Opinion ID: 1744695
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Consecutive Sentence.

Text: The sentencing judge's decision to impose the twenty-five-year sentence consecutively with the prior life sentences was based on Iowa Code section 901.8 which provides that, [i]f a person is sentenced for two or more separate offenses, the sentencing judge may order the second or further sentence to begin at the expiration of the first or succeeding sentence. Sumpter contends that, because his murder of Vickers actually occurred before the consecutive life sentences for which he was already doing time, the court had no authority under section 901.8 to sentence him to a consecutive term. He cites no authority for this proposition. The State contends that the consecutive sentence was properly within the court's discretion taking into consideration all of the relevant factors. The plain language of section 901.8 belies Sumpter's contention. The statute requires only that at least two separate offenses occur. If two or more offenses have occurred, it is within the judge's discretion to have the sentence for the second offense run consecutively. We do not read into the statute any sort of temporal prohibition on consecutive sentencing based on the order of crimes or the convictions for them. A trial judge is expected to consider all pertinent matters in determining proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant's age, character and propensities and chances of reform. The courts owe a duty to the public as much as to the defendant in determining a proper sentence. The punishment should fit both the crime and the individual. State v. Williams, 315 N.W.2d 45, 59-60 (Iowa 1982) ( quoting State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979)). The district court enjoys a strong presumption in its favor which will not be overcome absent an affirmative showing of abuse by the defendant. State v. Noonan, 246 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Iowa 1976); State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d 490, 494 (Iowa 1983). We do not find that abuse here. We conclude that the victim impact statements do not require vacation of the sentence, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Sumpter to the consecutive terms. The judge's findings are supported in the record, and the sentence was within statutory parameters. We therefore affirm this portion of the judgment.