Opinion ID: 2982513
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interception of calls by translators

Text: The government does not deny that its agents knew before applying for the wiretap order that most of the intercepted conversations would be spoken in a Hindu dialect. Within hours after the district court issued the initial wiretap authorization order on January 10, 2011, the wiretaps were in place and translators were situated at the monitoring stations listening to the intercepted calls under the supervision of a law enforcement agent. The government informed the district court about the large volume of foreign language calls and the use of translators in the first 10-day report submitted to the court. The government repeated the same disclosure in the first wiretap extension application submitted to the court on February 8, 2011. The government argues that it was not required to obtain court preauthorization to use translators during call interception because § 2518(5) expressly states that “[a]n interception . . . may be conducted in whole or in part by Government personnel, or by an individual operating under a contract with the Government, acting under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer authorized to conduct the interception.” Congress added this language to the statute in 1986 “to free field agents from the relatively routine activity -9- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. of monitoring interceptions so that they can engage in other law enforcement activities.” S. Rep. No. 541, reprinted in, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3585. Had Congress wanted to impose a requirement that the government notify the court about the use of translators, the government contends, Congress could have included it in the “full and complete statement” mandate of § 2518(1). Congress did not do so, leading to the inference that the statute does not require notice to the court in the wiretap application of the intended use of translators to monitor intercepted telephone calls. Because the translators provided services to the government under contract and because they were directly supervised by a law enforcement agent present at the monitoring stations, the government asserts that no violation of the wiretap statute occurred to warrant suppression of the evidence obtained through call interception. The defendants rely on a First Circuit case, United States v. Lopez, 300 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2002), which held “that the government must disclose, as a part of its application for a wiretap warrant, any intention to utilize the services of civilian monitors in the execution of the warrant.” In that case, the government relied on civilian monitors working under contract with the government to listen to intercepted calls, perform minimization, and provide some translation services. Id. at 50. The First Circuit reasoned that § 2518(1) placed on the government a duty of candor to the tribunal to make a “full and complete” disclosure in the wiretap application of the intended use of civilian monitors. Nonetheless, the First Circuit upheld the wiretap in that case because it was conducted in a manner that preserved the core protective purposes of Title III. Id. at 56. In the twelve years since Lopez was decided, only one other federal circuit has cited the case and did so for a point not relevant here. See United States v. Yarbrough, 527 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 2008). -10- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. We conclude that the statutory language controls over the Lopez opinion. See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997) (“The text of [the statute] does not include an ‘intent to defraud’ state of mind requirement, and we ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face”). The statute allows a wiretap to be conducted by “Government personnel,” which may include both law enforcement agents and civilians employed by the government. The statute also permits the wiretap to be conducted by “an individual operating under a contract with the Government” as long as that person is supervised by a law enforcement officer who is authorized in the wiretap order to intercept communications. The statute does not require the “individual” working under contract to be a law enforcement agent. Further, the statute does not state that translators are authorized to intercept and translate only foreign language calls, as Patel argues. Finally, the statute does not require the government to disclose the planned use of translators to the authorizing court at the time wiretap authorization is sought. Even the Lopez court recognized that whether civilian monitors are employed does not “affect the likelihood that the wiretap would be authorized in the first place” nor does “it increase the wiretap’s intrusion on privacy interests.” Lopez, 300 F.3d at 55. Here, the primary purposes of Title III were not frustrated by using qualified foreign language translators to understand the substance of the calls intercepted. Id. A wiretap would be meaningless if English-speaking monitoring agents could not understand the communications taking place between coconspirators. And while encouraging government candor to the court is certainly a worthy objective, in this case the government disclosed to the court ten days after the wiretap began that most of the intercepted calls were spoken in Hindu dialect and that translators were necessary to help the government understand the communications. There is no indication that an agent -11- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. provided a false affidavit to the court to obtain wiretap authorization, as was the case in United States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 707, 710–11 (6th Cir. 2007). In making its oral ruling on the motion to suppress, the district court stated, “I think there has to be some showing of deliberate violation of the rules.” Although the defendants now challenge that standard as applied by the district court, the comment appears to have been drawn from Lopez, where the First Circuit ultimately decided that the government’s violation in failing to give notice of civilian monitors had not been knowing and willful. See Lopez, 300 F.3d at 56. We apply our own law in affirming the district court’s finding that the defendants did not carry their burden to show a violation of § 2518(5). See Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d at 643; Chaar, 137 F.3d at 363. b. Minimization of nonpertinent calls, including privileged calls Section 2518(5) requires that electronic surveillance “shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter . . . .” In analyzing under the Fourth Amendment the reach of governmental intrusions into personal privacy, the Supreme Court has “undertaken an objective assessment of an officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.” Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). The Fourth Amendment “itself proscribes only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures,” id., and in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968), “the Court emphasized the objective aspect of the term ‘reasonable.’” Scott, 436 U.S. at 137. In applying “reasonableness” in the wiretap context, the focus must be “on the agents’ actions not their motives.” Id. at 139. And “[b]ecause of the necessarily ad hoc nature of any determination of reasonableness, there can be no inflexible rule of law which will decide every case.” Id. The wiretap statute “does not forbid the interception of all nonrelevant conversations, -12- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. but rather instructs the agents to conduct the surveillance in such a manner as to ‘minimize’ the interception of such conversations.” Id. at 140. Whether the agents have complied with the minimization requirement “will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. Here, the defendants initially challenged the monitors’ performance in minimizing calls by gathering a random sample of the intercepted calls and suggesting that the percentage of intercepted nonpertinent calls was too high and that the percentage of minimized calls was too low. But “blind reliance on the percentage of nonpertinent calls intercepted is not a sure guide to the correct answer.” Scott, 436 U.S. at 140. While percentages may be helpful, there are surely cases, such as the one at bar, where the percentage of nonpertinent calls is relatively high and yet their interception was still reasonable. The reasons for this may be many. Many of the nonpertinent calls may have been very short. Others may have been one-time only calls. Still other calls may have been ambiguous in nature or apparently involved guarded or coded language. In all these circumstances agents can hardly be expected to know that the calls are not pertinent prior to their termination. Id. A more useful approach than percentages, the Supreme Court explained in Scott, is to consider the circumstances surrounding the wiretap. Id. When agents are investigating what is “thought to be a widespread conspiracy more extensive surveillance may be justified in an attempt to determine the precise scope of the enterprise. And it is possible that many more of the conversations will be permissibly interceptible because they will involve one or more of the coconspirators.” Id. During the early stages of wiretapping, “agents may be forced to intercept all calls to establish categories of nonpertinent calls which will not be intercepted thereafter.” Id. at 141. Interception of those same kinds of calls may be unreasonable later, after the non-pertinent categories of calls have been identified. Id. Agents who listen to one-time conversations that defy categorization do not violate the minimization requirement, and other scenarios may come -13- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. up “where patterns of nonpertinent calls do not appear. In these circumstances it may not be unreasonable to intercept almost every short conversation because the determination of relevancy cannot be made before the call is completed.” Id. at 141–42. In Scott, the Supreme Court found no Fourth Amendment violation where forty percent of the intercepted calls were “clearly narcotics related” and where many of the remaining calls were “very short.” Id. In a case presenting a “wide-ranging conspiracy with a large number of participants, even a seasoned listener would have been hard pressed to determine with any precision the relevancy of many of the calls before they were completed.” Id. at 142. Further, a large number of calls were ambiguous, “making characterization virtually impossible until the completion of these calls.” Id. In applying Scott’s principles of reasonableness in the minimization of wiretapped calls, we consider three factors: “the nature and scope of the criminal investigation; the Government’s reasonable expectations of the character of conversations; and, the extent of judicial supervision over the surveillance.” United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1979) (and cases cited therein). Defendants must carry the burden to establish that “the monitoring agents exhibited a high disregard for appellants’ privacy rights or that they did not do all they reasonably could to avoid unnecessary intrusions.” Id. at 679. “It is not enough for the defendants to identify particular calls which they contend should not have been intercepted; they must establish a pattern of interception of innocent conversations which developed over the period of the wiretap.” United States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535, 540 (6th Cir. 1985). The defendants did not carry their burdens of production and of persuasion to show that the government failed to comply with the minimization requirements. See Giacalone, 853 F.2d at 482. Although the district court held an evidentiary hearing at the defendants’ request, DEA -14- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. Agent Parkison’s testimony at the hearing supported the government’s position, and the defendants did not present any contradictory evidence. Agent Parkison informed the wire monitors about their responsibility to minimize calls that did not relate to the investigation or that were covered by the attorney-client privilege. He required them to discuss their minimization duties with a federal prosecutor before intercepting any calls. A law enforcement agent was present in the monitoring room at all times to supervise the wiretap and answer any questions of the translators about minimizing phone calls. The monitors intercepted business calls to and from Patel because these calls were either blatantly incriminating—Patel was bribing doctors or discussing drugs that had been billed for but not dispensed—or Patel was discussing conspiracy-related matters, such as meeting with doctors he was recruiting into the conspiracy or opening and closing pharmacies. The monitors also intercepted calls pertaining to Patel’s assets, including his many discussions about purchasing gas stations, motels, and other property, because the investigators were tracking money laundering. The monitors listened to certain calls concerning Patel’s family because at least one family member was involved in the conspiracy and because Patel held $600,000 in a bank account in the name of a family member. The monitors also intercepted some of Patel’s personal calls if the calls also involved the conspiracies. For example, one call between Patel and Acharya included both a personal exchange and a discussion of six of Patel’s corporations held in Acharya’s name. Patel told Acharya that there would soon be $18 million deposited into the corporate accounts. Early in the initial wiretap period, monitors intercepted a few calls involving nonprivileged communications between Patel and his attorneys. Concerned that attorney-client privileged calls would occur in the future, the government promptly established a “filter team” -15- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. comprised of agents and a prosecutor who were not working on the Patel case. Whenever a monitor intercepted a call between Patel and an attorney, the monitor transferred the call to a filter team member and the agent assigned to the filter team made the determination whether to minimize the call under standard minimization practices. Upon minimizing a call, the recording system generated an entry, which permitted agents later to request a system report detailing which of the calls had been minimized. After each call was complete, a filter team agent accessed the call, wrote a summary of the call or transcribed it, and provided that document to the prosecutor supervising the filter team. That prosecutor, with advice from the Criminal Chief of the United States Attorney’s Office, determined whether the call contained privileged attorney-client communications or whether the call should be turned over to the conspiracy investigators and prosecutors. The establishment of the filter team was reported to the district court within the first thirty days after the wiretap began, and the court approved the procedure. None of the intercepted attorney-client calls were ever provided to the investigators and prosecutors who conducted the conspiracy investigation. Agents employed a special procedure so that privileged calls were never placed on either the evidence discs or the working copy discs given to the agents and prosecutors handling the conspiracy investigation. The parties stipulated that Patel’s attorney received a disc containing a copy of all of the attorney-client privileged calls, yet Patel produced no evidence that the government filter team intercepted his calls in violation of the attorney-client privilege. He also did not dispute Agent Parkison’s testimony that none of the attorney-client calls intercepted by the filter team were disclosed to the investigation team. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 294–95 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is no indication that -16- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. the government made any direct use of the privileged communications, either at trial or before the grand jury.”). In every ten-day report provided to the court, Agent Parkison included data about the minimization rate of phone calls intercepted on Patel’s phones. He testified during the evidentiary hearing that 5,952 calls were intercepted that were sixty seconds or more in length and of those, 685 calls or 11.5 percent, were minimized. The defendants did not produce any evidence to contradict Agent Parkison’s testimony, despite their earlier demand for the evidentiary hearing and their strenuous argument that the wiretap was structurally flawed. In light of this factual record, the district court did not err in ruling that the government demonstrated substantial compliance with the minimization provision of the wiretap statute and the wiretap authorization orders. The defendants did not establish that “the monitoring agents exhibited a high disregard” for their privacy rights or that the agents “did not do all they reasonably could to avoid unnecessary intrusions.” Feldman, 606 F.2d at 679. The defendants made no showing that the agents and monitors engaged in an improper pattern of intercepting innocent conversations over the period of the wiretap. See Lawson, 780 F.2d at 540. Taking all of the circumstances of the wiretap into account, the agents and the prosecutor charged with supervising the operation acted reasonably and did not violate the defendants’ Fourth Amendment or statutory rights. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 137–40. We recognize the inherent danger in allowing government agents on a filter team to listen to a target’s conversations with his attorneys without minimization. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511, 523 (6th Cir. 2006). There was no proof presented, however, that the monitoring agents and translators failed to abide by the limitations set forth in the wiretap authorization orders. This is not a case like United States v. George, 465 F.2d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 1972), where -17- Nos. 13-1164/1173/1182/1215/1216 United States v. Babubhai Patel, et al. the “protective limitations” of the wiretap authorization order “were completely defeated.” Moreover, the evidentiary record in this case is far different from the factual records presented to the courts in United States v. Renzi, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (D. Ariz. 2010), and United States v. Simels, No. 08-CR-640, 2009 WL 1924746 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2009). In those cases, the district courts suppressed all evidence obtained through electronic surveillance because the proof established that agents unlawfully intercepted privileged attorney-client calls. Here, no such proof was presented. Because the district court did not err in ruling that the government met the minimization requirement of the wiretap statute, we affirm on this ground.