Opinion ID: 4538232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: motion for civil contempt

Text: Next, the Plaintiffs argue that District Court Judge Jones abused his discretion, and denied them due process, when he denied their motion for contempt without ordering the M&B Attorneys to show cause.5 The Plaintiffs assert that, 5 This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the district court’s ruling on a motion for civil contempt. Nat’l Urological Grp., 785 F.3d at 481. This Court also reviews for an abuse of discretion a district court’s interpretation of its own orders. In re Managed Care, 756 F.3d 1222, 1234 (11th Cir. 2014). 12 Case: 19-15001 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 13 of 17 because they made a prima facie showing that the M&B Attorneys violated Judge Hunt’s October 25 oral order, the burden shifted to the Attorneys to show cause that they did not violate the order.6 “Courts have the inherent power to enforce compliance with their orders through civil contempt.” U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Escobio, 946 F.3d 1242, 1255 (11th Cir. 2020). Upon filing a motion for civil contempt, the movants—here, the Plaintiffs—bear the initial burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the alleged contemnors’ noncompliance with a prior court order. Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 814, 821 (11th Cir. 2010). “The clear and convincing evidence must establish that: (1) the allegedly violated order was valid and lawful; (2) the order was clear and unambiguous; and (3) the alleged violator[s] had the ability to comply with the order.” Ga. Power Co. 6 The Plaintiffs contend that Judge Hunt entered ten “orders” during the October 25 hearing and that those orders were “suppressed” and “never entered [onto] the court [docket].” The Plaintiffs identify the ten “orders” in a chart they prepared. The Plaintiffs assert that the “records were tampered [with] in the [district] court record by recording only a partial order,” which allowed the M&B Attorneys to argue “an alternative conclusion than what Judge Hunt [actually] ordered.” There is simply no record evidence supporting the Plaintiffs’ claims of suppressed orders and transcript tampering, nor have they provided any such evidence. The transcript of the October 25, 2010 hearing is available on the district court docket, and there is no indication from the face of the transcript that it has been tampered with. Moreover, the only order by Judge Hunt that is relevant to this appeal—that the parties meet and attempt to reconcile—was an oral order that is sufficiently reflected in the transcript and in the hearing minutes. There is no indication that Judge Hunt made or entered a written order on this matter. Thus, there was no such written order to “suppress.” The remaining alleged nine “orders” identified by the Plaintiffs were merely statements Judge Hunt made to the parties during the hearing in relation to its ultimate oral order, and each of those nine statements was included in the transcript of the hearing. 13 Case: 19-15001 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 14 of 17 v. N.L.R.B., 484 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis omitted). Once the movants make a prima facie showing of a violation, the burden shifts to the alleged contemnors—here, the M&B Attorneys—to produce evidence explaining their noncompliance at a show cause hearing. Thomas, 594 F.3d at 821. To determine whether a party is in contempt of a district court’s order, the order is subject to reasonable interpretation and may not be expanded beyond the meaning of its terms without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Ga. Power Co., 484 F.3d at 1291. This Court construes any ambiguities or uncertainties in the court order in the light most favorable to the party charged with contempt. Id. We look not to the subjective beliefs or intent of the alleged contemnor in complying with the subject order, but to whether in fact the alleged contemnor complied with the order. Id. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Plaintiffs’ contempt motion. See F.T.C. v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., 785 F.3d 477, 481 (11th Cir. 2015). As an initial matter, Judge Jones did not abuse his discretion in construing Judge Hunt’s October 25, 2010 oral order as an order “for the parties to essentially make an attempt at reconciliation.” See In re Managed Care, 756 F.3d 1222, 1234 (11th Cir. 2014). At the October 25 hearing, Judge Hunt stressed his preference that the parties reconcile and ordered the parties to confer and attempt to reconcile by the end of the week. In fact, Judge Hunt instructed that he wanted 14 Case: 19-15001 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 15 of 17 the parties to meet at the M&B Attorneys’ office, talk for “at least an hour’s time,” “have this meeting,” and “see if there isn’t some way you can get along.” Even the hearing minutes reflected that Judge Hunt’s oral order was that the parties “make another attempt to reconcile their differences.” Only if the parties were unable to come to a resolution were they to notify the court and was the court to take further action (i.e., grant the M&B Attorneys’ motion to withdraw on the conditions stated in the Settlement Letter). The Plaintiffs contend that Judge Hunt’s October 25 oral order went beyond merely requiring them to reconcile, and rather required that either (a) the parties agree to a contingency fee arrangement in particular or (b) the M&B Attorneys withdraw and recover only $500 in out-of-pocket costs. However, the transcript of the October 25 hearing evidences that Judge Hunt’s oral order was not this definitive. While Judge Hunt did make one statement that the parties needed to “agree on contingency,” he did so in the context of the parties’ indications that they wished to reach a contingency fee agreement but had been unable to do so. This single statement cannot reasonably be construed as an order that the M&B Attorneys could only continue representation on a contingency basis, regardless of any subsequent agreement between the parties. Rather, the overall import of Judge Hunt’s oral order was simply that the parties needed to meet “to see if there isn’t 15 Case: 19-15001 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 16 of 17 some way [they] c[ould] get along.” In any event, we must construe any ambiguities or uncertainties in Judge Hunt’s October 25 oral order in the light most favorable to the M&B Attorneys. See Ga. Power Co., 484 F.3d at 1291. Thus, to the extent there is any ambiguity, we read Judge Hunt’s oral order as directing the parties to meet and attempt to reconcile as to the fee arrangement, not to require the M&B Attorneys to either agree to a contingency fee arrangement or withdraw with only $500 recompense. Nor did Judge Jones abuse his discretion in determining that the M&B Attorneys did not violate Judge Hunt’s October 25, 2010 oral order. The record evidences that, just three days after the October 25 hearing, the parties did meet and confer as to a fee agreement. While the parties did not agree to a contingency fee arrangement in particular, the M&B Attorneys proposed the Amendment to the parties’ Attorney-Client Contract (proposing a flat rate for all work performed through October 27 and an hourly rate for work performed after that date), and the Plaintiffs signed and executed the Amendment on October 28, 2010. The Plaintiffs concede that they did in fact confer and agree to this fee arrangement on October 28, and they have never challenged the validity of the Amendment. Additionally, neither party returned to the district court by October 29, or anytime thereafter, to notify Judge Hunt that they had not come to a resolution. Rather, the M&B Attorneys withdrew their first motion to withdraw, further evidencing their 16 Case: 19-15001 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 Page: 17 of 17 October 28 reconciliation. Therefore, the record shows that the parties complied in fact with Judge Hunt’s October 25 oral order “to essentially make an attempt at reconciliation.” See id. And, as Judge Jones determined, the parties’ post-reconciliation and post- Amendment breakdown in communication was no longer subject to the October 25 oral order, with which the parties had already complied. Because the Plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing that the M&B Attorneys violated either Judge Hunt’s October 25 oral order or any other order, the burden never shifted to the M&B Attorneys to explain their noncompliance at a show cause hearing. See Thomas, 594 F.3d at 821. Accordingly, Judge Jones did not abuse his discretion, or deprive the Plaintiffs of due process, in denying the Plaintiffs’ contempt motion without issuing a show cause order.