Opinion ID: 2826211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction, Justiciability, and Standing

Text: [¶15] At oral argument, Gregor stated that there has been a lack of clarity on the issue of whether a party’s standing affects a court’s jurisdiction. We do not agree, but will begin by addressing this issue. [¶16] Standing is properly labeled an issue of “justiciability.” Madore v. Me. Land Use Regulation Comm’n, 1998 ME 178, ¶ 8, 715 A.2d 157. “Justiciability requires a real and substantial controversy, admitting of specific relief through a judgment of conclusive character.” Witham Family Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Bar Harbor, 2015 ME 12, ¶ 7, 110 A.3d 642. “Courts can only decide cases before them that involve justiciable controversies.” Id. (quoting Lewiston Daily Sun v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 43, 1999 ME 143, ¶ 12, 738 A.2d 1239). [¶17] We have recognized before that the words “jurisdiction” and “jurisdictional” are understood to have “‘many, too many, meanings,’” and that “[c]ourts ‘have been less than meticulous’ in using the term[s].” Landmark Realty v. Leasure, 2004 ME 85, ¶ 7, 853 A.2d 749 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)). The word “jurisdiction” most properly encapsulates only “‘prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.’” Id. (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455). 12 [¶18] We have stated before that standing issues are “jurisdictional,” see, e.g., Stull v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 2000 ME 21, ¶ 11, 745 A.2d 975, but that observation is shorthand for the statement that standing affects a party’s capacity to invoke a court’s jurisdiction, see Brink’s, Inc. v. Me. Armored Car & Courier Serv., Inc., 423 A.2d 536, 537 (Me. 1980). We have made a similar observation in other foreclosure cases. See, e.g., Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶ 9, 96 A.3d 700 (“Without possession of or any interest in the note, [a party] lack[s] standing to institute foreclosure proceedings and [may] not invoke the jurisdiction of our trial courts.” (quoting Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2010 ME 79, ¶ 15, 2 A.3d 289)). [¶19] Standing does not affect the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over foreclosures; 14 M.R.S. § 6321 grants subject-matter jurisdiction of all foreclosure cases to our trial courts. A party may not invoke that jurisdiction without standing, however, which is also required by section 6321. Cf. Brink’s, Inc., 423 A.2d at 537 (noting that the first sentence of a now repealed and replaced statute granted subject-matter jurisdiction to this Court to hear appeals of Public Utilities Commission decisions and that the second sentence “define[d] the class of persons [that] ha[d] standing to invoke [that] jurisdiction”). [¶20] Just as a court may notice and act on issues of jurisdiction at any time, so may a court notice and act on issues relating to its authority at any time, on its 13 own motion or on the motion of a party. Francis v. Dana-Cummings, 2007 ME 16, ¶ 20, 915 A.2d 412; see also Nemon v. Summit Floors, Inc., 520 A.2d 1310, 1312 (Me. 1987) (“We will entertain a question of standing at any time.”). [¶21] Here, the court properly determined that Homeward Residential/Ocwen lacked standing to bring the foreclosure action pursuant to section 6321. The plaintiff in a foreclosure action must demonstrate that it is the holder of the promissory note and the owner of the mortgage, or that it is claiming under the holder and owner. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶¶ 9, 10, 12, 96 A.3d 700. Homeward Residential/Ocwen admitted that it does not own the mortgage, and did not offer evidence that it was claiming under the owner of the mortgage. Homeward Residential/Ocwen conceded in its responses to Gregor’s requests for admissions that Fannie Mae owns the mortgage. [¶22] The court also did not clearly err in finding that, because Homeward Residential/Ocwen had a copy of the Fannie Mae assignment in its file for the mortgage, it was more likely than not that each entity assigned the mortgage after it was assigned to Fannie Mae had actual knowledge of the unrecorded assignment. See 33 M.R.S. § 201 (2014); Spickler v. Ginn, 2012 ME 46, ¶ 10, 18, 40 A.3d 999 (interpreting 33 M.R.S. § 201 to provide that when a party chooses not to record a deed, that deed trumps the interest in the same property of the grantor, the grantor’s heirs and devisees, and any person having “actual notice” of the 14 unrecorded conveyance, even if the later person records her deed, as long as she had actual notice of the unrecorded deed at the time she recorded the deed). Any plaintiff claiming to have an interest in the mortgage superior to that of Fannie Mae would have been required to join Fannie Mae as a necessary party. See M.R. Civ. P. 19. No effort at joinder was initiated here. [¶23] Finally, Ocwen’s witness’s testimony called into question whether Homeward Residential continued to exist. Therefore, the record wholly supports the court’s determination that Homeward Residential/Ocwen failed to demonstrate that either had standing to maintain the foreclosure action. [¶24] Although the court maintained jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter, it could not decide the merits of the case when the plaintiff lacked standing pursuant to section 6321. See Witham Family Ltd. P’ship, 2015 ME 12, ¶ 7, 110 A.3d 642 (“Courts can only decide cases before them that involve justiciable controversies.”). Instead, the court could only dismiss the action. Because the court addressed the merits of the complaint for foreclosure in its judgment, we vacate the judgment in its entirety and remand for an entry of a dismissal without prejudice.