Opinion ID: 2146839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting into evidence his two statements made while in custody of police officers, and in admitting a knife and other items of physical evidence that Defendant assisted police officers to locate, after he had made these statements. Specifically, Defendant contends that, prior to giving his first statement, he was not adequately advised that if he wished to consult with counsel prior to or during interrogation but could not afford a lawyer, one would be provided for him. He argues that the first advisement of rights given by police officers indicated only that Defendant would be provided with counsel during court appearances. Although Defendant's brief appears to concede that the advisements given before the second statement were adequate, he claims that the second statement was so tainted by the first statement that neither should have been admitted. He further argues that the trial court should not have admitted various items of physical evidence that Defendant had helped police to find in Lake Michigan several days after his second statement, during which Defendant had told the officers he had thrown his knife and other items into the lake. We reject these contentions. Before a confession may be admitted into evidence, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect intelligently and knowingly waived his rights not to incriminate himself and to have an attorney present. See, Chamness v. State (1982), Ind., 431 N.E.2d 474, 476; see generally, Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. However, this Court will not reweigh the evidence in evaluating a trial court's decision to admit a confession, but will only determine whether the record includes sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's ruling that the confession was voluntarily made. See, e.g., Ortiz v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 549, 553, 356 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 and authorities cited. Prior to taking Defendant's first statement police officers read to Defendant, and had him read and sign, a waiver of rights form which included the following advisements: YOUR RIGHTS Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer. The record contains no indication that Defendant questioned the officers or expressed any confusion concerning the content of these advisements, nor any indication that Defendant requested an attorney before or during his statement. Defendant's first statement claimed that the victim, after spending part of the evening with Defendant, had gone with other persons in a van to the Lake Michigan shoreline while Defendant followed at a distance, that the persons in the van had then approached Defendant, told him they had dropped off the victim, and that they then beat him. Thus, outside of Defendant's having admitted that he was with the victim the evening of the crime near the crime scene, facts which he had already reported to police officers before they took him into custody, Defendant's first statement contained nothing implicating himself in the attack upon her. Following further investigation, police officers asked Defendant to make a second statement one day later, and he agreed. Prior to taking the second statement, police read to Defendant and had him read and sign a waiver form which included the following advisements: 1. Before making this statement, I was advised that I have the right to remain silent and that anything I might say may or will be used against me in a court of law. 2. That I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own choice before saying anything, and that an attorney may be present while I am making any statement or throughout the course of any conversation with any police officer if I so choose. 3. That I can stop and request an attorney at any time during the course of the taking of any statement or during the course of any such conversation. 4. That in the course of any conversation I can refuse to answer any further questions and remain silent, thereby terminating the conversation. 5. That if I cannot hire an attorney, one will be provided for me. Defendant then, in his second statement, admitted that he had stabbed the victim. He also told the officers he had discarded a knife and other items in the lake. He later led police officers along the shoreline to where he had discarded the items, and police divers recovered them. Defendant argues that the first waiver form indicated that he could be provided with counsel only at some future point, i.e. during court hearings. He cites California v. Prysock (1981), 453 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696, to support his position. While Prysock does support the proposition that a suspect must be clearly told that counsel will be provided during interrogation, the opinion does not otherwise support Defendant's position here regarding his first statement. The Prysock Court found that the interrogating officer's specific statements to a juvenile suspect and his parents satisfied Miranda requirements. This Court's prior decisions in Dickerson v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 562, 276 N.E.2d 845, cited by Defendant, and Goodloe v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 270, 252 N.E.2d 788, are distinguishable. In Dickerson a suspect was presented with a waiver form very similar to the form used before Defendant's first statement in this case, but the officers did not make sure that the defendant could read the form, nor did they read and explain the form to him. Id., 257 Ind. at 567-72, 276 N.E.2d at 848-51. Although we determined that the defendant was not given adequate Miranda warnings, the error was deemed harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id., 257 Ind. at 572-74, 276 N.E.2d at 851. In Goodloe the arresting officer's advisements were patently inadequate and incomplete, and clearly did not inform the appellant that she had a right to an attorney prior to [or during] interrogation. Id., 253 Ind. at 275-76, 252 N.E.2d at 791-92. This case is more analogous to Jones v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 235, 238-44, 252 N.E.2d 572, 573-77 (DeBruler and Jackson, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied (1977) 431 U.S. 971, 97 S.Ct. 2934, 53 L.Ed.2d 1069, where this Court upheld admission of a confession made after the defendant had been presented with advisements virtually identical to the first advisements provided the Defendant here, and the interrogating officers had explained them. In this case the record also demonstrates that the interrogating officers read and explained the first waiver form to Defendant. There is no evidence that the officers threatened or physically abused him. The advisements form included the statement (y)ou have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning, ... even if you cannot afford to hire one. We conclude that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that Defendant's first statement was voluntary, and therefore admissible. Assuming, arguendo, that Defendant's first statement should not have been admitted, we conclude the error was harmless. Outside of admitting that he was with the victim the night of the crime, which police officers already knew, Defendant's first statement did not implicate himself in her stabbing. The five-part waiver form presented and explained to Defendant prior to his second statement fully satisfied Miranda requirements and, as the State emphasizes, was substantially approved by this Court in Robinson v. State (1979), 272 Ind. 312, 315-16, 397 N.E.2d 956, 958-59. This is not a case where a second confession, preceded by proper Miranda warnings, was nevertheless so tainted by a suspect's prior confession rendered without adequate warnings that the second confession should have been excluded as well as the first. Defendant was fully advised of his rights to counsel before his second, substantially inculpatory statement was given to police, and it properly was admitted.