Opinion ID: 727303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defining the Vessel's Duty of Care: The Supreme Court Cases

Text: 19 As Jones & Laughlin allows Morehead to bring a third-party negligence action against a vessel owner even though the latter is simultaneously his statutorily-immune employer, we need to find the principles for determining whether the alleged acts of negligence--the open hatch and failure to warn--are attributable to A-K qua vessel owner rather than qua employer. The Supreme Court has indicated that Congress left to the courts the task of defining the vessel's duty of care. See Howlett, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2063 (Because Congress did not 'specify the acts or omissions of the vessel that would constitute negligence,' the contours of a vessel's duty to longshore workers are 'left to be resolved through the application of accepted principles of tort law and the ordinary process of litigation. ' ) (citing Scindia, 451 U.S. at 165-66, 101 S.Ct. at 1621). 20 In Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981), the Supreme Court considered the duty of care that a vessel owner owed to an injured longshore worker who was employed by an independent stevedoring firm. For this common triangular relationship at least--vessel, stevedore, and longshore worker 8 --the Court held that limiting the vessel's duty of care so as to put the chief responsibility upon the independent stevedore was consistent with Congress' intent to permit third-party negligence actions against the vessel but to eliminate the vessel's no-fault liability (the unseaworthiness claim). In Howlett, a case that also involved a longshore worker suing an independent vessel, the Court restated the vessel's limited residual duties: 21 The first, which courts have come to call the turnover duty, relates to the condition of the ship upon the commencement of stevedoring operations.... The second duty, applicable once stevedoring operations have begun, provides that a shipowner must exercise reasonable care to prevent injuries to longshoremen in areas that remain under the active control of the vessel.... The third duty, called the duty to intervene, concerns the vessel's obligations with regard to cargo operations in areas under the principal control of the independent stevedore. 22 Howlett, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2063 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 23 This court recently applied these duties in Keller v. United States, 38 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.1994), a case also involving the triangular relationship of vessel, stevedoring contractor, and longshore worker. We described two duties of a vessel prior to turnover: the duty to warn and the duty of safe condition. Id. at 23-24. We further described three continuing duties of care: 24 First, the vessel owner might remain under such a duty were it to retain actual physical control or custody of a portion of the vessel, or participate in stevedoring operations. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167, 101 S.Ct. at 1622.... Second, a duty to intervene might attach in the event the vessel owner were to acquire actual knowledge that unsafe conditions had developed in the vessel's appurtenances since turnover, that the stevedore-employer will not address the unsafe condition, and that the stevedore's decision not to remedy the developing hazard was obviously improvident in the circumstances. Id., at 174-75, 101 S.Ct. at 1625-26. Third, even absent actual control, participation or knowledge, a post-turnover duty may arise if the vessel owner was obligated, by contract, statute or custom, to monitor stevedoring operations for the purpose of detecting and remedying unsafe conditions. Id. at 172, 101 S.Ct. at 1624-25. 25 Id. at 32. 26 Keller affirmed a judgment that an independent vessel owner had breached neither its turnover nor its continuing duties to a longshore worker who had fallen from a ladder on board the vessel. We ruled that the district court had not erred in relying on testimony based on industry standards, which indicated fulfillment of the turnover duty. We also found no breach of a continuing duty of the vessel, where the allegedly dangerous condition developed during cable loading operations which were under the stevedore's control. 27 As did the Supreme Court in Scindia, this court noted the independent stevedore's greater skill and expertise relative to the vessel's, making the former better positioned than the vessel to prevent employee injury, and the traditional stevedoring warranty to perform competently. See id. at 29-30; see also Howlett, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2065 (The rule relieving vessels from this general duty [to exercise reasonable care to discover dangerous conditions that develop] rests upon 'the justifiable expectations of the vessel that the stevedore would perform with reasonable competence and see to the safety of the cargo operations.' ) (citation omitted); Scindia, 451 U.S. at 172, 101 S.Ct. at 1624 ([the 1972 Amendments] did not undermine the justifiable expectations of the vessel that the stevedore would perform with reasonable competence and see to the safety of the cargo operations). Further supporting the vessel owner's justifiable reliance on the stevedore is that the latter is subject to detailed legislative and administrative prescriptions for affording its workers a 'safe' workplace. Keller, 38 F.3d at 24 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 941 and accompanying regulations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1918.1-1918.106, § 1918.25, and Scindia, 451 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. at 1623-24). 28 In Scindia and Howlett the Supreme Court, as noted, outlined a vessel owner's duties of care relative to a longshore worker employed by an independent stevedore. 9 But the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to analyze the vessel's duties in a dual capacity case. 10 Nor has the Court considered to what degree its Scindia analysis applies to non-longshoring harbor workers, whose duties and modus operandi often differ considerably from those of longshore workers. 11 The Court has said, though, that [o]f course, [section 905(b) ] does make it clear that a vessel owner acting as its own stevedore is liable only for negligence in its 'owner' capacity, not for negligence in its 'stevedore' [the insured employer] capacity. Jones & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 531 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. at 2547 n. 6. 29 How to distinguish between vessel owner negligence and employer negligence--where the same entity is both vessel owner and employer--is key here, because Morehead's statutory right to sue is solely for injury caused by the vessel negligence of a vessel as third-party. For other work injuries within the scope of his employment, the LHWCA expressly provides that he must accept the worker's compensation prescribed under the LHWCA as exclusive and in place of all other employer liability. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a). 30 A further matter complicates this case: as the defendant has two capacities, so too, it might be said, does the plaintiff. Morehead was a carpenter, but was hired to perform both carpentry and scowmen's duties. A-K did not employ a separate crew on its barges. 12 As we will discuss further below, this double dual capacity aspect of the case is a factor to be considered in determining whether negligent acts are properly attributable to a defendant as vessel. 13 VI. Lower Court Precedent 31 While the Supreme Court has said little about dual capacity cases beyond giving approval to the suing of dual capacity defendants in their vessel owner capacity, some circuits have decided cases similar to ours. They have asked whether the alleged negligence was due to the defendant qua employer or qua vessel, with recovery allowed only in the latter instance. And, principles borrowed from Scindia have been applied to harbor workers as well as longshore workers. 32 Applying Scindia to a dual capacity defendant raises questions even in the longshoring context. For example, if a defendant is aware of a defect in the work area as stevedore employer, should such awareness also be attributed to it as vessel owner? And as we note supra, Scindia and Keller emphasized a vessel owner's reliance upon the presumed expertise of the stevedore, an independent contractor. Where the vessel owner is also the stevedore, is it reasonable to attribute such reliance? 33 Concerns of this nature led the Second Circuit in Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1206, 103 S.Ct. 3535, 77 L.Ed.2d 1387 (1983), to indicate that a longshore worker's claim against a dual capacity defendant would be analyzed differently from a claim against a separate shipowner brought by the employee of an independent stevedore. In Fanetti, a longshore worker was injured on deck by an unsafe condition. The dual capacity defendant argued that 1) in its role as employer-stevedore, it was primarily responsible for the safety of the workplace, and 2) as vessel owner, it should be able to rely upon its expertise as stevedore, thereby avoiding liability as vessel for the negligence. 34 The Second Circuit rejected the defendant's attempt to escape liability in negligence as vessel by seizing its employer hat. Relying on a dissent by Judge Friendly in Canizzo v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 682, 687 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 316, 58 L.Ed.2d 322 (1978), the court of appeals ruled that a vessel assumes a greater duty of care when there is no independent employer responsible for workplace conditions, upon whom the vessel owner may rely to oversee the safety of the workplace on board. See Fanetti, 678 F.2d at 428 (citing Canizzo, 579 F.2d at 689-90). 35 Rearranging duties of care as in Fanetti raises serious problems, discussed hereafter, by enlarging an employer's tort liability beyond the purposes of the 1972 Amendments. Cf. Howlett, 512 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2063. Fanetti, moreover, was decided before Jones & Laughlin was handed down in the Supreme Court. We do not think that the Second Circuit today would endorse Fanetti 's broadened duty of care, given the Supreme Court's remark that a vessel owner acting as its own stevedore is liable only for negligence in its 'owner' capacity, not for negligence in its 'stevedore' capacity. Jones & Laughlin, 462 U.S. at 531 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. at 2547 n. 7. This comment suggests that the Court expected the limited vessel liability in Scindia to carry over to dual capacity situations as well. No later case from the Second Circuit, nor from any other circuit, has been called to our attention following Fanetti 's enlargement of a vessel's duty in a dual capacity situation. 14 Cf. Guilles, 12 F.3d at 383, 387 (a recent Second Circuit decision citing Fifth Circuit authority contrary to Fanetti and ruling only that a valid cause of action under section 905(b) existed, where the parties had stipulated to the vessel's negligence). Whether or not termed dicta, we do not feel free to overlook the Court's statement in Jones & Laughlin. 36 Contrary to Fanetti, the Fifth Circuit, which has decided a great number of LHWCA cases, has allocated the same vessel duties of care to dual and single capacity defendants. It regards this approach as in keeping with the Supreme Court's limiting of a vessel's duty of care (e.g., Scindia and Jones & Laughlin ), and with Congress' intent to provide injured workers the same remedies, regardless of whether their employer or another happens to be the legal owner of the vessel. 15 37 The seminal Fifth Circuit case was Castorina v. Lykes Bros. S.S., 758 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846, 106 S.Ct. 137, 88 L.Ed.2d 113 (1985). There, a longshore worker exposed to asbestos during cargo operations alleged that his employer-vessel owner knew of the harm qua vessel and failed to make the vessel safe. The Fifth Circuit stated that the LHWCA compensation scheme requires us to separate the negligence of the shipowner and that of the stevedore, even when the shipowner performs its own stevedoring activities. Id. at 1033. Noting that the alleged harm had arisen during stevedoring activities, the court refused to impute any knowledge of this danger by the employer to it as vessel. It explained: 38 To impute this knowledge to a shipowner-employer would be to hold it liable in tort for damages arising from its negligence as stevedore, and effectively to eliminate the exclusivity provisions of sections 905(a) & (b). This result is contrary to the language and purpose of the Act as amended. We therefore hold that the duty owed by a shipowner to a longshoreman under section 905(b) is that established by Scindia and its progeny; this duty is neither heightened nor diminished when the longshoreman is employed directly by the vessel. 39 Id.; accord Tran v. Manitowoc Eng'g Co., 767 F.2d 223, 228 (5th Cir.1985). 40 On the facts of Castorina, it was relatively easy to apply the Scindia standard to the shipowner-employer. In a later case, the Fifth Circuit applied Scindia in a more complex situation involving a harbor worker. In Levene v. Pintail Enters., 943 F.2d 528 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 2274, 119 L.Ed.2d 201 (1992), the injured employee was a heavy equipment operator who performed other maritime tasks as well. A captain had instructed Levene to untie another owner's barge, which blocked access to the particular barge they had been instructed to pick up. Levene was injured on the other owner's barge, where grease and scrap materials were present on the deck. See id. at 530. 41 Applying the Scindia duty of turnover and the duty arising from active control over a dangerous condition, the Levene court rejected the employee's claim. The court explained that Scindia did not mandate extending the duty of a shipowner to protection against hazards on another ship. Id. at 534. [W]e decline to fashion a general standard of 'reasonable care' that would require a shipowner to protect against any and all hazards a longshoreman might encounter in the course of his work. Id. Further, the court did not view the fleeting contact between Pintail [the employer-vessel owner] and the BB-242 [the separate owner's barge] as the kind of control that could result in a finding of liability. Id. at 535. It noted that the duty arising from active control over a hazardous condition may be triggered when the dangerous condition is on the vessel itself. See id. (discussing Masinter v. Tenneco Oil Co., 867 F.2d 892, 896-97 (5th Cir.1989), a non-dual capacity case in which the vessel crew was solely responsible for placing a stairway in a way that caused injury to a worker, and the vessel was contractually bound to conduct the drilling operations and remained in control of the vessel to effectuate this obligation). Even though the captain temporarily was in 'command'  of both the vessel and the separate owner's barge, the court found that this did not rise to the level of active control required. Id.