Opinion ID: 169363
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment Claims

Text: W e review the district court’s dismissal of Sparks’ claims de novo pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Sparks. See Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999). Because Sparks appears pro se, we review his pleadings and other papers liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991). Dismissal of a pro se complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim “is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Sparks asserts he was denied Fourteenth Amendment procedural due -7- process and Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because he was not afforded the opportunity to present witnesses and produce evidence to demonstrate he is not a gang member. A due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment can only be maintained where the government has interfered with a constitutionally cognizable liberty or property interest. See Bd. of Regents of State C olls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Changing a prisoner’s classification generally does not deprive him of liberty under the due process clause alone. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 479-83 (1995). A liberty interest may be implicated, however, when State laws and prison regulations create a liberty interest to w hich due process protections apply. M eachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226, 229 (1976). In Colorado, “[c]lassification decisions are within the discretion of the Department of Corrections and a particular classification does not implicate any liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.” Green v. Nadeau, 70 P.3d 574, 577 (Colo. App. 2003) (citing Deason v. Kautzky, 786 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo. 1990) (en banc)). Because Sparks does not have a liberty interest in a particular classification, be it a gang member or within an STG, he cannot maintain an action based on the classification under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed Sparks’ claim. The district court also properly dismissed Sparks’ Sixth Amendment claim. -8- “The protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are explicitly confined to ‘criminal prosecutions.’” United States v. Deninno, 103 F.3d 82, 86 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U .S. 602, 608 (1993)). Sparks’ classification as a gang member was an administrative decision made by the Department of Corrections and not part of a criminal prosecution.