Opinion ID: 77067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Knights Balancing Test

Text: The search of Yuknavich’s computer easily passes muster as reasonable under the balancing test set out in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587 (2001).8 In Knights, the Supreme Court examined the reasonableness of a 8 The Government urges us to uphold the search of Yuknavich’s computer based on the “special needs plus reasonableness” exception to the warrant requirement established in Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875, 107 S. Ct. at 3169. In Griffin, a Wisconsin regulation permitted a probation 12 search for investigative purposes of a probationer by a law enforcement officer. Id. at 115–16, 122 S. Ct. at 589–90. “[T]he reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19, 122 S. Ct. at 591 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999)). In this analysis, the presence of a search condition is but one “salient circumstance” to consider. Id. at 118, 122 S. Ct. at 591; see also United States v. Keith, 375 F.3d 346, 350 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding a warrantless search of a probationer’s house officer to conduct a warrantless search of a probationer’s home if there were “reasonable grounds” to believe the probationer was in violation of his probation. Id. at 870–71, 107 S. Ct. at 3167. The Supreme Court upheld a search conducted pursuant to the regulation because the regulation was justified by the “special needs” of a state’s probation system. Id. at 876, 107 S. Ct. at 3169–70. Despite the lack of a regulation or search condition in this case, the Government contends we can still rely on the “special needs” exception of Griffin. The Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have upheld warrantless searches of probationers based on reasonable suspicion where no regulation or search condition was present. See United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 910 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 34–35 (5th Cir. 1982); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1975). Yuknavich interprets Griffin as creating an exception to the warrant requirement only when (1) the probationer is subject to a regulation or search condition that requires him to submit to warrantless searches, and (2) the probation officer possesses reasonable suspicion. Because the first condition is not met here, Yuknavich argues Griffin does not apply. Although no circuit has adopted Yuknavich’s reading of Griffin, and the only support he provides for his position is a single district court opinion, United States v. Trzaska, 866 F. Supp. 98, 103–04 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), we do not need to resolve the issue today because we affirm the district court based on Knights. 13 in the absence of a state regulation or search condition where the probation officer had reasonable suspicion). Concerning a probationer’s privacy, the Supreme Court has stated: Probation, like incarceration, is a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty. Probation is one point on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service. Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S. Ct. at 591 (citations, internal quotations, and ellipsis omitted). The government has a considerable interest in supervising probationers. “[T]he very assumption of the institution of probation is that the probationer is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.” Id. at 120, 122 S. Ct. at 592 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Unlike the ordinary criminal, “probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal their criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence” because they are aware that at a probation revocation hearing, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial do not apply. Id., 122 S. Ct. at 592 (citations omitted). In Knights, “the balance of these considerations require[d] no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of th[e] probationer’s house.” Id. at 121, 122 S. Ct. at 592. 14 The only major difference between the case before us and Knights is that Knights’ probation agreement contained a provision explicitly requiring him to submit to warrantless searches, whereas no such provision is present here. We must consider whether, in this case, the lack of search condition upsets the Knights balancing test so as to require more than reasonable suspicion to justify a search of Yuknavich’s computer. Cf. United States v. Brown, 346 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir. 2003) (considering “whether, given the scope of Brown’s probationary condition, the presence of the additional personnel sway[ed] the [Knights] balancing test”). It is important to note that the search we are reviewing is limited to that of Yuknavich’s computer.9 Therefore, we must consider his expectation of privacy in his computer and computer related activities, i.e., accessing the Internet. First, we are mindful of the crime for which Yuknavich was on probation. It goes without saying that possession of child pornography is not a victimless 9 Yuknavich argues that he never asked the officers to follow him out of the living room. He contends they were just “roaming throughout the house.” In reference to how the officers were able to see Yuknavich’s computer, Goldstein testified she asked to see his computer and he took them into the bedroom, while Spencer stated: “[H]e wanted to take the clothes out of the dryer while we were there, so I just walked back—we all walked back there with him while he did that.” Admittedly, Spencer’s testimony is slightly ambiguous as to whether Yuknavich intended for the officers to follow him; however, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that Spencer’s testimony indicated the officers followed Yuknavich through the house at Yuknavich’s request. We cannot say this factual finding was clearly erroneous. Therefore, it makes no difference whether Goldstein’s or Spencer’s version of the events is more accurate: either way, the officers locating themselves in a position where they could see inside the bedroom did not constitute a search. 15 crime. A child somewhere was used to produce the images downloaded by Yuknavich, in large part, because individuals like Yuknavich exist to download the images. “Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation . . . . States thus have a vital interest in rehabilitating convicted sex offenders.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 32–33, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2024 (2002) (plurality opinion). Yuknavich’s Internet usage was explicitly restricted to “work related purposes” during “work hours.” Given this limitation, Yuknavich should have always been prepared for three questions: Do you have a computer? If yes, can you access the Internet? If yes, what are you doing on-line? Not only should he have been prepared to answer those questions, but he also should have been prepared for the officers to conduct their own research to find the answers. If the Internet restriction did not provide the officers with a greater ability to examine the life of Timothy Yuknavich, then there would be little reason for it to exist. Yuknavich’s expectation of privacy was further reduced because of his actions while on probation. He violated the terms of his release several times and often placed himself in situations that were inappropriate for a convicted child sex offender. By virtue of these infractions and inappropriate behavior, the officers were justified in monitoring him more closely and thereby imposing greater infringements on his privacy. Yuknavich was given chance after chance after 16 chance and as a result of all of those chances he should have necessarily expected closer monitoring, especially when he bought a computer—Yuknavich knew the terms of his probation severely restricted his ability to access the Internet. For an individual, who was on probation for possessing child pornography on his computer, who admitted he had masturbated to fantasies of a young boy he had sexually assaulted, who had already twice accessed the Internet without anyone’s knowledge, to purchase a computer and not expect his probation officers to see red flags everywhere is inconceivable. In sum, assuming the lack of a search condition heightened Yuknavich’s expectation of privacy, it did not sway the Knights balancing test such that the probation officers needed more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Yuknavich’s computer.10 C. Reasonable Suspicion Reasonable suspicion consists of “a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest reasonable.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S. Ct. at 592 (citation omitted). “When making a determination of reasonable suspicion, we must look at the 10 We offer no opinion on whether a warrantless search based on less than reasonable suspicion could be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 17 totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. It is clear that an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity is not enough to satisfy the minimum level of objectivity required.” United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 970 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The officer must “‘be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1107 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1990)). To determine whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to search Yuknavich’s computer, we must take stock of everything they knew before searching. They had knowledge of Yuknavich’s two prior convictions, and the restriction placed on his Internet usage. They also knew that while on probation he repeatedly walked close to, and sometimes crossed, the line of what was acceptable behavior, including twice accessing the Internet unsupervised. On the day in question, Yuknavich delayed ten minutes in opening the door—time not spent getting fully dressed because he was shirtless when he opened it—and he acted very nervous. Finally, and most damaging, the officers saw a phone line running into a modem connected to his computer. When all of those facts are 18 added up, we have no problem concluding the officers had reasonable suspicion to suspect Yuknavich’s use of his computer violated his probation.