Opinion ID: 1794583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: effect of failure to adopt proposed kre 406.

Text: If I am reading his separate opinion correctly, Justice Keller agrees that our common law rule excluding evidence of habit and routine practice is untenable but is concerned that a decision of this Court to depart from that common law rule would circumvent the KRE 1102 procedure for amending the adopted rules of evidence. The Committee that drafted the proposed Kentucky Rules of Evidence recommended adoption of a proposed rule identical to URE 406(a) and FRE 406. Evidence Rules Study Committee, Final Draft, at 29-30 (1989). Pursuant to that recommendation, the 1990 General Assembly enacted KRS 422A.0406, adopting proposed KRE 406, 1990 Ky. Acts, ch. 88, § 16, subject only to the approval of the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Id. § 93. Because the 1991 Supreme Court disapproved the adoption of proposed KRE 406, the 1992 General Assembly subsequently repealed KRS 422A.0406. 1992 Ky. Acts, ch. 324, § 30. [10] Thus, both the General Assembly and the Evidence Rules Study Committee (three of whose members presently serve on the Evidence Rules Review Commission, KRE 1103) voted to adopt proposed KRE 406. Only this Court disagreed. However, the 1991 Court did not amend proposed KRE 406 to codify the existing common law. The significance of that fact is exemplified by the numerous instances where the Court did amend or even rewrite other proposed rules to codify pre-existing law or, in some instances, to modify both the proposed rule and pre-existing law. See 1992 Ky. Acts, ch. 324 for the 1992 amendments of the proposed rules. With very few exceptions, those amendments were initiated by the 1991 Court, not the 1992 General Assembly. The following are only a few examples of those amendments (deleted language indicated by strikeout; added language in brackets): The Court amended proposed KRE 103(a)(1), pertaining to preservation of error, to insert language from pre-existing procedural rules, i.e., CR 46 and RCr 9.22, that required an objecting party to state the specific ground for objection only if requested by the court, viz: In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record [and upon request of the court] stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context. 1992 Ky. Acts, ch. 324 § 1(a). The Court also amended proposed KRE 403 to limit the circumstances under which relevant evidence could be excluded, viz: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair [undue] prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. § 3. The Court amended proposed KRE 407, pertaining to subsequent remedial measures, to ensure that the rule would not apply to criminal or products liability cases, viz: When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made an injury or harm allegedly caused by the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures [in products liability cases or] when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. Id. § 6. The Court essentially rewrote proposed KRE 504, the husband-wife privilege, to completely change its intended meaning, viz: (a) Spousal testimony in criminal proceedings. The spouse of an accused [a party] has a privilege to refuse to testify against the accused spouse [party] as to events occurring after the date of their marriage. [(b) Marital communications. An individual has a privilege to refuse to testify and to prevent another from testifying to any confidential communication made by the individual to his or her spouse during the marriage. The privilege may be asserted only by the individual holding the privilege or by the holder's guardian, conservator, or personal representative. A communication is confidential if it is made privately by an individual to his or her spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person.] ... Id. § 9(1), (2). And the Court substituted Kentucky's pre-existing Rule in Queen Caroline's Case, Fisher v. Duckworth, Ky., 738 S.W.2d 810, 815 (1987), i.e., CR 43.08, with respect to laying the foundation for admission of a witness's prior statement, for proposed KRE 613, which would have adopted the more liberal federal rule, viz: (a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by the witness, whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. [Before other evidence can be offered of the witness having made at another time a different statement, he must be inquired of concerning it, with the circumstances of time, place, and persons present, as correctly as the examining party can present them; and, if it be in writing, it must be shown to the witness, with the opportunity to explain it. The court may allow such evidence to be introduced when it is impossible to comply with this rule because of the absence at the trial or hearing of the witness sought to be contradicted, and when the court finds that the impeaching party has acted in good faith.] (b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in KRE 801A. 1992 Ky. Acts, ch. 324, § 16(1), (2). The 1991 Court could also have amended proposed KRE 406 so as to codify our existing common law rule excluding evidence of habit or routine practice merely by changing one word, e.g.: Evidence of habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant [inadmissible] to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. However, it chose not to do so. Except for Rules 401 and 402, the rules of relevancy in Article IV of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, if not rules of exclusion, are certainly rules of limitation, Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1500, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), i.e., exceptions to the general rule of admissibility of relevant evidence enunciated in Rule 402. URE 406(a), however, is a rule of admissibility, not of exclusion or limitation, and its adoption as FRE 406 obviously was intended to emphasize that the previous common law rule of exclusion then being followed in some jurisdictions, e.g., Levin v. United States, supra, note 3, had been abrogated by the adoption of FRE 402. Proposed KRE 406 would have accomplished the same purpose. However, a decision not to adopt a rule specifically abrogating the common law does not equate to a decision to adopt a rule codifying the common law, especially where, as here, the common law rule was apparently abrogated by another adopted Rule, i.e., KRE 402. [W]hen there is an adopted Rule of Evidence that speaks to the contested issue, the adopted Rule occupies the field and supersedes the former common law interpretation. Garrett, supra, at 14, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). However, where there is no adopted Rule, the issue either remains open for common law development, Stringer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 883, 891-92 (1997), or is considered subsumed in the general rule of inclusion, i.e., Rule 402. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50-51, 105 S.Ct. 465, 468, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984) (although no specific federal rule speaks to the inclusion of evidence of bias for impeachment purposes, such is admissible under FRE 402). By simply refusing to approve proposed KRE 406, as opposed to amending it to codify the common law rule of exclusion, the 1991 Court may have recognized that KRE 406 was redundant in light of KRE 402; or, more likely, it may have intended to simply leave the door open for future common law development in this area of the law. [11] If faced with the case sub judice, a majority of the 1991 Court may well have decided it the same way that the plurality opinion, ante, now decides itby reaffirming our antiquated common law precedents. However, Justice Leibson, a member of the 1991 Court, also famously wrote: The common law is not a stagnant pool, but a moving stream. It seeks to purify itself as it flows through time. The common law is our responsibility; the child of the courts. We are responsible for its direction. Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713, 717 (1984) (citations omitted). If the majority of the members of this Court now believe that the time has come to reconsider the admissibility of habit evidence and depart from the fallacy of our old cases, the 1991 Court left the door open to do so. Professor Lawson queried whether the adoption of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence abrogated all common law evidentiary rules. See Robert G. Lawson, Interpretation of the Kentucky Rules of EvidenceWhat Happened to the Common Law?, 87 Ky. L.J. 517 (1998-99). [12] If so, then this case is governed by KRE 402 and we should hold that habit evidence, if relevant and competent, is admissible. If not, and that obviously is the premise of the plurality opinion, ante, then this Court has the authority to change the direction of the common law by overruling those precedents that are inconsistent with modern (and virtually unanimous) legal thought. Cf. Stringer, supra, at 891-92 (discarding our prior common law rule excluding ultimate issue testimony in favor of the modern majority rule).