Opinion ID: 1303107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ministerial v. Discretionary Duties

Text: 2. I believe that duties can be discretional in nature and have within them ministerial duties that must be performed. I also believe that once an officer goes outside of the scope of his authority he has exceeded his discretion. In either case the officer should be held personally liable for his acts. The following from Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329 (264 SE2d 878) (1980), and Nelson v. Spalding County, 249 Ga. 334 (290 SE2d 915) (1982), leads me to that conclusion. As this Court stated in Hennessy, supra, 245 Ga. at 330-31: It is a well-established principle that a public official who fails to perform purely ministerial duties required by law is subject to an action for damages by one who is injured by his omission. However, it is equally well established that `where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him, he is sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as a result of an erroneous decision; provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority, and without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.' (Emphasis omitted.) Only when an official is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him[,] is the official  sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer.... (Emphasis supplied.) Id. The officer in this case was not so invested or empowered. I can find no authority that would invest or empower any officer with discretion to disobey the law. While there are certain aspects of answering a call that may require discretion, no officer is empowered to disobey the law. The decision as to whether duties are discretionary or ministerial is determined by the facts of the case. Nelson, supra, 249 Ga. at 336. Ministerial duties are those which must be performed without regard to the official's own judgment and must be performed in obedience to some specific external mandate. They are duties which the officer has no power or discretion to deviate from and they must be performed in the manner prescribed. Discretionary duties are those in which there are no specific mandates and in which the officer has power or discretion to interpret and judge the manner in which he will perform in a certain situation. Adherence to the law does not involve the exercise of discretion. Adherence to the law is a ministerial duty of the highest order. Furthermore, the opinions of this Court indicate that the characterization of a duty must be determined by the nature of the act to be performed and not by the title of the official who is performing it. Not all of the acts of an official vested with discretionary powers are discretionary. In Nelson, id., Mr. York, Warden of the Spalding County Correctional Institute, had a duty to maintain and replace traffic control devices. Of course as Warden, Mr. York had broad discretion in many areas, just as an officer has broad discretion in many areas. That discretion, however, is properly limited by the ministerial duties that must be performed. Justice Clarke, writing for the majority in Nelson, id., stated: The act of replacing and repairing signs is ministerial and not discretionary in its nature. Once York is notified that a sign is missing his duty is to replace it; this duty does not involve the exercise of a discretion on his part. The performance of this duty is, therefore, a ministerial act. Mr. York may have had the discretion to decide who he would send out to replace the sign, however, it was not within his discretion to fail to replace it. Likewise, Officer Logue could exercise his discretion to rush to the scene (Majority opinion p. 208); however, it was his duty to observe the specific external mandate of the law and to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons[,] OCGA § 40-6-6 (d), while rushing to the scene. That duty did not involve the exercise of discretion on his part. The performance of that duty was, therefore, a ministerial act. Officer Logue, like all citizens, must obey the law. Nothing relieves the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. OCGA § 40-6-6 (d). As stated by the majority, an act could be within the scope of authority as required by Hennessy v. Webb, supra, and still be beyond the exercise of sound discretion. (Majority opinion p. 207.) A finding that the officer was answering a call is not enough to declare that the officer was within his authority.