Opinion ID: 1952844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Blum's Exceptions

Text: Blum claims that because the evidentiary hearings were unfair[ly] schedul[ed] in the Circuit Court, he was prevented from fully presenting his case and from retaining counsel. Consequently, he claims that his admissions should be stricken and that he is entitled to an entirely new hearing. In support of that claim, Blum presents no arguments other than those contained in his Supplemental Motion to Continue Disciplinary Hearing, which was previously filed in and denied by this Court. Blum also claims that he did not receive a full and fair trial because the Circuit Court, after realizing that the proceedings would take longer than expected, continued them through September 6, 2002, despite Blum's claim that he could not appear on that date. We have considered previously the arguments contained in Blum's Supplemental Motion to Continue Disciplinary Hearing and found them to be without merit. The disciplinary hearings in this case, pursuant to our March 27, 2002 Order remanding the matter to the hearing judge for findings of fact and conclusions of law, was to occur not later than thirty (30) days from the filing of the response. Nonetheless, we already had continued the hearing twice before Blum's third motion for a continuance. In the first motion, which was filed by Bar Counsel, Blum agreed with Bar Counsel that, because of discovery difficulties, the hearing should occur on July 8, 2002. We granted that motion on May 22, 2002. Two days later, however, despite agreeing to the date of July 8, 2002, Blum filed a motion seeking to continue the proceedings further in order to obtain counsel and to adequately prepare. In a July 8, 2002 Order, we granted Blum's motion, setting the hearing date for September 4 and 5, 2002. Thus, we afforded Blum almost two more months to retain counsel and prepare for the hearings, even after he had already agreed that July 8, 2002 was an appropriate date. Moreover, Blum concedes that by July 8, 2002, he was aware of our Order. Thus, despite any prior communications he claims that he had with the Circuit Court or Judge Dugan's chambers with respect to the hearing dates, he knew, as of July 8, 2002, when the hearings were to occur. Blum's claim with respect to the continuance of the hearing on September 6, 2002, is also wholly meritless. Blum represented to the hearing judge that he was unavailable on September 6, 2002 for two reasons: first, because his family celebrates Rosh Hashanah early, and second, because he had a brief due in the Court of Special Appeals on September 6, 2002. With respect to the brief, the Court of Special Appeals was contacted to determine if the due date could be extended, and Judge Dugan discovered that Blum's case in fact had been dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals in an August 28, 2002 order because a brief due on August 14, 2002 had not been timely filed. When confronted with this, Blum's response was that the Court of Special Appeals had miscalculated the due date and that he had not received notice of the dismissal. Judge Dugan, however, found that Blum was being less than candid with the Court. We have no difficulty in accepting Judge Dugan's finding, especially in light of Blum's continued lack of candor, which occurred when he appeared before this Court. In oral argument, Blum was asked whether he had told Judge Dugan that he could not appear on September 6 because he had a brief due in the Court of Special Appeals. Blum claimed that he had not said that, but had stated that he would be filing a brief. Before Judge Dugan on September 5, 2002, however, Blum asserted on at least two separate occasions, I have a brief due by tomorrow. Nor was he unavailable for the September 6, 2000 hearing because of Rosh Hashanah, for, as Judge Dugan pointed out, that holy day did not begin until sundown on September 6, 2002. Thus, Blum was not prevented from attending the September 6, 2002 hearing. On the contrary, he chose not to attend. Blum's final two exceptions are based on Judge Dugan's denial of his motion for sanctions and his motion for recusal. They carry no more weight than the exceptions already discussed. On May 23, 2002, Blum served petitioner with a notice to take the deposition of Petitioner. In response, Bar Counsel filed a motion for protective order alleging that Blum's notice was oppressive, overly broad, and inappropriate because it would not lead to discoverable facts. During a hearing on Bar Counsel's motion, after negotiating other issues, Bar Counsel offered to make available for the deposition Mr. Reburn, the primary investigator in the matter, or Mr. Hirshman, Bar Counsel. Blum would not identify whom he would prefer for the deposition, and the Circuit Court advised petitioner that it need only produce Mr. Reburn. When Bar Counsel produced Mr. Reburn for the deposition, Blum inquired as to whether Mr. Reburn was produced pursuant to the notice of deposition and was there to testify on behalf of petitioner. Blum also claimed that Bar Counsel's response was that Mr. Reburn, who was the investigator, was present to testify. Dissatisfied with Bar Counsel's answer, Blum filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that the disciplinary action against him should be dismissed for willful discovery violations. The Circuit Court denied Blum's motion, and was correct in doing so. We have said in the context of interpreting the discovery rules [18] that [t]he dismissal of a claim ... is among the gravest of sanctions, and as such, is warranted only in cases of egregious misconduct such as `willful or contemptuous' behavior, `a deliberate attempt to hinder or prevent effective presentation of defenses or counterclaims,' or `stalling in revealing one's own weak claim or defense.' Manzano v. Southern Maryland Hosp., 347 Md. 17, 29, 698 A.2d 531, 537 (1997)(quoting Rubin v. Gray, 35 Md.App. 399, 400-01, 370 A.2d 600, 601 (1977)) (citations omitted). There is absolutely no indication that Bar Counsel committed any discovery violations, willful or otherwise. Indeed, the Circuit Court found during the June 18, 2002 hearing that Ms. Kessler [Assistant Bar Counsel who prosecuted this case] is not acting in bad faith [but] is doing everything she can to provide you with what you want. Blum's final exception is based on his motion to recuse Judge Dugan. In that motion, Blum asserted that Judge Dugan, by his ruling on the discovery issue, showed a predisposition and bias in favor of petitioner. Blum's argument has no merit. In ruling on the motion for recusal, Judge Dugan declared that he had no reason or basis to recuse himself. Contrary to what Blum asserts, the record in this case reflects behavior of the Circuit Court Judge that was both patient and fair. Respondent bears the heavy burden to overcome the presumption of impartiality and must prove that the judge has a personal bias and prejudice against him or her or has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Shaw, 363 Md. 1, 11, 766 A.2d 1028, 1033 (2001). Blum has not demonstrated that Judge Dugan was biased or prejudiced against him, only that Judge Dugan did not rule in his favor. None of Blum's exceptions have merit and all, therefore, are overruled.