Opinion ID: 3012029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Johnathan Kerr

Text: Kerr first appeals the District Court’s denial of his pre-trial motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 to sever his trial from Bradley’s, and the District Court’s failure to sua sponte grant a mid-trial severance. We review the denial of the pre-trial motion for abuse of discretion and the failure to order severance sua sponte for plain error. United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 369-70 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Sharma, 190 F.3d 220, 230 (3d Cir. 1999). Even with an abuse of discretion, reversal is not required absent clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial. Hart, 273 F.3d at 370 (quoting United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 854 (3d Cir. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999)). In his pre-trial motion, Kerr argued that severance was necessary because in a joint trial Bradley would be unable to take the stand to offer exculpatory evidence confirming that the $2180 dollars found in Kerr’s pockets upon arrest was actually Bradley’s. The District Court applied the factors set forth in United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1978), and found it unlikely that Bradley would testify in a separate trial, that such testimony if given would not be exculpatory, that Bradley could be impeached, and finally, that judicial economy weighed against severance. Denial of the motion was well within the sound discretion of the District Court. Furthermore, Kerr has not demonstrated how a joint trial unfairly prejudiced his case in the way he urges. In numerous instances throughout the trial, Kerr introduced redacted statements from both Bradley and Kerr explaining that the $2180 had been given to Kerr to hold. Kerr was thus unhindered in making the argument that the money was not his; any slight disadvantage from not putting Bradley on the stand did not amount to clear and substantial prejudice. Kerr also argues that the District Court should have ordered a severance mid-trial because Kerr was prejudiced by spillover evidence regarding a drug importation managed by Bradley that formed part of the charged conspiracy, but in which Kerr did not take part. Because Kerr did not renew his severance motion during the trial, he must demonstrate that the District Court’s failure to sever sua sponte was a plain error affecting substantial rights. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Hart, 273 F.3d at 371; United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom, Stevens v. United States, 531 U.S. 1179 (2001). Kerr has not done so. We conclude that there was no error, let alone plain error, on the part of the District Court. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kerr’s pre-trial severance motion or commit plain error in failing to sever midtrial.
Kerr next claims that the District Court violated Fed. R. Evid. 801 ) and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment when it declined to redact the testimony of Customs Agent Jessie Esposito before it was given to the jury to read during deliberations. Kerr did not object to the testimony when it was given at trial, therefore we review the District Court’s ruling for plain error. Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1994). The District Court did not err in allowing the jury to read Esposito’s testimony. The complained-of testimony consists of Esposito’s explanation that when she and Agent Jackson entered the airport, [they] were just looking to see if [they] could find the described individuals, and her later statement that when she walked in there was a male that fit the description which we later identified as Richard Bradley. (A508, 509) These statements are not hearsay: they were used to establish a background for her investigative conduct, not to prove any essential facts about the defendants. See United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 98 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 780 (3d Cir. 1997). We conclude that the District Court did not commit plain error in allowing the jury to read Esposito’s testimony.
Kerr’s final appeal is of the District Court’s denial of his two motions for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) and ). We exercise plenary review over challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Taftsiou, 144 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1998). Such review is highly deferential, United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 238 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1100 (2001), and requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Hart, 273 F.3d at 371, and to the jury verdict, United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1999). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and to the jury verdict, we cannot say that no reasonable trier of fact could have convicted Kerr. The government introduced evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that Kerr had wired money to Chambers to set up her July drug importation and on numerous previous occasions under the assumed name of Alvin Shaw; that Kerr’s ostensible reason for being at Newark Airport (to show Bradley the way) was most likely a concocted story, as Bradley had dropped off a rental car at the same airport that afternoon and Kerr had written down Chambers’ flight number and time of arrival; that Kerr’s explanation for why he came in a separate rental car (because he had to leave to pick up a friend at JFK Airport) was also likely concocted, as he remained at Newark Airport past the time when he would have needed to leave for JFK; that the flurry of phone calls between Kerr and Bradley around important times in the drug transactions were related to the conspiracy; that the $2180 in cash found in a separate bundle in Kerr’s pockets upon arrest was connected to his participation in the drug deal; and that Kerr’s statement that he had an idea that a drug deal was occurring evidenced his participation in the conspiracy. Any possible introduction of hearsay evidence during Medoff or Esposito’s original testimony was harmless as there was sufficient other evidence presented by the government to allow a rational trier of fact to convict Kerr. Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error in denying Kerr severance, or commit plain error in allowing the jury to read Esposito’s testimony, and because the evidence presented by the government was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to convict Kerr, we will affirm Kerr’s conviction.