Opinion ID: 78439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Competency to Proceed with Federal Habeas Claim

Text: Ferguson asserts that the district court's determination that he was competent to proceed with his federal habeas claim was clearly erroneous because the evidence established that his paranoid schizophrenia prevented him from providing full assistance to his counsel during the federal habeas proceedings. Since we have not reviewed a habeas competency finding before, we have not had occasion to address the relevant standards of review. We generally review a district court's determinations that a defendant is competent to stand trial for clear error, and the parties agree that the same standard of review should apply here. See United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1372 (11th Cir. 1993) (using clearly erroneous standard to evaluate finding that petitioner was competent to stand trial). The applicable competency standard is whether the petitioner has both sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Moore v. Campbell, 344 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). After holding a competency hearing, the district court found that there was credible evidence to show that Ferguson at one time suffered from a mental disorder that had symptoms associated with paranoid schizophrenia and that, since 1994, his mental health has improved so as to make him no longer a disruptive member of his prison environment. R4-107 at 15. It also found that his disorder was in remission and that he was malingering or exaggerating his symptoms. See id. The court further found that Ferguson had the mental competency, clarity of thought, directness of speech, and motivation to advance his interests and objectives when faced with a variety of adverse circumstances. Id. at 15, 17. The court made a number of other factual findings including that the totality of his test results supported the conclusion that he was consciously reporting symptoms of mental illness that he [was] not presently experiencing and that his unwillingness to cooperate with his counsel was based on a desire to avoid punishment. Id. at 17, 20. Based on all of this, the court concluded that Ferguson ha[d] sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and ha[d] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Id. at 21-23. After thoroughly reviewing the transcripts and evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, we find that there was ample evidence to support the district court's findings. Accordingly, assuming arguendo that there is a federal right to be competent during federal habeas proceedings, [55] we conclude the district court did not clearly err in deeming Ferguson competent to proceed with his federal habeas petition and did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to stay. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. & Assoc., 743 F.2d 1519, 1525 (11th Cir.1984) (noting that a motion to stay is directed to the district court's sound discretion). In light of this conclusion, we need not address the State's cross-appeal regarding whether the district court improperly granted an evidentiary hearing on the issue.