Opinion ID: 836272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Scientific Evidence

Text: In Brown, this court abandoned special tests for the admissibility of scientific evidence in favor of resolving the problem by relying on traditional evidence law as codified in the Oregon Evidence Code. 297 Or. at 408, 687 P.2d 751. The admissibility of scientific evidence implicates three provisions of the evidence code. OEC 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. (Emphasis added.) OEC 702, which sets the standard for admission of scientific evidence, provides: If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. OEC 403 permits the trial court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. According to Brown, expert testimony is admissible if it is relevant under OEC 401, would assist the trier of fact under OEC 702, and is not subject to exclusion under OEC 403. 297 Or. at 409, 687 P.2d 751. Scientific evidence draws its convincing force from some principle of science, mathematics and the like. Typically, but not necessarily, scientific evidence is presented by an expert witness who can explain data or test results and, if necessary, explain the scientific principles which are said to give the evidence its reliability or accuracy. Id. at 407-08, 687 P.2d 751. This court also held: In applying OEC 401, 702 and 403, this court must identify and evaluate the probative value of the evidence, consider how it might impair rather than help the factfinder, and decide whether truthfinding is better served by exclusion or admission. Id. at 409, 687 P.2d 751. The Brown court instructed: In determining whether scientific evidence is probative under OEC 401 and the relevancy and prejudice analysis implicated in OEC 702's helpfulness standard, we believe [that seven factors]    provide structure and guidance   . Id. at 417, 687 P.2d 751. Those factors are: (1) The technique's general acceptance in the field; (2) The expert's qualifications and stature; (3) The use which has been made of the technique; (4) The potential rate of error; (5) The existence of specialized literature; (6) The novelty of the invention; and (7) The extent to which the technique relies on the subjective interpretation of the expert. Id. at 417, 687 P.2d 751. [8] Those seven factors are not an exclusive checklist. Rather, [t]he existence or nonexistence of these factors may all enter into the court's final decision on admissibility of the novel scientific evidence, but need not necessarily do so. What is important is not lockstep affirmative findings as to each factor, but analysis of each factor by the court in reaching its decision on the probative value of the evidence under OEC 401 and OEC 702. Id. at 417-18, 687 P.2d 751 (footnotes omitted). As noted in O'Key, a court should evaluate evidence that purports to be scientific to ensure that it is scientifically valid: Evidence perceived by lay jurors to be scientific in nature possesses an unusually high degree of persuasive power. The function of the court is to ensure that the persuasive appeal is legitimate. The value of proffered expert scientific testimony critically depends on the scientific validity of the general propositions utilized by the expert. Propositions that a court finds possess significantly increased potential to influence the trier of fact as scientific assertions, therefore, should be supported by the appropriate scientific validation. This approach `ensure[s] that expert testimony does not enjoy the persuasive appeal of science without subjecting its propositions to the verification processes of science.' 321 Or. at 291-92, 899 P.2d 663 (footnote and citations omitted).