Opinion ID: 6108756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Bus Driver Employee

Text: The Court next concludes that for the purpose of liability, an independent contractor performing essential governmental functions under chapter 452 of the Transportation Code shall be treated as the government; therefore, the employees of such an independent contractor are to be treated as employees of the government for purposes of liability. Ante at 847. Of course, the TTCA would not apply to Leshawn Vaughn and would not even be part of the discussion if she were not employed by a governmental unit. And as noted above, I disagree with the Court that MTA and MTI either are, or should be treated as, governmental units. But, even given the Court's mistaken conclusion regarding their status and treatment, the Court errs in its analysis regarding whether the TTCA's election of remedies provision applies to Vaughn. The TTCA provides that [t]he filing of a suit under this chapter against a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against any individual employee of the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(a). But the Act specifically excludes employees of independent contractors from the definition of employee. Id. § 101.001(2). The Court acknowledges this language, but concludes that despite it, an independent contractor performing essential governmental functions under  chapter 452 of the Transportation Code shall be treated as the government; therefore, the employees of such an independent contractor are to be treated as employees of the government for purposes of liability. Ante at 856. This is directly contrary to what the statute actually says. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.001(2). In disregarding the plain statutory language as to Vaughn, the Court relies on Klein v. Hernandez , 315 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2010) to support treating an employee of a private entity as an employee of the government when that employee was performing a governmental function. Ante at 847. In Klein , this Court addressed whether a doctor who was a resident physician in a private medical school, but who was working at a public hospital, was to be treated as a public employee. 315 S.W.3d at 2, 4 . The statute in question in Klein provided that such a resident physician is an employee of a state agency for purposes of ... determining the liability, if any, of the person. Id. at 4-5 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 312.007(a) ). But the statute here contains no similar language; it does not address employees at all. Even assuming the Legislature intended for MTI to be treated as the government as the Court concludes, if the Legislature intended the TTCA to encompass employees of private operators, it easily could have said so. And its failure to say so creates a presumption that it purposefully intended not to say so. See Lippincott , 462 S.W.3d at 510 (The plain language of the statute imposes no requirement that the form of the communication be public. Had the Legislature intended to limit the Act to publicly communicated speech, it could have easily added language to that effect.); TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs , 340 S.W.3d 432 , 439 (Tex. 2011) (We presume that the Legislature chooses a statute's language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.). Because the statutory language here does not purport to provide any protection to Vaughn-even considering the Court's erroneous conclusion that her employer, MTI, is to be treated as a governmental entity-I disagree that Klein supports the Court's conclusion that Rodriguez's claim is barred.