Opinion ID: 2382080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bail Condition Authorized by Statute

Text: [¶ 13] We next examine whether the bail condition requiring Ullring to submit to random searches of his residence and person is permitted by the Maine Bail Code, 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 1001-1104 (Supp. 1999). The legislative findings and statement of purpose for the bail code are as follows: It is the purpose and intent of this chapter that bail be set for a defendant in order to reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required, to otherwise reasonably ensure the integrity of the judicial process and, when applicable, to reasonably ensure the safety of others in the community. It is also the purpose and intent of this chapter that the judicial officer consider, relative to crimes bailable as of right preconviction, the least restrictive release alternative that will reasonably ensure the attendance of the defendant as required, or otherwise reasonably ensure the integrity of the judicial process. Finally, it is also the intent and purpose of this chapter that a defendant, while at liberty on bail, refrain from committing new crimes. Id. at § 1002. Although the statement of purpose gives four purposes, only two are listed in the preconviction bail section: (1) ensure the appearance of the defendant; and (2) ensure the integrity of the judicial process. See § 1026. The setting of postconviction bail, however, requires a judge to consider the other two purposes; that is, to ensure the safety of others in the community and to keep a defendant from committing new crimes while at liberty on bail. See § 1051(2). [¶ 14] The bail code authorizes judicial officers to impose conditions on the preconviction release of persons on bail. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 1026(1)(C). If the judicial officer determines that the release . . . will not reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required or will not otherwise reasonably ensure the integrity of the judicial process, the judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the defendant subject to the least restrictive further condition or combination of conditions that the judicial officer determines will reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required and will otherwise reasonably ensure the integrity of the judicial process. § 1026(3)(A). Judicial officers include both judges and bail commissioners. See § 1003(8). The phrase ensure the integrity of the judicial process is defined as: safeguarding the role of the courts in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of defendants by ensuring the presence of the defendant in court and otherwise preventing the defendant from obstructing or attempting to obstruct justice by threatening, injuring or intimidating a victim, prospective witness, juror, attorney for the State, judge, justice or other officer of the court. § 1003(5). [¶ 15] There is no express authorization in the bail code for the imposition of a condition of submitting to random searches. On the other hand, there is nothing in the bail code that prohibits the condition. The bail code contains seventeen specific conditions that a judicial officer may include in a bail order. See § 1026(3)(A)(1)-(17). Included among these conditions are staying in the custody of a designated person or organization; maintaining employment; maintaining or commencing an educational program; abiding by restrictions on personal association, place of abode, and or travel; complying with a specified curfew; refraining from the possession of a firearm; and refraining from the use of alcohol or drugs. Id. Further, there is a catch-all provision which allows a judicial officer to require a defendant to [s]atisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to ensure the appearance of the defendant as required and to otherwise reasonably ensure the integrity of the judicial process. § 1026(3)(A)(18). [¶ 16] Section 1026(4)(C) sets forth numerous factors that the judicial officer is required to review in setting bail such as the crime charged; the defendant's criminal history and past conduct including drug or alcohol abuse; and the defendant's ties to Maine. The judicial officer is to obtain the information on which to make the assessment from an interview with the defendant, information from the State, and the defendant's attorney, and other reliable information. See § 1026(4). [3] No facts were presented in this case as to the information upon which the bail commissioner based the conditions which were imposed upon Ullring in the bail bond. [4] [¶ 17] The bail code specifically allows a judicial officer to require a person on preconviction release to refrain from the possession of firearms, alcohol, or drugs. See § 1026(3)(A)(7)-(9). The State argues that the only effective means of enforcing these conditions is to require the defendant to submit to random searches and testing. [¶ 18] In Oliver v. United States, 682 A.2d 186, 189 (D.C.1996), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that if a court can order abstention from illegal drug use, it must have the power to enforce compliance with the order through drug testing. Without such testing, the court ordinarily would have no reasonable means to determine whether the defendant has complied with the condition of his release proscribing use of unlawful drugs. Id.; see also United States v. Kills Enemy, 3 F.3d 1201, 1203 (8th Cir.1993) (upholding presentence release condition authorizing warrantless search). The bail statutes for the District of Columbia expressly authorized the imposition of a condition of bail that the defendant refrain from the possession of drugs, although they did not authorize drug testing. Oliver, 682 A.2d at 189. The bail statutes also contained a general provision allowing for any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person as required .... Id. (statutory citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). The Oliver court reasoned that a legislative purpose in authorizing the prohibition against drug possession was to prevent nonappearance in court, and that, therefore, a drug testing condition was permissible and reasonable in order to enforce the condition prohibiting possession of drugs. [5] [¶ 19] In York, the California Supreme Court held that the bail statute permitted the imposition of bail conditions of warrantless search and random drug testing. Although the statute did not expressly authorize the condition, it authorized a court or magistrate to impose all reasonable conditions. York, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d at 807. The court reviewed the legislative history and concluded that the legislature intended that conditions that relate to the safety of the public were included within all reasonable conditions. [6] Id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d at 808-11. It found the conditions permissible under the statute. Id. 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d at 811. [¶ 20] We are not aware of any court which has struck a bail condition of random search on the grounds that the condition was not authorized by the bail statute. We are persuaded that the condition of random search is authorized by the catch-all provision of the Maine Bail Code, § 1026(3)(A)(18), when the judicial officer is of the opinion that (1) the defendant should be prohibited from possessing illegal drugs; (2) a condition of random search is necessary to ensure that the defendant will not violate other conditions; and (3) the conditions of refraining from illegal drug possession and random search are the least restrictive alternative that reasonably will ensure the presence of the defendant and the integrity of the judicial process. Bail conditions which prohibit illegal drug use and authorize random searches can serve the purpose of ensuring the presence of the defendant in court. The bail condition of random search is not prohibited by the Maine Bail Code.