Opinion ID: 3045500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 530, 537-38 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Insurance

Text: Commissioner and addressing inter-policy stacking). Given the great deference afforded to the Insurance Commissioner in Sackett II, and the Statutory Construction Act’s requirement that technical words be construed with their appropriate meaning, we predict that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would extend its ruling in Sackett II to the single-vehicle policy at issue here. Section 1738(c) states that a named insured “purchasing uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage for more than one vehicle under a policy shall be provided the opportunity to waive” stacking. According to the Insurance Commissioner, as noted supra, the mere addition of a vehicle to an existing policy is not a purchase. Section 1738(c) thus did not require Appellant to provide Appellee with the opportunity to waive stacking upon the addition of the second and third vehicles to the policy; the waiver signed at the inception of the policy remained valid 16 upon the addition of those vehicles and the subsequent renewals of the policy. This decision is consistent with “the primary purpose of the MVFRL, and especially the 1990 amendments of which Section 1738 was a part, [which] was to control the cost of insurance such that a higher percentage of drivers would be able to afford insurance.” Everhart v. PMA Insurance Group, 938 A.2d 301, 306 (Pa. 2007) (citing Craley, 895 A.2d at 541 n.17 (Pa. 2006)). It is also consistent with the waiver executed by Appellee, in which he agreed that he was rejecting stacked UIM coverage in exchange for a lower premium. Cf. Rupert v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 291 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Allowing [an insured] to reap the benefits of stacked coverage without having paid for stacked coverage not only seems unfair, but could compromise the legislative goal of reducing the cost of insurance.”). For the aforementioned reasons we will reverse the decision of the District Court and remand with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of Appellant. 17