Opinion ID: 1093210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err in refusing to grant appellant's request for instruction d-2?

Text: These instructions stated: INSTRUCTION D-1 The Court instructs the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. INSTRUCTION D-2 The Court instructs the jury that you cannot find the Defendant guilty of Capital Murder. In his brief Monk argues that there was no evidence to establish the underlying felony of child abuse and consequently the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. He argues that the jury should have been required to find additional acts apart from those resulting in death in order to find him guilty of capital murder. He grounds this argument in the fact that there was no evidence of a series of abusive acts and that abuse cannot occur within 30 minutes, the amount of time during which Rose received the fatal injuries. Obviously, child abuse can occur within 30 minutes and often does. The statutes under which Monk was convicted state: § 97-3-19. Homicide; murder defined; capital murder.       (2) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases:       (f) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of section 97-5-39, or in any attempt to commit such felony. § 97-5-39. Contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a child; felonious abuse and/or battery of a child. (2) Any person who shall intentionally burn or torture or, except in self-defense or in order to prevent bodily harm to a third party, whip, strike or otherwise abuse or mutilate any child in such a manner so that any bone is fractured or any part of the body of such child is mutilated, disfigured or destroyed, shall be guilty of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child, and upon conviction may be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years. There is no requirement in either statute that a pattern of child abuse must be established before a defendant can be said to have committed felony child abuse and the case of Faraga v. State, 514 So.2d 295 (Miss. 1987), answers Monk's contention to the contrary. In Faraga the defendant was also convicted of felony murder under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(f). Id. at 301. Faraga argued that because there had been no showing of an independent act of child abuse or battery separate from the act which caused death, then there could be no felony murder conviction. Id. at 302. In finding this argument to be without merit, this Court stated: [F]araga's act of throwing a child to the pavement which resulted in skull fractures and broken bones clearly was intended to be classified as felonious abuse of a child under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2). This statute does not require that the abuse be dispensed over a period of time before a charge of felonious abuse will arise. Therefore, Faraga's argument that he was a first time child abuser would not have prevented him from being punished under this statute had the infant lived. [Emphasis added] Id. at 302. Also, this Court in Faraga declined to adopt the felony murder doctrine and held that the underlying felony of child abuse does not merge with the murder. Id. at 302-03. Therefore, Monk's argument that there was no showing of felony child abuse is without merit. Further, there was ample evidence presented at trial from which a jury could conclude that Monk feloniously abused and/or battered Rose resulting in her death. Therefore, Instructions D-1 and D-2 were properly refused and a new trial was not warranted. See McAlpin v. McAlpin, 245 Miss. 25, 147 So.2d 623 (1962); Jakup v. Lewis Grocer Co., 190 Miss. 444, 200 So. 597 (1941). Moreover, this assignment of error was also cured by the jury's sentencing to life imprisonment. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-37.