Opinion ID: 752355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commencement of Back Pay Period

Text: 28 We review a district court's designation of the beginning of a back pay period for an abuse of discretion. See EEOC v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 840 (6th Cir.1994). Abuse of discretion is defined as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment. Logan v. Dayton Hudson Corporation, 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir.1989). In its March 1996 decision, the district court determined that the back pay compensation would begin to accrue for all claimants in this case as of October 31, 1984, two years before the United States filed its complaint. The United States contends that its letter of February 7, 1986, informing Warren that it would investigate the city's employment practices, provided the city with sufficient notice such that the back pay period should begin on February 7, 1984. The district court declined to use the February 7 letter to measure the beginning of back pay accrual because the United States had not provided the court with the contents of the letter. However, when the district court was provided with the letter, it concluded that it was insufficient to provide Warren notice of its questionable practices in order for back pay to begin to accrue February 7, 1984. 29 Section 706(g) of Title VII as amended in 1972 provides that [b]ack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). See, e.g., Winbush v. State of Iowa by Glenwood State Hosp., 66 F.3d 1471, 1477 n. 8 (8th Cir.1995); Bereda v. Pickering Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir.1989). However, Title VII is silent as to how the two-year back pay provision of Section 706(g) applies to civil rights suits that are brought by the Attorney General under her authority to bring pattern or practice suits under Section 707(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a). In Wilson Metal Casket Co., we noted that the purpose of Title VII's requirement that claimants file charges with the EEOC is to give notice of potential Title VII liability to an alleged wrongdoer and allow the EEOC to attempt to conciliate with the wrongdoer rather than go to court. 24 F.3d at 839 (citation omitted). To this end, in a pattern or practice case, the back pay period should begin whenever the United States provides the employer with notice and information comparable to that normally contained in a charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC. 11 30 The narrower question before us, then, is whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that the United States' letter of February 7, 1986 did not identify sufficiently the relevant facts of the alleged discrimination such that it could substitute for a complaint filed with the EEOC. We believe that the February 7 letter failed to provide such notice. The much-disputed letter stated in relevant part that the United States had received information indicating that the City of Warren may have been conducting employment practices which discriminated against blacks unlawfully on the basis of race; the letter cited the residency requirement and indicated that the United States would investigate in order to garner additional information. The letter did not mention the city's recruiting practices, which have since become a central issue in this case. More significantly, the letter served more to inform Warren of the pending investigation than to give the city notice that specific practices were in violation of Title VII. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accrue back pay beginning February 7, 1984. 31 The United States, however, sent Warren a determination letter dated September 23, 1986, identifying both the recruiting practices and the residency requirement as violating Title VII. The determination letter provides the city with ample notice of the claims against it and of its challenged practices. Therefore, it would appear that Fears's back pay should accrue beginning September 23, 1984. Thus, we believe that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider that date. We therefore remand this issue for the district court to determine whether Fears's back pay should accrue beginning September 23, 1984. In addition, we note that the date ultimately determined by the district court would apply to back pay relief for any claimants previously excluded by the district court's erroneous holding in City of Warren II, discussed in Part II, above.