Opinion ID: 774014
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Use value

Text: 25 Landmark appeals the trial court's denial of award for the use value of the initial contribution from the time of contribution until the government's payment of the judgment. The remedy of restitution may include compensation for lost use value where necessary to restore the plaintiff to its status quo ante by providing compensation for the use of the subject matter for the period during which [it] was deprived. Restatement of Restitution §§ 157(1), cmt. a. The trial court denied Landmark's claim for use value because it found Landmark's evidence unconvincing. Specifically, the trial court stated that: 26 Landmark did not prove that it lost a specific amount of money from not having the use of the property that it contributed to Dixie in 1982. To award damages under Landmark's use value theories, we would be required to engage in a series of speculative assumptions that are not permitted in these circumstances. We could not establish at trial how Landmark would have profited from use of the parcels of real estate that it contributed to Dixie in 1982. Expert testimony that Landmark offered for this purpose was not convincing, and we were left with the need to engage in improper speculation. For this reason, we must deny Landmark recovery for use value. 27 Landmark, 46 Fed. Cl. at 270. Landmark argues on appeal that, because a plaintiff is not required to prove the exact amount of its loss in order to be entitled to compensation, the trial court improperly denied recovery for use value on the ground that Landmark did not prove that it lost a specific amount of money. While it is well settled that recovery cannot be denied on the ground that a non-breaching plaintiff failed to prove the amount of its loss with utter precision, the trial court did not deny recovery solely, if at all, on this basis. As quoted above, the trial court found that Landmark's evidence did not even establish how it would have profited from use of the initial contribution. On appeal, Landmark has failed to point to any evidence to indicate that the court's finding was clearly erroneous. Instead, Landmark argues that the trial court improperly applied the standard of proof for an award of lost profits. However, Landmark has provided no indication of how the use value would have been anything other than the profits that the initial contribution would have generated outside the contract--which the trial court found that Landmark had failed to prove. Thus, Landmark has failed to show that the denial of an award for use value was improper. 28 We hold, therefore, that the trial court's award was sufficient restitution. Thus, we need not consider the trial court's alternative award of the same amount as reliance damages. 29