Opinion ID: 564919
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Panel Majority's Actual Prejudice Test

Text: 68 The panel majority attempted to articulate a test to determine whether a constitutional error has skewed a sentencing body's deliberative process ... to such a degree that its ultimate conclusions are probably factually in error. Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 468 (emphasis omitted). Asking the wrong question necessarily begets the wrong answer. When a defendant is eligible for the death penalty (by virtue of having committed first-degree murder accompanied by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance), it is nearly impossible to determine that the sentencing body's ultimate conclusion that imprisonment is more appropriate than the death penalty (or vice versa ) is correct or accurate, or incorrect or inaccurate. 69 The nature of the question asked by the panel majority illustrates its misinterpretation of the actual or factual innocence standard. Although factual errors can undermine the factual premises from which the sentencing body reaches its ultimate conclusion, one can never say that the ultimately discretionary choice by the sentencing body is factually in error. Other than in the context of a general proportionality review, a court lacks objective criteria by which to divine that it is factually incorrect to sentence a particular death-eligible defendant to death, or to life imprisonment instead. So long as the jury could have imposed the death penalty, there can be no correct or incorrect sentencing outcome. 70 It is, however, possible to determine that a constitutional error led to a factual error, and that the factual error probably influenced the sentencing body to select the death penalty. In fact, courts often define prejudicial error in just this fashion. It is within Congress' power to enable federal courts to review these errors in habeas proceedings, regardless of a litigant's procedural default or of an abuse of the writ. The Supreme Court has interpreted habeas jurisdictional statutes to require, in such defaulted or abusive cases, more than prejudicial error. The Court reached this conclusion in light of certain expressions of congressional intent and a serious concern for comity and finality. 71 The panel majority attempted to distinguish its test from the ordinary test for prejudice. The majority was correct that the Supreme Court has admonished courts to apply the test for actual innocence in light of all probative evidence, including evidence that was admitted (or excluded) as a result of constitutional error. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 n. 17, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (citing Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 538, 106 S.Ct. at 2668. We recognize that the panel majority applied its test in light of all probative evidence. Our concern is that the panel majority's test seeks to answer the wrong question. The panel majority's test asks whether, but for a factual misimpression with regard to aggravation or mitigation, the sentencing body probably would have exercised its discretion in a different manner. The Supreme Court has made clear that the question is whether, in light of all probative evidence, including evidence that was or was not admitted as a result of the alleged constitutional error, the petitioner has made a colorable showing that he has suffered a conviction or received a punishment that the adjudicator of guilt or the sentencing body was not free to impose under the actual facts. 72 In answering what is a wrong and an unanswerable question, the panel majority propose a test that equates correctness or accuracy of sentence with a deliberative process free from factual errors that affect the exercise of discretion. According to the panel majority, if the petitioner makes a colorable showing of the following, he is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim--regardless of an unexcused procedural default or an abuse of the writ: 73 (1) the sentencing body was under a misperception as to the factual background of either the offender or the offense, and 74 (2) but for those factual misperceptions held by the sentencing body, the petitioner probably would not have received a sentence of death. 75 Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 468-69. 76 The panel majority's test has only a slight bearing on the petitioner's innocence of the sentence imposed. It instead looks to the purity of the deliberative process and grants relief for errors that probably affected the outcome. The panel majority held that a petitioner is guilty of the death penalty only if the process by which he received that sentence is absolutely free from any omissions or presentations of fact that probably influenced the sentencing body's exercise of discretion. Conversely, a petitioner is actually innocent of the death penalty, according to the panel majority, if any factual error with regard to aggravation or mitigation probably influenced the deliberative process. In short, the panel majority sets forth a roughly accurate description of the standard for evaluating the significance of a timely raised allegation of constitutional error in connection with the sentencing process. 47 77 Aside from being wrong, the panel majority's test is an undesirable one for several reasons. The test is fundamentally offensive to both comity and finality. It requires a federal court to review the merits of a claim whenever an alleged constitutional error probably influenced the sentencing body to impose the death penalty even though a claim is procedurally defaulted, constitutes an abuse of the writ, or is barred under both doctrines. Thus, the panel majority's test abolishes the distinction between a petitioner's first federal habeas petition and all subsequent such petitions. It matters not, under the panel majority's test, that a petitioner is filing his second, third, fourth, or even tenth federal habeas petition. If he can make out a colorable claim of actual prejudice, he is entitled to have the merits of his claim reviewed. Were this Johnson's first federal habeas petition, he would have to allege and prove both that the performance of his counsel at sentencing was deficient, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under the panel majority's test, Johnson need prove no more even though his claim is procedurally defaulted or abusive or both. 78 The test creates the necessity of holding an evidentiary hearing for the first time in federal court on a claim the petitioner should have presented to a state court long ago. Were we to remand this case, as the panel majority held we should, a federal district court would hear evidence a state court never had the opportunity to hear and evaluate. The panel majority's assertion that its test is reserved for extraordinary cases is of little comfort. This case demonstrates that the panel majority's test turn[s] the case in which an error results in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the 'extraordinary case,' ... into an all too ordinary one. Adams, 489 U.S. at 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1217-18 n. 6. Johnson's claim is a common one. He claims that his counsel did a poor job--they could have done better, and if they had, he probably would not have received the death penalty. We are faced with similar claims in many capital cases. Thus, the panel majority's test would require evidentiary hearings in many not-so-extraordinary cases. 79 Lastly, the panel majority's test encourages and rewards sandbagging. Johnson's habeas counsel admitted they filed first in federal court because they believed they could always go back to state court later. In part, the procedural default doctrine is designed to prevent such practices. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2508, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). The panel majority's test allows petitioners to circumvent the procedural default doctrine and the policy against intentionally withholding claims all too easily. 80