Opinion ID: 3066157
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of NEPA to Reclamation

Text: Having explained why the FWS was not required to produce an EIS when it issued the BiOp, we now address why the district court correctly concluded that Reclamation’s adoption and implementation of the BiOp requires the preparation of an EIS. The federal defendants do not contest the district court’s decision that Reclamation should have completed an EA and, if necessary, an EIS in conjunction with its implementation of the BiOp. But NRDC appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim that Reclamation violated NEPA.49 49 Because the federal defendants have not appealed the district court’s decision that Reclamation’s adoption of the BiOp is subject to NEPA, we must first confirm that NRDC has standing to challenge the decision. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (“[A]n intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.”). We hold that NRDC has standing to appeal the district court’s decision. “To determine whether an intervenor may appeal from a decision not being appealed by one of the parties in the district court, the test is whether the intervenor’s interests have been adversely affected by the judgment.” Didrickson v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1992). “To invoke this court’s jurisdiction on the basis of an injury related to the judgment, Intervenors must establish that the district court’s judgment causes their members a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 482 (9th Cir. 2010). “[A] credible threat of harm is sufficient to constitute actual injury for standing purposes, whether or not a statutory violation has occurred.” Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950. 134 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL We begin by noting that we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp is a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” even though NRDC does not directly challenge this portion of the court’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), First, implementation of the BiOp is a “major Federal action.” We have held “that where a proposed federal action would not change the status quo, an NRDC has demonstrated, for Article III standing purposes, that the district court’s judgment requiring Reclamation to complete an EIS poses “a credible threat of harm” to the delta smelt. The 2008 BiOp—which we hold today is not arbitrary and capricious—concluded that project operations jeopardized the delta smelt. There is, therefore, “a credible threat of harm” to the delta smelt if project operations continue. Although the district court remanded without vacatur, the plaintiffs can potentially use the judgment that Reclamation violated NEPA to enjoin implementation of the RPAs so long as doing so does not violate Section 7 of the ESA. See In re Consolidated Delta Smelt Cases, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1198 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (judgment vacated by San Luis & DeltaMendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, No. 11-17143 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2012)) (“A court may not issue an injunction under NEPA that would cause a violation of other statutory requirements, such as those found in Section 7 of the ESA. . . . However, where the evidence indicates that the ESA will not be violated by injunctive relief issued under NEPA, the presence of a NEPA claim permits consideration of economic harm evidence.”). The fact that a court cannot grant an injunction based on the judgment that Reclamation violated NEPA if doing so would cause a violation of Section 7 of the ESA does not preclude NRDC from having standing to appeal the judgment because “a credible threat of harm is sufficient to constitute actual injury for standing purposes, whether or not a statutory violation has occurred.” Cent. Delta Water Agency, 306 F.3d at 950 (emphasis added). The judgment thus introduces some probabilistic chance of environmental harm short of a statutory violation of Section 7 of ESA, which is sufficient for Article III standing. See id. at 948 (“‘Threatened environmental harm is by nature probabilistic.’” (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 135 EIS is not necessary.” Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1980) (“An EIS need not discuss the environmental effects of mere continued operation of a facility.”). In Upper Snake River, the court held that Reclamation’s decision to reduce the flow of water from a dam to 1,000 cfs was not a major federal action. Upper Snake River, 921 F.2d at 233. Reclamation had already set the flow rate below 1,000 cfs during 4.75% of the total days that the dam had been in operation, which led the court to conclude that “[w]hat they did in prior years and what they were doing during the period under consideration were no more than the routine managerial actions regularly carried on from the outset without change . . . they are doing nothing new, nor more extensive, nor other than that contemplated when the project was first operational.” Id. at 234–35. The district court correctly distinguished Upper Snake River by observing that the BiOp does not merely involve a “routine” adjustment to the operation of the project. Rather, it “can be determined from the face of the BiOp and uncontroverted analyses of public data . . . [that] the Projects’ water delivery operations must be materially changed to restrict project water flows to protect the smelt.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1049. Second, Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp “significantly affect[s] the human environment.” We have held that “[a]n agency is required to prepare an EIS where there are substantial questions about whether a project may cause significant degradation of the human environment.” Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). The district court correctly concluded that “dispositive 136 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL conclusions can be made without looking to the [administrative record].” San Luis & Delta-Mendota, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. For example, the federal defendants’ answer states that “Defendants aver that ‘reductions in exports from the Delta’ may ‘place greater demands upon alternative sources of water, including groundwater.’” Id. The district court correctly concluded that Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp is a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). NRDC’s argument on appeal is that, under these circumstances, NEPA conflicts with the ESA’s goal of preserving listed species like the delta smelt by imposing an additional procedural requirement on Reclamation. For this reason, NRDC contends that NEPA does not apply to Reclamation’s adoption and implementation of the BiOp, even if the action is a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” that would ordinarily trigger NEPA review. We therefore consider whether we should set aside the EIS requirement when an agency implements a BiOp and RPAs designed to ensure that its action “is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). We find no basis in the statute or our case law for excusing Reclamation from its NEPA obligations under these circumstances. On its face, the statute does not permit case-by-case exceptions that assess how NEPA interacts with the substantive statute at issue. It simply requires that “to the fullest extent possible . . . all agencies of the Federal Government shall” complete an EA and, if necessary, an EIS SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 137 for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Congress has expressly provided that NEPA does not apply to certain statutory schemes. For example, “No action taken under the Clean Air Act shall be deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.” 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1). In other words, no action taken under the Clean Air Act will trigger NEPA’s requirement that the agency produce an EIS. See also 42 U.S.C. § 8473 (stating that the EIS requirement does not apply to certain exemptions for electric powerplants); 42 U.S.C. § 5159 (providing that actions restoring particular facilities to their condition prior to a disaster or emergency are exempt from the EIS requirement). Most notably, Section 7 of the ESA—the provision at issue here—carves out a narrow exception to the EIS requirement. The ESA authorizes the formation of an “Endangered Species Committee” that is empowered to grant exemptions from the general prohibition on agency actions that “jeopardize the continued existence” of listed species or “result in the destruction or adverse modification of [their] habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). The statute specifically provides that a decision by the Endangered Species Committee to exempt an agency action from the ESA’s prohibitions is not subject to NEPA if the agency already completed an EIS concerning the effects of the action. Id. at § 1536(k). This could very well be the end of our inquiry. Congress has repeatedly demonstrated that it knows how to exempt particular substantive statutes from the EIS requirement when it wishes to do so. Moreover, Congress has expressly exempted a particular subset of actions under Section 7 of the ESA—decisions by the Endangered Species Committee 138 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL where an EIS was already completed by the action agency. But Congress did not exempt all efforts to avoid jeopardizing the survival of a listed species from the EIS requirement. In fact, Congress’s decision to exempt certain decisions by the Endangered Species Committee from the EIS requirement reaffirms that NEPA applies to other actions under Section 7 of the ESA, including Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp. There is additional statutory evidence that Reclamation’s adoption and implementation of the BiOp triggers its obligations under NEPA. Section 7 of the ESA provides that a biological assessment “may be undertaken as part of a Federal agency’s compliance with the requirements of section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. § 4332),” which is the section that governs the preparation of an EIS. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1). This is evidence that Congress specifically contemplated that an action agency discharging its duties under Section 7 of the ESA would also comply with NEPA by completing an EA and, if necessary, an EIS. The regulations also acknowledge that the agencies are expected to concurrently comply with both Section 7 of the ESA and NEPA. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.06 (“Consultation, conference, and biological assessment procedures under section 7 may be consolidated with interagency cooperation procedures required by other statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).”). NRDC does not cite a single case where any court has held that an action agency’s obligations under Section 7 of the ESA excuse it from complying with NEPA. There are, however, a number of cases holding that other substantive statutes are exempt from the EIS requirement, even though SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 139 Congress has not expressly provided an exemption. NRDC would have us extend the rationale of those cases to these circumstances. We have recognized two circumstances where an agency need not complete an EIS despite an absence of an express statutory exemption. First, an agency is excused from complying with NEPA where doing so “would create an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict” with the substantive statute at issue. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976). Second, we have identified a limited number of instances where a substantive statute has “displaced” NEPA’s requirements, even though there is not “an irreconcilable” conflict between the substantive statute and the EIS requirement. See Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1502 (“[The plaintiff] argues that without this ‘irreconcilable’ statutory conflict NEPA must apply. We disagree, and . . . we hold that NEPA does not apply to the designation of a critical habitat.”). First, in Flint Ridge the Supreme Court held that the EIS requirement did not apply because requiring the agency to prepare an EIS “would create an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict with the Secretary’s duties under the [substantive statute at issue].” Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 788. There, the substantive statute provided that a document filed with the agency would automatically become effective in thirty days under certain circumstances. Id. at 788. The Court explained that “[i]t is inconceivable that an environmental impact statement could, in 30 days, be drafted, circulated, commented upon, and then reviewed and revised in light of the comments.” Id. at 789. But in Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986), we observed that “Flint Ridge applies only when a conflict is ‘clear and 140 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL unavoidable’ and ‘irreconcilable and fundamental.’” Id. at 826. The Jones court explained that, unlike in Flint Ridge, the agency “could withhold publication long enough to comply with any NEPA requirement for preparation of an environmental impact statement.” Id. There is no “irreconcilable and fundamental conflict” between NEPA and Section 7 of the ESA. Although the statute sets out a timetable for the consultation process, it is flexible enough to accommodate the preparation of an EIS. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(1)(A) (“Consultation under subsection (a)(2) of this section with respect to any agency action shall be concluded within the 90-day period beginning on the date on which initiated or, subject to paragraph (B), within such other period of time as is mutually agreeable to the Secretary and federal agency.” (emphasis added)); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(1)(B) (“The Secretary and the Federal agency may mutually agree to extend a consultation period established under the preceding sentence if the Secretary, before the close of such period, obtains the consent of the application to the extension.”); see also Westlands Water Dist. v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 850 F. Supp. 1388, 1423 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (“Section 7 of the ESA gives agencies control over the time within which consultation is to be concluded . . . . [And] ESA § 7 provides for the inclusion of ‘applicants’ within the consultation process, which demonstrates access to the ESA process by interested parties . . . . Neither timing nor secrecy concerns bar the ability to comply with NEPA.”). Second, we have held that an agency action might be exempt from NEPA even “without this ‘irreconcilable’ statutory conflict” identified in Flint Ridge. Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1502; see also Drakes Bay Oyster, 729 F.3d at 984; SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 141 Merrell, 807 F.2d at 778. In Douglas County, we held that the Secretary of the Interior need not complete an EIS when designating the critical habitat of a listed species pursuant to Section 4 of the ESA. Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1507.50 The Douglas County court concluded that “Congress intended to displace” NEPA’s procedures when authorizing the agency to designate critical habitat under Section 4 of the ESA. Id. at 1504 n.10. But none of the factors relied on by the Douglas County court in reaching this decision apply with the same force where, as here, the agency action at issue is the implementation of a BiOp under Section 7 of the ESA. The Douglas County court reasoned that the process for designating critical habitat under Section 4 of the ESA effectively accomplished all of NEPA’s goals without requiring an EIS, thereby “mak[ing] the NEPA procedure seem ‘superfluous.’” Id. at 1503. Section 4 of the ESA compels “the Secretary [to] consider impacts that concern NEPA, to the extent that the critical habitat designation has a positive environmental effect on the species in question.” Id. Furthermore, “The critical designation process also provides for public notice, another goal of NEPA.” Id. But the same cannot be said for Section 7 of the ESA, which is at issue in this case. In Save the Yaak Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1988), we explained the difference between a biological assessment (BA) produced 50 The Tenth Circuit subsequently disagreed with the result that we reached in Douglas County, creating a circuit split concerning whether NEPA applies to the designation of critical habitat under Section 4 of the ESA. See Catron Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 133–36 (D.D.C. 2004). 142 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA, and an EA or EIS prepared in accordance with NEPA. The Save the Yaak court considered an argument that “even if the EA was inadequate, it was supplemented by the biological assessment (BA)” completed under Section 7 of the ESA. Id. at 718. We rejected this reasoning, explaining that “[w]hile a BA analyzes the impact of a proposed action upon endangered species, an EA analyzes the impact of the proposed action on all facets of the environment. Thus, if only a BA is prepared there may be gaps in the agency’s environmental analysis.” Id. Courts have offered several other examples of the differences between the Section 7 process and the one prescribed by NEPA. For instance, “the ESA’s Section 7 consultation process fails to provide for public comment in the same way that NEPA does.” Fund for Animals v. Hall, 448 F. Supp. 2d 127, 136 (D.D.C. 2006). This is particularly important because “[p]ublication of an EIS, both in draft and final form, also serves a larger informational role. It gives the public the assurance that the agency ‘has indeed considered environmental concerns in the decisionmaking process,’ and, perhaps more significantly, provides a springboard for public comment.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97) (internal citation omitted). Additionally, “the ESA only requires agencies to consider the cumulative impacts of non-federal actions, while NEPA requires agencies to consider the cumulative impacts of all actions.” Fund for Animals, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 136; see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (describing the cumulative effects analysis under the ESA); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (describing the cumulative impacts analysis under NEPA). We cannot say that Section 7 of the ESA renders NEPA “superfluous” when the statutes evaluate SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 143 different types of environmental impacts through processes that involve varying degrees of public participation. In Merrell, we held that the EIS requirement does not apply to FIFRA’s scheme for registering pesticides because the two processes are markedly different. See Merrell, 807 F.2d at 778 (“The differences between FIFRA’s registration procedure and NEPA’s requirements indicate that Congress did not intend NEPA to apply.”). Although both Merrell and Douglas County conclude that NEPA does not apply to a particular substantive statute, they do so for opposite reasons. Douglas County holds that Section 4 of the ESA renders NEPA superfluous because the processes are sufficiently similar, while Merrell holds that FIFRA renders NEPA superfluous because the processes are sufficiently different. See Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1503 (“[T]he Secretary will consider impacts that concern NEPA, to the extent that the critical habitat designation has a positive environmental effect on the species in question. The critical designation process also provides for public notice, another goal of NEPA.”); Merrell, 807 F.2d at 779 (“[W]hen Congress revised FIFRA in 1972, it designed a registration procedure with public notice and public participation provisions that differ materially from those that NEPA would require.”). Although we have already acknowledged the differences between Section 7 of the ESA and NEPA, we do not think that the distinctions are as pronounced as those in Merrell, where the court concluded that “[t]o apply NEPA to FIFRA’s registration process would sabotage the delicate machinery that Congress designed to register new pesticides.” Merrell, 807 F.2d at 779. As we have observed, Congress specifically contemplated that an agency could comply with NEPA while 144 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL discharging its duties under Section 7 of the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1) (explaining that the biological assessment required by Section 7 of the ESA “may be undertaken as part of a Federal agency’s compliance with the requirements of section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. § 4332)”). In this very case, the federal agencies acknowledge that Reclamation will complete an EIS in conjunction with its adoption and implementation of the BiOp, which undercuts the notion that the two processes are incompatible. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the process set out by Section 7 of the ESA clashes with NEPA to such an extent that requiring Reclamation to produce an EIS “would sabotage the delicate machinery that Congress designed.” Merrell, 807 F.2d at 779. Instead, we find that Section 7 of the ESA fits within the broad swath of statutes that coexist with NEPA.51 51 A number of other circuits have held that an agency need not produce an EIS where the substantive statute at issue offers a procedure that is the “functional equivalent” of the EIS process. See, e.g., State of Ala. ex rel. Siegleman v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990); Limerick Ecological Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n., 869 F.2d 719, 729 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989); Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 367 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1981). We have been skeptical of the “functional equivalent” approach and have not used this language in our cases. See Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1504 n.10 (“Courts have used a ‘functional equivalent’ test to exempt agency action from NEPA requirements . . . . The defendants here do not advance the functional equivalent argument, so we do not address it. The [plaintiff] would have us believe that the ‘displacement’ argument defendants make is the same as the ‘functional equivalent’ test. We do not agree. The ‘displacement’ argument asserts that Congress intended to displace one procedure with another. The ‘functional equivalent’ argument is that one process requires the same steps as another.”); Merrell, 807 F.2d at 781 (“While we hesitate to adopt the ‘functional SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 145 The Douglas County court also noted that Congress acquiesced to decisions by the agencies and courts that compliance with NEPA was not required when designating critical under habitat Section 4 of the ESA. We noted that in 1983 the Secretary of the Interior stopped preparing EAs and EISs before designating critical habitat, yet Congress did not address the agency’s interpretation of the statute when it amended the ESA in 1988. Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1504. The Sixth Circuit had also suggested in dicta that it might not be necessary to prepare an EIS before designating critical habitat before the 1988 amendments to the ESA. Id. (citing Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1981)). But here, neither the agencies nor the courts have interpreted Section 7 of the ESA to permit noncompliance with NEPA. As noted, the relevant regulations indicate that the action agency will complete an EIS while carrying out its duties under Section 7, and the federal defendants in this case have assumed that Reclamation will complete an EIS evaluating the effects of implementing the BiOp. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.06 (“Consultation, conference, and biological assessment procedures under section 7 may be consolidated equivalence’ rationale, we are confident that Congress did not intend NEPA to apply to FIFRA registrations.”). NRDC relies on Douglas County and Merrell, which are “displacement” cases rather than “functional equivalent” cases. To our knowledge, none of the circuits that have adopted the “functional equivalent” test have held that the procedures set out by Section 7 of the ESA are equivalent to the EIS requirement. Although NRDC does not urge us to adopt the “functional equivalent” approach, we note that the factors considered in the preceding paragraphs are the same ones that we would address under that analysis. Regardless of the language used to conduct the analysis, the statutes and regulations reveal that Section 7 of the ESA and NEPA involve different processes that measure different kinds of environmental impacts. 146 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL with interagency cooperation procedures required by other statutes, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).”). And, to our knowledge, there are no cases stating that an agency need not comply with NEPA because of its obligations under Section 7 of the ESA. Next, the Douglas County court stated that there is no reason to prepare an EIS “when the action at issue does not alter the natural, untouched physical environment at all.” Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1505. We explained that “the purpose of NEPA is to protect the physical environment, and the purpose of preparing an EIS is to alert agencies and the public to potential adverse consequences to the land, sea or air.” Id. Therefore, the designation of critical habitat, which results in the land at issue being left alone, does not require an EIS. Here, the BiOp does far more than leave nature alone. Humans have dramatically altered the Bay-Delta ecosystem. Even if we assume that implementing the BiOp is a step toward returning the ecosystem to its natural state, there is no doubt that project operations will continue to alter the physical environment, albeit in different ways. We have already interpreted this portion of Douglas County quite narrowly. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002) (abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011)). In Kootenai Tribe, the agency announced a “Roadless Rule” that prohibited construction of new roads in certain areas. Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1105. We considered an argument that NEPA should not apply to the agency’s action in light of the Douglas County court’s statement that “an EIS is not required to leave nature alone.” Id. at 1114 (quoting Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1505). We held that “[b]ecause human intervention, in the form of forest management, has been part of the fabric of our national SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 147 forests for so long, we conclude that, in the context of this unusual case, the reduction in human intervention that would result from the Roadless Rule actually does alter the environmental status quo . . . . The Forest Service’s Roadless initiative thus required an EIS under NEPA.” Id. at 1115. An action to lessen one form of pressure on the natural environment, such as Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp, is distinguishable from a decision to continue to leave a portion of nature untouched altogether. At its broadest point, our opinion in Douglas County implied that the agency’s designation of critical habitat did not trigger NEPA review because it was an environmental preservation effort. We explained that “[b]y designating critical habitats for endangered or threatened species, the Secretary ‘is working to preserve the environment and prevent the irretrievable loss of a natural resource.’ Thus the action of the Secretary in designating a critical habitat furthers the purpose of NEPA. Requiring the EPA to file an EIS ‘would only hinder its efforts at attaining the goal of improving the environment.’” Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1506. We recently applied this principle in Drakes Bay Oyster, where we wrote that “[t]he Secretary’s decision is essentially an environmental conservation effort, which has not triggered NEPA in the past.” Drakes Bay Oyster, 729 F.3d at 984 (citing Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1505–06). We do not read either Douglas County or Drakes Bay Oyster to stand for the proposition that efforts to preserve the natural environment are per se exempt from NEPA.52 As 52 We recently observed that our court has yet to hold that an agency that has already produced an EA need not produce an EIS when the action in question will only have beneficial impacts on the environment. See 148 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL noted, the Douglas County court relied on the observation that designating critical habitat under Section 4 of the ESA is an “action[] that do[es] nothing to alter the natural physical environment.” Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1505. Similarly, in Drakes Bay Oyster, the only purported “adverse environmental consequences” of designating the area in question as a wilderness were “short-term harms, such as noise associated with heavy machinery needed to remove Drakes Bay’s structures” in order to return the area to its natural state. Drakes Bay Oyster, 729 F.3d at 984. We noted that “such relatively minor harms do not by themselves ‘significantly affect[]’ the environment in such a way as to Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010) (“As a threshold matter, plaintiffs’ argument appears to raise an issue of first impression in this circuit: whether NEPA requires an agency to prepare an EIS when an action has a significant beneficial impact but not significant adverse impact on the environment.”); see also id. at 1046 (“[T]o comply with NEPA, NMFS prepared an environmental assessment . . . . The final environmental assessment resulted in a finding of no significant impact under NEPA.”). In Humane Society, we did not resolve the question whether an agency that has produced an EA showing significant beneficial environmental impacts and no adverse environmental impacts must still complete an EIS. See id. at 1056. In order to hold that Reclamation need not comply with NEPA, we would need to take two substantial steps forward because, in this case, Reclamation did not even complete an EA. We see no basis for holding that an agency can avoid NEPA review altogether when it believes that an agency action will have beneficial impacts on the environment when we have not even excused an agency from producing an EIS when its EA shows that its action will have exclusively beneficial impacts on the environment. In other words, even if we had some basis for assuming that Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp would have exclusively beneficial impacts on the environment, we would still lack a firm foundation for holding that Reclamation need not prepare an EA and, if necessary, an EIS. SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 149 implicate NEPA.” Id. But here, NRDC does not even contest the district court’s conclusion that implementation of the BiOp “significantly affect[s] the human environment.” See San Luis & Delta-Mendota, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. Whatever effects implementing the BiOp might have on the human environment, it is apparent that they are more complex and wide-ranging than the removal of a few buildings in Drakes Bay Oyster. At this point, we can only speculate about what kind of significant effects will eventually result from implementation of the BiOp because Reclamation has not yet completed its EIS. But it is beyond dispute that Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp has important effects on human interaction with the natural environment. We know that millions of people and vast areas of some of America’s most productive farmland will be impacted by Reclamation’s actions. Those impacts were not the focus of the BiOp. In sum, we cannot reach an informed decision about the extent to which implementation of the BiOp is an environmental preservation action in the vein of Douglas County and Drakes Bay Oyster because we do not know how the action will impact the broader natural environment. We find no basis for exempting Reclamation from the EIS requirement. See Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 349 (“NEPA ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast.”). We recognize that the preparation of an EIS will not alter Reclamation’s obligations under the ESA. But the EIS may well inform Reclamation of the overall costs—including the human costs—of furthering the ESA. So informed, Reclamation has 150 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL the option of seeking an exemption from the ESA from the Endangered Species Committee. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e).53 Finally, NRDC argues that Reclamation’s issuance of the 2004 OCAP is the “major Federal action[]” that should have been subject to NEPA review instead of its implementation 53 The Endangered Species Committee is the exclusive avenue through which an applicant may obtain an exemption from the ESA’s substantive prohibitions. See 16 U.S.C. §1536(a)(2) (“Each federal agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species . . . unless such agency has been granted an exemption for such action by the Committee pursuant to [16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)].”); see also Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1537 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The Committee was created by the Endangered Species Act for the sole purpose of making final decisions on applications for exemptions from the Act . . . . Because it is the ultimate arbiter of the fate of an endangered species, the Committee is known as “The God Squad.”). The Committee has only convened on a handful of occasions and has only granted two exemptions. See Portland Audubon Soc’y, 984 F.2d at 1537. Commentators have discussed whether action from the Committee would be appropriate under these circumstances. See generally Eric M. Yuknis, Note, Would a “God Squad” Exemption under the Endangered Species Act Solve the California Water Crisis?, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 567 (2011). For our purposes, it is worth noting that the possibility of review by the Endangered Species Committee, however unlikely it may be, renders the preparation of an EIS more than a mere academic exercise in cases involving Section 7 of the ESA. Although the agency cannot ignore its obligations under the ESA because of the impacts on other aspects of the human environment, the Committee might wish to consider these factors in making an exemption decision. And, as previously noted, the statute contemplates that the agency will have completed an EIS by providing that the Committee itself need not do so if the agency has already prepared an EIS with respect to the action subject to the Committee’s review. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(k). SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 151 of the 2008 BiOp. In a different case, NRDC alleged that Reclamation’s “approval and implementation” of the 2004 OCAP triggered its obligation to complete an EIS. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n/Inst. for Fisheries Res. v. Gutierrez, No. 1:06-cv-00245, 2007 WL 1752289, at  (E.D. Cal. June 15, 2007). In Gutierrez, the district court held that the 2004 OCAP was not subject to NEPA because its was not a “final agency action.” See id. at –13 (“[The OCAP] do[es] not implement any actions or inactions. They are informational. If any proposed changes are initiated that will have the requisite effect on the environment, such changes will be agency action subject to NEPA review. The purpose of the OCAP is ‘to serve as a baseline description of the facilities and operating environment of the CVP and SWP.’”). NRDC contends that Gutierrez was wrongly decided and that the district court should have required Reclamation to complete an EIS on the 2004 OCAP. Yet NRDC and the other plaintiffs in Gutierrez did not appeal the district court’s decision concerning its NEPA claims. Not only is NRDC collaterally estopped from relitigating the decision in Gutierrez, but the issue is also not pertinent to our holding that Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp requires the agency to prepare an EIS. Even if Reclamation’s implementation of the 2004 OCAP was a final decision that changed the status quo of the project operations in a way that significantly affected the environment, that does not mean that Reclamation’s implementation of the 2008 BiOp did not also change the status quo in a way that significantly alters the environment, thereby requiring an additional EIS. NRDC bolsters its contention that NEPA should apply to the 2004 OCAP in lieu of the 2008 BiOp by referencing Section 7 of the ESA and its regulations. As noted above, the 152 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL statute and its regulations explain that an action agency like Reclamation can coordinate the preparation of its biological assessment with its obligations under NEPA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(c)(1); 50 C.F.R. § 402.06. NRDC reasons that these provisions suggest that NEPA review of the BiOp is not required because Reclamation could not complete its EIS until after its Section 7 consultation with the FWS rather than at the same time as its consultation obligations. But even if we fully credit this line of reasoning, it does not affect our conclusion that NEPA applies to Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp. We need not locate affirmative and unequivocal confirmation in every substantive statute that a particular agency action requires NEPA review; most substantive statutes never mention NEPA at all. They do not need to because NEPA itself provides that “to the fullest extent possible . . . all agencies of the Federal Government shall” complete an EA and, if necessary, an EIS for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). The fact that Section 7 of the ESA expressly mentions the EIS requirement supports, rather than rebuts, the notion that NEPA applies to the action at issue here. Our starting point was that NEPA applies to Reclamation’s implementation of the BiOp because it is a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” We acknowledge that we have previously held that the EIS requirement does not apply to particular agency actions even in the absence of an express statutory exemption. See Drakes Bay Oyster, 729 F.3d at 984; Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1507; Merrell, 807 F.2d at 781. But the factors identified in those cases are simply not present here. We are cognizant of our commitment to avoid “mak[ing] NEPA more of an ‘obstructionist tactic’ to prevent SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 153 environmental protection than it may already have become.” Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1508; see also Drakes Bay Oyster, 729 F.3d at 984. But, as noted, the district court remanded the BiOp and RPAs without vacatur, and it continues to actively manage Reclamation’s deadline for completing the EIS process. We conclude that Reclamation is obligated to comply with NEPA, and we affirm the judgment of the district court with respect to the NEPA claims.