Opinion ID: 807002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Post-Trial Accounting

Text: Finally, WhitServe appeals the denial of a post-trial accounting. “[W]hen damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (emphasis added). District courts have discretion to award damages for periods of infringement not considered by the jury. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “the district court was within its discretion to impose a royalty WHITSERVE v. COMPUTER PACKAGES 46 on [post-verdict sales not considered by the jury] in order to fully compensate” the patentee); Finjan, 636 F.3d at 1212-13 (explaining that the trial court erred when it did not award damages for the time between entry of judgment and entry of an injunction because otherwise the patentee would not be fully compensated); Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1353 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2009), modified in part by Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 366 F. App’x 154, 155 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that an accounting should be ordered in order to adequately compensate the plaintiff). WhitServe states that the jury’s verdict “was based on financial data up to March 31, 2010, and therefore does not include compensatory damages for CPi’s infringement after this date.” CPi argues that the jury’s award was a paid-up license and no accounting is necessary. “District courts have broad discretion to interpret an ambiguous verdict form, because district courts witness and participate directly in the jury trial process.” Telcordia, 612 F.3d at 1378. Here, however, not only did the trial court not exercise its discretion under Telcordia and find that the jury award included a paid-up license for post-verdict conduct, but we have already found that nothing in the record would support such a conclusion. Much like prejudgment interest, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to award, or explain its reasons for denying, damages for the period between the jury’s verdict and judgment. Accordingly, we vacate and remand this ruling. While we would normally direct an accounting of damages flowing from post-verdict and pre-judgment infringement, our decision to vacate the damages award and order a new trial would make such an accounting premature. On remand, the trial court 47 WHITSERVE v. COMPUTER PACKAGES shall give due consideration to any request for an accounting following a new damages verdict. 20 III. Whitmyer’s Cross-Appeal In his separate cross-appeal, Whitmyer claims the court erred in not awarding fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 or sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. A district court’s Rule 11 determination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., Inc., 275 F.3d 1066, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2002). A fee award under 35 U.S.C. § 285 first requires a finding that the case was exceptional. Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Whitmyer asked for sanctions and fees against CPi because CPi allegedly engaged in “vexatious” litigation. The trial court denied the motion because Whitmyer “failed to set forth facts warranting such relief.” On appeal, Whitmyer complains that CPi filed a de- claratory judgment against him in his personal capacity and deposed him 5 times for a total of 17 hours. CPi states that Whitmyer was deposed in his personal capacity as the sole principal of WhitServe and NetDocket and as a member of the St. Onge law firm, which is Net- Docket’s sole client and is representing Whitmyer in this matter. CPi also argues that, because WhitServe’s only assets are the patents, it was justified in counterclaiming against him personally in order to pierce the corporate veil and recover its fees. It also points out that Whitmyer never filed, or withdrew, any motions that argued that CPi failed to plead sufficient claims against Whitmyer, and thereby conceded that CPi was not acting vexatiously. 20WhitServe asks the court to fix damages for the period of time between March 31, 2010 and trial. This request is moot in light of the remand for a new damages trial. WHITSERVE v. COMPUTER PACKAGES 48 While CPi’s claims against Whitmyer are certainly questionable, including its original designation of him as a “counterclaim defendant,” after reviewing Whitmyer’s motion for fees and sanctions, as well as his truncated briefing on the issue, we decline to find an abuse of discretion in the court’s denial of sanctions. We also find that the court did not err in concluding that the case was not exceptional. Therefore, the trial court’s denial of Whitmyer’s request for fees and sanctions is affirmed.