Opinion ID: 1433877
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allowing the Victim to Speak with the Prosecutor During Cross-Examination

Text: Defendant Guthrie first argues that the district court erred by improperly and abruptly halting the cross-examination of Shavonne Williams, the victim, in order to recess for the day, and then permitting the prosecutor to speak to the witness during the recess, before the conclusion of Williams's cross-examination. Guthrie characterizes this error as a failure to sequester the witness and a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. Guthrie, however, grossly mischaracterizes the recess taken during Williams' testimony. Rather than improperly and abruptly halting the cross-examination, the district court merely called a routine recess at the end of a day of trial. The district court allowed defense counsel to finish his line of questioning. The district court called the recess after asking whether the defense was at an appropriate transition point. Although the court then allowed two prosecution witnesses to testify before calling an end to the day's proceedings, they were brief witnesses with valid reasons necessitating their immediate testimony. [2] More importantly, the possibility of these final two witnesses testifying at the end of the day was not raised until after the court had announced the recess that interrupted Williams' testimony. Defense counsel did not object to either the interruption of Williams' testimony or the inclusion of the two prosecution witnesses. We find that the district court did not abuse her discretion in interrupting Williams' testimony for an overnight recess and then allowing two brief prosecution witnesses to testify before the recess began. In considering the district court's decision to allow the prosecutor to speak with Williams while she was still on cross-examination, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Rugiero, 20 F.3d 1387, 1394 (6th Cir.1994). Guthrie fails to show any abuse of discretion. Moreover, even if the district court had abused its discretion, to reverse on these grounds we must find that the error was prejudicial to the defendant's receiving a fair trial. Id. (citation omitted). At trial, the district court called the described recess during the cross-examination of Williams, the victim in this case. As she was being dismissed, defense counsel asked that [the prosecutor] not have any conversation with [the witness]. She is on cross-examination at this point. Defense counsel then formally objected. Guthrie thus sought to prevent Williams from speaking to the prosecutor. In permitting the prosecutor to speak with the victim while she was still on cross-examination, the district court did not explicitly violate the rule on sequestration of witnesses. Federal Rule of Evidence 615 provides that at the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.  FED.R.EVID. 615 (emphasis added). Sequestration orders, even when granted, do not prohibit witnesses from speaking with counsel. See United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1011-12 (6th Cir.1998). Defendant Guthrie nonetheless argues that the district court's ruling violated the spirit of Rule 615, because the purposes of the sequestration of witnesses are to prevent witnesses from tailoring their testimony to that of other witnesses; to facilitate the detection of less than candid testimony; and to prevent improper attempts to influence witness testimony. The district court enjoyed discretion to address those concerns by means other than prohibiting the prosecutor from speaking with the witness. In fact, the district court clearly and correctly articulated the limits of the prosecutor's permitted interaction with the witness by stating: [The prosecutor] may have conversations with his witness. He may not coach the witness. Despite the trial court's invitation to Guthrie's counsel to make any record that the prosecutor improperly communicated with Williams, Guthrie's attorney asked no questions on this when Williams retook the stand the following day. In overruling the Defendant's objection, the court told defense counsel, She is going to be here tomorrow morning at 9:00 o'clock, and you may examine her about anything improper in the interim. Moreover, the Defendant does not allege, much less demonstrate, that anything improper occurred over the recess. Although the court had encouraged the Defendant to inquire as to any impropriety over the break, when the witness resumed her testimony the following morning the Defendant did not even question the victim about the issue. Thus, there is no evidence that the court's failure to prevent the prosecutor from speaking to the victim while she was on cross-examination was prejudicial to the defendant's receiving a fair trial. Rugiero, 20 F.3d at 1394. Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate the Confrontation Clause by allowing the prosecutor to speak with the witness over the recess.