Opinion ID: 1479756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attorney Conflicts of Interest and Manifest Necessity

Text: At the outset, we note that during the discussion before his declaration of a mistrial, Judge Hannon never expressly made a finding of manifest necessity. In fact, at no time did he evince a concern for the possible double jeopardy consequences of his decision; he never referred to appellant's constitutionally protected interest in having the trial concluded before the jury already empaneled. We must, nonetheless, review the record as a whole to determine whether Bar Counsel's investigation created the required high degree of necessity to support a mistrial. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In giving content to this safeguard, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (citations omitted). The first essential element of effective assistance of counsel is counsel's ability and willingness to advocate fearlessly and effectively on behalf of his client. United States v. Hurt, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 15, 20-21, 543 F.2d 162, 167-68 (1976); see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); Tate v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 269, 359 F.2d 245, 253 (1966). For this reason, the importance of ensuring that defense counsel is not subject to any conflict of interest which might dilute loyalty to the accused has been long and consistently recognized: [t]he right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725, 68 S.Ct. 316, 324, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948); accord Strickland v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (defense counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest) (citation omitted); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (the Sixth Amendment gives rise to a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest). [14] To protect this right to conflict-free counsel, the trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire into the effectiveness of counsel whenever the possibility of a conflict becomes apparent before or during trial. Wood, 450 U.S. at 272, 101 S.Ct. at 1103-04 (emphasis in original). [15] If such an inquiry reveals that an actual conflict of interest exists, and the defendant objects to continued representation by the conflict-burdened attorney, new counsel must be appointed. Indeed, a failure to appoint new counsel under these circumstances will lead to a reversal of any conviction obtained at trial. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487-91, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1180-82, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). Even in cases where a defendant does not object at trial to an attorney's representation, a Sixth Amendment violation warranting reversal will be established if a convicted defendant demonstrates on appeal that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718 (footnote omitted). [16] In applying these standards here, we note that as soon as Kane learned of Bar Counsel's intention to pursue an investigation of appellant's complaint, he acquired a personal interest in the way he conducted appellant's defense  an interest independent of, and in some respects in conflict with, appellant's interest in obtaining a judgment of acquittal. For instance, fearing that appellant's complaint to Bar Counsel might later be expanded to include claims of ineffective assistance at trial, Kane would have an inordinate interest in conducting the defense in a manner calculated to minimize any opportunity for post hoc criticism of his efforts. This could compromise Kane's professional judgment about the best means of defending this particular case; it could encourage the most standard or conservative trial strategy, as well as overcautious tactical decisions and courtroom demeanor. Furthermore, concerns about the pending investigation might impede communications between appellant and Kane. Kane might be apprehensive about sharing with appellant the reasons behind tactical defense decisions and refrain from disclosing to appellant any unexpected problem that arose during the course of trial. [17] Appellant, in turn, might be reluctant to question Kane's trial decisions for fear of further alienating counsel in the midst of trial. Thus, the circumstances at the time of the mistrial were not conducive to the cooperative spirit and singlemindedness of purpose that ordinarily should underlie a defendant/attorney relationship. Additionally, because Judge Hannon had a firsthand opportunity to observe the relationship between appellant and Kane over the course of several months, we give substantial deference to his finding that the conflict of interest would have adversely affected Kane's ability to render effective assistance to appellant at trial. In short, had Judge Hannon simply ignored Bar Counsel's investigation and allowed the trial to continue with Kane representing appellant, it is reasonable to conclude that any conviction obtained as a result would have been vulnerable if appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. See Scott v. District of Columbia, 99 A.2d 641 (D.C.1953), aff'd 94 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 214 F.2d 860 (1954); Hurt, 177 U.S.App.D.C. at 20-21, 543 F.2d at 167-68. Accordingly, if appellant had refused to waive his right to conflict-free counsel, and no other means of curing the negative effects of this conflict were available, a trial court finding of manifest necessity for a mistrial would have been appropriate.