Opinion ID: 528419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Lincoln Entitled To A New Trial?

Text: 44 Lincoln contends that evidence was improperly admitted and that the plaintiffs' counsel's opening and closing statements included inflammatory and prejudicial remarks. Lincoln argues that it should have been granted a new trial, at least as to the plaintiffs' allegations of unreasonable and vexatious conduct. 45 Lincoln raises a general objection to the testimony of statements made to others outside of Mr. Rosenburg's presence regarding Lincoln's program in Granite City and other cities in Indiana. Lincoln claims that these statements were irrelevant, prejudicial and inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) as evidence of other wrongs or bad acts. Lincoln specifically objected to Joe Miklovic's testimony which included statements made to Miklovic by Dick Portell, another city employee. Over the defendant's objection, Miklovic also testified for the plaintiffs that he stated to Wedmore that if an applicant died before the 40% misrepresentation was clarified, Lincoln would have one hell of a liability. Lincoln further objected to the plaintiffs' counsel's reference in his opening statement to twenty-nine people who would verify Mr. Rosenburg's story but would not testify. According to Lincoln, although several objections were sustained by the court, the jury was not able to disregard the cumulative prejudice. 46 The plaintiffs contend that the evidence objected to was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 406 to show habit: Lincoln agents had a habit of selling conditional insurance, waiving such conditions and later asserting them as defenses. The plaintiffs claim that they believed in good faith that the testimony of the twenty-nine people would be admissible. The plaintiffs' attorney had given Lincoln copies of these persons' statements prior to trial (during Mr. Rosenburg's deposition) and Wedmore testified at trial that he had received such statements. The plaintiffs argue that any prejudicial effect from these references or from Miklovic's testimony was overcome by the judge's prompt instructions to the jury to disregard the references. In addition, the plaintiffs note that the objection to Miklovic's testimony regarding conversations with Dick Portell was immediately sustained and, in any event, the testimony heard was partially favorable to Lincoln. 47 Under both Wallace and Colontuono, evidence of Lincoln's previous waivers was relevant. An insurance company may be held to have waived its written policy conditions if agents were trained to or tended to, with the management's knowledge, give oral assurances that insurance coverage was effective immediately despite written conditions to the contrary. There was sufficient evidence of such a routine practice by Lincoln agents such that the testimony in question was properly admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 406 to establish that Lincoln acted in conformity with its routine business practice in this instance. 5 See G.M. Brod & Co. v. U.S. Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir.1985). That evidence came from the testimony of Kevin Kielty, Joe Miklovic, Connie Koch, Ailene Shaw and David Rosenburg. 48 In addition, we have no reason to believe that the district court's instructions to the jury that it disregard certain testimony were not followed. Moreover, the testimony in question was, at least in part, favorable to Lincoln. Finally, while other alleged misrepresentations do not establish that Rosenburg himself was defrauded, the fraud count was dismissed. After carefully reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Lincoln's objection to the admission of evidence. 49 It is clear that the closing statement of plaintiffs' counsel was intended to invoke the passions of the jury but we do not believe that it led to an unfair trial. 6 Instead, it is a good argument for the practice of bifurcating trials. The comments regarding damages would not have been allowed during the liability phase of a bifurcated trial. We conclude that the district court's rulings on the defendant's objections to the plaintiffs' closing argument did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Lincoln was not denied a fair trial and the district court's denial of Lincoln's motion for a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.