Opinion ID: 1579159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of the Vagueness Challenge.

Text: Because the district court's decision may cast a cloud over the local ordinance defining a nuisance to include an incomplete structure, we also review the merits of that determination. We have recognized that a civil statute is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause when its language does not convey a sufficiently definite warning of the proscribed conduct. Knepper v. Monticello State Bank, 450 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Iowa 1990); Pottawattamie County v. Iowa Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 272 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1978). We articulated the legal test for vagueness in Knight v. Iowa District Court, 269 N.W.2d 430 (Iowa 1978), in which we concluded: If the statute's meaning is fairly ascertainable by reliance on generally accepted and common meaning of words used, or by reference to the dictionary, related or similar statutes, the common law or previous judicial constructions, due process is satisfied. Knight, 269 N.W.2d at 432 (citations omitted). A presumption of constitutionality exists that must be overcome by negating every reasonable basis on which the statute can be sustained. Knepper, 450 N.W.2d at 838. Literal exactitude or precision is not required. Id. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a key word has not been specifically defined. Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Goettsch, 403 N.W.2d 772, 773 (Iowa 1987). In determining that the ordinance under consideration was void for vagueness, the district court focused on the ordinance provisions proscribing the maintaining of an incomplete structure. The court stated: If one builds a structure, one must necessarily maintain the structure during the construction period. Although the right to build a structure may not rise to the constitutional level of free speech, it is a right that may not be unreasonably burdened by statute or ordinance. The City argues that an incomplete structure is not considered to be a nuisance unless it is maintained in an incomplete state. Plaintiffs, the City contends, have maintained their incomplete house for years, often making little progress for a year at a time. While such contention may be true, the ordinance offers no guidance as to the extent of progress necessary to avoid application of the sanctions. As we have previously noted, a statute's meaning is not considered to be vague if it is fairly ascertainable from previous judicial constructions. We believe the same thing is true with regard to administrative interpretations. We are satisfied that in situations of this kind the requirements for avoiding the violation will necessarily be brought to the attention of the building owner by those persons administering the local building code. In the present case, that administrative interpretation was buttressed by a judicial interpretation as the proceedings went along. Given the history of events in the present case over a period of more than five years, including many appearances before the court in which the defendants requested additional time to comply with the local building codes, we are convinced that the deficiencies required to be corrected were adequately called to the defendant's attention. Persons who engage in some conduct that is clearly prescribed by an ordinance as interpreted in a judicial proceeding cannot complain of vagueness as applied to other conduct. Knepper, 450 N.W.2d at 839. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court must be reversed. REVERSED. All justices concur except WIGGINS, J., who takes no part.