Opinion ID: 198025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Consent Decree Mandate Ruiz's Promotion?

Text: 23 It is undisputed that Defendants promoted Ruiz in genuine reliance on the district court's then outstanding decision interpreting certain consent decree requirements to apply to all promotions including lieutenants'. Although Defendants were following that judicial construction, Plaintiffs argue that Ruiz's promotion was not, in fact, required by the terms of the consent decree nor permitted under the Equal Protection Clause, which ensures that no state or local government shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 3 24 Defendants' first line of defense is the consent decree, which, through its invocation of the EEOC Guidelines, is argued to have mandated Ruiz's promotion. This is the first time we have reviewed the 1991 district court decision construing the consent decree so as to apply to lieutenant promotions. Plaintiff-Appellant Boston Police Superior Officers Federation earlier appealed from that ruling, but we dismissed the appeal as unripe. Massachusetts Ass'n of Afro-American Police, Inc. v. Boston Police Dep't, 973 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.1992). The challenge ripened into a justiciable controversy upon Defendants' promotion of Ruiz, allowing Plaintiffs to bring the instant action. A different district judge, from whom this appeal comes, then rejected Defendants' and the earlier court's reading of the decree, concluding that it did not require the BPD to promote Ruiz ahead of the individual Plaintiffs. 25 We affirm this latter interpretation. In our judgment, neither the original consent decree nor the 1991 amendment required the BPD to conform to the EEOC Guidelines in the promotion of lieutenants, as opposed to sergeants. The original decree stated that it concerned promotional tests for the purpose of selecting police officers for promotion. In context, police officers means not all officers--the decree refers to the set of all officers as sworn officers--but instead patrolmen, or those officers who might be elevated to sergeant. By contrast, the more encompassing term sworn officers appears only in the decree's statement of purpose. 26 Moreover, the decree's references to a specific rank are confined to promotions to sergeant. For instance, the decree provision mandating compliance with the EEOC Guidelines mentions only the sergeant position: The DPA will develop and administer a promotional examination and/or other selection procedure(s) for the position of police sergeant ... which will be validated in accordance with the Guidelines. Several other provisions regarding examinations and promotions refer specifically to the sergeant position and nowhere does the decree mention promotions to lieutenant. Most important, the decree expressly states: 27 To the extent that this action involved allegations of employment discrimination in promotion other than to the rank of sergeant ... such allegations are not resolved herein, nor are they intended to be, and they are in effect being voluntarily dismissed without any prejudice whatsoever. 28 This language disavows any intention to resolve discrimination allegations relative to others than sergeant. Consistently, the 1991 amendment, while providing generally that the BPD and the DPA would establish a significantly different selection procedure for all promotions, prescribes compliance with the Guidelines only in the case of sergeants. Agreement To Amend Consent Decree pp 5, 6. 29 Defendants point to a few isolated passages in the consent decree that are seemingly broader, including one providing that [p]romotional tests will be validated in accordance with the [Guidelines]. However, we believe it wrong to read the latter passage out of the context of the entire decree, which indicates that the promotional tests to which it refers are only those to the position of sergeant. For example, the decree speaks in the general terms of selecting police officers for promotion and any promotional test, without qualification when providing for Guidelines validation of the promotional tests. However, in the next few paragraphs, the decree describes the ranking of [p]ersons passing future validated tests--again with no qualification--before granting the BPD Commissioner power to make appointments to overcome any underutilization that may exist among sergeants  (emphasis added). And on the same page the decree provides that the DPA will be responsible for administering new tests for promotion to sergeant. As the decree contains no parallel provisions referring to positions other than sergeant, we believe that when the decree says promotions, it means only those to the position of sergeant. Looking at the entire decree, especially the passage expressly disclaiming any effect on positions other than sergeant, we view the decree's generally worded passages as reflecting an assumption that only sergeants' promotions were at issue, not an intent to modify the lieutenants' test. 30 Defendants' argument fares no better in light of the context that gave rise to the decree. The original suit alleged harm derived primarily from bias in entry-level hiring. To be sure, that hiring eventually impacts the higher ranks, see infra, but the decree itself evinced a concern with discrimination among the lower ranks. Had the parties meant to extend the decree's reach beyond the level of sergeant, they would have written it differently. 31 Defendants place great weight upon the interpretation of the consent decree given by the district court when approving the 1991 amendment to the decree. There, after pointing out that the class certified consisted of '[a]ll present and future black sworn officers in the Boston Police Department,'  the court rule[d] that the consent decree applies to promotional exams for all ranks of sworn police officers and concluded that the decree imposed conformity to the [EEOC] Guidelines and provision of training with respect to all promotional examinations. This was the interpretation of the amended decree under which the BPD acted when it promoted Ruiz ahead of the individual Plaintiff-Appellants. See note 3, supra. 32 Defendants argue that we should accord less weight to the subsequent interpretation by the district court below than to the views of the judge who earlier entered the order amending the consent decree. However, it was the parties, not the judge, who jointly drafted and proposed the 1991 amendment, and we find the text of the amended decree relatively clear on the point in issue. We conclude that it did not regulate promotions to the position of lieutenant. 33 Our reading also disposes of Defendants' related argument that this action is forbidden by § 108 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(1). That provision bars collateral attacks on judgments in federal employment discrimination cases by any person with actual notice of a judgment and a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order. Id. § 2000e-2(n)(1)(B)(i). However, this bar applies only if the challenged employment practice [ ] implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order [resolving a federal claim of employment discrimination]. Id. § 2000e-2(n)(1)(A). As the consent decree did not apply to promotions to lieutenant, Ruiz's promotion was not within the scope of a consent decree protected by § 108.