Opinion ID: 2061361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence on Extrinsic Offenses

Text: Evidence concerning crimes extrinsic to the one for which a defendant is on trial is generally inadmissible for three reasons. First, the government may not punish people for their character, and evidence of extrinsic offenses [1] poses the danger that the jury will convict the defendant because his general character is bad or ... he has a tendency to commit certain crimes. Williams v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 53, 55. Second, indiscriminate admission of extrinsic offenses compels a defendant to meet accusations without notice. Third, extrinsic offenses raise collateral issues that confuse the jury and divert attention away from the charged crimes. This Court has developed a number of exceptions to this general rule under the rubric common scheme or plan. The exceptions allow admission of evidence on extrinsic offenses when necessary to promote some legitimate inference about a particular issue. Because the admission of extrinsic offenses can taint the fairness of the trial, the exceptions must be cautiously applied. Penley v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 806. Our cases recognize two branches of the common scheme or plan exception. Id. at 809. The first branch permits proof of an extrinsic offense as evidence of a preconceived plan that includes the charged crime. In other words, the extrinsic offense is part of the res gestae of a larger criminal plan that included the charged offense. To be admissible under this branch of the exception, this Court requires that [t]he crimes must ... be so related in character, time and place of commission as to establish some plan which embraced both the prior and subsequent criminal activity and the charged crime. Malone v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1339, 1347. The second branch allows for the admission of extrinsic offenses to prove intent, motive, purpose, or identity by showing the defendant committed other offenses with a similar modus operandi. Penley, 506 N.E.2d at 808-09. This Court requires a lesser degree of similarity between the charged crime and the extrinsic offense when the evidence is introduced to prove state of mind than when it is introduced to prove identity. See Williams v. State (1985), Ind., 481 N.E.2d 1319. As long as the motive or intent is the same then the extrinsic offense is admissible, even if there are differences in the manner in which the two offenses are committed. For example, the government may prove that the defendant knew he was passing counterfeit securities by eliciting testimony that the defendant had knowingly purchased counterfeit currency on a prior occasion. Peters v. United States, 376 F.2d 839 (5th Cir.1967). Although the crimes were to some extent dissimilar, the extrinsic offense was relevant to establish the defendant's state of mind. When an extrinsic offense is offered to prove identity, however, the modus operandi must be unusual and distinctive. Justice Pivarnik described the test to apply when an extrinsic offense is offered to prove identity: [T]his Court requires a strong showing that the different criminal actions were so similarly conducted that the method of conduct can be considered akin to the accused's `signature.' Malone, 441 N.E.2d at 1346. The mere repetition of similar crimes is not enough to qualify for an exception to the general rule. Id. at 1346.