Opinion ID: 479002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Distance Requirements

Text: 43 King County and Snohomish County require all nude entertainment to be performed on a stage eighteen inches high and six feet from the nearest patron. King County Ordinance No. 7216 Sec. 8(A)(6) 4 ; SCC Sec. 10.04.100. The purpose of the section is to deter sexual contact and illegal touching between performers and patrons. The district court held that this was a reasonable time, place, or manner regulation permissible under the First Amendment. 5 We affirm. 44 We note at the outset that BSA and Chase have failed to explain how the distance requirement impinges upon their First Amendment rights. The requirement does not prohibit nude entertainment. It also does not diminish the expressiveness of nude entertainment. There is no allegation that the distance between entertainer and patron is an integral part of the expressive activity, or that the viewing public is [less able] to satisfy its appetite for sexually explicit fare. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 62, 96 S.Ct. at 2448. 45 Even assuming, however, that the distance requirement does burden protected expression, it is a valid place or manner regulation. Regulations of the time, place, or manner of protected speech will be upheld if necessary to further significant governmental interests. Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.1982). Curtailing public sexual contact and sexual criminal offenses represents a significant state interest. Id. The six-foot/eighteen inch distance requirement furthers this interest by keeping nude entertainers just out of reach of the nearest patron. The district court therefore properly found that the requirement constitutes a valid place or manner regulation. 6 46 BSA, however, further raises a procedural challenge to the manner in which the King County ordinance was adopted. The district court found that the King County Council considered no evidence regarding the need for the distance requirement before adoption of the ordinance. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that King County adequately justified the ordinance by introducing at trial affidavits from two police officers. Both officers described their observations of sexual contact between patrons and dancers and concluded that such incidents decreased after the passage of the distance requirement. 47 BSA argues that the County's post facto justification was impermissible. It asserts that a claim of governmental interest must be supported by empirical, factual evidence actually considered at the time an ordinance is passed. 48 BSA's contention fails on three grounds. First, it is sufficient that the County was able to present some evidence at the time of trial. In Schad, 452 U.S. at 72, 101 S.Ct. at 2184, the Supreme Court implied that the city could have justified its substantial restriction of protected activity by presenting evidence at trial. BSA provides no authority requiring that a legislative body need function like a court of law every time it considers legislation that may implicate the First Amendment. 49 Second, the cases cited by BSA in which courts have required a factual basis all involve ordinances that substantially restrict protected speech. CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir.1982); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir.1982); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659 (8th Cir.1981); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir.1981); Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v. City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115 (1st Cir.1981). In this case the distance requirement imposes at most a minimal restriction on First Amendment activity. 50 Third, there is no evidence indicating that King County passed the distance requirement to suppress protected speech rather than to deter illegal sexual contact. Given this, there is no reason to require a factual basis in support of the ordinance. Accordingly, Sugar's challenge that Snohomish County's factual findings were inadequate must also fail. 51 The requirement clearly furthers a legitimate goal, is adapted to accomplish that end, and imposes at most a very minimal restriction on protected activity. Hence, we find no error.