Opinion ID: 2266073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Atlantic's and Sobolewski's Appeal

Text: Atlantic and Sobolewski argue at some length and with great vigor that the trial justice improperly denied their new-trial motion. But after reviewing the record, we find no reversible error. The modern gospel in regard to a trial justice's duty in considering a new-trial motion is still to be found in Barbato v. Epstein, 97 R.I. 191, 196 A.2d 836 (1964). See Gordon v. Campanella Corp., 112 R.I. 417, 420, 311 A.2d 844, 847 (1973). Essentially the trial justice functions as a superjuror who, in light of the charge to the jury, can weigh the evidence, pass on credibility, and draw appropriate inferences therefrom. See Barbato, 97 R.I. at 193-94, 196 A.2d at 837 (using their independent judgments, trial justices can accept some or all of the evidence as having probative force, or they can reject some of the testimony because it is impeached or contradicted or because other circumstances make it inherently improbable). Once this evaluation is completed, the trial justice must select one of two choices. Relying on the evidence accepted and inferences drawn, the trial justice must decide[ ] whether to approve the verdict even against doubts as to its correctness because the evidence is nearly balanced, or is such that different minds can naturally and fairly come to different conclusions thereon; or, in the alternative, to set it aside when his [or her] judgment tells him [or her] that it is wrong because it fails to respond truly to the merits of the controversy and to administer substantial justice and is against the fair preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 194, 196 A.2d at 837. To comply with Barbato's mandate, a trial justice need not offer an extended dissertation of the evidence adduced at trial, see Gordon, 112 R.I. at 425, 311 A.2d at 849, but should provide enough reasoning so we can determine whether the decision was rationally premised. See Morinville v. Morinville, 116 R.I. 507, 511-12, 359 A.2d 48, 51 (1976). A trial justice who faithfully follows this approach will not be reversed unless a party convinces us that the justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. Fox v. Allstate Insurance Co., 425 A.2d 903, 907 (R.I. 1981) (quoting Galusha v. Carlson, 120 R.I. 204, 207, 386 A.2d 634, 635 (1978)); accord Gordon, 112 R.I. at 421, 311 A.2d at 847. And even if we conclude that the trial justice failed to undertake the required evidential scrutiny, we shall not cast aside the verdict if after looking at the record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, we find any competent evidence that sustains it. E.g., Fox, 425 A.2d at 907. Sobolewski and Atlantic assail the trial justice's decision to deny their new-trial motion on manifold grounds. Reduced to essentials, they argue that (1) the jury's award of only $18,902 against Long was inadequate given the plethora of testimony concerning his deceitful conduct and the damages Atlantic suffered as a result, (2) the imposition of a statutory penalty against Sobolewski for failing to produce corporate records was inconsistent with the jury's finding that Long had breached a fiduciary duty owed to Atlantic, and (3) the jury's verdict against Sobolewski personally on Long's stock-transfer claim was against the weight of the evidence and the applicable law. For the reasons set forth below, we find that these arguments are unconvincing. The trial justice engaged in a thorough analysis while fulfilling her role as the superjuror. After patiently listening to counsel, she duly reviewed the evidence and independently assessed the witnesses' credibility. She considered both sides, determined that reasonable minds could fairly come to different conclusions, said the jury's awards were not shocking, and denied the new-trial motion. Because she has touched the appropriate bases outlined in our cases, see, e.g., Barbato, 97 R.I. at 193-94, 196 A.2d at 837, justice need not offer an extended within the zone in which such a denial is permissible. And since we have not been convinced that she overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong her decision must stand For the reasons previously stated, the jury's award of $18,902 in Atlantic's favor, far from being inadequate, well exceeded what the evidence warranted. Moreover, Long's breach of fiduciary duty to Atlantic in 1987 did not relieve Sobolewski of his duty to produce corporate records upon receipt of a proper request from Long to do so. Given the jury's determination that Long was a minority stockholder of Atlantic at the time of the records demand and that Sobolewski's purported cancellation of this stock interest and his failure to transfer the stock to Long were in breach of his promise to do so, Sobolewski was under a legal duty to permit the records examination requested by Long if his request was made in good faith and for a proper purpose; in any event, Sobolewski was not excused from doing so merely because Long had previously breached his fiduciary duty to Atlantic. Any legitimate concerns that Atlantic and Sobolewski may have had about Long's good faith, the propriety of the purposes for his demand, or his potential misuse of such records to their competitive detriment should have been presented to a court for its consideration and possible entry of a protective order concerning such activity. But the jury was entitled to conclude that Sobolewski's potential defenses to this demand were unfounded and that he was not free simply to deny or to ignore the request with impunity. Sobolewski's third plaint is equally unavailing. The linchpin of his argument here is that the jury overlooked the fact that the earlier stock-transfer agreement had been superseded by an unsigned 1986 accord that canceled Long's right to certain shares. However, the jury apparently believed otherwise, as it was entitled to do, since this socalled accord was never signed by both parties, thereby evidencing the apparent lack of any meeting of the minds on any proposed modification of the original agreement. Sobolewski's fallback position is that he should not be held personally liable on the stock-transfer claim because Long failed to pierce Atlantic's corporate veil in prosecuting this charge. But there was no corporate veil to pierce or to lift: Sobolewski, as Atlantic's sole shareholder, owned or controlled all Atlantic stock. He even admitted at trial that it was his intention to give Long his shares of Atlantic's stock, thereby diminishing the amount of shares that he would be left owning. The jury was therefore entitled to conclude that Sobolewski had breached a personal contract between Long and himself qua Atlantic's sole shareholder to transfer a portion of the stock Sobolewski owned or controlled to Long. [8] And since we have not been persuaded that the trial justice overlooked relevant evidence on a critical issue or was otherwise clearly wrong, we cannot fault her for denying the new-trial motion.