Opinion ID: 874853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Under the facts presented, Eby may be entitled to relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6).

Text: Having concluded that relief from a dismissal under I.R.C.P. 40(c) may be sought under I.R.C.P. 60(b), there are two corollary questions for the Court to address in order to determine whether the district court's decision should be vacated. First, is neglect by post-conviction relief counsel grounds upon which relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) may be granted? Second, did the district court's denial of Eby's motion constitute an abuse of discretion? Eby argues that both I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1), granting relief on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), applicable to any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment may be grounds for relief from the order of dismissal. However, I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6) are mutually exclusive provisions, such that a ground for relief asserted, falling fairly under 60(b)(1), cannot be granted under 60(b)(6). Pullin v. City of Kimberly, 100 Idaho 34, 37 n. 2, 592 P.2d 849, 852, n. 2 (1979) (citation omitted). [A]lthough the court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its discretion is limited and may be granted only on a showing of `unique and compelling circumstances' justifying relief. Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 924 P.2d 607, 611 (1996) (quoting Matter of Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093, 793 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Ct.App.1990)). Our decision today is limited in scope, and has potential application only to post-conviction relief proceedings, rather than all civil cases. Generally, parties are bound by the actions (and failures to act) of their attorneys. The rationale for this rule has been explained by the U.S. Supreme Court: There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734, 740 (1962) (internal quotations omitted) (quoted in Henney v. Henney, 100 Idaho 739, 740, 605 P.2d 503, 504 (1979)). Individuals are generally bound by their attorneys' actions and when that representation falls below professional standards, the usual course of action is not to vacate the judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b), but to allow a malpractice suit against the attorney. Carroll v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 32 Cal.3d 892, 187 Cal.Rptr. 592, 654 P.2d 775, 777-78 (1982). Eby argues that being prevented a meaningful opportunity to present his claim through the inaction of his state-provided attorney would be a denial of his due process rights and would constitute grounds for relief from judgment based on I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). We have recognized that [t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings. Lee v. State, 122 Idaho 196, 199, 832 P.2d 1131, 1134 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2566, 115 L.Ed.2d 640, 671 (1991)). We recognize and reiterate today that there is no right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction cases. We likewise recognize that this Court has infrequently found reason to grant relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 576 n. 7, 212 P.3d 1001, 1006 n. 7 (2009). However, we are also cognizant that the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is the exclusive means for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence other than by direct appeal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 215, 217, 220 P.3d 571, 573 (2009) (quoting Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 519, 975 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ct.App.1999)). Given the unique status of a post-conviction proceeding, and given the complete absence of meaningful representation in the only available proceeding for Eby to advance constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence, we conclude that this case may present the unique and compelling circumstances in which I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) relief may well be warranted. As this is a matter of discretion for the trial court, we vacate and remand to the trial court rather than reversing. This Court has held that when the discretion exercised by a trial court is affected by an error of law, our role is to note the error made and remand the case for appropriate findings. Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15-16, 175 P.3d 172, 177-78 (2007) (citing Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho at 351, 924 P.2d at 613). In this case, unless there is an alternative ground for upholding the district court's decision, this matter must be remanded to the district court for that court to exercise its discretion in determining whether Eby is entitled to relief. The State argues that the district court made such an alternative ruling. The State directs this Court to the following statement from the district court: I don't know that the Court . . . really is in a position to consider the application, but really if you go through several factors under which relief can be sought under Rule 60b, I don't think that the Court has really received any satisfactory showing under rule 60(b) here to justify setting aside the Order of Dismissal. We do not agree that this statement reflects an alternative ruling which may be upheld on appeal. While this Court defers to the trial court's determinations regarding I.R.C.P. 60(b), it does review those determinations for abuse of discretion. In this process, we consider whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether the district court acted consistent with the applicable legal standards and whether the trial court reached its determination through an exercise of reason. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996). Although the district court clearly reached its decision by the exercise of reason, we are not persuaded either that the district court recognized that it had discretion to grant Eby relief or that the decision was consistent with applicable legal standards. The prefatory language used by the district court was consistent with its earlier statements indicating its belief that it was bound by the rule articulated in Castle and that, as a matter of law, Eby was not entitled to relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b). Indeed, at one point, Judge Luster stated: I can certainly pass on Mr. Kehne's representation here, that certainly may have been deficient and untimely, but I don't think that sympathy for Mr. Eby's plight trumps the [ Castle ] case holding or application under the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case. To the extent that the single sentence upon which the State relies may be interpreted as a holding by the district court that counsel's neglect of Eby's case was notas a matter of lawgrounds for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), this decision was inconsistent with the applicable legal standards. We therefore remand this case to the district court for consideration of whether the facts presented by Eby constitute grounds for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6).