Opinion ID: 682805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutionality of the Carjacking Statute.

Text: 11 Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2119, for the first time on appeal. The contemporaneous objection requirement of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 generally requires that a party make a timely objection to preserve an issue for appeal. However, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), we may review an issue not preserved below under the plain error standard of review. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778-79, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (appellate court should conduct plain error review under Rule 52(b) in those circumstances where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result); United States v. Nelson, 36 F.3d 1001, 1002 (10th Cir.1994) (application of sentencing guidelines reviewed for plain error despite failure to object at sentencing hearing); United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 950-51 (5th Cir.1994) (failure to challenge constitutionality of criminal statute in district court confines appellate court's review to a search for plain error). 12 The constitutionality of section 2119 is a question of first impression in this circuit. The other circuits that have considered the question have concluded that although the statute may stretch the outer limits of the Commerce Clause, under current doctrine it is not unconstitutional. United States v. Harris, 25 F.3d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 108-09 (6th Cir.1994); contra United States v. Cortner, 834 F.Supp. 242 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (holding that interstate commerce is not implicated and, therefore, Sec. 2119 is unconstitutional), rev'd sub nom., United States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir.1994). 13 The test is whether there is any rational basis for the finding of Congress that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce. See Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 2382-83, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981); Harris, 25 F.3d at 1280. Courts generally have found a nexus between section 2119 and interstate commerce in: 1) the effect of carjacking on interstate travel and the travel of foreign citizens in this country, Johnson, 22 F.3d at 109; 2) the impact of the sale of stolen cars and parts in interstate commerce; and 3) increased insurance premiums that result from carjackings. United States v. Watson, 815 F.Supp. 827, 831 (E.D.Pa.1993) (providing an excellent discussion of the evolution of modern Commerce Clause doctrine and the constitutionality of Sec. 2119). 14 We recognize the concerns about broadening federal jurisdiction raised by Judge Wiseman in Cortner, 834 F.Supp. at 243-44. Nevertheless, we do not agree that section 2119 lacks any rational nexus to interstate commerce and that Congress lacks the power to legislate thereon. See id. at 244. The Supreme Court has long upheld similar federal statutes under an extremely broad modern-day interpretation of the Commerce Clause. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (rejecting challenge to criminal loansharking statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 891, where wholly intrastate actions had an effect on interstate commerce); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S.Ct. 345, 69 L.Ed. 699 (1925) (upholding the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2312, involving stolen vehicles); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 33 S.Ct. 281, 57 L.Ed. 523 (1913) (rejecting a challenge to the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2421, involving transportation of prostitutes); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936) (rejecting challenge to Lindbergh Law governing certain kidnappings, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1201). See also Watson, 815 F.Supp. at 829-32. We agree with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits that, under current Commerce Clause doctrine, section 2119 is not unconstitutional. Accordingly, defendant's conviction under the statute was not plain error. 15