Opinion ID: 789821
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Prejudgment interest (Central)

Text: 65 Both parties appeal the district court's grant of prejudgment interest to Central, but neither party has convinced us that the district court abused its discretion regarding this issue. Scotts appeals on the ground that Central's motion for prejudgment interest, which was filed 19 days after the entry of judgment, was untimely as a Rule 59(e) motion. As the district court pointed out, however, Central's motion was not untimely under Rule 60(b)(6), which allows parties to seek relief for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Cf. Hopper v. Euclid Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 867 F.2d 291, 294 (6th Cir.1989) (noting that a motion made under Rule 60(b)(6) is addressed to the trial court's discretion). A motion under Rule 60(b)(6) must be filed within a reasonable time after the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). This term is not defined for subsection (6), but it is defined for subsections (1), (2), and (3) as not more than one year after judgment... was entered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Given this open-ended time limitation under subsection (6), we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by accepting a motion filed 19 days after the entry of judgment. 66 Central, on the other hand, claims that it is entitled to $1,574,630 in additional prejudgment interest on amounts allegedly owed by Scotts. As the district court correctly pointed out, however, the additional amounts claimed by Central were not presented to the jury and were not part of the judgment issued in this case. We therefore hold that the district court's rejection of Central's claim for additional interest was not an abuse of discretion. 67