Opinion ID: 1267097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: Scott pled guilty to criminal conspiracy, common law robbery and kidnaping. He received a sentence of five years for criminal conspiracy. He was, additionally, sentenced concurrently to ten years for kidnaping and robbery, suspended upon confinement for three and one-half years and five years probation. Scott served approximately 89.6% of the term of incarceration. Due to good conduct credits Scott maxed out his sentence, was released and placed in the CSP. The State claims Scott violated the terms of his CSP nineteen times and failed to report for vocational rehabilitation. [1] The State sought to revoke his CSP. At the revocation hearing, Scott argued he should be placed on probation, instead of CSP, because he maxed out his sentence. He further claimed he was not in violation of his probationary sentence because electronic monitoring was not a probationary condition. The circuit court judge agreed, terminated Scott's CSP and ordered the State to place him on probation. The State's motion for reconsideration was denied. The State appeals. ISSUES I. Did the State properly and timely serve Scott with its notice of intent to appeal? II. Did the circuit court err in terminating Scott's CSP and ordering him placed on probation?
Scott argues this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the State failed to timely serve its notice of intent to appeal. See Rule 203, SCACR. We disagree. Rule 203 requires the State serve a notice of appeal within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice of entry of the order or judgment. Rule 203(b)(2), SCACR (emphasis added). The rule requires the State file the notice with the clerk of the lower court and the clerk of the appellate court within ten (10) days after notice of appeal is served. Rule 203(d)(2), SCACR (emphasis added). The State received the circuit court's order denying reconsideration on July 18, 2000, served its notice of intent to appeal on July 21, 2000, and filed the notice with the South Carolina Court of Appeals and, erroneously, with the Clerk of Court of Richland County on the same date. [2] The State correctly filed its notice of appeal with the Clerk of Court of Lexington County on July 31, 2000. The State timely served a notice of appeal on Scott. See Rule 203(b)(2), SCACR. The notice of appeal was timely filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals and a corrected notice of appeal with the Clerk of Court of Lexington County within ten days after serving Scott. See Rule 203(d)(2), SCACR; see also Rule 234(a), SCACR (In computing any period of time . . . the day of the act . . . after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included.). Scott argues, however, the notice originally served on him incorrectly listed Richland County as the county from which the appeal was taken. As such, Scott believes the State failed to perfect service. We disagree. While this Court has consistently held service of the notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement, [3] non-prejudicial clerical errors in the notice are not detrimental to the appeal. Moody v. Dickinson, 54 S.C. 526, 32 S.E. 563 (1899) (a court may allow an appellant to correct a mere clerical error in the notice of intention to appeal where there is no prejudice to the appellee); see also Charleston Lumber Co., Inc. v. Miller Housing Corp., 318 S.C. 471, 458 S.E.2d 431 (Ct.App.1995). It is undisputed Lexington County, rather than Richland County, was the proper county in which to file the notice. The State mistakenly filed in Richland County because Scott was supervised in Richland, the warrant was initiated in Richland, the hearing took place in Richland, and the circuit court mistakenly cited Richland County in its Order. The citation of the incorrect county in such circumstances is a clerical error. Scott does not allege, nor do we discern, he was prejudiced by the error, which was corrected within 10 days of notice to Scott. We are, therefore, not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. See Charleston Lumber Co., Inc. v. Miller Housing Corp., supra .