Opinion ID: 2006788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of testimony concerning defendant's amnesia.

Text: The defendant offered the testimony of two medical witnesses to the effect that the defendant had a hysterical personality and that such personality was consistent with amnesia that could be triggered by a traumatic event such as the death of a loved one. The purpose of the testimony was to rebut the inference of guilt from statements made by the defendant to investigating officers that he was unable to remember certain of the events at the time the deceased was stabbed. The trial court ruled that there was no issue concerning the testimonial trustworthiness of the statements against interest and thus the testimony offered would be irrelevant and immaterial in view of the general plea of not guilty. This court has adopted the definition of relevancy in Wharton's Criminal Evidence. Oseman v. State (1966), 32 Wis. 2d 523, 526, 145 N. W. 2d 766; Berg v. State (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 729, 739, 165 N. W. 2d 189. That definition was recently expanded to read as follows: Evidence is relevant when it is persuasive or indicative that a fact in controversy did or did not exist because the conclusion in question may be logically inferred from the evidence. The criterion of relevancy is whether or not the evidence adduced tends to cast any light upon the subject of the inquiry. Evidence of any fact is admissible as relevant which might establish the hypothesis of innocence, or show the defendant's guilt. Any evidence that assists in getting at the truth of the issue is relevant; in other words, any fact which tends to prove a material issue is relevant, even though it is only a link in the chain of facts which must be proved to make the proposition at issue appear more or less probable. As a starting point, all facts affording a reasonable inference as to either innocence or guilt are relevant and admissible. To be relevant, it is not necessary that the evidence be conclusive as to guilt or innocence; and it is sufficient that it tend to convince that the fact sought to be established is so. Relevancy is not determined by resemblance to, but by the connection with, other facts. 1 Wharton's, Anderson, Criminal Evidence (12th ed.), pp. 284-287, sec. 148. Detective Wolf testified that the defendant stated he could not remember what had happened between the time he had the knife in his hand and he saw the deceased walk down the stairs. This stated inability to remember, if feigned, gives rise to a reasonable inference of guilt. The inability to remember, if real rather than feigned, however, does not give rise to such an inference. Thus the proof offered tended to rebut the inference of guilt inherent in the statement of the defendant that he was unable to remember, and indirectly related to the innocence or guilt of the defendant. In Whitty v. State (1967), 34 Wis. 2d 278, 294, 149 N. W. 2d 557, this court adopted Rule 303 of the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence which allows the trial court to exclude relevant evidence when it concludes that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the risk that its admission will:  `. . . .  `(a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or  `(b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury, or  `(c) unfairly surprise a party who has not had reasonable ground to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.' However, this court has held that in reviewing an alleged error of the trial court in excluding relevant evidence it will not consider these factors as a basis for excluding relevant evidence unless there is an indication in the record that the trial court's discretion has been exercised; and the basis for the exercise of discretion is set forth in the record. Berg v. State, supra ; State v. Hutnik (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 754, 159 N. W. 2d 733. In this case, there is no indication in the record that the evidence was excluded in the exercise of the trial court's discretion pursuant to Rule 303 of the Model Code of Evidence. The testimony could have been excluded as irrelevant on the basis that it was so inconclusive and speculative as to have no probative value. On direct examination, in the offer of proof, the doctor testified only that on the basis of his examination of the defendant's personality and psychology, assuming that the deceased was stabbed and that the inconsistent statements attributed to the defendant were made by him to the investigating officers, the stated inability of the defendant to recall the event was consistent with amnesia. On cross-examination, he testified that he examined the defendant too long after the event and was unable to form an opinion as to whether the defendant was amnesic or not at the time he made the statement to the officer. He stated it was unlikely that the defendant would have made a true statement at that time whatever his condition of mind, and that he could either have forgotten or could have been lying. Thus the testimony had no tendency to establish whether the claimed inability of the defendant to remember was real or whether it was feigned, and had no tendency to rebut any inference of guilt raised by the defendant's inability to remember. The medical opinion testimony to have any probative value should at least advise the jury that one of the two alternatives was more probably correct. Assuming that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony, the error was harmless. This court has held that errors occurring in the course of a trial will not serve to overturn a conviction unless it clearly appears that had they not occurred, the result would probably have been more favorable to the defendant. Woodhull v. State (1969), 43 Wis. 2d 202, 168 N. W. 2d 281; Blackwell v. State (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 615, 167 N. W. 2d 587. Not only was the offered testimony vague and speculative as to whether the claimed amnesia was real, but in addition amnesia is not a legal defense to the crime. There was credible evidence that the defendant stabbed the deceased. The defendant could be found guilty of murder whether or not he was later able to remember stabbing the deceased.