Opinion ID: 2630002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reasonable belief to administer the field tests

Text: This court has stated that the scope of review during a driver's license revocation hearing is limited to three issues: (1) whether the person failed to submit to an evidentiary test; (2) whether a person's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit at the time of the test; and (3) whether the officer who ordered an evidentiary test had reasonable grounds, at the time she ordered the test, to believe the person had been driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated. [5] Significantly, [t]his court has carved out a unique posture towards administrative driver's license revocation proceedings. [6] Under Nevada law, such proceedings are considered to be `civil in nature, not criminal.' [7] Consequently, the objective of such a proceeding is not to punish the licensee; rather, the goal is to protect the public from irresponsible and dangerous drivers. [8] On appeal, Weaver challenges the last determination and asserts that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Officer Kisfalvi had reasonable grounds to believe that he drove while intoxicated. We disagree. In State, Department of Motor Vehicles v. Evans, this court expressly stated that it was not incumbent upon the DMV to prove that Evans was in fact driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle, only that the officer directing him to be tested had reasonable grounds to believe that Evans had been doing so while under the influence of alcohol. [9] In this particular case, Weaver readily admitted that he was driving his Porsche when he crashed. Therefore, the DMV only needed to demonstrate that Officer Kisfalvi had reasonable grounds to believe that Weaver was intoxicated when he crashed the vehicle. Here, substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge's determination that Officer Kisfalvi had a reasonable belief that Weaver was driving while under the influence. When Officer Kisfalvi arrived at the scene of the accident, Weaver exhibited physical signs of intoxication; Weaver smelled strongly of alcohol, had watery bloodshot eyes, and slurred his speech when he spoke. Moreover, Weaver failed all of the sobriety tests administered by Officer Kisfalvi and refused to complete the walk-and-turn test. This evidence supports a reasonable belief that Weaver was intoxicated at the time of the accident, which occurred some time before Officer Kisfalvi's arrival on the scene. That Weaver chose later to modify his story and testify at the hearing that when he returned home after the accident he consumed four or five shots of tequila and five or six beers has no impact upon the inquiry into the reasonableness of the officer's beliefs because this was not part of the information evaluated by Officer Kisfalvi at the scene. Importantly, the results of the blood test tend to verify that the officer's decision was reasonable since the test demonstrated that Weaver's blood alcohol level was .272, almost three times the legal limit. [10] Thus, we conclude that the administrative law judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that when Officer Kisfalvi conducted the test he had reasonable grounds to believe that Weaver had been driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated.