Opinion ID: 1174723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of criminal jury trial as provided by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution

Text: Citing State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981), and State v. Wedge, 293 Or. 598, 652 P.2d 773 (1982), defendant argues that the determination of the amount of damages to be awarded in a restitution hearing is closer to a determination of an element of the crime than to a characterization of the defendant and, therefore, requires a criminal jury trial under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. [5] In State v. Quinn, supra , we stated the fundamental proposition that a criminal defendant is entitled to have all the elements of a crime decided by a jury. For this reason, this court struck down a death penalty statute, ORS 163.116, as unconstitutional. The statute provided that when a defendant was convicted of intentional murder, the judge was to determine whether defendant deliberately committed the homicide. On a finding of deliberateness, and additional findings regarding the character of the defendant, the court was required to impose a sentence of death. If, however, the judge did not find that the homicide was deliberate, a life sentence was to be imposed. In State v. Wedge, supra , we characterized the holding in Quinn as relating to elements of the crime charged. In Wedge, we held that the use or threatened use of a firearm during the commission of a crime is a finding that must be made by the jury: In Quinn we stated as a simple principle that facts which constitute the crime are for the jury and those which characterize the defendant are for the sentencing judge. The application of this simple principle is not always so simple. The present fact to be found describes an act in the commission of the crime which determines the maximum penalty to which the defendant is subject. In order to decide whether a jury determination is required in the present case, one must look beyond this categorization. We also said in Quinn that facts which go to the criminal acts for which a defendant is to be punished must be proved to a jury's satisfaction unless admitted or waived. Quinn, supra, 290 Or. at 406, 623 P.2d 630. The use or threatened use of a firearm is a finding that goes to the criminal act for which this defendant is punished, and thus is closer to an element of the crime than to a characterization of the defendant.    Wedge, 293 Or. at 607, 652 P.2d 773 (emphasis added). In the instant case, defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree which is defined as [i]ntentionally or knowingly caus[ing] serious physical injury to another. ORS 163.175(1)(a). Serious physical injury is defined by ORS 161.015(7) as physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. The seriousness of the injury inflicted by the defendant is an element of the crime of assault, but the monetary amount of the medical and other out-of-pocket expenses associated with the injury is not. The monetary cost of the injury is neither an element of the crime nor an act in the commission of the crime. Wedge, 293 Or. at 406, 652 P.2d 773. Therefore, while the amount of the restitution order might be termed an element of sentencing, it is not an element of the crime of assault. We hold that defendant was not entitled to a criminal jury trial under the Oregon Constitution on the issue of restitution.