Opinion ID: 2978635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: SORNA’s Applicability to Doshak

Text: SORNA made it a federal crime for a convicted sex offender required to register under the Act to travel in interstate commerce and “knowingly fail[] to register or update [his] registration.” -2- No. 08-3141 United States v. Doshak 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). A different section of SORNA sets forth the registration requirements and includes procedures for both initial registration and “keeping the registration current,” among other obligations. 42 U.S.C. § 16913. To support a § 2250 conviction, the Government must prove (1) the defendant is a person required to register under SORNA, (2) he is a sex offender, as defined by SORNA, and (3) that he knowingly failed to register or update his registration pursuant to SORNA. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). Recently, we decided that SORNA was not effective against persons “convicted of a sexual offense before July 27, 2006 . . . until the Attorney General validly so specified pursuant to SORNA.” United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408, 410 (6th Cir. 2009). At issue in the instant case—and the issue in Cain—is the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d), which makes it a crime for sex offenders to fail to register pursuant to SORNA, to those convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment. In Cain we held that the plain language of subsection (d) required the Attorney General to specify the Act’s applicability to pre-SORNA defendants. Cain, 583 F.3d at 419 (“SORNA unambiguously delegated to the Attorney General the authority to determine whether SORNA applies to [offenders whose convictions pre-date SORNA].”). Under Cain, SORNA does not apply to Doshak unless the Attorney General promulgated a valid regulation that subjected Doshak to SORNA’s registration requirements during the period covered by his indictment. Thus, the only issue before this court is whether Doshak was subject to SORNA’s requirements during the period covered by his indictment. His indictment charged failure to register from October 26, 2006, through March 20, 2007. In Cain, we held that the Attorney General’s regulation was not effective against Cain, because his indictment covered a period ending on March -3- No. 08-3141 United States v. Doshak 28, 2007, “less than thirty days after promulgation of the regulation, and a month before the close of the comment period.” Cain, 583 F.3d at 420. Similarly, Doshak’s indictment covered a period ending March 20, 2007. Thus, Doshak was not subject to SORNA’s criminal sanctions during the period alleged in the indictment. His conviction, therefore, must be vacated.1 VACATED and REMANDED. 1 We express no opinion on whether a conviction based on failure to register after the close of the comment period would be invalid, as the issue is not before us. -4-