Opinion ID: 175339
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Attacking Aurora's Certification are Preempted

Text: For similar reasons, the class plaintiffs' claims that Aurora and the retailers sold milk as organic when in fact it was not organic are preempted because they conflict with the OFPA. Even where concurrent regulation is not totally precluded... state and local enactments are nullified to the extent that they actually conflict with federal law. ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir.1986). The class plaintiffs argue the defendants must be both certified and compliant with the underlying requirements in order to comply with the OFPA. Viewed in light of the OFPA's structure and purpose, compliance and certification cannot be separate requirements. Compliance with the regulations may lead to certification, and failure to comply with the regulations may lead to nonapproval, suspension, or revocation of certification, see 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.405, 205.660, but compliance with the regulations is not a separate requirement independently enforceable via state law. In arriving at this conclusion, we need look no further than the purposes articulated in the OFPA itself. The first purpose, to establish national standards governing the marketing of certain agricultural products as organically produced products, would be deeply undermined by the inevitable divergence in applicable state laws as numerous court systems adopt possibly conflicting interpretations of the same provisions of the OFPA and NOP. See § 6501(1). While the addition of state enforcement mechanisms may assist in assur[ing] consumers that organically produced products meet a consistent standard, any added assurance comes at the cost of the diminution of consistent standards, as not only different legal interpretations, but also different enforcement strategies and priorities could further fragment the uniform requirements. See id. at (2). The natural result of these differences in interpretation and enforcement would be an increase in the consumer confusion and troubled interstate commerce, S. Rep. 101-357, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 4943, that characterized the period before the OFPA, which stands in direct conflict to the OFPA's third purpose of facilitat[ing] interstate commerce in fresh and processed food that is organically produced, § 6501(3). The structure of the OFPA, and particularly its remedial scheme, also support our conclusion that to the extent state laws challenge Aurora's certification they are preempted. Title 7, United States Code, Section 6505(a)(1)(A), specifically allows a person [to] sell or label an agricultural product as organically produced ... if such product is produced and handled in accordance with the OFPA and NOP. The only penalty for noncompliance with the OFPA subjects persons who knowingly sell[ ] or label[ ] a product as organic to a civil penalty of up to $10,000. § 6519(a). The role of the certifying agent is to certify a farm or handling operation that meets the requirements of the OFPA. § 6503(d). As noted above, Aurora maintained its certification at all times relevant to this appeal. Therefore, any attempt to hold Aurora or the retailers liable under state law based upon its products supposedly not being organic directly conflicts with the role of the certifying agent as set forth in § 6503(d). To the extent the class plaintiffs, relying on state consumer protection or tort law, seek to set aside Aurora's certification, or seek damages from any party for Aurora's milk being labeled as organic in accordance with the certification, we hold that state law conflicts with federal law and should be preempted. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the class plaintiffs' claims based upon Aurora's and the retailers' marketing, representing, and selling milk as organic when, allegedly, it was not.