Opinion ID: 2141079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review & Issue Presented

Text: Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind.Trial Rule 56(C). Our standard of review is well-established. Although Blake, the non-moving party, has the burden of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court. Mullin v. Municipal City of South Bend, 639 N.E.2d 278, 280-81 (Ind.1994). On summary judgment all facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Wright v. Carter, 622 N.E.2d 170, 171 (Ind.1993). To recover under a theory of negligence, Blake must show three things: (1) Calumet owed a duty of care to Blake at the time he was injured; (2) Calumet failed to conform its conduct to that standard of care; and (3) damages were proximately caused to Blake by the breach. Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1991). Because the trial court granted summary judgment on the first element of negligencedutywe address only that issue. To find a duty running from one person to another is to state the conclusion that the former may be liable to the latter. Because this Court has often spoken in these terms, we use the same terminology here. Duty has been defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 356 (5th ed. 1984). In deciding whether to impose a duty at common law, this Court usually considers three factors: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the foreseeability of the harm; and (3) public policy concerns. Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995; see also William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L.REV. 1, 12-16 (1953) (discussing other considerations, such as conscience of the community and ease of administration). The duty inquiry in this case, however, is governed by a line of decisions dealing specifically with contractors' liability to third parties for construction flaws. In general, Indiana law has followed the rule that contractors do not owe a duty of care to third parties after the owner has accepted the work. An exception to this rule exists where the work is deemed dangerously defective, inherently dangerous or imminently dangerous such that it poses a risk of imminent personal injury to third parties. Although the existence of duty is generally a question of law, see Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995, under this line of authority duty in this case turns on two factual issues: did the owner accept the loading dock before the accident occurred and, if so, did the loading dock nonetheless present a risk of imminent personal injury as of that time? Both must be established favorably to Calumet by undisputed facts for summary judgment to be appropriate. [1]