Opinion ID: 2413244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Adverse Possession Without Regard To a Deed To a One-Half Interest in Land

Text: The finding of the jury that Hart and his tenant had had adverse possession to a one-half interest in the larger tract for ten years without regard to a deed raises many very difficult questions of substantive law and of procedure. Many of the problems are not raised and are not briefed. The Court of Civil Appeals did not pass on the points of error attacking the questions of no evidence and insufficient evidence to support the answer to that issue. Since that court did not pass upon the points, they were not raised in the motion for rehearing of the lumber company or presented to us in its application for writ of error. While we might return the case to the Court of Civil Appeals for it to pass upon the points, we have determined that in the interest of justice these questions should be remanded to the trial court along with the issue of adverse possession under a deed discussed above. Rule 503, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Hart brought the suit alleging himself to be the owner of a one-half interest in the land. He introduced a deed which he asserted vested him with ownership of an undivided one-half interest. He testified on the trial that he recognized the [undivided] ownership of the company to the extent of one-half. This was a recognition of a cotenancy in the land. The theory of Hart's counsel (set out in their brief in the Court of Civil Appeals) is that Hart had exclusive adverse possession of the entire tract and that he simply did not wish to claim the other half undivided interest. Under that theory, the issues to the jury should have been couched in terms of adverse possession of the entire tract, not a half interest in the tract. The finding of the jury that Hart held adverse possession to a one-half interest does not support Hart's theory. We do not here pass upon the correctness of the theory. We do say that the answers of the jury do not support it. Hart is faced with many decisions forming a general rule to the effect that possession by one cotenant is lawful as to his cotenant. Each cotenant is entitled to possession, and possession by one is not generally adverse to the other in the absence of some repudiation, notice, or ouster. 4 Tiffany on Real Property (3rd ed.) 526, § 1185; 4 Thompson on Real Property (Perm. ed.) 405, § 1881 et seq. Art. 5515 defines adverse possession as an actual and visible appropriation of the land, commenced and continued under a claim of right inconsistent with and hostile to the claim of another. This Court has, under other circumstances, held that this statute means that the possession must be exclusive. Rick v. Grubbs, 147 Tex. 267, 214 S.W.2d 925. If the Respondent Hart has a theory that a person can acquire adverse possession to an undivided interest in the land against a cotenant while recognizing the right of the cotenant to possession of the land with him, he may present it upon the retrial. We do not pass upon that or the other related points at this time because they are not here raised. Compare, Noble v. Hill, 8 Tex.Civ. App. 171, 27 S.W. 756, and Le Blanc v. Jackson, Tex.Com.App., 210 S.W. 687. And see annotations, 32 A.L.R.2d 1214, and 27 A.L.R. 8.