Opinion ID: 1667339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Did Goodwin Voluntarily Waive His Miranda Rights Before Making His Statement?

Text: In Miranda v. Arizona, [12] the Supreme Court held that authorities must employ procedural safeguards during a custodial interrogation to protect a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically, authorities must advise an individual in custody that he has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. [13] In its order overruling Goodwin's motion to suppress, the district court noted the State's argument that Goodwin was not in custody at the time of the interview, but it did not address this issue, because it found that Goodwin had waived his Miranda rights. On appeal, the State does not argue that Goodwin was not in police custody at the time of his statement. Accordingly, we assume he was in custody and focus our review on the waiver issue. Miranda rights can be waived if the suspect does so knowingly and voluntarily. [14] A valid Miranda waiver must be voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice and made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. [15] In determining whether a waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made, a court applies a totality of the circumstances test. [16] Factors to be considered include the suspect's age, education, intelligence, prior contact with authorities, and conduct. [17] Based upon principles articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Gault, [18] Goodwin argues that the district court did not adequately consider the significance of his youth in determining that he voluntarily waived his rights prior to his inculpatory statement to police. In In re Gault, the Court held that constitutional procedural safeguards, including the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel, are applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed. The Court noted that admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution, [19] and further stated: If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. [20] Goodwin argues that because of his youth, police should have conducted further inquiries beyond the familiar Miranda warnings to ensure that Goodwin fully understood the potential consequences of waiving his rights and making a statement to police about his involvement in the shooting. Goodwin urged the trial court and now this court to adopt the following position taken by the American Bar Association: Youth should not be permitted to waive the right to counsel without consultation with a lawyer, and only after a full inquiry by a court into the youth's comprehension of that right and his or her capacity to make the choice intelligently and understandingly. Any waiver of counsel must be in writing and made of record. [21] This court has utilized the totality of the circumstances test to determine whether there has been a voluntary and effective waiver of Miranda rights by adults [22] and juveniles [23] alike. We have employed the same test in the different but related context of determining whether a juvenile has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings. [24] In another related context, we have noted that while the minority of an accused is a factor to consider in determining the voluntariness of a confession, it is not determinative. [25] Because the age, education, and intelligence of an accused are included within the totality of circumstances which a court must assess in determining whether there has been a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights prior to a custodial interrogation, a court necessarily exercises special caution with respect to juveniles. [26] Accordingly, we decline to modify the totality of the circumstances test for determining the voluntariness of Miranda waivers by minors. The district court's findings of historical fact are not clearly erroneous; they are fully supported by the record. Goodwin came to the police station with his grandmother, who was also his legal guardian, after she learned that he had been implicated in the shooting and advised him to cooperate with the investigation. After obtaining preliminary information from Goodwin, Perna explained that because there were accusations directed at Goodwin and they were in a police facility, he needed to advise Goodwin of his rights before asking further questions. Perna asked Goodwin if he understood what Miranda rights were, and Goodwin acknowledged that he did. Before questioning, Goodwin further acknowledged his understanding that Perna was a police officer, that Goodwin had a right to remain silent and not answer questions, that anything Goodwin said could be used against him in court, that Goodwin had a right to consult with a lawyer and have a lawyer present during questioning, and that if Goodwin could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for him. After receiving these advisements and indicating that he understood them, Goodwin agreed to speak to police. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Goodwin was impaired by drugs or alcohol at the time of the questioning. As noted above, Goodwin's prior contacts with law enforcement authorities are well-documented, although the record does not reflect whether he was ever previously advised of his Miranda rights or subjected to custodial interrogation. In order to require cessation of custodial interrogation, the subject's invocation of the right to counsel must be unambiguous and unequivocal. [27] Statements such as [m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer [28] or `I probably should have an attorney' [29] do not meet this standard. Goodwin made no statement invoking his right to counsel. We conclude that his grandmother's comment regarding Goodwin's attorney did not constitute an unambiguous and unequivocal invocation of Goodwin's right to counsel on his behalf. Based upon our independent review of the totality of the circumstances, we likewise conclude that Goodwin knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before talking to police about the shooting.