Opinion ID: 371900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: penalties for failure to make discovery

Text: 15 Francis Dorey and his attorney, Leo Costello, challenge the authority of the district court to impose upon them sanctions of 16 $599.06, as reasonable expenses incurred by plaintiff Edith W. Dorey in proving the facts recited in the pleadings and opinion herein and in establishing the genuineness of the documents admitted into evidence . . . and the additional sum of $2,000.00 as a reasonable attorney fee to (the) attorney for the . . . plaintiff for services rendered on account of failure of . . . Francis Dorey, as advised by Leo E. Costello, to make discovery . . . . 17 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court possessed the authority to assess the penalty and did not err in exercising that authority. 18 Neither party in the present litigation performed admirably with regard to discovery. Edith Dorey filed suit in October, 1975. Nevertheless, despite notice of the determination of the court that compliance with discovery rules would be more vigorously enforced, 9 the parties failed to engage in any form of discovery whatsoever until after the pretrial conference in December, 1976. 10 19 Mrs. Dorey complied with the pretrial order and had requests for admissions personally served on Francis Dorey's lawyer on December 13, 1976. In response to the requests for admissions, Mr. Dorey timely filed a Rule 26(c) motion for a protective order which was granted in part and denied in all other respects in an order of the United States Magistrate dated December 29, 1976. The magistrate granted Francis Dorey until January 5 to answer the requests and, on that date, he filed an answer. Edith Dorey deemed the answer inadequate, however, and on January 25, 1977, filed a motion to determine the sufficiency of the response as to twenty-eight specific matters. 11 The district court in effect consolidated the motion with others concerning the adequacy of discovery to be considered following trial. 20 As the events described above unfolded, the parties also tussled on another discovery front. Mrs. Dorey's attorney served by hand one set of interrogatories on Francis Dorey's lawyer on December 13, and another set on December 22. The trial date of January 25 approached, however, and Francis Dorey did not answer the interrogatories. On January 21, thirty-five days after service of the first set of interrogatories and thirty days after service of the second set, Mrs. Dorey's attorney hand served on Attorney Costello a motion for default judgment for failure to answer interrogatories. 12 Francis Dorey's answers to both sets of interrogatories were mailed on January 21. 13 21 We believe that the district court was fully justified under the circumstances in imposing the relatively light sanctions involved here. Francis Dorey and Attorney Costello contend that the penalties come under the rubric of Rule 37(b) and therefore cannot stand because there was no violation of a court order compelling discovery. The argument, however, fails to recognize that the sanctions imposed were clearly under the authority of Rule 37(c) (Expenses on failure to admit) 14 and Rule 37(d) (Failure of party to . . . serve answers to interrogatories . . .). 15 Ordinarily Rule 37 sanctions are imposed following violation of a court order. 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 2282 at 757 (1970). The only exceptions to the general rule are those situations involving Rules 37(c) and 37(d). Id.; see Fox v. Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., 516 F.2d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 1975) (F.R.Civ.P. 37(d)); Robison v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 368 F.2d 37, 39 (10th Cir. 1966) (F.R.Civ.P. 37(d)). 16 Both rules state that if certain requirements are not met the court Shall impose sanctions upon application or motion. 22 The requirements necessary to justify Rule 37(c) sanctions were clearly met in the present case. Costs and fees imposed by the court could have covered in part expenses incurred in proving facts that should have been admitted. 17 Indeed, in its Memorandum Decision accompanying judgment in the litigation, the district court expressly noted that the clear and uncontroverted proof made in open Court justifies a larger sum . . . . Nevertheless, the court was unwilling to require payment of all expenses resulting from procurement of evidence to substantiate the facts on which refused admissions were later proven. 23 Similarly, the court could have appropriately assessed costs and attorney's fees against Francis Dorey and his attorney for failure to answer interrogatories. As noted above, even if the answers to interrogatories are determined to have been made on January 21, the requirement of Rule 33(a) that interrogatories be answered within thirty days of service certainly was not met. Further, Edith Dorey's motion for default judgment satisfies the motion requirement of Rule 37(d). 18 With reference to the Rule 37(d) motion, the district court again noted that the evidence justified a much greater award of fees and expenses than that granted. 24 The district court has broad, although not unbridled, discretion in imposing sanctions, including default judgment and dismissal, under Rule 37. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642-43, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976). Especially is this true in the imposition of the monetary penalties involved here. See Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 503 (4th Cir. 1977), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 744, 54 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978). Nothing in the record suggests that the court abused its discretion in any way in requiring Francis Dorey and his attorney to pay to Edith Dorey nearly $2,600 in costs and attorney's fees. We are not left with a  'definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of relevant factors.'  Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., supra, 561 F.2d at 506 (quoting Finley v. Parvin/Dohrmann Co., 520 F.2d 386, 390 (2d Cir. 1975)). 25 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.