Opinion ID: 2623278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Purpose of delay

Text: First, the district court found that Vanisi's motion for self-representation was made for purpose of delay. The court referred to prior actions by Vanisi that had resulted in delay, including a personal request by Vanisi for a continuance, Vanisi's motion to appoint new counsel, his subsequent refusal to cooperate with counsel, and the consequent need for a competency evaluation. The court also believed that Vanisi had decided to represent himself long before he actually made his request to do so. The court concluded, Although the defendant states he is not making this motion for the purpose of delay, the court finds otherwise in light of his previous actions and requests in this case. Indeed, at an earlier hearing on a motion by Vanisi to dismiss his counsel, the court had stated that it appeared that Mr. Vanisi has an agenda to delay the trial. As the district court acknowledged, Vanisi's motion was technically timely. Vanisi made his motion approximately one month before the scheduled start date for the trial and did not request a continuance. If it is clear that the request comes early enough to allow the defendant to prepare for trial without need for a continuance, the request should be deemed timely. [6] Nevertheless, a specific finding of dilatory intent provides a separate and distinct basis for denial of the request. [7] The Ninth Circuit has explained that the district court may deny a request for self-representation in circumstances where the defendant's prior conduct indicates that he or she is making the request as a delaying tactic: Of course, a request for self-representation need not be granted if it is intended merely as a tactic for delay. Moreover, a court may consider events [preceding] a motion for self-representation to determine whether the request is made in good faith or merely for delay. Thus, if the district judge determines that the ... request is part of a pattern of dilatory activity, the court has the discretion to deny the continuance and require the defendant to proceed to trial on the scheduled date either with the counsel designated or pro se. [8] The district court determined that Vanisi's request was part of a pattern of dilatory activity based on his prior behavior. Although Vanisi said during the Faretta canvass that he would be prepared to go to trial on schedule and that his motion was not for purpose of delay, we decline to substitute our judgment for the district court's direct observations and findings on this matter. [9] We conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in finding that Vanisi harbored an intent to delay the proceedings.