Opinion ID: 1563772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mandate in Pleasant Management I

Text: Since [t]he existence of excusable neglect is a question of fact and must be established by evidence, Cournoyer v. Doorley, 697 A.2d 332, 333 (R.I.1997) (quoting Graham Architectural Products Corp. v. M & J Construction Co., 492 A.2d 150, 151 (R.I.1985)), we instructed the Superior Court to determine whether such evidence existed in this case to support vacating the decree. Pleasant Management I, 870 A.2d at 447. On remand, the narrow issue for the Superior Court to decide was whether Murray's violation of the anti-contact rule led to excusable neglect on the part of defendants. Despite our ruling, the hearing justice disregarded this mandate and held an in-depth evidentiary hearing that ultimately led him to rule, in direct contradiction of our holding in Pleasant Management I, that Murray did not violate the anti-contact rule. [11] As we have stated in the past, the opinions of this Court speak forthrightly and not by suggestion or innuendo. Fracassa v. Doris, 876 A.2d 506, 509 (R.I.2005). Nor is it the role of the trial justice to attempt to read `between the lines' of our decisions. Id. We have made clear that the lower courts and administrative bodies that receive our remand orders may not exceed the scope of the remand or open up the proceeding to legal issues beyond the remand. Willis v. Wall, 941 A.2d 163, 166 (R.I.2008). The mandate rule can be summarized as follows: When a case has been once decided by this court on appeal, and remanded to the [Superior Court], whatever was before this court, and disposed of by its decree, is considered as finally settled. The [Superior Court] is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution according to the mandate. That court cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon any matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.    But the [Superior Court] may consider and decide any matters left open by the mandate of this court. United States v. Thrasher, 483 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255-56, 16 S.Ct. 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895)); see also RICO Corp. v. Town of Exeter, 836 A.2d 212, 218 (R.I.2003) (noting that lower court may not disregard the explicit directives of an appellate court) (quoting Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 2002)). In our opinion, the hearing justice strayed from the mandate when he ruled that Murray did not violate the anti-contact rule and that defendants were victim[s] of ineffectiveness of counsel because of their attorney's neglect in her handling of this matter. We believe this to be clear error in light of our opinion and mandate in Pleasant Management I. These issues were simply not before the hearing justice.