Opinion ID: 435832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: instruction on aiding and abetting4

Text: 11 With regard to the aiding and abetting jury instruction, Galiffa raises several sub-issues: (1) whether a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting a conspiracy; and (2) whether a fatal variance from the original indictment was created where Galiffa, although not originally charged in the indictment with aiding and abetting, may have been adjudged guilty of conspiracy as a result of the aiding and abetting instruction given to the jury. 12 Citing People v. Strauch, 240 Ill. 60, 88 N.E. 155 (1909), Galiffa contends that since the agreement is the essence of a conspiracy one can only aid and abet a conspiracy by facilitating the creation of the agreement to commit the substantive crime. 5 Galiffa contends that since there is no evidence demonstrating that he actually brought the parties together, he cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting the conspiracy. We believe this interpretation of the conspiracy statute is too restrictive. Although the petitioner is correct in stating that one can aid and abet a conspiracy by bringing the parties together to enter into the illicit agreement, a person can also be convicted of aiding and abetting a conspiracy for deeds other than acting as a liaison for the parties to the agreement. 13 In his treatise on criminal law, Professor LaFave enunciates his belief that the Supreme Court, although it has not explicitly ruled on this issue, would decide that a person can be guilty of aiding and abetting a conspiracy when the person commits an act designed to further the conspiracy. 6 The key, of course, is that the person must know of the conspiracy's existence at the time of his act. Without the crime of aiding and abetting a conspiracy, an unintended loophole would exist in the criminal justice system where an act is performed with full knowledge that it will further the ends of the illegal conspiracy. 7 14 We are not alone in expressing the view that one may aid and abet a conspiracy. United States v. Walker, 621 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.1980) involved a situation similar to the present case. The defendant in Walker was charged with conspiracy to import marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 952(a) and 963 and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846. On appeal, the defendant, like Galiffa, challenged a jury instruction on aiding and abetting the conspiracy. In rejecting the defendant's claim, the Fifth Circuit stated: 15 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 does not define a crime. It simply makes punishable as a principal one who aids or abets the commission of a substantive crime. 16 Id. at 165 (citations omitted). This circuit has also stated that the violation of the aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, does not constitute a separate offense (United States v. Gonzalez, 582 F.2d 1162, 1165 (7th Cir.1978)), but rather, the aider is punishable as a principal. United States v. Holleman, 575 F.2d 139, 144 (7th Cir.1978). The Walker court went on to state: 17 [a]ppellant seeks to distinguish these cases, urging that he was charged not as a principal, but as a conspirator in a conspiracy, a distinct 'inchoate' offense similar to, but different from aiding and abetting. However, if we accept the Eighth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Rector, 538 F.2d 223, 225 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 963, 99 S.Ct. 2410, 60 L.Ed.2d 1068 (1979), that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 is applicable to the entire criminal code, it would be applicable to conspiracy. 18 Walker, 621 F.2d at 166. We agree with the Walker court that if one can aid and abet a robbery, one can also aid and abet a conspiracy, which is a separate chargeable offense in and of itself. 19 The Ninth Circuit is also in accord with this view. In United States v. Lane, 514 F.2d 22 (9th Cir.1975), the defendant, while not assisting in the formation of the original agreement, was found guilty of aiding and abetting a conspiracy to distribute narcotics. In Lane, a defendant owned a shortwave radio over which he monitored police calls. After hearing that a pending drug deal was actually a setup, the defendant called the three persons who intended to make the deal in order to inform them that the parties to whom they were about to sell drugs were undercover policemen. The defendant was found guilty of aiding and abetting the conspiracy to sell narcotics at trial and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. 20 Finally, a Fifth Circuit decision also recognizes that as an alternate theory of criminal liability one can aid and abet a conspiracy without necessarily participating in the original agreement. See United States v. Alvarez, 610 F.2d 1250, 1257 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Alvarez, 625 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc ). Therefore, assuming that knowledge of the conspiracy is established, these cases demonstrate that one can aid and abet a conspiracy at any stage and not merely at the time of the agreement. 21 Under this approach, there is more than sufficient evidence to prove that Galiffa knew of the conspiracy. For over two years he resided in a house that was used as a drug distribution center. He was present when drug transactions were made and he accompanied other members of the conspiracy on drug courier trips. He was in the rented truck carrying the marijuana from the warehouse to the residence in Ingleside, Illinois and was arrested with the other defendants as they attempted to unload the truck. It is eminently clear that Galiffa did in fact have knowledge of the conspiracy. 22 Having determined that one can aid and abet a conspiracy and that Galiffa did have knowledge of the conspiracy, it must be determined whether Galiffa did in fact aid and abet the conspiracy. In order to aid and abet the evidence must demonstrate that the defendant was associated with a criminal venture, participated in it as something he wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.1938); United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir.1980). In the present case, the evidence demonstrates that Galiffa not only drove on trips to pick up marijuana from suppliers but he also performed other errands such as weighing and marking bales of marijuana, issuing receipts and delivering marijuana to customers from the basement of the house. Finally, on the day of his arrest, Galiffa traveled to a forest preserve with Ashenfelter, assembled boxes which were later filled with marijuana by Ashenfelter at another location, traveled back to the house from the preserve in the loaded truck, and attempted to unload the marijuana just prior to his arrest. We hold that the evidence, when viewed in its entirety and in the light most favorable to the government, sufficiently establishes that Galiffa did in fact aid and abet the conspiracy. 23 Even though one can be guilty of aiding and abetting the conspiracy, and the evidence in this case demonstrates that Galiffa did aid and abet, we must next determine whether the district court nevertheless erred by instructing the jury on the question of aiding and abetting. The district court can commit reversible error when it strays from the original indictment by either allowing an amendment to the indictment at trial or permitting a variance in the proof presented. A judicial amendment of the indictment, whether implicit or explicit, is per se reversible error, Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), while a variance in proof from the original indictment justifies reversal only when the defendant has been prejudiced. United States v. Salinas, 654 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Bursten, 453 F.2d 605 (5th Cir.1971); Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C.Cir.1969). 24 This difference in treatment is attributable to the difference in the rights of the defendant that are affected. Where the indictment is amended, 'the defendant's substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury' ... is violated. In contrast where the evidence proves facts different from those alleged in the indictment--resulting in a variance--the defendant may be deprived of notice of the details of the charge against him. 25 Salinas, 654 F.2d at 323-24. While Galiffa's position is not completely clear, he appears to allege that the jury instruction on aiding and abetting erroneously amended the indictment or, in the alternative, surprised him to his prejudice. 26 With regard to the fatal amendment challenge, we hold that the district court's instruction on aiding and abetting did not constitute reversible error. This court has previously held that the aiding and abetting charge under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2(a) need not be specifically pleaded and a defendant indicted for a substantive offense can be convicted as an aider and abettor upon a proper demonstration of proof so long as no unfair surprise results. United States v. Tucker, 552 F.2d 202, 204 (7th Cir.1977). If the trial court determines that the evidence warrants an aiding and abetting instruction, it is immaterial, although preferable, whether 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 is actually charged in the indictment. An aider is punishable as a principal. United States v. Holleman, 575 F.2d 139, 144 (7th Cir.1978). This is the rule in other circuits as well. See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 430 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir.1970) (listing cases from the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits supporting this rule). See also United States v. Smith, 727 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.1984). For example, in United States v. Walker, 621 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.1980), the defendant was indicted for conspiracy but was later found guilty of aiding and abetting the conspiracy. The court stated: 27 The [district] court did not err in giving an instruction on aiding and abetting even though the defendant was not specifically indicted on that count. As we noted in United States v. Bullock, 451 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir.1971), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 is an alternative charge in every count, whether explicit or implicit, 'and the rule is well-established, both in this circuit and others, that one who has been indicted as a principal may be convicted on evidence showing that he merely aided and abetted the commission of the offense.'  28 Id. at 166 (footnote omitted). The reason for this rule is that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 does not create a separate offense. It simply makes those who aided and abetted a crime punishable as principals. United States v. Gonzalez, 582 F.2d 1162, 1165 (7th Cir.1978); United States v. Walker, 621 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir.1980). We therefore hold that there was no fatal amendment to the indictment where the defendant may have been convicted as a principal in the conspiracy by aiding and abetting the conspiracy even though he was not charged with aiding and abetting in the original indictment. 29 A variance occurs when the terms of the indictment are unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.Cir.1969). Even assuming a variance did in the present case exist, no prejudice resulted from it. Because aiding and abetting does not constitute a separate crime, all indictments are to be read as if the alternative provided by the aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 is included therein. United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 174 (4th Cir.1975). See also United States v. Walker, 621 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir.1980). 30 In Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962), the court delineated the criteria by which an indictment is to be measured: 31 These criteria are, first, whether the indictment 'contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, ' and, secondly, ' in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offense, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction. Cochran and Sayre v. United States, 157 U.S. 286, 290 [15 S.Ct. 628, 630, 39 L.Ed. 704 (1895) ]; Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 34 [16 S.Ct. 434, 435, 40 L.Ed. 606 (1896) ].'  32 Id. 369 U.S. at 763-64, 82 S.Ct. at 1046-47. The latter criteria is not at issue in this case. As to the former, the present indictment sufficiently informed Galiffa of the offense with which he was charged and later convicted. The indictment under Count I charging conspiracy stated, in pertinent part, that: 33 STUART ASHENFELTER, 34 LEROY SCHUBERT, 35 TOM GALIFFA, RICHARD KASVIN, also known as 36 Mr. Smith, SUSAN SCHWIND, 37 KATHRYN RODGER, RICHARD GIOSH, and 38 RONALD VALUZZI, 39 defendants herein, wilfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree together, ... (a) to knowingly and intentionally distribute marijuana, ... and (b) to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute marijuana .... 40 2. It was part of the conspiracy that the aforementioned individuals would and did possess with intent to distribute, distribute and cause to be distributed quantities of marijuana. 41