Opinion ID: 168074
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Photo Array Identification

Text: Franklin argues the district court erred in refusing to suppress Ryan Gilchrist’s photo array identification of Franklin as the perpetrator of the Taco Inn restaurant robbery. In considering a denial of a motion to suppress a photo array identification, we review the district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error and the ultimate question of whether the identification infringed due process rights de novo. United States v. Sanchez, 24 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1994). W hen the constitutionality of a photo array is challenged under the due process clause, this court applies a tw o-pronged test. Id. at 1261. W e first -7- determine whether the photo array was impermissibly suggestive, considering such factors as the size of the array, the manner of its presentation by the officers, and the details of the photographs themselves. Id. at 1262. If the photo array is impermissibly suggestive, we determine w hether the identification is nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. Factors to consider include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the w itness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972). “These two prongs must be analyzed separately, and it is only necessary to reach the second prong if the court first determines that the array was impermissibly suggestive.” Sanchez, 24 F.3d at 1262. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Franklin’s motion to suppress the identification. The district court made the following findings of fact: Franklin was suspected in connection with a robbery in Topeka, Kansas. Police in Topeka asked Detective Smith to compile a photographic array to present to witnesses of the robbery. Smith used computer software to generate photographs of individuals w ith characteristics similar to Franklin. Smith then manually narrowed the twenty to forty photographs selected by the computer to five that looked similar to Franklin. The array Smith compiled contained photographs of six, relatively young, black males with similar characteristics including height -8- and weight, short hair, and a mustache. All of the individuals w ere dressed in casual street clothes, and the background of each photograph was the same. Subsequently, Special Agent Jim Carlson of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms presented the photo array to Ryan Gilchrist. Before he was presented with the array, Gilchrist was asked to read and sign an admonition form, which indicated he should not assume the perpetrator’s photograph is included in the array. Gilchrist selected Franklin’s photograph as that of the individual who robbed the Taco Inn restaurant. After an independent review of the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and the photo array, we conclude the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. Further, because the individuals pictured in the array had similar characteristics and the array was not presented in a manner that would influence Gilchrist’s identification, the array was not impermissibly suggestive. 1 W e therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Franklin’s motion to suppress the photo array identification. 1 Franklin argues the identification should not have been admitted because it was made two years after commission of the crime and after Gilchrist viewed newspaper articles containing Franklin’s photograph in connection with other crimes. These factors, however, do not impact our analysis of whether the array itself, or the manner of its presentation, was impermissibly suggestive. Instead, they are only relevant in assessing whether an identification is reliable in spite of an impermissibly suggestive array under the second prong of the applicable test. See United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999). Because w e conclude the array in this case was not impermissibly suggestive, we need not reach the second prong. United States v. Sanchez, 24 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1994). -9-