Opinion ID: 2180953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Pro Se Defendant's Taking of Depositions

Text: On August 7, 1984, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to proceed as his own counsel and appointed Deputy Public Defender Michael Hunt as stand-by counsel. On September 27, 1984, the defendant filed a motion requesting transport from the Pendleton Reformatory to the Putnam County Jail for the purpose of deposing numerous witnesses on October 10 and 11, 1984. Due to the defendant's repeated escape attempts, the trial judge deemed the defendant a serious security risk and denied the request for transport. The court also ruled that the defendant's stand-by counsel could depose State witnesses but that any other persons could be deposed only upon a sufficient showing of demonstrated materiality of their testimony to the defendant's case. The defendant responded by filing a written Notice to Stand-by Counsel of Non-Consent ordering stand-by counsel not to interfere with the defendant's control over the defense of this case by complying with the Court's order on taking of depositions and a Written Objection to Court's Entry and Denial of Defense Preparation. The defendant now contends that the trial court's ruling violated his sixth amendment right to defend; his right to a fair trial, and his fourteenth amendment rights to due process, fundamental fairness and equal protection. The objective of pre-trial discovery is to promote justice and to prevent surprise by allowing the defendant adequate time to prepare his case. Campbell v. State (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 174. As Justice Jackson observed in Johns v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 172, 179, 240 N.E.2d 60, 64, it is axiomatic that an accused is not justly and fairly tried when his counsel is compelled to maneuver in a factual vacuum. Although discovery in criminal cases is a two way street, Morris v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 288, and a criminal defendant generally has the right to depose prosecution witnesses, Drollinger v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 5, 408 N.E.2d 1228, the trial court has wide discretionary latitude in discovery matters as part of its inherent power to guide and control the proceedings. See, e.g., Tinnin v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 203, 416 N.E.2d 116 (denial of defendant's motion to depose state witness was proper exercise of trial court's inherent power to prevent discovery from unjustifiably delaying proceedings). Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the trial court's ruling here does not evidence an imbalance in the discovery process in contravention of the dictates of Wardius v. Oregon (1973), 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (striking state statute requiring a defendant to give pre-trial notice to prosecution of his alibi defense and alibi witnesses, unless reciprocal discovery rights were given to the defendant). Rather than prohibiting depositions, the trial court merely delineated the means of taking depositions due to the defendant's proclivity for attempting to escape. The defendant asserts an absolute right to have conducted the depositions himself, but nothing in any of his cited authority supports such a proposition. Moreover, we agree with the State that he waived his argument here by ordering stand-by counsel not to take the depositions as allowed by the trial court. Discovery is not required under the due process clause of the Constitution, Johnson v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 589, 266 N.E.2d 57, and a defendant may waive any pre-trial discovery rights by failing to exercise or pursue them. Gubitz v. State (1977), 172 Ind. App. 343, 360 N.E.2d 259. Finally, the defendant has failed to support his bald assertion that he was prejudiced as a result of the trial court's ruling. He suggests that stand-by counsel was unaware of the questions upon which to depose the State witnesses; however, there is no indication that prior to the scheduled depositions, the defendant's capacity to confer with stand-by counsel was curtailed in any way. In light of the foregoing, we reject the defendant's arguments.