Opinion ID: 654597
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Anecdotal Evidence of Racial Discrimination

Text: 45 The City and UMEA contend the district court understated the evidence of prior discrimination available to the Philadelphia City Council when it enacted the 1982 ordinance. The City Council Finance Committee received testimony from at least fourteen minority contractors who recounted personal experiences with racial discrimination. In certain instances, these contractors lost out despite being low bidders. This anecdotal evidence significantly outweighs that presented in Croson, where the Richmond City Council heard no direct evidence of race discrimination on the part of the city in letting contracts or any evidence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors. 488 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. at 715. 46 Although the district court acknowledged the minority contractors' testimony was relevant under Croson, it discounted this evidence because other evidence of the type deemed impermissible by the Supreme Court ... unsupported general testimony, impermissible statistics and information on the national set-aside program, ... overwhelmingly formed the basis for the enactment of the set-aside ... and therefore taint[ed] the minds of city councilmembers. 735 F.Supp. at 1296. 47 The district court's approach appears inconsistent with the accepted proposition that at the summary judgment stage the [trial] judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Moreover, the court offered only a few factual examples of this impermissible evidence but did not attempt to quantify or otherwise explain why the impermissible evidence was dominant and why Council members necessarily attached more weight to this evidence than to the permissible evidence. 48 Yet given Croson's emphasis on statistical evidence, even had the district court credited the City's anecdotal evidence, we do not believe this amount of anecdotal evidence is sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny. SeeCoral Constr., 941 F.2d at 919 (anecdotal evidence ... rarely, if ever, can ... show a systemic pattern of discrimination necessary for the adoption of an affirmative action plan.). Although anecdotal evidence alone may, in an exceptional case, be so dominant or pervasive that it passes muster under Croson, it is insufficient here. But because the combination of anecdotal and statistical evidence is potent, Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 919, we turn to the statistical evidence proffered in support of the Ordinance. 49