Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: determining jury unanimity function of appellate court

Text: The appellate court, of course, cannot read the jurys' mind, and so review necessarily involves an examination of the charges filed, the instructions given defining the elements of those charges, the instructions given with regard to the requirement of unanimity, and the verdicts actually returned by the jury. Obviously, if the verdict specifies the theory used by the jury in finding guilt, no problem is presented. It is then only a question of examining the evidence to determine if the theory used is supported by the evidence. The question, therefore, nearly always arises where the verdict form is ambiguous and only the jurors know what was actually decided. Ambiguous jury verdicts in criminal cases are frequently the result of a failure to properly charge a crime or crimes, and of a failure to give the jury proper instructions and verdict forms. For example, if a defendant is charged in count I with two or more crimes, what does a jury verdict reveal where it finds that defendant is guilty of count I? Did the jury convict the defendant of one crime or both? Was the jury unanimous with respect to either? United States v. Starks (3rd Cir.1975), 515 F.2d 112, 116-117. Also see, United States v. Uco Oil Co. (9th Cir.1976), 546 F.2d 833, 835, cert. den. (1977), 430 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 1646, 52 L.Ed.2d 357. And, of course, the same questions can be asked, although in a slightly different context, if a defendant is charged in count I with one crime, but where several alternative theories are also alleged in that count. If the jury returns a guilty verdict to count I, the questions arise as to whether the jury convicted defendant under one alternative theory, or more than one alternative theory, or under all alternative theories. In addition, the question arises as to whether the jury reached unanimous agreement on at least one theory? No one knows. One of the first questions is to determine how the jury was instructed on the question of unanimity. Some courts have held that a general instruction on unanimity is sufficient. For example, see, State v. Arndt (1976), 87 Wash.2d 374, 553 P.2d 1328; United States v. Natelli (2nd Cir.1975), 527 F.2d 311; State v. Williams (Iowa 1979), 285 N.W.2d 248; State v. Souhrada (1948), 122 Mont. 377, 204 P.2d 792. On the other hand, other courts have held that a general instruction is not sufficient; rather, the jury must be specifically instructed that it must reach unanimous agreement on any one or more statutory theories of criminal responsibility as charged by the State. The defect of a general instruction has been pointed out in United States v. Gipson, supra: The unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Requiring the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does little to insure that his right to a unanimous verdict is protected unless this prerequisite of jury concensus as to the defendant's course of action is also required. 553 F.2d at 457-458. Implicit in this ruling is a requirement that the trial court instruct the jury that it must reach unanimity on any theory used as a basis to find guilt. Several state courts have held that a jury must be instructed that its verdict be unanimous on one or more of the alternative theories submitted to the jury for its decision. See, for example, State v. Bleazard (1943), 103 Utah 113, 133 P.2d 1000, 1003; People v. Thompson (1956), 144 Cal. App.2d (Supp.) 854, 301 P.2d 313. And more recently, in cases involving the alternative theories of premeditated murder and felony-murder, Michigan and Washington have held that the jury must be instructed that its verdict be unanimous on at least one of the theories. State v. Golliday (1979), 78 Wash.2d 121, 137, 470 P.2d 191, 201; People v. Embree (1976), 68 Mich. App. 40, 241 N.W.2d 733; People v. Olsson (1974), 56 Mich. App. 500, 507, 224 N.E.2d 691, 693-694. In Olsson, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a conviction because jury instructions failed to distinguish between felony murder and premeditated murder, and because the jury was not instructed that it must unanimously agree on the same statutory theory in order to reach a verdict. 224 N.W.2d 693-694. And in Embree, the Michigan Court of Appeals again warned trial courts that they must instruct juries that their verdict must be unanimous on the question of whether the alleged murder was premeditated or whether it was committed in a situation calling for application of the felony-murder rule. 68 Mich. App. 384, 246 N.W.2d at 7. Finally, in Golliday, the Washington Supreme Court held that instructions must clearly distinguish between the alternative theories and require the necessity for a unanimous verdict on either of the alternatives. 470 P.2d at 201. As I shall later demonstrate in detail, each of the charges involved here was based on alternative allegations. Yet the jury was not told that its verdict must be unanimous as to any one or more theories. In addition, there is no way of telling which theory or theories the jury used to convict Coleman of all three offenses  one of which triggered the imposition of the death penalty.