Opinion ID: 2537152
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Means's motion for post-conviction relief

Text: ¶ 7. The trial court summarily dismissed Means's PCR motion, finding it to be procedurally barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding that Means's motion was barred by the waiver bar in Section 99-39-21(1) and by the successive-writ bar in Section 99-39-23(6). Means, 43 So.3d at 462-65. Means did not object to his banishment at the sentencing hearing, and he did not raise this issue in his first PCR motion. So the present PCR motion should be procedurally barred. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 99-39-21(1), 99-39-23(6) (Rev.2007); Reed v. State, 536 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss.1988). ¶ 8. But a PCR motion is excepted from the successive-writ bar if the petitioner claims that ... his probation, parole or conditional release has been unlawfully revoked. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev.2007) (emphasis added). In his PCR motion, Means asked the trial court to vacate [his] illegal sentence and unauthorized revocation. He argued that the trial court was not authorized to order the banishment without placing him on probation, that the court was limited to imposing a five-year term of probation, and that his twenty-five-year banishment, without probation, was thus unenforceable. Because of this, Means claimed that the court was without judicial authority to revoke his suspended sentence for violating the banishment. ¶ 9. Means's sentence was suspended, and he was released, upon several conditions, including the banishment. So Means's suspended sentence was a conditional release, in the parlance of Section 99-39-23(6), and his suspended sentence was revoked for violating the banishment condition. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) (Rev.2007). We agree with Means that, if the banishment condition was illegal, unauthorized, or otherwise improper, then the revocation of the suspension for violating the banishment was unlawful, and Means's PCR motion should be excepted from the successive-writ bar in Section 99-39-23(6). Id. ¶ 10. Additionally, this Court recently held unequivocally that errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars of the UPCCRA. Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503 (Miss.2010) (emphasis in original) (citing Luckett v. State, 582 So.2d 428, 430 (Miss.1991), holding [e]rrors affecting fundamental constitutional rights may be excepted from procedural bars which would otherwise prohibit their consideration... but overruling Luckett 's discretionary may language). Means argued in his PCR motion that the trial court's imposition of his banishment violated his constitutional rights to fundamental and procedural due process of law.... Due process of law is a fundamental right guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Mississippi Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....); Miss. Const. art. 3, § 14 (No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.). ¶ 11. Our opinion should not be read to mean that every alleged violation of the Due-Process Clause involves a fundamental constitutional right. Our power to regulate procedural burdens [is] subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause if it `offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 367, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)). So if the trial court violated Means's fundamental due-process rights by imposing the banishment, his PCR motion should be excepted from the waiver bar in Section 99-39-21(1). ¶ 12. But as the Court of Appeals has explained, merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars. There must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim before the [procedural bar] will be waived. Crosby v. State, 16 So.3d 74, 79 (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (citing Stovall v. State, 873 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Miss.Ct.App. 2004)). So we must review the record surrounding the imposition of Means's banishment to determine whether there is any arguable basis for his claim that his due-process rights were violated by the banishment and that his conditional release was unlawfully revoked for violating the banishment. But before we do so, we must outline the standards for proper banishments.