Opinion ID: 2463705
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Definition of Extended Limits of Confinement

Text: Townsend also argues that the trial court's definitional instruction encompassed conduct that did not rise to the level of escape under the meaning of sections 18-8-208(2) and 17-27.5-104. In particular, Townsend contends that the instruction impermissibly allowed the jury to consider parole limitations that are not judicially recognized extended limits on confinement as a part of the custody or confinement from which he could have escaped. Townsend first contends that the definitional instruction permitted the jury to convict him for failing to report to a residence of record despite his contentions that he was not subject to ISP when he was released from jail on March 3, 2005, and that he did not have a residence of record at that time in any case. This contention, however, is a thinly veiled attempt to challenge the court of appeals' conclusion that there was sufficient evidence that, on March 3, Townsend was on ISP according to the terms of his original parole agreement, that he was on notice of the terms, and did have a residence of record to which he failed to report. We denied certiorari review of this issue and reject Townsend's attempt to revisit it. Townsend concedes that a parolee's failure to report to his residence of record constitutes escape under sections 18-8-208(2) and 17-27.5-104 in light of a long line of precedent from the court of appeals, including People v. Sa'ra, 117 P.3d 51, 55 (Colo. App.2004); People v. Smith, 77 P.3d 751, 754-56 (Colo.App.2003); People v. Taylor, 74 P.3d 396, 399-400 (Colo.App.2002); People v. Perea, 74 P.3d 326, 331 (Colo.App.2002); and People v. Williams, 33 P.3d 1187, 1188-89 (Colo.App.2001). Accordingly, we perceive no error in the possibility that he was convicted for escape for failing to report to his residence of record under the terms of the ISP. Second, Townsend contends that the definitional instruction permitted the jury to convict him for failing to report to his parole officer and establish a residence of record as required under the terms of the ISP, failures which he concedes violate the conditions of his parole but which he contends do not rise to the level of escape under the meaning of sections 18-8-208(2) and 17-27.5-104. Townsend, however, tendered the portion of the instruction that defined extended limits of confinement as the geographic, time limits [sic] and other established ISP directives placed on the defendant under the [ISP] (emphasis added). Under the invited error doctrine, we will not review alleged errors in jury instructions drafted and tendered by the defense. People v. Zapata, 779 P.2d 1307, 1308-09 (Colo.1989). Accordingly, we decline to address whether a parolee's failure to report to his parole officer and establish a residence of record constitutes escape under the meaning of sections 18-8-208(2) and 17-27.5-104 because any error in the possibility that Townsend was convicted on that basis is attributable to his tendered jury instruction. [2]