Opinion ID: 1747923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Persistent Conditions

Text: Section 36-1-113(g)(3) of the Tennessee Code Annotated authorizes termination of parental rights when: (3)(A) The child has been removed from the home of the parent or guardian by order of a court for a period of six (6) months and: (i) The conditions which led to the child's removal or other conditions which in all reasonable probability would cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect and which, therefore, prevent the child's safe return to the care of the parent(s) or guardian(s), still persist; (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent(s) or guardian(s) in the near future; and (iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly diminishes the child's chances of early integration into a safe, stable and permanent home. There is no dispute that Oliver had been removed for at least six months from the home of Ms. Wallace by order of a court. With regard to factor (i), the trial court concluded that the conditions which led to Oliver's removal still persisted. The trial court did not conclude that other conditions would in all reasonable probability cause Oliver to be subjected to further abuse or neglect. Therefore, with respect to factor (i), we are reviewing only the trial court's conclusion that conditions persisted that prevented the child's safe return to the care of Ms. Wallace. The condition which led to Oliver's removal was physical abuse by Ms. Wallace. The trial court found that the change that had been suggested in Ms. Wallace's parenting skills did not seem to be a realistic change. The burden of persuasion on this issue rests with DCS, the party seeking to terminate parental rights. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1). The burden was on DCS, therefore, to show that Ms. Wallace had not learned to control her anger. Even if the trial court did not find credible the testimony of Ms. Wallace's witnesses describing her improved parenting skills, there was no proof that Ms. Wallace was still unable to control her anger. The trial court seemed more concerned that Ms. Wallace continued to live with Mr. Valentine. As we previously noted, there is no evidence that Mr. Valentine had abused Oliver or that Mr. Valentine's prior abuse of Ms. Wallace affected her relationship with and parenting of Oliver. Moreover, Ms. Wallace and Mr. Valentine testified that Ms. Wallace had not been abused in the eight months prior to the hearing. The trial court impliedly credited this testimony but held that this evidence demonstrated that the child would not have an early integration into a stable home. We cannot conclude that factor (i)persistent conditionshas been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Because termination of parental rights under Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) requires clear and convincing evidence of all three factors and the proof supporting factor (i) fails to reach this level, consideration of factors (ii) and (iii) is pretermitted. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by terminating Ms. Wallace's parental rights under Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3).