Opinion ID: 6971869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits — Genuine Issues of Material Fact

Text: We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens Inc., 143 F.3d 71, 83-84 (2d Cir.1998). Summary judgment is appropriate only if, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved by a jury. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The non-moving party who will bear the burden of proof at trial must produce specific facts indicating that a genuine factual issue exists. See Scotto v. Arcadio Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.1998). However, “[w]e do not resolve disputed issues of fact but determine whether genuine issues of fact exist to be resolved at trial.” Krumme, 143 F.3d 71, 83-84. A discussion of whether Gliek-man has produced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on his sole timely claim (his Bivens claim that Gottlieb was the person who laced his drink with LSD) must begin by focusing on the CIA’s destruction of its MKULTRA files in 1973, at the direction of Gottlieb and with the approval of Helms. Although we believe, like the district court, that a jury might be skeptical of plaintiffs claim that he was drugged by Gottlieb, we also believe, contrary to the district court, that a jury should be permitted (but not required) to draw an adverse inference against Gottlieb based on the destruction of MKULTRA documents. Further, we believe that, when combined with the possibility that a jury would choose to draw such an adverse inference, plaintiffs circumstantial evidence that he may have been one of the victims of the CIA’s drug tests was enough — barely enough, but enough nonetheless — to entitle him to proceed to trial. It is a well-established and longstanding principle of law that a party’s intentional destruction of evidence relevant to proof of an issue at trial can support an inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction. See, e.g., Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distributors, 692 F.2d 214, 217-18 (1st Cir.1982); 2 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 291 (James H. Chadbourn rev.1979). 11 This adverse inference rule is supported by evidentiary, prophylactic, punitive, and remedial rationales. The evidentiary rationale derives from the common sense notion that a party’s destruction of evidence which it has reason to believe may be used against it in litigation suggests that the evidence was harmful to the party responsible for its destruction. The prophylactic and punitive rationales are based on the equally commonsensical proposition that the drawing of an adverse inference against parties who destroy evidence will deter such destruction, and will properly “plac[e] the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party that wrongfully created the risk.” Nation-Wide Check, 692 F.2d at 218. Finally, courts have recognized a remedial rationale for the adverse inference — namely, that an adverse inference should serve the function, insofar as possible, of restoring the prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing party. See Skeete v. McKinsey & Co., No. 91 Civ. 8093, 1993 WL 256659, at  (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1993); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 74 (S.D.N.Y.1991). In order for an adverse inference to arise from the destruction of evidence, the party having control over the evidence must have had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed. This obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation — most commonly when suit has already been filed, providing the party responsible for the destruction with express notice, but also on occasion in other circumstances, as for example when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation. See Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 72-73; Skeete, 1993 WL 256659, at . Once a court has concluded that a party was under an obligation to preserve the evidence that it destroyed, it must then consider whether the evidence was intentionally destroyed, and the likely contents of that evidence. See Weinreich v. Sandhaus, 850 F.Supp. 1169, 1181 n. 19 (S.D.N.Y.1994). The district court properly rejected defendants’ argument that an adverse inference was not warranted because at the time the MKULTRA documents were destroyed in 1973 no litigation, administrative action, or congressional investigation had commenced, and because Helms’s and Gottlieb’s reasons for destroying the evidence allegedly had nothing to do with the fear of future litigation. See Kronisch III, 1997 WL 907994, at . Although defendants claimed that the documents were destroyed to preserve the confidential identities of outside participants in the MKULTRA program, to prevent incomplete documents from being misunderstood, and to prevent paper overflow, the district court concluded that “[i]t is somewhat hard to believe that both Gottlieb and Helms ... were concerned only with the effect of disclosure on other persons connected to the drug program, and not with the possible consequences to themselves or to the CIA.” Kronisch III, 1997 WL 907994, at . Moreover, the district court observed, Gottlieb’s own expressed fear that the documents might be “misunderstood” could be interpreted in a number of ways, including as a fear that the documents would become the subject of litigation. See id. At the very least, the district court could not rule out the possibility that a reasonable jury would find that Helms and Gottlieb feared the prospect of litigation against them individually, and that this prospect may have played a role in their decision to order the destruction of MKULTRA files. Inasmuch as the veracity of Gottlieb’s stated reasons for destroying the MKULTRA documents “is an issue of credibility best left for trial,” id., the district court presumed for purposes of considering the motion for summary judgment that defendants had an obligation to preserve the files and that the destruction was intentional, see id. Defendants do not challenge this sound approach on appeal.’ Concluding (or, for purposes of summary judgment, assuming) that a party has intentionally destroyed evidence that it had an obligation to preserve is not the end of the story, however. We must also attempt to determine whether there is any likelihood that the destroyed evidence would have been of the nature alleged by the party affected by its destruction. This inquiry is part of our attempt to place the innocent party in the same position he would have been in had the evidence not been destroyed by the offending party. The task is unavoidably imperfect, inasmuch as, in the absence of the destroyed evidence, we can only venture guesses with varying degrees of confidence as to what that missing evidence may have revealed. Nonetheless, before we permit the drawing of an adverse inference, we require some showing indicating that the destroyed evidence would have been relevant to the contested issue. See Stanojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 923-24 (2d Cir.1981) (refusing to draw inference, based on nonproduetion of personnel records, that the records would have substantiated plaintiff’s age discrimination claim, where the nonproduction bore “no logical relationship to a finding of age discrimination” because “the documents [were] from a time period prior to [plaintiffj’s assumption of the position from which he was discharged”); Skeete, 1993 WL 256659, at  (refusing to draw adverse inference- where party had “not demonstrated prejudice from the denial of access to the destroyed or lost materials” because it had “fail[ed] to provide any extrinsic evidence that the subject matter of the lost or destroyed materials would have been unfavorable to [the opposing party] or would have been relevant to the issues in this lawsuit”). Wigmore states the rule as follows: The failure or refusal to produce a relevant document, or the destruction of it, is evidence from which alone its contents may be inferred to be unfavorable to the possessor, provided the opponent, when the identity of the document is disputed, first introduces some evidence tending to show that the document actually destroyed or withheld vs the one as to whose contents it is desired to draw an inference.’ 2 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 291, at 228 (emphasis in original). Wigmore’s description of the proper rule was offered in the context of a hypothetical in which a particular document (e.g., a deed meant to show the conveyance of a certain piece of land from X to Y), known by all to contain critical evidence in the case, was destroyed. Where, as here, a party loses the opportunity to identify such a particular document or documents likely to contain critical evidence because the voluminous files that might contain the document(s) have all been destroyed, the situation becomes more complex — but there can be no doubt that the same basic principle proposed by Wigmore still applies. That is, the prejudiced party may be permitted an inference in his favor so long as he has produced some evidence suggesting that a document or documents relevant to substantiating his claim would have been included among the destroyed files. Just how much evidence is enough to support an inference about the content of destroyed evidence cannot be precisely defined, and will necessarily vary from case to case, but we remain mindful of Wigmore’s admonition that “care should be taken” not to require too specific a level of proof. Id. at 228. Indeed, holding the prejudiced party to too strict a standard of proof regarding the likely contents of the destroyed evidence would subvert the prophylactic and punitive purposes of the adverse inference, and would allow parties who have intentionally destroyed evidence to profit from that destruction. Certainly, the level of proof that will suffice to support an inference in favor of the innocent party on a particular issue must be less than the amount that would suffice to survive summary judgment on that issue. Otherwise, innocent parties meant to benefit from the adverse inference against offending parties would receive no benefit at all, having been deprived of evidence that may have been crucial to making their case, and yet being held to precisely the same standard of proof before they may present their case to a jury. We do not suggest that the destruction of evidence, standing alone, is enough to allow a party who has produced no evidence — or utterly inadequate evidence — in support of a given claim to survive summary judgment on that claim. See Nation-Wide Check, 692 F.2d at 218-19 (“The issue before the court was not whether the destruction was sufficient, standing alone, to warrant an adverse inference about the documents’ contents; it was simply whether the destruction was at all relevant to the tracing issue, and if so, whether it was sufficiently probative in conjunction with the other evidence to support the tracing conclusion.”). But at the margin, where the innocent party has produced some (not insubstantial) evidence in support of his claim, the intentional destruction of relevant evidence by the opposing party may push a claim that might not otherwise survive summary judgment over the line. In the absence of such a result, as noted above, the purposes of the adverse inference are eviscerated. Although we emphasize again that there are reasons to be skeptical of plaintiffs claim, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs evidence is so utterly insubstantial as to render an adverse inference unwarranted as a matter of law. We believe that plaintiff has produced enough circumstantial evidence to support the inference that the destroyed MKULTRA files may have contained documents supporting (or potentially proving) his claim, and that the possibility that a jury would choose to draw such an inference, combined with plaintiffs circumstantial evidence, is enough to entitle plaintiff to a jury trial. We reiterate that, at the summary judgment stage, we are required to draw all factual inferences in. Glickman’s favor. Moreover, for purposes of this summary judgment motion (only), defendants do not contest that Glickman was unwittingly drugged with LSD in a Paris cafe in 1952. See Kronisch III, 1997 WL 907994, at . Although at trial Gottlieb might be able to offer explanations for the events in Glick-man’s life beginning in October 1952, and might be able to discredit the conclusion of plaintiffs expert that these events are explained by Gliekman’s unwitting consumption of LSD, defendants have not yet attempted to do so. Defendants likewise do not contest at this stage that Glickman was given the LSD-laeed drink by an American with a clubfoot — a distinguishing characteristic possessed by Gottlieb, the head of the MKUL-TRA1 program. See id. The allegation that the man who gave Glickman the drink was clubfooted is also one that might be attacked by Gottlieb at trial. Glickman claims to have only remembered this distinguishing characteristic some twenty-nine years after the fact when his friend Dean Corren, upon Corren’s return from Washington after viewing CIA files in 1981, asked him whether the man who gave him the drink in 1952 was clubfooted. Glickman’s recollection in response to his friend’s suggestive question will doubtless be challenged at trial. However, whatever doubts Gottlieb might reasonably be able to create in the minds of a jury as to the credibility of this recollection are not doubts that we may now entertain, inasmuch as we are reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we must accept as true for purposes of reviewing the district court’s decision on this motion that Glickman was given LSD by an American with a clubfoot in 1952. Plaintiff has produced evidence that the pool of Americans who would have had access to LSD at the relevant time — not to mention the subset of all • such individuals also having a clubfoot — was quite limited, inasmuch as “LSD was known only to a few researchers and government agents” in 1952. Report of Dr. Lester Grinspoon, Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, at 8 (May 3, 1988). Moreover, as the district court recognized, “it appears that the CIA, and specifically Gottlieb, was engaged in some form of LSD research in 1952.” Kronisch III, 1997 WL 907994, at . In conducting LSD tests on unwitting victims within the United States, the CIA at times would make contact with the subject in a bar or other public place, and administer the drug by slipping it into the person’s drink — a scenario like .the one allegedly experienced See Kronisch III, 1997 WL 907994, at , . Apart from the domestic testing of LSD on unwitting subjects, MKULTRA materials were used abroad on a number of occasions, “possibly as early as 1950.” Church Committee Report at 391. Although there is no direct evidence that any overseas tests were conducted in Paris or on American subjects in non-interrogational settings, and although Gottlieb testified at his deposition that his only overseas use of LSD involved three interrogations of foreign nationals after 1952 in places other than France, the destruction of MKULTRA files has made it “impossible to reconstruct the operational use of MKULTRA materials by the CIA overseas,” id., and thereby, perhaps to contradict Gottlieb’s assertions. by Glickman. In sum, while plaintiffs chain of circumstantial evidence may prove to be altogether vulnerable at trial, it is sufficient to suggest the reasonable possibility that, had Gottlieb and Helms not ordered the destruction of the MKULTRA files, these files may have contained evidence helping to substantiate plaintiffs claim that Gottlieb drugged him in Paris in 1952. Accepting, as the current record requires on defendants’ motion for summary judgment, that very few Americans — other than those working with the CIA — knew of or had access to LSD in 1952; that Gottlieb was engaged in some form of LSD research in 1952; that the CIA performed LSD tests on unwitting subjects in the United States at or near the relevant time; that the CIA drug tests were at times performed using the same means alleged here; that the CIA tested LSD abroad, albeit under different conditions and circumstances; and that the man who gave Glickman the drink, like Gottlieb, had the distinguishing trait of a clubfoot, we cannot say that it is so unlikely that the destroyed MKULTRA files would have contained evidence buttressing plaintiffs claim that an adverse inference is unwarranted as a matter of law. 12 Although plaintiff has not produced direct proof that the CIA conducted LSD tests in Paris, or that the overseas use of LSD involved tests on Americans (rather than foreign nationals) in non-interro-gational settings, the most obvious source of such proof, if it were to exist at all, has been destroyed at Gottlieb’s direction. Under these circumstances, requiring more direct proof than plaintiff has provided before permitting an adverse inference to be drawn against Gottlieb would be at odds with the purposes of the adverse inference rule. Assuming that a jury were to find that Gottlieb had an obligation to preserve the MKULTRA documents that he ordered to be destroyed, the jury would be entitled to draw an adverse inference against Gottlieb. The possibility that the jury would choose to draw such an inference, along with plaintiffs other circumstantial evidence that he was drugged by the CIA — specifically, by Gottlieb — is enough to entitle plaintiff to a jury trial.