Opinion ID: 1091927
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: family allowance

Text: The opinion of the majority states that the trial court did not consider Mittie Marie Posey's request for a family allowance and, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court is not final. This holding ignores the indications in the record that Mittie Marie asked for the family allowance, that evidence was presented both for and against her receiving a family allowance, and that the trial court specifically stated in its order, All claims not herein adjudicated are denied. The majority also fails to consider that Mittie Marie stated in her motion for a new trial, The Court erred in not awarding to Plaintiff her family allowance as the widow of Troy Posey, and, further, that this motion was denied by operation of law on June 10, 1992. The law is settled that, in the absence of an order severing a claim or ordering a separate trial,  [a] judgment will be deemed a final judgment on all issues pleaded and any claims which are not specifically disposed of in the judgment will be deemed to have been rejected or denied. Poston v. Gaddis, 372 So.2d 1099, 1101 (Ala.1979) (emphasis added). In Poston, the basis for finding the order nonfinal was stronger than that in the present case. Gaddis sued Poston, alleging breach of a construction contract; Poston counterclaimed, alleging that Gaddis had not paid him all that he was owed on the contract. The jury returned a judgment in favor of Gaddis on the breach of contract claim. Although Poston argued that he had voluntarily dismissed the counterclaim, no order dismissing the counterclaim was entered in the record. Unlike this case, in Poston no evidence was admitted on the counterclaim; also, the jury was not instructed on the counterclaim. One of the issues on appeal in Poston was whether the order of the trial court was a final judgment for purposes of appeal when the record did not contain an order dismissing the counterclaim or a Rule 54(b), A.R.Civ.P., certificate. Despite the failure to specifically address the counterclaim, and even lacking any evidence and/or instructions to the jury on the counterclaim, this Court held that the order awarding money damages to Gaddis was a final judgment on all claims; Poston's counterclaim was deemed to have been denied and/or rejected. In the present case, evidence was presented both for and against a family allowance for Mittie Marie. The trial court specifically stated that the order of February 14, 1992, disposed of all claims, stating that those claims not specifically adjudicated were denied. After the entry of this order, Mittie Marie filed a motion for new trial, asking the trial court to make a family allowance award. On June 10, 1992, this motion for new trial was denied by operation of law. The record supports the trial court's decision not to award a family allowance to Mittie Marie. That decision is supported by evidence showing that months before her husband died Mittie Marie had moved out of the home she had shared with him and that he was not supporting her at the time of his death. Section 43-8-112, Ala. Code 1975, provides for a family allowance to be paid to the surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent was obligated to support and the children who were in fact being supported by him. Section 43-8-112 also states that the amount of the family allowance award is to be set at a reasonable allowance ... for [the surviving widow's and children's] maintenance during the period of administration. Also, a surviving spouse may not be entitled to a family allowance when she was not living with the decedent at the time of his death and when she had voluntarily abandoned, deserted, or separated from him. See 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 344(b) (1942). Therefore, the trial court's denial of a family allowance to Mittie Marie is supported by the record.