Opinion ID: 1111426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Waiver of Statutory and Due Process Requirements

Text: The district court's second order says that Johnson waived any rights to further proceedings by insisting on a hearing instanter following the completion of the preliminary hearing on July 2, 1996. This order recites that three times, the district court offered Johnson a separately scheduled sanctions hearing, but Johnson continued to insist on the hearing instanter. The transcript of the exchange between Judge Buchele and Johnson following the preliminary hearing supports the order's recitation. Judge Buchele told Johnson at the beginning of the exchange that he would be sending Johnson a letter on this. After being offered a separate hearing, Johnson stated: I want to be heard now, since we've got a record. I have a right to be heard. Judge Buchele then advised Johnson, You'll have your hearing right now, then. The State argues that Johnson waived any due process rights by insisting on the contempt hearing instanter. Because Johnson's actions were in direct contempt, the 20-1204a requirements are not applicable. Johnson argues that any purported waiver was uninformed and invalid. He suggests that Judge Buchele should have confirmed with him that he was knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights to any further hearing, including his right to counsel. Johnson also contends that he did not waive the right to contest the evidence obtained ex parte by Judge Buchele and used to impose the sanctions against him. Johnson relies on State v. Buckland, 245 Kan. 132, 138, 777 P.2d 745 (1989). Buckland considered whether a pro se criminal defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Buckland is distinguishable. Johnson, an attorney, was fined for a less than serious contempt. Unlike Buckland, no incarceration was threatened or imposed. Johnson cites United States v. Johnson, 659 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1981), and Emerick v. Emerick, 28 Conn. App. 794, 613 A.2d 1351, cert. for appeal denied 224 Conn. 915 (1992), for the proposition that the district court's failure to advise him of the right to counsel requires reversal of the contempt conviction. Under the applicable law in Johnson and Emerick, those contemners faced the possibility of incarceration if found in contempt. Johnson's reliance on Johnson and Emerick is misplaced. Judge Buchele announced that he intended to fine Johnson for his absence and tardiness, not incarcerate him. At the contempt hearing, Judge Buchele told Johnson, I intend to sanction you for the costs of all these officers waiting on you between ten and two. Johnson responded, That's fine, and later finished with, You send me the bill and I'll see to it, if I choose. If I don't, I'll appeal it. That's the end of that. Johnson knew that Judge Buchele would fine him for the time lost waiting for him at the preliminary hearing. Johnson was not interested in further hearings on the matter at the district court level. The fine that Judge Buchele imposed went beyond what Johnson was told the fine would include. Johnson was not informed of any ceiling amount for the fine. A fine of $550 could be considered sizeable, under the circumstances. Only the least possible power adequate to the end proposed should be used in contempt cases. Wilson, 421 U.S. at 319. However, our reading of the transcript suggests that during the contempt hearing, Johnson was not concerned about the amount of the fine. Johnson has failed to cite any authority that he is entitled to be told in advance the ceiling amount of any fine. See Zeigler, 806 P.2d at 1134. K.S.A. 20-1201 et seq. contains no requirement that Johnson be given such advance notice. We impose no such requirement.