Opinion ID: 2756581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpretation of the 1923 Deed

Text: We turn now to the relevant language in the 1923 deed: It is understood and agreed that [1] the said Texas & Pacific Railway Company shall fence said strip of ground and shall maintain said fence at its own expense and shall provide three crossings across said strip at the points indicated on said Blue Print hereto attached and made part hereof, and [2] the said Texas & Pacific Railway hereby binds itself, its successors and assigns, to furnish proper drainage out-lets across the land hereinabove conveyed. 57 For convenience and consistency with the district court opinion, we will refer to clause [1] as the “crossings clause,” and to clause [2] as the “drainage clause.” In essence, Franks argues that the crossings clause creates a predial servitude because it was established to provide a benefit to the property owned 55 Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Poydras Ctr. Associates, 487 So. 2d 120, 122–23 (La. Ct. App. 1986), writ denied, 492 So. 2d 1221 (La. 1986). 56 Id. 57 Franks, 972 F. Supp. 2d at 894-95 (emphasis added). 17 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 18 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 by the Levys. Therefore, Franks argues, it is presumed to be a predial servitude under the RCC provisions and case law discussed above. The district court, citing much of the case law discussed above, agreed with Franks that the cases “are persuasive that the crossings clause, standing alone, would create a predial servitude.” 58 However, the Court continued, “the parties have not drawn the court’s attention to a case that presented an additional clause, such as the drainage clause, that had to be considered in interpreting the contract. For that reason, the caselaw [sic] is of less assistance than usual.” 59 We agree with the district court’s assessment. If the crossings clause stood alone in the 1923 deed, then Franks likely would be correct that it would be subject to the predial servitude presumption. It does not stand alone, however. It is in the same sentence as the drainage clause, and we must interpret both provisions which satisfies “both the general rules of contract construction as well as in accordance with specific rules of construction for instruments that purport to create servitudes.” 60 As the district court explained (and we agree): The court must, however, keep in mind the provisions of the Civil Code that (1) each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole and (2) doubt as to the existence of a predial servitude shall be resolved in favor of the servient estate. The court must also, if possible, give practical effect to all parts of the contract, so as to 58 Id. at 900. 59 Id. 60 Ryan, 666 So. 2d at 714. 18 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 19 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 avoid neutralizing or ignoring any of them or treating them as surplusage. 61 The problem for Franks is that Franks is trying to establish a predial servitude by presumption because the crossings clause does not expressly create a predial servitude, but the parties to the 1923 deed showed that they knew how to establish a predial servitude expressly in the drainage clause— not just in part of the same deed but in the very same sentence. Specifically, whereas the crossings clause binds only Texas & Pacific Railway Company to maintain fences and provide crossings (which does not necessarily establish a predial servitude), the drainage clause binds not only Texas & Pacific Railway Company but “itself, its successors and assigns,” which is sufficient to create an express predial servitude. 62 The parties knew how to create an express servitude by adding the “successors and assigns” language but added that language only to the drainage clause, limiting the obligations in the crossings clause to “Texas & Pacific Railway Company” only. As the district court reasoned: If the parties intended all of the obligations to be predial in nature, they could have easily applied the successors and assigns language to the entire sentence. They did not. Instead, they specifically made one obligation (drainage) binding on successors and assigns, and did not impose that requirement on two other obligations (fencing and crossings). The most reasonable interpretation in accordance with 61 Franks, 972 So. 2d at 900 (citing LA. CIV. CODE arts. 730 and 2050, which are the current equivalents of RCC arts. 753, 1952, and 1955); see also RCC art. 1951. 62 See Burgas, 174 La. at 591 (noting that language in a deed granting use of a driveway to “the purchaser, its successors and assigns” would have created a predial servitude). 19 Case: 13-30990 Document: 00512854148 Page: 20 Date Filed: 12/02/2014 No. 13-30990 Louisiana law is that the obligations are to be treated differently. 63