Opinion ID: 42576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remand in Light of United States v. Booker

Text: 19 Garza argues that due process and ex post facto constitutional concerns require that a defendant who committed a crime prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Booker be sentenced only according to Justice Stevens' merits opinion and not Justice Breyer's remedy opinion. 23 Garza was sentenced to 360 months imprisonment in September 2004. Prior to his sentencing, Garza objected to the Presentence Report, which called for a sentence enhancement based upon obstruction of justice and being involved in a conspiracy involving 500 grams or more of cocaine and 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Garza argues that these enhancements were unconstitutional because he neither admitted to, nor did a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt, the specific quantity of drugs, or that he obstructed justice. The Presentence Report placed Garza in the sentencing range of 360 months to life imprisonment, and recommended 360 months. However, because Garza claims that the district court was prohibited from enhancing Garza's sentence based upon the above facts, Garza insists that the appropriate guideline range was 27-33 months of imprisonment. 20 In Booker, Justice Stevens wrote the merits opinion which concluded that the jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment apply to the federal sentencing guidelines. 24 Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that [a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 25 Justice Breyer wrote the remedies portion of the Booker opinion, in which the Court invalidated provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the federal sentencing guidelines mandatory. 26 The Court concluded that the sentencing guidelines are now advisory, which cures any Sixth Amendment problem. 27 21 Garza fails in his argument that, based on due process and ex post facto concerns, only the merits portion of Booker applies to his sentence. This Court has already rejected this ex post facto argument in United States v. Scroggins. 28 However, because Garza objected to his sentence enhancements before the district court, and those enhancements, based on facts not admitted to by Garza nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, were imposed under a mandatory sentencing scheme, Garza is entitled to have his sentence vacated and remanded, unless the error was harmless. 29 The burden of proof is on the Government to show that the error was harmless by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the sentence received. 30 The record reveals that, at sentencing, when the district judge sentenced Garza to 360 months imprisonment, he also orally imposed two alternative sentences in anticipation of Booker. First, the court imposed a discretionary alternative sentence the same as that imposed under the guidelines to become effective if the Supreme Court of the United States declares the United States Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional. 22 Second, the court imposed a further discretionary alternative sentence, the same as that imposed under the guidelines to become effective if the Supreme Court of the United States declares the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines constitutional but requires all facts used in enhancing the sentence under the sentencing guidelines to either be admitted — either admitted by the Defendant of found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 23 The district court's alternative sentences were not included in the written judgment but were made orally. [W]hen there is a conflict between a written sentence and an oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls. 31 However, if there is an ambiguity between the two sentences, the entire record must be examined to determine the district court's true intent. 32 In the case before us, there is an ambiguity in the oral pronouncement itself, and we cannot ascertain the district court's true intent from an examination of the record. 24 Keeping with this Circuit's precedent, the trigger for the first alternative sentence — the Guidelines being declared unconstitutional in their entirety — did not occur. Therefore, the first alternative sentence did not come into play. 33 With regard to the second alternative sentence, this Circuit has held in recent cases that similarly worded alternative sentences were ambiguous. 34 Similar to those cases, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district judge anticipated the remedial holding in Booker, such that he considered the Guidelines as one factor among others in determining Garza's sentence. 25 Criminal sentences must reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court to exclude any serious misapprehensions by those who must execute them. 35 Therefore, unclear or ambiguous sentences must be vacated and remanded for clarification in the interest of judicial economy and fairness to all concerned parties. 36 It is unclear whether the district judge anticipated that the Supreme Court would take the remedial measure of rendering the Guidelines advisory rather than completely invalidating them.