Opinion ID: 741895
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instructions on Pretext

Text: 47 The defendants next argue that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the issue of pretext. In reviewing jury instructions, we consider all the jury heard, and from the standpoint of the jury, decide not whether the charge was faultless in every particular, but whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duties to determine these issues. Considine v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 43 F.3d 1349, 1365 (10th Cir.1994) (quotations and citations omitted). While the instruction as a whole must convey the correct statement of the applicable law, no particular form is essential. Id. We reverse an erroneous jury instruction only when we have substantial doubt whether the instructions, considered as a whole, properly guided the jury in its deliberations. Id. 48 After instructing the jury on the elements of Mason's political patronage claim, the district court gave the following instruction regarding pretext: 49 The Defendants in this case allege that the Oklahoma Turnpike Authority had a legitimate reason for terminating the Plaintiff, i.e., an agency reorganization. The Defendants do not bear the burden of proof with respect to the reason for terminating the Plaintiff. Thus, the Plaintiff can prevail only if he proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that political patronage was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to terminate him, in addition to any legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. 50 If you find that the stated reasons given by the Defendants are inconsistent or implausible, or that the Defendants have substantially deviated from their own practices or customs, then you may conclude that the offered explanation is a mere pretext for political patronage. If you find pretext, you may also infer that political patronage was a substantial or motivating factor in the employment decision; though you are not required to draw such an inference. 51 If you do not find that the Defendants' explanations were a mere pretext, you must still consider whether political patronage was a determining factor in the Plaintiff's termination. 52 The Plaintiff is not required to prove that political patronage was the sole motivation or the primary motivation for the Defendants' decision to terminate his employment. The Plaintiff need only prove that political patronage was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to discharge him. 53 App. Vol. II at 652. The court gave a similar instruction with respect to Mason's wrongful discharge claim. 54 The defendants contend that the court's pretext instructions allowed the jury to find for Mason solely by disbelieving the defendants' explanation for the discharge. We disagree. The instructions repeatedly and accurately place the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to prove that political patronage and/or retaliation was a substantial or motivating factor in the employment decision. With respect to pretext, the instructions merely informed the jury that, if it disbelieved the defendants' proffered reason for the discharge, then it may, but need not, infer that an illegitimate motive existed. The jury would be permitted (but not required) to draw such an inference because Mason had already presented sufficient evidence of political patronage and retaliation--i.e., sufficient evidence of a prima facie case--to warrant submission of those claims to the jury. Once Mason presented such evidence, a finding of pretext is simply inferential evidence of discriminatory animus that may aid the jury in answering the ultimate question: Did political patronage and/or retaliation motivate the employment decision? See Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir.1995) (The defendant fails to appreciate that the Supreme Court has said that discriminatory animus may be inferred from the simple showing of pretext. Thus, a showing of pretext is evidence which allows a jury to infer discriminatory intent.). 9 55 Furthermore, we reject the defendants' additional argument that pretext is relevant in Title VII, but not section 1983 actions. When an employer's intent is the ultimate issue, the jury's disbelief of the employer's proffered reasons for a termination will typically, if not always, be relevant to its ultimate determination. See Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1393-94 (10th Cir.1990) (The absence of any legitimate motive for the plaintiff's termination makes it more likely that other motives, such as political patronage, were behind the decision to fire the plaintiff.); Howard v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 27 n. 2 (2d Cir.1993) (Though pretext analysis was developed in Title VII cases, ... it is fully applicable to constitutional claims where the issue is whether an improper motive existed ....); see also Brown v. MFC Finance Co. of Oklahoma, 838 P.2d 524, 527 (Okla.App.1992) (applying pretext analysis to a retaliatory discharge claim). 10 In sum, we hold that the court's instruction properly guided the jury, and is not grounds for reversal. 56