Opinion ID: 788575
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission Of Other-Acts Evidence

Text: 45 Burton first asserts that the trial court erred in admitting other-acts evidence in the form of suggestions by the prosecutor that witnesses had been threatened and that a residence connected to Burton was a safe house. For the admission of evidence to violate constitutional due process, it must be shown that admitting the evidence violates fundamental fairness, i.e., that it violates those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions and which define the community's sense of fair play and decency. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 439 (6th Cir.2001) , cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1031, 122 S.Ct. 1639, 152 L.Ed.2d 647 (2002) (stating in reference to habeas corpus challenge to admission of other-acts evidence that [s]tate court evidentiary rulings do not rise to the level of due process violations unless they offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir.2000) , cert. denied, 532 U.S. 989, 121 S.Ct. 1643, 149 L.Ed.2d 502 (2001) (Errors in the application of state law, especially rulings regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence, are usually not to be questioned in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 46
47 Burton asserts that the following exchange between the prosecutor and Markita Robinson on redirect examination was in error because the prosecutor elicited testimony suggesting that Robinson had been threatened: 48 Q. What was the reason that you didn't contact the police before October 27th? 49 A. `Cause I was scared. 50 Q. Scared of what. 51 A. Something happening to me. 52 Q. For what reason. 53 A. Threats. Through threats. I was just scared that something might happen to me and fear of my life. 54 J.A. at 31 (Br. in Support of Pet. for Habeas Corpus at 8) (quoting Trial Tr. Vol. III at 509-10). However, the prosecutor's line of questioning was in response to cross-examination by defense counsel suggesting that the witness had not contacted the police at the time of the events in question: 55 Q. Now, prior to October 27th, you did not contact the police, is that correct? 56 A. No. 57 Q. And neither you nor your sister, as far as you know, contacted the police. 58 A. No. 59 Trial Tr. Vol. III at 509. It does not appear that the prosecutor violated Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), much less constitutional due process, because the prosecutor elicited the challenged testimony, not to prove Burton's character in order to show action in conformity therewith, but rather to explore more fully the issue, first raised by defense counsel, as to why the witness did not report Burton's conduct to the police. Mich. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); see Pennington v. Lazaroff, No. 98-4373, 2001 WL 406420,  (6th Cir. Apr.3, 2001) (stating that if properly before the court, we could only conclude that the introduction of the prior misconduct did not violate `fundamental fairness.' ... The prior misconduct..., coupled with the evidence of [the defendant's] threats and the victims' fear and guilt, helped explain the victims' reasons for not exposing [the defendant's] transgressions. Hence, the evidence of other misconduct was more probative than prejudicial, and its admission did not violate the due process clause.). 60 Given the difficulties in establishing that the admission of evidence regarding possible threats against witnesses was fundamentally unfair in this case, an objectively reasonable lawyer could have chosen not to raise this issue on appeal. Because the substance of Burton's other-acts-evidence claim lacks merit, Burton has failed to show a reasonable probability that his conviction would have been reversed on direct appeal even if appellate counsel had raised the issue. Thus, Burton has not demonstrated that his counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective, and in turn has failed to establish the requisite cause for excusing his procedural default of this claim. 61
62 Burton also alleges that his counsel on direct appeal was constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the prosecutor's repeated reference to a residence linked to Burton as a safe house where firearms were kept. Burton contends that the prosecutor used the term safe house for the purpose of impermissibly characterizing Burton as a person with a propensity to commit illegal acts, citing as an example the prosecutor's statement during closing argument: `Why do I keep a 9 mm in the safe house? These are all the acts, ladies and gentlemen, of a very innocent person, aren't they? It's all evidence on this record.' J.A. at 32. (Br. in Support of Pet. for Habeas Corpus) (quoting Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 52). 63 Burton's contention that the prosecutor's references to a safe house where firearms were kept constituted inadmissible other-acts evidence is undermined by the fact that the prosecution seems to have intended to use such testimony to establish that Burton had access to a nine-millimeter handgun like the one used to kill the victim. 3 Because the murder weapon itself does not appear to have been introduced in evidence at trial, evidence of Burton's connections to the West Lapeer residence and the presence at that location of the particular type of weapon used to kill McClayton did have probative value with respect to a material issue other than Burton's character. See People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52, 508 N.W.2d 114, 122, 126 (Mich.1993) (noting that [r]elevant other acts evidence does not violate Rule 404(b) unless it is offered solely to show the criminal propensity of an individual to establish that he acted in conformity therewith, and establishing that, for other-acts evidence to be admissible, the prosecutor must offer the other acts evidence under something other than a character to conduct theory, the evidence must be relevant under Rule 402, as enforced through Rule 104(b), to an issue or fact of consequence at trial, and the danger of undue prejudice [must] substantially outweigh[ ] the probative value of the evidence) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Waters v. Kassulke, 916 F.2d 329, 336 (6th Cir.1990) (finding that due process was not violated by the admission of other-acts evidence because the evidence was relevant to the case's central issues of knowledge and intent and the evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect). 64 Although the use of the term safe house might have been somewhat prejudicial, it cannot be said that the term was so prejudicial as to render Burton's trial fundamentally unfair. Moreover, the prosecutor's use of the term safe house without objection by Burton's trial counsel may have factored in the decision of Burton's counsel not to raise this issue on direct appeal. See People v. Bullock, 440 Mich. 15, 485 N.W.2d 866, 870 n. 7 (1992) (rejecting argument that trial court erred by admitting other-acts evidence because the defendant failed to raise any timely objection at trial on the basis of MRE 404(b)); see also People v. Buck, 197 Mich.App. 404, 496 N.W.2d 321, 330 (1993) (Appellate review of prosecutorial misconduct is foreclosed where the defendant fails to object or request a curative instruction, unless the misconduct was so egregious that no objection or curative instruction could have removed the prejudice to the defendant or if manifest injustice would result from our failure to review the claims of misconduct.). Hence, Burton's counsel on direct appeal was not constitutionally defective for failing to raise this claim, and there is not a reasonable probability that Burton's conviction would have been reversed on appeal. Because Burton has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this claim remains procedurally defaulted. 65