Opinion ID: 2632740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State's Motion to Exclude Evidence

Text: Because insanity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving `by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was insane at the time of the offense or offenses with which he or she is charged.' State v. Platt, 143 Wash.2d 242, 246, 19 P.3d 412 (2001) (quoting RCW 10.77.080). Chapter 10.77 RCW establishes the procedures for determining whether a criminal defendant was insane at the time of the commission of a charged crime. RCW 10.77.060 gives the trial court authority, either on its own motion or on the motion of any party, to order a mental health examination when a defendant has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. RCW 10.77.060(1)(a). A mental health evaluation under RCW 10.77.060 must be completed by at least two court appointed qualified professionals, one of whom must be approved by the prosecuting attorney. RCW 10.77.060(1)(a). Extent of the Right Under RCW 10.77.020(3): It is well settled that when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, and proffers evidence in support of that plea, statements uttered in the context of a psychiatric examination by defense experts are beyond the reach of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. State v. Pawlyk, 115 Wash.2d 457, 465-66, 800 P.2d 338 (1990) (citing State v. Bonds, 98 Wash.2d 1, 20, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831, 104 S.Ct. 111, 78 L.Ed.2d 112 (1983)); accord State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wash.2d 863, 876, 959 P.2d 1061 (1998) ( Hutchinson II ); State v. Jones, 99 Wash.2d 735, 749, 664 P.2d 1216 (1983). In addition when a defendant raises an insanity defense, the court may order the defendant to submit to a sanity examination by court appointed or State experts without violating his or her constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. RCW 10.77.060(1)(a); see also Bonds, 98 Wash.2d at 20, 653 P.2d 1024; Hutchinson II , 135 Wash.2d at 876, 959 P.2d 1061; Pawlyk, 115 Wash.2d at 466, 800 P.2d 338. However, RCW 10.77.020(3) also delineates rights for a defendant who has been ordered to submit to an evaluation. The statute provides that the defendant is entitled to have his or her attorney present and he or she may refuse to answer any question if the defendant believes the answer may tend to be incriminating or form links leading to evidence of an incriminating nature. RCW 10.77.020(3). Thus, once a defendant is ordered to submit to a mental health evaluation under RCW 10.77.060, the rights under RCW 10.77.020(3) apply. The State argues that the trial court erred when it refused to exclude evidence supporting Carneh's claim of insanity. According to the State, the statutory right against self-incrimination contained in RCW 10.77.020(3) is a mere codification of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Thus, the State contends that the statutory protection against self-incrimination under RCW 10.77.020(3), like the constitutional protection, is waived when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. The State asserts that as a result, a defendant like Carneh who refuses to answer critical questions during a court ordered sanity evaluation should be prevented from presenting evidence at trial to support his insanity defense. In response, Carneh argues that the statutory right against self-incrimination under RCW 10.77.020(3) is separate and distinct from the constitutional right. According to Carneh, RCW 10.77.020(3) unambiguously gives a defendant the right, during a court ordered sanity evaluation, to refuse to answer questions he or she believes call for incriminating answers. Thus, Carneh asserts, the trial court correctly denied the State's motion to suppress his evidence supporting insanity. We have not previously discussed how to interpret and apply RCW 10.77.020(3) where, as here, a trial court orders a defendant who has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to submit to a sanity evaluation requested by the State. However, we have addressed similar issues arising from mental-condition defenses. See Pawlyk, 115 Wash.2d at 466-67, 800 P.2d 338; Hutchinson II , 135 Wash.2d at 877-78, 959 P.2d 1061. The State relies heavily on Pawlyk to support its argument that RCW 10.77.020(3) is coextensive with the constitutional right against self-incrimination. But Pawlyk actually supports the opposite proposition, namely that RCW 10.77.020(3) provides a right that is separate and distinct from the constitutional right. In Pawlyk the defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity to two counts of aggravated first degree murder. Pawlyk, 115 Wash.2d at 460-61, 800 P.2d 338. Pursuant to his plea, two psychiatrists interviewed the defendant at his request. Id. at 460, 800 P.2d 338. The State subsequently contacted one of the psychiatrists as a prospective witness and learned he had interviewed the defendant. Id. at 461, 800 P.2d 338. Thereafter the State moved to discover, among other things, the psychiatrist's written reports. The State also served the psychiatrist with a subpoena to testify. Id. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to quash the subpoena and ordered discovery of the psychiatrist's written reports. Id. On his motion for interlocutory review to this court the defendant argued that the State's use of the psychiatrist as an expert and the disclosure of his reports violated the defendant's right against self-incrimination. Id. at 465, 800 P.2d 338. We disagreed and reaffirmed our holding in Bonds, 98 Wash.2d at 20, 653 P.2d 1024, where we found that when a defendant proffers an insanity defense, statements uttered during a psychiatric examination are removed from the reach of the Fifth Amendment. Pawlyk, 115 Wash.2d at 465-66, 800 P.2d 338. The defendant in Pawlyk also claimed that the statutory privilege against self-incrimination under former RCW 10.77.020(4) (now RCW 10.77.020(3) [2] ) prohibited the State's use of the psychiatrist and/or his reports at trial. Id. at 466-67, 800 P.2d 338. We again disagreed, noting that former RCW 10.77.020(4) applied only to court ordered evaluations and recognizing that the psychiatrist's examination was conducted at the defendant's request. Id. There is nothing in Pawlyk to indicate that we interpreted RCW 10.77.020(4) as a mere codification of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Indeed, the different analytical approaches we used to resolve the defendant's constitutional and statutory claims indicate an understanding that the right under RCW 10.77.020(3) is separate and distinct. Thus, the Pawlyk court's holding that a defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination is diminished when he or she pleads not guilty by reason of insanity has no application here, as Carneh was explicitly invoking his statutory right when he refused to answer incriminating questions during the court ordered sanity evaluation. Moreover, in Hutchinson II this court recognized the distinct nature of the rights established in RCW 10.77.020(3). In that case we addressed a defendant's right against self-incrimination in the context of a court ordered mental health evaluation where the defendant had raised a diminished capacity defense. Hutchinson II , 135 Wash.2d at 876-80, 959 P.2d 1061. We clarified our previous opinion, State v. Hutchinson, 111 Wash.2d 872, 766 P.2d 447 (1989) ( Hutchinson I ), in which we held that a defendant could invoke former RCW 10.77.020(4) to refuse to answer questions at a mental health evaluation: A defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity and is examined under RCW 10.77 has a statutory right to refuse to answer any question if he ... believes his ... answers may tend to incriminate him ... or form links leading to evidence of an incriminating nature. The statutory privilege against self-incrimination is strictly construed and applies only to psychiatric evaluations of a defendant conducted under RCW 10.77, not in diminished capacity cases. Hutchinson II , 135 Wash.2d at 878, 959 P.2d 1061 (quoting RCW 10.77.020(4) and citing State v. Pawlyk, 115 Wash.2d at 467, 800 P.2d 338). Hutchinson II did not discuss RCW 10.77.020(3) in the context of a court ordered sanity evaluation of a defendant who has pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity; however, that case, like Pawlyk, recognizes that RCW 10.77.020(3)'s right is separate and distinct from the state and federal constitutional rights against self-incrimination. [3] The language of RCW 10.77.020(3) is strikingly clear; it grants a defendant who is subject to a court ordered sanity evaluation an unqualified right to refuse to answer any question if [the defendant] believes his or her answers may tend to [be incriminating] or form links leading to evidence of an incriminating nature. RCW 10.77.020(3). We conclude that the right expressed in RCW 10.77.020(3) extends beyond the constitutional rights against self-incrimination in that the statutory right is not waived when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court correctly recognized that by its plain language, RCW 10.77.020(3) permitted Carneh, during the court ordered sanity evaluation, to refuse to answer questions that he believed called for incriminating answers. There is no basis, either in the language of the statute or in case law discussing the statute, to support the State's argument that by pleading not guilty by reason of insanity Carneh waived his statutory right under RCW 10.77.020(3). Impact of a Defendant's Invocation of the Statutory Right: The State argues that because Carneh has refused to answer questions that are necessary to complete the independent sanity evaluation, the defendant should be prevented from introducing evidence or expert opinion testimony on the issue of his sanity at the time of the charged crimes. The State relies exclusively on Hutchinson II to support this proposition, but that reliance is misplaced. In Hutchinson II , the trial court excluded defense expert testimony supporting the defendant's diminished capacity claim because the defendant repeatedly refused to submit to a court ordered mental health examination. 135 Wash.2d at 872, 876, 959 P.2d 1061. On appeal this court affirmed the trial court's decision, but only after considering the proper remedy for the defendant's discovery violation in the context of CrR 4.7, not RCW 10.77.020. Id. at 881-82, 959 P.2d 1061. As noted above, the Hutchinson II court expressly held that former RCW 10.77.020(4) did not apply to diminished capacity cases. Id. at 878, 959 P.2d 1061. In contrast, prior to Carneh's court ordered sanity examination the trial court specifically ruled he could invoke RCW 10.77.020(3) by refusing to answer incriminating questions. CP at 25. We reject the State's argument that Carneh's silence should result in the exclusion at trial of evidence supporting his insanity defense. We agree with the trial court that if Carneh had the right under RCW 10.77.020(3) to refuse to answer incriminating questions during the court ordered evaluation, his exercise of that right cannot result in his being barred from presenting evidence supporting his insanity defense. Thus, the trial court correctly denied the State's motion to suppress.