Opinion ID: 2556346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Medical Examiner Testimony

Text: Dr. Sarah Colvin, a deputy medical examiner with the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, testified that she performed Miller's autopsy and concluded that he died from blunt-impact head trauma. She further testified that the manner of Miller's death was homicide, acknowledging that she classified Miller's death a homicide after reviewing the police report and speaking with Detective Webb during the autopsy. Over appellant's objection, she explained: [I]f a person ... is fleeing from gunfire, you don't go to the crosswalk ... look both ways, see if a car is coming across the street. Being fired upon then takes it out of the realm of chance. And chance is what is reserved for accidents. If you're hanging Christmas lights and you fall on your head, that's an accident. But when it becomes that the reason for your actions are because you are fearing for your life, that takes it into the realm of homicide for the medical professional. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Colvin to testify that the manner of death was homicide and that the ultimate cause of [Miller's] death was appellant['s] firing a gun. [7] In allowing this testimony, appellant complains, the trial court permitted the government to elicit an opinion from its medical expert on the mental state of the appellant and regarding the impact of his alleged actions on traffic and on pedestrian conduct, matters clearly outside of her area of expertise. He also asserts that Dr. Colvin's testimony invaded the province of the jury. Contrary to appellant's assertion that the medical examiner testified about what was in the mind of ... appellant as he fired the gun, the medical examiner did not express an opinion about appellant's state of mind. [8] Rather, in explaining her conclusion that Miller's death was classified as a homicide for medical purposes, the medical examiner discussed generally the mental state of a hypothetical decedent (explaining that if the decedent took the ultimately fatal action out of fear for his life, the case enters the realm of homicide for the medical professional). Nor did the medical examiner testify to issues outside her area of expertise or invade the jury's province. Dr. Colvin testified that, when classifying the manner of death, a medical examiner chooses from five optionsnatural, accident, suicide, homicide or undetermined. Importantly, she explained that a medical examiner's definition of homicide does not equate to the court definition of murder or manslaughter or anything like that, but just means death at the hands of another. In addition, under cross-examination, she acknowledged that she was not at the scene of the accident when Miller suffered his injuries, that her opinion was based upon what the police told her, and that she would not have been able to tell from her medical review alone the circumstances that led to Miller's sustaining trauma. We think this testimony kept Dr. Colvin's testimony within permissible bounds, and further that the court's instructions to the jury that it was entirely up to [them] ... to decide what facts to find from the evidence received during this trial was adequate to guard against usurpation of the jury's function.