Opinion ID: 812677
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Huerta’s Other Claims

Text: Alternatively, Huerta contends that even if Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar precludes, as a matter of law, his negligence claim, the district court erred in applying it to his other claims. Huerta correctly asserts that, by its terms, Peeler concerned only claims brought against an attorney for malpractice and violations of the DTPA.3 See 909 S.W.2d at 498. Common to both causes of action, the Peeler court explained, was “the element of cause in fact,” meaning that, to prevail, the plaintiff was required to show “that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury which would not otherwise have occurred.” Id. The plaintiff could not show this, however, since the court concluded that “as a matter of law, it is the illegal conduct rather than the negligence of a convict’s counsel that is the cause in fact of any injuries flowing from the conviction.” Id. In light of the court’s analysis, Huerta maintains that Peeler operates only to bar claims that require a showing of proximate cause. As such, he submits that his claims for breach of contract, money had and received, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty—none of which, he argues, requires a showing of proximate cause—should have survived Shein’s motion to dismiss, because they are independent of his negligence claim. Under Texas law, however, “[w]hether allegations against a lawyer, labeled as breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, or some other cause of action, are actually claims for professional negligence or something else is a question of law to be determined by the court.” Nabors, 2010 WL 255968, at . “Texas courts unsettled. DiPascal v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir. 1985). Here, the Texas courts have “given us ample guidance in the decisions cited in this opinion.” Id. 3 Although the suit in Peeler originally also had included claims for breach of contract and breach of warranty, those issues had not been preserved for appeal. 909 S.W.2d at 499. The Peeler court thus “express[ed] no opinion about them.” Id. 9 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 do not allow plaintiffs to convert what are really negligence claims into claims for fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or violation of the DTPA.” Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). “[T]his prohibition does not necessarily foreclose the simultaneous pursuit of a negligence-based malpractice claim and a separate breach of fiduciary duty or fraud claim when there is a viable basis for doing so.” Meullion, 2011 WL 5926676, at . Nevertheless, to do so, “the plaintiff must do more than merely reassert the same claim for legal malpractice under an alternative label. The plaintiff must present a claim that goes beyond what traditionally has been characterized as legal malpractice.” Duerr v. Brown, 262 S.W.3d 63, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). “Regardless of the theory a plaintiff pleads, as long as the crux of the complaint is that the plaintiff’s attorney did not provide adequate legal representation, the claim is one for legal malpractice.” Kimleco Petroleum, Inc. v. Morrison & Shelton, 91 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied). Accordingly, we must turn to Huerta’s complaint to determine the precise character of his claims, viewing the pleaded facts, as we must, in the light most favorable to him. At the outset, we note that Huerta’s complaint describes the nature of the action as one “involving breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, actual fraud, and fraudulent concealment of facts, which relate to Mr. Huerta’s underlying claim that Defendant’s [sic] engaged in legal malpractice when they represented him.” Huerta’s claims therefore are set forth as follows: his breach of contract claim is based on the allegation that Shein failed to perform their contractual obligations “by failing to timely file Plaintiff’s §2255 Habeas Corpus Motion”; Huerta’s money had and received claim is grounded on the assertion that Shein “received monies from Plaintiff” to prepare and file the motion and that the “monies in equity and good conscience . . . belong[] to Plaintiff”; the breach of fiduciary duty claim is based on the 10 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 contention that Shein “failed to inform Plaintiff of their mistake associated with the untimely filing of his” motion and erroneously informed him that the courts’ rulings were incorrect; and Huerta’s fraud claims are grounded on the allegation that Shein failed to disclose and misrepresented certain facts “regarding their failure to timely file Plaintiff’s” motion. Thus, the crux of Huerta’s complaint is that Shein: (1) failed timely to file Huerta’s section 2255 motion, which led to its dismissal; (2) did not disclose the untimely nature of the filing to Huerta; and (3) erroneously advised Huerta to pursue an appeal because the law supported his position. Though framed as multiple causes of action, we conclude that these claims all sound in negligence, essentially amounting to the assertion that Shein committed legal malpractice. Our conclusion finds ample support in Texas caselaw. In Murphy, for example, the court explained that, as alleged here, a lawyer commits “professional negligence by giving an erroneous legal opinion or erroneous advice, by delaying or failing to handle a matter entrusted to the lawyer’s care, or by not using a lawyer’s ordinary care in preparing, managing, and prosecuting a case.” 241 S.W.3d at 693; see also id. at 692–93 (“Professional negligence, or the failure to exercise ordinary care, includes giving a client bad legal advice or otherwise improperly representing the client.”). Because acts of this nature constitute professional negligence, Texas courts repeatedly have declined to permit plaintiffs to convert claims for these acts into breach of contract actions. See Nabors, 2010 WL 255968, at  (collecting cases). Likewise, “Texas courts have consistently held that the failure to disclose significant information about a client’s case is professional negligence and not a breach of fiduciary duty.” Kemp v. Jensen, 329 S.W.3d 866, 872 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied) (reviewing cases); see also Murphy, 241 S.W.3d at 694 (explaining that Texas appellate courts have “differentiated between claims against a lawyer for 11 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty” and discussing cases so holding). Indeed, this case is analogous to Nabors. There, an attorney (“McColl”) had represented a defendant (“Nabors”) charged with various drug-related offenses in both federal and state court. Nabors, 2010 WL 255968, at . After Nabors entered into a plea agreement, McColl allegedly informed him that additional charges that had been pending in Dallas County, Texas were dismissed. Id. Later, while serving his federal sentence, Nabors attempted to enroll in a residential drug and alcohol treatment program in exchange for a reduced sentence, but was informed that he was ineligible because his Dallas County case was still pending. Id. Nabors contacted McColl, who informed Nabors that the problem was simply a “bureaucratic error.” Id. Although McColl subsequently determined that Nabors’ Dallas County case remained open, he did not inform Nabors of this fact until several months later. Id. Nabors eventually sued McColl for legal malpractice, DTPA violations, fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and conversion. Id. At the outset, the court affirmed summary judgment against Nabors’ malpractice claim after holding that, as a matter of law, Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar precluded recovery for malpractice. Id. at –2. The court then considered whether Nabors’ additional claims were “subsumed in his legal malpractice claim.” Id. at . In analyzing that issue, the court began by examining Nabors’ complaint, explaining: Nabors’ claim for breach of contract is based on McColl’s failure to “fully perform his agreement to represent [Nabors] in the Dallas case and timely complete” it and on Nabors’ claim that McColl failed to earn the $25,000 fee in the Dallas case. Nabors’ breach of fiduciary relationship claim is based on McColl’s failure to disclose that the Dallas case was not dismissed, McColl’s misrepresentations that the case was dismissed, and McColl’s refusal to turn over 12 Case: 12-50346 Document: 00512064515 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/27/2012 No. 12-50346 certain client files and accounting records. Nabors’ common law fraud claim is also based on McColl’s alleged intentional nondisclosure of the fact the Dallas case had not been dismissed. Id. at . The court noted that “[a] cause of action claiming bad legal advice or improper representation is one for legal malpractice,” and similarly, “[a]n attorney’s misrepresentations about the status of litigation being handled by the attorney constitutes a claim for malpractice rather than breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. Thus, the court held, “Nabors’ claims were an impermissible attempt to convert what were really negligence claims into claims of breach of contract, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment against Nabors, as it was “well settled” that his claims were barred by law. Id. at . Likewise here, Huerta’s claims all amount to the assertion that Shein committed professional negligence. We are therefore constrained by Peeler’s sole proximate cause bar to affirm the district court’s dismissal of those claims.