Opinion ID: 2618245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 49

Heading: Instructions on Diminished Capacity, Voluntary Intoxication, and Lesser Included Offenses

Text: (57a) Defendants contend the trial court erroneously failed to instruct, sua sponte, on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, as well as the defenses of diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication. [28] In support, they point to evidence adduced at trial indicating both Reilly and Hardy drank beer and snorted cocaine the night of the murders. (They apparently used a beer bong, described as a funnel-type device which enables the user to pour beer directly down his throat and into his stomach.) Even if we assume there was sufficient evidence to support such instructions, we reject the contention because the record reveals defendants' trial attorneys each made a tactical decision to forgo these instructions because they were inconsistent with the defense on which defendants relied. [29] (58, 59)(See fn. 30.) During trial, counsel met in chambers with the trial judge to discuss jury instructions for the guilt phase. [30] (57b) During these discussions, neither Lasting nor Demby requested instructions on either diminished capacity or voluntary intoxication, or on the lesser forms of criminal homicide (second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter) that could result should the jury be convinced defendants acted without the requisite criminal intent because of their intoxication. Both attorneys conceded that the defenses of diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication were inconsistent with the defenses on which their clients relied. At this same in-chambers conference, according to the settled statement, Mr. Lasting was thinking about what instructions should be given to the jury, [and] he wanted the jury to be instructed in accordance with his theory of the case. Mr. Lasting did not think it would be the most effective way to argue the case to argue inconsistent defenses to the jury. He made a tactical decision in this respect.  (Italics added.) Finally, During the in-chambers discussions on guilt phase jury instructions, it was agreed between Judge Fratianne, Mr. Lasting and Mr. Demby that no jury instructions would be given on diminished capacity [or] voluntary intoxication. (60) The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present and there is evidence that would justify a conviction of such a lesser offense. ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 827.) A trial court need not deliver the instruction, however, where a defendant expresses a deliberate tactical purpose for objecting to the instruction. ( Ibid.; People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 182-183 [276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169].) (57c) The record clearly shows such a waiver as to Reilly, whose counsel unequivocally indicated that he did not want instructions on diminished capacity or voluntary intoxication because those defenses were inconsistent with Reilly's proffered defense in the guilt phase. Reilly argues the settled statement merely shows Lasting acquiesced to the omission of the additional instructions, but does not show he actually objected to them. Such a rigid requirement would elevate form over substance. The record, fairly read, reveals that Lasting debated the issue and decided he did not want the instructions on lesser included offenses, explaining the tactical reason for his position. As we stated in People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 229 [207 Cal. Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]: Here defense counsel's actions taken as a whole ... show that his lack of objection to the proposed instruction was more than mere unconsidered acquiescence. Contrary to Reilly's argument, this is not a case where counsel silently accepted the decision to omit the instruction. Although the evidence of Demby's purpose in objecting to the instructions is less straightforward, we nevertheless reach the same conclusion with regard to Hardy. The settled statement reveals that at the conference in chambers, Judge Fratianne and Demby agreed that no jury instructions would be given on diminished capacity [or] voluntary intoxication. Because the pros and cons of whether to give the disputed instructions had just been thoroughly discussed by all parties present (Judge Fratianne, Demby, and particularly Lasting), we conclude Demby's acquiescence to the omission of the instructions indicated his agreement with Lasting's tactical assessment of the situation. Under the circumstances, we are confident that Demby's agreement to the omission of the instructions was for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) Defendants also argue that despite counsels' objections, Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625 [65 L.Ed.2d 392, 100 S.Ct. 2382] nevertheless required the trial court to give lesser included offense instructions. Beck is distinguishable, however, because it involved an Alabama statute that prohibited lesser included offense instructions in capital cases. Moreover, Beck does not prohibit a criminal defendant from choosing to forgo such instructions for strategic reasons, as was the case here. ( U.S. v. Lopez Andino (1st Cir.1987) 831 F.2d 1164, 1171, cert. den. 486 U.S. 1034 [100 L.Ed.2d 605, 108 S.Ct. 2018]; Look v. Amaral (1st Cir.1984) 725 F.2d 4, 9.) Although Reilly did not personally waive his right to the instructions on lesser included offenses, such a personal waiver was not required. ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 827.) Reilly argues Cooper did not address the question in the capital-case context as a matter of federal law. Cooper, however, was a capital case. On this record, we conclude both Reilly and Hardy expressed a deliberate, tactical decision to forgo jury instructions on diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication. As a result, they waived their right to have the trial court deliver such instructions to the jury. In addition, because the only way the jury could convict defendants of second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter was to find their intoxication negated the formation of either express malice, premeditation, or an awareness that their acts involved a high degree of probability that death would result, we also find the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury as to these crimes. Finally, we find no violation of defendants' constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.