Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Erroneous, inadequate, ambiguous instructions.

Text: The jury was instructed in the language of former CALJIC No. 8.84 that it should consider all of the evidence received at any phase of the trial except as hereafter instructed. The jury was also told twice that it shall consider, take into account, and be guided by the statutory factors relevant to the penalty decision. (§ 190.3.) Appellant contends that the first of these instructions permitted the jury to consider all of the evidence received during the earlier stages of the trial regardless of whether evidence was relevant to one of the statutory factors. The second instruction, he claims, was not sufficient to restrict consideration of evidence that was not relevant. While an instruction that evidence should be considered only if it was relevant to one of the statutory factors would be proper, appellant did not request such an instruction and the court was not required to give one sua sponte. ( People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 947, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) Moreover, the evidence introduced at the sanity phase that appellant identifies as irrelevant was in fact relevant to several statutory factors  whether appellant acted under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance, whether defendant believed he had a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct, and whether his capacity to conform his conduct to the law was impaired by mental disease. (§ 190.3, factors (d), (f), and (h).) Much of the other evidence, specifically that to which the prosecutor referred in closing argument, could be considered in rebuttal to the mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase.
Appellant contends that the jury was likely to misunderstand the instruction, former CALJIC No. 8.84.1, that it consider, if applicable, the absence of criminal activity other than those acts for which he has been convicted in this trial, which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence. As worded, appellant argues, the jury would believe that only complete absence of other criminal activity was mitigating, an understanding reinforced by defense counsel who referred to that factor as absence of criminal activity and by the prosecutor's argument in which he identified appellant's nonviolent criminal activity as aggravating factors. The prosecutor did not do so. He argued only that the defense penalty phase witnesses who testified about appellant's sterling character as a youth did not know about his conduct as an adult. We find no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in the manner now suggested by appellant. ( Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316; People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 801, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.)
Factor (d) of section 190.3 permits the jury to consider whether the defendant committed the capital offense while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Factor (h) of section 190.3 permits the jury to consider whether the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect. The jury was so instructed. Appellant contends that evidence of these factors may only be considered mitigating. In People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at page 709, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640, we reaffirmed our view that a court need not instruct that section 190.3, factor (d) may only be considered in mitigation. We have held, however, that the absence of these, or any, factors may not be considered aggravating. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) Because the jury was not so instructed, appellant argues, jurors who did not believe in an insanity defense or thought a mental illness defense was a cop-out would have considered his reliance on that defense as a factor in aggravation. He did not request a clarifying instruction, however. The jury was properly instructed to rely on evidence. Appellant's reliance on an insanity or mental illness defense was not itself evidence. We see no possibility that the jury would misunderstand the instruction in the manner suggested by appellant. Nor would a reasonable juror fail to identify evidence of mental illness as mitigating. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, 802, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.) Thus, the failure of defense counsel to request further instructions cannot be deemed incompetent or prejudicial. In sum, the record does not support appellant's assertion that the jury relied on an invalid aggravating factor.
We held in People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 784, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297 that the court is not required to instruct that the absence of a mitigating factor is not itself aggravating, stating further: Although that would be a correct statement of the law [citation], a specific instruction to that effect is not required, at least not unless the court or parties make an improper or contrary suggestion. Appellant contends that two aspects of the prosecutor's argument obliged the trial court to instruct that the absence of mitigating factors is not aggravating. He claims that the prosecutor suggested to the jury that evidence that appellant did not come from a repressive home was aggravating, and that he argued that appellant's lack of remorse was aggravating. The prosecutor did not argue that coming from a good home is a factor militating in favor of death. Again, appellant relies on argument related only to the defense penalty phase evidence which, the prosecutor argued, rebutted what the jury somewhere ... heard about a repressive and terrible childhood. [48] The reference to remorse came after a recitation describing the manner in which the victims died, their defenselessness, the prosecutor's theory that the victims died only because they stood between appellant and his sexual lust, at the end of which the prosecutor asked rhetorically: And what about Herbert James Coddington, the sinner? Is he remorseful, sorry, apologetic for what he has done? And the answer is profoundly `no.' There was no argument that absence of remorse is aggravating. The import of the argument was that the highly aggravated, heinous nature and circumstances of the crimes were not tempered by remorse. That was neither misleading nor improper. A prosecutor may comment on lack of remorse if he or she does not suggest that this is an aggravating factor. ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 545, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.)
Appellant next contends that the jury should have been instructed that it could not consider any aspect of the crimes that was part and parcel of the elements of first degree murder as aggravating. He derives authority for this proposition from this court's statement in People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 77, 246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1, that the following instruction was a useful framework within which a jury could consider the aggravating circumstances set out in section 190.3: `An aggravating circumstance is any fact, condition or event attending the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the offense itself.' Appellant's understanding of that instruction, which he complains was not given in this case, is faulty. Dyer did not say that the manner in which the elements of first degree murder were established could not be considered aggravating. It said only that additional circumstances attending the commission of the crime could also be considered. Were appellant's construction of section 190.3, factor (a) accepted, a jury could not consider the method of killing or evidence of extensive planning offered to establish premeditation as aggravating factors. That is not the law. All circumstances of the crime or crimes may be considered. (§ 190.3, factor (a); see, e.g., People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1170, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950 [photographs showing execution-style form of killing, manner of inflicting wounds, also relevant to intent]; People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 552, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100 [fact that telephone line cut, and victim raped, beaten, stabbed, and intentionally tortured properly considered under § 190.3, factor (a) ].)
Appellant argues that one or more jurors might have believed that his mental illness was not mitigating because it was not extreme. He contends that instructing the jury that it could consider any other circumstance in his character, background, history or mental condition that the defendant offers in mitigation (see § 190.3, 1st par.; see also factor (k)) was not sufficient to offset the misleading impact of the instruction following section 190.3, factor (d) that the jury should consider: Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Appellant concedes that we have rejected this argument, but notes that in doing so in People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 443-444, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221, we said we would presume the jury understood the instructions correctly, barring evidence to the contrary. Although appellant disputes the logic of our conclusion, he offers no such evidence. The record does not, as he claims, demonstrate that the jury failed to give proper weight to the evidence of appellant's mental and emotional difficulties. Nothing in this record or in appellant's argument persuades us that we should reconsider our conclusion that it is not error to give only the standard instructions. (See People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 709, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.)
Contrary to appellant's contention, the court was not required to instruct that unanimity is not required before a juror may consider evidence to be mitigating. ( People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 314-315, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585.) Moreover, he did not request that instruction, and CALJIC No. 8.84.2, the instruction of which he complains, was not misleading. [49] It would not lead the jury to conclude that only facts deemed mitigating or aggravating by all 12 jurors could be considered. The jurors had already been told: Both the People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror. At this phase of the proceedings you must each exercise your personal moral judgment within the frame-work of the instructions as I am now giving to you as to whether the appropriate punishment for the defendant is death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. [¶] It is the duty of each of you to consider the evidence for the purpose of arriving at a verdict if you can do so. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after a discussion of the evidence and instructions with the other jurors. This instruction was adequate to inform the jurors that each was to weigh the evidence and arrive at a penalty decision individually.
Appellant contends that if it was not necessary to instruct that jury unanimity was not required as to mitigating factors because CALJIC No. 8.84.2 would not mislead the jurors, it follows that they must be instructed that they must unanimously agree that a factor is aggravating before weighing it against the mitigating evidence. He argues that such unanimity is necessary to ensure the reliability of a death verdict demanded by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Appellant analogizes a finding that a factor is aggravating to the statutory requirement of jury unanimity on enhancing allegations in noncapital cases (e.g., §§ 1158, 1158a), arguing that capital defendants are entitled to even more rigorous protection in the penalty decision. The jury was instructed, however, that [t]o return a judgement of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances, that it warrants death instead of life without possibility of parole. This instruction is adequate to ensure reliability in a death verdict as it makes clear to the jurors that each must reach an individual decision that evidence or factors that the individual juror believes are aggravating outweigh those he or she deems mitigating.
Appellant contends that, having given an instruction at the guilt phase that no adverse inference should be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify, the court's omission of that instruction at the penalty phase suggested to the jury that at that stage of the trial such an inference is permitted. That implication, he suggests, was reinforced by the prosecutor's comment on his failure to testify during closing argument. The prosecutor made no such comment, however. The argument identified by appellant is that in which the prosecutor stated that appellant professes no words whatsoever in remorse for what he has done. That comment was directed to, and the jury would so understand, the numerous occasions on which appellant discussed the crimes with others  from his initial statements to the arresting officers through his interviews with the psychiatrists  in which he did not express remorse. We reject this claim for the reasons we rejected the same claim when raised by appellant with regard to the sanity phase instructions.