Opinion ID: 629121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bloomer's Trial Issues

Text: 9 On appeal, Bloomer challenges numerous rulings relating to his conviction. His claims range from attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction, to charges of error in certain evidentiary rulings. We have carefully examined all of his these claims and find them to be meritless. We discuss only his challenge to the district court's failure to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 10 At trial, the government introduced the testimony of two expert chemists who supervised the investigation of Bloomer's methamphetamine laboratory. Brendan McMahon, the Vermont State Police forensic chemist, testified that he found traces of methamphetamine in the fume hood. When Bloomer mixed the precursor chemicals in the fume hood, small deposits of methamphetamine were left behind which enabled McMahon to identify the narcotic. The government's second expert, Jack Fasanello, worked as the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) clandestine laboratory coordinator for the northeastern United States. Fasanello examined the precursor chemicals seized from Bloomer's home. He testified that the presence of a tube furnace found together with pumice and thorium nitrate could only lead to the conclusion that Bloomer was manufacturing methamphetamine. Fasanello also identified notations in the defendant's handwriting that were found during the search of the defendant's study as references to procedures for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on McMahon's discovery of methamphetamine traces, the chemicals Bloomer ordered and stored in the laboratory, and the laboratory equipment, Fasanello concluded that Bloomer was capable of producing three to four pounds of pure methamphetamine. 11 On April 15, 1992, the jury found Bloomer guilty. Shortly before sentencing, Bloomer moved for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Bloomer had learned that on November 16, 1992, McMahon was relieved of duty because of the discovery that he had taken and used regulated drugs from the state police crime laboratory. Bloomer argued that this new evidence would have impeached McMahon's credibility at trial, and could have led to an acquittal. The district court denied Bloomer's motion, finding that the defendant has not shown that this newly discovered evidence would probably lead to his acquittal. Persuasive independent evidence ... supported [the] defendant's conviction. Moreover, there is no indication that Dr. McMahon's trial testimony was untrue. 12 On appeal, Bloomer argues that the district court should have granted him a new trial because the new evidence would have impugned McMahon's veracity and led to an acquittal. He contends that McMahon was the key witness and the only one who connected the presence of methamphetamine with his private laboratory. We disagree. 13 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that [t]he court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice. In making this determination, however, [a] district court must exercise 'great caution' in determining whether to grant a retrial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and may grant the motion only 'in the most extraordinary circumstances.'  United States v. Imran, 964 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Di Paolo, 835 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1987)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 626, 121 L.Ed.2d 558 (1992). The motion is not favored and will only be granted when the new evidence ... would probably lead to an acquittal. United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946, 102 S.Ct. 2014, 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982). In other words, [a]n appellate court must weigh whether or not there is in reality a 'significant chance' that the disclosure would have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to prevent a conviction. United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3198, 49 L.Ed.2d 1203 (1976). Moreover, we will not disturb the district court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and we will not overturn the district court's decision unless it abused its discretion. See United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 72 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1953, 123 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993). 14 We have recently stated that when the district court learns of newly discovered evidence after a conviction, it should provide relief if the defendant makes a showing that the evidence is in fact 'new,' i.e., it could not have been discovered, exercising due diligence before or during trial, and that the evidence is so material and non-cumulative that its admission 'would probably lead to an acquittal.'  United States v. Siddiqi, 959 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 479 (2d Cir.1980)). It is clear that the evidence concerning McMahon is new; neither Bloomer nor the government could have discovered the evidence before or during trial. Furthermore, because the new evidence was the only evidence impeaching McMahon's credibility, it was non-cumulative. Cf. Gordils, 982 F.2d at 72 (holding that new evidence impeaching credibility of government's key witness was cumulative of other evidence of witness' criminal activity); Gilbert, 668 F.2d at 96 (holding that new evidence impeaching government's witness was cumulative of other evidence questioning the witness' character), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946, 102 S.Ct. 2014, 72 L.Ed.2d 469 (1982). 15 The evidence, however, was clearly not so material that a new trial was required. The district court correctly found that [p]ersuasive independent evidence ... supported the defendant's conviction. There was overwhelming testimony from six buyers of Bloomer's narcotic that established Bloomer's manufacture of methamphetamine. Furthermore, Fasanello's expert opinion indicated that the presence of certain chemicals, laboratory equipment, and Bloomer's notations could lead only to the conclusion that Bloomer was manufacturing methamphetamine. Because this evidence corroborated McMahon's testimony that Bloomer's home contained traces of the narcotic, the newly discovered evidence possibly impeaching McMahon would not have materially altered the outcome of the trial. Moreover, although the evidence may have impeached McMahon's credibility, it did not serve to contradict any of McMahon's conclusions or statements of fact. As we have previously stated,  '[t]he discovery of new evidence which merely discredits a government witness and does not directly contradict the government's case ordinarily does not justify the grant of a new trial.'  United States v. Sposato, 446 F.2d 779, 781 (2d Cir.1971) (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 387 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir.1967)). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of the new trial motion.