Opinion ID: 5064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Pre–1988 Complaints.

Text: Essentially, Russell's pre–1988 complaints center around the Plan requirement that one must retain the status of a widow or widower to draw continuously benefits from the Plan. More plainly, Russell claims that the Plan provision was an unlawful restraint on remarriage, violative of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 14th amendment, and was contrary to public policy. Additionally, she alleges breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action. Russell did not bring her claim until more than four years after the termination of her benefits. As is well established, the prescriptive period applicable to a § 1983 claim involving an action by a Texas domiciliary is governed by the applicable Texas statute of limitations concerning torts. Jackson v. Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir.1992). Moreover, appellant's complaints founded upon violations of the state and federal constitutions and the public policy of the United States and Texas, as well as the allegations of a breach of fiduciary duty, are also governed by the tort statute. A two year period is the applicable Texas statute. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. § 16.003. Although Texas law mandates the limitation period and tolling rules, federal law will dictate when a cause of action arises. Jackson, 950 F.2d at 265. Under federal law, the period begins to run the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured. Rodriguez v. Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir.1987)). Russell was fully aware that she would lose her benefits after she remarried. The correspondence sent by Russell to the Board just prior to her remarriage reveals that Russell undoubtedly knew her benefits would terminate upon remarriage.4 Pursuant to the provisions of the Plan, she ceased to be a Plan participant on 26 April 1986, the date of her rem arriage. In federal cases, the applicable statute of limitations is not tolled until the plaintiff's complaint is received by the court clerk. Martin v. Demma, 831 F.2d 69, 71 (5th Cir.1987); Fed.R.Civ.P. 3. Thus, any complaint by appellant as to § 1983 violations, co nstitutional violations, public policy violations, misrepresentation or fiduciary duty violations concerning the denial of benefits upon a surviving spouse's remarriage accrued on the date of remarriage and would have expired more than two years prior to the filing of her suit on 11 May 1990. Applying the same date of accrual, Russell's breach of contract allegations are also barred by the applicable limitation statute. The only possible breach would have occurred when the Board failed to pay Russell under the plan. Co ntract s are governed by a four year statute of limitations. Tex.Civ.Pract. & Rem.Code § 16.004. Russell did not commence her action by the 26 April 1990 deadline, and is therefore precluded by the limitations statute. Appellant describes the trustee's failure to pay each monthly benefit as a continuing violation 4 In a letter to the Board dated 9 April 1986, Russell wrote: I'm planning to get married April 26, 1986. I want to let you know in advance so you can make the final check correct and won't have to be returned, etc. (emphasis added) that suspends the running of the statute of limitations until the payments are restored. Appellant's reliance on a continuing tort is misplaced. The test to be applied in analyzing the problem is that emanating from Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 2261, 104 L.Ed.2d 961 (1989), and summarized by this circuit in Hendrix v. Yazoo City, 911 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir.1990): As Lorance makes clear, the distinction does not turn on the type of discrimination, but on whether the practice at issue is part of or a repetition of a past discriminatory act, in which case there is a continuing violation, or whether it is facially neutral, simply giving effect to prior discrimination, in which case there is no continuing violation. Id. at 1104. Put succinctly, the question is: did the original discriminatory act have the degree of permanence that should trigger the claimant's awareness of and duty to assert her rights. Berry v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 232, 93 L.Ed.2d 158 (1986). As we have said, the discriminatory act was the termination of benefits due to claimant's remarriage. We have also recognized that appellant was unquestionably aware that her remarriage would and did sever her benefits. Her duty to assert any remaining rights in the Plan commenced on the date she stopped receiving checks. Yet, she took no action after the checks stopped. It was not until she had filed for divorce that Russell decided to reapply for benefits—apparently in the mistaken belief that her return to widow status would qualify her for reinstatement. On the basis of the unambiguous terms of the Plan, the Board declined to reinstate appellant. The Board's act of terminating of Russell's benefits upon remarriage was not revisited after her divorce, it was accomplished only once. Clearly, this is not a case involving a continuous tort.