Opinion ID: 2428106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: denial of second-degree manslaughter instruction

Text: Foster argues reversible error occurred when the trial court refused to instruct the jury on second-degree manslaughter. Appellant admitted during opening statements that she participated in the homicides, but claimed that she was intoxicated. The trial court explained that Foster was not entitled to the lesser-included instruction because [t]here is no evidence of wanton or reckless conduct in this case from which a rational finder of fact could make such a finding. However, the jury was instructed that intoxication would be a complete defense to intentional murder. KRS 501.080 provides that intoxication is a defense to a criminal charge only if the condition negates the existence of an element of the crime. Obviously, one of the essential elements of intentional murder is intent. KRS 507.020(1)(a). In Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a homicide prosecution is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if the evidence would permit a jury to rationally find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater. We have held that an accused is entitled to have the defense of intoxication submitted in instructions to the jury if the evidence is sufficient to indicate that the degree of intoxication was at a level which prevented the forming of the intent necessary under the statute. Parido v. Commonwealth, Ky., 547 S.W.2d 125 (1977); Cf. Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 737 S.W.2d 683, 687 (1987). But we have also stated that the circumstances of voluntary intoxication, standing alone, will never require a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 771 S.W.2d 34, 36 (1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060, 110 S.Ct. 1536, 108 L.Ed.2d 774 (1990). Intoxication is a defense only if there is something in the evidence sufficient to support a doubt that the defendant knew what he was doing. Id. at 36. (Citation omitted.) Lack of sleep or fatigue is not a defense. Id. Neither is a history of past drug and alcohol abuse a defense. The test for the inclusion of a lesser-included instruction on voluntary intoxication is found in Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112, 117-118 (1990): While intoxication may be a defense in a criminal case, it is such only if there is evidence sufficient to support a doubt that the defendant knew what he was doing. In Jewell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 549 S.W.2d 807 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Payne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 867 (1981), it was held that in order to justify such an instruction there must be evidence not only that the defendant was drunk, but that he was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing. Meadows v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 511 (1977). We agree with the trial court that there was no rational basis in the evidence to justify an instruction on second-degree manslaughter. Moreover, in our view, the trial court unnecessarily instructed the jury under this evidence that intoxication could be a complete defense to each count of intentional murder. Logic dictates that if there is sufficient proof to justify an instruction on intoxication as a complete defense to intentional murder, then this evidence would necessarily include proof sufficient to justify instructing on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. This is because it takes a more advanced degree of drunkenness for a complete defense than for establishing a wanton (as contrasted with intentional) state of mind for involuntary manslaughter. But the circumstances surrounding this case did not justify any instruction on intoxication. There were five victims brutally killed over a period of approximately four hours. The victims each were shot at short range (some being contact wounds), stabbed repeatedly, crushed by a car, and in some instances, burned. They were then left for dead at three separate locations throughout the city. Foster and Powell twice went to find additional bullets and once to repair the gun which they had been using to kill the victims. Foster attempted to destroy evidence immediately before and after being arrested. No evidence of drug use on the day of the murders was presented. Foster's alcohol intoxication may have been at a level to support being arrested for public intoxication but still not to a level where she did not know what she was doing. Moore, supra ; Stanford, supra . The trial court did not abuse its discretion.