Opinion ID: 199833
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Velez testimony.

Text: 49 At the November 19, 1999, suppression hearing, agent Velez testified that the time period during which he was able to observe Luciano at sea — that is, the elapsed time from when agent Velez turned on the spotlight to when the drug-importing speed boat rammed into the FURA vessel — was maybe two or three seconds. He said, more generally, that it was very fast. Defense counsel argues that this statement is inconsistent with Velez's testimony at trial that the same time period was [b]etween five and four seconds and that it wasn't more than five seconds. After counsel moved to admit the allegedly inconsistent prior statement as substantive evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) and the court deferred its determination of the motion, counsel said to Velez: Two or three seconds is what it took; isn't that so? Agent Velez responded by saying approximately, noting that he did not have a watch in his hand at the time of the incident, and then conceding that it could have been two or three seconds, as he had said at the suppression hearing. He reiterated that it all happened very quickly. The cross-examination then continued on the presumption that two to three seconds was the correct time estimate. 50 Ultimately, the court refused to instruct the jury that prior inconsistent statements could be used not just to impeach, but as substantive evidence. The court told defense counsel I will allow you to argue anything you want on the effect of the evidence and explained that defense counsel could develop any arguments he pleased on the basis of the discrepancy between the statements. 9 Counsel objected. 51 As to Velez's statement, we think Luciano's argument fails for a very simple reason. Agent Velez, at trial, adopted his allegedly inconsistent suppression hearing testimony when he affirmatively stated that the correct time could have been two or three seconds rather than five seconds. On these facts, there is no Rule 801(d)(1) issue, nor is there any hearsay issue at all, and thus there are no grounds for counsel to object to the district court's refusal to provide an 801(d)(1) instruction. See Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(1) advisory committee's note (If the witness admits on the stand that he made the statement and that it was true, he adopts the statement and there is no hearsay problem.); United States v. Klein, 488 F.2d 481, 483 (2d Cir.1973); 5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence, supra, at § 801.21[4] (If a witness, questioned about a prior statement, admits on the stand that he or she made the statement and acknowledges that it is true, the witness thereby adopts the prior statement as his or her testimony. This adoption by-passes the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1) and the entire hearsay problem.). 52