Opinion ID: 784595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: New Issues Raised in the City's Civil Complaint

Text: 9 The civil compromise the district court determined was a bar to the present action was a California state court judgment. We give preclusive effect to that judgment and thus apply California law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 10 For res judicata to apply, the issues decided in the prior adjudication must have been identical to the issues raised in the present action. Seadrift, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d at 84. Under California law, a cause of action is (1) a primary right possessed by the plaintiff, (2) a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the defendant, and (3) a harm done by the defendant which consists in a breach of such primary right and duty. Id. at 86. Claims are identical if they involve the same primary right. Acuna v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 56 Cal.App.4th 639, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 388, 394 (1997). To determine if the issues in both actions involve the same primary right, we look to the rights sought to be vindicated and, specifically, to the claimed harm. The fact that various theories of recovery are asserted and various remedies are requested does not necessarily create different primary rights. Gates v. Superior Court, 178 Cal.App.3d 301, 223 Cal.Rptr. 678, 683 (1986). 11 However, in this case, some of the City's seventeen causes of action do amount to a different primary right than that at issue in the prior criminal proceeding that resulted in the civil compromise. Primarily, the City has a distinct property interest in Mococo Marsh arising from its easement. This primary right stemming from this property interest, as opposed to the public rights the City also asserts, was not adjudicated in the prior proceeding. 12 In Seadrift, the California Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff public interest group was barred from seeking an implied dedication of a recreational easement when several state agencies had previously entered into a settlement agreement that had resolved the issue. 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 77. Although the Seadrift court found the new plaintiff's claims to be barred, the court specifically noted that the Seadrift plaintiff did not claim any individual private property rights separate and apart from those already adjudicated. Id. at 91. The implication was that private property rights, if raised, would not have been barred by res judicata. Id. See also Alaska Sport Fishing Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 770-73 (9th Cir.1994) (barring plaintiffs' claims under res judicata, but recognizing that sufficiently private, individual injuries may not have been barred). 3 13 In the case at hand, the DFG's complaint described a public offense subject to criminal prosecution, whereas counts in the City's complaint ask for a civil remedy for invasion of a private property right. Specifically, the City asserts that it is entitled to just compensation for the violation of its easement, 4 just the same as a landowner is entitled to just compensation for the taking of its property. When an easement owner is deprived of some aspect of its property right, the owner may seek damages and injunctive relief. See Moylan v. Dykes, 181 Cal. App.3d 561, 226 Cal.Rptr. 673, 680 (1986). Here, the City seeks damages under California Civil Code §§ 815.1 and 815.3(b) for the loss of scenic, aesthetic, or environmental value to the real property subject to the easement. The City also argues that the oil spill decreased the value of the easement by causing damage to wildlife on the land. These asserted property rights form a different primary right than that involved in the § 5650(a) prosecution. It is just this type of private right that the Seadrift court intended not be barred by prior resolution of public claims. 14 Further, this property right was plainly not adjudicated in the first action. The civil compromise provided for monies to be paid to the DFG, but the City's rights and possibility of recovering damages were not considered, nor did the City receive any portion of the sum allocated to the DFG. Moreover, the City's cause of action asserting violation of the private property right could not have been raised in the prior criminal proceeding. The criminal court would not have had jurisdiction over the civil claims. Thus, this private property right the City seeks to assert is not identical to the issue raised in the prior action under California Fish and Game Code § 5650(a) and res judicata does not apply.