Opinion ID: 2974320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Acquittal First Jury Instruction

Text: Defendant next claims that the trial court unconstitutionally instructed the jury that its sentencing decision had to be unanimous and gave an improper “acquittal-first” jury instruction. The district court concluded, and we agree, that Defendant’s argument has merit under this Court’s prior holding in Davis v. Mitchell, 318 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2003). In Davis, this Court granted habeas relief to a death sentenced defendant because it determined that the acquittal-first jury instruction, combined with a verdict form that required the signature of all twelve jurors, likely led the jurors to conclude that mitigation factors also had to be found by all twelve jurors, thereby precluding an individual juror from giving effect to mitigation evidence not found by the others. Id. at 689. While a trial court’s sentencing phase instructions may require juror unanimity as to the results of the process of weighing aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors, the instructions cannot require unanimity as to the presence of a mitigating factor. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); see also Roe v. Baker, 316 F.3d 557, 563-64 (6th Cir. 2002); Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 702 (6th Cir. 2001); Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 337-39 (6th Cir. 1998). Further, an “acquittalfirst” instruction, which requires the jury to unanimously reject a death sentence before considering other sentencing alternatives, is unconstitutional. Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 416-17 (6th Cir. 1999). In McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990), the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional any requirement that “prevents the jury from considering, in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, any mitigating factor that the jury does not unanimously find.” Under McKoy, each juror must be permitted to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence when deciding the ultimate question whether to vote for a sentence of death. Id. at 443; Mills, 486 U.S. at 374-75. Aggravating factors must be found unanimously because they are the elements of the murder offense that make the defendant death eligible. Davis, 318 F.3d at 687. “Mitigating factors, on the other hand, are not viewed as elements of the crime but rather as evidence relevant to a defendant’s character or record or other circumstances of the offense that might lead a sentencer to decline to impose the death sentence.” Id. at 688. Therefore, a state may not require unanimity in finding mitigating factors because such a requirement “impermissibly limits jurors’ consideration of mitigating evidence.” Id. (citing McKoy, 494 U.S. at 444). “In fact, as Mills and McKoy hold, any requirement that mitigating factors must be found unanimously is incoherent.” Id. In other words, “in order for Eighth Amendment law on mitigating factors to be coherent and capable of judicial administration without serious confusion, a capital jury must understand that . . . a finding with respect to a mitigating factor may be made by one or more members of the jury.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). No. 03-4034 Spisak v. Mitchell Page 21 In light of the case law discussed above, this Court’s inquiry in the present case is, “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.” Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 390 (1999); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). We think that the answer is “yes.” During the mitigation phase, the trial court read the following instructions to the jury: [T]he procedure which you must follow in arriving at your verdict in this sentencing hearing is set forth in Section 2929.03 of the Revised Code of the State of Ohio . . . you must determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the aggravating circumstances, which the defendant, Frank G. Spisak, Jr., has been found guilty of committing in the separate counts are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in this case. If all twelve members of the jury find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances in each separate count outweighs the mitigating factors, then you must return that finding to the Court. I instruct you, as a matter of law, that if you make such a finding, then you must recommend to the Court that a sentence of death be imposed upon the defendant, Frank G. Spisak, Jr. A jury recommendation to the Court that the death penalty be imposed is just that, a recommendation. The final decision is placed by law upon the Court. On the other hand, if after considering all of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the evidence and the testimony received at this hearing and the arguments of counsel, you find that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances which the defendant, Frank G. Spisak, Jr., has been found guilty of committing in the separate counts outweigh the mitigating factors, you will then proceed to determine which of two possible life imprisonment sentences to recommend to the Court . . . . (J.A. at 3146-47.) These instructions are virtually identical to those given in Davis, which this Court determined are “acquittal-first” jury instructions that failed to instruct the jury “that it need not be unanimous in rejecting the death penalty.” Davis, 318 F.3d at 689. The Davis Court found that not only did these instructions reflect a unanimity requirement, but the verdict form itself also reflected one, in that it had a spot for all twelve signatures under a statement professing that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors. Davis, 318 F.3d at 689. Similarly, in the present case, the verdict form also reflected a unanimity requirement for a finding that the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors. The trial court told the jury that in order to impose a sentence of death, all twelve had to sign under the statement on the verdict form stating that “we the jury, in this case, being duly impaneled and sworn, do find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance . . . was sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors . . . we the jury recommend that the sentence of death be imposed . . . .” (J.A. at 3149.) The trial court further explained the method for using the verdict forms in the following manner: There are four separate jury forms for counts five, six and . . . eight. Now, there is also a set of verdict forms, same count numbers, read [sic] as follows: ‘We the jury, being duly impaneled and sworn, do find that the aggravating circumstances which the defendant, Frank G. Spisak, Jr., was found guilty of committing are not sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in this case. We the jury recommend that the defendant Frank G. Spisak be sentenced to life imprisonment with parol eligibility after serving’ – there is an asterisk for a spot on No. 03-4034 Spisak v. Mitchell Page 22 the verdict form for you to fill in either 20 or 30 years of imprisonment. And again, all twelve of you must sign whatever verdict it is you arrive at [sic] must be signed in ink. (J.A. at 3149.) The instructions as to how to acquit for death and impose a life sentence did not differ at all from the instructions as to how to impose death. In explaining the forms, the trial court indicated that all twelve signatures were required to impose a sentence of death, and to acquit for death and impose a life sentence. As we stated in Davis, this instruction, combined with the jury verdict form, not only ‘could’ but by its plain language ‘would’ lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the only way to get a life verdict is if the jury unanimously finds that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, an entirely different instruction from one that clearly informs the jurors that a life verdict can be rendered by a jury that has not first unanimously rejected the death penalty. Further adding to the confusion, the jury was never told, either expressly or impliedly, that individual jurors may consider mitigating factors in the weighing process regardless of the lack of agreement with other jurors as to the presence of that factor. Davis, 318 F.3d at 689-90. In conclusion, we find that the silence on the lack of unanimity required to find mitigating circumstances, the improper “acquittal-first” jury instruction, and the misleading verdict form and instruction as to how to use the verdict form, would have led a jury to apply an unconstitutional unanimity standard at all stages of the deliberative process. See id at 690.