Opinion ID: 179379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent and Adequate State Ground Methodology

Text: Balentine argues that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 2009 reached the merits of the claim and did not simply rule that the habeas application was procedurally flawed. This distinction matters in a Section 2254 proceeding because we do not reach the merits when the state court denied relief due to an adequate state law basis for the decision, independent of the merits of the federal claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court has held that if the state court decision rests primarily on federal law or the state and federal law are interwoven, and if the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, then we should construe the state court ruling as one applying federal law. Ruiz, 504 F.3d at 527 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)). On the other hand, when it does not fairly appear that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal grounds, it is simply not true that the `most reasonable explanation' is that the state judgment rested on federal grounds. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 737, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1041, 103 S.Ct. 3469). This court has had to apply these rules when reviewing state court orders that were dismissed without clear explanation of the reason for the dismissal. See, e.g., Ruiz, 504 F.3d at 527-28; Hughes, 530 F.3d at 341-42. In those cases, as here, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed a subsequent habeas application with a boilerplate order that did not indicate whether the decision turned on a state procedural bar or on an assessment of the federal merits. A Texas state prisoner seeking relief from the death penalty has a limited right to have a subsequent application for habeas relief considered in state court. If a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after filing an initial application, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that: (1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application; (2) by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; or (3) by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the state's favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury in the applicant's trial under Article 37.071, 37.0711, or 37.072. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071 § 5(a). The determination of whether these requirements are satisfied is for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, not for a Texas trial court. Id. § 5(c). The application may be filed in the court of conviction, but the clerk of that court is to send the application to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. § 5(b). The next section of Article 11.071 addresses the situation in which the requirements are found to be satisfied. If the convicting court receives notice that the requirements of Section 5 for consideration of a subsequent application have been met, a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the court of criminal appeals, shall issue by operation of law. Id. § 6(b). Only then is the State required to file an answer to the application. Id. § 7(a). Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals determines without briefing by the State whether the Section 5(a) requirements have been met. In practice, the Court of Criminal Appeals, after determining that a prisoner's subsequent habeas application satisfies Section 5(a)(1), (2), or (3), often remands the case to the trial court for fact findings. See Ex parte Alexander, No. WR-57156-02, 2010 WL 2524572, at  (Tex.Crim. App. June 16, 2010); Ex parte Rachal, No. WR-60394-02, 2009 WL 3042631, at  (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 23, 2009). The Court of Criminal Appeals then reviews the trial court's findings and makes a ruling on the underlying constitutional claim. See Ex parte Tercero, No. WR-62593-03, 2010 WL 724405, at  (Tex.Crim.App. Mar. 3, 2010); Ex parte Cockrell, No. AP-76168, 2009 WL 1636528, at  (Tex.Crim. App. June 10, 2009). On occasion, though, the Court of Criminal Appeals makes a merits ruling without remand. See Ex parte Buntion, No. AP-76236, 2009 WL 3154909, at-2 (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 30, 2009). On August 21, 2009, Balentine filed a subsequent habeas application. In a two-page order, the Court of Criminal Appeals first summarized the prior proceedings. It then addressed the most recent filing: Applicant presents two allegations in his application. In the first allegation, applicant asserts that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to adequately investigate, develop, and present mitigation evidence in the punishment phase of the trial. In his second allegation, applicant asserts that the prosecution unconstitutionally exercised peremptory challenges on two venire persons in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). We have reviewed the application and find that his allegations fail to satisfy the requirements of Article 11.071 § 5. Accordingly, applicant's application is dismissed, and his motion to stay his execution is denied. Likewise, applicant's motion to vacate the judgment rendered in his initial state writ application is denied, and the Court otherwise declines to reconsider that case. Ex parte Balentine, Nos. WR-54071-01, WR-54071-02, 2009 WL 3042425, at  (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 22, 2009). The order does not explain the basis for the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision. In our withdrawn opinion, we held the order's lack of an explanation had to be understood in the context of that court's prior caselaw. That caselaw caused us to presume that the Court of Criminal Appeals reached the federal merits of the application. We now hold Coleman demands a different outcome. The reason for our new decision will be better understood in the context of certain Supreme Court precedents. The decisions endeavored to address a problem federal courts frequently face when reviewing state court dismissal orders: determining whether an order rested on independent and adequate state grounds or instead reached the federal merits. If a decision rests on state substantive or procedural law, federal courts are not permitted to second-guess the decision. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546. But, if the state court's reasoning was based upon its conclusions about the federal claims, then federal courts can make their own assessment of those merits. Id. When both grounds are present, the Supreme Court presented a standard for federal courts to apply when assessing whether a state court decision rested on federal law or on independent and adequate state grounds. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41, 103 S.Ct. 3469. When a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so. Id. Applying this presumption, federal courts avoid deciding cases where there is an adequate and independent state ground for the decision. Id. at 1040, 103 S.Ct. 3469. Prior to Long, the Court dealt with cases that involve[d] possible adequate and independent state grounds in a variety of unsatisfying ways. Id. at 1039, 103 S.Ct. 3469. The Court previously dismissed cases that were unclear or simply vacated or continued cases to obtain clarification about the nature of a state court decision. Id. Another manner of analysis the Court sought to discontinue with Long was examining state law . . . because it requires us to interpret state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar. . . . Id. The new approach is intended to keep federal courts from interpreting state law when analyzing a state court order for adequate and independent grounds, allowing for clarification of the state law only in certain circumstances. Id. at 1041 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 3469. The Supreme Court's opinion in Long was on direct review of the Michigan Supreme Court's reversal of the conviction. Later, the same presumption was held to apply when a federal court reviews a state inmate's habeas petition challenging his conviction. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989). Harris was interpreted by some later courts to require application of the Long presumption to cases in which the state court failed to make clear a state procedural ground for its ruling. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Two years after Harris, the Supreme Court provided some clarification. Id. A predicate to the application of the Harris presumption is that the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner presented his federal claims must fairly appear to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law. Id. In Coleman, the Court reviewed an ambiguous state court dismissal. See id. at 727-29, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Roger Coleman, convicted of rape and capital murder in Virginia, exhausted his direct state court appeals in 1983. Id. at 726-27, 111 S.Ct. 2546. He filed a habeas petition in a state trial court. Id. at 727, 111 S.Ct. 2546. After that court denied his claims, he appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court. Id. The State of Virginia filed a motion to dismiss, contending Coleman's appeal could not be considered because his notice of appeal was not timely filed. Id. Both parties filed briefs on the motion to dismiss and on the merits of Coleman's claims; the Virginia Supreme Court issued a brief order dismissing the appeal. Id. The order noted that Coleman filed a petition for appeal on December 4, 1986. It then stated: Thereupon came the appellee, by the Attorney General of Virginia, and filed a motion to dismiss the petition for appeal; on December 19, 1986 the appellant filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss; on December 19, 1986 the appellee filed a reply to the appellant's memorandum; on December 23, 1986 the appellee filed a brief in opposition to the petition for appeal; on December 23, 1986 the appellant filed a surreply in opposition to the appellee's motion to dismiss; and on January 6, 1987 the appellant filed a reply brief. Upon consideration whereof, the motion to dismiss is granted and the petition for appeal is dismissed. Id. at 727-28, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Coleman then turned to federal court. The district court and the Fourth Circuit denied relief. Id. at 728-29, 111 S.Ct. 2546. At the Supreme Court, Coleman argued that the presumption of Long and Harris applies in this case and precludes a bar to habeas because the Virginia Supreme Court's order dismissing [his] appeal did not `clearly and expressly' state that it was based on state procedural grounds. Id. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2546. He sought creation of a conclusive presumption of no independent and adequate state grounds in every case in which a state prisoner presented his federal claims to a state court, regardless of whether it fairly appears that the state court addressed those claims. Id. at 737-38, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Coleman's proposed rule would result in federal courts reviewing the constitutional merits of state prisoners' claims even when independent and adequate state grounds should have barred their consideration. Id. at 738, 111 S.Ct. 2546. After the Court declined Coleman's invitation to extend the Long presumption to all state habeas corpus petitions asserting federal claims, it also declined to create a presumption in cases where a state court order did not plainly rest on federal grounds. See id. at 739-40, 111 S.Ct. 2546. It stated that in the rest of the cases that is, those cases where a state court judgment does not rest primarily on federal grounds or is not interwoven with federal lawthere is little need for a conclusive presumption. Id. at 739, 111 S.Ct. 2546. In the absence of a clear indication that a state court rested its decision on federal law, a federal court's task will not be difficult. Id. at 739-40, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Supreme Court then undertook the task of determining the basis for the state court's ruling as to Coleman. The Virginia Supreme Court had granted the state's motion to dismiss without explaining the court's reasons. Id. at 727-28, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The state's motion, though, raised only the fact that Coleman's notice of appeal was untimely. Id. at 727, 740, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Virginia Supreme Court made no mention of federal law in its brief dismissal order. Id. at 740, 111 S.Ct. 2546. Based on this evidence from the state court record, the decision fairly appeared to be based primarily upon state procedural grounds. Id. at 740, 744, 111 S.Ct. 2546. As just noted, the Coleman court considered the Virginia Supreme Court order to be uninformative. Conversely, our initial opinion in the present appeal held the Court of Criminal Appeals' order that denied Balentine's subsequent application was informative. The information was not in the order itself but came from the context in which its words were to be read, which was an earlier decision by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that explained how it resolved whether a subsequent application satisfied Section 5(a)(1) of Article 11.071. The Texas court's explanation was this: 1) the factual or legal basis for an applicant's current claims must have been unavailable as to all of his previous applications; and 2) the specific facts alleged, if established, would constitute a constitutional violation that would likely require relief from either the conviction or sentence. Ex parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (discussed in Ruiz, 504 F.3d at 527). The court held that a sufficient showing of unavailability was made. Id. at 422. The subsequent application then faced one more hurdle: Applicant also must jump over the rest of the section 5(a)(1) bar. That is, his application must allege sufficient specific facts that, if proven, establish a federal constitutional violation sufficiently serious as to likely require relief from his conviction or sentence. Id. at 422. The court concluded that because no prima facie case of a constitutional violation was shown, Campbell failed to meet the second element of this test, and the application was therefore an abuse of the writ. Id. at 425. We have held that a determination by a state court that a petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing of sufficient specific facts to entitle him to relief is a decision on the merits. Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 359 (5th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). The first element of the Campbell analysis is a state-law question, but Rivera categorizes the second element as a question of federal constitutional law. Ruiz, 504 F.3d at 527. In our first opinion on this appeal, we analyzed the effect of the Court of Criminal Appeals' explanation of its procedure. We first considered Ruiz, which concluded that a dismissal without explanation might be due to the first element, a state-law question, or on the second element, a question of federal constitutional law. Id. We then evaluated what we understood Ruiz to say about the effect of that uncertainty. Our re-evaluation on rehearing now leads us to a different understanding of Ruiz. It is beyond question that this court in Ruiz concluded that the Court of Criminal Appeals' order denying relief was not a decision based on independent and adequate state grounds. Id. at 527-28. Ruiz gave weight to the fact that there were only four votes at the Court of Criminal Appeals for the lead opinion that denied the writ; the judge casting the fifth vote which was necessary for the decision explicitly reached the merits. Id. Even though such vote-counting was not involved in Balentine's Court of Criminal Appeals decision, our initial opinion in the present appeal held that Ruiz had also relied on the explanation in Ex parte Campbell that an unexplained denial of a subsequent application may have been based on a federal merits ground. We understood Ruiz to mean that uncertainty should be transformed into a presumption that the state court reached the merits. We did not consider, though, that this approach was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's refusal in Coleman to create a conclusive presumption of no independent and adequate state grounds in every case in which a state prisoner presented his federal claims to a state court, regardless of whether it fairly appears that the state court addressed those claims. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 738-39, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Texas court's explanation that it at times reaches the federal merits in denying a subsequent application cannot, consistent with Coleman 's admonition, be the basis for a presumption that the state court actually reached the merits. Balentine cites several Texas cases to support the argument that denials of relief under Section 5 may be the result of a merits-determination. E.g., Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). Decisions that explicitly reach the merits, as that 45-page opinion did, are irrelevant to the issue before us. There must be more than silence. In some form, the state court has to make a fair indication that the merits of the claims were reached. We conclude that Ruiz, by relying on the fact that one of the state court judges clearly reached the merits, had a decision in which it did fairly appear that the state court primarily relied on federal grounds. We erred in interpreting Ruiz otherwise.