Opinion ID: 2515839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kennedy's immunity agreement.

Text: John Kennedy testified for the prosecution pursuant to an immunity agreement. Defendant claims the agreement was improperly coercive, in that it obliged Kennedy, as a condition of immunity, to testify in strict accordance with certain prior statements he gave the police. Admission of this coerced testimony, defendant avers, violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process; his Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial, fair cross-examination, and a jury trial; and his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to reliability in the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial. (See, e.g., People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1179, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1251, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115.) At the outset, defendant has forfeited the claim by failing to raise it below. In both trials, defendant urged that Kennedy's testimony was the tainted fruit of illegal police conduct against defendant (see text discussion, ante ), but defendant never asserted, until now, that the immunity agreement was coercive as to Kennedy for the reasons advanced in this appeal. ( People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 612, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472.) [28] Moreover, defendant's argument on appeal is clearly meritless. Defendant has materially mischaracterized the agreement at issue. The written immunity agreement, entered before the original trial, said Kennedy had been told that he would not be prosecuted for any act or fact concerning which [he] was required to testify in this case, but that this immunity does not extend to any false testimony that may be given under oath by [him] in this case, which testimony would make [him] subject to prosecution for perjury. Further, the agreement stated,  the witness has represented that [his] testimony . . . will be in substance as follows: Consistent with the tape recorded statements given to Fullerton Police Department, Detective Lewis, on December 17, 1982, . . . and December 20, 1982, . . . [t]ranscriptions of which are attached hereto and incorporated by reference. At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate explained to Kennedy that, under the agreement, the District Attorney can prosecute if they find that you have lied, prosecute you for perjury. During cross-examination of Kennedy at the retrial, defense counsel asked Kennedy whether it was explained to him, in court proceedings concerning the immunity agreement, that if your testimony was inconsistent with what you had been telling the District Attorney . . . that all bets were off and you could be prosecuted for this case again. Kennedy replied, Yes. On redirect, however, the prosecutor asked Kennedy whether you [were] ever told anything by a member of the District Attorney's office other than to testify truthfully, and whether you [were] ever told what to testify to or how to testify. Kennedy answered both questions [n]o. A prosecutor may grant immunity from prosecution to a witness on condition that he or she testify truthfully to the facts involved. ( People v. Green (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 831, 838-839, 228 P.2d 867.) But if the immunity agreement places the witness under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion, the testimony is tainted by the witness's self-interest, and thus inadmissible. ( People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 438, 455, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133.) Such a strong compulsion may be created by a condition `that the witness not materially or substantially change her testimony from her tape-recorded statement already given to . . . law enforcement officers.' ( People v. Medina, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 450, 116 Cal.Rptr. 133.) On the other hand, we have upheld the admission of testimony subject to grants of immunity which simply suggested the prosecution believed the prior statement to be the truth, and where the witness understood that his or her sole obligation was to testify fully and fairly. Thus, in People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680 ( Fields ), defense counsel elicited from a prosecution witness that her immunity was conditioned on testimony consistent with her prior statement. On redirect, however, the witness made clear that her prior statement was the truth, that the prosecutor had asked her to testify to the truth, and that she was never asked to testify to a certain story. ( Id. at pp. 359-360, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680.) As we explained, the record suggested, at most, that the witness understood she was obliged to recount her prior statement because it was the truth. We found the evidence insufficient to conclude that the grant of immunity required the witness to testify in accord with a prior statement regardless of its truth. ( Id. at pp. 360-361, 197 Cal.Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680.) Similarly, in People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419 ( Garrison ), witness Roelle's plea agreement, as disclosed at his preliminary hearing, provided that Roelle would testify truthfully at Garrison's trial, and that `a further part of this . . . agreement is that . . . [Roelle] has already truthfully stated to the investigating detectives what happened in this case.' ( Id. at p. 768, 254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419, italics omitted.) Roelle's counsel advised the court that Roelle had passed a polygraph examination, and the prosecutor examined Roelle on voir dire to confirm the latter's understanding that, as part of his bargain, `he [was] going to come in and tell the truth about what happened.' ( Ibid. ) On this record, we declined to accept the premise that Roelle's bargain was conditioned on the truthfulness of his prior statements. Rather, we noted that as in Fields, the record does not demonstrate either that the plea bargain required Roelle to testify in accord with his statement regardless of its truth, or that Roelle so understood the agreement. Instead, we observed, the record reflects that the district attorney and Roelle's counsel sought to ensure that the record reflected the factual basis for their belief that permitting Roelle to plead guilty to the lesser charges would be appropriate in light of their understanding of his actual involvement in the offenses. ( Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d 746, 770, 254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419.) We held that unless the bargain is expressly contingent on the witness sticking to a particular version, the principles of [ People v.] Medina, supra, 41 Cal. App.3d 438[, 116 Cal.Rptr. 133], and [ People v.] Green, supra, 102 Cal.App.2d 831[, 228 P.2d 867], are not violated. ( Garrison, supra, at p. 771, 254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419, italics added.) That reasoning governs here. The grant of immunity to Kennedy, by its terms, was based on his truthful testimony, which Kennedy himself represented would be in accordance with his prior statements. Thus, the agreement simply reflected the parties' mutual understanding that the prior statements were the truth, not that Kennedy must testify consistently with those statements regardless of their truth. Kennedy so confirmed on the stand. [29] Accordingly, Kennedy's testimony was not rendered inadmissible by the terms of his grant of immunity.