Opinion ID: 906351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Appellants question the jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Court to consider Holdsworth’s motion for pen­ alties following the parties’ settlement under § 48-139(3). Because we have the duty to determine whether the lower court 2 Foster v. BryanLGH Med. Ctr. East, 272 Neb. 918, 725 N.W.2d 839 (2007). 3 Midwest PMS v. Olsen, 279 Neb. 492, 778 N.W.2d 727 (2010). 4 Id. Nebraska Advance Sheets 54 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS had the power to enter the order in question, we consider this assignment of error first.5 Appellants base their argument that the Workers’ Compensation Court lacked jurisdiction solely on the fact that Holdsworth had signed a “[r]elease of [l]iability specifically waiving his right to have a judge of the compensation court decide the rights and liabilities of the parties.”6 This release was in accordance with the settlement procedures outlined in § 48-139(3) and therefore also stated that Holdsworth waived “all rights under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act.” According to § 48-139(3), “[s]uch release shall be a full and complete discharge from further liability for the employer on account of the injury . . . .” Because of this language of waiver and discharge, appellants allege that upon the filing of the signed release, the Workers’ Compensation Court “was divulged of jurisdiction to hear and rule on” Holdsworth’s motion for penalties.7 This is an incorrect conclusion. [4-6] As this court has previously stated, “[i]t is generally elementary that: ‘Jurisdiction does not relate to the right of the parties as between each other, but to the power of the court.’”8 Because jurisdiction does not relate to the rights of the parties, “[p]arties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a judi­ cial tribunal by either acquiescence or consent, nor may subject matter jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel, consent, or conduct of the parties.”9 Similarly, “the jurisdiction of courts is a public matter that cannot be affected by a private agreement, and the jurisdiction of a court can neither be acquired nor lost as a result of an agreement of the parties.”10 5 See Currie v. Chief School Bus Serv., 250 Neb. 872, 553 N.W.2d 469 (1996), limited on other grounds, O’Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d 350 (1998). 6 Brief for appellant at 10. 7 Id. at 12. 8 School Dist. No. 49 v. Kreidler, 165 Neb. 761, 771, 87 N.W.2d 429, 436 (1958) (quoting 14 Am. Jur. Courts § 161 (1938)). 9 Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 638, 667 N.W.2d 538, 542 (2003). 10 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 95 at 479 (2005). Nebraska Advance Sheets HOLDSWORTH v. GREENWOOD FARMERS CO-OP 55 Cite as 286 Neb. 49 Given these basic principles of jurisdiction, the parties in the instant case could not deprive the Workers’ Compensation Court of jurisdiction by private agreement. It necessarily fol­ lows that Holdsworth’s waiver of rights—filed pursuant to a private settlement agreement—did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear further issues in the case. Whether Holdsworth was entitled to bring further issues before the court is a separate matter relating to his rights under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act—a matter that we will discuss shortly. But whatever Holdsworth’s rights, our case law rec­ ognizes that the Workers’ Compensation Court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce the award of workers’ compensation benefits.11 This assignment of error has no merit. Whether P enalty P rovisions of § 48-125 Apply to Settlements R eached Under § 48-139(3) Next, we must consider whether the penalty provisions of § 48-125 apply to settlements reached under the new proce­ dures of § 48-139(3). We conclude that a worker waives his or her right to ask for penalties by filing the waiver required in § 48-139(3). Section 48-139(3) imposes specific requirements to utilize the new settlement procedures not requiring court approval. Notably, the statute mandates that if a “lump-sum settlement is not required to be submitted for approval by the compen­ sation court, a release shall be filed with the compensation court in accordance with this subsection.”12 In order to pro­ tect the worker’s rights, § 48-139(3) requires that the release be signed and verified by both the worker and the worker’s attorney. It also mandates that the release be made on a form approved by the compensation court and that the form notify the worker of particular rights conferred by the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. It further requires that the release “shall contain” certain statements, including a statement that the worker “waives all rights under the Nebraska Workers’ 11 See Russell v. Kerry, Inc., 278 Neb. 981, 775 N.W.2d 420 (2009). 12 § 48-139(3) (emphasis supplied). Nebraska Advance Sheets 56 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS Compensation Act, including, but not limited to: . . . [t]he right to ask a judge of the compensation court to decide the parties’ rights and obligations.”13 [7] We find no ambiguity in this language, but read it as a full waiver of any and all rights given to workers in the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. The statute does not qualify or limit the rights given up by the worker in the release, but states that the release is a waiver of “all rights under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act.”14 The Legislature also highlighted the expansiveness of the waiver by including in § 48-139(3) the words “including, but not limited to,” which ensures that the waiver will not be limited only to rights spe­ cifically listed in the statute. Because we find no ambiguity, we give the statutory language of § 48-139(3) “its plain and ordinary meaning.”15 We “will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.”16 [8] Without doubt, the waiting-time penalty and attorney fees for waiting-time proceedings provided under § 48-125 are rights under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. The broadly inclusive language of § 48-139(3) gives us no rea­ son to believe that the rights provided by § 48-125 should be excluded from the scope of the statutory waiver. Moreover, a worker cannot receive penalties under § 48-125 without relying upon another right explicitly waived by the release—“[t]he right to ask a judge of the compensation court to decide the parties’ rights and obligations.”17 As § 48-125 has been interpreted by this court, there are only certain circum­ stances in which a worker is entitled to a waiting-time pen­ alty.18 Where the employer alleges that there was a reasonable 13 Id. 14 Id. (emphasis supplied). 15 See Pittman v. Western Engineering Co., 283 Neb. 913, 925, 813 N.W.2d 487, 496 (2012). 16 Id. 17 § 48-139(3). 18 See Lagemann v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 277 Neb. 335, 762 N.W.2d 51 (2009). Nebraska Advance Sheets HOLDSWORTH v. GREENWOOD FARMERS CO-OP 57 Cite as 286 Neb. 49 controversy, the worker’s right to a waiting-time penalty must be decided by the Workers’ Compensation Court.19 And, an attorney fee may not be awarded pursuant to § 48-125(2)(a) due to a delay in paying compensation unless the worker receives an award of a waiting-time penalty. Therefore, a worker’s entitlement to penalties under § 48-125 depends upon the worker’s asking the court to decide both the worker’s rights and the employer’s obligations. But under the settle­ ment procedure in § 48-139(3), the worker’s release expressly waives this right. [9] In summary, the settlement procedures in § 48-139(3) require a worker to waive “all rights under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act,” including both the right to penal­ ties under § 48-125 and “[t]he right to ask a judge of the com­ pensation court to decide the parties’ rights and obligations.” Because a worker who enters into a lump-sum settlement without court approval and files a waiver in compliance with § 48-139(3) thereby waives “all” rights under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act, he or she also effectively waives the right to penalties under § 48-125. We agree with appellants that the penalty provisions of § 48-125 were waived by imple­ mentation of and compliance with the waiver procedures under § 48-139(3). The partial dissent argues that the waiver required by § 48-139(3) is limited by the main paragraph of this subsec­ tion and extends only to “those liabilities that can be consid­ ered to be ‘on account of the injury.’” It interprets the release statements required by § 48-139(3)(a) through (d) as implicitly incorporating this limitation. But this interpretation reads words into § 48-139(3) that are not there. If the Legislature meant to limit the language of the release to “those liabilities that can be considered to be ‘on account of the injury,’” then it would have qualified the release statement required by § 48-139(3)(a) so as to state that the worker waives only those rights under the Nebraska Workers’ 19 See, e.g., Hobza v. Seedorff Masonry, Inc., 259 Neb. 671, 611 N.W.2d 828 (2000) (superseded by statute as stated in Lovelace v. City of Lincoln, 283 Neb. 12, 809 N.W.2d 505 (2012)). Nebraska Advance Sheets 58 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS Compensation Act “on account of the injury.” But it did not. The statement of release provided by § 48-139(3)(a) would not accomplish the result urged by the dissent without this added language. Additionally, the dissent’s interpretation ignores the plain meaning of the word “all” in the various release statements. Under its interpretation, the word “all” is meaningless, because not all rights are waived, but only the rights and obligations “on account of the injury.” Moreover, the Legislature not only said “all,” it added the phrase “including, but not limited to.”20 This language cannot be reconciled with the approach urged by the dissent. [10,11] When interpreting statutes, an appellate court will not “read into a statute a meaning that is not there.”21 Additionally, “[a] court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless.”22 The dissent’s interpretation effectively adds language to the release state­ ments required by § 48-139(3) and erases the clear statement in § 48-139(3)(a) that the worker waives “all” rights under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. Furthermore, the dissent claims that our interpretation will lead to the absurd result that a worker who has reached a settlement agreement with his employer would have no means of enforcing the settlement once the release has been filed, thereby allowing an employer “to indefinitely delay payment.” Such an argument, however, ignores the reality that under § 48-139(3), the filing of a release by itself effects a discharge from liability and not actual payment, as is the case under the settlement procedures requiring court approval.23 The suppos­ edly absurd result is easily avoided by the simple expedient 20 See § 48-139(3)(a). 21 Blakely v. Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659, 679, 825 N.W.2d 149, 166 (2012). 22 In re Interest of Zylena R. & Adrionna R., 284 Neb. 834, 846, 825 N.W.2d 173, 182 (2012). 23 See § 48-139(2)(c). Nebraska Advance Sheets HOLDSWORTH v. GREENWOOD FARMERS CO-OP 59 Cite as 286 Neb. 49 of not delivering the release or stipulating to the dismissal of the case until the lump-sum payment is received. This happens every day in tort settlements, and we are not persuaded that a worker would be without a remedy where a release is fraudu­ lently obtained. In authorizing settlements without the protections inherent in the process of court approval, the Legislature struck a bal­ ance. Section 48-139(3) enables a worker to obtain a settlement more quickly, but in order to do so, it requires the worker to expressly waive his or her rights under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. It is the function of the Legislature, through the enactment of statutes, to declare what is the law and public policy of this state.24 Because the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not our province to disturb the balance framed by the Legislature. R emaining Assignments of Error [12] Because we have concluded that Holdsworth waived his right to penalties by filing the release required by § 48-139(3), we need not consider appellants’ remaining assignments of error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analy­ sis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.25