Opinion ID: 2510259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Framework for Reviewing a Motion to Withdraw Plea

Text: K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3210(d) allows for the withdrawal of a guilty plea in the discretion of the court. If the request is made before sentencing, the plea may be withdrawn for good cause shown; if the request is made after sentencing, the plea may be withdrawn to correct manifest injustice. In this case, the good cause shown standard applies because Edgar filed her motion before she was sentenced. In exercising its discretion under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3210(d), the trial court should evaluate whether (1) the defendant was represented by competent counsel, (2) the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of, and (3) the plea was fairly and understandingly made. [Citation omitted.] State v. Bey, 270 Kan. 544, 545, 17 P.3d 322 (2001). Edgar's arguments generally assert that her plea was not understandingly made. The question of whether a plea is understandingly made must be weighed in light of certain constitutional and statutory requirements which attach to a defendant's plea. United States constitutional due process requirements relating to pleas of guilty or nolo contendere were imposed upon the States in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969). To be constitutionally valid, guilty pleas and their resulting waiver of rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1975). A keystone of an intelligent plea is for the defendant to be informed of the nature of the charges. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 85 L. Ed. 859, 61 S. Ct. 572 (1941); see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969). Additionally, the defendant must be informed of the [s]everal federal constitutional rights . . . involved in [the] waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination [Citation omitted.] .... Second, is the right to trial by jury. [Citation omitted.] Third, is the right to confront one's accusers. [Citation omitted.] Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243. The Boykin Court explained that a waiver of rights cannot be presumed from a silent record. 395 U.S. at 243. Thus, the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily. Brady, 397 U.S. at 747-48 n.4. K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3210(a) embodies these due process requirements ( Trotter v. State, 218 Kan. 266, 268-69, 543 P.2d 1023 [1975]) and adds statutory conditions precedent to a plea of guilty or nolo contendere being accepted: (a) Before or during trial a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be accepted when: (1) The defendant or counsel for the defendant enters such plea in open court; and (2) in felony cases the court has informed the defendant of the consequences of the plea, including the specific sentencing guidelines level of any crime committed on or after July 1, 1993, and of the maximum penalty provided by law which may be imposed upon acceptance of such plea; and (3) in felony cases the court has addressed the defendant personally and determined that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea; and (4) the court is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. A failure to strictly comply with the requirements of K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3210(a) may be harmless error if a review of the entire record shows the guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Trotter, 218 Kan. at 269 (While we do not approve of any failure to comply strictly with the explicitly stated requirements of K.S.A. 22-3210, it does not follow that every deviation therefrom requires reversal.). Conversely, a failure to comply may be good cause for granting a motion to withdraw if the noncompliance results in the defendant not understanding the nature of the charge or the consequences of entering the plea. See K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3210(a)(3) and (d); Bey, 270 Kan. at 545. On appeal, the trial court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a plea will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. The defendant bears the burden of establishing such an abuse of discretion. Bey, 270 Kan. at 545-46. Judicial discretion will vary depending upon the character of the question presented for determination. Generally, the trial court's decision is protected if reasonable persons could differ upon the propriety of the decision as long as the discretionary decision is made within and takes into account the applicable legal standards. However, an abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court's decision goes outside the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory limitations or legal standards. Dragon v. Vanguard Industries, Inc., 277 Kan. 776, 779, 89 P.3d 908 (2004); see State v. Richard, 252 Kan. 872, 881-82, 850 P.2d 844 (1993).