Opinion ID: 853024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was the Confession Coerced?

Text: Griffith further argues that his confession was obtained in violation of his rights against self-incrimination. Admissibility of a confession is governed determining from the totality of the circumstances whether or not it was made voluntarily. Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind.1989). Standard indicators for voluntariness include whether the confession was freely self-determined, the product of a rational intellect and free will, without compulsion or inducement of any sort, and whether the accused's will was overborne. Johnson v. State, 250 Ind. 283, 235 N.E.2d 688 (1968). Although the State at trial was required to prove the voluntariness of Griffith's statement beyond a reasonable doubt, we review the question on appeal as we do other sufficiency matters. We do not weigh the evidence, but rather determine whether there was substantial probative evidence to support the trial court's finding. See Works v. State, 266 Ind. 250, 362 N.E.2d 144 (1977). Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Griffith's confession was voluntary. Griffith signed a waiver after police informed him of his Miranda rights. While being held, Griffith asked his wife to inform police that he wished to speak with them. Griffith never invoked his right to remain silent, as he now argues. He simply commented, I might as well not say anything more, in response to the police not striking any deals with Griffith for his information. (Appellant's App. at 95-96.) Yet, he continued to disclose information after this statement during the interrogation. Griffith's statement, like that of the defendant in Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 514-15 (Ind.1997) who told police during interrogation, I am through with this, does not constitute an invocation of silence. We therefore hold that Griffith's confession was voluntary.