Opinion ID: 172687
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was It A Search?

Text: This Court has not previously considered whether an officer’s intentional act of minimally intruding the air space of a lawfully stopped vehicle for an investigatory purpose constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It is not a simple question. The protections of the Fourth Amendment apply to the interior of automobiles, at least to some extent. In New York v. Class, the Supreme Court held an officer conducted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he opened a car door and reached into the interior of the vehicle to move papers obscuring the area of the dashboard where the vehicle identification number (VIN) is typically located. 475 U.S. 106, 108, 115 (1986). The Court explained: “While the interior of an automobile is not subject to the same -9- expectations of privacy that exist with respect to one’s home, a car’s interior as a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police.” Id. at 114-15. Similarly, in United States v. Ryles, the Fifth Circuit held a trooper’s act of either opening the driver’s side door or sticking his head inside an open window constituted a search because the officer “intruded a space that, under most circumstances, is protected by a legitimate expectation of privacy.” 6 988 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 363 (10th Cir. 1989) (“People have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interiors of their automobiles . . . .”). In Kyllo v. United States, the Court remarked: “When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to ‘search’ meant to look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection . . . .” 533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (quotations omitted). Rodriguez’s actions satisfy this definition S he leaned his head into Montes-Ramos’ car to examine by inspection whether the car smelled of marijuana. The fact that the intrusion was minimal does not affect the analysis. In Kyllo, the Court explained: “[T]here is certainly no exception to the warrant requirement for the officer who barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing but the nonintimate rug on the vestibule floor.” 533 U.S. at 37; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (refusing to uphold an 6 The Fifth Circuit went on to conclude the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was reasonable. Ryles, 988 F.2d at 15-16. -10- “actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area” despite the fact the intrusion was “by even a fraction of an inch”). 7 Over a century ago, Justice Bradley explained: “It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.” Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). If, as Class instructs, the interior airspace of the car is protected, then it must be protected from minimal intrusions as well as flagrant ones. The only basis we can see for concluding Rodriguez’s sniff was not a search is by analogy to cases involving canine sniffs. In Illinois v. Caballes, the Court held a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop “does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.” 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). The Court explained: The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 410. We are attracted by the reasoning in Caballes; but it is significant that 7 We recognize Kyllo and Silverman involved intrusions into the home, which is subject to greater Fourth Amendment protection than an automobile. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31. That said, we believe the principle that a minimal intrusion can violate the Fourth Amendment is not limited to intrusions into the home. -11- the dog sniff at issue there was conducted on the exterior of the car. While it revealed information about the car’s contents, the dog did not actually intrude into the car’s protected space. 8 Moreover, because a drug dog is trained to alert only to the presence of drugs, its “search” will only disclose information about the presence of certain contraband; it will reveal nothing about other (presumably innocent) smells. Though farfetched, Rodriguez’s sniff could have revealed information about Montes-Ramos’ private, lawful activities – the perfume of a recently departed passenger, a recently consumed lunch, a wet dog – as well as illegal activities – contraband or perhaps a decomposing body. We conclude a police officer’s intentional act of intruding a vehicle’s air space, even if by only a few inches, constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It would be different if Rodriguez had smelled marijuana 8 We have found no Fourth Amendment violation where a dog “instinctive[ly]” jumped into an open hatchback and where “[t]here [was] no evidence . . . that the police asked [the defendant] to open the hatchback so the dog could jump in” and no “evidence the police handler encouraged the dog to jump in the car.” Stone, 866 F.2d at 364; see also United States v. Vazquez, 555 F.3d 923, 930 (10th Cir. 2009). However, in United States v. Winningham, we distinguished Stone and suppressed contraband discovered in a vehicle following a canine sniff of the interior where the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that the car contained narcotics and opened the vehicle door through which the dog jumped. 140 F.3d 1328, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1998). “[T]he consensus among the courts that have addressed this question appears to be that a canine sniff that migrates from outside a car or other container to the interior does not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided that the canine makes entry into the suspect vehicle of its own initiative and is neither encouraged into nor placed in the vehicle by a law enforcement officer.” United States v. Hutchinson, 471 F. Supp. 2d 497, 506 (M.D. Pa. 2007). -12- prior to leaning into Montes-Ramos’ vehicle. Under the plain view doctrine, “a law enforcement officer [may] seize evidence of a crime, without violating the Fourth Amendment, if (1) the officer was lawfully in a position from which the object seized was in plain view, (2) the object’s incriminating character was immediately apparent . . . and (3) the officer had a lawful right of access to the object.” United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 748 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). The plain view doctrine is equally applicable to plain smells, such that no search occurs if a police officer detects an odor of illegal drugs, alcohol, chemicals or the like from a location in which he is entitled to be. See id. at 748 (“The plain smell doctrine . . . is simply a logical extension of the plain view doctrine . . . .”) (quotations omitted); United States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 784 (10th Cir. 1980) (“This Circuit has held that the smelling of marijuana by an experienced observer furnishes probable cause for the search.”); see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]romas that are generated in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or opium den, enter the public domain if and when they leave a building.”). But Rodriguez did not smell marijuana prior to leaning his head into Montes-Ramos’ vehicle. Instead he was suspicious Montes-Ramos might be trafficking drugs and leaned his head in “[f]or assurance.” (R. Vol. III at 16.)