Opinion ID: 2261485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Dortch Case

Text: Terry Dortch was charged with storehouse breaking and related offenses. Pursuant to Rule 735 b, he filed a written election to be tried by the court rather than by jury. The written election was witnessed by Dortch's trial counsel and specified that it was made knowingly and voluntarily. Prior to trial, the court questioned Dortch on the record as required by Rule 735 d to determine whether his jury trial waiver was knowing and voluntary. After advising Dortch of his right to a jury trial, the court told him, as required by the rule and by Countess, that a jury was comprised of twelve persons who, in order to convict, must all agree as to his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In response to the court's questions, Dortch acknowledged that his counsel had advised him all about a jury trial when he signed the election for a court trial. Dortch said that he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial and wanted the court to hear the case without a jury. The trial judge did not inquire as to whether Dortch's decision to waive his right to trial by jury was a product of threats, promises or inducements. Dortch was convicted of storehouse breaking and appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming that the failure of the trial judge to inquire on the record as to whether he voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial constituted reversible error under Rule 735 d. The court in an unreported opinion found no merit in Dortch's contention. After reviewing the colloquy between the trial judge and Dortch at the commencement of the trial, the intermediate appellate court concluded that, considering the record as a whole, Dortch had been fully advised of the nature of a jury trial and voluntarily waived his right thereto. We granted certiorari.