Opinion ID: 284440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence allegedly stemming from an independent venture by Reid

Text: 10 Turning to the conduct of the trial, we shall deal first with two contentions which have as a common ground a claim that Reid's final trip was not a part of the conspiracy charged in the indictment but rather an independent venture of his own. One of these, to be discussed below, relates to a statement made considerably before the trip by Lewis to Reid concerning Jessup. The other is that it was error to admit into evidence against all the defendants the heroin seized from Reid in Honolulu and to allow the jury to hear the story of his post-arrest contacts with Egan and Harris. 11 Since the heroin was real evidence, its admissibility is governed by the rule, stated in Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1963), that though hearsay declarations of a co-conspirator are admissible against the others only if made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, acts relevant to prove the conspiracy are admissible even if they occurred after the conspiracy had ended. Here the jury could reasonably have inferred from proof of Reid's possession of concealed heroin on his person at the time of his passage through Customs that he either had had previous experience as a courier or had been instructed by other conspirators. 12 Furthermore, the heroin would have been properly admitted even if it were necessary to show that it was taken from Reid while he was acting in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is common ground that in conspiracy the agreement itself is the crime, and that it is therefore essential to determine what kind of agreement or understanding existed as to each defendant. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384, and 385 (2 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, Cinquegrano v. United States, 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965), quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 403 (2 Cir. 1938). On this theory the heroin would have been admissible against a given defendant only insofar as it might reasonably have been generated by the operation of the conspiracy as he understood it. The agreement here was a broad one for the procurement of cheap heroin in Hong Kong, its transportation to the United States, its sale at a profit in this country, and a division of the spoils among the participants. Certainly at the time of Reid's last trip his actions were within the agreement as understood by the New York distributors, Jessup, Thomas, and Haywood — the very appellants who press the point. They expected heroin from Hong Kong, and Reid was bringing it. The Government was not limited to proving an agreement in which everyone's role and share was carefully fixed in advance, so that the slightest alteration in the arrangements would mean that the agreed venture had terminated. Cf. United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 87-89 (2 Cir. 1944), cert denied, 323 U.S. 799, 65 S.Ct. 553, 89 L.Ed. 637 (1945). We have held that a far more striking example of conspirators deciding to cheat each other does not destroy the conspiracy. United States v. Gersh, 328 F.2d 460, 462 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, Mugnola v. United States, 377 U.S. 992, 84 S.Ct. 1919, 12 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1964). The very most that could be said is that the trip was not in furtherance of the conspiracy as understood by Bennett, since it was undertaken against his express wishes, but no objection was made with sufficient specificity to preserve for him this narrow point on appeal. 13 What Egan said and what Harris did after Reid's arrest were admissible under the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule, since they were plainly intended to further the conspiracy as most of the conspirators understood it. It makes no difference that Reid was no longer their co-conspirator, so long as they thought he was. The argument that the tapes made of these conversations, and the testimony of one of the agents who listened to them, should have been excluded as gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment was rejected for this circuit in United States v. Kaufer, 406 F. 2d 550 (1969). While again there might have been room for a specific request for a limiting instruction by Bennett, none was made. 14 The statement concerning Jessup was made, according to Reid, around November 3, 1966, before Reid's penultimate trip, concededly a part of the conspiracy. Reid was in Hong Kong, working out arrangements with Hopes, Summerill, and Lewis (known to Reid as Mulligan). Reid drew Mulligan aside, recalled a previous promise to introduce him to some of the customers in New York City, and mentioned that he was thinking of buying some heroin from the Chinese people I know in Hong Kong, taking it to the United States and selling it myself. Mulligan then gave a telephone number to a person named Dog. Lewis, alias Mulligan, testified to the same episode; his version was that the conversation took place in late November, after they had both returned from New York, and that Reid asked, What about that address you were going to give me so I can go into business for myself instead of just carting for Egan, Bennett and Hopes?, whereupon Lewis gave the Dog's phone number. Jessup contends that Lewis' statement was in furtherance not of the conspiracy charged in the indictment but of a separate venture of Reid's and hence was inadmissible hearsay. 15 As indicated, we think this argument takes too narrow a view of the agreement charged and proved. Reid wanted the information not in order to leave the conspiracy but to enable him to continue it with some links in the chain to the exclusion of others, and Lewis, another member of the conspiracy, was passing on information gathered from his own participation that was useful to that end. Nothing in the proof indicates that Jessup placed the kind of reliance on the maintenance of a given chain of command among the Australian suppliers that would justify finding the conspiracy ended as to him when the Australians changed their relations to each other without ceasing to supply heroin through the same channels as before. 16 Alternatively, we believe the hearsay rule was satisfied by the fact that here the declarant, Lewis, himself testified. Assuming that Lewis' statement should be treated as an elliptical way of saying that in the course of the conspiracy he had had dealings with Jessup, a report given directly and unambiguously in other portions of Lewis' testimony, he was open to cross-examination as to the underlying facts. We fail to see why, under the circumstances, the embodiment of his experience in an earlier declaration would inhibit effective cross-examination. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 177, 192-96 (1948), reprinted in Ass'n of American Law Schools, Selected Writings on Evidence and Trial, 764, 774-77 (1950). Certainly the opportunity for cross-examination was far better than in many instances of preserved memory where admission is routine. See Morgan, The Relations between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 712, 719-20, 724-32 (1927), reprinted in Ass'n of American Law Schools, supra, 374, 378-79, 382-87. The testimony would clearly be admissible under the definitions of hearsay in the ALI Model Code of Evidence, Rule 503(6), and Rule 63 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. We limit our ruling to the situation here presented, where the witness' statement was made in the course of imparting information for a use desired by the hearer; we are not approving a general practice of admitting prior consistent extra-judicial statements of a witness, such as those made to investigating officers, for the truth of the matter asserted. See United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2 Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979, 84 S.Ct. 1885, 12 L.Ed.2d 747 (1964). 6 17