Opinion ID: 2175682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: factual support

Text: To be sure, the trial court summarized some  what it characterized as the major points  of the facts. Although we may assume that any fact the court mentioned was a fact found, notwithstanding the rather lengthy hearing conducted on the issue, the trial court found precious few facts. At best, the court found the following facts: (1) there was a falling out between Inlet Associates and the Harrisons, which resulted in protracted proceedings before the Worcester County Board of Zoning Appeals and other administrative bodies and the Worcester County Circuit Court. (2) while the cases were pending either in the Circuit Court for Worcester County or on appeal, Nilson was hired for the express purpose, that the court finds, to see if there was not some manner in which all the other ongoing litigation could be settled; (3) Nilson's retainer had a bonus provision, which would be effective should the matter be settled within a relatively short period of time; thus, it was obvious to the court ... time was of the essence. No settlement was effected within the applicable period of time, however; (4) a draft copy of a complaint, with some modifications, which was ultimately filed, was sent to Burnett. The court found that to be an obvious act of intimidation to effect a settlement; and (5) the court granted Burnett's motion to dismiss, in its entirety, and the Harrisons' motion, in part. The court made no additional findings of fact [2] when it separately considered the counts pled. Although it stated that it found that the claim against Mr. Burnett was instituted in bad faith and without substantial justification, this finding was no more than a conclusion; no facts to support it were supplied. Similarly, addressing the second count of the complaint, the court found no colorable claim and no evidence or allegation of malice, nor was there any substantial justification for filing of that claim. Again, no supporting findings of fact were provided. Moreover, the conclusion that there was no evidence or allegation of malice was wrong. While the second count does not use the word, malice, it alleged that the multiple actions were filed without right or justifiable cause. In Natural Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 302 Md. 47, 71, 485 A.2d 663, 675 (1984), we equated that phrase with malice. In any event, the complaint in its entirety produces a strong inference of malice. Thus, the court did not provide the brief exposition of the facts upon which the findings of bad faith and lack of substantial justification were based. Moreover, the facts it did find do not suggest, not to mention, demonstrate, that the court focused, as required, on relevant facts. The facts the court summarized do not tell us very much about the appropriateness of the imposition of sanctions in this case. If they are relevant at all, they relate only, and then not very strongly, to the bad faith prong of the rule. None of the facts directly, or indirectly, addresses whether Nilson had substantial justification for filing the complaint. That Nilson was hired to find a way of settling the ongoing litigation between the parties, for example, does not necessarily indicate that he filed the litigation in bad faith, and it certainly is not indicative that it was filed without substantial justification. Nor does the presence of a bonus provision in Nilson's retainer agreement mean that whatever he did pursuant to that agreement was undertaken in bad faith and/or without substantial justification, whether or not, as the court found, time was of the essence. It may be that sending a copy of the draft complaint to Burnett evidenced Nilson's intent to intimidate Burnett which, when coupled with the filing of the complaint, may support an inference of bad faith; that fact does not, however, without more, provide any support for the assertion that the complaint was filed without justification. The lack of substantial justification prong of the rule was addressed only when the trial court focused on the separate counts of the complaint. Even then, as pointed out, the trial court did little more than merely state the conclusion that Nilson acted without substantial justification. Apparently, the majority has similar problems with the trial court's focus and findings. It relies only on the trial court's conclusions that Nilson acted in bad faith and without substantial justification, not the facts used by the trial court to support them. This is most apparent in the case of the bad faith conclusion. Rather than focus on the trial court's reasons, the majority scoured the record for facts it believed supported the court's bad faith finding, facts neither explicitly, nor implicitly, relied on, as far as the record reveals, by the trial court. [3] Thus, the majority notes that Nilson added Burnett as a defendant in the draft complaint he received from Inlet's former lawyer and asserts that it is a fact from which the court  could conclude... that Nilson had no reason to believe that Burnett had the intent to maliciously interfere with prospective business advantage or intent to utilize legal process in an improper manner or for a result not contemplated by law. Similarly, the Harrisons' successful appeal of the adverse decision rendered by the circuit court in the administrative appeals and the trial court's finding that the draft complaint naming Burnett as a defendant was mailed to Burnett as an act of intimidation are cited as presenting a permissible inference that Burnett was joined as a defendant for an improper purpose: to force the Harrisons to abandon their legal challenges to the Inlet project. The majority also relies on a letter to Nilson from Inlet's prior counsel, in which it was suggested that, if the Harrisons would simply drop their lawsuits in the Circuit Court for Worcester County, the entire matter would go away, to support the inference of bad faith. As indicated, as far as the record reveals, none of these reasons was relied upon by the trial court. The majority does not even explain its rationale for adopting the court's finding with respect to the lack of substantial justification prong. It merely rejects Nilson's argument that the court applied the wrong standard on the basis that it takes certain of the trial court's statements out of context and, apparently, presumes that the trial judge knew and properly applied the law. In point of fact, consequently, the majority opinion is strong evidence that the trial court failed to provide its rationale for finding bad faith and lack of substantial justification, as Tally requires, [4] necessitating reversal and remand for further proceedings.