Opinion ID: 793700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Imposition of a Special Condition

Text: 11 Levering first argues that the special condition prohibiting his contact with juvenile females is not reasonably related to the statutory sentencing goals and is a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to protect the public. 12 It is fundamental that a district judge has wide discretion in formulating the terms of supervised release. United States v. Bass, 121 F.3d 1218, 1223 (8th Cir.1997). The district court's discretion, however, is limited by the requirement that the conditions be reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors, involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary, and are consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing Commission. United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir.2006). We review the district court's imposition of special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. Id. 13 While Levering argues that a total prohibition on contact with juvenile females is not reasonably related to the statutory sentencing goals and is a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to protect the public, we have, on several occasions, approved virtually identical supervised release conditions for defendants guilty of less egregious conduct than Levering. See e.g., Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1057 (upholding as reasonable a special condition prohibiting defendant, who pleaded guilty to receiving child pornography, from having contact with anyone under the age of 18 without the express written permission of the probation officer); United States v. Mark, 425 F.3d 505, 507-08 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding special condition prohibiting defendant, who was convicted of possessing child pornography, from having any contact with, or residing with, any children under 18 years of age, including his own children, unless the probation officer gave prior approval in writing); United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733-34 (8th Cir.2005) (rejecting the argument of defendant, who was convicted of knowingly receiving child pornography, that the special condition prohibiting him from contact with children under the age of 18 without the written consent of his probation officer was an unnecessary deprivation of his liberty interest in having contact with his own children because the condition did not completely bar him from interacting with his children); United States v. Heidebur, 417 F.3d 1002, 1004 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding a special condition that prohibited the defendant from contact with children under the age of 18 unless the probation officer gave prior written permission because the deprivation of liberty was not greater than that which is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, considering the defendant was convicted of conduct involving the sexual exploitation of a minor); United States v. Vick, 421 F.3d 794, 795 (8th Cir.2005) (upholding a supervised release condition that prohibited the defendant, who was convicted of possessing child pornography, from having any contact with children under the age of 18, including his daughter, unless he received prior written approval from his probation officer because the condition was tailored to the defendant's extensive history with minors, was reasonably related to the nature of seriousness of the offense, and was needed to deter [the defendant] and protect the public). 14 Because Levering pleaded guilty to the forcible rape of a female juvenile, requiring prior approval before [Levering,] a convicted sex offender[,] has contact with minors is a reasonable means of ensuring that such contact remains appropriate. Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1057. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the special condition.