Opinion ID: 1442440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's correction of Clark's sentence

Text: Clark argues that the district court was not authorized to correct his sentence under Rule 35(a) to reflect the statutory mandatory minimum because, in Clark's opinion, the Rule does not allow a correction in a case where the government waived the application of the mandatory minimum at the sentencing hearing. This presents a question of law that we review de novo. See United States v. Mendoza, 510 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir.2007) (Whether the district court followed the proper procedures after United States v. Booker in imposing [a] sentence is a question of law we review de novo.  (internal citation omitted)). Rule 35(a) allows for Correcting Clear Error: Within 7 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a). The district court's action in this case correcting the sentence the day after it was imposedfalls within the parameters of Rule 35(a). The error was not arithmetical or technical, but instead was substantivethe court mistakenly failed to apply the mandatory minimum sentence for Clark's conviction, as prescribed by Congress. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). The scope of Rule 35(a) is narrow; the advisory committee notes indicate that the Rule should extend only to those cases in which an obvious error or mistake has occurred in the sentence, that is, errors which would almost certainly result in a remand of the case to the trial court. . . . Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 advisory committee's note to 1991 Amendments. The Rule does not give the district court a second chance to exercise its discretion with regard to the application of the sentencing guidelines, nor does it allow for changes to a sentence based on the court's change of mind. Id. Additionally, the Rule should not be used in a way that relaxes any requirement that the parties state all objections to a sentence at or before the sentencing hearing. Id. Clark clings to this last limitation on Rule 35(a), and claims that the government lost its opportunity to argue for application of the mandatory minimum sentence by not raising the issue at sentencing, and more significantly, by affirmatively stating that no mandatory minimum sentence applied to Clark's conviction. With this argument, Clark suggests that whenever the government (or the defendant, for that matter) makes a mistake at a sentencing hearing, the court is bound by that mistake and may not correct a sentencing error that stems from it. Clark's position might make sense if applied to discretionary considerations and enhancements or reductions under the advisory guidelinesparties must state all of their objections to the multiple facets of a sentence at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Porretta, 116 F.3d 296, 300 (7th Cir.1997). Arguing after-the-fact, via a Rule 35(a) motion to correct a sentencing error, that the district court improperly applied a sentencing enhancement or reduction flies in the face of the advisory committee's admonition that it `did not intend that the rule relax any requirement that the parties state all objections to a sentence at or before the sentencing hearing.' Id. (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 advisory committee's note to 1991 Amendments). But the situation here is different because the mistake was more fundamentalthe resulting sentence violated a legislative mandate requiring that persons convicted of Clark's particular crime, with the amount of drugs involved, be imprisoned for a minimum term of ten years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii). The district court repeatedly asked the AUSA whether there was a mandatory minimum it should factor into Clark's sentence, but the AUSA erroneously stated that there was not. To bind the court to the government's error would not only result in a windfall to this particular defendantwho is not unlike other defendants who were correctly sentenced to the mandatory minimum of ten years' imprisonmentbut would also directly contravene congressional intent. Unlike the sentencing guidelines, which are advisory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264-65, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), statutory mandatory minimums are just as they soundmandatory, see United States v. Cannon, 429 F.3d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir.2005). To allow a party's blunder at sentencing to defuse the mandate of Congressespecially where the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a means for district courts to correct such blunders within seven days of the sentencewould convert individual lawyers into legislators each time a court mistakenly follows an illegitimate recommendation. The statements of the Supreme Court in Bozza v. United States, are equally pertinent here: The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner.. . . The sentence as corrected, imposes a valid punishment for an offense instead of an invalid punishment for that offense. 330 U.S. 160, 166-167, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947) (internal citations omitted). The mistake in this case that Clark desired to let lie would have been reversed on appealdistrict courts must abide by statutory sentencing ranges. See United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 434 (7th Cir.2007) (The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker , which made the sentencing guidelines advisory, did not authorize district judges to ignore statutory sentencing ranges. . . . Booker confers no authority on judges to disregard statutes. (internal citation omitted)). And the district court was well aware of its authority and the repercussions of such a mistake: based on Seventh Circuit precedent, I have no choice but to impose the ten-year mandatory minimum, and I think the failure to do so and the propriety of doing so is so clear that it would almost certainly result in a remand, which, I take it, is what I need to find in order to have jurisdiction under Rule 35 to correct the sentence. Clark continues, however, that the AUSA's denouncement during the sentencing hearing of a mandatory minimum foreclosed the possibility of a sentence correction under Rule 35(a) by way of the waiver doctrine. His argument is somewhat tenable in light of our language in United States v. Byerley, 46 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir.1995). In Byerley, the government attorney told the district court that it was within the court's discretion to impose a mandatory sentence. Id. at 696. The government was wrong, but the government did not bring the error to the court's attention until over two years later, after the defendant had (unsuccessfully) appealed his sentence, and after we issued our mandate affirming his conviction. Id. at 697. The government filed a motion under the old version of Rule 35(a), which allowed the district court to correct an illegal sentence at any time and [ ] correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence, that is, within 120 days of an affirmance of the judgment. Id. (quoting old Rule 35(a)). The government acted within the proper time frame under the old rule, but we decided that the district court could not correct the illegal sentence, notwithstanding the language of old Rule 35(a), because of the government's waiver. Id. at 699-700. An attorney cannot agree in open court with a judge's proposed course of conduct and then charge the court with error in following that course. [The] AUSA [ ] bound his principal and client, the United States, to the position that the application of the Guidelines and a mandatory minimum sentence to Byerley's conviction was discretionary with the district court. The government cannot now use old Rule 35(a) to overcome the errors of its agent. Id. at 700 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Old Rule 35(a) was more expansive than the current version of the ruleallowing for the correction of an illegal sentence at any time up to 120 days after an affirmance or dismissal of the appeal. Id. at 697. Thus, the Rule allowed for corrections of sentences long after their imposition, and in Byerley, the implications of such a broad grant of corrective power were clear. The Rule contemplated allowing a party, the government, to sit back throughout the direct appeal process with the possibility of a Rule 35(a) correction in reserve. It made sense for us, in terms of judicial economy and the finality expectations of convicted defendants, to impose a limitation on old Rule 35(a) in a case where the government reversed the position it advocated to the district court, years after sentencing. But that functional limitation is no longer necessary because Rule 35(a)'s revision includes a limitation that protects the dual concerns of judicial economy and finality: the district court must correct the sentence within seven days, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a), and it may not correct the sentence after that time period, see United States v. Baldwin, 414 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir.2005) (The Supreme Court has held that these rules [including Rule 35(a)] operate to deprive the court of authority to act after the time period specified in the rule has elapsed.) (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 428, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613 (1996)) ( overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Parker, 508 F.3d 434, 441 (7th Cir.2007)). Unfortunately for Clark, the doctrine of waiver is no longer necessary, nor applicable to the new Rule. Where a party makes a mistake at a sentencing hearing, which in turn leads to the imposition of a sentence that is clearly wrongfor example, a mistake in contravention of clear congressional intent or mandatethe district court may correct the sentence so long as the correction complies with Rule 35(a) and occurs within seven days. We emphasize that such mistakes might be made by either partyif a defendant did not realize at sentencing that he was not subject to a mandatory minimum sentence, but the court erroneously applied one, the defendant could make a motion for a corrected sentence within the seven-day time period. We also reiterate that the scope of Rule 35(a) is narrow, and our reasoning should not be read to allow parties to raise, after sentencing, arguments for or against enhancements or reductions under the guidelines that should have been raised at the sentencing hearing. See Porretta, 116 F.3d at 300. To the extent that this decision is inconsistent with our prior ruling in Byerley, we overrule that portion of Byerley. 46 F.3d at 700. [1]