Opinion ID: 512586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment in Milligan's Case

Text: 38
39 Eng's appeal from summary judgment in favor of Milligan presents a different picture. The district court there ruled as a matter of law that Eng's claims against Milligan, even if true, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under Wolff. This ruling effectively determines that Milligan is entitled to qualified immunity because no construction of the alleged facts could demonstrate that in 1983 Milligan violated Eng's established constitutional right to assistance. 40 As the district court recognized, a prison inmate facing a disciplinary hearing is only entitled to assistance from a fellow inmate or a prison employee under certain circumstances. For example, when the inmate is illiterate or the issues extremely complex. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570, 94 S.Ct. at 2981. The hearing transcript and pleadings demonstrate that Eng is not illiterate and that he understood the charges against him. Thus, he was not, at the time when these events occurred in 1983, deprived of any assistance due him as a matter of clearly established constitutional right. See Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 803 (2d Cir.1986) (requiring an appropriately direct prior holding by federal courts as a prerequisite to finding clearly established rights), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3263, 97 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987); see also Anderson v. Creighton, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir.1987). Because the interest asserted by Eng was not clearly established, and therefore not protected at the time of Milligan's omissions, we affirm Judge MacMahon's ruling that granted summary judgment dismissing Eng's claim against Milligan for failure to provide assistance.
41 In our view that does not end the matter. Confinement in SHU is a factor which, like illiteracy or complexity of charges, makes it nearly impossible for an inmate to formulate a defense, collect statements, interview witnesses, compile documentary evidence, and otherwise prepare for a disciplinary hearing. Although we recognize that inmates are not entitled to the full panoply of rights involved in a full-scale criminal proceeding, see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2974, the list of disabling factors in Wolff which trigger the right to some assistance in preparation for constitutionally-mandated procedures is not exclusive. 42 Prison authorities have a constitutional obligation to provide assistance to an inmate in marshaling evidence and presenting a defense when he is faced with disciplinary charges. No additional procedures are required to implement that obligation. When the inmate is disabled, either by being confined full-time to SHU or transferred from the prison in which the incidents occurred, the duty of assistance is greater because the inmate's ability to help himself is reduced. See Aikens v. Lash, 514 F.2d 55, 59 (7th Cir.1975), vacated on other grounds, 425 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 1721, 48 L.Ed.2d 191 (1976). If the inmate's right to marshal evidence and present a defense to charges of breaches of prison disciplinary rules is to mean anything, then an inmate so disabled must be provided with some assistance. Although this is not the occasion to define the assigned assistant's precise role and the contours of the assistant's obligations, such help certainly should include gathering evidence, obtaining documents and relevant tapes, and interviewing witnesses. At a minimum, an assistant should perform the investigatory tasks which the inmate, were he able, could perform for himself. 43 Green Haven procedures provide for certain assistance to be made available to inmates facing disciplinary hearings. Specifically, on the form which Superintendent Scully used to appoint Milligan as Eng's assistant, the printed instructions read: 44 You are to explain the nature of the proceeding and the charges to the inmate. You [are to] ask the inmate whether there is any factual matter that can be presented in his [defense] and you shall investigate any reasonable factual claim the inmate may make. 45 Here, providing no assistance whatsoever was a breach of Milligan's duty to assist Eng. 46 Apart from reporting the action taken and the results of the investigation, an inmate or prison employee assistant currently has no affirmative obligation to perform investigatory tasks. As illustrated by this case, doing nothing--and reporting it as such--appears to satisfy the current institutional guidelines for inmate assistance. 47 We think that for inmates disabled by confinement in SHU, or transferred to another facility, the right to substantive assistance is an obligation imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556-72, 94 S.Ct. at 2974-82 (inmates entitled to certain minimal due process requirements relating to prison disciplinary hearings). Further, the assistance must be provided in good faith and in the best interests of the inmate. For example, an assistant, such as Milligan, who is requested to interview a group of prisoners too numerous to interview must attempt to determine independently who the most relevant witnesses might be and to interview them. This role accords with those actions that an inmate facing disciplinary charges can undertake himself simply by asking guards and fellow inmates if they observed the incident. In sum, we hold that an assigned assistant who does nothing to assist a disabled prisoner--one who is segregated from the general prison population--has failed to accord the prisoner his limited constitutional due process right of assistance.