Opinion ID: 2633509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Victims' Peaceful Characters

Text: Defendant contends certain testimony elicited during the prosecution's case-in-chief about Miller's and Wissel's nonaggressive or nonviolent characters violated Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a). As the cited provision states not a rule of exclusion but an exception to one, we understand defendant to be arguing, more precisely, that the admission of this evidence violated the rule against use of character evidence to show conduct on a particular occasion ( id., § 1101, subd. (a)) because it was not within the exception for rebuttal of defense evidence of the victim's character ( id., § 1103, subd. (a)(2)). [4] We conclude defendant forfeited the issue of the evidence's admission by his failure to make a timely objection on this ground. ( Id., § 353, subd. (a).) The issue arises as follows. The prosecutor asked the cashier at the Yum Yum Restaurant, where Miller was a regular customer, whether she had ever seen Miller acting hostile or threatening or violent towards anybody. The defense objection, irrelevant, was overruled, and the witness answered, No. Similarly, a bartender at the Round Up Bar testified, over a defense objection of relevance and speculation, foundation, that Miller was nice and polite, not angry or threatening, on the occasions when she had seen him there. A fellow tenant at the Mar Mac Manor testified, over defense objections of foundation and speculation, that he had never known Miller to be hostile. Clarence Wissel's daughter testified, over a defense objection of irrelevant, that he was a quiet man who avoided conflict. Finally, in response to defense counsel's question whether she considered Miller a friend, the owner of the Round Up Bar testified that Miller was just a customer, but he was a very nice man who would give anyone who asked the shirt off his back. The court denied the defense motion to strike this answer as nonresponsive. Later, on the basis of defense statements indicating that defendant was claiming self-defense, the prosecution sought to call other witnesses to testify to Miller's peaceful character. The defense moved to exclude the witnesses, arguing the self-defense claim did not open the door to such rebuttal character evidence (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(2)) because the defense had not and would not introduce any negative character evidence regarding Miller ( id., subd. (a)(1)). At the same time, the defense moved to strike any previous references to either victim's peaceful character. The court, agreeing the character evidence door would not be opened simply by defendant's likely testimony that Miller had attacked him, excluded the proposed prosecution witnesses, but declined to strike the limited and brief reference[s] to the victims' characters already in the record. Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) allows a judgment to be reversed because of erroneous admission of evidence only if an objection to the evidence or a motion to strike it was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection. Pursuant to this statute, `we have consistently held that the defendant's failure to make a timely and specific objection on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable.' ( People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) Under this principle, defendant's claim that the admission of evidence of the victims' peaceful characters violated Evidence Code section 1103 is not cognizable; defendant forfeited his claim by failing to make timely objections or a timely motion to strike on that specific ground. [5] Defendant made timely objections (or in the case of the Round Up Bar owner's testimony, a timely motion to strike), but not on the grounds now asserted. Contrary to defendant's argument, a relevance objection does not, in itself, alert the trial court to the claim that the testimony objected to is inadmissible character evidence. Evidence of a character trait has a tendency in reason (Evid.Code, 210) to prove the person's conduct in conformity with that trait on a particular occasion. Indeed, the Law Revision Commission comment to Evidence Code section 1100 notes that [e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is relevant . . . when offered as circumstantial evidence of his conduct in conformity with such character or trait of character. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3 West's Ann. Evid.Code (1995 ed.) foll. 1100, p. 431.) The general rule against its use for this purpose (Evid.Code, 1101, subd. (a)) is founded not on lack of relevance but on Extrinsic Policies ( id., title of div. 9) relating to prejudice, the potential for the jury to be distracted and base its decision on the parties' characters themselves, and the potential for confusion of the issues and extended inquiry into collateral matters. (See Cal. Law Revision Com. com., supra, foll. 1101, p. 438.) Nor did defense counsel's objections that the testimony lacked foundation, was speculative, or nonresponsive reasonably specify the character evidence claim now presented. Defendant did rely on Evidence Code section 1103 (and thus impliedly on Evidence Code section 1101, to which section 1103 is an exception) in his motion to strike the testimony, which was made some days afterward. The motion was thus specific enough, but not timely. When the nature of a question indicates that the evidence sought is inadmissible, there must be an objection to the question; a subsequent motion to strike is not sufficient. ( People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 781, 103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129, overruled on other grounds in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 28, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468; see Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 640, 657-658, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 [failure to object at the time of testimony forfeited claim under Evid.Code, 353, notwithstanding motion to strike at close of day's trial proceedings].) Any other rule would in a great measure do away with the necessity of interposing seasonable objections and enlarge the motion to strike out. ( People v. Scalamiero (1904) 143 Cal. 343, 346, 76 P. 1098.) The same rule applies here, even though defendant did object to the testimony before it was given, because those objections were not made on the specific ground now urged. To satisfy Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a), the objection or motion to strike must be both timely and specific as to its ground. An objection to evidence must generally be preserved by specific objection at the time the evidence is introduced; the opponent cannot make a placeholder objection stating general or incorrect grounds (e.g., relevance) and revise the objection later in a motion to strike stating specific or different grounds. In People v. Camacho (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1745, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 286, for example, the appellate court held the defendant had forfeited his claim of improper examination by the trial court where, though he initially objected on other grounds, his objection that the court was improperly cross-examining him was raised only later, after additional testimony. Similarly, in People v. Horn (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 68, 76-78, 9 Cal. Rptr. 578, the defendant's hearsay claim was held forfeited because at the time the evidence was admitted the defendant objected only that it was `incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,' though he later submitted a further objection on hearsay grounds. Though the trial court in this case could perhaps have excused the untimeliness of defendant's objection and stricken the testimony (which was, as the court noted, limited and brief), it was not required to do so.