Opinion ID: 8312407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requested Inspection of Evidence Presented To Grand Jury

Text: With respect to the first proffered basis for inspection of the grand jury minutes, Agustin denies that he is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury, Def.'s Mot. GJ Inspection at 5; see Def.'s Reply Supp. Mot. In Camera Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes (Def.'s Reply Mot. GJ Inspection) at 1, ECF No. 132, but requests only that the Court inspect  what evidence was presented ... and take appropriate steps to ensure that the charge is not constructively amended at trial ..., Def.'s Mot. GJ Inspection at 5 (emphasis in original). He points out that: the last three alleged events do not support Count Two, since the December, 2009 evidence falls outside the two-year date range of the firearms charge; the September 2010 evidence amounts to an attempt, which is a theory that is not included in the Indictment; and the October 2013 evidence occurred after the Indictment had been returned on May 2, 2012. Id. at 4-5. Agustin concedes that more generalized testimony from cooperating witnesses about his possession of firearms in the course of drug trafficking activities would be sufficient to support the charge, but nonetheless urges inspection of the grand jury minutes apparently to ensure that such generalized evidence was, in fact, provided and to assess whether some undefined appropriate steps must be taken to avoid constructive amendment of the indictment at trial, with the concomitant risk of infecting the trial with reversible error, id. at 5, by supplement[ing] the factual basis of criminal liability at the trial, Def.'s Reply Mot. GJ Inspection at 2. At the outset, the government's response lacks any specific assurances about the evidence presented to the grand jury to support Count Two. Id. at 1 (noting that Government has [not] even offered an informal 'proffer' as to the evidentiary predicate for Count Two presented to the grand jury). Nevertheless, as Agustin concedes, the government had cooperating witnesses' testimony available in some form to present to the grand jury, and such evidence would be sufficient to support Count Two. Thus, despite his denial that he is challenging the sufficiency of the grand jury evidence, Agustin's request for in camera review of grand jury minutes to ascertain what evidence was presented to support the grand jury's finding of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the firearms offense charged, amounts to the same thing. Yet, the law is well-established that challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury are not permitted. See, e.g., United States v. Williams , 504 U.S. 36 , 54-66, 112 S.Ct. 1735 , 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992) ([I]t would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury institution' to permit an indictment to be challenged 'on the ground  that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury.) (quoting Costello v. United States , 350 U.S. 359 , 363-364, 76 S.Ct. 406 , 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) ); Bank of Nova Scotia , 487 U.S. at 261 , 108 S.Ct. 2369 (explaining a challenge to the reliability or competence of evidence presented to the grand jury will not be heard, and the mere fact that evidence itself is unreliable is not sufficient to require a dismissal of the indictment). This law reflects a long-established policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in the federal courts, United States v. Procter & Gamble Co. , 356 U.S. 677 , 681, 78 S.Ct. 983 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), and a presumption of regularity, with respect to grand jury proceedings, which generally may be dispelled only upon particularized proof of irregularities in the grand jury process, United States v. Mechanik , 475 U.S. 66 , 75, 106 S.Ct. 938 , 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986). Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e), grand jury materials are subject to disclosure when the defendant succeeds in carrying the heavy burden of showing that a particularized need exists that outweighs the policy of secrecy. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States , 360 U.S. 395 , 400, 79 S.Ct. 1237 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1323 (1959) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 399 , 79 S.Ct. 1237 (Petitioners concede, as they must, that any disclosure of grand jury minutes is covered by [ FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) ].) The Supreme Court has found this burden met where the Government concedes that the importance of preserving the secrecy of the grand jury minutes is minimal and also admits the persuasiveness of the arguments advanced in favor of disclosure. Dennis v. United States , 384 U.S. 855 , 871-72, 86 S.Ct. 1840 , 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966) ; see also De Binder v. United States , 292 F.2d 737 , 739 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (determining that defendant met burden for inspection of grand jury minutes where ample ground existed for suspicion of inconsistencies between grand jury and trial testimony of prosecution's sole, key, eyewitness). By contrast, where a defendant fails to provide a discrete reason, and instead relies on speculation or unsupported assumptions, courts have made clear that disclosure of grand jury minutes is not warranted. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble , 356 U.S. at 682-83 , 78 S.Ct. 983 (noting that defendants' showings fall short of proof that without the [grand jury] transcript a defense would be greatly prejudiced or that without reference to it an injustice would be done, and thus the case was not one of those cases of particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and limitedly); Jackson v. United States , 297 F.2d 195 , 197-98 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (explaining, after finding not the slightest evidence of inconsistency between witness's trial and grand jury testimony, that [i]f defendant's position is correct ... defense counsel in every case [might] be allowed to go upon a fishing expedition in the hope of developing something favorable to the defense); United States v. Borda , 905 F.Supp.2d 201 , 205 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding defendants did not demonstrate particular need for inspection of grand jury minutes where their assertions about misleading evidence were completely speculative and relied on a tenuous connection between an affidavit and testimony presented to the grand jury); United States v. Hernandez , No. CR-14-0120 EMC, 2015 WL 4498084 at , 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96402 at  (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2015) (finding, where [i]ndictment is sufficiently factually specific, defendants have no particularized need ... to obtain the grand jury transcripts so that they can 'confirm' that the grand jury did not pass on the factual allegations the Government intends to prove at trial).  Only in exceedingly rare cases are defendants able to make a factually based showing of particularized need for the production and inspection of grand jury materials. United States v. Naegele , 474 F.Supp.2d 9 , 10-11 (D.D.C. 2007) (allowing inspection of grand jury minutes because government misled the grand jury about the existence of a page of a document that had been the basis for [a]t least five counts of the original eleven-count indictment). In this case, Agustin contends that the grand jury minutes should be inspected to guard against any constructive amendment of the indictment stemming from variance between the evidence considered by the grand jury and the anticipated proof at trial. He speculates about what evidence was presented to the grand jury to raise a very real possibility that constructive amendment of the Indictment may occur. Def.'s Reply Mot. GJ Inspection at 1-2. While constructive amendment of an indictment violates the Fifth Amendment's presentment clause where substantial variance exists between the charging terms of the indictment left unaltered and evidence offered at trial prov[ing] facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment, Gaither v. United States , 413 F.2d 1061 , 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; see also Stirone v. United States , 361 U.S. 212 , 218, 80 S.Ct. 270 , 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) ([T]he basic protection the grand jury was designed to afford is defeated by a device or method which subjects the defendant to prosecution for [an offense] which the grand jury did not charge.), Agustin has not presented any sufficient reason, let alone a particularized need, to overcome the presumption against disclosure of the grand jury materials. Even if Agustin is correct that all of the evidence regarding the firearms charge that the government intends to introduce at trial was not presented to the grand jury, this does not amount to an improper variance of proof or demonstrate a particularized need for inspection of the evidence presented to the grand jury. As long as the defendant is on notice of the charges against him and the trial evidence does not alter an essential element of the charge, the law permits some variance in proof between the grand jury and at trial. United States v. Hitt , 249 F.3d 1010 , 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (permitting flexibility in proof at trial, where the defendant was given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial. (quoting Berger , 224 F.3d 107 , 117 (2d Cir. 2000) ); see United States v. Sitzmann , 74 F.Supp.3d 96 , 122 (D.D.C. 2014) ([W]here 'a generally framed indictment encompasses the specific legal theory or evidence used at trial, there is no constructive amendment.' ) (quoting United States v. Rigas , 490 F.3d 208 , 228 (2d Cr. 2007) ); accord United States v. Dowdell , 595 F.3d 50 , 68 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that, given notice of charge given to defendant, any variance in proof would have been a harmless one and not in violation of the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Wiley , 29 F.3d 345 , 352 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding where defendant was on notice before trial that the government intended to present certain evidence, any variance did not affect his substantial rights or cause actual prejudice). For instance, [t]here is no constructive amendment when a court 'admit[s] evidence of other criminal conduct that is inextricably intertwined with the charged offense or that completes the story of the charged offense.'  McClurge v. United States , No. 04 C 3628 , 2004 WL 2870072 at , 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25108 at  (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. King , 126 F.3d 987 , 995 (7th Cir. 1997) ). Thus, to the extent Agustin is concerned that the government will present at trial other crimes or intrinsic  evidence supporting Count Two that was not previously submitted to the grand jury, this additional proof does not amount to an improper variance and consequently does not warrant inspection of the grand jury minutes. Given the adequate notice of the firearms charge afforded to the defendants, see Apodaca II , --- F.Supp.3d at ----, 2017 WL 3575655 at , 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131617 at , and Agustin's failure to provide any actual particularized need for disclosure of grand jury materials, especially in light of his concession that cooperating witnesses may provide sufficient support for the charge against him, the first basis of his motion for inspection of grand jury minutes fails.