Opinion ID: 619809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim II and Claim IV requests under Exemptions 7E and 7F

Text: Having decided that the Supermax staff roster and the copies of select pieces of Mr. Jordan's mail meet Exemption 7's threshold law enforcement purposes requirement under the per se test, we turn to the specific portions of Exemption 7 the BOP relied on in withholding these records. We will first address the Supermax staff roster.
The BOP invoked Exemption 7F in withholding the Supermax staff roster. As noted, the magistrate judge concluded that the BOP had to release the roster but with staff members' names redacted on the ground that releasing staff names could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F), by exposing them to threats, manipulation, and harm. See Jordan II, 2010 WL 3023795, at , . On appeal, Mr. Jordan first argues that a provision of BOP Program Statement 1351.05 (2002), which establishes procedures for the release of records under the FOIA and the Privacy Act, forecloses reliance on Exemption 7F with respect to the roster. That provision states: A list of Bureau employees may be generally releasable. R. at 435 (Program Statement 1351.05, Pt. One, § 9.c.). Mr. Jordan argues that the BOP is compelled to abide by its Program Statement. The difficulty with Mr. Jordan's argument is its disregard of another provision in the Program Statement permitting BOP staff to assert any applicable exemption to disclosure which is provided under the FOIA. Id. at 429 (Program Statement 1351.05, Pt. One, § 7.c.). Thus, the Program Statement permits, rather than forecloses, the assertion of Exemption 7F. Mr. Jordan also notes that in Maydak v. United States Department of Justice, 362 F.Supp.2d 316 (D.D.C.2005), the district court found exemption [7F] inapplicable to shield BOP staff names. Aplt. Br. at 22. Aside from being nonbinding on this court, Maydak is clearly distinguishable. The Maydak court ordered the release of BOP staff names for two reasons, neither of which is applicable here. First, the BOP failed to establish Exemption 7's threshold requirement that the names were contained in a record compiled for law enforcement purposes. Maydak, 362 F.Supp.2d at 323. Here we have concluded to the contrary in our adoption of the per se rule. Second, the BOP admitted to having a policy of releasing staff names, titles, and salaries to the general public but not to prisoners, and the Maydak court concluded that an agency cannot base its disclosure decisions on the identity of the requester or the purpose of the request. Id. Here, there is no indication that the BOP releases the names of Supermax staff to the general public but not to inmates. Accordingly, Maydak is not persuasive. [6] Hence, we conclude that the BOP met its burden under Exemption 7F.
The BOP relied on Exemption 7E to withhold 495 pages of Mr. Jordan's mail the SIS Office had copied. Again, Exemption 7E applies if the release of records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). The BOP argued that releasing the copied mail would reveal [t]he technique and procedure used for determining which items [are] of interest, thereby enabling inmates to circumvent staff's efforts. R. at 252, ¶ 57. Mr. Jordan argues that the BOP's own evidence contradicts its rationale. He points to a statement in the affidavit of a BOP paralegal that [w]hat is copied and placed in the information file is at the discretion of the SIS Technician reviewing the mail and is based on his or her professional judgment and experience. Id. at 500-01, ¶ 8. Mr. Jordan claims this statement shows there is no technique or procedure used for determining which mail items are of interestthat is, it is left to individual discretionand therefore any concern about circumvention of the law is unreasonable. He also argues that to the extent the technician's judgment and experience is a technique or procedure, it is now publicly known and therefore cannot be shielded under Exemption 7F. It does not appear that Mr. Jordan advanced these theories in the district court. The paralegal's affidavit was submitted in response to a court order that, in relevant part, requested a supplemental affidavit addressing the scope of the search for documents responsive to Claim IV. Id. at 496. In his response to the supplemental affidavit, Mr. Jordan argued that defendants failed to show that the technician's discretion was exercised parcel to or exclusively parcel to any law enforcement proceeding, or otherwise and more importantly connect any of the withheld documents/information to any law enforcement purpose or proceeding. Id. at 516-17. Accordingly, Jordan forfeited his new theories on this issue. See Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128 (10th Cir.2011) (explaining that a theory is forfeited when a party simply fails to present it to the district court). When a matter is forfeited, we may review for plain error, but that review is limited to whether there was a clear legal error that implicates a miscarriage of justice. Id. Mr. Jordan has not addressed the belated nature of his new theories, let alone argued for plain-error review, which surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court. Id. at 1131.