Opinion ID: 2999151
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: All EMS’ Right to a Jury

Text: As we previously described, the district court attempted to put an end to the protracted litigation between these parties that had been ongoing for almost ten (...continued) has no right to or does not choose to, the injured party is said to treat the breach as partial. The injured party has a claim for damages for partial breach, in addition to its remaining substantive rights under the contract. Damages are calculated on the assumption that both parties will continue to perform in spite of the breach. They therefore compensate the injured party only for the loss it suffered as the result of the delay or other defect in performance that constituted the breach . . . . (footnotes omitted); see also Dr. Franklin Perkins Sch. v. Freeman, 741 F.2d 1503, 1518-19 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that a non-material breach allows the non-breaching party to sue for damages, but does not relieve the non-breaching party of its obligations under the contract); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 237, 241(a). Nos. 05-1234, 05-1330 Page 10 years. As part of the court’s January 5, 2005 order, entered at the conclusion of the bench trial, the court disposed of all counts pending in All EMS’ Fourth Amended Complaint and Second Amended Counterclaim. All EMS contends that this was constitutional error because the bench trial was a “bifurcated” proceeding meant to decide solely the issues related to All EMS’ 2000 net worth deficit. According to All EMS, the parties intended to proceed, at the conclusion of the bench trial, to a trial before a jury on All EMS’ remaining grievances, including those related to the older, 1996 dispute. The record, interestingly, is devoid of any reference to bifurcation, and neither the district court nor the parties ever referred to the bench trial as a bifurcated proceeding until All EMS’ motion for a new trial. See R.313 at 1. The bench trial, nonetheless, did seem focused on deciding 7-Eleven’s Third Amended Counterclaim, which alleged breach of the franchise agreement based on events occurring in 2000, and sought damages and repossession of the Wagdys’ store. See R.279. Assuming, arguendo, that All EMS is correct in characterizing the bench trial as a bifurcated proceeding, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) governs the parties’ claims. Rule 42(b) gives a district court the power “in furtherance of convenience or . . . when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, . . . [to] order a separate trial . . . of any separate issue or issues.” Using bifurcation in order to conduct “an evidentiary hearing limited to a discrete, potentially dispositive issue is an authorized and frequently a sensible method for expediting the decision of cases.” Robinson v. Sheriff of Cook County, 167 F.3d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 1999). The rule qualifies this power by providing that a procedural device such as bifurcation may not be used in a manner that impinges upon the constitutional right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Importantly, however, “[t]he right [to a jury trial] disappears if all parties entrust the resolution of factual issues to the court without objection.” Stewart v. RCA Corp., 790 F.2d 624, 630 (7th Cir. 1986). “This circuit is in the majority of circuits that hold that failure to object to a non-jury factfinding proceeding waives a valid jury demand as to any claims decided in that proceeding, at least where it was clear that the court intended to make fact determinations.” Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 227 (7th Cir. 1987).5 5 The precise language of Rule 39(a), which governs the availability of bench trials, provides: “The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the (continued...) Nos. 05-1234, 05-1330 Page 11 All EMS concedes that it agreed to a bench trial that would resolve “issues regarding Net Worth being asserted by 7-Eleven.” Appellants’ Br. at 41. All EMS also concedes that “[t]he allegations set forth in the Wagdy’s [sic] Fourth Amended Complaint are intricately intertwined with 7-Eleven’s allegations concerning Net Worth.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 23. At the very least, therefore, All EMS proceeded willingly to a bifurcated proceeding on allegations that very likely would be resolved, as a matter of law, once the net worth issues were decided. Having consented to a bench trial where “it was clear that the court intended to make fact determinations” whose unfavorable resolution would end this litigation, All EMS and the Wagdys waived their right to a jury. Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 227.