Opinion ID: 2555770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Jury Instructions as to the Presumption of Life

Text: In Issue 12, Appellant argues that the trial court's penalty phase jury instructions erroneously required the jury to reject death, thereby unconstitutionally shift[ing] the sentencing-stage burden of persuasion from the Commonwealth to the defense, undermin[ing] the presumption of life afforded defendants in capital sentencing proceedings, and violat[ing] the Pennsylvania sentencing statute and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellant's Brief at 69. Appellant also asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions. Id. Appellant challenges specifically the portion of the court's instruction that directed the jury how to fill out the sentencing verdict slip. However, because, when reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, we must consider the entire charge, not just selected portions thereof, see Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 1122, 1138 (2007), we set forth much of the instruction in the paragraphs below: Your verdict must be a sentence of death if you unanimously findthat is if you all findat least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. If you do not all agree on one or the other of these findings, then the only verdict that you may return is a sentence of life imprisonment. N.T. Penalty Phase, 5/17/96, at 1905 (Jury Instructions). The trial court then instructed the jury regarding the differing burdens of proof applicable to the Commonwealth and the defendant with regard to, respectively, aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The instruction continued with an explanation of each of the proffered aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, and then continued as follows: As I told you earlier, you must agree unanimously on one of two general findings before you can sentence the defendant to death. [The general findings] are a finding that there is at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, or a finding that there are one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.    If you all agree on either one of the two general findings, then you can and must sentence the defendant to death. When voting on the general findings, you are to regard a particular aggravating circumstance as present only if you all agree that it is present. On the other hand, each of you is free to regard a particular mitigating circumstance as present, despite what other jurors may believe..... This different treatment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is one of the law's safeguards against unjust death sentences. It gives a defendant the full benefit of any mitigating circumstances. It is closely related to the burden of proof requirements. Remember, the Commonwealth must prove any aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. While the defendant only has to prove any mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. [sic] If you do not agree unanimously on a death sentence, and on one of the two general findings that would support it, then you have two immediate options. You may either continue to discuss the case and deliberate the possibility of a death sentence, or if all of you agree to do so, you may stop deliberating and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. If you should come to a point where you have deliberated conscientiously and thoroughly, and still cannot all agree either to sentence the defendant to death or to stop deliberating and sentence him to life imprisonment, report that to me. If it seems to me that you are hopelessly deadlocked, it will be my duty to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. I now ask you to pick up the verdict slip again..... I shall now give you specific directions about how to complete this part of the verdict slip. Before you can sentence the defendant to death, you must all agree on a general finding in either B-1 on page three, or B-2, beginning on the top of page four.    Remember, you can stop deliberating and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment only if you all agree to do so..... [I]f your sentence is life imprisonment, you should check the finding either C-1 or C-2 which will explain why you are rejecting the death penalty and imposing a life sentence. If the reason for rejecting the death penalty is that one or more of you find no aggravating circumstances, check C-1. If the reasons for rejecting death is that, although all of you agree on at least one aggravating circumstance, one or more of you find that mitigating circumstances are not outweighed by aggravating circumstances, then you would check C-2. N.T. Penalty Phase, 5/17/96, at 1911-14 (Jury Instructions). Appellant contends that, by repeatedly using the phrase rejecting death, the trial court failed to make clear that life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence unless the Commonwealth met its high burden of persuasion that death should be imposed. Appellant's Brief at 70. In rejecting Appellant's claim of error with respect to this instruction, the PCRA court cited Commonwealth v. Eichinger, supra , for the proposition that the words presumption of life were not mandatory in a capital penalty phase jury instruction. PCRA Court Opinion at 56. The PCRA court concluded that the trial court had adequately explained the deliberately disparate treatment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and had made clear that life in prison is the appropriate sentence unless the Commonwealth has carried its high burden of proof. Id. We agree. In Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288, 300 (1983), this Court acknowledged that, in some sense, a presumption of life is inherent in the capital sentencing statute. This presumption arises from the limited number of statutory aggravating circumstances, any one of which the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, as compared to the wide latitude granted for mitigating circumstances, which the defendant need prove only by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In Eichinger, supra at 1137, the appellant relied on Travaglia to allege denial of due process by the trial court because it had declined to include an explicit presumption of life jury instruction. We recognized that life has intrinsic value and should not be taken by the state without good cause, proven to our highest standard, whereas life imprisonment remains our default punishment for capital cases. Id. at 1138. However, consistent with this Court's policy to give trial courts latitude and discretion in the phrasing of jury instructions, we held that the words presumption of life were not explicitly required in penalty phase instructions. We clarified what was required in a proper instruction as follows: An explanation of the deliberately disparate treatment of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the applicable standards of proof and a clear indication that life in prison is the sentence unless the Commonwealth meets its high burden is sufficient to convey the fact that life is presumed. Id.; accord, Commonwealth v. Lesko, ___ Pa. ___, 15 A.3d 345 (2011). Based on our review of the entire jury instruction, we conclude that the trial court here met this standard. The trial court clearly explained and provided the correct rationale for the disparate treatment of and the distinct standard of proof applicable to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In addition, the trial court stated directly and indirectly that life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence unless the Commonwealth met its high burden of proof with regard to aggravating factors. In fact, the instruction here in its entirety was very similar to the one challenged in Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 589 Pa. 682, 910 A.2d 672, 682-84 (2006) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court), even to the point of using the phrase rejecting the death penalty or rejecting death three times. We concluded that there was no merit to the Marinelli appellant's claim that the repeated use of the word reject rendered the instructions erroneous. [32] We reach the same conclusion here, and accordingly hold that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions. [33]