Opinion ID: 1134905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: vacating dissolution decree after death of a party

Text: Petitioner asserts that Washington is the only state that precludes courts from vacating a dissolution decree after the death of one of the parties. [34] She urges this Court to reconsider this position which was first established by the Court in 1905 in Dwyer v. Nolan . [35] In Dwyer, after the death of her former husband, the wife sought to vacate their dissolution decree, contending that the superior court acted without jurisdiction and the judgment was therefore void. This Court denied her motion to vacate the judgment: [36] We will not enter into an investigation of the question presented as to whether or not the service in the divorce proceeding was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, for the reason that there are no proper parties to this proceeding, and in the nature of things, the plaintiff having died, that the question of divorce cannot be relitigated. It will not be gainsaid that an action for divorce is a purely personal action. Nothing is sought to be affected but the marital status of the husband and wife. The distribution of property in such an action is incidental, and it is clearly incontestable that upon the death of either party, whether before or after the decree, the subject of the controversy is eliminated. Petitioner argues that the Court almost a century ago established this ill-conceived, shortsighted, and harsh rule unaware of its effect on future cases like this where marital status determines annuity rights and relief can be granted only by vacating the dissolution decree. Petitioner asserts that, given the increasing prevalence of surviving spouse benefit plans offered under federal, state, and private annuities, dissolutions are no longer purely personal actions because they involve substantial property rights. Petitioner asserts that in Osborne v. Osborne, [37] in which the wife sought to vacate a dissolution decree primarily on the basis of fraud, this Court invited reexamination of the rule in a future and proper case: It may be that this rule is harsh and is more restrictive than the rule in other jurisdictions. There may be good reasons why this court should reconsider the rule and perhaps modify it. But if such reasons exist, they have not been presented in the appellant's brief, and we therefore do not feel called upon to go in search of them at this time. Another reason why this court is reluctant to view the present case as a proper one in which to reexamine the rule that has been laid down regarding the vacation of a divorce decree after death of a party, is that the appellant's affidavit does not allege facts which clearly show that the decree was fraudulently obtained. Petitioner argues that those good reasons for reexamination of the rule exist in this case because Victor P. Himes obtained the dissolution decree by filing a false affidavit. She asserts that, although the court did not distribute any physical property, the dissolution nevertheless deprived her of surviving spouse benefits, a property interest of considerable value. According to Petitioner, she had no notice of nor an opportunity to respond to the dissolution with the consequent violation of her constitutional due process rights. Petitioner contends that in all other reported jurisdictions, courts may vacate a dissolution after the death of one of the parties based upon equitable principles. [38] She cites the Maryland case of Connelly v. Connelly, [39] which also involved entitlement to Navy pension benefits. In that case, the wife filed a motion to vacate a dissolution decree 26 months after she discovered her former husband had obtained the decree through fraud. The court vacated the decree even though the husband had since remarried and died, holding that [l]apse of time will not bar relief where circumstances exist which excuse the delay and render it inequitable to interpose the bar. [40] According to Petitioner, the facts in this case justify reexamining and overruling Dwyer and Crockett and adopting the more flexible rule announced in the Restatement of the Law, Conflict of Laws 2d, §74: [41] A person may be precluded from attacking the validity of a foreign divorce decree if, under the circumstances, it would be inequitable for him to do so. Petitioner asserts that a corollary to this rule is the courts should decide on equitable grounds whether to vacate a dissolution decree after death of one of the parties. Petitioner argues that, in weighing the equitable factors in this case, Respondent's assertions are hardly worthy of much weight on the scales of justice. Petitioner contends she is an innocent victim of fraud who did not learn of the 1987 default dissolution decree until March 1994 and then only after she was notified by the Navy that it had terminated her dependent's medical benefits. Petitioner argues that, even after their separation in 1982, she remained in contact with her husband and remained a Navy dependent spouse and therefore had no reason to suspect her husband had obtained a dissolution of their marriage. Petitioner asserts that she filed a petition to vacate the decree within eight months after learning of the dissolution and her proceeding should not therefore be subject to the equitable defenses of laches and estoppel. Petitioner points out that there are no children from her husband's marriage to Respondent MacIntyre-Himes, who was married to Victor P. Himes only for a year, the minimum eligibility time for a surviving spouse annuity under federal law. Petitioner asserts that Respondent was apparently self-supporting before she married Mr. Himes. She argues that vacating the decree would not inequitably disturb [Respondent's] interest of reliance on the judgment. Petitioner asserts that she was married to Mr. Himes for 27 years prior to the 1987 dissolution, reared their two children, faithfully remained his wife, and received and expected to continue to receive dependent spouse benefits from the Navy. She emphasizes that she manages a fabric shop and upon retirement she would have no other income than Social Security benefits. Citing Dwyer v. Nolan , [42] Respondent argues that under controlling Washington decisions, the death of Victor P. Himes on August 14, 1994 deprived the court of jurisdiction to vacate the dissolution decree. Citing McPherson v. McPherson, Respondent argues that this Court has long held that an action for divorce proper, being purely a personal action based upon personal relationship and status of marriage, terminates with the death of either spouse, not only because of its personal character, but because the marriage is ipso facto dissolved by death. [43] In McPherson, the trial court entered an interlocutory divorce decree in favor of the wife and settled the property rights of the parties. The husband appealed the interlocutory order. The wife died before the court entered a final divorce decree. The executor for the wife's estate argued that the interlocutory decree with respect to property rights did not abate upon the death of the wife. The Court stated that it has long recognized the rule that where the main purpose of a divorce action fails, any property settlement made therein, being only ancillary to and dependent upon the main purpose, also fails. [44] The Court concluded it did not have authority to reverse, modify, or affirm an interlocutory decree of divorce, after the death of one of the parties to such decree, except where the rights of third parties were involved in the decree itself, and then only for the purpose of adjudicating the rights of such third persons. [45] Respondent argues that although McPherson involved an interlocutory decree, the Court adhered to the same ruling in Crockett v. Crockett [46] which involved a final decree. In Crockett, the husband sought a divorce while the wife was confined in a mental institution. The court granted the interlocutory decree and approved a property settlement agreed to by the wife's guardian ad litem. The wife died seven years after the court entered a final decree of divorce. As administrator of his mother's estate, decedent's son brought a motion to vacate the divorce decree claiming it was void for fraud. The Court determined there was no evidence in the record supporting fraud and, because the son was not a party to the divorce action, he was not a proper party plaintiff. The Court concluded that [T]he final decree of divorce in its entirety is a valid and binding decree, settling the rights of the parties thereto, which decree cannot be vacated by the administrator of Mrs. Crockett's estate after her death. In other words, the divorce action being purely a personal one, and one of the parties having died, the subject matter of the action has ceased to exist.... Respondent MacIntyre-Himes contends she is an innocent new spouse who relied upon the validity and finality of her husband's dissolution decree. She emphasizes that Petitioner and Mr. Himes separated in 1982, the dissolution decree was entered in 1987, she and Mr. Himes married in 1993, and Petitioner did not file her motion to vacate the decree until 1994. According to Respondent, the lapse of timetwelve years after separation and seven years after dissolutionestops Petitioner from challenging the validity of the 1987 default decree. Respondent argues that Petitioner is precluded from relief under CR 60(b) which states that motions for vacating judgments shall be made within a reasonable time and Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments 2d, § 74 [47] which states that relief will be denied if barred by lapse of time or inequitable disturbance of an interest of reliance on the judgment. Respondent contends that because she is only employed as a part-time bookkeeper/receptionist, she would face extreme financial hardship without the Navy annuity benefits. She asserts that Commissioner Bedle correctly concluded that setting aside the decree is contrary to public policy in that it would undivor[c]e the decedent.... Among other reasons, this public policy is meant to protect the innocent new spouse. The trial court disagreed with Commissioner Bedle and vacated the judgment for fraud under CR 60(b)(4). Distinguishing Dwyer and Crockett, Judge David F. Hulbert stated he was persuaded by musings of the court in Osborne : [48] While Wife was alleging fraud in the Osborne case as well, it is apparent that the court did not find her facts particularly strong. The Osborne court indicated that the issue should be revisited on the right facts ... the right facts exist here. The court rules that the controversy was not extinguished when Victor Himes died, and Frances Himes may proceed with a Motion to Vacate the Decree of Dissolution. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that it must adhere to the ruling in the seminal case of Dwyer v. Nolan , and its progeny. The United States Supreme Court, however, has held that a divorce decree pending appeal does not abate upon the death of a party when property rights are involved. In Bell v. Bell, [49] the husband obtained a divorce decree in Pennsylvania by falsely stating he was a resident of that state. The wife brought a petition for divorce and alimony in the Supreme Court of New York where she resided, asserting that the Pennsylvania court did not have jurisdiction to grant her husband a divorce. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the New York Supreme Court that the Pennsylvania court lacked jurisdiction, and granted the wife's action for divorce and alimony. The husband obtained review by the United States Supreme Court, but died before its decision was announced. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals, stating that the judgment was not only for divorce but was for a large sum of alimony: The wife's rights to such alimony and costs, though depending on the same grounds as the divorce, are not impaired by the husband's death, should not be affected by the delay in entering judgment here while this court has held the case under advisement, and may be preserved by entering judgment nunc pro tunc as of the day when it was argued. It is true that this Court has long held that a dissolution action abates upon the death of one of the parties unless the rights of third parties are involved in the dissolution. We have rejected the general rule followed in virtually all other jurisdictions that during the time an appeal is pending or during the time when an appeal may be taken, a divorce or dissolution action abates with respect to marital status of the parties but does not abate with respect to property interests affected by the decree. [50] As this Court observed in Osborne, [i]t may be that this rule [established in Dwyer ] is harsh and is more restrictive than the rule in other jurisdictions. [51] We believe the facts in this case justify our reconsideration of the rule in Dwyer on equitable grounds.