Opinion ID: 2745713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Goggans argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request that the District Court submit to the jury special interrogatories on the conspiracy count. His second claim alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. According to Goggans, special interrogatories were needed to determine whether he had conspired to commit the completed robberies, the attempted robbery, or both. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-part test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The first part of the Strickland test “requires [a] showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. The second part specifies that “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. “‘The purpose of the 4 Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.’” Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 107 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92). “Because under Strickland either prong can be dispositive, if we can conclude that there is no prejudice — i.e., that even if counsel had not failed in the ways alleged, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would be different — our analysis would be at an end.” Id. On direct appeal Goggans argued that the criminal course of conduct included in the conspiracy count and the attempted robbery count “were not only continuous but involve[d] the same attempted bank robbery.” (J.A. 1073). According to Goggans, “[a]ppellant’s second conviction under § 924(c)(1) . . . involve[d] the same predicate offense included under the first conviction under § 924(c)(1) . . . and, thus, should be vacated.” (Id. at 1074). This Court has already reviewed the issue presented here and affirmed the two § 924 convictions and sentences. As a result, we can find no prejudice resulting from either trial counsel’s or appellate counsel’s performance.