Opinion ID: 2582262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motions to Disqualify Trial Judge and Related Misconduct Claim

Text: Defendant twice moved to disqualify the trial judge, John T. Ball. Both times, another superior court judge heard and denied the motion under Code of Civil Procedure sections 170.1 and 170.3. Defendant challenges these rulings as erroneous, and contends the facts underlying the second motion demonstrate judicial misconduct. We disagree.
Before jury selection began, Judge Ball told the parties that 14 or 15 years previously, his daughter had been robbed at knifepoint while working at a photo shop. The judge accompanied his daughter to a live lineup and to the preliminary hearing where she testified and identified the robber. Defendant moved for Judge Ball's disqualification. The judge filed an answer reaffirming these facts and adding that the incident in question is dim and distant in my mind. His daughter was an adult at the time, had not lived with him for about five or six years, and had not been injured. They had not discussed the incident in over 10 years. He went on to attest, I did not make nor do I presently have the slightest connection with the event occurring to my daughter and the pending matter before me. I in no way feel bias, prejudice regarding the defendant nor for that matter any person charged with a crime as a result of my daughter's victimization. The motion was assigned by stipulation to another judge and denied. After return of the penalty verdict but before rulings on post-verdict motions, defendant again moved to disqualify Judge Ball. In his motion he cited the previous grounds, and added allegations that: [O]n December 14, 1992, after the death verdict, Judge Ball approached the rail dividing the well of the courtroom from the spectators and spoke to the victim's father [who had testified at the penalty phase]. The Judge mentioned how he (the Judge) knew it has been very hard. Mr. Lo Bue responded about the fact that he (the Defendant) took his baby's life, and that his (the defendant's) life should be taken. Defendant supplied a supporting declaration by John Aaron, who had been in the courtroom. Aaron said that he could not remember what was said verbatim or what else was said but the encounter lasted about forty seconds. I do not recall who spoke first. In Judge Ball's answer, he stated: During the trial there were various times wherein Mrs. Lo Bue, mother of the victim, would lose her composure and speak out. Concern was expressed on the occasions and, upon request and I believe without request, admonishments were given to the jury. On these occasions, when present, Mr. Lo Bue, father of the victim, would attempt to control and console his wife. On December 14, 1992, . . . after the jury reached its verdict, Mr. Lo Bue accosted me in the courtroom when I returned to the courtroom to deliver items to my clerk, and attempted to apologize for his wife's conduct. My best recollection is that I merely acknowledged his concern and indicated it was understandable and that he should not concern himself with the matter. I extended the same courtesy to him that I would have extended to anyone expressing anxiety. I specifically cut short his statements, and by my conduct indicated my inability to discuss the matter further with him. The comments regarding the Defendant's punishment and the loss of his daughter were addressed to my Deputy and not to me. The only comment I heard related to the apology for his wife's conduct. He denied that his daughter's experience or his feelings or statements to the victim's father affected his feelings toward defendant or the charges. By stipulation, the motion was assigned to a different judge from the one who had heard the first disqualification motion. The second motion was denied. The judge concluded an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary: [T]he second incident was handled appropriately by Judge Ball . . . [H]e still maintains and maintained throughout that incident the appearance of impartiality.
Defendant asserts the motions to disqualify should have been granted. At trial, he relied primarily on Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(C), which provided that a judge is disqualified if a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. . . . [7] He also argued that [a] biased decision maker is constitutionally unacceptable, citing Withrow v. Larkin (1975) 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712. That case stated that `a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' ( Id. at p. 46, 95 S.Ct. 1456.)
The Attorney General urges defendant did not challenge these rulings by a pretrial writ, thus forfeiting the right to complain on appeal. He is partially correct. Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), provides: The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by the parties to the proceeding. This provision governs both peremptory challenges [8] and those made for cause. [9] ( People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272-275, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 526, 820 P.2d 1036.) In People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 335, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 710, 862 P.2d 710 ( Brown ), we held a claim based on the statute was barred, but that a constitutionally based challenge asserting judicial bias could be raised on appeal. In Brown, the defendant did file a pretrial writ. We noted that a defendant may, and should, seek to resolve such issues by statutory means, and that his negligent failure to do so may constitute a forfeiture of his constitutional claim. ( Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 336, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 862 P.2d 710.) We have subsequently indicated, however, that a defendant who raised the claim at trial may always assert on appeal a claim of denial of the due process right to an impartial judge. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 811, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485 ( Mayfield ).) [10] While defendant may not raise the statutory claim on appeal, he may assert a constitutionally based challenge of judicial bias. ( Brown, at p. 335, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 862 P.2d 710.)
As noted, the statute requires the disqualification of a judge whenever a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. . . . (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, former subd. (a)(6)(C), see now subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).) The Attorney General argues the constitutional standard is narrower. He cites Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97, where the high court explained that most questions concerning a judge's qualifications to hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard. [Citation.] Instead, these questions are, in most cases, answered by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar. [Citations.] But the floor established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a `fair trial in a fair tribunal,' [citation], before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case. ( Id. at pp. 904-905, 117 S.Ct. 1793, italics added.) Accordingly, the Attorney General argues that the due process claim requires a showing of actual bias, whereas the statute requires only the appearance of bias. We need not further address the distinction because defendant has failed to show even the appearance of bias. Potential bias and prejudice must clearly be established by an objective standard. ( In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 817, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 605, 61 P.3d 402.) Courts must apply with restraint statutes authorizing disqualification of a judge due to bias. ( Ibid. ) Under this standard, there was no error. Defendant's allegations in support of his disqualification motions simply do not support a doubt regarding [the trial judge's] ability to remain impartial. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 50, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30, fn. omitted.) The mere fact that Judge Ball's daughter had been the victim of a knifepoint robbery at a photograph store many years before does not disqualify him. Judges, like all human beings, have widely varying experiences and backgrounds. Except perhaps in extreme circumstances, those not directly related to the case or the parties do not disqualify them. [11] In this case, the judge stated unequivocally that he made no connection between the earlier robbery and the present case. `[W]e of course presume the honesty and integrity of those serving as judges.' ( Mann v. Thalacker, supra, 246 F.3d at p. 1097.) The judge's brief encounter with the victim's father shortly after the jury's penalty verdict likewise did not require his disqualification. Judge Ball did not seek out the encounter. The victim's father approached him to apologize for his wife's behavior. The judge merely listened briefly and expressed sympathy, extending the same courtesy to him that I would have extended to anyone expressing anxiety. While a judge in any case must ensure that every litigant receives a fair trial, no rule precludes a judge from treating members of the public with courtesy. To require that the judge here simply turn his back on the father would do nothing to make the proceedings fairer to defendant. The entitlement of a criminal defendant to a fair trial must never be compromised. Yet the criminal justice system does not exist for the benefit of criminal defendants alone. Parents of murder victims also have a stake in the criminal justice system. Courts may also consider, and be sensitive to, the needs and concerns of crime victims and their families. Defendant contends the judge ruling on the second motion should have taken testimony to resolve asserted factual discrepancies between Judge Ball's account and that of the witness, John Aaron. A hearing was unnecessary. Judge Ball's account was more complete than Aaron's, but it was not inconsistent. Aaron acknowledged he was recounting only part of the conversation, and could not remember who spoke first. Thus, Aaron's observations were fragmentary, and contained nothing to cast doubt on Judge Ball's more inclusive statement. Given the circumstances, Judge Ball handled the impromptu incident with the victim's father appropriately. Defendant argues that, standing alone, the father's statement that defendant's life should be taken requires the judge's disqualification. The argument fails. It is immaterial whether the comment was directed to the bailiff or the judge, and whether the judge heard it directly, through staff, or in connection with defendant's motion. It is clear that the judge did not solicit the comment. During a trial any number of things come to a judge's attention beyond the strict confines of the written record. Among these are the reactions of spectators manifested by their facial expressions and other behavior, before, during, and after court sessions. Indeed, judges must be aware of these things as part of their diligent trial management and their responsibility to ensure that jurors remain unaffected by them. Likewise, judges are often asked to rule on the admissibility of evidence they ultimately exclude. Judges are required to set this information aside, just as jurors are instructed to do when evidence is stricken. In this case, given the father's testimony during the penalty phase, it was hardly a revelation that he favored the death penalty. Certainly the father should not have approached the judge. Such conduct is inappropriate, as would be a plea from a defendant's family to spare their loved one. Yet events of this nature do happen. Capital cases unfold in a crucible of strong emotions. Courts cannot expect that families will always conform their behavior to the standards of trained professionals. However, the court system must function in the face of occasionally imperfect behavior from the public. The record contains no evidence that the father's comment influenced the court's rulings. No reasonable person would doubt that a judge could remain impartial merely because of a brief encounter that the murder victim's father initiated after the penalty verdict. [12]