Opinion ID: 3038348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Reddam argues that we do not have jurisdiction to review the remand to the Orange County Superior Court because “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). We disagree. [1] It is a commonplace that an order that is actually issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which provides for remand when there is a defect in the removal or when there is a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, cannot be reviewed by us. See, e.g., Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S. Ct. 2145, 2153, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, ___ (2006); Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 300 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 276 (9th Cir. 1984). But despite its apparently comprehensive language, § 1447(d) does not mean quite what it says. Where the remand order is not based on defective removal or lack of subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal,6 § 1447(c) does not apply and the § 1447(d) restriction does not apply either. As the Supreme Court has put it, “only remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein . . . are immune from review 6 There can be little doubt that the question of jurisdiction is determined as of the time of the removal itself. See Abada, 300 F.3d at 1117; Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2000); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. NASD, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992). REDDAM v. SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN AND WOOD 9251 under § 1447(d).” Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346, 96 S. Ct. 584, 590, 46 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1976). Moreover, we are not bound by the district court’s characterization of the basis for its remand order. See Abada, 300 F.3d at 1117; cf. Kunzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 833 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (9th Cir. 1987) (district court did not specify basis, but it was apparent that the basis was § 1447(c)). In the case at hand, the district court expressly declared that it had jurisdiction in the first place. It never deviated from that declaration. This case is unlike cases where a district court later determines that there was no jurisdiction ab initio.7 In this case, the district court determined that a later event—the NASD’s refusal to arbitrate—had made the arbitration provision unenforceable as to the parties then before it. [2] We recognize that the district court referred to § 1447(c) when it decided the removal issue, but that is not dispositive. On the face of its order, the district court explained that it would remand because “[h]ere, based on the decision by the NASD to decline jurisdiction, the claims are no longer subject to arbitration. It follows, therefore, that the sole basis for federal jurisdiction is no longer present. . . . Thus, the Court has no basis for jurisdiction, and must remand the case to state court.” (Emphasis added). That plainly indicates that the later occurring events were the basis for the decision. That cannot be a basis for a § 1447(c) remand order. See Davis v. UAW, 392 F.3d 834, 837-38 (6th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3051 (U.S. Jul. 15, 2005) (No. 05-107); Poore, 218 F.3d at 1290-91; Sparta Surgical, 159 F.3d at 1211-13. 7 See DaWalt v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 397 F.3d 392, 400-02 (6th Cir. 2005); Special Invs. Inc. v. Aero Air Inc., 360 F.3d 989, 996 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2004) (Fernandez, J., concurring); Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 326 F.3d 828, 833 (7th Cir. 2003). 9252 REDDAM v. SIDLEY AUSTIN BROWN AND WOOD [3] Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review the propriety of the remand order.8