Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Riley's Right to Counsel

Text: Riley argues that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel at 9:00 a.m. on September 9, during the initial interrogation by Detectives Sauls and Garvey, when he checked no in the box next to the question Do you want to make a statement at this time without a lawyer? on the Prince George's County rights waiver form. The trial court found, however, that he did not invoke his Fifth Amendment rights at that time, and there is evidentiary support for its finding. Under case law interpreting the Fifth Amendment, custodial interrogation must cease if, at any time during the questioning, the suspect clearly and explicitly requests an attorney. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). If the suspect clearly requests an attorney, interrogation may lawfully resume only if the suspect initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880. However, the Supreme Court has stated that if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). [13] Police officers have no duty to clarify ambiguous statements that might arguably contain a request for an attorney. Id. at 461-462, 114 S.Ct. 2350; see United States v. Cooper, 85 F.Supp.2d 1, 20 (D.D.C.2000). A court, moreover, must consider the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). The trial court found, as a fact, that Riley did not explicitly invoke this right when he answered no to the question Are you willing to make a statement at this time without a lawyer? The court interpreted this no answer as clearly invoking his right to remain silent, but not his right to an attorney under the Fifth Amendment. In explaining its finding, the court said that when a person answers no to the [question of whether he is willing to make a statement without a lawyer], it is impossible to know whether the person . . . is not willing to make a statement without a lawyer but is willing to make a statement with a lawyer or whether the person is not willing to make a statement. The Prince George's County waiver form, the court said, was inherently ambiguous. [14] The court noted that Riley did not explicitly ask for a lawyer at any time on September 9, and when he was specifically asked late in the day on September 9 whether he had ever requested a lawyer that day, he responded no. Riley further demonstrated that he did not ask for a lawyer when, at 1:43 p.m. on September 9, he again answered no upon being asked whether he was willing to make a statement without a lawyer, but clarified that statement by saying to Detective DeLoatch, I don't want to make a written statement, but I'm willing to talk to you. Taking all of these facts into consideration, we hold that Riley failed to invoke his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. See Gresham v. United States, 654 A.2d 871 (D.C.1995) (holding that defendant's confession to the police need not be suppressed because defendant did not clearly assert his right to counsel during interrogation when he asked his girl friend, in the presence of the police, to call his mother and tell her to get him a lawyer). [15]