Opinion ID: 885241
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Heading: Livestock owner's common law duty to highway users

Text: ถ 86 Seemingly at odds with the historical common law trespass rule โ that an owner of livestock is strictly liable for damages caused to another landowner โ is the companion historical common law rule that on a highway, an animal is not a trespasser, and therefore there is no strict liability for any harm which it may cause to other highway users. Under the common law, as expressed by the House of Lords in a comprehensive 1947 decision: An underlying principle of the law of the highway is that all those lawfully using the highway, or land adjacent to it, must show mutual respect and forbearance. The motorists must put up with the farmer's cattle: the farmer must endure the motorist. Searle v. Wallbank [1947] 1 L.R.App.Cas. 341, 361 (L. du Parcq, concurring). See also Andes, 56 Mont.L.Rev. at 492 (discussing public ways exception); Prosser & Keeton, ง 76 (stating that on the highway itself, even an escaped animal is not a trespasser, and there is no strict liability for any harm which it may do upon that basis); Kendall v. Curl (1960), 222 Or. 329, 353 P.2d 227, 230 (citing Searle ). The common law exception to this rule involved cases only where the animal was known by the owner to have a dangerous propensity or trait that was not characteristic of a domestic animal of like kind. See Prosser & Keeton, ง 76. ถ 87 Thus, at common law, on the one hand a livestock owner may have a legal duty to restrain his livestock to prevent harm to his neighbor's crops, but has no similar duty to restrain his livestock to prevent them from using a highway โ even though the animal may have escaped the very restraint intended to prevent harm to the neighbor. This apparent contradiction is reconciled by the historical context of the common law as it developed: neither cost-efficient fencing such as barbed wire, nor motor vehicles were a feature of rural England prior to the 20th century. The rural road system, in fact, developed in correlation to markets where livestock were routinely herded, and a rural traveler's common mode of transportation was either on foot or by horse. See generally Searle, 1 L.R.App.Cas. at 345-353. ถ 88 The foregoing mutual respect and forbearance rule of common law was never codified in Montana under its open range doctrine statutes, nor has it been expressed, or referenced to, or in any clear manner discussed by our Legislature or this Court in the context of the legal relationship and duties between livestock owners and motorists on Montana highways. ถ 89 In contrast, other western states' legislatures have clearly adopted and incorporated this common law rule into their respective open range doctrines. See Idaho Code ง 25-2118 (stating that [n]o person owning, or controlling the possession of, any domestic animal running on open range, shall have the duty to keep such animal off any highway on such range, and shall not be liable for damage to any vehicle or for injury to any person riding therein, caused by a collision between the vehicle and the animal); Nev.Rev.Stat. ง 568.360(1) (stating that [n]o person, firm or corporation owning, controlling or in possession of any domestic animal running on open range has the duty to keep the animal off any highway traversing or located on the open range, and no such person, firm or corporation is liable for damages to any property or for injury to any person caused by any collision between a motor vehicle and the animal occurring on such a highway); N.M.State. Ann. ง 66-7-363(C) (providing that [o]wners of livestock ranging in pastures through which unfenced roads or highways pass shall not be liable for damages by reason of injury or damage to persons or property occasioned by collisions of vehicles using said roads and highways and livestock or animals ranging in said pastures unless such owner of livestock is guilty of specific negligence other than allowing his animals to range in said pasture). ถ 90 Our Legislature, meanwhile, has only incidentally modified the concept of the common law public way rule by restricting certain kinds of animals from running at large in certain areas that include highways, and from restricting animals from certain kinds of highways. Thus, we have no express statutory affirmation or modification or complete abrogation of the common law rule governing the legal relationship between livestock owners and motorists as equal, lawful users of highways in Montana. ถ 91 As previously addressed, in Montana, pursuant to ง 1-1-108, MCA, where the law is not declared by statute, the common law shall be the law and rule of the decision. We have also held that the term common law also means that body of jurisprudence as applied and modified by the courts of this country up to the time it became a rule of decision in this commonwealth. Aetna Accident & Liab. Co. v. Miller (1918), 54 Mont. 377, 382, 170 P. 760. Furthermore, in Nehring v. LaCounte, (1986), 219 Mont. 462, 712 P.2d 1329, we declared that where [c]urrent conditions in Montana are such that the literal application of the common law rule has become unjust, we may judicially adopt a standard against which negligence or due care can be measured. See Nehring, 219 Mont. at 469, 712 P.2d at 1334 (citing statutory maxim under ง 1-3-201, MCA, that [w]hen the reasons of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself). ถ 92 Thus, we first turn to ง 27-1-701, MCA, encoded in 1895, which provides the general standard against which negligence or due care can be measured: Except as otherwise provided by law, everyone is responsible not only for the results of his willful acts but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person except so far as the latter has willfully or by want of ordinary care brought the injury upon himself. Further, our Legislature (also in 1895) has provided that [e]very person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or property of another or infringing upon any of his rights. See ง 28-1-201, MCA. In the absence of an express statute, it is from these foregoing general rules that the duty in this instant case must be derived. ถ 93 With these general principles in mind, we next observe that we need not judicially adopt an entirely new standard to meet the current conditions. Rather, our case law already provides that where two parties have an equal right to use a public highway, each must use it so as not to injuriously interfere with the other's right, and each must exercise a degree of care commensurate with the danger of the agency that he himself is using. See Franck v. Hudson (1962), 140 Mont. 480, 484-85, 373 P.2d 951, 953; Sztaba v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1966), 147 Mont. 185, 197, 411 P.2d 379, 386, overruled in party by Kyriss v. State (1985), 218 Mont. 162, 707 P.2d 5; Hightower v. Alley (1957), 132 Mont. 349, 355, 318 P.2d 243, 247; Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmers' Co. (1934), 98 Mont. 48, 64, 37 P.2d 1025, 1029-30. See also ง 1-3-205, MCA (stating maxim that one must so use his own rights as not to infringe upon the rights of another). ถ 94 The roots of the foregoing rule in Montana can be traced to the mid 1800s common law in this country that existed at the time Montana became a Territory. See, e.g., Warner v. New York Cent. R.R. Co. (N.Y.Sup.1866), 45 Barb. 299, rev'd on other grounds (1871), 44 N.Y. 465 (stating that [i]t is not a question of superior, or subordinate right, in passing, which arises in an action for damages occasioned by a collision between a locomotive on the railroad and a vehicle upon the highway, but a question merely of the exercise of suitable caution and prudence, by either party in the exercise of a common and equal right ); Bradley v. Boston & M.R. Co. (1848), 56 Mass. 539, 2 Cush. 539 (concluding that the defendants had a right to run their engines on the road at all times, for all suitable and proper purposes, using proper care not to interfere with the equal right of travelers to use the road crossed); Potter v. Pettis (R.I.1853), 2 R.I. 483 (concluding that the plaintiff and defendant had each an equal right to the river as a navigable highway, and when one was in the lawful use of it, the other should have yielded). ถ 95 In Franck, a case involving a collision between a plaintiff's logging truck and a defendant's cattle, this Court approved of a jury instruction which provided that [w]here two parties have an equal right to use a public highway, each must use it so as not to injuriously interfere with the other's right, and each must exercise a degree of care commensurate with the danger of the agency that he himself is using. Franck, 140 Mont. at 484-85, 373 P.2d at 953 (concluding that instructions taken as a whole ... adequately state the applicable law). In Sztaba we concluded that [b]oth the railroad and the motoring public have an equal right to the use of a crossing. Sztaba, 147 Mont. at 197, 411 P.2d at 386. In Hightower, we likewise concluded that in Montana, a pedestrian and a motorist have equal rights in the use of a public highway. Hightower, 132 Mont. at 355, 318 P.2d at 247 (stating that a pedestrian must use ordinary care for his own safety). Finally, in Fulton, we stated that this rule applies to all other persons lawfully using the highway. Fulton, 98 Mont. at 64, 37 P.2d at 1030 (stating that the driver of an automobile certainly, in case of a breakdown, a collision, or other accident, if he exercises reasonable care, may use the highway for the purpose of inspection, or repair in case his car is unable to proceed, or may render assistance to another on the highway). ถ 96 Thus, because both a livestock owner and a motorist may have an equal right to lawfully occupy a highway in an open range area, or, to a limited extent, within a herd district under ง 81-4-306, MCA, or designated state highway under ง 60-7-201, MCA, we hold that both owe each other a legal duty to use such roads so as not to injuriously interfere with the other's right of use. Accordingly, ascertaining the precise standard of care each owes the other is a fact-driven question that must be viewed in light of the circumstances under which the harm occurs. See Lopez v. Great Falls Pre Release Services, Inc., 1999 MT 199, ถ ถ 27-28, 295 Mont. 416, ถ ถ 27-28, 986 P.2d 1081, ถ ถ 27-28; Ambrogini, 197 Mont. at 120, 642 P.2d at 1019 (stating that reasonableness of livestock owner was for jury to decide). ถ 97 Obviously, in Montana such a determination involves a broad spectrum of circumstances. As observed by amici, open range encompasses remote, seldom traveled unpaved highways where no fences at all restrain livestock, as well as heavily fenced areas traversed by high levels of traffic on paved roads near dense population centers where livestock customarily have no cause to be herded or otherwise occupy the highway for the purpose of grazing or seeking water. ถ 98 Accordingly, the duty owed to motorists by an owner of a black Angus bull, which is standing in the middle of a highway at night in harm's way, conceivably may be no different than that owed by an owner of a vehicle who permits his or her vehicle to remain in harm's way in the middle of the same highway, under the same circumstances. In both instances, each has a legal right to use the highway. Yet both must act in a reasonable manner under the circumstances, and failure to do so may constitute negligence on his or her part. See, e.g., Morton v. Mooney (1934), 97 Mont. 1, 8, 33 P.2d 262, 264 (stating that if a car becomes disabled, the motorist should employ due diligence to remove it from the highway within a reasonable time, but, in the absence of any showing of lack of diligence, the mere fact that a disabled car is standing on the highway does not constitute actionable negligence). See also Carrow v. Lusby (1990), 167 Ariz. 18, 804 P.2d 747, 754 (applying duty of ordinary care to livestock owners and stating that in open range territory, the mere failure to prevent one's cattle from entering the highway, by erecting fences or otherwise, does not constitute conduct falling below the standard of care required of livestock owners); Shively v. Dye Creek Cattle Co. (1994), 29 Cal.App.4th 1620, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 244 (applying duty of ordinary care to livestock owners and stating that against the backdrop of the `open range' law, the duty of ordinary care in this context does not contemplate extreme preventive measures). ถ 99 In accordance with the foregoing we now turn, at last, to the issues raised by the parties.