Opinion ID: 844267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The EIR Requirement

Text: “[A] public agency pursuing or approving a project need not prepare an EIR unless the project may result in a „significant effect on the environment‟ (§§ 21100, subd. (a), 21151, subd. (a)), defined as a „substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment‟ (§ 21068). If the agency‟s initial study of a project produces substantial evidence supporting a fair argument the project may have significant adverse effects, the agency must (assuming the project is not exempt from CEQA) prepare an EIR. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15064, subd. (f)(1); No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 75.)” (Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 310, 319, fn. omitted.) 7 If, on the other hand, “[t]here is no substantial evidence, in light of the whole record . . that the project may have a significant effect on the environment,” the agency may adopt a negative declaration. (§ 21080, subd. (c)(1); see also § 21082.2, subd. (a); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15064, subd. (f)(3); Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 319.)8 7 The first step in CEQA analysis, of course, is whether the activity in question amounts to a “project.” (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 380.) “A CEQA „project‟ falls into one of three categories of „activity which may cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment . . . .‟ (§ 21065.)” (Sunset Sky Ranch Pilots Assn. v. County of Sacramento (2009) 47 Cal.4th 902, 907.) In this case, the ordinance is “[a] n activity directly undertaken by [a] public agency” under section 21065, subdivision (a). The city has conceded at every stage of this litigation that the ordinance qualifies as a “project” for CEQA purposes. 8 Another alternative at this stage is to determine that the project is exempt from CEQA review. Here, city staff suggested at first that the proposed ordinance would be exempt “under what is sometimes called the „commonsense‟ exemption, which applies „[w]here it can be seen with certainty that there is no possibility that (footnote continued on next page) 17 The city‟s decision to issue a negative declaration in connection with its plastic bag ordinance is reviewed for “prejudicial abuse of discretion,” which “is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.” (§ 21168.5; Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 319.) The majority below concluded: “it can be fairly argued based on substantial evidence in light of the whole record that the plastic bag distribution ban may have a significant effect on the environment.” The majority was satisfied from the various studies comparing the environmental impacts of paper and plastic bags that a plastic bag ban was likely to lead to increased use of paper bags, which have relatively greater negative environmental effects including “greater nonrenewable energy and water consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, solid waste production, and acid rain.” The majority conceded, “[i]t may be that the city‟s population and the number of its retail establishments using plastic bags is so small and public concern for the environment is so high that there will be little or no increased use of paper bags as a result of the ordinance and little or no impact on the environment affected by the ordinance.” However, “the initial study contains no information about the city‟s actual experience — including, by way of example (footnote continued from previous page) the activity in question may have a significant effect on the environment‟ ([Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14,] § 15061, subd. (b)(3)).” (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380.) However, once plaintiff raised objections to the ordinance, the city abandoned that idea and proceeded instead to conduct an initial study and issue a negative declaration. (See Muzzy Ranch, at pp. 380-381.) 18 only: the number of plastic and paper bags consumed; recycling rates; the quantity of plastic bags disposed of in city trash; how the city disposes of its trash; whether plastic bags are a significant portion of litter found; how, when and in what quantities paper and plastic bags are delivered into the city; whether the city has a landfill that would be impacted by any increased paper bag use; whether there are recycling facilities or programs in the city or the surrounding area; and what the likely impact will be of a campaign urging recycling and reusable bag use.” On this record, it is undisputed that the manufacture, transportation, recycling, and landfill disposal of paper bags entail more negative environmental consequences than do the same aspects of the plastic bag “life cycle.” The city conceded as much in the initial study supporting its negative declaration. CEQA, however, does not demand an exhaustive comparative analysis of relative environmental detriments for every alternative course of action. It requires an EIR only for those aspects of a project likely to have significant environmental effects. Section 21151, subdivision (b), governing local agency preparation of EIRs, specifies that “any significant effect on the environment shall be limited to substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse changes in physical conditions which exist within the area as defined in Section 21060.5.” (Italics added.) Section 21060.5 refers to “the physical conditions which exist within the area which will be affected by a proposed project, including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, [and] objects of historic or aesthetic significance.” When we consider the actual scale of the environmental impacts that might follow from increased paper bag use in Manhattan Beach, instead of comparing the global impacts of paper and plastic bags, it is plain the city acted within its discretion when it determined that its ban on plastic bags would have no significant effect on the environment. 19 The only strictly local impacts of the ban appear to be those related to the transportation of paper bags, and possibly their disposal. It did not require a detailed study to conclude that the increased vehicle traffic and related effects stemming from the delivery of paper bags to Manhattan Beach businesses would be minimal. Nor was it necessary for the city to attempt a thorough analysis of the additional garbage that might result from the use of paper instead of plastic carryout bags. While the Court of Appeal majority faulted the city for not providing information on whether it had a landfill that would be affected by increased paper bag use, the initial study noted that the city “represents a small proportion of regional landfill users.” A reasonable inference is that solid waste from Manhattan Beach is taken to a regional landfill or landfills used by a variety of refuse sources in the surrounding area. The city properly anticipated that there would be no increase from those establishments already using paper bags, that some consumers would switch from plastic to reusable bags, that some would recycle their paper bags,9 and that the number of Manhattan Beach consumers is small enough that the increase in the regional solid waste stream caused by discarded paper bags would be insignificant. The other environmental impacts reflected in the record are those that might be felt beyond Manhattan Beach, as a result of processes associated with the manufacture, distribution, and recycling of paper bags in general. We have noted that the area defined by section 21060.5, that is, the area that will be affected by a proposed project, may be greater than the area encompassed by the project itself. 9 In addition to banning plastic bags, Ordinance No. 2115 requires all paper bags provided by establishments in the city to be recyclable “using Manhattan Beach‟s available recycling collection programs.” 20 “ „[T]he project area does not define the relevant environment for purposes of CEQA when a project‟s environmental effects will be felt outside the project area.‟ [Citation.] Indeed, „the purpose of CEQA would be undermined if the appropriate governmental agencies went forward without an awareness of the effects a project will have on areas outside of the boundaries of the project area.‟ [Citation.]” (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 387.) This does not mean, however, that an agency is required to conduct an exhaustive analysis of all conceivable impacts a project may have in areas outside its geographical boundaries. “ „[T]hat the effects will be felt outside of the project area . . . is one of the factors that determines the amount of detail required in any discussion. Less detail, for example, would be required where those effects are more indirect than effects felt within the project area, or where it [would] be difficult to predict them with any accuracy.” (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 388.) In Muzzy Ranch, we were concerned with the level of detail required to apply the commonsense exemption from CEQA review. However, our comments are equally pertinent to the analysis of impacts in an initial study leading to the issuance of a negative declaration. “Evidence appropriate to the CEQA stage in issue is all that is required.” (Ibid.) The impacts of this project in areas outside Manhattan Beach itself are both indirect and difficult to predict. The actual increase in paper bag use as a result of the ordinance is necessarily uncertain, given that some percentage of local residents may be expected to turn to the city‟s favored alternative, reusable bags. Moreover, the city could hardly be expected to trace the provenance of all paper bags that might be purchased by Manhattan Beach establishments, in order to evaluate the particular impacts resulting from their manufacture. Accordingly, under the approach we endorsed in Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport 21 Land Use Com., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 388, the city could evaluate the broader environmental impacts of the ordinance at a reasonably high level of generality. The city properly concluded that a ban on plastic bags in Manhattan Beach would have only a minuscule contributive effect on the broader environmental impacts detailed in the paper bag “life cycle” studies relied on by plaintiff. Given the size of the city‟s population (well under 40,000) and retail sector (under 220 establishments, most of them small), the increase in paper bag production following a local change from plastic to paper bags can only be described as insubstantial. As the city conceded at oral argument, the analysis would be different for a ban on plastic bags by a larger governmental body, which might precipitate a significant increase in paper bag consumption. In the courts below, plaintiff referred to the cumulative impacts the Manhattan Beach ordinance might have in conjunction with similar laws enacted or contemplated elsewhere, including bans in San Francisco and Santa Monica, and possible bans in Oakland, Los Angeles County, and even statewide. (See § 21083, subd. (b)(2); Environmental Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 524-525; Sierra Club v. West Side Irrigation Dist. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 690, 700-702.) The Court of Appeal did not discuss this issue. In any event, we note that Manhattan Beach is small enough that even the cumulative effects of its ordinance would be negligible.10 10 For instance, plaintiff pointed out in its trial court briefing that Los Angeles County had an estimated population in 2006 of close to 10 million. It would be pointless to require the city to prepare an EIR on the additional impacts of paper bag use by its fewer than 40,000 residents, and ridiculous to ask it to evaluate the effects of a possible countywide ban before acting locally. While cumulative impacts should not be allowed to escape review when they arise from a series of (footnote continued on next page) 22 In sum, the Court of Appeal erred by concluding there was substantial evidence to support a fair argument that Manhattan Beach‟s plastic bag ordinance might significantly affect the environment. While some increase in the use of paper bags is foreseeable, and the production and disposal of paper products is generally associated with a variety of negative environmental impacts, no evidence suggests that paper bag use by Manhattan Beach consumers in the wake of a plastic bag ban would contribute to those impacts in any significant way. It is well settled that “CEQA is to be interpreted „to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.‟ [Citation.]” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 112.) As noted above, it is also established that CEQA review includes the impacts a project may have in areas outside the boundaries of the project itself. However, this case serves as a cautionary example of overreliance on generic studies of “life cycle” impacts associated with a particular product. Such studies, when properly conducted, may well be a useful guide for the decisionmaker when a project entails substantial production or consumption of the product. When, however, increased use of the product is an indirect and uncertain consequence, and especially when the scale of the project is such that the increase is plainly insignificant, the product “life cycle” must be kept in proper perspective and not allowed to swamp the evaluation of actual impacts attributable to the project at hand. (footnote continued from previous page) small-scale projects, that prospect does not appear in this case. According to plaintiff, the movement to ban plastic bags is a broad one, active at levels of government where an appropriately comprehensive environmental review will be required. 23 Common sense in the CEQA domain is not restricted to the exemption provided by the regulatory guideline discussed in Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380. It is an important consideration at all levels of CEQA review. (See, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 272; Martin v. City and County of San Francisco (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 392, 402, citing cases.) Here, common sense leads us to the conclusion that the environmental impacts discernible from the “life cycles” of plastic and paper bags are not significantly implicated by a plastic bag ban in Manhattan Beach. DISPOSITION We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. CORRIGAN, J. WE CONCUR: CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. KENNARD, J. BAXTER, J. WERDEGAR, J. CHIN, J. CROSKEY, J.  ___________________________  Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 24 See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach __________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted XXX 181 Cal.App.4th 521 Rehearing Granted __________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S180720 Date Filed: July 14, 2011 __________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior County: Los Angeles Judge: David P. Yaffe __________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel: Robert V. Wadden, Jr., City Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant. John B. Murdock for Heal the Bay as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Remy, Thomas, Moose and Manley, James G. Moose, Ashle T. Crocker and Jennifer S. Holman for Californians Against Waste as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Briscoe Ivester & Bazel, Christian L. Marsh and Peter S. Prows for League of California Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Carico Johnson Toomey and William G. Benz for The Manhattan Beach Residents Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Stephen L. Joseph for Plaintiff and Respondent. M. Reed Hopper and Joshua P. Thompson for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): James G. Moose Remy, Thomas, Moose and Manley 455 Capitol Mall, Suite 210 Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 443-2745 Christian L. Marsh Briscoe Ivester & Bazel 155 Sansome Street, Seventh Floor San Francisco, CA 94104 (415) 402-2700 Stephen L. Joseph 350 Bay Street, Suite 100-328 San Francisco, CA 94133 (415) 577-6660