Opinion ID: 2518013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Avalanche Industries

Text: In 2008, we addressed whether an ALJ had discretion to base an employee's AWW on the salary and benefits the claimant received while working for a subsequent employer. Avalanche Indus., 198 P.3d at 590. In that case, the claimant was injured in a work-related accident while employed at Avalanche Industries, Inc. Id. The claimant later worked for a second employer, which provided both health insurance and a higher salary. Id. at 591. While the claimant was at this second employer, her physical condition worsened and the ALJ reopened her workers' compensation claim. Id. The ALJ increased the claimant's AWW based on the compensation she received from her subsequent employer. Id. The court of appeals held that the ALJ possessed this authority. Id. In sections III.A. and III.B. of Avalanche Industries, we affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and ALJ because the discretionary exception contained in section 8-42-102(3) is not tied to the time of injury and vests the ALJ with broad discretion to determine a fair amount for the employee's AWW. Id. at 591-597. We held that, under the facts presented, it was not an abuse of discretion for the ALJ to determine the claimant's AWW based on her increased salary and healthcare benefits at her subsequent employer. Id. at 596-97. In section III.C. of the opinion, we discussed whether the ALJ's determination could have been similarly affirmed under the default provision. Id. at 597. When an ALJ determines an employee's AWW under the default provision, the calculation must be based upon the remuneration that the injured employee was receiving at the time of injury. § 8-42-102(2). We explained that the statute governing the default provision left open the question as to what the term time of injury means. Avalanche Indus., 198 P.3d at 597. We noted that other jurisdictions have interpreted this term to refer to either the time of the accident or the time of disablement. Id. Evaluating the statutory definitions and legislative history, we stated that the time of injury could mean either the time of the accident or the time of disablement. Id. at 598.