Opinion ID: 196794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Chapter 93A liability.

Text: 67 Section 2 of Chapter 93A makes it unlawful to engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, §§ 2, 11 (section 11 makes section 2 applicable to businesses). Perhaps by design, the dimensions of Chapter 93A liability are difficult to discern with precision. Neither unfair nor deceptive is specifically defined in the statute; nor has the case law supplied precise definitions. There is a rubric: The objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce. Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass.App.Ct. 498, 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (1979); see also Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., Inc., 884 F.2d 1510, 1513 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting Levings ). But, as the Supreme Judicial Court has recently observed, the rhetoric of rascality is uninstructive. Massachusetts Employers Ins. Exch. v. Propac-Mass, Inc., 420 Mass. 39, 648 N.E.2d 435, 438 (1995). 68 Chapter 93A liability may exist if the defendant's conduct falls within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness or is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous. PMP Assoc., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915, 917 (1975). Thus, proof of a common law tort, while not necessary for liability, see Massachusetts Farm Bureau Federation, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 403 Mass. 722, 532 N.E.2d 660, 664 (1989) (a violation of G.L. c. 93A, § 11, need not be premised on a violation of an independent common law or statutory duty), may be sufficient. See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assoc., 411 Mass. 451, 583 N.E.2d 806, 822 (1991) (breach of implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing gave rise to Chapter 93A liability); VMark Software, Inc. v. EMC Corp., 37 Mass.App.Ct. 610, 642 N.E.2d 587, 594 (1994) (intentional misrepresentation provided basis for Chapter 93A liability). 69 Under this precedent, Napco's liability under Chapter 93A follows almost as a matter of course. The district court appropriately found that: 70 NAPCO, which knew throughout that the static mixer was not installed, learned that the system was not performing as warranted and nevertheless 1) failed to reveal knowledge within its possession which would have stemmed the tide of damages being caused by its own misconduct and 2) misdirected plaintiff's attention to operator error as the source of the System's shortcomings. 71 Cambridge Plating II, 876 F.Supp. at 337. This finding, which was not clearly erroneous, supports the conclusion that Napco behaved both deceptively and unfairly under Chapter 93A. 18 72 Moreover, Napco's argument--that Chapter 93A liability is inappropriate because its decision to omit the static mixer was simply a professional judgment--misses the mark. Even if at the time of installation Napco believed that the probability was small that the static mixer would make a difference to the system's performance, the probability was large enough that it should not have been ignored once Napco learned that Cambridge Plating was having problems. Yet even after Cambridge Plating had complained about the system's performance, Napco never seriously reconsidered its professed judgment about the static mixer. Napco also knew all along that it had provided Cambridge Plating with inaccurate drawings. So Napco also knew that Cambridge Plating would be handicapped in reaching its own conclusion on the matter. Where Napco knew the system was not performing as warranted, Napco was not free to ignore the fact that Cambridge Plating might benefit from knowing that the mixer had been omitted. Napco's silence became sufficiently unscrupulous to fall within a penumbra ... of [an] established concept of unfairness. PMP Assoc., 321 N.E.2d at 917. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment of liability for single damages under Chapter 93A. 73