Opinion ID: 1090858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether co-counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during closing by revealing statements in violation of the attorney-client privilege.

Text: ¶ 17. Davis's appellate and trial counsel, Wesley Evans, argues that statements made by trial co-counsel Michael Rushing violated Davis's attorney-client privilege and totally contradicted Davis's trial strategy that Clifton fired the fatal gunshots. The pertinent statements are as follows: Now we've got Josh's three statements, and y'all can read them for yourself. Y'all are intelligent folks, and I want you to do that, especially the third one where Josh incriminates himself at least to the extent of saying he fired the three shots, but, at the same time, he provides his defense, which the State cannot counter. They have no testimony or evidence to counter the defense that the gun was put to his head and he was threatened with his life. but I've got a statement here that's not into evidence, but it's my work product, and I'm going to read it to you. It's very brief.... THE COURT: Five minutes. MR. RUSHING: Okay. It's from August 29th, 2000. Interview: Josh Davis at Holmes County jail. These are my notes on my initial full interview with Josh. [DA] POWELL: Your honor, we're going to object to Mr. Rushing reading his notes from an interview. There's nothing in evidence about that. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. RUSHING: I can read my statement, my closing statement. THE COURT: Let's approach the bench. (AT BENCH OUT OF HEARING OF JURORS) THE COURT: You can't read anything that is not a part of the evidence that the defense MR. RUSHING: I can't talk about it? THE COURT: Not unless it came out as evidence in this trial. MR. RUSHING: It's exactly the same as his third statement. THE COURT: If it is the same, then you can testify, but you can't testify if this is something that came out of an interview that you had with him, because it's not in evidence. MR. RUSHING: Okay. I understand. (END OF BENCH CONFERENCE) MR. RUSHING: Well, I'm not going to read you the statement, but suffice it to say that I have been representing Josh since less than a month after this unfortunate occurrence, and, at no time, has he given me varying versions of what happened. And at no time has he waivered from the contention that Clifton Campbell put that shotgun to his head and said, Boy, if you don't shoot up in there, I'm going to blow your head off. And he was drunk and he was mean, and he meant it, at least to Josh. ¶ 18. We outlined the standards to be applied when addressing issues of the ineffective assistance of counsel in Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 989 (Miss.1998): In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency was so substantial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Wilcher v. State, 479 So.2d 710, 713 (Miss. 1985); Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984). This Court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether counsel's efforts were both deficient and prejudicial. Carney v. State, 525 So.2d 776, 780 (Miss.1988); Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832 (Miss.1983). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance [is] highly deferential. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. There is a strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Carney, 525 So.2d at 780; Gilliard v. State, 462 So.2d 710, 714 (Miss.1985). Only where it is reasonably probable that but for the attorney's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different, will we find that counsel's performance was deficient. Dickey v. State, 662 So.2d 1106, 1109 (Miss.1995); Reed v. State, 536 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss.1988). ¶ 19. The State argues that Davis has failed to demonstrate a deficiency in his counsels' overall performance sufficient to undermine the integrity of his trial and conviction. We agree. There was testimony that Davis admitted shooting into the camp cabin and a confession stating likewise. Rushing's statements during closing presented an alternative defense theory, namely, that Clifton put the shotgun to Davis's head and ordered him to fire. There was no deficiency and no concomitant prejudice. This assignment of error is without merit.