Opinion ID: 2600342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charging Documents

Text: ¶ 9 In the instant case, Mr. Williams was charged with felony unlawful possession of a controlled substance under former RCW 69.50.401(d) (1998). [2] In analyzing the sufficiency of the charging information, we must first address whether the penalty classification (class A, B, C felony or misdemeanor) of bail jumping is an essential element of that crime. In Washington, a charging document must allege facts which support every element of the offense and must adequately identify the crime charged. State v. Leach, 113 Wash.2d 679, 689, 782 P.2d 552 (1989). The rationale behind including essential elements rather than only statutory elements is to give the accused proper notice of the nature of the crime so that the accused can prepare an adequate defense. State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d 93, 101, 812 P.2d 86 (1991). However, we first look to the statute, because the legislature defines elements of crimes, to determine the elements `that the prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.' Miller, 156 Wash.2d at 27, 123 P.3d 827 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 559 (8th ed.2004)). ¶ 10 Bail jumping is defined in RCW 9A.76.170. [3] [T]he elements of bail jumping are met if the defendant: (1) was held for, charged with, or convicted of a particular crime; (2) was released by court order or admitted to bail with the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance; and, (3) knowingly failed to appear as required. State v. Pope, 100 Wash.App. 624, 627, 999 P.2d 51 (2000) (emphasis added). ¶ 11 There is a fundamental split between two divisions of the Court of Appeals regarding the adequacy of bail jumping charging information. Division Two holds that the classification of the underlying crime is an element of bail jumping. State v. Ibsen, 98 Wash.App. 214, 217, 989 P.2d 1184 (1999). Under this analysis, RCW 9A.76.170(1) must be read in conjunction with RCW 9A.76.170(3) where the definition of bail jumping and its possible penalties are both essential elements of the crime. Division One, by contrast, recently held that the classification of the underlying crime is not a statutory element of bail jumping. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 132 Wash.App. 622, 132 P.3d 1128 (2006). The court in Gonzalez-Lopez specifically rejected the Ibsen court's analogy, which compared bail jumping to the degrees of theft in welfare fraud. Id. at 634, 132 P.3d 1128. The Gonzalez-Lopez court held that all of the elements of bail jumping are clearly articulated in RCW 9A.76.170(1) and that penalties mentioned in RCW 9A.76.170(3) are a separate and subsequent judicial determination. Id. at 636, 132 P.3d 1128. ¶ 12 We agree with the reasoning set forth by Division One. An examination of the statute demonstrates that the actual elements of the crime are clearly set forth in the first section, without reference to the penalty section. ¶ 13 Under Washington law, to be convicted of bail jumping, the defendant must be charged with a particular [underlying] crime. Pope, 100 Wash.App. at 627, 999 P.2d 51. Using this standard, the courts have invalidated a number of generic charging attempts. For example, in Ibsen, 98 Wash.App. at 215, 989 P.2d 1184 (quoting CP at 1), the information simply noted that the defendant had `been admitted to bail with the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance' in court. This generic description was found constitutionally insufficient because it did not allow the accused to plan a defense. Id. Another instance of insufficient charging language is found in State v. Green, 101 Wash.App. 885, 888, 6 P.3d 53 (2000), where the information charged only Cause No. 98-1-00123-2 rather than name the particular crime. Finally, in Pope, 100 Wash. App. at 629-30, 999 P.2d 51, the court held that information that merely stated that the defendant had failed to appear `regarding a felony matter' (emphasis omitted) was constitutionally insufficient. ¶ 14 The current case is unlike the examples above. Here, the charging language depicting Williams' crime was sufficient because it identified the particular crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and alleged a corresponding felony bail jumping violation. See supra note 1; see also State v. Spiers, 119 Wash.App. 85, 89-91, 79 P.3d 30 (2003) (defendant received adequate notice when charging document only alleged he failed to appear for a class B or C felony). ¶ 15 Additionally, when a charging document is challenged for the first time on appeal, it must be construed liberally. Thus, we need only determine if the necessary facts appear in any form in the charging document. Ibsen, 98 Wash.App. at 216, 989 P.2d 1184. The test for the liberal interpretation of the document is: (1) do the necessary facts appear in any form, or by fair construction can they be found, in the charging document; and, if so, (2) can the defendant show that he or she was nonetheless actually prejudiced by the inartful language which caused a lack of notice? Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 105-06, 812 P.2d 86. ¶ 16 Applying this standard, we find that the charging information, construed liberally, was sufficient under the first prong of the Kjorsvik test. Id. at 105, 812 P.2d 86. The charging information clearly stated that Williams was charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, a felony and as a result, he faced felony bail jumping. CP at 86. Due to this twice referenced felony charge, Williams cannot point to any lack of notice due to the inartful phrasing of the information. ¶ 17 The second prong of the Kjorsvik test allows the court to look outside the information to determine whether the defendant suffered actual prejudice. 117 Wash.2d at 106, 812 P.2d 86. The court notes that [i]t is possible that other circumstances of the charging process can reasonably inform the defendant in a timely manner of the nature of the charges. Id. In the instant case, the information was accompanied by a statement of probable cause, which detailed the 1.3 grams of cocaine found on Williams, along with several hundred dollars. Williams was not actually prejudiced because he could adequately prepare his defense. He also received proper notice, which is the ultimate goal of the charging documents. We affirm the ruling of appellate court and hold that the penalty classification of bail jumping is not an essential element of that crime and is not necessary for charging information to be sufficient.