Opinion ID: 1115370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Effect on Voting and Candidacy Rights

Text: Petitioners next assert that the term limitations of Proposition 140 violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. They observe that under Proposition 140, as previously discussed, once the prescribed maximum terms have expired, officeholders are forever barred from running for the office they held. According to petitioners, this lifetime ban substantially burdens two fundamental rights, namely, the right to vote and the right to be a candidate for public office. Petitioners, urging strict scrutiny of the new measure, suggest that no compelling state interest supports such a lifetime ban. (See Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm. (1989) 489 U.S. 214, 222 [103 L.Ed.2d 271, 281, 109 S.Ct. 1013] [hereafter Eu ]; Johnson v. Hamilton (1975) 15 Cal.3d 461, 466-468 [125 Cal. Rptr. 129, 541 P.2d 881] [applying strict scrutiny to review constitutionality of candidates' durational residence requirement].) Respondents, on the other hand, assert the measure is valid under the balancing test announced in Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983) 460 U.S. 780 [75 L.Ed.2d 547, 103 S.Ct. 1564], discussed below. Respondents, noting certain mitigating aspects of the measure, contend that the public policy served by Proposition 140 is both rational and compelling, having only minimal effects on voting or candidacy rights. We first turn to the question of the proper standard for resolving petitioners' challenge. Because Proposition 140 amends the California Constitution itself, it is appropriate that we look to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court for guidance in determining the validity of the measure under the federal Constitution. We have observed that [i]n analyzing constitutional challenges to election laws, this court has followed closely the analysis of the United States Supreme Court. [Citations.] [¶] The high court has generally addressed the validity of election regulations under the equal protection clause. However, the basis for the court's selection of that approach and the precise nature of the equal protection tests employed has not always been easily discernible. And, as is true for equal protection doctrine in general, the standard of review utilized in voting and election cases has been in a state of flux. [Citations.] ( Canaan v. Abdelnour (1985) 40 Cal.3d 703, 710-711 [221 Cal. Rptr. 468, 710 P.2d 268, 69 A.L.R.4th 915]; see also Munro v. Socialist Workers Party (1986) 479 U.S. 189, 200-201 [93 L.Ed.2d 499, 509-510, 107 S.Ct. 533] [dis. opn. of Marshall, J., observing majority's failure to articulate appropriate level of scrutiny for appraising validity of restrictions on ballot access].) Petitioners assume that a compelling interest standard is required by Eu, supra, in which the justices unanimously invalidated California's prohibition on primary endorsements by political parties. To the contrary, it seems clear the high court in Eu imposed such a strict standard because of the serious impact on First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, interests not as directly impacted by Proposition 140, which does not affect speech interests and which impacts all political parties on an equal basis. (See 489 U.S. at pp. 222-225 [103 L.Ed.2d at pp. 281-283].) As Eu concluded, Because the ban [on endorsements] burdens appellees' rights to free speech and free association, it can only survive constitutional scrutiny if it serves a compelling governmental interest. ( Id. at p. 225 [103 L.Ed.2d at P. 283], fn. omitted.) Thus, Eu is probably inapposite. (See also Clements v. Fashing (1982) 457 U.S. 957, 963 [73 L.Ed.2d 508, 515-516, 102 S.Ct. 2836] [plurality opinion stating barriers to candidate's access to ballot do not compel close scrutiny]; Erum v. Cayetano (9th Cir.1989) 881 F.2d 689, 692, fn. 7 [discussing Eu, but concluding that in cases involving restrictions on ballot access heightened scrutiny is not the rule].) In any event, as will appear, it is unlikely we would reach a different result applying strict scrutiny to evaluate Proposition 140. In Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party (1982) 457 U.S. 1 [72 L.Ed.2d 628, 102 S.Ct. 2194], the court considered the constitutional validity of Puerto Rico's system of allowing only certain designated political parties access to the vote needed to fill legislative vacancies on an interim basis. In another unanimous opinion, the court noted that the federal Constitution does not specify the procedure a state must use in filling legislative vacancies ( id., at p. 8 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 634]), that the Constitution does not compel a fixed method of choosing state or local officers or representatives ( id., at p. 9 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 635]), that the right to vote for state offices is not a constitutionally protected right ( ibid. [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 635]), but that once a state or commonwealth provides for elected representatives, a citizen has a constitutional right to participate on an equal basis with other citizens ( id., at p. 10 [72 L.Ed.2d at p. 635]). Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, supra, 457 U.S. 1, indicates the high court will give wide latitude to state election laws, even those that may restrict the electorate's choice of representatives, so long as those laws are applied in an even-handed manner without discriminating against particular citizens or classes of citizens. The incumbency limitations involved here satisfy that standard. (See also Burdick v. Takushi (9th Cir.1991) 927 F.2d 469, 473-474 [voters have no constitutional right to vote for particular candidate]; Stiles v. Blunt (8th Cir.1990) 912 F.2d 260, 266, fn. 10, cert. den. (1991) ___ U.S. ___ [113 L.Ed.2d 241, 111 S.Ct. 1307] [same]; Zielasko v. State of Ohio (6th Cir.1989) 873 F.2d 957, 961 [same]; but see Caanan v. Abdelnour, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 713.) In Canaan v. Abdelnour, supra, 40 Cal.3d 703, we struck down a city's blanket prohibition against write-in voting in municipal elections. In so doing, we applied the balancing test set forth in Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. 780, wherein the court held unduly burdensome an Ohio law requiring independent candidates for the November 1980 Presidential Election to file their statements of candidacy by March of that year. The high court in Anderson, acknowledging that a state's regulatory interests in determining the eligibility of candidates are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions ( id., at p. 788 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 557], fn. omitted), announced the following test: Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State's election laws ... cannot be resolved by any `litmus-paper test' that will separate valid from invalid restrictions. [Citation.] Instead, a court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It must then identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it must also consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. [Citations.] The results of this evaluation will not be automatic; as we have recognized, there is `no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made.' [Citation.] (460 U.S. at pp. 789-790 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 558].) With respect to Anderson 's requirement of showing the necessity of the particular burden imposed by the state, we must also consider whether there are any less drastic alternatives to a lifetime ban. (See Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 806 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 568]; Canaan v. Abdelnour, supra, 40 Cal.3d 703, 719, fn. 13.) (10) Thus, Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. 780, requires us to consider three separate elements in ascertaining the constitutionality of state laws restricting access to the ballot: (1) the nature of the injury to the rights affected, (2) the interests asserted by the state as justifications for that injury, and (3) the necessity for imposing the particular burden affecting the plaintiff's rights, rather than some less drastic alternatives. Lacking any more specific guidance from the high court, we now apply Anderson 's balancing test to the challenged provisions of Proposition 140.
(11) Two important rights are affected by Proposition 140, namely, the incumbent's right to run for public office, and the voters' right to reelect the incumbent to that office. Consequently, the injury to those rights resulting from the application of Proposition 140 is also twofold, namely, lifetime exclusion of the incumbent from the office previously held, and a corresponding permanent inability of the voters to return the incumbent to that office.
As previously explained, Proposition 140 imposes a lifetime ban on legislators once they have completed the maximum number of terms. Petitioners argue, In the long run, the term limitations permanently ban those who are arguably the most qualified candidates  incumbents with the experience and expertise in the legislative process necessary to the most effective representation of their constituencies. According to petitioners, qualified incumbents will be purged solely to seat massive numbers of inexperienced newcomers. Petitioners predict that only a few qualified persons will be attracted to short term public office. Respondents, of course, dispute petitioners' premise that long-term legislators are inevitably better qualified than other candidates, and they believe that term limitations will encourage, rather than inhibit, new qualified candidates seeking short term public service. They characterize the term limitations of Proposition 140 as additional candidacy requirements, akin to age, integrity, training or residency, which have generally been upheld. (See, e.g., Zeilenga v. Nelson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 716, 721 [94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d 578]; 25 Am.Jur.2d, Elections, § 175, pp. 870-871, and cases cited; Note, Developments in the Law: Elections (1975) 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1111, 1217 et seq.) Respondents also stress three features of Proposition 140 that assertedly serve to mitigate the severity of its lifetime ban: First, the affected incumbent is not barred from seeking any other public office, including a seat in another legislative house or a statewide constitutional office. A former Senator may seek a seat in the Assembly, and vice versa. Second, the term limitations arise only after the incumbent already has had the opportunity to serve a significant period in office (i.e., eight years for a Senator, and six years for a member of the Assembly). Finally, the term limitations are generally applicable to persons elected or appointed on or after November 6, 1990. Except for some incumbent Senators, past terms served do not count in calculating the limitation. Thus, by the time the term limitations of Proposition 140 come into play, the incumbent will have already served, and indeed may continue to serve, several terms in public office.
Petitioners also stress the impact on the voters who are prevented from casting their ballots for the particular candidate of their choice. Just as incumbent legislators are permanently barred from running for another term once they have served the prescribed numbers of terms, the voters are permanently barred from voting for such persons, at least for the legislative office they once held. According to petitioners, the voters thus will be denied the right to vote for those persons who arguably possess the best qualifications. Additionally, petitioners note that because Proposition 140 was adopted on a statewide basis, the disability [on candidates and voters] is imposed not by those who have the right to vote for the candidate, but rather by those outside the district. Petitioners thus suggest the resulting impact on or injury to the voters is aggravated or enhanced by reason of the ability of voters residing outside a particular voting district to essentially veto particular candidates within that district. Respondents reply by citing federal court cases (e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, supra, 927 F.2d 469, 473-474) stating that voters have no constitutional right to vote for particular candidates. Additionally, respondents observe that the challenged measure does not fall into any of the categories of prior cases in which the right to vote was found impermissibly infringed. No identifiable groups of voters are excluded from voting or otherwise unduly burdened in the exercise of their franchise. Characterizing the term limitations of Proposition 140 as additional candidacy qualifications akin to age or residency, respondents submit that Proposition 140 does not truly impair the franchise, for the voters retain the basic fundamental right to cast their ballots for the qualified candidate of their choice. Moreover, respondents observe that neither voter choice nor candidate eligibility is restricted based on the content of protected expression, political affiliation, or inherently arbitrary factors such as race, religion or sex. The only criterion used is incumbency. Voters retain the ability to vote for any qualified candidate holding the beliefs or possessing the attributes they may desire in a public officeholder. Under these circumstances, First Amendment protection of political expression and promotion of the marketplace for ideas continue unabated. Respondents further note that petitioners have cited no case supporting their theory that a voting restriction on local offices would be invalid if imposed by voters on a statewide basis. Indeed, such a rule would seemingly call in question any statewide legislation affecting the qualification of candidates for local elections, such as age or residency requirements. Finally, respondents suggest that because Proposition 140 was an initiative measure adopted by the people at a statewide election, any resulting injury to the exercise of the franchise should be deemed self-inflicted, and thus not constitutionally protected.
In sum, although Proposition 140 does affect the rights of voters and candidates to a degree, there are several mitigating aspects, including the voters' continued right to vote for any qualified candidates, as well as the candidates' ability to run for other public offices, their entitlement to a significant period of service in office before the term limitations apply, and the prospective application of the limitation provision. Additionally, we should bear in mind that it is presently unclear under federal law whether and to what extent voters retain a constitutional right to vote for particular candidates such as the incumbent legislators affected by the challenged measure. Thus, the legal impact of Proposition 140 on the voters remains uncertain. Having discussed the extent of the asserted injury to the rights protected ( Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 789 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 558]), we next analyze the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule ( ibid. ).
Balanced against the foregoing negative impact on candidates and voters flowing from the challenged measure are the considerable state interests assertedly promoted thereby. In the words of new article IV, section 1.5, of the state Constitution, term limitations are deemed necessary to restore free, fair, and competitive elections, to encourage qualified candidates to seek public office, and to eliminate unfair incumbent advantages that have resulted in an extremely high number of incumbents and created a class of career politicians instead of the citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers. According to respondents, the state's interests in limiting incumbency should support measures considerably stronger than a mere temporary disability from holding office. As respondents argue, the state's strong interests in protecting against an entrenched, dynastic legislative bureaucracy, and in thereby encouraging new candidates to seek public office, are both legitimate and compelling ones that support a lifetime ban from the office and outweigh any interest the incumbent legislators, or the voting public, may have in perpetuating the incumbents' positions of control. The legitimacy of the foregoing asserted state interests in limiting incumbency are well recognized in analogous contexts. As stated by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in rejecting a similar challenge to a state constitutional amendment limiting the right of the Governor to seek a third consecutive term, Constitutional restrictions circumscribing the ability of incumbents to succeed themselves appear in over twenty state constitutions, and exist in the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States with regard to the Presidency. The universal authority is that restriction upon the succession of incumbents serves a rational public policy and that, while restrictions may deny qualified men an opportunity to serve, as a general rule the over-all health of the body politic is enhanced by limitations on continuous tenure. [Citations and fn. omitted]. ( State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney (1976) 159 W. Va. 513 [223 S.E.2d 607, 611] [hereafter Maloney ], app. dism. sub nom. Moore v. McCartney (1976) 425 U.S. 946 [48 L.Ed.2d 190, 96 S.Ct. 1689]; see Maddox v. Fortson (1970) 226 Ga. 71 [172 S.E.2d 595, 598-599], cert. den. 397 U.S. 149 [25 L.Ed.2d 183, 90 S.Ct. 999]; cf. Chemerinsky, Protecting the Democratic Process: Voter Standing to Challenge Abuses of Incumbency (1988) 49 Ohio St. L.J. 773 et seq.; Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) § 13-18, at p. 1097 [Democracy envisions rule by successive temporary majorities. The capacity to displace incumbents in favor of the representatives of a recently coalesced majority is, therefore, an essential attribute of the election system in a democratic republic.]; cf. Annot. (1958) 59 A.L.R.2d 716 [construction and effect of incumbency limitation laws].) The Maloney decision continues by describing at length the substantial reasons for limiting the right of incumbents to succeed themselves. These include The power of incumbent officeholders to develop networks of patronage and attendant capacities to deliver favorably disposed voters to the polls, fears of an entrenched political machine which could effectively foreclose access to the political process, and the belief that regularly disrupting those machines would stimulate criticism within political parties and insure a meaningful, adversary, and competitive election. (223 S.E.2d at p. 611.) In addition, Maloney explains that it has long been felt that a limitation upon succession of incumbents removes the temptation to prostitute the government to the perpetuation of a particular administration. [Citation.] ... Meretricious policies which sacrifice the well-being of economic, social, racial, or geographic minorities are most likely where a political figure, political party, or political interest group can rely upon electorate inertia fostered by the hopelessness of encountering a seemingly invincible political machine. (223 S.E.2d at pp. 611-612.) Petitioners observe that Maloney involved a limitation on consecutive terms of a Governor, rather than a lifetime ban on incumbent legislators. They suggest that term limitations on the executive branch are justified by the need to check the substantial concentration of power that the chief executive possesses, a consideration assertedly not applicable to the legislative branch. But we think that many, if not all, of the considerations mentioned in Maloney (e.g., eliminating unfair incumbent advantages, dislodging entrenched political machines, restoring open access to the political process, and stimulating electorate participation) would apply with equal force to the legislative branch. In connection with petitioners' argument that Proposition 140's lifetime ban is unconstitutional, two other cases are instructive, though factually distinguishable. In Clements v. Fashing, supra, 457 U.S. 957, cited with apparent approval in Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. at page 789, footnote 9 [75 L.Ed.2d at page 558], the high court upheld the validity of a Texas statute that rendered incumbent justices of the peace ineligible for the Texas Legislature. The disability from office extended only during the term for which the justices were elected or appointed. A plurality of the high court took the position that barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot do not compel close scrutiny (457 U.S. at p. 963 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 516]), and stressed the de minimis nature of the restriction, noting that the act merely imposed a brief waiting period on current officeholders, and therefore could be sustained by a mere showing of some rational predicate to support it ( id. at pp. 967-968 [73 L.Ed.2d at pp. 518-519]). The Clements v. Fashing plurality did not affirmatively indicate that a lifetime bar to legislative service necessarily would be invalid. Significantly, unlike Proposition 140, the Texas act apparently was not aimed at limiting the powers of incumbency, but was based on the rational predicate that an affected justice will be less inclined to abuse his position or neglect his duties because of the justice's aspirations for higher office. (457 U.S. at p. 968 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 519].) In De Bottari v. Melendez (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 910 [119 Cal. Rptr. 256], the Court of Appeal struck down a local ordinance prohibiting recalled council members from running for city council within a year of the recall. Although petitioners believe the case supports their position, closer scrutiny indicates otherwise. Finding the candidacy restriction too severe, the De Bottari court observed, Cases in other jurisdictions upholding limitations on successive terms in office [citations] involve similar restrictions but are not authoritative here since such limitations serve totally different governmental interests.  (44 Cal. App.3d at p. 913, fn. 1, italics added.) De Bottari, using strict scrutiny, reviewed the interests that assertedly supported a temporary ban on candidacy by recalled candidates and found them insufficient to sustain the restriction. The court had no occasion to review the different interests served by general limitations on incumbency, as outlined by Maloney, supra . In sum, despite its distinguishing features, we conclude that Maloney 's ( supra, 223 S.E.2d 607) analysis is quite pertinent to our determination whether permanent incumbency limitations are supported by legitimate and compelling considerations. We conclude they are so supported.
We turn next to the necessity of imposing the restrictions of Proposition 140 on the dual rights at issue here (see Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 789-790 [75 L.Ed.2d at pp. 558-559]). Petitioners contend that a lifetime ban on candidacy was unnecessary, and that other less drastic alternatives, such as a limitation on consecutive terms, together with additional restrictions on campaign contributions to legislators, decreased fringe and pension benefits, and additional incentives for early retirement, would have been sufficient to promote and accomplish the state interests previously discussed. As will appear, we conclude that the less drastic alternatives suggested by petitioners would have been inadequate to accomplish the declared purpose of Proposition 140 to eliminate the class of career politicians that assertedly had been created by virtue of the unfair incumbent advantages referred to in that measure. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.5.) Respondents stress the substantial advantages incumbent legislators enjoy in this state, advantages that permitted 92 percent of all incumbents to win reelection at this state's November 1990 General Election. Indeed, respondents note that nine of these incumbents ran unopposed. Respondents seem correct in this regard. Whether by reason of superior fund raising ability, greater media coverage, larger and more experienced staffs, greater name recognition among the voters, favorably drawn voting districts, or other factors, incumbents do indeed appear to enjoy considerable advantages over other candidates. (See Service Employees v. Fair Political Practices (E.D.Cal. 1990) 747 F. Supp. 580, 588; Watson v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1990) 217 Cal. App.3d 1059, 1074 [266 Cal. Rptr. 408], & fn. 13.) As Proposition 140's introductory statement indicates, the framers of the measure believed these substantial advantages of incumbency were unfair to other candidates and tended to create a class of career politicians, instead of the citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.5.) Petitioners suggest that a more reasonable alternative existed to the measure's lifetime ban: disqualification of the incumbent for the forthcoming term, thus forcing the legislator to take one term off, before being eligible to run for the body. Yet, as respondents observe, the framers reasonably could conclude that a lifetime ban was necessary to assure that a former officeholder could not reinvoke at least some of the advantages of incumbency to gain reelection after leaving office for a term or more. Additionally, we believe the framers might well have reasonably concluded that a mere ban on consecutive terms could encourage popular career politicians to trade terms with each other, or to attempt to arrange for a caretaker candidate, such as a spouse or relative, to hold office for them during the interrupted term. For example, when in 1966 George Wallace became legally ineligible to run for reelection as Governor of Alabama because of state term limitations applicable to that office, his wife, Lurleen, successfully ran in his place, and served as Governor until her death in 1968. George Wallace was reelected as Governor in 1970 and again in 1974. (See 12 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropaedia (15th ed. 1990) Wallace, George C., at p. 467.) Realistically, only a lifetime ban could protect against various kinds of continued exploitation of the advantages of incumbency captured through past terms in office. The remainder of petitioners' suggested alternatives essentially involve narrow changes in the system of providing contributions or compensation for legislators, changes that would afford career politicians with independent resources little incentive to voluntarily terminate public service.
On balance, we conclude the interests of the state in incumbency reform outweigh any injury to incumbent officeholders and those who would vote for them. As Maloney observed (223 S.E.2d at p. 612), no decisions of the United States Supreme Court have been found that suggest a limitation on incumbency would be unconstitutional. Although such limitations may restrict the franchise (but see cases indicating voters have no right to vote for particular candidates, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, supra, 927 F.2d 469, 473-474), if we use a balancing test that weighs the enlargement of the franchise by guaranteeing competitive primary and general elections against incidental disenfranchisement of some voters, the court must conclude that restrictive provisions on the succession of incumbents do[ ] not frustrate but rather further[ ] the policy of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Maloney, supra, 223 S.E.2d at pp. 612-613.) It is true, as petitioners observe, that respondents have not offered evidence to support all of the various premises on which Proposition 140 is based. But as the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, supra, 479 U.S. 189, upholding state restrictions on minority party candidacy, a state need not demonstrate empirically all of the various evils that its regulations seek to combat: Such a requirement would necessitate that a State's political system sustain some level of damage before the legislature could take corrective action. Legislatures, we think, should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights. ( Id., at pp. 195-196 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 506].) We have no reason to doubt that the high court would give similar leeway to state regulations imposed directly by the people through the initiative process. In sum, it would be anomalous to hold that a statewide initiative measure aimed at restor[ing] a free and democratic system of fair elections, and encourag[ing] qualified candidates to seek public office (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.5), is invalid as an unwarranted infringement of the rights to vote and to seek public office. We conclude the legitimate and compelling interests set forth in the measure outweigh the narrower interests of petitioner legislators and the constituents who wish to perpetuate their incumbency.