Opinion ID: 1309215
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of Stipulation Admitting Identity

Text: For purposes of establishing defendant's identity as the kidnapper and killer of Tina Salazar, the People were prepared to introduce evidence of defendant's conviction of an offense involving the kidnapping in Albany of Michele G., a nine-year-old girl, occurring shortly after the Salazar incident. After receiving an unfavorable ruling from the trial court upholding the limited admissibility of the foregoing offense, defendant and his counsel agreed to stipulate to the issue of identity in order to foreclose the People from introducing at the guilt phase potentially prejudicial evidence regarding the Albany offense. The stipulation read as follows: I, Richard Adams Hovey, acknowledge taking possession of Tina Salazar against her will and driving her from the neighborhood. [¶] I, Richard Adams Hovey, acknowledge doing the act which caused injuries which ultimately lead [ sic ] to the death of Tina Salazar. Before accepting the stipulation, the trial court extensively examined defendant and his counsel regarding the scope and effect of the admissions contained therein, observing that although it would preclude the People from introducing any similar offenses, such as the Michele G. conviction, during the guilt phase of the trial, the stipulation also would incriminate defendant in two very serious crimes (i.e., murder and kidnapping), and would conclusively establish the issue of identity. The trial judge determined that defendant both understood the nature of the stipulation and realized that he was waiving certain constitutional rights by agreeing to its contents, including the right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury determination of the identity issue, and the right to confront witnesses on that issue. Defendant explained that My lawyer has advised me that it's a good course to follow and I agree with it. (11a) Defendant now contends that the court failed adequately to explain to him the potential penal consequences of the stipulation, namely, that he was in effect admitting to second degree murder, which would justify imposition of a prison term. (12) We have held that before a defendant may admit a prior conviction ( In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 [112 Cal. Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561]), submit a case on the preliminary hearing transcript ( Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 604 [119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086]), or stipulate to ex-felon status ( People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826]), the court should assure that the defendant is aware of the nature and consequences of his actions. (See also In re Birch (1973) 10 Cal.3d 314, 321-322 [110 Cal. Rptr. 212, 515 P.2d 12] [guilty plea invalid where defendant not advised of sex registration requirement accompanying conviction].) (11b) We reject defendant's argument. First, his stipulation was not the legal equivalent of a guilty plea or other admission which necessarily would have definite penal consequences. The stipulation admitted his identity as the offender, but did not purport to deprive defendant of any affirmative defenses he might have, such as diminished capacity, insanity, lack of premeditation, deliberation or malice, killing upon provocation or heat of passion, or even an accidental killing. Although the stipulation came close to admitting that a felony-murder took place (a killing during the commission of a kidnapping), it was probably legally insufficient by itself to establish each of the technical legal requirements for either the offense of kidnapping or murder. At most, the stipulation relieved the prosecution of the burden of establishing that defendant was the person who abducted and killed Tina Salazar. The People were still required to prove (and in fact did prove) the essential legal elements of the various offenses with which defendant was charged. Defendant states that Even if appellant's stipulation was not technically an admission of second degree murder, it was certainly an admission of conduct subjecting him to serious criminal liability, and it required a knowing and voluntary waiver. We think that the trial court adequately advised defendant of the consequences of the stipulation by telling him that you will be incriminating yourself in two very serious crimes and lessening the burden of the district attorney of proving those particular elements. Defendant's response, I understand, undoubtedly included a realization that, having admitted taking and killing Tina, he faced a probable prison sentence (and possible death sentence). We decline to hold that the trial court in a capital case commits reversible error by failing to tell the defendant that his admission of committing a kidnapping and homicide might have serious penal consequences. (13a) In a supplemental brief, defendant raises the further contention that the stipulation was void because it was induced by the trial court's erroneous ruling that evidence of defendant's commission of a similar offense (the kidnapping of Michele G. in Albany) would be admissible for the limited issue of identity. The contention is without merit. First, although the parties have not cited pertinent authority, it is arguable that defendant waived the right to attack his stipulation on this basis, having voluntarily accepted it without attempting to reserve the right subsequently to challenge it as the tainted product of the trial court's erroneous ruling regarding the admissibility of the Michele G. evidence. (14) In a closely analogous situation, we have ruled that if a defendant wishes to preserve for appeal his claim of improper impeachment by a prior conviction, he must take the stand and actually suffer such impeachment. ( People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 383-388 [228 Cal. Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173]; see Luce v. United States (1984) 469 U.S. 38 [83 L.Ed.2d 443, 105 S.Ct. 460].) (13b) Here, rather than testify subject to such impeachment, defendant chose to stipulate to his identity as Tina's assailant. [4] His decision to do so arguably waived his right to raise the admissibility issue on appeal. On the merits, a close question is presented whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that evidence of the Michele G. incident would be admissible on the issue of identity. The People acknowledge that such other crimes evidence is admissible only where there exist common marks which, considered singly or in combination, support the strong inference that the current crime bears [defendant's] signature. ( People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 632.) But the People point to 23 common marks which they claim support the trial court's ruling. The areas of similarity include the fact that both incidents occurred in Alameda County; both victims were Caucasian female children between the ages of eight and nine; both victims were walking home alone near a public school in their own neighborhood when abducted from the sidewalk and dragged into their assailant's car; both victims were tied hand and foot and their heads covered by a piece of cloth to hide their eyes; both victims' hands were tied in front of their bodies; both victims were driven from a public street to a more secluded area and, after being observed by third persons, both victims were thrown from the car with their hands and feet still bound. Finally, although the kidnapper did not remove his victims' clothes, some evidence was admitted indicating that he molested each girl. (Michele G. testified that defendant forced her to hold his penis; cellmate Donald Lee reported that defendant admitted playing with Tina Salazar and feeling her body.) On the other hand, defendant correctly observes that several of these common marks are likewise common to a substantial portion of the population of child molesters. ( Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 633.) Many child abductors who commit violent sex crimes against children attempt to conceal their identities and control their victims by blindfolding and binding them. If such an assailant is observed while his victim remains in the vehicle, it is logical to expect him to eject the still bound victim and attempt to escape. In addition, the two crimes bore some substantial dissimilarities, such as the materials used to bind the victims' hands, and the fact that Michele G. was released unharmed. Thus, the question whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling the Michele G. incident admissible is close. We conclude, however, that under the circumstances here any possible error in that ruling was harmless. In addition to defendant's stipulation, defendant's identity as Tina's killer was amply established by the other evidence in the case, including the testimony of witnesses Anderson and Irons and defendant's cellmates Lee and Hughes.