Opinion ID: 887870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Constructive Trust Claim

Text: ¶59 Lastly, Phelps alleged under Count VI that “Frampton derived property or benefit by appropriation of partnership property or opportunity” and that “Frampton would . . . be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain the extraordinarily large sum that he took as his sole property.” Thus, “[a] constructive trust should be imposed on the fee to insure that Phelps receive [sic] a 20% share of it.” The District Court ruled against Phelps on this claim, reasoning that “it is inappropriate to impose a constructive trust” since “the Partnership Agreement dictates the nature of the fee distribution,” “Frampton correctly retained his percentage of the fee,” and, thus, “there can be no question that any part of the fee belonged to Phelps.” 30 ¶60 On appeal, the crux of Phelps’s challenge to the District Court’s ruling is that “[the Gallagher fee] was not properly the sole property of Frampton and/or Hileman.” Phelps requests that we impose “a constructive trust on an equitable portion of the fees improperly taken by Frampton as his own in [the Gallagher case].” Yet, we concluded above that Frampton was entitled to 55% of the Gallagher fee, and the record reflects that he contributed to the partnership pool as required by the Agreement. Phelps has failed to demonstrate that Frampton would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain the remaining portion of his 55% share of the Gallagher fee. See In re Marriage of Moss, 1999 MT 62, ¶ 29, 293 Mont. 500, ¶ 29, 977 P.2d 322, ¶ 29 (“[A] person seeking to impose a constructive trust on property must . . . prove that the title holder would be unjustly enriched if they were permitted to retain title.”); see also § 72-33-219, MCA (“A constructive trust arises when a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that the person holding title would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.”). We conclude, therefore, that there is no basis here for imposing a constructive trust, and we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Frampton on Phelps’s Constructive Trust claim.