Opinion ID: 32132
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Benchmark's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 35 After Huber moved to dismiss Benchmark's claims on the pleadings, Benchmark moved for partial summary judgment, asserting Huber is liable for breach of several contract warranties. The district court granted summary judgment in Huber's favor. Although a court may grant summary judgment against the moving party, Landry v. G.B.A., 762 F.2d 462, 464 (5th Cir.1985), we vacate the district court judgment. At this point, neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 9 36 As one example of the district court's mistaken contractual analysis, Huber warrants in § 3.7 that since December 31, 1998, there has not been any Material Adverse Change. The Agreement defines Material Adverse Change as a material adverse change to the business, results of operations or financial condition of the AVEX Group taken as a whole. The parties disagree on the meaning of § 3.7 but each offers a reasonable interpretation of the provision. This contract interpretation issue, as discussed above, is governed by New York law. Under New York law, the question of ambiguity vel non must be determined from the face of the agreement, without reference to extrinsic evidence. Contract language is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement. Collins v. Harrison-Bode, 303 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Huber argues that in § 3.7, the parties agreed upon December 31, 1998, as a baseline for comparison; under this view, AVEX's condition as of December 31, 1998, is the baseline condition against which alleged material adverse changes must be assessed. 37 Benchmark, on the other hand, argues that the contract does not establish December 31, 1998, as a baseline but, instead, specifies the time period (after December 31, 1998) with respect to which Huber warranted the absence of a material adverse change. Under Benchmark's view, the results of operations for the first five months of 1999, which initially showed modest profits followed by substantial losses, are part of the baseline against which alleged material adverse changes must be assessed. We decline to resolve the ambiguity on appeal and, instead, remand for the parties to present extrinsic evidence supporting their interpretations of the agreement. See id. at 434. 10 38 In similar fashion, the district court too abruptly dispatched Benchmark's other breach of contract claims by making findings on highly disputed facts. Review of the parties' arguments convinces us that further factual development on remand is necessary to proper resolution of the contract claims.