Opinion ID: 164580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weakness of the City's Evidence of Misconduct

Text: Plaintiff asserts that 43 there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether [he] cleaned 17 catch basins on January 31, 2000; whether he had lied or merely made an innocent mistake in stating initially on his work order that he had cleaned 27 catch basins that day; whether he had lied in denying that he had cleaned 17 catch basins; whether he had asked or induced Mr. Martinez or Mr. Gallegos to lie for him; and whether it was possible for him to have cleaned 17 catch basins during the time available to him that day. 44 Aplt. Br. at 21. The City responds that Plaintiff must show that there is a dispute or genuine issue concerning the sincerity of the City's proffered reason for his termination, and not simply that the decision was, in retrospect, erroneous or ill-advised. Aplee. Br. at 16. We agree. We further agree with the City that Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing. 45 The relevant inquiry is not whether [the employer's] proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether [it] honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs. Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1318 (10th Cir.1999), overruled on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). In determining whether the proffered reason for a decision was pretextual, we examine the facts as they appear to the person making the decision. Watts v. Norman, 270 F.3d 1288, 1295 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). An articulated motivating reason is not converted into pretext merely because, with the benefit of hindsight, it turned out to be poor business judgment. McKnight, 149 F.3d at 1129; see also Tran v. Trs. of State Colls. in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1268-69 (10th Cir.2004) (employer's good faith belief would not be pretextual even if the belief was later found to be erroneous) (internal quotation marks omitted). 46 Nevertheless, [p]retext can be shown by such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons. Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Plaintiff could show pretext by persuading the jury that the evidence of Plaintiff's misconduct presented to Kazemian was so implausible, incoherent, or internally contradictory that Kazemian must have made his decision on some other basis. In our view, no reasonable jury could be so persuaded by the evidence in this record. 47 The implausibility lies in Plaintiff's version of events, not Kazemian's. To have any chance of cleaning 17 catch basins in the available time, Plaintiff must have decided to take a lunch break promptly after filling the tank with water (even though leakage would result in a substantial loss of water), and then proceeded promptly after lunch to work at a breakneck pace to clean as many basins as possible, despite there being no apparent reason for the rush (he could hardly have anticipated the brake failure that would occur at 12:30). In addition, to believe Plaintiff, Kazemian would have had to disbelieve Montoya's report of her observations and believe Martinez's retractions of his original statement that he and Plaintiff had filled the water tank after lunch and cleaned no basins on January 31. 48 Perhaps a reasonable factfinder could observe all the witnesses and believe Plaintiff's version of the events of January 31. As previously noted, however, that is not the issue. See Bullington, 186 F.3d at 1318. What is at issue is whether the evidence of Plaintiff's misconduct presented to Kazemian was so weak that a rational factfinder could infer that Kazemian's expressed reason for terminating Plaintiff must have been pretextual. We think not. In other words, Plaintiff's evidence regarding the events of January 31 failed to raise a genuine issue regarding pretext. 49 Having rejected both of Plaintiff's arguments regarding pretext, we hold that he has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City's proffered reason for terminating his employment was pretextual.