Opinion ID: 5197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Departure by Analogy to Section 2B3.2.

Text: A sentencing court has the power, under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), to impose a sentence outside the range established by a proper application of the guidelines, provided it finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. 1992)). Our determination on appeal follows a two-pronged inquiry: First, was the sentence imposed either in violation of law or as a result of an incorrect application of the 5 Guidelines? If so, a remand is required under § 3742(f)(1). If the court concludes that the departure is not the result of an error in interpreting the Guidelines, it should proceed to the second step: is the resulting sentence an unreasonably high or low departure from the relevant guideline range? If so, a remand is required under § 3742(f)(2).[2] Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1120. We review findings of fact that underlie the court's sentence under a clearly erroneous standard. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (Supp. 1992); Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 221. Applying the first prong of the inquiry, we find that the departure based upon the extortive aspects of Lara's conduct was imposed neither in violation of law nor as the result of an incorrect application of the guidelines, which direct sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a `heartland,' a set 2 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f) (Supp. 1992) provides as follows: If the court of appeals determines that the sentence )) (1) was imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate; (2) is outside the applicable guideline range and is unreasonable or was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable, it shall state specific reasons for its conclusions and )) (A) if it determines that the sentence is too high and the appeal has been filed under subsection (a), it shall set aside the sentence and remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate; (B) if it determines that the sentence is too low and the appeal has been filed under subsection (b), it shall set aside the sentence and remand the case for further sentencing proceedings with such instructions as the court considers appropriate; (3) is not described in paragraph (1) or (2), it shall affirm the sentence. 6 of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure may be warranted. U.S.S.G. ch. I, pt. A(4)(b), at 1.5-1.6 (policy statement). We find that the district court's decision to depart upward in this case was amply supported by the record. The heartland of the typical section 2L1.1 offense, the offense to which Lara pled guilty, includes the profit-making element of Lara's scheme. Beyond this, however, section 2L1.1 appears to have accounted for no other aggravating conduct in cases involving the smuggling, transporting, or harboring of an illegal alien. Specifically, we are told, [t]he Commission has not considered offenses involving . . . dangerous or inhumane treatment. An upward departure should be considered in those circumstances. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1, comment., application note 8. In sentencing Lara, the district court adopted the findings of the PSI and announced its intention to depart upward under section 5K2.0. The court cited as its reasons the large number of aliens involved and the extortive and inhumane aspects of the instant offense, both of which grounds the above commentary recognizes as deserving of departure, and additional factors, including the use of a firearm and the commission of another immigration offense while on bond. Moreover, a sentencing court may rely upon relevant information contained in the PSI in fashioning its upward departure. United States v. Murillo, 902 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1990). 7 Having expressly adopted the factual findings of the PSI (subject only to Lara's objection to one paragraph contained therein), the district court was entitled to rely upon the facts as it found them in imposing sentence. See United States v. Ramirez, 963 F.2d 693, 707 (5th Cir. 1992) (district court may choose to believe PSI's construction of evidence in resolving factual issues); United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1989) (same). The PSI reveals a wealth of support for the district court's judgment that the base offense level and adjustments afforded by section 2L1.1 did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Lara's offense. INS officials conducted interviews with Lara, her codefendant Ramos-Flores, local residents, and a number of the aliens smuggled in by the two defendants. According to information obtained from the interviews and recited in the PSI, Lara and Ramos-Flores at one point threatened a smuggled alien, one Magda Leticia Alvarado-Amaya, with a .357 revolver, insisting that she either pay the $400 fee or suffer forcible repatriation. Fearing for her safety, Alvarado-Amaya shortly thereafter sought refuge at the home of a United States citizen, Patricia Mendoza, with whom a number of the aliens stayed. Mendoza confirmed Alvarado-Amaya's story and related another incident, involving a fifteen-year-old El Salvardoan girl smuggled in by Lara and Ramos-Flores. The girl, Rosa Candida Alvarenga, was forced by Lara and Ramos-Flores to dress up like a prostitute and work the bars in town until she could pay off her fee. When Alvarenga informed Lara that she would prefer to work at more 8 honest labor, Lara reportedly became infuriated, and Ramos-Flores threatened to cut her hands off and take her back to Mexico, once again brandishing the revolver for persuasive effect. Daunted but indomitable, Alvarenga fled the apartment in which she had been held for the shelter of Patricia Mendoza's house. Lara and Ramos-Flores later tracked her to Mendoza's house and tried to threaten her into leaving with them. At one point, RamosFlores discharged his revolver into the air and tried to kick the door in but left when alerted that the police had been called. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in adopting the factual findings of the PSI. Neither are we impressed with Lara's contention that the conduct outlined above was accounted for by the Sentencing Commission when promulgating section 2L1.1, which no more accounts for the extortive nature of Lara's particular immigration offense than it does the use of a weapon in the typical immigration violation. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, comment., at 5.43. Lara's conduct undeniably fell outside the heartland described by section 2L1.1. The record before us, at least as regards the extortive ground for departure, plainly evinces aggravating circumstances of the kind described in section 3553(b). Hence, the district court did not err in departing upward based upon the extortive elements of Lara's offense.