Opinion ID: 629167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sec. 1983 Retaliation Claim

Text: 33 As the district court noted, public employees are protected from adverse employment action on the basis of their speech only if they speak upon matters of public concern as opposed to matters of personal interest. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. A showing of public concern turns not on the general subject matter of the employee's speech, but on the content, form, and context of a given statement. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690-91. It is critical, therefore, that the employee claiming retaliation be able to recount these elements of his or her speech with some degree of specificity. Certainly Hartman was required to do so in response to defendants' summary judgment motion, which plainly raised the issue. (Rec. 76 at 10-13.) 34 With one exception, however, Hartman did not describe her statements in any detail. Rather, she simply claimed to have refused to do a variety of things that Brady and Glover instructed her to do. The verbal content, the form, and the broader context of her refusals remain a mystery, making it impossible to address the legal question of whether the refusals actually raised a matter of public concern. It is not enough that the things she refused to do or say were themselves of public concern, for it is the nature of her expression, not the actions of her supervisors, that we must gauge. Further, the court is not required to assume that because an employer's action could be objected to as an issue of public concern, the employee must have objected to it on that basis. 35 Hartman failed to elaborate on her allegations concerning her objections to the scope of the Caravan program, to Brady's and Glover's use of a racial slur, and to all but one of the detestable tasks that they assigned her. Thus, none of these objections supports a First Amendment claim for retaliation. 36 Hartman did adequately elaborate, however, on her claim concerning Glover's alleged requests for assistance in soliciting sexual favors from other City Colleges employees. Hartman says she objected to such requests in separate, private conversations with Glover and Brady, telling Glover that the requests were an abuse of power, that they would get him in a lot of trouble, and that he was not acting as a chairman of the board, and telling Brady that she, Hartman, was sick of being pressured by the requests, that they were very improper, and that, as a result of them, Glover was going to get himself in an awful lot of trouble. 37 Whether these statements are directed toward a matter of public concern depends in part on the motivation behind them. Colburn v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 586 (7th Cir.1992). Thus, even if an issue is one of public concern in a general sense, as sexual harassment surely is, still we must ask whether the speaker raised the issue because it is matter of public concern or whether, instead, the issue was raised to further some purely private interest. Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir.1987). 5 When the speaker's motives are mixed, as often they are, the speech will not be found to raise a matter of public concern if the overriding reason for the speech, as determined by its content, form, and context, appears to have been related to the speaker's personal interests as an employee. Colburn, 973 F.2d at 587. 38 We conclude that Hartman's speech related predominantly to her personal interest in resolving the friction between herself and Glover, not to her concern as a citizen over the sexist behavior of a City Colleges official. This conclusion is based on the interplay of a few factors, none of which is determinative. First, the content of Hartman's speech addressed primarily, though not exclusively, the individual interests of herself and of Glover: she was sick of the pressure; he might get into trouble. Second, Hartman chose to speak in an informal, private setting. See Callaway, 832 F.2d at 417. She made no public or lasting record of her concerns, and she did not try to disclose them beyond the small circle of people who might have been able to help improve her own situation. Third, Hartman's statements were made in the context of a personal conflict between Hartman and Glover, not as part of some broader effort to protest sexual harassment. Id. 39 We reiterate that none of these factors alone decides the case. Matters of public concern may be raised in the midst of a personal dispute. Colburn, 973 F.2d at 587. And they may be expressed in a private setting. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414, 99 S.Ct. at 696. In this case, however, in view of the particular combination of content, form, and context that describes Hartman's statements, we are convinced that the statements did not address a matter of public concern. Thus, the retaliation claim was properly dismissed.