Opinion ID: 1952246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Procurement Practices Act

Text: Francis begins, properly, with the Procurement Practices Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-1181.1 to -1192.6. She points specifically to § 1-1189.5(b), which provides in part: If the Director [of the Department of Administrative Services (DAS)] determines that an appeal should be taken, the Director, with the prior approval of the Corporation Counsel, may appeal the Board's decision to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.... This language would appear to reserve to DAS the exclusive right to seek judicial review of CAB decisions. Francis maintains, however, that our decision in Jones & Artis eliminated this exclusive arrangement by assigning appeals of bid protests to the Superior Court. Francis specifically argues, initially, that someone must have the right to appeal a bid protest to the Superior Court on behalf of the District; failure to permit that would contravene the pre- Jones & Artis meaning of § 1-1189.5(b) and give contractors an unfair advantage over the District. Cf. United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426, 430-32, 69 S.Ct. 1410, 1413-14, 93 L.Ed. 1451 (1949) (holding that United States as shipper does not have fewer rights than private commercial shipper and can seek judicial review of I.C.C. decision). [10] Francis then makes her fundamental point: while DAS may have the sole authority to appeal a CAB decision to the Court of Appeals, [t]he Procurement Act is silent about who can bring an action in the Superior Court. Because of this legislative silence, Francis finds it logical to look at the actual interests involved and concludes that she is the real party in interest entitled to bring such an action. While we agree that the District has authority to appeal a CAB bid protest decision, we see no reason to believe that the Procurement Practices Act leaves room for anyone other than DAS to do so. In the first place, because DPW is not sui juris, Francis cannot bring this suit on behalf of DPW without legislative authorization found somewhere. To hold, as Francis apparently would have us, that any governmental entity with an interest can file suit on behalf of the District, unless the Council has positively forbidden it to do so, would violate the fundamental requirements of standing to sue. More specifically, even if Francis, as DPW Director or contracting officer  embodying the District's interests  can be shown, by virtue of the CAB's decision in favor of RSI, to have suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1160 (D.C.1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), and can be said to fall within the zone of interests protected by the Procurement Practices Act, see GIA, 633 A.2d at 17  propositions that are dubious at best  she still cannot claim standing to sue if there is a clear legislative intent to withhold judicial review by placing that right in another. See id. (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)). Furthermore, our decision in Jones & Artis dealt strictly with choice of forum. Nothing in that opinion, and certainly nothing in the statute itself, suggests that the Council intended to give a District representative other than DAS the authority to file a bid protest if the specified forum turned out to be inappropriate. Even if DPW were sui juris, therefore, we would reject Francis's argument that, failing applicability of § 1-1189.5 pursuant to its exact terms (authorizing DAS to appeal the CAB's decision directly to this court), there is implied statutory room for another governmental department to seek judicial review of CAB orders in another, correct forum. The legislative history of the Procurement Practices Act makes clear, if its plain statutory words do not, that the Council granted DAS the exclusive right to file bid protests on behalf of the District, whatever the forum. This conclusion is best confirmed by examining Francis's alternative argument that, if she lacks standing to bring this case simply as a real party in interest, she is clothed with the statutory authority of the Mayor that trumps any exclusive right to sue that the Procurement Practices Act may confer on DAS. We turn to that contention.