Opinion ID: 1154678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: cause challenge (assignment of error i)

Text: The defendant complains that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause of prospective juror, Gloria Rains, thus requiring him to exercise one of his peremptory challenges to excuse her, and thereby depriving him of the right to use the peremptorily challenge on another prospective juror. An accused has the constitutional right to challenge jurors peremptorily, with the number of challenges to be fixed by law. La. Const. art. 1, § 17. Louisiana Code Crim.P. art. 799 provides the defendant in a death penalty case with 12 peremptory challenges. Therefore, when a defendant uses all of his peremptory challenges, a trial court's erroneous ruling depriving him of one of his peremptory challenges constitutes a substantial violation of his constitutional and statutory rights, requiring reversal of the conviction and sentence. State v. Robertson, 92-2660, p. 2 (La. 1/14/94); 630 So.2d 1278, 1280, citing State v. Monroe, 366 So.2d 1345, 1347 (La.1978), and State v. McIntyre, 365 So.2d 1348, 1351 (La.1978). Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is erroneously denied by a trial court and the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. To prove there has been reversible error warranting reversal of the conviction and sentence, defendant need only show: (1) the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2) the use of all of his peremptory challenges. Robertson, 92-2660, p. 3 (La. 1/14/94); 630 So.2d at 1280-1281, citing State v. Ross, 623 So.2d 643, 644 (La.1993); State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198, 225 (La.1993); State v. Lee, 559 So.2d 1310, 1317 (La.1990); State v. Comeaux, 514 So.2d 84, 93 (La.1987); State v. Brown, 496 So.2d 261, 263-264 (La.1986). In this case, it is undisputed that the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Accordingly, we are left only with the task of deciding whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's challenge for cause of prospective juror Gloria Rains. If so, then defendant's constitutional and statutory right to 12 peremptory challenges has been violated, prejudice is presumed, and there is reversible error requiring reversal of the conviction[s] and sentence. Robertson, 92-2660, p. 3 (La. 1/14/94); 630 So.2d at 1281. The defendant's challenge for cause was based upon potential juror Rains' predisposition to automatically impose the death penalty in the event that the defendant was found guilty at the guilt phase of the trial. The grounds for which a juror may be challenged for cause are set forth in La.Code Crim.P. art. 797. Two of these grounds are pertinent here, namely, that [t]he juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality, and [t]he juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court. La.Code Crim.P. art. 797(2) and (4). In Robertson, supra, this Court summarized the applicable legal principles for reviewing the propriety of a trial court's denial of a cause challenge: A trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and his ruling will be reversed only when a review of the entire voir dire reveals the judge abused his discretion. State v. Knighton, 436 So.2d 1141, 1148 (La.1983). A refusal by a trial judge to excuse a prospective juror on the ground he is not impartial is not an abuse of discretion where, after further inquiry or instruction (frequently called rehabilitation), the potential juror has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and the evidence. [State v.] Copeland, supra, 530 So.2d [526] at 534 [La.1988]. [A] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied. State v. Hallal, 557 So.2d 1388, 1389-90 (La.1990). As Chief Justice Calogero stated in Lee, supra, 559 So.2d at 1318 (citations omitted): When a juror expresses a predisposition as to the outcome of a trial [or in this case, as to a particular sentence], a challenge for cause should be granted. Yet, if after subsequent questioning the juror exhibits the ability to disregard previous views and make a decision based on the evidence presented at trial, the challenge is properly denied. When assessing whether a challenge for cause should be granted, the trial judge must look at the juror's responses during her entire testimony, not just correct, isolated answers, or, for that matter, incorrect, isolated answers. Robertson, 92-2660, p. 4 (La. 1/14/94); 630 So.2d at 1281. During initial voir dire examination by the prosecution, Ms. Rains stated that she believed that the death penalty was appropriate in particular cases, and could vote to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances. [12] Thereafter, the following exchange took place between Ms. Rains and the defendant's attorney: Q Okay. I understand and you did tell the District Attorney that it would be possible for you to vote for the death penalty. A [No answer from the prospective juror on tape but affirmative nod was noted in court reporter's shorthand notes.] Q You understand the steps that I went over with Mr. Lee that have to occur before A Uh Huh. Q before it is imposed? A [No answer from the prospective juror on tape but affirmative nod was noted in court reporters [sic] shorthand notes.] Q Do you feel like that it should automatically be imposed if he is convicted of first degree murder? A Yes. Q Okay. Why is that? A Because I believe that the crime that was committed if proved, rape and murder of you know the woman is one of the worst crimes in our society today. Q Is your feeling about that so strong that you would not be willing to listen to or consider the alternative, life imprisonment, or to you know look at any of the reasons why the death penalty may not be appropriate? A Well, I could listen to all of it. Q But your feeling is right now, you seem pretty firm in that opinion, that you would vote to impose the death penalty given the conviction of the crime charged? A Right. Q In other words, conviction of the crime itself would be sufficient for you? A No, not the crime, the proof that he was guilty. Q Of the crime? A Of the crime, right. Q Well, I want to be sure we are on the same page here A If it is proven to me that he is guilty of this crime then you know I would vote for the death penalty. The trial judge then questioned Ms. Rains. She described the judicial procedure employed in capital murder cases, particularly, the guilt and sentencing phases. She also explained to Ms. Rains that the jury must consider certain aggravating and mitigating factors when sentencing the defendant, and that at least one aggravating factor must be found to exist before the death penalty may be imposed. Finally, the trial judge explained that even if the jury finds that an aggravating factor is present, it may nevertheless choose not to impose the death penalty. At the conclusion of her explanation, the trial judge asked Ms. Rains whether she would automatically vote for the death penalty without considering mitigating evidence, to which Ms. Rains responded negatively. Thereafter, when defense counsel resumed questioning, Ms. Rains again stated that she would not automatically vote for the death penalty. However, the trial judge's success in explaining the law to Ms. Rains was subsequently called into doubt when Ms. Rains responded to defense counsel's question about whether she would consider mitigating factors during the sentencing phase by asking, What is mitigating? Upon having mitigating factors defined by defense counsel, Ms. Rains indicated that she could listen to the evidence, consider mitigating factors and impose a sentence of life imprisonment. Nevertheless, the following exchange then took place between defense counsel and Ms. Rains: Q ... Can you share with us what kind of circumstances in terms of both the crime and the offender that you feel would justify the death penalty? A As I just stated the rape and murder. Q Okay, okay. But you understand or are you saying that that would be a circumstance that would justify it A Right. Q but you would also look at the offender A Right. Q George Maxie? A Right. Q What kind of record he has, has he done this before and is he a violent person, would you also look at those kinds of things in deciding whether he got the death penalty, or would the mereI don't mean mere, but would the rape-murder itself be enough for you? A Like I said you know it has to be proven to me, but I believe that is one crime you know today that definitely demands the death penalty if proven. Q Well, you know it is made available for that crime. A Right. Q The law makes it available for that crime, but at the same time the law says you don't have to do it? A Right. Q But do you feel like you have got to do it if rape-murder is proven? A Yes. Q Bearing in mind you know what the Judge has said about looking at A Right. Q the other circumstances. Would that circumstance alone be enough for you to impose the death penalty? A If as she [the trial judge] has stated the evidence was you know I would vote for the death penalty. The District Attorney then examined Ms. Rains again. He spent a significant amount of time reexplaining the procedure used in capital murder cases, including the guilt and sentencing phases previously described by the trial judge. The District Attorney emphasized that the jury may choose either life imprisonment or the death penalty at the sentencing phase, and that nothing is automatic about the decision. He also stressed that the jury must be composed of 12 individuals that are not automatically predisposed either in favor of or against the death penalty, and that will consider all of the evidence presented. At the close of his explanation, the District Attorney asked Ms. Rains if she would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant was found guilty, to which she responded that she would not. Despite this response, Ms. Rains' voir dire ended with this colloquy with defense counsel: Q Do you understand that rape alone, even aggravated rape, does not call for the death penalty? A Yes. Q I thought that might be A Right. Q where you were mis-connecting. The question remains then, what is your present disposition in terms of imposing the death penalty if he is convicted of first degree rape-murder? A Death penalty. (Emphasis added.) Q Right now? A No, you said after he is proven guilty. Q Okay, I am going to go over it again because I want to make sure we are communicating, and I thought you and Mr. Burkett [the District Attorney] communicated about that. What the law says is that in cases of first degree murder, whether it is rape-murder, armed robbery-murder or any other mind [sic] of first degree murder, the death penalty may be imposed in the discretion of the Jury A Right. Q or according to the Jury's decision. So by saying may it means that it is not automatic upon guilt being shown of first degree murder, you understand that? A Uh Huh. Q Maybe we are you knowthe two phases are kind of throwing you off a little bit. The first phase is the guilty-innocence phase. A Right, I understand that. Q Or if he is found guilty of first degree murder there A Right. Q then there is what is called the penalty phase. A Uh Huh. Q You know, and you don't come back as the Jury as the finding of guilt, what you come back with is either life or death. Do you understand that? A Uh Huh. Q Do you think you could do that? A Yes. Q You understood what Mr. Burkett said about you know the A The two phases, right. Q And we are simply trying to guard against people predisposed one way for the death penalty or the life imprisonment, you know, that's all we are doing by asking you all these questions. So, is your mind open to both the death penalty and life imprisonment if we reach the penalty phase of this trial? A No. (Emphasis added.) Q You understand now the procedure A We go through the guilty phase first Q Yes, ma'am A And then to the sentencing phase Q Yes, ma'am A I understand that perfectly. Q But you feel right now that the death penalty ought to be imposed once the crime guilt A Right. Q gets established? A Once the crime guilt is established. (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel then unsuccessfully moved to challenge Ms. Rains for cause. Based on a reading of the entire voir dire of Ms. Rains, we find that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to grant the defendant's challenge. On the whole, Ms. Rains' responses indicated that she was predisposed to vote for the death penalty because of the rape-murder nature of this case. Even after the trial judge's explanations, she continued to exhibit an inability to accept the law as explained to her by the court. Her partiality was shown throughout the entire examination, and became particularly apparent during defense counsel's closing voir dire questioning, when: (1) Ms. Rains stated that she was presently disposed to impose the death penalty if the defendant was convicted of rape-murder; (2) Ms. Rains responded negatively to the question of whether her mind was open to both the death penalty and life imprisonment; and (3) Ms. Rains agreed, in her response to the final question posed, that the death penalty should be imposed once the defendant's guilt was established. A potential juror who indicates that she will not consider a life sentence and will automatically vote for the death penalty under the factual circumstances of the case before her is subject to a challenge for cause by the defendant. Robertson, 92-2660, p. 8 (La. 1/14/94); 630 So.2d at 1284.