Opinion ID: 1860134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does the excluded evidence's probative value substantially outweigh the danger of harm to the victim and of unfair prejudice to the other party under KRE 412(b)(2)

Text: `Unfair prejudice' means the undue tendency to suggest a decision based on improper consideration; it `does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.' Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn. By and Through Claiborne County Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 516 (6th Cir.1996) ( quoting United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir.1993)) (emphasis in original). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if ... it `appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish,' or otherwise `may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case.' Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir.1980) ( quoting Fe. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note). [U]nfair prejudice is that which is unnecessary and unreasonable. Partin v. Commonwealth, 918 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Ky.1996) rev'd on other grounds by Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288 (Ky.2008). Since Brooks is both the victim and the other party opposing the evidence, both tests must be applied with her in mind. And [w]e must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, `maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.' Sutkiewicz v. Monroe County Sheriff, 110 F.3d 352, 360 (6th Cir.1997).
The probative value of evidence is measured by the strength of its tendency to prove one side or the other of a material issue in the case. Direct evidence is often stronger in value than circumstantial, but that which is most convincing, or proves to be the more conclusive, or finally pushes the strength of one's case to a conclusive level on a material issue of fact, is entitled to the strongest probative value. In Barnett v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Ky.1992), we stated: The purpose of the Rape Shield Statute[, then KRS 510.145,] in generally prohibiting evidence of prior sexual conduct of a complaining witness is to insure that that witness does not become the party on trial through the admission of evidence that is neither material nor relevant to the charge made. The statute does not prohibit the introduction of relevant, probative evidence at trial, if the evidence of prior sexual conduct directly pertains to the [act] with which the defendant is charged. Id. at 363. In Barnett , the Commonwealth offered the testimony of an examining physician who testified to findings of chronic sexual contact in regards to the young female victim and identified the appellant as the perpetrator of such contact. Yet, [d]espite the existence of several handwritten notes by the [youthful] victim and her brother which suggested the existence of a sexual relationship between them, and statements by the victim identifying her brother as one with whom she had sexual contact, the trial court denied appellant any right to cross-examine the complaining witness or her brother as to their possible sexual contact. Id. at 362. In reversing, this Court stated: In the case of a sexually active adult who claims to be the victim of rape, medical findings that she frequently engages in intercourse would not be probative of the crime charged. However, in the case of a female child who is presumed not to be sexually active, and with whom any sexual contact is prohibited, a medical finding of frequent sexual activity establishes the relevance of evidence that the perpetrator is one other than the person charged. .... Omission of the evidence concerning the ongoing sexual activity between the complaining witness and her brother was devastating to appellant in light of the testimony of the examining physician who expressed findings of chronic sexual contact and, without objection, identified appellant as the guilty party. The possibility that the victim had engaged in ongoing sexual conduct with her sibling was not revealed to the physician during his examination and interview of the victim. This revelation may have caused the physician to qualify or omit his branding of appellant as the assailant. Id. at 363. Thus, [a]ppellant was required to defend himself without the benefit of evidence which could have explained the expert's ... findings. The preclusion of the evidence of the victim's sexual contact with her brother was tantamount to a denial of appellant's right to present a defense. Id. at 363. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 135 (Ky.2001), involved similar circumstances where the excluded testimony was critical to the right to a defense. Again, the victim was a child and unlikely to have sexual partners. The only partner identified was the appellant. Therefore, testimony from a doctor that C.S.B. had a loose vaginal opening would lead the jury to believe that Appellant must have been the one who penetrated C.S.B. and caused her vaginal opening to be loose. Therefore, under Barnett , it appears that the evidence of the victim's past sexual encounter is relevant to provide an explanation for why she had a loose vaginal opening, and rebut the inference of guilt. Id. at 140. Young, 182 S.W.3d at 224, involved a defendant charged with rape who filed a motion pursuant to KRE 412 to be allowed to introduce evidence that (1) the alleged victim made statements to her co-worker that she wanted to engage in sex with the defendant to such a degree that it would melt the ice in the water cooler and also commented, in reference to the defendant, that she `wanted some of that,' and (2) that the alleged victim frequented the police department where he was working at night and flirted or made sexual advances directed at him. Young's entire defense to the charge of first-degree rape was that the sexual encounter was consensual. Id. at 224. The trial court sustained the motion to allow admission of the offered evidence and granted a continuance for the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating: This is a case which hinges solely on the credibility of the prosecuting witness and Young. There is no medical evidence since the alleged rape was not reported for months. Excluding the evidence as the Commonwealth desires would be tantamount to denying Young his constitutional right to present a defense of consensual sexual contact. Id. at 224-25. Judd v. Rodman, 105 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir.1997), is also instructive as to probative value in regards to past and present sexual activities in a civil action for damages. In Rodman , Judd sued Rodman for damages, claiming he gave her herpes. On Judd's appeal, after a trial verdict in favor of Rodman, she contended that, under the balancing test of Rule 412(b), evidence of her prior sexual history should have been excluded because its probative value failed to outweigh substantially the unfair prejudice toward her. Id. at 1343. In upholding its admission, the court held: A central issue of the case, however, is whether Judd contracted genital herpes from Rodman. Expert testimony revealed that the herpes virus can be dormant for long periods of time and the infected person can be asymptomatic. Consequently, evidence of prior sexual relationships and the type of protection used during sexual intercourse was highly relevant to Rodman's liability. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Judd's prior sexual history. Id. Delaney v. City of Hampton, 999 F.Supp. 794 (E.D.Va.1997) involved similar circumstances. In Delaney , the court found that such evidence should be available to the jury, noting: It is clear from Delaney's psychiatric file that she has had numerous stressors in her life besides the alleged incident with Parker including a history of sexual abuse and other incidents such as an automobile accident. The City has experts who will testify that these stressors may have contributed to her current psychiatric problems. Therefore, evidence of such past abuse that is found in Delaney's psychiatric medical file should be admitted in this case. Id. at 796. Here, evidence that the sexual activity which admittedly occurredwas so quiet that Brooks' sleeping roommate was not awakened and the nearby nurses' station never heard any activity, sets the stage for a significant factual issue for the jury as to whether or not the sexual activity was consensual or non-consensual. Moreover, Brooks' comments to Dr. Gibson that she had sex in the hospital, as opposed to having been raped in the hospital, could be taken by the jury as strongly suggestive of consensual sex. Consistent with this point, her failure to report being raped during her admission and treatment is highly relevant on this same issue. In addition, Dr. Lisa Goodman was allowed to testify as plaintiffs expert regarding a hypothetical damage theory based on the consequences of an actual rape. She gave opinions which were based upon damage that a rape could cause an average victim. Though Dr. Goodman never saw, evaluated or diagnosed Brooks, she was allowed to testify that Brooks was raped. Thus, evidence that she liked sex too much and had been sexually promiscuous and had unprotected sex with numerous men and with at least one woman and had reported conflicted feelings in regards to her sexual promiscuity, that she believed she was bi-sexual and that these, along with the state of her resulting mental and emotional health, which were the reasons for her admission to Ten Broeck, are strongly relevant to the issue of damages. In addition, Brooks' mother's report that Brooks had been molested at age fourteen (14) by her father and that her many sexual relationships caused her to express feelings of shame, guilt and lack of self-esteem, all strongly relate to the issue of damages. Clearly, any damage she was suffering prior to the time of the sexual event of January 5, 2001, was highly relevant to the question of what damages she suffered as a result of the event. Thus, in the balancing required under KRE 412(b)(2), the probative value of the evidence excluded would necessarily be high when weighed in regards to the appropriate issues of consent and damages.
In Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637 (8th Cir.2006), a sexual harassment suit, the court allowed into evidence sexually charged comments made by the plaintiff in the work place. Testimony was also allowed that the plaintiff used lewd, rude and unlady-like language in the workplace. Id. at 643. The evidence was allowed on the basis that the plaintiff might have welcomed the alleged harassment. The admission of such evidence was affirmed on appeal, wherein the court noted: While we agree that the district court erred in mischaracterizing this evidence as non-Rule 412 evidence in the first instance, there was no danger of harm or prejudice to [the plaintiff] or any other party, and the district court correctly determined that it was admissible as relevant to the issues raised by [the plaintiffs] claims. Id. In another sexual harassment suit, Hall v. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 883 S.W.2d 884 (Ky.App.1994), the court allowed evidence of the plaintiffs extra-martial affair with a co-worker. In affirming admissibility, the court noted: If an employee made a claim for damages based upon a physical trauma allegedly suffered in the workplace, any prior or contemporaneous complaints relating to other causes of the alleged injury would most certainly be relevant. The same reasoning applies to injuries resulting from non-physical traumas such as sexual harassment. Evidence of other factors that possibly contributed to [the plaintiffs] emotional injuries are clearly relevant to the issue of damages in this case. Id. at 887. Thus, considering Brooks' Ten Broeck medical records during the term of her treatment within the context of the issues raised by the evidence, particularly in regards to the issues of consent and damages, we find no unfair prejudice. To the extent the jury finds the sexual event to have been non-consensual, it is unlikely that the evidence contained within the records dealing with her sexuality would suggest a decision on any improper basis. Were the jury to find the sexual event was consensual, then the damage to Brooks' case would be by virtue of the consent rather than the evidence of the medical records. Moreover, a trial court can, concurrent with the introduction of the evidence, give such admonitions to the jury as it deems proper to avoid any untoward use of the evidence. See Wilkinson, 307 F.3d at 422 (The court could minimize any danger of undue prejudice by admitting the evidence with a cautionary instruction.). We must also consider the danger of harm to the victim. KRE 412(b)(2). This test is, however, more objective than subjective, and must relate to potential actual harm of a physical, emotional or mental nature, as opposed to the unfair prejudicial affect one would assess upon behalf of a party. Thus, this test is separate from that of unfair prejudice. Yet, the measurement of this danger of harm to the victim, like that of unfair prejudice, may not transcend a party's right to a fair defense. See Wilkinson, 307 F.3d at 422 (The constitutional violations in this case are significant enough to outweigh any violation of the rape shield law, whose purposes can be served by the instructions of the trial court.). Conversely, the closer one gets to damaging a party's right to cross-examining a critical witness and presenting a defense, the higher the probative value of the evidence being considered for exclusion. Id. at 419-21. Considering the objective circumstances, we recognize that Brooks entered Ten Broeck for treatment stemming from her past sexual history and the mental and emotional turmoil and injury created thereby. We note from Ten Broeck's records that Brooks' discharge summary of January 20, 2001, states she felt 100% better than when she was admitted, that the group sessions had helped her, and that she had done well on her treatment. Her principal concerns upon discharge were that she might be bi-sexual and she was concerned about how her boyfriend might react to this. She noted this condition stresses her. Moreover, the fact of the trial itselfand we are not unmindful of her tearful testimonygenerated stressful, and emotional conditions for her. Yet, to the extent the evidence discussed herein is true, it is a truth she has lived with for some time. To the extent that it is not true, one would expect it would generate anger, which one would expect to be fleeting. It is not evidence, which if disclosed at trial, would cause someone to want to hurt her. In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence in this regard, the proper standard of review is an abuse of discretion. Thus, from a consideration of the evidence excluded and the relationship of this evidence to the other evidence of the case, we cannot place a value on the danger of harm to Brooks that would overcome the substantial need of Appellant for the probative value of the excluded evidence. We thus conclude that the probative value of the excluded evidence substantially outweighs the danger of harm and unfair prejudice to Brooks. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Brooks' Ten Broeck hospital records during her treatment period, as well as, the other evidence of her sexual history as discussed herein, excepting, however, Brooks' statement in her deposition that she had sex with one-hundred (100) men and one woman. This last statement should remain excluded for reasons that Brooks' Ten Broeck medical records already note that she stated she had been sexually promiscuous and had unprotected sex with numerous men and with at least one woman. Once sufficient evidence is introduced on a particular point, the KRE 403 and 412(b)(2) balancing considerations may shift to protect against unnecessary and unfair repetition designed solely to place a victim in a bad light. We note Brooks' argument that KRE 412(c) requires the defendant to file a written motion at least fourteen (14) days before trial specifically describing the evidence sought to be admitted for the purposes for which it is offered. However, two separate motions were filed by Ten Broeck seeking the admissibility of this evidence, both before, and after, the 2003 Amendment adding KRE 412(b)(2), and that Ten Broeck requested an evidentiary hearing, which the court improperly denied. Nor, do we consider the evidence to have involved evidence of reputation as argued by the Appellant. We find these arguments without merit. Moreover, having found error in the exclusion of the stated evidence, we cannot under the facts of this case, find it to be harmless. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. To the extent they are preserved and are capable of repetition, we will also address other issues raised.