Opinion ID: 878314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Disqualify

Text: Lemmon moved to disqualify the Fergus County Attorney's office because a deputy county attorney, who office-shares with the county attorney in his private practice, represented Koralyn Lemmon in the divorce. If conflict were established there could be a fair trial question but the District Court properly denied Lemmon's motion to disqualify because these facts do not establish conflict of interest or abuse of discretion. Lemmon based his motion on DR 5-105(D): If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such employment. Merely reciting a rule does not establish a violation. No evidence was introduced establishing conflict of interest. It was not established that the county attorney would have been disqualified from the criminal prosecution of Lemmon if he had represented Koralyn Lemmon in the divorce let alone that the county attorney must be disqualified because the deputy county attorney represented Mrs. Lemmon. We also note, in passing, that Canon 5 concerns conflicts in representation not prosecution. Issue No. 2. Was there sufficient evidence to establish criminal intent or Lemmon's defense of reasonable force in the course of a lawful arrest? Lemmon argues the evidence of intent was insufficient to support the verdict and the evidence established a defense that he had reasonable grounds to arrest and his conduct was authorized by statute. The standard this Court uses in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in a jury trial is it is well-established that questions of fact must be determined solely by the jury and that given a certain legal minimum of evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment. State v. Martinez (Mont. 1980), 613 P.2d 974, 980, 37 St.Rep. 982, 989. Applying this standard both arguments are entirely meritless.