Opinion ID: 2569893
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: history of this case

Text: {6} The facts of this case are more completely presented in McClaugherty I, we present an abridged version here. The indictment arose from a shooting in Albuquerque over an argument wherein Ricky Solisz argued with a girl on the phone. The conversation allegedly concluded with Solisz threatening to slap or kick her. The girl was at a party at Defendant's apartment, and Defendant took umbrage when he was told of Solisz's aggression. Defendant and his friend Rodrigo Dominguez argued with Solisz on the telephone, and eventually Solisz agreed to bring his friends to a fight where Defendant and his friends would defend the girl from the disrespect. The two groups agreed to meet at a shopping center parking lot and arrived there in separate cars. {7} Defendant arrived with Dominguez, Nachima Coriz, and others at the rendezvous. McClaugherty I, 2003-NMSC-006, ¶ 5, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486. Solisz arrived with his friends, Vincent Martinez and Eloy Sandoval. Martinez brandished a baseball bat. Id. ¶ 6. There was testimony that Defendant and his friends brought two handguns and a shotgun with them. Shots fired from Defendant's group fatally wounded Solisz and injured Martinez. The police determined that the fatal shot had come from a handgun; however, they recovered only one handgun and they could not determine if that gun had fired the fatal shot. [1] After the early morning shootout, Defendant and Coriz hid all day in a nearby apartment. That evening, Coriz turned himself in to the police and gave them a statement inculpating Defendant and Dominguez. 2003-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 5-6, 8-9, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486. {8} Coriz testified for the State at Defendant's trial and was the only witness to identify Defendant as one of the young men who fired a gun on the night of the murder. Coriz testified that Defendant carried a pistol to the scene on the night of the murder and that he saw Defendant and another person get out of their car and run toward a fence bordering the parking lot. Coriz claimed that Defendant turned and shot at Solisz's car between five and seven times while he was running, then turned and jumped over the fence. Coriz also testified that after he, Defendant and Dominguez returned to Defendant's apartment, he heard Defendant tell his sister that they went and shot at some people. After the State rested, defense counsel called Defendant to the stand, where he was the last witness to testify. During Defendant's cross-examination, Montoya repeated statements he claimed were contained in witness statements to the police and drew a hearsay objection from defense counsel. Id. ¶¶ 9-14. Montoya's description of these witness statements during cross-examination became the subject of Defendant's first appeal to this Court. See Id. ¶ 3.
{9} In McClaugherty I, we reproduced the colloquy between Defendant and Montoya, and repeat it here for ease of reference. During his testimony, Defendant denied that he handled or fired a gun on the night of the murder. On cross-examination, Montoya asked Defendant if he told his sister and his roommate what happened that night. Defendant answered: I had told them, yes, I was there and I ran. McClaugherty I, 2003-NMSC-006, ¶ 11, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486. Montoya continued to question Defendant while holding papers in his hand: Q: Is that all you told them? A: I'm pretty sure. Q: You're aware I've got statements? You got copies of the statements. A: Yes. Q: So why are they lying about you then? A: Can you tell me what you're referring to? At this point defense counsel objected to the State's line of questioning. During the subsequent bench conference, defense counsel argued to the court: Defense: He's trying to impeach him with hearsay that's never been admitted into evidence. [Montoya]: Inconsistent statements of admission. Court: Do we have statements from these people that say something opposite to what he's saying? [Montoya]: When they were talking about the shooting, at first he  Court: I think what you're doing is the objection is really to the form of the question. You can ask him, Would it surprise you if somebody else said this, like as far as something  you know, why are they lying about you? You're assuming facts not in evidence, so I'm going to sustain the objection on that particular ground, okay? [Montoya] then returned to the cross-examination by asking Defendant, [s]ir, would it surprise you to hear that your sister, Sarah Tucker, gave a statement to the police 6/19/99, the day after or the day, that morning, that said that you admitted to her that you shot . At this point defense counsel objected again. At the bench conference, defense counsel argued: Defense: He is attempting to impeach him with extrinsic evidence of which I have no opportunity to cross-examine him with, under what circumstances or anything else. Court: Anything for your record? [Montoya]: Your Honor, [Sarah] Tucker is actually his sister. She's been subpoenaed. She's been available. She won't come up to our office. [Defense counsel] has had the opportunity to interview her. Court: The question that's being asked is whether or not he agrees with this or not is not  I mean because this person can always be brought in to explain it, so I'm going to allow him to proceed and allow him to ask the question, so I'm going to overrule the objection. [Montoya] then continued to question Defendant: Q: Do you remember the question? A: Yes. Q: Does it surprise you? A: Yes. Q: How about your roommate, Sherri Goen? Does it surprise you that she also made the same statement? A: Yes. Q: That you admitted shooting? A: Yes. Q: Bragged about it? A: Yes. Id. ¶¶ 11-14. During redirect examination, Defendant disagreed with Montoya's version of the girls' police statements saying that he had read the statements and they contained references only to him denying any shooting. At this point in the redirect, Montoya objected and argued to the district court that defense counsel just elicited a lie, stating: He said he shot. Do you want me to let that go? and They both admit that he said that he shot at the guys. Defense counsel responded that the State was free to bring in the declarant of those statements, but that Montoya's characterizations of the statements should have never come in in the first place. {10} In McClaugherty I, we agreed that the statements Montoya had made during his cross-examination contained hearsay not subject to any exception. Id. ¶ 16. We held that the cross-examination was improper in its use of hearsay, and it was not harmless. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. We reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. Id. ¶ 35.
{11} After we remanded the case, Defendant's new defense counsel received and reviewed the police statements of Tucker and Goen that had been in Montoya's possession during his impeachment of Defendant at trial. Defense counsel determined that the statements did not contain any references to Defendant bragging about the shooting and did not include a statement from Defendant's sister that Defendant admitted he shot the victim and presented a motion to the district court to bar further prosecution. In the motion, defense counsel explained to the trial court that the police statements from these witnesses did not contain the statements that Montoya claimed they did when he attempted to impeach Defendant at trial. Defendant's counsel concluded in his memorandum in support of the motion to bar further prosecution that Montoya certainly knew, or must be presumed to have known ... that his false characterization of the statements [given to the police by Sarah Tucker and Sherri Goen] was `improper and prejudicial'; and he `act[ed] in willful disregard of the resulting... reversal' such that retrial should be barred pursuant to Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 32, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792. {12} Prosecutor Troy Davis, Montoya's co-counsel at the first trial, represented the State after remand for a new trial and filed a response describing Montoya's impeachment of Defendant as an isolated instance in an otherwise fair trial. In the response, Davis claimed that a prosecutor acting out of error or negligence, or mistake does not subject the State to the sanction of a bar to retrial because his behavior does not rise to the level of willful disregard as required by Breit to bar reprosecution. Id. ¶ 48. {13} The district court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the State did not call any witnesses. Conceding that Montoya's questioning of Defendant about the statements made by Tucker and Goen had been improper, the State argued that it was an isolated instance in an otherwise fair trial and that Montoya's questions were not in evidence, only Defendant's responses were evidence. Orally, the district court told the parties: Certainly, if this Court had known about what was transpiring during the trial, the Court would have put a stop to it immediately and declared a mistrial in that case. But unfortunately the Court didn't know what was transpiring at the time and this Court was under the presumption that the District Attorney was asking those questions in good faith. Granting Defendant's motion to bar further prosecution and dismissing the matter with prejudice pursuant to New Mexico Constitution, Article II, Section 15, NMSA 1978, Section 30-1-10 (1963), and Breit, the district court entered a written order with the following findings: 1. In the course of cross-examining defendant Charles I. McClaugherty at trial in this matter, Assistant District Attorney Kenny Montoya questioned Mr. McClaugherty about statements given by his sister Sarah Tucker and his roommate Sherri Goen to the police on June 19, 1999. In his questions to Mr. McClaugherty and in a colloquy at the bench, Mr. Montoya grossly misrepresented the content of those statements. 2. If the Court had known of Mr. Montoya's misconduct at the time, it would have granted a mistrial. 3. Mr. Montoya's misconduct was so unfairly prejudicial to Mr. McClaugherty that it could not have been cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for new trial. 4. Mr. Montoya either knew, or must be presumed to have known, that his conduct was improper and prejudicial to Mr. McClaugherty. 5. Mr. Montoya acted in willful disregard of the potential consequences of his misconduct. He either was actually aware, or must be presumed to have been aware, that his misconduct had the potential to result in a mistrial or a reversal. Mr. Montoya made a conscious and purposeful decision to dismiss any concern that his conduct might lead to a mistrial or reversal. The State timely appealed this dismissal to the Court of Appeals.
{14} Fifteen days after filing its appeal, the State filed a motion in district court for voluntary dismissal of the appeal and a motion to reopen the proceedings so that Montoya could come testify to dispute and defend himself against the trial court's findings in its Order of Dismissal. The day after the motions were filed, the district court scheduled a hearing in district court on both of the State's motions. {15} Before the hearing on the merits of these motions, Defendant filed a motion in the Court of Appeals to dismiss the State's pending appeal because the State had failed to timely file a docketing statement. Determining that the State's motions were a motion for voluntary dismissal of its appeal and motion for reconsideration, which requested that the district court reopen the hearing that led to the dismissal of this case, the Court of Appeals denied Defendant's motion and remanded the matter to the district court for the limited purpose of ruling on the State's pending motions. The Court of Appeals further ordered that if the district court denied the State's motion to dismiss its appeal, the State would have twenty days from the district court's denial of that motion within which to timely file a docketing statement. {16} The district court commenced the hearing on the motions by asking if there was any objection to dismissing the State's appeal. After clarifying that there was no opposition from Defendant, the district court articulated, If there's a stipulation of that, we'll go ahead and grant the State's motion for dismissal of the appeal. The district court granted the State's motion and dismissed the pending appeal. {17} The district court then addressed the State's motion to reopen the hearing. Defendant argued against reopening the hearing on jurisdictional grounds, relying on the language of Section 39-1-1. Defendant claimed that Section 39-1-1 clearly states that motions attacking a final judgment that are not acted upon by the district court are deemed denied thirty days after their filing, and approximately sixty days had elapsed since the State filed its motion. The State responded that the district court had jurisdiction because either (1) the thirty-day time period for hearing the post-judgment motion should have been calculated from the date the Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the district court for the limited purpose of ruling on the State's pending motions or (2) the thirty-day period should have been calculated from the district court's dismissal of the State's appeal in open court. {18} The district court determined that Section 39-1-1 authorized a district court to, in its discretion, grant additional time to hear a matter raised in a timely filed post-trial motion. Because it originally set the State's motions for hearing and subsequently granted continuances within thirty days of their filing, the district court believed that it would be unjust to deny the court the opportunity to hear a timely raised matter if its docket precluded any earlier setting. The district court ruled that it had jurisdiction to consider the motion and reopened the hearing on the Breit dismissal to receive additional evidence. A full discussion of the evidence and the district court's decision are outlined in detail later in this Opinion. Montoya testified that he believed his actions at the trial were proper. The district court (1) found that Defendant had established that Montoya's conduct met the first prong of the Breit test; (2) determined that the second two prongs were not met; and (3) denied Defendant's motion to bar further prosecution. McClaugherty II, 2007-NMCA-041, ¶ 44, 141 N.M. 468, 157 P.3d 33. The district court vacated its earlier dismissal of the matter, denied Defendant's motion to bar retrial, and reinstated the case for trial. Defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals.
{19} The Court of Appeals' majority affirmed the district court and held that under Section 39-1-1 the district court had been divested of jurisdiction to hear the State's motion to reopen the hearing until the State's appeal had been resolved by dismissal, and after the dismissal of the appeal, the district court properly exercised its discretion pursuant to Section 39-1-1 to reopen the hearing and ultimately consider the evidence presented by the State. McClaugherty II, 2007-NMCA-041, ¶¶ 37, 40, 53, 141 N.M. 468, 157 P.3d 33. The Court of Appeals correctly articulated that, to be successful, Defendant's claim had to establish all three prongs of the Breit test: (1) improper official conduct so unfairly prejudicial to the defendant that it cannot be cured by means short of a mistrial or a motion for a new trial; (2) the official knows that the conduct is improper and prejudicial; and (3) the official either intends to provoke a mistrial or acts in willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal. Id. ¶ 42 (citing Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 32, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792). The Court of Appeals' majority reasoned that it had to find that Defendant failed to meet only a single prong of the Breit test to affirm the trial court's conclusion that Defendant's Breit claim failed. Id. ¶ 44. Relying heavily on the trial court's factual finding that the State would not have gained a tactical advantage from a mistrial in this case to conclude that the third prong of the Breit test was not met, the majority upheld the trial court's conclusion that Defendant had not met the Breit threshold for barring reprosecution. Id. ¶¶ 48-51. Judge Kennedy's dissent, while agreeing with the majority that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the motion to reopen the case, disagreed with the district court's Breit analysis. Id. ¶ 55. The dissent would have reversed the district court and barred retrial due to severe prosecutorial misconduct. Id. ¶¶ 105-106. {20} Defendant petitioned this Court for review of the Court of Appeals' published Opinion. We granted certiorari to determine, under Section 39-1-1, whether filing an appeal divests the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear a timely filed post-judgment motion and whether or not the legislature intended that a post-judgment motion be automatically denied by operation of law thirty days after it was filed, where a trial court had to set the motion for hearing outside of the thirty-day time period due to requests for continuance and the press of court business. We also granted certiorari to clarify the proper standard by which courts should review a defendant's deprivation of due process by prosecutorial misconduct.