Opinion ID: 1747791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: We are called upon to interpret our constitution. On appeal, our task is to read the laws as they are written, and interpret them in accordance with established principles of constitutional construction. The fundamental rule is that the words of the constitution should ordinarily be given their obvious and natural meaning. Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark. 454, 995 S.W.2d 341 (1999). See also, Knowlton v. Ward, 318 Ark. 867, 889 S.W.2d 721 (1994); Kervin v. Hillman, County Judge, 226 Ark. 708, 292 S.W.2d 559 (1956). We review issues of construction de novo; it is for this court to decide what a constitutional provision means. Hodges, supra . We are not bound by the decision of the trial court; however, in the absence of a showing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the law, that interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal. Bryant v. Weiss, 335 Ark. 534, 983 S.W.2d 902 (1998). In this case, we are interpreting a constitutional amendment. We have said that in so doing, it is helpful to determine what changes the amendment was intended to make in the existing law. Glover v. Henry, 231 Ark. 111, 328 S.W.2d 382 (1959). See also, Bradley v. Hall, 220 Ark. 925, 251 S.W.2d 470 (1952). Of Amendment 29, this court has previously stated: Amendment 29 provides that the governor shall fill vacancies in the office of United States senator and in all elective state, district, circuit, county, and township offices except lieutenant governor, member of the legislature, and member of Congress. It is significant that these provisions made no substantial change in the law as it already existed, for the governor had the power to fill vacancies in the office of United States senator (Pope's Dig., 11807) and in the designated elective offices (Const., Art. 6, 23) with the exception of the lieutenant governor (Amendment 6, 5), member of the legislature (Const., Art. 5, 6), and member of Congress (Pope's Dig., 4676). Thus the purpose of Amendment 29 was not to create a new appointive power in the chief executive; it was to reaffirm the existing law as a basis for the operation of the other provisions in the amendment. Glover, 231 Ark. at 115, 328 S.W.2d 382.