Opinion ID: 1846529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Have We Eliminated the Requirement?

Text: The majority concludes that, so long as there is an impact, we no longer require a physical injury. See majority op. at 850. The majority cites Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), and Zell v. Meek, 665 So.2d 1048 (Fla.1995), as cases holding that emotional distress damages may be based on either impact or injury. Both cases, however, required some physical injury or manifestation. In both cases, physical injury had been demonstrated. Cox is not a case from this Court, but from the Third District. In Cox, the plaintiff sought recovery for mental anguish caused by the increased risk of cancer resulting from the inhalation of asbestos fibers and his subsequent contraction of asbestosis. The district court held that inhalation of asbestos fibers, although involving only slight physical contact, nevertheless constituted an impact: The essence of impact, then, it seems, is that the outside force, no matter how large or small, visible or invisible, and no matter that the effects are not immediately deleterious, touch or enter into the plaintiff's body. 481 So.2d at 527. The majority seizes on a quote from Cox where the court stated: If the plaintiff has suffered an impact, Florida courts permit recovery for emotional distress stemming from the incident during which the impact occurred, and not merely from the impact itself. Cox, 481 So.2d at 526. Read in isolation, this quote may suggest that an impact alone suffices to sustain a cause action for emotional distress. Such a reading, however, ignores the district court's lengthy analysis of Florida's physical injury requirement later in the opinion: Having determined that inhalation of asbestos satisfies the impact rule, and that, therefore, the plaintiff need not physically manifest his alleged emotional distress, we must still determine if and when recovery is available for fear of cancer. . . . . . . [S]everal courts have required that fear of claims be available only to those who have suffered a physical injury. . . . The physical injury requirement is consistent with Florida law, necessary and fair. Millions of people have been exposed to asbestos. Permitting an action for fear of cancer where there has been no physical injury from the asbestos would likely devastate the court system as well as the defendant manufacturers. Imposing a requirement that there be a physical injury as a predicate for recovery . . . is not an arbitrary act. . . . . . . In short, the physical injury requirement will insure that the claims permitted are only the most genuine. . . . . . . . The stringent requirement of both impact and injury for a fear of claim keeps the [floodgates] intact. Cox, 481 So.2d at 527-29 (emphasis added). [13] The court stated that although the inhalation of asbestos fibers constitutes an impact, that alone is insufficient to sustain a cause of action for emotional distress. However, because the plaintiff also suffered from asbestosis, the illness provided him with a chronic, painful and concrete reminder that he had been injuriously exposed to a substantial amount of asbestos, a reminder which may both qualitatively and quantitatively intensify his fear [of contracting cancer]. Id. at 529. Because there was both impact (inhalation of fibers) and injury (asbestosis), the district court permitted recovery. More on point is the Third District's subsequent application of the rule in Ruttger Hotel Corp. v. Wagner, 691 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). That case presented almost identical facts. The plaintiff was robbed at a hotel. The assailant accosted the plaintiff just outside his room, forced him into his daughter's room, and then pushed both him and his daughter into the bathroom. As in this case, then, there was impact (the push into the bathroom) but no injury. Quoting our decision in Humana, the court stated the rule as requir[ing] that before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional distress suffered must flow from physical injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact. Id. at 1178 (quoting 652 So.2d at 362). The court denied recovery. Id. If we are going to rely on a district court decision, certainly Wagner is more analogous than Cox. The majority also relies on Zell for the rule that once an impact occurs, a plaintiff is not required to demonstrate physical injury. Our opinion in Zell, however, is replete with references to Florida's physical injury requirement. In Zell, after witnessing her father's death as a result of a bomb that exploded in their unit, the plaintiff sued an apartment complex for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Although the plaintiff was not physically injured in the blast, we permitted recovery because she suffered physical manifestations of her mental anguish following the incident. In Zell we applied the bystander rule, which permits recovery for emotional distress absent an actual impact if a plaintiff can demonstrate physical injuries resulting from the mental anguish of witnessing the death or injury of a loved one. We first adopted the bystander rule in Champion v. Gray, 478 So.2d 17 (Fla.1985), where the plaintiff's wife died of shock after witnessing her daughter killed by a drunk driver. As we explained in Zell, prior to Champion, Florida adhered strictly to a requirement that some physical impact to a claimant must be alleged and demonstrated before the claimant could recover damages for personal injury. This rule is referred to as the impact rule. Zell, 665 So.2d at 1050. In Champion, however, we retreated from our strict adherence to the impact rule and recognized for the first time a negligence action for physical injuries occurring without an actual impact. Id. at 1052 (emphasis added). We permitted recovery in Zell because expert medical testimony linked the plaintiff's emotional distress to physical impairment of her stomach area, pain below her rib cage, an ulcer, blockage of her esophagus, joint pain, and insomnia. Although Champion, Zell, and the bystander line of cases permit recovery for emotional distress without an impact, they clearly continue to require a physical injury or manifestation: [W]e rejected the impact rule to the extent that we held that no impact need be shown where psychological trauma could be demonstrated to cause a demonstrable physical injury, but we retained the rule as a bar to psychic injuries resulting from such trauma. Of course, in addition to the requirement of a physical injury, we limited the class of claimants to those who, because of [their] relationship to the [directly] injured party and [their] involvement in the event causing the injury, [are] foreseeably injured. . . . . The essence of our holding in Champion was to recognize a claim where an actual physical injury could be demonstrated by psychic trauma. . . . . . . . . . . . [T]he elements required to allege a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress [are]: (1) the plaintiff must suffer a physical injury; (2) the plaintiff's physical injury must be caused by the psychological trauma; (3) the plaintiff must be involved in some way in the event causing the negligent injury to another; and (4) the plaintiff must have a close personal relationship to the directly injured person. Zell, 665 So.2d at 1052-1054 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). Thus, we have relaxed the rule to permit recovery where there is physical injury but no impact, but not where the converse is true. We reached a similar result in Gracey, where we described the impact rule as having a `hybrid' nature, requiring either impact upon one's person or, in certain situations, at a minimum the manifestation of emotional distress in the form of a discernible physical injury or illness. 837 So.2d at 355. But we did not mean that impact without physical injury suffices. In the preceding sentence, we reiterated that [t]he `impact rule' requires that a plaintiff seeking to recover emotional distress damages in a negligence action prove that that `the emotional distress . . . flow[s] from physical injuries sustained in an impact [upon his person].' Id. (quoting Humana, 652 So.2d at 362) (emphasis added) (alterations in original). We described the rule as a hybrid not because it requires either impact or physical injury, but because in certain bystander cases it allows recovery based on physical injury alone. See Zell, 665 So.2d at 1052 (noting that Champion retreated from our strict adherence to the impact rule in those limited circumstances); Champion, 478 So.2d at 18 (holding that a bystander closely related to the directly injured person can recover upon a showing of significant discernible physical injury). The case from which Gracey took the hybrid language Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992)made clear that it was referring to the bystander exception, not declaring that impact and injury were alternative paths to recovery. Id. at 422 n. 4. Gracey was also referring to the bystander exception, as evidenced by its use of Champion's phrase, discernible physical injury, and its caveat that physical injury without impact is sufficient only in certain situations. 837 So.2d at 355. Nothing in Gracey suggested the converse: that impact without physical injury is sufficient. Indeed, our quotation from Humana directly stated that, to satisfy the rule, the impact must cause physical injury. [14] In the one other case the majority cites for the elimination of the physical injury requirement, see majority op. at 850, we actually found the impact rule inapplicable. Hagan held that the impact rule does not apply to cases where a plaintiff suffers emotional distress as a direct result of the consumption of a contaminated beverage. 804 So.2d at 1236. Thus, any mention of the impact rule in Hagan was merely dictum. Presumably, we did not intend Hagan to change a rule that we were not even applying. At any rate, Hagan faithfully stated the rule as requiring physical injury. See id. at 1237 (explaining that the impact rule requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the emotional stress suffered flowed from injuries sustained in an impact) (citing Humana, 652 So.2d at 362). [15] We certainly had the opportunity in Hagan to hold that the impact rule requires only impact, since only impact was present in that case. The plaintiffs had ingested a bottle of Coca-Cola that apparently contained a condom (later determined to be mold). Impact was clear because our previous cases held that ingesting a foreign substance constitutes an impact. See Doyle v. Pillsbury Co., 476 So.2d 1271, 1272 (Fla.1985). But it was also undisputed that the plaintiff had suffered no physical injury. We held in the plaintiffs' favor, but instead of holding that no physical injury was required to recover damages for emotional distress, we held that the impact rule does not apply to cases involving the ingestion of contaminated substances. Hagan, 804 So.2d at 1239. As we explained: This ingestion requirement is grounded upon foreseeability rather than the impact rule. The public has become accustomed to believing in and relying on the fact that packaged foods are fit for consumption. Id. at 1239 (quoting Doyle, 476 So.2d at 1272). Because we deemed the impact rule inapplicable to ingestion cases, we reasoned that any discussion as to the requirement for a physical injury would have been unnecessary based upon our holding that the impact rule did not apply. Id. at 1239. The strong implication of this languageindeed, of the entire Hagan decisionis that when the impact rule does apply, there continues to be a requirement for a physical injury. Id. Hagan did not hold that the ingestion of food (which supplies the necessary impact) satisfies the rule. Rather, it held that the impact rule does not apply  in such cases. Id. at 1239 (emphasis added). Had we meant to hold that mere ingestion satisfied the rule, we would not have said that the rule does not apply, and we certainly would not have restated the rule as requiring that before a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress, she must demonstrate that the emotional stress suffered flowed from injuries sustained in an impact. Id. at 1237. In his separate opinion, the Chief Justice cites Crane v. Loftin, 70 So.2d 574 (Fla.1954), as the case where we first held that emotional distress damages could be based on either impact or injury. Specially concurring op. at 853. There are two problems with relying on Crane, however. First, Crane denied recovery to the plaintiff, whose claim was based solely on fright and mental anguish unaccompanied by direct physical impact or trauma. 70 So.2d at 575. Therefore, any implication that damages could be recovered where only impact, but no physical injury, occurred, was dictum. Second, the non-binding nature of the statement is proven by our subsequent statements of the rule, which, as I noted above, repeatedly require physical injury. See Humana, 652 So.2d at 364 ([M]ental injuries are insufficient to meet the physical injury required under the impact rule.); see also Welker, 908 So.2d 317, 320; Rowell, 850 So.2d at 477-78; Burger, 712 So.2d at 393; Tanner, 696 So.2d at 707; Brown, 468 So.2d at 904; Clark, 107 So.2d at 611-12; Macurda, 93 So.2d at 861 (all noting the physical injury requirement). The Chief Justice also relies on our holding in Macurda, 93 So.2d at 860. Specially concurring op. at 855. Macurda involved plaintiffs who ingested a can of worm-infested spinach and subsequently suffered fits of vomiting and diarrhea. The spinach company argued that the physical symptoms were the result of psychological trauma, rather than actual food contamination. Far from rejecting the impact rule's physical injury requirements, we stated that the requirement was sound but inapplicable because the jury heard evidence from which they could properly infer that the physical symptoms were caused by ingestion of the worms. 93 So.2d at 862. In Macurda, we noted that the plaintiffs exhibited physical manifestations following ingestion of a contaminated substance. Recovery for emotional distress under these circumstances is consistent with our traditional application of the impact rule. The Chief Justice also relies on our decision in Clark, 107 So.2d at 609, as supporting the rule that once an impact occurs, no physical injury is required to claim emotional damages. Specially concurring op. at 16. But that case did not go so far. In Clark, the plaintiff suffered an electric shock due to an electric company's negligent repair of high-voltage power cables. The central issue was not whether physical injury occurred, but whether the absence of visible bodily marks from the electric shock precluded a finding of physical injury. We held that it was error to limit[] evidence of trauma to visible bodily injury. 107 So.2d at 612. Clark did not abrogate the physical injury requirement; it simply acknowledged that physical injury may occur without leaving a mark. Clark specifically stated that we do not . . . intend to recede from the rule requiring physical injury to recover for emotional distress damages. Id. at 611. Granted, our definition of the required physical injury has evolved: while we previously demanded that a physical injury produce the emotional distress, we now require only that the emotional distress produce some discernible physical injury or some physical manifestation. See Champion, 478 So.2d at 20 ([A] claim exists for damages flowing from a significant discernible physical injury when such injury is caused by psychic trauma. . . .); Brown, 468 So.2d at 904 ([P]sychological trauma must cause a demonstrable physical injury such as death, paralysis, muscular impairment, or similar objectively discernible physical impairment. . . .). The fact remains, however, that, until now, in no case where we have actually applied the rule have we allowed emotional distress damages without proof of some physical manifestation or injury. We have never receded from the cases requiring physical injury, and we do not recede from our cases sub silentio. See Puryear v. State, 810 So.2d 901, 905-06 (Fla.2002) (warning that the Court does not overrule itself sub silentio, and where a court encounters an express holding from the Supreme Court on a specific issue and subsequent contrary dictum on the same issue, the court should apply the express holding until the Supreme Court specifically recedes from it). Therefore, our many prior cases requiring physical injury remain good law. I dissent from discarding that requirement today.