Opinion ID: 1181110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Reduce Penalty.

Text: Defendant alleges that the trial court's denial of his section 190.4, subdivision (e) motion to reduce the penalty [30] was erroneously based on a misunderstanding of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, requiring that the penalty judgment be vacated. Defendant first cites the court's consideration of his two robbery felony convictions under both factors (b) and (c) of section 190.3 (see fn. 27, ante ). As previously indicated, however, when a defendant's prior felony convictions involve violent criminal activity, the convictions may properly be considered under both factors (b) and (c). ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 765-766.) (45) Defendant next asserts that the court incorrectly assessed his mental state evidence under factors (d) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance) and (h) (impaired capacity). The record shows, however, that in weighing and considering the expert testimony, the court rejected the evidence of defendant's mental problems and accepted as the more credible the testimony of Dr. Coleman that defendant did not suffer from emotional or mental disturbance and that of Dr. Galioni that he did not have impaired mental capacity. [31] In light of its assessment of the evidence, the court did not err in failing to consider defendant's mental state as a mitigating factor. Defendant asserts additionally that as to factor (h) the court erroneously found his lack of impaired capacity to be a factor in aggravation. [32] Viewed in context, the court's comment appears to be a reference to the fact that defendant's conduct was purposeful, and ... was goal oriented, which fact the court had found negated any impairment. (See fn. 31, ante. ) The purposeful nature of defendant's conduct could properly be viewed as an aggravating circumstance of the offense under factor (a). In any event, the error, if any, could not have affected the court's ruling in light of the court's determination that there were numerous other proper factors in aggravation and no real mitigating factors and the further fact that the court did not engage in a mechanical counting of factors. (46) Defendant contends that the court erroneously considered his age as an aggravating factor. The record shows that the court determined that defendant's age could not operate as a mitigating factor, especially when viewed against [his] prior exposure to the criminal process.... [T]he defendant is indeed old enough to have learned from his past behavior and mistakes.... The court concluded that the defendant's age certainly ... produces no mitigation. If anything, it produces further aggravation.... The court's consideration of defendant's age was not error. ( People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 302.) (47) Finally, defendant argues that the court erroneously failed to treat his combat duty in Vietnam and its impact on him as mitigating factors under factors (d), (h) or (k) of section 190.3. Defendant asserts that his combat service in Vietnam is per se a mitigating circumstance, and that while the trial court could have found that it was outweighed by aggravating factors, the court was not free to determine that the experience was not a mitigating circumstance. Defendant cites the commendations and medals he received, as well as the brutal nature of his combat duty and the devastating effect it had on him, as matters that were not seriously in dispute and that were necessarily of mitigating effect. Defendant's premise that the court failed to consider the mitigating effect of his combat service is faulty. Although the court stated that to the extent that the label of post-Vietnam stress syndrome or any other label may be applicable to the defendant within the field of psychiatry, ... that condition simply does not extenuate the gravity of the crime, so the Court finds no mitigation under this factor [(k)], and that it found that there are no real mitigating factors, it further stated that it had given consideration to the matters testified to by defendant's family (defendant's attributes and the post-Vietnam changes in him) and to defendant's expressions suggestive of remorse, [b]ut to the extent that those may be factors in mitigation, and to the extent that they exist, there are in opposition to those factors many, many aggravating circumstances.... The court thus concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and that the jury's verdict is supported certainly beyond any reasonable doubt. The trial court's charge under section 190.4, subdivision (e) is independently to review the evidence and, guided by the factors set forth in section 190.3, to determine whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. In the instant case, in light of the numerous aggravating factors properly cited by the court โ the merciless beating and sexual assault of a very frail 78-year-old woman who had the sanctity and privacy of her home violated and her physical person and her physical surroundings... totally violated and destroyed, including her dignity as a human being, the multiple special circumstances that the homicide occurred during the commission of three specified felonies, the brutal attack on Mavis W. who evidently was spared death only by the happenstance of someone ... interrupting the attack, defendant's history of violent behavior, his prior felony convictions, and the court's determination of no mitigating factors โ it is inconceivable that the trial court, absent the asserted errors, would have ruled differently on defendant's application for modification of the verdict of death. Any error, therefore, was nonprejudicial. (Cf. People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 971-972 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395] [1977 law]; People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 624-625 [no indication court misapplied proper review standard].)