Opinion ID: 2570544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusal of Juror M.M. for Cause

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a reliable penalty verdict (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.), as well as corresponding rights under the state Constitution, by sustaining the prosecutor's challenge for cause to Prospective Juror M.M. As we explain, the trial court did not err.
All prospective jurors were asked to fill out a written questionnaire. In a section entitled Opinions About the Death Penalty, the jurors were asked about their general feelings about capital punishment. Prospective Juror M.M. answered this question by writing: It hard to say to I hear the case. [ Sic. ] Although the questionnaire asked her to rate her support for the death penalty on a scale from one to 10, and to state whether her opinions about the death penalty would make it difficult for her to vote for either life or death, whether her views on the death penalty had changed over time, and whether she had any religious affiliations that would affect her ability to take a stance on the death penalty, she failed to provide any answers to these questions. Asked what she would do if defendant were convicted of a special circumstance murder, she declined to check the options that she would always vote for (a) death or (b) life imprisonment, and instead checked option (c), which stated that she would consider all the evidence and the jury instructions... and impose the penalty I personally feel is appropriate. She also affirmed that she would assume the penalty reached would be carried out. Asked whether death or life imprisonment was the more severe punishment, she wrote: It [is] hard to say. Following completion of the questionnaires, the trial court conducted voir dire of some of the prospective jurors. When the court questioned Prospective Juror M.M., she asserted there was nothing she wished to add to or subtract from her questionnaire. In response to pointed questioning, she agreed that death was a more severe penalty than life in prison, that she was neutral on the propriety of the death penalty, that she would not treat defendant any differently because he was African-American, that she could apply the law as instructed by the court, and that she did not have any religious objection to the death penalty. The discussion then took a surprising turn: THE COURT: I'm going to ask you the same questions I've been asking the other jurors. Let's assume for argument's sake that you've heard all the evidence in the guilt phasephase one where you're deciding did he or didn't he do the things he's charged with. The district attorney has put on sufficient evidence, and you believe that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree. Do you think you could convict him? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [M.M.]: Yes. THE COURT: Do you think you'd be tempted or would you refuse to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder just to stop yourself from having to go any further? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [M.M.]: No. THE COURT: Assume that there was sufficient evidence put on to show that the special circumstance[s] were true in the guilt phase. Do you think you'd be able to find that those were true? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [M.M.]: Yes. THE COURT: Or would you be tempted to vote that they were not true just to avoid the responsibility of jumping off the bungee jump and going into the penalty phase? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [M.M.]: No. THE COURT: All right. Do you think you'd automatically vote for life without possibility of parole in a penalty phase, if we got there, regardless of the evidence? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [M.M.]: Yes. THE COURT: You do ? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [M.M.]: Uh-huh. THE COURT: Automatically ? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [M.M.]: Uh-huh. THE COURT: So you are sufficiently against the death penalty that if you found him guilty of first degree murder with a special circumstance, we get to the penalty phase, it's basically over for you? You've already decided the penalty ? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [M.M.]: Uh-huh. THE COURT: Uh-huh, yes ? PROSPECTIVE JUROR [M.M.]: Yes. (Italics added.) The prosecutor later moved to exclude Prospective Juror M.M. for cause and the court agreed, noting that she said she'd automatically give life. As soon as she reached the penalty phase, it would be over for her. I'm prepared to excuse her. Defense counsel said he would not stipulate to her exclusion, arguing that he had not had a chance to question the juror and that he would like an opportunity to himself conduct a follow-up voir dire. When pressed by the trial court to explain what he would ask the juror, counsel replied: I'm not convinced that she understood exactly what the Court had asked her. I'd like to follow up and make sure that she completely understood that she has the option of making the decision, life or death. [¶] She was somewhat inconsistent in her responses. Initially she said she didn't have an opinion, but she ... did indicate ... that she could participate. THE COURT: No, she didn't. I did ask her several times, and I said, in other words, if we got to the penalty phase, and you had found him guilty of murder with a special circumstance, murder in the first degree, it would be over for you? She said it would be over, she'd always give life, she couldn't give death. The court then excused Prospective Juror M.M. for cause.
(1) The United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a trial by an impartial jury. As we have explained in numerous recent decisions in capital cases, [t]o achieve the constitutional imperative of impartiality, the law permits a prospective juror to be challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of or against capital punishment `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror' in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145]; see Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844].) `In many cases, a prospective juror's responses to questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or even conflicting. Given the juror's probable unfamiliarity with the complexity of the law, coupled with the stress and anxiety of being a prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation should be expected. Under such circumstances, we defer to the trial court's evaluation of a prospective juror's state of mind, and such evaluation is binding on appellate courts.' ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 696 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289].) `There is no requirement that a prospective juror's bias against the death penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity. [Citations.] Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the juror. [Citation.] Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court.' ( People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 497-498 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58].) (2) The United States Supreme Court has recently expounded on the propriety of deferring to a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause, explaining that the finding may be upheld even in the absence of clear statements from the juror that he or she is impaired because `many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakably clear; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.' [Citation.] Thus, when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror's statements, `the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman's] demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.' ( Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, ___ [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2223].) Accordingly, trial courts must, before trial, engage in a conscientious attempt to determine a prospective juror's views regarding capital punishment to ensure that any juror excused from jury service meets the constitutional standard, thus protecting an accused's right to a fair trial and an impartial jury. ( People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 963-968 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 75 P.3d 53].) In arguing the trial court abused its discretion by excusing Prospective Juror M.M., defendant focuses on the juror's written questionnaire answers and oral responses on voir dire, specifically that she rated her support for the death penalty as only a five on a scale of one to 10, that she was capable of voting to impose the death penalty if appropriate for the case, that she would not vote against a guilt or special circumstance verdict warranted by the evidence merely to avoid the penalty phase, and that she had no religious opposition to capital punishment. When asked whether it would be difficult for her to vote for the death penalty in a case such as the present one, she replied in the negative. We do not know how the juror appeared to the court when she made these affirmations, whether her demeanor suggested sincerity, dissimulation or merely confusion. We do know she appeared to change her mind during the course of the court's questioning, suddenly contradicting herself and informing the court that if defendant was convicted of first degree murder, she would automatically vote for a life sentence instead of the death penalty. The trial court, clearly surprised at her change of direction, followed up to make sure she had not merely misspoken. She had not. The court then asked her directly whether she was sufficiently against the death penalty that if she found defendant guilty of murder with special circumstances at the guilt phase, she would go no further, that the penalty determination was basically over for her, and that she had already decided the penalty. She agreed unequivocally. The trial court was in the best position to assess the juror's state of mind, based on her conflicting responses, her demeanor, her vocal inflection and other nonverbal cues. Even when `[t]he precise wording of the question asked of [the juror], and the answer [she] gave, do not by themselves compel the conclusion that [she] could not under any circumstance recommend the death penalty,' the need to defer to the trial court remains because so much may turn on a potential juror's demeanor. ( Uttecht v. Brown, supra, 551 U.S. at p. ___ [127 S.Ct. at p. 2223].) Faced with a conflict in the juror's responses, the trial court pursued the matter and the juror finally admitted she would not vote to impose the death penalty. Although defendant argues the juror's conflicting responses reflected simple confusion rather than a fluid and evolving position that coalesced to produce an anti-death-penalty epiphany, we are unable to resolve that point from the cold record and leave it to the trial court in the first instance to ascertain the juror's true state of mind. Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to permit defense counsel to ask the juror additional clarifying questions, but we reject the point. One can always argue further questioning might yield different and more favorable results, but that is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court. A trial court has the discretion to deny all questioning by counsel when a prospective juror gives `unequivocally disqualifying answer[s]' [citation], and may subject to reasonable limitation further voir dire of a juror who has expressed disqualifying answers [citations]. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 823 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2].) Sufficient evidence here supports the trial court's decision to terminate questioning, as the court had already considered the juror's questionnaire answers and her responses during voir dire. Moreover, the court asked her pointed questions when she equivocated, and it was within the court's discretion to conclude that further questioning would have been of little value. Certainly defense counsel did not identify any area of inquiry not already covered by the trial court. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion, nor violate defendant's constitutional rights, by excusing Prospective Juror M.M. for cause.