Opinion ID: 866146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Ralph moved for a judgment of acquittal on all of the charges against him under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court denied Ralph's motion, and he appeals from that ruling. We review a challenge based on insufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. United States v. Rodríguez–Vélez, 597 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2010). We give equal weight to direct and -6- circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Ortiz, 447 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 2006). The inquiry focuses on whether 'a rational jury could have found that the government proved each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' United States v. Mardirosian, 602 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1173 (1st Cir. 1993)). We begin with Ralph's arguments as to the substantive wire fraud counts before turning to his conviction on the conspiracy count.
The elements of a wire fraud conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 are: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud using false or fraudulent pretenses; (2) the defendant's knowing and willing participation in the scheme or artifice with the intent to defraud; and (3) the use of the interstate wires in furtherance of the scheme. See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1011 (1st Cir. 1993). The false or fraudulent representation must be material. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999); United States v. Blastos, 258 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2001).
Transaction) Counts Two and Three arose from Ralph's participation in the sale of the East Third Street property to Ralph's mother-inlaw, Clemendore. Appellant's challenge to these counts concerns the materiality of his misrepresentations. A material statement -7- has a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed. Neder, 527 U.S. at 16 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). The government need not prove that the decisionmaker actually relied on the falsehood or that the falsehood led to actual damages. See id. at 24-25 (The common-law requirements of justifiable reliance and damages . . . plainly have no place in the federal fraud statutes. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the misrepresentations at issue were contained in the mortgage application Ralph prepared and submitted to Long Beach Mortgage. Ralph observes that the government presented no evidence regarding Long Beach Mortgage's loan evaluation process, in contrast to the Washington Street transaction, where the government presented witness testimony from a WMC Mortgage representative who spoke about the types of factors that company used when evaluating an application. Without any information regarding the types of information that Long Beach found relevant in deciding whether to approve a loan, Ralph argues, the government could not establish that any of the misrepresentations on the application were factors in the company's decisionmaking. The record defeats this contention. The Long Beach loan file for the Third Street transaction included application forms -8- that specifically sought information regarding the purchaser's income, assets, and intent to reside in the property, all of which were designed to assess the borrower's creditworthiness. Cf. United States v. Kenrick, 221 F.3d 19, 32 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating, in context of bank fraud conviction, that misrepresentation about a borrower's creditworthiness can certainly be a material falsehood that supports a []conviction). Ralph provided responses to these requests that the trial testimony established as untrue, including a verification of Clemendore's rent, information regarding her employment, and an occupancy agreement that certified her intent to live at the Third Street residence. The fact that Long Beach's loan application explicitly sought this information from the applicant indicates that Clemendore's responses were capable of influencing its decision. Moreover, the government adduced other evidence regarding the types of information material to Long Beach's decisionmaking process. Specifically, the government called Diane Taylor, a representative of WMC Mortgage, the lender for the Washington Street transaction, to testify about WMC Mortgage's practices. Although Taylor could not speak to Long Beach's lending protocols, she testified about a range of criteria relevant to WMC Mortgage's lending decisions, including information regarding income and employment, assets, and residence at the purchased property. As noted above, Long Beach's mortgage application requested the same -9- information. Indeed, the trial testimony establishes that the loan file for the Third Street transaction contained loan applications substantially similar to WMC Mortgage's applications, strongly supporting the inference that the two mortgage companies used the same types of information in assessing mortgage applications. A reasonable jury could thus rely on Taylor's testimony, combined with the similarity between Long Beach's and WMC Mortgage's loan applications, to conclude that Long Beach would have considered the same types of factors in assessing Clemendore's loan application. In light of all this evidence, it is of no moment that the government did not introduce testimony from a Long Beach representative regarding the specific types of information it found material. This challenge therefore fails.
Transaction) Counts Six and Seven concerned Ralph's engagement with the Washington Street property transaction, and he asserts two main challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting these convictions. First, he argues that the government failed to present evidence that Ralph knew the representations on the loan application were false or misleading. Ralph relies heavily on the notion that Robinson, the property's purchaser, dealt primarily with Ernst. The government introduced other evidence demonstrating Ralph's interactions with Robinson, however, including Robinson's testimony that he spoke with Ralph regarding the transaction on at -10- least one occasion, and that Ralph was present briefly at the closing. Additionally, another conspirator testified that Robinson came to the office multiple times looking for Ralph, and witnessed Ralph, Ernst, and Robinson meeting at the office on at least one occasion. These facts establish that Robinson had at least some interaction with Ralph regarding the loan transaction. Moreover, testimony from one of Lindley's employees established that Ralph acted as the broker representative on the transaction, and that he put his name on a number of fax transmissions with Lindley's office. Ralph also listed himself as the interviewer on the loan applications that contained the false statements, as well as other forms related to the transaction. The false verification of rent from the lender file listed Ralph as the requesting party and gave New England Merchants' address as the location of Robinson's landlord.3 This compilation of evidence gives rise to the reasonable inference not only that Ralph was an active participant in the transaction, but also that he participated with the specific intent to defraud. See United States v. Alfonzo–Reyes, 592 F.3d 280, 291 (1st Cir. 2010) (Direct evidence is not required to find [a defendant] guilty, and juries are entitled to draw reasonable inferences at trial based on circumstantial evidence.). These 3 Some of the documents described above have not been made part of the record on appeal. We thus rely on the government's descriptions of them, which appellant has not disputed in any way. -11- facts, joined with Ralph's general awareness of the mechanics of appellants' scheme, Daniel Appolon, 695 F.3d at 59, are more than sufficient to meet the government's burden. Ralph's second contention is similarly unavailing. He posits that New England Merchants' offices permitted any employee to use the computer system to generate and transmit forms, thus making it possible that his brother Ernst or some other employee forged Ralph's signature and engaged in the inculpatory wire communications. But Ralph's ability to construct an alternative (and rather speculative) reading of the evidence does not invalidate the jury's conclusion. We ask only whether a rational fact finder could find that the government proved the essential elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Marin, 523 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2008). As we have explained, the record bears more than sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion. More fundamentally, a wire fraud conviction does not require that Ralph have had any personal involvement in initiating the wire transfers; instead, the use of the wires need only have been 'a reasonably foreseeable part of the scheme in which he participated.' United States v. Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Sawyer, 85 F.3d at 723 n.6). The evidence described above, particularly Ralph's signatures on the transmitted documents, his interactions with WMC Mortgage, and his awareness of the general contours of the fraudulent scheme, was sufficient to -12- demonstrate that he should have foreseen the use of wire transmissions as a result of his involvement in the Washington Street transaction. For these reasons, Ralph's conviction on Counts Six and Seven must stand.
To sustain a conviction of conspiracy, the government must prove that 1) the defendant agreed to commit an unlawful act, 2) the defendant voluntarily participated in the scheme, and 3) one of the conspirators took an affirmative step toward achieving the conspiracy's purpose. Cassiere, 4 F.3d at 1015. The defendant must have both intended to make the agreement as well as intended to commit the substantive offense. See United States v. Gonzalez, 570 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2009). Where the indictment alleges a conspiracy to commit multiple offenses, the charge may be sustained by sufficient evidence of conspiracy to commit any one of the offenses. United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 46 (1st Cir. 2007). Ralph claims that the government failed to prove the existence of an agreement among the conspirators. An agreement is not proven by demonstrating 'mere knowledge of an illegal activity . . . , let alone [] mere association with other conspirators or mere presence at the scene of the conspiratorial deeds.' United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 115 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting -13- United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 1991)). Rather, the government must prove the existence of an agreement or understanding as to each defendant. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073, 1079 (1st Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). [C]onspiratorial agreement need not be express so long as its existence can plausibly be inferred from the defendants' words and actions and the interdependence of activities and persons involved. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 241–42 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d at 45-46. As the discussion regarding the substantive wire fraud counts shows, the record is replete with evidence evincing Ralph's agreement to commit unlawful acts. He made numerous admissions to an FBI special agent regarding the Third Street transaction, including that he agreed to purchase the property in his mother-inlaw's name and that he prepared loan applications that he submitted to the mortgage company. These admissions are supported by volumes of documentary evidence and testimony establishing the falsity of the statements contained in the applications that Ralph prepared. Similar evidence shows his agreement to participate in the Washington Street scheme, including testimony showing that Ralph met with Ernst and Robinson on at least one occasion and appended his name to a number of documents relevant to the transaction. Ralph's engagement with the scheme rose far beyond simple association with the conspirators. United States v. -14- Pérez-González, 445 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir. 2006). His conduct demonstrates both his intent to engage in a common scheme and specific acts in furtherance of that scheme. Thus, there is no reason to disturb the jury's verdict.4