Opinion ID: 201397
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Context of the Statutory Scheme

Text: 86 The terms and provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) must be understood in the larger context of the statutory scheme. The immigration laws about adjustment of status are not a haphazard compilation of provisions; they are a calibrated set of rules that govern an area of national importance. Congress in many instances has specifically determined when to give discretion to the Attorney General and when to make its own policy choices. Viewing the statutory scheme in this manner clarifies two things: first, that the exclusion of parolees in removal proceedings renders ineligible most of the class that Congress rendered eligible by including parolees (for Congress clearly stated that most parolees would be in removal proceedings), and second, that the congressional choice to delegate to the Attorney General some circumscribed discretion over the ultimate decision of who is granted adjustment of status 23 is not authorization for discretion in other areas. 87 We explain: one policy choice Congress made was to allow (in some instances) aliens who were otherwise inadmissible on arrival the opportunity to seek adjustment of status relief if they met certain statutory criteria. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255. In 8 U.S.C. § 1182, Congress defines the classes of aliens who are ineligible for visas or admission to the United States and makes various exceptions from these blanket rules. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). Congress also allows for parole of these inadmissible aliens for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Congress specifically says parolees are not considered admitted. Id. Despite their status as inadmissible, Congress has also made the policy determination that these paroled aliens should be eligible to apply for adjustment of status, which essentially can act as an admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 88 Section 1182 is integral to determinations made in inspection, which is provided for in 8 U.S.C. § 1225. All arriving aliens and aliens who are present in the United States without an inspection are applicants for admission, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), and they  shall be inspected. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) (emphasis added). Section 1225(b) provides for the inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). If aliens being inspected are not clearly and beyond a doubt admissible, under section 1182, then they must be referred to removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 89 This context shows that Congress purposefully classified paroled individuals as inadmissible, and it also determined that they should generally be placed in removal proceedings. But Congress also explicitly allowed paroled individuals to adjust status if they meet the other statutory requirements. 90 Further, the larger statutory scheme makes clear that in the context of adjustment of status, Congress is particular about where it grants discretion to the Attorney General. Congress has specified the conditions under which an arriving alien (including a paroled alien) is to be determined inadmissible and must be placed in removal proceedings. The determination as to placing an alien into removal is not a decision committed to agency discretion by Congress. Rather, Congress has defined the terms for initiating removal proceedings against arriving aliens in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which provides that, 91 [I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a [removal proceeding]. 92 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Congress used the word shall to mandate that an immigration officer who cannot determine that the applicant for admission is clearly entitled to be admitted has no choice but to place the alien in removal proceedings. After the alien is placed in removal, the Attorney General may parole the alien into the United States in some instances, 24 but the alien still must go through removal proceedings. 25 93 The incorrectness of the Attorney General's argument can be seen by looking at one of its logical implications. The Attorney General is also given discretion as to the ultimate decision in determining whether to grant asylum to aliens who are eligible for this relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443-44, 107 S.Ct. 1207. 26 If this grant of discretion meant what the government argues here, it would be logical that the Attorney General could similarly decline to allow asylum by issuing a regulation that refused to process applications from categories of asylum applicants. 94 But that is not so. If the asylum applicant meets the eligibility requirements — if, in other words, the Attorney General determines that an applicant for asylum establishes she has a well founded fear of persecution on account of one of the statutory grounds — the alien must be allowed to apply. The Attorney General may only exercise his discretion in granting the asylum. 27 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Similarly, if the paroled adjustment of status applicant meets the eligibility requirements, the Attorney General may exercise his discretion only in the decision whether to grant permanent resident status. In both asylum and adjustment of status, an alien who satisfies the eligibility requirements to apply does not have a right to the [relief], but he is eligible to apply for it. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443-44, 107 S.Ct. 1207 (emphasis removed). 95 Although the regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8), denying adjustment of status to parolees in removal proceedings is itself framed in terms of who is eligible to apply, the Attorney General argues the regulation is simply a determination at the outset that of the eligible parolees, the Attorney General will not exercise its discretion favorably to those who are in removal proceedings. The Attorney General relies on Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 121 S.Ct. 714, 148 L.Ed.2d 635 (2001), for the proposition that categorically excluding otherwise eligible individuals is an appropriate use of his discretion as to the ultimate decision granted in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 96 Lopez is distinguishable. In Lopez, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), 28 C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B), which categorically denied early release to prisoners whose current offense was a drug felony involving the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm. See Lopez, 531 U.S. at 233, 121 S.Ct. 714. The relevant statute states, The period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the [BOP], but such reduction may not be more than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). The Supreme Court framed the question as whether the Bureau has discretion to delineate, as an additional category of ineligible inmates, those whose current offense is a felony involving a firearm. Lopez, 531 U.S. at 238, 121 S.Ct. 714. The Court answered this question in the affirmative, agreeing with the BOP that Congress simply did not address how the Bureau should exercise its discretion within the class of inmates who satisfy the statutory prerequisites for early release. Id. at 239-40, 121 S.Ct. 714 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court noted: 97 Beyond instructing that the Bureau has discretion to reduce the period of imprisonment for a nonviolent offender who successfully completes drug treatment, Congress has not identified any further circumstance in which the Bureau either must grant the reduction, or is forbidden to do so. In this familiar situation, where Congress has enacted a law that does not answer the precise question at issue, all we must decide is whether the Bureau, the agency empowered to administer the early release program, has filled the statutory gap in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design. 98 Id. at 242, 121 S.Ct. 714 (emphasis added)(quoting NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257, 115 S.Ct. 810, 130 L.Ed.2d 740 (1995)). In the face of congressional silence, the Court held that it was not unreasonable for the BOP to exercise its discretion and exclude a class of prisoners as ineligible for early release. Id. at 242-43, 121 S.Ct. 714. 99 By contrast, Congress has not been silent here. There are differences in the two statutes. In the adjustment of status statute here, Congress made numerous and explicit policy choices about who is eligible for adjustment of status relief, who is ineligible, and of those ineligible, who is nonetheless eligible with certain application restrictions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (setting out basic eligibility requirements for adjustment of status); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(c), (e) (limiting the eligibility of otherwise eligible aliens); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (allowing eligibility to otherwise ineligible aliens). The statutory immigration scheme also constrains the Attorney General's discretion in several ways, including mandating when an arriving alien must be placed in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), limiting the discretion of the Attorney General to parole aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), and denying the Attorney General the ultimate discretion to adjust the status of some otherwise eligible aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(f). Lopez is a Chevron step two case because of congressional silence; our case, however, is a Chevron step one case because Congress has clearly spoken on the issue of eligibility. We find the Attorney General's regulation to be inconsistent with that congressional determination. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 91, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002). 28 100 From the language and structure of the statute alone, we find the regulation to be inconsistent with the expressed intent of Congress. 29 Still, we do not lightly overturn regulations.