Opinion ID: 1664931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pure comparative causation

Text: I would, however, overrule that part of Duncan that reaffirms the viability of comment n. A relic from the pre-comparative fault era, it unduly complicates our law without sufficient corresponding benefit. Comment n was promulgated in 1965, before the advent of comparative principles in either negligence or strict products liability cases. In the emerging doctrine of strict liability, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts wisely attempted to avoid the unjust effects of the all-or-nothing concepts of contributory negligence by providing that only extreme forms of behavior would bar recovery under the new theory. The drafters thus drew a sharp distinction between aggravated behavior, i.e., assumption of the risk, which would prevent any recovery by a plaintiff, and all other unreasonable behavior, which would not. But the distinction was rooted more in fairness than in logic. As one recognized treatise states: Perhaps if comparative negligence had preceded the development of strict liability, contributory negligence would have been recognized as a defense that would diminish recovery in proportion to the percentage of the plaintiff's fault. But courts were operating under the all-or-nothing doctrines of common law. W. Prosser & P. Keeton, THE LAW OF TORTS 712 (5th ed. 1984). In Duncan, this court joined a growing number of states in sweeping aside generations of convoluted legal precedent and adopting a system of comparative causation for product liability cases in which at least one defendant is found liable on a theory other than negligence. The all-or-nothing concepts of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were abandoned in an effort to create a less confusing and more efficient system of loss allocation. Out of a desire to protect consumer reliance on product safety, however, we did reaffirm the rule of comment n that negligent failure to discover or guard against a product defect is not a defense. Duncan v. Cessna, 665 S.W.2d at 432. I believe that even this limited adherence to the old approach was a mistake. The unfortunate truth is that everyday situations sometimes defy textbook classifications. This case is an excellent example of the difficulties that judges can and do encounter in deciding how to label particular conduct. Yet our choice of that label results in a substantial difference in the amount of the judgment. I suggest that finders of fact, with the best opportunity to consider all the facts and circumstances, should be allowed to analyze the relative contribution of the respective parties' conduct to the plaintiff's injuries. Under the broad form submission now mandated by our rules, the fairest results will be obtained by letting the finder of fact decide to what degree, if any, the plaintiff's own negligence has contributed to his injury. In short, I would hold that all of plaintiff's conduct which contributes to his injury should be compared to the defendant's liability, irrespective of the labels attached to that conduct. See generally, Comment, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Company: Sooner or Later Is Now, 36 Baylor L.Rev. 429, 463-65 (1984). I am persuaded by the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978). In adopting pure comparative causation, the court said: Plaintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the manufacturer or distributor was negligent in the production, design, or dissemination of the article in question. Defendant's liability for injuries caused by a defective product remains strict. The principle of protecting the defenseless is likewise preserved, for plaintiff's recovery will be reduced only to the extent that his own lack of reasonable care contributed to his injury. The cost of compensating the victim of a defective product, albeit proportionately reduced, remains on defendant manufacturer, and will, through him, be spread among society. However, we do not permit plaintiff's own conduct relative to the product to escape unexamined, and as to that share of plaintiff's damages which flows from his own fault we discern no reason of policy why it should... be borne by others. Such a result would directly contravene the principle... that loss should be assessed equitably in proportion to fault. 20 Cal.3d at 736-37, 144 Cal.Rptr. at 386-87, 575 P.2d at 1168-69. The failure to discover or guard against a product defect rule which today's dissent recognizes and today's majority expands is an anachronism. The continued retention of a rule which allows a plaintiff to recover full damages, even though concededly at fault, is inconsistent with comparative fault principles. Such a rule is unfair and inequitable in its operation because it places the entire burden of loss on one party when, in truth, two parties are at fault. As the court stated in Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Const. & Design Co., Inc., 565 F.2d 1129, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 1977): [T]here is no reason why other consumers and society in general should bear that portion of the burden attributable to the plaintiff's own blameworthy conduct. Id. at 1140. In the instant case, all parties operated under the holding in Duncan v. Cessna . What should be a question of fact, therefore, is in this case a question of law. As discussed above, I believe that Keen's conduct exceeds a mere negligent failure to discover or guard against a product defect. Hence, I dissent from the majority's result. I suggest, however, that in the future we discard comment n completely and adopt a pure form of comparative causation for products liability cases in which at least one defendant is found liable on a theory other than negligence. WALLACE, J., joins in this dissent.