Opinion ID: 795795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Crawford Violations

Text: 19 Martinez contends his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated by the receipt in evidence of Banks's plea allocution and of the case officer's testimony regarding the guilty pleas of Banks, Mojica, and Junior and Peralta's proffer session. Martinez relies on law established by the Supreme Court subsequent to his trial. 20 Effecting a significant change in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that in criminal prosecutions, unless a declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, the Confrontation Clause forbids use against the defendant of the declarant's out-of-court testimonial statements admitted for their truth. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Government does not dispute that the pleas, allocutions, and post-arrest statement made at a proffer session constitute testimonial statements of the sort barred by Crawford. We assume without deciding that this characterization is correct. Cf. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that a plea allocution is a testimonial statement); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (declining to spell out a comprehensive definition of `testimonial'); id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (providing [v]arious formulations of . . . `testimonial' statements). 21 Martinez contends his conviction must be overturned by reason of the Crawford violations unless the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the errors did not contribute to the jury's verdict. That, however, is not the standard applicable in Martinez's case, because it applies only when the claim of error has been preserved below. See, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1179 (2d Cir.1989). Martinez made no objection in the district court to this evidence based on the Confrontation Clause. 22 Rather, our review is under one of two alternative plain error standards. Under the classic plain error standard, the court may overturn a conviction on the basis of a forfeited error only where the defendant shows an error that (1) was plain, (2) affect[ed] substantial rights, and (3) seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.' United States v. Nucci, 364 F.3d 419, 421 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982), the Supreme Court elaborated that reversal for plain error should be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Id. at 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584. Alternatively, we have employed the modified plain error standard, when `the source of plain error [has been] a supervening decision.' United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 639 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Monteleone, 257 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 2001)). This standard requires the government, not the defendant, [to bear] the burden [of] demonstrat[ing] that the error did not affect substantial rights. Outen, 286 F.3d at 639. We need not resolve which is the appropriate the standard because we find that, under either standard, Martinez is not entitled to have his conviction overturned. 1 23 The Government's lawful evidence so powerfully established that the objective of the conspiracy was to murder, not to kidnap, that the Crawford evidence cannot be said to have affected Martinez's substantial rights or impaired the fairness or integrity of the proceedings (or the public perception thereof). Robinson, the co-conspirator who rode in the van with the gunmen, testified—repeatedly and without equivocation or contradiction— that he had no doubt that the relevant conspiracy was to murder, not to kidnap. He testified that Junior had explained to him that the victims'betrayal had to be paid in blood, and that Martinez had explicitly asked before the attack whether they should grab one of [the victims] and shoot the other one. Robinson's description of the attack further confirmed the nature of the intention. He testified that Martinez and the other gunmen approached the victims' car from behind on either side when it was stopped at a red light and shot many rounds through the front windows, a procedure obviously designed to kill and incompatible with intent to kidnap. This description was supported by the statement of Duran, the surviving victim, that after the van pulled up near his car, someone from the van began shooting at him and Johan (the other victim). Furthermore, forensic evidence describing the condition of the scene and of the victims' car was consistent with these descriptions. 24 Matos likewise testified that the conspiracy was to murder, not to kidnap. He testified that Martinez himself had said the conspiracy, which began as a kidnaping plot, had become a murder plot; that Martinez told him extra money had been paid for the murder; and that one of the participants had described the deliberate way in which the gunmen had approached the victims' car and fired. 25 Proof of the conspiracy to murder, as opposed to a conspiracy to kidnap, was solidly established. There was no evidence to the contrary. Whatever corroboration was provided by the Crawford evidence was not of sufficient importance to meet the standards for plain error. It is true that [e]rror going to the heart of a critical issue is less likely to be harmless. United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 64-65 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Crawford evidence, nonetheless, was cumulative and added relatively little to the powerful proper evidence of conspiracy to murder. The receipt of this evidence did not produce a miscarriage of justice. Frady, 456 U.S. at 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584. 26