Opinion ID: 846031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the discussion of civil cases

Text: Much of the majority's opinion centers on criticizing the Court of Appeals for relying on a civil case. The Court of Appeals supported its decision with a reference to a civil case dealing with the same factual scenario as in this case, but in the context of an insurance contract, Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of Michigan v. Riddering, 172 Mich.App. 696, 432 N.W.2d 404 (1988). Given that Riddering was factually close to this case and construed essentially the same term, operation, as does this case, it was wholly appropriate for the Court of Appeals to reference it. [3] Riddering noted the distinction between interference and operation: Operation includes more than simple control as Pioneer State seems to argue on appeal. While Ms. Riddering did exercise some control over the vehicle by grabbing the steering wheel, steering is only part of operating a vehicle. Operation necessarily includes the additional functions of controlling the gas and brake pedals and all other components necessary to make a vehicle run. Operation includes control over all the parts that allow the vehicle to move, not just the steering function. Obviously, one cannot operate a vehicle only with the steeringthere must be acceleration to get anywhere and there must be braking to stop the vehicle, along with control over other key components, such as the engine. We can reach no other logical conclusion on the facts of this case than that Ms. Riddering interfered with the operation of the vehicle while it was being operated by Ms. Jaarsma. Ms. Jaarsma unequivocally testified at her deposition that Ms. Riddering's actions were a surprise and without consent or permission and the trial court so found. It logically follows that Ms. Riddering's actions, in order to constitute operation or use, had to be with Ms. Jaarsma's consent or permission, because Ms. Jaarsma was operating the vehicle at the time while occupying the driver's seat. Without this needed consent, Ms. Riddering's actions did not constitute operation of the vehicle, but, rather, interference with its operation. [ Id. at 703, 432 N.W.2d 404.] The majority first contends that Riddering used some other definition of operate than the one appropriate for this case. Again, the majority claims that it is applying the plain language. See ante at 336. This claim is at odds with the fact that the majority fails to state what makes its definition of operate different from the Court of Appeals definition in either this case or in Riddering. Next, the majority claims that Riddering improperly stated that [o]peration includes more than simple control. . . . Id. The paragraph that followed demonstrated that the Court of Appeals was noting the difference between mere influence and the dominating or directing influence required to meet the definitions of control discussed before. Riddering noted that, while Ms. Riddering did have some influence over the vehicle, it did not rise to the level of the dominating influence necessary to reach the meaning of operate. This is because Ms. Riddering could not command the gas and brake pedals or any of the other components necessary to make the vehicle run. Therefore, she did not have sufficient control of the vehicle to be considered an operator. Id. Although the majority passes over this point, the Riddering conclusion is eminently consistent with common sense. Everyone who has been in an automobile knows that you cannot operate it simply by moving the steering wheel. If you sit in a parked car and move the steering wheel clockwise and counterclockwise, you will not move the vehicle. This is because it takes more than influence or simple control over the steering wheel to make a car function. Simply put, no one would believe that interference with a steering wheel is sufficient to operate a car. Given that the Court of Appeals reading of the statute is consistent with common sense, it should not be casually overturned. The majority also complains that reliance on Riddering is inappropriate because that decision narrowly construed an exclusion in the language of an insurance contract. The majority feels that such narrow construction is inappropriate in a criminal case. [4] I disagree. The rule of lenity should be used when construing a criminal statute. It requires that criminal statutes be construed strictly and in favor of the defendant. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). The rule demands sensitivity to the rights of individual defendants. Id. Lenity is required because, often, it provides the only means of giving fair warning to people about what behavior is criminal. Constitutionally, fair warning is given only if an ambiguity in a criminal statute is construed to apply to conduct that the statute clearly designates as criminal. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). In this case, if there is any question about the level of control necessary to meet the meaning of the word operate, it must be resolved in favor of the accused. The majority's reading creates ambiguity in this statute because it is no longer clear what level of influence over a vehicle is sufficient to meet the definition of operate. The rule of lenity is especially important here, given that Riddering held that a person's action in grabbing the steering wheel does not constitute operating a motor vehicle. It must be expected that the law laid down in Riddering would affect this defendant's understanding of what constitutes a crime under the circumstances of this case. Fair warning mandates that it is made clear to people what the law intends to do if they cross a certain line. Id. at 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219. `The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.' Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). No one should be left to speculate about what constitutes a crime or about the meaning of a penal statute. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697 quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939). In this case, defendant and all others in the state could reasonably believe that interference with someone operating a motor vehicle would not be equated to operation of the vehicle. In changing the Riddering analysis, the majority holds defendant criminally responsible for conduct that he could not reasonably have understood to be proscribed. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697. This violates the constitutional right of fair notice. Id.