Opinion ID: 1223302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Photographs of the campsite

Text: The second issue for our review is whether the trial court improperly denied Appellant's motion for mistrial based upon the fact that the State introduced photographs of the campsite which pre-dated the murder by more than one year and which, for that reason, were later deemed inadmissible. During its opening statement, the State showed to the jury several black and white photographs of Mr. King's campsite. The purpose of the photographs was to demonstrate to the jury that Mr. King took pride in the home he made for himself on the riverbank; that he kept it neat, orderly and organized; and that the campsite's normal appearance sharply contrasted the destruction and disarray depicted in photographs taken by the police following Mr. King's murder. After the photographs were introduced, Gregory Behan, a lawyer and the amateur photographer who took them, testified that he first met Mr. King in early 2001 during the course of his representation of a criminal defendant in an unrelated case. Mr. Behan befriended Mr. King and returned to his campsite three times to take photographs of it. Mr. Behan testified that each time he returned to the campsite, [i]t was pretty much the same. I mean there would be some times where he would have found some stuff along the river that he would have piled up as far as lumber to use, but other than that it was generally the same. ... Always neat. According to Mr. Behan, the photographs were taken in March 2001, more than one year before Mr. King's murder, a fact of which the State was unaware until Mr. Behan's trial testimony. Mr. Scarberry, like Mr. Behan, testified that whenever he visited Mr. King's campsite  including the evening of the murder  it was always neat and well maintained. The Stated then moved for the admission of the above-described photographs. The trial court denied the State's motion on the ground that, because the photographs were taken well before the murder, they could not be used to demonstrate how the campsite appeared just prior to the murder. Appellant subsequently moved for a mistrial on the ground that the jury had been shown the inadmissible photographs. The trial court, however, concluded it was harmless error and denied Appellant's motion. We agree with the trial court's ruling. In past cases, this Court has held that [t]he decision to declare a mistrial, discharge the jury, and order a new trial in a criminal case is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Davis, 182 W.Va. 482, 483, 388 S.E.2d 508, 509 (1989). See State v. Armstrong, 179 W.Va. 435, 443, 369 S.E.2d 870, 878 (1988); State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295, 304, 305 S.E.2d 251, 260 (1983). Furthermore, this Court has set forth the harmless error test to determine whether the introduction of improper evidence in some instances does not constitute reversible error: `Where improper evidence of a nonconstitutional nature is introduced by the State in a criminal trial, the test to determine if the error is harmless is: (1) the inadmissible evidence must be removed from the State's case and a determination made as to whether the remaining evidence is sufficient to convince impartial minds of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) if the remaining evidence is found to be insufficient, the error is not harmless; (3) if the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, an analysis must then be made to determine whether the error had any prejudicial effect on the jury.' Syllabus point 2, State v. Atkins, 163 W.Va. 502, 261 S.E.2d 55 (1979). Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Doonan, 220 W.Va. 8, 11, 640 S.E.2d 71, 74 (2006). See Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Rahman, 199 W.Va. 144, 483 S.E.2d 273 (1996); Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Maynard, 183 W.Va. 1, 2, 393 S.E.2d 221, 222 (1990). See also State v. Potter, 197 W.Va. 734, 748, 478 S.E.2d 742, 756 (1996) (Our cases consistently have held that nonconstitutional errors are harmless unless the reviewing court has grave doubt as to whether the erroneously admitted evidence substantially swayed the verdict.) Thus, under Doonan , we must first determine if, absent the inadmissible photographs, the remaining evidence was sufficient to convince the jury of Appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that it was. The evidence at the heart of the murder and conspiracy charges included testimony from co-defendant Jarrett Bailey who testified that it was Appellant who initially wanted to go kick [Mr. King's] ass. Bailey testified that Appellant hit Mr. King in the head with a thick tree branch, swinging it [k]ind of over his head and down at least twice and so hard Bailey could hear the hit, like it sounded painful. Bailey further testified that he saw Appellant stomping Mr. King in the chest and head while he was lying on the ground over the embankment. According to Dr. Mahmoud, Mr. King ultimately died from subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhages and a broken left thyroid cartilage probably caused when Appellant struck Mr. King in the neck. Dr. Mahmoud also testified that Mr. King could have survived long enough to move himself from the location where he was last beaten to the rivers edge where his dead body was found the following day. Furthermore, according to the trial testimony of Mary Ann Travis and Lidia Miles, Appellant later bragged about the attack and declared that he and the other men may have killed that one dude, clearly referring to Mr. King. Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, we find that, absent the inadmissible photographs, the remaining evidence was more than sufficient to convince a jury of Appellant's guilt of first degree murder and conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Having so concluded, the test in Doonan requires this Court to next analyze whether the introduction of the inadmissible photographs during its opening statement had any prejudicial effect on the jury. We conclude there was no prejudice. As indicated above, the purpose of the pre-murder photographs was to demonstrate to the jury that the campsite where Mr. King made his home ordinarily appeared neat and orderly and sharply contrasted the crime scene photographs which showed various items knocked over and strewn about the campsite and either broken or bloodstained or both, thus showing that a violent attack had occurred there. Though ruled inadmissible because they were taken more than one year before the murder, the essence of the photographs was reflected in the testimony of Mr. Scarberry, who had visited Mr. King at the campsite only hours before the murder. He testified as to the neat, orderly and well-maintained appearance of Mr. King's campsite that evening and each time he had visited it previously. Moreover, later in the trial, Sgt. Castle also testified that he had been to Mr. King's campsite approximately three weeks before his murder and found it to be neat and well-organized and distinctively different than the way it appeared following the murder. Because the admissible testimony of Mr. Scarberry and Sgt. Castle described for the jury what the inadmissible photographs visually conveyed  that Mr. King normally kept his campsite neat, clean and orderly  we conclude that the introduction of the photographs had no prejudicial effect on the jury's verdict. Based upon the above, under the test set forth in Doonan , introduction of the inadmissible photographs was harmless error.