Opinion ID: 433580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scott v. Hammond

Text: 70 There is an additional reason for dismissal of the Scott complaint, apart from the preclusive effect of 1972 FWPCA on a cause of action based on the Illinois law of nuisance. He has not alleged harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right common to the general public which was allegedly interfered with by defendants. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Sec. 821C (1977). The order of the district court is reversed and the case remanded for dismissal.  Circuit Judge Robert A. Sprecher heard oral argument and voted at the post-argument conference to affirm. He died on May 15, 1982, before the preparation of this opinion 1 In addition to Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., plaintiffs rely on Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325, 93 S.Ct. 1590, 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973), and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1962), to establish a state's power to control pollution of its boundary waters, but the reliance is misplaced. In Askew the Supreme Court upheld Florida's power to impose liability for oil spills occurring within its own territorial waters. Nothing in the opinion indicates that Florida would have been able to extend that power to spills occurring in the territorial waters of other states. Similarly, nothing in Huron Portland Cement suggests that Detroit could have enforced its air pollution laws against ships outside of Michigan waters. Illinois remains free to regulate pollution of Lake Michigan from sources within Illinois, but it may not extend that regulatory authority to sources beyond its own borders 2 Our decision here is limited to the context of these cases, and to a holding that a remedy provided by the law of Illinois is not available herein. We do not address other dimensions of the complex legal issues that may be presented in transboundary pollution cases brought in the domestic courts of the state of discharge or the state of impact. See, e.g., Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, National Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213, 215 (6th Cir.) (application of law of state of discharge to international pollution dispute), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997, 95 S.Ct. 310, 42 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974); Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 391 n. 14 (D.C.Cir.1978) (application of United States law to federal government actions abroad affecting environment). See also Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 502-03, 91 S.Ct. 1005, 1011-12, 28 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971) (involvement of many state, interstate and international agencies in water pollution dispute supported Court's denial of leave to file original complaint); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 27 S.Ct. 618, 51 L.Ed. 1038 (1907) (applying federal common law to interstate air pollution dispute). Nothing in our decision precludes the application of Wisconsin or Indiana law by state or federal courts in one of those states at the suit of out of state parties affected by discharges in that state 3 We recognize that in the ordinary interstate tort the Constitution does not preclude the application of one state's law to determine liability and afford a remedy for acts done in another state and producing injury within the forum state. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court in Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258-59, 53 S.Ct. 599, 601, 77 L.Ed. 1158 (1933) stated: A person who sets in motion in one State the means by which injury is inflicted in another may, consistently with the due process clause, be made liable for that injury whether the means employed be a responsible agent or an irresponsible instrument. The cases are many in which a person acting outside the State may be held responsible according to the law of the State for injurious consequences within it. Thus, liability is commonly imposed under such circumstances for homicide, Commonwealth v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1; for maintenance of a nuisance, State v. Lord, 16 N.H. 357, 359; for blasting operations, Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark. 381, 386, 13 S.W. 1092; and for negligent manufacture, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050. In State v. Lord, an obstruction to a ditch in Maine caused the runoff of heavy rains to damage a road in New Hampshire. Other cases also recognized that an act which affects waters flowing between states performed in one state will give rise to a cause of action in another state if the effect on the water causes damage in the second state. See Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio 489 (1848) (draining a swamp in Pennsylvania injured a mill in Ohio); Howard v. Ingersoll, 17 Ala. 780 (1850) (dam on river in Georgia injured mill in Alabama) reversed on other grounds, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381, 14 L.Ed. 189 (1852) (jury improperly instructed on boundary; damaged mill may well have been in Georgia); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Craigo, 10 Tex.Civ.App. 238, 31 S.W. 207 (1895) (construction in Indiana Territory redirected river currents causing injury to land in Texas). But see Gilbert v. Moline Water Power & Manufacturing Co., 19 Iowa 319 (1866) (Iowa courts cannot take cognizance of the nuisance which resulted in flooding of Iowa lands when the river dividing Illinois from Iowa was dammed between an island in Illinois and the Illinois mainland). These cases are consistent with the general common law characterization of actions for damages to real property as local and therefore maintainable only in the state wherein the damaged land lies. Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 107, 15 S.Ct. 771, 39 L.Ed. 913 (1895); Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F.Cas. 660 (C.C.D.Va.1811) (No. 8,411); Wooster v. Great Falls Manufacturing Co., 39 Me. 246, 249 (1855) (dam across river between Maine and New Hampshire injured real estate in Maine); Eachus v. Trustees of the Illinois & Michigan Canal, 17 Ill. 534 (1856) (dam in Illinois injured Indiana land; suit can only be brought in Indiana); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Sec. 87, comment a (1969). Nonetheless, we think it evident from Milwaukee I that this doctrine is not applicable to the determination of liability and remedy for discharges within one state by its municipalities into an interstate body of water, which by their nature implicate uniquely federal concerns. In addition, the conflict and confusion which would arise from the imposition by the second state of a more restrictive effluent standard than would be applicable under FWPCA counsels rejection of this doctrine in the present circumstances. 4 The Governor of each state is responsible for identifying each area within his state which has substantial water quality control problems. Where such area is located in two or more states, the Governors shall consult and cooperate. Section 1288. The federal Administrator shall modify certain requirements with the concurrence of the State. Section 1311(g)(1), (h). The state (if appropriate) may grant certain time extensions. Section 1311(k). A state with an approved permit program may, in consultation with the Administrator, establish a compliance date where an innovative production process will be used. Section 1311(k). A state has certain primary responsibilities with respect to adopting and revising water quality standards, and making determinations and plans with respect to attainment of such standards. Section 1313. Each state is required to report on water quality of all navigable waters in such state. Section 1315. Each state may develop a procedure under state law for applying standards of performance for new sources in such state. Section 1316(c). Each state has primary responsibilities for enforcement of limitations in a permit issued by that state. Section 1319(a)(1). A state has certain powers with respect to sewage discharged from vessels into waters within such state. Section 1322(f), (3) and (4). Each state has certain responsibilities with respect to all publicly owned fresh water lakes in such state. Section 1324. The state (if appropriate) may impose different effluent limitations with respect to the thermal component of discharges. Section 1326(a). An applicant for federal license or permit shall provide a certification by the state in which the discharge originates. Section 1341(a). There are provisions for a state permit program for discharge of dredged or fill material within the state, with procedures to protect the interests of other states, the waters of which may be affected. Section 1344. It seems clear that where these provisions recognize or confer power upon a state, the reference is to the state within which the discharges under consideration occur 5 Illinois' basic grievance is that the permits issued to Milwaukee pursuant to the Act do not impose stringent enough controls on the discharges. Nevertheless, Illinois failed to participate in the permit issuing process when the Milwaukee permits were issued. See Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 325, 326, 101 S.Ct. at 1796, 1797. In light of the FWPCA's preemption of federal common law, that process seems now to be the appropriate federal forum for adjusting the competing claims of states in the environmental quality of interstate waters. Illinois' failure to participate in that process cannot now justify unilateral application of Illinois law to these discharges. If Illinois desires more stringent protection from out-of-state discharges, it must turn in the first instance to the EPA and federal law for the equitable accommodation of its interests 6 On its face it is arguable that Sec. 1370 contemplates only legislatively or administratively prescribed state standards. The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that it may refer to effluent limitations imposed as a result of court decrees under the common law of nuisance In fact the Senate Report on the FWPCA Amendments of 1972 stated with respect to the saving clause: It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages. S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971) (Emphasis added). See also S.Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971) (Report on the MPRSA) (the citizen-suit provision does not restrict or supersede any other right to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or the common law). It might be argued that the phrase any effluent standard or limitation in Sec. 505(e) [33 U.S.C. Sec. 1365(e) ] necessarily is a reference to the terms of the FWPCA. We, however, are unpersuaded that Congress necessarily intended this meaning. The phrase also could refer to state statutory limitations, or to effluent limitations imposed as a result of court decrees under the common law of nuisance. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1, 16 n. 26, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2624 n. 26, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981). 7 Under this interpretation, Sec. 1370(2) is not reduced to a nullity. The provision ensures that states retain their power to regulate discharges within their waters (including boundary waters). See supra n. 1 8 This construction is consistent with this court's former reading of the saving clause. In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir.1977) we said, Congress has chosen not to preempt state regulation when the state has decided to force its industry to create new and more effective pollution control technology. (Emphasis added.)