Opinion ID: 210758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to a Hearing on USERRA Claim

Text: 110 The lead opinion holds that section 4324(c)(1) unambiguously requires the Board to provide Kirkendall a hearing on his USERRA claim. 7 I do not agree with the interpretation of the statute reached in the lead opinion. Rather, I conclude that the Board's own regulations, rather than anything in USERRA, provide Kirkendall with the right to a hearing under section 7701 of Title 5. It is for this reason that I concur only in the result with respect to Part II of the lead opinion.
Section 4324(c)(1) provides in full: 111 The Merit Systems Protection Board shall adjudicate any complaint brought before the Board pursuant to subsection (a)(2)(A) or (b), without regard as to whether the complaint accrued before, on, or after October 13, 1994. A person who seeks a hearing or adjudication by submitting such a complaint under this paragraph may be represented at such hearing or adjudication in accordance with the rules of the Board. 112 38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). The plurality relies heavily on the language that that Board shall adjudicate any complaint brought before [it]. Maj. op. at 844 (quoting section 4324(c)(1)). Nothing in the statute requires that adjudication automatically include a hearing. In fact, the word adjudication is used disjunctively from the term hearing and indicates that they have different meanings. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 2739. The plurality believes that any interpretation of the statute that does not confer the right to a hearing renders the at such hearing language of the statute nonsensical. Maj. op. at 844. To reach this conclusion the plurality ignores the words of the statute, which permit representation in the court of such hearing or adjudication.  38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(1) (emphasis added). The statute only requires: (1) retroactivity; and (2) that a person be entitled to representation when the Board hears or adjudicates their USERRA claims. Id. This statute cannot reasonably be read to mandate a right to a hearing on all USERRA claims. 113 Even if section 4324(c)(1) were ambiguous, which it is not, the legislative history demonstrates that during the enactment of this section changes were made to the statutory language to address concerns regarding whether the Office of Special Counsel would be required to represent USERRA claimants or how representation would be made available. See, e.g., JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ON H.R. 955, 140 CONG. REC. H 9136 (1994) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2493, 2509-10 (explaining the adoption of the Senate proposal that an individual would be able to be represented before the MSPB by a representative of choice); S. REP. No. 103-158, at 37 (1993) (stating that USERRA would [e]nable Federal executive agency employees . . . to receive representation by the Office of Special Counsel before the MSPB and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). I have found nothing in the legislative history that suggests that Congress intended section 4324(c)(1) to mandate that the Board provide a hearing to all USERRA claimants. In fact, the legislative history, as reflected in the statute, indicates that the Board would be free to promulgate rules to govern the USERRA claims process. See 38 U.S.C. § 4331(2)(A) (2000); S. REP. No. 103-158, at 75 (1993) (Although [the Board] may have authority under title 5, United States Code, to prescribe necessary regulations, explicit inclusion of that authority in chapter 43 of title 38 would remove any doubt on this matter.); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1) (2000) (amended with enactment of USERRA to permit the Board to hear, adjudicate, or provide for the hearing or adjudication, of all matters within the jurisdiction of the Board under . . . [USERRA], or any other law, rule, or regulation . . . (emphasis added)). 114 Although the plurality determines that the statutory language unambiguously requires a hearing, the majority also relies on Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285, 66 S.Ct. 1105 and King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215, 220 n. 9, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991), to conclude that it is abundantly clear that Congress' intent is to provide veterans a hearing upon request, especially because we resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of the veteran. Maj. op. at 845-46. The statute is unambiguous and, in my opinion, does not convey an automatic right to a hearing.
115 Although I do not believe section 4324 conveys a right to a hearing in every case, I do conclude Kirkendall is entitled to a hearing based on the Board's regulations. Section 7701 of Title 5 of the United States Code applies to appeals to the Board under any law, rule, or regulation. See also 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1) (2000) (giving the Board authority to hear or adjudicate any matter brought within its jurisdiction by any . . . rule, or regulation). The plain import of this language permits appeals to lie with the Board not only under laws, but also under rules and regulations. Here, the Board has promulgated regulations that invoke section 7701 by repeatedly defining USERRA claims as appeals and by placing these claims within its appellate jurisdiction. 8 See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.3(b)(1), 1208.4(a), 1208.13. The Board's regulations clearly define USERRA claims to be within the Board's appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(b)(1); Petersen v. Dep't of the Interior, 71 M.S.P.R. 227, 234 (1996) (stating that both the language and legislative history of USERRA make it evident that all cases under USERRA brought by the individual appellants fall within the Board's appellate jurisdiction). The Board's intent when it enacted the rules enabling USERRA was clear: USERRA actions are appeals. See 65 Fed. Reg. 49,895 (Aug. 16, 2000) (notice of final rulemaking for subpart 1208 referring to USERRA claims as appeals); 65 Fed. Reg. 5,409 (Feb. 4, 2000) (addressing new subpart 1208 and continuing to refer to USERRA claims as appeals); 62 Fed. Reg. 66,813 (Dec. 22, 1997) (stating that USERRA provides federal employees expanded rights including a new statutory right to appeal a USERRA violation to the MSPB). Given that the Board treats USERRA proceedings as appeals, USERRA proceedings are subject to the procedures specified in section 7701 and Kirkendall had a right to a hearing. 9 Notes: 1 Because I conclude that the 15-day deadline is not subject to equitable tolling, I need not reach the question of whether the 60-day deadline may be equitably tolled 2 Appellant proffered this language to the court during oral argument, but could point to no statute in which Congress used this language 3 Although Bailey has been cited in cases wording the applicable doctrine as equitable tolling, this does not change the limited nature of the holding in Bailey. For example, in Lampf, the petitioner's arguments were directed to whether fraud should equitably relax the deadline at issue. 501 U.S. at 363, 111 S.Ct. 2773 (Thus, this Court has said that in the usual case, `where the `party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.') Read in context, the Supreme Court's citation of Bailey in Lampf makes sense. Therefore, I do not read the Supreme Court's decisions as interjecting Bailey 's fraudulent concealment doctrine into all equitable tolling cases where fraud is not at issue. 4 The majority suggests that the short 15-day time period favors tolling, relying on the three—and twelve-year periods of Lampf and Beggerly. Maj. op. at 841. The statutes at issue there, however, were limitation periods for bringing actions, rather than time for review provisions, as in this case. This distinction is an important one. There is clearly an interest in expeditious resolution of employment disputes once in progress, thereby justifying much shorter time limits. 5 To the extent that Bailey is read as permitting equitable tolling even where a statute is decisively mandatory and jurisdictional it would seem inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45, 110 S.Ct. 1651, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995); see also Neverson v. Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32, 40 n. 8 (1st Cir.2004) ([I]t may be that when a time limit is phrased in jurisdictional terms, the Irwin presumption is rebutted; the Supreme Court after Irwin has continued to characterize `jurisdictional' time limits as ineligible for equitable tolling.). If Stone and Jenkins are interpreted as prohibiting equitable tolling of statutory time limits that are mandatory and jurisdictional, equitable tolling would not be permitted in this case because section 3330a(d)(1) is the sole statutory section providing an individual the ability to appeal a VEOA violation to the board. 6 For example, had Congress said equitable tolling shall not apply, would the majority still suggest that because they did not say it twice or allow exceptions, tolling is permitted? 7 Notably, no party or amici at any time during any of the proceedings before this court suggested that section 4324(c)(1) provides an automatic right to a hearing as the majority holds 8 In fact, the Board's regulations refer to USERRA actions as appeals 29 times and the person bringing the action before the Board as the appellant 28 times 9 The Board interpreted 5 C.F.R. § 1208.13 as permitting it to exercise discretion on whether or not Kirkendall was entitled to a hearing Kirkendall v. Dep't of the Army, AT-343-02-0622-B-1, AT-0330-02-0621-B-1 at 6 n. 3. Because the Board has consistently treated USERRA actions as appeals, its interpretation of 5 C.F.R. § 1208.13 as giving it discretion to grant a hearing in a USERRA action is improper and inconsistent with the body of its regulations. 116