Opinion ID: 2162437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony of State's DNA Expert

Text: Defendant first asserts that the trial court erred in denying his request for a continuance to obtain an expert to refute certain testimony of the State's DNA expert, Tamara Camp, which was not disclosed to the defense prior to trial. Defendant also asserts that the trial court compounded this error when it refused to allow defendant to reopen his case to present expert testimony on this issue after defendant obtained an expert without the benefit of a continuance. Embedded in these claims is defendant's contention that the State committed a discovery violation at trial which should have been acknowledged and appropriately sanctioned by the trial court. Defendant maintains that these errors amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to due process of law, the right to present a defense, the right to compulsory process, and his right to effective assistance of counsel. The State responds that the trial court's rejection of defendant's discovery-violation argument and its denial of defendant's motion for a continuance and motion to reopen his case were entirely proper because defendant was aware of the evidence in question prior to trial and failed to diligently seek an expert to rebut it. Additionally, the State argues that the evidence that would have been elicited from defendant's expert was properly excluded because it was not material. Before addressing the merits of defendant's claim, we consider the circumstances surrounding Camp's testimony. Camp is a forensic scientist employed by the Du Page County Crime Laboratory, specializing in forensic biology and DNA. Prior to trial, Camp generated a report that was tendered to the defense in discovery. The report indicated that three swabs, labeled 10B1, 10B2, and 10B3, [1] were taken from a piece of ceramic tile. The piece of tile was removed from the bathroom where Erin's body was found, specifically, the area of the bathroom floor just inside the doorway. At trial, Camp explained that an area in the center of the tile contained a very clear ridge impression that was suitable for latent print analysis. That ridge impression was positively identified as defendant's footprint. Directly adjacent to the area containing defendant's footprint was another ridge impression. The second ridge impression was of a lesser visual quality and was less suitable for latent print comparison. However, that area of the tile had turned an intense purple color after being treated with LCV. Swab 10B1 was taken from the intensely purple portion of the tile containing the blurred ridge impression. Camp explained that she swabbed this portion of the tile because the intense purple reaction indicated that more body fluid was located in that area. Also, she wanted to preserve the area of the tile that contained the clear ridge impression for further analysis. Camp's report stated that a limited portion of swab 10B1 was negative to a presumptive test for the presence of blood. However, DNA was extracted from that swab and was consistent with having originated from Erin. Camp did not offer any opinion as to why a portion of the swab was negative for the presence of blood in her report. During her trial testimony, Camp explained that she engages in a multistep process when conducting DNA analysis. First, before beginning DNA analysis, Camp tests a stain to determine whether it is possible blood or semen or saliva or some other body fluid. If a body fluid is detected, the next step is to extract DNA from the body fluid and quantify the amount of DNA that has been extracted. The final step would include a genetic analysis to determine a DNA profile. Within that context, Camp discussed the process she used to evaluate swab 10B1. As stated, swab 10B1 was taken from a portion of tile that contained a blurred ridge impression and was intensely purple in color from having reacted with LCV. The reaction from the LCV test indicated that the area of the tile swabbed was presumptively positive for the presence of blood. Despite the positive LCV test, Camp tested the swab with TMB, a more sensitive and more reliable presumptive test for the presence of blood, as her protocol dictates. The TMB test was negative, indicating that the substance swabbed was not blood. Camp was directly asked by the State why the test was negative. Camp explained, both tests have the same chemical reaction. I would expect that perhaps the leuco crystal violet [LCV] catalyzed all of the hem[oglobin] and therefore there was none left which would be able to react to the TMB test. Camp opined that the substance she swabbed and tested for DNA was apparent blood which is consistent with having originated from Erin Justice. Camp explained that the words apparent blood are used because there is no test available to her that can actually confirm that a substance is blood. Camp was then asked, With respect to the area that LeRoy Keith [expert in latent print identification] used to make his analysis of that ridge detail [footprint on the tile], have you formulated a conclusion? Camp responded that she did not understand the question. The prosecutor then asked, To a reasonable degree of forensic biology, that area that is observed on the tile, what is your conclusion regarding that? Camp replied, Well, it is all one stain. The State then asked, So, the areas where Mr. Keith indicated to you that he used the ridge details to make identification [of defendant's footprint], do you have an opinion as to what that substance is? Camp stated, Again, it's apparent blood which is consistent with having originated from Erin Justice. In sum, despite the negative TMB test, Camp testified that the substance on swab 10B1 was apparent blood. She further testified that the substance swabbed was part of one stain which also contained defendant's footprint. Accordingly, the conclusion to be drawn from Camp's testimony was that defendant's footprint was made with Erin's blood. Despite the negative TMB test, Camp opined that the substance on the portion of the tile containing defendant's footprint was blood because the tile tested positive when treated with LCV. Camp explained, From the first day that I analyzed the tile it was apparent that there was blood on the tile. And after my DNA analysis I concluded that the apparent blood was consistent with having originated from Erin Justice. She acknowledged that the TMB test did generate a positive result on another area of the tile that was previously tested with LCV, which seemed contrary to her opinion that the LCV absorbs all the hemoglobin in the blood, thus causing the TMB test to be negative. The defense began its cross-examination of Camp by asking if she included her opinion that the negative TMB finding could still indicate blood in any of the reports she generated in this case. Camp replied that she had not done so. The defense then asked, You arrived at that opinion after talking to the prosecution in recent days, did you not? Camp replied, Well, not necessarily, no. The State objected and a sidebar was held where the State asserted that defense counsel was well aware    that the results in this examination in total is going to be that this Defendant's footprint was in Erin Justice's blood. We filed numerous documents on that. The State did not have those filings in its immediate possession, but nevertheless asked the trial court to take judicial notice that the information in question had been disclosed. The State also requested that the jury be apprised of the contents of the filings containing the disclosure. The court overruled the objection and cross-examination resumed. Prior to redirect examination, the State reasserted that it previously disclosed Camp's opinion that the substance on the tile was blood. The trial court asked the State to find the relevant document, and a recess was taken. After the recess, the State advised the trial court that it could not find the report where Camp disclosed the information at issue. The State did provide a memorandum of law, attached to its Motion to Declare Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, where the State represented that defendant's footprint was found on a bathroom tile in the victim's blood. However, the State's support for that position was a two-page report authored by LeRoy Keith, the latent print expert. In response, defense counsel orally moved to strike the contested testimony and requested that the State's notice to seek the death penalty be stricken on the basis that the State committed a discovery violation. The trial court denied defendant's motions. On the following day, defendant renewed his motion to strike portions of Camp's testimony and the State's notice to seek the death penalty on discovery violation grounds. The trial court denied these motions, stating: As I see it, it all comes down to the defendant's position that they were unaware of the fact that she would be able to testify or opine that the area where there was a negative presumptive test for blood still was in her opinion blood based on everything else. But in looking at her report there were three swabs all from the same piece of ceramic tile. The first one    was negative to a presumptive test for the presence of blood, portion extracted for DNA. And then there's a second one and a third again a swab from a piece of ceramic tile blood indicated portion extracted for DNA. She testified a number of times that in her opinion it was one stain. And she reiterated that, and the fact that she had a negative presumptive test for blood in one portion, it's reasonable to me that she be allowed to explain why it was negative. And she did that she explained it in her opinion it was negative because of the reaction of the LCV basically used up everything that was there to react when she did her own test. But I don't find that the defense is surprised. They were on notice of the fact that it was identified as a bloody footprint through various experts. Although she was not identified by name, she ought to be able to explain why in her opinion the test was negative. The trial proceeded, but prior to resting his case, defendant requested a continuance so he could confer with an expert regarding Camp's testimony, particularly the portion describing the interaction of the LCV and TMB tests. The trial court denied the request, reiterating its previous finding that the State did not commit a discovery violation because defendant had sufficient knowledge of what Camp's testimony would be. Notably, defendant requested this continuance on Thursday afternoon at 4:53 p.m. The trial court followed a schedule in this case whereby the matter would proceed from Tuesday morning until Friday evening, with Monday off, every week until completion. The proceedings generally concluded at 5 p.m. daily. Defendant requested a continuance on Thursday afternoon until Tuesday morning, which would have amounted to a one-day delay. On Monday, the matter was placed on call and a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury regarding defendant's motion to reopen proofs and present expert testimony. In that motion, defendant stated that Dr. Karl Reich, who holds a degree in molecular biology from the University of California, Los Angeles and Harvard University, was prepared to testify that the TMB test used by Camp is the most sensitive presumptive blood test available; that a negative TMB test strongly suggests that there is no blood in the area tested; and that Camp's testimony that the LCV consumed the reactive blood components, thus confounding the TMB test, was incorrect. The trial court denied the motion, finding once again that no discovery violation occurred and that Camp's testimony was no surprise to the defense. In light of these facts, we consider defendant's claim that the trial court erred by failing to grant his request for a continuance or his motion to reopen proofs. Defendant bases these claims on the underlying assertion that the State committed a discovery violation when it failed to disclose Camp's conclusion that the TMB test produced a false negative. The State maintains that it did not commit a discovery violation because it was not required to disclose Camp's expert opinion. Further, the State asserts that defendant was not surprised by Camp's testimony because defendant knew that the State intended to prove that defendant's bare foot transferred Erin's blood onto the tile and left a footprint. The parties do not dispute the facts giving rise to the alleged discovery violation. Both sides agree that Camp did not include her finding that the TMB test produced a false negative, and did not state her reason for the negative TMB test in her report. Since the issue before us is one of law, we review it de novo. People v. Hood, 213 Ill.2d 244, 256, 290 Ill.Dec. 207, 821 N.E.2d 258 (2004). Disclosure requirements in criminal cases are governed by Supreme Court Rule 412, which provides, in relevant part, that the State shall disclose to defense counsel certain material in its possession or control, including any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the particular case, including the results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons, and a statement of qualifications of the expert. 188 Ill.2d R. 412(a)(iv). Discovery rules are intended to protect the accused against surprise, unfairness, and inadequate preparation. People v. Heard, 187 Ill.2d 36, 63, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d 58 (1999). As the committee comments to Rule 412(a)(iv) explain: [W]ithout the opportunity to examine such evidence prior to trial defense counsel has the very difficult task of rebutting evidence of which he is unaware. In the interest of fairness paragraph (a), subparagraph (iv), requires the disclosure of all such results and reports, whether the result or report is `positive,' or `negative,' and whether or not the State intends to use the report at trial. If the State has the opportunity to view the results of any such examination, the same opportunity should enure to defense counsel. No relevancy limitation is included; the only requirement is that the examination, etc., have been made `in connection with' the case. 134 Ill.2d R. 412(a)(iv), Committee Comments, at 347-48. In this case, Camp authored a report which stated that a limited portion [of the swab of the tile directly adjacent to defendant's footprint] was negative to a presumptive test for the presence of blood. She did not state that the negative result was a false negative and did not include her conclusion that the DNA extracted from that swab came from blood. The State argues that Camp's conclusion was a logical inference from the information she did disclose and maintains that it complied with Rule 412 because it disclosed Camp's report as it was written. We agree with the State that it properly disclosed the report it had in its possession, and we do not suggest that the report was manipulated in any way to exclude relevant information. The fact remains that relevant information was left out of the report, and the information provided was misleading. Camp disclosed the result of a scientific test, but did not disclose the fact that she intended to disregard the result and interpret it to mean the opposite of what was reported. We disagree with the State's assertion that the defense should have logically inferred that Camp would testify in this fashion. There is nothing logical about an expert testifying to a conclusion that stands in complete opposition to the conclusion stated in her own official report. We note that the State has never suggested that it was unaware of Camp's undisclosed conclusion about the TMB test results. The record is clear that Camp did not spontaneously offer this information during her testimony. Her conclusion was elicited from the State through a direct question. Further, when the discovery violation was alleged at trial, the State attempted to show that it had disclosed Camp's conclusion, but was unable to do so. The State argues that under Rule 412, it is not required to reduce every conversation it has with a witness to writing, and emphasizes that Rule 412(a)(iv) only requires disclosure of written reports, not expert opinions. While both of these points are supportable, the fact remains that Rule 412, like all discovery rules, is designed to protect the accused against unfair surprise. Hood, 213 Ill.2d at 258, 290 Ill.Dec. 207, 821 N.E.2d 258; Heard, 187 Ill.2d at 63, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d 58. That protection was not afforded to defendant in this case, as information integral to the defense was not divulged prior to trial. This omission unfairly burdened defense counsel with the difficult task of rebutting evidence of which he [wa]s unaware (134 Ill.2d R. 412(a)(iv), Committee Comments, at 347) and amounted to a violation of the disclosure rule. It is well established that the failure to comply with discovery rules does not require a new trial in every instance. Heard, 187 Ill.2d at 63, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d 58; People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill.2d 163, 172, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970 (1987). A new trial should only be granted if defendant, who bears the burden of proof, demonstrates that he was prejudiced by the discovery violation and the trial court failed to eliminate the prejudice. Cisewski, 118 Ill.2d at 172, 113 Ill. Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970; People v. Robinson, 157 Ill.2d 68, 78, 191 Ill.Dec. 107, 623 N.E.2d 352 (1993). Several factors are considered when determining whether a new trial is warranted, including the closeness of the evidence, the strength of the undisclosed evidence, and the likelihood that prior notice would have helped the defense discredit the evidence. Cisewski, 118 Ill.2d at 172, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970. We also consider the remedies sought by defendant, such as whether defendant requested a continuance, when determining if actual surprise or prejudice existed. Heard, 187 Ill.2d at 63, 240 Ill. Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d 58; Robinson, 157 Ill.2d at 78, 191 Ill.Dec. 107, 623 N.E.2d 352. We conclude that defendant was prejudiced by the State's discovery violation, and that the trial court failed to eliminate the prejudice. The State presented significant circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt, but the lynchpin of the State's case was the evidence of defendant's bare footprint, allegedly made with Erin's blood, on a tile in the bathroom where Erin's body was found. Camp's testimony that the substance swabbed was apparent blood despite the negative TMB test was devastating to defendant. This testimony deprived defendant of the argument that Camp's test results contradicted the test results of the State's other expert, LeRoy Keith, who concluded that the ridge impressions positively identified as defendant's footprint were made on the tile with Erin's blood. If the swab taken in the area directly adjacent to the footprint, which also contained ridge impressions, was negative for the presence of blood, defendant could argue that the ridge impressions identified as his footprint were likewise not made in blood. Camp's statement that the substance swabbed was negative to a presumptive test for the presence of blood provided some support for defendant's argument that the footprint found on the tile was a preexisting print that came in contact with a substance, other than blood, that contained Erin's DNA, such as skin cells or saliva. This argument would have had a basis in the evidence, as Valerie testified that defendant was previously in the bathroom when he changed the showerhead at her request. Further, if defendant were made aware of Camp's conclusion that the TMB test produced a false negative because the LCV used all the hemoglobin in the blood, he could have called an expert to refute this contention during his case in chief, or could have chosen to pursue a different line of defense altogether. Defendant was prejudiced when Camp's conclusions were revealed for the first time at trial. We recognize that defendant was aware that Camp would be called as a State witness long before trial commenced, and there is no indication that the defense attempted to interview Camp prior to trial. In Hood, the defendant alleged that the State presented surprise expert testimony which amounted to a discovery violation. The State disclosed the expert, but did not disclose a certain aspect of the expert's testimony. The defendant never attempted to interview the State's witness prior to trial and did not speak with the witness after trial commenced, even though the trial judge encouraged the defendant to do so and took time out of the trial to facilitate the interview. Also, the defendant did not ask for a continuance to obtain an expert to counter the testimony, but only requested that the testimony be stricken. Hood, 213 Ill.2d at 262, 290 Ill.Dec. 207, 821 N.E.2d 258. This court found that the defendant waived his discovery-violation argument because he elected to forgo reasonable methods available to alleviate the purported prejudice. Hood, 213 Ill.2d at 262-63, 290 Ill.Dec. 207, 821 N.E.2d 258. Similarly, in People v. Shinohara, 375 Ill. App.3d 85, 109, 313 Ill.Dec. 515, 872 N.E.2d 498 (2007), the appellate court concluded that the State committed a discovery violation when it failed to disclose the report of an expert witness, but declined to reverse the defendant's conviction because he knew about the expert and had the opportunity to speak to the expert before trial, but failed to do so. Additionally, the defendant did not seek additional time to prepare or seek a continuance to secure his own expert. Shinohara, 375 Ill.App.3d at 109, 313 Ill.Dec. 515, 872 N.E.2d 498. In this case, defendant sought a continuance to find an expert to refute Camp's surprise testimony. Even when that request was denied, defendant obtained an expert for the next court date and sought to reopen his case to include the expert's testimony. Unlike the defendants in Hood and Shinohara, defendant here made reasonable efforts to alleviate the prejudice created by the State's discovery violation, and his attempts were wrongfully thwarted by the trial court. Recently, in People v. Walker, 232 Ill.2d 113, 125-26, 327 Ill.Dec. 570, 902 N.E.2d 691 (2009), we discussed factors a trial court should consider when entertaining a request for a continuance, including the movant's diligence, the defendant's right to a speedy, fair and impartial trial, the interests of justice, the history of the case, the complexity of the matter, the seriousness of the charges, docket management, judicial economy, and inconvenience to the parties and witnesses. We recognize that the trial court did not find that the State's conduct rose to the level of a discovery violation and, therefore, did not consider whether a continuance should be granted or proofs reopened, in that context. However, we feel compelled to note that there is no good reason why the trial court denied defendant's request for a continuance after Camp's testimony in light of the seriousness of the charge, the complexity of the evidence at issue, and the fact that a short continuance would not have created any hardship to the court, the parties, or the witnesses in this case. For the reasons discussed, we reverse defendant's conviction and death sentence and remand the matter for a new trial. We note that there is no double jeopardy impediment to retrial in this case. Defendant does not assert that the evidence against him was deficient, and our review of the evidence demonstrates that it was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Lopez, 229 Ill.2d 322, 366-67, 323 Ill.Dec. 55, 892 N.E.2d 1047 (2008); People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill.2d 92, 134-35, 313 Ill.Dec. 1, 871 N.E.2d 728 (2007). We make clear, however, that our analysis regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is not binding on retrial. People v. Roberts, 214 Ill.2d 106, 126, 291 Ill.Dec. 674, 824 N.E.2d 250 (2005); People v. Fornear, 176 Ill.2d 523, 535, 224 Ill.Dec. 12, 680 N.E.2d 1383 (1997). Because a new trial is required, we may address additional claims of error that are likely to arise again on remand. People v. Hari, 218 Ill.2d 275, 299, 300 Ill.Dec. 91, 843 N.E.2d 349 (2006); People v. Fuller, 205 Ill.2d 308, 346, 275 Ill.Dec. 755, 793 N.E.2d 526 (2002).