Opinion ID: 782391
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appeal and Habeas

Text: 14 On direct appeal, Wade argued that by precluding Folk's testimony, the court violated Wade's right under the New York and federal constitutions to present a complete defense. The Appellate Division, however, affirmed Wade's conviction, holding that 15 [t]he trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion by limiting the defendant's examination of one of his witnesses. Even though a defendant has a right to introduce evidence that a person other than himself committed the crime ( see, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297), the evidence must do more than raise a mere suspicion that another person committed the crime. In this case, the defendant failed to show a clear link between the third party and the crime. [citations omitted]. 16 People v. Wade, 245 A.D.2d 473, 666 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468 (1997). 17 Wade sought, but was denied, leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals. People v. Wade, 92 N.Y.2d 862, 677 N.Y.S.2d 93, 699 N.E.2d 453 (1998). Wade filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, again arguing that the trial court's ruling violated his right to present a complete defense, as did the Appellate Division's reliance, in rejecting his appeal, upon the clear link test for the admission of evidence of third-party culpability. 18 While his petition was pending, the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal in People v. Primo, 270 A.D.2d 291, 704 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2000), leave granted, 95 N.Y.2d 907, 716 N.Y.S.2d 648, 739 N.E.2d 1153 (2000), which presented the question of the appropriateness of the clear link test. The district court, consequently, reserved decision on the habeas petition pending the state court's decision. In June 2001, the New York Court of Appeals issued its decision in Primo, in which it concluded that the `clear link' phraseology does not best articulate[] the standard that should govern the admissibility of evidence of third-party culpability and that instead the test is better described in terms of conventional evidentiary principles. People v. Primo, 96 N.Y.2d 351, 355, 728 N.Y.S.2d 735, 753 N.E.2d 164 (2001). 2 To the extent that the `clear link' standard implies no more than an abbreviation for the conventional balancing test, the Primo court noted, it presents no problem. Id. at 356, 728 N.Y.S.2d 735, 753 N.E.2d 164. A review of the application of this standard by the New York Appellate Divisions led the court to the conclusion that the lower courts would generally have reached the same ruling no matter the nomenclature used. But because of the possibility that it could be easily misread as suggesting that evidence of third-party culpability occupies a special or exotic category of proof, the court determined that clear link, and similar coinages, should be abandoned. Id. 19 Encouraged by this decision and seeking fully to exhaust available state remedies, Wade moved in the Appellate Division for leave to reargue his appeal, but this was denied. Wade sought reconsideration by the New York Court of Appeals, but this too was denied. People v. Wade, 96 N.Y.2d 942, 733 N.Y.S.2d 383, 759 N.E.2d 382 (2001). 20 The district court then denied Wade's petition. The court identified the determinative question to be whether there[was] a reasonable probability that the outcome [of the trial] would have been different if the testimony about the shootout had not been excluded. 3 (Tr., May 1, 2002, at 7). After discussing the evidence presented at trial, the court observed that, had it been the trial judge, it would have admitted the testimony, but nevertheless concluded: 21 Looking at the entire record in a realistic way, including the questions that were asked by the jurors, the prosecution's case, the defense case, I think that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had this testimony been admitted. 4 22 ( Id. at 14). 23 We agree with the district court's conclusion and affirm, but on a somewhat different rationale.