Opinion ID: 1152523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merger-of-Contract Issue

Text: The trial court ruled that Rochester could not recover under the rock excavation clause, which was contained only in the general contract. The court, however, after allowing Rochester to go forward with proof that he excavated rock, appropriately did instruct the jury on the law of damages under the theory of quantum meruit. Rochester contends that the trial judge erred in not finding the rock excavation clause of the general contract to have been incorporated by reference into the subcontract, because, he argues, the subcontract made specific provision for incorporation of the terms of the general contract. Specifically, Rochester points to the language within the subcontract providing that the architect's specifications, schedules and drawings are made a part of said general contract, and ... are now made a part of this subcontract. We note, however, that that language was limited in its scope by the concluding clause insofar as they apply and the parties hereto desire to contract with reference to a part of said work. Additionally, Rochester points to the language of the subcontract which explained his duties to furnish all labor and materials and perform all work necessary to complete the following ... namely: Plumbing and site utilities complete.... Rochester here contends that this work could not have been completed without excavation of the rock; and, he says, because he was to perform all labor required, his subcontract necessarily incorporated by reference the rock excavation clause of the general contract. Rochester concedes, however, that neither he personally, nor anyone under his employ, is trained or licensed to perform the blasting work required for the excavation. Thus, a qualified third party was required to perform this work. Rochester counters this fact by stating that he could have located (and in fact did locate) someone who was qualified to do the job. The otherwise persuasive nature of Rochester's contention is overcome by the application of the concepts of nondelegable duty and strict liability. It is well understood that a general contractor cannot escape all potential civil liability by subcontracting extra-hazardous activities. The normally applicable independent contractor defense does not, necessarily and of itself, shield the general contractor from liability in this kind of case. Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Const. Co., 295 Ala. 477, 331 So.2d 651 (1976); and, for a discussion of strict liability, see Harper v. Regency Development Co., 399 So.2d 248 (Ala.1981). When this nondelegable duty concept is coupled with the strict liability doctrine applicable to extra-hazardous activities, the concomitant right of control of such activities by the general contractor dictates a strict construction of contract language, in the context of a subcontractor's claim of a right to conduct blasting operations by way of incorporation by reference. This is not to say that a general contractor is legally precluded from authorizing a subcontractor to perform extra-hazardous activities contemplated by the general contract. It is to say, however, that the subcontract language must be clear and unequivocal before the general contractor will be legally required to forgo its right of direct control over such activities. Furthermore, state law abundantly supports the general proposition that it is the province of the court to construe written instruments, and declare their legal effect. Boykin v. Bank of Mobile, 72 Ala. 262, 269 (1882). Also, [i]t is, of course, fundamental in our law that it is the duty of the court and not the jury to `analyze and determine the meaning of a contract... when its terms are clear and certain, and also [to] ascertain whether or not it is ambiguous....' C.F. Halstead Contractor, Inc. v. Dirt, Inc., 294 Ala. 644, at 649, 320 So.2d 657, at 661 (1975). The trial judge here looked at the documents and found no ambiguity. After scrutinizing the documents and hearing from the parties, he determined that the subcontract did not incorporate by reference the rock excavation clause of the general contract. Applying the principles discussed above, we hold that the trial court was correct in its rejection of Rochester's claim of merger of contract. Likewise, the trial court correctly accorded Rochester the benefit of submitting for the jury's consideration the quantum meruit theory of recovery.