Opinion ID: 3011737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Date of the last action which constituted

Text: part of the breach Having concluded that the six-year limitations period is applicable to plaintiffs' claims, we must determine when that period began to run, i.e., the date of the last action which constituted a part of the breach. Unisys insists that this text focuses on the last action of the fiduciary which was in violation of its fiduciary duty. While it does not maintain that the current record pinpoints the date upon which the last alleged misrepresentation was made, it correctly points out that insofar as decisions to retire are concerned, a retiree's date of r etirement is necessarily the last date upon which Unisys could have made a r elevant misrepresentation or upon which a clarifying communication could have prevented detrimental reliance. Unisys therefore asks us to affir m the District Court's grant of summary judgment against those members of the plaintiffs' class who retired mor e than six years before the date on which their case was originally filed, in 1992. The retirees, on the other hand, contend that the date of the last action which constituted part of the br each was November 3, 1992, the date on which Unisys announced the termination of its lifetime plans. They argue that S 1113 must be interpreted in this manner because no 14 actual harm occurred and thus no legitimate claim of breach of fiduciary duty arose until Unisys terminated the plans that it initially had misrepresented. Even though the retirees concede that the termination of the old plans was a non-fiduciary act, they nevertheless insist that a nonfiduciary act can constitute part of the br each or violation of fiduciary duty if it is the final act that gives rise to a cause of action. In Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475 (3d Cir. 2000), this Court recently reviewed the elements of a breach of fiduciary duty claim like that of the plaintiffs here. We found the controlling pr ecepts in our prior decision in this case: An employee may recover for a breach of fiduciary duty if he or she proves that an employer , acting as a fiduciary, made a material misrepresentation that would confuse a reasonable beneficiary about his or her benefits, and the beneficiary acted ther eupon to his or her detriment. Id. at 492, citing Unisys II, 57 F .3d at 1264. Given these elements of a claim for breach offiduciary duty in this context, it necessarily follows that any breach that may have occurred was completed, and a claim based thereon accrued, no later than the date upon which the employee relied to his detriment on the misr epresentations. Surely, any employee who sought counsel and who took early retirement based on Unisys' expr ess assurance that she possessed guaranteed lifetime health car e, thereby reducing the amount of pension she would otherwise receive, could bring suit immediately and secur e rescission of her retirement or some other appr opriate equitable relief.7 _________________________________________________________________ 7. The dissenting opinion assumes that an employee misled by Unisys about guaranteed life care benefits would be entitled to a remedy taking into account his or her expectancy interest in such benefits rather than, or perhaps in addition to, the economic loss suffered when he changed position in detrimental reliance on Unisys' conduct. The District Court has not yet addressed what remedies may be available to a retiree who establishes a breach of fiduciary duty, and we, of course, express no opinion on the availability of expectancy compensation or any other form 15 Accordingly, it seems clear to us that the six-year period for such plaintiffs commenced no later than the r espective dates of their retirements.8 We therefore agree with the District Court that the denial of free health care coverage was not an element of the plaintiffs' claim. As the District Court pointed out, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty here concerned the counsel allegedly given or not given, and there is no causal nexus between that counsel and the denial of free health care coverage. In re Unisys Corp., 957 F . Supp. at 639. If Unisys had provided clear and accurate counsel, some r etirements may not have occurred when they did, but ther e is no reason to believe retirees would now have free coverage. As the District Court held, Unisys had a right to ter minate free _________________________________________________________________ of relief. We do note, however, that there is a material difference between the value of a health care plan with guaranteed lifetime benefits and the value of a health care plan with benefits that can be canceled at any time for any reason. Accordingly, if an employee were entitled to an expectancy remedy as a result of r etiring after being told he had the former, when in fact he had the latter , he would be entitled to bring suit immediately for the difference between the value he was promised and the value he received or for specific per formance of the promise to provide a plan or policy with guaranteed lifetime health care. The dissent is correct, however, that a retir ee who chose not to bring a suit for guaranteed lifetime benefits or the value ther eof, and who died before any change in the plan, would serendipitously have wound up in the same position he would have been in had the misr epresentation been true. Accordingly, his estate would have no claim based on lost health care benefits. 8. If the date of the last action which constitutes a part of the breach is the date of Unisys' last misrepresentation, it is theoretically possible that the statute could begin to run before a r etiree could seek relief from a court since detrimental reliance is a necessary element of a breach of fiduciary duty of this kind. We need not decide, however, whether the six year period can begin to run before a br each of fiduciary duty claim accrues. As we have noted, the District Court and the parties have regarded the date of the last relevant misrepresentations and the date of detrimental reliance as being the same date and the only issue briefed is whether that date or the date of the denial of fr ee health care coverage is the legally relevant date. Accordingly, we hold only that the statute began to run no later than the date of alleged detrimental reliance. 16 health care coverage, and it exercised that right in a nonfiduciary capacity. Id. at 638.9 It is not clear to us, however, that the claims of all Sperry retirees who retired befor e November 17, 1986, and all Burroughs retirees who retir ed before December 3, 1986, are barred. While the primary theory of liability being asserted here is clearly that many relied on the misrepresentations to their detriment by deciding to take voluntary retirement, as we explain her eafter, Unisys has not persuaded us that this is the only viable theory of liability. It may well be that retirees who retired before those dates relied to their detriment in making other decisions after those dates. Accordingly, the summary judgment entered by the District Court was overbroad and must be reversed. Summary judgment for Unisys would be appropriate, however, with respect to those who assert claims based solely on retirement decisions made more than six years before suit was filed.