Opinion ID: 1207145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right of Self-representation

Text: The appellant's third major assignment of error relates to the trial court's refusal to allow him to represent himself at trial. The question arose on the first day of trial at an in camera hearing held prior to the jury selection. At that time, the appellant again raised objections to his court-appointed attorneys, stating that, in his opinion, they did not represent him and that he would prefer to represent himself. The appellant refused, however, to waive his right to assistance of counsel. The trial court refused to dismiss the appellant's court-appointed attorneys or to allow the appellant to defend without the assistance of counsel and instructed the appellant that he would be represented at trial by his court-appointed attorneys. Pursuant to a request by the appellant, the trial court informed the jury of the appellant's dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorneys and of the court's decision to require counsel to appear and defend on the appellant's behalf. Trial then proceeded with court-appointed counsel conducting the appellant's defense. The appellant asserts that in forcing him to accept the assistance of counsel against his will, the trial court violated his right to represent himself. It has long been recognized in this jurisdiction that an accused has a constitutional right to defend himself in a criminal proceeding without the assistance of counsel. In State v. Yoes, 67 W.Va. 546, 68 S.E. 181 (1910), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. May v. Boles, 149 W.Va. 155, 139 S.E.2d 177 (1964), the right of self-representation was held to be a correlative of the right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by article III, section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution. This characterization of the right of self-representation was reaffirmed in State v. Blosser, W.Va., 207 S.E.2d 186 (1974), where the Court stated: [N]o one is compelled to have counsel if the does not so choose. The right [to assistance of counsel] is permissive and conditional upon the pleasure of the accused; preferring the protection of the court, or choosing to rely upon his own skill and ability, he may not desire the assistance of counsel. The right of a party to appear in his own behalf and be heard in the courts is fundamental. It is an inalienable right common to all, guaranteed by both the constitution of the state and the Constitution of the United States. 207 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting 5 M.J. Criminal Procedure § 41 (1949)). The right of self-representation has been asserted in civil proceedings as well. See Sisler v. Hawkins, W.Va., 217 S.E.2d 60 (1975); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W.Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959). In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that the refusal of the trial court to permit a defendant in a state criminal proceeding to represent himself without the assistance of counsel constituted a denial of an accused's independent right of self-representation, which is implied in the structure of the Sixth Amendment and is applicable to criminal defendants in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Faretta decision discussed the existence of the constitutional right of self-representation as a general principle, but left unresolved serious practical questions involved in the implementation of the right at trial. [8] The development of procedural standards governing the assertion and exercise of the right of self-representation was left largely to the state courts. The Faretta decision implicity recognized that the right of an accused to represent himself without the assistance of counsel is not an absolute right. Rather, the right of self-representation is a qualified right and its exercise is subject to reasonable restrictions designed to further two important considerations: protection of other fundamental rights guaranteed the accused by the Constitution, and protection of the orderly administration of the judicial process. See Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; United States v. Coupez, 603 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1979); People v. Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 247 N.W.2d 857 (1976). Thus, there is no requirement that the trial court, sua sponte, advise the accused of his right of self-representation. People v. Salazar, 74 Cal.App.3d 875, 141 Cal.Rptr. 753 (1977); People v. Clark, 94 Ill.App.3d 295, 49 Ill.Dec. 871, 418 N.E.2d 891 (1980); Russell v. State, 270 Ind. 55, 383 N.E.2d 309 (1978); State v. Stinson, 424 A.2d 327 (Me.1981); State v. Gregory, 595 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.App.1980); Block v. State, 95 Nev. 933, 604 P.2d 338 (1979); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981). To be entitled, as a matter of right, to represent himself without the assistance of counsel, the defendant must make a timely and unequivocal assertion of the right. The failure to make a timely and unequivocal demand places the decision within the discretion of the trial court. Barnes v. State, 258 Ark. 565, 528 S.W.2d 370 (1975); People v. Windham, 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 848, 98 S.Ct. 157, 54 L.Ed.2d 116, reh. denied, 434 U.S. 961, 98 S.Ct. 495, 54 L.Ed.2d 322 (1977); State v. Hegwood, 345 So.2d 1179 (La.1977); Commonwealth v. Miller, 6 Mass.App. 959, 383 N.E.2d 1144 (1978); State v. Fritz, 21 Wash. App. 354, 585 P.2d 173 (1978). An accused who asserts his right to represent himself without the assistance of counsel is required to comply with all the technical rules of procedural, substantive and evidentiary law in conducting his defense. Faretta v. California, supra ; Smith v. State, 267 Ind. 167, 368 N.E.2d 1154 (1977); State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 262 S.E.2d 277 (1980); Bowen v. State, 606 P.2d 589 (Okl.Cr.1980); Williams v. State, 549 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); State v. Hoff, 31 Wash.App. 809, 644 P.2d 763, cert. dismissed, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 583, 74 L.Ed.2d 942 (1982). A defendant may not assert or exercise the right of self-representation as a means of unduly delaying the proceedings. People v. Barnes, 636 P.2d 1323 (Colo.App.1981); German v. State, 268 Ind. 67, 373 N.E.2d 880 (1978), Parish v. State, 632 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. App.1982); State v. Fritz, supra . And the trial court may terminate the defendant's self-representation where the defendant, after warnings from the trial court, engages in disruptive and obstructionist conduct. Faretta v. California, supra ; People v. Manson, 71 Cal.App.3d 1, 139 Cal.Rptr. 275 (1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 953, 98 S.Ct. 1582, 55 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978); People v. Heidelberg, 33 Ill.App.3d 574, 338 N.E.2d 56 (1975); German v. State, supra ; Commonwealth v. Africa, 466 Pa. 603, 353 A.2d 855 (1976). [9] Finally, a defendant who validly elects to represent himself in a criminal proceeding cannot thereafter complain of ineffective assistance of counsel. Faretta v. California, supra ; United States ex rel. Smith v. Pavich, 568 F.2d 33 (7th Cir.1978); People v. Lucero, 200 Colo. 335, 615 P.2d 660 (1980); Mullins v. Lavoie, 249 Ga. 411, 290 S.E.2d 472 (1982); People v. Heidelberg, supra ; State v. Brincefield, 43 N.C.App. 49, 258 S.E.2d 81 (1979); Berry v. State, 552 P.2d 87 (Okl.Cr.1976); Williams v. State, supra . Once the defendant expresses a timely and unequivocal desire to represent himself without the assistance of counsel, it must be ascertained whether the defendant's election to proceed pro se is made knowingly and intelligently. As the Supreme Court stated in Faretta v. California, supra : When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst [304 U.S. 458, 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) ]. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 [(1948)] (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, [317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) ]. 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. The determination of whether an accused has knowingly and intelligently elected to proceed without the assistance of counsel depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. People v. Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 247 N.W.2d 857 (1976). The test in such cases is not the wisdom of the accused's decision to represent himself or its effect upon the expeditious administration of justice, but, rather, whether the defendant is aware of the dangers of self-representation and clearly intends to waive the rights he relinquishes by electing to proceed pro se. Barnes v. State, 258 Ark. 565, 528 S.W.2d 370 (1975); Johnson v. State, 556 P.2d 1285 (Okl.Cr.1976). To this end, the trial court is required to conduct, on the record and out of the presence of the jury, an inquiry of the defendant, informing him of his rights and of the possible consequences of self-representation. Costello v. Carlisle, 413 So.2d 834 (Fla.App.1982); Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 406 A.2d 98 (1979). It is the primary duty of the trial court in conducting its inquiry to ascertain whether the defendant is cognizant of and willing to relinquish his right to assistance of counsel, since there can be no valid exercise of the right of self-representation absent a competent and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. Commonwealth v. Glover, 247 Pa.Super. 465, 372 A.2d 919 (1977). As our Court stated in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Blosser, supra : An accused may represent himself in a criminal proceeding, but the election to do so must be predicated upon an intelligent and understanding waiver by the accused of the fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel upon a full and fair disclosure and explanation by the trial court of the constitutional right to counsel. The trial court should also insure that the accused is aware of the nature, complexity and seriousness of the charges against him and of the possible penalties that might be imposed. Leak v. Graves, 261 Ark. 619, 550 S.W.2d 179 (1977); People v. Lopez, 71 Cal. App.3d 568, 138 Cal.Rptr. 36 (1977); Commonwealth v. Davis, 479 Pa. 274, 388 A.2d 324 (1978). It is incumbent upon the trial court to warn the accused of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation Faretta v. California, supra ; State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874 (Utah 1981). In this context it has been held that the trial court has an obligation to warn the accused that self-representation is almost always detrimental, that he will be afforded no special indulgence or advocacy privileges by the court; that he will be subject to all the technical rules of substantive, procedural and evidentiary law; that the prosecution will be represented by an experienced attorney; that misbehavior or disruption at trial may vacate his right to represent himself; and that in spite of his efforts he cannot later claim ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Lopez, supra ; State v. Quinn, 565 S.W.2d 665 (Mo.App.1978). See generally Annot. 98 A.L.R.3d 13 (1980). In addition, the trial court should advise the defendant that he waives his right to refuse to testify by going outside the scope of argument and testifying directly to the jury. Jones v. State, 381 So.2d 983 (Miss.1980). Finally, the trial court should make some inquiry into the defendant's intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of his decision. In this respect, the defendant's background, education, experience and familiarity with the legal system are relevant considerations in the trial court's determination of the validity of the defendant's election to proceed pro se. See Faretta v. California, supra ; Leak v. Graves, supra ; People v. Miller, 110 Cal. App.3d 327, 167 Cal.Rptr. 816 (1980); State v. Bell, 381 So.2d 393 (La.1980); State v. Ahearn, 137 Vt. 253, 403 A.2d 696 (1979); State v. Fritz, 21 Wash.App. 354, 585 P.2d 173 (1978). However, the technical legal knowledge of a defendant who wishes to represent himself at trial is not relevant to the question of whether his election to proceed pro se was intelligently and knowingly made. Faretta v. California, supra ; People v. Freeman, 76 Cal.App.3d 302, 142 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1977); State v. Cunningham, 222 Kan. 704, 567 P.2d 879 (1977); State v. Fritz, supra . In sum, then, a defendant in a criminal proceeding who is mentally competent and sui juris, has a constitutional right to appear and defend in person without the assistance of counsel, provided that (1) he voices his desire to represent himself in a timely and unequivocal manner; (2) he elects to do so with full knowledge and understanding of his rights and of the risks involved in self-representation; and (3) he exercises the right in a manner which does not disrupt or create undue delay at trial. Turning to the case at hand, we are of the opinion that the trial court did not err in requiring the appellant to be represented at trial by his court-appointed attorneys. First, we have some question as to whether the appellant's demand that he be allowed to represent himself was made in a timely manner. The request was not tendered until the morning of trial and was apparently the result of the trial court's refusal to permit the appellant's court-appointed attorneys to withdraw. That matter had been thoroughly argued at the hearing held two days before, at which time the appellant gave no indication that he wished to represent himself. As a general rule, where the request to defend without the assistance of counsel is made in the first instance on the morning of trial, the defendant's right to appear and defend in person depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and is ordinarily a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Barnes v. State, supra ; People v. Windham, 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 848, 98 S.Ct. 157, 54 L.Ed.2d 116, reh. denied, 434 U.S. 961, 98 S.Ct. 495, 54 L.Ed.2d 322 (1977); State v. Hegwood, 345 So.2d 1179 (La.1977); State v. Fritz, 21 Wash.App. 354, 585 P.2d 173 (1978). [10] We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's request as untimely. Even if we were to hold that the appellant's request was timely made, we think it is clear that it cannot be characterized as an unequivocal demand. Although the appellant stated that he wished to represent himself at trial, he also clearly indicated that he had no intention of waiving his right to the assistance of counsel. As we held in State v. Blosser, supra , a defendant may not be permitted to exercise his right of self-representation absent an intelligent and understanding waiver of the right to counsel. In addition, as we noted above, the appellant's demand to defend pro se appears to have resulted more from the trial court's denial of the appellant's request for appointment of other counsel than from any genuine desire to represent himself without the assistance of counsel. In these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to allow the appellant to defend himself at trial. The appellant also asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to conduct an extensive inquiry into the validity of the appellant's election to represent himself. It has been held, however, that where a defendant does not make a timely and unequivocal demand to exercise the right of self-representation, the trial court need not conduct a detailed hearing on the issue of whether the demand was knowingly and intelligently made. Russell v. State, 270 Ind. 55, 383 N.E.2d 309 (1978); State v. Burgin, 539 S.W.2d 652 (Mo.App. 1976). The appellant also asserts that his right of self-representation was infringed by the trial court's refusal to permit him to act as co-counsel. This request was made by the appellant after the trial court initially refused to allow the appellant to defend pro se. The appellant then requested permission to address the jury personally as co-counsel. The trial court initially indicated that he would permit the appellant some limited right to speak to the jury. After jury selection was completed, however, the trial court, upon further reflection, ruled that the appellant would not be permitted to make opening or closing remarks or to question witnesses and that any questions or statements the appellant had should be directed to the witnesses or the jury through his counsel. At the close of the State's case, the appellant requested that the defense witnesses be dismissed and that he be allowed to take the witness stand in order to explain to the jury the reason for his failure to put on a defense. The trial court cautioned the appellant against dismissing his witnesses and informed him at length of his right not to testify. During this exchange the appellant indicated that he did not wish to be interrogated on the stand or to relinquish his right to refuse to testify, but that he only wished to inform the jury of his reasons for not producing defense witnesses. The trial court refused to allow the appellant to address the jury on these conditions, informing him that if he took the stand he would be subject to cross-examination by the State. The appellant then refused, despite further cautioning by the trial court, to allow his attorneys to present any defense witnesses. The court again refused to dismiss the appellant's court-appointed attorneys and the case was submitted to the jury. While the defendant has a constitutional right to represent himself without the assistance of counsel, he is not entitled, as a matter of right to appear as co-counsel. United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630; cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972, 97 S.Ct. 2937, 53 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950, 98 S.Ct. 2858, 56 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978); State v. McCleary, 149 N.J.Super. 77, 373 A.2d 400 (1977). The right of an accused who is represented by counsel to participate personally in his defense by examining witnesses or addressing the jury is ordinarily a matter within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Moorefield, 33 N.C.App. 37, 234 S.E.2d 25 (1977); State v. Burgin, 539 S.W.2d 652 (Mo.App.1976); State v. Carr, 13 Wash.App. 704, 537 P.2d 844 (1975). Here we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to permit the appellant to act as co-counsel. Nor do we find error in the trial court's refusal to allow the appellant to dictate the conditions under which he would address the jury. See Hollis v. State, 95 Nev. 664, 601 P.2d 62 (1979). One final matter is raised by the appellant in this context. The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in permitting the appellant to dismiss the defense witnesses. He asserts that his request to dismiss those witnesses was conditional upon his being granted the opportunity to address the jury in person. Consequently, he contends, the trial court erred in dismissing the witnesses once it was decided that the appellant would not be permitted to speak to the jury. The record does not support this contention. After the trial court denied the appellant's request, the judge again warned the appellant against dismissing the defense witnesses and permitting the case to go to the jury on the State's evidence alone. The appellant adamantly refused to allow his attorneys to put on a defense for him. In view of these facts, we find no error in the trial court's decision to allow the appellant to dismiss the defense witnesses.