Opinion ID: 2444891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lake is inapposite to our disposition in this case and the judge in Kent applied the most significant relationship analysis to the wrong parties.

Text: Our conclusion that New Jersey has the most significant relationship in this case diverges from the majority's conclusion, which relied heavily on the choice of law analyses in both Lake and Kent. We do not agree with the majority's assertion that Lake is directly on point in this casewe believe Lake is inapposite here. We also believe Kent applies the choice of law analysis incorrectly. The issues presented in this case and in Lake are quite different. In Lake, this Court applied the significant relationship test and determined that Delaware law applied to the calculation of Lake's damages. [45] In Lake, however, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff was legally entitled to recover, and the only issue was the amount of recovery. [46] In other words, the parties in Lake did not dispute the satisfaction of the condition precedent to Lake's claim for UM benefitsthe precise issue this appeal presents. There, this Court resolved the second step of the UM benefits claim analysis without addressing the first step. After resolving the condition precedent under the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the tort, Delaware law should govern the calculation of benefits, as Lake illustrates. The amount of recovery arises out of a Delaware contract signed by a Delaware resident and a Delaware insurance company. This case, however, concerns which law governs the threshold right to recover at allnot the amount of the judgment. To be sure, Lake establishes that Delaware has a significant relationship to the calculation of UM benefits and a strong public policy interest in governing step two of the UM benefits claim analysis. Indeed, this determination is as true today as it was when this Court decided Lake. It is inapposite, though, to our disposition in this case, which focuses on which state's law should govern the condition precedent that Patterson be legally entitled to recover damages from Armstrong. Our determination that New Jersey has the most significant relationship in this case also appears at odds with the Superior Court judgment in Kent, which had nearly identical facts. In that case, the judge applied the most significant relationship test to the insured plaintiff and her insurance carrier, determined that Delaware law should apply, and ruled that Kent was legally entitled to recover to the extent she could prove fault and damages. [47] Our colleagues invoke Kent as persuasive authority and adopt the same approach as the judge in Kent by applying the most significant relationship test to Patterson and State Farm. We believe Kent misapplied the conflict of law principles in two respects, and therefore reject its analysis. First, the contract between Kent and her insurance carrier defined their legal rights and obligations. Those contract rights could only be triggered by, but not defined by, a third party. Therefore, to determine which law would govern the extent of their rights and duties vis-à-vis each other, the judge should have applied a true contract choice of law analysis. Yet, she ostensibly applied a tort choice of law analysis. [48] Second, and more immediately important, the judge applied the tort choice of law analysis to the wrong parties. The General Assembly mandates that at this condition precedent first stage of a UM benefits claim analysis, the question must be whether Kent was legally entitled to recover damages from a tortfeasornot her own UM carrier. By the clear language of Section 3902(a), the question was whether Kent was legally entitled to recover damages from [the] owner[] or operator[] of [the] uninsured or hit-and-run vehicle[], not whether the contract required the carrier to pay an amount of damages to be determined at the second (injury) stage. Therefore, the relevant parties for purposes of conflicts analysis were not Kent and her insurance carrier, but rather Kent and the tortfeasor. Similarly, in our case, Patterson and State Farm are not the relevant parties. Patterson and Armstrong are the relevant parties. Therefore, we cannot agree with the majority's reliance on Patterson and State Farm in its conflicts of law analysis. Our colleagues cite Kent County v. Shepherd [49] for the proposition that Delaware has a significant public policy interest in supporting its citizens' ability to recover the full amount of actual damages in cases like this. As accurate a characterization of Delaware public policy as this may be, the statutory language in Section 3902(a) is unambiguous. [50] Indeed, regardless of policy concerns, it is not within our province to rewrite the statute to suit our favored policy. If it is thought desirable to rewrite the statute to more clearly state a desired policy or to create order in a setting of divergent understandings, that is clearly the sole province of the General Assembly. We cannotnor should weattempt to alter that well-established division of responsibility, regardless of whether we believe alternative statutory language would more clearly illuminate the General Assembly's actual intent.