Opinion ID: 774368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Feltner's Appeal from the Jury Verdict

Text: 9 Feltner first appeals from the jury's $31.68 million verdict in favor of Columbia. Specifically, Feltner asserts that a new trial is warranted because the district court erred in: (1) denying his motion in limine to dismiss the suit because Columbia lacks standing under the Copyright Act; (2) denying his motion in limine to preclude a jury trial on statutory damages; (3) granting Columbia's motion in limine to reaffirm the district court's prior ruling that Feltner infringed 440 separate works; (4) ruling as a matter of law that the two stations that aired Who's the Boss? were not joint tortfeasors for purposes of calculating statutory damages; and (5) denying Feltner's new trial motion. We address each of these arguments in turn. 10
11 Feltner asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion in limine to dismiss the suit for lack of standing under the Copyright Act. A prior panel of this court already held that Feltner failed to timely raise this issue in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and that Feltner failed to satisfy the requirements for a motion for reconsideration. Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 290. In light of this prior ruling, the law of the case doctrine bars reconsideration of the issue whether Columbia's standing as an exclusive licensee is properly before the court. See Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 1990). 12
13 Feltner also asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion in limine to preclude a jury trial on the issue of statutory damages. Here, Feltner argues that in holding that the statutory damages provision of the Copyright Act violates the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court effectively found that the statutory damages provision of the Copyright Act is unconstitutional in its entirety. Feltner thus urges us to find that the Supreme Court's decision in this case rendered the statutory damages provision of the Copyright Act constitutionally unenforceable. 14 This argument is not persuasive. What the Supreme Court held is that to the extent §§ 504(c) fails to provide a jury trial right, it violates the Seventh Amendment and is therefore unconstitutional. However, this holding in no way implies that copyright plaintiffs are no longer able to seek statutory damages under the Copyright Act. Indeed, the position urged by Feltner is contrary to the express language of the Supreme Court's decision in this case. As the Feltner Court stated, if a party so demands, a jury must determine the actual amount of statutory damages under §§ 504(c) . . . .  Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355. The Court later reaffirmed this point by stating, the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on all issues pertaining to an award of statutory damages under §§ 504(c) of the Copyright Act, including the amount itself. Id. This language evinces the Court's intent to preserve a plaintiff's ability to seek statutory damages under§§ 504(c) of the Copyright Act. 15 Feltner argues that this interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision amounts to an impermissible rewriting of §§ 504(c). According to Feltner, if the Court finds that §§ 504(c) is constitutionally infirm because it fails to provide for a jury trial, then the Court must strike down §§ 504(c) in its entirety and wait for Congress to re-enact §§ 504(c) with a jury trial provision included. This argument fails to understand the Supreme Court's holding in this case. In Feltner , the Supreme Court held that §§ 504(c) provides a remedy for copyright infringement, and the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial when that remedy is at issue. This holding is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of other federal statutes that provide a remedy but similarly fail to provide for a jury trial. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987) (regarding civil penalties under the Clean Water Act); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (holding that although it is not clear whether Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 provides for a jury trial, a jury trial is provided by the Seventh Amendment). 16 This interpretation is also consistent with Nimmer's reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Feltner . According to Nimmer: 17 Eight justices of the Supreme Court have now determined that Congress did not allow for juries to be appointed under Section 504(a), which is therefore unconstitutional; one might therefore conclude that an award of statutory damages cannot ever be invoked against a defendant who demands her right to a jury trial . . . . But in the topsy-turvy world of the Seventh Amendment, a finding that a statute is unconstitutional typically does not render it inoperative. Whenever the Supreme Court has determined that the particular statute under examination does not accord the right to a jury but the Seventh Amendment so requires in that type of case, the same pattern recurs: Notwithstanding that the Court holds the enactment of Congress unconstitutional, the statute itself goes on functioning. 18 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, §§ 14.04[C][2] (2000) (emphasis added). 19 Finally, we note that since the Supreme Court's ruling in Feltner, various courts have conducted jury trials on the issue of statutory damages. See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 449, 462 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that [I]t is worth noting that the question of statutory damages was put to the jury, rather than decided by the Court, given the Supreme Court's decision in Feltner . . . .); Segrets, Inc. v . Gillman Knitwear, Co., 207 F.3d 56, 62-65 (1st Cir. 2000) (remanding for a jury trial following Supreme Court's ruling in Feltner). 20 Therefore, we find that the Supreme Court's decision in Feltner did not eliminate §§ 504(c) of the Copyright Act, and we affirm the district court's denial of Feltner's motion to preclude a jury trial on statutory damages. 21
22 Feltner next argues that the district court erred in granting Columbia's motion in limine to reaffirm the district court's prior ruling that each episode aired by Feltner is a separate work for purposes of computing statutory damages. Copyright Act §§ 504(c)(1) permits the copyright owner to recover an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c)(1) (2001) (emphasis added). In addition, §§ 504(c)(1) states that all the parts of a compilation or derivative work constitutes one work. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, under the Copyright Act, each work infringed may form the basis of one award. Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 294 (emphasis added). 23 Although the Copyright Act does not define the term work, every circuit to address the issue has held that separate copyrights are not distinct works unless they can `live their own copyright life.'  Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir. 1976)). As applied to episodes of a television series, this test requires us to determine whether each episode has an independent economic value and is, in itself, viable. Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1117 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Walt Disney, 897 F.2d at 596). We adopted this test for what constitutes a work in a prior appeal of this case. Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 295. 24 In this appeal, Feltner argues that in light of the Supreme Court's ruling, the issue whether each episode constitutes a separate work is a question of fact for the jury to decide, and that because this issue was not presented to the jury, he is entitled to a new trial. Although there may be a case in which the issue of what constitutes a work is a jury question, we need not address that issue at this time. In the present action, the question whether each episode of a television series is a separate work is a question of law because there are no underlying factual disputes for the jury to resolve. Cf. Segrets, 207 F.3d at 65 n.7 (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in Feltner does not require that issues properly decided on summary judgment be remanded to a jury). As the district court explained in granting Columbia's motion to reaffirm its prior ruling that Feltner infringed 440 works: 25 The facts which underlie the determination of the number of infringements are not disputed . . . . There are no factual disputes on this issue for the jury to decide. The prior ruling was made by the Court as a matter of law, since there were no factual issues . . . . The Ninth Circuit noted that the Court made this finding. The Ninth Circuit went on to affirm this Court's determination that each episode in a television series constitutes a separate work . . . . This holding was not certified by the Supreme Court, and was not affected by the Supreme Court's opinion, and thus remains the law of the case. 26 Because [t]here are no factual disputes . . . for the jury to decide, our prior ruling on this issue was not disturbed by the Supreme Court's decision in this case. Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine bars reconsideration of the question whether each episode constitutes a separate work for purposes of computing statutory damages. See Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1489; Milgard, 902 F.2d at 715. The district court's ruling on this issue is therefore affirmed. 27 4. Feltner's Appeal of the District Court's Ruling That the Two Stations That Aired Who's the Boss? Were Not Joint Tortfeasors 28 Feltner next argues that the district court erred by allowing two awards of statutory damages for one work  under Copyright Act §§ 504(c)(1). Specifically, Feltner asserts that he is entitled to introduce evidence that the two defendant stations that aired Who's the Boss? are joint tortfeasors, and that therefore, each station's airing of the same episode should only count as one work. This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the stations are joint tortfeasors. Second, to the extent that Feltner seeks to introduce evidence to demonstrate his connection with each of the stations, that simply makes Feltner a joint tortfeasor with each station -it does not make each station a joint tortfeasor with respect to the other. Columbia Pictures, 106 F.3d at 294. This district court's decision on this issue is therefore affirmed. 5. Feltner's New Trial Motion 29 Feltner also argues that the district court erred in denying his new trial motion. Specifically, Feltner argues that a new trial is warranted because: (1) the jury's verdict was excessive; and (2) the district court erred in excluding certain evidence. We review a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 1281 (9th Cir. 1998). 30
31 Feltner first asserts that the jury's verdict in this case was excessive. As set forth above, the Copyright Act provides a plaintiff the option of electing either statutory damages or actual damages. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a) (2001). In this case, Columbia elected to seek statutory damages. A plaintiff may elect statutory damages regardless of the adequacy of the evidence offered as to his actual damages and the amount of the defendant's profits. Nimmer, supra,§§ 14.04[A]. If statutory damages are elected, `[t]he court has wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, constrained only by the specified maxima and minima.'  Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984)). Subject to certain exceptions, at the time this case was tried to a jury, the statutory minimum was $500 and the maximum was $20,000. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c)(1) (1998). In the case ofwillful infringement, however, the maximum amount per work infringed was $100,000. 4 Id. at§§ 504(c)(2). We will uphold a jury's finding of willful infringement if it is supported by substantial evidence. Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1985). 32 Here, the district court initially held a bench trial and found that Feltner was liable for $8.8 million in statutory damages for infringing 440 works. This award amounts to approximately $20,000 per work infringed. That award was vacated, however, after the Supreme Court held that Feltner was entitled to a jury trial on the amount of statutory damages. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 355. The case was then remanded and tried to a jury, and the jury awarded Columbia $31.68 million in statutory damages for the same 440 works infringed. This award amounts to approximately $72,000 per work infringed. 33 Although the jury's $31.68 million verdict is substantial, it is equal to a per work infringed award that is well within the statutory range for willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(c)(2). In addition, there was substantial evidence to support a finding of willfulness. Transgo, 768 F.2d at 101314. For example, it is undisputed that 415 of the 440 works infringed were aired after Columbia filed the instant action. The jury also heard testimony that Feltner was an experienced businessman who understood the nature of Columbia's copyright infringement claims, and who nonetheless continued to air the series in question until well into the course of this litigation. This is sufficient to support a finding of willfulness. 34 Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Feltner's motion for a new trial due to the allegedly excessive jury verdict. 35
36 Feltner also asserts that the district court erred in denying his new trial motion because the district court improperly excluded evidence from the jury trial. According to Feltner, the district court erred in excluding: (1) the stipulated testimony of Alanna Anderson, 5 which Feltner asserts is relevant to whether Feltner ever really assumed the licenses for the television series at issue in this litigation; (2) evidence of Feltner's reliance on advice of counsel; and (3) evidence that Columbia recovered some of the licensing fees in bankruptcy. To reverse on the basis of an evidentiary ruling, we must conclude both that the district court abused its discretion and that the error was prejudicial. Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2000). 37 Feltner asserts that the district court erred in precluding him from introducing into evidence the stipulated testimony of Alanna Anderson because Anderson's testimony demonstrates that Feltner never assumed the licenses between Columbia and the prior owners of two of Feltner's television stations. As the district court noted, however, Feltner would be liable for copyright infringement regardless of whether the licenses were valid because he broadcast the television series without permission from Columbia. Moreover, Anderson's testimony is generally relevant to the question of liability rather than to the question of damages, and was thus properly excluded from the damages phase of the trial. 38 The district court was also within its discretion in excluding evidence of Feltner's reliance on advice of counsel. Feltner sought to rely on advice of counsel to demonstrate that his infringement was not willful. But Feltner refused to answer questions regarding his interactions with counsel at his deposition. Accordingly, prior to the bench trial, the district court precluded Feltner from relying on the defense of advice of counsel at trial. 39 Following remand from the Supreme Court, Columbia filed a motion in limine to reaffirm the district court's prior ruling prohibiting Feltner from relying on the advice of counsel defense. In opposition to the motion in limine, Feltner offered to make himself available for deposition on this issue. The district court rejected this offer, stating that[t]he Defendant cannot now, at the eleventh hour, make himself available for a deposition. 40 Although courts have recognized that reliance on advice of counsel may be probative of non-willfulness, see RCA/Ariola Int'l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1988), the district court was within its discretion in precluding Feltner from relying on advice of counsel in this case. The privilege which protects attorney-client communications may not be used both as a sword and a shield. Where a party raises a claim which in fairness requires disclosure of the protected communication, the privilege may be implicitly waived. Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991)). Here, Feltner sought to argue that he continued his infringing activities based on the advice of his attorney, while at the same time refusing to answer questions regarding relevant communications with counsel until the eleventh hour. Under these circumstances, the district court was within its discretion in precluding Feltner from invoking the advice of counsel defense. Cf. William A. Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, ¶¶ 11:37 at 11-29 (2000) (stating that the court may fashion remedies to prevent surprise and unfairness to the party seeking discovery. For example, where the party claiming privilege during discovery wants to testify at the time of trial, the court may ban that party from testifying on the matters claimed to be privileged). 41 Finally, Feltner asserts that the district court erred in precluding him from introducing evidence that Columbia received money from Feltner's television stations through the stations' bankruptcy proceedings. At the close of the first day of trial, and at the suggestion of the district court, the parties entered into a stipulation regarding the bankruptcy proceeding evidence. The stipulation, which was read to the jury, provided as follows: 42 In the summer and fall of 1993 the three television stations at issue went into bankruptcy. Columbia filed claims for unpaid license fees on over 15 television series or groups of motion pictures which it had licensed to the stations, including the four series at issue in this case. The three television stations were sold to new operators. In 1995 and 1996, Columbia received a portion of the proceeds of that sale which substantially reduced the license fees owing on the 15 series and motion picture groups, including the four series at issue in this case. 43 On appeal, Feltner essentially argues that he was forced to agree to this stipulation in order to introduce any evidence regarding the bankruptcy payments at trial. This argument is not sufficient to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion. 44 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court's denial of Feltner's new trial motion. 45