Opinion ID: 45549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Garnishment Action

Text: 10 The first issue of this consolidated appeal is whether the district court erred by dissolving the writs of garnishment on the ground that Texas law does not allow the garnishment of nonmonetary obligations. 11 Garnishment actions in Texas are purely statutory and courts have no power to extend the benefits of garnishment beyond the relief available under statute. Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039, 1042 (1937); see also 17 TEX. JUR.3D Creditors' Rights and Remedies § 359 (1998). The Texas garnishment statute, however, does not address the question posed here. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. ch. 63 (Vernon 1997). It makes no mention of nonmonetary debts. Likewise, no Texas case has specifically considered whether a nonmonetary obligation can be subject to garnishment.
12 Our analysis of this issue is guided by the fact that garnishment has been long considered [a] harsh remed[y] by Texas courts. Varner v. Koons, 888 S.W.2d 511, 513 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1994, orig. proceeding); cf. Beggs, 106 S.W.2d at 1042 (describing garnishees as strangers to an action who are subjected to inconvenience and hazard). Indeed, Texas case law requires us to strictly construe the Texas garnishment statute. See Varner, 888 S.W.2d at 513. Given this task of strict construction, we find that expanding the garnishment statute to cover nonmonetary obligations goes too far. This holding conforms with the principle that courts do not have the equitable power to expand the purely statutory garnishment remedy. Beggs, 106 S.W.2d at 1042. 13 Our conclusion is informed by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 668, which provides that in the event it is determined that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant in any amount, or was so indebted when the writ of garnishment was served, the court shall render judgment for the plaintiff against the garnishee for the amount so admitted or found to be due to the defendant from the garnishee. TEX.R. CIV. P. 668 (emphasis added). This rule does not contemplate indebtedness as encompassing obligations other than money. See Waples-Platter Grocer Co. v. Tex. & Pac. Ry., 95 Tex. 486, 68 S.W. 265, 266 (1902) (holding that an unliquidated claim for breach of contract cannot be garnished); Willis v. Heath, 75 Tex. 124, 12 S.W. 971, 972 (1889) (holding that a negotiable promissory instrument cannot be garnished). Indeed, Texas courts define the term debt as a specified sum of money owing to one person from another. See Seay v. Hall, 677 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. 1984), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Palmer v. Coble Wall Trust Co., 851 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex.1992). Given that the CMS Companies have a nonmonetary obligation to pay in kind oil to the Congo, it cannot be garnished under Texas law. 14 Af-Cap has failed to point this Court to any authority that proves Texas allows the garnishment of nonmonetary debts. Instead, it mistakenly relies on authority related to effects. The Texas garnishment statute contemplates garnishment of (1) debts, money owed to a defendant, and (2) effects, tangible property owned by the defendant in possession of the garnishee. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 63.003(a) (After service of a writ of garnishment, the garnishee may not deliver any effects or pay any debt to the defendant.). The only way the effects provision could be applicable here is if a physical object in the possession of the CMS Companies were the subject of this garnishment. That is simply not the case. Indeed, this Court already determined in Af-Cap II that the royalty obligation at issue does not have physical characteristics. 383 F.3d at 371 ([T]his property is intangible in nature.). Therefore, the issue before us concerns a debt, and the effects authority relied upon by Af-Cap is inapposite. 4 15 To conclude, this case turns on the fact that the obligation at issue is nonmonetary. The CMS Companies, operating under the Convention, do not owe money to the Congo; they owe oil. Af-Cap does not ask this Court to allow it to garnish that oil, assuming it could do so under the FSIA, and instead seeks to be the beneficiary of the nonmonetary obligation. As explained above, Texas does not allow garnishment of this type of debt. Therefore, the district court did not err in dissolving the writs of garnishment.
16 Af-Cap also argues that the district court's holding contravenes the law of the case. [U]nlike res judicata, the law of the case doctrine applies only to issues that were actually decided, rather than all questions in the case that might have been decided, but were not. Alpha/Omega Ins. Servs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 272 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir.2001). An issue is actually decided if the court explicitly decided it or necessarily decided it by implication. Id. Af-Cap II only addressed whether the obligations at issue were immune from garnishment under FSIA. There is nothing in Af-Cap II that interprets state garnishment law. Therefore, the district court correctly questioned whether such an obligation could be garnishable in Texas. 17 Af-Cap also argues that, as a plaintiff in a garnishment action, it can step[ ] into the shoes of the Congo and elect to receive the royalty payments in cash. See Rowley v. Lake Area Nat'l Bank, 976 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). This reasoning, however, ignores the chronology of a garnishment proceeding. The writs at issue must first capture a debt before a garnishor can step into the shoes of the creditor. If this were not the rule, would-be garnishors could manipulate assets so that a writ could attach. Here, the writs failed to capture anything, given that the obligation is nonmonetary. Therefore, Af-Cap has no authority to request payment in cash.