Opinion ID: 2198876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The question of negligence.

Text: As before stated, Count 2 of the complaint charges that Pan American's damages were caused by United's negligence. Does the General Terms Agreement absolve United from the consequences of its own negligence? The Superior Court held that the language did not so absolve United. Thereafter, it certified to us the following questions: (a) Whether, under the law of Connecticut, the General Terms Agreement exonerated the defendant from liability for its negligence as alleged in Count 2? (b) If the General Terms Agreement exonerated the defendant from responsibility for its negligence, did it contravene public policy, as a result of which it was invalid? Article VIII (A) is quoted above. The important language is: This warranty is expressly accepted by the Buyer in lieu of any or all other warranties or representations, express or implied, in fact or in law arising out of the sale of the goods and of all duties or liabilities of Seller to the Buyer arising out of the use of the goods;   . United stresses the phrase  all duties or liabilities    arising out of the use of the goods. The word duties, it is said, clearly refers to tort liability, since liability in tort is predicated upon a breach of duty. It is to be noted that the negligence charged is negligence in connection with the sale of the governors, not in connection with the use of the goods. The charge is the failure to use reasonable care in the design, selection of material, inspection and testing of the governors, and the failure to warn the plaintiff of the existence of defects in the goods. The disclaimer refers to a duty or liability arising out of the use of the goods. There is certainly some doubt whether the language of the disclaimer has any application to negligence incident to the sale of the governors as distinct from their operation. Cf. Brewster & Son v. Catalytic Construction Co., 17 N.J. 20, 109 A.2d 805, 811. United's construction of the word use in the quoted phrase relates it to the possible liability of United to a user of the goods who is a stranger to United. The pertinency of this suggestion we cannot follow. But the plain answer to United's contention on the negligence issue is that the language relied on is reasonably susceptible of a construction that relates to a contractual duty or liability only, e. g., a contractual duty to respond in damages for breach of warranty. It is the general rule that contracts to relieve one from the consequences of his own negligence are not favored in the law, and if possible are construed not to confer immunity from liability. The parties are agreed that Connecticut law governs, and this is the Connecticut rule. Parillo v. Housing Authority of New Haven, 16 Conn.Sup. 106; Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts, 21 Conn.Sup. 38, 143 A.2d 466. The Deleware law appears to be the same. See Marshall v. M. D. & V. Rwy. Co., 31 Del. 170, 173, 112 A. 526. It is obvious that the language of the disclaimer does not necessarily embrace immunity from the consequences of negligence. United leans heavily on Blythewood, Inc. v. Jaquish, 2 Conn.Sup. 22. In that case Mrs. Jaquish had indemnified plaintiff, operator of a sanitarium, from any and all claims or liability arising out of the acceptance by the sanitarium of her husband for care and treatment. In a suit against the sanitarium for negligence causing the husband's death the sanitarium was held responsible in damages. It sued on the contract of indemnity and it was held that the liability was covered. The case is distinguishable. Indemnity against one's own negligence is more readily to be found in a specific indemnity contract than in a contract of sale. It is often clearly within the contemplation of the parties, as in the case of the usual insurance policy indemnifying against liability arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle. In the Blythewood case it could reasonably be said that indemnity against any liability for injury to the patient, no matter how caused, was within the contemplation of the contracting parties. A different situation is presented here. The parties were buying and selling goods and dealing primarily with questions of breach of warranty. The language, we think, is not sufficiently specific to exonerate United from liability for its own negligence. Certified question (a) is answered in the negative. Certified question (b) therefore requires no answer. Petition of Appellee for Reargument. Appellee United Aircraft Corporation, the defendant below, complains in its petition for reargument of the summary treatment given in the opinion to its contention that the exoneration clause relating to the use of the goods was drafted in the light of the possible liability of United as manufacturer of the goods to the user, even though the user is a stranger to the contract of sale, under the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696. Since the facts are that United was not the manufacturer of the goods, and Pan Am was not a stranger to the contract, we still fail to see the pertinency of the argument. The parties, United and Pan Am, had an express contract relating to the sale. The only question is whether the language of the contract should be construed as exonerating United from its own negligence. We adhere to our opinion that the language is not broad enough to do so. The petition for reargument is denied.