Opinion ID: 4535378
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Record support

Text: Appellant opens his advocacy by suggesting that this Court disapprove the common pleas court’s factual finding that the prosecution’s mistakes were not made with the intent of depriving him of a fair trial, but with some lesser scienter such as gross negligence or possibly recklessness. Appellant’s argument is essentially that the types and combination of errors ultimately uncovered in this matter were so numerous and severe that they had to have been committed intentionally, and thus, we should reject the common pleas court’s contrary finding as clearly erroneous. See Brief for Appellant at 16-30. The Commonwealth’s failure to grasp, during the trial or the proceedings leading up to it, that there were two hats involved in this matter does appear to have been the result of an accumulation of a series of mistakes. Still, there is little in the record to suggest the prosecution was aware of these mistakes at the time they were made. Nor is there anything tending to reflect a conspiracy on the part of the various witnesses at the hearing in late 2015 and early 2016 to conceal any such awareness from the common pleas court. To the contrary, the mistakes, which even defense counsel did [J-65-2019] - 13 not notice notwithstanding the discrepancy in property receipt numbers, had their genesis in what appears to have been a highly unusual circumstance: a bystander – Debbie Williams – removed one of the hats from the crime scene after the shooting but before the police arrived, and then gave it to the assigned detective at the police station later that night.6 In ruling on Appellant’s motion to bar retrial, moreover, the common pleas court expressly considered the testimony of all the witnesses who were involved in some way with the original prosecution. This included, most notably, the testimony of the lead prosecuting attorney, Mr. Barry, in which he admitted that he had made several significant errors. See, e.g., N.T., Jan. 27, 2016, at 55 (“I should have noticed that the property receipts were different. That’s absolutely, 100 percent, my fault, and I should have caught that.”). The court credited the prosecutor’s description, including the clear implication that his errors were unintentional. See N.T., Mar. 3, 2016, at 37 (“I find [Mr. Barry’s] testimony to have been completely credible.”). A fact-finder who hears witness testimony first-hand is able to take into account not only the words that are spoken and transcribed, but the witnesses’ demeanor, tone of voice, mannerisms, and the like. See generally Daniels v. WCAB (Tristate Transp.), 574 Pa. 61, 76-77, 828 A.2d 1043, 1052 (2003) (listing other non-verbal cues that may 6 We are troubled that the lead crime scene investigator testified that he saw fresh drops of blood on the red cap when no blood was found on that hat. However, he did see a hat at the scene, he was informed prior to testifying by a forensic scientist that blood was found on “the hat,” and there is no suggestion he was aware that a hat with blood had been removed from the scene before he arrived. Thus, it is not entirely clear that the investigator’s testimony amounted to a conscious lie. As well, there is no indication that the Commonwealth’s attorney was aware that the testimony concerning the supposed fresh drops of blood on the red hat was false. Still, the investigator’s testimony is of some present significance, as explained below. [J-65-2019] - 14 be available to the first-hand observer (quoting Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 416, 383 A.2d 155, 168 (1978))). Accordingly, appellate courts, which must “rely[] upon a cold record,” Armbruster v. Horowitz, 572 Pa. 1, 10, 813 A.2d 698, 703 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), review deferentially the findings of fact reached by such individuals. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 612 Pa. 56, 81, 29 A.3d 1129, 1144 (2011) (observing that a fact-finder’s credibility determinations are to be upheld where there is adequate record support for them); see also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 614 Pa. 1, 27, 36 A.3d 24, 39 (2011).7 We do not mean to suggest that such review is blindly deferential, and hence, not all prosecutorial claims of inadvertence must be believed by appellate courts. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Virtu, 495 Pa. 59, 432 A.2d 198 (1981), a defense motion for a mistrial was granted after the Commonwealth called a defense-associated witness who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury. In a subsequent hearing on the defendant’s motion to bar retrial on doublejeopardy grounds, the prosecutor asserted that he did not realize the witness would do so, whereupon the common pleas court credited the prosecutor’s claim and denied the relief. On appeal, this Court found it clear from the record that the prosecutor’s assertion was untruthful and that he had acted in bad faith. See id. at 65 n.8, 432 A.2d at 201 n.8. For example, it was a matter of record that the Commonwealth’s attorney had previously lied to the trial judge at side-bar about whether the witness was the 7 In PennDOT v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989), the Court went so far as to suggest that, where the testimony of two witnesses is in conflict, a trial court’s credibility determinations made to resolve the conflict is entirely insulated from review. See id. at 248, 555 A.2d at 875 (expressing that issues of credibility and the resolution of conflicting evidence are left to the trial court and “not our appellate courts”). Even that precept has its limits, however, such as where the credited testimony is undeniably irrational or provably false. [J-65-2019] - 15 same person who had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights at a pre-trial suppression hearing. As well, the witness’s attorney had informed the prosecutor during trial that the witness would do so again if he was called to testify. Based on such factors, this Court ultimately reversed the trial court’s order denying the defense motion to bar retrial, and discharged the defendant due to the objective record evidence of prosecutorial bad faith. See id. at 70, 432 A.2d at 204. In the present matter, by contrast, the common pleas judge who ultimately denied the motion to bar retrial personally heard extensive testimony from numerous witnesses involved in the prosecution. Additionally, he actively questioned many of the witnesses himself. After that lengthy process was complete, and in consideration of all of the evidence, he credited the prosecutor’s testimony and found that the Commonwealth had not acted with the intent to deprive Appellant of a fair trial. Unlike in Virtu, there is no basis in the record to overturn the judge’s credibility determination or his ultimate factual finding concerning the Commonwealth’s motives. That being the case, the record support for the common pleas court’s credibility determination is the extensive testimony itself.