Opinion ID: 1190207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory provisions for discipline of judges as lawyers.

Text: As previously stated, the complaint of the Oregon State Bar and the recommendation of its Trial Board are based upon the same acts of misconduct by the accused. That Trial Board, based upon the same record, concluded that the accused had acted as an attorney in the estates mentioned in violation of ORS 1.220, [17] which forbids a judge to practice law. [18] The recommendation of the Trial Board to this court is that the accused be suspended from the practice of law in Oregon for a period of two months. In Jenkins v. Oregon State Bar, 241 Or. 283, 405 P.2d 525 (1965), decided prior to the adoption in 1968 of Article VII, § 8, proceedings had been brought by the Oregon State Bar charging Jenkins with misconduct in his capacity as a district judge. That proceeding did not seek the removal of the judge from office. It was contended by Jenkins by writ of prohibition in that case that the Oregon State Bar, by seeking his disbarment as a lawyer, sought also to disqualify him as a judge by reason of the fact that in order to qualify as a judge he was required to be a member of the Oregon State Bar. In denying the writ of prohibition in Jenkins we found it unnecessary to decide that question, although holding (at 287, 405 P.2d at 527) that [a]ny lawyer, if disbarred, is disqualified from seeking election or re-election to the bench. We went on to hold, however, that the Oregon State Bar was nevertheless entitled to bring disciplinary proceedings against a judge as a lawyer. In so holding we said (at 289-90, 405 P.2d at 528): In Oregon, a lawyer does not cease to be a lawyer when he is elected or appointed to a judicial office.    As far as his duty to his profession is concerned, a judge is a lawyer whose labors are performed behind the bench instead of before it. As observed recently by Chief Justice Weintraub of New Jersey: `In terms of rational connection with fitness at the bar, behavior of an attorney in judicial office cannot be insulated from the demands of professional ethics. On the contrary, the judge's role is so intimate a part of the process of justice that misbehavior as a judge must inevitably reflect upon qualification for membership at the bar. Hence the disciplinary power should apply unless it is restrained by some provision of the Constitution.   .' 34 N.J. at 264-265, 168 A.2d at 41. [19] Three years later Article VII, § 8, was adopted as an amendment to the Oregon Constitution. As previously noted, it states that the methods provided by that section and by the provisions of § 18 for recall are the exclusive methods of removal of a judge from judicial office. It is also of interest to note that during the consideration by the 1967 Oregon Legislature of SJR 9  the proposed amendment to Article VII, § 8  the Senate Judiciary Committee amended the original proposal by the Oregon Judicial Council to add, as a ground for removal, the suspension or disbarment from active membership in the Oregon State Bar   . [20] That additional provision was deleted, however, when SJR 9 was finally approved by the legislature for submission to vote of the people in 1968. It follows that at the present time the suspension or disbarment of a judge as a member of the Oregon State Bar cannot require his removal as a judge, despite the fact that it would disqualify him from running for re-election as a judge while still suspended or disbarred. It also follows, in our opinion, that it would be a futile and anomalous gesture in this case to suspend the accused from membership in the Oregon State Bar for two months, as recommended by its Trial Board, when the effect of such a suspension would be only to prohibit his further practice of law  conduct already prohibited by ORS 1.220. The accused was relected in 1974 and need not stand again for re-election as a judge until 1980. Because we do not consider his conduct to involve moral turpitude, we do not believe that his conduct was such as to require either permanent disbarment as a lawyer or suspension from practice for a period of as long as five years. [21] As previously stated, however, we reprimand the accused for his misconduct as a judge. This reprimand includes his misconduct as a lawyer. Since the institution of the proceedings in this case it has come to the attention of this court that a bill is now pending before the 1975 Oregon Legislature to amend Article VII, § 8, by deleting some of its limitations upon the grounds for removal, suspension or reprimand of judges for misconduct. [22] It would be inappropriate for this court to comment by this opinion upon the merits of that proposed bill. We believe, however, that the history of the experience to date under the present provisions of Article VII, § 8 of the Oregon Constitution, as well as a recitation of the facts of this case, speak for themselves. The accused is reprimanded for his misconduct.