Opinion ID: 1753810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Effect of Subsequent Payment of Taxes and Presumption of Grant

Text: The chancellor found that appellees have been in exclusive possession of the subject land, paying taxes thereon, farming, cultivating and fencing said property for more than a period of thirty-five (35) years. This Court has held that continuous peaceable possession of land, when accompanied by the usual acts of ownership, will raise the presumption that the land has been granted to the possessor by the State, even where the claim is asserted against the State. Caruth v. Gillespie, 109 Miss. 679, 68 So. 927 (1915). Payment of taxes on land is considered an act of ownership in this context. Presley v. Haynes, 182 Miss. 44, 180 So. 71 (1938); Scarborough v. Native Lumber Co., 118 Miss. 138, 79 So. 84 (1918); Caruth v. Gillespie, supra . This doctrine of presumption of grant is not precisely synonymous with adverse possession, though the two are indissolubly linked. Gibson v. State Land Commissioner, 374 So.2d 212, 216 (Miss. 1979). Where adverse possession can be shown, the doctrine of presumption of grant has no application. Itawamba County v. Sheffield, 195 Miss. 359, 13 So.2d 649 (1943). The purpose of the doctrine is to quiet title after long possession; its applicability depends upon possession under a claim of right, actual, open, and exclusive, and a chain of conveyances and payment of taxes are important. 4 Tiffany on Real Property, 3d ed., § 1136, n. 3 (1975) [citing United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 67 S.Ct. 1287, 91 L.Ed. 1474 (1947)]. The greatest practical difference between adverse possession and the doctrine of presumption of grant is that the latter allows assertions of claims against the sovereign, despite statutes barring adverse possession against the State. 5 Thompson on Real Property, § 2540A (1979) [citing Carruth v. Gillespie, supra ]. It is readily apparent, then, that application of the doctrine of presumption of grant to the facts of the instant case is especially appropriate. In Presley v. Haynes, 182 Miss. 44, 180 So. 71 (1938), Haynes conveyed certain land to Presley who in turn conveyed to a third party. When the third party discovered that the chain of title depended upon two 1887 tax deeds which were void, he required Presley to quiet title by procurement of a state patent. Presley sought indemnity from Haynes pursuant to the warranties in the deed from Haynes to Presley. Haynes and his predecessors in title had been in open possession of the land and had paid taxes thereon for over 45 years before the conveyance to Presley. Concluding that Haynes was not liable on his warranty, this Court held that the doctrine of presumption of grant cured any remote defect in the chain of title: Under such circumstances, and because of such a long lapse of years, it will be presumed that the state has long ago conveyed to the said occupants all its title to the land by a valid patent or patents, other than the invalid patents to which appellant here points... . When continuous occupancy, possession, and use of land has been openly held for such a great length of time as shown in this case, the state receiving taxes assessed thereon as if privately owned, the presumption above mentioned becomes absolute, and the title will be deemed as perfect as if held against private owners for the 10 years prescribed by the adverse possession statute, section 2287, Code 1930, which, under its express terms, gives full and complete title. 182 Miss. at 49-50, 180 So. at 71-72. Even though we think that the tax deed in the instant case was valid, Presley clearly demonstrates that presumption of grant will cure even a void tax deed under the proper circumstances. A title problem similar to the one now before the Court was resolved in Jones v. Gulf Refining Co., 202 Miss. 705, 32 So.2d 435 (1947). There, the State, as a party in interest, sought to confirm title in itself to land which Jones and his predecessors, claiming under an 1875 tax deed, had continuously occupied for 66 years. The State argued that because there was no evidence the land had ever been patented to a private owner, title was still in the State in 1875 and consequently, the land could not possibly have been sold for taxes then. Regardless of whether title was actually in the State in 1875, this Court invoked the doctrine of presumption of grant to dispel the confusion: In order that the forfeited tax-land patent shall have been good to convey a fee-simple title, a title of that grade must have passed out of the state into the hands of a private person before January 1, 1874, else it would not have been assessable and subject to the tax sale as a fee-simple title on May 10, 1875. There is no record that the title had so passed out of the State. In favor, however, of a possession of such a long length of years as is here present, a presumption exists that there was such a grant by the sovereign as will support the title of the persons in actual adverse occupancy and claim of title. 202 Miss. at 709, 32 So.2d at 436. The same principle is applicable to the facts of the instant case. There is no evidence that the school board ever parted with the title it acquired from Sullivan in 1867. But title must have passed from the school board to a private person prior to the 1878 tax sale, else the property would not have been subject to such a sale. The open and continuous possession of the subject property by appellees and their predecessors for the previous 93 years (1892-1985), is enough to raise a presumption that there was at some time a grant from the sovereign sufficient to support the title they now assert. This Court has recently addressed the doctrine of presumption of grant in Gibson v. State Land Commissioner, 374 So.2d 212 (Miss. 1979). That opinion as it relates to presumption of grant is not clear. Gibson appears to mean that presumption of grant will not arise against the State unless the claimant produces written evidence of some kind from the State to impart color of title (374 So.2d at 217.) If this is the rule in Gibson, then such a rule is erroneous, since the very purpose of the doctrine is to remedy the absence of written evidence of some kind from the State. Notwithstanding the requirement in Gibson, that case poses no obstacle to appellees. The written evidence from the State which imparts color of title to appellees' claim is the 1878 tax deed from the State wherein the subject property is conveyed to the purchaser, his heirs and assigns forever. A final question which arises in connection with this issue is whether a prior tax sale is necessary to invoke the doctrine against the State. This question is particularly relevant to the instant case in that part of the subject property (Parcel C, W 1/2 of NE 1/4) was never sold for taxes as were the other two parcels. Jones v. Gulf Refining Co . and Presley v. Haynes suggest that there must be some triggering event in the chain of title ( e.g., tax sale of public land) to raise the presumption of grant. This appears to be the force behind the implication in Gibson v. State Land Commissioner that a presumption of grant will not arise unless there is shown some written evidence from the State imparting color of title. What these cases stand for is the principle that a presumption of grant arises where there is some unexplained anomaly in the chain of title. But this principle should not be construed to mean that the presumption arises only in the face of such anomaly. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that the lack of defect in the chain of title does not preclude the application of the presumption where the claimant has openly occupied the land and paid the taxes thereon for a long period. Miller v. Kansas City Southern Rwy. Co., 216 Ark. 304, 225 S.W.2d 18 (1949); Carter v. Stewart, 149 Ark. 189, 231 S.W. 887 (1921). Surely the State cannot undertake to profit because of the negative nature of the records. Miller, 216 Ark. at 306, 225 S.W.2d at 19. [W]here the State has for a long time demanded and collected taxes on property, and the property owner [claimant] has acquiesced therein by paying the taxes, there arises a presumption that there was a legal liability to pay the taxes, and this furnishes a strong circumstance from which the court may infer a grant from the State. Carter, 149 Ark. at 195, 231 S.W. at 889. See generally Baker v. Certain Lands in Independence County, 19 Ark. App. 253, 750 S.W.2d 318 (1986). In summary, we conclude that the 1878 tax deed vested perfect title in the purchaser. But even if the 1878 tax sale was void, we hold that the open and continuous possession of the subject property by the Ryes and their predecessors in title from 1892 to the present, together with the usual acts incident to ownership, is sufficient under Mississippi law to raise the presumption that at some time there was a grant by the sovereign which divested itself of title and perfected title in those from whom the Ryes now deraign their title.