Opinion ID: 1656009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Gashes' Claim for Declaratory Judgment

Text: In sections 64.845 through 64.880, the General Assembly prescribed procedures for zoning in fourth class counties. [6] Section 64.870.2 provides for judicial review of such zoning decisions. That section states, in pertinent part: Any owners, lessees or tenants of buildings, structures or land jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment or of the county commission, respectively, under the provisions of sections 64.845 to 64.880, or board, commission, or other public official, may present to the circuit court of the county in which the property affected is located, a petition. . . . Upon the presentation of the petition the court shall allow a writ of certiorari directed to the board of adjustment or the county commission, respectively, of the action taken. . . . (emphasis added) The determinative word is the adjective any, which modifies the noun decision. The word any is defined as: one, no matter what one: every; all; and great, unmeasured, or unlimited in amount, quantity, number, time, or extent. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (3d ed.1993). Thus, all decisions of the county commission made pursuant to sections 64.845 through 64.880, including the adoption of zoning ordinances and amendments thereto, must be challenged via a writ of certiorari. The General Assembly's decision to provide review of actions such as those complained of here via a writ of certiorari precludes the use of declaratory judgment. As the Court recently stated in Lane v. Lensmeyer, 158 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Mo. banc 2005): An action for declaratory judgment is inappropriate when the issue can be raised by some other means. . . . Count I of Taxpayers' amended petition for a declaratory judgment failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment thereon. Because a legal remedy exists in the instant case, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment for the Gashes. [7] The Court recognizes that decisions from other jurisdictions differ. Courts from those jurisdictions find that declaratory judgment, rather than certiorari, is the appropriate procedure for reviewing acts such as zoning and rezoning. See, e.g., Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 414 (Minn.1981). They ground their analyses in the different purposes of the two procedures. Declaratory judgment serves to evaluate the validity of legislative enactments. See section 527.020, see also 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgment section 53 (2001). A writ of certiorari, comparatively, is a common law writ that generally only lies to review the proceedings of bodies and officers of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. 14 C.J.S. Certiorari section 8 (2006); see also State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 61 S.W.3d 243, 245 (Mo. banc 2001); State ex rel. Manion v. Dawson, 284 Mo. 490, 225 S.W. 97, 99-100 (1920). Given this difference, those courts conclude that [t]he nature of the act determines the appropriate method of review. 14 C.J.S. Certiorari section 8. Because zoning and rezoning are legislative in nature, [8] they hold that declaratory judgment is proper in cases such as the one at bar. However, those jurisdictions are not governed by section 64.870.2. This Court must be guided by what [our] legislature said. . . . Metro Auto Auction v. Dir. of Revenue, 707 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Mo. banc 1986). If the General Assembly wished to create one remedy for a county commission's legislative actions and another for its quasi-judicial actions, it could have easily done so. [9] Instead, the General Assembly said that any decision . . . of the county commission is subject to review via a petition for writ of certiorari. Although courts do not typically employ the writ to review legislative decisions, the General Assembly may enlarge the scope of the remedy of certiorari and the grounds on which it will lie. 14 C.J.S. Certiorari section 4; see also State ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. v. Brown, 795 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo. banc 1990). [10] The plain and ordinary meaning of the statute also promotes efficiency within the judicial system. If the nature of the action determined the remedy available, courts would be asked to characterize every type of land-use planning and zoning decision as either legislative or quasi-judicial. Such categorization has engendered much debate in other jurisdictions. Compare R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Comm. for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 239 Va.484, 391 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1990) (finding all rezoning decisions are legislative), with Sutton v. Dubuque City Council, 729 N.W.2d 796, 798-99 (Iowa 2006) (adopting a factors analysis for determining whether a particular rezoning decision is legislative or quasi-judicial). Accordingly, this Court holds that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment in the instant case and vacates that aspect of its judgment. [11]