Opinion ID: 220999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: We will apply our decision prospectively only.

Text: Having decided to overrule Lujan-Armendariz, we next consider whether to apply the new rule of law only prospectively. The default principle is that a court's decisions apply retroactively to all cases still pending before the courts. Federal courts may depart from that default principle only in certain circumstances, as outlined in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Below, we first explain that the three-factor Chevron Oil test remains good law, at least in cases, such as this one, where we announce a new rule of law not affecting our jurisdiction. Balancing the three factors described in Chevron Oil, we conclude that we will apply our decision only prospectively.
The circumstances that justify a deviation from the normal rule of retroactivity have a long jurisprudential history. In the criminal context, the Supreme Court originally held that prospective application was appropriate in some circumstances. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). But the Court later overruled Linkletter in favor of a bright-line rule: In criminal cases, any new rule of law must be applied retroactively. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). In the civil context, the Supreme Court originally announced a three-factor test of general applicability in Chevron Oil. Under the Chevron Oil test, equitable considerations in some circumstances warrant prospective application of a new rule of law. But the Court has limited, in two relevant ways, the circumstances in which the Chevron Oil test applies. First, a court announcing a new rule of law must decide between pure prospectivity and full retroactivity; what Justice Souter termed selective prospectivity, in which courts weighed the equities on a case-by-case basis, is foreclosed. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537-38, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) (Souter, J., plurality op.); see Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 131 L.Ed.2d 820 (1995); Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (When[the Supreme] Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review. . . .); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir.2004) (In a civil case, then, a court [announcing a new rule of law] has only two available options: pure prospectivity or full retroactivity.). Second, in cases in which the new rule of law strips the courts of jurisdiction, the courts must apply that new rule of law retroactively. See United States ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare W., 602 F.3d 949, 953 (9th Cir.) (citing United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2230, 173 L.Ed.2d 1255 (2009); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 366, 178 L.Ed.2d 150 (2010); Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988)). Equitable considerations are altogether irrelevant when a court lacks adjudicatory power. Felzen, 134 F.3d at 877. We glean from this jurisprudential history the following rule of law: We apply the three-pronged test outlined in Chevron Oil (1) in a civil case; (2) when we announce a new rule of law, as distinct from applying a new rule that we or the Supreme Court previously announced; (3) and when the new rule does not concern our jurisdiction. See, e.g., George v. Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393, 1399 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). [4] Like some of our sister circuits, we acknowledge that the Supreme Court's reasoning in cases such as Harper could support a conclusion that the Chevron Oil test no longer applies in any circumstances: all new rules of law must be applied retroactively. See, e.g., Kolkevich v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 501 F.3d 323, 337 n. 9 (3d Cir.2007) (observing that, as some commentators have noted, it is unclear whether we have the power to apply a new rule of law prospectively in light of Harper, but not reaching the issue); Fairfax Covenant Church v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 17 F.3d 703, 710 (4th Cir.1994) (noting that, in Harper, the Supreme Court cast serious doubt upon the continuing vitality of the Chevron Oil test). But the Supreme Court has not overruled the Chevron Oil test in the circumstances described above. See Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (11th Cir.2003) (en banc) (Although prospectivity appears to have fallen into disfavor with the Supreme Court [citing Harper, James B. Beam, and Griffith ], the Court has clearly retained the possibility of pure prospectivity and, we believe, has also retained the Chevron Oil test, albeit in a modified form, as the governing analysis for such determinations in civil cases.); Fairfax Covenant Church, 17 F.3d at 710 (We are struck, however, by the notable absence in Harper of any statement that Chevron [Oil] is overruled. . . .); but see Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 333 (5th Cir.1999) (concluding, in dictum, that [t]he Court's most recent decisions . . . leav[e] only an indistinct possibility of the application of pure prospectivity in an extremely unusual and unforeseeable case). As a circuit court, even if recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has perhaps called into question the continuing viability of [its precedent], we are bound to follow a controlling Supreme Court precedent until it is explicitly overruled by that Court. United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1079 n. 16 (9th Cir.2005) (citation omitted); see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) (If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.). We therefore remain bound by Chevron Oil. For that same reason, every court to have decided the issue has concluded that Chevron Oil continues to apply. See Crowe, 365 F.3d at 94 (applying the Chevron Oil test); Glazner, 347 F.3d at 1219 (same); see also Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir.1998) (same). Following our sister circuits and our previous holdings, we too will apply the Chevron Oil test when all three of the requirements described above are met. In this civil case, we announce a new rule of law that does not concern our jurisdiction. The Chevron Oil test applies.
The three Chevron Oil factors are: (1) whether the decision establish[es] a new principle of law; (2) whether retrospective operation will further or retard [the rule's] operation in light of its history, purpose, and effect; and (3) whether our decision could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively. 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no question that our decision today establish[es] a new principle of law . . . by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied. Id. at 106, 92 S.Ct. 349. Lujan-Armendariz clearly announced the rule that equal protection required that we treat expunged state drug convictions as we do expunged federal drug convictions. Just as clearly, we overrule that holding today. Further, amici assertand the government does not disputethat, because of the clarity and consistent application of Lujan-Armendariz for more than a decade, aliens and their counsel have acted in reliance on Lujan-Armendariz. According to amici, aliens often have pleaded guilty to minor drug crimes and have completed drug treatment in order to have their convictions expungedall in reliance on Lujan-Armendariz's promise that doing so would spare them from adverse immigration consequences. There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). [5] [D]eportation is an integral partindeed, sometimes the most important partof the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes. Padilla v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1480, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (footnote omitted). Preserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence. Id. at 1483 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Accordingly, the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty. Id. at 1486. Our decision in Lujan-Armendariz provided clear assurance that expungement after a plea of guilty to the state crime of simple drug possession would insulate the alien from adverse immigration consequences. Even if the defendant were not initially aware of [ Lujan-Armendariz ], competent defense counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides, would have advised him concerning the [decision's] importance. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. at 323 n. 50, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Indeed, in a situation similar to this one, where the immigration consequences are succinct, clear, and explicit, the Supreme Court has held that an alien's counsel who fails to inform the alien of those consequences has provided ineffective assistance. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1483. After our decision today, alien defendants will know that an expunged state-law conviction for simple possession will have adverse immigration consequences. [6] Those aliens will be able to make a fully informed decision whether to plead guilty or to exercise their constitutional rights, such as the right to trial by jury. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (In exchange for some perceived benefit, defendants waive several of their constitutional rights (including the right to a trial) and grant the government numerous tangible benefits. . . .). For those aliens who relied on Lujan-Armendariz, however, [t]he potential for unfairness in the retroactive application of today's decision is significant and manifest. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Those aliens were assured that, after completion of drug treatment, there would be absolutely no legal consequences. Their waiver of their constitutional rights was in reliance on Lujan-Armendariz. In these circumstances, we easily conclude that the third Chevron Oil factor is met: our decision could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107, 92 S.Ct. 349. It would be manifestly unfair effectively to hoodwink aliens into waiving their constitutional rights on the promise of no legal consequences and, then, to hold retroactively that their convictions actually carried with them the particularly severe `penalty' of removal, Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481; cf. Crowe, 365 F.3d at 94 (We think that it would be patently unfair to subject a party to a forfeiture for assiduously following binding circuit precedent.); Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 545 (11th Cir.2002) (en banc) (It would be inequitable to punish those parties for following the clearly established precedent of this Circuit.). For similar reasons, we conclude that the second Chevron Oil factor is met: In light of the rule's history, purpose, and effect, retroactive application will not further the rule's operation. 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349. As we now make clear, Congress intended that convictions for state-law simple possession have adverse immigration consequences. At first glance, it may appear that retroactive application of today's decision would further that purpose. After all, the state-law convictions occurred, and Congress intended that such convictions have adverse immigration consequences. But Congress did not intend adverse immigration consequences for those who were merely charged with a crime or suspected of a crime; Congress intended such results only for those who were duly convicted, with all the constitutional protections of our criminal justice system. Relevant here, we think it is a reasonable assumption that Congress intended adverse immigration consequences only for those who were convicted either after the exercise of their constitutional rights, such as the right to trial, or after an informed waiver of those constitutional rights. As discussed above, many alien defendants fell into neither category. Instead, they pleaded guilty and waived their constitutional rights with a wholly uninformed understanding of the consequences of their plea. Contrary to their understanding that there would be no immigration consequences, the actual consequence is the severe penalty of removal. Nothing in the statute or its history, purpose, or effect suggests that Congress intended adverse immigration consequences for those whose waiver of constitutional rights turned out to be so ill-informed. Indeed, the Supreme Court has instructed that such a gross misunderstanding of the immigration consequences of a plea, when caused by incompetent counsel, rises to the level of a constitutional violation. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1486-87. We conclude that retroactive application of our decision today will not further the purposes of the immigration laws. Weighing the Chevron Oil factors, we hold that our decision today will apply only prospectively. Cf. Glazner, 347 F.3d at 1220 (If this were truly a situation where the class of persons affected by the new rule would suddenly face a strong likelihood of liability when they faced no possibility of liability before, we would be inclined to view the equities as weighing heavily in favor of pure prospective application.). For those aliens convicted before the publication date of this decision, Lujan-Armendariz applies. For those aliens convicted after the publication date of this decision, Lujan-Armendariz is overruled.