Opinion ID: 1901333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The February Injunction

Text: The plaintiffs urge us to dismiss the appeals from the February injunction, contending that the issues presented therein are moot. Specifically, they refer to the April injunction as the Modified Order, and assert that the February 22 injunction is no longer in effect, Brief of Appellee AASB, et al., at 32. They contend, in other words, that the February injunction has been replaced and superseded by the April injunction. Id. at 33. The plaintiffs contend, and we agree, that the April injunction differs from the February injunction in two important respects. First, they are based on different legal theories. The theory underlying the February injunction is that the Governor's February 2 proration order violates rights guaranteed to children of K-12 by the Alabama Constitution. By contrast, the April injunction rests expressly and exclusively upon the claim that the Governor's February 2 proration order violates § 16-6B-9 and § 16-13-144. Second, the April injunction is narrower than the February injunction. While the February injunction exempts from the proration order all funding of the K-12 Programs, the April injunction exempts only funds allocable to salaries in the K-12 Programs. On similar grounds, the Executive Parties also urge us to dissolve the February injunction. [4] In that respect, the position of the Executive Parties parallels the position of the Universities, which also urge us to dissolve the February injunction. The Joint Committee, in its brief to this Court, addresses only the April injunction. Thus, the February injunction is championed by no one, and the Executive Parties, the only parties to whom it was directed, do not consider themselves bound by it. Brief of Executive Parties, at 43-44. Since the [February injunction] no longer controls, the plaintiffs contend, any affirmance or reversal of the [February injunction] by this Court is unnecessary and would not grant effectual relief to any party. Brief of Appellee AASB, et al., at 33 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs are claiming nothing under it and the Executive Parties do not consider it binding. During the oral argument of this case, it was conceded by all that no party is claiming any benefit under the February injunction. More specifically, the plaintiffs conceded that they do not intend to invoke the February injunction in the future. As stated in the April injunction, the plaintiffs have decided to raise the constitutional issues outside of the context of the preliminary injunction stage of this litigation. It is clear that the plaintiffs have abandoned the constitutional issues as a ground for preliminary injunctive relief. As to the February injunction, therefore, there is an absence of adversity of the sort necessary to constitute a justiciable controversy. A number of principles applicable to this dispute were articulated long ago: The necessary requisite to appellate jurisdiction is the existence of an actual controversy; therefore it is not within the province of this court to decide abstract or hypothetical questions, which are disconnected from the gravity of actual relief, or from the determination of which no practical result can follow. Nor is it the province of this court to consider a fictitious case, submitted merely for the purpose of testing the right to do a particular thing. The general rule is, if pending an appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant any relief, the appeal may be dismissed. There are many instances in which such condition may arise. It may arise by the act of the appellant himself. Woodruff v. Austin, 16 Misc. 543, 38 N.Y.S. 787, or it may likewise arise by the act of the appellee, as where, pending the appeal, he does, or relinquishes the right to do, some act in respect to which the appeal was taken. Wallingford v. Benson, 17 S.C. 591; Foote v. Smith, 8 Wyo. 510, 58 P. 898; 2 Cent. Dig. Appeal and Error, § 70 et seq. The condition may also arise from the act of the court a quo, that is to say, from some order or judgment in the case pending the appeal, which is made by the court, which renders the determination of the questions presented by the appeal unnecessary. Paris Electric Light [& Ry.] Co. v. Martin (Tex.Civ. App.) 31 S.W. 243; 2 Cent. Dig. Appeal and Error, § 71 et seq. It may also arise by an act of law. Kidd v. Morrison, 62 N.C. 31 [(1866)]. And it has been held that mere lapse of time may create this condition. 2 Cent. Dig. supra. Similarly it arises where a litigation has ceased to be between parties having adverse interests, etc. It has also been held, where all substantial interest in the controversy has been parted with or extinguished, the court will not hear the appeal merely to determine the rights to costs. Randolph v. Rosser, 7 Port. 249 [(Ala.)]. Caldwell v. Loveless, 17 Ala.App. 381, 382, 85 So. 307, 307-08 (1920) (emphasis added). In this case, a condition has arisen by act of court during the pendency of the appeals render[ing] the determination of the questions presented by the appeal unnecessary, namely, the entry of the April injunction, which modified and narrowed the earlier order. More recently, this Court stated that in order to present a justiciable controversy, the parties must be damaged and seeking a remedy, not just advice. State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 69, 75, 300 So.2d 106, 111 (1974) (emphasis added) (dismissing the appeal of the plaintiff Attorney General and the cross-appeal of the defendant Superintendent of Banks due to the absence of adversity in their positions in the litigation). Elsewhere, this Court explained: Not only must the plaintiff prove his tangible interest in obtaining a judgment, but the action must be adversary in character, that is, there must be a controversy between the plaintiff and a defendant ... having an interest in opposing his claim. Reid v. City of Birmingham, 274 Ala. 629, 639, 150 So.2d 735, 744 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite the fact that the Universities claim nothing under the February injunction, but, rather, oppose it, they urge this Court to considerfor the purpose of rejecting the constitutional theories on which it was based. In this connection, the Executive Parties observe: It is clear that the Universities seek to breathe life back into the [February injunction], for the sole purpose of killing it on appeal. Brief of Executive Parties, at 42. Under the posture of this case, the Executive Parties' observation is irrefutable. No party in this dispute claims anything based on the rationale of the February injunction. The Universities urge us to address the constitutional rationale only to reverse an order which is now opposed by everyone in the case. Thus, as to the constitutional issues themselves, there is no adversity. This Court will not ... allow the judiciary of this state to become a political foil, or a sounding board for topics of contemporary interest. Ex parte State ex rel. James, 711 So.2d 952, 962 (Ala.1998) (dismissing the appeal of the State of Alabama for lack of adversity) (plurality). Because the April injunction rendered the February injunction without force or effect, the appeals from the February injunction present no justiciable controversy. Therefore, the injunction is vacated and the appeals in cases no. 1000951, 1000952, 1000953, 1000954, 1000959, 1000995, and 1000998 are dismissed.