Opinion ID: 535324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: aggregation of amounts

Text: 7 Defendant Ryan first asserts that amounts of value of things obtained in different districts cannot be aggregated in order to reach the jurisdictional amount. We disagree. 8 The broad wording of the statute itself indicates that aggregation should be allowed between districts. The statute provides that anyone who knowingly uses one or more unauthorized access devices during any one-year period, and by such conduct obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more  is guilty of the offense if the action affects interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(a) (emphasis added). This wording is broad and there is no mention of geographical limitations. We believe that the statute means what it says, and we are unwilling to read into it a requirement which would undermine the statute's clear purpose. 9 In order to be convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(a)(2), three elements must be satisfied: First, the person must have knowingly and with intent to defraud trafficked in, or used, one or more access devices (such as credit cards) without authorization. Second, the person must, as a result, have obtained anything of value aggregating $1000 or more during a year-long period. Finally, the offense must have affected interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(a). 10 Section 1029 was enacted in 1984 as a response to the growing importance of credit cards and other access devices in our society and to increasingly sophisticated criminal activity in this area. H.R.Rep. No. 894, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3689-3690. One of its purposes was to close the loopholes of already existing legislation under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1644, and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1693n(b). Those statutes prohibit fraudulent use of credit cards and debit instruments. However, 11 [b]oth of these statutes use a jurisdictional amount of $1,000 of activity in each instrument within 1 year; industry representatives state that the organized groups generally stay just under this amount but use many different counterfeit or stolen cards or debit instruments. 12 H.R.Rep. No. 894, 98th Cong., 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3691. See also United States v. Iredia, 866 F.2d 114, 120 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3250, 106 L.Ed.2d 596 (1989); United States v. Brewer, 835 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Newman, 701 F.Supp. 184, 186 (D.Nev.1988). 13 Congress stressed that neglect of white collar crimes such as credit card fraud is a great mistake and in fact an attack on white collar crime can often be much more productive, economically, to this country than the more publicized emphasis on violent crime. H.R.Rep. No. 894, 98th Cong., 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3690. The House Committee on the Judiciary found evidence of the deterrent power of the law when enforced in the area of white collar crime. By using the phrase affects interstate or foreign commerce, the Committee intended to establish a broad jurisdictional basis. See H.R.Rep. No. 894, 98th Cong., 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3702; Newman, 701 F.Supp. at 186-87. 14 At the same time, Congress recognized that not every credit card crime warrants federal attention. For example, the use of counterfeit cards is considered more serious than the misuse of genuine cards; there is therefore no threshold dollar amount for producing or trafficking in counterfeit cards. H.R.Rep. No. 894, 98th Cong., 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3699. For misuse of genuine credit cards, certain thresholds contained in the bill, such as the dollar amount threshold on trafficking in or using unauthorized devices ... will insure that Federal involvement is concentrated on those situations where they can best supplement the efforts of State and local governments. Id. at 3702. It is this fact to which defendant Ryan points in her assertion that amounts should not be aggregated from different districts in order to meet the jurisdictional amount. She argues that small amounts from different districts are better left to the States to handle. 15 However, Congress also limited federal jurisdiction with an additional constraint: the offense must affect interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(a). Thus in order to be convicted of violating the statute, one must obtain value of at least $1000 and the offense must affect interstate or foreign commerce. This second requirement, in addition to the threshold amount, ensures that the federal government will involve itself in those cases which it is best able to handle and in which it has the most interest. Cf. United States v. Mikelberg, 517 F.2d 246, 252 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 909, 96 S.Ct. 1104, 47 L.Ed.2d 313 (1976) (for purposes of 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1644, Congress intended to confine the aggregating of purchases only to those purchases made 'in a transaction affecting interstate or foreign commerce.' ). Here both elements were alleged--the amount of goods obtained was charged to be of an aggregate value of $1,000 or more, and the offense was allegedly committed in transactions affecting interstate commerce. 16 We are not persuaded by defendant's arguments based on Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 81 S.Ct. 358, 5 L.Ed.2d 340 (1961). She argues under Travis that here there was an offense committed only where goods of a value of at least $1,000 were obtained. She says that Travis held that the offense of filing a false affidavit was committed only where the filing of the affidavit was completed--in the District of Columbia--in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, and that here the offense had to be completed by obtaining $1,000 of goods in Kansas for the offense to be committed there. In Travis, however, the only place where a false affidavit was on file with the Board and in a matter within [its] jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, was in the District. The broad terms of Sec. 1029(a) show a very different intention on the part of Congress here and the special statutory limitations of Travis are lacking. 2 17 We are likewise unpersuaded by defendant's contention resting on Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 517, 80 S.Ct. 945, 948, 4 L.Ed.2d 921 (1960), that there the transactions had to have enough relationship to be properly charged as one offense (transporting stolen goods in interstate or foreign commerce) and that the Schaffer opinion did not suggest that the case could have been tried anywhere except in New York where the value of the stolen goods aggregated the required $5,000 amount. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2314. Schaffer makes no holding on venue limitations and the theory of aggregation under Sec. 2314 in Schaffer for its transportation offense is based on wording that is again materially different. Here Sec. 1029(a) broadly prohibits using one or more unauthorized access devices during any one year period to obtain anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during the period--which logically combines the wrongful use of one or more access devices in difference places, with no geographical limitation, the only requirement being that the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce. 18 Defendant Ryan protests that under our interpretation a person can be prosecuted if she charges only $20 in each of the fifty states. However, if each of those fifty transactions affects interstate commerce, there is no reason why the statute should not apply. In fact, as the government pointed out at the time Ms. Ryan made her motion to dismiss, III R. 5-6, States might be hesitant to prosecute for such small amounts; thus under defendant Ryan's interpretation, persons might be free to steal small amounts with impunity if the federal government does not prosecute. Moreover, Ms. Ryan's argument cuts both ways, for her interpretation would leave persons free to charge $999.99 in each State for a total of $49,999.50 with no federal prosecution. Given that Congress intended to close similar loopholes in predecessor statutes, it seems illogical that Congress intended to leave such a loophole. 19 As pointed out, Congress meant to establish broad authority to punish credit card crime. This is true not only in the case of Sec. 1029, but also in the case of its predecessor statute, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1644. See United States v. Lomax, 598 F.2d 582, 584 (10th Cir.1979); United States v. Abod, 770 F.2d 1293, 1296-1297 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. De Biasi, 712 F.2d 785, 790 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Eboli v. United States, 464 U.S. 962, 104 S.Ct. 397, 78 L.Ed.2d 339 (1983). 3 It is true that [w]hen Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955). Moreover, unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.... United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379, 98 S.Ct. 1112, 1116, 55 L.Ed.2d 349 (1978) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 523, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971)). Nevertheless, these maxims only apply when we are uncertain about the statute's meaning and they are not to be used 'in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature.'  Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 1970, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977) (quoting United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 510, 75 S.Ct. 504, 508, 99 L.Ed. 594 (1955)). Here we are satisfied that the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1029(a) is clear from the broad and forceful terms used: anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during [a one-year period].... 20 We hold that the amounts may be aggregated from different districts to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement in circumstances such as are alleged in the indictment.