Opinion ID: 862600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 759 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1963).

Text: ¶30. This Court, however, has addressed before the issue of constructive discharge in an unemployment compensation context. Hoerner Boxes, Inc. v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 693 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Miss. 1997). The Hoerner Boxes Court stated that constructive discharge results when the employer has made conditions so intolerable that the employee feels compelled to resign. Hoerner Boxes, 693 So. 2d at 1347 (citing Bulloch v. City of Pascagoula, 574 So. 2d 637, 640 (Miss. 1990) (citing Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 481 (5th Cir. 1983))). In Hoerner Boxes, the employee claimed that she voluntarily left her employment with good cause as a result of the hostile environment created by a continued practice of sexual harassment by other employees, and the Appeals Referee and Board of Review concluded that the workplace environment was hostile as a result of sexual harassment and awarded the employee unemployment benefits as having shown good cause for voluntarily leaving her employment. Id. The employer, however, on appeal argued that the employee's departure was not tantamount to a constructive discharge because the employee participated in the sexual harassment and welcomed the creation of the hostile environment. Id. This Court, however, affirmed the Board's decision awarding unemployment benefits to the employee and held that sexual harassment in the workplace constituted good cause for voluntarily leaving employment. Id. at 1348. ¶31. However, I adhere to the position that the facts in the case sub judice do not reach the level of a constructive discharge as defined by this Court in Hoerner Boxes. There is no evidence in the record that Huckabee's employer made her working environment conditions so intolerable that she felt compelled to resign. See id. at 1347. Moreover, regardless of the Majority's contention that Huckabee regrets citing Hoerner Boxes, she did in fact cite the case as authority for her position. Her regret is of no consequence. ¶32. The Majority curiously remarks that the Appeals Referee found, she left work believing her employment had been terminated. Maj. Op. at 12. To clarify, the Appeals Referee found that Huckabee had unreasonably interpreted a remark by her employer to mean she was discharged, and the Referee specifically found that Huckabee had voluntarily quit her employment. ¶33. Furthermore, I remain steadfast that the case sub judice is analogous to Mississippi Employment Security Commission v. Fortenberry, 193 So.2d 142 (Miss. 1966). In Fortenberry, a supervisor reprimanded one of the sewing machine operators in which the supervisor shook her finger at the operator and said: That machine will sew. Fortenberry, 193 So. 2d at 143. During the lunch hour, Fortenberry shook her finger at the same operator and told her, Get to your machine and go to work. Id. The supervisor then approached Fortenberry and stated that it was not nice to mock her during the lunch hour. Id. Fortenberry responded that she did not think it was nice for the supervisor to talk to the operator the way she did. Id. Fortenberry called the supervisor again and stated the same, and the supervisor told Fortenberry that the matter was of no concern to her and that her job was to sew. Id. Fortenberry responded that she was ready to get in it. Fortenberry, 193 So. 2d at 143. The supervisor then reported the incident to the forelady who arranged a meeting with the plant manager and Fortenberry. Id. Fortenberry denied that she was mocking the supervisor but was advised that she would be required to apologize to the supervisor, and she refused to do so. Id. The plant manager told the supervisor and Fortenberry to go home, cool off, and come back the next morning. Id. Fortenberry stated that she would not come back the next morning to be fired and that if she was to be fired then it would have to be then whereupon she demanded her pay and left. Id. Fortenberry came back late the next day but did not go back to work because she was required to apologize to the supervisor. Fortenberry, 193 So. 2d at 143. ¶34. Fortenberry filed for unemployment benefits, and the Referee rejected the claim because Fortenberry was discharged because of misconduct during work hours. Id. Fortenberry appealed the Referee's decision, and the Board of Review decided that Fortenberry was not entitled to receive benefits under the provisions of the Mississippi Employment Security Law for the reason that the claimant 'did voluntarily leave her employment for she demanded her check before it was due and failed to return to work . . . .' Id. This Court held that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's decision that Fortenberry left her employment and voluntarily demanded and received her compensation before it was due, and did not return to her employment for reasons of her own. Id. at 144. ¶35. Analogously, in the case sub judice, Huckabee was told by Saucier that she was hiring someone else in the event Huckabee informed her that she would be leaving. After the conversation, Huckabee did not report to work the next day, but instead, Huckabee called Lyman's and requested her paycheck at which time she was instructed by Saucier that she would have to turn in her uniforms before she could receive her paycheck. Furthermore, at the hearing before the Appeals Referee, Hyde stated Saucier did not have the authority to relieve anyone of their duties, that Huckabee was not under the threat of discharge for any reason, and that work was still available for her at the time of separation. Thus, in my view, the instant case is analogous to Fortenberry in that Huckabee voluntarily demanded and received her compensation before it was due, and did not return to her employment for reasons of her own. See Fortenberry, 193 So. 2d at 144. ¶36. Since this Court is bound by the Board's findings of fact unless there is no substantial evidence to support the findings of fact or fraud exists, I would accordingly affirm because substantial evidence exists to support the Board's determination that Huckabee voluntarily left her employment without good cause and was, therefore, not entitled to unemployment benefits. ¶37. I respectfully dissent. MILLS AND WALLER, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.