Opinion ID: 1171395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: trestle removal

Text: In his cross appeal, defendant challenges the propriety of the court's order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the issue of whether removal of the trestles constituted a violation of the SMA. The court held that the demolition and removal of the trestles constituted a substantial development under the SMA, and that the demolition and removal of the trestles without a permit constituted a violation of the act. The question whether defendant was liable for damages resulting from that violation was left for trial. In the subsequent trial, therefore, the question whether removal of the trestles constituted a substantial development was not at issue, having been resolved on summary judgment. CR 56(d). [7] In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Marincovich v. Tarabochia, 114 Wn.2d 271, 274, 787 P.2d 562 (1990). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); Marincovich, at 274. Facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom are considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary judgment should be granted only if, from all the evidence, reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion. Marincovich, at 274; Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982); Glesener v. Balholm, 50 Wn. App. 1, 7, 747 P.2d 475 (1987). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate there is no issue as to a material fact, and the moving party is held to a strict standard. Atherton Condominium Apartment-Owners Ass'n v. Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wn.2d 506, 516, 799 P.2d 250 (1990). Defendant argues that summary judgment was improper because as a matter of law the removal of the trestles did not constitute a development under the SMA. We agree that, as a matter of law, removal of the trestles did not constitute a development within the meaning of the SMA, and partial summary judgment was improperly granted. We therefore do not address defendant's additional arguments that there remain material issues of fact as to whether removal of the trestles constituted a substantial development under the SMA. [8] Cowiche Creek is within the jurisdiction of the SMA. See WAC 173-18-430(5) (designating creek as shoreline of state). Under the SMA, no substantial development shall be undertaken on shorelines of the state without first obtaining a permit from the local government having administrative jurisdiction under RCW 90.58. RCW 90.58.140(2); see RCW 90.58.140(3). Development is defined for purposes of the SMA as a use consisting of the construction or exterior alteration of structures; dredging; drilling; dumping; filling; removal of any sand, gravel, or minerals; bulkheading; driving of piling; placing of obstructions; or any project of a permanent or temporary nature which interferes with the normal public use of the surface of the waters overlying lands subject to this chapter at any state of water level[.] RCW 90.58.030(3)(d). A substantial development is defined as any development of which the total cost or fair market value exceeds two thousand five hundred dollars, or any development which materially interferes with the normal public use of the water or shorelines of the state ...[.] RCW 90.58.030(3)(e). Under the statute no substantial development exists if there is no development within the meaning of RCW 90.58.030(3)(d), because for there to be a substantial development, there must first be a development (`substantial development' shall mean any development ...). (Italics ours.) RCW 90.58.030(3)(e). See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. King Cy., 91 Wn.2d 721, 726, 592 P.2d 1108 (1979). The Department claims that the trestle removal was a development because it was an exterior alteration of a structure within the meaning of RCW 90.58.030(3)(d). [9, 10] In construing statutes, the primary objective is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. Martin v. Meier, 111 Wn.2d 471, 479, 760 P.2d 925 (1988). Clear language will be given effect. People's Org. for Wash. Energy Resources v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 104 Wn.2d 798, 825, 711 P.2d 319 (1985). If a term is defined in a statute, that definition is used. Absent a statutory definition, the term is generally accorded its plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary legislative intent appears. Dennis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467, 479-80, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). The term exterior alteration of structures is not defined in the statute. The ordinary meaning of the words is contrary to the Department's position. Alteration is the act or action of altering. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 63 (1981). Alter means to cause to become different in some particular characteristic ... without changing into something else. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 63 (1981). [11] Total removal, i.e., the equivalent of complete destruction, is simply not the alteration of the exterior of a structure  nothing at all remains. If the Legislature had intended removal or destruction to fall within the meaning of development, it could have said so. In advancing its implausible argument that complete removal equals alteration, the Department fails to analyze the words of the statute. The Department simply makes assertions and characterizations which lack reasoning or analysis. [12, 13] The Department argues, however, that its interpretation of the statute is entitled to great weight in determining legislative intent, citing Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wn.2d 441, 448, 536 P.2d 157, 161 (1975). The rule relied upon at the cited page is that when a statute is ambiguous, the construction placed upon the rule by the administrative agency charged with its administration and enforcement should be given great weight in determining legislative intent. The specific rule set out in Hama Hama applies when the statutory language is ambiguous. Simply because the words of a statute are not defined in the statute does not make the statute ambiguous. If that were true, the majority of statutes would suffer from ambiguity. Such is not the case. The words alteration and alter have well-accepted, ordinary meanings. The problem thus is not deciding what the statute means, but is instead a question of whether the particular act complained of, removal of the trestles, falls within the statutory terms exterior alteration of structures. [14] The Department, however, relies upon trial testimony for the proposition that the agency has interpreted development and substantial development to include bridge removal. The first problem with reliance on trial testimony is that the meaning of a statute's terms is a question of law; the question is not one amenable to resolution based upon trial testimony. See, e.g., State v. McCormack, 117 Wn.2d 141, 812 P.2d 483 (1991) (interpretation of statute is question of law). The agency either has an agency interpretation or it does not. Second, the question whether the bridge removal was a development or a substantial development was not at issue at trial (and this is why testimony relied upon by the Department was ruled inadmissible). Verbatim Report of Proceedings (June 27, 1989), at 53-54. The issue was resolved by a different judge in the earlier summary judgment proceedings. Third, the testimony relied upon by the Department is, in any event, merely a conclusory statement that the trestle removal was a substantial development. The record tends to show that, to the contrary of the Department's now asserted position, the agency had no agency interpretation of the statute which would include the trestle removal within the definition of development (and therefore none bringing the trestle removal within the definition of substantial development). The Department took no action regarding the removal of other bridges from the same railroad right of way, even though no permits were obtained for their removal. Deposition of Mack, at 12. In fact, the Department's enforcement coordinator was aware of only one or two instances in 14 years where a permit was processed for bridge removal. Deposition of Beery, at 4-6. [15] If an agency is asserting that its interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to great weight it is incumbent on that agency to show that it has adopted and applied such interpretation as a matter of agency policy. It need not be by formal adoption equivalent to an agency rule, but it must represent a policy decision by the person or persons responsible. Nothing here establishes such an agency policy, and nothing shows any uniformly applied interpretation. The evidence establishes that the application and interpretation here was nothing more than an isolated action by the Department. Therefore, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that the statute was ambiguous, and thus the Hama Hama analysis applicable, the Department has not established an agency interpretation entitled to great weight. Instead, it attempts to bootstrap a legal argument into the place of agency interpretation. [16] Moreover, an administrative determination will not be accorded deference if the agency's interpretation conflicts with the relevant statute. Department of Labor & Indus. v. Landon, 117 Wn.2d 122, 127, 814 P.2d 626 (1991); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Cowlitz Cy., 109 Wn.2d 363, 371-72, 745 P.2d 488 (1987). In this case, there is no basis for giving deference to the assertion that removal of the trestles constituted a development. As a matter of law removal of the railroad trestles was not a development within the meaning of RCW 90.58.030(3)(d), and thus was not a substantial development within the meaning of RCW 90.58.030(3)(e). The court erred in granting partial summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor. [17] Finally, the Department confusingly argues that removal of the trestles otherwise violated the SMA. The clearest argument is that regardless of whether a permit was required, defendant's act violated RCW 90.58.140(1), which provides that [a] development shall not be undertaken on the shorelines of the state unless it is consistent with the policy of this chapter.... This section does not require that a permit be obtained before a development is undertaken. The claim here is that the removal of the trestles was inconsistent with the policy of the SMA. However, in order to fall within RCW 90.58.140(1), the action must constitute a development within the meaning of RCW 90.58.030(3)(d). See Clam Shacks of Am., Inc. v. Skagit Cy., 109 Wn.2d 91, 94-95, 743 P.2d 265 (1987) (in the context of RCW 90.58.140, development and substantial development are terms of art by virtue of the definitions in RCW 90.58.030(3)(d) and (e)). As explained above, the trestle removal did not constitute a development within the meaning of the statute. Removal of the trestles did not violate the SMA pursuant to RCW 90.58.140(1). The Department also argues that there has been material interference with public use of the Cowiche Creek shoreline, and a violation of the SMA therefore occurred. Again, the difficulty is the Department's lack of clarity in addressing the express statutory provisions. Public use of the shoreline is a concept embodied in both the definition of development and the definition of substantial development. Looking first at development, RCW 90.58.030(3)(d) provides that a use consisting of ... any project ... which interferes with the normal public use of the surface of the waters overlying lands subject to [RCW 90.58] is a development. Nothing in the record or in the arguments advanced by the Department supports the notion that public use of the surface of the waters of Cowiche Creek was affected by the trestle removal. Therefore, the public use concept in RCW 90.58.030(3)(d) is inapplicable. The definition of substantial development also refers to public use of the shoreline. RCW 90.58.030(3)(e) provides in part that any development ... which materially interferes with the normal public use of the water or shorelines of the state is a substantial development. As exhaustively discussed above, there is no substantial development without there being first a development and the trestle removal, as a matter of law, does not constitute a development. The question of public use of the water or shoreline of Cowiche Creek under RCW 90.58.030(3)(e) is simply irrelevant to the question whether the trestle removal violated the SMA in the absence of any development within the meaning of RCW 90.58.030(3)(d). The question of public use is relevant, however, to the question whether defendant's placement of the gates constituted a violation of the SMA. As explained below, the Department's claim of interference with normal public use is without merit.