Opinion ID: 758556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: proportionate responsibility10

Text: 62 The district court reduced the award of damages to Plaintiffs as a consequence of the jury's findings concerning Plaintiffs' proportionate responsibility for their injuries. 11 A take nothing judgment was entered as to Rucker because his proportionate responsibility was found to be 70%. Plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal, arguing that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's findings regarding their proportionate responsibility for their injuries and that they should have been granted a judgment as a matter of law on that issue. 63 a. Was the issue preserved for appellate review? 64 Initially, we must determine whether Plaintiffs preserved the right to appeal the jury's proportionate responsibility findings. Euclid contends that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of FED.R.CIV.P. 50, thus precluding our review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict on this issue. Generally, sufficiency of the evidence is not reviewable on appeal unless a pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law was made in the trial court at the conclusion of all the evidence. See McCann v. Texas City Refining, Inc., 984 F.2d 667, 671 (5th Cir.1993). However, strict compliance with Rule 50 is not necessary so long as the purposes of the requirement have been satisfied. Greenwood v. Societe Francaise De, 111 F.3d 1239, 1244-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 558, 139 L.Ed.2d 400 (1997). These purposes are met when the court and the [opposing party] are alerted to the grounds on which the [complaining party] contends the evidence is insufficient prior to the submission of the case to the jury. Id. at 1245. 65 In this case, the evidence closed shortly before noon on Thursday, January 30, 1997. The trial court then considered Euclid's motion for judgment as a matter of law and began work on the jury charge. After 6:00 p.m. the following day, after completing what the court termed its informal charge conference the court allowed the parties to go on the record with comments, requested instructions, and objections. At that time, Plaintiffs objected orally, on the record, to the submission of contributory negligence to the jury on the ground that there was not legally sufficient evidence to support the submission of the evidence to the jury. The court overruled the objection. After the verdict was returned, Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law addressing the sufficiency of the evidence of contributory negligence. 66 It is undisputed that Plaintiffs failed to file a formal, written, pre-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law. However, we find that Plaintiffs' objection to the jury charge on sufficiency of the evidence grounds served as the functional equivalent of a formal pre-verdict motion. See Greenwood, 111 F.3d at 1245, n. 7 & 8; see also Wells v. Hico ISD, 736 F.2d 243, 251-52 (5th Cir.1984). The issue of sufficiency of the evidence on plaintiffs' proportionate responsibility is thus preserved for appellate review.b. Sufficiency of the evidence on proportionate responsibility 67 Plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence that any of the Plaintiffs had an awareness of the cumulative trauma they were suffering as a result of their exposure to Euclid's coal haulers. Nor, they argue, is there any evidence in the record to indicate that any of the Plaintiffs should have had knowledge of the dangerous and unsafe nature of the vibration levels they were receiving while driving the coal haulers. 68 Euclid answers that the evidence supports findings that Plaintiffs were negligent and at least partially responsible for their alleged physical injuries and damages. Euclid points to evidence that the coal hauler, like any other vehicle, had a rougher ride when road conditions were bad and the driver was driving too fast. The record contains evidence that there was no reason for driving the haulers at top speed and in fact TUMCO management wanted its drivers to slow down. Further, there was evidence that Rucker continued to smoke, though doctors had told him smoking aggravates his back injury. 69 Given evidence that the Plaintiffs knew the vibrations worsened based on the speed the haulers were driven and that the drivers drove the haulers faster than their employer recommended, we find sufficient evidence to support the proportional negligence findings of the jury. Further, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's finding that Rucker was responsible for 70% of the negligence that resulted in his injuries, thereby precluding any obligation for Euclid to compensate him for his damages.