Opinion ID: 696325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Claim: Cause of Action # 9

Text: 28 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. A due process claim is cognizable only if there is a recognized liberty or property interest at stake. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Therefore, Schroeder must establish that he had either a liberty interest or a property interest sufficient to trigger due process protection. 29 Under certain circumstances, state prison regulations may create a liberty interest that is protected under the Due Process Clause. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1909, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). To do so, the regulations must (1) contain 'substantive predicates' governing an official's decision regarding a matter directly related to the individual; and (2) employ 'explicitly mandatory language' specifying the outcome that must be reached upon a finding that the substantive predicates have been met. Dix v. County of Shasta, 963 F.2d 1296, 1299 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462-63, 109 S.Ct. at 1910). 30 The district court in this case concluded that Prison Policy Nos. 493.18.01 and 493.18.03 involved both the substantive predicates and mandatory language necessary to give rise to a liberty interest for Schroeder in not being transferred from the minimum security facility back to the medium security facility. We disagree. Although Policy Nos. 493.18.01 and 493.18.03 generally require a particular result (the least restrictive confinement) once a substantive predicate is met (the inmate is classified at a certain risk level), the terms of those policies and the terms of other, related, policies make clear that prison administrators retain broad discretion to make decisions regarding prisoner confinement and transfers. 31 Both 493.18.01 and 493.18.03 provide for exception cases, in which administrative action may override the security/custody scoring system. Even more significantly, Prison Policy No. 493.18.04 expressly gives prison officials discretion to deviate from Policy Nos. 493.18.01 and 493.18.03. 13 32 In light of the exceptions contained in the prison policies at issue here, we cannot conclude, consistently with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, that the policies are sufficiently mandatory to create a liberty interest for Schroeder in not being transferred from the minimum security facility back to the medium security facility. See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462-65, 109 S.Ct. at 1909-11; Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249-51, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747-49, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983); Dix, 963 F.2d at 1299-1300. Absent a protected liberty interest, Schroeder cannot state a due process claim. We therefore conclude that the district court should have granted summary judgment for defendants on this claim. 33