Opinion ID: 4575983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reviewability of the Summary Judgment Motion

Text: [¶8] Appeals from the denial of a motion for summary judgment are “generally barred by the final judgment rule.” Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River, 2007 ME 68, ¶ 16, 922 A.2d 484. “We have consistently held, however, that the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on a claim of immunity is immediately reviewable pursuant to an exception to the final judgment rule.” J.R.M., Inc. v. City of Portland, 669 A.2d 159, 160 (Me. 1995); see also Polley v. 1 McDonald and Pelletier appear to have abandoned their argument that there is a genuine dispute of material fact that precludes resolution of the immunity issue but nevertheless contend that the undisputed facts do not entitle the City to summary judgment as a matter of law. See M.R. App. P. 2C(a)(1) (“An appellee may, without filing a cross-appeal, argue that alternative grounds support the judgment that is on appeal.”). 6 Atwell, 581 A.2d 410, 412 (Me. 1990) (noting that “because immunity is . . . immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,” it “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial” (emphasis omitted) (quotation marks omitted)). Pursuant to this exception, we will reach the merits of an appeal “[e]ven when the trial court decides that there is a dispute of material fact” so long as the parties do not dispute the facts material to the legal question of immunity. Rodriguez, 2007 ME 68, ¶¶ 16-17, 922 A.2d 484; Paschal v. City of Bangor, 2000 ME 50, ¶¶ 1 & n.1, 11, 747 A.2d 1194. [¶9] In this case, although the court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that there were “material issues of fact in dispute regarding whether or not the fall took place in an appurtenance to a government building which would be an exception to immunity,” the parties do not dispute the location of Pelletier’s fall, the characteristics of the plaza, or the uses of the plaza, and do not otherwise contend that there are genuine disputes of material fact. The question of whether the plaza is a public building or an appurtenance to a public building is therefore a legal question, not a factual one. See Tolliver v. Dep’t of Transp., 2008 ME 83, ¶ 10 n.5, 948 A.2d 1223 (explaining that although the issue of immunity can be “intertwined with the facts of a case,” the availability of immunity pursuant to the Maine Tort Claims Act “generally 7 turns on the proper interpretation of the statute, absent a dispute of material fact, and is therefore a question of law”).2 Accordingly, we reach the merits of the City’s appeal. See Rodriguez, 2007 ME 68, ¶¶ 16-17, 922 A.2d 484; Paschal, 2000 ME 50, ¶¶ 1 & n.1, 11, 747 A.2d 1194.