Opinion ID: 853267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Payment from Public Funds

Text: For the foregoing reasons, if section 34-10-1-2 sought to impose service without a fee, that section would be unconstitutional. However, the terms of section 34-10-1-2 do not require an attorney to serve without compensation. Section 34-10-1-2 denies the appointed attorney a fee or reward from the indigent person. Ind.Code § 34-10-1-2 (1998). There is no statutory prohibition disallowing payment to the appointed attorney from other sources. Although the Court in Pollard concluded that no mechanism existed for courts to order payment of the appointed civil attorney by the county, it has since been firmly established that courts have the inherent power and authority to incur and order paid all such expenses as are necessary for the holding of court and the administration of its duties. Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 511, 29 N.E.2d 405, 413 (1940) (citation omitted). This authority includes the power to appoint and require payment of such personnel as the functions of the court may require. Noble County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 187, 125 N.E.2d 709, 717 (1955). Today, the source of that power is found in Indiana Trial Rule 60.5. That rule sets forth the procedure by which courts may seek funds which are reasonably necessary for the operation of the court or court-related functions. Ind. Trial Rule 60.5. [7] In many cases, it is the duty of the county council to make the proper appropriation to meet such expense. Dunn v. State ex rel. Corydon, 204 Ind. 390, 395, 184 N.E. 535, 536 (1933); see also Fifer, 234 Ind. at 187-88, 125 N.E.2d at 717 (court has authority to require county council to pay salary of court appointed probation officer); McCormick, 217 Ind. at 512, 29 N.E.2d at 413 (court has power to require county council to pay for appointed attorneys in criminal cases). If counsel is required to be appointed, the payment of counsel becomes a reasonably necessary court-related cost, imposed as a result of the legislature's directive. However, the legislative directive to appoint counsel is only one of several factors that a trial court must weigh before requiring payment of appointed counsel under Trial Rule 60.5. This Court explained that balancing, and the reason for it, in Overbeck v. Barton, 471 N.E.2d 1105, 1106 (Ind.1984) (citation omitted): It may not be overlooked ... that our system of government does not repose the authority in judges to set salaries for court officials and employees. That duty and responsibility is with others.... In exercising such extraordinary authority, due and full consideration must be given to the possible adverse impact upon any specific governmental interests. An order to pay funds should not be issued by a trial court if any specific fiscal or other governmental interests [would be] severely and adversely affected by the payment. In re Court Reporter Salaries in Knox Circuit and Superior Courts, 713 N.E.2d 280, 282 (Ind.1999). In the context of appointed counsel for criminal defendants, any governmental or fiscal consequences of paying the counsel are necessarily trumped by the constitutional requirements that (1) counsel be appointed and (2) counsel be compensated for the work. As this Court stated in McCormick, 217 Ind. at 498, 29 N.E.2d at 407: [W]here one who is without means is charged with crime, the question of whether he shall have counsel appointed for him has not been left to the discretion of the court or the Legislature. It has been determined by the people in their Constitutions, national and state, that he shall have counsel.... Because we have systems providing publicly funded counsel for criminal defendants, no mandate is required. But if there were no such provision, courts would be required by the Constitution to exercise their power under Trial Rule 60.5 to direct payment of counsel. In most civil cases, however, we have only a statutory directive, and there is no constitutional requirement that counsel be appointed for indigent litigants. As explained in Part II, before appointing counsel, the trial court is to consider the type of case presented to determine whether even an indigent applicant has sufficient means to proceed without appointed counsel. In addition, the trial court is obliged to consider whether any specific fiscal or other governmental interests would be severely and adversely affected by a Trial Rule 60.5 order requiring payment of any appointed counsel. Christine is correct that appointment in some cases is, to use her word, absurd. Although most lawsuits represent genuine disputes, some litigants present wholly frivolous cases. Others pursue cases where the amount of money or principles of law are insignificant. Courts are occasionally presented with vendettas and simple sporting exercises. Public funding of counsel in those cases is a waste of public funds. But apart from the amount of public waste involved, appointment of counsel at public expense would severely impair the credibility of the judicial branch. Although the legislature directs appointment of counsel, apparently on the mistaken assumption that attorneys could be required to do their duty, the appointment and attendant mandate of funds are judicial functions reserved to the courts. As this Court recently observed, [I]t has been held in a variety of contexts that the legislature cannot interfere with the discharge of judicial duties, or attempt to control judicial functions, or otherwise dictate how the judiciary conducts its order of business. State v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind.2000). The ultimate credibility of the judicial process must be considered in any exercise of judicial power. Rule 60.5 calls for exercise of judicial judgment, and that judgment cannot be directed by another branch of government consistent with the separation of powers required by Article III of the Indiana Constitution. If no uncompensated attorney is willing to serve and the trial court finds itself unable to order payment, then, for the reasons set forth in Part III, the statutory obligation to appoint counsel fails as an unconstitutional order to attorneys to work without compensation.