Opinion ID: 774021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Weight of the Presumption of Access

Text: 30 We must next consider what weight to give the presumption of access in connection with documents presented at a pretrial detention hearing. As we discussed in Amodeo II, the central concern is the role the tapes at issue played in the district court's exercise of its Article III powers. See Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049. Under our analysis in Amodeo II, documents that directly affect an adjudication and play a significant role in determining litigants' substantive rights, see id., receive the benefit of a relatively strong presumption, while the public interest in other documents is not as pressing, see id. (quoting In re Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1342 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (J. Skelly Wright, concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In assessing the presumption to be applied to documents in the middle of this continuum, we look to whether such documents are usually filed with the court and are generally available. Id. at 1050. 31 The tapes at issue here clearly directly affect[ed] an adjudication and were material to the district court's determination of the defendants' substantive rights. Indeed, as discussed above, they were the primary basis for the district court's decision to detain the defendants pending trial. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply a strong presumption of access, such as that applied in Myers. See id. 32 Moreover, even if we were to find that the tapes were situated toward the middle of the continuum described in Amodeo II, we would be inclined to give substantial weight to the presumption of access. The detention of criminal defendants pending trial is a quintessential exercise of a court's Article III judicial power, and the public has a legitimate interest in monitoring a court's use of that power. See, e.g. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1984) ([T]he bail decision is one of major importance to the administration of justice, and openness will help to assure the public that the decision is properly reached.); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 1983) (Pretrial release proceedings require decisions that attract significant public interest and invite legitimate and healthy public scrutiny.). Barring a successful motion to close the courtroom, pretrial detention hearings are open to the public. See In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 52; Chagra, 701 F.2d at 363; United States v. Gotti, 753 F. Supp. 443, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); cf. In re Application of The Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting, in the context of a suppression hearing, a public right of access to pretrial hearings). In the instant case, the defendants have not appealed the district court's decision to allow Category One and Two tapes to be played in open court, and the intervenors have not requested copies of the Category Three tapes played after the courtroom was closed. Thus, there is nothing to lead us to think that we should treat materials introduced in the pretrial detention hearing in this case differently than those introduced in any other such hearing held in open court. Given the considerable public interest in scrutinizing the courts' exercise of authority in the context of pretrial detention hearings, the traditionally public nature of such hearings, and the centrality of the tapes at issue to the district court's decision to detain the defendants in the instant case, we find that the district court did not err in applying the strong presumption of Myers to the tapes at issue here. 33