Opinion ID: 2059969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Bolstering Claim

Text: The trial testimony of the two individuals who were present at the time of the crimes, and who testified against defendants, was not a model of consistency. Neither Cruz nor Ruballo wanted the police to know that they had been smoking crack cocaine with defendants the night of the incident. On cross-examination by defense counsel, Cruz conceded that he testified before the grand jury that the robbery occurred as he and Ruballo walked into the building, that a bat was used during the incident, and that he had never associated with defendants prior to the incidentall of which was untrue. In an attempt to explain the inconsistency between his trial testimony and grand jury testimony, Cruz testified that he was confused by certain of the questions asked of him before the grand jury. On redirect examination, the prosecutor sought to question Cruz about what he was confused about during his grand jury testimony. Counsel for Ochoa objected, stating that the prosecutor could not rehabilitate Cruz with a prior consistent statement. The trial court overruled the objection, and allowed the prosecutor to ask Cruz whether, at the time of his grand jury testimony, he was confused about what item he possessed on the day of the incident, whom he visited that day, how he was injured and who injured him. We conclude that these questions on redirect were addressed to matters raised by defense counsel on cross-examination, and did no more than to explain, clarify and fully elicit a question only partially examined by the defense ( People v Regina, 19 NY2d 65, 78 [1966]; see Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-501 [Farrell 11th ed]). The prosecutor's redirect examination of Ruballo was also proper. Defense counsel elicited testimony from Ruballo that she lied in her written statement to police when she stated that defendants followed her and Cruz into the building and mugged them, that one of the perpetrators took $50 from Cruz, and that Figueroa pushed her during the encounter. On redirect, the prosecutor sought to clarify what was correct and incorrect about the statements. Ochoa's counsel objected that a prior consistent statement could not be elicited except upon a claim of recent fabrication. Over defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor elicited from Ruballo that the name on the statement was hers, and that the pedigree information, the apartment address and where the altercation occurred were correct. She also testified that, relative to the statement, the names of the perpetrators and the victim were correct, but that she lied when she stated that $50 had been taken, when she said that she and Cruz were attacked upon entering the building, and when she told police that Figueroa pushed her. The prosecutor's redirect examination did not constitute impermissible bolstering, as she was seeking merely to fill in the gaps that defense counsel left during cross-examination, after defense counsel implied that Ruballo's entire statement to police was a lie. Where only a part of a statement is drawn out on cross-examination, the other parts may be introduced on redirect examination for the purpose of explaining or clarifying that statement ( People v Torre, 42 NY2d 1036, 1037 [1977], citing Regina, 19 NY2d at 70). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to ask Ruballo to clarify which parts of her statement she claimed were true, and which were not true.