Opinion ID: 2348937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Work Product in Grand Jury Proceedings

Text: The common law, as recognized in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), and its progeny, governs the proper scope of discovery of information under the work-product doctrine. In State ex rel. Friedman v. Provaznik , the grand jury sought to investigate criminal conduct within a law firm and issued a subpoena for client and billing records of the law firm. 668 S.W.2d at 78. The firm filed a motion to quash the subpoena, asserting that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine protected the materials sought. Id. at 78, 80. Although the subject of the subpoena differed from the case at bar, the analysis in Friedman is instructive. In Friedman, this Court defined the work-product doctrine as preventing an opposing party from discovering materials collected by an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation. Id. at 80 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 505, 67 S.Ct. 385). The work-product doctrine customarily shields materials from discovery by an adverse party in a particular cause of action or investigation[.] Friedman, 668 S.W.2d at 80. The doctrine is intended to prevent a party from reaping the benefits of his opponent's labors. Id. Friedman applied the work-product doctrine as defined in Hickman . Hickman held that, [w]hen the desired material can be obtained elsewhere, the burden of showing such special circumstances [that would require disclosure] has not been met. 329 U.S. at 511-13, 67 S.Ct. 385. The Supreme Court in Hickman acknowledged that there would be situations in which discovery of work product would be justified. Id. at 511-12, 67 S.Ct. 385. The Supreme Court stated, however, that the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify production through a subpoena or court order. Id. at 512, 67 S.Ct. 385. Following Hickman , the work-product doctrine evolved into a two-pronged approach that consists of both tangible work product (consisting of trial preparation documents such as written statements, briefs, and attorney memoranda) and intangible work product (consisting of an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theoriessometimes called opinion work product). State ex rel. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Malley, 898 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Mo. banc 1995). This Court noted with approval that [t]he Hickman decision recognized that discovery of tangible work product will inevitably disclose the attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories, and, therefore, must be protected. Id. Hickman explicitly recognized the need to protect written statements, such as interviews. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511, 67 S.Ct. 385. The [ Hickman ] decision also recognized, however, that, upon a showing of substantial need, the materials may be discoverable. Atchison, 898 S.W.2d at 552. This Court went on to recognize that because intangible work product is not discoverable at all, the substantial need requirement applies only to tangible work product, which includes all documents and tangible items, such as interviews, statements, and memoranda, and does not apply to require disclosure of intangible work product, which includes anything intangible such as an attorney's opinions, thoughts, or theories. See Atchison, 898 S.W.2d at 553. Tangible work product, therefore, may be discoverable in Missouri upon a showing of substantial need and that the party requesting is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. Id. at 552.