Opinion ID: 2250034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Meaningful Opportunity to Participate

Text: We also address two other issues which the parties raise. The State asserts that Corbin may be inapplicable to the instant case because the record is insufficient to show whether the State's Attorney was or could have been present for the ordinance violation cases prosecuted by the Village of Addison. The State cites People v. Raebig (1991), 213 Ill.App.3d 146, 157 Ill.Dec. 155, 571 N.E.2d 1174, in which the appellate court distinguished Corbin's double jeopardy bar where the State prosecutor was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the initial proceeding. The State asserts that if this court agrees with Raebig, this court should remand the instant case for a more complete determination of whether the State's Attorney had a meaningful opportunity to participate in the initial prosecution. Stefan counters that Raebig stands for the proposition that the appropriate prosecuting official, as opposed to the arresting officer, must have a meaningful opportunity to decide upon the charge to be brought and to take part in the prosecution of that charge before the prosecution will be barred by the double jeopardy guarantee from pursuing other charges. ( Raebig, 213 Ill.App.3d at 149-50, 157 Ill.Dec. 155, 571 N.E.2d 1174.) Stefan asserts that Raebig does not support the State's assertion that a remand is necessary. We agree. In Raebig, the arresting officer issued traffic citations to the defendant for failure to yield at a stop sign or to wear a seat belt. The officer noted that the traffic accident had resulted in a fatality, but he failed to check the box on the citations requiring a court appearance, and the defendant signed the guilty pleas on the citations and mailed them with the required fines to the circuit court clerk's office. Defendant later was indicted for reckless homicide based on the same conduct charged by the traffic tickets. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, and the trial court granted the motion. ( Raebig, 213 Ill.App.3d at 148, 157 Ill.Dec. 155, 571 N.E.2d 1174.) The appellate court reversed, holding that because the officer's failure to properly mark the citations to require defendant to appear in court deprived the State's Attorney of the opportunity to participate in the prosecution, the subsequent prosecution for reckless homicide was not barred by the double jeopardy clause. Raebig, 213 Ill.App.3d at 149-50, 157 Ill.Dec. 155, 571 N.E.2d 1174. Raebig does not apply to the facts of the instant case, where there is no assertion that a prosecutor was not provided the opportunity to participate in the prosecution of the initial ordinance violation charges. Further, as noted by Stefan, the United States Supreme Court held in Waller v. Florida (1970), 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435, and this court reiterated in People v. Allison (1970), 46 Ill.2d 147, 263 N.E.2d 80, that for double jeopardy purposes, a municipality and a State constitute the same sovereign. Therefore, a conviction or acquittal entered in a municipal ordinance prosecution bars a later prosecution by the State's Attorney for violation of a State statute based upon the same conduct. ( Waller, 397 U.S. at 394-95, 90 S.Ct. at 1188-89, 25 L.Ed.2d at 440-41; Allison, 46 Ill.2d at 149, 263 N.E.2d 80.) Accordingly, we reject the State's argument that because it did not prosecute the initial charges, the double jeopardy clause does not bar prosecution under the indictment.