Opinion ID: 2509094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intended Scope of Amended Statute

Text: Both sides had assumed throughout these proceedings, including in their briefs on the merits in this court, that the challenged amendments were intended to affect any section 777 proceeding held after the voters approved Proposition 21 on March 7, 2000. However, after we requested supplemental briefs on this threshold statutory question, petitioners argued for the first time that such provisions were not meant to apply here. Insofar as an initiative statute takes effect the day after the election unless the measure provides otherwise (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a)), petitioners suggest the operative event is the section 602 offense triggering the juvenile court's jurisdiction, not the section 777 proceeding in which Proposition 21's new rules would otherwise apply. Since their section 602 crimes occurred before March 8, 2000, petitioners insist pre-Proposition 21 law dictates how their post-Proposition 21 probation violations should be litigated. The statutory language belies this claim. (See Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 900-901, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951 [general rules of statutory construction govern initiatives like Prop. 21]; People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 231, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 205, 980 P.2d 912 [statute's plain meaning controls].) In making procedural changes to juvenile probation violation proceedings, Proposition 21 did not amend section 777 to state that the original section 602 offense must occur on or after March 8, 2000 in order for the changes to apply. By its own terms, section 777(a)(2) broadly applies where the person is a court ward or probationer under Section 602 in the original matter and the notice alleges a violation of a condition of probation not amounting to a crime. Section 777 also contemplates a noticed hearing conforming to the statute's requirements, including Proposition 21's new standard of proof and evidentiary rules. (§ 777, 1st par.) [2] The quoted language is unqualified and its meaning seems plain. Any noticed hearing held while Proposition 21's changes to section 777 are in effect is subject to their terms, regardless of when the section 602 offense in the original matter occurred. (§ 777(a)(2).) If voters had intended to limit such amendments to probationers who committed their section 602 crimes after the initiative's effective date, Proposition 21 could have so provided. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).) We would have to rewrite the statute in order to restrict its scope in this manner. (See People v. Ansell (2001) 25 Cal.4th 868, 881, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 24 P.3d 1174 ( Ansell ) [subjecting convicted sex offenders to new restrictions on procedure for removing civil disabilities even where qualifying crimes predated statutory change].) The statute's purpose, as reflected in Proposition 21 ballot materials, also suggests an intent to affect the maximum number of juvenile probation violation cases as soon as possible. In general, voters expressed alarm over the recent increase in juvenile and gang-related crime, and the perceived inability of the juvenile justice system to protect the public, particularly against violent and recidivist offenders. (See Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 574-579, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168, 41 P.3d 3.) Regarding changes to juvenile court procedures like section 777, ballot materials emphasized the interest in reforming less serious offenders by holding them more `accountab[le]' for crimes and other misconduct. ( Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th 480, 500, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 73 P.3d 1115.) Indeed, by making it easier to prove a probation violation alleged under section 777(a)(2), Proposition 21 ensures that new misconduct otherwise immune from either an adult criminal prosecution or a new section 602 proceeding does not escape sanction altogether. ( Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 500-501, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 73 P.3d 1115.) The ballot materials convey a sense of urgency in this regard. (See id. at p. 500, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 73 P.3d 1115; Manduley v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 575-576, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168, 41 P.3d 3.) In contrast, petitioners' approach effectively means that the section 777 amendments at issue both here and in Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th 480, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 73 P.3d 1115, would only affect juvenile court cases in which all of the following events occurred after Proposition 21's effective date: (1) the person violated a criminal statute within the meaning of section 602, (2) the juvenile court adjudicated such offense in a section 602 proceeding and issued a dispositional order, including probation, (3) the person thereafter violated such probation within the meaning of section 777(a)(2), and (4) authorities initiated a probation violation proceeding under section 777(a)(2). Such a scenario could postpone  perhaps by many years  the significant rehabilitative and public safety aims the changes were meant to achieve. Thus, to ensure accountability for new misconduct alleged as juvenile probation violations, it seems reasonable to conclude that Proposition 21 covers any probationer whose section 777 hearing takes place after March 7, 2000, whether or not the original section 602 crime occurred before that time. Finally, this conclusion is consistent with how similar initiative measures have long been judicially construed. For instance, Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 299, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434 ( Tapia ), concerned Proposition 115, the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, which changed criminal trial procedure by, among other things, limiting counsel's role on voir dire and expanding the People's discovery rights. A capital defendant (Tapia) claimed these statutory changes did not apply in his trial because the charged crimes occurred before the initiative's effective date. ( Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 286-287, 299-300, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434.) Tapia emphasized that both Proposition 115 and related ballot materials were entirely silent on the question of retrospectivity ( Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 287, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434), and that all statutes were presumed to operate prospectively absent clear evidence to the contrary. ( Ibid. ; see Pen. Code, § 3; People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1274, 265 Cal.Rptr. 132, 783 P.2d 719.) However, we determined that these general principles of statutory construction supported, rather than defeated, application of Proposition 115's new procedural rules in Tapia's case. Even though applied to the prosecution of a crime committed before the law's effective date, a law addressing the conduct of trials still addresses conduct in the future. This is a principle that courts in this state have consistently recognized. Such a statute `is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts existing prior to its enactment. . . . [Instead,] [t]he effect of such statutes is actually prospective in nature since they relate to the procedure to be followed in the future. ' [Citations.] For this reason, we have said that `it is a misnomer to designate [such statutes] as having retrospective effect.' [Citation.] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [Thus,] a law governing the conduct of trials is being applied `prospectively' when it is applied to a trial occurring after the law's effective date, regardless of when the underlying crime was committed. ( Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d 282, 288-289, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434, italics added; accord, Albertson v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 796, 804, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 23 P.3d 611 [new statute making mental health data available for use against sexually violent predators in civil commitment proceedings applies in both pending and future cases].) We must assume that Proposition 21 voters knew about and followed Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d 282, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434. (See Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th 480, 495-496, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 119, 73 P.3d 1115 [electorate presumed to be aware of existing law when amending statutes].) Much like the initiative statutes that Tapia construed, Proposition 21's standard of proof and evidentiary provisions concern the conduct and procedure to be followed in future section 777 proceedings, i.e., juvenile probation violation hearings held after March 7, 2000. ( Tapia, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 288, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434.) Nothing in the relevant text or history suggests an intent to postpone this effective date, or to otherwise limit Proposition 21 depending upon when criminal conduct in the original section 602 proceeding occurred. We reject petitioners' contrary construction.