Opinion ID: 274326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: K. Greenfield

Text: Ed Brown Charlie Harrison John W. Joyce
Rufus Vestal Will Matthews Toby Armstrong 10th District 44 'District 7 contains the following names personally known by the Court to be members of the Colored Race: Charlie Chavers Ed Driver Perry Dudley Max Fleming Henderson Hylick Maxie Perryman Jordan Townes Joe Worley Walter Woodson 45 'So therefore, the undersigned personally knows that there was no systematic exclusion of members of the Colored Race from Jury service in this County at the time of the trial of the Petitioner. 46 'This, the 4th day of July, 1964. 47 (s) Joe M. Ingran' 48 The case of Kennedy v. State, 186 Tenn. 310, 210 S.W.2d 132, cert. denied, 333 U.S. 846, 68 S.Ct. 659, 92 L.Ed. 1129 (1947), which is referred to in the affidavit of Judge Ingram, involved the question of whether there was a systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries in Maury County in 1946. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee states that approximately eleven hundred pages of the record in that case were devoted to testimony on this question. The Supreme Court of Tennessee said: 49 'It should be borne in mind that members of the Negro race have no constitutional right to trial by a mixed racial jury. All that they have is a right that their race shall not be discriminated against in the selection and drawing of grand juries. The testimony of the jury commissioners is to the effect that when they placed the names of seven hundred and fifty or more taxpayers in the jury box for subsequent drawing, they were not aware as to the race of a great many of the persons whom they placed therein, but undertook to select a proportionate number of such persons from the various civil districts of the county without regard to their race. That this must be true is evidenced by other testimony in the record. A Negro teacher called by the defendant testified that he was summoned for jury duty at a time previous to the impanelment of the grand jury that indicted the defendant and was excused from jury service at his own request. The evidence further shows that at the November term 1946, at which defendant was tried, one Negro appeared for jury service and was present awaiting such until the entire panel of some fifteen members was excused by the trial judge. The evidence also shows that one member of the colored race, Henry McGlothlin, was on a list of jurors drawn from the jury box in drawing a panel to select the petit jury for the trial of this case. The proof shows that these names which were drawn from the box were placed therein by the jury commission in July, 1944, or more than a year and a half before the commission of the alleged crime in this case.' 186 Tenn. at 317-318, 210 S.W.2d at 135. 50 The findings of the State court on the issue of discrimination, although not binding on the court, are entitled to great respect. Pierre v. State of Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 757. 51 Mr. Paul F. Bumpus, who served as district attorney general in Maury County from 1935 through 1950, testified that Negroes were summoned and appeared for jury duty 'at practically every term of court as far as I can remember' but they generally were not willing to serve and asked to be excused; that 'frequently they would have letters from their employers asking that they be excused, that they were needed badly at work.' Attorney-General Bumpus did not recall having seen a Negro serve on a jury in Maury County prior to 1949. 52 Mr. Pride Tomlinson, Jr., who represented appellant as court-appointed attorney at his trial in 1949, testified that Negroes were included in calls for jury duty in Maury County, particularly following certain racial troubles that occurred there in 1946, but that they frequently were excused from duty on their own applications. Mr. Tomlinson did not recall having seen a Negro serving on a jury in the county prior to 1949, but testified that many Ndgroes have served and continue to serve on juries in the county since that time. 53 Appellant asserts that at the time of his trial and conviction in Maury County, Tennessee, there were three steps in the selection of jury panels: 54 (1) The selection from the tax books of the large list of names of prospective grand and petit jurors by Maury County's board of jury commissioners; 55 (2) The selection from the jury commissioner's large list of a smaller list, which list made up the prospective grand and petit jurors for a particular term of court; 56 (3) A narrowing of this smaller list by disqualification or by the judge's excusing from service persons summoned therefor. 57 On the basis of the evidence introduced in the district court, appellant now concedes that there was no systematic exclusion in the first two steps. Therefore if systematic exclusion of Negroes did in fact take place it would be the result of step three, i.e. either by disqualification or by the judge excusing from service persons summoned therefore. 58 In Swain v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 226-227, 85 S.Ct. 825, 839, the Court said that: 59 'Total exclusion of Negroes by the state officers responsible for selecting names of jurors gives rise to a fair inference of discrimination on their part, an inference which is determinative absent sufficient rebuttal evidence. But this rule of proof cannot be woodenly applied to cases where the discrimination is said to occur during the process of peremptory challenge of persons called for jury service. Unlike the selection process, which is wholly in the hands of state officers, defense counsel participate in the peremptory challenge system, and indeed generally have a far greater role than any officers of the State.' 60 Likewise, the excusing of summoned Negro jurors from service upon their own application and for cause does not necessarily constitute systematic exclusion on account of race. 61 The fact that no Negro served on the grand jury that indicted appellant or on the petit jury that convicted him, coupled with the further fact that no witness testifying in the present case could recall having seen a Negro serving on a jury in Maury County prior to 1949, would have established a prima facie case of systematic exclusion, except for other evidence in the record. Under the evidence hereinabove outlined, and especially in view of the detailed affidavit of Judge Ingram, we cannot say that the findings of fact of the district judge in the present case are 'clearly erroneous.' 62 Judge Ingram's affidavit was introduced into evidence under the authority of 28 U.S.C. 2245, which provides that: 63 'On the hearing of an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the detention of a person pursuant to a judgment the certificate of the judge who presided at the trial resulting in the judgment, setting forth the facts occurring at the trial, shall be admissible in evidence.' 64 To the extent that the affidavit of Judge Ingram contained statements as to matters which took place other than at the trial, we are of the opinion that it was properly admissible under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2246: 65 'On application for a writ of habeas corpus, evidence may be taken orally or by deposition, or, in the discretion of the judge, by affidavit. If affidavits are admitted any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants, or to file answering affidavits.' 66 The record in the present case discloses that, after the filing of the foregoing affidavit, the district judge allowed counsel for appellant fifteen additional days in which to propound written ingerrogatories or further questions to Judge Ingram, or to obtain a supplemental affidavit from him. 67 Although issues of fact in a habeas corpus case may not be established by ex parte affidavits alone, Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 287, 61 S.Ct. 574, 85 L.Ed. 830; Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347 U.S. 832, 84 S.Ct. 42, 11 denied, 375 U.S. 832, 84 S.Ct. 42, 11 L.Ed.2d 63, the procedure followed by the district court in the present case was in accord with the statute and would be calculated to help maintain a desirable relationship between State and Federal courts. Both the Circuit Judge presiding over the State court in Maury County, Tennessee, and the United States District Judge for the Middle District of Tennessee are judges with original general jurisdiction. It was fitting and proper that Judge Ingram not be called to testify as a witness in federal court so long as the rights of appellant were protected. The rights of appellant were protected amply under the facts of the present case, in that his court-appointed attorney was accorded an opportunity to cross-examine Judge Ingram by interrogatories and to obtain a supplemental affidavit. 68 We hold that the findings of fact of the district court are not 'clearly erroneous.' 69 The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 70 This court takes this occasion to express its appreciation and thanks to Mr. James O. Bass, Jr. and Mr. J. Brad Reed of the Nashville bar, who, acting under appointment of the court as counsel for appellant, undertook the laborious preparation of this case on review, and submitted excellent briefs and arguments on the difficult issues presented. 71