Opinion ID: 887281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the District Court err in failing to give Tracy credit for time served on the sentence in this case for time served in detention on other, concurrent, sentences?

Text: ¶ 22 To secure the benefit of the provision requiring the same or a lesser sentence on revocation of a suspended sentence in the 1995 version of § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA, Tracy cites the Court to § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA, in the 1999 version of that statute. Section § 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA (1995), is the same as § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA (1999). Then, citing State v. Wilson (1996), 279 Mont. 34, 40, 926 P.2d 712, 716, Tracy argues that he is entitled to the benefit of the addition of a new subsection, § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, in the 1999 version of the statute. This subsection, not contained in the 1995 version of § 46-18-203, MCA, provides that when a suspended sentence is revoked the defendant must be allowed credit for time served in a detention center or on home arrest. Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA (1999). ¶ 23 Tracy's argument that he must be given the benefit of the new subsection (7)(b) in the 1999 version § of 6-18-203, MCA, is unnecessary. Section 46-18-201(4), MCA (1995), provided: (4) If any restrictions or conditions imposed under subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) are violated, the court shall consider any elapsed time and either expressly allow part or all of it as a credit against the sentence or reject all or part as a credit. The court shall state its reasons in the order. Credit, however, must be allowed for jail or home arrest time already served. Therefore, § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA (1999), from which Tracy makes his argument, was in essence a part of the code in 1995, when he committed the Cascade County offenses. It was then codified in § 46-18-201(4), MCA, rather than § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA. Tracy is entitled to the benefit of § 46-18-201(4), MCA (1995). ¶ 24 The substance of Tracy's argument is that, based on § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, (which is essentially the same as § 46-18-201(4), MCA (1995)), he must be given credit on his Cascade County sentence for all time he served in jail or on home arrest on his concurrent Yellowstone County commitments. ¶ 25 The State does not contest that § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, is applicable. It argues that the statute does not require that credit be given for time served on the concurrent Yellowstone County sentences because the statute's language does not contain the word concurrent. Further, the State asserts Tracy offers no authority for his position and goes on to argue that State v. Kime, 2002 MT 38, 308 Mont. 341, 43 P.3d 290, stands for the proposition that a defendant may be credited with the time he or she was incarcerated only if such incarceration was directly related to the offense for which the sentence is imposed. ¶ 26 Kime has no application to the facts in this case. Section 46-18-403, MCA, dealing with credit for time served before sentencing, was the basis for our decision in Kime. In this case § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, and § 46-18-401, MCA, dealing with credit for time served on consecutive sentences, apply. ¶ 27 Section 46-18-401, MCA, while not artfully drafted, provides that when a judge chooses to exercise his or her discretion to order that sentences for unrelated offenses are to run concurrently, not consecutively, and the person committed is already serving a sentence, the two terms are merged. ¶ 28 We conclude § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, in conjunction with § 46-18-401(1)(a), MCA, requires that credit be given for time spent in a detention center or on home arrest on all sentences that are being served concurrently. The word concurrent is not contained in the statute because it is unnecessary. Concurrent means operating at the same time. Black's Law Dictionary 286 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999). By definition, concurrent sentences are to be served simultaneously. Black's Law Dictionary at 1367. When the District Court exercised its discretion under § 46-18-401(4), MCA, to order that Tracy's Cascade County commitment at issue in this case be served simultaneously with the Yellowstone County commitments, it was a decision that credit must be allowed for all time spent in a detention center or on home arrest on each concurrent sentence. After the commitment in this Cascade County case was imposed and specifically made to run concurrent, it merged with and ran at the same time as those in Yellowstone County. Tracy was in detention on these sentences during a portion of the time after May 24, 2000, and before he discharged the prison time of the Yellowstone County sentences. Thus, by the plain words of the statutes, he is entitled to credit against each of the concurrent commitments for the time he was in detention. Were we to hold otherwise, by the simple device of seeking revocation of some, but not all, of several concurrent sentences, the State in this case would have been able to, in effect, convert a concurrent sentence to a consecutive sentence contrary to law. ¶ 29 Of course, Tracy is entitled to credit on the Cascade County sentence only for those days served on the concurrent Yellowstone County sentences which were subsequent to the time the Cascade County sentence was imposed. His Cascade County sentence is not to be credited with time served on the Yellowstone County sentences before May 24, 2000. Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, does not apply to a sentence before it is imposed. ¶ 30 The Cascade County sentence imposed December 16, 2003, did not grant credit for time served in a detention center or on home arrest on the concurrent Yellowstone County sentences in accord with § 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, and § 46-18-401(1)(a), MCA. It is necessary to remand this case to the District Court to calculate and grant such time.