Opinion ID: 1155848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the multiple sentence enhancements

Text: After the jury found Odoms guilty of burglary and attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon, Odoms was adjudged an habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010. [2] Pursuant to NRS 207.010(2) the district court imposed the enhanced penalty of a life sentence without possibility of parole for each of the primary offenses with the two sentences to run consecutively. Pursuant to NRS 193.165 [3] the district court imposed an enhancement of a third life sentence without possibility of parole for Odoms' use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the attempted murder. On appeal Odoms challenges the three multiple sentence enhancements. Odoms argues that the maximum penalty he could have received under both NRS 207.010 and NRS 193.165 was one life sentence without possibility of parole. Odoms contends that the district court erred by imposing three multiple consecutive life sentences because the convictions arose out of the same act, transaction or occurrence and under NRS 207.010 must therefore be treated as one conviction for sentence enhancement purposes. The purpose behind habitual criminal statutes is to increase sanctions for the recidivist. Lisby v. State, 82 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966). By enacting the habitual criminal statute, the legislature sought to discourage repeat offenders. Rezin v. State, 95 Nev. 461, 596 P.2d 226 (1979). The statute allows an enlarged punishment for one who cannot be rehabilitated, and, who as a recidivist, repeatedly violates the law. Howard v. State, 83 Nev. 53, 422 P.2d 548 (1967). As we opined in Howard, society has the right to remove from its ranks for a longer time those who refuse to conform to a lawful mode of living. Id. Odoms was convicted of two distinct primary offenses: (1) attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon and (2) burglary. Enhancement of the penalty for each primary offense is applicable to each felony conviction. See Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333 (Wyo. 1983); Wingo v. Ringo, 408 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 946, 87 S.Ct. 983, 17 L.Ed.2d 876 (1967); cf. Crew v. State, 100 Nev. 38, 675 P.2d 986 (1984) (enhancement of penalty of each count pursuant to enhancement statute NRS 193.165 is proper when each count requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not); Koza v. State, 100 Nev. 245, 681 P.2d 44 (1984) (consecutive enhanced penalties proper where separate and distinct statutes and offenses are involved). We conclude that under NRS 207.010 the district court properly enhanced Odoms' sentence under the habitual criminal statute for the two primary offenses. After the district court enhanced the sentences for the burglary and attempted murder convictions pursuant to NRS 207.010, the judge then imposed an additional enhanced sentence under NRS 193.165(1) for Odoms' use of a deadly weapon in the commission of the attempted murder. We conclude that the district court erred by doing so. NRS 193.165 demonstrates generally the legislature's concern regarding the increased use of deadly weapons in the commission of crimes and its belief that such proscription will serve to deter persons from using weapons during the perpetration of certain crimes. Anderson v. State, 95 Nev. 625, 600 P.2d 241 (1979). The use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a crime does not constitute a separate substantive offense under NRS 193.165 and does not subject a defendant to a separate penalty; instead, NRS 193.165 serves only to enhance the penalty imposed for the primary offense. NRS 193.165(2); Biffath v. Warden, 95 Nev. 260, 593 P.2d 51 (1979); Woofter v. O'Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 542 P.2d 1396. In Carter v. State, 98 Nev. 331, 647 P.2d 374 (1982), we considered the sentencing of a defendant under the enhancement statutes NRS 193.165 and NRS 193.167. Carter at p. 331, 647 P.2d 374. The district court imposed consecutive sentences for multiple enhancements under those statutes. Id. We found the legislative intent ambiguous as to whether a single substantive offense was subject to more than one consecutive enhancement penalty. Id. We held that the sentencing court may not impose consecutive enhancement penalties under NRS 193.165 and NRS 193.167. Carter at p. 335, 647 P.2d 374. We conclude in the instant case that as the habitual criminal statute does not constitute a substantive offense, a sentence imposed pursuant to that statute cannot be further enhanced pursuant to NRS 193.165. We hold that when a defendant is convicted of a principal crime with the use of a deadly weapon and is adjudged an habitual criminal, the sentencing court may either enhance the sentence for the primary offense pursuant to NRS 193.165 for the use of a deadly weapon, or, alternatively, the court may enhance the sentence under the habitual criminal statute. A district court may not enhance a primary offense under both NRS 193.165 and NRS 207.010. In the present case the district court chose to sentence Odoms pursuant to the habitual criminal statute. The court therefore was not then permitted to also sentence Odoms pursuant to NRS 193.165. We therefore vacate the life sentence without possibility of parole imposed pursuant to NRS 193.165. We have considered Odoms' remaining contentions and conclude that they are meritless. Accordingly, we affirm Odoms' convictions. We also affirm the two consecutive life sentences without possibility of parole imposed pursuant to NRS 207.010, but we vacate the life sentence without possibility of parole imposed pursuant to NRS 193.165.