Opinion ID: 1160921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether the PSA violates Labor Code section 923, 1779, or 1780

Text: Labor Code section 923 declares that the public policy of California favors the rights of individual workers to freedom of association, self-organization, the designation of representatives of their choice, negotiation of the terms and conditions of their employment, and freedom from interference or restraint by employers in the exercise of those rights. [7] ABC contends the PSA frustrates the right of its members' workers under this statute by precluding them from choosing for themselves whether to be represented by the relevant craft union. There are several problems with ABC's argument. First, as the Commission and the Trades Council point out, ABC lacks standing to assert the organizational rights of the workers employed by its members. None of the cases ABC cites in an attempt to demonstrate it possesses standing to do so are relevant, [8] and other courts addressing the issue in the context of project labor agreements have uniformly rejected attempts by contractor associations to assert standing on behalf of their members' employees. (See, e.g., Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Otter Tail Power (8th Cir.1979) 611 F.2d 684, 693 [The assertion of the employees' rights is properly left to a plaintiff who actually has those rights.]; Utility Contractors Ass'n of New England v. Comm. of Mass. Dept. of Public Works (Mass.Super.Ct.1996) 5 Mass.L.Rptr. 17, 33 [153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2297, 1996 WL 106983, ] [holding contractors' association lacked standing because it was not an affected employee or association of employees but rather an association of contractors, and neither it nor any of its members had suffered a cognizable injury under statute protecting workers]; NYS Chapter v. N.Y. State Thruway Authority (1994) 207 A.D.2d 26, 620 N.Y.S.2d 855, 858, affd. sub. nam. N.Y. State Chapter v. Thruway Authority, supra, 88 N.Y.2d 56, 643 N.Y.S.2d 480, 666 N.E.2d 185 [concluding contractor-bidders lacked standing to assert violations of constitutional and statutory provisions on behalf of employees]; cf. Azusa Western, Inc. v. City of West Covina (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 259, 265-266, 119 Cal.Rptr. 434 [`It is a firmly established principle of law that one may not urge the unconstitutionality of a statute unless his rights are adversely affected thereby ....' [Citation.]].) Second, ABC's argument lacks merit under state law. The California statutes that declare and protect workers' rights to self-determination in matters of labor organization cannot reasonably be construed to invalidate project labor agreements. Courts have held that even agency shop agreements are lawful in this state; a fortiori, project labor agreements, which restrict workers' freedom to a lesser degree, must also be lawful. ( Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Etc. Local No. 88 (1960) 53 Cal.2d 455, 474-475, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76 [[C]losed or union shop agreements and concerted activities to achieve them are lawful in this state whether or not a majority of the employees directly involved wish such agreements.]; Roe v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Supervisory Etc. Assn. (1980) 114 Cal. App.3d 147, 154, 170 Cal.Rptr. 448 [The right to work guaranteed by the California Constitution is not absolute, but may be limited by an agreement that union membership is a condition for employment.]; see also Boston Harbor, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 230, 113 S.Ct. 1190 [federal law permits construction industry employers to enter into agreements providing for union recognition, compulsory union dues or equivalents, and mandatory use of hiring halls before hiring any employees]; Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn. (1991) 500 U.S. 507, 520-521, 111 S.Ct. 1950, 114 L.Ed.2d 572 [union security agreements are justified by the government's interest in promoting labor peace and avoiding the free rider problem that would otherwise accompany union recognition].) Englund v. Chavez (1972) 8 Cal.3d 572, 593, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457, on which ABC relies, has no application here: That case dealt with agricultural workers, who are expressly not governed by the NLRA (see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)), and, indeed, California law bars prehire agreements in the agricultural industry (see Lab.Code, §§ 1153, subd. (f), 1156-1159). Finally, ABC's argument fails to come to terms with the supremacy of federal labor law, embodied in 29 United States Code section 158(f), which permits prehire agreements in the construction industry. Any California law purporting to bar such agreements would raise serious questions of preemption under Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n (1976) 427 U.S. 132, 147, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396, which prohibits state and municipal regulation of areas that have been left `to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.' ( Id. at p. 140, 96 S.Ct. 2548.)  Machinists pre-emption preserves Congress' `intentional balance `between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective interests.'' [Citation.] ( Boston Harbor, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 226, 113 S.Ct. 1190.) As the high court observed, Indeed, there is some force to petitioners' argument ... that denying an option to public owner-developers that is available to private owner-developers itself places a restriction on Congress' intended free play of economic forces identified in Machinists.  ( Id. at p. 232, 113 S.Ct. 1190.) It is unnecessary here to resolve definitively whether the rule in Machinists would preempt the interpretation of Labor Code section 923 for which ABC argues, as we conclude that interpretation does not correctly reflect California law. ABC forfeited its contentions regarding Labor Code sections 1779 and 1780 by failing to raise them at a prior stage of this litigation, and we therefore need not address them. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1).) Were we to do so, how they would provide a basis for invalidating the PSA requirement is in any event unclear. These statutes are criminal anti-kickback laws; [9] ABC cites no authority supporting its implicit argument that they create a private right of action against a public entity for imposition of a bid requirement. Moreover, nothing in the record supports ABC's accusation that union hiring halls charge fees for usage. The discriminatory charging of such fees, we note, may be an unfair labor practice under federal law. (See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5); Local 138, Internat'l U. of Operating Engineers v. N.L.R.B. (2d Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 130, 134; N.L.R.B. v. Local 138, Internat'l U. of Operating Engineers (2d Cir.1967) 385 F.2d 874, 877-878.) Finally, the same question of possible Machinists preemption, noted above, would arise were sections 1779 and 1780 interpreted to preclude project labor agreements of the kind involved in this case.