Opinion ID: 200697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Request for a Continuance

Text: 21 Castillo contends that the trial court's denial of a continuance was so arbitrary as to violate due process. In his challenge to the state court's failure to grant his motion for a new trial on this basis, he claims that this denial constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent 5 because it 22 gave no weight to counsel's lack of preparation and experience, drew an improper presumption that counsel was ready willing and able to try the case from the fact of her appearance in the face of her representation to the contrary, and misrepresented the roles of the various members of the law firm in a way that is misleading and beside the point. 23 We disagree. 24 The only Supreme Court precedent that Castillo identifies for purposes of the unreasonable application analysis is Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964). The Supreme Court held that a trial judge's decision not to grant the defendant in a contempt hearing a one-week continuance did not offend the requirements of due process. 25 The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. 26 Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court added that [t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. Id. Instead, reviewing courts must examine the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Id. However, [n]ot every restriction on counsel's time or opportunity to investigate or to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). 27 We recently applied Ungar's case-specific inquiry to a denial of a continuance, holding that a reviewing court must look at the reasons contemporaneously presented in support of the request for the continuance. We also identified a number of relevant factors: 28 the amount of time needed for effective preparation, the amount of time actually available for preparation, the amount of time previously available for preparation and how assiduously the movant used that time, the extent to which the movant has contributed to his perceived predicament, the complexity of the case, the availability of assistance from other sources, the probable utility of a continuance, the extent of inconvenience to others... should a continuance ensue, and the likelihood of an injustice or unfair prejudice attributable to the denial of a continuance. 29 United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 770 (1st Cir.1995). 30 Due to the summary nature of the Appeals Court's affirmance, our review of the state courts' application of federal law to the request for a continuance requires us to review the decision of the trial court denying Castillo's motion for a new trial. In its denial of Castillo's motion for a new trial, the trial court noted that the trial originally had been scheduled for September 23, 1996, that Fernandez had presented a motion to appear pro hac vice and had made a corresponding appearance almost two months before the scheduled trial date, and that, in allowing the motion, the court put Fernandez on notice that the impending trial would not be delayed. Thus, counsel had ample time to prepare. Even in pressing her last minute request for a brief continuance, Fernandez made no representations to the trial judge that she had never before tried a case and that her inexperience might make it difficult for her to try this case under the circumstances. Furthermore, in its order denying Castillo's motion for a new trial, the trial court found that counsel's performance during the trial did not reflect that of an attorney noticeably lacking in either experience or competence sufficient to meet constitutional standards. Commonwealth v. Castillo, No. 9477 CR 3461, slip op. at 4. 31 In submitting her motion to appear, Fernandez represented to the court that she was ready to try the case. Moreover, that motion was allowed on the express condition that the trial date remain as scheduled and the trial not be delayed. At no time did Fernandez indicate to the judge that this was her first trial. To the contrary, in her motion to appear, Fernandez explicitly stated I specialize in Criminal and Federal law. In light of the information before the trial judge at the time he made his decision and the great deal of latitude necessarily afforded judges in scheduling trials, Morris, 461 U.S. at 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, the decision not to grant Castillo a new trial on the basis of the denial of his request for a continuance was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.