Opinion ID: 160121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction on Accomplice Testimony

Text: 7 Mr. Valdez asserts the court erred in rejecting his proposed jury instructions regarding accomplice testimony and that the instruction given to the jury was erroneous. We review the district court's decision to give a particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion and consider the instructions as a whole de novo to determine whether they accurately informed the jury of the governing law. United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1999). We will not reverse unless we have substantial doubt that the jury was fairly guided. United States v. Guidry, 199 F.3d 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). 8 Mr. Valdez submitted two proposed jury instructions regarding accomplice testimony, which the court rejected. One of the proposed instructions informed the jury as follows:You may give the testimony of this [accomplice] such weight as you think it deserves. Whether or not testimony of a witness may have been influenced by her hope of receiving a reduced sentence is for you to decide. However common sense suggests that an accomplice often has a greater interest in lying in favor of the prosecution rather than against it, epical [sic] if (she) is still awaiting (her own) sentencing. To think that criminals will lie to save their fellows but not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is intended to clothe the criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to find in the public at large. [Washington v. Texas, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1925 (1967).] It is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence. [United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987).] 9 Aple's Br. at 14 (Requested Instr. No. 2). Thus, Mr. Valdez sought an instruction which specifically pointed out the suspect credibility of accomplice testimony. 10 Instead, the court tendered the following instruction: 11 You have heard evidence that Chincoya and Taylor each hope to receive a reduced sentence in return for their cooperation with the government. Both are subject to mandatory minimum sentences, that is, sentences which must be of a certain minimum length. Chincoya and Taylor have entered into plea agreements with the government which provide that if the prosecutor handling these witnesses' cases believes that they have provided substantial assistance in this case, he can file in this court a motion to reduce the sentences below the mandatory minimum. I have no power to reduce a sentence for substantial assistance unless the U.S. Attorney files such a motion. If such a motion is filed then it is entirely up to me to decide whether to reduce the sentence at all, and if so, how much to reduce it. 12 The testimony of a witness who provides evidence against a defendant for personal advantage, such as the possibility of a reduced sentence, must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. The jury must determine whether the witness's testimony has been affected by self interest, or by prejudice against the defendant. 13 Rec. vol. 3, doc. 106 (Instr. 30). 14 In United States v. Narviz-Guerra, 148 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit upheld, under plain error review, an instruction similar to the one given here: [t]he testimony of one who provides evidence against a defendant as an informer pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, or for personal advantage or vindication, must always be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care and caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses. Id. at 538 n.5. In affirming the instruction the court explained that although the judge did not give an instruction pointing out the witnesses' suspect credibility, he did instruct the jury to carefully, cautiously weigh the testimony of those who have entered into a plea agreement. Id. at 538. The court further noted that [i]t is up to the jury to evaluate the credibility of compensated witnesses, and the judge's instruction allowed the jury to do so. Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, here, the instruction informed the jury to weigh the accomplice testimony carefully and with caution. Thus, the fact that it did not specifically point out the suspect nature of accomplice testimony did not render it erroneous. See id.; United States v. Caraveau, No. 96-8115, 1997 WL 616064 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 1997) (upholding jury instruction nearly identical to the one tendered in this case). 15 Mr. Valdez' other proposed instruction contained the following language: 16 Under the current law, the only way that a cooperating witness can receive a reduction of his sentence below the numerically determined guideline range or the mandatory minimum is if a prosecutor files a motion with the sentencing judge asking the judge to reduce the sentence of the witness. 17 . . . The decision to file a 5K1.1 motion or Rule 35 motion is within the sole discretion of the prosecutor. . . . 18 . . . You should consider that such a witness may be motivated to please the prosecutor, since only the prosecutor, not the defense lawyer, can help that witness obtain a reduction of his sentence. 19 Aple's Br. at 13 (Requested Instr. No. 1). 20 In United States v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's rejection of proposed jury instructions with similar language. There, the court concluded the proposed instructions, while perhaps not a technically inaccurate statement of the law, at a minimum had the potential to confuse or mislead the jury, because they created the impression that the prosecutor, not the judge, actually possessed the authority to reduce the witness's sentence. Id. at 153 n.2. Mr. Valdez' first proposed instruction was similarly technically accurate but potentially confusing and misleading with regard to the prosecutor's authority to reduce the witnesses' sentences. 21 Mr. Valdez distinguishes Abrego on the grounds that the instructions actually adopted by the trial court and presented to the jury in that case tracked the language of the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions while those adopted by the court in this case do not. This argument is unconvincing. In fact, the instruction given in this case does not significantly differ from the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions. See Committee On Pattern Jury Instructions, District Judges Ass'n Fifth Cir., Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) 25-26 (1997); Abrego, 141 F.3d at 153 (This court has held that [the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions] adequately safeguard a criminal defendant when the government offers the testimony of a compensated informant.). Both instructions inform the jury to weigh the testimony of an accomplice with greater care. Moreover, even if the instruction tendered in this case did not track the language of the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, that would not warrant the conclusion that the instruction was erroneous. The instruction adequately informed the jury to weigh the credibility of accomplice testimony with caution and Mr. Valdez is not entitled to 'any specific wording of instructions.' United States v. McGuire, 27 F.3d 457, 462 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Bryant, 892 F.2d 1466, 1468 (10th Cir.1989)). 22 Finally, Mr. Valdez contends the court's instruction was erroneous because it only referred to the government's promise to file a motion to reduce the accomplices' sentences below the statutory minimum and failed to inform the jury of the government's promise to file a motion to request sentences below the applicable guidelines range. Because both motions are necessary for an accomplice to receive a reduced sentence, Mr. Valdez argues the tendered instruction was misleading. 23 Mr. Valdez cites no authority for his contention and we conclude it is without merit. As the government points out, the jury was allowed to view the accomplices' plea agreements, which specifically set forth the government's promise to file a motion to reduce their sentences below the statutory minimum and a motion to reduce their sentences below the applicable guidelines range. Additionally, both accomplices were cross-examined as to these promises. Therefore, we conclude the tendered instruction's reference only to the government's promise to file a motion to reduce the accomplices' sentences below the statutory minimum adequately informed the jury of the government's promises of leniency at sentencing. Accordingly, we hold the court did not err in instructing the jury on the evaluation of accomplice testimony. 24