Opinion ID: 3053391
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Taylor’s Modified Categorical Approach

Text: [4] “Where a state statute is categorically broader than the generic definition of a crime, we employ a modified categorical approach.” Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Under this approach, we conduct “a limited examination of documents in the record of conviction to determine if there is sufficient evidence to conclude that a defendant was convicted of the elements of the generically defined crime,” without reviewing the particular facts underlying the conviction. Chang, 307 F.3d at 1189. We must first determine whether Ngaeth’s conviction contains the elements of attempted theft. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, considering similar statutes, have so indicated. See Martinez-Garcia, 268 F.3d at 462; Lopez-Elias, 209 F.3d at 792 n.7. In Lopez-Elias v. Reno, the petitioner was charged with vehicular burglary with the intent to commit theft. See LopezElias, 209 F.3d at 792 n.7. The Fifth Circuit held that the petitioner had not actually committed a theft offense, because he pled guilty to having an intent to commit theft but not to having stolen anything. Id. at 792. The court noted, however, that the petitioner “could have been removed . . . based alternatively on the theory that burglary of a vehicle with intent to commit theft is tantamount to an offense of attempted theft.” Id. at 792 n.7 (emphasis in original). In Martinez-Garcia, the petitioner pled guilty to vehicular burglary, admitting that he “without authority, knowingly entered a motor vehicle . . . with the intent to commit therein a theft.” Martinez-Garcia, 268 F.3d at 462. In the Seventh Circuit’s view, this conduct was “a substantial step toward the commission of the theft.” Id. at 466. The conviction was, therefore, an attempted theft offense and thus an aggravated felony. 13610 NGAETH v. MUKASEY [5] We agree with the reasoning of our sister circuits. Cf. Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[i]n the immigration context, . . . the need for national uniformity is paramount”). Although we are mindful of the Second Circuit’s warning that inchoate crimes like attempt are highly fact-specific, with the result that many will not be amenable to categorical analysis, see Sui, 250 F.3d at 119, it is clear that entering a “vehicle . . . when the doors are locked,” Cal. Penal Code § 459, clearly constitutes a substantial step towards committing a theft. When that entry is committed with an intent to “commit grand or petit larceny,” as the statute provides, our generic definition of attempted theft is satisfied. We, therefore, hold that a conviction for entering a locked vehicle with the intent to commit theft constitutes an attempted theft offense for purposes of the aggravated felony definition. [6] Having held that entering a locked vehicle with intent to commit theft is an attempted theft offense, we must now determine whether Ngaeth pled to those elements of section 459. See Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “charging documents in combination with a signed plea agreement, jury instructions, guilty pleas, transcripts of a plea proceeding, and the judgment may suffice to document the elements of conviction” under the modified categorical approach). Ngaeth pled guilty to Count 1 of the criminal complaint, which provided, in pertinent part, that he “enter[ed] a locked motor vehicle, . . . with the intent to commit theft, in violation of Penal Code Section 459.” Ngaeth further admitted the facts supporting this specific charge in his written plea and waiver-of-right form. [7] We have the “defendant’s own admissions . . . [to] confirm[ ] the factual basis for a valid plea” to the elements of the generic offense of attempted theft. See Penuliar, 523 F.3d at 971 (quoting Vidal, 504 F.3d at 1088-89). Ngaeth is, therefore, an aggravated felon under the modified categorical approach. NGAETH v. MUKASEY 13611