Opinion ID: 396493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Due Process and Fair Play

Text: 33 Notwithstanding the apparent intent of § 504, appellees contend that due process and fair play require us to reject FERC's construction of its jurisdictional mandate. They note that, unlike the final adjustment order, the interim order issued here preceded the quasi-adjudicative proceedings held by DOE. The constitutional challenge, then, is levelled at the ex parte interim order of adjustment relief. 34 The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Appellees do not question that DOE afforded them a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the issuance of the final order. Like the final order, the interim order is subject to judicial review after the DOE quasi-adjudicative process is completed. 47 Because the factual issues underlying the grant of interim relief are generally the same as those underlying the final order, a record adequate for meaningful review of one will be adequate for review of the other. 48 35 The focus of constitutional concern must then be on the timing of appellees' opportunity to contest the interim order. Analysis requires consideration of, inter alia, the private interest that will be affected by the official action ... and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used.... 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903. 36 The private interest at stake here is qualified by the remedies available to objecting parties during the pendency of an interim order. If the interim exception causes special hardship, inequity, or unfair distribution of burdens, 49 an adversely affected party can petition for an adjustment and interim relief under § 504. Where enforcement of an interim order would cause irreparable injury, an objecting party may obtain a stay from DOE pending judicial review of the final order. 50 Thus, only where the effect of an interim adjustment is neither irreparable nor unduly burdensome will an affected party be obliged to await a final order before receiving meaningful review. In light of the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), we do not find this scheme inconsistent with due process. 51 37 Finally, appellees contend that FERC's construction of § 504 gives applicants for exception relief an opportunity for review unavailable to parties objecting to the exception, and thereby violates Congress's concern for fair play. We disagree. 38 An applicant for exception relief has a qualitatively greater and more direct interest in the DOE decision than an objecting party. An applicant claims to be suffering a special hardship, but objecting parties' interests are contingent, shared, and indirect. 52 Moreover, the legislative history of the DOE Act suggests that Congress was more concerned with erroneous denials than erroneous grants of exception relief. 53 Under these circumstances, we find the regulatory scheme to be both fair and rational. 39 The judgment of the district court is reversed, and FERC's order dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction is ordered reinstated. 40 So ordered.