Opinion ID: 1787070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the trial judge erred as a matter of law by denying the plaintiff's motion for additur, or in the alternative, for a new trial on damages, inasmuch as the jury verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Text: ¶ 33. This Court reviews for abuse of discretion when determining whether a trial court erred in refusing an additur or a new trial. Harvey v. Wall, 649 So.2d 184, 187 (Miss.1995) (citing Rodgers v. Pascagoula Pub. Sch. Dist., 611 So.2d 942, 945 (Miss.1992); Odom v. Roberts, 606 So.2d 114, 118 (Miss.1992); Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 555 So.2d 713, 723 (Miss. 1989)). Because it is primarily the province of the jury to determine the amount of damages to be awarded, the award will normally not `be set aside unless so unreasonable in amount as to strike mankind at first blush as being beyond all measure, unreasonable in amount and outrageous.' Harvey, 649 So.2d at 187 (quoting Rodgers, 611 So.2d at 945). This Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, giving him any favorable inferences that may reasonably drawn therefrom. Id. ¶ 34. In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant him an additur or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages, Herring apparently takes for granted the jury's finding that Poirrier's negligence was the proximate cause of the Herring's injuries. Herring argues that this case is similar to Williams v. Wiggins, 285 So.2d 163 (Miss.1973), in which the jury was peremptorily instructed regarding the issues of negligence and proximate cause. The only question remaining for the jury's determination was whether Williams was injured and, if so, the ascertainment of damages. In the case at hand, however, the jury was peremptorily instructed as to Poirrier's negligence only. The jury was also instructed that in order to award damages to Herring, it must find that Poirrier's negligence must be a substantial factor in producing Herring's injuries. As the trial judge explained to Poirrier's attorney during the charge conference, the jury's refusal to award damages to Herring could be based either on the jury's finding that Herring was not injured or that the damages that Herring alleged were not caused by the accident. ¶ 35. Poirrier introduced evidence at trial from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Herring's alleged injuries were not caused by the 1994 accident. Not only did Dr. Graham, an expert in orthopedic surgery offered by Poirrier, testify to Herring's preexisting back problems, but he also testified that Herring's current problems were likely not a result of the accident in question. Dr. Graham stated that Herring's injuries were due to a degenerative joint disease, normal in aging individuals, related to factors such as age, height and weight. ¶ 36. There was also evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Herring was not injured. Herring testified that two days after Dr. Danielson recommended surgery, which he ultimately underwent to put an end to, in his own words, unbearable pain, Herring went on a six-day trip to Disney World. There was also evidence, discussed above, that Herring did not follow his physician's recommendations regarding physical therapy, use of pain medication, and doctor's visits. Herring's own expert and physician, Dr. Danielson, testified that, upon his initial examination of Herring, there was no objective proof that Herring's injuries were attributable to the accident. Dr. Danielson testified that his examination of Herring did not confirm Herring's complaints. ¶ 37. Dr. Danielson stated that, though the 1994 accident may have set the landscape for Herring's injuries, disk protrusions can occur spontaneously. He stated that he would not have recommended surgery for Herring had he known that Herring had not complied with his recommendations regarding the physical therapy and that Herring's failure to comply with his instructions could impair Herring's ability to recover without the necessity of surgery. ¶ 38. Herring contends that, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 41-9-119 (1993), the proof that he incurred medical bills of $21,997.18 is prima facie evidence that the bills were necessary and reasonable. Herring contends that these medical bills constituted a minimum floor upon which the jury should have assessed damages. However, as Herring also notes, an opposing party may rebut the necessity and reasonableness of the bills, and the ultimate question is for the jury to determine. Jackson v. Brumfield, 458 So.2d 736, 737 (Miss.1984). Poirrier put forth evidence, in the form of testimony from Dr. Graham, that the first surgery performed by Dr. Danielson was without the benefit of prior examination and that the reason for conducting the surgery, correction of pain in the right leg, did not match the results of the prior examination, which revealed problems with the left leg. ¶ 39. Furthermore, even if, pursuant to § 41-9-119, Herring's medical bills were necessary and reasonable, § 41-9-119 does not mandate a finding that those medical bills were incurred as a result of the accident in question. Again, there was evidence before the jury which raised a question as to whether the accident actually caused the injuries, if any, sustained by Herring. ¶ 40. Herring contends that, according to the testimony of Dr. Graham, he was injured a minimum of eight weeks as a result of the accident. Specifically, Herring refers to Dr. Graham's testimony that in the accident, Herring may have sustained a soft tissue injury such as a low back soft tissue strain. Dr. Graham explained that the healing time for a soft tissue injury is eight weeks in a person of good nutrition and that there would be no permanent impairment as the result of such an injury. Dr. Graham did not state that Herring actually sustained such an injury or that the records reviewed by him revealed the existence of such an injury. In fact, there was no evidence of a medical examination conducted during the eightweek period following the accident. ¶ 41. Herring also argues that the case sub judice is similar to Brown v. Cuccia, 576 So.2d 1265 (Miss.1991), in which this Court reversed the trial court's refusal to grant Brown's request for an additur. Brown is factually distinguishable from the case at hand in that the Court's decision in Brown rested on the fact that the medical evidence regarding Brown's injuries and the origin of those injuries was uncontradicted by the defendant, who put forth no evidence disputing the opinion of Brown's physician that Brown had suffered a disabling back injury as a result of the accident. In the case sub judice, the testimony of Dr. Danielson was disputed by Dr. Graham. Certainly, the weight accorded to differing opinions of experts is a question of fact for the jury. Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 629 So.2d 595, 602 (Miss.1993) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Cockrell, 211 So.2d 833, 837 (Miss.1968)). And, again, it is primarily the province of the jury to determine the amount of damages to be awarded. Harvey, 649 So.2d at 187 (quoting Rodgers, 611 So.2d at 945). The jury's determination to award no damages to Herring was supported by evidence that the accident in question was not the proximate cause of Herring's alleged injuries, as well as evidence that Herring possibly was not injured at all. It cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Herring's motion for additur or, in the alternative, for a new trial on the issue of damages.