Opinion ID: 3194599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hawkins' Representation of J.G.

Text: The hearing panel concluded that Hawkins, by filing a temporary parenting plan which did not reflect the interests or the position of J.G., failed to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of her client. The panel noted that after filing the initial temporary parenting plan, Hawkins had to file a motion to withdraw that plan which delayed consideration of a parenting plan which did accurately reflect the interests and position of J.G. The panel also concluded that Hawkins violated KRPC 3.2 when she refused to turn over the quitclaim deed to R.G. in an attempt to remove the sanctions that the court entered against her personally. Hawkins attacks the panel's findings regarding the temporary parenting plan by arguing that the findings were taken solely from the original complaint that Suzanne Valdez (opposing counsel in the underlying matter) filed against her. Hawkins then proceeds to argue that the temporary parenting plan accurately reflected J.G.'s wishes and concerns and that Hawkins and J.G. decided to withdraw the plan for strategic reasons because R.G. threatened and harassed J.G. after the proposed plan was filed. Though Hawkins is correct that the hearing panel based its factual findings regarding the temporary parenting plan on information contained within Valdez' complaint, she fails to acknowledge that Valdez' testimony (via deposition) was presented as evidence to the hearing panel and was consistent with the allegations Valdez 41 made within her complaint. She also fails to acknowledge that attached to the complaint was documentary evidence (e.g., portions of an email from J.G. to R.G.) indicating that the initial parenting plan did not reflect J.G.'s wishes. Though Hawkins testified before the hearing panel that the parenting plan did accurately reflect the matters that she had discussed with J.G., Hawkins was unable to confirm that J.G. had reviewed the parenting plan before Hawkins had filed it with the court. Notably, the record indicates Hawkins mailed the parenting plan to J.G. on the same day she filed it with the court. Despite Hawkins' testimony to the contrary, the panel had evidence before it showing that it was highly probable that the parenting plan Hawkins filed did not reflect the wishes of her client. With regard to the quitclaim deed, the hearing panel found that the district court, within its divorce decree, awarded martial property located in Alabama to R.G. The court ordered J.G. to execute a quit claim deed in favor of R.G. J.G. executed the quit claim deed and provided it to the respondent. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent refused to turn over the quit claim deed to opposing counsel until a journal entry and other court orders were agreed to. In the spring, 2014, after the disciplinary administrator's office became involved, the respondent finally turned over the quit claim deed. Based on this finding, the panel concluded that Hawkins violated KRPC 3.2 when she withheld the quitclaim deed in an attempt to remove the sanctions that the court entered against her personally. As can be discerned from the hearing panel findings in DA11730, the divorce case between J.G. and R.G. was, to put it mildly, a contentious affair. Highly summarized, the record indicates that the parties eventually entered mediation, reached what they thought 42 was an agreement on how to settle the case, but then could not agree on the exact language needed to memorialize their agreement. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 170(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 264), the parties submitted their competing drafts of their agreement to the district court so it could settle the matter, resulting in the district court filing the divorce decree mentioned above on July 24, 2013. Though the divorce decree awarded a home located in Alabama to R.G., there is no specific order within it commanding J.G. to execute a quitclaim deed in R.G.'s favor. Valdez indicated that R.G. wanted the quitclaim deed so he could sell the home. In addition to the divorce decree, the district court filed a memorandum decision on August 14, 2013, ordering Hawkins to pay $1,575 in attorney fees in connection with her supposed failure to comply with a court order to make available to R.G.'s attorneys adoption records of the couple's children. On August 22, 2013, Hawkins filed a notice of appeal, challenging (1) the divorce decree on the basis that it did not reflect the entirety of the parties' agreement and (2) the order for her to pay attorney fees. On September 10, 2013, Valdez filed a notice of crossappeal, challenging certain judgments entered herein on July 24, 2013; and all previous rulings on all issues decided therein to the Kansas Court of Appeals. While this appeal was pending, the parties returned to mediation to work out their remaining differences. It must be pointed out that the issues addressed in mediation were solely those involving R.G. and J.G.; mediation did not address the attorney fee sanction personally levied against Hawkins. Highly summarized, in October 2013, Valdez and Hawkins exchanged numerous emails indicating that R.G. and J.G. had reached a settlement. The attorneys discussed how to memorialize and file the settlement with the district court and what actions each party needed to take in order to implement their agreement (e.g., J.G. executing a quitclaim deed and delivering it to R.G.). The attorneys 43 also discussed what impact the settlement should have on the appeal pending before the Court of Appeals. Valdez believed that the settlement should result in a voluntary dismissal of the entire appeal. Hawkins disagreed, noting that though R.G. and J.G.'s settlement may have rendered as moot any appellate issues concerning the divorce decree, the attorney fee sanction was still at issue. Thus, Hawkins refused to dismiss the appeal. One email in particular, an email Hawkins wrote to Valdez on October 17, 2013, detailed Hawkins' understanding of the tasks that needed to be completed by both sides in order to implement the parties' agreement. The email also demonstrates Hawkins' understanding of what impact the parties' settlement should have on the pending appeal. Because the Disciplinary Administrator relies solely on this email to argue that Hawkins attempted to coerce Valdez into abandoning the attorney fee sanction in exchange for Hawkins agreeing to deliver the quitclaim deed to Valdez' client, the email is quoted in its entirety: Suzanne, I, like you, am pleased that Susan Kraus was able to work with the parties to resolve the majority of the outstanding issues in mediation. I have reviewed the memorandums of understanding with my client and she expresses a desire that once these MOUs are filed that there are no loose ends. The loose ends presently are: (1) The Military Retired Pay Court Order, (2) the agreed Parenting Plan signed by the parties, (3) assurance there will be no modification of maintenance award, (4) quit claim deed, (5) LES statements. I am seeking your cooperation to get all of these matters wrapped up and the necessary paperwork on file with District Court and the Court of Appeals by Thursday of next week. 44 I propose the journal entry incorporating the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Supplement to Property Settlement Agreement also incorporate by reference the agreed parenting plan (I have the original signed by both parties), Military Retired Pay Court Order, and a second Supplement to Property Settlement Agreement that incorporates the financial awards contained in the Decree of Divorce and Journal Entry of Final Settlement into the parties mutual agreement. That eliminates the possibility of either party revisiting the property settlement terms and would make the appeal addressing those issues moot with or without a dismissal. The journal entry should contain a space for both of our signatures as well as the judge so that once ordered [sic] becomes incorporated into the Decree of Divorce[.] Before the journal entry is filed in District Court along with the aforementioned documents, your client needs to forward the LES statements he promised during mediation. I can approve the remainder of the paperwork once that has been received. Upon filing I will provide a signed quitclaim deed for the real estate. RE: Voluntary dismissal of Appeal I received a phone call from the Court of Appeals regarding the fax they received from Branden [Valdez' co-counsel]. They are not filing the Voluntary Dismissal as it is improperly filed. Both parties are represented by counsel, therefore any dismissal must be signed by their attorneys of record. I am willing to sign a stipulated joint dismissal if you file a document in District Court that the attorney fees judgment will not be pursued. Absent there being an agreement not to pursue the attorney fees judgment I intend to proceed with that appeal. 45 If you intend to enforce the award of attorney fees I am still amenable to dismissing all but the attorneys fees judgment upon the filing of the journal entry and accompanying documents referenced above; however, it cannot be done through a voluntary dismissal. If the appellate case is dismissed as to the issues contained in the Decree of Divorce and Journal Entry of Final Settlement then everything is dismissed. There is no such thing as a partial dismissal on the issues. If the proposal for district court is acceptable to you I will prepare the proposed paperwork for your consideration. Once I know whether or not you intend to pursue collection of attorneys fees I can prepare paperwork to be filed in the Court of Appeals. If you prefer to draft the paperwork please let me know so there is not duplication of efforts. If any of this requires further discussion please feel free to give me a call. Joan. (Emphasis added.) The above email indicates that Hawkins made delivery of the quitclaim deed to R.G. contingent upon Valdez and R.G. completing certain tasks which Hawkins believed were essential to implementing the agreement the parties had reached in mediation. This may be an example of a lawyer playing hardball on behalf of a client, but it is certainly not unethical behavior. What would constitute unethical behavior is if Hawkins made delivery of the quitclaim deed to R.G. contingent upon Valdez agreeing not to pursue enforcement of the attorney fee sanction levied specifically against Hawkins. Such an action could certainly be construed as failing to expedite litigation. See KRPC 3.2. But nowhere in Hawkins' October 17 email or in her subsequent emails to Valdez does she make such a suggestion. 46 What Valdez wanted is for Hawkins to agree to dismiss the entire appeal pending before the Court of Appeals. But if Hawkins did that, she would have abandoned her right to challenge the attorney fees levied against her. Clearly, that is why Hawkins suggested to Valdez that if she agreed not to enforce the attorney fee sanction, Hawkins would agree to dismiss the appeal. Such an agreement would have rendered as moot the only issue that Hawkins could have properly appealed at that point in time, i.e., the attorney fee sanction. But because Valdez did not agree to Hawkins' suggestion, Hawkins proceeded with her appeal. Though the parties eventually reached a settlement, causing the issues related to the underlying divorce to be dismissed from the appeal on February 21, 2014, the Court of Appeals retained jurisdiction over whether the attorney fee sanction was appropriate. Notably, the Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the district court's order for Hawkins to pay attorney fees. See In re Marriage of Gerleman, No. 110,461, 2015 WL 1513967 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). Though the record indicates that Hawkins did not mail the quitclaim deed to Valdez until April 3, 2014, the hearing panel did not find that this delay constituted a violation of KRPC 3.2. Instead, the hearing panel found a rule violation based on Hawkins allegedly withholding the quitclaim deed in an attempt to have the sanctions against her removed. But as shown above, the record does not support this finding. The panel's conclusion that Hawkins violated KRPC 3.2 by withholding the quitclaim deed is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.