Opinion ID: 374943
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Untimeliness of the Removal Petition.

Text: 26 Reynolds concedes it filed the petition for removal one day late. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). It argues that this defect is not jurisdictional and that Fristoe should be estopped from raising it because he objected only after this appeal was taken. 27 The statutory time limit for removal petitions is merely a formal and modal requirement and is not jurisdictional. See Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702-04, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 1347-48, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Mackay v. Uinta Development Co., 229 U.S. 173, 176-77, 33 S.Ct. 638, 639, 57 L.Ed. 1138 (1913); 1A Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure P 0.168(3.-5) (1974 ed.). 28 Although the time limit is mandatory and a timely objection to a late petition will defeat removal, a party may waive the defect or be estopped from objecting to the untimeliness by sitting on his rights. See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17, 71 S.Ct. 534, 541, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951); Mackay, 229 U.S. 173, 33 S.Ct. 638, 57 L.Ed. 1138; Transport Indemnity Co. v. Financial Trust Co., 339 F.Supp. 405, 407 (C.D.Cal.1972); Green v. Zuck, 133 F.Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y.1955). 29 When a case such as this has been removed and tried on the merits without objection and the federal court enters judgment, the issue in subsequent proceedings on appeal is not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction . . . . Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 702, 92 S.Ct. at 1347. 30 Because the district court would have had original jurisdiction here, and we find that Fristoe had waived the untimeliness of the removal petition by failing to object on these grounds until this appeal, his point is not well taken. 31