Opinion ID: 2538196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Interpretation of the 10-20-Life Statute

Text: Questions of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 194 (Fla.2007). A court's purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction. Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008). As with any case of statutory construction, [the Court must begin] with the `actual language used in the statute.' Heart of Adoptions, Inc., 963 So.2d at 198 (quoting Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla.2006)). This is because legislative intent is determined primarily from the statute's text. Id. This Court has explained: [W]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning ... the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Further, we are without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power. A related principle is that when a court interprets a statute, it must give full effect to all statutory provisions. Courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. Velez v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Police Dep't, 934 So.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Fla.2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Section 775.082(3)(b), which is in the general sentencing statute, provides the maximum sentence for a first-degree felony: For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 30 years or, when specifically provided by statute, by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment. However, section 775.087(2)(a)(3) clearly states: [T]he convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison. Section 775.087(2)(c) makes reference to section 775.082 and states that the mandatory minimum, when it exceeds the statutory maximum, must be imposed. In resolving any perceived conflict between the statutory maximum in the general sentencing statute and the mandatory minimum range of twenty-five years to life, we conclude that the specific provisions of section 775.087(2)(a)(3) prevail over the general provisions of the 775.082 regarding statutory maximums. We have previously stated: [I]t is a well settled rule of statutory construction ... that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms. In this situation the statute relating to the particular part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any. McDonald, 957 So.2d at 610 (quoting Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959)). Under this principle of statutory construction, section 775.087(2)(a)(3), which specifically addresses a situation where a defendant, in the course of certain enumerated felonies, discharges a firearm and, as a result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm is inflicted upon any person, prevails over section 775.082(3)(b), which is a general sentencing statute and provides the sentences for all first-degree felonies. Section 775.082 covers sentencing for all crimes, including those involving the use of a firearm. The 10-20-Life statute, on the other hand, addresses the mandatory minimum sentences for enumerated crimes involving the use or possession of a firearm. The application of this statutory construction principle here is analogous to our analysis in McDonald, 957 So.2d at 610-11, wherein we held that the specific provisions of the 10-20-Life statute control over the more general provisions of the Prison Releasee Reoffender (PRR) statute: The PRR statute is part of the general sentencing provision of chapter 775. It provides the mandatory minimum sentence for anyone deemed a prior releasee reoffender within the general sentencing scheme. See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2000). In other words, the PRR statute covers sentencing for all crimes, including those involving the use of a firearm. On the other hand, the 10-20-LIFE statute addresses the mandatory minimum sentence for the use or possession of a firearm in some manner during the commission of a specified crime. See § 775.087(2)(c). Accordingly, the Fourth District properly concluded that the more specific provisions contained in the 10-20-LIFE statute should control over the more general provisions of the PRR statute.... Our reading of the statute is further supported by the application of the elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So.3d 1220, 1233 (Fla.2009) (quoting Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So.2d 599, 606 (Fla. 2006)). To adopt Mendenhall's interpretation of the statute would render the phrase and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison meaningless and mere surplusage. We reject this interpretation and adopt the reasoning of Judge Farmer's dissent in Collazo v. State, 966 So.2d 429, 433 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007): In subsection (a)3 the words not less than 25 years mean that more than 25 years is possible. But the majority limits the mandatory part to not more than 25 years, making the words not less than 25 years and not more than life superfluous. The majority seem to read into the provision a punctuation mark after the words 25 years. There is no mark at that point; the clause presses on without any break. Then the words not less than 25 years are followed immediately by the conjunction and which is not preceded by a comma, semi-colon or period. If there had been some such punctuation, one might conceivably read the sentence as containing two separate thoughts: (1) a mandatory period of 25 years; (2) discretion to make the total sentence life. As actually written and punctuated, however, the plain meaning is to conjoin not less than 25 years with the words not more than a term of life into a single thought. As thus written, the mandatory period can be anything from life down to 25 years. Finally, this reading of the statute not only recognizes that specific statutes control over general statutes and that words in a statute should not be rendered meaningless, but also effectuates the Legislature's clearly stated and unambiguous intent to punish offenders who possess or use firearms to the fullest extent of the law. § 775.087(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2004). The Legislature, in enacting the 10-20-Life statute, very clearly mandated that it is the policy of this State to deter the criminal use of firearms. McDonald, 957 So.2d at 611. This policy is underscored by the statement of legislative intent contained in the act enacting section 775.087(2)(a)(3): WHEREAS, Florida ranks among the most violent states in the nation, and WHEREAS, in 1975 the Florida Legislature enacted legislation requiring a minimum mandatory sentence of three years in prison for possessing a gun during the commission or attempted commission of a violent felony, and WHEREAS, the Legislature enacted this mandatory penalty in order to protect citizens from criminals who are known to use guns during the commission of violent crimes, and WHEREAS, the FBI reports that among persons identified in the felonious killings of law enforcement officers in 1997, 71% had prior criminal convictions, and one of every four were on probation or parole for other crimes when they killed the officers, and WHEREAS, criminals who use guns during the commission of violent crimes pose an increased danger to the lives, health, and safety of Florida's citizens and to Florida's law enforcement officers who daily put their lives on the line to protect citizens from violent criminals, and WHEREAS, the Legislature intends to hold criminals more accountable for their crimes, and intends for criminals who use guns to commit violent crimes to receive greater criminal penalties than they do today, and WHEREAS, the Legislature intends that when law enforcement officers put themselves in harm's way to apprehend and arrest these gun-wielding criminals who terrorize the streets and neighborhoods of Florida, that these criminals be sentenced to longer mandatory prison terms than provided in current law, so that these offenders cannot again endanger law enforcement officers and the public, and WHEREAS, there is a critical need for effective criminal justice measures that will ensure that violent criminals are sentenced to prison terms that will effectively incapacitate the offender, prevent future crimes, and reduce violent crime rates, and WHEREAS, it is the intent of the Legislature that criminals who use guns to commit violent crimes be vigorously prosecuted and that the state demand that minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment be imposed pursuant to this act, NOW, THEREFORE, Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida.... Ch. 99-12, at 537, Laws of Fla. Because the Legislature clearly intended that those who use guns to commit violent crimes be vigorously prosecuted and that the state demand that minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment be imposed pursuant to this act, id., we conclude that the Legislature intended for trial courts to have discretion to impose a mandatory minimum under section 775.087(2)(a)(3) in the range of a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison. § 775.087(2)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). Mendenhall contends that the statute is ambiguous and that this Court should apply the rule of lenity. There is certainly nothing ambiguous about the statute's language that the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison. § 775.087(2)(a)(3), Fla. Stat. Regardless, we have previously recognized that the rule of lenity is a canon of last resort. Kasischke v. State, 991 So.2d 803, 814 (Fla.2008). We thus conclude that under section 775.087(2)(a)(3), the trial court has discretion to impose a mandatory minimum within the range of twenty-five years to life. Consequently, we conclude that Mendenhall was properly sentenced to thirty-five years with a thirty-five-year mandatory minimum, notwithstanding the statutory maximum of thirty years contained in section 775.082 for Mendenhall's offense.