Opinion ID: 2600500
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of claims against the department

Text: J & S's complaint against the department unquestionably amounts to a claim against an agency arising in relation to a procurement under AS 36.30.690; and J & S indisputably qualifies as [a] person who may bring an action under AS 36.30.560-36.30.695. Because these provisions unambiguously apply to J & S and allow only a narrow form of administrative redress, they appear to directly bar J & S from pursuing its contract and tort claims against the department. Indeed, J & S offers no persuasive basis to avoid this conclusion. It suggests that the procurement code's remedies may be inadequate, and should not be applied, because its complaint alleges bad faith and deliberate misconduct. But we rejected similar arguments when we limited an unsuccessful bidder's remedy against the state to bid preparation costs in King v. Alaska State Housing Authority. [11] In King, we held that an agency impliedly contracts to give bids it solicits fair and honest consideration. [12] Adopting the rule in Heyer Products Co. v. United States, [13] we recognized that subjective bad faith on the part of procuring officials causes the state to breach its implied contract with the bidder. [14] We discussed how an unlimited damages remedy would subject the state to excessive litigation arising out of the procurement process, impede the right of the department to reject any and all bids, and force the public to pay twice, once for a bad procurement and a second time to compensate the wronged bidder, [15] and ultimately held that bid preparation costs were the only damages properly available to the bidder from the state. [16] Accordingly, we conclude that the superior court correctly dismissed J & S's complaint against the department on the ground that the exclusive remedy provision barred the claims.