Opinion ID: 768421
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 8 The Constitutional principles governing competency determinations are clearly established. It is settled that trying an incompetent defendant violates due process. Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Williams, 113 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the criminal prosecution of an accused person while legally incompetent offends the Due Process Clause). Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993). Accordingly, the test for competency is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)); accord Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1472 (10th Cir. 1995). 9 Our standard of review is equally clear. Competency to stand trial is a factual determination that can be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 828 (1999). A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The district court need not be correct, but its finding must be permissible in light of the evidence. Id. (citing Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. of Springfield, Missouri, 887 F.2d 242, 244 (10th Cir. 1989)). When assessing a defendant's competence, the district court may rely on a number of factors, including medical opinion and the court's observation of the defendant's comportment. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d at 1189 (citation omitted); see also Williams, 113 F.3d at 1159 (indicating that a district court may review evidence of defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence) (citation omitted). 10 The district court's finding that Mackovich was competent to stand trial was not clearly erroneous. First, in both his testimony and his written reports, Dr. Bull concluded that Mackovich was able to understand the proceedings against him. See, e.g., SROA, Vol. III, Doc. 50 at 2 (setting forth Dr. Bull's professional opinion that 1) Mr. Mackovich has a rational and factual understanding of the charges against him and their consequences and 2) he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with complete rational understanding). Dr. Bull was the only medical expert who assessed Mackovich's competence, and the district court's reliance on his opinion is not clear error. See Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d at 1212 (affirming a finding of competence based on a doctor's uncontradicted testimony); Boigegrain, 155 F.3d at 1189-90 (affirming a finding of incompetence based largely on the testimony of one psychiatrist). That much is evident from our decision in Miles: There, we held that it is not clearly erroneous for a district court to declare a defendant competent by adopting the findings of one expert and discounting the contrary findings of another. 61 F.3d at 1472-74. Second, while Mackovich admittedly rambled and expressed paranoia at certain points during the competency hearing, see Appellant's Opening Brief at 27, the district court was in a position to determine whether Mackovich's statements were genuine or feigned. After observing Mackovich's behavior during the course of the hearing, the district court apparently accepted the prosecution's argument that Mackovich was a desperate individual facing serious sentencing consequences who had nothing to lose by malingering. SROA, Vol. II, at 46. The hearing transcript also reveals that Mackovich made statements indicating that he understood the mechanics of the criminal process. Mackovich referred to prosecutors, public defenders, and the jury, implicitly acknowledged the difference between an acquittal and a conviction, and spoke of imprisonment and probation. While these statements by themselves would be insufficient to establish Mackovich's competence, see Williams, 113 F.3d at 1160 (That defendant can recite the charges against her, list witnesses, and use legal terminology are insufficient 'for proper assistance in the defense requires an understanding that is rational as well as factual.') (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), in combination with the district court's firsthand observations of Mackovich and Dr. Bull's medical opinion they preclude our concluding the district court's competency finding was clearly erroneous. 11 Mackovich's remaining objections to the district court's assessment of the evidence are insufficient to establish reversible error. Mackovich emphasizes that Dr. Bull diagnosed him with a schizo-affective disorder and recommended psychiatric treatment and antipsychotic drugs. Appellant's Opening Brief at 27. Mackovich's description of Dr. Bull's diagnosis is accurate, but this circuit has long recognized that [t]he presence of some degree of mental disorder in the defendant does not necessarily mean that he is incompetent to . . . assist in his own defense. Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1970); accord Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d at 1212; Miles, 61 F.3d at 1472. Mackovich also notes that his counsel expressed serious and concrete concerns about his competency. Appellant's Opening Brief at 27. As we explained in Bryson, [d]efense counsel is often in the best position to determine whether a defendant's competency is questionable. Nonetheless, the concerns of counsel alone are insufficient to establish doubt of a defendant's competency. 187 F.3d at 1201-02 (citations omitted). 12 Mackovich next contends that several developments after the hearing should have caused the district court to reevaluate his competence. For example, after receiving permission to address the court on the first day of trial, Mackovich made the following statement: 13 This is the flag of the United States of America. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(a), the plaintiff's claim of the pleading is in the Constitution of the United States of America, dated 1789, Article of the Ninth, for a hearing sworn by oath of the office. Army regulations 840-10, Chapter 21AB, states the flag of the United States will be of red, white, and blue with a star for each state and will be in the highest honored position over foreign flags and the president of the United States. Corporate flag of the fringe, by the law of the flag, the foreign flag of the fringe makes the jurisdiction foreign. Plaintiff is not an attorney of the law, plaintiff is a citizen and a party. How can a party plead to the matter by the subject in the court when the jurisdiction of venue, federal rules of court procedure, Rule 12(b)(3), has not been established or placed and erected plain under the flag with the fringe as to jurisdiction of the foreign power under the law of the flag? That the party is guilty until proven innocent, the Constitution of the United States rights are guaranteed to a citizen in the party innocent until proven guilty. Until the joinder of the federal rule of court procedure Rule 12(b) is established, no conversation can be understood. 14 ROA, Vol. III, at 72-73; see also id. at 73 (indicating that the district court responded by saying I don't know what the purpose of that is[,] but if it's an objection to proceeding, it's overruled). Later, believing that he and his attorney were not adequately prepared, Mackovich opted to stand mute and refused to testify in his own defense. 15 These developments do not demonstrate that the district court erred by refusing to halt the trial to reassess Mackovich's competence. It is true that [e]ven when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial. Drope, 420 U.S. at 181; accord Williams, 113 F.3d at 1160. Here, however, the district court's decision to proceed was not clearly erroneous for at least three reasons. First, Mackovich's flag fringe argument though indisputably frivolous was not indecipherable. Litigants in this circuit and elsewhere assert with some frequency that a flag adorned with yellow fringe is foreign and thus robs the trial court of jurisdiction. See Wacker v. Crow, No. 99-3071, 1999 WL 525905, at  (10th Cir. July 1, 1999) (unpublished disposition) (deeming frivolous the argument that the presence of a flag with yellow fringe precluded jurisdiction and effectively commuted the district court into a foreign power); Hancock v. Utah, No. 98-4139, 1999 WL 288251, at , ,  (10th Cir. May 10, 1999) (unpublished disposition) (rejecting a plaintiff's argument that state officials violated his right to due process by placing yellow fringe around the American flag); Murray v. Wyoming, No. 98-8095, 1999 WL 140517, at  (10th Cir. Mar. 16, 1999) (unpublished disposition) (dismissing as meritless a plaintiff's argument that the district court and a state penitentiary lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims on the ground that both institutions display a flag with yellow fringe). 2 Second, the district court did, in fact, briefly revisit the issue of competency after Mackovich complained about the flag. The district judge stated during trial that earlier I had a competency hearing to decide on the competency of the defendant, and I ruled that he was competent, and my opinion has not changed. ROA, Vol. III, at 196. Third, Mackovich made several remarks before and during trial that suggested he understood the proceedings. Prior to jury selection, for instance, Mackovich implicitly acknowledged that he was charged with robbery when he requested permission to wear at trial the clothes he had on at the time of his arrest: I had new clothes that the FBI took as evidence and apparently they're not matching any description of the robber. I don't see any reason why I shouldn't be having these to wear, Your Honor. Id., Vol. II, at 10. 3 Mackovich likewise demonstrated at least passing familiarity with courtroom rules and procedures when he objected at trial to the government's motion to require him to wear the disguise used by the bank robber: Your Honor, there haven't been any hair samples or fibers to match or testing. I would object to this as being highly prejudicial, anyway. Id., Vol. IV, at 442. The district court's repeated findings of competency are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.