Opinion ID: 1387075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Water users' associations

Text: Article 5 of Chapter 73 is unofficially entitled Water Users' Associations and it is a completely separate body of law from the SPA. Morningstar's articles of incorporation, dated September 26, 1977, state that owners of land in San Juan county have on this day formed a corporation under § 73-5-1 through § 73-5-9, N.M.S.A., 1978. Morningstar affirmed this fact in the companion case to this one, Morningstar I, 309 N.M. at 120, 901 P.2d at 727. No evidence or documentation supports Morningstar's assertions in this case that it is a mutual domestic governed by the SPA. Chapter 73, Article 5 water users' associations are not expressly included nor excluded from the PUA. We cannot presume that these providers are outside the Commission's jurisdiction simply because they are not mentioned in the PUA statutes and regulations. Legislative silence by itself is not an expression of legislative intent. See El Vadito, 115 N.M. at 788, 858 P.2d at 1267 (The PUA's silence as to whether the Commission has jurisdiction over SPA associations, by itself, proves to be inconclusive on the issue of whether the Commission has jurisdiction by necessary implication over SPA associations.). In interpreting this omission we must look at the objectives the legislature sought to accomplish and thereby interpret the statute to achieve these purposes. Garcia v. Thong, 119 N.M. 704, 706, 895 P.2d 226, 228 (1995). While the inclusion of one group of water providers in the PUA does not automatically mean that all others are excluded, the legislature did offer insight into its intentions in this regard on at least one occasion. See Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 109, 227 P.2d 365, 383 (1950) (The maxim `expressio unius est exclusio alterius' is only an aid to construction and not a rule of law.). The legislature went through quite a bit of trouble to bring within the PUA a type of electric providerrural electric cooperativesthat had been exempted from the PUA. These cooperatives are governed by the Rural Electric Cooperative Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 62-15-1 to -33 (Repl.Pamp.1993). The legislature probably acted in response to our decision in Socorro Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Public Service Co., 66 N.M. 343, 345, 348 P.2d 88, 89 (1959). In that case an electric cooperative filed a petition with Commission to protest the intrusion by a certificated electric company into the cooperative's service territory. Id. This Court found that the PUA expressly exempted cooperatives from regulation by the Commission. Id. at 347, 348 P.2d at 90. Having no jurisdiction over the cooperative, the Commission could not grant it any affirmative relief. Id. at 349, 348 P.2d at 91-92. After Socorro the legislature attempted, with 1961 N.M.Laws, Ch. 89, § 2, to bring rural electric cooperatives within the definition of public utility in the PUA. See NMSA 1953, § 68-3-2(F)(1) (Supp.1961); Community Pub. Serv. Co. v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 76 N.M. 314, 317, 414 P.2d 675, 677 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 933, 87 S.Ct. 292, 17 L.Ed.2d 213 (1966). However, we found this attempt to be unconstitutional in Community Public Service Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Commission. In that case, we noted that cooperatives were not required to render service to the general public and that the Commission had no power to regulate their rates and financing; they were therefore not public utilities. Id. at 317-18, 414 P.2d at 677-78. In contrast, other certificated electric utilities were required to render service to the public generally and their rates and financing were completely regulated. Id. at 316-17, 414 P.2d at 676. We concluded that cooperatives were at a decided advantage to other certificated utilities and the legislative attempt to include rural electric cooperatives into the PUA was unconstitutional. Id. at 318-19, 414 P.2d at 677-78. Probably in response to this opinion the legislature went back to the drawing board and, in 1967 N.M.Laws, ch. 102, § 4, redrafted the Rural Electric Cooperative Act to say that should any provision of the Rural Electric Co-operative Act ... be held to be repugnant to any provision of the Public Utility Act ... the latter shall be controlling and the former shall be held repealed to the extent of the repugnancy. See NMSA 1953, § 45-4-32 (Supp.1967); NMSA 1978, § 62-15-32. The fact that the legislature persisted in bringing within the PUA a previously excluded class of electric providers suggests the legislature intended to limit the definition of public utility to an enumerated list of specific types of utilities. See El Vadito, 115 N.M. at 788, 858 P.2d at 1267 (stating that SPA utilities are exempt from the PUA absent a provision that affirmatively brings them within the Commission's jurisdiction). The only exception to this rule seems to be when a utility belonging to a non-enumerated class begins to act like a public utility; that is, when it crosses the indistinct line between a private coalition serving its own select members and becomes a utility that opens its services to the public at large. See Id. at 789, 858 P.2d at 1268 (An SPA association operating as a public utility would be subject to the Commission's exclusive regulatory jurisdiction, as any other public utility would be.). It may also be possible for a member of a non-enumerated class to elect to come within the PUA, though it is unlikely many utilities would volunteer for this bureaucratic burden. Cf. Electric v. Commission, 81 N.M. at 685, 472 P.2d at 650 (stating Commission had no authority over electric company that did not invoke Commission's jurisdiction). We conclude that, absent a regulatory provision stating otherwise, or absent a willingness of the utility to serve an indefinite public, any utilities not expressly brought within the scope of the PUA are excluded from the Commission's jurisdiction. See El Vadito, 115 N.M. at 790, 858 P.2d at 1269 (referring to indefinite public). In the case of water users' associations, this conclusion is supported by the fact that the Commission steadfastly insists that it has no jurisdiction over water users' associations. Additionally, Morningstar has offered no evidence to show that, as a water users' association, it is subject to the PUA. Moreover, according to the statutes by which they are governed, water users' associations are intended to be a private coalition of owners of lands, reservoirs or irrigation ditches who organize an association for their mutual advantage. See § 73-5-1. They are not intended or required to serve any and all members of the general public within a specific geographical area. In fact, as indicated above, there is no support in the record for Morningstar's claim that it has an actual water supply service territory as if it had some kind of property rightas does a PUA public utilityin a specific geographical region. Though water users' associations can acquire lands and rights-of-way for their reservoirs, canals, ditches and works, the areas they serve seem to be defined largely by the property interests of their members. See §§ 73-5-9; see also § 73-5-1. Therefore Morningstar does not come within the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction.