Opinion ID: 2680033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Statements Against Interest

Text: [¶12] “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” M.R. Evid. 801(c). In other words, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered at trial to prove a relevant fact. See id. Subject to certain exceptions, hearsay is inadmissible in a court proceeding. M.R. Evid. 802. One of the exceptions to this rule applies when a party offers in evidence certain statements of an unavailable witness when those statements are against the declarant’s interest: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness [as provided in M.R. Evid. 804(a)]: .... (3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another or to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered in a criminal case is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. A statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a defendant or other person implicating both the declarant and the accused, is not within this exception. M.R. Evid. 804(b) (emphasis added). 7 [¶13] Here, the statements of Larsen’s son were not made in court and were offered to prove the truth of the matters that he asserted in those statements: that he and another person met on property that had been owned by Larsen’s former employer, used a key to enter a Club building, took away materials from that building, and stored them at the home of Larsen’s friend. See M.R. Evid. 801(c). Accordingly, the statements constituted hearsay and were not admissible unless an exception to the hearsay rule applied. See M.R. Evid. 802. [¶14] To determine whether the statement-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule could apply, the threshold question is whether Larsen’s son was unavailable as a witness. See M.R. Evid. 804(a), (b). On this point, the parties do not dispute that, because he asserted his privilege against self-incrimination, see U.S. Const. amend. V, Larsen’s son was unavailable for purposes of this hearsay exception, see M.R. Evid. 804(a)(1) (“‘Unavailability as a witness’ includes [a] situation in which the declarant is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement.”). [¶15] Next, we consider whether the statement-against-interest exception applies in the circumstances of this case. The plain language of the exception provides that the exception does not apply if, in a criminal case, the statement implicates both the unavailable declarant and the defendant: “A statement or 8 confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a[n] . . . other person implicating both the declarant and the accused, is not within this exception.” M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The proffered statements of Larsen’s son fall directly within that description. Thus, the statements were not admissible against Larsen pursuant to the Maine Rules of Evidence. See State v. Guyette, 2012 ME 9, ¶ 17, 36 A.3d 916. [¶16] Because Larsen did not draw the court’s attention to this evidentiary basis for exclusion, however, and instead argued that the admission of the statements would violate his constitutional right of confrontation, see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), we next address the constitutional considerations that formed the basis for the court’s evidentiary ruling.