Opinion ID: 1794217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: recreational use immunity

Text: [1-3] We review a grant of summary judgment by applying the same standards used by the circuit court in making its initial determinationthose set forth in Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 441, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Linville v. City of Janesville, 184 Wis. 2d 705, 714, 516 N.W.2d 427 (1994). Resolution of this case requires us to apply the recreational use statute to the undisputed facts which presents a question of law requiring de novo review. Sievert, 190 Wis. 2d at 628. Verdoljak argues that Mosinee is not entitled to invoke the protection of the recreational use statute in this case because Mosinee had not opened its property for the particular recreational use of motorbiking at the particular time of the accident. He asserts that the legislative history and the decisions of Wisconsin courts have made it clear that a private landowner is only afforded immunity for lands opened to public use. He argues further that Mosinee cannot claim the benefit of having opened its lands for recreational use because it took affirmative steps to expressly forbid the use of motorbikes on the property. [3] Under Verdoljak's theory, landowners should permit the public full access to their land for all recreational uses because any restrictions would expose an owner to liability. In short, he contends that landowners must open all of their land, to all recreational uses, at all times, in order to benefit from full protection of the recreational use statute. [4] We reject this argument. Rather, we concur with the position taken by the court of appeals which found that the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 895.52 is straightforward and plain: It limits `the liability of property owners toward others who use the property for recreational activities'; it does not purport to condition that limit to owners who open their land to those who use it for recreational activities. Verdoljak v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 192 Wis. 2d 235, 246, 531 N.W.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1995). There are large sections of land in Wisconsin on which a member of the public will be greeted by neither a Welcome nor a No Trespassing sign. Under Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2) the owner of the property is clearly, unambiguously immune from liability for injury suffered or caused by a person engaging in recreational activity on the property. The focus is on the activity of the person who enters and uses the land, not upon any obligation on the part of the owner to affirmatively demonstrate that the land is open. [4] [5] As in all instances when our inquiry centers on a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993). Here, the legislature has provided us with a clear statement of intent contained in the introductory language to 1983 Wisconsin Act 418 which created Wis. Stat. § 895.52: Legislative intent. The legislature intends by this act to limit the liability of property owners toward others who use their property for recreational activities under circumstances in which the owner does not derive more than a minimal pecuniary benefit. While it is not possible to specify in a statute every activity which might constitute a recreational activity, this act provides examples of the kinds of activities that are meant to be included, and the legislature intends that, where substantially similar circumstances or activities exist, this legislation should be liberally construed in favor of property owners to protect them from liability. Neither the statement of legislative intent nor the language of Wis. Stat. § 895.52 contains the word open. This stands in contrast with the introductory language of 1963 Wis. Act 89 which created the predecessor immunity statute, Wis. Stat. § 29.68 [5] describing it as relating to the limitations on liability of landowners who open private lands for recreational purposes. However, this introductory language was altered three times prior to the creation of § 895.52 in subsequent amendments, none mentioning an obligation to open land but rather referring to: a landowner who gives another permission to use his land for a recreational purpose (1965 Wis. Act 190); landowners who permit people to cut or remove wood from their land (1977 Wis. Act 75); and finally landowners who allow their land to be used for certain outdoor recreational activities (1977 Wis. Act 123). [6-8] We have found that the nature and language of amendments are significant and that the omission of a word or phrase is indicative of an intent to alter statutory meaning. Cardinal v. Leader Nat. Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 375, 388, 480 N.W.2d 1 (1992). Further, where a statute has been repealed and recreated on the same subject, any changes in language are presumed to be the result of conscious deliberation on the part of the legislature. Kerkvliet v. Kerkvliet, 166 Wis. 2d 930, 945-46, 480 N.W.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1992). Here, the newly created statute is essentially a complete rewrite, containing none of the previous references to open[ing] land and giving or granting permission to enter. Again, the legislature has provided clear guidance in its statement of its intent as to the focus of the current statute as contrasted with its predecessor: [1983 Wis. Act 418] is intended to overrule any previous Wisconsin supreme court decisions interpreting section 29.68 of the statutes if the decision is more restrictive than or inconsistent with the provisions of this act. [9] The unambiguous language of the recreational use statute sets the following precondition for immunitythat the injury be to or caused by a person engaging in a recreational activity on the owner's property . . . Wis. Stat. § 895.52(2)(b). There is no language that conditions immunity upon affirmative acts on the part of the owner to grant permission or otherwise open land. [6] The legislature has made it clear that previous decisions by Wisconsin courts that are more restrictive, implying a requirement that lands be open, are overruled. [10, 11] We must presume that the legislature intends for a statute to be interpreted in a manner that advances the purposes of the statute. GTE North Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 176 Wis. 2d 559, 566, 500 N.W.2d 284 (1993). This court and the court of appeals have recognized that the purpose of the recreational immunity statute is to encourage property owners to allow use of their lands for recreational activities by removing the potential for liability arising out of negligence actions brought against them by persons who use the land for such recreational purposes. See, e.g., Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 715; Silingo v. Village of Mukwonago, 156 Wis. 2d 536, 544, 458 N.W.2d 379 (Ct. App. 1990); Bystery v. Village of Sauk City, 146 Wis. 2d 247, 252, 430 N.W.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1988). This purpose would be defeated if Verdoljak's interpretation were adopted because property owners would lose the certainty that a true immunity statute like § 895.52 provides. Owners would be encouraged to close all of their lands to all purposes if they feared that a partial restriction covering particular activities would actually expose them to greater, rather than lesser, liability. [7] Public policy is well-served by the current statute under which landowners are encouraged to allow public access to their property and those who take advantage of this access by recreating cannot sue for ordinary negligence. According to Verdoljak, each case is fact-governed and immunity should only apply to injuries sustained in recreational activities that are specifically permitted on a given property. In investigating this line of thought, the following hypothetical was posed during oral argument: Farmer A allows public access to a lake on his property for public swimming, but posts a sign prohibiting skateboarding on a hilly area next to the lake. Verdoljak stated that, under his interpretation, the statute would immunize the property owner from suit by an injured swimmer but not by a skateboarder. [12] Adherence to the canons of statutory construction as well as common sense require us to reject this argument. We will not adopt an interpretation that would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result. Cardinal, 166 Wis. 2d at 390. The above scenario does present just such an absurd result. This line of questioning in oral argument also raised the issue of whether, if Verdoljak were determined to have been trespassing at the time and point of his accident, Mosinee would be barred from claiming statutory immunity. We take this opportunity to state that the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 895.52 does not hinge on the injured party's status as a non-trespasser, but rather on his or her use of the property for recreational purposes. We reject the notion that the recreational use statute could confer greater protection to a trespasser than to one who was lawfully using the premises and, conversely, that it could expose a property owner to greater liability to one engaging in prohibited activity than to members of the public utilizing the property as intended. Again, we avoid constructions of a statute that lead to absurd results. Although our decision today is based on interpretation of Wisconsin's recreational use statute which predates that of many other jurisdictions, [8] we note that our holding is in conformance with that reached by many other state and federal courts faced with similar scenarios. For example, in Holden v. Schwer, 495 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1993), the Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that the state's Recreation Liability Act immunized a farmer, who allowed the public to use his property with permission, from suit by a plaintiff who was injured when she drove a three-wheeled vehicle into a barbed wire fence. The court commented that [i]t would not encourage landowners to allow others to use their property if, to come under the protection of the act, they had to allow any person, at any time, under any circumstances, to come onto their property and use it in any manner that person saw fit. Holden, 495 N.W.2d at 273. [9] [13] Our decision follows the legislative directive contained in 1983 Wis. Act 418 that the recreational use statute should be liberally construed in favor of the property owners to protect them from liability. See also Linville, 184 Wis. 2d at 715. In keeping with that directive, and to give effect to the intent of the legislature, we conclude that under Wisconsin's recreational use statute, § 895.52(2)(a), Mosinee owed no duty to Verdoljak who had entered the property to engage in a recreational activity and, therefore, Mosinee is not liable for the injury incurred by Verdoljak while engaging in that activity. Thus, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.