Opinion ID: 797658
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Federal Rights Were Clearly Established.

Text: 71 [I]f a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established at the time of the arrest. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Saucier 's requirement that the plaintiff's asserted right be clearly established does not mean that the very action at issue must have been held unlawful before qualified immunity is shed. Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir.2004). On the contrary, police officers can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). While no prior Supreme Court or circuit case presents facts that are fundamentally similar or materially similar to those presented here, the salient question is still whether, at the time of the encounter with Blankenhorn, the state of the law ... gave [defendants] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [him] was unconstitutional. Id.; see also Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004) (In excessive force cases, the inquiry remains whether, `under the circumstances, a reasonable officer would have had fair notice that the force employed was unlawful, and [whether] any mistake to the contrary would have been unreasonable.') (alteration in original) (quoting Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir.2003)). 72 In assessing the state of the law at the time of Blankenhorn's arrest, we need look no further than Graham 's holding that force is only justified when there is a need for force. We conclude that this clear principle would have put a prudent officer on notice that gang-tackling without first attempting a less violent means of arresting a relatively calm trespass suspect — especially one who had been cooperative in the past and was at the moment not actively resisting arrest — was a violation of that person's Fourth Amendment rights. This same principle would also adequately put a reasonable officer on notice that punching Blankenhorn to free his arms when, in fact, he was not manipulating his arms in an attempt to avoid being handcuffed, was also a Fourth Amendment violation. Finally, we hold that no reasonable officer would have believed that hobble restraints on his wrists and ankles, in addition to handcuffs, were necessary to maintain control of him and prevent possible danger to passersby. 73 Therefore, we conclude that the state of the law was clearly established at the time of Blankenhorn's arrest and gave the arresting officers sufficiently fair notice that their conduct could have been unconstitutional. Accordingly, Gray, Nguyen, Ross, and South are not entitled to qualified immunity as to the gang tackle and punches used while taking Blankenhorn into custody. Gray, Nguyen, Ross, South and Kayano are not entitled to qualified immunity as to the use of hobble restraints. 12 74