Opinion ID: 2307555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel's Failure to Discover and Present Certain Mitigating Evidence

Text: At the 1990 penalty-phase retrial, defendant attempted to prove four mitigating factors: (1) defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a)(extreme emotional disturbance); (2) defendant's age at the time of the murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(c) (age); (3) defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d) (diminished capacity); and (4) [a]ny other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) (catch-all). Four witnesses, including Patricia Bey (Ms. Bey), defendant's mother; Clarence Horton, defendant's uncle; Wendolyn El, defendant's aunt; and Juliet El, a family friend; testified in support of the catch-all mitigating factor. These witnesses described defendant's addiction to drugs and alcohol as well as Patricia Bey's neglect and physical abuse of defendant. The defense also presented three expert witnesses: Dr. Gary Kay, a clinical neuropsychologist; Dr. John Young, a forensic psychiatrist; and Dr. Jonathan Pincus, a neurologist. These witnesses testified that defendant suffers from a psychiatric condition caused by organic brain damage. To support the mitigating factors pertaining to extreme emotional disturbance and diminished capacity, the experts also related defendant's account of the murder, his relationship with his mother, his abuse of alcohol and drugs, and other aspects of his life. Defendant's statements to the experts were introduced to support the catch-all factor. Two jurors found the extreme emotional disturbance factor, and six jurors found the catch-all factor. No juror found the age and diminished capacity factors. The jury unanimously concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors, prior murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a), and contemporaneous felony, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(g), outweighed the mitigating factors. At the penalty-phase hearing, two counsel represented defendant: R. Diane Aifer, lead counsel, and Donald McCauley, co-counsel. Defendant now claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the presentation of the mitigation evidence. First, defendant questions Aifer's overall lack of preparation for the penalty-phase trial. Second, defendant alleges that both counsel were ineffective because they failed to support the catch-all factor with sufficient evidence of Patricia Bey's abuse and neglect of defendant, defendant's untreated sexual deviance, and his substance abuse. According to defendant, counsel failed to interview several potential witnesses, unreasonably decided not to call other witnesses, and failed to elicit certain evidence from witnesses who did testify. Third, defendant maintains that counsel should have presented evidence to support four nonstatutory mitigating factors: defendant's intoxication at the time of the crime, the failure to treat defendant's substance abuse, defendant'sremorse, and defendant's life sentence and parole ineligibility. At the PCR evidentiary hearing, defendant introduced testimony from fifteen witnesses to support the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The witnesses included eight people whom Aifer had not interviewed in preparation for the 1990 penalty-phase retrial: Cora Patterson, defendant's father's girlfriend; Kim Alston, Patterson's daughter; James Sullivan Evans, Patterson's son; Kenneth McGloun, defendant's half-brother; Mack El, defendant's cousin; Theopolis Stewart, defendant's childhood friend; Armand Veltre, defendant's sixth-grade teacher; and John Kuttin, defendant's Little League baseball coach. Four witnesses whom counsel had interviewed but not presented at the penalty-phase trial appeared on defendant's behalf: Benjamin Bey and Karrel McGloun, defendant's younger brothers; Ri El, defendant's cousin; and Bernadine Phillips Jackson, defendant's girlfriend at the time of the murder. Additionally, Ms. Bey, Wendolyn El and Clarence Horton, who had testified at the 1990 penalty-phase trial, again testified. Defendant also argues that Aifer should have offered as witnesses Macko McGloun, defendant's father, and Henry Bey, defendant's brother, both of whom Aifer interviewed before the 1990 penalty-phase trial. The defense, however, did not call either as a witness in the PCR evidentiary hearing. Several of defendant's attorneys appeared at the PCR evidentiary hearing. Aifer described her preparation for the case and explained her trial strategy. McCauley; James Kinarney, co-counsel for defendant in his trial for the murder of Cheryl Alston, see State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 548 A. 2d 846 (1988) ( Bey I ); James Smith and Judith Borman, defendant's appellate attorneys; Timothy Hughes, Deputy Public Defender and Aifer's boss; Matthew Astore, co-counsel on direct appeal of the second death sentence; and Edward Washburn, co-counsel at the guilt-phase trial, also testified. Lastly, the PCR court admitted into evidence welfare department records, notes from a probation officer, and a report by Lois Nardone, a social worker, concerning defendant's social history. Nardone interviewed thirty-five witnesses and reviewed many documents to construct a detailed compilation of defendant's life history. The court, however, did not permit Nardone to testify. A. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Standard Fundamental to criminal justice is a defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The test for measuring the effectiveness of counsel in the penalty-phase of a capital trial is set forth in the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland, supra, and of this Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A. 2d 336 (1987). That test, known as the Strickland/Fritz test, provides: To prove ineffective assistance of counsel in his penalty-phase trial, defendant must pass a two-pronged test. First, defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was truly deficient, with such grievous errors that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, defendant must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the jury's penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially. [ State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 431, 715 A. 2d 228 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).] To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, the defendant must show that `counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.... Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential'... [and] must avoid second-guessing defense counsel's tactical decisions `under the distorting effects of hindsight.' State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 156-57, 690 A. 2d 1 (1997) ( Marshall III ) (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693-94). Merely because a trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective. State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 357, 561 A. 2d 1082 (1989). An inadequate investigation of the law or fact, however, dispels the presumption of competence that might otherwise arise from a strategic choice. Ibid. A defendant can satisfy the requirement of prejudice by showing that counsel's ineffective assistance substantially affected the jury's penalty-phase deliberation to a degree sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 250, 690 A. 2d 1 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698). The defendant has the burden of establishing a reasonable probability that the omitted information would have substantially affected the jury's deliberations during the penalty phase. See id. at 250-51, 690 A. 2d 1. Although the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz standard is relaxed in the context of a penalty-phase proceeding, that prong, contrary to the dissent, requires more than a showing that a reasonable juror would have considered the material in his or her deliberative process. Post at 298, 736 A. 2d at 505. Unsurprisingly, because the dissent applies the wrong standard, it reaches the wrong result. B. Analysis of Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim 1. Aifer's Investigation Defendant first argues that Aifer's overall representation was ineffective. He contends that Aifer did nothing for months after she was assigned the case and that her efforts were both cursory and untimely. In particular, defendant questions Aifer's failure to retain a social worker or investigator to construct defendant's social history. He also calls attention to her refusal to delegate any responsibility to her co-counsel, McCauley. The State counters that Aifer sufficiently familiarized herself with the facts and the law and that she implemented a sound trial strategy. According to the State, Aifer reasonably declined to introduce cumulative evidence of defendant's life history; instead, she focused on the most important facts. Her strategy of connecting mitigation evidence through the testimony of expert witnesses presented a unified theory that explained defendant's acts. Therefore, the introduction of a social history prepared by a mitigation specialist was unnecessary. Lastly, the State argues that further investigation and preparation would not have produced any testimony that reasonably would have affected the jury's deliberations. In August 1988, this Court rendered decisions in defendant's trials for the murders of Cheryl Alston and Carol Peniston. Bey I, supra; Bey II, supra. In addition to remanding this case for a new penalty-phase trial, Bey II, supra, we vacated defendant's conviction and death sentence for murdering Alston, Bey I, supra. The Public Defender assigned Aifer to the retrial of the Alston case and the retrial of the penalty-phase of the Peniston case. Aifer met with defendant's appellate attorneys, Smith and Borman, to discuss strategy in both cases. Smith and Borman emphasized the importance of working with defendant's mother and recommended a social worker who could assist Aifer. Over the next year, Aifer did not work on either case, except for reviewing the case files. She did not contact a social worker or any other investigator. As a result, in August 1989, the Public Defender's Office held a meeting to discuss Aifer's lack of investigation. In particular, Smith criticized Aifer's inaction. Despite the meeting, Aifer continued her representation of defendant in both cases. Shortly thereafter, Aifer began preparing for the Alston retrial. After defendant was again convicted for murdering Alston, Aifer concentrated on the Peniston case. In particular, Aifer unsuccessfully moved to preclude the use of the Alston murder conviction as an aggravating factor in the Peniston case. Because she needed additional time to prepare the case, Aifer moved to stay the Peniston trial. On June 4, 1990, the trial court denied the motion and set August 20, 1990 as the date to commence the penalty-phase hearing. Aifer immediately began focusing on the presentation of the mitigation evidence. On June 21, 1990, Aifer, according to her PCR testimony, began a compressed, hard-working effort to prepare the case. Aifer conducted in-person interviews of seven potential witnesses and telephone interviews with three other potential witnesses. Ms. Bey, defendant's most important witness, testified at the PCR hearing that Aifer met with her only once, in a meeting that lasted approximately one hour. Aifer also arranged for three medical experts, Kay, Young, and Pincus, to evaluate defendant. She hired a jury consultant to assist her on the voir dire. Instead of retaining an investigator or social worker, Aifer interviewed witnesses herself. She also felt that a mitigation specialist would not necessarily garner any additional evidence. Aifer conceded that she did not involve her co-counsel in the investigation or witness preparation. In 1994, just before the start of another capital trial, Aifer resigned from the Public Defender's Office. Aifer believed that her superior, Assistant Public Defender Dale Jones, was unduly interfering with her case. The following morning, she submitted her letter of resignation: Please accept my letter of resignation, effective immediately, from all of my duties as an employee of the Office of Public Defender. After much reflection, and after discussing the matter with Dale Jones, I have come to the conclusion that I am not competent to handle the responsibilities of being an attorney within the Office. In particular, I am convinced of my inability, as corroborated by Mr. Jones, to properly represent our clients in capital cases. As you may already know, my inadequate performance resulted in a death sentence being imposed upon Mr. Marko Bey. It is intolerable to me that I may yet jeopardize the life of another young man, Mr. David Cooper, currently on trial in Monmouth County. I regret that I cannot give more notice, however, the situation is urgent. I simply cannot continue in any capacity as a member of the staff. At the PCR hearing, Aifer explained that this letter was intended as a sarcastic and facetious response to internal criticism. Our review of these facts leads us to conclude that Aifer's preparation was incomplete. The preparation of mitigation evidence is a substantial undertaking. To postpone preparation until two months before a penalty-phase hearing is not commensurate with the dreadful consequences of such a hearing. See Davis, supra, 116 N.J. at 353, 561 A. 2d 1082. As Aifer's motion for a stay reflects, she should have started earlier. Despite the incompleteness of Aifer's investigation, we decline to find that her conduct constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Absent specific prejudicial errors, a general insufficiency in counsel's performance does not justify vacating a death sentence on post-conviction relief. The case law makes clear that such purely speculative deficiencies in representation are insufficient to justify reversal. Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 44, 519 A. 2d 336. Only after evaluating the specific claims asserted at the PCR hearing may we determine whether counsel's failure to introduce mitigating evidence prejudiced defendant. Although the lack of sufficient time to prepare for trial can support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant generally may support that claim with proof of specific evidence adduced at a post-conviction hearing, but not at the original trial. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F. 3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (finding prejudice in sentencing proceedings where counsel failed to present pertinent evidence of mental history and mental capacity discovered at post-sentencing hearing); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F. 2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that defendant was prejudiced at sentencing phase by counsel's failure to discover and present any available mitigating evidence concerning defendant's impoverished childhood, epileptic seizures, and organic brain damage); State v. Tokman, 564 So. 2d 1339, 1345 (Miss.1990) (affirming lower court's conclusion that evidence of defendant's psychological traits presented at post-conviction hearing could have affected judgment at trial). The presumption of prejudice is reserved for cases involving the complete denial of the right to counsel. Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 53, 519 A. 2d 336. Here, Aifer's performance does not sink to the level of the constructive denial of the right to counsel. From her prior representation of defendant in the retrial of the Alston murder, Aifer was familiar with defendant and his history. She had the benefit of the records in the original Peniston trial and the Alston trial. Additionally, Aifer interviewed many witnesses and arranged for three mental health experts to testify. In sum, we decline to find that Aifer's preparation and investigation support the conclusion that her assistance of counsel was presumptively ineffective. The deficiencies in her preparation, however, point to the need for the Public Defender's Office to supervise more closely attorneys engaged in capital murder trials. We now turn to the question whether there were any specific deficiencies by counsel that prejudiced defendant at the penalty-phase proceeding. 2. Mitigating Factors Defendant asserts that Aifer was ineffective in her presentation of evidence to support the catch-all mitigating factor. Specifically, he asserts that Aifer failed to present adequate evidence of his mother's abuse and neglect, his untreated sexual deviance, and his addiction to alcohol and drugs. Defendant maintains that Aifer also should have informed the jury more clearly of the components of the catch-all factor. a. Abuse and Neglect To support the catch-all factor, defense counsel presented extensive evidence at the 1990 penalty-phase retrial of Patricia Bey's abuse and neglect of defendant. Ms. Bey told the jury that she was an alcoholic and that she had abused alcohol during her pregnancy with defendant. She admitted to neglecting and abusing her children generally and to beating defendant on many occasions. As we related in affirming defendant's death sentence: Ms. Bey testified that on one occasion she knocked defendant down, causing defendant to hit his head on a coffee table and lose consciousness. Although defendant's head was gashed, she did not take him to a doctor. Ms. Bey also recalled another time when her neighbors had threatened to call the police if she did not stop beating defendant. [ Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 573, 610 A. 2d 814.] Ms. Bey acknowledged that she always blamed defendant when things went wrong and that she scolded and hit him more than the other children. Her apartment was dirty, dark, and cold. Out of fear, she covered the windows and mirrors and did not turn on the lights. Six other witnesses confirmed Ms. Bey's testimony. Wendolyn El, Juliet El, and Clarence Horton described Patricia Bey's alcoholism and her physical abuse of defendant. Defendant's three mental health experts communicated to the jury defendant's own account of his childhood. They confirmed that Ms. Bey abused all her children, but that she meted out the harshest treatment to defendant: She kept the lights off in the apartment, and covered the windows and mirrors out of an alcohol-induced paranoia that the devil would get her. Several witnesses described the cold, dark, slovenly state of the Beys' apartments and the unkempt condition of the children.... Growing up, defendant frequently received severe, unpredictable beatings with broom handles, belts, belt buckles, straps and other items.