Opinion ID: 1379070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: West Virginia Antilapse Statute

Text: The antilapse statute adopted by the legislature of this state, West Virginia Code § 41-3-3, was discussed by this Court in Mrocko v. Wright, 172 W.Va. 616, 309 S.E.2d 115 (1983). In Mrocko, the testator left all her property to her husband, her sister Mrs. Tomich, and her sister Mrs. Wright. The testator provided that her two sisters, on a share and share alike basis, were to receive certain specified devises. Id. at 617, 309 S.E.2d at 116. The particular provision of the will relevant to the operation of the antilapse statute and determined to constitute a contrary intention negating the effect of the antilapse statute provided as follows: `This is providing that all named are living at my death.'' Id. at 617, 309 S.E.2d at 117. The testator's husband and her sister Mrs. Tomich predeceased her. Id. The lower court held in Mrocko that Mrs. Wright, as the sole surviving sister, was the beneficiary under the will. The appellants contended on appeal that the antilapse statute entitled them to one-half of the residuary estate. Id. at 618, 309 S.E.2d at 117. This Court affirmed the determination of the lower court, finding that the testator's provision, `This is providing that all named are living at my death' applied to all of the named beneficiaries in the will. Id. This was in essence a survivorship clause creating a different disposition negating the application of the antilapse statute. Because the bequest was not saved by the antilapse statute, the void gift statute was invoked, and the failed devise was added to the residuary estate which permitted Mrs. Wright to receive the entire estate under the residuary clause. Id. at 619, 309 S.E.2d at 118. The case sub judice differs markedly from Mrocko. The testator in Mrocko included an express survivorship requirement in the provision devising to the beneficiaries providing that all named are living at my death. Id. at 617, 309 S.E.2d at 117. The will under scrutiny in the present case contains no such provision; nor does it contain any alternate disposition of the portion of the estate which was to be given to Mrs. Mary Harmath Kish. Keller v. Keller, 169 W.Va. 372, 287 S.E.2d 508 (1982), is also illuminating as to the incorporation of an express alternate distribution provision in a trust. In Keller, this Court encountered a scenario in which a testator had willed his property in equal shares to his eight children. The testator had also provided a spendthrift trust for the share of one of the children and expressly provided that on the death of that child his share should go to the other surviving children, all named individually in the residuary clause. Specifically, the testator provided: I further direct that should George W. Keller die while the said trust fund is in existence that the said Trustee shall pay his funeral expenses from said fund and any balance remaining in said trust fund to pass outright to such of the brothers and sisters of said George W. Keller as are then living, share and share alike. Id. at 374, 287 S.E.2d at 509. The child for whom the spendthrift trust had been created predeceased the testator. This Court, analyzing the antilapse statute, concluded that the deceased child's share should pass to the surviving children. While [t]he trust provisions of the will had no specific application[,] because the child for whom the trust had been created had predeceased the testator, this Court found that the trust provisions of the will expressed a general intent that the brothers and sisters surviving George W. Keller would take his share. It is clear that had the trust been in existence after the death of the testator, such brothers and sisters, rather than the appellants, would have taken George W. Keller's share. 169 W.Va. at 381, 287 S.E.2d at 513. Based upon the obviously intended alternate distribution, the antilapse statute did not apply to transfer the disputed share to George W. Keller's lineal descendants. Id. We also adhere to the firmly established legal presumption against intestacy. We explained in Cowherd v. Fleming, 84 W.Va. 227, 100 S.E. 84 (1919) that [t]he presumption is that when a testator makes a will he intends to dispose of his whole estate, and if possible the will should be so interpreted as to avoid total or partial intestacy. Id. at 231, 100 S.E. at 86. In syllabus point four of Rastle v. Gamsjager, 151 W.Va. 499, 153 S.E.2d 403 (1967), this Court explained: Where a will is made it is presumed that the testator intended to dispose of his whole estate, and such presumption should prevail unless the contrary shall plainly appear. In syllabus point eight of In re Teubert's Estate, 171 W.Va. 226, 298 S.E.2d 456 (1982), this Court succinctly stated the [t]he law favors testacy over intestacy. The presumption against intestacy is quite significant in the present case. If this Court were to adopt the reasoning of the Appellees and carry that argument to its logical conclusion, escheat to the state would have resulted if all three residuary beneficiaries had predeceased the testator. In other words, in such event, if the language utilized in the will, to the express exclusion of any other person or persons, were interpreted to constitute sufficient intent of a different disposition and thereby deemed to negate the operation of the antilapse statute, escheat to the state would have been the resulta result which would violate all established principles of testamentary interpretation. See W. Va.Code § 41-3-3. This Court summarized the effect of the antilapse statute in syllabus point one of Mrocko, as follows: W.Va.Code 41-3-3 [1923] provides that the heirs at law of a devisee or legatee who dies before the testator take such property as the joint devisee or legatee would have taken if he had survived the testator, unless a different disposition thereof be made or required by the will. As established by the principal cases interpreting antilapse issues throughout the nation, the burden of proving that a different disposition was made or required by the will must be upon that party urging the inapplicability of the antilapse statute. Such intention for a different disposition must be expressed clearly and unequivocally by the testator, and the antilapse statute is to be granted broad and liberal construction. If the intention of the testator in the present case had been to bequeath a share of his estate to only his sisters living at the time of his death, he should have expressed it. [5] The will as drafted, however, did not require survivorship; nor did it include an alternate distribution which expressed any intent to exclude descendants of a predeceased beneficiary. Premised upon the broad interpretation of the antilapse statute, the presumption that the testator was aware of the workings of the antilapse statute when the will was written, and the necessity for clear and unambiguous assertion of an alternate intent in order to defeat the antilapse statute, we find that the antilapse statute applies and that the one-third share to which Mrs. Mary Harmath Kish would have been entitled shall pass to her issue. In providing for distribution of an estate, utilization of the phrase to the express exclusion of any other person or persons, in the absence of clear and unequivocal expression of intent for an alternate distribution, is insufficient to negate the operation of the antilapse statute, West Virginia Code § 41-3-3. We consequently reverse the determination of the lower court and remand this matter for the entry of an order in accord with this opinion. Reversed and Remanded with Directions.