Opinion ID: 2816261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extension of the Stop

Text: ¶34 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. There is no question that a police officer may stop a vehicle when he or she reasonably believes the driver is violating a traffic law . . . . State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 93, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing United States v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1995)). However, a traffic stop 'can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission' of issuing a . . . ticket. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). ¶35 After a justifiable stop is made, the officer may expand the scope of the inquiry only to investigate additional suspicious factors [that] come to the officer's attention. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d at 94 (citing United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir. 1994)). See also State v. Gammons, 2001 WI App 36, ¶¶18-19, 214 Wis. 2d 296, 625 N.W.2d 623. An expansion in the scope of the inquiry, when accompanied by an extension of time longer than would have been needed for the original stop, must be supported by reasonable suspicion. See State v. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25, ¶13, 260 Wis. 2d 406, 659 N.W.2d 394. See also Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). In this 11 No. 2013AP430-CR regard, the legal extension of a traffic stop is essentially a Terry investigatory stop. State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶35, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. ¶36 The focus of an investigatory stop is on reasonableness, and the determination of reasonableness depends on the totality of circumstances . . . . State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). Although officers sometimes will be confronted with behavior that has a possible innocent explanation, a combination of behaviors——all of which may provide the possibility of innocent explanation——can give rise to reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274-75 (2002). ¶37 It follows that the legality of the extension of the traffic stop in this case turns on the presence of factors which, in the aggregate, amount to reasonable suspicion that Hogan committed a crime the investigation of which would be furthered by the defendant's performance of field sobriety tests. See State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶10, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. ¶38 In his incident report, Deputy Smith explained the basis for extending the stop: Based upon Patrick shaking and his pupils being restricted, I asked him if he would be willing to attempt some field sobriety tests and he indicated he would. ¶39 Hogan's post-arraignment motions challenged the sufficiency of this explanation as well as the sufficiency of the deputy's observations at the preliminary hearing——he was very nervous, shaking, and his pupils were restricted——as 12 No. 2013AP430-CR providing reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to perform field sobriety tests. ¶40 At the subsequent motion hearing, Deputy Smith testified at greater length and the State's evidence included video of the entire incident taken from the deputy's squad car and audio of the deputy's statements and discussions with others. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Day asked for letter briefs. ¶41 In his brief, the assistant district attorney did not emphasize reasonable suspicion for the field sobriety tests as much as he emphasized Hogan's consent to search, and he did not rely on information the Boscobel police officer gave to Deputy Smith about Hogan as an important element of the reasonable suspicion for the tests. Hogan's attorney said a bit more about Officer Dregne's statements but he pointedly observed that Officer Dregne . . . had heard (from some unknown source) that the defendant had a drug history. (Emphasis added.) ¶42 Judge Day concluded that the field sobriety tests were an unlawful extension of the stop. He attributed no power or persuasive force to Deputy Smith's observation of [Hogan's] pupils, saying it doesn't mean anything on this record. He did not refer to the deputy's acquired information about Hogan's alleged 961 issues or his alleged involvement with methamphetamine. ¶43 Upon careful examination of the record, we believe the State could have made a valid case that Deputy Smith had reasonable suspicion to pursue field sobriety tests with Patrick 13 No. 2013AP430-CR Hogan. However, the case the State could have made in circuit court was not made, and, consequently, Judge Day's ruling on this point was not error. ¶44 We review the totality of the circumstances to illustrate the problems. ¶45 There was no evidence and no suspicion that Hogan was driving under the influence of alcohol. There also was no evidence that Hogan's driving had been impaired by drugs. The deputy's observations suggested that Hogan might have been using drugs and thus might have violated Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(am), which makes it illegal for a person to drive or operate a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood. As a result, the issue presented to the circuit court was whether there was reasonable suspicion that Hogan had been using controlled substances recently enough that evidence of that use would be detected in his blood. ¶46 Any order for a blood test would require probable cause. State v. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, ¶31, 359 Wis. 2d 421, 857 N.W.2d 120. Field sobriety tests were intended to secure evidence to establish probable cause. ¶47 Deputy Smith was an experienced officer with 12-1/2 years of service in the Grant County Sheriff's Department. His experience should have been a plus. State v. Meyer, 216 Wis. 2d 729, 752-53, 576 N.W.2d 260 (1998). His instincts were, in fact, correct. However, Deputy Smith conceded that he was not a drug recognition expert and his testimony about restricted 14 No. 2013AP430-CR pupils undermined his credibility in the court's eyes. The court heard the following testimony on cross-examination: Q: You also indicated that you observed his pupils to be restricted, right? A: Yes, sir. Q: Okay. Was it sunny out that day? A: Yes, sir. Q: And pupils restrict when it's sunny? A: Yes, sir. Q: You're not a drug recognition expert, right? A: Correct. Q: What drugs cause pupil restrictions? A: Cocaine being one. I'm sure there's others, but I'm not a drug recognition expert. Q: Do you know what methamphetamine does to pupils? A: No, sir. Q: Okay. Approximately what size do you believe Mr. Hogan's pupils were? A: Three millimeters. . . . . Q: [D]o you know what the normal pupil size is for an adult male? A: Four to five millimeters, I believe. ¶48 For a variety of reasons, the circuit court put no stock in the deputy's testimony about restricted pupils as a factor in establishing reasonable suspicion. The deputy did not have definitive information at any point on how drug use might 15 No. 2013AP430-CR affect pupil size.6 He referred to his familiarity with a pupilometer card but he did not bring the card to substantiate or supplement his testimony. ¶49 Consequently, the case for reasonable suspicion rests primarily on the deputy's observations that Hogan's upper body was shaking and he appeared to be very nervous. These points appear in his suppression hearing testimony and are even more prominent in the audio that accompanies the video. ¶50 Nervousness, anxiety, and tremors are consistent with methamphetamine use. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets, Report No. DOT HS 809 725, at 63 (April 2014). These characteristics, however, may also have innocent explanations. The possibility that innocent explanations may exist for observed behavior does not preclude a finding of reasonable suspicion, but as a practical matter, police cannot expect to conduct field sobriety tests on every motorist who is shaking and nervous when stopped by an officer. ¶51 Officer Dregne's comments that Hogan had 961 issues and that Officer Dregne had received tips that Mr. Hogan's a shake and bake methamphetamine cooker undoubtedly influenced 6 In fact, during the course of the discussion about pupil size, Deputy Smith suggested that restricted pupils are consistent with cocaine use. However, according to a source cited by the State, cocaine use may lead to dilated pupils, not restricted pupils. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets, Report No. DOT HS 809 725, at 21 (April 2014). 16 No. 2013AP430-CR Deputy Smith's decision to proceed as he did. At least some of Deputy Smith's observations meshed with Officer Dregne's information. Ultimately, however, when a court is asked to rule on a suppression motion, the court must evaluate whether the information conveyed by a fellow officer, and relied upon in taking the action under review, was reliable information, because the officer conveying the information had either firsthand knowledge or a reliable informant. No effort was made in this case to show that Officer Dregne's tips came from a reliable informant.7 Such an effort, if successful, would have made a substantial difference in establishing reasonable suspicion. ¶52 The audio from the incident several times records an urgent announcement, perhaps from the squad computer: Warning, potential hit. These announcements are never referred to in the testimony or the argument, so that their import and 7 To assess the reliability of an anonymous tip, a totality of the circumstances test is used. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983). Courts must take into account the quantity and quality of information received during this analysis. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). The quantity and quality are inversely proportionate: if one is relatively low, the other must be relatively high for the tip to be deemed reliable. Id. Courts consider such factors as awareness of the informant's identity, an officer's past interactions with the informant, and predictive information offered in the tip. See United States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985); State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). Officer Dregne's informant may not have been anonymous and may have been completely reliable, but any such facts are not in evidence. 17 No. 2013AP430-CR relationship to Hogan, if any, are unknown. If either Deputy Smith or Officer Dregne had been shown to know of Hogan's criminal record, which included three felony convictions and a drug conviction as well as his probationary status, the case for reasonable suspicion would have been greatly strengthened. After all, Hogan's statement to Deputy Smith that I don't do drugs could have been challenged, and Hogan's immediate explanation that Deputy Smith's observations could be attributed to Hogan's use of prescription Adderall could have been viewed even more skeptically because of background information from reliable sources. ¶53 Reasonable suspicion here is a close question. But the State's failure to tie up loose ends in circuit court should not be rewarded just because the case is close. As a result, we will not disturb the circuit court's conclusion that the extension of the stop for field sobriety tests was not lawful.