Opinion ID: 1922564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Analysis of Content-Neutral Regulations

Text: [¶ 20] We analyze Diva's claim employing the framework set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Under the four-part O'Brien test, courts analyze the constitutionality of content-neutral regulations by inquiring into whether: (1) they are within the constitutional power of government to enact; (2) they further an important or substantial government interest; (3) the government interest is unrelated to suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to furtherance of the government interest. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. Applying the O'Brien test to the present case, we conclude that section 228 does not prohibit protected speech in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 4 of the Maine Constitution.
[¶ 21] The first prong of the O'Brien test asks whether the ordinance is within the authority of the municipality to enact regulations. Id. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that municipalities are authorized, pursuant to their police powers, to enact laws to protect public health and safety. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Pursuant to the Maine Constitution and statutory provisions, municipalities have been granted home rule authority, empowering them to legislate on matters beyond those exclusively `local and municipal' and in all areas except where expressly prohibited by the Legislature or where the Legislature has intended to exclusively occupy the field and the legislation would frustrate the purpose of a state law. Sch. Comm. v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935, 939 (Me.1993). [¶ 22] The Maine Constitution authorizes municipalities to alter and amend their charters on all matters local and municipal in character and provides that the Legislature shall prescribe the procedure by which the municipality may so act. ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1. This provision affords municipalities broad powers of legislation and administration of their affairs, provided there exists no express or implied prohibition by the Constitution or the general law. Bird v. Town of Old Orchard, 426 A.2d 370, 372 (Me. 1981). [¶ 23] In addition, municipalities have been granted more expansive powers of home rule authority by statute. Pursuant to 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001 (1996), [a]ny municipality, by the adoption, amendment or repeal of ordinances or bylaws, may exercise any power or function which the Legislature has power to confer upon it, which is not denied either expressly or by clear implication, and exercise any power or function granted to the municipality by the Constitution of Maine, general law or charter. [¶ 24] Construing these two sources of home rule authority together, we have stated that section 3001 constitutes an independent and plenary grant of power to municipalities to legislate on matters beyond those exclusively `local and municipal,' Town of York, 626 A.2d at 939, and that we will invalidate municipal legislation only: (1) where it conflicts with other constitutional provisions; (2) where the Legislature has expressly prohibited local regulation; or (3) where the Legislature has intended to exclusively occupy the field and the legislation would frustrate the purpose of a state law, see id. at 939; Bird, 426 A.2d at 372. Based on the City's home rule authority and the absence of an express prohibition or preemption by the Legislature, we conclude, subject to our remaining analysis for possible conflict with free speech protections, that the City acted within its authority when it enacted section 228-14.
[¶ 25] The next inquiry under the O'Brien test is whether an ordinance serves an important or substantial government interest. 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. The legislative findings of section 228-14 indicate that the ordinance is aimed at preventing the harmful secondary effects associated with nude entertainment. The findings state, inter alia, that such activities have created a tawdry atmosphere, adversely affecting the quality of life in Bangor. BANGOR CODE § 228-12(6). The City is entitled to rely on such legislative findings of fact. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 297-98, 120 S.Ct. 1382. [¶ 26] Although the City offers no direct evidence to demonstrate that these secondary effects are a problem in Bangor, the city need not `conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities' to demonstrate the problem of secondary effects, `so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.' Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925). The nude entertainment proscribed by Bangor's ordinances in establishments serving alcohol is similar to the entertainment described in numerous cases and the City could reasonably conclude that the same negative effects would result. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-97, 120 S.Ct. 1382; Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 925; Young, 427 U.S. at 54-55, 96 S.Ct. 2440; California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 110-12, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972). Thus, we conclude that section 228 serves important government interests.
[¶ 27] The third prong of the O'Brien test asks whether the government interest served by an ordinance is unrelated to the suppression of expression. 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc ., the United States Supreme Court held that a statute prohibiting public nudity was unrelated to the suppression of free expression because it was aimed at the nudity rather than erotic expression. 501 U.S. at 570, 111 S.Ct. 2456. The Court stated that it was not the dancing that was prohibited, but simply its being done in the nude. Id. at 571, 111 S.Ct. 2456. In the same manner, section 228 is a content-neutral regulation that is aimed at preventing the harmful secondary effects of nude entertainment. Based upon the legislative findings, the City adopted section 228 to protect the public health, safety and morals. BANGOR CODE § 228-12(B). Because section 228 serves important governmental interests that are unrelated to the suppression of free expression, it satisfies the third prong of the O'Brien test.
[¶ 28] Under the fourth prong of the O'Brien test, an incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary to achieve the government's purpose, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673 providing reasonable alternative avenues for expression, Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres , a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult theaters from locating within 1000 feet of residences, churches, parks, and within one mile of any school was held to permit reasonable alternative avenues of communication where 520 acres were zoned for adult theatres. 475 U.S. at 44-54, 106 S.Ct. 925. In that case, the Court noted all 520 acres need not be actually available. Id. at 54, 106 S.Ct. 925 (That respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an equal footing with other prospective purchasers and lessees, does not give rise to a First Amendment violation.). [¶ 29] In the present case, the trial court concluded that there are substantial areas where a business providing `nude entertainment' could be lawfully located within the city. The record reflects that Diva's introduced a map into evidence which demonstrated that 963 acres are potentially available for adult businesses in Bangor. Because the trial court's factual finding is supported by competent evidence, it is not clearly erroneous. Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 13, 770 A.2d 592, 600. Based on the record presented, we conclude that section 228's incidental restriction on speech is no greater than is necessary to achieve the government's purpose, providing reasonable alternative avenues for expression. [¶ 30] Because section 228 is within the City's power to enact, furthers important government interests, is not related to the suppression of expression, and works incidental restrictions no greater than necessary to achieve the government's purpose of minimizing the negative effects associated with nude entertainment, we hold that it complies with the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 4, of the Maine Constitution.