Opinion ID: 1786407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the trial court erred in granting the widow statutory allowances and refusing to make such allowances to appellant, sandra price clark

Text: We really cannot say that appellants have demonstrated reversible error in the matter of statutory allowances. Appellants complained that the personal property had been undervalued. Testimony by one of them was to the effect that some property was not listed. Still the widow was entitled to dower in the personalty to the extent of one third. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 61-202 (Repl.1971). She valued the total at $327.50. As we understand the abstract of the record it appears that appellants claim the personal property had a value of approximately $2,345. Of this, Mrs. Price would have been entitled to $781.67 leaving only $1,563.33. The law governing widow's allowances at the time of Carrol Price's death allowed her all furniture, furnishings, appliances, implements and equipment reasonably necessary for family use and occupancy. Sec. 10, Act 255 of 1951. Again using appellants' values, these items would total some $1,590. She then would have been entitled to an additional $1,500 in personal property for herself and the minor children (Sec. 10, Act 255 of 1951), two of which were her own sons. Of course, some part of the allowances should have gone to appellant Sandra Price Clark, but it seems to us that those items to which the widow was entitled in her own right exceeded the total value of the personal property, even if we apply the values appellants would have us use. Of course, it is necessary that we reverse the orders and judgments of the probate court before us on this appeal, except as to the widow's rights in the personal property, and remand the case for further proceedings. In this connection it has become obvious that appellee is unsuitable for the discharge of the trust involved in acting as personal representative and that she has failed to perform duties required of her by law. Her unsuitability to act as personal representative is demonstrated by the fact that, as administratrix, she has persistently acted in the furtherance of her own interests in a manner to deprive her step-children of any benefits from their rights in their father's property and that she has been recalcitrant about compliance with her fiduciary responsibilities and the directions of the court. She has failed to file a satisfactory account, in spite of the fact that the probate judge admonished her about this some thirteen years ago. We do not see how this matter can ever be concluded as long as Mrs. Price remains as administratrix. We remand the case for further proceedings with instructions to the Probate Court of Pulaski County to remove Mrs. Price as administratrix of the estate. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 62-2203 (Repl.1971). Obviously, she cannot be allowed compensation in an indefinite amount by simply saying that her services are worth more than the heirs, collectively, are entitled to, as she persistently contends. Her entitlement to compensation is very questionable in view of Ark.Stat.Ann. § 62-2208, subd. c (Repl. 1971), the fact that the real property has not, (at least prior to the court's order of sale) become an asset in the hands of the personal representative, [See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 62-2401 (Repl.1971)] the fact that she has not been authorized to operate a business [See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 62-2410 (Repl.1971)], and the fact that she will receive and retain all the personal estate of the decedent. Nevertheless, the trial court has never made any determination as to the amount or elements of compensation of appellee, so this question may be determined upon remand. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion and with our opinion on the earlier appeal. BYRD, J., not participating.