Opinion ID: 2322058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutional Challenge to the Child-Abuse Statute

Text: I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the majority that it need not and do[es] not address defendant's argument that the statute under which defendant faces a second trial, G.L.1956 § 11-9-5.3, is void for vagueness. Because the Court is remanding this case for a new trial, defendant is forced to undergo a second trial in which the constitutionality of the statute under which he is charged remains unresolved. I cannot recall any other case in which this Court has vacated a conviction and ordered a new trial, yet failed to address the constitutional validity of the enactment under which the accused was charged. Jeopardy has attached in this case. Because this was a jury-waived case, I would vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial justice for a determination based on the existing recordwhether the state has established that the child's injuries rose to the level of serious physical injury as set forth in § 11-9-5.3(b)(2). See State v. DiPetrillo, 922 A.2d 124, 137 (R.I.2007) (after this Court vacated the conviction based on an error of law by the trial justice in a jury-waived trial, the case was remanded for additional findings by the trial justice, in accordance with our decision on the questions of law). Instead, there will be a new trial, affording the state a second opportunity to prove the elements of the crime of second-degree child abuse, including the degree of seriousness of the injury in this case. I also respectfully disagree with the observation of the majority that the Attorney General's proposed legislative amendments to the child-abuse statute, § 11-9-5.3(b)(2), as disclosed by the state during oral argument, would essentially mean that second degree child abuse requires the same conduct as that described and defined by this Court in State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785 (R.I.1981)a case in which the defendant was charged with simple assault and battery, a misdemeanor rather than a felony. In addition to my reticence about commenting on matters that may be pending in the General AssemblyI do not believe that this is an appropriate role for the Courtthe majority's observation is incorrect. The misdemeanor crime of simple assault does not require physical injury. Also, an essential element of second-degree child abuseunder either versionis the imposition of excessive corporal punishment, an element that is not included in the crime of simple assault. Should the Legislature revisit § 11-9-5.3(b)(2) and adopt an amendment that brings it into conformity with the definition of other physical injury as set forth in § 11-9-5.3(d), [22] this definition would not implicate our holding in Thorpe, and the misdemeanor crime of simple assault would, in my opinion, remain a lesser-included offense, in cases in which a parent engaged in excessive corporal punishment that did not result in an injury or the injury was de minimis. Thus, because in accordance with Thorpe, a parent is privileged to impose nonexcessive corporal punishment as that concept has been described, it is only the application of excessive force, coupled with a physical injury that is addressed in the child-abuse statute. Accordingly, for the crime of second-degree child abuse, Thorpe, is inapposite. My reading of § 11-9-5.3 and Thorpe leads me to conclude that simple assault is a lesser-included offense to the felony assault charges set forth in the child-abuse statute and defined as first-degree child abuse (serious bodily injury) and second-degree child abuse (serious physical injury). The lynchpin of either offense is an injury that arises from the imposition of excessive corporal punishment, an element that simply is not required for the misdemeanor offense of simple assault. In accordance with our holding in Thorpe, a parent may inflict only nonexcessive corporal punishment on a child. The use of excessive corporal punishment removes the parental protections found in Thorpe, 429 A.2d at 788. The degree of force that is acceptable and thus, nonexcessive, varies in relation to the sensitivity and character of the child [and] the child's age, sex, physical condition, as well as in relation to the particular offense for which punishment is to be meted out. Thorpe, 429 A.2d at 788. If the punishment is excessive or unreasonable, the parent is subject to criminal liability. Id. When a parent ceases to act in good faith and with parental affection and acts immoderately, cruelly, or mercilessly with a malicious desire to inflict pain, then the parental right to impose corporal punishment vanishes and the parent has committed a criminal offense. Id. Finally, if an injury arises from excessive corporal punishment and the injury is deemed serious, then the parent is guilty of second-degree child abuse. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority.