Opinion ID: 859229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Requests for Change of Counsel

Text: ¶18 Gomez argues that the trial court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing before denying requests by him and his lawyer for the appointment of new counsel. We review a trial court’s decision to deny a request for new counsel for abuse of discretion. State v. Moore, 222 Ariz. 1, 15 ¶ 77, 213 P.3d 150, 164 (2009). ¶19 The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the 9 right to representation by counsel, but “an indigent defendant is not ‘entitled to counsel of choice, or to a meaningful relationship with his or her attorney.’” State v. Torres, 208 Ariz. 340, 342 ¶ 6, 93 P.3d 1056, 1058 (2004) (quoting State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 507 ¶ 11, 968 P.2d 578, 580 (1998)). A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated “when there is a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict between a defendant and his appointed counsel.” Id. “Conflict that is less than irreconcilable, however, is only one factor for a court to consider in deciding whether to appoint substitute counsel.” State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 186 ¶ 29, 119 P.3d 448, 453 (2005). ¶20 On December 8, 2009, nearly five weeks before the resentencing trial was then scheduled to begin, Gomez filed a pro per “motion for change of counsel.” He alleged that Alcantar, his appointed lead counsel, had not visited him in more than a year, had not devoted enough time to prepare the case, and was unprofessional. Gomez further alleged that he did not trust Alcantar because the lawyer had submitted excessive bills while acting as advisory counsel and had not deposited money into Gomez’s account for stamps and supplies. Gomez also asserted that Flores, his other attorney, was not qualified to handle a death penalty case. Finally, Gomez complained that he had “been subjected to the t[y]pical unethical actions of [an] 10 irresponsible Court appointed defense attorney . . . with whom [Gomez] has an actual major conflict of interest, and an irredeemable client-attorney relationship.” ¶21 On December 18, 2009, attorney Christopher Dupont filed a “motion to determine counsel,” stating that he was specially appearing because the Consulate of the Dominican Republic intended to retain him to represent Gomez at the resentencing hearing. This motion criticized Alcantar’s representation, asserted that there had been a complete fracture in Gomez’s relationship with his counsel, and requested an evidentiary hearing. At two subsequent hearings, however, DuPont said he would not represent Gomez. ¶22 On February 4, 2010, Alcantar filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Record. This motion alleged that Dupont had “broken any confidence Mr. Gomez had in his legal team” and “poisoned” counsel’s relationship with Gomez, specifically noting difficulties the defense team had communicating with mitigation witnesses. Alcantar claimed that “the defendant’s family in the Dominican Republic will no longer speak to the Mitigation Specialist because she [sic] was informed . . . that the defense team was not helping Mr. Gomez.” ¶23 Three weeks later, the court held a pretrial conference attended by Gomez, Alcantar, and DuPont. The court, without objection, announced that it would decide the pending 11 matters without an evidentiary hearing or oral argument. It struck Dupont’s motion to determine counsel and denied Alcantar’s motion to withdraw. The court also denied Gomez’s motion for change of counsel, finding “an insufficient showing in the motion to demonstrate that a change of counsel is necessary, especially considering the age of the case and the timing of the motion in this matter.” ¶24 Relying on Torres, Gomez now argues that the trial court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing to consider the specific allegations in his motion for change of counsel. He further contends that both his motion and Alcantar’s motion to withdraw alleged “an irretrievable breakdown of the attorneyclient relationship.” ¶25 “[T]o protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a trial judge has the duty to inquire as to the basis of a defendant’s request for substitution of counsel.” Torres, 208 Ariz. at 343 ¶ 7, 93 P.3d at 1059. But “[t]he nature of the inquiry will depend upon the nature of the defendant’s request.” Id. at ¶ 8. “[G]eneralized complaints about differences in strategy may not require a formal hearing or an evidentiary proceeding.” Id. Before ruling on a motion for change of counsel, a trial court should consider whether an irreconcilable conflict exists between counsel and the accused, and whether new counsel would be confronted with the same conflict; the timing of 12 the motion; inconvenience to witnesses; the time period already elapsed between the alleged offense and trial; the proclivity of the defendant to change counsel; and quality of counsel. State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 486-87, 733 P.2d 1066, 1069-70 (1987). ¶26 In requiring a hearing in Torres, the Court noted that the defendant had alleged “that he could no longer speak with his lawyer about the case, he did not trust him, he felt threatened and intimidated by him, there was no confidentiality between them, and his counsel was no longer behaving in a professional manner.” Torres, 208 Ariz. at 342 ¶ 2, 93 P.3d at 1058. We held that the trial court abused its discretion by summarily denying a motion for change of counsel without inquiring into the “specific factual allegations that raised a colorable claim that he had an irreconcilable conflict with his appointed counsel.” Id. at 343 ¶ 9, 93 P.3d at 1059. ¶27 The facts of this case are distinguishable from Torres. Gomez’s motion did not allege facts suggesting that there had been a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict. “A single allegation of lost confidence in counsel does not require the appointment of new counsel, and disagreements over defense strategy do not constitute an irreconcilable conflict.” Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186 ¶ 29, 119 P.3d at 453. Nor did Alcantar’s motion to 13 withdraw allege specific facts suggesting a “completely fractured relationship.” Id. Instead, it contended that Dupont had made it difficult for the defense to communicate with mitigation witnesses and had undermined Gomez’s confidence in his legal team. ¶28 Moreover, in denying the requests for change of counsel, the trial court considered the LaGrand factors and Alcantar’s written responses to Gomez’s allegations and Dupont’s motion. For example, Alcantar discussed interviews done by the mitigation specialist, motions Alcantar intended to file before trial, why he had not more frequently visited Gomez at the jail (Alcantar said that Gomez had imposed restrictions on the visits and persisted in discussing matters not at issue in the resentencing), and his providing stamps to Gomez and depositing money in Gomez’s jail account. The State also provided information to the court about the number of times that the mitigation specialist, the defense investigator, or counsel had gone to the jail to visit Gomez. When the trial court announced it intended to decide the matters on the pleadings, neither Gomez nor any lawyer requested an evidentiary hearing to present additional information. ¶29 A trial judge is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion for change of counsel if the motion fails to allege specific facts suggesting an irreconcilable conflict or a 14 complete breakdown in communication, or if there is no indication that a hearing would elicit additional facts beyond those already before the court. See LaGrand, 152 Ariz. at 486, 733 P.2d at 1069 (noting that “a request for new counsel should be examined with the rights and interest of the defendant in mind tempered by exigencies of judicial economy”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the requests for change of counsel without holding an evidentiary hearing.