Opinion ID: 1058084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Jury Instructions on Prior Violent Felonies

Text: Ivy next argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that he had prior convictions for felonies whose statutory elements involved violence to a person. He asserts that the trial court violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by making factual findings about the prior felony convictions for the purpose of imposing the death sentence. Ivy cites Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), in which the United States Supreme Court held that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the proscribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), in which the United States Supreme Court held that aggravating factors in a death penalty case must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because they are `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.' (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348). In reply, the State argues that the trial court followed the correct procedure and that the jury found the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. We begin our review of this issue by carefully summarizing the key portions of the record. Prior to the penalty phase, the prosecution told the trial court that it intended to establish the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance by relying on Ivy's five prior convictions. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2). The trial court found that the statutory elements of Ivy's prior convictions for second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery plainly involved violence to a person. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210 and 39-13-403(a). The trial court recognized, however, that Ivy's prior convictions for aggravated assault were more problematic because aggravated assault may be committed with or without actual violence to the person. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a). As a result, the trial court examined the indictment for aggravated assault in case number 91-02560 and found that the offense had involved violence to the person because Ivy pled guilty to a charge alleging serious bodily injury. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(B). In addition, although the trial court found that the indictments for aggravated assault in case numbers 90-09886 and 90-09887 did not allege serious bodily injury, [7] the trial court also examined the affidavits of complaint: [T]he affidavit reads as follows. This is a sworn affidavit of Patsy Pollard on May 11, 1990. `On May 3rd, 1990, at approximately 5:00 p.m., David Ivy shot into the home of Patsy Pollard at 636 Thomas Number C with a shotgun. No one was injured but Ms. Pollard and several children were in the living room at the time. Davy Ivy also shot through the back door of the home of Sharon Branch at 636 Thomas Number B. Ms. Branch and her two week old baby were in the kitchen at the time. David Ivy had been harassing Ms. Pollard's 16 year old daughter and was still mad at her and apparently thought she was in the house at the time.' So clearly at least according to this affidavit it involved more than just pointing a gun. After deliberating, the jury found that the aggravating circumstance had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Having summarized the trial court's findings, we now turn to the applicable procedures under our case law. In State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tenn.2001), we held that whether the statutory elements of a defendant's prior conviction involved the use of violence to the person is a question of law for the trial court. Moreover, where an offense may be committed either with or without violence to the person, such as aggravated assault, the trial court must conduct a hearing outside the jury's presence and examine the underlying facts of the prior offense. Id. at 12. If the trial court determines that the statutory elements of a prior offense involved the use of violence to the person, the State may introduce evidence of the defendant's conviction for that offense and the jury is instructed that the prior conviction was for an offense involving the use of a violence to the person. Id. We have upheld the procedures under Sims on several occasions. See State v. Cole, 155 S.W.3d 885, 901-02 (Tenn.2005); State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 400 (Tenn.2003). In addition, we have rejected the argument that Sims is invalid under Apprendi or Ring because the Sixth Amendment requires facts used to enhance a punishment to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. As we explained in Cole : The (i)(2) aggravating circumstance requires only that the statutory elements of the prior felony involve the use of violence to the person. The Sims procedure authorizes trial judges merely to examine the facts, record, and evidence underlying the prior conviction to ascertain which `statutory elements' served as the basis of the prior felony conviction. This is a legal determination that neither requires nor allows trial judges to make factual findings as to whether the prior conviction involved violence. 155 S.W.3d at 904 (emphasis added). In addition, we emphasized that [o]nce the trial court determines as a matter of law that the statutory elements of the prior convictions involve the use of violence, the jury must then determine as matters of fact whether the prosecution has proven the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury alone must decide these factual questions, and these are the factual questions that determine whether the maximum sentence of death will be imposed. Id. The foregoing does not, however, end our analysis. In Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court recently clarified the effect of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments on a trial court's authority to examine the facts underlying a defendant's prior conviction being used to enhance a sentence. In that case, the district court refused to enhance a defendant's sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act by relying on police reports offered by the prosecution to show that the prior conviction was for a violent felony. In upholding the district court's decision, the Court concluded that a trial court may find the fact of a prior conviction but is limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Id. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254. Moreover, the Court emphasized that a trial court may not, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, make a disputed finding fact that is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record. Id. at 25, 125 S.Ct. 1254. In our view, Shepard clarifies but does not invalidate the procedures this Court adopted in Sims . See State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn.2006). Like Sims , Shepard holds that a trial court may find the fact of a prior conviction for enhancing a sentence. Also like Sims , Shepard holds that a trial court may make findings with regard to the nature of a prior conviction. Unlike Sims , however, Shepard clarifies that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments allow the trial court to consider only the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254. Thus, we conclude that the trial court's determinations under the procedure in Sims must likewise follow these limitations. See Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 668. Applying these principles to this case demonstrates that the trial court properly instructed the jury that three of Ivy's five prior convictions were felonies involving the use of violence to the person. As the trial court noted, the statutory elements of second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery plainly involved violence to the person. In addition, the trial court properly examined the indictment in determining that Ivy's prior aggravated assault conviction in case number 91-02560 involved violence to the person; indeed Ivy pleaded guilty to aggravated assault committed by causing serious bodily injury to the victim. The trial court erred, however, in instructing the jury that Ivy's two prior convictions for aggravated assault in case number 90-09886 and case number 90-09887 involved violence to the person. The prosecution conceded that the indictments in these cases alleged only that Ivy had used a deadly weapon and had caused the victims to fear bodily injury. The trial court, however, examined the detailed allegations of fact contained in the affidavit of complaint. An affidavit of complaint is a written statement alleging that a person has committed an offense and alleging the essential facts constituting the offense. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 3. Although made upon oath before a magistrate or a neutral and detached court clerk who is capable of [a] probable cause determination, id., an affidavit of complaint, like a police report, is not a judicial record of the kind approved in Shepard . Moreover, even though Ivy pled guilty to the two offenses, there is no plea transcript or other evidence indicating that he assented to the facts alleged in the affidavit of complaint. As a result, the trial court should not have considered the affidavit of complaint under Shepard . In addition, even if Ivy had assented to the facts in the affidavit of complaint, a factual question would have arisen as to whether there had been violence or an attempt to commit violence. As we conclude that the trial court erred, a recent Sixth Circuit case is instructive. In United States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550 (6th Cir.2005), the court held that Shepard did not preclude the district court from considering a criminal complaint in finding that a defendant's prior conviction under a state statute would also have been an offense under federal statute. The court emphasized, however, that the district court had before it the state criminal complaint, a transcript of the state plea proceedings, and [the defendant's] acceptance in those proceedings of the factual statements in the complaint. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). In contrast, the trial court in the present case considered only the affidavit of complaint without the defendant's assent or agreement as required under Shepard . Addressing the effect of the trial court's erroneous instructions as to the two prior convictions used by the prosecution in support of the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance, we believe that the appropriate analysis is analogous to that in cases where an aggravating circumstance has been held invalid but other valid aggravating circumstances remain. State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 262 (Tenn.1993). [8] In such cases, the invalid aggravating circumstance is harmless if a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same had the jury given no weight to the invalid felony murder aggravating factor. Id. We cautioned, however, that: In order to guarantee the precision that individualized sentencing considerations demand and provide a principled explanation for our conclusion in each case, it is important, when conducting harmless error review, to completely examine the record for the presence of factors which potentially influence the sentence ultimately imposed. These include, but are not limited to, the number and strength of remaining valid aggravating circumstances, the prosecutor's argument at sentencing, the evidence admitted to establish the invalid aggravator, and the nature, quality and strength of mitigating evidence. Id. at 260-61. Here, the record shows that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was properly instructed that Ivy had been convicted of second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. These prior convictions, particularly second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, were objectively reliable and qualitatively persuasive. See id. at 262 (noting that prior convictions under (i)(2) are often more objectively reliable and persuasive than other evidence). The jury was also properly instructed on the (i)(6) aggravating circumstance, i.e., the killing was committed to avoid lawful arrest or prosecution. Moreover, although the prosecutor's closing argument contained a few brief references to Ivy's five prior felony convictions in support of the (i)(2) aggravating circumstance, the transcript demonstrates that the prosecutor's arguments would have been no less effective with references to only three prior convictions. In addition, the transcript shows that the prosecution placed equal if not more emphasis on the evidence in support of the (i)(6) aggravating circumstance: This defendant took a gun, hid out in the bushes where she was staying and waited for her to come out. Why? Because she had come to the law. She had come to 201 Poplar and sworn out a warrant for his arrest on the morning when he beat her over and over and over again with a gun.    We don't need David Ivy playing God. We don't need David Ivy deciding who gets to go to the police and when they get to. We don't need David Ivy beating up his girlfriend, leaving her unconscious and then when she does the one thing that we have left in an orderly society to hold onto, filling her body with bullets. That's why I submit the legislators wrote that in the law. And the state ... has proven to you that that's why [the victim] died.    Why he killed. To try to break the system again [the victim] was struggling so hard to get to help her. That he murdered her to prevent the system from working. And also all the other times he did it. In contrast, the record shows that the evidence of mitigating circumstance consisted primarily of witnesses asking the jury to impose a life sentence. Thus, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict would have been the same even without the trial court's error in instructing the jury as to the two aggravated assault convictions.