Opinion ID: 3178556
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We first consider juror Jackson. A review of the

Text: record shows that Jackson expressed concerns about the death penalty. In his questionnaire, he stated that he was not sure if he would vote for the death penalty, stating, “[a]s more [and] more new methods of investigation show the old flaws, I am becoming less inclined toward it.” During voir dire, he stated that he would be hesitant to impose the death penalty because he doubted the fairness of the criminal justice system. In striking Jackson, the prosecutor referred to Jackson as a “resident of Berkeley, . . . a hotbed of anti-deathpenalty people.” The prosecutor also expressed concern that Jackson had “problems with the system with respect to the fairness of the death penalty”; for instance, he stated “‘I don’t know if I can consciously end someone’s life.’” The trial 38 SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON court concluded that the prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for striking Jackson were credible. The California Court of Appeal conducted a comparative juror analysis. Based on its comparison of seated jurors, the state court rejected Sifuentes’s argument that the prosecutor’s explanations for striking Sifuentes were pretextual because other seated jurors lived in Berkeley and expressed similar concerns about the death penalty. We now evaluate the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations in light of the evidence in the record. The prosecutor’s characterization of Jackson’s statements as showing reluctance to impose the death penalty was not contrary to the evidence. However, the prosecutor’s belief that Jackson lived in Berkeley and that he said “I don’t know if I can consciously end someone’s life” was an error: those were true about juror Jasper, not Jackson. Sifuentes argues that the prosecutor’s mistaken attribution of statements to Jackson that were made by another black juror demonstrates the prosecutor’s bias. While a prosecutor’s credibility may be questioned if the prosecutor “mischaracterizes a juror’s testimony in a manner completely contrary to the juror’s stated beliefs,” a prosecutor’s “mistake in good faith, such as an innocent transposition of juror information,” does not support a finding that the prosecutor is not credible. Aleman, 723 F.3d at 982. Here, the state court found that the prosecutor’s error in attributing Jasper’s statements to Jackson’s was a “mistake in good faith,” because Jackson expressed similar reservations. Based on our review of the record, this conclusion was not an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, applying our doubly deferential standard, and giving the state court the benefit of the doubt, the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that SIFUENTES V. BRAZELTON 39 the prosecutor was credible is not an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts.