Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Permitting Sergeant Quinn to bolster Garrison's testimony

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court erred by permitting Sergeant Quinn to testify and recount Garrison's admissions. Defendant characterizes Garrison as less than an ideal witness and claims the People were unfairly permitted to bolster his credibility by having a police officer testify and essentially repeat everything Garrison said. Defendant specifically identifies those portions of Quinn's testimony in which Quinn reported that Garrison had called the police with no prompting and had confessed to his participation before being offered a plea bargain, that Quinn determined the man Garrison knew only as Apache was defendant, and that Garrison stated that defendant told him he (defendant) had killed someone in the past. The gist of defendant's argument is that all such testimony was inadmissible hearsay. The trial court disagreed, ruling the evidence was admissible on the basis that, because the defense had suggested Garrison's story was a recent fabrication to come within the terms of his plea bargain, the People were entitled to show that his prior statement to Sergeant Quinn, given before the plea bargain, was consistent with his testimony. In truth, however, the jury had already heard much of the evidence of which defendant now complains from when Quinn testified earlier in the trial. Thus, for example, Quinn already had recounted the circumstances of how Garrison called the police and reported his involvement in the Dolinka murder. [17] Although respondent contends defendant failed to object to the admission of any evidence on this ground, defense counsel made a standing objection and thus preserved the issue for appeal. In any event, we find no error, as the trial court properly ruled that Garrison's prior consistent statements were admissible to rebut the suggestion he recently had fabricated his story. ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 609, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376; Evid.Code, §§ 791, subd. (b), 1236.) Consequently, we also reject defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant defense counsel's motion for a mistrial based on Quinn's testimony. Although defendant further claims that Sergeant Quinn's testimony constituted a form of improper vouching for the credibility of a witness (cf. People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848, 97 Cal.Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564 [a prosecutor [may not] express a personal opinion or belief in a defendant's guilt]), he is incorrect. Quinn merely testified to prior consistent statements of the witness to rebut a claim of recent fabrication. In addition, defendant contends Quinn was allowed to usurp the role of a psychiatric expert when the trial court permitted him (over defense objection) to answer the prosecutor's question whether he had observed any delusional or hallucinatory speech or conduct on the part of Mr. Garrison. Quinn was not qualified to offer a professional psychological diagnosis, as both the prosecutor and the trial court stated before the jury. Nevertheless, the court made clear to the jury that Quinn's answer would reflect his own observations as a layperson. Quinn thereafter testified that Garrison did not appear distracted or hesitant during the interview, was responsive to questions, and his attention was always toward the speaker. We perceive no error: laypersons may testify to their observations of a witness's behavior outside the therapeutic setting that is relevant to the overall question of the witness's mental state. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 32, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) To the extent defendant contends the admission of Quinn's testimony violated his rights to confrontation, due process, a fair trial, and fundamental fairness, we reject those claims as well. (See People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 305, 70 Cal. Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.)