Opinion ID: 2600752
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The plain meaning of boundary change supports the landowners' interpretation.

Text: In interpreting a statute, we have rejected a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule in favor of a sliding scale approach. [8] The plainer the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be. [9] The language of a statute is construed in accordance with [its] common usage, unless the word or phrase in question has acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction. [10] We presume that every word in the statute was intentionally included, and must be given some effect. [11] In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, we refrain from adding terms. [12] The phrase boundary change is not defined in AS 09.55.275 or elsewhere in the Alaska Statutes. [13] It has not acquired a particular meaning through judicial construction. Although the municipality and the landowners have cited cases that use boundary in a manner consistent with their respective positions, these usages do not control our interpretation. We have no reason to think that the legislature intended to use boundary in the narrow sense urged by the municipality. Boundary is commonly defined as [s]omething indicating a border or limit. [14] BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines boundary as: Every separation, natural or artificial, which marks the confines or line of division of two contiguous properties. Limits or marks of enclosures if possession be without title, or the boundaries or limits stated in title deed if possession be under a title. See also Land boundaries; Metes and bounds; Plat map. [15] A boundary is a separation that marks the limits of property. To the extent that the municipality thinks the statute does not apply to an easement, we disagree. Easements are property: Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that which belongs exclusively to one. In the strict legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government. The term is said to extend to every species of valuable right and interest.... The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real and personal property, easements, franchise, and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of one's property rights by actionable wrong. [16] Easements also have limits in the physical and measurable sense. These easements certainly do. One of them currently extends through the former location of twenty-two of the Black Angus Inn's rooms, and the other extends through the former location of a gasoline dispensing island. And the limits have certainly changed. We think the plain meaning of boundary change includes an easement that functionally interferes with the owner's exclusive use, as do the easements at issue in this case. The municipality has failed to demonstrate that the word boundary must be read as holding a more particular meaning. It is a canon of statutory construction that the reading of the statute should not render any of its sections meaningless. [17] The landowners argue that the municipality's interpretation renders the final clause of the first sentence meaningless. They reason that if replat were only required for boundary changes of fee simple interests, it would be unnecessary to require that the replat show clearly the location of the proposed public streets, easements, right-of-ways, and other taking of private property. [18] They note that the use of the term proposed proves that the replat must show that which will be acquired, not that which has already been acquired. We agree. The municipality argues that rights-of-way are not limited to easements, but include fee simple interests. The municipality concludes from this that the final clause of section .275 is not rendered meaningless by the municipality's construction. But this argument ignores the inclusion of easements in the statute's list of interests that the replat must show clearly. Even though a right-of-way can refer to a fee simple estate, the statute requires that proposed ... easements ... and other taking of private property be shown in the replat. [19] The municipality argues that the landowners' interpretation fails to give effect to the statutory phrase that results in a boundary change. We can contemplate hypothetical situations in which an interest is taken without causing a boundary change, thus giving meaning to the statute's limiting language that results in a boundary change. For example, no boundary change occurs if the condemning authority takes the entire parcel in fee simple, if the proposed easement will be coextensive with the parcel's existing boundaries, or if the municipality broadens the scope of an existing easement without altering the easement's boundaries. A temporary easement does not result in a boundary change. The limitation thus retains meaning, even assuming the circumstances it excludes are rare. If the legislature had intended the meaning suggested by the municipality, it could have easily tied the replat obligation to fee simple interests. It alternatively could have defined boundary change to exclude easements. That it did neither suggests, but does not compel, the conclusion that it intended boundary change to include easements. Given that the plain meaning of boundary change encompasses changes in easement borders, such as those in the case now before us, we will apply the plain meaning of the language absent convincing evidence that the legislature intended a different result. [20]