Opinion ID: 2831358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compliance with Safety Standard

Text: The Ruizes argue that the first prong of the presumption, which requires a showing that the product’s design complied with a mandatory federal safety standard, has not been satisfied in two respects. First, the Ruizes contend that the particular air bag at issue—the one in the Ruizes’ vehicle—did not comply with FMVSS 208 because it did not deploy in the crash as required. This assertion ignores the language of the relevant statute and regulation as well as the uncontroverted evidence at trial. Section 82.008 requires that the product’s design comply with the pertinent standards, not that the particular unit at issue comply. In turn, a motor vehicle’s compliance with the standards must be reached before the vehicle—here, the 2002 Spectra—is offered for sale in the United States. 49 U.S.C. § 30112(a)(1). As discussed above, compliance is reached when a vehicle is crash-tested and the resultant forces and accelerations on the dummy occupants are within the stated injury criteria limits. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S5.1, S6. The testimony and exhibits at trial demonstrated that the 2002 Spectra was tested under the conditions specified in FMVSS 208, and that the regulatory injury criteria were met.8 Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that the Spectra’s design complied with FMVSS 208. 8 FMVSS 208 requires a crash test from three different frontal angles: a direct frontal crash and a frontal crash from an angle up to thirty degrees in either direction. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S5.1. 7 Second, the Ruizes argue that compliance with FMVSS 208 is immaterial to the nonliability presumption because the regulation contains a performance standard rather than a design standard. See Perry v. Mercedez Benz of N. Am., Inc., 957 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that FMVSS 208 provides “minimum ‘performance requirements’ for automobile crash-protection systems, without requiring the use of any single particular system or design”). The Ruizes contend that “for a product’s design to comply with a mandatory standard or regulation, there logically must be a standard or regulation that mandates a design.” Kia, on the other hand, argues that the absence of a particular design requirement in FMVSS 208 is immaterial to its applicability under section 82.008.9 The plain language of section 82.008 supports Kia’s interpretation. The statute requires a product’s design to comply with mandatory federal safety standards or regulations. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a). The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, by their terms, are safety standards. In turn, if a particular FMVSS does not specify a design, whatever design the manufacturer does choose must nevertheless comply with that standard. Interpreting section 82.008 to apply only to federal design standards impermissibly adds language and alters the statute’s plain meaning. Moreover, such an interpretation would deter manufacturers from creating new and better designs to improve safety. Accordingly, we agree with Kia that, in applying the nonliability presumption to a product design that complies with mandatory safety standards, section 82.008 9 Amici Texas Civil Justice League, The Association of Global Automakers, The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, and Texas Association of Defense Counsel similarly argue that the statute does not require compliance with a federal “design standard.” 8 simply means that a manufacturer’s chosen design must comply with the standard, not that the safety standard must mandate a particular design.10 FMVSS 208’s classification as a performance standard is immaterial; all agree that it is a safety standard. And as the court of appeals held, the undisputed evidence at trial demonstrated that the 2002 Spectra complied with that standard. See 348 S.W.3d at 474; see also 49 U.S.C. § 30112(a)(1) (generally precluding a vehicle from being sold in the United States absent compliance with applicable safety standards). Accordingly, Kia has satisfied the first prong of section 82.008(a). B. The Standard Did Not Govern the Product Risk that Allegedly Caused the Harm Under the third prong of the section 82.008(a) analysis, the 2002 Spectra design’s compliance with FMVSS 208 raises a presumption of Kia’s nonliability only if that standard “governed the product risk that allegedly caused the harm.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a). Kia argues that, because this case involves an occupant’s death caused by an alleged lack of crashworthiness, the “product risk” at issue here is that of occupant injury during a crash. Kia also argues that FMVSS 208 clearly governs that risk. The Ruizes contend that the “product risk” is properly formulated as the risk that an air bag will fail to deploy because of defective circuitry, arguing that Kia’s broad characterization of the risk would result in the presumption’s applying in every crashworthiness case. 10 If, as the Ruizes assert, the presumption only arises in design-defect cases when there is a governmentmandated design, then compliance with FMVSS 208 would never trigger the presumption in a design-defect case. Yet the Ruizes concede in their post-submission brief that the presumption could apply in some air bag cases involving an alleged design defect, such as a claim for inflation-induced injuries from a deploying air bag or injuries caused by a deploying air bag’s failure to adequately protect the occupant from injury. 9 We find instructive two Fifth Circuit cases that have addressed section 82.008 in the context of compliance with the FMVSS. In Wright v. Ford Motor Co., the parents of a child who was killed when an SUV owner accidentally backed over him sued Ford, the manufacturer of the SUV, on a design-defect claim. 508 F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 2007). The complaint alleged that the SUV, an Expedition, had a “large and unreasonably dangerous blind spot immediately behind the vehicle” and that Ford should have included a reverse-sensing system as standard equipment on all Expedition models. Id. at 267–68. Ford asserted it was entitled to a nonliability presumption in light of the Expedition’s compliance with FMVSS 111, which addresses rearview mirror performance and placement in order to reduce deaths and injuries caused by a limited rear view. Id. at 269; 49 C.F.R. § 571.111. The district court instructed the jury on the presumption, and the jury found in favor of Ford on the Wrights’ claim. 508 F.3d at 269. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, first rejecting the Wrights’ argument that the presumption’s applicability under section 82.008 requires that the safety standard at issue govern “the particular defect claimed” rather than “the risk arising from that defect.” Id. at 270. The court then concluded that “[t]he risk that caused the harm and forms the basis of the Wrights’ suit is the rear blindspot of the Expedition.” Id. Holding that the risk was governed by FMVSS 111, the court found persuasive that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration had considered, but decided against, amending the regulation to require additional rear-visibility systems, including reverse-sensing systems, on certain trucks. Id. at 270–72. That the Administration had decided not to impose additional requirements beyond those already in the regulation, to address the exact risk alleged in 10 the case, was a “further indication that [FMVSS 111] governs the product risk that allegedly caused the harm.” Id. at 272. The Fifth Circuit again addressed the applicability of the nonliability presumption in Trenado v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., a case involving alleged manufacturing and design defects in a tire that failed and caused an accident. 465 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2012). The applicable regulation was FMVSS 109, which “‘specifies tire dimensions and laboratory test requirements for bead unseating resistance, strength, endurance, and high speed performance.’” Id. at 379 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 571.109). FMVSS 109 requires a tire to “exhibit no visual evidence of [various types of damage] after being subjected to a variety of stressful conditions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The tire manufacturer argued that the required regulatory tests pertained to the same characteristics—tire strength and durability—that the plaintiffs contended were lacking in the tire that failed. Id. at 380. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the manufacturer that “the relevant product risk” was tire failure. Id. In holding that the regulation governed that risk, the court explained that FMVSS 109 “require[s] a number of tests aimed at assuring that a tire is sufficiently durable to avoid failure under numerous stressful conditions” and that “the broad range of tests required by FMVSS 109 . . . suggest[s] that the regulation governs tire failure in general, as opposed to a particular mode of failure or type of defect.” Id. We agree with the Fifth Circuit that the plain language of section 82.008 requires that a safety regulation govern product risk, not a particular product defect. Wright, 508 F.3d at 270; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a). But the alleged defect is certainly not immaterial to the analysis. Rather, courts must distinguish between the alleged defect and the risk arising from that 11 defect. Wright, 508 F.3d at 270; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a) (standard must govern “the product risk that allegedly caused harm”). Thus, we must closely examine both the product risk arising from an alleged design defect and the parameters of the regulation at issue in evaluating whether the manufacturer’s compliance with that regulation entitles it to a presumption of nonliability to an injured claimant. In this case, the Ruizes alleged that the air bag’s defectively designed wiring harness rendered it prone to open circuits and the air bag’s corresponding failure to deploy when it should have. The regulation relied upon by Kia, FMVSS 208, requires vehicles to be equipped with frontal air bags and seat belts, and specifies the maximum amount of force and acceleration that dummy occupants may encounter during a frontal-crash test. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, S5.1, S6. The test thus measures how well the vehicle’s air bags and other restraint systems protect occupants. But the test presumes air bag deployment. It does not measure or apply to air-bag failure rates, and it is that risk—the risk of occupant injury due to the failure of the air bag to reliably activate and deploy—that arises from the alleged defect and is at issue in this case. By contrast, FMVSS 210, which applies to seat-belt assembly anchorages, contains various requirements relating to the type, location, and strength of these devices that are intended to ensure “effective occupant restraint and to reduce the likelihood of their failure.” Id. § 571.210, S1 (emphasis added). Similarly, the regulation at issue in Trenado required tires to undergo various tests designed to measure durability in order “to avoid failure.” 465 F. App’x at 380. Nothing in FMVSS 208 suggests a purpose of reducing the likelihood of an air bag’s failure to deploy under circumstances in which everyone agrees it should have deployed. 12 Kia concedes that FMVSS 208 does not test for reliable deployment, but argues in its postsubmission brief that this “is not important for triggering the presumption” because “whatever standard the federal agency sets then becomes the default standard for triggering the presumption.” Kia asserts that, to the extent the lack of such testing arguably renders FMVSS 208 “inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or damage,” the statute gives the plaintiff the opportunity to rebut the nonliability presumption. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(b)(1). We disagree. A significant difference exists between an inadequate standard and a standard that simply does not contemplate the risk at issue. The Ruizes have not, for example, alleged that the Spectra is defective because it lacks additional occupant-restraint equipment, such as a third frontal air bag, that FMVSS 208 does not require. Had that been the case, the presumption would have applied. See Wright, 508 F.3d at 270–72. But while FMVSS 208 clearly contemplates what occupant-restraint systems are required, it does not contemplate the likelihood of their failure to deploy and thus does not address that risk. For these reasons, we hold that FMVSS 208 does not “govern[] the product risk that allegedly caused the harm” in this case. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a). The trial court and the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the presumption did not apply. Accordingly, we need not reach the issue of whether the Ruizes rebutted that presumption pursuant to section 82.008(b).11 11 Several amici submitted briefs discussing the application of section 82.008(b), but we need not discuss them in light of our disposition. 13