Opinion ID: 2103224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impeachment of Sharron Webb

Text: Appellant also argues that the trial court erred (1) in permitting the government to impeach its witness, Sharron Webb, without first establishing surprise or affirmative damage to its case, and (2) in permitting the examination to exceed the scope of proper impeachment. He also contends that the court erred in failing to provide contemporaneously a limiting instruction. We conclude that a proper foundation was laid for the impeachment of Ms. Webb. The prosecutor asked Ms. Webb what appellant had said about the murder that summer, anticipating that she would recount an inculpatory admission made to Webb by appellant. Instead, Ms. Webb testified to an exculpatory statement, i.e., that appellant said that he was not going to jail for something he did not do. The prosecutor repeated the question, and Ms. Webb gave essentially the same response. At the bench conference which followed, the prosecutor expressed surprise and represented to the court that the testimony was contrary to what the witness told her, in the presence of police officers, several times shortly before trial. The trial court found the foundation for the impeachment adequate, and we agree. The statute governing a party's right to impeach its own witness, D.C.Code § 14-102 (1989), vests broad discretion in the trial court, and its finding of surprise will not be overturned unless it is without a rational basis. Stewart, supra, 490 A.2d at 624. We cannot say on this record that the trial court's finding of surprise lacks a rational basis. In taking the contrary position, appellant argues only that Ms. Webb was recalcitrant about testifying, and therefore, the government should not have been surprised by the change in her account of events at trial. A claim of surprise is not defeated simply because a witness is reluctant to testify. See Price v. United States, 545 A.2d 1219, 1224 (D.C.1988). Since Ms. Webb had repeatedly told the prosecutor in the presence of others that appellant admitted shooting the decedent, the trial court's finding of surprise has a rational basis. Indeed, Ms. Webb's anticipated inculpatory statement was consistent with the statements of other witnesses. The prosecutor had no reason to expect that Ms. Webb would not only change her account at trial, but that she would also attribute an exculpatory statement to appellant. Appellant also contends that the government failed to show the requisite affirmative damage to its case to allow the impeachment. The rule is that to justify impeachment of a party's own witness, that party must demonstrate not only surprise, but affirmative damage to his case as well. Scott, supra, 412 A.2d at 367-68. We conclude that this foundational requirement of affirmative damage to the government's case was demonstrated. Ms. Webb testified that appellant had said with respect to the murder of Williams that he was not going to jail for something that he did not do. She repeated this testimony twice. Thus, she provided exculpatory evidence. This evidence also detracted from testimony of other government witnesses who were present and heard appellant say he shot the victim. Such testimony from a witness called by the government was particularly harmful. Accordingly, Ms. Webb's unanticipated testimony provided a sufficient basis for the trial court's finding of affirmative damage to the government's case. See Price, supra, 545 A.2d at 1225. Appellant also argues that the government's impeachment of Ms. Webb exceeded the permissible scope of inquiry necessary to negate the harm caused to the government's case and that the testimony of the impeaching witness, Officer Hewick, did not support the claimed inconsistency. We find no abuse of discretion requiring reversal. Following her testimony that appellant said he did not do it, Ms. Webb denied hearing appellant implicitly threaten potential witnesses. The subject of this testimony, to which appellant did not object, was within the scope of the valid impeachment. The scope of impeachment is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we find no abuse of discretion requiring reversal. See Scott, supra, 412 A.2d at 367. Certainly, we find no plain error. Finally, with respect to Webb's testimony, appellant contends that the trial court did not give a timely instruction on the limited use of the impeaching evidence. Although a cautionary instruction is required when a party, surprised by its own witness, impeaches the witness with a prior inconsistent statement, Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084, 1087 n. 5 (D.C.1978) (en banc), the failure to give it does not automatically result in reversal. Lucas v. United States, 436 A.2d 1282, 1284 (D.C.1981). We review the record to ascertain whether the omission created a substantial likelihood of prejudice to appellant. Stewart, supra, 490 A.2d at 625. Having done so, we find no substantial likelihood that appellant suffered prejudice by the timing of the instruction. The court instructed the jury on the use of impeachment evidence several times during the course of the trial, including during the testimony of the immediately preceding witness, following the testimony of the two witnesses who completed the impeachment of Ms. Webb, and again in final instructions to the jury. Even government counsel reminded the jury in closing argument that the impeachment evidence could be used only in assessing the witness' credibility. Therefore, even assuming error in the timing of the instruction, we find it harmless under the circumstances. See Gordon v. United States, 466 A.2d 1226, 1231 (D.C.1983) (such instructional error harmless where it can be said with fair assurance that the verdict was not substantially swayed by the error). [3]