Opinion ID: 736234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attorney malpractice

Text: 42 The appellants contend that the district court's grant of summary judgment on the derivative claims left Palmer with, at best, an individual claim for attorney malpractice. The appellants point out that Count III of the complaint, which alleged attorney malpractice, claims no injury to Palmer separate and distinct from that to the corporation, and that, in any event, Palmer failed to prove any such individual and non-derivative claim. For the reasons explained above, we agree that Palmer is not entitled to recover for acts of malpractice that resulted in injury to the corporation, and are therefore solely derivative claims. Because we think, however, that read broadly, Count III can be construed to allege a claim of separate injury to Palmer, in addition to the derivative claims, we review the record to determine whether Palmer presented sufficient evidence of attorney malpractice resulting in injury peculiar to him to sustain the jury's verdict. 43 The elements of legal malpractice in Ohio were stated early in this century. See Jablonski v. Higgins, 6 Ohio Misc.2d 8, 10, 453 N.E.2d 1296, 1298 (Ohio Com.Pl.1983) (citing Long v. Bowersox, 19 Ohio Dec. 494, 500-01, 8 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 249, 255-58 (C.P.1909)). As recently stated, the elements are (1) an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a duty, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. State ex rel. Sellers v. Gerken, 72 Ohio St.3d 115, 117, 647 N.E.2d 807, 810 (1995) (citing Krahn v. Kinney, 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 105, 538 N.E.2d 1058, 1060 (1989)). 44 Palmer points first to the fact that LaValley had for many years been the attorney for Palmer in all of his personal, business and family affairs, claiming that under those circumstances, he felt and expected that LaValley was acting as his attorney with respect to Fox Research matters as well. However, the reasonableness of that expectation is undermined by the fact that in the offering circular LaValley sent to prospective investors in Fox Research, including Palmer, LaValley identified himself as counsel for the corporation. Further, as the appellants point out, Palmer himself states in his brief that the damages he claims as a result of the alleged acts of malpractice were what Fox Research should have obtained and ultimately paid pro rata to Palmer--but did not obtain or pay to him because of LaValley's wrongdoing. The fact that Palmer claims only his pro rata share of those damages does not change the character of his claim. The injury claimed was to the corporation. 45 We have reviewed the voluminous record in this case, and conclude, albeit reluctantly, that the evidence of attorney malpractice presented by Palmer falls short of meeting the requirements for establishing an attorney malpractice claim resulting in injury to Palmer individually. We do not, by this conclusion, condone the conduct of LaValley, which we think the jury disapproved of with good cause. However, because the evidence supports only derivative claims of injury as a result of LaValley's actions, we hold that the judgment on Count III must be reversed.