Opinion ID: 2446341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inadequate Section 3507 Foundation

Text: Title 11, section 3507 of the Delaware Code provides: (a) In a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent testimonial value. (b) The rule in subsection (a) of this section shall apply regardless of whether the witness' in-court testimony is consistent with the prior statement or not. The rule shall likewise apply with or without a showing of surprise by the introducing party. (c) This section shall not be construed to affect the rules concerning the admission of statements of defendants or of those who are codefendants in the same trial. This section shall also not apply to the statements of those whom to cross-examine would be to subject to possible self-incrimination. [4] Today's opinion by this Court in Woodlin sets forth a comprehensive review and analysis of the section 3507 foundational requirements that must be established by the State during the direct examination of a witness, as a condition precedent to admissibility of the witness' prior statement. The foundational requirements applicable to Blake's appeal were summarized by this Court two decades ago in Ray v. State : In Keys v. State, 337 A.2d 18, 20 n. 1 (Del.1975), this Court stated that: In order to offer the out-of-court statement of a witness, the statute requires the direct examination of the declarant by the party offering the statement, as to both the events perceived or heard and the out-of-court statement itself. Thus, a witness' statement may be introduced only if the two-part foundation is first established: the witness testifies about both the events and whether or not they are true. Finally, in order to conform to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an accused's right to confront witnesses against him, the victim must also be subject to cross-examination on the content of the statement as well as its truthfulness. Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 127 (Del.1975). [5] The trial judge permitted the State to introduce into evidence the out-of-court statements of Land, Majors, Tilghman, Tolson and Fisher from their video and audio taped interviews with police. Each of those prior statements implicated Blake in the crimes and was introduced by the State under section 3507. The extent of the State's direct examination of each of the five witnesses was laconic. The State's direct examination of Tolson is illustrative: Q: Your name is Leia Tolson? A: Yes. Q. And how old are you? A: I'm 19. Q: And what town and state do you live in? A. Magnolia, Delaware. Q: You recall the alleged events that occurred on or about September 1, 2007 in the vicinity of North New Street, Dover, Delaware? A: Yes. Q: You spoke to the Dover Police Department about that? A: Yes. Q: You did so voluntarily? A: Yes. The State's direct examination of Tilghman and Fisher was similar. A two-part foundation must be established by the State during its direct examination before a witness' prior statement can be admitted under section 3507. First, the witness must testify about the events. Second, the witness must indicate whether or not the events are true. [6] Blake argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the recorded police interviews of Land, Majors, Tilghman, Tolson and Fisher to be presented to the jury, pursuant to section 3507, without a proper foundation. In this appeal, a supplemental filing by the State concedes: With respect to Tilghman, Tolson and Fisher, the State agrees with Blake that the direct examination of each witness was insufficient to meet the foundational requirements of title 11, section 3507. We commend the State for its professionalism and candor in confessing error with regard to the inadmissibility of those three witnesses' prior statements. The State acknowledges that none of the five section 3507 witnesses was asked, on direct examination, whether or not the statements they made to police were truthful. The State also acknowledges that this Court, in Ray v. State , held that such a question was foundational. Nevertheless, the State argues that the prior statements of Land and Majors did touch upon the events [7] and, therefore, were properly admitted into evidence absent their specific testimony that their prior statements were truthful or false. The State contends that certain of this Court's decisions after Ray have caused some confusion as to the necessity of asking the truthfulness question on direct examination in every instance. As an example, the State notes that this Court has, since Ray, also held that there is no requirement that the witness either affirm the truthfulness of the out-of-court statement, or offer consistent trial testimony. [8] As a result, the State submits, there appears to be some inconsistency in the trial court decisions regarding the truthfulness aspect of section 3507 practice. In support of that assertion, the State summarized the trial judge's ruling in Blake's case as follows: After the State finished its direct examination on voir dire, Blake argued that the State, under Ray and Acosta [ v. State ] [9] , was required to ask Land whether her statement was truthful. The Superior Court, recognizing that the statement could be played for the jury whether Land said that her prior statements were truthful or not, ruled that the statement could be played for the jury without such an inquiry. That ruling is contrary to this Court's holdings in both Ray v. State and Moore v. State. After Ray and Moore were decided, there was no reason for confusion, because our holding in Moore was completely consistent with Ray, where we construed Johnson v. State [10] as standing for the proposition that the witness must testify about whether or not the prior statement is true. In Johnson we specifically recognized that the drafters of section 3507 expressly contemplated that the in-court testimony [of a witness] might be inconsistent with the prior out-of-court statement. One of the problems to which [section 3507] is obviously directed is the turncoat witness.... [11] Accordingly, our 1995 decision in Moore clearly explained,  [u]nder section 3507, there is no requirement that the witness either affirm the truthfulness of the out-of-court statement, or offer consistent trial testimony.  [12] Moreover, the foregoing sentence that is quoted from Moore is followed by  See Ray v. State, Del.Supr., 587 A.2d 439, 443 (1991) ([A] witness' statement may be introduced only if ... the witness testifies about both the events and whether or not they are true. ).