Opinion ID: 2003960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Conditions Precedent and CPLR 205 (a)

Text: To avert the consequences of their decision to forgo bringing this lawsuit in the Appellate Division within 30 days of ESDC's determination and findings, petitioners rely on CPLR 205 (a). CPLR 205 is entitled Termination of action, and subdivision (a), designated New action by plaintiff, provides as relevant that [i]f an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within six months after the termination provided that the new action would have been timely commenced at the time of commencement of the prior action and that service upon defendant is effected within such six-month period. Petitioners concede that the six-month toll in CPLR 205 (a) is unavailable to them, however, if the 30-day time limit in Eminent Domain Procedure Law § 207 (A) is a condition precedent to suit. Our principal case discussing conditions precedent is Romano v Romano (19 NY2d 444 [1967]). There, the wife alleged that her consent to marriage was induced by the husband's fraudulent misrepresentations and that she left him upon discovery of the fraud, although she did not bring an action for annulment until 14 years later. The husband defaulted and never appeared in the action. The trial court nonetheless dismissed the complaint on the ground that the three-year period fixed for the commencement of an action for annulment set out in Domestic Relations Law § 140 (e) was a part of the statutory cause of action itself. We affirmed, reasoning that where a statute created a cause of action and attached a time limit to its enforcement, the time was an ingredient of the cause. As a result, [t]his statutory provision could be seen as a sort of condition precedent, . . . probably more accurately described as . . . [a] special statutory limitation[] qualifying a given right in which time is made an essence of the right created and the limitation is an inherent part of the statute . . . out of which the right in question arises ( id. at 447 [internal quotation marks omitted]). We subsequently held that CPLR 205 (a) does not extend a time limit that is a condition precedent to suit ( Yonkers Contr. Co. v Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 93 NY2d 375 [1999] [one-year time limit for suits against Port Authority in section 7107 of McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws of New York (L 1950, ch 301, § 7) is a condition precedent and therefore may not be extended by CPLR 205 (a)]). The 30-day time limit in section 207 (A) is exactly the type of condition precedent described in Romano. When the Legislature adopted the Eminent Domain Procedure Law in 1977, it created a uniform procedure for pre-acquisition hearings before administrative agencies, which afforded potentially affected property owners new opportunities to have their objections or concerns aired and addressed before any taking occurred ( see EDPL 201, 202, 203, 204). As a tradeoff for these newly created rights for condemnees  the exercise of which inevitably prolonged the acquisition timetable  the Legislature in section 207 (A) incorporated a 30-day time limit as one of several measures intended to simplify and speed up any subsequent judicial review of the condemnor's determination and findings. Thus, the 30-day time limit is a condition precedent not susceptible to tolling by CPLR 205 (a). Moreover, unlike the statutes involved in any other case where the question of whether a time limit is a condition precedent or a statute of limitations has arisen, the Legislature specifically preempted the CPLR where the Eminent Domain Procedure Law provides its own procedure, as it does in section 207 (A) ( see EDPL 703, 705). The majority argues, though, that the Legislature's intent when it enacted article 2 of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law is practically beside the point because petitioners would have had the right under federal law to bring their section 207 (C) (1) claim in state court by virtue of 28 USC § 1367 (d) (majority op at 522). Section 1367 (d) provides generally for the tolling of statutes of limitations with regard to state law claims during their pendency in federal court and for a period of 30 days after [dismissal in federal court] unless State law provides for a longer tolling period. First, petitioners never mentioned 28 USC § 1367 (d) in their briefs to us or the Appellate Division. [1] We generally do not opine on newly raised issues because, without the benefit of briefing and oral argument, we are not fully informed. Further, considerations of fairness to the litigants come into play ( see Misicki v Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511, 519 [2009]). I would also note that the United States Supreme Court has, to date, approached section 1367 (d) cautiously, particularly as it pertains to pendent claims asserted against state defendants ( see Raygor v Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 US 533, 549, 549 n 2 [2002, Ginsburg, J., concurring] [noting the mist surrounding (section) 1367, and the well-reasoned commentary on the supplemental jurisdiction statute's flaws]). In any event, even if 28 USC § 1367 (d) tolls an Eminent Domain Procedure Law § 207 (C) (1) claim asserted against ESDC, [2] these petitioners would not be helped (which may be why they never mentioned this provision in their brief) because they did not commence this lawsuit within 30 days after the federal District Court dismissed their section 207 (C) (1) claim. [3] Petitioners waited until August 1, 2008 to refile their section 207 (C) (1) claim. This was 13 months  not 30 days  after the District Court dismissed this claim on June 6, 2007, and exactly six months after February 1, 2008, when the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment of dismissal. [4] And further assuming the availability of CPLR 205 (a) (that is, assuming that the 30-day limit in Eminent Domain Procedure Law § 207 [A] is a statute of limitations and therefore qualifies as a longer tolling period under state law within the meaning of 28 USC § 1367 [d]), the delay would be reduced from one year to seven months. Whether seven months or one year, these delays are significant, and they cannot be chalked up simply to the availability of a federal forum.