Opinion ID: 3160782
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The dismissal of the complaint in this case

Text: Dahne argues that Richey received an additional strike when the district court dismissed the lawsuit at issue here for failure to state a claim. Dahne cites the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015). In Coleman, a prisoner had already received two strikes when a third complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and he appealed that dismissal. Id. at 1762. While that appeal was pending, the prisoner filed multiple other lawsuits and moved to receive IFP status while doing so. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that the prisoner was not entitled to IFP status in those successive suits, holding that “[a] prior dismissal on a statutorily enumerated ground counts as a strike even if the dismissal is the subject of an appeal.” Id. at 1763. The Court, however, left open the question presented here: whether a prisoner is entitled to IFP status on “appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of [a] third complaint instead of [in] an attempt to file several additional complaints. Id. at 1764–65.6 We conclude that a prisoner is entitled to IFP status while appealing his third-strike dismissal. The Supreme Court in Coleman based its holding on “the plain language of” § 1915(g), stating that “[l]inguistically 6 Prior to Coleman, the law in this circuit was that “a district court’s dismissal of a case does not count as a ‘strike’ under § 1915(g) until the litigant has exhausted or waived his opportunity to appeal,” i.e., “‘the date of the Supreme Court’s denial or dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari, if the prisoner filed one, or from the date when the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari expired, if he did not.’” Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 2011)). Silva’s holding does not survive Coleman. RICHEY V. DAHNE 13 speaking, we see nothing about the phrase ‘prior occasions’ that would transform a dismissal into a dismissal-plusappellate-review.” Id. at 1763. The United States argued as amicus curiae in Coleman, however, that “[t]he phrase ‘prior occasions’ is most sensibly read as referring to strikes imposed in prior-filed suits, not to those imposed in an earlier stage of the same suit.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015) (No. 13-1333), 2015 WL 272362, at .; see also Coleman, 135 S. Ct. at 1765 (noting the Solicitor General’s argument that “a trial court dismissal qualifies as a strike only if it occurred in a prior, different, lawsuit” (emphasis in original)). We agree with the Solicitor General’s interpretation of § 1915. The Supreme Court’s holding in Coleman was based in part on “the way in which the law ordinarily treats trial court judgments.” 135 S. Ct. at 1764. While judgments are immediately preclusive as to successive suits, see id., they are certainly not preclusive to the panel on appeal. Denying IFP review of a district court’s third strike dismissal would prevent us from performing our “appellate function” and would “freeze out meritorious claims or ossify district court errors.” Henslee v. Keller, 681 F.3d 538, 543 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s statement in Coleman that a prisoner could refile his fourth lawsuit IFP if his third strike were reversed on appeal, 135 S. Ct. at 1764, would be of no consolation if a prisoner could not appeal the erroneously-issued third strike IFP. And the Court’s concern in Coleman that a dismissal-plus-appellatereview rule would “produce a leaky filter” allowing a prisoner to file many frivolous lawsuits while his third strike dismissal was pending on appeal, id., is not implicated here, 14 RICHEY V. DAHNE as the prisoner retains IFP status only for the appeal of his third strike. The facts of this case exemplify why § 1915(g) should be construed as allowing appellate review of a third strike. As explained in the jointly-filed memorandum disposition, the district court erred in dismissing Richey’s complaint. If Richey was not entitled to IFP status on appeal, he would have to pay the filing fee for us to reverse the district court’s erroneous third strike, which would ironically make him eligible again for IFP status in successive suits. We do not think that Congress intended such a peculiar system. We hold that dismissal of the complaint in the action underlying this appeal does not constitute a “prior occasion” under the PLRA, and Richey had not accumulated a third strike before he filed this appeal. Dahne’s motion to revoke Richey’s IFP status on appeal is denied.