Opinion ID: 1958884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Permitting plaintiffs' expert to testify as to the causes of the March 2 and August 16 accidents.

Text: Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting that plaintiffs' expert on braking systems, George Ternent, be prohibited from testifying that: 1) IH negligently designed or manufactured the braking systems on the 5070 and the 2070, 2) Kelsey Hayes negligently designed the 121 anti-locking brake system, and 3) the March 2 and August 16 accidents were caused by a malfunction in the 121 anti-locking device installed on the 5070 and the 2070. The motion followed a lengthy deposition taken of Ternent by the defense. The defendant argues now, and argued to the Court below, that Ternent did not possess the requisite factual basis to render the opinions outlined in the Motion and in fact based his opinions upon `surmise and conjecture.' The Court denied the motion on the theory that the objection went to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility. Defendant does not dispute that Ternent is an expert in heavy truck braking design. Indeed, Ternent has impressive qualifications, including serving as chief engineer in the truck air brake manufacturing division at Bendix Westinghouse Corporation during the period when Bendix began to test a computerized anti-locking braking system. He retired from Bendix in 1976 and became a consultant, specializing in heavy truck braking system design. He has investigated other accidents involving alleged failures of computer anti-locking systems. Notwithstanding Ternent's experience at Bendix, however, the defendant contends that Ternent should not have been permitted to testify about the computerized braking systems in the 5070 and the 2070. As the defendant points out, Ternent never inspected the computer braking systems actually in place in the two trucks, nor has he examined the electronic components of any Kelsey Hayes 121 system. Ternent admitted that he did not know the circuitry of the computer system. All parties agree that Ternent used a process of elimination to reach his conclusion that the computer braking system caused the March 2 and August 16 accidents. In short, Ternent relied on the testimony of the drivers that they had no brakes, he relied on the testimony of Densmore that the underlying air braking system was in working order, and he relied on what he knew about the general design and history of computerized anti-locking braking systems. Because nothing was wrong with the air brake system itself, Ternent concluded that the most probable cause of the accident was in the electronically controlled anti-locking system. He was not, however, able to pinpoint where the specific failure in the system occurred, although, again by process of elimination, he believed the most likely culprit was the electronic circuitry of the computer. Defendant focuses on a portion of Ternent's deposition testimony in which he stated his opinion that the design of the anti-lock system produced what I would want to call a defective product. At trial during his voir dire, Ternent agreed that in his opinion, expressed at his deposition, the defect in computer controlled anti-locking brake devices is in taking away from the driver control over the release of the brakes. The defendant points out that Ternent admitted in his deposition that there was no design standard in the trade to support his theory of negligent design. From this absence of support, the defendant concludes that Ternent's testimony should have been excluded because it did not comport with the practice of experts when not testifying. See McLellan v. Morrison, 434 A.2d 28, 30 (Me.1981) (expert opinion excluded in certain circumstances where basis of opinion in inadmissible); see also M.R.Evid. 705(b) (expert must possess a sufficient basis for his opinion). We find that the requirements for admissibility of an expert's opinion were met in Ternent's case. The facts upon which Ternent's opinion was based were of a type permitted by M.R.Evid. 703. An expert may rely on facts or data perceived by him or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. See M.R.Evid. 703. Ternent relied upon the testimony of the drivers and Densmore, as well as, his own knowledge of air brakes and computerized anti-locking devices. His testimony was admissible at trial. [5]