Opinion ID: 1374541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Make Independent Determination and to State Reasons for Findings in Ruling on Automatic Motion for Modification of Penalty Verdict

Text: (32a) Finally, appellant contends the judgment of death must be vacated because the trial court failed to exercise all of its responsibilities under section 190.4, subdivision (e). That subdivision provides that after a verdict imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have applied for modification of the verdict under section 1181, subdivision 7. [25] In ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) The trial court's ruling on appellant's automatic application for modification was as follows: Having considered the arguments of counsel and having considered all of the evidence received in the matter, and having considered, taken into account and being guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Penal Code Section 190.3, the Court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that the weight of the evidence supports the jury's verdict of death. [¶] Accordingly, defendant's motion for modification of the jury's verdict of death must be, and hereby is, denied. Appellant claims two fatal defects in this ruling. One is that the trial court assertedly did not make an independent determination of the propriety of the verdict under the law. The other is that the court failed to state on the record the reasons for his findings. (§ 190.4, subd. (e).) It is not apparent from the face of the court's ruling whether or to what extent the ruling was based on an independent review of the weight of the evidence. Just before announcing his ruling in open court, however, the trial judge stated he would not make factual findings because I believe that Briggs [the 1978 death penalty statute] ties the hands of the court.... I'm not suggesting what I would do if I had the right of independent determination. Similar remarks by the judge appear earlier in the record. He relied on the fact that the 1977 version of section 190.4, subdivision (e), provided that the judge should make an independent determination as to whether the weight of the evidence supports the jury's findings and verdicts. The 1978 version, now in effect, omits the word independent. (33) We think that the present version of section 190.4, subdivision (e), like the 1977 version, requires that the trial judge make an independent determination whether imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant is proper in light of the relevant evidence and the applicable law. One reason for this interpretation is that it harmonizes section 190.4, subdivision (e), with section 1181, subdivision 7, to which subdivision (e) refers. Subdivision 7 of section 1181 was adopted in 1951. In ruling on motions under that subdivision for modification of verdicts that called for the death penalty under former sections 190 and 190.1, which were in effect up to 1972, the trial judge ha[d] the duty to review the evidence to determine whether in his independent judgment the weight of the evidence support[ed] the jury's verdict, and if he decide[d] it d[id] not, he ha[d] the power to reduce the penalty to life imprisonment. ( In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 623 [73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117].) Moreover, in determining whether in his or her independent judgment the weight of the evidence supported the verdict, the judge was required to assess the credibility of the witnesses, determine the probative force of the testimony, and weigh the evidence. ( People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 728 [16 Cal. Rptr. 777, 366 P.2d 33].) By providing for automatic review of a death verdict under section 1181, subdivision 7, section 190.4, subdivision (e), must have intended that the trial judge exercise the responsibilities for independent review imposed by subdivision 7, notwithstanding the omission of the word independent that appeared in the 1977 version of section 190.4, subdivision (e). Moreover, if subdivision (e) were construed as precluding independent review of the death verdict by the trial judge, questions of federal constitutionality might arise. (See Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 178-179.) [26] (32b) The trial judge's ruling was therefore deficient because it appears from the record to have been based on an erroneously narrow view of the scope of his powers and responsibilities under sections 190.4, subdivision (e) and 1181, subdivision 7. The ruling also was deficient for its failure to specify reasons for denying modification sufficient to assure thoughtful and effective appellate review. ( Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 179.) [27] (34) We conclude that the deficiencies in the disposition of appellant's automatic application to modify the penalty verdict constitute the only grounds for reversal. Accordingly, while the penalty judgment must be vacated, there is no reason to order a new penalty trial. Rather, we may simply remand with directions to the trial court to reconsider and rule on the verdict-modification application in accordance with our opinion. (§ 1260; Love, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 729.)
The judgment is affirmed in all respects, except that the judgment of death is vacated and the cause remanded to the trial court solely for prompt reconsideration of appellant's automatic application for modification of the death verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) under the standards set forth in this opinion. If, after applying such standards, the court again denies the application for modification of verdict, it shall reinstate the judgment of death. If it grants the application, it shall modify the judgment to reflect a penalty of life without possibility of parole. Defendant's appeal from any reinstated death judgment shall be automatic (§§ 190.4, subd. (e), 1239, subd. (b)) and limited to issues arising on the modification application. The People shall have an appeal, similarly limited, from any modified penalty judgment (§§ 190.4, subd. (e), 1238, subd. (a)(6)).