Opinion ID: 6497670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review and sentencing standards

Text: ¶11 We review a circuit court's sentencing decision for an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Dodson, 2022 WI 5, ¶8, 400 Wis. 2d 313, 969 N.W.2d 225. A circuit court erroneously exercises its sentencing discretion when it actually relies on clearly irrelevant or improper factors. Id. Accordingly, a defendant challenging his or her sentence must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the challenged factor is irrelevant or improper; and (2) the circuit court actually relied on that factor. Id. ¶12 Sentencing factors are proper when they inform valid sentencing objectives including the protection of the community, punishment of the defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and deterrence to others. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶40, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197; see also Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2). Primary factors informing those objectives include the gravity of the offense, the character of the offender, and the need to protect the public. Dodson, 400 Wis. 2d 313, ¶9. Secondary factors include: (1) Past record of criminal offense; (2) history of undesirable behavior pattern; (3) the defendant's personality, character and social traits; (4) result of presentence investigation; (5) vicious or aggravated nature of the crime; (6) degree of the defendant's culpability; (7) defendant's demeanor at 7 No. 2020AP29-CR trial; (8) defendant's age, educational background and employment record; (9) defendant's remorse, repentance and cooperativeness; (10) defendant's need for close rehabilitative control; (11) the rights of the public; and (12) the length of pretrial detention. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶43 n.11. ¶13 To prove actual reliance on an improper factor, a defendant must show that the circuit court made the improper factor a part of the basis for the sentence. Dodson, 400 Wis. 2d 313, ¶10. We have interpreted this to mean that a defendant must show that the circuit court impose[d] 'a harsher sentence solely because' of the improper factor. State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶¶46, 53, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373 (quoting Buckner v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 539, 550, 202 N.W.2d 406 (1972)); see, e.g., State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120 (holding that a circuit court impermissibly imposed a harsher sentence solely because the defendant exercised his constitutional right to refuse to submit to a warrantless blood draw). To be the sole cause of a harsher sentence, an improper factor must stand alone as an independent factor. See Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶50. That means a circuit court's reliance on an improper factor cannot be cured by additionally relying on other proper, but unrelated, sentencing considerations. However, if a circuit court's reference to a challenged factor bears a reasonable nexus to a 8 No. 2020AP29-CR proper sentencing factor, then the circuit court has not imposed sentence based solely on the improper factor.6 Id. 6 This case highlights some confusion regarding the correct approach to evaluating constitutionally protected conduct considered at sentencing. The court of appeals, following guidance from federal cases, has applied a reliable nexus test in determining whether consideration of constitutionally protected conduct at sentencing is improper. See State v. Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903, 913, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994) ([A] sentencing court may consider a defendant's religious beliefs and practices only if a reliable nexus exists between the defendant's criminal conduct and the defendant's religious beliefs and practices.). This reliable nexus test is applied under the first prong of the test set out in Alexander——the improper-factor prong. State v. Alexander, 2015 WI 6, ¶17, 360 Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662. More recently, this court has applied a reasonable nexus test in the context of the second prong——the actual-reliance prong. See State v. Dodson, 2022 WI 5, ¶10, 400 Wis. 2d 313, 969 N.W.2d 225 (citing State v. Williams, 2018 WI 59, ¶53, 381 Wis. 2d 661, 912 N.W.2d 373); State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶4, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409. But see Dodson, 400 Wis. 2d 313, ¶¶21-23 (Hagedorn, J., concurring) (arguing that the reasonable nexus analysis more properly goes to whether the factor was improper rather than whether it was actually relied on). In Williams, this court appeared to consider a nexus to proper sentencing factors under both analytical prongs. Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶¶51, 53 (saying both that when the factor is inextricably intertwined with a defendant's character and lack of remorse, its consideration is proper, and that [t]he sole reference to [the alleged improper factor] bore a reasonable nexus to the relevant factor of Williams' lack of remorse). 9 No. 2020AP29-CR