Opinion ID: 1537676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: defer review of the constitutionality of the 1975 act by the court at the present time

Text: In our most recent decision in this case, we ordered limited relief for plaintiffs by redistributing minimum aid and save-harmless funds according to the equalized aid formula of the Bateman Act. Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. at 150. This plan, while intended as a first step towards the elimination of inequities which had been found inherent in the Statewide system of public education was readily conceded to be both an interim resolution and far short of a perfect plan. 69 N.J. at 151. Therefore, in footnote 4 of that decision, the majority established a contingency upon which the Court's order might be vacated : If implementing legislation for financing and the attendant administrative process is completed before October 1, 1975, but not in time to permit review thereof by the Court by that date, the Court will then, in the light of the nature of the entire plan submitted, consider whether it may be permitted to go into effect for 1976-1977, with or without terms, or be deferred to subsequent years if ultimately sustained by the Court. [69 N.J. at 144 n. 4]. The commonsense meaning of this statement clearly conveys the Court's intention at that time: 1. Any legislative alternative to the Robinson IV order was to become operational only after it had been reviewed and approved by this Court. This prerequisite follows from the role which the Court established for itself in the instant case, namely, the designated last-resort guarantor of the Constitution's command, Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. at 154. 2. In turn, review of any such legislative alternative was to be contingent upon submission of the proposed legislation in a form which would make thorough consideration possible. Implementing legislation for financing and the attendant administrative regulations were to have been completed prior to our review. Through this requirement, we sought to avoid a review process whose hypothetical and fragmentary nature would frustrate the consideration which this legislation obviously requires and deserves. 3. To assure that any legislative alternative to the Robinson IV order would be forthcoming in time for preparation of the 1976-1977 school budgets, we set October 1, 1975 as a deadline for submitting the legislation. The Court did not envision that mere submission of an alternative educational plan would itself satisfy the contingency set forth in footnote 4. Our May 1975 order was to be vacated only after the Court had had an opportunity to review and, if warranted, sustain the statute. 4. Accordingly, the Court reserved the option either to permit any submitted legislation to be effective immediately or to defer implementation and subject the legislation to further consideration. To suggest that the Court did not retain this option would be to negate the Court's powers of review in this case and would further contradict the language of the Robinson IV footnote in which we expressly reserved such an option. Therefore, in Robinson IV the Court not only established the basis and scope of its review of any legislative alternatives, but also the posture in which such legislation would have to be presented before review could proceed. Tracking the language of footnote 4, the legislation would have to be an entire plan for which the implementing legislation for financing and the attendant administrative process [had been] completed. Robinson IV, supra, 69 N.J. at 144 n. 4. Consequently the Court must first address itself to the threshold question of whether the 1975 Act is in an appropriate posture for review. The 1975 Act was enacted on September 29, 1975, two days before the October 1, 1975 deadline fixed by this Court in Robinson IV. Although the Act contained provisions concerning the distribution of State school aid (Article III) and provisions defining, in general terms, the contours of a thorough and efficient system of education (Article II), no regulations had been promulgated to implement the Act and no moneys had been appropriated to fund it at the time of its enactment. In light of the contingencies set forth in footnote 4, plaintiffs and supporting amici argued before us that the Act was not in a proper posture for review. In choosing to review the facial constitutionality of the 1975 Act, the majority today rejects this contention. With respect to the argument that attendant administrative regulations must be completed prior to review, the majority observes that: Whether they are valid and adequate must await later determination and in no event can directly affect the constitutionality of the Act. [ Ante, at 454 n. 2]. Accordingly, the majority confines its examination to the facial constitutionality of the Act and abandons all questions concerning the adequacy of its subsequent operational impact. Ante, at 454. The concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Conford agrees with this proposition. I find such partial and intermittent review to be both unsupportable and inappropriate in the instant case. First, the issue before the Court is not whether the 1975 Act contravenes some constitutional guarantee or proscription, but whether it fully comports with the constitutional mandate imposed upon the State by the education clause. N.J. Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1. To review the Act in a piecemeal fashion, as the majority has done, constitutes a clear retreat from Robinson I, where we held: Whether the State acts directly or imposes the role upon local government, the end product must be what the Constitution commands. A system of instruction in any district of the State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional command. Whatever the reason for the violation, the obligation is the State's to rectify it. If local government fails, the State government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the State must itself meet its continuing obligation. [62 N.J. at 513; emphasis added]. We repeat that if the State chooses to assign its obligation under the 1875 amendment to local government, the State must do so by a plan which will fulfill the State's continuing obligation. [62 N.J. at 519; emphasis added]. Obviously, an Act which is facially constitutional will not satisfy the State's continuing obligation, if the legislation fails to redress the wrongs identified in Robinson I or is otherwise found to be unconstitutional as applied. Second, in Robinson I, this Court expressly held that the State has a constitutional duty to define in some discernible way the educational obligation mandated by the Constitution. 62 N.J. at 519. As will be discussed more fully below, the Legislature confronts this obligation in Article II of the Act. While this article purports to define the goal of a thorough and efficient educational system and outline the major elements of that system, it does so only in the broadest of terms. Consequently, administrative regulations are necessary to clarify and implement the statutory framework. The Act itself recognizes that there exists a need for regulations to fill in the broad interstices remaining in the general language of the statute. Accordingly, the Act delegates to the appropriate State and local agencies the tasks of establishing goals and objectives consistent with legislative guidelines and defining standards of performance necessary to indicate achievement of the goals and objectives. § 2b(3); see also §§ 6, 7. Without these additional standards and objectives, the statutory scheme is neither in a proper form for review nor constitutionally sufficient. In this last respect, the instant case is analogous to cases where implementing regulations were found to be a prerequisite to judicial review because, without such regulations, the statutory mandates were too vague and too general to permit judicial construction and interpretation. United States v. Boyd, 491 F. 2d 1163, 1169-70 (9 Cir.1973); United States v. Approximately 633.79 T. Yellowfin Tuna, 383 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Cal. 1974); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, etc. v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758 (D.D.C. 1971). Third, the amorphus guidelines of Article II, standing alone, give little insight to the courts which must interpret them and little guidance to the local boards which must comply with them. The reviewing court is afforded scant assistance in determining the proper bounds of administrative discretion and the Act's constitutional sufficiency. Similarly, the absence of regulations prevents the Court from determining the adequacy of the fiscal provisions of Article III. Standards of educational quality are needed in order for the Court to ascertain whether the State school aid formulae comply with constitutional dictates. Moreover, without attendant administrative regulation, the 1975 Act might well approach a level of constitutional vagueness. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 86 S.Ct. 518, 15 L.Ed. 2d 447 (1966); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed. 2d 629 (1967); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed. 2d 731 (1969). [1] Finally, review of the Act under these circumstances directly contradicts both the language and intent of this Court, as expressed in footnote 4 of Robinson IV. 69 N.J. at 144 n. 4. For these reasons, I find that promulgation of attendant administrative regulations is a prerequisite for both review of this statute and its constitutionality. [2] As previously noted, at the time motions were filed initiating the current phase of this litigation the State Board had not yet promulgated regulations implementing the Act. However, I now take judicial notice that on January 7, 1975 these regulations were officially promulgated (Reg. 1976 docket #3). Therefore, at least with respect to this requirement, the 1975 Act is now ripe for review. As noted in footnote 4, fiscal implementation is just as important a prerequisite to a valid legislative scheme as administrative regulations. Consequently, one might similarly require full funding as a condition to judicial consideration of the Act. However, the practicalities and difficulties of the legislative process impel me to the contrary. Within the timetable which I set out below, such a task could not realistically be accomplished prior to a plenary hearing. Thus, I would permit the trial court to consider this legislation for which regulations have been promulgated even though the funding necessary for its operation has not yet been appropriated. I would, however, as does the majority, retain full funding as a condition precedent to finding the Act constitutional.