Opinion ID: 2569893
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Final Ruling on the Breit Issue

Text: {37} At the conclusion of the hearings on the motion to reopen, the district court found inter alia that (1) Montoya did not know or can be presumed not to have known that [his] conduct was improper and prejudicial; (2) Montoya had an honest belief that his questions were proper; (3) Montoya did not act in willful disregard; (4) Montoya's misconduct does not appear to be the result of a plan or scheme to inject unfair prejudice into the trial; and (5) Montoya did not seek a tactical advantage through his conduct [n]or would the State have gained a tactical advantage because of a mistrial. The district court then concluded that Montoya's conduct did not evince the extraordinary circumstances that would require barring a retrial ruling that the Order of Dismissal filed on May 8, 2003 be vacated and Defendant's Motion to Bar further Prosecution be Denied. {38} The district court concluded that the only prong of the Breit test that was met was that if the court had known about Montoya's misconduct at the time he was introducing the inadmissible hearsay, it would have granted a mistrial. The district court did not construe the facts to meet the other two prongs of Breit. Defendant appealed these conclusions to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court. McClaugherty II, 2007-NMCA-041, ¶ 2, 141 N.M. 468, 157 P.3d 33.