Opinion ID: 1445104
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The first blood sample

Text: At Parks' request, hospital personnel withdrew the first blood sample from defendant. The extraction of a blood sample by the police is both a search of the person and a seizure of an `effect'the person's blood. State v. Milligan, supra, 304 Or. at 664, 748 P.2d 130. In the present case, Parks did not have a search warrant for the first blood sample. The lack of a search warrant, however, does not automatically mean that the search was unreasonable or that the evidence must be suppressed. A warrantless search is reasonable under Article I, section 9and therefore constitutionally permissibleif it is conducted with probable cause to search and under exigent circumstances. State v. Matsen/Wilson, 287 Or. 581, 586, 601 P.2d 784 (1979) (exigent circumstances exception to warrant requirement recognized). More particularly, when police extract a blood sample from a suspect without a search warrant, the evidence obtained is admissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement if the record shows (1) that the police had probable cause to believe that the suspect was a vessel containing evidence [i.e., alcohol,] of a crime, State v. Milligan, supra, 304 Or. at 665, 748 P.2d 130, together with probable cause to believe that an analysis of [the suspect's] blood would yield evidence that he had committed    [a] crime, id.; and (2) that no warrant can be obtained without sacrificing the evidence[,]    [and] the extraction was made promptly after the suspect was taken to a place where [the extraction] could be made. Id. at 666, 748 P.2d 130. [2] We hold that Parks had probable cause to arrest defendant at the time the first sample was extracted. [3] In State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 204, 729 P.2d 524 (1986), this court held that [p]robable cause [to arrest] under the Oregon Constitution has both a subjective and an objective component. An officer must subjectively believe that a crime has been committed and    this belief must be objectively reasonable in the circumstances. The test is not simply what a reasonable officer could have believed when he conducted a warrantless search or seizure, but it is what this officer actually believed, based upon the underlying facts of which he was cognizant, together with his own training and experience. (Emphasis in original.) Parks' affidavit shows that he subjectively believed that defendant had committed the crimes of driving while under the influence of intoxicants and assault. Moreover, Parks' belief that defendant had committed those crimes was objectively reasonable, given the facts that defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery, his speech was slow and slurred, he had been in a rear-end automobile collision, and he admitted to consuming three mixed drinks earlier that afternoon. The same evidence gave Parks probable cause to believe that an analysis of defendant's blood would yield evidence that defendant had committed a crime. At the time that Parks requested the blood sample, he subjectively believed that alcohol was present in defendant's blood. That belief was objectively reasonable because defendant admitted having some time before consumed alcohol, had bloodshot and watery eyes, slow and slurred speech and only two hours previously had been involved in an automobile accident in which his car rear-ended another vehicle. Similar facts were deemed by this court to establish probable cause to believe that a defendant had been driving under the influence of intoxicants in State v. Milligan, supra, 304 Or. at 665, 748 P.2d 130. (The circumstances surrounding the accident, the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath and [a witness'] statement that defendant had been drinking heavily were sufficient to establish probable cause.). There being probable cause to seize a sample of defendant's blood, but no warrant, the remaining issue is exigency. In the context of an alcohol-related crime, there commonly will be an exigency because, as we already have noted, a suspect is a vessel containing evidence of a crime he had committedevidence that [i]s dissipating with every breath he t[akes]. State v. Milligan, supra, 304 Or. at 665, 748 P.2d 130. In Milligan, we explained: In order to determine accurately the level of alcohol in a suspect's blood at the time of the alleged crime, the police must obtain an initial sample of the suspect's blood with as little delay as possible. Testimony at the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss established that alcohol dissipation rates vary from person to person. To determine the dissipation rate of any particular individual, it is necessary to take more than one blood sample. A nurse at the hospital testified that the `usual practice' was to draw the blood samples one hour apart. Thus, the first blood sample must be drawn early enough so that a measurable amount of alcohol will still be present in the suspect's blood an hour later. Id. at 666, 748 P.2d 130. There was similar evidence in the present record. The loss of alcohol evidence which creates the exigency occurs because of the biological fact that the human body metabolizes and expels alcohol. The exigency created by the dissipating evidence of blood alcohol, however, did not make the blood sample seizures per se reasonable under Article I, section 9. The state was still required to prove, in order to justify the warrantless extraction of defendant's blood, that it could not have obtained a search warrant without sacrificing the evidence and that the blood sample that it obtained had been extracted promptly. State v. Milligan, supra, 304 Or. at 666, 748 P.2d 130. The trial court foundand the evidence supports the findingthat Parks could have obtained a search warrant without sacrificing the evidence: [T]here was a manner of obtaining a search warrant prior to obtaining the first blood sample taken. [The evidence] further showed that the procedure could be accomplished quickly within the time period necessary to prevent the loss of evidence. The evidence was not abstract; Parks' own superiors knew it. It is true that the trial court found that Parks did not know it personally. But we think that it is sufficient, at least for the purposes of defeating the state's attempt to justify Parks' actions taken without a warrant, to show that Parks' own police department knew how to obtain a warrant expeditiously. We recognize that our holding places pressure on police agencies to assure that all of their officers know what techniques are available for obtaining search warrants within their jurisdiction, but that is as it should be. An individual's degree of protection under the Oregon Constitution should not depend on whether the officer who encounters the individual is well or poorly informed. The trial court's order suppressing the result of the first blood test, and the Court of Appeals' affirmance of that ruling, were correct.