Opinion ID: 1182553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Agent's Discretion

Text: Defendant contends that even if plaintiff has stated a cause of action in negligence, defendant nevertheless cannot be held liable because the act of the city employee in issuing the license to Terminal was a discretionary one for which immunity is provided by ORS 30.265(3)(c). The defense of immunity is one that may properly be considered on demurrer. Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485, 475 P.2d 78 (1970). ORS 30.265(3)(c), the discretionary act exception to governmental tort liability, provides in part: Every public body and its officers, employes, and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties are immune from liability for:   . (c) Any claim based upon the performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused. In his specially concurring opinion to the decision in the Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Schwab concluded that the City was immune under this provision because the decision by the government as to whether it will provide complete or haphazard or no enforcement at all of licensing and regulatory legislation is discretionary in the context of tort liability. 30 Or. App. at 1102, 569 P.2d at 1088. Like the majority, the Chief Judge's analysis focuses on the City's decision to license. As noted above, however, the act complained of in this case is the issuance of the license to Terminal, not the decision by the City to license generally. Our analysis therefore differs from Chief Judge Schwab's on this issue. In analyzing the allegations in plaintiff's complaint to determine whether or not defendant is immune from suit, we bear in mind the fact that not every exercise of judgment and choice is the exercise of discretion. It depends on the kind of judgments for which responsibility has been delegated to the particular officer. McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or. 433, 436, 578 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1978). The ordinance under which Terminal obtained its license in the present case may have contemplated some exercise of discretion, such as a consideration of the applicant's ability and the possibility of unreasonable danger to the public that might result from issuance of the license. Eugene Mun.Code § 3.050(b), (d). Nevertheless, the language relating to minimum liability insurance is clearly mandatory, and we do not believe the language, taken as a whole, vested the licensing agent with discretion to issue a license to an applicant who did not meet these requirements. [8] Although the decision to issue the license, in the abstract, may or may not have required discretion, the only duty of the agent regarding the liability insurance was to compare the facts stated in the application with the requirements of the ordinance. We do not consider this to be the kind of function that is inappropriate for judicial review. Cf., Smith v. Cooper, supra (planning and designing of highways); Jarrett v. Wills, 235 Or. 51, 383 P.2d 995 (1963) (decision to release inmate from state hospital for the mentally retarded). We therefore conclude that defendant is not immune under ORS 30.265(3)(c), the discretionary act exception to governmental liability.