Opinion ID: 2334802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unambiguous Language

Text: Appellant Harasyn argues that the Major Exclusion at issue is ambiguous when considered with the rest of the policy issued to them. They claim that UIM and PIP are not liability or property coverages; thus, they contend, they are not subject to the exclusions as evidenced by the reference at the beginning of their policy: Be sure to read the `Major Exclusions' (page 17) and `Other Provisions' (page 21) sections to fully understand how the liability and property coverage of PAK II are applied. The Harasyns assert that while one could reasonably interpret the Major Exclusion as applying to all sections of the PAK II policy, one could also reasonably interpret the entire policy to mean that the Major Exclusion applies only to liability and property coverages and not to personal coverages. However, the policy in this case will not be construed to provide coverage for a plainly excluded risk, for which no premium was paid. The language at the beginning of the Major Exclusions states: The major exclusions listed here apply to all sections of the policy. Other restrictions that apply only to particular sections will appear in the section to which they apply. Here, the Harasyns do not argue that the language of the exclusion itself is unclear; instead, they argue that it is unclear whether the business-premises exclusion listed under the Major Exclusions applies to all sections of the policy, including the UIM and PIP. The UIM coverage is under the Personal Liability Coverage and the PIP is contained in an endorsement to the policy. Regarding PIP, it contains the following language: With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, the provisions of the policy apply unless modified by this endorsement. Because the language used in the business-premises exception is clear, the trial court was correct. In Elam v. First Unum Ins. Co., 346 Ark. 291, 57 S.W.3d 165 (2001), this court set forth its standard for reviewing an insurance policy's language. If the language of the policy is unambiguous, we will give effect to the plain language of the policy without resorting to the rules of construction. Elam; supra; Norris v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 341 Ark. 360, 16 S.W.3d 242 (2000); Western World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 332 Ark. 427, 965 S.W.2d 760 (1998). On the other hand, if the language is ambiguous, we will construe the policy liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Id. Language is ambiguous if there is doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning and it is fairly susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Norris, 341 Ark. 360, 16 S.W.3d 242; Smith v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 340 Ark. 335, 10 S.W.3d 846 (2000). Here, the trial court specifically found that the business-premises policy exclusion was clear and unambiguous. The exclusion, in plain language, excluded coverage for accidents occurring on the insured's business premises. Because the language is plain, there is no need to resort to the rules of construction. Harasyn's accident occurred at Stogie's Cigars, of which she was an owner. Because the accident took place on her business premises, Harasyn's PAK II policy does not provide coverage. Accordingly, because the terms of the exclusion are clear and unambiguous, the policy language controls, and absent statutory strictures to the contrary, the exclusionary term should be generally enforced according to its terms. Smith v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 208, 937 S.W.2d 180 (1997).