Opinion ID: 4534204
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense Comments

Text: Smiley next argues that defense counsel’s own closing argument was so deficient that it constituted fundamental error or ineffective assistance of counsel. - 31 - We have reviewed defense counsel’s argument, both on its own and together with the State ’s closing argument, and we find no fundamental error. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims usually are not cognizable on direct appeal. We have been willing to depart from this general rule in the rare situation where ineffectiveness (both performance and prejudice) is “indisputable from the face of the record before us.” Monroe v. State, 191 So. 3d 395, 404 (Fla. 2016). The alleged inadequacies in defense counsel’s argument in this case do not meet that demanding standard. Accordingly, we will not take up the merits of Smiley’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim here. VIII. Penalty Phase Jury Instructions and Verdict Form Smiley contends that reversible error occurred because the verdict form and the trial court’s jury instructions allowed the jury to treat each of Smiley’s five prior violent felony convictions as a separate aggravator. Specifically, the verdict form identified and listed each prior violent felony individually and asked the jury to record its vote on each. Smiley claims that this deviated from the verdict form and jury instructions that we approved in In re Standard Jury Instructions in Capital Cases, 214 So. 3d 1236 (Fla. 2017). Smiley further argues that this caused him prejudice by overstating the number of aggravators proven in his case. Because Smiley did not object to the verdict form or jury instructions, we evaluate this claim under the fundamental error standard. To constitute fundamental error, - 32 - an alleged error must reach down into the validity of the sentencing proceeding itself such that the sentence could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. See, e.g., Archer v. State, 673 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1996). There is nothing in the death penalty sentencing statute or in our case law that prohibits asking the jury to separately indicate its findings on any prior violent felony underlying the prior violent felony aggravator. Indeed, we have observed that in evaluating the weight of the prior violent felony aggravator, “the facts upon which the aggravator is based are critical to our analysis.” Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505, 524 (Fla. 2008). Voting separately on each underlying conviction also adds clarity to the jury’s findings and could be helpful if any particular conviction is subsequently invalidated. We find no error in this regard. But Smiley makes a separate argument that the presentation of Smiley’s prior violent felonies in this case skewed the jury’s weighing of aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances. Under our case law, “[i]f a defendant has multiple convictions for prior violent felonies, the trial court can find only a single aggravating circumstance, but it may give that circumstance greater weight based upon the existence of multiple convictions.” Bright v. State, 90 So. 3d 249, 261 (Fla. 2012). Presumably this applies to the jury’s findings and weighing calculus as well. Thus, even though a jury is entitled to weigh multiple prior violent felonies more heavily than a single violent felony, the jury instructions here were - 33 - erroneous to the extent they suggested that each prior violent felony conviction constituted a separate aggravating factor. Nonetheless, any error falls far short of the high bar for establishing fundamental error. The aggravating factors here included Smiley’s prior conviction for the Carmen Riley murder (a capital felony), a particularly weighty aggravator. The Drake episode involved contemporaneous felony convictions involving crimes against a separate victim. The verdict form shows that the jury found this to be a case involving very little mitigation. Indeed, the verdict form suggests that the jury unanimously rejected Smiley’s principal argument in mitigation, that his ruptured aneurysms and resulting brain damage lessened his culpability. Finally, the trial court properly instructed the jury that the weighing process is not “mechanical or mathematical” and that the jury therefore “should not merely total the number of aggravating factors and compare that number to the total number of mitigating circumstances.” Under these circumstances, we find no fundamental error. We also see no merit in Smiley’s challenge to the jury instructions and verdict form as they related to mitigating circumstances. Smiley bases this claim on alleged deviations from standard jury instructions approved after his sentencing - 34 - proceeding, 5 and he points to no independent authority to support his argument that the trial court committed reversible error. We therefore deny this claim as well.