Opinion ID: 692706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jimenez' Gang Membership:

Text: 7 Jimenez claims that the prosecution improperly injected irrelevant, prejudicial material by repeatedly referring to evidence of his alleged gang membership, an intimidating visit to Vega's home by four Latin Kings and a phone call from Jimenez that scared Vega's daughter. He also contends that the prosecution erred by attempting to make Vega admit his fear of reprisal as an informant and by implying that Jimenez had somehow caused Vega to perjure himself at trial. 8 From the opening argument, the prosecution referred to Jimenez' position as jefe or chief of the Latin Kings. Throughout the trial, the prosecution pursued the theory that Jimenez had used his gang affiliation to recruit Vega and Geissler and to maintain control over the conspiracy. Although Geissler was not a member in full standing, he was associated with the gang. At one point, Vega agreed with Geissler's statement that Jimenez' sponsorship of Geissler in the gang gives me some rank. In another conversation, Geissler told a friend, Andrew Lundberg, that he could not talk at the moment because of my business with my nation, i.e. the robbery for the Latin Kings. When Geissler later introduced Vega to Lundberg, he said, Drew, this is one of my King brothers, Joe Vega. Vega admitted his own former membership in the gang from 1980 to 1988. 9 The prosecution further introduced evidence of Jimenez' intimidating authority. Geissler testified that Jimenez' position was a factor in his decision to assist in the robbery because Frankie was not someone I wanted to get mad at me. In a recorded conversation, Vega said that Jimenez had sent Latin Kings to his house because he thinks we're slow ... draggin'. Vega testified before the grand jury that one of the four men had told him that Jimenez can always reach out and touch someone, you know, just like in the phone commercial. In a recorded conversation, Vega also said that a telephone call from Jimenez to Vega's daughter had scared her. In its closing argument, the prosecution referred to the visit by the Latin Kings and the phone call as evidence of Jimenez' participation in the conspiracy. It also argued that Jimenez had caused Geissler to carry the weapon by offering him acceptance by his peers, the gang members, and through his authority as jefe. 10 A prosecutor does not engage in misconduct by introducing and commenting on otherwise admissible, relevant evidence of gang membership and fear of gang retaliation, unless he uses it as a springboard for more general prejudicial comments inconsistent with the purpose of its admission. 4 United States ex rel. Garcia v. Lane, 698 F.2d 900, 901-02 (7th Cir.1983). We have recognized the admissibility of gang membership for various purposes. 5 In United States v. Rodriguez, 925 F.2d 1049, 1050-51 (7th Cir.1991), a mid-level gang member, Rodriguez, asked a low ranking member, DeLeon, to assist him in robbing a postal carrier of his keys. Both were indicted for conspiracy, robbery of a postal carrier and use of a firearm in a crime of violence. Id. at 1050. DeLeon pleaded guilty and testified against Rodriguez at trial. Id. at 1051 n. 1. In addition to holding that the evidence of membership tended to show Rodriguez' motive for the robbery, this court held that DeLeon's testimony about Mr. Rodriguez's position as an enforcer could have helped the jury understand why Mr. Rodriguez approached DeLeon and why the latter, a mere soldier in the gang, quickly agreed to participate in this criminal endeavor. Id. at 1053-54. 11 In this case, evidence of their respective affiliations with the Latin Kings would have helped the jury understand why Geissler, at the request of an inmate (albeit his former roommate), would post bail for a stranger and plan a robbery with them both. Furthermore, both the visit by the four Latin Kings to Vega and Jimenez' phone call to Vega's daughter have direct relevance to proving Jimenez' participation in the conspiracy. Pressuring the others to quicken the pace of their activities demonstrates Jimenez' intent to conspire. Thus, introducing this evidence and commenting upon it in closing arguments did not, in this case, constitute prosecutorial misconduct. 12 Jimenez also protests the prosecution's attempts to impeach Vega by questioning him about his fears of being retaliated against by the Latin Kings as an informant. Vega recanted his prior statements concerning Jimenez' participation and threats made by him through the Latin Kings. He said that he had told the FBI he had been threatened in order to receive more money for his services. On cross-examination, the prosecution attempted to impeach Vega both by prior inconsistent statements concerning the visit by the Latin Kings and Jimenez' call to Vega's daughter and by attempting to elicit evidence of bias due to fear. As Special Agent Christopher Cole, a rebuttal witness for impeachment purposes only, 6 explained, Vega had told the FBI that he was afraid of the Latin Kings because he had been exposed as an informant. The FBI gave him money to relocate and assisted him in leaving town. Furthermore, Vega was serving time in a state prison for an unrelated offense and had requested the FBI's assistance in moving him to federal prison. On cross-examination concerning these facts, Vega admitted that he was going to a prison where the Latin Kings rule and that the penalty for being an informant against the Latin Kings was death. However, he denied being afraid. 13 The evidence of Vega's fear of retaliation was used to impeach him on the basis of bias. Bias ... [describes] the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' ... fear of a party, or by the witness' self-interest. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984). This evidence tended to show that Vega's testimony was slanted or perhaps fabricated in [Jimenez'] favor. Id. The use of this testimony was not pretextual. See also Gomez v. Ahitow, 29 F.3d 1128, 1139 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that, in habeas case, admission of testimony concerning threats from unknown source against potential witness did not constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice for procedural default purposes and distinguishing prior habeas cases on grounds that use of evidence was not pretextual because it explained witness' ten month delay before contacting authorities), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3626 (Feb. 21, 1995) (No. 94-7102). 14 We have held that a prosecutor may not elicit inadmissible hearsay impeachment testimony of implied threats or danger to the witness, but that the admission of the hearsay was harmless error in part because the prosecution did not directly state that the defendant himself had threatened the witness. United States v. Patterson, 23 F.3d 1239, 1249 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 527 (1994). However, in dictum, we referred to the proposition that references to threats or danger to prosecution witnesses from the defendant are improper unless admissible evidence links the threats or danger to the defendant. Id. (citing see United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir.1979)). In this case, the prosecution provided admissible substantive and impeachment evidence both showing Vega's fear of the Latin Kings and linking Jimenez to the leadership of that group, which held certain tenets relating to informants. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 47-48, 52-53 (holding that court did not err by permitting impeachment testimony concerning tenets of secret prison gang that required members to commit perjury and murder on each other's behalf). The prosecution did not act improperly. 15 In closing arguments, the prosecution declared that Vega had committed perjury. Initially, the prosecution stated that [c]learly, Joe Vega committed perjury when he testified before you.... After reviewing the evidence of gang intimidation, the prosecution concluded that the very fact of Vega's perjury corroborated Geissler's testimony that Jimenez was jefe of the Latin Kings. The defense counsel, in its closing argument, argued that Vega, who no longer received income for his services as an informant, had said anything he thought the government would pay money to hear. Defense counsel flatly labeled Geissler a liar. On rebuttal, the prosecution asserted that [s]omething or someone got to Joe Vega since the government talked to him on Monday. The something, the threat of death, the someone, I don't know.... 7 The prosecutor did not say that a death threat did in fact occur, but instead commented on the credibility of the defendant's sudden attack of conscience in light of the evidence before the jury. 16 [T]he courts have viewed the direct accusation of the crime of perjury with considerable disfavor. United States v. Reicin, 497 F.2d 563, 573 (7th Cir.1974) (holding that two references to witness perjury induced by defendant were not sufficient to mandate reversal), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974). However, in Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 208 (7th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 494 (7th Cir.1977) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978)), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 105 (1991), we said once again in dictum that merely calling a defense witness a liar is not improper conduct, if it does not cross the line from hard, but fair argument to an impairment of the  'calm and detached search for truth....'  See United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1409-10 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that prosecutor did not err by attacking veracity of witness because it represented reasonable inference from evidence adduced at trial rather than prosecutor's personal opinion, and noting that prosecutor may even call witness a liar if term is not used excessively). In this case, Vega's testimony on the stand was irreconcilable with his prior recorded statements and his grand jury testimony. The prosecution did not cross the line by arguing that Vega had lied on the stand. Even if it had crossed the line, given the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, the argument did not constitute plain error.