Opinion ID: 2535879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the trial court's judgment against the overwhelming weight of the evidence?

Text: ¶ 10. The findings of fact by a circuit court judge, sitting without a jury, will not be reversed on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence. [11] The sole evidence offered at the new trial on damagesthe testimony of Dr. Steven Hayneis unavoidably contradictory to expert testimony offered by the plaintiff at the first trial. On the other hand, Womack's undisputed testimony from the first trial is that her mother's fall immediately precipitated her deteriorating health, pain and suffering, and extensive medical bills. In total, the trial court's determinations are not so manifestly wrong that we can disturb them. ¶ 11. The inconsistencies in the evidence are troubling. In the original trial, the Plaintiff presented extensive evidence that Stewart's fall had caused an extension of her 1978 stroke. Dr. Calvin Ramsey testified that Stewart's constellation of symptoms [after August 11, 1997] could have only been caused by a stroke. Dr. Hayne, of course, testified that, based upon his education, training, experience, and activities in the case, the cause of these ailments was not an exacerbation or extension of a stroke. He testified that the fall produced severe brain injuries that were not uncommon in elderly people experiencing similar blows, resulting in mental and physical deterioration ending in death. ¶ 12. We think both doctors for the plaintiff used the differential diagnosis methodology, [12] though Dr. Ramsey's methodology was not very clearly articulated. Differential diagnosis is a process whereby medical doctors determine which of two or more diseases with similar symptoms is the one from which the patient is suffering, by a systematic comparison and contrasting of clinical findings. [13] By definition and by Dr. Hayne's admission, the plaintiff's experts ruled out the credibility and accuracy of each other's diagnoses. ¶ 13. But this inconsistency does not disqualify Dr. Hayne's opinion. We have said [w]here there is conflicting evidence, this Court must give great deference to the trial judge's findings. [14] The inconsistencies between these experts testimony about why Stewart took such a drastic downturn so soon after the fall does not alter the uncontested fact that she did. ¶ 14. Womack testified that her mother was nonresponsive and unable to stand just five days after the fall, and that she became practically an invalid, taking no pleasure in life. The record is very clear that, though Stewart was disabled before the fall, her difficulties were exacerbated in the near term following her fall. And based upon the medical records entered into evidence, the trial court found that Stewart's medical care cost more than $400,000 in those final years. Dr. Hayne offered an opinion which causally linked Stewart's deterioration and rising medical costs to the negligent act of the City. The trial court found that opinion credible. For us to decide otherwise would be to say that the trial court was unmistakably, clearly, plainly, or indisputably wrong. [15] We would have to replace the trial court's judgment with ours. ¶ 15. In sum, the trial court was faced with the reality that in the near term after a fall that sent her to the hospital, Stewart began to decline in physical and mental health. It found credibility in the opinion of an expert operating under a well-established methodology that the fall and the deteriorating health were causally related. The City offered no new evidence to rebut that opinion testimony. And the trial court found for the plaintiff within its discretion. We will not disturb that finding. ¶ 16. AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH, LAMAR, KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.