Opinion ID: 6499669
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Dangerous Assignment

Text: Grayer assigned Lesiv to work the RIP track as punishment. While the parties dispute whether Lesiv had a partner when Grayer made the assignment, the parties agree that the relief supervisor ordered Lesiv to work the RIP track alone. And as Lesiv testiﬁed, the relief supervisor never clariﬁed that he had a partner originally as they tried to contact Grayer, spoke with Duggan, or after he completed his statement about his confrontation with Grayer. As noted above, carmen do not work the RIP track by themselves, and doing so could be dangerous. Putting these facts together and giving Lesiv the beneﬁt of conﬂicting evidence on summary judgment, the relief supervisor directed Lesiv to work an unusual and inherently dangerous assignment that Grayer himself described as punitive. Such an unusual and dangerous work assignment can qualify as a materially adverse action. We have held that a No. 21-2496 11 jury could ﬁnd that retaliating against an employee by assigning her unusually dangerous duty would deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. In Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2007), a police oﬃcer sued for retaliation. She oﬀered evidence that after she complained of discrimination, she was singled out for inherently more dangerous work assignments. We reversed summary judgment for the employer, ﬁnding that the dangerous assignments could amount to materially adverse actions. Id. at 655. Similarly here, by providing evidence that he was singled out for an unusually dangerous work assignment, Lesiv met his burden for defeating summary judgment on this issue. Accord, Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment for employer; change in work schedule that resulted in more dangerous work assignment could qualify as materially adverse employment action). 4 Illinois Central’s attempt to distinguish Lewis is not persuasive. It points out that the Lewis plaintiﬀ actually worked the dangerous assignments while Lesiv never ended up completing his. The argument overlooks why Lesiv did not end up working the RIP track by himself: he refused and was later suspended for that refusal. Granted, Duggan ultimately suggested that Lesiv work the light track, but that was not until 4 At the later trial in Lewis, the jury found for the employer on the retaliation claim, and we affirmed. We determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that the actions Lewis complained of were not inherently more dangerous than her prior assignments and were “merely part of her job.” Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dep’t, 590 F.3d 427, 445 (7th Cir. 2009). The fact that the jury later decided against Lewis has no bearing on whether a reasonable jury also could have found in her favor. A disputed fact is one that a jury could—but is not required to—find for the non-moving party, as Lewis illustrates. 12 No. 21-2496 after Lesiv refused to work the RIP track alone and demanded to speak to someone other than the relief supervisor about the situation. Illinois Central proposes a rule under which, if an employee refuses a dangerous retaliatory assignment, the employer could avoid liability as a matter of law even if the employer then punished the employee for refusing the dangerous retaliatory assignment. We reject that proposed rule. The Supreme Court has cautioned against categorical rules for retaliation claims. See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 175 (“Given the broad statutory text and the variety of workplace contexts in which retaliation may occur, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is simply not reducible to a comprehensive set of clear rules.”); Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 69 (“[A] legal standard that speaks in general terms rather than speciﬁc prohibited acts is preferable, for an act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Courts need to focus on whether, under the particular circumstances, a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that the employer’s actions would dissuade reasonable employees from asserting rights under Title VII. Having to choose between insubordination and an unreasonably dangerous assignment could produce such dissuasion. At the very least, the question should be left for a jury to decide. 5 5 To be sure, we have held that unfulfilled threats do not typically constitute materially adverse actions. See, e.g., Poullard, 829 F.3d at 856–57 (threats of unspecified disciplinary action did not constitute adverse actions); see also Lewis, 909 F.3d at 870 (collecting cases). Those cases are readily distinguishable from the facts here. First, in this case, it was the employee—not the employer—who stopped the adverse action from materializing. Viewing the facts most favorable to Lesiv, we assume that Grayer did not intend merely to threaten this assignment but instead No. 21-2496 13