Opinion ID: 1099739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecution's objection to defense counsel's questions to Watson designed to show his belief about his parole eligibility.

Text: ś 45. In their fifth and sixth issues, which will be combined in this opinion, the brothers complain that the prosecution misled the jury concerning Watson's plea agreement. In addition, the brothers assert that the jury was not fully informed of a potential reason for Watson to falsify testimony. The brothers base this assertion upon the sustained objection by the trial court of the defense counsel's question concerning whether Watson believed that he had to serve the full four years of the agreement. However, it is important to include the direct examination testimony as well. ś 46. On direct examination the prosecution questioned Watson concerning his plea agreement with the State. The following exchange occurred: Q. I believe my question was that you have previously pled guilty to a manslaughter charge in connection with the death of Rainey Pool? A. Right. Q. And as part of that plea, there's a sentencing recommendation for your truthful testimony that we would make to the Court; is that correct? A. Correct. ś 47. Watson's relevant testimony on cross-examination by the brothers' counsel is as follows: . . . . Q. Did you enter into a plea in this case? A. Yes, sir. Q. And that plea was for manslaughter? A. Right. . . . . Q. And you got manslaughter? A. I reckon I did. Q. What did they give you? How many years they give you? A. Ask my lawyer. Q. I'll ask you. Four years, right? A. Right. Q. That's true isn't it? A. Right. Q. I mean, you can flat time that in two years, can't you.? A. I don't know. The State: Your Honor, objectionâ Q. (By [defense counsel]) You can parole in one year, aren't you? The State: If we could object before he continues asking questions, we object. And the Court well knows nobody can predict what parole or probation eligibility is in any case. That's up to the Department of Corrections. The Court: The Objection is sustained. Q. (By [defense counsel]) Now, Doc and Charles went back into the place didn't they, in Jimmy's place that night? A. Oh, yeah. Q. That was after you kicked that man in the head? They went ahead of Dennis Newton, didn't they? A. I don't remember that. Q. You don't know. Now, I know that you have made a deal with the State to come up here to testify and save your neck, but I want you to tell this jury what you remember and what you don't. The State: Your Honor, and we would object to the argumentative tone of the question, to the phrase to save your neck. This man is going to do four years in the penitentiary at least. The Defense: Well, I object to counsel's observations. The Court: Objections'sâ The Defense: He objects to mine; I object to his. The Court: Objection's sustained. Rephrase your question. (emphasis added). ś 48. In his closing argument to the jury the prosecutor said, Certainly Joe Watson pled guilty to manslaughter. He didn't get off with anything. He's going to do four years in the penitentiary. (emphasis added). There was no objection to this closing statement by defense counsel. ś 49. The brothers cite many United States Supreme Court cases and various federal circuit cases for support. In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the credibility of a prosecution witness was instrumental in the case and that the jury was entitled to know of any agreements or understandings concerning future prosecution. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375,3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), the prosecution failed to disclose that two key witnesses had a contract for payment commensurate with the information provided against the defendant. The Supreme Court found that the witness had a motive to give false testimony since payment was contingent on the government being satisfied with the end result. Id. at 683, 105 S.Ct. 3375. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), a prosecutor's failure to give defense counsel a victim's arrest record where defense counsel failed to request nor did it rise to an inference of perjury, did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial as guaranteed by the due process clause. Id. However, the brothers cite this case for the holding that the prosecution cannot rely on evidence that is false or that the government should have known was false. Id. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791(1935)). ś 50. This Court, in Suan v. State, 511 So.2d 144, 147 (Miss.1987), has held the following: Evidence that a material witness has received favored treatment at the hands of law enforcement authorities, particularly where that witness is himself subject to prosecution, is probative of the witness' interest or bias and may be developed through cross-examination or otherwise presented to the jury. See Malone v. State, 486 So.2d 367, 368-69 (Miss.1986); Hall v. State, 476 So.2d 26, 28 (Miss.1985); Barnes v. State, 460 So.2d 126, 131 (Miss.1984); King v. State, 363 So.2d 269, 274 (Miss.1978); Sanders v. State, 352 So.2d 822, 824 (Miss.1977). This Court further held in Suan that: [O]ne accused of a crime has the right to broad and extensive cross-examination of the witnesses against him, and especially is this so with respect to the principal prosecution witness. See Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111 (Miss.1987); Miskelley v. State, 480 So.2d 1104, 1108-12 (Miss.1985); Myers v. State, 296 So.2d 695, 700 (Miss.1974). Not only is this right secured by our rules of evidence, see Rule 611(b), Miss.R.Evid., it is a function of the confrontation clauses of federal and state constitutions. Suan v. State, 511 So.2d at 148. ś 51. In the case sub judice, Watson actually entered a plea agreement of manslaughter with the State. The terms of the petition to enter plea of guilty was for the district attorney's office to recommend a 10 year sentence with 6 years suspended. The trial court accepted the plea of guilty and postponed sentencing until the October 1999 term of the Humphreys County Circuit Court. On January 3, 2000, Watson was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, six years suspended and 4 years to be served. ś 52. The testimony at trial revealed that Watson had a plea agreement with the State. Watson entered his guilty plea prior to the brothers' trial. The terms were disclosed to the jury. Watson's agreement to testify truthfully was disclosed on direct examination at trial. It was evident to the jury that Watson's manslaughter plea would give him a reduced sentence for his participation in Pool's death. Watson was a material witness, and the jury was aware that he received favored treatment at the hands of law enforcement authorities through disclosure of the plea agreement. The defense questioned Watson about the agreement and thus had the opportunity to probe into Watson's interest or bias in testifying at trial. Further, there was no known false testimony as to the terms of the plea agreement. The judge gave Watson a ten-year sentence with four years to serve. Whether Watson served four years as opposed to one year is inconsequential in the case before the Court. The jury was aware that Watson received favorable treatment from the prosecution via his plea agreement. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, these issues are without merit.