Opinion ID: 2978538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration of the guideline range

Text: The defendant first complains that the district court improperly considered the sentence range recommended by the now-advisory guidelines because the guidelines section applicable to his case is unreasonable. The defendant argues that the guidelines in child pornography cases are arbitrary because they call for enhancements in virtually every case and routinely recommend an excessive term of incarceration. The defendant points out that district courts across the nation have concluded that the sentencing guidelines applicable to child pornography offenses are excessive and illconceived. See United States v. McElheney, 630 F. Supp. 2d 886 (E.D. Tenn. 2009); United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d 889 (D. Neb. 2008); United States v. Stern, 590 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Ohio 2008); United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Wis. 2008). Contra United States v. Fiorella, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074 (N.D. Iowa 2009). Based on the flaw in USSG § 2G2.2, the defendant reasons, the district court should not have taken the guidelines into account in this case. Of course, the district court must at least consider the sentencing guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the sentencing statute still “requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges”); United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 350 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “a sentence is unreasonable when the district court fails to ‘consider’ the applicable Guidelines range” (internal quotations omitted)). The defendant does not argue that there exists some constitutional infirmity in the guidelines, see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991); United States v. Jiles, 259 F.3d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 2001), or that there is “a direct facial conflict between the substance of the Commission’s promulgated Guidelines commentary and the sentencing parameters set forth by federal statute,” see United States v. Martin, 4 438 F.3d 621, 629 (6th Cir. 2006). Instead, the defendant only contends that the guidelines are illconceived. It is true that sentencing courts may disagree with, and therefore not follow, a guidelines range or method of calculation perceived to be arbitrary or excessive. See, e.g., Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91, 108-110 (2007); United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 586 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that district court could reject guidelines provision for policy reasons, such as “on the grounds that the base offense level prescribed . . . was arbitrary and out of balance with Congress’ determination of the seriousness of this type of offense”). Although district courts may choose to reject guideline sentences for childpornography offenses simply due to policy disagreements with those guidelines, district courts are not required to do so. United States v. Mikowski, 332 F. App’x 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Huffstatler, 571 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hile district courts perhaps have the freedom to sentence below the child-pornography guidelines based on disagreement with the guidelines, as with the crack guidelines, they are certainly not required to do so”); United States v. O’Connor, 567 F.3d 395, 398 (8th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir. 2009) (“In appropriate cases, district courts certainly may disagree with the Guidelines for policy reasons and may adjust a sentence accordingly. But if they do not, we will not second-guess their decisions under a more lenient standard simply because the particular Guideline is not empirically-based.”). The defendant’s argument falters at this stage because the decision as to the soundness of the guidelines range is vested in the district court, not the appellate court. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 392 (stating that “one theme” runs through Booker and its progeny: “Booker empowered district courts, not appellate courts and not the Sentencing Commission” (emphasis added)). “[I]t is not our job to wear ‘the district judge’s robe.’” United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276, 5 286 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Whitehead, 532 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2008)). Under our deferential review, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s consideration of the sentencing guidelines here.