Opinion ID: 2003747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Hoover's Statement Regarding Keene's Imprisonment

Text: Keene had been released from incarceration in Wisconsin shortly before taking part in the crimes underlying this case. Pursuant to a defense motion in limine, the trial judge barred reference to that fact at trial. Nevertheless, Hoover alluded to Keene's release from prison during his cross-examination. Keene sought a mistrial. The trial judge denied the request. The jury was instructed to disregard Hoover's statement, as Hoover's answer had not been responsive to the question asked. Keene claims it was error not to declare a mistrial. The State, he says, should have more effectively instructed Hoover not to mention Keene's prior imprisonment. Regardless, Keene states, Hoover's statement was sufficiently prejudicial to violate the due process clause. U.S. Const., amend. XIV. Such claims of error as Keene raises have been resolved with reference to how the particular testimony challenged came about. Where a challenged statement has not been made in direct response to a question, that fact has been seen to be consequential. (See People v. Naujokas (1962), 25 Ill.2d 32, 35-36, 182 N.E.2d 700.) Where the statement arose from vigorous defense cross-examination, that fact has been taken into account. (See Naujokas, 25 Ill.2d at 35-36, 182 N.E.2d 700.) Of course, neither circumstance would operate to negate resulting prejudice, a central concern to the claim Keene raises. On the other hand, prompt action taken with regard to the particular testimony may have some hope of blunting actual harm. And so where the jury is immediately admonished to disregard the statement, that action is material to the analysis (see People v. Naujokas (1962), 25 Ill.2d 32, 35-36, 182 N.E.2d 700) even though, it is said, it is impossible to unring a bell (see People v. Brown (1975), 27 Ill.App.3d 891, 898, 326 N.E.2d 568, quoting Maness v. Meyers (1975), 419 U.S. 449, 460, 95 S.Ct. 584, 592, 42 L.Ed.2d 574, 584). The record here tells nothing about the State's efforts in instructing Hoover as to the scope of permissible testimony. The fact that the statement was made simply does not permit the conclusion that the State was to blame for it. (See generally People v. Gregory (1961), 22 Ill.2d 601, 604, 177 N.E.2d 120.) Keene's assertion is pure speculation, and the implication of a per se due process violation based upon it a chimera. For that matter, the record does not show that Hoover's statement resulted from vigorous cross-examination or even, more darkly, prompted error. As such, principles of waiver cannot help to resolve the issue. The concern, then, is whether prejudice resulted. The trial judge here did what he could to reduce the impact that the reference to Keene's prior incarceration could have on the jury's collective mind. It is at least arguable that the admonishment could not eliminate all chance of prejudice. But we do not believe that what residual harm may have remained could rise to the level of a due process violation.