Opinion ID: 764135
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miller was Pettis' friend and manager.

Text: 47 (ii) Prior to his decision to terminate Clover, Miller knew Pettis had been investigated about something, but did not know the details. 48 (iii) Miller spoke with Hollingsworth, at some point after Clover participated in the investigation on March 23 but before Miller informed Clover she was being terminated March 24. 49 Clover argues that a jury could infer Miller knew that Pettis was being investigated for sexual harassment from the fact he was Pettis' friend and manager and Miller's admission that he knew Pettis had been investigated about something. Clover further argues that given the timing of Miller's conversation with Hollingsworth--i.e., shortly after Clover met with Hollingsworth as part of the investigation and shortly before Miller decided to terminate Clover--a reasonable jury could infer that Hollingsworth told Miller that Clover had participated in the investigation of Pettis. Thus, Clover contends she presented sufficient evidence to establish Miller's awareness of her protected conduct. 50 Clover cites our decision in Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155 (11th Cir.1993), to support her argument. In that case, Goldsmith, a black employee of the City of Atmore, sought to prove that she had been transferred by the mayor in retaliation for engaging in conduct protected under Title VII. Goldsmith had applied for a position as city clerk. After learning the position would be filled by a white female, Goldsmith informed one of the city council members that she was going to file an EEOC complaint. The next morning the council member met with the city's mayor. After the meeting, the mayor met with Goldsmith and told her the clerk position she sought was filled and there was nothing [Goldsmith] could do about it. Id. at 1157. Three weeks later the mayor told Goldsmith to clean out her desk, because she had been transferred to the city library. See id. 51 A key issue at trial and on appeal was whether Goldsmith had presented sufficient evidence to establish that the mayor was aware of her protected activity--i.e., her complaints to the council member and threat to file an EEOC complaint. At trial, the mayor denied talking about Goldsmith during his meeting with the councilman but was impeached by his deposition testimony stating that he may have discussed Goldsmith's complaints during their meeting. See id. at 1163 & n. 12. We held that those facts were sufficient for a jury to find that the mayor was aware of the employee's protected activity for purposes of satisfying the causal link requirement of Goldsmith's retaliation claim. See id. According to Clover, the evidence she presented was sufficient, under Goldsmith, for a reasonable jury to find that Miller was in fact aware of her protected conduct. We disagree. 52 Although Clover's evidence raises the inference that Miller was aware, in some fashion, that TSYS was investigating Pettis, that evidence is insufficient for any reasonable jury to find that Miller was aware of Clover's participation in that investigation when he decided to terminate her. The evidence that Miller and Hollingsworth spoke in the time period between Clover's participation in the investigation and Miller's decision to terminate her shows, at most, that Hollingsworth could conceivably have told Miller about Clover's participation. But because could have told is not the same as did tell, it would be pure speculation to infer that Hollingsworth actually told Miller about Clover's participation. The fact that the vice-president who heads a corporate division and the vice-president in charge of Human Resources talk regularly is not surprising, nor is it enough to support a reasonable inference that they discussed a specific topic, much less an inference concerning what they said about it. A jury finding that Miller was aware of Clover's protected conduct must be supported by reasonable inferences from the evidence, not mere speculation. 53 Goldsmith is not to the contrary. In that case, plaintiff Goldsmith had evidence to impeach the mayor's denial that he had discussed her protected conduct with the councilman. In contrast, Clover offered no evidence to impeach Miller's unequivocal denial that he had any knowledge of Clover's participation in the Pettis investigation or that he had ever discussed the subject with Hollingsworth. Nor did Clover even ask Hollingsworth during the trial if she had told Miller about Clover's participation in the investigation. Clover did not introduce any evidence that it would have been Hollingsworth's standard practice to inform Miller his subordinates were involved in investigations conducted by Human Resources. Accordingly, we conclude that Clover failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Miller was aware of her protected conduct. 4 54 With regard to her second theory of causation, Clover relies primarily on two pieces of evidence to support her position that Hollingsworth was a decision-maker. We find neither persuasive. First, she points to Hollingsworth's testimony that it was the general practice of the Human Resources Department, of which Hollingsworth was Assistant Vice-President, to review and evaluate termination decisions at TSYS. Clover argues that Hollingsworth's role in reviewing and evaluating termination decisions was enough for a reasonable jury to infer that she was a decision-maker in TSYS' termination of Clover. The problem with that argument, however, is that Hollingsworth did not testify that she actually had the authority to overrule the decision of Miller, a senior vice-president, to terminate Clover. Nor did Clover present any evidence showing Hollingsworth had such authority. Furthermore, the undisputed testimony of both Hollingsworth and Miller was that Hollingsworth made no recommendation at all to Miller concerning whether he should terminate her. There is no evidence to contradict that unequivocal testimony. 55 Second, Clover points to her testimony that Miller told her that he would revoke his decision to terminate her if she could work out her differences with Hollingsworth concerning the scheduled time of Clover's March 23 meeting with the Human Resources. According to Clover, she did work out those differences, and Hollingsworth promised to tell Miller. Although Clover argues that this made Hollingsworth a decision-maker in her termination, we cannot agree. At most, the evidence shows Hollingsworth supplied Miller with information (apparently favorable to Clover) which he may or may not have considered in making his decision to terminate Clover. It does not show that Hollingsworth made the decision. To the contrary, Clover's own testimony was that when Hollingsworth called her on March 27, 1995, Hollingsworth told her that it was Miller who had decided to terminate her for falsifying information. Accordingly, we conclude that Clover failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that Hollingsworth was a decision-maker in her termination. 5 56 In sum, because Clover failed to present sufficient evidence either that (1) Miller was aware of her protected conduct or (2) anyone other than Miller was a decision-maker, we conclude she did not present sufficient evidence to permit a jury to reasonably find the requisite causal connection between her protected activity and her termination. Because Clover was required to establish that causal connection in order to prevail on her retaliation claim, the district court erred in denying TSYS' motion for judgment as a matter of law.