Opinion ID: 2600573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Disqualification of Care Custodians

Text: Part 3.5 of division 11 of the Probate Code (hereafter part 3.5), section 21350 et seq., sets forth certain limitations on donative transfers by testamentary instrument. [3] Section 21350 lists seven categories of persons who cannot validly be recipients of such donative transfers, including, inter alia, [a] care custodian of a dependent adult who is the transferor ( id., subd. (a)(6)). The statute provides that the term care custodian for these purposes has the meaning as set forth in Section 15610.17 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (§ 21350, subd. (c).) [4] That section, in turn, defines care custodian by means of a list of described agencies and persons, concluding in its final subdivision with [a]ny other . . . agency or person providing health services or social services to elders or dependent adults. [5] (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 15610.17, subd. (y).) Section 21351 sets forth several exceptions to section 21350. Relevant for our purposes is subdivision (d) of section 21351, which provides that the prohibition of section 21350 does not apply if [t]he court determines, upon clear and convincing evidence, but not based solely upon the testimony of any person described in subdivision (a) of Section 21350 [i.e., any prohibited transferee], that the transfer was not the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. Once it is determined that a person is prohibited under section 21350 from receiving a transfer, section 21351 creates a rebuttable presumption that the transfer was the product of fraud, duress, menace, or undue influence. A person who is prohibited from receiving a transfer under section 21350 may still inherit, if [he or she] successfully rebuts the section 21351 presumption (§ 21351, subd. (d)). In order to rebut the presumption, the transferee must present clear and convincing evidence, which does not include his or her own testimony, that the transfer was not the product of fraud, duress, menace, or undue influence. (§ 21351, subd. (d).) ( Estate of Shinkle (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 990, 993, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 42.) As we previously have observed, this statutory scheme supplements the common law doctrine that a presumption of undue influence, shifting the burden of proof, arises upon the challenger's showing that (1) the person alleged to have exerted undue influence had a confidential relationship with the testator; (2) the person actively participated in procuring the instrument's preparation or execution; and (3) the person would benefit unduly by the testamentary instrument. ( Rice v. Clark (2002) 28 Cal.4th 89, 97, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 522, 47 P.3d 300; see also Graham v. Lenzi (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 248, 257, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 407; Estate of Swetmann (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 807, 816-817, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, and cases cited there.)