Opinion ID: 2507343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background In Lopez

Text: In May and June 2005, Gregory S. Gittens and Mona S. Gittens were the registered owners of an automobile, a 1995 Honda Accord, and their son, Brian Harris, was the primary driver. Gregory and Harris each had a set of keys to the car, neither of which was ever lost. Aside from some damage to the front of the car, the car was in pretty good condition; its door locks and steering column were not damaged, and an after-market sound system, the initial cost of which was between $300.00 and $400.00, was installed in it. At around 5:00 p.m. on May 31, 2005, Harris drove the car to his workplace at Bandito's Cantina in the Pearlridge Center, located in the City and County of Honolulu, parked the car in the mall's parking lot, locked the doors, and went to work. He left some clothes, his wallet, and over one hundred compact discs in the car. Harris finished work at about 9:00 p.m. only to discover that the car was gone. He contacted security guards and the police, reporting that the car had been stolen. Shortly after midnight, at approximately 12:45 a.m. on June 8, 2005, Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Edward Hawkins was in a police cruiser at Wai'anae Mall, employing a laser device to identify and stop drivers speeding on Farrington Highway. Using the laser device, he observed a car traveling sixty miles an hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone. Officer Hawkins pursued the car and activated his cruiser's blue lights and siren, and the car pulled over immediately. Officer Hawkins exited the cruiser and approached the car to find Lopez behind the wheel. Lopez provided his Washington State driver's license but was unable to produce either the vehicle's registration certificate or any proof of insurance. Lopez stated that the car belonged to a friend and that he did not know where the paperwork was located. Officer Hawkins instructed Lopez to turn off the vehicle's ignition and, in response, Lopez retrieved what appeared to be a house key from his pocket, put his hands underneath a towel on the steering column for fifteen to twenty seconds, and turned off the ignition. Deeming the towel suspicious, Officer Hawkins called dispatch, ran a check on the vehicle's license plate number, and was informed by dispatch that the car was stolen. The officer ordered Lopez out of the car, handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest for driving a stolen vehicle. The record does not reflect whether Officer Hawkins, or any other police officer, administered warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), during or after the arrest. Officer Hawkins processed the car, removing the towel and observing that all of the plastic around the steering column was gone, such that he could see its internal mechanisms. HPD Officer Kepi Visoria, who assisted in processing the car, noticed that the ignition was broken and dangling and that the door locks had been punched, which means that the locks had been shoved in with a blunt object, such as a screwdriver, in order to open the doors. The police returned the car to Harris, whereupon he noticed that, in addition to the other damage, the compact discs, the sound system, and Harris's wallet were missing, and a door window was flexed, which is a method by which a person breaks into a car by flexing a window so that he can place his hand through the window and open the door. Harris never gave Lopez, or anyone else, permission to drive the car at any time, and Gregory and Mona, the vehicle's owners, likewise never authorized Lopez, or anyone other than Harris, to drive the car.

On June 17, 2005, Lopez was charged by complaint with intentionally or knowingly exerting unauthorized control over a propelled vehicle, by operating the vehicle without the consent of Gregory and/or Mona, the owners of the vehicle, thereby committing the offense of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS  708-836, see supra note 3.
At the February 1, 2006 trial, the prosecution called Harris, Gregory, Mona, and Officers Hawkins and Visoria as witnesses during its case-in-chief. On cross-examination by Lopez, Officer Hawkins affirmed that, when he stopped Lopez for speeding, Lopez was calm and cooperative and that, when he asked for Lopez's license, registration, and insurance, Lopez told him that the car belongs to a friend and he doesn't know where the paperwork is. On redirect examination by the prosecution, the officer testified that Lopez did not volunteer his friend's name or address or the means by which he acquired control of the car from his friend. The deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA) asked, Did he say anything at all about this friend except [']well, I got it from a friend, I don't know where the paperwork is[']?, to which Officer Hawkins responded, That's all he said. On recross-examination, the officer admitted that he could not recall whether he had asked Lopez for his friend's name and other pertinent information. After the prosecution rested, Lopez testified on direct examination that he had grown up in Hawai`i and, in June 2005, he had returned to the islands from Seattle to visit friends and family for a couple of weeks. He acquired the Honda from a friend, Greg Ramba, an automotive mechanic who he had known for approximately two years. When Lopez arrived at Ramba's house, he noticed four or five cars parked in the driveway. Ramba offered to let Lopez use one during his two-week stay. Lopez observed that the car's exterior was damaged in the front, that its interior was very dirty and filled with rubbish, that its steering column was missing and covered by a towel, and that its ignition was broken, but he did not notice that the door locks were punched in. Lopez believed that the car was abandoned but did not find its poor condition suspicious because Ramba was simply a broke mechanic. Ramba gave Lopez a key to the car. Lopez testified that he did not know that the car was stolen until he was pulled over by Officer Hawkins. On cross-examination, Lopez admitted that he had neither seen nor asked to see any paperwork for the car and that the car key he received from Ramba was not the actual key to the car, because it looked like a house key. When questioned about Ramba, Lopez claimed that Ramba was twenty-six years old, unmarried, law abiding and honest and that he lived with his parents in Makakilo. Lopez could not, however, remember Ramba's precise address. Lopez maintained that he believed that the car belonged to Ramba or Ramba's family, because the car was in Ramba's driveway and because he had observed Ramba's family members driving the car. Lopez used the car for two days before he was arrested.
Lopez requested that the circuit court instruct the jury on the mistake-of-fact defense, as set forth in HRS  702-218(1), see supra note 2, as follows: [LOPEZ'S] PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 In any prosecution for an offense, it is a defense that the Defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct under ignorance or mistake of fact if the ignorance or mistake negates the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense. Thus, for example, a person is provided a defense to a charge based on an intentional or knowing state of mind, if the person is mistaken (either reasonably, negligently, or recklessly) as to a fact that negates the person's state of mind required to establish an element of the offense. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was not ignorant or mistaken as to a fact that negates the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense. If the prosecution fails to meet its burden, then you must find the Defendant not guilty. This instruction tracks Hawai`i Jury Instruction Criminal (HAWJIC) No. 7.13, available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/attachment/5 D6FD371721EB8CBEC4445E53C/crimjury instruct.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2007). The circuit court declined to give the instruction, citing State v. Palisbo, 93 Hawai`i 344, 3 P.3d 510 (App.2000), and reasoning that there was no evidence showing that [an] actual registered owner, either [Gregory or Mona], or an agent thereof, [Harris], gave permission to [Lopez;] in fact, that [possibility] was specifically rejected by the defense [and by Lopez's] testimony, and, therefore, that instruction is not supported by the evidence. The prosecution asked the circuit court give the following instructions in light of Palisbo: [THE PROSECUTION'S] INSTRUCTION NO. 3 It is not a defense to the offense of Unauthorized Control of Propelled Vehicle that the Defendant may have received permission to operate the vehicle from another person, unless that person was either the vehicle's registered owner or the agent of the registered owner with either actual or apparent authority to authorize such use. (Formatting altered.) The prosecution argued that the circuit court should give its instruction because, under Palisbo, the prosecution is only required to prove knowing operation of the automobile without the consent of the registered owners and that, although the defendant may have been mistaken in his belief that the person who authorized his use of the vehicle was the vehicle's true owner, he is nevertheless subject to criminal liability. According to the prosecution, Palisbo turns [the authorization] element into an element of strict liability. The circuit court declined to give the prosecution's instruction, because it was confusing and not required under Palisbo.
During closing argument, the DPA, over the objections of the deputy public defender [hereinafter, defense counsel or DPD], commented on Lopez's post-arrest silence: [DPA:] Again, consult your own reason and common sense, you come up with a story, you know, that you think might work. []Oh, I cannot find it[;] it's my friend's car.[] Yeah, he does say that. Okay. Does he say anything more? Bear in mind within minutes he's out of that car in cuffs being arrested for driving that stolen car[,] right? Did he say anything more? The cop told you he didn't say what his friend's name was, didn't say the address or didn't say anything about the details, didn't say nothing. Again, you consult your own reason and common sense about how people normally act. A person is stopped in a stolen car and he really is innocent, what's the first thing he's going to do? []Hey, wait a minute, wait a minute ÔÇö [] [DPD]: Your Honor, I'm sorry, I'm going to object[,] commenting on the defendant's right to remain silent. [DPA]: It's in evidence, Your Honor. [Court]: Overruled. You may continue. [DPA]: []Wait a minute, wait a minute, I got it from my friend Greg Ramba, he lives in Makakilo, he fixes cars, he told me I could drive it, wait, wait, wait.[] Again, think, you're all adults here, you know how people react to things. That's what an innocent person would do[;] he didn't do anything like that. He got cuffed, he got arrested, he got taken away. Why? Because he got caught red-handed and he knew it. That's why. Defense counsel responded in his closing argument: [DPD]:. . . . [Lopez] was telling you the truth, he was telling you the truth. You know, . . . [Lopez's] actions on . . . the day he was arrested matter, too. . . . He doesn't know the car is stolen, he doesn't know there's anything wrong with the car, you know. He does tell the police it's his friend's car. And, you know, the officer himself says[, W]ell, I can't remember if I asked him anything more about the friend.[] So, you know, [the DPA] is making a big deal about [Lopez] not saying[, M]y friend is this, he lives there, he lives there.[] We don't know if he did or he didn't[;] the officer himself doesn't know. [Lopez's] actions on that day matter. On rebuttal, the DPA replied: [DPA]: Well, the officer didn't ask him, that's why he didn't say anything about the friend's name, where he could be found, the details of the car, et cetera. Again, use your common sense. The [prosecution's] position is that the officer wouldn't need to ask[;] an innocent person would just start talking and try to convince the person arresting him that he didn't do it and here's why. I mean, don't you think [that the first thing] a reasonable person would have said [is], . . . []I got it from my friend, Greg Ramba, brah, go talk to him, he'll tell you[]? Nothing like that. In addition, during closing argument, the DPA, over defense counsel's objections, commented on Lopez's failure to call Ramba during trial: [DPA:] What the defense is going to argue is he didn't know, he didn't really know because he didn't know the car was stolen and he thought his friend Greg gave him permission to drive the car. Okay. So let's look more closely at that because that's really sort of the nub of this case. All right? First of all, bear in mind trials are all about evidence, yeah, evidence. What's the evidence for that? [Lopez's] testimony. That's it, that's all you have. [DPD]: Objection, Your Honor, burden shifting. [Court]: Overruled. [DPA]: All you have on this, his testimony that he borrowed the car, that he didn't know it was stolen, et cetera. There's not one single bit of corroboration for what he told you in this case, not a single bit. [DPD]: Same objection, Your Honor. [Court]: Overruled. During rebuttal argument, the DPA, again over defense counsel's objections, returned to the same theme: [DPA]: And, by the way, this Greg Ramba ÔÇö now it's true, you know, the defense doesn't have a burden, he didn't have to testify, he doesn't have to call witnesses. But he has a right to do so and he can put on any evidence he wants. As I said, the evidence for his story is just that, his story. Zero corroboration. Wouldn't you have liked to have heard from Greg? [DPD]: Objection, Your Honor, again burden shifting. [Court]: Overruled. [DPA]: Wouldn't you have liked to have heard from Greg Ramba? He says he's a local boy, lives [in] Makakilo with his family. You know, would it have been so hard to get him . . . into court to tell you guys[, Y]eah I lent him the car, I told him it was okay, and I neva know it was stolen either[]? He himself said Greg is law abiding, honest, his friend. You know, don't you think his friend would come in? And all he would have to say is[, Y]eah, I lent him the car.[] I would probably vote not guilty maybe at that point.[ [4] ] Why didn't he do that? I suggest to you one of two possibilities: There is no Greg Ramba or Greg Ramba would have come in here if he called him and said something very different from what he would have wanted Greg to say. [DPD]: Objection, Your Honor, that calls for speculation. [Court]: Overruled.
The jury found Lopez guilty of the charged offense of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle. The circuit court sentenced Lopez to an indeterminate five-year term of imprisonment, subject to a mandatory minimum term of five years as a repeat offender, entering its judgment of conviction and sentence on May 9, 2006. Lopez filed a timely notice of appeal on June 8, 2006.
In his opening brief, Lopez argued that the circuit court erred by refusing to give his proposed instruction on the mistake-of-fact defense and by overruling his objections to the prosecution's remarks regarding his failure to call Ramba at trial and his post-arrest silence. Relying on Palisbo and the legislative history underlying HRS  708-836, the ICA concluded that the circuit court correctly declined to give the mistake-of-fact instruction, because the only factual mistake that would absolve Lopez of liability for the offense charged would be a mistaken belief that the registered owners of the vehicle, the Gittens[es], had authorized Lopez's use of the Honda and Lopez made no such claim. ICA's Lopez mem. op. at 7. The ICA also concluded that the prosecution's closing argument legitimately commented on the evidence and drew reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. at 10. The ICA entered its judgment on appeal on September 10, 2007, and Lopez filed his timely application on December 7, 2007.