Opinion ID: 167728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Paragraph 21 of Mr. Argo's Affidavit

Text: 17 As an initial matter, Mr. Argo appeals from the district court's decision to strike and disregard paragraph 21 of his affidavit opposing summary judgment, which reads: No female Individual Enrollment Specialists [sic] was terminated during my employment for failing to make monthly or yearly goals. App. 269. The district court cited three related grounds for disregarding paragraph 21:(1) that a self-serving affidavit is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on summary judgment; (2) that paragraph 21 contradicts Mr. Argo's deposition testimony and attempts to create a sham fact issue; and (3) that the allegations of paragraph 21 are not based on personal knowledge. App. 305-07. We focus on the district court's third reason for excluding paragraph 21. 18 In finding that the allegations were not based on personal knowledge, the district court relied on District of Kansas Rule 56.1(d), which requires that [a]ffidavits or declarations shall be made on personal knowledge, but it might just as easily have relied on Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that [s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, or Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires that testifying witnesses ha[ve] personal knowledge of the matter. Under the personal knowledge standard, an affidavit is inadmissible if `the witness could not have actually perceived or observed that which he testifies to.' United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527, 1536 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting M.B.A.F.B. Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 681 F.2d 930, 932 (4th Cir.1982)). Accordingly, at the summary judgment stage, statements of mere belief in an affidavit must be disregarded. Tavery v. United States, 32 F.3d 1423, 1427 n. 4 (10th Cir.1994). 19 Mr. Argo's affidavit recites in paragraph 1 that he is personally familiar with the matters contained in the affidavit based on his over 7 years of employment with the Defendant, Blue Cross Blue Shield. App. 267. Yet the claim in paragraph 21, that [n]o female Individual Enrollment Specialists was [sic] terminated during my employment for failing to make monthly or yearly goals, id. at 269, requires knowledge about the performance and discipline of every female IES at the company. As a co-worker, and not a human resources official, Mr. Argo simply was not in a position to acquire such comprehensive knowledge. In his deposition, he named only seven female IESs who worked at Blue Cross Blue Shield during his tenure, and he admitted that two of them resigned for reasons he did not fully understand while another may in fact have been terminated. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that these women were the only seven females employed by Blue Cross Blue Shield as IESs during the relevant time period. At best, Mr. Argo has personal knowledge that a handful of female IESs, whose performance and disciplinary history he happened to learn through workplace discussions, were not terminated for missing performance goals. He may well believe the different, stronger claim in paragraph 21 of the affidavit, but his personal knowledge does not extend so far. 1 In fact, his deposition testimony acknowledges as much: asked directly whether there could have been IESs, male or female, who were fired for performance problems, Mr. Argo said, There could have been.... [I]t is possible, yeah. Id. at 95H. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in striking and disregarding paragraph 21 of the affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. 20