Opinion ID: 1169183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: characterization of property upon dissolution of marital community

Text: Petitioner Arthur Mell contends that when Mary Mell died the community dissolved and E.J. Mell's one-half share of community property became his separate property as a matter of law. Accordingly, he asserts that under the clear and unambiguous language of the will he is entitled to the entire estate. THIRD: I will, devise and bequeath to my son, ARTHUR J. MELL, all of the separate property owned by me at the time of my death, both real and personal, and wherever situate, absolutely to do with and dispose of as he may deem fit. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that E.J. Mell's choice of separate and community property labels for the distribution scheme in his will created an ambiguity. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, when the marital community dissolves upon the death of a spouse, the former community property becomes individually owned property. Thus, neither separate nor community property existed at the death of the testator. The court held that the testator's specific bequest of separate property referred to that property he had acquired prior to his marriage. Consequently, his former community property and accumulations subsequent to his wife's death would be distributed to the residuary legatees. [1] The court relied primarily on a divorce case to support its analysis: Where no disposition of the property rights of the parties is made by the divorce court, the separate property of the husband prior to the divorce becomes his individual property after divorce, the separate property of the wife becomes her individual property, and from the necessities of the case, their joint or community property must become common property. After the divorce there is no community, and in the nature of things there can be no community property. (Italics omitted.) In re Estate of Mell, 40 Wn. App. at 364 (quoting James v. James, 51 Wash. 60, 62, 97 P. 1113, 98 P. 1115 (1908)). This analysis is problematic. First, in the process of reaching its result, the Court of Appeals has seemingly created a new class of property: individual property. Second, the Court of Appeals reliance on a divorce case to classify E.J. Mell's one-half interest in the community property as individual rather than separate property seems strained. In James, the court specifically noted that the property only becomes individual `[w]here no disposition of the property rights of the parties is made by the divorce court ...' James, at 62. The point emphasized by the court was that community property becomes common property if no other disposition is made in the divorce decree. Here, by contrast, the testator disposed of all of his property by will; there was no undisposed of property to be classified or partitioned in some fashion. Finally, although the Court of Appeals correctly noted that `[r]eferences to community property existing after the death of a spouse are made merely as an aid to administration, Mell, at 364 (quoting Edmonds v. Ashe, 13 Wn. App. 690, 695, 537 P.2d 812 (1975)), this statement is not particularly relevant here. The Edmonds court was discussing whether a deceased spouse's former half interest in community property could still be liable for the separate tort obligations of the deceased. The court was thus concerned with the legal definitions of each type of property or debt. In this case, the references to community and separate property were made by a testator as descriptive of the nature of his property. Thus, E.J. Mell appears to have divided his property into separate and community for dispositive, rather than administrative, purposes. The Court of Appeals reliance upon Edmonds is questionable. The Court of Appeals decision also fails to recognize that courts and commentators often use the term separate property to mean both property obtained before or during marriage which is owned by only one spouse, and property which remains or becomes owned by only one spouse after dissolution of the marriage or death of one of the marriage partners. For instance courts often hold that when a marital community dissolves, the one-half share of community property of a former spouse becomes that spouse's separate property: At death, the community is dissolved and the former community property becomes the separate property of the decedent's estate and of the surviving spouse. deNoskoff v. Scott, 36 Wn. App. 424, 426-27, 674 P.2d 687 (1984). See also Edmonds v. Ashe, 13 Wn. App. 690, 537 P.2d 812 (1975) (citing Crawford v. Morris, 92 Wash. 288, 158 P. 957 (1916)); Washington State Bar Ass'n, Community Property Deskbook § 40.2 (1977). Applying this definition to E.J. Mell's will transforms the entire estate into separate property. By the third paragraph of his will, the testator made a specific devise and bequest to his son of all of the separate property owned by me at the time of my death. Upon the death of Mrs. Mell, the property which Mr. Mell and his deceased wife had formerly owned as community property ceased to be such and became the separate property of E.J. Mell and the successors of Mary A. Mell. The one-half share of community property described by the testator in the second clause of his will thus became his separate property, owned by the testator at the time of his death.