Opinion ID: 1286061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutional Guarantee

Text: Plaintiffs do not contend their property was taken. However, they do contend it was damaged. But that is not enough. According to the constitutional provision set out above, they would be entitled to compensation from the public only if they alleged and proved their property was damaged for public    use. The case of Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321, 327, 2 A.L.R.2d 666, had to do with a claim under a similar constitutional provision, where property was damaged as a result of an accident which happened on a public-works project. The Supreme Court of Louisiana in that case said it could not perceive how the unintentional destruction of plaintiffs' property was for a public purpose. In fact it described the damage (on page 323 of 34 So.2d) as a wholly unintentional destruction which served no public purpose whatever. The allegations of the Chavezes in this case make it clear the crushing of the sewer line and severing of the water main, with the resulting damage to their property, were accidental and unintentional. Certainly the accident and consequent damage served no public purpose, and there was absent a taking or damaging of property for public use. In Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 P. 510, 514, the Supreme Court of Utah said it was clearly of the opinion that the damages for which compensation is allowed under the constitution are such as are the direct consequences of the lawful exercise of eminent domain, and that ordinarily such damages must be unavoidable. At 200 P. 512, the court also said injuries cognizable at common law or in equity are ordinarily not covered by constitutional provisions authorizing compensation for taking or damaging property. It certainly will not be contended that every destruction of property or injury thereto by public officers or their agents, in the discharge of governmental functions, is covered by the constitutional guaranty relied upon in this case. Where the injury involves a tort, being caused by the negligence of public officers or their agents, it cannot be said that property is taken or damaged for public use. Sanguinetti v. United States, Ct.Cls., 264 U.S. 146, 150, 44 S.Ct. 264, 68 L.Ed. 608, 611; Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Company v. United States, Ct.Cls., 260 U.S. 125, 127, 43 S.Ct. 37, 67 L.Ed. 165, 167; Hughes v. United States, Ct.Cls., 230 U.S. 24, 35, 33 S.Ct. 1019, 57 L.Ed. 1374, 1379, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 624. See also Angelle v. State, supra, at 34 So.2d 325. We think the rule stated in 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain, § 14.245[1], pp. 626-628 (Revised 3d Ed.), is correct. It states: If the damage for which recovery is sought is the result of improper, unlawful or negligent construction    recovery may not be had therefor in the [condemnation] proceeding; the owner is relegated in such case to a common-law action for damages. If we permitted the theory of plaintiffs to prevail in this case, we would subject the state and city to actions for damages in all cases involving injuries to or destruction of private property resulting from the torts of their agents, when acting in an official capacity. This would effectually repeal the universal rule that a state exercising governmental functions cannot be made to respond in damages for tort and is not liable for the torts of its officers or agents in the discharge of their official duties, unless it has voluntarily assumed such liability and consented to be liable. See Art. 1, § 8, Wyoming Constitution; and 81 C.J.S. States § 130, p. 1137.