Opinion ID: 4513027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Anderson’s Contrary Arguments.

Text: First, Anderson argues that Piggott contains a correct analysis and application of the first condition that must be met before a separate offense qualifies as a permissive lesser-included offense: that “the indictment or information must allege all the statutory elements of the permissive lesser included offense.” Piggott, 140 So. 3d at 669 (quoting Khianthalat, 974 So. 2d at 361). However, instead of analyzing the language of the charging instrument in Piggott’s case, the Fourth District seems to have concluded that alleging an automobile as a deadly weapon constitutes an allegation of driving as a matter of law. See id. 3. “Aggravated assault” is an “assault . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon without intent to kill.” § 784.021(1)(a). “Assault” is defined in section 784.011(1), Florida Statutes (2014), as “an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.” -9- (“conclud[ing] that reckless driving is a permissive lesser included offense of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon when the alleged deadly weapon is an automobile” and reiterating that “the charge of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon alleges all of the statutory elements of reckless driving when the alleged deadly weapon is an automobile”).4 Although Piggott cites two cases in support of its conclusion, see id. (citing Wallace v. State, 688 So. 2d 429, 429-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), and LaValley v. State, 633 So. 2d 1126, 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)), both of the cited opinions state that the information at issue in those cases alleged driving. Wallace, 688 So. 2d at 430 (“The allegation within the information that Wallace intentionally drove his car in such a way as to threaten the officers was ‘sufficient to include the willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others’ 4. In fairness to the Fourth District, we find it appropriate to point out that the briefing before that court did not illuminate a clear path to the correct legal analysis. In its answer brief, for example, the State seemed to accept that alleging use of an automobile constituted an allegation of driving, and focused instead on the intent elements associated with each crime and on whether any error in refusing to give the instruction constituted harmless error. Answer Brief of Appellee at 4-7, Piggott v. State, 140 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (No. 4D12-2704). Even on rehearing, when the State first argued that “in order to be entitled to an instruction on the crime of reckless driving, there needed to be an allegation in the charging document that the defendant committed the battery by driving the automobile,” the State neither expounded on its argument nor cited Von Deck, 607 So. 2d 1388, or any other case setting forth the well-settled law that an element cannot be inferred in this context. Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing and/or Motion for Rehearing En Banc and Motion for Certified Question of Great Public Importance at 1-5, Piggott v. State, 140 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (No. 4D12-2704). - 10 - necessary to establish reckless driving.” (quoting LaValley, 663 So. 2d at 1127)) (emphasis added); LaValley, 633 So. 2d at 1127 (“We believe that a charge that one committed an aggravated assault by intentionally driving her vehicle in a threatening manner subsumes the elements of reckless driving.”) (emphasis added). 5 By contrast, according to the Fourth District’s opinion, the State merely alleged that Piggott “did unlawfully and intentionally touch or strike [the victim] against his will with a deadly weapon, to wit: a Kia Sephia four-door automobile,” Piggott, 140 So. 3d at 669 (alteration in original), which only implies driving and does not allege driving. Accepting Anderson’s argument on this issue would require that we ignore or recede from Florida’s “well[-]settled [law] that the elements of an offense cannot be established by mere inference,” Von Deck, 607 So. 2d at 1389, which we are unwilling to do. As a factual matter, alleging use of an automobile in this context is not the same as alleging driving because an automobile could be used to commit the greater offense without driving, as the State pointed out to the Fourth District on rehearing, see Piggott, 140 So. 3d at 671 n.1 (“According to the state, ‘one can 5. However, it is unclear how the Fifth District reached the conclusion that the charging document alleged that the defendant drove the vehicle when such was not included in its earlier recitation of the charging document’s language. See LaValley, 633 So. 2d at 1127. - 11 - batter another person with an automobile with[out] the act of driving the automobile (e.g., by slamming the hood or door of a car on the head of a victim of dropping a car from a crane onto a victim).’ ”), and as the State argues here. With respect to the aggravated assault charge in this case, and analogous to the analysis in Von Deck, one could commit aggravated assault with a motor vehicle without driving it, by, for example, pushing an unmanned vehicle down a hill toward the victim, threatening to crush part of the victim’s body with a vehicle door or trunk lid, or threatening to lock the victim in a trunk and roll the vehicle into a body of water. Cf. Von Deck, 607 So. 2d at 1389 (explaining that, as a factual matter, “[i]t is possible to commit an attempted murder without also committing aggravated assault, such as where the victim remains unaware of the attempted murder until some time has elapsed after the commission”). Anderson attempts to bolster his reliance on Piggott by pointing out the far greater likelihood that a person committing an aggravated assault using an automobile would do so by driving than by any other method. This argument misses the point. The existence of a foreseeable way that an automobile could be used to commit an aggravated assault or battery without driving, irrespective of the probable frequency of occurrence, means that alleging use of a vehicle as a deadly weapon cannot be treated, factually, as an allegation of driving. - 12 - Finally, Anderson relies heavily on the dissent in Anderson, which posits that: Limiting review solely to the information as originally drafted—and forcing trial judges to ignore subsequent indisputable factual developments—is a recipe for gamesmanship when defendants request instructions on lesser-included offenses. Because an information’s content is exclusively controlled by the State, a game of “heads I win, tails you lose” can result if a Spartan information is drafted, alleging aggravated assault but leaving out whether the car was driven, thereby precluding a defendant from claiming a legitimate lesser-included offense based on the facts developed prior to trial; no suggestion is made that was the intent here, but that is the result. Had the State alleged in its information against Anderson that the assault upon the victim was by “driving with a motor vehicle,” it could not now argue that the lesser-included offense of reckless driving was precluded. What an odd result: Anderson loses his right to the lesserincluded offense instruction of reckless driving simply because the original information left out the word “driving”—even though everyone knew pre-trial that was the means of assault. Anderson, 247 So. 3d at 685 (Makar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 6 These points do not give us pause. First, the law is clear that the facts as they are known to the State at the time of charging, or “subsequent[ly] . . . develop[ed],” id., including at trial, are legally irrelevant to a trial court’s determination of whether “the allegations of the greater offense contain all the 6. Judge Makar concurred only in the decision to certify conflict with Piggott, which he viewed as “set[ting] forth the better approach in deciding whether a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense requested by a defendant should be given.” Anderson, 247 So. 3d at 684 (Makar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). - 13 - elements of the lesser offense,” Williams, 957 So. 2d at 599, which is what this Court’s precedent clearly requires a trial judge to first examine when determining whether a separate offense constitutes a permissible lesser-included offense. See Khianthalat, 974 So. 2d at 361 (explaining that for a separate charge to constitute a permissive lesser-included offense “the indictment or information must allege all the statutory elements of the permissive lesser included offense” (quoting Jones, 666 So. 2d at 964)). The charging document does not change based upon “subsequent indisputable factual developments,” Anderson, 247 So. 3d at 685 (Makar, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), unless the State chooses to amend the information and is permitted to do so. Here, the information was never amended. Second, the notion that the charging information should be viewed in light of the evidence presented at trial inappropriately conflates the two independent considerations set forth by this Court for decades as the test for determining what constitutes a permissive lesser-included offense, see, e.g., Brown, 206 So. 2d at 383, essentially eliminating the first requirement that all elements of a lesser offense “must” be factually alleged in the charging document in order for the offense to qualify as a permissive lesser-included offense. Khianthalat, 974 So. 2d at 361. - 14 - Third, this result would implicate separation of powers concerns by interfering with the charging discretion granted to the executive by substantive law. See art. V, § 17, Fla. Const.; ch. 27, Fla. Stat. (2019); Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3. There is nothing sinister about a prosecuting authority exercising its charging discretion strategically in this context. Had the State elected to charge reckless driving, it invariably would have done so in a second count. Reckless driving would have then been presented to the jury as an additional charge—not as a lesser alternative to the aggravated battery charge, as the defendant would have preferred. Fourth, the purpose of a charging instrument is to put the defendant on notice, Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 215 (Fla. 2010) (citing art. I, § 16, Fla. Const.), not to allege all of the facts that will ultimately support the essential elements of the charge. Indeed, the state attorney is directed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(b) to draft an information that is “a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Requiring the State to allege “driving” in this case would be contrary to the direction of our rules and go beyond putting the defendant on notice of the nature and cause of the charged offense. Moreover, the responsibility for detail and particularity in the charging document rests on the defendant and not the State. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(n) (“The court, on motion, shall order the prosecuting attorney to furnish a statement of particulars when the indictment or information - 15 - on which the defendant is to be tried fails to inform the defendant of the particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable the defendant to prepare a defense.”). Finally, neither Anderson nor Judge Makar’s dissent cites any authority supporting the assertion made by both that Anderson had a “right” to have his jury consider a separate crime as a lesser alternative to the crime charged when the lesser, separate offense does not qualify as a permissive lesser-included offense under well-settled Florida law.