Opinion ID: 2087875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: clayvon d. anderson

Text: Anderson argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for a mistrial: (2) allowing a witness to testify to a redacted version of a statement that he made to her; and (3) declining to suppress statements he made to a detective before he was read his Miranda [19] rights. Anderson first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. He specifically contends that he was prejudiced when he was seen by at least three jurors being escorted back to the cellblock behind the courtroom. Anderson also claims that he should have been granted a mistrial because Michael Lewis had been improperly allowed to testify as to his prior drug dealings with Anderson. As stated before, the decision to grant a mistrial is subject to the broad discretion of the trial court, and our standard of review is deferential. See Wright, 637 A.2d at 100. Anderson's first claim that he should be granted a mistrial on the basis that the observed act of a defendant being led to a cellblock during trial probably causes a layperson to ignore the presumption of innocence, must fail because this court has previously stated that such an incident would not necessarily cause prejudice, and the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice. Watts v. United States, 449 A.2d 308 (D.C.1982). As this court noted, even the most unsophisticated juror must know that defendants indicted for serious crimes ... may have to post bail ... [and] that many defendants lack the resources to accomplish this. Id. at 312. Here, the trial court agreed to admonish the Marshals and there were no further complaints from counsel. Because Anderson failed to show that he was prejudiced, the trial court's ruling was proper. Id. at 311-12. Anderson's second claim that he was entitled to a mistrial on the basis of Michael Lewis' reference to prior drug dealings with him must similarly fail. Lewis' testimony was admissible to show Anderson's motive for committing the crimes, his intent in entering the house, and his knowledge of where to find the hidden safe. See ( William A.) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087 (D.C.1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1148, 117 S.Ct. 1323, 137 L.Ed.2d 484 (1997). [I]n cases where evidence of incidental, uncharged criminal conduct is inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged offense, evidence of the uncharged criminal conduct is directly admissible without the necessity of a cautionary Drew instruction. Toliver v. United States, 468 A.2d 958, 961 (D.C.1983). The statement's prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh its probative value, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson's motion for a mistrial. Anderson also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Miller, Anderson's old girlfriend, to testify to a redacted version of a statement that he had made to her. Miller's statement that Anderson told her they had just robbed some niggers in Northeast was redacted at trial to state, I robbed some niggers in Northeast, in order to eliminate reference to his co-defendants. Anderson claims that the redacted statement changes the original statement into an admission on his part. The trial court has broad discretion to determine the substance, form, and quantum of evidence which is to be presented to a jury. ( William T.) Johnson, 452 A.2d at 960. This court's scope of review is limited to whether the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. Anderson claims that when he used the word they in the statement, he was referring to another group besides Anderson and his co-defendants and that the statement in its original form served to exculpate him. However, the statement, when viewed in the context of Miller's testimony, expressly includes Anderson in the meaning of they. Before the redaction, Miller's original testimony was, I asked Clay what did he do, you know, what was going on, and he told me that they had just robbed some niggers in Northeast, period. Furthermore, according to Miller's testimony, she had seen Anderson with a gun in his waistband on the morning of the shootings, he later returned to her house with three others, carrying guns and a safe, and they subsequently divided up a large sum of cash and other items. Therefore, the trial court appropriately admitted a redacted form of the statement in order to inculpate only Anderson and not his co-defendants. Anderson finally contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to Detective Bell before he was read his Miranda rights. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, this court's scope of review is limited. See Womack v. United States, 673 A.2d 603, 607 (D.C. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1156, 117 S.Ct. 1097, 137 L.Ed.2d 229 (1997). We must defer to the trial judge's findings of evidentiary fact. Id. Furthermore, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, and we must draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Id. Under Miranda, a person's rights are not triggered until he or she is in police custody and subject to interrogation. Miranda, supra note 19, 384 U.S. at 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602. There was no dispute that Anderson was in custody and that he was given his Miranda rights only until after the statements in question were obtained. The only question was whether Anderson was subject to interrogation. Interrogation has been defined by the Supreme Court to include not only express questioning, but also its functional equivalent. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). In other words, interrogation refers to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. The test for whether a suspect has been subject to interrogation or its functional equivalent focuses on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. However, the Court noted that where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect. Id. at 301-02 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 1682. In this case, Anderson was in the hospital receiving treatment for gunshot wounds in an unrelated case. Detective Bell went to the hospital for the purpose of advising Anderson that he was under arrest and to interview him about the Lewis killings. Detective Bell was the only person in the room with Anderson. After informing Anderson that he had an arrest warrant for him, Detective Bell told him about the investigation into the Lewis murders, including Anderson's apparent involvement in the crime and the penalty if convicted. Anderson subsequently blurted out, I heard that girl's not getting charged with nothing. That girl, is she being charged too? What about Mike? Is he finished? At that moment, hospital staff came to move Anderson to another room. Detective Bell followed Anderson to the new room and subsequently asked him if he would be willing to tell Detective Bell about his involvement. Anderson then stated that he wanted to speak to his lawyer, upon which Detective Bell read Anderson his Miranda rights. A review of the circumstances which led to Anderson's statements compel the conclusion that the statements were obtained in a manner that was the functional equivalent of custodial interrogation. Objectively viewing Detective Bell's remarks and actions, we conclude that he should have known they were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating evidence. There were no extenuating circumstances to suggest that [Detective Bell] had any purpose in inducing [Anderson] to talk other than to pursue his investigation .... Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d, 1314, 1328 (D.C.1985). Furthermore, Detective Bell admitted that he made his statements to Anderson with the hope that by Anderson knowing what Detective Bell knew, he would be willing to want to talk about his involvement. [20] Therefore, we find that Anderson's Miranda rights were violated and the court erroneously denied Anderson's motion to suppress. Even though we find that the trial court should have granted Anderson's motion to suppress, we conclude that any error in the admission of his statements was harmless. In determining whether the admission of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda is harmless, we examine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). Here, Anderson's statements to Detective Bell do not expressly implicate himself in the crimes. Therefore, Anderson's statements were not directly incriminating. Furthermore, there was compelling evidence of Anderson's involvement in the crimes apart from his statement to Detective Bell. Besides Williams' testimony describing in detail Anderson's role in staging the robbery and carrying away the proceeds, Miller confirmed his actions in dividing up the proceeds and testified that he admitted the robbery to her. The fact that the prosecutor did not mention Anderson's statements in her opening, closing, or rebuttal statements to the jury further demonstrates their insignificance to the evidence of Anderson's guilt. For these reasons, the admission of Anderson's statements to Detective Bell was harmless error. See Derrington, 488 A.2d at 1333. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for resentencing not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered.