Opinion ID: 2219221
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Civil Cases

Text: On March 2, 1979, respondent filed a products liability complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of Clarence and Nancy Dixson, alleging that, on March 3, 1977, three of the couple's children had consumed cereal distributed by General Mills, Inc., which contained crushed glass. Both Clarence and Nancy Dixson testified before the Hearing Board that they initially retained another attorney, but were persuaded to transfer the case to respondent, who is Nancy Dixson's nephew. The Dixsons had contact with respondent regarding their case shortly after the March 2, 1977, incident. Thereafter, at least a year passed between contacts with respondent; Mrs. Dixson testified that she telephoned and wrote respondent but could never get any adequate responses from him concerning the case and its status. The documentary evidence submitted by the Administrator reveals that, after initiating the action on March 2, 1979, respondent failed to appear at the December 28, 1979, status hearing scheduled by the Federal court. Moreover, respondent failed to produce a sample of the cereal, to answer the interrogatories, and to produce his clients for properly noticed depositions. Based on respondent's conduct, the Federal court dismissed the Dixsons' complaint with prejudice on February 19, 1980. (Fed.R.Civ.P. 35, 37(c).) Respondent never took any steps to reinstitute the Dixsons' cause of action and it is now time-barred. These facts form the basis of count VII of the Administrator's complaint. On August 12, 1983, Madronica Biddings interviewed with American Airlines, Inc., for employment. During the interview, the agent interviewing her wrote on her application that she was a bitch. Biddings argued with the agent and obtained possession of the application. Thereafter, Biddings consulted with respondent, who agreed to represent her in a cause of action against American Airlines. Biddings paid respondent a retainer of $250. Biddings testified before the Hearing Board and acknowledged that respondent, at the time he agreed to represent her, informed her that there were numerous problems with her case. Nevertheless, respondent filed an action on her behalf in the circuit court of Cook County on August 10, 1984. Biddings testified that she called respondent about once a month to inquire about her case and that she had contacted him about 10 times. The documentary evidence submitted by the Administrator shows that, on May 1, 1985, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss Biddings' complaint for failure to state a cause of action. On June 27, 1985, the court struck plaintiff's complaint in its entirety, giving respondent leave to file an amended complaint within 28 days. On July 25, 1985, respondent moved the court for an extension in which to file the amended complaint, but failed to provide opposing counsel with notice of the motion. Respondent failed to appear at the next scheduled progress call and Biddings' case was dismissed for want of prosecution. Respondent motioned the court to vacate the dismissal order which was set for hearing on September 26, 1985. However, respondent failed to appear at the scheduled hearing and his motion to vacate was denied on September 26, 1985. Respondent took no further action to reinstate Biddings' cause of action, which is now time-barred. Biddings testified that the last time she spoke with respondent was in September 1985. At that time, respondent told her that the case was going to court and she might have to testify. Thereafter, Biddings called the clerk of the circuit court herself and discovered that her case had been dismissed for want of prosecution. Biddings further testified that, up to the date of the hearing, respondent had not informed her that her case had been dismissed. These facts form the basis of count IX of the Administrator's complaint. On November 14, 1984, respondent petitioned the clerk of the circuit court for the dissolution of Wanda Ferguson's marriage. Ms. Ferguson testified at the hearing that she paid respondent a $450 retainer fee to obtain his services. Ms. Ferguson paid respondent an additional $125 shortly after he filed her dissolution petition. The Administrator's documentary evidence established that, on May 8, 1985, respondent successfully moved the court for temporary custody and child support on behalf of Ms. Ferguson. However, respondent failed to appear at a trial call on May 9, 1985, and the court dismissed Ms. Ferguson's petition for want of prosecution. Respondent never told Ms. Ferguson that her petition had been dismissed, nor did he ever file a motion to vacate the dismissal order. Ms. Ferguson testified that, after respondent argued her motion for temporary custody and child support, she made numerous attempts to contact respondent. Either Ms. Ferguson could not reach him or he told her that he would get back to her. She finally reached respondent on July 14, 1986, when he told her that, for an additional $250, he could complete the dissolution within a month. Ms. Ferguson testified that she and her ex-husband paid respondent $125 each in August 1986. Ultimately, Ms. Ferguson had to obtain the services of another lawyer and incurred an additional $689 in attorney fees. These facts form the basis of count X of the Administrator's complaint. Finally, Herbert Turner testified before the Hearing Board that he retained respondent in September 1985 to represent H & W Towing concerning a potential purchase of property which it was leasing. Turner paid respondent a $400 retainer fee. Turner provided respondent with the lease, the building appraisal and other documents related to the property in October 1985. As of December 26, 1985, respondent had taken no action regarding the purchase and had not communicated to Turner in this regard. Therefore, Turner terminated the attorney-client relationship. Turner testified that, because of respondent's inaction, he was unable to purchase the property. Turner requested respondent to return his check for $400, which respondent failed to do. Turner stated that he had difficulty contacting respondent and could not get any information from him. During cross-examination, Turner testified that the purchase of the property was a pressing matter because the fire department and the city building inspectors had made complaints on the property and he did not want to spend any more money on the building without owning it. These facts form the basis of count XIII of the Administrator's complaint. Based on the facts set forth above, counts VI, VII, IX, X, XII, XIII and XV of the Administrator's complaint charged respondent with violating: (a) Rule 1-102(a)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) (107 Ill.2d R. 1-102(a)(5)); (b) Rule 6-101(a)(3) (neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him) (107 Ill.2d R. 6-101(a)(3)); (c) Rule 7-101(a)(1) (failure to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means) (107 Ill.2d R. 7-101(a)(1)); (d) Rule 7-101(a)(2) (failure to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services) (107 Ill.2d R. 7-101(a)(2)); (e) Rule 7-101(a)(3) (conduct which prejudiced or damaged a client during the course of the professional relationship) (107 Ill.2d R. 7-101(a)(3)); (f) Canon 9 (conduct which has the appearance of professional impropriety) (107 Ill.2d Canon 9); and (g) Supreme Court Rule 771 (conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or brings the courts or legal professions into disrepute) (107 Ill.2d R. 771).