Opinion ID: 1759068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Commissioners Courts as Agents of the State

Text: Although related to the parties' arguments about section 81.028, we analyze separately whether a county commissioners court, acting as the State's agent, can petition a municipality to annex portions of the county's roads. San Antonio and Boerne dispute whether the Legislature authorized commissioners courts to petition cities for annexation by enacting section 42.022, which provides: The extraterritorial jurisdiction of a municipality may expand beyond the distance limitations imposed by Section 42.021 to include an area contiguous to the otherwise existing extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality if the owners of the areas request the expansion. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 42.022(b) (emphasis added). Boerne focuses on the statute's reference to owners. It argues that [t]he Legislature, acting for the State, has primary and plenary power to control and regulate public roads and streets and it may delegate such powers to the counties in this state. Boerne then reasons that, because the Legislature gave commissioners courts general control over all roads in section 81.028, a commissioners court maywith respect to public roads within its jurisdictiondischarge the owner's prerogative by petitioning for annexation. San Antonio repeats its earlier contention, which we have sustained, that the counties' general control over roads is not sufficient to give them the power to petition for inclusion in a municipalities' extraterritorial jurisdiction. San Antonio's position regarding the State's ownership of county roads, however, has changed. In its initial briefing, San Antonio did not dispute that the State owned those roads, but argued that the counties were never granted specific authority to assert the State's ownership rights to petition for inclusion within a city's extraterritorial jurisdiction. Subsequently, at our request, the State filed an amicus brief in which it denied fee simple ownership of the roads. [8] San Antonio has now adopted the State's position and argues that, because the State is not fee simple owner of the roads in question, the commissioners courts cannot exercise the State's ownership right to petition for inclusion in Boerne's extraterritorial jurisdiction. Boerne correctly asserts, however, that the record in this case does not reflect title to the roads, whether fee simple, easement or otherwise. We note that while the State is not precluded from owning county roads in fee simple, [9] we have generally held that unless otherwise provided in the grant or conveyance, the owner of land abutting a street, alley, or public highway owns the fee to the center of the road, subject only to the easement in favor of the public to a right of passage. [10] From the record presented on appeal, we can neither determine who owns the county roads nor the nature of that ownership. But we need not ascertain the exact nature of the State's interest to determine whether a county is authorized to petition a municipality for annexation on the State's behalf. Nothing in section 42.022(b) clearly permits a commissioners court, purportedly acting on behalf of the State, to advance purely provincial concerns for a subset of the counties' landowners. Because a commissioners court has only those powers expressly conferred or those powers necessarily implied from other grants of power, we hold that a commissioners court is not entitled, as agent of the State, to petition a municipality for annexation. See Canales, 214 S.W.2d at 453. Finally, we note that the parties' assumption regarding ownership may affect the result of this case on remand. As outlined above, at the time they stipulated to exhibits concerning extraterritorial boundaries, the parties were operating under what may have been an incorrect assumption regarding ownership of the roads at issue. For example, Boerne asserts that, if abutting property owners have fee simple title to the centerline of the road, Boerne's extraterritorial jurisdiction may be greater than its stipulations at trial. The merit of Boerne's argument should be addressed by the trial court in the first instance, and therefore we express no opinion on the subject. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court to determine San Antonio and Boerne's extraterritorial boundaries in light of our decision and to permit the parties to withdraw stipulated exhibits if warranted. Tex.R.App. P. 60.2(d), 60.3; Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 469 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex.1971) (remanding in the interest of justice because party misunderstood the effect of a trial stipulation).