Opinion ID: 380921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the remedy here

Text: 89 We come finally to the question of what this court can legitimately do to catalyze the FCC's proceedings. Fortunately we have some precedent. Almost thirty years ago in ABC v. FCC 107 this court confronted circumstances hauntingly similar to those now before us when it found unreasonable an FCC delay of almost ten years in the final resolution of the award of a broadcast frequency. 90 In 1941 the FCC issued a special service authorization i. e., a temporary license for a certain frequency to a station operator and rebuffed objections from another licensee. The other licensee was using the same frequency pursuant to an earlier clear channel license granting it the right to operate on that frequency without interference. After hearings were held, the FCC began a comprehensive investigation of all clear channel licenses and refused to resolve the controversy before it regarding the frequency at issue in the ABC case until the clear channel proceeding was resolved. This court rejected the FCC's rationale for the delay: 108 91 Turning to the question whether the proceedings before the Commission on the two authorizations now here on appeal satisfy the requirements of section 312(b), we must answer that question in the negative. There comes a point when what has been designated a temporary measure lasts for so long, and shows so little sign of being terminated in the foreseeable future, that to continue to categorize it as temporary is to ignore the realities of the situation. A license itself, under the Act, can only be granted for three years duration. Thus, the special service authorizations here in question have lasted for almost three times the term of the modifying license which was held invalid in the KOA case. 92 We cannot agree that the Commission can maintain the status quo indefinitely and in effect semi-permanently by offering the argument that the ultimate determination of KOB's status must depend upon the outcome of the clear channel proceedings. It is true that those proceedings may ultimately lead to very different conclusions regarding KOB than those which might be reached in this case. And that in turn might result in KOB having to incur additional expenses and frequency changes. But even if this would have been a valid argument in 1945, when the clear channel proceedings were first commenced, it cannot be controlling now. Until that time delay had been due primarily to the war, and all parties had acquiesced. Further, it then appeared that the clear channel proceedings would be disposed of promptly. But that is not the situation now before us. The Commission has made no showing of even a reasonable possibility that the clear channel proceedings will be completed shortly. And apparently it has conducted no further tests to determine where KOB should be located. WJZ has thus been required to bear a large part of the loss resultant from the original NARBA treaty arrangement eliminating frequency 1180. Interference caused by the operation of KOB causes the loss of approximately 23,000,000 possible listeners to WJZ. The Commission has in effect permitted this substantial loss to occur and to continue. 93 Invoking its general equity powers, the ABC court remanded to the FCC, noting we can direct the Commission to exercise its discretion in accordance with law. 109 94 Nader v. FCC, 110 also in this court involved a similar situation of several years delay by the FCC in settling a rate controversy between the same parties at issue here. There this court said: 111 95 We are sympathetic with MCI's characterization of Docket 18128 as an interminable proceeding, the principal function of which has been that of a giant regulatory wastebasket. MCI's Reply Br. at 8. Though unwilling to impute ill motives to the Commission, we are constrained to agree with MCI on the following point: 96 nine years should be enough time for any agency to decide almost any issue. There comes a point when relegating issues to proceedings that go on without conclusion in any kind of reasonable time frame is tantamount to refusing to address the issues at all and the result is a denial of justice. 97 The court noted several harmful effects from the FCC's dilatory pace. 112 98 . . . Until it rules on the lawfulness of a rate, its sole remedial power is to subject the filed tariff to an accounting and refund order. While there is much merit to this procedure, it is far from perfect. First, it does not protect specialized carriers from the discriminatory tactics that they claim AT&T is using. If the Commission ultimately determines that Bell's MTS rates are too high and the private line rates too low, MTS users will receive a refund, but AT&T's competitors will not be compensated for loss of business. Second, if at some future date a refund is ordered, its magnitude could be staggering. To date, AT&T has well over one billion dollars of revenue subject to accounting and refund, and this figure grows at the rate of four hundred million annually. Finally, the present inflationary trend is causing regulated industries to seek rate revisions more frequently than in the past AT&T sought and received interim increases in 1970, 1972, and in February of this year. The Commission's inability to determine the lawfulness vel non of these increases within a reasonable time suggests that it verges on losing its ability to effectively regulate at all. 99 Calling upon our authority under § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed, 113 the Nader court required the FCC to file with the court in 30 days a schedule for completion of the rate proceedings. 114 The court retained jurisdiction to approve the schedule and required prior court permission before that schedule could later be changed. That procedure appeared in the Nader case to produce results; although the schedule agreed upon inevitably encountered some slippage, the FCC apparently issued a final decision within 17 months. We are inclined to try that alternative again. 100 We are aware in so doing that the task is complicated, that the FCC has set and reset many schedules of its own for these proceedings over the years, and that delays have resulted from new thinking, new methodologies, new theories of rate evaluation and from the inception of related proceedings which must be coordinated with this one. Nevertheless, we believe the time has come to bring these proceedings to a close, and a judicially supervised schedule for doing that hopefully will obviate the need for more drastic judicial relief. Therefore, we will not now act on MCI's petition for review of the FCC's 1977 and 1978 WATS decisions, but we remand to the FCC to recommend to us 30 days from today a feasible schedule for final determination of a just and reasonable WATS tariff in this proceeding. That schedule shall discuss the FCC's estimated timetable for disposing of any other current or proposed FCC proceedings having a substantial impact on the resolution of this matter. Any party to the proceedings before the FCC 115 or now before the court shall file with the court any comments on the FCC's proposed schedule within fifteen days after that schedule is filed with the court by the FCC. Within fifteen additional days, the FCC may reply to any of the comments. The court will then either approve, reject, or appropriately modify the schedule, or make such further orders as necessary. 101 After a schedule has been approved, the parties will be expected to adhere to it. Deviations from the schedule will require the court's prior approval. 116 This division of the court shall retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance 117 with our decision. 102 IT IS SO ORDERED.