Opinion ID: 1708139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of the Bank.

Text: ¶ 17. Gulledge correctly notes the following general rule: The doctrine of respondent superior has its basis in the fact that the employer has the right to supervise and direct the performance of the work by his employee in all its details, and this right carries with it the correlative obligation to see to it that no torts shall be committed by the employe [sic] in the course of the performance of the character of work which the employe [sic] was appointed to do. White's Lumber & Supply Co. v. Collins, 186 Miss. 659, 191 So. 105 (1939). As Gulledge points out, under the respondent superior doctrine, one who acts through another is in law himself the actor. Fruchter v. Lynch Oil Co., 522 So.2d 195, 199 (Miss.1988). That is, [i]f B while acting on A's behalf commits a tort, A may be liable. Id. ¶ 18. However, where an employee is not acting in the furtherance of her employer's interests, the employer is not liable for her torts: The inquiry is not whether the act in question, in any case, was done, so far as time is concerned, while the servant was engaged in the master's business, nor as to mode or manner of doing it,whether in doing the act he uses the appliances of the master, but whether, from the nature of the act itself as actually done, it was an act done in the master's business, or wholly disconnected therefrom by the servant, not as servant, but as an individual on his own account Holliday v. Pizza Inn, Inc., 659 So.2d 860, 864 (Miss.1995) (quoting Canton Cotton Warehouse Co. v. Pool, 78 Miss. 147, 28 So. 823 (1900) (emphasis added)). Moreover, In determining whether a particular act is committed by a servant within the scope of his employment, the decisive question is not whether the servant was acting in accordance with the instructions of the master, but, was he at the time doing any act in furtherance of his masters' business? If a servant, having completed his duty to his master, then proceeds to prosecute some private purpose of his own, the master is not liable; but if the servant, while engaged about his master's business, merely deviates from the direct line of duty to accomplish some personal end, the master's responsibility may be suspended, but it is re-established when the servant resumes his duty. Holliday, 659 So.2d at 864-65 (quoting Barmore v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry., 85 Miss. 426, 38 So. 210 (1905) (emphasis added)). ¶ 19. The record indicates that Shaw knew Sonny, Marjorie, and Alice. She worked with Sonny at the Bank. She was not the only notary available at the Bank on the day in question. Moreover, Shaw never charged a Alice or Marjorie a fee for her services as a notary. This was the only occasion on which Shaw had notarized the signature of a person who did not appear before her when signing a document. ¶ 20. While we have already unequivocally found that Shaw's job responsibilities at the Bank included her notary public duties, we find from the record before us, and for the foregoing reasons, that Shaw's act of notarizing a forged document was not in the furtherance of the Bank's businessrather, it was a personal act. When Shaw notarized the application, she ceased to be an actor on the Bank's behalf and instead became a private actor seeking to accomplish her own private purpose. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Bank may be held liable for any of Gulledge's claims under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See Holliday, 659 So.2d at 864. ¶ 21. Finally, we note that Gulledge's claim against the Bank for negligent supervision is not considered here because that issue is not discussed in Gulledge's brief, aside from the conclusory statement that the Bank is liable to the Appellants for the negligent supervision of Deborah Shaw. It is well settled that this Court will not consider assertions which are unsupported by authority. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So.2d 1051, 1057 (Miss.2003) (citing Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So.2d 1124, 1136 (Miss. 2002)). The trial court did not err in summarily dismissing the case against the Bank.