Opinion ID: 612846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cordery's Sentence Was Error

Text: The issue raised by this appeal was resolved by United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir.2011), a recent decision whose statutory analysis was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Tapia v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2382, 180 L.Ed.2d 357 (2011). In Story, as here, a federal prisoner asserted the district court erred in imposing a longer term of imprisonment in order to make her eligible for RDAP. In addressing that appeal, we considered the apparent tension between two provisions of the sentencing guidelines. Titled Factors to be considered in imposing a term of imprisonment, § 3582(a) states: The court, in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation. (emphasis added). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), titled Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, instructs the sentencing court to consider the need for the sentence imposed ... to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. Reconciliation of these two provisions had divided the circuit courts. Compare United States v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 629-30 (8th Cir.2006), and United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d 557, 561 (9th Cir.1994), with In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 849-51 (D.C.Cir.2009), and United States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2007). We adopted the view that § 3553(a) authorizes consideration of rehabilitation in composing a sentence generally, but that § 3582(a) prohibits consideration of rehabilitation in setting one aspect of that sentence, the term of imprisonment. See Story, 635 F.3d at 1247-48. Thus, while a court can pursue the goal of rehabilitation in sentencing, for example, in setting the terms of supervised release, it cannot do so in either determining whether to impose a term of incarceration, or in determining the length of that term. Id. But because of the split of authority on the question at the time of appeal  including mixed signals from our court  we concluded the district court's error was not plain, and affirmed Story's sentence. Id. at 1248. Shortly after we published the opinion in Story, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Tapia. That decision confirmed our reading of both statutory provisions. We therefore conclude that, under § 3582(a), the district court's reliance on rehabilitative goals to set the length of Cordery's sentence was error.