Opinion ID: 757749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Downward Departure Based on Government Misconduct

Text: 124 Nolan-Cooper argued to the district court at sentencing that a downward departure was warranted in this case because the government's misconduct (i.e. Agent Oubre's cultivation and consummation of a sexual relationship) during the investigation was sufficiently unusual to take this case outside the heartland of the applicable guidelines. The district court rejected this argument and denied her motion for a departure, stating: 125 The Court has already concluded that Ms. Nolan-Cooper was not induced to commit or enlarge the crime as a result of Agent Oubre's engaging in sexual relations with her. In fact, all counts against Ms. Nolan-Cooper that stemmed from actions taken by her after the incident are to be dismissed by the government at sentencing, pursuant to the plea agreement. To base a downward departure on the defendant's reasoning would result in a sentencing windfall to the defendant for no logical or policy rationale. 126 Therefore, the Court concludes that Ms. Nolan-Cooper should be sentenced in accordance with the crime to which she has pled guilty. None of the purposes of the current sentencing scheme would be served by this departure. Absent a due process violation or a showing that the government misconduct enlarged the scope or scale of a crime, and resulted in an increased sentence, a departure is not warranted. 127 Att. at 80. According to Nolan-Cooper, this denial was premised on the court's conclusion that the government's misconduct provided a legally insufficient basis for a downward departure. The government contends that the court did not rule on legal grounds, but instead properly considered Nolan-Cooper's departure argument, and, based on the facts, ruled in its discretion that a departure was not warranted. 128 The first paragraph of the district court's statement, rescribed above, lends credence to the government's argument that the court made a discretionary decision based on facts found after extensive hearings, while the second paragraph strongly supports Nolan-Cooper's position. We lack jurisdiction to review a district court's refusal to depart downward when, aware that it has the authority to depart, it nonetheless determines that a departure is not warranted, see United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir.1997) (citing United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 729 (3d Cir.1996), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2413, 138 L.Ed.2d 178 (1997)), and thus if the government is correct we would have no jurisdiction to consider Nolan-Cooper's departure arguments on appeal. It appears to us, however, more plausible that the district court believed that it was legally precluded from departing in the present circumstances. 129 Since we have concluded that the government's violation of the plea agreement requires vacatur of Nolan-Cooper's entire sentence and a remand for resentencing before a different judge of the district court, we need not definitively decide this issue. However, if the court did hold--and it appears that it did--that it was precluded from departing, we believe that such a holding would be in error. Since we presume that Nolan-Cooper will move for a departure on the same grounds at her resentencing, we think it appropriate for us to discuss the merits of Nolan-Cooper's departure claim for the guidance of the district court on remand. 130 The question on the merits can be easily restated. The district court held that a departure would not be warranted absent a due process violation or a showing that the government misconduct enlarged the scope or scale of the crime. In effect, we understand the latter clause to mean that a departure would not be warranted unless the government's misconduct was related to the guilt of the defendant. This formulation presents the legal question whether potential departures based on improper investigative techniques that are unrelated (or only tangentially related) to the defendant's guilt should be categorically excluded under the applicable Supreme Court standards. 131 The now-familiar framework for analyzing the legal propriety of downward departure decisions was established by the Supreme Court in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). In Koon, the Court identified the three basic categories of departure factors set forth in the Guidelines: those that are encouraged, those that are discouraged, and those that are forbidden. See id. at 95-96, 116 S.Ct. 2035. If a particular factor is not mentioned in the Guidelines, however, that does not mean that a departure based on that factor is precluded. To the contrary, Koon states that a federal court's examination of whether a factor can ever be an appropriate basis for departure is limited to determining whether the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter, consideration of the factor. 518 U.S. at 109, 116 S.Ct. 2035. 132 As the Second Circuit has held, absent express prohibition by the Commission, a sentencing court is free to consider, in an unusual case, whether or not the factors that make it unusual ... are present in sufficient kind or degree to warrant a departure. United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied sub nom. Reyes v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 735, 139 L.Ed.2d 672 (1998)). This would appear to prohibit courts from categorically excluding any departure factor not expressly prohibited by the Guidelines. See United States v. Mendoza, 121 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir.1997) (We are not at liberty, after Koon, to create additional categories of factors that we deem inappropriate as grounds for departure in every circumstance.); Core, 125 F.3d at 76-77; United States v. Brock, 108 F.3d 31, 34 (4th Cir.1997). 133 The factors categorically excluded by the Guidelines are few. They include: race, sex, national origin, creed, religion and socio-economic status, see U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10; lack of guidance as a youth, see § 5H1.12; drug or alcohol dependency, see § 5H1.4; and economic hardship, see § 5K2.12. Notably, this list does not include government investigatory misconduct. Thus, applying the Koon-based analysis employed by the Mendoza and Core courts, we would reach the conclusion that departures based on investigative misconduct unrelated (or only tangentially related) to the guilt of the defendant are not expressly precluded from consideration for departure by the Guidelines, and should not be categorically proscribed. 12 Therefore, the district court's apparent holding that it was precluded from departing here would be in error. 13 134 For a departure based on a factor unmentioned in the Guidelines (such as improper investigatory techniques) to be permitted, however, it must comply with U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. Under that section, a sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds 'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.'  U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (policy statement). Koon instructs that, in order to determine whether a departure shall be permitted under § 5K2.0, courts must, after considering the structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole, ... decide whether it [the departure factor] is sufficient to take the case out of the Guidelines' heartland. 518 U.S. at 96, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (citations omitted). Moreover, Koon states that, in conducting this heartland analysis, we must bear in mind the Commission's expectation that departures based on grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be 'highly infrequent.'  Id. Nolan-Cooper contends that various aspects of the misconduct by the government agents detailed above take this case out of the heartland. Primarily, she contends that Agent Oubre's manipulation of her romantic and sexual life constitutes an unprecedented invasion well-beyond the manipulation and trickery that the typical subject of a sting operation must endure. If Nolan-Cooper renews her motion for a downward departure on this basis on remand, the district court will have to decide whether the misconduct found here is sufficient to take this case outside the Guidelines' heartland. 14