Opinion ID: 172498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Law Dictates Summary Judgment Standard

Text: Before turning to the facts of this case, this court must address whether Utah's summary judgment rules preclude this court from upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment. Under federal law, a defendant may be granted summary judgment whenever plaintiffs fail adequately to support one of the elements of their claim upon which they ha[ve] the burden of proof. Jensen v. Kimble, 1 F.3d 1073, 1079 (10th Cir.1993). Utah's approach to summary judgment is generally parallel to the federal courts' approach. See, e.g., Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 418-20 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (affirming summary judgment for defendants because plaintiff failed to bring evidence supporting one of the elements regarding which it had the burden of proof). However, Utah has a special rule for summary judgment in negligence cases that differs significantly from federal law. Under Utah law, [s]ummary judgment in negligence cases, including gross negligence cases, is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is fixed by law.  Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 179 P.3d 760, 767 (Utah 2008) (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). In other words, Utah courts would prevent either party to a negligence dispute from obtaining summary judgment where the standard of care applicable to that dispute has not been fixed by law. See Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 171 P.3d 442, 449 (Utah 2007) (explaining that Utah courts will not grant summary judgment in a gross negligence case where the applicable standard of care has not been fixed by law because [i]dentification of the proper standard of care is a necessary precondition to assessing the degree to which conduct deviates, if at all, from the standard of carethe core test in any claim of gross negligence); but see RJW Media, Inc. v. CIT Group/Consumer Finance, Inc., 202 P.3d 291, 296 (Utah Ct. App.2008) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant in a negligence case where the standard of care had not been fixed by law but the defendant had presented uncontested evidence of the appropriate standard of care). In Pearce, 179 P.3d 760, the most recent Utah Supreme Court case to consider this issue, the plaintiff brought gross negligence claims arising out of injuries that occurred during a bobsled ride. The Utah court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate because the applicable standard of care had not been fixed by law. The court held that the generally applicable reasonably prudent person standard was insufficiently specific to constitute a standard of care fixed by law. Id. at 768 n. 2. Rather, for the standard of care in that case to be fixed by law, a statute or judicial precedent must articulate specific standards for designing, constructing, and testing a bobsled run for the public or for operating a public bobsled ride. Id.; see also Berry, 171 P.3d at 449 (denying motion for summary judgment in negligence case involving a skiercross course because the applicable standard of care was not fixed by law); Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (stating that the applicable standard of care in a given case may be established, as a matter of law, by legislative enactment or prior judicial decision). Since no statute or precedent provided a standard of care for bobsled rides, the Utah court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Pearce, 179 P.3d at 768. Applying Utah law to this case would probably require that we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment. It is undisputed that no Utah precedent or legislative enactment specifically establishes the standard of care for running mixed-course bicycle races. Thus, under Utah law, the standard of care in this case is not fixed by law, and summary judgment would be inappropriate. Under federal law, on the other hand, a defendant need not establish that the standard of care specific to the factual context of the case has been fixed by law in order to be granted summary judgment. See Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 342 (3rd Cir.1985) (holding that defendant moving for summary judgment in a legal malpractice claim need not present expert testimony establishing a standard of care even though a plaintiff in that position would need to do so, because the case law establishing the plaintiff's duty to provide expert testimony cannot fairly be characterized as applying to a defendant's motion under Rule 56) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 343 ([T]he party moving for summary judgment has the ultimate burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. But once the appellees averred facts and alleged that their conduct was not negligent, a burden of production shifted to the appellant to proffer evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact as to the standard of care.) (citations omitted); see generally Young v. United Auto. Workers Labor Employment and Training Corp., 95 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir.1996) (A party who moves for summary judgment under Rule 56 is not required to provide evidence negating an opponent's claim. Rather, the burden is on the nonmovant, who must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.) (citations and quotations omitted). On the contrary, federal courts will sometimes grant summary judgment to defendants on negligence claims precisely because of the plaintiff's failure to present evidence establishing a standard of care as part of its burden of proof on an element of plaintiff's case. See, e.g., Briggs v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C.Cir.2007) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendants on a negligence claim where plaintiff, who under state law had the burden to provide expert testimony on the standard of care, failed to offer creditable evidence sufficient to establish a controlling standard of care); Keller v. Albright, 1 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1281-82 (D.Utah 1997) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's legal malpractice claim asserted under Utah law because the plaintiff failed to provide expert testimony regarding the standard of care, and the case did not involve circumstances within the common knowledge and experience of lay jurors) (citation and quotation omitted), aff'd, No. 97-4205, 1998 WL 163363 (10th Cir. Apr.8, 1998) (unpublished) (affirming for substantially those reasons set out in the district court's [opinion]). Thus, even when Utah substantive law was involved, the federal district court of Utah and the Tenth Circuit have held that the federal courts may grant a defendant summary judgment on a negligence claim even if the parameters of the standard of care in the relevant industry have not been previously established by precedent or statute. [4] See also Noel v. Martin, 21 Fed. Appx. 828, 836 (10th Cir.2001) (unpublished) (upholding summary judgment for defendants in a legal malpractice case where the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's only expert on the issue of the standard of care). In Foster v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 293 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir.2002), this court addressed a closely analogous set of facts involving a conflict between federal and state law standards for granting summary judgment. Foster involved a retaliatory discharge case brought pursuant to Kansas law. Id. at 1190-91. Under Kansas law, a plaintiff can prevail at trial if she establishes her case with clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1194 (internal quotation omitted). However, Kansas law provides that a plaintiff in a retaliation case .... can successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1194 (internal quotation and citation omitted). In Foster, this court rejected the plaintiff's efforts to have that lower evidentiary standard apply at the summary judgment stage in federal court. Id. at 1194-95. Instead, this court held that the Supreme Court's opinion in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), required that courts view the evidence through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. Id. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 769 F.2d 1451, 1454-55 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating, in the context of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence needed to go to the jury in a diversity case is a matter of federal law); Bank of Cali., N.A. v. Opie, 663 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir.1981) ([F]ederal law alone governs whether evidence is sufficient to raise a question for the trier-of-fact.). Applying that standard to the case before it, this court in Foster held that, at summary judgment, the plaintiff must set forth evidence of a clear and convincing nature that, if believed by the ultimate factfinder, would establish that plaintiff was more likely than not the victim of illegal retaliation by her employer. Foster, 293 F.3d at 1195. See also Conrad v. Bd. of Johnson County Comm'rs, 237 F.Supp.2d 1204, 1266-67 (D.Kan.2002) (holding that, for state law retaliatory discharge claims, the clear and convincing standard is applied at the summary judgment stageat least when the claim is brought in a federal court sitting in diversity). Thus, although the state law dictated that a plaintiff alleging retaliatory discharge could avoid summary judgment under a preponderance of the evidence standard, federal law required that the substantive standard applied at trial (i.e., clear and convincing evidence) governs summary judgment determinations. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965); McEwen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 919 F.2d 58, 60 (7th Cir.1990) (Federal courts may grant summary judgment under Rule 56 on concluding that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the party opposing the motion, even if the state would require the judge to submit an identical case to the jury.); 10 A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2712 (3d ed. 1998) ([I]n diversity-of-citizenship actions questions relating to the availability of summary judgment, such as whether there is a disputed issue of fact that is sufficient to defeat the motion, are procedural and therefore governed by Rule 56, rather than by state law.). The circumstances of this case are very similar to what we addressed in Foster. Like the evidentiary rule in Foster, Utah's rule foreclosing summary judgment in cases where the standard of care has not been fixed by law applies exclusively at summary judgment. This is clear because Utah law provides that, at trial, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the appropriate standard of care. See Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005) (To establish a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must establish ... that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty [and] that the defendant breached that duty....) (citations and quotations omitted); Sohm v. Dixie Eye Ctr., 166 P.3d 614, 619 (Utah Ct.App.2007) (To sustain a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must demonstrate... the standard of care by which the [physician's] conduct is to be measured.... (quoting Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 82 P.3d 1076, 1095-96 (Utah 2003)) (alteration in original)); see also Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, CV301B (2009), http://www.utcourts.gov/ resources/muji/ (stating that to establish medical malpractice a plaintiff has the burden of proving, inter alia, what the standard of care is); id. at CV302 (putting the same burden of proof on a plaintiff attempting to prove nursing negligence). By allowing the plaintiff to avoid summary judgment in cases where the standard of care has not been fixed by law, Utah has created a rule very similar to Kansas's rule allowing plaintiffs to avoid summary judgment under a lesser standard of proof than they would carry at trial. We are, therefore, bound to treat Utah's unique summary judgment rule in the same way that we treated the rule in Foster, and conclude that, although we will look to Utah law to determine what elements the plaintiffs must prove at trial to prevail on their claims, see Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 792 (10th Cir.1997) (stating that in a diversity action we examine the evidence in terms of the underlying burden of proof as dictated by state law), we will look exclusively to federal law to determine whether plaintiffs have provided enough evidence on each of those elements to withstand summary judgment. [5] As we discuss in the following section, this approach leads us to concur with the district court's decision granting summary judgment for the defendants.