Opinion ID: 428600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Communication with the Jury

Text: 24 Birges contends that his motion for a new trial was improperly denied. Specifically, he challenges the propriety of two communications between the judge and jury which occurred during jury deliberations.
25 Birges contends that the trial judge, in response to a request, erroneously supplied a dictionary to the jury. He complains that the dictionary is a supplemental instruction, requiring counsel to be informed and defendant to be present, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 43. Rule 43 guarantees to a defendant in a criminal trial the right to be present at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict... A violation of the rule does not compel reversal unless a reasonable possibility of prejudice is shown. United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131, 139 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949, 101 S.Ct. 2031, 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981). 26 This issue was presented to the court in United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861 (10th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 2189, 53 L.Ed.2d 232 (1977). In Gunter, the court stated: 27 The jury, while deliberating, sent a note to the judge asking for a definition of the word tacitly. Without consulting with counsel, the trial judge simply sent a Webster's dictionary into the jury room. Such may well have been error, but if it be deemed error, it was most certainly harmless error. No prejudice has been shown. 28 Gunter, 546 F.2d at 869. 29 Unlike the court in Gunter, we have no doubt that the sending of a dictionary into the jury room, without consulting counsel, is error. Questions or disputes as to the meaning of terms which arise during jury deliberations should be settled by the court after consultation with counsel, in supplemental instructions. Such guidance will avoid the danger that jurors will use the dictionary to construct their own definitions of legal terms which do not accurately or fairly reflect applicable law. The meager record presented to us on this issue, however, does not demonstrate that any prejudice occurred as a result of the alleged introduction of a dictionary into the jury's deliberations. 30
31 During deliberations, the jurors sent a note to the court which read: Is it possible for us to obtain testimony without returning to the courtroom? The judge replied: No! You must rely on your memory. 32 The decision to honor a request that the court reporter read his notes of certain testimony for the jury's benefit after deliberation has begun is left to the discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 435 (9th Cir.1983). Such a ruling will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing of abuse of discretion. United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 175 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940, 94 S.Ct. 1945, 40 L.Ed.2d 292 (1974). 33 It is error, however, under Rule 43 for the court to deny the jury's request without consulting counsel for their views before exercising such discretion. Had the court conferred with counsel, the trial court's reply to the communication might have been more responsive to the jury's question. The jury did not ask the court if it was required to rely on its memory in resolving any uncertainties as to the exact testimony of a witness. Apparently the jury wanted to know if it was possible to receive the recorded testimony of witnesses in the jury room. 34 Birges, however, has failed to demonstrate that the court's error was prejudicial to his defense. See Powell v. Kroger Co., 644 F.2d 1245, 1247 (8th Cir.1981) (ex parte communication with jurors does not compel reversal where prejudice is not shown). In United States v. Medansky, 486 F.2d 807 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct. 1587, 39 L.Ed.2d 886 (1974), the jury sent a communication to the judge requesting transcripts of the trial proceedings. The judge entered the jury room and told the jurors that transcripts would not be provided; that they had to rely upon their own recollections. The reviewing court concluded that this was not prejudicial error. Id. at 816. 35 Birges has not demonstrated that the errors committed by the trial judge responding to the jury's communications affected the outcome of the trial. The motion for a new trial was properly denied.