Opinion ID: 196027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Step One: The Court's Reason.

Text: 18 While the government assails the departure decision on all available fronts, its fundamental point is that, as a matter of law, the guidelines simply do not authorize departures under a multiple loss causation theory. Since this assertion questions whether the departure-justifying reason cited by the court below is of a kind that the guidelines, in principle, permit a sentencing court to embrace for that purpose, we afford plenary review. See Rivera, 994 F.2d at 951; Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49. 19 In evaluating multiple loss causation as a departure-justifying circumstance, we do not write on a pristine page. In United States v. Gregorio, 956 F.2d 341 (1st Cir.1992), we approved the manner in which the district court, acting under the general fraud guideline, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1, structured its downward departure to reflect[ ] 'multiple causation' for victim loss. Id. at 344. Although the sufficiency of the basis for departing in response to multiple causation of victim loss was not at issue on that occasion, id. at 347 n. 10, we stated unambiguously that  'multiple causation' of victim loss is a 'Commission-identified' circumstance in which a downward departure may be warranted. Id. at 347. We do not believe that these words, even if technically dictum, can be read other than as an outright endorsement of multiple loss causation as a permissible basis for departing downward, and, indeed, as a departure-justifying reason that the guidelines encourage. See generally Rivera, 994 F.2d at 948 (explaining that the guidelines sometimes offer the district court, which is considering whether to depart, special assistance, by specifically encouraging certain types of departures). 20 Despite the plain import of Gregorio, the government maintains that multiple loss causation is an invalid basis for a downward departure. Gregorio is irrelevant here, the government says, because the Gregorio court had before it the November 1990 version of the guidelines, which, like the original (1987) version, authorized departures when the total dollar loss that results from the offense [overstates] its seriousness, such as when a misrepresentation ... is not the sole cause of the loss. 956 F.2d at 345 (citing November 1990 version of application note 11). 5 In the government's view, time has passed Gregorio by, for the Sentencing Commission rewrote the application notes to section 2F1.1 effective November 1, 1991, consolidating several preexisting notes into a new note 10. In the process, the Commission eliminated any reference to the sole cause of the loss language. 6 The government proceeds to weave a tapestry from several gossamer strands of speculation and surmise, hypothesizing that the Commission, recognizing that it had improvidently promulgated former note 11, acknowledged the error of its ways and junked the original reference. Using this hypothesis as a springboard, the government then jumps to the conclusion that the Commission, in essaying the revision, tacitly rejected multiple loss causation as an appropriate factor in the departure calculus. 21 We need not resolve the issue of whether the Commission, in revising the application notes in a way that dropped the sole cause of the loss language, intended to drum multiple loss causation out of the ranks of encouraged departures. To avoid ex post facto difficulties, courts should normally apply [guideline] amendments retroactively only if they clarify a guideline, but not if they substantively change a guideline. United States v. Prezioso, 989 F.2d 52, 53 (1st Cir.1993); accord Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir.1992). This rule stymies the government in this instance. If, on the one hand, as the government argues, the Commission's rewriting of the application notes bars downward departures premised on multiple loss causation, then that revision cannot be applied retroactively for doing so would change the substance of the fraud guideline, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1, as that guideline was explicated in Gregorio. See Prezioso, 989 F.2d at 54 (explaining that a new interpretation of a guideline that contradicts existing circuit precedent alters the guideline and, hence, constitutes a substantive change that can only apply prospectively). If, on the other hand, the revision does not bar downward departures for multiple loss causation, then the district court's selection of multiple loss causation as its departure-justifying ground is, under Gregorio, unimpugnable. 22 Consequently, we hold that, under the original pre-1991 version of the guidelines--the version that controls here--the district court permissibly singled out multiple loss causation as a departure-justifying circumstance. 7 23