Opinion ID: 178214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Supreme Court's Decisions in Carey v. Saffold and Evans v. Chavis

Text: The specific problems addressed in Carey and Evans stemmed from an unusual feature of California's post-conviction procedure. Rather than taking an appeal from a trial court's denial, the petitioner files a new original petition in the appellate court, and if that is denied, files a new original petition in the state supreme court. There are no specific deadlines, though; California requires only that the later petition be filed within a reasonable time after denial of the earlier. The question in Carey was whether the federal clock was tolled in the period between the appellate court's denial of relief and the filing of the later petition with the state supreme court. The Court stated the general rule: an application [for post-conviction relief] is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is `in continuance' i.e., `until the completion of' that process. In other words, until the application has achieved final resolution through the State's post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains `pending.' Carey, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002). In Carey, the Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit to figure out whether the state courts had treated the petition as timely: If the California court had clearly ruled that the delay in filing had been unreasonable, that would be the end of the matter. 536 U.S. at 226, 122 S.Ct. 2134. But if the state court had treated the filing as timely, then the federal claim would have been timely as well. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to clarify what the state court had actually decided. Id. To the extent that Carey left any doubt as to whether state law controls any pendency analysis under the habeas tolling provision, Evans dispelled that doubt. The time that an application for state postconviction review is `pending' includes the period between (1) a lower court's adverse determination, and (2) the prisoner's filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191, 126 S.Ct. 846, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006) (emphasis in original). If the filing of the appeal is timely, the period between the adverse lower court decision and the filing ... is not counted against the 1-year AEDPA time limit. Id. at 192, 126 S.Ct. 846. [1] Under Carey and Evans, then, the issue here is whether Griffith's appeal was actually timely under state law. Evans, 546 U.S. at 197, 126 S.Ct. 846. At first blush, Griffith's appeal might seem untimely. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 then set a 35-day time limit to file a PLA, and Griffith admittedly failed to file within that time. But the state court may extend the time for petitioning for leave to appeal on a party's motion in the most extreme and compelling circumstances. That's what the Illinois court did when it granted Griffith leave to file his PLA. See Wauconda Fire Protection Dist. v. Stonewall Orchards, LLP, 214 Ill.2d 417, 293 Ill.Dec. 246, 828 N.E.2d 216, 220 (2005) ([A]n order was entered granting the County's motion [for leave to appeal instanter], the effect of which was to extend the County's deadline for filing its petition for leave to appeal....); id., 293 Ill.Dec. 246, 828 N.E.2d at 223 (referring to the grant of the motion for leave to file as an extension). (I agree with the panel's observation that, for federal habeas purposes, there is no difference under Illinois law between acceptance instanter and an extension of the time for filing the petition. 614 F.3d at 330. I draw the opposite conclusion from that observation, however.) In other words, the state supreme court deemed Griffith's PLA timely for purposes of state law. Under Carey and Evans, that action should have tolled the federal limitations period for Griffith during the two-week gap, as well as the rest of the time his case was pending in the state courts. Under this reasoning, Griffith's federal petition was timely. The panel in this case and the panel in Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977 (7th Cir.2000), rejected the idea that a state court's allowance of a late filing could have the retroactive effect of making the state court case pending (for federal purposes) during such gaps in the state court proceedings. Yet the Supreme Court in Jimenez v. Quarterman, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 681, 172 L.Ed.2d 475 (2009), authorized an even greater retroactive reset under section 2244(d). The question in Jimenez was when the state courts' direct review of a conviction became final for purposes of section 2244(d)(1). After the petitioner's initial appeal had concluded, he sought state post-conviction relief. The state courts ordered that he be allowed to pursue a second out-of-time appeal because he had not been kept informed by his lawyer or the state courts about his first appeal. The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the date of final decision was the conclusion of the first appeal or the second out-of-time appeal. The Court held that the second appeal was the relevant one: once the [state court] reopened the direct review of petitioner's conviction on September 25, 2002, petitioner's conviction was no longer final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A). Rather, the order `granting an out-of-time appeal restore[d] the pendency of the direct appeal.' 129 S.Ct. at 686. In other words, the state courts' actions had the retroactive effect of making what had once been a final decision by the state courts no longer final for federal purposes. From Jimenez, as well as Carey and Evans, I conclude that when a state court decides to excuse a criminal defendant's failure to meet state court deadlines, the federal courts should give the same retroactive effect to that state court decision when calculating timeliness under section 2244. It's the fair thing to do, and it's consistent with the language and purpose of the statute.