Opinion ID: 4352094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to the Matter at Hand

Text: The district court did not err by failing to consider Rafferty’s Eighth Amendment “sexually-hostile environment” claim. The Amended Complaint does not contain the words “hostile” or “environment” or give any other indication that Rafferty asserted a “sexually-hostile environment” claim. In fact, Rafferty admits that she did not raise this claim until her response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Because Rafferty did not raise her claim until this late juncture, the district court did not err by failing to consider it. Tucker, 407 F.3d at 789; see also Traster, 685 F. App’x at 407; Powell-Lee, 231 F. App’x at 440. Moreover, this Court cannot consider the claim on appeal. West, 672 F. App’x at 541; see Traster, 685 F. App’x at 407. West is instructive. In that case, the complaint alleged that a defendant violated the plaintiff’s “First Amendment rights to Free Speech and Freedom of Political Association.” 672 F. App’x at 541. But the complaint only alleged facts relating to the free speech claim. Id. In response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff abandoned his free speech claim and exclusively argued that the defendant violated his right to political association. Id. This Court held that it could not consider the political association claim because the plaintiff failed to give defendants adequate notice of the claim. Id. This Court explained that plaintiff should have amended his complaint to properly notify defendants about the nature of his claim prior to summary judgment. Id. Like the plaintiff in West, Rafferty invoked a constitutional amendment in her Amended Complaint—here, the Eighth Amendment. And like the plaintiff in West, Rafferty responded to a motion for summary judgment by advancing a novel theory under the relevant constitutional -7- No. 18-3138, Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio provision—her “sexually-hostile environment” theory. Accordingly, like the plaintiff in West, Rafferty failed to provide adequate notice of her claim.2 Therefore, the district court did not err by not considering this claim, Tucker, 407 F.3d at 789; see also Traster, 685 F. App’x at 407; PowellLee, 231 F. App’x at 440, and this Court cannot consider the claim on appeal. West, 672 F. App’x at 541; see Traster, 685 F. App’x at 407. But even if this Court reached the merits it would still affirm the district court. Rafferty does not cite any authority for the proposition that a “sexually-hostile environment” claim exists under the Eighth Amendment, and the Court is aware of no such authority. Rafferty cites two cases that recognize that prison guards can bring “hostile work environment” claims when they are subject to sexual misconduct at the hands of inmates. See Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006); Beckford v. Dep’t of Corr., 605 F.3d 951 (11th Cir. 2010). But these cases deal with Title VII, not the Eighth Amendment. See Freitag, 468 F.3d at 532; Beckford, 605 F.3d at 953. Rafferty cannot state a Title VII claim as a matter of law because she was an inmate, not an employee. See generally Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 332 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir. 2000) (“A violation of Title VII is established if ‘discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.’”) (emphasis added)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting unlawful employment practices). Rafferty’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument that Rafferty’s Eighth Amendment “sexually-hostile environment” claim lacks any foundation in existing case law. Nonetheless, Rafferty argues that this Court should expand the purview of the Eighth Amendment to give prisoners a right to be free from a “sexually hostile environment” because prisoners cannot sue 2 In fact, the plaintiff in West probably provided more notice than Rafferty because he at least referenced a “political association” claim in his complaint. By contrast, Rafferty never mentioned a “sexually-hostile environment” claim in her Amended Complaint. In fact, her Amended Complaint does not even contain the words “hostile” or “environment.” -8- No. 18-3138, Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty., Ohio under Title VII. (Pl. Br. at 13–15.) But Rafferty fails to adequately explain why Title VII—which, by its own terms, applies only to employment relationships—applies to prisoners. The Court accordingly declines Rafferty’s invitation to recognize an Eighth Amendment “sexually-hostile environment” claim based on her dubious analogy to Title VII. Because Rafferty failed to present evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Drennen violated the Eighth Amendment, her Monell claim against Trumbull County also fails. See, e.g., Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 622 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2007)).