Opinion ID: 502461
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Issues of Material Fact

Text: 40 1. AMA initially claims [t]here is a dispute of fact as to whether or not the 1983 amended management agreement requires the approval of the BIA and the Department of Interior under 25 U.S.C. Section 81. Issues of statutory construction are questions of law. Pathfinder Mines Corp. v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir.1987). Courts confronted with the issue of whether a bingo agreement between Indians and a non-Indian contractor requires BIA and Secretary approval under section 81 have resolved the issue as a question of law. See e.g., A.K. Management, 789 F.2d at 787-88; Wisconsin Winnebago Business Comm. v. Koberstein, 762 F.2d 613, 619 (7th Cir.1985). A question of fact concerning the interpretation of a contract does not arise unless the contract is ambiguous. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir.1983). AMA does not claim the 1983 agreement is ambiguous. Thus, the issue whether the 1983 agreement required BIA and Secretary approval under section 81 does not raise questions of fact. 41 2. AMA claims [t]here are questions of fact as to whether the BIA, in reviewing the 1981 contract between the Tribe and AMA, approved the contract and/or determined that it was not subject to the provisions of 25 U.S.C. Section 81 so as to require BIA approval. (Emphasis added). The validity of the 1981 agreement was not the subject of the declaratory relief action brought by the Band. The motion for a summary judgment addressed the validity of the 1983 agreement. The 1981 agreement was nullified by the following language of the 1983 agreement: 42 Cancellation of previous agreement --The parties recognize that they executed a somewhat similar version of this instrument on or about April 20, 1981. When this Management Agreement is executed by the parties it will take the place of, substitute for, replace, supersede, and cancel that prior Management Agreement in all respects. 43 Any alleged question of fact regarding the 1981 agreement is not material to the issues presented in the summary judgment motion in this matter. 44 A material fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit. The materiality of a fact is thus determined by the substantive law governing the claim or defense. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. 45 T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). 46 3. AMA claims that there are disputed questions of fact concerning whether it was impossible for AMA to obtain BIA review of the 1983 management agreement. AMA argues it was impossible for it to obtain approval because the BIA would not review or approve the 1983 agreement even if it was submitted for such review. AMA relies on the October 5, 1984 correspondence from the Department of the Interior, which states in part:Until two federal courts recently held that 25 U.S.C. [Sec.] 81 renders tribal bingo management contracts invalid unless they are approved pursuant to that section, the Bureau did not deem Bureau approval of management contracts between tribal governments and bingo management firms necessary unless they were also a lease or involved a lease. 47 AMA argues that the doctrine of impossibility of performance supports its contention that the 1983 agreement is valid. The doctrine of impossibility of performance has been only applied in contract cases where a party seeks to excuse his nonperformance of a condition of a contract. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Sec. 266 (1981); North Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753 F.2d 1482, 1484-86 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 931, 106 S.Ct. 265, 88 L.Ed.2d 271 (1985); Balzer/Wolf Assocs., Inc. v. Parlex Corp., 753 F.2d 771, 775 (9th Cir.1985). In this matter, no contractual relationship existed between AMA and the Department of the Interior. AMA has not cited any case in which the doctrine of impossibility of performance has been applied where the parties to the action did not have a contractual relationship. Our research has disclosed none. AMA has failed to demonstrate that impossibility of performance is material to the resolution of the motion for summary judgment. 48 4. AMA next claims [t]here are questions of fact as to whether the rulings by the District Court in the case of Barona v. Duffy collaterally estop the Tribe and the District Court from claiming or ruling that the 1983 contract is invalid. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable to this case. 49 In Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy (Duffy), 694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929, 103 S.Ct. 2091, 77 L.Ed.2d 301 (1983), the Band filed a declaratory relief action in district court against John Duffy, the Sheriff of San Diego County, California, requesting an injunction barring the enforcement of certain county and state laws pertaining to the operation of bingo games. In Duffy, the Band argued that the Sheriff was without authority to enforce the state and county bingo laws on the Barona reservation. 50 AMA argues that in his answer to the Band's complaint, Sheriff Duffy alleged that there was no case or controversy until the 1981 agreement was approved by the BIA as required by section 81. Additionally, in the Sheriff's opposition to the Band's motion for a preliminary injunction, the Sheriff claimed the case failed to meet the case or controversy requirement because the 1981 agreement was null and void without BIA approval. The district court denied the Band's motion for a preliminary injunction, but concluded that the case satisfied the case or controversy requirement of the Constitution. AMA claims that in determining justiciability the district court must have found that the 1981 agreement was valid and effective because BIA approval was not required. This argument is based on pure speculation. AMA has failed to demonstrate by citation to appropriate portions of the record that the district court made any factual finding or legal determination concerning the validity of the 1981 agreement. 51 5. AMA next asserts that [t]here is a material issue of fact as to whether the conduct of the BIA, the rulings of the District Court in Barona v. Duffy, and the conduct of the Tribe and its attorney is sufficient to estop the Tribe and District Court from declaring the contract invalid under principles of equitable estoppel. AMA argues that it began operating bingo games and constructed a bingo hall in express reliance upon the ruling of the BIA that written approval of the agreement was not required, the court's ruling in Barona v. Duffy which upheld the validity of the agreement, and the representations of the Tribe and its attorney. This claim is without merit. 52 AMA's actions in reliance on the BIA correspondence, and the district court's ruling in Duffy, involve the 1981 agreement. The question whether equitable estoppel would apply to the 1981 agreement is not before us in this proceeding. AMA did not submit the 1983 agreement for approval. 53 6. AMA finally claims [t]here are questions of fact as to whether the actions of the BIA in determining that the contract did not require approval, and the later ruling by the District Court in this case that the contract was invalid, constitute violations of AMA's Constitutional rights to due process, protection against taking of its property without just compensation, and equal protection. AMA fails to identify any triable issues of material fact which would preclude summary judgment as to these claims, and our review of the record has disclosed none. These issues involve questions of law which we address in sections VI, VII, and VIII of this opinion. 54