Opinion ID: 1580987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: did the advertisement expressly advocate a candidate's election or defeat?

Text: Peca has no quarrel with applying the express advocacy standard. He instead argues that the advertisement meets that standard because it directly advocated that viewers VOTE FOR HIS OPPONENT. On the other hand, the Osterbergs contend that the advertisement was not express advocacy because it had contradictory pleas for action. If the viewer agreed with one proposition, the ad urged the viewer to vote for Peca; if the viewer agreed with a different proposition, the ad urged the viewer to vote against Peca. Despite this contradictory plea, we hold that the advertisement taken as a whole constitutes express advocacy as a matter of law. In defining what constitutes express advocacy, Buckley recognized that the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42, 96 S.Ct. 612. Buckley therefore restricted express advocacy to spending that is unambiguously related to the campaign of a particular federal candidate. Id. at 80, 96 S.Ct. 612. It thus was limited to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as `vote for,' `elect,' `support,' `cast your ballot for,' `Smith for Congress,' `vote against,' `defeat,' `reject.' Id. at 44 n. 52, 96 S.Ct. 612. In Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court clarified that a message can be marginally less direct than the examples listed in Buckley so long as its essential nature goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral advocacy. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 249, 107 S.Ct. 616. Unfortunately, these descriptions in Buckley and Massachusetts Citizens for Life do not give unambiguous answers to the myriad situations that arise. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Paradise, 138 F.3d 1183, 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 873, 119 S.Ct. 172, 142 L.Ed.2d 140 (1998). Different federal courts of appeals and the Federal Election Commission have disagreed over whether communications that constitute express advocacy must contain certain magic words of advocacy akin to those listed in Buckley, or whether the communications should be judged as a whole and in context. See Thomas & Bowman, Is Soft Money Here to Stay Under the Magic Words Doctrine?, 10 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 33, 35 (1998); Hayward, Note, Stalking the Elusive Express Advocacy Standard, 10 J.L. & Pol. 51, 54-55, 62-69 (1993). This disagreement, however, has no bearing on our decision, because the Osterbergs' advertisement described Peca in its first screen, and then in its second screen exhorted, using words well within those Buckley listed, VOTE FOR HIS OPPONENT. The Osterbergs contend that the advertisement's first screen makes it ambiguous. That screen recites that Judge Peca was chosen by his peers El Paso's outstanding jurist, that he graduated Summa Cum Laude, and that he worked to reduce his docket over seven years, before saying IF THAT'S ENOUGH, VOTE FOR HIM. The Osterbergs argue that this is a contradictory plea for action that gives the advertisement several plausible meanings. They rely on Federal Election Commission v. National Organization for Women, in which the court held, Because the letters are suggestive of several plausible meanings, because there are numerous pleas for action, and because the types of action are varied and not entirely clear, NOW's letters fail the express advocacy test. 713 F.Supp. 428, 435 (D.D.C.1989). That case does not apply to the Osterbergs, because the court in National Organization for Women concluded that NOW's letters do not contain pointed exhortations to vote for or against particular persons. The three mailings include no explicit words directing the reader how to vote. Id. at 434. As opposed to NOW's mailings, the Osterbergs' advertisement cannot be regarded as a mere discussion of public issues that by their nature raise the names of certain politicians. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 249, 107 S.Ct. 616. The Osterbergs also argue that their advertisement does not meet the standard that the Ninth Circuit announced for express advocacy in Federal Election Commission v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850, 108 S.Ct. 151, 98 L.Ed.2d 106 (1987). In Furgatch, the court stated that to be express advocacy, a communication must, when read as a whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate.... [S]peech is express for present purposes if its message is unmistakable and unambiguous, suggestive of only one plausible meaning.... [S]peech may only be termed advocacy if it presents a clear plea for action, and thus speech that is merely informative is not covered by the Act. Finally, it must be clear what action is advocated. Speech cannot be express advocacy of the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate when reasonable minds could differ as to whether it encourages a vote for or against a candidate or encourages the reader to take some other kind of action. We emphasize that if any reasonable alternative reading of speech can be suggested, it cannot be express advocacy subject to the Act's disclosure requirements. Id. at 864. Admittedly, the Osterbergs' first screen does attribute some favorable qualifications to Peca. And then, in all capitals, it says, IF THAT'S ENOUGH, VOTE FOR HIM. But the advertisement's second screen renders it unmistakable and unambiguous, suggestive of only one plausible meaning. In all capitals, it directly advocates the viewer to BRING THE COURTHOUSE BACK TO THE PEOPLE, and VOTE FOR HIS OPPONENT, if the viewer wants someone who understands that the Courthouse exists for the people, and not for judges, accidents of politics, and lawyers; [t]he spirit of the law, not just the letter, must be employed for justice and the people; or [e]fficiency at the expense of justice cannot be tolerated. This admonishment reveals the essential nature of the advertisement. It goes beyond issue discussion to express electoral advocacy. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 249, 107 S.Ct. 616. The first screen's statement, IF THAT'S ENOUGH, VOTE FOR HIM, does not negate this essential nature. The first screen essentially tells voters that Peca's standards areaccording to Osterbergtoo low, and the second screen urges viewers to vote for what Osterberg considers to be higher standards by voting against Peca. As the court of appeals observed, The message is clear: credentials are not `enough,' and Peca does not understand that the courthouse exists for the people. 952 S.W.2d at 131. While the advertisement's strategy and efficacy are debatable, the fact that it constitutes express advocacy is not. Whether the advertisement is effective advocacy is of little consequence to the determination of whether it is express advocacy. The Osterbergs' advertisement is no less express and no less advocacy than the contradictory messages in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, which the Supreme Court held amounted to express advocacy. In that case, the advertisement included a disclaimer that read: This special election edition does not represent an endorsement of any particular candidate. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 243, 107 S.Ct. 616. The Court held that the disclaimer of endorsement cannot negate the fact that the communication's essential nature was express advocacy. Id. at 249, 107 S.Ct. 616. Like the communication in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the first screen in the Osterbergs' advertisement does not diminish its essential express advocacy nature. We therefore hold as a matter of law that the Osterbergs' advertisement was express advocacy and thus their expenditures were campaign expenditures.