Opinion ID: 1770046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: should the defendant have been granted a continuance?

Text: Defendant was indicted on August 26, 1987. Counsel was appointed to defend him on September 3, 1987. Defense counsel filed five motions on September 14, 1987. These motions were heard and denied on September 14 and 15, 1987. Trial was scheduled for September 16, 1987. At the September 14 hearing the prosecutor informed the court that he had met with defense counsel on September 3. At that time, defense counsel informed the prosecution that he would file several motions, none of which was filed until September 14. The prosecutor tendered a letter from the victim's psychiatrist which stated that a continuance would work a severe hardship on the victim who was extremely anxious, fearful, depressed, guilt-ridden and a suicide risk. Discovery was requested by defense for September 14 and received on that date. Defense counsel had previously been orally advised of the identity and location of the State's witnesses a week before this hearing. In denying the motion for continuance, the court noted that the trial was to last one day and concluded that counsel had sufficient time to prepare. Denials of motions for continuance have been upheld where defense counsel was afforded fewer days to prepare for trial than here: Hughey v. State, 512 So.2d 4, 6 (Miss. 1987) (defendant caused to go to trial on day of arraignment and nine days after appointment of counsel); Cole v. State, 405 So.2d 910, 911-12 (Miss. 1981) (counsel had seven days to prepare for murder trial); Speagle v. State, 390 So.2d 990, 992 (Miss. 1980) (new counsel forced to prepare for incest trial in one day); Shaw v. State, 378 So.2d 631, 633-34 (Miss. 1979) (defense counsel afforded eight days to prepare); Garner v. State, 202 Miss. 21, 24, 30 So.2d 413, 414 (1947) (seven-day preparation time for capital murder trial). In support of his argument that failure to grant a continuance was reversible error, Morris cites: Cochran v. State, 244 So.2d 22 (Miss. 1971) (defendant entitled to more than one week preparation for trial where pre-set court appearances interfered); Barnes v. State, 249 So.2d 383 (Miss. 1971) (attorney had not had sufficient time to prepare for trial); Yates v. State, 251 Miss. 376, 169 So.2d 792 (1964) (Court committed reversible error in denying motion for continuance); and Foster v. State, 484 So.2d 1009 (Miss. 1986) (failure to grant continuance on state's failure to furnish name of chief witness until ten minutes prior to trial held reversible error); Stewart v. State, 512 So.2d 889 (Miss. 1987) (reversed for state's failure to comply with discovery until day before trial). Cochran is distinguishable on the facts. The murder for which Cochran was indicted occurred on July 7, 1970. Cochran was indicted on July 15, 1970. His attorney immediately filed for a continuance as Cochran was seriously cut in the fight and could not assist counsel in properly preparing the defense. In addition, the defense attorney had been ordered to appear in federal court on Friday, July 17, 1970; Monday, July 20; and Friday, July 24. On July 22, 1970, a special venire was summoned; counsel moved for a continuance on the ground that six material witnesses were absent, including two non-residents of Mississippi. The motion was overruled and trial was held on July 22, resulting in a guilty verdict. Cochran's motion for a new trial was based on lack of time to prepare a defense and was bolstered by an eyewitness affidavit which strongly supported a self-defense case. In Barnes, defendant was indicted on July 15, 1970, the same date on which defense counsel was employed. Counsel requested process for defense witnesses on July 20, 1970. When trial was called, it appeared that none of the witnesses summoned had been served and no official return had been made explaining why the witnesses had not been summoned. Defendant's motion for a continuance was overruled. In granting a new trial, the Barnes court noted that the application for a continuance on the ground that the attorney for the defendant has not had a reasonable time to prepare for trial is different from an application on the ground that there is an absent witness. The lack of time to prepare for trial is subject to proof and to facts apparent to the trial court, and is largely within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Where the trial record reveals a statement of facts indicating a lack of fair trial, a new trial will be granted. 249 So.2d at 385. Foster and Stewart are both cases in which the prosecution did not comply with discovery requests until the day before trial, and are not applicable here. Appellant contends that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to review evidence provided by prosecution on September 14. At the hearing on the motions, defense counsel stated that discovery was provided as agreed. He did not dispute the prosecution's statement that he knew of the evidence on September 7, 1987. The trial judge is vested with broad discretionary powers in granting or refusing to grant a continuance. Lambert v. State, 518 So.2d 621, 623 (Miss. 1987). To prevail, the defendant must show not only abuse of this discretion, but also that the abuse actually worked an injustice in his case. Arteigapiloto v. State, 496 So.2d 681, 685 (Miss. 1986); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-29 (1972). Morris makes no showing that he would have been better able to meet the prosecution's evidence given more time. Even a wrongful denial of continuance, which is not present here, does not mandate reversal absent a showing of injury. Plummer v. State, 472 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1985). Neither has Morris demonstrated that the failure to continue the case deprived him of witnesses, alibi or otherwise, who would have provided a defense. Morris argues that he was unable to prepare a substantial alibi defense due to the vagueness of the time of the alleged acts, not the failure to continue. He further contends that his cross-examination of the prosecuting witness was weakened by the fact that only one of the defense attorneys was present during her testimony. Morris was represented by at least one attorney throughout the trial. The victim was adequately cross-examined. The defense called five witnesses, including the defendant. Nothing is presented in this appeal which indicates the defense would have been handled any differently had the continuance been granted; therefore, even assuming for argument's sake the denial was not proper, the appellant has failed to show that he did not receive a fair trial. We are satisfied that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance.