Opinion ID: 2753792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Garretsons’ Specific Causes of Action

Text: 8 ¶18. The crux of the Garretsons’ argument on this issue is that the trial judge erred when he granted MDOT summary judgment on all the claims in their complaint. Specifically, the Garretsons argue that they “filed a multi-count complaint which was specific and detailed each count and the damages arising therefor. The Trial Court should not have dismissed all of [the] claims because the Trial Court insulated MDOT from all claims by sustaining [the exemptions] under §11-46-9(1)(d)(p).” ¶19. We disagree with the Garretsons’ argument, as a cursory review of their complaint reveals that all of their causes of action sound in tort. In other words, even though they asked for costs of their timber and for all damages permitted by Section 95-5-10, all of their causes of action center on the alleged “[tortious] acts” of MDOT. And Mississippi Code Section 11-46-7 states that “(1) The remedy provided by this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee is exclusive of any other civil action or civil proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the governmental entity or its employee or the estate of the employee for the act or omission which gave rise to the claim or suit.” (Emphasis added.) ¶20. We find Section 11-46-7 unambiguous – any claim for money damages arising out of the State’s tortious acts must be brought under the MTCA. And here, the trial court was correct in finding that MDOT is immune under the MTCA. As for the Garretsons’ claim for an injunction, the Legislature clearly has stated that a plaintiff cannot procure an injunction against the State for actions sounding in tort: The Legislature of the State of Mississippi finds and determines as a matter of public policy and does hereby declare, provide, enact and reenact that the “state” and its “political subdivisions,” . . . are not now, have never been and shall not be liable, and are, always have been and shall continue to be immune 9 from suit at law or in equity on account of any wrongful or tortious act or omission[.] Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-3(1) (Rev. 2012) (emphasis added). Although there is a waiver of this immunity in Section 11-46-5 for claims for money damages arising out of the State’s alleged tortious conduct, there is no such waiver of immunity for injunctive relief in this context. Thus, the trial judge was correct when he granted MDOT summary judgment on all of the Garretsons’ claims. ¶21. The Garretsons argue that MacDonald v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, 955 So. 2d 355 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), is applicable and supports their argument that they should be able to pursue some of the claims in their complaint. We disagree. There, the Court of Appeals did state that: [W]here there are separate claims, that single [immunity] provision may or may not be sufficient to create immunity as it applies to those other claims. Resolution of the question as to whether a single finding of immunity equates to immunity as to each and every claim raised depends on the facts of the case and the relevant claims. Therefore, such an issue must be decided on a caseby-case basis . . . . Succinctly put, immunity as to one claim does not necessarily, as a matter of law, equate to immunity for all claims. Id. at 361-62 (emphasis added). ¶22. But the plaintiff in MacDonald had made other claims along with her negligentdesign claims – for instance, she made a claim for negligent maintenance and improvement, as well as a claim for failure to warn of a dangerous condition. Thus, some of her claims fell outside the realm of road design. MacDonald, 955 So. 2d at 357. Here, after carefully reviewing the “facts of [this] case and the relevant claims,” we find that all of the Garretsons’ causes of action are barred by the design exemption. 10 II. The Garretsons did not plead a taking. ¶23. In their second point on appeal, the Garretsons argue that a taking claim brought under Article 3, Section 17 of the Mississippi Constitution 4 trumps the provisions of the MTCA. But because the Garretsons did not plead a taking in their complaint, we do not address the merits of this issue. ¶24. Even a liberal reading of the Garretsons’ complaint would not and did not put MDOT on notice of a constitutional taking claim. The words “taking” or “eminent domain” are nowhere to be found, nor is any sort of citation of or reference to the Takings Clause. Rather, the Garretsons repeatedly used phrases like “negligence,” “trespass,” and “[tortious].” The first time the Garretsons mentioned Article 3, Section 17, was in their response to MDOT’s motion for summary judgment. And despite the passage of almost five years between MDOT’s motion and the Garretsons’ response, there is no evidence in the record that the Garretsons ever attempted to amend their complaint to add a taking claim. ¶25. The Court of Appeals’ opinion in B&W Farms v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 922 So. 2d 857 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006), is directly on point and instructive. There, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants (MTC and its contractor) “unlawfully and negligently diverted and obstructed the natural flow of surface water,” and that they “had a duty to . . . avoid the negligent flooding of the crops . . . while constructing and improving the said Highway.” Id. at 858. 4 “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use, except on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof, in a manner to be prescribed by law . . . . ” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 17 (emphasis added). 11 ¶26. MTC filed a motion for summary judgment. Id. During the hearing on the motion, counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the term “unlawfully” must “certainly refer” to a violation of Article 3, Section 17, under the notice-pleading doctrine. Id. But the trial judge disagreed and found that the term “unlawful” was insufficient to put MTC on notice that the plaintiffs were asserting a constitutional claim. Id. The plaintiffs appealed and argued that the trial judge erred by strictly construing their complaint as “being limited to only a theory of negligence.” Id. ¶27. The Court of Appeals affirmed, beginning its analysis with a summary of Mississippi’s notice-pleading jurisprudence: Although Rule 8 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure “has eliminated the technical forms of pleadings required in years past, notice pleadings are still required to place the opposing party on notice of the claim being asserted.” ... In the complaint . . . B & W asserted that the “[d]efendants ... unlawfully and negligently diverted and obstructed the natural flow of surface water which flowed from the west to the east under U.S. Highway No. 61.” The complaint is void of any references to the Mississippi Constitution or to a taking of private property for public use. ... The first specific mention of a violation of the takings clause did not come until . . . B & W filed its response to the MTC’s motion for summary judgment. We agree with the finding of the trial court that “the word ‘unlawful’ is not so comprehensive as to specifically involve a constitutional claim in this instance because all contentions point to negligence.” Moreover, if B & W sought relief under Article 3, Section 17 of the Mississippi Constitution, at least some notice of this claim should have been given before B & W filed its response to the motion for summary judgment, (especially since the complaint was filed nearly seven years earlier). Id. at 858-59 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We find this reasoning persuasive and reach the same result here. 12 ¶28. The Garretsons’ reliance on this Court’s opinion in McLemore v. Mississippi Transportation Commission, 992 So. 2d 1107 (Miss. 2008), is, again, misplaced. This Court did indeed hold in McLemore that the McLemores could bring their claims against MTC in spite of the provisions of the MTCA.5 Id. at 1111. But it was clear there that the McLemores had pleaded a taking: Dennis and Tammy McLemore filed suit in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) and Talbot Brothers Contracting Co., Inc., alleging a taking without just compensation in violation of the Mississippi and U.S. Constitutions due to flooding and siltation on real property from negligence in the construction of a highway. ... Moreover, the parties agree that the McLemores provided notice of the constitutional claims. Id. at 1107-1109 (emphasis added). ¶29. Finally, the Garretsons’ last-ditch effort to argue that Article 3, Section 17 is “selfexecuting” – i.e., that they did not have to plead it – is unconvincing. It is true that this Court, in Parker v. State Highway Commission, 162 So. 162 (Miss. 1935), stated that “[S]ection 17, Constitution of 1890, is self-executing.” Id. at 164. But a reading of the opinion as a whole reveals that the term “self-executing” as used there meant that the Legislature could not limit the right – not that a plaintiff did not have to plead it. This interpretation is evidenced by the sentence immediately following the “self-executing” sentence relied on by the Garretsons: 5 “[T]he MTC asserts that the Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy for the McLemores and that they failed to plead it; therefore summary judgment was proper. However, we disagree.” Id. at 1109. 13 Prior to the adoption of this Constitution the Legislature could limit a landowner’s recovery to compensation for the land appropriated for public use, but as section 17 now exists it is quite clear that any effort on the part of the Legislature to shield the government or any arm thereof from payment of damages occasioned by it on the appropriation of land would be futile and of no effect. Before our Constitution was adopted, sections similar to the one here under consideration had been construed by the courts of other states as being self-executing. Section 17 of the constitution is mandatory. Id. at 164. ¶30. In sum, the Garretsons failed to plead a taking claim in their complaint, and we find that they are barred from attempting to argue that theory now.