Opinion ID: 778660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Third-Party Communication with Jurors

Text: 39 Before closing arguments in the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the district court told counsel: a juror said as they came past where some people were out on the sidewalk this morning, and some person they described as a `Black lady,' said to them, `Someone is going to die in that trial today.' So, if you notice some extra security or something today, that will be the reason. The record reflects no response from any of the parties. Bernard now contends that the court conducted an insufficient inquiry into this alleged incident, and the court erred in believing that the jury had not been tainted by the third-party communication. 40 We review the court's decision that the jury was not improperly tainted by extrinsic evidence under the clearly erroneous standard, and we review the court's choice of methods to investigate the possibility of extrinsic taint for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cantu, 167 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir.1999) (citations omitted). 6 Bernard argues that the district court abused its discretion by discussing this alleged communication with the juror ex parte. Relying on Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), and other jury tampering cases, Bernard argues that the district court committed reversible error by failing to conduct a hearing to investigate this incident. 41 This court has explained, however, that district courts are not required to conduct a `full-blown evidentiary hearing in every instance in which an outside influence is brought to bear upon a petit jury.' Cantu, 167 F.3d at 201-02 (quoting United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150, 1153 (5th Cir.1995)); see also, United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 932 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1998). To determine whether a hearing is necessary, the district court must balance the probable harm resulting from the emphasis such action would place upon the misconduct and the disruption involved in conducting a hearing against the likely extent and gravity of the prejudice generated by the misconduct. Ramos, 71 F.3d at 1153 (5th Cir.1995). 42 In this case, the passing statement of a crowd member was minimally prejudicial, even if it is assumed to have been intended to influence the jury. The effect of her statement would have been greatly outweighed by the disruption and prejudice of an evidentiary hearing. This conclusion is underscored by the absence of any request for further investigation or a request for a mistrial. The district court's failure to investigate further or differently was not an abuse of discretion. Likewise, its conclusion that the jury was not improperly tainted is not clearly erroneous. Bernard's argument is without merit. 7