Opinion ID: 781912
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered

Text: 36 It is this factor that weighs most heavily in favor of applying Indiana law. Though Appellants urge us instead to consider Ohio law because the actual accident occurred in Ohio, the relationship between Muncie and UTA was centered principally in Indiana. See Cheatham v. Thurston Motor Lines, 654 F.Supp. 211, 214 (S.D.Ohio 1986) (explaining that for third-party claims in product liability actions, courts should look to where the product was sold, manufactured, and modified, not solely to the place where the product caused injury). 37 Since 1969, Muncie has worked with UTA and its predecessors in developing designs for the hydraulic tanks in Indiana. In 1976, Muncie approved the new design for the tank involved in the accident at issue here, and that tank was manufactured by UTA's predecessor, Alma Plastics, in Indiana. At all times relevant to this action, Muncie took delivery of the tanks in Indiana at its facility in that state. Muncie's action against UTA alleges that UTA is jointly responsible for the defectively designed and manufactured tank and the lack of adequate warnings. Therefore, any design or manufacturing defects or failure to provide proper warnings were the result of the business relationship between Muncie and UTA occurring wholly in Indiana. 38 Though the first factor weighs in favor of applying Ohio law, the Restatement states explicitly that the location of the injury is not dispositive. See RESTATEMENT § 173 cmt. a (The state where conduct and injury occurred will not by reason of these contacts alone be the state that is primarily concerned with the question whether one tortfeasor may obtain contribution against another.). The balance of the factors clearly supports the application of Indiana law. In particular, the second and fourth factors weigh heavily in favor of applying Indiana law. As section 145 instructs, the factors are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. Restatement § 145; see also Miller v. Long-Airdox Co., 914 F.2d 976, 978 (7th Cir.1990) (Generally, in a tort case, the two most important contacts are the place where the injury occurred and the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred.). Factors two and four are clearly the most important factors in this action because it is a claim for contribution based on a product liability claim concerning design and manufacturing defects allegedly occurring in Indiana. Though we do not intentionally ignore the fact that Bowling's lawsuit against Muncie was filed and decided in Ohio, we find that the previous lawsuit does not exclusively guide the analysis that we undertake here. 39 Furthermore, in considering the general principles governing choice-of-law analysis outlined in section 6, the law of Indiana is most appropriate. See MacDonald v. Gen. Motors Corp. 110 F.3d 337, 342 (6th Cir.1997) (explaining that the general principles governing choice of law under § 6 should be used to guide choice-of-law analysis); see also RESTATEMENT § 173, cmt. a (noting that there is a growing realization that all issues in tort need not be governed by the same law). We concede that Ohio is interested in preventing the sale of defective products in its state. That interest, however, was satisfied by the judgment against Muncie and the award of damages to Bowling in the state-court action. See Cheatham, 654 F.Supp. at 214 (In product liability claims, the primary interest of a state is to deter the sale and/or manufacture of negligently or defectively manufactured goods to that state's citizens.); see also Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 1354, 1360 (8th Cir.1994) ([t]he Missouri law of products liability ... is even more concerned with compensating injured victims and protecting the expectation interests of the victim.) (citations omitted). Muncie's subsequent claims against a third party to recover part of the damages resulting from the tort action have little effect on Ohio's interest in the underlying tort claim. Bowling's award will not be reduced or increased as a result of Muncie's contribution action, and Muncie's liability for Bowling's injuries similarly will remain unchanged. See RESTATEMENT § 145 cmt. c (stating that `the interest of a state in having its tort rule applied ... will depend on the purpose sought to be achieved by that rule'). 40 Finally, Appellants rely on the fact that the tort occurred in Ohio and argue that Ohio has developed an entire tort scheme that includes actions for contribution and indemnification. Though Ohio's policy is to recognize actions by joint tortfeasors for contribution, Indiana's policy not to recognize such actions is more important here because Indiana is more interested in determining the rights of parties whose conduct was centered in its state. Therefore, Indiana law applies to this contribution claim and Muncie's claim must fail as Indiana does not recognize actions for contribution.