Opinion ID: 900705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strict Standards

Text: ¶ 40 Trial courts must employ the strict legal standards of the Restatement formulation to distinguish intentional infliction of emotional distress from the often sordid, and sadly familiar, deeds of marital misconduct. Certainly, people are entitled to no less dignity in the marriage relationship than they are in other types of human interactions. Yet a marriage calls on physical and emotional resources rarely needed in other less intimate unions. Even a successful and thriving marriage can bring difficulty and disappointment. Because a marriage commitment demands so much and dedicates so much, it is difficult to overvalue the sense of loss the destruction of a marriage can beget. Marital partners unable to overcome their failings may seek dissolution of the relationship, but neither spouse will ordinarily gain monetary damages from the other merely by virtue of these failings. See, e.g., Wiener v. Wiener, 84 A.D.2d 814, 444 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (1981). ¶ 41 To ensure that these tort claims are not conceived out of petty spite or as leverage for concessions on divorce issues, trial courts, not juries, must sift out unmeritorious suits. [4] Whether conduct is so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery is a question of law. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt h. Only when reasonable minds may differ does the fact finder decide whether, in a particular case, the conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Id. Thus, as with many other legal questions, the Restatement requires the judge to act as a gatekeeper in these cases. Id. ¶ 42 The extreme outrage committed by the offending spouse must far exceed the bitter but common emotional torments accompanying a deteriorating marriage. Liability will not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Id. at cmt. d. The injured spouse must prove not only outrageous conduct but also conduct committed with the very purpose of, or the reckless disregard for, inflicting severe emotional distress on the injured spouse. Establishing both prongs requires more than a showing of mere negligence. Emotional distress includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, worry, and nausea. Id. at cmt. j. The law intercedes only when the distress is so severe that no reasonable person should be expected to endure it. Id. ¶ 43 These tort actions should not be used as a method to augment divorce awards. Trial courts must scrupulously forestall double recoveries. [5] A spouse should not reap tort damages on the same misconduct that generated an alimony award. To avoid a double recovery, a court should factor the alimony awarded in the divorce action when considering damages. On the other hand, in the tort action, an award to one spouse from the other should not add to the marital estate, making the tort award self-offsetting. See Barbara H. Young, Interspousal Torts and Divorce: Problems, Policies, Procedures, 27 J. Fam. L. 489, 511 (1989). ¶ 44 I share in the dissent's concern that we may see these tort claims combined routinely with divorce actions. It bears stressing, therefore, that if a court dismisses such a claim because it was frivolously or maliciously brought, then the court must order the offending party to pay part or all of the expenses incurred by the defense, including reasonable attorneys' fees. SDCL 15-17-51. The language of this statute is mandatory. SDCL 2-14-2.1. Furthermore, courts should sanction attorneys who regularly bring or assist in bringing meritless tort claims in unison with divorce actions, as authorized by SDCL 15-6-11(a)-(d).