Opinion ID: 1669788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Substantially Limited

Text: In order to qualify as a disabled person under the Act, Tervo must be substantially limited by his impairment in one or more major life activities. The court of appeals relied on language in the supreme court's Arline opinion which stressed that a physical or mental impairment does not constitute a handicap for the purposes of section 504 unless its severity is such that it results in a substantial limitation of one or more major life activities. Arline, 480 U.S. at 280 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. at 1127 n. 5. Arline's tuberculosis was considered a handicap under the second prong of the definition, since she had a record of a substantially limiting impairment: [Arline's] impairment was serious enough to require hospitalization, a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more of her major life activities were substantially limited by her impairment. Thus, Arline's hospitalization for tuberculosis in 1957 suffices to establish that she has a `record of    impairment' within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)(ii), and is therefore a handicapped individual. Id. at 281, 107 S.Ct. at 1127. Tervo does not have a record of such an impairment. His hearing and vision problems have never substantially affected his ability to see or hear. He has also never had any problem getting work on the basis of these physical impairments. See, Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir.1985) (plaintiff whose condition had never had any effect whatsoever on any of his activities failed to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination). Under the first prong of the definition, an individual may also be substantially limited in present or future activities. The federal regulations define substantially limits as the degree that the impairment affects employability. A handicapped individual who is likely to experience difficulty in securing, retaining or advancing in employment would be considered substantially limited. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741, App. A (1987). In E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F.Supp. 1088 (D.Hawaii 1980), the federal district court listed factors to be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a person is substantially limited in securing a job due to a physical or mental impairment. Looking at each individual case the court must determine (a) the number and types of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified, (b) the geographic area to which the applicant has reasonable access, (c) the applicant's own job expectations and training, (d) the criteria or qualifications in use generally, and (e) the types of jobs to which the rejection would apply. Id. at 1100-01. Under the Black factors a court must assume that all employers offering the same job or similar jobs would use the same requirement or screening process. Id. at 1100. If such an assumption were not made the applicant would bear the burden of proving that specific employers in the area use different requirements that would not exclude him/her. In this case the court must assume all other agencies will require uncorrected vision of 20/100 for the position of detention deputy since there is no evidence to suggest there are employers with other standards in the area. The Black analysis was applied in Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F.Supp. 739 (C.D.Cal.1984), where a flight attendant claimed he was handicapped when he was denied a job with an airline as a result of his failure to meet the airline's weight restriction. He argued that because the weight restriction prevent[ed] him from obtaining a job, for which he would otherwise be qualified, the requirement transform[ed] him into a handicapped individual   . Id. at 745. The court rejected this argument and stated: There is, however, no authority for the proposition that failure to qualify for a single job because of some impairment    constitutes being limited in a major life activity. The regulations define major life activity as, inter alia, working, 45 CFR § 84.3(j)(2)(ii), but not working at the specific job of plaintiff's choice. Id. The court relied on the Black court's reasoning that the inability to obtain a single job does not render one `handicapped.' Id. Applying this reasoning, Tervo fails to meet the substantially limited standard. Tervo has only been rejected for one specific job. He has completed his law enforcement training program and is qualified to obtain other jobs in the field. Even if we assume Tervo cannot obtain a detention deputy position with another agency, there are many different jobs in law enforcement for which he would still be qualified. Tervo himself admits his impairments would not disqualify him for positions as a probation or parole officer. He has not yet applied for these positions. Tervo did, however, apply for positions at the Minnesota correctional facilities at Shakopee and Lino Lakes and has yet to hear a response regarding those applications. In addition, Tervo has expressed interest in positions outside the law enforcement field. He has applied for jobs in management and juvenile counseling and on his application to Hennepin County indicated he would be willing to accept a position in welfare, corrections or law enforcement. Tervo has not been substantially impaired in the area of employment by this rejection for a single position with Hennepin County. Therefore, he fails to meet the definition of a disabled person under the Human Rights Act.