Opinion ID: 1725936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did trial court submit an erroneous instruction on circumstantial evidence?

Text: A fighting issue at trial concerned which of two instructions on circumstantial evidence should be submitted to the jury. Defendant contended for the Iowa State Bar Association's Uniform Instruction 501.13, the last two sentences of which provide: In order, however, to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence alone, the facts proved must not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused, but they must also be inconsistent with any rational theory of his innocence, and all the facts and circumstances necessary to prove guilt must be connected with each other and with the main facts sought to be proven, that taken together they lead to a satisfactory conclusion that the crime charged was committed and that the accused committed it. It is not sufficient that they render probable the guilt of the accused, but they must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of his innocence. State persuaded the court to give an instruction which followed 501.13 except for the portion quoted above, which was replaced with this sentence: Whether the evidence in this case is direct or circumstantial, or a combination thereof, you are instructed that before you can convict the defendant, you must be satisfied of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evidence in this case. Although the State urges defendant did not preserve the alleged error, the record reveals trial court was apprised of the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. See rule 196, Rules of Civil Procedure; State v. Wright, 274 N.W.2d 307, 311-12 (Iowa 1979). The alleged error was preserved for our review. The State concedes trial court's instruction falls well short of the standard expressed in 501.13 and a long line of Iowa cases. See, e. g., State v. McDaniel, 265 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Iowa 1978); State v. Overstreet, 243 N.W.2d 880, 883-84 (Iowa 1976); State v. Hall, 235 N.W.2d 702, 715 (Iowa 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 66, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977); State v. Ampey, 210 N.W.2d 433, 434 (Iowa 1973). Our cases are not, however, in accord with the federal courts and a growing number of state courts. These courts have eliminated distinctions between direct and circumstantial evidence in testing evidential sufficiency. See, e. g, Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137-38, 99 L.Ed. 150, 166-67 (1954); United States v. Shepard, 538 F.2d 107, 110-11 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Heck, 499 F.2d 778, 790 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088, 95 S.Ct. 677, 42 L.Ed.2d 680 (1974); United States v. Lawson, 483 F.2d 535, 536-38 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1133, 94 S.Ct. 874, 38 L.Ed.2d 757 (1974); United States v. Maenza, 475 F.2d 251, 254 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Coombs, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 333, 334, 464 F.2d 842, 843 (1972); United States v. Hamilton, 457 F.2d 95, 100 n.12 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Siragusa, 450 F.2d 592, 596 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974, 92 S.Ct. 1195, 31 L.Ed.2d 248 (1972); United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023 (10th Cir. 1971); O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131, 137 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827, 90 S.Ct. 72, 24 L.Ed.2d 77 (1969); Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 568 (1st Cir. 1968), aff'd, 394 U.S. 316, 89 S.Ct. 1099, 22 L.Ed.2d 302 (1969); United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 181, 204 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 383 U.S. 169, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966); Jordan v. State, 481 P.2d 383, 386 (Alaska 1971); State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 389-91, 476 P.2d 841, 844-46 (1970); Murray v. State, 249 Ark. 887, 894-95, 462 S.W.2d 438, 442-43 (1971); People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 130-32, 515 P.2d 466, 469-70 (1973); Henry v. State, 298 A.2d 327, 330 (Del.1972); Byrd v. United States, 388 A.2d 1225, 1229 (D.C.1978); State v. Bush, 58 Haw. 340, 569 P.2d 349 (1977); State v. Wilkins, 215 Kan. 145, 151-56, 523 P.2d 728, 733-37 (1974); State v. Cowperthwaite, 354 A.2d 173, 179 (Me.1976); Metz v. State, 9 Md.App. 15, 20-23, 262 A.2d 331, 334-35 (1970); Bailey v. State, ___ Nev. ___, ___, 579 P.2d 1247, 1248-49 (1978); State v. Fiorello, 36 N.J. 80, 87-90, 174 A.2d 900, 903-05 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 967, 82 S.Ct. 439, 7 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1962); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 137, 560 P.2d 925, 928 (1977); State v. Krummacher, 269 Ore. 125, 137-40, 523 P.2d 1009, 1014-16 (1974); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 150, 371 A.2d 468, 478 (1977); State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425, 435 n.6, 358 A.2d 46, 52 (1976); State v. Gosby, 85 Wash.2d 758, 761-68, 539 P.2d 680, 682-86 (1975); Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 861-63 (Wyo.1975). Although we have recently reaffirmed the cautionary provisions in the circumstantial evidence instruction, State v. Kaufman, 265 N.W.2d at 615, the rationale of these cases was not advanced there. Nor did we have before us the instruction given here. We now conclude the cautionary language of uniform instruction 501.13 is no longer a requirement in this jurisdiction. This court has routinely observed that circumstantial evidence often may be equal or superior to direct evidence. E. g., State v. Streit, 205 N.W.2d 742, 743 (Iowa 1973). Accord, Holland v. United States : Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence. Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may in some cases point to a wholly incorrect result. Yet this is equally true of testimonial evidence. 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S.Ct. at 137-38, 99 L.Ed. at 166-67; United States v. Becker: All conclusions have implicit major premises drawn from common knowledge; the truth of testimony depends as much upon these, as do inferences from events. A jury tests a witness's credibility by using their experience in the past as to similar utterances of persons in a like position. That is precisely the same mental process as when they infer from an object what has been its past history, or from an event what must have preceded it. 62 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1933) (L. Hand, J.); 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 6 (13 ed. 1972); 1 Wigmore on Evidence § 26 (3d ed. 1940); Note, Circumstantial Evidence Charge in Texas Criminal Cases: A Retrograde Doctrine, 55 Tex.L.Rev. 1255, 1255-56 & n.6 (1977). Instructions should permit a juror to view the merits of the particular circumstantial evidence presented without the restriction based on an outmoded generality. For purposes of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative. Trial court did not err in deleting from uniform instruction 501.13 language which might convey a contrary impression to the jury. We approve the instruction given by trial court in this case.