Opinion ID: 294996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the certification proceedings

Text: 4 Relator claims that he was not given due notice of the certification hearing and that he was not granted the right to present evidence, time for an adequate review of his social record, or the right to cross-examine witnesses. Moreover, he claims that certification took place without an adequate statement of reasons therefor. Relator maintains that these procedures violated constitutional guarantees set forth in Kent v. United States. 5 Opinion is split as to whether Kent's holdings are of constitutional dimension or whether they are limited to cases in the District of Columbia courts. 8 The language of that decision is not entirely clear. 9 However, it is our view that Kent, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), sets forth certain principles of constitutional dimension. The Court stated in Kent that the waiver of jurisdiction is a critically important action and held that as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. 10 We believe that this result is required by the statute read in context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel (383 U.S. 556, 557, 86 S.Ct. 1055). Noting that a certification hearing does not necessarily have to conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing, the court declared that it must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment (383 U.S. at 562, 86 S.Ct. at 1057). Subsequently, in In re Gault, the Court referring to its opinion in Kent, stated, Although our decision turned upon the language of the statute, we emphasized the necessity that `the basic requirements of due process and fairness' be satisfied in such proceedings (387 U.S. at 12, 87 S.Ct. at 1436). We think, along with the majority of courts which have expressed themselves on this issue, that Kent prescribes constitutional duties. 11 At the minimum, a juvenile must be given due notice of the charges against him, access to social records, the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and an adequate statement of the reasons for the certification. Furthermore, for the reasons stated in Kemplen v. State of Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970), we believe that the requirements of Kent, recognized as having constitutional dimension in Gault, are applicable to the 1966 certification proceedings of relator conducted after the decision in Kent. 6 The Commonwealth claims that relator deliberately bypassed state procedures by not questioning the certification hearing until the second Post Conviction Hearing Act petition, and thereby waived his right to raise the issue of deprivation of Kent rights. That position was accepted by the Superior Court, which was aided in its decision by Section 4 of the Post Conviction Hearing Act, providing for a presumption of waiver in the case of a failure to raise a claim in a timely manner. 12 The district court adopted the Superior Court decision and denied the petition. 13 7 The question of waiver is governed in federal cases by the federal standard enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). A waiver under that standard consists of `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a know[n] right or privilege,' and every presumption against waiver is to be indulged. 14 It is true that relator was represented by counsel during the proceedings and yet failed to raise his Kent contentions. However, our examination of the state records has convinced us that the record is not conclusive on the reasons for his silence. The fact that Kent was decided less than a month before the certification hearing offers some excuse for counsel's failure to raise the issue. Also, in the days immediately following Kent, and particularly before the opinion in In re Gault was filed on May 15, 1967, it was not clear that Kent was a constitutionally based decision. Moreover, there does not appear to be any strategic or tactical benefit which the relator would derive from a by-pass of the state procedures. 15 Relator has never been granted a hearing on this issue of waiver. Under the circumstances presented by this case, an evidentiary hearing in the district court is required so that the facts bearing on the issue of whether the relator understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims [to be tried as a juvenile] in the state courts 16 may be developed. 17 8 If it is determined that relator has not waived his right to raise the Kent issues and that his rights under that decision have been violated, the problem arises as to how to correct the inadequacies of the original hearing. Since Turner is over 21, 18 the Juvenile Court no longer has jurisdiction over him. We shall follow the procedure adopted by the Supreme Court in Kent 19 and therefore direct, in the event that the district court finds no waiver and determines that relator's constitutional rights were violated in the course of the certification proceedings, that the writ shall issue unless a hearing de novo on the issue of certification be held in the Delaware County Criminal Court within a reasonable time. If it is found that the certification to adult court was proper under the circumstances, the writ shall issue unless the state courts grant relator within a reasonable time, a new trial consistent with our ruling under II below on the Miranda claim. If it is determined as the result of this new certification proceeding that relator should not have been certified as an adult in April 1966, the writ shall issue unless he is released from custody promptly. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 44, 56 n. 5, 246 A.2d 356, 363 n. 5 (1968).