Opinion ID: 534088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medina's Appeal

Text: 19 (1) Standard of Review.--We review the district court's refusal to sever Medina's case from that of Delgado for abuse of discretion. United States v. Burgess, 791 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir.1986). We use the same standard to review the district court's admission of evidence of prior misconduct. See United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir.1982). 20 (2) The Motion to Sever.--An appellant bears a heavy burden when he seeks to overturn a district court's denial of a motion to sever. Joint trials are favored, United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir.1980), and the mere existence of antagonistic defenses will not by itself mandate a severance, where the defenses are not mutually exclusive. United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 546 (9th Cir.1983). Not only must the defendant show some prejudice, he must show what has been called significant prejudice, United States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir.1989), or manifest prejudice, United States v. Abushi, 682 F.2d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir.1982). It has also been held that the party who seeks severance must show a violation of one of his substantive rights. United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, 101 S.Ct. 154, 66 L.Ed.2d 71 (1980). As the court said in Sherlock, 865 F.2d at 1078, [t]he prime consideration in assessing the prejudicial effect of a joint trial is whether the court may reasonably expect the jury to collate and appraise the independent evidence against each defendant in view of its volume and the court's limiting instructions. 21 Medina has failed to meet these standards. The most he can say is that Delgado's testimony implicated him in the crime. But Delgado was on the witness stand and was subject to cross-examination. Moreover, there was a great deal of other evidence to implicate Medina. Also, while Delgado and Medina had different postures by the time they came to trial, their defenses were not even directly antagonistic. Delgado claimed entrapment, and Medina claimed that he knew nothing about the deal. Whether the jury believed Delgado's entrapment story, or not, it could have believed that Medina was not involved. The fact that the other testimony in the case made Medina's position precarious did not mean that he was entitled to severance. Finally, the jury was not able to agree on a co-defendant and even brought in verdicts against the two appellants at different times. Quite obviously, the jurors were considering each defendant separately. 22 The trial judge did not abuse his discretion. 23 (3) Prior Offense Testimony.--Over Medina's objection, Delgado testified to a prior marijuana transaction in which he and Medina engaged. The district court found that the testimony was admissible. Medina had objected on grounds that the testimony was irrelevant. He now asserts that it was not properly admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. 24 First, there is some doubt that counsel's relevance objection preserved this ground for appeal. The trial judge is generally entitled to have counsel be considerably more specific than that. See 1 Weinstein's Evidence, para. 103, p. 103-23 (1988). See, also, Fed.R.Evid. 103. Perhaps it can be said that the context made the grounds of the objection apparent. As we will show, that is an issue we need not resolve at this time. 25 Second, even assuming that the objection was sufficient to alert the district judge and preserve that ground for appeal, it was not well taken. The evidence was clearly relevant to show knowledge and intent. Medina claimed that despite his presence at the scene, and despite the fact that he was riding about in a vehicle which fairly bristled with packages of cocaine, he had no knowledge that a drug transaction was in progress, and had no intention to participate in it. The fact that he and Delgado had engaged in a prior drug transaction was clearly probative on those points. It also tended to impeach Medina's attempt to present himself as a virtual ingenue, an uninvolved bystander to Delgado's narcotics dealings. 2 The prior sale was not too remote from the transaction in question, and was clearly established by Delgado's testimony. See United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d at 1110. Even though Delgado was a co-conspirator, the standards for admission were met. See United States v. Evans, 697 F.2d 240, 249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086, 103 S.Ct. 1779, 76 L.Ed.2d 350 (1983). 26 Finally, the probative value of the evidence far outweighed any untoward prejudice that Medina may have suffered. The evidence went directly to the core of Medina's assertion that he was uninvolved. Of course, the other evidence also showed that assertion to be a pretense.