Opinion ID: 166091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Interstate Commerce Must Have Been Contemplated by the RICO Conspiracy

Text: 57 Mr. Smith further argues that the jury should have been instructed that the Government must prove that the defendant's agreement contemplated or that the defendant had a reasonable basis to foresee that the affairs of the enterprise would affect interstate commerce. 58 The District Court's refusal to issue a particular jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 433 (10th Cir.1995). The District Court did not abuse its discretion here. The phrase engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce is a jurisdictional, rather than substantive, element of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). We have held that knowledge of such jurisdictional facts is not generally an element of the required intent under federal statutes. United States v. Speir, 564 F.2d 934, 938 (10th Cir.1977) (citing United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684-85, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975)); see also United States v. Gumbs, 283 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir.2002); United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1543 (2d Cir.1994). We hold, then, that the Government was not required to prove Mr. Smith knew or should have known that KMD was engaged in, or its activities affected, interstate commerce. The District Court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on this point.