Opinion ID: 1700069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: law the pretrial phase

Text: In his first assignment of error, the appellant contends that the indictment should have informed him of the aggravating circumstances intended to be relied upon by the state so that a defense could be more adequately prepared. We note that, under section 99-19-101(5) of the Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1982), no more than eight listed aggravating circumstances may be potentially introduced against a defendant found guilty of murder. Several jurisdictions have considered this question, and the consensus is that the indictment does not have to inform the accused of the aggravating circumstances intended to be relied upon by the prosecution. See, e.g., Federal: Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976, 99 S.Ct. 1548, 59 L.Ed.2d 796 (1979); Mitchell v. Hopper, 538 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.Ga. 1982); Florida: Sireci v. State, 399 So.2d 964 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2257, 72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982), reh. denied, 458 U.S. 1116, 102 S.Ct. 3500, 73 L.Ed.2d 1378 (1982); Georgia: Goodwin v. Hopper, 243 Ga. 193, 253 S.E.2d 156 (1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 2896, 61 L.Ed.2d 319 (1979); Missouri: State v. Trimble, 638 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. 1982); Texas: Amanda v. State, 640 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. App. 1982). However, some states do have statutes which require such notice. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 371 So.2d 932 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978), aff'd, 371 So.2d 943 (Ala. 1979), vacated, 448 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 3042, 65 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1980), on remand, 405 So.2d 696 (Ala. 1981). In Mississippi, we have no such statutory requirement. The major purpose of an indictment is to furnish the accused such a description of the charges against him as will enable him to adequately prepare his defense. Westmoreland v. State, 246 So.2d 487 (Miss. 1971); Woods v. State, 200 Miss. 527, 27 So.2d 895 (1946). Thus, all that is required in this regard is a concise and clear statement of the elements of the crime charged. Love v. State, 211 Miss. 606, 52 So.2d 470 (1951). Nothing more is required. We believe that the fact that our capital murder statute lists and defines to some degree the possible aggravating circumstances surely refutes the appellant's contention that he had inadequate notice. Anytime an individual is charged with murder, he is put on notice that the death penalty may result. And, our death penalty statute clearly states the only aggravating circumstances which may be relied upon by the prosecution in seeking the ultimate punishment. In our opinion, Williams received adequate notice. [1]
The appellant's next contention is that the trial judge erred in sustaining the state's challenge of potential juror Odom for cause because Odom expressed reservations about the death penalty. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), the United States Supreme Court clearly set forth the criteria upon which a challenge for cause of this nature may be sustained. A sentence of death cannot be executed if the jury was chosen by excluding potential jurors for cause simply because they voiced general objections or conscientious scruples against the death penalty. Instead, the state is permitted to exclude potential jurors only if (1) they would automatically vote against capital punishment without regard to the law and the evidence, or (2) their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. 391 U.S. at 522-23, 88 S.Ct. at 1776, 20 L.Ed.2d at 784. During voir dire, Ms. Odom specifically stated that her ability to determine guilt or innocence would be affected by her personal attitude toward the death penalty. Furthermore, she added that she was opposed to the death penalty under any circumstances. These remarks clearly justified the sustaining of the challenge for cause.