Opinion ID: 865287
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in admitting

Text: IMPERMISSIBLE HEARSAY. ¶23. Relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court, and reversal may be had only where that discretion has been abused. McIntosh v. State, 917 So. 2d 78, 82 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Price v. State, 898 So. 2d 641, 653 (Miss. 2005); White v. State, 742 So. 2d 1126, 1134 (Miss. 1999)). Furthermore, the trial court's discretion must be exercised within the scope of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and reversal will be appropriate only when an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused occurs. Id. (quoting Price, 898 So. 2d at 653; White, 742 So. 2d at 1134). A trial judge enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Unless the judge abuses this discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused, the Court will not reverse this ruling. Id. (quoting Price, 898 So. 2d at 653; Walker v. State, 878 So. 2d 913, 915 (Miss. 2004); Jefferson v. State, 818 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Miss. 2002)). ¶24. Wilson finds objectionable Harris’s testimony concerning what the three women were doing inside the store while he was outside the store, as well as Wilson’s knowledge of the overall plan to commit the crime of shoplifting. According to Wilson, this was improper testimony, to which Wilson’s counsel objected. Wilson argues in her brief to this Court: [T]he prosecution introduced no evidence whatsoever to show how Harris came to his conclusion about [Wilson]’s knowledge. For example, there is no evidence that the four discussed the plan while en route to Dillard’s. There is no evidence that Harris’ [sic] conclusion is based on anything other than unsupported opinion or that it was not derived from what someone else, rather than [Wilson], told him. 20 Thus, Wilson argues that Harris’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and that no hearsay exception exists to allow this testimony to be heard by the jury. Wilson further argues that this inadmissible hearsay testimony was so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial because the testimony was the only direct evidence of Wilson’s knowledge of and intent to shoplift. ¶25. We first note that while Wilson complains of Harris’s inability to see what the three women were doing inside the store since Harris was “outside” the store, the fact is that Harris was in the mall area looking back into the store. Just because Harris was not physically inside the store, Harris was not prevented from observing activity inside the store. We note a portion of Harris’s testimony, to which there was no objection: Q. Well, what did you observe [Wilson] doing?
Q. And, then, did what with the clothes? A. I don’t know what she did with them. She was just with the other girls pulling the clothes. Q. Did you see who put the clothes in the bag? A. No, because I was outside. From this testimony, the jury reasonably could have inferred from the evidence that Harris had at least some view of the activities occurring in the store. On the other hand, the record reveals that Harris testified on several occasions that he was not in the store, and thus he did not see the actions of any of the three females. However, the cold, hard facts are that when we consider Officer Wilson’s eye-witness testimony as to what he observed the suspects doing, including Christine Wilson, Harris’s testimony was cumulative, at best. The admissibility of evidence “is left to the sound discretion of the trial court within the boundaries of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence,” and on appeal, the trial court’s ruling on 21 the admissibility of evidence will not be deemed to be error unless the trial court has abused its discretion. Harris v. State, 861 So. 2d 1003, 1018 (Miss. 2003) Additionally, “[s]uch error will warrant reversal only when the abuse of discretion has resulted in prejudice to the accused.” Id. (citing Parker v. State, 606 So. 2d 1132, 1137-38 (Miss. 1992)). ¶26. Concerning the plan to shoplift, Harris testified, inter alia, over objection, that “[i]t was all our plan” to steal, that “[w]e all went to steal,” and that everybody in the car (including Wilson) knew about the plan “[b]ecause every - - everybody know [sic] that we work together like that, you know. They know - - they know [sic] exactly what we were going to the store to do. We wasn’t [sic] going to watch no movie.” We wasn’t [sic] going to buy nothing.” ¶27. In Williamson v. State, 512 So. 2d 868, 878-79 (Miss. 1987), we stated: In Peoples v. State, 501 So. 2d 424 (Miss. 1987), we again recognized that among co-conspirators there must be a recognition that they are entering into a common plan knowingly intending to further its common purpose. There need not be a formal or express agreement and the existence of any such agreement necessarily may be inferred from the circumstances, particularly the declarations, acts, and conduct of the alleged conspirator. Mere association with a conspirator is not enough -- there must exist some evidence that the defendant has associated himself with the venture in some fashion, participated in it as something that he wished to bring about, or sought by his actions to make it succeed. Peoples, 501 So. 2d at 428. One conspirator need not be aware of all the details of the conspiracy in order to be found to have agreed to participate in the conspiracy. U.S. v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849, 104 S. Ct. 157, 78 L. Ed. 2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1984). Once a conspiracy is established coconspirators [sic] statements made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against each conspirator, notwithstanding the confrontation clause or hearsay rule. Mitchell v. State, 495 So. 2d 5, 11 (Miss. 1986); see also, Miss. R. Evi[d]. 801(d)(2) (E). 22 Id. at 878-79. With this in mind, there was sufficient evidence in the record that a conspiracy to shoplift existed among Harris, Wilson and the other two females. From the evidence and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence, all viewed in the light most favorable to the State of Mississippi, the jury was informed that: (1) Wilson knew one of the other two females as Shameka; (2) on the day in question, Wilson was at Shameka’s house when they decided to go to the mall; (3) when they left in Shameka’s car headed to the mall, Shameka mentioned there were two friends (Harris and the other woman) who wanted to go to the mall with them; (4) Harris, Shameka, Wilson and the unknown female all went into Dillard’s; (5) according to Officer Wilson, all three females were gathering merchandise and carrying the merchandise to a common location in the store, and when Officer Wilson approached the four individuals, “they split up” with two of the females heading toward one door to the parking lot, and the male (Harris) and the other female (Wilson) heading out into the mall area; and (6) the bag carried out by Harris when he and Wilson exited the store contained stolen merchandise. ¶28. All testimony offered by Harris as to who knew what regarding the plan to shoplift, related to acts and conduct which occurred “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” at a time when Wilson, from the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, could be deemed to be a co-conspirator. Williamson, 512 So. 2d at 878. See also Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 845-47 (Miss. 2005). ¶29. With this having been said, we disagree with the State’s assertion that Harris’s “weall-went-to-steal” testimony was admissible under Mississippi Rules of Evidence 23 801(d)(2)(E), concerning statements by a co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. We emphasize here that Wilson offered a hearsay objection to Harris’s testimony that: “[i]t was all our plan” to steal, that “[w]e all went to steal,” and that everybody in the car knew about the plan “[b]ecause every - - everybody know [sic] that we work together like that, you know. They know - - they know [sic] exactly what we were going to the store to do. We wasn’t [sic] going to watch no movie.” We wasn’t [sic] going to buy nothing.” Simply stated, this testimony is not hearsay under Mississippi Rules of Evidence. 801(a)(1) or (2). Further, the evidence was both relevant and admissible under Mississippi Rules of Evidence 401, 402 and 403, so that the jury could consider this evidence along with the other evidence, including Officer Wilson’s eye-witness testimony as to what he personally observed the three women doing inside Dillard’s. ¶30. Based on these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Harris’s testimony as to the “plan to steal.” We thus find this issue to be without merit.