Opinion ID: 2051933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Deed Construction

Text: Although the facts of this case were generally undisputed, the parties offered different interpretations of the language in the quitclaim deed, by which HCM sold lot No. 434-2 to Bluff Head. The parking easement is described as follows: Said premises are conveyed subject to and together with the benefit of:    all easements reasonably necessary for access and egress to said marina facility for the enjoyment, use, maintenance and repair of the same, and for the parking of twenty-one (21) motor vehicles for the benefit of said slip owners/lessees and their guests, said easement area(s) to contain not less than 5,400 square feet of land. The exact location of said parking easement is to be determined by the Grantees, its successors and assigns and may be changed from time to time, but shall at all times be located on the premises conveyed herein or Lot 434-1. The exact location of any easements necessary for access and egress to the marina facilities shall be determined and agreed to by both the grantor and grantee herein. Said easements reserved herein are not mutually exclusive. [2] (Emphasis added.) At issue is the meaning of the emphasized phrase describing the location of the parking easement. Sakonnet Point and Harbor Point asserted that, because HCM did not own lot No. 434-1 when it conveyed lot No. 434-2 to Bluff Head, HCM had no authority to encumber lot No. 434-1 with an easement. Consequently, the deed should be construed as establishing the parking easement only on lot No. 434-2. Bluff Head, in contrast, argued that terms of the deed must be construed as written, in the absence of a prayer for reformation of the deed. The motion justice found that the deed clearly provided for a parking easement to be located on one of the two lots, 434-1 or 434-2, but she noted that, because [o]ne cannot grant an easement in what one does not own, the purported easement on lot No. 434-1 could not be legally recognized. Whenever possible, the terms of a deed are construed according to their plain meaning. Kusiak v. Ucci, 53 R.I. 36, 38, 163 A. 226, 226 (1932). Here, the language of the deed is clear. It is also clear that neither party to the deed had an ownership interest in lot No. 434-1. It is a basic tenet of the law of real property that an easement cannot be reserved by deed over property that the reserving party does not own. [3] 4 Powell on Real Property § 34.04[8] at 34-37 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.2000); 7 Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(a)(4) at 412 (David A. Thomas ed. 1994). Consequently, the option offered in Bluff Head's quitclaim deed of situating the easement on lot No. 434-1 was a nullity, thus rendering inoperative the disjunctive or. Moreover, because HCM conveyed the property by quitclaim deed, without warranty, HCM transferred only the rights in the property not otherwise reserved that it actually possessed at that time. Wood v. City of East Providence, 504 A.2d 441, 443 (R.I.1986) (citing G.L. 1956 § 34-4-11; G.L. 1956 §§ 34-11-4, -17, -18, and -28; and Lapre v. Flanders, 465 A.2d 214, 216 (R.I.1983)); 14 Powell on Real Property § 81A.03[1][c] at 81A-29 (Michael Allan Wolfed. 2000). In a case such as this one, a court must look to the circumstances attending the transaction, the situation of the parties, and the state of the thing granted, and in case of doubt, must adopt the interpretation most favorable to the grantee. First Baptist Society v. Wetherell, 34 R.I. 155, 157-58, 82 A. 1061, 1062 (1912). Moreover, [w]e are bound to give the language in the deed such an interpretation as will carry out the grantor's intent. Reniere v. Gerlach, 752 A.2d 480, 483 (R.I.2000). Here, the motion justice found that the option of situating the parking easement on lot No. 434-1 was included in anticipation that [Bluff Head] would purchase and subsequently own both pieces of property. From this fact, which Bluff Head did not dispute, it follows that the grantor  HCM  intended to reserve, for the benefit of the marina, a parking easement on either of the two appurtenant lots that Bluff Head expected to own. Irrespective of whether Bluff Head ever ultimately consummated its purchase of lot No. 434-1, the quitclaim deed from HCM to Bluff Head was clearly executed as a conveyance only of lot No. 434-2, with a reservation of a parking easement for the benefit of the marina. In light of this clear intent, even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Bluff Head, we conclude that the language or Lot 434-1 does not relieve the conveyed premises  lot No. 434-2  of the burden of the parking easement. Rather, the term or Lot 434-1 merely expanded Bluff Head's discretion to select [t]he exact location of said parking easement if it had already acquired or should in the future obtain an interest in lot No. 434-1. This conclusion is a matter of construction and does not, as Bluff Head contended, constitute reformation of the deed.