Opinion ID: 2623326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant asserts the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish he had the requisite mental state for robbery and burglary to sustain his conviction of first degree felony murder. In considering this claim, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidenceโthat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid valueโthat would support a rational trier of fact in finding the essential element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 462, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) Liability for first degree murder based on a felony-murder theory is proper when the defendant kills in the commission of robbery, burglary, or any of the other felonies listed in section 189. For conviction, the prosecution must establish that the defendant, either before or during the commission of the acts that caused the victim's death, had the specific intent to commit one of the listed felonies. ( People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 34, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942; People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 532, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) Thus, to find a defendant guilty of first degree murder based on a killing perpetrated during a robbery, the evidence must show the defendant intended to steal the victim's property either before or during the fatal assault. (ง 211; People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 619, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152; People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 34, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Conviction of felony murder in the commission of burglary requires proof that the defendant entered the residence with the intent to commit a felony or theft. (ง 459; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 954, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Proctor, supra, at p. 533, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) Here, we are satisfied that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to steal from the Rumseys when he entered their apartment and assaulted them. The evidence at atrial showed: (1) in the month preceding the crime, defendant had neither money nor a place to live, and he was involved in drug activity; (2) on the day of the murder, defendant saw James Rumsey take $50 from his wallet and overheard Baker's eight-year-old daughter say that Rumsey had gobs of money; (3) several hours before the murder, defendant had fought with a man in Baker's apartment and had forcibly taken his money, which he used to buy methamphetamine; and (4) before leaving Baker's apartment and going to the Rumseys' apartment, defendant had armed himself with a knife. Also, Helen Rumsey and Amy Hadix testified that when defendant followed Hadix past the opened door to the Rumseys' apartment, he pushed her out of the way and entered the residence, then quickly slammed the door shut after jumping on James Rumsey and stabbing him in the neck. Helen Rumsey further testified that after defendant had stabbed James and kicked her away as she approached, he removed the wallet from James's back pocket and went through it. When defendant found no cash in the wallet, he stabbed Helen in the throat, then pointed a gun at her head, yelling obscenities and demanding money. Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had formed the intent to steal before entering the Rumseys' apartment and attacking them. Although the evidence is circumstantial, the intent required for robbery and burglary is seldom established with direct evidence but instead is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. (ง 21, subd. (a); People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 669, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 47, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224; People v. Gibbs (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 526, 549, 90 Cal.Rptr. 866.) Defendant argues that his own testimony and that of the three primary prosecution witnessesโMarie Baker, Amy Hadix, and June Riceโestablished that he entered the Rumseys' apartment by mistake and without the specific intent to steal from them before the entry and attack. He points out that the prosecution's witnesses testified consistently with his own account of the incident and without contradiction that he had purchased methamphetamine from June Rice, that he discussed returning to Rice's apartment to complain about the drugs and attempt to get more, and that he did return to Rice's residence as originally planned after the stabbings of the Rumseys. Even if we were to find that a rational trier of fact could draw from this evidence the inferences defendant suggests, reversal of the judgment would not be warranted. We have previously described the limited role of this court in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction: If the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings as to each element of the offense, the judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding. ( People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55; People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 528-529, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) Defendant further asserts that uncontroverted evidence of his intoxication before and during the incident established he had not formed the intent to steal when he entered the Rumseys' apartment. Evidence of defendant's conduct after the murder casts serious doubt on his assertion that the testimony at trial showed he had acted in a frantic, drug-induced state. But even assuming for argument's sake that the evidence of defendant's methamphetamine and alcohol consumption before the commission of the crimes would permit an inference he actually lacked the requisite specific intent for robbery and burglary ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1119, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478), we conclude that reversal is not warranted. We have determined that the record contains substantial circumstantial evidence supporting the jury's findings on the question of defendant's intent. Having reached this conclusion under the applicable principles of appellate review outlined above, we reject defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. ( People v. Ceja, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1138, 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55.) [4]