Opinion ID: 2498646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Restriction of Heavey Testimony

Text: Landowner also argues that the district judge placed improper restrictions on the testimony of its valuation expert, Heavey. In its initial and supplemental motions in limine, the City asked the trial judge to prohibit Heavey's testimony regarding the value of Manhattan Meats or Rainbo Bread, any proposed multi-use shopping/marketplace/dining development, the fair market value of the subject property, the replacement cost method of appraisal, and depreciation. The trial judge ruled that the opinions of Heavey were admissible as to the cost of the replacement of the existing buildings and land within the subject tract. In other words, Heavey was not prevented from testifying. To the extent his testimony was restricted at all, it was cabined only by the limitation of the entire action to jury determination of fair market value. See Miller v. Bartle, 283 Kan. 108, 114, 150 P.3d 1282 (quoting Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan. 33, 37-38, 325 P.2d 338 [1958]) (sole issue in eminent domain proceeding is amount of compensation due). Heavey was free to give his replacement cost-based opinion on fair market value, including components such as the values of the Rainbo Bread and Manhattan Meats improvements and depreciation. The record reflects that Heavey attended the trial, but landowner chose not to call him to testify. Instead, landowner attempted unsuccessfully during Saroff's testimony to introduce an appraisal prepared by Heavey using Larva's estimate for the replacement meat processing plant. The record does not explain why landowner made this tactical decision or why, when it was clear it had failed, it did not jettison the tactic for the more conventional and probably more successful sponsorship of Heavey's direct testimony live. Landowner is correct that our precedent has held that an expert in an eminent domain trial may testify to hearsay matters for the purpose of giving information upon which he or she relied in reaching a valuation conclusion. See City of Wichita v. Eisenring, 269 Kan. at 781-82, 7 P.3d 1248 ([T]he hearsay rule's application is limited with regard to expert testimony in eminent domain cases. . . . `Information acquired from others, though generally not admissible as an independent fact, may be sufficient to qualify an expert and to supply a partial basis for his opinion.'); Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 250 Kan. at 96, 825 P.2d 130 ([O]nce a witness has qualified as an expert, a court cannot regulate the factors used or the mental process by which the witness arrives at the conclusion. These matters can only be challenged by cross-examination testing the witness' credibility.). But this argument misses the source of any problem on Heavey's testimony. The problem was not that the trial judge disallowed appropriate opinions and support for them. The problem was that landowner did not call Heavey to the stand. Error, if any, must be laid at landowner's feet. See State v. Murray, 285 Kan. 503, 522, 174 P.3d 407 (2008) (invited error no basis for relief).