Opinion ID: 777678
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did J & J Disseminate Literally False Claims Re Mylanta Night Time Strength?

Text: 23 If a plaintiff proves that the challenged commercial claims are literally false, a court may grant relief without considering whether the buying public was actually misled. Rorer, 19 F.3d at 129. In analyzing whether an advertisement or product name is literally false, a court must determine, first, the unambiguous claims made by the advertisement or product name, and second, whether those claims are false. Clorox Co. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir.2000). A literally false message may be either explicit or conveyed by necessary implication when, considering the advertisement in its entirety, the audience would recognize the claim as readily as if it had been explicitly stated. Id. at 35. Regardless, only an unambiguous message can be literally false. The greater the degree to which a message relies upon the viewer or consumer to integrate its components and draw the apparent conclusion, however, the less likely it is that a finding of literal falsity will be supported. United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1181 (8th Cir.1998); see Warner-Lambert Co. v. Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 96 (3d Cir.2000); Castrol, 987 F.2d at 946; see also Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int'l Corp., 1982 WL 121559, at  (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1982). 24 The District Court found that the MNTS product name and/or advertising conveyed two messages that are literally false by necessary implication: (1) that the MNTS product is superior to other products in providing nighttime relief, 129 F.Supp.2d at 360-61; and (2) that the product is specially formulated for nighttime relief, id. at 364. We will discuss each of these messages in turn after briefly reviewing the cases where courts have found a false message necessarily implied from a product's name or advertisement. The common theme in these cases is a finding, based on a facial analysis of the product name or advertising, that the consumer will unavoidably receive a false message from the product's name or advertising. When consumer deception can be determined by examining the challenged name or advertising on its face, the plaintiff is excused from the burden of demonstrating actual deception through the use of a consumer survey. 25 For example, in Breathasure, the defendant claimed that its capsules would freshen breath when swallowed, and that they were more effective at freshening breath than other products like gum, mints, and mouthwash because the capsule would [f]ight the problem at its source. Breathasure, 204 F.3d at 89. During the course of litigation it became clear that the capsules had no effect on bad breath because in fact bad breath originates in the mouth, not in the stomach. See id. at 90. The District Court found that the BreathAsure product claim was therefore misleading because it implie[d] assurance where there [was] no basis for it, and we concurred. Id. at 96. In addition, because [t]he name [BreathAsure] falsely tells the consumer that he or she has assurance of fresher breath ..., id. at 97, we enjoined use of that name. 26 In Castrol, the defendant's advertisements claimed that motor oil viscosity breakdown leads to engine failure. The advertising also claimed that the defendant's brand of motor oil outperformed any leading motor oil against viscosity breakdown. We affirmed the District Court's conclusion that these two claims taken together necessarily implied that Pennzoil outperforms the other leading brands with respect to protecting against engine failure, because it outperforms them in protecting against viscosity breakdown, the cause of engine failure. Castrol, 987 F.2d at 947. Because this implied message of superior protection against engine failure was false, the defendant, Pennzoil, was permanently enjoined from using these challenged advertisements. See id. at 948. 27 In Cuisinarts, the defendant's advertisement stated: Robot-Coupe: 21, Cuisinart: 0. WHEN ALL 21 OF THE THREE-STAR RESTAURANTS IN FRANCE'S MICHELIN GUIDE CHOOSE THE SAME PROFESSIONAL MODEL FOOD PROCESSOR, SOMEBODY KNOWS THE SCORE — SHOULDN'T YOU? Cuisinarts, 1982 WL 121559, at . The District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the advertisement necessarily implied a message that both Robot-Coupe and Cuisinart built professional model food processors and that restauranteurs presented with two existing alternatives had chosen the Robot-Coupe model. This implied message was false because Cuisinart did not in fact make a professional model food processor. The Court therefore issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the use of this advertisement. See id. at -. 28 As noted already, the District Court here found that the MNTS name and advertising necessarily imply a claim that MNTS provides superior relief for nighttime heartburn. 129 F.Supp.2d at 359-60. It provided the following reasons for this determination: 29 While night time sufferers may indeed be likely to opt for a higher strength antacid, the Night Time Strength designation does more than simply promise a higher strength; it claims that its strength corresponds to effectiveness such that it can even remedy night time heartburn, the symptoms of which tend to be severe or moderate. 30 Consistent with the label, the television commercial promises that MNTS is made strong to work on even tough nighttime heartburn. J & J's website also provides that MNTS works on even your tough nighttime heartburn. Despite the FDA conclusion that the ANC rating might confuse the public, the MNTS product name and advertising play upon and reinforce the perception that greater strength provides relief for more severe heartburn, which often can occur at night. In other words, MNTS is named and advertised to suggest that its strength gives it the ability to fight greater heartburn. Therefore, J & J's advertisements necessarily imply a claim of superior relief. 31 Id. at 360. 32 In short, the District Court found that the MNTS name and advertising would play upon and reinforce consumer perceptions and suggest that its strength correlates to greater efficacy. The very use of these verbs is instructive. When a Court considers whether a product's name and advertising are misleading, it may examine consumer survey evidence demonstrating that they play upon or reinforce consumer perceptions, or otherwise suggest false messages. By contrast, when a Court considers whether a message is necessarily implied from the product's name and advertising, it must determine whether the false message will necessarily and unavoidably be received by the consumer. 33 In this case, consumers will only receive a message of superior relief from the MNTS name and advertising if they assume that a product that provides Night Time relief is more effective than a product that provides Extra Strength or Maximum relief. The MNTS name and advertising alone do not require that this inference will be made. The District Court therefore clearly erred in finding that a message of superior efficacy is necessarily implied from the MNTS name and advertising. Instead, Novartis should have been required to prove through a consumer survey that the name and advertising actually misled or had a tendency to mislead consumers into believing that the product provided nighttime heartburn relief superior to any other product in the market. 5 34 Although the District Court erred in finding that a message of superior efficacy is necessarily implied from the MNTS name and advertising, it did not err when it found that the MNTS name is literally false by necessary implication because it conveys the unambiguous message that the product is specially formulated to relieve nighttime heartburn. The Court found that the product name Mylanta `Night Time Strength' necessarily implies a false message ... that it possesses a quality that is particularly efficacious for those suffering from heartburn at night. 129 F.Supp.2d at 364. It reasoned as follows: 35 Here, by naming its product Night Time Strength, J & J maintains that its goal was to emphasize the strength of the product, rather than its duration. Clearly, the designations such as regular, extra, or maximum would have sufficiently described the level of strength of MNTS. The use of nighttime, however, is as Novartis points out, a temporal designation communicating that the product is effective in remedying nighttime heartburn. Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1040-41 (2d Cir.1992) (PM designation immediately conveys night time use). Indeed J & J admits that MNTS is targeted exclusively to the needs of nighttime sufferers. Miller Decl., at ¶ 17. 36 Id. We agree with the District Court that the term nighttime conveys a different meaning than the terms regular, extra, and maximum. The latter terms describe different degrees of strength and are descriptions that are arguably supported by evidence of different ANC ratings. 6 By contrast, the nighttime designation describes not a degree of strength, but rather a time when the product will be effective. The phrase nighttime strength therefore necessarily conveys a message that the MNTS product is specially made to work at night. We cannot say that the District Court's finding to that effect is clearly erroneous. 37 We also cannot say that the District Court clearly erred in finding that this message is false. J & J argues that the Court improperly shifted the burden of proof from Novartis to J & J when considering this question. It points out that the plaintiff, Novartis, bears the burden of showing that a challenged advertisement is false or misleading, not merely that it is unsubstantiated by acceptable tests or other proof. Sandoz, 902 F.2d at 228. While this is generally the case, in Sandoz we specifically declined to answer whether completely unsubstantiated advertising claims violate the Lanham Act absent proof that consumers are actually misled by this lack of substantiation. Id. at 228 n. 7 (emphasis in original). We explained that 38 [i]n such a case, there is a plausible argument that the claim is literally false because the advertiser has absolutely no grounds for believing that its claim is true. A Lanham Act plaintiff may be permitted to presume that consumers expect advertisers to have at least some semblance of support for their publicly-disseminated claims. However, since that is not the question before us, we do not decide whether a completely unsubstantiated claim is per se false or whether a Lanham Act plaintiff can presume that a defendant must have some substantiation for its advertising claims. 39 Id. 40 Today we decide what we left open in Sandoz. We hold that, although the plaintiff normally has the burden to demonstrate that the defendant's advertising claim is false, a court may find that a completely unsubstantiated advertising claim by the defendant is per se false without additional evidence from the plaintiff to that effect. 41 Here, the District Court observed that J & J does not argue or present any evidence to show that MNTS was specifically formulated for night time heartburn or that its product actually remedies heartburn at night more effectively than heartburn during the daytime. 129 F.Supp.2d at 363. On appeal, J & J has not directed our attention to any evidence in the record that was overlooked by the District Court. We therefore conclude that the message of special formulation for nighttime relief that is necessarily implied from the MNTS name is a completely unsubstantiated advertising claim, and that the District Court did not clearly err by concluding that this claim is per se false. 42