Opinion ID: 197341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marcello

Text: We first consider whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for Marcello on Key Bank's defamation claim. In order to state a claim for defamation in Maine, a private person must establish the following: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. Powers, 596 A.2d at 69. The issue in this case is whether Marcello's conduct constituted negligence. We find that the existence of material issues of fact precludes the entry of summary judgment concerning this issue. See Lipsett v. University of P. R., 864 F.2d 881, 885 (1st Cir. 1988) (If, after . . . canvassing . . . the material presented, the district court finds that some genuine factual issue remains in the case, whose resolution one way or another could affect its outcome, the court must deny the motion.). We believe that reasonable jurors could find negligence in this case. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248 (indicating that a material issue of fact exists if the evidence is such that a -55- 55 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party); see also Mejias-Quiros v. Maxxam Property Corp., 108 F.3d 425, 427 (1st Cir. 1997) (Negligence . . . is usually a jury issue, but only if there exists evidence from which a rational jury could find negligence in the case at hand.); Taylor v. Gallagher, 737 F.2d 134, 137 (1st Cir. 1984) (Summary judgment is inappropriate in [cases involving] negligence . . . if genuine issues of material fact exist or if reasonable jurors could draw different inferences from agreed facts.). Reasonable jurors could draw a conclusion, at odds with the district court's finding, that Marcello did much more than read the substance of PIN's complaint to the print and broadcast media at PIN's press conference. Penobscot, 906 F. Supp. at 23. Marcello's press release did not simply recite the complaint; it used such language as lied to, cheated, manipulated, stole[] from, and conspired and acted to defraud to describe Key Bank's conduct. Given the negligence standard in Maine of a reasonably prudent person acting under like circumstances, see Lambert v. Tripp, 560 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Me. 1989); Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491, 499 (Me. 1973); Restatement (Second) of Torts S 283 (1978), we believe that reasonable jurors could find that Marcello's characterization of Key Bank's conduct amounted not simply to colorful adjectives and common parlance, Penobscot, 906 F. Supp. at 23, -56- 56 but to negligence. See Marston v. Newavom, 629 A.2d 587, 592 (Me. 1993) ([D]efamatory language must be 'construed in the light of what might reasonably have been understood therefrom by the persons who [heard] it. In interpreting the language, it is . . . a question of . . . the understanding of those to whom the words are addressed and of the natural and probable effect of the words on them.) (quoting Picard v. Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 835 (Me. 1973)). Regardless of the reasonableness of the statements that Marcello disseminated to the media at the press conferences, a material issue of fact remains as to whether Marcello actually rel[ied] on the veracity of PIN's complaint. Penobscot, 906 F. Supp. at 23. In his deposition testimony, Marcello stated repeatedly that he could not recollect the exact documents that he used to assemble his press package. At his deposition, in fact, Marcello could not locate the written notes or statements that he made in preparation for the press conferences. There is a material issue as to whether Marcello even consulted PIN's complaint in advance of the press conferences. In any event, Marcello has not made a sufficient showing that he was privileged to disseminate the defamatory statements to the media. Maine law provides that allegations made in pleadings are absolutely privileged. Dineen v. Daughan, 381 A.2d 663, 664 (Me. 1978); see also Creamer v. -57- 57 Danks, 700 F. Supp. 1169. 1171 (D. Me.) (discussing Maine judicial proceedings pleadings privilege), aff'd, 863 F.2d 1037 (1st Cir. 1988). The Maine Supreme Court has indicated that the privilege may be lost by unnecessary or unreasonable publication beyond the scope of the privileged circumstances. Vahlsing Christina Corp. v. Stanley, 487 A.2d 264, 267 (Me. 1985); see also Sriberg v. Raymond, 544 F.2d 15, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1976) ([I]f an occasion is privileged as to communications between certain parties, the privilege is lost if the communication is made in such a manner as to unnecessarily and unreasonably publish it to others, as to whom the occasion is not privileged.) (quoting Galvin v. New York, 168 N.E.2d 262, 266 (N.Y. 1960)). The Vahlsing Christina court reversed the dismissal of a defamation claim predicated on the dissemination of false statements originally contained in a complaint on the basis that publication removed the statements from the privileged context. See id. In this case, a media relations consultant engaged by a party to a lawsuit claims protection under the judicial proceedings privilege for statements that he disseminated to the press concerning the suit. Marcello published these statements on the same day that PIN filed the complaint but prior to the commencement of any courtroom activity. The judicial proceedings privilege reflects public policy regarding the importance and necessity of the free flow of information -58- 58 during such proceedings. Creamer, 700 F. Supp. at 1171. In light e public policy underlying the judicial proceedings privilege, we doubt very much that this privilege applies to Marcello's publications, which were neither reasonable nor necessary for efficient disposition of the legal proceedings at issue of the circumstances of the press conference and th the . See Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 921, 932 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining that under Massachusetts law, if a communication is unnecessarily or unreasonably published, it is no longer privileged); Dineen, 381 A.2d at 665 (The purpose of the privilege is to allow the attorney to litigate strenuously the interests of his client. To fulfill this purpose the privilege need only be broad enough to encompass statements relevant to those interests. To extend the protection beyond this point would be to abuse the public policy which acts rt has explained, moreover, that this privilege applies to judges, parties, witnesses, and attorneys. See id.; Dineen, 381 A.2d at 664-65. Marcello directs us to no authority indicating that the judicial proceedings privilege pertains to a media consultant who is not a party or a witness or an attorney in the dispute at issue.30 30. Marcello contends that his statements are privileged because they fairly and accurately report a judicial proceeding. The privilege that Marcello attempts to adopt at this point pertains to defamatory statements contained in reports of judicial proceedings prepared by reporters. See Brown v. Hearst Corp., 54 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1995); Jones v. Taibbi, 512 N.E.2d 260, 266 (Mass. 1987). Regardless of -59- 59 We thus conclude that Marcello's statements were not within the judicial proceedings privilege. Based on this conclusion, in addition to our findings that reasonable jurors could determine that Marcello did more than read from PIN's complaint and that a material issue of fact exists as to whether Marcello actually relied on PIN's complaint in formulating these statements, we believe that the district court improperly granted summary judgment for Marcello. We note that if the trial court, with the assistance of further factual development, determines that Key Bank constitutes a public figure, it may resolve the defamation issue on alternative grounds. According to the Supreme Court, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). Although ostensibly a question of law suitable for our the fairness or accuracy of Marcello's publications, he is not a reporter. In any event, Maine does not appear to have adopted the reporter privilege to this date, and we will not speculate as to the future development of Maine law. -60- 60 resolution, see Quantum Elecs. Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 753, 763 (D.R.I. 1995); Haworth v. Feigon, 623 A.2d 150, 158 (Me. 1991); Restatement (Second) of Torts S 580A cmt. c (1978), a finding of public figure status necessitates a detailed fact-sensitive determination, see Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 589 (1st Cir. 1980); Quantum, 881 F. Supp. at 763; Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law S 12-13, at 880-81 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining that the determination of whether an individual constitutes a limited public figure necessitates that the trial court establish first the existence of a public controversy, and second that the nature and extent of the person's participation in the controversy reached some critical mass at which 'voluntary injection' occurred). On the record before us now, we cannot make this particularized factual determination.31 If the trial court determines that Key Bank constitutes a public figure, Marcello may claim a conditional privilege regarding his publications concerning Key Bank. Such a privilege exists for statements concerning public figures. See Curt is Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 31. Marcello must establish sufficient evidence to support a factual conclusion that Key Bank is a public figure. See Restatement (Second) of Torts S 580A cmt. e (1977) (For a privilege created by the law to apply, the person who seeks to dispel the seemingly tortious character of his conduct normally has the burden of raising the issue of the privilege and proving the existence of its elements.). -61- 61 Liability does not attach for a defamatory statement concerning a public figure unless the publisher of the statement acted with knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity of the defamatory publication. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Curtis Publ'g, 388 U.S. at 155; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976); Michaud v. Inhabitants of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Me. 1978). On the record before us, we do not presume to direct a trial court finding regarding either the predicates for or, in the event that the trial court establishes the existence of such predicates, the consequences of a conditional privilege.