Opinion ID: 2176374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court's authority to grant preliminary relief

Text: The District argues, first, that the trial court lacked authority to issue the injunction while GIA's bid protest was still pending before the CAB. Essentially, the District's argument has three themes. One theme involves subject matter jurisdiction: the District argues that, until the CAB rendered a decision on GIA's bid protest, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear GIA's suit for injunctive relief because the applicable statute designates the CAB as the exclusive hearing tribunal for bid protests. [6] A second theme raises the issue of standing: the District asserts that GIA had no right to sue for any relief other than the remedies expressly provided by statute. The third theme concerns the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: the District argues that the court should not have acted on GIA's behalf because GIA had not yet exhausted its administrative remedies. Although the District tends to interweave these three themes in its argument, we distinguish them and consider them one at a time for the sake of clarity.
In 1985, the Council of the District of Columbia established the CAB in its present form under the District of Columbia Procurement Practices Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-1181.1 to 1-1192.6 (1992 & Supp.1993). [7] D.C.Code § 1-1189.3 (1992) sets forth the CAB's jurisdiction over bid protests as follows: The Board shall be the exclusive hearing tribunal for, and shall have jurisdiction to review and determine de novo: (1) Any protest of a solicitation or award of a contract addressed to the Board by any actual or prospective bidder or offeror, or a contractor who is aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or award of a contract.... (Emphasis added.) The District argues that this statute gives the CAB the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and resolve [bid] protests and that the Superior Court accordingly has jurisdiction to intervene only after the CAB has rendered a decision. GIA responds that, notwithstanding the statutory language, the Superior Court's general equity jurisdiction gave the court authority to hear GIA's claims even though GIA's protest was still pending before the CAB. For reasons that will become evident momentarily, we begin our analysis by considering the nature and sources of the Superior Court's subject matter jurisdiction. In 1970, Congress passed the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act, Pub.L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1971), which conferred upon our local courts ... powers analogous to those of state courts and gave the Superior Court plenary jurisdiction over civil matters brought in the District of Columbia via D.C.Code § 11-921 (1989). Reichman v. Franklin Simon Corp., 392 A.2d 9, 12 (D.C. 1978). Thus, [a]s presently constituted, the Superior Court is no longer a court of limited jurisdiction, but a court of general jurisdiction with the power to adjudicate any civil action at law or in equity involving local law. Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C. 1979) (emphasis in original). Only Congress has the authority to alter this grant of general jurisdiction to the Superior Court. D.C.Code § 1-233(a)(4) (1992) specifically prohibits the Council of the District of Columbia from enacting any act, resolution, or rule ... relating to organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts. Thus, the Council may not expand or reduce the jurisdiction of the local courts. See Jones & Artis Const. Co. v. Contract Appeals Board, 549 A.2d 315, 318 (D.C.1988); Capitol Hill Restoration Soc'y v. Moore, 410 A.2d 184, 188 (D.C.1979); Columbia Realty Venture v. District of Columbia Hous. Rent Comm'n, 350 A.2d 120, 124 (D.C. 1975). The Procurement Practices Act was enacted by the Council, not initiated by Congress. [8] The Act therefore lacked the authority to alter the existing jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Consequently, before examining D.C.Code § 1-1189.3, which governs the CAB's authority over bid protests, we must first consider whether, as part of its general equity jurisdiction and entirely apart from the commands and implications of § 1-1189.3, the Superior Court may hear a suit for injunctive relief in relation to a bid protest, even though the underlying protest is still pending before the appropriate agency review board. This court has held that [D.C.Code] § 11-921(a)(6) permits a party `aggrieved' by a decision of a District of Columbia agency to initiate an appropriate action in the Superior Court for equitable relief, unless this court has jurisdiction under the DCAPA [District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, D.C.Code §§ 1-1501 to 1-1511 (1992)] to consider a direct appeal. Speyer v. Barry, 588 A.2d 1147, 1159-60 (D.C.1991); see also Capitol Hill Restoration Soc'y, 410 A.2d at 188; Columbia Realty, 350 A.2d at 123. D.C.Code § 1-1510(a) allows the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to hear a direct appeal from an agency decision only in a contested case, i.e., a proceeding in which `the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law ..., or by constitutional right,' to be determined after a trial-type hearing. Jones & Artis, 549 A.2d at 318 (quoting D.C.Code § 1-1502(8)). Because a bid protest is not a contested case within the meaning of the DCAPA, a disappointed bidder seeking relief from a decision on a bid protest by the CAB must resort in the first instance to the Superior Court. See id.; Network Technical Servs. v. District of Columbia Data Co., 464 A.2d 133, 136 (D.C. 1983). Citing Jones & Artis, the District concedes in its brief that the Superior Court has the authority to review the CAB's final decision on a bid protest. The District contends, however, that the trial court has no authority to interfere with a pending administrative proceeding other than its authority under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to preserve its jurisdiction. The qualification in the District's argument is highly significant, for, indeed, the All Writs Act does provide the Superior Court with jurisdictional authority, albeit in rare circumstances, to issue emergency relief pending the resolution of agency proceedings. The All Writs Act provides that all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988). In FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603-05, 86 S.Ct. 1738, 1742, 16 L.Ed.2d 802 (1966), the Supreme Court held that this act empowered a federal court of appeals to issue a preliminary injunction to prevent a merger until the Federal Trade Commission had determined its legality. Exercise of the power to issue writs in aid of jurisdiction, the court said, `is in the nature of appellate jurisdiction' ... and extends to the potential jurisdiction of the appellate court where an appeal is not then pending but may be later perfected. Id. at 603, 86 S.Ct. at 1742 (quoting Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. 190, 193 (5 Pet.), 8 L.Ed. 92 (1832) and citing Ex parte Bradstreet, 32 U.S. 634 (7 Pet.), 8 L.Ed. 810 (1833)). Furthermore, the Court observed, the power to issue preliminary relief also covers cases involving administrative agencies: decisions of this Court have recognized a limited judicial power to preserve the court's jurisdiction or maintain the status quo by injunction pending review of an agency's action through the prescribed statutory channels.... Such power has been deemed merely incidental to the court's jurisdiction to review final agency action.... Id. at 604, 86 S.Ct. at 1742 (quoting Arrow Trans. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658, 671 n.22, 83 S.Ct. 984, 991 n. 22, 10 L.Ed.2d 52 (1963)). We recently recognized this doctrine in the context of appellate court review of contested cases in Capitol Hill Hosp. v. District of Columbia State Health Planning & Dev. Agency, 600 A.2d 793 (D.C.1991). Citing Dean Foods, we observed that, in a contested case over which we would eventually have direct reviewing authority, we would also have the authority to issue emergency relief to preserve the status quo while administrative review is still pending. See id. at 799. As with federal courts, the source of our authority to issue temporary relief pending administrative review in such a case is the All Writs Act. See id.; cf. Morrow v. District of Columbia, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 167, 417 F.2d 728, 735 (1969) (holding that District of Columbia Court of Appeals, as then constituted, had power to issue extraordinary writs in aid of jurisdiction under All Writs Act). Because the District of Columbia Superior Court, like this court, was created by Congress, it follows that the All Writs Act applies equally to the Superior Court. See Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 43-44 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979). Therefore, like this court, the Superior Court must also have the power to issue emergency relief pending the completion of administrative proceedings in cases where, in the first instance, review would lie in the Superior Court. [9] Thus, because the Superior Court has jurisdiction to review the CAB's decisions in bid protests, as the District concedes, the Superior Court also possesses the power under the All Writs Act to issue temporary relief to a disappointed bidder even though the CAB has not yet issued a decision. Nothing in the Procurement Practices Act can affect this power because, as we have already noted, the Council, in adopting the Act, lacked authority to alter the jurisdiction of the Superior Court as Congress defined it. [10] With this said, however, we also note that we see not necessary inconsistency between D.C.Code § 1-1189.3 and the Superior Court's authority to issue emergency relief pending the outcome of CAB proceedings. In concluding as we do that the Superior Court has the power to issue emergency relief by virtue of its jurisdiction to review CAB decisions, we do not question the CAB's role as exclusive hearing tribunal for all bid protests. We recognize that, in so designating the CAB, the Council apparently rejected other procurement schemes that allow a disappointed bidder to resort to the trial court either instead of, or in addition to, seeking administrative review. [11] We also appreciate that CAB members have experience in the areas of procurement and contract law, D.C.Code § 1-1189.2(b) (1992), which gives them particular expertise in compiling and interpreting the voluminous and highly technical factual records that are typically involved in a public procurement dispute. Accordingly, we do not hold that the Superior Court's power to grant emergency relief gives it the authority to function as a competitor of the CAB or to ignore the CAB's findings. Nothing in this opinion is intended to authorize the Superior Court as an alternative hearing tribunal. On the contrary, the Superior Court still owes the CAB deference as the primary fact-finder. See D.C.Code § 1-1189.8(d) (1992) (A determination of an issue of fact by the Board [in a bid protest] shall be final and conclusive unless arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or clearly erroneous.); see also Kegley v. District of Columbia, 440 A.2d 1013, 1018 (D.C. 1982) (where review of administrative proceeding properly lies in Superior Court, Superior Court must apply same standard of review as Court of Appeals would apply to review of contested case under DCAPA). Furthermore, as we set forth in detail in Part IV.A., the circumstances in which the Superior Court is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction to issue temporary relief pending the completion of agency proceedings will be extremely rare.
In another argument against the trial court's authority to issue the preliminary injunction, the District cites Perkins v. Lukens Steel, 310 U.S. 113, 60 S.Ct. 869, 84 L.Ed. 1108 (1940), for the proposition that it is a basic principle of government contract law that an unsuccessful bidder has no right to challenge a government contract other than the rights given ... by statute. Thus, the District argues, GIA may not resort to any forum other than the CAB in the first instance, nor may GIA sue for preliminary relief, because such relief is not available from the CAB under its governing statutes. See D.C.Code §§ 1-1189.3,-1189.8(e)(1) (1992). [12] We reject this argument. In citing Lukens Steel, the District is apparently attempting to revive the old notion that a party has standing to sue for relief from an adverse administrative decision only where the agency has invaded a specific legal right, either founded in common law or specifically conferred by statute, that belongs to that party. [13] But that is no longer the Supreme Court's test for standing to challenge an administrative agency's decision, nor is it ours. In Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp (ADAPSO), 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970), the Supreme Court specifically rejected the legal interest test as a condition of standing to sue for relief from agency action, stating that the legal interest test goes to the merits, id. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 830, and is a matter quite distinct from the problem of standing, id. at 153 n. 1, 90 S.Ct. at 829 n. 1. Instead, the Court announced a broader test for standing. As summarized and adopted by this court in Lee v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 423 A.2d 210 (D.C. 1980), the ADAPSO test requires that in order to seek review of an administrative agency's decision, (1) the petitioner must allege that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact; (2) the interest sought to be protected by the petitioner must be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question; and (3) there must be no clear legislative intent to withhold judicial review either from the class of persons or in the type of case involved. Lee, 423 A.2d at 216 (citing ADAPSO, 397 U.S. at 152, 153, 156, 90 S.Ct. at 829, 830, 831); see also Dupont Circle Citizens Ass'n v. Barry, 455 A.2d 417, 421 (D.C.1983); Basiliko v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 816, 818 (D.C.1971). For example, using this test in ADAPSO the Supreme Court held that a data processors association had standing to challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that banks could make data processing services available to other banks and bank customers. See ADAPSO, 397 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. at 832. Such a party would have lacked standing under the old legal interest test. See id. at 153, 90 S.Ct. at 829-30. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court added further refinements to this test for standing, which we have also incorporated into our own caselaw. Thus, we have said the plaintiff must also show that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action, and that it is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Speyer, 588 A.2d at 1160 (quoting Community Credit Union v. Federal Express Servs. Corp., 534 A.2d 331, 333 (D.C.1987)); see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758-59, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 1925-26, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976). Furthermore, a plaintiff may assert only its own legal rights [and] may not attempt to litigate generalized grievances. Speyer, 588 A.2d at 1160 (quoting Community Credit Union, 534 A.2d at 333); see Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75, 102 S.Ct. at 759-60. [14] Applying these standards, the federal courts have typically held that disappointed bidders for a contract with the federal government have standing to sue for relief. [15] We see no reason to treat GIA differently under our own local law. First, GIA had unquestionably suffered injury in fact. Having lost a substantial contract that it otherwise stood a fair chance of winning, GIA claimed that it faced loss of key employees; threat to the viability of the company; and loss of marketplace credibility. The unsuccessful bidder meets the `injury in fact' prong of the test because `the economic injury he [or she] suffers ... is manifest. No serious doubt exists that a disappointed bidder suffers economic loss by virtue of his [or her] inability to obtain the contract at issue.' Choctaw Mfg. v. United States, 761 F.2d 609, 616 (11th Cir.1985) (quoting Hayes Int'l Corp. v. McLucas, 509 F.2d 247, 255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864, 96 S.Ct. 123, 46 L.Ed.2d 92 (1975)) (brackets omitted). Second, that injury was fairly traceable to the District's alleged breach of its own procedures and regulations in (1) initially awarding the benefits administration contract to QDP and (2) continuing the contract with QDP after learning of Parnham's convictions. Of course, GIA was not entitled to this contract. But it was entitled to a fair award process. Doing business with the Government has become an important part of American economic life; arbitrary deprivation of government contracts on non-discretionary grounds is a serious wrong.... B.K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 719 (2d Cir.1983). Thus, a disappointed bidder need demonstrate only that if its bid had been fairly and honestly considered, `there was substantial chance that [it] would receive an award....' CACI, Inc.Fed. v. United States, 719 F.2d 1567, 1574 (Fed.Cir.1983) (quoting Morgan Business Assocs. v. United States, 619 F.2d 892, 895, 223 Ct.Cl. 325 (1980)). As the previous administrator and only other bidder, GIA had a substantial chance of winning the new benefits administration contract. See id. at 1575 (disappointed bidder that was one of six companies qualified to submit final offer had standing to challenge award). Third, the claimed injury could be redressed by court action. An injunction barring the award would correct this alleged injury since it would require the government... to repeat the bidding process under circumstances that would eliminate the alleged taint of the prior proceedings. Id. Fourth, GIA sought to safeguard interests that were arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question. Lee, 423 A.2d at 416. D.C.Code § 1-1181.1(b) (1992) specifies that the Procurement Practices Act supports the following purposes among others: (2) To foster effective and equitably broad-based competition in the District of Columbia ...; . . . . . (4) To provide for increased public confidence in the procedures followed in public procurement; . . . . . (7) To insure the fair and equitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement system of the District government; . . . . . (11) To provide safeguards for the maintenance of a procurement system of quality and integrity.... In claiming that the District (1) had failed to follow proper procedures in evaluating its proposals and (2) had awarded the contract to a service provider that did not meet the District's standards for integrity, GIA was seeking to protect interests in fair competition and integrity that lie at the heart of the Procurement Practices Act. Fifth, no argument can be made that GIA was merely raising a generalized grievance or seeking to vindicate the rights of third parties. While a disappointed bidder's challenge to the government's procurement process also serves the public interest in fair and efficient government, the bidder's grievance is also particularized, insofar as the bidder is seeking a procurement contract. Finally, we discern no clear legislative intent to withhold judicial review from bid protestors. Lee, 423 A.2d at 416. Indeed, as we noted above in Part III.A., the District concedes that GIA is entitled to judicial review. We therefore conclude that GIA had standing to seek relief in the Superior Court. In doing so, we reject the District's claim that GIA has no right to pursue relief in the Superior Court until after the CAB has issued a decision. A disappointed bidder who has shown standing has the right to avail himself or herself of the Superior Court's review jurisdiction, which also includes, for reasons we have already set forth in Part III.A., the jurisdiction to hear claims for interim relief before the CAB has rendered a decision. We also reject, for similar reasons, the District's claim that D.C.Code § 1-1189.8(e)(1), see supra note 12, limits GIA's right to interim relief in the trial court. We recognize, as the District points out and as the CAB held in an earlier decision issued in this case, see supra note 12, that § 1-1189.8(e)(1) appears to prohibit the CAB from enjoining a contract award. But that fact has no bearing on GIA's standing to seek relief in the Superior Court. It can hardly be said that § 1-1189.8 indicates any intent to withhold judicial review as a whole; it pertains solely to the availability of a particular remedy from the CAB. Nor can it be argued that § 1-1189.8 limits the availability of a preliminary injunction from the Superior Court. As we have already demonstrated in Part III.A., the power to grant interim relief is incidental to the Superior Court's review jurisdiction and cannot be overridden by the Procurement Practices Act. Therefore, where a disappointed bidder such as GIA can demonstrate standing, it can sue for emergency relief in the Superior Court regardless of the CAB's apparent incapacity to issue such relief.
Finally, the District argues that the trial court lacked authority to issue a preliminary injunction because GIA had not exhausted its remedies. We disagree. It is a well-established doctrine that where a statute provides an administrative forum to resolve disputes, `no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.' Dano Resource Recovery, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 566 A.2d 483, 485 (D.C.1989) (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969)) (further citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bender v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 562 A.2d 1205, 1207-08 (D.C.1989) and authorities cited therein. As the Supreme Court observed in McKart, there are sound policy grounds for adhering to this doctrine: The reasons for making such procedures exclusive, and for the judicial application of the exhaustion doctrine in cases where the statutory requirement of exclusivity is not so explicit, are not difficult to understand. A primary purpose is, of course, the avoidance of premature interruption of the administrative process. The agency, like a trial court, is created for the purpose of applying a statute in the first instance. Accordingly, it is normally desirable to let the agency develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based. And since agency decisions are frequently of a discretionary nature or frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the first chance to exercise that discretion or to apply that expertise. And of course it is generally more efficient for the administrative process to go forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages. McKart, 395 U.S. at 193-94, 89 S.Ct. at 1662-63; see also McCarthy v. Madigan, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 1086-87, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992); Dano Resource Recovery, 566 A.2d at 485; Bender, 562 A.2d at 1208. Unlike jurisdiction and standing, however, exhaustion of remedies is a flexible doctrine, National Treasury Employees Union v. King, 295 U.S.App.D.C. 153, 156, 961 F.2d 240, 243 (1992), subject to a number of interrelated exceptions, including inadequate remedy, unavailable remedy, and futility, Dano Resource Recovery, 566 A.2d at 486. Both the inadequacy and unavailability exceptions are relevant in a case such as this where the movant alleges imminent, danger of irreparable harm and seeks emergency relief not available from the administrative forum. [16] `[A]dministrative remedies need not be pursued if the litigant's interests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government's interests in the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to further.' McCarthy, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1087 (quoting West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 715 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821, 101 S.Ct. 79, 66 L.Ed.2d 23 (1980)). In particular, the Supreme Court observed in McCarthy that the interests of a party in obtaining prompt judicial review may weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion in situations where, even though the administrative decisionmaking schedule is otherwise reasonable and definite, a particular plaintiff may suffer irreparable harm if unable to secure immediate judicial consideration of his [or her] claim. ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1087; see also 5 JACOB A. STEIN, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 49.02[2], at 49-50 (1993). For instance, in Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a federal district court did not err in allowing persons who had not exhausted their administrative remedies to challenge the denial of disability benefits to them. Otherwise, the Court observed, the claimants in this case would be irreparably injured were the exhaustion requirement now enforced against them. Id. at 483, 106 S.Ct. at 2032. For this reason, we are unwilling to say, as a rule of general application, that a disappointed bidder who alleges irreparable harm as the result of improper agency action must nevertheless always await the CAB's decision before seeking relief in the trial court. Of course, the protestor must still show that he or she is entitled to such extraordinary relief in the individual case. We now turn to that inquiry.