Opinion ID: 2343191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: capital sentencing phase issues

Text: Because we reverse Appellant's death sentence and remand this case to the trial court for a new capital sentencing phase, most of Appellant's allegations of error with respect to the capital sentencing phase of his trial present themselves in various degrees of mootness. We address Appellant's allegations of error, therefore, to the extent that they may be relevant to proceedings upon remand.
We find no merit in Appellant's contention that the Commonwealth was precluded from seeking the death penalty because the Bullitt County Grand Jury's indictment did not identify the aggravating circumstance. Although a defendant cannot be made to face the sentencing phase of a capital trial unless he or she is first given sufficient notice of the Commonwealth's intention to seek the death penalty[,] Commonwealth v. Maricle, Ky., 15 S.W.3d 376, 379 (2000), [t]here is no authority supporting [Appellant's] claim that an aggravating circumstance must be described in the indictment. Wheeler, 121 S.W.3d at 185. See also Garland, Ky., 127 S.W.3d at 546; Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 41. The Commonwealth complied with KRS 532.025(1)(a) by providing Appellant with written notice prior to trial  in fact, approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years prior to trial  of the evidence in aggravation that it intended to introduce. At no time prior to this appeal did defense counsel complain of insufficient notice and Appellant may not claim such at this time. Id. In Part III(F)(4), infra, we address Appellant's arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence in aggravation identified in the Commonwealth's notice.
After the jury found Appellant guilty of Murder, an ex parte hearing was held in the trial court's chambers in which Appellant's trial counsel briefly outlined the mitigation evidence that had been prepared, informed the trial court that Appellant had instructed his attorneys not to introduce mitigation evidence and not to plead for his life during the capital sentencing phase, and then asked Appellant on the record is what I have just said essentially correct? Appellant answered It is all true. Appellant's trial counsel then informed the Court that Appellant additionally had instructed us that he does not wish us ... to plead that his life be spared although he does not object if we make a general argument to the jury and, again asked Appellant [i]s that true? Appellant responded Yes, it is. Appellant's trial attorneys then indicated that Appellant's wishes placed [them] in a position that is antithetical to everything that we have ever been trained to do ... and in everything that we believe we should do. Accordingly, trial counsel moved the trial court to allow them to withdraw and to appoint new counsel for the penalty phase. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant argues: (1) that the trial court erred by failing to determine whether his waiver of his right to introduce mitigation evidence was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and (2) that the trial court should have permitted Appellant's trial counsel to withdraw. Although both issues are rendered largely moot by our reversal of Appellant's death sentence and remand for a new capital sentencing phase, we will address the substance of these issues as they may be relevant to proceedings upon retrial. Although KRS 532.025 and KRS 532.055(2)(b) permit a defendant to introduce mitigating evidence, the defendant, is master of his own defense and pilot of the ship[,] Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412, 418 (1994), and thus may elect to ignore the advice of his counsel and to waive the presentation of mitigating evidence. Cf. id. at 417 ([The Sixth Amendment] grants to the accused the right to make his defense, for it is he who suffers the consequences.) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). If a defendant wishes to do so, however, it is incumbent upon the trial court to determine, on the record, whether he or she is competent to make such a waiver and whether the decision to do so is knowing and voluntary. Id. at 418. In making this determination, a trial court should: (1) inform the defendant of the right to present mitigating evidence, and what mitigating evidence is; (2) inquire both of the defendant and his attorney (if not pro se) whether he or she understands these rights; (3) inquire of the attorney if he or she has attempted to determine from the defendant whether any mitigating evidence exists; (4) inquire what that mitigating evidence is (if the defendant has refused to cooperate, the attorney must relate that to the court); (5) inquire of a defendant and make a determination on the record whether the defendant understands the importance of mitigating evidence in a capital sentencing scheme, understands such evidence could be used to offset the aggravating circumstances proven by the prosecution in support of the death penalty, and the effect of failing to present that evidence; (6) after being assured the defendant understands these concepts, inquire of the defendant whether he or she desires to waive the right to present such mitigating evidence; and (7) make findings of fact regarding the defendant's understanding and waiver of rights. Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233 (10th Cir.2001) (relying upon guidelines established by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, but describing such guidelines as little more than commonsense and holding that they should have been substantially followed by the trial court.). If, upon remand, Appellant again elects not to present mitigation evidence and the trial court finds that Appellant's decision to do so is knowing and voluntary, counsel ... must proceed according to [his] wishes. Jacobs, 870 S.W.2d at 418. We disagree with Appellant's contention that his decision not to introduce mitigating evidence required the trial court to permit his trial counsel to withdraw. When a competent criminal defendant makes a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to introduce mitigating evidence, his or her attorney will not fail to provide competent representation to a client, SCR 3.130-1.1, by proceeding in accordance with the defendant's wishes. And, although counsel may have a basis to withdraw if the defendant's decision constitutes the pursuit of an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent, SCR 3.130-1.16(b)(3), counsel may not withdraw if the tribunal orders the representation to continue. SCR 3.130-1.16(5). Given the length of time it took for this case to come to trial, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to withdraw on the cusp of the capital sentencing phase. See Jacobs, 58 S.W.3d at 449.
During the capital sentencing phase of Appellant's trial, the Bullitt Circuit Court Clerk testified for the Commonwealth and read the entirety of the Oklahoma prosecutors' informations that led to Appellant's four (4) First-Degree Murder convictions and his Solicitation of Murder conviction. Although written in somewhat flowery prose, each murder information simply detailed: (1) the name of the defendant (and any co-defendant), (2) the date the offense was committed, (3) the offense charged, (4) the name of the victim, (5) the weapon used in each offense (a firearm), and, in the Murder informations, (6) the fact that the victim died. [4] We disagree with Appellant's contention that the trial court should have sustained his objection to this evidence, and hold that the trial court properly permitted its introduction. KRS 532.025(1)(a) provides that the judge shall hear additional evidence ... including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant. See also KRS 532.025(1)(b) (incorporating the same procedures for capital sentencing proceedings before a jury). We have previously explained that [t]he purpose of K.R.S. 532.025 is to allow evidence of all relevant and pertinent information so that the jury can make an informed decision concerning the appropriate sentence in a particular case. Templeman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 785 S.W.2d 259, 260 (1990). Furthermore, KRS 532.055(2)(a), which governs the penalty phases of all felony cases, [5] permits the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of [t]he nature of prior offenses for which [the defendant] was convicted. This Court has held that KRS 532.055(2)(a) permits the introduction of a general description of the crime. Robinson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 926 S.W.2d 853, 855 (1996). Because the language of the informations contained no more than a general description of Appellant's prior convictions, the trial court correctly overruled Appellant's objection.
Each of these three (3) separate allegations of error take aim upon the aggravating circumstance found by the jury in this case, i.e., the Defendant has a prior record of conviction for murder, a capital offense. See KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1): In all cases of offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider ... any of the following statutory aggravating ... circumstances which may be supported by the evidence: (a) Aggravating circumstances: (1) The offense of murder or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital offense, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. Appellant first argues that KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) unconstitutionally surrenders the decision whether to impose the death penalty to the jury's subjective beliefs because it is ambiguous and fails to inform the jury what facts it must believe to find the presence of the aggravating circumstance. Appellant submits that the provision is unclear as to the definition of: (1) prior, e.g. prior to the commission of the offense or simply at some point prior to the capital sentencing phase?; (2) conviction, e.g. a final judgment of conviction or a finding of guilt by a judge or jury?; and (3) capital offense. Appellant argues, in the alternative, that he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal as to the aggravating circumstance because KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) required that his conviction for a capital offense exist prior to the time of Brady's murder. Appellant argues that, although he had four (4) capital convictions for murders committed in Oklahoma by the time he came to trial in Kentucky, he did not have a prior record of conviction for a capital offense at the time he murdered Brady because final judgment and sentence had not yet been entered in two (2) of his Oklahoma murder cases and he had yet to stand trial in the others. Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court's capital sentencing phase jury instructions erroneously reformulated the KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) aggravating circumstance. Because an issue of first impression concerning the proper interpretation of KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) is at the heart of each of Appellant's allegations of error, we begin our analysis there. This Court has been asked to address issues as to KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) only twice. In Bevins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 712 S.W.2d 932, 935-6 (1986), the appellant argued that it was improper for the trial court to consider a fifty (50) year old murder conviction as a foundation for the prior record of a capital offense aggravating circumstance. Id. at 935. We did not address the question presented because the appellant was appealing from a judgment convicting him of five (5) counts of murder arising out of a shooting spree, id. at 933, and was thus already death eligible under KRS 532.025(2)(a)(6). Id. Seven (7) years later, in Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 871 (1993), we reversed the appellant's death sentence because a murder conviction that remained on appeal had been used to prove the KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) aggravating circumstance: KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) lists a prior record of conviction for a capital offense as an aggravating circumstance for which the death penalty may be imposed. During appellant's trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of this aggravator through the testimony of the Lyon Circuit Clerk. The clerk testified that he had certified records showing that appellant was convicted in Pike County, in 1974, of willful murder under KRS 435.010. Appellant argues that the conviction from Pike County was improperly used as an aggravator because the 1974 conviction was not final. Appellant's trial for murder, robbery, and escape was in 1986. In 1987, this Court stated that appellant's appeal from the Pike County willful murder conviction has never been dismissed. It is still pending. Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 319, 321 (1987). The language in KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) refers to an aggravator as being a prior record of conviction. It has long been held by Kentucky courts that a conviction, which of course means the final judgment cannot be relied upon as a conviction if an appeal is being taken because an appeal in a criminal case suspends the judgment, and this [sic] does not become final until a termination of the appeal. Foure v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 620, 283 S.W. 958, 962 (1926). See also Commonwealth v. Duvall, Ky., 548 S.W.2d 832 (1977) (conviction that is being appealed is not final and cannot be used for impeachment purposes). More recently this Court has held that a prior conviction cannot be utilized under the truth-in-sentencing statute or the persistent felony offender statutes if an appeal is pending. Melson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 772 S.W.2d 631 (1989). Because appellant's appeal of the 1974 conviction was pending, it was improper for it to be used as an aggravating circumstance in KRS 532.025. As to this issue, a majority of the Court reverses. Id. at 877 (footnote omitted). The parties' positions on this interpretive question are in clear opposition as to whether KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) requires that the prior record of conviction for a capital offense exist at the time of the present capital offense. Appellant emphasizes the past tense of was committed and cites Thompson in support of its claim that the Commonwealth can demonstrate the applicability of the KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) aggravating circumstance only by proving that, at the time that a defendant committed the present offense of Murder or Capital Kidnapping, the defendant had exhausted all of his or her appeals under a preexisting final judgment of conviction for a capital offense. In contrast, the Commonwealth relies upon Haight and Templeman , in which we interpreted the word prior in KRS 532.025(1)(a)'s including the record of any prior criminal convictions language as authorizing the admission of evidence of subsequently-obtained criminal convictions at a capital sentencing proceeding. Templeman, 785 S.W.2d at 260 ([T]he trial judge was correct in allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of prior criminal convictions which occurred subsequent to the commission of the crime. The term prior is the status of the defendant at the time of sentencing, not at the time of the commission of the charged crime.); Haight, 938 S.W.2d at 253 (There was no error in the Commonwealth's introduction, pursuant to KRS 532.025, of appellant's criminal convictions which occurred and became final subsequent to his commission of the instant offenses. (citing Templeman )). Accordingly, the Commonwealth argues that, to satisfy its burden of proof as to the KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) aggravating circumstance, it need only demonstrate that, at the time a capital sentencing proceeding is conducted, the defendant's criminal record contains a conviction for a capital offense. Without question, the specific language utilized in an aggravating circumstance is critical to interpreting its scope. See Young v. Commonwealth, Ky., 50 S.W.3d 148, 159 (2001) (contrasting the Model Penal Code's  the murder was committed for pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance with Georgia's  the offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value aggravating circumstance). Accordingly, we observe that KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1), which was adapted from the Georgia death penalty statute the United States Supreme Court found constitutional in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), parallels an aggravating circumstance found in the Model Penal Code, i.e. , The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part II, § 210.6(3)(b) (A.L.I.1980). [Model Penal Code § 210.6](3)(b) deals with the defendant's past behavior as a circumstance for aggravation. Perhaps the strongest popular demand for capital punishment arises where the defendant has a history of violence. Prior conviction of a felony involving violence to the person suggests two inferences supporting escalation of violence: first, that the murder reflects the character of the defendant rather than any extraordinary aspect of the situation, and second, that the defendant is likely to prove dangerous to life on some future occasion. Thus prior conviction of a violent felony is included as a circumstance that may support imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 136. A majority of our sister states that permit the imposition of the death penalty have statutorily-authorized aggravating circumstances that, like KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1), address defendants' prior violent crimes, but the majority of aggravating circumstances that specifically reference capital offenses track the Model Penal Code § 210.6(3)(b)'s the defendant was previously convicted language. [6] A number of other states have broader aggravating circumstances that also correspond in structure to the Model Penal Code. [7] Five (5) death penalty jurisdictions have statutory aggravating circumstances that utilize a  the defendant has been convicted structure, [8] but only one (1) of them contains language that expressly limits the timing of the other conviction or convictions. [9] Two (2) other jurisdictions' aggravating circumstances expressly include convictions obtained at any time prior to sentencing. [10] Finally, in addition to Kentucky, four (4) states' statutes include an aggravating circumstance that employs the passive voice, the offense was committed by a person with a prior conviction wording. [11] Unfortunately, these jurisdictions do not agree on how to interpret this language. In Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S.E.2d 92 (1978), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that its prior conviction of a capital felony aggravating circumstance could be demonstrated with proof of capital felony convictions that were obtained subsequent to the commission of the crime for which the death penalty was sought: The statutory aggravating circumstance complained of is found in Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(1), which provides in pertinent part that [t]he offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony.... The appellant argues that at the time he committed the murder of Roy Asbell he did not have a prior record of conviction for a capital felony. Although the appellant was convicted of a murder and two armed robberies committed prior to the date that he murdered Roy Asbell, these convictions were not obtained until after the murder of Roy Asbell was committed. This argument raises the question whether, in deciding if the appellant has a prior record of conviction for a capital felony the jury should consider his record as of the moment of the crime or as of the time of sentencing. We conclude the latter was intended by the legislature, and at the time of his sentencing Stephens' jury could correctly find that he had such a record. To conclude otherwise would produce the intolerable result that an offender with no prior record could commit numerous separate murders one after the other before being apprehended, and then, at the trials for those murders could Never receive death under this aggravating circumstance even though convicted of each and every one of the murders. Id. at 97. See also State v. Terry, 257 Ga. 473, 360 S.E.2d 588 (1987) (after defendant's request for severance of counts for trial, capital convictions obtained at trial for counts 1 and 2 of indictment used as aggravating circumstance at subsequent trial for remaining counts); Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48, 61 (1987) (capital conviction obtained at same trial used to prove aggravating circumstance as to second murder). In State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.1994), however, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that its aggravating circumstance allows the jury to consider only those convictions for first degree murder committed prior to the charged offense. Id. at 813. Neither South Carolina nor South Dakota has addressed this issue. The specification of aggravating circumstances is the legislature's prerogative, not ours. Young, 50 S.W.3d at 162. Thus, as is the case in any issue of statutory construction, our responsibility is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Moore v. Alsmiller, 289 Ky. 682, 160 S.W.2d 10 (1942). In so doing, we are required by KRS 446.080(4) to construe words and phrases according to the common and approved use of language. In Gateway Construction Co. v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 247 (1962), our predecessor described the inquiry as follows: The best way in most cases to ascertain such intent or to determine the meaning of the statute is to look to the language used, but no intention must be read into the statute not justified by the language. The primary rule is to ascertain the intention from the words employed in enacting the statute and not to guess what the Legislature may have intended but did not express. Resort must be had first to the words, which are decisive if they are clear. Id. at 249. Although, in Templeman and Haight , we adopted a broader construction of the legislature's use of the words prior criminal convictions when interpreting a different subsection of KRS 532.025, we find the verb tense and phraseology utilized by the General Assembly in KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) to be unequivocal, i.e. , [t]he offense of murder or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital offense[.] (emphasis added). We find KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) susceptible to but one natural and reasonable construction: the aggravating circumstance is implicated only when the defendant has already been convicted of a capital offense prior to the commission of the present capital offense. The word with is self-explanatory; in the context used in KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) it means [h]aving as a possession, attribute, or characteristic, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.2000). Accordingly, if an unarmed person uses his bare hands to strangle a victim to death, it is an objective fact that the offense was not committed by a person with a handgun. Similarly, in a case where a defendant with no prior criminal record kills Victim A, the murder of Victim A was not committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital offense. The defendant's status at the time of the offense does not change if the defendant is subsequently convicted of murdering Victim B. See Stephens v. Hopper, 247 S.E.2d at 99 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, the murder of Victim A was committed by a person who later became a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital offense. And, while we agree with the Commonwealth's observation that [b]oth a backward-looking and a forward-looking inquiry are a permissible part of the sentencing process [,] Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 977, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 2637, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994), KRS 532.025(1)(a), as interpreted in Templeman and Haight , permits the jury to perform the forward-looking inquiry by considering the capital offender's full criminal history in determining an appropriate sentence within the available penalty range. It is clear from the language of KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1), however, that a subsequently-obtained capital conviction, standing alone, will not make the defendant death eligible. A second interpretative question remains, however, as to what level of finality is contemplated by a prior record of conviction for a capital offense. We recognize that we stated in Thompson that a `conviction, which of course means the final judgment' cannot be relied upon as a conviction if an appeal is taken because `an appeal in a criminal case suspends the judgment, and this [sic] does not become final until a termination of the appeal.' Thompson, 862 S.W.2d at 877 (quoting Foure, 283 S.W. at 962). In doing so, however, it appears that we quoted out-of-context the authority upon which we relied), see Foure, 283 S.W. at 962 (interpreting the language  judgment of conviction in § 597 of the former Civil Code of Practice), and overlooked nearly a century of jurisprudence from this Court which recognizes that [t]he word `conviction' has a twofold meaning. One is the determination of the fact of guilt, as by the verdict of a jury. The other ... denotes the final judgment in the prosecution. Dial v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 32, 133 S.W. 976, 976 (1911). See also Kentucky County Judge/Executive Association v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 938 S.W.2d 582, 584 n. 1 (1996) (The definition of `convict' or `conviction') has a meaning dual in nature: `The word `conviction' has two meanings: its ordinary or popular meaning, which refers to a finding of guilt by plea or verdict, and its legal or technical meaning, which refers to the final judgment entered on plea or verdict of guilty....' (quoting 21A Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 1313 at 571 (1998)). It has been held that the word convicted (or conviction) is equivocal and its meaning can vary according to its use in a particular statute.... The word generally means the ascertainment of defendant's guilt by some legal mode and an adjudication that the accused is guilty. This may be accomplished by a confession by the accused in open court, a plea of guilty or a verdict which ascertains and publishes the fact of guilt. We believe in the majority of ... cases and in the majority of jurisdictions (although we have not counted noses) the word conviction is not limited to a final judgment. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 853, 854 (1963). See also Kentucky County Judge/Executive Association, 938 S.W.2d at 584 n. 1 (Kentucky law recognizes the equivocal nature of these terms and has held that the meaning implicated depends upon the particular statute in question.). Kentucky appellate courts have had occasion to interpret the word convict or conviction in a number of enactments and have concluded that this language connotes a final judgment of conviction in (1) Section 254 of the Kentucky Constitution, id. at 584 ([I]t is clear that the word `convicts' in this provision of the Constitution means one who is convicted and sentenced to a state facility for a felony. A sentence and judgment have been recognized in Kentucky as being essentially the same.); (2) KRS 532.055(2)(a) of Kentucky's Truth-in-Sentencing statute and KRS 532.080(2) & (3) of Kentucky's Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) statute, Melson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 772 S.W.2d 631, 633 (1989) ([A] prior conviction may not be utilized under KRS 532.055 ... or under KRS 532.080... unless: (1) The time for appealing the convictions has expired without appeal having been taken, or (2) Matter of right appeal has been taken pursuant to § 115 of the Constitution of Kentucky and the judgment of conviction has been affirmed.); and (3) in enactments permitting the impeachment of a witness with his or her felony conviction, Commonwealth v. Duvall, Ky., 548 S.W.2d 832 (1977); Foure, 283 S.W. at 962. But see Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d at 856 (holding that, under CR 43.07, a witness has been convicted so far as this Rule is concerned and may be impeached with the felony conviction [i]f it is shown that he has been guilty of a felony and his guilt has been fixed either by a plea of guilty or a verdict of the jury [.]). For purposes of Kentucky's Felon in Possession of a Handgun statute, KRS 527.040, however, the courts have held that a person is a convicted felon upon entry of his or her plea of guilty. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 828, 829 (2003) (When Appellant freely, knowingly, and intelligently entered a plea of guilty to first-degree possession of a controlled substance, he acknowledged the fact of having committed a crime and accepted legal responsibility for a criminal act. Thus, Appellant's status as a `convicted felon' was established, and all that remained was the imposition of sentence.); Grace v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 915 S.W.2d 754, 756 (1996) ([O]nce the appellant's plea of guilty was accepted by the court, and he was found by the court to be guilty, he became a `convicted felon' for purposes of KRS 527.040.). This Court has observed its different interpretations of conviction in different statutes are a function of an attempt by the courts to determine legislative intent in each case. Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d at 855. Turning to that inquiry, we again find guidance in KRS 446.080(4): [a]ll words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved use of language. As the Court of Appeals has observed, the ordinary or popular meaning of conviction refers to a finding of guilt by plea or verdict[.] Kentucky County Judge/Executive Association 938 S.W.2d at 584 n. 1. Further, our rules of statutory construction presume that the legislature is aware of the state of the law at the time it enacts a statute, Shewmaker v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 30 S.W.3d 807, 809 (2000), including judicial construction of prior enactments. Button v. Hikes, 296 Ky. 163, 176 S.W.2d 112, 117 (1943) (It is presumed that the legislature is acquainted with the law; that it has knowledge of the state of it upon subjects upon which it legislates; that it is informed of previous legislation, and the construction it has received.). We therefore find it significant that the General Assembly chose the phrase prior record of conviction in KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1)  a phrase that invokes the vernacular notion of a person's criminal record  instead of judgment of conviction, which would have had not only a defined legal meaning, see RCr 11.04, but also a body of precedent  specifically Foure and Duvall  interpreting it to mean a final judgment of conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that, for purposes of KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1), prior record of conviction for a capital offense includes a plea of guilty accepted by the trial court or a jury's or judge's verdict of guilty. To the extent that Thompson reaches a contrary holding, it is overruled. In light of our construction of the KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) aggravating circumstance, Appellant's allegations of error are easily resolved. First, we find that the aggravating circumstance satisfies the Constitutional demands and provide[s] a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not, Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764, 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 406 (1980) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2764, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). The statute not only provides some `common-sense core of meaning ... that criminal juries should be capable of understanding[,]' Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 967, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 2632, 129 L.Ed.2d at 760 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2959, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976)) (White, J., concurring in judgment), but, in our view, contains clear objective standards from which a jury may determine a defendant's eligibility for a capital sentence. Simply put, KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) does not permit [t]he standardless and unchanneled imposition of death sentences in the uncontrolled discretion of a basically uninstructed jury, Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 429, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1765, 64 L.Ed.2d at 407, which the constitution prohibits. The trial court also correctly denied Appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal with respect to the KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) aggravating circumstance. Although the final judgments were not entered in Appellant's first two Oklahoma Murder convictions until November 22, 1991, or approximately six (6) weeks after Brady's murder, Appellant acknowledged during his culpability phase testimony that he had been convicted of those two (2) counts of Murder following a trial: Defense: Where had you been right before that; right before September of '91? Appellant: I was transferred to Sulfur, Oklahoma  that is Murray County  due to a change of venue waiting trial; weeks before my trial that started in August of 1991. Defense: You had a trial in August of 1991? Appellant: Yes, sir. Defense: When did that trial end? Appellant: It ended September 12 of 1991. Defense: And you were found guilty in that trial? Appellant: Yes, sir, I was. Defense: And that was of? What were you found guilty? Appellant: Two counts of murder and Solicitation of Murder. Defense: Okay. So on September 12th, were you awaiting final sentencing on those cases? Appellant: Yes, sir. I was awaiting final sentencing. Because these two (2) murder convictions demonstrated that Brady was murdered by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital offense, the trial court correctly denied Appellant's motion for a directed verdict as to the aggravating circumstance. Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991). Although the Commonwealth introduced evidence of all four (4) of Appellant's capital convictions at trial  the latter two (2) of which stemmed from a trial conducted in 1994 and therefore did not constitute part of Appellant's prior record of conviction of a capital offense at the time of Brady's murder  we observe that all of them were admissible at the capital sentencing phase pursuant to KRS 532.025(1)(a). Given our construction of the KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) aggravating circumstance, we agree with Appellant's contention that the trial court's articulation of that aggravating circumstance changed its meaning. Upon remand, the trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with the statutory language, i.e. , the murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction of a capital offense.
Appellant raises a number of complaints regarding the trial court's capital sentencing phase jury instructions. Although we find most of these allegations lacking in merit, we agree with Appellant that pursuant to RCr 9.54(1), the trial court was required to read the capital sentencing phase jury instructions to the jury unless both Appellant and the Commonwealth agreed otherwise. Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court shall read its instructions to the jury. As to Appellant's other allegations of error in the capital sentencing phase instructions, we hold that the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury that: (1) it could not consider any aggravating factors not enumerated in the instructions, see Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 599 S.W.2d 900, 911 (1980); (2) jury findings as to mitigating circumstances need not be unanimous, Perdue, 916 S.W.2d at 168; Bowling, 873 S.W.2d at 181; (3) a verdict of death would result in lethal injection, Perdue, 916 S.W.2d at 169; (4) it may not be influenced by passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factors, Id. ; (5) any juror could grant Appellant mercy for any reason whatsoever and that the death penalty could not be imposed if any juror had any doubt as to whether death was the appropriate punishment (issues that the trial court addressed properly in its mitigation and reasonable doubt instructions); and (6) it could not impose the death penalty if it had reasonable doubts whether Appellant actually fired the shots that killed Brady, Smith, 599 S.W.2d at 909. See also Perdue, 916 S.W.2d at 166; Stanford , Ky., 854 S.W.2d at 744. Further, we find no error in the trial court's verdict form, see Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 854 (2000), or its description of one of the jury's sentencing options in accordance with the statutory language, i.e. , imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole until he has served a minimum of 25 years of his sentence, instead of the Appellant's proposed description, which omitted the word probation.