Opinion ID: 2571623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: specific intent jury instructions

Text: [¶ 7] Appellant first argues that the district court did not adequately instruct the jury regarding the specific intent element of first-degree arson. At trial, appellant entered a timely objection, stating that it is reversible error not to instruct the jury as to the definition of specific intent and that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant maliciously set a fire specifically intending to destroy or damage an occupied structure. See W.R.Cr.P. 30(a). Appellant contends that two jury instructions he offered at trial, which instructions the district court refused, would have adequately instructed the jury on this specific intent element. [¶ 8] We have stated that the trial judge is afforded latitude to tailor the instructions to the facts of the case, and reversible error will not be found as long as the instructions when viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire trial fairly and adequately cover the issues. Streitmatter v. State, 981 P.2d 921, 925 (Wyo. 1999) ( quoting Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1053 (Wyo.1987)). Jury instructions are designed to inform the jury about the applicable law so that the jury may apply that law to its own findings with respect to the material facts. Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 439 (Wyo.1991). Given this purpose, the test whether the jury has been instructed on the necessary elements of the crime charged is whether the instruction `leaves no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be found to have been committed.' Graham v. United States, 187 F.2d 87, 90 (D.C.Cir.1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920, 71 S.Ct. 741, 95 L.Ed. 1353 (1951); United States v. Salliey, 360 F.2d 699, 702 (4th Cir.1966). A failure to give any instruction on an essential element of a criminal offense is fundamental error, as is a confusing or misleading instruction, requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction[.] Vigil [v. State], 859 P.2d [659] at 662 [(Wyo.1993)], quoting Cole v. Young, 817 F.2d 412, 423 (7th Cir.1987) (emphasis added); Phillips v. State, 760 P.2d 388, 390 (Wyo.1988); Redland v. State, 766 P.2d 1173, 1174 (Wyo.1989). Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 1259, 1265 (Wyo.2002) ( quoting Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo.1995)) (emphasis in original). [¶ 9] According to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a), a person is guilty of first-degree arson if he maliciously starts a fire or causes an explosion with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure. The district court instructed the jury as follows regarding the elements of first-degree arson: INSTRUCTION NO. 7 The necessary elements of the offense of First Degree Arson as contained in Count I are: 1. On or about December 31, 2000; 2. In Campbell County, Wyoming; 3. The Defendant, Wade Travis Keats; 4. Maliciously started a fire(s); 5. With intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure. [¶ 10] We recently stated: In the past, crimes have commonly been categorized by whether they require a specific intent or a general intent. For many years, Wyoming had several pattern jury instructions defining and explaining the two terms, and yet, the differences between the concepts were not always readily discernible. Realizing that the distinction between a specific intent crime and a general intent crime is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by stating it in a somewhat different way. When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to be a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the jury. Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d at 1262 ( quoting Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo.1978)). Following that logic, first-degree arson can be categorized as a specific intent crime in that the statute requires that one act with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-101(a). [¶ 11] Appellant offered this additional instruction on the specific intent element of first-degree arson, which instruction the district court refused: DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. K The crime charged in this case is a serious crime which requires proof of specific intent before the Defendant can be convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent the State must prove that the Defendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, [knowingly failed to do an act which the law requires,] specifically intending a result prohibited by law. Such intent may be determined from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. An act or a failure to act is knowingly done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason. (Bracketed material in original.) The proposed jury instruction's language mirrors that contained in former W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.504 (1978). Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 9 n. 1, 55 P.3d at 1262 n. 1. [¶ 12] We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing this proposed jury instruction. The district court's jury instruction on the substantive elements of first-degree arson adequately instructed the jury regarding the specific intent element of first-degree arson, leaving `no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be found to have been committed.' Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d at 1265 ( quoting Miller, 904 P.2d at 348). Wyoming does not require particular words be used to properly instruct on the specific intent element of the crime of [first-degree arson]. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 940 (Wyo.1997). On appeal, Compton argued that the district court erred by not separately (beyond the substantive elements of the crime charged) instructing the jury on the definition of specific intent contained in the very jury instruction appellant proposed in the instant case. Id. at 940-41. We held that, instead, it is more important that the jury understand what exactly they had to determine, and the district court's elements instruction in that case specifically and precisely and in an understandable manner properly instructed the jury on the specific intent element of the crime charged. Id. at 941. [¶ 13] We further note that W.Cr.P.J.I. 3.504 is no longer contained within the pattern criminal jury instructions. Indeed, we have acknowledged a trend in the law to dispense with the pattern jury instructions defining and explaining intent due to their vagueness and general failure to enlighten juries. Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo.1997). Instead, juries should be instructed as to the appropriate intent that is an element of the particular crime; it is more important that the jury understand what exactly they [are required] to determine. Id. This is consonant with our recent holding that the test of whether a jury has been properly instructed on the necessary elements of a crime is whether the instructions leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed. Mueller v. State, 2001 WY 134, ¶ 9, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wyo.2001). The point is that attempting formally to distinguish between specific intent and general intent, beyond the substantive elements of the crime, may not be the surest way to define the nature of the intent that must be proven. Reilly, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d at 1262-63 (footnote omitted). [¶ 14] Appellant also offered this additional instruction, which instruction the district court refused: DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L You are instructed that First Degree Arson is a specific intent crime. To find the Defendant guilty, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant maliciously set a fire specifically intending to destroy or damage an occupied structure. Such intent may be determined from all the facts and circumstances presented by the evidence. [¶ 15] The district court did not err in refusing this proposed jury instruction. We are unable to discern precisely how the proposed instruction would have assisted the jury in rendering its verdict. Regarding the proposed instruction's first sentence, we find that the facts and charges of this case did not require the court to identify [the requisite] intent as `specific' or restate the name of the crime, but required the court to adequately instruct the jury that it should determine whether [appellant] was guilty of . . . first-degree arson. Compton, 931 P.2d at 940. We previously established that the district court's elements instruction in the instant case met this requirement. Juxtaposition of the proposed instruction's second sentence (that the Defendant maliciously set a fire specifically intending to destroy or damage an occupied structure) with the elements instruction actually given by the district court (the Defendant, Wade Travis Keats . . . [m]aliciously started a fire(s) . . . [w]ith intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure) reveals no meaningful distinction between the language contained in the proposed instruction and that contained in the elements instruction the district court actually gave the jury. Id. Finally, as to the proposed instruction's third sentence, the district court did instruct the jury that: The intent with which an act was done is [a] condition of the mind, that is seldom if ever, capable of direct or positive proof. Because we have no power to directly oversee the condition of a person's mind, the best we can do is infer it from the evidence introduced. The Jury may consider the circumstances surrounding the act, the doing of the act itself, the manner in which it was done, and the means used.