Opinion ID: 3168517
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Disparate Treatment Claim

Text: With respect to Connelly’s disparate treatment claim,8 the Amended Complaint set forth sufficient factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery would reveal evidence that Connelly was a member of a 8 While Connelly advances a disparate treatment claim under both Title VII and the PHRA, we refer to those claims in the singular, as they are governed by essentially the same legal standards. See Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The analysis required for adjudicating [plaintiff’s discrimination] claim under PHRA is identical to a Title VII inquiry, and we therefore do not need to separately address her claim under the PHRA.”) (internal citation omitted). 18 protected class and that she suffered an adverse employment action when Lane did not rehire her in 2011. More specifically, Connelly has alleged that (i) during her tenure at Lane, she was the only female truck driver at the Pittsburgh facility; (ii) she was qualified to drive all but one of Lane’s trucks; (iii) Lane failed to rehire her at the start of the 2011 construction season, despite recalling the six other union truck-drivers – all male, and two with less union seniority than Connelly; and (iv) since failing to rehire Connelly, Lane has employed no other female truck drivers. Once accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, those allegations raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that Connelly’s protected status as a woman played either a motivating or determinative factor in Lane’s decision not to rehire her. That is enough for Connelly’s disparate treatment claim to survive a motion to dismiss. Cf. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211-12 (“Although [the] complaint is not as rich with detail as some might prefer, it need only set forth sufficient facts to support plausible claims.”). Connelly has also alleged that Lane apparently deviated from its own past hiring norms and work assignments during the 2011 construction season by employing rental trucks and allowing a less senior driver to operate the tack truck. Once accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Connelly, those factual allegations would also permit the reasonable inference that Lane’s proffered explanation that it failed to rehire Connelly for lack of work was pretextual. But, to be clear, at this stage Connelly is not obliged to choose whether she is proceeding under a mixed-motive or pretext theory, nor is she required to establish a prima facie case, much less to engage in the sort of 19 burden-shifting rebuttal that McDonnell Douglas requires at a later stage in the proceedings. It suffices for her to plead facts that, construed in her favor, state a claim of discrimination that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). She has done that.