Opinion ID: 1434624
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant requested, but the lower court refused, the following instructions:

Text: I. Nevada Law provides that lunatics, idiots and insane persons are not capable of committing crimes. It is expressly provided by statute that idiots and lunatics are not of sound mind. If soundness of mind and legal insanity are synonymous, the express provisions of our statute exempting idiots and lunatics from criminal responsibility would be superfluous because they would necessarily be included within the provision exempting the insane. II. Idiots, lunatics and insane persons are not capable of committing crimes. This is because they are not capable of manifesting the mens rea necessary to constitute a criminal act. A lunatic has been defined as a person of deranged or unsound mind; a person whose mental facilities are in a condition called lunacy. Lunacy has been defined as any form of mental unsoundness except idiocy. There are certain Nevada statutes which bear upon the question of the mental capability of accused persons to be held responsible for criminal acts. They are: NRS 193.190 which states that, In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intention   ; NRS 193.200 which states, Intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the person accused. (emphasis added) Appellant contends in the absence of a sound mind there can be no intent and therefore no crime or public offense. NRS 193.210 provides that, A person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an idiot nor lunatic, nor affected with insanity,   . Another Nevada statute defines persons who are capable of committing crime. NRS 194.010 provides, All persons are liable to punishment except those belonging to the following classes: 1.    2.    3. Idiots 4. Lunatics and insane persons. Appellant does not contend he was insane under the M'Naghten Rule at the time of commission of the robbery. M'Naghten's case is the approved test of insanity in Nevada. Jackson v. State, 84 Nev. 203, 438 P.2d 795 (1968); Mears v. State, 83 Nev. 3, 422 P.2d 230 (1967); Bean v. State, 81 Nev. 25, 398 P.2d 251 (1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 1012, 86 S.Ct. 1932, 16 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1966). Appellant contends, however, that the M'Naghten rule does not apply where the defense is lunacy, and submitted proposed instructions I and II quoted above. Neither this court nor the legislature has provided a definition of lunacy. We are convinced that the rule in M'Naghten's case is the test of criminal responsibility in the State of Nevada, whether the alleged absence of criminal responsibility is sought to be attributed to lunacy, idiocy, or insanity. In State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 351, 22 P. 241, 247 (1889), the court said: [I]f a man has capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish right from wrong as to the particular act in question, and has knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and will deserve punishment, he is, in the eye of the law, of sound mind and memory, and should be held criminally responsible for his acts   . (emphasis added) That quotation was recently approved by this court in Criswell v. State, 84 Nev. ___, 443 P.2d 552 (1968). Under NRS 193.210, three types of persons can be said to have unsound minds: (1) idiots; (2) lunatics; and (3) those affected with insanity. We hold M'Naghten's rule is the proper test in determining criminal responsibility of a defendant alleged to have been suffering from any of those three conditions at the time of his commission of a crime. The instructions requested were therefore legally erroneous and no error occurred in their refusal. 2. Appellant contends it was prejudicial error for the court to allow Officer Gault of the San Diego Sheriff's office to testify he recognized the brown valise found by Officer Cole at the scene where Williams was first stopped, because it tended to inject evidence of a prior offense. Any error, if it was error, was rendered harmless when, upon objection and motion of defense counsel, the testimony was stricken and the jury instructed to disregard it. 3. The lower court, at no time during the trial, ordered a hearing pursuant to NRS 178.405, to determine if appellant was sane. NRS 178.405 reads: When an indictment or information is called for trial, or upon conviction the defendant is brought up for judgment, if doubt shall arise as to the sanity of the defendant, the court shall order the question to be submitted to a jury that must be drawn and selected as in other cases. (emphasis added) NRS 178.410 reads: The trial of the indictment or information or the pronouncing of the judgment, as the case may be, shall be suspended until the question of insanity shall be determined by the verdict of the jury. The doubt mentioned in NRS 178.405 means doubt in the mind of the trial court, rather than counsel or others. People v. Jensen, 43 Cal.2d 572, 275 P.2d 25 (1954). A determination whether doubt exists rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge. Hollander v. State, 82 Nev. 345, 418 P.2d 802 (1966); People v. Aparicio, 38 Cal.2d 565, 241 P.2d 221 (1952); People v. Gilberg, 197 Cal. 306, 240 P. 1000 (1925). This issue may be suggested to the court or it may be inquired into by the court of its own motion. If the court determines a doubt to exist, it must suspend the trial and inquire into the sanity of the accused. People v. Vester, 135 Cal.App. 223, 26 P.2d 685 (1933); and see Krause v. Fogliani, 82 Nev. 459, 421 P.2d 949 (1966). The record demonstrates the court below made that inquiry and thereafter concluded there was no doubt regarding appellant's sanity. There is substantial evidence to support that conclusion. We see no error in the court's decision. 4. Appellant contends it was prejudicial error to allow Officer Flynn to testify about the shooting incident when appellant was stopped for questioning, because it admitted evidence of a separate and distinct offense than the robbery charge for which he was on trial. Appellant, when stopped and questioned, whipped out a gun, wounded the officer, and fled. Evidence of the flight was admissible as indicative of a guilty mind. People v. Hagan, 203 Cal.App.2d 34, 21 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1962); People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 249 P. 859 (1926). All the circumstances of the flight may be shown, including the gunning down of the officer. People v. Hall, supra; People v. Weatherford, 78 Cal.App.2d 669, 178 P.2d 816 (1947). There was no error in admission of the testimony. The conviction of robbery and sentence is affirmed. ZENOFF, BATJER, MOWBRAY and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.