Opinion ID: 458544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: liability of biw in its capacity as employer

Text: 50 We now turn to the land-based third-party negligence claims alleged in Counts I through V, which challenge acts or omissions of BIW in its capacity as an employer. There can be no question that if the MWCA is the governing law, it bars these actions. Section 4 of the Maine Act states that employers who provide workers' compensation shall be exempt from civil actions because of such injuries either at common law or under sections 141 to 148, under Title 14, sections 8101 to 8118 or under Title 18-A, section 2-804. Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 39, Sec. 4 (1978). 13 This provision has been unequivocally interpreted by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court to provide a covered employer with immunity from third-party claims arising from work-related injuries to its employees that extends to all non-contractual rights of contribution and indemnity. McKellar v. Clark Equipment Co., 472 A.2d at 416; Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d at 51. 51 Defendants do not dispute the effect of the Maine statute, but argue that it does not apply. Their argument, as we understand it, runs as follows: Plaintiffs' claim for workers' compensation was made under the Longshore Act, 33 U.S.C. Secs. 901-950, not the Maine Act; therefore, it is the LHWCA that is implicated. This means that it is the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA, Sec. 905(a), 14 that controls and under Lockheed Aircraft Corporation v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 74 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983), Sec. 905(a) does not bar third-party actions. 52 Since the linchpin of defendants' argument is Lockheed, we turn first to that decision. Lockheed involved the crash of a plane manufactured by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and owned and operated by the United States Air Force. The administrator of the estate of a civilian employee of the United States Navy killed in the crash brought suit against Lockheed as the manufacturer of a defective product. Lockheed brought a third-party indemnity action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b), 2671-80. The question was whether the exclusivity provision of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8116(c), barred Lockheed's indemnification action. In holding that it was not a bar, the Court relied heavily on Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 83 S.Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d 1, which had considered FECA's exclusive-liability provision and carefully reviewed its legislative history. Lockheed, 460 U.S. at 194, 103 S.Ct. at 1036. The Court stated: 53 The Court's reasoning in Weyerhaeuser applies with equal force in the present case. The Government advances the same arguments before us now that it unsuccessfully advanced in Weyerhaeuser. To paraphrase the Weyerhaeuser Court's conclusion, [t]here is no evidence whatever that Congress was concerned with the rights of unrelated third parties, much less of any purpose to disturb settled doctrines of [tort] law affecting the mutual rights and liabilities of private [parties] in [indemnity] cases. Id., at 601 [83 S.Ct. at 929]. Section 8116(c) was intended to govern only the rights of employees, their relatives, and people claiming through or on behalf of them. These are the only categories of parties who benefit from the quid pro quo compromise that FECA adopts. 54 Lockheed, 460 U.S. at 196, 103 S.Ct. at 1037 (footnotes omitted). 55 Defendants seize upon this language to argue that Lockheed swept away the third-party bar of Sec. 905(a) along with that of Sec. 8116(c) of FECA. We disagree. We first point out that neither Weyerhaeuser nor Lockheed implicated the LHWCA. Secondly, the Court stressed twice in the course of its opinion that the underlying substantive law granting Lockheed a right to indemnification was uncontroverted, 460 U.S. at 192, 199 n. 8, and the only question for decision was whether Sec. 8116(c) of FECA interposed a bar to a third-party action against the United States. The holding in Lockheed is carefully and precisely worded: 56 The District Court held that Lockheed had a right to indemnity under the governing substantive law, but the Court of Appeals did not rule on that question. Accordingly, we do not consider it. We adhere to the decision in Weyerhaeuser, and hold only that FECA's exclusive-liability provision, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8116(c), does not directly bar a third-party indemnity action against the United States. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further consideration consistent with this opinion. 57 460 U.S. at 199, 103 S.Ct. at 1038. Lockheed requires that we determine whether there is a basis in substantive law for defendants' third-party action against BIW; it does not overrule three decades of consistent Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of Sec. 905(a). 58  BIW's employees are concurrently covered by the MWCA and the LHWCA. In Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 716, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 2434, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980), the Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that a State may apply its workers' compensation scheme to land-based injuries that fall within the coverage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), as amended in 1972. 33 U.S.C. Secs. 901-950. After tracing the evolution of the law of compensation for workers injured in maritime precincts, id. at 717, 100 S.Ct. at 2435, the Court concluded: We therefore find no sign in the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA that Congress wished to alter the accepted understanding that federal jurisdiction would coexist with state compensation laws in that field in which the latter may constitutionally operate under the Jensen doctrine. Id. at 722, 100 S.Ct. at 2437 (footnote omitted). In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917), the Court held that states are constitutionally barred from applying their compensation systems to maritime injuries and thus interfering with overriding federal policy of a uniform maritime law. The Sun Ship Court emphatically rejected the argument that for compensation jurisdictional exclusivity is--in 'fact' or in 'law'--implied in the LHWCA. Sun Ship 447 U.S. at 723, 100 S.Ct. at 2438; see also id. at 723-26, 100 S.Ct. at 2438-39. 59 The holding and reasoning of Sun Ship compel the conclusion that the applicable substantive law here is both the MWCA and the LHWCA. Since there can be no doubt that the Maine Act bars this third-party action, our next inquiry is as to the effect of Sec. 905(a). 60 The question is whether a nonvessel tortfeasor who may be found liable for injuries to employees of a LHWCA-covered employer has a right to indemnity or contribution from the employer. Section 905(a) provides in pertinent part: 61 (a) The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death.... [Emphasis added.] 62 Our review of the case law under Sec. 905(a) shows a nearly uniform interpretation of the statute prior to Lockheed. The first Supreme Court case addressing the right of contribution in light of the LHWCA is Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318 (1952). The facts are simple: an employee of Haenn was injured on one of Halcyon's ships while making repairs; the employee sued Halcyon on the grounds of negligence and unseaworthiness; the jury found Haenn 75% and Halcyon 25% liable. The Court declined to apply the admiralty collision doctrine that the mutual wrongdoers shall share equally the damages sustained by each, as well as personal injury and property damages inflicted on innocent third-parties, id. at 284, 72 S.Ct. at 279, and stated categorically that a right of contribution did not exist in maritime, noncollision cases. Noting the extensive legislation in this field, i.e., the Harbor Workers Act, the Jones Act, the Public Vessels Act, the Limited Liability Act, and the Harter Act, the Court held: In view of the foregoing, and because Congress while acting in the field has stopped short of approving the rule of contribution here urged, we think it would be inappropriate for us to do so. Id. at 287, 72 S.Ct. at 280. Although the Court did not reach the issue of the impact of Sec. 905(a), later decisions have explained that Halcyon stands for the principle that contribution actions against the compensation-paying employer are barred by Sec. 905(a). 63 Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974), was one of these explanatory decisions. The Supreme Court clarified that despite the occasional breadth of its dictum, ... Halcyon stands for a more limited rule than [an] absolute bar against contribution in noncollision cases.... Id. at 111, 94 S.Ct. at 2177. The Court recognized instead the well-established maritime rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors. Id. at 113, 94 S.Ct. at 2178. But this rule was limited by the exclusivity provision of the LHWCA when contribution was sought from the compensation-paying employer of the injured worker. The Cooper Court pointed out that this result was reached in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 406 U.S. 340, 92 S.Ct. 1550, 32 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972), where Erie, against whom contribution was sought, was the plaintiff's employer.... Cooper, 417 U.S. at 114, 94 S.Ct. at 2179. The Court stated that it had ruled Erie to be entitled to the limitation of liability protections of the Harbor Workers' Act, just like the employer in Halcyon. Id. And again, it stated, Erie was accordingly entitled to the protective mantle of the Act's limitation-of-liability provisions. Id. at 115, 94 S.Ct. at 2179. The Court concluded by saying that Atlantic proves only that our decision in Halcyon was, and still is, good law on its facts. Id. This interpretation of Halcyon and Atlantic was later reaffirmed in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979), where the Court stated: We ... held that the shipowner could not circumvent the exclusive-remedy provision by obtaining contribution from the concurrent tortfeasor employer. Halcyon Lines.... Id. at 261, 99 S.Ct. at 2757. 64 We note that our construction of Sec. 905(a) is in accord with the most recent authoritative expressions of Congress. Senator Nickles, the chair of the Senate Labor Subcommittee and one of the managers of the 1984 Amendments to the Longshore Act, explained the conference committee's concerns to the Senate: 65 The conferees were also concerned over the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States et al, U.S. [190, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 74 L.Ed.2d 911], which decided that the Federal Employees' Compensation Act did not bar third party claims for indemnification. Because section 5(a) of the Longshore Act contains nearly identical language to FECA, we considered an amendment to section 5(a). However, the plain meaning of the existing language indicates that there should be no third party liability. In addition, the clear congressional intent of the 1972 amendments to the act was to eliminate the problem of circular suits whereby employers paid workers compensation and then through suits by third parties became liable for additional amounts. 66 130 Cong.Rec. 11621 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1984). 67 The Courts of Appeals, so far as we can determine, also have interpreted Sec. 905(a) to bar contribution, and some forms of indemnity, from an LHWCA employer. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714-19 (2d Cir.1978) (Friendly, J.); Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100, 120 (5th Cir.1970); Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S J.E. Dyer, 428 F.2d 1131, 1133-34 (5th Cir.1970); see also American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir.1950); St. Julien v. Diamond M. Drilling, 403 F.Supp. 1256, 1259 (E.D.La.1975). In these and other cases, frequently a distinction has been drawn between contractual (express or implied) indemnity, and noncontractual indemnity. Where indemnity is sought on the basis of an express or implied contract, the indemnity action has been held to proceed not on account of injury, Sec. 905(a), to the employee but because of the contract. See, e.g., Pippen v. Shell Oil Co., 661 F.2d 378, 386-88 (5th Cir.1981); Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d at 718, 721-22. 68 Here, defendants sue only for contribution and noncontractual indemnity. Based on the principles of Halcyon and Atlantic, as interpreted by Cooper Stevedoring and Edmonds, we rule that the contribution claims against BIW in its capacity as employer are barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(a). As far as the noncontractual indemnity claims are concerned, the facts presented here compel us to characterize them as tort based contribution claims, see supra note 2. Accordingly, these claims are also barred by Sec. 905(a). 69 Because the exclusivity provisions of both the Maine Act, Sec. 4, and the federal LHWCA, Sec. 905(a), bar these third-party claims against BIW qua employer, we have no need to reach the question whether the LHWCA preempts an inconsistent state exclusivity provision. 70 We have carefully considered defendants' other claims for relief and find them without merit. As far as the pro tanto claim is concerned, we note that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has very recently rejected defendants' position. See Diamond International Corp. v. Sullivan & Merritt, Inc., 493 A.2d 1043 (Me.1985). 71 The judgment of the district court dismissing the third-party complaint is affirmed.