Opinion ID: 1754868
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the Chancellor Erred in Allowing Testimony Concerning the Rejection of Certain Evidence by the Court in the Previous Conservatorship Hearing.

Text: ¶ 26. This issue is related to the admissibility of the judgment already discussed, though it deals more specifically with the previous chancellor's reaction to particular evidence which was before him in the prior proceeding. Four of the proponents' witnesses, including Sue Collins, Dr. Stumme, Vicki Price and James Homan, had testified for Mask at the 1987 hearing on whether Mask's conservatorship should be terminated. At the trial here under consideration, they were cross-examined by contestants' counsel as to whether the chancellor in the previous hearing had rejected their similar testimony there and determined that Mask's conservatorship should be continued. Thus, the jury was exposed to the prospect of accepting or rejecting evidence which it was told was accepted or rejected on a previous occasion by a judge. ¶ 27. Our first inquiry concerns whether this evidence of the previous court's decision to reject certain evidence and continue Mask's conservatorship was relevant to the issue of Mask's testamentary capacity some nine months later. Under the rules, the concept of relevance is given a broad construction. Relevant evidence is that `having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.' Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So.2d 770, 773 (Miss. 1997) (quoting MidSouth Rail Corp. v. O'Connor, 672 So.2d 1176, 1182 (Miss. 1996)); Miss. R. Evid. 401. The comment to Miss. R. Evid. 401 notes that [e]vidence is relevant if it is likely to affect the probability of a fact of consequence in the case. See Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Dixie Contractors, Inc., 375 So.2d 1202, 1205 (Miss. 1979). ¶ 28. In spite of this broad definition, it strikes this Court as irrelevant to show that some prior factfinder, whether judge or jury, did or did not accept certain evidence. We noted as much in Sample, 643 So.2d 524, in which a criminal defendant charged with possession of illegal drugs sought to introduce evidence of a civil judgment in a previous forfeiture proceeding arising out of the same circumstances. In the civil proceeding, the trial court had ruled in favor of the defendant because the State failed to refute [the defendant's] claim that he had earned the money legitimately. Id. at 527. This Court refused to allow the defendant to introduce the evidence to prove that he was not involved in the drug trade, remarking that [t]he fact the trial judge did not require Sample to forfeit a certain sum of money found inside his automobile would not have a tendency to make more or less probable his innocence of marijuana or cocaine possession. Id. at 528. Similarly, the conclusion by the chancellor that Mask was unable to attend to his affairs merely represents the opinion of a separate factfinder based upon evidence presented to him at that time, and does not make it more or less probable that Mask possessed testamentary capacity when he executed his will nine months later. ¶ 29. The issue before the court in the conservatorship hearing was whether Mask was generally capable of handling his business affairs alone, while the issue before the jury in the case below was whether Mask was mentally capable or whether he may have experienced a lucid interval on February 22, 1988, such that at that time he had testamentary capacity. Thus, evidence of the chancellor's previous assessment of testimony before him with respect to the need for a conservatorship was of no moment to the subsequent factfinders. Moreover, any such determination was a conclusion reached based upon evidence presented by others, and as such, it is a form of hearsay. ¶ 30. The chancellor's acceptance or rejection of evidence proffered at the conservatorship hearing concerning Mask's ability to manage his affairs at that time was totally irrelevant to the task of the will contest jury to assess testimony from the same witnesses, even if identical in content, with regard to a determination whether Mask had testamentary capacity at the time that he executed his will.