Opinion ID: 6536853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The importance of individualized sentencing in the capital context

Text: {199} All of the provisions of the CFSA must be considered when construing its terms. State v. Thompson , 1953-NMSC-072 , ¶ 9, 57 N.M. 459 , 260 P.2d 370 . Subsections 31-20A-1(B) and -2(B) direct that where a capital defendant is tried before a jury, that jury shall select the appropriate sentence. It is hardly surprising these provisions exist. {200} [I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ. concurring). The sentencing jury asked to choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. Witherspoon , 391 U.S. at 519, 88 S.Ct. 1770 . And one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of punishment would hardly reflect [the Eighth Amendment's concern with] the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. Id. at 519 n.15, 88 S.Ct. 1770 . It is inevitable that juries in the capital context will reach divergent outcomes in seemingly similar cases, and this, in and of itself, is no basis to question the validity of those judgments. McCleskey , 481 U.S. at 311 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 . {201} Despite the fact that the CFSA gives to sentencing juries the authority to determine whether to impose death or extend mercy, and despite the fact that this  delegation of authority has a constitutional dimension and necessarily grants discretion, Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) nevertheless directs this Court to verify the correctness of the sentencing jury's determination. The problem inherent with Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) should be self-evident. {202} On one hand, the constitution requires an individual assessment of the capital defendant's circumstances and crime and the CFSA ensures that this will occur by granting to juries the right to decide the propriety of capital punishment. On the other hand, Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) assumes that the facts giving rise to death sentences may be flattened for comparison and that this Court may, somehow, meaningfully judge the capital sentencing determinations of juries. I am not the first to acknowledge that these concerns are entirely at odds with one another and present us with what appears to be an unresolvable conflict. {203} Other courts have already recognized that comparison of capital sentences is inherently problematic given the constitutional requirement for individualized sentencing in the imposition of death sentences, and is also inherently illogical as that which is unique is also incommensurable. Addison , 7 A.3d at 1255 . For these reasons, some have expressed the belief that the entire concept of comparing death sentences is beset with so many problems that the exercise is incapable of meaningful application. Joseph T. Walsh, The Limits of Proportionality Review in Death Penalty Cases , 21 Del. Law. 13, 15 (2004). The experiment conducted in New Jersey over the last half-century compellingly illustrates this point and proves that comparative proportionality review is no panacea. {204} The Majority mentions the statistical model of comparative proportionality review adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Maj. Op. ¶ 45, but fails to note that some scholars denounce New Jersey's attempts-which have been vigorous and resource intensive-to make comparative proportionality review an empirical and scientific endeavor as nothing more than an abject failure. Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (with Lessons from New Jersey) , 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1161 , 1234 (2001). The lesson to be learned from New Jersey is, according to some, one available from the exercise of common sense: statistics can inform human judgment, not substitute for it. Id. The fact that comparative proportionality review is, as New Jersey teaches us, a process in which subjective, human judgment is exercised and not one whereby objective, empirical inquiry produces an objectively correct answer is one the Majority appears to reject. They present comparative proportionality review as an objective inquiry. It is not. {205} Comparative proportionality review is conducted on an individual basis for each death sentence and [a]t its heart, ... will always be a subjective judgment as to whether a particular death sentence fairly represents the values inherent in [any given] sentencing scheme for [the most depraved forms of] murder. Gregory , 427 P.3d at 637 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For this reason, the Majority's contention that this Court cannot inject its own subjective views about the propriety of any given death sentence-something the Majority seems to believe it is not doing-rings hollow. See Maj. Op. ¶ 11.