Opinion ID: 378143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Diane Smith and Mary Brown from the bargaining unit.

Text: 8 The Union obtained authorization cards from twenty-three employees. If employees Diane Smith and Mary Brown were properly excluded from the unit, the unit consisted of forty-four employees and the Union had authorization cards from a majority of the unit employees. If they were not properly excluded, the unit consisted of forty-six employees and the Union had not secured authorization cards from a majority of the unit employees. There was substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the Board's finding that both women should be excluded. Diane Smith was not supervised by the same personnel who supervised the other sales people, she spent about forty percent of her time in clerical work, she was paid by the hour rather than by a draw against commission and her work as a sales person was largely as a replacement. Mary Brown spent only ten to fifteen percent of her time selling merchandise and her sales were to special customers referred to her by supervisory personnel or to her own personal acquaintances or relatives. She spent most of the remainder of her time assisting the merchandise manager. She, too, was paid a salary rather than a draw against commission and had contact with regular sales persons only when she was called to obtain special items not in inventory and for information on delivery of such items. She did not cover for absent and vacationing sales persons. 9 Under the circumstances recited above, we believe that the Board's determination that Smith and Brown did not share the requisite community of interest with selling personnel to warrant their inclusion in the unit was reasonable. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., supra; N.L.R.B. v. Target Stores, Inc., supra; N.L.R.B. v. Crystal Tire Co., 410 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1969). 10 III. The validity of the authorization cards of Janice Harris, Sharon Summers, Katie Snyder, Shai Farber and Paul Devino. 11 In September, 1976, the Union mailed cards to the employees of Tipton and Professional. The cards were single-purpose cards in the following form: 12 RETAIL STORE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL NUMBER 655--AFL-CIO AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION Union's address Union's Telephone number Date _______________________________ Name ________________________________ Home Phone ___________________________ Address _____________________________________________________________________ (Street) (Zone) (City) (State) Employed by: Company ___________________________ Store No. __________________ Store Address _______________________________________________________________ Job title _________________________________________(Full-time)--(Part-time) Department _________________________ Weekly Salary __________________________ My day off is _________________ Date of Employment __________________________ I, the undersigned, of my own free will, authorize the above named union, their agents or representatives to act for me as a collective bargaining agency in all matters pertaining to pay rates, hours of employment and other conditions of employment. (Signature) _________________________ 13 --THIS CARD IS KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL-- 14 The cards were accompanied by a letter which read in part as follows: 15 Enclosed, you will find two authorization cards to be used by yourself and a co-worker who is also interested. Local 655 must have at least 51% of the employees employed at Tipton sign one of the cards to attain union representation. Remember three important things when signing this card: 16 1. You are not joining a union, by signing the card. 17 2. You cannot be fired by signing the card. 18 3. You are only allowing Local 655 to attempt to negotiate a contract, which you will vote on! (Emphasis included.) 19 Harris signed an authorization card on September 16, Snyder signed a card on October 12, Farber and Devino signed cards on November 7, and Summers signed a card on November 8. The Board found that all of the cards were valid. The employers argue vigorously that this finding is in error as to each of the employees listed above, principally 3 because their signatures were obtained on the basis of representations that the cards would be used exclusively to obtain an election. 20 In N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969), the Supreme Court affirmed the Board's Cumberland Shoe doctrine, 4 and held that when an employee signs a single-purpose card stating clearly and unambiguously on its face that the signer designates a union as his or her representative, the signer is bound by the clear language of what he or she signs unless that language is deliberately and clearly cancelled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language above his signature. The Court quoted with approval the Board's application of the doctrine: 21 Thus the fact that employees are told in the course of solicitation that an election is contemplated, or that a purpose of the card is to make an election possible, provides in our view insufficient basis in itself for vitiating unambiguously worded authorization cards on the theory of misrepresentation. A different situation is presented, of course, where union organizers solicit cards on the explicit or indirectly expressed representation that they will use such cards only for an election and subsequently seek to use them for a different purpose . . . . The Board stated further in a footnote: 22 The foregoing does not of course imply that a finding of misrepresentation is confined to situations where employees are expressly told in haec verba that the 'sole' or 'only' purpose of the cards is to obtain an election. The Board has never suggested such a mechanistic application of the foregoing principles, as some have contended. The Board looks to substance rather than to form. It is not the use or nonuse of certain key or 'magic' words that is controlling, but whether or not the totality of circumstances surrounding the card solicitation is such, as to add up to an assurance to the card signer that his card will be used for no purpose other than to help get an election. 23 Id. at 608 n.27, 89 S.Ct. at 1936 (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 172 N.L.R.B. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338, 1341, 1342 & n.7 (1968)) (emphasis included). 24 The Board, relying on Gissel, found the five cards in question to be valid. We agree with that finding. The cards were clearly single-purpose cards. They were not only entitled Authorization for Representation but they specifically authorized the Union to represent the signer as his or her collective bargaining agency. The accompanying letter also clearly specified that the purpose of the card was to allow the Union to attempt to negotiate a contract which you will vote on. 25 The language on the cards was not deliberately and clearly cancelled by a Union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language above his signature. Here, as in Gissel, the employees were told that if sufficient cards were signed, an election would be made possible but the totality of the circumstances surrounding the card solicitation was not such as to add up to an assurance to the signers that their cards would be used for no other purpose than to help get an election. 26 Harris was told that if she signed and returned the cards, she would get information and find out about the Union. She may also have been told by fellow employees who were Union adherents that signing the card did not commit her one way or another. What they may have meant by this statement, or what she may have understood by it, is not clear. Certainly, it cannot be said that the language was clearly and deliberately calculated to direct her to forget the language above her signature. Harris also testified that she filled in the card and signed it without reading either the card or the letter accompanying it. The Board discredited that testimony as incredible. We agree with that assessment but, even if she had not read the card or letter, that fact would not, standing alone, be dispositive of the question. It would still be necessary to find that the Union adherents used language calculated to direct her to forget the language above her signature, and this they did not do. See Texaco, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 436 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971). 27 Snyder received a card and a letter in the mail. She, too, testified that she read neither when she received them. She signed a card in one of the employer's stores a few weeks after she received the initial card and letter in the mail. Snyder testified that she filled in all of the blanks on the card and signed it after a short conversation with a Union organizer who, she said 28 handed me a card and    said You can just sign it now. And I didn't give a second look to the card. The only thing I asked him was, Does this card mean anything? And he said, No it's just for the election, that it doesn't mean you're for or against anything. It's just that we know that you are employed here since we have never ran into you in any of the stores before. 29 Robert Litteken, the Union organizer who solicited the card, described the solicitation differently: 30 A. I just talked to her at her desk, discussed many facets of the Tipton Electric Company, the pros and cons of why she should have the union represent her, and eventually she signed a card for representation by Local 655. 31