Opinion ID: 3009588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The Director had jurisdiction over these proceedings pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(h)(1). Seidman and Bailey filed timely petitions for review pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(h)(2). Because of the Director's remand to an ALJ for further findings on Seidman's and Bailey's ability to pay civil penalties, we must consider whether their petitions seek review of a final order. Generally, an order which decides all issues of liability but remands on issues of damages is not immediately appealable. See Teledyne Continental Motors v. United States, 906 F.2d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Here the agency clearly contemplates further action concerning civil penalties. So long as the assessment of monetary penalties is pending, the full impact the Director's decisions may have on either Seidman or Bailey is uncertain. Under FDIA, parties sanctioned by OTS may obtain a review of any order . . . by the filing in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the home office of the depository institution is located . . . within thirty days after the date of service of such order, a written petition praying that the order of the agency be modified, terminated, or set aside. . . . Upon the filing of such petition, such court shall have jurisdiction, which upon the filing of the record shall . . . be exclusive, to affirm, modify, terminate, or set aside, in whole or in part, the order of the agency. Review of such proceedings shall be had as provided in chapter 7 of Title 5. The judgment and decree of the court shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari . . . . 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(h)(2) (West 1989). Nothing in FDIA expressly states that the order must be a final one. We recognized in Shea v. OTS, 934 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1991), however, 'there is a strong presumption that judicial review is only available when an agency action becomes final . . . .' Id. at 44 (quoting Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 (1983)). This presumption recognizes that postponement of review until final action can sometimes avoid the inefficiency of piecemeal review and, in some cases, make any review unnecessary. CEC Energy Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 891 F.2d 1107, 1112 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Fidelity Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 502 F.2d 443, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) and Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 & n.24 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990 (1954)). In Shea we concluded, in this Circuit, the finality of a disposition is determined by its consequences[,] including whether the OTS's decision 'imposes an obligation' or 'denies a right.' Shea, 934 F.2d at 44-45. In CEC Energy we reasoned that [a]pplication of the ripeness doctrine prevents the entanglement of the courts in administrative policy disagreements and protects the agencies from judicial interference until decisions are formalized and their effects felt in a concrete way. CEC Energy Co., 891 F.2d at 1109 (citation omitted). We went on to state, [t]he doctrine of ripeness requires an evaluation of the fitness of the challenged issue for review and the hardship to the parties of withholding judicial consideration. Id. at 1109-10 (citation omitted); see also Federal Trade Comm'n. v. Standard Oil, Inc., 449 U.S. 232 (1980); Solar Turbines Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1080 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding Supreme Court's finality standard incorporates ripeness standard). An important but not dispositive factor is an agency's classification of its order as final. Because finality is a pragmatic requirement informed but not decided by an agency classification of its decision, we looked at several other factors in CEC Energy: 1) whether the decision represents the agency's definitive position on the question; 2) whether the decision has the status of law with the expectation of immediate compliance; 3) whether the decision has immediate impact on the day-to-day operations of the party seeking review; 4) whether the decision involves a pure question of law that does not require further factual development; and 5) whether immediate judicial review would speed enforcement of the relevant act. CEC Energy Co., 891 F.2d at 1110 (citing Solar Turbines Inc., 879 F.2d at 1080). Thus, we turn to the facts that are material to our jurisdiction over Seidman's and Bailey's petitions for review. Under the Director's order, Seidman is permanently removed from, and prohibited from returning to, the banking industry. The order denies Seidman a right to pursue the trade he has chosen. It also firmly concludes that Seidman is not fit to be a banker and that Bailey should be publicly reprimanded. The order notifies Seidman and Bailey of their right to petition for judicial review and the agency states it is final. Most significantly, the order demands immediate compliance and impacts immediately on Seidman's and Bailey's day-to-day affairs. OTS is currently enforcing the order precluding Seidman from taking part in the business of banking, and it is clear the agency has definitely decided to ban Seidman from that industry. Although the consequences to Bailey are not as harsh as those visited upon Seidman, the agency has indicated that it will engage in no further factual development or reconsideration of its order publicly directing Bailey to cease and desist from unsafe practices. The order has a continuing effect on Bailey's reputation and it too poses legal questions that can be fully reviewed at this time. In addition, Seidman's and Bailey's petitions pose questions that are mainly legal in nature and judicial review now is likely to facilitate the appropriate enforcement of applicable law. Because assessment of any civil penalties hinges on the Director's conclusion that Seidman and Bailey violated FIRREA, we believe review at this juncture serves the interest of judicial economy. This case turns not on the civil penalties that are yet to be determined on the Director's remand to an ALJ but on the legality of the decisions the Director has already made. The Director's decision 'imposes . . . obligation[s]' and 'denies. . . right[s].' Shea, 934 F.2d at 44-45. Therefore, we have jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(h)(2) to review the Director's order removing Seidman from his position at Crestmont and banning him permanently from the thrift industry, and directing Bailey to stop engaging in unsafe or unsound practices.17