Opinion ID: 795341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: State Law Tortious Interference Claim

Text: 65 Champagne also alleged that the Established Distributors tortiously interfered with its relationships with the mills. To prove a claim of tortious interference with business relations, one must show (1) a business or contractual right that was interfered with, (2) interference that was malicious and wrongful and was neither justified, privileged nor excusable, and (3) damage caused by interference. Brown v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 58 P.3d 217, 223 (Okla.Civ.App.2002). The district court found that the alleged acts of interference that fell within the two-year statute of limitations period 22 were directed at Champagne's relationship with only two mills—Ormet and Commonwealth. 23 66 A. Interference With Champagne's Relationship With Ormet 67 Turning first to the alleged interference between Champagne and Ormet, the district court noted that, as no business relationship yet existed between the two, Champagne's claim of interference with business relations was more properly a claim of interference with prospective business advantage. 24 The district court then ruled that there was no evidence of improper interference and that, even if there was, there was nothing to suggest that the interference was wrongful because [i]f [Champagne] cannot demonstrate that [the Established Distributors'] actions rise to an unreasonable restraint of trade, as a matter of law, it cannot succeed on its tortious interference claim. 68 On appeal, Champagne argues that it did not need to separately plead interference with prospective business advantage, because this tort is encompassed within the tort of interference with business relations. This is incorrect. See Overbeck v. Quaker Life Ins. Co., 757 P.2d 846, 847-48 (Okla.Civ.App.1984) (Appellant argues that interference with a prospective economic advantage is synonymus [sic] with interference with contractual or business relations. This comparison is not entirely accurate. Although both torts do have similarities, the underlying theories of liability differ .... We believe the subtle differences between tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage and tortious interference with a contractual or business relation is more than just a semantical one, and thus we decline to treat the two synonymously ....); see also Gaylord Entm't Co. v. Thompson, 958 P.2d 128, 150 n. 96 (Okla. 1998) (noting that there is a difference between interference with a prospective economic advantage and with contractual or business relations). 25 We therefore restrict Champagne to its pleadings and consider only whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Champagne's interference with business relations claim. As noted, the district court rejected this claim because it found Champagne failed to establish that it had any right to a relationship with Ormet—a critical element of the claim. See Brown, 58 P.3d at 223. On appeal, Champagne does not present any argument that this ruling was wrong; we therefore affirm the district court's disposition of this claim. 69 B. Interference With Champagne's Relationship With Commonwealth 70 As the Established Distributors acknowledge, Champagne does have a business relationship with Commonwealth. The district court granted summary judgment for the Established Distributors on this claim based on its conclusions that there was no evidence of any wrongful conduct in the form of an unreasonable restraint of trade and any interference was protected by the competitors privilege. Our reversal of the district court's decisions on Champagne's federal and state antitrust claims compels a reversal of this claim as well; if Champagne can show evidence of anticompetitive conduct, it can, by definition, show wrongful conduct in support of its interference with business relations claim. Cf. Krebsbach v. Henley, 725 P.2d 852, 856-59 (Okla.1986) (discussing whether defendants unlawfully and wrongfully interfered with plaintiff's business relations by looking at whether defendants violated federal or state antitrust law and concluding that [a]s the evidence fails to support an inference that appellees' actions constituted an unlawful restraint of trade, it also fails to support any other inference which would establish that their actions in refusing to work in conjunction with appellant were in any way wrongful). We therefore remand this claim for further consideration. 26