Opinion ID: 842726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: accepting the premise of tomac i

Text: Even accepting the premise of the majority in TOMAC I that the instant compact does not constitute legislation, I would still dissent. The amendment procedure in the LTBB compact improperly delegates the legislative power to contract to the Governor because the Legislature has failed to impose adequate standards on the Governor’s exercise of that power. As already noted, the Michigan Constitution grants the legislative power-- the entirety of it-- to the Legislature. Const 1963, art 4, § 1. The Legislature retains the general power to contract. See TOMAC I, supra at 328 (“[O]ur Legislature has the general power to contract unless there is a constitutional limitation.”); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 240, 400 Mich 311, 318; 254 NW2d 544 (1977). Here, the Legislature has authorized the Governor to carry out the contracting power through the amendment provision in the compact. Even if the compact as a whole had been validly approved by the Legislature under the rationale of TOMAC I, the Legislature was still required to have properly authorized the exercise of the contracting power in the amendment provision. If the exercise of the contracting power was improperly authorized, 24 then the Legislature essentially delegated its legislative power to the Governor and thereby violated the Separation of Powers Clause. “Strictly speaking, there is no acceptable delegation of legislative power.” Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 419; 109 S Ct 647; 102 L Ed 2d 714 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In determining whether a delegation of legislative power has occurred, the Court should inquire whether the Legislature has “authorize[d] the exercise of executive or judicial power without adequate standards.” Id. Justice Scalia elaborated: “The focus of controversy . . . has been whether the degree of generality contained in the authorization for exercise of executive or judicial powers in a particular field is so unacceptably high as to amount to a delegation of legislative powers.” Id. (emphasis in original). A determination whether the Legislature has improperly delegated legislative power to the Governor requires that this Court examine whether the authorization of amendatory power provides “adequate standards” for the Governor’s exercise of amendatory power, and whether the “degree of generality . . . is so unacceptably high as to amount to a delegation of legislative powers.” Id. “The true distinction . . . is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.” [Id. at 418 (emphasis in original), quoting Field v Clark, 143 US 649, 693-694; 12 S Ct 495; 36 L Ed 294 (1892).] 25 This Court considered whether an authorization of executive power violated the principle of separation of powers in Soap & Detergent Ass’n v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 728; 330 NW2d 346 (1982). Soap & Detergent considered a separation of powers challenge to the Governor’s power to reorganize executive agencies. Id. at 751. Although the Governor possesses the power to reorganize under Const 1963, art 5, § 2, Soap & Detergent nonetheless characterized this power as a “legislative” power.9 Id. After noting that the grant of power to the Governor under the constitution precluded a separation of powers claim, Soap & Detergent argued that inherent checks in Michigan’s constitutional scheme barred the conclusion that the principle of separation of powers had been violated: Article 5, § 2, does not by any means vest “all” or any considerable legislative power in the executive. While it is true that broad legislative power has been delegated to the Governor to effectuate executive reorganization, this power is clearly limited. Three limitations must be emphasized. First, the area of executive exercise of legislative power is very limited and specific. Second, the executive branch is not the sole possessor of this power; the Legislature has concurrent power to transfer functions and powers of the executive agencies. Third, the Legislature is specifically granted the power to veto executive reorganization orders before they become law. 9 It is axiomatic that when the constitution grants a specific power to the executive branch, that power becomes an “executive” power, however it might have been characterized in the absence of such a grant. Cf., e.g., Const 1963, art 3, § 8 (advisory opinions as part of the “judicial power” in Michigan). I cite Soap & Detergent here only because it illustrates the criteria for determining when a violation of the separation of powers occurs. 26 Therefore, the specific intent of the constitutional convention in fashioning art 5, § 2, having been to delegate a very limited and specific legislative power to the executive, and this provision having been adopted into the constitution with sufficient checks to restrain an improper exercise of this power, we find no constitutional infirmity negating the Governor’s ability to transfer rulemaking authority from one agency to that agency’s department head. [Id. at 752-753.] Under Soap & Detergent, when one branch authorizes the use of power by another branch, the authorizing branch must provide “sufficient checks” on the exercise of power. Whether the Legislature has provided sufficient checks on the exercise of power depends on whether the authorization of power is “limited and specific,” whether the branch authorizing the power retains concurrent power, and whether the branch authorizing the power may veto the decisions of the branch exercising the power. Although I would prefer to cast this inquiry in terms of whether the power being conferred has, by the constraints placed upon its exercise, been effectively transformed from a power properly exercised by the grantor branch into a power properly exercised by the grantee branch, Soap & Detergent does identify important aspects of this analysis. Although this Court has never before addressed an authorization of amendatory power in the context of Indian gaming compacts, the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed a similar question in Panzer v Doyle, supra. In Panzer, the Wisconsin legislature had statutorily authorized the governor to enter into and amend compacts with Indian tribes. Id. at 303. “The delegation of power to a 27 sister branch of government must be scrutinized with heightened care to assure that the legislature retains control over the delegated power . . . .” Id. at 335. Panzer held that the Wisconsin legislature had properly authorized the governor to enter into Indian gaming compacts because the legislature retained “procedural safeguards” against the abuse of this power. Id. at 340-341. First, the legislature could repeal the statute enabling the governor to enter into Indian gaming compacts; second, the legislature could amend the statute to require that modifications be subject to legislative ratification; third, the governor would be held accountable for his actions at the ballot box. Id. at 341. Panzer next addressed whether the legislature had properly authorized the governor to extend the duration of an Indian gaming compact indefinitely by later amendments of the compact entered into solely by the governor. Id. at 341-342. The governor had amended the compact to effectively prevent the state from rescinding the compact in the future, thereby rendering the duration of the compact indefinite. Panzer stated: We think it is extremely unlikely that, in the factual and legal atmosphere in which [Wis Stat] 14.035 was enacted, the legislature intended to make a delegation that could terminate its ability to make law in an important subject area. If such a far-reaching delegation were in fact intended, the delegation would be unconstitutional. [Id. at 347-348 (citation omitted).] Panzer concluded that the Wisconsin legislature could not have authorized the governor to extend the duration of the compacts, even if it had intended to do so, because the legislature would lose all ability to control the power that it had 28 authorized the governor to wield. “The legislature would be powerless to alter the course of the state’s position on Indian gaming” by changing state law. Id. at 345. The authorization of the Governor’s use of amendatory power in the LTBB compact constitutes a similar delegation of legislative power and hence violates the Separation of Powers Clause. Legislative power has been delegated here because the authorization of power does not impose “adequate standards” on the exercise of that power, and the “degree of generality . . . is so unacceptably high as to amount to a delegation of legislative powers.” Mistretta, supra at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Legislature placed a single restriction on the Governor’s ability to amend the compact: the Governor merely cannot expand the counties in which the LTBB may operate casinos. Beyond this stricture, the Governor possesses plenary authority, subject to no constraint beyond her own discretion, in the exercise of the contracting power. The compact imposes no limit on where or when the Governor may authorize new casinos. The compact imposes no limit on when or for how long the Governor may extend its duration. The compact imposes no procedural standards or obligations upon the Governor. For example, the Governor is not required to submit proposed amendments to the Legislature, to the affected local unit of government, or to any other governmental body, before enacting amendments of the compact. The compact contains no overarching standard to guide the Governor in her exercise of the amendatory power, not even one as general as those that have sustained delegations of power by the Congress 29 to federal administrative agencies, e.g., the Federal Communications Commission must regulate to promote the “public convenience, interest, or necessity . . . .” 47 USC 303. The LTBB compact contains no standard, broad or narrow, substantive or procedural, that would transform the legislative power being delegated into an executive power. Consequently, the authorization of the amendatory power constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Thus, the majority establishes the third provision of the “casino exception”: in the realm of Indian casinos, the Legislature may authorize the exercise of power without imposing any standard on the Governor’s exercise of power, thereby effectively delegating legislative power to the Governor. Moreover, Soap & Detergent directs this Court to consider whether the authorization of power is “limited and specific,” whether the branch authorizing the power retains “concurrent power,” and whether the branch authorizing the power “is specifically granted the power to veto” the other branch’s exercise of that power. Soap & Detergent, supra at 752. None of these considerations alters the conclusion that the Governor here is exercising a legislative power. First, the authorization of the amendatory power is not “limited” or “specific.” Pursuant to these amendments, the Governor has already allowed another casino and extended the duration of the compact for 25 years; there is nothing that precludes the Governor and her successors from allowing 50 or 100 casinos and extending the compact indefinitely. Second, unlike in Soap & Detergent, the Legislature here 30 does not retain any power to amend compacts with the LTBB. Third, the Legislature cannot thwart actions of the Governor by legislative veto. The Governor’s ability to expand the scope of the compacts is plenary. Moreover, under the rationale in Panzer, the Legislature should never be allowed to completely “terminate its ability to make law in an important subject area.” Panzer, supra at 347. In this case, the Legislature has wholly ceded its ability to effect future amendments of the compact. The Legislature’s acquiescence to the amendment procedure “terminate[d] its ability to make law in an important subject area.” Id. Such acquiescence transforms both the legislative and executive powers of our state by precluding the Legislature in the future from reasserting its proper authority over both state contracting and Indian casinos. Rather, it will remain bound indefinitely by the actions of the Legislature in 1998. The majority argues: (1) because the Legislature properly approved the compacts under TOMAC I, any amendment approved by the Governor pursuant to the amendment process would be permissible, but only as long as the amendment is “within the limits of the constitution,” ante at 4, 9, and 14; (2) the Legislature acquiesced in the authorization of the Governor’s exercise of amendatory power by approving the compacts by resolution; (3) the Legislature may properly confer amendatory authority on the Governor, citing People ex rel Sutherland v Governor, 29 Mich 320 (1874), and discretionary decisions made by the Governor pursuant to delegated authority are not reviewable by this Court, citing People ex 31 rel Ayres v Bd of State Auditors, 42 Mich 422; 4 NW 274 (1880); (4) the conferral of amendatory power on the Governor was “limited and specific,” Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v Michigan, 459 Mich 291; 586 NW2d 894 (1998); and (5) the amendments “‘[did] not impose new obligations’” on the people of Michigan because the amendments “‘simply reflect the contractual terms agreed to by two sovereign entities.’” Ante at 11, quoting TOMAC I, supra at 327. I will briefly respond to these arguments. First, the majority argues that the Legislature validly approved the amendment procedure in the compact, thereby “giv[ing] the Governor broad discretion-- within the limits of the constitution-- to amend the compacts.” Ante at 9. However, this ignores that our constitution itself limits the methods by which the LTBB compact may be amended, by defining and limiting the powers of the three branches of government. An amendment procedure in violation of the separation of powers is made unconstitutional by Const 1963, art 3, § 2. Second, the majority also argues that the Legislature acquiesced to the delegation of power to the Governor. While this may be true, it is this Court's obligation to uphold the constitution in service to the people, not in service to a particular branch of government. Moreover, it is our obligation to uphold the permanent interests of the separate branches, not those of its particular members at a particular moment in time. That one branch agrees to the exercise by another of an unconstitutional power does not mitigate the breach of the constitution. The 32 premise of a government of defined and limited constitutional powers is that the rights of “we the people” will most securely be maintained by this method. “The acceptance by one branch of the expansion of the powers of another branch is not dispositive in whether a constitutional power has been properly exercised.” Nat’l Wildlife Federation, supra at 616. Third, the majority contends that Sutherland allows the Legislature “to confer authority on the Governor.” Ante at 10. It further contends that “discretionary decisions made by the Governor are not within this Court’s purview to modify.” Ante at 10, citing Ayres, supra at 426. Who could doubt either of these propositions? However, the relationship these propositions bear to the majority’s conclusion that the Legislature may “confer authority” upon another branch of government in any way or to any extent the Legislature chooses is hard to comprehend. Sutherland did not assert that courts should be disinterested in the nature of the authority being conferred, and Ayres did not assert that all decisions made by a Governor were “discretionary.” Indeed, neither Sutherland nor Ayres even addressed delegations of “legislative power” to the executive.10 The 10 In Sutherland, the Legislature had granted the Governor the discretion to issue certificates stating that a canal and harbor had been built in conformity with federal law. The dispute in Sutherland centered on whether this power was an “essentially executive” duty or a ministerial duty. Sutherland, supra at 329. In Ayres, the Legislature had authorized the Board of State Auditors to solicit contracts for the printing of Supreme Court reports. Ayres noted that “State officers inferior to the Governor have many duties which courts can compel them to perform . . .” Ayers, supra at 427. The dispute in Ayres was whether the Board (continued…) 33 majority’s casual assertion of governmental authority simply bears no resemblance to any traditional understanding of American constitutionalism. Fourth, the majority invokes the test from Judicial Attorneys Ass’n v Michigan in support of its decision, but fails to properly apply that test. The majority states: An overlap or sharing of power may be permissible if “the grant of authority to one branch is limited and specific and does not create encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other . . . .” [Ante at 7, quoting Judicial Attorneys, supra at 297.] Judicial Attorneys concluded that a statute that allowed a local county to become the employer of judicial employees was not “limited and specific” and constituted an “aggrandizement” of the Legislature at the expense of the judicial branch. Id. at 301-303.11 In the instant case, the Governor has been given the power to unilaterally amend the compact, constrained only by her inability to alter the definition of “eligible Indian lands.” This near-plenary power is neither “limited” (continued…) of State Auditors could be compelled to perform its duties in a manner similar to an inferior officer. 11 I dissented in part from the Court of Appeals opinion in the Judicial Attorneys cases and would have found that the Separation of Powers Clause was not violated. See Detroit Mayor v Michigan, 228 Mich App 386; 579 NW2d 378 (1998). I concluded that “any potential separation of powers concerns are not ripe for decision,” id. at 427, and that the law in dispute “could be construed or applied in many ways, in many combinations and permutations, anticipated and unanticipated, some of which would engender no serious constitutional difficulties and others of which might be inconsistent with Const 1963, art 3, § 2 in whole or (continued…) 34 nor “specific,” and permits the “aggrandizement” of the executive branch at the expense of the legislative, which will play a sharply limited role in the formulation of Indian casino policy. The majority further contends that the authorization of power in this case is limited by the “compacts themselves” and by the Governor’s inability to “agree to an amendment that would violate the constitution or invade the Legislature’s lawmaking function.” Ante at 10 n 3. However, as already mentioned, there is only a single relatively insignificant limitation upon the Governor in the compact itself, and the majority apparently understands constitutional violations only in terms of substantive and not procedural terms. That is, while the Governor presumably could not set different minimum age limits for gambling in new casinos on the basis of race or nationality, the fact that she has exercised legislative power in this realm in the first place apparently does not implicate the constitution, no matter how much “aggrandizement” of one branch has occurred at the expense of another. Finally, the majority concludes by saying, “[T]he amendments ‘do not impose new obligations on the citizens of the state subject to the Legislature’s power; they simply reflect the contractual terms agreed to by two sovereign entities.’” Ante at 11, quoting TOMAC I, supra at 327. The issue in the instant (continued…) in part.” Id. at 439. This case is distinguishable in that the Governor’s exercise of (continued…) 35 case is not whether the 2003 amendments were agreed to by “two sovereign entities”; obviously they were.12 Rather, the issue is whether the procedure undertaken to approve the 2003 amendments complied with the requirements of our constitution. Just as the United States cannot enter into a treaty with Belgium, and Michigan cannot enter into a compact with Ohio, by extra-constitutional procedures, neither can Michigan negotiate an Indian casino compact by extraconstitutional means. The amendment procedure utilized here involves an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Governor because it fails to provide “adequate standards”-- indeed it fails to provide any standards-- for the Governor’s exercise of such power. Such standards are necessary to transform a legislative power into an executive power. The majority’s conclusion that the amendments “‘simply reflect the contractual terms agreed to by two sovereign entities’” is simply irrelevant to the necessary constitutional analysis.13 (continued…) power engenders “serious constitutional difficulties” under all circumstances. 12 See TOMAC I, supra at 397 (“I do not dispute that the compacts are akin to contracts of a unique nature.”). 13 The majority asserts that the contractual nature of the compact and the amendments is relevant because “‘mutual assent’” is “‘a characteristic that is not only the hallmark of a contractual agreement but is also absolutely foreign to the concept of legislating.’” Ante at 11 n 4, quoting TOMAC I, supra at 324. I do not disagree that the compact and its amendments are contractual. Where I disagree is in the majority’s assertion that, when acting pursuant to a contract, the Governor and the Legislature are no longer bound by the grants and limitations of authority set forth in our constitution. The fundamental flaw in the majority opinion is that (continued…) 36 Moreover, the majority’s assertion that the amendments are not legislation because they “‘do not impose new obligations on the citizens of the state’” simply ignores the reality that the citizens of this state are now obliged to admit a new casino and an indefinite number of future casinos into their communities, replete with the attendant economic and social consequences, without their elected representatives having had a voice in this determination. It is hard to conceive of a greater “obligation” being imposed upon a free citizenry than to be deprived of its ability to effectively communicate with its elected representatives.