Opinion ID: 849107
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the impossibility doctrine

Text: The doctrine of impossibility as it has been discussed in the context of inchoate crimes represents the conceptual dilemma that arises when, because of the defendant's mistake of fact or law, his actions could not possibly have resulted in the commission of the substantive crime underlying an attempt charge. Classic illustrations of the concept of impossibility include: (1) the defendant is prosecuted for attempted larceny after he tries to pick the victim's empty pocket [6] ; (2) the defendant is prosecuted for attempted rape after he tries to have nonconsensual intercourse, but is unsuccessful because he is impotent [7] ; (3) the defendant is prosecuted for attempting to receive stolen property where the property he received was not, in fact, stolen [8] ; and (4) the defendant is prosecuted for attempting to hunt deer out of season after he shoots at a stuffed decoy deer. [9] In each of these examples, despite evidence of the defendant's criminal intent, he cannot be prosecuted for the completed offense of larceny, rape, receiving stolen property, or hunting deer out of season, because proof of at least one element of each offense cannot be derived from his objective actions. The question, then, becomes whether the defendant can be prosecuted for the attempted offense, and the answer is dependent upon whether he may raise the defense of impossibility. Courts and legal scholars have drawn a distinction between two categories of impossibility: factual impossibility and legal impossibility. It has been said that, at common law, legal impossibility is a defense to a charge of attempt, but factual impossibility is not. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (1985), comment to § 5.01, pp. 307-317; Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.), p. 632; Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (1st ed.), § 27.07[B], p. 349. However, courts and scholars alike have struggled unsuccessfully over the years to articulate an accurate rule for distinguishing between the categories of impossibility. Factual impossibility, which has apparently never been recognized in any American jurisdiction as a defense to a charge of attempt, [10] exists when [the defendant's] intended end constitutes a crime but she fails to consummate it because of a factual circumstance unknown to her or beyond her control. Dressler, supra, § 27.07[C][1], p. 350. An example of a factual impossibility scenario is where the defendant is prosecuted for attempted murder after pointing an unloaded gun at someone and pulling the trigger, where the defendant believed the gun was loaded. [11] The category of legal impossibility is further divided into two subcategories: pure legal impossibility and hybrid legal impossibility. Although it is generally undisputed that pure legal impossibility will bar an attempt conviction, the concept of hybrid legal impossibility has proven problematic. As Professor Dressler points out, the failure of courts to distinguish between pure and hybrid legal impossibility has created confusion in this area of the law. Dressler, supra, § 27.07[D][1], p. 351. Pure legal impossibility exists if the criminal law does not prohibit D `s conduct or the result that she has sought to achieve. Id., § 27.07[D][2], p. 352 (emphasis in original). In other words, the concept of pure legal impossibility applies when an actor engages in conduct that he believes is criminal, but is not actually prohibited by law: There can be no conviction of criminal attempt based upon D's erroneous notion that he was committing a crime. Perkins & Boyce, supra, p. 634. As an example, consider the case of a man who believes that the legal age of consent is sixteen years old, and who believes that a girl with whom he had consensual sexual intercourse is fifteen years old. If the law actually fixed the age of consent at fifteen, this man would not be guilty of attempted statutory rape, despite his mistaken belief that the law prohibited his conduct. See Dressler, supra, § 27.07[D][2], pp. 352-353, n. 25. When courts speak of legal impossibility, they are generally referring to what is more accurately described as hybrid legal impossibility. Most claims of legal impossibility are of the hybrid variety. Hybrid legal impossibility exists if D `s goal was illegal, but commission of the offense was impossible due to a factual mistake by her regarding the legal status of some factor relevant to her conduct. This version of impossibility is a hybrid because, as the definition implies and as is clarified immediately below, D's impossibility claim includes both a legal and a factual aspect to it. Courts have recognized a defense of legal impossibility or have stated that it would exist if D receives unstolen property believing it was stolen; tries to pick the pocket of a stone image of a human; offers a bribe to a juror who is not a juror; tries to hunt deer out of season by shooting a stuffed animal; shoots a corpse believing that it is alive; or shoots at a tree stump believing that it is a human. Notice that each of the mistakes in these cases affected the legal status of some aspect of the defendant's conduct. The status of property as stolen is necessary to commit the crime of receiving stolen property with knowledge it is stoleni.e., a person legally is incapable of committing this offense if the property is not stolen. The status of a person as a juror is legally necessary to commit the offense of bribing a juror. The status of a victim as a human being (rather than as a corpse, tree stump, or statue) legally is necessary to commit the crime of murder or to take and carry away the personal property of another.' Finally, putting a bullet into a stuffed deer can never constitute the crime of hunting out of season. On the other hand, in each example of hybrid legal impossibility D was mistaken about a fact: whether property was stolen, whether a person was a juror, whether the victims were human or whether the victim was an animal subject to being hunted out of season. [Dressler, supra, § 27.07[D][3][a], pp. 353-354 (emphasis in original).] As the Court of Appeals panel in this case accurately noted, it is possible to view virtually any example of hybrid legal impossibility as an example of factual impossibility: Ultimately any case of hybrid legal impossibility may reasonably be characterized as factual impossibility. ... [B]y skillful characterization, one can describe virtually any case of hybrid legal impossibility, which is a common law defense, as an example of factual impossibility, which is not a defense. [241 Mich.App. at 106, 614 N.W.2d 674 (emphasis in original), quoting Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (2d ed.), § 27.07[D][3][a], pp. 374-375.] See also Weiss, Scope, mistake, and impossibility: The philosophy of language and problems of mens rea, 83 Colum. L .R. 1029, 1029-1030 (1983) ([b]ecause ordinary English cannot adequately distinguish among the various kinds of impossible attempts, courts and commentators have frequently misclassified certain types of cases); United States v. Thomas, 13 USCMA 278, 283, 32 C.M.R. 278, 283, 1962 WL 4490 (1962) ([w]hat is abundantly clear ... is that it is most difficult to classify any particular state of facts as positively coming within one of these categories to the exclusion of the other); State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 189, 244 A.2d 499 (1968) ([o]ur examination of [authorities discussing the doctrine of impossibility] convinces us that the application of the defense of impossibility is so fraught with intricacies and artificial distinctions that the defense has little value as an analytical method for reaching substantial justice). It is notable that the great majority of jurisdictions have now recognized that legal and factual impossibility are `logically indistinguishable' ... and have abolished impossibility as a defense. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 199 (C.A.3, 1998). [12] For example, several states have adopted statutory provisions similar to Model Penal Code § 5.01(1), [13] which provides: A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he: (a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part; or (c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. In other jurisdictions, courts have considered the impossibility defense under attempt statutes that did not include language explicitly abolishing the defense. Several of these courts have simply declined to participate in the sterile academic exercise of categorizing a particular set of facts as representing factual or legal impossibility, and have instead examined solely the words of the applicable attempt statute. See Darnell v. State, 92 Nev. 680, 558 P.2d 624 (1976); State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 189, 244 A.2d 499 (1968); People v. Rojas, 55 Cal.2d 252, 10 Cal.Rptr. 465, 358 P.2d 921 (1961).