Opinion ID: 429598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: compensable time

Text: 27 Appellants assert that they were entitled to summary judgment in the trial court on the issue of whether the twelve hours per day spent off duty in the refinery were hours spent working. They claim that there was no competent evidence to show that they were there for anything but the employer's benefit. There are many instances, however, in which time spent on the employer's premises is not compensable working time. A foreman in residence on the employer's premises, in an apartment in which the telephone is connected to the plant switchboard, is not compensated for all time spent on the premises. Walling v. Lippold, 72 F.Supp. 339, 350 (D.Neb.1947). Night switchboard operators who are permitted to sleep on premises when their presence is not required at the switchboards are not entitled to compensation for the entire duration of their shift. Howard v. Southern Continental Telephone Co., 72 F.Supp. 276 (M.D.Tenn.1944). Oil well pumpers who are on duty for twelve-hour shifts but work only part of the time they are actually available for duty need not be compensated for time they are available but not active. Thompson v. Loring Oil Co., 50 F.Supp. 213 (W.D.La.1943). 28 In Skidmore, supra, seven employees regularly stayed in the company fire hall or within hailing distance three and a half to four nights a week. Their only duty on such nights was to answer any alarms. The employees were paid for the time spent answering alarms on the infrequent occasions the alarms were set off. 65 S.Ct. at 162. The Supreme Court looked to administrative interpretation of the FLSA for guidance in determining whether time spent off duty constituted work time. The administrator suggested that sleeping and eating time would not ordinarily be considered work time, but that all other on-call time might constitute work time. Id. 65 S.Ct. at 164. The Court concluded that, in general, whether time was compensable working time depended  'upon the degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal activities during periods of idleness when he is subject to call and the number of consecutive hours that the employee is subject to call, without being required to perform active work.'  Ibid. 29 In their argument appellants do not break down the twelve off-duty hours into hours spent sleeping, eating, and engaging in recreational activities. They argue that all twelve hours were spent primarily for the employer's benefit. 30 Arco presented evidence at trial that the guards were called to duty during their off hours only a few times during the strike. The guards were free to sleep, eat at no expense, watch movies, play pool or cards, exercise, read, or listen to music during their off-duty time. Such evidence was sufficient to raise a fact question as to whether all the guards' free time, including sleeping and eating time, was spent predominantly for the employer's benefit. Therefore it was proper for the district court to deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on that issue since it is proper to grant summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of material fact. McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Services Co., 700 F.2d 260, 262 (5th Cir.1983). 31 The jury's answer that the time the guards spent in the refinery while off duty was not compensable time indicates that, having failed to distinguish the different types of activities engaged in during that time and in light of the specific facts of this case, appellants failed to carry their burden of proving the time was work time.