Opinion ID: 1179846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Less Satisfactory Evidence Instruction

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction on weaker and less satisfactory evidence. In part, ORS 10.095 provides that, on all proper occasions, the jury is to be instructed: (7) That evidence is to be estimated, not only by its own intrinsic weight, but also according to the evidence which it is in the power of one side to produce and of the other to contradict; and, therefore, (8) That if weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it appears that stronger and more satisfactory was within the power of the party, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust. Defendant requested that the jury be instructed: When you evaluate the evidence, you may consider the power of the prosecution to gather and produce evidence. If the evidence offered by the prosecution was weaker and less satisfactory evidence than other stronger or more satisfactory evidence which the prosecution could have offered, then you should view the weaker and less satisfactory evidence with distrust. [9] Although defendant testified at his trial, his requested instruction limited application of the principle to evidence submitted by the state. The trial court declined to give defendant's requested instruction. Defendant argues: The record shows that the state could have offered stronger evidence that its investigators were unable to find defendant's clothing and the knife abandoned in the woods, and that the victim did or did not use marijuana. The state's evidence showed that a limited search of the area where defendant was found was made, rather than a thorough attempt to find the missing items. The state argued that as a result of not finding the items, it could be inferred that defendant's testimony was not credible. In addition, most of the witnesses whom defendant called to testify about Keever's drug use were reluctant to do so and had less recall upon taking the stand than when being interviewed by the defense investigator. There was evidence available to the state regarding Keever's drug use. Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in refusing to give the instruction upon defendant's request. The state notes, correctly, that defendant cites to no place in the record where the district attorney made any argument at trial that as a result of not finding the items, it could be inferred that defendant's testimony was not credible. The state argues that nothing in the record suggests that it had any evidence that it did not offer concerning the search for the murder weapon and defendant's clothing, or that the state could have obtained additional evidence and simply failed to do so. The state argues further that, although it was aware of defendant's assertion at trial that the victim had used various drugs before her death, it was not incumbent on the state to offer evidence of such use, which the state did not dispute, and which use defendant argued at length to the jury. In State v. Mains, 295 Or. 640, 647-48, 669 P.2d 1112 (1983), this court stated: This case gives us an opportunity to reiterate in plain and certain terms that the `weaker and less satisfactory evidence' instruction, ORS 10.095(7) and (8), should not be given in a criminal case whether or not the defendant takes the stand, except in those rare instances where because of an asserted defense the defendant has the burden of proof on an issue in the case. For example, when a defendant elects to attempt to evade responsibility for his conduct because of mental disease or defect, ORS 161.295, the defendant has the burden of proof on that issue. Unless such a defense has been asserted by the defendant the `weaker and less satisfactory evidence' instruction may not be given. We believe such a rule will prevent further confusion about this instruction, provide appropriate guidance to trial courts and avoid unnecessary appeals. (Footnote omitted.) In a footnote (and without analysis) that opinion added: Of course, it is proper to give the statutory instruction if specifically requested by the defense[.] Id. at 648 n. 5, 669 P.2d 1112. Relying on that footnote, defendant asserts that, because he requested the instruction, the trial court erred in refusing to give it. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. We did not mean to suggest in State v. Mains, supra , that a trial court must give the instruction any time it is requested by the defense. On the contrary, the instruction should rarely be given. See State v. Mains, supra, 295 Or. at 647-48, 669 P.2d 1112 (unless, because of an asserted affirmative defense the defendant has the burden of proof on an issue in the case, the instruction should not be given). The instruction is perhaps as close to a comment on the evidence as any presently allowed and it is not appropriate in most cases. See ORCP 59 E (The judge shall not instruct with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon), made applicable to trial of criminal actions by ORS 136.230. Moreover, with the advent of reciprocal discovery, ORS 135.805 et seq.; the requirement that, if the state has knowledge of evidence favorable to the defense or exculpatory in nature, the state is under an affirmative due process obligation to make it available to the defense, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); State ex rel. Dooley v. Connall, 257 Or. 94, 475 P.2d 582 (1970); and the availability of subpoena duces tecum, the necessity for the instruction will be rare in a criminal case. See State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 777 (Me.1985) (in a criminal case, the failure of a party to call a witness does not permit the opposing party to argue, or the factfinder to draw, any inference as to whether the witness' testimony would be favorable or unfavorable to either party). Generally, the defendant will have knowledge of and access to the same evidence as the state. Evidence, therefore, normally is equally available to both parties. See 2 McCormick on Evidence 184-89, § 264 (4th ed 1992) (A number of factors support a conservative approach [to instructing on an adverse inference]); 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 285 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) (failure to produce evidence, as indicating unfavorable tenor of evidence). The trial judge has discretion to refuse the statutory instruction, and it is an abuse of discretion only if the evidence in the case make the instruction appropriate. Ireland v. Mitchell, supra, 226 Or. at 292, 359 P.2d 894. The party requesting the instruction must show, and the court must find, that other evidence was reasonably available on a fact in issue and that there is a basis for the jury to conclude that the other evidence is stronger and more satisfactory than the evidence offered. See, e.g., Fitze v. American Hawaiian SS. Co., 167 Or. 439, 444-47, 117 P.2d 825 (1941) (applying the principle). In Ireland v. Michell, supra , this court held that it is reversible error to refuse to give a statutory instruction upon timely request when there is a basis in the evidence for giving it. 226 Or. at 291, 359 P.2d 894. In Ireland, however, the court explained that it is not reversible error in every case to fail to give a statutory instruction, merely because it has been requested. There must be a proper occasion. Id. In the first instance, the trial judge must decide what is a proper occasion. On appeal, the appellate court must review the evidence and try to recapture, as much as is possible, the atmosphere of the trial which guided the trial judge's ruling. Id. at 292, 359 P.2d 894. We find persuasive several Court of Appeals decisions concerning the giving of the less satisfactory evidence instruction: In State v. McNassar, 77 Or.App. 215, 712 P.2d 170, rev. den. 300 Or. 704, 716 P.2d 758 (1986), the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants and reckless driving. On appeal, he assigned as error the trial court's refusal to give a less satisfactory evidence instruction. In rejecting that contention, the Court of Appeals explained: The instruction does not penalize a party for failing to produce all available evidence. Rather, it draws the jury's attention to a party's failure to produce evidence when that failure could give rise to an inference that the evidence would be adverse to the party that is, when it appears that the party may be trying to hide something. 77 Or.App. at 218, 712 P.2d 170 (emphasis in original). In State v. Sellers, 76 Or.App. 552, 709 P.2d 768 (1985), rev. den. 300 Or. 478, 713 P.2d 1058 (1986), the defendant was convicted of unauthorized use of a vehicle. On appeal, he assigned as error the trial court's refusal to give a less satisfactory evidence instruction. The Court of Appeals held that the court's refusal to give the instruction was not error, because the record does not indicate that the state had and failed to produce stronger evidence. 76 Or.App. at 555, 709 P.2d 768. In State v. Woodfield, 62 Or.App. 69, 659 P.2d 1006, rev. den. 295 Or. 259, 668 P.2d 381 (1983), the defendant was convicted of murder, attempted murder and two counts of first degree sodomy. On appeal, he assigned as error the trial court's refusal to give a less satisfactory evidence instruction. In rejecting that contention, the Court of Appeals explained: Defendant's request for this instruction was based on the fact that the state called two `prestigious experts' to testify concerning tests of the bullets found in defendant's house and at the scene and a pubic hair found at the scene. They described the tests and testified that those tests were generally accepted in the scientific community. They did not themselves, however, conduct tests on the exhibits in this case; employes of the State Police crime laboratory had performed the actual tests on the physical evidence. Defendant would treat their testimony as `less satisfactory evidence,' because those employes had considerably less experience in conducting the tests than the `prestigious experts' called by the state.      The only indication in this record is that the state did not have any evidence that was not offered. The `prestigious experts' testified that they had not conducted analysis of the bullets or the hair. There is no contention that the experts who did conduct the tests were not qualified to do so. There was no error in the court's refusal to give the instruction. 62 Or.App. at 73-74, 659 P.2d 1006 (emphasis in original). In State v. Brock, 53 Or.App. 785, 633 P.2d 805 (1981), aff'd 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543 (1982), the defendant was convicted of theft in the first degree. On appeal, he assigned as error the trial court's failure to instruct on less satisfactory evidence. The Court of Appeals stated: When a defendant in a criminal case requests such an instruction, it ought to be given if otherwise appropriate. To be appropriate, there must be evidence to support the instruction. If there is no basis in the record to conclude [that] the state had evidence not produced which was arguably stronger than the proof offered, then it is not error to refuse the instruction. 53 Or.App. at 790, 633 P.2d 805. Because there was not a sufficient basis in the evidence to support it, the court concluded that the instruction was not appropriate. Id. at 791, 633 P.2d 805. Finally, in Whaley v. Russell Stover, 44 Or.App. 541, 606 P.2d 667 (1980), an action for damages arising out of an automobile collision, the defendants assigned as error on appeal the refusal of the trial court to give a less satisfactory evidence instruction. The Court of Appeals rejected their contention, stating: Four doctors were called as witnesses, three by plaintiff and one by defendants. The fact that other witnesses are available and could give competent testimony regarding the issues at trial does not establish that the evidence offered is weaker and less satisfactory. The record establishes little more than that the opinions of the two doctors not called as witnesses would have been cumulative of the opinion of Dr. Schwerzler. The trial court, having heard the evidence and having an appreciation of the atmosphere of the trial, concluded the instruction was not appropriate. 44 Or.App. at 544-45, 606 P.2d 667. In sum, in a criminal case, the statutory less satisfactory evidence instruction, ORS 10.095(7) and (8), should rarely be given. It may, however, be appropriate where because of an asserted affirmative defense the defendant has the burden of proof on an issue in the case. State v. Mains, supra, 295 Or. at 657-58, 669 P.2d 1112. Moreover, it may be appropriate in a criminal case where the state's failure to produce evidence could give rise to an inference that the evidence would be adverse to the statethat is, when it appears that the state may be trying to hide something, State v. McNassar, supra, 77 Or.App. at 218, 712 P.2d 170, or in a case where the record indicates that the state possessed and failed to produce stronger evidence, State v. Sellers, supra, 76 Or.App. at 555, 709 P.2d 768. In such a case, however, the instruction may be given only if there is evidence in the record to support it. State v. Brock, supra, 53 Or.App. at 790, 633 P.2d 805. Generally, the instruction need not be given where the other evidence would be merely cumulative. See State v. McNassar, supra, 77 Or.App. at 218, 712 P.2d 170 (If the other evidence were favorable to the state, it would most likely be [repetitious]); Whaley v. Russell Stover, supra, 44 Or.App. at 545, 606 P.2d 667 (the record established little more than that the [evidence] would have been cumulative[.]). In this case, nothing in the record suggests that the state had any other evidence that it did not offer concerning the search for the murder weapon or defendant's clothing, or that the state could have obtained additional admissible evidence and simply failed to do so. The record therefore does not support the giving of the requested instruction. [10] We find no error.