Opinion ID: 2570464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of sale of methamphetamine to support felony murder

Text: Beach was charged in the alternative with first-degree felony murder under K.S.A. 21-3401(b). A defendant is guilty of felony murder if, in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436 and amendments thereto, a human being is killed. The sale of methamphetamine is deemed an inherently dangerous felony in Kansas. See K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3436(a)(14); K.S.A. 65-4161. The trial court instructed the jury to find Beach guilty of felony murder if it found the following elements: To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 1. That the defendant, or another, killed Land S. Grant; 2. That such killing was done while in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or in flight from committing a felony, to-wit: aggravated robbery and/or sale of methamphetamine; and 3. That this at occurred on or about the 23rd day of June, in Wyandotte County, Kansas. The court instructed the jury on the definition of sale of methamphetamine (see K.S.A. 65-4161[a] K.S.A. 65-4107[d][3]): The elements of sale of methamphetamine are as follows: 1. That the defendant sold methamphetamine; 2. That the defendant did so intentionally; and 3. That this act occurred on or about the 23rd day of June, in Wyandotte County, Kansas. Beach's argument is twofold. First, she challenges the legal sufficiency of the sale to support felony murder, claiming that the crime of sale was already completed at the time of the killing. Second, Beach argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the sale and Grant's killing. Beach's first argument concerning legal insufficiency is without merit. The jury was properly instructed to convict Beach of felony murder if it found that Grant was killed while in the commission of, or attempt to commit, or in flight from committing sale of methamphetamine or aggravated robbery. This issue is a factual one for the jury. See State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, 189-91, 14 P.3d 409 (2000). In Jacques, the defendant was convicted of felony murder with possession of cocaine as the underlying felony crime. Jacques and his friend, Everitt, had developed a scheme to purchase drugs. The plan called for Jacques to stay away from the house where the drugs were to be purchased. However, Jacques went to the house where Everitt was purchasing the drugs. Everitt was angry that Jacques failed to follow the plan and a fight broke out between them, resulting in Everitt's stabbing death. Jacques went back into the house and completed the purchase. On appeal, Jacques raised the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that he could not be guilty of felony murder because he did not possess cocaine at the same time that he stabbed Everitt and did not have any intent to possess cocaine at the time. 270 Kan. at 189. The court discussed the necessary timing of the underlying felony crime and the killing: When applying the felony-murder rule, however, the felony and the victim's death do not need to occur simultaneously, nor does the felony need to occur before the death. Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a part of the felony and therefore subject to the felony-murder rule. [Citations omitted.] We hold that the death need not occur during or after the commission of the felony to support a conviction for felony murder. The question for the jury is whether the death is within the res gestae of the crime, regardless of the actual sequence of events. [Citations omitted.] 270 Kan. at 189-90. In its analysis, Jacques found that the attempt by Everitt to purchase cocaine, the stabbing of Everitt, and the subsequent purchase of the cocaine by Jacques were part of one continuous transaction. 270 Kan. at 190. Thus, the appropriate standard of review on appeal is a familiar one set forth in Jacques : A review of all of the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, shows that a rational factfinder could have found Jacques guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. A rational factfinder could have concluded eluded that the stabbing was within the res gestae of the possession of cocaine. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of Jacques for felony murder. 270 Kan. at 191. See State v. Kaesontae, 260 Kan. 386, 390, 920 P.2d 959 (1996); State v. Hearron, 228 Kan. 693, 696, 619 P.2d 1157 (1980) (Whether the underlying felony had been abandoned or completed prior to the killing so as to remove it from the ambit of the felony-murder rule is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to decide.). Nevertheless, Beach argues that it was after an exchange that Grant was shot and killed. However, there was no evidence of an exchange. The only evidence confirmed by Beach's own testimony was that Grant gave Beach money. She was in the middle of the transaction and would not have completed it until she had gone inside the house and returned with the methamphetamine. Beach also relies upon the broad definition of sale to support her argument. This court has in the past noted the broad definition of sale but that broad definition of sale fails to provide authority for concluding that the crime was completed in this case. See State v. Griffin, 221 Kan. 83, 84, 558 P.2d 90 (1976) (A `sale' of drugs is given a much wider meaning than a `sale' in the context of commercial law.); State v. Mauldin, 215 Kan. 956, 959, 529 P.2d 124 (1974) (Our statute explicitly requires that the killing be `committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any felony.' Under the facts presented in the instant case the commission of the felony [the act of selling heroin] completely terminated when the seller and the purchaser parted company.). In the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence shows a rational factfinder could have found that Grant was killed while Beach was engaged in the sale of methamphetamine. We, therefore, reject Beach's first challenge to the sufficiency of the sale of methamphetamine to support her felony murder conviction. For her second argument Beach claims that the State presented insufficient evidence of the causal connection between the killing and the sale of methamphetamine. Again our standard of review is one of the sufficiency of evidence to support her felony-murder conviction. In State v. LaMae, 268 Kan. 544, 555, 998 P.2d 106 (2000), this court described the requirement of a direct causal connection: It is true that there must be a direct causal connection between the commission of the felony and the homicide to invoke the felony-murder rule. [Citation omitted.] However, the general rules of proximate cause used in civil actions do not apply. Rather, a defendant will be found not responsible for the death which occurs during the commission of a felony only if an extraordinary intervening event supersedes the defendant's act and becomes the sole legal cause of death. See Bonhart v. U.S., , 691 A.2d 160, 162-63 (D.C. 1997) (act of person going back into burning house to rescue dog not sufficient to break chain of causation for felony murder based on arson); State v. Leopold, 110 Conn. 55, 62, 147 A. 118 (1929) (act of boys in attempting to rescue personal possessions from house not sufficient to break chain of causation for felony murder based on arson). Beach argues that it was the plan and actions of Arevalo and Jiminez that caused the death of Grant, thereby, amounting to an extraordinary intervening event as that phrase was used in LaMae. Beach points to her acquittal of aggravated robbery of Grant and of the conspiracy to kill Grant. In support, she relies upon our recent decision in State v. Sophophone, 270 Kan. 703, 19 P.3d 70 (2001), and State v. Murphy, 270 Kan. 804, 19 P.3d 80 (2001). Neither case provides support for her argument. In Sophophone, this court reversed the defendant's conviction for felony murder based upon the underlying felony of aggravated burglary. During the commission of the burglary, the defendant, along with three others, scattered when police officers arrived at the scene. The defendant was tracked down, secured with handcuffs, and placed in a police car. Thereafter, a police officer chased another of the burglars. The other burglar shot at the police officer, who returned fire, killing the burglar. On appeal, the defendant argued that under the Kansas felony-murder statute, he could not be criminally responsible for the killing because he was in custody at the time of the killing, thus, there was a `break in circumstances' sufficient to insulate him from further criminal responsibility. 270 Kan. at 705. However, the majority disagreed that this was the issue, finding instead the issue to be whether [the defendant] can be convicted of felony murder for the killing of a co-felon not caused by his acts but by the lawful acts of a police officer acting in self-defense in the course and scope of his duties apprehending the co-felon fleeing from an aggravated burglary. 270 Kan. at 705. The court found that the defendant could not be so convicted. 270 Kan. at 713. In State v. Murphy, 270 Kan. 804, this court held that a co-felon shot by the victim of the underlying felony supporting the felony-murder charge cannot be liable for the death of that co-felon. The causal connection required by LaMae is discussed in State v. Hearron, 228 Kan. at 696: Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a part of the felony and, therefore, subject to the felony-murder rule. Whether the underlying felony had been abandoned or completed prior to the killing so as to remove it from the ambit of the felony-murder rule is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to decide. Grant's murder took place at the exact time of Beach's involvement in what she believed to be a sale of methamphetamine, according to her own testimony. Beach received the money from Grant and was on her way to exchange the money for drugs. Beach had not exchanged the money for the drugs, had not returned to Grant, and had not given Grant the drugs by the time the shooting began. Based upon time, the jury rationally concluded the sale of methamphetamine was part of the killing. Beach's plan to facilitate the drug transaction took Grant to the location of his eventual murder. Grant did not move while Beach went to the house to complete the transaction. Based upon the distance between the sale of methamphetamine and the killing, the jury rationally concluded the sale of methamphetamine was part of the killing. While Beach, under her theory of the facts, has a visceral argument that Arevalo's appearance with guns blazing constitute an extraordinary intervening event [that] supersedes the defendant's act and becomes the sole legal cause of death, LaMae, 268 Kan. at 555, Arevalo's act was not, upon further consideration, an extraordinary intervening event in light of her plan to sell methamphetamine. Arevalo learned of the transaction through Beach. Thus, without Beach, Arevalo would not have known that Grant was coming to the city. Further, based upon the nature of the transaction, Beach let it be known to Arevalo that Grant would be carrying a large amount of cash. A person with a large amount of cash intent on engaging in an illegal transaction is a foreseeable target of a violent crime. Thus, based upon the causal connection between the sale of methamphetamine and the killing, the jury rationally concluded the killing was part of the sale of the methamphetamine. As a final note, the jury had evidence from a coconspirator that Beach planned the robbery and the death of Grant. There was further testimony that it was her intent before the transaction that both Grant and Thomas would be killed before the sale was completed. While the jury acquitted Beach of the aggravated robbery and the conspiracy to kill, her conviction of felony murder in the sale of methamphetamine, as discussed below, does not require reversal. We conclude that a rational factfinder could have concluded upon all evidence considered in a light most favorable to the State that the killing of Grant was part of the sale of methamphetamine and that Arevalo's killing of Grant was not an extraordinary intervening event.