Opinion ID: 2638999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Was the denial of re-licensure supported by substantial evidence?

Text: [¶ 33] In this section of his appeal, the appellant challenges three of the Board's conclusions as having no bases in facts presented in the record. We will review these contentions under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) and the substantial evidence test set forth earlier herein. [¶ 34] The appellant's first argument is that there is no evidentiary support for the Board's conclusion that he fraudulently represented himself as a licensed counselor to the First Judicial District Court in October 1999. The appellant contends that the record lacks substantial evidence that he made any representation to that court that he was licensed or practicing as a counselor, which is substantially different from being licensed or practicing as a clinical social worker, and furthermore, the appellant contends that it is unrefuted that he had no knowledge that his renewal application had been denied until December 2, 1999, well after the court hearing at issue. [¶ 35] We reject these arguments and affirm the Board on this issue because, as so often happens, the appellant's contentions depend upon acceptance of his version of the evidence, rather than upon application of the substantial evidence test. Further, it must be remembered that, in its findings and conclusions, the Board clearly resolved all credibility issues against the appellant. This is important in our application of the substantial evidence test because we do not second-guess the Board in judging witness credibility. Hicks v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2005 WY 11, ¶ 18, 105 P.3d 462, 470 (Wyo.2005); Davis, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d at 485 ( quoting Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 26, 49 P.3d 163, 173 (Wyo.2002)); City of Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 451-52 (Wyo.1995). [¶ 36] The record contains the following evidence that, with credibility issues resolved against the appellant, is sufficient for the Board to have found that the appellant knew before the October 1999 custody court hearing that he was unlicensed. First, the appellant testified both that he had not received the license application and fee that were returned to him in January 1999, and that in January 1999 he spoke with a male Board employee who asked him several questions about his application and then told him the license would be issued. In that regard, the Board's only male employee testified that no such conversation took place. In further contradiction to the appellant's denial of knowledge that his license had expired, the Board's executive director testified that the private investigator hired to locate the appellant reported the appellant told him that he had contacted the Board and spoken to the male employee when he received his renewal application back in the mail.... The Board's executive director also testified that the renewal application and fee that were returned to the appellant were not received back in the Board's mail, indicating that they had been received by the appellant. Finally, the executive director also testified that, when a license is sent to an applicant, a wall certificate is also sent, and that the licensee is required to display the wall certificate in a conspicuous location. The Board found that the lack of such a wall certificate was additional notice to the appellant that he was unlicensed. Taken together, there is substantial evidence supporting the Board's conclusion that the appellant knew he was practicing without a license. [¶ 37] We will pay scant attention to the appellant's rather frivolous argument that he made no representation to the First Judicial District Court that he was a licensed counselor, as opposed to a licensed clinical social worker. To begin with, the second complainant testified before the Board as follows: Q. And during that hearing did he indicate to the court that he was licensed as a social worker in the State of Wyoming? A. He did. And he also handed out a resumé stating that he was licensed in the State of Wyoming, and introduced himself as an expert in having served as a counselor with my daughter. Beyond that, inasmuch as the statutory definition of clinical social work includes counseling, we consider this as little more than an argument over semantics. An unlicensed clinical social worker who practices counseling is practicing clinical social work without a license. [¶ 38] The appellant's second attack upon the evidentiary sufficiency behind the Board's findings and conclusions focuses upon the allegation that he failed to produce his file in the matter underlying the second complaint. Although this issue is characterized by the appellant as a substantial evidence issue, the arguments presented in his appellate brief combine legal and factual elements. Those arguments are: (1) there is no record-retention requirement in the applicable statutes or administrative rules; (2) the file was not requested by a client, but by the client's mother; (3) there was no evidence to prove loss of the file violated an ethical standard; (4) there was no evidence to prove loss of the file violated client confidentiality; and (5) if the appellant was unlicensed at the time the Board requested the file, he was under no duty or obligation to provide anything to the Board. [¶ 39] The Board's analysis of the lost file followed two avenues. First, the Board stated that at best, the appellant's failure to produce the file in response to the Board's four requests was unethical and unprofessional under Board Rule, ch. 11, § 2(c)(xxi), which requires licensees to respond to requests from the Board for information. And second, the Board concluded that the appellant's misplacement of the file jeopardized its confidentiality in violation of Board Rule, ch. 12, § 2(b) and ch. 11, § 2(b)(iii) and (c)(ix), as well as provisions 1.01, 1.07, 1.08 and 5.01 of the Code of Ethics. [¶ 40] The question in a substantial evidence challenge is whether there was `relevant evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's conclusions.' Davis, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 6, 88 P.3d at 485 ( quoting Legarda, 2003 WY 130, ¶ 10, 77 P.3d at 712). In the present case, however, the appellant does not really challenge the quantum of the evidencehe admits that he cannot locate the file at issueinstead, for the most part, he challenges the existence of any duty on his part to keep or produce the file. Three of his five arguments are of that nature: that there is no record-retention requirement, that the file was not requested by a client, and that unlicensed persons are under no obligation to the Board. For several reasons, we will not further consider these issues. First, they are not substantial evidence issues, and that is how they were presented. Second, the appellant was not accused of violating a record-retention requirement, but of jeopardizing a client's right to confidentiality and the integrity of the profession. Third, the appellant presents no law as to the duty, or lack thereof, of a clinical social worker to produce a file at the request of a parent of a client who is a minor child. And fourth, the appellant presents no law in support of his interesting theory that, if one is practicing without a license, one is not required to follow licensing standards. [¶ 41] The two remaining issues are evidentiary in nature: whether there was evidence to prove that loss of the file violated an ethical standard and whether there was evidence to prove that loss of the file violated client confidentiality. We will affirm the Board as to these issues because they reflect a misunderstanding of the process of applying the law to the facts. Where the standard of care is identified by statute or rule, and where facts are presented such that the Board is able to apply the law to the facts, testimony to the effect that these facts constitute a violation of the law is neither necessary nor appropriate. It is the role of the fact-finding decision-maker, not the role of the witness, to apply the law to the facts. In the instant case, the standard of care is well defined in the administrative rules adopted pursuant to statutelicensees are to maintain the confidentiality of client files, they are to provide clients with reasonable access to records, and they are to respond to reasonable requests from the Boardand the conduct at issuelosing a client's filewas fully developed in the evidence before the Board. [¶ 42] The appellant's third challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is similar to the portion of his first challenge where he argues that he made no representation to the First Judicial District Court that he was a licensed counselor, as opposed to a licensed clinical social worker. Finding of Fact 11 in the Board's order stated that after [the appellant] had been notified by the Board that his license had expired, he continued to practice as a counselor until July 17, 2000.... In regard to this finding, the appellant makes the following complaint: The MHPL Board, who is supposed to be the expert regulators in Wyoming of the mental health professions, cannot itself delineate between what comprises the Practice of Clinical Social Work or the Practice of Professional Counseling, Wyo. Stat. § 33-38-102(a)(v) and (vi), respectively! That is a very important distinction! The MHPL Board wants to complain that [the appellant] is not licensed as a Clinical Social Worker, but denies his license application upon assertions that he is practicing Counseling! WOW, a simple point to demonstrate the need for expert testimony and lack of substantial evidence! There is ABSOLUTELY no evidence in the record concerning what actions or practice are encompassed within the practice of Counseling, Wyo. Stat. § 33-38-102(a)(vi) or practice of Clinical Social Work, Wyo. Stat. § 33-38-102(a)(v). [¶ 43] As with the earlier incarnation of this argument, we will give this reincarnation short shrift. A reading of the entire order makes it clear that use of the word counselor in the quoted sentence did not indicate any intent on the part of the Board to charge the appellant with the unlicensed [p]ractice of counseling under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(vi), rather than the unlicensed [p]ractice of clinical social work under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(v), nor did it indicate any confusion on the part of the Board as to any differences between the two professions. To begin with, as noted earlier herein, the practice of clinical social work includes, by statutory definition, counseling. In addition, repeated references throughout the order place the counseling allegation squarely within the confines of the practice of clinical social work. For instance: [Finding of Fact] 16.... Regardless, [the appellant] certainly knew he held no valid license to practice social work in December 1999 when he signed for a certified letter from the Board requesting he cease and desist from counseling without a license, yet he continued to provide counseling services and continued to bill Blue Cross and Blue Shield for those services. Even after the Board notified [the appellant] on July 26, 2001 that his July 2000 application had been denied, [the appellant] continued to provide counseling services and hold himself out to the public as a licensed clinical social worker.... [Finding of Fact] 17.... [The appellant] also denied he engaged in the activities listed in the Wyoming Statutes defining professional social work services, such as assessment, diagnosis, treatment including counseling, client-centered advocacy, consultation and evaluation of individuals and families.... Yet [the appellant] admitted he made diagnoses from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV).... [The appellant] also represents himself as a counselor in the yellow pages of the phone book.... [Conclusion of Law] 10.... The overwhelming evidence presented by the State showed [the appellant] was acting as a clinical social worker and practicing clinical social work as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(iii) and (v) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003) in that he clearly provided assessments, counseled individuals and made diagnoses in accordance with the DSM-IV Manual when he was not licensed to perform those services in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a) (Lexis[Nexis] 2003). [¶ 44] The only real issue presented by these circumstances is whether the word counseling needs expert definition before this Court is able to review the Board's conclusion that the appellant provided unlicensed counseling services within the meaning of the [p]ractice of clinical social work under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(v). We conclude that it does not. Generally, words used in a statute are given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning, unless the statute clearly intends otherwise. Saiz v. State, 2001 WY 76, ¶ 10, 30 P.3d 21, 25 (Wyo.2001) ( quoting Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 657 (Wyo.2000)). Where statutory words have both an ordinary meaning and a `peculiar and appropriate meaning in law,' however, the technical meaning is preferred unless that construction is contrary to legislative intent. Amoco Production Co. v. State, 751 P.2d 379, 383 (Wyo.1988) ( quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-103(a)(i) ((LexisNexis 2005))). [¶ 45] In the instant case, the appellant has not even attempted to argue that the word counseling as used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(v) should be given anything but its ordinary dictionary definition. For that matter, we do not even need to venture so far as the dictionary, inasmuch as the legislature has, in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 33-38-102(a)(ii)(A), defined the word as it pertains to mental health procedures: Counseling means assisting clients through the counseling relationship, using a combination of mental health, psychotherapy and human development principles, methods and techniques, to achieve mental, emotional, physical, social, moral, educational, spiritual or career development and adjustment through the life span, but shall not include religious instruction[.] [¶ 46] All four of the complainants in the consumer complaints filed against the appellant testified that he provided counseling or psychotherapy services during the period of time in which he was not licensed to do so. In the four separate cases he provided pre-adoption counseling to a child, he counseled a child concerning visitation after a divorce, he provided psychotherapy services to a child in a court-ordered supervised visitation situation, and he provided conflict resolution and parenting education in an ongoing divorce litigation. That evidence was sufficient to place the appellant's conduct squarely within the statutory definition of counseling. In addition, the Board also found that the appellant provided assessments and made diagnoses under the mental health profession's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV). While the appellant characterized his work as mediation and conflict resolution in a forensic setting, it is clear that, in each of these cases at least, he had a specific client that he counseled in the statutory sense.