Opinion ID: 595542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appellant mark john lamere

Text: 62 Mark John Lamere was convicted solely on the basis of Count III of the indictment, which charged him with passing or attempting to pass a counterfeit one hundred dollar bill, with intent to defraud, on May 19, 1990. The district court applied the obstruction enhancement for Mark John Lamere's role in directing his brother to conceal the $39,600 in counterfeit currency found in the attic. Mr. Lamere contends that the obstruction enhancement was applied based on the concealment of the $39,600 in the attic, and that he was convicted of passing a single, and different, counterfeit one hundred dollar bill, an offense separate from and unrelated to the money found in the attic. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 directs that the obstruction must be related to the instant offense for the enhancement to apply. Under his interpretation, concealment of the $39,600 was unrelated to the offense for which he was convicted. He argues the concealed counterfeit notes were not material to the investigation, prosecution or sentencing on the single count of passing a counterfeit one hundred dollar, therefore, the district court's consideration of concealment of the $39,600, for obstruction purposes, amounted to an incorrect application of the Guidelines. We disagree. 63 Mark John Lamere contends that the $39,600 in counterfeit bills was not material to the investigation, prosecution or sentencing on the count of his conviction. The official investigation, in this case, began when Mark John Lamere was interviewed by the police on May 19, 1990, at the bar where he attempted to pass a counterfeit one hundred dollar bill. An increase for obstruction is properly applied for conduct that occurs during the investigation, prosecution or sentencing phases of the instant offense. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 890 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.1989) (giving false name to officer); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861, 110 S.Ct. 175, 107 L.Ed.2d 131 (1989) (hiding stolen credit card under seat of police car). 6 64 This Court has interpreted the phrase instant offense in U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to mean the offense of conviction. United States v. Dortch, 923 F.2d 629, 632 (8th Cir.1991). In Mark John Lamere's case, the offense of conviction was passing or attempting to pass a counterfeit one hundred dollar bill, with intent to defraud. Accordingly, we must determine if, by concealing the $39,600 in counterfeit currency, appellant obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with regard to the investigation, prosecution or sentencing on his conviction for passing the counterfeit one hundred dollar bill. The Application Notes to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 define obstructing conduct to include destroying or concealing or directing or procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding ..., or attempting to do so. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n. 3(d)) (emphasis added). 65 As our discussion in part II. of this opinion, supra, demonstrates, the $39,600 in counterfeit currency, which appellant sought to conceal, was particularly relevant to the sentencing proceedings in this matter. Additionally, on the single count of passing counterfeit, the government carried the burden of proving appellant's knowledge of the counterfeit character of the bill he attempted to pass, and that he had a general intent to defraud a third party or parties with the bill. United States v. Baker, 650 F.2d 936, 937 (8th Cir.1981). At the time of his arrest, Mark John Lamere claimed that his possession of the counterfeit bills was innocent; he asserted that he had received them in consideration for a Rolex watch he had sold the previous evening. Clearly, the $39,600, which appellant sought to conceal, was material to disproving his claim of innocent possession, as well as proving his intent to defraud by passing the bill at the Perimeter Bar. 7 66 We hold that the district did not err in its application of the two point obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to the sentence of Mark John Lamere. Accordingly, we AFFIRM that portion of the district court's decision.