Opinion ID: 2559391
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Daniel's Exceptions

Text: We quickly dispense with Daniel's exceptions to the Board's Report and Recommendation. The only argument Daniel has preserved for review in this court is his challenge to the one-year suspension recommended by the Board. We discuss that issue in Section II.B.3, infra. Daniel did not raise before the Board any of the other issues raised in his brief to this court, and therefore he has waived them. See In re Hines, 482 A.2d 378, 383-84 (D.C.1984) (respondent waived the issue by not raising it before the [Board]). Although Daniel claims that he has not abandoned his delay argument, in proceedings before the Board he addressed this issue only as a mitigating factor to be considered in assessing an appropriate sanction. In any event, Daniel's delay argument is meritless because, as the Hearing Committee stated, Daniel has not shown any prejudice to his case as a result of delay. See In re Williams, 513 A.2d 793, 796 (D.C.1986) (Any betrayal of the trust which the attorney is sworn to keep demands appropriate discipline; a delay in prosecution, without more, cannot override this necessity.). Daniel also waived the argument that he did not violate Rule 1.15(a)'s prohibition against commingling client and personal funds in account 329 by not challenging the Hearing Committee's finding of a violation of that rule; to the contrary, Daniel's brief to the Board expressly stated that he accept[ed] the findings of fact made by the Hearing Committee. In any event, there is overwhelming, not to mention clear and convincing, evidence that Daniel held both client funds and personal funds in the 329 account. Daniel's argument that he did not violate the spirit of Rule 1.15(a) holds no weight. See In re Hessler, 549 A.2d 700, 700 (D.C.1988) (One of the most basic rules of fiduciary conduct is that the fiduciary must not commingle his own property with that held by him belonging to another. In particular, fiduciary funds must be kept separate and deposited in a special account.) (interpreting Disciplinary Rule 9-103(A), the predecessor to Rule 1.15(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct). Finally, Daniel also waived any challenge to the Board's conclusion that his statements to the IRS violated Rule 8.4(c). Daniel's argument, raised for the first time in this court, that he never signed, executed, or attested to the April 9, 2003, letter to the IRS comes too late. He already has accepted the Hearing Committee's findings of fact. In addition, his assertion that the letter to the IRS does not support a finding of a violation of Rule 8.4(c) is wrong. Daniel admits that the statements in this letter were not true. We have deemed even technically true answers to the IRS to be dishonest. See In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 768 (D.C. 1990). Therefore, Daniel's not true statements are most assuredly dishonest.