Opinion ID: 1529733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err when it failed to instruct the jury on wanton murder and second degree manslaughter?

Text: Appellant contends that he was entitled to an instruction on second-degree manslaughter. KRS 507.040 provides: Manslaughter in the second degree.  (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, including, but not limited to, the operation of a motor vehicle, he wantonly causes the death of another person. Further, wanton has been defined as: Wantonly  A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts wantonly with respect thereto. Appellant maintains that an instruction on wanton murder was mandated based upon his alleged participation in the robbery as a look-out, during which the victim was murdered. We disagree. The jury must be instructed according to the evidence. Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 685 S.W.2d 557 (1985). In the case at bar, there was no evidence of intent whatsoever. Indeed, appellant argued at trial that an unidentified other man actually committed the robbery-murder. The jury was unconvinced. We have consistently held that when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could convict the defendant of a lesser offense, an instruction on that offense is necessary. Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 737 S.W.2d 683 (1987), Commonwealth v. Rose, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 588 (1987), Baker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 677 S.W.2d 876 (1984). However, an instruction on wanton murder was not appropriate here, because there was no evidence of intent presented whatsoever, and no reasonable jury could conclude that appellant consciously disregarded an unjustifiable risk he denied ever taking.