Opinion ID: 812341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Stay Proceedings

Text: The appellants next claim that the district court erred by refusing to stay the declaratory judgment pro- ceedings until Starks’s criminal case ended. The Declara16 Nos. 11-1215 & 11-3729 tory Judgment Act by its own terms grants district courts discretion in determining whether to entertain such an action. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (providing that the district court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration” (emphasis added)). Naturally, we review a denial to stay proceedings for an abuse of discretion. See Envision Healthcare, Inc. v. PreferredOne Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 983, 985-86 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court is authorized, in the sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or to dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment.”). Here, the appellants make a handful of arguments faulting the district court for refusing to grant its motion to stay proceedings, none of which we find persuasive. Principally, the appellants claim that there are too many uncertain future events to allow the district court to effectively adjudicate the insurers’ obligations. But, as our preceding analysis of Starks’s complaint suggests, we disagree. The complaint sets forth specific claims for false arrest and imprisonment and the various claims for malicious prosecution. Starks also intimates that he intends to bring an IIED claim. All of those claims have discrete trigger points that allowed the district court to determine whether the insurers have a duty to defend. And no future actions, save Starks’s exoneration—which brings his claim even farther outside of the insurers’ policies—change that analysis. Any delay in adjudicating the insurers’ duty to defend costs the insurers much-needed certainty. See Am. Safety, 678 F.3d at 480 (A long tail of insurance coverage affects insurers’ ability to adjust prices to reflect previously Nos. 11-1215 & 11-3729 17 incurred risk.). Thus, we find that the district court rightly exercised its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion to stay. The appellants also point out that they sent the insurers a letter proposing that the parties file a joint motion to stay proceedings. Apparently, this letter is evidence of the appellants’ willingness to back away from their immediate demand for coverage and a de- fense. And without a demand for coverage, the dis- trict court has no live controversy to adjudicate. The appellants have mischaracterized the contents of the letter. In fact, this letter never suggests that the appellants intend to withdraw their demand for coverage. Rather, the letter simply requested that both parties file a joint motion to stay the proceedings. As long as a live controversy exists between the parties, the district court has discretion to declare the rights of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); see also Cincinnati Cos. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 701 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ill. 1998) (“If, after being contacted, the insured indicates that it desires the insurer’s assistance, then the insurer’s duty to defend continues.”). Finally, the appellants argue that the district court must have abused its discretion because two other courts facing the same underlying civil complaint stayed proceedings pending the resolution of Starks’s criminal case. At the threshold, we have already acknowledged that district courts have wide discretion in adjudicating declaratory judgment actions and motions to stay proceedings. It is no surprise that district judges vested with this discretion may come to different conclusions. 18 Nos. 11-1215 & 11-3729 More than that, the two cases the appellants cite are inapposite. For example, Judge Kocoras granted a stay in TIG Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, No. 10-cv-1466 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2010), presumably because TIG Insurance was on risk from November 1, 1985, to November 1, 1987. Our preceding trigger analysis suggests that Starks’s claim for false imprisonment may have ripened in 1986, potentially implicating TIG’s duty to defend. Similarly, Judge Gettleman stayed the proceedings in Westport Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, No. 10-cv-263 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2010). Unlike this case, the insurer there was on risk under numerous policies stretching from November 1, 1987, to November 1, 2000. Given the greater com- plexity, it again is no surprise that the district court in that case exercised its discretion to stay the proceedings. The larger point, however, is that district courts maintain wide discretion in adjudicating these matters, and evidence of conflicting decisions without anything more is not evidence that a judge abused that discretion. In sum, we find that the district court was well within its discretion in denying the appellants’ motion to stay.