Opinion ID: 2076252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: testimony of major thompson

Text: Hunt next alleges that the trial judge erred when he denied Hunt's motion for a mistrial during the testimony of Major Hollis Thompson, Chief of Security at the Maryland Penitentiary. Major Thompson when testifying about a knife that was recovered from Hunt's cell, stated that the knife had a lot of blood on it. Upon objection by defense counsel, the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard Major Thompson's statement about the blood, but denied Hunt's motion for a mistrial. Hunt argues that Major Thompson's testimony was so prejudicial that only mistrial could cure the damage. [T]he declaration of a mistrial is an extraordinary act which should only be granted if necessary to serve the ends of justice. Jones, 310 Md. at 587, 530 A.2d at 752. This Court has recognized that granting a motion for a mistrial lies within the discretion of the trial judge. Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 183, 453 A.2d 1218, 1227 (1983). The trial judge, who hears the entire case and can weigh the danger of prejudice arising from improper testimony, is in the best position to determine if the extraordinary remedy of a mistrial is appropriate. We will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial unless the defendant was so clearly prejudiced that the denial constituted an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. State, 303 Md. 487, 516, 495 A.2d 1, 16 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 868, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986) ( Johnson II ). We hold that Hunt was not so clearly prejudiced that the judge's denial of a mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion. There was no suggestion that Hunt had used this knife or any other weapon to assault any inmate or guard, nor is there any suggestion that, if the substance was in fact blood, it was not Hunt's. The judge took curative action when he instructed the jury to disregard Major Thompson's testimony about blood on the knife. This action of striking the single reference to blood on the knife in Thompson's testimony sufficiently cured any prejudice that may have occurred. Collins, 318 Md. at 287, 568 A.2d at 9.
Hunt contends that the trial judge erred in admitting Major Thompson's opinion that Hunt was dangerous. After Major Thompson had testified about Hunt's behavior in prison and about prison disciplinary procedures, he testified as follows: [STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Have you made a decision about Flint Gregory Hunt? A. Yes. Q. What do you consider him? A. Oh, he's dangerous. He's dangerous. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. Hunt's only contention on appeal is that there was no evidentiary basis for Major Thompson's opinion on this issue. We initially point out that once again Hunt's attorney merely objected to the answer. He did not ask the court to strike the testimony, did not move for a mistrial, and did not ask for a cautionary instruction. Even if Hunt had sought curative action, we would find no reversible error. Hunt's contention on appeal is not that the opinion was improper, but that Major Thompson was not competent to express the opinion. Hunt acknowledges that the opinion was related to an important mitigating factor. A witness must have an adequate basis for an opinion about the character of another before the opinion may be admitted into evidence. Durkin v. State, 284 Md. 445, 453, 397 A.2d 600, 605 (1979). The trial judge determines whether the witness satisfies this requirement, and the judge's determination will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. The jury heard a great deal of evidence on the issue of Hunt's dangerousness. Mitigating circumstances number 7 was [i]t is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Hunt called as a witness Gordon Kamka, the former Secretary for Public Safety. Mr. Kamka was questioned about his opinion as to whether or not Hunt would be a danger within the institution. Q. Do you have an opinion, sir, as an expert in correctional administration whether Mr. Hunt is a danger in the institution? A. I do have an opinion. Q. Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what that is? A. I don't believe he is a danger inside the institution. He is a problem to the correctional staff, in that he has a number of disciplinary reports, a number of tickets, is what we call them, but I see no indication that he is any particular danger to himself or to other people. A problem, yes; irritant, yes; danger, in my opinion, no. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by determining that Major Thompson had an adequate basis for forming an opinion about Hunt's dangerousness. Certainly, Major Thompson was as qualified as defense witness Kamka. Mr. Kamka met Hunt once, and reviewed his records. Major Thompson had 16 years of experience as a correctional officer. He was Chief of Security for the Maryland Penitentiary. As a security officer, he was aware of Hunt's many infractions in the penitentiary. Major Thompson received reports on Hunt's violations of the rule prohibiting possession of weapons. He knew that Hunt was placed in segregation status for those violations. Major Thompson's testimony was specifically about Hunt's dangerousness in the prison, not Hunt's general capacity for dangerousness. Major Thompson was qualified to form and offer an opinion on the subject.