Opinion ID: 75827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Dedication to Best Interests Prong

Text: 39 Throughout this proceeding, the State of Florida has contested Scher's standing to litigate the issue of whether Sanchez-Velasco can decide for himself about filing a federal habeas petition. From the beginning, the State has contended not only that Sanchez-Velasco is mentally competent to make his own decisions but also that Scher has no right to even litigate that question. The State has, in other words, contended all along that Scher has failed to establish not only the first prong or adequate explanation requirement, but also the second prong or dedication to best interests requirement. That is the position the State took in its initial response to the habeas petition, the position it took in the motion for reconsideration that it filed after the district court had ordered an evidentiary hearing on Sanchez-Velasco's mental competency, and the position it took at the evidentiary hearing. Nothing if not consistent and persistent, the State has also taken that position in its brief and oral argument to this Court. 40 Despite the State's pertinacity in pursuing the prong-two point, Scher contends that we should not consider the issue of whether he has standing to litigate Sanchez-Velasco's mental competency — whether he meets the second Whitmore prong — because the State failed to cross-appeal the district court's ruling against it on that question. We disagree. 41 An appellee may, without cross-appealing, urge in support of a result that has been appealed by the other party any ground leading to the same result, even if that ground is inconsistent with the district court's reasoning. See El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 479, 119 S.Ct. 1430, 1434-35, 143 L.Ed.2d 635 (1999); accord Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2359 n. 5, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982) (It is well accepted, however, that without filing a cross-appeal or cross-petition, an appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment below.). In addition, because standing issues resonate with Article III concerns we are under an obligation to consider standing at every step in the judicial process even if the parties do not press it or have acted or failed to act in a way that would have waived some other issue. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 2435, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607-08, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). 42 Turning now to the question of whether Scher has established the dedication to the best interests prong, we begin by reiterating the Supreme Court's precise language. It said: the `next friend' must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and it has been further suggested that a `next friend' must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64, 110 S.Ct. at 1727. 43 As to that latter part, about some significant relationship, we have previously indicated that it may not be an additional, independent requirement but instead may be one means by which the would-be next friend can show true dedication to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate. See Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637, 641 (11th Cir.1992) (Then, the next friend must show some relationship or other evidence that would suggest that the next friend is truly dedicated to the interests of the real party in interest.). We have concluded that some significant relationship does exist when the would-be next friend has served in a prior proceeding as counsel for the real party in interest and did so with his consent. That was the situation in the Ford case, where the attorney who was acting as next friend for the inmate had represented him with his consent for years in prior litigation challenging his conviction and death sentence. See Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 605 & n. 1 (11th Cir.1999), and Ford v. Haley, 179 F.3d 1342, 1344-45 (11th Cir.1999); see also Hauser ex rel. Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir.2000) (The most logical `next friend' is Hauser's court-appointed counsel from prior proceedings). We have also indicated that some significant relationship exists and the second Whitmore prong is satisfied where a close relative acts as next friend. See Lonchar, 978 F.2d at 641 (The district court held and no one disputes that Kellogg, as Lonchar's sister, is sufficiently dedicated to the interests of her brother.); but see Hauser, 223 F.3d at 1322 (expressing reservations about whether the inmate's biological mother, who gave him up for adoption, was dedicated to his best interests for next-friend purposes). 44 Neither of those situations exist here. Sanchez-Velasco's brother attempted to act in a next-friend capacity and pursue state court remedies on his behalf, but he has not done that in federal court. Scher is not related to Sanchez-Velasco. He has never represented him before. Prior to filing the federal habeas petition (and for more than a year afterwards) Scher had never met Sanchez-Velasco. He had never spoken with him. He had never even attempted to do so. Scher was, in short, a total stranger to Sanchez-Velasco. He had no relationship at all with him, much less a significant one. 45 Nor has Scher shown in any other way that he is truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate within the meaning of that Whitmore requirement. Scher, as a CCRC attorney, does have state law authority to represent death row inmates who consent to the representation, but he has no more authority than any other attorney to represent an unconsenting inmate. That is true as a matter of federal law under the Whitmore decision, and it is true as a matter of state law as well, see Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So.2d 482, 485 (Fla.1993) ([W]e hold that ... CCR [CCRC's predecessor] has no duty or right to represent a death row inmate without that inmate's permission.); cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (An unwanted counsel `represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction.). 46 The district court gave three reasons for finding that Scher had met the second prong of the Whitmore test, none of which we find persuasive. First, it said that in this case Scher had followed [CCRC's] standard procedures in filing the habeas petition on Petitioner's behalf. If that is so, then CCRC's standard procedures should be changed. They should be changed because they are contrary to Florida law, which is that CCRC has no right to represent a death row inmate without that inmate's permission. Durocher, 623 So.2d at 485. CCRC's standard procedures, if this is what they are, ought to be changed because no attorney should ever file a habeas petition in the name of an inmate he has not even bothered to speak with, much less obtain permission from, and omit from the petition the critical fact that the inmate has not consented to the filing. See Fla. Stat. Bar R. 4-1.2(a) (A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.); id. at 4-8.4(c) (A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving ... misrepresentation ...). Nowhere in the two-pound, 272-page habeas petition Scher filed did he disclose to the court that he had not obtained Sanchez-Velasco's permission to file the petition. Regardless of whether CCRC followed its standard procedures in this case, or whether those procedures ought to be changed, its practices or procedures cannot trump the requirements of federal law; they cannot take the place of the showing Whitmore requires that the would-be next friend be dedicated to the best interests of the inmate. 47 The second reason that the district court gave for concluding that Scher could proceed to litigate Sanchez-Velasco's mental competency is that the petition was filed in December 1998 and Petitioner did not move to withdraw the petition until March 2000, which the court described as being at a late stage. But there were no earlier stages because nothing happened in the case, which was held in abeyance pending a decision from the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), during the interval between Scher's filing of the petition and Sanchez-Velasco's filing of the motion to dismiss, except the State's response which also asked the court to dismiss because Scher could not show the prerequisites for next-friend standing. Besides, we are not aware of any doctrine which would entitle a stranger to control the legal affairs of another party after that party protested based upon nothing more than the lateness of the protest. It is not as though the doctrine of laches applies to next-friend standing, and even if it did the requirements of that doctrine would not be met in this case. 7 48 The third reason the district court gave for allowing Scher to challenge Sanchez-Velasco's mental competency is that since this is a capital case, and similar issues related to Petitioner's mental competency could be raised potentially by a third party prior to execution, it makes additional good sense to allow CCRC to litigate Petitioner's mental competency to withdraw his habeas petition. This reason at least has the virtue of being pragmatic, but there is no pragmatic exception to the requirements of next-friend standing. If we were to sanction the district court's reasoning, it would be tantamount to writing the second prong out of the Whitmore test, something we cannot do because the Supreme Court wrote it in. 8 49 Scher offers no better reasons than the district court did for why we should find that he has met the second prong of the Whitmore test by showing that he is dedicated to the best interests of Sanchez-Velasco. Attempting to excuse his failure to ask for Sanchez-Velasco's permission before filing the petition in his name, Scher says he was busy drafting the petition before the statute of limitations ran out. That assertion is both incredible, and beside the point. It is incredible, because Scher admits that he or others from his CCRC office visit the prison where Sanchez-Velasco was being held each week, and obviously the phone lines run to and from the prison. Yet during all the time Scher was compiling the mammoth petition and appendices to file, Scher never once attempted to contact his purported client about the fundamental question of whether he wanted to be Scher's client. Not only that, but even after the petition was filed Scher made no attempt to visit or talk with Sanchez-Velasco until fourteen months had passed, and he only went to see him then because Sanchez-Velasco had filed a motion to dismiss the petition as unauthorized. Scher's assertion about being busy is also beside the point, because there is no too busy exception to the second Whitmore requirement. 50 Scher has not established that he is dedicated to Sanchez-Velasco's best interests. To the contrary, he appears to be pursing his own interests in opposing the imposition of the death penalty. See Hauser, 223 F.3d at 1322 (noting that the would-be next-friends in that case appear to be motivated solely by their own desires to block imposition of the death penalty in an attempt to define justice as they see fit (internal quotation marks omitted)). To allow him to proceed in Sanchez-Velasco's name would run counter to one of the central purposes of the requirements of next-friend-standing, which is to keep out intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164, 110 S.Ct. at 1728 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 51 The district court should not have ruled that Scher had made the showing required by Whitmore 's second prong, that he had, in the district court's words, limited standing to litigate Scher's mental competency to decide whether to proceed with the federal habeas petition that Scher had filed without permission. Scher's failure to meet the second prong requirement alone is sufficient reason to affirm the dismissal of the habeas petition. 52 This case does not present the issue of how the second Whitmore requirement should be applied when there is no one who can meet that requirement and there are serious questions about the mental competency of the inmate that have not been addressed by any court. Sanchez-Velasco's mental competency to forego further legal challenges was fully and completely litigated in the state courts. His brother had previously filed a petition on his behalf in the state courts, and counsel who represented Sanchez-Velasco in the state collateral proceedings began that representation with his consent. Unlike Scher, the brother and prior counsel have a significant relationship with the real party in interest and under our precedent would be considered to be sufficiently dedicated to the best interests of Sanchez-Velasco to meet Whitmore 's second requirement for next-friend standing. If there is a last resort exception to that second requirement, this is not a case where it would apply.