Opinion ID: 2620371
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kowalskys’ Arguments

Text: The Kowalskys make two arguments: (1) the subsidence cases show that the “substantial injury” standard requires serious damage to the surface or a diminution of -14- use or value, which did not occur here until 2008;4 and (2) they could not have reasonably ascertained the injury before 2008 because saltwater wells and subsidence are complicated.
The Kowalskys argue if a hairline crack, see Olson, 679 P.2d at 173, or small sinkholes, see Ward v. Island Creek Coal Co., 1995 WL 371676 at  (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished), are not substantial, actionable injuries, there was no substantial injury here before 2008 because only small cracks appeared and the subsiding land had not yet reached the water table. We disagree. First, the Kowalskys’ argument overlooks the record, including Mr. Kowalsky’s deposition, showing their awareness of sidewalk and home foundation cracks, lower pasture, wetness and new dips in the neighbor’s road, sinkage of the KCC monitor stake, and the connection of all this to the saltwater disposal well. This is sufficient for accrual under K.S.A. 60-513(b) and Diefendorf, which holds that the seriousness of the injury 4 The Kowalskys argue that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to determine when the action accrued: instead of looking at when the surface had appreciably subsided, they argue district court should have been looking at when the surface had substantially subsided as to create a reasonably ascertainable injury. The court, however, used the word “appreciably” to refer to the subsidence while still recognizing the injury must be substantial under K.S.A. 60-513(b). “There is no genuine factual dispute remaining that before the plaintiffs ever acquired this land, its surface had fallen or subsided appreciably as to result in a substantial injury. . . .” Dist. Ct. Op. at 13 (emphasis added). -15- does not govern when the action accrues. 689 P.2d at 859.5 Second, the Kowalskys’ cases are distinguishable. In Olson, a homeowner sued a contractor and the Kansas Department of Transportation for foundational damage from blasting while building a highway near her home. 679 P.2d at 170. The homeowner’s son discovered a hairline crack in the foundation and told the highway work crew about it in May or June of 1978, thinking the crew would return after blasting was completed to assess any damages to the home. Id. The plaintiff moved into the home without inspection in 1979, but in 1980 discovered many significant foundation cracks. Id. The plaintiff filed suit in October 1980, more than two years after the first hairline crack was discovered. Id. On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations issue should be submitted to a jury. Id. at 173-74. The Kowalskys argue Olson holds that a hairline crack is not a sufficient injury for claim accrual. But the Olson court did not say the hairline crack was not insufficient. It denied summary judgment because a jury could conclude that subsequent blasting within the statute of limitations period caused additional, substantial cracking. Id. at 173. The Kowalskys’ reliance on Olson is also misplaced because much more than hairline crack 5 At oral argument, the Kowalskys’ attorney acknowledged that the Kowalskys would have had a claim for trespass by subsidence before 2008 for the damages that existed at that time. He also said this damage affected the value of the property “in a minor way.” Oral Argument Recording at 12:40. -16- damage was apparent on the Kowalsky property in 2005 and 2006.6 In Ward, an unpublished Fourth Circuit case interpreting Virginia law, coal mining initially caused several sinkholes on the plaintiff’s property. 1995 WL 371676 at . The property progressed into subsidence, causing major structural damage to buildings and a well. Id. The Fourth Circuit said that even if the sinkholes were not a substantial injury, the plaintiff still could not recover under the later, larger injury because the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at . The court did not say whether the sinkholes constituted substantial injury. Ward provides no support for the Kowalskys.
The Kowalskys contend that they did not know the disposal well caused the subsidence until 2008 because they lacked knowledge about subsidence. But the test is reasonable ascertainment, an objective test that established accrual here as explained earlier. The Kowalskys rely on Hecht v. First National Bank & Trust Co., a medical malpractice case in which x-ray treatments for Hodgkin’s disease burned a patient. 490 P.2d 649, 651-54 (Kan. 1971). Despite the doctors’ assurances that the burn would eventually heal itself, the patient developed an ulcer that required extensive surgery. Id. at 654. She filed suit months after the surgery and years after the initial burn. The 6 By Mr. Kowalsky’s admission, in 2005 the cracks in his foundation were “larger than a hairline” but “not as big as quarter-inch.” Appx. at 406. -17- Kansas Supreme Court held that, although the patient knew she had an unhealed sore more than two years before filing suit (outside the statute of limitations), her knowledge of her condition at that time was not “sufficient to justify a determination . . . that she knew or could have reasonably ascertained . . . that she had suffered substantial injury caused by the alleged negligent treatment of the defendants.” Id. at 655. The Kowalskys liken the KCC’s telling Mr. Kowalsky the subsidence was unlikely to get worse to the doctors’ telling Ms. Hecht her burn would heal on its own. They also analogize the changes they noticed to the land before 2008 to the patient’s burn two years before filing the suit —an injury was apparent, but it was not a substantial injury that they could reasonably have ascertained was caused by the disposal well or S & J. The Kowalskys’ reliance on this case is unavailing. First, the Kansas Supreme Court has limited the holding in Hecht. See, e.g., Diefendorf, 689 P.2d at 859; Friends Univ., 608 P.2d at 940. In Diefendorf, the court stated that the Hecht facts are distinctive because “[r]adiation therapy, whether or not properly done, frequently produces substantial injury to the body, which generally heals in time. . . . Further, with a living entity, healing can occur which remedies the problem in whole or in part.” 689 P.2d at 859 (quoting Friends Univ., 608 P.2d at 940). Second, Hecht is distinguishable. The KCC’s telling the Kowalskys that the subsidence was unlikely to get worse is not equivalent to doctors telling a patient that an injury will get better. Also, the KCC’s comment that the subsidence was unlikely to get -18- worse does not erase that there was subsidence or the Kowalskys’ awareness of it when the KCC came to inspect the land in 2005. The Kowalskys knew the injury was sufficient for the KCC to monitor the site, and Mr. Kowalsky stated the subsidence was “getting pretty aggressive” in 2005. Appx. at 406. They did not need knowledge of the extent of the injury to reasonably ascertain its existence. Friends Univ., 608 P.2d at 940.