Opinion ID: 1060373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Refusal to Instruct Jury as to Sentence of Life Without Parole

Text: The Appellant asserts that he was entitled to have the jury instructed as to the sentencing option of life without the possibility of parole. In 1993, the General Assembly amended the capital sentencing statutes to provide for the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196, 213 (Tenn.2000), petition for cert. filed, (Dec. 5, 2000) (citing 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 473). It is well established that prior to 1993 the only punishments available for a person convicted of first degree murder were life imprisonment and death. See Keen, 31 S.W.3d at 213; State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Tenn.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967, 119 S.Ct. 414, 142 L.Ed.2d 336 (1998); see also State v. Bruce C. Reliford, No. W1999-00826-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1473846 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Jackson, Oct. 2, 2000). Although the Appellant's offense was committed prior to the effective date of the act, he asserts that he is entitled to an instruction on life without the possibility of parole because his sentencing hearing on remand occurred after the act was passed. Specifically, in support of his position, the Appellant advances the following arguments: (1) A sentencing scheme that does not offer a sentence of life without the possibility of parole cannot be relied upon to reflect a properly guided and reasoned decision that death is the most appropriate punishment; (2) A sentencing scheme that does not permit consideration of life without the possibility of parole infringes upon evolving standards of decency protected by the federal and state constitutions; (3) A death sentence returned under a sentencing scheme which requires juries to sentence defendants to the death penalty in order to incapacitate the defendants from committing further crimes constitutes excessive punishment; and (4) Refusal to permit consideration of life without the possibility of parole violates rights to equal protections of the laws. While we respect the Appellant's arguments in support of this claim, we note that the identical arguments were recently rejected by our supreme court in State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d at 213-219. Accordingly, as we are bound by the precedent established by the supreme court, we find it unnecessary to revisit the arguments recently dismissed by the court. This claim is without merit.