Opinion ID: 2967883
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Multiple Killings Aggravator

Text: We begin by rejecting the government’s contention that the indictment is not defective as to either the § 1111(a) murder or § 1201(a) kidnapping charges because it alleges facts supporting the statutory aggravator of multiple killings in a single criminal episode. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(16). Although the indictment sufficiently alleged the aggravating factor, multiple killings was not added to the FDPA as a statutory aggravating factor until April 1996, three months after the murders were committed. Article 1, § 9 of the United States Constitution provides that [n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. Pursuant to the Clause, ‘any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more bur20 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS densome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.’ Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-170 (1925)). In short, the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits laws that retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. California Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). A new law may not alter the elements of the offense or the quantum of punishment, nor may it deprive the defendant of a defense to which he would otherwise be entitled. See id.; Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521-525 (2000). Although the prohibition against the use of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed, Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted), it does assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981). The Clause operates to forbid[ ] the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred. Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual’s right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). In view of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Apprendi and Ring, we agree that the government cannot solely rely upon multiple killings as a statutory aggravating factor for a crime committed before its adoption without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. With the exception of the prior conviction aggravators, statutory aggravating factors which render an offense of conviction death-eligible clearly increase the punishment for criminal acts. Morales, 514 U.S. at 504. Accordingly, we hold that the multiple killings aggravator cannot act as the sole statutory aggravator which rendered these murders death-eligible.