Opinion ID: 1219827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wilson's Sixth Amendment Claim

Text: Wilson presented as mitigating factors during the penalty phase that he had take[n] responsibility for his actions and that he ha[d] remorse for the murder[s] of Detectives Andrews and Nemorin. Verdict Form at 15, App'x at 1394. The principal evidenceindeed, the only evidencethat Wilson offered in support of these mitigating factors was the prepared, unsworn statement that he read to the jury without taking the stand. In it, Wilson claimed to be truly sorry for the pain he had caused, and he expressed his deepest sorrow towards the victim's [sic] family and friends. Tr. 1501. The majority concludes that the government unconstitutionally burdened Wilson's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in challenging the credibility of this allocution during its summation. Respectfully, I disagree. The government's allegedly improper words came not in the principal part of its summation, which addressed the evidence supporting each of the aggravating factors on which the government relied, but in that portion of the summation discussing the mitigating factors that Wilson urged to be present. The majority focuses solely on the language in italics, which reads in its broader context as follows: Ronell Wilson takes responsibility for his actions. Ronell Wilson has remorse for the murders of Detective Andrews and Nemorin. Did Ronnell Wilson show remorse after he killed Detective Andrews and when he turned the gun on Detective Nemorin, killed him as he begged for his life? ... From the moment of those murders up to the start of this trial, did you hear any evidence, is there any evidence in the record of remorse or acceptance of responsibility? There's none. Ronell Wilson up until the very moment that he addressed you last week has done everything he could to escape responsibility for his crimes. He has an absolute right to go to trial, put the government to its burden of proof, to prove he committed these crimes, but he can't have it both ways. He can't do that, then say I accept responsibility.... And [say ]I'm sorry, only after you prove I did it.[] That's not acceptance of responsibility. That is a manipulative criminal saying what he has to, saying what he knows you want to hear when it's in his interest to say it. The timing of his statement alone should tell you it's nothing more than a self-interested selfish man trying to save his own skin. Tr. 1637-38. The majority contends that this languagewhich explicitly states that Wilson had an absolute right to go to trial nevertheless unlawfully burdened his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial by using Wilson's constitutionally protected decision to go to trial ... as a reason to sentence him to death. (Maj. Op. at 195.) This contention, however, simply mischaracterizes the government's summation. The government did not, as the majority contends, cite[ ] as a reason to sentence him to death that Wilson had elected to go to trial. ( Id. ) Instead, the government appropriately responded to Wilson's mitigation evidence. The challenged comments occurred in response to Wilson's endeavor to persuade the jury that he had accepted responsibility for his actions, and that in light of this mitigating factora factor he placed before the jury a sentence of death was not justified. The government did not, as the majority contends, seek to characterize... the request for trial by jury as an aggravating circumstance, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (citation omitted)a reason to sentence [Wilson] to death. (Maj. Op. at 195.) Instead, it sought only to draw into question the credibility of Wilson's late-in-coming expression of remorse, which Wilson proffered as a basis for concluding that the government's evidence in aggravation did not justify the multiple death sentences for which he was eligible. [5] United States v. Stratton, 820 F.2d 562 (2d Cir.1987), on which the majority relies, is therefore inapplicable. Stratton recognized a distinction between increasing the severity of a sentence for a defendant's failure to cooperate, which is prohibited, and refusing to grant leniency, which is not. Stratton, 820 F.2d at 564. But Stratton would only be relevant here, to the extent relevant at all, if the government had urged the jury to consider Wilson's exercise of his jury trial right as a reason to sentence him to death. Again, this is not what the government did. The prosecutor's remarks came not in his discussion of aggravating factors, but in his examination of the mitigating evidence put forward by Wilson, and in the context of explaining why this evidence should not be credited. The prosecutor's comment, to the effect that the allocution lacked credibility as a statement of remorse because it came only when Wilson faced punishment for his crimes, was entirely proper. It is both natural and irresistible for a jury, in evaluating the sincerity of a statement of contrition, to note when it comes only at the point a defendant is seeking to avoid the maximum penalty and when it is utterly devoid of corroboration. In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court has indicated that prosecutorial comment pointing these facts out to the jury impairs no constitutional rights. See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 67-68, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000). In Portuondo, the Supreme Court determined that it did not unlawfully burden a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to be present and to confront the witnesses against him for a prosecutor to comment, in summation, on the opportunity that the exercise of these rights provided the defendant to tailor his testimony in light of the government's case. The Court noted that it is natural and irresistible for a jury, in evaluating the relative credibility of a defendant who testifies last, to have in mind and weigh in the balance the fact that he heard the testimony of all those who preceded him. Id. Prohibiting the prosecutor from making this point, as the majority would do in this case, is unjustifiable: to do so either prohibits inviting the jury to do what the jury is perfectly entitled to do; or it requires the jury to do what is practically impossible. Id. at 68. This case is thus substantially less difficult than United States v. Mikos, 539 F.3d 706 (7th Cir.2008), in which the Seventh Circuit determined that the government was entitled to rely on the defendant's supposedly remorse-free demeanor in courtin essence, on his decision to go to trial and remain silent thereto prove an aggravating factor: that the defendant had no remorse for his crimes. The majority criticizes Mikos, but the Seventh Circuit's analysis is wholly apt to explain why the remarks at issue here were proper: [The defendant] fought every charge every step of the way. That was his right, but in the process he showed no remorse, compared with a person who conceded some culpability ... If it is proper to take confessions, guilty pleas, and vows to improve one's life into account when deciding whether a murderer should be put to deathand it is unquestionably proper for a judge or jury to do so, see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)then it must also be proper for the prosecutor to remind the jury when none of these events has occurred. Mikos, 539 F.3d at 718. In truth, this case is quite akin to United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2008), which goes largely unaddressed by the majority. The defendant in Fell introduced evidence during the penalty phase of his capital trial that he had offered to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment without paroleevidence he said was relevant to establishing that he had accepted responsibility for his actions. Sentenced to death, Fell challenged the government's summation comments to the effect that if [Fell] wanted to plead guilty, he could have pled guilty: Let's move on to the next [mitigating] factor: Donald Fell offered to plead guilty to kidnapping and murder[ ] ... knowing that the law requires a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release and he has maintained that offer to this day. Ladies and gentlemen, the judge instructed you. You know the law. Life imprisonment without the possibility of release is the minimum sentence that Donald Fell faces for kidnapping with death resulting. It's the minimum sentence. When he offered to make that plea, he knew the evidence against him was overwhelming .... Ladies and gentlemen, we had to try to convict him. If he wanted to plead guilty, he could have pled guilty. We had a guilt phase in this case, ladies and gentlemen. We put on our case. We met our burden. We proved it. And now we are here to decide what is the just sentence. The minimum sentence? Or the death Sentence? Trial Tr. at 50, United States v. Fell, No. 01-12 (D.Vt. July 13, 2005). This Court determined that the government's remarks constituted a reasonable response to Fell's evidence in mitigation and that [n]o error occurred. Id. at 221. [6] Both Fell and Wilson exercised their constitutional right to go to trial. Both thereafter sought to persuade the jury that they had accepted responsibility, and that this was a factor in mitigation that the jury should take into account. Fell attempted to do so by showing that he was willing to accept punishment short of death, Wilson with his statement of contrition. The jury in each case could have considered this evidence and found it persuasive. At the same time, however, the government was entitled to point to reasons that jurors should not take this course. Cf. Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 1119; United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (noting that where ... [a] prosecutor's reference to the defendant's opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel, the Fifth Amendment is not violated). It is thus wholly irrelevant that Fell is distinct from this case, as Wilson and the majority contend, because Wilson, unlike Fell, introduced no evidence that he had offered to plead. (Maj. Op. at 196 n. 20.) In Fell's case, the prosecutor legitimately argued that an offer to plead guilty in exchange for the minimum penalty authorized for one's conduct does not demonstrate acceptance of responsibility. Fell, 531 F.3d at 221; see also Br. of Appellant at 79, Fell, 531 F.3d 197 (noting that the plea offer was introduced in an attempt to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility as a mitigating factor). It was in that context that the prosecutor stated, we had to try to convict him. If he wanted to plead guilty, he could have pled guilty. We had a guilt phase in this case, ladies and gentlemen. We put on our case. We met our burden. In Wilson's case, the government argued that a statement of contrition that came at the last minute and was uncorroborated by any other evidence was not worthy of belief. It was in that context that the prosecutor said, [Wilson] has an absolute right to go to trial, put the government to its burden of proof, to prove he committed these crimes, but he can't have it both ways. In neither case did the prosecution urge the jury to sentence the defendant to death because he went to trial and in neither case were the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights violated. There was no error here, much less error requiring vacatur.