Opinion ID: 2252986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: waiver of right to take against will

Text: Comes now Josephine Taylor, and now waives her right to take against the will of her husband, John Robert Taylor. Josephine Taylor has been advised that but for the instrument she could take against the will of John Robert Taylor and is aware that one now exists that does not provide for her. That in the event of John Robert Taylor makes [sic] other wills, the waiver will continue in force. /s/ Since decedent was not even present and there is no mention in it of the negotiations that allegedly occurred prior to the marriage, it is unclear how this writing could be a memorialization of the prenuptial agreement. Of course, the waiver document is admissible at trial, not as evidence of a prenuptial agreement, nor as evidence of partial performance of a prenuptial agreement, but as evidence of Josephine's waiver of right to take against the will. Under our decision today the trier of fact may still decide that it is inadequate to establish such waiver, e.g., the trier of fact might determine that the disclosure failed to satisfy the statute. However, Patrick's general position is untenable. One cannot simultaneously rely on the written waiver of the right to elect to take against the will as both a memorialization of the entire oral prenuptial agreement and partial performance thereof. His reliance on Josephine's statement in her deposition that there had been a prenuptial agreement is misplaced. A layperson's claim that some legal requirement has been satisfied cannot be given significant evidentiary weight. [3] Josephine is not an attorney with experience in the law of contracts and therefore her alleged admission tells us nothing about the existence of an enforceable prenuptial agreement. [4] Since there is no evidence of an actual prenuptial agreement, the trial court was not in error in granting partial summary judgment.