Opinion ID: 2399306
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Izod's coconspirator declaration

Text: Johnson contends that the trial court erred in admitting Ramsey's recounting of Izod's inculpatory comments to her, as follows: [W]e did them n_____s. You didn't think we would, but we did. There is not going to be a problem. In this regard, he takes issue with the trial court's conclusion that such statements qualified for treatment under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, see Pa.R.E. 803(25)(E). Citing to Commonwealth v. Zdrale, 530 Pa. 313, 608 A.2d 1037 (1992), Johnson correctly recites the requirements of the coconspirator exception: the existence of a conspiracy between the declarant and the defendant must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence; the statements must be shown to have been made during the course of the conspiracy; and they must have been made in furtherance of the common design. See id. at 317, 608 A.2d at 1039. According to Johnson, however, the above remarks meet none of these requirements. Primarily, Johnson argues that the trial court's finding of a conspiracy between Izod and Appellant to murder Combs is unsupported in the evidence proffered by the Commonwealth, particularly as Johnson was not charged with conspiracy, he did not initiate the meeting that resulted in Combs' death but was summoned by Cook, and there is no evidence that Izod was ever charged with any crime in relation to Combs' death. Although Johnson's argument contains a near concession that the Commonwealth effectively demonstrated an illegal drug conspiracy ([a]t best, the Commonwealth established a conspiracy between Izod and [A]ppellant to distribute drugs), he discerns no material significance from such fact. Further, Johnson contends that the Commonwealth failed to meet the second and third requirements of the coconspirator exception (demonstration that the statement was made during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the common design), particularly as Izod's comments were made after the occurrence of the shooting. Application of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is predicated on agency principleswhen the elements of the exception are established, each conspirator is considered an agent of the other, and therefore, a statement by one represents an admission by all. [4] As Johnson acknowledges, to meet the first requirement of the exception (existence of a conspiracy), the Commonwealth's burden is gauged according to a preponderance standard, and conspiracy may be inferentially established, for example, by relation, conduct, or circumstances of the parties. See Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 536 Pa. 271, 293, 639 A.2d 421, 432 (1994); Commonwealth v. Pinkins, 514 Pa. 418, 424, 525 A.2d 1189, 1191 (1987). No formal charge of conspiracy is necessary. See Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103, 113, 425 A.2d 387, 392 (1981); Commonwealth v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 426 A.2d 1111 (1981). Here, the trial court held that Ramsey's and Cook's testimony provided the Commonwealth with ample direct and circumstantial evidence that proved that Appellant, Izod, and Starks conspired to murder Combs so that they could take over his drug territory. In our view, however, the evidence of such a conspiracy is more modest than ample, although it was at least arguably sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth's burden concerning the first requirement of the coconspirator exception. [5] However, there is little evidence that the statement by Izod made to Ramsey was made in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit murder. Generally, it has been held that, in order to satisfy the in-furtherance-of requirement of the coconspirator hearsay exception, it is sufficient for the government to establish an intent to promote the conspiratorial objective. See, e.g., United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1103 (10th Cir.1996). In a number of circumstances, however, where as here, the inculpatory statements are narrative declarations of past activity made to a non-participant in the asserted conspiracy, courts have found the essential in-furtherance-of attribute absent. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir.2000) (citing cases distinguishing statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy from, inter alia, narrative declarations); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1001 (3d Cir.1980) (distinguishing statements made to third parties from those made to coconspirators); accord United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 845 (3d Cir.1984) (observing that statements made to those who are not involved in the conspiracy are not `in furtherance' of it). See generally 23 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 990 (2002) (Generally speaking, unauthorized admissions or confessions, or casual admissions of guilt, cannot be considered in furtherance of the conspiracy or enterprise and are inadmissible. (footnotes omitted)). [6] Nevertheless, we believe that any error on the part of the trial court in articulating a basis for the admission of Izod's inculpatory remarks is harmless, since the coconspirator exception contains no requirement that the conspiracy identified as the basis for admissibility be related to the crime charged. See United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 196 (1st Cir.1999) (Subject to relevancy and similar considerations, out-of-court statements of a declarant coconspirator, if made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy, are admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, regardless of whether the conspiracy furthered is charged or uncharged, and regardless of whether it is identical to or different from the crime that the statements are offered to prove[.] (citations omitted)); cf. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. at 113, 425 A.2d at 392 (This Court has extended the co-conspirator exception to admit declarations by `co-participants' in a crime even where conspiracy has not been charged or proven. (citations omitted)). [7] Here, as Johnson essentially concedes, the Commonwealth's evidence demonstrated, by a clear preponderance, a larger conspiracy between Appellant and Izod to distribute illegal drugs. Significantly, this is a conspiracy as to which the evidence demonstrated that Ramsey was not a third party, but a participant. In the course of Izod's remarks to Ramsey, he advised her of an act that eliminated a rival seller, thus promoting the objectives of the drug conspiracy, and instructed her to maintain a low profile for the time being to avoid detection in light of the expected, increased law enforcement activity. [8] Accord Johnson, 200 F.3d at 533 (noting that statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy can take a variety of forms, including comments made to inform other members about the progress of the conspiracy, to control damage to or detection of the conspiracy, to hide the criminal objectives of the conspiracy, or to instill confidence and prevent the desertion of other members).