Opinion ID: 1479485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant Grayson

Text: Grayson filed a pretrial motion to suppress all the fruits of his allegedly illegal warrantless arrest and the subsequent search of his dwelling, including any and all statements obtained by the police which were fruits of the illegal arrest or obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. He also sought to suppress as the fruits of his allegedly illegally obtained statements, the coat he had worn on the night of the crimes, a police photograph of the blister in the webbing of his hand, William Wright's testimony, and the items seized at his apartment.
It is a `basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 588-89, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 1381, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (the Fourth Amendment further bars police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry for purposes of a routine felony arrest) (citing Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385 (1970) (en banc)). However, there is an exception to the warrant requirement where exigent circumstances are present. Payton, supra, 445 U.S. at 590, 100 S.Ct. at 1382; Dorman, supra, 140 U.S.App. D.C. at 319, 435 F.2d at 391; United States v. Minick, 455 A.2d 874 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 111, 78 L.Ed.2d 112 (1983). The Dorman criteria for determining whether there are exigent circumstances are well settled. As summarized in United States v. Lindsay, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 110, 506 F.2d 166, 171 (1974), they are: (1) a grave offense is involved, particularly a crime of violence; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) a clear showing of probable cause; (4) a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the dwelling; (5) the likelihood of escape if not swiftly apprehended; (6) a peaceful entry as opposed to a breaking; and (7) the time of entry (night or day). The trial court concluded there were exigent circumstances. We must accept the trial court's factual determinations absent clear error. Minick, supra, 455 A.2d at 876 (citing Brooks v. United States, 367 A.2d 1297, 1302 (D.C.1976)). Applying the analysis of Minick, supra, 455 A.2d at 876, [7] and Dorman, supra, 140 U.S.App. D.C. at 320-21, 435 F.2d at 392-93 to determine whether the police actions can be upheld, we conclude the trial court carefully considered the seriousness of the intrusion and, in view of the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing, we find no reversible error in its conclusion that the warrantless entry was justified by exigent circumstances. All but one of the Dorman factors are easily disposed of here. The offense involved was clearly a grave one. The police could reasonably have believed Grayson would be armed since Melson told them Grayson had the shotgun with him at home and would take it with him if he left his home. There was also a clear showing of probable cause since Melson, as a citizen reporting criminal activity, [8] provided the police with substantial evidence that Grayson had committed the crimes. Detective Green testified that several of the facts Melson related would have been known only by someone with firsthand knowledge or by someone who had spoken with the actual perpetrator. Under the totality of circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), we hold there was a clear showing of probable cause. The record supports the trial court's finding that the police had strong reason to believe that Grayson was in the dwelling at the time. Although Detective Green could not remember how Melson knew Grayson was home, Green testified he was positive that Melson told him that Grayson was there at that time, and he was also sure he asked Melson how he knew and was satisfied with the answer. Finally, the peacefulness of the entry, offset the concern that the police entered at night. Minick, supra, 455 A.2d at 878; Brooks, supra, 367 A.2d at 1303. Grayson contends, however, that there was no evidence he was likely to flee and, therefore, the police had time to obtain a warrant. This court has taken an expansive view of the likelihood of escape criterion, Minick, supra, 455 A.2d at 878, and [n]ot all the indicia of exigency need be present to justify a warrantless search. Gaulmon v. United States, 465 A.2d 847, 850 (D.C.1983). Under limited circumstances, the `likelihood of escape' inquiry properly includes consideration of the probability that evidence as well as the suspect may be lost. Brooks, supra, 367 A.2d at 1303 and cases cited (footnote omitted). Exigency is heightened where the evidence about to be removed is a gun used to kill. See United States v. Allison, 205 U.S.App. D.C. 270, 272, 639 F.2d 792, 794 (1980); United States v. Hendrix, 194 U.S.App. D.C. 76, 79, 595 F.2d 883, 886 (1979); cf. Rushing v. United States, 381 A.2d 252, 256 (D.C.1977). The evidence before the trial court was that the police did not know how long Grayson would remain at home. They were dealing with a relatively recent crime, and thought a prompt arrest might enable them to locate and recover the instrumentalities and fruits of the crime before they were disposed of. Dorman, supra, 140 U.S.App.D.C. at 321, 435 F.2d at 393; cf. United States v. McEachin, 216 U.S.App. D.C. 320, 670 F.2d 1139, 1145 (1981) (information that defendant about to dispose of shotgun which was evidence of crime which occurred three weeks prior sufficient exigent circumstances). In explaining why, after starting to prepare warrant papers, he decided to act without obtaining a warrant, Detective Green testified that he was primarily concerned about recovering the sawed-off shotgun. He knew it would take between two and three hours to get a warrant, and his experience convinced him that all the evidence would have disappeared if he had not acted very quickly. But, before proceeding without a warrant, Detective Green conferred with a senior Assistant United States Attorney and both agreed that Grayson should be arrested immediately. The trial court must be guided, in making its determination of exigent circumstances, by the realities of the situation facing the police as it is presented in the record. United States v. Robinson, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 351, 354, 533 F.2d 578, 581 (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 956, 96 S.Ct. 1432, 47 L.Ed.2d 362 (1976). It must also be mindful of the danger that a preservation of the evidence rationale, if unrestrained, could undermine the Fourth Amendment's protections. Brooks, supra, 367 A.2d at 1303. But given the facts that the shooting and robberies were recent, and the police had obtained information that a suspect whom they had clear probable cause to arrest was, at least temporarily, at a given location with the murder weapon, and likely also to dispose of it and the robbery money, we cannot say the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence was likely to disappear if the police did not act promptly and that this provided sufficient urgency to justify a warrantless entry. Lastly, the Minick analysis requires the court to determine whether the police, confronted by exigent circumstances, entered the premises without unreasonable delay. Minick, supra, 455 A.2d at 881. (Even when the Dorman criteria are met, the court shall not excuse the unexplained failure of the police to procure a warrant if they unreasonably delayed their investigation or entry.). Melson identified Grayson at approximately 8:45 p.m. and the police entered Grayson's mother's home a few minutes after 10:00 p.m. The trial court's finding that the police did not unreasonably delay their entry is supported by the evidence in the record. Accordingly we conclude that, consistent with our standard of review and the Dorman factors, a warrantless entry into Grayson's mother's apartment at 10:00 p.m. to effectuate his arrest was justified. We also affirm the trial court's ruling that the seizure of the gym bag and its contents (the shotgun and Grayson's eyeglasses), a coat, and the money from Grayson's bureau was pursuant to validly given consent. One exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment is a search conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Welch v. United States, 466 A.2d 829, 843 (D.C. 1983); Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911, 920 (D.C.1979). The consent must be voluntary and the voluntariness is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. at 2048; Welch, supra, 466 A.2d at 844. Permission for a search need not be given by the defendant but may also be obtained from a third party who possesse[s] common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969). The trial court found that Grayson's mother, as the lessee and person who exercised control over the entire apartment, had authority to consent to the search of Grayson's bedroom, and that her consent was voluntary and not the product of improper pressure. The record indicates that the trial court assessed the totality of the circumstances and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, particularly Grayson's mother's demeanor. Since determinations on the issue of consent are factual in nature, ... they may not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. Welch, supra, 466 A.2d at 844 (citations omitted). We hold the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence. Appellant's claim that his mother's authority to consent to a search of the room did not extend to a search of the gym bag is without merit. Grayson did nothing to assert an exclusive right of control over the bag; it was unzipped and in an open area of the apartment to which all members of the household had access. See United States v. Harrison, 220 U.S.App. D.C. 124, 129, 679 F.2d 942, 947 (1982) (where boxes found in common area, not sealed or taped but closed by crisscrossed flaps, wife's consent to search of the boxes held valid); Welch, supra, 466 A.2d at 845 (wife had sufficient relationship to basement office to consent to search of unlocked desk). Since Grayson assumed the risk that his mother would permit someone to look in the bag, Frazier v. Cupp, supra, 394 U.S. at 740, 89 S.Ct. at 1425, we affirm the trial court's ruling that she had authority to consent to the search of the room and the bag.
Grayson bases his Fifth Amendment claim on his contention that statements obtained by Detective Green were in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 2, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, because Detective Green did not scrupulously honor his asserted rights to remain silent and not to answer questions without an attorney present. Michigan v. Mosley, supra note 3, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313. 1. The Statements. Under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627, [o]nce warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. The issue before us is whether Detective Green's remarks to Grayson after he invoked his rights to remain silent and not to answer questions without an attorney present constituted interrogation. In deciding this issue, we are guided by Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), which was decided while this appeal was pending. See United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42 (D.C.), reh'g denied, 441 A.2d 936 (D.C. 1981). In Innis, supra, the Supreme Court defined interrogation under Miranda to refer not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The Innis test of interrogation requires us to make an objective evaluation of the normally foreseeable effect of Detective Green's remarks, which turns on the objective purpose manifested by Green, and then to consider any peculiar susceptibilities of Grayson which were known to Detective Green when he spoke to him in the homicide office. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90; ( Dalton ) Hawkins v. United States, 461 A.2d 1025, 1030 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 734, 79 L.Ed.2d 193 (1984). The latter part of the Innis definition of interrogation focuses primarily on the perceptions of the subject in order to reflect the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1690. [9] In Miranda the Court noted that coercion could occur without direct questioning, citing among examples, the use of a coached witness in a lineup that was designed to establish that the defendant was in fact guilty as a predicate for future interrogation and the use of psychological ploys such as to posit the guilt of the subject. See id. (citing Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 450, 453, 86 S.Ct. at 1615, 1616). In Innis, the Court also noted that finding a defendant is subjected to subtle compulsion is not the end of the inquiry since it must also be established that a suspect's incriminating response was the product of words or actions by the police that they should have known were likely to elicit any response whether inculpatory or exculpatory that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 300-01 & n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90 & n. 5; Brewster v. United States, 271 A.2d 409, 412 (D.C.1970). Detective Green testified that when he arrested Grayson he told the transporting Officer, Officer Lomax, Don't talk to this man. Don't have any conversation with him. If he talks to you, tell him to be quiet. Just take him to my office. We'll be there as soon as we can. Other detectives at the scene told Lomax to read Grayson his Miranda rights; Lomax did, and he also called the homicide office to tell the detectives to advise Grayson of his rights when he arrived there. At the homicide office, Grayson was given a rights form (Form PD 47), which he read, marked and signed. On both occasions Grayson indicated that he did not want to answer any questions and did not want to answer questions without an attorney present. When Detective Green arrived at the homicide office, he was informed that Grayson had asserted his rights to silence and to have an attorney present during any questioning. Green looked at the rights form which Grayson had executed and also spoke with the detectives who had advised Grayson of his rights. Green then went with his partner to the interview room where Grayson was and spoke to him for almost ten minutes. In summarizing his remarks, Detective Green testified: A. I explained to Mr. Grayson that I was the officer who had arrested him in the apartment. I explained to him that I knew he had been advised of his rights by the uniformed officer who brought him down here. I asked him to please not say anything to me, but to listen, at which time I told him that the officer that had advised him of his rights knew nothing about the investigation, he was simply a transporting police officer from the scene of the arrest to our office; and I told Mr. Grayson that  in fact, I had the rights card in my hand  that he had said no, that he didn't want to answer any questions. I explained to Mr. Grayson and explained  and told him that he was arrested for homicide, that we had a  what we felt to be a very strong case. Q. Did you tell him anything about the case itself, where it had occurred or when, anything of that nature? A. Not  not specifics, no sir. I told him that we had in fact recovered a shotgun from his room, that we were given information by a citizen that not only was he directly involved in the homicide, but that he was fingered as the trigger man. I explained to him that if he wanted to tell me what happened, that he had an opportunity to do so; that the information we were given led us directly to him, to the shotgun, to the recovery of some money, and other items that we felt were evidence in the case; that it was unfortunate that the officer advised him of his rights prior to us getting there, that he knew nothing about the case; and I told him that if he wanted, in fact, now to tell me what happened, and tell me his involvement, if any, in the case, that he could do so. Grayson did not say anything. Detective Green gave him another rights form and asked him to read it. Grayson then told Detective Green, before reading the new rights form, that he wanted to tell him what had happened. Detective Green testified: I told him that I didn't want him to say anything to me, or to ask me any questions, or to tell me anything, until he read that form, and that if he wished, at that point, to waive his rights, that he could do so, and then we would have a conversation with one another. I still had not asked him any questions. I told him that I wanted him to read this form, and if he did, in fact, want to talk to me, to answer the questions on the back side of the form. Grayson read the rights form and answered all four questions yes, indicating that he was waiving his previously asserted rights. [10] Grayson thereafter gave oral and written statements to the police. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding Grayson's statements were voluntarily made under Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911 (D.C. 1979), and that his waiver of his rights was a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). The trial court did not specifically address whether Grayson's asserted Miranda rights were scrupulously honored under Mosley, supra note 3, or whether he was interrogated; nor were its findings the functional equivalent of findings on those issues. We affirm the trial court's finding that Grayson had invoked his rights to remain silent and not say anything without an attorney present since it is supported by substantial evidence. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1981). However, under ( Joseph ) Wilson v. United States, 444 A.2d 25, 27-28 (D.C.1982), we can only affirm the trial court's determination that a defendant made a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right if the defendant's asserted Miranda rights were scrupulously honored under Mosley. Since the record before us is sufficient, we must therefore determine whether, as a matter of law, Grayson's rights were scrupulously honored. Hawkins, supra, 461 A.2d at 1032; Alexander, supra, 428 A.2d at 49. Objectively viewing Detective Green's remarks and actions, we hold that he should have known they were reasonably likely to cause Grayson to relinquish the rights he had asserted under Miranda and to elicit incriminating evidence. [11] Detective Green's remarks were not a few offhand remarks, as in Innis, and there were no extenuating circumstances to suggest that Detective Green had any purpose in inducing Grayson to talk other than to pursue his investigation, as did the detective in Alexander, supra, 428 A.2d at 49. In view of the information the police had from Melson and the recovery of the shotgun and other evidence, this was not a case where a victim or innocent bystander was to be saved, [12] and the time for totally exculpatory explanations had passed; [13] nor was this a situation which can fairly be characterized as responding to the defendant's need for consolation. [14] Detective Green was an experienced detective and was familiar with Miranda procedures. [15] When he spoke to Grayson, he was not engaged in routine booking and arrest procedures, as in Hawkins, supra, 461 A.2d 1025. Rather, his remarks went to the heart of the offense under investigation, relating details about the strong case the police thought they had. Wilson, supra, 444 A.2d at 27-28; see Miley v. United States, 477 A.2d 720 (D.C.1984). Moreover, his remarks were made after Grayson's earlier invocation of his right to counsel had acknowledged his position vis-a-vis the police was one of weakness, Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at 110 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. at 329 n. 2, (White, J., concurring), and when the proper way to communicate was through Grayson's lawyer, or by waiting until a lawyer was present. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. [16] The record does not indicate Grayson suffered from any peculiar susceptibilities when Detective Green spoke to him. Grayson was not distraught (the killing had occurred the day before his arrest and involved a stranger, unlike Alexander ), nor impaired mentally by alcohol or drugs. Nor was he naive, like the defendant in Alexander; Grayson was 19 years old and had a prior felony conviction. [17] However, Detective Green admitted that when he arrived at the homicide office Grayson was afraid because he was unaware of why he had been arrested. Green also admitted that his remarks were intended to let [Grayson] know that we knew he was the trigger man in this case, and there were a lot of things that we did not know, and I would like very much for him to tell me if he so desired. We hold Detective Green's remarks were designed to elicit an incriminating response in the face of Grayson's assertion of his rights to silence and counsel and constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. Furthermore, upon examining the factors in Mosley, supra, [18] to determine ultimately whether Grayson's Fifth Amendment rights were violated, Wilson, supra, 444 A.2d at 29, we conclude that Detective Green's action did not comport with the guidelines as set forth in Mosley. The transporting officer testified he did not ask Grayson any questions, not even whether Grayson understood the Miranda rights of which he had been advised; the fifteen minute interval between Grayson's reassertion of his rights and Green's remarks is not the significant type of break described in Mosley; nor did Detective Green begin his remarks by first giving Grayson new Miranda warnings. Accordingly, we hold that Grayson was provided insufficient Mosley safeguards to assure that his rights were scrupulously honored. Wilson, supra, 444 A.2d at 29; Peoples v. United States, 395 A.2d 41 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 2826, 61 L.Ed.2d 277 (1979). Therefore, we conclude his statements were not the result of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege for purposes of his Fifth Amendment protection required by Miranda, [19] and should have been suppressed. Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at 100, 96 S.Ct. at 324 (procedures established by Miranda must be followed or any statements given by the person in custody cannot be admitted over his objection in evidence against him as a defendant at trial, even though the statement may in fact be wholly voluntary); Wilson, supra, 444 A.2d at 30; Alexander, supra, 428 A.2d at 52. [20] 2. The Fruits. Grayson also seeks to suppress the tangible fruits of the violation of his Miranda rights. The government contends that the exclusionary rule does not apply to the fruits of a Miranda violation. However, we need not decide this issue because all of the evidence Grayson seeks to have excluded was either in plain view, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468-69, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2039-40, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), or arrived at by an independent source. [21] Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). Grayson's coat had been described by a bystander who saw three men fleeing in an alley behind the garage on the night of the crimes, and was in plain view when Grayson, wearing the coat, was taken to the homicide office following his arrest. The blister injury to his hand would have been observed by any of the officers who conducted the booking process, especially in the course of taking fingerprints, see Nix v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). As previously discussed, supra Part II A, the shotgun, gym bag, eyeglasses, and money were seized pursuant to a valid consent search. With respect to Wright's testimony, the record indicates that Wright was located through information provided to Detective Green by Holland; Grayson did not name Holland in his statement, and Melson had told the police during their initial meeting about the others involved in planning the robbery. Finally, the trial court's finding that Wright voluntarily gave the police the attache case, paper bag and robbery money is supported by evidence in the record. 3. Harmless Error. This court has held that the admission of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda is subject to the harmless constitutional error standard of Chapman v. California, supra note 4, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. Lewis v. United States, 483 A.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. 1984) ( Chapman standard applicable where statement is voluntary); see also Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to admit statements deliberately elicited after Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached); Miley, supra, 477 A.2d at 724 (improper admission of statements obtained during custodial interrogation harmless beyond reasonable doubt). [22] Grayson does not contend, and the record does not suggest, that his statement was involuntary because compelled by police threats or promises or third degree tactics. Rather, the coercion of which he complains relates to the conditions which we hold constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation. Even were we to hold that, therefore, Grayson could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, ( Joseph ) Wilson, supra, 444 A.2d at 27-28, we would hold that the interrogation in this case involved no compulsion sufficient to breach the right against compulsory self-incrimination and his statement was voluntary for purposes of the harmless error analysis. See Michigan v. Tucker, supra note 21, 417 U.S. at 445, 94 S.Ct. at 2364; [23] Lewis, supra at 1131 n. 7 (dictum). [24] Thus we must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Chapman v. California, supra note 4, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. at 827 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230-231, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). As this court commented in Brooks, supra, 367 A.2d at 1309-10, the harmless error analysis should not be limited to superficial inquiry as to whether the same verdict would have been possible absent the tainted evidence, but must also consider its probable impact on the minds of an average jury (quoting Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969)). [25] Following the analysis of Lewis, supra, we first examine the substance of Grayson's admissions to Holland, Melson and Wright, and the other evidence adduced by the government which tended to establish the same facts admitted by Grayson in his admissions to them, and then consider the effect on the jury of Detective Green's testimony about Grayson's confession. Holland testified he met the appellants in Derrington's apartment on the Sunday before the Metheny robberies to plan the liquor store robbery. Derrington had told them it would involve a white man in a liquor store in Northwest who carried the store receipts in a suitcase. The man had a .38 gun, and all the robbers would carry guns; Derrington was to have a .25 automatic gun with him and Grayson would have his shotgun. Holland claimed he had decided later not to join them after talking to his girlfriend who said it was not worth it. The day after the robbery, Grayson telephoned Holland and told him about the robbery, including that he had shot a white man in the face and taken a bag containing money from the lady who was with the man. Grayson said he had shot the man because the man had a .38 pistol, and because Andre's gun had jammed. Holland also testified he had previously seen Grayson's sawed-off shotgun. Melson's testimony was similar. Melson had also heard appellants talking about robbing a white man who owned a liquor store downtown. He testified Derrington had instructed Grayson to shoot the man when they went in. Melson told Grayson he did not want to join them. The morning after the Metheny robberies Grayson had come to Melson's home and showed him a lot of money from the robbery. Grayson told Melson he had shot the man, who was in a basement, because after the man had assisted a lady into the car, he appeared to reach for something. Melson, too, had previously seen Grayson's shotgun. Wright testified that Derrington had been staying at his apartment for several days. Grayson had come over with others on the afternoon of the robbery, and appellants and two others had left early in the evening. When the four men returned to Wright's apartment later that evening, Wright noticed they had an attache case and Grayson had a shotgun. Wright heard Grayson say something about popping someone in the eye. The four men went into a bedroom to divide the money, and when Derrington was about to throw away the attache case, Wright asked if he could have it and Derrington gave it to him. The next day Wright gave the case to Detective Green, who also found a paper bag in the bedroom. Other testimony corroborated the testimony about Grayson's admissions. Although Mrs. Metheny could not identify any of the perpetrators, including Grayson, in a lineup, she described the shooting that occurred after her husband had assisted her and put his attache case in the car, including how a gun had jammed and the gunman had taken her purse and the attache case. An employee at the liquor store testified he thought appellants had previously been in the store, and described Mr. Metheny's practice of putting the store receipts in a paper bag which he then put in his attache case. A bystander saw three men running in an alley behind the garage at the time of the robbery; one man had on a trenchcoat and appeared to be hiding something underneath it. The physical evidence recovered by the police included the victim's attache case and Grayson's shotgun. Mrs. Metheny identified her husband's attache case, which was the same one Wright had given to Detective Green, and a paper bag as similar to the kind her husband used for the store's receipts. She also identified Grayson's eyeglasses as like those the gunman was wearing, and his shotgun as looking like the murder weapon. Holland and Melson also identified Grayson's shotgun. In addition, a firearms identification expert testified that the shotgun casing found at the scene of the shooting had been fired from Grayson's shotgun. The wounds suffered by Mr. Metheny were also consistent with the spray of pellets which occurred when Grayson's shotgun was fired. [26] A police firearms expert testified the blister on Grayson's hand could have been caused by firing the shotgun with the index finger. The coat seized from Grayson was similar to that described by the bystander who saw three men running down an alley near the garage. Detective Green testified that Grayson had admitted driving to the garage with three other men, whom he claimed not to know, to rob a white man. The man had assisted his wife into a car in an underground garage, and as he was walking to the other side, Grayson admitted he fired at him. Grayson claimed, however, that as he was fumbling with the gun which was inside his coat, it accidentally went off. He also claimed he had gone over to the car to see if the lady was all right and somehow had taken the attache case. He said the shotgun had caused a blister on his hand, and identified his eyeglasses and the coat he had worn during the robbery, as well as the money from his bureau, as proceeds of the robbery. Based on Grayson's admissions to Holland and Melson, which Grayson does not seek to suppress and were properly admitted in evidence against him, [27] and the corroborative testimonial and physical evidence, we are satisfied that Detective Green's tainted testimony about Grayson's confession could not have affected the verdict. We have reached this conclusion only after examining four aspects of the trial relating to the impact of the tainted testimony: first, its probative value as compared to the untainted evidence; second, the extent to which the untainted evidence was disputed; third, the effect of the tainted evidence on Grayson's presentation of a defense; and fourth, the effect of inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony. A jury is likely to give greater weight to a homicide detective's testimony about a defendant's voluntary confession than to the testimony of a defendant's friends and accomplices about his admissions. Thus, the latter testimony could be accepted primarily as reinforcing the former. Indeed, this is how the prosecutor described the case in his opening statement to the jury. Cf. Commonwealth v. Pearson, 427 Pa. 45, 233 A.2d 552 (1967) (where government emphasizes tainted evidence, error less likely to be harmless). However, as the trial developed, the testimony of Holland, Melson and Wright, as supported by the physical evidence, presented the jury with consistent testimony about all elements of the crimes necessary to convict Grayson. By the time Detective Green testified about Grayson's confession, his testimony was cumulative in all significant respects, [28] and this was how the prosecutor presented the case to the jury in his closing argument. Because of redaction problems, Green's testimony about Grayson's confession was relatively limited in comparison to Holland's and Melson's. Furthermore, the probative value of their testimony about Grayson's admissions was somewhat enhanced because his admissions had preceded police involvement in the case and were related to Detective Green before the witnesses could confer among themselves. Moreover, even absent the cumulative nature of most of Green's tainted testimony, we are also satisfied that the untainted evidence was compelling even though disputed by the defense through cross-examination and in closing argument. See Field, supra note 25, at 44. By cross-examination and in argument to the jury, defense counsel suggested that Holland, Melson and Wright might have been involved in the crimes. Yet, despite vigorous cross-examination, the witnesses did not change their stories, which remained mutually corroborative and was corroborated by the physical evidence. Each witness continued to deny he was involved in the crimes for which appellants were on trial or that he had any personal advantage to gain; Detective Green testified that no promises had been made to any of the government's witnesses. Further, some of the impact of the defense attacks was diffused by the government's direct examination which explored the issue of the witness' motives for testifying. [29] We also conclude that Detective Green's tainted testimony was only one of several factors limiting Grayson's defense. See Fahy v. Connecticut, supra, 375 U.S. at 90-91, 84 S.Ct. at 232-233; United States v. Baldwin, 691 F.2d 718, 724 (5th Cir.1982) (harmless error where over-whelming evidence of guilt and no claim tainted confession exerted adverse impact on conduct of defense and record failed to disclose such impact); Brooks, supra, 367 A.2d at 1310. Admittedly, the inconsistencies between Grayson's admissions to Holland and Melson and his confession to Green were sufficient to highlight the implausibility of his explanation to Green that the shooting had been an accident. But even without Green's tainted testimony, Grayson's admissions to the other witnesses and the physical evidence recovered by the police limited the defense he could present. Holland and Melson also testified that Grayson had not indicated on the day after the robbery that the shooting was accidental. We recognize, however, Detective Green's testimony was also designed to allay jury skepticism about Melson's and Holland's testimony. Green testified after Holland, Melson and Wright, and in the course of reviewing his investigation he summarized what they had told him, and on redirect examination he vouched for Melson's truthfulness and Holland's lack of involvement in the homicide. Much of this testimony was inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony, [30] but it was also independent of his tainted testimony, and in the absence of defense objection, the trial court was not under a duty to strike it sua sponte. Id. In addition, Green could properly testify about the circumstances under which he had spoken to Holland, Melson and Wright, and about Holland's arrest and the dismissal of the charges. Thus, the prosecutor had evidence on which he could properly base his closing argument that Melson, Holland and Wright did not stand to gain personally by testifying against appellants. The court instructed the jury that it should receive the testimony of the accomplice Holland with caution, and could not convict Grayson unless his confession was corroborated or there was independent evidence of his guilt. Neither the note from the jury requesting, after two hours' deliberation, a clearer instruction on the meaning of premeditated murder, nor the length of the jury's deliberations suggests to us the verdict was a compromise or that the jury thought the case was close. Accordingly, as virtually everything in [Detective Green's testimony about Grayson's confession] was otherwise presented to the jury ..., Lewis, supra, 483 A.2d at 1131, and upon analysis of its impact, we hold the tainted testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.