Opinion ID: 215095
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Resisting a Government Employee

Text: Bibbins was convicted of violating 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1), a regulation of the National Park Service that prohibits [t]hreatening, resisting, intimidating, or intentionally interfering with a government employee or agent engaged in an official duty, or on account of the performance of an official duty. Specifically, Bibbins was convicted of violating the resisting offense of the regulation. Bibbins contends that the resisting offense of 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) contains a willfulness element and that the evidence at trial was insufficient to show that he acted willfully. [3] The question of the mens rea requirement for a violation of the resisting offense of § 2.32(a)(1) is one of first impression for this court. We agree with Bibbins that willfulness is a necessary element of the resisting violation. We ultimately conclude, however, that substantial evidence supports the magistrate judge's finding that Bibbins acted willfully.
To determine the mens rea for a violation of the resisting term of § 2.32(a)(1), we start with the plain language of the regulation. [4] Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); United States v. Bucher, 375 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir.2004); see also Reno v. Nat'l Trans. Safety Bd., 45 F.3d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir.1995) ([T]he plain meaning of language in a regulation governs unless that meaning would lead to absurd results.). Section 2.32(a)(1) does not explicitly state a mens rea element. We do not construe this silence to mean that the statute does not include a mens rea requirement. See United States v. Johal, 428 F.3d 823, 826-27 (9th Cir.2005) ([W]e construe [a] statute in light of the background rules of the common law in which the requirement of some mens rea for a crime is firmly embedded.) (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To deduce the mens rea for a violation of the resisting offense of § 2.32(a)(1) we must consider the plain meaning of the word resisting. Because resisting is undefined in the regulation, the word will be interpreted as taking [its] ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979). As the magistrate judge noted, the dictionary definition of the word resist is: to exert oneself to counteract or defeat, strive against: OPPOSE. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1932 (1993 ed.) (capitalization in original). From this definition, we do not think a person can resist someone or something without forming an intention to do so. Accordingly, we hold that the resisting offense of § 2.32(a)(1) includes a mens rea element of willfulness. [5] Even if the dictionary definition of resisting were ambiguouswhich we do not believe it isseveral other considerations counsel in favor of a willfulness requirement. First, the structure of § 2.32(a)(1) suggests that willfulness is a necessary element of the resisting offense. We generally interpret statutory provisions containing multiple enumerated offenses to require consistent mens rea elements. See United States v. Vela, 624 F.3d 1148, 1154 n. 9 (9th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Crews, 621 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir.2010). We similarly believe that § 2.32(a)(1) should be interpreted to require consistent mens rea elements for all of its enumerated offenses. We can not help but notice that all of the offenses contained in § 2.32(a)(1) are actions that are typically done with purpose. The threatening offense of § 2.32(a)(1) appears to contain a willfulness requirement because the dictionary definition of threat expressly includes an intent component. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2832 (1993 ed.) (defining a threat as an expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm on another by illegal means and especially by means involving coercion or duress of the person threatened. (emphasis added)). Similarly, the intimidating offense probably contains a willfulness mens rea element because the verb intimidate is defined as to make timid or fearful: inspire or affect with fear. Id. at 1184. Although one could arguably intimidate someone by accident (for example, as a person is intimidated by a dangerous animal), it seems unlikely that the National Park Service would criminalize accidental intimidation. Thus, we believe the plain meaning of the intimidating offense includes a willfulness requirement. Finally, we have previously held the obvious: that the intentionally interfere offense of § 2.32(a)(1) requires a showing of the defendant's intent. Bucher, 375 F.3d at 934. Therefore, the plain meanings of each of the offenses enumerated in § 2.32(a)(1) all suggest that willfulness is required, which strengthens our conviction that the resisting violation also includes such a mens rea element. Second, our conclusion that the resisting violation of § 2.32(a)(1) includes a willfulness element is consistent with our precedent of frequently interpreting Forest Service regulations to require such an element. As we have explained, [s]trict criminal liability is strong medicine, and, accordingly, we have read criminal intent requirements into some Forest Service regulations, where their language remotely suggested it. United States v. Kent, 945 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Semenza, 835 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir.1987) (construing 36 C.F.R. § 261.7(a), which prohibits allowing unauthorized livestock to enter or be in the National Forest System to require the government to prove that the violator acted willfully); United States v. Launder, 743 F.2d 686, 689 (9th Cir.1984) (interpreting a statute that prohibits permit[ting] or suffer[ing] a fire to spread out of control in a national forest to require a showing of willfulness). Our predilection towards reading an intent element into regulations of the National Forest Service also supports our conclusion that in order to prove that a defendant violated the resisting offense of § 2.32(a)(1), the government must prove that the defendant acted willfully. Finally, to the extent that resisting has a legal meaning that is distinct from the colloquial definition that we apply here, the legal connotation of the term confirms the correctness of our holding that the resisting offense of § 2.32(a)(1) contains an element of willfulness. The Model Penal Code ( MPC ) defines two generic misdemeanors that are similar to the resisting offense under § 2.32(a)(1), and both of these MPC definitions require a showing of purposefulness. In particular, a person commits Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function under MPC § 242.1 if he acts purposefully. Similarly, a person commits Resisting Arrest or Other Law Enforcement under MPC § 242.2 if he acts  for the purpose of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty. (emphasis added). To the extent the resisting offense in 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) was designed to conform to other misdemeanor offenses that involve resisting an officer or government employee, a willfulness mens rea element is appropriate. Therefore, we conclude that for a defendant to be convicted of violating the resisting offense contained in 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1), the government must prove that the defendant acted willfully.
The magistrate judge correctly analyzed the resisting offense as if it included an intent requirement. We therefore review for substantial evidence Bibbins's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for his conviction. [6] United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir.1986). There is substantial evidence to support a conviction if after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found Bibbins guilty. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original); United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). We hold that there was substantial evidence in the record to support Bibbins's conviction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was evidence that Bibbins tensed his arms and made fists, jerked his right arm out of Schonzeit's and Westpfahl's grip, did not get on the ground when ordered to do so, and rotated his body to the right. Despite Bibbins's uncontradicted testimony that he was under severe pain during the incident and that he repeatedly informed the rangers of his broken leg, a rational fact-finder could find that Bibbins willfully resisted the rangers. We therefore conclude that his conviction was supported by substantial evidence.
We must also address Bibbins's argument that he is entitled to the necessity defense. During closing argument, Bibbins's attorney argued to the magistrate judge that if Bibbins had intentionally resisted the rangers, he had done so out of necessity. The magistrate judge, however, did not mention the necessity defense in his written Findings and Decision. Bibbins renewed his necessity defense argument in his appeal to the district judge, but the district judge similarly did not address the defense in his order. Because Bibbins's attorney did not request special findings under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(c), we review the district court's denial of Bibbins's necessity defense for substantial evidence. As explained above, there is substantial evidence to support the magistrate judge's rejection of the necessity defense if after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have rejected the defense. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original). In other words, to prevail, Bibbins must demonstrate that no rational factfinder, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, would reject his necessity defense. Bibbins has not made such a showing. To succeed on his necessity defense, Bibbins must show: (1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) that he acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a causal relation between his conduct and the harm to be avoided; and (4) that there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law. United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir.2001). We agree with the district court's rejection of Bibbins's necessity defense because there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Bibbins was not forced to choose between two evils. The first prong of the necessity defense requires a showing that Bibbins was faced with a choice between two evils and chose the lesser one. See id. at 1126. This prong reflects the underlying utilitarian principle of the necessity defense. United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir.1992). We have explained that the necessity defense justifies criminal acts taken to avert a greater harm, maximizing social welfare by allowing a crime to be committed where the social benefits of the crime outweigh the social costs of failing to commit the crime. Id. at 196. Bibbins argues that he was forced to choose between two evils: protecting his leg or resisting the officers. We disagree. Even if we assume without deciding that sustaining leg pain is the kind of evil that the necessity defense is designed to prevent, we think a reasonable factfinder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, could find that Bibbins could have protected his leg without resisting the officers. Specifically, Bibbins could have more articulately vocalized his need for medical help or proposed an alternative way to comply with the rangers' instructions. We therefore cannot say that no reasonable factfinder would reject Bibbins's necessity defense. Accordingly, we hold that the district court's rejection of Bibbins's necessity defense was supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm his conviction of violating 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1).