Opinion ID: 4531772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attorney Neff Was Properly Disqualified

Text: Lacerda argues that the District Court arbitrarily disqualified his counsel of choice or at least abused its discretion by disqualifying Neff. When a defendant challenges the District Court’s decision to disqualify his counsel of choice, we apply a bifurcated standard of review: first, we exercise plenary review when determining whether the District Court’s decision was arbitrary, and then, if not arbitrary, we review the decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, we find that the District Court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion, so we will affirm. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of counsel to every criminal defendant. That guarantee has generally been understood to encompass a right to the counsel of choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). But the right to counsel of choice is not absolute. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). “The essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” Id. at 159 (internal citations omitted). Before disqualifying a defendant’s counsel of choice, the trial court must balance that defendant’s right to his counsel of choice against the fair and proper administration of justice. United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1074 (3d Cir. 1996). When “considerations of judicial administration supervene,” such as when an attorney has a serious potential conflict of interest, the presumption in favor of counsel of choice is rebutted and the right must give way. Id. at 1074–75 (citing Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 607 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)). Here, the District Court weighed Lacerda’s right to counsel of choice against Neff’s serious actual and potential conflicts of interest and, ultimately, determined those conflicts could neither be waived nor cured by anything short of disqualification. That conclusion was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion. 15 After the FBI raid on VOG in November 2010, Lacerda retained Neff as his counsel. The following month, Neff met with VOG employees to ease any concerns they had, assuring them that (1) only the Lacerdas were under investigation by the FBI and (2) the post-raid revised phone scripts were lawful. VOG continued operations using the phone scripts whose legality had been vouched for by Neff. Contrary to Neff’s representations, 18 VOG employees, including the Lacerdas, were eventually indicted in this criminal case based in part on their use of the phone scripts. In proffers to the government, several of those defendants told of the December meeting with Neff. In United States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2003), we recognized that “[a]n attorney who faces criminal or disciplinary charges for his or her actions in a case will not be able to pursue the client’s interests free from concern for his or her own.” We also recognized the potential conflicts that arise when counsel realistically could be called as a witness, as “it is often impermissible for an attorney to be both an advocate and a witness.” Id. at 152. And we noted “that disqualification may also be appropriate where it is based solely on a lawyer’s personal knowledge of events likely to be presented at trial, even if the lawyer is unlikely to be called as a witness.” Id. (citing United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 933 (2d Cir. 1993)). Each consideration applies here and was central to the District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned decision disqualifying Neff.