Opinion ID: 2519774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: julian's petition under prior post-conviction relief law

Text: ¶ 13 Alternatively, the State argues that the trial court should have denied Julian's petition for relief under the post-conviction relief case law in effect prior to the enactment of the PCRA. ¶ 14 While we have recognized that newly discovered evidence may warrant post-conviction relief, we have not addressed the standards that govern such decisions. See Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 (Utah 1989); Gallegos v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 273, 275, 409 P.2d 386, 387 (Utah 1965). In its decision, the habeas court relied on the standards we use to determine whether to grant a new trial under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In that context, we require that newly discovered evidence (1) must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been produced at trial, (2) must not merely be cumulative, (3) must not be used solely for impeachment purposes, and (4) must be such as to render a different result probable on retrial. See James, 819 P.2d at 793; State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988). ¶ 15 In applying this standard to Julian's post-conviction relief claim, the habeas court followed a number of states that apply various combinations of these same four criteria to new evidence claims in both the criminal trial and post-conviction relief settings. See, e.g., State v. Serna, 167 Ariz. 373, 807 P.2d 1109, 1110 (1991); Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); People v. Washington, 171 Ill.2d 475, 216 Ill.Dec. 773, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1337 (1996); Powell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ind.1999); State v. Sims, 239 N.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Iowa 1976); State v. Bradley, 246 Kan. 316, 787 P.2d 706, 707 (1990); Woodruff v. State, 608 N.W.2d 881, 888 (Minn.2000); State v. Abe, 307 Mont. 233, 37 P.3d 77, 79 (2001); Callier v. Warden, 111 Nev. 976, 901 P.2d 619, 626 (1995); Hopfauf v. State, 575 N.W.2d 646, 647 (N.D. 1998), overruled in part by Whiteman v. State, 643 N.W.2d 704 (N.D.2002); Brennan v. Vose, 764 A.2d 168, 173 (R.I.2001). We agree with these jurisdictions that the requirements that newly discovered evidence not be available at trial, not be merely cumulative, and not be used solely for impeachment purposes are equally applicable in the rule 24 and post-conviction relief settings. ¶ 16 With regard to the evidentiary impact that newly discovered evidence must have, we have stated that [i]n order to sustain the granting of [post-conviction relief], something more is required than that the evidence might have justified the granting of a new trial had it been promptly disclosed. Ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 310, 313, 366 P.2d 72, 74 (1961). Indeed, in order to justify the [post-conviction] release of a convicted person ... the evidence of his innocence must be stronger than would be necessary in the first instance in support of a motion for a new trial, for special writs are applied for after the defendant's conviction has been affirmed or denied on appeal, and in a sense they invade the usual rules for the finality of judgments. Id. Nothing in our pre-PRCA case law, however, suggests that newly discovered evidence must rise to the heightened standard required by the PRCA that viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(1)(e)(iv). This is an extremely heavy burden, one that we have generally reserved for the review of insufficiency of the evidence claims. See State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980) (stating that when petitioning this court to reverse on insufficiency of evidence grounds, appellant bears heavy burden of establishing that the evidence is so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the crime (emphasis added)). We have recognized that this high showing is necessary in those cases because it is not within the prerogative of this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder, State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980); therefore, we do not weigh conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given appellant's testimony, State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Utah 1977). These restrictions do not exist in the post-conviction relief setting because there, the habeas court is a fact-finder charged with considering both the substance of the proffered testimony and the testimony's probable weight. State v. Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4, ¶ 28, 20 P.3d 265 (quotations omitted). ¶ 17 Consequently, our pre-PCRA case law requires that newly discovered evidence demonstrate more than merely rendering a different result probable at retrial, but less than insuring that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense. See Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 641 A.2d 1356, 1376 n. 22 (1994) (suggesting a standard higher than a probability but lower than beyond a reasonable doubt). This intermediate burden has been articulated by the court of appeals as when there is a substantial likelihood that had certain evidence been available at the time of trial, a different verdict would have resulted. Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct.App.1992); Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 949 (Utah Ct.App.1998), cert. denied, Matthews v. Warden, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998) (affirming dismissal of petition for extraordinary relief); Casida v. DeLand, 866 P.2d 599, 599 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (affirming habeas court's denial of post-conviction relief). We believe the phrase substantial likelihood adequately describes this intermediate burden, and we will therefore use it to refer to instances where the evidence must be more compelling than merely rendering a different result probable on retrial but need not rise to the level of insuring that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty. In summary, we hold that in order to merit post-conviction relief under our case law in effect prior to the enactment of the PCRA, newly discovered evidence (1) must be such that it could not with reasonable diligence have been produced at trial, (2) must not be merely cumulative, (3) must not be used solely for impeachment purposes, and (4) must render a different result substantially likely at retrial. ¶ 18 In granting Julian post-conviction relief, the habeas court did not apply these criteria as outlined. Although the habeas court did rule that the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative and that it was not available at trial, it did not consider whether the evidence's sole purpose was impeachment. Nor did it decide whether the evidence would make a different result substantially likely at trial, erroneously applying, instead, the rule 24 new trial standard. We therefore reverse the habeas court's granting of post-conviction relief to Julian and remand, directing it to determine whether (1) the new evidence in this case creates the substantial likelihood of a different result on trial and (2) the recantation evidence is solely for the purpose of impeachment. ¶ 19 We now address several issues likely to arise on remand. See James, 819 P.2d at 795.
¶ 20 The State argues that Julian is not entitled to post-conviction relief because A's recantation is impeachment evidence as to N's trial testimony. We note, without deciding the issue, however, that the rule enunciated above and applied in the rule 24 arena precludes relief where the only use [of newly discovered evidence] is impeachment. Worthen, 765 P.2d at 851. The same evidence often has more than one use. This rule merely precludes the granting of relief based on evidence which has as its only purpose the impeachment of another witness. If the trial court determines that the sole purpose of A's recantation is to impeach N's testimony, it should deny Julian's petition. If however, on remand, the habeas court determines that A's recantation, while having some impeachment effect on N's testimony, can also be used in an attempt to negate an essential element of the State's case or for some other non-impeachment purpose (a very conceivable finding given that Julian was convicted based on the combined weight of both girls' testimony and that A exhibited the only possible physical evidence of the crime), it should not deny the petition on this ground.
¶ 21 The State also argues that Julian is not entitled to post-conviction relief because the fact that N has not recanted her testimony renders it impossible for Julian to show the substantial likelihood of a different result on retrial. It cites a number of newly discovered evidence cases where courts have denied relief because recantation testimony was offset by the testimony of other victims or eyewitnesses who had not recanted. See M.T., Sr. v. State, 677 So.2d 1223 (1995); People v. Davenport, 233 A.D.2d 771, 650 N.Y.S.2d 418, 420 (N.Y.App.Div.1996). Under our case law, however, the fact that one or more witnesses have not recanted does not automatically mean that there is not a substantial likelihood of a different result on retrial. In determining whether there is a substantial likelihood, the habeas court should consider both the substance of the proffered testimony and the testimony's probable weight (quotations omitted). Hoffhine, 2001 UT 4 at ¶ 28, 20 P.3d 265; see also State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, ¶ 18, 994 P.2d 1237 (stating that in recantation cases part of the determination regarding probable weight includes the likelihood that a jury would find the new evidence credible).