Opinion ID: 1799918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Absolute or conditional privilege.

Text: Defendant contends initially that he cannot be sued for libel because as a public official he is absolutely immune from such an action. It is a general rule that absolute privilege is accorded principal federal or state executive officers in the exercise of their duties. [15] However, when considering the lower strata of executive officials such as defendant the majority of courts have concluded that such officials are not entitled to an absolute privilege, but only a conditional privilege, although there are authorities according absolute privilege to minor officials. [16] The restatement rule is that inferior officers of the state or nation are protected by only a conditional privilege. [17] Defendant cites two recent United States supreme court cases and other cases which allegedly indicate that the public official designation now extends to an official of appellant's status. These cases are New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , [18] Rosenblatt v. Baer , [19] Walker v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., [20] and Gilligan v. King. [21] However, in these cases the courts were confronted with a public official or a public figure suing a private citizen for libel, not a private citizen suing a public official for libel. By footnote in Rosenblatt v. Baer , the United States supreme court made it clear that the New York Times decision did not deal with the issue of delineating which public officials qualify for absolute privilege when sued by a private citizen for libel. This footnote stated, For similar reasons, we reject any suggestion that our references in New York Times, 376 U. S., at 282, 283, n. 23, and Garrison, 379 U. S., at 74, to Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, mean that we have tied the New York Times rule to the rule of official privilege. The public interests protected by the New York Times rule are interests in discussion, not retaliation, and our reference to Barr should be taken to mean no more than that the scope of the privilege is to be determined by reference to the functions it serves. See Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 Cornell Law Quarterly, 581, 590-591 (1964). [22] In determining the scope of the privilege to be accorded public officials while acting in an executive or administrative capacity [23] competing values exist: (1) Of insuring that government officials not to be deterred from performing their public duties in fear of being held individually liable for what they may say or publish, and (2) of protecting private citizens from having their private or professional reputations damaged by defamatory matter uttered or published by public officials. Giving due weight to these competing values, we feel that with respect to all but executive officers in the higher echelons of government the according of condition:I privilege rather than absolute privilege is preferable. Therefore we conclude that school board members do not fall within the category of high ranking executive officials of government whose defamatory acts should be accorded absolute privilege. We also conclude, however, that the defense of conditional privilege is available to defendant. In the instant case defendant's office of director of the board of education is equivalent to that of chairman. His participation in the board function of discharging a teacher, of which the sending of the letter was a part, ordinarily would constitute performance of official duty which would accord conditional privilege to the contents of the letter. We accord no significance to the fact that the members of the board, prior to sending of the letter, had acted informally and not by formal meeting, and later ratified such action in the formal meeting of December 9th. Defendant and other board members were clearly attempting to perform the duties of their offices. The conditionally privileged status of the letter does not depend upon whether they as laymen strictly followed the statutory procedural requirements for transacting board business. The defense of conditional privilege may be lost if certain conditions do or do not occur. In Hett v. Ploetz this court stated, The privilege is said to be `conditional' because of the requirements that the declaration be reasonably calculated to accomplish the privileged purpose and that it be made without malice. [24] The use of the word malice in connection with conditional privilege is probably unfortunate. Prosser, in discussing conditional privilege as a defense in defamation suggests that malice is a meaningless and quite unsatisfactory term. [25] The Restatement avoids entirely the use of the word malice. Instead it talks in terms of the abuse of the privilege which causes its loss and states: One who publishes false and defamatory matter of another upon a conditionally privileged occasion is liable to the other if he abuses the occasion. [26] The Restatement further lists the four conditions which may constitute an abuse of the privilege, and the occurrence of any one causes its loss. These are: (1) The defendant either did not believe in the truth of the defamatory matter or, if believing the defamatory matter to be true had no reasonable grounds for so believing; [27] (2) because the defamatory matter was published for some purpose other than that for which the particular privilege is given; [28] (3) because the publication was made to some person not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the particular privilege; [29] or (4) because the publication included defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the privilege is given. [30] With respect to condition (2) the Restatement comments as follows: Thus, a publication of defamatory matter upon a privileged occasion if made solely from spite or ill will is an abuse and not a use of the occasion. However, if the publication is made for the purpose of protecting the interest in question, the fact that the publication is inspired in part by resentment or indignation at the supposed misconduct of the person defamed does not constitute an abuse of the occasion. [31] There is nothing in the record before us which would substantiate a finding that the privilege was lost because abused with respect to condition (2). The parties had never met each other prior to the delivery of the letter, and the record is barren of any fact giving rise to an inference that the letter was written for any other purpose than notifying plaintiff of her discharge and the reasons therefor. The privilege was not lost because of the abuse embraced in condition (3). As previously pointed out herein, upon the record made on the motion for summary judgment, the only persons to whom defendant authorized publication were the school principal and school superintendent. Their supervisory position over plaintiff would reasonably entitle them to copies of the letter of discharge. However, we are not satisfied that the state of the record is sufficient to warrant disposition by summary judgment of conditions (1) and (4). The written reports to defendant by Principal Wagner and Superintendent Kromrey of their investigation into the conduct of plaintiff on the afternoon of November 22, 1963, are not part of the record. They would be very material on the issue of whether defendant believed the defamatory matter in the letter to have been true or whether he had reasonable grounds for so believing. These reports would also be material on the issue of whether the letter contained defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be essential in stating the reasons why plaintiff was being discharged. We do not hold that after trial and the production of further evidence there necessarily will be issues to submit to the jury. However, if a special verdict is submitted embracing the issue of conditional privilege, we recommend avoidance of use of the word malice, but instead submission of questions framed in terms of abuse of the privilege in accordance with Restatement, 3 Torts, p. 263 et seq., secs. 599, 600, 601, 603, 604, 605. We omit reference to sec. 602 because it has no application to the facts of this case. [32] For the reasons stated herein the learned trial court properly denied the motion for summary judgment. By the Court. Orders affirmed. WILKIE, J., took no part.