Opinion ID: 2820096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Sprinkle's Opinion

Text: Generally, [a] treating physician's opinion is given controlling weight if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence. House v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 2007) (quotation and citation omitted). A treating physician's own inconsistency may [] undermine his opinion and diminish or eliminate the weight given his opinions. Hacker v. Barnhart, 459 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2000)). In this case, Dr. Sprinkle's -8- opinion that Milam is unable to work is not only inconsistent with the other substantial evidence, it is also inconsistent with his own treatment and notes. First, Dr. Sprinkle's opinion that Milam may return to work with certain restrictions does not comport with his opinion that Milam could neither stand nor sit for a total of even two hours per workday. His opinion that Milam may return to work does comport, however, with the opinions of three other physicians who independently evaluated Milam's impairments in late 2011 and concluded that she had only moderate limitations. Dr. Strode, for instance, concluded that Milam could stand or walk for approximately six hours per eight-hour workday and could likewise sit for approximately six hours per eight-hour workday. Dr. Thomas agreed with this assessment. Similarly, Dr. Randolph noted that Milam had only moderate limitation in standing, walking, climbing, squatting, lifting and carrying. These medical opinions cast significant doubt on Dr. Sprinkle's opinions, particularly when considered in light of Dr. Sprinkle's own belief that Milam may return to work. Id.; Juszczyk v. Astrue, 542 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ properly discounted a treating physician's opinion when it was inconsistent with his own treatment notes, as well as other medical opinions). Moreover, Milam's regular physical activities further undermine Dr. Sprinkle's opinion that Milam could neither stand nor sit for a total of two hours per workday. Indeed, as Dr. Sprinkle noted on June 3, 2011, Milam has a moderate activity level, her [e]xercise includes walking and weights, and she [e]xercises 3-4 times a week for up to 5 hours per week. Dr. Sprinkle also recommended she continue the home exercise program. In addition to Milam's exercise regimen, Milam regularly cleans her home, cooks for her family, cares for her pets, pays bills, does laundry, drives a car, shops for groceries and clothing, attends church, visits family, plays computer games, watches television, and so forth. Milam even represented in her Function Report that she cleans, cooks, and does laundry for approximately 4 hours per day. To be sure, a claimant's ability to engage in personal activities such as cooking, -9- cleaning, and hobbies does not preclude a finding that the claimant is disabled. Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). In this case, however, Milam's regular activities support the ALJ's discounting of Dr. Sprinkle's opinion given both the extent of [Milam's] daily activities and the independent medical evidence that she was not totally disabled. Ponder v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1190, 1196 (8th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); see also Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 852 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding a denial of disability benefits in part because the claimant engaged in extensive daily activities, such as fixing meals, doing housework, shopping for groceries, and visiting friends). In sum, given Dr. Sprinkle's opinion that Milam could return to work; the opinions of Dr. Strode, Dr. Thomas, and Dr. Randolph; and Milam's regular physical activities, we conclude that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the ALJ's decision to discredit Dr. Sprinkle's opinion.