Opinion ID: 1203801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: California Pretrial Procedures

Text: California procedures governing the pretrial detention of those charged with misdemeanors who are arrested with or without a warrant (cf. People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418 [67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321]) do not presently comport with our implementation of the constitutional requirements of Gerstein since the defendant is not afforded a post-arrest judicial determination that probable cause exists for his continued detention. (2a) Accordingly, for reasons which follow, we hold that, unless waived, a judicial determination of probable cause is required in every case where a defendant charged with a misdemeanor is detained awaiting trial. A police officer may lawfully arrest a person without a warrant if such a person has committed a public offense in the officer's presence or if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony. (Pen. Code, § 836.) Of course, a person charged with the commission of a misdemeanor may also be arrested pursuant to a warrant. (Id.) The arrest warrant may be issued by a municipal or justice court judge when a complaint is filed charging a public offense that is originally triable in the superior court, municipal court, or justice court of the county in which such judge sits. (Pen. Code, § 1427.) The arrest warrant may also issue if the complaint shows that the defendant is in the magistrate's county even though the offense charged is originally triable in another county. (Pen. Code, §§ 827, 829.) The magistrate or judge must issue the warrant if satisfied from the complaint that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed it.... (Pen. Code, § 1427, subd. (a); see also Pen. Code, §§ 813, 827, 829.) (3) In making this determination, an affidavit supporting the warrant, or the complaint itself, must recite competent facts that would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence conscientiously to entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused. ( People v. Cressey (1970) 2 Cal.3d 836, 842 [87 Cal. Rptr. 699, 471 P.2d 19].) The information in the complaint or affidavit in support thereof must either (1) state facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant or complainant directly supportive of allegations in the complaint that the defendant committed the offense; or (2) when such stated facts are not within the personal knowledge of the affiant or complainant, further state facts relating to the identity and credibility of the source of the directly incriminating information. ( Jaben v. United States (1965) 381 U.S. 214 [14 L.Ed.2d 345, 85 S.Ct. 1365]; Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108 [12 L.Ed.2d 723, 84 S.Ct. 1509]; Giordenello v. United States (1958) 357 U.S. 480 [2 L.Ed.2d 1503, 78 S.Ct. 1425]; People v. Sesslin, supra, 68 Cal.2d 418, 424.) (4) If the arrest warrant is based solely upon a complaint or affidavit framed in terms of information and belief rather than upon the affiant's personal knowledge, or solely upon a complaint that is phrased in the statutory language, the warrant may be constitutionally inadequate if sufficient allegations of probable cause are not otherwise present. ( People v. Sesslin, supra, 68 Cal.2d 418, 424-425.) Consequently, since such documents alone may not sustain a finding of probable cause for arrest and issuance of a warrant, they will not sustain a finding of probable cause to hold the defendant for trial in the event that the warrant is nonetheless issued. In such event, however, probable cause to detain might be grounded on such documents, if augmented by other sufficient evidence at a proper hearing. After a misdemeanor arrest with or without a warrant, current procedures do not provide for a judicial determination of the legality of the detention. Ordinarily, if the arrestee is not immediately released (see Pen. Code, §§ 849, 851.6) he must be brought before a magistrate within two days (Pen. Code, § 825) and at that arraignment shall be admitted to bail. (Pen. Code, §§ 815a, 823, 849.) In the instant case, four days after petitioner's warrantless arrest, a misdemeanor complaint was filed which recited the charges in the statutory language. There was no affidavit stating facts supporting the complaint and the complaint was signed by a person who did not have personal knowledge of the allegations. Petitioner was thereafter arraigned; bail was set; a not guilty plea was entered; and petitioner's request for a determination of probable cause for his detention was entertained. These circumstances present precisely that situation with which Gerstein was concerned: a significant pretrial restraint of liberty without procedures for a reliable determination of probable cause for that restraint. Clearly petitioner was entitled to demand such determination when he first appeared before the magistrate. A more difficult question is presented, however, in the case of a misdemeanor suspect arrested on a warrant. An arrest warrant cannot properly issue under our procedures except in compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements. ( People v. Sesslin, supra, 68 Cal.2d 418, 425-426.) As noted, Gerstein requires neither an adversary nor a post-arrest hearing. It requires only a fair and reliable determination of probable cause to be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest. ( Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103, 124-125 [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 71-72].) It thus appears that when a magistrate has determined the existence of probable cause for arrest, even in an informal ex parte proceeding before arrest, Gerstein has been satisfied. A difficulty is immediately apparent, however, in that after his arrest a defendant is not afforded an opportunity to challenge in the criminal proceedings the propriety of the determination of probable cause for issuance of the warrant. If we do not afford him the opportunity to make that challenge then we would, in actuality, give conclusive effect to the propriety of all arrest warrants merely because the warrant issued. We elect not to approve a procedure for determining compliance with a constitutional mandate when that procedure is vulnerable to attack on grounds which suggest the possibility of a type of star-chamber determination, particularly when the alternative poses little additional burden on the administration of justice. [5] (2b) Since Gerstein affords the states wide latitude in implementing its mandate, we choose to apply its probable cause determination to all misdemeanor post-arrest detentions when the defendant is not released prior to arraignment or at the time of arraignment, and does not waive the probable cause determination. This application is consistent with Gerstein 's statement that, [b]ecause the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial.  ( Id., at p. 125, fn. 26 [L.Ed.2d at p. 72]; italics added.) The mere fixing of bail does not satisfy Gerstein, of course. As the posting of bail may impose an unwarranted burden on an accused if probable cause to detain is lacking, the accused is entitled to have that determination made prior to electing to post or not to post bail.