Opinion ID: 2792828
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner’s Miranda Claim

Text: Petitioner contends that, when he asked one of the officers who arrested him if he could talk to his attorney, he invoked his Miranda right to have counsel present during any subsequent questioning. The recorded interview reflects that Petitioner advised Moore of his previous request for an attorney. Rather than concluding the interview, Moore sought a Miranda waiver and resumed his questioning. Petitioner argues that Moore thereby violated Miranda and the Supreme Court’s subsequent admonition that an accused who invokes his right to have counsel present during questioning “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). According to Petitioner, the Florida appellate court’s adverse ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. We disagree. 1. The state court properly identified the governing legal principles. The Florida appellate court’s decision clearly was not “contrary to” federal law. Beginning with Miranda itself, the Florida court cited and accurately 7 Case: 13-14521 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 8 of 12 described the holdings of the most relevant Supreme Court cases. Pardon, 930 So. 2d at 701-703. The Florida court noted that Miranda “require[s] the police to unequivocally honor an arrestee’s request not to speak to the police without counsel.” Id. at 702. Quoting extensively from Edwards, the court further recognized that an accused, “having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85). This is a correct statement of the legal principles that govern Petitioner’s claim. 2. The state court’s decision was not an “unreasonable application” of the above authorities. Although the Florida court acknowledged that the police must scrupulously comply with the Miranda-Edwards rule, it held that the rule was not implicated here because Petitioner was not subject to interrogation or imminent interrogation when he inquired about an attorney. Id. In support of its holding, the court cited Supreme Court authority indicating that (1) Miranda safeguards only apply when a defendant is subject to “custodial interrogation” and (2) “custodial interrogation” must involve something more than merely being in custody. Id. (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (“the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, 8 Case: 13-14521 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 9 of 12 but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation”). Specifically, the Supreme Court has explained that “interrogation” in the Miranda context refers either to “express questioning” or other “words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)” that are likely to elicit an incriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. Based on the evidence presented, the Florida court concluded that although Petitioner was in custody, he was not subject to questioning or other “words or actions” likely to elicit incriminating information when he inquired about an attorney. Pardon, 930 So. 2d at 702. Furthermore, the Florida court rejected the idea that Petitioner could have “anticipatorily invoked” his Miranda right to counsel before interrogation was imminent. Id. According to the court, “requiring the invocation [of the right to counsel] to occur either during custodial interrogation or when it is imminent strikes [the healthiest] balance between the protection of the individual from police coercion on the one hand and the State’s need to conduct criminal investigations on the other.” Id. (quoting Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674, 686 (Fla. 2003)) (quotation marks omitted). Petitioner conceded that he was fully apprised of his Miranda rights and that he did not invoke, and in fact repeatedly disavowed, his right to counsel just prior to his interview with Moore, when his interrogation did become imminent. Id. at 701. The Florida court thus held that Petitioner’s interview did 9 Case: 13-14521 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 10 of 12 not violate the Miranda-Edwards rule, and that the interview was properly admitted into evidence. Id. at 702-04. The Florida court’s decision was not unreasonable. Supreme Court authority supports its conclusion that the Miranda-Edwards safeguards only apply when a defendant is undergoing or imminently subject to interrogation and not when the defendant is merely in custody. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 (“‘Interrogation,’ as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.”) and McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991) (noting that the Miranda-Edwards guarantee “relates only to custodial interrogation”). The evidence in this case suggests that although Petitioner was in custody when he inquired about an attorney, he was not undergoing or imminently subject to “interrogation.” See Pardon, 930 So. 2d at 701. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never held that a defendant can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n. 3. See also Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 29 (2011) (quoting McNeil for the proposition that “this Court has never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than ‘custodial interrogation’”) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Florida court’s holding that Petitioner’s interrogation did not violate the Miranda-Edwards rule was a reasonable application of the governing Supreme Court precedents. 10 Case: 13-14521 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 11 of 12 3. The state court’s decision was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence in the record. Finally, Petitioner’s argument that the Florida court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts consists of little more than a conclusory assertion. Petitioner does not support the assertion with any more detailed argument or even identify the factual determinations that he claims to be unreasonable. Based on his arguments below, we assume Petitioner’s position to be that the Florida court unreasonably determined that interrogation was not “imminent” when Petitioner asked about an attorney. Petitioner argued in the district court that there were no facts in the record to support this conclusion. Again, we disagree. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence in the record to support the Florida court’s finding. Petitioner acknowledged during the interview that “there was no questioning going on” when he inquired about an attorney. There is no evidence that Petitioner, at the time of the inquiry, was otherwise subjected to any “words or actions on the part of the police” that were likely to elicit incriminating information. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. About three hours after the inquiry, and just prior to his interview, Petitioner equivocated when asked whether he had previously invoked his right to an attorney, stating “Yeah, I did that. No, I’m going to put no.” He then clarified that he had no desire to talk to an attorney, and wanted to waive his Miranda right to have an attorney present during questioning. 11 Case: 13-14521 Date Filed: 04/10/2015 Page: 12 of 12 Based on this evidence, the Florida appellate court’s factual finding was not unreasonable.