Opinion ID: 2457485
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Heading: Contractual Nature of the Letter and Check

Text: That a written instrument cannot be varied by parol evidence is a rule of substantive law. Hubacek v. Ennis State Bank, 159 Tex. 166, 317 S.W.2d 30 (1958); South Texas Implement & Machine Co. v. Anahuac Canal Co., 280 S.W. 521, 523 (Tex. Comm.App.1926, judgmt adopted). Yet it is true that the rule applies only to contractual or jural writings evidencing the creation, modification, termination or securing of a particular right or obligation. 9 J. Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence §§ 2400-01 (3d ed. 1940); 2 C. McCormick and R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 1612 (1956); 4 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 631 (3d ed. 1961). We consider the letter and the check relating to lease rentals as contractual in nature because late payment and acceptance of annual rentals provided for in an oil and gas lease has the effect of reviving the lease as though it had never terminated. Mitchell v. Simms, 63 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Comm.App.1933, holding approved); McCoy v. Texon Royalty Co., 124 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ.App.1939, writ dism'd, judgmt correct). See also Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947); Myers v. Crenshaw, 116 S.W.2d 1125 (Tex.Civ.App.1938), affm'd 134 Tex. 500, 137 S.W.2d 7 (1940). In Simms, a rental due on June 1, 1929, was paid in December, over six months late. The payment was accepted by the lessor, and it was held that such acceptance estopped the lessor from claiming that the lease had terminated before payment was made. The court said: The practical result... is the same as if Simms and wife [the lessors] had by binding agreement in December, revived the lease. By the same token, the written tender of lease rentals by Gulf States to Mrs. Martin two months late and her acceptance, endorsement, and deposit of the check to her account had the same effect as a binding agreement to revive the only existing lease on which any rentals were due. The transaction was contractual in nature. Furthermore, there is no ambiguity in the term lease rental. One pays lease rental for the purpose of delaying drilling operations, rather than consideration for a new lease. Griffith v. Taylor, 156 Tex. 1, 291 S.W.2d 673, 676 (1956). The parties were familiar with the term. Being evidenced by unambiguous written documents clearly designating the payment as rentals, extrinsic parol evidence was not admissible to prove that the lease rental was a bonus consideration for an unexecuted lease rather than rental due under the executed Martin-Elliott lease of November 20, 1973.