Opinion ID: 1863727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State v. Ramos

Text: ś 54. The rule in Ramos is that: [T]he use of a peremptory challenge to correct a trial court error is adequate grounds for reversal because it arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a statutorily granted right. 211 Wis. 2d at 14. We revisit the case to understand how the court made this ruling. ś 55. Edward Ramos was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide in the death of his girl-friend's two-year-old son. Id. at 15. There was an extensive voir dire of prospective jurors before his trial. Because of the nature of the case, one prospective juror expressed doubt whether she could be fair. When she was pressed on the subject, she said: Just knowing that the child was suffocated, I guess I couldn't be fair. The defense attorney followed up: So you could not be fair to this man? The prospective juror replied: No. Id. ś 56. In chambers, Ramos's counsel moved to strike the juror for cause. The circuit court refused to strike the juror for cause. When the judge and the prosecutor said they did not recall the prospective juror saying that she could not be fair, defense counsel asked that the reporter read back the prospective juror's responses. Three times counsel asked that the prospective juror's responses be read back and three times he was denied, and the court refused to strike the juror for cause. As a result, Ramos exercised the first of his seven peremptory challenges to remove the prospective juror and she did not sit at the trial. Id. at 14-15. ś 57. When the case came to this court after Ramos's conviction, we noted that the circuit court's action violated Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1) in two respects: (1) a prospective juror who is not indifferent in a case shall be excused, but this prospective juror was not; and (2) any party objecting for cause to a prospective juror may introduce evidence in support of the objection, but three times Ramos was denied that right. This court concluded that the failure to excuse the suspect juror was an erroneous exercise of discretion by the circuit court. Id. at 16. ś 58. This court structured its analysis of constitutional questions to conform to our understanding of Ross, 487 U.S. 81. It acknowledged that a defendant's right to a full complement of peremptory strikes was not grounded in the Sixth Amendment but rather in state law. Citing Ross, we stated that peremptory challenges are creatures of state law and that it is `for the state to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise.' Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 18 (quoting Ross, 487 U.S. at 89). Thus, `the `right' to peremptory challenges is `denied or impaired' only if the defendant does not receive that which state law provides.' Id. at 18-19 (quoting Ross, 487 U.S. at 89). In short, we concluded that our task was to configure the peremptory rights of a criminal defendant in Wisconsin on the basis of Wisconsin law. ś 59. The court then concluded that Wisconsin gives a criminal defendant a mandatory right to a specific number of peremptory challenges. It does not, we said, require the defendant to use peremptory challenges against a prospective juror who should have been removed for cause. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 19 (citing State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 671, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992)). The court recognized the importance that has been accorded to peremptory challenges over our history and formulated the rule of automatic reversal. Id. ś 60. Two members of the court, Justice N. Patrick Crooks and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, strongly disagreed with the court's decision. Justice Crooks wrote: I dissent because I conclude that the circuit court did not deprive Edward Ramos of his right to the effective exercise of a peremptory challenge under Wisconsin law. Instead, I conclude that by using a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who should have been excused for cause, Ramos effectively exercised this challenge for the purpose it is intended â to impanel an impartial jury. Further, I conclude that Ramos is not entitled to automatic reversal of his conviction because it is well established that, in cases like this, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial unless a biased juror actually sat on the jury. Consequently, I conclude that Ramos' challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution must fail because he was not deprived of any right to which he was entitled under Wisconsin law. Id. at 30-31 (Crooks, J., dissenting). ś 61. Justice Crooks argued that it was not improper for a defendant to use a peremptory strike to cure a circuit court error. The majority essentially concludes that, under Wisconsin law, if a defendant uses a peremptory challenge to strike a for cause juror, the defendant is thereby deprived of the effective exercise of that challenge because he or she did not use it to strike a juror for no cause, i.e., based on a hunch or intuition. Id. at 33 (Crooks, J., dissenting). He cited four Wisconsin cases including Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 (1891), which reached conclusions contrary to the majority opinion. ś 62. Justice Bradley reiterated her concern with the Ramos decision the following year in State v. Ferron : As the dissent in Ramos succinctly noted, statutory peremptory challenges exist not to allow defendants to randomly shuffle a jury pool in their favor, but rather to ensure the impaneling of an impartial jury as a component of our constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. When a defendant exercises a peremptory challenge to strike a juror who should have been excused by the court for cause, the defendant also acts to ensure that an unbiased trier of fact considers the case. .... Although Ramos is a recent decision of this court, its rationale is no more correct today than it was one year ago when it was decided. While I agree that the doctrine of stare decisis deserves great weight in our jurisprudence, it seems incongruous to refuse to reconsider the decision solely on stare decisis grounds when... Ramos itself disregarded a line of precedent spanning over a century in reaching its conclusion. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d at 514-15 (Bradley, J., dissenting). ś 63. For this court, time and events have put the Ramos decision in a new light. We have reexamined our premises, and conclude that Ramos should be overruled.