Opinion ID: 1922946
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of the belief

Text: A protected disclosure is defined, in relevant part, as any disclosure of information ... by an employee to a supervisor or a public body that the employee reasonably believes evidences ... [a] violation of a federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation .... D.C.Code § 1-615.52(6)(D) (emphasis added). Appellant contends that he was fired because he disclosed to the OIG Mr. Branham's August 23 order, as well as Branham's telephone call to the attorney for the Hamilton Square property, both of which he believed were illegal. To determine whether his belief was reasonable, the proper test is as follows: [C]ould a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee reasonably conclude that the actions of the government evidence [illegality]? A purely subjective perspective of an employee is not sufficient even if shared by other employees. The WPA is not a weapon in arguments over policy or a shield for insubordinate conduct. Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed.Cir.1999). [13] This analysis hinges not upon whether the order was ultimately determined to be illegal, but whether appellant reasonably believed that it was illegal. See Horton v. Department of the Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 283 (Fed.Cir.1995). The trial court found that appellant's belief was not that of an objectively reasonable person, but rather that of a rigid partisan whose beliefs and conduct were being challenged by his superiors. We discern no error in this finding. Because OTR's new policy was, for reasons explained above, so clearly a proper exercise of discretion, we conclude that someone with appellant's background and expertise could not reasonably believe that Mr. Branham's order, made pursuant to that policy, was illegal. See Haley v. Department of the Treasury, 977 F.2d 553, 557 (Fed.Cir.1992) (The relevant statutes clearly granted broad discretion .... Petitioner's experience as an Examiner and the clear language of the relevant authorities make Petitioner's claim [of a reasonable belief] untenable). The unreasonableness of appellant's belief is compounded by the fact that he never raised any objection toand indeed helped to createOTR's five o'clock rule. Appellant tries to distinguish the two policies from each other on the ground that OTR's new policy allows a taxpayer to withdraw an appeal after learning that an increase appears warranted, whereas under the five o'clock rule the taxpayer had to exercise the withdrawal option on the day of the hearing, which of course would be before a formal decision had been issued. This is not a meaningful distinction. As we have pointed out, 9 DCMR § 306.2 requires assessments to be made on the basis of the most current, accurate, and conclusive evidence of market value. Under the five o'clock rule, even though a decision had yet to be reached, more recent information was adduced at the hearing, thereby creating a more current and perhaps accurate body of information. Thus, if appellant's reasoning were followed to its logical conclusion, no withdrawal could be allowed under either policy. It was inconsistent, and therefore unreasonable, for appellant to believe that the new OTR policy was illegal, while at the same time endorsing the previous five o'clock rule. The trial court was correct when it concluded that the five o'clock rule on which plaintiff relies is no more than a different policy choice in the exercise of that same discretion.