Opinion ID: 2627396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Alternate Suspect Evidence[5]

Text: [¶ 10] Prior to Grady's second trial, the State filed a motion to exclude evidence of alternate suspects in the murder of Mrs. Watts until Grady produced an adequate evidentiary basis supporting its admission. The State noted that Grady had indirectly accused inmates Dale Goss, Thomas Bedsaul, Scott Young and Joe Sanchez of murdering Mrs. Watts during his first trial, and that it anticipated Grady would employ the same defense strategy in the second trial. The State asserted that alternate suspect evidence was not admissible unless it established a probative nexus between the alleged suspects and Mrs. Watts' murder. The district court denied the State's motion but ruled it would require Grady to establish at trial a proper foundation for the admission of any proffered alternate suspect evidence under the standard articulated in United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir.1998). The district court stated: As a motion in limine, I'm going to deny the State's motion. I don't perceive that the parties are that far apart in what they understand the law to be here. In fact, well, they don't disagree as to what the law is, it's just how the Court applies it, I guess, is the central issue. But the quotation from the McVay [sic] case, I think, is appropriate and sets forth the standard. In fact, the State cited it in their motion, and they [sic] not only cited it, they [sic] highlighted it. Although there is no doubt that the defendant has the right to attempt to establish his innocence by showing that someone else did the crime, the defendant still must show that is [sic] proffered evidence on the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record to show a nexus between the crime charged and the assertive [sic] alternative perpetrator. It is not sufficient for a defendant merely to offer up unsupported speculation that another person may have done the crime. Such speculative claiming intensifies the grave risk of jury confusion, and it invites the jury to render its findings based on [emotion or] prejudice.     Again, the way I would anticipate it would happen is that if and when [the] defense starts on a line of questioning along those lines, I'll hear an objection. And we'll resolve it when I hear the objection. And that probably will include a request for an offer of proof, otherwise, in other words, there has to be a foundation before you get to the point, and if there's no foundation, then it's not coming in. [¶ 11] At trial, and as expected, Grady denied killing Mrs. Watts and sought to introduce evidence that one of the aforementioned inmates, as well as Taylor Kubiak or Cory Warpness, committed the crime. The State objected and, in accordance with its earlier ruling, the district court declined to admit the alternate suspect evidence absent an offer of proof establishing the required nexus between the crime and the alleged alternate suspect. Thereafter, Grady provided an offer of proof which listed the following evidence: (1) Inmate Dale Goss: Testimony from Sergeant Davis and Tilton Davis (Wyoming State Crime Lab) that Goss' shoes contained an unknown red substance, and that there was an unknown red substance on the carpet in the medical office. Testimony from Jim Nethercott, a caseworker at the Honor Farm, that Goss suffers from violent blackouts during which he commits crimes. Grady noted that previous testimony indicated Goss was in the vicinity at the time of the murder and that he was mentioned as a possible suspect by several people. (2) Inmate Taylor Kubiak: Testimony by Sergeant Davis that Kubiak's DNA was never tested to see if he was a possible contributor to the unidentified DNA found on Mrs. Watts' breasts and the dental office's carpet. Testimony from Kubiak or his caseworker that Kubiak wrote a note in May or June that contained lewd, sexual content and was derogatory to women. Grady noted that previous testimony indicated Mrs. Watts had received notes that contained lewd, sexual content. (3) Inmate Scott Young: Testimony from Sergeant Davis that Young was very angry at Mrs. Watts the night before the murder about a write-up and his whereabouts at the time of the murder could not be verified. Photographs depicting scrapes on Young's arms after the murder. Grady noted that previous testimony showed that Young was still ranting and raving about Mrs. Watts at eleven o'clock that night, a mere seven hours before she was killed, and that several inmates and staff members mentioned him as a possible suspect. (4) Inmate Joseph Sanchez: Testimony from Leah Hornecker that Mrs. Watts was afraid of an inmate matching Sanchez's description who had told Watts, I had better never catch you alone. Testimony from Correctional Officer Patty Davis that Sanchez had a bubble pack of medicine in his room and had made comments about it the day after the murder. Grady noted that previous testimony indicated that Sanchez, who worked at the mushroom farm, may have been missing from the farm transport bus around the time of the murder. The district court ruled admissible the alternate suspect evidence pertaining to inmate Young. The district court, however, determined that Grady's offer of proof was insufficient to establish the requisite nexus to allow the evidence regarding Goss, Kubiak, and Sanchez to be presented to the jury. [¶ 12] Grady contends the district court deprived him of his constitutional right to present a complete defense when it prohibited him from introducing evidence implicating Goss, Kubiak, and Sanchez in Mrs. Watts' murder. [6] Generally, we review the district court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. To the extent Grady's claim involves a constitutional issue, we review it de novo. Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo.2004). [¶ 13] Our recent decision in Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, 193 P.3d 203 (Wyo.2008) controls our resolution of this issue. In Bush, the defendant was charged with first degree murder in connection with the disappearance of his wife. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence implicating his brother in the wife's disappearance. The district court disallowed the evidence. In affirming the district court's decision, we held that a defendant's proffered alternate suspect evidence must demonstrate a direct nexus between the alternate suspect and the crime charged to be admissible. Id., ¶ 62, 193 P.3d at 218. If the proffered evidence does not sufficiently connect the alternate suspect to the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is speculative and does nothing more than raise a suspicion, the evidence may properly be excluded. Id., ¶¶ 68-69, 193 P.3d at 220. In Bush, we held that the defendant's proffered evidence was properly excluded because it failed to establish the requisite link between the brother and the crime charged. [¶ 14] In light of Bush, we now consider the evidence Grady sought to have admitted to show that Goss, Kubiak or Sanchez committed the murder. The proffered evidence concerning Goss merely showed that he had a red substance on his shoes and suffered from violent blackouts. There was no evidence that the red substance was the same substance that was discovered in the medical office, nor was there any evidence indicating Goss was under the influence of a violent blackout on the morning of the murder. In this latter regard, there was no evidence indicating the frequency of Goss' blackouts or when they occurred in relation to Mrs. Watts' murder. In essence, this proffered evidence was purely speculative and did not link Goss to the crime charged. The district court, therefore, did not err in excluding this evidence. [¶ 15] The proffered testimony concerning the absence of DNA testing on Kubiak was apparently intended to show that Kubiak might have been the contributor of some unidentified DNA found on Mrs. Watts' breasts and the dental carpet. The obvious problem with this proffered evidence is that it did nothing to connect Kubiak to the murder. Furthermore, the fact that Kubiak penned a letter derogatory to women in May or June did nothing more than raise a suspicion that Kubiak might have written the sexually oriented notes previously received by Mrs. Watts. It did not, standing alone, establish a nexus between Kubiak and the crime. We conclude the district court properly excluded this evidence. [¶ 16] The same can be said about the testimony concerning Sanchez. At most, it indicated that Sanchez may or may not have been on the mushroom farm transport bus on the morning of the murder, he possessed a bubble pack of medicine, and that Mrs. Watts feared an inmate matching his description. Furthermore, there was no evidence when the inmate matching Sanchez's description made the alleged threatening comments to Mrs. Watts. This evidence did not provide a connection between Sanchez and the crime charged and, consequently, it was properly excluded. [¶ 17] As a final matter, Grady contends the district court violated his right to present a defense when it prohibited testimony concerning statements made by Scott Young the night before the murder. [7] The district court excluded the statements on relevancy and hearsay grounds. Grady presents no argument challenging the legality of the district court's ruling, but merely asserts the statements should have been allowed as alternate suspect evidence. As we noted in Bush, a defendant may introduce any legal evidence tending to prove that another person may have committed the crime in which the defendant is charged. Legal evidence is evidence that would be admissible at trial. Bush, ¶ 71, 193 P.3d at 220 (emphasis in original). Absent a showing that the statements were legally admissible, we cannot conclude the district court erred in excluding them.