Opinion ID: 778481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aluminum Companies' Petitions

Text: 34 The Aluminum Companies challenge the BPA's calculation of excess federal power, claiming BPA flouted the Excess Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 832m(a)(3)(A), by treating power it refused to sell as power the DSIs elected not to purchase. We agree.
35 The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing `is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.' FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). Article III's case or controversy provision creates an irreducible constitutional minimum of standing for all federal court plaintiffs: 36 (1) that the plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact — an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 37 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). 38 The Aluminum Companies have alleged a cognizable injury. When making its 1999 and 2000 excess federal power forecasts, BPA considered 1440 aMW rather than 2907 aMW as its obligation to the DSIs. The difference — 1467 aMW — represented excess federal power that enabled BPA to honor 1467 aMW worth of contracts for excess federal power. The 1467 aMW also constituted power that was no longer available for Bonneville's power contracts with the DSIs. BPA would be forced to make up for the resulting shortfall by purchasing additional power from an outside source and passing the cost of this additional power on to the DSIs through higher rates. Though this increased cost will not be felt until 2004, the cost is certain to accrue and, under the relevant statutory limitations period, can be challenged only now. Thus, the Aluminum Companies identify a concrete injury. 39 It is evident that the causation and redressability elements of standing are also met. The alleged injury — the increased cost of energy — results from the challenged conduct — namely, BPA's method of calculating excess federal power. Further, the relief sought by the Aluminum Companies — setting aside Bonneville's 1999 and 2000 determinations with instructions to recalculate excess federal power using 2907 aMW instead of 1440 aMW — would remedy their injury. Bonneville's recalculation of excess federal power using 2907 aMW instead of 1440 aMW would decrease the amount of excess federal power available for sale, thereby increasing the amount of power available to cover the DSIs' contracts and reducing BPA's need to purchase power from an outside vendor to meet its obligations to the Aluminum Companies. The less outside power BPA purchases, the lower the cost of power to the Aluminum Companies. Therefore, the Aluminum Companies have standing to bring their petitions. 40
41 The EFP Policy established 8298 aMW as a fixed baseline against which BPA's future reductions in power obligations would be compared for purposes of calculating excess federal power. Of the 8298 aMW, 2907 aMW were allocated to its DSI customers. The parties agree that the DSIs would have purchased significantly more than 1440 aMW had BPA offered more for sale. Nonetheless, Bonneville treated its refusal to sell the DSIs more than 1440 aMW of power as an election by the DSIs to purchase no more than this amount. By doing so, the Aluminum Companies argue, Bonneville flouted Congress's intent. 42 While we generally accord substantial deference to BPA's decisions interpreting its organic statutes, extending such deference is unwarranted where, as here, Congress has squarely addressed the issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In the Excess Federal Power Act, Congress defined excess federal power in plain terms — reduced energy obligations due to the election by customers ... to purchase power elsewhere. 16 U.S.C. § 832m(3)(A) (emphasis added). This language makes clear that Congress intended that excess federal power arise from decisions of BPA's customers, not the agency itself. Therefore, Bonneville violated Congress's directive by treating power it refused to sell as power the DSIs elected not to purchase. 43 Though the plain language of 16 U.S.C. § 832m settles the matter, we find two additional bases for our holding. First, reading due to the election by customers, as BPA does, to include any reduction in firm power obligations would render the election by customers language mere surplusage — a violation of a well-established principle of statutory construction. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. We are thus reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Second, Bonneville's interpretation of 16 U.S.C. § 832m clashes with the statute's legislative history: 44 This legislation poses no significant risk or cost to Bonneville's regional customers because the only power sold outside the region without the restrictions is power abandoned by regional customers and excess power generated or purchased for the benefit of fish and wildlife. No other amount of power can be sold outside the region without such restrictions. 45 H.R.Rep. No. 104-293, H 10974 (1995) (emphasis added). 46 When BPA approached the DSIs with a take-it-or-leave-it offer to purchase 1440 aMW, their acceptance was not the sort of freely chosen election that Congress envisioned. Holding to the contrary would allow Bonneville to liberate 2907 aMW for sale outside the region by refusing to sell the DSIs a single megawatt of power — a result manifestly at odds with Bonneville's obligation to operate[] for the benefit of the general public, and particularly of domestic... customers.  16 U.S.C. § 832c(a) (emphasis added). We therefore grant the Aluminum Companies' petitions.