Opinion ID: 4542854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Moye

Text: XPO concedes for appeal that Moye made a discrimination complaint in January 2016 and suffered an adverse employment action (termination) but asserts that he fails to make a prima facie retaliation case because he cannot show a causal connection.33 The circumstances surrounding Moye’s alleged complaint are murky, but with XPO’s concession we assume that Moye engaged in protected activity on January 14, 2016, when he disputed the letter of instruction he received for his 32 Thus, Mann’s assertion that XPO decided to terminate him on the same day he made his complaint is incorrect. 33 Moye argues that, because XPO failed to challenge his ability to establish a prima facie case of race retaliation in the district court, the claim survives summary judgment. But XPO did not differentiate between Moye’s age and race retaliation claims as he asserts it did; it simply argued that he “cannot establish a retaliation claim submissible to the jury.” App. vol. 2 at 215. Further, XPO explicitly addressed both in its reply brief by stating that his asserted protected activity “says nothing related to opposition of race or age discrimination.” App. vol. 15 at 3542. We thus do not view as undisputed Moye’s race-retaliation claim. 45 time-keeping issues. XPO did not terminate Moye until roughly four months later, on April 8, 2016. So, as Moye recognizes, he cannot rely on temporal proximity alone to establish a causal connection. See Anderson, 181 F.3d at 1179 (stating that “a threemonth period, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation” (citation omitted)). But Moye provides no other evidence that shows XPO fired him “out of a desire to retaliate for his” complaint. Singh, 936 F.3d at 1043 (citation omitted). Instead, he merely asserts that he can make a prima facie case and then moves on to argue why XPO’s stated reasons for his termination were pretextual—which is a separate issue. This is insufficient.34 So we agree with the district court that Moye has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Moreover, even if we could conclude that Moye has established a prima facie case of retaliation, his retaliation claims would not survive summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Moye concedes that XPO’s proffered reason for his termination is nondiscriminatory—his Policy 541 violations. See supra 34 XPO argues that Moye also fails to make a prima facie case because he does not provide evidence that Huner—who made the decision to terminate him (at Mahr’s recommendation)—knew of Moye’s complaint. See Singh, 936 F.3d at 1043 (“Plaintiff must therefore point to evidence that those who acted against him knew of his formal complaints.”). XPO notes that Huner stated in his affidavit that he was unaware of any complaints Moye made. But there is a January 15, 2016 e-mail from Mahr to Huner stating that Moye “would like to utilize the open door policy and have the attached [letter of instruction] reviewed.” App. vol. 2 at 331. The letter of instruction regarded the time-keeping issues—the subject of Moye’s complaint and asserted protected activity—and Huner responded that “[a]fter a complete review and discussion, I believe that the [letter of instruction] is appropriate in this case.” Id. This e-mail thus creates a genuine issue of material fact whether Moye complained of race and age discrimination to Huner in that discussion. 46 Discussion Part III. But, like Mann, except for one new argument, Moye raises the same arguments for pretext that we have already rejected in analyzing his discrimination claims. See supra Discussion Section III.B. Moye’s new argument regards the letter of instruction for his time-keeping issues. He asserts that Lewis and Mahr refused to rescind the letter of instruction, issued for a Policy 541 violation, “even after [it was] substantiated that Moye didn’t violate this policy,” so a reasonable jury could infer that Moye’s discipline was without reason and suspicious. Corrected Appellants’ Br. at 60–61. But this argument does nothing to show that XPO’s terminating Moye, for separate conduct, was suspicious. And considering this argument with the rest of Moye’s assertions does not cross the line to create a genuine issue of material fact on pretext. So the district court properly granted XPO summary judgment on Moye’s retaliation claims, and we affirm.