Opinion ID: 39702
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 19 953 F.2d at 427. 20 See Popkin, 943 F.2d at 1540. 21 Defendants did not actually brief a colorable challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence but only challenged that the evidence did not support that they sought an unfair benefit or advantage under the tax laws —— therefore we need not consider this argument on appeal. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.”) (citing Villanueva v. CNA Ins. Cos., 868 F.2d 684, 687 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989)). In any event, in light of our holding that “corruptly” does not include a requirement that the government prove that defendants sought such an advantage under the tax laws, there can be no doubt that defendants’ convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, as a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 22 Samuel Saldana did not appeal this issue. 12 We review the admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion.23 If we conclude that a district court has abused its discretion, we apply the harmless error doctrine.24 Accordingly, unless the trial court has abused its discretion and a substantial right of the defendant has been affected, we will not reverse on the basis of the evidentiary ruling in question.25 The government advances that we should review Saul’s challenge to the district court’s exclusion of the manuals for plain error, because he did not counter the government’s hearsay objection at trial and raises his non-hearsay argument for the first time on appeal.26 Even if we assume arguendo that the district court plainly erred when it excluded the manuals as hearsay, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it decided to exclude the manuals as cumulative and as potentially confusing to the jury.