Opinion ID: 2517596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Asserted Failure to Address an Alleged Conflict Between Defendant and Defense Counsel Concerning Defendant's Desire to Enter a Plea of Guilty

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to address adequately a conflict that arose between defense counsel and defendant concerning her desire to enter a plea of guilty shortly before the commencement of the guilt phase of the trial. Defendant maintains that she repeatedly informed her counsel that she wished to plead guilty but that counsel unreasonably withheld consent to a guilty plea and thereafter insisted on presenting a defense that ultimately proved to be unsuccessful and prejudiced defendant's ability to demonstrate at the penalty phase her remorse and acceptance of responsibility. [2] Defendant asserts that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the alleged conflict between defendant and her counsel regarding her desire to enter a plea of guilty, and that, had such an inquiry been conducted, the trial court would have determined that counsel's refusal to consent was unreasonable. Defendant further asserts that as a result of the trial court's inaction, she was deprived of her right to plead guilty and that such a plea would have enhanced her defense at the penalty phase. Although defendant concedes that the plain language of section 1018 conditions a guilty plea in a capital case upon the consent of counsel, she urges that a trial court nonetheless has a duty to ensure that defense counsel does not unreasonably withhold such consent. Defendant asserts that the trial court's alleged error deprived her of her constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, of control over her own defense, and of her right to a fair trial. For the reasons that follow, we find no error in the trial court's inquiry into, and resolution of, the purported conflict between defendant and her counsel regarding her plea.
On the day of defendant's arrest in late June 1991, police officers gave defendant Miranda advisements ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), and thereafter she agreed to be interviewed by law enforcement officers without counsel being present. In a four-hour videotaped confession, she assumed complete responsibility for the murder of Autumn Wallace. Defendant described in detail the circumstances of the crimes, including her intention to steal property when she entered the Wallace home, as well as taking a knife from the drawer in the kitchen shortly after entering the residence. Defendant admitted that she inflicted all of Autumn's wounds, specifically acknowledging that no one else participated in the murder and that she knew the wounds she inflicted could cause death. In mid-February 1992, 11 days prior to the commencement of jury selection, defendant's counsel filed an in camera request for special instruction wherein he informed the court: My client ... refuses to follow my instructions and take the stand and implicate `Beto' ... If my client insists on pleading guilty to the special circumstances, it is against my most vigorous advice. I am requesting instructions from the court as to whether or not the court believes it is necessary for me to withdraw from the case at this late stage or whether or not I should remain on the case. The following day, the court met with defense counsel, William Monroe, and defendant ex parte. During the lengthy ensuing discussion, Monroe described an out and out conflict between himself and defendant regarding her desire to plead guilty and his wish to proceed to trial on the guilt phase. Monroe told the court that because of fears for the safety of defendant and her family should she implicate Beto in the crime, defendant adamantly refused to allow counsel to call Beto as a witness, to cross-examine Antonio Shorty Reynoso regarding his relationship with Beto, or to question any other witnesses regarding a possible identification of Beto. Monroe also informed the court that defendant would not testify and implicate Beto in Autumn's murder, because of fears for her safety, and that she sought to plead guilty against my vigorous, vigorous advice. The trial court explained that pursuant to Penal Code section 1018, it did not have authority to accept a guilty plea from a defendant in a capital trial without the consent of counsel, and accordingly, even if she desired to do so, defendant could not enter a guilty plea without counsel's consent. [3] Ultimately, the court refused to remove counsel from the case, concluding that the asserted conflict between defendant and her counsel was one involving trial tactics and, as such, did not require the removal of counsel or the appointment of new counsel. Nearly a week after this hearing, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence of defendant's videotaped confession, arguing that drugs affected her judgment and rationality at the time of the confession, and asserting that introduction of the confession would violate defendant's right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to due process of law. The court denied the motion, concluding that defendant's statements were voluntary and that the amount of drugs in her system did not affect her ability to waive her rights knowingly and voluntarily. The trial proceeded, and during cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses, Shorty Reynoso and Tom Giffin, as well as in his closing argument, defense counsel suggested that Beto was a second killer who goaded defendant into murdering Autumn Wallace by threatening to harm defendant's family unless she committed the murder (purportedly to eliminate the victim as an eyewitness to the robbery). As expected, the defense rested its case without defendant testifying on her own behalf. A few days later, the jury found defendant guilty on all charges, finding that the murder was of the first degree and that the alleged special circumstances were true. During both the first and second penalty phase trials, the district attorney told the jury that defendant had not accepted responsibility for the murder and that she lacked remorse. The jury did not hear evidence reflecting that prior to the guilt phase trial, defendant had attempted to accept the prosecutor's offer to enter an unconditional plea of guilty.
As a threshold matter, the parties vigorously disagree with respect to whether the guilty plea proffered by defendant was conditional or unconditional. Defendant contends that the discussion between the trial court and defense counsel clearly establishes that defendant sought to enter an unconditional plea. The Attorney General maintains, on the other hand, that defendant sought to enter a conditional plea of guilty, that is, she desired to plead guilty in exchange for receiving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of paroleand that this offer was communicated by defense counsel to the prosecutor, who rejected the offer. The Attorney General reasons that because evidence of a desire to plead guilty conditionally (that is, in exchange for an agreement to avoid the death penalty) would not have provided evidence that defendant was remorseful, defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by refusing to accede to defendant's wish, and the trial court did not err in failing to further investigate the purported conflict. The record supports the inference that defendant had communicated to her counsel a desire to enter an unconditional guilty plea. The transcript of the in camera proceedings conducted to discuss defense counsel's request for special instruction reflects that defense counsel and the trial court discussed defendant's desire to plead guilty to a capital offense and that doing so could subject her to the death penalty. When the trial court asked defendant what she wanted to do, she answered, without any expressed condition, plead guilty. Defense counsel stated several times that his objection to entry of a guilty plea was based upon his refusal to allow defendant to plead guilty to a capital offense. Counsel stated, I can't turn around and say I consent to allow my client to plead guilty when I know she's pleading guilty for all intents and purposes to a death sentence, and A twenty year old child is going to plead guilty to a death penalty? The trial court, in turn, expressed doubt that any attorney in Orange County would consent to somebody pleading guilty to a capital offense. The clear inference is that defense counsel withheld his consent to what he perceived as an unconditional guilty plea. Moreover, approximately one week after the foregoing hearing, the prosecution moved to exclude evidence of defense counsel's offer to allow his client to plead guilty to life without possibility of parole in lieu of the death penalty. In lieu of us seeking the death penalty. Thus, it appears that defense counsel specifically offered that defendant would plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Accordingly, it is apparent that the conflict between defendant and counsel that was the subject of the in-camera discussion concerned defendant's desire to enter an unconditional guilty plea and her attorney's refusal to consent to her doing so. Turning to the substance of defendant's argument, we note at the outset that defendant did not make an unequivocal request to discharge her counsel, William Monroe, and to represent herself. Rather, Monroe himself sought guidance from the court regarding what he feared was an irreconcilable conflict. Nonetheless, although defendant acknowledges that she did not herself invoke her right to self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ( Faretta ), she contends that a defendant's right to self-representation under Faretta encompasses a duty on the part of the trial court to ensure that defense counsel does not unreasonably withhold consent to the entry of a guilty plea in a capital case. Reasoning that a defendant has the ultimate, fundamental right to control his or her own defense, and contending that defendant desired to plead guilty in order to establish her acceptance of responsibility that in turn would enhance her penalty phase defense, defendant argues that she had the right to enter an unconditional plea of guilty against the advice of counsel and that the trial court erred in not allowing her to do so. Section 1018, limiting a defendant's right to plead guilty in a capital case, is one of several exceptions to the general rule recognizing the need to respect the defendant's personal choice on the most `fundamental' decisions in a criminal case. ( People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1221-1222, fn. 6, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a plainer statement of law than the rule of section 1018 that no guilty plea to a capital offense shall be received `without the consent of the defendant's counsel.' ( People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 746, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837 ( Chadd ).) We considered section 1018's consent requirement in Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d 739, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837, in which we held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in accepting the defendant's plea of guilty without obtaining the consent of his counsel. ( Id. at p. 746, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) The capital defendant in Chadd initially pleaded not guilty, but after attempting suicide, he waived his right to a preliminary hearing and through his appointed counsel informed the court that he sought to plead guilty against the advice of counsel. [4] As characterized by defendant's counsel, his `basic desire [was] to commit suicide,' and the defendant was `asking for the cooperation of the State in that endeavor.' ( Id. at p. 744, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) Indeed, when the trial court directly inquired, the defendant in Chadd expressly confirmed that he was seeking the court's assistance in committing suicide. The trial court found the defendant competent within the meaning of Faretta , reasoning that a finding of competence under that decision justified a departure from the consent requirement of section 1018. Although the court did not officially relieve counsel, it accepted the defendant's guilty plea to first degree murder and his admission of all charged enhancements and special circumstances, despite counsel's continuing objections. Thereafter, a penalty phase jury imposed a judgment of death. ( Chadd , at p. 748, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) Emphasizing the plain language of section 1018, and concluding the trial court committed prejudicial error in accepting the defendant's plea, we reversed the judgment of death. ( Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 754-755, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) Although acknowledging that in California's system of criminal justice, the decision how to plead to a criminal charge is personal to the defendant, we also emphasized that it is no less true that the Legislature has the power to regulate, in the public interest, the manner in which that choice is exercised. ( Id. at pp. 747-748, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) We specifically considered the interplay between the section 1018 consent requirement and the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation discussed in Faretta , and observed that, as Faretta recognized, the Sixth Amendment grants the right to defend directly to the accused, because he or she suffers the consequences in the event the defense fails. ( Chadd , at p. 751, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) In rejecting the Attorney General's contention that therefore the so-called veto power vested in defense counsel renders section 1018 unconstitutional, we explained that in capital cases ... the state has a strong interest in reducing the risk of mistaken judgments. Nothing in Faretta , either expressly or impliedly, deprives the state of the right to conclude that the danger of erroneously imposing a death sentence outweighs the minor infringement of the right of self-representation resulting when defendant's right to plead guilty in capital cases is subjected to the requirement of his counsel's consent. ( Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 751, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) Defendant urges us to revisit and limit our holding in Chadd because unlike the defendant in that casewho sought to waive any defense entirely and confirmed unambiguously that his desire to plead guilty amounted to an attempt to commit suicide with state assistancedefendant in the present case sought to plead guilty in order to help establish a foundation for a remorse defense at the penalty phase. But we need not decide in this case whether Chadd would apply to a defendant's desire to enter a guilty plea as part of a strategy to obtain a life sentence at the penalty phase, because the record here does not indicate that defendant sought to plead guilty in furtherance of such a strategy. Instead, the record supports an inference that defendant desired to plead guilty in order to avoid testifying against Beto, whom her counsel sought to implicate as an accomplice in the murder of Autumn Wallace. During the ex parte colloquy prior to jury selection, defense counsel informed the court that defendant refused to testify because she was in absolute fear of her safety and she's in absolute fear of the safety of her family should it become known to Beto that we in some way, shape, or form, for lack of a better term, have given him up. Although defense counsel did not state explicitly that defendant's desire to plead guilty and her refusal to testify were interconnected, the tenor of the lengthy discussion clearly supports that inference. Defendant, who was present at the colloquy, did not dispute counsel's characterization of her position and said nothing more than that she desired to plead guilty. In particular, she made no overt or implicit reference to remorse or a desire to take responsibility for the crime. Thus, as defense counsel informed the trial court, although defendant told him that Beto had pressured her to murder Autumn by threatening defendant's child, she refused to testify to that effect, because she allegedly continued to fear for the safety of herself and her family. In other words, it appears that defense counsel reasonably believed that defendant sought to plead guilty to a capital offense not in order to help establish a foundation for a defense of remorse at the penalty phase, but instead to avoid naming an alleged coconspirator and thus protect herself and her family from harm. Defense counsel's refusal to consent to a guilty plea under these circumstances was not unreasonable. As we recognized in Chadd , the 1973 statutory revision adding to section 1018 the requirement of counsel's consent was part of a more extensive revision of California's death penalty legislation and thus was intended to serve as a further independent safeguard against the erroneous imposition of a death sentence. ( Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 750, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) In Chadd , we explained that `[a] plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.' ( Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 748, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837, quoting Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.) The consent requirement of section 1018 has its roots in the state's strong interest in reducing the risk of mistaken judgments in capital cases and thereby maintaining the accuracy and fairness of its criminal proceedings. ( Chadd , at pp. 750, 753, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.) The statute constitutes legislative recognition of the severe consequences of a guilty plea in a capital case, and provides protection against an ill-advised guilty plea and the erroneous imposition of a death sentence. Defense counsel's refusal to consent to defendant's guilty plea under the present circumstances was well within the purview of our holding in Chadd . Although defendant did not seek to enter a guilty plea in order to effectuate a state-assisted suicide, the record demonstrates that she nonetheless sought to waive her right to present a defense in order to prevent the presentation of evidence regarding an accompliceevidence that her counsel believed would mitigate her culpability for the murder. Had defense counsel capitulated to defendant's desire to plead guilty unconditionally despite the information she had conveyed to him implicating another person in the murder, defendant's plea would have cast doubt on potentially critical mitigating evidence. A guilty plea entered under such circumstances might very well lead to the erroneous imposition of the death penaltyprecisely the outcome section 1018 is intended to prevent. We likewise reject the claim that counsel's refusal to consent to the guilty plea became unreasonable because defendant's refusal to testify at the guilt phase of her trial hindered counsel's presentation of her defense. Defendant contends that because counsel was well aware she would not testify, and because the defense strategy would be substantially undercut by defendant's silence, counsel should have consented to defendant's entering an unconditional guilty plea. However, in view of the circumstance that the trial court admitted into evidence the videotape of defendant repeatedly confessing to the murder of Autumn Wallace, defense counsel was not unreasonable in attempting to present a defense that would mitigate defendant's culpability in the crime. Defendant faults the trial court for failing to inquire into defendant's reasons for desiring to plead guilty. She claims that had the trial court done so, it would have discovered that defendant sought to take responsibility for the crime in order to demonstrate her remorse, and that defense counsel's refusal to consent was patently unreasonable in light of the weak defense case. Although defendant vigorously argues that the trial court had a duty to intervene after it was apprised of the conflict between defendant and her counsel, there is no express duty on the part of the trial court to ensure that counsel's consent to a guilty plea is not unreasonably withheld. Even assuming the existence of such a duty, the trial court conducted a complete and adequate inquiry into the purported conflict between defendant and her counsel in the present case. The court reasonably relied upon counsel's representation, unrebutted by defendant, that the conflict concerned defendant's desire to plead guilty in order to avoid testifying against Beto, who might retaliate against her and her family. Although defendant had ample opportunity during the lengthy ex parte discussion between defense counsel and the court to elaborate on her motivation to enter a guilty plea, she told the court only that she wished to plead guilty. Moreover, as we have held in the context of Marsden hearings ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 ( Marsden )), any conflict over the wisdom of presenting evidence that Beto had pressured defendant into participating in the murder was merely a dispute over tactics and would not by itself constitute an irreconcilable conflict. ( People v. Cole (2005) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1190, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811 ( Cole ); People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754 ( Welch ).) Indeed, as we noted in Cole, a `defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense.' ( Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1192, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811, quoting Welch . ) Defendant contends the decision how to plead is fundamental, and therefore her disagreement with counsel concerned a fundamental aspect of her defense that the trial court should have recognized must remain within defendant's control. As set forth above, however, nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that her desire to plead guilty was motivated by a desire to establish a defense of remorse or to demonstrate her acceptance of responsibility for the murder so that a lesser punishment might be imposed at the penalty phase. Accordingly, the trial court reasonably concluded that the dispute between defendant and her counsel did not implicate a constitutionally protected fundamental interest that might override the plain terms of section 1018. [5] Defendant also contends that if the trial court believed defendant's desire to plead guilty was unreasonable, it had a duty to order a competency hearing. There is no indication in the record, however, that the trial court believed defendant's desire to plead guilty was unreasonable. The trial court recognized that defendant sought to plead guilty, that defense counsel would not consent, and that the dispute was one involving tactics, requiring no action on the court's part. Defense counsel did not mention any issue concerning defendant's competency, and explained that defendant's desire to plead guilty was the product of her alleged fear of testifying against Beto. In addition, defendant did not provide any indication that she was incompetent. The trial court had no duty to inquire further into defendant's competence. Defendant further faults the trial court for failing to appoint second counsel after defense counsel conveyed the circumstances of the conflict between himself and defendant and suggested that another counsel be appointed to advise defendant. Section 987, subdivision (d) provides in relevant part: In a capital case, the court may appoint an additional attorney as a cocounsel upon a written request of the first attorney appointed. The request shall be supported by an affidavit of the first attorney setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be appointed.... The court shall appoint a second attorney when it is convinced by the reasons stated in the affidavit that the appointment is necessary to provide the defendant with effective representation. (See also Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 430, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108.) Defendant concedes that defense counsel did not file a written request for cocounsel as required by section 987, subdivision (d), but asks that we interpret defense counsel's oral suggestion as a formal request for Keenan counsel. We decline to do so. The sole allusion to such a request was defense counsel's suggestion that second counsel might be appointed to advise defendant regarding the consequences of her decision not to testify. The trial court was not requested to, and did not, rule on a formal motion to appoint second counsel. Thus, the issue was not preserved for appeal. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365, 926 P.2d 365.) In the alternative, defendant asserts that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to invoke the trial court's discretion to appoint a second attorney to assist counsel at the guilt and penalty phases of this capital case. ( Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 430, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108; § 987, subd. (d).) Defendant asserts that (1) her case was unusually daunting, (2) counsel was overwhelmed and improperly relied on his investigator to perform tasks that should have been performed by an attorney, (3) the lack of cocounsel led to presentation of a deficient and ill-advised defense that relied solely upon a duress theory that ultimately was not available to absolve defendant of responsibility for the murder of Autumn Wallace, and (4) counsel was not prepared to offer evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase, which required the development of issues and evidence different from what was presented at the guilt phase. The record on appeal does not establish that counsel provided constitutionally inadequate assistance in failing to request cocounsel. Nothing in the record demonstrates that Monroe performed below constitutional standards, especially in light of the lack of cooperation he received from defendant. ( People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 523, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032 ( Michaels ).) To the contrary, the record reveals that defense counsel sought to present a defense that would minimize defendant's culpability based upon her own description of the events, and that possibly would avoid imposition of the death penalty. The circumstance that defendant refused to assist counsel in presenting that version of the events to the jury, allegedly because she was afraid of the consequences of further identifying the second man, thereby hindering presentation of her defense, does not render unreasonable the refusal of counsel to accede to defendant's desire to plead guilty or counsel's continuing representation inadequate. Moreover, the cooperation between Monroe and his investigator in performing quasi-legal tasks such as examining appropriate areas of defense and/or mitigation was not improper and does not demonstrate that Monroe was overwhelmed in conducting the defense. In any event, because the claim is presented as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, relief depends solely on whether counsel's error, if any, may have affected the outcome. ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 437, 285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 692-693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) The record does not reflect that, but for counsel's refusal to permit defendant to enter an unconditional guilty plea, or his failure to request appointment of second counsel, a more favorable verdict was reasonably probable. ( Michaels, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 525, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.)