Opinion ID: 2112894
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Agreement

Text: The determination whether an enforceable contract exists, when based on the contract documents, is a question of law .... Rosenthal v. National Produce Co., 573 A.2d 365, 369 n. 9 (D.C.1990). When the determination is based on oral representations, it is likewise [a question] of law. Id. We therefore review de novo the trial court's decision that no contract existed; the clearly erroneous standard of review does not apply. See L.K. Comstock & Co. v. United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., 880 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir. 1989) (factual findings [by the court] as to what the parties said or did are reviewed under the `clearly erroneous' standard, while principles of contract interpretation applied to the facts are reviewed de novo); United States v. John McShain, Inc., 103 U.S.App. D.C. 328, 330-331, 258 F.2d 422, 424-425, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832, 79 S.Ct. 52, 3 L.Ed.2d 70 (1958). As the parties asserting the existence of a contract, appellants have the burden of proving that one existed. Jack Baker, Inc. v. Office Space Development Corp., 664 A.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C.1995). In the District of Columbia and virtually everywhere else, [f]or an enforceable contract to exist, there must be both (1) agreement as to all material terms, and (2) intention of the parties to be bound. Georgetown Entertainment Corp. v. District of Columbia, 496 A.2d 587, 590 (D.C. 1985) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Davis v. Winfield, 664 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C.1995) (`to establish a contract the minds of the parties must be in agreement as to its terms' (citations omitted)). Unless the statute of frauds requires otherwise in a particular case, the contract need not be written; parties may be bound by their oral agreement if it meets the dual requirements of intent and completeness. Jack Baker, 664 A.2d at 1238 (citations omitted). Appellants maintain that the agreement between KAI and Ikam was embodied in the document that KAI executed on March 13, 1998, even though Ikam never executed that document. Specifically, the proposed contract contained a clause stating that Ikam will pay Kramer Associates, Inc.... a deposit of U.S. $75,000 which will be credited against any payment requirements. It also contained two paragraphs which provided for start-up payments of $50,000 for financing work (paragraph 3) and $25,000 for marketing (paragraph 5). Mr. Kramer stated at trial that [paragraphs] three and five add up to seventy-five thousand and those are the two projects ... that we worked on. [6] Thus, appellants argue, the fact that Mr. Amoa-Marfo ultimately transferred a total of $75,000 to KAI and Mr. Kramer (even though Mr. Amoa-Marfo did not sign the document), coupled with the fact that KAI embarked on the work agreed to, is evidence that the parties were proceeding in accordance with the arrangements described in the agreement.... Appellants are correct in asserting that the absence of Mr. Amoa-Marfo's signature on the proposed contract does not, by itself, invalidate any potential agreement between the parties. See Davis v. Winfield, 664 A.2d at 838. While a meeting of the minds, or mutual assent, is most clearly evidenced by the terms of a signed written agreement ... such a signed writing is not essential to the formation of a contract. The parties' acts at the time of the making of the contract are also indicative of a meeting of the minds.... Id. (citations omitted). Contrary to appellants' assertions, however, the parties' acts in this case do not prove mutual assent, and the trial judge was correct in so concluding. Appellants insist that the $75,000 was a non-refundable start-up fee to induce KAI to begin work on the projects, which KAI did. Appellee, on the other hand, characterizes the $75,000 as seed money, held as a good faith deposit in an effort to induce investors .... In support of this interpretation, appellee cites numerous communications from Mr. Amoa-Malfo in which he asked for a refund of part or all of the money. [7] Appellee also provided testimony from Mr. Poku-Kwateng, who participated in the initial telephone calls with the parties, that he understood the $75,000 to be seed money. Given this conflict in the evidence as to the purpose of the $75,000 transfer, we hold that the trial court could, and did, reasonably find that appellants failed to prove there was an agreement as to all material terms of the contract. Neither the (unsigned) contract itself nor the parties' actions pursuant to their negotiations support the argument that there was an agreement as to the purpose of the $75,000. Moreover, as we pointed out in the Rosenthal case: A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is. It is not enough that the parties think that they have made a contract; they must have expressed their intentions in a manner that is capable of understanding. It is not even enough that they have actually agreed, if their expressions, when interpreted in the light of accompanying factors and circumstances, are not such that the court can determine what the terms of that agreement are. Vagueness of expression, indefiniteness, and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms of the agreement have often been held to prevent the creation of an enforceable contract. Rosenthal, 573 A.2d at 369-370 ( quoting 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 95, at 394 (1963)). In this case, not only did Mr. Amoa-Marfo fail to sign the proposed contract, but he clearly believed that he was entitled to the return of at least some of the money. While it may be true that Mr. Kramer saw the $75,000 payment as an assent to the terms of the written contract, it is equally plausible that Mr. Amoa-Marfo understood, as his faxes suggest, that the money was transferred in trust to prove his credibility. Thus, even if both parties believed that a contract had been formed, [8] it would be impossible for any court to determine what the terms of that contract were, since nowhere in the record is there any clear indication of the actual purpose of the $75,000 transfer. In these circumstances, we simply cannot say that the promises and performance to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain. Rosenthal, 573 A.2d at 370.