Opinion ID: 181375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: A Significant Purpose To Obtain Foreign Intelligence Information Is Sufficient to Support the Application of FISA's Standards to Surveillance Applications

Text: Abu-Jihaad does not dispute the considerations prompting Congress's adoption of the significant purpose amendment. Rather, he argues that if FISA's probable cause standards are applied without a primary government purpose to obtain foreign intelligence information, the executive will be able to manipulate FISA to obtain surveillance warrants for criminal investigations without demonstrating the probable cause required by Title III for that purpose. Because we conclude that the required certification of a significant purpose to obtain foreign intelligence information adequately protects against this possibility, we reject Abu-Jihaad's constitutional challenge to this language. As Congress and the courts have recognized, government investigations relating to national security frequently pursue more than one purpose. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78 (stating that, in enacting FISA, Congress recognized that in many cases the concerns of the government with respect to foreign intelligence will overlap those with respect to law enforcement); see also In re FISA Section 105B Directives, 551 F.3d at 1011 (A surveillance with a foreign intelligence purpose often will have some ancillary criminal law purpose.). Indeed, multiple purposes may be inevitable given FISA's definition of foreign intelligence information and agent of a foreign power by reference to serious criminal conduct. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 724 (observing that foreign intelligence information as defined in FISA `can include evidence of certain crimes relating to sabotage, international terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities' (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 95-1283, at 49 (1978)) (emphasis omitted)); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (defining agent of foreign power by reference to involvement in, inter alia, clandestine intelligence gathering, sabotage, and international terrorism). In such circumstances, intelligence and law enforcement purposes `tend to merge,' making it difficult to identify one as primary. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 724-25 (quoting S.Rep. No. 95-701, at 10-11, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3911-12 (1978)). Indeed, as experience has taught, if the executive is required to certify that its primary purpose in conducting surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information, it may well have to exclude law enforcement officials from playing any part in the surveillance. Such a segregation of purposes makes no sense in terms of protecting national security. See id. at 727 ([I]f one considers the actual ways in which the government would foil espionage or terrorism it becomes apparent that criminal prosecution analytically cannot be placed easily in a separate response category.). More important for our purposes, it is not compelled by the Fourth Amendment. For Fourth Amendment purposes, the critical question is not whether the executive can certify that obtaining foreign intelligence information is its primary purpose, but whether it can certify that it is a bona fide purpose of the surveillance. Thus, where the executive in good faith pursues both intelligence and law enforcement purposes, it may apply for surveillance authority under either FISA or Title III, provided it satisfies the particular warrant standards of the statute invoked. A Fourth Amendment concern would arise only if the executive, without a bona fide purpose to obtain foreign intelligence information, tried to secure a warrant under the standards identified in FISA as reasonable for that purpose. We need not here decide at what point a purpose advanced by the executive might be so trivial as to preclude it from being pursued in good faith. Congress adequately safeguarded against that possibility in FISA by demanding certification of a significant purpose to obtain foreign intelligence information, rather than simply a purpose as originally requested by the executive. Moreover, the FISA Review Court, whose rulings bind the FISA Court in issuing surveillance warrants under the statute, has construed the significant purpose standard to require that the government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than just criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes. Id. at 735. [28] Indeed, the FISA Review Court has ruled that the significant purpose requirement specifically excludes from the purpose of gaining foreign intelligence information a sole objective of criminal prosecution, even for foreign intelligence crimes. Id.; see also id. at 736 (rejecting government's argument that significant purpose requirement allowed it to have primary objective of prosecuting foreign agent for non-foreign-intelligence crime, and noting that the manifestation of such a purpose would disqualify an application). The FISA Review Court has also plainly ruled that the government's certified purpose in seeking a FISA warrant is subject to judicial review. See id. at 735-36 (recognizing FISA Court's authority to seek more information pertaining to government's purpose). While a significant purpose standard eliminates any justification for the FISA Court to balance the relative weight the government places on criminal prosecution, if the court determines that the government's sole objective is merely to gain evidence of past criminal conducteven foreign intelligence crimesto punish the agent rather than halt ongoing espionage or terrorist activity, the application should be denied. Id. at 735. Thus, the FISA Review Court has ruled that to satisfy the significant purpose test, it must appear that the government entertains a realistic option of dealing with the target of the FISA surveillance other than through criminal prosecution. Id. We do not here decide which, if any, of these FISA Review Court conclusions are constitutionally compelled. We conclude simply that FISA's significant purpose requirement, so construed, is sufficient to ensure that the executive may only use FISA to obtain a warrant when it is in good faith pursuing foreign intelligence gathering, the purpose for which that statute's warrant standards apply. The fact that the government may also be pursuing other purposes, including gathering evidence for criminal prosecution, compels no different conclusion. Accordingly, we reject Abu-Jihaad's argument that FISA is unconstitutional because it does not require certification of a primary purpose to obtain foreign intelligence information. Rather, we hold that certification of a significant purpose to obtain foreign intelligence information, together with satisfaction of all other FISA requirements, is reasonable and, therefore, sufficient to support the issuance of a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. 2. FISA Was Lawfully Applied to This Case Abu-Jihaad submits that, even if FISA is not unconstitutional on its face, his conviction must be vacated because the statute's conditions were not satisfied in securing some of the evidence supporting his conviction. Specifically, Abu-Jihaad contends that the government's application for a surveillance order (a) failed to satisfy the significant purpose requirement of 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B); (b) failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that he was an agent of a foreign power or that his telephones were being used or about to be used by a foreign power or agent of such a power, see id. § 1804(a)(3)(A)-(B); (c) included clearly erroneous § 1804(a)(6) certifications; and (d) was based on false statements, requiring a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Moreover, he faults the district court for deciding these questions against him without affording him access to the FISA warrant application papers and an adversarial hearing. a. The District Court Properly Denied Disclosure and a Hearing In FISA, Congress expressly provided that where, as here, the Attorney General certifies that disclosure [of FISA materials] or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States, a district court must review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and conducted. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). While the district court retains authority to order disclosure of FISA materials under appropriate security procedures and protective orders, it may do so only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance. Id. Where the court determines that the surveillance was lawfully authorized and conducted, it shall deny the motion of the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process requires discovery or disclosure. Id. § 1806(g). Mindful of these provisions, we have concluded that disclosure of FISA materials is the exception and ex parte, in camera determination is the rule. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d at 129 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Here the district court found that review of the FISA materials in this case [was] relatively straightforward and not complex. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F.Supp.2d 299, 310 (D.Conn.2008). Further, while keeping the requirements of the Constitution, the statute, and Duggan fixed firmly in mind[,] the district court determined that disclosure and an adversary hearing were unnecessary because its in camera, ex parte review permitted it to assess the legality of the challenged surveillance and the requirements of due process did not counsel otherwise. Id. at 311 & n. 11. Upon our own review of the materials supporting the challenged FISA orders, we reach the same conclusions. Accordingly, we identify no denial of due process in the district court's decision not to order disclosure of FISA materials to the defendant, or to conduct a preliminary hearing to rule on Abu-Jihaad's challenge to FISA's implementation in this case.