Opinion ID: 1161683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Specific Statute

Text: The defendants next assert that the complaint was defective because the State charged the general crime of theft by deception rather than the specific crime of commission of a fraudulent insurance act, pursuant to K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 40-2,118. The State first argues that this court should refuse to consider the issue because the defendants failed to raise the issue to the trial court. In Carmichael v. State, 255 Kan. 10, 872 P.2d 240 (1994), the defendants raised, for the first time on appeal, a challenge to his rape convictions by asserting the more specific offense of aggravated incest should have been charged. The Carmichael court noted that a sentence which does not conform to the statutory provisions, either in character or the term of punishment authorized, is an illegal sentence and evaluated the issue, despite the fact that it had not been raised in the district court. 255 Kan. at 16. The defendants' argument here is that conspiracy to commit theft by deception is the general crime and conspiracy to commit a fraudulent insurance act is a more specific crime that is alleged to have occurred. Usually, when there is a conflict between a statute dealing generally with a subject and another statute dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the specific statute controls unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling. State v. Fritz, 261 Kan. 294, Syl. ¶ 1, 933 P.2d 126 (1997). In Carmichael, the question was whether, when a defendant is related to the victim of a sex crime, aggravated incest, a specific crime, should be charged rather than rape, a general crime. The Carmichael court found that even though the crimes of aggravated incest and rape contain different elements, when the prohibited relationship exists, aggravated incest is the specific offense and must be charged, rather than the general offense of rape. The rule that a more specific statute should prevail over the general statute is merely a rule of interpretation which is used to determine which statute the legislature intended to be applied in a particular case. State v. Hill, 16 Kan. App.2d 280, Syl. ¶ 1, 823 P.2d 201 (1991), rev. denied 250 Kan. 806 (1992). As pertinent to this case, a fraudulent insurance act, defined by K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 40-2,118(a), is an act committed by any person who, knowingly and with intent to defraud, presents, causes to be presented or prepares with knowledge or belief that it will be presented to or by an insurer, any written statement or claim for payment containing any materially false information. Theft by deception is obtaining by deception control over the property of another. K.S.A. 21-3701(a)(2). The State asserts that we are not required to answer the question because it was precluded from charging a fraudulent insurance act due to the fact that K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 40-2,118 was not effective until July 1, 1994, and the acts alleged in the conspiracy, specifically, all written claims presented to insurance companies, occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. The State argues that under these circumstances, charging a fraudulent act would have resulted in an ex post facto violation. An ex post facto violation occurs when a new law is retroactively applied to events that occurred before its enactment and the new law disadvantages the offender affected by it. State v. LaMunyon, 259 Kan. 54, 65, 911 P.2d 151 (1996). All criminal offenses, except those considered continuing offenses, are committed when every act which is an element of the offense has occurred. State v. Cox, 258 Kan. 557, 579-80, 908 P.2d 603 (1995). The State is correct in its assertion that it was precluded from charging conspiracy to commit a fraudulent insurance act because to prove the crime, it would have had to prove that the defendants submitted the written claims to the insurance companies prior to the effective date of the statute. In this case, even though the final overt act alleged in the complaint occurred after the effective date of the statute, all written claims presented to insurance companies occurred prior to the effective date of the statute. Therefore, the State was precluded from charging conspiracy to commit a fraudulent insurance act.