Opinion ID: 3011057
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Preemption of Air Safety Standards

Text: As the District Court set out in its thorough examination of the legislative history, the FAA was enacted in response to a series of fatal air crashes between civil and military aircraft operating under separate flight rules. United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969) (quoting 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3742). Congress's purpose in enacting the FAA was to promote safety in aviation and thereby protect the lives of persons who travel on board aircraft. In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 1983); accord Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 457 (3d Cir. 1976). Congress found the creation of a single, uniform system of regulation vital to increasing air safety. City of Burbank 9 v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973) (noting that a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation is required if the congressional objectives underlying the [FAA] are to be fulfilled); Christensen, 419 F.2d at 1404 (remarking that the whole tenor of the [FAA] and its principal purpose is to create and enforce one unified system of flight rules). By enacting the FAA, Congress intended to rest sole responsibility for supervising the aviation industry with the federal government: [A]viation is unique among transportation industries in its relation to the federal government--it is the only one whose operations are conducted almost wholly within federal jurisdiction, and are subject to little or no regulation by States or local authorities. Thus, the federal government bears virtually complete responsibility for the promotion and supervision of this industry in the public interest. S.Rep. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958). Similarly, the House Report accompanying the FAA indicates that one of the purposes of the Act is to give [t]he Administrator of the new Federal Aviation Agency 5 . . . full responsibility and authority for the advancement and promulgation of civil aeronautics generally, including promulgation and enforcement of safety regulations. H.R.Rep. No. 2360, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3741. In addition, in a letter included as part of the House Report, the Airways Modernization Board Chairman wrote: It is essential that one agency of government, and one agency alone, be responsible for issuing safety regulations if we are to have timely and effective guidelines for safety in aviation. Id. at 3761. Thus, legislative history reveals that Congress intended the Administrator, on behalf of the Federal Aviation Administration, to exercise sole discretion in regulating air _________________________________________________________________ 5. Originally called the Federal Aviation Agency, it was later renamed the Federal Aviation Administration and made part of the Department of Transportation. Department of Transportation Act, Pub.L. No. 89-670, SS 3(e)(1), 6(c)(1), 80 Stat. 931, 932, 938 (1966) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 10 safety. And this is exactly what Congress accomplished through the FAA. Congress enacted Chapter 447, Safety Regulation, and directed the Administrator to carry out this chapter in a way that best tends to reduce or eliminate the possibility or recurrence of accidents in air transportation. 49 U.S.C. S 44701(c). See City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 627 (noting that Congress gave the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration broad authority with respect to air safety standards). To effectuate this broad authority to regulate air safety, the Administrator of the FAA has implemented a comprehensive system of rules and regulations, which promotes flight safety by regulating pilot certification,6 pilot pre-flight duties,7 pilot flight responsibilities,8 and flight rules.9 The federal courts that adjudicated the first major cases involving the FAA interpreted its legislative history as evincing Congress's intent to exercise supremacy over the field of aviation safety. For instance, just after the passage of the FAA, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remarked: The Federal Aviation Act was passed by Congress for the purpose of centralizing in a single authority--indeed, in one administrator--the power to frame rules for the safe and _________________________________________________________________ 6. For example, 14 C.F.R. S 61.3 (1996) provides: No person may act as pilot in command, or in any other capacity as a required pilot flight crew member of a civil aircraft of United States registry unless he has in his personal possession a current pilot certificate issued to him under this part. 7. For example, before flight the pilot must review available information concerning the flight, 14 C.F.R. S 91.103 (1996), verify the aircraft's worthiness, 14 C.F.R. S 91.7 (1996), and ensure that passengers are briefed on the use of their seatbelts, 14 C.F.R. S 91.107 (1996). 8. For example, according to 14 C.F.R. S 91.13, [n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. 14 C.F.R. S 91.13 (1996). Furthermore 14 C.F.R. S 91.7 mandates that [t]he pilot in command shall discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur. 9. 14 C.F.R. S 91.101 states: This subpart prescribes flight rules governing the operation of aircraft within the United States and within 12 nautical miles from the coast of the United States. 11 efficient use of the nation's airspace. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960). Then, in City of Burbank, the Supreme Court held that Congress's consolidation of control of aviation in one agency indicated its intent to federally preempt aviation safety. 411 U.S. at 639. In reaching this decision, the Court first noted that the Solicitor General had conceded that airspace management was federally preempted. Id. at 627. Finding this to be a fatal concession, the Court held that state noise regulation was federally preempted because of its interrelationship with airspace management. Id. at 62728. Although he dissented in City of Burbank, Justice Rehnquist agreed with the majority on the issue of federal preemption, noting that Congress clearly intended to preempt the States from regulating aircraft in flight. 411 U.S. at 644. According to Justice Rehnquist, The 1958 Act was intended to consolidate in one agency in the Executive Branch the control over aviation that had previously been diffused within that branch. The paramount substantive concerns of Congress were to regulate federally all aspects of air safety, . . . and, once aircraft were in flight, air-space management . . .. Id. (emphasis added).10 _________________________________________________________________ 10. The decision in City of Burbank, regarding federal preemption, affirmed sentiments that, prior to the passage of the FAA, the Court had expressed regarding the nature of aviation. For instance, in Northwest Airlines, Inc v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944), Justice Jackson, in a concurrence, expressed the view that federal aviation by nature admits to only one uniform system of safety standards. He remarked: Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hand of federally certified personnel and under an intricate system of federal commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of controls. It takes off only by instruction from the control tower, it travels on prescribed beams, it may be diverted from its intended landing, and it obeys signals and orders. Its privileges, rights and protection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes to the Federal Government alone and not to any state governments. 12 In Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), a mid-air collision case, the Seventh Circuit found the rights and liabilities of the parties to be federally preempted. The court wrote of Congress's objective in enacting the FAA: [T]he principal purpose of the [FAA] is to create one unified system of flight rules and to centralize in the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration the power to promulgate rules for the safe and efficient use of the country's airspace. Id. at 404. The court found a predominant, indeed almost exclusive, interest of the federal government in regulating the affairs of the nation's airways. Id. at 403. Similarly, the Second Circuit recognized the broad scope of the FAA and its implied federal preemption of state air safety standards in British Airways Bd. v. Port Authority of New York, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1977), and held that, by enacting the 1968 noise control amendments to the FAA, Congress intended to strengthen the FAA's regulatory role within the area already totally preempted--control of flights through navigable airspace. Id. at 84; see also id. at 83 (stating that without federal preemption, [t]he likelihood of multiple, inconsistent rules would be a dagger pointed at the heart of commerce--and the rule applied might come literally to depend on which way the wind was blowing.). The understanding of the courts in these early cases that the FAA's broad scope implied federal preemption of aviation safety standards, has been affirmed over time. In recent decades, courts of appeals have found implied federal preemption of various aspects of air safety that states have attempted to regulate. For example, the First Circuit in French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989), found pilot regulation, which related to air safety, to be federally preempted. Id. at 6. The court held _________________________________________________________________ 322 U.S. at 303. This statement was cited by the Court in City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 638. See also Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 107 (1948) (noting that the nature of aviation called for a more penetrating, uniform and exclusive regulation by the nation than had been thought appropriate for the more easily controlled commerce of the past.). 13 that such an intent is implicit in the pervasiveness of relevant federal regulation, the dominance of the federal interest, and the legislative goal of establishing a single, uniform system of control over air safety. Id. at 6-7. The court explained: The intricate web of statutory provisions affords no room for the imposition of state law criteria vis-a-vis pilot suitability. We therefore conclude, without serious question, that preemption is implied by the comprehensive legal scheme which imposes on the [Administrator] the duty of qualifying pilots for air service. Id. at 4. Because the legislative history of the FAA and its judicial interpretation indicate that Congress's intent was to federally regulate aviation safety, we find that any state or territorial standards of care relating to aviation safety are federally preempted. Our analysis is sustained by reference to the broad scope of the FAA, described above. It also is supported by decisions in which courts found federal preemption of discrete, safety-related matters, such as airspace management, flight operations, and aviation noise, because of the promulgation of specific federal regulations over those aspects of air safety. See, e.g., City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633; San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1316 (9th Cir. 1981); Price v. Charter Township, 909 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Mich. 1995); see also id. at 1351 n.22 (citing numerous cases in which the courts held flight control regulation to reduce noise federally preempted); Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus , 76 F.3d 778, 786 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating in dictum that [federal] regulations preempt local law in regard to aircraft safety, the navigable airspace, and noise control); id. at 792 (Jones, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that local land and water use are not preempted, but that aviation safety, navigable airspace and noise control are preempted). It follows from the evident intent of Congress that there be federal supervision of air safety and from the decisions in which courts have found federal preemption of discrete, safety-related matters, that federal law preempts the 14 general field of aviation safety. Indeed, it would be illogical to conclude that, while federal law preempts state and territorial regulation of matters such as pilot licensing, it does not preempt regulations relating to the exercise of the specific skill for which licensing is necessary--pilots' operation of aircraft. Moreover, our move from specific to general regulation is not without support in FAA regulations themselves. For example, 14 C.F.R. S 91.13(a), which governs Careless or Reckless Operation, supplies a comprehensive standard of care to be exercised by pilots and flight crew. It provides, No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. In a case then where there is no specific provision or regulation governing air safety, S 91.13(a) provides a general description of the standard required for the safe operation of aircraft. Thus, in determining the standards of care in an aviation negligence action, a court must refer not only to specific regulations but also to the overall concept that aircraft may not be operated in a careless or reckless manner. The applicable standard of care is not limited to a particular regulation of a specific area; it expands to encompass the issue of whether the overall operation or conduct in question was careless or reckless. Moreover, when a jury is determining what constitutes careless or reckless operation of an aircraft, expert testimony on various aspects of aircraft safety may be helpful to the jury. In the present case, for example, the regulations on the use of seat belts and on the illumination of the fasten seat belt sign11 set the standard for determining both whether American _________________________________________________________________ 11. FAA regulations require passengers to wear their seat belts when the seat belt sign is illuminated: [T]he Fasten Seat Belt sign shall be turned on during any movement on the surface, for each takeoff, for each landing, and at any other time considered necessary by the pilot in command. . . . Each passenger . . . shall fasten his or her safety belt around him or her and keep it fastened while the Fasten Seat Belt sign is lighted. 14 C.F.R. S 121.317(b), (f). 15 operated the aircraft carelessly or recklessly and whether the passengers, who had not fastened their seatbelts, were contributorily negligent. In addition, expert testimony may help the jury to understand whether the way in which warnings of turbulence and/or illumination of seatbelt signs were conveyed to the passengers constituted careless or reckless operation. We conclude, therefore, that because of the need for one, consistent means of regulating aviation safety, the standard applied in determining if there has been careless or reckless operation of an aircraft, should be federal; state or territorial regulation is preempted.