Opinion ID: 2977979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Remble’s Conviction

Text: We review a district court’s factual findings regarding a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Watson, 498 F.3d 429, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2008). On appeal, we must determine whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate judge had a “substantial basis” for concluding that evidence of a crime or contraband would be found at the place to be searched. United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 478 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991)). Remble argues that the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not support a finding of probable cause because: (1) it relies almost entirely on unreliable and conclusory hearsay from other law enforcement; (2) it relies on stale information, including information concerning large amounts of money seized from Owens, and information about Theopolis Niles (not a party to this conspiracy) from 2001; and (3) it provides no information about the reliability of the confidential informant or other law enforcement officers, who are the primary source of the statements that incriminated Remble. We disagree. Here, Special Agent Peter Lakes’s affidavit detailed information which, in light of the totality of the circumstances, provided the magistrate judge with a substantial basis for concluding that evidence of a crime or contraband would be found at Remble’s 469 West Raymond Street residence. -5- Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson In particular, the affidavit contained evidence linking that residence to ongoing criminal activity. Even if certain information were stale, recent information corroborating the otherwise stale information may be taken into account during the probable cause analysis where, as here, the place to be searched is linked to ongoing continuous criminal activity. See United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1381-82 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that “recent information corroborates otherwise stale information” in an affidavit and that “time is of less significance” where the “affidavit recites activity indicating protracted or continuous conduct”). Moreover, detailed truthful information of suspicious or criminal activity that is obtained from reliable police investigations and which link the place to be searched to criminal activity, as here, may also support a finding of probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 242-46 (1983) (finding that probable cause existed where the anonymous tip contained specific, predictive information, which officers were able to corroborate through investigation); see also United States v. Gregory, No. 07-5624, 2009 WL 415994, at  (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2009) (finding that probable cause existed where the affidavit identified six law enforcement officers with whom the officer-affiant communicated, described in detail the suspicious activity occurring over several years at the place to be searched, and relayed the substance of the officer-affiant’s communications with fellow named officers). In the affidavit, Agent Lakes averred that he spoke with various officers involved in a multijurisdiction investigation of Remble and others in the conspiracy on a daily basis and detailed his own efforts to corroborate the officers’ information. Lakes also averred, among other things, that from February 2005 to the date of the affidavit, he was in contact with Detective Mike LeCocq of the Muskingum County Sheriff's Department in Zanesville. From weekly conversations with -6- Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson LeCocq, Lakes stated that he learned that on October 31, 2003 and January 27, 2004, Muskingum County Sheriff’s Department seized $24,190 and $45,960 respectively from Earl Owens. He also learned that on November 8, 2004, two money orders each in the amount of $1,000.00 were sent from “Chris Owens” or “C. Owens” of 923 Curtis Street, Zanesville to Maurnisha Cobene and Clarence Remble, respectively, at the 163rd Street premises. Then on December 3, 2004, four money orders were sent from “Chris Owens” of 923 Curtis Street to Derrick Braggs at the West 163rd Street premises. Later, Lakes read an incident report by the Ohio Highway Patrol dated September 25, 2004, and learned that on that date Derrick Braggs and Remble were stopped by the Ohio Highway Patrol and found to be in possession of four kilograms of cocaine and other drugs. Lakes also stated that, on or about July 8, 2005, he learned through a Choicepoint Online query that Cobene resided at 469 West Raymond Street, and Remble resided at the West 163rd Street premises. Lakes also detailed information from March 2005 when Muskingham County Sheriff’s deputies discovered a large quantity of crack cocaine and a handgun during a traffic stop of Jamie Covington. The deputies then recovered $5,800 in cash when they searched Covington’s hotel room. Agent Lakes stated that he learned through a confidential source that Covington was distributing drugs in Ohio on behalf of Remble. On July 26, 2005, he learned from FBI Agent K.W. Wong that on that day law enforcement officers saw Remble leaving the 469 West Raymond residence in a vehicle that had been parked in front of that address since the previous night. Because of the unexplained money found in the hotel and the drugs found in the car, along with the other information about Remble’s connection to Owens and Braggs, the repeated nature of the transactions, and the information linking the 469 West Raymond Street address to the suspicious -7- Nos. 06-3909 & 07-3106 USA v. Anderson activities, the magistrate judge had a substantial basis for concluding that Remble was engaged in ongoing drug trafficking, and by extension, that evidence of illegal activity would be found at his residence. See United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 747-49 (6th Cir. 2005) (determining that probable cause may exist to search the residence of a suspected drug dealer where there is a “connection between the residence to be searched and the facts of criminal activity that the officer set out in [the] affidavit”); see also United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 974-75 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that probable cause to search the residence of a suspected drug dealer existed where he engaged in two recorded transactions outside of his residence because “[i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the drug dealers live”). Moreover, the affidavit, twelve pages in length, is not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. The district court properly concluded, therefore, as an alternative basis for its ruling, that denial of the suppression motion was justified under the good faith exception recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (finding Leon exception applicable where affidavit facts, albeit insufficient to establish probable cause, “were not so vague as to be conclusory or meaningless”).