Opinion ID: 2294182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Initial Disqualification In The First Trial And Denial Of Mr. Freeman's Motion To Reinstate His Retained Counsel Jonathan Stern In The Third Trial.

Text: Mr. Freeman contends that the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying his retained counsel, Jonathan Stern, in the first trial and by refusing to reinstate him at the third trial, because there was no conflict of interest. Mr. Freeman argues that the trial court was required to accept the waivers of any conflict that existed and that changed circumstances warranted the reinstatement of Mr. Stern in the third trial. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its disqualification or denial of the motion to reinstate Mr. Stern because an actual conflict of interest existed. Further, the trial court had discretion to refuse the waivers, and the defense counsel failed to apprise the trial court of changed circumstances warranting reinstatement.
On July 7, 1998, Jonathan Stern, who had been retained by Mr. Freeman, entered his appearance in the case as defense counsel. Three months later, in October 1998, Mr. Stern filed an ex parte pleading. The pleading advised the Honorable Mary Ellen Abrecht, who was assigned the case at the time, that he planned to call Navarro Hammondwhom he had previously represented in an unrelated murder caseto testify as a witness at Mr. Freeman's trial. Mr. Stern advised the trial court that he expected Mr. Hammond would testify that he and another man, who also would appear as a defense witness, had committed the murders with which Mr. Freeman was charged. In his ex parte pleading, Mr. Stern recognized that this strategy presented a conflict of interest and asked the trial court to appoint counsel for Mr. Hammond so that Mr. Stern could determine whether Mr. Hammond would agree to waive any conflict of interest. By an order dated October 23, 1998, Judge Abrecht found that there is a conflict of interest and there can be no effective waiver by the former client [Mr. Hammond]. Judge Abrecht ordered Mr. Stern to withdraw, which he did on November 2, 1998. On December 1, 1998, Richard Gilbert, who had been appointed by the trial court, entered his appearance as defense counsel. On January 25, 1999, Mr. Freeman acting pro se, with Mr. Gilbert serving as his attorney advisor, filed a motion seeking reconsideration of Judge Abrecht's order and requesting that Mr. Stern be reinstated as defense counsel before Judge Keary, who had taken over the case from Judge Abrecht at this point. The motion noted that the defense had obtained a written waiver from Mr. Hammond. The government filed a written opposition to this motion, arguing inter alia, that the conflict was unwaivable. At a hearing on February 12, 1999, the trial court denied Mr. Freeman's motion to reinstate Mr. Stern as defense counsel. Although Judge Keary noted that Judge Abrecht's ruling was the law of the case, Judge Keary explained in detail that she agreed with the substance of the prior order, because the conflict was unresolvable. Judge Keary refused to appoint counsel to advise Mr. Hammond on his Fifth Amendment rights, finding that it was wholly unnecessary to do so in light of the decision not to reinstate Mr. Stern as defense counsel. Before Mr. Freeman's third trial, defense counsel renewed his motion to reinstate Mr. Stern. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the situation has not changed and there is no more merit to the motion[] than the Court found originally to exist. The government's witness, Mr. Thomas, testified at the third trial that Mr. Freeman told him that he planned to have Mr. Hammond and another individual falsely confess to the murders to exonerate him and that Mr. Stern was Mr. Hammond's attorney.
We review the trial court's decision to disqualify Mr. Stern due to a conflict of interest raised at the first trial for an abuse of discretion. Pinkney v. United States, 851 A.2d 479, 486, 490 (D.C.2004). The trial court's determination of whether a conflict of interest exists presents a mixed question of law and fact, so we accept the trial court's factual findings unless they lack evidentiary support, and we review the legal issues de novo. Veney v. United States, 738 A.2d 1185, 1193-95 (D.C.1999). The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused in a criminal case the right to the effective assistance of counsel for his or her defense. Gibson v. United States, 632 A.2d 1155, 1158 (D.C.1993). The first essential element of effective assistance of counsel is counsel's ability and willingness to advocate fearlessly and effectively on behalf of his client. Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 135 (D.C.1985) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The erroneous deprivation of a defendant's right to retain counsel of choice is a structural error, which entitles a defendant to a reversal of his conviction without a requirement of prejudice. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145, 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). A defendant's right to counsel of choice is not absolute; it may be limited, inter alia, by the trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of its calendar. Id. at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (internal citations omitted). [T]he essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. Pinkney, supra, 851 A.2d at 486-87 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). Moreover, the trial court has an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. Id. at 489 (quoting Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692). Whenever a constitutional right to counsel exists, ... there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. Singley v. United States, 548 A.2d 780, 783 (D.C.1988) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981)). Encompassed within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is the right to representation by counsel whose loyalty is undiluted by conflicts of interest. Fitzgerald v. United States, 530 A.2d 1129, 1133 (D.C.1987) (footnote omitted). The danger of an attorney's conflict of interest is that the `attorney may forego efforts he would ordinarily undertake on behalf of one client, in order that the other client may not thereby be harmed.' Derrington v. United States, 681 A.2d 1125, 1133 (quoting Fitzgerald, supra, 530 A.2d at 1133). To protect this right to conflict-free counsel, the trial court has an affirmative `duty to inquire' into the effectiveness of counsel whenever `the possibility of conflict' becomes apparent before or during trial. Douglas, supra, 488 A.2d at 136 (quoting Wood, supra, 450 U.S. at 272, 101 S.Ct. 1097 (emphasis in original)). If such an inquiry reveals that an actual conflict of interest exists, and the defendant objects to continued representation by the conflict-burdened attorney, new counsel must be appointed. Indeed, a failure to appoint new counsel under these circumstances will lead to a reversal of any conviction obtained at trial. Douglas, supra, 488 A.2d at 136 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487-91, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). In this case, Judge Abrecht properly recognized the competing constitutional rights at stakethe right to retain counsel of choice versus the right to conflict-free counsel. Mr. Stern himself recognized that his proposed strategy of calling his former client, Mr. Hammond, to testify that he had committed the murders with which his current client, Mr. Freeman, was charged presented a conflict of interest, for which he believed he needed to obtain a waiver. We have held that a counsel's belief about the existence of a conflict of interest and what course of action is necessary is significant. See Gibson, supra, 632 A.2d at 1158 n. 14 (stating that [i]t is significant whether counsel believed conflict of interest was so real as to oblige him to seek leave to withdraw from the case). The trial court recognized that Mr. Stern's duties to his clients were in direct conflict. In order for Mr. Stern to represent his current client, Mr. Freeman, zealously and diligently within the bounds of the law, Mr. Stern would have to elicit the most detailed and inculpatory confession on the stand from Mr. Hammond, when he was prohibited from exploiting any privileged information or any other information gained during the representation which would prove embarrassing or detrimental to Mr. Hammond or be in a position where his judgment may be affected by his duties to his current client, Mr. Freeman. See D.C. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.3 (duty of zealous and diligent representation); 1.6 (duty not to use or reveal client confidences and secrets without client's informed consent), [5] 1.7(b)(4), (c)(1) (representation prohibited where lawyer's judgment may be affected by duties to other parties without the client's informed consent). [6] While the violation of a rule of professional conduct does not necessarily prove that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated, [t]he rules do provide guidance, however, and can shed light on counsel's perceived constraints because we have recognized that an attorney's subjective belief that a conflict is present, while not conclusive, is strong evidence of an actual conflict. McCrimmon v. United States, 853 A.2d 154, 164 (D.C.2004) (citations omitted); see also id. (citing Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at 172-73, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (holding that reversal for conflict requires showing of effect on counsel's performance)). Moreover, [a]n actual conflict in successive representation may arise where the subject matter of the previous representation is substantially related to the case being tried, the attorney reveals privileged communications of the former client stemming from the previous representation, or the attorney's loyalties are otherwise divided. Pinkney, supra, 851 A.2d at 487 (quoting Veney, supra, 738 A.2d at 1193) (emphasis in original). An actual conflict of interest was present here because Mr. Stern, in representing his current client, Mr. Freeman was in a position to take advantage of his former client, Mr. Hammond's confidences and secrets. His loyalties, therefore, were divided between both Mr. Freeman and Mr. Hammond. Cf. Veney, supra, 738 A.2d at 1193-95 (citations omitted) (no indication attorney was ever in a position to use confidential information obtained from [the former client] in [the current client's] defense when the former client was not called as a witness and the attorney faced no decision over whether he could use previously acquired confidential information to cross-examine him). As Judge Abrecht noted, it would have been impossible for [Mr. Stern] to know and reveal to [Mr. Hammond] in advance all possible questions that Mr. Hammond would encounter on direct examination by him and cross-examination by the government while still zealously representing [Mr.] Freeman. By seeking to provide the best defense to Mr. Freemana sworn confession to the very crime with which he was chargedMr. Stern needed to act in the most detrimental way to his former client by eliciting the most damning confession on the stand possible. The possibility existed that Mr. Stern might improperly rely on confidences, secrets, or other information obtained in his prior representation of Mr. Hammond in a murder case. Mr. Stern also might not have objected to particular lines of inquiry by the government on cross-examination, or he might not have conducted redirect examination in order to advance Mr. Freeman's defense. Although the trial court did not elaborate in her ex parte order, it is clear from the record that the trial judge properly appreciated that the risk was too great that Mr. Stern could have favored one client over the other. Given the present charge of murder, and Mr. Stern's previous representation of Mr. Hammond in an unrelated murder case, Mr. Stern is likely familiar with Mr. Hammond's criminal history (possibility the existence of undiscovered impeachable convictions), modus operandi (possible similarities between the two murders), and personality (a factor that cannot be underestimated in formulating effective cross-examination). See Pinkney, supra, 851 A.2d at 488 ([T]he danger in not protecting the former client's confidences could be `highlighted by the nature of the questioning that can be anticipated.') (citations omitted). Although Mr. Freeman contends that this conflict was waivable by both Mr. Hammond and Mr. Freeman, the trial court was not obligated to accept that waiver because of the wide latitude accorded to trial courts in balancing the right to counsel of choice against other interests. [7] Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the trial court had an independent interest in this case of ensuring that [the trial was] conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. Id. (quoting Wheat, supra 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692). We adopt the United States Supreme Court's admonition that: [u]nfortunately for all concerned, a [trial court] must pass on the issue whether or not to allow a waiver of a conflict of interest by a criminal defendant not with the wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pretrial context when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly. The likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict, even for those thoroughly familiar with criminal trials.... Other [trial courts] might have reached differing or opposite conclusions with equal justification, but that does not mean that one conclusion was right and the other wrong. [Trial courts] must recognize a presumption in favor of [a defendant's] counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict [8] but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 162-64, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Given the facts before Judge Abrecht at the first trial, there was an actual conflict of interest that warranted the trial court's exercise of its discretion in refusing the proffered waiver and disqualifying counsel. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Mr. Stern in the first trial. [9]
Having held that the court's original disqualification of Mr. Stern in the first trial was not an abuse of discretion, we now turn to the separate issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Freeman's motion to reinstate Mr. Stern in the third trial. The grant or denial of such a motion is, again, a matter within the trial court's discretion. See Pinkney, supra, 851 A.2d at 490 (citation omitted). A trial court is required to consider reinstatement when the conflict of interest no longer exists. See id. (defense counsel discovered during voir dire that the government was not intending to call the disqualified defense counsel's former client as a witness and alerted trial court to the change in circumstances). Judge Keary did not abuse her discretion by denying defense counsel's first motion to reinstate Mr. Stern before the first trial. Although the defense had obtained a written waiver from Mr. Hammond, who also asserted that he would be available for the court's examination of his waiver on the record, Judge Keary was correct in noting that the situation that [existed when Judge Abrecht] reached her decision [to disqualify wa]s not markedly changed by the addition of the provision of a written waiver. Judge Keary referenced the discretion to disqualify counsel in light of the trial court's independent interest in ensuring the trial was conducted according to the profession's ethical standards and that the proceedings appeared fair to those who observe them as another basis for her decision. See Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (quoting Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692). Indeed, the soundness of Judge Abrecht's initial rulingand Judge Keary's decision not to reinstate Mr. Stern as defense counselis buttressed by the fact that Mr. Gilbert noted that Mr. Stern [could not] even promise that he wouldn't inadvertently mentally rely on information known to him previously through his representation of Mr. Hammond. Furthermore, Judge Keary recognized that [t]here is no telling what could develop at trial if Mr. Stern were reinstated as counsel and that the trial court was in the untenable position of choosing between not reinstating conflict-burdened counsel and having the defendant appeal the denial of his right to retained counsel of choice, or accepting Mr. Hammond's waiver of the conflict, and proceeding with conflict-burdened counsel, having the defendant challenge the effectiveness of the counsel based on his right to conflict-free counsel. See Wheat, supra, 486 U.S. at 161, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (trial courts confronted with multiple representations face the prospect of being `whip-sawed' by assertions of error no matter which way they rule, which supports the need to grant them wide latitude in deciding whether to disqualify counsel). Although Judge Keary acknowledged Mr. Freeman's preference to be represented by Mr. Stern, Judge Keary explained that the conflict of interest, the trial court's independent interest, and the lack of any change in circumstances, including the fact that Mr. Stern was not available for the first trial date, were among several factors the trial court considered. See Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557 (reaffirming trial court's wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and against the demands of its calendar) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the motion for reinstatement before the first trial. For the same reasons as discussed above, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel's renewed motion to reinstate Mr. Stern before Mr. Freeman's third trial, because the trial court properly noted that the situation has not changed and there is no more merit to the motion[] than the Court found originally to exist. Now, for the first time on appeal, Mr. Freeman asserts that the defense had abandoned Mr. Hammond as a witness before the beginning of the third trial, and thus the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to reinstate Mr. Stern. Although defense counsel may have intended to abandon Mr. Hammond as a witness, thereby eliminating the conflict of the interest that prevented Mr. Stern from serving as counsel, this change in circumstances was not brought to the attention of the trial court at the beginning of the third trial nor did defense counsel make such an argument. Instead, defense counsel's motion for reinstatement at the beginning of the third trial made a bare and vague reference to reinstatement. Defense counsel did not present the trial court with a list of defense witnesses until after the government's case-in-chief and after the defense commenced the direct examination of its own witnesses. It is significant that defense counsel did not renew its motion to reinstate Mr. Stern when it presented the trial court with its list of defense witnesses. Further, defense counsel did not address the possibility that it might call Mr. Hammond as a rebuttal witness to Mr. Thomas' testimony that Mr. Freeman informed him that Mr. Hammond, who was a client of his attorney, Mr. Stern, and another man would falsely confess to the murders to exonerate him. In sum, defense counsel's failure to renew its motion to reinstate Mr. Stern after the government's case-in-chief, its failure to apprise the trial court that it did not intend to call Mr. Hammond as either a direct or rebuttal witness, and its failure to assert any other change in circumstances distinguishes this case from Pinkney. In Pinkney, where as soon as defense counsel realized during voir dire that the government was no longer going to call the witness that presented a conflict with defendant's counsel of choice, defense counsel alerted the trial court of the change in circumstances and immediately moved for reinstatement. 851 A.2d at 490 (acknowledging defense counsel was in the best position both at the beginning of and after the government's case-in-chief in the third trial to knowand to inform the trial courtof whether Mr. Hammond would testify). Although the trial court is obliged to consider a change in circumstances warranting a reconsideration of its decision to disqualify counsel, it is not obligated to do so sua sponte. This is particularly so where the error appellant now complains of is one the appellant allowed the trial court to make by failing to apprise the Court of the changed circumstances when it had the opportunity and was in the best position to do so both before trial and during the defense's case. See id. (defense counsel promptly alerted trial court to the change in circumstances); Cowan v. United States, 629 A.2d 496, 502-03 (D.C.1993) (rejecting counsel's request for self-defense and defense of a third person jury instruction under the invited error doctrine when defense counsel failed to make clear that his initial position had changed, and thus induced the trial court to fail to give those instructions). In conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying or refusing to reinstate Mr. Stern as Mr. Freeman's defense counsel in the first and third trials, respectively.