Opinion ID: 2086811
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allegations of Pretrial Errors

Text: Appellant first argues that the lower court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss the charges against him because his previous acquittal on charges of possessing the murder weapon on June 25, 1979 should have, by application of principles of collateral estoppel, precluded the Commonwealth under the circumstances from prosecuting him for the shooting death of Davis Kelly. Relying on this Court's plurality decision in Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600, 425 A.2d 313 (1980) and on 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110, When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense, appellant asserts that the issue of whether he possessed the firearm on June 25, 1979, which was the murder weapon, was also an essential issue in the subsequent prosecution for murder, conspiracy and possession of an instrument of crime, and hence his previous acquittal on the possession charges requires his discharge. While Hude was a plurality opinion (per Nix, J.), its analysis of collateral estoppel principles in criminal prosecutions has since been accepted by a majority of the members of this Court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brown 503 Pa. 514, 517-19, 469 A.2d 1371 (1983) and Commonwealth v. Lagana, 510 Pa. 477, 480-81, 509 A.2d 863 (1986). Hude interpreted 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 in light of federal constitutional double jeopardy protections which were held to encompass principles of collateral estoppel as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Collateral estoppel is issue preclusion which does not automatically bar subsequent prosecution but does bar redetermination in a second prosecution of those issues necessarily determined between the parties in a first proceeding which has become a final judgment. Commonwealth v. Hude, supra, 492 Pa. at 612, 617, 425 A.2d at 319, 322. It is a principle to be applied with realism and rationality, not with the hyper-technical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book. Ashe v. Swenson, supra 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. We stated in Hude: The approach set forth by the Ashe Court in determining the applicability of the principle of collateral estoppel where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, is that we must: . . . examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. Id. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. In determining whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which is sought to be foreclosed we are cautioned that the inquiry `must be set in a practical frame and viewed with any eye to all the circumstances' Id. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. 492 Pa. at 612, 425 A.2d at 319-20. In making this determination, we are guided by the federal decisions which employ a three-step approach in applying Ashe: (1) An identification of the issues in the two actions for the purpose of determining whether the issues are sufficiently similar and sufficiently material in both actions to justify invoking the doctrine; (2) an examination of the record of the prior case to decide whether the issue was `litigated' in the first case; and (3) an examination of the record of the prior proceeding to ascertain whether the issue was necessarily decided in the first case. 492 Pa. at 613, 425 A.2d at 320 (federal court citations omitted). Finally, in Hude, we interpreted 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 in a manner consistent with Ashe and the above principles, stating: Section 110(2) states in pertinent part: § 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense. Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:       (2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an acquittal . . . which acquittal. . . necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense. We therefore hold that  necessarily required a determination  is no more restrictive than whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict without inclusion of the issue defendant seeks to exclude from relitigation. 492 Pa. at 613, 425 A.2d at 320-21. In the instant case, we do not have a full record of the proceedings in the first prosecution, as the notes of testimony were not transcribed. Nevertheless, it is clear from the record before us and from the foregoing principles that appellant's previous acquittal on charges arising from his arrest on June 25, 1979 did not preclude his subsequent prosecution for murder and related charges. In the first prosecution, appellant was charged under two sections of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act, namely sections 6106 and 6108, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106, 6108. Section 6106 provides, in relevant part: Firearms not to be carried without a license (a) Offense defined.  No person shall carry a firearm in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a license therefore except as provided in this subchapter. Section 6106(b) then lists numerous exceptions to application of the licensure requirement, including (8) Any person while carrying a firearm unloaded and in a secure wrapper from the place of purchase to his home or place of business.... Section 6108 provides: Carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time upon the public streets or upon any public property in a city of the first class unless: (1) such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or (2) such person is exempt from licensing under section 6106(b) of this title (relating to firearms not to be carried without a license). Possession of the instrument is a necessary element of both section 6106 and section 6108, but a defendant can be in physical possession of a firearm and not violate these provisions. For prosecutions under section 6106, the Commonwealth must affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant carried the firearm in a vehicle or concealed on his person, and that he did not have a license for the firearm. Commonwealth v. McNeil, 461 Pa. 709, 337 A.2d 840 (1975). In prosecutions under section 6108, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant possessed the firearm on public streets or public property in Philadelphia; however the Commonwealth need not affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant was without a license. Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 484 Pa. 476, 399 A.2d 392 (1979). The defendant may demonstrate under section 6108 that he had a license, as a defense, or that he did not need a license because he was exempt under section 6106(b). In the instant, subsequent prosecution, appellant was charged with possessing an instrument of crime-generally, namely a handgun, on June 23, 1979, under the Inchoate Crime chapter of our Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907. Section 907 provides in relevant portion: Possessing instruments of crime (a) Criminal instruments generally.  A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally. (b) Possession of weapon.  A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses a firearm or other weapon concealed upon his person with intent to employ it criminally. As he was charged with possession of an instrument of crime-generally, the Commonwealth was required in the instant case to demonstrate only that on June 23, 1979, appellant possessed an instrument of crime, as defined in subsection (c), [4] and that he had the intent to employ it criminally. It is apparent that appellant's acquittal on charges of possessing a firearm on June 25, 1979 in violation of sections 6106 and 6108 of the Uniform Firearms Act did not necessarily litigate or decide an issue dispositive of, or sufficiently similar to, the issues involved in the instant prosecution to preclude the Commonwealth from prosecuting appellant. Appellant's acquittal of violating section 6106 might well have been based upon the Commonwealth's failure to demonstrate that he had no license for the firearm or to convince the fact-finder that he had it concealed on his person (it was readily visible to the arresting officer). The acquittal might also have resulted from his presentation of the defense that he was exempt under one of the numerous exceptions of section 6106(b), say for example subsection 8 regarding transporting a firearm unloaded from the place of purchase. Appellant gave an exculpatory statement following his June 25, 1979 arrest which was consistent with his trial testimony (in the instant prosecution) that he had just purchased the gun in the bar at which he was arrested. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.) November 29, 1983 at 252, Pretrial Suppression Hearing before Judge Richette, and N.T. January 1, 1985, Trial at 99-102; Brief for Commonwealth at 18. Appellant's acquittal of violating section 6108 may well have been based upon the Commonwealth's failure to prove he carried the handgun on public property or streets (the record does not disclose whether the June 25th arrest took place on a public sidewalk or on private property adjacent to the bar), or upon appellant's establishing a defense under § 6108(1) or (2). Appellant's acquittal on these possession charges did not, therefore necessarily prove that he did not actually possess the handgun on June 25, 1979, nor did it dispose of the issues to be litigated in the subsequent prosecution for the inchoate crime of possession under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907, wherein the Commonwealth was required to show that appellant was in possession of an instrument of crime on June 23, 1979 and that he intended to employ it criminally. Appellant, despite the former acquittal, could well have possessed the handgun on both June 23rd, and June 25th, and the Commonwealth's failure to establish that he violated sections 6106 and 6108 of the Uniform Firearms Act did not preclude the Commonwealth from proving that, on June 23rd, he possessed an instrument of crime (a handgun) and employed it criminally (to kill Davis Kelly). Collateral estoppel did not therefore prevent the subsequent prosecution of appellant under section 907, nor his prosecution for murder and criminal conspiracy, as the acquittal did not necessarily require a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(2). [5] Appellant next raises a closely related collateral estoppel argument, stating that the pretrial motion court erred in denying petitioner's motion to exclude any mention of the firearm allegedly obtained from the petitioner at trial because of the not guilty ruling on the trial for possession of the allegedly fatal firearm in C.P. XX-XX-XXXX. He makes no new argument, simply stating that the discussion of collateral estoppel from point number one is incorporated herein. This contention is without merit, for the reasons stated in our foregoing discussion. Appellant's acquittal of the charges for possession under the Uniform Firearms Act did not necessarily determine that appellant was not in actual physical possession of the gun on June 25, 1979. Moreover, the suppression court at C.P. XX-XX-XXXX, the first prosecution, denied appellant's motion to suppress the gun and bullets on October 31, 1979. [6] In the instant, subsequent prosecution, Judge Richette reheard the suppression motion, considered the court's prior ruling (of non-suppression) in the previous case, and properly denied appellant's motion to suppress, finding that the evidence was legally obtained. We find no error in the court's refusal to suppress the gun and to prohibit testimony about the gun merely because appellant had been previously acquitted of charges under the Uniform Firearms Act. Appellant argues that the court erred in denying his pretrial request to order Barbara Harris to identify appellant from a police lineup, and in failing to suppress the identification of appellant by Barbara Harris. Appellant's Points 3 and 6. These arguments are specious. His argument that he was entitled to have the eyewitness, Betty Harris, [7] participate in a lineup is based on Commonwealth v. Sexton, 485 Pa. 17, 400 A.2d 1289 (1979), wherein this Court held that under some circumstances it could be an abuse of discretion to deny such a request. In Sexton: The sole evidence connecting appellee to this crime was the identification of Mr. Weinstein, [the eyewitness] who had no knowledge of appellee before the incident, observed the culprit briefly before and during the crime, had no contact with the appellee between the arrest and the certification hearing, and had not been presented with an opportunity of a photographic identification prior to the hearing confrontation. Id., 485 Pa. at 23, 400 A.2d at 1292. The circumstances in the present case bear little resemblance to those in Sexton. Betty Harris had known appellant from the neighborhood for some ten years preceding the murder in June, 1979, and had seen him since the shooting. She had the opportunity to observe appellant at close range, and she did, in fact, identify appellant from a photographic array. The court did not abuse its discretion, therefore, in refusing to order a pretrial identification lineup. Appellant's contention that Ms. Harris' identification of him should have been suppressed is based upon her previous inability to identify the shooter to the police on numerous occasions between the shooting on June 23, 1979 and January 1, 1985 (when she finally went to the police and informed them that appellant was the shooter). Appellant asserts this renders Ms. Harris' identification of him inherently suspect and unreliable. The suppression court properly refused to suppress Ms. Harris' identification, finding that the witness had adequate opportunity to observe the incident and appellant and that she did in fact recognize him. N.T. Pretrial Suppression Hearing before Judge Gelfand, January 1, 1985 at 61-62. The witness's prior failure to identify appellant did not require suppression of her identification, but instead went only to the weight and credibility of her testimony. Commonwealth v. Silver, 499 Pa. 228, 237, 452 A.2d 1328 (1982) (Mrs. Collier's credibility, given her inability to identify appellant before trial, goes to the weight to be accorded her testimony rather than its admissibility .... The witness's earlier failures were brought out fully by defense counsel on cross-examination, and the trial court properly instructed the jury to receive her identification testimony with caution.) The court properly admitted Ms. Harris' identification testimony. Appellant also asserts that the court erred in failing to grant petitioner's request for the criminal records of all civilian witnesses who were to testify at trial. Point 4. The record does not support this assertion. The court reviewed the criminal records of the various prosecution witnesses in camera and disclosed to counsel all of their convictions involving crimen falsi. The record shows that counsel did in fact make use of the criminal records of Kimberleigh Green and Levi Rucker in an attempt to discredit their testimony. Appellant does not now inform us whether there were any additional criminal records involving crimen falsi that would have been helpful in his impeachment of these or other prosecution witnesses, and in the absence of any factual averments that he was actually deprived of specific information that might have benefited appellant at trial, we find no merit to this claim. We are also unpersuaded by his bare assertion that the in camera proceeding mandated by the pre-trial motion judge . . . barred [counsel] from being able to preserve proper objections to the trial court's ruling. Appellant offers no citation of authority nor does he elaborate as to how the in camera review was inadequate and prevented him from preserving any objections. In fact, the record indicates that counsel acquiesced to the court's in camera review of the witnesses' criminal records for crimen falsi. N.T. November 28, 1983, Pretrial Hearing before Judge Richette, at 40-44. Appellant next asserts that the suppression court erred in failing to suppress physical evidence and statements. Presumably, while he does not identify the challenged evidence and statements, he refers to the handgun, bullets and exculpatory statement obtained as a result of the June 25, 1979 arrest. His arguments are that the arresting officer had no reasonable basis to search him and seize the handgun on June 25, 1979, and that the appellant's obviously low I.Q. clearly shows his inability to understand Miranda warnings. Brief for appellant at 15, Point 5. Again, appellant gives no citations of authority to support either contention. The suppression court correctly ruled that the physical evidence was properly seized because the arresting officers pat-down of appellant was justified as a stop and frisk for the officer's safety under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See also Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529, 491 A.2d 111 (1985). Appellant did not raise the issue of his low I.Q. at the suppression hearing, and it has been waived. N.T. Pretrial Hearing before Judge Richette November 29, 1983, at 247-53. Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 36 n. 3, 331 A.2d 213 (1975). Furthermore, there could be no prejudice because, as counsel conceded, the statement was exculpatory. N.T., id. at 252. Appellant raises several issues regarding the pretrial procedures in capital cases. (Points 7-9) He first argues that the court erred in denying his request for a pretrial hearing regarding the existence of aggravating circumstances. The absence of such a pretrial hearing is objectionable to appellant because the prosecutor can obtain an additional allotment of peremptory challenges (thirteen additional: see Pa.R.Crim.P.Rule 1126) upon the mere assertion that aggravating circumstances exist. Appellant fails to indicate how he was or could be prejudiced by such circumstances, he cites no authority, and he in fact concedes that the current procedure (i.e., no pretrial hearing) is required by the present state of law. This argument is frivolous. Appellant's second and third arguments regarding pretrial procedures in capital cases involve the procedures on voir dire for death-qualifying a jury: he argues that death-qualifying a jury violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the applicable provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution; that the death penalty is unconstitutional under the due process, equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the state and federal constitutions; and that certain prospective jurors were improperly excused for cause. [8] However, appellant's argument on these issues concedes that the present state of law is such that the death penalty is not seen as being per se cruel and unusual punishment, nor is it seen as a violation of the due process and equal protection provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. Brief for appellant at 17-18. Indeed, appellant is correct on this score. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). He argues, however, that A civilized and free society should not kill pathetic creatures such as defendant [because of his low I.Q.]  for its sake, not his. It is hoped that the law will evolve to this point soon. Brief for appellant at 17. The law has not evolved to this point. Our legislature has painstakingly enacted a comprehensive sentencing scheme for imposing the death penalty when certain aggravating circumstances accompany the killing. This decision was reasoned and reasonable, and was within the legislature's prerogative to make. Appellant claims that the court erred in denying his challenges for cause to six particular prospective jurors, which challenges were based on the jurors' answers to various questions posed by the attorneys on voir dire. Points 10-12, 14-16. These claims are without merit. It is true, of course, that an accused has the right to challenge a prospective juror for lack of impartiality. We do not expect jurors to be free from all prejudices, however; rather, the law requires them to be able to put aside their prejudices and determine guilt or innocence on the facts presented. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 452 Pa. 130, 305 A.2d 5 (1973); Commonwealth v. Sweeney, 464 Pa. 425, 430, 347 A.2d 286 (1975). The purpose of the voir dire examination is not to provide a better basis upon which a defendant can exercise his peremptory challenges, but to determine whether any venireman has formed a fixed opinion as to the accused's guilt or innocence. Commonwealth v. Sweeney, supra ; Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 364 A.2d 1335, 1336 (1976). The burden of proving that a venireman should be excused for cause is on the challenger who must demonstrate that he or she possesses a fixed, unalterable opinion that would prevent him or her from rendering a verdict based solely on the evidence and the law. Commonwealth v. Martin, 465 Pa. 134, 348 A.2d 391 (1975); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Even a statement by a prospective (or chosen) juror that some evidence might be required from defendant to change an opinion or impression already formed would not be a sufficient basis for challenge for cause if he or she also stated that he or she could follow the court's instructions and decide the case solely on the evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Sparrow, 471 Pa. 490, 500-01, 370 A.2d 712 (1977); Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552 (1967); Commonwealth v. McGrew, 375 Pa. 518, 100 A.2d 467 (1953). In applying these standards and principles, great deference must be given the trial judge who not only hears the questions and answers during voir dire, but also observes the demeanor of the veniremen and assesses their credibility and ability to be impartial. Commonwealth v. Bachert, 499 Pa. 398, 408-09, 453 A.2d 931 (1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1043, 103 S.Ct. 1440, 75 L.Ed.2d 797 (1983); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037-38, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891-92, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); Wainwright v. Witt, supra 469 U.S. at 424-26, 105 S.Ct. at 852-53. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Wainwright, a finding regarding a venireman's impartiality is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province. . . . The trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears, but his predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate record. Id. at 105 S.Ct. 854-55. This Court just recently reiterated the longstanding standards of appellate review of a trial judge's rulings during voir dire examination, which standards recognize the deference to be given the trial judge; in Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 510 Pa. 603, 617, 511 A.2d 764, 771 (1986), we stated: The Court in Commonwealth v. McGrew, 375 Pa. 518, 525, 100 A.2d 467, 470 (1953), stated: The examination of jurors under voir dire is solely for the purpose of securing a competent, fair, impartial and unprejudiced jury. We also there observed that the scope of a voir dire examination rests in the sound discretion of the trial Judge and his decisions, even in a challenge for cause, will not be reversed in the absence of palpable error. (emphasis added). See also Irvin v. Dowd, supra (manifest error); Commonwealth v. Bachert, supra (abuse of discretion). Applying these standards in the instant case, and reviewing the entire voir dire examination of the challenged veniremen, including that conducted by the trial judge in addition to questioning by defense counsel, we find no error in refusing to excuse the veniremen for cause. While each venireman gave answers which, to varying degrees, initially indicated that people charged with crimes are usually guilty of something and that some evidence might be required to change their (the veniremen's) impressions in this regard, or that policemen are more believable than other witnesses, each also responded positively to the judge's questioning about the burden of proof being on the Commonwealth, about the presumption of innocence including that defendants have no obligation to testify or present evidence, and about their (the veniremen's) ability to render an impartial verdict on the evidence alone. The trial judge was in the best position to assess the prospective jurors' potential bias and partiality, and determined that they would be impartial. Moreover, appellant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, so there can be no prejudice. Commonwealth v. Morales, 508 Pa. 51, 63-64, 494 A.2d 367 (1985). Accordingly we see no reason to disturb the trial judge's rulings on voir dire and find no error in his refusing to grant these challenges for cause. Appellant also claims the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial when one of the veniremen actually chosen as a juror was excused for cause due to hardship after her selection but before any testimony was taken. Point 13. This issue is frivolous, as counsel agreed during voir dire that this selected juror should be excused, and stated I will accept her being excused. N.T., Voir Dire, January 17, 1985 at 4. Moreover, appellant does not provide a clue as to how he was prejudiced by this juror's being excused, and we discern none.