Opinion ID: 2170484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: IE's Judgment Against GE for Contribution.

Text: A. Proximate Cause. In attempting to reverse IE's judgment against it for contribution, GE argues that the trial court did not make a sufficient finding that GE's failure to warn proximately caused the accident. Causation is an element essential for finding a party liable in a tort action. To constitute a proximate cause of harm to another, a party's conduct must have been a substantial factor in bringing about that harm. Oak Leaf Country Club, Inc. v. Wilson, 257 N.W.2d 739, 746 (Iowa 1977); Pedersen v. Kuhr, 201 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa 1972); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 430-33 (1965). On this issue GE concentrates its fire on the following statement in the trial court's decision: Had reasonable warnings been attached to the transformer, the incident may have been averted. GE asserts that the trial court was required to find not just that the accident may have been averted but that it definitely would have been averted. It is clear that the trial court found GE's conduct to be a proximate cause of the accident, despite its use of the phrase may have been averted. Earlier in its opinion, the trial court stated that GE's failure to place a warning on the transformer was a proximate cause of the personal injury and damages suffered by Trevallis Swayze. The trial court thereby made a sufficient finding of proximate cause. Generally questions of proximate cause are for the jury; only in exceptional cases may they be decided as matters of law. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(10). Here, substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court's finding of proximate cause. The trial court could properly find from all of the surrounding circumstances that if GE had affixed to its product an appropriate warning about the danger lurking in the transformer, the apartment complex manager, the parents of the children who played around the transformer or other persons would have taken precautions either to keep children away from the transformer or to make sure the transformer remained locked. See DeSantis v. Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357, 364 (7th Cir. 1976). The record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that GE's failure to affix appropriate warnings to the transformer it sold was a proximate cause of the accident and injuries to Trevallis. B. Superseding Cause. GE also argues that IE's negligence in failing to keep the transformer box padlocked was a superseding cause of Trevallis Swayze's injury, relieving GE of liability. A determination of whether another person's conduct constitutes a superseding cause is usually a question of fact, and it is a question of law only in extreme circumstances where it is manifestly clear that the intervening conduct was a superseding event. Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 15 (Iowa 1977); Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 729 (Iowa 1974). We will not reverse such a determination if it is supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(1). Moreover, an intervening act or force will not relieve a negligent defendant of liability if that act or force was a normal consequence of the defendant's conduct or was reasonably foreseeable by that defendant. Haumerson v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d at 15. Section 442 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets out several factors which should be considered in determining whether an intervening act or force constitutes a superseding cause: The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause of harm to another: a. The fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence; b. The fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation; c. The fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created by actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation; d. The fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or his failure to act; e. The fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him; f. The degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening force in motion. Although GE contends that several of the above subsections are favorable to its superseding cause defense, all of the listed factors must be considered together. Section 447 of the Restatement, referred to in the comments to section 442, is also instructive in determining whether an intervening act constitutes a superseding cause: The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or (b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or (c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent. We approve the Restatement analysis. Applying these Restatement principles to the facts of this case, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that IE's conduct was not a superseding cause which relieved GE of liability. The trial court found, on the basis of substantial evidence in the record, that GE should have foreseen that the transformer might at some time be left unlocked by IE personnel. If GE had affixed appropriate warnings on the transformer that it sold to IE, IE might itself have taken further precautionary steps necessary to safeguard persons like Trevallis from electrical injury. Even though IE knew of the danger, negligently failed to warn of the danger, and failed to see that a padlock was kept in place, GE's failure to warn brought about the same harm and was of essentially the same degree of culpability. While IE's conduct occurred after GE sold the transformer and involved activity independent of GE's conduct, IE's failure to warn and failure to secure the transformer box were a normal result of GE's failure to warn, within the meaning of section 443 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: The intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which such conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about. GE's failure to affix appropriate warnings to the dangerous product which it sold to IE may have put IE off its guard about the need to take special precautions to avoid this accident. Comment b of section 443 explains that the word normal is there used as the antithesis of abnormal, of extraordinary. The trial court properly concluded that IE's conduct giving rise to Trevallis's injuries was not extraordinary, in view of GE's failure to give appropriate warning when it sold the transformer to IE. GE cannot square its superseding cause defense with applicable Restatement principles and the record-supported findings of the trial court. The trial court did not err in concluding that IE's negligent conduct was not a superseding cause of the injuries to Trevallis. C. Apportioned Liability. Finally, GE argues that the trial court should have apportioned liability by applying a theory of comparative contribution. GE contends that comparative contribution is entirely consistent with this court's adoption of comparative fault in Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982). This issue was not presented to the trial court, however, and we will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Regal Insurance Co. v. Summit Guaranty Corp., 324 N.W.2d 697, 706 (Iowa 1982); Peel v. Burk, 197 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Iowa 1972); cf. Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d at 754 (comparative negligence does not apply to cases tried before December 22, 1982 unless comparative fault issue was preserved).