Opinion ID: 2789470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Error With Respect to Dr. Gold’s Testimony

Text: Medina points to two mistakes made by counsel at the sanity phase involving Dr. Gold’s testimony: counsel’s failure to object to cross-examination of Dr. Gold based on the Rosenhan study,5 and counsel’s failure to adequately prepare Dr. Gold to testify at the sanity hearing. Medina contends that these deficiencies further prejudiced him at the penalty phase, rendering his death sentence unreliable. We have recognized that “prejudice may result from the cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies.” Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Trial counsel’s failure to object to the use of the Rosenhan study during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Dr. Gold was deficient performance. The prosecution’s purpose in 5 In the Rosenhan study, eight individuals who were not suffering from any mental illness visited a mental institution and complained they were hearing voices. D. L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 Santa Clara Law. 379 (1973). All of them were admitted and diagnosed as schizophrenic or manic-depressive despite their lack of mental illness. Id. at 384. MEDINA V. CHAPPELL 23 mentioning this study was to remind the jury that people are capable of faking schizophrenia and fooling mental health workers into rendering that diagnosis. California Evidence Code section 721(b)(1) prohibits cross-examination of expert witnesses regarding scientific journal articles unless the expert considered or relied upon that article in forming his opinion. California courts have also held that the prosecutor’s reference to the Rosenhan study during cross-examination, specifically, is improper. People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 435 (Cal. 1992). Counsel’s failure to object, however, did not prejudice Medina during the penalty phase within the meaning of Strickland. The prosecutor’s reference to the study was only a small piece of the evidence admitted at the competency hearing. Additionally, the prospect that Medina was malingering and had fooled mental health experts was suggested by more than the Rosenhan study. On direct examination at the sanity phase, Dr. Gold stated that many prisoners malinger and, in response to a question about whether Medina was malingering, testified: “It’s possible, but it’s not probable.” Thus, the reference to the Rosenhan study was cumulative of other, more direct evidence of possible malingering and, therefore, was not prejudicial. Medina also contends that counsel’s failure to prepare Dr. Gold to testify at the sanity phase of his trial was deficient performance. In his declaration, Dr. Gold asserts that defense counsel failed to provide him with “relevant medical records and reports relating to petitioner,” and that counsel spent only about an hour with him prior to the presentation of his testimony. However, counsel is entitled to rely upon the opinion of experts, and, outside of the penalty phase, is not 24 MEDINA V. CHAPPELL required to provide experts with relevant information they do not request. See Wallace, 184 F.3d at 1117 (distinguishing between ineffective assistance claims for failure to provide experts with information at the penalty and guilt phases). In sum, although counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the Rosenhan study, that error was not prejudicial under Strickland during the penalty phase. And counsel’s performance was not deficient with respect to Dr. Gold’s testimony at the sanity phase.