Opinion ID: 1194191
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Termination of Stewart order related to access to day room.

Text: The Stewart order requires that inmates be given access to the day room for two hours daily, but provides for curtailment or elimination of the right to day room access for security or disciplinary reasons. Confinement necessarily imposes restraints on detainees' freedom of movement and access to recreation. Nonetheless, such restrictions may constitute punishment in the constitutional sense, and thus violate the Fourteenth Amendment, if they are not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and . . . appear excessive in relation to that purpose. Bell, 441 U.S. at 561, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Given the conditions and average duration of confinement in administrative segregation and similarly restrictive classifications, failure to provide detainees with the opportunity for some daily out-of-cell movement raises serious constitutional questions. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 543, 99 S.Ct. 1861(considering day room access as a factor that mitigates overcrowding); Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 493-94 (7th Cir.1981) (finding that the importance of day room access increases as the length of time the detainee spends in the cell increases and the size of the cell decreases). The record evidence demonstrated that administrative segregation detainees, were, in fact, given access to the day room. The restrictions placed on use of the day room  limiting administrative segregation detainees' use of the room to one or two inmates at a timeare reasonably related to institutional security concerns. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because in this instance the County's restrictions still permit access to the day rooms and do not evince any punitive intent. Accordingly, there is no evidence of a current and ongoing violation of a Federal right, and we therefore also affirm the district court's termination of this Stewart order. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). [23] D. The district court erred by finding that the County was not in violation of the ADA. Having addressed the portions of this appeal relating to the Stewart injunction and the claims of the overall Pierce class, we turn our attention to the rights of the Pierce sub-class of mobility- and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees. Plaintiffs argued at trial that the County was not in compliance with the ADA or California's co-extensive access requirements at § 54.1 of the California Civil Code. Plaintiffs maintained that the County failed to address numerous structural barriers and, as a result, denied mobility- and dexterity-impaired detainees access to various features and elements of their cells and common spaces. They also argued that, because of their disabilities, they were segregated and denied access to a variety of the County's educational, rehabilitative, and recreation programs, services, and activities for pretrial detainees. Despite finding that the County was not in full ADA compliance, the district court decline[d] to declare an ADA or California Civil Code violation, or order injunctive relief. This decision cannot stand. As we explain below, we reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1. Standards for evaluation of the ADA claims. Pursuant to Title II of the ADA, a qualified individual with a disability cannot, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. [24] It is undisputed that Title II applies to the Orange County jails' services, programs, and activities for detainees. See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-10, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir.2001). The regulations promulgated under Title II spell out the obligations of public entities. [25] Under the regulations, a qualified individual with a disability (an individual for whom reasonable modifications may be required, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)) must not be excluded from or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities because the entity's facilities are inaccessible or unusable. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.149. Generally, public entities must make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity. Id. § 35.130(b)(7); see McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265-67(9th Cir.2004). In a subsection titled existing facilities, the regulations provide that a public entity must operate each service, program, and activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). The regulations, however, note in relevant part that: (1) a public entity is not necessarily required to make each of its existing facilities accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, id. § 35.150(a)(1); and (2) a public entity is not required to take any action that it can demonstrate would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens, id. § 35.150(a)(3). [26] The regulations allow public entities to use a variety of methods to make existing facilities readily accessible, including the reassignment of services to accessible buildings and the alteration of existing facilities and construction of new facilities. Id. § 35.150(b)(1). Section 35.150(b)(1) provides: A public entity is not required to make structural changes in existing facilities where other methods are effective in achieving compliance with this section. . . . In choosing among available methods for meeting the requirements of this section, a public entity shall give priority to those methods that offer services, programs, and activities to qualified individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate. Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A(stating that under Title II the concept of program access will continue to apply with respect to facilities now in existence, because the cost of retrofitting existing facilities is often prohibitive). To the extent that structural changes are to be made to an existing facility, the accessibility requirements that apply to new construction and alterations, set out in 28 C.F.R. § 35.151, must be met. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1). In addition, the regulations require that an entity with more than fifty employees, such as Orange County, develop a transition plan setting forth the steps that must be taken to complete any planned structural changes. Id. § 35.150(d)(1). Finally, January 26, 1995, was the deadline for making structural changes under the regulations. Id. § 35.150(c). While § 35.150 addresses itself to existing facilities, § 35.151 concerns new construction and alterations. The regulatory requirements in this section are somewhat more straightforward. See Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 6 & n. 7 (1st Cir.2000) (comparing Title II's regulations governing existing facilities and new construction and alterations). Section 35.151 requires that any part of a public entity's facility constructed after January 26, 1992 must be designed and constructed in conformance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (`UFAS') (41 C.F.R. Pt. 101-19.6, App. A) or with the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities ('ADAAG') (28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A). Id. § 35.151(a), (c) (allowing departures from these standards when it is clearly evident that equivalent access is afforded). And, to the maximum extent possible, any part of a public entity's facility altered after January 26, 1992 in a manner that affects or could affect [its] usability must also be altered in conformance with one of these accessibility standards. Id. § 35.151(b), (c). 2. ADA standards in the context of prison administration. While the regulations promulgated under Title II provide a framework for analyzing ADA claims generally, we have held that inmates' rights must be analyzed in light of effective prison administration. Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir.1994). As the district court observed, we held in Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447, that inmates' claims that their rights under the Rehabilitation Act had been violated were subject to the so-called reasonable relation standard articulated in Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. [27] Under Turner, a regulation that would impinge on inmates' constitutional rights is nevertheless valid if it is reasonably related to the prison's legitimate interests. [28] Id. We concluded in Gates that to prevail on a claim that their statutory rights have been violated, inmates must show that the challenged prison policy or regulation is unreasonable. Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447. [29] In ADA cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the elements of the prima facie case, including  if needed  the existence of a reasonable accommodation that would enable him to participate in the program, service, or activity at issue. Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1046. The public entity may then rebut this by showing that the requested accommodation would require a fundamental alteration or would produce an undue burden. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3). As we explained in Zukle, determining whether a modification or accommodation is reasonable always requires a fact-specific, context-specific inquiry. 166 F.3d at 1048. This analysis permits a court to consider, with deference to the expert views of facility administrators, a detention or correctional facility's legitimate interests (namely, in maintaining security and order and operating [an] institution in a manageable fashion, Bell, 441 U.S. at 540 n. 23, 99 S.Ct. 1861) when determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable. Cf. Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir.1997). 3. The County has failed to reasonably accommodate mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired inmates in violation of the ADA. The plaintiff class of mobility- and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees contends that the County's failure to accommodate their disabilities has prevented them from enjoying a number of the County's services, programs, and activities. They argue that the County has not reasonably addressed various structural barriers, and maintains unreasonable policies and practices in violation of the ADA. a. Physical barriers. With regard to barriers, the district court found the evidence to show that the Orange County jails have not yet been brought into full ADA compliance. In 2000, Orange County adopted a Transition Plan to move existing facilities toward ADA compliance. That plan was directed more toward structural modifications of public and visitor areas than toward compliance in inmate areas. The district court went on to state that inmate witnesses and plaintiff's expert, Mr. Robertson, identified various specific architectural barriers and features that are out of compliance with the ADA. These findings are clearly supported by the record. As of 2004, when the case went to trial, the County housed mobility- and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees in two of its five facilitiesthe Men's and Women's Central Jails. Male inmates with such disabilities were placed in one of three parts of Module O in the Men's Jail: Sheltered Living, Ward C, or Ward D. Female inmates with such disabilities were housed in either Sheltered Living in Module P of the Women's Jail or the infirmary. Plaintiffs' expert witness Peter Robertson was permitted to tour these areas, and to take photographs and measurements of the structures and fixtures. He testified at length regarding his measurements, observations, and conclusions. Robertson maintained that a host of features and fixturesincluding toilets, sinks, showers, hot water dispensers, telephones, and water fountainsin cells or common spaces the County referred to as accessible did not comply with federal accessibility standards. [30] Since the district court's order fails to specify which architectural barriers and features [were] out of compliance with the ADA, we limit ourselves to noting  in support of the court's proper, but vague, finding  that a number of the deficiencies reported by Robertson were conceded by Ron Bihner, the project manager charged with supervising structural modifications at the County jails pursuant to the Transition Plan, and many others were not explicitly disputed. Notably, Bihner agreed that the showers in Wards C and D were not accessible to the mobility-impaired, conceded that the toilet and sink in the women's infirmary day room were inaccessible to individuals in wheelchairs, and acknowledged that the rooftop exercise and recreation areas afforded to male and female disabled detainees did not offer accessible bathroom facilities. [31] The County presented no evidence to dispute Robertson's assertions that rooftop telephones and water fountains were inaccessible to those in wheelchairs and that the sinks and toilets serving the Women's Central Jail classroom were inaccessible, as well as facilities in other areas. [32] While it is evident that the district court was well-supported by the record when it observed (albeit without specificity) that the existence of barriers had been shown, the district court inexplicably made further findings which are unsupported by and contrary to the record: The court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because they had not shown that effective modifications could be made, or that where an architectural shortcoming existed, it was not made accessible by other appropriate action taken by a jail employee. The district court asserted broadly that where structural corrections had not been made, the County had shown that other effective remedies [were] in use. To begin, we agree that plaintiffs were required to show `the existence of . . . reasonable accommodation[s]' that would enable them to make use of the facilities. Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1046(quoting Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1998)). Any finding that they did not do so is legal error. Robertson's testimony included site-specific suggestions of structural, as well as non-structural, accommodations. He drew upon the minimum standards set out in the UFAS or the ADAAG for proposed structural changes, such as the repositioning of a sink or the replacement of controls. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1)(requiring that structural modifications be made in accord with the guidelines for new construction, UFAS or ADAAG). Alternative solutions to remedy some access problems were also offered. For example, Robertson noted in one instance that an inaccessible water fountain could be remedied by adding a cup dispenser rather than changing the position of the fountain. The district court found further that the County was not required to remedy structural deficiencies because other curative methods provided disabled individuals with the requisite access. We agree, as a matter of law, that where reasonable alternative methods achieve compliance, structural changes to existing facilities need not be made. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1). However, there is no support for the court's conclusion that such methods were shown to cure the many structural deficiencies in this case. The only deficiencies that were shown to be addressed by alternate methods were small surface-elevation changesi.e., ridges or curbsthat otherwise posed obstacles to movement between locations. Robertson observed, for example, that a five-inch curb obstructed access to the women's rooftop recreation area. He testified that this could be overcome by having a trained deputy guide a wheelchair over the curb. The record supports the conclusion that deputies, in fact, do this, and plaintiffs are not denied access to the rooftop or other locations because of these surface irregularities. [33] The County did not present evidence, as the district court's broad finding asserts, that other deficiencies were remedied through the assistance of deputies or by other curative methods. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, presented evidence to show that deficiencies were not remedied. Robertson testified, for example, that he observed detaineesnot deputiesstruggling to lift a fellow wheelchair-bound detainee over a foot-high retention wall in one of Ward C's inaccessible showers. Conn also testified that he was forced to rely on fellow inmates for assistance when faced with inaccessible bathroom facilities. [34] The impediment posed by such a barrier highlights the inadequacy of deputy or other inmate assistance. The County maintained throughout the trial that the deputies have their hands full given the ratio of deputies to inmates and the various duties incumbent upon the former. Staffing limits make it unreasonable to expect to address all structural deficiencies through deputy assistance. The County argues that the district court's holding should, in any event, be affirmed because plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden under Turner. We disagree. Even under Turner, the County was required to proffer some reason for its policy or practice. See Armstrong '01, 275 F.3d at 874. The County did not posit any legitimate rationale for maintaining inaccessible bathrooms, sinks, showers, and other fixtures in the housing areas and commons spaces assigned to mobilityand dexterity impaired detainees. [35] The vague assertion by the County's counsel that some accommodations might be costly cannot be construed as a legitimate basis for failing to comply with the ADA (whether through structural modifications or other reasonable methods). See id.; Walker, 917 F.2d at 386. We conclude that the district court erred in denying relief because it based its conclusion on clearly erroneous factual findings. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings. b. Integration and access to programs and services. Plaintiffs also argued that, by virtue of being housed exclusively in the Men's and Women's Central Jails, they were denied access to a variety of programs, activities, and services for which they would otherwise be eligible. Plaintiffs essentially advanced two arguments: First, they challenged the County's policy of segregating disabled detainees, rather than allowing them to reside, recreate, and consume meals in integrated settings. Second, they argued that, regardless of where they are housed, the County had not operate[d] each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, [was] readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, as required by 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). The district court rejected plaintiffs' claims. First, the court concluded that the segregation of disabled detainees was reasonably related to legitimate interests, and therefore declined to order mainstreaming. Second, the court found that the evidence shows that, except for the `Best Choice' Program, the various inmate programs are also available to disabled inmates, and concluded that this was reasonable. The exclusion of disabled inmates from the Best Choice Program, a drug rehabilitation program, was deemed reasonable in light of security concerns. We do not find error in the district court's ruling regarding mainstreaming. Sheriff's Department officials testified at some length regarding the security concerns related to housing mobility- and dexterity-impaired detainees with non-disabled detainees. The district court's finding that plaintiffs did not refute this evidence is not clearly erroneous. The district court's finding that disabled inmates had access to all programs, save the Best Choice program, cannot, however, be squared with the record. [36] As we mentioned earlier, as of 2004, disabled detainees with mobility and dexterity impairments were not housed in the County's James A. Musick Facility or Theo Lacy Facility. [37] The testimony of Sheriff's Department officials revealed that Theo Lacy and Musick offered a variety of programs, services, and activities which were not available to inmates of the Men's and Women's Central Jails. For example, programs in agriculture, woodworking, and welding were among the vocational opportunities available at Musick or Theo Lacy, but not available at the Central Jail Complex. In addition, detainees at Musick and Theo Lacy were afforded opportunities to participate in off-site or community work projects. The recreational opportunities available at Musick or Theo Lacywhere inmates had access to a softball field, volleyball courts, pool tables, and other indoor and outdoor facilitiesalso exceeded those provided at the Central Jail Complex. The Central Jail Complex houses both disabled and non-disabled detainees. However, non-disabled detainees retain at least the possibility of access to the programs offered at Musick and Theo Lacy, while disabled detaineessolely by virtue of their status as disabledhave no possibility of access to the superior services offered outside of the Central Jail Complex. The ADA does not require perfect parity among programs offered by various facilities that are operated by the same umbrella institution. But an inmate cannot be categorically excluded from a beneficial prison program based on his or her disability alone. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952(Modern prisons provide inmates with many recreational `activities,' medical `services,' and educational and vocational `programs,' all of which at least theoretically `benefit' the prisoners (and any of which disabled prisoners could be `excluded from participation in').). Moreover, ADA regulations contemplate reassignment of services to accessible buildings, as a permissible means of accommodation. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1). The County would not have to make Musick and Theo Lacy physically or structurally ADA compliant. It might consider, for example, redistributing some programs available at those two facilities to make them available at the Central Jail so that when viewed in [their] entirety the County's programs are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a). But the County may not shunt the disabled into facilities where there is no possibility of access to those programs. [38] While the County need not make all of its existing facilities accessible to individuals with or without disabilities, it is expected to provide program access. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A. Any type of educational, vocational, rehabilitative, or recreational program, service, or activity offered to nondisabled detainees should, when viewed in its entirety, be similarly available to disabled detainees who, with or without reasonable accommodations, meet the essential eligibility requirements to participate. The County has offered no explanation or justification, either in district court or on appeal, for the significant differences between the vocational and recreational activities available at Theo Lacy and Musick, and those available to either able or disabled detainees at the Central Jail. As such, the County has not raised the defense that a policy of restricting access to these programs, services, or activities is reasonably related to a legitimate government objective. See Armstrong '01, 275 F.3d at 874. We conclude that the district court erred when it concluded that disabled inmates had access to the various inmate programs, and we must remand as further fact-finding is required to determine what relief is appropriate. [39] In particular, the district court should examine the extent to which the programs offered at Theo Lacy and Musick are capable of reassignment to the Central Jail without eliminating those programs at Theo Lacy or Musick. c. The district court's unsupported assumption that the County would move toward full compliance was clearly erroneous. The district court determined that the County was not in compliance with the ADA, but took it on faith that the County would move toward full compliance. This conclusion is unwarranted given the County's track record. The County adopted its Transition Plan for structural changes in August 2000eight years after the deadline set by the regulations for such plans, and five and a half years after the regulations' deadline for the completion of structural modifications. [40] Furthermore, when ultimately adopted, the Plan failed to address many architectural barriers in common spaces used by disabled detainees (for example, those on the rooftop of the Men's and Women's Jails). Diane DeHaas, the Orange County ADA Title II Coordinator, testified that the work under the Transition Plan had been completed, and spoke of no particular plans to remedy any of the glaring deficiencies. The County has done even less to ensure that disabled detainees are given opportunities to benefit from the various programs, activities, and services offered by the jails. While Title II regulations require that the County complete a self-evaluation regarding the availability of programs, activities, and services, see 28 C.F.R § 35.105(a), DeHaas conceded that she did not know whether it had been done for the County jails. Moreover, she admitted that she had no information about whether disabled detainees could have access to educational programs or a variety of other services. In any event, neither the fact that Orange County might move toward compliance nor the district court's belief that it would do so eventually constituted a proper basis for denying plaintiffs relief. We must remand so that the district court can engage in further fact-finding, consistent with our opinion, to determine what relief should be granted. We note that several years have passed since the trial was held, and, as a result, determining what prospective relief is warranted may require consideration of any significantly changed facts. [41] Finally, the district court's Final Pierce Order did not address plaintiffs' claims that they were denied adequate notice of their rights under the ADA and an appropriate grievance procedure, as required by the regulations. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.106, 35.107. On remand, the district court also should make findings on these issues. d. Claims for mental and emotional harms. Prior to trial the district court granted summary judgment to Orange County on plaintiffs' claims for mental and emotional harms. We conclude that decision was in error as it related to two specific allegations advanced by plaintiff Timothy Conn. According to plaintiffs' complaint, Conn alleged that the County failed to adequately accommodate his disability in violation of the ADA, and that he suffered physical injuries, as well as mental and emotional distress, as a result. The district court's March 1, 2004 order held that these alleged injuries were merely de minimis, and therefore precluded by the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), from giving rise to any cognizable claim under the ADA for compensatory damages. The PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), states, No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. See Oliver, 289 F.3d at 626-27(concluding that § 1997e(e) requires a showing of physical injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis. ). Conn challenges the district court's determination, arguing that § 1997e(e) does not apply to claims under the ADA and that his injuries were in any case more than de minimis. While the former argument is unpersuasive in light of the plain language of § 1997e(e), [42] the latter argument compels our reversal of the district court's decision with regard to two of Conn's allegations. Conn alleged that during his detention in 2000-2001 he was denied an adequate supply of catheters, and as a result suffered recurrent bladder infections. He also alleged that he was not provided a proper mattress given his disability, and as a result developed bed sores. Neither of these injuries is de minimis. Both bladder infections and bed sores pose significant pain and health risks to paraplegics like Conn. [43] Our court has rejected as overly restrictive the standard for de minimis injuries espoused by the Northern District of Texas in Luong v. Hatt, 979 F.Supp. 481 (N.D.Tex.1997), which requires `an observable or diagnosable medical condition requiring treatment by a medical care professional,' which would cause a `free world person' to seek such treatment. Oliver, 289 F.3d at 628. We have maintained that if allowing claims for de minimis injuries requires too little of plaintiffs, this standard requires too much. Id. Yet notably, Conn's alleged bed sores and bladder infections clear even that stringent standard. Both constitute `observable or diagnosable medical conditions' that would lead a person to seek treatment. See id. [44] In sum, these claims were improperly dismissed, and we remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. E. The district court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection claims. Finally, the disabled plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly rejected the equal protection claim brought by the sub-class of mobility- and dexterity-impaired detainees. After reviewing the district court's November 2004 ruling de novo, see Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir.2004), we affirm the grant of summary judgment. The district court considered whether plaintiffs could establish that they were treated differently from how similarly situated prisoners are treated. This is the first step in a successful equal protection claim based on disability. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 490, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). Because `the disabled do not constitute a suspect class' for equal protection purposes, a governmental policy that purposefully treats the disabled differently from the non-disabled need only be `rationally related to legitimate legislative goals' to pass constitutional muster. Lee, 250 F.3d at 687(quoting Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.1996)). However, the court's assertion that disabled and nondisabled detainees are not similarly situated for equal-protection purposes is an overstatement. Disabled and nondisabled detainees may be similarly situated in some instances. See, e.g., More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 270-71 (8th Cir.1993) (finding that wheelchair-bound inmates and nondisabled inmates were equally capable of watching television without assistance, and therefore were similarly situated with regard to the installation of cable television); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.). Nonetheless, we conclude that the district court's holding was proper, given the case presented by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' allegations in support of their equal protection claim did not show that they were treated differently from similarly situated prisoners. For example, although plaintiffs alleged that paraplegic and quadriplegic detainees were kept in holding cells without accessible toilets and sinks, they did not allege that the County accommodated the special needs of any other group with regard to toilet or sink access. While these allegations implicate the County's ADA obligations, they do not, without more, implicate equal protection concerns.