Opinion ID: 2333373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: adjective course of determination.

Text: The initial questions involved presented by Erie on these appeals broach three adjective issues: whether there should be a reversal of the judgments of the Division for failure of all three members of the railroad panel to sign their report, whether the panel report was invalid because it included recommendations, and whether the approval of the report submitted by Commissioner Hull constituted adoption thereof by the Division. Erie accepts as valid the mechanics of the Division's assignment of these appeals to, and of hearing by, the railroad panel. The questions involved are devoid of any direct or implied attack thereon, and if there is any deficiency in that respect it must be deemed waived. Cf. R.R. 1:7-1( c ). The portions of the record reproduced by Erie in the appendix to its brief, see R.R. 1:7-1 ( f ), as necessary to a determination herein do not disclose any patent error in this respect. The questions involved as presented by Erie hinge on construction and application of pertinent provisions of the applicable statute of this State. The statute provides that a majority of the Division shall constitute a quorum and a vacancy shall not impair the powers nor affect the duties of the board or of the remaining members. R.S. 54:2-10. The Division may make such reasonable orders upon the final determination of    appeals as will effectuate the final determination thereof according to law. Such determination shall be evidenced by a judgment signed by at least four members, and filed with its secretary   . R.S. 54:2-14, as am. L. 1946, c. 161, sec. 3. (Emphasis supplied) The statute further provides as follows: R.S. 54:2-16, as am. L. 1941, c. 143, sec. 1: Hearings before the board shall be open to the public and its proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with such rules of evidence and procedure as the board from time to time may prescribe. The board shall reduce to writing its findings of fact and its decision in each case. These findings and decisions shall be entered of record and a copy furnished to the appellant and the State Tax Department. All findings, decisions and reasons therefor of the board including the transcript of testimony, if any, shall be public records and open to the inspection of the public. (Emphasis supplied) R.S. 54:2-18, as am. L. 1941, c. 143, sec. 2; L. 1946, c. 161, sec. 4: The Division of Tax Appeals in the State Department of Taxation and Finance may, as occasion shall require, by order, refer to two or more of its members, at least one of whom shall be an attorney-at-law, the duty of taking testimony in a matter pending before it, and to report on such matter and the testimony so taken, to the division, but no determination shall be made therein except by the division. Said reports shall be in writing and signed by the members, and shall include, in substance, the facts and particulars of the testimony so taken, which written reports shall be public records and open to the inspection of the public. Stenographic notes shall be made of all testimony so taken, but the members of the board shall be qualified to make their determination after receiving the report of the members hearing the testimony, and without the necessity that the stenographic notes so taken shall have been reduced to writing; provided, however, that the testimony shall be reduced to writing at the request of any member of the division required to make a determination in any such matter.  (Emphasis supplied) Erie asserts no error in the judgments of the Division as such. The judgments in each matter stated the ultimate determination made by the Division and were signed by five members of the Division. On their face the respective judgments appear to be strictly in conformity with R.S. 54:2-14, as amended, supra. Erie contends that initial error obtains in the element of the making of recommended findings of fact and determinations in Commissioner Hull's report. Erie's argument is that the statute expressly forbids such a practice in the phrase no determination shall be made therein except by the division. R.S. 54:2-18, as amended, supra. We find no merit in this argument. The clear sense of this statutory provision as an entirety is to permit the report of the panel members to contain recommendations of findings of fact and conclusions ( i.e., proposed determinations to be acted upon by the Division). The absence of these elements contributed to reversal in a similar case, Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 10 N.J. 418, 427 (1952). And the specific language no determination shall be made therein except by the division (emphasis supplied) obviously refers to the phrase matter pending before the Division, and not to the report of the panel. It does not bar recommendations by the panel, and the statutory provision R.S. 54:2-18, as amended, supra, expressly requires the report to include, in substance, the facts and particulars of the testimony   . The further contention is advanced by Erie that the panel report was invalid in that it was not signed by all members of the panel. We do not condone the omission but the error under the circumstances of this case is not demonstrably prejudicial to any party to the appeals. The report could be made by a majority of the panel since the duties of Division members are not impaired by a vacancy. R.S. 54:2-10, supra. No arbitrary refusal to sign the report by one or the other of Commissioner Hull's confreres on the panel is suggested either in the arguments presented to this court or in the record. No disagreement is indicated and Commissioner Weiner, a panel member, participated in the determination (as did Commissioner Hull, who wrote the report) made by the Division and signed the respective judgments, signifying thereby his agreement therewith. Examination of the record suggests that during the 20 days of hearings before the panel, Commissioner Hull was absent on one day, Commissioner Weiner was absent on one day and Commissioner DeVoe was absent on more than one day. On each day of the hearings the statutory panel minimum was present, namely two commissioners, one of whom was an attorney. R.S. 54:2-18, as amended, supra. The essential purpose of resort to hearers under this statute is to facilitate the compilation of a record under quasi -judicial guidance, and their report as such hearers is not a decision. Ibid. The record compiled is reviewed by the Division. Such procedure does not constitute a denial of due process. Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 504 (1954). No error or prejudice is charged by Erie in these respects and none is apparent under the circumstances of the matters involved on these appeals. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, no reversal will be effected on this basis. However, as a caveat we reiterate and stress our conclusion, stated by Mr. Justice Brennan, in City of Passaic v. Passaic County Bd. of Taxation, 18 N.J. 371, 397 (1955), concerning R.S. 54:2-18, as amended, supra, that: We think the sense of this provision is that the members assigned to conduct a proceeding and who report to the full Division must hear the proceedings throughout.    Erie also contends that the Division did not adopt the panel report and therefore made no written findings of fact and decision. See R.S. 54:2-16, as amended, supra. We find no merit in this contention. Commissioner Hull did not acquire a lesser status as a panel member but remained a member of the Division. His report was no less subject to adoption by the whole Division than was Commissioner DeVoe's report in Atlantic City Transportation Co. v. Director, 12 N.J. 130, 140-141 (1953). The panel members are commissioners, not subordinate employees, and the panel report is expressly declared by statute to be a public record. It is not secret, and Erie has asserted no right of access thereto or notice thereof prior to consideration of the appeals on the merits by the Division. Compare Mazza v. Cavicchia, supra, 15 N.J., at page 514. Further the judgments of the Division expressly state the members of the Division of Tax Appeals having considered the evidence submitted by the parties, or the Division of Tax Appeals having considered the evidence submitted by the parties, signifying resort to the record of testimony and other evidence by the Division members who signed the judgments. See R.S. 54:2-18, as amended, supra. Erie does not contend to the contrary. Erie's argument is that the record states that the Division merely approved Commissioner Hull's report, and reversal is required because there was no adoption thereof. The strict lexicographic definitions of approve include the sense of ratification, or official sanction. Webster's New International Dictionary (2 d ed. 1947), p. 133. We are not here confronted with a statutory expression of the word approve but with the discernment of the intent of the use thereof by the Division. In the sense used there is no doubt that the Division by approval or ratification under the circumstances of this case intended and consummated adoption in fact, and we so hold. Cf. Miller v. Union County, 48 Or. 266, 86 P. 3 ( Sup. Ct. 1906); City of Dallas v. Beeman, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 335, 45 S.W. 626, 628 ( Civ. App. 1898). Compare Leopold v. Civil Service Commission, 126 N.J.L. 613, 615 ( Sup. Ct. 1941).