Opinion ID: 1263054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: seattle-first's motion to dismiss

Text: Next we turn to the court's order denying Seattle-First's motion to dismiss for improper venue. Both parties and the trial court agree that these two actions should be resolved in a single court. In favor of Pierce County is a priority of several hours in filing. In favor of King County are the venue agreements between some, but not all, of the parties to the dispute. While the priority rule may not be enforced as was attempted here, the rule might still dictate that the cases should be heard in Pierce County. Although Seattle-First concedes the general validity of a priority rule, Seattle-First argues that here the rule should not determine in which court the actions should be resolved. Seattle-First maintains that the rule applies primarily to special types of actions such as in rem actions, guardianships, and other actions under specific statutes. Next, Seattle-First contends that even if the rule applies to more than those limited types of actions, it cannot apply here because, Seattle-First maintains, there are not the requisite identities between the two actions. Finally, Seattle-First argues that the rule is only a general rule which should not be invoked when the first action is filed as a preemptive strike in anticipation of another's lawsuit. [7] As to Seattle-First's first contention, although Seattle-First is correct that the priority rule has been applied by this court in special types of actions such as guardianships and in rem actions, nothing in those cases suggests that the rule was intended to apply only to those special scenarios. See, e.g., State ex rel. Greenberger v. Superior Court, supra . [8, 9] In regard to Seattle-First's second contention, Seattle-First is correct that the priority rule is generally applicable only when the cases involved are identical as to subject matter, parties and relief. This identity must be such that a final adjudication of the case by the court in which it first became pending would, as res judicata, be a bar to further proceedings in a court of concurrent jurisdiction. Sherwin v. Arveson, 96 Wn.2d at 80. In Sherwin we found some of these requisite identities lacking when we compared a 14-day involuntary mental health treatment detention proceeding with a subsequent 90-day detention proceeding. There, although the subject matter may have been the same, the relief sought was different and therefore the priority rule did not apply. Sherwin, at 80. Here, there is no identity of subject matter, relief, or parties. The subject matter and relief sought overlaps because both American and Seattle-First seek a determination of the validity of the recourse provisions. American, however, seeks various other forms of relief. As to the difference in parties, American did not include the individual guarantors as parties to its action. We find American's motives for not joining the individual guarantors questionable in light of American's request to join the individual guarantors immediately following the trial court's order consolidating the cases. The res judicata effect on the issue of the effect of the recourse agreements is also questionable because the guarantors were not parties to American's action. We conclude that because the identities announced in Sherwin are not all present, the priority rule should not be applied without consideration of other factors. This brings us to Seattle-First's third contention. Seattle-First argues that American should not be permitted to bring an action in another county as a preemptive strike in anticipation of Seattle-First's action. Seattle-First contends that upon receipt of its letter of February 10, 1989, American quickly filed its case for the purpose of avoiding Seattle-First's action in King County. In essence, Seattle-First argues that consideration of American's allegedly improper motives for filing its action militates against giving preference to American's priority in filing. Seattle-First's argument sounds much like the approach taken by some federal courts which do not blindly apply a first-filed, first prevails rule. Instead, many courts give the trial court discretion to take into account countervailing equitable considerations. Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 525 F.2d 620, 627-29 (D.C. Cir.1975); Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 96 L.Ed. 200, 72 S.Ct. 219 (1952) (even though a declaratory judgment action is filed first, where equitable factors dictate, it may be enjoined pending resolution of another action surrounding the same issues); see also Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). Here we find several countervailing equitable considerations militating against automatic application of the priority rule. Most significant are the agreements between American's officers and Seattle-First setting venue in King County. Venue agreements have long been given effect in this state. Mangham v. Gold Seal Chinchillas, Inc., 69 Wn.2d 37, 416 P.2d 680 (1966); State ex rel. Schwabacher Bros. & Co. v. Superior Court, 61 Wash. 681, 112 P. 927 (1911); Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc. v. South Columbia Basin Irrig. Dist., 51 Wn. App. 143, 752 P.2d 395 (1988). However, the fact that the venue agreements were between some, but not all, of the parties precludes automatic enforcement of the agreements. Cf. State ex rel. Electrical Prods. Consol. v. Superior Court, 11 Wn.2d 678, 679, 120 P.2d 484 (1941); State ex rel. Lund v. Superior Court, 173 Wash. 556, 558, 24 P.2d 79 (1933) (both holding that a wife was not bound by a venue agreement signed only by the husband); see also Dyersburg Mach. Works, Inc. v. Rentenbach Eng'g Co., 650 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tenn. 1983) ([c]ourts which recognize the validity of forum selection clauses generally, nevertheless, have refused to enforce them against third parties who did not agree to the contract containing such clause and are not parties to the agreement). Because not all the parties to the action are parties to the agreement, the agreement will not be subject to mandatory application but instead the partial agreement will be one of several factors to be considered by the trial court in determining where venue should lie and whether to give preference to the action filed first in time. Other factors to be considered may relate to the convenience of witnesses and the interests of justice. See RCW 4.12.030(3). For example, here, the trial court apparently believed that this case could be resolved 1 to 3 years faster in Pierce County than in King County. Other relevant considerations are the allegation that American filed its action as a preemptive strike and the likelihood that American did not join the guarantors as plaintiffs for the purpose of avoiding King County venue although the guarantors, who are officers of American, certainly stand to benefit if American avoids enforcement of the recourse obligations and underlying guaranties. We do not find the time to trial factor very persuasive. We do, however, find it very likely that American filed its action in Pierce County and did not include the individual officers as parties in the action for the purpose of avoiding King County venue. Taking all these factors into account, we are convinced that these cases should be tried in King County rather than Pierce County. We reverse the trial court's order denying Seattle-First's motion for dismissal of the Pierce County action and remand to the Pierce County Superior Court. The trial court may either dismiss the Pierce County action, so that those claims may be brought as counterclaims in the King County case, or transfer venue of the Pierce County action to King County so that the cases may be consolidated and tried in King County. To summarize, we hold that a superior court may not consolidate cases pending in different counties, nor may a superior court transfer to itself a case pending in another county. We reverse the trial court's order consolidating the cases and setting venue in Pierce County. When nearly identical cases are brought in different counties, a motion to transfer must be brought in the court in which the case sought to be transferred is pending. Alternatively, a party may seek an order enjoining other parties from prosecuting a case pending elsewhere. When determining whether to grant a motion to transfer or enjoin parties from further prosecution of a case pending elsewhere, we do not adopt a bright line rule favoring the case first filed. Instead, in addition to the priority of action rule, the trial court should consider various equitable factors such as the convenience of witnesses and the interests of justice, the parties' possible motivations for their filing decisions as determined from the surrounding circumstances, and the presence of venue agreements between some but not all of the various parties. Reversed and remanded. CALLOW, C.J., and UTTER, DOLLIVER, DORE, ANDERSEN, DURHAM, SMITH, and GUY, JJ., concur.