Opinion ID: 2218451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Klein's Prior Convictions

Text: Our review of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Klein's two prior felony convictions for theft by deception. We believe, as did the trial court below, that the convictions, especially the count charging him with theft by deception which involved a check scheme designed to assist Klein with his house payments, was relevant to show his motive and intent. We note that his convictions were to be admitted in a sanitized fashion so that the jury would not be able to consider their other, less relevant aspects. The admission of Klein's prior convictions fits squarely within the motive exception to SDCL 19-12-5. Klein was motivated by financial difficulties at the time of the fire, as he had been previously when he committed the 1986 check scheme in order to make his house payments. Even Klein himself went so far as to admit that he had previously committed theft by deception because of his financial difficulties. Thus, the admission of his prior convictions is clearly relevant on the issue of Klein's motive. See State v. Swallow, 405 N.W.2d 29 (S.D.1987). Evidence of Klein's prior convictions also would be admissible under the intent exception to SDCL 19-12-5. As we stated in Champagne, supra, where specific intent is an element of an offense, proof of similar acts may be admitted so that the State may carry its burden even if the defense to the charge is a complete denial. It is beyond dispute that intent is an element of both burning with intent to defraud an insurer and theft by deception. [3] We believe that evidence of prior similar crimes is admissible to show that Klein's action was done with the specific intent necessary to convict under these two statutes. See also State v. Pedde, 334 N.W.2d 41, 43 (S.D.1983), wherein we stated that evidence of prior acts need not be that of an identical offense but only of similar involvement reasonably related to the offending conduct. Citing United States v. Gocke, 507 F.2d 820, 825 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 979, 95 S.Ct. 1407, 43 L.Ed.2d 660 (1975). Having determined that Klein's prior convictions were relevant, we must next turn to the issue of whether their admission would be unfairly prejudicial. The evidence tends to show that Klein was in dire financial straits and that he had previously committed similar acts because of his financial condition. We do not believe that the trial court erred in determining that the probative value of the evidence, as admitted, was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence. See Swallow, supra . We further note that Klein's counsel, during cross-examination of one of State's expert witnesses, opened the door to the admission of Klein's prior convictions when he asked the witness whether he was aware that Klein was a convicted felon. The trial court later noted that this question by Klein's counsel was the functional equivalent of putting Klein himself on the stand and therefore evidence concerning Klein's status as a convicted felon was admissible. Having opened the door to the admission of evidence of Klein's prior convictions, Klein may not now challenge its admission on appeal. See United States v. Gipson, 862 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1988). He cannot seek to advantage himself through the use of an error which he himself committed. See State v. Vogel, 315 N.W.2d 321 (S.D.1982).