Opinion ID: 778518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victim status

Text: 14 Zats' first argument is that the victims to which the vulnerable victim enhancement refers must be the victims of the offense of conviction. He contends that because he pled guilty only to defrauding his clients, who were not vulnerable, the enhancement cannot apply. 15 The cases on this issue and the language of the Sentencing Guidelines refute Zats' argument. The application note for U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b) states in relevant part: 16 For purposes of subsection (b), vulnerable victim means a person (A) who is a victim of the offense of conviction and any conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) .... 17 U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, cmt. n. 2 (emphasis added). The application note thus refers not only to conduct involved in the offense of conviction, but also to any relevant conduct under § 1B1.3. Section 1B1.3(a) includes the following as relevant conduct: 18 (1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and 19 .... 20 (3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions.... 21 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a). In United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1134 (3d Cir.1997), we found that neither § 3A1.1(b) nor the application note explicitly requires that we read `victim' narrowly and that, under § 1B1.3, we may look at all the conduct underlying the offense of conviction.  Id. at 1137 (emphasis added). We then applied the enhancement where the defendant sexually assaulted a twelve-year-old victim in the process of stealing a car and later pled guilty only to carjacking. Id. Likewise, in Monostra, we said that the drafters of the Sentencing Guidelines did not intend to limit the application of § 3A1.1(b) to situations in which the vulnerable person was the victim of the offense of conviction. Rather, trial courts may look to all the conduct underlying an offense, using § 1B1.3 as a guide. 125 F.3d at 189. We held that the enhancement could apply where the defendant bilked a small business in the course of defrauding a bank. Id. In addition, other courts of appeals have applied the enhancement where doctors exploited patients in order to submit fraudulent medical insurance claims. See, e.g., United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F.2d 722, 735-36 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175, 180-81 (2d Cir.1994). 22 One argument that neither Zats nor any of our cases raises, but which we address nonetheless, is that the application note for U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b) says that a victim must be a victim of the offense of conviction and any conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, cmt. n. 2 (emphasis added). The use of and here is troubling because it suggests that a vulnerable victim must be harmed by both the offense of conviction and by relevant conduct outside that offense. Under that reasoning, Cruz was wrongly decided because the vulnerable victim (a twelve-year old girl raped during a carjacking) was not also the victim of the offense of conviction (the stolen car's driver), Cruz, 106 F.3d at 1137, and the debtors in this case — who are not victims of any offense of conviction — are not victims for purposes of the enhancement. 23 However, we will not adopt this reading. The Sentencing Commission could not have intended to define victim for sentencing purposes more narrowly than for the offense of conviction itself, and we will not read a text to produce absurd results plainly inconsistent with the drafters' intentions. See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452-55, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989). At the same time, it cannot be that the Commission meant to say or instead of and. That would render the offense of conviction clause redundant because relevant conduct already includes the offense of conviction. We conclude that the drafters obviously intended to define victim to mean anyone hurt by conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3. That reading is consistent with our precedents and with common sense. Therefore, victim status is not limited to those hurt by the offense of conviction, but also includes those hurt by relevant conduct outside that offense. 24 In his brief, Zats does not address the holdings in Cruz and Monostra on this issue even though the District Court explicitly relied on them. In any event, Zats could not have refuted our rule that, for the vulnerable victim enhancement to apply, the victim injured by the defendant's relevant conduct need not also be injured by the offense of conviction. See Cruz, 106 F.3d at 1137; Monostra, 125 F.3d at 189. Zats intimidated the debtors and violated their rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Applying §§ 1B1.3 and 3A1.1(b), we find this sufficient to deem the debtors victims of Zats' conduct for purposes of the vulnerable victim enhancement. 25