Opinion ID: 1830286
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Weight and Preponderance of the Evidence)

Text: Although Contestants present the directed verdict/JNOV issue, they candidly acknowledge that their burden to prove fraud in the procurement of the will, as a matter of law, is a heavy one. Consequently, because of the legal presumption of the validity of the 1977 contested will, coupled with the further acknowledgement of Mrs. Warren's unconditional power of appointment, Contestants place the primary emphasis of their argument on an alternative allegation of error: that the trial court erred in its denial of their motion for a new trial, based on the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. As stated in Linnard v. Shields, 368 So.2d 14 (Ala.1979): The case was tried before a jury, which found that the instrument was valid and was the will of the testatrix. The contestant filed a motion for a new trial, and claimed that the jury's verdict was contrary to the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Contestant appealed. The testimony given at trial was in conflict as to the mental and physical condition of the testatrix during the time period surrounding the making of her will. There is a well-established doctrine in this state which has recently been reiterated by this Court in Fletcher v. DeLoach, 360 So.2d 316 ([Ala.] 1978), which states: `In cases of this nature, the verdict of the jury cannot be overturned unless shown to be clearly wrong and unjust. Wilson v. Payton, 251 Ala. 411, 414, 37 So.2d 499, 501 (1948); Watkins v. Yeatman, 189 Ala. 370, 66 So. 707 (1914). The refusal of the trial judge to grant the appellant-proponent's motion for new trial strengthens this presumption in favor of the verdict. Johnson v. Howard, 279 Ala. 16, 22, 181 So.2d 85, 91 (1965).' 368 So.2d at 15. Although Linnard, supra, dealt with mental incapacity to execute a will, rather than fraud in its procurement, the new trial standard of review set out therein is equally applicable here. As Contestants insist, however, despite a presumption of correctness accorded the trial court in its refusal to grant their motion for new trial, if, after indulging in this presumption, the appellate court finds the preponderance of the evidence so decided as to establish that the verdict is unjust, that court is duty bound to set it aside and order a new trial. It should be noted that this new trial standard is called into play only if there is sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for directed verdict. Otherwise, if a motion for directed verdict was refused, but should have been granted for lack of requisite proof, a post-trial motion for JNOV is due to be granted, rather than the granting of a motion for a new trial. A judgment, where the challenge is grounded on the objective JNOV test, does not carry with it on appeal a presumption of correctness, as does the trial court's ruling where the evidence is tested against the more subjective new trial standard. See First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. Coker, 408 So.2d 510 (Ala.1982). (We note an inadvertence in footnote 1 of Coker. The word sufficient in the last sentence of that footnote should read insufficient.) As is our duty when, as here, the weight and preponderance of the evidence test is invoked, we have read and considered all the evidence of record. A recitation of its details would serve no useful purpose. A few observations will suffice. Hermon Warren's will gave Agnes Warren an absolute power of disposition by appointment over certain of his assets ( i.e., Trust One). In other words, she was to enjoy such assets for life, and, then, through her power of appointment, dispose of them by will as she, in her sole discretion, saw fit. This she did. As we have earlier concluded, Contestants' argument that Proponents' discussions with their mother, concerning her 1970 will and codicil, constituted fraud, as a matter of law, is without merit. The jury was free to conclude, if anything, that Proponents may have influenced their mother to do not only that which she had every legal right to do, pursuant to Mr. Warren's directives ( i.e., exercise her power of appointment in favor of whomever she pleased), but also that which she most naturally wished to do. Any questions as to the existence vel non of fraud were merely factual, and properly submitted to the jury. Furthermore, the jury was free to reject any inference of undue influence amounting to fraud, despite the element of confidential relationship, on the factual basis that such influence as may have been exerted was not adverse as among her own children, but only as between her children on the one hand and Mr. Warren's children on the other. It goes without saying that Mrs. Warren could not have been fraudulently induced into following a course of action which she, of her own free will, and in accordance with her natural desires, preferred to follow. Such a conclusion was within the jury's factfinding prerogative under the reasonable inferences raised by the evidence of record. The common thread running through Contestants' preponderance of the evidence argument is summarized in the concluding paragraph of their brief: It was the intent of both Hermon Warren and Agnes Warren that their separate estates go to each one's children. The fraudulent conduct of Proponents has frustrated the testamentary plans of Hermon and Agnes Warren and has produced a result intended by no one except the Ousley children. While this may be excellent jury argument, amply supported by reasonable inferences from the evidence, we are not convinced that the jury's findings of contrary inferences are so irrational as to result in an unjust verdict. In the first place, the jury was free to infer from the evidence, or from the lack thereof, that Mrs. Warren's separate estate, which was to pass to her natural children under her 1970 will, was of such nominal value as to render her children's representations substantially true. As to the testamentary plans of Hermon and Agnes Warren, we can only glean those plans from the clear and unequivocal terms of their respective last wills. It was Mr. Warren's prerogative to leave his property as he saw fit. He chose to establish two separate trusts of equal parts, aggregating substantially all of his assets, for the use and benefit of his wife during her lifetime, if she survived him, with one-half of the total trusts remaining upon her death passing to his children; and she was given the absolute power of appointment with respect to the other half. She exercised that power in favor of her children. This was the testamentary plan presented to the jury and upon which it rendered its verdict, effectuating virtually an even division of the marital estate between the two sets of children. Mr. Warren could have effected the passage of all his property to his children simply by withholding any power of appointment from his wife with respect to any part of the trust. Because he gave his wife the absolute power of appointment, under the evidence before us, we are unwilling to say that a jury verdict upholding her exercise of that right, as against a claim of fraudulent inducement, should be set aside as unjust, particularly, where her exercise of that power was in favor of the natural objects of her bounty, in equal shares. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court validating Mrs. Warren's 1977 will, is due to be, and hereby is, affirmed. AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.