Opinion ID: 1124343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requirement of a Hearing on the Reliability of the Hair and Fiber Evidence

Text: On February 27, 1994, just prior to presentation of opening statements, defense counsel argued that a separate hearing should be held, pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 104, [4] to determine the admissibility of the Prosecution's hair and fiber evidence. The trial court denied the request and proceeded with opening statements. On March 15, 1994, defense counsel renewed the request, and the trial court responded as follows: THE COURT: Well, counsel, hair is not in the nature of scientific evidence as such, if you look at the case law, it's not subject to, uh, the kind of [Daubert] scrutiny that's required of DNA and luminol. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ... I asked the Court for a 104 hearing, it wasn't given, but again I think that one is necessary for the hair. THE COURT: I don't think so, and and the reason is what I've stated, I think that, um, under [ Daubert ], [ Daubert ] applies to scientific evidence and that there is language in [ Daubert ] requiring the Court to conduct, um, a hearing outside the presence of the jury with respect to so-called, uh, scientific evidence. And I do not believe that hair analysis like ballistic analysis is in the nature of scientific evidence. There are laboratory techniques, uh, I guess that have been developed over the years and I believe that the case law in this area, um, suggests that it is not subject to scientific scrutiny as such. They're laboratory techniques, and theythey operate under different standard and different standard of evidentiary admissibility, so if . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, at some point during the State's presentation of evidence they're going to have to put someone on the stand, qualify them as an expert and have them give an opinion that in their opinion this hair isthis sample is consistent with this known or this piece of evidence that was recovered. I mean, it's much like a fingerprint comparison by Russell Crosson. THE COURT: That's right, they're they're all similar types of evidence, counsel, and they're not treated as scientific evidence, they'rethey're different kind of evidence. . . . . THE COURT: [T]hey are not, as far as I have determined to be the nature of scientific evidence that requires a pretrial determination of reliability as to this extent. (Emphases added.) On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court should not have allowed expert testimony on the hair and fiber samples without first requiring the Prosecution to establish the reliability of the expert's conclusions. Defendant argues that in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that it is the trial court's responsibility to make certain that the scientific evidence presented is reliable. [5] Furthermore, argues Defendant, the need for a judicial determination of reliability is not limited to novel scientific procedures. See id. at 592 n. 11, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 n. 11 (Although the Frye decision [which Daubert overruled] itself focused exclusively on `novel' scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of [Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) ] Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence.). Defendant relies upon Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F.Supp. 1529 (E.D.Okla.1995), [6] in which a federal district court conducted a Daubert analysis of hair and fiber evidence and ruled that such evidence is scientifically unreliable. Id. at 1558. The Prosecution's response is that hair and fiber evidence is reliable. The Prosecution notes that the overwhelming majority of cases have found such evidence to be reliable and admissible. [7] The trial court's decision was apparently based on the distinction between scientific evidence and laboratory techniques. The trial court apparently ruled that while scientific evidence is subject to a Daubert reliability analysis, laboratory techniques are not. Although the trial court did not specifically cite authority for this distinction, it appears to have relied on certain statements in Daubert. In Daubert, the Court noted that FRE Rule 702 applies to scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794. The Court, however, was careful to limit its holding in Daubert to scientific knowledge. Id. at 590 n. 8, 113 S.Ct. at 2795 n. 8. Thus, the trial court in the present case apparently ruled that hair and fiber evidence is technical knowledge rather than scientific knowledge and was therefore not subject to a separate reliability determination. Whether expert testimony should be admitted at trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Maelega, 80 Hawai`i 172, 180, 907 P.2d 758, 766 (1995). This court has followed a two-pronged analysis when addressing proposed expert testimony. State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai`i 507, 533, 928 P.2d 1, 27 (1996); Maelega, 80 Hawai`i at 180-81, 907 P.2d at 766-67; State v. Montalbo, 73 Haw. 130, 138-40, 828 P.2d 1274, 1280-81 (1992); State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 604-05, 645 P.2d 1330, 1336 (1982), overruled on other grounds, State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 799 P.2d 48 (1990). We have held that: The critical inquiry with respect to expert testimony ... is whether such testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. ... [HRE 702.] Generally, in order to so assist the jury an expert must base his [or her] testimony upon a sound factual foundation; any inferences or opinions must be the product of an explicable and reliable system of analysis; and such opinions must add to the common understanding of the jury. See [HRE Rule 703]. Maelega, 80 Hawai`i at 181, 907 P.2d at 767 (quoting Montalbo, 73 Haw. at 138, 828 P.2d at 1280) (emphases and alterations in original). Furthermore, after a 1992 amendment, HRE Rule 702 provides as follows: Testimony by experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. In determining the issue of assistance to the trier of fact, the court may consider the trustworthiness and validity of the scientific technique or mode of analysis employed by the proffered expert. (Emphases added.) In short, expert testimony must be (1) relevant and (2) reliable. Samonte, 83 Hawai`i at 533, 928 P.2d at 27; Maelega, 80 Hawai`i at 181, 907 P.2d at 767. In addition, the trial court must determine whether admitting such evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. Maelega, 80 Hawai`i at 181, 907 P.2d at 767 (internal quotation marks omitted); See also HRE Rule 403. [8] Therefore, reliability is an essential part of the analysis we apply to the admission of expert testimony. Nevertheless, in addressing the reliability prong, our case law suggests that scientific knowledge is distinguishable from other types of knowledge. In Maelega, the defendant argued that the proffered expert testimony on domestic violence was unreliable as scientific knowledge because it was not empirically testable. Maelega, 80 Hawai`i at 182, 907 P.2d at 768. In response, this court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Daubert had expressly limited its holding to scientific knowledge, as opposed to technical or other specialized knowledge. Id. We further noted that expert testimony on domestic violence constitutes specialized knowledge. Id. at 183, 907 P.2d at 769. See also State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 298-99, 926 P.2d 194, 204-05, reconsideration denied, 83 Hawai`i 545, 928 P.2d 39 (1996); State v. Cababag, 9 Haw.App. 496, 508, 850 P.2d at 722, cert. denied, 74 Haw. 652, 853 P.2d 542 (1993). We then upheld the admission of the testimony and implicitly rejected the defendant's contention. Maelega, 80 Hawai`i at 182, 907 P.2d at 768. Thus, under Maelega, specialized knowledge may be deemed reliable even if it is not empirically testable. This suggests that expert testimony involving other types of knowledge may be treated differently than scientific knowledge. We agree with the trial court's approach to this issue. Scientific knowledge must be distinguished from technical knowledge. Expert testimony deals with scientific knowledge when it involves the validity of the scientific principles and the reliability of the scientific procedures themselves. In contrast, expert testimony deals with technical knowledge when it involves the mere technical application of well-established scientific principles and procedures. In such a situation, because the underlying scientific principles and procedures are of proven validity/reliability, it is unnecessary to subject technical knowledge to the same type of full-scale reliability determination required for scientific knowledge. Thus, although technical knowledge, like all expert testimony, must be both relevant and reliable, its reliability may be presumed. The principles and procedures underlying hair and fiber evidence are overwhelmingly accepted as reliable. As one treatise notes, [t]he cases in which courts have excluded hair evidence are so rare that they literally amount to only a handful of precedents.... In contrast to the few cases excluding hair evidence, a large body of case law reflects the courts' receptivity to hair analysis. P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence § 24-3, at 360-61. See also G. Sarno, AnnotationAdmissibility and Weight, in Criminal Case, of Expert Testimony or Scientific Evidence Respecting Characteristics and Identification of Human Hair, 23 A.L.R.4th 1199 (1983); cases cited supra note 7. Hawai`i law also supports the reliability of hair and fiber evidence. This court and the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) have affirmed convictions in which the prosecution relied upon hair and fiber evidence. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 81 Hawai`i 293, 296, 916 P.2d 703, 706 (1996); State v. Liuafi, 1 Haw.App. 625, 634, 623 P.2d 1271, 1277 (1981). In State v. Wilkins, 1 Haw.App. 546, 622 P.2d 620 (1981), the ICA noted that trial courts have broad discretion in admitting expert testimony and cited federal case law as follows: [T]he Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in an appeal of a bank robbery conviction upheld the admission into evidence of expert testimony that hairs recovered from the articles used by the appellant in the robbery were microscopically like hair samples taken from the appellant, even though there was admitted to be an insufficient basis to conclude that the hairs did, in fact, come from the defendant. Id. at 553, 622 P.2d at 625 (citing United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1977)). The one case cited by Defendant for the proposition that hair and fiber evidence is unreliable is no longer valid authority. Although the Tenth Circuit affirmed Williamson on other grounds, it specifically reversed the district court's ruling on the admissibility of hair analysis evidence. See supra note 6. Because the scientific principles and procedures underlying hair and fiber evidence are well-established and of proven reliability, the evidence in the present case can be treated as technical knowledge. Thus, an independent reliability determination was unnecessary. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold a reliability hearing. Additionally, we note that there is no indication in the record that the manner in which the hair and fiber analysis was conducted in this case was technically deficient. The relevancy of the evidence and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect have not been challenged. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.