Opinion ID: 1922397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Pretext and Discrimination

Text: The third and final step in this burden-shifting framework focuses on the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.  Casey, 861 A.2d at 1037 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). An employee need not offer `smoking gun' evidence of discrimination. Barros, 710 A.2d at 685. Rather, an employee must prove that defendant's reason for termination was a pretext for discriminatory animus. Casey, 861 A.2d at 1038. More specifically, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Id. (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). The ultimate inference of discrimination is stronger when the reason for terminating an employee is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity. Barros, 710 A.2d at 685 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742). The burden of proof in the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework rests with the employee/plaintiff. Wellborn, 873 A.2d at 889. The plaintiff argues that, on the ultimate issue of discrimination, a triable issue of fact arises from defendant's failure to adhere to its handbook and to offer plaintiff the option of displacing less senior employees  a younger woman and a man. [6] From this failure, plaintiff contends, a factfinder would be permitted to infer that by not allowing her to displace a younger woman, defendant committed age discrimination, and that by not allowing her to displace a man, defendant committed gender discrimination. The plaintiff relies heavily on our opinion in Barros to support her argument. In determining whether an employee has demonstrated pretext, we first analyze whether defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason bears a suspicion of mendacity. See Barros, 710 A.2d at 685 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742). Accordingly, we observed in Barros that almost all the conduct that served as a basis for her termination took place prior to February 1991, when she announced her pregnancy. Id. at 686. Thus, the fact that her behavior became more objectionable to her employer after she became pregnant rendered the employer's reasons suspect. This suspicion of mendacity, combined with the employer's failure to follow its policies, was sufficient to support a finding of unlawful gender discrimination. See id. at 685-86. Read fairly, Barros stands for the proposition that evidence suggesting a meaningful suspicion of mendacity will greatly bolster a plaintiff's case. It follows, therefore, that a lack of evidence on this point may be fatal to a claim of discrimination. Cf. Ruiz v. Posadas de San Juan Associates, 124 F.3d 243, 248 (1st Cir.1997). The defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff in this case is not analogous to Barros. At the same time plaintiff was terminated, defendant also discharged several other employees, including other salaried employees. This lends support to defendant's assertion that it sought to cut payroll throughout the company. Furthermore, plaintiff does not directly controvert defendant's assertion that it was, in fact, reducing its staff; she takes issue only with who was terminated. When analyzing an employer's attempt to reduce staff, other courts have noted the importance of allowing an employer to exercise its business judgment in terminating a member of a protected class: There is little doubt that an employer, consistent with its business judgment, may eliminate positions during the course of a downsizing without violating Title VII even though those positions are held by members of protected groups (pregnant women included).    This is merely a reflection of a central theme that permeates the relevant jurisprudence: insofar as Title VII is concerned, an employer can hire or fire one employee instead of another for any reason, fair or unfair, provided that the employer's choice is not driven by race, gender, pregnancy, or some other protected characteristic.    The flip side of the coin, however, is that an employer who selectively cleans house cannot hide behind convenient euphemisms such as `downsizing' or `streamlining.' Whether or not trimming the fat from a company's organizational chart is a prudent practice in a particular business environment, the employer's decision to eliminate specific positions must not be tainted by a discriminatory animus. Smith v. F.W. Morse & Co., 76 F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 1996). Therefore, plaintiff's failure to cast meaningful doubt on the proffered reason of staff reduction only militates in favor of entry of summary judgment. We are mindful, however, that an employer's failure to follow certain termination policies can support an inference of discrimination. Barros, 710 A.2d at 686; see also Casey, 861 A.2d at 1039 (holding that an employee did not create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether an employer deviated from its hiring policies). In Barros, however, the employer did not contend on appeal that the commission erred in concluding that the policies in question applied to the employee/plaintiff; in this case, by contrast, defendant vigorously maintains that the staff reduction policy applied only to non-salaried employees, rather than such salaried employees as plaintiff. The plaintiff does offer an affidavit of another former employee to support her assertion that the policy applied to salaried employees. When pressed by the motion justice, however, plaintiff could not identify a single instance in which a salaried employee was offered an opportunity to displace a less senior salaried employee. Ultimately, we must answer the challenging question of whether the pleadings and affidavits in this case, which suggest that an employer may have failed to adhere to its handbook, are sufficient to survive summary judgment in an employment discrimination case in which the factfinder will be asked to infer an employer's true intent and motive for terminating an employee. Even when we read the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to her, the plaintiff fails to cast any meaningful doubt on the defendant's reason for terminating the plaintiff, staff reduction. Accordingly, a reasonable juror could not infer age and/or gender-based discriminatory animus from the combination of the plaintiff's prima facie case and the fact that the defendant may have failed to adhere to its staff reduction policy. We hold that the motion justice properly entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant on both employment discrimination claims.