Opinion ID: 3173497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dow’s Cross-Appeal

Text: In its cross-appeal, Dow challenges the district court’s conclusion that the claims of the ’956 patent are not invalid for indefiniteness. Specifically, Dow contests two limitations. First, Dow argues that “viscosity below 10 Pa.s” renders claims 1–8 indefinite because it fails to recite the temperature at which the viscosity measurement is to be taken. Second, Dow argues that “carried out at a temperature of from 5 to 150° C. above the melting point of the polymer” renders claims 2–6 indefinite because it fails to specify which steps in the claimed process occur at those elevated temperatures. Indefiniteness is a question of law that we review de novo, Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014), subject to a determination of underlying facts. A patent claim is invalid for indefiniteness if its language, when read in light of the specification and prosecution history, “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. ____, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014). Patents are presumed to be valid, and the challenger bears the burden of establishing invalidity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 n.10. We first address the “viscosity below 10 Pa.s” limitation. The district court’s determination that one of skill in the art would measure viscosity at room temperature in 3 As we agree with the reasoning relied on by the district court in affirming the grant of summary judgment of no infringement, we find it unnecessary to consider Dow’s alternative grounds for affirmance. 16 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY the absence of a specified temperature was based on extrinsic evidence. Because we see no clear error in that fact finding here, and it does not conflict with the intrinsic record, we affirm. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The district court considered, inter alia, two pieces of extrinsic evidence: Dr. Mount’s declaration, J.A. 482–83, and the ASTM protocol, J.A. 542–49. Dr. Mount’s declaration, in part, recites: “[t]he standard practice in analytical chemistry dictates that if a temperature is not specified for a given measurement, room temperature is implied.” J.A. 482 ¶ 18. The ASTM protocol, on the other hand, relays a “test method [for] the determination of the apparent viscosity of hot melt adhesives . . . at temperatures up to 175° C.” J.A. 542. The method then requires “report[ing] the apparent viscosity at a given temperature along with the particulars . . . .” J.A. 543. The district court did not clearly err in crediting Dr. Mount’s declaration over the ASTM protocol. The ASTM protocol does indicate that viscosity varies with temperature. But the described method only discusses “hot melt adhesives” above 175° C, which is inapposite to the claimed product that has been cooled to below 100° C, aims to find different viscosities over a range of temperatures, and fails to indicate what a skilled artisan would understand. Accordingly, the court correctly discounted the ASTM protocol to find that one of skill would understand that room temperature is implied for a viscosity measurement with no specified temperature. As the court then noted, Dow “fail[ed] to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a person skilled in the art would not know with reasonable certainty at what temperature to measure viscosity.” Decision at 11. AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY 17 Moreover, although the district court did not expressly rely on the intrinsic record, we conclude that the intrinsic record only further supports the court’s determination. Granted, neither the claim language nor the specification indicates a temperature for the final viscosity measurement. But room temperature is the only temperature mentioned at all in the ’956 patent in connection with a viscosity measurement. ’956 patent col. 3 l. 23. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s conclusion that the expression “viscosity below 10 Pa.s” does not render claims 1–8 indefinite, as well as its construction of that limitation as “viscosity below 10 Pa.s at room temperature.” We next address the “carried out . . . of the polymer” limitation. 4 The process recited in claim 2 is “a process according to Claim 1.” Id. col. 8 ll. 5–8. Claim 1 recites a process “for producing a dispersion in an aqueous medium in which the polymer is dispersed in an aqueous medium in an extruder at a temperature above 100° C.” Id. col. 7 ll. 9–11. The specification then teaches that the dispersing step necessarily takes place before the dispersion exits the extruder; it is during that dispersing step when the temperature exceeds the melting point of the polymer. Indeed, the specification describes a typical process where the polymer “is melted in the initial melt zone of the extruder at a temperature above the melting point of the polymer, preferably from 5 to 150° C, typically 10 to 130° C, above the melting point.” Id. col. 2 ll. 36–41. Thus, as the district court found, “the specification supports a construction which indicates that the limitation in claim 2 refers to the elevated temperature phases and not to the stages that follow.” Decision at 14. 4 Claims 2–6 all contain the same “carried out . . . of the polymer” limitation and are thus subject to the same analysis. 18 AKZO NOBEL COATINGS, INC. v. DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY Further, in concluding that claims 2–6 were not indefinite, the district court stated that “Dow has provided no evidence to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not know with reasonable certainty the steps to which the limitation in claim 2 applies.” Decision at 14. Absent any evidence contrary to the clear meaning of the intrinsic record, the court did not err in finding that one of skill in the art would understand which steps the elevated temperature range applied to. See id. Dow suggests that, in affirming the district court’s construction, we run afoul of the principle that courts may not redraft claims to sustain their validity. Appellee’s Br. 67–68 (discussing Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Dow’s reliance on Chef America, however, is misplaced. In affirming the district court’s construction, we are not redrafting the claims, but rather construing the claims to require the heightened temperature range to apply to the elevated temperature phases in accordance with the specification. Eidos Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Determining how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the limitation, however, is different from rewriting the limitation.”); Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that “carried out . . . of the polymer” does not render claims 2–6 indefinite, as well as its construction of that limitation as “[t]he elevated temperature phases of claim 1 are carried out at a temperature of from 5 to 150° C above the melting point of the polymer.”