Opinion ID: 183063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stop of Hambrick's Vehicle

Text: We first address Hambrick's assertion that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the stop of his vehicle was merely discretionary and was not supported by reasonable suspicion. When reviewing the district court's denial of a suppression motion, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its determination that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment de novo. United States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.2007). Hambrick contends the officers did not stop and arrest him based on his suspended license, contrary to their testimony. At the suppression hearing, two officers testified the informant identified the individual in the Monte Carlo as Lolo, which happened to be Hambrick's street moniker. The officers also testified they ran a search of Hambrick's license with the Department of Transportation (DOT) while following Hambrick's vehicle. Hambrick suggests this testimony demonstrates that at the time of his arrest, the officers only knew Hambrick's street name, and they did not know Hambrick's real name in order to run the search with the DOT, as it would be impossible to run a search using Lolo as an identifier. Hambrick thus contends the officers lacked any articulable, reasonable suspicion for the stop and the stop was made in the hope of discovering some incriminating evidence against Hambrick. The district court found Hambrick's argument was without merit. It concluded Hambrick's vehicle was lawfully stopped because Hambrick was driving with a suspended driver's license. The court appeared to credit the testimony of the arresting officers because it concluded the officers knew Hambrick's license was suspended prior to stopping his vehicle. We agree with the district court's determination. First, a careful review of the record demonstrates the officers' testimony was not contradictory, contrary to Hambrick's suggestion. The officers stated the informant identified the individual in question as Lolo, but they were never asked whether Lolo was the only name they knew Hambrick by. The officers testified they determined Hambrick's license was suspended by running a check with the DOT prior to stopping Hambrick's vehicle, a fact explicitly credited by the district court in making its determination that the stop was lawful. Were we to accept Hambrick's theory on appeal, we would be required to overturn the district court's determination, which was based on its assessment of the officers' credibility, as clearly erroneous. We decline to do so under a clear reading of the record. See United States v. Harris, 617 F.3d 977, 979 (8th Cir.2010) (As to the facts, the district court believed the officer's testimony that the license plate was not plainly visible. This determination, based on credibility, is not clearly erroneous.). While the government concedes that some pretense existed surrounding the stop based on the suspended license due to the officers' reliance on the informant's tip, it is well-settled that any traffic violation provides a police officer with probable cause to stop a vehicle, even if the officer conducted the valid traffic stop as a pretense for investigating other criminal activity. United States v. Escamilla, 301 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir.2002). Even if we were to accept Hambrick's theory, we would reach the same conclusion. The Fourth Amendment permits an investigative stop of a vehicle if officers have a reasonable suspicion the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal activity. Bell, 480 F.3d at 863. In forming an objective and particularized basis for a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, officers may rely on an informant's tip if the tip is both reliable and corroborated. Id. Here, the informant was well known to the officers and had provided accurate and reliable information used against at least three prior federal defendants. The informant described the vehicle's make, model, and color, as well as the fact that the vehicle was missing its gas-tank cover. The informant also successfully predicted when and where Hambrick would be and described the precise manner in which he carried drugs. In relying on this information, the officers maintained reasonable suspicion to stop Hambrick's vehicle that was based on more than `inarticulate hunches.' Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Therefore, we reject Hambrick's argument that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated based on the stop of his vehicle.