Opinion ID: 1059625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of Ordinances

Text: We now turn to the various challenges the Dails make regarding the validity of certain portions of the York County zoning ordinance. Subsection A of Code § 10.1-1126.1 states that it is a beneficial and desirable use of the forest resources of this Commonwealth to practice forestry in accordance with the best management practices promulgated by the State Forester. Subsection B of that section places limitations on the regulations localities can impose on silvicultural activity conducted on property such as the Dails. [3] The limitations placed on the localities are that the ordinances (1) may not prohibit or unreasonably limit such silvicultural activity, (2) may not impose a permit or fee requirement to engage in such activity, (3) must be reasonable and necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the localities' residents, and (4) may not conflict with the purposes of promoting the growth, continuation and beneficial use of the Commonwealth's privately owned forest resources. Code § 10.1-1126.1(B). The Dails assert that a number of the provisions in the Forestry, EMA, and WMP Ordinances are invalid because they are preempted by state law or are inconsistent with state law. Specifically, the Dails assert that the requirement imposed by the Forestry Ordinance that the zoning administrator approve a forest management plan before engaging in silvicultural activities and the provisions in the EMA Ordinance regarding clear cutting of timber are preempted and invalid because they directly contravene Code § 10.1-1126.1(B). The Dails also contend that even if the provisions regarding clear cutting are not preempted, they, along with other provisions of the Ordinances regarding buffer zones, nevertheless are invalid because they violate state law established for the regulation of forestry and the protection of water quality in the Commonwealth.
The Dails assert that the requirement in the Forestry Ordinance that a forest management plan be approved by the zoning administrator is in effect a permit requirement and, therefore, conflicts with the provision of Code § 10.1-1126.1(B) prohibiting localities from imposing permits. We disagree with the Dails' interpretation of the statute because it is not supported by the language in the statute and it relegates the submission and review process allowed by the statute to one of mere notice filing. Code § 10.1-1126.1(B) authorizes a county zoning administrator to review proposed silvicultural activity to determine whether it complies with applicable local zoning requirements. Allowing proposed activity to be reviewed for compliance implies that the review process encompasses more than simply a review of a proposed plan of activity. The statutory review process includes a component of evaluation and decision regarding compliance. Describing this decision as an approval in the Forestry Ordinance is consistent with authorizing the zoning administrator to make such a determination regarding compliance, and does not create a permit requirement. The Dails further argue that the compliance review is limited to determining whether the forestry plan complies with other zoning ordinances relating to non-silvicultural activities, such as noise abatement ordinances. However, there is nothing in the statute that suggests such a limited interpretation, and nothing in the statute suggests that the County cannot enact ordinances affecting silvicultural activity. Therefore, we conclude that the provisions of the Forestry Ordinance requiring submission and approval of a forest management plan by the zoning administrator do not impose a permit requirement for silvicultural activities and therefore do not contravene, and are not preempted, by Code § 10.1-1126.1(B).
The Dails next turn to the aspects of Code § 10.1-1126.1(B) which forbid the enactment of local ordinances that prohibit silvicultural activity. The Dails maintain that a portion of the EMA Ordinance, § 24.1-372(e)(5), prohibits clear cutting of timber and, therefore, is invalid. However, reading the provision challenged by the Dails in its entirety shows that it is not an absolute prohibition on clear cutting of timber in areas subject to the EMA Ordinance. The portion of the EMA Ordinance challenged by the Dails states that, in those areas subject to the Ordinance: Clear cutting of trees shall not be permitted. However, the zoning administrator may permit selected thinning based upon best management practices and in accordance with an approved plan. § 24.1-372(e)(5), York County Code. We do not interpret this language as prohibiting silvicultural activity. This provision is a limitation on clear cutting, which can be altered by the zoning administrator. Therefore, this provision does not contravene, and is not preempted by, Code § 10.1-1126.1(B). [4]
Finally, relying on Code §§ 1-13.17, 15.2-1200, and 15.2-2283, the Dails contend that, even if the provision regarding clear cutting is not preempted, it, along with other provisions establishing buffer zones, are invalid because they conflict with, or are inconsistent with, state law. The Dails assert that the statutory scheme for regulating silvicultural activity includes delegating to the State Forester the development of best management practices, Code § 10.1-1105, and placing the sole authority to enforce and implement the laws pertaining to forest and woodlands in the State Forester, Code §§ 10.1-1181.2 and 10.1-1181.3. Citing Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 357 S.E.2d 200 (1987), the Dails conclude that the provisions of the Ordinances establishing buffer requirements are invalid because they address these matters of silviculture activity in a manner that conflicts with the provisions of the best management practices promulgated by the State Forester. This conflict, however, does not render the Ordinance provisions void. A local ordinance may be invalid because it conflicts with a state regulation if the state regulation has the force and effect of law. Loudoun County v. Pumphrey, 221 Va. 205, 206-07, 269 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (1980). The Dails' argument fails because the best management practices promulgated by the State Forester do not have the force and effect of law. The best management practices are only guidelines for use in forestry activities. Moreover, the State Forester's enforcement authority extends to the issuance of special orders for silvicultural activity which is causing or is likely to cause pollution or an alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of any state waters resulting from sediment deposition presenting an imminent and substantial danger to the public health, water supply, or other endeavors such as recreation or commerce. Code § 10.1-1181.2(B), (C). The State Forester cannot issue special orders solely for the violation of a best management practice. [5] Therefore, the provisions of the Ordinances establishing buffer zones are not invalid based on a conflict with the buffer zones suggested by the best management practices because the best management practices do not have the force and effect of law. The Dails make a similar argument regarding the validity of provisions of the Ordinances which regulate silvicultural activity for the purposes of maintaining water quality. The Dails say that the State Water Control Board is the sole agency authorized to administer the state's water control law and to establish standards for protection of state waters. The Dails argue that the State Water Control Board has recognized the best management practices for non-point pollutant sources such as forestry as practices to be the most effective, practicable means of preventing or reducing the amount of non-point source pollutants entering a water course. 9 VAC XX-XXX-XXX. These practices, therefore, according to the Dails, are standards promulgated as part of an overall scheme designed to regulate and foster the State's forestry industry and to the extent the Forestry, EMA, and WMP Ordinances exceed these standards, they are invalid. As we have just said, the best management practices are merely guidelines and do not have the force of state law. State Water Control Board recognition of these guidelines as preferred methods for maintaining clean water does not transform them into enforceable regulations. Therefore, provisions in the challenged Ordinances which conflict with the best management practices are not invalid on the basis that they conflict with state law governing water quality. Finally, we note that in their reply brief, the Dails argue that the limitations placed on a locality's general police powers and zoning authority by Code § 10.1-1126.1(B) reflect an intent by the General Assembly to change the status quo,  and to impose the burden upon localities if they enact requirements that exceed the best management practices to show that the State regulations are inadequate to protect the health, safety and welfare of their citizens and that local regulation is necessary to meet identified shortcomings in the State program. We reject this invitation to abandon the presumption of validity afforded a local government ordinance and to adopt the burden shifting scheme proposed by the Dails. We find the suggestion particularly inappropriate in this case because the Ordinances at issue address conditions contained in guidelines, not in state statutes or regulations, and because many of the challenged requirements of those Ordinances may be altered by the zoning administrator. Furthermore, to the extent that this argument addresses the requirement of Code § 10.1-1126.1(B) that a locality's ordinance regulating silvicultural activity be reasonable and necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the locality's residents, we will not consider the argument because the Dails did not assign error to the trial court's conclusion that the ordinances are reasonable and necessary, and serve to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public. For the above reasons, we will reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment concluding that the Dails were required to exhaust their administrative remedies, and affirm that portion of the judgment concluding that the challenged provisions of the York County zoning ordinance are valid. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and final judgment.