Opinion ID: 1127405
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guilt and Special Circumstance Phase Issues

Text: On the second day of trial, July 11, 1988, defendant's chief guilt phase trial counsel, Toton, moved to submit the guilt and special circumstance phases on the preliminary hearing transcript. (Cocounsel Frank was also present during the proceedings.) Toton stated that defendant had agreed to waive his right to a jury trial and to confront witnesses, and to offer no additional evidence, subject to being allowed to argue the legal admissibility of the testimony. The next day, the court informed the parties that although it had not researched the issue, it would allow Toton to take tentative nonbinding waivers of constitutional rights from defendant. These nonbinding waivers included defendant's waiver of his right against self-incrimination. The prosecutor, Ryals, opposed the motion. She stated that although she was willing to accept a stipulation from defendant that he was guilty of the charges and the special circumstance allegations and to proceed directly to a penalty trial, she would not stipulate to the submission of the case on the preliminary hearing transcripts. On July 13, the court told the parties that it believed the prosecution had the right to a jury trial in the guilt and special circumstance phases but that it would entertain further argument from defendant. Toton informed the court that the submission proposal was a compromise made by defendant at Toton's request. Defendant originally had wanted to plead guilty to the capital charges, but Toton would not consent to such a plea, believing that a guilty plea would amount to ineffective assistance of counsel under People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1]. Ryals argued that if the court granted defendant's request to submit the case on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts, the prosecution would be foreclosed from proffering additional evidence gathered since the preliminary hearing. Ryals told the court that the additional evidence was essential to convict defendant and included testimony by Rodriguez (who purchased property stolen from the murder scenes), reporter Trihey, to whom defendant confessed, a police officer, and an employee of the Bakersfield Inn. Toton and Ryals agreed that the prosecution should be allowed to present additional evidence at the guilt phase, and that the defense would present rebuttal evidence and argue the case. Toton then stated to the court: MR. TOTON: Let me attempt then, because there is a lot of things going on, to see if my understanding is correct. We are prepared to waive jury trial on the guilt phase, on the special circumstance. Mrs. Ryals will present additional evidence. We will be able to present additional evidence and argue the matter. At penalty phase, it will be statutory, and, in other words, we understand that she has to put on the facts and circumstances of the case itself. Regular rules of evidence will apply at this point as if they were, as if there had been a jury trial on the guilt phase, and that Mr. Sanchez would be prepared to so waive his right to a jury trial on both and separately on both the guilt phase and the special circumstance. Mr. Frank and I would be prepared to join that on the People's consent to also join. THE COURT: It sounds all right, sounds good. The trial court then allowed Toton to inform defendant of his constitutional rights, but ruled that the waivers would not bind defendant until the following morning. Defendant waived his rights to trial by jury and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, but was not asked to and did not repeat his waiver of the right against self-incrimination. He repeatedly acknowledged, however, that he was waiving his constitutional rights and that his decision was entered freely and voluntarily. Once the waivers were taken, the following colloquy occurred between the court and defendant: THE COURT: I take it that ... Mr. Frank and Mr. Toton have talked to you at some length about the waivers? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you feel you understood them? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I believe I do. THE COURT: And you have had some time to think about it, at least since about 10:30 this morning, and they talked to you later, I take it? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you have thought about it? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: So far as you are losing your right to confront witnesses, those witnesses whose testimony will be presented to the court through the preliminary examination, you won't get a chance to cross-examine them in this court. You understand that? DEFENDANT: Yes sir. THE COURT: And you are giving that right up then? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Now, so far as the witnesses called ... to augment the People's case and/or in your behalf, the live witnesses called in this case, you will have the right to confrontation and you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I have to tell you that some of the cases in the state of California say that when you present a case to the judge to determine the guilt or innocence on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcript, that's sometimes called a slow guilty plea. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I don't know whether you have heard that language before, but it's used in the cases. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And I want you to be aware of that. I am not telling you how I am going to decide this case, but there is an aura of that in the cases and you should be aware of that fact. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you are willing to give up your right to a trial by jury both as to the guilt of the two homicides alleged and of the other enhancements and the special circumstances; is that right? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And you know you have the right, and we are ready to give you a jury on all those issues. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor, I understand all that. THE COURT: And you nonetheless give it up? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Shortly thereafter, the court again confirmed that defendant understood he was waiving important constitutional rights: THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your decision? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am very confident. THE COURT: Because you know we have got a record of everything here. It's going to be kind of hard to tell somebody else, gee, I didn't think about it. The judge coerced me. The [d]istrict [a]ttorney growled at me. My lawyers kicked me around. You know, it's going to be kind of hard to say that after you have been very candid with us here. Are you satisfied with that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I am very satisfied. THE COURT: You seem satisfied. I believe you are satisfied. I will make that kind of a finding. Defendant confirmed his intent to waive his jury trial and confrontation rights the following morning, but no mention was made by the court or counsel of defendant's right against self-incrimination. (1a) Defendant now contends that because submitting the case on the basis of the preliminary hearing was tantamount to pleading guilty (or a slow plea), the trial court committed reversible error under Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 [119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086] (hereafter Bunnell ) when it failed to advise in the binding waivers that defendant would be relinquishing his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He also contends that the court's failure to advise him of the direct consequences of a conviction requires reversal, as does the fact that he was unaware of the legal ramifications of his initial submission and waiver.
(2a) In Bunnell, this court held that a stipulation to submit a case for decision on preliminary hearing transcripts must be accompanied by advice regarding the personal waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights to jury trial, silence, and to confront and cross-examine, i.e., Boykin-Tahl advice and waivers. ( Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1960) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449].) The Bunnell court held, the record shall reflect that he had been advised of his right to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against self-incrimination.... Express waivers of the enumerated constitutional rights shall appear.... In all guilty plea and submission cases the defendant shall be advised of the direct consequences of conviction such as the permissible range of punishment provided by statute.... ( Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 605.) Thereafter, in People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350] (hereafter Hendricks ) we held that the mandate of Boykin-Tahl applies only to pleas of guilty and submissions on the preliminary hearing transcript, or slow pleas, by virtue of which [defendant] surrenders one or more of the three specified rights. ( Id., at p. 592.) A slow plea is defined as a submission of the guilt phase to the court on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts that is tantamount to a plea of guilty because guilt is apparent on the face of the transcripts and conviction is a foregone conclusion if no defense is offered. ( People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 496 [233 Cal. Rptr. 69, 729 P.2d 260] [hereafter Wright ].) (3) Deciding whether a submission is a slow plea is often difficult, and courts generally review such pleas based on defendant's willingness to contest guilt during the court trial. Submissions that are not considered slow pleas include those in which (1) the preliminary hearing involves substantial cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and the presentation of defense evidence or (2) the facts revealed at the preliminary examination are essentially undisputed but counsel makes an argument to the court as to the legal significance to be accorded them. ( Ibid. ; see In re Mosely (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924-925, fn. 9 [83 Cal. Rptr. 809, 464 P.2d 473] [extending, in dictum, Tahl advisement and waiver requirement to cases in which defendant's submission on preliminary hearing transcript is tantamount to a guilty plea].) Defendant claims that because counsel did not argue for acquittal of all charges and presented no defense to some of the charges, his submission was a slow plea tantamount to a guilty plea. But as the Wright court observes, [a]n appellate court, in determining whether a submission is a slow plea, must assess the circumstances of the entire proceeding. It is not enough for a reviewing court to simply count the number of witnesses who testified at the hearing following the submission. A submission that prospectively appeared to be a slow plea may turn out to be part of a full-blown trial if counsel contested the sufficiency of evidence for those counts or presented another potentially meritorious legal argument against conviction. Conversely, a submission that did not appear to be a slow plea because the defendant reserved the right to testify and call witnesses or to argue the sufficiency of the evidence ( see People v. Guerra (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 534, 538 [98 Cal. Rptr. 627]) may turn out to be a slow plea if the defense presented no evidence or argument contesting guilt. [¶] If it appears on the whole that the defendant advanced a substantial defense, the submission cannot be considered to be tantamount to a plea of guilty. Sometimes, a defendant's best defense is weak. He may make a tactical decision to concede guilt as to one or more of several counts as part of an overall defense strategy. A submission under these circumstances is not a slow plea, and the trial court is not constitutionally compelled by Boykin and Tahl to administer the guilty-plea safeguards to assure that the tactical decision is voluntary and intelligent. (2b) The advisements and waivers in such a case are required only as a matter of the judicial policies that underlie our decision in Bunnell.  ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 496-497.) (1b) In the present case, defendant's submission on the preliminary hearing transcripts was not a slow plea. Defense counsel Toton conducted substantial cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses during the preliminary hearing. Toton also called prosecution witnesses Hernandez and Detective Stratton to testify for the defense, and questioned Hernandez about whether he had agreed to testify against defendant with the intent of making a deal in his own case. In addition, following the close of the prosecution's guilt phase presentation, Toton renewed his motions to strike portions of the trial testimony of Maria Rodriguez, Detective Boggs, and William Freeman (the patrolman who seized two screwdrivers from defendant that had been stolen from the Bocanegra residence), and then moved for a judgment of acquittal of all the charges. In arguing the motion for acquittal, Toton asserted there was insufficient evidence of defendant's guilt of the robbery and murder charges, and that the People failed to charge properly the special circumstance allegations. In addition, Toton asserted that no physical evidence linked defendant to the Bocanegra murders. He argued that the prosecution presented no evidence of premeditation in those murders, and that defendant's hypothetical questions to Detective Stratton should not be used as evidence of murder. Toton also pointed out that defendant's incriminating statements to newsman Trihey implied knowledge of the crime, but not intent to kill, that there was no evidence that defendant robbed the Bocanegras or that defendant had the specific intent to kill either the Bocanegras or Tatman. Toton's closing argument following the guilt phase was equally extensive. He asserted there was insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the charged robberies and the Bocanegra murders because the testimony of Hernandez and Trihey was not credible. At best, he argued, the evidence in the Bocanegra murders supported a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. He also asserted that the prosecution had failed to prove the specific intent to kill necessary to support the special circumstance allegations. It therefore appears that defense counsel's cross-examination was substantial, and that he argued constantly that the facts as presented at the preliminary hearing should be viewed as not supporting first degree murder convictions. These facts support the People's assertion that defendant's submission on the preliminary hearing transcripts for the guilt and special circumstance phases of the trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea. ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 496.) For submissions not tantamount to a guilty plea, a trial court's failure to advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination is implicated only to the extent defendant surrendered the right. ( Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 592.) Through the submission stipulated to here, defendant never surrendered his self-incrimination privilege because he chose not to testify during the guilt phase proceedings. Because defendant never surrendered his right against self-incrimination, there was no requirement of a personal, on-the-record waiver. ( Ibid. )
(4) Defendant next contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to advise him that a conviction of guilt and special circumstances could lead to a death sentence. Without an understanding of the possible consequences of submitting the guilt and special circumstances on the preliminary hearing transcripts, defendant asserts, any waiver of constitutional rights is invalid. We find defendant's argument unavailing. On submission on a transcript of preliminary hearing, a defendant must be told of the potential maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment. ( People v. Dakin (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 1026, 1033 [248 Cal. Rptr. 206].) Nonetheless, a court's failure to comply with this rule requires reversal only if it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in absence of the error. ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 495; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) We find no such prejudice. Defendant had been thoroughly advised by counsel of the consequences of pleading guilty and of the consequences of waiving his constitutional rights. He was well aware that he faced a possible death sentence, and, according to reporter Trihey, even asked for his own death. It is clear from the record that defendant would have waived his right to a jury trial and insisted on the submission of the guilt phase on the preliminary hearing transcripts even if he was specifically told by the court that he faced a possible death sentence.
(5) Defendant asserts that he was not told (1) of the legal ramifications of the agreement between Toton and Ryals to limit evidence to that presented at the preliminary hearing, and (2) of the absence of a defense to the Tatman robbery and the Tatman first degree felony-murder charges. Defendant especially notes that he was unaware the defense challenge to the charges would rest solely on the ground of insufficient evidence. Moreover, defendant claims, Toton never explained he limited his defense to rebuttal witnesses. The lack of any explanation as to the procedural aspects of submitting the case on the preliminary hearing transcripts, defendant asserts, renders his waiver and submission void. As to defendant's claims that he was unaware of the legal ramifications of his submission and waiver, and the probability of conviction, we conclude no such advisement was required in light of defendant's reservation of his right to present additional evidence and to contest his alleged guilt in argument to the court. As the People observe, Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592, requires that a defendant be advised of the probability that his submission will result in a conviction of the offenses only [i]f a defendant does not reserve the right to present additional evidence and does not advise the court that he will contest his guilt in argument to the court.... ( Id., at p. 605.)
(6a) Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support his convictions for the first degree murders of both Juan and Juanita Bocanegra. In the alternative, he asserts that even if there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the Bocanegra murders on an aider and abettor theory, the evidence supported only a second degree murder conviction because the prosecution failed to prove that Joey intended to kill his parents with premeditation and deliberation, and that defendant aided and abetted in the murders. [1] (7) We need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders were premeditated. Our inquiry on appeal in light of the whole record [is] whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 511 [41 Cal. Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [hereafter Davis ]; see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573-574, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) The standard of review is the same when the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [42 Cal. Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481]; see also People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932 [251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996] [conviction based on circumstantial evidence will be affirmed if circumstances reasonably justify trier of fact's findings].) The record does not support either of defendant's contentions. (8a) As we have observed in numerous cases, we apply the tripartite test of People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], in deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation based on these three factors: (1) planning activity; (2) motive (established by a prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim); and (3) manner of killing. ( Id., at pp. 26-27; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 546-547 [280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290] [hereafter Wharton ]; cf. People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 849, fn. 1 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776].) [T]his court sustains verdicts of first degree murder typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3). ( Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27.) We have recently explained that the Anderson factors do not establish normative rules, but instead provide guidelines for our analysis. In People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101] we observed: The Anderson analysis was intended as a framework to assist reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing resulted from preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations. It did not refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law in any way. Thereafter, in People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159] (hereafter Perez ) we reiterated the Thomas statement, and added that [t]he Anderson guidelines are descriptive, not normative. [Citation.] The goal of Anderson was to aid reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.] [¶] In identifying categories of evidence bearing on premeditation and deliberation, Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.... The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive. (See Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 511.) Finally, we have recognized that it is not necessary that the Anderson factors be present in some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) Nonetheless, we are guided by the factors in our determination whether the murder occurred as a result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. ( Ibid. ) (6b) We find substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Joey Bocanegra intended to kill his parents, that he premeditated and deliberated the murders, and that defendant can be found vicariously liable for the murders as an aider and abettor. (9) As we have observed, an aider and abettor must act with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense. ( People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 [199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318] [hereafter Beeman ].) We have also recognized that if the aider and abettor undertakes acts with the intent that the actual perpetrator's purpose be facilitated thereby, he is a principal and liable for the commission of the offense. ( People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, fn. 5 [221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392]; see also §§ 31, 190.2, subds. (c) & (d), 971.) Thus, the basis of liability for the perpetrator applies to the aider and abettor and extends to the natural and reasonable consequences of the acts he knowingly and intelligently aids and encourages. ( Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) (6c) As we explain, we conclude that defendant shared Joey's intent to kill, and in assisting Joey in committing the crimes, understood, and facilitated, the full extent of Joey's criminal purpose. Hernandez testified, and defendant admitted to Detective Stratton, that defendant initially waited outside while Joey entered his parents' house. Defendant then entered the house after hearing the sounds of a fight between Joey and Juan. Defendant told Hernandez that he went inside the house to break up the fight between Joey and his father, but the facts belie his stated intent. When defendant entered the house, he saw Joey fighting with his father. Rather than come to Juan's aid, defendant grabbed a curved metal bar and commenced beating Juan. Joey's actions, according to defendant's statements to prosecution witnesses, indicated that Joey deliberated over his father's killing. Joey initially struck Juan in the hallway and then, in the kitchen, obtained a knife that he used to stab Juan. In our view, Joey formed a clear intent to kill, at the latest, during the altercation with his father, and obtained a kitchen knife to carry out that plan. (8b) Our cases hold that planning activity occurring over a short period of time is sufficient to find premeditation. `The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly....' ( Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1127, quoting People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900 [156 P.2d 7].) (6d) There was also ample evidence of motive. The evidence supports a strong inference that Joey entered his parents' house to rob them. When his father resisted the robbery, Joey was motivated to murder him in order to gain access to both money and tangible goods, including a television set. Substantial evidence supports a finding that Joey believed Juan stood in the way of his plan. Finally, the trial court could infer from the evidence that the manner of killing tended to demonstrate Joey acted with premeditation and deliberation. The attack occurred in a series of rooms, indicating that Juan's repeated attempts to break away from his murderers were consistently thwarted by the attackers' relentless pursuit of him, even after he was gravely wounded. A rational finder of fact could infer that the manner of killing, when combined with Joey's retrieval of the knife in the kitchen, and defendant's retrieval of a metal bar used in clubbing a defenseless Juan, is sufficient to support the trier of fact's implied finding that Joey formed the plan to kill his parents during the altercation, located the murder weapon, and along with defendant, deliberately murdered his father. (See Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 511.) The same evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendant shared Joey's intent and plan to kill Juan, and thus was liable, as an aider and abettor, for Juan's murder. ( Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) The killing of Juan ended after a prolonged knife attack and beating from which Juan attempted to defend himself. Defendant's personal involvement in the murder was substantial. Far from merely acting as a lookout, or beating Juan after he was already dead, defendant was actively involved in assisting Joey in Juan's murder. Defendant's admitted act of arming himself with a curved metal bar before joining the altercation between Joey and Juan indicates he shared Joey's plan. ( Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1126 [evidence of planning activity shown by defendant's act of surreptitiously entering victim's house and obtaining knife from victim's kitchen]; Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 547 [defendant's act of retrieving hammer constituted planning activity].) From this evidence, the trier of fact could reasonably infer defendant knowingly engaged or assisted in Juan's murder as an aider and abettor. ( Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 556.) As to Juanita's murder, defendant asserts the evidence similarly does not support the conviction. He claims that he did not personally kill Juanita [because] she was stabbed to death by Joey. He asserts that there is no evidence in the record that [he] held Juanita down, helped push her back to the sewing room, or had any contact with her while Joey was stabbing her. He contends that there is no evidence to support the People's theory that defendant aided Joey by hitting Juanita with a bar and that [t]here is simply no evidence that [his] initial grabbing of Juanita actually aided, or even was intended to aid, Joey's subsequent stabbing of his mother. Finally, defendant asserts in his reply brief that his efforts to tie and gag Juanita are altogether inconsistent with an intent to kill her. Again, the evidence supports the court's verdicts and refutes defendant's contention. Hernandez testified defendant told him that during the murder of Juan, Juanita screamed. Defendant grabbed Juanita and told Joey to shut her up. Joey then stabbed his mother 26 times. A bloodstained garment was wrapped around Juanita's neck, and her wrists had been tied together with a piece of fabric. The pathologist (Holloway) opined that Juanita died of the stab wounds and that the ligature constriction of her neck was a possible contributing cause. She also had severe scalp injuries that Holloway concluded were consistent with those inflicted by a long bar or pipe less than one-half inch in diameter, similar to the instrument used by defendant to inflict Juan's scalp wounds. The trial court could reasonably infer from the evidence that Juanita was killed in order to keep her from being a percipient witness to the murder of her husband. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have been persuaded that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse. ( Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) Defendant's participation in Juanita's murder, like his aiding and abetting in Juan's killing, clearly supports a finding that defendant aided and abetted her murder. ( Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) Finally, defendant contends that the evidence showing he waded into a fight already in progress and struck the victim several ineffectual blows with an instrument found on the scene, proves no more than an unlawful killing. When nothing further is shown, defendant claims, the presumption is that the evidence supports differing degrees of guilt, based on the same conduct. Thus, defendant asserts, he should have been convicted of murder in the second degree. (See People v. Woods (1992) 8 Cal. App.4th 1570, 1586-1587 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 231]; see also People v. Wells (1938) 10 Cal.2d 610, 616-617 [76 P.2d 493].) We reject defendant's interpretation of the evidence. Far from wading into a fight and being ineffectual, we have shown how the evidence clearly reflects that defendant aided and abetted Joey in killing both Juan and Juanita. We thus conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder.
(10) Defendant asserts that his right to the effective assistance of counsel under the federal and state Constitutions was violated when the trial court denied two motions to withdraw filed by defense counsel Toton and Frank. The first motion was filed on the ground that defendant refused to follow their advice by speaking with newsman Trihey and discussing the Bocanegra murders. In denying the motion, the court asked defendant if he felt he could continue to work with counsel. The court told defendant: You've got a little say in it. Whatever you've done, if it's damaged your case, it's damaged your case; if it hasn't damaged your case, it hasn't. What's done is done. And it really comes down to a question now and again whatever has been done, whatever has been said is going to be there whether you have these attorneys or another attorney or attorneys appointed to represent you. The court then told defendant it would not relieve counsel from the case unless defendant told the court he no longer trusted them. Defendant replied: There is a little bit of mistrust there, but, you know, I'm willing to stay with them, but if they want out, you know, I won't stop them. The court thereafter denied the motion to withdraw, informing counsel that it had the highest regard for both attorneys, but whatever defendant had done has happened and any attorney on the case is going to have to live with that. Two months later, following an article published in the Bakersfield Californian in which Trihey wrote that defendant told him he was a triple killer who deserves to die for his crimes, Frank filed a second motion to withdraw on the ground that his continued representation of defendant would require the proffering of perjured testimony, resulting in violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Toton joined the motion, and the court again denied it on the ground that trial was to begin shortly thereafter. Defendant claims that the court's failure to grant both motions was an abuse of discretion that led counsel to submit the guilt phase on the preliminary hearing transcripts and resulted in a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The determination whether to grant or deny a motion by an attorney to withdraw is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion. ( People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 629 [194 Cal. Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 282 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) We find no abuse of discretion on this record. As the People observe, implicit in the court's denial of the motions is the finding that defendant's discussion of his case with the media was not an indication of his distrust or dissatisfaction with counsel. Rather, the conduct was merely indicative of his unwavering desire to admit culpability and to atone for his crimes. Indeed, allowing counsel to withdraw would not have alleviated any prejudice to defendant caused by his contact with the press, nor does the record indicate that denying the motion to withdraw influenced defendant's desire to submit the guilt issue on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts. Even though counsel were dissatisfied with defendant's failure to heed their advice and not discuss the case with the media, the record shows defendant's right to counsel was not jeopardized by counsel's continuing representation. Thus, because defendant does not show that any disagreement with counsel resulted in a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that jeopardized his right to a fair trial, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsels' motions to withdraw. (See People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 542 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) [In reviewing denial of motion to substitute attorneys, the court focuses on the ruling itself and the record on which it is made. It does not look to subsequent matters....].)

On July 26, 1988, the last day of testimony in the guilt and special circumstances phase of trial, an article titled Bakersfield Attorney Faces Disbarment appeared on the front page of the morning edition of the Bakersfield Californian. The article noted that Toton, attorney for triple killer Ted Sanchez, faced potential disbarment for allegedly failing to (1) notify his clients of receipt of funds, (2) turn over funds in a timely manner, (3) provide an accounting of receipts, and (4) communicate with his clients. In addition, the article observed that Toton was scheduled to appear before the California State Bar's Review Department, which would thereafter make its disciplinary recommendation. Toton alone was aware of the proceedings prior to the article's publication. The court met in chambers with Ryals, Toton, Frank, and defendant to discuss the article. Ryals requested the court make inquiry as to [defendant], as to his knowledge of the problems Mr. Toton is facing, of whether or not we are being rushed through this trial for Mr. Toton's benefit, if there is so much as a rush.... After Frank agreed to discuss the disciplinary proceedings with defendant that evening, the court agreed to meet in camera with the defense the following morning. When Frank and defendant met with the court in camera the next morning, Frank indicated that he had met with defendant and learned that defendant had read the July 26 article, and that Frank had no knowledge of the disciplinary proceedings prior to reading the article. The following colloquy then occurred: THE COURT: One of the things that concerns me about this incident is the fact of the date of August 25th and the fact that a jury trial was waived in this case, and now we're at that stage of the case where a [Penal Code section] 1118.1 is under submission. And I suppose somebody reviewing this case could say one of the reasons maybe that Mr. Toton suggested that the jury trial be waived was the fact that the trial could be completed prior to the time that the Californian suggests that there's going to be some kind of a ruling in his case. As  and clearly if we had had a jury, we would still have been going at that time, and I really seriously doubt whether we would have been in a position even to have begun to take evidence as of the 25th day of August. That situation worried me a little bit. And I wonder if you have discussed this with your client. MR. FRANK: Yes, your Honor. I advised [defendant] that the article certainly did imply that Mr. Toton's motivation for pursuing the presentation of the case in the manner in which he has, at least indicated, that perhaps he did that because of his own personal problems, plans or agenda. I advised [defendant] that he had the right to be represented by an attorney who was completely and absolutely free from any sort of conflict, that [defendant] had the right to have an attorney whose decision-making process was unfettered by any of his own personal plans or problems, and that he had the right to have an attorney whose representation and whose decision-making process was based not on any of the attorney's considerations but on the best interests of [defendant], the client in this case. The court then questioned defendant to verify that he had spoken to Frank about the disciplinary proceedings, that he had read the Bakersfield Californian article, and that he was unaware of any disciplinary action against Toton prior to the date of the article. The court asked defendant if he believed the article implied that one reason Mr. Toton was pushing this case forward was because of his own personal time considerations. Defendant replied: Not really sir, because we had discussed  you know, this was part  I wanted to go this way in the beginning anyway. So there was really  I never really felt that he was doing it for his own incidences [ sic ]. The court confirmed defendant's earlier position that it was his idea alone to waive the jury under any circumstances. The court next asked defendant if he wanted to make a motion for mistrial and for certain other motions in view of the publicity that this has gotten? The following discussion ensued: THE COURT: What I'm concerned [about] is that something will happen down the line and then you will say, gee, I didn't know what I was doing; I should have asked for a mistrial at that point in time. That would probably be too late, because I'm probably getting an indication that you want to waive any problems that Mr. Toton's difficulties might have in this case. Is that right? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: I didn't make that very clear. THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: What I'm saying is, I don't want you to go down the line and then all of a sudden say, gee, I've changed my mind. THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: Probably you can't do that. You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand that. THE COURT: Are you satisfied with the state of the record at this point? THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir. I'm very satisfied. THE COURT: Nobody threatened you to get you to say this? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.... THE COURT: Are you satisfied, sir, that Mr. Toton's dilemma with the State Bar had nothing to do with the waiver of the jury trial? MR. FRANK: I am, yes. THE COURT: And are you, Mr. Sanchez? THE DEFENDANT: I am too. The parties agree Toton was not disbarred until March 31, 1989, well after defendant's trial was completed. Against this background, we address below defendant's several arguments regarding Toton's disbarment and its effect, if any, on the fairness of defendant's trial.
(11a) Defendant first asserts that on learning of the pending disciplinary action against Toton, the court was required to terminate Toton's appointment as defendant's counsel. Defendant claims that the court's failure to remove Toton as counsel denied him his right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, denied him due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprived him of a reliable determination of penalty under the Eighth Amendment. We are not persuaded. (12) In order to establish a violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was inadequate when measured against the standard of a reasonably competent attorney, and that counsel's performance prejudiced defendant's case in such a manner that his representation so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692-693, 104 S.Ct. 2052] [hereafter Strickland ]; Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 575.) Moreover, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 699].) Prejudice is shown when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257 [259 Cal. Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164]; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 697-698].) If defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced by counsel's performance, we may reject his ineffective assistance claim without determining whether counsel's performance was inadequate. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 699-700].) To support his federal constitutional argument, defendant relies on two Illinois cases, in which the appellate courts reversed sentences of murder in cases where the same defense attorney was subject to disciplinary proceedings during separate murder trials for the same crime. ( People v. Williams (1982) 93 Ill.2d 309 [67 Ill.Dec. 97, 444 N.E.2d 136] [hereafter Williams ]; People v. Rainge (1983) 112 Ill. App.3d 396 [68 Ill.Dec. 97, 445 N.E.2d 535] [hereafter Rainge ].) In Williams, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of murder, kidnapping, and rape, and sentenced him to death. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence, over his protest that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. While the defendant's petition for rehearing on the appeal was pending, the defendant's attorney appeared before the same court in a disciplinary action in which the Hearing Board and Review Board of the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission recommended that the attorney be disbarred because of misconduct in handling the estate of a client. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered the attorney disbarred. ( In re Weston (1982) 92 Ill.2d 431 [65 Ill.Dec. 925, 442 N.E.2d 236].) Based on the information presented to it in the attorney disciplinary action, the Williams court granted the defendant's petition for rehearing. After reconsidering the effectiveness of counsel in light of the disbarment, the court reversed the defendant's conviction and sentence. The court held that even though the evidence supported defendant's conviction, in light of the disbarment it no longer can say, with any degree of assurance, that [the defendant] received the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Constitution. ( Williams, supra, 444 N.E.2d at p. 142.) In reversing the conviction, the Williams court cited numerous examples of inaction by counsel that it believed demonstrated ineffective assistance, including the failure to make a motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from [defendant's] car  evidence which was perhaps crucial to the State's case; the failure to object to the testimony concerning the Canadian study on hair comparisons; the failure to object to prejudicial material received by [the defendant's] jury ...; the failure to object to testimony concerning the good character of the decedents.... (444 N.E.2d at pp. 142-143.) The court admitted that it had originally examined in the appeal the more significant errors... and found no plain error. ( Id., at p. 143.) But in light of counsel's disbarment, the court reconsidered its original affirmance of the conviction. The court stated: [W]e are now aware, for the first time, of the unique circumstances under which counsel in this case was operating at the time of the capital trial. In light of these facts, we can no longer characterize counsel's decision not to make the motion to suppress ... evidence or to take other action on his client's behalf as professional misjudgments made with full knowledge of the applicable law and the facts.... [¶] It is apparent to us that the unique facts in this case require that we forgo application of either of the established tests, normally applied in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. [Citations.] As we originally indicated, the voluminous record here shows that there were many instances where counsel made able and vigorous objections and presentations, and we cannot characterize his performance as actual incompetence or as of such a low caliber as to reduce the trial to a farce or sham. We believe, however, considering the unique circumstances and sequence of events in this capital case, which will rarely, if ever, be duplicated, that the interests of justice require that ... Williams be granted a new trial. ( Ibid. ) Defendant Williams's two codefendants, Rainge and Adams, were separately tried and also found guilty of the above murders and sentenced to life imprisonment. ( Rainge, supra, 445 N.E.2d 535.) Defendant Rainge was represented by the same attorney who had represented Williams. The Illinois Court of Appeal held in abeyance its decision in the Rainge case pending the decision in Williams, supra, 444 N.E.2d 136, because numerous issues raised in the supreme court by Williams, were common issues based upon the same record which were raised in the instant appeal by Rainge and Adams. ( Rainge, supra, 445 N.E.2d at p. 544.) Thereafter, the Rainge court reversed Rainge's murder convictions because the similar interests of Williams and Rainge and the similar issue raised on the same record require that defendant Rainge be granted a new trial. As in [ Williams ], we base our decision upon `the unique circumstances and sequence of events in this capital case which will rarely, if ever, be duplicated.' ( Rainge, supra, 445 N.E.2d at p. 547, quoting Williams, supra, 444 N.E.2d at p. 142; but see People v. Neal (1984) 123 Ill. App.3d 148 [78 Ill.Dec. 695, 462 N.E.2d 814, 816] [distinguishing Williams and Rainge and finding same counsel not incompetent in noncapital case].) (11b) Defendant asserts that we should follow the Williams and Rainge courts and find that on the unique facts of this case, the State Bar proceedings against Toton tainted his representation of defendant and compromised the constitutionality of the conviction and sentence. But unlike Williams, who had asserted numerous instances of inaction by counsel to demonstrate he was denied the effective assistance of counsel ( Williams, supra, 444 N.E.2d at p. 142), defendant points to no instances of inaction that, in light of the pending discipline, would allow the court to characterize Toton's representation as incompetent. Indeed, the record is clear that defendant agreed to the guilt phase submission on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts even though factual issues remained in the case. Although the Williams court had found no plain error prior to learning of the disciplinary action pending against counsel, once the court became aware of the disciplinary matter, it lost confidence that counsel's decision not to make the motion to suppress [certain evidence] or to take other action on his client's behalf as professional misjudgments made with full knowledge of the applicable law and the facts. ( Id., at p. 143.) By contrast, defendant herein does not assert that Toton's pending discipline prejudiced his case. The record would not support such an argument. Toton vigorously cross-examined prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing and during the guilt phase, made several defense motions, including one for appointed assistant counsel, which was granted, and motions for pretrial discovery, severance and additional motions that indicated he was vigorously representing his client. In addition, Toton made a comprehensive closing argument at the guilt phase. Thus, there is no indication on the record that counsel's representation was anything less than competent, and defendant fails to persuade us that counsel's representation was ineffective solely on the basis of the disciplinary action pending against him.
Defendant next asserts that even if we find no federal constitutional violation, he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution which states that a defendant in a criminal case has the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense.... Defendant relies on our decision in In re Johnson (1992) 1 Cal.4th 689 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 170, 822 P.2d 1317] (hereafter Johnson ) to support his argument that Toton was unfit to represent him during his capital trial. In Johnson, the defendant was convicted in July 1989 of selling cocaine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352. ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 694.) Unknown to the defendant, his counsel had been suspended from the practice of law prior to the representation pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6102, following a conviction under Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (committing a lewd or lascivious act against a child using force or fear). In May 1989, while State Bar disciplinary proceedings were pending against counsel, he resigned. We accepted the resignation in September 1989. ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 694.) Although we refused to presume that a suspended attorney lacks professional competence (1 Cal.4th at p. 699), we nonetheless reversed the Court of Appeal judgment denying habeas corpus relief. We held that representation by one who has resigned from the State Bar denies effective counsel, and observed: Representation by a person who has never been admitted to the practice of law or has fraudulently procured admission denies a defendant his rights under article I, section 15, as a matter of law. So too does representation by a person who, although formerly licensed, has resigned from the State Bar. The court will not examine the quality of the representation in such cases since an essential element of the constitutional right to counsel is counsel's status as a member of the State Bar. ( Id., at p. 701, fn. omitted.) Thus, we held, once an attorney resigns from the State Bar with charges pending, and is immediately transferred to inactive status, that attorney, for all purposes, is no longer considered a member of the bar and is not licensed to practice law. Such an attorney's representation of a defendant, therefore, violates article I, section 15, and denies the defendant effective assistance of counsel. (1 Cal.4th at p. 701.) In reversing Johnson's conviction on ineffective assistance grounds, however, we emphasized that mere suspension of an attorney from practice under Business and Professions Code section 6102 upon conviction of any felony or other offense involving moral turpitude does not alone create a presumption of incompetence or deprive the defendant of his right to counsel under article I, section 15. ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 699.) Indeed, we observed that even a suspension of an attorney pursuant to section 6102 does not establish, as a matter of law, that the attorney is unfit to practice law, and a conclusion that an attorney who has committed an offense of moral turpitude is unfit to practice law is not necessarily a judgment on the attorney's professional competence. ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 699.) We have not previously addressed whether, as in this case, disciplinary proceedings that are pending during an attorney's representation of a criminal defendant render the assistance of counsel ineffective when there is no suspension of the attorney or placement on inactive status. But under Johnson 's reasoning, we can conclude that the fact disciplinary proceedings were pending against counsel Toton did not automatically render Toton's performance inadequate or prejudice defendant's right to effective counsel. (See also Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 696 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 699].) As the People observe, While representing [defendant], defense counsel Toton was not even subject to suspension under Business and Professions Code section 6102 because he had not been convicted of any crime. In an attempt to establish the denial of his right to counsel, [defendant] equates defense counsel Toton's alleged failure to challenge the State Bar proceedings with the attorney's resignation from the State Bar in Johnson.  In fact, unlike the attorney in Johnson, Toton was a member of the State Bar at all times during his representation of defendant. `Erring morally or by a breach of professional ethics does not necessarily indicate a lack of knowledge of the law.' ( Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 699.) We simply are not persuaded that Toton's unrelated disciplinary problems in any way influenced his representation of defendant or otherwise rendered him unfit as a matter of law. (See Johnson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 699-702.)
Defendant's claim that Toton's disciplinary proceedings rendered him incompetent `is no more persuasive if considered under the rubric of conflict of interest. (13) A criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by both the state and federal Constitutions, includes the right to representation free from conflicts of interest. ( Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 271 [67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1097]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1134 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) To establish a violation of the right to unconflicted counsel under the federal Constitution, `a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' [Citation.] To establish a violation of the same right under our state Constitution, a defendant need only show that the record supports an `informed speculation' that counsel's representation of the defendant was adversely affected by the claimed conflict of interest.' ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1009 [30 Cal. Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248].) In People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757] (hereafter Jones ) we also observed that [c]onflicts of interest may arise in various factual settings. Broadly, they `embrace all situations in which an attorney's loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or a third person or by his own interests.' ( Id., at p. 1134, quoting People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 853 [254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460] [hereafter Bonin ].) (14a) Defendant contends that the alleged conflict of interest between himself and Toton was caused by Toton's own interest in expediting the trial prior to his disbarment, to the defendant's prejudice. Defendant asserts that the fact of the pending disciplinary action gave Toton a strong incentive to finish defendant's case as quickly as possible, implying that Toton's desire to end the case led to a constitutionally deficient performance. Based on the appellate record, we are not persuaded by defendant's arguments. As we have observed, the record shows that Toton was not disbarred until eight months after the court and defendant learned of the proceedings against him, and one month after completion of the penalty phase of defendant's trial. There is no indication that the disciplinary proceedings influenced the pace of Toton's representation, and, indeed, there is substantial evidence on record that would support the opposite conclusion. First and foremost, it was Toton who advised defendant not to plead guilty and instead to submit the guilt and special circumstance issues on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts. This alternative to a guilty plea allowed counsel to contest the People's case, present various defense motions to the court, and generally make a stronger case for defendant than would have been available following a guilty plea. Thus, counsel Toton actually prolonged the trial notwithstanding defendant's desire to proceed directly to the penalty phase. Moreover, even if we were to perceive either an actual conflict of interest, as required by federal law, or to conclude the record supports an informed speculation of a conflict as required under our state Constitution, defendant intentionally and knowingly waived any conflict on the record. ( Ante, at pp. 38-39.) In addition, defense counsel Frank informed the court he was satisfied that Toton's pending discipline had nothing to do with the waiver of the jury trial. At a later in camera hearing attended by defense counsel Frank, defendant admitted that, in partially submitting his case, it was his desire to waive jury trial under any circumstances, that he had had a lengthy discussion regarding his rights with defense counsel Frank, and that he wanted to maintain the status quo. The fact that defendant did not discuss Toton's pending discipline with him does not assist defendant's conflict claim. Here, defendant asserts that his discussion with Frank could not substitute for a discussion with Toton. By his own admission, Frank knew nothing about his cocounsel's impending [discipline] until the news appeared on the front page of the Bakersfield newspaper.... Toton hid this important fact from his own assistant counsel until the news became public. Nothing in the record indicates that Frank knew any more about the [discipline] than did the readers of the Bakersfield Californian. Frank simply was not able to speak for Toton in discussing the impact of the [disciplinary proceedings] on the future conduct of the defense [nor was] Frank in [a] position to discuss with [defendant] how the [disciplinary] proceedings already might have affected Toton's guilt phase strategy. Defendant fails to show, however, how Toton's assurances or perspective would have assisted him in determining whether he wanted to waive the conflict, or how Toton would have provided him with a better explanation than that given by the court about the potential drawbacks of Toton's continued representation. Defendant next asserts that the trial court failed in its duty to ensure that he knowingly and intelligently waived any conflict with counsel. (15) When a trial court knows or should know that defense counsel has a possible conflict of interest with his client, it must inquire into the matter [citations] and act in response to what its inquiry discovers [citation]. ( Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1136.) If the court determines that a waiver of a conflict is necessary, it must satisfy itself that `(1) the defendant has discussed the potential drawbacks of [potentially conflicted] representation with his attorney, or if he wishes, outside counsel, (2) that he has been made aware of the dangers and possible consequences of [such] representation in his case, (3) that he knows of his right to conflict-free representation, and (4) that he voluntarily wishes to waive that right.' ( Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 837, quoting People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 110 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835].) A trial court's failure to inquire into the conflict or to adequately respond to its inquiry amounts to reversible error if the defendant can show that an actual conflict of interest existed and that that conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. ( Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 837-838; cf. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 692 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 696-697].) (14b) Defendant asserts that the trial court never asked [defendant] in clear, unambiguous language whether he was willing to waive his right to unimpaired counsel. He also complains of the court's failure to determine whether [Toton's] alleged misuse of client funds might indicate that Toton had financial difficulties which might affect his work or handling of funds in [defendant's] case, [nor did the court] ask Toton about the timetable of state bar proceedings [or ask] how the bar proceeding might affect, or might have affected, Toton's conduct of [defendant's] case. In deciding whether a defendant understands the nature of a possible conflict of interest with counsel, the trial court need not explore each foreseeable conflict and consequence. ( Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1137.) Nor does a defendant's waiver of conflict-free counsel extend merely to matters discussed on the record. ( Ibid. ) As we observed in Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 621 [180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248, 18 A.L.R.4th 333], [r]ules that are that strict seem neither necessary nor workable. (See also People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 140 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561] [waiver found adequate even though all conceivable ramifications of conflict not explained].) Thus, looking at the whole record, we must determine whether defendant was aware of the potential drawbacks and possible consequences of retaining Toton, and whether he understood his right to conflict-free counsel and knowingly waived that right. It is clear that the record belies defendant's argument. The court's response to the asserted conflict of interest was appropriate under the circumstances; it was immediate and informed petitioner of his rights under the facts. As the record indicates, the court discussed the conflict with the parties, was careful to ensure defendant was aware that a conflict existed, and confirmed that his waiver of the conflict was voluntary and knowing. ( Ante, at pp. 37-40.) Defendant even declined the court's invitation to make a motion for mistrial, emphasizing that he was satisfied with the state of the record. Thus, in light of all the circumstances, we conclude the court gave defendant an opportunity to declare a mistrial, to relieve counsel, and to voice his objections on the record. In our view, the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the conflict, and we are satisfied that defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary. (See Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1137-1138.)

As observed in the statement of facts ( ante, at p. 21), following his arrest, defendant was interviewed by Michael Trihey, a reporter for the Bakersfield Californian. The newspaper published an article based on Trihey's five interviews with defendant. The article, entitled Accused Asks for Own Death, System Says No, was published on April 25, 1988. The article observed that Ted Sanchez says he's a murderer, a triple murderer, and that all three victims were killed for their social security checks. The article also revealed defendant's feelings of guilt: I am not an innocent man. If a man feels guilty he should be allowed to plead guilty, and revealed that he wanted to die in the gas chamber: I want to do the right thing. I should go straight to the gas chamber. I don't need no appeals. I deserve to die. In addition, the article noted that defendant reenacted the crimes for Trihey by raising one arm, covered with the tattoos he got in prison, to show how a fatal knife wound was inflicted. Earlier articles based on the same interviews, including one published on February 12, 1988, reported that defendant did not actually kill either Juan or Juanita but felt he deserves to die because he was present when the slaying happened, because he helped the killers and because he didn't intervene to save the couple, who had been kind to him for years. The same article also quoted defendant as telling Trihey that, `Joey grabbed a knife and started going at his dad' and, `that's when Reyes stepped in' and began clubbing [Juan] Bocanegra. The article also stated that defendant told Trihey they all had been smoking PCP before committing the crimes. Defendant was quoted as admitting that at the time of the Bocanegra murders, `I was scared.... It was just that I felt fear, and I didn't know how to respond to it. It could have been mixed emotions because of the PCP taking me.... I've been through a lot. I have done a lot of bad things. You know, I am no angel. [¶] One thing, I have not murdered nobody. I've done a lot of other things but I haven't went that far yet.' Finally, the article quoted defendant as asserting he didn't want to talk about the Tatman case other than to say, `I'm not guilty of that.' During the guilt phase the prosecution subpoenaed Trihey as a witness to testify as to the events he reported in his April 25, 1988, article. Trihey and the Bakersfield Californian filed a motion to quash the subpoena and for a protective order against the disclosure of unpublished information obtained from defendant, on the ground that the information sought was protected by the California Shield Law (hereafter shield law). (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 1070.) [2] After the prosecutor assured the court she intended to limit questioning of Trihey to published statements only, the court indicated that it would rule on a question by question basis. When the prosecutor called Trihey to testify, Toton objected. The court allowed Trihey to testify, subject to a motion to strike. Trihey then testified that he interviewed defendant five times, and that defendant told him he was a triple murderer and that all three [victims] were killed for their social security checks. When Toton asked Trihey if he had made any tape recordings of any interviews with defendant, Trihey's counsel objected on the ground that the question violated the shield law. The court then discontinued the cross-examination pending the submission of defense counsel's points and authorities. The next day, defendant argued that application of the shield law to protect unpublished information in Trihey's possession would deny him his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and to the effective assistance of counsel, as well as his statutory right to introduce his entire conversation with Trihey. (Evid. Code, § 356 [when part of act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole may be inquired into by adverse party].) Defense counsel moved the court either to strike Trihey's testimony or to order Trihey to furnish defendant with all unpublished information regarding the interviews. The court made the following ruling: THE COURT: I am going to rule that you haven't gotten over the hurdle of [ Hammarley v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 388 (153 Cal. Rptr. 608)] and [ Hallissy v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 1038 (248 Cal. Rptr. 635)] at this point, and that you may cross-examine Mr. Trihey concerning any of the printed material we have, either this current article or the one before. I am also going to tell you that the court's ruling at this point is without prejudice and that the court does not intend to make a ruling in this case. Thereafter, the court clarified its ruling in the following colloquy: MR. TOTON: Number one, I can cross-examine Mr. Trihey on any published article. THE COURT: Absolutely. MR. TOTON: And the contents of any published article. THE COURT: Absolutely. MR. TOTON: I would be prohibited from inquiring behind the published material? THE COURT: At this point. MR. TOTON: I am not clear as to which [ Hammarley ], [ Hallissy ] prong is lacking. THE COURT: Well, I don't think there is any, right now there is no issue that somehow Mr. Trihey is lying and can be impeached and so forth. That penultimate paragraph [in Hallissy ] that Mr. Werdel called to my attention is pretty strong language. MR. TOTON: That is the one that starts off, [A]rguably? THE COURT: Right. MR. TOTON: So that if I understand, it's the second prong of [the Hammarley test relied on by the Hallissy court] which is lacking; is that correct, your Honor? THE COURT: Right. Defendant now claims the trial court erred in limiting the scope of Trihey's testimony and renews his trial court objections.
In ruling that defendant had failed to meet the second prong of the Hammarley test, the court was referring to Hammarley 's construction of the shield law under Evidence Code section 1070, and its development of a four-pronged test that assisted the court in determining whether the statute should protect a newsperson from having to reveal undisclosed corroborating sources pertaining to the newsperson's interviews with a named individual who was the prosecution's principal witness in a murder case. ( Hammarley v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 388, 392-394 [153 Cal. Rptr. 608] [hereafter Hammarley ].) (16) The Hammarley court reviewed the legislative history and intent of the shield law. The court observed, The `unpublished information' provisions of [Evidence Code] section 1070 were added by amendment in 1974. Prior to that time, the statutory privilege expressly encompassed only source disclosure. ( Hammarley, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d at p. 396, fn. omitted.) The court held that the statutory privilege protecting unpublished information is not limited to material which might lead to the disclosure of a [newsperson's] confidential sources, but encompasses all information acquired by the [newsperson] in the course of his professional activities which he has not disseminated to the public. ( Id., at pp. 397-398.) The Hammarley court then stated its test for determining whether a defendant has met his burden in overcoming the statutory protection. Faced with a claim of privilege, the burden is on the party seeking to avoid the privilege competently to demonstrate not only that the evidence sought is relevant and necessary to his case, but that it is not available from a source less intrusive upon the privilege. Moreover, as with any attempt to discover evidence subject to a claim of privilege, a defendant must show a reasonable possibility that the evidence sought might result in his exoneration. (89 Cal. App.3d at p. 399.) Nine years later, in Hallissy v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 1038 [248 Cal. Rptr. 635] (hereafter Hallissy ), the court used the Hammarley test to grant a newsperson immunity from revealing unpublished sources. A brief review of Hallissy 's facts is instructive. A defendant was charged with three counts of first degree murder (§§ 187, 198), and with the multiple-murder and murder-for-financial-gain special circumstances. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1) & (3).) Prior to the preliminary hearing, the defendant was interviewed by a reporter for the Contra Costa Times. ( Hallissy, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at p. 1041.) Information gathered during the interview was published in the paper in an article entitled, I Killed Many for Pay. ( Ibid. ) Following publication of the article, the prosecutor amended the complaint to allege the murder-for-financial-gain special circumstance. ( Ibid. ) The defendant then subpoenaed Hallissy, the reporter, to appear at the preliminary hearing with the unpublished notes of the interview. ( Ibid. ) The trial court granted Hallissy's motion to quash the subpoena on the ground that the unpublished information was protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and by article I, section 2, subdivision (b), of the state Constitution. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant had failed to meet the second prong of Hammarley. ( Hallissy, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at p. 1046.) The court observed, Arguably [defendant] approaches an adequate showing of relevancy: he wishes to attack his own credibility by using inconsistent statements that he may have made to the reporter during the interview. But he has made no attempt to demonstrate that this particular item of evidence, if it exists, is necessary to his case, the second prong of Hammarley.  ( Hallissy, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at p. 1046.) During the past five years, we have had the opportunity to review application of the shield law in the context of criminal cases. (See e.g., Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785.) While using the Hammarley and Hallissy cases as a benchmark from which to develop our own test for determining whether the shield law should protect a reporter under the particular facts of a case, we disapproved those cases to the extent they held that a criminal defendant must in every case show the lack of an alternative source regardless of the circumstances. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 813, fn. 29.) We noted, however, that both Hammarley and Hallissy were consistent with the test we adopted in Delaney [a]s to the threshold showing required. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 808, fn. 22.) In fashioning its test for determining whether the shield law should apply to a particular set of facts, the Delaney court held that the law protects a newsperson from being held in contempt of court for refusal to disclose either unpublished information or the source of the reporter's information, whether published or unpublished. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 796-797; cf. People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 820-821 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865] [hereafter Cooper ].) (17a) Nonetheless, the Delaney court recognized that a newsperson's protection under the shield law must yield to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial when the newsperson's refusal to disclose information would unduly infringe on that right. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 793.) In order to compel disclosure of information covered by the shield law, the defendant must make a threshold showing of a reasonable possibility that the information will materially assist his defense. The showing need not be detailed or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation. [Citation.] If the threshold showing is made, the court then balances various factors in determining whether to compel disclosure of the information. [Citation.] ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 820, paraphrasing Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 809-813.) The trial court's ruling in this case predated both Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785, and Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, but that fact does not bear on our decision. Indeed, defendant concedes Delaney states the applicable standard. Defendant makes several arguments against application of shield law immunity in this case: (1) Trihey's assertion of the privilege was premature because the court had not adjudged him in contempt of court before he invoked immunity; (2) Trihey failed to lay the proper foundation for invoking the immunity; (3) even assuming immunity was properly invoked, defendant met Delaney 's threshold test for defeating a claim for immunity; (4) application of immunity in this case was prejudicial and denied defendant his federal constitutional rights to confrontation and discovery under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments (see, e.g., Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 315 [39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353, 94 S.Ct. 1105]; Lee v. Illinois (1986) 476 U.S. 530, 540 [90 L.Ed.2d 514, 525-526, 106 S.Ct. 2056] [right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is functional right that promotes reliability in criminal trials]; Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683, 106 S.Ct. 1431] [right to confront and cross-examine witnesses includes right to adequate cross-examination]; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 56 [94 L.Ed.2d 40, 56-57, 107 S.Ct. 989] [criminal defendants have right to government's assistance in compelling attendance of favorable witnesses]); and (5) Toton's failure to cross-examine Trihey on alleged inconsistent statements contained in the article deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel. On this record, we are not persuaded by defendant's contentions. (18) First, with respect to his assertion that the timing of Trihey's claim of immunity should bar application of the shield law, defendant relies on New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 453 [273 Cal. Rptr. 98, 796 P.2d 811] (hereafter New York Times ), in which we held that a precontempt petition for extraordinary relief under the shield law was prematurely filed. New York Times, however, does not assist defendant, for it was based on the reasoning that precontempt relief would deprive trial courts of the opportunity to decide in the first instance whether the shield law applies to the facts of a case. ( Id. at p. 459.) In New York Times, the court was asked to decide whether, in a products liability action against a car manufacturer for damages arising out of an automobile accident, the manufacturer could subpoena the unpublished photographs of the accident taken by a newspaper reporter. After the publisher invoked the shield law immunity and refused to comply with the manufacturer's subpoena, the trial court ordered the production of the photographs. Before being adjudged in contempt, the publisher petitioned the Court of Appeal for an extraordinary writ and stay of the court's order. (51 Cal.3d at p. 457.) The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to deny the manufacturer's motion to compel, finding that, unlike application of immunity in a criminal proceeding, in which we have held that the defendant may overcome its application by showing that the immunity would deprive him of a fair trial under the federal constitution, the shield law provides `absolute protection to nonparty journalists in civil litigation from being compelled to disclose unpublished information.' ( Ibid. ) Although we granted the publisher relief in New York Times, we observed that because the shield law provides an immunity from contempt, and not a privilege, the writ petition was premature. (51 Cal.3d at pp. 458-459.) This finding of prematurity was based on the practical concern that precontempt relief would frustrate the trial court's ability to determine whether the immunity should apply in the first instance. ( Id. at p. 459.) We reasoned: Premature interference in trial court proceedings would deprive reviewing courts of adequate factual records for making this determination. Premature relief would also allow newspersons to avoid the responsibility of choosing between disclosing information or being held in contempt. A newsperson would have no incentive to make that choice until after a decision by a reviewing court. The result would be an increased burden on reviewing courts. ( Id., at pp. 459-460.) The above reasoning, while clearly based on practical grounds, does not foreclose a claim of immunity in the trial court by the nonparty witness during cross-examination. By invoking immunity while on the witness stand, the newsperson is making the choice, discussed in New York Times, between disclosing the information he or she believes falls under the ambit of the shield law, or being held in contempt. (51 Cal.3d at p. 460.) That was the choice properly made by Trihey and the Bakersfield Californian when raising shield law immunity during cross-examination. Defendant's claim that Trihey failed to lay a proper foundation for raising the shield law is equally unavailing. First, defendant failed to object on this ground. Accordingly, he has waived the claim on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Had he made the proper objection, however, his claim would fail on the merits. We held in Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 805, that under article I, section 2, subdivision (b) of the state Constitution, a newsperson claiming shield law protection must show that he is one of the types of persons enumerated in the law, that the information was `obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public,' and that the information has not been `disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought.' ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 805, fn. 17, quoting Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b).) Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the immunity to show a reasonable possibility the information will materially assist his defense. (50 Cal.3d at p. 808, italics in original.) Trihey met his foundational requirements. In support of his motion to quash the People's subpoena, he filed a declaration stating that he was a news reporter employed by the Bakersfield Californian Newspaper, that his sources for the February 12, 1988, and April 25, 1988, articles on defendant [were] the source or sources of some information, procured while so connected or employed, for publication in the newspaper. Trihey also declared that the information gathered for the stories [was] unpublished and [had] not been disseminated to the public... except for the specific information published in said news article, and that [a]ll such unpublished information was obtained or prepared in the gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public. Defendant has provided no evidence that would contradict Trihey's declaration and, in fact, concedes the subject notes and tapes were unpublished information within the meaning of the shield law. [3] (19a) Once Trihey met the shield law requirements, defendant was required to show that nondisclosure would deprive him of his federal constitutional right to a fair trial. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 805.) As observed, ante, this page, in order to meet this burden, defendant had to make a threshold showing that it was reasonably possible the unpublished information he sought was necessary to his defense. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 808.) (17b) Although Delaney did not and could not specify what evidence would meet its threshold test, the court did observe that the defendant need not prove evidence he sought to discover would lead to his exoneration and that the defendant's showing need not be detailed or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809.) Some examples the court provided are instructive: [E]vidence may establish an `imperfect defense,' a lesser included offense, a lesser related offense, or a lesser degree of the same crime; impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness; or, as in capital cases, establish mitigating circumstances relevant to the penalty determination. A criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial includes these aspects of his defense. ( Ibid., fn. omitted.) (19b) In attempting to meet his burden, defendant attacks his own credibility by claiming he made inconsistent statements during the course of the interviews that would have exposed his confused state of mind at the time the interviews took place. He asserts his alleged unpublished statements also could have been used to impeach Trihey's testimony that defendant had told him he was a triple murderer and that all three were killed for their social security checks. But defendant never shows how the information he sought would materially assist his defense, or how it differed in content from the testimony and published information available for cross-examination, including defendant's statements that he was scared, that he had taken phencyclidine (PCP), and that he had not murdered anyone. Defendant simply asserts that he needed discovery of, and cross-examination about, the unpublished records of the interviews to impeach Trihey's testimony. Unlike other statements attributed to [defendant] in the April 25th article, Trihey's `triple murderer' assertion was not a direct quotation. Rather, it was a conclusion drawn by Trihey. Trihey's unpublished material might have shown that his `triple murder' testimony was his own interpretation of [defendant's] account, not an actual admission. Moreover, discovery and cross-examination might have proven that Trihey's conclusion was not supported by the interviews. The tapes might have shown that [defendant] never said he was a `triple murderer' or a `triple killer'; that he did not hit either Juan or Juanita; that he did nothing to aid or abet Joey; that he did not intend that either Juan or Juanita be killed; that he tried to stop Joey from killing his parents; or that he feels guilty because he failed to prevent the homicides. Any of these possibilities would have bolstered [defendant's] insufficiency of the evidence argument. The alleged evidence defendant claims would have materially assisted his defense consists of nothing more than self-serving statements that a court could reasonably conclude were either too speculative to assist defendant or would harm, rather than materially assist, the defense. Indeed, this case is similar to Hallisy, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at page 1041, in which the court rejected the defendant's attempt to attack his own credibility by subpoenaing a reporter's unpublished interview notes. Based on this record, and under the more recent Delaney threshold test, we find that defendant has failed to make the threshold showing that publication of alleged unpublished interview information possessed by Trihey would have materially assisted the defense and defeated Trihey's claim of immunity under the shield law. [4] In addition, for the same reasons noted above, we reject defendant's claim that he was denied his right to confront and cross-examine Trihey and to discover and present evidence under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The record shows the court rejected Trihey's statements as proof that defendant killed the victims for their Social Security checks. Moreover, the court found untrue the special circumstance allegations that the murders of Juan and Juanita Bocanegra were committed during a robbery and found defendant not guilty of the robbery in connection with that crime. Thus, it appears the court afforded little weight to Trihey's testimony, and defendant was not denied his federal constitutional right to a fair trial simply because the court allowed the testimony to be introduced. (20) In a related argument based on independent state grounds, defendant claims that application of the shield law denied him his right to the complete statements he made to Trihey. Defendant asserts the unpublished statements should have been provided the defense under Evidence Code section 356, allowing him to inquire into the entire conversation with Trihey. Defendant fails to acknowledge, however, that section 356 evidence is subject to the immunity provided under the shield law. (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Circumstantial Evidence, § 319, p. 292, and cases cited.) In addition, defendant fails to show how the unpublished statements he alleged he made to Trihey would have placed Trihey's testimony in its proper context, or that the information sought had some connection with Trihey's testimony. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 959 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704]; see also People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1174 [259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) (21) Finally, we reject defendant's assertion that counsel's failure to cross-examine Trihey before closing argument denied him the effective assistance of counsel under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. In order to succeed in his claim, defendant must show (1) deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and (2) prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of an adverse effect on the outcome. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40] [hereafter Berryman ]; cf. People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839] [discussing state and federal right to effective assistance of counsel].) Defendant does not satisfy either prong of the foregoing test. As discussed, Toton convinced the court during his closing argument that Trihey's testimony should not be given substantial weight; his decision not to cross-examine Trihey as to the contents of the published material was sound strategy, given the nature of defendant's alleged contradictory statements. Defendant does not establish that cross-examination would have revealed any new information, or that any additional information about the interviews would have influenced the court's judgment. Hence, we cannot find counsel's failure to cross-examination Trihey to be deficient. In any event, given the fact that the court dismissed the robbery charges against defendant, and found not true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, we discern no prejudice to defendant based on counsel's performance. ( Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1082.)
(22) Defendant contends that Prosecutor Ryals committed prejudicial misconduct in her guilt phase closing argument. He claims that Ryals's argument that there was no evidence anyone other than Joey Bocanegra and defendant committed the murders was knowingly false. As evidence of the prosecutor's bad faith, defendant cites allegedly contrary statements she made to the court during subsequent pretrial hearings in the prosecution of Reyes. Because the asserted evidence of misconduct is not within the appellate record or our judicial notice, we do not reach the merits of defendant's claim on appeal. To the extent defendant has a valid claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on events occurring after his trial, and therefore not reflected in the appellate record, his claim must be presented by petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than by appeal. [5]
Defendant contends his conviction should be reversed because of the cumulative effect of the alleged guilt phase errors. He relies on the California Constitution, article I, section 15, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Contrary to defendant's contention, however, he has not sustained any of his claims of error. Accordingly, we find no cumulative deficiency in the guilt phase proceedings to support reversal. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 1006 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214] [hereafter Ashmus ].)