Opinion ID: 4537255
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: JVTA Assessment

Text: Finally, Goodin says that the district court plainly erred in ordering him to pay the $5,000 special assessment pursuant to the JVTA. Under the JVTA, the district court cannot order the otherwise mandatory special assessment if the defendant is indigent. 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a); United - 13 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin States v. Shepherd, 922 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 2019). On appeal, Goodin says that he was clearly indigent because he was over $25,000 in debt at the time of his conviction, will owe over $150,000 in restitution, and has a limited future earning potential. Normally, when assessing indigency for purposes of the JVTA, this Court will review the factual question of whether a defendant is indigent for clear error, but will assess the legal definition of indigency de novo. Shepherd, 922 F.3d at 757. But because Goodin failed to object in the district court, we only review his claim for plain error. E.g., Wheeler, 797 F. App’x at 965; Kent, 765 F. App’x at 126. In this circuit, district courts determine indigency under the JVTA by assessing both a defendant’s current and future ability to pay the assessment. Shepherd, 922 F.3d at 759. This future ability includes both potential in-prison and post-release earnings. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 889 (6th Cir. 2019). The defendant carries the burden of proving indigency. Id. at 889–90. Because Goodin has almost no cash and approximately $25,000 in debt, even before the $150,000-plus restitution order discussed above, it seems clear that Goodin lacks any current ability to pay the assessment. That said, prior to his arrest, Goodin held several jobs ranging from a minimum-wage job as a driver for a car dealership to various better-paying mechanical jobs. Goodin will be in his fifties when released from prison, and the JVTA gives defendants twenty years after release from prison to satisfy the debt before it is dissolved. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3014(g), 3613(b). Goodin argues that even with his work experience, his personal circumstances and the duration of his sentence mean it is unlikely that he will ever be able to pay the assessment. Specifically, Goodin notes that he lacks a high-school diploma or GED, that he is unlikely to land - 14 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin even a low-paying prison job, and that his sex-crimes conviction will severely hamper his ability to find employment after he is released. None of these arguments demonstrate plain error. Shepherd—a case that was not limited to plain-error review—found that the defendant was not indigent despite his significant other financial obligations, limited education, and correspondingly low potential for earnings after release. 922 F.3d at 759–60. And while Shepherd will be released from prison at a younger age than Goodin, id., this difference alone cannot support a finding that the district court plainly erred in its application of Shepherd. Though Goodin will be in his fifties when released from prison, he has not shown that he will be unable to pay the assessment using post-incarceration earnings, never mind whether the district court plainly erred in finding otherwise. Wandahsega also stands in the way of Goodin’s claim. Like Goodin, the defendant there faced significant debt and nonexistent assets, and even worse than Goodin, had never held a job earning more than $10 per hour. 924 F.3d at 889. Furthermore, Wandahsega was older than Goodin and faced a similar prison term, meaning he will be in his sixties when released. See id. at 878. But on plain error review, the Court held that Wandahsega’s prison and post-release earnings could support a future ability to pay. Id. at 889; see also id. (“Even if Wandahsega should be classified as impoverished now, and even if he earns only a minimum hourly wage when released from prison, he has not demonstrated that he will be unable to pay the assessment in increments over a twenty-year period.”). In an attempt to distinguish Wandahsega, Goodin focuses on Wandahsega’s belief that “he will obtain employment with [the] Hannahville Indian Community upon his release.” Id. Goodin says this “special attribute”—namely that Wandahsega “was a Native American living on the Hannahville Reservation in Michigan”—gave him a unique chance at post-release employment. - 15 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin (Reply Br. at 4–5.) But Shepherd rejected the argument that a sex-crimes conviction alone will forestall the chance of post-release employment, and that case involved no “special attribute” that could uniquely have landed the defendant a job. 922 F.3d at 759–60. Even without Shepherd, Goodin cannot thread the needle of plain-error review by distinguishing away parts of the very same cases he relies on; an on-point case is necessary (though not always sufficient) to show that the district court plainly erred. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d at 794. Finally, while Goodin argues that the district court erred by not expressly finding on the record that his future earnings could cover the assessment, this argument is directly at odds with Shepherd, which noted that the JVTA does not require “an explicit finding of [the defendant’s] non-indigency.” 922 F.3d at 760; see also id. (“[D]istrict courts ‘retain considerable latitude in deciding which arguments to discuss and how much explanation is necessary.’” (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 295 F. App’x 799, 804 (6th Cir. 2008))). And Shepherd was not a plain-error case; as discussed above, where a defendant fails to object, the district court’s obligation to place its reasoning on the record is substantially reduced. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) (requiring courts to rule on an issue at sentencing so long as the matter could affect the sentence and is “controverted” by the parties); United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 760–61 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that fact-finding on the record is not required when the defendant failed to object and “did not expressly call [the issue] to the court’s attention during the sentencing hearing”); see also Wandahsega, 924 F.3d at 888 (“[D]etailed findings are not necessary where it can be inferred that the district court considered the defendant’s ability to pay and other factors required by law.” (quoting United States v. Powell, 423 F. App’x 602, 610–11 (6th Cir. 2011))).3 3 In a post-argument letter, Goodin says that this Court’s recent decision in United States v. Fowler, 956 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2020), requires a finding of plain error where the district court imposes the JVTA assessment “without hearing argument, considering evidence or saying - 16 - No. 19-3554, United States v. Goodin In sum, Goodin faced the burden of proving indigency and failed to object or make any showing on this point before the district court. On appeal, his arguments suggesting that it may be difficult for him to pay in the future cannot demonstrate plain error, especially given this Court’s previous cases to the contrary.