Opinion ID: 2447372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty of This Court

Text: In Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 149 S.W. 656 (1912), a decision under our prior, but comparable, Initiative and Referendum Amendment, we construed the amendment and the enabling act in existence at that time and concluded that it was the duty of this court to examine the constitutionality of a proposed amendment. The enabling act that we construed in that case is the same in all material parts as the current act, Ark.Code Ann. § 7-9-112 (1987). In that case, the petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to force the Secretary of State to place an unconstitutional proposal on the ballot. We refused and wrote: The act clearly makes it the duty of the court, on an application for mandamus, to inquire whether the proposed measure falls within the terms of the Constitution as if amended, and, if it does, to compel submission to the people; otherwise to restrain the submission of it to the people. It follows, therefore, that, unless it be found that the measure proposed by the plaintiffs is subject to the initiative power of the people, and that the petition is legally sufficient, according to existing laws, the Secretary of State cannot be compelled to file it and certify the measure out for submission to the people. Id. at 591, 149 S.W. at 659. The opinion in that case set out the language of the then current Initiative and Referendum Amendment under which the people reserved to themselves the power to amend the state constitution. The present Initiative and Referendum Amendment, Amendment 7, contains the same provision: The legislative power of the people of this State shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of the Senate and House of Representatives, but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose legislative measures, laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls.... The first power reserved by the people is the initiative. [Emphasis Added]. The amendment does not confer power; it reserves power. Because the people of this State have never had the power to enact a law contrary to the United States Constitution, they could not reserve such a power. Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. at 595, 149 S.W. at 660-61. For that reason, we expressly stated that if a proposed measure is unconstitutional it should not be placed on the ballot. Id. That reasoning is just as valid today as it was then. In Dust v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 1, 4, 638 S.W.2d 663, 665 (1982), we defined the scope of our Initiative and Referendum Amendment as: The voters of this state essentially have, within constitutional limits, a right to change any law or any provision of our Constitution they deem appropriate through Amendment 7 to the Constitution. [Emphasis added.] In Czech v. Baer, 283 Ark. 457, 677 S.W.2d 833 (1984), a case squarely on point, the city clerk refused to certify two initiated measures to the election commission because the city attorney doubted the validity of the measures. Suit was filed and the circuit court held that the clerk had improperly exercised her authority, and issued a writ of mandamus. The city appealed and, in reversing and holding the matter should not be placed on the ballot, we wrote: At the outset the appellees argue that we should permit the measures to be placed on the ballot without first determining their validity. Certainly it is true that a party who resists an initiated petition on grounds such as insufficiency of signatures or improper ballot title is not required to question the validity of the proposed measure. On the other hand, that question may be considered and decided when it is properly raised, even before the election. Proctor v. Hammons, 211 Ark. 247, 640 S.W.2d 800 (1982); Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 149 S.W. 656 (1912). We then held that one of the measures was invalid and ordered that it not be submitted to the electorate, or, to the extent that such a directive may be too late to be effective, that the votes not be counted or considered. In Proctor v. Hammons, 277 Ark. 247, 640 S.W.2d 800 (1982), we wrote: Appellants argue that Amendment 7 to the Constitution, providing for Initiative and Referendum, prohibits a referendum by a municipality or county when such initiative or referendum is contrary to the constitution or any general law of the state. We agree with this statement of the law. Id. at 250, 640 S.W.2d at 802. We then held that the proposal did not violate state law. It is axiomatic that there is no power reserved in the people to initiate a state proposal that is in violation of the federal Constitution, and that under our prior interpretations of Amendment 7 and its enabling statutes we will enjoin such an unconstitutional proposal. This construction of the statute and of Amendment 7 has become as much a part of the statute as if written in it. Merchants Transfer and Warehouse Co. v. Gates, 180 Ark. 96, 21 S.W.2d 406 (1929). If stare decisis were not a controlling precept of statutory construction, this court would, in effect, be sitting as a second General Assembly. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977). The intervenors, who are the sponsors of the proposal, argue that we should not determine the constitutionality of the proposal because we would be issuing only an advisory opinion and we do not issue mere advisory opinions. The majority opinion adopts that specious rationale. Many times we have said that we will restrain a ballot title, or proposed issue, that misleads the voters. Each of the cases cited above is authority that a justiciable controversy exists at the time of certification, and not just after the people have voted. It is incongruous to think that this court must wait to act until after voters have been misled. The intervenors also suggest that we should wait until the Supreme Court of the United States decides the issue. Again, the argument may at first blush seem attractive, but is not so in reality. State courts frequently must decide issues that are governed by the United States Constitution, and at times they must do so before there is a decision by the Supreme Court. A large percentage of our criminal cases are governed by federal issues, and at times we must decide such an issue before the Supreme Court rules on some particular constitutional aspect of the criminal law. For example, this court had to decide initially whether death qualified juries violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right. We held that such juries were constitutionally valid. Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 659 S.W.2d 168 (1983). A federal district court and a sharply divided circuit court of appeals held to the contrary, Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F.Supp. 1273 (E.D.Ark.1983) and Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.1985), and eventually the question was decided by the Supreme Court, and it agreed with the result of our holding. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). Thus, at times, it is necessary for us to decide federal constitutional issues before the Supreme Court does. In sum, our cases and our dual court system require that we decide whether the proposed amendment is constitutionally valid, and I dissent from the majority opinion's refusal to do so. The result of this case is incongruous in still another manner. We have a litany of cases which recite that the popular name or ballot title of an initiated proposal must not be misleading. See, e.g., Leigh v. Hall, 232 Ark. 558, 339 S.W.2d 104 (1960). We have often said a ballot title or popular name must be honest. See, e.g., Arkansas Women's Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984). Yet, under the precedent of the majority opinion, the unfair political device of logrolling is authorized. A hypothetical example is as follows: Suppose a political action group wanted to propose an initiated act that required judges, rather than juries, to fix sentences for convicted felons, but the group knew that the voters would be reluctant to take sentencing of criminals away from the citizens. The group would add to the proposed initiative a provision that criminals could not take the Fifth Amendment. This second provision, even though blatantly unconstitutional, might be popular enough to give the sentencing part of the criminal procedure initiative enough votes to pass. Under today's precedent, this court could not hear a contest of the issue, and the public would be mislead into voting for the sentencing provision. In addition, the result of the majority opinion seems unfair to both the supporters and opponents of the current proposal and to those elected officials who might be affected. Both sides must now spend resources on the issue, and that is an unnecessary waste of those resources. The proponents of the proposed amendment must campaign under the cloud of constitutional invalidity. If the measure passes, incumbent office holders will have to campaign under the cloud of ineligibility and then those individuals might have to bear the expense of a lawsuit. I would not leave both sides in such suspension. Instead, I would follow our cases and decide the issue.