Opinion ID: 1651926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Lower court's review

Text: ¶ 35. The lower court erred when it expanded its scope of review to include issues concerning the planning stage instead of focusing only on the permitting process from which the appeal had been brought. ¶ 36. The matter before the lower court arose out of the CCALL's appeal of the Permit Board's decision. The site the Permit Board was considering had long since been determined by the Commission. The Permit Board's function was to determine if that one site was suitable according to the criteria contained in the regulations. The Permit found the site submitted by the Authority to be suitable for a solid waste landfill. ¶ 37. On appeal, the chancellor should have only considered whether the Permit Board abused its discretion in issuing a permit to operate the Tibbee site. Instead, the court's focus was on whether the December 21, 1992 hearing, which occurred during the planning process, violated CCALL's due process rights. Indeed, the opening paragraph of the Final Judgment provides that: this cause is before the Court on appeal of Appellant's claim of denial of due process by the Golden Triangle Solid Waste Management Authority during the public hearings held before the Authority on December 21, 1992, which pertained to the site selected for the Golden Triangle Regional Landfill. This statement by the chancellor below indicates that his focus was outside the bounds of the Permit Board's decision. This was supposed to be an appeal of the decision of the Permit Board to issue permits to the Authority to operate the landfill. ¶ 38. In its decision to overturn the Permit Board's decision, the lower court relied on Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality v. Parker, 643 So.2d 923 (Miss.1994), in support of the holding that an evidentiary hearing was required before the Authority during the planning process. In that case, this Court stated that the nature of the hearing requested by an objecting party under § 49-17-41 should be that of a full and complete evidentiary hearing. Parker, 643 So.2d at 929. However, Parker is distinguishable from the case sub judice. The statute discussed in Parker is for appeals from decisions of the Commission, whereas the present case involved a decision by the Permit Board. Id. ¶ 39. The Chancery Court below was bound by the administrative record for its review of the Permit Board's final decision, but it erroneously considered evidence outside of the record, alleged by CCALL, which concerned the course of events which took place during the planning process at the Authority and Commission levels. Those events were not before the Permit Board when it made its final decision, from which the appeal to the lower court was derived. ¶ 40. The precedent previously set by this Court mandates that the appellate court may not go beyond the administrative record when reviewing agency decisions. As a result, the chancellor erred when he expanded his scope of review to consider actions taken during the planning process.
¶ 41. The Appellants next argue that the Authority never violated any due process right(s) of CCALL in either the planning or permitting process. CCALL claims that its due process rights were violated because it was not allowed to participate in the Authority's decision as to the location of the landfill site. ¶ 42. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that the government will not take life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. ¶ 43. However, this Court has held that due process does not guarantee citizen[s] the right to reasonable advance notice and the opportunity to be heard before legislative decisions to undertake public improvements are made. In re Validation of $7,800,000 Combined Utility Sys. Revenue Bond, Gautier Utility Dist., 465 So.2d 1003, 1008 (Miss.1985) (hereinafter  Gautier ). ¶ 44. In Gautier, the utility district, a separate political subdivision, decided that it was necessary and in the best interest of the District to construct and operate a combined utility system. Gautier, 465 So.2d at 1009. It was not until the bond validation proceeding that the objectors argued that they had a right to be heard on the question of whether the district needed the utility system. Id. at 1018. However, we held that the decision to issue bonds to finance, construct and operate the utility system was a legislative function of the district, specifically stating that: Where the improvements to be constructed and maintained and the method of financing same are enacted by a political subdivision of the state which has been granted full legislative powers in the premises, the owners of property in that political subdivision have no due process right to be heard on the question of the desirability or feasibility of the project or the terms and provisions for its financing, unless, of course, the political subdivision at issue acts ultra vires. Gautier, 465 So.2d at 1020. ¶ 45. This Court explained that the objectors' only course of redress was through the political process and not through the judicial process. Id. at 1019 (citing In re Savannah Special Consol. Sch. Dist, 208 Miss. 460, 471-72, 44 So.2d 545, 548 (1950)). ¶ 46. To give the public a constitutional right to be heard on every policy decision of the Authority would prevent the Authority from performing the function for which it was created. Indeed, in Minnesota State Board For Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285, 104 S.Ct. 1058, 79 L.Ed.2d 299 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court found that: Government makes so many policy decisions affecting so many people that it would likely grind to a halt were policymaking constrained by constitutional requirements on whose voices must be heard. Knight, 465 U.S. at 285, 104 S.Ct. 1058. ¶ 47. Applying these principles to the case at hand, we hold that CCALL had no due process right to be involved in the policy decision made by the Authority on the location of the landfill. Like the utility district in Gautier, the Authority was created as a public body corporate and politic constituting a political subdivision of the state. Miss.Code Ann. § 17-17-307 (1995). ¶ 48. The Authority has the express power to construct and operate a landfill facility anywhere within its boundaries. Miss.Code Ann. § 17-17-317(d) (1995). Likewise, the Authority's choice of locations for its landfill was an exclusive legislative function of the Authority. Therefore, just as the objectors in Gautier had no due process right to be heard on the policy decision of the district to construct its utility system, neither did CCALL have any due process right to be heard on the decision of the Authority to locate its landfill facility. CCALL was afforded an opportunity to challenge the location of the landfill during the planning process, but it chose to waive that opportunity through its inaction. See Miss.Code Ann. 49-17-29(4) (1990). The record reflects that at all stages in the planning process, the Authority made a sincere effort to listen to CCALL's objections. ¶ 49. However, the Authority manages the solid waste for approximately 175,000 people. To give each one of these 175,000 people a direct voice in the location of a regional landfill would greatly hinder the Authority from managing the solid waste of the region. That is why the Authority is established as a separate political subdivision with its own governing board, with the power to locate its landfill anywhere within its boundaries. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 17-17-307, 17-17-309, 17-17-313, 17-17-317 (1995). The location of the landfill was clearly a policy decision of the Authority for which CCALL had no due process right to question at the time the decision was made by the Authority. Therefore, CCALL's due process rights were not violated and the lower court was in error when it found otherwise.
¶ 50. In its final point of error, the Appellees assert that all of CCALL's due process rights to object to the location of the landfill in this regard were met or exceeded, and thus CCALL has no claim of a denial of any due process rights. ¶ 51. The permitting process began after the Commission approved the Plan. Before the Authority could build or operate on the chosen site, there had to be a permit issued by the State of Mississippi via the Permit Board. Miss.Code Ann. § 49-17-29(3)(c) (Supp.1998). The Permit Board is the exclusive administrative body to make decisions about the issuance of a permit to construct and operate a non-hazardous solid waste facility. Miss.Code Ann. § 49-17-29(3)(a) (Supp.1998). ¶ 52. However, the permitting process does not require the submission of several sites, from which the Permit Board may choose the best site for the landfill. Rather, the applicant submits one site to the Permit Board. The Permit Board must either approve or disapprove the Authority's site. The Permit Board may not choose another site for the Authority. If the Permit Board rejects the Authority's proposed site, then the Authority must select another site, not the Permit Board. The Permit Board only has jurisdiction to consider the single site submitted in the Authority's permit application, and not numerous sites which might have been available to the Authority. See State Oil & Gas Bd. v. Crane, 271 So.2d 84, 86-87 (Miss.1972) (holding it is not necessary to show proposed location preferable to other locations). ¶ 53. Upon approval of the Plan by the Commission, the Authority shall make application to the Permit Board to approve and issue a permit. Miss.Code Ann. § 49-17-29(3)(c) (Supp.1998). ¶ 54. On January 28, 1994, the Authority filed its applications for permits with the Permit Board. Next, the Permit Board was to hold a public hearing to obtain public comment on the proposed landfill. Miss. Code Ann. § 49-17-29(4)(a) (Supp.1998). The Permit Board did, in fact, hold such a public hearing in the instant case on October 27, 1994. At this public hearing, CCALL members attended and made extensive comments in objection to the landfill. Id. Also, many citizens, businesses, industrial groups, Chambers of Commerce and public officials participated in this hearing. Id. Following the public hearing, the Permit Board approved the permits for the operation of the landfill on November 22, 1994. ¶ 55. Following such a ruling, pursuant to statute, any interested party aggrieved by the action of the Permit Board could request a formal hearing within thirty (30) days of the Permit Board's action. Miss.Code Ann. § 49-17-29(4)(b) (Supp.1998). In December of 1994, CCALL requested a full formal hearing pursuant to this statute. On March 14, 1995, the Permit Board conducted a full evidentiary hearing in compliance with the statutory guidelines. Following the hearing, the Permit Board is to enter in its minutes a final decision regarding the permit. Miss. Code Ann. § 49-17-29(4)(b) (Supp.1998). The Permit Board, in the instant case, affirmed its prior decision to issue the permits. Finally, any person aggrieved by the action of the Permit Board may appeal such decision to the chancery court. Miss.Code Ann. § 49-17-29(5)(b) (Supp.1998). ¶ 56. CCALL chose to appeal the decision of the Permit Board to the Chancery Court of Oktibbeha County pursuant to that statute. Therefore, CCALL's appeal to the Chancery Court below was an appeal of the Permit Board's decision to affirm the granting of the permits. ¶ 57. In the instant case, CCALL never established that it suffered any injury or compensable damage. CCALL simply does not like the location of the landfill, but it cannot point to any evidence establishing that the landfill site failed to meet any one of the twenty-three (23) siting criteria that must be met before a permit can be issued. Moreover, CCALL was afforded a full evidentiary hearing before the Permit Board to challenge the chosen landfill site, and it failed to meet the challenge. ¶ 58. CCALL had an opportunity to be heard concerning the location and creation of this landfill. Thus, the chancellor below erred in his finding that CCALL was not allowed adequate input in the location and creation of this landfill.