Opinion ID: 1727420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the jury verdict is contrary to the over-whelming weight of the evidence produced at trial

Text: ¶ 16. Gary asserts in his brief that he was merely a bystander and was unaware of Robertson's intent to rob the victims. Consequently, Gary contends that the evidence produced at trial was clearly insufficient to support a verdict of guilty. As such, Gary requests this Court reverse and remand his case for a new trial. ¶ 17. As distinguished from a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion for a new trial asks that the jury's guilty verdict be vacated on grounds related to the weight, not sufficiency, of the evidence presented at trial. May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984). We will not order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1983). Any less stringent rule would denigrate the constitutional power and responsibility of the jury in our criminal justice system. Id. The Supreme Court will reverse the lower court's denial of a motion for new trial only if, by denying, the court abused its discretion. Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1089 (Miss.1998). ¶ 18. Furthermore, we are to consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, accepting all credible evidence consistent with the verdict as true. Ashford v. State, 583 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1991). We must also accept all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that are consistent with the verdict. Id. In Ashford, this Court held: [O]nce the jury has returned a verdict of guilty in a criminal case, we are not at liberty to direct that the defendant be discharged short of a conclusion on our part that given the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. Id. Matters regarding the weight and credibility of evidence must be resolved by the jury. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212 (Miss.1985). ¶ 19. Although the testimony presented by both sides in this case is very contradictory, the State provided ample evidence to support the jury's verdict. On April 6, 1994, Gary was indicted for the offense of armed robbery. Jury instruction S-1 was given at trial and defined the offense as follows: The Court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cedrick Deshawn Gary, ... did unlawfully, wilfully, and feloniously commit an assault upon the person of one James McBeth and Phillip Rhodes, with a certain deadly weapon, to wit: a .22 caliber pistol, by threatening the said James McBeth and Phillip Rhodes with said deadly weapon, and did feloniously put the said James McBeth and Phillip Rhodes in fear of immediate bodily injury to their persons, by the exhibition of said deadly weapon as aforesaid, with the unlawful and felonious intent to steal, did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the person of and in the presence of and against the will of the said James McBeth and Phillip Rhodes, certain personal property, to wit: a 1985 Chevy Silverado truck, ... and $7.00 U.S. currency, and of the personal property of James McBeth and Phillip Rhodes then you shall find the defendant, Cedrick Deshawn Gary, guilty of the crime of Armed Robbery. Additionally, the Court gave Instruction S-3 which read as follows: An accomplice is someone who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent with the principal offender unites in the commission of a crime. If you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that Cedrick Deshawn Gary, on the 21st day of March, 1994, did knowingly, voluntarily and with common intent with Terry Robertson, unite in the commission of the crime of Armed Robbery, then you shall find the defendant guilty. ¶ 20. Gary contends that because he did not actually possess the gun, he should not be held accountable for armed robbery. Both sides agree that Robertson was the person in possession of the gun at the time the robbery began to take place. Both sides also agree that Gary never held or pointed the gun at Rhodes or McBeth while demanding their money. It is disputed, however, who actually shot the gun as Robertson and Gary sped away in the stolen truck. According to the testimony of both Rhodes and McBeth, as they began to run they noticed Gary entering the truck on the passenger side and do not believe that Gary and Robertson had time to switch sides before the shot was fired. [4] Gary, however, asserts that he was driving the truck and that Robertson was the person who actually fired the shot. ¶ 21. Gary's argument also ignores the concept of accomplice liability as set forth in Instruction S-3. Gary admits he hit Rhodes once to save Rhodes's life, although the number of times he did so is disputed. Gary himself testified that he hit Rhodes prior to Rhodes's giving up the money. [5] No where in the record is there any indication that Robertson forced Gary to participate in this robbery, nor is there any testimony that Rhodes ever held the gun on Gary. Gary asserts that he was scared and simply following instructions. However, the record makes no mention of Gary ever questioning what Robertson told him to do. Gary never voiced any objection to the robbery, did not try to flee, and proceeded, according to his own testimony, to steal the truck. ¶ 22. Where there was contradictory evidence at trial necessitating a factual determination, the Court has held the lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the appellant a new trial. Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131, 135 (Miss.1988). In the present case, the jury's verdict was not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence as to constitute an unconscionable injustice. A reviewing court cannot and need not determine with exactitude which witness or what testimony the jury believed or disbelieved in arriving at its verdict. Groseclose, 440 So.2d at 300. It is enough that the conflicting evidence presented a factual dispute for jury resolution. Id. It was quite possible and reasonable for the jury, upon the evidence given it at trial, to ultimately conclude that Gary was an accomplice and therefore guilty of armed robbery. The evidence presented was in conflict, the jury resolved the dispute, and this Court will not disturb the trial court's denial of Gary's motion for a new trial.