Opinion ID: 1726172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: comparative or contributory negligence

Text: There is little dispute among legal commentators that the doctrine of contributory negligence has caused substantial injustice since it was first invoked in England in 1809. [2] Of significance in this regard is that almost every common-law jurisdiction outside the United States has discarded contributory negligence and has adopted in its place a more equitable system of comparative negligence. [3] Even in this country, considered the only remaining primary location employing contributory negligence, [4] 32 states and the United States Supreme Court in the case of admiralty law have discarded or rejected it in favor of some form of comparative negligence. [5] This precedent is so compelling that the question before remaining courts and legislatures is not whether but when, how and in what form to follow this lead. Therefore, to the properly raised question [6] of whether a comparative negligence standard should be substituted for contributory negligence in Michigan, we answer in the affirmative. [7] In July, 1977, three Justices on this Court would have established comparative negligence as the rule in this state. [8] Kirby v Larson, 400 Mich 585; 256 NW2d 400 (1977), involved a factual situation typical of the potential injustice of the doctrine of contributory negligence. In Kirby, a defendant, driving north, approached an intersection passing by a car also traveling north which had already come to a stop at the intersection for a changing light. Plaintiff Christine Kirby was a passenger in a car which had been proceeding south on the same street and was stopped at the intersection waiting to make a left-hand turn. Both Kirby and the driver saw the first vehicle come to a stop and anticipated that defendant, then about three or four car lengths back from the intersection, would do the same. Plaintiff suggested completion of the turn to the driver, although there was some disputed testimony as to whether this suggestion was made after the driver was already turning the wheel of the car, and the driver proceeded to turn. Defendant's car, traveling at 25-30 miles per hour, struck the right rear of the car in which plaintiff was a passenger; plaintiff was thrown from the car and seriously injured. The trial court instructed the jury on contributory negligence:    if you find that Christine Kirby was personally and contributorily negligent and such negligence was a proximate cause of the injury and damages alleged by her and in that event Christine Kirby cannot recover from the defendant and your verdict therefore would be for the defendant. Kirby, supra, 595. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant. Kirby was heard at this Court by six Justices, [9] and the ultimate disposition included two opinions, each one representing the views of three Justices. The WILLIAMS opinion in Kirby found in part III that instructional errors at the trial level required reversal and remand for new trial. Beyond this, through the WILLIAMS opinion, the Chief Justice, Justice LEVIN and Justice WILLIAMS would have adopted comparative negligence as a substitute for contributory negligence in Michigan and would have instituted that doctrine as prevailing on remand. The three other participating Justices in Kirby concurred in part III of the WILLIAMS opinion, finding error below necessitating remand and a new trial. Justice FITZGERALD'S opinion, however, signed by Justices COLEMAN and RYAN, did not find Kirby the appropriate vehicle for adopting comparative negligence. That opinion found the record before this Court inadequate because, unlike the instant case, the parties had not fully briefed and discussed the issue. Because many aspects of comparative negligence were extensively dealt with in Kirby, only a brief review of certain of these is necessary. The sub-issues specifically discussed under headings A, B and C, infra, are those raised by the parties.
In part IX of the WILLIAMS opinion in Kirby, a brief analysis was made as to the propriety of judicial versus legislative abrogation of contributory negligence and adoption of comparative negligence. There is no question that both this Court and the Legislature have the constitutional power to change the common law. The common law and the statute laws now in force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed. Const 1963, art 3, § 7. This provision has been construed to authorize both judicial change and legislative amendment or repeal. Myers v Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich 1, 7; 133 NW2d 190 (1965). Further, when dealing with judge-made law, this Court in the past has not disregarded its corrective responsibility in the proper case. [O]ur Court has heretofore believed that rules created by the court could be altered by the court. For example, we abrogated the defense of assumption of risk, Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23; 133 NW2d 136 (1965), repudiated the doctrine of imputed negligence, Bricker v Green, 313 Mich 218; 21 NW2d 105 (1946), eliminated the privity requirement in actions for breach of an implied warranty, Spence v Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc, 353 Mich 120; 90 NW2d 873 (1958), overruled the common-law disability prohibiting the wife from suing for the loss of her husband's consortium, Montgomery v Stephan, 359 Mich 33; 101 NW2d 227 (1960), overruled the common-law disallowance of recovery for negligently inflicted prenatal injury, Womack v Buchhorn, 384 Mich 718, 724-725; 187 NW2d 218 (1971); and even eliminated charitable immunity from negligence, Parker v Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich 1; 105 NW2d 1 (1960). Kirby, 625. The question then is whether a judicial forum is appropriate for adoption of comparative negligence. [10] In three of the states now employing comparative negligence, that rule was judicially adopted: Alaska, Kaatz v State, 540 P2d 1037 (Alas, 1975); California, Li v Yellow Cab Co of California, 13 Cal 3d 804; 532 P2d 1226; 119 Cal Rptr 858 (1975); Florida, Hoffman v Jones, 280 So 2d 431 (Fla, 1973). Points raised against such judicial action include the legislature's superior power of investigation and ability to handle collateral problems as well as the legislature's ability to pass statutes which come into effect at some future date thereby providing notice to the bench and bar of impending change. However, considerations favoring judicial adoption rather than legislative are equally if not more compelling. Professor Fleming analyzes and ably disputes the three main points often asserted in favor of legislative adoption: First is the question which of these two bodies is better equipped to understand the nature and implications of the problem and to make an informed choice from available alternatives. It is fashionable to suppose that the investigatory opportunities of the legislature establish its superior credentials in this respect.    But on the question of contributory negligence, one cannot very well dispute the unique judicial experience and preoccupation   . Moreover, such quantitative data as exist on the impact of comparative negligence on insurance rates [see appendix in Kirby, p 651] and on the processing of claims by settlement or resort to court [see appendix in Kirby, p 648] are at least as well available to judges as to legislators.    Nor should one lightly indulge the fancy that because many legislators have enjoyed legal training, they are therefore as sensitive to the need for reform or as well equipped to pass an independent judgment on this issue as are the courts. In a nutshell, this is preeminently lawyer's law. (Emphasis added.) Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last  By Judicial Choice, 64 Calif L Rev 239, 279-280 (1976). The next point analyzed by Professor Fleming is the assertion of the Legislature's superior ability to enact the primary change and simultaneously anticipate and resolve the numerous details and collateral issues at one time. Professor Fleming cites two points in response. First, almost all comparative negligence statutes are    in the briefest conceivable form and leave the very same ancillary questions likewise to the courts for future solution. Second, courts can    anticipate several of the most important of these questions and thus dispose [sic] with the need for having them later explored at the cost of future litigants. Far from deserving rebuke for dealing with hypotheticals, this practice reveals courts as being on occasion at least as well equipped as legislatures in laying down a reasonably comprehensive blueprint of reform. Fleming, supra, 281. Finally, Professor Fleming analyzes the argument that legislative reform can give affected parties time to prepare themselves for the change of law, for example by procuring liability insurance and by adjusting cost calculations. Thus, statutes abrogating charitable and other immunities have commonly postponed their commencement for that purpose. But courts also have long broken with the Blackstonian fiction that judicial decisions must necessarily be retroactive in operation because they merely declare what the common law should always have been discovered to be. Fleming, supra, 281. As is indicated by the above analysis, although the courts have not been the primary agencies for adoption of comparative negligence, they are certainly in as good, if not better, a position to evaluate the need for change, and to fashion that change. Further, as to the final point raised by Professor Fleming regarding the need for advance warning, this is uniquely satisfied in this jurisdiction because the bench and bar were put on notice a year and a half ago when three members of this Court advocated adoption of comparative negligence in Kirby, supra . [11] With all these factors in mind, we find adoption of comparative negligence is consistent with this Court's responsibility to the jurisprudence of this state.
Extensive discussion in the WILLIAMS opinion in Kirby was devoted to an analysis of the most appropriate form of comparative negligence to adopt. Kirby, 629-645. Since that time, we have not altered our view that the doctrine of pure comparative negligence most nearly accomplishes the goal of a fair system of apportionment of damages. Only pure comparative negligence truly distributes responsibility according to fault of the respective parties. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence (Indianapolis: Allen Smith Co, 1974), § 21.3, p 347. As stated in Kirby, We are convinced, as was the United States Supreme Court and the other courts which have adopted the comparative negligence doctrine, that the `pure' form is preferable to any other. The `pure' form does not `unjustly enrich' anyone. For example, if an accident is wholly the fault of one party, then that party would not, of course, recover damages. If an injured plaintiff was 51% to blame, there still remains 49% of the fault which was not plaintiff's, and for which therefore the person who caused that much of the injury should be liable. The rule preventing recovery if plaintiff's negligence exceeds 50% of the total fault is just as arbitrary as that which completely denies recovery. Is the person who is 49% negligent that much more deserving than the one who is 51% negligent? We acknowledge that even under the `pure' form of comparative negligence there will be appeals concerning the percentage of award, but it is undoubtedly more compelling to appeal when you have been awarded nothing than when you have received some compensation. However, just as we did not reach our decision on contributory negligence because of the anticipated number of case filings, we will not reach our decision on the form of comparative negligence because of an equally unpredictable element, the anticipated number of appeals. Commentators acknowledge that the hybrid 50% rule leads to strange results.