Opinion ID: 4644704
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Correctional Officer essential functions

Text: The essential functions of a CO include the ability to respond to emergency situations, like riots, and to control inmates physically. Performing these tasks requires the ability to ambulate and exert significant force. Factors to determine whether a function is essential—including the employer’s judgment, job descriptions, the time dedicated to the function, and the consequences of failing to perform the function— support this conclusion. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). First, CDOC views these functions as essential. Warden Long described the ability to defend oneself as a “critical function” for COs. See App., Vol. 2 at 180; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i). Second, CDOC describes such functions as “essential” in its “position description” and job analysis. See App., Vol. 1 at 93, 114-15, 119 (capitalization altered); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii). Third, COs spend about a third of their time engaged in such tasks. See App., Vol. 1 at 114; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii). Fourth, the consequences of failing to perform these functions can be dire. The “position exists . . . to [m]aintain safety and security,” App., Vol. 1 at 114, and violence in the DRDC—both against prisoners and staff—occurs relatively frequently, see id. at 88; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv). 14 Mr. Mannan argues the essential functions of his job were not those of a CO generally, but rather those of a CO working in the control room. But Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120 (10th Cir. 1999),8 forecloses this argument. There, the CO, Mr. Martin, suffered from arthritis, which limited his physical activities. See id. at 1124-25. He was assigned to “tower duty,” see id. at 1124, where he conducted surveillance, communicated with others in the prison, checked equipment, and kept records, see id. at 1130—not physically demanding tasks. Mr. Martin argued the essential functions applicable to him were the “limited responsibilities of his tower duty post.” Id. The State “contend[ed] that the essential functions of [his] job included the broad list of duties required of all” COs. Id. These duties included “the job requirements set forth in the written position description and the rotation policy,” as well as physical requirements like being able stand, walk, and “physically restrain persons in custody.” Id. We held “the essential functions of [a CO’s] job were those broader functions of a corrections officer position, as opposed to the limited duties of a particular post.” Id. at 1132.9 8 Overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), as recognized in Rivero v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 950 F.3d 754 (10th Cir. 2020). 9 Other circuits agree. See Faulkner v. Douglas Cnty., 906 F.3d 728, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2018); Hoskins v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 726-28 (6th Cir. 2000); Kees v. Wallenstein, 161 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1998); Miller v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1997). 15 As in Martin, the essential functions for Mr. Mannan were not the narrow duties of the control room, but rather the broader duties of a CO. Even COs working in the control room performed the physical tasks of the position, like responding to emergencies. For instance, COs “in the [DRDC’s] housing unit’s control center have been forced to defend in place, or to evacuate their posts by exiting either onto a roof or through the offender occupied common areas for egress.” App., Vol. 1 at 87. ii. Mr. Mannan’s ability to perform the essential functions When determining whether an individual could perform the essential functions of his job, we look to the time of the employment action at issue. See Frazier, 254 F.3d at 1256. Mr. Mannan’s claims potentially encompass both Warden Long’s (1) removing him from transitional duty in the control room in August 2017 and (2) terminating him in March 2018. Mr. Mannan was unable to perform the job’s essential functions at both times. In August 2017, Mr. Mannan’s work restrictions while on transitional duty limited him to standing and walking for short periods of time, limitations that were incompatible with the essential functions of a CO. Indeed, Mr. Mannan could not even perform all the functions of a control room operator—other COs in the control room had to perform his “nonsedentary” tasks. See App., Vol. 2 at 222-23. In March 2018, Mr. Mannan’s work restrictions were even greater and therefore incompatible with the essential functions of a CO. 16 Reasonable Accommodation Because Mr. Mannan could not perform the essential functions of his job, we turn to the second step of the “otherwise qualified individual” inquiry—whether a reasonable accommodation existed. Mr. Mannan cannot show that CDOC could have provided a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of his job. a. Additional legal background i. Definition “[T]he term ‘reasonable accommodation’ refers to those accommodations which presently, or in the near future, enable the employee to perform the essential functions of his job.” Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995, 1007 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (defining reasonable accommodations as “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position”). Reasonable accommodations “may include”: job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2). 17