Opinion ID: 670481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was There Sufficient Basis for a Stop?

Text: 15 Clark argues that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him because they had little cause to believe that Braxton was a reliable informant or that he had any personal knowledge of Clark's criminal conduct. We find, however, that Braxton's identification of Clark provided police with ample justification for an investigatory stop. Detective Stone had caught Braxton selling marijuana and could reasonably assume that he could identify the person who had supplied it. As we noted in United States v. Chin: 16 Because [the informant] asserted direct personal knowledge of Chin's crime and had himself been caught red-handed, his identification of Chin could be viewed as weightier than a tip from a more distant informant. 17 981 F.2d 1275, 1278 (D.C.Cir.1992) (Ruth B. Ginsburg, J.). Clark nevertheless argues, on the basis of Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), that the officers were not entitled to rely on Braxton's tip because of the absence of any corroborating information that would demonstrate his reliability. 18 In Alabama v. White, the Supreme Court found that an investigatory stop based on an anonymous tip was justified because the police's independent corroboration of predictive details gave it sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. at 329-32, 110 S.Ct. at 2415-17. Anonymous tips are a category unto themselves. Because they typically do not reveal the informant's basis of knowledge or provide other indicia of reliability, courts generally have insisted that such tips must be supplemented by  '[s]omething more.'  See id. at 329, 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2326, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). 19 Here, the police had the informant in hand and were able to corroborate significant details of his tip. Braxton had stated that the man with the stash was dressed in a black coat and black trousers and that he could be found in a particular area. On driving there, the police saw an individual who matched the description and whom Braxton twice identified as the person with the drugs. 20 Clark nevertheless objects that Braxton could not be considered a reliable source of information because he was himself an admitted criminal, had an incentive to appear to cooperate with the police, and in fact was not trusted by the police. The answer, of course, is that the officers could reasonably believe that precisely because he was actively engaged in drug trafficking, he would know--and thus be able to identify--the source of his trading goods; furthermore, because he was seeking leniency at the hands of the law, Braxton would have little reason to prove himself an unreliable informant. As we noted in United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C.Cir.1979), should the informant lie to the police, he risks disfavor with the [police and] prosecution. See also United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944, 951 (D.C.Cir.1992) ([A]nyone fabricating information runs a risk.). 21 While it is true that Detective Stone testified that he did not trust Braxton to the degree that he would go and automatically lock up an individual on the basis of his information, he nevertheless felt it necessary to check it out. Suppression hearing transcript (Tr.) at 30. That, of course, is the purpose of a Terry stop, which is based not on certainty but on the need to check out a reasonable suspicion. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 1923 (A brief stop of a suspicious individual ... [to] obtain[ ] more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.). 22