Opinion ID: 1782599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: This Litigation (The Chilton County Action)

Text: On May 17, 1999, shortly after the trial court in the Montgomery County action had partially granted the motion to intervene, James E. Taylor and others filed the Chilton County action; they filed it as a putative class action. The named defendants were Speedee Cash and some 500 fictitiously named parties purportedly engaged in the business of payday lending. The Taylor plaintiffs asserted numerous violations of the Alabama Small Loan Act and made claims alleging unjust enrichment, unconscionability, the tort of outrage, and money had and received, all arising out of payday loans. For the Taylor plaintiffs to recover for the alleged violations of the Alabama Small Loan Act, the trial court would have to hold that that Act applies to the payday lenders. The Taylor plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of a class of persons who had obtained such loans in the six years preceding the filing of the complaint. Thus, if certified by the Chilton Circuit Court, this class will overlap significantly with the class seeking certification in the Montgomery County action. On June 30, 1999, Speedee Cash moved to dismiss or to stay the Chilton County action, asserting that the Chilton Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because of the pendency of the previously filed Montgomery County action. On October 19, 1999, the Chilton Circuit Court stayed the Chilton County action, pending further orders. On July 20, 2000, the Taylor plaintiffs moved to lift the stay, asserting that the trial court's order in the Montgomery County action did not allow the intervenors in that action to expand the scope of that litigation, but merely allowed intervention as to the declaratory and injunctive relief already requested by the payday lenders. The Taylor plaintiffs also noted that other class actions against payday lenders were proceeding in other courts despite the fact that the Montgomery County action was still pending. The Taylor plaintiffs argued that [i]n none of these cases have the Circuit Courts declined to exercise jurisdiction because of the Montgomery [County] action. Finally, the Taylor plaintiffs argued that they had a constitutional right to proceed in a court of law to seek a remedy for the wrongs they claimed had occurred to them. On September 13, 2000, the Chilton Circuit Court entered an order lifting the stay. Speedee Cash filed this petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Chilton Circuit Court to vacate its order of September 13, 2000. [1]