Opinion ID: 171881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Gonzales' burglary conviction

Text: We review a sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) de novo. United States v. Green, 55 F.3d 1513, 1515 (10th Cir.1995). Mr. Gonzales' argument that his prior burglary conviction is not a burglary for purposes of § 924(e) rests on Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). In Taylor, the Supreme Court conclude[d] that a person has been convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of [(1)] unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, [(2)] a building or structure, [(3)] with intent to commit a crime. Id. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Wyoming statute under which Mr. Gonzales was convicted defines burglary more broadly than the Supreme Court's generic definition of the term: [a] person is guilty of burglary if, without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a larceny or a felony therein. Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-301(a). We therefore must address the question whether, in the case of [Mr. Gonzales,] who [was] convicted under a nongeneric-burglary statute, the Government may seek enhancement on the ground that he actually committed a generic burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599-600, 110 S.Ct. 2143. For example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, [such as Wyoming], if the indictment or information and jury instructions show that the defendant was charged only with a burglary of a building, and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building to convict, then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement. Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. [W]hen determining whether a prior conviction resulting from a guilty plea is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, a court is limited to an examination of the language of the statute of conviction, `the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant ..., or to some comparable judicial record of this information.' United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)). Mr. Gonzales maintains that based on the material contained in these documents, it cannot be concluded that he committed a burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement. We disagree. As discussed in United States v. Barney, 955 F.2d 635, 640 (10th Cir.1992), the categorical problem with section 6-3-301, under which [Mr. Gonzales was convicted], is its inclusion of vehicles among the places that can be burglarized. Just as in Barney, however, [t]he information surmounts this obstacle by making clear that Mr. Gonzales' burglary conviction did not involve the alleged burglary of a vehicle. Id. To this end, the information provides that Mr. Gonzales did unlawfully and feloniously, without authority, enter or remain in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or separately secured portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein, to wit: did unlawfully and feloniously, without authority from the Cheyenne Airport Restaurant and Cloud Nine Bar, the owner or occupant, enter a building located at Laramie County, Wyoming, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein, and did steal food and beer items, contrary to W.S. 6-3-301(a).... (R2 at 17, Ex. B (emphasis added).) For all intents and purposes, this statement, which makes clear that Mr. Gonzales' burglary did not involve a vehicle, is identical to the information cited in Barney to support a finding that a defendant's § 6-3-301 conviction constituted generic burglary. Barney, 955 F.2d at 640 (stating that according to the information, the defendant did unlawfully enter or remain in a building or occupied structure or separately secured portion thereof, to wit: Senior Citizen's office, without authority and with the intent to commit a larceny therein....). Mr. Gonzales counters that Barney is in fact helpful to his case. In this regard, Mr. Gonzales relies on Barney 's statement that a back room is not a building or structure. Id. at 640 (quotation omitted). Mr. Gonzales' reliance on this statement is misplaced, however, as the statement was made in relation to the court's consideration of a conviction under Wyo. Stat. § 6-7-201, not Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-301(a). Significantly, although we have previously determined that Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-301(a) is generic aside from its inclusion of vehicles, [4] Barney, 955 F.2d at 640 (stating that the categorical problem with section 6-3-301... is its inclusion of vehicles among the places that can be burglarized), Wyo. Stat. § 6-7-201 covered much more ground: (a) Whoever, intentionally enters, or attempts to enter, any of the following places without the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to steal or commit a felony therein may be imprisoned not more than fourteen (14) years: (i) Any building or dwelling; or (ii) An enclosed railroad car; or (iii) An enclosed portion of any automobile, vehicle, or aircraft; or (iv) A locked enclosed cargo portion of a truck or trailer; or (v) A room within any of the above. Barney, 955 F.2d at 638-39. Based on the breadth of this statute, of course, the court in Barney was required to make a number of considerations that are not pertinent in this case. Instead, here, where Mr. Gonzales was convicted of burglary pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 6-3-301(a), we need only determine whether the information and the plea colloquy overcome the categorical problem with section 6-3-301, its inclusion of vehicles among the places that can be burglarized. Id. at 640. It is clear that they do. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that Mr. Gonzales' Wyoming burglary conviction was a burglary for purposes of § 924(e).