Opinion ID: 1592017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Ginny Raymond

Text: The defendant argues that the defense cause challenge lodged against prospective juror, Ginny Raymond, should have been granted because her voir dire responses showed that she would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty of first-degree murder and an aggravating circumstance existed. The record shows that Ms. Raymond was questioned in the ninth pre-qualification panel. [136] She initially indicated to the court that she had an upcoming custody hearing in two weeks for which she needed to prepare, but also admitted that the hearing date was subject to change. [137] When questioned by the prosecutor as to her view of the death penalty, the following colloquy occurred: Prosecutor: Ms. Raymond, do you think it's the proper function that the State should have a death penalty in certain types of cases? Ms. Raymond: Yes. Prosecutor: Do you have a problem with the State seeking a death penalty in a first degree murder case? Ms. Raymond: No. Prosecutor: Do you understand the procedure that we talked about? [138] Ms. Raymond: Yes, I do. Prosecutor: Do you understand that it's not automatic one way or the other? [139] Ms. Raymond: Right. Prosecutor: That we do have to present  we do have a burden at the penalty phase? Ms. Raymond: Uh-huh (Indicating affirmatively.) Prosecutor: Do you think you could consider a death sentence and a life sentence and make an appropriate determination? Ms. Raymond: Yes, I think I can. [140] Trial defense counsel posed a single question only to Ms. Raymond as to her death penalty views: Defense counsel: And Ms. Raymond, I'll ask you the same question. If they proved beyond a reasonable doubt that my client was guilty of first degree murder and an aggravating circumstance exists, would you automatically vote for the death penalty? Ms. Raymond: Yes. [141] After ascertaining that the exact date of Ms. Raymond's impending custody hearing could be determined in order to avoid a conflict with her possible jury service, the prosecutor then questioned Ms. Raymond further in an attempt to rehabilitate her with regard to her view that imposition of the death penalty was in any way automatic upon a finding of first degree murder: Prosecutor: Okay. Now the second question I have for you, Ms. Raymond, is similar to what we talked about-Mr. Smith and I. You remember the procedures we talked about? Ms. Raymond: Uh-huh (Indicating affirmatively.) Prosecutor: And you understand that the State has a burden in both the sentencing phase and the penalty phase? Ms. Raymond: Right. Prosecutor: And you understand that even if we prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance, there's still no automatic sentence under Louisiana law? Ms. Raymond: Right. Prosecutor: You understand that. The jury determines what is the appropriate sentence based on the facts and circumstances. Ms. Raymond: Yes. Prosecutor: You understand that procedure? Ms. Raymond: Yes. Prosecutor: There's no situation where any sentence is automatic based upon some law provision. It's always up to the jury to determine what the appropriate sentence is. You understand that? Ms. Raymond: Right. Yes. Prosecutor: Okay. Given that understanding, could you, even if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance, could you consider both a life sentence or a death sentence and base your decision on the appropriateness based on the circumstances in the particular case? Ms. Raymond: Yes. Prosecutor: So you could consider both sentences? Ms. Raymond: Yes. Yes. [142] The defense challenged Ms. Raymond for cause on the following bases: Your Honor, we would challenge Ms. Raymond. She has a custody trial coming up on the 28th wherein she is trying to obtain custody of her children, needs to meet with her attorney and prepare for it, as well as answering my question that she would automatically vote for the death penalty. [143] The court denied the challenge with the following observation: And on questioning by [the prosecutor] she indicated that she could consider both a death sentence or a life sentence and not necessarily impose the death sentence automatically upon the finding of guilt on first degree murder. The Court will deny the challenge. [144] There was no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the challenge for cause on the basis of the possibility of Ms. Raymond's pending custody hearing. Ms. Raymond's answers to questioning showed that she was not aware of the exact date when the hearing would be held and was unsure whether the hearing would even conflict with the trial. Moreover, she indicated that she would know the date of the hearing, or would have that figured out, prior to the end of the week before the jury would be finally selected. [145] Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying the cause challenge on the basis of Ms. Raymond's death penalty views. While the reviewing court must carefully review the record of voir dire for abuses of discretion, it need not and should not attempt to reconstruct the voir dire by a microscopic dissection of the transcript in search of magic words or phrases that automatically signify either qualification or disqualification. State v. Lucky, 96-1687 p. 7-8 (La.4/13/99), 755 So.2d 845, 851, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1023, 120 S.Ct. 1429, 146 L.Ed.2d 319 (2000); see State v. Ball, 2000-2277 p. 21 (La.1/25/02), 824 So.2d 1089, 1108, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 864, 123 S.Ct. 260, 154 L.Ed.2d 107 (2002) (prospective juror's use of the term automatically was troubling, but more likely merely mirrored the defense counsel's use of the term in the question put to her). This court must look to the entire voir dire on this subject matter and not individual responses. Although Ms. Raymond may have been predisposed in favor of the death penalty, this court has held that [n]ot every predisposition or leaning in any direction rises to the level of substantial impairment. Lucky, XXXX-XXXX p. 7, 755 So.2d at 850. Ms. Raymond's initial response to the prosecutor showed that she could consider both a sentence of life imprisonment and the death penalty for first degree murder. Her agreement that the imposition of the death penalty would be automatic, in response to defense counsel's sole question, is inconsistent with her initial response. Moreover, the prosecutor's detailed subsequent questioning established that Ms. Raymond's views on the death penalty would not prevent or substantially impair her from fulfilling her duties as an impartial juror. A trial court's refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause is not an abuse of discretion, even when the juror has voiced an opinion seemingly prejudicial to the defense, if the juror, on further inquiry or instruction, demonstrates a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. Lucky, XXXX-XXXX p. 6, 755 So.2d at 850. The trial judge is in the best position to determine whether a prospective juror is substantially impaired. This court has previously held [s]ignificantly, it is in the determination of substantial impairment that the trial judge's broad discretion plays the critical role. Lucky, XXXX-XXXX p. 7, 755 So.2d at 850. We find from our review of the record that there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion in denying the defense cause challenge to Ms. Raymond.