Opinion ID: 2671312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: claim construction of the ’949 patent

Text: The majority concludes that the “heuristic” claim terms in the ’949 patent have sufficiently definite structure to avoid means-plus-function treatment. Majority Op. 21. I disagree. As an initial matter, the majority misstates our law on means-plus-function claiming. Generally speaking, a means-plus-function analysis proceeds in two phases: first, the court must determine whether the claim term is drafted in means-plus-function format such that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies. See Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Before a court attempts to analyze what appears to be a meansplus-function claim limitation, it must first assure itself that such a claim limitation is at issue.”). Only then should the court undertake to construe the disputed claim term by identifying the “corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification” to which the claim term will be limited. Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Because ‘mechanism for moving said finger’ is a means-plusfunction limitation, this court must next examine the trial court’s identification of ‘the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.’”). Although the majority accurately states these legal principles, see Majority Op. 9, it fails to faithfully apply them. Rather, the majority’s analysis collapses these two steps into one, and in doing so, it effectively renders the category of non-indefinite means-plus-function claim terms a null set. The majority correctly states that the proper inquiry in determining whether a claim term is drafted in meansplus-function format is whether the limitation has “suffiAPPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. 3 ciently definite structure.” Majority Op. 10-11. The majority then identifies several ways in which a term may be deemed to have such structure, such as when it has “a structural definition that is either provided in the specification or generally known in the art,” when it “outlin[es] an algorithm, a flowchart, or a specific set of instructions or rules,” or when the specification “describ[es] the claim limitation’s operation, such as its input, output, or connections.” Id. at 13-14. By contrast, the majority states, “if the claim merely recites a generic nonce word and the remaining claim language, specification, prosecution history, and relevant external evidence provide no further structural description to a person of ordinary skill in the art, then the presumption against means-plus-function claiming is rebutted.” Id. at 16. In effect, what the majority has done is imported the second step of the analysis (where you define the scope of a means-plus-function claim term based on the corresponding structure in the specification) into the first step (where you identify whether the term is drafted in meansplus-function format). The majority’s analysis implies that so long as a claim term has corresponding structure in the specification, it is not a means-plus-function limitation. 1 But such a rule would render every means-plusfunction claim term indefinite. Under the majority’s approach, a term would only be deemed a means-plusfunction limitation if it has no corresponding structure— 1 Admittedly, the majority suggests that “it is possible to find that a claim limitation does not connote sufficiently definite structure despite the presence of some corresponding structure in the specification.” Majority Op. 10. But the majority’s actual analysis of how to identify a sufficiently definite structure to avoid meansplus-function treatment suggests that the opposite is true. 4 APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. an absurd result that would eviscerate means-plusfunction claiming. 2 Applying the proper legal analysis, there can be little doubt that the heuristic limitations are means-plusfunction limitations. 2 Nothing so clearly demonstrates the majority’s confusion on this issue as the cases on which it relies. In support of its view that a court must scour the specification for corresponding structure in order to save a claim term from means-plus-function treatment, the majority cites several cases that were attempting to identify the corresponding structure of undisputedly means-plusfunction claim terms. For example, the majority cites Typhoon Touch Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2011), for the proposition that a claim may contain sufficient structure to avoid meansplus-function claiming by reciting an algorithm. Majority Op. 13. However, the claim term at issue in that case was “means for cross-referencing,” which no one disputed was a means-plus-function limitation. This court’s search for an algorithm to support that claim term was merely an attempt to save the means-plus-function term from indefiniteness. See Typhoon Touch, 659 F.3d at 1385-86. The same is true of Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), on which the majority also relies. Id. at 1340 (evaluating whether “computerimplemented means-plus-function claims” disclosed enough of an algorithm to provide the necessary structure under § 112, ¶ 6). The majority’s misreading of these cases is all the more striking because it is the same error the majority accuses the district court of committing in its reading of Aristocrat Technologies Australia Party Ltd. v. International Game Technology, 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Majority Op. 12. APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. 5 To begin with, it is true that the absence of the word “means” in the disputed claim terms creates a presumption that these are not means-plus-function limitations. See Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, it is undisputed that the heuristics limitations recite functions performed by the heuristics (e.g., “determining that the one or more finger contacts correspond to a command to transition from displaying a respective item in a set of items to displaying a next item in the set of items”). The relevant question therefore is whether the claim fails to recite sufficient structure for performing those functions, in which case the presumption against means-plusfunction treatment would be overcome. See id. As we have previously explained: What is important is whether the term is one that is understood to describe structure, as opposed to a term that is simply a nonce word or a verbal construct that is not recognized as the name of structure and is simply a substitute for the term “means for.” The court in Personalized Media Communications drew the pertinent distinction in holding that the term “detector,” although broad, is still structural for purposes of section 112 ¶ 6 because it “is not a generic structural term such as ‘means,’ ‘element,’ or ‘device’; nor is it a coined term lacking a clear meaning such as ‘widget’ or ‘ram-a-fram.’” Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Following this, we have found that terms such as “computing unit,” Inventio, 649 F.3d at 1359-60, and “soft start circuit,” Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013), connote sufficient structure to 6 APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. avoid means-plus-function treatment. On the other hand, terms such as “colorant selection mechanism,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and “mechanism for moving said finger,” Welker Bearing, 550 F.3d at 1095-97, have failed to recite sufficient structure to avoid meansplus-function treatment. The term heuristic, which the district court construed as “rules to be applied to data to assist in drawing inferences from that data,” is a vague concept that does not connote known, physical structure in the same way as the terms “computing unit” or “circuit.” Rather, the term heuristic is much more similar to the imprecise terms “mechanism,” “means,” and “element.” Therefore, I would affirm the district court’s conclusion that the heuristic limitations are subject to means-plus-function treatment. If, as the majority concludes—in my view incorrectly—our precedent dictates that the “heuristic” limitations in the ’949 patent are not subject to means-plus-function treatment, then perhaps it is time to revisit the issue of when claim language invokes § 112 ¶ 6, particularly for computer-implemented inventions. As explained above, I see no real difference between the following two claim limitations: a next item means for determining that the one or more finger contacts correspond to a command to transition from displaying a respective item in a set of items to displaying a next item in the set of items; and a next item heuristic for determining that the one or more finger contacts correspond to a command to transition from displaying a respective item in a set of items to displaying a next item in the set of items. APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. 7 The first limitation would surely be construed as a meansplus-function limitation. Yet, although the second limitation provides no more real structure than the first, the majority concludes that it is outside the realm of § 112 ¶ 6. That one minor drafting decision greatly expands the scope of the claim limitation because the claim is not limited to the corresponding structure disclosed in the patent specification. Indeed, under the majority’s view, this case provides a stark example of how patent applicants are able to claim broad functionality without being subject to the restraints imposed by § 112 ¶ 6. As interpreted by the majority, the “next item heuristic” limitation in claim 1 covers any heuristic used by a touch-screen device to determine that “one or more finger contacts correspond to a command to transition from displaying a respective item in a set of items to displaying a next item in the set of items.” And yet, it is undisputed that the patent specification discloses only two such heuristics: a swipe from right to left and a tap on the right side of the screen. In fact, the majority relied on exactly those two heuristics as the necessary “structure” that removed this claim term from the means-plus-function realm altogether. Majority Op. 18. 3 Professor Lemley has recently written on the issue of functional claiming in software patents. Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 905 (2013). He acknowledges this court’s recent case law in which we have been “vigilant in 3 Oddly, in defining “heuristic,” the majority states that it “does not include all means for performing the recited function.” Majority Op. 17. But of course, once this court has ruled that the term is not a means-plusfunction limitation, that term can indeed be construed so broadly. 8 APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. limiting software patentees who write claims in meansplus-function format to the particular algorithms that implement those claims.” Id. at 926. However, he notes that in many cases involving software patents, we have not treated claims as means-plus-function claims at all, leading to problems of overbroad patents: The presence of structure in the form of “a com- puter” or “a processor” or even “the Internet” has led the Federal Circuit to give these claims control over the claimed function however implemented. As a result, software patents have circumvented the limits the 1952 Act places on functional claiming. The result has been a plethora of software patents claimed not on the basis of the technology the patentee actually developed, but on the basis of the function that technology performs. Those claims aren’t limited to or commensurate with what the patentee invented, and they are accord- ingly the ones that patent plaintiffs tend to assert against defendants whose systems bear little re- semblance to what the patentee actually invent- ed. . . . [U]nder this functional claiming rubric the software patents with the least actual technical content end up with the broadest claims: “Its mo- nopoly breadth is a function of its lack of technical specification.” Id. at 926-28 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation Without Re- straint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation 125 (2012)); see also id. at 905 (“[P]atentees claim to own not a particular machine, or even a particular series of steps for achieving a goal, but the goal itself. The resulting overbroad patents overlap and create patent thickets.”). I believe Professor Lemley raises valid concerns about this court’s means-plus-function jurisprudence as it relates to computer-implemented inventions. Although the majority here did not base its conclusion on such generic structural APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. 9 terms as “a computer” or “a processor,” the end result is the same: Apple’s ’949 patent is construed broadly to cover the function performed by the heuristics, not the specific heuristics disclosed in the specification. This outcome should compel our court to reconsider when we treat functional claims as means-plus-function claims.
Because I would affirm the district court’s conclusion that the heuristics limitations are means-plus-function limitations, I would therefore reach Apple’s alternative argument regarding the corresponding structure for the term “next item heuristic.” The ’949 patent specification contains two examples of a next item heuristic: a tap on the right side of the touchscreen and a right-to-left horizontal swipe. See, e.g., ’949 patent col. 34 ll. 12-16 (“In some embodiments, the user can also initiate viewing of the next image by making a tap gesture 1620 on the right side of the image. In some embodiments, the user can also initiate viewing of the next image by making a swipe gesture 1616 from right to left on the image.” (emphases added)). Nevertheless, the district court rejected the horizontal swipe as corresponding structure for the claimed next item heuristic. The district court reasoned that a horizontal finger swipe fell within the scope of another claimed heuristic— namely the “two-dimensional screen translation heuristic” in the prior claim limitation. The district court did not see how “the same user finger movement [could be] understood to communicate two separate commands.” J.A. 93. Therefore, the court limited the next item heuristic’s corresponding structure to “a heuristic that uses as one input a user’s finger tap on the right side of the device’s touch screen.” J.A. 94. Apple argues—and I agree—that the district court failed to consider that the heuristics might apply in different scenarios. For example, in describing the photo 10 APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. album application depicted in Figure 16A of the ’949 patent, the specification explains that the user can “initiate viewing of the next image by making a swipe gesture 1616 from right to left on the image.” ’949 patent col. 34 ll. 14-16. The specification goes on to explain, however, that “if just a portion of image 1606 is displayed, in response to detecting a finger drag or swipe (e.g., 1626), the displayed portion of the image is translated in accordance with the direction of the drag or swipe gesture (e.g., vertical, horizontal, or diagonal translation).” Id. at col. 35 ll. 19-24. In other words, a horizontal swipe will be treated differently depending on whether a full image is displayed or the user has zoomed in on a portion of the image. There is nothing in the claim language that requires that the “two-dimensional screen translation heuristic” and “next item heuristic” apply in the same context. Therefore, I would reverse the district court’s decision to limit the corresponding structure to a finger tap on the right side of the screen, and would reverse the grant of summary judgment of non-infringement for the accused products that use a “swipe” gesture as a next item heuristic. II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ’949 PATENT While I concur in the judgment reversing and re- manding the district court’s exclusion of the testimony of Apple’s expert, Brian Napper, based on his erroneous claim construction, I write separately to note my agreement with the district court that Napper’s reliance on the Magic Trackpad was inherently unreliable. The majority concludes that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of Apple’s expert, Brian Napper, for two reasons. First, the district court’s analysis was based on an incorrect claim construction. Majority Op. 42-43. Specifically, the district court criticized Napper for failing to isolate the value to consumers of the “tap for APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. 11 next item” functionality, and for failing to consider alternatives to a $35 million royalty that would enable Motorola to provide this functionality. See J.A. 112-14. These criticisms were based on the district court’s conclusion that the ’949 patent’s claimed “next item heuristic” was a means-plus-function claim that was limited to a tap on the right-hand side of the screen to turn to the next item. See J.A. 112. The majority determined that this claim construction was erroneous because the “next item heuristic” was not a means-plus-function limitation. Majority Op. 21. As explained above, I would affirm the district court’s construction of the “heuristic” claim terms as means-plus-function limitations, but would reverse the court’s ruling that the scope of the corresponding structure for the “next item heuristic” is limited to a tap on the right-hand side of the screen. Thus, although I arrive at the outcome in a different way, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the district court’s exclusion of Napper’s testimony must be reversed and remanded on the basis of its erroneous claim construction. However, unlike the majority, I do not believe the district court abused its discretion in excluding Napper’s testimony as unreliable. The district court determined that Napper’s reliance on the Magic Trackpad to calculate the value of the claimed functionality was unreliable because that product was not a sufficiently comparable benchmark. Specifically, the court said: Napper’s proposed testimony does not provide a reliable basis for inferring the value even of the vertical scrolling feature. The fact that many consumers will pay more for a Magic Trackpad than for a mouse tells one nothing about what they will pay to avoid occasionally swiping unsuccessfully because their swiping finger wasn’t actually vertical to the screen. Maybe consumers would pay $2, but there is no evidence they would, or at least none furnished by Napper. 12 APPLE INC. v. MOTOROLA, INC. J.A. 115. It is true that our precedent supports looking to the cost of benchmark commercial products in determining the value of a defendant’s infringement. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853-56 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, as even Apple concedes, the Trackpad “contains none of the function asserted from the ’949 patent.” Motorola Response Br. 39; see also Apple Reply Br. 70 (acknowledging that “[t]hat is true”). Napper therefore began his analysis from a highly questionable starting point. And because the Trackpad does not contain any of the claimed functionality, the discounts Napper applied to get from $20 to $2 (supposedly because the Trackpad contains more features than those claimed by the ’949 patent) appear to be completely arbitrary. Accordingly, I do not believe the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Napper’s proposed testimony failed to provide a reliable basis for inferring the value of the claimed functionality. On remand, I do not think it would be reversible error for the district court to again prohibit Apple from relying on such unreliable testimony.