Opinion ID: 3188539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This Court’s Decision in Engle

Text: Determining the scope of Engle class membership must begin with how this Court described the class in our 2006 decision from which this progeny case originates. In Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1274-75, this Court rejected the class plaintiffs’ argument that the class could be “open-ended.” We agreed with the tobacco companies that there was a “cut-off date” for class membership rather than an open-ended class and stated that the “plain language of the class certification indicates that the trial court anticipated that the class would be cut off or limited to the date of final certification.” Id. at 1275. This Court stated that it was “reasonable” to conclude that “the date of the trial court’s November 21, 1996, order that recertified a narrower class is the appropriate cut-off date” for class membership. Id. at 1255, 1275. As we stated, “the class is described as those ‘who have suffered, presently suffer or who have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine.’ ” Id. at 1275-76 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Engle, 672 So. 2d at 40). “The phrase ‘who have suffered, presently suffer or have died’ supports the view that the class should include only those - 14 - people who were affected in the past or who were presently suffering at the time the class was recertified by the trial court.” Id. at 1275. In discussing the cut-off date, this Court emphasized that diagnosis of the tobacco-related disease or medical condition was not the “critical event” for establishing class membership. Id. at 1275-76. Specifically, according to this Court’s opinion, the “critical event is not when an illness was actually diagnosed by a physician, but when the disease or condition first manifested itself.” Id. at 1276 (second emphasis added). Indeed, this Court noted that “ ‘diagnosis’ as a qualifying factor does not appear anywhere in the description of the class certified.” Id. at 1275. This Court’s discussion of class representative Della Vecchia is instructive in considering the necessary showing for establishing Engle class membership. According to this Court, “Della Vecchia’s medical records indicate that she had been suffering from a tobacco-related disease prior to the time of certification,” and was therefore “properly included as a class member.” Id. at 1276 (emphasis added). In addressing Della Vecchia’s membership in the Engle class, this Court pointed to notations by Della Vecchia’s doctors of having “a past medical history of ‘COPD’ and significant hypertension” in “early 1997.” Id. Significantly, nowhere did this Court state that, to establish Engle class membership, Della Vecchia was required to have knowledge that her symptoms - 15 - were caused by smoking. Indeed, there was no indication of when Della Vecchia even knew of her symptoms, and this Court required nothing more than medical records indicating that “she had been suffering from a tobacco-related disease” prior to the “cut-off” date. Id. In holding that “manifestation” of the tobacco-related disease or medical condition is the determining factor for Engle class membership, this Court was cognizant of crafting a “finite class,” rather than one that was “open-ended.” Id. at 1274-75. “A finite class is necessary,” this Court explained, “to avoid multiple similar lawsuits and to make legal process more effective and expeditious, important goals of a class action suit.” Id. at 1275. This Court thus imposed a “cut-off date” of November 21, 1996. Id. Nowhere in Engle did this Court hold that establishing class membership required any type of knowledge regarding the connection between smoking and the disease or medical condition prior to November 21, 1996. Rather, this Court consistently referred to whether the plaintiff was “suffering from a tobacco-related disease” before the class was recertified by the trial court on November 21, 1996, as the “critical event” in establishing whether the disease or condition had “manifested itself.” Id. at 1275-76 (emphasis added). The issue of class membership became especially important in light of this Court’s approach to the Engle litigation since our 2006 decision. In particular, this - 16 - Court held in Engle that “continued class action treatment” was “not feasible” and that the class must therefore be decertified to allow each class member the opportunity to file an individual lawsuit against the tobacco companies to determine entitlement to compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 1277. However, this Court “did not decertify the class in the traditional sense, but conferred upon the class members two benefits: (1) each class member’s time to file an individual suit would be equitably tolled to allow filing within one year of the court’s decision, and (2) in the individual action, the Engle jury’s ‘common core findings’ in Phase I would be given ‘res judicata effect.’ ” Ciccone, 123 So. 3d at 609-10 (quoting Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1269). Determining Engle class membership thus became critical in progeny cases after this Court’s decision because only individual plaintiffs “within the class” as of the trial court’s November 21, 1996, order were permitted to use the “res judicata” effect of the Engle jury’s Phase I common core findings. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1277.