Opinion ID: 1928561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Failing to Grant Adams' Motion for Judgment of Acquittal?

Text: A. Standard of review. In considering Adams' challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996). We look for substantial evidence, including any inferences arising from the evidence, to support the verdict. Id. If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, it is binding on us. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(1). Evidence that could convince a trier of fact the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt is substantial evidence. State v. Terry, 544 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Iowa 1996). Although Adams cites to evidence introduced at the suppression hearing, for purposes of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment of conviction, we confine our consideration to the trial record. See State v. Uthe, 542 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Iowa 1996) (We consider all the evidence at trial, not just the evidence supporting the verdict.) (emphasis added); State v. Conyers, 506 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Iowa 1993) (same). B. Sufficiency of the evidence on the drug tax stamp conviction. Adams was convicted of failing to affix a drug tax stamp to the cocaine base in violation of Iowa Code section 453B.12. One of the essential elements of this crime is that the defendant is a dealer. White, 545 N.W.2d at 555. The word dealer is defined in chapter 453B: Dealer means any person who . . . possesses... in this state any of the following: .... c. Ten or more dosage units of a taxable substance which is not sold by weight. Iowa Code § 453B.1(3). A dosage unit is the unit of measurement in which a substance is dispensed to the ultimate user. Id. § 453B.1(6). Examples of dosage units given in the statute are pills, capsules and microdots. Id. Adams claims the cocaine base he possessed is sold by weight, not by dosage unit. Because this case was submitted to the court on the defendant's stipulation to the minutes of testimony, we review those minutes to decide whether substantial evidence exists to support the court's finding Adams possessed [t]en or more dosage units of a taxable substance which is not sold by weight. See id. § 453B.1(3)(c) (emphasis added). The minutes show the police officer arresting Adams would have testified Adams had ten or more dosage units of crack cocaine. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we think the court could have reasonably inferred from this testimony that a dosage unit is the operative measurement unit for sales of this substance. Consequently, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding Adams qualified as a dealer under chapter 453B. C. Sufficiency of the evidence on the possession-with-intent-to-deliver conviction. Adams was convicted of violating Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(3), the unlawful possession of less than five grams of cocaine base with the intent to deliver, a class C felony. Intent to deliver is clearly an element of the crime of which Adams was convicted. State v. Oppedal, 232 N.W.2d 517, 524 (Iowa 1975). Adams claims there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of this element beyond a reasonable doubt. [4] Because it is difficult to prove intent by direct evidence, proof of intent usually consists of circumstantial evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. Cf. State v. Olson, 373 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Iowa 1985) (discussing element of intent in burglary case). Adams argues that he possessed only 4.69 grams of cocaine and this weight was, at best, consistent with either possession for personal use or for distribution. This argument overlooks the fact the amount of the controlled substance is not the only factor which may be considered. Intent may be inferred from the manner of packaging the drugs, see State v. Birkestrand, 239 N.W.2d 353, 362 (Iowa 1976), from large amounts of unexplained cash, see State v. Dandridge, 213 N.W.2d 903, 904 (Iowa 1974), as well as from the quantity of drugs, see Olson, 373 N.W.2d at 136-37. The evidence in the minutes of testimony showed Adams possessed 4.69 grams of crack cocaine. The cocaine consisted of numerous small rocks; the rocks were in a plastic sandwich bag. The police also found $464 in cash on Adams. Adams gave no explanation at trial explaining why he was carrying this money, a relatively large amount of cash for a twenty-one-year-old. The minutes also reveal two police officers would have testified the crack cocaine and the money are consistent with those items found in the possession of drug dealers at the street level. [5] Although one might characterize the quantity of drugs in this case as relatively small, when combined with the cash found on Adams, a trier of fact could reasonably infer Adams had already sold a quantity of drugs, thereby explaining both the small amount of drugs and the large amount of cash. See United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932, 110 S.Ct. 322, 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989) (the presence of a large sum of unexplained cash in connection with other evidence of drug trading is probative of the previous occurrence of drug transactions). Therefore, we think the record evidence is substantial and supports the trial court's finding of an intent to deliver. See United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir.1979) (four or five grams of cocaine is sufficient to prove intent, where other evidence of intent exists); Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1991) (sufficient evidence of possession with intent to distribute: defendant had 2.7 grams of cocaine and $874 on his person).