Opinion ID: 466263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Civil Contempt to Coerce Compliance

Text: 24 Those sanctions that are designed to coerce compliance are by their very nature conditional sanctions; they only operate if and when the person found in contempt violates the order in the future. If a sanction operates whether or not a party remains in violation of the court order, it obviously does not coerce any compliance. Therefore, the person in civil contempt must be given the opportunity to bring himself into compliance before the sanctions are imposed. 12 In Lance v. Plummer, 13 for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a sanction requiring that an unpaid deputy sheriff give up his badge and cease functioning as a peace officer was not an appropriate civil contempt sanction: 25 [S]ince sanctions imposed in civil contempt proceedings must always give to the alleged contemnor the opportunity to bring himself into compliance, the sanction cannot be one that does not come to an end when he repents his past conduct and purges himself. 14 26 In the instant case, the sanctions clearly did not serve to coerce compliance with the December 7, 1983 order. Even if Hicks put herself in complete compliance with that order, she could not avoid the sanctions. In particular, Hicks was forced to give up her right to consent to any sale of the property made free and clear of all liens, and this sanction was imposed on Hicks without regard to whether she obeyed the December 7, 1983 order. Rather than compel future compliance with the December 7, 1983 order, the contempt sanctions seem clearly designed to punish Hicks for her past disobedience. 27 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the sanctions imposed have no apparent connection to the contemptuous behavior. No one at oral argument was able to explain any such connection, and forcing Hicks to forego her statutory right to approve the sale of the property has no logical relationship to her past failure to obtain the Trustee's written approval before listing the property. Although the show cause orders allege that Hicks had also failed to keep the property in good repair and had failed to supply the Trustee with the required appraisals, the bankruptcy court made no findings that Hicks had violated these portions of the order. The sole violation found by the bankruptcy court was Hicks' failure to obtain the Trustee's written approval before listing the property, and that violation was remedied on May 6 when the Trustee entered into a new listing agreement with Hugh T. Peck Properties, Inc.--almost two weeks before the contempt order was issued. 28 It may be that the court was irritated with Hicks or her counsel because of their persistent efforts to protect Hicks' interests. Nevertheless, [i]n the civil contempt setting, the court has no independent interest in vindicating its authority should its orders be violated. 15 In short, it is clear that the court's contempt citation could not coerce Hicks to obtain the Trustee's written approval for a listing because the matter had been fully resolved before the contempt citation issued. We conclude, therefore, that the sanctions in the contempt order could not have been designed to coerce any compliance with the December 7, 1983 order. 29