Opinion ID: 1447881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Judge's Pretrial Comments

Text: Defendant contends that, before the presentation of evidence, the trial court took three steps that improperly tended to influence the jury in the direction of a verdict of guilt. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court erred by (1) reading to the prospective jurors the information that mentioned four robbery counts that were later severed; (2) implying that a decision by defendant to call witnesses was a concession that the prosecution had met its burden of proof; and (3) using in voir dire only death qualification hypotheticals that assumed defendant was guilty. 1. Reading Information to Jury Pool When first addressing the pool of prospective jurors, the trial court stated: This case alleges a count of first degree murder and several counts of robbery. Later, the court read the information, including all four robbery counts, to the jury pool. Two weeks later, the robbery counts were severed. (16) The record shows that defense counsel failed to object either to the reference to the robbery counts or the reading of the information that included the robbery counts. Accordingly, the issue has not been preserved for review. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) In any event, the reading of the information could not have influenced the jury, and was therefore harmless under any standard. 2. Defendant's Decision to Call Witnesses Before the presentation of evidence began, the trial court explained to the jury the procedure of a criminal trial. In part, the trial court stated: After the prosecution has presented their [ sic ] witnesses and the defense has cross-examined them, then the defense has the opportunity to present witnesses, if they wish to do so. I don't know in this case what decision the defense has made. They may decide not to present any evidence. There are a number of reasons why testimony may not want [ sic ] to be presented by the defense or why they may not want to call the defendant. One [of] those may be that they understand that the rule is that the prosecution has the responsibility of presenting sufficient evidence to convict the defendant, and that standard being beyond a reasonable doubt. They may wish to take the position, or they may take the position that the People have not proven their case, that they have not proven that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and may decide not to present evidence for that reason, or for any other reason. Should they elect to present evidence and present testimony then the district attorney has the same opportunities to cross-examination [ sic ] as the defense did.... (17) Defendant argues that the trial court's explanation indicated to the jury that a decision by a defendant to call witnesses is a concession that the prosecution has met its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject this argument. First, defendant failed to object to the trial court's explanation; therefore, the issue has not been preserved for appeal. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.) Moreover, the trial court's explanation, taken in context, does not amount to error. Rather, the court's explanation somewhat inartfully indicated that there are a variety of reasons why a defendant may choose not to present evidence. Before the jury began its deliberations, the court instructed the jury that defendant was presumed innocent and that the prosecution had the burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. On this record, any confusion was dispelled by later, correct jury instructions. 3. Use of Death Qualification Hypotheticals (18) In examining prospective jurors on their attitudes toward the death penalty (death-qualifying the jury) under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770] and Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1 [168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301], the trial court used only hypotheticals that assumed defendant was guilty. Defendant now contends that these hypotheticals improperly biased the jury toward conviction. Defendant overlooks that, in death-qualifying the jury, unless the jurors assume that a defendant is found guilty, they will have no reason to consider the question of an appropriate penalty. Accordingly, in determining the jurors' willingness to vote for the death penalty in an appropriate case, the hypotheticals necessarily must assume that the accused is guilty. Here, the court's hypotheticals were not improper.