Opinion ID: 150366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Likelihood of Confusion Analysis

Text: To prove likelihood of confusion, plaintiffs must show that consumers viewing the mark would probably assume the product or service it represents is associated with the source of a different product or service identified by a similar mark. Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at 280 (internal quotation marks removed). In Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., we set forth the factors which may indicate a likelihood of confusion: (1) the degree of similarity between the owner's mark and the alleged infringing mark; (2) the strength of the owner's mark; (3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising; (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; (6) the evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the goods, though not competing, are marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised through the same media; (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same; (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers because of similarity of functions; and (10) other factors suggesting the consuming public might expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's market or that he is likely to expand into that market. 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3rd Cir.1983). None of these factors is determinative in the likelihood of confusion analysis and each factor must be weighed and balanced one against the other. Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at 280. In reviewing a district court's analysis of the Lapp factors, we can reverse the court's conclusions if the relevant factors are not properly set forth and not properly weighed. See Kos Pharmaceuticals v. Andrx Corporation, 369 F.3d 700, 711-12 (3d Cir.2004). In Kos, a trademark case involving the marks ADVICOR and ALTOCOR, we reversed a district court's likelihood of confusion decision because it had erred in its analysis of mark similarity, overemphasized customer sophistication, applied the wrong standards regarding intent, and ignored several other relevant Lapp factors. Id. at 711-12. The same district judge made similar errors here. In finding that there was no likelihood of confusion between ForsLean and Forsthin, the District Court engaged in detailed analysis of only three of the relevant Lapp factors and failed to discuss much of the evidence presented by Sabinsa. The District Court then asserted, This Court is not going to comment on all of the testimony offered at trial. Suffice it to say, I am satisfied that the testimony taken as a whole amply supports the Court's decision. However, while it is true that a district court may find that certain of the Lapp factors are inapplicable or unhelpful in a particular case, the court must still explain its choice not to employ those factors. See A & H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 214 n. 8. Here, the District Court failed to explain whether it viewed these remaining factors as neutral or irrelevant or how it weighed and balanced the combined factors. Further, its reasoning concerning the three factors it chose to analyze is flawed. Typically, when a district court fails adequately to support its findings, we merely remand for a re-weighing of the applicable factors. Where the facts are largely undisputed, however, `we need not remand' if application of the correct standard could support only one conclusion. Kos, 369 F.3d at 712 (quoting Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1451 (3d Cir.1994)); see also Lapp, 721 F.2d at 460 (reversing and directing entry of judgment). Such a remand would be a waste of judicial resources. In Kos, for example, we observed, Regardless of how the factual disputes might be resolved, any reasonable factfinder weighing the Lapp factors in accordance with the correct legal standards would hold [in favor of Kos]. Kos, 369 F.3d at 725. Accordingly, as we did in that case, we will review the findings of the District Court, along with the evidence presented by the parties, to determine whether, in light of the controlling legal principles, the facts and/or the failures in the District Court's analysis compel a result as a matter of law.