Opinion ID: 1504524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission by a Party-Opponent

Text: Bynote argues that her testimony is admissible as an admission by a party-opponent. Courts allow testimony of admissions by party-opponents because the party objecting is, in effect, objecting to a statement it previously authorized by the establishment of an agency relationship with the declarant. The trial court determined that National's employees' statements did not fall under the admission by a party-opponent exception because neither the bagger nor the checker held an executive position within defendant's company. See Schultz v. Webster Groves Presbyterian Church, 726 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Mo.App.1987). To determine how Schultz came to require executive capacity as a condition for admitting testimony of an admission by a partyopponent, we must begin with Rogers v. McCune, 19 Mo. 557 (1854). Rogers states that [t]he admission or declaration of [an] agent binds the principle only when it is made during the continuance of the agency, in regard to a transaction then depending. Id. at 569. Under Rogers , then, it is the existence and scope of the declarant's agency that determines admissibility, not whether the person has broad management or executive responsibility. The first case to articulate an executive capacity requirement cited Rogers and, in keeping with the precedent, held that a narrative statement by an employee of past events is not admissible against the employer unless the admissions are made within the scope of the employee's employment; and to be within the scope of his duties, the employee usually must have some executive capacity. [Emphasis added.] Missouri State Highway Commission v. Howard Construction Co., 612 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Mo.App.1981). In 1987, the cases took the executive capacity language of Howard Construction on divergent paths. In Gary Surdyke Yamaha, Inc., v. Donelson, 743 S.W.2d 522, 523 (Mo. App.1987), the plaintiff and defendant each owned motorcycle shops. The plaintiff owned one; the defendant owned three. Id. at 523-24. Defendant placed coupon advertisements in a newspaper with circulation in the area in which plaintiff conducted his business. Id. at 524. Plaintiff responded by lowering the price of his motorcycles to the coupon price defendant advertised and sued defendant, claiming that defendant designed its advertising with the predatory intent of driving plaintiff from business. Id. At trial, plaintiff offered the statements of defendant's salesmen purporting to show defendant's predatory intent. Id. The trial court excluded the evidence. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the statements fell under the admission by a party-opponent exception to the hearsay rule. Id. The court of appeals stated that plaintiff failed to show the salesmen had authority to make the statement in question.... There was no showing that the salesmen took part in any advertising or marketing decisions nor was there a showing they were executives or acted in an executive capacity. Id. Surdyke Yamaha is consistent with Rogers . It limits admissibility of party-opponent admissions to the scope of the declarant's agency. In Schultz, 726 S.W.2d at 493, the plaintiff slipped and fell while attending church services. A church janitor arrived after the fall, saw the plaintiff and said, Oh, I guess I'm too late. Id. The trial court refused to permit testimony concerning the janitor's statement. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the janitor's statement did not qualify as an admission of the janitor's employer. Id. at 497. The court said, [t]o be within the scope of his duties, the employee usually must have some executive capacity. Id. It is true that a person with executive capacity is generally an agent for the entity he or she serves and has broad authority to bind the principal by his or her statements. It does not follow, however, as Schultz seems to say, that persons who do not possess executive capacity can never be agents of the principal for purposes of statements that bind the principal as admissions. The better rule is that an admission of an agent or employee... may be received in evidence against his principal, if relevant to the issues involved, where the agent, in making the admission, was acting within the scope of his authority,.... Roush v. Alkire Truck Lines, 299 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Mo.1957) ( quoting 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 343). To the extent that Schultz requires executive capacity as the sine qua non of the admission by a party-opponent exception to the hearsay rule, it is incorrect and is overruled. In the instant case, Bynote testified that the bagger had a National uniform on and that she recognized him from prior visits. Additionally, she later returned to the store and learned his name. The manager testified that the bagger in question was employed by National at the time of the incident and that his duties extended to mopping up spills. The manager also testified that store policy permitted any employee finding a spill to contact the appropriate employeea baggerto clean it up. Bynote testified that the checker who made the first statement took her money when she paid for her groceries. This evidence is sufficient to show that the bagger and checker were employees of National at the time of the statements and that the scope of their duties at that time included the making of those statements: the checker's duty to tell a bagger to clean up a spill if she saw one, and the bagger's duty to respond to the checker's inquiry of whether or not he had cleaned up a spill. We conclude, therefore, that the statements of the bagger and checker were admissible as vicarious admissions of National. The trial court's error in admitting the testimony as excited utterances was, therefore, an error founded in nomenclature, not substance. It was harmless. Moreover, the statements provided the substantial evidence necessary to show National's knowledge of the dangerous condition prior to Bynote's fall. Bynote made a submissible case and the trial court did not err in overruling National's motion for a directed verdict.