Opinion ID: 166613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nickl's Resentencing Claim

Text: 61 Nickl argues his case must be remanded for resentencing due to prejudicial, non-constitutional Booker error. He contends this court must presume prejudice because the district court sentenced at the bottom end of the guidelines range and might have imposed a lower sentence had it not considered the sentencing guidelines to be mandatory. From the record in this case, it is uncertain whether the district court would impose the same sentence under a discretionary guidelines scheme as it did under a mandatory guidelines scheme. Accordingly, we cannot say the district court's error was harmless, and we remand for resentencing. 62 After Nickl was convicted, a presentence investigation report concluded Nickl's offenses warranted a range of imprisonment of thirty-three to forty-one months under the sentencing guidelines. Nickl moved for a downward departure, arguing, inter alia, that incarceration would diminish his ability to pay restitution. 63 The district court denied Nickl's motion for downward departure. When it evaluated Nickl's restitution argument, the district court concluded it lacked the discretion to grant a downward departure. The court applied the sentencing guidelines and sentenced Nickl to thirty-three months, the bottom end of the guidelines range. The district court characterized the sentence as just and fair, but did not announce explicitly it would impose the same sentence if the guidelines were not mandatory. 64 After the district court sentenced Nickl, the Supreme Court in Booker invalidated the mandatory application of the sentencing guidelines and instructed district courts to consult the guidelines in an advisory fashion. 125 S.Ct. at 756. Accordingly, a sentence imposed through mandatory application of the guidelines is non-constitutional Booker error. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731-32. Here, the district court committed non-constitutional Booker error because it viewed the sentencing guidelines as mandatory when it sentenced Nickl. 65 This court reviews for harmless error when, as here, a defendant has properly raised a non-constitutional Booker claim below. United States v. Ollson, 413 F.3d 1119, 1120 (10th Cir.2005). Applying harmless error analysis to a preserved non-constitutional Booker error, this court reviews the record as a whole and asks whether the error affected the district court's selection of the sentence imposed. United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir.2005). In non-constitutional harmless error cases, the government bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the substantial rights of the defendant were not affected. United States v. Glover, 413 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir.2005). 66 Faced with non-constitutional Booker error in Labastida-Segura, this court remanded for resentencing when the trial court sentenced the defendant to the bottom end of the guidelines range. 396 F.3d at 1142-43. There was no concrete indication the district court would impose the same sentence on remand, viewing the guidelines as advisory instead of mandatory. Cf. United States v. Serrano-Dominguez, 406 F.3d 1221, 1223-24 (10th Cir.2005) (concluding non-constitutional Booker error was harmless when the district court's announcement of an alternative sentence not based on sentencing guidelines made clear it would have imposed same sentence on remand). Because this court found itself in the zone of speculation and conjecture, it concluded the non-constitutional Booker error was not harmless. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d at 1143. 67 In contrast, non-constitutional Booker error was harmless in Ollson. 413 F.3d at 1121. There, the district court exercised its discretion when it granted a motion for downward departure and determined what degree of departure was appropriate. Id. at 1120. [T]he district court had undoubted discretion to reduce the sentence below what it imposed, but chose not to do so. Id. at 1121. Accordingly, this court was confident the defendant's sentence would have remained the same if the district court had viewed the guidelines as advisory, and thus concluded the district court's error was harmless. Id. 68 Unlike the situation in Ollson, the district court here did not have unlimited discretion to grant Nickl's motion for downward departure. Although the court had discretion to grant Nickl's motion for downward departure on other grounds, it specifically concluded mandatory application of the sentencing guidelines prohibited it from granting a downward departure based on Nickl's restitution argument. Because the district court concluded mandatory application of the sentencing guidelines prohibited it from accepting Nickl's restitution argument, it is impossible to know whether the court would impose the same sentence if it viewed the guidelines as merely advisory. While the district court characterized Nickl's sentence as just and fair, it did not announce explicitly it would impose the same sentence if the guidelines were not mandatory. See Serrano-Dominguez, 406 F.3d at 1223-24. Because the district court concluded it was not free to exercise its unlimited discretion when it imposed Nickl's sentence, and because the court did not indicate an alternative sentence, we are in the zone of speculation and conjecture. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d at 1143. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the district court's error was harmless, and we remand for resentencing.