Opinion ID: 778069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Unreasonable Application of Napue and Giglio

Text: 70 [D]eliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153, 92 S.Ct. 763 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) ([T]he [Supreme] Court has consistently held that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.) (internal citations omitted); Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173 ([A] conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.) (citations omitted); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935) (condemning deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured); cf. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (noting that nondisclosure by a prosecutor violates due process when the suppressed evidence is material to guilt). 71 The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend. 72 Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173. 73 The Appellate Division unreasonably applied these holdings because the prosecution's knowing use of Morgan's false testimony could reasonably have affected the trial's outcome. Any doubts we might have about the existence of an increment of incorrectness beyond error, Francis S., 221 F.3d at 111, are eliminated by ADA Lendino's summation, which placed the State's credibility behind Morgan's untruthful testimony.
74 Napue involved a witness who had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony. Napue, 360 U.S. at 267, 79 S.Ct. 1173. The witness testified falsely that a prosecutor had not promised to recommend a reduction of his already imposed sentence. Id. at 266, 79 S.Ct. 1173. 75 The case at bar presents similar facts. While we cannot determine on the record before us precise details of Morgan's plea or the underlying crimes to which he pled, the respondent concedes that an agreement was made and, of course, that it knew of the agreement during the second trial. On cross examination, Morgan denied any deal with the State: 76 Q: And before you testified, your attorney and Mr. Landa [the prosecutor in the first trial] worked out a deal; is that correct? 77 A: No, that is not correct. 78 Only when confronted with his previous testimony did Morgan concede the plea's existence, but still he maintained it wasn't no deal, only what they offered me. That tepid admission tended more to preclude than to suggest a quid pro quo exchange of testimony for leniency. Reasonable jurors would have had to make a considerable inferential leap to conclude from that exchange that Morgan's testimony was the subject of a bargain with the State. We think it far more likely that jurors would have concluded that Jenkins's counsel tried but failed to establish that a deal had been made. The respondent's suggestion on appeal that Jenkins's counsel effectively drew forth the plea agreement's existence is without support. 79 ADA Lendino did nothing to correct this false impression. To the contrary, she further misled the jury. During cross-examination, she sought to foreclose defense counsel's inquiry into the plea agreement by objecting on the ground that his questions about it had already been asked and answered. On redirect examination, her questions, while eliciting technically accurate testimony, were phrased so as to reenforce the false impression that no deal had been made: 80 Q: David, have I ever met with you before today? 81 A: No. 82 Q: Did you make any deals with me? 83 A: No. 84 That testimony was probably true but surely misleading. ADA Lendino did not follow up by eliciting testimony that although Morgan had made no deal with her, he had indeed reached one with another member of the District Attorney's office. As the district court correctly observed, the jury was left with the mistaken impression that Mr. Morgan had no cooperation agreement with the State.... Jenkins, No. 98-CV-277, op. at 28.
85 Standing alone, a prosecutor's comments upon summation can so infect[ a] trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mills, 826 F.2d at 1195 ([T]here may be a deprivation of due process if the prosecutor reinforces the deception by capitalizing on it in closing argument....). The Darden Court declined to find so fatal a flaw in the proceedings it reviewed, in part because the prosecutor's argument [there] did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, and in part because the prosecutor's objectionable comments — describing the defendant as an animal and wishing that he had been shot during the crime — were invited by or [were] responsive to the opening summation of the defense. 477 U.S. at 181-82, 106 S.Ct. 2464; see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-13, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (explaining the invited response rule). 86 ADA Lendino, by contrast, bolstered Morgan's credibility in the course of her summation by falsely suggesting the absence of a deal between Morgan and the prosecution. He sold drugs twice, he got arrested, he pleaded guilty, he went to jail. Never met me before he testified, never made a deal with me. Noting that there was no bad blood between [Morgan] and the defendant, she asked the jury to conclude that Morgan had no reason to lie. That a statement standing alone is factually correct obviously does not mean that it cannot mislead based on the natural and reasonable inferences it invites. ADA Lendino's attempt to hide Morgan's plea agreement from the jury and to use the false impression of its absence to bolster his credibility leaves us with no doubt that her behavior violated Jenkins's due process rights. 87 We need not determine whether ADA Lendino's summation independently abridged Jenkins's due process rights. It plainly sharpened the prejudice resulting from the use of Morgan's initial untruthful testimony. The advocacy shown in the record at hand has no place in the administration of justice and should neither be permitted nor rewarded.... Young, 470 U.S. at 9, 105 S.Ct. 1038.
88 There is a reasonable likelihood that [Morgan's] false testimony ... affected the judgment of the jury. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392. As the district court noted, Morgan was one of two witnesses whose testimony specifically linked Jenkins to Reese's murder. He provided the only evidence of motive. The agreement implicates Morgan's credibility, a vital issue in a trial with only two substantive witnesses and no physical evidence linking the petitioner to the crime. The Napue Court observed that false evidence as to a witness's credibility can be determinative of guilt or innocence. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173; accord Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763; DuBose v. Lefevre, 619 F.2d 973, 979 (2d Cir.1980) ([U]nquestionably, agreements ... to reward testimony by consideration create an incentive on the witness'[s] part to testify favorably to the State and the existence of such an understanding is important for the purposes of impeachment.). Here, the remaining testimony was weak or problematic. A jury might well have doubted the testimony of Napoleon, the only eyewitness, in light of his limited prior knowledge of Jenkins and Reese, the difficulty of accurate observation at night, and the stark inconsistencies and contradictions in his testimony. 89 We have further noted the heightened opportunity for prejudice where the prosecutor, by action or inaction, is complicit in the untruthful testimony. See Mills, 826 F.2d at 1195 ([I]t is sufficient if [a] government attorney knows about the false testimony and no steps are taken to correct it.); DuBose, 619 F.2d at 978 (reversing denial of habeas writ because prosecutorial questioning fostered a misapprehension [in the jury] that the State had not offered [the witness] any kind of deal) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Pabisz, 936 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1991) (finding that the potential for misleading the jury was heightened by the prosecutor's summation); United States v. McElroy, 697 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir.1982) (condemning potentially misleading characterization[s] by the prosecution that deceived defense counsel). 90 The respondent counters that Jenkins should be denied the writ because a defendant [is] compelled to raise the issue at trial or not at all. Forgoing a challenge to false testimony, notes the respondent, may be strategically advantageous by strengthening arguments in support of a subsequent habeas petition. The respondent contends that gaming the system in this manner should be discouraged. See Evans v. United States, 408 F.2d 369, 370 (7th Cir.1969) (holding that a challenge based on knowing use of perjured testimony must be raised at trial). 91 But the case at bar does not require that we determine when a challenge to a state court judgment under Napue or Giglio should be denied for this reason because it seems clear to us that this case did not involve strategic or tactical omission. In United States v. Helmsley, upon which the respondent relies, we concluded that the defendant was not only ... unable to establish a justifiable excuse for her failure to challenge ... testimony at trial, but it appear[ed] that her choice not to do so may have been deliberate. 985 F.2d 1202, 1209 (2d Cir.1993). We see nothing analogous here. Rather, Morgan's untrue testimony occurred during the course of defense counsel's attempt to draw out of him testimony establishing the existence of the plea agreement. This failed attempt belies any suggestion of strategic or tactical omission. The trial judge knew the testimony was false because the court had been alerted to the existence of the plea agreement at the start of the trial. Moreover, defense counsel's failure to continue questioning Morgan or stress Morgan's self-contradictory testimony in summation is explained by the prosecution's behavior. Even if defense counsel thought that he had adequately established the plea agreement's existence in the course of his cross-examination, or that he could do so later in the proceedings, he was thwarted by the prosecutor's misleading examination on redirect. ADA Lendino averred at the trial's commencement that she would likely elicit the plea agreement's details in her direct examination of Morgan. Jenkins's counsel could not have anticipated her reinforcement of Morgan's false implication that there was no such bargain. And while Lendino's redirect questions elicited technically correct answers, by having Morgan testify that he had never met her before and had made no deals with her, they left the jury with the mistaken impression that no plea agreement existed. We can think of no credible explanation for her conduct other than an attempt to reinforce Morgan's false testimony. 2 92 Finally, the prosecutor's actions cannot be overlooked on the ground that Jenkins's counsel did not continue to seek to gain an admission from Morgan as to the plea agreement. Further questioning by defense counsel could have prejudiced Jenkins. When a prosecutor throws his or her weight behind a falsely testifying witness, challenging the witness's statement... runs the risk of implicating the credibility of the prosecutor before the jury. Helmsley, 985 F.2d at 1207. Even prosecutorial silence harm[s] defendants, who are unable to respond effectively. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States ex rel Washington v. Vincent, 525 F.2d 262, 268 n. 9 (2d Cir.1975) (noting that a defendant is harmed by his or her inability to respond effectively in view of [the prosecutor's] silence).