Opinion ID: 1419202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of the Corroborating Evidence as to Defendant Redmon

Text: (10a) The prosecution introduced the evidence as hereinafter set forth to corroborate Diana's testimony as it pertained to Redmon. Larry Linton, a convicted forger, testified that he was an inmate at the Solano County jail where Redmon had been confined prior to trial. On or about October 13, 1968, Redmon and another inmate named Billy Underwood entered Linton's cell. Linton was asked if he had thought about the possibility of escape. There was substantial conversation about the manner by which an escape could be accomplished, and Redmon showed Linton one or two places where the bars in the latter's cell had been cut. Underwood or Redmon also showed Linton an outside window through which a small person could crawl. Redmon said that arrangements had been made for some hacksaw blades to come up. Redmon appeared to be interested in Linton because Linton might have money or connections on the outside. Several days later, Redmon and a fourth inmate came to Linton's cell and talked more about escape. On cross-examination, Linton further testified that Redmon showed him a door into the corridor of the jail which could be jimmied with a spoon. Linton told a deputy jailer that something was going on upstairs and showed the jailer a possible escape route pointed out by Redmon. Linton did not tell the jailer that Redmon was going to attempt an escape. Although Linton conceded at trial that Redmon never expressed a definite intent or plan to escape, Linton quoted Redmon as saying that he wanted to escape because it wouldn't hurt him one way or the other. Two days after Redmon and Linton first discussed escape, two teenage girls were apprehended as they tried to smuggle a hacksaw blade through a window in the jail. Their attempt took place near the cell of inmate Underwood but some distance from the cell of Redmon. Testifying on his own behalf, Redmon stated that he never talked to Underwood or Linton about escape and that he did not know anything about the attempt to smuggle a hacksaw blade into the jail. In support, Underwood testified that he had asked a friend to get him a hacksaw blade and that the same was not intended for Redmon. He also testified that he had never discussed the matter of escape with Linton or Redmon. One of the girls who was caught trying to smuggle the blade testified that she did not know Redmon and that she attempted to deliver the blade to Underwood. Finally, the defense called the deputy jailer who testified that Linton did not tell him Redmon was planning to escape. Linton did inform the jailer, however, that trouble was brewing upstairs involving Redmon, Underwood, and the fourth inmate brought to Linton's cell by Redmon. (11) Evidence that a defendant was planning an escape, like evidence of flight, tends to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt ( People v. Burwell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 16, 34 [279 P.2d 744]), regardless of whether the escape was actually attempted ( People v. Schafer (1911) 161 Cal. 573, 579 [119 P. 920]). As such, evidence of a planned escape may be sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. (10b) In the present case, the jury implicitly found that Redmon was planning an escape and that the consciousness of guilt thereby demonstrated was sufficient to corroborate the incriminating testimony of accomplice Diana Moore. These conclusions are reasonable and will not be disturbed on appeal. (See People v. Redmond, supra, 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) Redmon presents several arguments why the evidence is insufficient to corroborate the accomplice's testimony as it relates to him. First, defendant contends that the cases dealing with escape as a factor revealing consciousness of guilt are factually distinguishable because the evidence in the instant case indicates only that there might have been general conversations about the desirability and means of escape. We disagree. Larry Linton testified that he was present when Redmon and Underwood discussed methods of escape; Underwood testified that he was planning an escape. Although there was testimony that the hacksaw blade intercepted by the jail guards was not intended for Redmon, the jury was not bound to accept this testimony. Presented with the total evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that Redmon was involved in more than general conversations about the desirability and means of escape. Moreover, we reject Redmon's argument that Burwell, supra, 44 Cal.2d 16 and Schafer, supra, 161 Cal. 573 are distinguishable because the record here contains no evidence that he escaped, actually attempted to escape, or possessed the tools for escape. In Schafer, a letter written by the defendant in which he discussed a possible escape was admitted to show consciousness of guilt. Upholding the sufficiency of this letter to establish consciousness of guilt, this court noted, [T]he fact that appellant was not furnished [with the requested means of escape] and therefore he made no attempt to carry his purpose into execution does not affect the question. ( Id. at p. 579.) Secondly, defendant maintains that our decision in People v. Ellis (1966) 65 Cal.2d 529 [55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393] destroyed the reasoning behind the rule that an escape or attempted escape from custody tends to demonstrate consciousness of guilt. In Ellis, we stated that an accused's refusal to take a voice identification test might indicate a consciousness of guilt. However, on the facts of that case, we held that evidence of the defendant's refusal was inadmissible because the police had warned the defendant of his right to remain silent but had failed to advise him that the right to remain silent does not include the right to refuse participation in a voice test. ( Id. at p. 539.) Furthermore, this court has recently reaffirmed the principle that escape may be probative of a consciousness of guilt. ( People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 395 [85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961].) In an argument similar to one raised by Redmon at the trial level, Terry contended that evidence of his escape was inadmissible because it is likely that one who has been incarcerated several months escapes because he cannot bear further incarceration. ( Id. ) Rejecting this contention, we stated: This is possible, but it is also probable that only one who expects his guilt to be proved at trial will attempt an escape and that an innocent man will stay for trial in order to clear his name and win lawful liberty. ( Id.; fn. omitted.) The existence of alternate explanations for the defendant's conduct goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the evidence. (See Id. ) [11] Thirdly, Redmon contends that the corroborating evidence is inadequate because it fails to connect him with the crime without any aid from the testimony of the accomplice. (See People v. Luker, supra, 63 Cal.2d 464, 469.) Apart from the testimony of the accomplice, the record contains testimony establishing that defendant was in jail awaiting trial for the murder of Roy when he made plans for escape. The jury could reasonably find that these escape plans were motivated by fear of conviction for the Roy killing. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence concerning the plan to escape adequately corroborates accomplice Diana Moore's testimony as to defendant Redmon.