Opinion ID: 773285
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Particularity and Overbreadth

Text: Greene first argues that the language of the search warrant is overbroad. The Fourth Amendment states no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Particularity eliminates the danger of unlimited discretion in the executing officer's determinationof what is subject to seizure. See United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1026 (6th Cir. 1991). While a general order to explore and rummage is not permitted, id., the degree of specificity required is flexible and will vary depending on the crime involved and the types of items sought. United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1033 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1026-27. Consequently, a description is valid if it is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit. Ables, 167 F.3d at 1033. However, infirmity due to overbreadth does not doom the entire warrant; rather, it requires the suppression of evidence seized pursuant to that part of the warrant . . . , but does not require the suppression of anything described in the valid portions of the warrant (or lawfully seized - on plain view grounds, for example - during their execution). United States v. Brown, 984 F.2d 1074, 1077 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quotes and citation omitted). This Court reviews de novo a district court's determination of particularity. See United States v. Durk, 149 F.3d 464, 465 (6th Cir. 1998). Greene argues that two clauses of the warrant are overbroad. The first clause authorizes confiscation of any other property that which (sic) is not identified as the occupant's personal property. Search Warrant and Aff., J.A. at 25. The government concedes that this catch-all clause is overbroad, giving the officers too much discretion to seize personal property not listed. Gov't's Br. at 6-7. However, the government also notes that the appropriate remedy for overbreadth is severing the infirm clause, and not dooming the entire warrant. See Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1027. In this case, severance of the catch-all clause does not change the scope of the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The long, detailed list of items to be seized preceding the catch-all clause includes the make, model, and caliber of four firearms. Moreover, the paragraph immediately succeeding the catch-all clause contains a general list of items to be seized, including all firearms used in connection with narcotics trafficking. Search Warrant and Aff., J.A. at 25. Assuming that this succeeding clause does not run afoul of Fourth Amendment strictures, severance of the catch-all clause does not change the scope of the search or impugn the validity of the seizure of the three firearms which are the basis for Greene's conviction. The second clause Greene challenges is the aforementioned list of general items to be seized. This list authorizes the seizure of: All controlled substances, all monies, books, records used in connection with illegal narcotic trafficking, all equipment and supplies used in the manufacture, delivery or sale of controlled substances, all firearms used in connection with the above described activities, evidence of ownership, occupancy, or control of the premises. Id. at 25. Greene argues that since [t]here was no specific language that indicated that the officers should search for [] the specific guns that were seized from the residences, this clause is overbroad. Greene's Br. at 12. Greene's argument is unpersuasive. Use of a generic term or generic description is not a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment. Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1027. [T]he degree of specificity required is flexible and will vary depending on the crime involved and the types of items sought. See Ables, 167 F.3d at 1033. Moreover, this Circuit has previously noted that the language of a warrant isto be construed in light of an illustrative list of seizable items. Id. Consequently, general descriptions of property are appropriate if descriptions of specific types of that property have already been furnished, and different types of that property would be relevant in determining the crime. See id. at 1034 (generic terms, such as other items evidencing . . . the concealment of assets, not overbroad where warrant gave specific examples of documents to be seized, such as bank statements, money drafts, [and] letters of credit, in money laundering case); Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1027 (since specific examples of documents proving ownership or residency were already included, a clause authorizing indicia of occupancy, residency and/or ownership of the premises did not violate particularity; such documents would tend to prove facts that would be relevant in establishing the identity of the perpetrators of the robbery). In this case, Lt. Hiller avers in his affidavit that a confidential informant told federal officers that Greene had engaged in ongoing narcotics trafficking and was selling certain caliber guns from 2139/2141 Ashland. Since two of the crimes alleged in the affidavit are narcotics trafficking and firearms dealing, any firearms associated with the trafficking or dealing are properly seized. See 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A) (establishing penalties for possession of a firearm in connection with drug trafficking); 18 U.S.C. §922(a)(1)(A) (prohibition against unlicenced gun sales). 1 Moreover, in the preceding paragraph, four specific firearms, property apparently stolen during the home invasions, are identified. As noted earlier, a generic description, such as firearms, is appropriate if property of the same type previously described would be relevant to the crime. See Ables, 167 F.3d at 1034; Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1027. Here, seizure of other firearms discovered in the search would be relevant in proving the crimes of narcotics trafficking with a firearm, firearms dealing, or disposal of stolen property. Since the search warrant is not overbroad, we affirm the district court on this claim.