Opinion ID: 697771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sec. 1983 Qualified Immunity, and the First Amendment Rights of Public Employees

Text: 21 This Court reviews the district court's denial of summary judgment on Sanders' qualified immunity defense de novo. Langley v. Adams County, Colo., 987 F.2d 1473, 1476 (10th Cir.1993). Qualified immunity shields Sanders from liability and the burden of having to go to trial unless he violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Following the approach specified by Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991), we must first assess whether Moore has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all, and then evaluate whether any legitimately asserted rights implicated by Moore's demotion were clearly established. If a plaintiff fails to state a valid claim, we need not even reach the issue of the qualified immunity defense. Primas, 958 F.2d at 1511; Hill v. Department of Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318, 1320 (10th Cir.1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990). Moreover, if Moore fails to state a valid First Amendment claim against Sanders, there would also be no basis for holding the City liable under Sec. 1983. 22 The First Amendment rights of public employees like Moore are judged according to the framework established by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), and its progeny. Applying that framework and viewing the factual record and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Moore, we conclude that he has failed to establish a First Amendment violation. 23 Defining the free speech rights of public employees involves a balancing between the needs of government as an employer to maintain an efficient workplace and the typical concerns that arise from any attempts by the government as sovereign to limit free expression. As the Supreme Court stated in Pickering, 24 The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 25 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734. The Supreme Court has established a two-part inquiry to evaluate the free speech claims of public employees and to strike an appropriate balance between these competing concerns. First, a plaintiff must establish that the speech for which the employee alleges he or she was retaliated against is protected speech. To establish that the speech is protected, the employee must show that: (1) the speech involves a matter of public concern and not merely a personal issue internal to the workplace, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); and (2) the employee's interest in the particular expression outweighs the government's interest in regulating such expression to maintain an efficient and effective workplace, Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2899, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734). Second, if the speech is protected, the plaintiff must also show that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged governmental action(s), and the employer must be given an opportunity to show that it would have taken the same actions in the absence of the protected expression. Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). We address each element of this two-pronged inquiry in turn. 26 A statement is characterized as a matter of public concern and not merely a personal employment grievance if it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. at 1689-90. When an employee speaks as an employee upon matters only of personal interest the speech is not protected. Id. at 147, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. To judge whether particular speech relates merely to internal workplace issues, courts must conduct a case by case inquiry, looking to the content, form, and context of the speech, Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690, which includes scrutinizing whether the speaker's purpose was to bring an issue to the public's attention or to air a personal grievance, McEvoy v. Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 466 (10th Cir.1989). An employee's speech must not merely relate generally to a subject matter that is of public interest, but must sufficiently inform the issue as to be helpful to the public in evaluating the conduct of government. Wilson v. City of Littleton, Colo., 732 F.2d 765, 768 (10th Cir.1984); see also Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1445-47 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (reaffirming Wilson ), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 262, 102 L.Ed.2d 250 (1988). That is, we look beyond the general topic of the speech to evaluate more specifically what was said on the topic. 27 In the present action, the relevant speech consists of Moore's statements at the city council meeting regarding the role of an image problem of an officer in causing or exacerbating the riotlike incident that occurred in Wynnewood. Looking at the circumstances surrounding Moore's statements, we concur with the district court's conclusion that they clearly involved matters of public concern. Moore's statements were uttered in a public forum and related to an issue of pressing concern to the community that had been raised at the meeting by citizens other than Moore. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. at 1691 n. 8 (describing an employee's protests about racial discrimination as a matter inherently of public concern). Moreover, Moore's opinion about the police department and its relations with the community provided the public with a useful perspective of the incident from a senior member of the department. As such, Moore's speech did not merely relate to a matter of general public interest, but helped inform the public on an important subject that was of heightened concern in the community. 28 Defendants characterize Moore's statements as an internal grievance related to a personal dispute with Officer Boucher and/or Chief Sanders. However, the mere fact that Moore's statements related to a general grievance he had with Boucher or Chief Sanders does not transform the statements into a matter solely of internal significance. The statements were made in relation to and in the context of an important community discussion and not as part of any particular employment practice or decision involving Moore. Thus, this case is distinguishable from the case of McEvoy v. Shoemaker, for example, where the court ruled that a letter written by a police officer to the city council complaining about mismanagement in the police department after he had been denied a promotion was not of public concern. 882 F.2d at 465. The McEvoy court held that while the operation of the department might be of general concern, McEvoy's principal purpose was to air his personal dispute about not receiving a promotion. Id. at 467. Rather, this case resembles Wulf v. City of Wichita, where the court ruled that a letter written by a police officer to the state attorney general complaining about a police chief's interference with the activities of a police union were of public concern, even though the letter also related to personal problems and tension between the officer and police chief. 883 F.2d 842, 857-59 (10th Cir.1989); see also Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir.1988) (analyzing an employee's purpose in speaking as one factor in the public concern determination and highlighting that the speaker was not motivated solely by personal grievances or interest). Therefore, we conclude that Moore's statements were of public concern. 29 Defendants' claim that Moore's accusations were false does not alter our conclusion that his speech was of public concern. We may assume that deliberately or recklessly false statements by public employees are either unprotected by the First Amendment or, at least, that such intentional falsity would weigh heavily against protection. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574, 88 S.Ct. at 1737-38 (suggesting that a public employee might lose the protection of the First Amendment for knowingly or recklessly making false statements); Wulf, 883 F.2d at 858 & n. 24 (suggesting that malicious or reckless false statements would receive less protection). However, here Defendants have failed to show either that Moore's statements were false or that Moore made them knowing that they were false or with reckless disregard for their veracity. Defendants claim that since the official investigation of the incident concluded that Boucher and the other officer followed appropriate procedures, Moore could not have been disclosing any wrongdoing, and thus he was merely making false accusations against Boucher. However, Moore's declaration that a particular officer had an image problem in the community is a matter of opinion and, in any event, is not negated by the fact that Boucher may have followed proper procedures in the incident. Even if the statement could be shown to be false, Defendants have offered no evidence that Moore knew it was false or acted recklessly with regard to its truth or falsity. See Wulf, 883 F.2d at 858-59. Moore was careful to state that the police followed proper procedures during the incident in question, and only explained that the incident would not have occurred in the first place if it were not for a particular officer's negative image in the community. 30 Although we conclude that Moore has satisfied the threshold requirement that his statements were of public concern, he must still show that his interest in the speech outweighed the government's countervailing interest in regulating the speech to maintain an effective working environment. Moore's interest in commenting on racial discrimination and the race relations of the police with the community is self-evident. Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir.1992). As we stated above, Moore's perspective as a senior officer in the police department made his perspective sufficiently informative to the public to qualify his speech as on a matter of public concern. See Waters v. Churchill, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 1887, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (Government employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they work; public debate may gain much from their informed opinions.). Nevertheless, Moore's speech is less important and less valuable to the public than is the speech often at issue in public employee speech cases. In particular, although providing an insider's perspective on an important issue, Moore did not reveal any new information to the public about the operation of the police department. For example, Moore did not disclose any wrongdoing or inefficiency or other malfeasance on the part of the government[ ], which we have previously recognized as particularly important matters of public concern. Koch, 847 F.2d at 1445; see also Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407, 1423 (8th Cir.1983) ([A]n employee's first amendment interest is entitled to more weight where he is acting as a whistleblower exposing government corruption.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023, 104 S.Ct. 1275, 79 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984). Whistleblowing, of course, is not the only form of public employee speech that is protected, but the State's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1692. 31 Balanced against the importance of Moore's speech are powerful governmental concerns that support the City's ability to take disciplinary measures in response to Moore's speech. As a starting matter, the government has a strong interest in controlling the speech of its employees when they purport to speak for the city or one of its departments. An employee's speech is not exempted from First Amendment protection just because it occurred on the job or as part of an employee's official functions, Koch, 847 F.2d at 1441-42; nevertheless, we acknowledge a city's special interest in controlling its own speech by taking action against employees who purport to speak for the government. In Koch we stated that[t]he fact that the speech at issue occurred during or as a part of an Employee's official duties is but one consideration in the Connick-Pickering inquiry. Nonetheless, it is a significant factor.... 32 Id. at 1442 (emphasis in original). 33 In the present action, there are some indications that Moore was speaking for the police department. For example, he stated at the city council meeting that You say you can't speak for the police department, but I can. Appellant App. at 107. Moreover, Moore was in uniform and on duty at the time of the meeting, and he might have appeared to citizens to be speaking in an official capacity, particularly given that Moore was the deputy chief of police and had other public relations duties as part of his job. However, Moore phrased his statements in terms of his personal opinion by stating I think and not the Department thinks, and he attempted to have his comments be off the record. Id. Nevertheless, we treat the close nexus between Moore's comments and his official duties and responsibilities as a factor (although not a conclusive one) weighing on the side of the City's ability to regulate such speech. 34 In addition, Defendants articulate other strong reasons for demoting Moore as a result of the incident. In particular, Moore left his scheduled patrol shift without authorization to attend the city council meeting and make his statements, despite being the only officer on duty to provide the town with protection at the time. As the Supreme Court stated in Connick v. Myers, the manner, time, and place in which expression takes place is relevant to the Pickering balancing calculus. 461 U.S. at 152-53, 103 S.Ct. at 1693. Looking to those factors in the instant case, we consider the fact that Moore essentially went AWOL and left Wynnewood without protection for the three hours he attended the city council meeting as strong support for the City's actions. 35 Furthermore, the government needs to maintain discipline by superiors [and] harmony among co-workers, especially where close working relationships [exist] for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at 2899. That need is particularly acute in the context of law enforcement, where there is a heightened interest ... in maintaining discipline and harmony among employees. Wulf, 883 F.2d at 861; see also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246-47, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 1445, 47 L.Ed.2d 708 (1976) (recognizing the need to accord police departments wide latitude in decisions that impact discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity). In the present case, Moore's statements threatened both the department's morale and chain of command. Working relations could not get much closer than in the six-person Wynnewood Police Department, and Moore's position as the second in command might have caused his statements to reverberate with special force. The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability the employee's role entails. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390, 107 S.Ct. at 2900. 36 Moore maintains that Defendants have not shown that Moore's statements actually caused any disruption in the Wynnewood Police Department. The government cannot rely on purely speculative allegations that certain statements caused or will cause disruption to justify the regulation of employee speech. Wulf, 883 F.2d at 862. Furthermore, the government's concerns about the impact of speech must be reasonable and formed in good faith. Waters, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1889. However, neither does the government, or a police department in particular, have to wait for speech actually to disrupt core operations before taking action. [W]e have consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large. Waters, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1887. In the present case, Defendants have articulated specific concerns about the impact of Moore's statements criticizing Officer Boucher at the Wynnewood City Council meeting. First, the small size of the department increased the likelihood and severity of disruption. Second, Moore's leadership position also increased the chance that his statements would impact the department and would reasonably threaten his close working relations both with the ordinary patrol officers and with Chief Sanders. See Wulf, 883 F.2d at 861 (noting that the government's justifications for regulating speech were weaker when an officer's critical statements did not relate to someone with whom the officer had to work closely); Joyner v. Lancaster, 815 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir.) (rejecting the First Amendment claims of a discharged captain in the sheriff's department in part because he was a highly placed official in a para-military unit, and because [h]e had an important role in the implementation of the sheriff's policies, and he was an essential link between the sheriff and the deputies whom he supervised), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 102, 98 L.Ed.2d 62 (1987). Moreover, Defendants need not justify their predictions of department disruption with a formal evidentiary showing. Governmental employers should be allowed to rely on hearsay, on past similar conduct, on ... personal knowledge of people's credibility, and on other factors that the judicial process ignores. Waters, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1888. Thus, although government employers do not have a blanket license to retaliate against employees based on unfounded fears or speculation about the harmful effects of employee speech, Defendants have identified a reasonable basis for their actions. 37 We conclude that the Pickering balance clearly tips in favor of Defendants. Even viewing the factual record in the light most favorable to Moore, we conclude that Moore has failed to show that his interest in voicing his opinion about Officer Boucher and the police department's race relations problem as he did, while on duty and in uniform, outweighed Defendants' interest in controlling who purports to speak on the City's behalf and in safeguarding the operation of the department. Accordingly, Moore's speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection, and Moore's Sec. 1983 claims against both Sanders and the City must fail. 6 Given our conclusion that Moore's speech was not protected, we need not reach the issue of whether Moore's speech was a substantial or motivating factor in his demotion.