Opinion ID: 773251
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Virtual Home Office Privilege

Text: 78 Straughn testified that all other sales representatives in the Boston Marketing Office were granted the virtual home office privilege. See Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824 (noting that evidence of differential treatment in the workplace supports pretext claim). Yet Straughn points to no evidence that she and these other sales representatives were similarly situated. 79 Competent proof that the plaintiff was denied privileges and opportunities available to similarly situated employees may constitute probative evidence that an adverse employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus. See Thomas, 183 F.3d at 63 (evidence that supervisors prevented minority employee from making important presentation and withheld appropriate developmental opportunities and computer training, all of which were accorded non-minority employees, supports disparate treatment claim). Straughn testified on deposition that she made at least three requests to work from a virtual home office. The record also reflects that some sales representatives were permitted to work from a virtual home office. Yet Richard Ealey denied Straughn permission to do so following her extended absence from work, since her doctor had advised that, though able to work, Straughn was not yet well enough to drive an automobile - hence unable to service clients, the primary responsibility of her position. 80 As concerns Straughn's previous requests to work from a virtual home office, one was denied by Meinhold and several by Giglio. The record reflects that her first request to Giglio was made within six months of her hiring. Straughn presented no evidence that other new sales representatives were accorded the privilege so early in their tenure. With regard to the other requests which Giglio denied, she points to no evidence (i) that she was similarly situated to any sales representative who was accorded the privilege, or (ii) that she met Delta's criteria for evaluating such requests. Instead, she simply asserts in conclusory fashion that everyone else was permitted to work part-time from a virtual home office. Thus, she failed to present competent evidence that the proffered reason for the challenged employment action was pretextual. See Fernandes, 199 F.2d at 581; Conward, 171 F.3d at 20; Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824. 81 Moreover, given the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the proffered reason for the dismissal action was both sound and sufficient, the tenuous disparate treatment evidence presented by Straughn was plainly insufficient to enable a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Giglio had fabricated the report about Straughn's prevarications relating to her wrongful retention of the workers' compensation benefits. 9 Nothing more is exigible. 82