Opinion ID: 448149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: August v. Bronstein

Text: 18 August v. Bronstein, 369 F.Supp. 190, is apparently on all fours with the present case. 2 The August plaintiffs were veterans who were then residents of New York but who had not been residents of New York when they entered the armed services. They met all of the other requirements of Sec. 85 of the Civil Service Law, and they challenged the provisions of that law and of the New York Constitution that awarded veteran preference points only to those veterans who had been residents of New York at the time they entered the armed services, contending that those provisions violated their right to equal protection and their constitutional right to travel. 19 The three-judge court convened to rule on these constitutional challenges upheld the New York provisions, finding that they violated neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the right to travel. The court stated that  'the test for application of the Equal Protection Clause is whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute.'  369 F.Supp. at 193 (quoting Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir.1973) (emphasis in original), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974)). After tracing the history of the veteran preference in New York, the August court stated that the purposes of the classification was apparent: 20 The preference is a token of gratitude conferred by New York upon its sons who enter their country's service in time of war, and perhaps an encouragement to return to the service of the State thereafter. 21 369 F.Supp. at 193. The court concluded that the modest veterans' preference at issue here is substantially related to the purposes of the State. Id. 22 In reaching that conclusion, the August court relied principally on Russell v. Hodges, 470 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.1972), which had upheld, in the face of an equal protection challenge, a New York statute that provided that an employee who was a wartime veteran would be granted a pretermination hearing before being fired from a civil service position while a peacetime veteran would not. 3 Russell, which did not involve the veteran's residence, reasoned that the State could rationally base the distinction challenged there on the premise that services performed and hardships undergone by servicemen in wartime were greater than those performed and undergone by servicemen in peacetime. 23 The August court distinguished Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F.Supp. 626 (D.Minn.1971), and Stevens v. Campbell, 332 F.Supp. 102 (D.Mass.1971) (three-judge court), both of which had struck down residency classifications in state civil service veteran preference statutes, and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), which had struck down one-year residency requirements for welfare and voting respectively, on the ground that the classifications in those cases were based on durational residency requirements. The court pointed out that the New York scheme was different because the New York classification was not based on duration of residency but require[d] only that the veteran be a resident at the time of induction and a resident and citizen at the time he claims the preference. 369 F.Supp. at 194 (emphasis in original). The court also distinguished Stevens on the ground that the preferences accorded veterans in that case were substantially greater. Id. at 194-95. 24 Finally, the court concluded that the preference granted under the New York laws was too limited to be held realistically to infringe or penalize the right to travel. In so ruling, the court noted the then-recent summary affirmances by the Supreme Court in Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057, 94 S.Ct. 563, 38 L.Ed.2d 464 (1973), aff'g 368 F.Supp. 38 (W.D.Wash.1973) (three-judge court), upholding a state statute authorizing lower state college tuition for students who had been bona fide residents of the state for other than educational purposes for one year prior to registration in the state school, and Spatt v. New York, 414 U.S. 1058, 94 S.Ct. 563, 38 L.Ed.2d 465 (1973), aff'g 361 F.Supp. 1048 (E.D.N.Y.1973) (three-judge court), upholding a statute that restricted eligibility for state scholarship assistance to students enrolled in an approved institution within the state. 25 The August plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court, pursuing their contentions that the New York provisions denied them equal protection and violated their right to travel. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed. 26 The summary affirmance of August by the Supreme Court constituted a decision on the merits of that case. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2289, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975); Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247, 79 S.Ct. 978, 978-79, 3 L.Ed.2d 1200 (1959). Accordingly, since the August plaintiffs' appeal to the Supreme Court presented precisely the questions at issue here, that affirmance constitutes binding precedent for the present case unless August has been overruled, explicitly or implicitly, by a subsequent Supreme Court decision. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176, 97 S.Ct. 2238, 2240, 53 L.Ed.2d 199 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 344-45, 95 S.Ct. at 2289-90; Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir.1973) ([W]e are bound by the Supreme Court's summary affirmances 'until such time as the Court informs us that we are not'  (quoting United States ex rel. Fein v. Deegan, 410 F.2d 13, 22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935, 89 S.Ct. 1997, 23 L.Ed.2d 450 (1969)).), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1096, 94 S.Ct. 732, 38 L.Ed.2d 555 (1973). See generally 12 J. Moore, H. Bendix & B. Ringle, Moore's Federal Practice p 400.05-1 (2d ed. 1982). Thus, as the Supreme Court observed in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 344, 95 S.Ct. at 2289 (quoting Port Authority Bondholders Protective Committee v. Port of New York Authority, 387 F.2d 259, 263 n. 3 (2d Cir.1967)),  'unless and until the Supreme Court should instruct otherwise, inferior federal courts had best adhere to the view that if the Court has branded a question unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.'  27 Plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Zobel v. Williams is such a doctrinal development and that August no longer constitutes binding precedent. We agree.