Opinion ID: 2449730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We first consider Welch's argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence because the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial when a judgment of conviction is reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732 (1996); Jones v. State, 323 Ark. 655, 916 S.W.2d 736 (1996). After the State rested its case, the following exchange took place: COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE: Your Honor, the State has rested and at this point the defense would move for a directed verdict. THE COURT: Is that all you've got to say? COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE: Yes, sir, that's all I'm saying. (The court then gave the State a chance to comment after which the following took place.) THE COURT: The motion for directed verdict is denied. COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE: Your Honor, then the defense would now rest and we renew our motion for a directed verdict and I would like to say that the defense is resting without calling the defendant, or a witness, after discussing that with my client and he is in agreement, is that right, Mr. Welch? The court then denied the renewed motion. At no time did defense counsel state any grounds for his motion, which violates Rule 33.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. See also Dixon v. State, 327 Ark. 105, 937 S.W.2d 642 (1997); Smallwood v. State, 326 Ark. 813, 935 S.W.2d 530 (1996). Thus, the trial judge had no opportunity to rule on specific grounds with respect to any of the charges. We hold that Welch is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal.