Opinion ID: 763105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ambiguous Testimony at the First Trial

Text: 51 The District Court devoted a number of its findings to a comparison between Whitaker's testimony about why Pelullo took the stand and what Pelullo actually testified to on the stand at the first trial. Finding that Pelullo did not testify unambiguously about the things he had purportedly planned to testify to, the District Court inferred that Whitaker's testimony was not entirely believable and appeared to be an after-the-fact explanation of why Pelullo took the stand. See id. at 414-15. 52 Specifically, Whitaker stated that Pelullo wanted to tell the jury his version of events; with regard to the FBI interview, the Court perceived that version to be a clear statement that Pelullo used the $114,000 to repay company debt. But the Court found that Pelullo never explicitly offered this explanation. See id. at 415. Instead, the Court noted that Pelullo testified at trial, I said I don't remember the $114,000 going to pay Tony DiSalvo, but I do have or did have a loan with Tony DiSalvo. See id. The Court concluded that the two versions of what Mr. Pelullo supposedly told the FBI agents are irreconcilable. See id. 53 We disagree. The District Court apparently wanted Pelullo to testify verbatim about what he ostensibly told the FBI agents, but that was not within its power to require. At all events, the two versions are not irreconcilable. The District Court ignored the segment of Pelullo's testimony that came just before the above-quoted language. In response to a question about the circumstances of the February wire transfer, Pelullo stated, That transfer was a transfer that I made to authorize to LRP for moneys that my dad was owed by the company. Since Pelullo had just testified that the February wire transfer went to pay off an intercompany debt, it is overly formalistic to require that he reiterate that point a few questions later in predetermined language. In sum, the District Court clearly erred on this set of findings, but this does not render its overall conclusion clearly erroneous. 54 The District Court found similar problems with Pelullo's testimony about Leonetti. While acknowledging that Pelullo denied meeting Leonetti, the Court noted that Pelullo admitted that he had been to Scarfo's house on two occasions, and that he did not deny that these visits had occurred in January 1986. The Court then faulted Pelullo for failing to deny that he met with Mr. Scarfo and Mr. Leonetti on either or both of those occasions. See id. at 416. But Pelullo had already testified, when asked if Leonetti ever contacted him about the DiSalvo loan, that Leonetti never had contacted him. Perhaps his lawyer should have made sure to ask Pelullo whether he visited Scarfo's house in January; it appears that Pelullo did not deny that his visits to Scarfo's house were in January because he was never asked when those visits occurred. The District Court declared, It is inconceivable to me under these circumstances that Mr. Pelullo would have given up his constitutional privilege only for the purpose of providing such vague and ambiguous testimony. See id. While it would be unfair to require Pelullo to lay out his defense in specific words, we do not think the District Court erred in inferring that Pelullo would have set forth a clearer defense if he truly had decided to testify solely to rebut the government's case on Count 54.