Opinion ID: 70645
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the District Court comply with this Court's prior

Text: 33 mandate and with the jury findings from the Sec. 1983 trial? 34 Caban-Wheeler argues next that the District Court did not comply with this Court's decision in the first appeal in this case. This Court, in Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir.1990), remanded for a new trial, with the following mandates: 1) the court must address Caban-Wheeler's testimony that Ricks told her he wanted a Black person for the job, Id. at 1555; 2) the court must address Caban-Wheeler's seemingly plausible explanation as to why her actions did not involve insubordination, Id. at 1555-56; 3) the court must address Melba Hill's possible attempts to fabricate evidence to create the appearance of progressive discipline, Id. at 1556; and 4) the court must address the fact that Caban-Wheeler's termination occurred a mere five days after the hearing following her suspension and the fact that certain testimony from that hearing was erased. 35 The District Court addressed each of these issues in its Findings of Fact. 4 Just because the court ruled against Caban-Wheeler after considering those issues does not mean that it violated this Court's mandate. The District Court's factual findings on these matters were not clearly erroneous. 36 Caban-Wheeler also argues that the District Court was bound by any determinations the jury made regarding the Sec. 1983 claim, and that the court did not properly abide by the jury findings when deciding the Title VII claim. Specifically, Caban-Wheeler argues that the jury awarded punitive damages for her procedural due process claim, and so must have found malicious intent. 37 When a party has the right to a jury trial on an issue involved in a legal claim, the judge is of course bound by the jury's determination of that issue as it affects his disposition of an accompanying equitable claim. Lincoln v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 697 F.2d 928, 934, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983). A legal action under Sec. 1983 entails the right to a jury trial while an equitable action under Title VII 5 does not. Id. Thus the judge in this case, when deciding the Title VII claim, was bound by the jury's findings on the Sec. 1983 due process claims. 38 However, the judge's findings on the Title VII claim did not directly conflict with the jury's findings on the procedural due process claim. The jury instructions in this case authorized the jury to award punitive damages if the jurors found that the defendants had acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively. 6 The jury instructions defined a wanton act as an act done in reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference to, the rights of the injured person. Thus the jury may have found that the defendants acted recklessly in regard to Caban-Wheeler's procedural due process rights, but did not intentionally discriminate based on her race, sex, or national origin, as required by Title VII. The jury's finding that Caban-Wheeler's substantive due process rights were not violated supports this possibility. 39