Opinion ID: 1924588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Appropriateness of an Unarmed Instruction

Text: Appellant contends that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury instruction on unarmed voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, and that the trial court therefore erred in refusing to give one. [23] His argument on this point is threefold. First, with regard to the back wound, appellant asserts that he did not intend to use the knife, and that for this reason the jury should have been given an unarmed instruction. Next, he maintains that [t]he jury could have rationally found that the [chest wound] was in self-defense and, thus, could have looked solely to the [back wound] to find [him] guilty of unarmed voluntary manslaughter. Finally, appellant claims that the fact that the jury acquitted [him] of the offense of carrying a deadly weapon shows that the jury should have been given an unarmed instruction. This court has repeatedly said that [a] defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction when (1) all elements of the lesser offense are included within the offense charged, and (2) there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the lesser charge. Rease v. United States, 403 A.2d 322, 328 (D.C.1979) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Leak v. United States, 757 A.2d 739, 740 (D.C.2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1054, 122 S.Ct. 644, 151 L.Ed.2d 562 (2001). Appellant's claim of error focuses only on the evidentiary requirement, i.e., the second element under Rease. [24] Generally, the court is not required to give a lesser-included offense instruction unless proof of the greater offense will require the jury to find a disputed fact that need not be found to prove the lesser charge. Rease, 403 A.2d at 328-329 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Lampkins v. United States, 515 A.2d 428, 432 (D.C.1986). Stated another way, [t]he requirement of a sufficient evidentiary basis can be met by a showing that (1) `there is conflicting testimony on the factual issue,' or (2) the lesser-included offense is fairly inferable from the evidence, including a reconstruction of the events gained by accepting all or some of the testimony of some or all [of the] witnesses. Boykins v. United States, 702 A.2d 1242, 1250 (D.C.1997) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 388 A.2d 1210, 1213 (D.C.1978)); see also, e.g., Leak, 757 A.2d at 740. We have emphasized that any evidence, however weak, will satisfy this requirement. Rease, 403 A.2d at 329 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord, e.g., Rouse v. United States, 402 A.2d 1218, 1221 (D.C.1979) ([t]he evidentiary requirement is minimal (citation omitted)). The lesser included instruction, however, is only required where . . . `a jury could rationally convict on the lesser included offense.' Leak, 757 A.2d at 740 (quoting Bright v. United States, 698 A.2d 450, 457 (D.C.1997)). [W]here a verdict on the lesser included offense would be irrational, or require the jury to undertake a `bizarre reconstruction of the evidence,' the instruction is not warranted. Boykins, 702 A.2d at 1250 (citation omitted); see also Bright, 698 A.2d at 458 (lesser included offense instruction is not required when the jury would have to disregard the government's evidence and engage in conjecture regarding why and how the [crime] occurred). With these principles in mind, we turn to appellant's individual arguments.
Appellant contends, first, that the trial court should have given an unarmed instruction because his own testimony showed that he did not knowingly and deliberately use Baylor's knife to commit a crime. [25] He asserts in his brief that the jury could have reasonably concluded that, while [he] did commit voluntary manslaughter by acting in conscious disregard of an extreme risk to Baylor's safety by twisting her arm behind her back while she was carrying a knife, he did not deliberately use the knife to cause her death. Essentially, appellant is arguing that there was evidence that he did not have the intent required under the while armed statute, D.C.Code § 22-4502(a) (2001), [26] and that the trial court should have therefore given the jury an unarmed instruction. Appellant bases his argument on the trial court's definition of readily available, which informed the jury that it necessarily must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the weapon was under his physical control for at least a moment and that he then knowingly and deliberately used it to commit the crime (emphasis added). Appellant's argument fails because intent is not an element that needs to be proved under section 22-4502(a). [27] Section 22-4502(a) is considered an enhancement provision and does not define a separate criminal offense. See Hager v. United States, 791 A.2d 911, 914-915 (D.C.2002); Thomas v. United States, 602 A.2d 647, 650-651 (D.C.1992). As an enhancement provision, it does not require the use of or the intent to use a weapon in the commission of [a violent crime]; it requires mere availability of a weapon. Washington v. United States, 366 A.2d 457, 461 (D.C.1976) (emphasis in original). All that the government had to prove to meet the requirements of 22-4502(a) in this case was that (1) the defendant committed a violent or dangerous crime, and (2) the weapon was (at least) readily available to him during the commission of that crime. Jamison v. United States, 670 A.2d 373, 375 (D.C.1996) (emphasis in original) [28] Any discussion of intent would involve only the underlying criminal offense; whether or not the knife was readily available to appellant does not depend on his intent. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, as we must, see, e.g., Minor v. United States, 623 A.2d 1182, 1185 (D.C.1993), we hold that appellant's testimony that he did not intend to stab Baylor in the back did not entitle him to an unarmed instruction. To convict him of armed voluntary manslaughter, it was enough for the jury to findas the trial court partially instructed itthat the weapon was under his physical control for at least a moment. [29]
Appellant's second argument in support of his claim that an unarmed instruction should have been given has two parts. First, he asserts that the jury could have viewed the infliction of the (second) chest wound as self-defense and, on the basis of Dr. Lee's testimony, [30] could also have found that it did not cause Baylor's death, and . . . accordingly disregarded it for purposes of determining the level of [his] culpability. Second, appellant proposes that [o]nce the jury decided not to impose homicide liability for the second stabbing, it could find [him] guilty of unarmed voluntary manslaughter based solely on the first stabbing. Initially, we regard this two-part argument as an attempt to draw attention away from appellant's testimony that he used the knife to stab Baylor in the chest, which clearly defeats any argument for an unarmed instruction in connection with the chest wound. As the trial court correctly observed, even crediting fully the defendant's version of what happened, he used the knife to stick her [in the chest]. The first part of the argument is unpersuasive because the jury, given appellant's testimonial admission that he stabbed Baylor in the chest, had only two options with regard to that chest wound: (1) to find that appellant acted in self-defense, and was therefore not criminally culpable for the chest wound, or (2) to find that appellant committed an armed offense. There was simply no rational way to view the evidence relating to the chest wound so as to enable the jury to find appellant guilty of an unarmed offense. On the other hand, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant did not act in self-defense when he stabbed Baylor in the chest. [31] See, e.g., Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C. 2000) (it is the jury's province to resolve questions of credibility and to make reasonable inferences from the evidence (citations omitted)). Furthermore, Dr. Lee initially testified that the autopsy report listed both wounds as the cause of death, and it was only after a follow-up question from the government that she said either wound alone could been fatal. As a result, the jury was presented with three options for the cause of death: (1) the back wound, (2) the chest wound, or (3) both wounds. We simply cannot say that the jury must or should have found that the back wound was the sole cause of death and that the chest wound did not contribute to Baylor's death, as appellant suggests. The evidence supported any combination of these three options, and there was simply no basis for the jury to ignore the strong likelihood that the chest wound was the fatal one. Moreover, appellant's argument is flawed because it is based on the trial court's erroneous definition of readily available. As we have observed, supra note 22, the trial court incorrectly added an intent element to the definition (while correctly pointing out that it required proof that appellant had control of the knife for at least a moment). Intent is not an element of availability, and D.C.Code § 22-4502(a) does not require proof of an intent to use a weapon in the commission of the underlying crime. See Jamison, 670 A.2d at 374; Washington, 366 A.2d at 461. Therefore, even if the jury believed that appellant acted in self-defense when he stabbed Baylor in the chest and that the back wound was the sole cause of death, appellant's argument would still fail because his asserted lack of intent for the back wound does not negate the factestablished in part by his own testimonythat the knife was readily available to him when that wound was inflicted.
Appellant's final argument on this point also has two parts. First, he contends that the jury's finding that he was not guilty of CDW shows that the court should have given an unarmed instruction. Second, he asserts that the jury rendered impermissibly inconsistent verdicts when it found him guilty of VMWA and acquitted him of CDW. Both arguments are unpersuasive. The jury's decision to acquit appellant on the charge of CDW does not establish either that an unarmed instruction should have been given or that the verdicts were inconsistent. As a sentencing enhancement provision, [section 22-4502] does not comprise a criminal offense in and of itself. Rather, its application is dependent upon a conviction of the underlying offense. Thomas, 602 A.2d at 650. CDW, on the other hand, is a criminal offense in and of itself, and it requires that the government prove that a defendant actually carried a weapon. Reed v. United States, 828 A.2d 159, 162 (D.C.2003) (To obtain a conviction [of CDW] when the weapon in question is a knife, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the defendant carried the knife either openly or concealed, (2) that the defendant had the general intent to do the acts constituting the carrying of the knife, and (3) that the purpose of carrying the knife was its use as a dangerous weapon. (citation omitted)). In this case there was evidence that appellant did not carry the knife to the scene of the argument but that the knife was readily available during his struggle with Baylor. Thus the jury could rationally have concluded that although he did not meet the requirements for CDW, he did have the knife readily available in connection with the offense of VMWA.
On the record before us, we think that an unarmed instruction in this case would have been irrational, or [would have] require[d] the jury to undertake a `bizarre reconstruction of the evidence.' Leak, 757 A.2d at 740 (citations omitted); see Shuler v. United States, 677 A.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C.1996) (the court is `not required to put the case to the jury on a basis that essentially indulges and even encourages speculations as to bizarre reconstruction' (citation omitted)); Price, supra note 25, 602 A.2d at 644 (a lesser included offense instruction is not required if a finding to the contrary on the only evidence at issue would be irrational (citation omitted)); Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1216 (D.C.1988) (lesser included instruction is not appropriate where mental gymnastics are required (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 814, 102 L.Ed.2d 803 (1989). The homicide charged in this case could not have been committed while unarmed, because the evidence conclusively established that the victim died of one or two stab wounds caused by a knife. There was no alternative evidence regarding the cause of death. See Lampkins, 515 A.2d at 432 (when undisputed facts [are] capable of only one inference . . . no lesser-charge instruction [would] be proper, let alone required (citation omitted)). Therefore, if the jury did not believe appellant's claim of self-defense, the only rational conclusion that it could have reached was that appellant was guilty of an armed offense. A person cannot be stabbed unless the stabber has a weapon of some kinda knife, dagger, stiletto, ice pick, or even an icicle. As a matter of logic (and physics), there can be no such thing as an unarmed stabbing.