Opinion ID: 791779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Chevron Step Two: Congressional Meaning Versus Regulatory Restrictions

Text: 70 Even if the statute is ambiguous, and even if the Attorney General is empowered to issue regulations to fill in gaps in the statute, those regulations must be reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design. NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 257, 115 S.Ct. 810. The fact that the Attorney General may regulate eligibility does not give him free rein to issue any eligibility regulations that he chooses; under the second step of Chevron, those regulations must still be based on a permissible construction of the statute. 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778.
71 To deal with the second Chevron prong, we must examine the statute in more depth. We begin with the fact that section 245(a) allows the Attorney General to grant adjustment to any alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Importantly, the statute grants eligibility to adjust status not only to those aliens who have been lawfully admitted into the United States, but also to those who have merely been paroled. 72 The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B) or in section 1184(f) of this title, in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States. 73 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Regulations prescribe in more detail who may be paroled; it appears that the broadest class of parolees comprises those whose continued detention is not in the public interest. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5). 74 Paroled aliens are not admitted to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(B). Instead, they are treated by the statute as applicants for admission. Id. § 1225(a)(1) (An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted... shall be deemed for the purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.). The statute provides that an applicant for admission shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding if an immigration officer determines that he or she is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Parole is a form of relief from immigration detention; it is not a form of relief from removal proceedings, and when the purposes of parole have been served the parolee must be returned to custody and removal proceedings must continue. Id. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Thus, the statutory structure seems to indicate that virtually all parolees will be in removal proceedings. 75 Parole is authorized by section 212 of the INA: 76 The parties to this case have not provided us with any statistics to test our supposition that most parolees are in removal proceedings. However, the First Circuit noted in Succar that it was represented in the briefs before this court that the `majority of the intended beneficiaries of parolee adjustment of status are in removal proceedings,' and that the Attorney General did not dispute that statistic. 394 F.3d at 21. 77 More compelling than any statistic, however, is the statutory structure that indicates that parolees will, by default, be in removal proceedings: any alien not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted will be placed in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), so any parolee—that is, any alien who has been inspected but not admitted—will necessarily be in removal proceedings. We thus do not rely exclusively upon the statistics provided to the Succar court; our conclusion is informed by the plain indication of congressional intent. It is clear from the statutory text that Congress intended for virtually all parolees to be in removal proceedings. 15 78 It is equally clear, of course, that Congress intended that parolees, as a general class, be eligible for adjustment of status: the statute provides explicitly that the Attorney General may grant adjustment to an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). The statute further provides that the Attorney General may grant the adjustment if the alien makes an application for such adjustment, id. § 1255(a)(1), which plainly contemplates that paroled aliens may make such an application (though of course the Attorney General need not grant it). Because the large majority of aliens paroled into the United States will be in removal proceedings, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Congress intended that the mere fact of removal proceedings would not render an alien ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. See also Succar, 394 F.3d at 25 (Congress chose not to disqualify from eligibility all of those aliens `inspected and admitted or paroled' in removal or other judicial proceedings.).
79 The regulation under which the government wants to exclude Zheng provides as follows: 80 (c) Ineligible aliens. The following categories of aliens are ineligible to apply for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident alien under section 245 of the Act: 81 ... 82 (8) Any arriving alien who is in removal proceedings pursuant to section 235(b)(1) or section 240 of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or § 1229a].... 83 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1. While the statute renders parolees eligible, as a general rule, for adjustment of status, the regulation appears to have the opposite effect. The regulation is phrased in terms of arriving aliens, as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q), but this term seems to be essentially synonymous with applicants for admission as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). See supra Part V.D.1. In particular, although the term arriving alien might sound like it refers only to those aliens physically in the process of arriving in the United States, it also extends to those who arrive and are paroled into the United States. See 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q); Succar, 394 F.3d at 17; Part IV.B, supra. Thus arriving aliens appears to encompass most or all of those aliens who are paroled into the United States, as well as many of those aliens who are detained by DHS. Indeed, in its supplemental briefing, the government states that [a] parolee is an `arriving alien' who has been permitted temporary entry into the United States, as opposed to a non-parolee `arriving alien' who has been detained for removal proceedings. 84 Similarly, the regulation limits its scope to arriving aliens who are in removal proceedings, but as we have seen this is no real limitation. At least the majority of aliens paroled into the United States are in removal proceedings, yet, as explained above, Congress's clear intent is that virtually all parolees should be in such proceedings. See supra Part V.D.1. We are thus faced with a regulation that renders most aliens paroled into the United States ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. 85 The government points out that, under its regulations, some parolees may be eligible for adjustment of status. Specifically, the government notes that an arriving alien may renew an adjustment application that was denied by a district director, if the alien had filed the denied application pursuant to an earlier admission into the United States and then renewed the application after returning to the United States under the terms of an advance parole granted in order to pursue the adjustment application. See 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1)(i) & (ii). This is, however, a very narrow exception. 16 Moreover, it does not comport with Congress's stated intent that parolees should be eligible to apply for adjustment of status. The parolees allowed to adjust status under § 1245.2(a)(1) are only those who are renewing applications that they made as admitted aliens; the regulation makes no provision for aliens making a first-time application while in removal proceedings. Thus, under the government's reading, paroled aliens may not really apply to adjust status; they may only renew applications that they made when they were not paroled but admitted. 86 In short, while there may be paroled aliens who are eligible to apply for adjustment of status under the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, the government has not pointed to any significant category of paroled aliens who would in fact be eligible to make such an application. For all practical purposes, then, it appears that § 1245.1(c)(8) renders paroled aliens ineligible to apply for adjustment of status.
87 We are thus faced with a statute providing that, in general, aliens paroled into the United States may apply to adjust their status, and a regulation providing that, in general, they may not. The conflict between regulation and statute is clear and unmistakable. Under the second step of the Chevron test, we must determine `whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and purpose. So long as the regulation bears a fair relationship to the language of the statute, reflects the views of those who sought its enactment, and matches the purpose they articulated, it will merit deference.' Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir.1994)). 88 While this is a deferential standard, we think it plain that § 1245.1(c)(8) fails to meet it. As we have explained above in some detail, Congress's clearly expressed intent was to allow most paroled aliens to apply for adjustment of status; the regulation's effect is to bar almost all such aliens from adjustment. Congress's intent is apparent both from the language of the statute, allowing aliens paroled into the United States to apply for adjustment, and from its structure, allowing such applications as a general matter and excluding only a few narrow classes from eligibility. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history. The First Circuit in Succar examined the history of INA section 245 in some detail, and came to the conclusion that Congress's intent in enacting that section was to spare admitted and paroled aliens the hardship and expense of having to leave the United States in order to apply for an adjustment of status to which they were entitled. See Succar, 394 F.3d at 32-34. 89 We have found that the text of INA section 245 leaves some ambiguity about whether the Attorney General may determine by regulation what classes of aliens are eligible to apply for adjustment of status, thus precluding reliance on the first prong of the Chevron test. See supra Part V.C. But, as we noted there, the decision is a close one: the statutory structure and language noted by the Succar court, while not unambiguous, certainly suggest that Congress intended to regulate eligibility by statute rather than to leave it in the Attorney General's hands. The closeness of the step one question has some bearing on our step two decision. While the statute may be ambiguous enough to allow for some regulatory eligibility standards, it does not so totally abdicate authority to the Attorney General as to allow a regulation, like § 1245.1(c)(8), that essentially reverses the eligibility structure set out by Congress. 90 Chevron, of course, stands for the proposition that administrative agencies receive broad deference in interpreting the statutes which they are charged with enforcing. We are mindful of our obligation to respect the decisions of the immigration agencies, which are informed by long experience and deep specialization in matters of great national importance. But we have an even higher obligation to respect the clearly expressed will of Congress, which in promulgating and amending the INA made its own considered decisions, balancing the need to swiftly remove undeserving aliens against the desire to afford every applicant a fair chance to request any immigration benefits that he or she may deserve. 91 Given Congress's intent as expressed in the language, structure, and legislative history of INA section 245, the regulation's effect of precluding almost all paroled aliens from applying to adjust their status does not harmonize[] with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and purpose. Sekula, 39 F.3d at 452. Because 8 C.F.R. § 1245.1(c)(8) is not based on a permissible reading of INA section 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), we hold that the regulation is invalid insofar as it renders parolees ineligible to apply for adjustment of status. As explained in the following Part, we will therefore remand Zheng's case to the immigration authorities for further consideration.