Opinion ID: 483642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mitigating Testimony

Text: 26 The critical question in this case is whether the petitioner was denied a federal constitutional right when the trial court, on its own initiative, precluded the jury from considering Mrs. Dutton's testimony. As discussed below, it is apparent from the record in this case, as well as the context of the proceeding and the nature of the witness, that at least some of Mrs. Dutton's testimony might have been relevant mitigating evidence. The Supreme Court's decision in Skipper v. South Carolina, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) dictates the conclusion that the state trial judge erred by refusing to permit counsel the opportunity to present this evidence to the sentencing jury. As a consequence, the United States District Court erred by denying the writ of habeas corpus. We, therefore, must reverse and remand. 7 27 A review of the evolution of the Supreme Court's position on mitigating evidence in death penalty cases is instructive in making our decision in this case. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), a plurality observed that the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other sentence, id. at 305, 96 S.Ct. at 2991, and that  'individual culpability is not always measured by the category of the crime committed.'  Id. at 298, 96 S.Ct. at 2988 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2810, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The mandatory death penalty statute was held invalid because it did not allow for consideration of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense.... Id. at 304, 96 S.Ct. at 2991. 28 In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of the Court, ruled that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (emphasis in original). The Ohio statute, which did not permit the sentencer to consider, as mitigating factors, character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and the degree of involvement in the crime, was found to be constitutionally infirm. The Court recognized the death penalty is qualitatively different from any other sentence, id., and stressed the need for individualized consideration of mitigating factors in capital cases. Id. at 606, 98 S.Ct. at 2965. 29 A year later, in Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 2151-52, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979) (per curiam), the Court held that testimony, though hearsay under Georgia law, could not be excluded because it was highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial ... and substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability. Petitioner had attempted to introduce testimony to the effect that the witness had been told by the co-defendant that he (the co-defendant) had actually killed the victim. The critical issue during the penalty phase was whether petitioner had participated directly in the murder. Tying the decision to the unique facts of the case, the Court concluded that  'the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.'  Id., (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)). 30 More recently, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), the Court vacated a death sentence relying on the standard set forth in Lockett. Eddings, while sixteen years old, killed a police officer in Oklahoma. During the sentencing proceeding, in mitigation, he presented evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by his father, and of emotional disturbance. The trial judge refused, as a matter of law, to consider in mitigation Eddings' family background and emotional disturbance, and found that the only mitigating circumstance was petitioner's youth, which was outweighed by aggravating circumstances. The Court found Eddings' family background and mental and emotional development relevant mitigating factors that must be considered in sentencing. Id. at 116, 102 S.Ct. at 877-78. It stressed that a system of capital punishment must be humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual, id. at 110, 102 S.Ct. at 874, and that the death sentence may not be imposed without individualized consideration of mitigating factors. The Court noted that [j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. Id. at 113-14, 102 S.Ct. at 876-77 (emphasis in original). 31 The most recent pronouncement by the Court on the issue is Skipper v. South Carolina, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). Skipper was convicted in South Carolina of capital murder and rape, and sentenced to death. During the sentencing proceeding, Skipper sought to present testimony of two jailers and a regular visitor to the jail to demonstrate his good behavior during the seven months he was in jail awaiting trial. The trial court, however, precluded the witnesses from testifying, ruling such evidence would be irrelevant because  'whether [petitioner] can adjust or not adjust' was 'not an issue in this case.'  Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1670. 32 The State argued that the ruling was correct because the witnesses were not competent to give an opinion of Skipper's future adaptability to prison, that his ability to adjust to prison was irrelevant because it did not bear on his character, and the testimony would have been cumulative because Skipper and his former wife testified about his behavior in jail. The Court rejected these arguments. It observed that Skipper informed the trial court that he intended the witnesses to testify about his past adjustment to prison, not render an opinion about future adaptability. Thus, the witnesses were competent to testify about what they had observed. It also concluded that a defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination. Id. at 1672. Its final conclusion was that the exclusion of the proffered testimony was not harmless because the testimony of the jailers, though cumulative, would tend to be given greater weight by the jury. The Court's holding was summarized as follows: The exclusion by the state trial court of relevant mitigating evidence impeded the sentencing jury's ability to carry out its task of considering all relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender. Id. at 1673. 33 In this case, Mrs. Dutton's testimony would have been relevant mitigating evidence and its exclusion impeded the jury's ability to consider relevant aspects of petitioner's character. Mrs. Dutton was present in the courtroom, was called by petitioner to testify, and it is apparent from the record that she would have testified about such mitigating factors as family background, medical history and education. Record vol. III at 49-68. The trial court could have reasonably inferred the general character of Mrs. Dutton's testimony from the context of the proceeding. Although everything Mrs. Dutton would have said might not have been relevant, and could have been excluded, the nature of the witness and the context of the proceeding would provide a sufficient basis to allow her to testify. It is clear from the testimony given by Mr. Dutton's trial counsel at the habeas corpus proceeding that he intended to call Mrs. Dutton for the purpose of eliciting testimony that would have been relevant to the issue of mitigation. Among other things, he stated Mrs. Dutton would have told the jury that her son was immature, was a slow learner, did not think real well, was not very smart, and was a follower. Record vol. 3 at 133-36. Moreover, during his opening remarks, trial counsel generally informed the court what he intended to show through the testimony of his two witnesses. These remarks sufficiently alerted the trial judge to the nature and tenor of Mrs. Dutton's testimony and that such testimony was likely to be relevant mitigating evidence. Record vol. II at 481-82. Under Skipper, this type of evidence of petitioner's character may not be excluded from the sentencer's consideration. 8 34 Oklahoma's rule of sequestration is a valid and important state rule. Nevertheless, a trial judge, faced with noncompliance with an order of sequestration, has a variety of methods of responding. 3 J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 615. The Oklahoma courts have ruled that it is within the discretion of the court to allow or exclude the testimony of such a witness. Mayes v. State, 560 P.2d 574, 577 (Okla.Crim.App.1976); Edwards v. State, 655 P.2d 1048, 1051-52 (Okla.Crim.App.1982). In the sentencing phase of a death penalty case, evidentiary rules may not be applied mechanistically.... Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. at 97, 99 S.Ct. at 2151. Assuming the exclusion order properly applied to the sentencing proceeding, the trial court had the discretion to select means other than the exclusion of Mrs. Dutton's testimony to enforce the sequestration order. For example, it could have allowed Mrs. Dutton to testify, and then instructed the jury that she was present during the guilt proceeding. That approach would have permitted the jury to assess the witness's credibility while, at the same time, allowed petitioner to present crucial mitigating evidence. 35 In Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 260 S.E.2d 60 (1979), the Georgia Supreme Court was confronted with this issue under very similar circumstances. The Georgia court ruled that, although the defendant failed to make an offer of proof, the trial court erred in mechanically applying the sequestration order to exclude a mitigating witness during the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial. Other courts have come to the same conclusion. For example, the Florida Supreme Court, in Wright v. State, 473 So.2d 1277, 1280 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 870, 88 L.Ed.2d 909 (1986), ruled that the trial judge erred in strictly enforcing a sequestration order in a death penalty case. The Alabama Supreme Court, in Ex parte Faircloth, 471 So.2d 493, 496 (Ala.1985), held that an accused may not be deprived of a witness's testimony solely because a witness disobeyed a sequestration order when that deprivation would violate the accused's constitutional rights. And in Allen v. State, 277 Ark. 380, 641 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1982), the Arkansas court noted that a violation of a sequestration order concerns credibility, not competency, and held that the rule should not be applied to deny an accused his constitutional rights even in the absence of a proffer. The Fifth Circuit, in Braswell v. Wainwright, 463 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.1972), also ruled that a breach of the rule of sequestration cannot be used to deny a criminal defendant his constitutional right to present witnesses in his favor. 36 We agree with the holdings in these cases. In light of the critical nature of mitigating evidence in a death penalty case, the fact that there were no objections to the testimony, and the trial court's discretion to permit the witness to testify, we conclude the state trial court erred by excluding relevant mitigating testimony.