Opinion ID: 203825
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Government's Remaining Arguments Are Unavailing

Text: The government's remaining arguments are unpersuasive in light of our holding that Mrs. Taing continues to be a spouse despite her husband's death. We take each in turn.
We disagree with the government's contention that the present tense language used in § 1154(b) evidences congressional intent not to confer immediate relative status on petitioners like Mrs. Taing. [8] The government argues that the present tense language in this provision supports the conclusion that Mr. Taing, the I-130 petitioner, must be alive and that Mr. and Mrs. Taing must still be married for USCIS to approve the I-130 petition. We disagree. As explained above, because we read the first two sentences of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) as creating separate and independent pathways, we conclude a surviving spouse remains a spouse, and therefore qualifies for immediate relative status for purposes of § 1154 even if the surviving spouse had been married for less than two years (provided, of course, that the marriage was not fraudulent). Thus, the use of the present tense in § 1154(b) does not affect our analysis because Mrs. Taing still qualifies as an immediate relative despite her husband's death. [9]
The government states that § 1155 allows the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) to revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 1154 at any time for what he considers to be good and sufficient cause. 8 U.S.C. § 1155. Further, the government states that, by regulation, the Secretary has established that the citizen petitioner's death automatically revokes approval of a visa petition. [10] See 8 C.F.R. § 205.1(a)(3)(i)(C). The government contends that if the visa petitioner's death is sufficient to revoke an approved petition, it should be sufficient to revoke an unapproved petition. Although the government did not raise this precise argument below, we nevertheless go to the merits and conclude that the automatic revocation provision is inapplicable here. First, it is significant that this provision applies only to approved petitions, whereas the I-130 petition at issue here is pending. We are not convinced that we should extend a regulation that applies to the revocation of approved petitions to the pending petition context. See Lockhart, 561 F.3d at 622 (noting that [t]he Secretary provides no evidence establishing that the government has, since 1938, denied pending immediate relative petitions solely on the basis of the citizen spouse's death, nor ... any historical analysis linking the `immediate relative' provision to the automatic revocation of approved petitions). Second, and more importantly, the government's reading of the automatic revocation provision's applicability to pending petitions is contrary to Congress's intent in § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). Where a regulation conflicts with congressional intent as expressed in a statutory scheme, courts must give effect to congressional intent. See Succar, 394 F.3d at 10-11 (holding that a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General was invalid where it conflicted with Congress's intent as expressed in a statute). Here, as expressed above in our discussion of Congress's intent behind § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), it is clear that Congress did not intend for Mr. Taing's death to cut off Mrs. Taing's eligibility for immediate relative status. [11] See also Pierno v. INS, 397 F.2d 949, 950-51 (2d Cir.1968) (concluding automatic revocation inappropriate where petitioner died during a delay in considering visa petition and that allowing wooden application of rules for automatic revocation would result in many aliens being denied adjustment by the happenstance of a spouse's death.).
In support of its argument, the government refers to related statutes under which an alien may obtain permanent residence based on a relationship that has been dissolved by death. In particular, the government cites to the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), Pub.L. No. 107-56, §§ 421, 423, 115 Stat. 272, and to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (NDAA), Pub.L. No. 108-136, § 1703(a)-(e), 117 Stat. 1392, 1693. The government cites to this legislation to support its claim that when Congress has wanted to permit an alien to obtain immediate relative status it has been explicit. The government's references to the Patriot Act and NDAA are inapposite because, to the extent they are relevant, the cited provisions pertain to the second sentence of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), not the first sentence. [12] As we held above, the second sentence of this provision has no bearing on whether a surviving spouse such as Mrs. Taing qualifies as an immediate relative for purposes of her visa petition and adjustment of status application. See Lockhart, 561 F.3d at 619 (Like the second sentence of the immediate relative provision ... the Patriot and the National Defense Authorization Acts provide a separate avenue for self-petitioning without requiring the alien-spouse to have been married for two years in the event that the deceased citizen did not petition prior to death.).
Lastly, the government argues that we should defer to a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in Matter of Varela, 13 I & N Dec. 453 (BIA 1970). In Varela, the BIA held that an alien spouse ceases to be a spouse, and hence an immediate relative, when a citizen spouse, petitioning on the alien spouse's behalf, dies before the alien spouse's adjustment of status application is due. Id. at 453-54. As explained above, we conclude that the language, text, structure, and context of the INA statutory scheme plainly and unambiguously indicate that Congress intended for surviving spouses such as Mrs. Taing qualify for immediate relative status for purposes of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); thus, we need not accord Chevron deference to the BIA's decision in Varela. Even if we were to consider Varela under the less deferential standard articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944), it fails to persuade us for two main reasons. [13] See Lockhart, 561 F.3d at 622 (holding that Varela is not entitled to either Skidmore or Chevron deference). First, the opinion summarily rules in favor of the government and does not engage in an adequate analysis of the statutory text. See id.; Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1038. Second, the BIA later found this decision to be extra-jurisdictional in Matter of Sano, 19 I & N Dec. 299 (BIA 1985), thereby making Varela a non-precedential decision. [14] See Lockhart, 561 F.3d at 622; Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1038.