Opinion ID: 217198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: definition of brandish

Text: Lettiere argues that the challenged instruction incorrectly defined brandish; it did not. We express no opinion on whether the inclusion of brandished in the indictment was harmless surplusage, or on whether brandished became a de facto element that the government improvidently obligated itself to prove. Specifically, Lettiere contends that the district court erred by not providing the dictionary definition of brandish in lieu of or in addition to the statutory definition. [2] That contention, however, is contrary to the well-settled principle that, for purposes of statutory interpretation, the language of the statute is the first and, if the language is clear, the only relevant inquiry. See Schwab v. Reilly, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2652, 2662, 177 L.Ed.2d 234 (2010) (Although we may look to dictionaries. . . to determine the meaning of words the [Bankruptcy] Code does not define. . ., the Code's definition of [the term at issue] in this case is clear and is therefore controlling.); Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 129, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 170 L.Ed.2d 478 (2008) (statutes control the meaning of the words used in them in the ordinary case); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000) (When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term's ordinary meaning. ) (emphasis added); United States v. Carter, 421 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir.2005) (It is well settled that, in a statutory construction case, analysis must begin with the language of the statute itself; when the statute is clear, judicial inquiry into [its] meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only in the absence of a statutory definition does this court normally look to the ordinary meaning or dictionary definitions of a term. United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 978 (9th Cir.2009) We perceive no reason why, in the circumstances of this case, this principle should not extend to the definition of terms given in jury instructions. Lettiere cites only one case to counter the weight of this authority, and that case does not support his assertion that a dictionary definition must, or even may, supplant a statutory one. Johnson v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2007), notes that a court's analysis must begin with the statutory language but that courts may follow the common practice of consulting dictionary definitions to clarify [the] ordinary meaning of terms used in a statute. Id. at 780 (emphasis added). But clarification is not necessary when a statute defines its own terms. Moreover, the court in Johnson cited for this principle the case of United States v. TRW Rifle 7.62X51mm Caliber, 447 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2006), in which the court follow[ed] the common practice of consulting dictionary definitions only because Congress did not define what it meant by the statutory term at issue. Id. at 689. Better support for Lettiere's argument comes from United States v. Albritton, 622 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.2010), in which this court considered the meaning of the term brandish as it is used in the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines). In contrast to § 924(c), which imposes a higher minimum sentence when a firearm is brandished (seven years) than when it is used (five years), the Guidelines impose a greater offense-level for otherwise us[ing] a dangerous weapon, than for brandish[ing] a dangerous weapon. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). The Guidelines define otherwise used as conduct that [does] not amount to the discharge of a firearm but [is] more than brandishing. . . . U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n. 1(I). The Guidelines definition of brandish is effectively identical to that in § 924(c)(4). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n. 1(C). The defendant in Albritton argued that the district court had improperly determined that he had otherwise used a weapon and that in fact he had only brandished it. 622 F.3d at 1105. The court looked to dictionary definitions, as well as the definition in the Guidelines and interpretations in existing caselaw, to determine the nature of the distinction between brandishing and otherwise using. Id. at 1106-07. Albritton does not indicate, however, that we should disregard the general principle that a clear statutory definition is controlling. While we did use dictionary definitions for clarity in that case, our analysis began with the definition in the Guidelines. Id. at 1106. We then turned to caselaw from other circuits for perspective on the term and, finally, cited to dictionary definitions merely to provide further support for the conclusions already reached about the correct definition of the term. Id. at 1107. Lettiere also argues that the statutory definition is deficient because it inverts the quantum of proof necessary to find brandishment relative to the quantum of proof necessary to find that the defendant only used the firearmin other words, that the statutory definition of brandished requires a lesser finding than used, despite the fact that the mandatory minimum sentence is greater for the former than the latter. There is no statutory definition of use in § 924(c), but courts have interpreted it as requiring merely some form of active employment of the weapon. United States v. Beaudion, 416 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 149-51, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995)). [3] Lettiere's argument is that, given this definition of use, the statutory definition of brandish permits one to brandish a weapon without using itthat is, without actively employing it in connection with a crime. This argument is unavailing in light of both the plain language of the statute and this court's past interpretations of the term use in § 924(c). For starters, § 924(c)(1)(A) clearly requires that any use, brandishment, or discharge of the weapon occur during and in relation to the relevant crime. The statutory definition of brandish requires a defendant to display or make reference to a weapon in order to intimidate another person. There is simply no logical basis for Lettiere's assertion that a defendant could in any conceivable circumstances engage in such behavior during and in relation to a crime without being deemed to have actively employed the weapon in relation to the crime. This court's past holdings support that interpretation. In Beaudion, we rejected the defendant's argument that there was no distinction between use and brandishment because one could not use a firearm without brandishing it. In fact, we held that use of a firearm can encompass activities that do not require the defendant to brandish itfor example, bartering it in a criminal context, using the butt of a rifle to break a padlock, or sneaking up on a security guard and using a firearm to strike him unconscious. 416 F.3d at 968-69; see also United States v. Bowen, 527 F.3d 1065, 1073-74 (10th Cir.2008) (brandish as defined in § 924(c) is a subset of use). Moreover, the statutory definition of brandishment adds a key element that distinguishes it from use: the firearm must be used to intimidate another person. United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir.2009); Beaudion, 416 F.3d at 968. The intimidation requirement not only makes brandishment a narrower category of activity than use, but it also makes the statutory definition narrower than the dictionary definition offered by Lettiere, which would permit a finding of brandishment if a criminal carried an expensive antique gun in a holster or pocket during the commission of a crime and then waved it about in glee, thereby display[ing] it ostentatiously, to celebrate the successful completion of the crime.