Opinion ID: 1932173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court err in denying the batson motion?

Text: The defense argues that the alleged use of its peremptory challenges to exclude black persons on the jury requires reversal of this case. Wheeler relies on the now-familiar decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant. 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d at 83. It was stipulated that seventeen members of the panel were members of the black race. Of these seventeen, the court struck three for cause. The State used four of its peremptory challenges to strike blacks, and two of its peremptory challenges to strike whites. The defense used all six of its challenges to strike whites. Of the twelve jurors finally seated, three were black and nine were white. As stated in Taylor v. State, 524 So.2d 565 (Miss. 1988). Under Batson, a criminal defendant makes out a prima facie case for attacking the composition of a jury panel if he can show (1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges toward the elimination of veniremen in that group; and (3) that the attendant circumstances justify an inference that the challenges were made for racially invidious purposes. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87. The burden then shifts to the prosecution to give racially neutral explanations for each challenge. Id. 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. In the present case, the State's use of its peremptory challenges to strike blacks was suspicious enough to warrant some inquiry, and the trial judge did well to conduct a hearing. Taylor at 566. The State gave the following reasons for each strike: The State struck No. 3, Marion McDonald, who indicated she had to go on active duty service, she is also a teacher and so we just used that peremptory challenge because we didn't feel, if she were going on active duty Friday, she would be with us; see, R. 118, 159. The State struck No. 9, Jimmy Lewis because every time Mr. Middleton would speak, he was sitting on the front row nodding affirmatively to all the questions on voir dire, the few that he did have, and he was very attentive to Mr. Middleton so we just struck him on that basis. It was a gut reaction... . And [he] was unresponsive to the voir dire of the State; The State struck No. 10, Betty Molphus, because [a]gain we looked at her background, she has no husband, two children and we did not feel that she would be a conservative juror on behalf of the State so we struck her. The State struck No. 22, Louise Johnson, who was not receptive to the State during voir dire and indicated absolutely no responses. In fact, it was difficult to maintain eye contact with her, I never did succeed in doing so. These reasons are similar to the explanations found to be race-neutral in Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346 (Miss. 1987). It should be reiterated that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level of justifying exercise of a challenge for cause, but may not include the prosecutor's assumption  or intuitive judgment  that they [black jurors] would be partial to the defendant because of their share[d] race. Lockett at 1352 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88). It is the duty of the trial court to determine whether purposeful discrimination has been shown. Lockett at 1349. In the present case, the explanations given by the State satisfied the trial court. Because a trial judge's factual findings relative to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on minority persons are to be accorded great deference [such findings] will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Lockett at 1350. This Court holds that there is no Batson violation in these explanations and affirms the trial court on this assignment.