Opinion ID: 1244769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: coerced confessions and reversal

Text: From the fact that it is error under both the United States and California Constitutions to admit a defendant's coerced confession into evidence at a criminal trial, let us now turn to the question of the consequences of such error.
It is the rule under the United States Constitution  Fulminante put to the side for the time being  that the admission of a defendant's coerced confession into evidence at a criminal trial requires automatic reversal. (See, e.g., Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 578, fn. 6 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470-471, 106 S.Ct. 3101] [hereafter sometimes Clark ]; United States v. Hasting (1983) 461 U.S. 499, 508, fn. 6 [76 L.Ed.2d 96, 105-106, 103 S.Ct. 1974]; New Jersey v. Portash (1979) 440 U.S. 450, 459 [59 L.Ed.2d 501, 510, 99 S.Ct. 1292]; Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398 [57 L.Ed.2d 290, 303-304, 98 S.Ct. 2408]; Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 483 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 623-624, 92 S.Ct. 619]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 & fn. 8 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065] [hereafter sometimes Chapman ]; Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 376 [12 L.Ed.2d 908, 915, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205]; Haynes v. Washington (1963) 373 U.S. 503, 518 [10 L.Ed.2d 513, 523-524, 83 S.Ct. 1336]; Lynumn v. Illinois (1963) 372 U.S. 528, 537 [9 L.Ed.2d 922, 928, 83 S.Ct. 917]; Blackburn v. Alabama (1960) 361 U.S. 199, 206, 211 [4 L.Ed.2d 242, 247-248, 250-251, 80 S.Ct. 274]; Spano v. New York (1959) 360 U.S. 315, 324 [3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 1272, 79 S.Ct. 1202]; Payne v. Arkansas, supra, 356 U.S. at p. 568 [2 L.Ed.2d at p. 981]; Brown v. Allen (1953) 344 U.S. 443, 475 [97 L.Ed.2d 469, 498-499, 93 S.Ct. 397]; Stroble v. California (1952) 343 U.S. 181, 190 [96 L.Ed. 872, 880-881, 72 S.Ct. 599]; Gallegos v. Nebraska (1951) 342 U.S. 55, 63 [96 L.Ed. 86, 93, 72 S.Ct. 141]; Haley v. Ohio (1948) 332 U.S. 596, 599 [92 L.Ed. 224, 228, 68 S.Ct. 302]; Malinski v. New York (1945) 324 U.S. 401, 404 [89 L.Ed. 1029, 1032, 65 S.Ct. 781]; Lyons v. Oklahoma (1944) 322 U.S. 596, 597, fn. 1 [88 L.Ed. 1481, 1483, 64 S.Ct. 1208]; Wan v. United States (1924) 266 U.S. 1, 17 [69 L.Ed. 131, 149, 45 S.Ct. 1]; Bram v. United States, supra, 168 U.S. at p. 541 [42 L.Ed. at p. 573].) The rationale of the rule is easy to discern. It is bottomed on the policy of fairness in the contest between the government and the individual, which underlies the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and the related rule barring the admission of a coerced confession. Stated more expansively, the rationale is to this effect: The harm caused by the violation  the skewed balance between the state and the accused  [can] be cured [only] by a new trial at which the confession and its fruits are excluded. Because the value in fair play is not concerned with reliability, the conviction [must] be reversed and [the] process redone even when the defendant is undeniably guilty and we are fully confident that the confession did not affect the jury's verdict. (Stacy & Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error (1988) 88 Colum. L.Rev. 79, 104 [hereafter Stacy & Dayton].) The rule of automatic reversal does not overlook the fact that a confession, when introduced at trial, constitutes evidence. But it recognizes that such evidence is sui generis. A plea of guilty is in essence a confession in open court.... ( In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 135, fn. 11 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449].) Similarly, a confession is substantially an extrajudicial plea of guilty. A coerced guilty plea cannot support a conviction: the former renders the latter a denial of due process. (See, e.g., Waley v. Johnston (1942) 316 U.S. 101, 104 [86 L.Ed. 1302, 1304, 62 S.Ct. 964].) It follows that a coerced confession cannot support a conviction for the same reason. ( Ibid. ) The rule, it must be emphasized, does not at all depend on considerations of reliability. In Jackson v. Denno, supra, 378 U.S. 368, the United States Supreme Court declared at page 376 [12 L.Ed.2d at page 915]: It is ... axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession [citation], and even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction. Associated with the fairness rationale is a more practical concern regarding the evidentiary force that inheres in confessions as such, which has compelled the recognition that where ... a coerced confession constitutes a part of the evidence before the jury ..., no one can say what credit and weight the jury gave to the confession. ( Payne v. Arkansas, supra, 356 U.S. at p. 568 [2 L.Ed.2d at p. 981].) Manifestly, the rule of automatic reversal dates back almost a century to Bram. (See Bram v. United States, supra, 168 U.S. at p. 541 [42 L.Ed. at p. 573].) There, the court flatly held that if a defendant's coerced confession is admitted, reversible error will result.... ( Ibid., italics added.) This holding cannot be treated as merely an instance of some general assumption that all federal constitutional errors are reversible per se. Barely two terms later, in Motes v. United States (1900) 178 U.S. 458, 475-476 [44 L.Ed. 1150, 1156, 20 S.Ct. 993], the court expressly held harmless the admission of evidence in violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Since Bram, as the citations in the initial paragraph of this section indicate, the rule has been firmly adhered to and reaffirmed time and again. The rule of automatic reversal arose in a period in which it was assertedly unclear whether and to what extent federal constitutional errors are subject to harmless-error analysis. (Stacy & Dayton, supra, 88 Colum. L.Rev. at pp. 82-83; compare Kotteakos v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 750, 764-765 [90 L.Ed. 1557, 1556-1567, 66 S.Ct. 1239] [stating in dictum that an error may be held harmless except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm] with Motes v. United States, supra, 178 U.S. at pp. 475-476 [44 L.Ed. at p. 1156] [holding harmless the admission of evidence in violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation].) In 1967, that period ended. In Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, the United States Supreme Court held that federal constitutional errors are, indeed, subject to harmless-error analysis. ( Id. at pp. 21-22 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 708-710].) In the court's words: [T]here may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. ( Id. at p. 22 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 709-710].) The standard is strict: [B]efore a federal constitutional error that is not automatically reversible can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711].) The Chapman court, however, expressly excepted from harmless-error analysis the admission of a coerced confession. Again in the court's own words: [O]ur prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.... ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) The court cited to Payne as one of those decisions, and to the introduction of a coerced confession as one of those errors. ( Id. at p. 23, fn. 8 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) Payne had held that, no matter what the other evidence, the admission in evidence ... of [a] coerced confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Payne v. Arkansas, supra, 356 U.S. at p. 568 [2 L.Ed.2d at p. 981].) In 1986, the United States Supreme Court revisited the question of harmless error. In Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570, the court concluded that federal constitutional errors are generally subject to harmless-error analysis. ( Id. at pp. 576-579 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 469-471].) It explained: `The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence [citation], and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.' ( Id. at p. 577 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 470], quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 681 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 684-685, 106 S.Ct. 1431].) All the same, the Clark court continued to expressly except from harmless-error analysis the admission of a coerced confession. ( Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 577-578 & fn. 6 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 470-471].) It did so because some errors necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair. The State of course must provide a trial before an impartial judge [citation], with counsel to help the accused defend against the State's charge [citation].... Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence [citation], and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair. Harmless-error analysis thus presupposes a trial, at which the defendant, represented by counsel, may present evidence and argument before an impartial judge and jury. ( Id. at pp. 577-578 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 470-471].) In the court's view, the use of [a] coerced confession abort[s] the basic trial process.... ( Id. at p. 578, fn. 6 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 470-471].) It does so, of course, because a confession is substantially an extrajudicial plea of guilty. Concurring in the judgment in Clark, Justice Stevens stated: As the Court recognizes, harmless-error inquiry remains inappropriate for certain constitutional violations no matter how strong the evidence of guilt may be. [Citations.] The Court suggests that the inapplicability of harmless error to these violations rests on concerns about reliability and accuracy, and that such concerns are the only relevant consideration in determining the applicability of harmless error. [Citation.] In fact, however, violations of certain constitutional rights are not, and should not be, subject to harmless-error analysis because those rights protect important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial. Thus, ... [t]he admission of a coerced confession can never be harmless even though the basic trial process was otherwise completely fair and the evidence of guilt overwhelming. In short, ... our Constitution, and our criminal justice system, protect other values besides the reliability of the guilt or innocence determination. ( Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 586-588 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 476-478], fn. omitted (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.).) Accordingly, the rule of automatic reversal survived the formal advent of harmless-error analysis in Chapman and its subsequent development in Clark. Indeed, the rule was explicitly reaffirmed in both decisions. The Chapman court simply cited to the unquestioned authority of Payne. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23, fn. 8 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) For its part, the Clark court  making an awkward attempt to fit settled federal constitutional law to its procrustean bed of reliability  asserted that the use of [a] coerced confession abort[s] the basic trial process.... ( Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 578, fn. 6 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 470].) Chapman and Clark were manifestly right to reaffirm the rule of automatic reversal. The threat of harm that harmless-error analysis is designed to assess concerns whether or not the outcome of an individual criminal trial is reliable. The harm that the admission of a coerced confession necessarily causes is the undermining of fairness in the contest between the government and the individual and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself. Hence, the application of harmless-error analysis to the introduction of a coerced confession is inappropriate: such analysis does not even take cognizance of the injury peculiar to error of this sort. The harm of a coerced confession can be cured only by reversal of the judgment and exclusion of the confession at any retrial. [5]
Separately and independently, it is the rule in California that the admission of a defendant's coerced confession into evidence at a criminal trial requires automatic reversal. (See, e.g., People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 605-606; People v. Sanchez (1969) 70 Cal.2d 562, 571 [75 Cal. Rptr. 642, 451 P.2d 74]; People v. Matteson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 466, 469 [39 Cal. Rptr. 1, 393 P.2d 161] [hereafter sometimes Matteson ]; People v. Brommel (1961) 56 Cal.2d 629, 634 [15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 364 P.2d 845]; People v. Trout (1960) 54 Cal.2d 576, 585 [6 Cal. Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231, 80 A.L.R.2d 1418]; People v. Berve (1958) 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [332 P.2d 97] [hereafter sometimes Berve ]; People v. Loper, supra, 159 Cal. at p. 20; People v. Barric (1874) 49 Cal. 342, 345; People v. Johnson (1871) 41 Cal. 452, 455; People v. Ah How (1867) 34 Cal. 218, 223-224.) The rationale of our rule of automatic reversal rests on the policy of fairness in the contest between the government and the individual, which underlies the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the related rule barring the admission of a coerced confession. In People v. Berve, supra, 51 Cal.2d 286, one of the landmark decisions in this area, we made the point plain: The introduction of a coerced confession constitutes a denial of due process of law ... under the ... state Constitution[] requiring a reversal of the conviction although other evidence may be consistent with guilt. [Citations.] `... Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency.... Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a society.' ( Id. at p. 290, quoting Rochin v. California (1952) 342 U.S. 165, 173-174 [96 L.Ed. 183, 190-191, 72 S.Ct. 205, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396].) Our rule too recognizes that a confession is indeed evidence, but evidence sui generis, being substantially an extrajudicial plea of guilty. A coerced guilty plea cannot support a conviction under California law. (See, e.g., People v. Wadkins (1965) 63 Cal.2d 110, 113-114 [45 Cal. Rptr. 173, 403 P.2d 429].) Under that same law, it follows, neither can a coerced confession. Associated with the fairness rationale, although apparently only in dictum in a single coerced-confession case, viz., People v. Matteson, supra, 61 Cal.2d 466, is the more practical concern regarding the evidentiary force that inheres in confessions as such. In People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378 [33 Cal. Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001]  which was not a coerced-confession case  we stated in dictum: Almost invariably, ... a confession will constitute persuasive evidence of guilt, and it is therefore usually extremely difficult to determine what part it played in securing the conviction. [Citations.] These considerations justify treating involuntary confessions as a class by themselves and refusing to inquire whether in rare cases their admission in evidence had no bearing on the result. ( Id. at p. 385.) This language was alluded to in dictum in Matteson, which was decided some years after Berve. (See People v. Matteson, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 470.) It must be noted that our rule of automatic reversal arose, and came to full stature, within a jurisprudence requiring harmless-error analysis. Our rule goes back to the early years of statehood. (See People v. Ah How, supra, 34 Cal. at pp. 223-224; People v. Johnson, supra, 41 Cal. at p. 455; People v. Barric, supra, 49 Cal. at p. 345.) It cannot be deemed, in its historical roots, simply a particularization of some presumption of prejudice that formerly attached to any error. Virtually since California's admission into the Union in 1850, no such presumption of prejudice has existed in this state. In 1851, harmless-error analysis was established by statute. Statutes 1851, chapter 29, section 499, page 267: After hearing the appeal, the Court shall give judgment without regard to technical error or defect, which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. This provision is the source of the substantially identical Penal Code section 1258, which was enacted in 1872 and has remained unchanged: After hearing the appeal, the court must give judgment without regard to technical errors or defects, or to exceptions, which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. So too, Statutes 1851, chapter 29, section 601, page 279: Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Act in respect to any pleadings or proceedings, nor an error or mistake therein shall render the same invalid, unless it have actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right. This provision is the source of the substantially identical Penal Code section 1404, which was enacted in 1872 and has remained unchanged: Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right. [6] In People v. Brotherton (1874) 47 Cal. 388, 404 (hereafter sometimes Brotherton ), we declared in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wallace for a unanimous court: ... Our judgment ..., it must be remembered, is to be given `without regard to technical error or defect which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.' That a technical error has intervened at the trial is, therefore, not of itself enough to warrant our interference. The prisoners must go further, and affirmatively show in some way that their substantial rights have been injuriously affected by the error complained of. The burden is upon them to do so. Mere intendments indulged here are in support of the proceedings below, so far as such intendments are consistent with the record. [7] We adhered to, and reaffirmed, Brotherton in such decisions as People v. Nelson (1880) 56 Cal. 77, 82; People v. Barnhart (1881) 59 Cal. 381, 384-385; and People v. Clark (1895) 106 Cal. 32, 40 [39 P. 53]. Thus, even as our rule of automatic reversal was arising, we were regularly conducting harmless-error analysis, in which we examined the entire cause, including the evidence. Accordingly, in many cases we concluded that errors of various sorts were not reversible because they were not prejudicial. For example, we held errors in pleading harmless in decisions including People v. Wynn (1901) 133 Cal. 72, 73 [65 P. 126]; People v. Haagen (1903) 139 Cal. 115, 116-117 [72 P. 836]; and People v. Mead (1904) 145 Cal. 500, 502-504 [78 P. 1047]. Similarly, we deemed harmless errors of procedure in cases such as People v. Sprague (1879) 53 Cal. 491, 494-495; People v. Gilbert (1880) 57 Cal. 96, 98-99; People v. O'Brien (1891) 88 Cal. 483, 488-489 [26 P. 362]; People v. Smalling (1892) 94 Cal. 112, 119-120 [29 P. 421]; and People v. Dolan (1892) 96 Cal. 315, 318-319 [31 P. 107]. Also, we held erroneous instructions harmless in decisions including People v. Nelson, supra, 56 Cal. at pages 81 to 83; and People v. Burns (1883) 63 Cal. 614, 615. Lastly  and of particular significance here  we deemed harmless errors bearing on the admission or exclusion of evidence in cases such as People v. Lee Chuck (1889) 78 Cal. 317, 321 [20 P. 719]; People v. Nelson (1890) 85 Cal. 421, 425, 429 [24 P. 1006]; People v. Dolan, supra, 96 Cal. at page 319; People v. Greening (1894) 102 Cal. 384, 386-387 [36 P. 665]; People v. Daniels (1894) 105 Cal. 262, 265 [38 P. 720]; People v. Clark, supra, 106 Cal. at pages 38 to 41; People v. Barthleman (1898) 120 Cal. 7, 15 [52 P. 112]; People v. Wynn, supra, 133 Cal. at page 73; and People v. Glaze (1903) 139 Cal. 154, 160-162 [72 P. 965], disapproved on another point in Funk v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 423, 425 [340 P.2d 593]. At a special election held on October 10, 1911, the people approved Proposed Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 26, and thereby added former section 4 1/2 to article VI of the California Constitution (hereafter sometimes former section 4 1/2): No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted in any criminal case on the ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In 1914, the constitutional provision was amended as to scope, in order to cover any case, civil as well as criminal, and also as to phrasing. In 1966, it was repealed as section 4 1/2 and added as section 13 (hereafter sometimes section 13): No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Thus, even as our rule of automatic reversal came to full stature, we regularly conducted harmless-error analysis, in which we examined the entire cause, including the evidence. Accordingly, in cases too numerous even to cite representatively, we have concluded that errors of various sorts were not reversible because they were not prejudicial. The practice we have adopted and followed over the years makes plain what is implicit in our decisions, viz., that our rule of automatic reversal treats the admission of a coerced confession as itself a miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), which at the very least tend[s] to [the defendant's] prejudice ... in respect to a substantial right (Pen. Code, § 1404) and cannot be deemed a mere technical error ( id., § 1258). (Cf. Davis v. City of Berkeley (1990) 51 Cal.3d 227, 239 [272 Cal. Rptr. 139, 794 P.2d 897] [holding that the practices adopted and followed by local governments to comply with the requirements of article XXXIV of the California Constitution, dealing with voter approval of low-rent housing projects, may appropriately be considered, and given considerable deference, in determining that constitutional provision's meaning].) On occasion, it is true, we have failed to apply our rule. Deviation, however, is not defeasance. Our rule of automatic reversal is not inconsistent with harmless-error analysis as established by sections 1258 and 1404 of the Penal Code and mandated by section 13 of article VI of the California Constitution. We need not detain ourselves long so far as harmless-error analysis under the statutory provisions is concerned. It is undisputed, and indeed indisputable, that the privilege against self-incrimination, under both the United States and California Constitutions, is one of the most substantial of rights. (Pen. Code, § 1258.) Similarly, it is settled beyond peradventure that the admission of a coerced confession must at the very least tend[] to [the defendant's] prejudice in respect to this most substantial right. ( Id., § 1404.) As for harmless-error analysis under the constitutional provision, we must spend considerably more time. The construction and application of section 13  former section 4 1/2  of article VI of the California Constitution are not easily determined, contrary to the evident belief of the majority (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 487-493) and others (see, e.g., People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 834-837 [299 P.2d 243] [hereafter sometimes Watson ]; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 466-467 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135] [hereafter sometimes Brown ] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.)). That is because the so-called seminal decision (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 491, 506) in People v. O'Bryan (1913) 165 Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042] (hereafter sometimes O'Bryan ) raises far more questions than it answers. At the outset, we must recognize, and in fact emphasize, a fact that has generally been overlooked. In O'Bryan, there is no opinion of the court. Justice Sloss authored the lead opinion, in which Justice Angellotti and Justice Shaw joined. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at pp. 57-68 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) For his part, Justice Lorigan authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Melvin and Justice Henshaw joined. ( Id. at pp. 68-70 (conc. opn. of Lorigan, J.).) Neither opinion commanded a majority. In the lead opinion in O'Bryan, Justice Sloss set forth the following facts. At trial before a jury, it was established beyond dispute that the defendant was a member of a labor organization striking the Llewellyn Iron Works, and that on the date in question he fatally shot one John D. Avila, a nonunion worker at Llewellyn. The point of controversy was whether or not the defendant intended to kill Avila. The prosecution sought to prove such intent. It presented evidence to show that the defendant sought to terrorize Avila because he was working for Llewellyn. Included, apparently, was certain testimony that the defendant had given before a grand jury. In Justice Sloss's words: On the day of the shooting, ... the defendant was arrested on suspicion of being concerned in the killing of Avila, and was held in custody in the county jail. [Some days later,] ... he was, by the sheriff, taken before the grand jury which was investigating the homicide, and was sworn and questioned concerning his actions before and at the time of the shooting. He was not informed of his constitutional right to decline to be a witness against himself, nor was he warned that his statements might be used against him. In response to the examination of the district attorney, he made to the grand jury a number of statements. These statements did not amount to a confession, indeed they were substantially unrelated to the shooting itself, but were admissible in evidence against the defendant as declarations against interest.... ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at pp. 60-61 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) The defendant denied intent to kill. Taking the stand, he testified on direct examination that he sought merely to frighten Avila, and not to cause him any injury. On cross-examination, the prosecution questioned him, over objection, as to certain testimony that he had given before the grand jury. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder of the first degree. The superior court entered judgment accordingly. On appeal, Justice Sloss concluded that the admission of the defendant's grand jury testimony was error. This testimony should not have been admitted. The course pursued was in violation of the constitutional right of every person not to `be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.' (Const. Cal., art. I, sec. 13.) ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 61 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) Here the defendant, when brought before the grand jury, was in custody under an accusation of guilt of the crime under investigation. Taken into the presence of that body by the sheriff, sworn and examined without the aid of counsel, and without any instruction as to his rights, it cannot be said that his submission to the interrogation was in any fair sense voluntary. The great preponderance of authority is that testimony so given by a defendant is not to be used against him. ( Id. at p. 62 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) But, conceding that error was committed in the admission of this testimony, Justice Sloss continued, there still remains the question whether the character and effect of the error were such as to require a reversal. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 63 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) Up to this point in Justice Sloss's lead opinion, as will subsequently appear, Justice Lorigan, together with the two justices who joined in his concurrence, did not disagree. In what follows, however, Justice Sloss spoke only for himself and for the two justices who joined in his opinion. The question of reversal, stated Justice Sloss, must be answered with due regard to the terms of section 4 of article VI, added to the constitution by amendment adopted in 1911. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 63 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) The general purpose of the amendment, he said, is plain. Inasmuch as under the pre-existing provisions of the constitution the jurisdiction of the supreme court and of the district courts of appeal was limited in criminal cases `to questions of law alone' [citation] it was incumbent upon these courts to reverse any judgment of conviction based upon proceedings which were affected in any degree by substantial error of law.... [W]here [the error was not trivial or could have prejudiced a substantial right] ... and ... was one which might or might not have turned the scale against the defendant, the limitation of the appellate jurisdiction to questions of law precluded the reviewing courts from weighing the evidence for the purpose of forming an opinion whether the error had or had not in fact worked injury. Having no jurisdiction in matters of fact, the court in which the appeal was pending was bound to apply the doctrine that prejudice was presumed to follow from substantial error. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at pp. 63-64 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) By the new constitutional provision, Justice Sloss went on, the appellate courts are empowered to examine `the entire cause, including the evidence' and are required to affirm the judgment, notwithstanding error, if error has not resulted `in a miscarriage of justice.' ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 64, italics in original (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) What, then, asked Justice Sloss, is a miscarriage of justice? The phrase is a general one and has not yet acquired a precise meaning. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 64 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) [W]e do not understand that the amendment in question was designed to repeal or abrogate the guaranties accorded persons accused of crime by other parts of the same constitution or to overthrow all statutory rules of procedure and evidence in criminal cases. ( Id. at p. 65 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) But it does not follow that every invasion of even a constitutional right necessarily requires a reversal. It may well be that the court, after examining the `entire cause including the evidence,' is of the opinion that the error complained of, whatever its character, has not resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The mere fact that the assignment of error is based upon a provision of the constitution is not conclusive. The final test is the opinion of the appellate court upon the result of the error. ( Id. at p. 66 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) Section 4 1/2 of article VI of our constitution, according to Justice Sloss, must be given at least the effect of abrogating the old rule that prejudice is presumed from any error of law. Where error is shown it is the duty of the court to examine the evidence and ascertain from such examination whether the error did or did not in fact work any injury. The mere fact of error does not make out a prima facie case for reversal which must be overcome by a clear showing that no injury could have resulted. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 65 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) Applying former section 4 1/2 to the facts, Justice Sloss concluded that the erroneous admission of the defendant's grand jury testimony had not resulted in a miscarriage of justice, essentially because [e]very material matter covered by [the testimony] was shown to the jury by other evidence, which was concededly admissible, and the truth of which was not contradicted. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at pp. 66, 67 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) Let us step out of O'Bryan for the moment. Having ourselves briefly reviewed the relevant history, we are compelled to conclude that Justice Sloss's statements are at best dubious. We need only recall two facts. First, for almost four decades prior to the addition of former section 4 1/2, we had conducted harmless-error analysis, and had done so without any presumption of prejudice. (See, e.g., People v. Nelson, supra, 56 Cal. at p. 82; People v. Barnhart, supra, 59 Cal. at pp. 384-385; People v. Clark, supra, 106 Cal. at p. 40.) Second, during that same period, we had conducted such analysis by means of an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Brotherton, supra, 47 Cal. at pp. 403-405; People v. Lee Chuck, supra, 78 Cal. at p. 321; People v. Nelson, supra, 85 Cal. at pp. 425, 429; People v. Dolan, supra, 96 Cal. at p. 319; People v. Greening, supra, 102 Cal. at pp. 386-387; People v. Daniels, supra, 105 Cal. at p. 265; People v. Clark, supra, 106 Cal. at pp. 38-41; People v. Barthleman, supra, 120 Cal. at p. 15; People v. Wynn, supra, 133 Cal. at p. 73; People v. Glaze, supra, 139 Cal. at pp. 160-162.) In attempting to determine the general purpose of former section 4 1/2, let us look to the arguments of the proponents of proposed Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 26, which added the provision to the California Constitution. The object of this amendment is to enable our courts of last resort to sustain verdicts in criminal cases unless there has been a miscarriage of justice, or, putting it in another way, its purpose is to render it unnecessary for the higher courts to grant the defendant in a criminal case a new trial for unimportant errors. It is designed to meet the ground of common complaint that criminals escape justice through technicalities. (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to the Cal. Const. with legislative reasons for and against adoption, Special Statewide Elec. (Oct. 10, 1911) [hereafter Ballot Pamp.], reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. A.E. Boynton; accord, id., reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. E.S. Birdsall.) ... [T]he adjective branch of our law has not kept pace with the development of substantive law. The trial of a criminal is so hedged about with technicalities that it has grown almost impossible to convict one whose wealth is sufficient to enable him to employ counsel skilled in the technique of criminal law. Thus there has grown up two systems of law  one for the poor, the other for the rich. The pauper prisoner is subjected to the iniquities of the `third degree' to secure from him incriminating evidence, while the wealthy one is surrounded by a corps of defenders, whose skill in barricading their client behind technicalities is usually commensurate with the fees secured. (Ballot Pamp., supra, reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. A.E. Boynton.) ... The reversal of the just conviction of a guilty man upon purely technical errors is the prime cause of want of confidence in our courts. (Ballot Pamp., supra, reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. A.E. Boynton.) In view of the foregoing, the general purpose of former section 4 1/2 was simply to constitutionally preclude reversals in criminal cases by appellate courts, and the attendant loss of public confidence in the criminal justice system, when the errors committed at trial were unimportant or purely technical. Informed with such an intent, the constitutional provision shows itself inapplicable to the admission of a coerced confession. As stated, a confession is evidence sui generis, being substantially an extrajudicial plea of guilty. The admission of a coerced confession, of course, is neither unimportant nor purely technical. Rather, it is a profoundly grave defect going to the very heart of a criminal trial under the California Constitution, which effectively defines a fair trial as one at which a coerced confession is not admitted. The proponents of the measure suggested as much. They made plain that former section 4 1/2 was aimed against the wealthy [prisoner], who is surrounded by a corps of defenders, whose skill in barricading their client behind technicalities is usually commensurate with the fees secured. (Ballot Pamp., supra, reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. A.E. Boynton.) They implied that it had nothing to do with the pauper prisoner  like the defendant in this very case  who is subjected to the iniquities of the `third degree' to secure from him incriminating evidence.... ( Ibid. ) It follows that the constitutional provision does not even reach our rule of automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession. True, the proponents of the measure criticized the so-called presumption of prejudice. (Ballot Pamp., supra, reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. A.E. Boynton; id., reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. E.S. Birdsall.) But they did so only in the context of errors that are unimportant or purely technical. ( Id., reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. A.E. Boynton; accord, id., reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. E.S. Birdsall.) Had the proponents of the measure desired to affect our rule, which does not presume prejudice for an unimportant or purely technical error but requires automatic reversal for a profoundly grave defect going to the very heart of a criminal trial, they would undoubtedly have given some indication. They did not. To do so would have been easy. They searched back almost 40 years to assail the doctrine announced in People v. Stanley, supra, 47 Cal. 113, that `every error in the admission of testimony is presumed to be injurious unless the contrary clearly appears[]' (Ballot Pamp., supra, reasons for adoption of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 26 by Sen. E.S. Birdsall)  even though Stanley was short-lived and long dead, having been effectively overruled in People v. Brotherton, supra, 47 Cal. 388, only a few months after it was decided. Certainly, they could not have missed People v. Loper, supra, 159 Cal. 6, which had been handed down not a year earlier. There, we held that the admission of a coerced confession was reversible even on the assumption that the prosecution had a perfect case without the confession, i.e., the evidence in this case was so complete without the confession of the defendant that the jury would have found him guilty even if the confession had been entirely omitted. ( Id. at p. 20.) To be fair, Justice Sloss did not completely miss what miscarriage of justice under former section 4 1/2 might comprehend. When we speak of administering `justice' in criminal cases, under the English or American system of procedure, we mean something more than merely ascertaining whether an accused is or is not guilty. It is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 65 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) For example, said Justice Sloss, if a court should undertake to deny to a defendant charged with a felony the right of trial by jury, and after a hearing of the evidence render a judgment of conviction, it cannot be doubted that such judgment should be set aside even though there had been the clearest proof of guilt. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at pp. 65-66 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) Or, he went on, if a defendant, after having been once acquitted, should be again brought to trial and thereupon convicted, in disregard of his plea that he had been once in jeopardy, it would hardly be suggested that because he was in fact guilty, no `miscarriage of justice' had occurred. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 66 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) Or  we might add  if a court should receive in evidence a defendant's coerced confession, it cannot be questioned that any ensuing conviction should be overturned notwithstanding guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This is because the harm caused by each of the three errors  denial of a jury trial, rejection of a plea of once in jeopardy, and admission of a coerced confession  is the undermining of fairness in the contest between the government and the individual and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself. Such harm can be cured only by reversal. ... When a defendant has been denied any essential element of a fair trial or due process, which must surely include the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the related rule barring the admission of a coerced confession, even the broad saving provisions of section 4 1/2 of article VI of our state Constitution cannot remedy the vice and the judgment cannot stand. ( People v. Sarazzawski (1945) 27 Cal.2d 7, 11 [161 P.2d 934] ( per curiam ).) The fact that a record shows a defendant to be guilty of a crime does not necessarily determine that there has been no miscarriage of justice. ( People v. Mahoney (1927) 201 Cal. 618, 627 [258 P. 607] ( per curiam ).) Let us now return to O'Bryan. In his concurring opinion, Justice Lorigan agreed with Justice Sloss's result affirming the judgment but disagreed with his views as to the construction of section 4 1/2 of article VI of the constitution and its application under the evidence. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 68 (conc. opn. of Lorigan, J.).) He was of the opinion that neither the construction nor application of this section is necessarily involved in the disposition of this appeal, and, therefore, the discussion upon it is obiter. ... ( Ibid. ) Justice Lorigan continued: It was, as pointed out in the [lead] opinion, error for the court to have admitted in evidence on behalf of the state the statements made by the defendant before the grand jury. This was in violation of the constitutional right of the defendant not to `be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 69 (conc. opn. of Lorigan, J.).) Such an error, Justice Lorigan suggested, might generally require automatic reversal, notwithstanding former section 4 1/2: If the defendant had not subsequently become a witness on the trial in his own behalf but had stood squarely upon the error of the court in permitting evidence of those statements, I am not prepared just now to say that against this violation of a constitutional right the section of the constitution could be interposed. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 69 (conc. opn. of Lorigan, J.).) Automatic reversal, Justice Lorigan concluded, was not required in this case: [H]ere the defendant did not stand upon the error. He became subsequent to its admission a witness in his own behalf and gave testimony in chief upon such matters as warranted the district attorney upon cross-examination in covering all the matters concerning which he had made statements before the grand jury. This district attorney was justified in cross-examining him as to all these matters and the testimony of the defendant respecting them was substantially a reiteration of the statements he made before the grand jury. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 69 (conc. opn. of Lorigan, J.).) Therefore, Justice Lorigan proceeded, what controlled was the general rule of harmless-error analysis, to which this court long since has given succinct utterance ... in People v. Brotherton, 47 Cal. 388, 404.... [W]hatever error was committed by the court in the first instance was cured by this subsequently properly elicited testimony covering the same matters. The original prejudicial character as error was obviated by this subsequent confirmatory evidence of the defendant and under the general rule which has always obtained here the error became harmless and could not be successfully invoked by defendant to obtain a reversal. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 69 (conc. opn. of Lorigan, J.).) Returning to his beginning, Justice Lorigan stated: This being the general rule applied before the constitutional amendment referred to was made, it is as directly applicable now since the amendment, and the assignment of the ruling as error was without merit by virtue of the general rule and in my opinion, therefore, it is unnecessary obiter to construe or apply the amendment in disposing of this alleged error. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 69 (conc. opn. of Lorigan, J.).) In the years after O'Bryan, we revisited the question of the construction and application of former section 4 1/2 in only one major decision. In People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, Justice Spence, in his opinion for the court, addressed former section 4 1/2. In all respects save one, he did little more than follow Justice Sloss's lead opinion in O'Bryan. The exception was this: he articulated what was to become the general standard for harmless-error analysis under the constitutional provision. Giving due consideration to the varying language heretofore employed in relating the constitutional amendment to the particular situations involved, he stated, it appears that the test generally applicable may be stated as follows: That a `miscarriage of justice' should be declared only when the court, `after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' is of the `opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Three points bear emphasis. First, Justice Spence's opinion did not hold that former section 4 1/2 precluded automatic reversal for certain errors, but merely stated the test that was generally applicable when harmless-error analysis was appropriate. [C]ertain fundamental rights, he declared, are guaranteed to the defendant upon which he can insist regardless of the state of the evidence, such as the right to a jury trial and the right to protection under the plea of once in jeopardy.... ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 835.) Second, Justice Spence's opinion did not hold that former section 4 1/2 mandated the so-called reasonable probability standard as the only test that could be employed when harmless-error analysis is appropriate, but simply defined that standard as the test that was generally applicable. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, italics added.) In a word, the constitutional provision does not expressly or impliedly mandate[] any specific standard of prejudice for any kind of error in any kind of proceeding. ( People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 467 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Third, and most important, Justice Spence's opinion did not raise the reasonable probability standard to constitutional status alongside former section 4 1/2 itself. That test is merely a gloss on the constitutional provision. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 834-837.) In Watson, Justice Carter, in dissent, disagreed with Justice Spence's opinion as to both the construction and application of former section 4 1/2. One of his comments should be noted: It is perfectly obvious to me  and, indeed, it should be perfectly obvious to all who give the matter any consideration  that the concept of the framers of section 4 1/2 of article VI of our Constitution was that technical errors in instructions to the jury or in the admission or rejection of evidence or errors in pleading or procedure which could not affect the result in a case should not be relied upon as a ground for the reversal of a judgment. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 840 (dis. opn. of Carter, J.).) In view of the foregoing, we must allow that the construction and application of what was formerly section 4 1/2 and what is now section 13 may be hard to determine fully and with precision. But we can at least arrive at this conclusion. The constitutional provision was not intended to abrogate or obviate our rule of automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession. It was designed simply to constitutionally preclude a reversal when the error in question is unimportant or purely technical  unlike the introduction of a coerced confession, which is a profoundly grave defect going to the very heart of a criminal trial. In concluding to the contrary, the majority make several missteps that prove to be fatal. First and most serious, the majority fail to recognize that what was formerly section 4 1/2 and what is now section 13 was not intended even to reach our rule of automatic reversal. They pay too little attention to the constitutional provision's words and its historical background and context, and too much attention to Justice Sloss's lead opinion in O'Bryan. The fact that several decisions have subsequently cited that opinion does not render it sound. Perhaps it was clear to Justice Sloss that the constitutional provision applies to constitutional as well as to nonconstitutional errors.... (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 501.) It was not clear to Justice Lorigan or, more significantly, to the proponents of the measure, who intended it to forgive unimportant or purely technical errors, among which constitutional defects do not seem to figure. In addition, our many decisions recognizing the rule of automatic reversal did not los[e] sight of the principal purpose and significance of the constitutional provision. ( Id. at p. 503.) Rather, the majority themselves appear never to have caught sight of such matters in the first place. Second and perhaps as serious, the majority assume without basis that a criminal trial can be deemed fair under the California Constitution even if a coerced confession is admitted. Surely the framers of the state charter would be surprised. The state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the related rule barring the admission of a coerced confession effectively define a trial as fair only if it is without such a taint. In the lead opinion in O'Bryan, Justice Sloss was certainly right on one point: When we speak of administering `justice' in criminal cases, under the English or American system of procedure, we mean something more than merely ascertaining whether an accused is or is not guilty. It is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 65 (lead opn. by Sloss, J.).) It appears beyond question that substantial rights include the privilege against self-incrimination and that orderly legal procedure does not allow the introduction of a coerced confession. Third, and related to the preceding, the majority treat a confession as though it were ordinary evidence, which has long been subject to harmless-error analysis. Of course, it is not. As stated, a confession is evidence sui generis, being substantially an extrajudicial plea of guilty. Fourth, the majority, in purporting to consider our rule of automatic reversal and its rationale, actually set up and knock down what is nothing more than a straw man. As stated, the rule with which we are concerned requires automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession. But the rule that the majority choose to attack is the derivative and broader one that treats as reversible per se the introduction of any confession violative of the United States Constitution. The majority confuse the two. Contrary to their implication, the latter rule is not at issue in this matter. (See fn. 1, ante. ) Similarly, the rationale of our rule of automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession rests on the policy of fairness in the contest between the government and the individual, which underlies the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the related rule barring the admission of a coerced confession. But the rationale that the majority decide to criticize depends on considerations regarding the inherent evidentiary force of confessions as such, which is not substantially associated with the rule at issue. The majority confuse the two rationales. Contrary to their implication, the considerations referred to above are not prominent in coerced-confession cases. (See, e.g., People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 605-606; People v. Sanchez, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 571; People v. Brommel, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 634; People v. Trout, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 585; People v. Berve, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 290; People v. Loper, supra, 159 Cal. at p. 20; People v. Barric, supra, 49 Cal. at p. 345; People v. Johnson, supra, 41 Cal. at p. 455; People v. Ah How, supra, 34 Cal. at pp. 223-224; but see People v. Matteson, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 470 [dictum].) The majority's confusion of rules and rationales is manifest. Their discussion focuses largely and extensively on People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 728-731 [44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665] (hereafter sometimes Schader ), and its progeny, including People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319, 329-331 [46 Cal. Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555] (hereafter sometimes Jacobson ). These decisions did not involve coerced confessions, but instead statements obtained in violation of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel as enunciated in the then new doctrine (5 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Trial, § 2676, p. 3215) of Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]. Schader is the source of the rule that the introduction of any confession violative of the United States Constitution is reversible per se. It employed as its foundation the rule requiring automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession. It proceeded to extend that rule into the derivative and broader rule referred to above. In doing so, it did not rely on the nature of the underlying violation. The reason is manifest: as explained, the admission of a coerced confession is a profoundly grave defect going to the very heart of a criminal trial; the introduction of a statement offensive to Escobedo and Dorado is not comparable. Rather, Schader used as its rationale the fact that evidentiary force inheres in confessions as such  that, in its own words, any confession operates as a kind of evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense ( People v. Schader, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 731). Jacobson followed Schader in this regard, recognizing the rule and its rationale. (See People v. Jacobson, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 329-330.) It also distinguished Schader in accordance with its own terms, concluding that, on the peculiar facts of that particular case, two statements improperly obtained under Escobedo and Dorado were ... merely cumulative to eight properly obtained statements. ( Id. at p. 331.) As a result of their confusion, the majority in effect challenge not the rule of automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession but rather the derivative and broader rule that the introduction of any confession violative of the United States Constitution is reversible per se. Whether they are successful  a dubious proposition  matters not. As stated, the latter rule is not at issue, only the former. Moreover, the latter rule may fall without taking down the former. The majority attempt to hide their confusion of rules and rationales  from themselves or from others or from both, I cannot say  by declaring that there is nothing in ... any ... decision of this court that supports the ... distinction set out above. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 504, fn. 15.) Can the majority possibly mean that the rule of automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession was not extended in Schader into the derivative and broader rule that the introduction of any confession violative of the United States Constitution is reversible per se? Schader itself belies any such claim. (See People v. Schader, supra, 62 Cal.2d at pp. 728-731.) Or can the majority possibly mean that the rationale of the rule of automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession rests on the evidentiary force that inheres in confessions as such? Any such claim founders on coerced-confession cases decided both before and after Schader, including People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d 595, 605-606; People v. Sanchez, supra, 70 Cal.2d 562, 571; People v. Brommel, supra, 56 Cal.2d 629, 634; People v. Trout, supra, 54 Cal.2d 576, 585; People v. Berve, supra, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290; People v. Loper, supra, 159 Cal. 6, 20; People v. Barric, supra, 49 Cal. 342, 345; People v. Johnson, supra, 41 Cal. 452, 455; and People v. Ah How, supra, 34 Cal. 218, 223-224. Among coerced-confession cases, the only apparent exception in this regard  such as it is  is our pre- Schader decision in People v. Matteson, supra, 61 Cal.2d 466. There, we concluded that the admission of a coerced confession required automatic reversal. ( Id. at p. 469.) We also concluded that the error was not cured by the trial court's striking the confession and admonishing the jury to disregard it entirely. In cases involving involuntary statements of the accused, we reasoned, the weight of other evidence of guilt is not considered. Incriminating statements from defendant's own tongue are most persuasive evidence of his guilt, and the part they play in securing a conviction cannot be determined. (See People v. Parham, supra, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385.) For the same reason, an admonition or an instruction to the jury to disregard involuntary incriminating statements does not cure the erroneous admission of such statements. ( People v. Matteson, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 470, italics added.) To the extent that the majority imply that the italicized dictum in Matteson is somehow typical of coerced-confession cases (maj. opn., ante, p. 494), they turn reality on its head. This language, as even a cursory review of the cited coerced-confession cases demonstrates, is altogether atypical. To claim otherwise is to indulge in revisionist history. One final point: Our rule of automatic reversal is indeed our rule. It arose more than a hundred years ago without citation to the United States Constitution or decisions construing that instrument. (See, e.g., People v. Ah How, supra, 34 Cal. at pp. 223-224; People v. Johnson, supra, 41 Cal. at p. 455; People v. Barric, supra, 49 Cal. at p. 345.) Moreover, it came to full stature well before 1967. It was only in that year, in its landmark Chapman decision, that the United States Supreme Court declared that the question of reversibility for error in a state criminal trial, even error of federal constitutional dimension, was governed other than by state law. (See Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 22-24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 709-711]; see, generally, id. at pp. 45-57 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 722-729] (dis. opn. of Harlan, J.).) Prior to that time it was commonly believed, apparently, that the issue was one of state law. Certainly that was our belief. (See, e.g., People v. Bostick (1965) 62 Cal.2d 820, 823-827 [44 Cal. Rptr. 649, 402 P.2d 529]; People v. Powell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 56 [59 Cal. Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137] [implying that before Chapman we believed that our inquiry was limited to article V, section 13, of our Constitution]; see also Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 51-53 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 725-727] (dis. opn. of Harlan, J.) [implying that California courts had applied the California harmless-error rule ... incorporated in that State's constitution to errors of federal constitutional dimension as well as those of state law].) To be sure, our rule has in its latter days become adorned with citations to federal constitutional provisions and decisions relating thereto. But it is simply not compelled by any of them. [8] The majority recognize that our rule of automatic reversal is indeed our rule. Here, they do no more than bow to necessity. But in an apparent effort to diminish the authority of our rule, the majority seek to show that it arose only 35 years ago in People v. Berve, supra, 51 Cal.2d 286. The attempt falters on the facts. As stated, the rule goes back well over a century, not merely three and one-half decades. This is not to deny that Berve is peculiarly significant. In Watson, we restated, but did not invent, the long-established general rule of harmless-error analysis. Similarly, in Berve, which was decided only two years later, we restated, but did not invent, the long-established exception for the admission of a coerced confession. Certainly, the majority's assertion that in the period before Berve we subjected the admission of coerced confessions to harmless-error analysis in each of numerous decisions (maj. opn., ante, pp. 494 & 502, fn. 14) is what may most charitably be labeled an overstatement. A brief review of the cases they cite proves the point. Thus, in People v. Gonzales (1944) 24 Cal.2d 870 [151 P.2d 251], People v. Rogers (1943) 22 Cal.2d 787 [141 P.2d 722], and People v. Ferdinand (1924) 194 Cal. 555 [229 P. 341], we did not even consider whether to apply our rule of automatic reversal because we did not find any confession to have been coerced. Rather, in Gonzales, we simply held harmless the erroneous refusal of an instruction that the jury was to determine the voluntariness of the defendant's confession. ( People v. Gonzales, supra, 24 Cal.2d at pp. 877-878.) In Rogers, we found an instruction on corpus delicti to be prejudicial error ( People v. Rogers, supra, 22 Cal.2d at pp. 806-808)  expressly noting that the defendant had not challenged the admissibility of his confessions upon any ground which required a ruling as to whether they had been freely or voluntarily made, and the trial judge evidently did not determine this of his own motion ( id. at p. 798). In Ferdinand, we held harmless what we assumed to be the erroneous refusal to permit defense counsel to examine a witness on voir dire concerning the circumstances of the confession of one of the defendants. ( People v. Ferdinand, supra, 194 Cal. at pp. 565-570.) In People v. Jones (1944) 24 Cal.2d 601 [150 P.2d 801]  contrary to the majority's assertion  we did indeed apply a rule of automatic reversal, but apparently that of the United States Constitution and not California law. At the beginning of our discussion therein, after relating the facts, we observed that the evidence other than the defendant's confession was clearly insufficient to establish guilt. ( Id. at p. 604.) But at the end, before proceeding to disposition, we held: `The Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an American Court by means of a coerced confession....' ( Id. at p. 611, quoting Ashcraft v. Tennessee (1944) 322 U.S. 143, 155 [88 L.Ed. 1192, 1200, 64 S.Ct. 921].) In People v. Stroble (1951) 36 Cal.2d 615 [226 P.2d 330], by contrast, we concluded that the federal constitutional rule of automatic reversal did not apply on the peculiar facts of that case  erroneously, it turns out. In affirming a judgment of death therein, we assume[d] that the first of at least six confessions made by the defendant was coerced. ( Id. at p. 623.) We then recognized that the introduction in evidence of such a confession ... would offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and require automatic reversal. ( Ibid. ) Nevertheless, we held that, under the circumstances presented, the use of the first confession could not have affected the fairness of defendant's trial, because defendant thereafter made at least five confessions, of materially similar substance and unquestioned admissibility, which were put in evidence. ( Ibid. ) On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed sub nomine Stroble v. California, supra, 343 U.S. 181. In doing so, however, it rejected our assumption that the first confession was coerced: [W]e are unable to say that [this] confession ... was the result of coercion.... ( Id. at p. 191 [96 L.Ed. at p. 191].) But it also rejected our holding that automatic reversal could have been avoided: If th[is] confession ... was in fact involuntary, the conviction cannot stand.... ( Id. at p. 190 [96 L.Ed. at p. 191].) In a related effort to diminish the authority of our rule, the majority effectively criticize Berve and its progeny for not discussing our allegedly numerous decisions subjecting the admission of coerced confessions to harmless-error analysis. But as shown, there was practically nothing to discuss. The exception, of course, is People v. Stroble, supra, 36 Cal.2d 615. After the United States Supreme Court declared on certiorari that our use of harmless-error analysis therein was erroneous, what was left for us to say? In a further effort to diminish the authority of our rule, the majority again set up and knock down their straw man, confusing this rule requiring automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession with its rationale resting on the policy of fairness in the contest between the government and the individual  which is at issue here  and the derivative and broader rule that treats as reversible per se the introduction of any confession violative of the United States Constitution with its rationale depending on considerations regarding the inherent evidentiary force of confessions as such  which is not at issue. As a result, the majority imply that Berve and its progeny did not suggest that the ... admission of a [coerced] confession ... deprived the defendant of the `orderly legal process' constituting a fair trial, but instead reasoned that such a confession `almost invariably' plays a significant role in any criminal trial in which it is introduced. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 502.) That is simply not the case. In Berve we made the point plain: The admission of a coerced confession constitutes a denial of due process of law ... under the ... state Constitution[] requiring a reversal of the conviction although other evidence may be consistent with guilt solely because the presence of such a confession `offend[s] the community's sense of fair play and decency.' ( People v. Berve, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 290, quoting Rochin v. California, supra, 342 U.S. at p. 173 [96 L.Ed.2d at pp. 190-191].)