Opinion ID: 2076061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The propriety of the court's order.

Text: The father contends that the court was without authority to order that S.G. be placed with someone other than her mother or father, because neither parent was found to have neglected her. We do not agree. The court's authority to place S.G. with her grandmother pursuant to D.C. Code § 16-2320(a)(3)(C) (1989) is contingent by its terms on a finding that S.G. had been neglected. For purposes of this case, a neglected child is one who has been abused by her parent, guardian, or other custodian. D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(A) (1989). A custodian is defined as including a person who is acting in loco parentis. Id., § 16-2301(12). On appeal, the father argues for the first time that the stepfather was not S.G.'s custodian, and not acting in loco parentis, because he was not sufficiently involved with her care. The father did not make this contention in the trial court, but instead argued in support of a finding that the stepfather abused S.G. Accordingly, this contention has not been adequately preserved. D.D. v. M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 48 (D.C.1988). [19] Because the judge found that S.G. had been neglected, he had the authority to enter a disposition in her best interest. If a child is found to be neglected, the [court] may order any of several enumerated dispositions which will be in the best interest of the child. D.C.Code § 16-2320(a) (1989). Nothing in the statute requires that a finding of neglect must first have been entered against a non-custodial parent before the court may order a disposition over that parent's objection. Even if the statute were ambiguous on that scoreand it is notit should be construed in a manner that would enable the court to act as parens patriae in the best interest of the child. In re S.K., supra . The trial judge also had ample basis for his finding, which he made by clear and convincing evidence, that placement with the grandmother was in S.G.'s best interest. In his post-trial order, he summarized the facts supporting that determination as follows: 1) [S.G.] has three half-siblings who are also presently in the custody of the maternal grandmother. The present placement therefore maintains the family unit and preserves [S.G.]'s relationship with these siblings. 2) [S.G.] indicated to the social worker that her preference is to remain with her grandmother and have visitation with her father. 3) The present placement allows [S.G.] to remain in Washington, D.C. where she has lived for most of her life. Her mother is in D.C. and can visit frequently with the child and her siblings. 4) [S.G.] has never lived with [her father]. Placing her in his custody would mean thrusting her into a totally unfamiliar environment. 5) [S.G.] can have just as much contact now with her natural father as she had before these proceedings. 6) No home study has been provided on [the father] and the Court is not likely to receive one in the near future. 116 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1155. The foregoing findings belie the assertion in the father's brief that the court did not consider the father's right to custody and ignored the father's home. To the contrary, the judge declined to place S.G. in the father's custody, at least in part, because his home would have been a totally unfamiliar environment for S.G. Significantly, the father, who had signed an agreement providing that it was in S.G.'s best interest to live with her mother, never presented any evidence to rebut the judge's understandable concern about removing S.G. from her roots. The father cites a number of decisions in cases resolving private custody disputes for the proposition that a parent may not be deprived of the custody of a child without a finding that he or she is unfit. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lloyd, 211 A.2d 764 (D.C. 1965); Davis v. Jurney, 145 A.2d 846 (D.C. 1958); cf. In re H.R., 581 A.2d 1141 at 1143 (D.C.1990) (per curiam), and authorities there cited. [20] Neither Johnson nor Davis involved a proceeding by the government to protect the interests of an abused or neglected child. Accordingly, the court's explicit statutory authority pursuant to Section 16-2320 to order placement of a neglected child in the best interest of that child did not come into play in any of these cases. See also In re N.M.S., 347 A.2d 924 (D.C.1975), in which we sustained a trial court decision holding that a girl who had been committed as a dependent child should remain with her foster parents, rather than being returned to her mother who, like the father in this case, had never lived with the child, and who was thus seeking to regainnot retaincustody. Id. at 927. We have consistently held, and now reiterate, that a child's best interests are presumptively served by being with a parent, provided that the parent is not unfit. See, e.g., In re S.K., supra, 564 A.2d at 1390; In re N.M.S., supra, 347 A.2d at 927. The trial judge explicitly recognized and accommodated the existence of that presumption. [21] Noting that the present case involved only a temporary custody determination, the judge nevertheless applied the standard applicable to permanent curtailments of parental rights and found by clear and convincing evidence that placement with the grandmother was in S.K.'s best interest. We are therefore satisfied that the father's presumptive rights as a parent were accorded the requisite consideration. Contrary to the father's apparent contention on appeal, we do not think that he had been lulled by the trial judge into not pressing his claim to physical custody. At the conclusion of the factfinding hearing, after directing that the children remain with the grandmother pending disposition, the judge authorized the father's counsel to file whatever motion or request she wished with respect to such issues as custody and visitation. In other words, the judge made it plain that the father was not foreclosed from pursuing his rights and that the court's final resolution of S.G.'s custody would be accomplished at the disposition hearing. There is no basis for any claim of surprise; indeed, at the disposition hearing, no claim of surprise was made. Finally, we discern no factual basis for the father's assertion that S.G. lost her entitlement to military benefits as a result of the trial court's disposition. The father did not have custody of S.G. either before or after the entry of the order. The applicable regulations established that the court's disposition had no effect on S.G.'s right to receive military medical or related benefits. A child born out of wedlock whose father is a male member of the armed forces on active duty is entitled to receive CHAMPUS benefits if paternity has been determined judicially; if paternity has not been so determined, benefits are available if the child resides with or in a home provided by the member of the armed forces and if the child is dependent upon the member for over 50 percent of his or her support. 32 C.F.R. § 199.3(b)(2)(iv)(A)(4) and (5) (1989). Accordingly, S.G.'s eligibility for CHAMPUS benefits was not dependent on an award of legal custody. If there had been a previous judicial determination of the father's paternityand the record is silent as to whether this had occurredthen S.G. was eligible for benefits regardless of the disposition of this case. If there had been no such determination, S.G. had never been eligible for benefits because she had not been living with her father. [22]