Opinion ID: 1103979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 7. Puckett has raised the following issues, verbatim, in his petition for post-conviction relief:

¶ 8. It is Puckett's contention that he was denied due process and a fundamentally fair trial because of the seating of juror No. 35, Tomoe Parker, whom Puckett asserts could not comprehend English. First, this issue was capable of being raised at the trial level and on direct appeal. It is procedurally barred from being raised for the first time in Puckett's petition for post-conviction relief. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1); Simon v. State, 857 So.2d 668, 682 (Miss.2003). Without waiving the procedural bar, Puckett's contention is also without merit. ¶ 9. Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-1 provides, in relevant part, as follows: Every citizen not under the age of twenty-one years, who is either a qualified elector, or a resident freeholder of the county for more than one year, is able to read and write, and has not been convicted of an infamous crime, or the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors within a period of five years and who is not a common gambler or habitual drunkard, is a competent juror. No person who is or has been within twelve months the overseer of a public road or road contractor shall, however, be competent to serve as a grand juror. The lack of any such qualifications on the part of one or more jurors shall not, however, vitiate an indictment or verdict. (emphasis added). ¶ 10. The record indicates that Puckett affirmed Ms. Parker's presence after fully exploring her abilities to read, write, and comprehend English. During voir dire, the trial court asked if there was anyone who cannot read or write. Two venire members raised their hands, and the following dialogue was had at the bench: THE COURT: All right. We are at the bench, T-O-M-O-E Parker, No. 35. We are in the presence of the Defendant and defense attorney. And Roger Dale Ellerman, Juror No. 53. Ms. Parker, how much formal education have you had? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: I have a high school  I am from Japan.[ [1] ] THE COURT: Where did you do your educational work? Was that in Japan or here in the states? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: Japan. THE COURT: You appear to be very fluent as far as English is concerned. JUROR TOMOE PARKER: I cannot understand big words. That is my problem. When you started getting people talking so fast  THE COURT: But you can read and write; it is just a matter of comprehending? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: Somewhat  but when I get the big words, I cannot understand. THE COURT: If You were selected for this jury panel, and you were sitting there and either a witness or an attorney said something you didn't understand, would you raise your hand and let us know that and have it clarified for you? Would you have any problem doing that? You would do that? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: If I could understand, I will. MR. ADELMAN [Defense counsel]: Were you able to fill out the questionnaire? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: No, I didn't my daughter filled it out for me. THE COURT: You understood the questions? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: Yes. Writing and reading I have no problem. MR. ADELMAN: If you were presented with written instructions of the Court, would you be able to read those? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: If people write  and I have time to read. THE COURT: They would be typed. You will have all the time you need. ¶ 11. The trial court then went on to question the reading and writing abilities of Juror No. 53, Mr. Ellerman. Upon concluding its questions, the trial court then asked for the views of counsel regarding these two potential jurors. The record reflects the following dialogue: THE COURT: I am going to need some direction. I don't want to make this decision. Obviously they both can read and write to a limited degree. I don't think they are automatically excluded under the statutory provision; so we are down to the point of whether or not y'all want to agree. MR. ADELMAN: Mr. Ellerman said he could not understand the questions. I move to strike. THE COURT: Do you have a problem? MR. JONES [Prosecutor]: If we do one, we need to do both. MR. ADELMAN: Why is that? MR. JONES: That will be fine; let's do the one.    MR. JONES: Leave the woman [Tomoe Parker] and strike the man [Mr. Ellerman]. MR. ADELMAN: I am moving to strike the man. Are you moving to strike the woman? MR. JONES: No. THE COURT: Mr. Ellerman, thank you for coming. We will excuse you.    THE COURT: And Ms. Parker, if at any point in time you don't understand what we're saying or doing, all you need to do is raise your hand and tell us that, and we'll either slow down or explain it for you or whatever. Okay? JUROR TOMOE O. PARKER: Yes, sir. ¶ 12. First, it is clear from the record that both parties explored Ms. Parker's abilities to read, write, and comprehend. The record also shows that Ms. Parker indicated that she could read and write as required by Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-1. The trial court held that she was not automatically excluded under the statutory provisions. The trial court then invited the prosecution and the defense to reach an agreement as to whether she should stricken. The record appears to indicate that the prosecution was ready to strike Ms. Parker and that it was the defense that was not agreeable. Further, Puckett did not object to Ms. Parker when the state tendered her as a juror. When the trial court presented Ms. Parker to the Defense, Mr. Adelman replied, Will accept Tomoe Parker. ¶ 13. Puckett offers the affidavit of Ms. Tomoe Parker in an apparent attempt to impeach the verdict. Puckett argues that Ms. Parker was forced to give in to what, she thought, must be the superior judgment of her fellow jurors, who had been able to understand the entire proceedings. As the State correctly points out, Rule 606(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides: (b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental process in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to beat upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. (emphasis added). Moreover, jurors generally may not impeach their own verdict by testifying about motives or influences affecting deliberations. Lewis v. State, 725 So.2d 183, 190-91 (Miss.1998) (citing Fairman v. State, 513 So.2d 910, 915-16 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 14. Finally, at the conclusion of the guilt phase of Puckett's trial, the jury was polled. The trial court specifically asked Ms. Parker if the verdict of guilty of murder during the commission of a sexual battery was indeed her verdict. The record reflects the following dialogue: THE COURT: Tomoe Parker, is that your verdict? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: Yes. ¶ 15. At the conclusion of the sentencing phase, the jury was polled again regarding their decision that Puckett should suffer death. THE COURT: Tomoe Parker, is that your verdict? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: Yes. This issue is not only procedurally barred, it is without merit.
¶ 16. Puckett's contends that the trial court judge should have dismissed Ms. Parker, sua sponte, upon learning that she did not complete the jury information questionnaire on her own. As the record indicates, Ms. Parker told the trial court that her daughter filled out the questionnaire. ¶ 17. This issue is without merit. Puckett is taking issue with the portion of Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-1, which reads: The judge shall personally examine the answers of each juror prior to empaneling the jury and each juror who cannot complete the above form shall be disqualified as a juror and discharged. The purpose of the form is to aid the trial court in determining who can and cannot read and write. The record reflects extensive voir dire by the trial court regarding Ms. Parker's ability to read and write. Puckett's counsel asked Ms. Parker if she filled out the questionnaire. MR. ADELMAN [Defense counsel]: Were you able to fill out the questionnaire? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: No, I didn't; my daughter filled it out for me. THE COURT: You understood the questions? JUROR TOMOE PARKER: Yes. Writing and reading I have no problem. Ms. Parker clearly indicated that she could read and write. ¶ 18. In Herring v. State, 374 So.2d 784 (Miss.1979), this Court held that a person who meets the other qualifications and can read and write only a few words is qualified as a juror. Further, in Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383 (Miss.1982), the Defendant asserted that juror Leflore could not read or write and moved for a mistrial. A hearing was conducted at which juror Leflore testified that she could read and write, that she read the jury instructions, and that it was only after the jury dispersed that she became ill and unable to read. The Defendant offered juror Leflore's step-daughter, Mrs. Griffin, as a witness, who testified that juror Leflore could not read. The trial judge overruled the motion for a mistrial. This Court held that [i]n view of the fact that the evidence was conflicting, a factual dispute evolved for resolution by the trial judge and held the issue to be without merit. Id. at 390. ¶ 19. In this case, there was not even a dispute as to whether Ms. Parker could read and write. Despite the fact that Ms. Parker stated her daughter filled out the Jury Information Questionnaire, the trial judge and Puckett's counsel questioned her about her ability to understand the questions asked on the questionnaire and her ability to read and write. The record supports the trial judge's finding that Ms. Parker was a qualified juror. This issue is without merit.
¶ 20. Puckett asserts that [j]ury members consumed alcohol and played cards with members of law enforcement some of whom testified during the course of the trial. Puckett directs our attention to the affidavit of Ms. Tomoe Parker. Her affidavit reads: The policemen and jurors played cards together and drank beer together while at the Holiday Inn in Gulfport. ¶ 21. First, nothing in Ms. Parker's affidavit suggests that the jurors were drinking beer with law enforcement officers who testified during the course of the trial. Further, Puckett has not identified those law enforcement officers who allegedly testified and drank beer with the jurors. It appears that Ms. Parker is most likely referring to the bailiffs assigned to the sequestered jury. ¶ 22. Second, Puckett cites the Hawaii case of Kealoha v. Tanaka, 45 Haw. 457, 370 P.2d 468 (1962), and asserts that alcohol consumption by any member of the jury was improper and constituted error. What the Hawaiian court actually held was that the consumption of liquor by some of the jurors, once segregated, is improper and constitutes error, but does not amount to prejudicial error or conduct as a matter of law. The material inquiry is whether the party to be affected by the verdict was prejudiced thereby as matter of fact. Id. at 475. `The material inquiry in such cases is whether the defendant was prejudiced thereby, in other words, whether the use was such as to affect the mind of any of the jurors and thus deprive the defendant of the benefit of the condition of mind of each and all of the jurors to which he is entitled; and if it appears that the defendant was not prejudiced the verdict can not be reversed.' Id. (quoting Territory v. Ferris, 15 Haw. 139 (1903).) ¶ 23. In King v. State, 580 So.2d 1182 (Miss.1991), this Court reviewed a similar circumstance. The trial court in King entered a sequestration order that required jurors, along with two bailiffs, to stay at a Holiday Inn each night of the four-day trial. On two separate occasions, three of the jurors visited the motel's lounge. Id. at 1186. Upon learning of the juror's visits to the lounge, two of the defendants filed a post-trial Motion to Set Aside Verdict, Declare Mistrial, and Grant a New Trial. Id. Although the trial court expressed its disappointment in the jurors' conduct, the trial court held that the conduct did not bring about the vitiation of the guilty verdict. Id. Both the trial court and this Court were more concerned with the separation of the sequestered jurors. After finding that the defendants did not present even a scintilla of evidence, this Court affirmed the trial court's decision to overrule the motion. ¶ 24. In the instant case, Puckett has not asserted that the jurors were intoxicated or that they were separated. Puckett does not present evidence that the jurors discussed the case or that the jurors were subjected to outside influence. Puckett merely asserts that [s]uch conduct raises a specter of impropriety. This issue is without merit.
¶ 25. Puckett maintains that he did not receive a fair trial because jury members were aware of the circumstances surrounding the death of Bailiff Ladner's husband, Bruce Ladner, who was a highway patrolman. Bruce Ladner was the victim of a capital murder. Puckett asserts that such knowledge by the jury constitutes extraneous influence because anything less than a guilty verdict and sentence of death would appear to be disrespectful to not only Mrs. Ladner but also to the memory of her deceased husband. ¶ 26. First, Puckett does not offer any authority in support of his contention. This Court has continually considered issues of error not supported by citation or authority as abandoned. Thibodeaux v. State, 652 So.2d 153, 155 (Miss.1995). It is the duty of an appellant to provide authority and support of an assignment of error. Drennan v. State, 695 So.2d 581, 585-86 (Miss.1997); Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 526 (Miss. 1996); Kelly v. State, 553 So.2d 517, 521 (Miss.1989); Smith v. State, 430 So.2d 406, 407 (Miss.1983); Ramseur v. State, 368 So.2d 842, 844 (Miss.1979). Because Puckett has failed to meet the burden of providing authority to support his assignment of error, he is procedurally barred. Holland, 705 So.2d at 329; Drennan, 695 So.2d at 585-86. ¶ 27. Without waiving the procedural bar, Puckett's claim has no merit. Puckett offers no proof that any juror had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the death of Bailiff Ladner's husband or that such knowledge had a prejudicial effect on the jury's verdict. Puckett directs this Court's attention to his Exhibit 7, purportedly and affidavit of Harris. Puckett's Exhibit 7 is an affidavit from James Green, an investigator for the MOCPCC who swears in his affidavit to a telephone interview with Ms. Tomoe Parker. There is nothing in Green's affidavit that relates to Bailiff Ladner or her late husband. ¶ 28. The only affidavit provided in Puckett's exhibits from an individual named Harris is Exhibit 8, which is a sworn affidavit of Tomika Harris. Harris is also an investigator for the MOCPCC. In this affidavit, Harris swears conducting an interview with Mr. Jerry Parker, an alternate juror in Puckett's trial. Harris's affidavit also comments on various statements made by Mr. Parker to her. Mr. Parker informed us that he only served as an ALTERNATE juror on this case. He stated that the bailiff's names were Mr. Warden and Mrs. Ladner (Mrs. Ladner is the widow of the late Bruce Ladner, officer slain in the line of duty years earlier). Puckett's petition, Ex. 8, Affidavit of Tomika Harris. ¶ 29. This is the only reference of Bruce Ladner's death presented by Puckett's exhibits to his application for post-conviction relief. This hearsay reference to Bruce Ladner does not assert that any juror's decision was influenced in any way because of Mrs. Ladner's presence as a bailiff in Puckett's trial. This issue is both barred from review, and without merit.
¶ 30. Puckett claims that the Mississippi Court erred in not applying the standards established by this Court in Duabert [sic] v. Merill [sic] Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), in determining whether [Dr. Michael West's, D.D.S.,] testimony should have been allowed. [2] Basically Puckett contends that the trial court and this Court erred in finding that Dr. West could testify as an expert in wound pattern analysis. Puckett maintains that Dr. West's methods were not generally accepted within the forensic science field and he should not have been allowed to testify. ¶ 31. First and foremost, the issue of whether Dr. West should have been permitted to testify as an expert witness in the field of wound patterns was raised and discussed on direct appeal. Puckett, 737 So.2d at 341-43. This Court held that the trial court did not err in allowing Dr. West to testify as an expert in the field of wound patterns. Id. at 343. This issue is procedurally barred. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3). ¶ 32. In his reply brief, Puckett offers his Exhibit 16 which he identifies as Minutes of the Ethics Committee of the American Academy of Forensic Science. The document was in response to a complaint regarding Dr. West's scientific methods. The complaint was filed after Dr. West testified in a capital murder case in 1992. The Academy appears to have recommended that Dr. Michael H. West be expelled from the Academy.... ¶ 33. Regardless of Puckett's contention and his Exhibit 16, this Court stated the following on Puckett's direct appeal regarding Puckett's challenge of Dr. West's testimony: It is interesting to note that the pathologist, Dr. Steven Hayne, also testified that the victim's wounds were consistent with State's Exhibit No. 3 without objection. Furthermore, Puckett himself testified that State's Exhibit No. 3 was the murder weapon, only that David Griffis was the one who used it to beat his wife to death. Puckett also admitted being hit by David with that very same stick. Consequently, even if it had been error to allow Dr. West to testify as a wound pattern expert, his testimony could not have been prejudicial and harmful as Puckett himself confirmed everything Dr. West stated during his own testimony. Puckett, 737 So.2d at 343. Relief on this claim is denied.
¶ 34. Puckett's claims that he was denied his fundamental right to a fair trial because the trial judge overruled his objection and permitted the testimony of Justin [3] and Jeffery Griffis, [4] the victim's children. Puckett contends that the State had already established evidence through Nancy Hatten and David Griffis that Rhonda was home alone while David and the children were out gathering pine straw before returning home around 5:00 P.M. Puckett asserts that the testimony of the children did not go to anything at issue. Their testimony was presented by prosecution purely for sympathy value. Puckett objected to the testimony of Jeffery and Justin at trial on the basis of relevancy. He also objected at trial to the cumulative nature of their testimony. The trial judge found that the boys were competent witnesses and allowed their testimony. Although Puckett was capable of raising this issue on direct appeal, he did not. The issue is procedurally barred. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1); Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193, 1208 (Miss.1999). ¶ 35. Without waiving the procedural bar, the issue is also without merit. Puckett cites two cases in his argument. First, Puckett quotes Cox v. State, 849 So.2d 1257 (Miss.2003). Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. at 1269 (emphasis added). This statement from Cox is, verbatim, M.R.E. 403. The Comment to Rule 403 states that [t]his rule also gives the trial judge discretion to exclude evidence which is merely cumulative. M.R.E. 403 cmt., citing Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886 (Miss. 1968). Further, [t]he relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court and reversal may be had only where that discretion has been abused. Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 56 (Miss.1998) (citations omitted). ¶ 36. Puckett also cites Flowers v. State, 842 So.2d 531, 541 (Miss.2003), for the proposition that evidence should be limited to what is relevant to the single issue. As the State points out, the context in which this statement was made in Flowers was a discussion regarding evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts pursuant to M.R.E. 404(b). That is not to say that eyewitness testimony should not also be relevant. `Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. M.R.E. 401. ¶ 37. Through his testimony, Jeffery identified Puckett as the man he saw inside the family's home upon returning from collecting straw on the day of the murder. He also testified that Puckett was holding on to Nancy Hatten's shirt and holding a club in the other hand. It cannot be said that Jeffery's testimony was irrelevant. ¶ 38. Justin testified that he saw his mother before going with his brother and father to collect pine straw and that his mother was okay at that time. The state argued at trial that the defense had made the opening statement that somebody else had murdered Rhonda and that Justin's testimony would help established the time frame in which the murder had occurred. This Court finds that Justin's testimony was also relevant. ¶ 39. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the relevant testimony of Justin and Jeffery was cumulative to matters already established through testimony of Nancy Hatten and David Griffis, Puckett's defense was to accuse David Griffis of the murder. The testimony of the boys corroborated portions of David Griffis's testimony. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the testimony. ¶ 40. Puckett's claim is both procedurally barred and without merit.