Opinion ID: 813114
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hammond’s Discrimination Claims

Text: To decide whether summary judgment was appropriate on Hammond’s ADA discrimination claim, we begin with the burden-shifting framework of 2 In his complaint, Hammond alleged that Jacobs retaliated against him for requesting accommodation for his disability (an ADA retaliation claim), as well as for his complaints about racial discrimination by Jacobs against its employees (a Title VII retaliation claim). However, Hammond appears to have abandoned his Title VII retaliation claim in his Opposition to Jacobs’s motion for summary judgment, and does not clearly indicate that he is pursuing this claim on appeal. Therefore, we review only Hammond’s ADA retaliation claim. 3 The district court dismissed Hammond’s state law claims without prejudice, as it exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 not to assert federal jurisdiction over them. 4 Case: 12-30222 Document: 00512073755 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/05/2012 No. 12-30222 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003); E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff succeeds, then the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If the employer meets its burden, then the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 804. A prima facie case coupled with a showing that the proffered reason was pretextual will usually be sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-48 (2000) (ADEA case); see also E.E.O.C. v. Chevron, 570 F.3d at 615 (citing Reeves for the proposition that McDonnell Douglas applies in ADA discrimination cases). The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . discharge of employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). To prevail on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must prove that he has a disability, that he is qualified for the job, and that he suffered an adverse employment decision because of his disability. Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1092-93 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 517-19 (5th Cir. 2008) (clarifying the ADA’s causation standard).4 The district court found that Hammond was not disabled,5 that he was not qualified for his position as line 4 The district court incorrectly cited Turco for the proposition that the ADA requires sole causation. This court, in Pinkerton, concluded that the ADA causation standard does not require a showing of sole cause. 529 F.3d at 519. 5 The district court was correct to cite language from the version of the ADA in effect at the time of the alleged discrimination. The ADA was amended in 2008 and the amendments took effect on January 1, 2009. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 11-325, 122 5 Case: 12-30222 Document: 00512073755 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/05/2012 No. 12-30222 operator, and that he did not offer any evidence that the nondiscriminatory reason Jacobs gave for the adverse employment decisions it made as to Hammond was pretextual. We assume arguendo that Hammond was disabled.6 As discussed below, we think there is a fact question as to whether Jacobs’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was legitimate. But we ultimately agree with the district court that summary judgment on Hammond’s ADA discrimination claim was correct because Hammond was not qualified for his position. “The term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (“Qualified individual with a disability means an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.”). As the record reflects, a line operator is required to perform moderately heavy manual tasks that Hammond was unable to do at the time of his termination. Some of these duties are not physically intensive (e.g., cutting excess wrapping material off of pallets, and adding glue to the glue pot), and sometimes operators are tasked, along with their other responsibilities, with the duty of training other employees. There is evidence—and on appeal Hammond Stat. 3553 (2008). We have previously held that these amendments are not retroactive. See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009). 6 The district court relied on Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Lafayette, Inc., 242 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 2001), in holding that Hammond is not disabled. But Hammond’s physical limitations are more severe than the plaintiff’s in Dupre. The plaintiff in Dupre was capable of “bending at the knees, walking a half mile, lifting up to thirty pounds, and driving a car for an hour.” Id. at 615. By comparison, the record shows that Hammond was unable to bend, stoop, or climb, and could not walk more than one block or lift more than five pounds. 6 Case: 12-30222 Document: 00512073755 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/05/2012 No. 12-30222 argues—that Jacobs could have retained Hammond by reassigning him exclusively to training responsibilities or light duty tasks, which at the time were distributed among all of the line operators in the plant. But this is not a “reasonable accommodation.” It is well established that the ADA does not require an employer to reassign an employee where doing so would result in other employees having to work harder or longer. See Turco, 101 F.3d at 1094; see also Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 621 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The ADA does not require an employer to relieve an employee of any essential functions of his or her job, modify those duties, reassign existing employees to perform those jobs, or hire new employees to do so.”). Because Hammond was not qualified for his position, and because the accommodations he sought were not reasonable under the ADA, summary judgment was appropriate on Hammond’s ADA discrimination claim.
The district court appears to have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in ruling on Hammond’s Title VII racial discrimination claim. However, “we apply the modified McDonnell Douglas framework in racial discrimination cases under Title VII.” Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 308 (5th Cir. 2004). This modified framework differs from the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework only in the third stage of the analysis, after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, and the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Id. Under the traditional framework, a plaintiff, having the burden of production shifted back to him, must show that the defendant’s reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. But under the modified framework, the plaintiff in this situation is required to show either that the defendant’s reason was pretextual, or that the reason, while true, was 7 Case: 12-30222 Document: 00512073755 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/05/2012 No. 12-30222 only one of the reasons for its adverse action, and that another “motivating factor” for the action was the plaintiff’s protected characteristic, Vaughn, 665 F.3d at 636 (citing Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312). We need not venture far into our modified McDonnell Douglas analysis because Hammond cannot establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, Hammond must show that he was qualified for his position. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Rutherford v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999). As discussed above, Hammond was not qualified for his position. Thus, summary judgment for Jacobs was proper on Hammond’s Title VII claim. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Employers may succeed on summary judgment by establishing that the plaintiff is not qualified for the coveted position.”).