Opinion ID: 1987778
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Sale Warning Jury Instruction.

Text: A trial court has a duty to give the jury a clear understanding of what they need to decide. Sanders v. Ghrist, 421 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa 1988). Thus, jury instructions must thoroughly and fairly convey the applicable law to the relevant issues. Id. Moreover, courts must give a requested jury instruction if it correctly states the applicable law that is not embodied in other instructions. Stover v. Lakeland Square Owners Ass'n., 434 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1989). Yet, error in failing to do so does not warrant reversal unless it is prejudicial to the party. Id. As with other negligence claims, the particular facts of each case determine whether conduct's reasonable. Johnson v. Svoboda, 260 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Iowa 1977). While this reasonableness standard is at times alone adequate to determine liability, it is at other times better understood by reference to other factors and standards. See Cooley v. Quick Supply Co., 221 N.W.2d 763, 771-72 (Iowa 1974) (whether reasonable care requires warning beyond manufacturer's immediate vendee in a particular case depends upon various factors); Langner v. Caviness, 238 Iowa 774, 778, 28 N.W.2d 421, 423-24 (1947) (evidence of industry practice and custom as evidence of reasonableness of defendant's conduct); see also 1 American Law of Products Liability § 10.16 (3d ed.1998). Furthermore, the scope and parameters of a duty of care can vary depending upon special circumstances faced by a defendant, as well as policy considerations surrounding the event. See Dickman v. Truck Transp., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 459, 466 (Iowa 1974) (sudden emergency excuses conduct which would otherwise be negligent). When special circumstances exist, it is incumbent upon the court to provide a full explanation of their application. Although we recognize a post-sale duty to warn, we have identified potential circumstances faced by manufacturers after the sale of a product not present prior to the sale. The jury instruction given in this case, however, failed to inform the jury of these circumstances, or how they might impact the reasonableness of a manufacturer's conduct. Instead, the jury was told that if Wil-Rich subsequently learned its product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, it had a duty to warn those it knows or reasonably should know will be affected by the use of the product. This is essentially the same standard applied to a point of sale warning claim. We believe this standard is insufficient to guide the jury. The duty to warn analysis at the point of sale essentially focuses on the foreseeability of a defective product. See Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Compensation Fund, 496 N.W.2d 247, 252 (Iowa 1993). This standard does not, however, identify the special burdens which may exist for manufacturers to discharge this duty. Thus, if used in a post-sale case, it restricts the jury's consideration to the danger of the product and the manufacturer's foreseeability of the danger. It excludes numerous critical factors identified by the Restatement. The jury is not told to consider the manufacturer's ability to identify users, the likelihood the risk of harm is unknown, the ability to effectively communicate a warning, and any other burden in providing a warning compared to the risk of harm. These factors are critical to understanding the reasonableness of the conduct. We believe the post-sale failure to warn instruction must be more specific than the point of sale failure to warn instruction and inform the jury to consider those factors which make it burdensome or impractical for a manufacturer to provide a warning in determining the reasonableness of its conduct. It is prejudicial error to fail to do so. Accordingly, we adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 10, including the need to articulate the relevant factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of providing a warning after the sale. We recognize the comments to the Restatement refer to the need for the court to consider the four factors in deciding whether a post-sale breach of duty to warn claim should reach the jury. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 10 cmt. a. Clearly, the particular circumstances of a case may permit a trial court to utilize the factors to determine as a matter of law no duty existed. Normally, however, the jury determines whether a warning of a product danger should have been given. Beeman, 496 N.W.2d at 252. Thus, if the trial court finds sufficient proof to impose a duty, the Restatement factors must be further utilized so the jury can understand the extent of the duty and properly perform its function in deciding the reasonableness of the conduct. See Patton, 861 P.2d at 1315. Our decision today confirms the existence ofa post-sale duty for manufacturers to warn when it is reasonable to do so. The trial court may determine no duty existed in a particular case as a matter of law. See id. Otherwise, the trial court should instruct the jury to determine whether it was reasonable to provide a warning by using the four Restatement factors. We recognize the Restatement approach gives rise to other issues, but they are not before us at this time. We hold trial courts must incorporate the Restatement factors in instructing the jury on the duty to warn following the sale.