Opinion ID: 2576137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legislative Declaration Must Be Judicially Reviewed and Found Obviously False

Text: ¶ 57 Our leading recent case on the referendum is CLEAN. Chief Justice Alexander wrote the majority opinion in both CLEAN and Washington State Labor Council v. Reed, 149 Wash.2d 48, 65 P.3d 1203 (2003) ( WSLC ) and summarized the CLEAN framework in WSLC: It is a judicial question whether a measure is, in fact, in support of an existing government institution when an emergency clause is challenged or when the legislature has not plainly indicated its intentions. WSLC, 149 Wash.2d at 58, 65 P.3d 1203. ¶ 58 In this case, the secretary of state focused his argument on the support of state government exception to the referendum power. Thus, the majority does not address the necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety exception. No colorable argument is made that there was any immediate threat to the public peace, health or safety even though that provision was also recited rote by the 2005 legislature. The court should take notice of the fact the legislature included an emergency declaration also based on health and safety, with no justification, as further indication of legislative dissimulation here. ¶ 59 The majority, however, focuses on the support of state government exception and tries to fit the facts to this theory. In evaluating whether facts exist that support the legislature's declaration that the act is necessary for the ... support of the state government and its existing public institution, the court has ruled that we must `consider the question from what appears upon the face of the act, aided by the court's judicial knowledge.' CLEAN, 130 Wash.2d at 807, 928 P.2d 1054 (quoting Humiston, 61 Wash.2d at 778, 380 P.2d 735). I do so below, to conclude this exception was not properly invoked.
¶ 60 Substitute Senate Bill (SSB) 6078 itself is devoid of any indication that it was necessary for the ... support of the state government and its existing public institutions. This legislation is unlike any law this court has held within this exception (cases discussed further infra part II). ¶ 61 The act does not raise revenue. ¶ 62 The act does not appropriate state funds, as did most such cases. [5] ¶ 63 The act does not even purport to save the state money (as did one act upheld by this court). ¶ 64 The only provision on this act's face quoted by the majority is in the statement of intent. [M]odifications to the state expenditure limit ... will better balance the needs of the citizens for essential government services. Majority at 306 (quoting SSB 6078, § 1). ¶ 65 This is hardly emergent and says nothing about supporting state government. Read in its entirety, but buried in a footnote by the majority, intent section 1 demonstrates only the legislature's intent to ensure that the long-term budget process operates with stability and predictability by amending the other part of I-601, the budget cap provision. The legislature finds that the citizens of the state benefit from a state expenditure limit that ensures that the state budget operates with stability and predictability, while encouraging the establishment of budget priorities and a periodic review of state programs and the delivery of state services. A state expenditure limit can prevent budgeting crises that can occur because of increased spending levels during periods of revenue surplus followed by drastic reductions in state services in lean years. The citizens of the state are best served by an expenditure limit that keeps pace with the growth in the state's economy yet ensures budget discipline and taxpayer protection. For these reasons, the legislature finds that modifications to the state expenditure limit, after ten years of experience following the initial implementation of Initiative Measure No. 601, will recognize the economic productivity of the state's economy and better balance the needs of the citizens for essential government services with the obligation of the legislature for strict spending accountability and protection of its taxpayers. Substitute S.B. 6078, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Wash.2005). Note that the emergency section applied only to this section and section 2it did not apply to the sections changing the budget cap. ¶ 66 The majority fails to understand that the intent section quoted above applies to the rest of the bill, not to the suspension of I-601's two-thirds supermajority requirement of section 2 (a provision it did not reference). SSB 6078 does more than suspend the two-thirds supermajority requirement to raise taxes  it fundamentally changes the way the state expenditure limit is calculated, shifting the fiscal growth factor from one based on inflation and population change to one based on statewide personal income. See SSB 6078, § 4. These changes, however, were not deemed emergenteven by the 2005 legislature. ¶ 67 On its face intent section 1 justifies only the change in the expenditure limit. It neither addresses nor justifies the supermajority requirement. ¶ 68 Obviously, suspension of the two-thirds supermajority for taxes had no effect on the state expenditure limit. Thus, the intent section by its terms does not establish any emergency for suspension of I-601's two-thirds vote requirement to raise taxes, nor that such supports state government. ¶ 69 Finally, by its own terms, SSB 6078's suspension of I-601 supermajority requirement only lasts two years (until June 30, 2007). Thus, the 2005 legislature essentially admits that suspension of the supermajority of I-601 is not necessary for all budgets. This is consistent with the historical record that a decade of state budgets has been passed by other legislatures with I-601 intact.
¶ 70 Although we may defer to the legislature for fact finding, we have never abdicated our judicial role to allow the mere legislative insertion of an emergency clause to block referendum. State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 270, 148 P. 28 (1915). ¶ 71 Here, some facts argued by respondents, such as the fact of a severe budget deficit, are certainly not capable of demonstration from a source of indisputable accuracy. No source for this claim was cited by respondents, and there were disputes over the size and scope of the budget deficit. ¶ 72 We may judicially note facts that demonstrate that the legislative assertion was obviously false or a palpable attempt at dissimulation. In this regard, the court should first note that the revenue from existing taxes was projected to increase more than 7 percent before the budget was even submitted. This proves factually that a budget could have been passed within I-601's expenditure limit without raising taxes or making any budget cuts. [6] ¶ 73 The court should also note that Governor Gregoire's proposed budget included less than half the tax increase ultimately adopted by the legislature. See Office of the Governor, Proposed 2005-07 Budget and Policy Highlights, available at http://www.ofm .wa.gov/budget /highlights/ass ets/pdf/highlights. pdf. If deference is also afforded the executive branch, especially on budget matters, the revenue projections and the governor's budget both indicate that the legislature's declaration of necessity for support of state government was false. ¶ 74 It is also obvious that budgets can be balanced by reducing government expenditures rather than raising taxes. Since more than two months remained before the statutory time for passing a budget at the time of this act, we cannot conclude that it was immediately necessary to change the law to make it easier to raise taxes to pass a budget. Compromise and bipartisanship, which the supermajority requirement of I-601 promotes, would allow another solution, as it has in years past. ¶ 75 Finally, the majority notes that four bills which increased taxes were passed by less than the two-thirds supermajority required under I-601. Majority at 14-15. However, as these bills were passed after I-601's requirements were suspended, the fact of their passage tells us nothing about what would have passed if I-601's protections had been in place. We cannot conclude that such changes were necessary to increase taxes, even assuming the majority's unproven assumption that increasing taxes was necessary to pass the budget. [7] ¶ 76 We should also note that some other taxes were actually decreased by the 2005 legislature, further eroding the credibility of the claim that increases were necessary. (These included exemptions to state property and sales and use taxes and deductions to B & O taxes. See S. WAYS & MEANS COMM., 2005-07 OPERATING & CAPITAL BUDGET: HIGHLIGHTS, pp. 39-43 (Apr. 24, 2005), available at http://leap.leg .wa.gov/leap/Bu dget/Detail/200 5/ o0507highlightsswm.pdf.) ¶ 77 Strongly bearing on the likelihood of dissimulation by the 2005 legislature through use of rote emergency clauses, the court should also note that of over 500 bills passed in the 2005 legislative session, nearly 20 percent contained an identical emergency clause. [8]