Opinion ID: 1096859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bills Relating to the Defendant Owens Alone

Text: The most serious issue of the appeal concerns whether admissible against Owens is this testimony as to these two later attempted robberies and the gun battle, both involving Witherspoon and Clark alone. Before these later two attempted robberies and the gun battle about a mile away from the Pizza Hut, Owens himself had been arrested and was in the custody of the police. Under the evidence, Owens was as much a principal in the robbery as were Witherspoon and Clark. La.R.S. 14:24. Also, all three were involved in a criminal conspiracy to commit the robbery, i. e., an agreement or combination of two or more persons for the specific purpose of committing any crime. La.R.S. 14:26. Even though Owens, driving the getaway car, was two blocks away when the robbery was committed, evidence concerning it was admissible against him, both as a principal and as coconspirator. As provided by La.R.S. 15:455, Each conspirator is deemed to assent to or to commend whatever is said or done in furtherance of the common enterprise, and it is therefore of no moment that such act was done or such declaration was made out of the presence of the conspirator sought to be bound thereby   . (Italics ours.) Nevertheless, the crime to which Owens was a principal involved only the armed robbery at the Pizza Hut and the planned escape in his Pontiac. Likewise, this was the only crime for which the criminal conspiracy was entered into. Therefore, considering that the planned crime and conspiracy was to this effect, it is at least arguable that the subsequent attempted robberies and the subsequent shootings by his confederates were not, at least after Owens's arrest, in furtherance of any conspiracy or crime to which he was any longer a party. State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 139 So. 463 (1932); State v. Johnson, 47 La.Ann. 1225, 17 So. 789 (1895). See Comment, Conspiracy, 28 La.L.Rev. 534, 542-43 (1968). Nevertheless, even if not admissible against Owens as in furtherance of a conspiracy or crime to which he was a party, the evidence is, under the present facts, admissible as part of the res gestae, La.R.S. 15:447, 15:448, of the crime of which he was a principal. The incidents of the flight occurred within minutes of the robbery and as a direct consequence, being an attempt to escape from the area. The circumstances of the attempted robberies by Owens's confederates of the automobiles and of the shootings in connection therewith are thus part of the res gestae of the Pizza Hut robbery, since they are necessary incidents of the criminal act, or immediate concomitants of it, or form in conjunction with it one continuous transaction. La.R.S. 15:448. They are part of his confederates' desperate attempt to make an escape when, for the reasons shown, Owens's own getaway car had left the scene. This is especially true, in view of the circumstances' relevancy as tending to corroborate (by tending to indicate the confederates had been deprived of other means of escape planned) the circumstantial showing that Owens was a principal in the crime, i. e., the driver of the planned getaway car. Owens had brought the confederates to the scene and, until forced to leave by the policeman, was parked nearby the scene of the robbery with motor running. We therefore find no error in the trial court's refusal to order the severance of Owens's trial from that of the other defendants (Bill No. 2), nor in its failure to limit the evidence (Bill No. 5) so as to exclude (at least as against Owens) testimony as to the shootings and the attempted robberies by Witherspoon and Clark. We further find no merit to Owens's motion to suppress evidence (Bill Nos. 3 and 4) seized at the time of his arrest. The facts recited show that, on the basis of information furnished him, the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Owens, as the latter returned to the vicinity of the Pizza Hut (apparently for the purpose of finding Witherspoon and Clark). State v. Wood, 262 La. 259, 263 So.2d 28 (1973). He was the driver of the car previously parked nearby and identified as such by make, color, and license. The clothing and items seized from Owens's person were the result of a search incident to a lawful arrest, Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973), while the hats in the car were in plain view following the lawful detention, State v. Jefferson, 284 So.2d 882 (La. 1973). See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).