Opinion ID: 1143015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: is the complaint procedure established by the supreme court for members of the mississippi bar a violation of the due process clauses of the constitutions of the united states and of the state of mississippi because members of the complaint tribunal are also members of the mississippi bar?

Text: Finally, appellant argues that because the members of the complaint tribunal were all members of the Mississippi Bar, they had an interest in the outcome of this matter and therefore a conflict of interest existed. Brief of Appellant, at p. 8. In support of this argument, appellant cites § 9-1-11 of Mississippi Code Annotated (1972): The judges of a court shall not preside on the trial of any cause where the parties, or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, or wherein he may have been of counsel, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties. As this Court has never squarely considered this issue, the Bar once more relies on Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd 425 U.S. 901, 96 S.Ct. 1489, 47 L.Ed.2d 751 (1976), wherein the Court analyzed the review process of disciplinary matters conducted by fellow attorneys: Perhaps the most important element of such proceedings, and that which gives them their unique status, is the universal recognition that the same Court before whom attorneys, acting as its officers are admitted to practice is the tribunal which must sit in judgment of charges of professional misconduct against them. There can be no doubt about such a court's inherent power of autonomous control over the conduct of its officers. [footnote omitted]. Disciplinary proceedings, while perhaps susceptible to such a label as `quasi-criminal' or to such a terse description as `comparable to a criminal rather than to a civil proceeding' (citation omitted), are in reality neither. Mildner, 405 F. Supp. at 191. There are two Mississippi code sections which assist in analyzing the jurisdictional issue raised by appellant. First, § 73-3-301 states in relevant part: Any attorney regularly admitted to practice law in the state of Mississippi ... [is] subject to the exclusive and inherent disciplinary jurisdiction of the supreme court of Mississippi and the disciplinary agencies hereinafter established and designated; provided, however, nothing herein contained shall be construed to deny to any other court such powers as are necessary for that court to maintain control over practice in and proceedings conducted before it, such as ... suspending or expelling their members from membership in such local bar association. Further, the next section establishes the disciplinary agencies: § 73-3-303 Disciplinary agencies of court. The jurisdiction of the court shall be administered in the matter hereinafter set out, and the following entities are hereby established and designated as agencies of the court for such purposes: ... (c) The complaint tribunals appointed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. A reading of the statutes combined with the history of this court's review of attorney disciplinary matters discounts appellants assertions. Appellant further argues that the alleged conflict of interest is compounded by the fact that there is no jury and the members of the complaint tribunal sit not only to decide and apply the law but also serve as the trier of fact. Appellant states that under these circumstances, it becomes impossible for an attorney before a complaint tribunal to receive a fair and impartial hearing ... [t]herefore, due process is not afforded the Attorney in this matter. Brief of Appellant, at p. 8-9. The method whereby this Court reviews disciplinary matters is a careful one where the entire history is taken into account. We should note that the Bar and the complaint tribunal are continuously improving the process and the discipline of offending members, they both have a thankless but absolutely necessary task. Based on the foregoing, it appears that appellant's third assignment of error is also without merit.