Opinion ID: 6215538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tailoring the topics

Text: To assist in this effort, we observe that the current deposition topics regarding Jana’s alleged design and compliance services could include questions essential in determining whether Jana engaged in additional conduct indicating its purpose to serve the Texas market under the stream-of-commerce-plus theory. Christianson claims that its proposed discovery seeks information about “Jana’s role in the reformulation project and in maintaining certification,” as well as Jana’s knowledge of “product needs” in Texas. Questions that target whether Jana had such knowledge and used it to reformulate products for the Texas market are essential to determine whether Jana’s actions meet the plus factor of “designing the product for the market in the forum “placement” of the product in the stream of commerce, or facts that tie the additional conduct causally to the litigation. 13 State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. But Christianson’s topics regarding Jana’s general knowledge or activities do not seek essential information. And questions regarding any other party’s intent to target the Texas market are not relevant because that intent cannot be imputed to Jana. Importantly, simply inserting the phrase “in Texas” or “in Texas field conditions” into a topic does not make it essential to prove specific jurisdiction. Knowledge of how a product works “in Texas”—the subject of one disputed topic—is akin to “awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State,” which is an insufficient basis for specific jurisdiction. See id. Jana’s knowledge of, or tests concerning, how a product at issue functions in Texas field conditions may be essential in determining purposeful availment under a stream-of-commerce-plus theory if such knowledge or tests are tied to Jana’s intent to target the market in Texas. See id. Likewise, any design work that Jana did using knowledge of Texas field conditions may be essential in determining whether there is a substantial connection between Jana’s alleged contacts and Christianson’s claims against it. But mere general awareness of a range of conditions within which a product must operate does not itself show a purpose to serve all markets in which those conditions exist. Moreover, applying general discovery principles, the disputed topics are too broad. See CSX, 124 S.W.3d at 152–53. Though deposition topics—by their nature—may be broader in scope than individual deposition questions or interrogatories, the principle that discovery 14 requests should not be overbroad nevertheless applies.7 See id. at 153 (noting that we have not “identified different standards for evaluating various discovery methods”) (citing K Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1996)); In re Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 617 S.W.3d 635, 643–44, 47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding) (concluding that some deposition topics at issue were “broad enough to encompass other matters irrelevant to the underlying . . . claim”). The topics should be tailored to provide further limitations as to time and subject matter. See CSX, 124 S.W.3d at 153 (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995)). Finally, some of the disputed topics are cumulative or duplicative of topics that the parties do not dispute. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4. Taking the total list of thirty proposed topics into consideration, some disputed topics target information already accessible through topic 19, which includes “Jana’s participation in studies, tests, investigations and assessments of the performance of plastic tubing in Texas.” The mandamus record does not indicate that Jana challenged topic 19. Studies, tests, and investigations related to the performance of “plastic tubing” could include the same studies, tests, and investigations sought in topics 17, 18, and 30. Whether that overlap constitutes “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative” discovery is a question for the trial court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.4 (emphasis added). 7 We recognize that it is common practice to provide topics rather than individual questions when noticing the depositions of corporate representatives, and we do not disturb this general practice. But in contexts such as jurisdictional disputes where the availability of discovery is limited, topics should be tailored to take those limits into account. 15 III. Mandamus relief is proper. Having concluded that the court of appeals clearly erred in restricting discovery more than Rule 120a requires, we next consider whether mandamus relief is a proper remedy. We review a court of appeals’ issuance of a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion, but in doing so our focus remains on the trial court’s order. In re Turner, 591 S.W.3d 121, 124 (Tex. 2019) (orig. proceeding) (citing In re State, 556 S.W.3d 821, 826 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding)). A court of appeals may issue a writ of mandamus only if the trial court abused its discretion and there is no adequate remedy by appeal. Johnson v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985). “If the trial court did not abuse its discretion, then the court of appeals erred in granting mandamus relief.” In re Am. Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 483 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding) (citing Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917); see also In re Panchakarla, 602 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding); Scott v. Twelfth Ct. of Appeals, 843 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). As we have explained, the trial court did not abuse its discretion for the reason identified by the court of appeals. We conclude that the court of appeals erred when it held that discovery on eight of the nine disputed deposition topics should be denied because Rule 120a(3) discovery must relate exclusively to the jurisdictional issue. Therefore, mandamus relief is proper. 16