Opinion ID: 1243165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chatterson further contends prejudicial error was committed when trial court, in five separate instructions and over defendant's timely objections, improperly described the offense of which Chatterson was accused.

Text: The offense charged was Assault with Intent to Maim and the jury was preliminarily so instructed. Nevertheless, proposed instructions 10, 13, 14, 15 and 17 described the offense as assault with intent to commit a felony . Defendant's objections to the italicized phraseology were overruled. Chatterson additionally objected to verdict form # 1, which described the principal charge as assault with intent to commit a felony, namely; maiming. In overruling these objections trial court said: THE COURT: Instead of namely; maiming I'm going to put namely; to maim. MR. PFEFFER: All the way through, your honor? THE COURT: Just these two. When ultimately submitted to the jury, instructions 10 and 14 read assault with intent to commit a felony, but 13, 15 and 17 and verdict form # 1 said assault with intent to commit a felony, namely to maim. As trial court subsequently recognized, those instructions were improperly worded. The offense-related phraseology should have been consistent with the information and instruction 1 as suggested by Chatterson: assault with intent to maim. On the other hand, defendant's arguments to the effect the questioned wording constituted prejudicial error are without merit. In essence, he finds prejudice in two related ways: (1) the instructions were confusing, and (2) they effectively operated to amend the information and allowed the jury to convict defendant of a crime with which he was not charged. As to the second premise, we note Chatterson was unquestionably charged under § 694.7, which says: If any person assault another with intent to maim    he shall be imprisoned   . Defendant claims the challenged instructions allowed the jury to convict him of a crime under § 694.5, a wholly different offense than that described in § 694.7. We do not agree. Section 694.5 says: If any person assault another with intent to commit any felony or crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, where the punishment is not otherwise prescribed, he shall be imprisoned   . (emphasis added). The purpose of that enactment is not to create a separate offense but rather:    to provide for the punishment of a person convicted of an assault with intent to commit a definite, specific crime which is made a felony, where no punishment is elsewhere provided by law for the assault. State v. Austin, 109 Iowa 118, 121, 80 N.W. 303, 304 (1899). Admittedly, the questioned instructions are neither within the norm nor by any means models to be followed. However, this alone is not determinative. As heretofore indicated, we are not presently confronted with a misstatement of law. Similarly, it is to us evident trial court's choice of words was not so confusing as to constitute prejudicial error. Viewed as a whole, the instructions clearly set out the elements the State had to prove in order to justify a guilty verdict for assault with intent to maim. And use of the precursory phrase a felony, though redundant, was merely a contemporary characterization of the statutory crime, assault with intent to maim. Briefly stated, the prefatory broad categorization of the specific crime charged was nothing more than harmless excess verbiage. Defendant's presently considered assignment affords him no basis for a reversal. IV. Chatterson correlatively contends he must be sentenced under 694.5, rather than 694.7, which provides a greater maximum penalty. This issue is raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore it is not entertained. Houston v. State, 246 N.W.2d 908, 910 (Iowa 1976). Furthermore, Division III hereof negates this contention. AFFIRMED.