Opinion ID: 1173194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: An Analysis of Segura

Text: My purpose at this point is not to dwell upon the invalidity of Segura, nor to discuss at length the reasons we should not bind Idaho to its holding. I suggest only that to my knowledge there has not been any analysis of Segura, and if there has been on this Court any discussion of its content and validity, I am wholly unaware of it. This case is a far, far cry from Gates and Cortez. Here we have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States authoring an opinion which concedes that there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry into petitioner's apartment. And he immediately concedes as well that the initial search was illegal. Illegal in my vocabulary means unlawful, and unlawful means that government peace officers were breaking the law. The Chief Justice, however, without bothering to condemn the unlawful entry and the hostile occupation of the premises by the police Task Force, in which the occupants were seized and forcibly evacuated from the premises, suggests that he can see no reason why a private residence may not be so invaded if the police see fit to do so. His holding, at p. 3389 of the 104 S.Ct. is that such police state conduct  bringing instantly to mind the unfettered and unchallenged Gestapo activities of Hitler's Germany  is not itself an unreasonable search of either the dwelling or its contents provided that a member of the Task Force has meanwhile been dispatched to request a search warrant so that that which has already been seized can then be searched. This is a monstrous proposition. If the people of this nation passively submit to such outrageous police conduct as the Chief Justice has now approved, then the people of this nation may very well live to see the day when, after World War II had ended, the German people asked themselves in retrospect, How did we ever allow ourselves to succumb to such a police-state government? Obviously the Chief Justice has placed the cart before the horse. Other than seizures which fall within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, seizures will follow from searches  whether with warrant, or without warrant. Under Segura, however, the police may unlawfully force themselves into private residences, make unlawful arrests, remove all occupants, take over the premises, thereby, even as the Chief Justice admits, seizing the entire dwelling and its contents, and thereafter at their leisure conduct the search which constitutionally should have been made under a warrant, thereby properly leading to a seizure. For many years the law schools have conducted courses in Search and Seizure. Those courses, if there remains any reason to teach them at all, will better be named Seizure and Search. The Chief Justice justifies this destructive assault on the federal constitution by the absurdism that he is unwilling to believe that officers will routinely and purposely violate the law as a matter of course. This is exactly what the Task Force (an ominous title for what we in Idaho call peace officers) did in Segura, and is the same conduct which took place in the case before us. The Chief Justice indulges in two other nonsensical platitudes in defense of his opinion, and concludes with his clincher, that officers breaking into private premises without exigent circumstances justifying their action, expose themselves to potential civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Of course they do, and those citizens who choose to seek redress in that manner had best have a deep pocket to afford the luxury of tackling the bottomless resources of the United States and most states as well. Such are but a few of the thoughts of a country lawyer who happens to be sitting on the highest court of Idaho. Others more capable will in due time render their criticisms of the Segura majority opinion. Whether or not the people of this nation no longer desire the protections of the fourth amendment remains to be seen. But, I quaere, what of the rights guaranteed by art. 1, § 13 of our Idaho Constitution? Even as we were receiving the Segura message, we were well advised of its fallacies and invalidity. The majority opinion of this Court issued today, which I do not join, barely deigns to mention that Chief Justice Burger's opinion is so outrageous that, of nine members who participated, only one joined his Part IV. Four members of the Court did not join any of the Chief Justice's opinion, but did join in a dissent authored by Justice Stevens. Unmentioned in our majority opinion, then, is that Segura  which a majority of our Court so quietly mentions, absent any analytical discussion of the opinion authored by Justice Stevens, and absent any reason for not giving any consideration to the pros and cons of applying Chief Justice Burger's rationale to our Idaho Constitutional provision, art. 1, § 17  is essentially but a plurality-of-four opinion (although there were five votes to affirm). I would hope that were this Court to obtain requisite briefing from learned counsel throughout the state, including those involved in this very case, it would at least make a considered decision before jumping aboard what has been called the Burger Band Wagon. We heard oral argument in this case in February of this year. I have neither recollection nor record of any party since then having requested us to base our decision on Segura, and as I say, if the members of the Court have discussed Segura, such has been without my knowledge. One member of this Court has consistently declared that as a matter of sound appellate practice we should never hinge a decision on a new case without affording counsel the opportunity to brief and/or argue it. Here, although I would be quick to concede that it is to be much doubted that anyone could much improve upon Justice Stevens' criticism of the Segura majority, nevertheless, the opportunity to argue the Justice Burger philosophies against the Justice Stevens historical documentation should be afforded  in fact, required. Since, on observing that a majority of this Court is willing to mention Segura without comment, and, in the realization that media coverage in judicial matters being what it is, it behooves me to at least invite the attention of those who faithfully read our opinions to point to some passages of Justice Stevens' opinion, with the hope that throughout the nation others are doing likewise. Otherwise, how is this gross inroad upon our federal and, in turn our state constitution to be brought home to the people? Justice Stevens wrote: Correct analysis of the Fourth Amendment issues raised by this case requires, first, a precise identification of the two constitutional violations that occurred, and second, an explanation of why a remedy for both is appropriate. While I do not believe that the current record justifies suppression of the challenged evidence, neither does it justify affirmance of petitioners' convictions. We must consider the substantial contention, supported by the findings of the District Court and left unaddressed by the opinion of this Court, that the authorities' access to the evidence introduced against petitioners at trial was made possible only through exploitation of both constitutional violations. Because I believe that contention must be addressed before petitioners' convictions are finally affirmed, I would remand for further proceedings. The Court's disposition, I fear, will provide government agents with an affirmative incentive to engage in unconstitutional violations of the privacy of the home. The Court's disposition is, therefore, inconsistent with a primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule  to ensure that all private citizens  not just these petitioners  have some meaningful protection against future violations of their rights. ... . ... Thus, it is uncontested that the warrantless entry of petitioners' apartment was unconstitutional. It is equally clear that the subsequent 18-20 hour occupation of the apartment was independently unconstitutional for two separate reasons. First, the occupation was an unreasonable `search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A `search' for purposes of the Fourth Amendment occurs when a reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed. Nowhere are expectations of privacy greater than in the home. As the Court has repeatedly noted, `physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 [92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752] (1972). Of course, the invasion of privacy occasioned by a physical entry does not cease after the initial entry. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 [98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290] (1978), we held that although the police lawfully entered Mincey's home to arrest him, the Constitution forbade them from remaining in the home and searching it. The Court reasoned that despite the lawful initial entry, Mincey retained a constitutionally protected privacy interest in his home that could not be infringed without a warrant. See id., at 390-391 [98 S.Ct. at 2412-2413]. Similarly, in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 [89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685] (1969), we could `see no reason why, simply because some interference with an individual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the absence of a warrant that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require.' Id., at 766-767, n. 12 [89 S.Ct. at 2041-2042, n. 12]. Here, by remaining in the home after the initial entry, the agents exacerbated the invasion of petitioners' protected privacy interests. Even assuming the most innocent of motives, the agents' occupation of petitioners' living quarters inevitably involved scrutiny of a variety of personal effects throughout the apartment. Petitioners' privacy interests were unreasonably infringed by the agents' prolonged occupation of their home. THE CHIEF JUSTICE simply ignores this point, assuming that there is no constitutional distinction between surveillance of the home from the outside and physical occupation from the inside. THE CHIEF JUSTICE's assumption is, of course, untenable; there is a fundamental difference when there is a `breach of the entrance to an individual's home. The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home  a zone which finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.' Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 [100 S.Ct. 1371, 1381, 63 L.Ed.2d 639] (1980). Second, the agents' occupation was also an unreasonable `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A `seizure' occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests. There can be no doubt here that petitioners' possessory interests with respect to their apartment were subject to meaningful governmental interference. The agents not only excluded petitioners from access to their own apartment, and thereby prevented them from exercising any possessory right at all to the apartment and its contents, but they also exercised complete dominion and control over the apartment and its contents. ... . ... The cases THE CHIEF JUSTICE cites, ante, [104 S.Ct.] at 3387-3389, for the proposition that the Government may impound premises for the amount of time necessary to procure a warrant thus have no application to this case whatsoever. There is no contention that a period of 18-20 hours was even remotely necessary to procure a warrant. The contrast between the 90 minute duration of the seizure of a piece of luggage held unreasonable in [ United States v. ] Place [462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110] and the 18-20 hour duration of the seizure of the apartment and its contents in this case graphically illustrates the unreasonable character of the agents' conduct. Moreover, unlike Place, which involved a seizure lawful at its inception, this seizure was constitutionally unreasonable from the moment it began. It was conducted without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances. It has been clear since at least Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 [89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685] (1969), that the police may neither search nor seize the contents of a home without a warrant. There is simply no basis for concluding that this 18-20 hours warrantless invasion of petitioners' home complied with the Fourth Amendment. Because the agents unreasonably delayed in seeking judicial authorization for their seizure of petitioners' apartment, that seizure was unreasonable. Nevertheless, in what I can only characterize as an astonishing holding, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concludes that the 18-20 hours seizure of the apartment was not unreasonable. He advances three reasons for that conclusion, none of which has any merit. First, he seeks to justify the delay because `the officers focused first on the task of processing those whom they had arrested before turning to the task of securing the warrant.' Ante, [104 S.Ct.] at 3390. But there is no evidence that this task presented any difficulties; indeed, since the arrest of the occupants itself was unconstitutional, it is truly ironic that THE CHIEF JUSTICE uses one wrong to justify another... . Second, THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests that it is relevant that the officers did not act in `bad faith.' Ante, [104 S.Ct.] at 3382-3383, 3390. This is done despite the fact that there is no finding as to whether the agents acted in good or bad faith; the reason is that the litigants have never raised the issue. More important, this Court has repeatedly held that a police officer's good or bad faith in undertaking a search or seizure is irrelevant to its constitutional reasonableness, and does so again today. Finally, and `most important' to his conclusion, THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests that there was no significant interference with petitioners' possessory interests in their apartment because they were in custody anyway. Ante, [104 S.Ct.] at 3390-3391. The cases are legion holding that a citizen retains a protected possessory interest in his home and the effects within it which may not be infringed without a warrant even though that person is in custody... . ... . Every time a court holds that unconstitutionally obtained evidence may not be used in a criminal trial it is acutely aware of the social costs that such a holding entails.[ [1] ] Only the most compelling reason could justify the repeated imposition of such costs on society. That reason, of course, is to prevent violations of the Constitution from occurring. For me, however, the controlling question should not be answered merely on the basis of such speculation, but rather by asking whether the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule would be served or undermined by suppression of this evidence. That is the appropriate `prudential' consideration identified in our exclusionary rule cases. The District Court found that there was a distinct possibility that the evidence was preserved only through an illegal occupation of petitioners' apartment. That possibility provides a sufficient reason for asking whether the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule is applicable to the second constitutional violation committed by the police in this case. ... . The importance of applying the exclusionary rule to the police conduct in this case is underscored by its facts. The 18-20 hour occupation of petitioners' home was blatantly unconstitutional. At the same time, the law-enforcement justification for engaging in such conduct is exceedingly weak. There can be no justification for inordinate delay in securing a warrant. Thus, applying the exclusionary rule to such conduct would impair no legitimate interest in law enforcement. Moreover, the deterrence of the rule is plainly applicable. The agents impounded this apartment precisely because they wished to avoid risking a loss of access to the evidence within it. Thus, the unlawful benefit they acquired through the impoundment was not so `attenuated' as to make it unlikely that the deprivation of that benefit through the exclusionary rule would have a deterrent effect. To the contrary, it was exactly the benefit identified by the District Court  avoiding a risk of loss of evidence  that motivated the agents in this case to violate the Constitution. Thus, the policies underlying the exclusionary rule demand that some deterrent be created to this kind of unconstitutional conduct. Yet the majority's disposition of this case creates none. Under the majority's approach, the agents could have remained indefinitely  impounding the apartment for a week or a month  without being deprived of the advantage derived from the unlawful impoundment. We cannot expect such an approach to prevent similar violations of the Fourth Amendment in the future. ... . The Government did not contest the blatant unconstitutionality of the agents' conduct in this case. Nevertheless, today's holding permits federal agents to benefit from that conduct by avoiding the risk that evidence would be unavailable when the search warrant was finally executed. The majority's invocation of the `enormous price' of the exclusionary rule and its stated unwillingness to `protect criminal activity,' ante, [104 S.Ct.] at 3392, is the most persuasive support that the Court provides for its holding. Of course, the Court is quite right to be ever mindful of the cost of excessive attention to procedural safeguards. But an evenhanded approach to difficult cases like this requires attention to countervailing considerations as well. There are two that I would stress. First, we should consider the impact of the Court's holding on the leaders of the law enforcement community who have achieved great success in creating the kind of trained, professional officers who deservedly command the respect of the communities they serve. The image of the `keystone cop' whose skills seldom transcended the ham-handed employment of the `third degree' is largely a matter of memory for those of us who lived through the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. For a congery of reasons, among which unquestionably is the added respect for the constitutional rights of the individual engendered by cases like Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (1966), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081] (1961), the professionalism that has always characterized the Federal Bureau of Investigation is now typical of police forces throughout the land. A rule of law that is predicated on the absurd notion that a police officer does not have the skill required to obtain a valid search warrant in less than 18 or 20 hours, or that fails to deter the authorities from delaying unreasonably their attempt to obtain a warrant after they have entered a home, is demeaning to law enforcement and can only encourage sloppy, undisciplined procedures. Second, the Court's rhetoric cannot disguise the fact that when it not only tolerates, but provides an affirmative incentive for warrantless and plainly unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into the home, the resulting erosion of the sanctity of the home is a `price' paid by the innocent and guilty alike.[ [2] ] More than half a century ago, Justice Holmes explained why the Government cannot be permitted to benefit from its violations of the Constitution. `The Government now, while in form repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it would not have had. `The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that although of course its seizure was an outrage the Government now regrets, ... the protection of the Constitution covers the physical possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act... . In our opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-392 [40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319] (1920) (citation omitted).' If we are to give more than lip service to protection of the core constitutional interests that were twice violated in this case, some effort must be made to isolate and then remove the advantages the Government derived from its illegal conduct. I respectfully dissent.