Opinion ID: 6326037
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Michigan Eavesdropping Statute

Text: Fisher asserts that the February 18 call recording, Perron’s alleged recordings of various other calls with her siblings, and the disclosure of those recordings violated Michigan’s eavesdropping statute. The district court dismissed this claim because the court concluded, No. 21-1184 Fisher v. Perron Page 5 based on relevant Michigan cases and other data, that the Michigan Supreme Court would interpret the statute as a one-party consent law. Perron, as a participant to the calls, was thus legally allowed to make the recordings. Fisher argues that the district court’s analysis was flawed and that the plain language of the statute is clear in requiring the consent of all parties for a legal recording. The threshold question for the claim under Michigan’s eavesdropping statute is whether the statute provides for liability of conversation participants who make recordings without the knowledge or permission of other participants. The law states: Any person who is present or who is not present during a private conversation and who wilfully [sic] uses any device to eavesdrop upon the conversation without the consent of all parties thereto, or who knowingly aids, employs or procures another person to do the same in violation of this section, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in a state prison for not more than 2 years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539c. Michigan law defines “eavesdropping” as “to overhear, record, amplify, or transmit any part of the private discourse of others without the permission of all persons engaged in this discourse.” Id. § 750.539a. The Michigan Supreme Court has yet to determine whether this statutory language allows for secret participant recordings or requires the consent of all parties to record a call. Thus, the district court and now we must predict how the Michigan Supreme Court would rule based on “all the available data.” Stryker Corp. v. XL Ins. Am., 735 F.3d 349, 360 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 450, 454 (6th Cir. 2001)). Michigan’s lower courts, however, have determined that the statute is a one-party consent law. In the leading case, Sullivan v. Gray, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that “the statutory language, on its face, unambiguously excludes participant recording from the definition of eavesdropping by limiting the subject conversation to ‘the private discourse of others.’” 324 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (per curiam). As such, “a potential eavesdropper must be a third party not otherwise involved in the conversation being eavesdropped on.” Id. The court reasoned that excluding participants from statutory coverage avoids making surplusage of the words “private discourse of others” in the definition of eavesdropping. Id. No. 21-1184 Fisher v. Perron Page 6 Fisher argues that we should not follow Sullivan based on a 2019 decision from the United States District Court for Eastern District of Michigan, AFT Michigan v. Project Veritas, 397 F. Supp. 3d 981 (E.D. Mich. 2019).2 In the 2019 decision, the district court analyzed “all the available data” and concluded that the Michigan Supreme Court would decide that the statute requires the consent of all parties for the recording of conversations. Id. at 987, 989 (quoting Stryker Corp., 735 F.3d at 360). The district court reasoned that “Sullivan’s construction contravenes the Legislature’s intent made clear” in the statutory language that “[a]ny person who is present” is potentially liable and that “all participants” must consent to a recording. Id. at 988–89 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sullivan, 324 N.W.2d at 61–62 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). However, the 2019 AFT Michigan decision is of little probative value. The Michigan Supreme Court declined in May 2021 to answer the certified question from the AFT Michigan court on the proper interpretation of the eavesdropping statute. In re Certified Question, 959 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 2021) (mem.). Then, in November 2021, the same district court granted a motion for reconsideration and entered an Opinion and Order holding that “the statute is not violated when a conversation is recorded by one of its participants.” AFT Mich. v. Project Veritas, No. 17-13292, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215090, at  (E.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2021). That leaves Sullivan untouched as a viable data point for our analysis. Although a published state appellate court decision does not dictate our determination of how the Michigan Supreme Court would construe the state’s eavesdropping statute, it “is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. Am. Safety Prods., Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 608–09 (6th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original) (quoting Comm’r v. Bosch’s Est., 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)). We cannot say that the appellate court’s analysis in Sullivan was “poorly reasoned,” as Fisher argues. The appellate court construed the statute according to Michigan law, which defines “eavesdropping” as based on “the private discourse of others,” to determine what behaviors § 750.539a and § 750.539c deem 2 Fisher asserts that AFT Michigan “overruled” Sullivan “for purposes of federal law.” This argument misunderstands both how precedent operates within the federal courts and how federal courts are meant to ascertain the proper interpretation of state law. No. 21-1184 Fisher v. Perron Page 7 illegal. Sullivan, 324 N.W.2d at 59–60. The court rejected the argument that the statute “must apply to both participants and nonparticipants since it relates to ‘[a]ny person who is present or who is not present during a private conversation.’” Id. at 60 (alteration in original). The Sullivan court instead explained that this statutory language acknowledges that eavesdropping may be committed by using a recording device either in close proximity or at distance. Id. The Sullivan court’s conclusion, therefore, is an important data point in favor of a participant exception to the Michigan eavesdropping statute. Apart from Sullivan, we must also consider the numerous cases that have since cited or relied on Sullivan’s conclusion that the eavesdropping statute allows for participant recording. Other Michigan Court of Appeals decisions, along with opinions from federal district courts applying Michigan law and this court, have cited Sullivan regularly as support for the conclusion that Michigan’s eavesdropping statute is inapplicable to participant recordings. See, e.g., Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 683–84 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); Courser v. Mich. House of Reps., 831 F. App’x 161, 179 (6th Cir. 2020); People v. Williams, No. 346689, 2020 WL 2601567, at  (Mich. Ct. App. May 21, 2020) (per curiam); Ferrara v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 52 F. App’x 229, 233 (6th Cir. 2002). Indeed, in the past two years, we have twice cited Sullivan to support the proposition that the Michigan eavesdropping statute does not cover participant recordings. Courser, 831 F. App’x at 179; Gamrat v. McBroom, 822 F. App’x 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2020). Based on the above data, we agree with the district court that, under the current law in Michigan, a participant does not violate Michigan’s eavesdropping statute by recording a conversation without the consent of the other participants. Fisher’s complaint alleges that Perron recorded conversations that she herself participated in. Therefore, he has failed to state a claim under Michigan’s eavesdropping statute. In his reply brief, Fisher argues for the first time that even if Michigan is a one-partyconsent state, he has still stated a viable claim against Perron because we should construe the complaint as alleging that Marc Thomas, Perron’s former attorney, did the recording. We cannot, however, assume facts that were not pleaded. Nothing in the complaint suggests that Thomas was responsible for the recording. See, e.g., McGrew v. Duncan, 937 F.3d 664, 668 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 328–29 (6th Cir. 2006)). No. 21-1184 Fisher v. Perron Page 8 The complaint clearly alleges that, by February 2018 or earlier, Perron began secretly recording telephone conversations among herself and her siblings. Thomas is not mentioned as a possible recorder; he is referenced only as having received the alleged recordings from Perron. Fisher’s new allegation, not included in his complaint, does not change our conclusion that Fisher has failed to state a claim under Michigan’s eavesdropping statute.