Opinion ID: 324542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claims Based on Newly Discovered Evidence and the Alleged Selective Prosecution.

Text: 7 McCord's motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence encompasses three general claims. First, he presents a straightforward claim that new evidence which bears on his guilt or innocence has been discovered and standing alone it justifies a new trial. Second, he claims that this new evidence was within the control of the prosecution 14 and thus he deserves a new trial under the principle of Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Third, he claims that the prosecution not only failed to disclose this evidence relevant to his guilt or innocence but actually used perjured testimony to obtain his conviction. 8 McCord points to four particular areas in which new evidence has been developed which could be relevant to his trial. First, McCord directs our attention to the fact that Jeb Magruder, deputy director of the Committee to Re-elect the President, and Herbert Porter, also associated with that Committee, have both admitted that they perjured themselves at McCord's trial when asked whether they authorized or had knowledge of McCord's illegal entry into the Democratic National Committee offices. Second, McCord notices that former Acting Director of the FBI, Patrick Gray, has admitted destroying materials relating to the authorization of the break-in and that certain persons, possibly including John Dean, Counsel to the President, destroyed the contents of coconspirator Howard Hunt's safe in the White House, material which also might be relevant to the authorization of the burglary. Third, new evidence has come forward concerning the role of Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy, co-conspirators with McCord in the Watergate entry, in the White House Special Investigations Unit, evidence allegedly relating to a domestic security justification for the Watergate break-in. Fourth, McCord claims there is other newly discovered evidence, largely on the various tape recordings of conversations between former President Richard Nixon and his subordinates, which directly implicates John Mitchell, former Attorney-General of the United States, and persons formerly in the White House in the authorization of the Watergate break-in. 9 McCord's claims relating to the existence of newly discovered evidence and the prosecution's failure to disclose that evidence are really two sides of the same coin and both may be disposed of by the same reasoning. Unless the newly discovered evidence not disclosed by the prosecution would create in either our minds or the minds of the jury 'a reasonable doubt about appellant's guilt', 15 neither the existence of newly discovered evidence nor the prosecution's failure to disclose it is grounds for a new trial. In McCord's case, this newly discovered evidence not disclosed by the prosecution is simply not relevant at all to the basic issue at his trial: did he or did he not break into the offices of the Democratic National Committee with the intent to install or remove wiretaps and in concert with other individuals. Indeed, the evidence on that issue is virtually conceded by McCord. The only possible issue in a new trial to which this newly discovered evidence could be relevant is a defense that McCord's actions were justified by his belief that the actions were authorized by the Attorney-General of the United States or the Counsel to the President of the United States. 16 10 Assuming arguendo, that a reasonable belief in authorization would be a defense to McCord's actions, we find that McCord may not raise this defense via coram nobis and we will not reach it on the basis of plain error. In regard to plain error, we find that the factual basis of McCord's claim is not established on the basis of the trial record 17 and therefore the trial judge was not in error in failing to raise the defense on his own motion. 18 And, as will be developed below, the newly discovered evidence relating to the defense is not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in either our minds or the minds of the jury about McCord's guilt. In regard to both the claim of plain error and the coram nobis petition, we note that a defense of belief in authorization, assumed for purposes of discussion, would in any event not be of constitutional magnitude 19 and therefore its nonassertion by itself does not seriously impair the judicial process or constitute an error automatically reviewable under principles of collateral relief. 20 Furthermore, McCord has presented us with no persuasive reasons why he did not assert this defense at trial such that his failure to so assert this defense should be excused. McCord is a well-trained, intelligent individual provided with competent counsel. 21 He was given a full and fair opportunity at trial to raise all his defenses. It is clear from McCord's own statements that he knew of the possibility of a defense of reasonable belief in authorization and of whatever facts there might be that would support such a claim. 22 Indeed, we would presume such knowledge from his allegation subscribed under oath that he did have a reasonable belief at the time of the break-in that his actions were authorized. 11 McCord's failure to raise the defense of authorization below is not excused by either the existence of newly discovered evidence or by the efforts of some government officials to coerce him to remain silent and plead guilty. Since the only relevant factual issue is whether McCord reasonably believed that he was acting pursuant to the authorization of the Attorney-General or Counsel to the President, 23 an issue which must be largely determined by reference to facts in McCord's possession at the time of his actions, newly discovered evidence could a fortiori have only a tangential relation to this central issue. The newly discovered evidence discussed above does provide much more evidence that McCord was reasonable in believing that his actions were authorized but no more evidence that he actually did believe that his actions were so authorized. This newly discovered evidence is, thus, merely cumulative to evidence that McCord possessed at the time of the burglary 24 and is not sufficient by itself to create in either our minds or the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt about McCord's guilt. 25 Our finding on this point also disposes of McCord's collateral contention that his failure to raise the defense below was excused by the prosecution's failure to disclose this newly discovered evidence at the time of the trial. 12 We furthermore find that the concerted pressures brought to bear on McCord do not justify his failure to even raise the defense of reasonable belief in authorization. McCord alleges that certain government officials offered him clemency and substantial cash payments to remain silent about the involvement of others in the authorization of the burglary or to plead guilty. McCord also alleges that his attorney took part in these efforts. Finally, mcCord alleges that even if these pressures were not sufficient to prevent his own waiver,  13 the pressures did affect the actions of co-conspirators Hunt, Liddy and the Cuban-Americans, thus making it difficult for McCord to assert the defense of authorization in face of denials by the other co-conspirators. The short answer to these contentions is the following statement made by McCord, under oath and after receiving the advice of counsel, before the Senate Watergate Committee: 'Well, I had many conversations with Mr. Alch (McCord's trial counsel) 14 about the facts in the case, and the other principals involved and the decision of mine as to when to come forward with the information which I did was basically my decision and it was a day at a time decision on my part as to when was the proper issuance time to tell the facts on this case.' 26 McCord did tell the facts of the case less than two months after the verdict in his trial in a letter to Judge Sirica and in May testified fully before the Senate Watergate Committee. 27 He did not plead guilty. There is uncontroverted evidence in the record that McCord never told his counsel that his actions were justified by his belief that those actions were authorized by the Attorney-General or Counsel to the President. 28 Furthermore, as is discussed in Part V below, there is insufficient evidence to even require a hearing as to whether McCord was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finally, the fact that other defendants might perjure themselves is an insufficient 15 justification for McCord's failure to even raise the defense when viewed in light of McCord's statements that the decision not to assert the defense was voluntary. If McCord had made any effort, however, slight, to raise this defense with his attorney or before the District Court, we might take a different view of the matter. Confronted with McCord's own lack of diligence 29 and his own statements that he was not coerced, we can only conclude that McCord knew full well the consequences of his failure to raise the defense and knowingly chose this course of action. We cannot excuse his failure to even raise the defense below and, therefore, no 'exceptional circumstances' exist to justify this Court in considering the defense at this time. 16 McCord's claim relating to perjury at his trial by Magruder and Porter stands on a different ground. That claim incorporates two principles: first, there is the principle of actual prejudice by reason of the use of the perjured testimony and second, there is the principle of a fair and honest criminal process. The first principle is not applicable to McCord's case for the reasons discussed above. Even if Magruder and Porter had testified truthfully about their part in the authorization or their knowledge of the break-in, we still would not have a reasonable doubt about McCord's guilt. 30 The second principle is discussed in Part IV below and we postpone our discussion of that principle until that section of the opinion. 17 We also find that McCord deliberately by-passed his remedies at trial and thereby waived his selective prosecution claim. The claim is that the government has arbitrarily chosen to prosecute only private citizens for violations of the anti-wiretapping laws while not prosecuting government agents who violate the same laws. Alternatively, McCord argues that he was in fact a government agent and that he is the first and only government agent to be prosecuted under the anti-wiretapping laws. McCord does not allege that he did not know of this defense at the time of his trial, yet he did not assert it. Since all the facts upon which this defense is based were known to McCord at trial, he cannot claim that newly discovered evidence has prompted him to raise the defense now. McCord, as was stated above, was given a full and fair opportunity at trial to raise all his defenses. The only real reason McCord offers for this failure to raise the defense below concerns the alleged disloyalty of his counsel. However, McCord has not alleged facts sufficient to even require a hearing into his allegations of disloyalty. 31 Finally, the applicability of the defense to the facts of this very extraordinary crime is doubtful, to say the least. 32 While we will not infer a deliberate by-pass or waiver of remedies at trial from a silent record, this record conclusively demonstrates that McCord knew of the defense and intelligently chose not to assert it. There is thus no plain error in the failure of the District Court to consider the matter on its own motion. 18 III. Claims Relating to Judge Sirica's Conduct of the Trial 19 McCord seeks a new trial because, he claims, Judge Sirica exhibited a bias in favor of the prosecution and generally assumed an inquisitorial role in the conduct of the trial. 33 While McCord does not specify any particular incidents of bias or inquisitorial attitude, 34 a thorough search of the record reveals the following significant events at trial which arguably could fall within that description. 35 First, Judge Sirica agressively examined Hugh Sloan, Treasurer of the Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President, outside the presence of the jury as to the amounts of money given to McCord's co-defendant, G. Gordon Liddy and, particularly, why part of it was laundered through Mexican banks. Second, Judge Sirica then read to the jury a transcript of his examination of Sloan which included a bench conference with McCord's attorneys. This examination reflected poorly on Sloan's credibility and indirectly called into question the testimony of Magruder and Porter. 36 Judge Sirica also interrupted the closing argument of Liddy's counsel to challenge the statement that 'it is conceded' that witnesses Magruder, Sloan, Porter and Odle, another functionary in the Committee to Re-elect the President, are 'on the safe side of innocence.' Judge Sirica conducted outside the presence of the jury an extensive examination of Hunt and the Cuban-American defendants as to the reasons for their guilty pleas and refused to accept a plea to anything less than all the charges. Finally, during sentencing Judge Sirica indicated that full co-operation with the prosecution might result in lighter sentences. 20 A superficial review of these events might support the inference that at least Judge Sirica communicated an appearance of inquisitorial attitude inconsistent with notions of a fair trial. 37 However, such a view assumes an exceedingly narrow interpretation of the responsibilities of a trial judge. No judge should remain aloof while the prosecution ignores important evidence or, indeed, while the defense fails to explore testimony central to the issues at trial or fails to raise defenses which may exonerate the accused. 38 The judge, like the prosecutor in this respect, 39 is not a passive by-stander in the arena of justice, a spectator at a 'sporting event;' 40 rather he or she has the most pressing affirmative responsibility to see that justice is done in every case. 41 There are, to be sure, strict limits on the judge's power to intervene in the conduct of the trial, particularly in the examination of witnesses and the order of presentation of evidence. 42 These limits are premised on the primary role of counsel in the formulation of trial strategy 43 and on the rule that the judge should not communicate to the jury an opinion on the guilt or innocence of the accused. 44 When a trial judge intervenes in the conduct of a trial, we must determine whether the intervention is in pursuit of justice and whether that intervention is consistent with the premises of the limits on intervention. 21 Judge Sirica's conduct of McCord's trial was consonant with these standards. Concerning the reading of Sloan's testimony, we have held in a companion case involving McCord's co-conspirator, Gordon Liddy, that the reading of Sloan's testimony and the examination that preceded it were a proper exercise of the judicial function. United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, at 104--109, 509 F.2d 428, at 437--442 (1974). The examination of the Cuban-Americans and Hunt as to their guilty pleas was undertaken outside the presence of the jury and thus could not have prejudiced the jury's deliberations on McCord's guilt. The statements made by Judge Sirica during sentencing, of course, could not have prejudiced the jury since it had been dismissed. Judge Sirica's interruption of Liddy's closing argument was justified since Liddy had stated a conclusion that nowhere appeared in the record; 45 Judge Sirica did not express an opinion on that conclusion but merely asked whether it had been conceded by the prosecution as Liddy had claimed. In sum, there was no prejudice to McCord by reason of Judge Sirica's conduct of the trial. McCord's contention that he deserves a new trial on that ground is without merit. 22