Opinion ID: 1694953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err when it refused the proposed defense jury instructions d-5, d-6, d-9, d-10, d-11(a)?

Text: ¶ 19. Woodham asserts that the trial court erred in refusing defense proffered jury instructions regarding insanity and manslaughter. Insanity, Woodham's defense theory, was submitted to the jury in instructions S-10 [3] (the verdict form for finding not guilty by reason of insanity), D-12(A) [4] (defining insanity), and C-3 [5] (instructing the jury on the State's burden). [6] Woodham, however, challenges the court's refusal of Jury Instruction D-11A, which reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that if you find from the evidence in this case that the State of Mississippi has proved each of the essential elements of the crime of murder or manslaughter, beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must next discuss among yourselves whether or not the State of Mississippi has proved the sanity of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Before you are allowed to return a verdict of guilty you must be satisfied that the State of Mississippi has proved the following beyond a reasonable doubt: That Luke Woodham, at the time of committing the act for which he is accused (if indeed you find that he committed said act) was laboring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as (1) not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or (2) if he did know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. If after considering all of the evidence in this case you find that the State of Mississippi has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the sanity of Luke Woodham, then your verdict must be not guilty by reason of insanity. [sic] ¶ 20. As the State points out, this instruction is confusing, contradictory and misleading. It requires in one breath (the 3rd paragraph) that the State prove Woodham's insanity beyond a reasonable doubt and in the next breath (the 4th and final paragraph as well as the 1st paragraph) that the State prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Apparently, the word not should have been supplied between the words was and laboring in the third paragraph of D-11A. ¶ 21. Despite Woodham's arguments that D-11A should have been granted, the record reflects that the Court did instruct the jury on the defense's theory of insanity in D-10 (the verdict form for finding not guilty be reason of insanity) 12(A), (defining insanity), and C-3 (D-13) (instructing the jury on the State's burden). Accordingly Woodham was able to argue the theory of insanity to the jury. This Court has repeatedly stated that when considering a challenge to a jury instruction on appeal, we do not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, we read them as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed. Burton ex rel. Bradford v. Barnett, 615 So.2d 580, 583 (Miss.1993). [I]n determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. When so read, if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss. 1997) (quoting Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918 (Miss.1997)). In other words, if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results. There was no error here. ¶ 22. Woodham further asserts that he was entitled to have the jury instructed on manslaughter. In Mississippi, manslaughter and murder are distinguished by the element of malice aforethought or deliberate design. Agnew v. State, 783 So.2d 699, 703 (Miss.2001). He contends that there was enough evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether he had the mental capacity required to develop deliberate design. Instructions D-56 and D-6 [7] dealt with manslaughter, and 9 and D-10 were verdict forms that included manslaughter. ¶ 23. A defendant is entitled to present his theory of the case to the jury if it is supported by the evidence and contains a correct statement of the law. As such, he is entitled to have the jury instructed as to this theory. This Court has repeatedly stated that: [a] lesser-included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge and ultimately this Court can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused and considering all the reasonable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant, guilty of a lesser-included offense (conversely, not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge). Greenlee v. State, 725 So.2d 816, 823 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Harper v. State, 478 So.2d 1017, 1021 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 24. In fact, our case law favors lesser-included offense instructions being given to the jury. Agnew, 783 So.2d at 703. In Agnew, we noted that the jury should be given the option of a lesser-included offense where there is any evidentiary basis [for it]. Id. (citing Russell v. State, 729 So.2d 781, 787 (Miss.1997)). Despite this fact, such an instruction should not be given automatically. Id. (citing Mease v. State, 539 So.2d 1324, 1329 (Miss.1989)). A lesser-included offense instruction should only be given after the trial court has carefully considered the evidence and is of the opinion that such an instruction is justified by the evidence. Id. (quoting Mease, 539 So.2d at 1329); See also Greenlee, 725 So.2d at 823 (The evidence must warrant an instruction on the lesser-included offense before it can be granted.). ¶ 25. This Court has noted that [j]ury instructions should be given only if they are applicable to the facts developed in the case being tried. Walker v. State, 740 So.2d 873, 888 (Miss.1999) (quoting Lancaster v. State, 472 So.2d 363, 365 (Miss.1985)). Further, [t]o grant an instruction that is not supported by the evidence would be error. Id. Generally, [a] defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case, however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Humphrey v. State, 759 So.2d 368, 380 (Miss.2000) (quoting Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 842 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 26. Woodham finds the evidentiary basis for a manslaughter instruction in his own testimony and that of Dr. Mick Jepsen, expert witness for the defense. To the contrary, close scrutiny of the record reveals that when considering all of the evidence below, including the testimony of these two witnesses, murder with malice aforethought and not guilty by reason of insanity were the only viable theories supported by the evidence. During the opening and closing statements, not guilty by reason of insanity was absolutely the only theory suggested by defense counsel. As Woodham's counsel stated in his opening, You're going to hear from a Dr. Mick Jepsen. You're going to hear that Luke Woodham was suffering from a mental disease and he didn't appreciate the nature and quality of his acts. As this was the only defense that was arguably supported by the evidence, the trial court was under no obligation to instruct as to other possible theories. See Tran v. State, 681 So.2d 514, 520 (Miss.1996) (Finding that in a prosecution for murder [w]here the only theory of defense was self-defense and the jury was properly instructed thereon, there was no requirement that the court instruct as to other possible theories.) (citing Smith v. State, 572 So.2d 847, 849 (Miss.1990)). ¶ 27. Woodham focuses on his own testimony, particularly his statements regarding closing his eyes and later opening them to find his mother dead, to find evidence supporting manslaughter. However, there was testimony below that he told a friend that he planned to kill his mother the day before the murder. In a written statement for the police after his arrest, Woodham wrote: I woke up this morning, got a butcher knife and a pillow. I got into my mother's room at about 5:00 a.m. I put the pillow over her head and stabbed her. He stated in his videotaped confession that he killed his mother in order to get the car and gun. Further, there was testimony that Woodham brutally used both an aluminum bat and a knife on his mother, and that the actual events of that day began in the kitchen hallway and ended in the master bedroom. The record reveals that Woodham never offered any mitigating evidence that would justify a manslaughter instruction. Here, an imperfect insanity defense is the only thing arguably supported by the evidence below. There was no evidence presented that would support a verdict of manslaughter. ¶ 28. There was no evidentiary basis in the record to permit a jury to rationally find Woodham guilty of manslaughter. Thus, the trial court judge correctly denied the request for an instruction on manslaughter.