Opinion ID: 2600593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims related to the penalty phase

Text: Defendant contends that the admission of the pornographic magazines in evidence violated his federal and state rights to a fair trial and to due process of law, as well as the constitutional requirement of reliability in a capital case. (U.S. Const., Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15.) He urges that we apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard required by Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824], to the asserted violations of his federal rights. We need not decide whether any error in admitting this evidence would constitute a violation of defendant's federal rights. The standard of review of state law error established in People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135] ( Brown )whether there is a `reasonablepossibility' that the error affected the penalty phase determinationis the same `in substance and effect' as the Chapman standard. ( People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 526 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58], quoting People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1264, fn. 11 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762].) Therefore, we evaluate whether there is any reasonable possibility the jury would have sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole rather than death if the pornographic evidence had been excluded. If there was no reasonable possibility of a different outcome, absent this evidence, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. At the penalty phase, neither side referred to defendant's pornography. The prosecution emphasized the brutality of the crimes against a young child, the fear and pain Tahisha must have suffered, and the impact of the crimes upon Tahisha's family. Defendant reviewed his troubled background, presented the testimony of his family members, asserted that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was in some ways worse than a death sentence, and urged the jury to consider any lingering doubt concerning defendant's guilt. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury: Evidence has been presented of defendant's lifestyle or background. You cannot consider this evidence as an aggravating factor but may consider it as a mitigating factor. Defendant identifies two ways in which, he claims, the pornographic evidence was prejudicial. First, he notes the prosecutor's arguments at the beginning of the guilt phase of the trialthat the magazines were evidence that defendant fantasized about sexual violence against prepubescent girls and asserts that the only use the jury could have made of [the magazines] was as `proof' that [defendant] is a despicable monster. Second, he asserts this evidence was devastating to his lingering-doubt defense. As explained in our analysis of the impact of the pornographic magazines at the guilt phase of the trial (see ante, pt. II.A.2.), the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming, and no reasonable juror could have concluded that defendant was innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted. For the same reasons that the admission of this evidence was not prejudicial at the guilt phase of the trial, its admission was not prejudicial to defendant's lingering-doubt defense at the penalty phase. In addition, the brutality of the attack on such a vulnerable victim as Tahisha, only six years of age, the sexual violation of an innocent child, the struggle she apparently put up against defendant (as evidenced by various injuries to her body), the fear and pain she must have suffered, and the manner of her death strangulation for two and one-half to three minutesoverwhelmed any mitigating evidence that defendant was a nice guy who did not deserve the ultimate penalty. Adding insult to the horrible injury inflicted, on the same evening defendant molested and murdered Tahisha, he blamed Tahisha's mother for her disappearance. Within hours of committing these horrible crimes, defendant was able to interact calmly with detectives who were investigating Tahisha's disappearance, and it apparently was the fear of being discovered as the perpetrator, and not the enormity of his crimes, that led defendant to attempt to commit suicide. The chilling circumstances of Tahisha's disappearance a young child who was supervised by family and friends running down a hill within a secure apartment complex to retrieve a ball and vanishingand the discovery of her body, dumped like trash in a mine pit after a brutal sexual assault, further contributed to the portrait of defendant as someone without substantial redeeming attributes. Finally, Tahisha's mother's testimony concerning the impact of the crimes upon the entire family, was devastating to the defense. We find no reasonable possibility that the jury would have chosen to sentence defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole rather than death, but for defendant's possession of pornographic magazines. Therefore, the admission of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant contends that Holly Robles's testimony concerning specific off-color remarks made by defendant to other waitresses was prejudicial at the penalty phase of the trial, because it was harmful to defendant's lingering-doubt argument, which was based upon his theory that someone so passive and mild-mannered as he could not have committed these crimes, no matter how strong the physical evidence of his guilt appeared. For the same reasons that admission of this hearsay evidence was harmless at the guilt phase of the trial, it was harmless to defendant's lingering-doubt argument at the penalty phase. Moreover, evidence concerning Tahisha's injuries and death, and the devastating impact upon her family, was so aggravating that exclusion of the evidence concerning defendant's statements to waitresses clearly would have made no difference in this case. We find no reasonable possibility that the jury would have chosen to sentence defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole rather than death, but for the hearsay statements related by Holly Robles. Therefore, the admission of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court declined to instruct the jury to consider any lingering doubt concerning defendant's guilt in deciding the appropriate penalty, but permitted the defense to argue to the jury that it should consider lingering doubt in reaching its penalty verdict. The trial court explained: [I]t's the Court's view that the only doubt that might be present as far as the verdict [is concerned] would be some sort of an imaginary or some possible doubt, some unreasonable doubt. There's really no lingering doubt based on the evidence in this case to support the giving of this instruction. (7) As we have observed: It is true ... that the jury's consideration of residual doubt is proper; defendant may assert his possible innocence to the jury as a factor in mitigation under section 190.3, factors (a) and (k). [Citations.] But there is no requirement, under either state or federal law, that the court specifically instruct the jury to consider any residual doubt of defendant's guilt. [Citations.] ( People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 77.) [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129].) In the present case, the trial court permitted defendant to assert he was not guilty, and defense counsel informed the jury that the concept of lingering doubt came within section 190.3, factor (k). Instructions to consider the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)) and any other circumstance extenuating the gravity of the crime ( id., factor (k)), together with defense argument highlighting the question of lingering or residual doubt, suffice to properly put the question before the penalty jury. ([ [ People v.] Earp [(1999) 20 Cal.4th 826,] 904 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15].) ( People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 42 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229] ( Demetrulias ).)
Defendant raises various challenges to CALJIC No. 8.88, which instructs the jury concerning the process by which to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in determining whether the penalty should be death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. All of defendant's challenges have been rejected in prior cases.
Defendant contends the instruction is impermissibly vague and ambiguous because of the phrase so substantial in the final sentence: To return a judgment of death each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life. Defendant notes that the Georgia Supreme Court found that the word substantial rendered an instruction impermissibly vague in a capital case. ( Arnold v. State (1976) 236 Ga. 534 [224 S.E.2d 386] ( Arnold ).) Georgia's statutory scheme described an aggravating circumstance that would support the imposition of a sentence of death as follows: `The offense of murder ... was committed by a person ... who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.' ( Id., 224 S.E.2d at p. 391.) The Georgia court concluded that [w]hether the defendant's prior history of convictions meets this legislative criterion is highly subjective. ( Id. at p. 392.) (8) We rejected defendant's contention in People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585] ( Breaux ), which evaluated basically identical language in CALJIC former No. 8.84.2 (1986 rev.). We explained in Breaux that the instructions as a whole adequately conveyed to the jury the appropriate manner of performing its task, and that the instruction concerning the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances essentially informed the jury that it may return a death verdict only if aggravating circumstances predominate[] and death is the appropriate verdict. ( Breaux, supra, at p. 316.) We added that the differences between the use of substantial in the Georgia instruction in Arnold, supra, 224 S.E.2d 386, and the use of substantial in CALJIC No. 8.84.2 in Breaux were obvious. ( Breaux, supra, at p. 316, fn. 14.) Defendant complains that our decision in Breaux did not specify the differences between Arnold and Breaux. Defendant's assertion that the two cases are analogous is based upon the presence of the word substantial in both of the challenged jury instructions, and does not take into account the context of the use of substantial in each case. The jurors in Arnold were called upon to decide, in isolation and without further guidance, whether a defendant's prior criminal record was substantial, whereas the jurors in the present case were instructed extensively with respect to the manner of performing their task and were called upon to compare the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. The instructions adequately explained that the jurors could return a death verdict only if aggravating circumstances predominated and death is the appropriate verdict. ( Breaux, supra, at p. 316.)
Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 8.88 fails to convey that the death penalty must be appropriate, not merely warranted. Again, defendant has focused upon specific terms and ignores the instructions as a whole. This instruction informs the jury that [t]he weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. (CALJIC No. 8.88.) As we have explained, CALJIC 8.88 properly describes the weighing process as `merely a metaphor for the juror's personal determination that death is the appropriate penalty under all of the circumstances.' ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1244, quoting People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1250.) [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702,842 P.2d 1].) ( People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1161 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572].)
Defendant contends that the instruction given pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.88 fails to convey that the jury must return a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if it finds that death is not an appropriate punishment, and that a life sentence is mandatory if the aggravating factors do not outweigh the mitigating factors. CALJIC No. 8.88 explains that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. Defendant acknowledges that we repeatedly have rejected the contention that substantially identical language in former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (1986 rev.) failed to explain the circumstances in which a verdict of death may be returned ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th, 826, 900 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135] ( Rogers ); People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 381; [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169]; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th 694, 781-782; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978 [281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131]( Duncan )), but asks that we reconsider our holdings. In particular, defendant challenges Duncan 's conclusion that substantially identical language clearly stated that the death penalty could be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating. There was no need to additionally advise the jury of the converse (i.e., that if mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating, then life without parole was the appropriate penalty). ( Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 978.) Defendant complains that the instruction does not explicitly state that aggravating circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances, but he is unpersuasive in urging that the phrase so substantial in comparison does not convey this requirement. Defendant also challenges Duncan 's conclusion that it is unnecessary to advise the jury of the converseif mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating, then life imprisonment without parole is the appropriate penalty. Asserting that Duncan cites no authority for this conclusion, he argues that the absence of the converse instruction causes CALJIC No. 8.88 to emphasize the prosecution's theory of the case. Contrary to defendant's characterization of the instruction, CALJIC 8.88 highlights the significant burden that must be satisfied before a verdict of death may be returned, and thereby conveys that life in prison without the possibility of parole is the appropriate punishment if this burden is not met.
Finally, defendant complains that CALJIC No. 8.88 fails to inform the jurors that they may return a verdict of life in prison without the possibility of parole even when the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and fails to explain that neither party has the burden of persuading the jury of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the death penalty. As we repeatedly have held, defendant was not entitled to such an instruction. (E.g., Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 893; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 782.)
On the third day of penalty phase deliberations, a juror told the bailiff during a break that a cartoon was circulating in the jury deliberation room and others were laughing, causing the juror some dismay. The bailiff told the juror he would search for the cartoon in the jury room. The bailiff found the cartoon and gave it to the court. The court directed the bailiff to relate these events to counsel. In addition, counsel viewed the cartoon, and the court described it for the record. The cartoon portrays two individuals in a jail cell, and its caption depicts one saying to the other, Hey, I got off easyit was the jury who had to deliberate for 36 months. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, stating that humor did not belong in the jury room and that the cartoon shows me that this jury is being contaminated by outside influences. The prosecutor responded that the cartoon had nothing to do with the case at hand. The court stated that it could ask the jurors, either individually or collectively, which jurors had seen the cartoon and whether or not viewing that cartoon would in any way affect their deliberations during this penalty phase of the trial, further observing: The Court is really concerned about exerting any kind of pressure whatsoever either individually or as a group on these jurors during this particular phase of the trial. And the Court would prefer not to make an inquiry of the jury. As far as the cartoon, it'sit is humorous. The Court does not believe that it ... represents a lack of seriousness on the part of the jurors. They are under what the Court would believe is tremendous pressure and stress. It's a very, very serious kind of decision that they're making. And this cartoon does not in any way favor one side or the other, it just brings to mind the shared sense that in the sense they're a captive group back there in the jury deliberation room trying to achieve justice. And the Court, although it's concerned about this cartoon, does not believe that the cartoon in any way affects the integrity of whatever verdict they may return. It's the Court's preference not to inquire of the jurors. The prosecutor was agreeable, but defense counsel stood by his motion for a mistrial and stated, I'll stand [mute] as to what procedure should be followed. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, stating that the grounds were insufficient, and reiterating its view that the cartoon would not affect the jury's decision. Defendant observes that an accused has a right to an impartial jury that reaches its decision based upon the evidence rather than out-of-court sources. He relies upon Turner v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 466, 472 [13 L.Ed.2d 424, 85 S.Ct. 546] (deputy sheriffs who were in close and continuous contact with the sequestered jury also were witnesses at the trial) and Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 467 (juror read aloud to other jurors Bible verses concerning punishment of murderers and equating resistance to governing authorities with resistance to God). In contrast to the out-of-court sources at issue in the cited cases, the out-of-court source in this case was unrelated to any issue to be decided. Although the cartoon was concerned with the jury process, it did not in and of itself suggest that the jurors should rush their consideration of the appropriate penalty or otherwise conduct themselves inappropriately. As defendant observes, when juror misconduct is established, a presumption of prejudice arises that must be rebutted by the state. He relies upon People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 949 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676] (a juror claiming to have a law enforcement background asserted that the defendant's apparent lack of a criminal background might be due to the sealing of juvenile records), People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 207 [155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91] (a juror discussed the trial with his neighbor, a police officer who was first to arrive at the scene of the crime and who was a witness at trial), and In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 402 [220 Cal.Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260] (a juror claimed to know the law and misstated the law to the other jurors). Unlike the situation in the cited cases, no showing of juror misconduct was made in the present case. The jurors shared a cartoon reflecting the reality that jurors sometimes spend a lengthy period of time in jury service. The cartoon did not suggest that the jurors should rush their deliberations or favor one side over the other. A juror's concern at the presence of such humor in this setting is not a problem which, if unattended, might later require the granting of a mistrial or new trial motion.... ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081].) Because neither the presence of the cartoon in the jury room nor the information provided by the bailiff suggested juror misconduct had occurred, the trial court was not required to conduct further inquiry into the cartoon's possible effect on the jury. [25]
Defendant raises various constitutional challenges that have been rejected in prior cases. Section 190.3, factor (a) directs the jury, in determining the appropriate penalty, to take into account the circumstances of the crime and any special circumstances found to be true. Defendant asserts that this statute directs that such circumstances be considered as aggravation, but the provision does not include any reference to aggravation. He also complains that factor (a) permits almost any circumstance to be considered in aggravation, but as we have observed previously, that is the nature of the fact-specific inquiry required in evaluating the appropriate penalty. As the United States Supreme Court noted in upholding factor (a) against an Eighth Amendment challenge, our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. (See, e.g., Woodson [v. North Carolina (1976)] 428 U.S. [280,] 304 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 96 S.Ct. 2978] (`[C]onsideration of ... the circumstances of the particular offense [is] a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death'). ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976.) [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630].) Finally, contrary to defendant's contention, California's death penalty scheme adequately narrows the class of persons eligible to receive the death penalty. ( Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1298; People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 237 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496] ( Gray ).) Defendant contends California's scheme violates the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments because it fails to impose a burden of proof at the penalty phase. We adhere to the principle that the assessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances required of California penalty jurors is inherently `normative, not factual [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden of proof quantification.' ( People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].) ( Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 40.) We similarly reject the contentions that the death penalty statute is unconstitutional in failing to require juror unanimity or written findings with respect to the factors in aggravation. ( Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1297; Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 41, 43; People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 731 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568].) In addition, [w]e have repeatedly held that the high court's ... decisions [in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531]] do not compel a different answer. [Citations.] ( People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 707 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 171 P.3d 2].) We likewise reject defendant's claims that (1) the death penalty statute's inclusion in the list of mitigating factors of adjectives such as extreme and substantial improperly limits consideration of mitigation in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments ( Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1298); (2) the phrase whether or not in section 190.3, factors (d) through (h) and (j) allows the absence of a mitigating factor to be considered as an aggravating circumstance; and (3) the failure to instruct that statutory mitigating factors may be considered solely as mitigating precludes a reliable, individualized sentencing determination as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 236.) We repeatedly have rejected challenges made under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the absence of intercase proportionality review. ( Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1298; App.4th at p. 1298; Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 44; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749].) And, as defendant acknowledges, in People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1288 [232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115], we rejected an equal protection challenge to the death penalty scheme. Finally, we have declined to accept the view that international law compels the elimination of the death penalty in California. ( Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1299; Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 43-44; Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 127.) We are not persuaded that we should reconsider these determinations.
As we have explained, any error in admitting the pornographic magazines was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, the brutality of his attack upon Tahisha, his cold and callous manner in the hours after he committed the crimes, and the devastating impact of the crimes upon Tahisha's family. In addition, the error in admitting the off-color remarks was harmless at the penalty phase, because no lingering doubt could exist that might be eliminated by this hearsay evidence. Considering these two items of evidence together, we find there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have chosen to set defendant's punishment at life imprisonment without the possibility of parole rather than death, but for the admission of the three pornographic magazines and the hearsay statements. Therefore, the admission of the evidence in question was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 655; Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 447.)