Opinion ID: 702500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Blackmail Conviction

Text: 47 Coyle contends that the district court erred in its jury instruction on the blackmail charge. In so arguing, Coyle notes correctly that the case law on blackmail is sparse. Nonetheless, we find no ambiguity in the statutory language relevant here. The blackmail statute provides: 48 Whoever, under a threat of informing, or as a consideration for not informing, against any violation of any law of the United States, demands or receives any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 49 18 U.S.C. Sec. 873. The court's instruction closely tracked the statutory language. App. at 429-30. 50 Two blackmail letters were identified in the indictment and at trial the government produced evidence of a series of five letters written by Coyle to Cusumano beginning October 18, 1990 and continuing until October 29, 1990. They alternate between vague threats, accusations and demands. App. at 81-96. 51 In one of these letters, Coyle advised Cusumano that he had been contacted by the FBI to discuss their investigation of the expense accounts you provided them earlier this year, stated, I really don't wish to be involved and hope to stonewall the request based on unavailability and a lack of a clear memory at this time, and then--in language that leaves no doubt as to its purpose--stated, Any attempt to tamper with my severance, deferred compensation or paid time off adjustment pay or any other moneys due me could reflect in my decision. I know you understand. App. at 87-88. 52 Coyle engages in semantic sophistry when he argues that because the payment of the benefits was to come from HCA rather than Cusumano, he did not demand anything from Cusumano within the meaning of the statute. But the statute does not require that the quid pro quo be a two-party transaction. Coyle's offer to stonewall the FBI in exchange for receiving Cusumano's assistance in securing (or forbearance in interfering with) his severance pay from HCA falls within the language of the statute. 53 Coyle argues that the district court erred in denying his proposed instruction that he could not be convicted if he was entitled to the benefits he demanded. He argues that something to which he was entitled could not be consideration. However, what is made unlawful by the blackmail statute is Coyle's use of the offer not to report the fraudulent activity or not to cooperate with the authorities as leverage over Cusumano, see United States v. Smith, 228 F.Supp. 345, 348 (E.D.La.1964), whether or not Coyle had a claim of right to the benefits. The blackmail statute thus reaches those who would evade their responsibility to inform the authorities about a violation of the law by exchanging the promise to forebear from giving such information for some benefit. It is the use of the information in this manner that Congress sought to penalize. A jury could find that this is exactly what Coyle did. The district court did not err in rejecting Coyle's attempt to restrict the scope of the blackmail statute.