Opinion ID: 2285907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does the Act deny the developer equal protection of the law?

Text: Finally, Lakesites argues that the Act denies a developerand especially it equal protection under the law. It argues that the subdivider of over 20 acres must receive the Commission's approval while the subdivider of under 20 acres faces no such requirements, and so it contends it is denied equal protection because size, it says, has no rational or reasonable correlation to the environmental impact. A 21 acre subdivision, it argues, may contain 5 residences while one of 19 acres may contain 19 residences. It is elementary that the Legislature may in its judgment create classifications so long as they are not arbitrary and are based upon actual differences in classes which differences bear a substantial rational relation to the public purpose sought to be accomplished by the statute. In re Milo Water Company, 128 Me. 531, 149 A. 299 (1930). The purpose, as we have said, was to control the locations of those commercial and industrial developments which could substantially adversely affect the environment. The Legislature evidently concluded that the size of a development has a distinct relationship to the amount of its potential adverse impact upon the environment and concluded that at this time the public interest could best be served by applying the admittedly severe restrictions of the new law to large developments. The justification of the distinction as to size seems most clear in such legislation as this. For example, in an area with no municipal sewage disposal system, such as in Spring Valley Development, and where much of the soil has a high seasonal water table and is unsuitable for septic tank disposal of domestic sewage, the potential danger to the environment from the discharge of sewage from 90 residences must be greater than the discharge from 2 or from 19. Drawing the line at 20 acres is not a denial of equal protection. Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 78 S.Ct. 1174, 2 L.Ed.2d 1313 (1958); Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 55 S.Ct. 187, 79 L.Ed. 281 (1934). A state `may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed.. . . if a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent, the 14th Amendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law'. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 556-557, 37 S. Ct. 217, 223, 61 L.Ed. 480 (1917). When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it may be, between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to be drawn, or gradually picked out by successive decisions, to mark where the change takes place. Looked at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point seems arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the Legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41, 48 S.Ct. 423, 426, 72 L.Ed. 770, 775 (1927). In State v. King, 135 Me. 5, 188 A. 775 (1936) we found no constitutional violation in the classification of carriers which demanded a certificate of public convenience and necessity or a permit to operate as a contract carrier of those carriers who operated beyond 15 miles of the point of receipt, quoting the language used by the United States Supreme Court in deciding a similar issue: `We think that the Legislature could properly take these distinctions into account, and that there was a reasonable basis for differentiation with respect to that class of operations. In this view, the question is simply whether the fixing of the radius at twenty-five miles is so entirely arbitrary as to be unconstitutional. It is obvious that the Legislature in setting up such a zone would have to draw the line somewhere, and unquestionably it had a broad discretion as to where the line should be drawn.' Continental Baking Company v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 370-371, 52 S.Ct. 595, 601, 76 L.Ed. 1155, 1166 (1931). We see no irrational or arbitrary discrimination in the application of the Act to the large mere-subdivider. It is his act of subdividing that initially indicates the volume of the impact likely to fall upon the environment. The distinction made by the Legislature does not appear to be unreasonable. In furtherance of its claim that it is denied equal protection, Lakesites contends that the statute would in effect authorize the Commission to create spot zones, administratively. The absence of a requirement of a comprehensive plan such as was demanded by the enabling statute which authorized municipalities to enact zoning ordinances, [13] Lakesites argues, results in piecemeal zoning with arbitrary distinctions. While the Site Location Law bears a resemblance to zoning ordinances [14] in that both seek to restrict the use of land to areas appropriate for the purpose, the basic purposes of the two laws are distinguishable. We have said that the Legislature has authorized municipalities to adopt zoning ordinances . . . as an integral part of a comprehensive plan for municipal development and promotion of the health, safety, and general welfare of its inhabitants. The geography, the economic and industrial development, the residential necessities, the nature and extent of residential, business and industrial growth of one municipality may be entirely different from those in another municipality. Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 168, 200 A.2d 543, 545-546 (1964). The Wright Court said also: In considering the provisions of a comprehensive zoning ordinance the legislative body may take into consideration the nature and character of the community and of its proposed zone districts, the nature and trend of the growth of the community and that of surrounding municipalities, the areas of undeveloped property and such other factors that necessarily enter into a reasonable and well-balanced zoning ordinance. Wright v. Michaud, supra, 160 Me. at 173, 200 A.2d at 548. The Site Location Law on the other hand is not directed toward promoting an orderly community growth relating one area of a community to all other areas. It is not concerned with where a development takes place in general but only that the development takes place in a manner consistent with the needs of the public for a healthy environment. It did not grant the Commission the authority to determine where the location of a development must be but rather it gave the Commission authority to measure the proposal and location against statutory standards and to apply reasonable terms and conditions which the proposal must meet in order that it may be located in a manner which will have a minimal adverse impact on the natural environment. There is no constitutional necessity that the Commission be required to draw a comprehensive plan as part of the Site Location Law and the Legislature has not considered one to be essential to its purpose here, perhaps recognizing the difficulties which the preparation of such a plan relative to ecological problems would entail. The application of the Site Location Law on a case by case basis but under guidance of the explicit criteria of the statute is not in itself a denial of equal protection and there is no evidence that there has been such a denial to Lakesites. We find that the application of the Act to Lakesites does not offend the provisions of either the state or federal constitutions. A strong policy against piecemeal appellate review has been manifest in the decisions of this Court for many years. Hand v. Nickerson, 148 Me. 465, 467, 95 A. 2d 813, 815 (1953). The principle that only final judgments are ripe for appellate review was preserved in the structure of our Maine Civil Rules and interlocutory review is authorized only when ordered by a Justice in the Superior Court in exceptional situations. [15] The definition of final judgment as one which fully decides and disposes of the whole cause leaving no further questions for the future consideration and judgment of the court Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 82 Me. 201, 203, 19 A. 166, 167 (1889) embraces our present problem. The powers of the Environmental Improvement Commission are wholly statutory. King Resources Company v. Environmental Improvement Commission, supra. The authority to dispose of issues presented at hearing which the statute gives the Environmental Improvement Commission is to make findings of fact and issue an order granting or denying permission. . . The jurisdiction of the Law Court is also entirely statutory. 38 M.R.S.A. § 487 provides for an appeal direct to the Law Court from an order of the Commission. The statute states: The court shall decide whether the commission acted regularly and within the scope of its authority, and whether the order is supported by substantial evidence, and on the basis of such decision may enter judgment affirming or nullifying such determination. [16] There is completely absent any statutory authority for the Commission to present an interlocutory appeal to the Law Court or for the Law Court to entertain direct appeals on a piecemeal basis. Although Lakesites chose to confine its participation in the hearing to an attack on the Commission's jurisdiction and waived the right of cross-examination and of presentation of evidence, the Commission's order fully decides and disposes of the whole cause and leaves no further questions for the future consideration and judgment of the Commission as to the development as presently proposed by Lakesites. We find that the Commission acted regularly and within the scope of its authority and that its order is supported by substantial evidence. [17] The Commission's [18] determination is affirmed and the appeal is denied.