Opinion ID: 1190856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct/Cross-Examination

Text: Appellant's second issue concerns the conduct of the prosecuting attorney with respect to an exchange which occurred during cross-examination of appellant at trial. After impeaching several statements appellant had made on direct examination concerning events occurring on the night of the crime, the prosecutor asked appellant: Mr. King, you're the only person who has any real interest in the outcome of this case, aren't you? The court sustained an objection to this question as calling for speculation, but not before appellant answered in the affirmative. The prosecutor then propounded this question: Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, Mr. King, you're not going to be too surprised when you are convicted, are you not? Appellant's counsel immediately objected, and the prosecutor withdrew the question. Appellant's contention regarding this question is twofold. First, appellant asserts that the question constituted prosecutorial misconduct intentionally designed to deny him a fair trial in that the prosecutor was in effect testifying as to his opinion regarding appellant's guilt. Second, although no motion for a mistrial was made, appellant contends that the district court committed plain error by not immediately declaring a mistrial upon its own motion. Although we agree that the question was improper, we do not perceive that it constituted misconduct so grave as to deprive appellant of a fair trial or to require the district court to sua sponte order a mistrial. We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by examining the entire record to determine whether the conduct of the prosecutor resulted in substantial prejudice amounting to the denial of a fair trial. Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852 (Wyo. 1987); Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649 (Wyo. 1986). Our review of the record includes an evaluation of the state of the evidence and the probability of prejudicial impact on the defendant under the circumstances of the particular case. Burke, 746 P.2d 852; Stogner v. State, 674 P.2d 1298 (Wyo. 1984). The question, which implied that appellant was guilty in the eyes of the prosecutor, was improper. Appellant calls our attention to various standards for prosecutors enunciated in I ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice ch. 3 at 3-69 (2d ed. 1979 & 1986 Supp.). [6] We agree with appellant that some of these standards are pertinent to our consideration of the prosecutor's conduct in this case. Standard 3-5.6(b) describes as unprofessional conduct by a prosecutor the asking of questions known to be legally objectionable and the making of impermissible comments in the presence of the judge or jury. Standard 3-5.8(b) states that it is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express a personal belief or opinion as to the guilt of the defendant. See also Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 1982) (prosecutor prohibited from injecting personal beliefs relating to matters in issue). The prosecutor, by making this thinly veiled statement of his belief in appellant's guilt, overstepped the bounds of proper prosecutorial conduct. As this Court has noted: While [the prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not free to strike foul ones. Lindsey, 725 P.2d at 656, and Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 166 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982). See also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 85 S.Ct. 783, 791, 13 L.Ed.2d 630 (1965). In reviewing the entire record, however, we are not convinced the conduct of the prosecutor in asking this one improper question substantially prejudiced appellant. The evidence of appellant's guilt was considerable. In particular, the testimony of the victim, Muggelberg, his girl friend, Baldes, and appellant's sister, Koryn, established a strong case for the State. In addition, the credibility of appellant and his theory of the case had been severely damaged by earlier cross-examination which revealed numerous inconsistencies in appellant's versions of the events on the night of the crime. We also note that the jury returned a verdict against appellant after deliberating only two and one-half hours. This was not a particularly close case. Cf. Browder, 639 P.2d at 895 (reversal of defendant's conviction on basis of plain error where the case was close and the improper comments of the prosecutor were numerous and extreme). As we have observed on other occasions, the Constitution guarantees only a fair trial, not a perfect one. Lindsey, 725 P.2d at 657; Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1330 n. 2 (Wyo. 1977). We conclude that the prosecutor's conduct in cross-examination, while improper, did not deny appellant a fair trial. It follows, accordingly, that the district court did not commit plain error by failing to declare a mistrial upon its own initiative.