Opinion ID: 457725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: survival and wrongful death actions

Text: 17 Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in finding that they were placed on notice of their causes of action when Mr. Ayo died. Rather they contend that they were not placed on notice until February 1983 when Mrs. Ayo reviewed the medical records with her attorneys and thus this action was timely instituted when it was filed a short time later on July 28, 1983. In order to understand the plaintiffs' contentions, a discussion of their two causes of action and the applicable Louisiana limitation provisions is necessary. 18 Under Louisiana law a decedent's statutorily designated beneficiaries have two possible causes of action against a tortfeasor who causes the death of the decedent. A beneficiary may bring a survival action, i.e., an action for damages the injured person would have had, had he lived. A beneficiary may also bring a wrongful death action, i.e., an action for the damages the beneficiaries sustained as a result of the death. The two causes of action are separate and distinct causes of action. Guidry v. Theriot, 377 So.2d 319, 322 (La.1979). The Louisiana Civil Code sets forth this recovery scheme and, at the same time, sets forth the applicable limitations period for a survival action: 19 (1) The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi-offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased in favor of: 20 (a) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either such spouse or such child or children; 21 (b) The surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or child surviving; and 22 (c) The surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving. 23 (2) The survivors in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the damages which they sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased. 24 La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 2315 D (West Supp.1985). As the statute expressly states, the period of limitations for a survival action is one year. While the statute does not state the period of limitations for a wrongful death action, that period is also one year. La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 3492 (West Supp.1985). 2 25 Louisiana law provides two methods for barring an action as being untimely: (1) prescription and (2) peremption. Whether a particular time period is prescriptive or peremptive is a matter determined by the Louisiana courts. The major factor used by a court in determining whether a statute is prescriptive or peremptive is whether the statute creating the cause of action also provides a time period in which the action must be asserted. Pounds v. Schori, 377 So.2d 1195 (La.1979). When the statute creating the cause of action provides the time period in which the action must be asserted, the courts are likely to find the time period is peremptive; when the statute creating the cause of action does not provide a time period, the courts are likely to find the limitations period is prescriptive. Id. Thus, the courts have held that the one year period of limitations for a survival action is peremptive, McClendon v. State Department of Corrections, 357 So.2d 1218 (La.Ct.App.1978), and that the one year period of limitations for the wrongful death action is prescriptive. Guidry v. Theriot, 377 So.2d at 326. 26 When prescription applies, the prescriptive period does not begin to run until the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the facts which would entitle him to bring suit. Jones v. Philco-Ford Corp., 441 So.2d 1251 (La.Ct.App.1983), original opinion reinstated, 452 So.2d 370 (La.Ct.App.1984); Lynch v. Foster, 376 So.2d 342 (La.Ct.App.), writ denied, 378 So.2d 433 (La.1979). This is the Louisiana doctrine of contra non valentem agere non currit prescriptio, that is, no prescription runs against a person unable to bring an action. When peremption applies, the statutory period is not subject to interruption. McClendon v. State Department of Corrections, 357 So.2d 1218 (La.Ct.App.1978); Succession of Roux v. Guidry, 182 So.2d 109 (La.Ct.App.1966). The plaintiffs argue that the wrongful death action is not prescribed due to the doctrine of contra non valentem and that the survival action is not perempted because, under their interpretation of Louisiana law, the peremption period is also subject to interruption and was properly interrupted in this case.
27 The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the survival action on the ground that the one year peremption period is not subject to interruption. We agree with the district court's holding. See, e.g., Pounds v. Schori, 377 So.2d 1195, 1199 (La.1979). Whether the plaintiffs reasonably could have discovered their cause of action is not an issue when a peremptive time period applies. Plaintiffs strongly assert, however, that a peremptive time period is subject to interruption or suspension in certain cases; therefore, plaintiffs would have us apply the theory of contra non valentem to their survival action. 28 As support for their argument plaintiffs rely on Giroir v. South Louisiana Medical Center, 453 So.2d 949 (La.Ct.App.) writs granted, 458 So.2d 108 (La.1984). The italicized portion of the following quote from Giroir provides the basis for plaintiffs' argument: 29 La.R.S. 9:5628 provides (in part) that claims against physicians and hospitals must be filed within one year of the negligent act or within one year from the date of discovery of such act. Plaintiffs allege that they did not learn of the negligent act until some time after Mrs. Giroir's death and that the burden is on the defendant to prove exactly when this knowledge was acquired. 30 This argument has no merit. The general rule is that when it appears from the face of the pleadings (as it does in this case) that a claim is not filed timely, the burden is on the plaintiff to show an interruption or suspension of prescription. Although here we are dealing with peremption rather than prescription, we conclude the same reasoning applies, i.e., plaintiffs must show at what point they learned of the negligent act in order to prove that the peremptive period began running at some point other than at Mrs. Giroir's death. There is no such evidence in the record. 31 Further, it has been held that La.R.S. 9:5628, which makes no specific provisions for wrongful death or survival actions, is a general statute. As such, it conflicts with art. 2315, which is a special statute providing a one-year time period for survival actions. The general rule is that in cases of conflict, the special statute prevails. Therefore the survival action is not governed by the time period provided in La.R.S. 9:5628, but by that provided in art. 2315. 32 453 So.2d at 954-55 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). While the italicized portion of the quotation, standing alone, would provide support for the plaintiffs' contention, when the entire passage is read, no support for the plaintiffs' contention exists. When the Giroir court states that they are dealing with peremption, they are referring to the peremptive period of the medical malpractice statute. When the court goes on to state that the time for beginning the running of the peremptive time period is the time of the learning of the negligence, the court is obviously still referring to the medical malpractice statute and not to any other peremption period. The medical malpractice statute specifically provides that the peremptive period will not begin to run until the negligent act occurs or is discovered. 33 In light of the substantial Louisiana authority in support of the proposition that peremptive periods are not subject to interruption or suspension, we decline to adopt plaintiffs' unsupported contention. The plaintiffs' argument appears to be grounded on a misreading of Giroir and goes against the pronouncements of the state's highest court. The district court correctly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' survival action. 34
35 The plaintiffs also assert that the district court erred in entering a summary judgment against them on their wrongful death claim. The district court held that the plaintiffs' cause of action had prescribed. Mrs. Ayo and her children argue that the doctrine of contra non valentem should be applied so that the one year prescriptive period would not have commenced to run until February 1983. 3 36 Under the doctrine of contra non valentem, prescription will not run against a person who is unable to bring an action or who for some reason is unable to act. Dagenhart v. Robertson Truck Lines, Inc., 230 So.2d 916, 918 (La.Ct.App.1970). The Louisiana courts have outlined four situations where the doctrine may be applied: (1) where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts from acting on plaintiff's claim; (2) where there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from acting; (3) where the debtor has done some act to prevent the creditor from availing himself of his claim or where the defendant has knowingly concealed information from the plaintiff or has through his own conduct misled or lulled the plaintiff into inaction; and (4) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, although his ignorance is not induced by the defendant. Corsey v. State Department of Corrections, 375 So.2d 1319 (La.1979); Nathan v. Carter, 372 So.2d 560 (La.1979). The plaintiffs rely on the fourth category as the basis for the argument that prescription has not run against them on their wrongful death action. 37 Louisiana law does not require a plaintiff to have actual notice of the cause of action; constructive notice is sufficient. 38 Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the owner on his guard and call for inquiry is tantamount to knowledge or notice of every thing to which inquiry may lead and such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably put the owner on inquiry is sufficient to start the running of prescription. 39 Cartwright v. Chrysler Corporation, 255 La. 597, 232 So.2d 285, 287 (1970) (footnote omitted). When an action appears to have prescribed on the face of the petition, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing facts which would interrupt or suspend prescription. Yarbrough v. Louisiana Cement Company, 370 So.2d 602 (La.Ct.App.), writ denied, 373 So.2d 531 (La.1979); Marcel v. Hospital Corp. of the Sisters of Saint Joseph, 322 So.2d 302 (La.Ct.App.1975). 40 We find that the district court was correct in concluding that, under Louisiana law, the plaintiffs had not raised a factual issue as to whether the cause of action was reasonably knowable by Mrs. Ayo. See Henderson v. Todd Shipyards, 462 So.2d 242 (La.Ct.App.1984), writ denied, 462 So.2d 1266 (La.1985). In Henderson v. Todd Shipyards the identical issue was raised. The widow of an asbestos worker who died of lung cancer filed a wrongful death action over ten years after her husband's death. The plaintiff relied upon the doctrine of contra non valentem. However, she made no showing that she had inquired into the cause of her husband's death but instead had simply rested on the assumption that his death had been caused by cigarette smoking. The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's wrongful death claim because she had not presented sufficient evidence to meet her burden of proof. 41 The summary judgment evidence in the instant case shows that Mrs. Ayo knew her husband was an asbestos worker and that Dr. Baltz mentioned to her that exposure to asbestos could be harmful. At no point did Dr. Baltz tell Mrs. Ayo that he had ruled out asbestos as a possible cause of her husband's cancer or that cigarette smoking was the cause of the cancer. The summary judgment evidence further shows that Mrs. Ayo took no steps to determine whether her husband's workplace could have played any role in causing his cancer although Dr. Baltz had indicated to her that her husband's employment as an asbestos worker could have been a factor in the problems from which he suffered. Thus, under the clear holding of Henderson v. Todd Shipyards, Mr. Ayo's death was sufficient to put plaintiffs on notice of their wrongful death cause of action. 4 42 We find that plaintiffs also failed to meet their burden of showing that they could not have reasonably known of the wrongful death cause of action; therefore, the district court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 43 AFFIRMED.