Opinion ID: 2108741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The 1898 Walker/Joyce Deed

Text: With our prior cases and the effect of the Marketable Title Act as background, we turn now to an analysis of the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed. To determine the nature of the conveyance at issue, we look to the deed to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties to the instrument. Walter, 243 Minn. at 162, 66 N.W.2d at 883; Lawton v. Joesting, 96 Minn. 163, 166-67, 104 N.W. 830, 831-32 (1905). In construing the deed, we must consider all parts of it, and the construction must be upon the entire deed, and not upon disjointed parts. Id. at 167, 104 N.W. at 832. If the deed's language is ambiguous, we may look to evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the situation of the parties to cast light upon their intention. Id. A review of cases from other jurisdictions reveals that there is considerable conflict in the way courts construe the nature of deeds purporting to convey land where there is also a reference to a right of way or a reference to the purpose of the conveyance. See A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Easement, 6 A.L.R.3d 973 (1966). The decisions usually turn on a case-by-case examination of each deed. See id. For the foregoing reasons, we must begin our examination of the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed by looking to the granting language to determine the intent of the parties as to the nature of the conveyance. The deed's granting clause expressly conveys land rather than mere use of the land, stating that the grantors hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said company, its successors and assigns, a strip, belt or piece of land. The deed also contains a habendum clause, which is a provision in a deed that traditionally could explain, enlarge, or qualify, but [could not] contradict or defeat, the estate granted. New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 20, 18 S.Ct. 531, 42 L.Ed. 927 (1898). We must, however, read the granting and habendum clauses together in order to arrive at the true intention, even to the extent of allowing the habendum to qualify or control the granting clause where it was manifestly intended that it should do so. Youngers v. Schafer, 196 Minn. 147, 153, 264 N.W. 794, 798 (1936) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the 1898 deed, the habendum clause states: Provided that this Grant or Conveyance shall continue in force[, so] long as the said strips of land shall be used for Right of Way and for Railway purposes; but to cease and terminate if the Railway is removed from the said strips. Here, we conclude that the use of the phrase so long as in the habendum clause provides clear evidence of the grantors' intent to convey a determinable fee because the phrase so long as is typically used in a conveyance of a fee simple determinable. See, e.g., Walter, 243 Minn. at 162, 66 N.W.2d at 883-84; see also McKusich v. County Comm'rs Washington County, 16 Minn. 151, 157 (Gil.135, 139-40) (1870) (1870) (recognizing fee simple determinable). The habendum clause also states that the land shall be used for Right of Way and for Railway Purposes. Courts have long recognized that use of the phrase right of way is ambiguous because the phrase may be used to describe either (1) `a right belonging to a party, a right of passage over any tract' or (2) the physical `strip of land which railroad companies take upon which to construct their road-bed.' Bosell v. Rannestad, 226 Minn. 413, 418, 33 N.W.2d 40, 43-44 (1948) (quoting Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 44, 11 S.Ct. 243, 34 L.Ed. 843 (1891)). Reference to a right of way in a conveyance has been frequently cited as evidence that a conveyance is an easement, but use of the phrase does not necessarily mean that a conveyance is an easement. See, e.g., Grill v. West Virginia R.R. Maint. Auth., 188 W.Va. 284, 423 S.E.2d 893, 896-97 (W.Va.1992); Maberry v. Gueths, 238 Mont. 304, 777 P.2d 1285, 1287-88 (1989). Moreover, Minnesota law does not presume that a conveyance of land to a railroad for right of way purposes is an easement. [8] The phrase right of way is used in the 1898 deed to indicate its purpose, which, even if we were to interpret the phrase as being used to indicate a mere right of passage, does not provide much evidence of the parties' intent as to the nature of the conveyance. As the Iowa Supreme Court has recognized: Determining the nature of the interest conveyed by reference to the intended use by the grantee seems frivolous in matters involving narrow tracts of land acquired by railroad companies. There is but one single reason for all such conveyances irrespective of whether the deed conveys a fee or an easement. As we stated in Turner v. Unknown Claimants of Land, 207 N.W.2d 544, 546 (Iowa 1973), [o]rdinarily the parties know the tract will be used for a railway; for what other purpose would a railroad purchase a strip of land across a farm. Lowers v. United States, 663 N.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Iowa 2003) (holding that deed labeled Rt. of Way Deed conveying a narrow tract of land to a railroad company conveyed a defeasible fee rather than an easement). Therefore, we conclude that the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed's reference to a right of way as the purpose of the conveyance does not necessarily make the conveyance an easement. Other language beyond the granting clause and the habendum clause of the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed provides additional evidence that the grantors conveyed a fee simple determinable. The deed includes a legal description of a corridor of land that is 100 feet in width, but also describes the conveyance of four additional strips of land that increase the width of the corridor up to 200 feet, beyond what would appear necessary for a railway easement. In addition, the deed uses different language for the grant of an easement to the railroad company to erect snow fences up to 100 feet beyond the edges of the corridor. Specifically, the deed provides: And with the right to said Company, its successors and assigns to protect cuts which may be made on said lands, by erecting on both sides of, or within one hundred and fifty feet from the said center line, Portable snow Fences. Awareness by the parties to a deed of the distinction between the conveyance of an easement and a fee simple can illustrate the intent of the parties as to the nature of the larger conveyance. King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th Cir.2002). Here, the parties used the term right to grant the snow fence easement as opposed to the phrase grant, bargain, sell and convey, which the parties used to describe the conveyance of the strip, belt or piece of land at issue. We conclude that both the language used for the additional strips of land that increase the width of the corridor, and the use of the term right to grant the snow fence easement, indicate that the parties to the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed understood the distinction between the conveyance of an easement and an interest in fee simple, and intended to convey an interest in land rather than mere use of the land. [9] Another feature of the 1898 deed that casts light on the intent of the parties is the grantors' apparent release of dower rights. Dower rights are an interest that a wife has in the real estate of her husband. Stitt v. Smith, 102 Minn. 253, 254, 113 N.W. 632, 633 (1907). An easement, because it is not title to land, does not relinquish dower rights when it is conveyed. Chicago & S.W. R.R. v. Swinney, 38 Iowa 182, 182 (Iowa 1874); 28 C.J.S. Dower and Curtesy § 12 (1996). The presence of the release of dower rights in the deed, while not dispositive, and unclear in this case, provides further evidence of intent to convey a fee interest rather than an easement. See Brewer & Taylor Co. v. Wall, 299 Ark. 18, 769 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1989). [10] Further, because the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed is ambiguous as to its intent to convey a fee simple determinable or an easement, we may also look to extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circumstances of the parties in relation to the conveyance, such as the subsequent conduct of the parties. Troseth v. Troseth, 224 Minn. 35, 36, 28 N.W.2d 65, 65 (1947); see Brown v. State, 130 Wash.2d 430, 924 P.2d 908, 912 (1996). On June 17, 1901, W.T. Joyce and Clotilde G. Joyce, grantors in the 1898 deed, conveyed by deed their interest to land in Hubbard County adjacent to the railway corridor created by the 1898 deed. The Joyces' 1901 deed described the land conveyed and then provided: Excepting and reserving there from the land heretobefore conveyed to the Park Rapids and Leech Lake Railway and to the Brainerd and Northern Minnesota Railway for right-of-way. The term excepting, when used in a deed, typically indicates that nothing passes. Carlson v. Duluth Short Line Ry., 38 Minn. 305, 306, 37 N.W. 341, 341 (1888). Furthermore, a conveyance that intends to reference a preexisting easement typically indicates that the conveyance is subject to the easement. See Hersh Properties, LLC, 588 N.W.2d at 730. For these reasons, the Joyces' 1901 deed excepting from the conveyance the land heretobefore conveyed provides additional support that the parties to the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed intended to convey title in fee simple determinable. By excepting the land conveyed in 1898 from their 1901 conveyance, the Joyces demonstrated an understanding of the 1898 deed a mere three years later that they no longer owned the land conveyed in 1898. See King County, 299 F.3d at 1087 (concluding that a subsequent deed by grantors conveying property less (3) acres right of way of Rail Road indicated that the railway owned the strip of land and did not merely have a right to use the land). For all of the foregoing reasons, we agree with the district court and conclude that the parties to the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed did not intend to convey a mere easement for use of the land. Rather, we conclude that the parties intended to convey real property in fee simple determinable, subject to the limitation that the conveyance would cease and terminate if the Railway is removed from the said strips. We believe this conclusion reflects the intent of the parties. We also believe this conclusion best serves many of the policy reasons underlying the Marketable Title Act, which, as we next discuss, should be applied to the interest conveyed in the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and hold that the 1898 deed conveyed title in fee simple determinable. [11]