Opinion ID: 1421847
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voter Intent and Avoidance of Absurd Results

Text: One of the cardinal principles of statutory and constitutional construction is that an enactment must be read to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the intent of the framers. ( Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 245.) The majority's interpretation of section 28(d) would lead to absurd results counter to the stated purposes of Proposition 8. Further, I cannot agree that the voters clearly intended to subordinate California's law of exclusion to the federal standard. The purpose of Proposition 8 is set forth in its section 3, now article I, section 28, subdivision (a), of the Constitution. [8] That section states in part that Proposition 8 is a bill of rights for victims of crime, including safeguards in the criminal justice system to fully protect those rights.... The section goes on to proclaim that The rights of victims pervade the criminal justice system, encompassing ... the ... basic expectation that persons who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims will be appropriately detained in custody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently punished so that the public safety is protected.... The avowed purpose of Proposition 8 is thus to implement safeguards for victims of crimes and to deal more harshly with violent criminals. If we were to accept the majority's reading of section 28(d), absurd results manifestly counter to the purposes of Proposition 8 would follow. For example, Evidence Code section 352.1, which prevents the introduction into open court of a rape victim's address and telephone number, would be repealed. A victim who testified at the trial could have his religious beliefs introduced and challenged in court, without the protective shield of Evidence Code section 789. Evidence Code section 786 would be repealed, permitting a general attack on the character of a victim-witness apart from his reputation for honesty. Evidence Code section 787 would be repealed, allowing defense counsel [to] attack the credibility of police officers, victims and other prosecution witnesses with any relevant evidence of specific instances of bad conduct. Were they expelled from school for cheating? A thorough investigation of the witness' background will turn up numerous possibilities. (Uelmen, Gann's Bonanza for Defense Counsel, in Criminal Practice after Proposition 8 (Cont.Ed.Bar 1982) p. 7.) Thus the majority's interpretation of section 28(d) would violate subdivision (a) of section 28 by removing safeguards that California law gives to victims. I cannot believe that such was the will of the voters. [9] To give meaning to the language of a constitutional provision created by initiative, courts may look to the ballot summary and analysis and arguments presented to the electorate. ( Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 245-246.) However, as I explained above, nothing in the voter pamphlet specifies that Proposition 8 repeals all independent California grounds for the exclusion of evidence in criminal trials. Additionally, in the case of complex initiative measures it is often difficult to rely on ballot information to discern voter intent: There are two factors which greatly inhibit [the electorate's] thoughtful consideration of the issues presented by all but the most simple initiative: the complexity of the ballot measure and the nature of the political campaign waged in its behalf. (Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform (1975) 48 So.Cal.L.Rev. 922, 934.) When a ballot proposal is lengthy only the most diligent voter [will] wade through [it] ( id. at p. 935), the result being a superficial intellectual exercise that leaves voters vulnerable to emotional  and perhaps misleading  advertising. ( Id. at p. 936.) Proposition 8 is undeniably long and complex: it adds one section containing seven subdivisions to the Constitution, and repeals one section thereof; it also adds five sections to the Penal Code and three more to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Another problem arises when a ballot measure affects many different rules of law. Even if arguendo Proposition 8 is not violative of the one-subject rule for the purpose of qualifying the whole measure for the ballot ( Brosnahan v. Brown, supra, 32 Cal.3d 236, 252-253, but see pp. 262-299), it remains speculative to rely on voter intent as it relates to any one provision. [A] proposition may contain 20 good features, but have one bad one secreted among the 20 good ones. The busy voter does not have the time to devote to the study of long, wordy, propositions and must rely upon such sketchy information as may be received through the press, radio or picked up in general conversation. If improper emphasis is placed upon one feature and the remaining features ignored, or if there is a failure to study the entire proposed amendment, the voter may be misled as to the over-all effect of the proposed amendment. (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 1948), argument in favor of Prop. 10, p. 8.) Given the complexity and length of Proposition 8 and the vagueness of the language of section 28(d), it is impossible to discern a clear intent of the electorate to abrogate independent state grounds for the exclusion of evidence. Under a proper construction of section 28(d), the trial court erred in admitting the evidence seized in the case at bar. Both parties concede that the search was unreasonable under California law. Because I believe section 28(d) did not repeal the vicarious exclusionary rule or other existing state grounds for the exclusion of evidence, I would hold that Lance had standing to challenge the unlawful search. When constitutional rights are implicated, the end cannot justify the means. The evidence is therefore inadmissible, and there appearing no other grounds in the record to uphold the search, I conclude that the order appealed from should be reversed.