Opinion ID: 1371140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The injury is indirect, the damages speculative, and the cause of action would extend to other classes of plaintiffs.

Text: Under this heading we group three arguments relied on in Deshotel which could be invoked against any proposed recognition of a new cause of action sounding in tort. As will appear, each has been refuted by application of fundamental principles of the law of negligence. First the Deshotel court asserted that Any harm [the wife] sustains occurs only indirectly as a consequence of the defendant's wrong to the husband (italics added; 50 Cal.2d at p. 667). The argument was negated 10 years after Deshotel in Dillon v. Legg (1968) supra, 68 Cal.2d 728. There the issue was whether a driver who negligently runs over a small child in the street is also liable to the child's mother for emotional shock and resulting physical disorders suffered by the latter when she personally witnessed the occurrence of the accident. Finding such liability, we in effect rejected the argument that the injury to the mother was too indirect. The critical question, we explained, was foreseeability: In order to limit the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, the law of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable. ( Id. at p. 739.) The defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous. ( Ibid. ) The foreseeable risk need not be of an actual physical impact, but may be of emotional trauma alone. ( Id. at pp. 739-740.) Whether a risk is sufficiently foreseeable to give rise to a duty of care depends on the circumstances of each case, including the relationship of the parties and the nature of the threatened injury. ( Id. at p. 741.) We concluded that In light of these factors the court will determine whether the accident and harm was reasonably foreseeable. Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particular [defendant] as an individual would have in actuality foreseen the exact accident and loss; it contemplates that courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen. The courts thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and unexpected. ( Ibid. ) Applying these rules to the facts alleged, we were of the opinion in Dillon that Surely the negligent driver who causes the death of a young child may reasonably expect that the mother will not be far distant and will upon witnessing the accident suffer emotional trauma. ( Ibid. ) By parity of reasoning, we conclude in the case at bar that one who negligently causes a severely disabling injury to an adult may reasonably expect that the injured person is married and that his or her spouse will be adversely affected by that injury. In our society the likelihood that an injured adult will be a married man or woman is substantial, [19] clearly no less than the likelihood that a small child's mother will personally witness an injury to her offspring. And the probability that the spouse of a severely disabled person will suffer a personal loss by reason of that injury is equally substantial. The latter point has been forcefully made in a number of decisions since Deshotel rejecting the argument that the wife's loss of consortium is too indirect an injury to be compensated. Thus the New York Court of Appeals said in Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co. (1968) supra, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308, Disparagingly described as `sentimental' or `parasitic' damages, the mental and emotional anguish caused by seeing a healthy, loving companionable mate turned into a shell of a person is real enough. To describe the loss as `indirect' is only to evade the issue. The loss of companionship, emotional support, love, felicity and sexual relations are real injuries. The trauma of having to care for a permanent invalid is known to have caused mental illness. There may not be a deterioration in the marital relationship, but it will certainly alter it in a tragic way. Even in the case of a husband the `sentimental' damages may predominate over the loss of support or material element. Thus to describe these damages as merely parasitic is inaccurate and cruel. Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court observed in Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc. (1970) supra, 258 N.E.2d 230, 235, There certainly is no doubt today that the wife of a husband who has been incapacitated suffers great pain and endures constant anguish, particularly if she is denied the opportunity to have children.... When a person is injured either intentionally or negligently, to the extent that such person can no longer be a companion and is no longer capable of giving love, affection, society, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and a real personal loss. For these reasons, as the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared in Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am. (1965) supra, 215 A.2d 1, 5, 8, The position that [the wife's] injuries are indirect or too remote to warrant legal protection runs counter to basic principles of negligence and causation.... While engaging in their activities, the defendants clearly came under the comprehensive common law duty of due care with tort liability for its breach. If, as alleged, they acted without due care causing serious bodily injury to the husband and consortium deprivation to the wife, they should, in all justice, be held liable in fair measure for the respective losses. Those losses were immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable and, there being no sufficient countervailing policy, the law now rightly views them as remediable by the responsible tortfeasors. (Italics added.) The principles of Dillon v. Legg permit of no other conclusion. The next rationale of the Deshotel court (50 Cal.2d at p. 667) was that the measurement of damage for the loss of such things as companionship and society would involve conjecture since their value would be hard to fix in terms of money. This argument, too, has fared badly in our subsequent decisions. (5) Although loss of consortium may have physical consequences, it is principally a form of mental suffering. We have fully recognized that One of the most difficult tasks imposed upon a jury in deciding a case involving personal injuries is to determine the amount of money the plaintiff is to be awarded as compensation for pain and suffering. No method is available to the jury by which it can objectively evaluate such damages, and no witness may express his subjective opinion on the matter. [Citation.] In a very real sense, the jury is asked to evaluate in terms of money a detriment for which monetary compensation cannot be ascertained with any demonstrable accuracy. ( Beagle v. Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166, 172 [53 Cal. Rptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673].) Yet, we emphasized in Beagle (at p. 176), the inescapable fact is that this is precisely what the jury is called upon to do. More recently, we observed that under the concept of pain and suffering a plaintiff may recover not only for physical pain but for fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or ordeal. [Citations.] Admittedly these terms refer to subjective states, representing a detriment which can be translated into monetary loss only with great difficulty. [Citations.] But the detriment, nevertheless, is a genuine one that requires compensation [citations], and the issue generally must be resolved by the `impartial conscience and judgment of jurors who may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with the evidence.' [Citations.] [¶] Indeed, mental suffering frequently constitutes the principal element of tort damages (Rest.2d Torts, § 905, com. c); awards which fail to compensate for pain and suffering have been held inadequate as a matter of law. [Citations.] ( Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1972) 7 Cal.3d 889, 892-893 [103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 500 P.2d 880].) Again the out-of-state decisions have applied these basic principles to the typical loss of consortium case, and have rejected the argument relied on in Deshotel. Thus the Massachusetts high court reasoned that The marital interest is quite recognizable and its impairment may be definite, serious, and enduring, more so than the pain and suffering or mental or psychic distress for which recovery is now almost routinely allowed in various tort actions. The valuation problem here may be difficult but is not less manageable. ( Diaz v. Eli Lilly and Company (1973) supra, 302 N.E.2d 555, 563.) And the New York Court of Appeals ruled, It is also contended that the `sentimental' damages such as the diminution of the value of her husband's society and affection and the deprivation of sexual relations and the attendant loss of child-bearing opportunity are too personal, intangible, and conjectural to be measured in pecuniary terms by a jury. This argument has no merit. The logic of it would also hold a jury incompetent to award damages for pain and suffering. [¶] Money is a poor substitute for the loss of an only child or the pain resulting from serious injuries. Likewise, it cannot truly compensate a wife for the destruction of her marriage, but it is the only known means to compensate for the loss suffered and to symbolize society's recognition that a culpable wrong  even if unintentional  has been done. ( Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co. (1968) supra, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 312.) That the law cannot do enough, in short, is an unacceptable excuse for not doing anything at all. The third argument of this group set forth in Deshotel is that if the wife's cause of action were recognized on the basis of the intimate relationship existing between her and her husband, other persons having a close relationship to the one injured, such as a child or parent, would likely seek to enforce similar claims, and the courts would be faced with the perplexing task of determining where to draw the line with respect to which claims should be upheld. (50 Cal.2d at pp. 667-668.) Here again the answer was subsequently given in Dillon v. Legg . In that case it was likewise urged that any cause of action granted to a mother who witnesses her child's injury could also be asserted by other close relatives present at the scene such as siblings or grandparents, thus involving the courts in the hopeless task of defining the extent of the tortfeasor's liability. (68 Cal.2d at p. 730.) We rejected this argument in Dillon on the ground that the alleged inability to fix definitions for recovery on the different facts of future cases does not justify the denial of recovery on the specific facts of the instant case; in any event, proper guidelines can indicate the extent of liability for such future cases. ( Id. at p. 731.) Those guidelines, as noted hereinabove, are the general principles of negligence law limiting liability to persons and injuries within the scope of the reasonably foreseeable risk. We do not believe that the fear that we cannot successfully adjudicate future cases of this sort, pursuant to the suggested guidelines, should bar recovery in an otherwise meritorious cause. ( Id. at pp. 743-744.) We noted (at p. 743) that in sanctioning recovery for injury caused by intentional infliction of mental distress ( State Rubbish etc. Assn. v. Siliznoff (1952) 38 Cal.2d 330 [240 P.2d 282]), this court did not defer to the argument that liability should not be imposed because of the possible future difficulty in delimiting the area of liability. Similarly, in imposing strict liability in tort for a defective manufactured product ( Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57 [27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049]), we were not halted by the specter of an inability to pre-judge every future case. We concluded in Dillon (at p. 747). Legal history shows that artificial islands of exceptions, created from the fear that the legal process will not work, usually do not withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into oblivion. The same reasoning has led the courts of other states to reject this argument in loss of consortium cases. Thus in Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc. (Mo. 1963) supra, 365 S.W.2d 539, 546, the court said, In the present case, we have for decision only the question whether the wife should be permitted to recover for the loss of consortium of her husband under existing conditions. If she should be so permitted, the fact that to so hold might cause others to assert causes of action, e.g., a child or parent, is no reason to deny a wife an existing right of action. (Italics in original.) Recognizing the traditional power of the courts to control the development of a judge-made rule of law, the court in Diaz v. Eli Lilly and Company (1973) supra, 302 N.E.2d 555, 563, stated: Nor does it follow that if the husband-wife relationship is protected as here envisaged, identical protection must be afforded by analogy to other relationships from that of parent-child in a lengthy regress to that of master-servant; courts will rather proceed from case to case with discerning caution. (Fn. omitted.) Dismissing the same argument, the New Jersey court stated that The law has always been most solicitous of the husband and wife relationship, perhaps more so than the parent and child relationship. [Citation.] In any event, policy rather than logic is the determinative factor and, while persuasive arguments may be mustered in favor of the child's claim (Prosser, supra, at p. 919), the reciprocal recognition of the wife's claim may readily be rested on its own footing of equality and justice without any compulsion of going further. ( Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp. of Am. (1965) supra, 215 A.2d 1, 6-7.) That the law might be urged to move too far, in other words, is an unacceptable excuse for not moving at all.