Opinion ID: 3161431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the finality of the sentencing orders

Text: Virginia law recognizes a rebuttable presumption that “trial courts speak only through their written orders.” McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463, 469, 552 S.E.2d 364, 367 (2001); see also Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808, 822 (1979). We have emphasized this point on “numerous occasions” in various contexts. McMillion, 262 Va. at 469, 552 S.E.2d at 367. The subjective intentions of a judge upon entering a written order cannot change its character or legal efficacy. If the rule were otherwise, litigants would never know the true scope of their rights, and appellate courts would never know the true grounds for lower courts’ decisions. Tracking the form order requirements of Code § 19.2-307 and Rule 3A:22 (Form 10), the sentencing orders in this case recited that Kozich was “found guilty” and that:  The court had reviewed the “sentencing guidelines and the guideline worksheets.”  Kozich was allowed to allocute prior to the court’s “pronouncing the sentence” and offered an opportunity to give “any reason why judgment should not be pronounced.”  Kozich was “SENTENCED” to two-year penitentiary terms for each of the three offenses, with credit for time served, and placed upon his release in “post release supervision.”  Kozich was ordered to pay costs and, where applicable, restitution.  Kozich’s counsel was entitled to his court-appointed attorney fee pursuant to Code § 19.2-163, a statute authorizing payment pursuant to a timely request after “the completion of all proceedings in that court.” 7 J.A. at 10-15 (capitalization and bold in original) (quoting Code § 19.2-163). The orders conclude by directing that Kozich be “remanded” to the custody of the sheriff. We concede that, in the occasional case, the distinction between an interlocutory and a final order sometimes involves an imprecise exercise in judicial line-drawing. “It is not always easy to determine on which side of the line a case falls.” Brooks v. Roanoke Cty. Sanitation Auth., 201 Va. 934, 936, 114 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1960). We face no such difficulty here. In this case, the trial court entered sentencing orders that were final, appealable orders in every respect. No provision of the orders suspended the execution of the court’s judgment, stayed its enforcement, continued the case for further proceedings, or in any way suggested that the orders were non-appealable, non-final orders. In short, nothing “appears upon the face of the judgment[s]” stating “that further action in the cause is necessary to give completely the relief contemplated by the court.” Turner v. Holloway, 146 Va. 827, 832, 132 S.E. 685, 686 (1926) (citation omitted). The habeas court erred, therefore, in interpreting these orders as interlocutory decrees putting into motion a “continuing” and “open sentencing” process. B. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO PURSUE MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER SENTENCES AFTER ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. 4 As a general rule, the entry of a final judgment adjudicating guilt and imposing a sentence marks the end of a criminal prosecution. 5 No matter what timeline 4 Kozich’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus claimed only a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases. See generally Scott v. United States, 473 F.3d 1262, 1264 (8th Cir. 2007) (refusing to address a putative due process right to counsel when the arguments on brief relied solely on a Sixth Amendment basis). 5 A few excursions beyond this general line of demarcation, however, have been judicially accepted. One recognizes a right to counsel — based not on the Sixth Amendment, but 8 milestones presumptively trigger or extinguish the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, the right applies only to “critical stages” of a criminal prosecution. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 n.16 (2008). While there is no “comprehensive and final one-line definition of ‘critical stage,’” Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 312 (6th Cir. 2007), the analysis usually turns on the likelihood of “substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights” during the “particular confrontation” and “the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice,” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967); see also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). These distinctions are important given that “the right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the right to counsel itself.” Howard v. Warden, 232 Va. 16, 19, 348 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1986) (alteration omitted) (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 n.7 (1985)); see also Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587 (1982) (holding that the defendant “could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel” due to counsel’s “failure to file the application timely” because the defendant “had no constitutional right to counsel”); United States v. Hamid, 461 A.2d 1043, 1044 (D.C. 1983) (holding that “the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel does not apply to the post-conviction process in seeking a reduction of sentence,” and thus, the defendant could not have been “deprived of effective assistance of counsel”). In the context of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the consensus view is that a motion to reduce a criminal sentence — no matter the procedural vehicle used to assert it — is on due process and equal protection principles — for purposes of filing the first direct appeal of right from a final order. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1985); see also United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the “right to counsel on direct appeal as of right stems from due process and equal protection interests,” not the Sixth Amendment). But even that right to counsel does not extend to a second appeal to a higher appellate court, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987), or to purely collateral attacks, including state habeas corpus actions, Howard v. Warden, 232 Va. 16, 19, 348 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1986). 9 not a critical stage of a “trial-related proceeding” when it occurs “after judgment has been entered and a sentence imposed.” United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying this principle to motions for reduction of a sentence previously imposed by the court, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)). As a matter of law, “no Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at this stage.” Id. From this perspective, “[t]he right to request a reduction in sentence is not a right of sufficient substance to trigger the Sixth Amendment.” Hamid, 461 A.2d at 1044. Thus, the “Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel does not apply to the postconviction process in seeking a reduction of sentence.” Id.; see also 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 26.4(e), at 765 (3d ed. 2007) (“Post-trial proceedings to reduce a sentence . . . are not a ‘critical stage’ of the ‘criminal prosecution’ triggering the sixth amendment right to counsel.”). 6 6