Opinion ID: 1900651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: question #1: did the failure to object to any of the special verdict questions waive any alleged error in the questions?

Text: Mr. Gyldenvand argues on appeal that the first question of the special verdict was fatally defective because it was duplicitous, making it impossible to determine how the jury answered the question. He also maintains that the right to have the question reviewed was not waived by the failure to object because the error went to substance, not form. This court has consistently held that failure to object to the special verdict before it is submitted to the jury waives an appeal of right. Roach v. Keane, 73 Wis.2d 524, 535, 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976). However, an exception to that rule occurs when the defect is not formalistic, but is of substance and renders the verdict void. Vroman v. Kempke, 34 Wis.2d 680, 150 N.W.2d 423 (1967); Johnson v. Heintz, 61 Wis.2d 585, 593-594, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973). The distinction was explained at some length in Vlasak v. Gifford, 248 Wis. 328, 333-334, 21 N.W.2d 648 (1946): The subject of duplicitous questions and fatally defective verdicts based on answers to such questions has frequently received the attention of this court. If a question in a special verdict is so drafted as to present to the jury more than one question, and it is impossible to determine whether some of the jury did not answer one question and some another, the verdict is fatally defective. The defect in the question is formal but the defect in the verdict is one of substance and the verdict is void. If no objection is taken to the form of the verdict, and the answer of the jury is such as to raise no ambiguities as to the extent of the finding, the verdict is valid and the formal defect is waived by failure to object. It is necessary to make a distinction between the form of the question and the validity of the verdict because the ultimate fate of the verdict depends upon the answer given to the question. For example, when the special question puts more than one question conjunctively, and the jury's answer is in the negative, the verdict is fatally defective because it is impossible to know whether all the jury found in the negative as to each of the questions included in the submitted question. Where the special question contains several questions disjunctively put, and the jury's answer is `Yes' the same result follows. It is impossible to determine what the jury has found as to any one of the questions duplicitously included in the special question. In connection with this see Berger v. Abel & Bach Co., 141 Wis. 321, 124 N.W. 410. Thus, it will be seen that when no objection is made to the form of the question, the person failing to make such objection takes the risk that the duplicitous question will be so answered as to leave nothing but a formal defect which he has waived by not objecting. If, however, the answer of the jury is such as to make it impossible to know what they have found, the verdict is fatally and substantially defective. This distinction was abolished with the adoption of the new rules of civil procedure. Sec. 805.13(3), Stats. (1975) provides: 805.13. Jury instructions; form of verdict. . . . (3) INSTRUCTION AND VERDICT CONFERENCE. At the close of the evidence and before arguments to the jury, the court shall conduct a conference with counsel outside the presence of the jury. At the conference, or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, counsel may file written motions that the court instruct the jury on the law, and submit verdict questions, as set forth in the motions. The court shall inform counsel on the record of its proposed action on the motions and of the instructions and verdict it proposes to submit. Counsel may object to the proposed instructions or verdict on the grounds of incompleteness or other error, stating the grounds for objection with particularity on the record. Failure to object at the conference constitutes a waiver of any error in the proposed instructions or verdict.  (Emphasis added.) Sec. 805.13 replaced former sec. 270.21. However, sub. (3) was new language. See Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974. The adoption of the new rule abolished the formal/substantive distinction in the earlier cases by providing that failure to object to the verdict waives any error. (67 Wis.2d at 703.) The failure to object to instructions under this section was discussed in Graczyk, The New Wisconsin Rules Of Civil Procedure: Chapters 805-807, 59 Marquette L. Rev. 671, 700 (1976) and a similar view was taken: Subsection (3) requires the court to inform counsel of the proposed instructions and special verdict questions, although the rule does not state when this notification must be made or whether the court must inform counsel of the precise language which the court will use. Presumably, notification of counsel may occur prior to the post-evidence conference. The new rule permits counsel to object to the instructions proposed by the judge on the grounds of `completeness or other error,' thereby eliminating the distinction between instructions which have material omissions and instructions which inaccurately state the law. Under the former practice, when an instruction given was incomplete, counsel had a duty to object at the time the instruction was given or else waive his claim of error, whereas if the instructions given erroneously stated the law, counsel was not required to object, but simply had to move for a new trial on that ground. Under subsection (3) counsel must object to an instruction which he considered to be inadequate on any ground. [1] Thus, whether the defect was one of form or substance, Mr. Gyldenvand waived the right to review the alleged error by failure to object.