Opinion ID: 2774027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wrongful Termination/Breach of Contract

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and JNOV on McNaughton's breach of contract claim because Appellant was entitled to terminate McNaughton's employment pursuant to the contingency clause in her employment agreement. We disagree. In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV, the trial court must view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions. Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., teach as a certified teacher, while she would have earned approximately $192,000 at a minimum wage job—a difference of $216,000. 350 S.C. 416, 427, 567 S.E.2d 231, 236 (2002). The trial court must deny either motion when the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt. Id. This Court will reverse the trial court only when there is no evidence to support the trial court's ruling. Id. A jury's factual finding will not be disturbed unless a review of the record discloses that there is no evidence which reasonably supports the jury's findings. Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 85, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976) (citing Odom v. Weathersbee, 225 S.C. 253, 260, 81 S.E.2d 788, 792 (1954)). Appellant argues that unless there was ongoing funding for [McNaughton's] position then the [employment agreement] entitled Appellant to end her employment without notice and before the school year ended. Therefore, in reviewing the trial court's rulings on the directed verdict and JNOV motions, we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to suggest that—given the contingency clause—Appellant breached McNaughton's employment agreement because there was funding actually available for her position at the time of her termination. The analysis of this issue hinges on whether the principal's decision to reallocate the funding initially designated for McNaughton's salary falls within the confines of the contingency clause, which states that McNaughton's employment was contingent on funding and enrollment. Appellant contends that the only evidence in this case shows that there was not even an extra penny available to fund [McNaughton's] position as a teacher. Not only is this contrary to the principal's statement at trial that there was indeed funding available to pay McNaughton's salary at the time of her termination, there is also other evidence in the record to support McNaughton's position. For example, there was funding available in other line items of the budget, such as teacher salary supplement and administrative staff services. Further, despite the principal's testimony that there was no play in the line item for teachers' salaries, the record makes it clear that it was not unusual for the principal to ask the board for approval to move around funding in the budget—as evidenced by the board's decision in November 2010 to approve the use of $72,000 to hire new teachers. Therefore, because there is evidence to support the jury's finding that Appellant breached McNaughton's employment agreement, we hold that the trial court properly denied Appellant's directed verdict and JNOV motions.