Opinion ID: 6944926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Likely to Appear again at Retrial.

Text: Because the same issues are likely to arise at Joe’s retrial, we will address Joe’s arguments that the district court should have suppressed his confession on the ground that his arrest for public intoxication was pretex-tual, and that the district court erred in admitting two out-of-court statements made by Larry.
The district court did not err in denying Joe’s motion to suppress his confession on the ground that his arrest for public intoxication was pretextual. Joe may be correct in insisting that the tribal officer who discovered him passed out beneath a tree intended to arrest him for murder prior to discovering that he was publicly intoxicated. But “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, — U.S. —, —, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The validity of an arrest depends upon the objective facts and circumstances of the arrest, not upon the arresting officer’s subjective intent. United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir.1994). Here, the objective facts and circumstances surrounding Joe’s arrest clearly establish probable cause to believe that Joe was guilty of public intoxication: he was passed out under a tree, having left his truck moments earlier; his truck was seen driving recklessly; when revived, he had a strong smell of alcohol on his breath; his eyes were bloodshot; his speech was slurred; and he staggered when he walked. Because the tribal officer had probable cause to arrest Joe for public intoxication, the officer’s arrest was not invalid as pretex-tual. See Whren, — U.S. at —, 116 S.Ct. at 1777. As a result, the district court’s admission of his confession to the F.B.I. was not error.
Joe also argues that the district court erred in admitting the following out-of-court statements made by Larry: Q. Mr. Sayetsitty, ... what did your brother Larry say in the truck ride from Diversion Dam to the Parrish house? A. (Defendant) ... he started talking ... he said, these — those that are named Stanley, they keep fighting me over land. This has happened three times. And he was very mad.     Q. ... did Larry say anything to you before getting out of the truck? A. He said the guy that parked in front of us, when he comes by here, throw him down. The district court admitted the two statements pursuant to the co-conspirator hearsay exception, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Joe disagrees with the district court’s interpretation of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In his view, the district court should not have invoked the exception, because there was no independent evidence — evidence other than Larry’s statements — indicating that he and Larry conspired to kill Stanley, and because Larry’s statements were not made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. We do not have to reach Joe’s argument concerning Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), however, because Larry’s statements were not hearsay. “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Larry’s statements were not introduced to prove the truth of the matters they asserted. The first statement — “those that are named Stanley, they keep fighting me over land” — was not introduced at Joe’s trial, to prove that, in fact, Larry was in a land dispute with the Stanleys. The statement was introduced to establish intent on the part of Larry and Joe, and would be admissible for that purpose even if it were hearsay. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(3); United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 376 (9th Cir.1976) (stating that “hearsay evidence is admissible if it bears on the state of mind of the declarant and if that state of mind is an issue in the case”), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099, 97 S.Ct. 1118, 51 L.Ed.2d 546 (1977). Similarly, the second statement— “the guy that parked in front of us, when he comes by here, throw him down” — was, by Joe’s own admission, offered to show that it induced in Joe the malice aforethought necessary to establish that element of second-degree murder. It was not introduced to prove the truth of any proposition stated. The statements were therefore not hearsay. Id.