Opinion ID: 736262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991

Text: 14 The first issue that must be addressed is Appellants' claim that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the Act) applies to this case. As this question is a legal issue involving statutory construction, we must conduct a de novo review. Loehrer v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 98 F.3d 1056, 1061 (8th Cir.1996). Our independent consideration persuades us that § 105 of the Act does not apply retroactively. 15 Section 105, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), provides that 16 An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established ... only if-- 17 (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of ... sex ... and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or 18 (ii) the complaining party [demonstrates] an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice. 19 The Act was Congress's response to a series of Supreme Court decisions; among the decisions specified by Congress was Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989), and § 105 is a direct response to Wards Cove. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 249-51, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1489, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court held that a business justification was a practice that serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer and further directed that the employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business justification for his employment practice [but that] the burden of persuasion ... remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659, 109 S.Ct. at 2126. 20 In passing § 105, Congress intended to codify the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Although this is not an appropriate case to detail all the differences between Griggs and Wards Cove, it is appropriate to point out that there are significant differences between the two. 21 Under Wards Cove, after the plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate impact, the defendant employer bore the burden of producing evidence of a legitimate business justification in defense of the challenged policy. The burden of persuasion, however, remained on the plaintiff. Under the Griggs standard, the burden is on the defendant employer to prove both a compelling need for the challenged policy, and the lack of an effective alternative policy that would not produce a similar disparate impact. 22 Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir.1993); see also Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir.1994). 23 We must begin by examining the language of the Act itself while keeping in mind that there is no special reason to think that all the diverse provisions of the Act must be treated uniformly for such purposes. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. In presenting their text-based argument, Appellants rely upon § 402 of the Act, which provides as follows: 24 (a) Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment. 25 (b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983. 26 It seems clear that § 402(b) describes one case and one case only; namely, Wards Cove. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 257-59, 114 S.Ct. at 1493. Appellants contend that by specifically exempting Wards Cove from the Act's application, and by declaring that, except as provided, the Act was to take effect upon enactment, the Act must apply to all other cases--including this one. The major flaw in this argument is that the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected it--twice. Id. at 259-65, 114 S.Ct. at 1494-96; Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 301-05, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 1514-15, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994). In rejecting this analysis with respect to § 102 of the Act, the Landgraf Court noted that [h]ad Congress wished § 402(a) to have such a determinate meaning, it surely would have used language comparable to its reference to the predecessor Title VII damages provision in the 1990 legislation: that the new provisions shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment of this Act, 511 U.S. at 259-60, 114 S.Ct. at 1494 (citation omitted). 6 The Rivers Court, when presented with the same argument with respect to retroactive application of § 101, noted that the argument is no more persuasive as to the application of § 101 to preenactment conduct than as to that of § 102. 511 U.S. at 303, 114 S.Ct. at 1514. 27 The above reasoning applies with equal force to § 105. Had Congress intended for § 105 to apply retroactively, it would have said so clearly and directly: just like it did in Title VII. Given the important considerations involved in deciding to apply a statute retroactively, we do not believe Congress would have employed such tortured language to achieve this result. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 261-63, 114 S.Ct. at 1495. 28 Appellants acknowledge Landgraf 's holding, but contend it should not apply in this case because it would render § 402(b) meaningless. However, as Landgraf explains, [i]t is entirely possible--indeed, highly probable--that, because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue with the clarity of the 1990 legislation, Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the Courts.... The only matters Congress did not leave to the courts were set out with specificity in §§ 109(c) and 402(b). Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 261, 114 S.Ct. at 1494-95 (emphasis in original). Rejecting Appellants' argument does not render § 402(b) meaningless. 29 Having concluded that Congress did not specifically declare that the Act is to apply retroactively, we must consider whether the new statute would have a true retroactive effect, i.e., 'whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.'  Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357, 361 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280-81, 114 S.Ct. at 1505) (footnote omitted). A statute is not retroactive merely because it applies to conduct that occurred prior to the statute's enactment; [t]he conclusion that a particular rule operates 'retroactively' comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. at 1499. Given the broad effect of § 105, it cannot be characterized as simply a procedural change. Generally speaking, § 105 reallocates and raises the burden of persuasion with respect to a business justification defense and redefines precisely what constitutes a valid business justification. It seems clear, then, that application of § 105 would attach new legal consequences to employment decisions made prior to its enactment, rendering impermissible certain acts that were previously permissible and giving employers different issues to consider when making decisions. We have no difficulty concluding that § 105 attaches new consequences to prior conduct and significantly alters the legal terrain that employers must traverse. Consequently, we hold that § 105 does not apply retroactively. 7