Opinion ID: 152605
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spees's pregnancy as a motivating factor for the transfer

Text: We must next determine whether Spees presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that her pregnancy was a motivating factor in transferring her to the tool room. In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), the Supreme Court set forth the parameters regarding the acceptable treatment of female employees with childbearing capacity. Johnson Controls had barred all fertile females from its lead-battery plant out of concern for the health of the fetuses that the women might conceive. Id. at 191-92, 111 S.Ct. 1196. The Court struck down the company's policy as violating Title VII because the policy discriminated against female employees based on their capacity to become pregnant, even though the employees' reproductive potential did not prevent them from being able to perform their jobs. Id. at 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196. It added that an employer's safety concerns were a permissible ground for restricting a female employee's job opportunities only where a pregnancy actually interfere[d] with the employee's ability to perform the job. Id. at 204, 111 S.Ct. 1196. The Court concluded that Congress made clear that the decision to become pregnant or to work while being ... pregnant ... was reserved for each individual woman to make for herself. Id. at 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196. In the present case, Spees presented considerable evidence demonstrating that her pregnancy was at least a motivating factor, if not the motivating factor, in JMI's decision to transfer her to the tool room. Milam testified that when he first learned of Spees's pregnancy, he had concerns that she would not be able to weld. When Spees read him Dr. Cardenas's first note clearing her to return to welding, Milam said that there was some question about her being pregnant and being able to safely perform the job that she was required to do. He based these concerns on his perception of common sense. And according to Spees, Milam told her to obtain a second note from Dr. Cardenas limiting her to light duty and instructing her to avoid toxic fumes. JMI then relied on this note in transferring Spees to the tool room. Other JMI employees superior to Spees exhibited a similar attitude. Tom Freeman, the head of JMI's Safety Department, told Spees that this is a man's world and that the notes from Dr. Cardenas were not acceptable. Freeman's statement that he didn't know what he was going to do with Spees could be construed as further questioning her ability to weld while pregnant. Gunder, the night foreman and Spees's brother, also partook in the decision to transfer Spees. He stated in his deposition that he did not want Spees welding because she was carrying my niece. Gunder and Milam discussed where Spees should be working, and they just decided that it wouldn't be a good idea for her to [weld]. In contrast, Spees never told her supervisors at JMI that she was unable to weld. She instead believed that she could weld, with only minimal restrictions, up until the full term of her pregnancy. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Spees requested a transfer to the tool room. Milam, on the other hand, knew that there was a night-shift opening in the tool room and recommended that Spees seek a transfer. He and other managers made the decision to move Spees to the tool room, allegedly telling her we don't know what to do with you. In addition, Milam later indicated to Spees that JMI management had taken unilateral action. According to Spees, Milam informed her that I have already been told by [Colbert] that you are not going to weld no matter what your doctor is going to do. JMI defends its decision to transfer Spees by relying on Dr. Cardenas's second note that restricts Spees to light duty and indicates that she should avoid toxic fumes. The company also points to Dr. Cardenas's testimony in which he states that his recommendations were independent of any motivations that JMI may have had. But this evidence does not shield JMI's transfer decision in light of Milam's apparent opinion that Spees should be transferred even before Dr. Cardenas had written the light-duty note. Furthermore, Spees testified that Milam instructed her to obtain the note so limiting her. Dr. Cardenas's statement that he was not influenced by JMI when writing the second note is similarly inconclusive because Spees might have chosen not to inform him (or forgotten to inform him) that she was seeking that note at JMI's request. In sum, evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that JMI had decided that Spees was unable to weld due to her pregnancy and had instructed her to get a doctor's note to that effect. JMI also argues that it would have been subject to a tort claim for negligence if it had permitted Spees to continue welding contrary to the orders contained in Dr. Cardenas's second note. But this argument again overlooks the evidence that Milam told Spees to obtain the restrictive note in the first place. Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Johnson Controls, JMI's risk of tort liability in this situation would be remote if it fully inform[ed] Spees of the risk inherent to welding while pregnant and did not otherwise act negligently. See id. at 208, 111 S.Ct. 1196. Summary judgment is accordingly inappropriate on this ground. As a whole, the evidence is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether JMI management, rather than undertaking an objective evaluation to determine whether Spees could perform her welding job while pregnant, instead subjectively viewed Spees's pregnancy as rendering her unable to weld. This would allow a reasonable jury to find that JMI's decision to transfer Spees was made out of concern for her pregnancy and the well-being of her unborn child rather than because Spees was unable to perform her job as a welder. Such concerns, though laudatory, do not justify an adverse employment action. See id. at 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196. The district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment in favor of JMI on Spees's transfer claim.