Opinion ID: 1239694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defective manufacture.

Text: In Howes v. Hansen (1972), 56 Wis. 2d 247, 252, 253, 201 N. W. 2d 825, this court further considered the concept of strict liability in tort as it relates to the type of situations which are generally called product liability cases, and stated: In Dippel v. Sciano, this court adopted the concept of strict liability in tort propounded in the Restatement: `Sec. 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer `(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if `(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and `(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. `(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although `(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and `(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.' Strict liability is not absolute liability. Rather, it does aid the plaintiff by relieving him of proving specific acts of negligence and protecting him from the defenses of notice of breach, disclaimer and privity of contract. The plaintiff, according to Dippel, must yet prove: `. . . (1) that the product was in defective condition when it left the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) of the plaintiff's injuries or damages, (4) that the seller engaged in the business of selling such product or, put negatively, that this is not an isolated or infrequent transaction not related to the principal business of the seller, and (5) that the product was one which the seller expected to and did reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition it was when he sold it.' (Emphasis supplied.) The concept of strict liability, as spelled out in the Restatement 402A and as adopted by this court in Dippel, was explained by Mr. Justice HALLOWS, now chief justice, in his concurring opinion: `What we mean is that a seller who meets the conditions of sec. 402A, Restatement, 2 Torts 2d in Wisconsin is guilty of negligence as a matter of law and such negligence is subject to the ordinary rules of causation and the defense applicable to negligence.' In determining whether the plaintiff had presented evidence upon which the jury could conclude that the crop blower was unreasonably dangerous, the testimony of Dr. Norval Wardle and the plaintiff becomes important. Dr. Wardle is an agricultural safety engineer and qualified as an expert witness. He testified that he had closely examined the machine and the manner in which it operated. He also testified that a fundamental rule of agricultural design engineering, which was recognized by the industry when this machine was manufactured, was that a control should be located so as to suggest by its location and by its movement what it would accomplish. It was Dr. Wardle's expert opinion that the location of the clutch lever on the defendant's crop blower was misleading and contrary to this recognized rule. The injured plaintiff testified that he thought by pulling the clutch lever on the defendant's machine he would shut off the entire blower machine, both the auger and the fan, because the clutch lever was the only lever between the power source (tractor) and the machine. When the clutch lever was pulled it was obvious that it controlled the auger because that mechanism was in plain sight and came to a stop. The fan, on the other hand, was not readily visible because it was enclosed by the fan housing. The fan would not come to an immediate halt even if the power to it was shut off, but plaintiff said he thought he had given the fan enough time to stop before he had stepped up onto the edge of the hopper. The tractors both continued to operate and according to plaintiff this, and the fact that he was preoccupied with repairing the wagon, prevented him from hearing the fan as it continued to run. The jury was entitled to believe this testimony. Of the other manufacturers who produced crop blowers, nine had clutch levers which controlled the auger alone. None had clutch levers which controlled the fan. Dr. Wardle testified that all of these other manufacturers located the lever on the auger side of the fan housing, thus suggesting it would control only the auger, in accordance with the design engineering rule he had earlier explained. The expert testimony of Dr. Norval Wardle regarding the standard practice in the industry regarding the location of the clutch lever could be properly considered by the jury in determining whether the design of defendant's crop blower was unreasonably dangerous. See: Kalkopf v. Donald Sales & Mfg. Co. (1967), 33 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 147 N. W. 2d 277; Raim v. Ventura (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 67, 72, 113 N. W. 2d 827; and Hipke v. Industrial Comm. (1952), 261 Wis. 226, 232, 52 N. W. 2d 401. Eugene Sousek was project engineer for the defendant between 1960 and 1963, and he testified that the clutch lever on the crop blower was placed as it was so that the farmer who was putting up silage could more easily reach it than if it was located on the other side. The purpose at that time was to manufacture a machine which would make it easier for one man to run the entire operation. Also, Sousek said that the lever was placed in that position because it was immediately adjacent to the clutching mechanism which controlled the auger, although there was no mechanical reason which prevented the lever from being placed on the other side. He also explained one of the reasons for the clutch lever was to prevent overloading the fan. We are of the opinion that there is credible evidence upon which the jury could find that the positioning of the lever was unusual and misleading. There is credible evidence that the location of the clutch lever contradicted the custom and practice of other manufacturers, who designed their machines in accordance with the accepted functional design engineering rule explained by Dr. Wardle. The jury could well have concluded that the placement of this lever could lead a potential user of the machine to believe he was stopping both the auger and the fan when he pulled the lever. In the absence of a warning to the contrary, the jury could well conclude that the machine was unreasonably dangerous and defective in its design by locating the control lever in such a misleading position without an appropriate warning. It was demonstrated at trial that the crop blower in question bore a warning label which read in pertinent part: BE CAREFUL . . . 4. Keep hands, feet and clothing away from power-driven parts. 5. Keep off implement unless seat or platform is provided. Keep others off. The trial court held that this warning was adequate as a matter of law and that plaintiff had violated this rule when he stepped onto the edge of the hopper. The court explained: . . . In spite of all the arguments made by plaintiff's counsel that the machine was defective because of the `misleading' placement of the auger clutch and the failure to have a warning sign on the handle of the auger clutch, the above quoted warning was certainly adequate as a matter of law and according to the rule: `A product bearing such warning which would be safe for use if followed, is not in a defective condition nor is it unreasonably dangerous.' Plaintiff was an experienced farmer and testified that he had seen such warning labels on combines in the past, but had never seen the label on this machine. The sign was a standard one used in the industry on various farm machinery. The machine was generally too muddy for the warning to be seen, according to the plaintiff. Dr. Wardle testified that the warning was not appropriate, nor was it practically located. The label was located low on the back of the belt shield toward the tractor side of the crop blower. Plaintiff characterizes its location as ankle level. Moreover, the trial court also concluded that if the warning was obscured, it was the fault of the machine owner or the farm owner, and not of the manufacturer. In this respect the trial court committed error. Commensurate with the duty to warn is the duty to make reasonable efforts to bring that warning to the attention of the potential users of the product. Thus the manufacturer may have to anticipate that placing the warning as it did created a reasonable likelihood it would become obscured. In any event, the warning mentions nothing about the danger involved, to wit, the fan is not shut off by the lever. While it does warn the user to keep off the machine and keep hands, feet . . . away from power-driven parts, a jury could reasonably infer that the warning appears to be applicable to when the machine is operating. Thus, the jury could infer the warning was irrelevant if it chose to believe the testimony submitted by the plaintiff because the alleged defect was that the plaintiff had been led to believe the machine was not operating. Implicit in the duty to warn is the duty to warn with a degree of intensity that would cause a reasonable man to exercise for his own safety the caution commensurate with the potential danger. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait (Fla. 1958), 103 So. 2d 603, 609. The duty to warn . . . is a duty to give a warning which is adequate and appropriate under the circumstances. Annot. (1961), Products LiabilityDuty to Warn, 76 A. L. R. 2d, p. 15, sec. 2. Moreover, it is generally recognized: Various general criteria against which a warning is to be measured to determine its adequacy have been stated by the courts. Thus, it has been said that a seller must give the purchaser of a dangerous article a warning that is accurate, strong, and clear, and readily noticeable. Any ambiguity in the language of a warning furnished in connection with the sale of a chattel is to be `construed against the one who chose the words used.' The warning must be appropriate; implicit in the duty to warn is the duty to warn with a degree of intensity that would cause a reasonable man to exercise for his own safety the caution commensurate with the potential danger. From this it follows that the likelihood of an accident's taking place and the seriousness of the consequences are always pertinent matters to be considered with respect to the duty to provide a sufficient warning label, and that there is a particular need for a sufficient warning where there is a representation that the product in question is not dangerous. 63 Am. Jur. 2d, Products Liability, p. 62, sec. 53. Plaintiff testified he believed he had shut off the fan by pulling the lever and the jury was entitled to accept his testimony. Plaintiff persuasively argues that the adequacy of the warning was for the jury's determination, citing Hyland Hall & Co. v. Madison Gas & Electric Co. (1960), 11 Wis. 2d 238, 243, 105 N. W. 2d 305, and under the facts of this case we are of the opinion the trial court erred in holding that, contrary to the verdict of the jury, the warning was adequate as a matter of law.