Opinion ID: 2051176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Creamer's Authority

Text: The State's backup argument for conviction asserts that the jury could have convicted Fenske because it thought Creamer never gave Fenske permission to enter the house. This idea is based on rebuttal testimony by Michael Bown, who was assaulted by Fenske at the house, that Creamer called him after the incident and said she had not given Fenske permission to be in the house. Creamer denied making such a statement. The use of an inconsistent statement does not violate the hearsay rule because it is not offered as a testimonial assertion to be relied upon. State v. Hill, 243 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Iowa 1976) (quoting 3A Wigmore Evidence § 1018, at 996 (1970)). The general rules regarding impeachment by use of prior inconsistent statements were explained in State v. Frommelt, 159 N.W.2d 532, 535-36 (Iowa 1968), as follows: It is generally held a witness may be impeached by showing his testimony upon a material matter is inconsistent with a prior statement made by him. (authorities). The impeaching testimony is not admissible to prove its truth, but solely to demonstrate the witness is not reliable because what he says now is contrary to what he said at some previous time. We have also held that impeachment evidence is not as potentially damaging as substantive evidence. State v. Allen, 348 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 1984); see also State v. Schatz, 414 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Iowa App. 1987). Moreover, there is no other evidence in this record on which a jury could base a finding that Fenske did not have authority or exceeded authority from Creamer to enter her house. Bown's testimony, therefore, standing alone as impeachment testimony, does not constitute sufficient substantive evidence from which a rational jury might find Fenske had no right, license, or privilege to be in Creamer's house. VI. Majority Opinion Analysis The majority on this appeal seeks to cement the validity of the opinion rendered on Fenske's direct appeal by distinguishing the rules of law pronounced by the United States Supreme Court in Dunn and its progeny. In so doing, it misapprehends the legal point announced in Dunn on theory of guilt. The Supreme Court, in its review of the Tenth Circuit decision, noted as follows in Dunn: [I]t is unnecessary to inquire, as did the Court of Appeals, whether petitioner was prejudiced by a variance between what was alleged in the indictment and what was proved at trial. For we discern no such variance. The indictment charged inconsistency between petitioner's statements in the September 30 interview and his grand jury testimony. That was also the theory on which the case was tried and submitted to the jury.... But while there was no variance between the indictment and proof at trial, there was a discrepancy between the basis on which the jury rendered its verdict and that on which the Court of Appeals sustained petitioner's conviction. Whereas the jury was instructed to rest its decision on Dunn's September statement, the Tenth Circuit predicated its affirmance on petitioner's October testimony. The Government concedes that this ruling was erroneous. Dunn, 442 U.S. at 105-06, 99 S.Ct. at 2194, 60 L.Ed.2d at 749-50 (emphasis added). Like Dunn, the case at bar does not present an issue of a variance. There is no discrepancy between the indictment and proof at trial as noted by the majority. However, like Dunn, there is a discrepancy between the basis on which the jury rendered its verdict and that on which [we] sustained [Fenske's] conviction. Id. This discrepancy is highlighted by the prosecution's reliance on the theory that it was Besco who had authority to refuse Fenske permission to enter, not Creamer, while our court relied on the scope of permission granted by Creamer to sustain Fenske's conviction. The majority affirms Fenske's conviction by assuming, without knowing what the jury decided, that the jury either decided that Besco had the sole authority to grant permission to enter the house and did not grant permission or that Creamer as the usual occupant did not grant permission. The majority believes it is enough to sustain a conviction that violation of a cited statute is charged and evidence is introduced showing a factual scenario. No theory of guilt is necessary. In fact, the majority is at pains to point out that the prosecutor charged no theory of guilt in this case at all. It states that the county attorney's information against Fenske did not charge any theory as to who had authority to give consent. The majority approves of this procedure as being in keeping with Iowa's short form indictment rule. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 31 (app. form 10). Also approved are the court's instructions which fail to mention any theory of guilt or give any instruction on who was in a position of authority to deny consent to enter the house. Thus, the majority not only gainsays any need for the prosecutor to present a theory of guilt to the jury but stamps its approval on an absence of any theory by finding that this procedure fits our criminal rules. Be that as it may, this approach is at odds with the United States Supreme Court's principles in deciding constitutional rights. Few constitutional principles are more firmly established than a defendant's right to be heard on the specific charges of which he is accused. Dunn, 442 U.S. at 106, 99 S.Ct. at 2194, 60 L.Ed.2d at 750. The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted merely because of his failure to disclose material, nonpublic information to sellers from whom he bought the stock of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury, we will not speculate upon whether such a duty exits, whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a violation of § 10(b). Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236-37, 100 S.Ct. at 1119, 63 L.Ed.2d at 361-62 (citations omitted). Citing Dunn, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that a coherent theory of guilt is required to affirm a conviction. The dual representation appellate theory can be adduced from the facts. But it was not the government's focus, or as Dunn requires, the theory on which the case was tried and submitted to the jury. Reference to the dual representation theory, if ever made explicit, was only incidental. The Dunn Court regarded tangential references... as insufficient because, in the Court's view, the prosecution did not build its case on such evidence.... Thus, we believe that, in order for any appellate theory to withstand scrutiny under Dunn, it must be shown to be not merely before the jury due to an incidental reference, but as part of a coherent theory of guilt that, upon reviewing the principal stages of trial, can be characterized as having been presented in a focused or otherwise cognizable sense. Cola, 787 F.2d at 693 (citations and footnote omitted). The majority's reliance on a statute prescribing a bare bones information procedure falls far short of a legally sufficient answer to Fenske's claim that his conviction for burglary violates his constitutional rights. Fenske believes we affirmed his conviction on a different theory of guilt than presented at trial. The majority affirms now on the basis that no theory of guilt is required. Either way, I believe Fenske's constitutional rights as claimed have been violated. Authority granted by statute to proceed as the statute allows does not excuse a constitutional violation of Fenske's rights. See Knowles v. Iowa, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 119 S.Ct. 484, 487, 142 L.Ed.2d 492, 497 (1998) (refusing to uphold search incident to citation under Fourth Amendment scrutiny despite statutory authority to the contrary). I would reverse the district court's denial of postconviction relief and reverse Fenske's conviction for first-degree burglary. LAVORATO and TERNUS, JJ., join this dissent.