Opinion ID: 767499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of Jurisdiction over Officer Heinz-Faljean's Appeal

Text: 27 The essence of Officer Heinz-Faljean's argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence before it presented an unresolved issue of material fact. However, [e]ven where the lower court rules that material disputes of fact preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity, we may still exercise interlocutory jurisdiction if the defendant . . . contends that [she] is entitled to qualified immunity even under plaintiff's version of the facts. Tierney, 133 F.3d at 194. Officer Heinz-Faljean does not frame her argument in these allowable terms but instead contends that 28 [f]or plaintiff to succeed in [a failure to intervene] claim, he must come forward with evidence that Officer Heinz-Faljean had the opportunity after observing the other officers hitting plaintiff to intervene. . . . There is no evidence in the record indicating that Faljean heard or saw the assault. ... In sum, no evidence was submitted in opposition to Faljean's motion for summary judgment indicating that it was objectively unreasonable for Officer Faljean to believe that her non-intervention would result in plaintiff's alleged assault. 29 Martinez' failure to adduce direct evidence that Officer Heinz-Faljean observed the assault on Martinez and failed to intervene, in response to Officer Heinz-Faljean's summary judgment motion, does not foreclose his claim. The district court analyzed the evidence already in the record and found, based on the deposition testimony of Sinagra and Martinez, that a reasonable juror might conclude that Officer Heinz-Faljean could see what was happening in the bedroom at 13 Rathbun Avenue. The Supreme Court has held that where the district court properly concludes that the record on summary judgment raises a genuine issue of fact concerning an officer's involvement in an alleged beating, the order of the district court adopting that conclusion is not appealable. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). We are of the opinion that just such an order is presented to us here. 30 Officer Heinz-Faljean's argument is similar to the one the defending officers in Johnson tried to make. There, three of five allegedly offending police officers argued that whatever evidence [the plaintiff] might have about the other two officers, he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present while others did so. Id. at 307. The plaintiff's evidence consisted in part of the officers' depositions, in which they admitted they were present at the arrest and in or near the booking room when the plaintiff was there. See id. at 307-08. The district court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting [the plaintiff's] theory of the case. Id. at 308. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals. See id. (describing circuit split and citing Second Circuit as among those jurisdictions within which no appeal would be taken where evidence insufficiency alleged). 31 The Court affirmed, holding that where the district court concludes that the summary judgment record . . . raise[s] a genuine issue of fact concerning petitioners' involvement in the alleged beating of respondent the summary judgment order is not appealable. Id. at 313. The Court based its decision on considerations of delay, comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and wise use of appellate resources. See id. at 317. 32 While claims of immunity are sometimes practically intertwined with the merits, id. at 314, the collateral order doctrine, permitting immediate appellate review of qualified immunity issues, nonetheless requires that a distinction be made between legal-based and fact-based appeals. Here, if Officer Heinz-Faljean had argued that, even taking as true the circumstantial evidence that she was aware of plaintiff's beating, she was entitled to a finding of objective reasonableness as a matter of law, her appeal could go forward. She grounds her argument instead on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to show her awareness of Martinez' plight. As such, she appeals a portion of a district court's summary judgment order that, though entered in a 'qualified immunity' case, determines only a question of 'evidence sufficiency,' i.e., which facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial. Id. at 313. Accordingly, the trial court's order denying Officer Heinz-Faljean's motion for summary judgment is not a final order for purposes of appellate review. 33