Opinion ID: 2290649
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: krs 454.210long-arm statute

Text: The purpose of Kentucky's long-arm statute, KRS 454.210, is to permit Kentucky courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants while complying with federal constitutional due process. Cummings v. Pitman, 239 S.W.3d 77, 84 (Ky.2007). Because KRS 454.210(2)(a) [2] is fundamental to our review in this case, we begin our analysis by setting out the relevant provisions of the statute in full: (2) (a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's: 1. Transacting any business in this Commonwealth; 2. Contracting to supply services or goods in this Commonwealth; 3. Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth; 4. Causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth, provided that the tortious injury occurring in this Commonwealth arises out of the doing or soliciting of business or a persistent course of conduct or derivation of substantial revenue within the Commonwealth; 5. Causing injury in this Commonwealth to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this Commonwealth when the seller knew such person would use, consume, or be affected by, the goods in this Commonwealth, if he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this Commonwealth; 6. Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this Commonwealth, providing the claim arises from the interest in, use of, or possession of the real property, provided, however, that such in personam jurisdiction shall not be imposed on a nonresident who did not himself voluntarily institute the relationship, and did not knowingly perform, or fail to perform, the act or acts upon which jurisdiction is predicated; 7. Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this Commonwealth at the time of contracting; 8. Committing sexual intercourse in this state which intercourse causes the birth of a child when: a. The father or mother or both are domiciled in this state; b. There is a repeated pattern of intercourse between the father and mother in this state; or c. Said intercourse is a tort or a crime in this state; or 9. Making a telephone solicitation, as defined in KRS 367.46951, into the Commonwealth. (b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him. As a point of emphasis, even though the statute identifies nine particular instances of conduct upon which personal jurisdiction over a nonresident may be predicated, the first sentence of subsection 2(a) imposes a critical limitation on the statute's operation: the cause of action must aris[e] from the identified conduct. That point is reinforced by its inclusion in subsection 2(b), limiting the joinder of any ancillary claim to those also aris[e] from acts contained within the enumerated section of the statute. Thus, personal jurisdiction cannot be exercised over a non-resident defendant simply because it has engaged in conduct or activity that fits within one or more subsections of KRS 454.210(2)(a). The plaintiff must also show that his claim is one that arises from the conduct or activities described in the subsection. In a series of cases addressing KRS 454.210, it appears the perception has developed that our long-arm statute has lost its identity, having been subsumed and, in effect, overridden by federal due process jurisdictional standards. This perception is illustrated by discussion of the statute in Wilson v. Case, 85 S.W.3d 589 (Ky.2002), wherein this Court stated: In practice, the precise language of the statute and the application of its terms are much less important than the simple fact that the statute exists. Courts have determined that `the long-arm statute within this jurisdiction allows Kentucky courts to reach to the full constitutional limits of due process in entertaining jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.' Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc., Ky.App., 675 S.W.2d 404, 405 (1984); Info-Med, Inc. v. Nat'l Healthcare, Inc., 669 F.Supp. 793 (W.D.Ky.1987). . . . For our purposes here, `the traditional two step approach of testing jurisdiction against first statutory and then constitutional standards is therefore collapsed into the single inquiry of whether jurisdiction offends constitutional due process.' First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Bezema, 569 F.Supp. 818, 819 (S.D.Ind. 1983) (referring to the Indiana long-arm statute which is similar to Kentucky's and has likewise been held to extend to the outer limits of due process). Id. at 592 (emphasis added); see also Cummings, 239 S.W.3d at 84-85 (We have interpreted this statute to authorize in personam jurisdiction to reach the outer limits of the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and because of this breadth, our statutory requirements have merged into the federal due process analysis.); Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc., 675 S.W.2d at 405 It is a well-settled principle of law that the long-arm statute within this jurisdiction allows Kentucky courts to reach to the full constitutional limits of due process in entertaining jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. (citing Poyner v. Erma Werke Gmbh, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.1980)); Davis H. Elliot Co., Inc. v. Caribbean Utilities Co., Ltd., 513 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir.1975) ([W]e hold, in light of the factors discussed above, that the limits of personal jurisdiction conferred by KRS 454.210(2)(a)(1) are coextensive with the boundaries of the due process clause.). It is fundamental that in determining the meaning of a statute, we must defer to the language of the statute and are not at liberty to add or subtract from the legislative enactment or interpret it at variance from the language used. Johnson v. Branch Banking and Trust Co., 313 S.W.3d 557, 559 (Ky.2010). Upon application of this principle, an examination of the long-arm statute discloses no language indicating that its provisions should, per se, be construed as coextensive with the limits of federal due process. To the contrary, the statute sets forth nine specific provisions defining the kinds of activity that will allow a Kentucky court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. While we believe it fair to say that these provisions should be liberally construed in favor of long-arm jurisdiction, their limits upon jurisdiction must be observed as defined. Thus, non-resident defendants whose activities fall outside the criteria of KRS 454.210 may not be subjected to long-arm jurisdiction. In addition, as previously noted, even when the defendant's conduct and activities fall within one of the enumerated categories, the plaintiffs claim still must arise from that conduct or activity before long-arm jurisdiction exists. Claims based upon contacts, conduct, and activities which may not fairly be said to meet one of these explicit categories must be held to be outside of the reach of the statute, regardless of whether federal due process might otherwise allow the assertion of in personam jurisdiction. Moreover, we note that if the intent of the statute were to reach the outer limits of federal due process, it could easily have been drafted to say precisely that. In this vein, we note that some jurisdictions have phrased their long-arm statutes in just this way. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 1.306 (Every corporation, individual, personal representative, partnership or association that shall have the necessary minimum contact with the state of Iowa shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, and the courts of this state shall hold such corporation, individual, personal representative, partnership or association amenable to suit in Iowa in every case not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.). Only after the requirements of KRS 454.210 have been satisfied can it be said that personal jurisdiction over a non-resident extends to the outer limits permitted by federal due process. Federal due process cannot act to expand the reach of Kentucky's long-arm statute beyond its statutory language. Wilson and like cases imply that, when examining personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, one may skip past KRS 454.210 and proceed directly to a federal due process analysis. We believe this is a misconception. The reach of Kentucky's long-arm jurisdiction is a policy choice of the General Assembly, limited by federal and state constitutional considerations. KRS 454.210 is the legislature's expression of that policy, and, as such, the statute operates independently of federal due process analysis. Thus, we clarify that proper deference to the language of the statute compels that, as an initial step, review is necessary to determine whether long-arm jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is permissible under KRS 454.210. Banco Ambrosiano, S.P.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64, 464 N.E.2d 432, 435 (1984) (Importantly, in setting forth certain categories of bases for long-arm jurisdiction, [the New York long-arm statute] does not go as far as is constitutionally permissible. Thus, a situation can occur in which the necessary contacts to satisfy due process are present, but in personam jurisdiction will not be obtained in this State because the statute does not authorize it.). In summary, the proper analysis of long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consists of a two-step process. First, review must proceed under KRS 454.210 to determine if the cause of action arises from conduct or activity of the defendant that fits into one of the statute's enumerated categories. If not, then in personam jurisdiction may not be exercised. When that initial step results in a determination that the statute is applicable, a second step of analysis must be taken to determine if exercising personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant offends his federal due process rights. To the extent Wilson, Cummings, and like cases hold otherwise, they are overruled.