Opinion ID: 2087795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Limitation Periods and Memoranda of Agreement

Text: The version of § 28-35-5, as amended by P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. I, § 10, that applies to the present case is entitled Appeals from memorandum of agreements. It states, in relevant part: any injured employee    who shall have been aggrieved by a memorandum of agreement in that it:    (2) fails to set out correctly all the injuries received by the injured employee    then upon petition [to the WCC], setting forth all the additional facts, filed by the aggrieved party and served in the same manner as is provided for in chapters 29 to 38    the [WCC] shall hear any and all such petitions and make its decision in accordance with the provisions of said chapters. Because neither this section nor any of the other provisions in Chapters 29 to 38 of the WCA delineates a limitations period for petitions filed under § 28-35-5, employee argues that her 1993 petition to amend was improperly denied and dismissed by the Appellate Division panel. We agree. In rejecting employee's argument, the panel reviewed this Court's decisions in Coletta v. Leviton Manufacturing Co., 437 A.2d 1380 (R.I.1981); Leviton Manufacturing Co. v. Lillibridge, 120 R.I. 283, 387 A.2d 1034 (1978), and DeConti v. A.D. Juilliard and Co., 85 R.I. 424, 132 A.2d 74 (1957), and determined that those cases required employee to file a petition to amend an MOA within the time period applicable for filing an original petition for benefits. The panel read DeConti, forexample, to require that petitions alleging an injury distinct from one set forth in the MOA must be filed as an employee's original petition (subject to § 28-35-57's then-existing three-year-limitations period) and that § 28-35-5 was reserved for allegations of incomplete diagnoses. The version of § 28-35-5 at the time of the DeConti case, however, had language dissimilar from the version that applies in the present case. Although this Court in DeConti stated that to amend the memorandum without consent of the other party, the petitioner must prove that the injury was not only work-related but also that it was omitted from the preliminary agreement because of a failure to correctly diagnose her condition, DeConti, 85 R.I. at 427, 132 A.2d at 76, this language conformed to the former wording of § 28-35-5, which then read, in relevant part, where the agreement    due to failure to correctly diagnose the injury, fails to set out correctly all the injuries received by the injured employee    then upon petition,    the director of labor may hear such petitions and file his [or her] written decision   . P.L. 1949, ch. 2272, § 1. (Emphasis added.) In contrast, the applicable version of § 28-35-5 in this case does not necessarily require that a petition to amend an MOA be linked to a failure to correctly diagnose the injury. [6] Id. Compare P.L. 1982, ch. 32, art. I, § 10 with P.L. 1949, ch. 2272, art. III, § 1. The panel may have assumed that bothversions of § 28-35-5 were identical when it made its decision. Nevertheless, the panel's misplaced reliance upon DeConti and upon its application to the instant case is harmless in light of the other cases it reviewed and applied. In Coletta and Lillibridge this Court held that [w]ithout evidence linking a new injury to one for which the employee originally received compensation, that is, so-called flow-from injuries, § 28-35-45 does not apply. Coletta, 437 A.2d at 1383; see Lillibridge, 120 R.I. at 292, 387 A.2d at 1039. We noted that, in cases alleging a different original injury from the one for which compensation was paid that do not involve a flow-from injury, the employee's remedy would be an original petition for compensation based on the new injury. Id. Thus, if an original injury is different from the one specified in the decree or in the MOA and does not flow from the original injury  even though this different injury also arises from the same work-related activity or accident  then § 28-35-45 is inapplicable; rather, the petitioner must file an original petition based upon this different, original injury within the limitations period set forth in the applicable version of § 28-35-57. [7] Lillibridge, 120 R.I. at 292, 387 A.2d at 1039. In so holding, the panel considered employee's neck injury as a new and different original injury as opposed to a flow-from injury. [8] Thus, the panel decided that § 28-35-45 did notapply in this case, because the injury to employee's neck apparently occurred simultaneously with her left-shoulder injury and, hence, was not an injury that arose later and flowed from the original shoulder injury. In such a case, we have stated that [b]ecause the preliminary agreement specifically described the injuries for which the employee first received compensation, the trial commissioner cannot consider a different injury sustained in the same accident on a petition for review under § 28-35-45  unless the petitioner proves that this later-arising injury is a flow-from injury. Coletta, 437 A.2d at 1383. (Emphasis added.) We have also stated on numerous occasions that the primary purpose of the statutory enactments concerning compensation for job-connected injuries was to provide some degree of economic help to an injured worker because of a loss of earnings. Church v. Doherty, 107 R.I. 432, 435, 267 A.2d 693, 695 (1970). In an effort to implement this legislative goal, this Court has repeatedly held that such legislation shall be construed liberally. Id. Consistent with a liberal construction of the provisions of the WCA, we hold that § 28-35-5 must be interpreted literally to allow an employee to petition to amend an MOA without any limitations period if the purpose of such a petition is merely to include in the MOA another part of the body that was injured at the same time as the injury or injuries specified therein but was omitted from the MOA for any reason specified in § 28-35-5. [9] Although we construe § 28-35-5 literally and, therefore, apply no specific limitations period to a petition to amend an MOA, the effect of such an amendment on employee's entitlement to compensation for such an omitted original injury depends upon the type and timing of any claim forwhich an employee petitions for benefits. We hold that once an amendment to the MOA is granted for a reason or reasons set forth in § 28-35-5, an employee may be awarded compensation benefits retroactively based upon that later-included injury only if (1) the claim or issue is not precluded because of res judicata or collateral estoppel as those doctrines are applied in workers' compensation cases, (2) the employee proves by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that he or she is incapacitated based upon an injury described in the amended MOA as of a specific date, and (3) the retroactive compensation claim is filed within the limitations period set forth in the applicable version of § 28-35-57. Because there is no provision within the WCA limiting the number of petitions alleging a recurrence of incapacity, if an employee proves by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence that a recurrence of incapacity has occurred because of an injury included within an amended MOA and files such a petition within the ten-year period specified in § 28-35-45, he or she will be entitled to ongoing compensation benefits only from and including the date of the alleged recurrence. However, the employee must petition the court within the limitations period set forth in the applicable version of § 28-35-57 (or § 28-35-45, if the different injury is a flow-from injury) for the employee to receive any additional compensation benefits that are retroactive to the date of the original MOA or to any date thereafter, if the MOA is still in effect. Thus, when an employee alleges, as here, that an MOA should be amended to include an additional original injury, then the employee must do so within the limitations period set forth in the applicable version of § 28-35-57 to obtain any additional benefits that may be due from such a disabling injury retroactive to the date of the MOA (or to some later date, if the MOA is still in effect). Otherwise, benefits with respect to the additional original injury are payable, if at all,only from the date of a proven recurrence of the employee's disability after the MOA has been amended to include that omitted injury. In petition 95-5023, employee alleged a recurrence of disability as of either September 7, 1988, and continuing, or June 13, 1994, and continuing. If employee had been able to prove by a fair preponderance of the credible evidence in 95-5023 that she had suffered a recurrence of her neck or shoulder injury as of June 13, 1994, then she would have been entitled to compensation benefits from that date forward. The trial judge there, however, did not find that such a recurrence existed as of that date. We note that the purpose of requiring    claims to be brought within a specific time limit is `to protect the employer from stale claims too old to be successfully or adequately investigated and properly defended,' Ochoa v. Union Camp Corp., 120 R.I. 898, 904, 391 A.2d 123, 127 (1978) (quoting 12 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation § 2355 at 4 (3d ed.1959)), and that this objective would be frustrated if employees were allowed to petition for compensation under an amended MOA and to obtain retroactive benefits for a disability arising from such injuries without any reasonable limitations period applying to such petitions. We find further support for this conclusion in the language of § 28-35-5 itself, as amended by P.L.1982, ch. 32, art. I, § 10, which provides, then upon petition [to the WCC], setting forth all the additional facts, filed by the aggrieved party and served in the same manner as is provided for in chapters 29 to 38    the [WCC] shall hear any and all such petitions and make its decision in accordance with the provisions of said chapters.  (Emphasis added.) Because § 28-35-57 is included within the provisions of said chapters, we construe § 28-35-5 to require an employee, who seeks not only to amend an MOA to include another and different original injury from the one specified in the MOA (albeit the injury arose out of the same work-related incident) but also to obtain additional compensation for such an injury retroactive to the date of the original MOA (or to some later date, if the MOA is still in effect), to file such a petition for benefits within the limitations period set forth in the applicable version of § 28-35-57. Such a petition is analogous to the filing of an additional claim  one that would require the filing of an additional original petition within the relevant limitations period of § 28-35-57. [10]