Opinion ID: 1942288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Discipline Warranted in the District of Columbia

Text: Identical reciprocal discipline is imposed in reciprocal cases, unless the respondent demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the five exceptions set forth in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c) apply. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(f); In re Zilberberg, 612 A.2d 832, 834 (D.C. 1992). [10] Moreover, when a respondent does not contest reciprocal discipline, the Board's role is limited to reviewing the foreign proceeding `sufficiently to satisfy itself that no obvious miscarriage of justice would result in the imposition of identical discipline. . . .' In re Childress, 811 A.2d 805, 807 (D.C.2002) (quoting In re Spann, 711 A.2d 1262, 1265 (D.C.1998)). The imposition of identical discipline when the respondent fails to object should be close to automatic, with minimum review by both the Board and the Court. In re Cole, 809 A.2d 1226, 1227 n. 3 (D.C.2002) (per curiam). Respondent has proffered no evidence that he was deprived of due process, and no infirmity of proof has been, nor could be demonstrated in this matter. His California disciplinary order resulted from his own voluntary resignation from the California Bar, with charges pending that were based upon misconduct that he had admitted in a previous Florida disciplinary proceeding. Consequently, no issue arises in this matter under exceptions (1) or (2) of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c). Nor would reciprocal discipline in this matter result in a grave injustice under exception (3). Even Respondent's assertion of the hardship that he and his clients would suffer by his suspension from the District of Columbia Bar is seriously undercut by the contradictory statements in his Section 14(g) and Goldberg affidavits. The California order accepting Respondent's resignation pending charges is a lawful predicate for the Court to order reciprocal discipline under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11. In re Day, 717 A.2d 883 (D.C.1998); In re Richardson, 692 A.2d 427 (D.C.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1118, 118 S.Ct. 1056, 140 L.Ed.2d 118 (1998). Moreover, Respondent agreed in his California proceeding (as well as in his Florida proceeding) to conditions that Bar Counsel maintains are equivalent to disbarment and that we have deemed equivalent to a five-year suspension with a fitness condition ( see, e.g. In re Tanner, 913 A.2d 1258 (D.C.2006)); In re Angel, 889 A.2d 993 (D.C.2005). The Court's April 4, 2006 order in this matter directed Respondent to show cause before the Board on Professional Responsibility, if cause there be, within 10 days why identical, greater or lesser discipline should not be imposed in the District of Columbia. Record Index Tab 5. The filing enclosed with letter to the Court, dated March 28, 2006, which Respondent filed in response to Bar Counsel's letter filing the California disciplinary order in this matter, although filed the day before the Court entered its April 4, 2006 order, appears to be Respondent's attempt to show cause why identical discipline should not be imposed. The Court, however, considered Respondent's contentions and rejected them in refusing to lift the interim suspension that previously had been ordered by the Court. Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Respondent has made no response to Bar Counsel's Statement of Position, we deem the no-obvious-miscarriage-of-justice test articulated by the Court in Spann and subsequent cases as the appropriate standard of review in this matter. But we reach the same result whether review be conducted under that standard or by direct application of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c). In Respondent's filing in opposition to Bar Counsel's request for an interim suspension order, he offered three reasons for his position that his resignation from the California Bar should not [a]ffect his membership in the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Response to the Notice of Proposed Order (Response to Notice), Record Index Tab 4 at p. 1. First, he denied culpability and contended that after explaining the situation, this Honorable Court should determine that [his] actions did not constitute any misconduct in the District of Columbia and should not warrant the imposition of discipline from the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id. The record, however, contains his clear admission of unauthorized practice in the Florida proceeding, and Respondent has offered no evidence that might tend to disprove or diminish his culpability. See Conditional Guilty Plea and Consent Judgment for Discipline, filed in Florida Bar v. Lebowitz, Fla. Sup.Ct. No. SC04-1598, 901 So.2d 874, filed herein as part of Exhibit B to Statement of Bar Counsel (Record Index Tab 11). Second, Respondent asserts that it would be unjust and oppressive to be punished again by the Bar because it would be a great hardship on respondent and the people he is helping with their immigration problems. Response to Notice, Record Index Tab 4 at p. 1. That assertion also is unproven, and it is contradicted by Respondent's own sworn statements in his later filed affidavits. See supra, p. 450, n. 5. Finally, he urges that his conduct in no way poses any threat of harm to [his] clients. Response to Notice, Record Index Tab 4 at p. 2. On the contrary, [p]racticing law without a license in violation of a state statute is serious misconduct. In re Harper, 785 A.2d 311, 317 (D.C.2001). Were it not for Respondent's history of felony convictions, the disciplinary suspensions in both Florida and California resulting from those convictions and other aggravating factors in this matter, the two instances of unauthorized practice of law with which Respondent was charged at the time of his resignation in California (and that he admitted in Florida) might warrant discipline that is substantially different  and considerably less onerous  than disbarment or suspension for five years. See, e.g., In re Schoeneman, 891 A.2d 279 (D.C. 2006) (four-month suspension for unauthorized practice and other disciplinary violations); In re Ray, 675 A.2d 1381 (D.C. 1996) (six-month suspension for unauthorized practice and other violations, including negligent misappropriation); In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600 (D.C.1992) (nine-month suspension with fitness condition for unauthorized practice continued over a period of years and previous suspension for unauthorized practice); In re Washington, 489 A.2d 452 (D.C.1985) (three-month suspension for unauthorized practice and other violations). Generally in District of Columbia cases involving unauthorized practice violations, a sanction as severe as disbarment or lengthy suspension has been imposed only when the unauthorized practice violation is accompanied by violations that would, in themselves, warrant those more severe sanctions. See, e.g., In re Devaney, 870 A.2d 53 (D.C.2005) (unauthorized practice accompanied by egregious violation of Rule 1.8(b), which prohibits the preparation of an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer . . . any substantial gift from a client . . . except where the client is related to the donee.) [11] ; In re Asher, 772 A.2d 1161 (D.C.2001) (unauthorized practice accompanied by intentional misappropriation of client's funds, knowingly made false statements of material fact to a tribunal, conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and criminal acts of forgery and fraud); In re Wade, 526 A.2d 936 (D.C.1987) (unauthorized practice accompanied by misappropriation and conversion of clients funds). On the other hand, in previous reciprocal cases that have involved unauthorized practice, coupled only with related violations of other disciplinary rules, the Court has ordered disbarment as reciprocal discipline identical to the discipline imposed in the original jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Barneys, 861 A.2d 1270, 1275 (D.C.2004) (reciprocal case from Maryland); In re Harper, 785 A.2d at 317 (reciprocal case from Maryland). Although the only charges in the California proceeding on which this matter is based are two instances of unauthorized practice, Respondent's prior felony convictions and his previous suspensions are serious aggravating factors. The federal tax offense that he admitted in his guilty plea was punished with a sentence of three years in prison. Moreover, his unauthorized practice in Florida not only violated the Florida law but also was totally at odds with his resignation from the Florida Bar, which the Florida Supreme Court had accepted in 1989 in lieu of further disciplinary proceedings based on his federal tax conviction. The Florida court regarded Respondent's conduct as a violation of its 1989 order ( see Report of Referee, part of Exhibit B to Statement of Bar Counsel at p. 3, approved by Fla. Sup.Ct., also part of Exhibit B), and accepted his resignation from its bar without leave to reapply for five (5) years. [12] A form of discipline that is not identical to the discipline ordered by the original court can only be imposed in a District of Columbia reciprocal proceeding upon a demonstration, by clear and convincing evidence, either that [t]he imposition of the same discipline by the Court would result in grave injustice or the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in the District of Columbia. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(3) and (c)(4). The burden of establishing the applicability of these exceptions is heavy. Evidence to support the exception must be clear and convincing, that is, evidence that will produce . . . a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 24 (D.C.2005); In re Dortch, 860 A.2d 346, 358 (D.C.2004) (quoting In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1, 16 n. 17 (D.C. 1995)). In view of the aggravating circumstances that this record presents and the Court's imposition of disbarment in previous reciprocal cases in which the principal violations have been unauthorized practice of law, we are satisfied that no miscarriage of justice would result from the imposition of identical discipline in this matter. Moreover, the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence of circumstances that would warrant application of either D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(3) or § 11(c)(4). We therefore recommend that the Court order Respondent suspended for five years with a fitness condition as identical reciprocal discipline in this matter. See Tanner, supra ; Angel, supra .