Opinion ID: 555114
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Do Financial Capability and Intent Matter?

Text: 35 Nor-West next argues that even if it lacked either the financial capability or the intent to compete with Continental, it has standing to sue, because [i]t has been denied the opportunity to speak and publish. That denial alone is a judicially recognized injury. Brief for Appellant at 30 (emphasis in original). In support of this view, Nor-West relies primarily on the cases of City of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (Arlington Heights ) and Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (Bakke ). 4 36 In Bakke, the plaintiff, an unsuccessful white applicant to a medical school, challenged a special admissions program setting aside 16 of 100 places for nonwhite applicants. 438 U.S. at 275, 98 S.Ct. at 2740. Several amici alleged that the plaintiff lacked standing, arguing that he never showed that his injury--exclusion from the Medical School--will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 280-81 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. at 2743 n. 14. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that: 37 even if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of a special program, it would not follow that he lacked standing. The constitutional element of standing is plaintiff's demonstration of any injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by favorable decision of his claim. The trial court found such an injury, apart from failure to be admitted, in the University's decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in his class, simply because of his race. 38 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, it could be argued that Bakke is on point because it defines a likelihood that plaintiff be redressed as a likelihood that the plaintiff be allowed to compete, rather than a likelihood that the plaintiff be able to succeed. 39 The opportunity to compete and the opportunity to prevail, however, are not wholly unrelated. For instance, in Doherty v. Rutgers School of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir.1981), as in Bakke, a white applicant challenged a graduate school's admissions program. The school argued that the applicant lacked standing to sue, because he did not possess the qualifications to have been admitted in the absence of the minority student program he challenges. Id. at 895. In response, the applicant relied on Bakke. The district court granted the school's motion to dismiss, and the Third Circuit affirmed, and interpreted Bakke as holding that even though an unsuccessful applicant need not show that he or she would have been admitted in the absence of the challenged discriminatory program, he or she still must show that there was a chance of successful admission had s/he not been prohibited from competing for all the seats. Id. at 902 (emphasis in original). The court went on to hold that Bakke was distinguishable, because the plaintiff did not meet the criteria needed for acceptance for any of the seats at Rutgers Law School and a favorable holding would not substantially increase [the plaintiff's] chances for admission. Id. 40 In sum, Doherty stands for the proposition that even under Bakke, a plaintiff does not have standing unless he or she would have had a realistic chance, id. of some benefit in the absence of the defendant's constitutional violations. In this case, Nor-West apparently did not have a chance of successfully competing with Continental. Thus, Bakke is distinguishable, and Doherty is on point. 41 For the same reason, Arlington Heights and other cases cited by Nor-West are distinguishable. In Arlington Heights, a non-profit housing developer contracted to purchase a tract of land in order to build racially integrated low-income housing. The developer's contract, however, was contingent upon securing rezoning from the municipality in which the land was located. After the municipality denied rezoning, the developer filed a suit alleging unconstitutional racial discrimination. The municipality argued that the developer lacked standing to sue, because even if the municipality rezoned the property at issue, the developer would still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies, and carry through with construction. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261, 97 S.Ct. at 561. The Supreme Court disagreed, because the developer had shown an injury to itself that is 'likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'  Id. at 262, 97 S.Ct. at 561, quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (emphasis added). See also Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 368, 100 S.Ct. 2232, 2241, 65 L.Ed.2d 184 (1980) (standing exists where it was likely, even if uncertain, that intervenors would benefit from favorable verdict); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74-77, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2630-32, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (affirming district court's finding of standing where the defendant's conduct caused substantial likelihood of injury to the plaintiffs); cf. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, Sec. 3-18, at 132 (2d ed. 1988) (citing Arlington Heights in support of proposition that standing exists if the plaintiff's transaction or project is demonstrably prevented by nothing but a challenged restriction) (emphasis added). 42 Because Nor-West was not willing or financially able to compete with Continental, we find that Nor-West was not likely to benefit from the grant of a second franchise in this case, and therefore lacked standing. Thus, Arlington Heights, like Bakke, is distinguishable. 43 Accordingly, we reject Nor-West's claim that it has standing because it was denied the opportunity to compete against Continental. 44