Opinion ID: 1931196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Existence of an Agreement to Arbitrate

Text: The Larkins initially contend that no contract to compel them to arbitrate their claims exists because they never signed the termite agreement and because, therefore, the termite agreement lacks mutuality of assent. We disagree. The mere fact that the Larkins did not sign the termite agreement does not preclude its enforceability. Ex parte Rush, 730 So.2d 1175, 1178 (Ala.1999). Absent a signature, the existence of a contract may... be inferred from other external and objective manifestations of mutual assent. 730 So.2d at 1178. In Rush, the Rushes sued a termite company based upon the company's performance under a termite agreement similar to the one in this case. 730 So.2d at 1176. Under the agreement, the company agreed to protect the Rushes' residence from subterranean termites, to reinspect the residence periodically, and to repair damage from any new infestation. 730 So.2d at 1176. The Rushes paid the annual renewal fee, made a claim under the agreement, and supervised the company's repairs to their residence. 730 So.2d at 1178. We held that the Rushes' conduct, absent their signature, evidenced an assent to the termite agreement, including its arbitration clause. 730 So.2d at 1178. Moreover, in Morris, supra, we held that the arbitration clause in the termite agreement was not lacking in consideration because the Morrises benefited from the terms of the [termite] agreement by accepting additional repairs to their home, as well as by being paid for incidental expenses they incurred during the repair period, including cleaning costs and the cost of alternative housing. 782 So.2d at 253. The Larkins contend that no mutuality of assent existed because, they say, unlike the homeowners in Rush and Morris, they received no benefit in the form of repairs or treatments under their termite agreement with the Orkin defendants. Generally, mutuality does not necessarily mean equal rights under a contract, or that each party is entitled to the same rights or covenants under the contract. So long as there is a valuable consideration moving from one side to the other, or there are binding promises on the part of each party to the other, there is adequate consideration for a valid contract. Marcrum v. Embry, 291 Ala. 400, 403, 282 So.2d 49, 52 (1973). It is undisputed that the Larkins, by paying the annual renewal fees, assumed the termite agreement entered into between Orkin and the Allisons. See Morris, 782 So.2d at 253. According to the affidavit of Verne Sanford, the office manager of Orkin's Montgomery office, Willie Larkin paid the annual renewal fee on November 23, 1999, September 13, 2000, and August 15, 2001. As was the case in Morris, the Larkins ratified the termite agreement by paying the renewal fees. 782 So.2d at 253. Moreover, the termite agreement provides that Orkin will retreat the structure for Subterranean Termites at no cost to [the] Customer if an infestation of Subterranean Termites is found. The termite agreement also provides that Orkin shall reinspect the treated structure as deemed necessary by Orkin or requested by the Customer. Therefore, the obligation of the Orkin defendants to re-treat and reinspect the residence is a binding promise in return for receipt of the Larkins' payment of the annual fee to renew the termite agreement. The fact that the Larkins had received no benefit from the termite agreement in the form of actual repairs or treatment is immaterial to establish mutuality. See Marcrum, 291 Ala. at 406, 282 So.2d at 54 (finding that the parties' promises established mutuality despite the fact that the promises were not coextensive).