Opinion ID: 1282144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Will Comparative Negligence Cause Insurance Rates to Increase?

Text: Proponents report that the effect of comparative negligence on insurance rates has been minimal, with the suggestion that part of this is due to the tendency of insurance adjusters, juries, [5a] and sometimes even courts to actually practice a form of comparative negligence even in contributory negligence states. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence (Treatise), § 21.1, p 338. The Brief for Amicus Curiae, Association of Defense Trial Counsel, in the case of Parsonson v Construction Equipment Co, 386 Mich 61; 191 NW2d 465 (1971), maintains that the alleged fact of the jury's de facto repeal of contributory negligence is not necessarily a certainty, p 15. More significantly, however, one amicus refrained from making a categorical statement that comparative negligence will mean increased insurance premiums, simply because there are too many variables. Id, p 15. [6a] Another amicus, Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Opposition to Comparative Negligence, Parsonson v Construction Equipment Co , predicted that adoption of the pure or modified form of comparative negligence would increase insurance rates, while application of the slight negligence rule might have little or no effect. Brief, p 24. That amicus appeared to rely on the opinion of several writers that comparative negligence increases the number of situations in which the plaintiff can recover, and that automobile liability insurance premiums in Wisconsin [with comparative negligence] were higher than in comparable communities in neighboring states. They also noted that insurance rates are already rising, and that it would be against the public interest to add comparative negligence and make costs concomitantly higher. Id, pp 25, 26, 29. However, the Brief for Amicus Curiae, Michigan Trial Lawyers Association in Support of Comparative Negligence, reiterates the conclusion of Professor Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 Mich L Rev 689, 728 (1960): It is possible that comparative negligence has an effect upon insurance rates, but that that effect cannot be detected with the data on hand and the techniques used. Even if this is true, however, some measure of its force has been obtained. Adoption of a comparative negligence rule, as shown by the Arkansas experience, would not have a catastrophic result upon the insurance rate structure of any state. Indeed, it would not have as much effect as rapid growth of population, increased urbanization, or change to a traffic program with the effective safety record of a neighboring state. Its effect, if any, would probably go undetected in the rates and statistics of the insurance industry. Further, amicus quotes: [O]ne defense practitioner [who] has put the matter more laconically: `We pay more people perhaps, but we pay less to each.' Pfankuch, Comparative Negligence v Contributory Negligence, 1968 Insurance L J 725, 731 [1968]. Trial Lawyers Brief, supra, p 16. One Amicus brief, that of the Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Support of Comparative Negligence, actually presented figures comparing insurance costs at the time between states having contributory negligence and those with comparative negligence: Quoting a defense attorney, amicus wrote: Let me give you the costs in various states having contributory negligence: Massachusetts  $129.92 Illinois  $92.76 New York  $109.69 Connecticut  $91.32 Rhode Island  $99.97 New Jersey  $81.95 Let us compare these costs with the comparative negligence states: Wisconsin  $75.74 Georgia  $50.82 Mississippi  $66.54 Nebraska  $49.05 Arkansas  $55.61 South Dakota  $33.01 All [the comparative negligence states] are below the U.S. average of $79.64. Heft, Comparative Negligence, 19 Federation of Ins Counsel Q 91, 93 (Spring, 1969), quoted in Negligence Section Brief, supra, pp 55-56, fn 98. Amicus also quotes the observations of Pound: [K]eeping down insurance rates at the expense of justice is not in keeping with humanitarian ideals of today. The world has been giving up the idea of leaving the burden of the nine million accidents which are recorded in the United States each year to fall wholly upon the injured victims. Pound, Comparative Negligence, 13 NACCA L J 195 (1954), quoted in Negligence Section Brief, supra, p 22. [7a] Here again, we find ourselves as we did when evaluating the question of increased litigation, with a situation in which the dire predictions appear not to have been realized, but where data to definitively resolve the issue are not fully conclusive. (4) Is Adoption of Comparative Negligence Unnecessary Since Juries Already Apply Some Form of Comparative Negligence? This alleged predilection of juries has been adverted to as a factor in favor of not making a formal change to comparative negligence. Powell, Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American Jury, 43 ABA J 1005 (1957). Some courts have also maintained the practice of jury administered comparative negligence exists. No one can appreciate more than we the hardship of depriving plaintiff of his verdict and of all right to collect damages from defendant; but the rule of contributory negligence, through no fault of ours, remains in our law   . It would be hard to imagine a case more illustrative of the truth that in operation the rule of comparative negligence would serve justice more faithfully than that of contributory negligence. We but blind our eyes to obvious reality to the extent that we ignore the fact that in many cases juries apply it in spite of us. Haeg v Sprague, Warner & Co, Inc, 202 Minn 425, 429-430; 281 NW 261 (1938). [8a] The doctrine of comparative negligence, or degrees of negligence, is not recognized by the Courts of Pennsylvania, but as a practical matter they are frequently taken into consideration by a jury. The net result, as every trial judge knows, is that in a large majority of negligence cases where the evidence of negligence is not clear, or where the question of contributory negligence is not free from doubt, the jury brings in a compromise verdict. Karcesky v Laria, 382 Pa 227, 234; 114 A2d 150, 154 (1955). [9a] However, it is apparent that often a jury, as in the case at bar, does not so compromise and instead follows the court's instructions as they are supposed to do. This may then result in at best a rough-hewn type of justice, one in which, if the jury chooses to in effect disobey the law, the lucky plaintiff may receive a form of justice, but where a jury chooses instead to follow the law an even more deserving plaintiff would be barred from recovery. Even if the jury does adopt the compromise verdict, [I]t has been pointed out that the practice itself is evidence that the contributory negligence rule does not conform to the community's sense of justice  indeed, it fosters disrespect for the law by perpetuating a questionable system whereby trial judges instruct juries on the theory of contributory negligence while tacitly recognizing that the jury will disregard the instructions and somehow apportion the damages. Anno, supra, 32 ALR3d 488. [T]he disrespect for law engendered by putting our citizens in a position in which they feel it is necessary to deliberately violate the law is not something to be lightly brushed aside; and it comes ill from the mouths of lawyers, who as officers of the courts have sworn to uphold the law, to defend the present system by arguing that it works because jurors can be trusted to disregard that very law. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U Fla L Rev 135, 151-152 (1958). [10a] Therefore, we believe this argument is persuasive only to convince us that, if it is indeed true that juries do apply comparative negligence sub rosa, it would be better to bring the practice out from underneath the table. (5) Does No-Fault Legislation Make Comparative Negligence Unnecessary?[11a] One of the most telling arguments in support of comparative negligence is that because it allocates liability according to fault, it is more faithful to the fault principle underlying our negligence law than the aberrational contributory negligence concept. Logically, then, the adoption of no-fault legislation may well reduce the need for a comparative negligence approach. The argument, however, is too simplistic, for, while no-fault would apply to most automobile negligence cases, it does not apply to all, as there is still a considerable area of no-fault exceptions in which the fault principle is still applied. [12a] Further, no-fault is indeed at the present time restricted to only automotive litigation, and, for example, cases involving slip and fall, products liability, or plane, boat, or train accidents are not affected. It is also coincident with the policy expressed in no-fault, that victims of automobile accidents may be compensated regardless of whether they are at fault, to do away with a rule that bars any recovery because of some fault . Codling v Paglia, 32 NY2d 330, 345, 346; 298 NE2d 622, 630, 631 (1973) (Jasen, J., concurring). Thus, other states have not found the doctrines mutually exclusive. Of the 21 states having adopted comparative negligence since 1969 by statute   , 13 also have no-fault coverage   . Among the six earlier adherents two have since adopted no-fault plans. Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last  By Judicial Choice, supra, 64 Cal L Rev 239, 240, fn 3 (1976). Georgia and Florida, which adopted comparative negligence by court decision, also have no-fault plans. Schwartz, Treatise, § 1.4, p 12; § 1.5, pp 18-19, 24-27. Thus, the adoption of no-fault, if it affects comparative negligence at all, affects only the scope of the change. If anything, therefore, it makes the new doctrine less revolutionary than it otherwise might be. But it does not eliminate the need for the change. FITZGERALD, J. (concurring in part). We concur in Part III of Justice WILLIAMS' opinion. The jury instructions were erroneous and confusing. The trial court also erred by ordering the jury to begin deliberating before counsel could object to the instructions. GCR 1963, 516.2. However, we do not believe this case is an appropriate vehicle for adopting a theory of comparative negligence. The parties have not had an opportunity to brief or discuss the issue. They did not raise it in the Court of Appeals or this Court. At oral argument, both parties were reluctant to use this case to discuss comparative negligence. We should not inject into a case a theory which the parties are unwilling or have not had an opportunity to discuss. The proposed adoption of comparative negligence raises problems which transcend this case. At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel wondered with the advent of no-fault legislation, whether or not comparative negligence should be adopted at all. He also wondered whether or not it should be something that the Legislature does as distinguished from our Courts. If the Court accepts the burden of altering a fundamental theory of tort law, we should do so in a carefully informed manner. It does not suffice to say that the issue was briefed in Parsonson v Construction Equipment Co, 386 Mich 61; 191 NW2d 465 (1971). That case was argued May 6, 1971. Only two members of the present Court heard the argument. Although briefs on comparative negligence were requested, that Court did not take a stand on whether it should be adopted. Comparative negligence is a complex and difficult doctrine. It should not be considered without a proper presentation. Six years have passed since Parsonson was argued. Theories popular then may have been discredited. New and better theories may have arisen. Experience may have shown that certain versions of the comparative negligence theory are better than others. Indeed, experience may have shown that comparative negligence is not a good tort theory. We do not know from the presentation in this case. We do not have the information we need. This is a major step which should be taken hand-in-hand with the bar. It should not be imposed without an opportunity for full discussion. Reversed and remanded for new trial.