Opinion ID: 1602788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: This Court is duty bound to take cognizance of its own jurisdiction or lack thereof. Although David and Donna May filed a claim against both VFW and Triplett, this appeal arose subsequent to the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of only one of the defendants, VFW. Accordingly, this appeal is governed by Miss.R. Civ.P. 54(b) which states: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment. Miss.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (emphasis added). The purpose of Rule 54(b) is to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units. Id. at 10. Additionally, the rule allows judges to efficiently and fairly resolve separable claims before protracted litigation is finally resolved. Cox v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 512 So.2d 897, 900 (Miss. 1987). Here, following entry of an order granting summary judgment, plaintiffs made an attempt at compliance with the Rule. They filed a motion for entry of an amended order to include the sentence: This order is a final judgment as provided by Miss.R. Civ.P. 54. After entry of the amended order, plaintiffs moved for a continuance. As grounds for the relief sought, plaintiffs stated that Triplett was impecunious and that it would be unfair to require them to incur the expense of trial before determining whether they had a claim against a defendant with the ability to pay. The motion was granted. The wording of the amended order falls far short of what is required as can be readily seen from our discussion of the issue in Cox, supra, 512 So.2d at 899-900. The Court must determine that there is no just reason for delay and so state. Moreover, [w]hile we will not require a trial court to set forth specific reasons and findings prefatory to entering a Rule 54(b) judgment, we will look with disfavor on such judgment. Indeed, unless the reason the judgment was granted is clear from the record, we will not search for a justification, but will vacate the appeal. Cox, supra, 512 So.2d at 901. We will entertain this appeal only because the record is clear that Triplett, the remaining defendant, is alleged to be impecunious and we assume that by responding favorably to plaintiff's motion for continuance, the trial court so found. To require a trial on the separate claim against Triplett before an appeal is heard on the present issue does not serve the interests of justice and fails to use efficiently our judicial resources. We will, therefore, treat the trial court's entry of the amended order as a determination that there is no just reason for delay. See, First United Bank v. Philmont Corp., 533 So.2d 449, 453 (Miss. 1988).