Opinion ID: 2334525
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Lenkart's Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance Resulted in Prejudice

Text: ¶ 38 Once a defendant demonstrates that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, we must then determine whether the deficient performance resulted in prejudice. [23] This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [24] A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [25] When we examine counsel's alleged errors, we consider the totality of the evidence to determine whether the errors alter[ed] the entire evidentiary picture and whether the verdict is supported by the record. [26] ¶ 39 While the trial court stated that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel may have rendered deficient performance, the trial judge concluded that Mr. Lenkart failed to show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's errors. In its order denying Mr. Lenkart's motion for a new trial, the trial judge stated, Although Ms. Bryner Brown's affidavit might have added some credibility to [Mr. Lenkart's] account, in light of [the Code R nurse's] admissions, Ms. Bryner Brown's testimony would not have been material ... and does not change the evidentiary picture presented to the jury. We disagree. ¶ 40 We conclude that Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel's failure to investigate and present an expert opinion concerning the presence of physical exculpatory evidence to the jury was a prejudicial error affecting the entire evidentiary picture at trial. This error undermines our confidence in the outcome of Mr. Lenkart's trial. ¶ 41 We conclude that if Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel had presented the Code R kit test results at trial, it would have affected the entire evidentiary picture. As discussed above, the narrative at trial was largely a credibility contest between Mr. Lenkart and K.H. K.H. presented her version of the events, which was followed largely by cumulative testimony of her statements to others. Mr. Lenkart offered a different version of the night's events. The Code R nurse's testimony on direct examination supported K.H.'s testimony, and the prosecutor heavily referenced and emphasized this testimony throughout the proceedings. For example, in closing argument the prosecutor stated: When we look at the [Code R] Nurse['s] [testimony,], and ... the chart of those injuries that she found[,] and the one injury, the laceration which she indicates, she told you a lot of times [that it] is found in non-consensual sexual encounters because the woman is not assisting in the penetration, not tilting her pelvis, all of those things.... [S]he told you that the injuries she found are consistent with non-consensual sex. The prosecutor also used the Code R nurse's testimony to make an argument about K.H.'s tampon. She told the jury: I find it fairly compelling that [K.H. was] on her period at this time and has a tampon in. If you believe the defendant's story, she's completely lucid. She's completely with it. She's not intoxicated at all. Why doesn't she remove the tampon before she goes to have sex? I can't imagine that would feel very good. And it's almost a little embarrassing. I just can't believe you would go with a perfect stranger, completely lucid, and have sex while you're on your period with a tampon still in. And finally, the prosecutor's closing argument also emphasized the untested Code R kit to support the sodomy charge: You know we have an account that yes, oral sex occurred, and I'm thinking how is [the defendant] going to get around the tampon issue? What is he going to say about the string? Well, he just kissed her on the outside of her underwear.... Forcible sodomy, that's just oral sex. The defendant put his mouth on her vagina. These statements reveal that the limited testimony of the Code R nurse was central to the State's theory of nonconsent. Without another opinion to counter these statements or any physical evidence to refute it, the jury was left with a lopsided evidentiary picture in K.H.'s favor. Indeed, had the jury been presented with the test results of the Code R kit and the testimony of Ms. Bryner Brown, the factual picture would have been completely transformed. First, the test results strongly corroborated Mr. Lenkart's testimony that no oral sex occurred. Second, Ms. Bryner Brown's testimony would have provided an alternate explanation for the tampon. Instead of suggesting that the presence of the tampon inferred nonconsensual sexual conduct, Ms. Bryner Brown's testimony would have suggested that the presence of tampons is common in these examinations, either due to forgetfulness, or because many women intentionally leave tampons in to enhance the sexual experience. Finally, had this evidence been presented at trial, it would have undermined K.H.'s testimony and bolstered Mr. Lenkart's credibility. The jury would have had concrete physical evidence from which they could conclude that no oral sex occurred between the parties. They would have been able to evaluate testimony explaining how the presence of the tampon was consistent with consensual intercourse. We conclude that this testimony would have shifted the credibility scale in Mr. Lenkart's direction, thus changing the entire evidentiary picture at trial. ¶ 42 We also conclude that Mr. Lenkart's conviction was not strongly supported by the record. [27] A rape case where the sole issue at trial is consent presents a unique circumstance not present in many other rape trials. In consent cases, physical evidence is often sparse, and few, if any witnesses are able to aid the jury in evaluating the subjective mindset of the parties to the encounter. Indeed, many of these cases hinge on a he-said-she-said credibility contest between the alleged perpetrator and the victim. Thus, when physical evidence comes to light suggesting the alleged perpetrator may not have committed the crime, the entire evidentiary picture shifts, and we are less confident that the he-said-she-said determination was accurately resolved. We conclude that this is particularly true in Mr. Lenkart's case. ¶ 43 The rape trial was largely a credibility contest between Mr. Lenkart and K.H. At the time of trial, the Code R kit had not been analyzed. The Code R nurse was the only expert who testified about the physical evidence at trial. Her testimony on direct examination concerned only her examination of K.H. on the night of the encounter; it did not concern the results of the Code R analysis. The Code R nurse testified that her observations supported a nonconsensual encounter. But on cross-examination, she stated that the physical evidence was also consistent with a consensual encounter. Thus, the testimony surrounding the physical evidence was particularly equivocal. ¶ 44 We conclude that had the post-trial physical evidence been presented to the jury, it would have changed the record completely. It would have changed the way the jury evaluated the credibility of the parties; it would have injected doubt into the prosecution's case. We are confident that had the jury been able to consider the existence of physical exculpatory evidence in support of Mr. Lenkart's testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Mr. Lenkart's trial counsel's decision not to investigate or present this evidence deprived Mr. Lenkart of that opportunity. ¶ 45 We conclude that both prongs of the Strickland test have been satisfied and therefore, Mr. Lenkart was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court, vacate Mr. Lenkart's conviction, and remand for a new trial.