Opinion ID: 1118080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Evidentiary Rulings on Amended Tax Returns

Text: The commissions Allied paid Edwards from the branch account constituted income to her for federal income tax purposes. Also, branch-operating expenses were deductible as ordinary business expenses on Edwards's tax returns. Edwards did not, however, initially report income or claim expense deductions on her tax returns with respect to the transactions she did not disclose to Allied. After Allied sued in 2003, Edwards amended her tax returns for the prior years to recognize those transactions. For impeachment purposes, the trial court allowed Allied to cross-examine Edwards concerning the timing and filing of her amended returns. Those returns were also admitted into evidence. Edwards objected to those evidentiary rulings on the basis that they allowed Allied to impugn Edwards's credibility in violation of Rule 608(b), Ala. R. Evid. Rule 608(b) provides: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness nor proved by extrinsic evidence. Edwards argues that Rule 608(b) proscribes cross-examination concerning `specific acts of misconduct by [a witness] which have no relevancy except as tending to show that [the witness] is a person of bad character as a whole or with respect to truth and veracity.' J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. Credeur, 681 So.2d 1355, 1361 (Ala.1996) (quoting C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 140(10)(4th ed.1991)). Edwards contends that the inquiry into her amended tax returns was error because, she argues, those returns were immaterial to the issues in the case. Allied argues that the impeachment of Edwards concerning her amended returns and tax-reporting practices was valid after she testified that Allied's nonperformance of its obligations under the agreement had prevented Edwards from making a living. A trial court has wide discretion in matters of cross-examination. Hyche v. Medical Ctr. East, Inc., 711 So.2d 1017, 1019 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). Rulings on those matters will not be reversed absent a showing of gross abuse of that discretion that caused substantial injury to the objecting party. 711 So.2d at 1019. Furthermore, a judgment will not be reversed for the improper admission or rejection of evidence . . . unless in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken . . . after an examination of the entire cause, it [appears] that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties. Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P. Without deciding whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing cross-examination based on the amended tax returns, Edwards has not demonstrated the requisite substantial injury required for a reversal of the trial court's judgment based on Rule 45.