Opinion ID: 1388553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Prior Felony Convictions

Text: (6a) Defendant claims the trial court erred in finding his prior felony convictions admissible for impeachment. We disagree. Before the October 1984 guilt trial, defendant moved to preclude impeachment with his 1975 lewd conduct conviction and 1980 child cruelty conviction. He argued that the prior convictions were too similar to the sole special-circumstance allegation of murder in the commission of a lewd and lascivious act upon a minor. (See Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 453 [99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].) The prosecutor replied that addition of article I, section 28, subdivision (f) to the California Constitution by Proposition 8 eliminated all restrictions on the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment, including the court's traditional power to exclude prejudicial evidence. [14] Without comment, the court denied defendant's motion. Defendant did not testify at the guilt phase. The first degree murder charge was submitted to the jury on theories of premeditated murder and murder in the commission or attempted commission of a lewd act. Defendant was convicted, as charged, of first degree murder and arson, and the special circumstance was found true. In October 1985, before the start of the penalty phase, defendant moved for a new trial under People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301 ( Castro ), which was decided after the guilt verdict was rendered. Defendant conceded in the motion  as he does on appeal  that his prior convictions involve moral turpitude and are prima facie admissible under Castro. ( Id. at pp. 315-316; see People v. Massey (1987) 192 Cal. App.3d 819, 823 [237 Cal. Rptr. 734].) He argued, however, that the court erred in failing to exercise its discretion to exclude the priors as substantially more prejudicial than probative, and that he had been kept off the stand as a result. ( Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 306-316 [plur. opn. of Kaus, J.], 322 [conc. & dis. opn. of Grodin, J.], 323-332 [conc. & dis. opn. of Bird, C.J.].) At the hearing on the new trial motion, the court announced that it had exercised its Castro discretion and determined that its pretrial decision to admit the prior convictions was correct. The court then denied the motion. (7) We first reject the Attorney General's suggestion that defendant has waived the right to challenge this ruling. Although People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 383-388 [228 Cal. Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173] ( Collins ), requires a defendant to testify in order to raise a Castro claim of improper impeachment on appeal, this rule applies to trials beginning after Collins became final. Where, as here, the case was tried before Collins, it is governed by prior law enabling a defendant to raise such a claim even though he did not testify or make an offer of proof. ( Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 388, citing People v. Fries (1979) 24 Cal.3d 222, 232-234 [155 Cal. Rptr. 194, 594 P.2d 19].) (6b) Nevertheless, we reject defendant's claim that the guilt judgment should be reversed on abuse-of-discretion grounds. At the hearing on the new trial motion, the prosecution indicated that it never intended to introduce the facts underlying the 1980 child cruelty conviction  forcible rape  if it were admitted for impeachment. The court could reasonably conclude that the sanitized version would not have tainted the instant verdict. While defendant's 1975 lewd conduct conviction is similar to certain elements of the charged crimes, it was almost 10 years old at the time of the guilt trial. The court could reasonably conclude that it was neither so recent as to prejudice defendant, nor so remote as to have no bearing on his credibility. [15] Defendant insists the case should at least be remanded so that the trial court  which had heard the prosecution's evidence when making its belated Castro ruling  can reassess the issue after hearing what his own testimony would have been. (See Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d 378, 394, fn. 20.) However, no  Collins remand is necessary. We can determine from the existing record that defendant was not prejudiced by the court's failure to consider his probable testimony, or by his failure to testify at the guilt phase. Defendant argues that, had he testified on the issue of guilt, he could have rebutted the prosecution's claims of premeditated murder and lewd conduct supporting the first degree murder and special circumstance charges. However, defendant concedes his guilt phase testimony would have conformed to testimony actually given under oath at the penalty trial. There, he denied committing the crimes or being present at the motel when they occurred. This alibi defense has no bearing on whether defendant was properly found guilty of first degree murder with a special circumstance, as opposed to other possible offenses arising out of the motel incident. [16] Moreover, this alibi defense is inherently implausible. Defendant admitted at the penalty trial, and an eyewitness confirmed, that defendant was present at the motel throughout the day on February 24 and until 8:30 p.m. Medical evidence established that the stabbing most likely occurred at that time. There was no evidence suggesting that a third person had gained entry to the motel and stabbed Lashan. No witness other than defendant could account for his whereabouts between 8:30 and 9:50 p.m., giving him ample time to commit the crimes and walk to Ruthie's house. In addition, defendant's version of events at trial was implicitly undermined by four witnesses who said he had admitted involvement in the motel crimes (i.e., two police officers, a nurse, and an informant). Under the circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that the outcome of the guilt trial would have been different if defendant had testified absent fear of impeachment with his prior convictions. The court's decision to admit them for that purpose was harmless.