Opinion ID: 1676194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: emergency clauseamendment 7

Text: Appellants contend the chancellor erred in holding the emergency clauses in Acts 1 and 2 were invalid. The emergency clause of Act 1 states in its entirety: SECTION 18. EMERGENCY. It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that there is an immediate and urgent need for constitutional revision in Arkansas. Since many parts of the Constitution of Arkansas are archaic, obsolete, and unrelated to the needs and demands of the citizens for good government in both the state and local governments; and since the number and types of changes needed are not suitable for piecemeal amendment of the present Constitution; an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act is declared to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety and shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval. An emergency clause has a significant effect on the people's reserved right of referendum and is therefore expressly controlled by Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution. Burroughs, 319 Ark. 530, 893 S.W.2d 319. Amendment 7 establishes the right of referendum by stating that the legislative power of the people is vested in the General Assembly, but the people reserve the power to approve or reject at the polls any entire act or any item of an appropriation bill. Ark. Const. amend. 7. By operation of Amendment 7, the people have until ninety days after adjournment of the legislative session to file a referendum petition. Any measure referred to the people by referendum petition remains in abeyance until voted upon. Id. The General Assembly is authorized to make an act effective immediately [i]f it shall be necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety by enacting an emergency clause. Id. However, it is necessary that the General Assembly state the fact which constitutes such emergency. Id. These requirements of Amendment 7 were observed by this court in Cunningham v. Walker, 198 Ark. 928, 132 S.W.2d 24 (1939). Most recently we have held that: [I]t is a matter of legislative determination whether an emergency exists that requires the enactment of an emergency clause, but pursuant to Amendment 7, it is a judicial determination whether facts constituting an emergency are stated.... [A]n emergency clause which does not state a fact that constitutes an emergency is invalid.... [T]here must be some statement of fact to show that a real emergency existed. Burroughs, 319 Ark. 530, 533, 893 S.W.2d 319, 320-21 (quoting Gentry v. Harrison, 194 Ark. 916, 110 S.W.2d 497 (1937) (citations omitted)). The test for determining if a real emergency has been stated is whether reasonable minds might disagree as to whether the enunciated facts state an emergency. Id. If so, the emergency clause is upheld; if not, then the emergency clause is invalid. Id. Emergency is defined as some sudden or unexpected happening that creates a need for action. Id. at 535, 893 S.W.2d at 321. The chancellor applied the aforementioned test and concluded the emergency clause in Act 1 did not state facts demonstrating a real emergency and therefore was invalid. The chancellor ruled further that the emergency clause could not be severed from Act 1 while still giving full effect to its other provisions and therefore declared Act 1 void. The chancellor ruled that she need not reach the emergency clause in Act 2 because Act 2 must suffer the same fate and is thus void. Appellants contend the emergency clause of Act 1 enunciates two statements of fact. First, appellants rely on the statement that many parts of the Constitution of Arkansas are archaic, obsolete, and unrelated to the needs and demands of the citizens for good government in both the state and local governments. Second, appellants rely on the statement that there is an immediate and urgent need for constitutional revision in Arkansas.... since the number and types of changes needed are not suitable for piecemeal amendment of the present Constitution. The chancellor concluded these two statements did not state an emergency because they did not describe a sudden or unexpected happening creating a need for action. The emergency clause at issue in this case is very similar to the one upheld in Mann v. Lowry, 227 Ark. 1132, 303 S.W.2d 889 (1957), where the General Assembly passed an act to establish a new form of city government for all cities of the first and second class. The emergency clause at issue in Burroughs , relied upon by the chancellor, stated that a new procedure was needed for calling special meetings of the West Memphis City Council and was held invalid. Our decision today is a catalyst to understanding and reconciling the Burroughs and Mann cases, two cases that when read separately appear to be inconsistent, but are not upon further examination. The scope of the proposed governmental reform is what distinguishes those two cases, and aligns the instant case with Mann rather than with Burroughs . Mann and the instant case both call for an entirely new form of government, while Burroughs only called for a modification of the existing government proposed by outgoing members of the governing body for obvious political reasons. Everyone may not agree that the need for a new constitution, as described in the emergency clause of Act 1, is a real emergency. However, that is not the test. The test is whether reasonable people might disagree as to whether an emergency is stated. Burroughs, 319 Ark. 530, 893 S.W.2d 319. In reviewing our recent case of Burroughs , we realize that it did not fully explore the methodology that this court has historically used to analyze emergency clauses, although it did apply the historical analysis in invalidating the emergency clause due to the obvious political motivation of the outgoing councilmen. In Jumper v. McCollum, 179 Ark. 837, 840, 18 S.W.2d 359, 361 (1929), this court stated that [i]f the fact which constitutes the emergency is recited, and if fair-minded and intelligent men might reasonably differ as to the sufficiency and truth of the fact assigned for placing the act in effect immediately upon its passage, the courts are concluded by the finding. (Emphasis added.) Thus, it is evident that this court's more recent cases on emergency clauses have failed to mention that we examine them to determine whether reasonable minds might differ as to the truth of the factual data alleged by the legislative body. Therefore, the instant case presents us with an opportunity to reconcile Burroughs , Mann , and Jumper within the scope of the proposed reforms. The fact that our current constitution is archaic and obsolete and cannot be updated without sweeping reform states an emergency. In so ruling, we observe that the General Assembly does not operate in a vacuum and that recent litigation in this court and federal courts has called wide-spread attention to at least four far-reaching problem areas in our state government caused by our existing constitution. E.g., Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25, 321 Ark. 618, 906 S.W.2d 295 (public-school funding); Little Rock Family Planning Servs., P.A. v. Dalton, 860 F.Supp. 609 (E.D.Ark.1994), aff'd 60 F.3d 497 (8th Cir.1995) (Medicaid funding); Foster v. Jefferson Co. Quorum Court, 321 Ark. 105, 901 S.W.2d 809, supp. op. granting reh'g on other grounds, 321 Ark. 117-A, 906 S.W.2d 314 (1995) (county sales tax); Brown v. City of Stuttgart, 312 Ark. 97, 847 S.W.2d 710 (1993) (equipment purchases by local government). In addition, there is at least a fifth problem area in our state government caused by our constitution's provisions for challenging initiated and referred measures and proposed constitutional amendments that was illustrated by the rash of expedited litigation in this court prior to the November 1994 general election. E.g., McCuen v. Harris, 318 Ark. 522, 891 S.W.2d 350 (1994) (per curiam) (sales tax); Wilson v. Cook, 318 Ark. 520, 886 S.W.2d 593 (1994) (per curiam) (succession and vacancies in office); Walker v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 508, 886 S.W.2d 577 (1994) (soft-drink tax); Page v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 342, 884 S.W.2d 951 (1994) (casino gambling); Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994) (worker's compensation); Walmsley v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 269, 885 S.W.2d 10 (1994) (charitable bingo and raffles); Christian Civic Action Comm. v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994) (state lottery). With these reported cases in mind, and the statements of fact in Act 1's emergency clause, the legislature was clearly attempting to cure at least five deficiencies in our state government, while at the same time being expressly limited to referring only three constitutional amendments to the people. Ark. Const. art. 19, § 22. Therefore, we find truth to the statement in the emergency clause that piecemeal amendment to the constitution is not suitable. Thus, we conclude, as this court concluded in Mann , that reasonable people might disagree that the facts stated in Act 1's emergency clause concerning the need for a new constitution did state an emergency. The chancellor's ruling to the contrary is therefore reversed, as is her ancillary ruling enjoining the election as an illegal exaction. The amicus curiae raises an argument that Amendment 7 does not apply to this case at all because Act 1 was not an exercise of the legislative power; rather it was an exercise of the people's powers under Article 2, §§ 1 and 29 of the Arkansas Constitution. We do not consider this argument because the amicus curiae cannot enlarge the issues beyond those raised by the pleadings of the parties in the lower court. City of Little Rock v. AT & T Communications of the Southwest, Inc., 316 Ark. 94, 870 S.W.2d 217 (1994); Moorman v. Pulaski Co. Democratic Party, 271 Ark. 908, 611 S.W.2d 519 (1981).