Opinion ID: 6323494
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clear Title and Single Subject Challenges

Text: Challengers assert SB 569 did not have a clear title and was not limited to a single subject. Their contentions rely on the premise that section 595.201.3(11)’s definition of “survivor” is not limited to sexual assault offenses. “No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title[.]” Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 23. A bill’s title must clearly express its subject so members of the legislature and the public are fairly informed of the matters addressed by pending laws. St. Louis Health Care Network v. State, 968 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Mo. banc 1998). The single subject requirement improves discussion by ensuring the matters covered by bills are more clearly defined, prevents logrolling as well as surprise in the legislative process, and ensures the public is fairly apprised of a bill’s contents. Hammerschmidt v. Boone Cnty., 877 S.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Mo. banc 1994). “[T]o survive a clear title challenge, a bill’s title need not give specific details of a bill, but need indicate only generally what the act contains.” St. Louis Health Care Network, 968 S.W.2d at 147. Typically, challenges assert the title fails to encompass all provisions and, thus, is underinclusive. Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis v. 19 State, 75 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2002). In this analysis, words are accorded their common and ordinary meaning. Id. at 271. “The test for whether a bill violates the single subject rule is ‘whether the bill’s provisions fairly relate to, have a natural connection with, or are a means to accomplish the subject of the bill as expressed in the title.’” Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Mo. banc 2013). “‘Subject’ . . . includes ‘all matters that fall within or reasonably relate to the general core purpose of the proposed legislation.’” Id. As enacted, SB 569 was titled “AN ACT to repeal section 595.220, RSMo, and to enact in lieu thereof five new sections relating to victims of sexual offenses.” Challengers allege the title was underinclusive because many provisions in section 595.201 mention “survivor,” and that term is not limited to sexual assault offenses. See section 595.201.3(11) (defining “survivor” as “a natural person who suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional, or financial harm as the result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime”). Challengers assert this definition applies to any person suffering any harm from any crime or attempted crime, such as theft, gun violence, robberies, and bear wrestling. They allege that, because this provision is not limited to victims of sexual assault offenses, SB 569 had an underinclusive title and contained more than one subject. Challengers analogize this case to Missouri Roundtable for Life. There, a bill’s title indicated it was related to science and innovation. Mo. Roundtable for Life, 396 S.W.3d at 352. One provision, though, provided a tax credit for the adoption of special needs children. Id. Accordingly, this Court determined the bill contained at least two subjects and was constitutionally invalid. Id. at 352-53. 20 Determinations regarding issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo review. Holmes v. Steelman, 624 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo. banc 2021). In analyzing Challengers’ arguments, this Court seeks to identify the intent of the legislature by considering the plain meaning of the statutory text. Id. In determining the meaning of words in a statute, the words should not be read in isolation but rather “must be considered in context and sections of the statutes in pari materia, as well as cognate sections, must be considered in order to arrive at the true meaning and scope of the words.” Id. Additionally, “[s]tatutes are interpreted to avoid unreasonable or absurd results.” St. Louis Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs of City of St. Louis, 259 S.W.3d 526, 528 (Mo. banc 2008); see also Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 145 (2010) (declining “to import a term of art that is a comical misfit” into a statute). Challengers’ argument fails to consider other provisions in section 595.201. While the definition of “survivor” is broad, its context properly limits the scope of the term. Section 595.201.1 provides “[t]his section shall be known and may be cited as the ‘Sexual Assault Survivors’ Bill of Rights[.]’” Many provisions also indicate survivors are limited to victims of sexual assault offenses. See, e.g., section 595.201.2(1) (“A survivor has the right to consult with an employee or volunteer of a rape crisis center during any forensic examination . . . .”); section 595.201.2(7) (“A survivor has the right to prompt analysis of sexual assault forensic evidence[.]”); section 595.201.2(15) (“In either a civil or criminal case relating to the sexual assault, a survivor has the right to be reasonably protected from the defendant and persons acting on behalf of the 21 defendant[.]”). The context of “survivor” clearly indicates it was not intended to mean anyone suffering any harm from any crime or attempted crime. 10 Challengers’ broad interpretation of the definition of “survivor” also leads to absurd and unreasonable results. Application of the above provisions to someone other than a victim of a sexual assault offense would be nonsensical. Before an interview commences, the subject must be informed of the rights encompassed in section 595.201; the right to consult with an employee or volunteer of a rape crisis center during the interview; the right to have a support person present; and the right to be interviewed by a law enforcement official of the gender of the survivor’s choosing. Section 595.201.2(4). Challengers’ suggestion that victims of theft, gun violence, robbery, and bear wrestling must be provided this information is unreasonable. Many of the rights in section 595.201 are not relevant to victims of crimes other than sexual assault offenses, and informing such individuals of their right to consult with someone from a rape crisis center is illogical. The statutory definition of “survivor” is limited to victims of sexual assault offenses. Section 595.201.3(9) defines “sexual assault survivor” as “any person who is a victim of an alleged sexual offense under sections 566.010 to 566.223 . . . .” Notably, 10 Challengers state the judiciary should not correct a mistake by the General Assembly. They argue only section 595.201’s text as written should be analyzed, see State v. Bazell, 497 S.W.3d 263, 266 (Mo. banc 2016), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hamilton v. State, 598 S.W.3d 607, 608 (Mo. banc 2020), and note a statute’s definition of a term should be followed for purposes of interpretation. See State v. Rousseau, 34 S.W.3d 254, 259 (Mo. App. 2000). This Court has not attempted to correct a mistake, moved beyond the text of the statute, or ignored statutory definitions. Instead, it is considering the definition of “survivor” in the context of section 595.201’s other provisions, which is proper. 22 “[t]he legislature will not be presumed to have ‘inserted idle verbiage or superfluous language in a statute.’” State ex rel. Goldsworthy v. Kanatzar, 543 S.W.3d 582, 586 (Mo. banc 2018). While limiting the definition of “survivor” to sexual assault offenses creates some overlap with the definition of “sexual assault survivor,” the latter has not been rendered meaningless or superfluous because “survivor” encompasses additional crimes. The provisions listed in the definition of “sexual assault survivor” cover various attempted crimes. See, e.g., section 566.030.2 (recognizing attempted first-degree rape); section 566.062.2 (recognizing attempted first-degree statutory sodomy). Other statutes in sections 566.010 to 566.223, however, do not mention attempt. See, e.g., section 566.031.1 (discussing second-degree rape); section 566.064 (discussing second-degree statutory sodomy). Regardless, the State can utilize section 562.012, the general attempt statute, to prosecute these offenses. State v. Schallon, 341 S.W.3d 795, 797 (Mo. App. 2011) (noting the defendant was charged with attempted second-degree statutory sodomy in violation of a prior version of the attempt statute and section 566.064); see also State v. Young, 139 S.W.3d 194, 195-98 (Mo. App. 2004) (affirming a conviction for attempted second-degree statutory rape in violation of section 566.034 and a prior version of the attempt statute). These attempted offenses do not fall solely within the statutes mentioned in the definition of “sexual assault survivor.” Yet they are encompassed by the broader definition of “survivor.” Limiting “survivor” to sexual assault offenses, therefore, does not render statutory language superfluous or meaningless. Because 23 section 595.201.3(11)’s definition of “survivor” is limited to victims of sexual assault offenses, SB 569 contained only one subject that was properly conveyed by its title. 11