Opinion ID: 3063426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Department’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kelley v. Hicks, 400 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The ADA, as amended, provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate 4 Keeler filed several post-judgment motions, insisting that summary judgment was improper and seeking to introduce additional evidence. R1-56; R1-57; R1-58; R1-59. While Keeler indicates in her brief that she seeks review of the district court’s denial of these motions, she offers no argument in support of these challenges. Accordingly, they are deemed waived. See United States v. Gupta, 463 F.3d 1182, 1195 (11th Cir. 2006) (issues on which party provides no argument or legal support are deemed waived). 12 against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”5 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2009). In order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she has a disability; (2) she is a qualified individual; and (3) the employer discriminated against her because of her disability. See Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (interpreting prior version of Act). A “disability” is defined by the ADA as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has further defined “major life activities” as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1264 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)). For purposes of the third element, an employer unlawfully discriminates against an employee because of her disability by “not making reasonable accommodations to the [employee’s] known physical or mental limitations” if the employee is otherwise qualified to 5 Recent amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 et seq. (“ADA”) became effective on 1 January 2009. See 29 U.S.C. § 705, Effective and Applicability Provisions (providing that amendments pursuant to Pub. L. 110-325, § 8, Sept. 25, 2008, 122 Stat. 3559 became effective on 1 January 2009). 13 perform her job and the accommodation would not impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added); see also Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). In this case, Keeler failed to show that the Department knew of her alleged impairments when it denied her request for a transfer. Keeler testified in her deposition that “nobody knew” of her disabilities when she asked Cain to be transferred to the Senior Clerk position and she admitted that she did not disclose her disabilities to her supervisors until after that position had been filled. R1-31 at 27, 154-55, 157. Nonetheless, Keeler asserts that the Department should have known of her limitations because she took lots of notes, cried while speaking to Cain about the transfer, and advised Cain that her position as a records technician was stressful and overwhelming. This behavior was not, however, sufficient to put the Department on notice that Keeler was disabled because it in no way suggested that Keeler was substantially limited in any major life activity. Because the Department did not have sufficient knowledge of Keeler’s mental impairments, the district court correctly concluded that the Department could not be liable for any failure to accommodate. See, e.g., Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1186 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that, in discriminatory discharge case, employer could not have fired employee “because of” a disability 14 that she knew nothing about).6 B. Denial of Motion for Extension of Time, Motion for Reconsideration, and Motion to Amend Keeler argues that she filed her motion for an extension within the time prescribed for filing a motion for leave to amend, that she was complying with local court rules by waiting for the court’s ruling on her extension motion before filing a motion for leave to amend, and that the amended complaint would not have unfairly prejudiced the Department because it concerned the same facts as the original complaint. Keeler further contends that in ruling on her motion for an extension, motion to reconsider, and motion to amend, the district court “never addressed the other issue raised in the complaint, which was retaliation under the FLSA and First Amendment.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. According to Keeler, her complaint stated a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and the FLSA because she alleged that she was terminated for speaking out about the inadequacies of her unit and for reporting that employees were forced to work uncompensated overtime in order to keep up with their heavy workloads. She asserts that it was necessary for her to amend her complaint once “it became 6 Keeler does not challenge the district court’s finding that she failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA and thus has abandoned this issue on appeal. See Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 972 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n argument not included in the appellant’s opening brief is deemed abandoned.”). 15 apparent [that] the only violations of the law that would be considered by the District Court would be [ADA violations].” Id. at 10. We first address whether the district court erred in denying Keeler’s motion to amend and related motions and then whether the district court erred in construing her complaint as alleging claims arising only under Title I of the ADA. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for extension of time. See Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 863 (11th Cir. 2004). We also review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to amend the pleadings. See Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (11th Cir. 1999). Under this standard, “[t]he district court has a range of options,” and we will not disturb the district court’s decision unless it constitutes a clear error in judgment. Young, 358 F.3d at 863. A party may amend her complaint after a responsive pleading is served only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Where a party’s motion to amend is filed after the deadline for such motions, as delineated in the court’s scheduling order, the party must show good cause why leave to amend the complaint should be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). A court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the amendment would prejudice the defendant, follows undue delays, or is futile. See 16 Maynard v. Board of Regents, 342 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2003) (district court did not abuse discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, filed on last day of extended discovery period, because amendment “would have produced more attempts at discovery, delayed disposition of the case, and likely prejudiced” the defendant, and there was no good reason why plaintiff could not have filed motion earlier). Keeler filed her motion for an extension of time to amend her complaint after the close of discovery and filed her motion to amend over a month after the deadline for such motions had passed. Although Keeler thus was required to show good cause as to why the amendments should be permitted, she offered no explanation in any of her motions as to why she failed to propose her amendments within the time limits prescribed by the court in its scheduling order. As in Maynard, Keeler’s proposed amended complaint, which purported to add new claims, would have resulted in additional discovery and delayed disposition of the case. Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Keeler’s motion for an extension of time, motion to reconsider, or motion to amend the complaint. Although the district court properly denied Keeler leave to amend the complaint, it erred in construing the complaint as asserting only violations of the 17 ADA. It is well-settled that “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). While we have little difficulty finding that Keeler’s complaint failed to state a claim under the First Amendment,7 it is less clear whether her complaint adequately stated a claim within the purview of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision. The FLSA, which addresses, inter alia, minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime pay, makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Informal complaints are sufficient to trigger this anti-retaliation provision. See E.E.O.C. v. White, 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that “unofficial complaints 7 In order to establish a claim of retaliation under the First Amendment, an employee first must show that her speech was protected by the First Amendment. See Anderson v. Burke County, Ga., 239 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Constitutional protection attaches to a public employee’s speech only where the employee is speaking “as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” Battle v. Board of Regents for Georgia, 468 F.3d 755, 760 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Vila v. Padron, 484 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The threshold question is whether [the employee] spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”). If the employee is not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, “[she] has no First Amendment cause of action based on . . . her employer’s reaction to the speech.” Battle, 468 F.3d at 760 (quotation marks and citation omitted). When Keeler reported to management that records technicians in her unit were working uncompensated overtime, she was speaking in her capacity as an employee on a matter of personal interest, and not as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Cf. Anderson, 239 F.3d at 1220. Because Keeler’s speech did not “relate to the political, social or other interest of the community,” id., the First Amendment was not implicated, and her retaliation claim necessarily fails. See Vila, 484 F.3d at 1339. 18 expressed by [employees] to their employer about unequal pay constitute[d] an assertion of rights protected under the [FLSA].”). Although Keeler’s complaint cited the ADA as the statutory basis for her lawsuit, she alleged that she suffered retaliation for reporting uncompensated overtime to Department management. While this type of speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection, it does trigger the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision. See White, 881 F.2d at 1011 (noting that the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA is “giv[en] a broad construction”). Because Keeler’s complaint, liberally construed, may have stated a claim under the FLSA,8 the district court erred in treating her complaint as alleging only failure-to-accommodate and retaliation claims under the ADA and in confining its summary judgment analysis to those claims.