Opinion ID: 2972022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nature of Information Sought

Text: During the interview, Heusel and Gorno broached the subject matter of the employees’ current union activities, and they asked Gregway three times whether the employees were still discussing the union. We examine whether the Observer’s questions sought “information outside the issues raised in the complaint” by asking an employee a question that “potentially covers matters outside the scope of a complaint.” Dayton Typographic Serv., Inc., 778 F.2d at 1195. The Observer maintains that Heusel’s and Gorno’s questions were permissible as discovery for the pending state-court lawsuit. See Mich. Ct. R. 2.302(B)(1). However, for material to be discoverable, it must be relevant to the subject matters of the pending suit. E.g., Bauroth v. Hammoud, 632 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Mich. 2001). In Michigan, relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” See Mich. R. Evid. 401; see also FED. R. EVID. 401 (same). Evidence is relevant when the “fact to be proven [is] truly in issue.” People v. Crawford, 582 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Mich. 1998). When the question has no probative value in resolving a contested issue, the evidence sought is irrelevant. E.g., United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985); see also People v. Edwards, No. 213336, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 616, at -7 (Mich. Ct. App. June 9, 2000); In re Estate of Johnson, 328 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a report dated after the “relevant time period” was immaterial to the case). The Observer cannot establish relevance. Although the Michigan rules have a broad scope of discovery, irrelevant information is not discoverable. Heusel’s and Gorno’s questions concerned -13- Nos. 03-2540, 04-1010 Observer & Eccentric Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB employees’ current union activities, and they were not probative of contested issues in the pending suit. Their questions were wholly irrelevant. See Schrand v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1988) (observing that the proffered evidence could not “logically or reasonably be tied to the decision to terminate” the plaintiff). The Observer had no legitimate purpose in asking such questions of Gregway. Given the irrelevance of questions about current union support to the statecourt case, the questions could easily be found to have a tendency to coerce Gregway not to exercise her Section 7 rights. The Observer claims that Heusel and Gorno did not violate Section 8(a)(1) because neither asked Gregway about her own union sentiment. Contrary to the Observer’s argument, an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it asks an employee about other employees’ union sentiments. See, e.g., Sundance Constr. Mgmt., 325 N.L.R.B. 1013, 1013 (1998); Williamhouse of Cal. Inc., 317 N.L.R.B. 699, 716 (1995); Cumberland Farms Inc., 307 N.L.R.B. 1479, 1479 (1992), enforced, 984 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1993). Heusel impermissibly asked Gregway why employees wanted a union.