Opinion ID: 2517596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure To Substitute Counsel

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying her request for substitute counsel after her first penalty phase trial ended in a mistrial. Defendant urges that the initial breakdown in the attorney-client relationship when defense counsel refused to consent to defendant's entry of a guilty plea was exacerbated by counsel's insistence on presenting what defendant terms a some-other-dude-did-it defense despite defendant's refusal to testify and the absence of any independent evidence to corroborate that theory of the crime. Defendant asserts the ongoing conflict culminated in a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship after defendant testified at the first penalty trial, allegedly while under the impression that she was not subject to cross-examination with regard to the circumstances of the crime. On direct examination during her first penalty phase trial, defendant testified concerning her background and upbringing. At defense counsel's request, she also read a letter she had written to Autumn Wallace, stating in part: Autumn, if you could hear me, please don't turn away `cause I want you to know that I'm sorry we took your innocent life. Thereafter, the prosecutor began to cross-examine defendant about the circumstances of the crime, over defense counsel's repeated objection. The trial court ruled that the defense had opened the door to cross-examination concerning the details of the crime. A week later, the first penalty phase jury informed the trial court that it was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared. The following day, defendant requested that the trial court appoint substitute counsel. At the subsequent hearing held pursuant to Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44, defendant stated to the trial court that her attorney had misrepresented to her the scope of cross-examination, and that her attorney wanted to do things I never wanted to do. He still goes ahead and does them. She told the trial court that her main complaint was that her attorney had informed her she would not be cross-examined regarding the circumstances of the crime, and I kept asking him, `is the D.A. going to ask me that? Is he going to bring that up?' and he told me he wasn't going to. And that's why I went up there on the stand. But `cause he told me the D.A. wasn't going to ask me anything. Defendant also described the larger, central dispute between herself and her attorney his insistence on pursuing and presenting a defense that implicated the other person and her persistent refusal to name or implicate another person in Autumn Wallace's murder. Defendant complained, among other things, of her attorney's decision to call as a witness at the second penalty phase trial Dr. Edwards, a move opposed by defendant because she understood that Dr. Edwards planned to testify regarding defendant's relationship with Beto, while defendant was steadfast in her intention to avoid any mention of Beto either as her crime partner or as the man who had raped her as a child. In turn, Defense Counsel Monroe informed the trial court that defendant felt counsel had betrayed her, and that as a result, defendant refused to cooperate with him with respect to the pending retrial of the penalty phase. The trial court conducted a diligent and in-depth inquiry into the subject of the discussion that had taken place between defendant and her counsel prior to defendant's taking the stand, specifically focusing upon what counsel had told defendant regarding cross-examination and repeatedly questioning Attorney Monroe with regard to whether he actually told defendant she would not face cross-examination if she testified. Counsel acknowledged that defendant's recollection or perception of what counsel had told her was different from his own, but stated that although his memory was imprecise, I did not say to her unequivocally that I would keep [the prosecutor's] cross-examination out. I said I would object to it in the eventnot in the event, when he did attempt to get into it. Defense counsel also told the trial court that counsel had attempted to avoid questioning defendant regarding the circumstances of the crime, but acknowledged having asked defendant to make a statement of remorse to Linda Wallace which subsequently was determined by the trial court to have opened the door to the prosecutor's cross-examination. Defense counsel acknowledged having reviewed defendant's letters to Autumn and Linda Wallace, repeatedly having discussed with defendant the importance of her testimony, and having told her that, should the prosecutor seek to cross-examine her, counsel would object. How Rosie perceived that, I can't say; or how she interpreted it, I can't say. The trial court stated with regard to the comment defendant directed to Autumn Wallace, I'm sorry we took your innocent life, that in its view under any reasonable interpretation of evidence that anybody is going to be able to cross-examine about what she meant by that. So I'm puzzled as to what kind of advice you gave her about that. Defense counsel admitted he had not provided any advice as to the significance of the comment insofar as it might determine the scope of the prosecution's cross-examination. Defense counsel denied, however, having advised defendant that she would not be cross-examined, and reiterated he had informed defendant he would object in the event the prosecutor attempted to cross-examine her regarding the circumstances of the crime. Defense counsel also agreed with the trial court's statement that after the jury had seen defendant's videotaped confession, if [defendant] didn't testify, she didn't have much of a chance to save her life. Counsel expressed frustration at defendant's continued refusal to cooperate, especially her refusal to identify the second man. Counsel noted that Rosie sent us on any number of wild-goose chases before we finally nailed this Beto character down. In particular, counsel expressed concern that if [defendant] is going to refuse to see me in the jail or cooperate with me, do I end up with a conflict so I can't do the damn job for her? Thus, counsel, although denying that he had performed incompetently, himself was concerned that defendant's stated refusal to cooperate would compromise his continuing efforts to provide a defense. The trial court observed that the alleged betrayal with respect to the possible scope of cross-examination was not raised by defendant on the day she testified. When questioned about the delay, defendant told the trial court: I didn't really know what I was supposed to do to bring it up. I had to ask one of the girls in the jail and they kind of told me what that I could talk and say anything I want whenever I wanted [to] ... so I didn't know I could have brought it up at that point. I didn't know that at the time. Ultimately, the trial court found that defendant's request for substitute counsel was untimely, having been made on the morning of the day the court had scheduled a hearing to set a date for retrial. Substantively, the court found that although defense counsel did not specifically tell defendant she would not be subject to cross-examination, she misunderstood his explanation regarding the scope of cross-examination and was under the impression she could read a letter to Autumn without being cross-examined regarding the circumstances of the crime. The court also explained that even if defendant did not understand the nature of cross-examination before her trial began, she should have acquired an understanding, after observing the direct testimony and cross-examination of numerous witnesses, that her statement in the letterdeclaring that she was sorry we took your innocent lifewould subject her to cross-examination regarding the circumstances of the victim's death. The trial court also found that counsel had not committed any misconduct, and had not demonstrated incompetence, by aggressively pursuing a defense theory that minimized defendant's role in the murder. The trial court noted that if another attorney were appointed to replace Monroe, such an attorney invariably would pursue the same defense strategy because, in light of defendant's videotaped confession, a defense that would attempt to lessen defendant's culpability for the murder of Autumn Wallace by placing shared responsibility for the crime on the second man would provide significant mitigating evidence. The trial court explained in sum that although defendant and her counsel consistently disagreed regarding tactics, and defendant threatened to withhold all cooperation from defense counsel, there had been no showing that counsel's continued representation of defendant at the second penalty trial would substantially impair or deny defendant's fundamental rights. As a result, the trial court stated, defendant's refusal to cooperate with her counsel during the penalty phase retrial would be at her own peril. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. As we have stated, a Marsden hearing is not a full-blown adversarial proceeding, but an informal hearing in which the court ascertains the nature of the defendant's allegations regarding the defects in counsel's representation and decides whether the allegations have sufficient substance to warrant counsel's replacement. ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1025, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) The trial court afforded defendant ample opportunity to set forth her complaints regarding counsel's representation, and after hearing defendant's complaints the trial court allowed counsel to respond. The trial court was not required to do more. Defendant complained primarily of defense counsel's (1) insistence on pursuing a defense that would attempt to temper defendant's culpability for the murder of Autumn Wallace by placing shared responsibility for the crime on the second man, Beto, and (2) defense counsel's allegedly inaccurate advice regarding the scope of the cross-examination to which defendant would be subjected. The complaints regarding Monroe's defense strategy were essentially tactical disagreements, which do not by themselves constitute an irreconcilable conflict. ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1190, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811; Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 728-729, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) As noted above with regard to the alleged conflict between defendant and counsel regarding entry of a guilty plea, a disagreement of this nature, by itself, is insufficient to compel discharge of appointed counsel. (See Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th 581, 606, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is `captain of the ship' and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 376, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The record does not establish that Attorney Monroe was incompetent or that he would not provide adequate representation during the forthcoming retrial, assuming he received defendant's cooperation. ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1190, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811, citing Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 523, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.) To the contrary, the record reveals that defense counsel vigorously and conscientiously pursued a defense designed to temper defendant's culpability, based upon the version of events conveyed by defendant both to counsel and to the expert witness Dr. Edwards. The circumstance that defendant refused to assist counsel in presenting that version of events to the jury, assertedly because she feared the consequences of her identification of the second man, does not suggest that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Although defendant's apparent feeling of betrayal regarding her cross-examination may have strained the relationship between defendant and her counsel, the trial court properly found that defendant misunderstood her attorney's advice, and this misunderstanding, although unfortunate, did not justify defense counsel's discharge.