Opinion ID: 1846346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Kruger's Performance Under the Subcontract

Text: Harbert and Federal contend that Kruger failed to fulfill its obligations under the terms of the Harbert-Kruger subcontract. The trial court concluded that the only reason Kruger did not fully perform its obligations under the subcontract was that it was impossible to do so, through no fault of its own. The trial court found that Kruger notified Harbert that it was ready to fully perform and it waited more than a reasonable time for approval to proceed with the final aspects of the subcontract before seeking final payment from Harbert and before filing its action. However, Harbert did not allow Kruger to perform because the Water Board had terminated Harbert's contract. The trial court's order notes that, when this case was tried, Kruger had been seeking final payment on the subcontract for over two years and that, during that time, Harbert had not once requested Kruger to perform any of the services it had not yet performed under the subcontract. Only after this litigation was filed did Harbert raise the issue of Kruger's failure to fully perform. The record supports the trial court's holding on this issue. In fact, Harbert's own evidentiary submission supports the trial court's holding. Kruger, through no fault of its own, was prevented from completing the requirements of its subcontract with Harbert. As a result, Kruger is excused from any further performance under the subcontract, and Kruger has a claim against Harbert under that subcontract. See Shirley v. Lin, 548 So.2d 1329, 1334 (Ala.1989) (Once a party to a contract repudiates the agreement, the other party is excused from further performance.); Health Care Mgmt. Corp. v. Rubenstein, 540 So.2d 77, 78 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989) (Because of the defendant's material breach of the contract, the plaintiff's future performance of the contract was excused and the plaintiff had an immediate cause of action for that breach.). See also Ex parte A.B./Wildwood Ltd. P'ship, 793 So.2d 784, 790 (Ala.2000) (Lyons, J., concurring in the result) (Once a party has committed an anticipatory breach, the other party is excused from further performance.); 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 531 (1999) (The party who is prevented by the other party from performing, or whose performance is made impossible by him or her, may treat the contract as broken or breached, or as repudiated, or rescinded, and may recover whatever damages he or she may have sustained, as if he or she had performed.). Thus, the fact that Kruger was prevented from fulfilling its obligations under the Harbert-Kruger subcontract does not prevent Kruger from recovering under the payment bond.