Opinion ID: 1959370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: R.Cr.P. 42(a) provides:

Text: Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record. [1] As the Reporter's Notes explain, V.R.Cr.P. 42(a) is procedural; the substantive legal standards for summary contempt are set by common law and statute. In Vermont, criminal contempt is an act committed directly against the authority of the court, tending to impede or interrupt its proceedings, or lessen its dignity. In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 90, 126 A. 550, 551 (1924) (emphasis supplied). The power to punish for contempt is indispensable to secure both the proper transaction and dispatch of business [and] the respect and obedience due to the court and necessary for the administration of justice. In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 258 (1859) (emphasis supplied). Orders of contempt are discretionary acts. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307, 9 S.Ct. 77, 80, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888); In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir.1981); Brooks v. Brooks, 131 Vt. 86, 92, 300 A.2d 531, 535 (1973) (civil case). Therefore, reversal is appropriate only if appellant shows that the trial court's discretion was either totally withheld or exercised on grounds clearly untenable or unreasonable. State v. Chambers, 144 Vt. 377, 381, 477 A.2d 974, 977 (1984). Appellant argues that, before summary contempt is permitted, not only must the conduct have occurred in the court's presence, but it must also so threaten orderly procedure that immediate action is necessary. Because the alleged contempt occurred at the conclusion of the proceeding and did not disrupt [its] orderly progress, appellant contends, his remark was not punishable under V.R.Cr.P. 42(a), and contempt charges could only be pursued before a different judge, under the delayed and more deliberate procedures set forth in V.R.Cr.P. 42(b). We disagree. Contempts committed in the face of the court are immediately punishable at the discretion of the judge without evidence or examination. Ex parte Terry, supra, 128 U.S. at 307, 312-13, 9 S.Ct. at 80, 82-83. In the instant case, the contempt was committed while the court was still in session; although sentence had been pronounced, the court was in the process of discussing with appellant's counsel the matter of credit for time already served. Thus, it was within the court's discretion to deal with the contempt immediately under V.R.Cr.P. 42(a). Compare Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925) (delivery of allegedly contemptuous letter on day following adverse jury verdict not punishable by summary contempt procedure). We also reject defendant's claim that contempts involving personal insults must always be directed to another judge at a later time under V.R.Cr.P. 42(b). A rule requiring that all flagrant personal insults be responded to only after delay would undermine the court's dignity and its authority. A judge is not merely an individual; he or she represents the authority of the law. As this Court has stated, the contempt power secures respect for the law by requiring respect and obedience to those who represent its authority. Its exercise is not merely personal to the court and its dignity; it is due to the authority of law and the administration of justice. Cooper, supra, 32 Vt. at 257. Where a single remark insults both the individual judge personally and the sovereign authority that the judge represents, the personal aspect does not require use of the delayed procedure of V.R.Cr.P. 42(b). However, because there is always the possibility that a personal insult will cause the trial judge to lose that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication, Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465, 91 S.Ct. 499, 505, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971), this Court must be ever watchful for distortion of the judge's sound discretion. In re Gustafson, supra, 650 F.2d at 1022. As authority for a delay requirement, appellant cites Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, supra, 400 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 505; United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 252 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 110, 78 L.Ed.2d 111 (1983); and United States v. Brannon, 546 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir.1977). However, unlike the present situation, the trial court in each of these cases found no pressing need to deal with the contempt immediately, delaying action in each instance until after trial. [2] When this procedure is followed, V.R.Cr.P. 42(b) will apply. As the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 1806, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975), when an affront to the court disrupts and frustrates an ongoing proceeding... summary contempt must be available. In this case, summary contempt was available to the judge, in his discretion, to act swiftly and firmly, id. at 319, 95 S.Ct. at 1808, in response to profanity uttered by appellant before the public and the court. We also conclude that the trial court did not exceed its discretion under V.R.Cr.P. 42(a) in imposing a ninety-day sentence. The record indicates that appellant had a history of seventy convictions, sufficient for him to be aware of proper courtroom behavior. Appellant had twice earlier disrupted the hearing, and had twice been warned. With the hearing drawing to a close, the court was justified in concluding that removal from the courtroom would be inadequate as a penalty. The penalty did not exceed that authorized for petty offenses. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 513-15, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 2691-93, 41 L.Ed.2d 912 (1974); State v. Moquin, 138 Vt. 160, 163, 411 A.2d 1355, 1357 (1980). Thus, the court's finding of summary contempt, and the punishment imposed therefor, was not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed.