Opinion ID: 588801
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sole Object Test

Text: 49 Appellants vigorously urge, however, that no fee award should have been allowed, as Domegan did not sue for nominal damages but for substantial compensatory and punitive damages. Relying on Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir.1991), cert. granted sub nom. Farrar v. Hobby, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1159, 117 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), appellants argue that Domegan's inability to establish an entitlement to compensatory or punitive damages required a determination that the nominal damage award represented de minimis success. 50 Appellants' contention runs counter to the formulation in Texas Teachers, 489 U.S. at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. at 1493, which precludes consideration of the degree of success in connection with the prevailing party test. de Jesus v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 918 F.2d 232, 234 (1st Cir.1990) (rejecting defendant's attempt to limit prevailing party status to plaintiffs whose damage awards closely approximate the sums sought). 26 In Estate of Farrar, 941 F.2d 1311, the Fifth Circuit did not conclude and, we submit, could not have concluded, in light of Carey and the congressional intent underlying section 1988, that a nominal damage award invariably constitutes de minimis success. Rather, the court held: when the sole object of a suit is to recover money damages, the recovery of one dollar is no victory under § 1988. Estate of Farrar, 941 F.2d at 1315 (emphasis added) (This was no struggle over constitutional principles. It was a damage suit and surely so since plaintiffs sought nothing more.). 27 51 Respectfully, we are unable to agree that a bona fide civil rights action converts to a mere damage suit simply by an adjustment to the ad damnum, particularly where the claim can (but need not) be brought only for nominal damages based on an alleged deprivation of an absolute constitutional right. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1053-54; see also Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544 n. 11. The present cause of action arose under the United States Constitution and was not converted into a mere tort claim for damages simply because Domegan demanded compensatory relief. 28 See also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96, 109 S.Ct. 939, 945, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (rejecting the notion that a civil rights action for damages constitutes nothing more than a private tort suit benefiting only the individual plaintiffs whose rights were violated) (quoting Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574, 106 S.Ct. at 2694 (plurality op.)). 52 Domegan did not deny culpability for the disciplinary charges which led to the AFP placement. Instead, he claimed that he was wrongfully placed and kept on the AFP without procedural due process. Accordingly, even if de facto isolation and an inadequate diet had caused provable injury amenable to monetary compensation, Domegan could not have established an entitlement to compensation for the substantive deprivation. 29 See Carey, 435 U.S. at 260, 263, 98 S.Ct. at 1050, 1052; Rodriguez de Quinonez v. Perez, 596 F.2d 486, 491 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840, 100 S.Ct. 78, 62 L.Ed.2d 51 (1979). The only wrong occasioned Domegan was the unconstitutional denial of his absolute right to procedural due process. Although a civil rights plaintiff may demand compensatory damages for mental and emotional distress resulting from a procedural due process deprivation, 30 see Carey, 435 U.S. at 263-64, 98 S.Ct. at 1052 (damages for mental and emotional distress); Maldonado Santiago v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 829 (1st Cir.1987) (same) (monetary damages are not presumed to flow from the violation). Carey, 435 U.S. at 260-64, 98 S.Ct. at 1050-52; id. at 263, 98 S.Ct. at 1052 ([W]here a deprivation is justified but procedures are deficient, whatever distress a person feels may be attributable to the justified deprivation rather than to deficiencies in procedure.). 31 53