Opinion ID: 2616859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Karn Letter

Text: It is complained that during the State's cross-examination of Dr. William Pace, Associate Superintendent at the Wyoming State Hospital at Evanston, called as a witness for defendant, the State offered a letter written March 18, 1968  some two years before the trial  by the hospital's superintendent, Dr. Karn. More definitively it is said that: A portion of the letter indicated that, although the patient was medically psychotic and had been so for years   , Dr. Karn at that time believed appellant sane, and that at that time he believed appellant had been legally sane at the time the act was committed under his then understanding of the legal standards for determination of the question of insanity. This letter was admitted over appellant's objection    and despite the fact that Dr. Karn was the Supervisor of the State Hospital in Evanston at the time of the trial and was available to testify. Defendant then goes on to define hearsay, to discuss certain exceptions, and to insist both that Dr. Karn was available to the State and that the hearsay was admitted with no foundation in violation of defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. [2] He disregards or at least leaves out of consideration the fact that Dr. Pace, in reaching the conclusions he expressed as to the mental condition of defendant on the day of the murder, and testifying over the objection of the State on the ground of hearsay, specifically indicated his reliance upon the records of the Wyoming State Hospital compiled during the period from the date of defendant's first admittance. [3] Such records consisted of reports of the psychiatrist and physicians who had examined defendant, neurological consultations and psychological testing, social history, laboratory work, physicians' progress notes, nurses' notes, and correspondence regarding his situation from the time of his arrival. Dr. Karn's letter here in issue was the original report of the Wyoming State Hospital to the court on defendant's mental condition, a part of the records of the hospital on which Dr. Pace professed to have based his opinion, and was admissible under the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. [4] Morton v. Reynolds, Wyo., 428 P.2d 725, 731. In this context the letter was not hearsay evidence at all and authorities submitted on that subject are not germane. Even if we did not so consider and were to assume, arguendo, the hospital records to be hearsay and admitted by the trial court as an exception because the doctor's testimony was an institutional opinion, courts will not permit a device of this nature to be used as a method of stifling cross-examination. Vinicky v. Midland Mutual Cas. Ins. Co., 35 Wis.2d 246, 151 N.W.2d 77, 83. [5] For these reasons, the contention of error because Dr. Karn's letter was admitted and because Dr. Pace was cross-examined regarding the contents thereof has no validity. Defendant also argues that the trial court was inconsistent in allowing hearsay testimony of Dr. Karn's letter and sustaining an objection to a question asked Dr. Pace as to Dr. Karn's opinion. We have previously indicated the letter was not hearsay. Very different was the attempted presentation of Dr. Karn's reaction to Dr. Pace's conclusions by way of the statement sought from Dr. Pace  most clearly hearsay. Accordingly, there was no inconsistency.