Opinion ID: 365635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Discharge of Phillips

Text: 95 While an employee at Delco, Phillips was actively engaged in the UAW's organizational campaign. He had signed a union authorization card, attended about eight or ten union meetings held at Barbara Rawls' home and at other places, and passed out leaflets at the Fitzgerald plant gate approximately three times in August, 1976. Phillips' uncorroborated testimony provided the only evidence that Delco management was aware of Phillips' support for the union. 96 Phillips was discharged for falsifying his time card. 97 Delco does not utilize conventional time clocks to record the arrival and departure of its hourly employees. Instead Delco relies on an honor system whereby each employee is required to enter on his time card the amount of time worked during that shift. To facilitate the entry of the time on these cards there is a big clock about ten or twelve feet from the time card rack. The time entry is made at the end of the shift. The entry is then initialed by a supervisor and the card is sent off to the payroll section at the end of the week to be used in the preparation of a paycheck. 98 If an employee works a standard eight-hour shift, he simply inserts the number 8 in the appropriate blank. If he worked something other than a standard shift, he places the exact time of his arrival and the exact time of his departure on the card. The number of hours worked, including overtime when applicable, is also entered. 99 Falsification of time card entries is dischargeable conduct and three employees were discharged for that reason in 1975. 100 From this record there can be no doubt that Phillips did falsify his time cards on at least two occasions. The Administrative Law Judge could not, and did not, make a finding to the contrary. 101 Rather, the Union argues, the Administrative Law Judge found, and the Board agreed, that Supervisor Johnson, who was anti-union, was out to get Phillips for his pro-union activities, that the falsification of his time cards was a mere pretext for discharging him. The Administrative Law Judge found that Phillips was discharged because he was a Union activist who would not march to Johnson's anti-union drumbeat, Record at 609. 102 We might prolong this opinion by recording the same type of detailed factual analysis herein previously accorded Rawls' case. Indeed, in preparation for the drafting of this opinion we did compile a witness by witness analysis which ran thirty nine typewritten pages in length. At the end of this intensive examination we are thoroughly convinced that the pretextual findings are without substantial support in the record as a whole. 103 We have often observed that the essence of discrimination in a § 8(a)(3) violation consists of treating like cases differently, NLRB v. Florida Steel Corporation, 5 Cir., 1978, 586 F.2d 436, 443, and cases cited therein. The record indicates that three other Delco employees were discharged in 1975 for falsification of their time cards. Neither the General Counsel nor the Union showed that a single employee who had falsified his time cards was not discharged. See NLRB v. Florida Steel Corporation, supra; Mueller Brass Company v. NLRB, 5 Cir., 1977, 544 F.2d 815, 819, 820; NLRB v. Mueller Brass Company, 5 Cir., 1975, 509 F.2d 704, 713; NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Company, 5 Cir., 1967, 374 F.2d 576, 582. 104 The Board argues in its brief, however, that the discrimination lies in the fact that but for his union activities, Phillips would not have been discharged rather than in the fact of disparate treatment from other employees, Board Brief at 29 n. 18. If we assume Arguendo that Phillips' misdeeds were not so flagrant that he would almost certainly be fired anyway, then an inquiry as to whether union animus was the motivating factor with respect to Phillips' discharge, 105 must be made even where the discharged employee has done something that might warrant his discharge, since if it is something that the employer might pass over in another instance the firing of (that employee) can be discriminatory. 106 Frosty Morn Meats, Inc. v. NLRB, 5 Cir., 1961, 296 F.2d 617, 621. The problem is that we are unable to agree that there is substantial evidence that union animus was the motivating factor for the discharge of Phillips. 107 The record clearly establishes that Delco had just cause to discharge Phillips. Once the employer established just cause the burden then shifted to General Counsel to prove that the employer's anti-union animus was the motivating factor, Florida Steel Corporation v. NLRB, 5 Cir., 1979, 587 F.2d 735, 741, 742, and cases cited; NLRB v. Florida Steel Corporation, 5 Cir., 1978, 586 F.2d 436, 447. 108 The General Counsel must also establish a causal connection between the employer's attitude and the discharge, Florida Steel Corporation v. NLRB, supra, 587 F.2d at 742; NLRB v. Florida Steel Corporation, supra, 586 F.2d at 447, 450. 109 An unlawful purpose is not lightly to be inferred, Federal-Mogul Corporation v. NLRB, 5 Cir., 1978, 566 F.2d 1245, 1260. Mere suspicions of unlawful motivation are not sufficient to constitute substantial evidence, Id. 110 In his findings, the Administrative Law Judge relies on the relationship between Johnson and Phillips once the latter began working on third-shift and, apparently, to the conversations between these two individuals. The two alleged conversations between Johnson and Phillips do not reveal that Johnson harbored any personal antipathy towards Phillips because of the latter's sympathy with the Union. Similarly, despite the Administrative Law Judge's unsupported insinuation to the contrary, the record leaves no doubt that Johnson's exercise of supervisory control over Phillips' activities on third-shift was neither improper nor unusual. 111 The record does not support the inference that Phillips' falsifications were of no moment to Johnson, especially when Johnson immediately sought Phillips' discharge upon determining that Phillips was guilty of a second offense of falsification. 112 The Administrative Law Judge's finding that Johnson was setting a trap for Phillips is also unsupported by the record. Although it may be uncommon for Delco guards to record the time of an employee's arrival at the plant, it was not an unusual if not extraordinary step (as the Administrative Law Judge termed it) for Johnson to instruct the guards to do so in Phillips' case. The night before Johnson so instructed the guards, Phillips had arrived late and falsified his time card. The Administrative Law Judge overlooked this important fact. Moreover, that there was a dispute on the next night when Phillips was once again late would indicate that if Johnson had not spoken with Phillips, Phillips would have falsified his time card on that occasion. Finally, Phillips admitted that Johnson had emphasized the importance of his being punctual. According to other undisputed testimony, there were a number of employee complaints with regard to Phillips' performance on third-shift prior to the time Johnson requested the guards to keep time on Phillips. The Administrative Law Judge's characterization of Johnson's activity as unusual if not extraordinary is not justified by the record. 113 Second, given Phillips' falsification with respect to his time of arrival on Tuesday night of the first week, Johnson did not need to go out of his way to discharge Phillips, Federal-Mogul Corporation v. NLRB, supra, 566 F.2d at 1258. A dischargeable offense had already been committed. An observation made by this Court in Federal-Mogul is equally applicable here: 114 Instead of giving the Company credit for its patience and forbearance with regard to Emerson's absenteeism during this long period of time, the Administrative Law Judge attributed an improper motive to the Company for its leniency and tolerance toward Emerson during this period. 115 This is simply a case in which the employee chose to falsify his time cards more than once and seeks immunity on the ground that he really was not fired for that but because the company was out to get him for his union activities several months previously. General Counsel failed to carry his burden on that issue. 116 According to the record, the company went to extraordinary pains to educate its supervisors against inadvertent infractions of the National Labor Relations Act. It played a very passive part in the Union organizing campaign. There was hardly any necessity for exercising animus against an individual employee after the election had been won in such an overwhelming fashion. It all boils down to an argument that Phillips was a union activist, months later he was discharged for falsifying his time cards: ergo, anti-union animus motivated his discharge. 117 We set aside the Board's findings and order as to Phillips' alleged § 8(a)(3) discharge.