Opinion ID: 620195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims of Ineffectiveness Before Removal Proceedings

Text: Because immigration proceedings are civil rather than criminal in nature, the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel does not apply. Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157 n. 23. But we have recognized (along with a majority of our sister Courts of Appeals) that [a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings is cognizable under the Fifth Amendment i.e., as a violation of that amendment's guarantee of due process. Id. at 155; see also Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 106 (3d Cir.2005); Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131-32 (3d Cir.2001). [3] To violate due process, an attorney's ineffectiveness must be so severe as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the removal proceeding. See Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155 ([W]here counsel does appear for the [alien], incompetence in some situations may make the proceeding fundamentally unfair and give rise to a Fifth Amendment due process objection.) (emphasis in original) (quoting Hernandez v. Reno, 238 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2001)). [4] To make out an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an alien must show that prior counsel's deficient performance prevented him from reasonably presenting his case and caused him substantial prejudice. Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155; Khan v. Att'y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir.2006); Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231 (3d Cir.2002). To evaluate the merits of an ineffectiveness claim, we apply the familiar two-part error-and-prejudice test. Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157. First, we ask whether competent counsel would have acted otherwise. Id. (quoting Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.2000)). If so, we ask whether counsel's poor performance prejudiced the alien. Id. To prove prejudice, an alien must show that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result of the removal proceedings would have been different had the error(s) not occurred. Id. at 159. This standard properly requires the alien to show not just that he received ineffective assistance in his removal proceedings, but that the challenged order of removal is fundamentally unfair, because there is a significant likelihood that the IJ would not have entered an order of removal absent counsel's errors. Id. [5] In Balam-Chuc v. Mukasey, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the primary issue we must now address: whether an alien's right under the Fifth Amendment to the effective assistance of counsel during removal proceedings extends to pre-proceeding attorney conduct in connection with the visa petition process. 547 F.3d 1044, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2008). In that case, the Court acknowledged that poor representation during that process can result in terrible consequences for an alien and his family. Nonetheless, it held that the Fifth Amendment simply does not apply to the preparation and filing of a petition that does not relate to the fundamental fairness of an ongoing [removal] proceeding. Id. at 1051; see also Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that unfortunate immigration-law advice prior to a removal proceeding does not taint the fairness of the removal hearing itself in violation of the Fifth Amendment), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005). Balam-Chuc, like the Contrerases, sought lawful permanent residency under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i). He argued that his attorney failed to file properly his visa petition before § 1255(i)'s April 30, 2001 deadline, and that this failure deprived him of due process. 547 F.3d at 1050. The Court noted that this deficiency did not relate to the substance of an ongoing hearing; in fact, no proceedings had begun at the time the alleged attorney misconduct took place. Id. It rejected Balam-Chuc's attempt to cast ... an expansive and amorphous Fifth Amendment due process right that encompasses legal assistance removed from the actual [removal] process itself. Id. at 1051 (quoting Lara-Torres, 383 F.3d at 975). The Contrerases have offered no authority to the contrary, nor have we found any. They merely claim that the BIA erred as a matter of law when it arbitrarily added an additional requirement not found in its prior decision in Lozada or our decision in Fadiga. Pet'rs' Br. 19. Those cases, however, did not address alleged ineffectiveness before removal proceedings begin. The Fifth Amendment right to effective counsel in removal proceedings is narrower than the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel in criminal proceedings. As we have recognized, the process that is due an individual facing removal is the process of a fundamentally fair hearing. See Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155, 159; Xu Yong Lu, 259 F.3d at 130; see also Hernandez, 238 F.3d at 55; Castaneda-Suarez, 993 F.2d at 144. To be sure, had prior counsel timely appealed or sought reconsideration of Margarito's visa petition denial, then the IJ may have been willing, in an exercise of her discretion, to continue the removal proceedings. But while counsel's inept conduct prior to the removal proceedings may have resulted poorly for the Contrerases, it did not compromise the fundamental fairness of the removal proceedings themselves. The Contrerases were still able to present arguments and evidence available to them at the time of the proceedings. Unfortunately, they had no arguments or evidence that would have provided relief from removal. [6] We cannot end our discussion on this point without further comment on Mella's representation before the start of the removal proceedings, even if it is not subject to due process scrutiny. Our review of the administrative record reveals instances of not only incompetence but also exploitation. For example, Mella required $1,000 from Margaritotwo weeks' pay according to his pay stubs at the timeto file a motion to reconsider that Mella knew or should have known would be untimely. As noted, when he met with the Contrerases in January 2008, both the 33-day window to appeal the visa petition and the 30-day window to file a motion to reconsider had closed. With no time left on the clock to challenge the visa petition denial, but with the Contrerases' money in hand, Mella sent himself on a fool's errand, what his office readily admits was a last-ditch effort. Furthermore, we are incredulous that Mella promptly and effectively discussed with the Contrerases and Margarito's employer the possibility of appealing the denied visa petition. Margarito's employer's claims that she has always been willing to sponsor Margarito Contreras. But, according to a letter from his office, Mella did not appeal the visa petition because Margarito's employer pulled out in December 2007 and therefore he had no ability to challenge assertions in the denial on appeal. Admittedly, only a petitioner (Margarito's employer) may appeal the denial of an employment-based visa petition on behalf of the petition's beneficiary (Margarito). See 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(iii)(B) (defining an affected party as the person or entity with legal standing in a proceeding and excluding from this definition the beneficiary of a visa petition); id. at § 103.3(a)(2)(i) (providing that an affected party may appeal the denial of a visa petition); id. at § 103.3(a)(2)(v)(A)(1) (requiring rejection of an appeal filed by a person not entitled to file such an appeal). But employer support is also necessary to file a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1) (allowing only an affected party to seek reopening or reconsideration of a denied visa petition). The supposed lack of necessary employer support that stopped Mella from appealing the visa petition denial in December 2007 did not stop him from filing the motion to reconsider in March 2008. Simply put, Mella's filing the motion belies his excuse for not filing an appeal. The Contrerases deserved better. Mella's representation during the visa petition process fell well short of the decency and professionalism we expect from the immigration bar. Navigating the legal complexities and administrative quagmires of our immigration system is difficult enough even with the benefit of the most zealous advocacy. As this case painfully demonstrates, attorney incompetencewhether the result of carelessness or dishonesty can make those difficulties insurmountable. Regrettably, however, because counsel's substandard performance occurred before the removal proceedings were instituted, we are unable to provide a remedy.