Opinion ID: 2639394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: smith's procedural arguments against the summary judgment order

Text: ¶ 14 On appeal, Smith makes several procedural arguments attacking the district court's summary judgment order. Smith argues that, to the extent the district court's order granting summary judgment to both Four Corners and the Randalls rests on the theory of governmental immunity, it is deficient because the district court failed to explain the reasoning supporting its conclusion on this theory. Smith further contends that the district court improperly supported its determination that the defendants [5] were entitled to governmental immunity by sua sponte incorporating its ruling regarding DHS's immunity into its order granting summary judgment. In addition, Smith asserts that Four Corners' failure to properly answer interrogatories prevented him from establishing material facts that would have precluded summary judgment based on his failure to comply with the UHCMA. Because these procedural arguments would ultimately be dispositive if true, we consider them first before discussing the propriety of the substantive legal theories offered to justify summary judgment for the Randalls and Four Corners.
¶ 15 In his brief, Smith asserts that the district court's ruling granting summary judgment to the defendants is a clearly deficient document that must be considered plainly erroneous. He argues that unspecified issues and accompanying argument were crucial to the court's decision and that non-disclosure of this information should invalidate the decision. ¶ 16 Smith's deficiency argument fails because the district court's order included sufficient detail to permit appellate review. When a court decides a motion for summary judgment, rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that [t]he court shall ... issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision ... when the motion is based on more than one ground. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). In an earlier case, we noted that the purpose of rule 52 is to give the parties a written indication of the court's reasoning and held that a court need only include the basic essentials of the grounds upon which it relies to comply with the rule. Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52, ¶ 8, 26 P.3d 227. The district court stated in its order that it granted summary judgment to Four Corners because Smith failed to timely file his lawsuit. It granted summary judgment to the Randalls because it determined that, like DHS, they were immune from suit. A simple reading of the district court's order reveals the basic grounds upon which it relied to grant summary judgment to both defendants. Therefore, we conclude that the district court's order granting summary judgment was not deficient. [6]
¶ 17 Smith also argues that the district court should not have sua sponte incorporated its earlier order granting DHS's motion to dismiss, and the arguments supporting that decision, into its decision to grant the Randalls summary judgment in order to support that judgment. Contrary to Smith's position, we note that the district court did not incorporate its earlier ruling for DHS sua sponte. In the memorandum supporting their motion for summary judgment, the Randalls specifically argued that they were appointed to act as foster parents by [DHS]. Consequently, they should be deemed quasi-governmental in their position and should be entitled to the same immunity as [DHS]. [DHS]'s arguments on immunity, which have already been successful herein, are incorporated herein by this reference. Additionally, at oral argument before the district court, the Randalls clearly claimed governmental immunity based on their relationship with DHS. Because the Randalls made this argument in their memorandum and at oral argument before the district court, Smith cannot argue that the district court relied sua sponte on its previous holding to justify granting summary judgment to the Randalls.
¶ 18 Finally, Smith argues that summary judgment was premature because he was not able to complete discovery prior to the district court's decision to grant summary judgment. He specifically argues that by failing to completely answer his interrogatories, Four Corners hampered his ability to demonstrate the existence of material facts. Four Corners argues that this claim was not properly preserved below because Smith failed to move the district court to compel Four Corners to fully answer the interrogatories or to make a rule 56(f) motion to allow for additional discovery. ¶ 19 We will not address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Treff v. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, ¶ 9 n. 4, 26 P.3d 212; see also Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993) (`With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal.' (citation omitted)). Smith claims that he first raised this issue in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. [7] Despite a close review of both this document and the oral argument before the district court, we are unable to discover any evidence that this issue was ever brought before the court below. Because this issue has been raised for the first time on appeal, it is not properly before us. Therefore, we will not address it. ¶ 20 Since each of Smith's procedural arguments fails, we now turn to discuss whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on the theories of governmental immunity and failure to timely comply with the UHCMA.