Opinion ID: 196286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sec. 1983 Claims

Text: 10 We first address appellants' argument that the preliminary injunction should issue because the district court abused its discretion and legally erred. We are not prepared to say that appellants were entitled to a preliminary injunction on the basis of the record. In particular, we note that the record does not support a finding of irreparable harm. First, appellants failed to submit job descriptions so that the district court could determine the magnitude of the harm they claim to have suffered from their transfers to new jobs at the same pay. Second, appellants waited to file their complaint until July 6, 1993, more than three months after the transfers took effect, thereby undercutting the claimed irreparable nature of their injury. The district court determined that plaintiffs' injury was not irreparable, in part, because plaintiffs did not show that their new jobs were unreasonably inferior to the old jobs. 11 Furthermore, the district court noted how the absence of evidence on the job descriptions in particular made difficult the determination of the issues relating to the appellants' claim for a preliminary injunction. It said: [t]he absence in the record of detailed job descriptions hampers our ability to explore the details of the [appellants'] duties, 852 F.Supp. at 109; the question remains whether the contract analyst position as newly reconstituted is a career position[;][a]gain, neither party has addressed this issue, id. at 110 (emphasis omitted); the proper inquiry is whether the position in question places an employee intrinsically, not incidentally, in a confidential position[;] ... [the court was not provided with] job descriptions detailing [appellants'] duties and responsibilities to allow [it] to determine if they involved partisan political concerns so that political affiliation would be an appropriate job requirement, id. at 111. 12 Section 1983 actions concerning transfers of public employees on the basis of their political affiliations are especially dependent on detailed factual determinations concerning claimants' job responsibilities. See, e.g., M e ndez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1260-62 (1st Cir.1987); Collazo Rivera v. Torres Gaztambide, 812 F.2d 258, 261-62 (1st Cir.1987); Jim enez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 243-44 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987). Appellants assert that producing detailed job descriptions is appellees' burden; appellees assert it is appellants' burden. We need not decide this issue in the aftermath of Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), given our disposition of this matter. 13 Appellants' other argument is that the district court should have afforded them an evidentiary hearing before making its determination. We do not reach this issue because we believe that the interests of justice do not justify remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing. The papers supporting and opposing the preliminary injunction had been filed by October 22, 1993, the district court issued its order on May 16, 1994, and fifteen months have passed in the interim. Because the judge ordered expedited discovery, such discovery should have taken place by now and the matter should be at or near trial on the merits. 14 If a trial or other final disposition is indeed in prospect, diverting efforts to a new preliminary proceeding could disserve the interests of both sides in an expeditious resolution and could needlessly waste judicial resources. In these circumstances, we think that the district court may reasonably insist that the parties proceed promptly to trial instead of revisiting the preliminary injunction.