Opinion ID: 2170484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability of Bulldog.

Text: Both IE and GE appeal from the trial court's conclusion that IE was not entitled to contribution from Bulldog. While the trial court found that Bulldog was negligent in failing to maintain common areas of the apartment complex in a reasonably safe condition, it also found that Bulldog merely failed to discover the dangerous condition which both IE and GE had themselves created. The trial court concluded that Bulldog was not liable to IE for contribution because Bulldog would have been entitled to indemnity from IE. One who must indemnify another is precluded from claiming contribution against that person. Stowe v. Wood, 199 N.W.2d 323, 327 (Iowa 1972). In analyzing this issue the trial court compared qualitatively the conduct of IE, GE and Bulldog, then concluded that it would be inequitable to allow IE to obtain contribution from Bulldog. The trial court also noted that this result is supported by section 886B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979), which provides in pertinent part: (1) If two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm and one of them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to indemnity from the other if the other would be unjustly enriched at his expense by the discharge of the liability. (2) Instances in which indemnity is granted under this principle include the following: . . . . (d) The indemnitor supplied a defective chattel or performed defective work upon land or buildings as a result of which both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect; (e) The indemnitor created a dangerous condition of land or chattels as a result of which both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect; . . . . Both subsections (d) and (e) of section 886B are applicable to the facts found by the trial court. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings (1) that Bulldog merely failed to discover the dangerous condition created by the conduct of both IE and GE, and (2) that Bulldog had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of that dangerous condition. Bulldog's liability-producing conduct consisted entirely of its failure to perform the duty imposed by law on a landlord to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. See Iowa Code § 562A.15(1)(c) (1979); Montgomery v. Engel, 179 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Iowa 1970). Unlike IE and GE, Bulldog did not participate in positive conduct which created the danger that proximately caused Trevallis's injuries. See Sweeny v. Pease, 294 N.W.2d at 822. We agree with the trial court that under these circumstances IE failed to establish a right to equitable contribution from Bulldog. The trial court carefully articulated the factual and legal bases for its rulings on each of the claims for contribution and indemnity asserted by IE and GE. Each of its multiple findings of fact is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Neither IE nor GE has demonstrated that the trial court erred in concluding that they should each pay one-half of the settlement made to compensate Trevallis Swayze for his injuries. AFFIRMED.