Opinion ID: 1834950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: was it error to deny wilson a manslaughter instruction?

Text: Wilson argues that he should have been granted an instruction that would have informed the jury that the murder was without malice and done in the heat of passion. The trial court refused that request on the grounds that the record contained no evidence from which the jury could determine that Mrs. Im's death resulted from heat of passion and not the result of malice. This refusal to grant the manslaughter instruction was based upon the trial judge's interpretation of Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 801-02 (Miss. 1984), where we unequivocally said: The manslaughter instruction was correctly refused because a manslaughter verdict could not on these facts have been reached solely by the jury's disbelieving a portion of the State's case. The jury could only have returned a verdict of manslaughter by finding affirmatively that Fairchild acted without malice aforethought and in the heat of passion, matters with respect to which there was no evidentiary basis in the record. Such matters may not be inferred. Wilson argues that the jury was prevented from considering the manslaughter issue because he could not negate the presumption that the killing, having been done with a deadly weapon, was committed with malice. But in explaining its rationale for denying the manslaughter instruction, the trial judge said: In Fairchild the decision was that where a deadly weapon is used, malice is implied and in order to overcome that, there must be some evidence in the record from which the jury could determine that it was not a result of malice, but a result of the heat of passion. There's no evidence in the record in this case ... following the dictates of Fairchild, it would seem that the manslaughter instruction should not be available since there is no evidence to overcome the implied malice from the use of a deadly weapon. You don't get a manslaughter instruction unless there's some evidence that would support it, that there was some evidence that it was something other than malicious. That's what Fairchild stands for. It only stands for the proposition that you can't give an instruction unless there's some evidence to support it. And where there is no evidence to support anything  where there is evidence of malice arising out of the use of a deadly weapon, there has to be some circumstance that would allow the jury to infer there was something other than malice and there's no circumstance here. In Lambert v. State, 462 So.2d 308, 315 (Miss. 1984), quoting from Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1255 (Miss. 1976), we said: ... when warranted by the evidence, the trial court may instruct the jury with reference to lesser included offenses. However, such an instruction should not be indiscriminately or automatically given, as was condemned in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3007, 49 L.Ed.2d 974, 982 (1976). In Swanier v. State, 473 So.2d 180, 188 (Miss. 1985), we said: ... [T]here was no evidence which would support the giving of a manslaughter instruction. The state's evidence showed a robbery and repeated stab wounds to the victim. The victim was forced to remove cash both from a cash register and a floor safe. His jugular vein was slashed and he was also stabbed in the back. Under the defendant's version of the events, he had nothing to do with the stabbing of the victim. Therefore, there was no evidence warranting a manslaughter instruction. In Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 354 (Miss. 1988), cert. granted, vacated on other grounds, Pinkney v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990), the defendant argued that he was entitled to a manslaughter instruction. In upholding the trial court's denial of such an instruction, we said, This case is different. Pinkney's requested manslaughter instruction was completely at odds with his testimony that he never went to Hickman's house and did not even know where she lived. The evidence on this record did not entitle Pinkney to a manslaughter instruction. Wilson's argument, that Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), serves as authority that he was entitled to a manslaughter instruction, has already been faced by this Court and rejected in Lanier v. State, 450 So.2d 69, 79 (Miss. 1984), where we held that Beck: [U]nequivocally hold[s] that a manslaughter instruction is proper and essential `when the evidence warrants.' This, of course, accords with this Court's holding in Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1255 (Miss. 1976), where we held that instructions on a lesser included offense, `should only be given after the trial court has carefully considered the evidence and is of the opinion that such an instruction is justified by the evidence.' (citations omitted.) In Fairchild, 459 So.2d at 802, this Court said that [m]alice or intent ... may be proved or inferred from the use of a deadly weapon. Wilson maintains that this constitutes a presumption of guilt which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1892, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, 522 (1975). Mullaney held that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case.  In that case, the defendant stated that he killed the victim in a frenzy provoked by [the victim's] homosexual advance. 421 U.S. at 685, 95 S.Ct. at 1883, 44 L.Ed.2d at 511. Alternatively, that defendant asserted that, at the most, the homicide was manslaughter since it occurred in the heat of passion provoked by the homosexual assault. Because Wilson failed to properly present evidence to raise the manslaughter issue, the current case is distinguishable from Mullaney. Quite simply, Mullaney clearly fails to support Wilson's position. Absolutely no evidence has been injected into this record which would change the character of this killing so that a reasonable jury might find that it was manslaughter. Fairchild, 459 So.2d at 802. Wilson was not entitled to a manslaughter instruction and this assignment of error is without merit.