Opinion ID: 495066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the liability of a sheriff for the defamatory

Text: STATEMENTS OF HIS DEPUTY
11 The defendant argues that the trial court's interrogatories were deficient because they allowed the jury to find Sheriff Corley liable for Graeter's defamatory statements if Corley knew or should have known that Graeter was making false statements or making statements with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. This instruction was reversible error. 12 Under Texas law, [t]he general rule is that a sheriff or constable is not liable for the unauthorized acts of his deputies where the liability arises in tort unless the sheriff or constable authorizes, participates in, or ratifies the individual tortious acts of his deputies. 3 Although courts have implied that a sheriff's negligent supervision may warrant a finding of liability for a deputy's tortious conduct, 4 the sheriff's liability is nevertheless predicated on authorization, participation, or ratification. The trial court must explain to the jury the relationship between the general rule of sheriff liability and a finding of negligent supervision. 5 It is not enough for the jury to find that the sheriff knew or should have known about his deputy's conduct; the jury should determine whether the sheriff's knowledge or negligent policy constituted authorization of, participation in, or ratification of the deputy's conduct.
13 The defendant asserts that the sheriff cannot be held liable for exemplary damages based upon his deputy's conduct. The cases that the defendant cites state that a sheriff cannot be held liable for exemplary damages absent a finding of malice or fraud on his part. 6 Texas cases, however, also state other circumstances when a principal or master may be held liable for exemplary damages based upon the acts of an agent or servant. 7 Because such circumstances include a principal's authorization or ratification of his agent's tortious conduct, we decline to decide whether exemplary damages were warranted in this case. Instead, we leave this issue to the discretion of the district court in a new trial. 14