Opinion ID: 1389408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: libel per se

Text: 2. At common law, libel was a strict liability tort that did not require proof of falsity, fault, or actual damages. [3] Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [4] the law of defamation has undergone substantial changes. [5] The Restatement now lists four elements in a cause of action for defamation: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault by the defendant amounting at least to negligence; and (4) special harm or the actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm. [6] When, as here, a libel action involves a speech of public concern, a plaintiff must show that the defendant published a defamatory statement about the plaintiff, [7] the defamatory statement was false, [8] the defendant was at fault in publishing it, [9] and the plaintiff suffered actual injury from the statements. [10] The first issue in this case concerns whether the trial court and court of appeals adopted the proper standard of liability for the element of fault. If Cannon is a private figure, as both courts held, then a negligence standard applies. [11] If he is a public figure, as the defendant contends, then the more stringent standard from the New York Times case applies. [12]