Opinion ID: 2071399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: effect of special finding on proximate cause

Text: Smith presents several arguments with respect to the alleged negligence of NORS, and the court's summary judgment in NORS' favor. We conclude, however, that these arguments do not undermine the jury's special finding on causation, and we further conclude that the jury's conclusion that the use of EC was not a proximate cause of the failure of the donor liver is dispositive of Smith's claim against NORS. As previously stated, a cause of an injury may be a proximate cause, notwithstanding that it acted through successive instruments of a series of events, if the instruments or events were combined in one continuous chain through which the force of the cause operated to produce the disaster. Sweeney v. Kerstens & Lee, Inc., 268 Neb. 752, 688 N.W.2d 350 (2004). Smith contends that NORS had a duty to review the paperwork accompanying the donor liver and to inform the UNMC transplant team that EC had been used. Smith argues that because Shaw was reported to have said that he would not have used the liver had he known of the EC flush, but for NORS' alleged negligence, Smith's failed transplant would not have occurred. However, a proximate cause is a cause that produces a result in a natural and continuous sequence and without which the result would not have occurred. Id. Even if NORS was negligent, and even if Smith's injury would not have occurred but for NORS' negligence, this does not establish that NORS' alleged negligence caused Smith's injury in a natural and continuous sequence. At best, NORS would have been a link in the chain of causation between the use of EC and the failure of Smith's donor liver. Smith contends that the absence of NORS at trial allowed the jury to conclude that the chain of cause broke at its weakest link. Brief for appellant 29. But the jury found that chain of causation never to have been initiated. The jury's special finding was not simply that the use of EC was not a proximate cause of Smith's damages  rather, the jury specifically found that the use of EC did not cause Smith's donor liver to fail. In other words, the jury found that even had EC not been used, the result of Smith's transplant surgery would have been the same. Since the jury found that the liver failure was not caused by the use of EC, it would have been impossible for the same jury to find that the liver failure was caused by NORS' failure to warn UNMC of the same use of EC. Consequently, any error in granting summary judgment for NORS was harmless, because any negligence on NORS' part was not a proximate cause of Smith's damages. Smith was not prejudiced by the empty chair at trial, as the jury's special finding on proximate cause was equally applicable to Spees, CORS, and NORS. Similarly, Smith argues that the jury should have been instructed that Spees and CORS were negligent as a matter of law in failing to ensure that UNMC was notified of the use of EC. Smith's reasoning here is substantially the same as that reasoning he advanced with respect to NORS  he argues that since Shaw would not have used the donor liver had he known of the EC flush, the failure to notify UNMC establishes but for causation of Smith's damages. But, as above, if the EC flush did not cause Smith's donor liver to fail, then the failure to notify the transplant team of the EC flush could not have been a cause of Smith's injuries. In short, CORS, Spees, and NORS were not the legal cause of Smith's injuries. While it is true that several events preceded the unfortunate failure of Smith's donor liver, the jury determined that the conduct of CORS, Spees, and NORS did not act in a natural and continuous sequence to produce such injuries. That is because, according to the jury, the use of EC simply did not cause Smith's donor liver to fail. Therefore, we decline to consider Smith's remaining arguments, because even if the court had committed error with respect to NORS', CORS', or Spees' failure to inform UNMC of the use of EC, such error would not be prejudicial and would not affect our disposition of this appeal. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis which is not needed to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. Livingston v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 269 Neb. 301, 692 N.W.2d 475 (2005).