Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Maria G.

Text: Prospective Juror Maria G. was a 36-year-old secretary who wrote in her questionnaire that her views about the death penalty were ―50/50‖ because imposition of it ―would depend on the circumstances,‖ and that the penalty would be appropriate in extreme cases like for serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer. She ―disagreed somewhat‖ that anyone who kills intentionally, or kills more than one victim, should always (or never) get the death penalty, and her feelings about the death penalty were not so strong that she would always vote for, or against, a guilty verdict, a special circumstance allegation, or to impose the penalty itself. Although she was a Catholic, she was ―not in total agreement with the church.‖ (Underscoring in original.) During voir dire, she stated that, as a general matter, she believed the death penalty had a place in society and she thought she could impose the death penalty in an appropriate case, but when asked about a murder for financial gain, she said she ―would favor life without possibility of parole‖ and that it would be ―a difficult decision on my part‖ to vote for the death penalty. She admitted she might, depending on the facts, ―possibly‖ vote for death under those circumstances, but rated herself only a 2.5 on a 10-point scale of those who, faced with a financial gain murder, would impose the death penalty. Under the prosecutor‘s questioning, Maria G. said she rated herself low on the 10-point scale because there were extreme cases such as that of Jeffrey Dahmer for which she would vote for death. In addition she said she believed cases involving the rape or murder of a child warranted the ultimate penalty. Asked by the prosecutor whether there were other kinds of murders in which she 24 could see herself voting for the death penalty, she replied: ―No.‖ Asked directly what kind of evidence would convince her to vote for death in a case involving financial gain, she said the possibility she would vote for death in a financial gain situation was a ―slim‖ one, and that ―it‘s unlikely‖ she would vote for death in that situation. The trial court then sustained the prosecution‘s challenge for cause, explaining that ―the words ‗slim‘ and ‗it‘s unlikely‘ ‖ showed her to be substantially impaired under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. Defendant argues Prospective Juror Maria G. was unequivocal about her ability to impose the death penalty, that she stated ―unambiguously that she would be able to vote for death in certain circumstances, and specified that she could consider the death penalty in rape and murder situations.‖ But when questioned about her willingness to consider the death penalty in situations other than those involving a serial killer or the rape and murder of a child, she offered no other situations in which she would consider death an appropriate penalty. She then equivocated slightly, saying there was a ―slim,‖ but ―unlikely,‖ possibility she would vote for death where a murder for financial gain was involved. This evidence suggests that, although the juror‘s views would not wholly prevent her from fulfilling her duties as a juror, they would ―substantially impair‖ her from doing so. The trial court apparently found that she was willing to fairly consider the death penalty only in two narrow circumstances (a serial killer or one who rapes and kills a child) and was not willing to fairly and impartially consider the appropriateness of the death penalty in other types of murders, including the type (financial gain killing) in this case. Although defendant argues this juror did not completely close the door to capital punishment for a person who killed for financial gain, emphasizing she said there was a ―slim‖ although ―unlikely‖ possibility, the Witt standard does not require a prospective juror‘s inability or unwillingness to fulfill her duties as a juror be proved to an unreasonably high 25 degree. Instead, the evidence must simply show the juror‘s views ― ‗substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror.‘ ‖ (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, italics added.) On this record, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s assessment of Maria G.‘s state of mind, and we defer to its decision to excuse her. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 316.)