Opinion ID: 1959742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Manner of Termination

Text: We now review the trial court's grant of summary judgment on appellant's claim of discrimination in the manner of termination. The essence of a disparate treatment case is that `[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' Shah v. General Elec. Co., 816 F.2d 264, 268 (6th Cir.1987) (citation omitted). As with her claim of discriminatory termination, here, too, appellant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment in the manner of termination. In support of her claim of discrimination in the manner of termination, appellant presented affidavits concerning the manner in which a male employee, David Johnston, was terminated. Johnston was asked to leave Associated General because of poor job performance. However, Johnston was given the position of Director of Special Projects for Associated General until he was able to secure other employment. Moreover, appellant stated that one of Associated General's employees told her that when frictions arose between Michael Kennedy, a male employee at Associated General, and another employee of the firm, Kennedy was reassigned to the position of Special Counsel with no one reporting to him instead of being terminated. In its motion for summary judgment, appellee claimed that appellant had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the manner of termination. Appellee argued that: [I]ndividual disparate treatment ... cases generally require indirect evidence from which an inference of discriminatory motive may be drawn, namely, comparative evidence demonstrating that the treatment of the plaintiff differs from that accorded to otherwise similarly situated individuals who are not within the plaintiff's protected group. Shah, supra, 816 F.2d at 268 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting B. Schlei and P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1291 (2d ed. 1983)). Therefore, in establishing her prima facie case, appellant was required to show that her manner of termination differed from the manner of termination for male employees who were similarly situated to her. See Hughes, supra, 583 F.Supp. at 70 (prima facie case of discriminatory firing requires plaintiff to show that other similarly situated employees, who were not members of protected class, were not terminated).  McDonnell Douglas teaches that it is plaintiff's task to demonstrate that similarly situated employees were not treated equally. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 1096 (citation omitted). Here, appellant did not proffer evidence of any similarly situated male employees of Associated General who were treated differently from her in the manner of their termination. She was not similarly situated to David Johnston. See Shah, supra, 816 F.2d at 270-71 (plaintiff, who worked for firm for nineteen months, was found not to be similarly situated to fellow employee who had worked for firm for over twenty years). It was undisputed that Johnston was a long-term employee who worked for Associated General for nearly twenty years. In his affidavit, Gentille explained Johnston's assignment to be Director of Special Projects. He stated that Johnston was not terminated promptly upon the determination of inadequate performance because of his long service with Associated General and because he had not engaged in improper conduct requiring immediate disciplinary action. Thus, the record is clear that appellant and Johnston were not similarly situated. Furthermore, the unnamed employee's remarks concerning Michael Kennedy were pure hearsay. Hearsay cannot be relied upon by one opposing summary judgment. See Super Ct.Civ.R. 56(e) (requiring parties to set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence ). Therefore, appellant's comparison of her treatment at the firm with Kennedy's could not be used to oppose appellee's motion for summary judgment. Moreover, appellee explained that Kennedy and appellant were not similarly situated because while appellant had engaged in misconduct, Kennedy had not. Hubert Beatty, Associated General's Executive Vice President, stated in his deposition that Kennedy's assignment as Special Counsel was not a form of discipline, and appellant has proffered nothing to dispute that assertion. Absent proof that other employees were similarly situated, it is not possible to raise an inference of discrimination. Shah, supra, 816 F.2d at 270. Because appellant did not proffer evidence that similarly situated male employees were treated differently from her, she failed to establish a prima facie case, and summary judgment was properly granted. [7] While the factual disputes involved in most Title VII suits preclude their resolution on summary judgment, summary judgment is available in an appropriate Title VII case. McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 67 (1982). Here, appellant was unable to proffer any competent evidence demonstrating discrimination in the manner of termination. It was undisputed that those men similarly situated to herthose fired because of their conductwere asked to resign. The record indicates that appellant was treated the same as those mennone received more severance pay than she, and none were demoted or transferred to other positions. Except for her naked assertion that men at Associated General were treated more leniently than she, appellant was unable to offer any evidence to support her claims of discrimination. Considering the record as a whole, we conclude that the Title VII case before us today is one in which summary judgment was properly granted. Accordingly, the judgment on appeal is Affirmed.