Opinion ID: 2633364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of defendant's murder conviction on appeal

Text: Ordinarily, if an alternative theory of criminal liability is found unsupported by the evidence, the judgment of conviction may rest on any legally sufficient theory unaffected by the error, unless the record affirmatively demonstrates that the jury relied on the unsupported ground. (See People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 42, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673 ( Johnson ), citing Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371; see also People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129-1130, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45.) Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeal, defendant's first degree murder conviction rested on either of two legally sufficient theories: premeditated murder (§ 189), and murder perpetrated by means of intentionally discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle with the specific intent to inflict death. ( Ibid. ) As we have explained, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first degree murder under either theory. Although it could not be determined who fired the fatal bullet, since sufficient evidence established that defendant and Gonzalez premeditated the murder of one another, and that the unlawful conduct of each was a substantial concurrent, and hence proximate, cause of Estrada's death, both could be convicted of the first degree murder of Estrada by operation of the doctrine of transferred intent. The Court of Appeal erred in concluding otherwise. Nor does the record affirmatively demonstrate that the jury rested defendant's first degree murder verdict on any other unsupported theory of liability. ( Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 42, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) The jury was instructed, pursuant to the standard instruction on provocative act murder (CALJIC No. 8.12), that A homicide committed during the commission of a crime by a person who is not a perpetrator of such crime in response to an intentional provocative act with implied malice by a defendant is considered in law to be an unlawful killing by such defendant. (Italics added.) Jurors are presumed able to understand and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have followed the court's instructions. ( People v. Scott (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1090, 1095, 246 Cal. Rptr. 406, and cases cited.) Defendant and Gonzalez engaged one another in a gun battle on a public street in broad daylight, during which each plainly attempted to murder the other. Given that their respective claims of self-defense were rejected by the jury, express malice on the part of each was patently established. In contrast, the definition of provocative act murder in the instruction given would have been triggered by the finding of a provocative act that gave rise to an inference of implied malice. Given that defendant and Gonzalez were each convicted of first degree murder on facts plainly establishing express malice, there is no sound basis on which to conclude that the jury rested defendant's first degree murder verdict on a finding that he committed a provocative act with implied malice. Nor is it logical to conclude such an implied malice murder would be elevated to first degree by operation of section 189. In People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365, we explained that provocative act implied malice murders are first degree murders when they occur during the course of a felony enumerated in section 189 that would support a first degree felony-murder conviction. ( People v. Gilbert, supra, at p. 705, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365.) Although section 189 was subsequently amended to make murder perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death  (§ 189, italics added) murder in the first degree, that provision by its very terms incorporates an express intent to kill requirement. It would have been anomalous for the Legislature to have intended section 189 to elevate a provocative act implied malice murder to first degree where the murder is committed by intentionally discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle with intent to inflict death, i.e., with express malice. Given the facts, defendant's first degree murder conviction logically did not rest on a provocative act implied malice murder theory, elevated to first degree by operation of section 189. [11] The Court of Appeal's conclusion to the contrary was in error. Finally, under the instructions given, in order to convict defendant of provocative act murder the jury would also have to find that Gonzalez, as the provoked shooter, was not a perpetrator of defendant's initial crime during which the homicide was committed. In one sense, both defendants might well be deemed perpetrators of the mutual crimethe simultaneous attempts to murder one another in a preplanned blaze of gunfirethat led to Estrada's death. [12] But even if we conclude Gonzalez was not a perpetrator of defendant's crime of attempted murder (of Gonzalez), Gonzalez was nonetheless found by the jury to have acted with his own express intent to kill in simultaneously premeditating and attempting the murder of defendanthardly the state of mind of an innocent victim who resists and kills in response to a violent felony, as envisioned in the seminal provocative act murder cases. (See, e.g., People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 782, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 [innocent victim of gas station robbery provoked into shooting back]; People v. Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 703, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365 [police officer returns gunfire killing fleeing robber's accomplice].) As Justice Kennard aptly reasons: Significantly, we are not faced with a situation in which the mental state of the person who fired the fatal shot was substantially more culpable than the mental state of the person who induced the shooter to act. . . . Because defendant and Gonzalez had equally culpable mental states and engaged in precisely the same conduct at the same time and place in exchanging shots, it is not unfair to hold them equally responsible for Estrada's death, without regard to which of them actually fired the bullet that struck and killed Estrada. (Cone. opn. of Kennard, J., post, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 145, 29 P.3d at p. 223.) We conclude defendant's first degree murder conviction rested on one or more legally sufficient theories, and that the record does not affirmatively demonstrate the jury relied on an unsupported theory in reaching that verdict. Accordingly, defendant's murder conviction must be affirmed. ( Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 42, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.)