Opinion ID: 2602185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether, Under California Law, the Superior Court's Failure to Readvise Defendant of His Right to Counsel Was Prejudicial

Text: As noted above, the People concede that under section 987, subdivision (a), the superior court was obligated to inform defendant of his right to appointed counsel and to obtain a waiver of that right at the time defendant was arraigned on the felony information, notwithstanding the admonitions given toand waivers taken fromdefendant under section 859 during the municipal court proceedings, and that the court erred in failing to do so. The question is what prejudicial error standard applies. Relying upon familiar authority, the Court of Appeal reiterated that all trial court error under California law is governed by article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution: No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, ... or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 483, fn. 10, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869; People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 500, 503, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037.) As this court long has held, under the miscarriage of justice standard of article VI, section 13, a trial court error generally is not reversible unless there is a reasonable probability that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the error. ( People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 483, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) Although a reversible per se rule may apply under California Constitution article VI, section 13, when a defendant erroneously is denied the right to counsel or never has knowingly or voluntarily waived that right (see People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, 501, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037 [recognizing that in some instances an error may result in a `miscarriage of justice' within the meaning of the California provision without a showing of actual prejudice]), we agree with the Court of Appeal that the Watson standard applies to the superior court's error in failing to follow the statutory command that the court, at the arraignment in superior court, readvise a defendant of his or her right to counsel and obtain a renewed waiver of that right. As discussed above, and as interpreted in People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, 858, footnote 5, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423, and People v. McKenzie, supra, 34 Cal.3d 616, 635, 194 Cal.Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769, section 987 requires that a defendant who appears at the arraignment in superior court without counsel be advised of his or her right to counsel, even when the defendant in the municipal court knowingly waived counsel and expressed a desire to represent himself or herself. Although section 987 requires this additional advice and inquiry at the arraignment on the felony information as a prophylactic safeguard, nothing in the language of the statute provides that when a defendant previously has been informed of his or her right to counsel at trial and has been adequately warned of the pitfalls of representing oneself at trial, the defendant's prior waiver of counsel and exercise of the constitutional right to represent himself or herself shall not carry over or be legally effective in the absence of a renewed warning and waiver. To the extent that language in our prior decisions conveys such an impression (see, e.g., People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, 858, fn. 5, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423 [neither an appointment ... nor a waiver of counsel in municipal court carries over into superior court (italics added) ]; People v. McKenzie, supra, 34 Cal.3d 616, 635, 194 Cal.Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769[[t]he People concede that defendant's waiver of the right to counsel in municipal court did not continue in effect in superior court (italics added)]), we conclude that such language misleadingly overstates the effect of section 987. When a defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings (including trial), and voluntarily and knowingly has invoked the right to represent himself or herself throughout all the proceedings, the trial court's failure to provide a new advisement and obtain a renewed waiver at the arraignment (as required by § 987) does not operate to terminate or revoke the defendant's validly invoked constitutional right to represent himself or herself at trial. Furthermore, contrary to defendant's claim, we believe that a trial court's error in failing to comply with section 987 clearly is susceptible to harmless error analysis. The complete record of the trial court proceedings often will shed light upon whether a defendant, despite the absence of an explicit readvisement by the superior court at arraignment, nonetheless was aware that he or she had the right to appointed counsel at the subsequent proceedings and whether an explicit advisement at the arraignment would have been likely to lead the defendant to reconsider the decision to represent himself or herself and request that counsel be appointed. (Accord, United States v. Vonn (2002) 535 U.S. 55, 74-75, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 1054-1055, 152 L.Ed.2d 90,109-110.) In some cases, the exchange between the magistrate and the defendant during the initial advisement and waiver may raise questions as to whether the defendant voluntarily and knowingly intended to waive his or her right to counsel throughout the entire proceedings or only at the preliminary hearing. In People v. Sohrab, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 89, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 749, for example, the defendant, unlike defendant here, expressed equivocation in the municipal court proceedings as to whether he desired to represent himself and, if so, at what stages of the proceedings. (Id., at pp. 92-95, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 749.) Under such circumstances, a superior court's failure to obtain a new and clear indication that the defendant desired to represent himself or herself at trial might well be prejudicial under the Watson standard. Because of the circumstances attending the present case, however, we agree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the error was not prejudicial under the Watson standard, there being no reasonable probability that defendant was unaware of his right to be represented by appointed counsel at trial or that he would have accepted the appointment of counsel had the court made the statutorily required inquiry at arraignment. As we have seen, the advisements that defendant received at the outset of the proceedings explicitly informed defendant of his right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings, including trial, and warned him of the risks of representing himself at trial. Although the court apprised defendant repeatedly of the risks of self-representation, defendant's desire to represent himself was unwavering throughout the proceedings. In light of the entire record (see People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1178, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315), there can be no doubt that defendant was aware of his right to appointed counsel at all stages of the proceedings and knowingly and voluntarily waived that right, insisting upon exercising his constitutional right to represent himself. Thus, we conclude that the Court of Appeal properly determined that there is no reasonable probability that the superior court's error in failing to readvise defendant of his right to counsel at the arraignment affected defendant's decision to represent himself throughout the course of the proceedings. ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) [10]