Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence as to Felony Murder

Text: Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a first degree murder conviction on a theory of felony murder. First, he claims there was no rape of either victim and no sodomy of Ryan as all such sexual conduct was voluntary. [13] Even if there was an adequate showing of rape and sodomy, however, he contends that his evidence of voluntary intoxication negated any specific intent to commit rape or sodomy and hence precluded a finding of felony murder in the commission of those crimes. [14] Finally, he urges that even if a specific intent to rape could be shown, evidence fails to establish that the death of the victims occurred during the commission or as a result of the alleged rapes. These claims utterly lack merit.
Rape involves intercourse that is nonconsensual either because consent is not given, is coerced, or is unavailing for one of the reasons specified in subdivisions of section 261. [15] (15) It is thus subject to a defense of consent. We have also recognized there is a defense of mistake of fact where a defendant alleges he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the victim voluntarily consented to engage in sexual intercourse. ( People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 155-157 [125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337]; see also People v. Rhoades (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 1362, 1367-1369 [238 Cal. Rptr. 909]; People v. Castillo (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 119, 124 [238 Cal. Rptr. 207]; People v. Burnham (1986) 176 Cal. App.3d 1134, 1140-1141 [222 Cal. Rptr. 630].) (16) (See fn. 16.), (17a) Defendant's first claim is that he did not commit rape or, as to Ryan, sodomy, [16] since both victims consented to sexual conduct. [17] As the Attorney General argues, defendant can only make this extraordinary assertion by focusing exclusively on his taped admissions to police (admitted into evidence as exhibits 111-A through 111-R and 112) and ignoring most of the evidence in the case. As to Bristol, evidence showed her wrists and ankles had been bound so tightly that there were ligature marks on the skin and hemorrhage in the underlying tissues. She had been struck in the mouth and had what was described as a defense wound on one hand. It also appeared lacerations of the anus and vagina were premortem. Defendant focuses on his contention that she had opportunities to leave his van and said she would do anything rather than be left where defendant tried to abandon her, and he emphasizes that in his statement he indicated intercourse thereafter was voluntary. But he ignores other implications in that same statement in which he said: ... I hit her, and I dragged her out of my van, and then she told me that she'd do anything, and I thought about that for a minute, and โ I don't know it was just that I was drunk and I was in a weird mood, and I just took her and I threw her in the back and told her to get in the back, and then I told her to get out and get in the front.... After parking at a new location: ... I told Edna to get in the back, [18] and we both got in the back; told her to take off her clothes, she did, she was willing and sat there, had sexual intercourse once, then I was getting up and getting ready to let her go, and I didn't really have her โ you know โ forcibly. I guess maybe she thought I did, but I don't know โ you know. [19] Similarly, physical evidence and defendant's own admissions regarding Ryan provide ample evidence that sexual intercourse and sodomy were nonconsensual. With Ryan as well, most injuries were premortem. She too had been punched and strangled and manifested the same unusual damage to anus and vagina as in the Bristol case. Additionally, however, we had evidence from people at the pizza parlor the night of the killing regarding her rejection of defendant's advances and defendant's statements to Chris Jackson that he wanted to have violent sex with her. As for defendant's statements that she submitted freely and that this wasn't the first time they had had sex, defendant also admitted she was sort of hesitant at first, and then I got mad, and then she said oh, okay, cuz I pushed her arms back, and I was just going to stick my hand down her pants and start playing with her at first, and then โ uh โ she said oh, okay I'll do it on my own.... (18) To determine sufficiency of the evidence, one examines whether a rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this process one must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and presume in favor of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. To be sufficient, evidence of each of the essential elements of the crime must be substantial and one must resolve the question of sufficiency in light of the record as a whole. ( People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303 [228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110]; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-578 [162 Cal. Rptr 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255]; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) (17b) We have no hesitancy in concluding that there was ample evidence before the jury justifying its finding that sexual intercourse and anal penetration in this case were nonconsensual as to both victims and that defendant had no reasonable belief in his victims' consent. The jury was certainly not bound to honor defendant's characterization of the events and, as noted, even those admissions contained sufficient ambiguity regarding the consent of the victims to justify the jury's conclusions.
(19a) As noted above, defendant next contends that even if there is sufficient evidence of rape and sodomy, his evidence of intoxication from the combined effects of alcohol and marijuana negated any possible specific intent to rape or sodomize and hence precluded a finding of felony murder. (20) We have required as part of the felony-murder doctrine that the jury find the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit one of the enumerated felonies, even where that felony is a crime such as rape. ( People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 392 [82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659]; People v. Fain (1969) 70 Cal.2d 588, 599 [75 Cal. Rptr. 633, 451 P.2d 65]; People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 34 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942].) [20] (19b) While there was evidence of his intoxication on the night of the Ryan killing, we cannot conclude his evidence was so overwhelming that the jury could not conclude he retained the capacity to intend to rape and sodomize his victims. [21] Defendant did establish that he had been drinking and smoking marijuana that night and that he may have been unsteady on his feet. He also alleged that at the time of the Bristol killing he had been drinking so much that he was weaving as he drove his van. His expert witness concluded he was an alcoholic who would have impaired judgment as to whether someone was sexually receptive or not, particularly if he were actually drinking at the time. But that expert also concluded that even while drinking, an alcoholic on a particular occasion might be capable of intending to have intercourse against someone's will; and in any event, given the limited contact of the expert with this defendant, the jury was entitled to weigh his opinion against the evidence of intent to be gained from the events of the evening and the physical evidence it produced. While biting the nipples and burning the pubic hair may simply show brutal perversion, punching the victims, taping them, and attacking them in the back of his van from which there was no exit supports an intent to have intercourse against the victims' will. The jury was certainly not bound to accept defendant's self-serving statements as to the victims' willingness to engage in sexual activity. Defendant contends that we may not distinguish the facts of the present case from the facts in Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, People v. Craig (1957) 49 Cal.2d 313 [316 P.2d 947], and People v. Granados (1957) 49 Cal.2d 490 [319 P.2d 346], in each of which evidence was found insufficient to sustain a conviction of felony murder on a theory of rape or violation of section 288. Each case, however, is readily distinguishable. While in each of those cases the condition of the body might have suggested some sexual motive in the killing, no evidence supporting more than a strong suspicion thereof was adduced. Hence in Anderson there was no evidence the defendant had ever formed any lewd or sexual feelings toward the victim, and a laceration in the vaginal area appeared to be only one of several randomly inflicted wounds. ( Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 34-35.) In Granados, while defendant had asked the victim whether she was a virgin and, when her body was found, her skirt was above her private parts, there was no evidence of contusion or laceration of her private parts or evidence of spermatozoa. ( Granados, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 497.) Finally in Craig, while the victim's nightgown and panties were torn open exposing the front of her body, her legs were apart, and defendant had said he would like a little loving, there remained no certain evidence of rape. There was instead evidence he had intentionally beat up a woman, strangled her, and dragged the body some 20 to 25 feet. ( Craig, supra, 49 Cal.2d at pp. 316-319.) Here contusions, lacerations, and other physical evidence indicate actual rape and sodomy. There is also evidence of defendant's sexual intentions both in his own statements and from the observations of others as to the Ryan incident. Evidence of specific intent to rape and sodomize is ample and we conclude that defendant's contention regarding sufficiency of evidence for felony murder lacks merit.
(21a) Finally defendant cites us to that portion of Anderson which states: Additionally, the evidence must establish that the defendant harbored the felonious intent either prior to or during the commission of the acts which resulted in the victim's death; evidence which establishes that the defendant formed the intent only after engaging in the fatal acts cannot support a verdict of first degree murder based on section 189. [citation omitted.] (70 Cal.2d at p. 34.) He urges that even if there was intent to rape, the rapes and the intent to rape were over at the time of the homicide. (22) As we have stated, however, in discussing the special circumstance of felony murder, determining whether a killing had occurred in the commission of a felony is not a matter of semantics or simple chronology. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 60 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) Defendant's strict construction of the temporal relationship between the rape or sodomy and the killing would preclude a felony-murder conviction or special circumstance in any case save where the victim died in the very midst of the sexual assault. Instead the focus is on the relationship between the underlying felony and the killing and whether the felony is merely incidental to the killing, an afterthought. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 6061; People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 321-325 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883]; and see People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 500-501 [244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803].) (21b) Here clearly the killings occurred when the victims screamed and struggled to get away. They occurred as a direct product of the sexual assaults and to silence the victims; and the sexual offenses were not incidental events or afterthoughts. This final aspect of defendant's sufficiency-of-evidence challenge to his convictions for rape, sodomy, and felony murder therefore lacks merit.