Opinion ID: 2443524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Prosecutor's Rebuttal Arguments

Text: Mr. Daniels takes issue with prosecutorial comments that he has extracted from the government's rebuttal argument. In Mr. Daniels' estimation, the trial court committed reversible error by not sua sponte intervening when the prosecutor inflamed the passions of the jury, violated [his] right to be presumed innocent, vouched for the credibility of government witnesses and argued facts not in evidence by commenting on a witness' allegedly prior consistent testimony. [14] Generally, comments appealing to the emotions, prejudices and passions of the jury, or comments arguing facts not in evidence or misstating facts in evidence, are improper. Diaz v. United States, 716 A.2d 173, 180 (D.C.1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The propriety and import of the prosecutor's remarks ... must be viewed in perspective by examining the arguments advanced by the defense, for a prosecutor may respond, in rebuttal, to defense counsel's assertions. ( Ronald) Coleman v. United States, 515 A.2d 439, 450 (D.C. 1986) (citations omitted). Closing arguments, and especially rebuttal arguments, are `seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation often frequently results in imperfect syntax and planning.' Lee v. United States, 668 A.2d 822, 831 (D.C.1995) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)) (citation omitted). If the prosecutor's comments are improper and an objection has been made, we examine whether they `rise to the level of substantial prejudice.' Hartridge v. United States, 896 A.2d 198, 221 (D.C.2006) (quoting United States v. Moore, 322 U.S.App.D.C. 334, 347, 104 F.3d 377, 390 (1997)). This determination involves an examination of the gravity of the improper comments, the corrective action taken by the trial judge, and the strength of the government's case. Id. We look for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel. Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989) (citations omitted). However, where counsel fails to object to the challenged comments, as here with the exception of one instance, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (The plain error standard requires a showing of `error' that is `plain' and that `affects substantial rights.' If these conditions are satisfied, then appellant must demonstrate that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the] judicial proceeding[ ].). See also Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 21-24 (D.C.2006). Some of the comments regarding the presumption of innocence and vouching for the credibility of a detective either are close to the edge of propriety, or cross the line into impropriety. Indeed, the government acknowledge[s] that one aspect of the prosecutor's rebuttal relating to vouching was improper. That is, in discussing a detective's testimony, the prosecutor asked the jury: Why would Detective Sullivan want to arrest the wrong person? What's his motivation to arrest [Mr.] Daniels and let the real killer go? However, Mr. Daniels cannot demonstrate that these comments about Detective Sullivan (or others to which there was no objection) seriously affected his substantial rights, or seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceeding against him, or substantially prejudiced him. See Olano, supra, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see also Teoume-Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478, 495 (D.C.2007) ([R]eversal for plain error in cases of alleged [improper prosecutorial comments] should be confined to particularly egregious situations) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (first alteration in original). Finally, we see no need to determine, definitively, whether the prosecutor's comments relating to facts not in evidence were improper because we are satisfied that they do not rise to the level of substantial prejudice to Mr. Daniels. Upon hearing defense counsel's objection to the comment pertaining to the rumor that Mr. Daniels killed Mr. Cofield and the reference to grand jury testimony, the trial judge offered to give the jury a curative instruction even though he did not believe there was anything improper about the argument, but defense counsel was not satisfied with the proposed instruction. When the trial court tried to determine whether there was something about the way [he] instruct[ed], defense counsel replied: No, Your Honor, I just would like it not be given. Nevertheless, the trial court three times instructed the jury that the attorneys' arguments are not evidence, and we must presume that a jury follows the court's instructions, absent any indication to the contrary. Lewis, supra, 930 A.2d at 1008. Under these circumstances, and given the strength of the government's case against Mr. Daniels, we are persuaded that any error did not substantially prejudice Mr. Daniels. See Teoume-Lessane, supra, 931 A.2d at 495 (We can say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping [any] erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by [any] error.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered.