Opinion ID: 2761072
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Batson standard

Text: {¶ 63} In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution precludes purposeful discrimination by the state in the exercise of its peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely on account of their race. Id. at 89. A court adjudicates a Batson claim in three steps. State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 61. First, the defendant must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Batson at 96-97. Second, if the defendant satisfies that burden, the prosecution must provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge. Id. at 97-98. Third, the trial court must decide, based on all the circumstances, whether the defendant has proved purposeful racial discrimination. Id. at 98. At this stage, the court “must examine the prosecutor’s challenges in context to ensure that the reason is not merely pretextual.” State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5048, 873 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 65. The judge must “assess the plausibility” of the prosecutor’s reason for striking the juror “in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). {¶ 64} A trial court’s finding of no discriminatory intent will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Frazier at ¶ 64; see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). If a trial court does err in applying Batson, the error is structural. United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 956 (6th Cir.1998). 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO