Opinion ID: 2065699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actual Success on the Merits

Text: The merits of Sierra Club's claims focus on the alleged destruction of its right to appeal, caused by defendants' decision to rely on Section 81 and to dredge the Assawoman Canal without complying with the EAB's July 26, 2005 Final Order. [11] Sierra Club insists that reliance on Section 81 violates not one, but two separation of powers tests applied by the Delaware Supreme Court. The first test, applied in Evans v. State, bars the General Assembly from reversing an adjudicatory decision in a particular case. [12] In Evans, a defendant sentenced to life with the possibility of parole argued before the Delaware Supreme Court that he was entitled to a conditional release date, contrary to an opinion by the Superior Court. The Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion on November 23, 2004 (the November Decision) that reversed the Superior Court. [13] As a result, the General Assembly adopted a statute (the Evans Bill) that specifically declared the Supreme Court's November Decision to be null and void. [14] Finding that the Evans Bill purported to reverse a judicial decision made in a particular case, the Delaware Supreme Court declared that the Evans Bill violated the Delaware Constitution's separation of legislative and judicial powers. [15] This case is different, and not controlled by Evans. Here, Section 81 did not reverse the EAB Email or the EAB Order. Indeed, the EAB Order was not even in existence when the Legislature adopted the Bond Bill on June 30, 2005. In addition, the EAB Order stated that another cost/benefit analysis should be performed but the EAB specifically acknowledged that the ultimate decision to go forward with the project remained with the Legislature. Section 81 specifically informed the relevant agency (DNREC) that the General Assembly viewed the benefits of the dredging project as outweighing its costs. Contrary to Sierra Club's argument, Section 81 did not reverse a particular determination made by the EAB, but rather addressed the EAB's request for additional information from DNREC, and the EAB's implicit request for legislative guidance. In other words, Section 81 did not reverse the EAB's remand order. Section 81 rendered the EAB Order moot. Thus, Evans is inapplicable in these circumstances. Next, Sierra Club argues that Section 81 violates a second (and this time, multi-part) separation of powers test applied by the Delaware Supreme Court in an advisory decision styled Opinion of the Justices. [16] The test has three parts. First, is the nature of the power being exercised exclusively executive or legislative or is it a blend of the two? Second, is the control exercised by the legislative department coercive? Third, is the intent of the Legislature to cooperate with the executive by furnishing unique information? In this case, determining the costs and benefits of a particular dredging project is inherently a blend of executive and legislative powers, as the project's costs are inevitably paid by legislative appropriations. Consequently, in advising DNREC of the General Assembly's findings regarding the costs of the canal dredging project, Section 81 exercised power that was only a blend of executive and legislative powers. Section 81 specifically requires adherence to DNREC's previously issued permits, and it addresses the EAB's acknowledgment that the final decision remained with the Legislature. Section 81 plainly instructs DNREC to carry out the dredging in accordance with its previously issued permit, and in accordance with past and future appropriations for the project as established in the budgetary process for DNREC. Accordingly, in my opinion, Section 81 does not run afoul of the Supreme Court's alternative separation of powers test. Sierra Club's failure to demonstrate that Section 81 violates the separation of powers doctrine as understood under the state constitution is sufficient for me to grant judgment in defendants' favor. Nevertheless, I will briefly describe other precedents that buttress my confidence more generally. Numerous federal cases address separation of powers issues similar to those presented here. Those cases likewise suggest, in my view, that Section 81 is a permissible exercise of legislative authoritynotwithstanding its application to an ongoing administrative proceeding, its specificity mooting a particular administrative appeal, and its impact upon a third party. In Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals had to address whether an administrative agency could retroactively apply legislation during ongoing administrative proceedings. [17] The Court found that the statute's language made clear its intent to be applied retroactively. [18] In National Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, a lawsuit was brought to enjoin the placement of a proposed World War II memorial on the National Mall. Congress responded by legislating that the decision to locate the memorial at the National Mallincluding agency actions and the issuance of requisite permitswould not be subject to judicial review. [19] In addition to finding that Congress did have the power to impose new substantive rules on suits such as the one pending in that case, the Court of Appeals found that the level of specificity in the legislationaddressing a particular memorial after a lawsuit had been brought challenging its locationwas unobjectionable. [20] Finally, in Biodiversity Associates v. Cables , the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed an issue perhaps most closely analogous to Sierra Club's challenge in this action. [21] In 2001 forest managers in South Dakota realized that due to an epidemic infestation by mountain pine beetles, immediate harvesting of deadwood and infested trees was necessary to guard against further spread of infestation and potentially disastrous forest fires. [22] Unfortunately, a settlement agreement signed a year earlier by the Forest Service and certain environmental groups prohibited such harvesting. [23] The Forest Service reached a modified agreement with all the environmental groups save one, but was unable to mollify this final holdout; consequently, South Dakota interests turned to Congress for a legislative solution. [24] In a rider to an unrelated appropriations bill, Congress enacted into law essentially the terms of the modified agreement negotiated with the other environmental groups. [25] The legislation required the Forest Service to take a variety of actions that violated the original settlement agreement. [26] The holdout environmental group went to federal court seeking continued enforcement of the settlement agreement, which the lower court denied. [27] On appeal, the Tenth Circuit examined appellant's argument that the particularity of the legislation was indicative of Congress's unconstitutionally mandating how the law was to be implemented, rather than a constitutional change to the applicable law. [28] The Tenth Circuit noted that the executive role of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed is entirely derivative of the laws passed by Congress, and Congress may be as specific in its instructions to the Executive as it wishes. [29] The Court went on to explain that this legislative prerogative to specify was not extinguished when creating law specific to an area already legislated upon: To give specific orders by duly enacted legislation in an area where Congress has previously delegated managerial authority is not an unconstitutional encroachment on the prerogatives of the Executive; it is merely to reclaim the formerly delegated authority. [30] Sierra Club's challenge to the constitutionality of Section 81 falls squarely within this principle elucidated in Biodiversity Associates. The General Assembly gave specific guidance with Section 81 in an area where managerial authority already had been delegated to DNREC and the EAB. The General Assembly reclaimed a portion of that authority by duly enacting legislation and did not, therefore, overstep its constitutional bounds. [31] As its final constitutional attack on Section 81, Sierra Club contends that Section 81 violates the one-subject rule set forth in article II § 16 of the Delaware Constitution. [32] The Delaware Supreme Court already has recognized that under the Delaware Constitution, a bill of the General Assembly that appropriates money for public purposes is free of the restraint that it be limited to a single subject. [33] Because the Bond Bill was an appropriations bill, there is no constitutional requirement that it be limited to the single subject that is expressed in its title. Because Section 81 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, and because it does not violate the single subject rule of article II § 16 of the Delaware Constitution, Sierra Club's claim that defendants impermissibly relied on Section 81 when it decided to forego the cost/benefit analysis and to proceed with dredging the Assawoman Canal is without merit.