Opinion ID: 215290
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 1. Special Condition Restricting Internet Access

Text: We have previously identified several key considerations when addressing challenges to special conditions restricting internet and computer use. In United States v. Heckman , we explained that three factors [] have guided our prior holdings in this area: (1) the length and (2) coverage of the imposed ban; and, (3) the defendant's underlying conduct.  592 F.3d at 405. Consistent with this approach, in United States v. Miller, we explained: First, we must examine the scope of the supervised release condition, including both its duration and its substantive breadthhere, the degree to which access to computers and the internet is restricted. . . . Second, we must consider the severity of the defendant's criminal conduct and the facts underlying the conviction, with a particular focus on whether the defendant used a computer or the internet to solicit or otherwise personally endanger children. 594 F.3d 172, 187 (3d Cir.2010). Although these factors provide a helpful framework for analyzing the challenge presented here, we remain cognizant of the reality that this is an area of law that requires a fact-specific analysis. See Heckman, 592 F.3d at 405. Maurer argues that the circumstances of his offense, when considered in light of the factors highlighted above and compared to other cases in our circuit dealing with similar challenges, require that we vacate the special condition restricting his use of the internet. In support of this position, Maurer places considerable emphasis on the fact that his use of the internet did not involve sexual exploitation of an individual who was actually a minor. Indeed, as noted above, the presence or absence of such conduct has been an important factor in previous decisions of this Court wherein we considered the reasonableness of restrictions on internet and computer use. See Miller, 594 F.3d at 187. For example, in United States v. Crandon , we upheld a three-year ban on internet use because the defendant used the Internet as a means to develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young girl. 173 F.3d 122, 125, 127 (3d Cir.1999). Similarly, in United States v. Thielemann, we upheld a computer restriction where a defendant, in addition to possessing child pornography, encouraged another person through an online chat to have sexual contact with a young girl. 575 F.3d 265, 278-79 (3d Cir.2009). In contrast, in United States v. Voelker , we struck down a lifetime ban on computer use given its extraordinary breadth and because the defendant did not use his computer equipment to seek out minors nor did he attempt to set up any meetings with minors over the internet. 489 F.3d at 144, 146. Thus, Maurer is correct that in addition to considering the length and breadth of such restrictions, our analysis looks to whether or not the defendant used the computer and internet to engage in predatory behavior. Contrary to Maurer's position, however, our consideration of this factor as well as its underlying concerns actually militate in favor of upholding the restriction on his use of the internet. Although Maurer did not in this particular instance use the internet to exploit a person that was actually a minor, his use of the internet nonetheless triggers concerns of predation that we believe are sufficient to sustain the restriction at issue here. While Nate was, insofar as Maurer knew, eighteen years old and therefore not a minor, Maurer explicitly stated via an internet message that he was interested in young guys too your age and under.  (PSR ¶ 10 (emphasis added).) Moreover, Maurer was clearly willing to use the internet to facilitate a sexual encounter. He directed Nate to a website featuring images of himself engaging in sexual acts and later expressed a desire to meet and have some good fun together. ( Id. ¶ 16.) These facts, when viewed together, demonstrate that Maurer's use of the internet went beyond simply obtaining child pornography. Maurer's expressed interest in minors, when coupled with his demonstrated willingness to use the internet as a means for arranging sexual encounters, presents a tangible risk to children. This risk exists notwithstanding the fact that Nate was eighteen years old insofar as Maurer knew at the time. Thus, although Maurer did not actually use the internet to seek out a minor in this particular instance, we believe that the unique facts of his offense trigger the very concerns that animated our consideration of the solicitation and predation concerns highlighted in Miller. See 594 F.3d at 187. We also believe that the duration and scope of the restriction on internet use are reasonable. While there is no precise formula for determining what constitutes a reasonable length of time, five years falls comfortably within the range of time periods we have previously upheld. See, e.g., Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 270, 278 (upholding a special condition lasting for ten years); Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125, 127-28 (upholding a special condition lasting for three years). Although Maurer is an older man, his age was not an obstacle to committing the instant offense, and we do not believe his age renders a five-year restriction excessive. The scope of the restriction is also sufficiently narrow. Rather than restricting all computer use, the District Court limited only Maurer's access to the internet, with exceptions to be provided by the Probation Office. Once released, Maurer may still use a computer for daily tasks. Thus, this restriction does not amount to cybernetic banishment, as did the condition in Voelker, 489 F.3d at 148, and it is more akin to the sufficiently narrow internet-only conditions we affirmed in Crandon and Thielemann. [12] See 575 F.3d at 278-79, 173 F.3d at 127-128. Furthermore, the District Court expressly stated at sentencing that disputes regarding the applicability of the restrictions would be decided by the court. (J.A. at 72.) The restriction on internet use therefore shares a nexus to the goals of deterrence and protection of the public and does not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary in this case. Accordingly, the District Court did not plainly err in imposing this condition.