Opinion ID: 1144018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: use of the paia land sale as a comparable sale for valuation purposes

Text: At issue in the trial was the market value that appellants' property would have had on April 22, 1970, if the operation of the Kahului Airport had continued at the level that existed in November, 1966, prior to the sustained use of the airport by commercial jet aircraft. In an attempt to demonstrate this value, appellants' expert witness, an appraiser, first gave his opinion as to the actual market value of the condemned land as of April 22, 1970, basing his opinion on comparable sales in the area. The appraiser then stated his belief that but for the noise from the use of the airport by commercial jet aircraft since late 1966, the value of appellants' land in 1970 would have been 15% greater. As support for this opinion, the appellants offered the appraiser's testimony with respect to a recent sale of land located in Paia, near Sprecklesville but not affected by the noise from Kahului Airport. The court refused to admit the testimony regarding the Paia sale into evidence. The Paia land, unlike the subject property, had not been affected by airport activity prior to November, 1966. Therefore, reasoned the court, the 1970 sale price would be of only speculative worth in establishing the market value that appellants' property would have had in April, 1970, if the airport activity had continued at the level that existed in November, 1966. Instead, sales of property situated closer to the airport were admitted as comparable sales. It is well established that recent sales of similar real estate are admissible as evidence in condemnation cases, either as substantive proof of value of the property taken or in support of an expert's opinion as to value. 5 Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain, § 21.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1969); see United States v. Johnson, 285 F.2d 35, 40 (9th Cir.1960); International Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d 201, 208 (5th Cir.1955); United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, Etc., 200 F.2d 659, 662 (4th Cir.1952). If such evidence is offered on the latter basis, as is the case herein, the foundation requirements to show similarity are less strict than when the evidence is used as direct and independent proof of value. United States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, Etc., 362 F.2d 660, 668 (3rd Cir.1966); United States v. Johnson, supra ; 5 Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain, § 18.42(1) (rev. 3d ed. 1969). This court has taken the position that in a condemnation case such as this one, any evidence which will aid the jury in fixing the fair market value of the property should be considered by them. Any competent evidence of matters, not merely speculative, which would be considered by a prospective vendor or purchaser or which tend to enhance or depreciate the value of the property taken is admissible. Territory v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 147-148, 363 P.2d 979, 980 (1961) (emphasis added). In the instant case the circuit court ruled that the evidence was of only speculative value and therefore inadmissible. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that the trial judge's determination as to admissibility or non-admissibility of . . evidence [of a comparable sale] will not be upset on appeal unless it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Heirs of Kapahi, 48 Haw. 101, 112-113, 395 P.2d 932, 939 (1964). Upon an examination of the record of the instant case, we are satisfied that the exclusion by the circuit court judge of the evidence of the Paia sale did not constitute a clear abuse of discretion and thus is not reversible error.