Opinion ID: 836300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: estoppel defense to alleged violations

Text: In a single cause of complaint, the Bar charged the accused with violating DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), and ORS 9.527(4), all arising from his telephone calls to Becker and Adams. We first address whether the trial panel erred in dismissing the Bar's complaint on the ground that the Bar was estopped from prosecuting the accused. According to the trial panel, Bar counsel's responses to the accused's 1992 complaint against SAIF and DOJ lawyers essentially represented to the Accused that SAIF's lawyers [sic] conduct does not violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, rather than representing to Accused that SAIF's lawyers were accorded a prosecutorial exception to the disciplinary rules. (Emphasis in original.) In the trial panel's view, the accused reasonably inferred from those letters that, in the Bar's view, it is ethical for a lawyer in private practice to use deceptive methods to investigate other private parties. Accordingly, the trial panel concluded that, when the accused made the telephone calls to Becker and Adams, he believed that he was acting ethically. The Bar contends that its letters to the accused did not state or imply that, in the Bar's view, it is ethical for a lawyer in private practice to use deceptive methods to investigate other private parties. Furthermore, it contends, its investigation of the accused's complaint simply had turned up little if any reliable evidence to support the accused's assertions regarding the lawyers who allegedly had been involved in Operation Clean Sweep, and its letters to the accused reflected that fact. The accused responds that the Bar's letters to him regarding his 1992 complaint against SAIF and DOJ lawyers reasonably led him to believe that lawyers in private practice as well as public lawyers may assist in a sting operation that has essentially deceitful elements without violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. This court has held that a lawyer violates DR 7-102(A)(5) by misrepresenting the lawyer's identity while engaged in the practice of law. See In re Chambers, 292 Or. 670, 680-81, 642 P.2d 286 (1982) (lawyer's knowing misrepresentation of self as independent insurance agent violates DR 7-102(A)(5)). Even assuming that the accused relied on the Bar's letters in making the calls, his reliance was not reasonable. The Bar's letters neither stated nor implied that lawyers in the private practice of law may misrepresent their identity or purpose in investigating a matter. Moreover, advice from disciplinary counsel is not a defense to a disciplinary violation. In re Ainsworth, 289 Or. 479, 490, 614 P.2d 1127 (1980). The trial panel erred in holding that the Bar was estopped from prosecuting the accused for the alleged misconduct at issue in this case. We turn to the merits.