Opinion ID: 2973991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standards applied to this case

Text: With this framework in mind, the question on appeal is whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The first step in the inquiry is determining whether any right was violated. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 (“A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”). In this case, Basim testified that he was kicked, punched, and threatened with a gun to his head in the course of the stop at issue. Basim also presented medical evidence of his injuries sustained during the stop. The district court found that the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could establish an excessive force claim. We agree with the district court. This Court reviews a decision to grant or deny summary judgment de novo. Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 817 (6th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “The burden is generally on the moving party to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, but that burden may be discharged by ‘showing — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Bennett, 410 F.3d at 817 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “In reviewing a summary No. 05-1856 Alkhateeb v. Charter Township of Waterford Page 12 judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited. Rather, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). The facts, and any inferences that can reasonably be drawn from those facts, must also be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Whether the force used during a seizure is objectively reasonable “depends on the totality of the circumstances, including 1) the severity of the crime, 2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and 3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). This list of factors is not exhaustive; the totality of the circumstances must be considered. Id. Taking Basim’s version of the events, as this Court must,we agree with the district court that the force as alleged was not reasonable and the facts would establish a violation of Basim’s Fourth Amendment rights. First, no crime was committed. See Ciminillo, 434 F.3d at 467 (noting that “[o]ther courts have found that the fact that a plaintiff in a § 1983 suit had committed no crime clearly weighed against a finding of reasonableness” and citing Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 743-44 (4th Cir. 2003)). Although the defendants testified that they believed they were responding to a call about drug activity, the record shows that the dispatcher coded the citizen call as “Blue” with code number 9027 meaning “surveillance detail.” JA 537. If the citizen call were for suspicion of drug No. 05-1856 Alkhateeb v. Charter Township of Waterford Page 13 trafficking, the call would have been coded “Red” with number 1800 meaning “narcotics complaint.” Second, there is no evidence that Basim and his brothers posed any kind of threat to the officers. When Officer Lemos drew his weapon and ordered Basim to the ground, Basim complied. Basim then complied by putting his hands behind his neck. Basim then alleges that while on the ground with his hands behind his head, Lemos asked Basim if he was “Arab,” and then repeatedly kicked him and yelled at him. Basim alleges that Lemos then pointed his gun at Basim’s head and pressed the gun to his temple. According to Basim’s version of events, Officer Ross then approached and placed his knees on the back of Basim’s neck. The officers then immediately searched Basim’s pockets and confiscated his personal possessions without his consent. At no time did Basim act in a threatening manner or attempt to resist or flee. See Ciminillo, 434 F.3d at 467 (finding it relevant that “there is no evidence to suggest that [the section 1983 plaintiff] was attempting to resist or evade arrest by flight”). Basim was then handcuffed and placed in the back of a police cruiser. Considering the totality of the circumstances, there is little, if anything, in the record that would justify the officers’ purported use of gratuitous force. In Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2001), this Court held that officers acted unreasonably by placing handcuffs that were too tight on a plaintiff who had been stopped for committing a traffic violation. Here, the force was beyond the mere use of handcuffs. Additionally, in Ciminillo, this Court found it relevant that the section 1983 plaintiffs’ “conduct demonstrated that he was not armed, and thus posed no threat to the officers’ safety.” 434 F.3d at 467; see also Robinson v. Nolte, 77 Fed. App’x 414, 414 (9th No. 05-1856 Alkhateeb v. Charter Township of Waterford Page 14 Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (finding the use of deadly force to be objectively unreasonable against a visibly armed plaintiff who had his hands over his head in the ‘surrender position’). Here, there was never any indication that Basim or his brothers were armed. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Basim, they do establish the use of excessive force. Based on this conclusion, the Court should proceed to the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. Despite finding that the allegations establish a violation of a constitutional right, the defendants may still be entitled to qualified immunity if the right alleged to have been violated was not “clearly established” at the time of the stop. “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held to be unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Thus, this Court must determine whether it would have been clear to a reasonable officer in the Waterford officers’ position that kicking Basim, holding a gun to his head, and kneeling on his neck, was unreasonable. In our opinion, the unlawfulness of holding a gun to a suspect’s head while berating him about his nationality is apparent. No reasonable officer in Lemos’ position would think that what he was alleged to have done would be lawful. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (noting that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances”). Moreover, in this Circuit, the law is clearly established that an officer may not use additional gratuitous force once a suspect has been neutralized. See Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, No. 05-1856 Alkhateeb v. Charter Township of Waterford Page 15 301 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding “no governmental interest in continuing to beat Phelps after he had been neutralized, nor could a reasonable officer have thought there was”); see also Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that force alleged to have been used would be unreasonable where plaintiff alleged that after complying with officer’s orders, the officer attacked him verbally and physically, put him in a headlock, and slammed his head against a tree several times, resulting in injuries). Likewise, in Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir. 1994), this Court held that after a suspect was incapacitated by mace, the continued use of force, which involved continuing to spray mace on the incapacitated suspect, was excessive as a matter of law. In McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988), this Court held that hitting a handcuffed suspect with a nightstick when the suspect was not resisting was gratuitous and unreasonable. Also, in Darnell v. Caver, 1998 WL 416000 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished), this Court held that it was unreasonable to lift a suspect’s head and let it drop to the pavement after the suspect had been thrown to the ground. See also Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding use of force to violate the Constitution — albeit wrongly analyzing under the Fourteenth Amendment’s heightened standard — where police officers kicked a handcuffed woman and struck her husband and son with nightsticks in the course of arresting them). Thus, with the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Basim, the officers inflicted force that was gratuitous and would have been recognized by a reasonable officer as excessive. Officers are and have been on notice that the use of gratuitous force against a detained and passive or nonresisting suspect violates the Constitution. No reasonable officer would have believed that he could No. 05-1856 Alkhateeb v. Charter Township of Waterford Page 16 kick, kneel upon a suspect’s neck, or hold a gun to a suspect’s head when that suspect has shown no sign of resistance, no sign of being armed or dangerous, and is already subdued.