Opinion ID: 2069680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of equitable doctrine of laches

Text: Van Milligan contends that equitable principles of laches should be applied in the instant cause to bar his discharge. Van Milligan notes that the Grosse incident occurred in July 1982. However, the action seeking Van Milligan's discharge was not filed until January 1988, almost 5½ years after the Grosse incident. Generally, principles of laches are applied when a party's failure to timely assert a right has caused prejudice to the adverse party. ( Tully v. State (1991), 143 Ill.2d 425, 432, 158 Ill.Dec. 546, 574 N.E.2d 659.) The two fundamental elements of laches are lack of due diligence by the party asserting the claim and prejudice to the opposing party. Tully, 143 Ill.2d at 432, 158 Ill.Dec. 546, 574 N.E.2d 659. Van Milligan suggests that both of these elements are present in this case. He contends that the approximate five-year delay in filing disciplinary charges against him evidenced a lack of due diligence. Van Milligan also argues that the record reveals that he was prejudiced by the failure to institute disciplinary charges sooner. The appellate court in the present cause found laches applicable for the following reasons: No one had ever indicated to Van Milligan that the result of Grosse's suit would have any effect on his status with the [police] Department. In fact, the Department indicated support for Van Milligan and encouraged him not to settle the litigation. Moreover, the Department determined, in its internal investigation, that the charges against Van Milligan were `unfounded.' It is not unreasonable to believe that had Van Milligan known that the results of the civil suit would be applied in a subsequent disciplinary hearing and would collaterally estop him from litigating those issues before the Board, he might have settled the case or otherwise proceeded differently. Thus, we believe that Van Milligan suffered prejudice as a result of the    delay. Therefore, the [police chief was] guilty of laches and barred from bringing charges against Van Milligan. 241 Ill.App.3d at 811, 182 Ill.Dec. 288, 609 N.E.2d 822. We conclude that the appellate court's decision on this point was in error. The appellate court's reasoning ignored substantial precedent in this State that has applied laches against a governmental body's actions only under compelling circumstances. There is considerable reluctance to impose the doctrine of laches to the actions of public entities unless unusual or extraordinary circumstances are shown. ( Hickey v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1966), 35 Ill.2d 427, 447, 220 N.E.2d 415.) This is so because laches may impair the functioning of the [governmental body] in the discharge of its government functions, and    valuable public interests may be jeopardized or lost by the negligence, mistakes, or inattention of public officials. ( Hickey, 35 Ill.2d at 447-48, 220 N.E.2d 415.) Although the reluctance to apply equitable principles    does not amount to absolute immunity    from laches and estoppel under all circumstances, it has been recognized that laches does not apply to the exercise of governmental powers except under compelling circumstances. ( Hickey, 35 Ill.2d at 448, 220 N.E.2d 415; see also Ferretti v. Department of Labor (1987), 115 Ill.2d 347, 352, 106 Ill.Dec. 760, 506 N.E.2d 560 (holding that State is not estopped from reassessing taxpayer liability, even where a tax return had been previously approved by State).) Also, the decision with respect to whether laches should be invoked is generally a discretionary matter. ( Pettey v. First National Bank (1992), 225 Ill.App.3d 539, 546, 167 Ill.Dec. 771, 588 N.E.2d 412.) Our review of the facts of record does not disclose a valid basis to disturb the discretionary determination of the police board in the present case. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that Van Milligan has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the approximate five-year delay in filing disciplinary charges against him. Van Milligan's suggestions that he might have conducted his Federal civil rights defense differently, or that he might have entered into a settlement agreement with Grosse in the Federal civil rights proceeding, are speculative and insufficient to prove that Van Milligan was, in fact, harmed by the lapse of time that occurred in the instant cause. Also, as we state in more detail below, it is our determination that this matter should be remanded for a full hearing wherein principles of collateral estoppel will not be applied to limit the evidence Van Milligan presents in his defense. In light of this determination, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate that Van Milligan will be deprived of an opportunity to present a full defense at the disciplinary hearing, notwithstanding the lapse in time since the Grosse incident occurred in July 1982. The cases upon which Van Milligan relies for application of laches are factually distinguishable from the present case and are consistent with the conclusion we reach herein. For example, in Monroe v. Civil Service Comm'n (1965), 55 Ill.App.2d 354, 204 N.E.2d 486, the appellate court found laches inapplicable to a city's discharge of a fire fighter for improper conduct with a private citizen, where the city awaited the outcome of a related civil suit before seeking the fire fighter's discharge. ( Monroe, 55 Ill.App.2d at 357-58, 204 N.E.2d 486.) Similar conclusions were reached in People ex rel. Casey v. Health & Hospitals Governing Comm'n (1977), 69 Ill.2d 108, 12 Ill.Dec. 695, 370 N.E.2d 499 ( laches did not bar discharged civil service employee from waiting for result in pending litigation before bringing suit) and Hippert v. O'Grady (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 310, 53 Ill.Dec. 36, 423 N.E.2d 228 ( laches held inapplicable where discharged police officer awaited outcome of pending litigation before seeking reinstatement). In other cases, the courts have refused to apply laches where there was no showing of prejudice and the parties could obtain a fair trial notwithstanding the delay in bringing suit. (See Bultas v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1988), 171 Ill.App.3d 189, 195, 121 Ill.Dec. 124, 524 N.E.2d 1172 ( laches not applied because delay did not prejudice police officer in presenting his defense at hearing that lead to his discharge); Jager v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n (1979), 74 Ill.App.3d 33, 42, 29 Ill.Dec. 619, 392 N.E.2d 176 ( laches not applied where facts were uncontroverted and alleged delay did not prejudice parties' ability to present claims, nor did delay adversely affect[] the ability of the trier of fact from determining the truth of the matters at issue); People ex rel. Jaworski v. Jenkins (1978), 56 Ill.App.3d 1028, 1032-33, 14 Ill. Dec. 602, 372 N.E.2d 881 (doctrine of laches would not prevent village from filing charges against police officer where written statements had been taken and physical evidence had been gathered; there would be no prejudice to the officer in presenting his own defense and evidence would not be based solely upon recollection of witnesses); Forberg v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 410, 412, 352 N.E.2d 338 ( laches held inapplicable where discharged police officer could not show that he was prejudiced by delay or that factual disputes were dependent solely upon recollection of witnesses).) In Mank v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 478, 288 N.E.2d 49, the court applied the doctrine of laches to charges filed against police officer where those charges relied upon conflicting evidence and the unrecorded recollection of witnesses, and several witnesses were unavailable to appear at the hearing. The facts in Mank do not bear any significant resemblance to the facts of the present case. Van Milligan also relies upon a statute of limitations enacted by the General Assembly which provides, in pertinent part, If the charge is based upon an allegation of the use of unreasonable force by a police officer, the charge must be brought within 5 years after the commission of the act upon which the charge is based. (65 ILCS 5/10-1-18(b) (West 1992 Supp.).) However, the provision explicitly states that the statute of limitations established [therein] shall apply only to acts of unreasonable force occurring on or after the effective date of this [amendment] (65 ILCS 5/10-1-18(b) (West 1992 Supp.)), and the amendment was effective as of December 22, 1992. The statutory period was adopted after the incident between Van Milligan and Grosse that gave rise to Van Milligan's discharge, and is therefore inapplicable to the instant cause. Van Milligan further contends that the statutory limitation period should apply as a matter of equity. According to Van Milligan, if a delay in filing suit exceeds the limitation period, `equity follows the law by adopting that limitation period as the period constituting laches as well.' ( Schlossberg v. Corrington (1980), 80 Ill.App.3d 860, 865, 35 Ill.Dec. 936, 400 N.E.2d 73, quoting Rakstiene v. Kroulaidis (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 1067, 1072, 339 N.E.2d 447.) However, as we note above, we do not believe that equitable principles of laches should be invoked under the facts of the present case. In light of these considerations, we conclude that the appellate court erred in its application of laches principles to the instant cause. Van Milligan is not entitled, based on laches, to reinstatement of his employment as a police officer on the Glenview police force. The decision of the appellate court on this issue is reversed.