Opinion ID: 498426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Regional Board Action as Bar

Text: 39 Chevron moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Regional Board's prior enforcement action against Chevron bars any further enforcement action by Sierra Club. The district court denied Chevron's motion. 40 As discussed above, citizen enforcement suits may not be commenced if the EPA Administrator or a state agency is diligently prosecuting an enforcement action in a court of the United States, or a State. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365(b)(1)(B). Sierra Club contends that (1) action within a state administrative agency is never action in a court; (2) in any case, the Regional Board in this case did not serve as the functional equivalent of a court; and (3) in any case, the Regional Board failed diligently to prosecute its enforcement action. Chevron argues that the Regional Board proceedings do constitute action in a court and that the Regional Board diligently prosecuted the action. 41
42 Two Courts of Appeal have addressed the meaning of action in a court and have arrived at different conclusions. The Third Circuit, in Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.) (involving the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision, which is for present purposes identical to the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979), and SPIRG v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.1985), has held that if agency action is the functional equivalent of action in a court, then the requirements of 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365 are satisfied, and a citizen enforcement suit is barred. The Second Circuit, in Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.1985), has held that 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365 unambiguously requires that action be in a literal court, so that agency action outside of a court will never bar a citizen enforcement suit. 43 The Third Circuit in Baughman and SPIRG indicated that under some circumstances agency action constitutes action in a court. In SPIRG, the court explained that a dual inquiry must be made before an agency proceeding can be characterized as action in a court. SPIRG, 759 F.2d at 1137. The court stated: 44 The first question to be answered is whether the coercive powers that the administrative agency possesses compel compliance with effluent limitations (to determine whether the agency has the power to accord relief which is the substantial equivalent to that available to the EPA in federal court). The second inquiry concerns the procedural similarities the agency proceeding might have to a suit in federal court (to determine, among other things, whether citizens have a right to intervene in the agency proceeding). 45 Id. The SPIRG court concluded that an EPA administrative enforcement action does not qualify as a court action. The court explained that the EPA is without power to enforce its compliance or consent orders, lacks the power to impose administrative remedies, does not allow citizens to intervene in its negotiation and enforcement process, and provides none of the procedural safeguards that are provided in federal court proceedings. SPIRG, 759 F.2d at 1138-39. 46 The Second Circuit, while acknowledging the approach taken by the Third Circuit, declined to follow it. In Friends of the Earth, 768 F.2d at 62, the Second Circuit found the language of 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365 to be unambiguous; the statute refers to action in a court, and an administrative proceeding is not an action in a court. The court also examined the legislative history of 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365 and concluded that it failed to disclose any indication that Congress meant other than what it plainly stated in section [1365]. Id. at 63. 47 We prefer the Second Circuit's reading of section 1365 over the Third Circuit's reading. Section 1365 does refer specifically to courts, and it makes no direct or veiled reference to any type of administrative proceeding. As Sierra Club notes, the citizen suit provisions of various acts, including the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2619(b)(1)(B), the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1540(g)(2), the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(g)(2), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6972(b), all bar citizen suits if the government is prosecuting either a court action or an administrative action. This contrast dispels any lingering ambiguity in the term courts as used in section 1365. In addition, Chevron has cited no legislative history that would justify the extraordinary step of ignoring the plain language of the statute. Our own review of the legislative history indicates only that citizen suits should be handled liberally, because they perform an important public function: It is the Committee's intent that enforcement of these control provisions be immediate, that citizens should be unconstrained to bring these actions, and that the courts should not hesitate to consider them. S.Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3746. 6 48 Because section 1365 is unambiguous and the legislative history supports a literal reading of section 1365, we hold that under 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365, a citizen enforcement suit is not precluded by nonjudicial enforcement action by the Regional Board.