Opinion ID: 788103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiffs' Entitlement to an Award of Fees

Text: 28 When, as here, a plaintiff does not win a final judgment on the merits, a two-part test determines whether that plaintiff nonetheless `prevailed' for the purpose of receiving attorney's fees. Greater L.A. Council on Deafness v. Cmty. Television, 813 F.2d 217, 219 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). First, in a factual inquiry, the District Court must determine what the lawsuit sought to accomplish and then determine whether it was accomplished by means of the suit. Plaintiffs need only have received some of the benefits they sought in the suit. There must, however, be some sort of clear, causal relationship between the litigation brought and the practical outcome realized. 3 Id. at 219-20 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). We review for clear error the district court's factual finding of such a causal relationship. Id. at 220. 29 The district court found that the instant action did indeed constitute[] a `material factor' and play[] a `catalytic role' in causing defendants to vacate and remand the final rule. 4 The court found that the Complaint in this action and the process of this lawsuit were a catalyst to the negotiation and issuance of the Consent Decree in the NAHB litigation, along with the result in the Tenth Circuit decision and the case in the Arizona District Court. The district court further found that [t]he results in these other cases, when conjoined with the imminence of summary judgment proceedings in this case, caused the Consent Decree, the issuance of which mooted this action. 30 We hold that the district court's findings on this issue are not clearly erroneous. Although the Government was contemplating a voluntary remand as early as August 2001, this was nearly four months after the district court had set the filing date for cross-motions for summary judgment in this case. 5 In addition, the Government's determination to seek a voluntary remand in this case was made on September 12, 2001, at which point the cross-motions for summary judgment deadline was less than two weeks away (September 24, 2001). Furthermore, the NMFS settled with the plaintiffs in the NAHB case only after the district court in the instant case issued its January 31, 2002 order allowing Plaintiffs' lawsuit to go forward. 6 31 Therefore, although the NMFS may have agreed to the voluntary remand in the NAHB litigation, it is certainly reasonable for the district court to have found that Plaintiffs' prior action played a part in that result and that Plaintiffs received some of the benefits they sought in the suit and that there was some sort of causal relationship between the litigation brought and the outcome realized, Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, 813 F.2d at 219-20. Plaintiffs' action was the first to challenge the Secretary's incremental effects approach to these ESUs. Although Defendants point out that there were other reasons for the NMFS to voluntarily remand the Final Rule and to reinterpret ESA § 4(b)(2), they fail to show how the district court's finding that the instant action was also a catalyst in that decision was clear error. 32 Defendants also argue that the amount of fees awarded to Plaintiffs is excessive and unreasonable. Defendants argue that, given the limited success of Plaintiffs, such fees are an abuse of the district court's discretion. We disagree and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making the award. Although Plaintiffs did initially seek a remand of the Final Rule for nineteen ESUs, and though the district court's January 2002 order limited the instant action to just six of the ESUs, the final consent decree from the NAHB litigation remanded the Final Rule for all nineteen ESUs. The main thrust of Plaintiffs' litigation was the Secretary's erroneous interpretation of ESA § 4(b)(2), in its incremental effects analysis. This ultimately applied to all nineteen ESUs. 33 Finally, we disagree with Defendants that because they were required to pay the attorneys' fees for the NAHB plaintiffs, as well as the fees for Plaintiffs in this case, this results in the federal government paying two sets of plaintiffs' counsel for only one consent decree in violation of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (holding that the district court should exclude hours not reasonably expended including redundant hours). Defendants misunderstand Hensley. The Supreme Court in Hensley was making the point that counsel seeking attorneys' fees must adhere to the ethical rules that apply to billing in private practice, such as avoiding double billing. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The Court indicated as much by stating that redundant hours must be excluded 34 just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such [redundant] hours from his fee submission. In the private sector, `billing judgment' is an important component in fee setting. It is no less important here. Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to statutory authority. 35 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). It is not unreasonable to have several plaintiffs sue for the same relief. 7 Each plaintiff's attorney in such an action must avoid double billing, but the fact that each plaintiff hires her own counsel is not, in itself, double billing. Here Plaintiffs filed the first action and Defendants made no effort to consolidate the actions. 36 The district court adequately considered the time records presented by Plaintiffs. The court found that the hourly rate billed by Plaintiffs' lawyers was reasonable given the amount of experience of the lawyers, the average rate of lawyers in the area, and the complexity of the case. The court also found that the amount of hours spent was reasonable given the same factors. 8 Defendants presented no evidence to show that the district court clearly erred in any of its factual findings (i.e., the number of hours actually worked). 37 The court did not award excessive fees, and the fees it awarded were supported by time records. Therefore, we affirm the amount of the district court's award of attorneys' fees.