Opinion ID: 2465545
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: preparation and submission of a pre-sentence report to the district court and the parties were mandatory conditions precedent to child's sentencing

Text: {62} Section 31-18-15.3(E) provides that [p]rior to the sentencing of an alleged serious youthful offender who is convicted of first degree murder, adult probation services shall prepare a presentence report and submit the report to the court and the parties five days prior to the sentencing hearing. The State concedes that a pre-sentence report does not appear in the record and that Child and his attorney did not receive such a report. Instead, the State argues (1) the issue was not preserved, (2) it was the obligation of adult probation services and not the court, and (3) Child has not shown any prejudice. We reject the State's arguments and remand this case to the district court to re-sentence Child, but only after a pre-sentence report is submitted to the court and the parties. {63} Initially, the State contends that Child failed to preserve this issue for appellate review under Rule 12-216(A) NMRA. However, [a] trial court has no jurisdiction to impose a sentence except in accordance with the law, State v. Mares, 119 N.M. 48, 50, 888 P.2d 930, 932 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and, in this case, the question of whether the district court erred in sentencing Child implicates review of a sentencing procedure that has been mandated by our Legislature. If the district court did not follow the mandated procedure, it follows that it did not have jurisdiction to sentence Child. Therefore, we undertake review of Child's claim of error without further addressing the alleged infirmity in its preservation. Rule 12-216(B). {64} The State's next argument is that Section 31-18-15.3(E) imposes the responsibility on adult probation services and does not require any action to be taken by the district court. Although adult probation services has the responsibility to prepare the pre-sentence report, the court is not permitted to sentence a youthful offender until two precedent conditions have been satisfied. First, a pre-sentence report must be prepared by adult probation services, and second, the report must be submitted to the district court and the parties five days prior to the sentencing hearing. See State v. Martinez, 1998-NMSC-023, ¶ 12, 126 N.M. 39, 966 P.2d 747 (A trial court's power to sentence is derived exclusively from statute.). It is axiomatic that the district court was not endowed with the authority to impose any sentence unless and until the mandatory conditions precedent to sentencing had been fulfilled. The State's statutory onus argument does not overcome this precept. {65} The State's final argument is that Child's sentence should not be reversed because Child has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the error. In State v. Jose S., 2007-NMCA-146, 142 N.M. 829, 171 P.3d 768, the Court of Appeals recently rejected a similar argument. In Jose S., 2007-NMCA-146, ¶¶ 16, 17, 142 N.M. 829, 171 P.3d 768, the sentencing judge did not obtain a predisposition report from the Children, Youth and Families Department regarding Child's amenability to treatment as required by NMSA 1978, Section 32A-2-17(A)(3) (2005). The State argued, among other things, that Jose S. had failed to show prejudice. Id. ¶ 11. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument because although it agreed that Child had not shown prejudice, Child is thwarted in his attempt to show prejudice because the reports do not exist. Id. ¶ 21. The court went on to emphasize that Child has no way of demonstrating that the reports would be favorable to him and contrary to the trial court's determination because the reports were never created. This inability to demonstrate prejudice is itself prejudicial to Child. Id. We agree with the sensible reasoning of the Court of Appeals and apply it in this case to reject the State's argument. {66} Having concluded that a pre-sentence report is mandatory in this case and otherwise rejecting all of the State's arguments, we reverse Child's sentence and remand to the district court with instructions that a pre-sentence report be prepared and submitted to the court and the parties prior to re-sentencing. To avoid any confusion upon re-sentencing, we note that a life sentence based on Child's first degree murder conviction is authorized, although not mandated, by statute. See § 31-18-15.3(D) (a court may sentence [a serious youthful] offender to less than, but not exceeding, the mandatory term for an adult). In light of our ruling, we do not reach Child's other sentence-related claims.