Opinion ID: 3171482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We review de novo whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Isnadin, 742 F.3d at 1303. “[We] consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 658 (11th Cir. 1990). “Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 5 In some of our severance cases, we have discussed whether evidence that was admitted at trial would have been admissible at a hypothetical severed trial. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1238 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that co-defendant’s statement would have been admissible in severed trial as co-conspirator’s statement). But even if the evidence would be inadmissible in such a trial, compelling prejudice does not necessarily result from a joined trial. United States v. Harper, 680 F.2d 731, 734 (11th Cir. 1982) (“admissibility is not required in order for the denial of severance to be within the district court’s discretion”). Here, Bowers never argued to the district court or on appeal that evidence from the other robberies would have been inadmissible at a severed trial. We therefore decline to engage in a lengthy hypothetical on this point. We note only that, in a hypothetical severed trial, under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), modus operandi evidence and other extrinsic evidence are admissible to prove identity, and a reasonable juror could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that Bowers committed the extrinsic robberies, thus permitting admission subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See United States v. Whatley, 719 F.3d 1206, 1217–19 (11th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 23 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 24 of 44 Further, “[i]t is not enough for a defendant to put forth a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, because the issue is not whether a jury reasonably could have acquitted but whether it reasonably could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Thompson, 473 F.3d 1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing MieresBorges, 919 F.2d at 656). Additionally, “no distinction is to be made between the weight given to either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d at 657 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir.1983)). But “[w]here the [G]overnment relies on circumstantial evidence, ‘reasonable inferences, and not mere speculation, must support the jury's verdict.’” United States v. Klopf, 423 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1994)).
Bowers challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the jury’s conviction on all sixteen counts. In particular, he disputes the sufficiency of the evidence identifying him as the perpetrator of the eight robberies. Below we consider Bowers’s challenge in two parts. First, we address whether there is sufficient evidence that the same individual committed the eight robberies in question, and, second, we discuss whether sufficient evidence identifies Bowers as that individual. We hold that a reasonable juror could have found beyond a reasonable 24 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 25 of 44 doubt that Bowers committed all eight robberies and found Bowers guilty on all sixteen counts. The evidence established that the eight robberies in question are sufficiently similar that a reasonable juror could conclude that each was committed by the same individual. We proceed from the general similarities to the most specific. The eight robberies were committed over six weeks between September 23, 2012 and November 4, 2012. The robberies were committed in Hernando, Hillsborough, and Pinellas Counties. All eight robberies were committed against fast food restaurants. More specifically, six of the eight robberies were against pizza restaurants, including the same Pizza Hut on two occasions. The robberies were all committed at night, with the six pizza restaurant robberies being particularly close in time—between 11:30 p.m. and 1:10 a.m. Moving to more specific instances of similarity, the witness descriptions of the perpetrator support the jury’s conclusion that the same individual committed all eight robberies. The robber was consistently described as an African-American male who was, for example, six-feet tall, a little bigger than 5'8, or between 5'8 and 5'10 tall. Regarding his weight, witnesses described him as “average weight,” “slender . . . weighing between 150 to 180 pounds,” and weighing more than one witness who was 130 pounds. The robber was described as wearing all black and a mask. The mask was variously described as a “ski mask,” “knit,” “wool,” or a 25 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 26 of 44 “beanie” that had been modified to have eye holes. 6 These descriptions were consistent with surveillance video and still photographs introduced from the Burger King and Wendy’s robberies that depicted a robber wearing a long-sleeved black shirt and a black mask with a white label on the back. Finally, and most importantly, the Government presented evidence of a unique method of entry that was consistent among the robberies. On most occasions, the robber approached the customer entry door and threw a brick or piece of concrete through the glass below the “push” bar. Once the lower glass was broken, the robber then entered by crouching and walking through the door, under the bar.7 Similarly, at the Papa John’s robbery, the robber threw a concrete paver through the store’s front window, adjacent to the entry door. Testimony by the BATF agent and another officer supported the conclusion that entry by breaking the glass of an entry door with a brick at an occupied or open business was unique to these robberies. 6 One witness described the robber as wearing a shirt wrapped across his face, but another witness from the same robbery described the same black knit mask consistent with the other robberies. The jury was free to credit the testimony of the latter witness. Additionally, some witnesses described the mask as having a hole for the mouth as well as the eyes. Given the other consistencies in the robberies, the jury could conclude that the witnesses’ memories of the mouth hole were faulty. In any event, taken in the light most favorable to the Government, such a minor inconsistency in the descriptions of the mask does not demonstrate a different perpetrator. 7 At the November 4 Pizza Hut robbery, the robber threw a brick through the lower glass, but, because the glass was only partially shattered, proceeded to enter by opening the door in the typical way. 26 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 27 of 44 There are, however, some inconsistencies between the robberies. Most notably, two robberies featured two perpetrators. During the October 7 Pizza Hut robbery, a store employee threw the restaurant’s deposit bag toward the entry door and a second robber reached from outside the door to retrieve it. And at the November 1 Burger King robbery, two people broke the glass door with a concrete block and robbed the restaurant. The Government, however, presented video and still pictures that showed a robber wearing a mask with a white label or tag at both the Burger King robbery, which two robbers committed, and the October 14 Wendy’s robbery, which one robber committed. A reasonable juror could conclude that this white-label robber was present at all eight robberies, even if joined by a second person for two robberies. Additionally, there are slight discrepancies between the witness descriptions regarding the gun used, the mask and other clothing worn, and the robber’s physical appearance. Those discrepancies are minor in nature and the jury was free to conclude that they resulted more from imperfect witness memories than from material differences in the robberies. Notwithstanding these differences, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a reasonable juror could conclude that the same person committed all eight robberies. That conclusion is supported by generally consistent witness descriptions, the similarity in the restaurants targeted, the 27 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 28 of 44 relative consistency in time of day, the short period of time during which all robberies were committed, the geographic proximity of the robberies, and the consistent method of entry. All told, the robber used a consistent and unique modus operandi in his commission of these robberies. Cf. Whatley, 719 F.3d at 1217–19 (discussing, in the context of admission of evidence, the similarity among robberies required to establish a modus operandi). The question then becomes, could a reasonable juror conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Bowers was the robber? Answering that question requires different evidence, which we now address. The primary evidence linking Bowers to the robberies includes: (1) DNA evidence from the Papa John’s robbery; (2) witness descriptions of the robber; (3) cell phone hit evidence; (4) Bowers’s own inculpatory statements; and (5) the similarity between green pavers near Bowers’s Tansboro Street residence and the one found at the Domino’s robbery. Perhaps the most important piece of evidence is the mask found at the first robbery. The mask was discovered approximately 150 yards from the entrance to the Papa John’s, around the corner of the small shopping center that included the Papa John’s, and close to a fence that divided the stores from nearby residences. The “mask” is actually a black wool cap that was modified to have eye holes and was apparently worn by pulling it over the perpetrator’s head and across his face, 28 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 29 of 44 at which point it resembled a ski mask. The modified cap found at the Papa John’s is consistent with witness descriptions of the “mask” used at the other robberies. An expert from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement testified that Bowers’s DNA is the “predominant” match with DNA found on the inside of the cap. As Bowers pointed out at trial, the expert could not conclude whether he wore the mask the night of the robbery. Nevertheless, as we discuss in more detail below, the presence of a cap possessing Bowers’s DNA that matches the description of the mask worn by the robber is circumstantial evidence that the jury may properly consider. Additionally, Bowers’s own body type was consistent with witness descriptions of the robber. Bowers’s driver’s license lists him as 5'10 tall. Surveillance footage of the Burger King and Wendy’s robberies shows a robber wearing a long-sleeved black shirt and a black mask with a white tag. According to the BATF agent’s testimony, that robber’s physical appearance resembles Bowers’s. Additionally, one witness testified that he could see that the robber had facial hair or a goatee and video and photographs from the Wendy’s robbery also showed what appeared to be the robber’s facial hair. In its order denying Bowers’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the district court observed that Bowers had a goatee that was consistent with the testimony and video. The jury also could observe Bowers’s goatee and physical appearance during the trial. 29 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 30 of 44 Additionally, the testimony of the BATF agent and the call logs introduced at trial place Bowers in relative proximity to each of the robberies. As an initial matter, substantial evidence supported Bowers’s possession of the MetroPCS Kyocera Domino cell phone during the relevant six-week period. See supra Part I.B.1. Testimony established that whenever an incoming or outgoing call is made on MetroPCS’s network, the cell phone “hits” a tower within two miles of the phone’s location. The testimony made clear that the cell phone only hits towers while a call is connected and not when it is merely on or, for instance, a call is made but not answered. The call logs and the agent’s testimony place Bowers’s cell phone and, by inference, Bowers in the general vicinity and often close proximity of the robberies. 8 Further, Bowers never hit a tower during a robbery, which is consistent with him not making or accepting any calls during the robberies. The most salient feature of the call logs is the relation between the timing of the hits and the distance from the robberies when they occurred. On each occasion, pre- and post-robbery hits are consistent with an inference that Bowers drove to and from the robbery. A jury could, of course, make a reasonable inference of innocence from these call logs. For instance, that no calls ever connected while the robberies were 8 For greater detail on the proximity of the cell tower hits from each robbery, see supra Parts I.B.2–9. 30 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 31 of 44 occurring could simply be a reflection of the short time the robberies took, rather than evidence that Bowers turned his cell phone off or refrained from placing calls during the robberies. Or, for another example, hitting towers in the Tampa area could reflect the realities of driving in a dense city with numerous towers where, at any given time, a driver could innocently drive by these restaurants. But we think the jury could infer the less innocent explanation that on eight separate occasions, late at night or in the early morning, Bowers was present at the robberies. 9 The remaining pieces of evidence corroborate the evidence already discussed. For one, Bowers’s text message suggests that he had enough money to rent a $1,000 per month apartment. Given that Bowers’s wage-and-earnings report indicates he made only $1,649.07 in the second and third quarters of 2012, the jury was free to infer that some of his extra money was derived from the six robberies that took place prior to the text message. Moreover, on multiple occasions Bowers attempted to hide his possession of his MetroPCS cell phone. This began, of course, by registering it under an alias rather than his full name and continued until he was arrested and directed others to turn off his phone. 9 Below we discuss how the cell tower hits and other evidence allow certain inferences to be drawn from the DNA evidence that may otherwise be impermissible. Similarly, the DNA evidence allows the jury to infer more from the cell tower hit evidence than would otherwise be permissible. As should be clear, this is not a case where the jury was presented with simply a suspicious correlation between cell tower hits and robbery locations. 31 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 32 of 44 Finally, one of the pavers used by the robber has a particular connection to Bowers. The perpetrator used a green paver to break the door of Domino’s Pizza on September 27, 2012. The BATF agent testified that the green paver had a “distinctive” appearance and that none like it was found near the Domino’s. There were, however, similar green pavers found at a residence approximately 150 yards from Bowers’s Tansboro Street residence. Bowers’s access to the unique kind of paver used at the Domino’s robbery permits the inference that he committed the robbery in question. Though not a particularly strong piece of evidence in its own right, it is part of the totality of evidence the jury could consider. No one piece of evidence discussed above is dispositive in this case. But courts instruct jurors to consider the totality of the evidence presented to determine a verdict. Conversely, courts instruct jurors not to improperly cumulate evidence. Said another way, courts instruct jurors to consider the totality of evidence related to each crime while not using guilt of one crime as a substitute for evidence on other charged crimes or using evidence related to one crime to convict on distinct, unrelated crimes. We are convinced the jury did the former and not one of the latter in this case. Considered in total and in the light most favorable to the Government, sufficient evidence identifies Bowers as committing the eight charged robberies. 32 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 33 of 44 Bowers’s contention related to the DNA evidence warrants further discussion. Bowers argues that reliance on the DNA evidence from the Papa John’s robbery requires an impermissible inference that, because his DNA was the predominant match on the mask, he therefore was wearing the mask on the night in question. In support, he cites United States v. Bonner, 648 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2011). In Bonner, two disguised men, one of whom was wearing a New York Yankees baseball hat, robbed a Subway. Id. at 211. Later that night, the police recovered a Yankees hat behind the Subway, which was identified as worn by the robber. Id. at 212. The Government argued that, because the defendant’s DNA was the “predominant” match on the hat, “it was reasonable for the jury to infer that he was wearing the hat on the night of the robbery.” Id. at 214. The DNA expert testified, however, that “he could not conclude who last wore the hat based on the DNA.” Id. The Fourth Circuit held that “any assumption that Bonner was the last wearer is an impermissible inference by the jury.” Id. 10 Three reasons 10 Other evidence was presented at trial, but was not discussed in detail by Bonner. The Fourth Circuit summarized the evidence as: (1) a hat with multiple DNA matches worn by Bonner was also worn by one of the robbers; (2) Bonner's wallet, discovered in the alleged getaway car; (3) phone records showing calls from Bonner's cell phone to [his girlfriend] and [his cousin] the night after the robbery; and (4) a separate phone record showing a call from a nearby gas station to [his girlfriend]. 33 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 34 of 44 supported that holding. First, equally plausible scientific inferences supported innocence. Id. at 214–15. Second, the argument that a jury could draw a scientific inference from the predominance of the defendant’s DNA to his wearing the Yankees hat that night was contrary to the evidence in the record. Id. at 215. And, finally, a commitment to scrutinizing forensic evidence counseled against allowing the jury to make an unsupported scientific inference. Id. To resolve this issue, we do not need to decide whether it is an impermissible scientific inference to infer that Bowers was wearing the mask the night of the Papa John’s robbery from only his DNA match, as the Fourth Circuit did in Bonner. Instead, we hold that, where modus operandi evidence supports the inference that the same individual committed multiple robberies, it is permissible Bonner, 648 F.3d at 214. The Fourth Circuit noted that the district court found that the content of the cell phone calls above was not in the record and therefore could have been innocuous. Id. at 213. Further, the district court discounted the evidence of the call from the gas station because the call was hours after the police dogs had tracked the scent from the Yankees hat to the station. Id. at 213–14. Besides recounting the district court’s views, the Fourth Circuit itself did not comment on the non-DNA evidence and its existence appears to not factor into the opinion’s reasoning. The Fourth Circuit possibly analyzed the case in this manner because the Government had explicitly argued that the scientific inference was a permissible one, notwithstanding the expert’s contrary testimony. Id. at 214 (“in this case, the government asked the jury to draw unwarranted inferences based on two unconnected pieces of scientific evidence through argument instead of specialized knowledge”). We think Bonner is best understood as resting on the permissible inferences that can be drawn from the DNA evidence standing alone. See id. at 215 (discussing three reasons that support the decision, all of which concern scientific evidence). Therefore, we limit our discussion on Bonner to the DNA evidence and the inferences that may be drawn from it. 34 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 35 of 44 to consider identity evidence from the other robberies, including, in this case, consistent physical descriptions and cell phone records, to corroborate the identity DNA evidence from an initial robbery. See United States v. Burston, 159 F.3d 1328 (where Government “presented evidence that the same modus operandi was used in [two] robberies . . . evidence of involvement in one provided some evidence of involvement in the other.”). In other words, the additional identity evidence from the other robberies transforms an impermissible scientific inference under Bonner (i.e., that the defendant was wearing the hat on the night of the robbery based on the predominance of his DNA), to a permissible one supported by identity evidence from other robberies with a consistent modus operandi. We acknowledge that this is a close case. It is a notably weaker case than United States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936 (11th Cir. 2009), for example, which Bowers attempted to distinguish at trial and on this appeal. 11 In Tate, the defendant was charged with five bank robberies. Id. at 939. Those robberies were connected by a 11 Bowers also cites and distinguishes the evidence found to be sufficient in United States v. Feliciano, 761 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2014). His reliance on Feliciano is unhelpful. In that case the defendant’s conviction on three robbery related offenses turned on the credibility of testimony by two alleged co-conspirators against him. Id. at 1206–07. Credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the jury, unless the testimony is “incredible as a matter of law.” Id. at 1206 (quoting United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999)). In Feliciano, direct testimony from two co-conspirators established that the defendant committed the robberies; the jury credited that testimony and found the defendant guilty. Id. at 1207. The instant case is not about credibility determinations; rather, it is about the reasonableness of juror inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. Feliciano therefore is so dissimilar as to be an unhelpful comparison for Bowers. 35 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 36 of 44 consistent modus operandi where the robber, dressed in sunglasses and a baseball hat, would hand the teller a withdrawal slip and demand money. Id. at 939–41. The defendant’s fingerprints were found on the withdrawal slips from the robberies. Id. at 944. Tellers from two of the banks testified that the defendant was the robber. Id. at 940–41, 944. The distinction between Tate and this case is the superior evidence presented in Tate that the defendant committed at least two of the robberies. From there, the jury was able to infer from modus operandi evidence that the defendant committed the other robberies as well. Id. at 945 (citing United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2001)). In Bowers’s case, the modus operandi evidence permits the jury to conclude that one person committed all eight robberies. That conclusion makes identity evidence from one robbery related to the other robberies. The relatedness of the identity evidence means that jurors may properly consider identity evidence from, for instance, the Papa John’s robbery to determine the identity of who robbed the Domino’s, and so on. The totality of the identity evidence presented in this case is sufficient to convict Bowers on all sixteen counts. Therefore, the district court’s denial of Bowers’s motion for judgment of acquittal is affirmed.