Opinion ID: 2966437
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Removal of Juror

Text: The defendants (collectively) contend that the district court erred when it refused to grant their motion for a mistrial following the removal of the only African-American juror from the panel during the presentation of evidence. During the voir dire, the judge asked the _________________________________________________________________ 1 In order to distinguish James Hayden from Reginald Hayden, we refer to the two men by their first names James and Reginald. 3 potential jurors if they knew any of the witnesses. The only AfricanAmerican, James Williams (Williams), answered that he did not. It then developed, however, that Williams knew Powell, a government informant and witness. However, Williams knew Powell only by his street name Champ and thus had not recognized the name Powell. Despite recognizing Powell when he testified the first day of trial, Williams did not speak up. Powell, however, told a prosecutor that he knew Williams. On the third day of trial, the district judge called Wil- liams to the stand and out of the presence of the jury asked him if he knew Powell. Williams admitted that he knew Powell. Williams, a hair dresser, stated that he had cut Powell's hair. The judge therefore dismissed Williams as a juror and replaced him with an alternate. The defendants moved for a mistrial, which the district judge denied. We review a district court's refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 287-88 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990). In order to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, the defendants must show prejudice. Id. at 288. The defendants argue that the presence of a juror who knew a witness prejudiced them even though the juror was dismissed before deliberations began. In exercising its discretion to grant a mistrial, the district court should consider whether there are less drastic alternatives to a mistrial that will eliminate any prejudice. United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259, 1268 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995). In the instance of a biased juror, that juror can be dismissed and replaced with an alternate juror. United States v. Thompson, 744 F.2d 1065, 1068 (4th Cir. 1984); Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c). Here, the judge did just that--he removed the juror and replaced him with an alternate juror, a measure which eliminated the prejudice of the juror knowing a witness, but did not necessitate the expense and delay of a mistrial. We therefore find no prejudice. The defendants also argue that dismissal of the only AfricanAmerican on the jury could have led the remaining jurors to conclude that the dismissed juror was untrustworthy and, by implication, that the defendants, who were also African-American, were also untrustworthy. We disagree. Dismissal of a juror does not necessarily mean 4 that the juror is untrustworthy. The district judge explained the dis- missal of Williams to the jury. Furthermore, Williams's dismissal was necessary to avoid the prejudice created by a biased juror. We therefore do not find that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Williams and refusing to grant a mistrial.