Opinion ID: 3010175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lindsey's Contentions and Scope of Review

Text: Lindsey's first contention is that it is not subject to the provisions of the Coal Act. The Coal Act authorizes the Commissioner to assign premiums to any signatory operator (or related party) that remains in business. 26 U.S.C.A. 9706(a). Lindsey is exempt from the Coal Act, it argues, because it is neither a signatory operator nor in business within the meaning of the Act. The Commissioner found otherwise. Our review is deferential. In reviewing the district court's order, we examine the agency's action under the same standard of review properly applied by the district court, seeFlorida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985), granting favorable inferences from disputed facts to Lindsey since this is a summary judgment, see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). Although Lindsey sought review under the declaratory judgment act, see 28 U.S.C.A. 2201, the determination that plaintiff Lindsey is a signatory coal operator that remains in business -- and thus liable for Coal Act premiums -- was a final administrative decision made by the Commissioner of Social Security. See 26 U.S.C.A. 9706(f). We review the Commissioner's decision as a final agency action brought under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C.A. 704 (Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.). Thus, the question before us, as before the district court, is whether the administrative determination challenged by Lindsey satisfies the applicable standard of review set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act: whether the agency action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C.A. 706(2)(A).