Opinion ID: 676497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subsequent Medical Evidence

Text: 28 We now turn to evidence of plaintiff's medical condition two years after she left Mount Sinai's employ. Although the proof was offered and rejected by the district court, the issue of what knowledge an employer under the Rehabilitation Act must have at the time it makes its decision was neither briefed by the parties or decided by Judge Owen. On appeal the issue has been fully briefed. We could remand to the district court for it to decide this issue in the first instance, but we see no reason to do so because there are no facts in dispute--either as to Heilweil's condition before or subsequent to her discharge when the bronchiectasis was diagnosed--and the issue to be decided is solely one of law, which we may decide ourselves. 29 Heilweil's medical evidence submitted with her affidavit in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, as noted earlier, indicates that in 1991 she may have been suffering from something more than asthma. We do not think this later obtained medical information is probative on the issue of whether or not she was a handicapped person under the Act when in June 1989 Mount Sinai decided to discharge her. Mount Sinai was then on notice that plaintiff suffered from symptoms of an asthmatic reaction that her doctor said was caused by the conditions in the blood bank. Both Seligman and Director of Human Resources, Kenneth Kruger, requested plaintiff to submit medical verification of her condition, but she never did. Heilweil cannot therefore now complain that she was discharged based on information that she may have been suffering from a different condition at the time she was terminated, when concededly neither she nor Mount Sinai was aware of it. 30 Heilweil contends that the district court should have considered this 1991 medical evidence as demonstrating that she had been suffering from a chronic and serious sinus condition, which eventually required surgery, and that her condition dated back to 1989. In so stating, appellant relies on decisional law for the proposition that subsequent medical evidence is probative of a Rehabilitation Act claimant's medical condition at the time her employer made the adverse employment decision. The decisional law is quite to the contrary. 31 Plaintiff relies first on Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424 (9th Cir.1985). There the Ninth Circuit held it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to consider subsequent medical evidence an employer had obtained after discharging plaintiffs. Although the court stated the evidence might be considered for the purpose of refuting plaintiff's claim that she was qualified for the position, it also concluded that [t]he asserted basis for the employer's decision not to hire the plaintiff is limited to the evidence relied on by the employer at the time the decision was made. As a corollary, an employer is only responsible for employment decisions based on information available to it when it decides. See Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir.1993) (plaintiff not dismissed solely by reason of handicap because decisionmaker had no knowledge of it); cf. Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869, 877 n. 6 (9th Cir.1989) (As long as the employer is on notice that an employee suffers from a serious medical condition, it may be liable under the [Washington] handicap discrimination law.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 814, 111 S.Ct. 53, 112 L.Ed.2d 28 (1990); O'Keefe v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 714 F.Supp. 622, 627 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (employer did not violate New York law when it discharged plaintiff prior to becoming aware of his alcohol problem). Of course, here there was no such notice. Plaintiff's further reliance on three cases discussed earlier in her quest to convince us that the district court erred by not considering her subsequent medical evidence gives her no comfort. In all three, no subsequent medical proof was offered to show the plaintiff was handicapped at the time of the relevant employment decision. See Byrne, 979 F.2d at 565; Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934; Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1250. 32 IV Providing Plaintiff with a Safe Place to Work 33 In dismissing Heilweil's common law cause of action alleging that Mount Sinai breached its duty to provide a safe place to work, the district court deferred to the expertise of the New York Workers' Compensation Board because it has primary jurisdiction over the matter. Section 10 of the New York Workers' Compensation Law mandates that every employer shall provide compensation to its employees for a disability from an injury arising out of and in the course of [their] employment. N.Y. Work. Comp. Law Sec. 10 (McKinney 1992). The liability of an employer ... shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever.... Id. Sec. 11. In any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation ..., it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary ... [t]hat the claim comes within the provision of this chapter.... Id. Sec. 21 (McKinney 1993). 34 Whether the injury arises out of and in the course of the employment is one of the most important criteria for determining whether an employer is liable for a worker's disability. Id. Sec. 10 Practice Commentary (McKinney 1992). Section 2 of the Law defines injury as encompassing only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease or infection as may naturally and unavoidably result therefrom. Id. Sec. 2(7) (1992). An occupational disease is defined as a disease resulting from the nature of employment and contracted therein. Id. Sec. 2(15). 35 In Liss v. Trans Auto Systems, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 15, 20-21, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831, 496 N.E.2d 851 (1986), the New York Court of Appeals held that the Board has primary jurisdiction regarding the availability of Workers' Compensation and plaintiff must litigate this issue before the Board. Since plaintiff's case presents a mixed question of fact and law, the Board must first decide if there is a causal connection between the deterioration of Heilweil's asthma and the conditions in the blood bank and, if so, whether such reaction is an accidental injury or occupational disease under the statute. Plaintiff's evidence regarding her physical condition in 1991 may be relevant to the Board's consideration of causal connection. 36 It is of course within the Board's authority to determine whether a physical condition that later manifests itself was caused by a condition of the worker's employment, and, if so, to compensate the employee accordingly for the incurred disability. An employer's responsibilities under the Act are not so broad. Nothing in the statute, regulations, logic or the decisional law charges an employer with liability for a handicapped condition of which it had no notice when it discharged an employee. The only pertinent language to hold an employer liable is that it must act because of an employee's handicap. The same responsibility is not thrust on employers as is on the Board. Were it otherwise, an employer could be subject to damages long after an employee had been terminated without being afforded the ameliorative opportunity to avoid such penalty by taking steps reasonably to accommodate the now known-to-be handicapped employee. 37 The district court did not abuse its discretion by deferring to the Board, especially because what constitutes an occupational disease or an accidental injury under the workers' compensation law is a fine distinction best left to the expertise of the Board. Compare Johannesen v. New York City Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 84 N.Y.2d 129, 133, 137, 615 N.Y.S.2d 336, 638 N.E.2d 981 (1994) (plaintiff suffered an accidental injury when she began suffering from bronchial asthma due to exposure to tobacco smoke and dust at work) with Mack v. County of Rockland, 71 N.Y.2d 1008, 1009, 530 N.Y.S.2d 98, 525 N.E.2d 744 (1988) (an aggravation of plaintiff's preexisting eye disorder by exposure to cigarette smoke in a poorly ventilated room was not an occupational disease under the statute). Because plaintiff chose not to litigate this issue before the Board, the district court correctly avoided ruling on the merits of her claim, referring it to the Board for its determination. See Liss, 68 N.Y.2d at 21, 505 N.Y.S.2d 831, 496 N.E.2d 851. 38 The instant case is unlike Shine v. Duncan Petroleum Transport, Inc., 60 N.Y.2d 22, 26, 466 N.Y.S.2d 672, 453 N.E.2d 1089 (1983), where the trial court improperly issued a stay on the morning of jury selection when the defendant asserted the workers' compensation defense as a bar to plaintiff's civil action. Shine held this action to be an abuse of discretion because the defendant had known the factual and legal aspects of the case for over two years and waited until the last minute to assert its jurisdictional defense. See id. at 27-28, 466 N.Y.S.2d 672, 453 N.E.2d 1089. Here, Mount Sinai asserted the worker's compensation defense in its answer to plaintiff's complaint thereby alerting Heilweil that it intended to assert it and causing her no prejudice when it did.