Opinion ID: 612732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The District Court Deprived Cronin and Hoffman of Their Right to Due Process, but We Decline to Reassign this Case at this Stage.

Text: The district court violated the civil rights of the two lead prosecutors, Cronin and Hoffman, when it publically reprimanded them without first affording them due process. We have been clear that for the imposition of sanctions to be proper, a court `must comply with the mandates of due process.' Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging, Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1320 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2136, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)). Due process requires that the attorney (or party) be given fair notice that his conduct may warrant sanctions and the reasons why. In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir.1995). Notice can come from the party seeking sanctions, from the court, or from both. In addition, the accused must be given an opportunity to respond, orally or in writing, to the invocation of such sanctions and to justify his actions. Id. at 1575-76 (citation omitted). The district court did not provide Cronin or Hoffman with notice that it was considering a public reprimand. At the sanctions proceeding, the court specifically asked Shaygan, You're not requesting that I exercise any inherent powers of contempt as relating to anyone in the United States Attorney's Office[?] Shaygan responded, No, Your Honor. I would defer to the Court on that. I don't think I have a dog in that fight.... Any other relief, I think, is better addressed between Your Honor and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Cronin and Hoffman were not even aware of this exchange because the court had sua sponte sequestered them as witnesses. The district court conducted an inquiry, not an adversarial hearing, and both prosecutors were denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard in that proceeding. Cronin testified at the sanctions proceeding, but he was not represented by an attorney, had no opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses, and did not know that the district court might rely on his testimony to impose an individual sanction. Cronin's testimony at the sanctions proceeding did not constitute an opportunity to be heard in the Anglo-American tradition. As the Supreme Court explained long ago, The charge must be known before the proceedings commence. They become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of testimony of the accused. He can then be given no opportunity to expunge the earlier statements and start afresh. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968); see also Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1211 (11th Cir.1985). The denial of Hoffman's right to due process was even more egregious. Hoffman was never even called as a witness, and because of the sequestration order there was no way for Hoffman to know about the testimony of the other witnesses at the proceeding. Cronin and Hoffman also request that we reassign this case to a different district judge, but we decline to do so. Reassignment is an extraordinary order, and we `do not order [it] lightly.' United States v. Gupta, 572 F.3d 878, 891 (11th Cir.2009) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir.1989)). Absent evidence of actual bias, we consider three elements: (1) whether the original judge would have difficulty putting his previous views and findings aside; (2) whether reassignment is appropriate to preserve the appearance of justice; (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to gains realized from reassignment. Torkington, 874 F.2d at 1447. We expect the district judge to put his previous views and findings aside, although that expectation might be unreasonable in a second, see United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1242 (11th Cir.2006), or third, see Gupta, 572 F.3d at 880, appeal. At this stage, reassignment is unnecessary to preserve the appearance of justice and would require undue duplication of effort. We express no view about whether the district court should conduct further proceedings, but if the district court decides again to consider sanctions against Cronin or Hoffman, it must, of course, afford them due process. An attorney charged with misconduct is entitled to notice of the charge: that is, the attorney is entitled to know the precise rule, standard, or law that he or she is alleged to have violated and how he or she allegedly violated it. Each of these attorneys also cannot be held responsible for the acts or omissions of others: Cronin, for example, cannot be held responsible for the acts or omissions of his superiors, such as Gilbert, and Hoffman cannot be held responsible for Cronin's acts or omissions. Another reprimand also would be subject to another appeal to this Court. We do not mean to suggest or even hint that the district court should consider sanctions against either Cronin or Hoffman. It is not apparent to us that either attorney necessarily violated any ethical rule or any constitutional or statutory standard. The record before us is unreliable because it was developed, after all, without affording either of them due process.