Opinion ID: 2784998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: M.R. Evid. 803(6): Business Records Exception

Text: [¶16] When admission of evidence is challenged, we review a trial court’s foundational findings to support admissibility for clear error and its ultimate determination of admissibility for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Gurney, 2012 ME 14, ¶ 36, 36 A.3d 893. Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(6), records kept in the ordinary course of a regularly conducted activity or business7 are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if the proponent lays the proper foundation. A proper foundation requires a custodian or qualified witness’s testimony to establish that (1) the record was made at or near the time of the events reflected in the record by, or from information transmitted by, a person with personal knowledge of the events recorded therein; (2) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business; (3) it was the regular practice of the business to make records of the type involved; and (4) no lack of trustworthiness is indicated from the source of information from which the record was made or the method or circumstances under which the record was prepared. 7 The term “business” is broadly defined in the Rules of Evidence that were applied here to include any “business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.” M.R. Evid. 803(6). The restyled Maine Rules of Evidence, effective January 1, 2015, are similarly broad, now referencing “regularly conducted activity” rather than “regularly conducted business.” See M.R. Evid. 803(6) (restyled rules). 10 HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., v. Murphy, 2011 ME 59, ¶ 10, 19 A.3d 815. [¶17] A custodian or other qualified witness is one “who was intimately involved in the daily operation of the business and whose testimony show[s] the firsthand nature of his or her knowledge.” Bank of America, N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶ 25, 96 A.3d 700. The fact that the witness did not prepare or supervise the preparation of the record does not preclude the witness from providing the foundation for admissibility. Bank of America, N.A. v. Barr, 2010 ME 124, ¶ 19, 9 A.3d 816; see also State v. Hager, 691 A.2d 1191, 1193-94 (Me. 1996) (holding that a credit union’s administrative assistant was qualified to support the introduction of copies of a defendant’s credit card receipts). [¶18] Abdi and Ahmed have challenged both Pelletier’s qualifications as a custodian or qualified witness and the State’s establishment of the requisite foundational requirements. Although Pelletier did not personally generate the 50059 forms created from 2002 to 2005, she testified in great detail as to her level of training and her involvement in record-keeping and oversight as President of NC/REMA. There was competent evidence in the record for the court to find that Pelletier possessed personal knowledge of each of the forms and that she was “intimately involved in” the business of processing the forms, either by completing the forms herself or acting in a supervisory capacity overseeing the creation and execution of the forms by housing assistance applicants. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, 11 ¶ 25, 96 A.3d 700; see Murphy, 2011 ME 59, ¶ 10, 19 A.3d 815; Barr, 2010 ME 124, ¶ 19, 9 A.3d 816. [¶19] Through Pelletier’s testimony, the State presented competent evidence to support the foundational elements necessary for the admission of the business records. See Murphy, 2011 ME 59, ¶ 10, 19 A.3d 815. Pelletier described how the forms were kept in the ordinary course of NC/REMA’s business, including the procedure that the specialists followed in interviewing tenants and recording their incomes and assets, the manner in which records were maintained and transmitted to the relevant authorities, and the regularity of the screening and interview process. Unlike other recent cases implicating the business records exception, particularly in the foreclosure context, where the entity that created the record has dissolved or merged into another entity, this case involves the same entity at all times and a custodian witness who oversaw creation and maintenance of all relevant records.8 See, e.g., Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶¶ 3 n.3, 17, 26, 96 A.3d 700. 8 Abdi and Ahmed also argue that the rent subsidy information included in the 50059 forms did not come from the personal knowledge of Pelletier but rather from HUD, and thus constituted hearsay within hearsay. See M.R. Evid. 805. This argument fails. There is ample evidence in the record demonstrating that NC/REMA created and maintained the information on the forms throughout the certification process, albeit using formulas provided by HUD. Additionally, the court allowed Pelletier to testify as to the HUD information because she was familiar with the federal housing assistance process as a whole and understood how HUD calculated and made payments to the landlord based on proposals by NC/REMA. Pelletier also testified that she managed the subsidy payments account on behalf of the landlord and knew which subsidy payments were attributable to each individual tenant. Thus, even if the 50059 forms included a subsidy calculation based on a HUD formula, that aspect did not affect admissibility because the information both originated with NC/REMA and was of the sort that Pelletier could testify was recorded in the course of regular business by NC/REMA. 12 [¶20] Abdi and Ahmed have identified certain purported errors in the preparation of the 50059 forms, including inconsistent signatures or a lack of signatures on certain forms and indications that the specialists may not have fully explained to Abdi and Ahmed what they were signing. However, there is no requirement in Rule 803(6) that business records be perfect in form in order to be trustworthy and admissible. Cf. State v. Therriault, 485 A.2d 986, 996 (Me. 1984) (stating that a finding of lack of trustworthiness is often “predicated on a finding that the record was altered . . . or that the preparer had some motivation to misrepresent or misstate results”). Further, the issue of the reliability of the forms is distinct from the determination of their admissibility. It was the province of the court as the fact-finder to consider any minor errors in weighing the credibility of the evidence, and the court did not err or abuse its discretion by finding that the errors did not affect admissibility. See State v. Cruthirds, 2014 ME 86, ¶ 16, 96 A.3d 80. [¶21] Although there was no error in the trial court’s admission of the 50059 forms pursuant to the business records exception, M.R. Evid. 803(6), we note that the court could have admitted the documents on another basis, one that neither party suggested to the trial court. The signatures of Abdi and Ahmed on the forms rendered the forms admissible as nonhearsay admissions of a party-opponent, representing either their own statements or statements through 13 which they “manifested an adoption or belief” in the truth of the information reported on the forms. See M.R. Evid. 801(d)(2).9 Pelletier, who was familiar with the signatures of Abdi and Ahmed from having previously conducted interviews and completed the forms for their applications, provided sufficient authentication during the course of her testimony to demonstrate that the signatures belonged to Abdi and Ahmed. See M.R. Evid. 901; see also State v. Jones, 405 A.2d 149, 151 (Me. 1979) (“Any statement by a defendant in a criminal case which, in conjunction with proof of other facts and circumstances, tends to prove guilt is an admission.”). [¶22] We also note that, regardless of how the forms are characterized as an evidentiary matter, proof of Abdi and Ahmed’s signatures was not required for the court to find that they were guilty of theft by deception. Abdi and Ahmed were not charged with perjury or false swearing, either of which would have required the State to prove that they had made false statements under oath or affirmation. See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 451-452 (2014). In this case, Abdi and Ahmed applied for subsidized housing through NC/REMA and provided financial information that qualified them for assistance, while actually earning income significantly greater than would qualify them to receive assistance. They continued to occupy a 9 The restyled Maine Rules of Evidence similarly require that the statement be “one the [opposing] party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.” M.R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B) (restyled rules). 14 subsidized apartment each year through 2008, which, as the trial court correctly observed, “would not have happened had the HUD subsidies not been paid.” Taken together, there was sufficient corroborative evidence beyond the signatures for the court to find that Abdi and Ahmed committed theft by deception.