Opinion ID: 1286606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Braxton County Charges

Text: The Appellant argues that the circuit court incorrectly allowed evidence from the Braxton County vehicle stop into evidence in the Calhoun County trial in violation of West Virginia Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Appellee argues that the use of the evidence was intrinsic and was a proper application of West Virginia Rule of Evidence 404(b). This Court has previously held that as a general rule [a] trial court's evidentiary rulings, as well as its application of the Rules of Evidence, are subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998); see also State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 680, 461 S.E.2d 163, 186 (1995) ([M]ost rulings of a trial court regarding the admission of evidence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.... [A]n appellate court reviews de novo the legal analysis underlying a trial court's decision.). Where the issue involves the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, however, [t]he standard of review for a trial court's admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) involves a three-step analysis. First, we review for clear error the trial court's factual determination that there is sufficient evidence to show the other acts occurred. Second, we review de novo whether the trial court correctly found the evidence was admissible for a legitimate purpose. Third, we review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's conclusion that the other acts evidence is more probative than prejudicial under Rule 403. State v. LaRock, 196 W.Va. 294, 310-11, 470 S.E.2d 613, 629-30 (1996). Using the foregoing standard of review, this Court opined in syllabus point one of State v. McIntosh, 207 W.Va. 561, 534 S.E.2d 757 (2000), that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. W. Va.R. Evid. 404(b). Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 207 W.Va. at 564-565, 534 S.E.2d 757. 534 S.E.2d at 760-761, Syl. Pt. 1. Additionally, we stated in LaRock: In determining whether the admissibility of evidence of other bad acts is governed by Rule 404(b), we first must determine if the evidence is intrinsic or extrinsic. See United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir.1990): `Other act' evidence is `intrinsic' when the evidence of the other act and the evidence of the crime charged are `inextricably intertwined' or both acts are part of a `single criminal episode' or the other acts were `necessary preliminaries' to the crime charged. (Citations omitted). If the proffer fits in to the intrinsic category, evidence of other crimes should not be suppressed when those facts come in as res gestae as part and parcel of the proof charged in the indictment. See United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir.1980) (stating evidence is admissible when it provides the context of the crime, is necessary to a `full presentation' of the case, or is ... appropriate in order `to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context or the res gestae'). (Citations omitted).... Evidence the defendant was responsible for all the injuries to the victim would seem to `complete the story of the crime.' Masters, 622 F.2d at 86. (Citation omitted). Indeed, evidence admissible for one of the purposes specified in Rule 404(b) and res gestae not always is separated by a bright line. See United States v. Cook, 745 F.2d 1311, 1317-18 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1220, 105 S.Ct. 1205, 84 L.Ed.2d 347 (1985). 196 W.Va. at 312, 470 S.E.2d at 631 n. 29; see Syl. Pts. 1 and 2, State v. McGinnis, 193 W.Va. 147, 455 S.E.2d 516 (1994)(establishing procedural requirements for admissibility of evidence under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 404(b)). Lastly, in syllabus point one of State v. Youngblood, 217 W.Va. 535, 618 S.E.2d 544 (2005), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 867, 126 S.Ct. 2188, 165 L.Ed.2d 269 (2006), this Court reiterated that [o]ther criminal act evidence admissible as part of the res gestae or same transaction introduced for the purpose of explaining the crime charged must be confined to that which is reasonably necessary to accomplish such purpose.' Syl. pt. 1, State v. Spicer, 162 W.Va. 127, 245 S.E.2d 922 (1978). Youngblood, 217 W.Va. at 538, 618 S.E.2d at 547, Syl. Pt. 1. The Circuit Court of Calhoun County, by Order entered July 5, 2006, determined that the evidence of crimes that the Appellant had been charged with in Braxton County was intrinsic to the crimes charged in Calhoun County. Specifically, the circuit court stated: The other crime evidence occurred near in time and place to the crimes charged by the Indictment. Acquisition of these items that were seized in Braxton County is a necessary preliminary to the operation of a clandestine drug lab and the production of methamphetamine, both of which crimes are alleged in the Indictment. Thus, as the State maintains, this is evidence of preparation. The presence of defendant and Jones, together with the items seized from the [v]an in Braxton county is also probative of the conspiracy count of the Indictment and, therefore, shows concerted activity, as the State maintains. Further, inasmuch as the defendant was the operator of the [v]an in which the items were seized, the evidence tends to connect the defendant to items necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.... A clandestine drug lab likely cannot operate without the items seized in the Braxton County stop. This evidence portrays to the Jury the complete story of the inextricably linked events.... It provides important context for the crimes that are charged by the Indictment. Further, a limiting instruction regarding the Braxton County evidence was given to the jury in the Calhoun County trial following the testimony regarding the Braxton County traffic stop. The circuit court instructed the jury that the evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. Specifically, the circuit court instructed as follows: The jury must remember that the defendant is being tried in this court for operating a meth lab or a clandestine drug lab in Calhoun County, manufacturing methamphetamine in Calhoun County, and entering into a conspiracy in Calhoun County. This evidence about the traffic stop occurring in another county is something that this man is not on trial for. It was admitted into evidence for a limited purpose, and that was to the extent that evidence maydepending on the credit and weight you give to it, if anymay indicate a conduct that is a necessary preliminary to the crimes that are charged in Calhoun County ordepending on the weight and credibility you give to the evidence, if anyit may indicate evidence necessary to complete the story of the entire transaction. So that evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, and you must always remember that in your consideration of this case. A review of the circuit court's ruling in admitting the evidence of the Braxton County traffic stop supports this Court's conclusion that the circuit court was correct in allowing the admission of the evidence at trial. The circuit court had enough evidence to show that the Braxton County traffic stop and the evidence associated with that stop occurred. The circuit court correctly found the evidence was admissible for a legitimate purpose under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 404(b). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the admissibility of the evidence for a limited purpose was more probative than prejudicial under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 403. LaRock, 196 W.Va. at 310-11, 470 S.E.2d at 629-30.