Opinion ID: 836618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: discussion of charged violations

Text: In discussing the charged violations, we will limit our consideration to alleged violations of the Canons and Judicial Rules. Whether any of the accused's conduct also violated ORS 244.040(1)(a) would have no bearing on the conclusions that we reach below or on the sanction that we deem appropriate. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to consider the possible application of that statute further. A. Personal Solicitation of Campaign Contributions. With respect to his 1995 letter about the golf tournament fundraiser, the accused advances a series of arguments as to why he should not be found guilty of violating former Canon 7 B(7) and former Canon 2 A. Some of those arguments assert that the canons did not in fact prohibit his conduct. In the alternative, the accused argues that an application of the canons to his conduct would be unconstitutional. We need not decide those questions. Whether the accused is guilty of the violations charged in the first cause of complaint would not alter the sanction that we deem appropriate. That being so, we need not decide whether the accused violated former Canon 7 B(7) or former Canon 2 A as charged in the first cause of complaint. B. Personal and Campaign Use of State Resources. In the second cause of complaint, the Commission charged that the accused had violated (among other things) former Canon 2 A, which required that a judge act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary; and JR 1-101(A), which currently contains substantially the same requirement. The accused acknowledges the underlying facts: thatat his directionhis judicial assistant performed purely personal and campaign tasks on work time, while being paid by the state, using state property (such as letterhead) and typing equipment (such as computers) in the process. Those facts constitute a violation of the charged rules. Court staff, court supplies, and court typing equipment are to be used for court business, not for personal and campaign purposes. The accused argues for a  de minimis  or incidental use exception to the foregoing principle. An example given by the accused is having a judicial assistant make a personal telephone call to cancel a lunch appointment so that a judge may continue a trial into the lunch hour. We assume that a  de minimis  or incidental use exception is proper. Normal human experience teaches that judges, like other workers, cannot separate personal life from work life completely. In this regard, the accused's example illustrates the point nicely. But the accused's acts, as demonstrated in the record, can in no way be characterized as falling within such an exception. Over a period of years, it was the usual custom and practice of the accused to make personal use of a state employee and of state supplies and typing equipment for personal and campaign purposes. Those uses were substantial. Austin-Croft spent almost full working days, for instance, administering the annual golf tournament fundraiser, and for many years designated even the golfing days as regular work time on her time sheets, which the accused approved and signed as her supervisor. Additionally, the quantity of the accused's personal documents, prepared by a state employee on work time and using official stationery, was voluminous. We conclude that the accused's extensive use of his judicial assistant's time, and of state property and equipment, for personal and campaign purposes violated former Canon 2 A. Taxpayers have a right to expect that the employees and the materials for which they pay will be used for public purposes. Obtaining substantial personal and political benefits directly from the use of those public employees and materials runs afoul of the requirement to act    in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity    of the judiciary. For the same reason, the accused's conduct violated JR 1-101(A), which contains substantially the same requirement. C. Use of Office to Advance Private Interests. The third cause of complaint alleged that the accused had violated, among other things, former Canon 2 A, which provided that a judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary; JR 1-101(A), which currently contains substantially the same provision; JR 1-101(C), which provides that [a] judge shall not engage in conduct that reflects adversely on the judge's character, competence, temperament or fitness to serve as a judge; former Canon 2 B, which prohibited a judge from lending the prestige of the office to advance the private interests of others and from conveying the impression that others are in a special position to influence the judge; and JR 1-101(F), which prohibits a judge from lending the prestige of the office to advance the private interests of the judge or of another and from conveying the impression that anyone has a special influence with the judge. The Commission concluded that the accused was not guilty of the matters charged in the third cause of complaint. Neither party asked this court to come to a different conclusion, and neither party briefed the issue substantively. Nonetheless, it is this court's task to consider the whole case de novo. Pursuant to ORS 1.430(1), this court  shall review the record of the proceedings under ORS 1.420 [relating to the Commission's procedures respecting charges of misconduct] on the law and facts. (Emphasis added.) We are mindful that in some past cases this courtalthough recognizing its authority to consider all matters chargedhas chosen to limit review to only those causes of complaint against a judge that resulted in a conclusion by the Commission that the judge had violated a provision of the Code. See, e.g., Schenck, 318 Or. at 404 n. 3, 870 P.2d 185 (reviewing only those causes of complaint for which the Commission had found a willful violation of a canon). On the other hand, in lawyer discipline cases, the court has exercised its authority to consider all charged conduct. See, e.g., In re Biggs, 318 Or. 281, 864 P.2d 1310 (1994) (finding additional violations of the charged disciplinary rules and increasing the accused's discipline from a two-year suspension to disbarment). In this case, we exercise our authority to consider all charged conduct, for three reasons. First, the conduct charged in the third cause of complaint is repeated and serious, and the nature of the charge does not duplicate the kind of misconduct complained of in the other causes of complaint. Second, we note (as discussed more fully below) that the Commission found that the accused had committed some of the charged acts; it went on to conclude only that the conduct was not willful. Third, the Commission's conclusion concerning willfulness is facially dubious. We turn to a consideration of the merits of the third cause of complaint. The Commission found that the accused's use of official letterhead and the title Circuit Court Judge in connection with correspondence relating to his parking ticket in San Diego would cause an objective observer to conclude he was attempting to receive better treatment than the average citizen protesting a parking ticket would receive. We agree with and adopt those findings. In addition, we find that the use of official letterheadand in most instances further references to the accused's office (such as the typing of his title beneath his signature)in the examples quoted in the Findings of Fact above would cause an objective observer reasonably to conclude that the accused was lending the prestige of the office to advance his own private interests. In some cases advancement of the private interests of others was involved, at least in part: his lawyer (with regard to the matter of the copier); his brother (with regard to the magazine subscription); and his wife (with regard to the matters involving the accused's own financial interests). In this connection, we note that the official commentary to Canon 2 B of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1998) (ABA Code) states in part: Judges should distinguish between proper and improper use of the prestige of office in all of their activities. For example, it would be improper for a judge to allude to his or her judgeship to gain a personal advantage such as deferential treatment when stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense. Similarly, judicial letterhead must not be used for conducting a judge's personal business.  Commentary to Canon 2 B of the ABA Code (emphasis added). The relevant portion of Canon 2 B of the ABA Code is almost identical to former Canon 2 B of the Oregon Code of Judicial Conduct and is similar to the pertinent provision of JR 1-101(F). Although this court is not bound by the ABA's commentary, we approve of the quoted interpretation. Notwithstanding its factual findings, the Commission concluded that the accused did not act willfully, [6] but only negligently. We disagree with that conclusion on willfulness for several reasons. First, the accused's testimony demonstrated that he knew what the ABA's commentary has made clear: that court stationery is for court-related business. Indeed, he had purchased and used separate personal stationery for non-court purposes, but his supply ran out. Second, the accused repeatedly used the letterhead and title of his office in correspondence designed to obtain personal advantages, including financial advantages, for himself and those close to him. That frequency suggests that the practice was far from inadvertent. Third, the official letterhead of the Circuit Court is colorful and conspicuous, and in most instances the accused placed his title just beneath his signature. Those elements suggest that the accused knew both that he was using stationery that featured his judicial identity and that the fact of his position was likely to play a prominent role in the recipient's response to each such letter. Fourth, many of the letters were demanding, and many of them asserted legal propositions in close proximity to reminders of the accused's status as a judge. Examples include his letters to the bankruptcy trustee, the Portland Golf Club, the computer publication, and Golf World magazine. 326 Or. at 276-281, 951 P.2d at 710-712. Those factors suggest that the accused intended his position to lend weight or credibility to his assertions. Accordingly, we conclude that the foregoing conduct was willful and that it violated former Canon 2 B and JR 1-101(F). We also conclude that this conduct violated former Canon 2 A and JR 1-101(A). The use of one's judicial office as a pressure tactic to gain personal advantages for oneself and one's relatives and friends undermines public confidence in the judiciary and in its integrity and impartiality. Finally, we conclude that this conduct violated JR 1-101(C). An inappropriate attempt to gain such personal advantages reflects adversely on the judge's character, competence, temperament or fitness to serve as a judge.