Opinion ID: 2518909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Absolute Judicial Proceeding Privilege

Text: ¶ 28 The Parents have also invited us to affirm the district court on the alternative ground that their statements were not actionable because they were protected by either an absolute or conditional privilege. We consider here whether the Parents' statements qualify for protection under an absolute or conditional privilege and will consider each privilege claim in turn. ¶ 29 When circumstances mandate wholly open, frank, and unchilled communication, the law readjusts the scales that balance the right to free expression with the interest in protecting one's reputation. See, e.g., DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, ¶ 10, 992 P.2d 979. The scales tip most heavily in favor of unfettered expression when we confer an absolute privilege on the speaker. We extend absolute privileges to persons whose special position or status requires that they be as free as possible from fear that their actions in their position might subject them to legal action. Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1990). Participants in judicial proceedings are among those who qualify for such a privilege against defamation. Id. ¶ 30 The Parents claim absolute sanctuary within this privilege. It is specifically bestowed upon those who make statements during or in the course of a judicial proceeding and exists for the purpose of preserving both the integrity of the judicial proceeding and the associated quest for the ascertainment of truth that lies at its heart. Id. It is not inimical to this objective that speakers may express false statements, even those uttered with ill motives, within judicial proceedings free of the risk that tort will hold them to account. The system achieves a satisfactory measure of confidence that the search for truth has been fruitful when all who claim to possess part of or the entire truth may freely disclose the basis of that claim. ¶ 31 The judicial proceeding privilege has three elements. First, the alleged defamatory statement must have been made during or in the course of a judicial proceeding. Second, the statement must have some reference to the proceeding's subject matter. Third, the party claiming the privilege must have been acting in the capacity of a judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel in the proceeding at the time of the alleged defamation. Id. at 1313; see also Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶¶ 27-31, 164 P.3d 366 (applying the judicial proceeding privilege in the context of a complaint); Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, ¶ 13, 40 P.3d 1128 (discussing the privilege, its elements, and its furthered public policies as akin to that of the legislative proceeding privilege); Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ¶ 8, 20 P.3d 895 (applying the privilege in the context of a published demand letter); Allen, 802 P.2d at 1311-13 (reviewing the history to date of Utah jurisprudence surrounding the privilege). The statements attributed to the Parents fail on all counts. ¶ 32 Our view of the forums and events that are entitled to designation as judicial proceedings is an expansive one. Pratt, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 29, 164 P.3d 366; see also DeBry, 1999 UT 111, ¶ 14, 992 P.2d 979 ([T]he requirement that the defamatory statement must be made in the course of a judicial proceeding requires a broad interpretation of the term `judicial proceeding.'). Even under the broadest definition of the term, however, the Parents give us scant reason to deem remarks made by several of their number during the Community Comment portion of an Alpine School District Board meeting as falling within any quasi-judicial function of the school board. Although the school board may have the authority to conduct quasi-judicial proceedings under certain circumstances, the record here makes clear that no such proceeding was underway or even contemplated when the statements were made. In the absence of a pending proceeding, the Parents' statements could not possibly satisfy the privilege's second element: that the content of the statements related to the subject matter of the proceeding. ¶ 33 A comparison of the Parents' appearance at the school board meeting with the facts in Allen is instructive. In Allen, we reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a clinical social worker who had sent letters to a mayor and a domestic-relations commissioner, alleging that a child's mother and stepfather had sexually molested the child. 802 P.2d at 1308. The mother had previously filed a petition to modify her custody and visitation rights. Believing the child to have been abused, the child's father solicited the letters detailing the social worker's affirming conclusions. We held that the social worker was ineligible for the privilege because she failed to satisfy its third element: when she made her statements, she was not, as a matter of law, acting as a witness in a judicial proceeding. For purposes of the privilege, a witness must be more than a person with sufficient expertise in or knowledge of a matter to be of some potential benefit. We were troubled that a contrary view would permit individuals, on their own initiative, to direct libelous communications to a participant or decision maker in a litigation with impunity. Id. at 1313. The judicial system, even when broadly defined, does not demand such license. Id. We decline to extend that license to the Parents here. We believe that the objectives of the absolute, judicial proceeding privilege are at odds with permitting unsolicited communication of defamatory statements to an entity that has undertaken no judicial proceeding. We therefore hold that the absolute privilege is inapplicable to the statements made by the Parents.