Opinion ID: 4296281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Homedew

Text: “We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo but the underlying factual determinations for clear error, giving due weight to inferences drawn by law enforcement officials.” United States v. Hayden, 759 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “We affirm . . . unless the district court’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear a mistake was made.” United States v. CorralesPortillo, 779 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2015) (ellipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Wallace, 713 F.3d 422, 426 (8th Cir. 2013)). “A consensual search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the consent was given voluntarily and without coercion.” United States v. Meza-Gonzalez, 394 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Martinez, 168 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1999)). The government must prove voluntary consent by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. (citations omitted). Whether a defendant consented to a search is a factual matter reviewed for clear error. Id. at 591 (citation omitted). At the suppression hearing, Carter testified that he asked Homedew, “Do you mind if I look through your backpack?” and that Homedew replied, “Go ahead.” Transcript of Suppression Hearing at 51, United States v. Homedew, No. 4:16-cr-145JAJ-HCA-1 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 22, 2016), ECF No. 252. Further, an exchange during the custodial interview suggests that Homedew acknowledged having consented to the search that resulted in the seizure of the receipts. The district court stated: “The -8- interviewing officer reminded the defendant that he had consented to the retrieval of his baggage claim receipt, ‘You told us we could look in there to get the . . . ’ at which point the defendant cut off the officer stating ‘You had the receipt . . . you still kept looking.’” Slip Op. at 4 (ellipses in original). The government’s representation that Homedew gave the officer permission to search his bag without a warrant is “coherent and facially plausible” and “not contradicted by extrinsic evidence.” United States v. Mendoza, 677 F.3d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)). Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s decision to accept that version of events. Homedew insists that if he did give consent, it was not voluntary and more limited than the search actually conducted. He points out that when asked for permission, he was “surrounded by police officers, was the focus of a particular investigation, was hand cuffed and physically controlled by the officers, his back pack was in possession of police, weapons were displayed and there was no uncertainty that compliance was necessary.” Homedew’s Br. at 35–36. We determine whether consent is voluntary by examining the totality of the circumstances, including (1) the individual’s age and mental ability; (2) whether the individual was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs; (3) whether the individual was informed of [his] Miranda rights; and (4) whether the individual was aware, through prior experience, of the protections that the legal system provides for suspected criminals. It is also important to consider the environment in which an individual’s consent is obtained, including (1) the length of the detention; (2) whether the police used threats, physical intimidation, or punishment to extract consent; (3) whether the police made promises or misrepresentations; (4) whether the individual was in custody or under arrest when consent was given; (5) whether the consent was given in public or in a secluded location; and (6) whether the individual stood by silently or objected to the search. -9- United States v. Quintero, 648 F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Golinveaux, 611 F.3d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 2010)). It is true that up to ten officers were on the scene and at least two officers were in the immediate vicinity of the police car containing Homedew. Further, Homedew was under arrest and handcuffed. But there is no evidence of any threat, physical intimidation, or punishment. The area was a public airport and not secluded. When an officer asked if he could search Homedew’s backpack for the baggage claim receipt, Homedew gave an affirmative response. The record gives us no indication that at the time of his arrest, Homedew was anything other than a sober, middle-aged man with no mental defects. And though he was not read his rights before consenting, he has an extensive criminal record and prior experience with the legal system. Further, the record does not indicate that the length of his detention before he gave his consent was of inordinate length. The district court found that Homedew “was under arrest for only a few moments when he gave his consent.” Slip Op. at 6–7. Homedew objected to the search once he thought the officers obtained not only the baggage claim receipt but also the postal receipts. He withdrew his consent, and the search ended. The district court’s finding of voluntary consent was not clearly erroneous. “Because we find the warrantless search valid on the basis of consent, we need not address the alternative theories advanced by the Government to justify the search.” United States v. Lumpkins, 687 F.3d 1011, 1014 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.
Homedew contends that if not for his attorney’s acquiescence to a continuance requested by a codefendant and filing of a motion to suppress, both against his wishes, he would have been able to obtain a dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act or under the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial. -10- Homedew’s argumentation of this issue is somewhat muddled. He makes a passing reference to a belief that the district court improperly determined that the time during which a detention motion pended was excludable. Homedew’s Br. at 29–30 (“It is Homedew’s position that the orders in regard to the revocation of the pretrial status of Amber Shipp are also not the kinds of motions or order that affect the trial matters, but merely concern where she would be held pending trial.”). However, at its core, this argument is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 28–30 (discussing speedy trial and ineffective assistance/habeas law, framing issue primarily in terms of counsel’s deficiencies, and concluding section, “Homedew was deprived of his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act by his attorney.”). Homedew’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is premature in this direct appeal. We have stated: While “[g]enerally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are better left for post-conviction proceedings,” this Court may decide an ineffective assistance issue on direct appeal if the ineffectiveness is “readily apparent or [the representation is] obviously deficient,” if resolution on direct appeal will “avoid a plain miscarriage of justice,” or if “the record has been fully developed.” United States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2006) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Cook, 356 F.3d 913, 919–20 (8th Cir. 2004)). The district court held a hearing on Homedew’s motion to substitute counsel. Though trial counsel conceded that her client wanted no continuances, she also stated that he had been fervent about the need to file a motion to suppress. Counsel stated that she believed the continuance was necessary to make an adequate suppression argument. -11- Additionally, the testimony at the hearing focused on whether the attorneyclient relationship had so degraded that a new attorney was necessary. The hearing did not explore the quality of legal representation that had been provided. We consider this record to be inadequate to enable appellate review of whether Homedew’s first attorney failed to render effective assistance. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A properly developed record for purposes of determining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would include cross-examination by [the defendant] of his counsel on the question of what advice counsel gave him.”). Furthermore, counsel’s ineffectiveness was not “readily apparent,” her representation was not “obviously deficient,” and no plain miscarriage of justice is before the court. See Rice, 449 F.3d at 897. Because none of the listed exceptions is present, this issue is best addressed in a habeas petition. See United States v. McAdory, 501 F.3d 868, 872–73 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that appellate court ordinarily defers ineffective assistance of counsel claims to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings). We therefore reject this claim without prejudice. See id.
Finally, Homedew has filed a motion for leave to file a pro se supplemental brief and tendered his proposed brief for the court’s consideration. “It is Eighth Circuit policy not to address issues raised by a defendant in pro se filings with this Court when he is represented by counsel.” United States v. Benson, 686 F.3d 498, 504–05 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Halverson, 973 F.2d 1415, 1417 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)). Notwithstanding this policy, we grant Homedew’s motion. After review of Homedew’s supplemental materials, we conclude that these additional arguments are without merit and do not raise additional issues warranting discussion. -12-