Opinion ID: 303597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant Cephas

Text: 6 A review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, does not conclusively establish that appellant Cephas was an active perpetrator of the offense. The victim, Mrs. Jackson, despite an illuminated five or six minute view of her assailants was unable to identify Cephas or McCall at trial or at a police lineup held a few days after the robbery. Indeed, at the lineup she selected two other men as her assailants. 11 Furthermore, her description of Cephas can only be denominated inconclusive at best, a mirage at worst. She described him as about five feet five and [as] wearing rather light pants, an approximately light shirt and a lumber jacket, described later by her as a light jacket. 12 Cephas, who is five feet eight inches tall, was, according to a police photograph, clad in a dark blue sport coat and white turtle neck sweater. 7 Despite the inconclusive identification of Cephas, his conviction may still rest upon the premise that he is an aider and abettor. 13 In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant 'in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.' Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949). See United States v. Lumpkin, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 448 F.2d 1085 (1971); Thompson v. United States, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 405 F.2d 1106 (1968); Long v. United States, 124 U. S.App.D.C. 14, 360 F.2d 829 (1966). As we indicated in Bailey (John) v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 98, 416 F. 2d 1110, 1113 (1969), [a] sine qua non of aiding and abetting . . . is guilty participation by the accused; and as the court recognized in White v. United States, 366 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1966), [a]iding and abetting implies guilty knowledge. 8 To overcome the victim's failure to conclusively identify Cephas, the Government must rely upon the inference arising from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property. Pendergrast v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 20, 416 F.2d 776 (1969). However, a prerequisite to the application of the inference is a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused was in possession of the property. United States v. Coggins, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 134, 433 F.2d 1357 (1970). Although the requisite possession has been denominated exclusive it 9 is no more than judicial shorthand for the underlying concept that the accused must bear a distinctive relationship to the property before the inference is allowed. . . . 10