Opinion ID: 1677203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Specific Assessments in this Case

Text: Leaving aside for a moment the penalty imposed for Barrett's violation of the stop-work order, we turn our attention to the penalties imposed for Barrett's failures to secure a building permit and for his improper installation of roof underlayment. Analyzing the actual purpose and effect of these monetary sanctions within the context of their statutory scheme, we first note that Title 16 of the Metropolitan Code of Laws does not appear to impose monetary penalties for the purpose of rectifying or otherwise correcting violations of its provisions. Rather, Title 16 imposes monetary penalties for past, completed violations of the Code of Laws without regard to correcting or rectifying any harm. For example, the Code of Laws does not impose monetary penalties for the purpose of compensating the Metropolitan Government or any private party for any loss that has resulted from a failure to comply with its provisions. It does not impose monetary penalties to reimburse the Metropolitan Government, or any private party, for expenses incurred in inspecting sites, in ensuring compliance with its provisions, or in administering any court proceedings. [23] The Code does not impose monetary penalties to disgorge defendants of any undeserved profits, nor does it impose monetary penalties to reimburse the Metropolitan Government, or any private party, for fixing the damage caused by a defendant's noncompliance. Finally, the Code does not impose monetary penalties to secure execution of any type of bond to ensure compliance with a legal obligation or duty. Moreover, the fines imposed in this case did not have the actual effect of correcting or remedying any of Barrett's violations. We see no indication, for example, that the fines actually corrected the improper installation of roof underlayment. Although Barrett's fines could have been used to pay for the installation of proper roof underlaymentand thereby give some remedial effect to that monetary sanctionit appears that these fines went into the Metropolitan Government's general fund and were not used for this purpose. Moreover, we also see no indication that the penalties have mended any harm associated with Barrett's three failures to secure a building permit. Indeed, whatever harm was caused by his failures in this regard, the fines cannot now be said to have arrested, alleviated, or rectified that harm, which is presumably still present to this day. Consequently, we must conclude that, unlike other sanctions available in Title 16, the fines imposed in this case do not have the actual effect of correcting or remedying any problem associated with Barrett's violations of the Code. As we stated earlier, we recognize that all fines, whether punitive or remedial in their actual purpose or effect, provide some measure of general and specific deterrence against noncompliance with the law. We also recognize that deterrence is one of several features that secures the benefits of remedial regulations such as these. However, Article VI, section 14 does not consider, as a proper remedial purpose outside of its application, the deterrence provided by the fine or the benefits that such deterrence brings. To the extent that the deterrence associated with a fine appears to be its only or its predominant remedial aim, the fine is more properly characterized as being punitive in its actual purpose or effect. Therefore, we conclude that Barrett has shown by clear proof that the actual purpose and effect of these four fines were so punitive as to negate any remedial intent by the Metropolitan Council. Accordingly, we hold that Article VI, section 14 applies with regard to these fines.