Opinion ID: 888945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue 2: Did the District Court err when it denied Eklund's Motion for Change of Venue?

Text: ¶ 22 A judge must change the place of trial when there exists a reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be held or when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted. Section 25-2-201(2)-(3), MCA. Eklund asserts that ample reason exists to believe that an impartial jury could not be achieved in Wheatland County. Eklund further asserts that, as each juror was either a taxpayer or related to a taxpayer, each juror had an interest in the outcome. ¶ 23 A party seeking to overturn a denial of change of venue must show that a fair and impartial trial could not have been had. School Dist. No. 1, 142 Mont. at 223, 383 P.2d at 484. The legislature did not intend that simply being a taxpayer would disqualify a person from sitting on the jury. School Dist. No. 1, 142 Mont. at 225, 383 P.2d at 485. ¶ 24 Counsel for Eklund and Wheatland County established during voir dire that the potential jurors were willing to return a verdict in favor of Eklund if the facts necessitated such a finding. The jurors also admitted they would be willing to return a large verdict if the evidence supported one. Nothing from voir dire leads us to believe that the jury would have been unwilling to deliver a verdict in Eklund's favor. Some jurors admittedly expressed concerns about the source of the verdict award, but none of the jurors stated that this concern would affect their impartiality. ¶ 25 Eklund cites multiple cases from other jurisdictions in support of his argument. We find these cases to be distinguishable from the issue at hand. For example Eklund cites Wheeler v. Cobbs & Mitchell Co., 121 Or. 422, 253 P. 5 (1927), in which the court held that taxpayers are absolutely disqualified from serving on a jury when the county is a party. Eklund fails to inform that this rule of law no longer applies in Oregon as evident by the decision in State ex rel. Douglas County v. Sanders, 294 Or. 195, 655 P.2d 175 (1982). The court in Douglas County specifically held that county residents are not disqualified from serving as jurors solely because the county has a pecuniary interest in the outcome. Douglas County, 655 P.2d at 175. ¶ 26 Eklund also relies on an old case from North Dakota. In Sheridan County v. Davis, 61 N.D. 744, 240 N.W. 867 (1932), the North Dakota court determined that the jury panel's status as taxpayers implied bias on the entire jury pool. The court reversed a denial of a motion for change of venue. Sheridan County, 240 N.W. at 871. The court in Linington v. McLean County, 150 N.W.2d 239 (N.D.1967), also refused to reverse a district court's decision to grant a motion for a change of venue. The court cited the fact that the trial court after weighing all of the allegations and the contentions reached the conclusion the people of McLean County were sympathetic to McLean County and for this and other reasons granted a motion for change of venue. ¶ 27 Here we face a situation where the District Court denied a motion for a change of venue. We review this denial for an abuse of discretion. Pease, 227 Mont. at 433, 740 P.2d at 664. The District Court weighed all of the allegations and contentions before reaching the conclusion that the citizens of Wheatland County could be fair and impartial jurors. Nothing in record leads us to believe that the District Court abused its discretion in determining that the jury could be fair and impartial. We decline to imply bias based solely on the juror's status as taxpayers. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying a change of venue.