Opinion ID: 2525572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: The negative inference

Text: The majority concludes, without citation to authority, that it is improper to argue a negative inference from the assertion of a proper hearsay objection. To the contrary, it is my view that this case presents the exact situation for which the negative inference is intended. A videotaped interview of a defendant shortly after a shooting is the type of evidence that one normally expects to be presented at a criminal trial. In addition to the State's burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see, e.g., Cordova v. State, 116 Nev. 664, 666, 6 P.3d 481, 483 (2000), the State has a duty to ensure that justice is done, not just to obtain a conviction. See Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 96, 81 S.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428 (1961); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that a defendant is entitled to argue to the jury that the government's failure to present a particular type of strong evidence . . . weakens its case. U.S. v. Thompson, 37 F.3d 450, 454 (9th Cir.1994). And historically, the propriety of such an inference in general is not doubted. 2 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence 192 (Chadbourn ed.1970). Here, it is clear from opening statements that the defense expected the State to present the videotape to the jury. Indeed, the record reflects that both the defense and the prosecution expected a redacted version of Glover's statement to be presented. It was not until the morning of trial that the defense was informed otherwise. Because of the evidentiary rules, the defense was unable to admit the videotape. However, the State could have offered it as the admission of a party opponent. See NRS 51.035(3)(a). Therefore, the evidence was peculiarly within [the] power [of the State] to produce. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121, 14 S.Ct. 40, 37 L.Ed. 1021 (1893); see also State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 1057-58 (Utah 1985) (quoting Chicago Col. of Ost. Med. v. George A. Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983)). When the State failed to produce the videotape, it naturally created a presumption that the evidence was unfavorable. See Graves, 150 U.S. at 121, 14 S.Ct. 40. In this case, the district court recognized that such inferences are proper and permitted negative inferences to be argued based on the State's cancellation of a gunshot residue test and apparent unwillingness to examine one of the key witnesses to the shooting. There was no compelling reason for the district court to preclude the same inference with respect to the videotape. The videotape was the type of evidence that would be natural for the State to produce, the State could have presented it, and the State chose not to do so. In my view, the fact that the defense was precluded from introducing the videotape has no bearing on the propriety of the negative inference. Therefore, I must disagree with the majority that defense counsel acted improperly in raising a negative inference based on the State's failure to present the videotape. The majority's reliance on Johnson v. United States, 347 F.2d 803 (D.C.Cir.1965), and Reichert v. United States, 359 F.2d 278 (D.C.Cir.1966), is misplaced for at least three reasons. First, in both cases the prosecution referenced the defendant's failure to use the applicable evidence for impeachment or other purposes. Clearly, the prosecutors' comments in those cases would be impermissible in Nevada because a defendant has no burden in a criminal case. Accordingly, this court has stated that comments on the failure to present evidence are not available to the State because they impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defense. Browning v. State, 120 Nev. 347, 360, 91 P.3d 39, 49 (2004). For that reason alone, Reichert and Johnson are inapposite. Second, the prosecutors in those two cases went beyond merely inferring that the unadmitted statements would corroborate their witnesses' testimony. In Johnson, the prosecutor explicitly stated, They corroborate the testimony of the police officer from the witness stand. Johnson, 347 F.2d at 805. Likewise, in Reichert, the prosecutor stated, Did you see counsel impeach any of the Government witnesses with any of their earlier statements? Now ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we submit to you that the descriptions, the report, the facts in this case are unimpeached. Do you recall counsel impeaching the descriptions of either one of these two robbers? Reichert, 359 F.2d at 281. While the statement in Reichert was not as direct as that in Johnson, it clearly inferred that the statements corroborated the in-court testimony. Furthermore, the prejudice in Reichert was heightened because the district court instructed the jury that it could consider the prior statements to the police, even though they had not been admitted as evidence. Coleman v. United States, 515 A.2d 439, 451 n. 11 (D.C.1986). Less than two years after Reichert was decided, the court that had decided both Johnson and Reichert distinguished those cases in Gibson v. United States, 403 F.2d 569 (D.C.Cir.1968). In that case, the prosecutor had referred to a prior unadmitted statement and the defendant's failure to use it for impeachment purposes. The court noted that the jury had previously been made aware of the statement and concluded that the error did not rise to the level of that in Johnson and Reichert because [i]n both of those cases there was affirmative argument that the contents of the alleged statement corroborated the testimony of the witness. Gibson, 403 F.2d at 570 n. 1. The present case is closer to Gibson than to either Johnson or Reichert. Defense counsel here commented on a prior statement of which the jury was already aware. Furthermore, defense counsel did not state that the videotaped interview would corroborate Glover's in-court testimony. He merely argued that the jury could infer that the State had chosen not to show the videotape because it would hurt the State's case. Accordingly, just as in Gibson, to the extent that counsel's comments were improper, objection and correction by the District Judge would have been sufficient. Id. Third, neither Johnson nor Reichert involved a mistrial requested by the State. There were no double jeopardy concerns, nor did any court conclude that the prosecutors' comments in those cases created a manifest necessity for a mistrial. As will be discussed below, the simple fact that the court in Gibson concluded that a correctional instruction could rectify any prejudice made by reference to the prior out-of-court statement demonstrates that the situation here did not rise to a level justifying a mistrial. The majority's references to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice also miss the mark. Clearly, it would be unfair to raise a negative inference against a party for failing to present evidence when that party was precluded from presenting that evidence by the trial court. But that is not the case here. With respect to the State, the evidence was not excluded by the court as inadmissible; the sole reason the evidence was not presented was because the State chose not to present it. Therefore, I conclude that the inference was proper. The majority concludes not only that defense counsel's inference in closing argument was improper, but describes defense counsel's actions as the culmination of repeated disobedience to district court rulings. In fact, the majority seems to suggest that this repeated misconduct places the facts of this case in the same category as those in Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978), where defense counsel explicitly told the jury that they were participating in a second trial because the State had previously withheld evidence. Again, I must disagree. The videotaped police interview first became an issue during opening statements when the prosecutor raised a hearsay objection to defense counsel's slideshow presentation that included quotations from Glover's recorded interview. The majority states that the prosecution warned defense counsel that it did not plan to introduce Glover's statement at trial. What the majority seems to ignore is the prosecution's concession that defense counsel had done nothing wrong because, the night before trial, counsel had met in chambers to discuss redacting part of the defendant's statement. Thus, as late as the eve of trial, both parties had contemplated the admission of Glover's videotaped interview. [1] The next time the issue arose was during the testimony of Detective Jesus Prieto. Prior to defense counsel's cross-examination of Detective Prieto, defense counsel acknowledged that he could not get into Glover's comments in the interview but asserted that the fact that he showed up, the fact that he turned in the gun, the fact that he sat down with him, those things I believe are all admissible and all highly relevant as to whether or not this was self-defense. The district court stated, Well, we'll take it as it comes. Defense counsel followed the court's direction and did not ask Prieto about the substance of any of Glover's statements. No wrongdoing can be imputed to defense counsel for asking Prieto about the circumstances of the interview when the district court had, on the record, stated that it would rule on that issue as it comes. Moreover, evidence showing that a recorded interview took place was not hearsay; clearly, the only evidence precluded by a sustained hearsay objection is the specific out-of-court statements. To the extent that the majority implies that defense counsel violated the district court's evidentiary rulings by making the jury aware that a recorded interview took place, I cannot agree. The videotaped interview was not mentioned again until closing argument, when defense counsel tried to raise a negative inference based on the State's failure to present the videotaped interview to the jury. [2] Thus, after the first objectionable reference in opening statements (which the State acknowledge was justified), counsel made no reference to Glover's statements in the interview. Accordingly, I cannot agree with the majority that the record exhibits repeated violation of the district court's evidentiary rulings. During argument on the State's motion for mistrial, the State tried to expand its argument to include other instances of alleged improper behavior. The district court declined to expand the argument, stating, I'm not seeing this as any cumulative problem. I'm isolating it to what was said here. A few moments later the court stated, I would rather restrict [argument] to this particular comment. The majority asserts that the fact the defense kept returning to the unadmitted statement figured in the district court's conclusion that the jury could not be expected to disregard the defense's comments about it. Based on the district court's comments, I cannot agree. The record reveals that the argument on the motion for mistrial was focused on defense counsel's choice of words and the impact of his comment on the minds of the jurors. During the lengthy argument on the merits of the State's motion for mistrial and the subsequent decision by the district court, the court did not make a single reference to defense counsel having violated its evidentiary rulings prior to closing argument. When the district court pronounced its oral ruling, there was no mention of the prior objections that the majority describes as cumulating to warrant a mistrial. Rather, the district court's ruling was based entirely on its conclusion that nine words in Glover's closing argument[b]ecause it is devastating to their case, absolutely devastatingwent beyond an inference to argument of facts that were not in evidence. I conclude that defense counsel raised a proper inference in closing argument. Although defense counsel was overzealous in suggesting the answer to his own rhetorical question, he did not describe the contents of the videotape, nor did he state that it conformed with his client's testimony at trial. Rather, defense counsel was raising a proper inference: that the State chose not to present evidence that it would normally produce because that evidence was harmful to the State's case. The only error, if any, was in going beyond the inference to suggest that the contents of the videotape itself were devastating to [the State's] case. By condemning defense counsel's actions here and characterizing them as repeated disobedience to the district court's orders, I fear that the majority's ruling today will have a chilling effect on defense counsels' efforts to provide their clients with the effective representation that is their constitutional right.