Opinion ID: 2604613
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis under article I, section 11

Text: Appropriate constitutional analysis begins with the text and, for most purposes, should end there as well. [31] The text necessarily includes the words themselves, their grammatical relationship to one another, as well as their context. Our objective is to define the constitutional principle in accordance with the original understanding of the ratifying public so as to faithfully apply the principle to each situation which might thereafter arise. This task begins with a specific focus upon the following language: No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.... Const. art. I, § 11. The verb appropriated means [t]o prescribe a particular use for particular moneys; to designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct use.... Black's Law Dictionary 101 (6th ed. 1990). Similarly, applied generally means to use or employ for a particular purpose; to appropriate and devote to a particular use, object, demand, or subject matter. Id. at 99. In this text the terms require one to determine whether our government has purposefully transferred, or made available, money or property for the defined objective. Ultimate utilization of the money or property is a necessary but insufficient part of the constitutional test; a religious purpose is the key. Without proceeding further it is at once apparent that the appropriation of money, or application of property, to effectuate any objective other than worship, exercise, instruction, or religious establishment is not within the prohibition. Were the chaplains paid for their time, and a portion of their time was necessarily devoted to religious worship, we would have a closer question; however, that is not our case. At most we are dealing with cars, insurance, radios, and the like, which are not only intrinsically secular in nature but also are purposely appropriated or applied to accomplish a secular counseling objective. That the unpaid volunteer might pause to join an injured victim in a consensual prayer does not alter the government's objective to appropriate property from a secular one to a sectarian one, although it may well reflect the volunteer's exercise of his personal religious conscience. But the latter is of no constitutional moment because the volunteer is not the property of the State and the exercise of his conscience is not Mr. Malyon's burden to bear. The context in which the clause appears stands in testamentary witness to the correctness of this result. [T]o read the language of the constitution without regard to the context in which it was written would be inconsistent with principles of responsible jurisprudence. Conklin & Vach, supra at 457. As previously noted, the entire article I, section 11 is entitled Religious Freedom and must, on fair reading, be said to serve that purpose. From the context it is plain the prohibition against appropriation or application of public money or property to a religious purpose is a means to an end, yet not an end in itself. This contextual conclusion is reinforced by the modifying proviso which mandates this article shall not be so construed  to prohibit the employment of a chaplain with public funds under numerous circumstances. This rule of construction literally pertains to the entire articleit is not, as the dissent would have it, merely an exclusive list of exceptions. [32] But how could the article in its entirety be consistently construed to hire a prison chaplain at public expense while at the same time forbid an unpaid volunteer chaplain from saying a prayer? That the program's volunteers may still practice or benefit religion in some sense proves no constitutional violation under our prior precedent either. This we recognized in Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Spellman, 96 Wash.2d 68, 633 P.2d 866 (1981) when we held that religious hospitals can, consistent with article I, section 11, raise money through public tax exempt bonds. By making this method of financing available to a private religious institution the state conferred a tremendous financial benefit on a religious establishment but without violating the state constitution in the slightest. Id. at 72, 633 P.2d 866. [33] Public education cases seem to be subject to stricter scrutiny but are often considered under the same constitutional article. Perry v. School Dist. No. 81, 54 Wash.2d 886, 344 P.2d 1036 (1959) involved a school release program where students were allowed to leave school one hour per week to pursue outside religious instruction. No state resources were utilized for the religious study per se at private off-campus sites; however, publicly salaried school teachers handed out registration cards to interested students on school property. The distribution of these cards was deemed an impermissible use of school facilities supported by public funds for the promotion of a religious program and the program was struck down. Id. at 896, 344 P.2d 1036. [34] Perry has been criticized as a dogmatic hostility to church-related schools.... Conklin & Vache, supra at 423, [35] but even so it was an appropriation of public money to pay public school teachers' salaries and public property to promote a religious program. That is not the case herethese are unpaid volunteers who are charged by the government to accomplish a secular objective. Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents, 72 Wash.2d 912, 919, 436 P.2d 189 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 960, 89 S.Ct. 389, 21 L.Ed.2d 372 (1968) upheld the constitutionality of a University of Washington course teaching the Bible as literature, noting that the course was taught at the university in a secular setting where intellectual independence replaces the captive minds of younger students. Again, the court found the course was not religious instruction [36] although bible study can certainly be an aspect of many organized faiths and may have promoted religion in that sense. To further test the presence of prohibited state financial aid to religion, we also should consider the free exercise rights of the volunteers because free exercise is precisely the opposite of coerced establishment. These volunteers have chosen to become credentialed ministers. The sheriff's department neutrally sought any qualified volunteers without regard to religion. If ordinary lay citizens volunteered as sheriff's chaplains, and they occasionally prayed with their fellow citizens, that would be their choice, not the state's. They would have appropriated their time, but the State would not have appropriated them. If a trooper prayed in his patrol car or a legislator rose from his seat at the Capitol when the chaplain opened the assembly in prayer the same would be true. These volunteer citizens are no less religiously free simply because they are ministers and/or openly profess their faith. If they choose religion that is their right. This does not change because they also volunteer their services to assist the State to accomplish its objective. [37] By undisputed fact the annual $3,000 appropriated for the program provides items of personal property such as uniforms and transportation which are, in themselves, wholly secular in nature and would be as necessary whether volunteers engaged in any religious activities or not. Moreover, any possible religious conduct by volunteers is not the purpose of any appropriation of money or application of property in any event. Nor are the taxpayers financially underwriting the activities of these volunteers. As there is no financial cause for taxpayer complaint; to coin Mr. Jefferson's phrase, Mr. Malyon has simply not been compelled to furnish contributions of money to propagate opinions with which he disagrees.