Opinion ID: 836476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of the standard for joinder and severance

Text: Given that Tobey and MCR 6.120 are consistent with one another, they provide a uniform standard for evaluating when joinder or severance of criminal charges is appropriate. The majority correctly notes that, in deciding whether severance is required, the threshold question must be whether the charged offenses were related. At the time of defendant's trial, MCR 6.120 defined a related offense as either the same conduct or a series of connected acts or acts constituting part of a single scheme or plan. [12] The lower courts both concluded that the offenses in this case were related under the acts constituting part of a single scheme or plan provision of MCR 6.120. The trial court ruled that the offenses were part of a single scheme or plan to commit drug trafficking. The Court of Appeals concluded that the offenses were part of a single scheme or plan to earn money by selling cocaine. [13] The majority seemingly accepts the trial court's interpretation of what may comprise a single scheme or plan, while rejecting the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the provision as too broad[ ]. [14] Yet the majority does not adopt the trial court's language that defendant had a single scheme or plan to engage in drug trafficking. Instead, it concludes, similarly, that the offenses were related because defendant had a single scheme or plan to package cocaine for distribution. [15] In doing so, the majority performs a semantic sleight of hand. It first observes that direct evidence indicated that [defendant] was engaging in the same particular conduct on those dates. [16] Thus, it purports to agree with the lower courts that defendant's conduct constituted a single scheme or plan. However, the majority actually places what it considers the same particular conduct under the guise of the single scheme or plan provision of MCR 6.120. [17] As will be discussed later, there is no basis for the majority's conclusions that defendant's offenses were related. It was not the same conduct or part of a single scheme or plan. Thus, none of the majority's analysis is tenable under the court rule or Tobey.
First, the provisions of the corresponding federal rules of criminal procedure, on which the majority relies heavily to support its holding, differ significantly from MCR 6.120. F.R. Crim. P. 8(a), which loosely tracks the definition of related offenses in MCR 6.120, defines such offenses more broadly than our court rule. [18] In addition, F.R. Crim. P. 14(a), which governs severance of unrelated offenses, is discretionary, not mandatory like MCR 6.120(B). The federal rule also authorizes the court to sever offenses only when joinder prejudices the defendant. Again, MCR 6.120 is inapposite because it requires a court to sever all unrelated offenses upon a timely motion by the defendant, without requiring a defendant to show prejudice. Second, caselaw interpreting the federal rule does not support the lower courts' interpretation of what types of conduct can be considered a single scheme or plan. For example, in United States v. Saadey , [19] on which the majority relies, the defendant was charged with, among other offenses, conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). [20] The defendant was an investigator employed by the county prosecutor. In 1994 and 1995, he participated in a case-fixing conspiracy. He argued that the counts charging him with filing false tax returns and credit applications had been improperly joined. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that joinder had been proper because all the charges filed against him stemmed from conduct that was part of his common scheme to defraud. [21] Another case that the majority relies on, United States v. Graham , [22] provides an even more compelling illustration of the connection necessary to establish a common scheme or plan. In Graham, the court upheld joinder of numerous drug and firearm charges against the defendant. However, the court based its holding on the motive underlying the defendant's perpetration of each offense, which was encapsulated in a charge of conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States. The defendant in Graham was a member of a local militia organization that planned to attack government targets. He also grew and sold marijuana, the proceeds of which he used to purchase weapons for his militia activity. Testimony at the defendant's trial established that each of the charged offenses was directly related to the larger conspiracy and underlying motive for the offenses: defendant's distrust of government and participation in the militia organization. The majority also relies on United States v. Fortenberry . [23] There, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit arson, possession of an unregistered firearm, and transportation of an undeclared firearm on a commercial airliner. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld joinder of the offenses because they involved a common plan to take revenge on persons involved in defendant's divorce and custody battle.
The underlying premise throughout these cases is that a simple string of similar offenses, in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish a single common scheme or plan. Rather, the cases cited by the majority all involve situations in which each joined offense was committed with a particular motive or goal underlying the defendant's conduct. [24] That common motive is what established the common scheme or plan and made joinder appropriate. [25] Hence, each of these cases involves situations in which the joined offenses were either planned in advance of their commission or committed to further the defendant's unified goal. This interpretation is what distinguishes acts committed as part of a single scheme or plan from acts that are of the same or similar character. [26] That these two distinct provisions are not intended to capture the same connection between offenses is evidenced by the fact that the rules in many jurisdictions include both. [27] The commentary to the revised American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice supports this interpretation. It states: [Common plan] offenses involve neither common conduct nor interrelated proof. Instead, the relationship among offenses (which can be physically and temporally remote) is dependent upon the existence of a plan that ties the offenses together and demonstrates that the objective of each offense was to contribute to the achievement of a goal not attainable by the commission of any of the individual offenses. A typical example of common plan offenses is a series of separate offenses that are committed pursuant to a conspiracy among two or more defendants. Common plan offenses may also be committed by a defendant acting alone who commits two or more offenses in order to achieve a unified goal.[ [28] ] By contrast, the commentary describing offenses of the same or similar character states, Similar character offenses normally involve the repeated commission of the same offense[,] often with the same modus operandi. [29] Michigan has not adopted the same or similar character language as part of MCR 6.120. The majority implicitly does so here by denying severance of offenses that are of the same or similar character under the misnomer of a single scheme or plan. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, defendant's acts of packaging cocaine for distribution do not meet the threshold for establishing a single scheme or plan. Unlike in Fortenberry, defendant in this case did not commit both drug offenses as part of a plan to exact revenge. Unlike in Graham, defendant's motive for committing these offenses did not stem from his participation in a militia organization based on an underlying distrust of government. In this case, there is no evidence that defendant either planned his two drug offenses in advance of their commission or that he had a unified goal for committing them. The intent to engage in drug trafficking, or earn money by selling cocaine, is the intent to engage in the conduct itself, not evidence of a unified goal motivating the commission of the offenses. [30] Labeling this conduct as a plan to package cocaine for distribution is nothing more than wordplay designed to evade this determination. Although the drug offenses in this case involve conduct of the same or similar character, this similarity is not included in the definition of related offenses in MCR 6.120. Thus, although joinder under the federal rule might be appropriate, [31] MCR 6.120 mandates severance upon the defendant's timely motion to sever.
The majority's analysis, taken to its logical conclusion, would eviscerate the mandatory severance provision in MCR 6.120 and give trial courts unfettered discretion to deny defendants' motions to sever. Defendants would never be entitled to severance of any drug offenses because such offenses could always be deemed related. Similarly, defendants charged with criminal sexual conduct offenses would never be entitled to severance; their conduct always could be deemed part of a scheme to molest victims for the defendants' sexual gratification. Such a broad construction of the joinder rules has been appropriately criticized. For example, in State v. Denton, [32] the Tennessee Supreme Court observed that [t]he argument that sex crimes can be construed as part of a continuing plan or conspiracy merely by the fact that they are committed for sexual gratification has previously been rejected. Thus, under the majority's analysis, severance of the charged offenses would be unnecessary regardless how far apart in time and space the offenses occurred or the underlying motive for them. Such outcomes arguably would be appropriate if MCR 6.120 did not require severance when the offenses are of the same or similar character. The federal rule does not require it. As noted previously, however, our rule omits such language from its definition of related offenses. Under the appropriate interpretation of MCR 6.120, defendant's actions in this case were insufficiently linked to be treated as related and part of a single scheme or plan. The Tobey Court rejected the argument that the defendant had a single scheme to make continuous sales of drugs, because the sales were not multiple acts aimed at achieving the same goal. Presumably the defendant in Tobey was just as interested in earn[ing] money from selling drugs as was defendant in this case. However, Tobey expressly rejected finding a single scheme or plan under similar circumstances. Given that Tobey and MCR 6.120 are reconcilable, there is no basis for the majority to abandon this key holding from Tobey. Finally, I note that other states with more expansive joinder and severance rules are typically far more protective of a defendant's rights in this context than the federal rule. These states also grant defendants a mandatory right to severance of multiple offenses under certain circumstances. [33] My conclusion in this case is consistent with the broad interpretation of the right to severance that courts in jurisdictions with similarly worded rules have adopted. Moreover, such an interpretation of MCR 6.120 is entirely in accord with the language of the rule and the staff comment stating that the rule is consistent with Tobey.