Opinion ID: 2632377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ireland's use of a concealed gesture constituted aggravated robbery

Text: ¶ 8 The crime of aggravated robbery is defined by section 76-6-302 of the Utah Code. It provides that [a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601. [9] Section 76-1-601(5) defines a dangerous weapon as (a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or (b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: (i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item. [10] ¶ 9 Our analysis turns on whether Ireland used a dangerous weapon during the robbery. We first address whether Ireland used a representation of an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury as defined by section 76-1-601(5)(b). If so, we must then address whether Ireland's use of such a representation led the victim to reasonably believe the item [was] likely to cause death or serious bodily injury or whether he represented to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he [was] in control of such an item. [11]
¶ 10 Under section 76-1-601(5), a dangerous weapon can be any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury or a facsimile or representation of the item used in a manner specified by subsections (i) and (ii). [12] The State contends that Ireland's concealed gesture constitutes a representation of a weapon. We agree. ¶ 11 The plain meaning of the term representation, as used by section 76-1-601(5), encompasses a gesture. Unlike a facsimile, which is `an exact and detailed copy,' [13] a wide array of items, conduct, and statements can be considered representations. [14] Black's Law Dictionary defines a representation as [a] presentation of facteither by words or by conductmade to induce someone to act. [15] A representation has also been defined as [a]n image or likeness of something or an account . . . of facts. [16] In context, the use of the term representation refers to verbal or nonverbal statements or conduct conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing action. [17] Because a concealed gun-like gesture is intended to influence a victim to act out of fear for his life or safety, it falls within the definition of representation. ¶ 12 The plain meaning of the word representation as used in the statute is buttressed by the available legislative history. The term representation was added to the statute in response to this court's decision in State v. Suniville. [18] In that case, the defendant pointed his concealed hand at a bank teller and demanded that she give him all her money to prevent the robbery from turning into a homicide. [19] Under the prior version of the statute, which did not include the term representation, this court ruled that a [d]efendant's menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient evidence alone to establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. [20] The legislature responded to our ruling by adding the term representation to the statute, evincing its intent that gestures, at least those accompanied by verbal threats, should be covered by the aggravated robbery statute. ¶ 13 Utah precedent also supports our conclusion that the term representation includes concealed gestures and verbal statements. For example, in State v. Candelario , the court of appeals affirmed a firearm enhancement, reasoning that even though the defendant did not use an actual firearm, [t]he plain meaning of the phrase `the representation of a dangerous weapon' requires that courts apply the firearm enhancement if a defendant makes a verbal or a nonverbal statement that he possesses a firearm. [21] Similarly, in State v. Reyos, [22] the court of appeals upheld an aggravated robbery charge, reasoning that a representation of a dangerous weapon may include a statement conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing action. [23] And in State v. Hartmann, [24] we indicated that a charge can be aggravated when a defendant verbally represents that he has a dangerous weapon, reasoning that [u]se or display of a weapon is not required; threat of such use is sufficient. [25] ¶ 14 The majority of courts from other jurisdictions have similarly held that statutes containing terms such as representation are broad enough to encompass verbal threats, menacing gestures, and the use of everyday objects in a threatening manner. For example, in Faulkner v. State, [26] a defendant threatened a victim by placing a sock-covered chisel to her back. The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the defendant's conviction for armed robbery, reasoning that he used an article that had the appearance of a gun to persuade [the victim] to comply with his demand and that his acts created a reasonable apprehension on her part that he was threatening her with a gun. [27] Similarly, in State v. Arena, [28] the Connecticut Supreme Court indicated that [t]he state only had to prove that the defendant represented by his conduct that he had a firearm and that he need not actually possess a real firearm. [29] And in People v. Lopez, [30] the New York Supreme Court held that [w]hile the display of what appears to be a firearm test requires a display of something that could reasonably be perceived as a firearm, there is no requirement that the object need be anything other than the defendant's hand. [31] ¶ 15 In this case, Ireland clearly gestured in a menacing manner. Although Ireland did not have a real firearm or even a facsimile of one, he gestured with his concealed hand in order to influence Reinkoester to turn over the money. We accordingly conclude that Ireland's concealed gesture constitutes a representation within the meaning of the statute.
¶ 16 Having concluded that Ireland's gesture qualifies as a representation, we return to the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon. To qualify as the use of a dangerous weapon, a defendant's representation must also satisfy one of the following requirements: (i) the use of the representation must lead the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury or (ii) the defendant must represent to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of the representation. [32] ¶ 17 Ireland argues that his conduct did not satisfy either requirement. He reasons that even if a concealed hand gesture qualifies as a representation under the first part of the statute, the structure of the statute and its use of the conjunction and requires an additional representation, verbal or otherwise, that the robber is in control of or will use the dangerous weapon. In short, Ireland argues that the statute requires something in addition to the mere use of a facsimile or representation. ¶ 18 The way in which section 76-1-601(5) is structured does suggest that subsections (i) and (ii) will add additional requirements beyond what is contained in subsection (5)(b) itself. But the actual verbiage of the subsections belies that suggestion. Indeed, virtually any use of a representation will necessarily satisfy the requirements of either subsection (i) or (ii). For example, one using a representation of a dangerous weapon will necessarily represent to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item (emphasis added). [33] Similarly, one using a representation of a dangerous weapon will almost always use it to lead the victim to believe that the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. [34] Indeed, in this case, Ireland's representation, almost by definition, satisfies the requirements of both subsections (i) and (ii). ¶ 19 Although the structure of the statute is confusing, we are unwilling to rework the statutory terms as Ireland suggests. [35] In our interpretive rubric, the plain language of the statute trumps any deference to seemingly contradictory structure. Thus, even though the statutory structure is somewhat inconsistent with its actual language, we will not attempt to rewrite it. ¶ 20 As Ireland rightly states, we try to avoid surplusage in statutory interpretation. [36] But in this case, avoiding the suggestion of surplusage creates untenable interpretive options. Adopting Ireland's plus-factor interpretation would require us to ignore the plain meaning of the language employed by the legislature either by interpreting representation in an unduly narrow manner or by ignoring the phrase in any other manner found in subsection (b)(i). Another option would be to craft an additional plus factor out of whole cloth, solely on the basis of the statutory structure and the statute's use of the conjunction and. But creating additional statutory requirements is not our role. Rather, our role is to interpret the statute according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confusing or inoperable. [37] ¶ 21 Ireland also argues that sustaining a conviction for aggravated robbery because of the mere use of a representation destroys the critical distinction between simple and aggravated robbery. While we are sympathetic to Ireland's argument, it is an argument appropriately directed to the legislature rather than to this court. Should the legislature wish to maintain such a distinction or should any part of our interpretation bring[] about a result contrary to the intention of the Legislature, it is a matter for the Legislature to remedy. [38] ¶ 22 Although it is not within our purview to rewrite the statute, we acknowledge the confusing statutory structure and Ireland's concern that the statute destroys the distinction between simple and aggravated robbery, and we encourage the legislature to consider these matters. [39] For example, several states classify robbery in three different tiers: simple robbery, robbery using a facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon, and robbery using an actual deadly weapon. [40] Such classifications enable these states to maintain a distinction between simple and aggravated robbery, while still punishing the use of representations and facsimiles. In other states, a defendant can be convicted of first degree robbery for using what appears to be a representation of a dangerous weapon; however, the charge drops to second degree robbery if the defendant can show that what appeared to be a dangerous weapon on was not loaded or was inoperable. [41]