Opinion ID: 2053481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the discrimination claims

Text: Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her age and sex. The issue presented is whether she has demonstrated sufficient evidence of age or sex discrimination to survive defendant's motion for summary disposition.
A court reviewing a motion for summary disposition must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion, and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party. Stevens v. McLouth Steel Products Corp., 433 Mich. 365, 370, 446 N.W.2d 95 (1989). As this Court stated in Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 374, n. 3, 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993): The alternative would require our abandonment of what has been called the truth-testing process of cross-examination and would encourage unwarranted invasion by judges of the jury's exclusive province. [Citations omitted.] In this case, I fail to understand how the majority can state that n o reasonable juror could find in favor of plaintiff, as a matter of law, when three respected and unanimous Court of Appeals judges and four members of this Court have already held that on the very facts of this case, plaintiff presented an issue of fact for the jury. At the summary disposition stage, the only question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, any reasonable person could find in favor of plaintiff. Seven current and former judges of this state have held that the answer is yes. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. [3]
At oral argument, the defendant argued that the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green [4] burden-shifting test does not apply because, in a reduction-in-force situation, there is no replacement. However, the defendant is incorrect that the burden-shifting test just doesn't work under the facts of this case. As this Court stated in Town v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 455 Mich. 688, 568 N.W.2d 64 (1997), a plaintiff does not have to prove she was discharged and replaced to prove a prima facie case. Indeed, we stated: The ... prima facie approach requires an employee to show that the employee was (1) a member of a protected class, (2) subject to an adverse employment action, (3) qualified for the position, and that (4) others, similarly situated and outside the protected class, were unaffected by the employer's adverse conduct. [ Id. at 695, 568 N.W.2d 64.] However, as a tangential issue, the difficulty is determining what amount of proof is necessary to survive summary disposition. The problem is that each case comes with its particular facts and circumstances, making it difficult to set a formula for determining what evidence is necessary in each case. I believe that, as a practical matter, applying McDonnell Douglas to any case should not make it any easier or any more difficult for a plaintiff to show an issue of fact for the jury, than it would be if the test never existed. I believe proper application of McDonnell Douglas supports this, as does this Court's opinion in Town. Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, and the defendant has articulated its legitimate business reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists whether the plaintiff was fired because of discrimination. All plaintiff's evidence should be considered at this final stage, including her prima facie evidence. The proofs offered in support of the prima facie case may be sufficient to create a triable issue of fact that the employer's stated reason is a pretext, as long as the evidence would enable a reasonable factfinder to infer that the employer's decision had a discriminatory basis. [ Id. at 697, 568 N.W.2d 64.] As is required of any case, the evidence must create a material issue of fact on which reasonable minds could conclude that the employer's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination for summary judgment to be precluded. Id. at 698, 568 N.W.2d 64.
The facts that support plaintiff's claim of sex discrimination have now been laid out in sufficient detail in one decision of the Court of Appeals and two decisions of this Court. Therefore, I will only list those relevant factors that plaintiff asserts support her claim: 1. In 1987, plaintiff was ordered by Malady that all the girls must wear dresses to the company open house. 2. Plaintiff told Malady that she did not want to wear a dress. 3. Plaintiff had never been required to wear a dress to the open house in the preceding fourteen years she worked at defendant company. 4. Plaintiff did not wear a dress to the company open house. 5. Within one week of the June open house, Malady gave Lytle her first negative performance evaluation. [5] 6. The company policy was to give performance evaluations in December of each calendar year. 7. No female employee who wore a dress to the company picnic was treated adversely by Malady. 8. In September 1987, plaintiff was not consulted regarding an affirmative action hiring by Malady. 9. Plaintiff was responsible for administration of the company's affirmative action program. 10. Malady hired a friend for the position. 11. Plaintiff complained to Malady, who did not respond. 12. Plaintiff complained to Malady's supervisor. 13. Malady's supervisor issued a memorandum to Malady remonstrating him for interfering with Lytle's responsibilities and failure of communication. 14. Within one to two weeks of the memorandum issued by Malady's supervisor, Malady made his second, negative performance evaluation of plaintiff, in September 1987. 15. Malady failed to do a December 1987 or any 1988 performance evaluation of plaintiff. 16. In January 1989, without warning, plaintiff was demoted to human resources specialist. 17. Plaintiff was replaced by Walter Boczkaja, a male. 18. Boczkaja had been Lytle's subordinate for the previous ten years. 19. When Boczkaja was originally hired, plaintiff trained him. 20. After 1989, plaintiff began reporting to Boczkaja. 21. After the negative performance evaluations by Malady, subsequent performance evaluations of plaintiff were done by Boczkaja, and all were satisfactory. The majority contends that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that she was similarly situated [to Boczkaja]. Op. at 919. In fact, plaintiff presented evidence that she was more qualified: She not only trained Boczkaja, she supervised him for the ten years preceding his promotion to her position, and her demotion. The majority contends that Boczkaja received a series of promotions on the basis of his work performance for his first two years on the job. However, the majority ignores the fact that plaintiff received outstanding performance evaluations and promotions over the preceding fourteen years of her employment. In fact, she was promoted from clerk typist, when she was first hired, to employment manager under the human resources director John Ozar. The majority contends that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that her performance or quality of her work product did not decline over time. However, even as the majority opinion recognizes, Plaintiff contended that these performance evaluations were uncharacteristic of her job performance.... Op. at 918. To be true to summary disposition, the majority must take plaintiff's testimony in the light most favorable to her. Therefore, even assuming defendant's position that the quality of plaintiff's performance declined in 1987, plaintiff contended that her performance did not decline, and the issuance of the negative performance evaluations was a pretext for discrimination. This is a factual dispute for the jury to decide. In support of plaintiff's contention that her performance did not decline, is the timing of the negative performance evaluations. A reasonable inference could be drawn that the performance evaluations were not issued because of poor performance, rather they were issued because of Malady's discriminatory intent. First, the evaluations had never been issued before December. Second, the evaluations each were issued within seven to fourteen days of the incidents relating to all the girls must wear dresses and the affirmative action policy of the company. Third, how could plaintiff show her performance was either good or bad from September 1987 through December 1988 when Malady failed to give her a performance evaluation in December 1987 or at any time during 1988? After fifteen months without any review by Malady, in January 1989, she was demoted by Malady. Finally, once Boczkaja began evaluating her instead of Malady, her reviews were increased to a satisfactory level. I would hold that there was more than ample evidence from which a reasonable person could find that plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of her sex in the events leading up to, and ultimately resting on, her demotion. Certainly, all should agree that a demotion is an adverse employment action. As a final point, the majority takes issue with plaintiff's sex discrimination claim because, with respect to plaintiff's ultimate discharge, Roof was the person who fired her, not Malady. However, a reasonable inference is that Roof's decision to terminate plaintiff was because of her two negative performance evaluations and her subsequent demotion, all of which were made by Malady. In fact, plaintiff noted that Boczkaja testified at his deposition that Malady participated with Roof in the decision with respect to the plaintiff. While defendants obviously contend that the decision was made because of economic reasons, this factual dispute is improperly resolved by the majority instead of by a jury. Additionally, the mere fact that plaintiff's duties were redistributed to seven employees, five of whom were women, proves nothing. There is no evidence to show whether these women objected to wearing dresses to the open house, whether they wore dresses to the open house, or whether they asserted their right to have the affirmative action policy implemented properly. Therefore, while defendant asserted that it was conducting a reduction in force, and while I would hold that the reduction in force was genuine, factual questions remain whether plaintiff was terminated as a result of the RIF or as a result of unlawful discrimination.
I concur with the result of the majority in regard to plaintiff's age discrimination claim. However, if, on remand, plaintiff were able to produce the evidence that the company was hiring more employees during the alleged RIF, and plaintiff were able to show that they were younger than the employees allegedly terminated as a result of the RIF, she may have presented sufficient evidence to survive summary disposition on her age discrimination claim.