Opinion ID: 1447807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the parol evidence for the jury?

Text: Whether contract language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation so that extrinsic evidence is admissible is a question of law for the court. See Leo Eisenberg & Co., Inc. v. Payson, 162 Ariz. 529, 532-33, 785 P.2d 49, 52-53 (1989). We have concluded in the preceding section that the language of the agreement, illuminated by the surrounding circumstances, indicates that either of the interpretations offered was reasonable. Because interpretation was needed and because the extrinsic evidence established controversy over what occurred and what inferences to draw from the events, the matter was properly submitted to the jury. See Burkons, 168 Ariz. at 351, 813 P.2d at 716; Leo Eisenberg, 162 Ariz. at 533, 785 P.2d at 53. The trial judge, therefore, instructed the jury as follows: ... [State Farm] has alleged the affirmative defense of release. In this regard, [State Farm] contends that the agreement ... was intended by the parties thereto to, among other things, release [State Farm] from all bad faith claims. ... Whether the parties intended the bad faith claims to be released is for you to determine. If you find that the parties to said agreement intended thereby that [State Farm] be released from bad faith claims, then your verdict must be for [State Farm]. .... A release is to be construed according to the intent of the parties to it. This intention is to be determined by what was within the contemplation of the parties when the release was executed, which, in turn, is to be resolved in the light of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted. Reporter's Transcript, Mar. 12, 1987, at 184-85. [10] The instruction states the issue quite clearly. So instructed, the jury resolved the release issue in Taylor's favor. [11] We leave that resolution undisturbed.