Opinion ID: 3159960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preponderance-of-Evidence Standard of Proof

Text: Mr. Walwyn objects to “any adjudication against him upon any standard of proof other than clear and convincing evidence.” He further asserts that Tennessee is among a minority of states that utilize the preponderance-of-evidence standard of proof and that this standard violates his due process rights. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 8.2 (requiring the Board to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence). Although Mr. Walwyn is correct that the majority of other states utilize the clear-and-convincing standard of proof, use of the preponderance-of-evidence standard did not deprive Mr. Walwyn of his right to due process. In Santosky v. Kramer, the United States Supreme Court determined that “in any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982). While this Court has not previously considered whether the balancing of those interests in attorney disciplinary proceedings requires adoption of an elevated standard of proof, several other jurisdictions have addressed this issue. In In re Barach, the United States Court of Appeals considered whether an attorney suspended by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court should receive reciprocal discipline in federal court. 540 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2008). Before the federal court, Mr. Barach argued that the preponderance-of-evidence standard of proof used in Massachusetts “rendered the state court proceedings fundamentally unfair, and, thus, violated his due process rights.” Id. at 85. In finding that Mr. Barach‟s due process rights had not been violated, the federal court weighed Mr. Barach‟s interests and those of the public at large, explaining: -22- Admittedly, the Due Process Clause applies to disciplinary proceedings. But the Due Process Clause does not demand that a state devise an ideal set of procedures for attorney discipline. It suffices to satisfy due process if a state adopts procedures that collectively ensure the fundamental fairness of the disciplinary proceedings. In other words, the Due Process Clause imposes a floor below which a state cannot descend, not a level of perfection that a state must achieve. We understand the importance of a lawyer‟s right to practice law and agree that, once granted, that right cannot be taken away in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Yet the Due Process Clause is flexible, and reasonable minds can differ as to the need for elevated levels of proof in particular situations. Viewed in this light, the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in bar disciplinary proceedings does not offend due process. After all, many types of important property rights typically rest, in contested proceedings, on proof by preponderant evidence. Moreover, other jurisdictions besides Massachusetts use a preponderance standard in attorney disciplinary matters. Although there is something to be said on policy grounds for requiring a more sturdy quantum of proof, the use of a preponderance standard is not so arbitrary or irrational as to render state disciplinary proceedings that use it fundamentally unfair. Id. at 85-86 (internal citations omitted); see also Disciplinary Matter Involving Walton, 676 P.2d 1078, 1085 (Alaska 1983) (“Under all of these circumstances, we are unwilling to hold that the risk of an incorrect factual determination in a bar disciplinary proceeding should be placed primarily on the public. Because there are substantial interest[s] on both sides, the risk of error should be borne equally. That is accomplished by use of the preponderance of the evidence standard. Due process demands no more.” (footnote omitted)); Ligon v. Newman, 231 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Ark. 2006) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer‟s assertion that the appropriate standard of proof should be clear-and-convincing evidence); In re McDonald, 162 S.W. 566, 567 (Ky. 1914) (upholding the preponderance-of-evidence standard and rejecting the lawyer‟s assertion that the standard should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Posler, 213 N.W.2d 133, 133-34 (Mich. 1973) (explaining that the preponderance-of-evidence standard has applied since March 1, 1970); In re Howard, 912 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Mo. 1995) (observing that the preponderance-of-evidence standard applies in disciplinary proceedings); Curtis v. Comm‟n for Lawyer Discipline, 20 S.W.3d 227, 230 n.1 (Tex. App. 2000) (recognizing that preponderance-of-evidence, not clearand-convincing evidence, is the burden of proof in an attorney disciplinary proceeding). -23- The reasoning of In re Barach is persuasive. We are mindful that attorneys are entitled to procedural due process and have an interest in avoiding suspension of their law licenses by which they earn their livelihood. Moncier v. Bd. of Prof‟l Responsibility, 406 S.W.3d 139, 156 (Tenn. 2013). However, we are equally mindful of the rights of Mr. Walwyn‟s clients and the public at large to ethical and diligent representation from lawyers licensed to practice in this state. This, too, is a weighty interest that must be protected.11 Weighing these interests, we conclude, as other courts addressing the appropriate standard of proof have concluded, that use of the preponderance-of-evidence standard satisfies Mr. Walwyn‟s right to procedural due process.12