Opinion ID: 764845
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability of the Municipality

Text: 49 As a rule, local governments may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by employees or agents under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. Id. at 694. A municipality can therefore be held liable when it unconstitutionally implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted by that body's officers. Id. at 690. Whether a governmental official is vested with the authority to make official policy is a question of state law. Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). The trial judge's task is to identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue. Id. It is then for the jury to determine whether their decisions have caused a deprivation of rights. Id. 50 Municipalities that meet the requirements of Ohio Rev.Code § 1905.01 are authorized to convene mayor's courts. The statute does not, however, require a municipal corporation or its mayor to establish or maintain a mayor's court. State ex rel. Boston Heights v. Petsche, 27 Ohio App.3d 106, 499 N.E.2d 1250, syllabus p 2 (1985). In State ex rel. Boston Heights v. Petsche, after holding court for almost one year, the Mayor of Boston Heights, Ohio announced his decision to shut down the mayor's court. Petsche, 27 Ohio App.3d at 106, 499 N.E.2d at 1250. In response, the village council passed an ordinance requiring the mayor to preside over the mayor's court and to exercise his statutorily conferred jurisdiction. After the Mayor steadfastly refused to hear any cases, the village brought a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel him to abide by the ordinance. The Court of Appeals of Ohio for Summit County denied the writ on grounds the state statute authorizing mayor's courts merely conferred jurisdiction and did not mandate mayor's courts. Also, because the exclusive power to create courts inferior to the Supreme Court of Ohio is vested in the General Assembly, the court concluded that villages cannot create a mayor's court by local ordinance and thereby force their mayors to hold mayor's court. Id., 499 N.E.2d at 1251. 51 In this case, the Mayor of Macedonia is undeniably vested with the authority to make official policy regarding whether to hold and how to structure a mayor's court. Jurisdiction to hold mayor's court is conferred upon the Mayor of Macedonia under Ohio Rev.Code § 1905.01. The City's charter confirms that [t]he Mayor may in his discretion hold Mayor's Court, pursuant to the Statutes of the State of Ohio. Charter § 5.01 (emphasis added). Thus the mayor speaks with final policymaking authority for the City of Macedonia concerning the functioning of the Mayor's Court. Defendants contend that the City should not be liable for actions of the Mayor [w]hile acting in his judicial capacity. Brief of Defendants-Appellees, at 20. Although the Mayor acted in his judicial capacity as a trier of fact and interpreter of existing law while presiding over plaintiff's trial, we do not agree that his judicial role encompassed the discretionary decision whether to operate a mayor's court and whether to appoint a magistrate to hear its cases. A mayor's decision whether to hold a mayor's court at all, and if so, whether to preside over it one's self, appoint a magistrate, or perhaps do both, are policy decisions addressing the administration of the municipality. We therefore hold that the City of Macedonia is not immune from liability for plaintiff's deprivation of due process. 52