Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-examination of Tobin Regarding the Term Instant Death (Letner, Tobin)

Text: During the prosecution's case-in-chief, the prosecutor notified the trial court that she intended to call as witnesses two persons who knew defendants in Napa in the late 1970's. These witnesses would testify that defendants spoke of and were seen practicing a martial arts technique causing the instant death of a victim by stabbing the sides and base of the victim's neck. The prosecutor contended this testimony should be admitted as circumstantial evidence tending to demonstrate that defendants murdered Pontbriant, because her wounds could have been inflicted by someone attempting to cause this manner of instant death. Defendants objected on the ground that, pursuant to section 352 of the Evidence Code, the probative value of the testimony on the subject of instant death would be grossly outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice and the consumption of time, because of (1) the prejudicial nature of the testimony indicating that defendants practiced such acts, (2) the remoteness of the events to which the witnesses would testify, and (3) the circumstance that these witnesses were enemies of defendants and therefore were of questionable credibility, necessitating essentially a trial within a trial concerning the various incidents that caused the rifts between them and defendants. The trial court sustained defendants' objections to the testimony, finding that the evidence would tend to establish defendants had a murderer's disposition, and that the method was not so sufficiently unique that the evidence was of particularly compelling probative value in establishing the identity of Pontbriant's killer. Later, during Tobin's defense case, after he had testified he knew nothing concerning Pontbriant's murder, the prosecutor asked two questions during cross-examination regarding the term instant death. The following exchange occurred: Q [by prosecutor]: There is a term in karate that is known as instant death, isn't there? [Objection by Tobin's attorney]: Your Honor, I'm going to object to the question. The Court: Overruled. [Tobin]: I don't know if there is or not. Q [by prosecutor]: You have never heard of instant death being caused by sticking someone in the side of their neck at or near major arteries or veins? Counsel for both defendants again objected, and the trial court recessed the proceedings to discuss the matter outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor was engaging in subterfuge, in an attempt to render admissible the previously excluded testimony from the two witnesses concerning defendants' familiarity with the instant death technique, by eliciting a denial from Tobin that then would be impeached by the witnesses. The prosecutor argued that the trial court's prior ruling concerned evidence proposed to be presented as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief, and that the context in which the admissibility of the evidence would be determined had shifted once Tobin testified he had nothing to do with the murder. The trial court, however, restated its finding that Pontbriant's wounds were not particularly unusual, and that therefore questions concerning instant death would not be permitted. At the conclusion of the short recess, the trial court admonished the jury that the statements of the attorneys, including their questions, were not evidence, that the jury should not assume the truth of anything insinuated in a question, and that if an objection to a question was sustained, the jury should not guess at what the answer might have been. The trial court, however, did not strike Tobin's answer to the first questionthere was no request by defendants that it do so. The prosecutor then moved on to a different subject. During the prosecution's opening argument at the conclusion of the guilt phase, in the course of asserting that the nature of the wounds to Pontbriant's neck showed that the murder was a calculated killing, the prosecutor stated: The location of these stab wounds, as testified to through Dr. Walter, were placed very strategically, almost over vital blood vessels and arteries that supply blood and take away blood from the head. That is something known to cause what's called `instant death,' if the arteries are actually stricken. [¶] And then we had the testimony about the spinal cord. At that location in the neck it'sit's a very vital, vital area. And one that can also cause death very quickly. Neither defendant objected to the prosecutor's statements. On appeal, defendants contend the prosecutor committed misconduct in questioning Tobin concerning the instant death technique and then mentioning that term during argument to the jury. We conclude there was no misconduct warranting reversal of the judgments. (26) Assuming that defendants' assertions during trial that the prosecutor was engaging in subterfuge were sufficient to preserve for appeal a claim of misconduct regarding the prosecutor's cross-examination, defendants have failed to establish that any misconduct occurred. We do not view as unreasonable, even though it was rejected by the trial court, the prosecutor's contention that Tobin, by taking the stand and denying his involvement in the murder, opened the door to being cross-examined concerning the possibility that Pontbriant's wounds reflected a particular martial arts technique with which he was familiar. ( Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 754 [the permissible scope of the cross-examination of a testifying defendant generally is very wide]; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 495 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249] [merely asking a question to which an objection is sustained does not itself show misconduct].) Indeed, in their briefs, defendants mischaracterize the record. The trial court never ruled that the prosecutor's questions were improper, as asserted by defendants. The court excluded evidence concerning the subject of the instant death technique from the prosecution's case-in-chief, but overruled the objection to the prosecutor's first question and permitted Tobin's answer (that he had not heard of the term instant death) to stand. What the court made clear in its subsequent ruling outside the presence of the jury was that the prosecution would not be permitted to attempt to impeach Tobin's answer by demonstrating that he did know of the term instant death. Therefore, because Tobin had testified he had no knowledge of the instant death technique, there simply was no further area of inquiry regarding that subject open to the prosecutor. The trial court also informed the jury that it was not to rely upon the prosecutor's question as evidence that the instant death technique existed or that Tobin was aware of it. For these same reasons, even if we were to conclude that the prosecutor had engaged in misconduct, any such misconduct could not have been prejudicial. The only evidence admitted at the trial on this issue was that Tobin had not heard of the term instant death. Contrary to defendants' assertions that the jury would have been unable to follow the trial court's admonition not to consider the prosecutor's questions as evidence that there was such a technique and that Tobin was familiar with it, we presume the jury followed the court's instructions not to do so. ( Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 610.) There is no reasonable probability that, had the prosecutor not broached this subject with Tobin, the jury would have reached a different verdict, nor can we conclude that these two brief questions (which were followed by a negative response by Tobin and the trial court's proper admonition concerning the applicable law) denied defendants a fair trial. (27) In arguing that the jury was prejudiced by the prosecutor's questions, Letner's reliance upon our decision in People v. Wagner (1975) 13 Cal.3d. 612, 619-620 [119 Cal.Rptr. 457, 532 P.2d 105], is misplaced. That case involved a situation in which a prosecutor attempted to impeach the defendant's testimony regarding his good moral character by asking a series of highly detailed questions concerning asserted specific criminal activities (not felony convictions) by the defendant for which the prosecutor offered no independent evidence. The defendant answered in the negative to each question. ( Id. at pp. 616-617.) We concluded that attempting to rebut the defendant's character evidence in such a manner was improper, and that the impropriety was not cured by the circumstance that the defendant had answered no to each question and the trial court later had admonished the jury not to view the attorneys' statements as evidence. As we observed, a prosecutor may not interrogate witnesses solely `for the purpose of getting before the jury the facts inferred therein, together with the insinuations and suggestions they inevitably contained, rather than for the answers which might be given.' ( Id. at p. 619.) In addition, we noted that the subject matter at issue in Wagner (the defendant's credibility) was crucial to resolving the charges, and that the evidence in favor of and against a finding of guilt was closely balanced. ( Id. at p. 621.) The extent and possible effect of any prosecutorial impropriety in the present case was in no way comparable: the questioning was not part of an attempt to impeach Tobin's asserted good moral character; the subject matter of the questions (whether Tobin knew of the instant death technique) did not focus upon specific instances of unproved criminal activity or involve a critical aspect of the trial; the extent of the questioning was quite limited; the evidence of defendants' guilt or innocence was not closely balanced; and it does not appear that the prosecutor asked the questions without regard to what Tobin's answers might be. Accordingly, we discern no reasonable probability that the questions were prejudicial. The possibility that Letner was prejudiced is even more remote, in light of the circumstance that the prosecutor never asked any questions concerning Letner's knowledge of the technique. Turning next to the prosecutor's observation during argument to the jury that stabbing someone in a way that cuts the blood vessels in the victim's neck is something known to cause what's called `instant death,' we note that defendants did not object at trial to this comment. An objection on the ground that, for example, the argument referred to facts not in evidence (e.g., defendants' knowledge of the instant death technique), together with a request for an admonition, would not have been futile or ineffective. Therefore, defendants have forfeited their appellate claim of misconduct. In any event, no misconduct occurred. The prosecution's pathology expert did, in fact, testify that had both of Pontbriant's carotid arteries been severed by the stab wounds in her neck, a loss of consciousness would have been very quick, almost immediate. [¶] A death depends on how you define death. [¶] But the actual cessation of brain function and the heart action may have taken several minutes to occur. The expert also agreed that the severing of the spinal cord in the area in which Pontbriant was cut could cause death to occur basically, instantly. The prosecutor reasonably could argue from this testimony that the wounds inflicted upon Pontbriant could have caused what the expert called an instant death, and that this was evidence of a calculated murder rather than of merely haphazard actions. Even were we to conclude the prosecutor improperly was attempting to refer the jury back to the cross-examination of Tobin regarding the subject of the instant death technique, and to argue facts not in evidence (that there was a martial arts technique called instant death with which Tobin was familiar), there is no possibility of prejudice. Such an oblique reference to a subject that had been mentioned very briefly in the midst of trial more than a week earlier was not likely even to attract the jury's notice. Moreover, as mentioned above, we presume that, even had the jury recognized the reference, it would have followed the trial court's instructions not to consider the attorneys' statements and questions as evidence of any fact. Accordingly, there is no reasonable possibility that in the absence of the prosecutor's comment the jury would have reached a verdict more favorable to defendants, nor were they deprived of a fair trial.