Opinion ID: 1137859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Completeness Of A Hypothetical

Text: When the district attorney asked Dr. Maggio  the State's expert psychiatrist  if he had an opinion regarding the sanity of Mary Ann Gerlach at the time of the shooting based upon Dr. Maggio's examination of her, defense counsel objected on the grounds that any such hypothetical must include all of the evidence and testimony before the Court. The trial judge sustained this objection and prosecutor rephrased the question  as shown in the foregoing Section II of the Facts  to include a substantial amount of the bizarre history and behavior of Gerlach. Defense counsel again objected that the hypothetical was incomplete. The trial court overruled this objection and allowed Dr. Maggio to testify that he believed that Gerlach was sane when she committed the shooting. On appeal, Gerlach contends that, unless the hypothetical question posed by the prosecutor included all undisputed evidence in the record to that point, it was an incomplete hypothetical and thus improper. Gerlach cites the case of Cates v. State, 171 Miss. 106, 157 So. 95 (1934), which states: Where the facts are conflicting, the party producing expert may state the facts in accordance with his theory of them, assuming them to be true for the purpose of the argument. He is not authorized to omit material evidence bearing on the issue and calculated to influence the decision of the issue, but he must state these facts, where they are not disputed. 171 Miss. at 124, 157 So. at 100. Cates is really the only case Gerlach attempts to hang her hat on. This reliance on Cates is clearly misplaced, however. Cates itself goes on to observe: If there had been a fair and full effort to embrace all the facts, and, through oversight, some of the material facts were omitted, then the objecter should be required to state such omitted facts so that the court might see where they had any material bearing on the issue being tried. 171 Miss. at 125, 157 So. at 100-01. The upshot of Cates' reasoning is that a party may not purposefully omit undisputed material facts in order to elicit from an expert an opinion which has really no bearing on the actual facts of the case, but which is given merely improperly to influence or mislead the jury. Subsequent cases  cases which cite Cates  make clear that [i]t is not imperative that hypothetical questions cover all the undisputed facts in evidence ... [t]he form of an hypothetical question is a matter within the sound discretion of the court. King v. State, 251 Miss. 161, 174, 168 So.2d 637, 642 (1964); see also Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Weaver, 242 Miss. 141, 153, 133 So.2d 635, 640 (1961) (trial court discretion); but see Magnolia Hospital v. Moore, 320 So.2d 793, 798 (Miss. 1975) (no modification made to the strong Cates language); Mississippi Power Co. v. Harrison, 247 Miss. 400, 417-18, 152 So.2d 892, 900 (1963) (same). We hold that the question posed in this case fairly summarized the relevant facts. It was not necessary that every minute undisputed detail be included. Defense counsel, of course, was free on cross-examination to inquire whether Dr. Maggio's opinion would change if certain additional facts were added, and counsel took full advantage of this opportunity. The assignment of error is without merit and is denied.