Opinion ID: 213492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of AIR 21 complaint

Text: Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion, as affirmed by the ARB, that NetJets proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have declined to promote Hoffman to the IOE instructor position even absent Hoffman's safety and regulatory reports. AIR 21, under which Hoffman brings his complaint, prohibits NetJets from discriminating against Hoffman because he provided information to NetJets or to the federal government in relation to any actual or alleged violation of any FAA order, regulation, or standard, or any other provision of federal law related to air-carrier safety. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(a)(1)-(2). To establish that NetJets violated AIR 21, Hoffman must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was engaged in protected activity, that he suffered adverse action, and that his protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action. See id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii); 29 C.F.R. § 1979.104(b)(1). The burden of proof then shifts to NetJets, which can satisfy this burden (and thus prevail on Hoffman's complaint) only if it proves by clear and convincing evidence that it still would have committed the adverse action even if Hoffman had not engaged in the protected activity. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 1979.109(a). The ALJ's findings that Hoffman engaged in protected activity numerous times when he voiced safety concerns, and that his promotion denial constituted adverse action, are not contested on appeal. [2] Hoffman only challenges the ALJ's clear-and-convincing-evidence conclusion. Hoffman argues first, that the court must change the applicable standard of review in light of AIR 21's stricter clear-and-convincing-evidence burden of proof, and second, that the record does not support the finding that NetJets satisfied its burden by such clear and convincing evidence. Neither point warrants relief. As for the standard of review, AIR 21 itself provides for judicial review pursuant to the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(4)(A) (Review shall conform to chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code.). The standard of review provided by the APA is whether the ALJ's findings, as affirmed by the ARB, are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or unsupported by substantial evidence in a case ... otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E). AIR 21 specifically provides that a complainant may request a hearing on the record.  § 42121(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Furthermore, other courts have held that judicial review of the ARB's AIR 21 determinations is conducted under the substantial-evidence standard. See Barker v. Admin. Review Bd., 302 Fed.Appx. 248, 249 (5th Cir.2008); Majali v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 294 Fed.Appx. 562, 563 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2008); Vieques Air Link, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 437 F.3d 102, 104 (1st Cir.2006). Contrary to Hoffman's argument, this deferential substantial-evidence standard of review is not inconsistent with the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard delineated in AIR 21. Clear and convincing evidence is what NetJets needed to offer to satisfy its burden of proof before the ALJ, once that burden shifted to NetJets following Hoffman's successful presentation of a prima facie AIR 21 case. Appellate review of the Secretary's finding that NetJets met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, though, consists of determining whether that finding is supported by substantial evidence, which is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). The ARB acts for the Secretary of Labor and is responsible for issuing `final agency decisions.' To satisfy the substantial evidence standard, the [ARB's] decisions must be supported by `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Sasse v. Dep't of Labor, 409 F.3d 773, 778 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting ITT Auto. v. NLRB, 188 F.3d 375, 384 (6th Cir. 1999)). Hoffman's argument conflates the ARB's and the court's standard of review with AIR 21's ALJ-level burdens of proof. Moreover, conducting judicial review under an agency-deferential standard like that of substantial evidence does not undermine the strict clear-and-convincing-evidence standard required for the ALJ to rule in NetJets's favor. Applying a deferential standard of review to a finding that could only be reached under a strict standard of proof is hardly unusual. Indeed, courts routinely employ this approach when they review the propriety of jury verdicts: though a jury's finding of guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard of proof even greater than that of clear and convincing evidence, the courts' standard of review is merely whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). This court must review the ARB's factual conclusions under the substantial-evidence standard. Reviewing these conclusions under that deferential standard supports upholding the ARB's denial of Hoffman's AIR 21 complaint. Documentary evidence shows that all thirty IOE instructor candidates were evaluated using the same three-part point system, the stated purpose of which was to make the selection of IOE instructors more objective. Hoffman was among the lowest-ranked candidates, placing twenty-seventh out of thirty. None of the three candidates who ranked lower or equal to Hoffman received promotions either; neither did nineteen candidates who ranked higher than Hoffman. Of the three categories considered in the point system, Hoffman received zero points in both the international-experience and program-manager-feedback categories, and one point in the peer-feedback category, giving him a total score of one point. By contrast, the seven successful candidates received total scores ranging from five to nine points, nine being the highest possible score. Though Decker admitted that the point-evaluation system was not contained in any formal documents, he testified that the system was developed in early 2004 and that the candidates were evaluated under the system in the summer of 2004. As this was well before Hoffman's November 2004 interview, this evidence contradicts Hoffman's claim that the point system was only a ruse developed after his interview in order to justify not promoting him. Also, even though international experience was not listed in the May 2004 IOE instructor position announcement, there was evidence that NetJets was indeed interested in promoting pilots who possessed such experience. This evidence included the following: Decker testified that NetJets was having trouble qualifying pilots to fly their international routes and thus needed instructors who could train pilots in this area; the documentation shows that every candidate was individually evaluated in his or her amount of international experience; five of the seven successful candidates possessed such experience, and of these five, four received three points in the international-experience category, the highest-possible score for the category; and Hoffman was questioned about his international experience during his interview. This undercuts Hoffman's argument that the international-experience category, like the point system in general, was only a pretext to deny him a promotion. Hoffman points out that two pilots received zero scores for international experience and were promoted nonetheless. [3] However, NetJets never contended that international experience was required for the promotion, only that it was preferred. Moreover, there is a stark comparison between these two successful candidates and Hoffman: even without any international-experience points, these two candidates received total scores of five and six, respectively, whereas Hoffman received a total score of only one. Further, there was evidence that Hoffman did not interview well. Both Martin and Smith testified that Hoffman did not demonstrate the level of knowledge expected of an IOE instructor. As to whether Hoffman answered interview questions correctly, Martin testified, Not completely. They were fuzzy on the details. Hoffman admitted during the interview that he had no experience flying to Europe or Hawai`i, and that he had had personality conflicts with other NetJets employees. Hoffman declined to ask any questions of his own or to make a closing statement. And by his own admission, Hoffman had already unsuccessfully applied for an IOE instructor position at least twenty-five times. A reasonable person could conclude from this record that NetJets had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have denied Hoffman the IOE instructor position because of his apparent faults as a candidate, regardless of his AIR 21-protected activity. Hoffman's primary argument is that Smith's question at the end of the interview regarding how Hoffman should deal with a questionable MFP made it impossible for NetJets to provide clear and convincing evidence that it still would not have promoted Hoffman. The hypothetical Smith presented Hoffman with in this closing question was similar to the MFP incident Hoffman had been disciplined for earlier that year. Hoffman's responsethat he would go as far with it as [he] felt necessary to make sure that things were being done correctlycombined with Smith's following statement that he had no further questions for Hoffman, could indeed give the impression that Smith's decision on Hoffman's promotion was based in part on Hoffman's willingness to pursue his MFP regulatory concern. Because Hoffman's actions regarding the MFP issue probably constitute protected activity under AIR 21 (NetJets has not contested this finding, anyway), Smith's question could possibly be viewed as evidence that Hoffman's protected activity contributed in some way to his promotion denial. That being said, Hoffman overlooks a more fundamental issue. Even if Smith's MFP question is considered evidence that Hoffman's regulatory concerns contributed to Smith's vote in the promotion decision, this goes towards the causation factor of Hoffman's prima facie case. In other words, this could perhaps provide substantial evidence supporting a finding that Hoffman satisfied his burden of proof under AIR 21that his protected activity was a contributing factor in an adverse employment actionand that the burden of proof then shifted to NetJets. However, all the other evidence discussed above regarding Hoffman's objective qualifications and poor interview performance then provides substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's finding that NetJets satisfied its own, shifted burden of proof: that clear and convincing evidence shows that NetJets would have declined to promote Hoffman based on its unfavorable view of his professional abilities, even had Hoffman never engaged in any AIR 21protected activities. Hoffman's apparent flaws as an IOE instructor candidate would still exist even if Smith had never asked the MFP question or had never been on the interview panel at all. As a final note on the matter of Smith's MFP interview question, Smith testified that the MFP incident had no bearing on Hoffman's not getting the promotion, that there was no discussion after the interview about safety matters that Hoffman had raised, that Smith did not lobby or urge the other interviewers to not promote Hoffman, and that Smith was not instructed to ask difficult questions or to not promote Hoffman. The ALJ found this testimony to be credible. This court may not ... decide questions of credibility. Moon v. Transp. Drivers, Inc., 836 F.2d 226, 229 (6th Cir.1987). Decker and Martin also testified that they were unaware at the time of the interview whether Hoffman had filed safety complaints. The interview panel's decision denying Hoffman his promotion was unanimous, and Smith testified that he did not possess any kind of veto power that would ensure that his opinion prevailed over those of the other interviewers. Hoffman also argues that the point system should have played no role at all in his evaluation following his interview. However, Hoffman offers no evidence to support his conclusory assertion that the three factors utilized in the point system were supposed to be disregarded simply because the SBA recommended that NetJets grant Hoffman an interview. The SBA's recommendation simply states the following: The board recommends that Mr. Hoffman's qualifications and performance be re-evaluated to include an in-person interview. If it is determined that Mr. Hoffman is qualified for the position, he should be awarded an instructor position. Since NetJets had decided to use the point system's three categories of international experience, program-manager feedback, and peer feedback to determine whether candidates were qualified for the IOE instructor position, it is sensible for NetJets to have looked to these criteria in again denying Hoffman a promotion. Similarly, Hoffman also argues that the interview panel was not supposed to compare him to the other instructor candidates in making its promotion decision. However, there is at best only conflicting, inconclusive evidence that the panel in fact did this. [4] Moreover, even assuming that NetJets did compare Hoffman to the other candidates, the SBA's formal recommendation did not forbid NetJets from doing so. Hoffman claims that the SBA recommended that he must not be compared to previous candidates, but the source of this quotation is not the text of the SBA's formal recommendation. Instead, Hoffman is quoting anonymous, handwritten notes purporting to summarize the SBA's grievance hearing. Since the SBA's formal recommendation on Hoffman's grievance does not address the permissibility of comparing him to the other instructor candidates, NetJets cannot be faulted for doing so. Finally, even if the SBA had not envisioned NetJets's comparing Hoffman to the other candidates, this would still only constitute a recommendation that NetJets was not contractually bound to accept. Substantial evidence therefore supports the ALJ's finding, as affirmed by the ARB, that NetJets proved by clear and convincing evidence that it still would not have promoted Hoffman even in the absence of Hoffman's AIR 21-protected activities. While this conclusion is somewhat troubling because of the possibility that Hoffman was not promoted because of his safety actions, Congress gave primary authority to the Secretary, and not to the courts, to carry out AIR 21. We are required to give deference to the Secretary's factual determinations, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.