Opinion ID: 1436172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: by Albert Del Guercio, Vice President of Good Government Group of Seal Beach

Text: The citizens of Seal Beach finally had their day in court and the Robertson-Baum-Fuhrman-Hogard combine was dealt a mortal blow. Superior Court Judge Van Tatenhove, after days of hearings, issued an order requiring the recalcitrant councilmen  Baum, Fuhrman and Hogard to set a date for the recall of Fuhrman. In so doing the Judge found that Jody Weir, the City Clerk, had properly performed the duties of her office in certifying as valid and sufficient the recall signatures of over 50% of Fuhrman's councilmanic district. It overruled Bentson's inadvisable contention that the law required 25% of the signatures of the voters of the entire City. Notwithstanding the favorable court decision, the combine continued to deny the citizens their rights, and instructed Bledsoe (Robertson's former attorney) to file a notice of appeal. This would have had the effect of stalling the recall for months if not a year. This was too much for Councilman Lloyd Gummere to stomach. Notwithstanding his long record of outstanding public service he had been harassed, maligned and his motives impugned by the combine. He had had his fill of the Hogard-Fuhrman-Baum-Robertson daily chicanery and machinations. So at the January 4th meeting of the City Council it was announced that he had reached an agreement with the combine whereby he would resign as councilman and the combine would drop the appeal and set a date for the Fuhrman recall election and the election of his successor. The date of the recall election was thereafter set for March 30, 1971. Thus as a result of the sacrifice of the venerable senior councilman, the people of Seal Beach will be permitted to exercise its sovereignty over its public servants. But it will be difficult to find a man to fill Mr. Gummere's (affectionately known as Pop) place. The combination had needlessly spent over fourteen thousand dollars of the taxpayers money to fight Fuhrman's battle and to frustrate the will of the people. In addition, the combine by its unjustified action compelled the Good Government Group to raise over twelve thousand dollars in legal fees to fight the people's battle. The money is coming from small donations from thousands of concerned citizens of Seal Beach. This is the price we had to pay in order to oust irresponsible men from office and restore honest and responsible government in the City. The day the combine compelled the resignation of one of its most respected and beloved councilman to insure the people their rights, will go down as a day of infamy. This is the same combine which extorted by blackmail $100,000 from the R & B Development Company. For its thirty pieces of silver the combine agreed to forgo its concern for the City's ecology, pollution and strain on our sanitation system that Baum had so sanctimoniously raised during his campaign and in City Council meetings. For economical reasons the R & B Development Company submitted to the holdup and agreed to drop its multi-million dollar suit against the City so that it could begin the construction of apartment buildings in the downtown section of the City. But the combine will pay for its infamy and lose its stranglehold on the City. Notices of intention to recall have been served on Baum and Hogard and circulation of petitions have commenced. For the first time the Fuhrman-Hogard-Baum combine have dropped their arrogance and are running scared. They were given an opportunity in the recall notice to answer specific charges of misconduct and illegal activities. They elected not to do so but instead chose to set up a smoke screen by falsely claiming to have benefited the City of Seal Beach during their incumbency. They enshrined themselves in a cloak of innocence and humility that ill becomes them. From now to the date of the election you will hear a lot of political hog-wash from this combine. It appears that Robertson will have to move elsewhere to impose his will on an elective body. BIRD, C.J., Dissenting. The First Amendment protects the expression of political opinions  the polite utterance along with the rude remark, the sober judgment along with the emotional exaggeration. However, the majority find that an article criticizing the official conduct of three city councilmen may have gone beyond the expression of opinion to include one false statement of fact. This, the majority conclude, warrants denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment. I cannot agree. When read in context, the offending phrase, which supposedly accuses the councilmen of criminal blackmail, emerges clearly as a literary device for ridiculing their political conduct. Beyond the instant case, I fear the majority opinion will have a chilling effect on the exercise of legitimate First Amendment rights. Every critic of government must now unduly restrain his or her language, lest some imaginary reader mistake literary license for criminal allegations.
This country has a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. ( New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 270 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 701, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412].) The constitutional guarantees of free speech and press assure every person the right to criticize public men and measures  and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation. ( Baumgartner v. United States (1944) 322 U.S. 665, 674 [88 L.Ed. 1525, 1531, 64 S.Ct. 1240].) It is, after all, a sign of a free society that politics still engenders passion  and the excesses of passion. Therefore, courts wisely refuse to prescribe rules of etiquette for political parlance. Rhetorical hyperbole, vigorous epithet[s] and opinions couched even in the most pejorative terms are all in order. ( Greenbelt Pub. Assn. v. Bresler (1970) 398 U.S. 6, 14 [26 L.Ed.2d 6, 15, 90 S.Ct. 1537]; Letter Carriers v. Austin (1974) 418 U.S. 264, 284 [41 L.Ed.2d 745, 761-762, 94 S.Ct. 2770].) For we must recognize that how one talks about a political candidate is often what one wants to say. Therefore, to restrict the language of political dialogue is ultimately to restrict the dialogue itself. The First Amendment was promulgated in recognition of this fact. Unlike an expression of opinion, a false statement of fact may be the basis of a defamation action. Unfortunately, few words are immutably cast as either statements of fact or opinion. [1] [W]hat constitutes a statement of fact in one context may be treated as a statement of opinion in another.... ( Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 601 [131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 552 P.2d 425].) Therefore, a court looks to see whether a particular expression is one of fact or opinion. In making this determination, courts look to the nature and content of the communication and to the knowledge and understanding of the individuals to whom the publication is directed. `A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So the whole item ... should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined.' ( Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner (1919) 250 U.S. 290, 293 [63 L.Ed. 987, 989, 39 S.Ct. 448], italics added; accord Hoffman v. Washington Post Co. (D.D.C. 1977) 433 F. Supp. 600, 602, fn. 1; Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 277, 291, fn. 11 [112 Cal. Rptr. 609]; see Eldredge, The Law of Defamation (1978) § 9, pp. 44-45.) The events and environment which precipitate the publication must also be examined. [W]here potentially defamatory statements are published in a public debate ... or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole, language which generally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion. ( Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 601; see Letter Carriers v. Austin, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 284-286 [41 L.Ed.2d at pp. 761-762].) This is particularly relevant where a heated political controversy prompts the publication. The United States Supreme Court has observed that in the midst of such political campaigns `[c]harges of gross incompetence, disregard of the public interest, communist sympathies, and the like usually have filled the air; and hints of bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct are not infrequent.' ( New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at p. 273, fn. 14 [11 L.Ed.2d at p. 702].) As a result, courts must decide whether the challenged language constitutes a statement of fact in light of the usual political hyperbole customarily encountered when political figures clash on controversial public matters. ( Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 37 Cal. App.3d at p. 291.)
Appellate courts are required to `make an independent examination of the whole record' to guarantee that these principles have been constitutionally applied. ( New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at p. 285 [11 L.Ed.2d at p. 709].) Consider the record. In July 1970, Morton Baum and Thomas Hogard assumed their offices as two of the five councilmen for the City of Seal Beach. Less than a month later, Baum and Hogard joined with incumbent Councilman Conroy Fuhrman to fire the city manager and city attorney. A citizens' group claimed this violated the city charter and promptly filed a notice of intention to circulate recall petitions against Fuhrman. The city manager had been investigating charges of misconduct and drug abuse at a teenage dance hall operated by William Robertson. This investigation was continued by the interim city manager, who found the charges to be true and suspended the dance hall's license. Robertson appealed to the city council, and public hearings were held over a two-month period. Baum refused to disqualify himself despite his close personal relationship with Robertson. In a final 3-2 vote, Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman united to reject the city manager's findings. Another controversy began on October 21, 1970, when the City of Seal Beach issued building permits for the construction of an apartment complex by R & B Development Company. On October 30th, these permits were revoked because the final plans had not been fully examined and approved. On November 2d, a building moratorium in the area encompassing the development project was passed 3-2 by the city council because ... absolutely no investigation, study, evaluation or consideration was made or given to the possible adverse, or even catastrophic effects that the implementation of the [Redevelopment] Project Plan might have upon the quality and purity of the environment.... No building permits were to be issued until environmental studies had been completed. The R & B Development Company filed suit seeking the reissuance of the building permits, an injunction against the enforcement of the moratorium, and damages. At an executive session on November 23d, the council reversed itself and exempted the R & B Development Company from the moratorium. The building permits were immediately reissued in exchange for the development company's agreement to pay $100,000 to the city, to drop its lawsuit, and to rent to married as well as single persons. The development company made no changes in its building plans and no environmental studies were conducted. Councilman Holden, joined by Councilman Gummere, charged that the city's activities amounted to extortion and blackmail. Nevertheless, a majority of the council approved the settlement that evening after its terms were discussed in a public council meeting. In August 1970, petitions were circulated to recall Fuhrman, and 6,900 signatures were submitted, including 55 percent of the district represented by Fuhrman. Although the required number of signatures were certified by the city clerk, Baum and Hogard voted against setting a date for the recall election. [2] A mandate proceeding, initiated by the Good Government Group, was filed requesting the court to order the council to set an election. In December 1970, a recall election was ordered by the superior court, but Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman filed an appeal. Councilman Gummere, who had consistently opposed Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman, offered to resign if the recall election were allowed to go forward. This offer was accepted, and the Fuhrman recall election was set. In January 1971, notices of intent to circulate recall petitions were filed against Hogard and Baum. Fuhrman was recalled by a 6-1 margin in March, and Hogard was recalled by two-thirds of the electorate in August. These events were reported in the defendants' monthly newsletter. In front page articles during November and December, the newsletter detailed the arbitrary actions, irresponsible conduct and machinations of the combine (Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman). A third-page article appearing in the February issue formed the basis of this action by real party in interest, Hogard. [3] The article discussed the conduct of Hogard, Baum and Fuhrman, denominated the combine, in their capacity as public officials. They were criticized for expending public funds to fight the Fuhrman recall effort, refusing to set a date for the recall election, and forcing another councilman to resign in exchange for setting a date for the recall election. The article deemed the combine's performance of their official duties recalcitrant and irresponsible. Their conduct was denigrated as daily chicanery and machinations, their actions were considered infamy. The article concluded that the combine will pay for its infamy and lose its stranglehold on the City through recall elections. Readers were warned to expect to hear a lot of political hog-wash from the combine in defense of their conduct as the recall elections approached. The paragraph containing the words found objectionable by the majority is buried in the middle of the article. [4] The subject of that paragraph was the settlement of the dispute between the city council and R & B Development Company. Specifically the article charged the combine with extort[ing] by blackmail $100,000.00 from the R & B Development Company. The majority argue this court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that this was only a colorful characterization of the way these councilmen handled the city's business. The majority fasten on the failure to state explicitly that the development company's payment went to the city. This omission supposedly leaves the article ambiguous and creates a jury question: would an ordinary reader have understood that sentence as making the factual assertion that the councilmen had personally pocketed the money? (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 681-683.) I cannot agree that this article, which clears its ground with the subtlety of a bulldozer, is ambiguous or suggests in any way that the councilmen were guilty of the crime of blackmail. No reader of the article could miss the strident tone and hyperbole used to express the author's criticisms of the councilmen's official conduct. The article was a partisan indictment of their actions, alleging abuses of power and unprincipled conduct. The councilmen were accused of undermining honest and responsible government, of arrogance, of daily chicanery and machinations, and of refusing to answer charges of misconduct and illegal activities. Surely if the author intended to blacken their reputations by alleging the receipt of a personal payment in exchange for official favors, he would have proclaimed the outrage openly and in the first paragraph, not the fourth. Moreover, even scant attention to the language of the offending paragraph, set in the midst of this tirade, makes abundantly clear the rhetorical nature of the blackmail charge. The paragraph labeled the $100,000 settlement a `holdup.' By placing the word in quotation marks, the author clearly announced he was castigating the combine for the settlement's unfairness, not its unlawfulness. The deliberate use of figurative language was again impressed upon the reader when the $100,000 was referred to as thirty pieces of silver. Judas received thirty pieces of silver, not the three councilmen of Seal Beach. Finally, the paragraph concluded by noting that R & B Development Company dropped its lawsuit against the city as part of the settlement. This belies any suggestion that the councilmen personally pocketed the money. The statement confirms that it was the city, acting through the council, which negotiated and received the payment. The charges made against the three councilmen are not uncommon in a vigorously contested political campaign. The readers of this newsletter had previously read critical articles about the combine's conduct. The electorate was aware of the intense emotions generated by the recall campaign. The dispute between the city and the development company had been discussed at length in two public council meetings and reported in the local press. The settlement was publicly memorialized in the council's minutes and in the agreements and letters between the parties. The majority concede that [t]he fact that the city had received the $100,000 payment in settlement of the dispute with the developer was public knowledge. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 681, italics added.) [5] In such a highly political context, readers would readily anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade [them] to their positions by the use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole.... ( Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 601.) Reasonable readers, who persevered through the article's repeated criticisms, would easily understand that blackmail referred to political, not criminal, misconduct. As such, the statement clearly is an expression of opinion characterizing the conduct of a public official. Therefore, it is constitutionally protected as a matter of law. The case law is in accord. In Greenbelt Pub. Assn. v. Bresler, supra, 398 U.S. 6, a small weekly newspaper was sued for libel for reporting that individuals at a public city council meeting had charged blackmail in connection with a developer's negotiations with the council. The articles, as in the present case, presented only the salient features of the event reported, not a verbatim transcript. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court held, as a matter of constitutional law, that the word blackmail was not defamatory when spoken at the meeting or printed in the newspaper. ( Id., at p. 13 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 14-15].) The court found that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet.... ( Id., at p. 14 [26 L.Ed.2d at p. 15].) The language was not defamatory since a member of the audience and a reader of the paper would have understood exactly what was meant: it was [the plaintiff's] public and wholly legal negotiating proposals that were being criticized. ( Ibid. ) That is equally true here. [6] In Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 17 Cal.3d at page 603, this court unanimously held accusations that union officers were willing to sacrifice the interests of the members of their union to further their own political aspirations and personal ambitions were incapable of supporting a defamation action. Such accusations are as capable of being construed as statements of fact as the statements in the present case. However, this court held that since the charges are of the kind typically generated in the `economic give-and-take' of a spirited labor dispute ..., they constituted protected statements of opinion.... ( Id., at pp. 603-604.) [7] Similarly, it has been held that charging a person with the kind of paranoid thinking that you get from a schizophrenic was not capable of a defamatory meaning. ( Fram v. Yellow Cab Company of Pittsburgh (W.D.Pa. 1975) 380 F. Supp. 1314, 1323, 1330.) The court noted that in the context of a television talk show the audience was accustomed to hearing criticism and controversy, and would understand the comment as colorful rebuttal rather than an accusation of mental illness. ( Id., at pp. 1329-1331.) [8] Another recent case held that a broadcast was not defamatory despite the omission of an important statement of fact. The broadcast, entitled Public Bridges & Private Riches, created the impression that a former member and chairman of the Delaware River Port Authority privately benefited from inside information, failed to reveal conflicts of interest, and abused his public trust. ( Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. (3d Cir.1978) 576 F.2d 495.) The broadcast stated that `some Port Authority Commissioners saw an opportunity for enormous profits, profits on land deals....' ( Id., at p. 498.) Land purchases involving plaintiff, who appeared to benefit from the authority's decisions, were described in detail. In describing one transaction, the defendant omitted the date of the plaintiff's purchase, creating the impression that the plaintiff benefitted from inside information. In fact, the land was purchased after the authority's action was public knowledge. Despite the fact that the failure to include this statement of fact led to the impression of misconduct and unlawful dealings in office, the court held that the broadcast was incapable of a defamatory meaning. ( Id., at p. 510; cf. Time v. Pape (1971) 401 U.S. 279, 289-290 [28 L.Ed.2d 45, 52-54, 91 S.Ct. 633].) The reasoning of these decisions is compelling. The comments were made in the middle of a public controversy, where caustic language, exaggeration and fiery rhetoric are regularly employed. In this context, many comments which might be construed as assertions of fact in a more tranquil setting are found, as a matter of law, to be opinions intended to persuade. The First Amendment protects such statements from judicial incursions. Any other conclusion would have `disquieting implications for criticism of governmental conduct,' for it would likely lead to the kind of chilling effect on the media that New York Times and its successors directly seek to avoid. ( Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., supra, 576 F.2d at p. 510, fns. omitted.) [9]
The majority's reason for affirming the denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment portends a judicial intervention in the area of our free press which is inimical to the principles enshrined in the First Amendment. In holding that a defamation suit will lie because of the alleged failure to make one statement sufficiently explicit, the majority set a course which bodes ill for the future. Their analysis would make editors of judges. The judiciary's red pen is thereby unleashed to strike vexatious language or to demand augmentation according to the judges' image of how the public should be informed. This will cause publishers to moderate their political commentary and to dilute the intensity of their judgments in order to avoid the shadow of liability cast by this court's opinion. As a consequence, the vigorous and vital public debate essential to a healthy electoral process will be tempered to polite sparring. Today, good government is made a double victim. Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied December 27, 1978. Newman, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.