Opinion ID: 181300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indirect Comments on Right to Remain Silent

Text: Tanner's primary argument on appeal is that the district court should have declared a mistrial sua sponte because the prosecution's closing arguments infringed his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. We review such allegations of prosecutorial misconduct not in a vacuum, but in the larger context of the parties' closing arguments and the trial itself. See United States v. Holt, 817 F.2d 1264, 1275 (7th Cir.1987), quoting United States v. Buchbinder, 796 F.2d 910 (7th Cir.1986). Our analysis of Tanner's claim starts with the specific parts of the defendant's closing argument that the prosecutor was attempting to rebut. During Tanner's closing argument, defense counsel stated: I put witnesses on the stand, and I asked you to believe them beyond a reasonable doubt, even though I had no burden at all. No, I asked you just to believe them. Believe them a little bit. What difference does it make? [Tanner's] defense is unrebutted. The government had the right to bring in witnesses to say he had a horrible reputation for being a law abiding citizen. Did they? Not one single one. I rested [Tanner's] defense. They stood up and said, we rest in rebuttal. There was no rebuttal. The defense is unrebutted. After arguing that the government had failed to rebut Tanner's character witnesses, Tanner's counsel concluded: Where ... is the rebuttal of the defense? Where are the witnesses that say that [Moore] is a truthful person? Where is the witness that says [Tanner] is an untruthful person? [The prosecution] had the right of rebuttal, [but] didn't use it. Responding in his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated: Defense counsel ... got up and talked about what is unrebutted. So [it was] unrebutted he was a good boxer. This isn't about boxing.... It's unrebutted that he's a good character. Look at the evidence, we're not talking character witnesses. This isn't I like this guy, I don't like that guy. This guy's got a good reputation, this guy doesn't. We try this case, ladies and gentlemen, on facts. So if defense counsel wants to get up and say what's unrebutted, I'll tell you what's unrebutted. It's unrebutted, defense counsel didn't say a single thing about it, it's unrebutted that his client... was there to pick [the 15 kilograms of cocaine] up. It's unrebutted that he did pick that up on this date. It's unrebutted that defense counsel didn't say a single word about it, that it's his client on video ... and that he thinks it's 15 kilos of cocaine. That, ladies and gentlemen, is unrebutted. Defense counsel didn't say a single word that this isn't my guy. At this point, Tanner's counsel voiced his belief that these comments came dangerously close to a certain area of law, but he did not object or state a specific legal basis for an objection. Absent more specific complaints from defense counsel, the court reminded the jury that Tanner does not have to prove anything. Tanner's counsel voiced his disapproval of this statement but, once again, failed to actually object. Absent any objection, the prosecution continued: Defendant does not have to prove anything.... But defense counsel gave you a closing argument in which he talks about what was unrebutted. It is unrebutted that is this guy in the video. Now I want you to watch it. It's unrebutted that he hasn't said a single word about it. That ... Tanner thought that was cocaine. It's unrebutted ... he thought this was directly cocaine. It's unrebutted that that was his guy right there trying to get 15 kilos of cocaine. Those phone calls ... setting up the deal. Those are unrebutted. Defense counsel has no word of doing anything, he doesn't have to say a single word, but you have not heard a single thing which would lead you to believe that that wasn't his guy ... on the phone. Tanner's counsel finally objected at this point and, at a side-bar, argued that the prosecution came so close to [saying that] the defendant did not testify. The court overruled the objection, and the prosecutor continued: You have not heard a single thing from anyone to suggest that those calls weren't [Tanner], you never heard a single peep of evidence. That's not [Tanner] setting up that deal. It's unrebutted that when he's setting up that deal, he's trying to get 15 kilos of cocaine to distribute to his brothers. That is unrebutted. Ladies and gentlemen, perhaps the most important thing that is unrebutted that you've heard nothing in defense closing argument about is the defendant's own confession. It's unrebutted that [Tanner] chose on his own to meet with [two FBI agents]. Those two FBI special agents, it's unrebutted, sat downstairs while [the] defendant poured out his heart to them, and said I'm doing this for my brothers.... It's unrebutted that he confessed like that to a major narcotics conspiracy of over five kilos.... It's unrebutted that he tried to give up ... a boxer that supplied him. It's unrebutted that he talked about [another of his suppliers]. Tanner's counsel objected again, but that objection was overruled. The prosecution concluded by noting, It's unrebutted that [Tanner] confessed that he was getting drugs from [one of his suppliers]. It's unrebutted ... that he in his own words confessed to this entire conspiracy to not one, but two FBI agents. Did these comments require a mistrial? As a general matter, a mistrial is appropriate when an event during trial has a real likelihood of preventing a jury from evaluating the evidence fairly and accurately, so that the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial. United States v. Collins, 604 F.3d 481, 489 (7th Cir.2010). A prosecutor's alleged misconduct during closing arguments requires a mistrial only if (1) the conduct was actually inappropriate; and (2) in light of the entire record, the inappropriate conduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Cheska, 202 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir.2000). We typically review a district court's refusal to declare a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mannie, 509 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir.2007), citing United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 937 (7th Cir.1991). Here, however, Tanner's counsel (eventually) objected to the prosecutor's comments but never requested a mistrial, so our review is for plain error. United States v. Harris, 325 F.3d 865, 871 (7th Cir.2003). [1] On review for plain error, a convicted defendant has the burden to show that (1) the error complained of actually occurred; (2) the error was clear or obvious; (3) the error affected his substantial rights ( i.e., he probably would not have been convicted absent the error); and (4) the error seriously impugned the judicial proceeding's fairness, integrity, or public reputation. United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 1002 (7th Cir.2010). As a result, Tanner must show not only that the district court erred by failing to declare a mistrial, but that it was clear and obvious that a mistrial was necessary. In other words, Tanner must convince us that it should have been obvious to the district court both that an error occurred and that the error deprived him of a fair trial. Cf. Cheska, 202 F.3d at 950. Even then, reversal is appropriate only if he can show that the remarks probably changed the outcome of the proceedings. United States v. Bowman, 353 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir.2003), quoting United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2003). Here, the prosecutor never commented directly on Tanner's exercise of his right to remain silent. Cf. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (forbidding comment on the refusal to testify). Absent such direct comment, [t]he right against self-incrimination is violated only when `1) it was the prosecutor's manifest intention to refer to the defendant's silence, or 2) the remark was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant's silence.' Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 561 (7th Cir.1995), quoting United States v. Donovan, 24 F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir.1994). Nothing in the transcript of closing arguments indicates a manifest ( i.e., obvious or apparent) intent to refer to Tanner's silence. As ill-advised as his comments may have been, see United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243, 255 (7th Cir.1995) (noting that we always urge prosecutors to be cautious in making this type of statement), the prosecutor appears to have intended only to respond to Tanner's counsel's closing argument that none of his character witnesses had been rebutted. In fact, the prosecutor explicitly said a number of times that Tanner's counsel  not Tanner himselfhad not rebutted any of the government's evidence in his closing. See United States v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir.2001) (finding no error in part because prosecutor's statements merely referred to what the defendants, through their lawyers ... had argued during the trial). It is a closer issue whether the jury would have naturally and necessarily understood the prosecutor's statements as comments on Tanner's failure to testify. In the past, we have applied this test strictly, even literally: A prosecutor's comment that the government's evidence is ... unrebutted will violate [the Fifth Amendment] if the only person who could have rebutted the evidence was the defendant. Id. at 871 (emphasis added); see also Williams v. Lane, 826 F.2d 654, 665-66 (7th Cir.1987) (finding error where defendant was the only other possible defense witness who had failed to testify); United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir.1987) (We have taken Griffin to forbid comment on the defendant's failure to call witnesses, when the only potential witness was the defendant himself.). After all, a comment does not necessarily implicate a defendant's silence (and thereby penalize him for refusing to testify) if another witness could rebut the prosecution's case. See United States v. Buege, 578 F.2d 187, 188 (7th Cir.1978) ([W]hen a prosecutor refers to testimony as uncontradicted where the defendant has elected not to testify and when he is the only person able to dispute the testimony, such reference necessarily focuses the jury's attention on the defendant's failure to testify.), citing United States v. Handman, 447 F.2d 853, 855 (7th Cir.1971). A speculative possibility that some third party could have testified for the defense is not enough, however. See Freeman v. Lane, 962 F.2d 1252, 1260 (7th Cir.1992) (Our cases have recognized that a prosecutor may not comment concerning the uncontradicted nature of the evidence when `it is highly unlikely that anyone other than the defendant could rebut the evidence.'), quoting United States v. DiCaro, 852 F.2d 259, 263 (7th Cir.1988); Buege, 578 F.2d at 188-89 (finding error where only possible witness other than defendant did not even hear the statements he could supposedly contradict); Handman, 447 F.2d at 855 (reversing where nothing in record showed that anyone other than the defendant could have challenged or contradicted the testimony against him). Under this demanding standard, we conclude that the jury would not necessarily have believed that the prosecutor was commenting on Tanner's failure to testify. Tanner was accused of having sold drugs not on his own, but as part of a large conspiracy. The possibility that even one of his alleged co-conspirators might have testified on his behalf is enough to dispel any constitutional concerns. See Mietus, 237 F.3d at 872 ([W]here an accomplice could have provided testimony to rebut a part of the government's case, the prosecutor's statement that that evidence was unrebutted [will] not be taken as an impermissible comment on the defendant's silence.); United States v. Aldaco, 201 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir.2000) (finding no error where defendant's three accomplices were available to rebut government witness's allegations); Butler, 71 F.3d at 255 (affirming because other gang members were present when defendant was arrested). A jury need not speculate about the possibility of third-party testimony on a defendant's behalf when, as here, the defendant is accused of conspiring with a large number of people, any of whom could have testified in his defense and rebutted the government's evidence. Cf. United States ex rel. Adkins v. Greer, 791 F.2d 590, 598 (7th Cir.1986) (finding no error where it was not hard to imagine that others could know of the defendant's illegal acts). Furthermore, Tanner's girlfriend was with him when he was arrested and, at the very least, could have testified on Tanner's behalf regarding the events leading to his arrest. See United States v. McClellan, 165 F.3d 535, 548 (7th Cir.1999) (finding no error because defendant's girlfriend, who was with defendant at time of his arrest, could have testified). Of course it is possible, even likely, that neither Tanner's co-conspirators nor his girlfriend were actually willing and able to testify on Tanner's behalf, but it matters for our analysis only whether it is particularly likely that the defendant was the only person who could rebut the evidence referred to by the prosecution in its closing. Adkins, 791 F.2d at 598 (emphasis in original). On this record, a number of individuals other than Tanner could have rebutted the government's case, if in fact there had been a factual basis for rebutting it. This analysis holds true despite the fact that the prosecutor specifically mentioned that Tanner's confession was unrebutted. On at least an intuitive level, this comment seems to be the most problematicwho other than Tanner could have rebutted his own confession to law enforcement? A moment's reflection, however, reveals the answer to this question. Certainly, Tanner could have taken the stand and contradicted the agents' testimony about his confession. But Tanner also could have rebutted this testimony by calling witnesses to undermine the substance of the alleged confession, by testifying that he was not a drug dealer. Again, there is no reason to think that Tanner's girlfriend and alleged coconspirators could not have been available to provide such testimony if there had been a factual basis for it. In sum, we hold that the prosecutor's comments did not plainly implicate, even indirectly, Tanner's constitutional right to remain silent. Absent such error, the inquiry is over, and there is no reason to grant a new trial. Cheska, 202 F.3d at 950.