Opinion ID: 1209472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is well established. The Supreme Court has long advised that a reviewing court is not required to determine whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (internal citation omitted). To obtain a conviction under § 924(c)(1), the government must show that the defendant's possession of the firearm was in furtherance of his drug crime. United States v. Lopez, 477 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir.2007). As we noted in Rios, 449 F.3d at 1013, § 924(c)(1) was amended in 1998 to employ the provision that the firearm be possessed in furtherance of the drug trafficking crime. This amendment superceded the previous standard that the offender use or carry a firearm during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). The amendment sought to broaden the scope of § 924(c)(1) to include more conduct than actually using or carrying the weapon during the course of the drug trafficking offense. H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 6 (1997). See also Rios, 449 F.3d at 1013-14 (detailing the reasons behind the alteration, including Congress's disapproval of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) (defining use to require active employment of a firearm)). However, mere possession of a firearm by an individual convicted of a drug crime is not sufficient for a rational trier of fact to convict under § 924(c)(1). Rios, 449 F.3d at 1012. A conviction is only supported by sufficient evidence when the facts reveal a nexus between the guns discovered and the underlying offense. United States v. Krouse, 370 F.3d 965, 968 (2004). To prove this nexus, the government must illustrate through specific facts, which tie the defendant to the firearm, that the firearm was possessed to advance or promote the criminal activity. Id. at 967 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-334, at 12 (1997)). Expert testimony indicating that drug traffickers generally use firearms to further their drug crimes is not sufficient. Rios, 449 F.3d at 1014. In cases where the underlying drug offense is possession with intent to distribute, the government has provided adequate evidence of a nexus between the firearm and the drug crime by showing that the firearm is in the same room and within easy reach of a substantial quantity of drugs and drug trafficking paraphernalia. Krouse, 370 F.3d at 968; see also Lopez, 477 F.3d at 1115 (Because Lopez's drug crime was possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, evidence establishing the ready accessibility of the gun while he was in possession of a distributable amount of cocaine satisfied the `in furtherance' requirement.). In this case, while the quantity of drugs is smaller and the circumstances establishing a nexus are not as clear as those in Krouse or Lopez, we cannot say that [no] rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. The gun at issue in this case was found by the police only a few feet from evidence that the jury found sufficient to establish Norwood's possession of cocaine with intent to distribute conviction. Specifically, the police found a digital scale, on which drug residue and Norwood's fingerprints were found, and 7.7 grams of cocaine packaged in two eight ball sizes, which both parties stipulated is a commercial amount that could be sold on the street. In addition, the police first discovered Norwood lying on top of the mattress where the gun was hidden, with over $2500 dollars in his pocket, along with a smaller amount of cocaine, which witnesses testified could still be considered a commercial amount. Given this evidence, we affirm the district court's ruling that a reasonable jury could infer that [Norwood] possessed the firearm in furtherance of the trafficking of crack, specifically to protect himself and his business. Order Den. Mot. For J. of Acquittal, United States v. Norwood, No. 06-091, (E.D.Wash.2007). AFFIRMED.