Opinion ID: 430879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: PBGC's Interpretation of Section 1461(b)

Text: 15 Appellants contend that PBGC's decision to deny insurance coverage based exclusively on its application of the other reasonable basis test was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Appellants stress that the purpose of ERISA is to provide relief for employees who otherwise would lose their pension benefits. In light of the remedial purpose underlying ERISA, appellants argue that section 1461(b) must be construed to provide expansive relief. Appellants therefore contend that section 1461(b) requires PBGC to apply the ceased to accrue test and allow window period coverage when, as here, any pension benefits accrued during the window period. If no pension benefits accrued during the window period, appellants contend that PBGC still has discretion to extend coverage pursuant to the other reasonable basis test. Because PBGC allegedly ignored the ceased to accrue test and relied exclusively on the other reasonable basis test, appellants argue that PBGC was arbitrary and capricious in its interpretation of section 1461(b). 16 We are not persuaded by appellants' argument. PBGC's interpretation of ERISA is entitled to great deference. See United Steelworkers of America v. Harris & Sons Steel Co., 706 F.2d 1289, 1296 (3d Cir.1983); Concord Control, Inc. v. International Union, UAW, 647 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054, 102 S.Ct. 599, 70 L.Ed.2d 590 (1981); Connolly v. PBGC, 581 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935, 99 S.Ct. 1278, 59 L.Ed.2d 492 (1979). We do not rely solely on great deference here, however, because PBGC's interpretation of section 1461(b) was consistent with the plain language of ERISA. 17 Our starting point for determining whether PBGC properly interpreted section 1461(b) is, of course, the language of the statute itself. See March v. United States, 506 F.2d 1306, 1313 & n. 26 (D.C.Cir.1974). If the statutory language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion. Id. at 1313 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)). Section 1461(b) is phrased unambiguously in the disjunctive. PBGC is authorized to determine whether the Georgia-Pacific Pension Plan terminated during the window period on the basis of the date on which benefits ceased to accrue or on any other reasonable basis consistent with the purposes of this subsection. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1461(b) (emphasis added). The statute clearly accords to PBGC the discretion to use the other reasonable basis test so long as the test is consistent with the purposes of section 1461(b). 18 PBGC's use of the other reasonable basis test here was consistent with the purposes of section 1461(b). An obvious purpose of this section is to provide insurance coverage retroactively for eligible pension plans. Another purpose, however, is to promote low insurance premiums. 4 Although Congress was concerned in ERISA with protecting employees' expectations of pension benefits, Congress also realized that employers would neither create nor maintain pension plans if ERISA imposed too much cost. Consequently, the entire statute is a finely tuned balance between protecting pension benefits for employees while limiting the cost to employers. A-T-O, Inc. v. PBGC, 634 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir.1980). Because PBGC's use of the other reasonable basis test here was consistent with maintaining insurance premium rates at the lowest practicable level, PBGC complied with the plain meaning of section 1461(b). 5 19 We are mindful of the principle that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to effectuate their purpose. See International Union, UAW v. Marshall, 584 F.2d 390, 396 (D.C.Cir.1978). That principle, however, does not give the judiciary license, in interpreting a provision, to disregard entirely the plain meaning of the words used by Congress. Symons v. Chrysler Corp. Loan Guarantee Board, 670 F.2d 238, 241 (D.C.Cir.1981). If Congress had intended that PBGC always use the ceased to accrue test in making window period coverage decisions, that intention would be manifest in the statutory language. 6 We find no evidence that section 1461(b) requires PBGC to use the ceased to accrue test when deciding the eligibility of pension plans seeking window period coverage. Instead, section 1461(b) gives PBGC discretion to use the other reasonable basis test so long as PBGC adheres to the purposes of section 1461(b). Here, PBGC adhered to an express statutory purpose and complied with the statute's plain language. We therefore reject appellants' argument that PBGC's decision to use the other reasonable basis test was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 7 20