Opinion ID: 1201664
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Michigan State Police Dept. v. Sitz

Text: Three months after the Morgan decision (and three years after Ingersoll ), the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Sitz, addressing for the first time the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints. (3b) In analyzing the issue of the validity of the initial detention of a motor vehicle at such a checkpoint, the court in Sitz acknowledged at the outset that a Fourth Amendment `seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint (496 U.S. at p. 450 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 420]), recognizing that [t]he question thus becomes whether such seizures are `reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment. ( Ibid. ) Sitz mirrored the opinion in Ingersoll in determining that the balancing analysis of Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47 [61 L.Ed.2d 357, 99 S.Ct. 2637] provided the governing framework for ascertaining the reasonableness of such a sobriety-checkpoint seizure. In applying Brown 's balancing analysis, the court in Sitz first considered the importance and strength of the state interest sought to be served by such checkpoints, finding such interest to be of considerable weight and observing that [n]o one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the States' interest in eradicating it. ( Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 451 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 420].) The court's opinion in Sitz then turned to the weight bearing on the other scale  the measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints, finding such intrusion to be slight. ( Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 451 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 421].) The court explained: We reached a similar conclusion as to the intrusion on motorists subjected to a brief stop at a highway checkpoint for detecting illegal aliens. See [ United States v.] Martinez-Fuerte [(1976) 428 U.S. 543], at 558 [49 L.Ed.2d at 1128-1129]. We see virtually no difference between the levels of intrusion on law-abiding motorists from the brief stops necessary to the effectuation of these two types of checkpoints, which to the average motorist would seem identical save for the nature of the questions the checkpoint officers might ask. (496 U.S. at pp. 451-452 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 421].) The court in Sitz thus concluded that the lower courts in that case had accurately gauged the `objective' intrusion, measured by the duration of the seizure and the intensity of the investigation, as minimal. (496 U.S. at p. 452 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 421].) Although the lower courts in Sitz had found the objective intrusion of the sobriety checkpoint to be minimal, those courts had found the subjective intrusion, that is, the potential for generating fear and surprise in motorists, to be substantial, and had invalidated the checkpoint on that basis. ( Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 452 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 421].) The high court's opinion in Sitz observed that, although the lower courts had agreed that the guidelines governing checkpoint operation minimize[d] the discretion of the officers on the scene ..., those courts had concluded that the checkpoints ha[d] the potential to generate fear and surprise in motorists ... because the record failed to demonstrate that approaching motorists would be aware of their option to make U-turns or turnoffs to avoid the checkpoints. On that basis, the court[s] deemed the subjective intrusion from the checkpoints unreasonable. (496 U.S. at p. 452 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 421].) In rejecting the lower courts' conclusion on this point, the high court's opinion in Sitz explained that those courts had misread our cases concerning the degree of `subjective intrusion' and the potential for generating fear and surprise. The `fear and surprise' to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking over the prospect of being stopped at a sobriety checkpoint but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists by the nature of the stop. This was made clear in Martinez-Fuerte. Comparing checkpoint stops to roving patrols considered in prior cases, we said, [¶] `we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion  the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers  is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop. In [ United States v.] Ortiz [(1975) 422 U.S. 891 (45 L.Ed.2d 623, 95 S.Ct. 2585)], we noted: [¶] `[ T ] he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion. 422 U.S. at [pp.] 894-895.' [Citations.] Here, checkpoints are selected pursuant to the guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every approaching vehicle. The intrusion resulting from the brief stop at the sobriety checkpoint is for constitutional purposes indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.  ( Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 452-453 [110 L.Ed.2d at pp. 421-422], italics added.) (9a) Finally, in Sitz the United States Supreme Court explained that the lower courts in that case also had erred in applying the third prong of the Brown balancing test, which concerns `the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest.' ( Sitz, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 453 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 422], quoting Brown v. Texas, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 51 [61 L.Ed.2d at p. 362].) The lower courts in Sitz had interpreted this language in Brown to require a judicial determination as to the effectiveness of the checkpoint program, and, on the basis of evidence adduced at trial, had concluded that the program failed the effectiveness test. The majority opinion in Sitz explained, however, that [t]his passage from Brown was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger. Experts in police science might disagree over which of several methods of apprehending drunk drivers is preferable as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public resources.... (496 U.S. at pp. 453-454 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 422].) The high court concluded in Sitz that the evidence presented in that case, which indicated that, on the average, sobriety checkpoints resulted in the arrest of approximately 1 percent of all motorists stopped, was sufficient to sustain the program's constitutionality under the public interest component of the Brown test. [6]