Opinion ID: 4541138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extraordinary Circumstances Review

Text: Wild Watershed contends the extraordinary circumstances review requirement stems from the statutory text of the Insect and Disease exclusion, which states a project “may be . . . categorically excluded” from the requirements of NEPA. 16 U.S.C. § 6591b(a). To Wild Watershed, use of the “categorically -13- excluded” language signifies Congress’s intent to incorporate the regulatory definition of “categorical exclusion” and “all that term entails” into the statutory provision. Aplt. Br. at 13. Regulations define “Categorical exclusion” as, [A] category of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and which have been found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency in implementation of these regulations (§1507.3) and for which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required. . . . Any procedures under this section shall provide for extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a significant environmental effect. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (emphasis added). This definition mandates extraordinary circumstances review for regulatory categorical exclusions, and Wild Watershed would therefore have us read such a requirement into the statutory language of the Insect and Disease exclusion because “when Congress employs a term of art, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken.” F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012). Wild Watershed also relies on the term “may” in the statute. This, it contends, shows HFRA merely grants administrative discretion to the Forest Service. In exercising that discretion and deciding to categorically exclude a project, the Forest Service must be constrained by those regulations that ordinarily govern its -14- decision to categorically exclude projects, including by mandating extraordinary circumstances review. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4; 36 C.F.R. § 220.6. Moreover, Wild Watershed argues, this is exactly how the Forest Service itself has interpreted the statute. Pointing to the Forest Service’s handbook and a Frequently Asked Questions document, Wild Watershed contends the Forest Service interpreted 16 U.S.C. § 6591b as requiring extraordinary circumstances review since immediately after passage of the Insect and Disease exclusion. This agency interpretation, it contends, is entitled to deference. We disagree. Beginning with the text of the statute, the Insect and Disease exclusion omits any explicit requirement to perform extraordinary circumstances review. See 16 U.S.C. § 6591b. Where no explicit statutory requirements exist, we generally refrain from reading any in. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012). But here we are not left to rely on this canon of construction alone. A comparison to other HFRA statutory categorical exclusions shows Congress understands what extraordinary circumstances review entails and how to explicitly require it where it intends to. In a separate section of HFRA, Congress created a categorical exclusion for applied silvicultural assessments (Applied Silvicultural Assessments exclusion) -15- using similar language to that at issue here. 16 U.S.C. § 6554(d)(1) (providing that projects “carried out under this section . . . may be categorically excluded from documentation in an environmental impact statement and environmental assessment under [NEPA]”). Yet, unlike in the Insect and Disease exclusion, Congress explicitly mandated that applied silvicultural assessment projects “be subject to the extraordinary circumstances procedures established by the [Forest Service].” Id. § 6554(d)(2)(B). Similarly, in another provision of HFRA, Congress created a statutory categorical exclusion for wildfire resilience projects. See 16 U.S.C. § 6591d (establishing the Wildfire Resilience exclusion). Just as it did in the Insect and Disease exclusion and the Applied Silvicultural Assessments exclusion, Congress stated that wildfire resilience projects are “categorically excluded from the requirements of [NEPA].” 16 U.S.C. § 6591d(a)(2). But again, unlike the provision presently at issue, Congress explicitly added that the Forest Service “shall apply the extraordinary circumstances procedures under [36 C.F.R. § 220.6] when using” the Wildfire Resilience exclusion. Id. § 6591d(c)(4). The import of these provisions is clear: Congress does not use the “categorically excluded” language as a term of art necessarily incorporating a requirement to perform extraordinary circumstances review. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (holding that where “Congress includes particular -16- language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,” courts presume that “Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion”); see also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 170 (noting that under the presumption of consistent usage canon, a word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a statute, and should be interpreted consistently with the way the term is used in other parts of the statute). Where Congress intends extraordinary circumstances review to be required before an agency may rely on a statutory categorical exclusion, it says so explicitly. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 6591d(c)(4). Accordingly, the absence of an explicit extraordinary circumstances review requirement in the Insect and Disease exclusion leads us to conclude that no such requirement exists under the statute. To our knowledge, every court that has squarely addressed this question has reached the same conclusion. 8 See, e.g., Marten, 2018 WL 6046472, at ; Greater Hells Canyon Council v. Stein, No. 2:17-cv-00843, 2018 WL 3966289, at  (D. Or. June 11, 2018) (Sullivan, 8 We do not suggest courts have treated this question uniformly. The Ninth Circuit, for example, recently assessed the adequacy of the Forest Service’s extraordinary circumstances review without deciding the threshold question of whether HFRA mandated such review. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Ilano, 928 F.3d 774, 781 n.3 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that it “need not address” whether HFRA mandated extraordinary circumstances review); Greater Hells Canyon Council v. Stein, No. 18-35742, 2020 WL 110523, at 1 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2020) (“Assuming, without deciding, that the [Insect and Disease exclusion] requires extraordinary circumstances review.”). -17- Magistrate J., proposing findings of fact and recommendations), adopted by, 2018 WL 3964801, at  (D. Or. Aug. 17, 2018). Wild Watershed’s reliance on the regulatory definition of categorical exclusion, see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4, fails to disturb this result. That definition, by its plain terms, applies only to regulatory categorical exclusions. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (defining “Categorical exclusion” as those actions “which have been found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a federal agency in implementation of these regulations” (emphasis added)). It does not reach statutory categorical exclusions such as the Insect and Disease exclusion at issue here. See Stein, 2018 WL 3966289, at . Nor do the Forest Service’s guidance documents suggesting such review might be appropriate convince us of Wild Watershed’s position. 9 Although the FAQ document and Forest Service handbook present some evidence in favor of 9 We consider these materials only for the persuasive value they may hold. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (noting that agency interpretations—no matter what form they take—may be considered for persuasiveness based on “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”). Although in its opening brief Wild Watershed sought Chevron deference, such deference is inappropriate considering neither the FAQ document nor the Forest Service handbook carries the force of law. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (noting that interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines are “beyond the Chevron pale”). In its reply brief, Wild Watershed appears to concede the point by noting that “the handbook, like the FAQ guidance itself, are not enforceable – they are each persuasive for the courts only.” Reply at 5. -18- Wild Watershed’s interpretation, we find this insufficient to overcome our conclusion based on the text and structure of HFRA that no extraordinary circumstances review was required prior to approving the projects. The Forest Service’s FAQ document, first issued on May 1, 2014 in the wake of the 2014 Farm Bill’s passage, weighs in Wild Watershed’s favor. App. at 21 (stating a Forest Service official must conduct extraordinary circumstances review for projects approved under 16 U.S.C. § 6591b). But immediately after issuing this FAQ document, the Forest Service updated its handbook. See Forest Service Handbook, Ch. 30, § 32.3 (Amendment No. 1909.15-2014-1, effective May 28, 2014). The updated handbook is more equivocal. It could be read either as supporting Wild Watershed’s interpretation or the Forest Service’s position. 10 But we need not definitively resolve the question because we find the Forest Service’s guidance documents and past practice insufficiently clear, consistent, or thorough 10 To Wild Watershed’s point, the handbook nowhere clearly states the position the Forest Service now advances—that statutory categorical exclusions are exempt from extraordinary circumstances review unless the statute explicitly states otherwise. See generally Forest Service Handbook, Ch. 30 (Amendment No. 1909.15-2014-1, effective May 28, 2014). The Forest Service would have us infer this point from the fact that the handbook states extraordinary circumstances review is required for one statutory categorical exclusion— the Applied Silvicultural Assessments exclusion—but omits any similar requirement from the section discussing the Insect and Disease exclusion. Id. This is one potential reading of the handbook, but far from the only plausible one. -19- to be persuasive in interpreting the applicable statutory and regulatory framework. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.