Opinion ID: 2220781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Setoff Application

Text: The following background will assist in understanding the parties' contentions. Plaintiff's third-amended complaint in this matter was filed in April 1981, and sought a wrongful-death recovery based in strict products liability on behalf of Samantha and David against Great Lakes and Speed. Wesley Law was named as co-plaintiff in the complaint. In February 1988, Speed filed a third-party complaint seeking contribution from F & B. Approximately two years later, plaintiff entered into a release and settlement agreement with Great Lakes on behalf of both Samantha and David. According to the stated terms of the agreement, Great Lakes was released from all claims by David, both individually and as administrator of Diane's estate in exchange for a sum valued at $861,789. Great Lakes was also released by Law for the amount of $100,000. The trial court found the settlement to be in good faith and, after a hearing, determined that Samantha and David's respective percentages of dependency were 50% as provided for under the Wrongful Death Act (Act). (See Ill.Rev.Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 2.) The entire settlement was then distributed by the trial court to David and Samantha so that each of them received $430,894.50. No part of the settlement was allocated to any type of claim other than wrongful death. In September 1990, plaintiff filed a fourth-amended complaint naming Speed and F & B as defendants. Because the two-year statutory limitations period for commencing wrongful-death actions had expired as to David against F & B, but was tolled as to Samantha due to her minority, the complaint stated two separate wrongful-death actions: count I for Samantha against F & B and Speed, jointly and severally, and count II for David against Speed alone. Counts IV and V stated survival and wrongful-death actions against Speed by co-plaintiff Law. Count III was subsequently dismissed and was discussed previously in this opinion. F & B did not object to plaintiff's pleading two separate wrongful-death actions. The case proceeded to trial against F & B and Speed on the plaintiffs' several wrongful-death and survival claims. At trial, the parties recognized that a single wrongful-death verdict would not suffice. The trial court thus instructed the jury, without objection by F & B, that the rights of each plaintiff were separate and distinct, that Samantha and David brought separate actions, and that they were each the real party in interest with regard to the assessment of damages in each action. The trial court also directed the jury that, if it found liability, it should separately assess Samantha's and David's damages and return separate verdicts for them, that the verdict in benefit of Samantha should be in a single sum against both F & B and Speed, that the verdict in benefit of David should be against Speed only, and that each verdict should be based on the pecuniary losses that each of them individually suffered as a result of Diane's death. At no time did F & B object to these instructions or to the use of separate jury forms for counts I and II. Pursuant to the provided forms, the jury returned the following verdicts: