Opinion ID: 402289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did a Seizure Occur, and, If So, When?

Text: 15 The issue of when a seizure has occurred is a somewhat unsettled one. As a preliminary matter, we note that the case law has developed three tiers or categories of police-citizen encounters. The first, an arrest, is characterized by highly intrusive or lengthy search or detention; the Fourth Amendment requires that such an arrest be justified by probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). The second category, the investigatory stop, is limited to brief, non-intrusive detention during a frisk for weapons or preliminary questioning; this type of encounter is also considered a seizure sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment safeguards, but because of its less intrusive character requires only that the stopping officer have specific and articulable facts sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or is committing a crime. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The third category of police-citizen encounter is that in which no restraint of the liberty of the citizen is implicated, but the voluntary cooperation of the citizen is elicited through non-coercive questioning; this type of contact does not rise to the level of a seizure. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-55, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1876-78, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (Stewart, J.) (with Rehnquist, J., concurring); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, n.16. 16 The proper test for determining whether a given police-citizen contact rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure was the focus of inquiry in the recent case of United States v. Mendenhall, supra. In Mendenhall, two federal DEA agents observed the defendant arrive at the Detroit Airport from Los Angeles, and determined that her conduct was characteristic of drug couriers. After following Mendenhall briefly, the agents identified themselves and asked to see her identification and ticket. On observing that the names on the two items were not the same, the agents questioned Mendenhall on the discrepancy and on her stay in California. The agents returned her ticket and license, and asked her to accompany them to the DEA's airport office. The defendant did so, and consented to a search of her person in the office. Heroin was found, and Mendenhall was arrested. 17 A majority of the Court concluded that no constitutional violation had occurred. The Court could not, however, reach consensus on the rationale. Justice Stewart, in an opinion joined only by Justice Rehnquist, concluded 18 that a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. 19 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. Justice Stewart determined that under the facts before the Court, no seizure of the defendant had occurred: 20 The events took place in the public concourse. The agents wore no uniforms and displayed no weapons. They did not summon the respondent to their presence, but instead approached her and identified themselves as federal agents. They requested, but did not demand to see the respondent's identification and ticket. Such conduct, without more, did not amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest. The respondent was not seized simply by reason of the fact that the agents approached her, asked her if she would show them her ticket and identification, and posed to her a few questions. Nor was it enough to establish a seizure that the person asking the question was a law enforcement official. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 31, 32-33 (88 S.Ct. at 1885, 1886) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.1(1) and commentary, at 257-61 (1975). In short, nothing in the record suggests that the respondent had any objective reason to believe that she was not free to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on her way, and for that reason we conclude that the agents' initial approach to her was not a seizure. 21 446 U.S. at 555, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. 22 Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment, but declined to join in that portion of Justice Stewart's opinion which found that no seizure had occurred. While specifically noting that he did not necessarily disagree with that conclusion, 446 U.S. at 560 n.1, 100 S.Ct. at 1880 n.1, Justice Powell declined to reach the issue of whether a seizure had occurred on the ground that that question had not been decided below, but ruled that any seizure was justified by the requisite suspicion. 23 Several circuits have adopted Justice Stewart's reasonable person test for determining whether seizures have occurred in airport surveillance cases such as the one before us now. See, e.g., United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970, 101 S.Ct. 2046, 68 L.Ed.2d 348; United States v. Allen, 644 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S.Ct. 2998, 64 L.Ed.2d 861 (1980); see United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1981). We are similarly persuaded that this is the appropriate standard under which the seizure question should be resolved. As long as a person remains at liberty to disregard a police officer's request for information, no constitutional interest is implicated. Imposition of an objective standard requiring the presence of circumstances which indicate that that freedom to disregard has been obumbrated properly provides a reliable basis on which the court may determine whether valuable liberty interests have been infringed, without hamstringing the ability of the police to engage in some modicum of legitimate contact with the citizenry. 24 Before determining whether the encounter between Black and the officers rose to the level of a seizure under this test, we point out that the question is a highly factual one, heavily dependent on the circumstances of each case. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. Our standard of review is accordingly limited to inquiry into whether the decision of the district court is clearly erroneous, and requires that particular deference be given to the district judge who had the opportunity to observe the testimony and demeanor of both the officers and the defendant. United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming trial court's finding that a seizure had occurred). 25 In determining whether a given police-citizen encounter constitutes a seizure in the context of airport surveillance, courts have looked at a variety of factors. The inquiry has focused on three major areas: (1) the conduct of the police; (2) the person of the individual citizen; and (3) the physical surroundings of the encounter. In examining the conduct of the police officer, courts have sought to determine whether the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen such that he is not free to walk away. United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970, 101 S.Ct. 2046, 68 L.Ed.2d 348 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n.16). The district court here found that no physical force was used to detain the defendant. Although the defendant contended at the suppression hearing that he had in fact been surrounded by the two officers, and prevented from leaving, the trial court rejected that testimony, and found that nothing about the encounter was coercive, and specifically noted, after reviewing the defendant and the manner in which he testified, that the court did not believe that the defendant could reasonably have felt coerced. 26 An individual need not be held at gunpoint or in bonds, however, before a restraint will be found: any restraint of movement will do. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S.Ct. 2998, 64 L.Ed.2d 861 (1980). Thus, if officers have intimidated an individual through the use of a show of authority sufficient to make it apparent that the individual is not free to ignore the officer and proceed on his way, a seizure will be found. The determination of precisely when an officer's polite request for an interview rises to the level of a show of authority sufficient to constitute an investigative stop is not always an easy one, Viegas, 639 F.2d at 44, may be extremely close, Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 560 n.1, 100 S.Ct. at 1880 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring), and calls for a refined judgment by the trial court, Elmore, 595 F.2d at 1041-42 (quoting United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S.Ct. 1527, 55 L.Ed.2d 542 (1978)). We are not persuaded that the findings of the district judge on this close question of fact are clearly erroneous. He noted that the officers were casually dressed, did not display any weapons, did not raise their voices above a conversational level, and did not threaten Black. We find no error with the district court's findings vis-a-vis the conduct of the officers and agree with its finding that Black's freedom was not restrained by an overbearing show of authority. 27 Courts have also looked to the characteristics of the defendant in seeking to determine whether even a facially innocuous encounter might, in the circumstances, have overborne the citizen's freedom to walk away. For example, in United States v. Patino, 649 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1981), the court affirmed a trial court's finding that an individual had been restrained by a request for an interview when she had problems understanding the English language, and was an alien who might therefore have felt a greater compulsion to comply with the request of the police. In contrast to Patino, the trial court here found the defendant, an articulate, intelligent young man, and noted that he was a college graduate. We concur that the defendant was not so naive or vulnerable to coercion that special protection from police contacts was required by the Fourth Amendment. 28 The final element courts have examined in determining whether a police-citizen encounter was voluntary or coerced is the physical setting in which the encounter took place. For example, in United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892, 894, 899 (5th Cir. 1981), the court noted that the encounter took place in an area of the airport which was characterized as relatively private, and pointed out that the defendant might have felt isolated from others. Similarly, in United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 1981), the court found a seizure had occurred when the citizen was immediately hustled from the public concourse to a private office, where he was interrogated. In the instant case, the district court found that (t)he incident took place entirely in a well-lit and spacious public concourse with other travelers present. 510 F.Supp. at 992. This is patently inconsistent with the contention that Black's liberty was restrained by a sort of quasi-imprisonment. Nor are we persuaded that the officers seized the defendant when they suggested moving to the side of the corridor to avoid the flow of traffic. This request, readily acquiesced to by the defendant, did not result in his isolation or restraint, and was therefore of no legal significance. See United States v. Allen, 644 F.2d 749, 751 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980). 29 We conclude, therefore, that the trial court correctly ruled that the officers' initial contact with Black, up to and including the point where Kinsella suggested they move to the side of the concourse, was lawful, and did not constitute a seizure triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), relied upon by the defendant to establish that probable cause was required for the initial contact is inapposite here. Dunaway was picked up in a police car, brought to police headquarters, given his Miranda warnings, and questioned in the station's interrogation room. This highly intrusive and lengthy detention falls into the first tier of Fourth Amendment analysis, and is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. 30 The defendant also contends that even if the initial encounter was valid, Black was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the officers took and kept his driver's license and airline ticket. Under our reasoning above, we believe it is clear that the mere request for and voluntary production of such documents does not constitute a seizure, but rather falls into the category of a non-coercive police-citizen encounter. As several courts have realized, however, the retaining of the documents beyond the interval required for the appropriate brief scrutiny, may constitute a watershed point in the seizure question. United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d 42, 44 n.3 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970, 101 S.Ct. 2046, 68 L.Ed.2d 348; United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S.Ct. 2998, 64 L.Ed.2d 861 (1980); see Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 570 n.3, 100 S.Ct. at 1885 n.3 (White, J., dissenting). The question whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave when Kinsella handed his ticket and driver's license to another officer while kneeling to look into the travel bag is extremely close. In Elmore, where a seizure was found, the agents did not merely hold on to the ticket; they actually carried it to the airline ticket counter, away from the physical presence and sight of the defendant. Here the ticket remained in plain view at all times. There is no intimation in the record that Kinsella handed the ticket to Burzinski in a manner that implied he was removing it from Black's grasp or otherwise prohibiting access to it. Rather the fair inference from the testimony is that Kinsella did so simply to free his hands for searching the travel bag, pursuant to Black's consent. 31 The trial court resolved the question whether the retention of the ticket constituted a search by finding that 32 in light of all the circumstances, even if Burzinski's failure to immediately and independently return Black's ticket and driver's license turned what had been, up to this time, mere personal intercourse into an investigatory stop or detention, this stop was justified by what was now the clearly reasonable suspicion of the officers .... 33 510 F.Supp. at 993. If such reasonable suspicion was present, there would be no Fourth Amendment problem with retention of the documents even if that rises to the level of a seizure. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 2753, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 560, 100 S.Ct. at 1880 (Powell, J., concurring); Viegas, 639 F.2d at 44. We therefore turn our attention to the question whether the officers had sufficient articulable facts to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Black had committed or was committing a crime at the time Kinsella handed the documents to Burzinski. 34 B. Was There Reasonable Suspicion Sufficient to Warrant Retention of the Defendant's Driver's License and Airline Ticket? 35 In Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980), the Supreme Court examined the circumstances surrounding a Terry stop of a suspected drug courier by DEA agents in the Atlanta airport, in order to determine whether they gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify the stop. The trial court had ruled that the defendant had been seized without the necessary articulable suspicion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that because the defendant appeared to the agents to fit a drug courier profile, there was reasonable suspicion. The drug courier characteristics listed by the appellate court were 36 (1) the petitioner had arrived from Fort Lauderdale, which the agent testified is a principal place of origin of cocaine sold elsewhere in the country, (2) the petitioner arrived in the early morning, when law enforcement activity is diminished, (3) he and his companion appeared to the agent to be trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling together, and (4) they apparently had no luggage other than their shoulder bags. 37 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. at 2753. The Supreme Court rejected these grounds as a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion, and pointed out thatonly the fact that the petitioner preceded another person and occasionally looked backward at him as they proceeded through the concourse relates to their particular conduct. The other circumstances describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure. 38 Id. 39 Kinsella and Burzinski articulated the following grounds for their decision to make the initial contact with Black: 40 (1) Black had arrived on a flight from Fort Lauderdale; 41 (2) Black was the first passenger off the plane; 42 (3) He exited the plane in a speedy fashion and was in a disoriented state; 43 (4) He appeared to be nervous as he walked through the concourse and viewed the flight information screen. 1 44 Despite the Supreme Court's recognition that a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions ... that might well elude an untrained person, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 563, 100 S.Ct. at 1882 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 n.2, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)), it is clear that under the Reid standard, these factors alone would not justify a Terry stop. 45 In the instant case, however, the officers had several additional facts to consider at the earliest point at which a seizure could be said to have occurred, i.e., when Kinsella passed the documents on to Burzinski. There was the unexplained discrepancy between the names on the ticket and the driver's license; the substantial cash price of the first-class ticket, and the defendant's heightened nervousness (Burzinski testified that at this point Black was shaking, visibly shaking, and acting very nervous). Finally, there was the coconut story, implausible on its face, and highly inconsistent with Black's expensive first-class ticket. These additional factors, gleaned during the constitutionally permissible initial encounter, provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to detain Black further and seek his consent to search his travel bag. United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 292, 70 L.Ed.2d 141; United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 986 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d at 1041. 46 We are unmoved by the defendant's assertion that all of his actions and responses were consistent with wholly innocent behavior, and could not therefore give rise to reasonable suspicion without subjecting every airport passenger to potential police seizure. As other courts confronted with similar situations have noted, (i)t must be rare indeed that an officer observes behavior consistent only with guilt and incapable of innocent interpretation. United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 (2nd Cir. 1979), quoted in United States v. Viegas, 639 F.2d at 45. It is for that reason that the applicable standard in determining the propriety of a Terry stop is not whether the defendant's acts can be construed as innocent through the exercise of exegetical speculation, but rather whether they give rise to an articulable, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. We conclude that in this case the trial court did not err in determining that even if the retention of the documents constituted a seizure, it was justified at that point by objective and articulable factors giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was being committed. We need not determine with precision therefore whether such a seizure actually occurred on the facts of this case when Kinsella turned the license and ticket over to Burzinski, and now turn our attention to the officers' search of Black's travel bag.III. 47 The defendant's final contention is that even if the seizure was not unreasonable and his consent to search his bag valid, he withdrew all consent to the search before the observation and seizure of the cocaine. He relies on Mason v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that consent to a search can be limited or withdrawn, and that such withdrawal must be honored by the police. We do not quarrel with that proposition as an abstract formulation of the law. It flies in the face of the facts found by the district court, however, to assert that consent was withdrawn in this case before the officers observed the cocaine. 48 Kinsella testified that subsequent to the grant of consent he reached into the bag, grasped a shirt and was about to remove it from the bag, when the defendant grabbed his arm, requested him to stop the search, and pulled his arm and the shirt out of the bag, whereupon the plastic bag of cocaine fell into plain view at the bottom of the bag. Burzinski testified that she was standing next to Kinsella and Black, who were kneeling next to the bag, and that she could see what appeared to be a bag of cocaine in the travel bag when Kinsella raised the shirt, shortly before Black attempted to pull Kinsella's hand from the bag. While Black testified that he had not pulled Kinsella's hand or the shirt from the bag, the court explicitly resolved whatever issue of fact the two accounts created against the defendant. It ruled that the discovery of the cocaine was the result of the defendant's initial consent, and his clumsy attempt to revoke that consent. We are not persuaded that these findings, based as they are on the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, are clearly erroneous. In light of these facts, we hold the district court correctly applied the law of consent pursuant to the standards of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), and of plain view, United States v. Schire, 586 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cooks, 493 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1974). 49 In accordance with the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 50 Affirmed. 51