Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counts One A and Three: Handling of the Henderson Matter

Text: In connection with the Richard Henderson matter, the Commission also unanimously concluded that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct in failing to disqualify himself and willful misconduct in directing alteration of court records to mislead the Commission.
At the August 2 hearing on Henderson's case, defense counsel stated that Henderson had said petitioner was a friend of Henderson's uncle and that diversion was a done deal. According to petitioner, on hearing this information, he concluded that Henderson did not deserve diversion because he was using his parents and uncle to manipulate the court. At that point, petitioner determined that his ex parte contacts and his feelings about Henderson had created a conflict and he decided to disqualify himself from making the diversion decision. Petitioner informed counsel of his decision, referred the matter to the probation department for preparation of a diversion report, and scheduled a diversion hearing for September 6. The probation department's report recommended against diversion, finding Henderson statutorily ineligible because of a prior conviction. At the September 6 hearing, the district attorney expressed willingness to consider diversion despite the recommendation. After Henderson's counsel asked the court to consider diversion, petitioner replied: Well, I don't want to consider it. Number one is because ... I know his uncle. I've talked to his uncle about getting him diversion and getting him treatment. And because of that, I don't think I should make the decision. Defense counsel then asked: Should we send it down to Madera Justice Court? Petitioner replied: No. Iif you two can work it out, that's fine with me. I'll go along with anything, [¶] I just want to put it on the record that I've talked to his uncle about helping him on a diversion, if he gets diversion, [¶] And I think if I got involved in overruling the Probation Department at this point, I think it would be a conflict. Contrary to his stated intent, petitioner then discussed with counsel Henderson's prior conviction, the reported level of his drug use, and his family situation, remarking on comments Henderson's uncle had made to petitioner about this subject. When defense counsel suggested getting a second probation report, petitioner replied: I don't think they're going to change their mind. Counsel then asked: You don't want to have another report? Petitioner responded: No. That would just tick them off. Defense counsel then expressed doubt about the probation department's conclusion regarding statutory eligibility. Petitioner then interjected: Yeah, well, the problem is, too, it says here, a `daily use of cocaine.' [¶] And diversion ... was originated for people who are in danger or might become endangered. When you have a regular user, C.R.C. is the place for them. Petitioner also expressed doubt about the relevance of the fact that Henderson had not been caught using drugs for some time. Finally, petitioner asked: What do the People want to do? The district attorney then suggested getting a rap sheet and noted numerous instances where the court, on the prosecution's recommendation, had overridden the probation department's recommendation. Petitioner replied: Absolutely. No problem with that, [¶] But I told you I have a conflict with that. At counsel's suggestion, petitioner then continued the diversion hearing to September 20 and set it before himself. At the hearing on September 20, the district attorney recommended diversion. Petitioner responded: All right. [¶] I told you that I wasn't going to make the decision in this. It's up to you. Henderson's counsel ask[ed] for the court's order for diversion even though the [probation] report [did] not seem to be too favorable. Petitioner replied: All right. [¶] Then ... under the People's recommendation, I'll grant you diversion. He also directed Henderson to appear on March 21, 1995, for review of his compliance with the terms of diversion. Petitioner later explained to the Commission: I should have denied the [diversion] request and set the case for another hearing with another Judge, but knowing that the Court usually goes along with the D.A. recommendation in these type [sic] of cases, and the problem of getting a visiting Judge on a Tuesday for one case, I went along with the D.A. and granted diversion. On this record, the Commission unanimously adopted the special masters' conclusion that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct by fail[ing] to disqualify himself after the ex parte communications and improperly delegat[ing] his [judicial] power [to order diversion] away to the District Attorney to avoid a conflict. Petitioner challenges these conclusions, noting that he fully disclosed his [ex parte] contact, he indicated he did not want to decide the diversion question because of a conflict, the parties did not seek his recusal, and he had no independent duty to disqualify himself. He also challenges the conclusion that he improperly delegated his judicial authority, arguing that diversion was a foregone conclusion in this case. We find clear and convincing evidence to support the Commission's conclusions. By statute, a judge shall be disqualified if [f]or any reason (A) the judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests of justice, (B) the judge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be impartial, or (C) a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6).) Petitioner was disqualified under this provision; he himself testified before the special masters that he had personal feelings about the propriety of granting diversion and that he should therefore not participate in the decision, based on his ex parte communications and Henderson's comment to his attorney that diversion was a done deal. As petitioner later explained to the Commission: I wasn't going to make the [diversion] decision, because I felt if I denied diversion it would look like I was mad at them, which I was. [¶] I was very angry at Mr. Henderson for playing games with his family.... And I felt that I needed to get out of the case. Disqualification based on the judge's personal bias or prejudice concerning a party may not be waived. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (b)(2)(A).) Moreover, even as to waivable disqualifications, a waiver must be written, signed by all parties and their attorneys and filed in the record. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (b)(1); see Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1995) 10 Cal.4th 866, 906, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 606, 897 P.2d 544 ( Adams ).) Thus, petitioner's suggestion that the parties waived the disqualification is unconvincing. We also agree that petitioner improperly delegated his judicial authority regarding diversion to the district attorney. Petitioner incorrectly contends that, because diversion was a foregone conclusion in this case, delegating this decision did not constitute prejudicial misconduct. Regardless of the likelihood that Henderson would receive diversion, as petitioner conceded during the Commission proceedings, legally it was [petitioner's] decision, and he should have ... set the case for another hearing with another Judge rather than address his conflict by ceding his power to the district attorney. Petitioner's decision to follow the latter course constituted prejudicial misconduct. (See McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) 12 Cal.3d 512, 532, 116 Cal.Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268 ( McCartney ) [judge improperly delegated judicial power and committed misconduct by imposing sentences bailiff suggested]; cf. Fewel v. Fewel (1943) 23 Cal.2d 431, 436, 144 P.2d 592 [judicial decisionmaking `may not be delegated to investigators or other subordinate officials or attachés of the court, or anyone else'].)
The record contains three documents entitled Notice, Sentence, Commitment Form that purport to memorialize Henderson's September 20 diversion hearing. As to disposition, the first, exhibit No.17, is blank. The second, exhibit 18, appears to be a copy of the first with addition of the following handwritten entry for Henderson's sentence: Formal Diversion granted. Father to find counselling program. [6] The third, exhibit 19, appears to be a copy of the second with a handwritten addition indicating, per Dan Pursell, who was the district attorney on the case. Toward the bottom of the form, the following phrase was added to exhibit 19: Judge Fletcher Disqualifies himself for any violation of Diversion Hearings. Finally, a handwritten Post-it note attached to exhibit 19 stated: Judge Fletcherdisq. himself. On October 26, one of the court clerks, Fran Saunders, faxed exhibit 18 to the probation department to inform it of the diversion disposition. On October 25, the Commission sent petitioner a letter of inquiry regarding the ex parte contacts and the grant of diversion in the Henderson matter. Petitioner's December 30 response to the Commission letter attached a copy of exhibit 19, but did not inform the Commission that the exhibit contained entries that did not appear on exhibit 18. On November 2, the Commission obtained a copy of exhibit 18 from the probation department as part of the investigation of petitioner. In January 1995, the Commission asked petitioner to comment on allegations that, between October 26, 1994, and his December 30 response to the Commission, during the Commission's investigation, he directed alteration of the original minute order. Saunders testified as follows regarding preparation of these documents: On September 20, 1994, or sometime after that date but before October 26, she prepared a minute order in the form of exhibit 18. [7] She received a telephone call from the probation department regarding the status of the case. In response to the inquiry, on October 26, she faxed the probation department a copy of the then-existing minute order, which was in the form of exhibit 18. [8] A few days later, petitioner approached Saunders and directed her to change the minute order to reflect that he had disqualified himself from future hearings in the case and that diversion was granted per Dan Pursell. She asked petitioner whether he wanted her to prepare an amended minute order, because the court's policy was to prepare amended orders when existing orders were changed. Petitioner said no, he didn't, just to change it. Saunders did not recall petitioner's stating in court on September 20 that he was disqualifying himself from hearings on diversion violations. She testified that the minute order she originally prepared would have reflected that disqualification had she heard petitioner make that statement. On this record, we agree with the Commission's unanimous conclusion that petitioner committed willful misconduct in his handling of the minute orders. Petitioner directed the clerk to alter a minute order and, contrary to court policy, not to indicate she had changed the order. The evidence strongly suggests he took this action after receiving the Commission's inquiry about his ex parte communications in the case. Petitioner told the Commission he received the inquiry within 48 hours of an October 26 telephone conversation with Henderson's father, and Saunders testified that petitioner directed her to alter the minute order within a few days of that date. In any event, petitioner submitted a copy of exhibit 19 to the Commission with his December 30 response without disclosing that he had directed alteration of the minute order to support his explanation of the events in the Henderson case. Petitioner's actions in this regard constituted willful misconduct. (See Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1981) 29 Cal.3d 615, 643-645, 175 Cal.Rptr. 420, 630 P.2d 954 ( Wenger ) [back-dating affidavit was willful misconduct].) In defense of his actions, petitioner argues that he did not commit willful misconduct because the alterations simply conformed the minute orders to the docket entry for the September 20 hearing, which petitioner asserts was completed contemporaneously with the court session and constituted the court's official minutes. This docket entry, petitioner maintains, was the source of all of the material added to Exhibit No.17, to make Exhibits 18 and 19 in order to accurately reflect what had occurred. This being so, petitioner continues, Exhibits No.17, 18 and 19 are merely draft documents that cannot be `altered' and would not mislead experienced readers. According to petitioner, [t]he editing of a draft document cannot be an impermissible alteration if the draft document is, as yet, incomplete. For several reasons, petitioner's response is unpersuasive. First, regardless of the docket entry, the fact remains that, during the Commission's investigation of the Henderson matter, including petitioner's role in granting diversion, petitioner directed alteration of the order, directed that the order not indicate that it had been altered, and sent the Commission a copy of the altered order without detailing the circumstances. By forwarding only the altered order, petitioner presented the Commission with a grossly incomplete and misleading response. (See Adams, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 606, 897 P.2d 544 [judge's inaccurate and incomplete responses to the Commission constituted willful misconduct].) Second, the record contradicts petitioner's contention that the docket entry reflects all of the information added to the orders. The entry states: Diversion granted; Judge Fletcher disq. himself for any violation of Diversion hrgs. Although this entry reflects petitioner's disqualification on future diversion violation hearings, it does not indicate that diversion was granted per Dan Pursell. This alteration of the order was important to support petitioner's claim that, because he had disqualified himself, he let the prosecutor make the initial diversion decision. Third, the record also does not support petitioner's claim that the docket entry was completed contemporaneously with the September 20 hearing. The initials of the supervising clerk, Velma Dee Buchanan, appear beside the docket entry, indicating that she made it. However, Buchanan was not the clerk for the September 20 hearing; Saunders was. Moreover, Buchanan learned about petitioner's alleged disqualification sometime alter September 20, when petitioner discovered that the case file did not reflect disqualification and informed Buchanan of the situation. The record thus suggests that Buchanan made the docket entry sometime after, and not contemporaneously with, the September 20 hearing. Fourth, a conflict exists between the docket entry and the reporter's transcript of the September 20 hearing. Unlike the docket entry, but consistent with Saunders's recollection, the hearing transcript does not reflect that petitioner disqualified himself from future diversion violation hearings. On the contrary, it shows that petitioner Ordered the parties to appear before him again on March 21, 1995, for a compliance review hearing. Consistent with the transcript, on March 21, 1995, Henderson appeared before petitioner for a diversion review hearing. [9] Given all of the circumstances we have detailed, and the court reporter's certification that the transcript comprise[d] a full, true, and correct transcript of the September 20 hearing, we afford the reporter's transcript more credence than the docket entry. (See People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599, 189 Cal.Rptr. 862, 659 P.2d 1152.) Finally, petitioner's current contention that it was unnecessary to mark the altered orders as corrected stands in stark contrast to his position and the uncontradicted testimony before the special masters. In addition to Saunders's testimony regarding court policy, which we have already discussed, petitioner testified that Saunders should have followed court procedures for preparing an amended minute order in complying with his order to make the alterations. While cross-examining Saunders, he reiterated that court policy required her to indicate on the altered order that it was corrected or amended, and he challenged her testimony that he told [her] to break that policy and violate the law. And, in closing argument to the Commission, petitioner again stressed that, if [clerks] add anything to a minute order after the defendant signed, they are supposed to mark it amended and supposed [to] get the defendant to agree to it. Buchanan, the court's supervising clerk, confirmed petitioner's position, testifying that court policy prohibits clerks from altering signed minute orders like exhibit 18 without indicating across the top that they are corrected orders and distributing copies to all parties. She also testified that petitioner's policy was to ask for preparation of a corrected minute order if he discovered that a minute order did not reflect his verbal, order. Thus, petitioner's current position is directly contrary to the uncontradicted evidence in the record. Indeed, petitioner's newly minted explanation is just another example of his vague and contradictory representations throughout these disciplinary proceedings regarding these documents. Petitioner maintains that Saunders faxed exhibit 18 to the probation department at his request after he learned from Henderson's father on October 26 that Henderson was not complying with diversion requirements. In his February 1995 response to the Commission's January 1995 inquiry about the matter, petitioner stated: I don't recall looking at the minute order or the file on 10-26-94. Regarding the differences between exhibits 18 and 19, he stated: The only explanation I can offer is that Ms. Saunders sent a FAX copy to the probation department and then added the rest at some later time. In his answer to the Commission's notice of formal proceedings, petitioner gave a different account. He there maintained that, after receiving the call from Henderson's father on October 26, he pulled the file, discovered that the minute order did not correctly reflect that Henderson had been granted diversion pursuant to the district attorney's decision and that petitioner had disqualified himself, and ordered Saunders to make the necessary corrections and send it to the probation department. Petitioner's testimony before the special masters was initially consistent with this latter account, although he additionally noted that the minute order he found in the file on October 26 was in the form of exhibit 18. [10] However, after being confronted with his previous position in his February response, petitioner began to waver as to whether he looked at the file after the October 26 phone call. Later, in arguing his case to the Commission, petitioner changed his account once again. He told the Commission that his only order to Ms. Saunders was to fax the minute order to the probation department. Contrary to his testimony before the special masters, petitioner told the Commission that he had not ordered Saunders to amend the minute order. When asked whether he direct[ed] her to change it in any way, petitioner replied, No, I did not, and he suggested that Saunders made the changes on her own initiative. [11] Of course, as we have explained, petitioner has shifted his position yet again in this court, conceding that he directed Saunders to prepare a corrected minute order, but arguing that this action did not constitute misconduct because the altered documents were merely incomplete draft orders. Petitioner's representations regarding his disclosures to the Commission on this topic are similarly confused and inconsistent. Petitioner initially testified that, with his December 30 response to the Commission's inquiry about ex parte communications, he sent copies of both exhibits 18 and 19 to show that the order had been altered. He then explained that he obtained a copy of exhibit 18 on October 26 when he reviewed the file after talking with Henderson's father. Later, however, he testified that he copied exhibits 18 and 19 when he received the Commission's inquiry about the matter. He also later testified that he sent the exhibits, not with his December 30 response, but with his February 1995 response to the Commission's January 1995 inquiry about the altered minute orders. Regarding his submission of minute orders to the Commission, he then testified: I'm sorry. I don't recall now.... I remember sending two minute orders, but I don't remember which they were and when I looked at them.... Later, petitioner again testified that he sent the two minute orders in response to the Commission's January 1995 inquiry, but he could not recall how he got a copy of the order in the form of exhibit 18. Before the Commission, however, petitioner appeared to state that he first received a copy of the minute order in the form of exhibit 18 from the Commission as part of its January 1995 inquiry. This last statement was consistent with the Commission's position that petitioner never submitted a copy of a minute order in the form of exhibit 18 and that he had only submitted a copy of exhibit 19. Petitioner's continually shifting explanations regarding these exhibits are further evidence of his willful misconduct in attempting to deceive the Commission. (See Adams, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 606, 897 P.2d 544 [judge's inaccurate and incomplete responses to the Commission constituted willful misconduct].)