Opinion ID: 2782927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Maersk’s Duties to Plaintiff

Text: We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. Connelly v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 764 F.3d 1358, 1363 (11th Cir. 2014). Further, “[w]e review questions of law de novo[.]” Dixon v. U.S Att’y Gen., 768 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff contends that the district court mischaracterized Maersk’s duties as ship owner to Plaintiff as a longshoreman. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the International Safety Management Code (“the Code”) mandates that a Safety Management System Manual be kept onboard the vessel for the crew’s use. This manual, Plaintiff states, requires the ship’s officers to supervise and ensure safe cargo loading. Plaintiff points to deposition testimony from the chief officer and captain of the M/V Sealand Champion that confirms that the ship had this responsibility. On this basis, Plaintiff argues that Maersk had a duty to supervise 8 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 9 of 19 the cargo operations and that there is “a clear question of fact as to whether . . . [Plaintiff’s] injuries were proximately caused by Maersk’s failure to supervise.” In its response, Maersk argues that the district court correctly stated the applicable law and that Plaintiff’s argument about the Code is unavailing because it imposes no duties on the ship owner that would supersede the existing legal obligations. As a longshoreman alleging negligence against a ship owner, Plaintiff’s claim is governed by § 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950. As the Supreme Court and this Circuit have explained, the Act imposes limited duties on a ship owner. First, “a shipowner must turn over the ship and its equipment in a condition that permits a stevedore to do its work with reasonable safety, and must warn the stevedore of any hidden dangers of which it knows or should know.” Roach v. M/V Aqua Grace, 857 F.2d 1575, 1581 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 166–67 (1981)). Second, “the shipowner may rely on the stevedore to perform its work with reasonable care, and there is no duty to supervise the stevedore ‘absent contract provisions, positive law, or custom to the contrary.’” Id. (quoting Scindia, 451 U.S. at 172). Third, “[t]he shipowner must intervene only when it becomes aware that the ship, its equipment or gear poses a danger to the stevedore and is also aware that the stevedore is acting unreasonably 9 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 10 of 19 to protect the longshoreman.” Id. (citing Scindia, 451 U.S. at 178) (emphasis in original). This duty is limited, however, because “creation of a shipowner’s duty to oversee the stevedore’s activity and insure the safety of longshoremen would . . . saddle the shipowner with precisely the sort of nondelegable duty that Congress sought to eliminate by amending section 905(b).” Scindia, 451 U.S. at 169 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237, 1249 n.35 (3d Cir. 1977)). It is clear that under the Act, there is no duty of the ship owner to supervise the stevedore. The question is whether the Code imposes such a duty. The Code, which is part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, has been implemented by Congress in 46 U.S.C. §§ 3201–3205. The safety management system Plaintiff mentions is to be implemented through regulations. 46 U.S.C. § 3203(a). These regulations are contained in 33 C.F.R. §§ 96.200–96.390. A vessel subject to the regulations may face a civil penalty or a revocation of its Coast Guard clearance if it is not in compliance with the regulations. 33 C.F.R. § 96.380(c). The circuit courts have not opined on whether the Code creates additional duties, running from vessels to longshoremen, besides those set out in the Act. District courts within this Circuit have done so, however, and have come to the 10 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 11 of 19 conclusion that it does not. E.g., Aronson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 12-CV20129, 2014 WL 3408582, at  (S.D. Fla. May 9, 2014) (“[T]he International Safety Management Code does not create any duties and thus cannot be the basis for a negligence claim against a cruise line.”); Rinker v. Carnival Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1243 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (“Plaintiff has failed to present any authority that establishes that the [Code] creates any duties that Carnival owes to Plaintiff.”); Calderon v. Offen, No. 07-61022-CIV, 2009 WL 3429771, at  (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20, 2009) (“Congress merely desired to participate with other maritime nations in achieving safety goals [through the Code], but did not intend to change longestablished rules of law which govern liability and its allocation in general maritime law.”) Addressing the regulations implemented in furtherance of the Code, the Southern District of New York noted that 33 C.F.R. § 96.230 was “cast in general terms which restate principles already well established by American case law,” and thus should not be construed as imposing additional duties. Johnson v. Horizon Lines, LLC, 520 F. Supp. 2d 524, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). We agree with these district courts that Plaintiff cannot rely on the Code to support his negligence claim against Maersk. Plaintiff points to no authority that recognizes the Code as modifying the duties set out in the Act and recognized in Scindia. Congress has directed that compliance with the Code is to be achieved 11 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 12 of 19 through regulations that are “consistent” with it, and it has provided penalties for non-compliance. 46 U.S.C. § 3203(b); 33 C.F.R. § 96.380(c). Further, attributing to the ship owner a duty to supervise cargo loading and unloading would run directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act: namely, that a duty to supervise the stevedore would “saddle the shipowner with precisely the sort of nondelegable duty that Congress sought to eliminate[.]” Scindia, 451 U.S. at 169. Because Plaintiff has not cited any specific United States statute or regulation that provides a private right of action for the breach of the duty he alleges, nor any judicial precedent that recognizes the Code as a basis for a negligence claim, we reject Plaintiff’s argument on this point and hold that the district court identified and applied the correct legal standards: namely, those recognized in the Act.