Opinion ID: 1452438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: change in the statute

Text: The majority also holds that the 1993 amendment to RCW 49.60.040(7), which defines marital status as the legal status of being married, single, separated, divorced, or widowed, applies prospectively only. This conclusion is based on its finding that [u]nder Washington law prior to the 1993 legislative amendment to RCW 49.60.040, marital status discrimination was not confined to discrimination involving the institution of marriage itself.... Majority op. at 313. However, this finding ignores the fact, recognized by the majority elsewhere in its opinion, that the definition of marital status was given divergent treatment in our case law prior to 1993. In Edwards v. Farmers Ins. Co ., Ill Wash.2d 710, 719, 763 P.2d 1226 (1988), we specifically adopted the holding of Cybyske v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933, 105 S.Ct. 330, 83 L.Ed.2d 266 (1984), that an employer's refusal to hire because of the views of an applicant's spouse did not constitute marital discrimination because it was not directed at the institution of marriage itself. This divergence in our case law makes this court's interpretation of marital status prior to 1993 ambiguous at best. Where the statute has not been interpreted to mean something different and where the original enactment was ambiguous to the point that it generated dispute as to what the Legislature intended, a subsequent amendment can enlighten courts as to a statute's original meaning. Ravsten v. Department of Labor & Indus., 108 Wash.2d 143, 150-51, 736 P.2d 265 (1987). Defining marital status to mean just what it says, the Legislature clarified the phrase as it was and is meant to be understood in its 1993 amendment. This amendment was meant to clarify an uncertainty rather than change existing law. Where a former statute is amended, or a doubtful meaning clarified by subsequent legislation a number of courts have held that such amendment or subsequent legislation is strong evidence of legislative intent of the first statute. 2B Norman B. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49.11 at 83. See also Cowiche Growers, Inc. v. Bates, 10 Wash.2d 585, 604, 117 P.2d 624 (1941) ([w]here the legislature has placed its own construction upon a prior enactment, the courts are not at liberty to speculate upon legislative intent.); State ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Clausen, 63 Wash. 535, 541, 116 P. 7 (1911) (Courts are not at liberty to speculate upon legislative intent when that body, having subsequent opportunity, has put its own construction upon prior enactments.). This amendment was a legislative instruction clarifying what that body meant from the beginning. Through this enactment the Legislature merely restated its original intent.