Opinion ID: 2091909
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Report Regarding the Dumping of Paint Thinner

Text: [¶25] ISI and IFPI argue that Currie's report regarding the dumping of paint thinner was not protected because it was not a report within the meaning of the WPA and, in any event, was not made in good faith. We consider these arguments and, finding them unpersuasive, engage in the remainder of the summary judgment analysis.
[¶26] ISI and IFPI assert that, at the time of Currie's internal report, another employee had already reported the dumping to the DEP and management was already aware of the situation. [7] The DEP allegedly received a report regarding the dumping in the spring of 2001, and Currie reported the dumping to management around June 2001. Although the statements do not reveal exactly when ISI and IFPI learned of the dumping, they indicate that Ouellette learned of a DEP investigation regarding the dumping at some point between May and July 2001. Although ISI and IFPI assert that they were aware of the alleged dumping prior to Currie's report, Currie asserts that one of the managers to whom he reported acted like he was astonished upon hearing what had occurred. Currie's statements, if believed, would support a finding that management first learned of the dumping through his report. The report is, therefore, a report within the meaning of the WPA.
[¶27] ISI and IFPI assert that Currie's report to management was made solely to disclaim responsibility for the report to the DEP. Currie's deposition testimony, however, which is cited in his statements of material facts, indicates that his report was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to prevent ISI and IFPI from burning the wood chips on which the paint thinner had been dumped. If believed, this assertion would support a finding that Currie's report was made in good faith.
[¶28] Having concluded that the statements, if established, would support a finding that Currie's report was protected activity, we consider whether it caused his discharge. ISI and IFPI argue that causation cannot be established because the discharge decision was made in March 2001 and the report was made around June 2001. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Currie and assuming that the discharge decision was made in July 2001, however, there is sufficient temporal proximity between his paint thinner report and his discharge to create an inference of causation between the report and his discharge. There is additional evidence of causation in that, at the meeting on the morning of Currie's discharge, Ouellette and Johnson discussed the paint thinner dumping. Currie's statements, if proved, would support a finding that the report contributed to his discharge. We, therefore, find that Currie successfully set forth a prima facie case. [¶29] Even if, at trial, the fact-finder concludes that Currie's report regarding the unauthorized workers provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his discharge, Currie's statements, if believed, could support a finding that his report regarding the dumping of paint thinner also motivated his discharge. The summary judgment must, therefore, be vacated on this issue.