Opinion ID: 2507985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror's Request to Speak with Defendant

Text: After the defense completed its case on November 5, 1992, the trial court excused the jury until Monday morning, November 9, for final arguments. Once the jurors left the courtroom, the court revealed to counsel that Juror M.B. had sent it a note earlier that afternoon that stated: I would like to talk to the defendant at the close of trial in the presence of the attorney and Your Honor. Asked to explain the note, the juror indicated it has nothing to do with me, as a juror. The juror also told the court that her inquiry was related to her work as a missionary, and that she would just like to talk to [defendant], person to person, and maybe say a prayer with him. Juror M.B. also revealed that Jurors S.S. and R.D. had expressed the same desire to meet with defendant, although the jurors had not discussed the case among themselves. [T]his was just a question that was brought up: Was it ever permissible for the jurors to talk to the defendant after the trial was over? During the discussion, defense counsel never objected to Juror M.B.'s request, but stated that I think we need to get together and work out a specific question to ask each of them. Because the one that you said here about the moral or humanitarian, it could kind of impinge on what they are told in the instruction. There might be some divergence there. I think we have to be extremely careful of our words. Before leaving the courtroom, Juror M.B. told the court that she promised to follow the court's directions about how to evaluate the case. The following Monday, the trial court questioned Jurors R.D. and S.S. Juror R.D. indicated she simply wondered whether jurors could say hi to defendant. Juror S.S. stated she had been a bystander when the discussion about communication with defendant occurred, and she did not desire to speak with him. Defendant contends that the manner in which the trial court conducted its bias inquiry of Juror M.B. compromised the juror's ability to be impartial and rendered her unable to fulfill her juror duties. He claims that the court's questioning effectively nullified any sympathy she may have felt toward defendant by alerting her to the fact that her note may have compromised her ability to impose the death penalty. By failing to object, defendant forfeited his claim. (Evid.Code, § 353; see Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 589-592, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) We also find the claim lacks merit. Nothing indicates that Juror M.B.'s note contained information that jurors had commenced their deliberations or had formed any tentative conclusions regarding the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 481, 276 Cal.Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107.) The note indicated the juror was concerned only with defendant's spiritual well-being. Because the note did not raise the possibility of juror misconduct, the court had no duty to conduct an inquiry into the juror's motives. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1117, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.)