Opinion ID: 772248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Forest Service's conduct is susceptible to policy analysis.

Text: 36 The Forest Service's conduct also fits within the second prong of the Berkovitz test as is susceptible to policy analysis. 3 The decision whether to require CRM training of contract pilots necessarily implicates competing policy considerations, such as employee and public safety, economic resources (including the number of individuals to be trained, the extent and cost of training, and the agency's resources), impact on the agency's relationship with contractors, and the agency's goals and duties. See Gager v. United States, 149 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1998). As the District of Columbia Circuit aptly observed, [t]he extent of training with which to provide employees requires consideration of fiscal constraints, public safety, the complexity of the task involved, the degree of harm a wayward employee might cause, and the extent to which employees have deviated from accepted norms in the past. Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 4 37 We recently confirmed that [t]his court and others have held that decisions relating to the . . . training . . . of employees usually involve policy judgments of the type Congress intended the discretionary function exception to shield. Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the Immigration and Naturalization Service's decision to excuse an employee from handgun training involved a judgment that is subject to the discretionary function exception and is not actionable); accord Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that alleged negligent and reckless training fall[s] squarely within the discretionary function exception); Gager , 149 F.3d at 922 (concluding that Postal Service's decision not to provide training to detect mail bombs was clearly rooted in social, economic, and political policy and protected by the discretionary function exception); Fang, 140 F.3d at 1242 (noting that decisions regarding training of emergency medical technicians are fully protected by the discretionary function exception); Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1217 (The extent of training with which to provide employees . . . [is ] surely among those [decisions] involving the exercise of political, social, or economic judgment.); Redmon v. United States , 934 F.2d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the FAA's decision to allow single-engine-rated pilots to carry over that rating to a multi-engine rating without a flight test falls squarely within the discretionary function exception). We likewise hold that the Forest Service's decision whether to require its contract pilots to undergo CRM training is a policy judgment that is protected by the discretionary function exception. 38 We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs' argument that policy-based judgment is not involved here because the Forest Service failed to follow industry safety standards and failed to act in the face of a known hazard--i.e., human factors error, which, the plaintiffs argue, is the leading factor in aviation accidents. As the plaintiffs point out, we have held that an agency's failure to follow safety standards and failure to warn the public of known hazards created by the agency are not protected by the discretionary function exception. See, e.g., Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that failure to post speed limit signs is not protected by the discretionary function exception, concluding that[a] decision not to warn of a specific, known hazard for which the acting agency is responsible is not the kind of broader social, economic or political policy decision that the discretionary function exception is intended to protect); Arizona Maint. Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1989) (Where the `choice' is a failure or refusal to follow safety standards, there is no immunity.); ARA Leisure Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that failure to maintain road in safe condition is not protected by the discretionary function exception because the conduct involves safety considerations under an established policy rather than competing public policy considerations). Here, however, there was no safety standard, industry or otherwise, with respect to requiring contract pilots to have CRM training; nor do the plaintiffs claim that the Forest Service created a hazard and failed to provide adequate warning. Rather, the Forest Service's conduct--not requiring a specific type of training for non-employees--involved judgment of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 5 39 Finally, the plaintiffs attempt to distinguish cases involving alleged failures to protect members of the public (which, they argue, involve policy considerations) from cases involving alleged failures to protect employees or contractors (which, they argue, do not involve policy considerations). In the context of aviation training, which surely affects the public as well as employees and contract workers, we find no support for this distinction, nor do we find it persuasive.