Opinion ID: 78287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eleventh Circuit's Interpretations of St. Cyr

Text: Although our Court has not squarely decided the retroactivity issue splitting the circuits, we have come close to doing so on two occasions. We have all but said that St. Cyr 's retroactivity analysis does not apply to aliens who were convicted after a trialas opposed to a guilty pleaand that § 212(c) relief is, therefore, not available to such aliens. Here, we examine our two prior decisions. In Alexandre v. United States Attorney General, 452 F.3d 1204, 1205 (11th Cir. 2006), this Court addressed the BIA's denial of Alexandre's motion to reopen his deportation proceedings in order to permit him to apply for relief under former INA § 212(c). The BIA denied the motion and concluded that Alexandre was ineligible for § 212(c) relief. Id. Alexandre (1) had been convicted of drug charges (considered an aggravated felony), (2) following a 1989 jury trial, and (3) had served five years of his sentence. Id. Relying on the five-year bar in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 (IMMACT-90), [22] the BIA determined that Alexandre was precluded from seeking § 212(c) relief. Id. at 207. This Court denied Alexandre's petition for review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen. Id. at 1207. We noted that Alexandre was convicted in 1989 and that when deportation proceedings began in 1994 he had served at least 5 years of his sentence. Id. We stated that the retroactivity rationale of St. Cyr does not apply to IMMACT-90. Id. Thus, at the time of his deportation proceedings, [Alexandre] was ineligible for § 212(c) relief because of the five-year bar. Id. Citing federal regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1003.44(a) we also stated that § 212(c) relief is not available to aliens who were convicted after a trial instead of on a guilty plea. Id. Although Alexandre argued that IMMACT-90's five-year bar produced an impermissible retroactive effect because he committed his crime before the statute including [the bar] was passed, this Court determined that his argument was resolved in [his] initial appeal before the BIA, and for that reason it [was] not properly before us  in the petition for review of the denial of his motion to reopen. Id. (emphasis added). We also noted, albeit in dictum, that [e]ven if the retroactivity rationale of St. Cyr did apply to IMMACT-90, it would not apply to Alexandre because he did not plead guilty to his drug trafficking charges, but instead proceeded to trial and was convicted by a jury. Id. [23] Alexandre is instructive. But it does not squarely resolve the issue presented in this petition. Alexandre involved a different statute that did not repeal all of § 212(c). And we stated quite clearly, the retroactivity rationale of St. Cyr does not apply to IMMACT-90. Id. Admittedly, Alexandre did state that § 212(c) relief is not available to aliens who were convicted after a trial instead of on a guilty plea. Id. However, our comments on the retroactivity issue and the scope of St. Cyr were classic dicta because we explicitly noted that the retroactivity issue was not properly before us. Id. As we noted earlier, the same retroactivity issue was presented in Brooks v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2002), but a jurisdictional bar, now removed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), prevented us from resolving it. [24] 283 F.3d at 1271-73. Although Brooks does not control the discrete retroactivity issue now before us, it also sheds light on our interpretation of St. Cyr. In Brooks, we addressed and rejected two constitutional challenges-under the Sixth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause-to applying IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) to aliens, like Brooks, who were convicted before IIRIRA's effective date. First, Brooks argued that applying IIRIRA would impermissibly penalize him for exercising his Sixth Amendment rights. Brooks argued that since St. Cyr authorized those who pled guilty to apply for § 212(c) relief, applying it to an alien convicted after a trial necessarily penalized him for exercising his Sixth Amendment right to trial. Id. This Court rejected Brooks's Sixth Amendment challenge. Nothing in St. Cyr changed the fact that Brooks was given the opportunity to be heard, the right to examine witnesses against him, the right to offer testimony, and the right to be represented by counsel. Id. We were thus hard-pressed to see how his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Id. We quoted St. Cyr for the proposition that alien defendants are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. Id. at 1274 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 322, 121 S.Ct. 2271). We concluded that Brooks weighed his options and was given a full trial, and was thus accorded his Sixth Amendment rights. Id. This Court also rejected Brooks's Equal Protection challenge. Id. Brooks argued that it violates the Equal Protection Clause to apply IIRIRA § 304(b) retroactively to aliens whose convictions preceded the enactment of IIRIRA, but yet preventing such retroactive application against aliens who pled guilty as in St. Cyr.  Id. But we found that there was a rational basis for distinguishing between the two groups. Id. And we quoted approvingly St. Cyr 's explanation of why plea agreements involve a quid pro quo, tit-for-tat exchange, between a criminal defendant and the government. Therefore, we concluded that Brooks's Equal Protection claim had no merit. Id. Nonetheless, Brooks did not directly address whether IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) had an impermissible retroactive effect-the question that Ferguson raises here.