Opinion ID: 73383
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Appoint Independent Prosecutor

Text: Reed first contends that the district court erred in failing to appoint an independent prosecutor to pursue his criminal contempt proceeding. The government counters that Reed’s argument fails not only because he neglected to establish the entitlement to such an appointment, but also because he waived any right to the appointment of an independent prosecutor when he affirmatively chose to proceed without one. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42(b), which governs indirect, out of court criminal contempt, provides in part: Rule 42. Criminal Contempt .... 4 (b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b). Through its terms, rule 42(b) does not require the appointment of an independent prosecutor to pursue an indirect, out of court criminal contempt citation. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., the Supreme Court held that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as prosecutor in a contempt action alleging a violation of that order. 481 U.S. 787, 809 (1987). The Young Court instructed federal courts to request that the United States Attorney’s Office prosecute out of court criminal contempt charges, and, if the United States Attorney declines, to appoint as a special prosecutor a private lawyer other than the lawyer for an interested party. 481 U.S. at 801-02. Young further held that a district court’s appointment of counsel for an interested party as a contempt prosecutor is not subject to a harmless error analysis. 481 U.S. at 810. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Young, the two circuit courts of appeals to address the issue have split over whether rule 42(b), or the Supreme Court’s decision in Young, requires the appointment of an independent prosecutor in every out of court criminal contempt action. For example, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, the First Circuit observed that Young did not decide whether the district court must appoint a prosecutor in all out of court contempt: In Young, the [Supreme] Court did not consider whether a court may ever conduct criminal contempt proceedings without first appointing any prosecutor at all. It can be argued that, lacking a prosecutor, the judge himself must fill the role, leading to an unacceptable confusion of roles and a violation of the separation of powers. See Young, 481 U.S. at 815-25, 107 S. Ct. at 2141-47 5 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Although the question is not free from doubt, we believe that not all out of court contempt proceedings are fatally flawed by the failure to appoint a prosecutor. Where, as here, the judge is impartial and the evidence is so simple that the judge is not diverted from the role of impartial judge and factfinder, we are not convinced that a prosecutor must be appointed. 875 F.2d 927, 933-34 (1st Cir. 1989). Thus, the First Circuit concluded that rule 42(b) does not require the appointment of an independent prosecutor in every criminal contempt action -- particularly not a contempt action where, as in this case, no challenge to the judge’s impartiality exists and the evidence is not complex. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 875 F.2d at 934. In United States v. Neal, the Fourth Circuit, taking a different approach, interpreted Supreme Court precedent to hold that the appointment of an independent prosecutor is required in all indirect out of court criminal contempt proceedings: At the time of Neal’s hearing, the settled law of the Supreme Court was abundantly clear that the simultaneous assumption of the inconsistent roles of prosecutor and judge transgresses our most fundamental notions of procedural fairness. In In re Murchison, [75 S. Ct. 623 (1955),] the Supreme Court held that it was error for a judge to initiate, prosecute, and adjudicate charges of indirect criminal contempt. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137-39, 75 S. Ct. at 625-27; see also Young, 481 U.S. at 796-97, 107 S. Ct. at 2131-32 (accepting by implication that district court could not prosecute an indirect criminal contempt in ruling that the power to appoint a private attorney to prosecute indirect contempt was necessary to protect the authority of the judiciary). 101 F.3d 993, 998 (4th Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted). The Fourth Circuit in Neal concluded that it was plain error affecting substantial rights, and therefore reversible error, for the district court to fail to appoint an independent prosecutor and, instead, act as both prosecutor and judge: Our review of the record convinces us that it is appropriate to notice the plain error of the district court. The melding of the judicial and prosecutorial functions is a fundamental error that undercuts the dispersion of power among the branches and, as a result, casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. To allow a district court to investigate the matter, call the witnesses for the prosecution, conduct the direct examination of them, and sit in judgment of the defendant 6 undoubtedly undermines the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. 101 F.3d at 999-1000; see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Association, 968 F.2d 523, 531 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court erred when it “sua sponte initiated the contempt proceeding, questioned the witnesses and otherwise acted as prosecutor, and then decided all factual and legal issues”). Although the Eleventh Circuit has yet to address the issue of whether the district court is required to appoint an independent prosecutor in all out of court criminal contempt proceedings, this court need not decide the issue in this case because Reed expressly waived any right to have an independent prosecutor appointed. On January 23, 1997, at the first in a series of hearings on the contempt motion brought against Reed, Reed’s lawyer told the court that he had read the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Neal, and that the case required on the district court to appoint an independent prosecutor. MR. BOTTS: As I was reading under U.S. v. Neal in late November, the court may be under some obligation to appoint an independent prosecutor in the case if it’s a criminal contempt. THE COURT: I think I have the authority to use the attorney in this case for one of the parties who is charging the contempt, so that’s who I plan to use. MR. BOTTS: Right, but is that an independent one is all I am saying. THE COURT: I am not sure they’re independent. If you prefer to have a U.S. Attorney prosecute it, that’s the normal procedure. MR. BOTTS: Yes, sir, I understand the court can appoint somebody. My question is under the U.S. v. Neal is it an independent prosecutor -- THE COURT: Well, if you challenge the right of the party’s attorney to prosecute Mr. Reed I will appoint a U.S. Attorney to do it. Maybe that’s the best way to go particularly I understand you need some time. 7 Later, after the discussion over Reed’s need to continue the proceedings, the district court revisited the issue of the need for the appointment of an independent prosecutor. THE COURT: Since there is some concern on your part about having a party’s attorney prosecute the matter, I will appoint an assistant U.S. Attorney to do so. MR. BOTTS: That was -- In my brief ability to research, I did find that case, and it did seem to indicate that it needed to be an independent prosecutor, and that was what was taken up on appeal as to whether the court could do it themselves or whether somebody else -- Following further discussions on scheduling, the district court again raised the issue of appointment of an independent prosecutor: THE COURT: Since there is a concern about a party’s counsel prosecuting the matter, unless you have some other feeling about it, I am going to appoint an assistant U.S. Attorney to do so. MR. BOTTS: I can talk with my client about it. THE COURT: Why don’t you do that and contact Adrienne and let us know what you want. Because if you are going to raise an objection about it, I am just going to go ahead and appoint an assistant U.S. Attorney. That’s the safest thing. MR. BOTTS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: That also makes it a more important case, too. MR. BOTTS: No, I don’t want to do that. I wasn’t trying to say that. I was just trying to preserve his rights. THE COURT: Well, if that’s going to be a reservation on your part, I will appoint an assistant U.S. Attorney. MR. BOTTS: What I want to do is go back and read the case a little bit more thoroughly, and I will let the court know. When the district court indicated its preference to appoint an assistant U.S. Attorney to prosecute the contempt charges, Reed’s counsel stated that he would discuss the matter with Reed before 8 making a decision, and that counsel would advise the court of Reed’s decision at the next hearing. When the court reconvened on February 12, 1997, Reed’s counsel told the court that he and his client had decided to waive the appointment of an independent prosecutor: THE COURT: First, before we hear from the plaintiff, I think I will ask the defendant if they are ready to proceed, and if they have any objections to the case proceeding before me. MR. BOTTS: No sir, I would certainly not have any objection to it appearing before you. We also waived any objection to the appointment of a special prosecutor in the case, also. The most basic rights of criminal defendants are subject to waiver. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (criminal defendant can waive objection to magistrate judge’s supervision of jury selection in felony trial); Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 619 (1960) (failure to object to closing of courtroom is waiver of right to public trial); Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106, 111 (1927) (failure to object constitutes waiver of Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure); United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1365 (11th Cir. 1984) (absence of objection is waiver of double jeopardy defense). In this case, Reed chose to forego his right to the appointment of an independent prosecutor not merely in failing to object, but in affirmatively choosing to proceed without such appointment. Having decided after consultation with counsel, in open court, with full knowledge of the rights available to him under the Young and Neal decisions, Reed’s waiver of his right to the appointment of an independent prosecutor was knowing, voluntary and effective. It was Reed’s choice whether to