Opinion ID: 1195113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Use of the Failed Entrapment Defense as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing Was Justified

Text: Having established that the elements of a failed entrapment defense may be used as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing, the next question is whether such mitigation is sustainable in this case. The considerations for our review of an exceptional sentence are well established. In State v. Allert, 117 Wash.2d 156, 163, 815 P.2d 752 (1991), we stated: Review of an exceptional sentence is governed by RCW 9.94A.210(4). An appellate court is to analyze the appropriateness of an exceptional sentence by answering the following three questions under the indicated standards of review: 1. Are the reasons given supported by evidence in the record? As to this, the standard of review is clearly erroneous. 2. Do the reasons justify a departure from the standard range? The standard of review on this is as a matter of law. 3. Is the sentence clearly too lenient? The standard of review on this last question is abuse of discretion. (Footnotes omitted.) See also State v. Branch, 129 Wash.2d 635, 645-46, 919 P.2d 1228 (1996).
In applying the clearly erroneous standard in reviewing a trial court's reasons for imposing an exceptional sentence, we have stated [w]e will reverse the trial court's findings only if no substantial evidence supports its conclusion. State v. Grewe, 117 Wash.2d 211, 218, 813 P.2d 1238 (1991). Substantial evidence has been defined as `evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premises.' Olmstead v. Department of Health, 61 Wash.App. 888, 893, 812 P.2d 527 (1991) (quoting Green Thumb, Inc. v. Tiegs, 45 Wash.App. 672, 676, 726 P.2d 1024 (1986)). Here, the trial court made extensive findings on sentencing and found Rigg was the instigator of the drug transaction. The court also found, other than Rigg's testimony, which the court found unpersuasive, there was no evidence before the court that Jeannotte had previously delivered a controlled substance, nor that Jeannotte had any criminal predisposition to deliver a controlled substance. The court also found Rigg encouraged Jeannotte to deliver the controlled substance, and Jeannotte's argument of entrapment, while not accepted by the jury as a defense, was persuasive as a mitigating circumstance. The record supports these findings. Rigg had significant incentives to help facilitate drug investigations and arrests. Jeannotte, although a cocaine user, was not a dealer. Rigg hounded Jeannotte to sell him cocaine until Jeannotte relented. This evidence was sufficient to persuade a fair minded person that Jeannotte did not instigate the drug deal and was actually pushed into it by Rigg. Under the above cited case law, the trial court's findings, upon which the exceptional sentence is based, are sustainable because substantial evidence appears in the record supporting those findings.
The second part of RCW 9.94A.210(4)(a) requires us to independently determine, as a matter of law, if the sentencing judge's reasons justify the imposition of a sentence outside the presumptive range. The reasons must be substantial and compelling, RCW 9.94A.120(2), and must take into account factors other than those which are necessarily considered in computing the presumptive range for the offense. State v. Nordby, 106 Wash.2d 514, 518, 723 P.2d 1117 (1986); Nelson, 108 Wash.2d at 498-99, 740 P.2d 835. This criterion is met because the elements of entrapment are specifically listed in RCW 9.94A.390(1)(d) as mitigating circumstances which a sentencing court may consider in exercising its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence. We recognized as much in Nelson, holding: Lack of predisposition and inducement by others to commit the crime is one of the mitigating factors listed under RCW 9.94A.390[(1)(d)]. Therefore, as a matter of law, this factor justifies the imposition of a nonstandard sentence. Nelson, 108 Wash.2d at 499, 740 P.2d 835 (emphasis added).
In determining whether an exceptional sentence is clearly too excessive or too lenient, we apply the abuse of discretion standard. Pascal, 108 Wash.2d at 138, 736 P.2d 1065. Under the abuse of discretion standard, a sentence will be adjudged clearly too lenient only if the trial court's action was one that no reasonable person would have taken. Id. at 139, 736 P.2d 1065. Under the facts of this case, it cannot be said the trial court abused its discretion in considering the failed entrapment defense. Although Jeannotte's attempted assertion of the affirmative defense of entrapment failed to win over the jury (i.e., he failed to meet the burden of asserting an affirmative defense), the record nevertheless contains evidence he was not predisposed to deliver the cocaine to the informant and he was induced into the delivery by the informant. Under Nelson, as these factors justify imposition of a nonstandard sentence, it cannot be said no reasonable person would have imposed an exceptional sentence below the standard range on Jeannotte as the trial court did in this case. The Court of Appeals' holding that the trial court improperly considered Jeannotte's failed entrapment defense for sentencing purposes cannot be sustained. [4]