Opinion ID: 109429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: As we have frequently and consistently recognized:

Text: The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination has two primary interrelated facets: The Government may not use compulsion to elicit self-incriminating statements, see, e. g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547; and the Government may not permit the use in a criminal trial of self-incriminating statements elicited by compulsion. See, e. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U. S. 52, 57 n. 6 (1964). Indeed, only weeks ago we said that the privilege protects against the use of compelled statements as well as guarantees the right to remain silent absent immunity. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653 (1976) (emphasis supplied). Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), held that the Fifth Amendmentthe essential mainstay of our American system of criminal prosecution, id., at 7protects the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence. Id., at 8. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511, 514 (1967). As THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted last Term: This Court has always broadly construed [the Fifth Amendment] protection to assure that an individual is not compelled to produce evidence which later may be used against him as an accused in a criminal action. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 461 (1975). Further, a witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least against the use of his compelled answers and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972). Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 78 (1973). See Maness v. Meyers, supra, at 473 (WHITE, J., concurring in result). Thus, the Fifth Amendment not only excludes from use in criminal proceedings any evidence obtained from the defendant in violation of the privilege, but also is operative before criminal proceedings are instituted: it bars the government from using compulsion to obtain incriminating information from any person. Moreover, the protected information does not merely encompass evidence which may lead to criminal conviction, but includes information which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could lead to prosecution . . . . Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951). Maness v. Meyers, supra, at 461. And it is not necessary that a person be guilty of criminal misconduct to invoke the privilege; an innocent person, perhaps fearing that revelation of information would tend to connect him with a crime he did not commit, also has its protection.  `The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.'  Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 421 (1957), quoting Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551, 557-558 (1956). See E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 10-22 (1955); Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 472 (1957). Accordingly, the fact that no criminal proceedings were pending against Palmigiano, ante, at 317, does not answer the crucial question posed by this case. The evidentiary use of his statements in a criminal proceeding lurked in the background, but the significant element for this case is that the Fifth Amendment also prohibits the government from compelling an individual to disclose information that might tend to connect him with a crime. Maness v. Meyers, supra , pointed up this distinction in its recognition that availability of motions to suppress compelled testimonial evidence do not remedy the Fifth Amendment violation. 419 U. S., at 460, 463.