Opinion ID: 6500431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dr. Sharma’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: The Court of Special Appeals correctly affirmed the Circuit Court for Baltimore County because Mr. Wadsworth pleaded a loss of chance case, which is not recognized in Maryland. Under principles of stare decisis, we are bound by our decisions in Weimer and Fennell. Stare decisis is Latin meaning “to stand by things decided[.]” Md. Small MS4 21 Coal. v. Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, ___ Md. ___, ___ (2022), 2022 WL 1771709 at . This Court employs the doctrine of stare decisis to “encourage[] the consistent development of legal principles, public reliance on our judicial decisions, and the perceived integrity of the courts.” Lawrence, 475 Md. at 415 (quoting State v. Stachowski, 440 Md. 504, 520 (2014)). Although the doctrine is not absolute, stare decisis encourages courts to “reaffirm, follow, and apply . . . the published decisional holdings of our appellate courts[.]” Lawrence, 475 Md. at 415 (quoting Stachowski, 440 Md. at 520). Only in rare circumstances should this Court overrule its own precedent. We recognize two “extremely narrow” situations where it would be appropriate to do so. Id. (citations omitted). This Court may abandon the doctrine of stare decisis when the decision is “clearly wrong and contrary to established principles” or where there is “a showing that the precedent has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” Wallace v. State, 452 Md. 558, 582 (2017) (quoting DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 64 (2010)). Neither exception to the doctrine of stare decisis applies here. This Court’s decisions in Weimer and Fennell are not “clearly wrong and contrary to established principles” nor has there been “a showing that the precedent has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” Wallace, 452 Md. at 582. In both Weimer and Fennell, this Court relied on sound principles of statutory interpretation, well-settled proximate causation requirements, and prior caselaw establishing the practice to defer policy decisions to the General Assembly. See Lawrence, 475 Md. at 416 (finding that the decision in Lee was not “clearly wrong” because this Court’s decision in Lee “accords with this Court’s fundamental rules of statutory construction”). This Court was not “clearly 22 wrong” in its reliance upon or application of these underlying principles that led to the decisions in Weimer and Fennell. Additionally, this Court’s decisions in Weimer and Fennell are predominately based upon maintaining traditional causation principles in wrongful death and survival actions and deferring policy decisions to the General Assembly. The proximate cause requirement in negligence actions and our practice to defer policy decisions to the General Assembly still remain, meaning that the rationale for this Court’s decisions in Weimer and Fennell has not “been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” Wallace, 452 Md. at 582. See Pittway Corp., 409 Md. at 243 (citation omitted) (“Proximate cause ‘involves a conclusion that someone will be held legally responsible for the consequences of an act or omission.’”); Coleman, 432 Md. at 690 (explaining that decisions “plainly involv[ing] major policy considerations” are “best left to the General Assembly”). We conclude that neither exception applies in this case. Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Ms. Wadsworth’s metastatic breast cancer caused her death. Depositions from Dr. Stark and Dr. Schneider revealed that once breast cancer metastasizes, “there is no cure” and “no one . . . survives metastatic breast cancer[.]” Neither party presented experts to opine that Ms. Wadsworth’s likelihood of survival, absent Dr. Sharma’s alleged negligence, exceeded fifty percent or that she would have survived if Dr. Sharma started treating her on the date that she produced the abnormal scan. According to the undisputed opinions from Dr. Stark and Dr. Schneider, Ms. Wadsworth did not have a greater than fifty percent chance of survival, absent Dr. Sharma’s alleged negligence. 23 Without evidence to dispute that Ms. Wadsworth had a greater than fifty percent chance of survival, Mr. Wadsworth, as a matter of law, cannot meet his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Sharma’s alleged negligence caused Ms. Wadsworth’s death. Therefore, Dr. Sharma correctly asserts that our decisions in Weimer and Fennell control. In comparing Weimer and Fennell to the case before us, it is clear that Mr. Wadsworth pleaded a loss of chance case, which is not recognized in Maryland under the Wrongful Death Act. In Weimer and Fennell, both decedents did not possess a greater than fifty percent chance of survival, absent the alleged negligence. In Weimer, Ms. Hetrick opted for an emergency caesarean section with knowledge that her premature infant had a poor chance of survival. 309 Md. at 539. Although one expert testified that the infant decedent could have survived with proper resuscitation efforts, the autopsy revealed that the infant’s death resulted from “eclampsia plus general anesthesia [that] led to fetal anoxia.” Id. at 540. Likewise, in Fennell, an expert testified that, even with immediate and appropriate treatment for meningitis, the decedent had a forty percent chance of survival. 320 Md. at 780. In both Weimer and Fennell, this Court disposed of the cases through the decision to maintain the preponderance of the evidence standard in wrongful death and survival claims. In essence, the decedents in Weimer and Fennell, absent the alleged negligence, did not possess greater than a fifty percent chance of survival. Because the plaintiffs could not meet their burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged negligence caused the decedents’ deaths, this Court held in favor of the defendants for claims premised 24 upon the loss of chance doctrine. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we hold that Mr. Wadsworth’s wrongful death claim cannot proceed because the loss of chance doctrine is not recognized in Maryland. Therefore, the circuit court correctly determined that Mr. Wadsworth’s case is a loss of chance case, which is not recognized in Maryland. Finding that “[i]t is without dispute that the proximate cause and the actual, sole cause of [Ms. Wadsworth’s] death was the metastatic . . . breast cancer[,]” the circuit court correctly granted Dr. Sharma’s motion for summary judgment because Mr. Wadsworth could not meet his burden of proof as a matter of law. Additionally, the Court of Special Appeals correctly affirmed the circuit court’s decision relating to the wrongful death claim.