Opinion ID: 844217
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenges to Strike African-American Prospective Jurors

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial claiming that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was based on race, in violation of People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748] ( Wheeler ) and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712] ( Batson ). At the time defendant made the motion, the prosecutor had used peremptory challenges against six African-American prospective jurors. Defense counsel stated that none of the African-Americans except one, Leticeia H., had expressed any reservation about the death penalty. The trial court ruled that defendant had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination and that, consequently, the prosecutor was not required to provide an explanation for why he had challenged these jurors. (4) A prima facie case of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges is established if the totality of the relevant facts gives `rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 [162 L.Ed.2d 129, 125 S.Ct. 2410].) Johnson reversed a prior decision of this court holding that the applicable standard was whether it was more likely than not that purposeful discrimination had occurred. ( People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1318 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270].) In cases like the present one, in which it is not clear whether the trial court applied the proper standard, we independently determine whether the record permits an inference that the prosecutor excused jurors on prohibited discriminatory grounds. ( People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1293 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 190 P.3d 616] ( Carasi ).) In doing so, we must consider all relevant circumstances. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 96.) Defendant cites the following as supporting an inference that the prosecutor exercised six peremptory challenges on the basis of race: The case involved an interracial offense (defendant is African-American, and one of his victims, Officer MacDonald, was Caucasian); two of the African-American jurors challenged by the prosecutor gave answers that appeared to strongly favor the prosecution (Alyn C. stated that she favored the death penalty for repeat offenders and Jacqueline R. had a friend in the Compton Police Department); and the excluded jurors had little more than their group membership in common and were otherwise a diverse group of individuals that would have made acceptable jurors. (See Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280; People v. Turner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 711, 719 [230 Cal.Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102].) These circumstances do not raise an inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges based on race. Although one of the victims was Caucasian, the other two victims were African-American. Contrary to defendant's contention, the answers given by Prospective Jurors Jacqueline R. and Alyn C. were not so obviously favorable to the prosecution that it can be inferred that the prosecutor's excusal of these two must have been based on race. Although Jacqueline R. had a friend in the police department and could have been viewed as a juror who would be sympathetic to the victims, she had mixed feelings about the death penalty and at one time did not believe in it at all. In addition, her son was in prison for armed robbery, and she stated that she believed he was not treated fairly because the prosecutor in that case was trying to make an example of him. (See People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 70 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622] [excused juror's voir dire disclosed numerous reasons for a prosecutor to excuse her, including personal experience with an allegedly unfair homicide prosecution of a close relative].) Although no obvious reason appears why the prosecutor would have chosen to strike Alyn C., neither were her answers so favorable to the prosecution that it would be reasonable to infer, solely on that basis, that she was excused because of her race. [4] Even if the struck African-American jurors had nothing in common with each other besides their race, that circumstance does not, in itself, create an inference that they were excused because of their race where, as here, obvious bases for the prosecutor's decision to excuse many of the jurors appear in the record. As noted above, Jacqueline R. had doubts about the death penalty and believed that her son had been prosecuted unfairly. Diana T. wrote on her questionnaire that she did not believe in the death penalty and that she would always vote for life and reject death, regardless of the evidence presented at the penalty trial. Leticeia H. indicated on her questionnaire that, based on her personal and religious beliefs, she did not believe that a criminal should be put to death and that she would always vote for life. It is not apparent exactly why the prosecutor would have wanted to excuse Jeanine P., but the record demonstrates that the trial court observed something about her that caused it to believe that she would be perceived as a problem by the prosecution. [5] Although no obvious reason appears why the prosecutor would have chosen to strike Alyn C. or Patricia S., the absence of a reason that is apparent on the record does not, in the context of all the other circumstances, suggest that the reason was race. Here, the prosecution's pattern of excusals and acceptances during the peremptory challenge process reveals no obvious discrimination ... against African-American jurors. ( Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1294.) The trial court observed that the first time the prosecution accepted the panel, it appeared to the court that there were two African-American males and two African-American females on the panel. The court noted that the prosecution subsequently accepted the panel with three African-Americans and that, at the time the motion was made, the panel included two African-American females and one female who was half African-American. [6] At the time of defendant's Wheeler motion, African-Americans constituted 26 percent of the prospective jurors who had been called into the jury box (15 out of 61) and the prosecutor had exercised 37 percent of his challenges (six out of 16) against African-Americans. This disparity is not significant enough, in itself, to suggest discrimination. (See Carasi, supra, at pp. 1291, 1295 [no prima facie case of gender discrimination even though prosecutor used 20 out of 23 peremptory challenges against female prospective jurors]; People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 345 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 160 P.3d 84] [no prima facie case of gender discrimination even though women represented 38 percent of the jury pool and the prosecutor used 67 percent of his strikes against women].) We conclude that the totality of facts did not give rise to an inference of discrimination.