Opinion ID: 760927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continuing Threat to Society

Text: 21 Mr. Cooks claims the continuing threat to society aggravator is unconstitutionally applied in Oklahoma because it functions as a catch-all circumstance that fails completely to narrow the class of individuals eligible for death. He further claims the continuing threat aggravator unconstitutionally overlaps the prior conviction aggravator in this case. 22 This court already has upheld the constitutionality of Oklahoma's continuing threat to society aggravator inasmuch as Mr. Cooks claims it is vague and fails to narrow the class of individuals eligible for death. Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1352-54 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 128, 142 L.Ed.2d 103 (1998). That resolution binds this panel. United States v. Foster, 104 F.3d 1228, 1229 (10th Cir.1997). 23 Mr. Cooks' argument the continuing threat aggravator impermissibly overlaps the prior conviction aggravator is likewise unavailing. It is true we have held certain aggravating circumstances may impermissibly overlap and therefore unconstitutionally skew the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1111-12. Such precedent does not, however, stand for the proposition that any time evidence supports more than one aggravating circumstance, those circumstances impermissibly overlap, per se. The test we apply is not whether certain evidence is relevant to both aggravators, but rather, whether one aggravating circumstance necessarily subsumes the other. Id. at 1111. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, there are two reasons the continuing threat aggravator did not subsume the prior conviction aggravator. 24 First, although Mr. Cooks' jury may have considered evidence of his prior conviction of a violent crime in the context of determining the presence of both the prior conviction and continuing threat aggravators, the prior conviction circumstance focused the jury's attention on the particular nature and consequences of his past conduct, while the continuing threat aggravator focused attention on the likelihood of future violent conduct. Second, under Oklahoma law, evidence regarding the callous nature of a crime, alone, is sufficient to support a jury's finding a defendant poses a continuing threat to society. See Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1390 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1835, 108 L.Ed.2d 964 (1990); Pennington v. State, 913 P.2d 1356, 1371 (Okla.Crim.App.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 841, 117 S.Ct. 121, 136 L.Ed.2d 72 (1996). The record here is replete with evidence that supports a finding Ms. Ridling's murder was, indeed, callous. Ms. Ridling was both elderly and disabled. Nevertheless, Mr. Cooks and Mr. Masters broke into her home, held her down, and then gagged her with sufficient force to lay her nose over to one side. The record further indicates that after binding and gagging Ms. Ridling, Mr. Cooks raped her and then proceeded to ransack her home and steal her possessions. Mr. Cooks and Mr. Masters then left Ms. Ridling, immobilized on her bed, to die from asphyxiation. This evidence invalidates any argument the jury's finding that Mr. Cooks posed a continuing threat to society was dependent on evidence he had committed a prior violent crime. Because the continuing threat aggravator did not subsume the prior conviction aggravator in this case, we find no constitutional error that warrants habeas relief.