Opinion ID: 322490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard for recusal

Text: 20 The first point raised by appellants is that the trial judge applied an erroneous legal standard in refusing to recuse himself after an affidavit had been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. Section 144 provides in full: 21 Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. 22 The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith. 23 The procedure prescribed by section 144 was not strictly followed in this case. It appears from the record that counsel for the appellants and the trial judge informally discussed the question of recusal over a month after the complaint was filed. The court later convened a hearing on December 22, 1972, to discuss the question. The judge permitted plaintiffs' counsel to question him at length at this hearing, after stating to counsel: 24 Heretofore I had felt that a judge should recuse himself very quickly because it made the court appear more fair, but there are other obligations the court owes and I am afraid that I shan't recuse myself but I want to give you an opportunity to put anything on record that you would like to put on record. 25 The section 144 affidavit was not filed until January 19, 1973. Without entering a formal order, the trial judge concluded that he should hear the case. Since it is apparent that the facts recited in the affidavit were developed to some extent from the preceding hearing, it is necessary to consider both the affidavit and the hearing in determining whether legally sufficient facts were presented to warrant recusal. 26 The affidavit was filed by plaintiff-appellant Thompson, who alleged two facts and reasons for his belief that the trial judge, Judge Robert E. Varner, had personal bias and prejudice in connection with the proceedings: 4 27 1) that while Judge Varner was President of the Montgomery County Bar Association two years ago, the Association had a clause in its by-laws barring black members and that the judge never made any effort to invite black lawyers whom he knew to join; 28 2) that Judge Varner was acquainted with several defendants in the suit and all of defendants' counsel, and that he said he did not believe that any of the defendants whom he knew would intentionally misrepresent any of the matters related to the lawsuit. 29 In support of his affidavit, Thompson appended a transcript of the preceding hearing. 30 Both of the grounds for recusal set out in the affidavit were fully developed at the hearing. Judge Varner stated that he first became aware of the whites only clause in the by-laws of the Association when it was mentioned in a newspaper article speculating on the possibility of his appointment to a federal judgeship. Counsel for the appellants, Mr. Clemon, asked the judge if he then recommended removal of the clause, and the following dialogue ensued: 31 THE COURT: My recollection is that I did not recommend anything but that I appointed a committee for a consideration of renovation of . . . the by-laws. . . . Frankly, when I looked at it I was appalled how out of date the whole thing was, not just to racial matters. . . . I believe there were several things in the . . . by-laws . . . that drew my attention and really shocked me. And I did not make any recommendation about it but I did appoint a committee to consider it, and the by-laws, as I recall it, were changed. . . . 32 MR. CLEMON: After you appointed that committee did it make a report during your tenure in office? 33 THE COURT: Oh, yes. 34 MR. CLEMON: It did?THE COURT: Yes. 35 MR. CLEMON: Do you recall what recommendations if any were made with respect to the racially exclusionary clause? 36 THE COURT: Yes. It was removed. 37 MR. CLEMON: During your tenure as president? 38 THE COURT: Well, I am speaking from recollection. It may have been after my tenure; but I think it was during my tenure. I am not sure. 39 During other discussions at the hearing, Judge Varner stated that he personally knew ten of the thirteen defendant bar examiners. He said that of the ten, he knew three only slightly. He added that he did not know three of the other examiners at all. He admitted that he has known defendant Reginald Hamner, who is secretary of the bar association and of the board of bar examiners, 5 ever since he became associated with the bar association. Mr. Clemon asked what effect these friendships or acquaintanceships would have on the judge's conduct of the trial: 40 MR. CLEMON: Judge, do you think that in the event there was testimony conflicting testimony involving a witness whom you didn't know and one of the defendants whom you have indicated that you do know, slightly or otherwise, that there might be any problem in your attaching more weight to the testimony of the person that you know rather than the person that you did not know? 41 THE COURT: Well, it would depend on who the person I did not know, maybe, and what the evidence shows. I will say this, of the people I know here, I have no reason to think any of them would intentionally misrepresent anything. I am sure there will be some mistake in recollection, and certainly I would expect most witness to make a few mistakes in their recollection if the testimony becomes complicated. 42 MR. CLEMON: Yes, sir. 43 THE COURT: But I do not think I would have any prejudice or bias about that matter. Certainly or any other matter for that matter, frankly. I have thought about the matter thoroughly, and I don't think that there is any reason why I can't fairly judge this case. 44 At another point, Mr. Clemon asked Judge Varner whether his friendship for over twenty years with former bar association secretary John Scott would influence the weight to which he might attach to Scott's testimony. 6 Judge Varner replied: I don't think so. I will say this, I think Mr. Scott is an honorable man but I don't think his memory is infallible. I think he would try to tell you the truth in his answers. But if he appeared to evade I think I could detect it. 45 Thus, in summary, we have a challenge to the judge assigned to try this case alleging discrimination on account of race in the grading of bar examinations on the basis of the following factual setting: the lawyer for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendants had held conversations off the record in the judge's chambers, apparently discussing the doubts that were in the minds of plaintiffs. 7 At this time no affidavit under section 144 had been filed. In effect, plaintiffs were undertaking to develop a basis for determining whether to file such an affidavit. The hearing conducted was in the form of questions and answers put to the judge by Mr. Clemon, counsel for the plaintiffs. This hearing developed the fact that the judge had been president of the Montgomery Bar Association shortly prior to being appointed to the bench and that at the time the rules of the Association forbade admission of black lawyers. When comment had been made in the public press about this fact and of Judge Varner's being considered for appointment to the United States Court, he appointed a commission to review the bar association by-laws, but gave no direction or suggestion that the racial restrictions be changed. They were subsequently changed, at a time which the judge thought was during his term of office, but as to this he was not certain. Judge Varner was acquainted with ten of the thirteen defendants who were members of the Board of Bar Examiners, three only slightly and several on a basis of what he considered friendship. Three of them he did not know at all. When asked as to the effect of his acquaintance or friendship with defendants in the event of a possible conflict in testimony in the anticipated hearings, Judge Varner, by the language quoted above, indicated a strong feeling of confidence in the veracity and trustworthiness of his friends. When asked expressly with respect to Mr. Scott, who had previously been secretary of the commission, and thus the one person who had custody of all of the documents, he expressed similar confidence in his likely credibility, noting that if (Scott) appeared to evade I think I could detect it. 8 46 Upon subsequently filing the affidavit, plaintiffs attached a transcript of the hearing before Judge Varner, so that we consider the section 144 affidavit to include all of the facts which are recited above. Interestingly enough, by the time the affidavit was filed in January, 1973, Judge Varner had, in effect, already decided the issue. For, as noted above he stated, before the facts were developed, I am afraid that I shan't recuse myself but I want to give you an opportunity to put anything on record that you would like to put on record. This sounds very much as though he was intending to permit the plaintiffs to build up a record for appeal, having already decided the matter on the merits against recusing himself. This statement, having been made prior to the filing of the affidavit, must be considered as one of the facts and reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists within the language of section 144. 47 Entirely aside, however, from the apparent prejudgment of the issue just mentioned, we conclude that the other facts stated in the affidavit, and supported by the testimony of the hearing, taken as true, as they must be, for the purpose of the judge's consideration of the motion, Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921) are legally sufficient to give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment. Berger, supra 255 U.S. at 33-34, 41 S.Ct. at 233. 48 The applicable standards for determining the legal sufficiency of the affidavit provided under section 144 are definitively set out in the Berger case. The Court at 32 of 255 U.S., at 232 of 41 S.Ct., quoted from an opinion of this Court in Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869 (5th Cir.) which said: 49 Upon the making and filing by a party of an affidavit under the provisions of section 21 (predecessor of section 144), of necessity there is imposed upon the judge the duty of examining the affidavit to determine whether or not it is the affidavit specified and required by the statute and to determine its legal sufficiency. If he finds it to be legally sufficient then he has no other or further duty to perform than that prescribed in section 20 of the Judicial Code. He is relieved from the delicate and trying duty of deciding upon the question of his own disqualification. (Emphasis supplied). 50 The Court then explains what it means by legal sufficiency. Speaking again of the definition in Henry v. Speer, supra, the Court said at 33-34 of 255 U.S., at 233 of 41 S.Ct.: 51 It is a precaution against abuse, removes the averments and belief from the irresponsibility of unsupported opinion, and adds to the certificate of counsel the supplementary aid of the penalties attached to perjury. Nor do we think that this view gives room for frivolous affidavits. Of course the reasons and facts for the belief the litigant entertains are an essential part of the affidavit, and must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment. (Emphasis supplied). 52 The Berger case was decided by the Supreme Court on a certified question from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and was designed expressly and explicitly to answer the very question that is presented here. The language of the section 9 clearly suggests that the belief of the affiant if supported by the facts he or she swears to, is crucial and thus that the test of the affidavit's legal sufficiency should be whether the facts alleged could reasonably lead to the belief that the affidavit says exists in the minds of the plaintiffs. Berger supports this approach. See Note, Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1435, 1446-47 (1966). 10 It is true that some post-Berger cases have adopted a different test, one that would virtually require that the facts taken, of course, as true are sufficient to demonstrate a personal bias or prejudice in fact on the part of the trial judge for or against one of the parties. 11 53 The only case in this Circuit that discusses the matter is Simmons v. United States, 89 F.2d 591 (5th Cir., 1937), upon which the appellees here rely. In Simmons, the affiant alleged that the trial judge had represented a potential witness and the relative of a potential witness, and that the trial judge was friendly (sic) inclined toward them.