Opinion ID: 726069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exhaustion under IDEA

Text: 52 As we have just pointed out, the Hunters have, with respect to their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, exhausted IDEA's administrative remedies. But the Hunters have also advanced two other groups of claims which call for a somewhat more extended exhaustion analysis. These are: (1) their effort to enforce the decision of the state administrative process, and (2) what appears to be an effort to raise claims that they did not raise in the state administrative process. 53 1. Efforts to enforce the decision of the state proceeding. The defendants argue that the Hunters' effort to enforce the decision of the state administrative proceeding is subject to a specialized exhaustion requirement. They assert that claims of this type must be exhausted through a Complaint Management System established by Pennsylvania's Bureau of Special Education, an administrative procedure distinct from the due process hearing procedure discussed above. 54 The defendants have furnished the court with a general description of this Complaint Management System, but with no documentation as to its specific elements or legal basis. The defendants' description suffices, however, to persuade us that the system to which they refer is the system established by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to implement a set of federal regulations that require that state educational agencies establish procedures for receiving and resolving complaints relating to IDEA implementation. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-300.662. These regulations establish minimum procedures that state agencies must follow in resolving complaints, requiring, for instance, that agencies carry out an investigation and issue a written decision containing findings of fact, conclusions, and, if necessary, corrective actions to achieve compliance. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.661. Complainants are also provided the right to appeal adverse decisions to the Secretary of the United States Department of Education. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.661. 18 55 The Ninth Circuit, in Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.1992), suggested in dicta that a plaintiff could, as to certain types of claims, be required to exhaust the Education Department General Administrative Regulations (or EDGAR) procedures, a regulatory forerunner of the present sections 300.660-300.662. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1307-08. 19 The Hoeft court noted that this process might serve as an alternative exhaustion mechanism to IDEA's own administrative procedures in certain cases, concluding that [w]hether to require or to accept exhaustion of the EDGAR procedure as a substitute for exhausting IDEA procedures in challenges to facially invalid policies, however, is a determination which must be made on a case-by-case basis. 967 F.2d at 1308. Hoeft did not, however, cite any legal authority, either in the EDGAR regulations or in the text of IDEA, under which a court might require exhaustion of EDGAR procedures. Nor can we discern any such authority, either as to the previous EDGAR procedures or as to the present §§ 300.660-300.662. Indeed, the text of §§ 300.660-300.662, and the various statements made in the Federal Register as they took their present shape, both evince an expectation that invocation of the complaint procedures they establish will be elective, not mandatory. 20 56 2. Claims not raised in the state proceeding. As to events that occurred after the conclusion of the state administrative proceeding, the Hunters have, of course, had no opportunity to exhaust their administrative remedies. For this reason, the district court dismissed all of the Hunters' claims based on such events. 21 The district court also stated that it was not persuaded by plaintiffs' conclusionary averment that their pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture. The Hunters appeal this ruling. 57 The district court did not provide a detailed listing of which elements of the Hunters' complaint it was dismissing on this ground. However, an examination of the complaint reveals that the only event which it describes that occurred after the termination of the administrative proceeding was Eugene and Jeremy Hunter's temporary move to Ohio in order to enroll Jeremy in a public school for the disabled. This claim raises a number of important policy questions, such as when it is appropriate for a state to pay the costs of moving one of its citizens to another state in order to receive public benefits there. We therefore agree with the district court that this claim should be exhausted. 22 58 Finally, it appears that one element of the Hunters' complaint, the Hunters' request that MLSD not be involved in evaluations or programming for Jeremy, was not raised in the state proceeding. The state appellate panel specifically rejected a request by the Hunters that MLSD not perform evaluation and programming, on the ground that this issue had not been raised before the hearing officer. App. at 99. Assuming that the appellate panel's finding was correct, we find that it would be appropriate for this claim to be exhausted before it is examined in the district court. 59 We reach this conclusion with some reluctance, as it could entail further delay in an already much-delayed case. However, the issue of MLSD's involvement in evaluation and programming for Jeremy seems to be central to the Hunters' complaint. Accordingly, the administrative process should be allowed an opportunity to address that central issue. A principal purpose of IDEA's administrative procedure is to permit state and local education agencies[,] in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child, to take primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982); thus, we find that it is appropriate to permit the Commonwealth to address this issue before it is considered in the district court. 23 We also note that the IDEA hearing and appeal process currently includes strict time limits, and that the entire exhaustion process should take no longer than a few months if these limits are observed. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.512 (1995). 24