Opinion ID: 1289106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bryson's Disability-Discrimination and Disability-Retaliation Claims

Text: Bryson challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to Regis on her disability-discrimination and retaliation claims, both brought under the KCRA. The district court held that Bryson did not establish that she is disabled within the meaning of the statute because the impact of her knee condition was temporary in nature, and because she did not show that she is substantially restricted in the major life activities of walking, standing, and working. Below we set forth the applicable legal standards governing Bryson's claims and discuss first her disability-discrimination claim and then her retaliation claim.
The language of the KCRA, Ky. Rev.Stat. § 344.010 et seq., mirrors that of the ADA; consequently, claims brought under the KCRA are interpreted consistently with the standards developed under the ADA. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 190-91, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) (stating that the KCRA is construed consistently with the ADA); Brohm v. JH Props., Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 520 (6th Cir.1998) (same). As a threshold issue, a disability-discrimination plaintiff must establish that she suffers from an impairment that qualifies as a disability. A person is defined as having a disability within the meaning of the ADA if she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual. [9] 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Merely having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 195, 122 S.Ct. 681. A claimant must also establish that her impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Id. at 196, 122 S.Ct. 681. According to the EEOC regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA, `substantially limited' means `unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform'; or `significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.' Id. at 195-96, 122 S.Ct. 681 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)). In Toyota, the Supreme Court held that the requirement that an impairment substantially limit a major life activity precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way . . . from qualifying as disabilities. Id. at 196, 122 S.Ct. 681. The Court also held that the phrase major life activities refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life. Id. Whether a claimant qualifies as having a disability requires an individualized inquiry. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999).
One of the factors that is relevant to determining whether an impairment amounts to a disability is whether it is permanent or long-term. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681 (stating that [t]he impairment's impact must also be permanent or long-term) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii)). Here, the record evidence casts doubt on whether Bryson's knee condition satisfies this requirement. In a letter to Bryson's counsel, dated May 27, 2005, Dr. Hester opined that, As of January 18, 2005, it was felt that [Bryson's] knee had improved considerably and was well resolved. (JA 186.) He reiterated this view at his deposition in August 2005, where he testified that Bryson's RSD had been brought pretty well under control by January 2005 and that Bryson was not under any restrictions in terms of her ability to work as of that time. (JA 183-84.) Furthermore, at her deposition, Bryson testified that she did not refrain from engaging in any activities as a result of her RSD: I can perform everythingactually, the only thing that it restricts me from, it makes it harder to sleep. Basically . . . I still do everything else. (JA 153.) The testimony of Dr. Hester and Bryson herself suggests that the impairment caused by Bryson's knee surgery and her RSD was not permanent or long-term. Nonetheless, because Bryson also testified that her RSD condition is chronic and will never go away, (JA 950), and because Dr. Hester testified that RSD develops into quite a debilitating condition, (JA 183), we proceed to evaluate whether Bryson has adduced sufficient evidence to show that she is substantially limited in the major life activities of standing, walking, and working.
An impairment that only moderately or intermittently prevents an individual from performing major life activities is not a substantial limitation under the ADA. Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 590-91 (6th Cir.2002). The record here shows that Bryson cannot stand or walk for as long as she was able to prior to her knee surgery and the onset of her RSD. But, she is not altogether precluded from standing and walking either. Indeed, Bryson testified that she can stand for fifteen to twenty minutes at a time and sometimes for a[n] hour, an hour and a half, two hours. . . . (JA 931.) Bryson simply cannot stand all day like [she] used to. (JA 931.) This is insufficient to establish that she is substantially limited with respect to standing and walking. See Mahon, 295 F.3d at 591 (holding that the plaintiff was not substantially restricted in his ability to sit, stand, bend, stoop, walk, climb, or lift even where the record established that the plaintiff's back impairment causes him distress and limits him in performing some activities); Penny v. UPS, 128 F.3d 408, 415 (6th Cir.1997) (stating that although the claimant suffers an impairment that affects to some degree his ability to walk, he has not `adduced sufficient evidence from which a factfinder reasonably could conclude that the nature and severity of his injury significantly restricted his ability to walk as compared with an average person in the general population') (quoting Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir.1996)).
In Sutton, the Supreme Court held that [t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 527 U.S. at 493, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). The Court held that the petitioners' poor eyesight did not substantially limit their ability to work, even if it meant that they were precluded from working as airline pilots. Id. Thus, it is not enough for Bryson to present evidence showing that she can no longer work as a Supercuts manager. She must instead show that she is significantly restricted in ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Bryson has failed to meet this standard. She has not established that her medical condition bars her from working in all jobs within the cosmetology field, or that it prevents her from holding a large number of jobs in other categories of employment. See Olds v. UPS, Inc., 127 Fed.Appx. 779, 782 (6th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (stating that the plaintiff's lifting restriction prevents him from working as a delivery driver and from performing other jobs at UPS specifically, but there is no evidence in the record that it prevents him from engaging in a broad class of jobs). Moreover, the testimony of both Dr. Hester and Bryson contradict any such finding. Dr. Hester testified that as of January 2005, Bryson was under no limitations with respect to her ability to work. Bryson agreed, testifying that she can still work full-time. (JA 938.) We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Regis on Bryson's disability-discrimination claim.
The district court granted summary judgment to Regis on Bryson's disability-retaliation claim because it concluded that where Bryson was not disabled, she could not show that Regis retaliated against her on the basis of her disability. The district court erred. A plaintiff may prevail on a disability-retaliation claim even if the underlying claim of disability fails. Soileau v. Guilford of Me., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997); accord Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.3d 932, 938 (7th Cir.2006); Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 759 (3d Cir.2004) (Unlike a claim for discrimination under the ADA, an ADA retaliation claim based upon an employee having requested an accommodation does not require that a plaintiff show that he or she is `disabled' within the meaning of the ADA.); Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d 622, 630 (8th Cir.2003). Bryson's disability-retaliation claim is evaluated under the same tripartite McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework as her FMLA-retaliation claim. First, Bryson must establish a prima facie case. Keeping in mind that the prima facie showing a plaintiff must make will vary depending upon the unique facts of each case, Macy, 484 F.3d at 365, we apply the formulation we have previously used, requiring an ADA-retaliation plaintiff to show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Penny, 128 F.3d at 417. Bryson argues that she engaged in statutorily protected conduct by requesting an accommodation, namely, to perform seated work, including cutting hair from a seated position. Regis does not dispute that Bryson satisfies the first two elements of the prima facie showing, and contends only that Bryson has failed to show a causal connection. We disagree. Bryson was terminated just two days after leaving a voice message with Sawyer asking if she could perform seated work, and one day after conveying the same request to Wilson. Moreover, Bryson testified that Wilson responded by saying that she did not think either corporate or Sawyer would permit Bryson to do seated work. Bryson has therefore presented sufficient evidence to raise the inference that she was unlawfully retaliated against on the basis of her request for an accommodation. Macy, 484 F.3d at 365 (The key question [at the prima facie stage] is always whether, under the particular facts and context of the case at hand, the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that he or she suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.). As we have already discussed, Regis has presented evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that it terminated Bryson for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, i.e., that Bryson was unable to return to work at the expiration of her leave period. Nonetheless, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment for Regis on Bryson's disability-retaliation claim because, just as we concluded with respect to Bryson's FMLA-retaliation claim, the record reveals questions of fact regarding whether Regis's explanation for its termination decision is pretextual. Where Bryson requested to perform seated work, where Wilson expressed skepticism that such a proposal would be favorably received, and where Bryson was terminated without ever having received a definitive response to her request from anyonenot Sawyer, not Wilson, and not anyone at Regiswe cannot conclude that Regis is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Rather, further factual development in the district court is necessary to ascertain what role, if any, Sawyer and Wilson played in Bryson's termination, and whether possible opposition to Bryson's request for an accommodation was a motivating factor in her termination.