Opinion ID: 2995291
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were the defendants associated

Text: with PLAN? (See Jury Instruction No. 20 for the definition of associated with.) . . . 4. Did any Defendant, or any other person associated with PLAN, commit any of the [alleged predicate acts]? The jury instruction to which the verdict form referred stated, in relevant part: Jury Instruction No. 20: Plaintiffs must show that the defendant was associated with PLAN. That is, the defendant must have had some minimal association with PLAN and have known something about PLAN’s activities as they relate to the illegal acts under RICO. It is not necessary that the particular defendant committed acts unlawful under RICO or was aware of all of the unlawful acts committed by the other people who were associated with PLAN. . . . . In the district court, the defendants objected to these instructions, arguing that they did not require the jury to find that the defendants harbored a specific intent to further PLAN’s illegal aims, as required by Claiborne Hardware. The district court apparently agreed, because it added an additional jury instruction which stated: Jury Instruction No. 30--Defendants’ Liability for Acts of Others Liability may not be imposed upon any defendant merely because that defendant belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence. In order to find the defendants liable, you must conclude that the enterprise, or those acting on behalf of the enterprise, directly or indirectly authorized or ratified unlawful activities and that the defendants held a specific intent to further those illegal objectives. The defendants did not renew their objection to the jury instructions after the district court made this change. Nevertheless, in this court, the defendants have argued that, even with the additional instruction, the jury instructions did not adequately protect their First Amendment rights, because the Claiborne Hardware standard was incorporated only into the jury instructions, not into the verdict form. Initially, we note that by not renewing their objection to the jury instructions and verdict form after the district court added Instruction 30, the defendants at least implied that they were satisfied with the court’s resolution of their objection. Accordingly, we are inclined to find that the defendants have waived any objection to those instructions on appeal. See United States v. Jones, 224 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2000) (objection to jury instruction waived where defense counsel agreed to instruction at trial). Because this is a civil trial, not a criminal trial, there is no equivalent of plain error review for a challenge that is forfeited rather than waived. In the interest of absolute fairness, however, we will consider this point based on the earlier objections. Our review of jury instructions is deferential, and we consider only whether the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately informed the jury of the applicable law. Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 602 (7th Cir. 2000). We are confident that these instructions did so. This jury could not have found the defendants liable without finding that the defendants themselves specifically intended to further PLAN’s illegal aims. Jury Instruction 30 made this requirement explicit, and absent any indication to the contrary, we presume that jurors follow the instructions they are given. Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 1997). There is no requirement for a district judge to replicate every instruction on the verdict form itself. We are confident that the jurors followed their instructions, heeded Instruction 30 when they considered the questions on the special verdict form, and that nothing on the form misled or confused them or caused them to ignore their instructions.