Opinion ID: 2081732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of a Fair Hearing.

Text: (a) Blanketing in of the transcript of the Superior investigation. Immediately before the commencement of the hearing at Madison on May 25, 1957, Magnusen, as the board's designated presiding officer, informed counsel for Dr. Ball that the transcript of the Superior investigation was going to be placed in the record, and the witnesses who there testified for President Hill were merely going to be called and asked whether the statements made by them at Superior were true and correct. With reference to such declaration by Magnusen that this was going to be done, counsel for Dr. Ball, at the opening of the hearing, entered the following statement on the record: We heard for the first time this morning, a few minutes ago, that the investigation record at Superior will not be repeated here this morning, that Mr. Hill's witnesses will be put on the stand and asked whether the testimony given under oath today would be the same as that given in Superior, and then we will have the opportunity of cross-examination. I just want the record to show that we did not know that before. We have no objection to that. Our only problem that I'd like to express to the board is that the hearing in Superior, not being under oath, and held in an informal manner, is replete with all sorts of hearsay. A person would get up and say that so-and-so told him that so-and-so told him that, and we feel that such testimony would not be admitted in a court of law, and in view of the seriousness of this matter as far as Dr. Ball is concerned, we think it should not be admitted here.... Likewise the testimony which is not sworn testimony in that investigation is full of statements such as `I feel,' `it is my opinion,' `it was my impression,' and things like that that likewise are matters for this board to determine and not based on what someone else's opinion or impression is. That is usurping the jurisdiction of the members of the jury, as we say in court language, and that is what you gentlemen on the board are here for. In response to such statement, Magnusen stated that hearsay evidence and opinion evidence appearing in the transcript of the Superior investigation would be disregarded by the board. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Magnusen, as presiding officer, ever ruled as to which parts of the evidence in the Superior transcript were hearsay and opinion evidence. We find much of the same was most prejudicial to Dr. Ball. After the hearing adjourned on May 25th the next action of the board of record is the voting of the resolution sustaining the charges at the June 17th meeting after approximately an hour's deliberation. The brief of the attorney general asserts that the members of the board had been furnished with copies of the transcripts of the Superior investigation and Madison hearing prior to the June 17th meeting. In all likelihood the members of the board did read such transcripts. In doing so they read the Superior transcript replete with hearsay and opinion evidence without any ruling to guide them as to which parts were to be disregarded. Apparently only one other of the 10 board members besides Magnusen is an attorney. No more need be said to indicate the great prejudice which might have resulted to Dr. Ball from the blanketing into the record of the Superior transcript. Such procedure vitiated against commonly accepted concepts of a fair trial. The brief of the attorney general asserts that counsel for Dr. Ball waived any right to object to such procedure because in the afore-quoted statement made by him to the board there was contained the words, We have no objection to that. It is because of such contention that we have set forth counsel's statement at length. A reading of such statement in its entirety, without taking words out of context, conclusively establishes to our satisfaction that counsel did specifically object to the parts of the Superior transcript which constituted hearsay and opinion evidence. Furthermore, we have serious doubts as to whether it was necessary for Dr. Ball's counsel to object to the announced action of the board blanketing in the Superior transcript on pain of being precluded from raising the issue here. Counsel was placed in the unenviable position of not wishing to offend the board then acting as a trial tribunal and yet at the same time preserving the rights of his client. Lawyers are sometimes faced with a like dilemma in the trial of a lawsuit when the trial judge asks an objectionable question of a witness. However, we find it unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal to pass on such question. (b) Failure to assure Dr. Ball's witnesses against reprisals. Two of the faculty members of the college who testified in behalf of Dr. Ball at the Superior investigation were Dr. Loop and Dr. McKee. They expressed fear of reprisals being exacted against them if they were to testify favorably to Ball, and the board failed to assure them against such action. The evidence before us indicates that President Hill was not one to brook any opposition to his policies by members of his faculty. Under such a situation we deem that the principles of a fair trial required the board to assure these two witnesses of protection against reprisals. On this issue we quote with approval from the memorandum opinion of the learned trial court: One of the most-serious aspects of the Superior hearing is the implied pressures which in the court's mind served to coerce witnesses. For example, all of the administration's witnesses were apparently lined up in advance. They had been requested to testify and exhibited no fear whatever for reprisals resulting from the testimony. In other words, they were on the right side. Ball's witnesses, to the contrary, were at a decided disadvantage for in effect they were sticking their necks out. Their testimony was pro-Ball and thereby antiadministration. They were there only at Ball's behest and not, apparently, because the board was searching for the facts. Under such circumstances the board had an absolute duty to insure each of Ball's witnesses that no administration reprisals would be permitted by way of salary-raise denials or otherwise because such witnesses dared to speak the truth. This the board utterly failed to do. For example, note the testimony of Dr. Loop at page 115 of the Superior transcript as follows: `Dr. Loop: May I ask what position is a man in who might care to take issue with some of these charges? `Mr. McIntyre: You are perfectly justified in doing so. They will be presented at the hearing. `Dr. Loop: Is there any protection against reprisals? `Mr. McIntyre: There is no protection we can offer against reprisal except protection under tenure and also right of appeal to the board. `Dr. Loop: For example, salary raises are customary, as you know better than I, and the man who takes issue with the president's charges here, would he be protected against being left out of a raise? What would be the situation there? `Mr. McIntyre: I couldn't answer that. `Mr. Magnusen: That would be presupposing he is going to get the raise. `Dr. Loop: Where you have a good percentage of the faculty members getting raises over the years. `Mr. Magnusen: 90 per cent get raises. `Dr. Loop: I understand. That is the question, when a man comes in here before the board, to know just where he is going to be. You can readily understand why one doesn't feel inclined to lay himself wide open unless you feel that there is some protection. `Mr. Magnusen: You are not obligated to testify. The only reason you were called is that Dr. Ball suggested you might have a statement to make on the charges. We don't ask you to testify if you don't wish to do so. If you testify you do it voluntarily and of your own free will. We are not in position to offer anybody anything pro or con. `Dr. Loop: I'm not asking for any particular offer. I am merely wanting to know how a faculty member can come into a situation of this sort and avoid that problem.' Finally Dr. Loop concluded at page 117, `You understand it will take a brave man to stick his neck out at this point but I will do it.' The testimony of Dr. McKee, one of Dr. Ball's witnesses, is also illuminating on this point. We note from pages 124, 125 of the transcript of the Superior hearing: `Dr. McKee: I'd like to raise the question of immunity. How can I be sure that comments I make to you will not mean future retribution salary-wise and in other ways of that sort? `Mr. McPhee: This is all a public record. `Dr. McKee: I am not thinking of the public. I am thinking of the local administration. `Mr. McIntyre: On what basis? `Dr. McKee: Because it's been found on the campus before. This campus is filled with fear. Faculty and students. Faculty members have said to me, Why not co-operate 100 per cent? It's profitable. `Mr. McPhee: That's quite a serious charge. `Dr. McKee: That's the exact point that I have in mind.' (c) Difference in treatment of the exhibits offered. The exhibits offered in favor of the charges against Dr. Ball were numbered, photostated, and made available to all members of the board. On the other hand, the exhibits offered in behalf of Dr. Ball were not individually numbered, copied, or photostated but were treated as mere miscellany. The brief in behalf of Dr. Ball charges, without contradiction, that some were even lost before the record was transferred to the circuit court. A fair hearing demands that equal treatment be accorded the exhibits of both parties. (d) Magnusen acting as both counsel for the prosecution and judge. One of the criticisms often leveled against administrative agencies is that they frequently initiate and prosecute proceedings before themselves, which they then must decide in their quasi-judicial capacity. This is not too weighty an objection if these two functions are not combined in the same person but are intrusted to different personnel of the agency. In order to obviate such objection the Taft-Hartley Act provides for the appointment of the board's general counsel directly by the president instead of the national labor relations board. Likewise, under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, hearing examiners are provided who are entirely independent of the administrative-agency legal staff who prosecute proceedings before such examiners. Sometimes practical considerations in the operation of a state administrative agency require that a hearing examiner protect the rights of a litigant not represented by counsel in the proceeding being heard by such examiner, and see that the witnesses of such litigant are asked the proper questions. An illustration of this is afforded in the method under which hearings in workmen's compensation cases are conducted before examiners of the industrial commission. However, in such a situation ch. 102, Stats., provides for review of any decision of the examiner by the three members of the commission who have had no participation in the hearing. In such review no weight need be accorded the examiner's findings. In Muench v. Public Service Comm. (1952), 261 Wis. 492, 514, 53 N. W. (2d) 514, 55 N. W. (2d) 40, this court condemned a proposal that would have required the three members of the public service commission to act in the dual capacity of judges and advocates, thereby denying the attorney general the right to take over the functions of counsel for one of the competing interests. The basic reason why the same person should not be put in the position of acting as both attorney and judge is that, when he lays down his duties as advocate and assumes those of judge, his activities in the former capacity may tend to influence his judgment while acting in the latter capacity. [1] In the instant matter there was no necessity for a member of the board to have to assume such a dual role. At the request of the board, a highly capable and experienced assistant attorney general was present at the Madison hearing to represent the board. The excuse offered is that President Hill was without counsel to represent him and present evidence in support of the charges. However, the board could well have requested such assistant attorney general to question the prosecution witnesses, offer exhibits, and enter objections to questions asked by counsel for Dr. Ball. It was far more preferable for such assistant attorney general to get into the position of a partisan than for a member of the board to do so, who later would have to act in a quasi-judicial capacity in deciding the controversy. Neither this objectionable feature, nor the immediately preceding one relating to the difference in treatment of exhibits, standing alone, might be deemed sufficient by a reviewing court to hold that a fair hearing had been denied. However, when combined with the two more-serious objectionable procedures hereinbefore discussed, the cumulative effect is such as to convince this court that Dr. Ball was denied a fair hearing.