Opinion ID: 6335826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Introduction of co-conspirator statements

Text: Holt next argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay in the form of statements made by Lakita Cain through the testimony of Holly Clemons. The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth that the statements were admissible pursuant to the “coconspirator exception” to the hearsay rule, which permits the introduction of a statement against the opposing party where the statement “was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Pa.R.E. 803(25)(E). The specific statements at issue were related by Clemons, a resident of 1206 Victoria Avenue at the time of Officer Shaw’s murder. She testified that on November 18, 2017, one day after the shooting, Holt’s relative Lisa Harrington arrived to meet with Cain, left via vehicle, and then returned shortly thereafter. N.T., 11/6/2019, at 497-502. Clemons testified to the following exchange: Q. When [Harrington] leaves, do you have any conversations with [Cain] about why [Harrington] came to the house? A. I did ask her what was going own [sic]. [Cain] was like – she had, like, to get stuff out of the house. She – Q. Who had to get stuff out of the house? A. [Cain]. She told [Harrington] to get things out of the house. Q. Did she say what she needed to get things out of the house?
basement. I never seen [Harrington] go to the basement or – Q. I understand. [J-64-2021] - 39 A. – [Cain] go to the basement. Q. What did [Cain] say about that gun? A. She said it was [Holt’s] gun and she had to get it out of the house so she called [Harrington]. Q. Was she explaining to you why [Harrington] had come to the house that afternoon? A. That’s what she said she was there for. Id. at 502-03. On re-direct examination, Clemons further clarified that she asked Cain “if it was [Holt’s] gun,” to which Cain replied that it was. Id. at 523. Holt objected to the introduction of these statements during pre-trial motions and prior to Clemons’s testimony. The Commonwealth replied that Clemons’s statements fell within the co-conspirator exception. Id. at 449, 455, 461-62, 464, 473-74. While Holt argued that this was an uncharged conspiracy, suggesting that the coconspirator exception did not apply in such an instance, see id. at 449, 456, 475, he also objected in the alternative that if Clemons’s statements did fall within the exception, the prejudice established by her statements outweighed their probative value. Id. at 466-67, 475. The trial court overruled these objections after holding an in camera hearing with Detective Dupilka to establish that there was an ongoing conspiracy among the residents of 1206 Victoria Avenue to hinder Holt’s apprehension by law enforcement. Id. at 464-78. “Application of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is predicated on agency principles—when the elements of the exception are established, each conspirator is considered an agent of the other, and therefore, a statement by one represents an admission by all.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 838 A.2d 663, 675 (Pa. 2003). The exception contains three elements: “[(1)] the existence of a conspiracy between the [J-64-2021] - 40 declarant and the defendant must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence; [(2)] the statements must be shown to have been made during the course of the conspiracy; and [(3)] they must have been made in furtherance of the common design.” Id. at 674. Holt challenges both the existence of a conspiracy between him and the declarant (Cain) as well as the existence of a conspiracy between Holt, Cain, and Clemons. Holt also argues that the exception “has its limits, especially with an uncharged conspiracy with no defined objective.” Holt’s Brief at 36. Holt concedes that the Commonwealth established a conspiracy between Cain and Taylor, albeit one limited to assisting Holt’s attempts to evade capture. “While the prosecution successfully argued that an uncharged conspiracy existed due to the failure of Cain and Taylor’s failure to disclose the whereabouts of [Holt] following the Shaw murder, there was no evidence of record of any conspiracy to hide the murder weapon.” Id. at 37. In effect, Holt argues that Cain, Clemons and all the other residents of 1206 Victoria Avenue, as well as Harrington, could have conspired to remove incriminating evidence on their own accord, and not necessarily at Holt’s behest. As well, Holt states that presenting Cain’s statements through Clemons violated his rights to confront the witness. Id. at 42. The Commonwealth responds that the testimony was properly admitted because all residents of 1206 Victoria Avenue, including Clemons, were involved in the conspiracy. Commonwealth’s Brief at 29-33. Further, the Commonwealth asserts that Holt’s counsel [J-64-2021] - 41 never objected to the testimony as violating Holt’s right to confrontation, and therefore, he waived the confrontation argument. Id. at 31.21 As with the other evidentiary rulings addressed above, we will reverse only if Holt shows that the trial court abused its discretion in deeming this evidence admissible. Gill, 206 A.3d at 466-67. The trial court’s opinion explained its basis for admitting the statements as follows. The evidence showed repeated contact between the Defendant and the other residents of 1206 Victoria Avenue, which include Lakita Cain, Taylor Mitchell, Holly Clemons, Michael Luffey, and Antoinette Strong. The evidence further showed that while the Defendant remained underground, those residents repeatedly rebuffed police attempts to learn of his whereabouts in order to effectuate his arrest and to secure the weapon. Over a period of four days, during each of which the police appeared at that address, the residents concealed knowledge of the Defendant's whereabouts, his status as a resident at that address, and the fact that he had been there shortly after the shooting in a frantic state of mind, with a bleeding hand. Only when Michael Luffey began to fear that he might lose his children if he continued in this concerted course of conduct with the other residents and went to the police, did the fabrication and concealment begin to unravel. Holly Clemons testified that from Lakita Cain, she learned that Lisa Harrington was present to get the Defendant's gun out of the house. Hiding the gun from the police was of the utmost importance to the Defendant, who had contact with the others in the house and who ultimately said he was “sorry for the things he put us through.” 21 We agree with the Commonwealth that Holt’s counsel’s failure to raise the confrontation clause argument before the trial court resulted in waiver of that aspect of his argument. This Court has long held that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of appellate review that we will not reverse a judgment or decree on a theory that was not presented to the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 217 A.3d 833, 842 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Kimmel v. Somerset Cty. Comm’rs, 333 A.2d 777, 779 (Pa. 1975)). At trial, Holt’s counsel explicitly objected to this evidence on the grounds that the statement was inadmissible hearsay and, alternatively, that the evidence was overly prejudicial, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 403. N.T., 11/6/2019, at 448-49, 466-67, 475. Counsel never mentioned Holt’s rights under the confrontation clause. [J-64-2021] - 42 From all of this, the court felt that, by reasonable inference from all of the circumstances present, a conspiracy existed inclusive of the Defendant and involving the other members of the household and that the statements made were in furtherance of and during the conspiracy involving the Defendant and the various persons at 1206 Victoria Avenue, including Holly Clemens, Lisa Harrington and Lakita Cain, inter alia. Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/2020, at 34-35 (citations omitted). The trial court did not err. The first question is whether there was a conspiracy between the declarant, Holt, and Clemons as the challenged statements were relayed by Cain to Clemons in response to Clemons’s question. The Commonwealth is not required to establish the existence of conspiracy through direct evidence, and the conspiracy “may be inferentially established by showing the relation, conduct or circumstances of the parties.” Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 639 A.2d 421, 432 (Pa. 1994). The trial court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that, following Officer Shaw’s murder, the police questioned all the residents of 1206 Victoria Avenue daily until Holt’s arrest, and on each occasion the residents concealed knowledge of Holt’s whereabouts, his status as a resident at that address, and that he had been there shortly after the shooting. It was reasonable for the trial court to infer that this ongoing conduct demonstrated an agreement between the residents of 1206 Victoria Avenue to impede the Commonwealth’s investigation. Addressing Holt’s argument that a conspiracy must be limited in its scope, we conclude that, under the circumstances, there is no difference between a conspiracy to frustrate law enforcement’s attempts to locate Holt and a conspiracy to conceal evidence on Holt’s behalf. In both scenarios, the conspirators share the overriding goal of shielding [J-64-2021] - 43 Holt from arrest. The preponderance of the evidence as accepted by the trial court established that the residents of 1206 Victoria Avenue engaged in conduct designed to assist Holt in avoiding prosecution. Nor do we need to rely on the inferential strength of these circumstances, as there was evidence that Holt was a part of this conspiracy. Clemons testified that Cain and Mitchell had communications with Holt in the days following Officer Shaw’s death. The trial court also cited the testimony of Michael Luffey, who was present for a phone call between Holt, Cain, and Mitchell, which took place on Cain’s speakerphone. Holt acknowledged Luffey’s presence and told them he was “sorry for the things he put us through.” N.T., 11/6/2019, at 421-22. We agree that this evidence, while not overwhelming evidence of a conspiracy, satisfies the applicable preponderance standard as it establishes that Holt was in contact with the residents.22 Finally, addressing whether the statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy, we note that statements of prior activity can fail this aspect of the exception. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 838 A.2d 663, 675 (Pa. 2003) (“In a number of circumstances, however, where … the inculpatory statements are narrative declarations of past activity made to a non-participant in the asserted conspiracy, courts have found the essential in-furtherance-of attribute absent.”). Thus, there is some merit to the argument that the statements here, which involve the completed activity of removing a firearm, failed to satisfy the in-furtherance-of requirement. However, we find that the statements promoted the broader conspiratorial goal of impeding the Commonwealth’s investigation. The exception “contains no requirement 22 The Commonwealth draws our attention to additional facts not cited by the trial court, namely that Luffey testified that Cain asked Luffey for $100 to help Holt. N.T., 11/6/2019, at 430. [J-64-2021] - 44 that the conspiracy identified as the basis for admissibility be related to the crime charged.” Id. at 676. Accordingly, “in order to satisfy the in-furtherance-of requirement of the coconspirator hearsay exception, it is sufficient for the government to establish an intent to promote the conspiratorial objective.” Id. at 675. In Johnson, the appellant Raymond Johnson was convicted of murdering Louis Combs. The evidence established that Johnson and Combs were rival drug dealers. Nicole Ramsey testified that she sold drugs for Johnson and was present for conversations between Johnson and a man known as “Izod,” whom she identified as Johnson’s “right-hand man,” regarding a plan to eliminate Combs. Id. at 679. On the day of Combs’s murder, Johnson testified that Izod told her, “we did them n______s. You didn't think we would, but we did. There is not going to be a problem.” Id. at 670. We determined that the evidence was admissible under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay. Here, as Johnson essentially concedes, the Commonwealth's evidence demonstrated, by a clear preponderance, a larger conspiracy between Appellant and Izod to distribute illegal drugs. Significantly, this is a conspiracy as to which the evidence demonstrated that Ramsey was not a third party, but a participant. In the course of Izod's remarks to Ramsey, he advised her of an act that eliminated a rival seller, thus promoting the objectives of the drug conspiracy, and instructed her to maintain a low profile for the time being to avoid detection in light of the expected, increased law enforcement activity. Accord [United States v.] Johnson, 200 F.3d [529] at 533 [(7th Cir. 2000)] (noting that statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy can take a variety of forms, including comments made “to inform other members about the progress of the conspiracy, to control damage to or detection of the conspiracy, to hide the criminal objectives of the conspiracy, or to instill confidence and prevent the desertion of other members”). Id. at 677 (footnote omitted). [J-64-2021] - 45 Likewise, we find that the Commonwealth established a conspiratorial objective broader in scope than the limited nature posited by Holt. See Holt’s Brief at 37-28 (“While the prosecution successfully argued that an uncharged conspiracy existed due to the failure of Cain and Taylor’s failure to disclose the whereabouts of [Holt] following the Shaw murder, there was no evidence of record of any conspiracy to hide the murder weapon.”). Clemons and Cain were both participants in a conspiracy to impede the Commonwealth’s investigation. Cain’s statements informing Clemons that another person removed a gun from the residence served to apprise Cain of the ongoing conspiracy. Additionally, Clemons’s testimony reflected that Cain’s statements were not spur of the moment. Instead, they were in direct response to Clemons’s questioning. Cain telling Clemons that Harrington came over because she “had to get the gun out of the house” kept Clemons abreast of the conspiracy and thus satisfies the co-conspirator exception’s infurtherance-of requirement. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Clemons’s testimony.