Opinion ID: 4525098
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due-Process Framework

Text: Zerezghi and Meskel contend that the government violated procedural due process when it determined that Meskel’s prior marriage was fraudulent. First, they argue that USCIS’s use of an apartment-rental application from Meskel’s first husband to support its determination without first disclosing it to them was unconstitutional. Second, they argue that the BIA applied too low a standard of proof in making its determination of marriage fraud and that, on remand, the agency must apply a higher standard of proof. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In determining whether a person’s rights under that clause have been violated, the “standard analysis 14 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS . . . proceeds in two steps: We first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the [government] were constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). The “threshold requirement” for Meskel and Zerezghi’s claim to succeed is that they have “a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution.” Wedges/Ledges of California, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, Ariz., 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994). We have held that a citizen petitioner has a constitutionally protected interest in the grant of an I-130 petition. Ching, 725 F.3d at 1156. This is because approval of an I-130 petition is nondiscretionary. By statute, the Secretary of Homeland Security “shall, if he determines that the facts stated in the petition are true and that the alien in behalf of whom the petition is made is an immediate relative . . . approve the petition[.]” Id. at 1155 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b) (emphasis added)). “[D]eterminations that ‘require application of law to factual determinations’ are nondiscretionary,” meaning that USCIS must approve an I- 130 petition if the facts stated in the application are true and the beneficiary is an immediate relative. Ibid. (quoting Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 833–34 (9th Cir. 2003)). This administrative framework thus creates a “legitimate claim of entitlement” that is “grounded in the statute defining eligibility,” rather than on a mere “unilateral expectation” for the petition’s approval. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). As we explained in Ching, “as long as the petitioner and spouse beneficiary meet the statutory and regulatory requirements for eligibility” an “[i]mmediate relative status for an alien spouse is a right to which citizen applicants are entitled[.]” Ching, 725 F.3d at 1156 (emphasis added). ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 15 The government contends that the grant of an immigration petition is a privilege, and that because it has determined that Meskel committed marriage fraud on a prior occasion, Zerezghi is statutorily ineligible from succeeding on the I-130 petition on her behalf. However, we squarely rejected this argument in Ching, noting that it “confuses the question of whether there is a protected interest in a benefit with the question of eligibility for that benefit.” Ibid. Because Ching established that the grant of an I-130 petition is a nondiscretionary, statutory, entitlement, Zerezghi is “entitled to the protections of due process” in insuring that the government determination of ineligibility was properly made. Ibid. Individuals are necessarily entitled to a proper procedure to contest a government determination of ineligibility because “[v]irtually no government benefit is available to individuals without a requirement that certain conditions are met.” Ibid. For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that welfare recipients held an interest in the continued receipt of their benefits even if the government determined that they had become statutorily ineligible for them. 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970). Because the “benefits [were] a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them,” the recipients were entitled to the protections of due process (in the form of a pre-deprivation hearing) to contest the government’s determination of ineligibility. Id. at 262; see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (holding that the Goldberg plaintiffs “had not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory terms of eligibility” but that the Court nonetheless “held that they had a right to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so”). In sum, because Zerezghi has a constitutionally protected interest in the grant of his I-130 petition, the main issue for us to decide 16 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS is whether the procedures followed by the government in not granting the petition were constitutionally sufficient.