Opinion ID: 1969546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Butz Presumption

Text: In Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 517 (N.D.1989), this court held that when no warning is given the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that an adequate warning, if given, would have been read and heeded. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A, Comment j (1965). The Butz presumption applies only to strict liability failure to warn claims, not to negligent failure to warn claims. Jacobs v. Anderson Bldg. Co., 459 N.W.2d 384 (N.D. 1990). A party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. N.D.R.Evid. 301. See Butz, supra . Absent the introduction of evidence to rebut the Butz presumption, the proximate cause element of a strict liability failure to warn claim is presumptively established. Butz, supra . In this case, Dr. Richard Harper, a psychiatrist, reviewed Crowston's medical and social records and testified at trial that Crowston had an anti-social personality disorder which made it highly unlikely he would have read or followed any additional warnings on the tire or the wheel. Harper testified that Crowston's anti-social personality disorder would cause him to act on his own internal impulses, have poor judgment, act impulsively, and do the opposite of directions or warnings. Crowston argues that Dr. Harper's testimony was inadmissible to show his character for the purpose of proving he acted in conformity therewith. The defendants respond that Dr. Harper's testimony was relevant and necessary to rebut the Butz presumption. In Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex.1972), the Texas Supreme Court described evidence that could be used to rebut the presumption that a warning would have been read: Depending upon the individual facts, this may be accomplished by the manufacturer's producing evidence that the user was blind, illiterate, intoxicated at the time of the use, irresponsible or lax in judgment or by some other circumstance tending to show that the improper use was or would have been made regardless of the warning. See also Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First National Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820 (Ind.Ct.App.1975), rev'd on procedural grounds, 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976). N.D.R.Evid. 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, but may be admissible for other purposes including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. Under N.D.R.Evid. 404(b), the proponent of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts must also demonstrate the relevance and probative value of the evidence, and its probative value must be balanced against its prejudicial effect under N.D.R.Evid. 403. Dahlen v. Landis, 314 N.W.2d 63 (N.D.1981). Under N.D.R.Evid. 403, the trial court has discretion to admit or exclude evidence after balancing its probative value against the dangers of unfair prejudice enumerated in the rule, and a trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Williston Farm Equipment, supra . Dr. Harper's testimony was offered for the purpose of rebutting the Butz presumption. His testimony was probative of the issue of whether Crowston would have read or heeded any warnings that might have been on the tire or the wheel and was relevant and necessary to rebut the Butz presumption. Technical Chemical, supra ; Nissen Trampoline, supra . The trial court carefully limited the evidence to Crowston's personality disorder and excluded other character evidence after concluding that its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Harper's testimony.