Opinion ID: 169685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Media Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: We next turn to the district court's grant of summary judgment for the media defendants on Anderson's publication of private facts claim. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard that the district court applied. Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir.2006). Ordinarily, the district court must view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment and should grant summary judgment only when there is no genuine dispute over a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Anderson argues that the district court incorrectly granted the media defendants summary judgment on her publication of private facts claim. Anderson alleges in her publication of private facts claim that the media defendants tortiously published private facts about her when they aired the videotape. We agree with the district court that Anderson failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to this claim because the material published was substantially related to a matter of legitimate public concern. Oklahoma has adopted the Restatement of Torts' definition of publication of private facts: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977); McCormack v. Okla. Publ. Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla.1980). The requirement that the published private facts not be of legitimate public concern is both an element of the common law tort and a constitutional limitation imposed by the First Amendment. See Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307-08 (10th Cir. 1981); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. d; see also Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1220 n. 9 (10th Cir.2007) (However, we observe that state law now defines torts involving publication to take into account First Amendment restrictions announced by the Supreme Court.). This limitation on the publication-of-private-facts tort protects the right of the press to disseminate newsworthy information to the public. Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 307. A matter can be of legitimate public concern even though it concerns private individuals, like Anderson, `who have not sought publicity or consented to it, but through their own conduct or otherwise have become a legitimate subject of public interest.' Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. f (1977)). But there are limits as well to what matters are of legitimate public concern. In Gilbert, we concluded that there are some facts which are beyond the sphere of legitimate public concern: Even where certain matters are clearly within the protected sphere of legitimate public interest, some private facts about an individual may lie outside that sphere. . . . [T]o properly balance freedom of the press against the right of privacy, every private fact disclosed in an otherwise truthful, newsworthy publication must have some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest. Id. at 308 (emphasis added); cf. Alvarado, 493 F.3d at 1221 (reiterating the substantial relevance standard). Although application of the newsworthiness standard to undisputed facts may well present a jury question in some cases, we can affirm the district court if objective and reasonable minds could not differ in concluding that the broadcast portion of the videotape is a matter of legitimate public interest. Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 309. The media defendants have satisfied this inquiry because the videotape was substantially relevant to a matter of legitimate public interest: the prosecution of Anderson's husband, a local attorney, for rape, as well as for other sexual assault charges involving multiple victims. By the time the media defendants aired the excerpts from the videotape, Anderson's husband had already been arrested for at least one other rape. Aplt. App. at 336. Anderson's allegation that she had been raped by her husband increased the likelihood that there was support for the other pending charges against him. Information concerning the possible guilt or innocence of a person charged with a crime is a classic example of a matter of legitimate public concern. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. h (1977) ([T]he life history of one accused of murder, together with such heretofore private facts as may throw some light upon what kind of person he is, his possible guilt or innocence, or his reasons for committing the crime, are a matter of legitimate public interest.); cf. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975). By airing the videotape, the media defendants heightened the report's impact and credibility by demonstrating that the allegations rested on a firm evidentiary foundation and that the reporter had access to reliable information. Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 308. Anderson raises two arguments which challenge the videotape's substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public concern. First, Anderson argues the videotape was highly personal and intimate in nature. While the sensitive nature of the material might make its disclosure highly offensive to a reasonable person, that does not make the videotape any less newsworthy so long as the material as a whole is substantially relevant to a legitimate matter of public concern. Alvarado, 493 F.3d at 1221 (noting that [o]ther courts also appear to give `public interest' status to news material on an aggregate basis, rather than itemizing what in the news report would qualify and what could remain private (citing Ross v. Midwest Commc'ns, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 274-75 (5th Cir.1989))). In support of her argument that the videotape is too personal and intimate to have any relevance to a matter of public concern, Anderson highlights the following example from the Restatement: [W]hen a photograph is taken without the plaintiff's consent in a private place . . . the plaintiff's appearance that is made public when the picture appears in a newspaper is still a private matter, and his privacy is invaded. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. b (1977). This illustration, however, does not refer to the legitimate public concern inquiry because the Restatement only uses the illustration to distinguish a private fact (such as a photograph of a person in a private place), from a public fact (such as a photograph of a person walking down the public street), without addressing the legitimate public concern requirement. See id. By holding that the content of the media defendants' newscast was substantially relevant to a matter of legitimate public interest, we do not imply that members of the media may escape any liability for publication of private facts whenever the subject of the publication is an alleged perpetrator of a crime. Some facts about the victim of an alleged crime will be too tangential to the prosecution of the perpetrator to be substantially relevant to a matter of legitimate public interest. Wherever that line may be drawn in other cases, the facts that the media defendants published in this case, for the reasons stated above, are substantially relevant to the alleged criminal activities of Anderson's husband, a matter of legitimate public concern. The focus of the news broadcast was on the perpetrator, not the victim. And as even Anderson acknowledges in her brief, she was never identified by name, and the excerpted portion of the videotape was limited to a few movements of the alleged attacker's naked body without disclosing the sexual acts in great detail; only Anderson's feet and calves were clearly visible, and they bore no identifying characteristics. Aplt. Opening Br. at 11. We can understand entirely why Anderson found the public display of any portion of the tape highly distressing, perhaps especially after having received Blake's assurance that it would be viewed by only himself, his partner, a judge, and a jury. But it is also difficult to see how the broadcast at issue could be said to have no legitimate public interest  the test we must apply. Had the broadcast gone further in invading Anderson's privacy, rather than focusing on her estranged husband's wrongdoing, we would have had a very different case. But the simple fact is that this was a broadcast about a rapist, not a rape victim, and the legitimate privacy interests of the two could not be more different. Anderson also argues that a declaration by Prof. Melinda Levin of the University of North Texas  reporting her conclusion that the videotape was unnewsworthy  creates a genuine issue for trial. We disagree for two reasons. First, Prof. Levin opines on whether the news broadcast was newsworthy or an issue of public concern. But this determination, based on the undisputed facts in the record, is the ultimate question of law before us. While expert witnesses may testify as to the ultimate matter at issue, Fed. R.Evid. 704(a), this refers to testimony on ultimate facts; testimony on ultimate questions of law, i.e., legal opinions or conclusions, is not favored. See, e.g., Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir.1988). Second, Levin concludes that the videotape is not newsworthy because it exploits Anderson and adds to her victimization. Even if true, Levin's declaration attacks not the newsworthiness of the video excerpts, but the media defendants' editorial judgment in airing them. Editorial judgment is a matter that courts have generally left to the press. See Sussman v. ABC, 186 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1999) (agreeing that newsworthiness . . . is evaluated with a high degree of deference to editorial judgment) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 308 (expressing concern over preserving the breathing space needed by the press to properly exercise effective editorial judgment). While Levin's critique of the broadcast may be relevant to whether it would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, her opinion as to the video excerpt's substantial relevance to a legitimate matter of public concern impermissibly addresses the ultimate legal question.