Opinion ID: 1424883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions Willful Blindness

Text: Defendants first argue there was no evidentiary basis for a willful blindness jury instruction and the instruction improperly reduced the government's burden of proof. We review the district court's jury instructions for abuse of discretion and will affirm [i]f the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the jury. United States v. Lalley, 257 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir.2001). A willful blindness instruction is appropriate when the defendant asserts a lack of guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance. United States v. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d 971, 974 (8th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). Ignorance is deliberate if the defendants were presented with facts putting them on notice criminal activity was particularly likely and yet intentionally failed to investigate. United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 652 (8th Cir.1992). We look to whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the instruction, reviewing the evidence and any reasonable inference from that evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1130-31 (8th Cir. 1990). A willful blindness instruction is not appropriate if the evidence implies defendants could only have had either actual knowledge or no knowledge of the facts in question. United States v. Parker, 364 F.3d 934, 946 (8th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). The evidence is sufficient to support the instruction if a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendants had either actual knowledge of the illegal activity or deliberately failed to inquire about it before taking action to support the activity. Id. (citing United States v. Kellermann, 992 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir.1993)). If reasonable inferences support a finding the failure to investigate is equivalent to burying one's head in the sand, the jury may consider willful blindness as a basis for knowledge. Gruenberg, 989 F.2d at 974. The defendants argued they were unaware Gecko was engaged in fraud. Based on the foregoing, however, we find a jury could reasonably conclude defendants knew something was wrong but chose not to inquire. The defendants' also claim the instruction lowered the government's burden of proof and allowed the jury to convict them based on a negligence standard. We have held a jury cannot be led to convict a defendant improperly on a negligence standard where, as here, the instruction states the jury must not conclude the defendant had knowledge of criminal activity if he was simply careless or negligent. See Parker, 364 F.3d at 947 n. 3. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the willful blindness instruction.