Opinion ID: 612988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixth Amendment Speedy-Trial Claim

Text: The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to a speedy and public trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Apart from her Speedy Trial Act argument, O'Connor contends that the 1,229-day pretrial delay violated her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Because O'Connor did not make this argument below, our review is for plain error. United States v. Gearhart, 576 F.3d 459, 462-63 (7th Cir.2009). Our rejection of O'Connor's argument under the Speedy Trial Act does not resolve her constitutional claim; while related, the constitutional and statutory rights are distinct. See id. at 462 (The constitutional right to a speedy trial is both narrower and broader than the corresponding statutory right.). Thus, a violation of one [right] may be found without a violation of the other. United States v. White, 443 F.3d 582, 588 (7th Cir.2006). A Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim turns on the following general factors: [W]hether [the] delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). Delays of more than one year are considered presumptively prejudicial, White, 443 F.3d at 589-90, and this one obviously qualifies. However, O'Connor bears primary responsibility for many of the pretrial delays and did not suffer actual prejudice. She changed counsel twice during the course of the pretrial proceedings, moved for several continuances, consented to others, and did not assert her speedy-trial rights until the end of December 2008, when she moved to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds several years after her indictment and a week before her trial. Moreover, O'Connor did not seek to sever her case from the other defendants to mitigate delays resulting from the joint prosecution. Finally, although O'Connor draws our attention to certain government witnesses who had difficulty remembering some facts during cross-examination, these memory lapses were not prejudicial. If anything, they were helpful to O'Connor; she could have highlighted the gaps in their memories as a reason to discount their testimony. The pretrial delay in this case, though lengthy, did not violate the Sixth Amendment.