Opinion ID: 2162881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of grievance committee transcript.

Text: Defendant finally contends trial court reversibly erred in admitting into evidence the transcript of the Black Hawk County Bar Association Ethics and Grievance Committee proceeding. He asserts such testimony was protected by the immunity provision of Iowa Sup.Ct.R. 118.18 (now 118.19). Rule 118.19 provides in relevant part, Complaints submitted to the grievance commission or testimony with respect thereto shall be privileged and no lawsuit predicated thereon may be instituted. The body referred to in rule 118.19 is the Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa whose members shall be the Committee on Grievances of the Iowa State Bar Association and their successors as confirmed by order of this court. Iowa Sup. Ct.R. 118.1. On April 25, 1977, Redfern met with Baker and Sindlinger and delivered to each a copy of the report he proposed to file with the Black Hawk County Bar Association Ethics and Grievance Committee. At that time he still thought Doerfer was the actual purchaser of the Miller farm. Neither defendant nor Sindlinger had any corrections and both indicated the complaint was either accurate or fair, although the two offered to make a full disclosure to him. Redfern delivered it to the chairman of the local ethics committee. The Black Hawk committee met April 27, 1977. A transcript of that meeting is the controverted State's exhibit 89, produced under subpoena directed to counsel for the Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association. Defendant and Sindlinger were present and represented by their then counsel. The chairman noted the meeting was at the request of defendant and Sindlinger. Their counsel agreed, stating they would tell the story and that it was his understanding, through the administrator for the Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Association, that the transcript would be submitted to the state committee which would then ship it on to the Grievance Committee [ sic ] for their recommendation, which in turn will be forwarded to the Supreme Court. Defendant and Sindlinger were cautioned that there was a possibility of criminal proceedings, that they were not required to make statements or answer questions, and that anything they said could be used against them. Defendant and Sindlinger were informed that a copy of the Redfern complaint already had been furnished to the county attorney. Counsel for Sindlinger and defendant expressed the opinion that no criminal action could be prosecuted because of Iowa Sup.Ct.R. 118.18 (now 118.19), a conclusion that was questioned by several committee members. Sindlinger and defendant then revealed to the committee that Doerfer was not the real purchaser of the Miller farm but was the straw man for Mark, Sindlinger and the defendant. It was defendant's recollection that in May of 1975 Sindlinger proposed that he, Mark and defendant buy the Nettie Miller farm, an unfamiliar tract to him. He further stated, I would also presume, based upon the chronological events, although I do not have a specific recollection of this, that there must have been some discussion about, Well, we can't let them know that Wayne [Mark] is going to buy it, and I'm reasonably sure that I'm probably the one that said, Let's have Doerfer buy it, because I had a rather close relationship with Dick Doerfer. The transcript, identified by the Black Hawk committee chairman, was offered at defendant's trial. Defendant's objections of privilege and denial of due process and fifth amendment rights were overruled. We hold trial court's ruling was correct. The intent and purpose of rule 118.19 (entitled Immunity) is to protect complainants, witnesses, members of the grievance commission, members of the committee on professional ethics and conduct and their respective staffs from retaliatory litigation by investigated lawyers, not to protect lawyers from prosecution for criminal offenses. In the interest of protecting the public from unethical practices, persons should not be dissuaded from filing complaints by threats of defamation suits or other litigation. Wong v. Schorr, 51 Hawaii 608, 609, 466 P. 2d 441, 442 (1970). The rules of procedure of the professional ethics and conduct committee which make its files confidential (except to the lawyer complained against) were designed to strike a proper balance between an attorney's protection from defamation and the public's protection from unethical conduct. Id. Accord, People v. Pacheco, ___ Colo. ___, (1980) (holding that a district attorney may obtain access to the files of a bar grievance committee for use in an ongoing investigation, and subsequent prosecution, so long as the information requested relates to the charges being investigated). Those provisions and the provisions of Iowa Sup.Ct.R. 118.7, which make confidential the proceedings and hearings before the grievance commission, were not intended to place evidence of a lawyer's criminal conduct beyond the reach of legal process emanating from a criminal proceeding. Were an attorney to be so insulated, there would be no necessity for him or her to claim the fifth amendment privilege, or for our rule recognizing and articulating the investigated lawyer's right not to answer if the response would be self-incriminatory. Iowa Sup.Ct.R. 118.6. Our rules do not confront a lawyer with the Hobson's choice of answering or disbarment, the practice struck down by the United States Supreme Court in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967). See also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). Defendant has cited no instance of our utilization of those grounds in this or any other disciplinary proceeding. Violation of his fifth amendment rights was not a viable objection to the offer of exhibit 89. Adoption of the evidentiary privilege defendant claims would require members of the grievance commission and committee on professional ethics and conduct, and staff, possessing evidence of serious criminal conduct of an investigated lawyer, to shield that information from law enforcement authorities, a potential violation of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, DR 1-103(A) and (B). It would lead to absurd results, for in our decision in the disciplinary proceeding such evidence likely would be set out in detail. See, e. g., Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Baker, 269 N.W.2d at 464-65. Defendant was not denied his fifth amendment privilege. He was forewarned his statements might be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Trial court was right in overruling his objections to the transcript, exhibit 89. The judgment entered in this case is affirmed. AFFIRMED.