Opinion ID: 75763
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: deviations from hiring policies

Text: 42 Walker and Golub argue that Prudential deviated from its hiring policies, thus resulting in circumstantial evidence of discrimination. The bending of established rules may, of course, be suggestive of discrimination. See Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366, 1374 (11th Cir.1985). In this case, however, Walker and Golub have not shown that Prudential departed from its usual hiring procedures. 43 First, Walker and Golub argue that the Orlando Dispatcher position should have been posted. However, the testimony of Tippy Rogers and Adell Jones establishes that the decision regarding whether to post a job was within the discretion of the Human Resources Department. Jones also testified that she decided not to post the job opening because the opening occurred so late in the process. Since there is no evidence regarding how long the posting process took, it is not clear whether the posting procedures could have been completed between November 9 and December 5. Based on this evidence, then, we cannot say that Jones's decision not to post the position violated a clearly established personnel policy. 44 Moreover, Walker and Golub cite Prudential's deviation from its affirmative action policy as evidence of pretext. Though the content of Prudential's affirmative action policy is not clearly established in the record, Walker and Golub contend that the policy encouraged the promotion of females and minorities and that hiring a male rather than a female for the Dispatcher position violated this policy. However, as we said in Liao v. TVA, 867 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir.1989), the failure to give a preference under such a plan cannot be used to support an allegation of discrimination in employment decisions. Id. at 1369. Any deviation from Prudential's plan in this case does not constitute evidence of pretext. 45 We are left, therefore, with a single shred of evidence to support Walker and Golub's assertion of pretext, namely that Jones took two days, rather than one or two weeks, to review the personnel files of the six members of the Fort Lauderdale operations staff before deciding that the Senior Dispatcher was more qualified than the others to serve as Dispatcher in the Orlando office. This shred of evidence, without more, is insufficient to establish that Prudential's articulated reason was pretextual. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Prudential was appropriate. Cf. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148, 120 S.Ct. at 2109 ([A]n employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.).