Opinion ID: 4538048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixth Amendment Right to a Public Trial

Text: ¶14 We review a trial court’s decision to close the courtroom as a mixed question of law and fact. People v. Hassen, 2015 CO 49, ¶ 5, 351 P.3d 418, 420. Thus, “we accept the trial court’s findings of fact absent an abuse of discretion, but we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Id. (quoting Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 2015 CO 31, ¶ 8, 350 P.3d 287, 289, rev’d on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017)).
¶15 “Both the United States and the Colorado Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to a public trial.” Id. at ¶ 7, 351 P.3d at 420; see U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. ¶16 This right “is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.” Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)). Courts specifically recognize the important role a defendant’s family members play in reminding the trial participants of this duty. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272 (1948); United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2012). 6 ¶17 Further, “[i]n addition to ensuring that [the] judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages perjury.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 46; see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process . . . . [P]ublic access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process—an essential component in our structure of self-government.”). ¶18 A public trial also protects the public’s and the press’s qualified First Amendment rights to attend a criminal trial. Waller, 467 U.S. at 44; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). “While innocent defendants benefit from the potential advantages of public trials . . . a guilty defendant may prefer secret proceedings where bribes, intimidation, or unfavorable verdicts can pass without ‘the bracing sunshine of publicity.’ Society, however, has an interest in fair outcomes in both situations.” Kristin Saetveit, Close Calls: Defining Courtroom Closures Under the Sixth Amendment, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 897, 903 (2016) (citations omitted) (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 677 (1996); see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (“[T]he open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion.”). 7 ¶19 Armed with these noble sentiments, we must now figure out how to deploy them. First, what does it mean to have a “public” trial? Of course, in the most general sense, the term defines itself: A “public” trial is one that is not secret; it is one that the public is free to attend. Hampton v. People, 465 P.2d 394, 399 (Colo. 1970). ¶20 But this broad definition has limitations. Given competing interests, a criminal defendant’s right to a public trial is not absolute. At times, it must yield to concerns such as “the defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 45; accord Hassen, ¶ 8, 351 P.3d at 421. Thus, while the total exclusion of the press and the public generally amounts to a closure, such closures may be permissible under certain circumstances. ¶21 Recently, we noted that these circumstances “will be rare” and “the balance of interests must be struck with special care.” Hassen, ¶ 8, 351 P.3d at 421 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 45). To justify a closure, (1) “the party seeking to close the [proceeding] must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced”; (2) “the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest”; (3) “the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding”; and (4) the “trial court must make findings adequate to support the closure.” Id. at ¶ 9, 351 P.3d at 421 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48). Regarding the third factor, we 8 recently emphasized that the Supreme Court insists that “[t]rial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.” Id. (quoting Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 215 (2010)).
¶22 But what if the closure is less complete? What if only one or two people are excluded from the trial? Or, as happened here, what if two people (specifically, a defendant’s parents) are excluded but only during the testimony of two witnesses? Are these closures that must first be justified by a Waller analysis? These questions have been hotly debated. ¶23 Many courts recognize that the exclusion of even a single individual can, under certain circumstances, implicate the values the Sixth Amendment seeks to protect. For example, the Ninth Circuit has observed that, “because they are the individuals most likely to be affected by the” outcome of a proceeding, “[f]riends and family members . . . are particularly effective” at reminding “the [trial] participants, especially the judge, that the consequences of their actions extend to the broader community.” Rivera, 682 F.3d at 1230. Thus, many courts now recognize limited exclusions as partial closures, though there remains some disagreement regarding what findings are required for such closures. ¶24 Some courts apply a more lenient “substantial reason” test to justify partial closures, reasoning that “the partial closing of court proceedings does not raise the 9 same constitutional concerns as a total closure, because an audience remains to ensure the fairness of the proceedings.” United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98–99 (5th Cir. 1995); accord United States v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2015); Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001). Under this modified Waller test, courts generally replace Waller’s “overriding interest” factor with the less stringent “substantial reason” factor, but otherwise employ the full Waller analysis. See Simmons, 797 F.3d at 414; Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76–77 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Addison, 708 F.3d 1181, 1187–88 (10th Cir. 2013); Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 1105, 1109–10 (10th Cir. 1989). ¶25 Other courts require the full Waller analysis for partial closures. After all, they say, the Waller test “already contemplates a balancing of competing interests”—such as reasonable alternatives to closure and the scope of the closure itself. People v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 529 (N.Y. 2001). So there is no need to distinguish between partial and total closures. Id. (concluding that because a partial closure implicates the same Sixth Amendment rights as a total closure, Waller’s overriding interest requirement must still be met); see also, e.g., Tinsley v. United States, 868 A.2d 867, 874 (D.C. 2005) (“[W]e are not persuaded that the distinction between a ‘substantial reason’ and an ‘overriding interest’ is a particularly meaningful one.”); State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007) (“Although some federal circuit courts of appeals apply a lesser ‘substantial 10 reason’ test to review the constitutionality of partial closures, we have not . . . .” (citation omitted)). ¶26 While courts debate what test to use, it seems that most courts now recognize that partial closures can have constitutional significance. See Saetveit, supra, at 917–19 (collecting cases that recognize partial closures from nearly every federal circuit court as well as New York, Illinois, Minnesota, Alabama, South Dakota, and New Mexico); see also, e.g., State v. Barnes, 251 P.3d 96, 99, 100–01 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011); Longus v. State, 7 A.3d 64, 67–68, 75–76 (Md. 2010); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 921 N.E.2d 906, 920–22 (Mass. 2010); State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 160–61 (R.I. 2004); Woods v. State, 383 S.W.3d 775, 781 (Tex. App. 2012). ¶27 We join these courts in recognizing the potential constitutional significance of partial closures, but we save for another day the decision regarding whether the first Waller factor requires a “substantial reason” or an “overriding interest” in this context. Regardless, we conclude that before granting a partial closure request, the trial court must consider the Waller factors.2 2 Despite this debate about how to address partial closures, courts still generally agree that there are certain situations where the exclusion of specific individuals does not constitute a closure that would implicate a defendant’s right to a public trial. For example, it is well-accepted that sequestration orders do not implicate this right. See, e.g., CRE 615; People v. Watkins, 553 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. 1976) 11 4. Whether an Unconstitutional Partial Closure Occurred Here ¶28 With this precedent in mind, the initial question we confront is whether, under the circumstances here, the trial court’s exclusion of Jones’s parents during the testimony of his two children amounted to a closure requiring a Waller analysis. If we conclude that this was a closure, we must then decide whether the lack of Waller findings can be cured by a remand for additional findings or whether the violation requires a new trial. ¶29 Here, the prosecution requested the exclusion of Jones’s mother and stepfather during the testimony of Jones’s two children (A.J. and J.J.) based on (acknowledging that regulating the sequestration of witnesses is a matter of discretion); Williamson v. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 695 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo. App. 1984) (“[A]bsent the exceptions not pertinent here, sequestration is a matter of right for either litigant.”); see also 23 C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 930 (updated 2020) (“The right to a public trial is not implicated by the exclusion of a potential witness pursuant to the witness exclusionary or sequestration rule.”). Nor does in camera voir dire of jurors implicate the right. See People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 757–58 (Colo. 1999) (discussing the use of in camera voir dire to question jurors individually about their views on the death penalty); People v. Rudnick, 878 P.2d 16, 21 (Colo. App. 1993) (acknowledging the use of in camera discussions with individual prospective jurors as a component of the voir dire process); see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 598 n.23 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that conferences held in chambers or at the bench do not necessarily implicate the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 661 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that closed, in camera voir dire of individual jurors on sensitive subjects did not “offend the Sixth Amendment”). Our opinion today should not be construed to suggest otherwise. 12 events that had occurred outside the courtroom the previous weekend. According to the prosecutor, as A.J. and J.J. left their paternal grandparents’ home, their grandmother, Jones’s mother, hugged A.J., “started bawling uncontrollably and said, I’m sorry you are going to have a tough week.” This then “sent A.J. into a bit of a tailspin” and “[set] him very much on edge.” Thus, the prosecutor asked for Jones’s parents to be excluded from the courtroom while the children testified, “for the benefit of the children. . . . [Because the grandparents] have already put the children on edge about a difficult situation they are in as it is. And I don’t want to put them in harm’s way any further than we have to.”3 ¶30 In granting the request, the court made no findings to support its decision. The court simply said that, “given the circumstances, I’m going to order that neither [of Jones’s parents] are going to be allowed in the courtroom during the children’s testimony.” Defense counsel objected based on Jones’s right to a public trial and asked that at least Jones’s stepfather be allowed to remain since he “[did] 3 The prosecutor claimed that “all parties [in the related dependency and neglect proceeding] were asked to not speak to the kids about any of the court proceedings or do anything that might make them more on edge regarding court proceedings.” If there was a court order to this effect, it is not part of the record in this case. Moreover, the trial court made no finding that anyone had violated a court order. In the absence of such a finding, there is simply no basis to conclude that Jones’s mother violated a court order by getting upset and expressing her concern that one of the children was going to have a hard week. 13 not have any involvement with this situation.” The court summarily denied the request. ¶31 The prosecution contends that this was merely an exclusion for cause, not a closure. As such, they say it was within the court’s discretion to exclude Jones’s parents to maintain courtroom decorum without implicating the Sixth Amendment. The prosecution cites to State v. Lormor, 257 P.3d 624, 628–29 (Wash. 2011), to support its argument that exclusion of only one or two people, “without more, is simply not a closure.” ¶32 In Lormor, the defendant’s daughter, who was not quite four years old, was confined to a wheelchair and on a ventilator. Id. at 626. In deciding to exclude the daughter from the proceedings, the court noted that, given the girl’s young age, “I don’t know how much she would understand of the proceedings[, and], given the setup I could even hear at the bench the ventilator operating.” Id. The court then concluded that having the daughter present “would be an inappropriate distraction and frankly [as] difficult for her as it would be potentially distracting for the jury.” Id. ¶33 On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that this exclusion did not amount to a closure because only a single person was excluded from the courtroom. Id. at 628–29. It therefore implicitly rejected the notion of a “partial” closure. The court then concluded that, as a matter of maintaining courtroom 14 decorum, the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding the defendant’s daughter for several reasons: the defendant’s entire family wasn’t excluded; the doors were not locked; the proceedings were not held in a location closed to the public (e.g., the judge’s chambers); and the defendant was not excluded from the proceedings. Id. at 628. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the supreme court further observed that the distraction was observable in the courtroom, the defendant made no objection, and “[t]he trial court judge discussed the removal on the record and gave his reasons for doing so.” Id. at 626–27, 630. ¶34 But the prosecution’s reliance on Lormor seems misplaced for at least two reasons. First, by joining what seems to be the majority of jurisdictions in recognizing the constitutional significance of partial closures, we accept that the exclusion of even a single person, depending on the circumstances, can violate a defendant’s public trial right. Thus, on this point, we simply disagree with Lormor. ¶35 Second, unlike in Lormor, here there was no disruption in the courtroom. Moreover, even accepting the prosecution’s offer of proof as to what had happened the preceding weekend between Jones’s mother and his children, the court made no findings—under Waller or otherwise—as to why this provided cause to exclude both parents. There was no showing that Jones’s stepfather or the child J.J. were involved in, or affected by, the out-of-court incident. Thus, at least as to J.J.’s testimony and Jones’s stepfather’s presence, there was no record 15 made showing any cause for exclusion. Even as to Jones’s mother, there is little to nothing in the record to support the conclusion that her presence at trial would have created the potential for disruption or witness intimidation. ¶36 Therefore, we conclude the trial court’s exclusion of Jones’s parents from the courtroom without first making any Waller findings constituted an unjustified partial closure.4 ¶37 The prosecution further contends, however, that even if the court’s exclusion of Jones’s parents was a closure, it was trivial. In a recent opinion, we adopted the triviality exception. See People v. Lujan, 2020 CO 26, ¶ 23, 461 P.3d 494, 4 As noted, we distinguish the situation here from those situations where the trial court must address a disturbance in the courtroom. Some courts treat the exclusion of individuals who have caused, or are causing, a disruption as a matter within the court’s discretion to maintain order that does not implicate the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., McCrae v. State, 908 So. 2d 1095, 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding the Sixth Amendment was not implicated, and a Waller analysis was not necessary, where the court imposed “time and manner restrictions on ingress and egress” because “[d]isruption may interfere with a spectator’s attention, or a participant’s performance, at public events of many kinds”). Other courts treat such exclusions as Sixth Amendment closures that must first be justified under the Waller test. See, e.g., Cosentino v. Kelly, 926 F. Supp. 391, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that “[t]he right to a public trial has always been interpreted as being subject to the trial judge’s power to keep order in the courtroom,” but nonetheless analyzing a partial closure based on disruptive behaviors under Waller (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1979))), aff’d, 102 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 1996). On the facts before us, we need not join this debate today. 16 499. A “trivial closure” is one where, although the closure might have been unjustified, it was “‘so trivial as not to violate’ a defendant’s right to a public trial.” Id. at ¶ 17, 461 P.3d at 498 (quoting Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1996)). ¶38 In assessing triviality, courts consider “whether the actions of the court and the effect that they had on the conduct of the trial deprived the defendant . . . of the protections conferred by the Sixth Amendment.” Peterson, 85 F.3d at 42. To do so, they look to the “values furthered by the public trial guarantee”; namely, “1) to ensure a fair trial; 2) to remind the prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their functions; 3) to encourage witnesses to come forward; and 4) to discourage perjury.” Id. at 43. A court should consider the totality of the circumstances and consider factors such as “the duration of the closure, the substance of the proceedings that occurred during the closure, whether the proceedings were later memorialized in open court or placed on the record, whether the closure was intentional, and whether the closure was total or partial.” Lujan, ¶ 19, 461 P.3d at 498–99. ¶39 Courts sometimes find that closures that are brief and inadvertent are so trivial as to not violate the defendant’s right to a public trial because they did not infringe on the values protected by the right. See United States v. Ivester, 316 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a brief, mid-trial closure to question jurors 17 about their expressed concerns regarding safety was trivial); Peterson, 85 F.3d at 44 (holding that “in the context of this case, where the closure was 1) extremely short, 2) followed by a helpful summation, and 3) entirely inadvertent, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were not breached”); United States v. Al-Smadi, 15 F.3d 153, 154–55 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that a closure that was not ordered by the trial court but rather was the result of standard courthouse practices, was “brief and inadvertent,” “unnoticed by any of the trial participants,” and occurred only once did not violate the Sixth Amendment); see also Lujan, ¶¶ 26–36, 461 P.3d at 500–02 (holding that although closure was deliberate, it was trivial for several reasons: it was brief; it was transcribed by the recorder; it repeated information that had been presented in open court; and it did not involve the presentation of evidence, witness testimony, or any novel legal issues). ¶40 However, intentional closures during more significant, and less fleeting, testimony are generally considered not trivial because of their potential to affect the fairness of the proceedings. See Hassen, ¶ 16, 351 P.3d at 422 (concluding that a closure during two witnesses’ testimony that spanned twenty-seven pages of transcript was not trivial); see also Gonzalez v. Quinones, 211 F.3d 735, 737–38 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that an intentional closure, during a key witness’s testimony, that lasted an entire morning was not trivial); State v. Ndina, 761 N.W.2d 612, 627–28 (Wis. 2009) (concluding that the exclusion of most of the defendant’s 18 family for three days of witness testimony was not trivial). But compare Rivera, 682 F.3d at 1230 (concluding that exclusion of the defendant’s seven-year-old son and other family members from the sentencing hearing was not trivial), with United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890–91 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding that the exclusion of the defendant’s eight-year-old son for the entirety of trial was trivial). ¶41 We conclude that the exclusion here was not trivial for at least two reasons. First, as previously noted, in evaluating a defendant’s right to a public trial, courts emphasize the important role the presence of a defendant’s family plays in ensuring a fair trial. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 272 (“[A]n accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.”); English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court has specifically noted a special concern for assuring the attendance of family members of the accused.” (quoting Vidal v. Williams, 31 F.3d 67, 69 (2d Cir. 1994))). Jones’s parents’ absence during his children’s testimony implicated the public trial right guarantees because their presence could have discouraged perjury. Further, numerous courts have concluded that the presence of a defendant’s family at trial reminds the trial participants of their duty to treat the defendant fairly. See, e.g., Rivera, 682 F.3d at 1230; Longus, 7 A.3d at 75 (“[T]he defendant’s family and friends are the people who have the strongest interest or concern in the handling of the defendant’s trial and their attendance perhaps best 19 serves the purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee.”). This is all the more important when a defendant is charged with an unusually vicious offense of the sort likely to arouse passion and a widespread desire for vengeance. ¶42 Second, the testimony at issue was significant, and the partial closure here was not brief. The two witnesses—Jones’s children—provided insight into Jones’s relationship with the children’s mother around the time she was killed. They also identified Jones’s gun. Moreover, their testimony was hardly fleeting. It resulted in 146 pages of transcript, almost an entire afternoon during a ten-day trial. ¶43 Therefore, we conclude that the exclusion of Jones’s parents during his children’s testimony violated his right to a public trial, despite the fact that other members of the public were able to attend. 5. The Remedy for Violating Jones’s Right to a Public Trial ¶44 In light of this violation, we must now determine the appropriate remedy. ¶45 Certain types of errors are structural, meaning that they affect the basic framework within which the trial occurs and are not merely errors in the trial process. Hassen, ¶ 7, 351 P.3d at 420. These errors “are not amenable to either a harmless error or a plain error analysis.” Id. (quoting Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 7 (Colo. 2001)). Therefore, they “require automatic reversal without individualized analysis of how the error impairs the reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 10, 288 P.3d 116, 119. Examples include the 20 “complete deprivation of counsel, trial before a biased judge, unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury, denial of the right to selfrepresentation, and denial of the right to a public trial.” Id. (emphasis added). Nonetheless, some courts have chosen to remand cases where the trial court violated the defendant’s right to a public trial to allow the trial court to make the required findings. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 49–50; United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542, 547 (10th Cir. 1991). ¶46 We conclude that such a remand would not be helpful here. First, the trial judge, unfortunately, has died; therefore, it is not possible to remand for more detailed findings about his reasoning at the time he closed the courtroom. Second, while the prosecution has suggested that a remand to incorporate information from a contemporaneous and related dependency and neglect case could support the closure, any information from the dependency and neglect case would be insufficient to satisfy the second, third, and fourth Waller factors. ¶47 A quick review of the Waller factors makes this more plain. As to the first factor—advancing an overriding interest or substantial reason for the closure—we assume, without deciding, that under either the overriding interest or the substantial reason test, this factor is satisfied. ¶48 As to the second factor—whether the closure was no broader than necessary—we believe a remand would constitute an exercise in futility. As noted 21 above, defense counsel asked that Jones’s stepfather be allowed to attend, but the court summarily denied the request. Whether it actually considered this option is unclear. What is clear is that there was no discussion about whether either or both of Jones’s parents could be present during J.J.’s testimony or whether J.J. had observed and been similarly influenced by Jones’s mother’s conduct over the weekend. Thus, we conclude that a remand would fail to satisfy this factor because these options were not explored contemporaneously. ¶49 As to the third factor—whether the court considered any alternatives to closing—here too, a remand would not help. It does not appear that the court considered any alternatives to partially closing the courtroom, such as allowing the children to testify in camera or having Jones’s parents observe the testimony on a closed-circuit television. A remand cannot change that. ¶50 As to the fourth factor—adequate findings by the trial court—we’re similarly stuck. Because the judge is now deceased, no such findings are possible. And even if findings by another judge based on records from the dependency and neglect case and other reconstruction methods were an option, supplemental findings would still fail to adequately address the second and third factors, as explained above. ¶51 Therefore, because the trial court violated Jones’s right to a public trial by excluding Jones’s parents from the proceedings without first justifying that 22 decision under Waller, and because such a violation constitutes structural error that cannot be cured by a remand in this instance, we reverse Jones’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial. ¶52 While this remedy will no doubt strike some as draconian, on these facts, fidelity to the law regarding public trials and structural error compels the remedy all the same. B. Definition of “Person” In the Child Abuse Statute ¶53 Because the issue will arise on remand, we must address the second question on which we granted certiorari; namely, whether the court of appeals erred by interpreting the child abuse statute to preclude a conviction for child abuse where the fetus suffered injuries but is then born alive. ¶54 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389. In interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to discern the legislature’s intent. Id. We do so by first looking to the plain language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole and giving words and phrases their common meanings. Id. If the language is clear, we apply it as written. Id. ¶55 If, however, the language is ambiguous, meaning it is silent or susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may use extrinsic aids of construction, “such as the consequences of a given construction, the end to be 23 achieved by the statute, and the statute’s legislative history.” Id. at ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389; see Martinez v. People, 2020 CO 3, ¶ 17, 455 P.3d 752, 756; People v. Carrillo, 2013 COA 3, ¶¶ 12–13, 297 P.3d 1028, 1030. ¶56 The child abuse statute provides that “[a] person commits child abuse if such person causes an injury to a child’s life or health, or permits a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the child’s life or health.” § 18-6-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2019). It also defines “child” as “a person under the age of sixteen years.” § 18-6-401(2). The statute does not define “person.” ¶57 The legislature’s general definitions, which “apply to every statute, unless the context otherwise requires,” § 2-4-401, C.R.S. (2019), define person as “any individual, corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, limited liability company, partnership, association, or other legal entity,” § 2-4-401(8). This definition does not aid our interpretation of the term “person” as it is used in the child abuse statute. And the common definitions of the term “person” are also not dispositive in this context. See Person, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A human being.”); Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/person [https://perma.cc/8ZAZ-9NY2] (defining “person” as “Human, Individual”). ¶58 Thus, because the child abuse statute is silent as to whether an unborn fetus is a “child,” and because the plain language does not reveal a clear legislative 24 intent regarding this term, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous. We therefore turn to other aids of construction. ¶59 One of the aids we may employ is to look to other statutes where the legislature has defined the term at issue, particularly when those statutes should be read in pari materia. Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1043 n.6 (Colo. 1991) (“In pari materia is a rule of statutory construction which requires that statutes relating to the same subject matter be construed together in order to gather the legislature’s intent from the whole of the enactments.”). Using this tool, Jones urges us to consider the definitions in the homicide and unlawful termination of pregnancy statutes, both of which exclude an unborn fetus from the definition of person. See § 18-3-101(2), C.R.S. (2019) (“‘Person’, when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who had been born and was alive at the time of the homicidal act.”); § 18-3.5-110, C.R.S. (2019) (“Nothing in this article shall be construed to confer the status of ‘person’ upon a human embryo, fetus, or unborn child at any stage of development prior to live birth.”). The prosecution contends, however, that the definitions contained in those statutes have no application to our interpretation of “person” in the child abuse statute. ¶60 We agree with the prosecution that those exclusionary definitions do not clarify the legislative intent in the child abuse context. First, we do not read these statutes in pari materia. They cover different subjects and different harms 25 —causing death (to either an unborn fetus or a living child) versus protecting a child who is still alive. The legislature clearly intended for the homicide statute to apply only to those individuals “who had been born and [were] alive at the time of the homicidal act.” § 18-3-101(2). We cannot infer from this definition, however, that the child abuse statute similarly applies only to harm caused to those who are already born at the time of the injurious conduct. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (“When conducting statutory interpretation, we ‘must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.’” (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008))). Without a cross-reference or specific incorporation, we will not infer a legislative intent to apply the homicide definition in the child abuse context. See People v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 729, 733–34 (Colo. 1996) (refusing to incorporate definitions from one statutory title into another title where such application was not expressly provided for by the legislature). ¶61 Likewise, the unlawful termination of pregnancy statute expresses a clear intent to protect a mother who has had a pregnancy terminated through the injurious conduct of another: “A person commits the offense of unlawful termination of pregnancy in the first degree if, with the intent to terminate unlawfully the pregnancy of a woman, the person unlawfully terminates the woman’s pregnancy.” § 18-3.5-103(1); see § 18-3.5-101(6), C.R.S. (2019) (“‘Unlawful 26 termination of pregnancy’ means the termination of a pregnancy by any means other than birth or a medical procedure . . . for which the consent of the pregnant woman . . . has been obtained . . . .”). It does not address harm to fetuses, and it does not discuss children. Thus, as with the homicide statute, because the unlawful termination of pregnancy statute and the child abuse statute cover different harms, and because neither expressly cross-references or incorporates the other, we will not infer a legislative intent to apply the unlawful termination of pregnancy definition of “person” in the child abuse context. ¶62 Second, Jones contends that the legislative history, including several failed voter initiatives, support the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to permit recovery for injuries caused to a fetus under the child abuse statute. However, we will not interpret failed voter initiatives as proof of legislative intent. ¶63 Similarly, we decline the prosecution’s invitation to infer legislative intent from the fact that the legislature has not amended the definition of “child” or “person” in the child abuse statute following People v. Lage, 232 P.3d 138 (Colo. App. 2009), despite amending the statute several times. See Welby Gardens v. Adams Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d 992, 998 n.8 (Colo. 2003) (“[W]e note that of the many sources we may consult to discern legislative intent, reliance on legislative inaction is particularly risky. The reasons for enacting, or not enacting, legislation are too numerous to tally.”); Williams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2015 COA 180, ¶ 103, 27 369 P.3d 760, 778 (refusing to interpret the legislature’s failure to amend a statute following a decision interpreting it, despite amending other sections of the statute, as indicative of legislative intent). ¶64 In Lage, a division of the court of appeals held that the term “person,” as used in the child abuse statute, “include[s] a fetus who is injured while in the womb, is subsequently born and lived outside the womb, and then died from the injuries sustained.” 232 P.3d at 144. The division reached this conclusion based on other jurisdictions’ application of the common law “born alive” doctrine in criminal contexts and on this court’s application of the doctrine in the civil context of interpreting Colorado’s wrongful death statute. Id. at 143–44. ¶65 However, “[i]t is ‘impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that [legislative] failure to act represents’ affirmative [legislative] approval of the Court’s statutory interpretation.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)). And given that this court has never interpreted the term “person” in the child abuse statute,5 we do not find such legislative inaction instructive. See Welby Gardens, 71 P.3d at 998 n.8 (noting that it was not surprising that the 5 The parties in Lage did not file a petition for certiorari review. 28 legislature had not amended a statutory definition where the supreme court had never interpreted the subject term in the given context). ¶66 The prosecution further contends, as did Judge Webb in his dissent to the division majority on this issue, that because the child abuse statute contains no definition of “person,” and because definitions of that term in other criminal contexts are inapplicable in this context, we should apply the common law “born alive” doctrine. The “born alive” doctrine provides that “a fetus that suffers a prenatal injury at the hands of a third party and is then born alive is capable of supporting certain criminal charges against the third party.” 62A Am. Jur. 2d Prenatal Injuries, Etc. § 40; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 869(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (“One who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the child for the harm if the child is born alive.”). ¶67 While “[c]ommon-law crimes are abolished and no conduct shall constitute an offense unless it is described as an offense” by the legislature, this statutory provision does not “affect the use of case law as an interpretive aid in the construction of the provisions of this code.” § 18-1-104(3), C.R.S. (2019); see Allen v. People, 485 P.2d 886, 887–88 (Colo. 1971) (recognizing “that the common law may be used in aid of the meaning to be given statutory language”). ¶68 This court has never explicitly adopted or applied the common law “born alive” doctrine, though we have impliedly recognized it in the civil law context. 29 See Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191, 1193, 1195–96 (Colo. 1988) (approving, in a medical malpractice insurance case in which we were not asked to decide, and did not in fact rule on, the validity of the underlying judgment that granted recovery to a child who had suffered injury in utero but was subsequently born alive with severe mental impairments and physical disabilities); see also Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. Keefe, 900 P.2d 97, 101 (Colo. 1995) (“If a child dies after birth as a result of prenatal injuries, a surviving parent may bring a wrongful death claim derived from the child’s injuries.”). ¶69 In the criminal context, however, this court has never recognized the doctrine even by implication; thus, there is no Colorado case law to illuminate our interpretation of the child abuse statute. Given this absence of case law, we do not believe reliance on this doctrine clarifies the legislative intent. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 594 (1990) (“This Court has declined to follow any rule that a statutory term is to be given its common-law meaning, when that meaning is obsolete or inconsistent with the statute’s purpose.”). Further, we are particularly concerned that adopting the “born alive” doctrine to define a criminal element would usurp the role of the legislature. Therefore, we decline the temptation to make law, no matter how sympathetic the alleged victim. Accordingly, to the extent Lage conflicts with this opinion, we overrule it. 30 ¶70 Because the legislature has not provided a definition of “person” in the child abuse statute, and because we have been unable to discern the legislature’s intent using various aids of statutory construction, we resort to the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity provides that, when we cannot discern the legislature’s intent, “ambiguity in the meaning of a criminal statute must be interpreted in favor of the defendant.” People v. Summers, 208 P.3d 251, 258 (Colo. 2009) (quoting People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Colo. 2003)). This is “a rule of last resort,” and is to be “invoked only ‘if after utilizing the various aids of statutory construction, the General Assembly’s intent remains obscured.’” Id. (quoting Thoro Prods., 70 P.3d at 1198). ¶71 And, applying the rule of lenity here, we conclude that a “person,” as that term is used in the child abuse statute, does not include a fetus who is later born alive. Therefore, we conclude that Jones cannot be retried for the crime of child abuse based on his alleged conduct here.