Opinion ID: 852583
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Freestanding Claim of Error

Text: Stephenson contends that his failure to object to the belt at trial did not preclude him from raising that issue on direct appeal because use of the belt constituted fundamental error. The parties dispute whether the use of the belt met that standard. That issue is moot insofar as Stephenson seeks to assert the belt as a freestanding claim in this post-conviction proceeding. Because no objection was raised at trial and the issue was not presented on direct appeal, a challenge to the use of the belt is foreclosed in this post-conviction proceeding as a freestanding claim of error, either fundamental or otherwise. See e.g., Conner v. State, 829 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ind.2005); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 756-57; Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind.2002). Stephenson argues that the State conceded that the use of the belt was properly before the post-conviction court as a freestanding issue. He bases this contention on the State's proposed findings and conclusions in which the State requested the trial court to find no prejudice from failure to object to the belt. The State cited as its reason for lack of prejudice the fact that the issue was before the post-conviction court. Assuming that a proposed finding can under some circumstances preclude a party from contesting its own finding, a concession as to a conclusion of law is not binding on this Court. See Myers v. State, 233 Ind. 66, 67, 116 N.E.2d 839, 839 (1954); Green v. State, 232 Ind. 596, 597, 115 N.E.2d 211, 212 (1953). Whether the issue of the belt's use was available as a freestanding issue is a question of law. The issue is therefore foreclosed if, as here, it was available at trial and no objection was raised.