Opinion ID: 2982668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conclusion

Text: The district court’s order included minimal explanation for the substantial award. In approximately four pages of analysis, it emphasized that fee and cost awards are within the discretion of the district court and cited relevant precedent. The court explained, citing United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Ass’n, Local 307 v. G & M Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 732 F.2d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 1984), that “[t]he determination of a reasonable fee must be reached through an evaluation of a myriad of factors, all within the knowledge of the trial court, examined in light of the congressional policy underlying the substantive portions of the statute providing for the award of fees.” The court further stated that the lodestar method is used to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees, and “modifications [to the lodestar] are proper only in certain ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ cases, supported by both ‘specific evidence’ on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts.” (Citing Adcock–Ladd, 227 F.3d at 350). However, the court did not acknowledge this court’s prevailing legal standard for determining the reasonable hourly rate for the local market, did not evaluate the reasonableness of the hours spent, and did not address most of ServiceMaster’s objections. 15 Smith et al. v. ServiceMaster Holding Corp., et al., No. 14-5481 Although “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation” and “the district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award, . . . [i]t remains important . . . for the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. For these reasons, we VACATE the award of fees and costs, and REMAND for further consideration consistent with this opinion. 16