Opinion ID: 2978290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary-Judgment Order

Text: We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 893 (6th Cir. 2006). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
Heard argues that the district court erred in dismissing his procedural-due-process claim because he has a cognizable “liberty” interest in avoiding STG II designation and the attendant confinement to maximum-security facilities. In order to prevail on a procedural-due-process claim, an inmate must first demonstrate that he was deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by government action. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Prisoners retain a liberty interest with respect to state-imposed prison discipline that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). If a prisoner establishes a liberty interest, the next question is what process the state must afford before imposing the discipline in question. Austin, 545 U.S. at 224. The initial question in this case is whether Heard’s allegedly indefinite confinement to maximum-security facilities because of his STG II designation constitutes an “atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that an inmate’s assignment to disciplinary segregation for 8 thirty days did not impose an “atypical, significant deprivation” that implicated an inmate’s liberty interest. Id. at 486. In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained that disciplinary segregation at the prison generally “mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,” the inmate’s confinement in segregation “did not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of restriction,” and the inmate’s segregation would not “inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.” Id. at 486-87. In Austin, however, the Supreme Court held that placement in Ohio’s maximum-security prison did implicate an inmate’s liberty interest. The Court concluded that assignment to the maximumsecurity prison “impose[d] an atypical and significant hardship under any plausible baseline,” and listed several factors that distinguished such confinement from the disciplinary segregation at issue in Sandin : For an inmate placed in [the maximum-security prison], almost all human contact is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light, though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small indoor room. Save perhaps for the especially severe limitations on all human contact, these conditions likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities, but here there are two added components. First is the duration. Unlike the 30-day placement in Sandin, placement at [the maximum-security prison] is indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just annually. Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration. While any of these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant hardship within the correctional context. It follows that respondents have a liberty interest in avoiding assignment to [the maximum-security prison]. Austin, 545 U.S. at 223-24 (citations omitted). The district court—without explanation—found that Heard’s placement in maximum-security facilities in Michigan was not an “atypical and significant hardship” that implicated a liberty interest. However, the limited record before us suggests that there is a fact question as to whether 9 confinement to Michigan’s maximum-security facilities—like the Ohio maximum-security prison at issue in Austin—implicates a protected liberty interest. On August 30, 2006, Heard filed a motion to supplement,4 adding the following paragraph to a sworn declaration that he had previously filed on January 10, 2006: Security Threat Group designations to status II result in plaintiff being placed in a maximum security prison, which is the most secured of all Michigan Department of Corrections prisons; but plaintiff does not challenge the increase in classification as a result of the STG designation. The challenge is to the atypical and significant hardships place[d] on plaintiff as a result of the designation that trigger due process. The designations are indefinite and paroles are automatically denied, there are only five minute showers (which include washing and drying off); visits are restricted to two one hour non-contacts visits per month; and all human contact is limited to yard, dining hall, library and religious service which culminate to a potential maximum of 21 hours out [of] the cell per week. Cell to cell communication is prohibited, the lights, though [they] may be dimmed at night, [are] on 24 hours a day. These conditions are not ordinary conditions in the life of a prisoner in lower levels (1-4) in MDOC. R. 117 (Mot. to Supplement 8/30/2006). Heard also submitted a “Parole Board Notice of Decision,” indicating that Heard was denied parole on June 19, 2006, in part because of his designation as STG II and his placement in a maximum-security facility. R. 100 (Mot. for Leave to File Exhibit 7/14/06 at 2). It is not clear from this document whether, as in Austin, Heard’s maximum-security designation automatically disqualifies him for parole. Finally, the record shows that prison officials are required to review a prisoner’s STG II status only once every six months. R. 88 (Ezrow Aff. ¶ 8). Because the district court did not explain the basis for its finding that Heard’s placement in maximum-security facilities did not implicate a liberty interest, it is unclear whether the district court considered these materials. 4 Heard styled the motion an “affidavit,” but it was unsworn. 10 We conclude that there are material issues of fact that prevent summary judgment on Heard’s claim that his confinement to a maximum-security facility implicates a protected liberty interest. Unlike the prisoner in Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 576-77 (6th Cir. 2005), who challenged only his designation by MDOC officials as an STG member, Heard challenges his placement in maximum-security facilities, coupled with the indefinite nature of this placement and the consequences for his eligibility for parole. It appears that there has been no discovery on these issues. On remand, the district court should permit Heard discovery regarding materials relevant to showing the conditions of his confinement in maximum-security facilities, the nature and timing of review of his maximum-security placement, and the consequences of his placement for parole eligibility. Defendants will, of course, have an opportunity to introduce evidence showing that the conditions of confinement in Michigan’s maximum-security facilities are distinguishable from those of the maximum-security prison in Austin. If a prisoner establishes a protected liberty interest, the next question is whether the state afforded the inmate sufficient process. See Austin, 545 U.S. at 224. The district court suggested that, even if Heard had a liberty interest, he received sufficient process when he “was called into the Captain’s office and his actions were discussed” and when he “received a misconduct hearing and was found guilty” before being designated STG II. R. 143 (Dist. Ct. Op. 2/6/07 at 3). However, on the bare-bones record before us, we cannot say whether Heard received the process that may be due if he has a protected liberty interest. Therefore, if the district court finds on remand that Heard’s placement in maximum-security facilities implicates a protected liberty interest, it should then consider whether prison officials have given Heard the process to which he is due under the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Austin and, if so, whether Heard actually received these 11 procedural protections. See Austin, 545 U.S. at 224-30 (applying the three factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 3. First-Amendment-Retaliation Claim—Heard’s September 18, 2004 Speech Heard argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on his claim that prison officials initiated the disciplinary actions against him in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights in his September 18, 2004 speech. To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, an inmate must show that (1) he was engaged in protected conduct, (2) an adverse action was taken against him “that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct,” and (3) there is a causal connection between the first two elements. Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2005); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). It is clear that an adverse action was taken against Heard—severe discipline resulting in maximum-security confinement—and that Heard’s speech was the cause of this adverse action. The only remaining question therefore is whether Heard’s statements during a Nation-of-Islam prayer service constitute speech that is protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has explained that although “incarceration does not divest prisoners of all constitutional protections,” the “constitutional rights that prisoners possess are more limited in scope than the constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large.” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228-29 (2001). In the specific context of the First Amendment, the Court has stated that “some rights are simply inconsistent with the status of a prisoner or ‘with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.’” Id. at 229 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). Under the “unitary, deferential standard” for reviewing the constitutional claims of 12 prisoners adopted by the Court, a prison regulation that impinges on a prisoner’s constitutional rights “‘is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Heard was disciplined for a speech to other inmates in which he, among other things, suggested that those who were mistreated would “strike back,” referred to the Fruits of Islam, the paramilitary wing of the Nation of Islam, stated that “the only way to establish peace was through war,” and said that “the officers do not want peace.” R. 78 Ex. E-A (Therrian Memo 9/18/04). Although Heard’s speech was directed at other prisoners, it contained thinly veiled threats against prison guards, suggesting that conflict between guards and prisoners was inevitable and that mistreated prisoners would rise up against the guards. In light of the narrowed scope of the First Amendment in the prison context, we conclude that disciplining Heard for this speech was reasonably related to the legitimate interests of prison officials in maintaining order and ensuring stability in the prison. The district court dismissed defendants Caruso, Sherry, McQuiggin, and Straub—supervisory prison officials—from Heard’s First Amendment retaliation claim because Heard failed to allege that these defendants participated directly or were involved in authorizing policies which violated Heard’s First Amendment rights. See Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisory personnel, unless the supervisory personnel “encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it”). Because we affirm the dismissal of this retaliation claim as to all defendants, we need not address this issue. 13 4. First-Amendment-Retaliation Claim Against Brown Heard separately argues that defendant Michael Brown (“Brown”), a corrections officer at Chippewa, retaliated against him for filing an internal grievance challenging his initial majormisconduct citation. According to Heard, Brown designated Heard as a “recruiter”—resulting in Heard’s STG II designation—because Heard filed this grievance. The district court granted summary judgment for Brown, finding that defendants had established that Heard’s STG II designation “was the result of his conduct and not based upon the filing of a grievance.” R. 143 (Dist. Ct. Op. 2/6/07 at 3). In his affidavit, Brown stated that, at the time he participated in designating Heard as STG II, he was unaware of Heard’s grievance. Brown further stated that the decision to designate Heard as STG II was based upon an interview that Brown conducted with Heard and the report Brown received from the misconduct hearing, which detailed Heard’s statements in the September 18, 2004 speech. Heard did not come forward with any evidence disputing Brown’s account, nor did Heard suggest how material uncovered through discovery might support this claim. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Brown. 5. First-Amendment-Retaliation Claim Against Huhta Heard also asserted a retaliation claim against defendant D. Huhta, a corrections officer at Baraga, alleging that Huhta placed a .40-caliber shell casing in Heard’s cell in retaliation for Heard’s threat to bring a lawsuit against prison officials. The district court granted summary judgment for Huhta, finding that Heard suffered no adverse action because of this incident and that there was no evidence that Huhta intentionally placed the shell casing in Heard’s cell. Summary judgment was properly awarded to Huhta. Even assuming that the shell can be traced to Huhta, Heard pointed to 14 absolutely no evidence that Huhta intentionally placed the shell in Heard’s cell or that Huhta was even aware of Heard’s plan to file a lawsuit. Further, the discovery requested by Heard with respect to this claim—testing of the shell casing in order to trace it to Huhta’s gun—could not create a fact issue as to whether Huhta intentionally placed the shell in Heard’s cell or whether Huhta had knowledge of Heard’s intent to engage in protected conduct. 6. Equal-Protection Claim—STG Designation Heard argues that his equal-protection rights were violated by his designation as STG II and his attendant placement in maximum-security facilities. According to Heard, prison officials targeted him for STG II designation because he is Muslim and a member of the Nation of Islam. Heard contends that prisoners of other religions who are found guilty of the same offense (“Incite to Riot or Strike”) have not received STG II designation. We conclude that district court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants because Heard has not identified similarly situated non-Nation-of-Islam prisoners who were treated differently. See Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1360 (6th Cir. 1996) (“In opposition to a motion for summary judgment [on an equalprotection claim], it is plaintiff who possesses the burden of demonstrating that the defendants treated similarly situated individuals in a disparate manner.”). Again, Heard failed to specify what material he hoped to uncover through discovery to support this claim. 7. Equal-Protection Claim—Diet Heard argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants on his claim that his equal-protection rights were violated by prison officials’ refusal to (1) provide a diet recommended by the Nation of Islam as set forth in How to Eat to Live by Elijah Muhammad, or (2) to provide him with meals under the kosher meal program. Heard alleged that prison officials 15 accommodated the religious diets of Jewish and Buddhist prisoners but did not accommodate his request for a religious diet. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that “MDOC had already made a determination rejecting a Nation of Islam menu years prior to [Heard’s] request for a religious diet, because the menu failed to meet dietary requirements.” R. 143 (Dist. Ct. Op. 2/6/07 at 5). According to defendant Dave Burnett, MDOC previously had determined that “the combination of foods not allowed [by the Nation-of-Islam diet] would make it impossible to meet nutritional standards.” R. 78 Ex. H (Burnett Aff. ¶ 4). Burnett further stated that Heard was denied a kosher diet because, “although the prohibition of blood and the prohibition of swine is common to Muslims, the Nation of Islam and Jews; Muslims and the Nation of Islam are not required to keep [k]osher,” and “[k]osher requirements go far beyond the denial of blood and pork.” Id. ¶ 7. According to Burnett, “Muslims and members of the Nation of Islam can avoid both blood and pork by selecting the non-meat entree from the main meal line.” Id. “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). We have explained that in the prison context “policies infringing on religious rights may be found unreasonable where accommodations are made for others.” Turner v. Bolden, 8 F. App’x 453, 456 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished order). If the defendants can show that the Nation-of-Islam diet requested by Heard fails to meet nutritional standards, we believe that the refusal to provide this diet would be “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The defendants have come forward with some evidence that the Nation-of-Islam diet is nutritionally inadequate—the affidavit of defendant Burnett, who evidently consulted the MDOC documents in which it was determined that the Nation-of-Islam diet was inadequate. However, it appears that 16 Heard has been denied discovery of the MDOC documents and, therefore, denied the opportunity to dispute defendants’ evidence. In his August 15, 2006 supplemental response and attached affidavit, Heard specifically sought discovery of “the document the [MDOC] relied on to determine an Islamic regimen could not meet MDOC required nutritional standards.” R. 113 (Heard Supplemental Response 8/15/06 at 5). According to Heard, discovery of this document would show that the Nation-of-Islam diet could meet MDOC nutritional standards and that prison officials were “favoring dietary regiments of [B]uddhist and [J]ewish prisoners over [Heard’s] Islamic regimen, because of [f]inancial reasons and for a detrimental effect on . . . Islamic practice.” Id. The requested document evidently was not produced and is not in the record, and the district court did not respond to Heard’s request for discovery of this document. Because Heard was denied discovery of specific MDOC records that may create a material issue of fact as to whether or not the Nation-of-Islam diet meets MDOC nutritional standards, remand for discovery and further factual findings is appropriate. Accordingly, we vacate this part of the district court’s summary-judgment order and remand for further proceedings. Heard also claims that prison officials should, in the alternative, provide him with kosher meals when Islamic meals are not available. Heard cites to sections of Islamic Dietary Concepts & Practices by The Islamic Food & Nutrition Council of America in support of the proposition that Muslims are required to eat kosher meals when Islamic meals are unavailable. See R. 163 (Exhibit 4/9/07). However, nothing in the pages cited by Heard supports his contention that Muslims must be given kosher meals when Islamic meals are unavailable, and Heard points to no other evidence that his religion mandates kosher meals. As defendant Burnett explained, kosher requirements far 17 exceed the prohibition of blood and pork, and Muslim and Nation-of-Islam prisoners “can avoid both blood and pork by selecting the non-meat entree from the main meal line.” R. 78 Ex. H (Burnett Aff. ¶ 7). Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants as to Heard’s claim that he should be accommodated with kosher meals. 8. RLUIPA Claim—Diet Heard also claims that defendants Straub, Burnett, Sherry, and Shaw—all of whom Heard sued in both their individual and official capacities—violated RLUIPA by failing to provide him with a Nation-of-Islam diet or by failing to provide him with a kosher diet. RLUIPA provides: [n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). If Heard’s religion requires adherence to a Nation-of-Islam diet, prison officials’ refusal to accommodate this diet would impose a substantial burden. See, e.g., Al-Amin v. Shear, No. 08-7681, 2009 WL 971454, at -3 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 2009) (unpublished) (finding that denying kosher (“Common Fare”) food to observant Sunni Muslim during Ramadan would be a substantial burden). The defendants would then have the burden of showing that denial of the Nation-of-Islam diet was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. As explained above with respect to Heard’s equal-protection claim, there remains a material issue of fact as to whether Heard’s proposed Nation-of-Islam diet does or does not meet MDOC nutritional 18 standards. Accordingly, we also vacate the district court’s dismissal of Heard’s RLUIPA claim and remand for further proceedings.5