Opinion ID: 1119472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance Manslaughter

Text: HRS § 707-702(2) (1993) provides, in pertinent part that: In a prosecution for murder in the first and second degrees it is a defense, which reduces the offense to manslaughter, that the defendant was, at the time he [or she] caused the death of the other person, under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation. Extreme mental or emotional disturbance is also a mitigating defense to attempted murder. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 45, 904 P.2d at 930; State v. Nizam, 7 Haw.App. 402, 771 P.2d 899, cert. denied, 70 Haw. 666, 796 P.2d 502 (1989). Thus, Moore was entitled to an instruction on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence, provided such evidence would support the consideration of that issue by the jury, no matter how weak, inconclusive or unsatisfactory the evidence may be. State v. Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 196, 830 P.2d 492, 501 (1992) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. O'Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 527-28, 616 P.2d 1383, 1390 (1980)). We need not decide whether the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the mitigating defense of attempted EMED manslaughter was plain error because the record in this case is entirely devoid of any evidence supporting a theory of attempted EMED manslaughter in the first instance. As the court stated in State v. Russo, 69 Haw. 72, 734 P.2d 156 (1987), `where evidentiary support for the asserted defense, or for any of its essential components, is clearly lacking, it would not be error for the trial court either to refuse to charge on the issue or to instruct the jury not to consider it.' Id. at 76, 734 P.2d at 158 (quoting State v. Horn, 58 Haw. 252, 255, 566 P.2d 1378, 1380-81 (1977) (citation omitted)); see also HRS § 701-115(2) (1993) (No defense may be considered by the trier of fact unless evidence of the specified fact or facts has been presented.). Moore asserts that the testimony by police officers, describing him at the time of his arrest as agitated, nervous, frantic, and anxious, as well as the hearsay statements of Mrs. Moore to Officer Daniels that I told him I was leaving and [h]e's distraught constitute substantial evidence supporting a finding that Moore was under the influence of an EMED. However, even if this evidence supported a conclusion that Moore was under the influence of an EMED when he was arrested, the relevant inquiry is whether he was under such influence at the time he shot Mrs. Moore and whether there was a reasonable explanation, viewed from Moore's standpoint, for the disturbance. Only two people had any knowledge of Moore's state of mind at the time he fired the shots, and neither of them testified. Thus, there is no evidence of whether Moore was under the influence of an EMED nor any evidence from which the jury could view[] the subjective, internal situation in which [Moore] found himself and the external circumstances as he perceived them at the time,... and assess[] from that standpoint whether the explanation for his emotional distress was reasonable[.] [8] State v. Dumlao, 6 Haw.App. 173, 184, 715 P.2d 822 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 68 Haw. 692, 715 P.2d 822 (1986), overruled in part by State v. Seguritan, 70 Haw. 173, 766 P.2d 128 (1988). [9] Moore's subsequent agitation or nervousness, when trying to convince the police that Mrs. Moore had been shot by an oriental male robber or when being placed under arrest, simply does not support a theory of EMED manslaughter. We therefore hold that there was no error in failing to instruct the jury on attempted EMED manslaughter because there was absolutely no evidentiary support for the mitigating defense.