Opinion ID: 1437902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Dismissal of Plaintiff's Action Against Hancock

Text: (a) Industrial next contends that the trial justice erred in dismissing plaintiff's action against Hancock. It argues that the denial of that motion violated the Law of the Case doctrine, in view of the prior inconsistent rulings on similar motions by two other justices of the Superior Court on November 15, 1968 and June 9, 1969. We shall assume without deciding that Industrial has standing to raise this question. Industrial cites several cases where this court has stated that when a motion involving a pure question of law is denied by one justice of the Superior Court, that ruling becomes the law of the case and should not be disturbed by another justice of the same court absent the development of significant new facts. [3] The cases cited by Industrial are factually different from the case at bar. All of them involved motions for summary judgment and the party against whom the motion was granted had opposed the motion. But, even if we hold that those cases are applicable here, it does not necessarily follow that the trial justice erred in granting Hancock's motion to dismiss. As the court pointed out in Payne v. Superior Court, 78 R.I. 177, 184-85, 80 A.2d 159, 163 (1951), the doctrine of the law of the case admits of exceptions and therefore does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata. It is, as the court said, a flexible rule; one more in the nature of a rule of policy and convenience, but one that generally ought to be adhered to absent the most compelling and exceptional circumstances. All of the cases cited indicate that a clear alteration of the circumstances since the first decision of the question may also make it advisable that the second justice be permitted to pass upon it in the light of the changed conditions. In the case at bar there has been a development of significant new facts and a clear alteration of the circumstances since the denial of Hancock's motion to dismiss on June 9, 1969. The posture of the case when the motion to dismiss was denied in June 1969 is entirely different from that when the motion was granted in June 1972. In June 1969 plaintiff objected to Hancock's motion to dismiss. On the contrary, in June 1972, plaintiff informed the trial justice that she wanted to consider dropping her claim against Hancock and proceeding alone against Industrial on the negligence claim. Hancock accepted plaintiff's suggestion to make a motion to dismiss her case, with prejudice, and, when made, plaintiff did not object to the motion or to the trial justice's ruling granting the motion. In these circumstances we cannot say that the trial justice erred in granting Hancock's motion to dismiss. (b) Industrial also argues that the trial justice based his grant of Hancock's motion to dismiss on an erroneous view of the law, namely, that plaintiff had no standing to sue Hancock directly because there was no privity between them. Industrial argues that plaintiff was a third party beneficiary and, as such, had standing to sue Hancock. On the view we take, we need not discuss the authorities and cases cited by Industrial on this question. We need only look at the language of the policy which expressly provides: On receipt of due proof, on its prescribed forms, of the death of the above-named person while insured under said Policy, the Company shall pay to the Bank the amount of life insurance in force under said Policy on his life at the date of his death, and said amount of insurance shall be applied by the Bank toward the discharge of such person's indebtedness under said mortgage loan. In view of the express language in the policy, we cannot say that the trial justice erred in ruling that plaintiff did not have standing, under the policy, to sue Hancock and that the bank was the only proper plaintiff in a case against Hancock.