Opinion ID: 1479756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutional Right to Counsel of Choice; Relationship to Waiver of Effective Assistance of Counsel

Text: We next must address the government's contention that appellant could not waive his right to conflict-free counsel, given the facts of this case. The government argues that the conflict of interest created by Bar Counsel's investigation so threatened appellant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance that the trial court would have been required to reject the waiver alternative, even after full consideration, in order to protect the ends of public justice. Perez, 22 U.S. at 580. [22] While the government is correct in pointing out that the trial court has a serious and weighty responsibility to safeguard a criminal defendant's constitutional right to legal assistance which comports with at least the minimum level of competence consistent with our standards of the fair administration of justice, Monroe, 389 A.2d at 816 (citing McMann, 397 U.S. at 771, 90 S.Ct. at 1449), this is not the only right of constitutional dimension to be considered in determining whether rejection of the waiver alternative is necessary. Unlike the waiver of most constitutional rights, [23] the waiver of a criminal defendant's conflict-free counsel is buttressed by a constitutional right to retain counsel of one's own choice  a right independent of, and sometimes in collision with, one's right to effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, in determining whether a waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel was a possible alternative to a mistrial here, we must recognize that we are dealing not with a garden-variety case of waiver, ... but rather with a conflict of two constitutional rights, to wit, the right of a criminal defendant to be represented by counsel of his own choice and the right of such a defendant to counsel whose effectiveness is unimpaired by divided loyalty. United States v. Curcio (Curcio II), 694 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir.1982); see Lewis v. United States, 430 A.2d 528, 532-33 (D.C.) (per curiam) (Newman, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081, 102 S.Ct. 635, 70 L.Ed.2d 615 (1981). In order to resolve the conflict between these two rights, it is necessary to explore more fully the origins and the nature of the right to be represented by counsel of choice. Many courts have recognized that the right to retain counsel of choice deserves constitutional protection. Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C. 1978) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 58, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)); see, e.g., United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir.1982); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209-11 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 318 (1982); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56-57 (3d Cir.1979); United States v. Burton, 189 U.S.App.D.C. 327, 332, 584 F.2d 485, 490 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 837, 59 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104, 97 S.Ct. 1133, 51 L.Ed.2d 556 (1977); United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir.1976); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir.1975); United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988, 94 S.Ct. 2394, 40 L.Ed.2d 766 (1974). [24] Courts have looked at two related, but distinct, constitutional norms in formulating the basis for this protection. Most courts have held that an implied right to choose one's counsel is part and parcel of the right to the assistance of counsel expressly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Curcio II, 694 F.2d at 26; see Harling, 387 A.2d at 1104. These courts have reasoned, more specifically, that in light of the Anglo-American concept of the role of an attorney within our adversarial system of justice  i.e., attorneys serve as the personal agents of litigants, Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820 n. 16, 95 S.Ct. at 2534 n. 16, not as agents of the state  an implied right to select counsel free from undue interference by the court is an essential corollary of the express right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. A number of courts have recognized, in addition, that the right to counsel of choice is embodied within the more general Sixth Amendment due process right of a criminal defendant to decide, within limits, the type of defense he wishes to mount. Laura, 607 F.2d at 56; see Curcio II, 694 F.2d at 25; Garcia, 517 F.2d at 276-77 n. 3. Both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized the importance of permitting a defendant to make decisions central to the defense, Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 375 (D.C.1979); see Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818-35, 95 S.Ct. at 2532-41. [25] We find this constitutional basis for the right to counsel of choice to be particularly informative in determining whether a defendant may insist on waiving the right to conflict-free counsel. In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment contains an implied constitutional right to waive the assistance of counsel and to insist upon self-representation at trial. In discerning this right, the Court first looked to the plain language and the structure of the Sixth Amendment and concluded: [t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. 422 U.S. at 819, 95 S.Ct. at 2533. Simply put, [t]he right to defend is personal. Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540-41. Given this underlying constitutional concern for a defendant's right to control the defense personally, the Court held that the right to dispense with trial counsel and to represent oneself follows naturally. Although the right to self-representation is not literally expressed in the language of the Constitution, it is among those rights which are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process and is therefore properly accorded constitutional status. Id. at 819 & n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2533 & n. 15. The Court in Faretta was careful to stress that it in no way intended to diminish the importance of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, id. at 832-33, 95 S.Ct. at 2539-40, but instead was motivated by a firm conviction that the defendant  who, after all, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction  must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. [W]hatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice. Id. at 833-34, 95 S.Ct. at 2540 (footnote omitted). Moreover, even though the defendant may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of `that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1064-65, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). In Frendak, this court recognized that the teachings of Faretta have logical and compelling implications that reach beyond the context of the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Frendak required a trial court to accept a competent defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver of the insanity defense, holding that respect for a defendant's freedom as a person mandates that he or she be permitted to make fundamental decisions about the course of the proceedings. 408 A.2d at 376. This holding, like that in Faretta, reflects both a desire to avoid a rigidly paternalistic attitude toward a competent defendant's ability to determine his or her own best interests, [26] and an abiding respect for the individual dignity and free will of an accused that exists irrespective of whether the accused is likely to act so as to further the chances of an acquittal. See 408 A.2d at 376-78. Frendak therefore stands for the proposition that, at least under certain circumstances, a defendant's interest in controlling important defense decisions may outweigh society's interest in promoting some abstract concept of justice by ensuring that a defendant enjoys the full panoply of defense-oriented constitutional rights. 408 A.2d at 378. Because the selection of an attorney is often the most important decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense, Laura, 607 F.2d at 56, [27] we conclude that a defendant's choice of counsel is among the fundamental defense decisions constitutionally protected under Faretta and Frendak. This means that the constitutional status accorded the right to counsel of choice derives both from the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, see Harling, 387 A.2d at 1104, and from the right to make decisions central to the defense which is inherent in the structure of the Sixth Amendment and in our notions of due process under the Fifth Amendment. The right to be represented by counsel of choice, however, is not absolute. Although a defendant's decision to place his liberty and possibly his life in the hands of an attorney of his choice may not be lightly tampered with, Laura, 607 F.2d at 53, such a decision may be overridden in certain limited situations. See id.; United States v. Shepard, 675 F.2d 977, 980 (8th Cir.1982); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir.1982). Nonetheless, two types of restrictions substantially limit a trial court's discretion to disqualify a defendant's chosen counsel. First, there are procedural restrictions on a trial court's power to interfere with a defendant's selection of counsel. Before denying a defendant's request to waive effective assistance and proceed with representation by chosen counsel, a trial court ordinarily must hold a hearing to assess the extent of the attorney's ethical violation, the disruption or delay to courtroom procedures caused by unqualified representation, and whether the defendant's attempted waiver is made knowingly and intelligently. Lewis, 430 A.2d at 531 (citations omitted); see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 25, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1623, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (trial court has obligation to inquire into possible means of accommodating defendant's choice of counsel). Although a hearing may be dispensed with in certain rare cases, see Lewis, 430 A.2d at 531, a decision to reject a defendant's chosen counsel without findings or reasoned support will generally constitute error. See, e.g., Laura, 607 F.2d at 57-58. [28] Second, a trial court decision denying a defendant representation by counsel of choice will be proper only if motivated by certain legitimate concerns: [t]he only limitation that may be placed on the right to retained counsel of choice is that the client's selection not impede or disrupt the orderly administration of justice. Harling, 387 A.2d at 1104 (citation omitted); see United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.) (the right of an accused to choose his own counsel cannot be insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct reasonable and orderly court procedure), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986, 98 S.Ct. 613, 54 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977). Under this guideline, a court need not permit representation by a person who is not properly qualified to practice before it, [29] or by a qualified attorney whose conduct threatens to disrupt the orderly progress of the trial. [30] Nor does a court necessarily abuse its discretion by refusing to interrupt a trial or grant a motion for continuance to facilitate a defendant's choice of counsel. [31] Also, the orderly administration of justice may require that an attorney be disqualified to protect the legitimate interests of some person or party other than the defendant. For instance, a defendant's interest in retaining a particular attorney may be outweighed by the interests of one of that attorney's former clients who seeks disqualification to prevent the misuse or disclosure of confidential information. [32] A trial court, however, should not interfere with a defendant's choice of counsel solely for the purpose of protecting the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel  even when effective assistance is threatened by a conflict of interest. If the right to counsel of choice conflicts with the right of an attorney of undivided loyalty, the choice as to which right shall take precedence must be left to the defendant, properly informed of that choice. Cunningham, 672 F.2d at 1073; see Curcio II, 694 F.2d at 22, 25; Curcio I, 680 F.2d at 888; Garcia, 517 F.2d at 276-77; see also Agosto, 675 F.2d at 976 (although court questioned the advisability of defendant's choice of a counsel burdened by a conflict of interest, it reasoned that defendant was fully capable of making that choice; therefore waiver should not be rejected absent adequate reason). [33] Thus, as long as the conflict of interest will not impede the smooth progress of the trial, adversely affect the legitimate interests of third parties, or otherwise disrupt the orderly administration of justice, Harling, 387 A.2d at 1104, a trial court should not force a competent defendant to forego representation by counsel of choice, even when disqualification would further the court's perception of the defendant's best interest. [34] A contrary holding would be patronizing toward defendants and would rob them of their right to choose freely how to present themselves before the law. Not only would it subvert the principles of Faretta and Frendak, which underlie the right to counsel of choice, it would also stand the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance on its head by limiting a defendant's ability to make his or her own case at trial. See Adams, 317 U.S. at 279, 63 S.Ct. at 242 (What were contrived as protections for the accused should not be turned into fetters.). The record in this case provides no support for Judge Hannon's interference with appellant's counsel of choice. Appellant's complaints to Bar Counsel dealt with Kane's efforts to obtain appellant's pretrial release, and Judge Hannon specifically found that Kane's preparation for and performance at trial could not prevent his continued representation. See supra note 2. Nor is there evidence that Kane's continued representation of appellant would have disrupted the trial proceeding or threatened the interests of a third party. Moreover, aside from his repeated assertions that the Bar Counsel investigation made Kane's continued representation of appellant impossible, Judge Hannon made no findings and gave no reasoned explanation why a waiver of effective assistance was improper. Under those circumstances, we cannot conclude that the waiver alternative would have been inappropriate.