Opinion ID: 1174031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Findings of Fact Evidence of Any Substance Whatever.

Text: The greatest degree of deference is extended to the Commission's findings on questions of basic fact (which do not include ultimate facts and the application of legal rules to basic facts, treated in section C). Here we apply the scope of review specified in the second sentence of § 54-7-16, quoted above. While the statutory language final and ... not ... subject to review has not been interpreted literally to foreclose all judicial review of Commission findings of fact, it does preclude such review in most cases. The words arbitrary and capricious have often been used to describe the circumstances in which this Court would upset Commission findings on questions of basic fact. Standing alone, these words are subject to the criticism that they are mere word formulas that give little guidance in defining the limited circumstances in which the reviewing court can upset the findings of the agency. [11] In this context, the words arbitrary and capricious are helpful only when they are combined with words describing some quantum of evidence. Thus, in Williams v. Public Service Commission, 29 Utah 2d 9, 13, 504 P.2d 34, 37 (1972), we held that Commission findings of fact will be upset by this Court only where they are so without foundation in fact that they must be deemed capricious and arbitrary (emphasis supplied). This high threshold of review provides less latitude for judicial review of Commission findings of basic facts than the substantial evidence standard specified in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. [12] There are other decisions to the same effect involving other questions and other agencies. Thus, in reviewing decisions on unemployment compensation under a statute essentially equivalent to § 54-7-16, we have declared that we will sustain the findings of the Industrial Commission if there is evidence of any substance whatever which can reasonably be regarded as supporting the determination made ... (emphasis supplied). Kennecott Copper Corp. Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 Utah 2d 262, 264-65, 372 P.2d 987, 989 (1962), reaffirmed in Taylor v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 647 P.2d 1 (1982). Other cases to the same effect involving other administrative decisions are set out in the footnote. [13] The standard of review that affirms Commission findings on questions of basic fact if they are supported by evidence of any substance whatever and sets them aside only if they are without foundation in fact is the standard this Court will follow in reviewing the Commission's findings of basic facts in this case. That includes its finding on the market value of the transferred assets (Part III).