Opinion ID: 48714
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mitchell’s and Bale’s Claims

Text: In McNair v. United States Postal Service, we held that, 15 See Bhd. of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 676 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1982). 13 under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”),16 which was made applicable by the Postal Reorganization Act17: When a collective bargaining agreement establishes a mandatory, binding grievance procedure and gives the union the exclusive right to pursue claims on behalf of aggrieved employees, the results obtained by the union are normally conclusive of the employees’ rights under the agreement. This means, of course, that an aggrieved worker whose employment is governed by such an agreement normally lacks standing independently . . . to attack in court the results of the grievance process. . . . These rules are not, however, without exception. It is established that, if the union has breached its duty of fair representation, by arbitrarily refusing to pursue a claim through the grievance process or by doing so in a perfunctory or otherwise inadequate manner, an aggrieved employee is not foreclosed by the results of the grievance process. He may sue his employer or his union or both but, in order to recover, he must prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation and that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement.18 As we explained in Acuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, which was decided under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),19 this reality is necessary to effectuate the purposes behind federal labor statutes, which require that the interests of particular individuals be subordinated to the interests of the 16 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. 17 39 U.S.C. § 1209. 18 768 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir. 1985). 19 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. 14 group at the contract-negotiation stage and beyond.20 If an employee could compel arbitration of a grievance without his union’s blessings, a CBA’s contractual conflict-resolution procedures would be substantially undermined, “thus destroying the employer’s confidence in the union’s authority and returning the individual grievant to the vagaries of independent and unsystematic negotiation.”21 The same can be said of an employee’s ability to seek judicial review of an arbitral award, after being abandoned by his union.22 Here, the plaintiffs recognize our decisions in McNair and Acuff and do not dispute their holdings, agreeing that an individual employee lacks standing to seek review of an arbitral award under the LMRA and NLRA, except that an employee may bring a claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation. Rather, the plaintiffs contend that our holdings in McNair and Acuff are limited to LMRA and NLRA claims; so they argue that they are not barred from bringing claims under the RLA. The plaintiffs, however, offer no support or reasoning for why claims grounded in the RLA should be treated differently from claims under the LMRA or the NLRA, other than their transparent 20 404 F.2d 169, 171 (5th Cir.1969). 21 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967). 22 McNair, 768 F.2d at 735. 15 acronymic differences or location within the United States Code. Indeed, we see the plaintiffs’ argument as constituting a distinction without difference. Regardless of whether a CBA is established under the LMRA, NLRA, or RLA, its existence is premised on effectuating a key purpose behind federal labor statutes, viz., placing the interests of the group ahead of the interests of the individual employees. As we have previously recognized, it would be “paradoxical in the extreme” if a union that is vested with the exclusive authority to bring an employment grievance and pursue it up to and through binding arbitration were not likewise vested with the exclusive responsibility to instigate and prosecute a review of an arbitral award in court.23 Thus, for the same reasons articulated in McNair and Acuff, we conclude that, when a CBA formed pursuant to the RLA establishes a mandatory, binding grievance procedure and vests the union with the exclusive right to pursue claims on behalf of aggrieved employees, an aggrieved employee whose employment is governed by the CBA lacks standing to attack the results of the grievance process in court —— the sole exception being the authorization of an aggrieved employee to bring an 23 Acuff, 404 F.2d at 171. 16 unfair representation claim.24 Here, the plaintiffs expressly disavowed any claim that IAM breached its duty of fair representation. Moreover, the CBA explicitly establishes that the IAM shall represent all flight attendants in grievance procedures. Both Mitchell and Bale specifically bestowed on the IAM (and never revoked) full power of attorney to represent them at all stages of the grievance procedure. We therefore affirm the district court’s conclusion that Mitchell and Bale lacked standing to petition for review of the Award.25 24 Contra McQuestion v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 892 F.2d 352, 354-55 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that the plain language of 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q) provides individual employees with uniquely individual grievances standing to bring in federal court a petition for review of a arbitral hearing initiated pursuant to the RLA). Unlike the underlying arbitral hearing here, which was brought by the IAM on behalf of all Continental flight attendants, the arbitration in McQuestion was “conducted solely to resolve appellants’ uniquely individual grievance,” such that the two plaintiffs/employees in McQuestion were the “‘real parties in interest.’” Id. at 354 (quoting McQuestion v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, No. 88-4037, slip op. at 10 (D.N.J. May 12, 1989)). We do not foreclose and need not decide today whether an individual employee may ever bring such “uniquely individual claims,” rendering him the “real party in interest,” such that § 153 First (q) provides him standing to bring an RLA claim. Rather, under the facts presented here and those of our precedent, an aggrieved employee will generally lack standing to bring an RLA action. 25 As we have concluded that Boorstein failed to exhaust her CBAcreated procedural remedies and that Mitchell and Bale lack standing to bring a petition for review under the RLA, we need not reach the plaintiffs’ constitutional due-process claims or their contention that the Award was “wholly baseless and completely without reason.” 17