Opinion ID: 2276127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: hollis.

Text: When Jackson was decided, murder was a common law offense and only the penalty was prescribed by statute. KS § 1149 (repealed 1942 Ky. Acts, ch. 208, § 2). Involuntary manslaughter (which now includes the offense of manslaughter in the second degree) was also a common law offense [4] but had no statutorily prescribed penalty, so was thus a misdemeanor punishable only by fine and/or confinement in the county jail. KS § 1127 (repealed 1942 Ky. Acts, ch. 208, § 2); Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 271 Ky. 52, 111 S.W.2d 445, 448 (1937); Spriggs v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 724, 68 S.W. 1087, 1088 (1902). Upon the adoption of the Kentucky Penal Code, effective January 1, 1975, common law offenses were abolished and all offenses, including homicides, were thereafter to be defined by statute. KRS 500.020(1). KRS 507.040 provides, inter alia: (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when he wantonly causes the death of another person including, but not limited to, situations where the death results from the person's: (a) Operation of a motor vehicle. . . . (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the murder statute, KRS 507.020, refers to causing the death of another person. KRS 500.080 has always provided that, [a]s used in the Kentucky Penal Code, `person' means a human being. . . . KRS 500.080(12). Likewise, KRS 507.010, titled Definitions, has always provided: A person is guilty of criminal homicide when he causes the death of another human being under circumstances which constitute murder, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, or reckless homicide. (Emphasis added.) Hollis v. Commonwealth, supra , like Jackson , was a murder case that, like the case sub judice, involved the killing of a proven viable fetus. Because the fetus was killed before it was born alive, Hollis held that a homicide had not been committed. Id. at 64-65. In interpreting KRS 507.020, [5] the plurality opinion in Hollis first inaccurately reported that [t]he statute makes no effort to define the word `person . . . .' Id. at 63. But see KRS 500.080(12) which, by its very language, applies to all penal code offenses, and KRS 507.010. The opinion then reasoned that in the absence of a statutory definition, the General Assembly would be presumed to have intended to retain the common law definition of person, which the opinion then concluded was the born alive rule adopted in Jackson . Hollis, supra, at 63. The concurring opinion in Hollis rejected this flawed statutory construction but nevertheless concluded that the holding in Jackson had survived the abolition of common law homicide offenses. Jackson, supra , had not been overruled when the act was committed by Hollis. I believe he was entitled to rely upon the decisions of this court which had not been repudiated. Id. at 65 (Vance, J., concurring). We do not know why the Hollis plurality chose to ignore the existence of KRS 500.080(12) and KRS 507.010, both of which define person as a human being, and instead employed a common law evidentiary requirement as the definition of person. Remember, Jackson, supra , had not applied the born alive rule as a definition but as the proof required to establish the corpus delicti of the common law offense of murder. Id., 96 S.W.2d at 1014. Perhaps the Hollis plurality had its eye on the definition of human being in the abortion statutes, supra. Although the effective date of KRS 311.720(6) was April 7, 1982 (1982 Ky. Acts, ch. 342, § 2), and Hollis was rendered on March 30, 1983, the offense in Hollis occurred prior to the enactment of the abortion statutes, thus precluding the application of KRS 311.720(6) to that case. See the discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause in Part V, infra. However, the Hollis plurality may have concluded that by construing person instead of human being, it could avoid a potential future argument, such as the one advanced here by the Commonwealth, that KRS 311.720(6) abrogated the common law interpretation applied in Hollis . By construing person instead of human being, the Hollis plurality also may have intended to deflect attention away from the fact that the drafters of the Kentucky Penal Code did not adopt the definition of human being espoused in the Model Penal Code (MPC) i.e., a person who has been born and is alive. MPC § 210.0(1). As noted by the Hollis plurality, 652 S.W.2d at 63, the MPC influenced the drafters of the homicide provisions of the Kentucky Penal Code. See KRS 507.020-.040 (1974 Commentary). [6] See generally Robert G. Lawson, Criminal Law Revision in Kentucky: Part I Homicide and Assault, 58 Ky. L.J. 242 (1969-70). Nevertheless, the drafters did not adopt the MPC's definition of human being which, as suggested by the dissent in Hollis , provides some evidence of a legislative intent not to incorporate the born alive rule into our penal code. Id. at 67 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). Remarkably, the Hollis plurality cited the Comment to the MPC's definition of human being for the proposition that the drafters of the Kentucky Penal Code did intend to retain the born alive rule. Id. at 63 (quoting MPC § 210.1 cmt. 4(c)).