Opinion ID: 2276550
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other evidence reflecting on fitness: Deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process

Text: In Cater we stated that [t]he relevance of the first two factors is undeniable, and the catchall third factor ensures that any other relevant facts will be taken into account. 887 A.2d at 26. Relevant to the imposition of a fitness requirement is any evidence that the respondent evinces deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process in violation of [Rule of Professional Conduct] 8.4(d) and [D.C. Bar Rule] XI, § 2(b)(3). In re Delaney, 697 A.2d 1212, 1214 (D.C.1997). In and of itself, such behavior raises a serious question about the attorney's continuing capacity and willingness to fulfill his or her professional obligations. Cater, 887 A.2d at 25. We conclude that the Board, in applying the third Cater factor, failed to give sufficient consideration to the committee's findings regarding Ms. Lea's deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process, namely, its findings that Ms. Lea had deliberately evaded service and that her testimony was not credible. Evidence showing evasion of service is one type of evidence that tends to demonstrate deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process. Godette I, 919 A.2d at 1166. Whether Ms. Lea deliberately evaded service is a question of basic, or evidentiary, fact; it is not a conclusion of law. Id. at 1164. Here the committee found that Ms. Lea took affirmative steps to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings by repeatedly evading service. The Board rejected this finding of evasion because of what it perceived as the absence of substantial evidence supporting it. Furthermore, the Board maintains that the evidence at the hearing demonstrated that Ms. Lea was not evading service because she testified that she gave Bar Counsel the Pennsylvania address as one where she could be reached and at which she could be served. This court held in Godette I that ample evidence supported the hearing committee's factual determination that the respondent deliberately evaded service. Id. at 1165. This ample evidence included the unsuccessful efforts by Bar Counsel to persuade the respondent to respond to the underlying complaint; a telephone message from the respondent to Bar Counsel, promising to submit a response within three days, which was followed by his failure to submit a response; and the unsuccessful attempts by a process server to serve the respondent with the Specification of Charges. The Board in Godette I discounted such evidence, particularly an affidavit in which a process server stated that he knocked on the respondent's door and could hear noises inside, but that no one answered the door. In the Board's view, the affidavit did not take the place of a live witness, and the assertions in it did not establish that the respondent had in fact been at home when the process server knocked and had intentionally failed to open the door. We stated that the Board's duty to defer to the findings of the trier of fact is obviously at its zenith where that trier of fact had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witness. Id. at 1164. However, we also stated that the clearly erroneous standard applied to the Board's review of the hearing committee's findings just as it applies to review of all factual findings, whether they are based on oral or on documentary evidence. Id. We ultimately concluded that substantial evidence, including the affidavit, supported a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that as part of his extended and consistent refusal to cooperate in any way in the disciplinary process, [the respondent], inter alia, deliberately avoided service of process. Id. at 1166. [12] In this case, despite the fact that Bar Counsel could not in fact reach or serve Ms. Lea at the Pennsylvania address, counsel for the Board suggested at oral argument that Ms. Lea's repeated avoidance in this case was distinguishable from the deliberate evasion in Godette I. We fail to see the distinction, and accordingly we hold that here, as in Godette I, the record as a whole supports a finding that Ms. Lea deliberately evaded service of the disciplinary complaint. Ms. Lea evaded service by failing to take the necessary steps to ensure that the mailings from Bar Counsel reached her in a timely manner. The letter dated February 5, 2003, demonstrates that Ms. Lea refused to give Bar Counsel an alternate address at which she could be personally served, even though she was aware that Bar Counsel was having difficulty in trying to serve her. In addition, while the process server's affidavit indicates that service was attempted at a Baltimore address, which apparently was not Ms. Lea's address, the affidavit also indicates that several attempts were made at the Pennsylvania address which Ms. Lea gave to Bar Counsel. D.C. Bar Rule II, § 2(1), directs every attorney in the District to file with the Bar a registration statement setting forth his or her current residence and office address and to file a supplement within thirty days if his or her contact information changes. Ms. Lea's address in the District of Columbia was not current when Bar Counsel first attempted to contact her. Eventually, she provided her mother's address in Pennsylvania, but Bar Counsel's certified letters were not accepted at that address. When other letters were sent by regular mail, Ms. Lea either did not receive them in a timely fashion or simply failed to respond. Pursuant to her duty to supply Bar Counsel with a current address, Ms. Lea should have taken the necessary steps to ensure that she was receiving mail at the address which she gave to Bar Counsel; otherwise, as the record confirms, the address she gave was not a sufficient address for her and was not in compliance with Rule II, § 2(1). By failing to take such steps, Ms. Lea could be compared to someone, like the respondent in Godette, who hides outright from a process server. That appears to be exactly what Ms. Lea was doing, or at least the hearing committee could reasonably draw such an inference. Indeed, the record reflects, and the hearing committee found, that Ms. Lea was again residing in the District of Columbia for a year prior to the hearing without informing Bar Counsel of her presence. Our holding in Godette II does not require us to accept the Board's recommendation in this case. The Board in Godette II, purporting to follow Cater, found that Godette had not repeatedly evinced indifference (or worse) toward our disciplinary procedures. 959 A.2d at 62 (citing Cater, 887 A.2d at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Board speculated that Godette's failure to respond [to the complaint] and his evasion of service were more likely motivated by `hopelessness and perhaps despair,' rather than indifference. Godette II, 959 A.2d at 62 (quoting Board Report). We found the Board's reasoning deficient: There is no doubt that the Board followed our instructions grudgingly. The excuses its posits for Godette's failure to respond are merely hypothetical and unsupported by any input from Godette himself. Id. at 63. Nevertheless, we acceded to the Board's revised recommendation and did not require a showing of fitness, recogniz[ing], as the Board did, that there is a spectrum of conduct that constitutes evading service of process. Perhaps Godette's failure to answer the door is not as egregious as `deceiving the process server or in any way mistreating him.' Id. (quoting Board Report). What we found most significant[] was the fact that the Board had significantly modified its recommendation to include a `time limit on [Godette's] exercise of the right to end the suspension by responding to Bar Counsel's letters.' Id. (quoting Board Report). The case at bar is different. Here we have input from the respondent which was lacking in Godette. Ms. Lea testified at some length by telephone, but the hearing committee did not credit what she had to say. Since the committee's credibility findings were not clearly erroneous, the Board was bound to accept them. There is no room here for the Board to speculate that Ms. Lea's evasion of service, like that of Mr. Godette, may have been motivated by hopelessness and perhaps despair. In addition to the evidence of evasion of service, the Board also failed to consider other evidence of Ms. Lea's deliberate disregard for the disciplinary process. In particular, given that substantial evidence supported the committee's credibility findings, [13] the Board erred in failing to accept those findings. See Temple, 629 A.2d at 1208-1209 (holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Board must defer to the hearing committee's credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts). The committee found that Ms. Lea's testimony, tone, and behavior demonstrated a lack of contrition or appreciation for the seriousness of her conduct. The Board argues, however, that Ms. Lea's testimony demonstrated that she suffered from a mental block regarding the Rule 11 order, not a lack of contrition or appreciation for the seriousness of the matter, and that this block does not translate to an inability to practice law. The Board also asserts that the committee did not make true credibility findings because Ms. Lea participated in the hearing only by telephone, and that the committee therefore could not directly observe her demeanor. The Board appears to overlook the fact that Ms. Lea was not physically present at the hearing because, as she admitted, she overslept and had another appointment scheduled for 12:30 p.m. that same day. The hearing committee was free to draw from such behavior reasonable conclusions about her appreciation of the seriousness of the disciplinary process; in other words, her absence was itself an evidentiary fact that the committee could properly consider. It is of course true that the hearing committee's ability to make credibility determinations is at its zenith when the witness is physically present. Nevertheless, regardless of whether the evidence at the hearing consists of face-to-face testimony, testimony by telephone, or something else ( e.g., a deposition or an affidavit), the Board can disregard the committee's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous, and in this case they are not. See Godette I, 919 A.2d at 1164. We are satisfied that in light of Ms. Lea's testimony, her conduct on the day of the hearing, and her entire history of unresponsiveness, there was substantial evidence supporting the hearing committee's finding that Ms. Lea did not appreciate the seriousness of the disciplinary process. Therefore, the committee's credibility findings were not clearly erroneous and should have been accepted by the Board.