Opinion ID: 1945754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appeal to Sympathy in Assessing Credibility

Text: The defendant's next claim is that the prosecutor improperly stated that the jurors could consider feeling sorry for other people in assessing the credibility of the witnesses. We agree that this comment was improper. During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor declared that defense counsel had expressed personal opinions, alluded to facts not in evidence and offered assessments of the credibility of particular witnesses, all of which had been improper. The prosecutor noted that he had objected to certain portions of defense counsel's argument and thereafter advised the jurors as follows: Issues about feeling sorry for particular people, assessing their believability, the manner in which they presented to you, are things that you're to consider. You're to use your everyday tools in assessing credibility in this case. In a subsequent portion of his argument, however, the prosecutor stated that [s]ympathy is to play no part in your deliberations.... You have a duty and an obligation ... that if the facts and the law dictate a guilty verdict, you must return that guilty verdict. And it must be found and it must be based on the facts and the law. Defense counsel did not object when the prosecutor told the jurors that they could consider feeling sorry for particular people, nor did he request a curative instruction to mitigate any potential harm. The trial court subsequently instructed the jury: Your verdict must not be influenced by sympathy. It is not within your province to determine, nor may you be affected by, the consequences of your verdict upon the accused or his family. You must, with your duty unswayed by sentiment or emotion, determine your verdict by a careful consideration of the facts disclosed by the evidence and the application of the relevant law to those facts. The defendant's argument that the prosecutor improperly told the jurors that they could consider feeling sorry for other people in considering whether the defendant was guilty is simply another way of claiming that the prosecutor appealed to the jurors' emotions. [14] As this court previously has stated, [i]t is well settled that [a] prosecutor may not appeal to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the jurors.... [S]uch appeals should be avoided because they have the effect of diverting the [jurors'] attention from their duty to decide the case on the evidence. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 462, 797 A.2d 1088 (2002). We conclude that the prosecutor's comment was improper because the message it conveyed to the jurors was that they could allow emotional factors to influence their assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The language was clear and direct and not open to interpretation. The fact that the prosecutor subsequently told the jurors that they could not be influenced by sympathy in reaching their verdict does not erase the fact that the earlier statement was made. Moreover, the state concedes that the comment was improper. We therefore review this impropriety in part II E of this opinion to determine whether it was harmful.