Opinion ID: 460188
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Six-Year Statute of Limitations

Text: 10 Amicus 4 argues that Sec. 2401(a) does not apply to this action because the statute governs only actions for damages under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2), and because Geyen's action is not against the United States. We reject both arguments. 5 11
12 Amicus offers considerable legislative history to support its contention that Sec. 2401(a) applies only to Tucker Act actions. This history demonstrates, according to amicus, that the predecessor of Sec. 2401(a) applied only to Tucker Act claims and that when Congress enacted Sec. 2401(a) in 1948 as part of the Judicial Code, it intended to retain this restriction. Several federal courts have rejected the argument that Sec. 2401(a) applies only to Tucker Act actions. See Christensen v. United States, 755 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir.1985); Walters, 725 F.2d at 111-14; Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 850 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 327, 83 L.Ed.2d 264 (1984); Werner v. United States, 188 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1951). 13 Moreover, amicus' analysis of Sec. 2401(a)'s legislative history, although extensive, is incomplete. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, accomplished the merger of law and equity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, 2. Congress undoubtedly took account of this merger when it replaced the word suit in the statutory predecessor of Sec. 2401(a) with the phrase every civil action in the current statute. See Saffron v. Department of the Navy, 561 F.2d 938, 946 (D.C.Cir.1977) (McGowan, J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033, 98 S.Ct. 765, 54 L.Ed.2d 780 (1978); Werner, 188 F.2d at 268. This change in language indicates Congress' intent that Sec. 2401(a) apply to both legal and equitable actions. Thus, we reject amicus' contention that Sec. 2401(a) applies only to Tucker Act actions. 14
15 Amicus argues that an action such as Geyen's against a federal official alleging that the official has acted unlawfully and seeking injunctive relief is not an action ... against the United States within the meaning of Sec. 2401(a). Before 1976 this ultra vires theory might have been valid; to avoid the bar of sovereign immunity, courts indulged in the fiction that a federal official acting in violation of the Constitution or beyond his statutory powers was acting for himself only and not as an agent of government. See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22, 83 S.Ct. 999, 1007, 10 L.Ed.2d 15 (1963); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1461-62, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949). 16 In 1976, however, Congress waived sovereign immunity for suits seeking nonmonetary relief through nonstatutory judicial review of agency action. Act. of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-574, Sec. 1, 90 Stat. 2721, 2721 (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702 (1982)). The principal purpose of this amendment was to do away with the ultra vires doctrine and other fictions surrounding sovereign immunity. As the House Report notes, Actions challenging official conduct are intrinsically against the United States and are now treated as such for all practical purposes. H.R.Rep. No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 6121, 6131. 17 Were we to hold, as amicus urges, that Geyen's action is not against the United States, we would revive the technical complexities that Congress sought to eliminate in 1976. We decline to do so. We hold that Geyen's action challenging his activation and the denial of his hardship applications is against the United States and subject to Sec. 2401(a)'s six-year limitation.