Opinion ID: 2331585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 51

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Appellee Hoge contends that since appellant Elliott appealed from the November 14, 2001, order rather than the November 30, 2001 amended order, he did not appeal a final order and therefore this court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See D.C.Code ง 11-721(a)(1). Hoge posits that a ruling on a pending motion by a trial court cures prematurity only where the court later ruled upon the pending motion without modifying the judgment being appealed. Circle Liquors, Inc. v. Cohen, 670 A.2d 381, 385 n. 8 (D.C.1996). See also D.C.App. R. 4(a)(2) (The running of time for filing a notice of appeal is terminated as to all parties by the timely filing of [a motion]. . . to amend the order.) Hoge contends Circle Liquors means that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear Elliott's appeal because the trial court modified the order from which Elliott appealed. In Circle Liquors, the motion in question was a Motion to Amend Judgment. Id. The timely filing of such a motion renders the judgment in the case non-final and that, in turn, denies this court jurisdiction to hear any appeal from that particular judgment. Dyer, supra, 635 A.2d at 1288. However, when a requested amendment raises issues that are, for all practical purposes, `collateral to and separate from the decision on the merits,' the order disposing of the merits remains appealable. Weaver v. Grafio, 595 A.2d 983, 986 (D.C.1991) (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)). See Words, Inc. v. Singer, 810 A.2d 910 (D.C. 2002). Moreover, if the trial court later rules on the pending motion without modifying the judgment being appealed, Circle Liquors, supra, 670 A.2d at 385 n. 8, the premature filing of the appeal does not divest this court of jurisdiction. The charitable beneficiaries' motion to amend the order requested only the addition of explanatory material. It did not ask the trial court to modify either the portion of the judgment removing Elliott, or the portion of the judgment appointing Hoge. The motion merely sought an explanation as to why there was good cause for removing Elliott and for not appointing his wife as his successor. Therefore, the order Elliott appealed from was immediately appealable and remained so. See, e.g., Budinich, supra, 486 U.S. at 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717 (holding that a judgment disposing of the merits but leaving open the question of attorneys' fees is a final, appealable order); Weaver, supra, 595 A.2d at 983 (holding that judgment disposing of all issues except Rule 11 sanctions should be treated as immediately appealable). Since that is so, Elliott's appeal was not premature, and this court has jurisdiction.