Opinion ID: 1191742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: repair of the elevator

Text: Tsern's final argument is that the trial court's ruling on Tsern's third-party claim against Kimball Elevator Company, that Kimball fulfilled its contract to repair the elevator to safe operating condition, is inconsistent with the court's ruling on Barton's primary claim against Tsern that Tsern failed to repair the elevator to good working order, as the lease required. Tsern's position is that Kimball could not have fulfilled its contract with Tsern without putting the elevator in good working order. The argument is correct only if the term good working order in the lease means the same as the term safe operating condition in Kimball's contract to repair. The two phrases are not recognized terms of art; they have no readily understood meaning outside of the contracts in which Tsern inserted them. Accordingly, the trial court's decision must be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). This imposes a heavy burden on the party bringing the appeal. To mount a successful challenge to the correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings even in viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989). Tsern has in no way met this burden. After Tsern contracted with Kimball Elevator, Kimball, pursuant to Tsern's express verbal instruction, did the barest minimum to make the elevator run up and down. Kimball informed Tsern that some eight additional repairs should be made and that installation of a new elevator was advisable. Tsern refused to authorize Kimball to make the necessary repairs and informed Kimball not to call for an inspection of the elevator by a state inspector and not to inform Barton of Kimball's recommended additional repairs. Thus, Kimball did what Tsern directed and nothing more because Tsern was unwilling to stand the expense of those additional repairs. Brent Russon of Kimball testified that completion of repairs authorized by Tsern made the elevator safe and operable for the time being. [5] Kimball emphasized on several occasions that the repair work it was allowed to do was the bare minimum. Kimball, of course, complied with Tsern's demand that the cost of the repairs not exceed $5,000. Kimball made clear that additional repairs were necessary if Tsern expected the elevator to pass inspection. Tsern refused to agree to the additional repairs and accepted that the elevator would not pass inspection. In contrast to his contract with Kimball, Tsern's agreement with Barton required that the elevator be in good working order. Relying on the testimony of Joseph Nicksic, the senior elevator inspector for the State of Utah, the trial court found that [w]hile `good working order' is not the same as `up to code,' it encompasses and mandates more than mere function of the elevator. The mere function of the elevator was all Tsern expected from Kimball. In inspecting the elevator, the state inspector found nine violations of the state code. On the basis of these violations, he shut down the elevator and prohibited anyone from operating it. The defects resulting in those violations would have been repaired had Tsern been willing to spend the money that was required. After two days of testimony, the trial court concluded that Kimball had fulfilled its contract and that Tsern had not complied with its covenant to provide an elevator in good working order. We are not at liberty to reject the trial court's rulings only on the basis of an unsubstantiated intuitive belief that the finding is inaccurate. The trial court's holding may also be affirmed on somewhat different grounds. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 & n. 2 (Utah 1988); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982). A more detailed inquiry into the nature of the contractual relationship between Kimball and Tsern shows that the contract that Tsern and Kimball signed for repair of the elevator was substantially modified by explicit directions that Tsern gave to Kimball not to make a number of repairs that Kimball knew were necessary to pass inspection and make the elevator safe. [6] The contract itself was a time and materials contract, and Tsern required that he give specific authorization for all work costing more than $5,000. The written contract provided for Kimball to undertake at least eight specified repairs, and the work was to pass a state inspection. Once Kimball's repairman began to work on the elevator, Kimball came to realize the extreme state of the elevator's disrepair. Kimball informed Tsern of additional necessary repairs, but Tsern refused to spend more than $5,000 and would not pay the additional funds for specified repairs. In short, Tsern ordered Kimball to limit the work only to what was needed to make the elevator run up and down; he indicated that he no longer wished the elevator to be inspected and indeed told Kimball not to tell that to Barton. By changing the terms of the service contract, Tsern and Kimball altered the contract itself and the term that it had employed  safe operating condition  became meaningless. Kimball made only those repairs specified by Tsern because Tsern would pay for nothing else. Thus, Kimball's obligations under its altered agreement with Tsern were considerably less than Tsern's obligation to repair the elevator to good working order pursuant to its contract with Barton.