Opinion ID: 216909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individualized Risk Based on Specific Threats

Text: Bugge first contends that the unidentified prison official who was warned about the need to separate Fanning and Bradford was deliberately indifferent by failing to place Bradford in protective custody in response to the warning, which resulted in Bradford’s death at the hands of Fanning. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on this claim for two reasons: first, Bradford’s warning to the prison official was too vague to provide the official with actual knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to Bradford, and thus Bugge failed 10 to satisfy the deliberate indifference element of the claim; and second, Bugge failed to satisfy the causation prong because he could not identify the prison official to whom Bradford gave the warning. We agree with the district court that this claim fails on the deliberate indifference prong. Regardless of whether Bradford’s warning to an unidentified prison official was detailed enough to provide the official with adequate knowledge of a specific, substantial risk of serious harm to Bradford from Fanning, Bugge has not provided any evidence showing that any one of the defendants received the warning. Thus, Bugge cannot prove that any one of the defendants actually possessed the requisite knowledge to be held liable. Burnette, 533 F.3d at 1331 (“[I]mputed or collective knowledge cannot serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. . . . Each individual [d]efendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person knows.”).3 Accordingly, the district court properly granted the defendants summary judgment on Bugge’s claims that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm posed to Bradford arising from his individual situation. 3 Moreover, the unidentified official's failure to place Bradford in protective custody did not cause Bradford's death. This is because Bradford's cell-mate, Stephen Johnson, repeatedly urged Bradford to request protective custody following his confrontation with the other inmate, but Bradford declined. Thus, the prison official cannot be faulted for failing to urge Bradford to accept protective custody, because the evidence shows that Bradford would have rejected such a suggestion prior to his fatal attack. 11 B. Environmental Risk Based on Dangerous Prison Conditions Next, Bugge argues that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm posed to Bradford due to dangerous prison conditions at CSP, and that the defendants’ deliberate indifference to those conditions caused the attack that resulted in Bradford’s death. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants because it concluded that Bugge failed to satisfy the objective component of the claim, finding that there was insufficient summary judgment evidence to demonstrate that the prison conditions at CSP posed an objectively substantial risk of serious harm.4 Although we think it is a close call, we must disagree with the district court’s conclusion. According to Bugge’s evidence, numerous racially charged robberies occurred at CSP, particularly of store-bought goods; there were “hundreds” of weapons in the prison, and almost every inmate in Bradford’s dormitory owned or had access to a shank; prison officials refused to discipline inmates for possessing weapons; and gangs, which operated in every dormitory, were extremely violent, stealing, robbing, and committing acts of violence against white inmates in 4 Although the district court’s analysis of this claim appears in several different sections of the opinion addressing different elements of the claim, it all centers on the objective component of the claim: whether the summary judgment evidence demonstrated that the prison conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Bradford. 12 particular. There is also evidence that officials encouraged inmates to obtain weapons for protection, due to the dangerous conditions at CSP. Notably, the defendants did not provide any evidence refuting that these conditions existed. Our decisions clearly establish that this evidence, at the very least, is sufficient to create a jury question on whether a substantial risk of serious harm existed at CSP. See,e.g., Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1033 (11th Cir. 2001); Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583; Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir.1977).5 In Hale, for example, the plaintiff “produced evidence that inmate-oninmate violence occurred regularly.” 50 F.3d at 1583. Here, Bugge has produced evidence that inmate-on-inmate robberies of the type that resulted in Bradford’s death happened regularly at CSP. Further, in Marsh and Williams, the plaintiffs presented evidence that there was widespread possession of weapons by inmates and that weapons were not confiscated from prisoners. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1033; Williams, 547 F.2d at 1211. Bugge presented the same evidence here. Finally, Bugge presented evidence that powerful gangs committed racially charged violent acts against white prisoners like Bradford.6 This dangerous mixture of regular 5 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), this court adopted all decisions of the Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981 as binding precedent in this circuit. 6 The defendants argue that this evidence of gang violence should be discounted on the ground that some of it suggests that the violence was more prevalent in a different dormitory than 13 robberies, widespread weapons possession by inmates, and unchecked racially charged gang violence erupted in a predictable way that lead to Bradford’s death. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Bugge, genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether a substantial risk of serious harm existed at CSP.7 The district court, therefore, erred in ruling that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the ground that no substantial risk of serious harm existed.8 However, all the defendants except for Warden Roberts are nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on these claims, because Bugge presented no evidence that any of the defendants, except for Warden Roberts, had any the one that housed Bradford. The fact remains, however, that the gang violence was widespread at the prison, and the defendants cite no authority for the proposition that the conditions at a prison should be analyzed on a dormitory-by-dormitory basis. 7 That no identical stabbing death had occurred at CSP immediately prior to this one is of no consequence, as the Supreme Court has instructed that “an Eighth Amendment violation can arise from unsafe conditions of confinement even if no assault or similar physical injury has yet occurred.” Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1034 (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993)). 8 The defendants also raised a qualified-immunity defense when moving for summary judgment. For Bugge to overcome that defense at summary judgment, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Bugge, must “make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and “the right at issue [must have been] ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. — , 129 S.Ct. 808, 816 (2009). The district court, in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, effectively ruled, without saying so, that Bugge failed to satisfy the first prong, i.e., he failed to show that Bradford’s constitutional rights were violated. As our discussion above indicates, we disagree with this conclusion, and additionally find that, based on Marsh, Hale, and Williams, the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendants’ alleged misconduct. 14 responsibility for the conditions at CSP, or could have taken reasonable steps to the lessen the substantial risk of serious harm that existed there. In fact, Bugge failed to present any evidence of the other defendants’ roles at CSP. Bugge’s claims against these defendants, therefore, fail on the causation prong: there is no evidence connecting them to the relevant prison conditions or Bradford’s murder. Regarding Bugge’s claims against Warden Roberts, though, there is evidence that he was aware of the dangerous conditions at CSP, and as Warden, he clearly had the power to take reasonable steps to address them.9 Bugge presented evidence that several inmates wrote to Roberts to inform him of the dangerous prison conditions. Moreover, the evidence shows that Roberts failed to discipline inmates for possessing weapons or engaging in gang violence. Finally, the pervasive and widespread nature of the conditions that the evidence shows existed suggest that Roberts “had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known about it,” which “could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that [Roberts] had actual knowledge of the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at842-43. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Bugge, genuine 9 We note that Warden Roberts left his post at CSP on July 2, 2006, and that Warden Thompson took over on July 5, 2006, the day of Bradford’s murder. Thompson, therefore, had no opportunity to learn about or address the conditions that existed when Roberts left immediately before the murder. 15 issues of material fact exist as to the remaining elements of Bugge’s claim against Roberts—deliberate indifference and causation—and thus the district court erred in granting Roberts summary judgment on that claim. Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of Crumbley’s claims; affirm summary judgment in favor of all the defendants except for Warden Roberts on Bugge’s claims; vacate summary judgment in favor of Warden Roberts on Bugge’s claim; and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART. 16