Opinion ID: 1133920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Extreme Mental Illness Mitigator

Text: Hertz alleges that the testimony of forensic psychologist Bill Mosman at the postconviction evidentiary hearing demonstrates that trial counsel clearly failed to properly develop and present the statutory mitigator of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Dr. Mosman testified that based on interviewing Hertz and reviewing both his mental health and other records, it was his opinion that Hertz suffered from incurable organic brain damage which had a genetic origin. Dr. Mosman agreed with Dr. Sesta's assessment that the large point differential in Hertz's verbal and performance IQ scores indicated frontal lobe damage. It was Dr. Mosman's opinion that there was no reason, strategic or otherwise, for not presenting evidence of this compelling mitigator. Although Dr. Mosman's firm stance that the test results indicate brain damage in the frontal lobe could have benefited Hertz if presented during his penalty phase, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that a reasonable investigation into mental health mitigation is not rendered incompetent merely because the defendant has now secured the testimony of a more favorable mental health expert. Asay v. State, 769 So.2d 974, 986 (Fla.2000); see also Davis v. State, 875 So.2d 359, 371 (Fla.2003) ([T]rial counsel was not deficient where the defendant had been examined prior to trial by mental health experts and the defendant was simply able to secure a more favorable diagnosis in postconviction.) (citing Asay ). In this case, the trial court stated that defense counsel conducted a very thorough investigation of the defendant's entire life, encompassing all areas of his upbringing, including discussing the defendant's hardships, difficulties and troubles with family members and reviewed and obtained all schooling and medical records, psychological history, disciplinary history, and criminal history. . . . [Counsel] made a strategic and reasonable decision as to presenting this information through the mental health expert he utilized. Rand's assistance is not considered ineffective simply because Hertz was able to locate a mental health expert to testify more favorably at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Additionally, even if the alleged additional mitigation that Dr. Mosman found could have been discovered by Rand and presented at the penalty phase, the trial judge determined that Dr. Mosman's testimony at the evidentiary hearing as to both the asserted brain damage and that Hertz was functioning at the mental age of a fourteen-year-old was not credible. In the order denying collateral relief, the trial court stated: There is no evidence in the record to lend weight that any mental age or extreme mental disturbance mental health mitigator asserted by Dr. Mosman, as either statutory or nonstatutory, contributed to the defendant's actions in committing his crimes. Dr. Mosman's testimony likely would have been entitled to insignificant weight had it been presented in the penalty phase. His asserted additional statutory mitigators are without basis in the record and clearly conflict with the evidence of the defendant's conduct and behavior presented during trial. He was not familiar with the significant facts and circumstances or the evidence presented during the guilt phase and his assertions of mitigation were somewhat conjectural. Dr. Mosman essentially presented no other supportable credible mitigation that would have been found that was not presented by trial counsel through the expert and lay witnesses presented. The defendant has simply presented an additional mental health expert with different conclusions than those of the expert relied upon by trial counsel. There has been no convincing demonstration that the evaluation of trial counsel's expert was insufficient. The penalty phase jury was aware of most, if not all, of the mitigation regarding the defendant's background and childhood. This Court has established that it will not substitute its judgment for that of a trial court on the credibility of witnesses if the trial court's judgment is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Porter, 788 So.2d at 923. The trial court order here describes the evidence as follows: Upon cross examination, Dr. Mosman admitted that he had not read the defendant's guilt phase trial transcripts but had read only the penalty phase. . . . He also admitted that he had not read the defendant's competency hearing transcripts during which three doctors: Dr. D'Errico, Dr. Sesta, and Dr. Conger, testified, nor had he read the competency hearing evaluation. He talked to Dr. Sesta and reviewed his report, but had not talked to Dr. D'Errico or Dr. Conger, nor read their reports. . . . [He] further acknowledged that he had not talked to the defendant's trial attorney, Robert Rand, with respect to his presentation of the defendant's mitigation, had not read defense counsel's argument, had no knowledge of and had not read the exhibit introduced into evidence and argued by Mr. Rand during the penalty phase which compiled a complete, detailed and extensive history of the defendant's background and all of his records, and also conceded that he did not know everything that the defendant's trial attorney presented. These circumstances support the trial court's determination that Dr. Mosman's testimony would have been given insignificant weight even if it had been presented at trial. Hertz relies on State v. Lara, 581 So.2d 1288 (Fla.1991), as supporting his assertion that Rand was ineffective for failing to present evidence of extreme emotional disturbance. Lara is inapposite here because it is clearly distinguishable. In Lara, this Court stated that defense counsel failed to present testimony of mental health experts regarding the defendant's diminished mental capacity and should have investigated and prepared [mental health mitigation] for presentation to the jury as evidence in mitigation at penalty phase. Lara, 581 So.2d at 1289 (quoting trial court's order). In the instant matter, the trial court specifically concluded that [c]ounsel did conduct a very thorough and reasonable investigation of mental health mitigation prior to trial and made a strategic and reasonable decision as to presenting this information through the mental health expert he utilized. Based on this record, we conclude that defense counsel did perform a reasonable investigation into mental health mitigation and that the alleged additional mental health mitigation presented in Dr. Mosman's testimony deemed unconvincing by the trial court does not undermine our confidence in the proceedings below.