Opinion ID: 1478545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Requisite Level of Harm

Text: We next consider the level of harm a plaintiff must show to state a valid hostile work environment LAD claim. This is a subject on which there has been considerable disagreement among the federal courts. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the split among the federal circuits on this question. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1382, 122 L.Ed. 2d 758 (1993). On one side of the split are those circuits that hold that in order to state a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff must allege conduct that had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff's work performance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment that affected seriously the psycho logical [sic] well-being of the plaintiff   . Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F. 2d 611 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S.Ct. 1983, 95 L.Ed. 2d 823 (1987); accord Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 939 F. 2d 260 (5th Cir.1991); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F. 2d 412 (7th Cir.1989); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F. 2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), aff'd in relevant part, rev'd in part, 900 F. 2d 27 (1990); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 830 F. 2d 1554 (11th Cir.1987). The courts on the other side of the split hold that a plaintiff must show that the complained-of conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. Ellison, supra, 924 F. 2d at 876; accord Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405, 91 L.Ed. 2d at 60 (for sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment (citations omitted)); Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., 957 F. 2d 59 (2d Cir.1992); Andrews, supra, 895 F. 2d 1469; Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F. 2d 881 (1st Cir.1988); Minteer v. Auger, 844 F. 2d 569 (8th Cir.1988); Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F. 2d 141 (D.C. Cir.1985). We find the latter line of cases more consistent with the purposes of the LAD. Although psychological damage to victims of harassment is one of the harms the LAD seeks to prevent, it is by no means the only one. The Legislature has found that because of illegal discrimination, of which sexual harassment is a form, people suffer personal hardships, and the State suffers a grievous harm. N.J.S.A. 10:5-3. Among the personal hardships noted by the Legislature are economic loss; time loss; physical and emotional stress; and in some cases severe emotional trauma, illness, homelessness or other irreparable harm resulting from the strain of employment controversies; relocation, search and moving difficulties; anxiety caused by lack of information, uncertainty, and resultant planning difficulty; career, education, family and social disruption; and adjustment problems   . [ Ibid. ] Sex discrimination and sexual harassment also cause serious economic harms. Dr. Freada Klein, a researcher and consultant to large companies on sexual harassment, has estimated that the cost of sexual harassment for a typical Fortune 500 service or manufacturing company of 23,784 employees is over $6.7 million per year, exclusive of costs of litigation, processing state or federal charges, and destructive behavior or sabotage. The $6.7 million figure derives from the costs of employee turnover, absenteeism, reduced productivity, and the use of internal complaint mechanisms. The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 1 Before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 168, 207-214 (1991) (statement of Dr. Freada Klein) (hereinafter Klein). That harm to the productivity and profitability of corporations necessarily harms the economy of the State and the welfare of its citizens. Moreover, the Legislature has declared that discrimination is a matter of concern to the government of the State, and that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic State. N.J.S.A. 10:5-3. Given the breadth of individual and societal harms that flow from discrimination and harassment, to limit the LAD's application to only those cases in which the victim suffered, or could have suffered, serious psychological harm would be contrary to its remedial purpose. We find no support in the statute for engrafting a requirement of serious psychological harm before a plaintiff can state a claim. It is the harasser's conduct, not the plaintiff's injury, that must be severe or pervasive. We agree with the Ellison court that [s]urely, employees need not endure sexual harassment until their psychological well-being is seriously affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety or debilitation before they can bring a claim. 924 F. 2d at 878; see also Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F. 2d 569, 578 (2d Cir.1989) (a female employee need not subject herself to an extended period of demeaning and degrading provocation before being entitled to seek the remedies provided under Title VII). Of course, if a plaintiff suffers psychological harm and wishes to collect damages for that injury, she must show that she suffered psychological harm and to what extent. However, that proof goes to the amount of her damages, not to whether she states a cause of action. Nor need a plaintiff show that she suffered an economic loss. The plaintiff's injury need be no more tangible or serious than that the conditions of employment have been altered and the work environment has become abusive. Although the LAD provides for compensatory and punitive damages, it is not primarily a tort scheme; rather, its primary purpose is to end discrimination. Because discrimination itself is the harm that the LAD seeks to eradicate, additional harms need not be shown in order to state a claim under the LAD. In a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment, the hostile work environment is the legally recognized harm. Therefore, a plaintiff in a hostile work environment sexual harassment case establishes the requisite harm if she shows that her working conditions were affected by the harassment to the point at which a reasonable woman would consider the working environment hostile. In making that showing, the plaintiff may use evidence that other women in the workplace were sexually harassed. The plaintiff's work environment is affected not only by conduct directed at herself but also by the treatment of others. A woman's perception that her work environment is hostile to women will obviously be reinforced if she witnesses the harassment of other female workers. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiff need not personally have been the target of each or any instance of offensive or harassing conduct. Evidence of sexual harassment directed at other women is relevant to both the character of the work environment and its effects on the complainant. The few courts that have addressed this issue have generally concluded that incidents involving employees other than the plaintiff are relevant in establishing a generally hostile work environment. In Vinson, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's rejection of evidence of harassment of female employees other than the plaintiff was improper. Evidence tending to show Taylor's harassment of other women working alongside Vinson is directly relevant to the question whether he created an environment violative of Title VII. [ Vinson v. Taylor, supra, 753 F. 2d] at 146. The court held that no evidence of sexual harassment directed specifically toward the plaintiff was necessary for a claim under Title VII: Even a woman who was never herself the object of harassment might have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere where such harassment was pervasive. Id. at 146. This view finds support in racial discrimination cases brought under Title VII. See Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F. 2d 234 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 2058, 32 L.Ed. 2d 343 (1972). [ Hicks v. Gates Rubber Company, 833 F. 2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir.1987).] Accord Hall v. Gus Constr., 842 F. 2d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir.1988) (Although [the plaintiff] was not subjected to sexual propositions and offensive touching, evidence of sexual harassment directed at employees other than the plaintiff is relevant to show a hostile work environment.).