Opinion ID: 411734
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Indictment and the Proceedings During Trial

Text: 15 Errante and LoRusso were arrested in September 1981 and were indicted on two counts. Count 1 charged them with conspiring with each other and with other persons unknown to the grand jury to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. Count 2 charged each defendant with possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 812, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) (1976). At trial the government's principal witnesses were Costanzo and Mimmo, who testified to the events described above. Neither defendant testified. 16 At the close of the government's case, the defendants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a) for judgments of acquittal as to count 2 on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that they had intended to distribute the heroin in their possession. 1 The trial court orally granted the motions, stating that the proof of intent to distribute was entirely speculative and Count 2 is dismissed. (Tr. 733.) 17 The government immediately moved pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c) to have the court submit a charge of simple possession, without intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844, to the jury as a lesser-included offense within count 2. The colloquy, beginning with the court's dismissal of the original count 2, was as follows:THE COURT: I think it is entirely speculative and Count 2 is dismissed. 18 MR. DOUGLAS [Assistant United States Attorney]: We would then move pursuant to 31(c) to have Count 2 considered under the lesser included offense. 31(c) was passed specifically to give the government an opportunity to still go to the jury even if its proof falls short of the greater offense if there is a logical reason to find the defendants guilty of the lesser included offense. 19 THE COURT: What is the lesser included offense? 20 MR. DOUGLAS: Simple possession without intent to distribute. 21 (Tr. 733.) Defendants objected on the ground that submission of the charge of simple possession would be improper under Rule 31(c) in light of the court's action on the original count 2, and that submission of the reduced count would constitute an impermissible variance in the indictment. The court gave both sides until the next day to present arguments. 22 In the argument on the government's motion, defendants adhered to their initial objections and argued in addition that, since [a] judgment of acquittal has been entered, (Tr. 771), such a submission would violate their rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. The trial judge rejected this argument, pointing out that judgments had not in fact been entered, and granted the government's motion, as reflected in the following colloquy: 23 THE COURT: ... I think the double jeopardy argument is not a profitable line of inquiry. 24 MR. SOROKA [Counsel for LoRusso]: I am giving you that reasoning because the record of this case is that a judgment of acquittal was entered. 25 THE COURT: No, a judgment of acquittal hasn't been entered. I have granted a motion. 26 MR. SOROKA: Pursuant to Rule 29 for a judgment of acquittal. 27 MR. DOUGLAS: The judgment was never entered. 28 THE COURT: Look, the trial is still going on. The motion was granted. I could reconsider the motion if I wanted to and it wouldn't be double jeopardy. The government could move for reargument. 29 (Tr. 776-77.) 30 Accordingly, the court agreed to submit count 2 to the jury as a charge of simple possession. The jury convicted both Errante and LoRusso on count 1 and on count 2 as reduced.