Opinion ID: 204040
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Embezzlement Convictions

Text: The Defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions for embezzlement. Each was convicted under Count I of conspiring to embezzle Health Plan funds pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 669 and 18 U.S.C. § 371. The Defendants were also convicted of separate counts of substantive embezzlement under § 669 based on payments they received from either the Union, Infrastructure, or Administrative Accounts. 18 U.S.C. § 669, the basis of the embezzlement convictions, provides: Whoever knowingly and willfully embezzles, steals, or otherwise without authority converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner, or intentionally misapplies any of the moneys, funds, securities, premiums, credits, property, or other assets of a health care benefit program, shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both .... 18 U.S.C. § 669(a). Section 669 remains largely untested and unanalyzed. Robert Fabrikant et al., Health Care Fraud § 2.02[5], at 2-34 (2009). [25]
The Defendants first contend that there is insufficient evidence to establish that the transactions at issue in support of Counts 2 through 139 involved funds ... of a health care benefit program. [26] 18 U.S.C. § 669. They argue that, because the Defendants commingled Health Plan funds with other funds within the custody of the Union, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the Defendants embezzled Health Plan funds as opposed to other Union funds. A first reason for rejecting this contention is that the defendants effectively admitted in their testimony and their arguments to the jury that the moneys they took were essentially payments to them by the Health Plan for services they rendered to it. It was the Defendants' position throughout trial that as officials of the Health Plan, they rendered numerous administrative and executive services to it for which they were entitled to compensation, and that moneys which are the basis of the allegations of the embezzlement were not embezzled at all but were rather taken by them as the Health Plan's proper compensation to them for the services they rendered. Their contention that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the funds were Health Plan moneys is contradicted by their own assertions that these were Health Plan moneys. Even without these admissions, we would reject the Defendants' contention. As a threshold matter, the parties dispute what § 669 requires the government to show in order to prove that the purportedly embezzled funds were funds ... of a health care benefit plan. [27] The language of the statute does not provide any guidance, and the few cases that have concerned convictions under § 669 have not addressed the government's burden in proving that embezzled funds are funds... of a health care benefit program. See, e.g., United States v. Whited, 311 F.3d 259 (3d Cir.2002) (addressing sufficiency of the indictment, meaning of health care benefit program, and Commerce Clause challenges to § 669); United States v. Jackson, 524 F.3d 532, 534 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1307, 173 L.Ed.2d 575 (2009) (mentioning, without discussing, conviction under § 669). The Defendants point out that, in enacting § 669, Congress did not adopt the approach of other federal statutes that relieve the government of proving the character of the funds embezzled. By way of contrast, the Defendants cite 18 U.S.C. § 666, which prohibits the embezzle[ment] of funds owned by, or ... under the care, custody, or control of [an] organization, government, or agency, so long as the organization received in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a) & (b). By its terms, § 666 does not require the government to prove that the funds purportedly embezzled are, in fact, those funds provided by the Federal program as opposed to other funds. In fact, the legislative history of § 666 shows that it was enacted precisely to deal with the difficulty of proving the federal character of funds under the general federal fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641. [28] See S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 369 (1985), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510 (noting that § 641 required the government to show that the property stolen is property of the United States, which was impossible in many cases where the funds are so commingled that the federal character of the funds [could] not be shown). By contrast, the Defendants argue that § 669 provides no such language. In fact, in enacting § 669 as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, (HIPAA), see Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), [29] Congress had the opportunity to adopt the approach taken by § 666 but chose not to. Instead, and as the government concedes, § 669 was most likely modeled after § 641. See Fabrikant et al., supra, § 3.02[13], at 3-114 to 3-115 (2007) (noting that § 669 was modeled after 18 U.S.C. Section 641, which makes it a crime to embezzle, steal, or convert property or a thing of value belonging to the United States); see also Diana Douglas, Attorneys Caught in the Web of Medicare/Medicaid Fraud, 21 J. Legal. Med. 395, 412 (2000) (Section 669 was patterned after 18 U.S.C. section 641, the federal theft and embezzlement statute, and serves as a companion to it.). [30] Indeed, although not mirror images of each other, both set forth the character of the funds as an element of the offense. We agree with the Defendants' premise that § 641 provides the closest analogue to § 669. However, we disagree with the Defendants' conclusion that embezzled dollars cannot serve as the basis of a conviction under § 669 unless they are proven to have been the property of a health plan. Like § 669, the case law interpreting § 641 is sparse, but courts have generally not required the government to trace the dollars embezzled to a federal source. In United States v. Gibbs, for example, the Ninth Circuit addressed a sufficiency challenge to a § 641 conviction in the context of commingled sources of funding. 704 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam). There, the defendant founded a corporation to promote educational opportunities for American Indians that received most of its funds from the federal government. Id. at 465. The defendant was convicted under § 641 despite the fact that the defendant commingled federal funds with nonfederal funds received from state and private sources. Id. The Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction, which involved multiple counts of substantive embezzlement where the amount of nonfederal funds exceeded the amounts embezzled, [such that] it is possible that the funds embezzled were entirely nonfederal. Id. at 465-66 (noting that the defendant was charged with thirty-four counts of embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 641 and that the jury convicted him of twenty of the counts.). In doing so, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the government failed to prove the federal nature of the funds embezzled. Id. at 465. The court held, in particular, that the evidence was sufficient because (1) between 80-86% of the funds in the account from which [the defendant] embezzled was federal money and (2) the federal government monitored and controlled these funds. Id. at 466. A number of other courts have adopted the same approach. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 474 (5th Cir.1978) (holding that the evidence sufficient to support a conviction under § 641 where more than 75 percent of the funds in the commingled account were federal and were subject to extensive federal controls); United States v. Scott, 784 F.2d 787, 790-91 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding evidence was sufficient to support verdict under § 641 where 98% percent of the commingled funds were federal and the federal government still maintained supervision and control over the funds at the point when the funds were stolen.). Our case law is not to the contrary. Defendants cite United States v. Elías-Rivera, where we noted that, in the bankruptcy context, there is an established presumption that withdrawals for other than trust purposes from an account in which trust funds are commingled with nontrust funds are presumed to be made from nontrust funds. 848 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir.1998). But in that case, involving a bankruptcy trustee who commingled all of the estates he supervised in one account, [t]he prosecution failed to prove that funds were even missing, much less missing from funds belonging to the debtors, such that there was a total lack of evidence to rebut [the] presumption. Id. Elías-Rivera, therefore, does not speak to the situation here, which concerns what evidence is sufficient to rebut any such presumption. Comparing this case to Gibbs and Evans, it is clear that the funds embezzled were funds ... of a health care benefit program under § 669. As in those cases, (1) the health care benefit program funds were a substantial portion of the commingled funds; and (2) the health care benefit program exercised sufficient supervision and control over the funds to preserve their character. As the Gibbs court emphasized, the government's supervision and control ... is the critical factor in determining the federal character of the funds in a commingled account. 704 F.2d at 466. We conclude that, based on the evidence in this case, the Health Plan had sufficient supervision and control over the Health Plan contributions to establish that the funds embezzled were funds ... of a health care benefit program. As an initial matter, the Defendants argue that the relevant analogue to federal supervision and control in the § 669 context is control by the AAA. But AAA is only the contributor of the funds. Section 669 protects funds ... of a health care benefit plan, and thus, as in the context of § 641, the relevant entity for purposes of the supervision and control prong is the protected entity. Moreover, as in Gibbs and Evans, the Health Plan was both the source of the funds and the protected entity. Once the Union deposited the funds in the Plan Account, the Health Plan stood in the same position as the federal government in both providing its funds to the Union and in being the victim of the Defendants' embezzlement. The Defendants further argue that the Health Plan did not have a sufficient stake in the funds such that the funds failed to retain their Health Plan character once they were diverted out of the Health Plan Account. In Evans, for example, the court noted that funds in that case ha[d] a federal origin and a federal end, and during their outstanding circulation they [were] subject to extensive federal controls. This [was] not the situation in which the federal monies [were] intended as an outright grant.  572 F.2d at 474 (emphasis added). In particular, the Evans court noted that the federal government (in that case the Office of Education) had a sufficient stake in the funds it provided for a federal program; The federal interest ... is specifically established and preserved by the provision for termination of the program on a date certain and the requirement that the proportionate share of the balance in the special fund be returned to the government.  Id. at 472; see also id. at 474 (It is statutorily contemplated that the ultimate repayment will be to the federal government.). The Defendants specifically argue that, unlike in Evans, the AAA did not have a right to recover any excess funds. But again the correct analogue is the Health Plan, not the AAA, and the funds diverted were not meant to be, even by the Defendants' own admission, outright grants. Rather, the Defendants contend that the funds embezzled were for administrative services rendered, and certainly the Health Plan had a sufficient stake in those funds to ensure that the Plan received fair value for those services. The Defendants further argue that the collective bargaining agreement did not bar the Union from preserving any excess funds from the Health Plan. Even if that is true (which is doubtful), there were no excess funds to claim. The Health Plan throughout the time period of the embezzlement scheme suffered significant impairments, such that there were no excess funds that the Union could claim as its own. Thus, as in Evans, the Health Plan had a right to all funds diverted by the Defendants. The Defendants finally argue that, unlike in Gibbs and Evans, there was no equivalent to federal regulation that mandated oversight. But there was. As required under Puerto Rico law, the Defendants were fiduciarily responsible to the Plan and, thus, required to maintain oversight on how the funds were used. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 1907 (Fiduciary liability[:] Any director, officer or member of a health service[ ] organization who receives, collects, disburses or invests funds related to the activities of said organization, shall be fiducially liable for the funds received from the subscribers.); cf. FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir.1982) (noting that interlocking directors of two boards have a fiduciary responsibility for assets of both companies). For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the Health Plan exercised supervision and control of the funds, such that they were, in fact, Health Plan funds. Furthermore, the Health Plan funds were a substantial portion of the commingled funds that the Defendants embezzled. As an initial matter, the Defendants argue that the Health Plan contributions made by AAA did not become funds ... of a health care benefit program until they were actually deposited in the Plan Account. They point to a concession made by the government in its brief in United States v. Jackson , S.Ct. No. 08-263, where the government conceded that employer contributions to an ERISA plan themselves are not assets of [a] plan until the contributions are paid to the plan. U.S. Br. at 10 (Jan. 16, 2009); see also Jackson, 524 F.3d at 543 (holding that unpaid employer contributions to the Company and Union Plans constituted `assets' of the Plans under 18 U.S.C. § 664, the ERISA theft statute). The concession, to the extent that it is relevant to this case, [31] does not assist the Defendants. With respect to the convictions occurring from 1998 to 2001, the evidence conclusively demonstrated that, save for one instance, the Union transferred the entire monthly Health Plan contributions to the Plan Account. Thus, there was no question that the funds subsequently diverted were Health Plan funds. Moreover, although, beginning in 2002, the Defendants first deposited the Health Plan in the Welfare Account, a substantial amount of the funds were then deposited into the Plan Account, such that any subsequent diversion of the funds from that Account were Health Plan funds. Turning to the evidence, it conclusively demonstrated that the Health Plan contributions, in the language from one defendant's brief, were the largest regular deposits by far. Based upon the balance sheets provided by the Union, for the years 1998 through 2000, the Union averaged approximately $757,543 per year in income, which translates to a monthly gross income of roughly $63,000 per month. In contrast, during that same time period, and with a contribution rate of $232 per member, the AAA contributed well over $1 million per month in Health Plan contributions during that time period. This percentage alone is well above the 75 to 80 percent threshold established in § 641 cases. [32] Holding the average income of the Union constant, the disparity between the Union's average monthly income as compared to the Health Plan contributions was even greater from 2002 to 2004. During this time period, the rate increased dramatically, such that the Union was receiving between $1.5 million and $2.3 million in Health Plan contributions per month from 2002 to 2004. The Defendants counter by arguing that the balance sheets failed to include SINOT, retirement, and rental income, which were also commingled with Health Plan funds. [33] However, their resort to these additional funds is unavailing. Including these amounts, the evidence showed that the Union contributed approximately $151,041 per month for SINOT and approximately $78,000 per month for the retirement program, and $4,500 per month in income from renting out a parking lot. Combined with the Union's income in dues (as reflected in the average income above), the total amount of non-Health Plan contribution income averaged approximately $300,000 per month. This, again, is only a small percentage of the millions per month the Union was receiving in Health Plan contributions, with the Health Plan contributions representing approximately 77% ($1 million out of $1.3 million total) of the total amount of commingled funds based on the lowest Health Plan contribution. The Defendants further counter by focusing on the specific accounts from which the Defendants paid themselves. Although, as a whole, the funds that the Union received in Health Plan contributions far outweighed the funds that the Union received from other sources, the Defendants argue that the amount of Health Plan contributions contained in the accounts vis-a-vis other funds were not proportionally high enough to support the convictions. For example, the Defendants point to the testimony of Jennifer Griffin, who did a deposit source analysis of the funds contained in the Infrastructure Account, as shown in the table below: 1998: 69% Health Plan 22% SINOT 9% Cultural Trips Account 1999: 74% Health Plan 18% SINOT 8% Cultural Trips Account 2000: 75% Health Plan 16% SINOT 5% Cultural Trips Account 4% Union Account 2001: 47% Health Plan 27% SINOT 15% Union Account 11% Cultural Trips Account 2002: 45% Union Account 36% Health Plan 16% SINOT 3% Cultural Trips Account 2003: 72% Union Account 15% SINOT 8% Cultural Trips Account 5% Health Plan 2004: 57% Investment Redemptions 32% Union Account 8% Health Plan 3% Welfare Account Although for the first three years of the scheme 69 percent (1998), 74 percent (1999), and 75 percent (2000) of the funds contained in the Infrastructure Account were derived from Health Plan funds, the amounts declined in 2001 to 47 percent, and further declined to 36 percent (2002), 5 percent (2003), and 8 percent (2004). The Defendants seize on this decline to argue that, on average, the percentage of Health Plan funds contained in the Infrastructure Account was approximately 44 percent, below the 75 to 80 percent threshold articulated in some § 641 cases. The government counters that the deposit source analysis is somewhat misleading. It notes that, even in those years where the Infrastructure Account contained a small percentage of funds directly diverted from the Health Plan, it still received a significant percentage of funds from the Union Account, which itself contained funds from the Health Plan. In 2003, for example, and as shown by the complicated flow charts prepared by Griffin for trial, $19.4 million of the AAA's Health Plan contributions were deposited into the Union Account. From there, $14.8 million was passed into the Plan Account (via the Welfare Account), with $4.1 million remaining in the Union Account. And then from there, an additional $873,000 was transferred from the Plan Account to the Union Account, which resulted in the Union Account containing well over $5 million of the Health Plan's funds. This exceeded by several million dollars any other sources of funds contained in the Union Account. Thus, the large percentage (72 percent) of Union Account funds contained in the Infrastructure Account itself contained a large percentage of Health Plan funds, such that, combined with the 8 percent of Health Plan funds already contained in the Infrastructure Account, Health Plan funds comprised a substantial portion of the funds in the Infrastructure Account. However, the government did not establish at trial the true total percentage of Health Plan funds contained in the Infrastructure Account. As the above evidence shows, and in contrast to Gibbs, this case involves multiple accounts with commingled funds, with those accounts funneling Health Plan funds into each other. This scenario presents further opportunities for abuse. [34] However, based on our review of the specific evidence in this case, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, we conclude that, as in Gibbs and Evans, Health Plan funds were a substantial portion of the funds in the commingled accounts. First, we stress again that the disparity between the Health Plan contributions as compared to the Union's other sources of funds was staggering. The Union received in the realm of 70 to 80 percent of its funds from Health Plan contributions, as compared to all other sources (including funds, such as SINOT and the funds for the retirement program, that the Union was not permitted to use as income). Moreover, and as the evidence showed, the Health Plan funds were commingled among the accounts from which the Defendants paid themselves, such that a rational juror could conclude that, at any given time, the Accounts contained Health Plan funds. That alone is sufficient under Gibbs to establish the substantial portion prong. Second, we note that the 75 to 80 percent level discussed in Gibbs and Evans is not a threshold. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit upheld a conviction under § 641 where as little as 50 percent of the commingled funds were federal. See United States v. Mitchell, 625 F.2d 158, 161 (7th Cir. 1980) (concerning theft of check from Aid to Families with Dependent Children account containing 50 percent federal funds). Thus, almost all of the years for the Infrastructure Account contained a sufficient portion of Health Plan funds. For all of these reasons, we conclude that, as in Gibbs and Evans, the evidence is sufficient to show that the Health Plan funds were a substantial portion of the funds embezzled from the commingled sources. Based on the above, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient in this case to permit a rational jury to convict the Defendants for each of the substantive embezzlement counts.
Defendants next contend that there was insufficient evidence to prove that they were without authority to receive the Health Plan funds. The Defendants argue that they were entitled to additional compensation for the work they performed on behalf of the Health Plan, and that this compensation was authorized by the collective bargaining agreement, the constitution, the Plan bylaws, and historical practice. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient in this case to establish that the Defendants acted without authority. We stress at the outset that the issue is not whether the Defendants were anywhere explicitly prohibited from receiving payments from the Health Plan for services rendered; rather, the issue is whether they lacked the authority to do so. See United States v. Hammond, 201 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir.1999) (per curiam) (although union president did not break any law or union rule in spending political funds, court affirmed conviction because a rational juror could conclude that expenditure was unauthorized). And, in this case, the Defendants lacked such authority. The Defendants first point to the purported administrative services contract they provided to OIC, but that is a nonstarter. The evidence at trial showed that the contract was replete with irregularities, overcharged for services, was created after the fact, was ultimately rejected by the OIC, and the government provided evidence that the minutes supporting the contract were forged. The Defendants claimed that the OIC mistakenly rejected the contract on the assumption that [the Defendants] could not receive such compensation because they were paid labor license. Even if true (which it is not, as detailed in the OIC rejection letter), the contract was nonetheless rejected, and cannot authorize the Defendants' actions in this case. The Defendants further point to a number of provisions in the Health Plan bylaws, the constitution, and the collective bargaining agreement that would permit compensation or at least not prohibit it. For example:  The Health Plan bylaws establish the authority of the board of directors to set[] salaries of officials;  The constitution states that the [CEC] will fix the representative expenses and the bonuses of the Union's Officers;  The collective bargaining agreement puts Lugo in charge of managing and directing the rendering of services. These provisions, if exercised, may have provided authority for the Defendants' compensation. But there was no evidence, such as a formal resolution, meeting minutes, or any other documentation that showed that the Defendants exercised those provisions. Thus, these provisions cannot supply the necessary authority for their actions. The Defendant next argue that, as a matter of practice, they received compensation for the services they provided for the Health Plan. They point to the testimony of Rubén Luciano, who testified that, under the Old Health Plan, there was always compensation paid to the Board of Directors. But this purported historical practice lacks any formal resolution or other authorization. Moreover, unlike the Old Health Plan, the Health Plan was subject to Puerto Rico's Insurance Code, and under the Code the Health Plan was required to seek approval from the OIC, and to furnish to the Commissioner the adequate information to justify the delegation of administrative services to the Defendants. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, § 1905(2)(a). The evidence showed that the Defendants failed to do so in this case, and thus they cannot resort to their historical practice as a source of authority. Finally, the Defendants challenge testimony given by Aurea López, the OIC's chief investigator into the Union's scheme, concerning the Defendants' labor license. [35] At trial, López testified to the following: The reason for excluding those enjoying Union leave is that the position held by the Commissioner of Insurance is that those persons were already being compensated by AAA so that they could offer services to the Union. So we understood that it was also not correct that the [Health Plan] be charged for services that these people rendered to the [Health Plan]. The Defendants claim that López provided unqualified opinion testimony to the effect that the labor license prohibited the Defendants from receiving additional compensation for their work on the Health Plan. See Fed.R.Evid. 702 (permitting opinion testimony if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case). The Defendants point out that López was not established as an expert on the Union's activities to opine on the labor license. The government argues that, when read in context, López was only giving testimony on historical fact as to the OIC's conclusion that the Defendants' six percent charges for services were unreasonable in light of prevailing market rates. We need not decide the issue, because any error in admitting the testimony was harmless, because it would not have affected the outcome of the trial. United States v. Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48, 59 (1st Cir.2009)(`The essential inquiry in harmless error review is whether the improperly admitted evidence likely affected the outcome of the trial.') (quoting United States v. Tom, 330 F.3d 83, 95 (1st Cir. 2003)). As noted above, there was no evidence of any authorization for the payments the Defendants received. The Defendants claim prejudice because, they argue, the government relied upon López's testimony at trial in support of its theory that the Union's labor license precluded compensation for Health Plan work, and even cited it in their closing. However, the government argued below, as here, that no provision in the constitution, collective bargaining agreement, the Health Plan by-laws, or any other document provided authority for the payments. Moreover, no mention was made of López's testimony in the government's closing. Thus, for all of the above reasons, the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendants acted without authority.
The Defendants finally argue with respect to the embezzlement convictions that the government had not met their burden to prove that the Defendants acted with the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of embezzlement. To establish an individual defendant's willing and knowing participation in a conspiracy as in this case, the government need not prove that [he] knew all the details ... or participated in all of the objectives ... of the conspiracy. United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 428 (1st Cir.1994). The prosecution need only show knowledge of the basic agreement, with an intent to commit the underlying substantive offense. Id. The requisite knowledge and intent can be proven through circumstantial evidence, including inferences from ... acts committed by the defendant that furthered the conspiracy's purposes. Id. With respect to the Top Four Defendants, the evidence of their knowledge and willfulness with respect to the embezzlement convictions was more than sufficient. They all essentially argue that their actions were done in good faith. However, the evidence conclusively contradicts this assertion. We start with Lugo and Román. Among other things, the evidence showed that Lugo and Román, as president and treasurer of both the Union and the Health Plan, had signing authority over all of the bank accounts at issue in this case, and thus signed all of the checks and other documents authorizing the transfer of funds to and from various bank accounts. Lugo and Román also signed off on regular checks made out to themselves and the other Defendants which were deposited into personal accounts. Their consenting signatures are also on Health Plan tax returns that omitted these payments. Lugo and Román were also instrumental in the creation of the administrative services contract, under which the Union leaders paid themselves a six percent of Health Plan funds for administering the Health Plan. They also provided vague and misleading responses about the specifics of the contract during the course of the OIC's investigation. The administration contract was ultimately found to be invalid by the OIC after it was discovered that the fees the Union charged were substantially above market rates and concerns about the legitimacy of the arrangement were uncovered. Despite being informed of this decision, Lugo and Román continued issuing personal payments from Union controlled funds, which further showed their intent. Cf. Young, 955 F.2d at 103-04 (evidence sufficient to show intent to embezzle where defendant's falsification to a government agency reveal[ed] a consciousness of guilt (quotation omitted)). Thus, through all of these actions, both Lugo and Román displayed knowledge and willfulness with respect to the embezzlement scheme in this case. The same is largely true of the actions of Carrasquillo. Even though he lacked signing authority, Carrasquillo controlled the Union and Health Plan accounts after Román's retirement in April 2004. He was also consistently obstructive when the OIC made inquiries into the administrative services contract. These facts would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Carrasquillo was knowingly involved in an embezzlement scheme. García, like Lugo and Carrasquillo, also played a significant role in the implementation of the administrative service contract. Although she insists that she was cooperative with the OIC in her investigation, which she asserts is proof that she did not have the intent to embezzle, her role in creating the administrative contract itself (and providing the forged minutes to support the contract) provides substantial evidence of her intent. Most importantly, none of the Top Four Defendants included any of the income they received as compensation from the Health Plan in their tax returns and, when confronted with evidence of their scheme, promptly reported the income, literally within days of each other. That alone is significant evidence of their knowledge and willfulness. See United States v. Fusaro, 708 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1983) (Fusaro's active participation in so many aspects of the scheme as well as his attempts to cover up the scheme as it unraveled, likewise, provides the basis for the inference that he acted with the requisite intent and knowledge.). The Top Four Defendants each argue that their failure to file taxes on their Health Plan income is evidence of tax evasion, but not of embezzlement. However, as noted below, the jurors were instructed that the case that is before us ... has nothing to do with tax evasion, and jurors are presumed to follow instructions. See United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 285 (1st Cir.2002) ([I]t is routinely presumed that jurors will follow curative instructions....). In any event, the Defendants conveniently only failed to report their Health Plan income, thus permitting a rational jury to conclude that the Defendants were not simply engaging in tax evasion. The issue is much closer with respect to the Chapter President Defendants. As noted below, the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for money laundering because minutes establishing their knowledge turned out to be forged. Moreover, unlike the Top Four Defendants, the Chapter Presidents had no authority over any of the Union-controlled accounts. The government does not dispute that the Chapter President Defendants' role in the crime was more limited than that of the other Defendants, but argues that the evidence was still sufficient to establish their intent. The government primarily argues that the Defendants were willfully blind to the scheme, and points out that the district court in this case provided a willful blindness instruction. [36] The government points out that, despite the forged minutes, García certified to the OIC that all ... members of the Health Plan's board of directors discuss[ed] and analyze[d] the diversity of administrative issues of their incumbency on a daily basis. The government also points out that Clotilde Díaz, who ran the Union's cafeteria, testified that all the Defendants would have lunch together every day whenever they were there. The government finally points out that the Health Plan's bylaws required the Defendants to manage[] the Plan and oversee[] the faithful compliance with the laws and regulations applicable to the operation of the Health Plan, such that the jury could infer that the Chapter President Defendants knew that there was nothing that authorized them to receive payments. The Chapter President Defendants respond by pointing out that García's certification is far from credible. Moreover, Díaz's testimony, to the extent that it can be interpreted to mean that the Defendants ate lunch every day, was belied by the lunch tickets presented at trial, which only showed that they met with the Top Four Defendants infrequently, if at all. The evidence in support of willful blindness is sparse, at best. Willful blindness requires evidence that the Chapter Defendants were trying to deliberately avoid knowledge of the scheme, see United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 68 (1st Cir.2009), and the government can only muster a few meetings with the Top Four Defendants and some duties on the part of the Chapter President Defendants to manage the Health Plan. None of these actions conclusively show the Chapter President Defendants deliberately avoid[ing] knowledge of the embezzlement. However, like the Top Four Defendants, the Chapter President Defendants failed to report the income they received from the Health Plan in their tax returns, even though the purported Health Plan income was far greater than the other income they reported. More importantly, and also like the Top Four Defendants, they all proceeded to report their payments simultaneously at a time when the OIC was discovering the extent of the scheme. This, along with the other evidence, was sufficient for the jury to conclude by proof beyond a reasonable doubt the element of criminal intent. The Chapter President Defendants argue that they did not know that they had to report the payments and, at worst, only engaged in tax evasion. Although that is one view of their actions, the jury was permitted to conclude that the confluence of events here established their knowledge and willfulness by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir.2007) (When the record is fairly susceptible of two competing scenarios, the choice between those scenarios ordinarily is for the jury.).