Opinion ID: 1345760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Elimination of other violent crimes factor from list of aggravating circumstances.

Text: (19) After discussion with counsel, the trial court eliminated factor (b), [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant [other than the currently charged crimes] which [activity] involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence (italics added), from the list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be read to the jury. (ง 190.3, factor (b).) The only instructional reference to defendant's other crimes was that set forth in factor (c) of section 190.3: [t]he presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.  Defendant now claims this was prejudicial error, in that it prevented the jury from realizing that his lack of other violent crimes was a mitigating factor. We disagree. In the first place, any error was invited by defendant himself. Defense counsel submitted the instruction in the form finally given. The prosecutor opposed deletion of factor (b) on grounds that, even though the circumstances of defendant's prior robbery had not been introduced, the least adjudicated elements of the robbery necessarily implied violence. On the other hand, both the court and the prosecutor reminded defense counsel of the presence or absence language, pointing out that the omitted factor would aid defendant if in fact his background lacked violence. Still, defense counsel indicated his preference that factor (b) be omitted, and his position prevailed. On this record, counsel's tactical purpose is obvious. Counsel knew that only defendant's bare reference to a prior robbery conviction had been allowed in evidence. Counsel sought to confine the jury's consideration of this incident accordingly, and to foreclose a prosecution argument that the robbery counted not only as a prior conviction, but also as a violent crime. (See Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 764.) This clear tactical decision prevents a contention on appeal that any resulting error is grounds for reversal. ( People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228-229 [207 Cal. Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; cf. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 334-335.) In any event, there was no reversible prejudice, because counsel's tactic had the desired result. The prior robbery was, in fact, a violent crime within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b). Had a reference to factor (b) been included in the instruction, the prosecutor would most likely have so argued, thus enhancing this prior conduct as an aggravating factor in the jurors' eyes. Deletion of instructional language based on section 190.3, factor (b), did not prevent the jury from considering past nonviolence as a circumstance in defendant's favor.