Opinion ID: 2977989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: conti’s discovery claim

Text: “The scope of discovery is, of course, within the broad discretion of the trial court. . . . An order denying further discovery will be grounds for reversal only if it was an abuse of discretion resulting in substantial prejudice.” Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the decision to issue a protective order is left to “the broad discretion of the district court in managing the case.” Lewelling v. Farmers Ins. -5- No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle of Columbus, Inc., 879 F.2d 212, 218 (6th Cir. 1989). Nevertheless, although the district court has discretion in managing discovery, “[t]he scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite broad.” Lewis, 135 F.3d at 402. As the Supreme Court has instructed, because “discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issue,” the limits set forth in Rule 26 must be “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). The operative test in determining whether discovery on a particular matter is permissible is “whether the line of interrogation is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499, 501 (6th Cir. 1970). AAM argues that Conti should not be permitted to depose Dauch because he was not personally involved in and did not have personal knowledge of the employment decisions at issue here, and that the information Conti seeks was available through other deponents. According to AAM, Dauch “has not been involved in any significant decision pertaining to [Conti’s] employment,” and “Conti never reported to Mr. Dauch and Mr. Dauch never supervised her work.” J.A. 34. In response, Conti points to record evidence showing that Dauch hired her, interacted with her regularly, and likely was aware of her decision to testify against the company’s interests in a deposition in another discrimination suit. Conti also claims that the record shows that Dauch likely was involved in or had knowledge of the particular employment decisions at issue here, namely Conti’s 2003 demotion and her 2004 “promotion” to manager, as opposed to director, of the New Model Launch division. Finally, Conti alleges that she should be permitted to question Dauch -6- No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle regarding his writings evincing his gender-biased attitudes, as well as the role that his management style has played in her stalled advancement at the company. Although the record supports AAM’s claim that Conti never reported directly to Dauch, it does not support its broader suggestion that Dauch has not been involved in decisions relating to Conti’s employment. For instance, Conti claims that AAM demoted her as retaliation for her protected activity related to her decision to testify “truthfully” but against the company’s interests in a prior discrimination suit brought against the company. The district court rejected this argument on the grounds that Conti had failed to demonstrate that her direct superiors were aware of her decision to provide deposition testimony that would have been adverse to the company. But the record suggests otherwise. According to Conti, she informed in-house counsel for American Axle that Roy Langenbach, her former boss, instructed her not to hire two female applicants, whom Conti judged to be “very capable candidates,” because “one was a mother [and another] one was overweight.”1 J.A. 98. Although it is unclear whether Shanti, her direct supervisor at the time, was aware of Conti’s intentions, the record suggests that Dauch was aware of this information. In his response to Conti’s written interrogatories, Dauch acknowledged that he “retained trial counsel reports to AAM staff counsel,” and received “periodic reports on litigation matters” from AAM’s 1 Conti claims that, in 2003, she informed counsel for AAM that she intended to disclose Langenbach’s statements during a deposition which was scheduled in a discrimination suit brought against AAM by a former employee, Terri Van Zoest (“Van Zoest”). Conti alleges that AAM retaliated against her for this protected conduct, claiming that her deposition in that case was cancelled and the suit settled almost immediately after AAM became aware of Conti’s intention to testify about these alleged statements, and that she was demoted shortly thereafter. -7- No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle staff counsel. J.A. 1494. From this, it follows that he would have been aware of Conti’s decision to testify against the company’s interests. As to this particular issue, AAM argues that the denial of Conti’s discovery request was proper because, “while Mr. Dauch received periodic updates on litigation matters, there is no evidence that he received any specific information regarding Conti’s alleged discussions with counsel.” Def. Br. at 41. But that argument seems to put the cart before the horse inasmuch as deposing Dauch is necessary to determine precisely what information was relayed to him by AAM’s staff counsel. As the record stands, there is no dispute that Dauch received updates regarding pending litigation, and everyone agrees that Conti made clear her intention to testify against the company’s interest in a scheduled deposition in a pending lawsuit. Shortly thereafter, the case was settled, and a few months later Conti was demoted. Although the factual record currently may be insufficient to support a claim of retaliation, see West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 665 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Mich. 2003) (“Something more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed.”), it is more than sufficient to support further discovery. That is especially true considering that, contrary to AAM’s portrayal of Dauch as an aloof, hands-off CEO, significant record evidence attests to Dauch’s personal involvement in and control over all aspects of his company. For example, Conti points to a 2006 article characterizing Dauch as “run[ning] his empire like a front-line general, relying on a mixture of fear and respect.” J.A. 79. Deposition testimony from AAM executives confirms that characterization. See J.A. 114-18. For instance, at least one AAM executive testified that Dauch personally identified “goals and -8- No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle objectives” for his executives. J.A. 116. Moreover, Earhart, who was Conti’s direct supervisor before her promotion to the co-Director position in 2003, admitted that his performance reviews of Conti were influenced by the “pressure of that relationship,” presumably referring to Dauch’s involvement in Conti’s career. J.A. 115. Such testimony casts serious doubt on the dissent’s contention that Dauch’s overarching influence and management style had “no real bearing on decisions about Conti.” Dissenting Op. at 3. In fact, Conti testified that her supervisors informed her that certain employment decisions related to this suit “came from the very top.” J.A. 95. In support of that claim, Conti points to her daily notes from March 2004 which indicate that she was told that “the only one who [can change her bonus percentage] is ‘the old man’ Dick Dauch.” J.A. 129. Like the district court, the dissent simply ignores this record evidence. Our conclusion also finds support in the fact that Dauch played a direct role in the decision to hire Conti in 1997. Even American Axle does not dispute Dauch’s personal involvement in Conti’s hiring. Although the district court acknowledged this fact, it failed to recognize the significance of this evidence. Obviously, the fact Dauch played a direct role in Conti’s hiring does not conclusively show that he was involved in any of the adverse employment decisions at issue here, many of which occurred several years later. Nevertheless, Dauch’s personal involvement in Conti’s hiring does directly contradict his statement that he has “no independent or unique knowledge of employment decisions made with respect to Ms. Conti’s employment with AAM.” It also casts serious doubt on AAM’s portrayal of Dauch as aloof and uninvolved in employment -9- No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle decisions. Indeed, Dauch himself acknowledges that he “was informed of” and “approved” employment decisions relating to Conti. J.A. 1495. Downplaying these statements, AAM repeatedly insists that Dauch was only marginally aware of issues related to Conti’s employment status because, as AAM puts it, Dauch is “the highest ranking official” at “a company employing more than 10,000 employees in nine countries worldwide.” J.A. 34. But Conti and Dauch were not separated geographically, as both worked at AAM’s corporate headquarters in Michigan. And although AAM is a large company, only one direct supervisor separated Conti from Dauch. Moreover, the record suggests that the two interacted on numerous occasions, and perhaps frequently. Despite AAM’s claims to the contrary, the record thus suggests that Dauch likely has knowledge that is directly relevant to Conti’s claims. At the very least, Dauch will be able to testify as to why he hired Conti and initially supported her advancement, a topic directly relevant to AAM’s claims that Conti was less qualified for promotion than some of her male peers. Like the district court, the dissent entirely ignores the relevance of this line of questioning, an issue about which Dauch undoubtedly has personal knowledge. Taken together, this record evidence casts serious doubt on the district court’s conclusion that Dauch was not aware of and played no role in any decision relevant to this action. Contrary to AAM’s characterization of Dauch as aloof and uninvolved, a characterization that the dissent uncritically accepts, the record instead suggests that Dauch played an active and direct role in at least ceratin employment decisions. In our opinion, the district court abused its discretion by precluding - 10 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle Conti from deposing Dauch as to whether the particular employment decisions at issue here fell within that category. The dissent contends that this evidence, even taken cumulatively, shows only that “further discovery might provide a more thorough record,” but falls short of showing that “the district court abused its discretion to the point of causing substantial prejudice.” Dissenting Op. at 3. We disagree. The record demonstrates that Dauch likely was aware of Conti’s decision to testify against the company, and that the adverse employment decisions at issue here likely “came from the very top.” Although the record at this point shows only that Dauch’s involvement was likely, that is only because the district court improperly precluded Conti from deposing Dauch on these issues. The cases on which AAM relies are not to the contrary as most involve corporate officers who had little if any interaction with the employees bringing claims against the company. For instance, in Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 1998), this Court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow only a limited deposition of the President and Chief Operating Officer of Pitney Bowes, and denied deposition of its CEO. Id. at 366. In that case, however, we found that the record did not show that these officers “even knew that [the plaintiff] had been terminated, much less that they in some way caused it.” Id. at 367. Nevertheless, even on that thinnest of records, we found that limited discovery of one of the officers was appropriate, reasoning that the district court’s approach was “a reasonable way to balance Bush’s right to discovery with the need to prevent ‘fishing expeditions.’” Id. (emphasis added). In light of the far more significant evidence suggesting Dauch’s knowledge of decisions relating to Conti’s employment at AAM, we conclude that the balance of interests suggests that reasonable discovery should have been permitted here. - 11 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle The cases on which the dissent relies are equally inapposite. For example, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Thomas v. IBM, 48 F.3d 478 (10th Cir. 1995), sheds very little light on the issue we confront here. In addition to the same lack-of-knowledge claim raised by Dauch and AAM here, the defendant in Thomas also argued that a protective order was warranted because plaintiff’s discovery request (1) violated the court’s local discovery rules, (2) the plaintiff failed to depose any other IBM personnel, including direct supervisors, and (3) the deposition would have imposed a “severe hardship” on the intended deponent, IBM’s Chairman of the Board. Id. at 483-84. None of those three significant factors is present in this case. To the contrary, as the record demonstrates, Conti provided more than ample notice of her intent to depose Dauch, attempting to ascertain Dauch’s availability for deposition as early as April of 2006, and maintaining communication with defense counsel on this issue throughout that summer. In fact, it was defense counsel who decided to seek a protective order at the eleventh hour, cancelling a deposition scheduled for September 29, 2006 with only a few days notice, and just before the close of discovery. Consequently, the fact that the discovery period closed before the court ruled on the discovery issue thus weighs against American Axle, not in its favor.2 Conti’s counsel also expressly agreed to depose other AAM employees first, thereby satisfying the second concern raised in Thomas. Finally, AAM’s motion for a protective order never provided any substantive basis for its repeated claim that this deposition would pose a hardship on Dauch. In fact, given that other executives at AAM who work alongside 2 This is another issue which the district court improperly failed to consider, and further demonstrates that it abused its discretion in precluding Conti from deposing Dauch. - 12 - No. 08-1301 Conti v. American Axle Dauch on a daily basis were able to make time to appear, it seems more than reasonable to conclude that Dauch could have been deposed without unreasonable inconvenience. Unlike the dissent, we are not inclined to credit Dauch’s bald assertion that being deposed would present a substantial burden, especially when his deposition could provide information critical to Conti’s claims.3 To allow a defendant to avoid his discovery obligations on such a thin basis frustrates the purpose of discovery, and runs counter to the Supreme Court’s explicit instruction that discovery privileges should be “construed broadly.” Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (observing that discovery was intended so that “civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark” by allowing “the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial”)). Absent any substantive basis to support Dauch’s hardship claim, and in light of Dauch’s likely knowledge of information relevant to Conti’s claims, we find that the denial of Conti’s deposition request was an abuse of discretion. See Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979) (“It is very unusual for a court to prohibit the taking of a deposition altogether and absent extraordinary circumstances, such an order would likely be in error.”). We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court as to this issue.