Opinion ID: 748877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Closure Standards to the Pending Cases

Text: 46 A. First Waller Factor. In each of the three pending cases, the state court trial judges adequately determined that courtroom closure was warranted during the testimony of the undercover officer. The officers in all three cases testified that they were continuing their undercover work and would soon be returning in an undercover capacity to the same areas where the defendants had been arrested. These areas were described with particularity--the area around 1006 Intervale Avenue (Ayala ), Cooper Square (Okonkwo ), and West 42nd Street and Eighth Avenue (Pearson ). 47 The state interest in maintaining the continued effectiveness of an undercover officer is an extremely substantial interest, and the trial judge in each case was amply justified in concluding that this interest would be seriously prejudiced by requiring the officer to testify in an open courtroom. There is no requirement that the prosecution must prove that particular individuals likely to attend the trial will disclose the officer's identity. Of course, the defendant himself has an opportunity to observe the officer (a second opportunity, if the defendant is guilty), and might communicate a description of the officer to others, particularly if the defendant is at liberty pending trial. The defendant's right of presence at his trial requires accepting that risk, but the right to a public trial does not require the further risk that the officer's identity will become known through observation by members of the public who might enter the courtroom and see the officer testifying. The gravity of the state interest in protecting the secrecy of the officer's identity from casual observers and the likelihood that this interest will be prejudiced by the officer's testifying in open court are both sufficiently substantial to justify the limited closure of the courtroom during the officer's testimony. The closure is limited not only because it lasts only for the testimony of one witness, albeit an important witness, but also because there is no limitation at all on the right of the public or the press to examine the transcript of the officer's testimony. Since the state interest in maintaining the secrecy of the undercover officer's identity warranted the limited closure, we need not consider the respondents' additional point that the closure was also justified by the risk to the officer's safety. 48 B. Third Waller Factor. In all three cases, the trial judge closed the courtroom, with justification, only during the testimony of one witness, and did so without limiting access to the transcript of the officer's testimony. No additional alternatives were suggested by any party, and the trial judges had no obligation to consider additional alternatives sua sponte. We note that none of the defendants requested that family members be permitted to remain in the courtroom, a request that would have required careful consideration by the trial judge. See Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir.1994) (writ of habeas corpus granted because of unwarranted exclusion of defendant's family members); see also Guzman, 80 F.3d at 774-76 (writ of habeas corpus granted because, among other things, court failed to inquire into alleged exclusion of defendant's family members). 49 C. Second and Fourth Waller Factors. There is no substantial issue raised as to the second and fourth factors. The limited closure occurring only during the testimony of the undercover officer was no broader than necessary, Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, to protect the interest in preserving the secrecy of the undercover officer's identity, and the trial judges in each case made findings adequate to support the closure, id.Conclusion 50 For these reasons, in No. 95-2463 (Ayala) and No. 95-2801 (Pearson) we affirm the judgment of the District Court; in No. 95-2626 (Okonkwo) we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand with directions to enter judgment dismissing the petition. We also vacate the decisions in Ayala I and Ayala II.