Opinion ID: 1997862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Father's Position.

Text: The father's primary contention on appeal, as stated in his brief, is that the trial judge erred in refusing to consider [A.R.'s] opinion as to what his best interests are. This proposition, if read literally, is based on a fallacious premise. The judge did not refuse to consider A.R.'s opinion. There was no evidence in the record regarding that opinion, and she could not have refused to consider that which was not there. [7] In fact, the judge unequivocally stated, while entertaining argument on this issue, that the parties were perfectly free to present evidence with regard to the child's opinion, and that counsel could call the child as a witness if they elected to do so. The judge was thus plainly aware of the provision in the statute requiring her to consider, to the extent feasible, the child's opinion of his or her own best interests in the matter. See D.C.Code § 16-2353(b)(4). There is no reason to believe that she would have declined to consider evidence of that opinion if such evidence had been introduced at trial. Although we cannot accept the father's formulation of the question before us, however, we are not prepared to reject his substantive contentions on the basis of their imprecise articulation. [G]iven the historic concern of the courts with the welfare of minors, ... any court is properly reluctant to penalize a juvenile for procedural defaults, especially those of his attorney. Fulwood v. Stone, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 317, 394 F.2d 939, 942 (1967); see also In re L. W., 613 A.2d 350, 352-53 n. 6 (D.C.1992). The father's submission could reasonably be construed as embracing either or both of two distinct (but related) arguments, each of which his attorney presented, at least in some measure, to the trial court: 1. that the judge abused her discretion in the conduct of the trial by refusing to interview A.R. or to ascertain A.R.'s opinion in some other way; and 2. that the judge abused her discretion by deciding the case against the father, and by terminating the father's rights, without evidence in the record of A.R.'s opinion of his own best interest. We will assume for purposes of the present appeal that both points have been preserved.