Opinion ID: 2305975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Grant of Judgment as a Matter of Law to Reid

Text: The court permitted Zanders to proceed to trial only against Reid, and only on her claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violation of her TOPA right of first refusal. (Zanders's tortious interference claims were asserted only against the Bakers.) It is not clear from the record why the court dismissed Zanders's fraud claim against Reid as well as against the Bakers, but Zanders does not challenge that dismissal on appeal. The court also ruled that because the Bakers had obtained possession of the house, Zanders could not seek the imposition of a resulting trust or a constructive trust in connection with her remaining claims against Reid. We agree with Zanders that this preclusive ruling was erroneous, inasmuch as she had a potential claim for the imposition of a constructive trust on any property that Reid may have acquired using the proceeds of his sale of the house to the Bakers. [8] As a result of the ruling, Zanders did not have the opportunity to explore at trial whether any such property existed. The claim for a constructive trust on Reid's property may be revived in the proceedings against him that will be required on remand. After the close of evidence at trial, the court granted judgment as a matter of law to Reid on Zanders's breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims (leaving only her TOPA claim to go to the jury). Because the court based its ruling on a misapprehension of the evidence, and a reasonable jury could have found in Zanders's favor on her breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims, [9] we agree with Zanders's contention that the court committed reversible error. At trial, Zanders and Reid agreed that they had entered into a three-year oral agreement covering the period 1997-2000. They disagreed over whether, in 2001, Reid again agreed to give Zanders three years  i.e., to 2004  to obtain a mortgage and purchase the house from him. The trial court's award of judgment as a matter of law resulted from its misunderstanding of this chronology. It stated that even if two oral agreements existed from 1997-2000 and from 2000-2003, respectively, Zanders's attempt to purchase the house in June 2004 was untimely. However, the putative second agreement did not cover the period 2000-2003, but rather the period 2001-2004, and if that agreement existed, Zanders's attempt to purchase the house was arguably timely under its terms. The issue thus was not susceptible to resolution against her as a matter of law. The Bakers argue that Reid was entitled to judgment as a matter of law for a different reason (which the trial court did not rely on or address)-namely, that the oral agreement Zanders claimed was made in the Spring of 2001 did not satisfy the statute of frauds (a defense Reid raised). [10] We are not prepared to uphold the trial court's ruling on this ground. [11] Oral agreements are exempt from the operation of the statute of frauds where a party's part performance shows unequivocal evidence of the alleged agreement, [12] or where the plaintiff has justifiably relied on the oral agreement to her detriment. [13] We think a jury reasonably could find that Zanders's payment of the mortgage and property taxes and her maintenance and renovation of the premises in the years following her Spring 2001 meeting with Reid constituted sufficient part performance or detrimental reliance to overcome Reid's statute of frauds defense.