Opinion ID: 509033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Antitrust and Common Law Claims

Text: 30 The district court summarily denied West Allis' claim for preliminary injunctive relief under each of the remaining seven counts of the complaint, stating that: 31 Although the requests brought under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Wisconsin Antitrust Act, and the Wisconsin common law are on somewhat different footing, they also rely on the fact that St. Luke's is allegedly committing a crime in order to, for instance, attempt to monopolize the market. 32 West Allis Memorial Hospital, 660 F.Supp. at 940. 5 The court's decision was presumably based on its previous conclusion that it was powerless to enjoin the commission of a crime. In so ruling, however, the district court failed to recognize that authority may exist under each of West Allis' remaining claims for the issuance of an injunction. 33 To the extent West Allis has demonstrated a viable claim under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1 and 2, independent of its claim under the Medicare fraud provisions of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395nn(b)(2)(B) (a matter which the parties dispute), the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 26, expressly provides the court with the statutory authority to enjoin the criminal activity complained of. 6 34 Wisconsin law provides similar relief for violations of its antitrust laws. W.S.A. Sec. 133.16 specifically provides that: 35 Any circuit court may prevent or restrain, by injunction or otherwise, any violation of this chapter. The department of justice, any district attorney or any person by complaint may institute actions or proceedings to prevent or restrain a violation of this chapter, setting forth the cause and grounds for the intervention of the court and praying that such violation, whether intended or continuing be enjoined or prohibited. When the parties informed against or complained of have been served with a copy of the information or complaint and cited to answer it, the court shall proceed, as soon as may be in accordance with its rules, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending the filing of the answer to such information or complaint may, at any time, upon proper notice, make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as is just.... 36 When exercising pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims, the district court has the same equitable powers as the state court. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) (federal courts exercising pendent jurisdiction bound to apply state substantive law). The district court erred in failing to recognize that antitrust activity may be enjoined under both federal and state law, and in so doing committed an error of law. 7 37 While West Allis makes several conclusory statements about the power of the district court to enjoin activity which may also violate Wisconsin common law, it specifically addresses only its claim of unfair competition, and generally abandons its remaining common law claims, making only cursory arguments in its reply brief. The burden was on West Allis to demonstrate an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court with respect to each of its claims. In failing to present any authority for its proposition that a state court, and thus the district court, was empowered to enjoin a common law conspiracy or tortious interference with a prospective contractual relation, West Allis failed to meet that burden. We accordingly limit our discussion to West Allis' claim of unfair competition. 38 St. Luke's does not dispute the availability of injunctive relief under the Wisconsin common law against unfair competition, but argues that unfair competition is limited to misappropriation and that West Allis has failed to demonstrate elements of a misappropriation claim, and has thus failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim. 39 Under Wisconsin law, injunctive relief is indeed available to a private entity in an action for unfair competition based on misappropriation. See Mercury Records v. Economic Consultants, 91 Wis.2d 482, 283 N.W.2d 613 (Wis.App.1979). Injunctive relief is also statutorily provided for under W.S.A. Sec. 100.20 which prohibits unfair methods of competition in business, although it appears from the language of the statute that only the state has the authority to seek such relief. 40 Whether injunctive relief would be available to West Allis only in an action based on misappropriation, or is available when other methods of unfair competition are alleged, and whether West Allis has sufficiently demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its unfair competition claim are questions better left for the district court to determine. We find merely that in denying the preliminary injunction without recognizing that authority may exist under state law for the issuance of an injunction the district court committed an error of law. 41 While it would appear from the extensive arguments presented on appeal that the parties would prefer de novo review by this court of the merits of West Allis' antitrust and common law claims, we regretfully cannot oblige. Our de novo review is limited to legal issues and conclusions. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 757, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2177, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986); Baja Contractors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d at 674; Faheem-El v. Klincar, 814 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir.1987). Even then we may decide the merits of legal issues which were not addressed by the district court only when the facts on which those conclusions must be based are not in dispute. Faheem-El, 814 F.2d at 467. In the present case, there are a number of factual disputes which prohibit our consideration of the legal issues presented by West Allis' antitrust and unfair competition claims--disputes which were not resolved by the district court in making its findings of fact. 8 42 By limiting its legal analysis to only one of the five factors necessary to support preliminary injunctive relief, the district court leaves us with but one alternative--to reverse its decision with respect to West Allis' federal and state antitrust claims, and its common law claim of unfair competition, and remand for further consideration. 9 See American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 326 (7th Cir.1984) (When the district court's error is the very predicate of its order, the order must be reversed as an improvident exercise of the court's discretion.)