Opinion ID: 2680025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of Contested Issues

Text: [¶54] To invalidate what the trial court has found to be a voluntary confession, our standard of review requires that the record on appeal must establish, without the capacity for the trial court to conclude otherwise, that a promise of leniency or other police coercion was the “motivating cause of the confession.” State v. Bragg, 604 A.2d 439, 440 (Me. 1992); State v. Durost, 497 A.2d 134, 137-38 (Me. 1985); Turner, 674 F.3d at 432-33 (defendant must establish a causal link between coercion and confession); Delaney, 443 Fed. App’x at 128 (coercion must be the “crucial motivating factor” leading to confession). [¶55] A causal link between coercion and confession has been occasionally found. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 532-34 (1963) (finding that the defendant’s involuntary confession was motivated by the officers’ illusory promise that she would not lose custody of her children and welfare payments if she 31 cooperated); State v. Tardiff, 374 A.2d 598, 601 (Me. 1977) (finding that the defendant’s involuntary confession was motivated by the officer’s false promise to drop charges in exchange for his cooperation). But these findings of coercion were premised on false or illusory promises as addressed in the more recent precedent discussed above. [¶56] Here, the record reflects that discussion regarding the possible jail sentence and violence in prison was initiated by Wiley. After Wiley expressed concern that “as soon as I hit any kind of jail, with that label, I’m dead,” the officer responded with the observations at issue on this appeal. Specifically, the officer stated that Wiley would not necessarily go to “the big house” and that, although Wiley would certainly serve some jail time and a long period of probation, he might avoid a long prison sentence if he admitted his acts and did not put the victim and his family through the ordeal of a trial. [¶57] The officer’s statements regarding likely sentencing options were consistent with the law addressing sentencing of sexual abusers of children, as we articulated it in State v. Farnham, 479 A.2d 887, 889-893 (Me. 1984) (approving the trial court’s rejecting as mitigating factors defendant’s claims of reform, rehabilitation, remorse and concern for the victim and imposing a seven-year sentence when defendant had taken the case to trial, engaged in aggressive and demeaning cross-examination of the victim, and admitted his abuse of the victim 32 and claimed to have reformed only after he had been found guilty). The officer’s statements were also reflective of the law applied in the federal courts where acceptance of responsibility for an offense and avoidance of trial can result in a two-level decrease in the offense level for any particular crime. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(a) (2012). Such a reduction is generally not available when a defendant denies guilt and puts the prosecution to its proof at trial. Id. § 3E1.1(a) cmt. 2. [¶58] Certainly the trial court could, and apparently did, infer that while the detective may have suggested or promised leniency in return for a confession, the promise of leniency was not false, illusory, or broken, the factors referenced in the case law that can render a suggestion or promise of leniency improper coercion. Accurately advising Wiley of choices he could make that could affect sentencing options did not, as a matter of law, constitute a prohibited promise of leniency. This record does not compel a conclusion that there was any coercive, improper promise of leniency that was the “crucial motivating factor” or causal link leading to Wiley’s confession. [¶59] The suppression hearing record supports the trial court’s finding that the detective “did not engage in any conduct or invoke any techniques that would render the defendant’s statements involuntary. Thus, there was no state action undermining the defendant’s free will.” This statement would be a factual error 33 only if one interprets this trial court finding, as the Court apparently does, to state that the detective did not make any promises or inducements or apply any techniques to secure Wiley’s confession. However, a fair interpretation of the trial court’s statement is that, although there were suggestions, even promises, of leniency if Wiley cooperated, those suggestions did not go beyond the bounds established by precedent for such investigatory questioning and, accordingly, were not improper conduct or techniques “that would render [Wiley’s] statements involuntary.” [¶60] If the focus is on Wiley’s state of mind when he made his statements, and not on the words the officer used in discussion with Wiley, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings that: (1) the detective “did not engage in any conduct or invoke any techniques that would render the defendant’s statements involuntary,” (2) “there was no state action undermining the defendant’s free will,” and (3) the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Wiley’s incriminating statements to the detective were voluntary. [¶61] Applying the standard of review applied to these questions in the past, and respecting precedent indicating that promises of leniency may become improper coercion as a matter of law only when the promises are false, illusory, or broken, I would affirm the motion court’s findings and the trial court’s judgment. 34 On the briefs and at oral argument: Steven C. Peterson, Esq., West Rockport, for appellant William A. Wiley Eric J. Walker, Dep. Dist. Atty., Belfast, for appellee State of Maine Waldo County Superior Court docket number CR-2009-112 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY