Opinion ID: 2246592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Aggravated Arson

Text: Defendant's sixth argument in this appeal relates again to his conviction for aggravated arson. Defendant contends that the State charged him only with committing arson knowing that Sophie Dudek was present and, because the evidence established that Ms. Dudek was dead at the time defendant started the fire, his conviction cannot stand because the statute only applies when a living person is present. We note first, as we stated earlier in this opinion, that defendant was charged generally with violating the aggravated arson statute and that this charge properly alleged that he committed arson when he should have known that other people were present. Although defendant has never challenged his indictment, we find that it was not unconstitutionally vague or duplicitous. Defendant was on notice that he was being charged with committing arson while he knew that Sophie Dudek was present or while he should have known that others were present. Defendant never sought a bill of particulars or challenged the substance of his indictment. He was convicted, moreover, on only one count of aggravated arson. See People v. Rentsch (1988), 167 Ill.App.3d 368, 371-73, 118 Ill. Dec. 145, 521 N.E.2d 213 (indictment that informs defendant of crimes charged and prevents double jeopardy is sufficient). The evidence in this case established that the Smialeks were, in fact, present when Thomas started the fire. Although itself not dispositive of the question of whether defendant should have known that other people were present, the evidence of the Smialeks' presence was certainly indicative of that conclusion. Other evidence established, moreover, that Thomas had previously worked in the building that he set on fire, and in similar buildings. We conclude, therefore, that defendant was properly charged with committing arson while he should have known that others were present and that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for aggravated arson. We are also unpersuaded by defendant's contention that one cannot commit aggravated arson if the person who the State alleges the defendant knew was present was in fact dead at the time he committed the arson. In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Wick (1985), 107 Ill.2d 62, 66, 89 Ill.Dec. 833, 481 N.E.2d 676 in which this court stated the following: No doubt the purpose of the portion of the aggravated-arson statute under which the defendant was charged (sec. 20-1.1(a)(3)) was to subject arsonists to a more severe penalty when their conduct results in personal injury to firemen or policemen than when it results in property damage only. Defendant, in the present case, was charged under a different portion of the statute than was the defendant in Wick. Here, defendant was charged with committing arson while he knew that Sophie Dudek was present and while he should have known that others were present. We think it is clear that this portion of the aggravated arson statute is designed to escalate the punishment for arsons committed when the defendant commits arson with the knowledge that someone is likely to get hurt or killed, and the portion of the statute in question in Wick was designed to escalate the punishment for arsons that actually cause injury or death. With regard to the portion of the statute in question here, we think it is immaterial whether Dudek was dead at the time of the arson. As we stated earlier, defendant was properly charged with and convicted of committing arson when he should have known that others were present. Defendant was also properly charged with committing arson knowing that Sophie Dudek was present. Although the evidence at trial established that she was probably dead when the fire was started, there is no indication that defendant knew she was dead when he set fire to the garage. Defendant's guilt of aggravated arson should not depend upon the happenstance of whether the decedent expired before or after the defendant struck the match. Dudek's death and the arson were both part of a closely related criminal episode. Whether she died shortly before or shortly after the fire was ignited is not material to the fulfillment of the purpose of the statute.