Opinion ID: 393745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriateness of Relief.

Text: 34 The appellants urge that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin all 'gravely disabled' certifications under the LPS Act. The appellants do not dispute the jurisdiction of the lower court to enjoin all future certifications of appellee on the basis of grave disability unless a probable cause hearing is provided, and recognize that a declaratory judgment as to the unconstitutionality of the certification procedure may affect all persons certified under the 'gravely disabled' standard. In their view, however, (t)he lower court lacks jurisdiction ... to enjoin all certifications on the basis of grave disability within the limited scope of this private action. 35 We are at a loss to understand this argument. The appellants complain that the separate counties in the State of California, under whose auspices commitments under the LPS Act may take place, were not parties to this action and have not had the opportunity to introduce evidence of additional procedural protection. The district court's injunction order, however, does not purport to bind anyone other than defendants and their privies. 8 We agree that the court had no power over those not properly before it. It did not attempt to exercise any such power. 36 Similarly, the appellants protest that plaintiff was granted no standing to assert the constitutional rights of third persons. Under those circumstances, the district court should not have granted relief beyond an injunction prohibiting future certifications of John Doe, the plaintiff, without a probable cause hearing. 37 In our view, this latter concern goes primarily to the appropriateness of declaratory relief in this case rather than the scope of the injunction issued to effectuate the declaratory judgment. 38 The declaratory remedy is committed to the sound discretion of the court. Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 331, 82 S.Ct. 337, 341, 7 L.Ed.2d 317, 322 (1961); Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241, 73 S.Ct. 236, 239, 97 L.Ed. 291, 294-95 (1952); Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494-98, 62 S.Ct. 1173, 1175-77, 86 L.Ed. 1620, 1625-27 (1942). Whether that discretion should be exercised in a given instance is subject to more searching review by an appellate court than the abuse of discretion standard. Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 591-92 (D.C.Cir.1976); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Preformed Line Products Co., 362 F.2d 339, 344 (9th Cir. 1966) (appellate court may substitute its judgment for that of the court below). 39 The district court found that Doe had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the gravely disabled statute and procedure on its face and as applied to him. His injury from the operation of the statute is direct; he can adequately present the constitutional issues to this court. 486 F.Supp. at 990. We agree that Doe's action properly presented the issues upon which the district court ruled. No reason for withholding the discretionary remedy appears in the record, nor has any meritorious reason been advanced by the appellants. Rather, this case seems an entirely appropriate one in which to exercise the discretion to render a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the challenged statutory provisions. 40 Having exercised that discretion, and having declared the statutory scheme unconstitutional on its face, the district court was empowered under 28 U.S.C. § 2202 to grant (f)urther necessary or proper relief to effectuate the judgment. The challenged provisions were not unconstitutional as to Doe alone, but as to any to whom they might be applied. Under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to enjoin the defendants from applying them.