Opinion ID: 3065290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Aggravating Evidence Presented During the

Text: Penalty Phase Does Not Preclude a Finding of Prejudice Relying on Van Hook, the majority opinion also concludes that omission of Cox’s severe childhood abuse was not prejudicial because of the weight of the aggravating factors. Maj. Op. 16271. Specifically, the majority opinion points out the violent nature of the murders and that Cox participated in the murders for money. As a preliminary matter, the prosecution did not present overwhelming evidence that Cox was the shooter or that the murders were for hire. The two surviving witnesses, who were actually inside the house when the shootings occurred, gave a description of the shooter that matched co-defendant C.W. Williams (“Williams”) rather than Cox. The witnesses described the intruder carrying the rifle as twenty-five to thirty-five years old, 5’10” to 5’11” and well-built with a dark complexion, short hair, and dark clothing. On the day of the murders, co16286 COX v. AYERS defendant Williams was in his mid-twenties, had a dark complexion, short hair and a muscular build, and wore a dark blue shirt and dark pants. Cox, on the other hand, was only eighteen years old, had a light complexion, a medium build and braided hair, and wore tan pants on the day of the murders. Moreover, two of the prosecution’s key witnesses, Ida Moore (“Moore”) and Lisa Brown (“Brown”), were impeached during trial. These witnesses testified that Cox stated after the murders, “I just blew the bitch’s head off.” Moore was impeached by her inconsistent testimony at codefendant Horace Burns’s (“Burns”) trial, during which she attributed the “I just blew the bitch’s head off” statement to Williams, not Cox.8 Brown was impeached by her statement to the police that she wasn’t sure if Williams or Cox stated “I just blew the bitch’s head off.” The prosecution presented evidence that Cox purchased a $3,000 Cadillac after the murders, but this evidence does not establish that Cox participated in the murders for money. Regardless of whether Cox was the shooter or committed the murders for money, the aggravating evidence does not preclude a finding of prejudice. There is no question that this case involves a horrible and senseless crime. Nevertheless, we have repeatedly found prejudice in capital cases that presented aggravating evidence which were equally, if not more, troubling than the facts here. In Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2006), this court found prejudice even though Hovey was sentenced to death for the brutal kidnaping and murder of an eight year-old girl. Hovey bound the girl’s wrists and thighs, fractured her skull in six places, and stabbed her fourteen times. Id. at 898. The jury also learned during the penalty phase that Hovey had pre- 8 At Burns’s trial, Moore testified that the person who closed the van door stated “I just blew the bitch’s head off.” She further testified that Williams, not Cox, was the person who closed the van door. COX v. AYERS 16287 viously been convicted of kidnaping another young girl. People v. Hovey, 749 P.2d 776, 795-96 (Cal. 1988). Nevertheless, this court found that Hovey’s death sentence was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance. Hovey, 458 F.3d at 930-31. We explained that, even though Hovey’s counsel called eighteen witnesses during the penalty-phase, Hovey’s death sentence was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to provide all of the pertinent records to an expert witness. Id. at 924-25, 930-31. In Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003), this court found prejudice even though Douglas was sentenced to death for murdering two teenage girls. Douglas forced the two girls to have sex with each other at gunpoint and then forced the girls to orally copulate him. People v. Douglas, 788 P.2d 640, 647 (Cal. 1990), overruled on other grounds by People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676 (Cal. 1990). Douglas then choked, cut, and murdered the girls. Id. In addition to the horrific details of this crime, the jury also learned of Douglas’s violent past. Two women testified that Douglas forced them to pose for nude pictures and perform sexual acts on him. Douglas, 316 F.3d at 1084. The jury also heard testimony that Douglas planned to torture and kill young women to make sex films. Id. Despite the horrific nature of the killings and the significant aggravating evidence presented by the prosecution, we found that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Douglas during the penalty phase because Douglas’s attorney failed to uncover and present extensive evidence of childhood abuse. Id. at 1089-91. Although the jury heard several of Douglas’s family members testify, and learned that Douglas had been orphaned as a child and grew up poor, we explained that Douglas was prejudiced because the jury never learned the full extent of his troubled past. Id. at 1087-88, 1090. The aggravating evidence in Cox’s case was substantially 16288 COX v. AYERS weaker than in Douglas or Hovey.9 Cox’s prior criminal history included two juvenile robberies, which are less serious crimes than Douglas’s depraved sexual acts or Hovey’s prior kidnaping of a young girl. Moreover, the murders in Cox’s case were less gruesome than the murders in Douglas, which involved sadistic torture, or in Hovey, which involved the kidnaping and murder of an eight year old girl. Had Cox’s attorneys conducted a reasonable investigation of Cox’s childhood and presented evidence of the severe abuse and trauma that Cox experienced as a child, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have felt sympathy for Cox and voted differently. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537. Accordingly, “consider[ing] all the relevant evidence that the jury would have had before it if [Cox’s attorneys] had pursued a different path,” Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. at 386, Cox’s attorneys’ failure to obtain and present evidence of Cox’s extensive childhood abuse was prejudicial. 9 The majority opinion contends that Hovey and Douglas are distinguishable. Maj. Op. 16271-72. The majority opinion notes that Hovey involved defense counsel’s failure to provide medical records to the psychiatrist, who was a key witness. Maj. Op. 16272. This is a correct interpretation of the case, but does not address my reason for citing the case— that prejudice was found notwithstanding substantial aggravating evidence. The majority opinion provides more relevant and precise reasoning for its contention that Douglas is inapposite. The majority opinion notes that in Douglas, counsel had totally failed to present any evidence of Douglas’s “serious and outstanding mental illness,” and that Cox cannot point to a “total absence of evidence” regarding any particular area of his life. Maj. Op. 16272. I do not think that Douglas stands for the proposition that a “total absence of evidence” regarding a particular area is prejudicial while inadequate presentation of evidence in a particular area is not. In fact, such a reading of Douglas would be contrary to the well-settled notion that prejudice is determined by balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. Accordingly, I believe that Hovey and Douglas support my view that Cox was prejudiced by the omission of his extensive childhood abuse, notwithstanding strong aggravating evidence. COX v. AYERS 16289 D. The Length of the Jury’s Deliberations During the Death Penalty Phase Supports a Finding of Prejudice I also believe that the length of the jury’s deliberations during the penalty phase of Cox’s trial strongly supports a finding of prejudice. See e.g. Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1209 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding prejudice, in part, because “[t]he jury deliberated for two days before returning a verdict of death”). Here, the jury deliberated for three days during the penalty phase of Cox’s trial and asked to see key pieces of evidence regarding the identity of the shooter. The length of the jury deliberations and the jury’s request for additional evidence indicates that the jury’s decision to impose a sentence of death was not an easy one and that any additional mitigating evidence may have changed the outcome. Accordingly, I believe that a reasonable probability exists that the additional mitigating evidence of childhood abuse would have led at least one juror to vote for a sentence of life in prison rather than a sentence of death. III. Conclusion At the time of the murders, Cox was eighteen years old. Although the jury was left with the incorrect impression that Cox had experienced a fairly normal childhood, the record demonstrates that Cox suffered severe abuse at the hands of his mother and was routinely exposed to extreme violence. I believe that Cox’s attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain and present evidence of Cox’s severe childhood abuse, which was readily available in Cox’s dependency court file and in Cox’s mother’s arrest records and court files. Had this evidence been presented to the jury, a reasonable probability exists that this evidence would have 16290 COX v. AYERS evoked sympathy for Cox and led at least one juror to vote for a sentence of life in prison rather than death.10 Accordingly, I dissent. 10 In the face of counsel’s clear ineffective assistance at the penalty phase of Cox’s trial, I see no need to reach the shackling issue.