Opinion ID: 1249253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ASUC-funded Lobbying.

Text: (7) Plaintiffs have also challenged the ASUC's use of mandatory fees to lobby the state and municipal governments. Issues on which the ASUC has lobbied in the past include a nuclear freeze initiative, public transportation fares, city investment policy, zoning, rent control, rent discrimination, the use of registration fees to fund abortions, budget cuts for the University, and mandatory student fees. The Court of Appeal disposed of plaintiffs' claim summarily, observing that the record supports the trial court's finding that lobbying activities are confined to student and university issues. Applying the test of germaneness articulated in Keller ( supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 13-14 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 13-14]) and Abood ( supra, 431 U.S. at pp. 217-223, 232-237 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 272-277, 282-286]), the court concluded that no constitutional infringement occurred because the ASUC's lobbying activities are related to the university's function. The Court of Appeal's reasoning entails two serious flaws. First, the trial court did not make the finding on which the Court of Appeal purported to rely. Rather than finding that the ASUC's lobbying efforts had been confined to student- and university-related issues, the trial court in its statement of decision merely cited a University policy permitting the ASUC to lobby on such issues. In fact, there is undisputed evidence in the record that the ASUC has lobbied on issues that have no meaningful relationship to students as students or to the University, such as a nuclear freeze initiative and municipal investment policy. Second, even if the ASUC's lobbying had been limited to student- and university-related issues, it does not follow that there is no constitutional problem. The Court of Appeal's reasoning assumes that one of the ASUC's purposes is to represent student interests before the municipal and state governments and that lobbying on university-related issues is germane to that purpose under Keller ( supra, 496 U.S. 1) and Abood ( supra, 431 U.S. at 209.) However, plaintiffs' meritorious objections to this reasoning find no answer in the Court of Appeal's opinion. Plaintiffs object, initially, that the analogy to collective bargaining is not truly apposite in this context. While the Regents have authorized the ASUC to communicate with government officials on public issues (University of Cal., Policies Applying to Campus Activities, Organizations, and Students, pt. A (rev. July 21, 1978) § 63.00, at p. 18), [12] the Regents have not purported to authorize the ASUC to negotiate with the government, or any other body, on students' behalf. Indeed, the relevant statement of policy negates any such implication by cautioning that the ASUC's permission to lobby does not affect the right of any student, as an individual, to petition government officials or bodies. ( Ibid. ) Furthermore, it is not clear that the state has any reason at all, let alone a compelling reason, to appoint a bargaining representative for students in their dealings with the government. Plaintiffs also argue that, even if the Regents had appointed the ASUC to represent student interests before government bodies, it does not follow that the permissible scope of lobbying would include all student- and university-related matters. A public employees' union, in comparison, may not use mandatory contributions to support lobbying on all union-related matters. This was the holding of Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn. (1991) 500 U.S. ___ 114 L.Ed.2d 572, 111 S.Ct. 1950] ( Lehnert ). In that case, the high court held that the State constitutionally may not compel its employees to subsidize legislative lobbying or other political union activities outside the limited context of contract ratification or implementation. ( Id., at p. ___ [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 591], italics added.) Thus, while the plaintiffs in Lehnert, who were state college professors, could be compelled to subsidize a union's collective bargaining efforts, they could not be compelled to subsidize lobbying on matters other than collective bargaining, even matters as closely related to the union's interests as taxes for the support of public education. ( Id., at p. ___ [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 594].) The high court's reasoning in Lehnert bears repeating because it appears to apply with equal force to the ASUC's lobbying efforts: [A]llowing the use of dissenters' assessments for political activities outside the scope of the collective-bargaining context would present `additional interference with the First Amendment interests of objecting employees.' [Citation.] There is no question as to the expressive and ideological content of these activities. Further, unlike discussion by negotiators regarding the terms and conditions of employment, lobbying and electoral speech is likely to concern topics about which individuals hold strong personal views. Although First Amendment protection is in no way limited to controversial topics or emotionally charged issues [citations], the extent of one's disagreement with the subject of compulsory speech is relevant to the degree of impingement upon free expression that compulsion will effect. The burden upon freedom of expression is particularly great where, as here, the compelled speech is in a public context. By utilizing petitioners' funds for political lobbying and to garner the support of the public for its endeavors, the union would use each dissenter as `an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.' [Citation.] The First Amendment protects the individual's right of participation in these spheres from precisely this type of invasion. Where the subject of compelled speech is the discussion of governmental affairs, which is at the core of our First Amendment freedoms [citations], the burden upon dissenters' rights extends far beyond the acceptance of the agency shop and is constitutionally impermissible. ( Lehnert, supra, 500 U.S. at p. ___ [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 591].) Thus, under Lehnert, even if the state has a sufficiently compelling interest to require unwilling persons to support an organization financially, the state may not compel support for lobbying efforts except on those matters that are strictly necessary to further the interest that justified the requirement of support. Applying this principle to the case before us compels us to reverse the judgment. Even if the Regents had appointed the ASUC to negotiate with governmental bodies on students' behalf, and even if the state had a compelling reason to do so, under Lehnert the state still could not force unwilling students to subsidize lobbying beyond the narrow subject matter that justified the requirement of support. However, the Regents have not claimed any interest in requiring students to support the ASUC's lobbying except the interest in providing an educational opportunity. In view of the core political freedoms that are at stake (see Lehnert, supra, 500 U.S. at p. ___ [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 591]), the educational benefit to a few student lobbyists cannot justify the burden on all students' free speech and associational rights. For these reasons, we hold that the Regents may not collect, from any student who objects, that portion of the mandatory fee that represents the cost of lobbying governmental bodies. Students who disagree with the Regents' calculation of the corresponding deduction will be entitled to the procedural safeguards set out above. (See Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. 292, 301-310 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 243-249]; Keller, supra, 496 U.S. 1, 16-17 [110 L.Ed.22d at pp. 15-16].)