Opinion ID: 171495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Late October Emails

Text: Ford obtained the undisclosed October 28 email from Heavilin's Yahoo account. In the email, Ford told Heavilin: nothing at this time. I don't expect to find a special on a computer this close to christmas [sic]. Too much demand for a good sale. Just keep watching the newspaper ad's [sic]. I am still watching. R., Vol. I, Doc. 196, at 14. Based on the text of this email, the district court convincingly concluded that an earlier email must have existed in which Heavilin asked Ford if any machine guns were currently available. The district court also properly concluded both emails would have been favorable to Ford's defense because they further supported his argument that Heavilin's persistence was the reason Ford committed the crime.
For the evidence to be material, there must be a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999) (internal quotation omitted). When reviewing materiality for Brady purposes, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition not to look for ample, independent evidence of guilt or evidence sufficient to support the [jury's] findings. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Rather, we look to whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. accord Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936; Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir.1995).
In attempting to prove entrapment, the defendant's central piece of evidence was an exhibit highlighting the number of times Heavilin contacted Ford. As the defense explained in closing, This is the exhibit that you have seen, at least the first page, you have seen it a lot. But what you need to focus on for a minute is the sheer number of contacts initiated by Keith Heavilin.... That is call after call, meeting after meeting, for one purpose only; to make him think you are a friend, and to persuade or talk him into selling you an automatic weapon. R., Vol. XV at 1832-33. The exhibit showed over a hundred contacts between Ford and Heavilin during the course of their dealings. From the first contact at the gun show to the first machine gun transaction, Heavilin initiated contact with Ford forty-three times, with a total of fifty-nine contacts. Between the first and second transaction, Heavilin initiated contact eighteen times, for a total of twenty-five communications. Between the second and third sale, the exhibit identified twelve more contacts initiated by Heavilin, with a total of nineteen interactions. If the missing emails had been disclosed to the defense, the exhibit could have shown two additional contacts initiated by Heavilin, and one more by Ford. [11] We agree with the district court there was not a reasonable probability that this additional evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial, especially in light of the strong evidence undermining Ford's entrapment defense for the third sale. Based on a holistic review of the evidence, we are confident the jury would not have reached a different result if the government had satisfied its Brady obligations. [12] Ford's entrapment defense required the jury to determine if Ford was predisposed towards possessing or transferring the weapon in question. The defendant's lack of [] predisposition is the crux of the entrapment defense. United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir. 1988). Predisposition is the defendant's inclination to engage in the illegal activity for which he has been charged. United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir.1986). Predisposition may be inferred from the defendant's desire for profit, his eagerness to participate in the transaction, his ready response to the government's... offer, or his demonstrated knowledge or experience in the criminal activity under investigation. United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1002-03 (10th Cir.1992) (internal quotation omitted). For the following five reasons, we conclude the suppressed evidence does not cast sufficient doubt on the outcome to be material for Brady purposes. Evidence before the jury demonstrates Ford was predisposed toward possessing or transferring the fully automatic AR-15 machine gun. The suppressed evidence simply does not undermine the probability of the jury's conclusion, and thus cannot be found material in this case. First. The evidence suggests Ford was eager to sell Heavilin a third machine gun, despite diminished pressure from Heavilin. Heavilin told Ford on November 17 that a dealer in Colorado Springs might be willing to sell him a machine gun. Because Heavilin told Ford another dealer was available, the pressure on Ford to procure a third machine gun had been substantially reduced. But instead of acting relieved, Ford decided to complete the sale. Ford called Heavilin two days later and told him he found a third machine gun. Because Ford reinitiated contact with Heavilin after the November 17 discussion, when Ford was told Heavilin could buy the machine gun elsewhere, this phone call suggests Ford was ready and willing to engage in the illicit transaction. Second. Ford insisted on completing the third transaction despite Heavilin repeatedly telling him he did not need to. When they met on October 18, 2005, and discussed another sale, Heavilin told Ford that he is going to leave the decisions up to him. R., Vol. X at 6. Heavilin explained at trial that he was referring to whether [Ford] is able to do it safely without getting in trouble or any complications on his part.... If he doesn't want to do it, get out of it. Id. Later in the October 18 conversation, Heavilin also told Ford if it isn't safe, screw it. Id. And unlike the prior sales, when they met for the gun and money exchange on November 21, Ford initially gave Heavilin a decoy machine gun. When the sale did not result in the immediate appearance of law enforcement officers, Ford told Heavilin that the gun was actually a fake; he wanted to make sure police were not monitoring the transaction. Heavilin then told Ford he did not need to complete the transaction if he was worried. Ford insisted they go ahead and complete the sale, met Heavilin at a second location, and gave Heavilin the real gun. Ford's careful planning and his insistence on finalizing the transaction supports the prosecution's argument that Ford was predisposed toward committing the crime. Third. The evidence shows for the first time Ford thought he would make a decent profit from selling a machine gun. As he testified, the third sale was the first one I was actually going to make a decent profit on. R., Vol. XIV at 37. Ford agreed to pay his dealer $5,000 for the gun and then charged Heavilin $5,400. This testimony about the third transaction suggests Ford was predisposed toward completing the last sale, even if he was induced to commit the previous two. See Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1002-03 (explaining that the defendant's desire for profit from an illicit transaction supports an inference that he was predisposed to committing the crime). Fourth. The nature of the contacts between the first two sales and the third sale is significant. By the time the third sale occurred, however, any previous entrapping influence exerted by the government had dissipated. In contrast to the first two sales where the jury found that Ford was entrapped, fewer contacts were made before the third sale where the jury did not find entrapment. And we agree with the district court that the substance of Ford's October 5 email shows he was responding to Heavilin's request for a gun, thus allowing Ford to convincingly argue the government initiated the idea of the third sale. The additional email contacts for the third sale would not have substantially changed the picture before the jury. Fifth. The government produced evidence indicating Ford possessed the fully automatic AR-15, long before Heavilin asked to buy it. To prevail on the third sale and overcome Ford's entrapment defense, the government only needed to prove Ford knowingly possessed or transferred this weapon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); see also Jury Instruction No. 17 (Defendant is charged in Count 3 of the Indictment with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which makes it a crime to knowingly transfer or knowingly possess a machine gun.). If the fully automatic AR-15 had been part of Ford's collection before Heavilin asked him to procure it, then the jury would be free to find that Ford could not have been entrapped; he already illegally possessed the weapon, regardless of the eventual transfer. Ford's co-worker Hee testified that in 2003 the two of them visited a cabin owned by Ford. Ford brought the fully automatic AR-15 to the cabin, and they took turns shooting it at targets. Hee also testified that while he was visiting Ford's house in May 2005, Ford again showed him the AR-15. Hee insisted the gun he shot in 2003 and saw in Ford's residence in May 2005 was the same weapon Ford sold to Heavilin on November 21, 2005. [13] In addition, two investigators who interviewed Ford after he was arrested also testified that Ford admitted he had possessed the AR-15 for an extended period of time, before selling it to Heavilin. Detective William Gallegos said Ford told him he had owned the weapon and had previously fired it. Similarly, FBI agent Brian Schmitt testified Ford had admitted that he had owned the weapon for a long time. Rick Tarvin, an acquaintance of Ford, also testified that he had never sold Ford an AR-15 or any other machine gun. This evidence is significant because Ford claims Tarvin sold him part of the machine gun just a few days before he resold the weapon to Heavilin. In its closing statement, the government repeatedly emphasized this evidence indicating Ford had illegally possessed the AR-15 long before Heavilin asked him to procure the weapon. To be sure, Ford's counsel contested this testimony in the closing statement, arguing all of the government's witnesses were not credible on this point. In light of the strong evidence undermining Ford's entrapment defense for the November 21 transaction, we conclude there is not a reasonable probability that the three undisclosed emails would have changed the outcome of the trial.
Ford nonetheless makes three arguments supporting his claim that the case was a close one, and therefore any additional evidence of entrapment might have made a difference. (1) Ford first points to the contents of the emails. He contends the emails are material to his entrapment defense because they show that (a) the idea for the third gun transaction came from Heavilin, (b) Ford was reluctant to sell Heavilin the gun, and (c) Heavilin repeatedly urged him to commit the crime. We disagree, and conclude the contents of the emails are not material. First, Ford argues that the jury might have misinterpreted the October 5, 2005 email as suggesting the idea for the third sale originated from Ford. As the argument goes, the pre-October 5 email is material because it would have definitively shown the idea for the third sale came from Heavilin. But Ford never used the October 5 email to cross-examine Heavilin or to establish that he was responding to one of Heavilin's earlier requests (by email or phone) for a gun. In this light, it is hard to place great weight on the exact wording of the email since the parties did not do so at trial. We thus agree with the district court that the content of this undisclosed email was not material to Ford's entrapment defense because the jury could only conclude that Heavilin raised and discussed the subject of a third machine gun and thus positioned Ford to argue as he did at trial that the idea and impetus for a third machine gun was Heavilin's. Dist. Order at 14. And in any event, the origination of the idea for the third transaction is not dispositive of the overall predisposition question. Even assuming the government first approached Ford regarding a third sale, it could still rebut the entrapment defense by other evidence of predisposition. See generally United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1002-03 (10th Cir.1992). Even so, the government did not repeatedly urge the jury to conclude that Ford originated the idea for the third weapon transaction in the October 5 email. For example, in its closing arguments, the government never suggested the idea for the third transaction originated with Ford rather than Heavilin. [14] Also, the absence of the pre-October 5 email did not prevent Ford from arguing that the idea for the third transaction originated with Heavilin, an argument he in fact did pursue, Dist. Order. at 11. Thus, we agree with the district court that while the government may have contended that there was no entrapment [] because the idea and impetus for the third illegal weapon came from defendant, Dist. Order at 3, we also agree with the district court that the pre-October 5 email is not material, but instead, is largely cumulative. Id. at 14. [15] Furthermore, the jury also heard of evidence after the October 5 communication indicating the idea for the last transaction was raised by Heavilin. The jury heard the audio of an October 18, 2005 conversation, in which Heavilin tells Ford he would like to purchase a third machine gun. [16] In cross-examination, Heavilin admitted he initiated the discussion of the weapon in the October 18 meeting. Defense counsel asked Heavilin, And you tell [Ford] at that point about your desire to have a third weapon and how you got the money ready this time, right? Heavilin responded, Yes, sir. R., Vol. X at 74. [17] In sum, the email is not material and does not undermine our confidence in the jury's conclusion that Ford was predisposed to commit the crime. We also reject Ford's argument that the undisclosed October 28 email provided material evidence showing he was reluctant to sell Heavilin the third machine gun. In the email, Ford tells Heavilin that no weapons were currently available. Ford's claims about the importance of this evidence are not persuasive because the content of the email was largely cumulative. At trial, Ford was able to present unrebutted evidence showing that on October 18 and November 17 he told Heavilin that no machine guns were currently available. A close look at the October 28 email, furthermore, shows only weak support for Ford's claim that he was reluctant to procure the weapon. In the email, Ford said he was currently unable to procure the machine gun. He did not state or suggest he was unwilling. In fact, Ford tells Heavilin that he is still watching for an available weapon. R., Vol. I, Doc. 196 at 14. At best, the email cuts both ways for Ford. Finally, we reject the contention that the emails provided material evidence showing Heavilin repeatedly pressured him to commit the crime. Out of the twelve communications initiated by Heavilin leading up to the last transaction, two more emails do not add up to much more. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests Heavilin had more aggressively asked Ford about the machine guns in the pre-October 5 and pre-October 28 emails compared to the communications before the jury. [18] In sum, we conclude the contents of the undisclosed emails were not sufficiently material to cast doubt on the jury's verdict. [19] (2) Second, Ford emphasizes that the jury acquitted him of the first two sales, suggesting the evidence supporting his conviction on the third count was weak. But as we have already explained, substantially different circumstances existed between the November 21 sale and the prior two sales. Acquittal on the first two counts, therefore, does not imply that the evidence supporting the third count was weak. See Nguyen, 413 F.3d at 1181. (3) Finally, Ford suggests the case was close based on the fact that the jury took a day and half to deliberate, asked the judge certain questions about the evidence, and asked to see certain trial exhibits corroborating Ford's testimony. But this fact does nothing to show which counts, if any, concerned the jury. We can only speculate whether the jury had any concerns in particular about the quality of the evidence for the third count. In sum, in light of the strong evidence that Ford was predisposed to possessing the third machine gun and selling it to Heavilin, we conclude the three non-disclosed emails were not material to Ford's defense.