Opinion ID: 2587576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Scope of SCR 182

Text: SCR 182 provides: In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. The purpose of the rule is generally regarded as twofold: first, it prevents lawyers from taking advantage of laypersons, and second, it preserves the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. [1] The rule also prevents inadvertent disclosure of privileged information by the layperson. [2] The issue in this case is whether the word client in the introductory phrase includes the lawyer himself, or means only a separate person who retains the lawyer. Schaefer argues that SCR 182 does not prohibit a lawyer who is representing himself in a case from directly contacting another party to the case who is represented by counsel. In support, Schaefer cites to the commentary to ABA Model Rule 4.2, which is nearly identical to SCR 182, as well as authority from other jurisdictions holding that SCR 182 does not prohibit a lawyer representing himself from contacting represented parties. Comment 1 to Model Rule 4.2 provides that parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other. [3] The comment does not specifically address the situation of a lawyer appearing pro se. Courts in some jurisdictions that have adopted Model Rule 4.2 have concluded that the rule does not prohibit contact when the lawyer represents himself. [4] The majority of courts considering the issue, however, have noted that the purposes served by the rule are equally present when the lawyer appears pro se. [5] The lawyer still has an advantage over the average layperson, and the integrity of the relationship between the represented person and counsel is not entitled to less protection merely because the lawyer is appearing pro se. Consequently, these courts have enforced the rule in situations where a pro se lawyer makes direct contact with a represented party. The state bar's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility came to the same conclusion in a 1988 non-binding formal opinion (Formal Opinion 8). [6] The committee determined that SCR 182 applies to a lawyer appearing pro se, and bars the lawyer from directly contacting an opposing party who is represented by counsel. [7] We agree, and conclude that the purposes of the rule are better served by applying it to lawyers who are representing themselves. A related issue is whether a lawyer who litigates on behalf of a corporation of which he is a principal is subject to the rule's restrictions on contact. Schaefer argues that SCR 44, which provides that nothing in the Supreme Court Rules prohibits a person from representing himself in any court except the supreme court, together with SCR 2(8), which provides that person includes a corporation, means that he is entitled to represent Schaefer, Inc., as a pro se litigant. Thus, according to Schaefer, he is not representing a separate client, and so the rule does not apply. We have consistently held that a legal entity such as a corporation cannot appear except through counsel, and we have prohibited non-lawyer principals from representing these types of entities. [8] Based on our prior cases, a lawyer principal who appears on behalf of his corporation is clearly acting in his capacity as a lawyer representing a client, not as a principal of the corporation. We therefore conclude that SCR 182 applies in these situations. In addition, in light of our clear rulings on this issue, we reject Schaefer's argument that SCR 182 as applied to such situations is void for vagueness. Finally, Schaefer contends that his contact with the Mirage Resorts officers and employees was permissible because he is a Mirage shareholder. According to Schaefer, SCR 182 only prohibits communication concerning the subject of the litigation. Schaefer thus argues that his letters to Mirage employees [9] and directors did not violate SCR 182 as they concerned shareholder matters. SCR 182 bars only communication concerning the subject of the representation. Thus, communications from Schaefer concerning matters of interest to Mirage shareholders unrelated to the pending litigation would not be barred by the rule. Here, however, while several letters in the record raise shareholder-type concerns, many do not. In addition, even those including shareholder concerns also discuss the pending litigation. Accordingly, Schaefer's conduct was within the scope of SCR 182.