Opinion ID: 867978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Single-Motive Discrimination

Text: Megivern alleges that Glacier Hills discriminated against her on the basis of her sex under Title VII, the ELCRA, and the Ann Arbor City Code by terminating her because of her pregnancy. Under Title VII, it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Sex discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The ELCRA provides similar protections, see Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.2202; 37.2201(d), and ELCRA claims are analyzed in the same manner as an analogous Title VII claim. See Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 614 n.4 (6th Cir. 2003). The Code of the City of Ann Arbor provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate in employment . . . or termination of employment of any person.” Ann Arbor, Mich., Code ch. - 18 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. 112, § 9:151. The Code defines “discriminate” to include “mak[ing] a decision . . . on the actual or perceived . . . sex . . . [or] condition of pregnancy . . . of another person.” Id. at § 9:151(4). The Code further allows individuals to bring a civil action for injunctive relief and damages against any individuals who have violated these provisions. Id. at § 9:164. The parties have analyzed the discrimination claim under the Ann Arbor City Code under the same framework as Title VII. In order to survive summary judgment on a sex discrimination claim: First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’ Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
In order to state a prima facie case for pregnancy discrimination, Megivern “must show that (1) she was pregnant, (2) she was qualified for her job, (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision, and (4) there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment decision.” Asmo v. Keane, Inc., 471 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Glacier Hills does not contest the first three elements of this test, - 19 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. but argues that Megivern is unable to establish a nexus between her pregnancy and her termination. Citing Asmo, the district court rejected this argument and found that Megivern’s announcement of her pregnancy in early April, 2010 was sufficiently close in time to her termination on May 26, 2010 to satisfy the nexus requirement. In Asmo, the defendant selected the plaintiff for lay-off within two months of learning that she was pregnant. Asmo, 471 F.3d at 594. This court held that the temporal proximity between the announcement of the plaintiff’s pregnancy and her termination was sufficient to establish a nexus between the two events for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case. Id. at 594. Megivern was terminated less than two months after announcing her pregnancy to her co-workers. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that Megivern stated a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. 2. Legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination Megivern argues that Glacier Hills has not articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. The district court did not consider whether Glacier Hills offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination, as it found that Megivern did not dispute that Glacier Hills terminated her employment because of her performance. On appeal, Megivern argues that Glacier Hills never clearly articulated its reasons for her termination. The termination notice prepared by Thompson lists “Performance” as a “Reason Code” for Megivern’s termination. Thompson described the events resulting in - 20 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. Megivern’s termination: “Employee placed on performance improvement plan 4/19/2010. Her performance did not improve to satisfactory status.” The second page of the notice provides a performance evaluation at the time of termination. Thompson rated Megivern’s performance as “unsatisfactory” in the following areas: (1) quality of work, (2) quantity of work, (3) promptness in completing assignments, (3) attitude, (4) acceptance of responsibility, and (5) initiative. Thompson further noted that Megivern “resisted or failed each of the significant components of the [PIP].” Megivern does not dispute that these comments comprised part of her termination notice; rather, she points to testimony by Thompson that Megivern was fired solely for performance issues, and suspended solely for insubordination. However, this assertion requires a selective reading of the facts; Thompson also discussed numerous issues with Megivern and testified that these issues were part of the “entire picture of her prior work” that resulted in Megivern’s termination. Further, the termination notice indicates that Megivern’s “performance” was partly based on the quality and quantity of her work, but also based on factors such as attitude, acceptance of responsibility, and initiative. Thus, Megivern is incorrect in arguing that Glacier Hills failed to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. 3. Pretext Pretext may be demonstrated if “the proffered reason (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant - 21 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. the challenged conduct.” Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000). At all times, “[t]he plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Megivern argues that she has shown Glacier Hills’s proffered reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual because: (1) Glacier Hills shifted its rationale for terminating Megivern, (2) the temporal proximity of Megivern’s pregnancy to her termination weighs in favor of finding pretext, (3) Thompson did not congratulate Megivern on her pregnancy, warranting an inference of discrimination, and (4) pattern or practice evidence suggests a pattern of discrimination based on pregnancy at Glacier Hills. a. Whether Glacier Hills employed shifting rationales for Megivern’s termination. “An employer’s changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext.” Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1996). “Shifting justifications over time calls the credibility of those justifications into question.” Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 592 (6th Cir. 2002). When a plaintiff is able to show that the defendant’s justification for firing him changed over time, this can demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that the proffered reason for termination is not only false, but that the falsity is a pretext for discrimination. Id. Megivern argues that Glacier Hills’s primary critique of Megivern’s performance was her failure to complete initial assessments on time. She points to her PIP as specifying three areas where she performed below acceptable standards: completion of initial recreation history and assessment forms, completion of recreation and assessment forms on an annual - 22 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. basis, and care plans. Megivern further points to her affidavit as demonstrating that at the time of her termination, she was up-to-date on her long-term resident assessments and care plans. Megivern argues that she was not the only LEC who completed late initial assessments, yet she was the only LEC terminated for this reason. To the extent that Glacier Hills’s reason for termination extends beyond Megivern’s late assessments, Megivern argues that this is a shifting rationale that warrants a finding of pretext as Thompson testified that Megivern was terminated for “performance.” Further, Megivern argues that Kudlak testified that she believed the decision to terminate Megivern was caused by Megivern’s refusal to meet with Thompson—not Megivern’s late assessments. Glacier Hills responds that its reasons for terminating Megivern have consistently remained the same: Megivern was terminated in part because of her failure to complete her work on time, and in part because of her poor attitude and behavior, and all of these reasons are reflected in Megivern’s termination notice. Further, Glacier Hills argues that although it is true that Thompson testified that Megivern was terminated for performance reasons, she also testified that Megivern’s work history and previous argumentative behavior were taken into account as part of the decision to fire her. The district court determined that Megivern was unable to show pretext on the asserted grounds. The court noted that the termination notice specified numerous reasons for Megivern’s termination and that Thompson elaborated on all of the ways that Megivern’s performance fell short of Glacier Hills’s expectations. - 23 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. In contrast to the cases relied on by Megivern,1 the rationale given for terminating Megivern’s employment was clearly articulated in the termination notice prepared by Thompson and has remained the same since. Megivern’s termination notice notes “unsatisfactory” performance in several areas, including attitude, acceptance of responsibility, and initiative. Thompson elaborated at her deposition that Megivern’s entire work history was taken into account when determining whether to terminate her, and she pointed to Megivern’s argumentative past as part of that decision. Further, the report prepared as part of the investigation into Megivern’s performance indicates that insubordination issues were taken into account as part of her pre-termination evaluation. Megivern has failed to show that Glacier Hills employed shifting rationales for her termination. To the extent that Megivern argues that she was singled out for discipline because of her pregnancy, her argument is without merit. Megivern’s transfer to the Two South unit occurred months prior to the announcement of her pregnancy. She concedes that she had trouble completing her assessments as soon as she was transferred, and acknowledges that Kudlak held a meeting with all of the LECs in February, 2010 to discuss the late assessment issue. Megivern does not contest that Kudlak was hired to restructure the LEC department 1 Asmo, 471 F.3d at 591 (shifting rationales where the two reasons a supervisor initially offered the plaintiff as reasons for the termination of her employment were false and eliminated at the commencement of the plaintiff’s lawsuit); Thurman, 90 F.3d at 1167 (shifting rationales where initial explanation of a failure to hire changed during discovery). - 24 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. and admits that of the five LECs employed at Glacier Hills when she worked there, only two remain. Further, Megivern testified that it is her understanding that her former supervisor, Kirk, was fired for turning in late assessments—a fact confirmed by Glacier Hills at oral argument. Megivern has not shown that she was singled out for adverse treatment. b. Whether the temporal proximity of Megivern’s termination to the announcement of her pregnancy supports a finding of pretext. Megivern claims that the timing of the disciplinary actions taken against her warrant an inference that Glacier Hills’s proffered reason for termination is pretextual. Specifically, Megivern argues that within two weeks of announcing her pregnancy she was placed on a PIP, and that she was suspended and her employment terminated a day after meeting with human resources to discuss FMLA and short-term disability benefits. Megivern argues that although her paperwork deficiencies began as soon as she was reassigned to work the Two South unit, she was only disciplined for late assessments after she announced her pregnancy. She clarifies that she is not arguing that the timing of her discipline is sufficient to warrant a finding of pretext, but rather that the temporal proximity of her discipline supports a finding of pretext. Glacier Hills responds that although it is true that Megivern was only formally disciplined after announcing her pregnancy, she had a history of turning in late assignments. When Kudlak took over Megivern’s duties once she went on vacation in April, she noticed that Megivern’s problems were worse than she had realized and that Megivern had not followed through on directives Kudlak had given her in February. - 25 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. Temporal proximity alone cannot prove pretext, but it can be used as indirect evidence to support a claim of pretext. Asmo, 471 F.3d at 598. A view of the evidence in the light most favorable to Megivern suggests that Glacier Hills’s timing is suspect; however, this evidence must be accompanied by other, independent evidence of pretext for Megivern to succeed. c. Whether Thompson’s failure to congratulate Megivern on her pregnancy supports a finding of pretext. Megivern argues that Thompson’s complete failure to congratulate Megivern on her pregnancy is significant evidence showing pretext because Thompson was the final decisionmaker in the termination of Megivern’s employment. Megivern relies on Asmo for this assertion. However, as Glacier Hills points out, Asmo is factually distinct as the supervisor in Asmo was directly told of the plaintiff’s pregnancy during a conference call. Id. at 591. In that case, the supervisor’s conspicuous silence warranted an inference of discrimination. In contrast, Megivern never had a face-to-face meeting or phone conversation with Thompson to tell her about her pregnancy, thus making Asmo distinguishable. d. Whether Megivern’s pattern or practice evidence supports a finding of pretext. Megivern points to evidence regarding three employees, Alicia Carey, Karen Klee, and Tabatha Smith, to argue that Glacier Hills has a practice of discriminating against employees who seek medical leave. Megivern argues that this evidence raises a triable issue of fact regarding pretext. - 26 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. Evidence that an employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination “may be relevant to proving an otherwise-viable individual claim for disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004). “The question whether evidence of discrimination . . . is relevant . . . is fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008). Among the factors to be considered in assessing “other acts” evidence are: whether the same actors were involved in each alleged retaliatory decision, the “temporal and geographical proximity” of the alleged other acts, “whether the various decisionmakers knew of the other decisions, whether the employees were similarly situated in relevant respects, or the nature of each employee’s allegations of retaliation.” Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 598–99 (6th Cir. 2012). Alicia Carey worked as a certified nurse assistant at Glacier Hills for nine years. She received excellent evaluations during this time. According to Carey, in September 2009, Thompson set off an emergency alarm during a state inspection, Carey retrieved the keys to shut off the alarm, and Thompson “grabbed the keys” from her hand. The next day, Carey was asked to meet with Thompson and the director of nursing. The director of nursing asked Carey why she had been “rude” to Thompson, and Carey apologized for her behavior, began crying, and explained that she was emotional because she was two months pregnant. Thompson told the director to “get rid of her” and left the office. Carey was removed from - 27 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. the weekend schedule and told to go home. Thompson called her on Monday and told her that her employment had been terminated because of her insubordination. Carey believes she was dismissed because of her pregnancy. Karen Klee worked at Glacier Hills for seven years as a unit secretary. Klee believes that everyone in the building was overworked, but only some employees were targeted for discipline. Klee announced that she was pregnant in July 2010. After she announced her pregnancy, her supervisor, Celia Williams, began “hounding” her and disciplining her for small performance issues. Klee believes that these actions were directed by Thompson as retaliation for Klee’s pregnancy, though she does not specify the reason for her belief that Thompson was involved. In September 2010, Klee suffered a miscarriage and received six weeks of medical leave under the FMLA. When she returned, she continued to be subjected to discipline for “petty things,” including work that had not been done while she was on leave. In November 2010, Klee suffered another medical emergency and was absent from work for one week. When she returned, she was fired for performance reasons, despite the fact that her PIP had not been completed. Klee believes the true reason for her dismissal was her pregnancy and the medical leave she took. Tabatha Smith was the LEC who replaced Megivern. She started working for Glacier Hills in June 2010, but began experiencing medical difficulties in 2011. Smith fainted at work twice during the summer of 2011, and she began seeing a doctor for tests to diagnose her condition. Smith was diagnosed with shingles and placed on medical leave from August - 28 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. 4 to August 10. Although her supervisor was aware of her condition, Smith was given a “Final Written Warning” for unreliable attendance on August 25, 2011. The warning cited specific times when she had come to work late following her medical leave and criticized her professionalism and behavior at work. Smith was placed on a PIP and had a meeting with Thompson where she told Thompson that she believed she was being harassed and targeted for termination. Smith is “certain” that Thompson planned to terminate her in advance of her medical leave. Smith was on medical leave at the time she wrote her affidavit, although she had been informed that Glacier Hills would not hold a position open for her as she had exhausted the twelve weeks of medical leave she was allowed under the FMLA. The district court rejected Megivern’s assertion that these affidavits supported a finding of pretext, and we agree. Carey testified that she was terminated following an interaction that she had with Thompson during a state inspection. Carey interjected her pregnancy during the meeting with Thompson as an excuse for her behavior during the state inspection. The meeting had already been scheduled based on Carey’s behavior and before Thompson knew she was pregnant. Klee’s and Smith’s experiences are also distinct. Klee testified that she was only placed on a PIP after she took medical leave for a miscarriage. Klee returned to work and was placed on a PIP for performance reasons, and took another medical leave in November, 2010. She was fired after returning from this second medical leave. Although Klee expresses her belief that her alleged harassment was instigated by Thompson, she does not - 29 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. explain her reason for this belief and her allegation appears to be purely speculative. Similarly, Smith has also failed to establish that Thompson was involved in her alleged harassment. She recounts a meeting with Thompson at which she believes Thompson planned to fire her, but concedes that she was not fired at this meeting. Indeed, Smith was never fired by Glacier Hills—she took a second medical leave and exhausted the amount of leave she was allowed under the FMLA. Neither affidavit supports Megivern’s theory of the case—that she was placed on a PIP and fired in order to prevent her from taking medical leave. Klee’s and Smith’s affidavits fail to establish that Thompson was involved in their alleged harassment, and Carey’s affidavit is factually distinct as Thompson was unaware of Carey’s pregnancy prior to her disciplinary meeting. Further, as part of Glacier Hills’s discovery disclosures to Megivern, Megivern was given a log of all employees terminated since 2008; the names and addresses of all employees who had taken medical leave since Thompson became executive director of the Care and Rehabilitation Center in 2009, together with the dates of their personal leave, their job title, current employment status with Glacier Hills, and whether the termination of their employment was voluntary or involuntary (if applicable); the personnel records of twentytwo employees identified by Megivern; and a list of twenty-one employees who had requested leave and their current employment status with Glacier Hills. From these disclosures, Megivern identified the three employees discussed above, all of whom present - 30 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. factually distinct circumstances from Megivern’s case. We agree with the district court that Megivern’s pattern or practice evidence does not support her claim. Considering Megivern’s evidence as a whole, the district court did not err in concluding that Megivern does not present enough evidence to warrant a finding of pretext. The only evidence that weighs in her favor is the temporal proximity of her dismissal to the announcement of her pregnancy. However, this evidence alone is insufficient to warrant a finding of pretext. See Asmo, 471 F.3d at 598. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Megivern’s single-motive discrimination claims.