Opinion ID: 775562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Testimony Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C)

Text: 55 Maha Joseph, a government witness, was subpoenaed to testify that he had told the police, on the day after the crime, that he had seen three of the defendants in the area of the crime during the time the homes were invaded. On the day he was called to testify, Joseph failed to appear in court. Once he was apprehended by the United States Marshal and brought to court to testify, he denied making any such statement to the police and was declared a hostile witness. The government then sought to impeach him about the statement he had made to the police regarding the defendants. 56 After Joseph had testified, the government called Lieutenant Cruz to the stand and questioned him about Joseph's prior statement. The defense objected to the admission of his testimony on the grounds that it was hearsay. The District Court permitted Cruz to testify, finding that as long as the testimony was limited to the statement regarding the identification, it fell under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). Cruz testified that Joseph had reported to the police that he had seen the defendants on the night of the crime in the vicinity of the crime scene. We review the admission of his testimony for abuse of discretion. 11 United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1994). 57 Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C) provides: A statement is not hearsay if... the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is... one of identification made after perceiving the person. The defendants argue that the Rule does not contemplate identifications of this nature but, rather, pertains to the selection of defendants from lineups or photo spreads. They also contend that testimony regarding when and where Joseph saw the defendants did not qualify as an identification. The government responds that an identification without the when and where would be nonsensical. It also argues that the Rule was designed to encompass exactly this type of testimony (and not just lineup and photo spread identifications). 58 Statements of prior identifications are admitted as substantive evidence because of the generally unsatisfactory and inconclusive nature of courtroom identifications as compared with those made at an earlier time under less suggestive conditions. Fed. R. Evid. 801, advisory committee notes. We noted in Brink, 39 F.3d at 426, that evidence is generally admitted under 801(d)(1)(C) when a witness has identified the defendant in a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial. We explained that this Rule then permits a third person to testify regarding the previous statements of the eyewitness. Id.; see also United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1578 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that testimony of FBI Agent regarding bank teller's out of court identification was properly admitted under 801(d)(1)(C)); United States v. O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 899 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that FBI Agent testimony regarding prior statements of witness who recanted at trial was admissible); United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that Agent's testimony as to witness's identification was not hearsay). 59 Certainly the purpose of the Rule seems to be fulfilled here, where Joseph abandoned his previous knowledge of the defendants at trial. While we have yet to construe Rule 801(d)(1)(C) as covering this type of identification, that is, one that consists of a person coming forward after a crime is committed and saying he saw a particular person at a certain place and time, viewing both the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 801 and our own case law, we see no basis to conclude that Rule 801 does not extend to such situations. Any concerns regarding conditions or circumstances that might bear on reliability are matters going to the weight of the evidence, which can be addressed on cross-examination, and should not affect the admissibility of the statement. In any event, certainly the trial judge did not abuse his discretion, nor was the error prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendants. See Fed. R. Evid. 52(a) (Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.); United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2001) (In practice, Rule 52(a) applies when the defendant has made a timely objection to an error, and the court of appeals normally engages in a so- called harmless error inquiry to determine whether the error was prejudicial to the defendant, with the government bearing the burden of persuasion on the issue of prejudice.). We cannot imagine that the defendants would not have been found guilty but for the detective's testimony regarding Joseph's identification. Even if the statement was arguably inadmissible, its admission was harmless. 60