Opinion ID: 67089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Valadez’s Arguments

Text: Valadez proffers two arguments unique to his conviction: (1) the district court erred by permitting the government to question his witness regarding the general reputation for truthfulness of used car salesmen and (2) the government improperly elicited testimony concerning his invocation of his right to an attorney 8 under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976) and its progeny. A. Testimony on the reputation of a used car salesmen Valadez argues that the district court erred by allowing the government to question one of his witnesses, who worked for a used car dealer, on car salesmen’s general reputation for truthfulness. Valadez further asserts that because he as well as two other witnesses all worked as used car salesmen, the government effectively impeached them all. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and will not reverse a conviction for evidentiary errors “unless there is a reasonable likelihood that they affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, “an erroneous evidentiary ruling is a basis for reversal only if the defendant can demonstrate that the error probably had a ‘substantial influence’ on the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Stephens, 365 F.3d 967, 977 (11th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404, in a criminal case, the defendant may offer evidence of his good character, if pertinent, and the prosecution may then offer character evidence in rebuttal. F ED. R. E VID. 404(a)(1). Evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness may also be offered in the form of opinion or 9 reputation. F ED. R. E VID. 404(a)(3), 608(a). “A proper foundation must be laid before the admission of reputation testimony.” United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1381 (11th Cir. 1982). Because this witness testified on direct examination that Valadez was “very honest,” Rule 404(a)(1) allowed the government to rebut that assertion. Nonetheless, even if this testimony was inadmissible, it did not affect Valadez’s substantial rights insofar as the witness testified regarding a common cliché and Valadez has failed to demonstrate that it had a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict. B. Post-Miranda 1 Statement Valadez argues that his trial was not fair because the government elicited testimony showing that he asked for counsel after his arrest. Because Valadez did not raise the Doyle violation before the district court, we review for plain error. United States v. O’Keefe, 461 F.3d 1338, 1348 n.10 (11th Cir. 2006); F ED. R. C RIM. P. 52(b). Under this standard, an appellant must show “(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Campbell, 223 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). See also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 10 508 (1993) (citation and quotations omitted) (providing that “Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of appeals, and the court should not exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”). “In order to ‘affect substantial rights,’ in most cases, the error must ‘have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” Campbell, 223 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S. Ct. at 177778). Because Miranda warnings carry an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty, it is fundamentally unfair, and a violation of Due Process, to use a defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach him. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 289-91 & n.5, 106 S. Ct. 634, 637-39 & n.5, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986) (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618-19, 96 S. Ct. at 2245). This protection extends to post-Miranda requests for counsel as well. Id. at 295 & n.13, 106 S. Ct. at 640 & n.13. Assuming arguendo that the testimony regarding Valadez’s post-Miranda statement in which he requested counsel constituted a Doyle violation, said violation did not affect his substantial rights. In light of the evidence against Valadez, specifically that he arranged to purchase large amounts of cocaine, 11 retrieved a bundle of cash from a hidden compartment in his trailer, and had $60,000 cash in his car, some of which was coated in mustard to prevent detection by drug dogs, the jury’s knowledge that he requested an attorney did not affect its verdict.