Opinion ID: 1743723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Establishment Clause Jurisprudence

Text: The Supreme Court has rejected any absolute approach in applying the Establishment Clause. At times it has relied on the principles enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), to guide it through this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law. [14] Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105. Under Lemon, a government practice is constitutional if: (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not excessively entangle the government with religion. Id. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105. But the Lemon test has been criticized by a majority of the current justices, [15] and the Court has used other analyses in attempting to achieve the First Amendment's underlying purpose. See, e.g., Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir.2001) (observing that the Court has developed three lines of analysis for Establishment Clause claims); Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951-53 (6th Cir.2000) (recognizing that the Court has not overturned or rescinded the Lemon test even as it has used its framework to shape differing analyses.). What we can infer from the Supreme Court's evolving Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that the government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), nor may the government appear to take a position on questions of religious belief or make `adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.' Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). In recent years, the Court has become particularly attuned to whether the challenged government practice purposefully or effectively endorses religion, an inquiry courts generally consider a component of the Lemon test's first and second parts. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94, 109 S.Ct. 3086; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688-94, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Books, 235 F.3d at 304-05; Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259, 264 (6th Cir.2000); Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 572-73 (6th Cir.1999); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 773-80 (9th Cir.1991). Thus in determining whether the challenged government practice in this case violates the Establishment Clause, we begin by inquiring whether the purpose of the government's practice is legitimately secular, Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105, that is, whether the actual intent of the government's action is to endorse or disapprove of religion. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (concluding that the purpose behind posting the Ten Commandments on a school wall was not secular, regardless of claimed educational intent); Abington, 374 U.S. at 223-24, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (concluding that the purpose behind beginning the school day with Bible verses was not secular, despite claim that doing so promoted moral values). If both religious and secular objectives motivate the government's practice, the practice does not violate the Establishment Clause as long as the government's avowed purpose is sincere. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-03, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 & n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 1355; Cammack, 932 F.2d at 773; see also Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (explaining that while the government's characterization of its policy deserves deference, its stated purpose must not be a sham). The County posits that the CEU curriculum promotes rehabilitation and reduces violence, which it alleges are the secular purposes behind its operation. We recognize that prisons across this state face, among other problems, overcrowding, gang activity, and inmate violence, and thus we do not question whether the County is sincere in declaring that its actions are motivated by rehabilitation and security concerns, or that those concerns represent legitimate penological interests. Nor do we question whether the County could employ means other than the CEU curriculum to achieve these goals; even Chaplain Atwell conceded that it could. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (noting irrelevancy of whether nonreligious means could be used). But see Abington, 374 U.S. at 265, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that government may not employ religious means without clearly demonstrating the insufficiency of nonreligious means). Indeed, we acknowledge that prison programs that involve religious instruction can comport with the Constitution. See generally Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-73, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (acknowledging that a hermetic separation between government and religion is an impossibility that has never been required). In this case, evidence that Williams and Atwell intended to exclude other religious groups suggests that Williams' and Atwell's purpose was not only to promote religion, but to promote their own personal religious views. But there is also evidence that the County was motivated by legitimate penological concerns with rehabilitation and safety. Accordingly, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the CEU had no legitimate secular purpose. The propriety of the County's purpose does not, however, immunize its actions from further scrutiny. We must also consider whether its actions in fact convey a message that endorses or inhibits religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105; accord Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594-95, 109 S.Ct. 3086; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Sheriff Williams and Chaplain Atwell acknowledged that they were personally involved in selecting and screening the religious teachings offered in the CEU, not for penological reasons, but to ensure compliance with their own personal religious beliefs. In fact, Chaplain Atwell acknowledged that he had never considered allowing other religious views to be taught in the CEU. Sheriff Williams admitted to making no bones about the fact that [he] applies the yardstick of [his] own belief system to what may permissibly go on in the CEU. He also conceded that denying the existence of the Holy Trinity would have been a sufficient reason for excluding certain instruction from being part of the CEU. Although Williams and Atwell expressed a willingness to allow representatives from other religions to instruct TCCC inmates, that instruction had to be based on the CEU curriculum; other religious instruction was prohibited. Williams' and Atwell's actions could be perceived as reflecting county endorsement of the specific religious content offered in the CEU. To contradict this appearance of religious endorsement, the County relies heavily on the fact that participation in the CEU is voluntary. Voluntariness, however, is not dispositive of the Establishment Clause claims in this case. The fact that participation in the CEU was voluntary does not detract from Williams' and Atwell's intention to allow only one religious viewpoint to be expressed. Cf. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 2955 (The absence of any element of coercion ... is irrelevant to questions arising under the Establishment Clause.); Abington, 374 U.S. at 223, 83 S.Ct. 1560 ([A] violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended....); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962) (The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion....). But cf. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001) (holding that allowing religious club to meet in school facility would not create valid Establishment Clause interest for the school in part because [t]he children cannot attend without their parents' permission, [and therefore] they cannot be coerced into engaging in [the club's] religious activities); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 239 (6th Cir.1997) (upholding nonsectarian prayer or moment of silence at the beginning of certain meetings or ceremonies when an adult's attendance was voluntary); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir.1997) (same). Thus the fact that inmates were willing to submit to the instruction offered does not mean that Williams and Atwell did not promote their own personal religious beliefs over other religious teachings, and their official endorsement of the substance of the religious instruction offered in the CEU goes beyond what the Establishment Clause can tolerate. On this record, no fact issues exist that prevent us from concluding that the County's operation of the CEU endorses one religious view while excluding others, and thus conveys the impermissible message of official preference for one specific religious view. Providing moral guidance to inmates is certainly an important mission, and we recognize that hiring a chaplain may be necessary to secure prisoners' rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 296-98, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (Brennan, J., concurring); Theriault v. A Religious Office in the Structure of the Gov't, 895 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir.1990). But the County cannot, consistent with the Establishment Clause, convey a message that endorses the personal religious beliefs of county officials in attempting to rehabilitate criminal offenders. Such an endorsement of religion is, by any test of which we are aware, unconstitutional.