Opinion ID: 1268223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Penalty Phase Presentation

Text: [17] Defense counsel compounded the errors he committed during the investigative stage of the penalty phase by presenting almost none of the little mitigating evidence he had discovered. The penalty phase began on November 18, 1982, at 10:00 a.m. By 3:30 p.m. that day, after deliberating for only four hours, the jury had fixed Hamilton's sentence as death. Of the 2423-page trial transcript, the entire penalty phase spans just 39 pages. Counsel's anemic presentation resulted from a number of unjustifiable errors, which, taken together, render his performance deficient. First, counsel waived his opening statement, as he had done during the guilt phase. He offered no explanation as to why he forfeited his first opportunity to explain the significance of the mitigating evidence to the jury. Mayfield, 270 F.3d at 928 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Ainsworth, 268 F.3d at 874. [18] Second, counsel presented only one witness Hamilton's mother, Jackiewhose testimony occupies less than 5 pages of the transcript. Although Jackie had firsthand knowledge of the hardships Hamilton endured during his childhood, almost none of that information was presented to the jury, largely due to counsel's scant questioning. The following exchange is illustrative: Q: All right. Now, Mrs. Piper, a number of years ago some problems developed in your home; is that correct? A: That is. Q: And at that time was Michael taken from you? A: He was. Q: And was that by court? Can you explain that? A: It was by court order. Q: Okay. And for how long did Michael remain outside your home? A: I don't remember exactly. Q: Was it more than a year? A: Yes, it was. . . . . Q: Okay. And did he to your knowledge go from foster home to foster home? A: Yes, he did. Q: Okay. And the reason that he was removed was there were problems between you and your husband; is that correct? A: That's right. Q: Okay. And can you indicate to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury some of those problems regarding his drinking or whatever the problem was? A: I'd rather not. I don't believe this has anything to do with this at all. Q: But there were problems; is that correct? A: There are  there were. Q: There were problems with abuse? A: Yes. Q: And those are the things that led to Michael's  the removal of Michael from your home? A: Yes. Counsel asked no further questions about the court order, why Hamilton moved from foster home to foster home, or the nature of the problems with drinking and abuse, although he was awareat least to some extentof this mitigating evidence. Instead, counsel asked questions such as [Hamilton and Gwen's] marriage was good as far as you knew? Given that only three days before Hamilton had been found guilty of murdering his wife by the same jury, this question epitomizes counsel's deficient performance. Counsel's subsequent questioning about Hamilton's father was similarly lacking: Q: [W]as there ever a relationship [between Hamilton and his father]? A: Not that I know of. Q: All right. And in part Michael's father was put in prison, was he not, or in a state hospital? A: In a state hospital, yes. Q: Thank you. Because counsel failed to develop her answers, Jackie's testimony left the false impression that Hamilton's childhood, while unhappy, was not unusual. Indeed, the most detail Jackie offered was a superficial statement that Hamilton was kind to stray animals and stray people and loved his children. Jackie's reluctance to volunteer information about Hamilton's childhood is hardly surprising. Given her involvement in the abuse suffered by Hamilton and his siblings, which we discuss further below, and the fact that she testified for the prosecution during the guilt phase, Jackie was one of the worst witnesses that defense counsel could have presented to the jury. Jackie's reticence can also be explained by counsel's failure to prepare her adequately. Even assuming counsel had planned to elicit from Jackie the details of Hamilton's childhood backgroundincluding the incest and abuseas he testified at the evidentiary hearing, the effectiveness of that plan was severely undercut by not sharing it with Jackie. The record shows that counsel spent either little or no time preparing Jackie to testify. Counsel was pretty sure he met with Jackie before putting her on the stand and that she had been reluctant to talk. Counsel recalled Jackie being difficult on the stand as well, although he conceded that the transcript undermined his recollection. Jackie, by contrast, stated in a declaration filed in support of Hamilton's habeas petition that she did not recall meeting with Hamilton's defense counsel or anyone working on his behalf prior to or during the trial. She remembered being confused during the penalty phase and not knowing why defense counsel was asking her questions about her son's upbringing. Jackie's testimony corroborates her recollection and undermines defense counsel's. The most telling example is her response to counsel's question about the problems regarding Hamilton's father's drinking: I don't believe [that information] has anything to do with this at all. [19] Additional preparation would have made a difference. Jackie stated in her declaration that she would have testified in detail about the physical and sexual abuse if she had been asked to do so. Defense counsel's assertion that he tried to elicit this information is not supported by the record. As we previously have held, the failure to prepare a witness adequately can render a penalty phase presentation deficient. See, e.g., Belmontes, 529 F.3d at 851; Douglas, 316 F.3d at 1087. This is especially true when the insufficiently prepared witness is the only penalty phase witness called to testified. [20] Counsel exacerbated the damage done during Jackie's testimony by not explaining the significance of the meager mitigating evidence during closing. See Belmontes, 529 F.3d at 846 n.3 (Our cases make clear that in addition to presenting witnesses to testify about mitigating circumstances, defense counsel must also explain the significance of the mitigating testimony in his closing statement.). Counsel mentioned Jackie's testimony only once in passing. Moreover, rather than challenging the prosecutor's characterization of Hamilton's childhood as unfortunate but neither unusual nor extreme, [11] he effectively validated it. In addressing whether any circumstances extenuated the gravity of the crime, counsel explained: Michael did come from a broken home. He was placed in foster home after foster home. I'm not telling you that's an excuse, because we know others have come from homes and have also grown up. Counsel drastically understated and mischaracterized Hamilton's home in referring to it as merely broken. As we explain later, the environment in which Hamilton grew up was extraordinarily abusive and atypical in almost every sense. Yet, the jury remained unaware of this significant mitigating evidence. Having provided the jury with no reason to show mercy, defense counsel's naked pleas to spare Hamilton's life were futile. While [b]egging for mercy is not incompetence per se, Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1043, this strategy was unreasonable under the circumstances here. The State contends that presenting the mitigating evidence that it acknowledges was available would have done more harm than good. There is nothing in the record that supports this assertion. A decision not to present mitigating evidence to the jury can be considered tactical only if counsel is aware of that information and how it could fit into a penalty phase defense. See Mayfield, 270 F.3d at 927 (Judicial deference to counsel is predicated on counsel's performance of sufficient investigation and preparation to make reasonably informed, reasonably sound judgments.). Defense counsel failed to pursue the relevant information provided to him by the five people he and Wells did interview, and did not even review the records unearthed during Wells's investigation. The record belies the State's assertion that defense counsel would never have been able to obtain much of the evidence that Hamilton has submitted in support of his [habeas] petition . . . no matter what efforts he made. Moreover, like counsel in Wiggins, defense counsel here uncovered no evidence in [his] investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless. 539 U.S. at 525. The evidence here was not a basket of cobrasthere were no obvious countervailing tactical dangers for petitioner. Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, contrary to his testimony, counsel had no tactical reason for not presenting Marvin, Hamilton's uncle, as a penalty phase witness. While Marvin did express some negative opinions about Hamilton during his interview with Wells, none of them would have done more harm than the failure to provide the jury with the evidence of the extreme sexual and physical abuse endured by Hamilton and his siblings. Defense counsel cited as one reason for not calling Marvin was his statement that Hamilton cheated on his wife and had been primarily interested in the insurance money after her death. Only a few days before the penalty phase began, however, the jury had found that Hamilton cold-bloodedly killed his pregnant wife for financial gain. Thus, the potential damage that Marvin's testimony might have caused had already been inflicted. Marvin's belief that Hamilton did not pay attention to his children was also relatively innocuous, since the jury had already heard testimony that Hamilton initially planned to kill Gwen in front of his four children. In any event, limiting the scope of a penalty phase presentation to evidence that the defendant is a good person who has done good deeds is, in and of itself, unreasonable where there is an extreme unlikelihood that any testimony about the defendant's character would be sufficient to humanize him. Correll, 539 F.3d at 945-46. Marvin could have testified about the countless difficulties Hamilton endured as a child, which would have removed Hamilton from the category of those who have experienced unfortunate circumstances and placed him squarely in the realm of unusual or extreme childhood suffering. Instead, the jury heard only Jackie's vague and terse testimony, which can hardly be considered a mitigation defense, much less a strategically reasonable one. Nor did counsel offer a legitimate reason for not trying to elicit the details of Hamilton's background from his sister Vicki. See id. at 948 (A decision by counsel not to present mitigating evidence cannot be excused as a strategic decision unless it is supported by reasonable investigations.); cf. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 616-624 (9th Cir. 2004) (listing four legitimate reasons that supported counsel's tactical decision not to present certain penalty phase evidence). On the contrary, counsel admitted that he never considered presenting Vicki as a penalty phase witness, even though she could have painted a portrait of Hamilton's childhood that would have greatly aided the jury as she had direct knowledge of the extensive abuse endured by Hamilton and his siblings. [21] Counsel also acted deficiently in not contacting Hamilton's other sister, Carolyn, who could have provided the most poignant and revealing mitigating evidence, as her declaration demonstrates. The district court clearly erred in finding that counsel could not talk to Carolyn because she was an adverse part[y] represented by counsel, which was the reason defense counsel gave for not interviewing her. Carolyn was not an adverse party; she was Hamilton's codefendant. Moreover, defense counsel could have subpoenaed Carolyn to interview her about Hamilton's background. The district court's conclusion that counsel made a reasonable tactical decision to present only one witness is therefore clearly erroneous.