Opinion ID: 70357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: frost's motion for new trial.

Text: 50 After filing the appeal of his conviction and sentence, Appellant Frost filed with the district court a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Frost cited three grounds for his motion: (1) impeachment evidence of government witness Mark Street; (2) evidence that a fourth person wrote the extortion note; and (3) perjury of co-defendant Martin in denying that he knew the identity of the author of the threatening note. 51 In its order, the district court noted that Frost's appeal removed the district court's general jurisdiction under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 33, and that it could not grant a motion for new trial absent a remand from this Court. The Court then proceeded to consider and deny the motion on its merits. The district court did not hold a hearing on the motion. Frost filed a second appeal, contending that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. 52 While Rule 33 expressly prohibits the granting of a motion for new trial absent a remand from the appellate court, the district court acted within its jurisdictional power in denying the motion. United States v. Hersh, 415 F.2d 835 (5th Cir.1969). 6 53 A motion for a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overruled on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2723, 129 L.Ed.2d 847 (1994). 54 In order to justify the granting of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in a criminal trial, the defendant must satisfy a five-part test: (1) the evidence must have been discovered subsequent to the trial; (2) the movant must have exercised due diligence in discovering the evidence; (3) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence must be material to the issues before the court; and (5) the evidence must be such that it would probably produce a new result. United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir.1989). Moreover, the district court cannot grant a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence once it has determined that the movant has failed to satisfy any part of the test. United States v. Reed, 887 F.2d 1398, 1404 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080, 110 S.Ct. 1136, 107 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1990). 55 In his motion for a new trial, Frost cited as newly discovered evidence certain employment records of the employee who normally delivered the mail to the Warner Robins City Hall, Victor Irwin. While these records, which were attached by Frost to his motion, show that Irwin did not clock into work at all on April 22, 1991, the day on which the evidence established that Street delivered the package containing the videotape and extortion note, the records also show that he was not charged any leave for that day. Frost argues that these records were sufficient to have caused the jury to acquit Frost. 56 Assuming without deciding that this evidence was not available to Frost and was in fact newly discovered, Frost fails to satisfy the five-pronged test. Frost's apparent argument is that the records show that Street did not pick up and deliver the mail on April 22, 1991, as he testified and, therefore, Street was not truthful in his testimony. As the district court noted, no evidence has been proffered to show that Street did not deliver the mail that day. In his own testimony, Frost stated that Street had related to him on April 22, 1991, that Street had delivered the mail because the employee who usually did so was absent. Additionally, two other witnesses called by Frost at trial testified that Street had related that he had delivered the mail on April 22, 1991. The evidence asserted by Frost as newly discovered does not contradict Street's testimony that he delivered the mail on the day in question. Even assuming that the evidence proffered by Frost in support of his motion could be viewed as impeaching, this evidence concerning the possibility that Irwin was not charged with leave even though he had not clocked into work on that day is not material and would not have been likely to have resulted in Frost's acquittal. 57 Appellant Frost asserts a second ground in support of his motion for a new trial. Subsequent to the trial of this case, Frost's attorneys established that Curtis McCollum, a Warner Robins minister, had written the blackmail note involved in this case. McCollum entered a guilty plea to the offense of misprision of a felony and stated under oath that he had written the note at the urging of Appellant Martin. Appellant Frost asserts that, at trial, significant emphasis was placed on the fact that in the blackmail note, the word council had been misspelled as counsel and that the evidence established that Frost was the only person of the all those whose handwriting exemplars had been taken who had misspelled that word. Because it was later conclusively established that McCollum had written the note, Frost argues, he is entitled to a new trial. 58 We agree with the district court that the evidence that McCollum wrote the note does not entitle Frost to a new trial. There was no evidence presented or argument made by the government connecting Frost to the actual writing of the note. The government's handwriting expert stated that he could not render an opinion as to who had written the note, and Frost's own handwriting expert testified that Frost had not written the note. The exemplars were offered by Martin's attorney and admitted without objection by Frost; no mention of Frost's misspelling of the word council was made to the jury. We find that this evidence was not material to Frost's guilt, and was not likely to result in Frost's acquittal. 59 Frost's final argument in support of his motion was that he was prejudiced by and entitled to a new trial because of the perjury of co-defendant Martin. Frost asserts that, if Martin had testified truthfully that he had caused the note to be written and mailed, Frost would have been acquitted. 60 As the district court noted in its order denying Frost's motion, Frost presumes in making both his second and third arguments for a new trial that he was convicted based solely on an assumption that he wrote the extortion note. The government neither attempted or needed to prove authorship of the note to carry its burden of proof; in fact, the government introduced evidence that it was impossible to tell who wrote the note. The testimony of Mark Street was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Frost knowingly participated in the scheme to obtain damaging evidence on Douglas and use it in an extortionate manner, regardless of the fact that Martin may have acted alone in causing the note to be written and mailed. Accordingly, we find that this evidence was not material and would not have resulted in an acquittal of Frost. 61 For the reasons discussed, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Frost's motion for a new trial. 7 62