Opinion ID: 172793
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Via Ineffective-Assistance Claim

Text: The theoretical basis for the assertion that raising an ineffective-assistance claim waives attorney-client privilege is the exception to the privilege that applies when a litigant chooses to place privileged communications directly in issue. The most straightforward application of this rule would be in the context of legal malpractice claims, in which the merits of the claim simply cannot be assessed without the revelation of otherwise-privileged communications. See Kenneth S. Broun, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 91.1 (6th ed. 2006) ([W]hen client and attorney become embroiled in a controversy between themselves, as in an action by the attorney for compensation or by the client for damages for the attorney's negligence, the seal is removed from the attorney's lips.). The same principle applies when a party interjects the `advice of counsel' as an essential element of a claim or defense. 1 McCormick § 93. In that circumstance, that party waives the privilege as to all advice received concerning the same subject matter. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized this rule for well over a century. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470-71, 9 S.Ct. 125, 32 L.Ed. 488 (1888) (When Mrs. Blackburn entered upon a line of defense which involved what transpired between herself and [her lawyer,] she waived her right to object to his giving his own account of the matter.). This circuit, as well, has acknowledged the implied waiver of attorney-client privilege that arises when a party puts his counsel's advice in issue. See Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir.1998) (surveying different approaches to determine when implied waiver arises). When a habeas petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, he puts communications between himself and his attorney directly in issue, and thus by implication waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to those communications. The Supreme Court's pathmarking ineffective-assistance case, Strickland v. Washington, itself hinted at this requirement. 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ([I]nquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's . . . litigation decisions.). Many of our sister circuits have recognized this rule. See, e.g., In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir.2005) (The implied waiver in habeas proceedings [is] the result of a petitioner's assertion of his own counsel's ineffectiveness.); Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 716 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (It has long been the rule in the federal courts that, where a habeas petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he waives the attorney-client privilege as to all communications with his allegedly ineffective lawyer.); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1178 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that by bringing an ineffective-assistance claim, § 2255 movant waives attorney-client privilege with respect to conversations that bare on strategic choices made during representation); Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir.1974) ([Attorney-client] privilege is waived when a client attacks his attorney's competence in giving legal advice, puts in issue that advice and ascribes a course of action to his attorney that raises the specter of ineffectiveness or incompetence.); Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir.1967) ([W]here, as here, the client alleges a breach of duty to him by the attorney, we have not the slightest scruple about deciding that he thereby waives the privilege as to all communications relevant to that issue.). The Ninth Circuit has also indicated that this rule applies as well to the attorney's work-product privilege. Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 722 n. 6. Further, numerous district courts, including district courts within this circuit, have noted the implied waiver of attorney-client privilege that arises when a prisoner claims ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, No. 09-CIV-105-JHP, 2009 WL 2982670, at  (E.D.Okla. Sept.11, 2009) (unpublished); Garcia v. Hartley, No. 07-CV-00781-CMA, 2009 WL 1392082, at  (D.Colo. May 15, 2009) (unpublished); Mower v. United States, No. 2:08-CV-5-TC, 2008 WL 2223200, at  (D.Utah May 27, 2008) (unpublished). Given the ample, unanimous federal authority on point, we hold that when a habeas petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel, he impliedly waives attorney-client privilege with respect to communications with his attorney necessary to prove or disprove his claim.