Opinion ID: 1713837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: adequacy of the board's reasoning

Text: ¶25 Certainly, a court's review of a zoning board's decision is deferential; the court must accord a presumption of correctness and validity to a board of adjustment's decision. Ziervogel, 269 Wis. 2d 549, ¶13. The court should not disturb a board's findings if any reasonable view of the evidence supports them. Waushara County, 271 Wis. 2d 547, ¶13. ¶26 For certiorari review to be meaningful, however, a board must give the reviewing court something to review. State v. Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d 91, 110, 408 N.W.2d 337 (1987); see also 3 Yokley Zoning Law and Practice § 18-9 at 18-62 (MacGregor rev. 2002) (hereinafter Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice) (The record made before a board of adjustment is essential to an enlightened determination of its action by a governing body or by a court on review); 3 Rathkopf The Law of Zoning and Planning § 62:47 at 62-133 (4th ed. (Ziegler rev.) 1975, supp. 2004) ([T]he most common reason for a remand is that the findings of fact upon which the determination should be based are either entirely absent or are so inadequate that the determination cannot adequately be reviewed.). The majority view is now that boards are generally required to make findings of fact and state reasons for their decisions. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 20-16 at 20-68. In this case, the court of appeals characterized the Board's order as exhibiting an absence of discretion. Lamar, unpublished order at 2. This amounts to a violation of the third prong of certiorari review. ¶27 The controlling statute is pithy, providing only that The grounds of every such determination shall be stated. Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)9. The term grounds is not defined in the statute. Accordingly, we look to the common, ordinary, and accepted meaning of the word. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. A ground in the legal sense is defined as The reason or point that something (as a legal claim or argument) relies on for validity. Black's Law Dictionary 710 (7th ed. 1999). The Board stated in conclusory fashion that Lamar's application was denied because it did not meet various statutory criteria. We believe that Lamar had the right to know not only the statutory criteria under which the Board rejected its claim, but also the reasons (grounds) why the Board decided that the facts did not fit the statutory criteria. ¶28 Such an approach is consistent with historical interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)9. In 1960 the League of Wisconsin Municipalities published Zoning Boards of Appeal: A Manual on Their Powers and Duties with Suggested Rules of Procedure. [12] The League intended to provide guidance for Wisconsin's boards of zoning appeal. In discussing the required form of a board's decision, the League stated: The decision of the board . . . must contain . . . reasons for the action taken . . . . It is not sufficient for the board to give its reasons in the words of the statute such as, The variance is granted because owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship. The exact nature of the hardship or difficulty found by the board should be stated. Id. at 10 (citing Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(e)9. [13] (emphasis added). ¶29 Requiring the Board to provide reasons for its determination is also consistent with common sense and traditional notions of due process. Accord Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) ([Due process] principles require that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed [benefit] termination.). ¶30 The Board, and the League of Wisconsin Municipalities as amicus, argue that we proceed down a slippery slope if we affirm the court of appeals' conclusion that the Board's discussion was inadequate. They argue that under the court of appeals' decision, boards of zoning appeals must produce an explicitly reasoned written decision. They note that we here consider the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals for the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin's largest community. In smaller communities, they observe, the boards may have less experience with governing legal standards, may not produce written opinions at all, and frequently have members who are neither attorneys nor are counseled by attorneys and cannot be expected to produce the type of finely-tuned legal reasoning expected from a court. ¶31 We understand and are sympathetic to the League's concerns. We realize that most board members are not attorneys and recognize that many boards in this state operate without issuing written opinions. We do not expect boards of zoning appeal to produce judicial opinions. We agree, in fact, that a written decision is not required as long as a board's reasoning is clear from the transcript of its proceedings. [14] ¶32 Nonetheless, this court cannot and should not relax its standards of reasoning to the point where the standards are nonexistent. A board may not simply grant or deny an application with conclusory statements that the application does or does not satisfy the statutory criteria. Accord League of Wisconsin Municipalities, Zoning Boards of Appeal at 10. Rather, we expect a board to express, on the record, its reasoning why an application does or does not meet the statutory criteria. Without such statement of reasoning, it is impossible for the circuit court to meaningfully review a board's decision, and the value of certiorari review becomes worthless. See Trudeau, 139 Wis. 2d at 110. ¶33 Finally, we address the Board's argument that it is particularly troublesome and impractical for a board to issue an explicitly reasoned decision because under the statute, the decision may effectively be controlled by a minority of the board. We disagree. Even when a board's decision is dictated by a minority, these controlling members of the board ought to be able to articulate why an applicant has not satisfied its burden of proof on unnecessary hardship or why the facts of record cannot be reconciled with some requirement of the ordinance or statute. ¶34 In its written order, the Board simply stated that Lamar's application did not meet the ordinance criteria, then recited the criteria. The court of appeals correctly perceived the problem with this approach. The Board may not rest on a declaration that an application does not meet certain ordinance criteria; the Board must explain why the application does not meet the criteria. In this case, the Board's written order did not do so. ¶35 That, however, is not the end of the inquiry because, as noted above, a written determination is not always necessary. We also review the transcript of the proceedings before the Board. [15] ¶36 Member Szymanksi disagreed with Member Winkler's assessment that We are faced with a very strong case of hardship. He also disagreed that non-conforming existing signage could be cited as precedent. He said he hoped existing signage would be further diminished because I'm not a sign aficionado. He added that the spirit and intent [of the ordinance] has not been met . . . [and] the hardship also has not been met, because it is intended to wind up generating some additional revenue for this facility . . . . ¶37 Member Szymanski's remarks that he hoped existing signage would be diminished and that he is not a sign aficionado, however heartfelt, are not relevant to a board's determination on a request for a variance. They might be characterized as expressions of his will and not his judgment. His other remarks were conclusory statements that the application did not meet the ordinance criteria. Member Szymanski did not explain why the application and supporting facts did not meet the criteria. His objection to the sign's revenue generation was not only a restatement of criteria in the Milwaukee ordinances (see Milwaukee Code § 295-95-2-b-3-5 (alleged hardship cannot be based solely on economic grounds)), but also a near per se rejection of any variance for a commercial sign. ¶38 Chairman Zetley's comments were also insufficient to justify a finding that the Board reasonably exercised its discretion. Chairman Zetley stated that he had three reasons for voting to deny the application. First, he believed the exceptional circumstances have not been met. I believe that this is an economic issue. As we have noted, that reasoning is insufficient because it is circular. It merely restated the grounds laid out in the ordinance. Second, Zetley stated there [are] other purposes for this land. It hasn't been shown that there isn't another purpose for this land. As we have described, this is a restatement of the now-abrogated no reasonable use test. Chairman Zetley's second reason is invalid. Third, Zetley stated, making the signs bigger and bigger isn't something that this Chair is in favor of. Again, a member's personal feelings about signs are irrelevant to the Board's determination of whether the statutory criteria have been met. ¶39 We conclude that the Board did not satisfactorily express its reasons for denying Lamar's application. Our remand will allow the Board to reconsider the facts in the wake of Ziervogel and Waushara County. We caution that we believe the Boardwith or without attorneyscan do a far better job of expressing its reasoning on the record. The Board must allow for meaningful certiorari review by stating the grounds for its decisionthe reasons that Lamar's application does or does not fit the statutory criteria.