Opinion ID: 2721616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sixth Amendment Claims

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court‟s decision to deny his second motion to dismiss and, alternatively, his request for a missing-witness instruction on the day of trial violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Specifically, he contends that “by failing to compel the government to produce Mr. Fritts at trial,” the trial court forced him to choose between his right to a speedy trial and his right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.9 To determine whether the trial court erred, we examine whether either of appellant‟s asserted Sixth Amendment rights were actually violated. 9 In support of this claim, appellant points to Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), where the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant‟s pretrial suppression hearing testimony could not be used against him at trial, as it would have put his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure at odds with his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at trial. 12
“It is axiomatic that „the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental constitutional right‟” under the Sixth Amendment. Hartridge v. United States, 896 A.2d 198, 207 (D.C. 2006) (citation omitted). However, “[t]he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (citation omitted). Speedy trial claims are reviewed against four factors: (1) the “[l]ength of delay, [(2)] the reason for the delay, [(3)] the defendant‟s assertion of his right, and [(4)] prejudice to the defendant.” Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086, 1090-91 (D.C. 1984) (en banc), partially overruled on other grounds by United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (quoting Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 530). Viewing the record, a balancing of the Barker factors reveals no violation of appellant‟s speedy trial rights. In this case, the information against appellant was filed on March 26, 2012, and the trial court held a hearing on May 24, 2012, to discuss appellant‟s first motion to dismiss. Ward v. United States, 55 A.3d 840, 844 (D.C. 2012) (“[T]he clock starts with „either a formal indictment or information . . .‟ and stops when pre-trial motions hearings commence.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). This constituted approximately two months, which is not generally considered an 13 unreasonable “delay.” See, e.g., Hartridge, supra, 896 A.2d at 208 (“We regard a delay of „a year or more‟ to be prima facie evidence of a speedy trial violation, which creates a presumption of prejudice to the defendant.” (citation omitted)); Graves, supra, 490 A.2d at 1091 & n.7 (“While the 25-month delay was substantial, . . . delays of roughly that length and longer have been countenanced by this court when all factors were considered.”). Nor do any of the other factors weigh in appellant‟s favor. Neither party disputes that appellant properly asserted his right to a speedy trial. Further, the reasons proffered for the continuances indicate that they either aided appellant in his discovery requests, or were granted for otherwise “neutral” or “valid” reasons that do not support or weigh in favor of appellant‟s speedy trial claim. See Diggs v. United States, 28 A.3d 585, 600 (D.C. 2011) (holding that delays for valid or neutral reasons such as difficulties with scheduling and locating witnesses make a Sixth Amendment violation less likely). Finally, appellant presents no evidence to support his claim of prejudice. Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1086 (D.C. 2005), abrogated in part on other grounds by Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (holding that prejudice is assessed in terms of “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired”) (citations omitted). Consequently, there was no violation of appellant‟s speedy trial right. 14
We likewise see no violation of appellant‟s right to call witnesses. “Due process and the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses entitle[s] [a defendant] to call witnesses on his own behalf.” Collins v. United States, 596 A.2d 489, 493 (D.C. 1991) (citations omitted). This right, however, is not without limits, as “the Sixth Amendment does not by its terms grant to a criminal defendant the right to secure the attendance and testimony of any and all witnesses: it guarantees him „compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.‟” United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing U.S. Const., amend. VI). To this end, appellant “must at least make some plausible showing of how [a witness‟s] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” Id. (emphasis added). Appellant cannot show that Fritts‟ testimony would have been favorable, which is fatal to his claim. The only fact that appellant points to in support of his argument that Fritts‟ testimony might have been favorable was that Fritts‟ affidavit left out any mention of appellant “resisting” arrest. However, this omission by itself does not indicate a favorable witness and appellant‟s contrary contention is speculative because Fritts‟ statement indicated that appellant was “creat[ing] a 15 problem,” implying that appellant was nonetheless resisting law enforcement. See Castellon v. United States, 864 A.2d 141, 161 (D.C. 2004) (finding no error in determination not to compel testimony without showing that it was “material and favorable” or could “affect[ ] the judgment of the trial of fact”) (citing ValenzuelaBernal, supra, 458 U.S. at 874). As appellant has not made any meaningful showing of favorability, we need not consider materiality. Because neither appellant‟s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial nor his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses was violated, appellant was not forced to choose between conflicting Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying appellant the relief that he sought.