Opinion ID: 164956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal Protection Versus Substantive Due Process

Text: 14 Because their substantive analyses converge, often the differences between equal protection and substantive due process are not fully appreciated. The Equal Protection and Due Process clauses protect distinctly different interests. On the one hand, the substantive component of the Due Process Clause provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997), even when the challenged regulation affects all persons equally. In contrast, the essence of the equal protection requirement is that the state treat all those similarly situated similarly, Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Schs., 263 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir.2001) (quotations omitted), with its central purpose [being] the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race [or other suspect classifications,] Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). As such, equal protection only applies when the state treats two groups, or individuals, differently. 15 Here, Plaintiffs have cast their challenge to the FSLA as both a substantive due process and an equal protection claim. Although Plaintiffs forward both contentions, their challenge is most properly presented as an equal protection claim, as evidenced by the fact that they almost exclusively cite to equal protection cases (even to support their substantive due process argument) and that the Court itself has most often analyzed regulatory challenges under the equal protection rubric. In any event, because a substantive due process analysis proceeds along the same lines as an equal protection analysis, our equal protection discussion sufficiently addresses both claims.