Opinion ID: 1841590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Separation of Powers and Article IV, Section 8

Text: ¶ 24. Wahl makes two separation of powers arguments that we consider together. First, he asserts that the subpoena intrudes into a core zone of legislative power thereby violating an area constitutionally reserved exclusively to the legislature contrary to the separation of powers doctrine. Second, he contends that Wis. Stat. § 13.96 is an Article IV, Section 8 rule of proceeding that may be interpreted only by the legislature. The State counters that it is the prerogative of the executive branch to investigate crime and assure the faithful execution of the laws, which is the object of all aspects of the John Doe proceeding. It also asserts that § 13.96 is not a rule of proceeding, but even if it were, courts may interpret it as not precluding executive inquiry into potential criminal acts of the legislature. ¶ 25. Separation of powers is a foundational principle of our tri-partite system of government, wherein each branch has equal power and a region of independent authority. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 825-26. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). However, there are many areas of shared power. Guzman v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 2001 WI App 21, ¶ 13, 240 Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776. When an issue exclusively committed to the legislative branch is brought before the courts, it is often described as a political question that is non-justiciable. Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93, ¶ 192, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388 (Sykes, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-11. ¶ 26. The LTSB has not demonstrated why the use of the data it has collected cannot be shared with the executive branch when potentially criminal conduct is at issue. The subpoena is not attempting to change the way in which the legislature functions, but rather attempting to gather information to investigate the commission of a crime. If all of the documents maintained by LTSB were out-of-bounds to such an investigation, the legislature would have effectively immunized its members and employees from criminal prosecution and in so doing usurped the role of the executive branch in assuring the faithful execution of the laws and the prosecution of crime. And finally, all of the information sought concerns past communications. It does not concern present or future communications within the legislature. ¶ 27. A related question is presented by the LTSB's argument that only the legislature can determine if the subpoena is enforceable because Wis. Stat. § 13.96 is a rule of proceeding. Article IV, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that [e]ach house may determine the rules of its own proceedings . . . . The LTSB cites this section of the constitution as a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment that the question of the subpoena's enforceability is a non-justiciable political question. [9] ¶ 28. Courts generally are unwilling to decide whether the legislature adhered to its own rules governing how it operates. State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 365, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983). The rationale for this judicial reluctance is that a legislative failure to follow the legislature's procedural rules is equivalent to an ad hoc repeal of such rules, which the legislature is free to do at any time. Id. ¶ 29. At its core, the LTSB's argument depends upon our conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 13.96 is a rule of proceeding within the meaning of Article IV, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Therefore, we may exercise our jurisdiction to decide whether § 13.96 is a rule of proceeding because that issue presents as a question of constitutional interpretation. State ex rel. Elfers v. Olson, 26 Wis. 2d 422, 426, 132 N.W.2d 526 (1965); see also Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963). ¶ 30. We note that Wis. Stat. § 13.96 has nothing to do with the process the legislature uses to propose or pass legislation or how it determines the qualifications of its members. It simply provides for assistance with electronic data and for an electronic storage closet for communications created or received by legislators and other employees of the legislature. Furthermore, the legislative history of § 13.96 shows that the LTSB was created to relieve the Legislative Reference Bureau of performing such technology-centered support duties. [10] See 1997 Wis. Act 27, § 18; Cf. Wis. Stat. § 13.92(1)(d) (1996-97) and § 13.92(1) (1997-98). ¶ 31. Moreover, the subpoena seeks information in the course of an investigation into potentially criminal conduct, a function of the executive branch. And finally, Wis. Stat. § 13.96 is not necessarily in conflict with a John Doe judge's statutory authority to investigate whether a crime has been committed. Provision of the communications requested can be accomplished in a manner that continues their confidential nature until the legislator or legislative employee can be heard by a court on the merits of any claim of privilege for individual communications. Accordingly, we conclude that neither the separation of powers nor Article IV, Section 8 provides an absolute defense to the compulsion of a John Doe subpoena. We do not address whether privilege may lie for any individual communication because that question is not before us, as we have no way of knowing what the tapes may contain.