Opinion ID: 2961259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wallis, Mabe, Rogers

Text: Under the majority’s holding, Dr. Wang would be exposed to liability because she recommended further hospital testing and monitoring for a nonverbal infant suffering from a complex depressed parietal skull fracture, an occipital skull fracture, extra axial bleeding, and bilateral posterior rib injuries. The majority does not dispute the medical literature, of which Dr. Wang was aware, confirming that these injuries were highly indicative of child abuse. Nor does it contest either Dr. Wang’s or Michael Jones’s conclusion that Jill Jones’s March 5 explanation for G.J.’s injuries was inadequate. Nonetheless, the majority, citing JONES V. WANG 37 Rogers, 487 F.3d at, 1295–96, and Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1106–07 (quoting Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1138), finds that there was no “imminent danger of serious bodily harm” to G.J.3 We must apply the test–or what the majority calls the “general rule”– announced in Wallis and adopted by Mabe and Rogers “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198. The contextual similarities between Dr. Wang’s investigation and our then-existing case law are therefore of paramount importance in determining whether Dr. Wang knew or should have known that her actions violated the constitution. See Id. “Even a cursory glance at the facts,” City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015), from Wallis, Mabe, and Rogers confirms just how different those cases are from this one. This is not a case involving a social worker or a police officer. Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1131; Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1105; Rogers, 487 F.3d at 1291. This is not a case where home removal is at issue. Id. This is not a case where the injuries to the child were imagined, Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1131–32, specific to a certain time of day, Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1105, or mere signs of “child neglect”, Rogers, 3 To circumvent a portion of the qualified immunity analysis, the majority submits, while concurrently finding that “[t]his case presents complex legal and factual issues,” that Dr. Wang “obviously” seized G.J. Op. at 25–26, 28–29. I oppose this argument based on my positions expressed in the previous section. I also highlight that the sitter placed in G.J.’s room did not materially change the Joneses’ freedom to leave, as it is undisputed that Dr. Kim, the attending physician when the sitter was placed, held both the obligation and authority to discharge the Joneses, regardless of the sitter’s presence. While this fact does not necessarily address whether the Joneses felt free to leave, it further confirms that the record does not sufficiently implicate Dr. Wang. 38 JONES V. WANG 487 F.3d at 1291. Nor is this a case where the child was able to communicate. Wallis, 202 F.3d at 1131–32; Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1105; Rogers, 487 F.3d at 1291. In sum, “there is a world of difference,” Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. at 1776, between a social worker removing young children without physical manifestations of abuse from their homes and Dr. Wang recommending hospital care to a nonverbal infant with textbook head and rib injuries suggesting serious child abuse. Given the unique situation presented in this case, a finding that “every reasonable official [in Dr. Wang’s situation] would have understood that what he is doing violated” a constitutional right is simply unsupported. Taylor, 135 S.Ct. at 2044; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).