Opinion ID: 2637986
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The circuit court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to cross-examine Culkin regarding the second Harold Cross and the Paul Polinski identifications.

Text: A police search of Culkin's house uncovered a number of forged identifications. [11] In connection with this discovery, Culkin was charged with one count of second degree forgery, and was scheduled for trial on that charge after the murder trial. The prosecution filed a motion indicating its intent to confront Culkin with evidence: (1) of a checking account with the Bank of Hawai`i that Culkin allegedly opened using the name of Harold Cross; (2) that, in May 1997, Culkin used that same name to rent his house; and (3) of several identification cards discovered during the search of Culkin's house. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that Culkin was facing an upcoming forgery trial based on the opening of a checking account under the name Harold Cross. She argued that to question Culkin on this matter would potentially force him to assert his fifth amendment privilege in front of the jury, which would be extremely prejudicial. The circuit court ruled that if Culkin took the stand, the prosecution could question him about use of the State Harold Cross identification to open the bank account and to rent the house, but precluded questioning about other identification cards. At trial, Culkin took the stand and testified that he used the name Harold Cross, who was a real person, to open a checking account and rent the house in which he lived. Culkin explained that he used the Harold Cross identification because he wanted a house big enough to start up a printing business, but that his own credit was bad. During Culkin's testimony, the following exchange occurred: Q. [by Prosecutor] Do you remember doing this, making this ID card? A. [by Culkin] Yes. Q. Do you remember putting six foot tall, 225 pounds? A. I remember sitting for the picture. I didn't fill out the ID, though. But (shrugs) Q. You did not fill out the ID. Who filled out the ID? A. My brother made the ID, typed in all the information. Q. Your brother makes your ID to rent the house, to open the bank account .... Q. Did you say in your answer your brother made this ID for you? A. I said my brother made the ID for me, yes. Q. All you did was sit for the picture? A. Right. The circuit court then ruled that Culkin had opened the door for the prosecution to impeach him with evidence that he also possessed other identification cards. Culkin advised the court that, due to the pending forgery trial, he would invoke his fifth amendment privilege if questioned about other identifications. Nevertheless, the court permitted the prosecution to question Culkin about a federal identification under the name Harold Cross and a state identification under the name Paul Polinski. In response to questions, Culkin asserted his privilege against self-incrimination six times. [12] The trial court cautioned the jury to not draw any inference prejudicial to the defendant by his choosing to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights. Culkin contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine him regarding false identification cards uncovered at his house, thereby forcing him to invoke his fifth amendment privilege on the witness stand. We agree. A defendant who elects to testify in his own defense is subject to cross-examination as to any matter pertinent to, or having a logical connection with the specific offense for which he is being tried. State v. Pokini, 57 Haw. 17, 22, 548 P.2d 1397, 1400 (1976). In this regard, a defendant may be cross-examined on collateral matters bearing upon his credibility, the same as any other witness. State v. Napulou, 85 Hawai`i 49, 57, 936 P.2d 1297, 1305 (App.1997) (citing Pokini, 57 Haw. at 22, 548 P.2d at 1400). Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 608(b) (1993) instructs in relevant part that [s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility, if probative of untruthfulness, may be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness and, in the discretion of the court, may be proved by extrinsic evidence. While HRE Rule 608 invests the trial judge with discretion to admit extrinsic evidence, the HRE Rule 403 balancing test will dictate exclusion of that extrinsic evidence in certain cases. HRE Rule 608-1992 Supplemental Commentary; see also Addison M. Bowman, Hawai`i Rules of Evidence Manual § 608-2B(2) (2d ed.1998). Initially, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the prosecution to question Culkin about the state Harold Cross identification. [13] Inasmuch as there were no witnesses to the stabbing, this case turned in large part on Culkin's credibility. The possession of false identification cards, and assorted activities undertaken therewith, were probative of untruthfulness. The circuit court's subsequent ruling, however, which occasioned Culkin to invoke his fifth amendment privilege in front of the jurors, presents an entirely different problem. We can perceive of no calculation by which the probative value of the prosecution's unanswered questions outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice engendered by compelling Culkin to assert his fifth amendment privilege in front of the jury. [14] Culkin's credibility had already been attacked by questioning about the Harold Cross identification card. Culkin testified that he made the identification card so that he could adopt Harold Cross's identity. He testified that he used the identification card to open a checking account and that he processed approximately $22,000.00 through the account during a five-month period, although he professed to being unemployed at the time. Similarly, the prosecution questioned Culkin about the rental application, revealing numerous untruths asserted thereon. The additional questions, leading to Culkin's invocation of privilege, were allowed to rebut Culkin's assertion that Thomas was primarily responsible for manufacturing the identification. Accordingly, the marginal probative value of the latter questions with respect to Culkin's untruthfulness would have been slight. In this case, however, the potential probative value of the questions evaporated when Culkin advised the court that he intended to give no answers. Meanwhile, the risk of unfair prejudice occasioned by compelling a criminal defendant to invoke the fifth amendment privilege in front of jurors is substantial. Generally, claims of privilege must be made outside of the presence of the jury in order to avoid `[t]he layman's natural first suggestion ... that the resort to the privilege in each instance is a clear confession of crime.' 2 J. Weinstein, M. Berger & J. McLaughlin, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 513[02] at 513-6 (1996). Inasmuch as the prosecution was advised that Culkin would not answer, we can only conclude that the prosecutor deliberately sought to compel Culkin to invoke the testimonial privilege in the hope that the jurors would, in fact, interpret Culkin's invocation as a clear confession of crime. Moreover, the circuit court appears to have paid little heed to HRE Rule 513(b), which is quite explicit that, to the extent practicable, claims of privilege should not be made in front of the jury. Both Culkin and his attorney advised the circuit court that he would not answer questions about other identification cards and would invoke his fifth amendment privilege if asked. With advanced warning, it was certainly practicable for the circuit court to avoid this prejudicial questioning. Nor are we persuaded by the prosecution's argument that any error in this regard was harmless because the circuit court admonished the jurors to draw no prejudicial inferences from Culkin's refusal to answer questions. We have repeatedly emphasized that such limiting instructions do not always adequately safeguard the defendant's rights. See State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 258, 492 P.2d 657, 660 (1971). We thus hold that because the circuit court was put on advance notice that Culkin intended to invoke his fifth amendment privilege, the circuit court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to question Culkin about the latter identifications. [15]