Opinion ID: 775616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Departmental Decision

Text: 17 A preliminary question before we reach the merits is whether we should remand the case to the district court as Appellants urge, or review the IBLA decisions ourselves, as suggested by the United States. The parties fully briefed and argued the issue of the validity of the IBLA decisions before the district court on a complete record. Because we would review de novo the district court's decision on the merits, 26 and the issue was properly raised in the district court, we may decide it on appeal and we will do so. 27 18 In the district court, Appellants sought a declaration that the IBLA's practice of requiring applicants to prove personal use and occupancy independent of immediate family members is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in compliance with the ANAA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. The IBLA's practice arose from its interpretation of 43 C.F.R. &#167 2561.0-5(a), which provides that qualifying use and occupancy under the ANAA contemplates the customary seasonality of use and occupancy by the applicant of any land used by him for his livelihood and well-being and that of his family. Such use and occupancy must be substantial actual possession and use of the land, at least potentially exclusive of others. The IBLA's interpretation is not embodied in any formal regulation or policy statement but arose through past adjudications of allotment applications. 28 19 The IBLA has interpreted the last sentence of &#167 2561.0-5(a) to mean that the use of the land must be accomplished by an independent individual acting in his own right. 29 [T]he substantial use and occupancy required by the [ANAA ] must be achieved by the Native as an independent citizen acting for herself and not as a dependent child . . . using the land in the company of [and under the supervision of] her parents. 30 The use of land as a minor only can qualify as substantial use and occupancy under the ANAA if the child was exerting independent control and use of the land to the exclusion of his or her parents, siblings, or other elders. 31 20 The first step in our analysis of whether the IBLA's interpretation of the ANAA's language is permissible is to determine if the statute itself clearly answers the question. If the intent of Congress is clear, then the agency must give effect to that unambiguously expressed intent. 32 If the statute is not clear as to the intent of Congress regarding the precise question at issue, then the question becomes whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 33 The agency's interpretation need not be the only permissible construction of the statute, as long as it is a reasonable construction. 34 21 Neither the statute nor the regulation clearly define the phrase substantial use and occupancy. First, we must look to the language of the statute. As relevant to our analysis, the ANAA simply says that [n]o allotment shall be made to any person . . . until said person has made proof satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior of substantially continuous use and occupancy of the land for a period of five years. 35 Congress did not indicate what the IBLA should consider when making its substantial use determinations. In the absence of a clear statutory answer, we turn to the regulation. The regulation does not directly answer the question either. It states that such use and occupancy must be substantial actual possession of the land, at least potentially exclusive of others. 36 Since the definition of substantial use and occupancy is not clear from the statute or the regulation, we must then determine whether the IBLA's interpretation is unreasonable. 22 This court must give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. 37 The court's task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose. 38 Rather, the court must defer to the agency's interpretation unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation. 39 We believe that the IBLA's interpretation is valid. 23 Appellants argue that the Department's interpretation runs counter to the intent of the Secretary at the time the regulation was adopted. They point to a 1964 Interior Department report referenced in the Federal Register when &#167 2561.0-5(a) was proposed. 40 According to the report,&#167 2561.0-5(a) would expressly permit consideration of . . . native custom and mode of living . . . in determining whether an applicant for an allotment has shown substantially continuous use and occupancy of the land for a period of five years. 41 The 1964 report also states: The proposed regulations represent a change of existing policy concerning the allotment of land to Alaskan natives. In addition to occupancy according to the standards of the white settler, the proposed regulations recognize occupancy according to the standards of the native in his present culture and environment. 42 24 Appellants contend that the 1964 report shows that the Interior Department intended to permit consideration of the fact that the rural Native Alaskans' mode of living was subsistence. Families, like those of the Appellants, used the land and its resources communally to carry on their way of life. According to Appellants, survival mandated that the members of their family work together to insure their livelihood and well-being. In that regard, no one member of a family can ever be considered independent. Appellants appear to argue that this evidence of the Department's intent at the time of &#167 2561.0-5(a)'s promulgation compels the conclusion that applicants need not prove personal use and occupancy independent of immediate family members. 25 While Appellants advance a plausible interpretation of &#167 2561.0-5(a), it is not the only reasonable interpretation and does not compel us to strike down the IBLA's interpretation. The right to an allotment is personal to the applicant and not a communal right. 43 It is reasonable to require the applicant to show hallmarks of personal use independent of any family members. It is evident that at certain ages, an allotment applicant under the control and supervision of his parents cannot be said to be capable of engaging in the use and occupancy required by the ANAA. A child visiting the land with a parent or relative is not capable, solely by virtue of his or her presence, to lay personal claim to the land to the exclusion of others. 26 Even though exclusive use is a standard of occupancy recognized by white settlers and not part of the Alaskan native culture that is supported by the 1964 report, the report did not completely disavow occupancy according to the standards of the white settler; it merely stated that [i]n addition to [those] standards . . . the proposed regulations recognize occupancy according to the standards of the native in his present culture. 44 Nor is the 1964 report rendered meaningless by the IBLA's requirement that applicants prove personal use and occupancy independent of immediate family members. Consistent with the 1964 report, consideration is still given to native custom and culture when deciding what types of uses (i.e., berry picking, hunting, fishing, winter homesteading) are sufficient to establish a right to an allotment. 45 27 We also note that the decisions in the Shields and Akootchook class actions support our holding. Those were the only other occasions on which we reviewed IBLA decisions relating to allotment claims under the same regulation. We affirmed the IBLA's decisions, giving deference to the administrative interpretation reflected in those decisions. 46 We held that applicants could not rely on their ancestors' use to qualify for an allotment but must demonstrate their own personal use. Because we concluded that the IBLA's interpretations of use and occupancy were reasonable in those earlier cases, it seems logical that we would give them deference in this situation as well. 28 After concluding that the IBLA's interpretation of the substantial use and occupancy standard is valid, we now examine whether the IBLA's decisions on the merits were well supported by substantial evidence in the record in each case. Each Appellant testified at length about his or her use of the land, but in each instance, the use was as a dependent minor in the company of parents. None of the Appellants made a showing that despite his or her age, the use and occupancy was somehow independent of the parents' use and occupancy. Because none of the Appellants could establish personal use independent of other family members, the IBLA's denial of all five applications for allotments was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.