Opinion ID: 492473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 111

Text: 12 Ignoring clear precedent to the contrary, Hohman argues that the statute prohibiting assault on a federal officer is unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide citizens with objective criteria to determine when a federal agent is on or off duty. Without such criteria, he argues, a citizen does not have fair notice of what constitutes criminal behavior. 13 It is obvious that this claim has little merit. The record reveals clearly that Hohman was on notice that Ranger Miller was a federal officer. When he first spoke to Hohman, Miller mentioned that he came to the beach when he was off duty. After Hohman had struck him, Miller identified himself as a federal officer. After this warning, Hohman struck him again. 14 Furthermore, Sec. 111 does not require notice to the assailant that his victim is on duty. The Congressional purpose of Sec. 111 was to give maximum personal protection to federal law enforcement officers. United States v. Sommerstedt, 752 F.2d 1494, 1496 (9th Cir.), amended, 760 F.2d 999, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851, 106 S.Ct. 149, 88 L.Ed.2d 123 (1985). Consistent with that purpose, Sec. 111 does not require that an assailant know his victim is a federal officer. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 679, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 1261, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975); United States v. Abraham, 627 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir.1980). 15 The assailant need intend only to assault one who later proves to be a federal officer. United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 1645, 52 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977). The assailant's knowledge of the officer's duty status is irrelevant. Cf. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68-69, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 2939, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (quoting Feola as holding:  'existence of fact that confers federal jurisdiction need not be one in the mind of the actor at the time he perpetrates the act made criminal by the federal statute.' ). 16 The Supreme Court has determined that this interpretation poses no risk of unconstitutional unfairness. One committing an assault knows from the very outset that his planned course of conduct is wrongful, therefore, Sec. 111 does not create a situation ... where legitimate conduct becomes unlawful solely because of the [federal] identity of the individual or agency affected. Feola, 420 U.S. at 685, 95 S.Ct. at 1264.