Opinion ID: 3199516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General Search

Text: Mr. Villanueva contends the warrant was overbroad in both its issuance and its execution and consequently resulted in a general search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which requires that warrants “particularly describ[e] . . . the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. We disagree. “The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (problem of general warrant “is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings”). “The particularity requirement ensures that a search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause.” Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1985). A warrant describing “items to be seized in broad and generic terms may be valid if the description is as specific as circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation permit.” United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 973 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 775 (10th Cir. 1990)). We review de novo the legal question of whether a warrant is overbroad. Id. -22- With this framework in mind, we turn to the search warrant in this case. Attachment B of the warrant set forth an extensive list of items to be seized, all limited by the general specification that they evidence “the business of illegal drug distribution and laundering profits from [the] enterprise” in violation of the Oklahoma drug statutes. Rec., vol. 1, at 285. The list included bank records, cash receipts, telephone records, investment records, and credit card records relating to All-Star Automotive, the business through which Mr. Villanueva was suspected of laundering drug money. In addition to these items, the warrant allowed for the seizure of all computer storage devices used to store the above information, all electronic communications between identified co-conspirators, and all the paraphernalia used for packaging, cutting, weighing, and distributing illegal narcotics. Although Mr. Villanueva argues that this list permitted the search and seizure of any and all property in the residence, we have repeatedly “upheld search warrants cast in comparably broad terms, where the subject of the search was a drug trafficking or drug dealing business, and where the circumstances permitted only a more general listing of the items to be seized.” Wicks, 995 F.2d at 973 (upholding search warrant allowing seizure of “large amounts of United States currency . . . books, records, receipts, notes, ledgers, and other papers relating to the transportation, ordering, sale and distribution of controlled substances . . . contraband, proceeds of drug sales and/or records of drug transactions, drug sources, and drug customers . . . safe deposit boxes . . . -23- caches of drugs, large amounts of currency, financial instruments, precious metals, jewelry . . . addresses or telephone numbers in books or papers . . . photographs . . . paraphernalia . . . includ[ing] syringes, bottles, scales, plastic bags, balloons, heat sealers, glassware, chemicals, mechanical stirrers, and/or heat sources[,] . . . stolen weapons or goods.” Id. at 967) (citing United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1424 n. 31 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 774-74 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir.1990)). Given our precedents upholding the validity of similar warrants in similar situations, we hold that the warrant in this case met the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. Mr. Villanueva also makes a conclusory argument that the search inventory indicates the officers exceeded the scope of the warrant when they searched the Lawton residence, and he correctly points out the “good faith exception does not apply to the improper execution of a warrant.” United States v. Moland, 996 F.2d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1993). But Mr. Villaneuva provides no evidence or argument showing there was a general rummaging for evidence during the search. The search inventory indicates that all items taken were permitted to be taken by the search warrant, which described the evidence with particularity. The search thus did not exceed its scope.