Opinion ID: 1562759
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Improper Victim Impact EvidenceGuilt & Penalty Phases

Text: Appellant argues that his next claim also implicates both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. Appellant alleges that the Commonwealth was improperly permitted to introduce victim-impact evidence at trial, i.e., evidence of the victim's attractiveness. [28] Over trial counsel's objection, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence regarding the victim's appearance through testimony, but prohibited admission of a photograph of the victim. [29] James Revak, the victim's husband, testified as follows: [Commonwealth]: Mr. Revak, would you describe your wife to us, please? [Revak]: She was around five six, five seven, brown hair, brown eyes, and she was beautiful in my opinion. [Commonwealth]: And everyone else's? [Revak]: Very much so. N.T., 2/3/87, at 164. Appellant contends that this testimony was irrelevant, inflammatory, and prejudicial, and was not elicited to show motive for rape because there is no motive element to rape. Appellant also states that the Commonwealth had the photograph of the victim in the courtroom and speculates that, although it was not admitted, it was still seen by the jury. Appellant claims that: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for supposedly failing to object; and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. Appellant also maintains that, although the evidence was presented at the guilt phase, the evidence affected the penalty phase because the trial court instructed the jury to consider all the evidence heard in the case-in-chief. The Commonwealth responds that the testimony regarding the victim's beauty was not victim-impact testimony because it was admitted, and properly so, only to show motive based on appellant's statements to fellow prisoners that he was attracted to the victim. [30] Thus, asserts the Commonwealth, appellant's claim lacks arguable merit. The Commonwealth also contends that appellant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this passing reference to the victim's appearance and that any possibility that the testimony tainted the penalty phase is improbable. The PCRA court concluded that this claim lacks arguable merit. The court found that the testimony was appropriate to establish motive and noted that the alleged victim-impact testimony was presented at the guilt stage, whereas in Fisher and Commonwealth v. McNeil, 545 Pa. 42, 679 A.2d 1253, 1259-60 (1996), the presentation of the victim-impact evidence, which was deemed to require a new penalty phase, was introduced at sentencing. Appellant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective clearly lacks arguable merit because trial counsel did in fact object to the presentation of evidence on the victim's attractiveness. In fact, the sidebar conference addressing trial counsel's objection takes up over eight pages of the transcript and trial counsel's objection to the admission of the photograph of the victim was sustained. Therefore, appellant's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness on appeal also lacks arguable merit. To the extent appellant's claim sounds only in appellate counsel ineffectiveness, it also fails because the trial court's ruling was proper. For one thing, James Revak's testimony did not implicate victim impact. He did not testify to the devastation he or family members suffered after his wife was brutally raped and murdered. He testified to her looks. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2) (describing victim-impact evidence as evidence concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim). Evidence of the victim's attractiveness was admissible in this case to explain appellant's reason for targeting this particular victim. As Ferry described, appellant himself had stated that he was attracted to the victim. Although motive is not an element of the crime of rape, such evidence may be relevant. Evidence to prove motive, intent, plan, design, ill will, or malice is always relevant in criminal cases. Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 497 Pa. 505, 442 A.2d 236, 241 (1982). Here, appellant's motive was relevant to show that he was the one who committed the crime. The victim of a murder is not merely a prop, and references to her humanity are not inherently and unfairly prejudicial. In this case, as Ferry's testimony made clear, appellant's focus on the victim was not generic or arbitrary. He focused on her precisely because of her looks. Finally, as the PCRA court noted, at the time of trial the capital sentencing scheme precluded victim-impact evidence at the penalty phase, and, unlike Fisher and McNeil, the testimony sub judice was admitted at the guilt phase for a valid purpose and it was never argued as victim impact at the penalty phase. Therefore, appellant's underlying claim is not cognizable under the prior capital sentencing scheme's prohibition on victim-impact evidence as described in Fisher and McNeil. Accordingly, appellant's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim on direct appeal lacks arguable merit.