Opinion ID: 77874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Florida Civil Rights Act

Text: Although we have reversed on Sheely's claims under the ADA and the RA, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to MRN on Sheely's state law claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq. (FCRA). That statute provides for a private right of action for violation of any Florida discrimination statute, and Florida Statutes §§ 413.08 and 413.081, in turn, provide that disabled individuals have the right to be accompanied by service animals in places of public accommodation. The district court held that the FCRA's narrow definition of public accommodation does not apply to MRN, and that Sheely may not import § 413.08's broader definition of public accommodation into the FCRA. We agree. Section 760.07 of the FCRA provides that [a]ny violation of any Florida statute making unlawful discrimination because of . . . handicap . . . in the area[] of . . . public accommodations gives rise to a cause of action for all relief and damages described in § 760.11(5), unless greater damages are expressly provided for. Section 760.02(11) provides that [f]or the purposes of §§ 760.01-760.11 and 509.092  i.e., for purposes of § 760.07  Public accommodations means places of public accommodation, lodgings, facilities principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises, gasoline stations, places of exhibition or entertainment, and other covered establishments. Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of this section: (a) Any inn, hotel, motel. . . . (b) Any . . . facility principally engaged in selling food. . . . (c) Any . . . place of exhibition or entertainment. . . . Thus, § 760.02(11)'s definition of public accommodations does not include medical facilities like MRN. Sheely does not contend otherwise. Instead, she notes that MRN is a place of public accommodation under Florida's separate service animal statute, and argues that this provides her with a private right of action against MRN under the FCRA. We are not persuaded. Florida Statute § 413.08 provides that [a]n individual with a disability has the right to be accompanied by a service animal in all areas of a public accommodation that the public or customers are normally permitted to occupy, id. § 413.08(3), and defines public accommodation broadly to include places to which the general public is invited, id. § 413.08(1)(c). Although § 760.07 of the FCRA provides a private right of action for any Florida statute making discrimination in places of public accommodation unlawful, § 760.02 of the FCRA expressly states that its narrow definition of public accommodation applies to § 760.07. Sheely therefore may not import § 413.08's broader definition of public accommodation into the FCRA. As the district court noted, this conclusion does not gut § 760.07. If MRN were a lodging, food, or entertainment establishment, § 760.07 would provide a private right of action for a violation of § 413.08. Moreover, Sheely has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the FCRA. The Act provides that [a]ny person aggrieved by a violation of §§ 760.01-760.10 may file a complaint with the [Florida] [C]ommission [on Human Relations] within 365 days of the alleged violation. . . . [or] with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or with any unit of government of the state which is a fair-employment-practice agency under 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.70-1601.80. Id. § 760.11(1). Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the commission shall determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that [a] discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Id. § 760.11(3).  In the event that the commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred . . ., the aggrieved person may . . . [b]ring a civil action . . . in any court of competent jurisdiction. . . . Id. § 760.11(4)(a) (emphasis added). However, [i]f the commission determines that there is not reasonable cause . . ., the commission shall dismiss the complaint. . . . If the aggrieved person does not request an administrative hearing within . . . 35 days, the claim will be barred. Id. § 760.11(7). Although Sheely timely filed a complaint with the Commission, it apparently concluded that there was not reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice had occurred in violation of the FCRA. The Commission's letter to Sheely states that [b]ased on the information you provided, we are unable to pursue this matter further because § 760.02(11)'s definition of public accommodation does not apply to MRN. Under these circumstances, the letter concluded, unless you advise us within 10 days . . . that the information on which we have based our decision is incorrect, we will take no further action on your inquiry. [31] There is no evidence in the record that Sheely provided the Commission with further information within 10 days under the terms of the letter, or that she requested an administrative hearing within 35 days under § 760.11(7). As a result, Sheely failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Act. [32] For these reasons, the district court properly granted summary judgment to MRN on Sheely's state law claim.