Opinion ID: 2574897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Hollingsworth's statements to Sharp

Text: Cornell testified about comments he heard Hollingsworth make to Sharp after Hollingsworth and Baker left Owen at the dike and returned to the camp: [Prosecutor]: Now, once [Charles Hollingsworth], [Carl Baker], and [David Owen] is [ sic ] taken from camp, how long are they gone? [Cornell]: Fifteen, no more than 20 minutes. .... [Prosecutor]: Who came back to the camp? [Cornell]: [Hollingsworth] and [Baker]. [Prosecutor]: Was [Owen] with them? [Cornell]: No. .... [Prosecutor]: All right. What did [Sharp] ask them? [Cornell]: `How's [Owen]?' .... [Prosecutor]: What did [Hollingsworth] say? [Cornell]: Well, he looked at his  well, he didn't wear a watch, he was being facetious, I guess, ` Probably dead by now. ' [Prosecutor]: Did he say anything else when he said, `He's probably dead by now?' [Cornell]: Yeah, he said, `He was turnin' blue when we left. ' (Emphasis added.) Sharp argues there are five prerequisites to admittance of a coconspirator statement under K.S.A. 60-460(i)(2), including that the statement must be made outside the presence of the defendant. Repeating defense arguments at trial, Sharp claims since these italicized statements were made in her presence they should not have been admitted. The State responds that the judge's rejection of the outside the presence of the defendant requirement was well reasoned, supported by case law, and consistent with the statute. Sharp does not argue that these statements were testimonial and therefore barred by the Confrontation Clause. See State v. Jackson, 280 Kan. 16, 34-35, 118 P.3d 1238 (2005) (Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 [2004], specifically noted that statements by coconspirators are not testimonial). Nor does she claim that they are anything but hearsay. Rather, the disagreement between the parties focuses on whether outside the presence is an element required under K.S.A. 60-460(i)(2). Accordingly, our review of this issue is de novo. See State v. White, 279 Kan. 326, 331, 109 P.3d 1199 (2005) (review is de novo of evidence admissibility decision when interpreting statute and determining if judicial discretion was guided by erroneous legal conclusions). The hearsay statute, K.S.A. 60-460, states in relevant part at subsection (i)(2): Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: .... (i) Vicarious admissions. As against a party, a statement which would be admissible if made by the declarant at the hearing if ... (2) the party and the declarant were participating in a plan to commit a crime or civil wrong and the statement was relevant to the plan or its subject matter and was made while the plan was in existence and before its complete execution or other termination. Sharp acknowledges that the outside the presence of the accused element does not appear in the statute. Nevertheless, she relies upon State v. Bird, 238 Kan. 160, 175-76, 708 P.2d 946 (1985), where this court stated: This exception to the rule against admitting hearsay establishes five prerequisites to its application: (1) the person testifying must be a third party; (2) the out-of-court statement about which the person will testify must have been made by one of the coconspirators; (3) the statement of the coconspirator must have been outside the presence of the accused; (4) the statement of the coconspirator must have been made while the conspiracy was in progress; and (5) the statement must be relevant to the plan or its subject matter. (Emphasis added.) Bird cites no authority for this proposition. We independently observe, however, that this uncited requirement also appeared in State v. Roberts, 223 Kan. 49, 574 P.2d 164 (1977). There, defendants attempted to keep a witness from testifying about what she had heard in the presence of conspirators. The court stated: Appellants have misinterpreted the statute and its case law. K.S.A. 60-460(i) addresses a third party situation. Its requirements apply when the party (defendant) and the declarant (coconspirator) are participating in a plan to commit a crime and a third person (witness) is later called to testify as to the coconspirator's statements made outside the presence of the defendant concerning the conspiracy for the purpose of establishing defendant's participation in the conspiracy and crime. (Emphasis added.) Roberts, 223 Kan. at 60, 574 P.2d 164. As in Bird, the Roberts court cited no authority for the outside the presence of the defendant requirement. Regardless, the court held that the hearsay exception in K.S.A. 60-460(i)(2) did not apply because the statements here were made in the presence of all conspirators. The statements were not made to a third party. 223 Kan. at 60, 574 P.2d 164. The court then explained that the testimony was nevertheless admissible for another reason: [S]tatements of persons present when the conspiracy is being consummated are admissible as matters accompanying an incident to the transaction or event; as such they are part of the res gestae. Such statements by which the agreement was reached may be established by the testimony of anyone present when the agreement was alleged to have been entered into. 223 Kan. at 60, 574 P.2d 164. Obviously, there is no outside the presence of the defendant requirement on the face of the statute. Additionally, the doctrine relied upon by the Roberts court to actually admit the evidence  res gestae instead of K.S.A. 60-460(i)(2)  has now been interred in Kansas. See State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). Finally, we observe that numerous Kansas decisions since Roberts have not even mentioned the outside the presence of defendant requirement. See State v. Nguyen, 281 Kan. 702, 715-16, 133 P.3d 1259 (2006); State v. Jackson, 280 Kan. 16, 33-35, 118 P.3d 1238 (2005); State v. Sherry, 233 Kan. 920, 933-34, 667 P.2d 367 (1983). Contra State v. Flynn, 274 Kan. 473, 509, 55 P.3d 324 (2002). For these reasons, this requirement articulated in Roberts and reiterated by its progeny is expressly disapproved. Sharp asserts that this court should consider two other reasons not expressly argued at the trial level to brand these statements as inadmissible hearsay. First, she contends that the statements did not relate to the plan or subject matter of the conspiracy. Second, she argues that the statements were made after the termination of the conspiracy. Sharp acknowledges that the contemporaneous objection rule would typically bar consideration of her arguments but contends it should be waived in order to protect her confrontation rights. The State responds there is no reason to waive the contemporaneous objection rule, but the statements are admissible under the exception anyway. We have held that a defendant's failure to timely object at trial to alleged hearsay statements precludes raising the issue on appeal, even where contending a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Mays, 277 Kan. 359, 384-85, 85 P.3d 1208 (2004). Moreover, it is well established that a party `cannot object to the introduction of evidence on one ground at trial and then assert another ground on appeal.' State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 127, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). Accordingly, Sharp's failure to object on these particular bases typically would bar our consideration on appeal. However, because of Sharp's understandable and sole reliance at trial upon a longstanding line of Kansas cases which today we disapprove, and because of the involvement of a fundamental right-confrontation-we will consider her alternate arguments. See State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 339, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007) (consideration necessary to serve ends of justice or prevent denial of fundamental rights). On these argued bases, our review of the court's ruling is for abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261, 294, 173 P.3d 612 (2007) (generally, an appellate court reviews a trial court's determination that hearsay is admissible under a statutory exception for abuse of discretion).