Opinion ID: 1155573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Dominant Issue

Text: In Virginia, as in other states, the law of defamation historically has protected a basic interest. The individual's right to personal security includes his uninterrupted entitlement to enjoyment of his reputation. Fuller v. Edwards, 180 Va. 191, 197, 22 S.E.2d 26, 29 (1942). Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86, 86 S.Ct. 669, 676, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966). Under the general framework of defamation law in Virginia prior to 1964, the beginning of a period when major aspects of libel law became federalized, the defamed private citizen had to prove only a false publication that included words which were either actionable per se according to certain fixed principles, or, if not defamatory per se, words which resulted in special damages to the party defamed. See M. Rosenberg & Sons v. Craft, 182 Va. 512, 518, 29 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1944). Upon such publication, [1] malice was inferred and damage to reputation was presumed. See Note, Defamation in VirginiaA Merger of Libel and Slander, 47 Va.L.Rev. 1116, 1117 (1961). And, unless the otherwise libelous statement was privileged or the defendant could establish its truth, Rosenberg v. Mason, 157 Va. 215, 228, 160 S.E. 190, 195 (1931), the publisher was liable for compensatory damages. Upon proof of common-law actual or express malice, the plaintiff was entitled to an award of punitive damages. James v. Haymes, 160 Va. 253, 263, 168 S.E. 333, 337 (1933). Commencing in 1964, however, a series of decisions of the United States Supreme Court caused significant changes in the law of libel.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , the Supreme Court determined for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections of speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. 376 U.S. at 256, 84 S.Ct. at 713. The Court decided that the rules of law applied by the Alabama state courts were constitutionally deficient for failure to provide safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by such a public official. Id. at 264, 84 S.Ct. at 717. The Court held that [t]he constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Id. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 725-26. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), the Court applied the New York Times actual malice standard to state criminal libel statutes that imposed sanctions for criticism of official conduct of public officials. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1966), the Court held that a `public figure' who is not a public official may ... recover [compensatory and punitive] damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. Id. at 155, 87 S.Ct. at 1991. In holding that the standard had been met by the plaintiff in Butts, but not in the companion case of Associated Press v. Walker (decided in the same opinion), the Court rejected the defendant's contention that it could not be subjected to an assessment of punitive damages. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated: Where a publisher's departure from standards of press responsibility is severe enough to strip from him the constitutional protection our decision acknowledges, we think it entirely proper for the State to act not only for the protection of the individual injured but to safeguard all those similarly situated against like abuse. Id. at 161, 87 S.Ct. at 1994. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968), the Court identified evidence that may be employed to establish New York Times actual malice. The majority, through Justice White, noted that evidence of either deliberate falsification or reckless publication `despite the publisher's awareness of probable falsity' was essential to recovery by public officials in defamation actions. Id. at 731, 88 S.Ct. at 1325. The Court then listed certain acts which show the recklessness aspect of actual malice: intentional fabrication by a defendant of facts or communications; basing an article wholly upon an unverified anonymous telephone call; printing allegations so inherently improbable that only a reckless person would put them in circulation; and publication of an article despite obvious reasons to doubt the truth and veracity of the informant upon whom the article relies for accuracy. Id. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326. The Court said that failure to investigate will not in itself establish bad faith, id. at 733, 88 S.Ct. at 1326, but stated that a defendant in a defamation action brought by a public official cannot ... automatically insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true. Id. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), a plurality of the Court, through Justice Brennan, extended the New York Times actual malice standard to publications relating to all matters of public or general concern, irrespective of the public or private nature of the plaintiff. In rejecting the suggested distinction between public officials and public figures on the one hand and private individuals on the other, Justice Brennan focused instead on society's interest in learning about issues of public or general concern. Thus, under Rosenbloom, once a trial court determined that the alleged libel involved a matter of public or general concern, the fact finder should then consider whether New York Times malice had been proved, paying no heed to the plaintiff's status. Three years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the Supreme Court expressly repudiated its holding in Rosenbloom. One commentator states that the Gertz majority sensed the Rosenbloom plurality opinion had nearly destroyed the common law of defamation.... J. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va.L. Rev. 1349, 1409 (1975). In Gertz, a Chicago policeman had shot and killed a youth. Gertz, a reputable attorney, was employed to represent the youth's family in civil litigation against the officer. The defendant published, in its monthly magazine giving the views of the John Birch Society, false statements about Gertz. The publication implied that Gertz had a criminal record and labeled him a Leninist and Communist-fronter. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, articulated several important holdings defining the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment. 418 U.S. at 325, 94 S.Ct. at 3000. First, the Court reaffirmed its rulings in New York Times and Butts stating that public officials and public figures may recover for defamation only upon clear and convincing proof of New York Times malice. Second, the Court made clear that all persons, public or private, may recover presumed or punitive damages only upon clear and convincing proof of New York Times malice. Third, and most important for purposes of the cases at bar, the Court held that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. Id. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. Justice Powell stated that this approach establishes an equitable boundary between the competing interests involved. It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. Id. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. The Court, however, expressly limited the applicability of a fault standard. Such limitation has not been sufficiently emphasized in many of the decisions and comments based on Gertz, but we think recognition of the limitation is essential to an accurate analysis of the decision. The Court said, quoting from Butts, that applicability of a fault standard must be restricted to circumstances where the substance of the defamatory statement `makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.' Id. Continuing, the Court stated: Our inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different from those discussed above if a State purported to condition civil liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential. Id.; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 464-65, 96 S.Ct. 958, 970-71, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). In addition, the Court said that the State's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation extends no further than compensation for actual injury, which may include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering, as well as out-of-pocket loss. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. Finally, the Court rejected the Rosenbloom plurality's requirement that judges must consider whether publications address issues of general or public interest, stating that such a test for determining the applicability of the New York Times standard to private defamation actions inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake. Id. at 346, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979), the Supreme Court rejected a plea that the balance struck in New York Times should now be modified to provide further protections for the press when sued for circulating erroneous information damaging to individual reputation. Id. at 169, 99 S.Ct. at 1645. The Court, through Justice White, noted that the 1964 New York Times decision which was widely perceived as essentially protective of press freedoms, has been repeatedly affirmed in succeeding cases. Id. The Court also pointed out, however, citing Firestone and Gertz, that the Court has reiterated its convictionreflected in the laws of defamation of all of the Statesthat the individual's interest in his reputation is also a basic concern. Id.
Sanders v. Times-World Corp., 213 Va. 369, 192 S.E.2d 754 (1972), was decided after New York Times and Rosenbloom, but before Gertz. There, for the first time, we applied the New York Times malice standard to a libel case involving a private person arising from matters of public or general concern, as required by Rosenbloom. In Rosenbloom and Sanders, the relevant test was not the status of the plaintiff involved but rather the events which were the subject of the publication. Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 803, 224 S.E.2d 132, 135 (1976). In Sanders, we cited three earlier Virginia cases, from 1961, 1967, and 1970 respectively, for the proposition that, where defendants' statements were qualifiedly privileged, the plaintiff bears the burden to establish actual malice. The Sanders decision was based, nevertheless, on the federal standards of New York Times and Rosenbloom. Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, supra , was the first libel case we decided after Gertz. Analyzing Gertz, we held that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury, in violation of the Gertz admonition, that the newspaper defendant could be adjudged liable without fault to the private plaintiffs. Additionally, the Court determined that the trial court incorrectly told the jury that an award of punitive damages could be premised upon a finding of common-law malice rather than New York Times actual malice. [2] Furthermore, while recognizing that we could define our own standard for recovery of actual, compensatory damages as authorized by Gertz, we chose not to formulate a Virginia standard in that case. We noted that the jury did not award actual damages, only punitive damages, and termed the task of fixing a Gertz -approved standard unnecessary. 216 Va. at 804, 224 S.E.2d at 136. In Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 275 S.E.2d 632 (1981) (hereinafter Fleming I), a suit against a non-media defendant and the precursor to the instant case of the same name, we decided that the publication was not defamatory per se; that the plaintiff, a private individual, did not forfeit his private status by speaking at public hearings involving land use proposals; that because the plaintiff Moore was not a public figure, he was not required to show New York Times malice as a prerequisite to recovery of compensatory damages, id. at 892, 275 S.E.2d at 637; that punitive damages may not be awarded without a tandem award of compensatory damages, unless the libel involved was actionable per se,  id. at 893-94, 275 S.E.2d at 638; and, that in libel actions not based upon per se defamation where New York Times malice is not shown, compensatory damages must be limited to actual injuries sustained. We decided, however, that actual injury was not confined to pecuniary loss but included such elements as damage to reputation and standing in the community, embarrassment, humiliation, and mental suffering. We modified language contained in Shupe v. Rose's Stores, 213 Va. 374, 192 S.E.2d 766 (1972), to the extent that Shupe may have indicated that emotional upset and embarrassment cannot constitute special damages. 221 Va. at 894, 275 S.E.2d at 639. In Fleming I, we further decided that Gertz did not control because the Gertz rule was not explicitly extended to non-media defendants. We stated, nevertheless, that we share the Gertz concern with the assessment by juries of punitive damages `in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused.' Id. at 893, 275 S.E.2d at 638, quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. Thus, we held in Fleming I, a suit by a private individual against a non-media defendant, that a recovery of punitive damages must be based upon the New York Times actual malice standard that is applicable to media defendants, that is, clear and convincing proof of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
The parameters within which we must fix the Virginia standard as a matter of state law have been set forth in our prior discussion of Gertz. The plaintiffs in the present appeals argue for a negligence standard. Generally, the defendants assert that a defamed private individual should be required to establish New York Times malice to recover actual, compensatory damages in this State. In a brief amicus curiae filed in one of the media appeals, the Virginia Press Association, Inc., argues that a negligence standard is no standard at all and that such a requirement simply does not provide the protection needed to ensure a free and open press. Asserting that the matters involved in these four appeals involve issues of public concern, the defendants contend that our pre- Gertz Sanders decision is controlling and that liability for the alleged defamations requires proof of New York Times actual malice. We do not agree. The Supreme Court in Gertz left little doubt that it expected many of the states to adopt a negligence standard. Justice Powell, while noting that allowance of presumed damages would unnecessarily exacerbate the danger of media self-censorship, stated that the policy considerations concerning punitive-damage awards are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions. 418 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. Justice Blackmun, concurring, flatly said that the Court now conditions a libel action by a private person upon a showing of negligence, as contrasted with a showing of willful or reckless disregard.... Id. at 353, 94 S.Ct. at 3014. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, said that the majority introduces the concept that the media will be liable for negligence in publishing defamatory statements with respect to [ordinary private citizens]. Id. at 355, 94 S.Ct. at 3014. Justice Brennan, dissenting, forecast adoption of a reasonable-care standard by many states as the probable result of today's decision. Id. at 366, 94 S.Ct. at 3020. Justice White, dissenting and deploring the additional burden on the plaintiff of proving negligence or other fault, stated that [u]nder the new rule the plaintiff can lose, not because the statement is true, but because it was not negligently made. Id. at 376, 94 S.Ct. at 3025. Certainly, despite the Supreme Court's forecasts, we properly may choose to adopt as a matter of state law a stricter standard than ordinary negligence. We will not do so. Indeed, while we did not explicitly fix the standard in Fleming I, we implicitly indicated that a level of liability less than New York Times malice was all that was required. We said: Therefore, [the plaintiff] was not required to show, as a prerequisite to recovery of compensatory damages, that Fleming acted with malice that met the New York Times standard. 221 Va. at 892, 275 S.E.2d at 638. We hold, therefore, that in an action brought by a private individual to recover actual, compensatory damages for a defamatory publication, the plaintiff may recover upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the publication was false, and that the defendant either knew it to be false, or believing it to be true, lacked reasonable grounds for such belief, or acted negligently in failing to ascertain the facts on which the publication was based. Under this standard, truth no longer is an affirmative defense to be established by the defendant. Instead, the plaintiff must prove falsity, because he is required to establish negligence with respect to such falsity. In addition, we hold that such liability may be based upon negligence, whether or not the publication in question relates to a matter of public or general concern. The application of this negligence standard is expressly limited, however, to circumstances where the defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent. The trial judge shall make such determination as a matter of law. If, on the other hand, no substantial danger to reputation is apparent from the statement in issue, New York Times malice must be established to recover compensatory damages. Nothing in the public policy of the Commonwealth or in our prior decisions requires adoption of a standard higher than one of ordinary negligence. The Constitution of Virginia does not mandate embracement of a more stringent standard. Article I, § 12 provides, in part, that any citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.... That provision recognizes the balance to be struck between the right of free expression enjoyed by the individual and the press on the one hand and the right of defamed individuals to hold the speakers responsible for damage to reputation on the other. See I A. Howard, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, at 249-59 (1974). And, as we already have said, our Sanders decision is not controlling, because it was decided before Gertz and was based on Rosenbloom, nor are any of our other cases. Moreover, we think that a negligence test strikes a proper balance between the rights of the news media and the rights of private individuals. As noted in Gertz, the private individual is more vulnerable to injury to reputation inflicted by defamatory falsehood than are public officials and public figures who ordinarily enjoy significantly greater access to channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. Even though the truth rarely catches up with the lie, id. n. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 3009 n. 9, the opportunity for rebuttal is more readily available to the public person. Consequently, the state interest in protecting the private individual is greater than in the case of a non-private person. In addition, we believe that the negligence standard will not result in self-censorship, as the media defendants argue, and that the duty of reasonable care is an acceptable burden for the press to bear. After all, the concept of negligence is fundamental to the imposition of tort liability in Virginia in the great majority of legal relationships that are created daily, and we have not been convinced that the publisher of the defamatory falsehood should be elevated to a preferred status for the assessment of liability for the harm caused by such a tort. Neither the intentional lie nor the negligent error substantially advances society's interest in uninhibited and robust debate. See id. at 340, 94 S.Ct. at 3007. Also, the limitations we have placed on the rule will serve to insulate the publisher from liability based on a publication the content of which does not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential. In such a case, New York Times malice must be established in order to recover compensatory damages. The mere negligent error or the careless misstatement of fact which, on its face, does not appear to be defamatory will not result in liability for compensatory damages being imposed on the publisher. Finally, the standard we adopt today is in accord with the rule embraced by a substantial number of the states that have decided the issue since Gertz. See E. Collins and J. Drushal, The Reaction of the State Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 306 (1978). To date, at least 30 states and the District of Columbia have adopted a negligence standard in media cases involving private persons, either after discussing the issue or without discussing the question. [3] Also, two federal courts interpreting Virginia law after Gertz anticipated that we would adopt a negligence standard. See General Products Co. v. Meredith Corp., 526 F.Supp. 546 (E.D.Va.1981); Mills v. Kingsport Times-News, 475 F.Supp. 1005 (W.D. Va.1979). And the drafters of the Restatement responded to Gertz by adopting a negligence standard for the media defendant who defames a private person or a public person in a matter unrelated to his public capacity. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B(c) (1977). See generally R. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1 (1983).