Opinion ID: 2081366
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Presence of the Expert in the Courtroom

Text: In the course of pretrial proceedings, the state had sought permission to have its anticipated expert psychiatric witness, Dr. Kelly, examine Victor. The court declined to grant unequivocal permission for such an examination; instead, it imposed certain restrictions on the scope of Dr. Kelly's examination of Victor. Most notably, the order issued by the Superior Court specifically barred Dr. Kelly from inquiring about the actual factual basis of the death of Rosa Perez. With these restrictions in mind, Dr. Kelly examined Victor in the presence of defense counsel on March 21, 2001. Thereafter, he composed a psychiatric evaluation based upon his interview with Victor, as well as upon various medical and police reports that the state made available to him for his review. During the actual trial, at the close of the state's case-in-chief, the trial justice heard arguments on Victor's motion to sequester Dr. Kelly, whom the state intended to present in rebuttal of the defendant's diminished-capacity defense. Defense counsel argued that Dr. Kelly should not be allowed to be present in the courtroom during Victor's testimony because when he subsequently offered expert testimony, the jury's knowledge of his presence would (according to defense counsel) constitute a form of impermissible bolstering. The state objected to the motion to sequester Dr. Kelly, arguing that Dr. Kelly's presence in the courtroom during Victor's testimony was essential to its case; the state emphasized that Dr. Kelly had previously been precluded by court order from inquiring about the murder during his examination of defendant. After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial justice denied defendant's motion to sequester. Victor asserts that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to sequester Dr. Kelly. He continues to argue that Dr. Kelly's expert testimony was, in effect, a form of impermissible vouching or bolstering. A trial justice is vested with the inherent authority to sequester witnesses during trial testimony for the purpose of preventing that witness from shaping his or her testimony to conform to that of other witnesses. State v. Mathias, 423 A.2d 484, 486 (R.I.1980). The decision by a trial justice to exclude a witness from the courtroom is discretionary and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Id.; see also State v. McDowell, 685 A.2d 252, 258 (R.I.1996); State v. Raposa, 100 R.I. 516, 517, 217 A.2d 469, 470 (1966); State v. Cyrulik, 100 R.I. 282, 284, 214 A.2d 382, 383-84 (1965). It should be noted, however, that a trial justice's discretionary power to exclude witnesses is not unlimited; that power is restricted by the explicit provisions of Rule 615 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Pursuant to Rule 615(3), a witness may not be excluded from the courtroom if ( inter alia ) that person's presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of that party's cause. [14] In denying Victor's motion to sequester, the trial justice observed that it is not unusual for an expert who is expected to give an opinion later in the trial to remain in the courtroom during the trial testimony. The trial justice also noted that Dr. Kelly's opportunity to examine defendant before trial had been restricted at the request of defense counsel and that, as a result, he was satisfied that the State's request to have the doctor present during defendant's testimony is well-founded and, indeed, comports with the exception of Rule 615(3). We agree with this determination. In the trial of this case, defendant raised the defense of diminished capacity in an attempt to show that, at the time that he killed his mother, he lacked the necessary specific intent to commit murder. Bearing in mind that the prosecution had the burden of proving each and every element of the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, it was necessary for the prosecution to rebut Victor's defense by proving that he was not suffering from diminished capacity. See State v. Pacheco, 481 A.2d 1009, 1028 (R.I.1984). In light of the foregoing considerations, it is our opinion that the trial justice correctly found that Dr. Kelly's expert testimony was essential to the prosecution's presentation of its rebuttal; and it is further our opinion that the trial justice correctly held that, in view of that preliminary finding, Rule 615(3) would not permit the exclusion of Dr. Kelly from the courtroom during Victor's testimony. [15]