Opinion ID: 2708833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Buechel’s Negligence Claim

Text: As noted, however, the theories that Buechel presented at trial were limited over his objection. The district court ruled in a September 13, 2012 pretrial order that Buechel’s negligence claim would be “limited to the conditions leading to the possible transmission of a staphylococcus infection in the laundry facility but not necessarily limited to contamination from Joseph [Hansen].” This ruling was based on the district court’s interpretation of the scope of Buechel’s pro se administrative tort claim and pro se complaint. Buechel argues on appeal that the district court erred by unduly limiting his claims. He contends that his pro se documents also asserted a broader theory that FCI-Greenville was negligent by failing to follow its own 2006 MRSA-containment policies, resulting in his infection. We conclude that the district court’s reading of Buechel’s claim was too restrictive and ran contrary to the imperative that courts construe pro se claims generously. In a new trial after remand, Buechel should be permitted to present evidence on his broader theory that the prison’s failure to follow its own policies in 2006 amounted to negligence that caused his MRSA infection and resulting injuries. A. The Federal Tort Claims Act and Its Exhaustion Requirement The Federal Tort Claims Act permits a person to bring suit in federal court against the United States: for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, 8 No. 13-2278 under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Pursuant to this provision, federal inmates may bring suit for injuries they sustain in custody as a consequence of the negligence of prison officials. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150 (1963). Like any other federal tort claimant, however, an inmate may not bring such a suit unless he has first presented his claim to the appropriate federal agency and that agency has denied the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (requiring claimant to execute a “Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain for … personal injury … alleged to have occurred by reason of the incident … .”). Once the agency denies or fails to take action on an inmate’s claim, he has six months to file a suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). B. Administrative and District Court Proceedings To comply with the administrative claim requirement, Buechel completed a complaint form and submitted it to FCI-Greenville for review on October 12, 2006. In support of his claim, and without outside legal assistance, he wrote: Lack of Medical Treatment / Refuse to treat a highly contagious disease ie: Staff infection with this lack of treatment has indangered the lifes of myself and other inmates and also the inmate that I caught this highly contagious disease to continue to interact in general population. No. 13-2278 9 Dkt. 139, Ex. 1 (emphasis added). When his claim was not resolved to his satisfaction, he filled out a Form 95, describing his claim as follows: Caught Staph Infestion from an INMATE JOE HANSON who works in [maintenance services], wherein the institution failed to quarantine Hanson to prevent transmittal of disease. Dkt. 139, Ex. 4 (emphasis added). Buechel next filed suit, setting forth his claim yet again, and still without the assistance of counsel. His claim narrative continues for more than two pages but begins: Defendant’s medical and Executive Departmental employees are intentionally disregarding basic manditory [sic] medical biohazard containment quarantine and decontamination procedures of infectious diseases … when Mr. “Joe Hanson” [sic] an inmate at federal correctional institution in Greenville, Illinois, was allowed to return to his job assignment in (“CMS”) after being diagnosed with the “staph infection virus” that ended up being transmitted to plaintiff during a machanical [sic] operation on a laundry unit which [“Hanson”] [sic] and the plaintiff were passing tools between each other … . Dkt. 1 at 4 (emphasis added). It bears repeating that Buechel was acting without the assistance of a lawyer both at the administrative complaint stage and when he drafted and filed his complaint in court. 10 No. 13-2278 Buechel’s complaint passed screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and the district court appointed counsel to represent him.1 After surviving two motions to dismiss, Buechel’s negligence claim proceeded to discovery and the government then moved for summary judgment.2 In its motion the government argued that Buechel had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and that his negligence claim should be treated as a medical malpractice claim (and thus subject to the district court’s prior dismissal of that claim). The district court rejected both of these arguments, though it put off a definitive ruling on the government’s failure-to-exhaust argument until trial. Regarding the scope of Buechel’s administrative complaint, however, the court wrote: Despite the fact that this paragraph was not in- cluded in the section of the administrative complaint form designated for describing the “basis of claim,” this paragraph was sufficient to alert a legally sophisticated reader that Buechel was complaining about the inadequacy of measures to prevent Hansen from transmitting staph to him. A legally sophisticated reader would have known that such a claim encompassed the practice of allowing sick inmates like 1 The district court appointed J. Kevin McCall of Jenner & Block, LLP, to represent Buechel. Mr. McCall and the firm continued to represent Buechel on appeal, and we are grateful to them and to Nicole A. Allen, Brij B. Patnaik, and Chelsea L. Warren for their able assistance. 2 The district court construed Buechel’s filings as including a medical malpractice claim. This claim ultimately was dismissed with prejudice, and Buechel does not appeal that ruling. No. 13-2278 11 Hansen to come into contact with Buechel—which is explicit in the administrative claim form in the allegation of “failed to quara[n]tine”—as well as the failure to ensure those sick inmates do not transmit their diseases to those with whom they come in contact—which is implicit in the allegation of failure to “prevent tran[s]mittal.” Because Buechel’s administrative claim form sets forth enough facts to alert a legally sophisticated reader to the presence of both aspects of his claim, it satisfies the presentment requirement. Thus, the United States is not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that Buechel failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court notes, however, that Buechel’s remaining claim in this case is limited to negligence that allowed Hansen to transmit pathogens to him and does not include a general claim about prison hygiene practices unconnected to Hansen. Buechel v. United States, 2012 WL 948368, at  (S.D. Ill. March 20, 2012) (emphasis added). We agree with the first portion of this passage, which recognized that Buechel had alleged a failure to ensure that MRSA-infected inmates did not spread their infections. But the last sentence seems to conflict with that appropriately generous reading of the pro se documents. While acknowledging that Buechel had claimed that the prison had “failed to quara[n]tine” inmates “like Hansen” in the operative documents, the court then, and without reference to those documents, also restricted that claim to contact with Hansen. Given this internal contradiction in the order, the issue arose again at the pretrial conference. Aided by counsel, 12 No. 13-2278 Buechel argued that his administrative complaint forms and pro se complaint presented a claim that his MRSA infection was caused by FCI-Greenville’s negligent and more general failure to segregate MRSA-positive inmates, including but not limited to Hansen, from the general inmate population. The government’s position was that Buechel’s claim should be construed as limited to infection only by Hansen. The court’s ruling was terse: In light of the language in plaintiff’s complaint and the scope of his administrative tort claim, the Court finds that the issues in this case are limited to the conditions leading to the possible transmission of a staphylococcus infection in the laundry facility but not necessarily limited to contamination from Joseph Hansen. Buechel argues this ruling was an error. C. Analysis At each stage of the federal tort claim process, pro se administrative complaint forms are “entitled to a generous construction.” Palay v. United States, 349 F.3d 418, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f the claim would have been apparent to a ‘legally sophisticated’ reader of the form, then [the Court] will charge the agency with notice of that claim and deem it to have been exhausted.”), quoting Murrey v. United States, 73 F.3d 1448, 1452–53 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Clearly, the entire [Standard Form 95] was intended to be read, and if it was read the [plaintiff’s] claim would leap out at the legally sophisticated reader.”). Though an inmate is required to plead sufficient facts to put the agency on notice of the claim so that it may No. 13-2278 13 investigate, an inmate is not required to plead legal theories. Palay, 349 F.3d at 425–26. Any claim “implicit in the facts” should be deemed to have been presented to the agency. Id. at 426, quoting Murrey, 73 F.3d at 1452; see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (pro se complaint entitled to generous construction). We review de novo the district court’s reading of Buechel’s administrative claim, giving Buechel the benefit of every reasonable inference that may be drawn from his allegations. Palay, 349 F.3d at 425 (using Rule 12(b)(6) standard to decide whether pro se complainant had exhausted administrative remedies). Here, though Buechel was clearly complaining about his medical treatment—i.e. “Lack of Medical Treatment / Refuse to treat a highly contagious disease”—he was also complaining of the prison’s failure to quarantine infected inmates properly, including Hansen but not necessarily limited to him. (“[A]lso the inmate that I caught this highly contagious disease to continue to interact in general population;” “the institution failed to quarantine [Hansen] to prevent transmittal of disease;” “medical and executive departmental employees are intentionally disregarding basic mandatory medical biohazard containment quarantine and decontamination procedures of infectious diseases;” “[Hansen] was allowed to return to his job assignment … after being diagnosed with [a staph infection].”) Buechel’s claim set forth his observations and his lay beliefs concerning how he contracted MRSA. As a pro se claimant without legal or medical training, he was not required to do more than that. It was up to the prison administration to fill in the gaps, to the extent possible. Buechel provided enough information from which a legally sophisticated reader could 14 No. 13-2278 recognize that when he claimed he had contracted MRSA after coming into contact with Hansen and that the prison was disregarding biohazard and quarantine procedures, he was making a more general claim that FCI-Greenville was not adhering to sound MRSA-containment policies. As noted above, the district court’s summary judgment ruling had seemed to recognize this. Buechel, 2012 WL 948368, at  (noting that Buechel had explicitly alleged the government “failed to quara[n]tine” and “prevent tran[s]mittal,” based also on allegation that a sick inmate “like Hansen” had come into contact with Buechel). But the summary judgment ruling and the September 13, 2012 pretrial order then imposed a hurdle for Buechel’s negligence claim that would be unreasonably difficult for any complainant to meet at the stage of the administrative claim or complaint, never mind that Buechel had been acting without outside legal or medical advice. By limiting Buechel’s pro se claim to contact with Hansen, Buechel, 2012 WL 948368, at , and/or the prison laundry, Dkt. 141, the court effectively required Buechel to pinpoint when and how he had contracted MRSA in order to state a viable negligence claim. This imposed too heavy a burden for any claimant and plaintiff, but especially for a prisoner acting pro se. To see why, set aside the challenges posed for prison inmates for a moment, and consider a different person trying to figure out how he contracted MRSA, perhaps after a routine visit to a doctor’s office.3 The patient was called back into the 3 Although it has evolved to include persons exposed to other communities, including inmate populations, MRSA is most often associated with (continued...) No. 13-2278 15 exam room, put on a gown, and sat on an exam table. A nurse entered and took vital signs. Then the doctor entered and performed a routine physical examination. Perhaps some blood was drawn for lab work. Even in that simple scenario, how could a lay person possibly figure out how he contracted MRSA? Did the doctor or nurse not wash her hands? Was the exam table not decontaminated between patients? What about the thermometer? Perhaps the syringe was unclean? MRSA is exceptionally contagious and is easily transmitted by casual contact. It would be difficult for any person, no matter his education or background, to figure out exactly how he contracted it. How was Buechel supposed to do it? Instead, he did what he could, and put forth the facts that he had, including his suspicions about Hansen. But the “legally sophisticated reader” we attribute to the government agency is expected to look more closely and to see that he was also complaining more generally about the prison’s failure to follow appropriate MRSA-containment guidelines, including taking reasonable measures to keep healthy prisoners separated from the contagion. The government argues that the district court’s pretrial ruling limiting Buechel’s negligence claim did not limit Buechel’s claims but expanded them. It also argues that Buechel could have amended his complaint after counsel was 3 (...continued) health care environments. See Federal Bureau of Prisons Clinical Practice Guidelines, Management of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Infections, 1 (April 2012), http://www.bop.gov/resources/pdfs/mrsa.pdf (last visited March 6, 2014). 16 No. 13-2278 appointed, but he failed to so. We reject both of these quasiwaiver arguments. First, the court’s ruling was not an expansion of Buechel’s claims, and it was not a “grant” of Buechel’s request. Buechel asked the district court to recognize that the negligence claim presented in his pro se administrative claim and complaint encompassed the theory “that the United States was negligent because FCI-Greenville employees failed to adequately segregate MRSA-positive inmates, including but not limited to inmate James Joseph Hansen, from the general inmate population, and that this caused Plaintiff’s MRSA infection and seriously injured him.” Buechel did not “request” that his claims be limited to contact and conditions within and relating to the prison laundry. The government’s insistence that Buechel “prevailed” is groundless. The government’s contention that Buechel had the opportunity to amend his complaint but failed to do so, even after counsel was appointed, also is not a ground to hold him to the court’s pretrial ruling. As discovery proceeded, but before the summary judgment and pretrial rulings were issued, Buechel questioned whether amending the complaint was necessary to clarify that his claim was not limited to the Hansen theory. Dkt. 70 at 5 (responding to government’s argument that discovery relating to other inmates besides Hansen was irrelevant) (“To the extent this Court believes it is necessary for Plaintiff to amend his complaint on the sole issue of other inmates who may have caused Plaintiff’s MRSA infection, Plaintiff requests the Court grant him leave to do so.”); Dkt. 74 at 4 (“Causation is an element of negligence that Buechel must prove, and there is ample authority that supports either allowing Buechel to amend his complaint on the sole issue of No. 13-2278 17 causation, or to read the complaint so that it is not limited to Hansen.”). Each of these motions was before the magistrate judge, who did not explicitly respond to Buechel’s assertion that he should be allowed to replead if necessary to expand his claim beyond Hansen. Implicitly, however, the magistrate judge’s ruling seemed to confirm that Buechel’s pro se documents were sufficient for a broader negligence claim to go forward. See Dkt. 75 at 1–2 (“[C]ounsel was appointed to ensure that this action was properly litigated because plaintiff was found incapable of adequately representing himself; therefore, plaintiff’s appointed counsel will not now be strictly constrained by the original pleadings.”); Dkt. 76 at 2 (“[C]ounsel was appointed to ensure that this action was properly litigated because plaintiff was found incapable of adequately representing himself; therefore, plaintiff’s appointed counsel will not now be strictly constrained by the original pleadings. With that said, the fact that information may be discoverable does not necessarily mean that it will ultimately be admissible, or that the scope of the complaint is being broadened.”). Buechel raised the issue again in the brief he submitted to the district court judge on the scope of the claim. Dkt. 139 at 8–9 (The “evidence warrants either a finding that Plaintiff’s complaint has been constructively amended to include the possibility that inmates other than Hansen caused his MRSA infection, or warrants allowing Plaintiff to formally amend the complaint prior to trial.”). Buechel raised the issue but did not receive a clear answer from the court until just before trial, when it was too late to cure the problem. A district court is not obliged to give legal advice to a party, with counsel or pro se, 18 No. 13-2278 but this was an issue that needed to be resolved when there was time to fix it. More to the point, however, Buechel correctly believed that he had properly pled a negligence claim that encompassed the prison’s failure to adhere to BOP and internal policies regarding MRSA, including its failure to quarantine infected inmates, and that amendment was unnecessary. Buechel did not need to replead a claim that was properly pled. Accordingly, we reject the government’s contention that he should, on appeal, be bound to the district court’s ruling. In sum, a prison administrator or other legally sophisticated reader interpreting Buechel’s claim should not have understood it as limited to contact with Hansen but should have recognized the more general assertion that inmates with MRSA were not being segregated from uninfected inmates, contrary to the prison’s policies. Buechel was alleging that the prison was negligent in failing to quarantine infected inmates, including but not limited to Hansen, and certainly not limited to the confines of the prison laundry or laundry procedures. The district court’s ruling otherwise was an undue restriction on Buechel’s claim and on the evidence it considered at trial. Accordingly, we must vacate the judgment in favor of the United States.