Opinion ID: 584329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of the Relevant Statutory Provisions

Text: 63 Sections 1671a(b) and 1673a(b) require that, in order to properly petition for countervailing and antidumping duty investigations, Southwire must be an interested party filing on behalf of the domestic industry. Southwire clearly is an interested party in these proceedings. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(C). The question here is whether Southwire's petitions should be considered to be filed on behalf of the domestic industry, as contemplated by the statute.
64 The phrase on behalf of is not among the terms defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1677. Nor does the statutory context provide us any concrete indication of Congress's intended meaning. When such an interpretational gap exists regarding a statutory provision, we are to examine whether, in its own interpretation of its responsibilities under the Act, the agency charged with the everyday administration of the provision applies a permissible construction. 5 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2793, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Our duty is not to weigh the wisdom of, or to resolve any struggle between, competing views of the public interest, but rather to respect legitimate policy choices made by the agency in interpreting and applying the statute. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866, 104 S.Ct. at 2793. 65 Thus, in our review here we will simply determine whether Commerce's 6 interpretation of the phrase on behalf of, as it pertains to the statutory requirements for filing a petition to initiate a countervailing or antidumping duty investigation, is a permissible construction. Whether we would come to the same conclusion, were we to analyze the statute anew, is not the issue.
66 The Court of International Trade held that its decision was consistent with this court's holding in Oregon Steel. We agree, but with a caveat--the issue in this action begins at the opposite end of the spectrum from the issue in Oregon Steel, a case which could be read to support either outcome here. Although we reverse the decision of the Court of International Trade, our decision, too, is consistent with Oregon Steel. 67 In Oregon Steel, the court faced a situation in which Commerce, responding to a petition, initiated an investigation and later issued an antidumping duty order covering certain steel plate imports from Korea. The United States and Korea later entered into a Voluntary Restraint Agreement under which Korea agreed to import restrictions conditioned on revocation of the antidumping order. Commerce accordingly surveyed the domestic industry, and found that six of seven domestic producers of steel plate favored the Agreement over the antidumping order. Only Oregon Steel Mills, Inc., at that time known as Gilmore Steel Corp., continued to favor the antidumping duty order. Oregon Steel, 862 F.2d at 1542, 7 Fed.Cir. (T) at 23. 68 Commerce proceeded to revoke the antidumping order in light of the lack of industry support for its continued existence. Oregon Steel Mills appealed to the Court of International Trade, which ordered the reinstatement of the order. This court reversed, holding that just as industry support underlies the merits of an order, Commerce may revoke an order for lack of industry support. Oregon Steel, 862 F.2d at 1545, 7 Fed.Cir. (T) at 27-28. The court noted that [w]e do not need to define 'lack of support' with precision in this case. The lack of industry support here is overwhelming. Moreover, the industry is not simply indifferent, but has expressed a positive desire to eliminate the antidumping order in order to secure other benefits. Oregon Steel, 862 F.2d at 1545 n. 4, 7 Fed.Cir. (T) at 28 n. 4. 69 The present action is the obverse. As noted, the Oregon Steel court did not reach the issue of the quantification of lack of support needed to allow for revocation of a duty order, or, said another way, the quantification of support needed to prevent Commerce from refraining to initiate or continue an investigation or a duty order. In that case, as the court acknowledged, the lack of support was overwhelming; there was only minimal support. At most, Oregon Steel stands for the proposition that without a certain minimal level of support, Commerce may, but need not, revoke a duty order. The present appeal asks us a different question: what is the degree of industry support which must be shown before Commerce may act in response to a petition for initiation of an investigation pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b) or 1673a(b).
70 There is nothing in sections 1671a(b) or 1673a(b) that answers the question. The statute cannot be said to give a clear answer, since it gives no answer. We must then decide if Commerce's interpretation is a permissible one. 71 Commerce can initiate a countervailing or antidumping duty investigation completely on its own, without any petition having been filed by an interested party. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a). Commerce need only determine, from information available to it, that a formal investigation is warranted. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a); 1673a(a). 72 There is no indication whatever that the phrase from information available to it is to be given a narrower meaning than the plain meaning of the words--Commerce could use information made available to it by a petition filed by one who is not an interested party, or by a petition filed by an interested party but not on behalf of an industry. There is no requirement that Commerce had to acquire on its own the information leading to a self-started investigation, or that Commerce must ignore or cannot rely on information made available by a petition which may for some reason fall short of the statutory requirements for a petition-induced investigation. And there is clearly no suggestion that any conclusion must be made that a majority of the relevant domestic industry must support the self-initiated investigation. 73 Accordingly, Appellees do not, and could not reasonably, argue that absent industry support, Commerce's investigations must be nullified even had they been explicitly based on Commerce's power to self-initiate the investigations under sections 1671a(a) and 1673a(a). The only argument is that, Commerce having explicitly based initiation of its investigations on the submitted petitions under sections 1671a(b) and 1673a(b), those petitions must be found to be on behalf of, i.e., affirmatively supported by a majority of, the domestic EC rod industry. 74 In our view, however, the statute lends itself to several possible interpretations, only one of which is suggested by Appellees. At one extreme, on behalf of could be interpreted as, rather than a standing requirement, simply a representational identity--a description of the role of the petitioner, and of the scope of any investigation and any ensuing remedy. At the other extreme, the statute could be interpreted as did the Court of International Trade, and as do Appellees--as a formalistic standing requirement. Before initiating any investigation in response to a petition, Commerce would have to determine that the petition is affirmatively supported by a majority of the domestic industry. 75 Commerce takes a middle position. As Commerce seems to apply the statute, the petition must be determined to have been filed on behalf of the domestic industry. However, Commerce reads the statute to give it broad discretion in making that determination. Commerce assumes that, as long as a petition is filed by an interested party, the filing is on behalf of the domestic industry unless and until Commerce determines otherwise. On the record before this court, it is not entirely clear whether Commerce construes on behalf of to be a standing requirement in the traditional sense, with a relaxed evidentiary showing, or merely a characterization of the nature of the petition, the satisfaction of which is left to Commerce's reasonable determination. The latter is the broader construction, and grants to Commerce the greater amount of discretion. If it is permissible, so too necessarily is the narrower construction. We thus assume, for the purposes of this analysis, that Commerce's position is the broader. 76 As we have previously explained, neither the statute nor the legislative history gives specific guidance on how Congress wished this issue to be decided. One thing Congress did make clear--Commerce has broad discretion in deciding when to pursue an investigation, and when to terminate one. The structure and purpose of the Act strongly suggest that any of the interpretations we have identified would be a permissible reading. The Court of International Trade erred in preferring its reasonable interpretation over that of Commerce's. Chevron teaches that, in the circumstances of this case, that is not the correct approach. Commerce's interpretation of its statutory power falls within the range of permissible construction; that ends our inquiry on this branch of the case.
77 Appellees next argue that the statutory provisions should be interpreted to be consistent with the obligations of the United States as a signatory country of the GATT. Appellees argue that the legislative history of the statute demonstrates Congress's intent to comply with the GATT in formulating these provisions. Appellees refer also to a GATT panel--a group of experts convened under the GATT to resolve disputes--which recently rejected [Commerce's] views on the meaning of 'on behalf of.'  78 We reject this argument. First, the GATT panel itself acknowledged and declared that its examination and decision were limited in scope to the case before it. The panel also acknowledged that it was not faced with the issue of whether, even in the case before it, Commerce had acted in conformity with U.S. domestic legislation. 79 Second, even if we were convinced that Commerce's interpretation conflicts with the GATT, which we are not, the GATT is not controlling. While we acknowledge Congress's interest in complying with U.S. responsibilities under the GATT, we are bound not by what we think Congress should or perhaps wanted to do, but by what Congress in fact did. The GATT does not trump domestic legislation; if the statutory provisions at issue here are inconsistent with the GATT, it is a matter for Congress and not this court to decide and remedy. See 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a); Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 242, 7 Fed.Cir. (T) 154, 156 (Fed.Cir.1989).