Opinion ID: 181161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Defendant failed to implement the 2005 IEP or develop and implement a new valid IEP within thirty days of A.M. transferring into the district

Text: When an exceptional-needs student transfers from one California school district to another during the school year, the local school district shall provide services comparable to those described in the previously approved [IEP] ... for a period not to exceed 30 days, by which time the local educational agency shall adopt the previously approved [IEP] or shall develop, adopt, and implement a new [IEP]. Cal. Educ.Code § 56325(a)(1). Plaintiffs argue that Section 56325(a)(1) required Defendant to provide services comparable to the 2005 IEP during the initial thirty days because the 2005 IEP was the previously approved IEP since Plaintiffs and CAVA agreed to it, though it was never implemented. [1] Defendant argues that it was required only to provide services in accordance with the last implemented IEP because California's Section 56325(a)(1) is modeled after the IDEA, which states that when an exceptional needs student who had an IEP that was in effect in the same State transfers to a new school, the school shall provide services comparable to the previously held IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I). Defendant argues that only the independent study/home schooling IEP was ever in effect. OAH concluded that Section 56325(a)(1) refers to the last IEP that was actually implemented. OAH's reasoning is persuasive: providing services in accordance with the previously implemented IEP effectuates the statute's purpose of minimizing disruption to the student while the parents and the receiving school resolve disagreements about proper placement. We agree with OAH. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant violated Section 56325(a)(1) by not developing a new valid IEP within thirty days. A.M.'s father filled out the paperwork to enroll A.M. in Defendant District on December 12, 2005; Defendant held an intake meeting with Plaintiffs on December 20, 2005; school closed for the winter break from December 22, 2005 to January 9, 2006; Defendant began providing services to A.M. on January 9, 2006; and Defendant held an IEP meeting on February 9, 2006. Thus, Defendant did not hold an IEP within thirty days of A.M.'s enrollment. OAH concluded, and the district court affirmed, that Defendant's actions were appropriate because Defendant would have had insufficient time to evaluate A.M. if Defendant were required to hold an IEP meeting within thirty days of A.M.'s enrollment on December 20, 2005. [2] However, neither OAH nor the district court cited authority for the proposition that school holidays toll Section 56325(a)(1)'s thirty-day requirement. Whether or not Defendant exceeded the thirty-day limit, A.M. suffered no deprivation of educational benefit and therefore has no claim. See Amanda J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 892 (9th Cir.2001). OAH is correct that A.M.'s service providers could not have adequately assessed A.M.'s needs within thirty days of December 12 or 20, 2005. Indeed, even though Defendant had thirty days to evaluate A.M., Plaintiffs and Defendant were unable to agree upon an appropriate IEP and had to schedule a further meeting in May. That the brief delay during winter vacation caused no educational deprivation to A.M. is further evidenced by the fact that A.M.'s placement continued as independent study/home schooling in May. Therefore, Defendant did not commit a procedural violation by failing to implement the 2005 IEP or by failing to develop and implement a new valid IEP within thirty days of A.M. transferring into the district.