Opinion ID: 166514
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prison Discipline

Text: Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating based on race in the terms and conditions of employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Thus, for a Title VII action, there must be an adverse employment practice, Hillig v. Rumsfeld , 381 F.3d 1028, 1033 (10th Cir. 2004), which necessarily requires conduct by an employer, see Williams , 926 F.2d at 997 (“Title VII protections apply only where there is some connection with an employment relationship.”) (quotation omitted). Mr. Martin does not argue that CSE had the authority to discipline him or actually did discipline him. Indeed, nothing in the record indicates that CSE disciplined Mr. Martin. Under the Agreement, the institutional discipline was at the behest of the State, not CSE, 6 and the discipline was imposed 6 Mr. Martin implicitly referred to this Agreement in his complaint. See R., Vol. 1, Doc. 1 at 2 (noting CSE “operates a prison based private industry production plant at the Lansing facility”). CSE attached a copy of this Agreement to the motion to dismiss. Id. , Doc. 14, Ex. B, Ex. 1. In his response to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Martin “[did] not deny that [CSE] entered into a Lease Agreement with the Lansing Correctional Facility.” Id., Doc. 17 at 1. Because the Agreement was implicitly referred to in the complaint and the parties do not dispute its authenticity, we may consider it in deciding this appeal. See Mishler v. Clift , 191 F.3d 998, 1008 n.7 (9th Cir. 1999) (deciding that where complaint did not specifically refer to document or discuss its contents, and district court (continued...) -14- due to Mr. Martin’s violation of a prison rule and his status as a prisoner, not as an employee. CSE had no authority to discipline Mr. Martin, and did not attempt to do so. CSE merely reported Mr. Martin’s request to be “laid in” to the State, as it was required to do. Under these circumstances, we therefore conclude that Mr. Martin failed to state a claim under Title VII for which relief may be granted.
Just as the prison discipline was not an adverse-employment action by CSE as is required for a Title VII claim, the prison discipline was not contract-related action by CSE as is required for a § 1981 claim. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude Mr. Martin failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1981.