Opinion ID: 75633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reynaldo rodriguez's motions to sever

Text: 67 Reynaldo Rodriguez, a former Miami police officer, contends that the district court erred by denying his motion, made pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 14, to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants. The ground urged in the motion was that separate trials were needed so that Rodriguez could obtain and utilize the testimony of co-defendants Francisco Novaton and Cuni. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge who recommended that it be denied without prejudice. Rodriguez filed objections to that report and recommendation and filed a renewed motion for severance. That renewed motion was supported by affidavits from Francisco Novaton and Cuni. After reviewing the Novaton and Cuni affidavits, the district court found that severance was not justified because the affidavits did not contain specific, exonerative facts and because the interest of judicial economy and preference for trying co-defendants together outweighed any prejudice to Rodriguez. Rodriguez again moved for severance during the trial, and the district court again denied his motion. 68 Motions for severance are governed by Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule requires a trial court to balance the rights of the defendants and the government to a trial that is free from the prejudice that may result from joint trials against the public's interest in efficient and economic administration of justice. United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 649 (11th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, because of the well-settled principle that it is preferred that persons who are charged together should also be tried together, particularly in conspiracy cases, the denial of a motion for severance will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cobb, 185 F.3d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation omitted). Furthermore, [a]ppellate courts are reluctant to second-guess trial court refusals to grant a severance, and therefore, in order to show an abuse of discretion, a defendant must satisfy the heavy burden of demonstrating compelling prejudice from the denial of a motion to sever. Pepe, 747 F.2d at 650-51; see also Cobb, 185 F.3d at 1197 (noting that defendant must show specific and compelling prejudice in order to justify severance). 69 This Circuit's framework for analyzing a motion to sever is well-established. We have recognized that a defendant first must demonstrate: 70 (1) a bona fide need for the testimony; (2) the substance of the desired testimony; (3) the exculpatory nature and effect of the desired testimony; and (4) that the codefendant would indeed have testified at a separate trial. 71 Cobb, 185 F.3d at 1197 (citations and quotations omitted). See also United States v. DeSimone, 660 F.2d 532, 539 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (same); Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017, 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1970). If a defendant makes such a showing, then: 72 [A] court must still (1) examine the significance of the testimony in relation to the defendant's theory of the case; (2) assess the extent of prejudice caused by the absence of the testimony; (3) consider judicial administration and economy; and (4) give weight to the timeliness of the motion. 73 Cobb, 185 F.3d at 1197 (citations and quotations omitted). See also DeSimone, 660 F.2d at 540 (same). It is within this framework that we review whether the district court properly denied Rodriguez's motions for severance. 74 This Court's cases addressing severance motions have often looked hard at the substance of the affidavits proffered by the co-defendant who purportedly would testify in a separate trial. For example, in Pepe, the Court considered the effect of affidavits proffered by a co-defendant of Albert Chink Facchione in which the co-defendant stated that he could testify that Facchione had not conspired with him to carry out the act charged in the indictment and had not, to his knowledge, engaged in wrongdoing. Pepe, 747 F.2d at 650. After reviewing the proffered testimony, the Court concluded that: 75 [The testimony] consisted almost exclusively of bare exculpatory denials, devoid of any specific exonerative facts. . . . [T]he testimony was of dubious credibility because it was in no way contrary to [the co-defendant's] own interests. Moreover, judicial economy weighed heavily against severance in this complex case. We thus conclude that Facchione failed to carry his heavy burden of showing compelling prejudice and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever his case. 76 Id. at 651 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). See also DeSimone, 660 F.2d at 540 (denying motion where affidavits contained no specific and exonerative facts, but instead only self-serving, conclusory allegations). Therefore, statements concerning the testimony that would become available by severing trials must be specific and exonerative, rather than conclusory or self-serving, in order to justify severance. 77 This point is borne out in those cases in which we have found failure to sever to be an abuse. In United States v. DiBernardo, we held that a district court correctly granted a motion to sever where a co-defendant proffered an affidavit stating he would testify that he had acted alone with regard to much of the charged criminal activity, and that the defendants who were seeking severance had no knowledge of his actions. 880 F.2d 1216, 1228 (11th Cir. 1989). We noted that such evidence incriminated the affiant and was significant to the defense because it would have specifically rebutted a crucial element of the prosecution's case. Id.; see also Cobb,185 F.3d at 1198-99 (finding an abuse of discretion where a co-defendant would have testified that he had not shared the proceeds of a bank robbery with the defendant, and where only evidence against defendant was testimony by a witness who allegedly saw defendant receive share of proceeds). 78 Our review of the affidavits submitted in support of Rodriguez's motion convince us that they do not contain the type of specific and exonerative facts which would establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motions. Almost all of the statements contained in the affidavits by Novaton and Cuni consist of conclusory denials of the charges in the indictment. For example, one such statement reads that Novaton would testify [t]hat REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ did not conspire with me, or to my knowledge with anyone else, to possess with intent to distribute cocaine at any time in 1993, as alleged in Count One of the Superseding Indictment in this case. This is precisely the type of self-serving statement which we have found to be insufficient to show compelling prejudice requiring a new trial. 79 Other than conclusory statements, which are neither contrary to the affiants' penal interests nor contain any other indicia of credibility, the only factual statement contained in either affidavit is one statement by Novaton attempting to explain the frequency of Rodriguez's visits to the Novaton residence. Novaton's affidavit says [t]hat on the occasions when REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ visited my residence . . . in 1993, he did so to eat, use the bathroom facilities, engage in Santeria worship, and for other personal reasons. He did not engage in any illegal narcotics activity in my residence at any time. This lone statement in no way incriminates the affiant, and it does not present the type of specific and exonerative facts necessary to require a severance. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rodriguez's motions for severance, particularly in light of the substantial systemic interest in handling this complex, conspiracy case in one trial (which lasted two months). 80 C. REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ'S RULE 806 MOTION TO ADMIT CO-DEFENDANTS' AFFIDAVITS IN ORDER TO IMPEACH CO-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY STATEMENTS 81 Reynaldo Rodriguez also contends that the district court erred by not permitting him to introduce the Novaton and Cuni affidavits submitted in support of his motions for severance as evidence at trial in order to impeach co-conspirator hearsay statements by them which were admitted. Rodriguez argues that the affidavits were admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 806, which provides that: 82 When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E) [which includes co-conspirator statements], has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified at trial as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination. 83 Fed. R. Evid. 806 (bracketed material added). 84 The government responds that the affidavits were not admissible under Rule 806 because they were not inconsistent with any of the co-conspirator statements admitted at trial. Although acknowledging that numerous co-conspirator statements were admitted, mostly in the form of taped conversations from the wiretaps, the government argues that those statements were not admissions of Rodriguez's complicity in the co-conspirators' crimes, but instead were statements that were part of the commission of the conspiracy and other underlying crimes. Because, it contends, no inconsistent statements were admitted, there was nothing to be impeached by the affidavits. 85 After the parties presented oral arguments in this case, we requested that Rodriguez provide the Court with supplemental briefing on the Rule 806 issue providing us with record cites to the co-conspirator statements admitted at trial which, in his view, would have been impeached by the Novaton and Cuni affidavits that he sought to have admitted. While attempting to respond to our request, Rodriguez discovered that although approximately 100 tape recordings (primarily of conversations intercepted by wiretaps) and accompanying transcripts and translations had been introduced as exhibits at trial, none of those exhibits were included in the record on appeal. 86 After we were informed by Rodriguez that the record on appeal was incomplete, we ordered the parties to discuss the missing portions of the record, and to tell us about the status of the record. In response, we were informed by Rodriguez that neither the district court clerk's office, nor our clerk's office, knew where the missing trial exhibits were. Rodriguez further indicated that the United States Attorney's Office was unaware of the location of the tapes and transcripts, and did not have duplicates of those trial exhibits, although the DEA apparently had at least some duplicate tapes, but no transcripts. 87 Although Rodriguez's counsel attempted to reconstruct some of the missing transcripts based on records he had, the Assistant United States Attorneys working on this appeal were initially unable or unwilling to stipulate to the authenticity of those transcripts because they had not been involved in the trial of the case. All of the prosecutors who participated in the trial have left the United States Attorney's Office. After being informed of this situation, our clerk's office inquired of the district court clerk's office concerning the trial exhibits, and was informed that the voluminous trial exhibits had been returned to the United States Attorney's Office at some time after the conclusion of trial, and that the district court clerk's office had not maintained copies of the exhibits nor had it included any of the exhibits in the record on appeal. 88 We urged the parties to do more to solve the problem of the missing exhibits. Later, we were informed that the United States Attorney's Office had located some tapes from which the missing transcripts might be reconstructed. Hoping to avoid the necessity of an evidentiary hearing, which would obviously require a remand, we directed counsel for Reynaldo Rodriguez and the government to meet and attempt to reach a stipulation about the contents of the missing exhibits. They made some progress but were not entirely successful. Some reconstructed transcripts have now been submitted to us, and the counsel for Rodriguez and the government have stipulated that those transcripts are true and correct copies of some of the missing trial exhibits. Rodriguez insists, however, that not all of the transcripts have been reconstructed and submitted to us, and apparently contends that some of the missing ones are or may be relevant to his Rule 806 issue. Absent any basis for concluding to the contrary, we will assume for present purposes that is true. 89 It is against this background that we are asked to decide whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court not to admit into evidence the two affidavits that Reynaldo Rodriguez wanted to use to impeach co-conspirator statements contained in transcripts of conversations that were admitted into evidence. In a recent case, we recognized that under some circumstances a district court's failure to admit affidavit statements which would impeach co-conspirator statements admitted at trial is reversible error. See United States v. Grant, 256 F.3d 1146, 1152-1156 (11th Cir. 2001). We held that under Rule 806, [t]he test is whether the out-of-court statements would have been admissible for impeachment purposes had the co-conspirator statements been delivered from the witness stand by the co-conspirator himself, not as hearsay about what he said during the conspiracy but as contemporaneous in-court statements. Id. at 1154. We are loath to decide this issue without assurance that every effort, including an inquiry by the district court, has been made to reconstruct all the missing trial exhibits that are relevant to the issue. 90 Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure places the burden on appellants to ensure that the record on appeal is properly prepared and forwarded to the court of appeals. However, in this case it appears that the problems with the record are not due to any lack of diligence or care on the part of Rodriguez. He made a timely request to the district court clerk's office that the entire record be included in the record on appeal. Through no fault of his own, that was not done, and the relevant trial exhibits were instead returned to the government. Also, through no fault of Rodriguez, the government subsequently misplaced those exhibits. 91 Under these circumstances, we will not hold Rodriguez accountable for the deficiencies in the record. 92 We previously have considered what to do when an incomplete record on appeal is supplied to us, and have stated that [i]f the defendant is represented by the same attorney at trial and on appeal, a new trial may be granted only if the defendant can show that the failure to record and preserve a specific portion of the trial visits a hardship on him and prejudices his appeal. 2 United States v. Medina, 90 F.3d 459, 462-63 (11th Cir. 1996). A criminal defendant's entitlement to a new trial based on the incompleteness of the record, however, is premised upon the district court's inability to reconstruct the record. United States v. Cashwell, 950 F.2d 699, 704 (11th Cir. 1992). A reconstructed record, even if not identical to the original trial transcript and exhibits, will provide a defendant with sufficient due process as long as it can accord effective appellate review of the issues raised on appeal by the defendant. Id. at 703. 93 In this case, the district court should make findings about whether there are in fact any missing trial exhibits that are relevant to Reynaldo Rodriguez's Rule 806 issue. If it finds that there are, the district court may be able to reconstruct, as provided in Rule 10(e) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, any missing trial exhibits that are relevant to the Rule 806 issue, which Rodriguez and the government have not been able to supply through stipulation. The court should at least attempt to do so. Therefore, we will remand this part of the case involving Reynaldo Rodriguez to the district court in order for it to make findings about whether there are any missing trial exhibits that are relevant to the Rule 806 issue, and for it to attempt to reconstruct any that are relevant. See United States v. Taylor, 607 F.2d 153, 154 (5th Cir. 1979) (remanding for reconstruction of trial transcript); United States v. Preciado-Cordobas, 923 F.2d 159, 160-61 (11th Cir. 1991) (remanding for reconstruction of closing arguments). 94 On remand, the district court may consider whatever evidence or testimony it sees fit for these purposes. Preciado-Cordobas, 923 F.2d at 160-61. Because the only issues remaining relate to Reynaldo Rodriguez's Rule 806 argument, the district court need only concern itself with the portions of any missing trial exhibits that contain co-conspirator statements by Cuni and Francisco Novaton which Rodriguez contends were impeached by their proffered affidavits. 95 Although remanding this case for findings and for a reconstruction of any relevant missing trial exhibits has the unfortunate effect of prolonging this already protracted litigation, we see no alternative which will provide Rodriguez with the due process protection to which he is entitled. Remanding the case will also give the district court an opportunity to reconsider its ruling on the Rule 806 issue in light of our Grant decision, which it did not have at the time of trial. We imply no view on whether Grant controls this case, but if the district court after reconstructing the missing transcripts and reconsidering the issue in light of Grant does decide that Rodriguez is entitled to a new trial, it should grant one. 96 On the other hand, if the district court finds that there are missing trial exhibits, which it cannot reconstruct, that are relevant to Reynaldo Rodriguez's Rule 806 issue, that court should decide in the first instance whether the missing exhibits prejudice Rodriguez by denying him effective appellate review within the meaning of our Medina and Cashwell decisions. Whatever the district court decides about either or both issues, the losing party may appeal. In light of that possibility, specific factfindings by the district court will be appreciated by this Court. D. ROSELL'S ABSENCE FROM TRIAL 97 Next, we turn to Appellant Ramon Rosell's contention that the district court erred by going forward with his trial even though he was absent due to health problems. Rosell argues that the court should have either granted a continuance, severed him from the trial, or granted a mistrial in light of his absence. His position is that the court's failure to do so resulted in the violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. We agree. 98 The eight-week-long trial in this case started on September 28, 1994. Rosell was in attendance at the trial from that time up until November 10, 1994. During a break in the late afternoon of that day, Rosell became ill and collapsed in the corridor of the courthouse. Emergency services were called, and Rosell was taken to the hospital by ambulance. After the district court was informed about these events, the court stated that it did not want to continue with trial if Rosell was unavailable and wished to attend. Because the evidence being presented by the prosecution at that time had nothing to do with Rosell's part of the case, however, his counsel agreed to go forward and waived Rosell's right to be present. 99 On November 14, the next day of trial, Rosell's counsel informed the court that Rosell initially had been hospitalized, but that he had been released an hour before the trial reconvened that day. Again because the evidence was unrelated to Rosell, his counsel waived Rosell's right to be present and requested permission to allow Rosell to stay home. The court agreed. 100 The next day, Rosell's counsel reported to the court that Rosell was physically unable to participate in the trial, and provided a letter to the court from Rosell's doctor concerning his condition. Rosell's counsel also consented to the government's discussing Rosell's condition with his doctor. For the first time, Rosell's counsel indicated to the court that a continuance might be necessary as portions of the trial relevant to Rosell's part of the case were about to begin. Counsel indicated that he was willing to cooperate and allow the trial to go forward with respect to matters unrelated to Rosell, but reiterated that Rosell did not waive his right to be present for aspects of the trial germane to him. 101 The following morning, Rosell was still absent from the trial. The government reported that it had spoken with Rosell's doctor, and that the doctor did not have enough information to know whether Rosell could attend the trial. The doctor indicated that an X-ray would be necessary in order to determine Rosell's condition. Rosell's counsel informed the court that he had difficulties communicating with his client because of the pain which Rosell was suffering and because of his medication. Rosell's counsel moved for continuance at that point in time so that an X-ray could be taken in order to determine the severity of Rosell's condition. The district court denied the motion for continuance finding that, based on the information that it had at that time, Rosell's absence was voluntary. The court did say that Rosell could present evidence to show the contrary. 102 The district court also denied Rosell a two-hour continuance so that his doctor could be brought into court and questioned about Rosell's condition. The court indicated that Rosell's counsel could skip the examination of the next witness if he needed to try to get more information about his client's condition. Counsel resisted that option, however, because he had been told that information relevant to Rosell would be brought out during the cross-examination of that witness. Rosell's counsel then requested a continuance of an hour and twenty minutes so that he could go to his client's home, and attempt to bring him to the courthouse so the judge could see his condition. The court denied that request. Rosell then made a motion for a mistrial, which the district court denied. 103 Later that afternoon, Rosell attended the trial for approximately an hour and twenty minutes. His counsel informed the court that he and Rosell's brother had to carry Rosell into court. Counsel informed the court that Rosell felt dizzy and uncomfortable as a result of the pain he suffered and the pain killers and other medications which he was taking, and that Rosell was sleeping fourteen to sixteen hours per day. Rosell's counsel also informed the court that he had been unable to have meaningful conversations with Rosell concerning the case since the day on which Rosell collapsed and was carried away by ambulance. Rosell's counsel also proffered Rosell for any questions that the judge might have concerning his condition, but the court indicated that it had no questions. Rosell confirmed under oath his counsel's representations concerning his condition and his inability to have meaningful conversations with his attorney about the case. After this presentation, Rosell's counsel informed the court that Rosell had another doctor's appointment later that afternoon, and requested a continuance until the following morning. Alternatively, he moved for a mistrial. The district court denied both motions. 104 On Thursday, November 17, Rosell's attorney informed the court that Rosell had been admitted to the hospital the previous evening, and that it was his understanding Rosell would be hospitalized for two or three days. The court noted that the situation was problematic, but determined that the trial should go forward given that it was the last day of evidence in an eight-week trial. The court noted that this decision might ultimately require that a mistrial be declared. The court nonetheless denied Rosell's motion for a continuance. 105 Later in the day, Rosell's counsel was forced to go forward with his defense case despite his client's absence from the trial. As part of his case, Rosell's attorney called and examined several witnesses, including the government agents who had monitored the wiretaps. Rosell remained hospitalized and absent from trial that day and on the following day when his counsel closed his defense case and when closing arguments began. Again, the district court denied his counsel's motions for a continuance or a new trial. 106 On the following Monday, two days after the conclusion of Rosell's defense, and after closing arguments had begun, Rosell returned to court. Thereafter, the jury convicted him of all three counts with which he was charged. Rosell made a post-trial motion for a new trial based, in part, on the district court's denial of his repeated motions for a continuance or mistrial as a result of his absence. The district court denied that motion. In doing so, the court stated that even assuming Rosell's absence was involuntary, he was not entitled to a new trial because his counsel had been present at trial and there had been no showing of prejudice resulting from Rosell's absence.
107 We review for clear error a district court's determination of whether a defendant's absence from trial was voluntary or involuntary. United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). If the court properly found the right [to be present] waived, we consider whether the court abused its discretion in concluding that there was on balance a controlling public interest to continue the trial in the defendant's absence. Id. Finally, if the court erred in continuing trial in the defendant's absence, we ask whether the error was harmless. Id. The determination of whether a constitutional error is harmless presents a mixed question of fact and law. . . . In reviewing mixed questions of fact and law the court is free to substitute its own judgment for that of the district court. Hall v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 945, 947 (11th Cir. 1986).
108 The first question which we must address in order to decide whether Rosell is entitled to a new trial because of his absence on three full days (November 15, 17, and 18) and most of a fourth day (November 16), is whether his absence was voluntary or involuntary. 3 Bradford, 237 F.3d at 1311. The parties have conflicting views on whether the district court ever answered this question. The government points out that the district court made a finding on November 16 that, based on the evidence that had been presented, it would treat Rosell's absence as voluntary. Rosell points out that the district court assumed for purposes of his motion for new trial that the absence was involuntary. 109 The district court never explicitly revisited its November 16 finding that Rosell was voluntarily absent, but the court made that finding before it was provided with much information about Rosell's condition. It also made that finding before Rosell's second hospitalization, which occurred during his absence from the two days of trial while his defense was presented. It is not clear from the record that the district court found Rosell's entire absence voluntary. For example, in discussing whether to go forward without Rosell on November 17, the day that the presentation of Rosell's defense began, the district court acknowledged that a showing that Rosell was simply unable to attend might be possible and could result in a mistrial. At that time, the court made no mention of Rosell's absence being voluntary. Given that, we do not agree with the government that the district court found the entirety of Rosell's absence to be voluntary. 110 In light of the record, we are convinced that at least substantial portions of Rosell's absence were involuntary, and that any contrary finding by the district court would have been clearly erroneous. Whether Rosell was voluntarily absent during the time when he was at home, but in pain and highly medicated, is a difficult issue, and if those were the circumstances surrounding the entirety of Rosell's absence, then it might be difficult for us to conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding the absence voluntary - if that is what the court did or would do. However, at least during the periods of time when Rosell was hospitalized, which included both days on which his defense was presented, we find that Rosell was involuntarily absent from court, and that any contrary finding would be clearly erroneous. 111 The record makes it abundantly clear, and the government does not dispute, that Rosell's ailments during the last week of his trial were real. There is no contention that this is a case in which a defendant was faking an illness or otherwise attempting to scuttle a trial. Rosell attended seven weeks of this eight-week trial, and was absent only after collapsing in the courthouse and being carried away in an ambulance. He was hospitalized twice over a ten-day period. Even after Rosell became ill, his counsel cooperated commendably with the government and the district court and only moved for a continuance, or in the alternative a mistrial, after the evidence being presented began to directly impact Rosell's part of the case. Under these circumstances, and absent further evidence, which neither side has requested an opportunity to present, it would be clearly erroneous to find that Rosell's absence was not, at least in part, involuntary. 4
112 We now turn to whether the district court erred by not granting a continuance or a mistrial in light of Rosell's involuntary absence. The right of a criminal defendant to be present at trial has three bases: the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. See United States v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1995) (The right to be present during one's trial arises from the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and is codified at Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.). 113 The right to be present pursuant to the Confrontation Clause has been referred to as a trial right, and is less broad than the right afforded by the Due Process Clause or Rule 43. United States v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 954 (11th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has emphasized that a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987) (citation, quotation, and brackets omitted). Thus, this clause has the functional purpose [of] ensuring a defendant an opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 739, 107 S. Ct. at 2664. 114 The Due Process Clause, on the other hand, offers a criminal defendant a somewhat broader right to be present. See Boyd, 131 F.3d at 954. The Supreme Court described this right as follows: 115 The Court has assumed that, even in situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him, he has a due process right to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. . . . Although the Court has emphasized that this privilege of presence is not guaranteed when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow, . . . due process clearly requires that a defendant be allowed to be present to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence . . . . Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. 116 Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745, 107 S. Ct. at 2667 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-08, 54 S. Ct. 330, 332-33 (1934)). Similarly, this Court has stated that [t]he right of a criminal defendant to be present at all critical stages of his trial is a fundamental constitutional right. Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1260 n.49 (11th Cir. 1982). 117 On its face, Rule 43 seems to provide a right to be present at trial that is broader still. Subject to certain inapplicable exceptions (including voluntary absence), the rule mandates that [t]he defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a). Although we have noted that Congress' intent in enacting Rule 43 was to codify then-existing case law regarding a criminal defendant's right to be present, we have declined to determine the extent to which the rule and the constitutional sources of the right to be present overlap. Boyd, 131 F.3d at 953 n.3. 118 It is clear under the facts of this case that the full force of each of the three sources of the right to be present - the Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause, and Rule 43 - bears down on the district court's decision to continue the trial in Rosell's absence. The trial right aimed at ensuring effective examination of witnesses provided by the Confrontation Clause is implicated given that Rosell was absent during several days of trial while witnesses gave testimony against him. The Due Process Clause's guarantee of presence during all critical stages of a trial applies because Rosell was absent during both the government's case-in-chief relating to him as well as the presentation of his own defense case. Stages of a trial could hardly be more critical for a defendant. Finally, the portions of the trial Rosell missed were unquestionably stages subject to Rule 43's directive. Consequently, Rosell had a clear right to be present during the portions of the trial which were conducted over his protest in his absence, and the district court committed a constitutional and statutory error by denying him that right. 119 The existence of error does not end our inquiry, however, because courts have repeatedly held that the continuation of trial in absence of a defendant may be harmless. See, e.g., Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643, 646 (11th Cir. 1983) (Any error by reason of Finney's absence during trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.), overruled on other grounds, Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1986); Hall v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 945, 947-48 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Proffitt, 685 F.2d at 1260 n.49 ([O]nce the defendant has established a violation of that right [to be present] his conviction is unconstitutionally tainted and reversal is required unless the State proves the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.). 5 120 Under the circumstances of this case, the government has not carried its burden of proving that the unconstitutional continuation of trial in Rosell's absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In reaching the conclusion that the error was not harmless, we find important the particular parts of his trial that Rosell missed. Obviously, the more crucial the stage of trial, the less likely that a defendant's involuntary absence was harmless. On several occasions, this Court has found that a defendant's absence was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 953-54 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding harmless the defendant's absence during evidentiary hearing on motion for new trial); United States v. Brantley, 68 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding harmless defendant's unobjected-to absence during time when jury challenges were exercised); United States v. Harris, 908 F.2d 728, 739 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding harmless a defendant's short absence during closing argument where defendant had attorney present and did not object to proceeding); Hall v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 945, 947-48 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding harmless defendant's absence during non-substantive portion of jury qualification and during brief colloquy between judge and jury during deliberations); United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 652-54 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding harmless defendant's absence during portion of James hearing on admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay evidence); Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643, 645-46 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding harmless defendant's brief, voluntary absence during the examination of witnesses when the defendant went to the restroom). 121 None of those decisions, however, involved the absence of a defendant for the length of time involved in this case or during stages of a trial as critical as those missed by Rosell. 6 Unlike the previous cases in which we found a defendant's absence to be harmless, Rosell was denied the opportunity to assist his attorney in the cross-examination of several witnesses put on by the government and by some co-defendants. Rosell was unable to confront those witnesses in the courtroom and unable to observe the witnesses put on in his own defense or to suggest additional areas of inquiry his attorney might pursue with any of the witnesses who testified during his involuntary absence. He was also not present to discuss with his attorney whether additional witnesses should have been called. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the government has carried its burden of proving that proceeding with the trial during Rosell's involuntary absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 122 Two arguments put forward by the government on this issue do merit some discussion. One is its argument that Rosell suffered no prejudice from his absence because his attorney was present at trial and represented his interests. As a panel of our predecessor court previously noted, in many cases finding a defendant's involuntary absence at trial to have been harmless error, the court emphasizes the fact that while the defendant may have been absent, his attorney was present to protect his rights. United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066, 1080 (5th Cir. 1981). Although the presence of counsel is certainly a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant's absence was harmless, the right to be present at trial - grounded in the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause - is not a gossamer right inevitably swept away simply because a defendant is represented, in his absence, by counsel. The right to be present is distinct from the right to be represented by counsel. The right to be present would be hollow indeed if it was dependent upon the lack of representation by counsel. Furthermore, such a rule would ignore the fact that a client's active assistance at trial may be key to an attorney's effective representation of his interests. 123 Second, the government argues that Rosell has made an insufficient showing of prejudice, because he does not point to any issue that his counsel did not raise relevant to his defense. This argument, like the one we have just discussed, devalues the constitutional right to be present, and ignores the assistance that a defendant can provide to his counsel during trial. If we were to require that a defendant show with specificity how his presence might have changed the course or outcome of a trial, then the right to be present would cease to exist in many cases in which the evidence of guilt is strong. The right to be present at one's own trial is not that weak. And, of course, the government's argument would transfer the burden on the prejudice issue from it to the defendant. For these reasons, Rosell's rights under the Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause, and Rule 43 were violated by continuation of the trial over his protests while he was involuntarily absent during critical stages of the trial, and the government has not proven that the violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we remand for a new trial. E. THE BATSON CHALLENGE 124 Mercedes Novaton, Rosell, Jorge Lopez, Matamoros, Cuni, Reynaldo Rodriguez, and Leopoldo Rodriguez argue that the government violated the Equal Protection Clause by using its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). During jury selection, the government used six of its eight peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic jurors (the government did not exercise its other two challenges). 7 At the time that the government exercised its peremptory challenges, most or all of the appellants objected on Batson grounds. They argued to the district court that the government was striking Hispanic jurors because the appellants were of Hispanic descent. The district court rejected the appellants' Batson challenges, concluding that the appellants had not made a prima facie showing given that several Hispanic jurors were accepted by the government and that the appellants themselves had exercised peremptory challenges against Hispanic jurors. Nonetheless, the court permitted the government to offer a race-neutral explanation for each of its peremptory strikes if it chose to do so, and the government took the court up on its offer. 125 The government proffered race-neutral explanations for each of the six peremptory challenges it exercised. With respect to the first juror that the government struck, Ms. Jarp, the government had attempted to have her removed for cause because of her difficulty understanding English. When asked by the court whether she understood what was being said, Ms. Jarp had responded: Like I said, for me it is a little hard because I don't speak the language very well as everybody else, although she stated that she did not think that she had problems understanding the proceedings. The court declined to strike her for cause, and the government exercised its peremptory challenge. To explain its peremptory challenge of a second juror, Ms. Mason, the government stated that the juror had indicated that her son had been wrongfully arrested for possession of cocaine. 126 Next, the government struck Ms. Orsatelliz. The stated reason was that she was a social worker employed by Health and Rehabilitative Services. The government's fourth peremptory challenge was used against Ms. Michelsen. There was confusion among the attorneys as to whether Ms. Michelsen was Hispanic. The government stated that it had no knowledge of her being Hispanic, but certain defense attorneys stated that she was. The government said that although it did not know whether Ms. Michelsen was Hispanic, it would provide its race-neutral explanation, which is that Ms. Michelsen had previously accompanied a criminal defendant to his sentencing in order to hold his hand and give moral support. 127 The government's fifth peremptory strike was used against Ms. De La Roca. When challenged, the government explained that it struck Ms. De La Roca because she was friends with one of the defense attorneys, knew another defense attorney, and had previously worked for a judge who was prosecuted by federal authorities. The defense attorney with whom Ms. De La Roca claimed to be friends stated that although he knew her, he did not consider her a friend. Finally, the government struck Mr. Saenz. The government explained that [t]he basis for the Government's striking of Mr. Saenz [was] his age, lack of life experience, and the fact that when asked . . . [about] the influence of narcotics indicated he had friends who 'smoked weed.' Satisfied with the government's race-neutral explanations for all of its peremptory challenges, the district court denied the appellants' Batson motion. 1. Standard of Review 128 A district court's findings regarding whether a peremptory strike was exercised for a discriminatory reason largely involve credibility determinations and are therefore entitled to great deference. Thus, we review a district court's findings in this respect only for clear error. United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 2. The Batson Framework 129 In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), the Supreme Court recognized that a prosecutor violates a defendant's equal protection rights when he or she uses peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner in order to strike from the petit jury members of the defendant's race. Courts evaluate Batson objections under the following three-step procedure: 130 (1) the objector must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge is exercised on the basis of race; (2) the burden then shifts to the challenger to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question; and (3) the trial court must determine whether the objector has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 131 United States v. Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2001). 132 Our cases hold that the establishment of a prima facie case is an absolute precondition to further inquiry into the motivation behind the challenged strike. Central Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Lowder Realty Co., Inc., 236 F.3d 629, 636 (11th Cir. 2000). [T]he party objecting to a peremptory strike bears the burden of establishing facts sufficient to support an inference of racial discrimination. Id. However, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances in determining whether a prima facie case of discrimination has been established. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. Such circumstances include whether there is a pattern of strikes against jurors of a certain race, and the questions asked by the prosecutor during voir dire. Id. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. 133 This Court has cautioned, however, that the mere fact of striking a juror or a set of jurors of a particular race does not necessarily create an inference of racial discrimination. Lowder Realty, 236 F.3d at 636. Instead, [t]he number of persons struck takes on meaning only when coupled with other information such as the racial composition of the venire, the race of others struck, or the voir dire answers of those who were struck compared to the answers of those who were not struck. Id. at 636-37. The existence of a substantial disparity between the percentage of jurors of one race struck and the percentage of their representation on the jury may create such an inference of discrimination, whereas the unchallenged presence of jurors of a particular race on a jury substantially weakens the basis for a prima facie case of discrimination in the peremptory striking of jurors of that race. Id. at 6338. Courts reviewing the resolution of a Batson challenge give great deference to a district court's finding as to the existence of a prima facie case. Allen-Brown, 243 F.3d at 1296 (citations and quotations omitted). 134 If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, then the prosecution must proffer a race-neutral explanation for its strikes. The Supreme Court has stated that [t]he second step does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995). In explaining the language in Batson, the Court noted that [w]hat [Batson] means by a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection. Id. at 769, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. See also United States v. Cobb, 185 F.3d 1193, 1196 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999) (Under Batson, the reason for a peremptory strike that is challenged on race grounds does not have to be 'valid' in any sense other than race-neutral, nor does it have to relate to the case being tried.). 135 After a race-neutral explanation is offered, a court must then determine whether an equal protection violation has occurred. It is during the third step [of the Batson framework] that the persuasiveness of the justification [proffered by the prosecutor] becomes relevant - the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. 3. Application to This Case 136 It is somewhat unclear on this record whether the district court rejected the appellants' Batson objections based on their failure to establish a prima facie case, or whether it did so because, in light of all relevant circumstances including the government's race-neutral explanations for its strikes, it found that the appellants had not carried their burden of proving that the challenged strikes were purposely discriminatory. When the appellants first raised the Batson issue, after the prosecution had exercised its first two strikes against Hispanic jurors, the court indicated that they had not established a prima facie case requiring a race-neutral explanation. Nonetheless, it allowed the government to proffer such an explanation, and the court indicated that it accepted the government's explanation. The court again indicated after the third strike that it did not believe that the government was obligated to offer an explanation. However, after the appellants made their later Batson objections, the court no longer voiced any opinions about whether or not a prima facie case of discrimination had been established or whether the government was obligated to proffer its race-neutral explanations. Instead, the court listened to those explanations, as well as the arguments made by the appellants' attorneys, and then overruled the objections. 137 We do not believe that the judge abused his discretion by finding that the first two or three strikes by the government did not require a response from the government. However, in light of the fact that the judge decided to hear the prosecution's explanations before ruling on the final Batson objections, and given that the court eventually stopped indicating that the government was not obligated to proffer those explanations, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the district court found that the appellants had put forth a prima facie showing of discrimination when all of the government's peremptory strikes were considered together. It is only an assumption, because whether the court actually did so is far from clear. We will further assume that the assumed finding of a prima facie case was correct. 138 Even assuming all of this, the appellants are not entitled to relief because the district court did not commit clear error by denying the appellants' Batson objections in light of the government's proffered, race-neutral explanations for its peremptory strikes as well as the other relevant circumstances. The appellants' contention that the government's explanations were pretextual concern only two of the strikes - those against Ms. De La Roca and Ms. Orsatelliz. The appellants point out that although the government said that it struck Ms. De La Roca because she was friends with one of the defense attorneys and had worked for a judge who had been federally prosecuted, another non-Hispanic juror who was not dismissed had worked as a clerk in the state criminal courts and stated that he knew most of the people here. Furthermore, the appellants argue that even though Ms. Orsatelliz was dismissed because she was a social worker employed by the Health and Rehabilitative Services, and was therefore presumably liberal, three other jurors who worked for the Dade County Department of Education had not been struck even though their employment could also indicate that they were liberal. 139 These arguments do not persuade us that the district court committed clear error in finding that the prosecution's strikes were non-discriminatory. We have recognized that failing to strike a white juror who shares some traits with a struck [non-white juror] does not itself automatically prove the existence of discrimination. United States v. Stewart, 65 F.3d 918, 926 (11th Cir. 1995). That is certainly true where there are relevant differences between the struck jurors and the comparator jurors. Here there are such differences. Although a white juror who worked for the courts and knew the attorneys was not struck, the Hispanic juror with those traits who was struck also had the added problem, from the government's perspective, of having worked for a judge who had been prosecuted by the federal government. That additional aspect of the Hispanic juror's background could certainly lead a prosecutor to decide to exercise a peremptory strike against her, but not the other juror. 140 Similarly, the fact that three Department of Education employees were allowed to remain on the jury certainly does not indicate that the government lied when it said that the reason it struck another juror was that she was a social worker for another agency. The appellants have not shown that all reasonable prosecutors would have considered those positions equally liberal. 141 Moreover, we note that the district court was free to consider all other relevant circumstances, such as the fact that the government left several Hispanic jurors unchallenged and that the appellants themselves exercised peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic jurors, in deciding whether the appellants had carried their burden of proving that the government had committed an equal protection violation. On this record, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in reaching the conclusion that the government had not exercised its strikes in a manner that discriminated against Hispanics. 142 F. THE FAILURE TO PERMIT CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AGENTS CONCERNING UNRELATED INVESTIGATIONS 143 Appellants Reynaldo Rodriguez, Humberto Rodriguez, Mercedes Novaton, Leopoldo Rodriguez, Rosell, and Lopez contend that the district court committed reversible error by granting the government's motions in limine precluding them from cross-examining some of the agents about certain matters. Although the motions concerned four different agents, the appellants' arguments on appeal are limited to the preclusion of cross-examination of two of them - Detective Paez and Agent Lucas. First, the appellants maintain that they should have been permitted to cross-examine Paez about his involvement in the Miami River Cops Scandal. As a part of the investigation into that scandal, Paez had been suspended with pay from the police force for a four-month period in 1987. After the investigation, he was reinstated. No criminal charges were ever brought against Paez in connection with the scandal, although he was formally reprimanded for failing to document a conversation with an informant. 144 The appellants argued to the district court that cross-examination of Paez concerning this matter should be permitted because it could show bias or a motive to lie on his part. In particular, they argued that Paez had a cloud over his head at the Miami Police Department [as a result of the Miami River Cops Scandal] and was motivated to clear himself by testifying against another alleged dirty cop. Furthermore, the appellants represented to the district court that although Paez had been cleared six years before the trial in this case, they had information that there might be an ongoing investigation into the scandal, possibly implicating Paez. They believed that the government should have provided them with information concerning any such investigation, and that they should have been permitted to cross-examine Paez about it. 145 Second, the appellants argued to the district court that they should have been able to cross-examine Agent Lucas concerning an investigation that was pending against him at the time of trial. Lucas was investigated by the DEA in July 1993 after the agency received a letter alleging that he had stolen twenty-three kilograms of cocaine during a cocaine seizure. Lucas was cleared after the investigation. In June 1994, however, the same source that had written the letter made the same allegations about Lucas, and a second investigation was conducted. That investigation was pending when the trial in the trial of this case began. 146 After listening to the arguments of counsel, the district court granted the government's motions in limine to preclude cross-examination concerning the investigation of Paez and Lucas. The court felt that those investigations were irrelevant, and even if [they were] relevant, [their] probative value is outweighed by [their] prejudice. The court also thought that the defendants had made an insufficient showing concerning the existence of an ongoing investigation into Paez's involvement in the Miami River Cops Scandal to permit cross-examination (or additional discovery) in that regard. 147 We review the district court's evidentiary decisions only for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1992). The parties basically agree on the framework applicable to the questions presented by the government's motions in limine. To the extent that the appellants sought to attack Paez's and Lucas' credibility, Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence controlled. That rule permits a party, under certain circumstances, to challenge the credibility of a witness with questions concerning past acts reflecting on the witness' character for truthfulness. That rule provides: 148 Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility . . . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . . 149 Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). 150 Although Rule 608 provides a district court with discretion to admit such evidence, Rule 403 circumscribes the court's discretion by requiring the court to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice from it. Ad-Vantage Tel. Directory Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 37 F.3d 1460, 1464 (11th Cir. 1994). Rule 403 provides that: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. 151 In addition to the rules of evidence, courts have long recognized that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides a criminal defendant with a right to cross-examine witnesses. This Court has stated that: 152 The district court's discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination is subject . . . to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. The right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment includes the right to cross-examination. Cross-examination has traditionally been allowed for the purpose of impeaching or discrediting the witness . In particular, the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying has been labeled by the Supreme Court as an important function of the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination. 153 Lankford, 955 F.2d at 1548 (citations omitted). Furthermore, [c]ross-examination of a government 'star' witness is important, and a presumption favors free cross-examination on possible bias, motive, ability to perceive and remember, and general character for truthfulness. United States v. Phelps, 733 F.2d 1464, 1472 (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). However, the mere fact that [a defendant] sought to explore bias on the part of a prosecution witness does not automatically void the court's ability to limit cross-examination. United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994). Instead, a defendant is only entitled to cross-examine a witness if the information sought to be elicited [is] relevant. Id. (citations and quotations omitted); see also Phelps, 733 F.2d at 1472 (noting that cross-examination regarding potential bias must be relevant). 154 In light of these standards, we believe that the district court acted well within its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of Paez and Lucas. First, with respect to Paez, the information which the appellants sought to elicit concerning the Miami River Cops Scandal was inadmissible under Rules 608 and 403. We find the Ad-Vantage case instructive in this regard. In that case, we held that cross-examination concerning two investigations by the Florida Bar Association and Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants into the witness' possible ethical violations, which had not resulted in sanction, were inadmissible under Rules 608(b) and 403. In reaching that conclusion, we noted that the types of [a]cts probative of untruthfulness under Rule 608(b) include such acts as forgery, perjury, and fraud. Ad-Vantage, 37 F.3d at 1464. On the other hand, [t]o infer untruthfulness from any unethical act 'paves the way to the exception which will swallow the Rule.' Id. (citation omitted). We also reasoned that the fact no sanction had been imposed for the allegedly unethical conduct and the temporal remoteness of the investigations made the relevance of the information questionable. Id. Moreover, we held in Ad-Vantage that even if the cross-examination concerning the investigations of the ethical complaints was marginally relevant, it still should be excluded under Rule 403 because [i]n these circumstances, when the allegations of wrongdoing were grave but no sanctions resulted, the danger was great that the jury would infer more from the investigation than was fairly inferable. Id. 155 The same reasoning applies in this case. The Miami River Cops Scandal occurred more than six years prior to the trial of this case. Paez was thoroughly investigated in connection with that scandal, but was never charged with any crime and only received a reprimand for failing to document a conversation with an informant. The conduct for which he was reprimanded does not indicate a lack of truthfulness. Given that the investigation was temporally remote from Paez's testimony in this case and that Paez's only sanction in connection with the scandal was completely unrelated to his character for truthfulness, we conclude that the district court properly concluded that it was irrelevant. Moreover, as in Ad-Vantage, we agree with the district court that any potential relevance of the information was substantially outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice, and that it was due to be excluded under Rule 403. 156 Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it limited the cross-examination of Agent Lucas. The insertion into the trial of unproven allegations that Lucas had stolen cocaine had the obvious potential to cause serious and unfair prejudice to the government. In light of the fact that Lucas was cleared during the first investigation and that the second investigation concerned the same allegations from the same source, information concerning those investigations elicited during cross-examination would not have had much, if any, probative value. 157 Finally, the appellants have failed to show any basis for attributing bias to Lucas because of the investigations. They might have (but did not) suggest that he was trying to gain advantage in the investigation by pleasing the DEA and prosecutors. However, the jury knew that Lucas worked for the DEA and presumably factored in his allegiance to it when weighing his testimony. We do not believe that the existence of the investigation would have added anything (other than unfair prejudice) to the equation. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the cross-examination of Lucas as it did under Rules 608(b) and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 158 G. LAY OPINION TESTIMONY REGARDING THE USE OF CODE WORDS 159 Appellants Humberto Rodriguez, Cuni, Lopez, Mercedes Novaton, Rosell, Reynaldo Rodriguez, and Leopoldo Rodriguez challenge the district court's admission of testimony by some of the agents on the case concerning the use of code words by the defendants. At several points throughout the trial, the district court permitted law enforcement agents who had monitored the telephone wiretaps, as well as the supervisors of those agents, to testify concerning their understanding of the meaning of certain words used by the defendants in the taped conversations. For example, agents testified that when the defendants used the phrases fifteen year old girl or fifty year old grandmother, they were actually referring to fifteen and fifty kilogram quantities of cocaine. 160 Over the objection of the defendants, the district court found that such testimony was admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 701 as lay witness opinion testimony which was rationally based on the perceptions and experience of the agents. The defense maintained that the testimony was actually expert testimony governed by Fed. R. 702, which should not have been admitted because the prosecution had not laid the proper foundation to qualify the witnesses as experts and because, contrary to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E) and the court's pre-trial orders, the government had not identified those witnesses as experts or provided summaries of their testimony before trial. 161 Rule 701 provides the standards for determining when a lay witness may provide testimony in opinion form. That rule, at the time of this trial in 1994, 8 provided as follows: 162 If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 163 Fed. R. Evid. 701. The appellants do not dispute that the testimony was rationally based on the perception of the witnesses, nor do they dispute that the testimony was helpful to the jury in understanding the witnesses' testimony or in determining a fact in issue in the case. Instead, the appellants argue that despite the satisfaction of each of the two prerequisites for admitting lay witness opinion testimony, the evidence should have been excluded because the testimony might also have been characterized as expert testimony subject to the requirements of Rule 702 because the agents' opinion testimony was based, in part, on their prior experiences. 164 The appellants' argument has superficial appeal because the agents' experiences in drug investigations could be viewed as the type of specialized knowledge falling under Rule 702. In fact, we have in the past affirmed the admission under Rule 702 of the expert testimony of a police officer interpreting drug codes and jargon. United States v. Brown, 872 F.2d 385, 392 (11th Cir. 1989) (affirming admission of opinion that references to paper, candy, dresses, related to the sale of cocaine). Also, at least one of our sister circuits has found that a district court committed error, albeit harmless, by admitting this type of testimony as lay witness opinion testimony rather than expert opinion testimony. See United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1244-46 (9th Cir. 1997). 165 However, we do not accept the appellants' position , because it is based on the erroneous assumption (at least with respect to the pre-amendment version of Rule 701) that because an expert could provide the type of testimony at issue, a lay witness cannot. Our case law is squarely to the contrary. In United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1992), this Court made clear that a witness does not fall outside of Rule 701 simply because his or her rational[] . . . perception is based in part on the witness' past experiences. In Myers, the defendant, a former police officer charged with depriving arrestees of their civil rights by using a stun gun, challenged a district court's admission of testimony that reddish burn marks on [a victim's] back were consistent with marks that would be left by a stun gun. Id. at 1577. Myers argued that testimony should not have been admitted under Rule 701 because it went beyond the everyday common knowledge of a lay person. Id. This Court rejected his argument concluding that the witness's conclusion was rationally based upon his personal perception of [the victim's] back and his nineteen years of experience on the police force. Id. We further noted that [t]o the extent that [the witness's] opinion lacked a technical/medical basis, [the defendant] had the opportunity to expose this on cross-examination, and the defendant's objection to the evidence goes to its weight and not its admissibility. Id.; see also Agro Air Assocs., Inc. v. Houston Casualty Co., 128 F.3d 1452, 1455 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming the admission of lay witness opinion testimony based on the witnesses' personal observations and knowledge of, and experience in, the aviation industry). Moreover, we have specifically held on a number of occasions that district courts did not abuse their discretion by permitting police officers to testify under Rule 701 about their understanding of the meaning of conversations by or with criminal defendants. For example, in United States v. Awan, we affirmed a district court's admission of testimony by an undercover agent concerning the meaning and import of statements that were part of tape-recorded conversations with the defendants. 966 F.2d 1415, 1430 (11th Cir. 1992). The defendants in that case argued that the jurors should have been permitted to reach their own conclusions about the meaning of the statements without the influence of the agent's interpretation. Id. We rejected that argument after finding that the agent's testimony was based on his perceptions of the conversations and that the testimony could have been helpful to the jury. Id. at 1430. See also United States v. Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming admission of opinion under Rule 701 that when defendant stated that he wanted to make a trip, he was referring to an illegal act); United States v. Russell, 703 F.2d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 1983) (affirming admission of agents' testimony interpreting tape-recorded conversations with defendants). 166 In light of these decisions, we believe that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting agents involved in this case to give opinion testimony based on their perceptions and on their experience as police officers about the meaning of code words employed by the defendants in their intercepted telephone conversations. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury that the agents were not expert witnesses and that the jurors should independently determine the meaning of the statements. Also, each of the witnesses was subject to cross-examination by the appellants during which they challenged the agents' interpretations of the taped conversations. Under these circumstances, the appellants' objections go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the agents' testimony. See Myers, 972 F.2d at 1577. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion. 9 H. CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF CUNI'S ATTORNEY 167 Cuni contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new trial or to dismiss the indictment based on an alleged conflict of interest by one of his trial attorneys. Cuni maintains that his attorney labored under a conflict of interest by continuing his representation of Cuni despite the possibility that he was being investigated by the same United States Attorney's Office in connection with a different case. Cuni states that his attorney did not inform him of the possible conflict and did not seek his consent to continue his representation. Cuni also argues that the government engaged in misconduct when it failed to inform the district court or the defendants of the potential conflict resulting from the investigation of Cuni's attorney. The district court rejected Cuni's arguments, concluding that there was no showing of an actual conflict between the interests of Cuni and his attorney, and also that Cuni's representation had not been adversely affected by any potential conflict. 10 168 The factual basis for Cuni's claim relates to the possible connection between one of his attorneys, Michael Blacker, and a conspiracy charged in an unrelated case in which Blacker was counsel for a different defendant (named Martin). On October 18, 1994, approximately three and a half weeks after the trial in this case began, Blacker was served with a bill of particulars in that case, and in it the Assistant United States Attorney indicated that: 169 [I]n an abundance of caution and to the extent defendant MARTIN has not read the discovery, the government will restate those individuals, other than the charged co-conspirators, who may have furthered the objects of the conspiracy: . . . Michael Blacker. 170 The government maintains that despite this statement in the bill of particulars, Cuni's attorney did not have a conflict of interest because he was not under investigation by the United States Attorney's Office. In support of its position, the government provided a copy of notes taken by an attorney who represented Blacker during a June 1995 meeting with the Assistant United States Attorney. The notes indicate that Blacker's lawyer was advised during the meeting that Blacker was not a target of any investigation and that no indictment was contemplated against him. In light of these facts, and without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that Cuni's motion for a new trial or dismissal be denied, and the district court adopted that recommendation. 171 It is well-settled that [i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1718 (1980). The Supreme Court noted in Cuyler that a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. Id. at 349-50, 100 S. Ct. at 1719. However, the Court emphasized that the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction, and that absent a showing of actual conflict and adverse effect, a defendant is not entitled to relief. Id. at 350, 100 S. Ct. at 1719. Therefore, the Supreme Court has noted that there is no per se rule of prejudice in all cases involving potential conflicts of interest, but instead only a rule of presumptive prejudice where an attorney 'actively represented conflicting interests' and . . . 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected [the] lawyer's performance.' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2067 (1984) (citation omitted). 172 In Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), this Court discussed the two-part Cuyler test for reviewing claims involving conflicts of interest. First, we noted that [a]n 'actual conflict' of interest occurs when a lawyer has 'inconsistent interests.' Id. at 859 (citations omitted). The Court stated that: 173 In order to prove that an actual conflict hindered [the defendant's] lawyer's performance, [the defendant] must make a factual showing of inconsistent interests or point to specific instances in the record to suggest an actual impairment of his or her interests. Overall, the actual conflict inquiry is fact-specific, consistent with the [defendant's] ultimate burden to prove that his conviction was unconstitutional. 174 Id. (citations and quotations omitted). If a defendant is unable to show an actual conflict, then he is not entitled to relief from his conviction because a speculative or merely hypothetical conflict of interest does not yield a Sixth Amendment violation. Burden v. Zant, 24 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 1994). 175 If a defendant carries his burden of showing an actual conflict of interest, a court must then consider whether the conflict adversely affected his representation. In Freund, we summarized the adverse effect inquiry as follows: 176 To prove adverse effect, a [defendant] must satisfy three elements. First, he must point to some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic [that] might have been pursued. Second, he must demonstrate that the alternative strategy or tactic was reasonable under the facts. Because prejudice is presumed, the [defendant] need not show that the defense would necessarily have been successful if [the alternative strategy or tactic] had been used, rather he only need prove that the alternative possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative. Finally, he must show some link between the actual conflict and the decision to forgo the alternative strategy of defense. In other words, he must establish that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interests. 177 Freund, 165 F.3d at 860 (citations and quotations omitted). In the absence of a showing of an adverse effect, prejudice is not presumed to flow from a conflict of interest. Id. 178 Applications of these standards to the facts of this case reveal that Cuni is not entitled to relief based on the alleged conflict of interest. First we consider whether an actual conflict has been shown. As we noted in Freund, the inquiry into the existence of an actual conflict is fact-specific. 165 F.3d at 859. Based on the evidence in the record, we cannot determine whether or not an actual conflict existed. The only evidence that the district court had before it on the issue was the bill of particulars indicating that Blacker might be an unindicted co-conspirator, and the representation, based on Blacker's attorney's notes from a meeting that occurred over six months after the end of the trial in this case, that Blacker was not a target of any investigation and was not expected to be indicted. We believe that this information was insufficient to permit the court to find that no actual conflict existed. In particular we note that reliance on the notes from the June 1995 meeting between Blacker's attorney and the Assistant United States Attorney are not persuasive because they apparently reflect only information that was given to Blacker after the conclusion of Cuni's trial in this case. Those notes do not indicate that no conflict existed earlier that should have been disclosed to Cuni and the district court. 179 Nonetheless, even if we assume that an actual conflict of interest existed between Cuni and his attorney, we agree with the district court's alternative holding that Cuni has not, and cannot, show his attorney's performance was adversely affected by the conflict. Cuni has made absolutely no showing of any adverse effect resulting from his attorney's alleged conflict of interest, much less any plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that was reasonable under the facts. See Freund, 165 F.3d at 860 (citations and quotations omitted). The closest Cuni comes to articulating any adverse effect is a statement that he would have dismissed his attorney if he had been informed of the possible conflict, and a conclusory allegation that his attorney absented himself from the trial in this case in order to defend his own interests in the case in which he was named as a possible, unindicted co-conspirator. While the latter allegation might be a cause for concern if there were any factual basis supporting it, there is none. 180 Moreover, our own review of the record convinces us that Cuni's representation was not adversely affected by the possible conflict of interest. As the magistrate judge pointed out, [t]his record is replete with examples of vigorous and relentless[] attacks by Blacker on the government's case and its agents. In particular, Blacker argued that Agent Lucas, the agent who filed affidavits in support of the various wiretaps, made intentional or reckless misrepresentations in support of the applications. Blacker also challenged the competence of the agents who monitored the wiretaps, and argued that those agents misunderstood the recorded statements. We agree with the magistrate judge that this aggressive approach could hardly be seen as an effective way for an attorney to curry favor with the government. 11 Therefore, we conclude that Cuni has failed to show any adverse effect from the alleged conflict of interest entitling him to relief from his conviction. 181 Our opinion in United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1987), on which Cuni heavily relies, does not require a different result. In McLain, we found that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated when his attorney had a conflict of interest because the same prosecutor was investigating that attorney on an unrelated matter. 823 F.2d at 1463. After noting that an attorney has an ethical obligation to inform his or her client about any potential conflict of interest, we considered whether the attorney's performance in that case was adversely affected by the conflict of interest. Id. at 1464. We found that [t]here [was] substantial evidence that the United States attorney would not attempt to indict [the attorney] until [his client's] trial ended, and noted that this created an incentive for the attorney to forego plea bargain negotiations and to prolong the trial. Id. We also found that the attorney's conflict of interest affected his efforts to negotiate a plea bargain in several other specific respects. Id. These specific instances of adverse effects resulting from the conflict of interest distinguish McLain from this case. As we have already discussed, nothing in the record of this case suggests that Cuni's representation was affected in any way by the alleged conflict. Therefore, we reject this contention. 12 182