Opinion ID: 1315869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial and Evidence in the Case and the Cumulative Error Claim

Text: In addition to claiming that the jury's verdict was not supported by the evidence, the appellant claims that the trial court committed a number of evidentiary and procedural errors during the trial of this case. For instance, he claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it limited the examination of one of his witnesses, Barry Stamper. Mr. Stamper was employed as a locomotive engineer at the time of the installation of the switch which the appellant was attempting to throw at the time he was injured. The appellant, in his brief in this case, contends that Mr. Stamper was prepared to testify that as an engineer, his duties included reporting defective track equipment via his locomotive radio, and that through his use of the radio, the fact that the switch on which the appellant was injured was defective was widespread among Norfolk and Western Railway Company employees in the area. When the appellant specifically attempted to question Mr. Stamper regarding his knowledge of complaints which he had relayed relating to the switch, counsel for Norfolk and Western Railway Company objected, and the court refused to allow Mr. Stamper to testify. Counsel, however, failed to explain to the court that the testimony was not offered to prove the matter asserted, but instead, to prove that Norfolk and Western Railway Company had notice of the switch problems. Following the court's ruling, the appellant's attorney did not pursue the issue and did not vouch, or otherwise place in the record, the excluded testimony of witness Stamper. On appeal, the appellant claims that the court's ruling prejudiced the outcome of this case. In Syllabus Point 8 of Torrence v. Kusminsky, 185 W.Va. 734, 408 S.E.2d 684 (1991), we said: If a party offers evidence to which an objection is sustained, that party, in order to preserve the rejection of the evidence as error on appeal, must place the rejected evidence on the record or disclose what the evidence would have shown, and the failure to do so prevents an appellate court from reviewing the matter on appeal. Syllabus Point 1, Horton v. Horton, 164 W.Va. 358, 264 S.E.2d 160 (1980). This Court believes that in line with this rule, the failure of the appellant to place on the record what Mr. Stamper would have testified to, in effect, precludes us from now reviewing his claim that the exclusion of Mr. Stamper's testimony prejudiced the outcome of the case. Another claim made by the appellant is that the circuit court improperly admitted evidence relating to prior company discipline imposed upon him. This claim grows out of the fact that sometime prior to the appellant's injury, the Norfolk and Western Railway Company disciplined him for having been involved in the derailment of certain rail cars. When counsel for Norfolk and Western Railway Company introduced evidence relating to this, the appellant's attorney interjected only a general objection, without stating a specific ground for the objection. Rule 103 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence normally requires that a specific objection be made to the admission of evidence for that evidence to serve as a predicate for error. The relevant language of Rule 103 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides: (a) Effect of erroneous ruling. -Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and (1) Objection. -In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.... In the present case, the Court believes that the failure of the appellant's attorney to interpose a specific ground for objection precludes the appellant from using the admission of the evidence of prior discipline as a predicate for error. Another claim made by the appellant is that the trial court committed reversible error by precluding his attorney from cross-examining Jack Stepp, the assistant track supervisor for Norfolk and Western Railway Company, on the effect of downsizing in Norfolk and Western's Track Department. Mr. Stepp was allowed to testify that over the course of several years, the number of workers provided to him by Norfolk and Western to perform his assigned work had decreased. When the appellant attempted to cross-examine Mr. Stepp further as to the number of workers assigned to him and the amount of work which they were required to perform, both before and after the downsizing, apparently to create the impression that the inspection staff was undermanned, counsel for Norfolk and Western Railway Company objected on the ground that such questioning was irrelevant and carried a potential prejudicial effect. The trial court sustained the objection. As was the situation with witness Stamper, counsel for the appellant again failed to vouch the record with what Mr. Stepp's testimony would have been. Under such circumstances, this Court again believes that the rule set forth in Syllabus Point 8 of Torrence v. Kusminsky, supra , dictates the failure to vouch the record precludes the trial court's ruling as serving as the predicate for reversing the verdict in this case. Another assignment of error made by the appellant is that the circuit court committed reversible error in limiting his cross-examination of two witnesses for Norfolk and Western Railway Company, Richard Hyath and Dr. David Santrock. Richard Hyath, who was Manager of Disability Support Services for Norfolk and Western Railway Company, testified that Norfolk and Western had offered the appellant an opportunity to participate in its vocational rehabilitation program, but that the appellant had refused. Mr. Hyath indicated that through this program, there were positions within the Norfolk and Western Railway Company for injured employees such as the appellant. It is rather obvious that Norfolk and Western Railway Company called Mr. Hyath to suggest that the appellant was not as vocationally impaired as a consequence of his injury as the appellant's own testimony had suggested. Mr. Hyath's testimony in no way related to the defectiveness of the switch on which the appellant was injured, or the knowledge of the Norfolk and Western Railway Company relating to that switch. It focused instead on the effect of any injury which the appellant had sustained on the appellant's ability to work. Similarly, the testimony of Dr. David Santrock involved the severity of the appellant's injuries rather than any possible negligence of the Norfolk and Western Railway Company in maintaining the switch in question, or Norfolk and Western's knowledge of any defect in the switch. The appellant sought to cross-examine Mr. Hyath about the number of disabled persons who had actually been placed in employment positions by him. Counsel for Norfolk and Western objected, and that objection was sustained. Likewise, the appellant sought to cross-examine Dr. David Santrock about injured Norfolk and Western employees he had previously examined and what his findings were relating to those employees. Again, counsel for Norfolk and Western objected, and again Norfolk and Western's objection was sustained. As was the case with witnesses Stamper and Stepp, defense counsel again failed to vouch the record as to what witnesses Hyath and Santrock would have stated had he been allowed to proceed with his cross-examination. For this reason alone, given the ruling in Torrence v. Kusminsky, supra , this Court believes that the trial court's ruling cannot serve as a basis for the reversal of the jury's verdict. Additionally, the Court notes that the jury in this case specifically found that Norfolk and Western Railway Company was not negligent. Since the testimony of witnesses Hyath and Santrock did not go to the negligence of Norfolk and Western Railway Company, but rather to the damages sustained by the appellant, we cannot see how the additional testimony would have altered the jury's conclusion on the negligent point or the outcome of the case. Another claim made by the appellant is that the trial court allowed counsel for Norfolk and Western Railway Company to engage in closing argument which was calculated to inflame and mislead the jury. An examination of the record of the argument shows that defense counsel at no point during the closing argument interposed any objection whatsoever to what counsel for Norfolk and Western Railway Company was saying. Under our law, the making of an objection is normally a precondition to challenging remarks made during argument on appeal. In line with this, this Court has repeatedly recognized that: Failure to make timely and proper objection to remarks of counsel made in the presence of the jury, during the trial of a case, constitutes a waiver of the right to raise the question thereafter either in the trial court or in the appellate court. Syllabus Point 6, Yuncke v. Welker, 128 W.Va. 299, 36 S.E.2d 410 (1945); see also Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 194 W.Va. 97, 459 S.E.2d 374 (1995). In addition, we have said: This court will not consider errors predicated upon the abuse of counsel of the privilege of argument, unless it appears that the complaining party asked for and was refused an instruction to the jury to disregard the improper remarks, and duly excepted to such refusal. Syllabus Point 6, McCullough v. Clark, 88 W.Va. 22, 106 S.E. 61 (1921). The appellant also claims that the introduction of his school and military records into evidence by the trial court constituted reversible error. In the course of the trial, evidence was introduced indicating that when the appellant applied for a position with Norfolk and Western Railway Company, he completed an application for employment. That application for employment was admitted without objection as Defendant's Exhibit No. 5. It showed that the appellant had represented to Norfolk and Western Railway Company that he had graduated first in his class from Crum High School and that he had attended Marshall University and achieved a grade point average of 3.5. Further, on his application for employment, the appellant represented to Norfolk and Western Railway Company that he had never sustained any type of back injury or back pain. To show that the appellant had made misrepresentations on his employment application, and to impeach the appellant's credibility, counsel for Norfolk and Western Railway Company questioned the appellant in some detail about his educational records and his medical records and the discrepancies between them and what he had said on his employment application. After the appellant admitted that there were discrepancies, counsel for Norfolk and Western Railway Company moved to introduce the actual records. The appellant's attorney objected to the admission of the actual records on two grounds, that to admit them after the appellant had testified would place undue influence on the contents of the records and that the documents were hearsay. The trial court overruled the objections. On appeal, the appellant no longer contends that the admission of the documents would place undue weight on their contents or that they were hearsay. Instead, he claims that they were not properly authenticated and that the documents constituted improper evidence of prior bad acts. As has been previously stated, Rule 103 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence requires that a party objecting to the admission of evidence assign a specific ground for the objection. It has been generally recognized that: Where a wrong reason is assigned for an objection it is the same as if there was no objection at all.... Further: Only those objections or grounds of objection which were urged on the trial court, without change and without addition, will be considered on appeal. 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 216. In line with this, in the concurring opinion in Leftwich v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Company, 123 W.Va. 577, 585-6, 17 S.E.2d 209, 213 (1941), Justice Kenna stated: It is well established that where the objection to the admission of testimony is based upon some specified ground, the objection is then limited to that precise ground and error cannot be predicated upon the overruling of the objection, and the admission of the testimony on some other ground, since specifying a certain ground of objection is considered a waiver of other grounds not specified. In the present case, since the appellant did not assign in the trial court the same reasons for his objections to the admission of the educational and medical records which he asserts on appeal, we believe that it would be inappropriate to reverse the jury verdict on the basis of the new points which he asserts for the first time on appeal. Although the appellant did not receive the verdict to which he believes he is entitled, as has previously been discussed, the jury's verdict is consistent with, and supported by the evidence in the case. A fair reading of the evidence adduced by Norfolk and Western Railway Company suggests that the company was not negligent in installing or maintaining the switch on which the appellant was injured; and the jury so found. The appellant was able to introduce into evidence testimony and opinion which contradicted the testimony and opinion of the Norfolk and Western witnesses. Many of the evidentiary and procedural assignments which the appellant now claims cumulatively resulted in an unfair trial affected evidence and argument which might have buttressed his position, but which would not have fundamentally altered the basic contradictory evidence in this case. Further, it is apparent that the inability of the appellant to introduce certain evidence, or to prevent the introduction of certain other evidence by Norfolk and Western Railway Company, was attributable to the failure of the appellant's attorney to interpose proper objections and to call to the trial court's attention to reasons for admitting or rejecting evidence. In light of all this, we cannot conclude that there was cumulative error in this case which denied the appellant a fair trial. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Wayne County is affirmed. Affirmed.