Opinion ID: 1426747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Exercise of Police Power

Text: The Ordinance must be a reasonable exercise of the County's police power in order to pass muster under article XI, section 11 of the state constitution. City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash.2d 583, 591, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996). A law is a reasonable regulation if it promotes public safety, health or welfare and bears a reasonable and substantial relation to accomplishing the purpose pursued. Montana, 129 Wash.2d at 592, 919 P.2d 1218; accord Thurston County Rental Owners Ass'n v. Thurston County, 85 Wash.App. 171, 181, 931 P.2d 208, review denied, 132 Wash.2d 1010, 940 P.2d 655 (1997). [T]he wisdom, necessity and expediency of the law are not for judicial determination, and an enactment may not be struck down as beyond the police power unless it is shown to be clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Homes Unlimited, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 154, 159, 579 P.2d 1331 (1978). In State ex rel. Faulk v. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash.2d 493, 816 P.2d 725 (1991), we announced a two-part test to be employed when determining the validity of a statute passed pursuant to the police power. First, the statute must promote the health, safety, peace, education, or welfare of the people. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash.2d at 504, 816 P.2d 725. Second, the requirements of the statute must bear some reasonable relationship to accomplishing the purpose underlying the statute. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash.2d at 504, 816 P.2d 725. The Ordinance indicates the ban on PWC is intended to prevent disruption to other vessels, swimmers and divers and the natural environment, prevent interference with the historical and current uses and enjoyment of the shoreline property, ensure the safety of destination commercial and recreational vessel traffic, protect wildlife and bird life, and further the tourism-based economy. See Ex. 249, at 8, 9 (Ordinance No. 3-1996). The plain language of article XI, section 11, which provides that counties may enact laws to promote peace, and safety, encompasses two of the objectives enumerated above. In State v. Satiacum, 50 Wash.2d 513, 520, 314 P.2d 400 (1957), we recognized that a plenary right is vested in the state under its police power to enact general laws for regulation and conservation of wildlife. Similarly, we found in CLEAN v. State, 130 Wash.2d 782, 806, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996), that the Legislature was within its purview in enacting legislation to improve[ ] the economy of the state ... and enhance[ ] the fabric of life. Thus, the ban does promote the purpose of the underlying statute. Once an ordinance is found to serve a legitimate public purpose, we examine whether the Ordinance uses means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose. Rivett v. City of Tacoma, 123 Wash.2d 573, 581, 870 P.2d 299 (1994) (quoting Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash.2d 320, 330, 787 P.2d 907 (1990)). A law must bear[ ] a reasonable and substantial relation to [6] or be reasonably necessary to protect [7] the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Respondents argue that `[c]ommunity displeasure,' `generalized complaints' or `public distaste for certain activities' cannot be the basis for governmental action. Br. of Resp'ts at 37 (citing Maranatha Mining, Inc. v. Pierce County, 59 Wash.App. 795, 804, 801 P.2d 985 (1990)). Respondents urge us to follow the reasoning of Steier v. Batavia Park Dist., 283 Ill.App.3d 968, 219 Ill.Dec. 327, 670 N.E.2d 1215 (1996), appeal denied, 171 Ill.2d 586, 222 Ill.Dec. 438, 677 N.E.2d 972 (1997), in which the Illinois Court of Appeals considered whether an ordinance prohibiting PWC from using a boat launch violated language in an Army Corps of Engineers' permit under which the launch had been constructed. In concluding the ban violated the permit's requirement that the city allow the full and free use by the public of all navigable waters at or adjacent to the [launch], [8] the Steier court stated: We recognize the defendant has a legitimate interest in preventing noise, wake, and wildlife problems. However, the Ordinance unreasonably singles out one type of watercraft in an effort to eliminate the deleterious effects that excessive noise and speed create. The problems of excessive noise and speed are not solely related to personal watercraft. We believe it is unreasonable to deny the use of the Batavia launch to users of personal watercraft and continue to allow all other watercraft of the same class to use the launch. Instead of singling out one type of watercraft, the defendant should enact appropriate ordinances which apply to all watercraft. The defendant has the right to regulate, but a regulation applies equally to all. Because the Ordinance singles out one type of watercraft, it is unreasonable and thus violates the permit issued by the Corps. Steier, 283 Ill.App.3d at 974, 219 Ill.Dec. 327, 670 N.E.2d 1215 (citations omitted). We find Steier unpersuasive. The issue there was whether the ban contradicted the Army Corps of Engineers' permit or violated a state statute that prohibited shut[ting] off the access to any public dock or landing thereon, [9] not whether the PWC ban was within the legislative police power. Moreover, San Juan County has determined that singling out PWC is, in fact, a logical distinction. Paragraphs 26 and 27 of the Ordinance state: 26. Existing regulations do not address the location o[r] operation of PWCs, nor do they deal with distances from machine to shoreline, speed zones, time of operation and operator safety training. The regulations also do not provide sufficient funding for enforcement, education and training. Existing laws present problems for enforcement, and create uncertainties with respect to the impact of the PWCs on marine sealife. 27. Although noise is regulated by RCW 88.12.085, that regulation does not address the cumulative noise of vessels operating in the same area, the annoying impact of vessels that are not destination-bound, and other noise characteristics unique to PWCs. Ex. 249, at 11 (Ordinance No. 3-1996). These and other findings set forth in the Ordinance indicate that the County determined PWC are distinguishable from other vessels and that banning them was the most prudent policy in light of the concerns enumerated. We believe a determination such as this is best left to a legislative body. If we accept the Board's conclusion that PWC are inherently distinguishable from other watercraft, then it logically follows that the ban is reasonable in light of the Ordinance's purported objectives. While replete with evidence of displeased citizens, the record also contains evidence of problems purportedly caused by PWC, including expert testimony regarding the harm such vessels cause to the marine environment. See, e.g., Ex. 216, at 2 (Letter from Richard Osborne, Curator of Science Services, The Whale Museum) (The ways which PWCs appear to be different from most other vessels include: 1) speed (up to 60 mph), 2) maneuverability, which facilitates erratic, unpredictable travel paths, 3) their function, or primary use, and 4) both air and underwater noise frequencies and amplitudes. All of these variables have implications in terms of their potential for impacting our water surface-dependent wildlife....); Ex. 216, at 4 (If PWCs were numerous in San Juan County waters they would logically present a negative impact to 49 species of seasonally resident marine birds and mammals); CP at 440 (declaration by University of Washington Zoology professor that San Juan County's ban on jetskis will promote the health and success of the seabird populations in the area); CP at 443, 444 (testimony of research wildlife biologist with National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration that PWC have a high potential for creating sounds aversive to both humans and mammals and pose a substantial risk of noise and visual disturbance to the marine mammals which reside in San Juan County). In sum, we find the Ordinance serves a legitimate public purpose, is supported by evidence, and is reasonable in light of the findings. Bans of PWC have been held reasonable in other jurisdictions. In Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass'n v. Department of Commerce, 48 F.3d 540 (D.C.Cir.1995), the court considered a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regulation that limited the use of PWC to 14 of the 4,000-square nautical miles that compose the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary. The Personal Watercraft Association had argued that treating PWC differently than all other vessels was arbitrary and unsupported by the factual record and, therefore, beyond the authority of NOAA, which is authorized to enact rules for the sanctuary that are necessary and reasonable. Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass'n, 48 F.3d at 544, 546. Nevertheless, the court concluded the regulation was not arbitrary and capricious: Maybe the presence of other vessels was a cause for concern; as we shall see, NOAA thought it might be. This scarcely means that NOAA had to regulate them if it was to do anything about thrill craft. An agency does not have to make progress on every front before it can make progress on any front. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., [509] U.S. [418], 434, 113 S.Ct. 2696, 2707, 125 L.Ed.2d 345 (1993). Agencies often must contend with matters of degree. Regulations, in other words, are not arbitrary just because they fail to regulate everything that could be thought to pose any sort of problem. Personal Watercraft Indus. Ass'n, 48 F.3d at 544. Although the Board's findings here are certainly debatable, it concluded that banning PWC was necessary to further a list of public interests. Support for this conclusion was provided by the testimony of business owners, wildlife experts, and other individuals. In determining whether ... particular legislation tends to promote the welfare of the people of the State of Washington, [the court] must presume that if a conceivable set of facts exists to justify the legislation, then those facts do exist and the legislation was passed with reference to those facts. State ex rel. Faulk v. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash.2d 493, 504, 816 P.2d 725 (1991) (citing State v. Conifer Enters., Inc., 82 Wash.2d 94, 97, 508 P.2d 149 (1973)). Many times we have noted our reluctance to substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature where there is competing expert testimony in the record. See State v. Dickamore, 22 Wash.App. 851, 855, 592 P.2d 681 (1979) ([S]o long as scientists disagree about the effect of marijuana, the legislature is free to adopt the opinions of those scientists who view marijuana as harmful. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the legislature where the statute in question bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose.); see also CLEAN, 130 Wash.2d at 806, 815, 928 P.2d 1054. In light of the evidence supporting the Board's findings, albeit contested by Respondents and their experts, and the Board's determination that PWC possess characteristics not shared by other watercraft, we are satisfied that the Ordinance constitutes a means reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate public purpose.