Opinion ID: 199486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brown's Counterclaim For Breach of Contract

Text: 19 Interstate challenges the jury's verdict on Brown's counterclaims for breach of contract to purchase the two presses. There could be no contract between Interstate and Brown d/b/a Integra as a matter of law, Interstate argues, 7 because: 20 1. The essential terms were missing from the purported contract -- the August 25, 1995 proposal. 21 2. The proposal did not satisfy the statute of frauds. 22 3. The proposal was invalid because Brown was incapable of delivering the two presses. 23 Interstate also seeks the return of its $75,000 deposit, arguing that there was an express oral agreement with Brown that the deposit was refundable. In addition, Interstate argues that Freidel's should return the $50,000 portion of the deposit it retained under the law of equity and unjust enrichment. The trial court erred, Interstate says, in not granting it judgment as a matter of law at the close of evidence and after the jury's verdict. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). 8 24 This court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law using the same standard applied by the trial court. Andrade v. Jamestown Hous. Auth., 82 F.3d 1179, 1186 (1st Cir. 1996). Such motion may be granted only if the evidence, viewed from the perspective most favorable to the non-movant, is so one-sided that the movant is plainly entitled to judgment, for reasonable minds could not differ as to the outcome. FHS Props. Ltd. v. BC Assocs., 175 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1994)). 25
26 The evidence was such that whether the August 25, 1995 proposal contained the essential terms of a contract was an issue of fact for the jury. The writing between the parties identified in detail the two presses being purchased, identified a total price for purchasing and reworking the presses ($2.6 million, with $900,000 of this amount allocated to acquiring the two presses), and set forth a detailed delivery and payment schedule. 27 Interstate argues, inter alia, that the proposal neither states that it is a final agreement for purchase of the two presses by Interstate from Integra nor provides in specific terms the completion date for refurbishment of the presses. However, [i]t is not required that all terms of the agreement be precisely specified, and the presence of undefined or unspecified terms will not necessarily preclude the formation of a binding contract. Situation Mgmt. Sys. v. Malouf, Inc., 724 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Mass. 2000). Here, the terms of the proposal -- which include nine pages of nitty-gritty detail on matters such as rollers and hangers, plate and blanket cylinders, and ink fountains -- were sufficient for the jury to find that Interstate had agreed to purchase the two presses. That Interstate wired $75,000 ($50,000 to Freidel's and $25,000 to Brown) to hold the presses on August 29, just a few days after signing the proposal, further supports the existence of a firm agreement between the parties. We cannot conclude as a matter of law that this contract lacked essential terms.
28 Interstate argues that the proposal does not satisfy the Massachusetts Statute of Frauds, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 106, §§ 2-201(1), because the August 25, 1995 proposal, though a writing, describes only the remanufacturing portion of the deal, and not the terms of the actual purchase of the two presses by Integra, for subsequent sale to Interstate. There was, however, no reason the proposal had to describe the details of Brown's own purchase of the eight color press from Freidel's or the four color press from Malaysia. Indeed, the important questions for a buyer like Interstate would, presumably, have centered on whether the refurbished presses met its needs and specifications, and not on the background details of how the broker (Brown) obtained those presses from third parties. As Brown himself testified, his initial acquisition of the presses was accomplished through transactions separate and distinct from the sale of the refurbished presses to Interstate. Thus the issue, properly presented to the jury, was whether the August 25, 1995 proposal constituted an agreement by Interstate to purchase the two presses from Brown. The jury found that it did, and so the proposal was a writing in satisfaction of the Statute of Frauds. 29
30 Interstate also challenges the validity of the contract on the ground that Brown was incapable of delivering the two presses when Interstate signed the August 25, 1995 proposal. See Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 194 (1st Cir. 1996) (plaintiff must be ready, willing, and able to perform to sustain breach of contract claim); Singarella v. City of Boston, 173 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Mass. 1961). Again, this issue was for the jury. 31 Interstate argues that there was no evidence of any agreement to purchase the four color press from Malaysia, that Integra had not yet entered into an agreement to purchase the eight color press from Freidel's, and that Integra had not entered into any agreement with E.R. Smith for refurbishing the two presses. In fact, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that a deal was in the works and that Brown could have delivered the two refurbished presses to Interstate. Brown testified to his extensive efforts to locate and hold the presses, one of which had already been secured from Freidel's (hence the need for the $50,000 deposit). Dulla testified about his efforts to obtain a second press in Malaysia, which was corroborated by his correspondence with the owner of the Malaysian press about price, shipping arrangements, and the like. Brown also testified that he had a verbal agreement with E.R. Smith to refurbish the two presses to Interstate's specifications, based on discussions and meetings with representatives of E.R. Smith and Interstate. Brown did not need fully executed written contracts with each of the parties he was dealing with on the Interstate project. Indeed, there was evidence that it was customary not to have such contracts in these types of deals. Whether Brown could have performed under the contract was for the jury to decide.
30 Interstate also challenges the validity of the contract on the ground that Brown was incapable of delivering the two presses when Interstate signed the August 25, 1995 proposal. See Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 194 (1st Cir. 1996) (plaintiff must be ready, willing, and able to perform to sustain breach of contract claim); Singarella v. City of Boston, 173 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Mass. 1961). Again, this issue was for the jury. 31 Interstate argues that there was no evidence of any agreement to purchase the four color press from Malaysia, that Integra had not yet entered into an agreement to purchase the eight color press from Freidel's, and that Integra had not entered into any agreement with E.R. Smith for refurbishing the two presses. In fact, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that a deal was in the works and that Brown could have delivered the two refurbished presses to Interstate. Brown testified to his extensive efforts to locate and hold the presses, one of which had already been secured from Freidel's (hence the need for the $50,000 deposit). Dulla testified about his efforts to obtain a second press in Malaysia, which was corroborated by his correspondence with the owner of the Malaysian press about price, shipping arrangements, and the like. Brown also testified that he had a verbal agreement with E.R. Smith to refurbish the two presses to Interstate's specifications, based on discussions and meetings with representatives of E.R. Smith and Interstate. Brown did not need fully executed written contracts with each of the parties he was dealing with on the Interstate project. Indeed, there was evidence that it was customary not to have such contracts in these types of deals. Whether Brown could have performed under the contract was for the jury to decide.
32 Interstate seeks the return of its $75,000 deposit, arguing that there was an express oral agreement with Brown that the deposit was refundable. 9 The jury rejected this claim. Brown testified that he told Interstate's Becker, before Becker paid the deposit, that the deposit was not refundable. Brown's testimony was supported by the testimony of Daniel Freidel, Freidel's president, and John Dulla that Freidel's needed a deposit from Brown to hold the eight color press. That Freidel's took the press off the market in exchange for the deposit, a fact not disputed at trial, further supported the jury's determination. There is no reason to disturb the jury's finding on this claim.