Opinion ID: 2514024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: power to fashion a remedy

Text: {21} Assuming the Election Code does not provide a remedy when candidates' names are omitted from the ballot, may courts grant remedies not found in the Code? Separation of powers principles might support the argument that a court may not do so; it might not be appropriate for a court to apply its remedy to a disrupted election without express statutory authority. See Cure v. Bd. Of County Comm'rs of Hodgeman County, Kansas, 263 Kan. 779, 952 P.2d 920 (1998) (rejecting an election contestant's argument that the election should be invalidated because lacking constitutional or statutory authority the court would not invalidate an election). However, separation of powers is not absolute and would therefore not necessarily prevent a court from fashioning appropriate relief if the Code fails to provide for it. Courts must often fill in gaps in statutory schemes in order to achieve just results. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, justifying its conclusion that a new election was required absent statutory authority, reasoned that: [E]xperience tells us that neither a statute, rule, nor regulation can pragmatically cover every situation that may arise, and as a result the official body required to act or make a decision or fashion a remedy must fill the interstices in accordance with those legal concepts, principles, or objectives which may apply to the situation and that are in harmony and legally compatible with the rule, regulation, or statute. State ex rel. Olson v. Bakken, 329 N.W.2d 575, 580 (N.D.1983). Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have held that a new election is an appropriate remedy under some circumstances even though the election code does not provide for that remedy. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Rohde, 449 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Ky. App.Ct.1970) (holding that the number of voters prevented from voting due to candidate's name being left off ballot could have changed the result; new election ordered); McCavitt, supra; Morrison v. Crews, 192 Tenn. 20, 237 S.W.2d 1 (1951). {22} Contestees cite a number of cases for the proposition that the Election Code provides the exclusive remedies for election contests in New Mexico. See Eturriaga v. Valdez, 109 N.M. 205, 210, 784 P.2d 24, 29 (1989) ([T]he Election Code has no remedy in a situation such as this, where a primary election contest has not been resolved before the voting in the general election.); Dinwiddie v. Bd. Of County Comm'rs, 103 N.M. 442, 445, 708 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1985) (The right to contest an election is entirely statutory; such a proceeding was unknown at common law.); Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 384, 362 P.2d 771, 773 (1961) (holding, under an earlier version of the Election Code, an election contest is a special proceeding unknown to the common law.). The question is whether our cases support this or a slightly different proposition. {23} For example, in Eturriaga, 109 N.M. at 209-10, 784 P.2d at 28-29, the primary issue was not which remedies the court had the power to grant, but what procedure a contestant must follow. The issue in that case involved the time for filing a primary election contest, and the Court held that the Election Code governed and that a court could not override the statutory limitation. See id. at 210, 784 P.2d at 29. {24} Contestees quote Dinwiddie, 103 N.M. at 445, 708 P.2d at 1046, for the following proposition: One has the right to contest an election only in the manner and to the extent prescribed by statute. That proposition can be traced back to State ex rel. Denton v. Vinyard, 55 N.M. 205, 230 P.2d 238 (1951). The issue in Vinyard was whether the trial court properly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. See id. at 207, 230 P.2d at 239. Reasoning that there was no procedure for contesting elections at common law and that the Election Code did not apply to the local option election at issue, the Court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the election. See id. at 209-10, 230 P.2d at 240-41. {25} Contestees also cite Montoya, but the issue in Montoya was whether a statute dealing with costs of civil litigation applied in an election contest. The Court concluded that special statutory proceedings such as election contests are not governed by the rules of civil procedure if those rules are inconsistent with the procedural rules for special statutory proceedings. See Montoya, 68 N.M. at 386, 362 P.2d at 774. Nowhere in Montoya did the Court discuss its power to provide remedies not specified in the Election Code. {26} Our cases indicate that it is the procedure in an election contest which is exclusive, not the grounds and the remedy. This accords with the need for speedy resolution of election contests; contestants are not permitted to proceed under the rules of civil procedure because the procedure set forth in those rules takes too much time. Common sense suggests that the grounds for an election challenge need not be found in the Code, such as the protection of the basic right to vote for the candidate of one's choice. This case is an example. The omission of a candidate's name from the ballot has deprived some voters of that choice, thereby, strictly speaking, compromising the validity of the election. See State ex rel. Rice v. Dillon, 197 Miss. 504, 19 So.2d 918, 920 (1944) (The freedom of the voters to choose between qualified candidates is the very foundation of a valid election.) We conclude there is no barrier to our fashioning a remedy outside the Code.