Opinion ID: 4543548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This court’s decision in Walker v. Toledo

Text: {¶ 10} First, Toledo argues that this court has already ruled in Walker v. Toledo, 143 Ohio St.3d 420, 2014-Ohio-5461, 39 N.E.3d 474, that R.C. 1901.20 contains no language barring Toledo from implementing its own civil administrative-enforcement system under its home-rule authority. But our holding in Walker was made in the context of a different statutory scheme and is no longer applicable. {¶ 11} The version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) that was in effect at the time of our Walker decision did not give municipal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving traffic-camera citations. Id. at ¶ 1-3. The previous version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) stated: “The municipal court has jurisdiction of the violation of any ordinance of any municipal corporation within its territory   .” Am.Sub.S.B. No. 98, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7357. We held that “any” did not mean the same thing as “exclusive,” and that the statute could therefore not be read as conferring exclusive jurisdiction over civil traffic-law violations on municipal 4 January Term, 2020 courts. Id. at ¶ 25. But as amended by H.B. 62 in 2019, R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) now states that municipal courts have “exclusive jurisdiction over every civil action concerning a violation of a state traffic law or a municipal traffic ordinance.” (Emphasis added). The current version of R.C. 1901.20(A)(1) clearly and unambiguously reserves for municipal courts exclusive authority to adjudicate every civil traffic-law violation. And that statutory grant of jurisdiction “cannot be impaired or restricted by any municipal charter or ordinance provision.” Cupps v. Toledo, 170 Ohio St. 144, 151, 163 N.E.2d 384 (1959).