Opinion ID: 788121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our Decision in Palila IV

Text: 10 The Cetaceans contend that an earlier decision of this court requires us to hold that they have standing under the ESA. We first address that decision. In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir.1988) ( Palila IV ), a suit to enforce the ESA, we wrote that an endangered member of the honeycreeper family, the Hawaiian Palila bird, has legal status and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right. Id. We wrote, further, that the Palila had earned the right to be capitalized since it is a party to these proceedings. Id. 11 If these statements in Palila IV constitute a holding that an endangered species has standing to sue to enforce the ESA, they are binding on us in this proceeding. Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1130 (9th Cir.2003) (three-judge panels are bound by the holdings of earlier three-judge panels). The government argues that these statements in Palila IV are nonbinding dicta. See, e.g., Hawaiian Crow (`Alala) v. Lujan, 906 F.Supp. 549, 552 n. 2 (D.Haw.1991) (characterizing statements in Palila IV as nonbinding dicta); Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 836 F.Supp. 45, 49 (D.Mass.1993) (same). The district court agreed with the government's argument. Cetacean Community, 249 F.Supp.2d at 1210 (As other courts have recognized, however, this statement is dicta and does not constitute precedent binding on this court.). However, at least two district courts, relying on our statements in Palila IV, have held that the ESA grants standing to animals. Marbled Murrelet v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 F.Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D.Cal.1995); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia, Florida, 896 F.Supp. 1170, 1177 (M.D.Fla.1995) (citing Marbled Murrelet ). We asked for briefing on whether we should take this case en banc to overrule Palila IV. A majority of the nonrecused judges voted not to take this case en banc. 12 After due consideration, we agree with the district court that Palila IV's statements are nonbinding dicta. A statement is dictum when it is `made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but ... is unnecessary to the decision in the case and [is] therefore not precedential.' Best Life Assur. Co. v. Comm'r, 281 F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1100 (7th ed.1999)). The line is not always easy to draw, however, for where a panel confronts an issue germane to the eventual resolution of the case, and resolves it after reasoned consideration in a published opinion, that ruling becomes the law of the circuit, regardless of whether doing so is necessary in some strict logical sense. United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir.2001) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 13 When we decided Palila IV, the case had already been the subject of three published opinions, two by the district court and one by this court. Standing for most of the plaintiffs had always been clear, and standing for the Palila had never been a disputed issue. In Palila I, the district court noted that the action was filed in the name of the Palila by the Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, Hawaii Audubon Society, and Alan C. Ziegler, suing as next friends and on their own behalf, as plaintiffs. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res. ( Palila I ), 471 F.Supp. 985, 987 (D.Haw.1979). On appeal from that decision, we wrote in Palila II, The Sierra Club and others brought this action in the name of the Palila. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res. ( Palila II ), 639 F.2d 495, 496 (9th Cir.1981). On remand, the district court did not repeat its description of the plaintiffs, but the parties were unchanged. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res. ( Palila III ), 649 F.Supp. 1070 (D.Haw.1986). Finally, in Palila IV, immediately after we stated that the Palila wings it way into the federal court as a plaintiff in its own right, we noted that the Sierra Club and others brought an action under the [ESA] on behalf of the Palila. Palila IV, 852 F.3d at 1107. 14 We have jurisdiction if at least one named plaintiff has standing to sue, even if another named plaintiff in the suit does not. See Laub v. U.S. Dep't. of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir.2003). Because the standing of most of the other parties was undisputed in Palila I-IV, no jurisdictional concerns obliged us to consider whether the Palila had standing. Cf. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 461, 466 n. 2 (3d Cir.1997) (allowing turtle to remain named in case caption, but not deciding whether it had standing because named human parties did). Moreover, we were never asked to decide whether the Palila had standing. 15 In context, our statements in Palila IV were little more than rhetorical flourishes. They were certainly not intended to be a statement of law, binding on future panels, that animals have standing to bring suit in their own name under the ESA. Because we did not hold in Palila IV that animals have standing to sue in their own names under the ESA, we address that question as a matter of first impression here.