Opinion ID: 2543075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Defendants Waived the Duty to Read.

Text: ¶ 20. We will begin our discussion with the fourth issue the Mladineos raise on appeal: whether the defendants waived their right to rely on the duty-to-read and imputed-knowledge doctrines. The foundation of this argument is the proposition that the duty-to-read and imputed-knowledge doctrines constitute an affirmative defense. The Mladineos assert that, because the defendants did not include the affirmative defense in their denial letters to the Mladineos prior to litigation, failed to plead the duty-to-read and imputed-knowledge doctrines as an affirmative defense in any responsive pleading filed in this case prior to filing the motion for summary judgment, and actively participated in the litigation for more than two years before raising the affirmative defense in the motion for summary judgment, they waived their right to pursue the affirmative defense. ¶ 21. Because the Mladineos label the duty to read as an affirmative defense, they claim this Court's ruling in MS Credit Center, Inc. v. Horton controls. See MS Credit Center, Inc. v. Horton, 926 So.2d 167 (Miss.2006). In Horton, this Court held that a substantial and unreasonable delay in pursuing the right to compel arbitration, coupled with active participation in the litigation process, waived that right. Id. at 180. We further explained, a defendant's failure to timely and reasonably raise and pursue the enforcement of any affirmative defense or other affirmative matter or right which would serve to terminate or stay the litigation, coupled with active participation in the litigation process, will ordinarily serve as a waiver. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 22. Here, the trial court held that the the Mladineos' waiver argument [was] misplaced. and explained that the defendants' motion for summary judgment was based on well-settled principles of Mississippi law, not an `affirmative defense' as [the Mladineos] suggest. The trial court further found that the defendants had complied with the agreed scheduling order entered into between the parties in filing the motion for summary judgment, and that Horton was, therefore, inapplicable. ¶ 23. We agree with the trial court. The duty-to-read and imputed-knowledge doctrines, as discussed in Section II, infra, are substantive rules of law. The defendant's defense is simply that the language of the policy the Mladineos purchased excludes the coverage the Mladineos are attempting to claim. The defendants asserted this in their Answer, in which they stated coverage provisions and exclusions of Plaintiff's Nationwide homeowner's policy speak for themselves. This language put the Mladineos on notice that the defendants intended to rely on the policy language and its exclusions in the course of this litigation. ¶ 24. Because the motion for summary judgment was filed within the time frame established by the parties in their agreed scheduling order, the trial court did not err in finding the Mladineos' waiver argument to be misplaced. The duty-to-read and imputed-knowledge doctrines are substantive rules of lawnot affirmative defenses, as the Mladineos contend. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court as to this issue.