Opinion ID: 2168209
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Heading: The Application of Sec. 269.46 (1), Stats.

Text: This section of the statutes authorizes the court to relieve a party from a mistake at any time within one year after notice. The one year starts to run after notice of the judgment or order from which relief is sought. Knowledge is the equivalent of notice under sec. 269.46 (1), Stats. Langlade Realty Co. v. Magee (1914), 156 Wis. 457, 461, 145 N. W. 1101; Bloor v. Smith (1901), 112 Wis. 340, 351, 87 N. W. 870. The statute does not refer to notice of entry of judgment but, on the contrary, refers only to notice of the judgment. In the instant case, there was a verbal pronouncement by the court after a hearing on May 2, 1962, which permitted Thorp's counsel to prepare findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a judgment. From the record it is clear that findings of fact and conclusions of law were signed by the trial court on May 2, 1962. However, there is an ambiguity surrounding the date of the actual judgment. An examination of the record suggests that a judgment was signed by the clerk of the Chippewa county court on May 2, 1962. However, the date of May 2, 1962, was stricken, and the date of June 14, 1963, was substituted therefor, with the initials of the court clerk appearing alongside. While there is ambiguity concerning the date of the judgment, there is no ambiguity concerning the fact that a notice of entry of judgment was dated May 3, 1962, and addressed to various attorneys, including the attorneys for the appellant, Eau Claire Tile. This notice was signed by Thorp's attorney and gives notice to the effect that the judgment was entered on May 2, 1962.  While there may be a scintilla of doubt that Eau Claire Tile actually received notice of the entry of judgment and that a judgment was in fact entered on May 2, 1962, there can be no doubt whatsoever that Thorp had notice of the order for judgment and was chargeable with the entry of such judgment. If there was a failure to prepare a judgment or to enter it, it was an error attributable to Thorp. Under the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that Thorp had notice of the judgment within the meaning of sec. 269.46 (1), Stats., not later than May 3, 1962. Therefore, the amendment of the judgment on October 29, 1963, was beyond the one year authorized by sec. 269.46 (1).