Opinion ID: 204065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Fingerprint Evidence

Text: We review Pena's claim that the district court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding fingerprint evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Diaz, 300 F.3d 66, 74 (1st Cir.2002). Pena challenges the ACE-V method used by the state troopers in matching the partial latent fingerprint recovered from the firearm to Pena's inked fingerprint. Pena claims that the method was not scientific and that the troopers' conclusion that his fingerprint matched the partial latent print was based on no discernible standard. Specifically, Pena argues that the ACE-V method was unreliable because it involved merely a visual comparison of the two prints where the trooper conducting the initial analysis knew that the inked print was taken from a suspect and the trooper made no diagrams, charts, or notes as part of his evaluation. Given our standard of review, we are not persuaded. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits a witness qualified as an expert to offer opinion testimony if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. As the Supreme Court has held, it is the task of the trial judge to ensure that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). This involves a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court later extended Daubert's application to technical and other specialized knowledge in addition to scientific testimony. See Seahorse Marine Supplies, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co., 295 F.3d 68, 81 (1st Cir.2002) (citing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)). In this case, the district court declined to hold a Daubert hearing and initially denied Pena's motion to exclude the fingerprint evidence. On Day 6 of trial, Massachusetts State Trooper Kevin Halle gave extensive testimony about the ACE-V method, his training and experience using the method for fingerprint identification, and how he used the method in Pena's case. He explained that after he had analyzed the partial latent print, compared it to the prints on Pena's fingerprint card, and determined that it matched Pena's left thumb print, he had two other troopers independently verify his findings. Those two troopers then testified as to their verification of the match. Though Trooper Halle acknowledged that the Massachusetts State Police used no specific minimum number of points to confirm a fingerprint match, and the district court expressed some reservation about the reliability of the testimony on that basis, [3] the court ultimately decided to admit the testimony, noting that the case law is overwhelmingly in favor of admitting fingerprint experts under virtually any circumstance. Consequently, the court reasoned, the only way it would have considered excluding the testimony or giving a limiting instruction is if there had been data, real evidence presented about the limitations of fingerprinting. Instead, as the court acknowledged, Pena's motion to exclude relied on one article from the Fordham Law Review, and that's not enough to carry the weight of the exclusion motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion. Numerous courts have found expert testimony on fingerprint identification based on the ACE-V method to be sufficiently reliable under Daubert. See United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir.2009); United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir.2004); United States v. Sullivan, 246 F.Supp.2d 700, 704 (E.D.Ky.2003); United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F.Supp.2d 549, 575-76 (E.D.Pa.2002); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 840 N.E.2d 12, 32-33 (2005) (finding ACE-V method reliable for single latent fingerprint impressions). Though acknowledging the lack of minimum points and relative subjectivity of certain ACE-V protocols, including that followed by the FBI, courts have nonetheless found that most of the Daubert factors support admitting latent fingerprint identification evidence obtained pursuant to the ACE-V method. See Baines, 573 F.3d at 990-92; Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 241, 246. As this court has stated, against such a backdrop, it is difficult to discern any abuse of discretion when the district court decides to admit expert testimony that relies on the ACE-V method. United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir.2006). The same holds true in this case. [4]