Opinion ID: 2445108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Majority Opinion Wrongly Transmutes Reasonable Understanding of the Defendant into Reasonable Lay Person in the Defendant's Position.

Text: After misreading Rule 4-243 to limit the scope of proper analysis, the Majority also transmutes (albeit subtly) our previous precedent, as explained in Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 482, 845 A.2d 1215, 1219 (2004), and Solorzano, 397 Md. at 668, 919 A.2d at 656. In Tweedy, we held that courts should construe plea agreement terms according to what a defendant reasonably understood when he or she pled guilty. 380 Md. at 482, 845 A.2d at 1219. In Solorzano, we held that courts should construe plea agreement terms according to the reasonable understanding of the defendant when he or she pled guilty. 397 Md. at 668, 919 A.2d at 656. Arguably, both of these standards are subjective, for they focus on the understanding of their particular defendants, rather than the understanding of other reasonable lay person[s].... Majority op. at 582, 7 A.3d at 565; see Solorzano, 397 Md. at 671, 919 A.2d at 658 (finding dispositive the fact that its [defendant's] understanding was reasonable....). By rearranging a few words, the Majority opinion seems to be applying an objective standard, as found in the objective law of contracts. Under that approach, courts construe a contract according to what a reasonably prudent person in the same position would have understood as to [its] meaning.... Cochran v. Norkunas, 398 Md. 1, 17, 919 A.2d 700, 710 (2007). We never have held expressly, before now, that courts should apply this standard to plea agreements. [4] Although I agree that, where appropriate, courts should apply contract principles to plea agreements (including the objective law of contracts), if not for certainty's sake alone, I doubt whether this step in the Majority opinion's analysis was necessary because there are at least three other, narrower ways to resolve Cuffley's case. See Part IV, infra.