Opinion ID: 772701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative Structure

Text: 22 We may properly examine the structure of the legislation passed in 1994 for interpretive assistance in deciphering Congress's meaning 3 . See Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 (noting that courts consider not only the bare meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 56-57 (1995) (determining meaning of one term in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 by reference to the same term in Bail Reform Act of 1984 because Congress presumably confers consistent meaning on terms in related legislation); see also Choice, 201 F.3d at 840([T]his court also looks to the language and design of the statute as a whole in interpreting the plain meaning of statutory language.) (internal quotation omitted). 23 First, it does not strain reason to accept that Congress intended its cross-reference in §3565(b)(3) to refer to the paragraph in §3563(a) that requires mandatory drug testing as a condition of probation. At the time of enactment, Congress was correct to cross-reference §3563(a)(4) in newly drafted §3565(b)(3). Confusion arose only because Congress, presumably inadvertently, enacted a second subsection (a)(4). Such an oversight is perhaps not surprising given the length and breadth of the Crime Control Act. But Congress's intent to revoke probation for those defendants who are required to submit to drug testing and fail to do so cannot be in doubt. For evidence of Congress's intent, we need only look to §3583(d), a provision similar to §3563(a), which provides for conditions of supervised release and was also amended by the Crime Control Act of 1994. 24 The Crime Control Act added several new sections to §3583(d) regarding supervised release that are relevant to this case. As a result of these amendments, §3583(d) now contains mandatory conditions for supervised release which are nearly identical to the mandatory conditions for probation found in §3563(a). The amendment most relevant to our purposes, which can be found at Pub. L. No. 103-322, §20414(c), 108 Stat. 1796, 1831, added the following language to §3583(d): 25 The court shall also order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to a drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter ... for use of a controlled substance. The condition stated in the preceding sentence may be ameliorated or suspended by the court as provided in section 3563(a)(4). 26 18 U.S.C. §3583(d). There can be no doubt that the reference to §3563(a)(4) in this amendment is an error. The first sentence clearly adds mandatory testing for use of controlled substances as a condition of supervised release. The second sentence clearly refers to this drug testing condition as it references readers to §3563(a)(4). We know that Congress initially enacted one §3563(a)(4) that required drug testing as a mandatory condition of probation and that this section is now found at §3563(a)(5). The very language of the statute, therefore, compels our conclusion that Congress intended the second sentence to cross-reference readers to a related statute that imposes mandatory drug testing. Based on the language in this amendment, we conclude that, just as with §3583(d), which establishes conditions for supervised release, so too with §3565(b)(3), which establishes conditions for probation, may we infer Congress's intent to cross-reference the provision in §3563(a) requiring drug testing. 27 Our conclusion is bolstered by another relevant amendment, which, corresponding to an amendment to §3565(b)(3), establishes mandatory revocation of a defendant's supervised release if the defendant refuses to comply with drug testing imposed as a condition of supervised release. Pub. L. No. 103-322, §110505, 108 Stat. 1796, 2017 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §3583(g)(3)). The similarities between §3565 and §3583 following the amendments reveal that, just as Congress intended for there to be mandatory revocation of supervised release for failure to submit to mandatory drug testing in §3583(g)(3), Congress intended there to be mandatory revocation of probation for failure to submit to mandatory drug testing in §3565(b)(3). 28 Finally, a third amendment to §3583(d), which can be found at Pub. L. No. 103-322, §320921(c), 108 Stat. 1796, 2130-31, provided the following: 29 The court shall order as an explicit condition of supervised release for a defendant convicted for the first time of a domestic violence crime as defined in section 3561(b) that the defendant attend a public, private, or private nonprofit offender rehabilitation program that has been approved by the court .... 30 This amendment offers further proof that §3583(d)'s reference to §3563(a)(4) is clearly an error: the reference must be to what is now §3563(a)(5) because §3583(d) already contains within it the condition relating to domestic violence offenders. Had Congress meant for §3583(d) to refer to the conditions imposed on domestic violence offenders at §3563(a)(4), it need not have cited to an outside statute. Indeed, such a citation would have been both redundant and confusing 4 . 31 A close analysis of the structure and language of these related statutory provisions reveals that the problem with the statute before us is the result of a drafting error, not any ambiguity about Congress's intent. Instead of creating more confusion and holding the statute to its literal and implausible reading, we hold that the government's proposed reading of §3565(b)(3) is the correct one.