Opinion ID: 1767013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Mercury's Motion for a Directed Verdict was properly denied.

Text: ¶ 87. Mercury argues that [T]here should have been no jury issue on whether there was a breach of warranty or whether the Plaintiff was entitled to damages. Mercury was entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of liability and damages. Mercury was not so entitled. The record amply supports the jury's finding for Travis; and the law supports it. Thus, denying the directed verdict motion was not in error. ¶ 88. The majority belies the realities and often unique circumstances of sales transactions, and the teachings of the Uniform Commercial Code, and is yet another example of the kind of analysis coming from this Court that ranks our legal aptitude among the embarrassing. Mercury's express warranty failed of its essential purpose because it deprived Travis of the benefit of his bargain. Mercury also breached its implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The motors were defective before they were even installed. They broke down consistently, if not one, then the other, then the other one, and then the one before. Moreover, if Travis wanted a motors warranted strictly to propel him through the water, as Mercury insisted at trial, with no particular assurance as to the name and quality and reliability of tested high performance motors used time and again for competitions, one must question whether Travis would have bargained with Mercury at all. As to Mercury's right to cure, under the facts of this case, reasonable people, applying the correct legal standards, decided that Mercury was given a reasonable opportunity to cure and failed to do so. As a direct result, Travis incurred direct, consequential, and incidental damages for which he is entitled compensation under the law. The jury's award should be affirmed. Since it was not, I dissent. DIAZ AND EASLEY, JJ., JOINS THIS OPINION.