as their incredible claim that [i]t was only upon being served with Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that they realized that their attempt was supposedly deficientis flatly belied by (1) the return of the summons three days later marked as not served, (2) their post-removal inquiry regarding the proper means of service, and (3) their request for the city to waive service on Officer Gallegos's behalf. They nevertheless argue, unconvincingly, that the Superintendent is the de facto head of the Office of Legal Affairs and that serving the summons on the Superintendent's office was essentially the same as giving it to the Office of Legal Affairs. They also complain about the difficulty of serving police officers in general. But neither point explains how their attempt at service complied with either the state or federal rules. Perhaps the Plaintiffs believe that offering the summons to another office on the same floor as the correct office should suffice, and thus wish us to deem their singular attempt valid. Whether such an effort should arguably be effective has no bearing on whether it was legally sufficient. Because this attempt at service occurred before the case was removed, Illinois service of process rules govern whether the attempt was legally sufficient. Allen v. Ferguson, 791 F.2d 611, 616 n. 8 (7th Cir.1986). Under Illinois law, serving an individual's employer or other putative agent is not sufficient for service on the individual. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-203. Even if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to this singular attempt at service, the Plaintiffs have not shown that the Superintendent was an authorized agent to receive service of process on Officer Gallegos's behalf. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(2)(C). Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that the Plaintiffs had not served Officer Gallegos within the 120-day period.