Opinion ID: 3011898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Law of the Case, Waiver, and Estoppel

Text: Stonington makes several additional arguments on appeal: that the Bankruptcy Court’s order violates the law of the case and that L&H’s argument that U.S. law governs distribution in the Belgian proceeding is estopped and waived. Stonington urges that the Bankruptcy Court’s order violates the law of the case doctrine. Specifically, it contends that the Bankruptcy Court, having repeatedly recognized Stonington’s right to proceed in the Belgian reorganization proceedings, file a proof of claim, and otherwise participate, cannot now order that Stonington should not be permitted to do so. We recognize, however, that the Bankruptcy Court’s previous reflections on Stonington’s ability to pursue its claims were not uttered in the same context as the ruling we review.12 Accordingly, we _________________________________________________________________ 12. In December 2000, the Bankruptcy Court said that Stonington was absolutely right in the -- contention that[it] must be permitted to 19 do not think that the Bankruptcy Court’s previous references to Stonington’s right should serve as an automatic bar, or law of the case, regarding its consideration of an anti-suit injunction and conflict of laws issue. Further, Stonington argues that the debtor’s failure to appeal the allowance of Stonington’s claims in the Belgian proceeding and the Belgian court’s rejection of the debtor’s proposed plan (which contained a subordination provision) constitute a waiver of its right to assert that Stonington should not be allowed to pursue its claims in Belgium under Belgian law. Stonington also urges that L&H has taken the position that Stonington can pursue all prepetition claims other than penalties in the Belgian proceeding.13 While we do not view this conduct as creating a bar, nonetheless we would urge that the Bankruptcy Court, as a court of equity, consider L&H’s conduct in its overall assessment of the issues before it. Especially relevant are the facts that: the debtor sought relief in the Belgian court; pursued a plan in that court; and, when faced with an adverse ruling, did not appeal it, but instead sought refuge from the Belgian court in the United States. To the extent that the Bankruptcy Court views these aspects as having bearing on the equities, it should include them in its ruling. _________________________________________________________________ participate in the Belgian reorganization proceedings. The Court made this statement while deciding the effect of the automatic stay on the Belgian order to deposit Dictaphone shares with a court-appointed trustee. It reiterated that Stonington was specifically permitted to file its pre-petition claims in Belgium and that to preclude it would be problematic in the context of the April 2001 hearing on a motion to enjoin Stonington from pursing penalties in Belgium. Even in the hearing on the motion that gives rise to this appeal, the Bankruptcy Court repeated its prior statement that Stonington could participate in the Belgian Concordat. 13. As noted above, the Belgian court had ordered L&H to deposit the Dictaphone stock with a court-appointed trustee. It imposed penalties for each day that L&H failed to comply with this order. In seeking an order from the Delaware Bankruptcy Court enjoining Stonington from pursuing these penalties in Belgium, L&H stated thatStonington should . . . have ‘full access’ to the Belgian Concordat Court, but only for the purpose of proving its pre-petition claims. 20