Opinion ID: 2994513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Abuse of

Text: Trust Sentencing Enhancement The defendant’s first challenge to his sentence centers on the district court’s decision to increase his offense level by two points for an abuse of trust pursuant to sec. 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines. In applying this increase, the district court found that the defendant represented himself as a licensed money manager to Theresa Anzine and offered to invest her money for her. The district court further determined that the defendant assumed a position of trust in respect to Anzine when she gave him money to invest, and that he abused that position by misappropriating her funds. According to the defendant, these findings are erroneous because he did not hold himself out as an expert in investing in the manner that he contends would be necessary for an abuse of trust enhancement, but only stated that he had some level of knowledge in regard to money management. The defendant admits that he took advantage of an opportunity that was presented to him by Anzine, but argues that this kind of action does not constitute an abuse of trust. The Sentencing Guidelines mandate a two-level increase [i]f the defendant abused a position of public or private trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense . . . . U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.3. In order to determine if the abuse of trust enhancement was properly applied in this case, we consider: (1) whether the defendant occupied a position of trust; and (2) whether his abuse of the position of trust significantly facilitated the crime. United States v. Sierra, 188 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1999). We review the district court’s interpretation of what constitutes a position of trust de novo, see United States v. Boyle, 10 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1993), but we review the district court’s factual determination as to whether the defendant occupied such a position for clear error, see United States v. Bhagavan, 116 F.3d 189, 192 (7th Cir. 1997). Although the defendant claims that he did not occupy a position of trust in relation to Anzine because he did not hold himself out as an expert money manager, the evidence introduced at trial indicates the opposite. The defendant told Anzine that he possessed a Series 7 license, which is the basic license required by the National Association of Securities Dealers before a person is permitted to operate as an investment broker. In addition, the defendant stated that he was knowledgeable about investments, and that he regularly invested other peoples’ money for them. These representations were sufficient to convince Anzine to entrust the defendant with her money, thereby placing the defendant in a position of trust. See United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578, 596 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that a person is considered to have occupied a position of trust if he had ’access or authority over things of value’) (quoting United States v. Lamb, 6 F.3d 415, 419 (7th Cir. 1993)). Moreover, the defendant’s actions in defrauding Anzine were not merely opportune, but were made possible by the private trust Anzine placed in him because of his avowed knowledge about financial markets and by his willingness to exploit that trust. See United States v. Kosth, 943 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting an abuse of trust enhancement where no special element of private trust [was] involved). Because the defendant’s abuse of his position of trust facilitated his commission of the fraud against Anzine, the district court properly increased the defendant’s sentence two offense levels pursuant to sec. 3B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines.