Opinion ID: 667828
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of the Ex Parte Communication

Text: 12 DeGross argues that the exchange between the trial judge and Sergeant Bailey in the presence of the jurors invaded the fact-finding province of the jury. By accepting Bailey's response that she had not been signalling the jury, DeGross contends, the trial judge left the jury with the impression that Bailey had not, in fact, signalled the jury. We reject the argument. 13 The trial judge did not instruct the jury that no signalling had occurred, nor did he instruct the jurors that they should disregard the signalling. At the close of trial, the trial judge specifically told the jury that [n]either by these [jury] instructions nor by any ruling or remark which I have made do I or have I meant to indicate any opinion concerning the facts. 14 The jury's verdicts lend further support to the district court's conclusion that the trial error did not have a substantial or injurious effect. Miller and Kloby (the two witnesses who were allegedly signalled to) testified that DeGross had admitted to them that he committed all three robberies, and that he had assaulted a McDonald's employee during the second McDonald's robbery. The jury convicted DeGross of the second McDonald's robbery, but acquitted him of the assault charge. It also acquitted DeGross of the first McDonald's robbery. The jury apparently focused on physical evidence linking DeGross to the second McDonald's robbery. For example, three McDonald's employees identified the mask worn by DeGross during the second McDonald's robbery as the same mask DeGross was wearing when he was arrested as he fled from the Carrs robbery. They also identified the handgun the robber used as the same gun DeGross was armed with when he was apprehended for the Carrs robbery. The jury may have also believed testimony that a footprint left by DeGross during the second McDonald's robbery matched the soles of the shoes DeGross was wearing when he was arrested for the Carrs robbery. 15 We are also convinced that the trial error did not have a substantial or injurious effect with respect to the jury's verdict on the attempted murder charges stemming from the Carrs robbery. The evidence was clear that DeGross fired his gun at pursuing police officers before he was apprehended. DeGross' counsel acknowledged this much during opening and closing arguments. Counsel argued, however, that it was a shot that was fired to prevent pursuit, not a shot that was fired to cause death. The jury accepted counsel's argument that DeGross did not intend to murder the police officers, and convicted DeGross of third degree assault, a lesser included offense. The ex parte communication was irrelevant. 16 DeGross also argues that the trial court would have responded differently to the communication had it first consulted with counsel: he contends that the trial court would have either (1) instructed the jury that signalling is a question of fact for the jury or (2) not instructed the jury at all and ordered Sergeant Bailey to refrain from signalling. He further argues that had the trial court responded differently, the outcome of the case may have been different. See United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 844 (1986). We reject these arguments as well. 17 The trial court specifically offered to give a curative instruction, but DeGross declined the offer. DeGross therefore cannot now find fault with the trial court's failure to give a curative instruction. DeGross has also failed to show how the outcome would have differed if the trial court had responded to the communication by ordering Sergeant Bailey to refrain from signalling. 18 We conclude that the state trial court's error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993). 19 AFFIRMED.