Opinion ID: 6332191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Issue Stemming from the Varying Federal

Text: Delineations of Cocaine For purposes of the categorical/modified categorical analysis, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the term “controlled substance” as used in USSG §§ 2K2.1(a) and 4B1.2(b) “to mean a substance listed in the Controlled Substances Act (‘CSA’), 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.” United States v. Bautista, 989 F.3d 698, 702 (9th Cir. 2021). “[C]onstruing the phrase in the Guidelines to refer to the definition of ‘controlled substance’ in the CSA—rather than to the varying definitions of ‘controlled substance’ in the different states—furthers uniform application of federal sentencing law, thus serving the stated goals of both the Guidelines and the categorical approach.” 1 Id. (citing to United States v. Leal-Vega, 680 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2012), and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 589 (1990)). 1 The goal of achieving a uniform application of federal sentencing law in this area is initially vitiated by fact that there is a split amongst the federal circuits as to whether the definition of “controlled substance” is limited to federal law (i.e., the substances listed in the CSA) or whether the definition is based on relevant state law. See Guerrant v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 640 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (observing that the Second and Ninth Circuits “have turned to federal law to define the term”; the First and Fifth Circuits “have not directly resolved the question, but have indicated agreement with that approach”; the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits “define[] what qualifies as a ‘controlled substance’ based on relevant state law”; and the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits “have issued internally inconsistent decisions on the question.”). Id. at 640 (citations omitted). 32 UNITED STATES V. HOUSE In determining the federal demarcation of a particular controlled substance, one initially examines the CSA—i.e., 21 U.S.C. Chapter 13, Subchapter I. The CSA defines a “controlled substance” as “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter [i.e., 21 U.S.C. § 812].” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). While various drugs are identified and listed in the schedules, the actual definitions and/or descriptions of the substances are delineated in a number of different locations within the CSA and not just within the schedules. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Schedule I(c)(10) (listing “marihuana” as a Schedule I drug); 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (containing a definition of “[t]he term ‘marihuana’”). Additionally, 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) allows the United States Attorney General, pursuant to the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59), to “add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any drug or other substance” or “remove any drug or other substance from the schedules . . . .” See also 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (“Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V shall, unless and until amended pursuant to section 811 of this title [21 U.S.C. § 811], consist of the following drugs or other substances, by whatever official name, common or usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated . . . .” (emphasis added, footnote omitted)). Therefore, in determining whether a particular drug or its variants are designated as federal controlled substances, one must also review the relevant regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.02 (“Any term contained in this part shall have the definition set forth in section 102 of the Act (21 U.S.C. 802) or part 1300 of this chapter.”). The Ninth Circuit has, on occasion, relied upon the federal regulatory definitions of controlled substances when UNITED STATES V. HOUSE 33 conducting a categorical analysis under Taylor. See, e.g., Coronado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 977, 988 Appendix 1 (9th Cir. 2014) (In engaging in the categorical analysis to determine whether there was a match as to California law and the CSA, the panel made comparisons between the state statutes and the corresponding federal regulations in 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11–1308.15.). Turning to the various definitions of cocaine involved in this case, it would appear that the Montana statutory definition of cocaine is broader than both the CSA definition (because the Montana statute includes derivatives of cocaine whereas the CSA does not), and the federal regulatory definition (because it does not specifically exclude [123I]ioflupane 2—which is a cocaine derivative—whereas 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4) does). 3 However, it would also [ I]ioflupane is the active pharmaceutical ingredient in DaTscan, 2 123 “a single-dose, injectable diagnostic radiopharmaceutical,” which was approved for use by the Food and Drug Administration in January 2011. Schedules of Controlled Substances: Removal of [<123>I]Ioflupane From Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 3152122 (June 3, 2015). “[123I]Ioflupane [was], by definition, a schedule II controlled substance because it is derived from cocaine, a schedule II substance, via ecgonine (a schedule II substance).” Id. 3 Mont. Code Ann. § 50-32-224(1)(d) delineates the following substances: coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, including cocaine and ecgonine and their salts, isomers, derivatives, and salts of isomers, and derivatives, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of them that is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, except that these substances do not include decocainized coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves, 34 UNITED STATES V. HOUSE appear that the CSA and the federal regulatory definitions of cocaine are likewise not a categorical match with each other. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) Schedule II(a)(4) does not expressly include cocaine derivatives within its definition (although it does expressly reference ecgonine derivatives) nor does it expressly exclude [123I]ioflupane. 21 C.F.R. which extractions do not contain cocaine or ecgonine .... The CSA at 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) Schedule II(a)(4) includes: coca leaves, except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed; cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers; ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; or any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of any of the substances referred to in this paragraph. The applicable federal regulation, i.e., 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4), states: Coca leaves (9040) and any salt, compound, derivative or preparation of coca leaves (including cocaine (9041) and ecgonine (9180) and their salts, isomers, derivatives and salts of isomers and derivatives), and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, except that the substances shall not include: (i) Decocainized coca leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which extractions do not contain cocaine or ecgonine; or (ii) [123I]ioflupane. UNITED STATES V. HOUSE 35 § 1308.12(b)(4) expressly includes cocaine (and ecgonine) derivatives, but also expressly excludes [123I]ioflupane. The Ninth Circuit has not yet determined whether “the definition of cocaine in the CSA, rather than the definition in the corresponding regulation, should be the controlling definition for the purposes of the Taylor analysis.” United States v. Lasalle, 785 F. App’x 410, 412 (9th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Holliday, 853 F. App’x 53, 54 n.1 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting the difference but not deciding whether the “federal statutory schedules” or the “federal regulatory schedules” are the “appropriate comparator” in regards to “cocaine-related substances.”). There is also no precedent as to what a court should do in the context of the categorical analysis where the definition of a controlled substance in the CSA differs from the definition in the corresponding federal regulation. In regards to cocaine, because the appropriate categorical analysis under Taylor will differ depending upon whether one compares the Montana statute with the CSA (where the overbreadth rests on Mont. Code Ann. § 50-32-224(1)(d)’s inclusion of cocaine derivatives in its definition) versus comparing the Montana statute with 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4) (where the overbreadth arises from the latter’s express exclusion of [123I]ioflupane), it is essential to select the appropriate comparator at the first step of the analysis. Given that: (1) the schedules of controlled substances in the CSA are to be updated annually, see 21 U.S.C. § 812(a); Coronado, 759 F.3d at 983; (2) the “drugs and other substances” designated in the schedules remain there “unless and until amended pursuant to section 811,” 21 U.S.C. § 812(c); and (3) 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) authorizes the Attorney General to add, remove or transfer substances between the schedules, I would hold that—where 36 UNITED STATES V. HOUSE there is a difference in the delineation of a substance between the CSA and a subsequent regulation promulgated by the Attorney General—the latter controls for purposes of the categorical analysis.