Opinion ID: 1395772
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Presumption of Reasonableness

Text: Although we review a district court's sentencing determination for reasonableness, we have explained: [A] district court's job is not to impose a reasonable sentence. Rather, a district court's mandate is to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of section 3553(a)(2). Reasonableness is the appellate standard of review in judging whether a district court has accomplished its task. United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 n. 1 (6th Cir.2006); accord Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2465 (We repeat that the presumption before us is an appellate court presumption.). At the same time, the mere fact that the district court utters the word reasonableness or recognizes that we apply a presumption of reasonableness on appeal does not render its sentencing determination procedurally unreasonable. See United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 505, 511 (6th Cir.2006) ([T]he district court's reference to a reasonableness standard does not render [the defendant's] sentence unreasonable in the face of the district court's satisfaction of the post- Booker sentencing mandates.); United States v. Cage, 458 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir.2006) (We decline to conclude that by using the term `reasonable' or by acknowledging that the appellate court will apply a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to a sentence, the district court is itself applying that presumption.). In this case, however, the district court went a step further, requiring the arguments presented to overcome the presumption of reasonableness with respect to the sentencing guidelines in this case. [1] J.A. at 192 (6/13/06 Sentencing Hr'g at 16). Wilms was ultimately sentenced below the applicable Guidelines range, but the district court's application of a rebuttable presumption that Wilms should be sentenced within the Guidelines range requires us to vacate his sentence. If there was any question under our prior caselaw whether such reasoning renders a district court's sentencing determination unreasonable, [2] there is no question after Rita. In no uncertain terms, the Rita Court instructed that the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply. Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2465. Moreover, even when reviewing a sentencing determination on appeal, we recognize that the presumption of reasonableness does not, like a trial-related evidentiary presumption, insist that one side, or the other, shoulder a particular burden of persuasion or proof lest they lose their case. Id. at 2463. Permitting the district court to apply a presumption of reasonableness to the applicable Guidelines range would also conflict with the core reasoning of Rita. In permitting the courts of appeals to apply a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence, the Rita Court relied on the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case. Id.; see also id. at 2465 ([T]he courts of appeals' `reasonableness' presumption, rather than having independent legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the judge's discretionary decision accords with the Commission's view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable.). If the sentencing judge presumes that the defendant should be sentenced within the applicable Guidelines range, however, it renders meaningless the fact that both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission reached the same conclusion, as such a result would be preordained. Only when a sentencing judge makes an independent determination of what sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a)taking into account the advisory Guidelines range, the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and any other nonfrivolous arguments presented in support of a particular sentencecan the appellate presumption of reasonableness permitted by Rita be more than a return to the pre- Booker mandatory-Guidelines regime. Because the district court in this case applied a rebuttable presumption that Wilms should be sentenced within the applicable Guidelines range, we must vacate his sentence.