Opinion ID: 2737443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: This is the second appeal in a case that began in July 2008 when the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) assumed custody of four-month-old Dawn1 from her parents.2 Dawn was found to be a child in need of aid (CINA).3 Dawn’s parents were Alaska Natives and thus the protections and requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)4 applied to the CINA case.5 One of ICWA’s provisions establishes preferences for foster care and adoptive placement of an Indian child with a member of the child’s extended family, with other members of the child’s tribe, or with other Indian families.6 Native Village of Tununak (the Tribe) intervened in Dawn’s CINA case and submitted a list of potential placement options for Dawn, including Dawn’s maternal grandmother, Elise, who lives in the village.7 Throughout much of the case, the parents and Tribe agreed there was good cause not to place Dawn with an ICWA preferred placement, and Dawn was eventually placed with the Smiths, non-Native foster parents who live in Anchorage.8 1 We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the parties involved. 2 Native Vill. of Tununak v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 303 P.3d 431, 433 (Alaska 2013) (Tununak I). 3 Id. 4 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012). 5 Tununak I, 303 P.3d at 433. 6 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 7 Tununak I, 303 P.3d at 433. 8 Id. at 434-35. -2- 6954 The superior court terminated Dawn’s parents’ parental rights at a September 2011 trial, making Dawn eligible for adoption.9 The Tribe asserted that, given the termination of parental rights, there was no longer good cause to deviate from ICWA’s placement preferences and objected to Dawn’s continued placement in Anchorage.10 In November the Smiths filed a petition to adopt Dawn.11 At no point in the case did Elise file an adoption petition in the superior court. The superior court conducted a placement hearing following the Tribe’s objection to placement with the Smiths.12 Following testimony by a number of witnesses, including Elise,13 the court found that there was continued good cause to deviate from ICWA’s adoptive placement preferences and again approved Dawn’s placement with the Smiths.14 The court then granted the Smiths’ adoption petition in March 2012.15 Dawn was almost four years old, and had lived with the Smiths for almost two and a half years.16 In separate appeals, the Tribe appealed both the superior court’s order finding that there was good cause to deviate from ICWA’s placement preferences and 9 Id. at 435. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. at 435-39. 13 Id. at 437-38. 14 Id. at 439-40. 15 Id. at 440. 16 Id. at 434, 440. -3- 6954 the adoption order.17 We issued an order staying the adoption appeal while we considered the adoptive placement appeal.18 On June 21, 2013, we issued our decision in the first appeal that examined Dawn’s adoptive placement with the Smiths.19 We reversed the superior court’s finding of good cause to deviate from ICWA’s placement preferences.20 Though we had held in previous cases that the preponderance of the evidence standard was the correct standard of proof, we were convinced by the Tribe’s argument that the preponderance standard was inconsistent with Congress’s intent in enacting ICWA, and that a higher standard of proof — proof by clear and convincing evidence — was required.21 We overruled our prior cases and remanded the adoptive placement case to the superior court for it to take additional evidence and make its determination whether there was clear and convincing evidence of good cause to deviate from ICWA’s adoptive placement preferences.22 We continued our stay order of the adoption appeal.23 17 Id. at 440 n.10. 18 Id.; see also Native Vill. of Tununak v. State, OCS, et al., No. S-14670 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, Nov. 29, 2012) (staying sua sponte the adoption appeal pending the resolution of the adoption placement appeal). 19 Tununak I, 303 P.3d at 431. 20 Id. at 453. 21 Id. at 446-49. 22 Id. at 453. 23 Native Vill. of Tununak v. State, OCS, et al., No. S-14670 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, Nov. 29, 2012); Native Vill. of Tununak v. State, OCS, et al., No. S-14670 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, June 21, 2013) (ordering briefing on whether the stay of the adoption appeal should continue following the court’s issuance of its opinion in the adoption placement appeal). -4- 6954 Four days after we issued our opinion in the adoptive placement appeal (Tununak I), the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (Baby Girl).24 There, the Supreme Court held that ICWA “§ 1915(a)’s [placement] preferences are inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward.”25 We asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing and oral argument on the effect of the Supreme Court’s Baby Girl decision on the adoption appeal currently before us.26 We now hold that because the United States Supreme Court’s decisions on issues of federal law bind state courts’ consideration of federal law issues — including the Indian Child Welfare Act — the decision in Baby Girl applies directly to the adoptive placement case on remand and to this adoption appeal. We discern no material factual differences between the Baby Girl case and this case, so we are unable to distinguish the holding in Baby Girl. Because the Supreme Court’s holding in Baby Girl is clear and not qualified in any material way, and because it is undisputed that Elise did not “formally [seek] to adopt” Dawn in the superior court, we conclude that, as in Baby Girl, “there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply[,] [as] no alternative party that is eligible to be 24 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 25 Id. at 2564. The dissent argues that this portion of the opinion was dicta. We disagree. While “statements of a legal rule set forth in a judicial opinion do not always divide neatly into ‘holdings’ and ‘dicta,’ ” Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 831 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting), in this case, the Court’s Baby Girl opinion is divided into distinct sections considering three discrete subdivisions of ICWA: §§ 1912(f), 1912(d), and 1915(a). See Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2557. The Court’s discussion of § 1915(a) is succinct and its holding unequivocal, id. at 2564-65, and we apply it to the facts of the present appeal. 26 Native Vill. of Tununak v. State, OCS, et al., No. S-14670 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, Oct. 7, 2013) (ordering briefing and oral argument on the effect of Baby Girl on the adoption case). -5- 6954 preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward[,]” and therefore ICWA “§ 1915(a)’s [placement] preferences are inapplicable.”27 We affirm the superior court’s order granting the Smiths’ petition to adopt Dawn and vacate our remand order in Tununak I requiring the superior court to conduct further adoptive placement proceedings. We do not otherwise disturb our decision in Tununak I.