Opinion ID: 195289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Warning.

Text: 19 Appellant has a fallback position. He strives to persuade us that, even if the written conditions extended to enforced hospitalization, they did not afford him adequate notice that refusal to accept such treatment would constitute a violation of his probation. In studying this proposition, we must ask whether appellant was chargeable with knowledge of the probation order's inclusive requirements (and the penalties that might be imposed for disregarding those requirements) when he spurned the request to admit himself to the hospital. 20 When, as now, a court order is read to proscribe conduct that is not in itself unlawful, the dictates of due process forbid the forfeiture of an actor's liberty by reason of such conduct unless he is given fair warning. See United States v. Grant, 816 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 3075, 57 L.Ed.2d 1124 (1978); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191, 97 S.Ct. 990, 992-93, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (discussing fair warning in respect to conduct that is deemed criminal); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1701, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (similar). Nevertheless, the fair warning doctrine does not provide a safe harbor for probationers who choose to ignore the obvious. 21 Furthermore, though a probationer is entitled to notice of what behavior will result in a violation, so that he may guide his actions accordingly, fair warning is not to be confused with the fullest, or most pertinacious, warning imaginable. Conditions of probation do not have to be cast in letters six feet high, or to describe every possible permutation, or to spell out every last, self-evident detail. See Green v. Abrams, 984 F.2d 41, 46-47 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that, though a probation order did not specify the time for payment of a fine, it gave sufficient notice that failure to pay the fine would work a violation); see also United States v. Ferryman, 897 F.2d 584, 590 (1st Cir.) (noting in an analogous context that defendants are entitled only to fair notice, not letter perfect notice), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 830, 111 S.Ct. 90, 112 L.Ed.2d 62 (1990). Conditions of probation may afford fair warning even if they are not precise to the point of pedantry. In short, conditions of probation can be written--and must be read--in a commonsense way. 22 Adherence to these principles demands that we uphold the adequacy of the warning furnished here. We have three main reasons for reaching this conclusion. First, we cannot fault the district court's finding that the phrase proper psychiatric treatment, inclusive of medication, on the basis of its plain meaning, see supra Part II(A), put appellant on notice that a refusal to follow doctor's instructions and submit to hospitalization would constitute a violation of the probation order. 6 Cf., e.g. Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F.Supp. 847, 849-50 (D.Vt.1991) (ruling that a condition of probation requiring participation in and completion of a sexual therapy program put defendant on notice that therapy might necessitate admitting his sexual misconduct). The challenged condition, read in context, itself provided fair warning. 23 Second, there is nothing in the record to suggest either that appellant acted under a misapprehension or that he believed a refusal to accept inpatient admission would comport with the conditions of his probation. A probationer who does not advance a credible claim that he was unaware, or misunderstood the scope, of the conditions of his probation is hard pressed to claim that he lacked fair warning. See, e.g., United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 790 (9th Cir.1991). So it is here. 24 Finally, the inquiry into fair warning is not necessarily confined to the four corners of the probation order. See Grant, 816 F.2d at 442; United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir.1982). The meaning of a probation order may be illuminated by the judge's statements, the probation officer's instructions, or other events, any or all of which may assist in completing the notification process and in aiding the court to determine whether a probationer has been forewarned about what conduct could be deemed to transgress the probation order. 25 Here, several pieces of data buttress the district court's finding that appellant received fair warning. In the first place, the plea agreement provided a prism through which the conditions of probation could be read--and that agreement made the scope of the conditions very clear. See supra pp. 11-12. In the second place, appellant signed his name below the list of conditions contemporaneous with the imposition of the original sentence. In this fashion, he signified his understanding that, upon a finding of a violation, probation might be revoked. Such a manifestation of acceptance of the terms, though rebuttable, is prima facie evidence of a probationer's knowing acceptance of the conditions in place at the time probation commenced. See, e.g., Green, 984 F.2d at 47; United States v. Barth, 899 F.2d 199, 203 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1083, 111 S.Ct. 953, 112 L.Ed.2d 1042 (1991). 26 It is also significant that both the probation officer and the court repeatedly explained to appellant the risk he was running. The record reflects that the probation officer told appellant on May 21 that Dr. Geller believed inpatient treatment was essential to meet the goal of proper psychiatric treatment and exhorted appellant to comply. Such a conversation may be considered as a component of the notification process. See, e.g., Green, 984 F.2d at 47; Romero, 676 F.2d at 407; Mace, 765 F.Supp. at 849-50. Furthermore, the district judge, who exhibited great sensitivity in his thoughtful handling of a difficult case, urged appellant on more than one occasion to relent and told him in no uncertain terms that, if his intransigence did not abate, he would be found in violation of the probation order. 27 To sum up, appellant timely received the probation order; the conditions of probation contained therein clearly contemplated inpatient care if medically indicated; and the penalties that might flow from violating those conditions were apparent. Given the unvarnished terms of the special condition, appellant's previous three-year hospital stay, the tenor of the plea agreement, the probation officer's guidance, and the district judge's entreaties, appellant received ample notice of both the proscription against refusing inpatient treatment and the possible, if not certain, consequence of persisting in his chosen course of conduct.