Opinion ID: 2536526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: People v. Boston

Text: The court of appeals recently addressed the issue we resolve here in an opinion announced after certiorari was granted in this case. The court of appeals reached a different conclusion than we reach today, essentially writing the effective date clause out of the statute to find that there was no conflict on the face of the statute and that the eighteen-plus-ten statute of limitations applied retroactively. To the extent that the court of appeals' opinion is inconsistent with ours, it is overruled. The court provided two lines of reasoning to support its conclusion that the eighteen-plus-ten statute of limitations should apply retroactively. First, it reasoned that the effective date clause was inserted into H.B. 02-1396 together with a safety clause for two purposes  showing when the act became effective and protecting the bill from the referendum process  and therefore could be ignored when interpreting the bill. Boston, ___ P.3d at ___, 2009 WL 400073, at . Second, it determined that because the effective date clause appears only in the Colorado Session Laws, and not in the Colorado Revised Statutes, it is not considered to be a part of the official statutes of the state. Id. at ___, at . We find neither line of reasoning persuasive. We reject the court of appeals' contention that the General Assembly's alleged intention behind the effective date clause renders the language in that clause meaningless. There is no evidence to show that the only purpose behind the effective date clause was to protect the bill from the referendum process, and the court provided no analysis explaining why it believed that to be the General Assembly's intent. Even if the effective date clause were only inserted to avoid the referendum process, we cannot simply disregard the legislature's indication that the statute was intended to apply prospectively. See Riley, 828 P.2d at 257. The court of appeals' decision to essentially ignore the effective date clause based upon the legislature's alleged intent was error. The court of appeals' second line of reasoning, that anything not appearing in the Colorado Revised Statutes is not officially part of the laws of this state, is likewise erroneous. The court cited section 2-5-118(1)(a) of the Colorado Revised Statutes and Suncor Energy (USA) v. Aspen Petroleum Prods., Inc., 178 P.3d 1263 (Colo.App.2007), to support its conclusion. This reliance is misguided. While the Colorado Revised Statutes are considered the official publication of statutes in Colorado, § 2-5-118(1)(a), C.R.S. (2008), the reviser is required to include references to the Colorado Session Laws to permit the reader to locate the original source of legislation published in the Colorado Revised Statutes. See § 2-5-102(a), C.R.S. (2008); see also People v. Washington, 969 P.2d 788, 789 (Colo.App.1998). We consistently reference Colorado Session Laws when interpreting statutes. See, e.g., Kaufman v. People, 202 P.3d 542, 548 (Colo.2009); Avalanche Indus., Inc. v. Clark, 198 P.3d 589, 592 (Colo.2008); Gallion v. Colo. Dep't of Revenue, 171 P.3d 217, 221 (Colo.2007). In addition, the Colorado constitution provides that a statute take[s] effect on the date stated in the act, or, if no date is stated in the act, then on its passage. Colo. Const. art. V, sec. 19. We are not free to simply ignore language which is given meaning by our constitution. The court of appeals erred in reasoning that, because the effective date clause appeared only in the Colorado Session Laws, and not in the Colorado Revised Statutes, it need not be enforced. Because neither line of reasoning provided by the court of appeals in Boston was correct, and because the analysis we conduct today compels a different result, that case is overruled.