Opinion ID: 1058577
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Green's Plea in Bar

Text: Green next assigns error to the Bar's failure to schedule a hearing on the charges of misconduct against him within the 30-120 day time period in Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1), which states in pertinent part: After a Subcommittee or District Committee certifies a matter to the Board, and the Respondent has been served with the Certification, the Respondent shall, within 21 days after service of the Certification: (a) file an answer to the Certification, which answer shall be deemed consent to the jurisdiction of the Board; or (b) file an answer to the Certification and a demand that the proceedings before the Board be terminated and that further proceedings be conducted pursuant to Va.Code § 54.1-3935; and simultaneously provide available dates for a hearing to be scheduled not less than 30 nor more than 120 days from the demand. Green contends the Bar is also subject to the 30-120 day time constraints of Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(b) and that the Panel erred in ruling that the scheduling requirements did not require a hearing within that time limitation. Green cites Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(3) to identify the Bar's duty to set a date, time, and place for the hearing and Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(E), which provides that [w]here specific time deadlines are provided, such deadlines shall be jurisdictional in support of his position. Green contends that the Panel lacked jurisdiction to hear the Complaint because the hearing was held more than 120 days after his demand for proceedings to be conducted by the Panel. The Bar responds that Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1) does not impose a duty upon the Bar to actually schedule a hearing within that 30-120 day window, nor does it require the Panel to conduct a hearing within that time period. The Bar insists that Green's suggested interpretation of the Rule would permit Green, or any attorney before a panel, to avoid prosecution altogether by providing available dates that are not available for the Bar or the Panel. The Bar notes that while Green provided his available dates, the Bar was unavailable on those dates and attempted to contact Green to schedule a mutually agreeable time, but Green did not respond to calls and letters from the Bar. In denying Green's plea in bar, the Panel ruled because the rule is capable of a couple of interpretations, and because the rule is designed to protect the public . . . we interpret the rule to impose a responsibility on the lawyer who is submitting the dates  in this case that being Mr. Green  to submit dates within the four-month window time frame. The rule does not then specifically go so far as to require the Bar to hold a hearing within that time frame. We have held that the requirements of Part 6, § IV, 13(I)(1) do not involve subject matter jurisdiction. Brown v. Virginia State Bar, 270 Va. 409, 412, 621 S.E.2d 106, 108 (2005); Fails v. Virginia State Bar, 265 Va. 3, 7, 574 S.E.2d 530, 532-33 (2003). We have also stated: A proceeding to discipline an attorney is not a criminal proceeding and the purpose is not to punish him but to protect the public. It is a special proceeding, civil and disciplinary in nature, and of a summary character. It is in the nature of an inquest or inquiry as to the conduct of the attorney. Being an informal proceeding it is only necessary that the attorney be informed of the nature of the charge preferred against him and be given an opportunity to answer. Seventh Dist. Committee v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 284, 183 S.E.2d 713, 717 (1971). The Panel clearly had subject matter jurisdiction of the claims against Green and over Green in his capacity as an attorney subject to the imposition of discipline for violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The issue is whether Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(E)(1) applies so that the 30-120 time provision is a specific time deadline [which is] jurisdictional. We conclude that it does not apply, and thus no jurisdictional impediment existed in this case. Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(b) required Green to provide available dates for a hearing to be scheduled not less than 30 nor more than 120 days from the demand. Under the plain terms of the Rule, however, no such obligation was imposed on the Bar or upon the Panel. While this may appear unfair from the attorney's viewpoint, there is no language in the Rule from which a jurisdictional time deadline can be derived. The Bar is not subject to the same 30-120 day time requirement, and the Rule is devoid of any mandate on the Panel to act within that period. Moreover, even if the Bar were subject to providing hearing dates, nothing in the Rules would permit the Bar to compel the Panel to set a hearing date at a particular time. The 30-120 day time provision of Part 6, § IV, ¶ 13(I)(1)(b) operates as a scheduling mechanism rather than a jurisdictional bar such as a statute of limitations or statute of repose. Thus, the failure to schedule a hearing within the 30-120 day window of the Rule did not divest the Panel of jurisdiction to consider the matter. The Panel did not err in dismissing Green's plea in bar.