Opinion ID: 159979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence of Professional Baseball Leagues' Trademark Use After June 22, 1994

Text: 39 We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1555 (10th Cir. 1994). An abuse of discretion will be found only when the trial court makes an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment. Id.
40 In connection with its claim of common law ownership of the trademarks The Minor Leagues and Minor League Baseball, Professional Baseball Leagues sought to introduce evidence of its prior use of those trademarks. 10 Very Minor Leagues filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of Professional Baseball Leagues' use of those marks after June 22, 1994, the date Very Minor Leagues first adopted and used the Very Minor Leagues mark. The district court granted the motion by Very Minor Leagues, but later permitted Professional Baseball Leagues to introduce evidence of third parties' use of the terms The Minor Leagues and Minor League Baseball after June 22, 1994, to show recognition of the secondary meaning alleged by Professional Baseball Leagues. 41 Professional Baseball Leagues argues that the district court's ruling was one-sided and deprived it of a full opportunity to introduce evidence to counteract Very Minor Leagues' claim that minor league was a generic term. We disagree. We believe the evidence Professional Baseball Leagues presented of its own use of the marks Minor League Baseball and The Minor Leagues prior to June 22, 1994, and the evidence it presented of third parties' use of the marks after June 22, 1994, was sufficient to challenge the assertions by Very Minor Leagues that the term minor league was generic. 42 In any event, under the deferential standard of review that we apply to evidentiary rulings, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion in limine. 43 AFFIRMED.