Opinion ID: 787454
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Clearly Established Right?

Text: 31 The first Feathers inquiry bleeds into the second question of whether the constitutional right was clearly established, which is the focus of the parties on appeal. If the law at that time was not clearly established, an official could not... fairly be said to `know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. [T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been `clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Officials do not enjoy qualified immunity simply because the exact action in question has not previously been held unlawful by a court, but in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. Id. In the excess-force context, it is not enough for a plaintiff to demonstrate that an officer's use of force exceeded the objective standard of reasonableness articulated in Graham. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). Rather, qualified immunity is proper unless it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his use of excessive force was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. 32 The Supreme Court has refused to require that a plaintiff demonstrate the existence of a fundamentally similar or materially similar case. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). There can be notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on ... so long as the prior decisions g[i]ve reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights. Id. at 740, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (quotation omitted). [O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. Id. at 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508. Moreover, the fact that various courts have not agreed on one verbal formulation of the controlling standard does not by itself entitle an officer to qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 203, 121 S.Ct. 2151. 33 To demonstrate that the Officers unreasonably violated a clearly established right, the Plaintiffs must therefore show the prior articulation of a prohibition against the type of excess force exerted here. In inquiring whether a constitutional right is clearly established, we must look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of this court and other courts within our circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits. Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 876 (6th Cir.2002). [A]n action's unlawfulness can be apparent from direct holdings, from specific examples described as prohibited, or from the general reasoning that a court employs. Feathers, 319 F.3d at 848. Other sources can also demonstrate the existence of a clearly established constitutional right; in Hope, the Supreme Court considered Alabama state regulations and communications between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Alabama Department of Corrections as evidence that the corporal punishment at issue in Hope was clearly proscribed. Hope, 536 U.S. at 744-45, 122 S.Ct. 2508. 34 Our caselaw and the evidence presented at trial about the training that the Officers received demonstrate that the force exerted against Champion violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. We have repeatedly stated that the right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established Fourth Amendment right. Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir.2001) (decided after Saucier ). For example, we have articulated a clearly established right to be free from specific types of non-deadly excessive force, such as handcuffing an individual too tightly. See Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th Cir.1993). We have also consistently held that various types of force applied after the subduing of a suspect are unreasonable and a violation of a clearly established right. See, e.g., Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir.2002) ([T]here was simply no governmental interest in continuing to beat Phelps after he had been neutralized, nor could a reasonable officer have thought there was.); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1307 (6th Cir.1988) ([A] totally gratuitous blow with a policeman's nightstick may cross the constitutional line.); Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711, 715 (6th Cir.1985) (The unprovoked and unnecessary striking of a handcuffed citizen in the mouth with a nightstick is clearly excessive.). 35 The particular type of physical force exerted against Champion was unreasonable, and the Officers should have been aware that they were violating Champion's rights. First, it is clearly established that the Officers' use of pepper spray against Champion after he was handcuffed and hobbled was excessive. In Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375 (6th Cir.1994), a plaintiff was sprayed with mace by authorities. Id. at 378. The police then handcuffed the plaintiff, placed him in his car, and according to the plaintiff and two witnesses, continued to spray mace in the plaintiff's face even though he was already blinded and incapacitated. Id. We held that this use of force was excessive, and we denied the officers qualified immunity because [a] reasonable person would know that spraying mace on a blinded and incapacitated person ... would violate the right to be free from excessive force. Id. at 387; see also Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir.2002) (Courts have consistently concluded that using pepper spray is excessive force in cases where ... the arrestee surrenders, is secured, and is not acting violently, and there is no threat to the officers or anyone else.). 36 In addition to prior precedent, the Officers' training demonstrates that they were aware of Champion's clearly established right to be free from this type of excessive force. The Officers were taught that pepper spraying a suspect after the individual was incapacitated constitutes excessive force. Sergeant Robert Allen, who testified about the training the Nashville Police Officers received, agreed that if Champion were handcuffed and hobbled, spraying him with pepper spray would be excessive. 37 Second, it also clearly established that putting substantial or significant pressure on a suspect's back while that suspect is in a face-down prone position after being subdued and/or incapacitated constitutes excessive force. This appeal gives us no cause to consider whether leaving a bound suspect on his or her stomach without more constitutes excessive force that violates a suspect's clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. This is neither a positional asphyxia case nor a case in which the officers lightly touched or placed incidental pressure on Champion's back while he was face down. The asphyxia was caused by the combination of the Officers placing their weight upon Champion's body by lying across his back and simultaneously pepper spraying him. 2 Creating asphyxiating conditions by putting substantial or significant pressure, such as body weight, on the back of an incapacitated and bound suspect constitutes objectively unreasonable excessive force. For example, in Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.1990), several police officers entered an inmate's cell, placed the inmate in a neckhold, and put strong pressure upon his chest. Id. at 403. The inmate died as a result, and a physician's report suggested that the inmate may have died as a result of the pressure placed upon his chest. Id. The Fifth Circuit denied qualified immunity to the officers, ruling that any reasonable officer would have known that the force exerted was excessive and thus constitutionally deficient. Id. Other district courts in our circuit have highlighted the dangers of putting pressure on a prone, bound, and agitated detainee. Swans v. City of Lansing, 65 F.Supp.2d 625, 633-34 (W.D.Mich.1998) (jury awarded verdict to a mentally ill arrestee who was hog-tied); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 39 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1019-20 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (finding that information existed in the law enforcement community, which put officers on notice of the dangers of positional asphyxiation). 38 Additionally, the Officers' training outlined the boundaries of excessive force and made clear that lying on a suspect can cause asphyxiation. All three Officers admitted that they were aware of the potential danger of putting pressure on an individual's back or diaphragm. J.A. at 187 (Dickhaus Test.) (I believe our training was once he is under control we are to sit him up physically....); J.A. at 262 (Miller Test.). J.A. at 305 (Woodside Test.). Additionally, Sergeant Allen testified that he taught his officers that lying across an individual's back when that person is on his or her stomach increases the possibility of asphyxia. Just as the Supreme Court determined that the Alabama Department of Corrections Regulations and the communications between the U.S. Department of Justice and the State of Alabama put the state on notice about what constituted cruel and unusual punishment, so too here the training these Officers received alerted them to the potential danger of this particular type of excessive force. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 744-45, 122 S.Ct. 2508. 39 It cannot be forgotten that the police were confronting an individual whom they knew to be mentally ill or retarded, even though the Officers may not have known the full extent of Champion's autism and his unresponsiveness. The diminished capacity of an unarmed detainee must be taken into account when assessing the amount of force exerted. See Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1283 (9th Cir.2001) ([W]here it is or should be apparent to the officers that the individual involved is emotionally disturbed, that is a factor that must be considered in determining ... the reasonableness of the force employed.). For example, in Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.2003), officers handcuffed a mentally ill individual and leaned their body weight onto his upper torso. Id. at 1054. The officers then applied a hobble device. Drummond fell into respiratory distress and eventually a coma. Id. at 1055. The court held that the district court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity was not proper because the officers had violated Drummond's clearly established rights. Id. at 1062. It stated,  Any reasonable officer should have known that such conduct constituted the use of excessive force. Id. at 1061. Drummond postdated the events that led to Champion's death, but it relies on cases decided before April 30, 2000 (including the Swans case) and notes that when officers receive training explaining the dangers of asphyxia, they are on notice that applying pressure to an arrestee's back is objectively unreasonable. 40 Consequently, the right to be free from the two types of excessive force exerted against Champion was clearly established by the law of this circuit and by the training of the Officers. Either action by itself violated a clearly established right, and the combination of the actions bolsters the conclusion that no reasonable officer could believe that excessive force was not being used. We recognize that the Officers perhaps did not intend to harm Champion; indeed, they may have believed they were helping him. Such a consideration is immaterial, however, because the qualified immunity doctrine is an objective one; motive is irrelevant. The evidence presented in the light most favorable to Champion, and in the light accepted by the jury, demonstrates that the Officers unreasonably applied excessive force to Champion after he had been incapacitated in violation of Champion's clearly established rights. No reasonable officer would have continued to spray a chemical agent in the face of a handcuffed and hobbled mentally retarded arrestee, who was moving his or her head from side to side in an attempt to breathe, after the arrestee vomited several times. No reasonable officer would continue to put pressure on that arrestee's back after the arrestee was subdued by handcuffs, an ankle restraint, and a police officer holding the arrestee's legs. 41 The Officers concentrate their efforts on the evidence presented at trial that Champion may have died from a preexisting medical condition unrelated to his treatment by the police and that the pepper spray was unlikely to contribute to Champion's vomiting or his death. In particular, the Defendants' medical expert, Dr. Wetli, testified that Champion's injuries were inconsistent with a death caused by Officers lying across Champion's back. J.A. at 284-86 (Wetli Test.). This evidence is unavailing for two reasons. First, the Plaintiffs presented contradictory evidence, and the jury believed the Plaintiffs' experts (and the witnesses who viewed the Officers lying on Champion's back) more than the Defendants' witnesses. Second, the Officers' argument sidesteps the point: even if Champion had not died, but had only been injured, his clearly established rights were no less violated.