Opinion ID: 1310881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Determination on Fraud

Text: Hardesty challenges the adequacy of the trial court's findings and conclusion he defrauded the trial court, and asserts the State failed to meet its burden of proof and the trial court failed to conduct a required hearing. Neither party articulated the relevant elements, burden of proof or procedures for modification of the judgment on grounds of fraud. The State's motion for an increase in Hardesty's sentence ostensibly was pursuant to RCW 9.94A.100. However, RCW 9.94A.100 merely requires the defendant and prosecutor to provide their understanding of the defendant's criminal history to the trial court. Disputes on criminal history are decided at a sentencing hearing. RCW 9.94A.100. RCW 9.94A.100 does not authorize modification of a final judgment and sentence. CrR 7.8 authorized the trial court to modify the judgment and sentence here based on fraud. Upon a party's motion, a court may vacate or modify a final judgment for reasons of: Fraud ... misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party. CrR 7.8(b)(3). The procedure for such a motion is as follows: (1) Motion. Application shall be made by motion stating the grounds upon which relief is asked, and supported by affidavits setting forth a concise statement of the facts or errors upon which the motion is based. (2) Initial Consideration. The court may deny the motion without a hearing if the facts alleged in the affidavits do not establish grounds for relief. The court may transfer a motion to the Court of Appeals for consideration as a personal restraint petition if such transfer would serve the ends of justice. Otherwise, the court shall enter an order fixing a time and place for hearing and directing the adverse party to appear and show cause why the relief asked for should not be granted. CrR 7.8(c). A trial court's decision on a motion to vacate a judgment is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. In re Adamec, 100 Wash.2d 166, 173, 667 P.2d 1085 (1983); State v. Scott, 92 Wash.2d 209, 212-13, 595 P.2d 549 (1979); State v. Hall, 32 Wash.App. 108, 111, 645 P.2d 1143, review denied, 97 Wash.2d 1037 (1982). The motion must be supported by an affidavit setting forth a concise statement of the facts or errors upon which the motion is based. State v. Gallagher, 46 Wash.2d 570, 573, 283 P.2d 140 (1955); CrR 7.8(c)(1). When fraud is the ground to set aside a judgment, the fraud must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Scott, 101 Wash. 199, 206, 172 P. 234 (1918); Lindgren v. Lindgren, 58 Wash.App. 588, 596, 794 P.2d 526 (1990), review denied, 116 Wash.2d 1009, 805 P.2d 813 (1991); Peoples State Bank v. Hickey, 55 Wash.App. 367, 372, 777 P.2d 1056, review denied, 113 Wash.2d 1029, 784 P.2d 530 (1989). If the affidavits raise the issue of fraud, it is error to vacate the judgment without first hearing and weighing testimony concerning the alleged fraud, and entering appropriate findings on the elements of fraud. Marriage of Maddix, 41 Wash.App. 248, 251-52, 703 P.2d 1062 (1985); CrR 7.8(c)(2). The State here failed to comply with CrR 7.8. No affidavit accompanied the State's motion. The motion did not even mention fraud. The State first mentioned fraud at the June 30, 1993 hearing. At that hearing, Hardesty made an unsworn statement denying any intentional misconduct, and attempted to explain why he and the State both signed a plea statement containing erroneous information. However, neither side introduced any evidence through sworn testimony or exhibits. A plea bargain is essentially contractual. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); State v. Ammons, 105 Wash.2d 175, 184, 713 P.2d 719, amended by 105 Wash.2d 175, 718 P.2d 796, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 398, 93 L.Ed.2d 351 (1986); State v. Hall, 104 Wash.2d 486, 706 P.2d 1074 (1985). Accordingly, where the State asserts fraud to modify a judgment based upon a plea bargain, it must show the traditional elements of fraud. Traditionally, nine elements of fraud must be proven to rescind a contract: (1) A representation of an existing fact; (2) its materiality; (3) its falsity; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the speaker's intent that it should be acted on by the other party; (6) the other party's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the other party's reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) the right of the other party to rely upon it; and (9) consequent damage. See Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 70 Wash.2d 915, 920, 425 P.2d 891 (1967); Webster v. L. Romano Eng'r Corp., 178 Wash. 118, 120, 34 P.2d 428 (1934). When the State seeks to rescind a plea agreement, and increase a prison sentence, it must show no less. The State did not produce affidavits, exhibits, or other evidence at the hearing as required by CrR 7.8, and there is no indication the trial court considered the nine elements of fraud. The findings and conclusions as to fraud here are inadequate. The trial court's findings state Hardesty disclosed two prior felonies when he actually had four, and, therefore, he defrauded the trial court. This amounts to finding Hardesty's representation was in error. There are no findings as to Hardesty's knowledge of falsity and intent the State should act upon his statement. There are no findings as to the State's ignorance of the falsity of the statement, or its reliance and right to rely upon Hardesty's statement. [5] Absent any evidence and specific findings on the elements of fraud, the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the original judgment and sentence, and imposing an increased sentence.