Opinion ID: 1090418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim of Negligent Supervision of Students Asserted Against Ross and Trottman

Text: Ex parte Cranman provides State-agent immunity for individuals who are exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in . . . educating students. 792 So.2d at 405. Educating students includes not only classroom teaching, but also supervising and educating students in all aspects of the educational process. In Ex parte Blankenship, supra, this Court held that a band director and a high school principal were entitled to State-agent immunity because they were exercising their discretion in educating students when they allowed a 19-year-old male, who was not a student at the school, to participate in the band. In Blankenship, the parents of C.S., a female band member, had asked Harold Blankenship, the band director, to keep C.S. and Jason Howard, the 19-year-old male, separated. When the band returned to Elmore County from marching at a football game in Troy, neither C.S.'s parents nor the parents designated by C.S.'s parents to pick up C.S. were available, even though C.S.'s parents knew that it was their responsibility to provide C.S. with a ride home after the trip. C.S. and a girlfriend left with Howard and his brother, who was at the high school to pick up Howard. At some point after that, C.S. and Howard engaged in sexual intercourse. When C.S. told her parents what had happened, C.S.'s parents reported the incident to the police. They later sued Blankenship and Louie Fryer, the principal, alleging that Blankenship and Fryer had failed to properly supervise C.S. by allowing C.S. to leave the school grounds with Howard. Blankenship and Fryer moved for a summary judgment, arguing that their actions were protected under the doctrine of discretionary immunity. C.S.'s parents argued that Blankenship and Fryer had exceeded the scope of their discretion and were not entitled to immunity because they had allowed Howard, a nonstudent, to participate in the band when the guidelines established by the Elmore County School Board stated that a child could not participate in an extracurricular activity on a particular day if the child had not attended school for the entire day. 806 So.2d at 1188. After the trial court denied Blankenship and Fryer's motion, they petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in their favor. This Court, recognizing that the guidelines did not limit the discretion of a principal and a band director in allowing nonstudents to participate in the band, held that Blankenship and Fryer were protected under the doctrine of discretionary immunity because their decision to allow Howard to participate in the band was made while they were acting in their official capacity discharging their duties in educating students. We stated: One with 20/20 hindsight might question the wisdom of Blankenship and Fryer's decision to allow a person they thought was a student from a private school outside Elmore County to participate in the band activities and the wisdom of their failing to verify that he was a student at the private school he claimed to attend. State-agent immunity protects agents of the State in their exercise of discretion in educating students. We will not second-guess their decisions. 806 So.2d at 1190. Applying the reasoning set forth in Blankenship, we conclude that Ross and Trottman are entitled to the protection of State-agent immunity. Ross, in his official capacity as principal of Mount Olive Elementary School, designated Trottman to check students in and out of school on the day J.T. left the school with C.W. The documents before us establish that allowing a student to leave with an older sibling was a standard checkout procedure at Mount Olive Elementary School. As a consequence, Trottman permitted J.T. to leave the school grounds with C.W., who represented to Trottman that he was J.T.'s brother. Therefore, Ross's and Trottman's actions occurred while they were discharging their official duties in educating students. Because Ross and Trottman established that their conduct was based on their exercise of judgment in educating students, the burden then shifted to T.W. to establish that Ross and Trottman acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond [their] authority. According to T.W., Ross and Trottman acted beyond the scope of their authority because, she argues, they did not follow the established procedure for allowing a student to check out of school. She maintains that if the procedure designated in the 1998-1999 district-wide handbook and the proposed 1999-2000 Mount Olive Elementary School handbook had been followed, J.T. would not have been allowed to check out and leave the school grounds with C.W. She states that these handbooks provided detailed rules and regulations, which Ross and Trottman were required to follow, and, because they did not follow these established procedures in deciding to allow J.T. to check out and leave the school grounds with C.W., they exceeded their authority. In support of her argument, she also offered an affidavit stating that when she enrolled J.T. at Mount Olive Elementary School, she completed a form in which she indicated that in the event she could not pick up J.T. at school, only T.W.'s mother or T.W.'s aunt were authorized to pick up J.T. from school. Ross and Trottman, however, presented evidence indicating that there was not an official checkout policy in place at Mount Olive Elementary School at the time of the incident. They submitted an affidavit from Lee Henderson, the superintendent of education for the Russell County Board of Education at the time of J.T.'s assault. He stated: The Russell County Board of Education did not have any policies, procedures, rules or regulations in place regarding the checking out of students during the 1999-2000 school year. While the Russell County Board of Education did not require each school to have its own handbook during the 1999-2000 school year, we were in a transition period where each school was in the process of formulating its own handbook addressing the specific needs of the school. During this school year, each principal, including Mr. Ross, had the authority to put into effect those procedures which best served the circumstances of their community and school. Each principal also had the authority to delegate the responsibility for checking students out. Thus, Henderson's affidavit establishes that there was not a district policy regarding checking students out of school. Additionally, Ross and Trottman presented evidence through the depositions of Ross and other faculty and staff working at Mount Olive Elementary School during the 1999-2000 school year indicating that although there was a proposed 1999-2000 handbook for Mount Olive Elementary School, the handbook was never adopted and there was no school policy regarding checking students out of school. [1] Ross and Trottman further state that the enrollment form T.W. completed when she enrolled J.T. at Mount Olive Elementary School did not designate certain individuals to pick J.T. up in the event T.W. could not do so; rather, it provided names of individuals whom the school could contact in case of an emergency. [2] In light of the foregoing, T.W. has not established that a specific checkout policy existed at Mount Olive Elementary School at the time of the incident; thus, she has not established that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Ross and Trottman exceeded the scope of their discretion by permitting J.T. to leave the school grounds with C.W. Cf. Giambrone v. Douglas, supra (holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a wrestling coach was entitled to State-agent immunity because evidence was presented indicating that specific guidelines and rules had been provided to the coach, thus removing the coach's discretion). Consequently, the trial court exceeded the scope of its discretion by refusing to enter a summary judgment for Trottman and Ross on the ground of State-agent immunity with regard to T.W.'s claim of negligent supervision of students.