Opinion ID: 1427400
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Heading: Whether Probable Cause or Reason to Believe is the Correct Standard Governing When Officers May Enter a Residence to Execute an Arrest Warrant

Text: The first question presented by this case concerns the proper standard for evaluating the quantum of proof required for police officers to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), the Supreme Court stated that an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. Id. at 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (emphasis added). Earlier in the opinion, the Court noted that the case involved no contention that the police lacked probable cause to believe that the suspect was at home when they entered. Id. at 583, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (emphasis added). In dissent, Justice White stated his understanding that under today's decision, the officers apparently need an extra increment of probable cause when executing the arrest warrant, namely, grounds to believe that the suspect is within the dwelling. Id. at 616 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Given that the officers did not have an arrest warrant in Payton, the Supreme Court did not elaborate on the quantum of proof necessary for officers to enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant, as the Court simply reversed the judgment against the defendant in the case after noting the absence of an arrest warrant. Id. at 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371. The district court analyzed Hardin's motion to suppress using a probable-cause standard, but on appeal the government argued in its brief that an intervening decision from our court, United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477 (6th Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1814, 167 L.Ed.2d 325 (2007), controls this case and commands a different standard. In particular, the two-judge majority in Pruitt stated that a lesser reasonable belief standard, and not probable cause, is sufficient to allow officers to enter a residence to enforce an arrest warrant. Id. at 482. In response to the government's argument, Hardin contended in his Reply Brief that the Pruitt panel had overlooked our prior decision in United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425 (6th Cir.1981). Reply Br. at 3-4. In Jones, observing that [i]t is . . . fundamental that government officials cannot invade the privacy of one's home without probable cause for the entry, we summarized Payton as holding that an arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within. Id. at 428 (emphases added). At first glance, Jones and Pruitt appear in conflict on this issue, in which case our circuit's rule that [a] panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel, Salmi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985), would mean that our prior holding in Jones governs this case, notwithstanding the later view expressed by the majority in Pruitt. Indeed, at oral argument the government conceded that Jones, as the earlier case in our circuit, was binding and had settled this issue. Upon more careful review, however, we conclude that Jones does not control this case because Jones involved a distinct factual scenario and because the language in our Jones opinion is dicta. Applying the same careful review to our opinion in Pruitt, we conclude that Pruitt does not control this case either because the language in Pruitt purporting to adopt a lesser reasonable belief standard was not necessary to the determination of the issue on appeal and is therefore dicta. See United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir.2003) ([T]his holding might be considered dicta in that it was not necessary to the determination of the issue on appeal.). We address Jones first and then Pruitt. 1. Jones Does Not Control this Case In Jones, we considered the admissibility of evidence against a person not named in an arrest warrant; the arrest warrant was for the defendant's brother. Jones, 641 F.2d at 426-27. In Payton, in contrast, the officers were seeking to and did arrest Payton. [3] The Court's statement, therefore, that an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within pertained to the Fourth Amendment rights of a person named in arrest warrant. Payton, 445 U.S. at 603, 100 S.Ct. 1371. Indeed, in Payton the Court specifically observed that its opinion did not address the authority of the police, without either a search warrant or arrest warrant, to enter a third party's home to arrest a suspect. Id. at 583, 100 S.Ct. 1371. Although our opinion in Jones cited Payton and summarized Payton 's holdingsupplying the language in Jones that Hardin relies upon as establishing that Payton 's reason to believe standard is equivalent to a probable-cause standard Jones clearly involved a different factual situation than Payton. We noted as much in Jones, observing that Payton did not address the requirements when the entry is to the premises of a third person who then challenges the evidence seized in the search. Jones, 641 F.2d at 428 n. 3. Citing our decision in United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.1967), we stated that an arrest warrant and probable cause is sufficient in such circumstances. Jones, 641 F.2d at 428 n. 3. Shortly after our decision in Jones, however, the Supreme Court addressed this exact question in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), and held that more was required to protect persons not named in an arrest warrant when officers seize evidence during their intrusion into a residence at which the persons enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court in Steagald explained that the narrow issue before us is whether an arrest warrantas opposed to a search warrantis adequate to protect the Fourth Amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant, when their homes are searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 212, 101 S.Ct. 1642 (emphasis added). The Court held that a search warrant must be obtained absent exigent circumstances or consent for evidence to be admissible against the person not named in the warrant. Id. at 205-06, 101 S.Ct. 1642. The Court noted that the issue involved a conflict among the circuits and specifically cited our decision in McKinney as one adopting the contrary view that a search warrant is not required. Id. at 207 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1642. The Court's opinion in Steagald, therefore, overruled our opinions in McKinney and Jones as to their holdings concerning the requirements for the admissibility of evidence against a person not named in an arrest warrant when officers enter a dwelling to execute the arrest warrant. In light of Steagald, our opinion in Jones does not control this case. Hardin correctly notes that portions of Jones refer to a need for officers to have probable cause to believe the person named in arrest warrant is within a dwelling, but for the most part, those portions of Jones do not survive Steagald because those references to probable cause appeared within our analysis applying the standard (an arrest warrant plus probable cause) that the Supreme Court in Steagald rejected in favor of requiring a search warrant. Our other references in Jones to probable cause are mere dicta. We introduced our analysis in Jones by referring to the fundamental principle that government officials cannot invade the privacy one's home without probable cause for the entry and summarized the Court's holding in Payton by using the term probable cause. Jones, 641 F.2d at 428. Our summary of Payton, however, was not essential to our resolution of a case involving distinct facts and a different question of law, and that summary is therefore dicta. Bridewell v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828, 831 (6th Cir. 1998) (The country club's ability to satisfy the receipts test in [the statute] was not necessary to the holding in Brock [v. Louvers & Dampers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir.1987)], which means that the part of the opinion discussing the receipts test is dicta.). 2. Pruitt Does Not Control this Case Having dispensed with Hardin's argument that Jones controls and establishes that Payton 's reason to believe standard is equivalent to probable cause, we now examine the government's contention that Pruitt has definitively settled this issue. We conclude that Pruitt has not answered this question and that language in our Pruitt opinion purporting to adopt a lesser reasonable belief standard is merely dicta. In Pruitt, the defendant and the government disputed the correct interpretation of Payton 's reason to believe language and noted that a circuit split existed regarding the meaning of that language. Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 482. The defendant in Pruitt argued in support of the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2002), which ruled that probable cause was required to support the reasonable belief that the subject of an arrest warrant was in a third-party's residence. Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 482 (citing Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1111-15). In response, the government argued that a majority of the circuits that have ruled on the issue have determined that a lesser reasonable belief standard, and not probable cause, is sufficient to allow officers to enter a residence to enforce an arrest warrant, and that the officers here had adequate information in this case to meet this standard. Id. The two-judge majority agree[d] and proceeded to explain why the Supreme Court's reason to believe language in Payton should be understood as a standard lower than probable cause. Id. at 482-85. The majority then simply affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. Judge Clay concurred in the judgment, but his opinion disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the Supreme Court had intended to establish, without any elaboration, a new standard of reason to believe in Payton. Judge Clay argued that the `reason to believe' standard under Payton . . . is the functional equivalent of `probable cause' and not some lesser standard. Id. at 485 (Clay, J., concurring). Most importantly, however, Judge Clay highlighted that resolution of this dispute was unnecessary to the outcome of the case: reviewing the officers' evidence demonstrated that the officers in the instant case had probable cause to believe Defendant was inside [the residence] when they entered. Id. at 491 (Clay, J., concurring). Although the majority opinion contained responses to certain other points made in Judge Clay's concurring opinion, see id. at 483-84, the majority opinion did not disagree with Judge Clay's assertion that the officers had satisfied the probable-cause standard. [4] Indeed, nowhere did the majority state that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that the defendant was inside the residence when they entered. It is easy to understand the majority's silence: the officers in Pruitt clearly had a great deal of evidence establishing probable cause to believe that the defendant was inside the residence when they entered. If the officers in Pruitt had evidence sufficient to satisfy either a standard of probable cause or a lesser reason-to-believe standard, then selecting one standard or the other would not [be] necessary to the determination of the issue on appeal, which was whether the officers violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Swanson, 341 F.3d at 530; see also Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1249, 1256 (2006) (A dictum is an assertion in a court's opinion of a proposition of law which does not explain why the court's judgment goes in favor of the winner.). The preference of a particular standard would therefore be dicta. Indeed, two of our sister circuits have recognized this point and, in similar cases in which the officers' knowledge satisfied both standards, the Third and Seventh Circuits simply affirmed the judgments without purporting to adopt one standard or the other. See Covington v. Smith, 259 Fed.Appx. 871, 874 (7th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (We need not choose a side in this split because, again, under either standard the officers here were sufficiently certain that [the defendant] was present at the time of the search.); United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 n. 3 (3rd Cir.2006) (As we conclude that the probable cause standard was met, we need not determine whether a possibly lower standard of reasonable belief should be applied here.). Considering the facts in Pruitt, it is clear that the officers had probable cause to believe that the defendant was inside the residence when they entered, and therefore the majority's conclusion that Payton established a lesser reasonable belief standard was merely dicta. In Pruitt, the defendant failed to report to his parole officer in July 2004 and thereby became a fugitive from justice, with an arrest warrant issuing for him after law-enforcement officers were unable to find him at his listed address. Id. at 478. In August 2004, an anonymous female caller contacted the defendant's parole officer and told the parole officer that the defendant was residing at a specific address in Lorain, Ohio. The parole officer believed the caller to be the ex-girlfriend of the defendant, and [t]he caller told [the parole officer] that she had seen [the defendant] at the [specific] address within the past few hours, and that [the defendant] was in possession of drugs and a firearm. Id. at 478-79. After the parole officer reported the tip to area police officers, the police officers began surveillance of the address. Id. Shortly thereafter, the officers observed a man knock at and enter the home; the man exited the home a few minutes later, and sped away from the scene, prompting the officers to conduct a traffic stop. Id. at 479. The driver produced a driver's license and recited a social security number. Id. After the officers showed the driver a photograph of the defendant, the driver identified the defendant as Meaty, which the officers knew to be the defendant's street name, and the driver stated that `Meaty' was inside the residence, and that `Meaty' had refused to sell him crack cocaine on credit. Id. Such information clearly is sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant was present inside the residence. Two witnesses reported the defendant's very recent presence at the address, and, after the officers watch one of the witnesses enter and exit the residence, that witness stated he had just seen the defendant inside, identifying the defendant using his street name. Indeed, the officers in Pruitt had sufficient confidence in this information that [a]fter receiving the information from [the driver], the officers went to the Lorain County Municipal Court to seek a search warrant for the specified address in Lorain. Id. This information also convinced a prosecutor and a municipal court judge that probable cause existed, as the officers successfully obtained a search warrant and then entered the residence. Id. Due to several procedural errors, however, the district court concluded the search warrant was invalid: the detective forgot to add any information to the affidavit accompanying the warrant, and although the detective recited the factual basis for the search warrant under oath [in municipal court], however, no transcript of his sworn statement was prepared. Id. at 479, 480. We affirmed the district court's ruling that the search warrant was invalid, stating that the officers could not have had a good faith belief that the warrant was valid because the warrant was obtained with a `bare bones' affidavit, and no transcript of [the detective's] sworn statement was recorded by the Court. Id. at 480-81. In Pruitt, the government therefore relied on the arrest warrant only because procedural errors had invalidated the search warrant that the officers had obtained, but the government's evidence regarding the quantum of proof showing the likelihood that the defendant was inside the residence was the exact same evidence the officers had used in obtaining a search warrant. See id. at 483 (holding that the officers had sufficient evidence to believe that the defendant was inside the residence to execute the arrest warrant because the officers relied on the anonymous tip given to [the defendant's] parole officer, [the driver's] identification of [the defendant] as `Meaty' in a photograph, and his assertion that `Meaty' was in the residence at that time selling drugs). At no point did the majority in Pruitt suggest that officers had failed to demonstrate probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant; acknowledging the government's argument that the detective had merely fail[ed] . . . to follow the correct procedure and that the searching officers relied on the warrant in good faith, the majority reasoned that such a bare bones affidavit cannot support a reasonable belief on the part of law enforcement officials that a warrant is valid. Id. at 480-81. Had the above information failed to satisfy a probable-cause standard, the majority could have avoided analyzing whether the officers relied on the warrant in good faith; that is, the majority could have concluded that, even if the officers had properly prepared a complete affidavit and given sworn, recorded testimony, their evidence did not establish probable cause. In sum, careful review of the facts in Pruitt demonstrates that the officers in that case had assembled evidence sufficient to satisfy both a probable-cause standard and a reason-to-believe standard. The majority's statements in Pruitt holding that Payton established a lesser reasonable-belief standard were unnecessary to the outcome of the case, and when the facts of the instant case do not require resolution of the question any statement regarding the issue is simply dicta. See Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 713 n. 4 (6th Cir.2006); see also Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 525, 528 (6th Cir.2008) (en banc) (stating that [t]he Constitution does not extend the `judicial Power' to any legal question, wherever and however presented, but only to those legal questions presented in `Cases' and `Controversies,' noting that [c]oncerns about the premature resolution of legal disputes have particular resonance in the context of Fourth Amendment disputes, and explaining that courts reach[ ] case-by-case determinations that turn on the concrete, not the general, and offering incremental, not sweeping, pronouncements of law). [5] Having concluded that neither Jones nor Pruitt binds us in interpreting the meaning of Payton 's reason to believe language, we explain below that this case, too, does not require that we adopt one standard or the other to evaluate the district court's ruling on Hardin's motion to suppress. [6] That is, even assuming that a lesser reasonable-belief standard applies, the officers in this case did not have sufficient evidence to form a reasonable belief that Hardin was present in the apartment.