Opinion ID: 166395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: bivens claims against employees of a private prison

Text: 17 Thirty-four years ago, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs may sue federal officials in their individual capacities for damages for Fourth Amendment violations, even in the absence of an express statutory cause of action analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619. In that case, agents from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, acting under color of federal law, unlawfully entered and searched Mr. Bivens' apartment and unlawfully arrested him. The Court concluded that although Congress had not statutorily provided a remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment and that the amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation, federal courts have the power, in certain situations, to imply such a cause of action directly from the Constitution. Id. at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999. 18 In making this determination, the Court first noted that it had long since rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment proscribes only such conduct as would, if engaged by private persons, be condemned by state law. Id. at 392, 91 S.Ct. 1999. Second, the Court noted that Mr. Bivens might not have a cause of action under state law — namely, trespass — because a person is generally not considered to be a trespasser if the property owner has consented to the alleged trespasser's entry. Id. at 394, 91 S.Ct. 1999. Finally, the Court explained that damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty, id. at 395, 91 S.Ct. 1999, and that the case at hand presented no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress such that an implied cause of action for damages should not be permitted, id. at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999. 19 Since Bivens, the Court has implied a cause of action for money damages directly under the Constitution on only two other occasions. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), the Court employed nearly the same reasoning it used in Bivens and held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for money damages against her former employer, a member of the United States Congress, for violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court emphasized the importance of the dearth of alternate remedies, stating there are available no other alternative forms of judicial relief. For Davis, as for Bivens, `it is damages or nothing.' 442 U.S. at 245, 99 S.Ct. 2264 (quoting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410, 91 S.Ct. 1999). 20 One year later, in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), the Court held that federal prison officials may be sued for violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, notwithstanding the fact that unlike the plaintiffs in Bivens and Davis, the plaintiff in Carlson had another remedy. Shifting slightly from its reasoning in Bivens and Davis, the Court explained that Bivens actions are presumed to be available but that [s]uch a cause of action may be defeated . . . in two situations. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18, 100 S.Ct. 1468. First, the defendants may show the existence of `special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.' Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999). Second, the defendants may show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective. Id. at 18-19, 100 S.Ct. 1468. 21 Noting that the defendants in Carlson were not members of another branch of government, the Court concluded that there were no special factors counseling hesitation. Id. at 19, 100 S.Ct. 1468. The Court then determined that Congress had not explicitly declared any other remedy to be a substitute for a Bivens action. Although the plaintiff could have brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court reasoned that it was crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action. Id. at 19-20, 100 S.Ct. 1468. 22 The Court then went on to identify four other factors that demonstrated a lack of congressional intent that the FTCA should defeat a Bivens cause of action. Id. at 20-21, 100 S.Ct. 1468. First, because only the United States — as opposed to an individual official — could be sued under the FTCA, Bivens is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy. Id. at 21, 100 S.Ct. 1468. Second, punitive damages might be available under Bivens, but not under the FTCA. Id. at 21-22, 100 S.Ct. 1468. Third, a plaintiff may have a jury in Bivens, whereas only judges hear FTCA claims. Id. at 22, 100 S.Ct. 1468. And fourth, the viability of an FTCA claim turns on the law of the state in which the action occurred, but it is obvious that the liability of federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules. Id. at 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468. 23 Since Carlson was decided in 1980, however, the Court has refused to recognize a cause of action for money damages directly from the Constitution in any other case. In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), the Court declined to imply a Bivens action for enlisted military personnel who alleged that they had been injured by the unconstitutional actions of their superior officers and who had no remedy against the Government itself. The Court reasoned that [t]aken together, the unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment and Congress' [unique] activity in the field constitute `special factors' which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivens -type remedy against their superior officers. Id. at 304, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) (holding Bivens actions inapplicable to military personnel whenever the injury arises out of activity `incident to service.'). 24 That same year, the Court refused to recognize a Bivens claim for First Amendment violations aris[ing] out of [a government] employment relationship that is governed by comprehensive procedural and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the United States. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). The Court held that because the congressionally installed administrative system provide[d] meaningful remedies for employees who may have been unfairly disciplined for making critical comments about their agencies, id. at 386, 103 S.Ct. 2404 (note omitted), a Bivens action was inappropriate even though it assumed a First Amendment violation had occurred and acknowledged that the administrative remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff, id. at 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999. 25 Similarly, in Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988), the Court considered the propriety of Bivens claims filed by disabled social security beneficiaries who eventually received benefits but who had not been given a remedy in damages for emotional distress or for other hardships suffered because of delays in their receipt of Social Security benefits. The Court reasoned that because Congress . . . has addressed the problems created by state agencies' wrongful termination of disability benefits through the creation of wide-ranging administrative remedies, a Bivens action would be inappropriate. Id. at 429, 108 S.Ct. 2460. 26 In FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473-74, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), the Court considered whether a Bivens action could be brought directly against a federal agency, as opposed to the federal agents in their individual capacities. The Court declined to extend Bivens to such an action because it would eviscerate the Bivens remedy. It reasoned that if it impl[ied] a damages action against federal agencies . . . there would be no reason . . . to bring damages actions against individual officers [and]. . . the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost. Id. at 485, 114 S.Ct. 996. The Court also added that unlike in Bivens, there are `special factors counselling hesitation' in the creation of a damages remedy [against a federal agency]. If we were to recognize a direct action for damages against federal agencies, we would be creating a potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government. Id. at 486, 114 S.Ct. 996 (citation omitted).
27 Four years ago, the Supreme Court in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456, underscored its hesitation to imply a Bivens cause of action in a new circumstance. In that case, Mr. Malesko, a federal offender, sued Correctional Services Corporation (CSC), a private corporation under contract with the federal Bureau of Prisons to operate a halfway house. While Mr. Malesko was in CSC custody, its employees forced him to climb stairs to his fifth floor living quarters even though he had a known heart condition that entitled him to use the elevator. During his ascent, he suffered a heart attack, fell, and was injured. Mr. Malesko brought a Bivens action alleging Eighth Amendment violations against CSC for actual and punitive damages. The Court held that Meyer forecloses the extension of Bivens to private entities. 4 534 U.S. at 66 n. 2, 122 S.Ct. 515. 28 In holding that Mr. Malesko did not have a Bivens claim against CSC, the Court applied the core premise of Bivens — which is concerned solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers — without discussing the two-part test laid out in Carlson (i.e., whether there are special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress or whether Congress provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective). See id. at 67, 71, 122 S.Ct. 515. The Court explained that it implied a cause of action in Davis chiefly because the plaintiff lacked any other remedy for the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. at 67, 122 S.Ct. 515 (emphasis added). And it implied a cause of action in Carlson because the only other available remedy — the Federal Tort Claims Act — was an insufficient deterrent to individuals because only the United States was subject to suit under the FTCA. The Court then recognized that it has consistently rejected invitations to extend Bivens  except to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally [as in Carlson ], or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy [as in Davis ]. Id. at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515. Neither circumstance was present in Malesko. 29 The Court found that Mr. Malesko did not lack an alternative remedy in part because of the existence of a state law claim for negligence. Id. at 74, 122 S.Ct. 515. The Court also explained that no federal prisoner enjoyed [Mr. Malesko's] contemplated remedy — namely, a Bivens suit against the prison or the United States — and that Congress, rather than the Court, was the more appropriate branch to impose asymmetrical liability costs on private prison facilities. Id. at 71-72, 122 S.Ct. 515. 30 Therefore, the Court determined that Mr. Malesko is not a plaintiff in search of a remedy as in Bivens and Davis. Nor does he seek a cause of action against an individual officer, otherwise lacking, as in Carlson.  Id. at 74, 122 S.Ct. 515. Moreover, the Court said that [t]he caution toward extending Bivens into any new context, a caution consistently and repeatedly recognized for three decades, forecloses such an extension here. Id.
31 Following Malesko, three district courts — but no Court of Appeals — have considered whether the existence of a state-law cause of action for damages, standing alone, precludes a Bivens claim against an employee of a privately operated prison. The courts fall into two groups. The District of Rhode Island issued the lead opinion in the first group, holding that the existence of state-law relief does not necessarily bar a Bivens cause of action against such individual defendants. Sarro v. Cornell Corrections, Inc., 248 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I.2003); see also Jama v. INS, 343 F.Supp.2d 338, 362-63 (D.N.J.2004) (adopting Sarro ); Purkey v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 339 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1148-51 (D.Kan.2004) (same). The case in the opposing group is one of the cases under review in which the District Court held that because other remedies are available — including state negligence actions — the Supreme Court would not extend Bivens to private employees of government contractors. This Court cannot ignore Malesko's statement that where a state remedy is available, the Supreme Court will not imply a new Bivens action. Peoples I, 2004 WL 74317 at . 5 We start with the Sarro decision. 32 The facts in Sarro are quite similar to those in Peoples I. The plaintiff was in pretrial detention at the Donald Wyatt Detention Center in Rhode Island, a privately run prison under contract with the Marshal Service. The plaintiff feared that he would be attacked by African-American inmates, and asked the guards several times to be put in protective custody. The guards refused. Then during a fire drill, the plaintiff was attacked and injured. The plaintiff brought a Bivens claim alleging Eighth Amendment violations against the corporation and the individual guards. The Sarro court held that Malesko barred the suit against the corporation, but that the suit against the guards could proceed. 33 In considering the impact of Malesko, the Sarro court noted that the core purpose of a Bivens suit is to deter individuals and found that because the plaintiff was suing individual guards, this purpose was served. 248 F.Supp.2d at 62-63. Next, the court found that allowing a Bivens suit against an individual guard would foster parity between prisoners held in BOP prisons and private prisons. Id. Finally, the court considered the effect of the availability of other remedies. The court noted that, unlike Malesko, Mr. Sarro did not have access to alternative federal remedies because he was held in pretrial detention. Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (2001) (BOP administrative remedies do[] not apply to inmates confined in other non-federal facilities.). 34 As to the possibility of a state tort claim, the court explained: 35 [W]hile Malesko indicates that the existence of state law remedies may be a factor to be considered, in applying Bivens, state law remedies cannot be construed as a manifestation of Congressional intent to preclude the application of Bivens. Indeed, making the federal remedies available to a federal prisoner at a privately-operated institution contingent upon whether there are adequate alternative state law remedies would require a case-by-case analysis of state law and would cause the availability of a Bivens remedy to vary according to the state in which the institution is located, a result that Bivens, itself sought to avoid. 36 Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Sarro court held that a Bivens action could be brought against guards of a privately run, federal, pretrial detention facility. 37 Peoples I was decided after Sarro. After considering Sarro's reasoning, the District Court concluded that it has some appeal but declined to follow it. 2004 WL 74317 at . Instead, the District Court determined that, under Malesko, if a state tort claim may be brought, then Bivens is not available; it reasoned that  Malesko makes it clear that because [Mr. Peoples] has a negligence remedy, a majority of the Supreme Court would not imply a Bivens claim against individual CCA employees. Id. at . That is to say, the District Court held that the possibility of a state-law remedy is a sufficient reason, standing alone, not to imply a Bivens action. It then granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 38 As noted earlier, the District Court did, in fact, have jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Peoples's Eighth Amendment claim. We agree with the District Court, however, that there is no implied private right of action for damages under Bivens against employees of a private prison for alleged constitutional deprivations when alternative state or federal causes of action for damages are available to the plaintiff. Such a claim is therefore properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). We base our holding upon the Court's statements in Malesko that the purpose of Bivens is only to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally [as in Carlson ], or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy [as in Davis ]. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515. An alternative cause of action for damages against an individual defendant eliminates either of those two circumstances, and therefore Bivens and its limited progeny do not apply in such a case. 39 We recognize that at first blush Carlson may appear to control this case. In Carlson, because the United States was potentially liable under the FTCA, there appears to have been a state-law cause of action available against the private individual defendants for the particular Eighth Amendment violation at issue. 6 The Court nonetheless held that Bivens was available, which might indicate that a state tort cause of action will not preclude a Bivens cause of action. 40 Importantly, however, the Court in Carlson did not address the specific question of whether a potential state law cause of action against and individual will preclude an implied Bivens claim. Instead, the Court stated that the issue was whether a remedy [is] available directly under the Constitution, given that respondent's allegations could also support a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act? Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16-17, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (emphasis added). Answering in the affirmative, the Court reasoned that Congress had not explicitly provided that the FTCA should supplant Bivens claims in part because only the United States — rather than the individual officers — could be sued under the FTCA. 41 Later, the Malesko Court underscored that this was the issue in Carlson, stating that [i]n Carlson, we inferred a right of action against individual prison officials where the plaintiff's only alternative was a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States. We reasoned that the threat of suit against the United States was insufficient to deter the unconstitutional acts of individuals. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (citations omitted). Indeed, according to the Malesko Court, the sole purpose in extending Bivens in Carlson was to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers. Id. at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515. 42 This is not to say, however, that we do not recognize the tension between Carlson and Malesko. The Malesko Court's reading of Carlson perhaps is not the only reading of that case, but we note that — indeed, as we described above — the Court has explained its approach to Bivens claims in a variety of ways in the thirty-four years since Bivens itself was decided. We therefore think it prudent to follow the Court's most recent pronouncement on the issue. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 822 n. 2, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme Court has an obligation to try to harmonize its holdings). 43 Moreover, the Court has often focused upon the availability of alternative administrative procedures to provide meaningful, although not necessarily complete, redress for constitutional violations when determining whether a Bivens claim is available. See, e.g., Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 421-23, 108 S.Ct. 2460; Bush, 462 U.S. at 380-81, 388, 103 S.Ct. 2404. It follows, then, that the presence of an alternative cause of action against individual defendants provides sufficient redress such that a Bivens cause of action need not be implied. We also point out that in many cases, state law may provide more meaningful relief than Bivens itself; for example, the limitations imposed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act do not apply to state law claims. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3626(d) (The limitations on remedies in this section shall not apply to relief entered by a State court based solely upon claims arising under State law.). 44 We also note that our holding is not contrary to the Supreme Court's admonition to avoid creating asymmetrical liability costs on privately operated facilities as compared to government-operated facilities. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72, 122 S.Ct. 515. There is no doubt that our holding renders federally employed guards subject to a Bivens claim while privately employed guards might not. This asymmetry, however, existed prior to today's holding; it was not created by this decision. An implied right, by definition, is created by the courts and therefore cannot exist until it is judicially announced. We are cognizant that it is not the prerogative of federal courts, as Malesko underscored, to impose costs on one wrongdoer and not another. Our decision today — which simply declines to imply a cause of action directly from the Constitution such that a prisoner in a privately operated prison may sue a private employee of that prison for money damages for alleged constitutional violations notwithstanding the presence of an alternative cause of action — does not do so. 45 Finally, the dissent points out — and we agree — that there certainly are significant policy arguments that favor extending Bivens to the case at hand, including creating state-federal uniformity between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits and Bivens claims. In our view, however, extending this judicially-created remedy so that it more closely mirrors a statutory remedy is a decision best left for Congress. 46 In sum, Malesko indicates that a Bivens claim should not be implied unless the plaintiff has no other means of redress or unless he is seeking an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against the individual defendant. Therefore, we will not imply a Bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility when we conclude that there exists an alternative cause of action arising under either state or federal law against the individual defendant for the harm created by the constitutional deprivation. While there certainly are points to be made that would favor implying a Bivens claim in such a scenario, we are reminded that [t]he caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any new context, a caution consistently and repeatedly recognized for three decades, forecloses such an extension here. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74, 122 S.Ct. 515.