Opinion ID: 2831302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment—Neutral Principles

Text: TEC asserts that application of neutral principles may violate free-exercise protections if, for example, the Diocese is permitted to void its commitments to church laws because the specific formalities of Texas law governing trusts were not followed or if they are applied retroactively. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 606 (noting that the case did not “involve a claim that retroactive application of a neutral-principles approach infringes free exercise rights”). But TEC recognizes that whether application of the neutral principles approach is unconstitutional depends on how it is applied. See id. at 606 (“It remains to be determined whether the Georgia neutral-principles analysis was constitutionally applied on the facts of this case.”). Because neutral principles have yet to be applied in this case, we cannot determine the constitutionality of their application. Further, TEC does not argue that application of procedural matters such as summary judgment procedures and burdens of proof are unconstitutional. Thus, we address the arguments of the parties regarding who is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to neutral principles and conclude that neither TEC nor the Diocese is. See Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex. 2010) (noting that when both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one 8 motion and denies the other, appellate courts consider the summary-judgment evidence, determine all questions presented, and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered). Under the neutral principles methodology, ownership of disputed property is to be determined by considering evidence such as deeds to the properties, terms of the local church charter (including articles of incorporation and bylaws, if any), and relevant provisions of governing documents of the general church. E.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03; see Presbyterian Church v. E. Heights, 167 S.E.2d 658, 659-60 (Ga. 1969). TEC points out that deeds to the properties involved were not part of the summary judgment record when the trial court ruled. Thus, TEC argues, if we do not sustain the summary judgment in its favor, we should remand the case so the trial court may consider the record on the basis of neutral principles and the four factors referenced in Jones: (1) governing documents of the general church, (2) governing documents of the local church entities, (3) deeds, and (4) state statutes governing church property. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03. We agree that the case must be remanded for further proceedings under neutral principles. Although deeds to the numerous properties involved were not before the trial court when it granted summary judgment, the Diocese asserts that there is no dispute about its holding title to and having control of the properties. But TEC disagrees with that position. And absent agreement or conclusive proof of title to the individual properties and the capacities in which the titles were taken, fact questions exist under neutral principles of law, at a minimum, about who holds title to each 9 property and in what capacity.6 Accordingly, we cannot render judgment on the basis of neutral principles.