Opinion ID: 2324757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The OEA decision.

Text: The DCPL sought review of the ALJ's decision invalidating the removal of Ms. Okyiri from her position, and on December 23, 1996, the OEA affirmed the ALJ's ruling. Unlike the ALJ, the OEA devoted considerable attention to the DCPL's criticisms of Ms. Okyiri as uncooperative and difficult to deal with. Nevertheless, the OEA sustained the ALJ's order. With respect to the Greenlee voucher, the OEA concluded that both sides had acted somewhat unreasonably: In this case, neither Agency nor Employee sought an opinion from the Controller concerning certification of the Greenlee voucher. [13] Instead, both parties backed into their respective corners unwilling or unable to recognize any merit in the other's position. As a result, Agency focused entirely on its contractual obligations with Greenlee and ignored Employee's concern that she could be held personally liable under Mayor's Memorandum 83-68 for an erroneous certification. Employee, on the other hand, focused entirely on her potential liability under Mayor's Memorandum 83-68 and ignored Agency's concern that a failure to pay Greenlee could constitute a breach of contract. The OEA expressed some puzzlement as to what work product Dr. Greenlee could have produced to satisfy Ms. Okyiri that Dr. Greenlee had performed the work she claimed to have performed, when that contract was for consulting services, and when [m]uch of the work for which Greenlee billed was not in the form of a reviewable work product. The OEA also questioned whether Ms. Okyiri would have been satisfied with whatever documentation was available. Nevertheless, the OEA concluded: Although documentation of the services was not required under the contract, it is an express requirement under Mayor's Memorandum 83-68. Thus, Agency could not order Employee to certify an inadequately documented voucher without requiring her to violate the Mayor's Order and subject herself to personal liability for an improper certification. We agree with the A.J. that Agency's order was both unreasonable and unlawful. Turning to the allegation of inexcusable neglect of duty, the OEA quoted from, but did not expressly adopt or reject, the ALJ's finding that this charge was a pretext manufactured by the agency. But although the OEA was obviously more troubled than the ALJ had been by Ms. Okyiri's protracted inaction following her receipt of the letter from Bert Smith & Company, it nevertheless affirmed the ALJ's disposition: There is no question that Employee was Agency's highest ranking financial official and that her position was equivalent to an agency controller. Employee knew that her superiors were anxious to resolve the questioned costs for FY 1990 and she herself was the one who suggested that her superiors request the additional information from Bert Smith. Normally, Employee would have an implicit duty to turn the information over to her superiors as soon as she received it. However, according to Employee, Agency routinely routed financial correspondence to Franklin. Therefore, even if Employee had seen the correspondence, she could reasonably assume that Franklin had already received a copy of it. Other than speculation, Agency offered nothing to rebut Employee's sworn testimony and we do not find her testimony inherently incredible. In our view, Employee cannot be disciplined for failing to deliver a copy of the Bert Smith document to Franklin when she had a reasonable basis for believing that he had already received it through Agency's internal routing procedures. Under the circumstances, Agency's decision to remove Employee was unwarranted and the initial decision must be affirmed. [14]