Opinion ID: 1427111
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: orders set aside on appeal

Text: UP & L argues that I.C. §§ 61-624 and 61-629 give the PUC the authority to grant monetary relief to a utility when a PUC order is set aside by this Court on appeal. At the time relevant to this appeal I.C. § 61-629 provided in part: Upon the hearing the Supreme Court shall enter judgment, either affirming or setting aside the order of the commission. In case the order of the commission is set aside the commission, upon its own motion or upon motion of any of the parties, may alter or amend the order appealed from to meet the objections of the court in the manner prescribed in section 61-624. (Emphasis added.) [7] This provision permits the PUC to alter or amend the order appealed from but does not permit the PUC to alter or amend any other order, or to make any new order not within the purview of the Court's directions on remand. UP & L's petition, in addition to requesting that Order No. 13448, which had since been superseded by intervening PUC orders, be amended, also, in effect, requested the PUC to amend whatever rate order was then in effect in order to grant UP & L a surcharge. The relief requested by UP & L would not be the altering or amending of Order No. 13448 to meet the objections of the Court as set forth in UP & L I, supra, but would amount to the imposition of a surcharge which simply is not related to an amendment of Order No. 13448. UP & L argues that I.C. § 61-629 would lose its meaning and effect if it were concluded that no additional monetary awards could be collected as a result of an altered or amended order. It argues that the only way the amendment of the PUC's order to increase a rate base and rate of return to meet the Supreme Court's objections thereto can have any real meaning or practical effect is by allowing the collection of the additional revenue which would have flowed to it had there been a proper Order No. 13448 in the first instance. First, it must be noted that this Court in UP & L I, supra, did not order the PUC to alter or amend its order of September 29, 1977, nor did it order the PUC to grant UP & L a surcharge or other monetary relief. In fact, to do so was not within the range of our statutory prerogatives. [8] I.C. § 61-629 provided that the Supreme Court shall enter judgment, either affirming or setting aside the order of the commission. The Court's direction to the PUC in UP & L I was that provided by statute: The order of the Commission is set aside. 102 Idaho at 285, 629 P.2d at 681 (1981). Second, it is not for this Court to imply a term in the statute allowing the PUC to grant a surcharge when the legislature has not so provided, and this is especially so where the legislature has provided a means for obtaining monetary relief, i.e., compliance with the statutory stay and bond procedures. UP & L will not be heard to complain to this Court that it has no adequate remedy when a procedure has been specifically provided to obtain relief with which the utility has made no endeavor to comply. [9] Additionally, I.C. § 61-624 [10] limits the manner in which the PUC may alter or amend the order appealed from pursuant to I.C. § 61-629. This provision permits the PUC to amend or alter an order in a prospective manner only. Any order ... shall ... have the same effect as is herein provided for original orders or decisions, i.e., prospective effect only. I.C. § 61-624. See I.C. § 61-502. Therefore, an order by the PUC allowing UP & L to expand its rate base and its rate of return can be only of a prospective nature. The intent of the statute would be circumvented by a holding that would allow utilities to obtain a surcharge to make up past rate deficiencies on the premise that customers were only being surcharged prospectively.