Opinion ID: 1861843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court held:

Text: . . . [T]hat the Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought by their Complaint and that the Plaintiffs' property lies south of the road, and the Defendant's land lies north of the road, and the Court further finds that the northwest corner of the property of the Plaintiffs, Willis A. Sanders and Barbara Jean Sanders, and the southwest corner of the property of the Defendant is the northwest corner of the NW ¼ of SE ¼ of Section 31, Township 13 South, Range 3 West, as established by the survey of Frank S. Hollis, Registered Land Surveyor, Registration No. 9323, as shown by plat of said survey dated August 28, 1975, and that the boundary line between the lands of the parties hereto runs from said corner north 89° 33' 11 east along the road as shown in said survey, a distance of 810 feet, and as claimed by the Plaintiffs. It is well settled that the decree of a trial court, hearing the evidence ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decree is plainly and palpably erroneous. Varner v. Carr, 291 Ala. 654, 286 So.2d 294 (1973); Deese v. Odom, 283 Ala. 420, 218 So.2d 134 (1969). Sandlin contends that this presumption is overcome because the Hollis survey, adopted by the trial court, fatally relies upon the Rice survey's 1366.03 feet measurement of the northern interior quarter-quarter line. It is undisputed that the Hollis survey did rely heavily upon this measurement for determining the location of Sanders' northern boundary. Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, introduced to bolster the conclusions of the Hollis survey, likewise relies upon this measurement. (Although other calculations were made to determine the proper location of the half section line, Mr. Allred in constructing Exhibit 17 admittedly measured 1366.03 feet north to determine the northern boundary.) In Merchants National Bank v. Hall, 278 Ala. 319, 178 So.2d 146 (1965), the court stated: Thus by the complainant's own witnesses, the Durant line of 1962 was shown to have been based upon the Teter description which in turn had been based upon the Greenwood survey, the accuracy of which was questionable to the extent that the additional conveying all the land owned by the Hall sisters (the northern two-thirds of the original Young C. Hall tract in Section 8, supra) was added. Such evidence cannot be deemed of any real probative value justifying the lower court decreeing that the Durant line was the correct boundary between the northern two-thirds and the southern one-third of the original Young C. Hall tract, and the decree of the lower court is erroneous in this aspect.       There being no evidence to support the court's decree fixing the boundary line between the complainant the respondents' land as being that shown by the Durant survey of 1962, the decree is due to be reversed and remanded to the lower court. (Emphasis added.) The instant case is analagous. Here Mr. Rice, who performed the 1960 survey from which Sanders acquired the 1366.03 feet measurement, testified as follows: Q. Let me ask you, from looking at this survey and the way it is prepared, can you define for us what type of survey it is? A. Well, it is my judgment that it is a possession survey. Q. You are, or were before you retired, a licensed surveyor, were you not? A. Yes. Q. In the State of Alabama? A. Yes. Q. What is the difference between a possession survey and any other type of survey? A. Well, a possession survey attempts to survey and describe and plat the corner as shown by the owner. In other words, the owner says, `this is what I want. I want you to survey and plat this property.' Now, if he had told me, `I want you to survey this property in order to locate and determine the property line corners,' this is not a possession survey. Q. Now, do I understand your testimony Mr. Rice, that this survey that you hold in your hand was not done to locate the corners and boundaries of what it shows? A. That is my judgment. Q. Would it be correct to say that it was done simply to plat the lines described to you by the owners? A. That's right. Q. Now, have you reviewed this survey specifically at my request? A. That's right. Q. Have you done some calculations to determine the correctness of certain lines of this survey? A. We ran this survey through a computer and I have here a computer tape, or read out tape, indicating that the survey as far as the quality of the survey is concerned ia [sic] almost a perfect, and it pulls it back to the point of beginning with practically no error. As a matter of fact, the error isn't but about four-tenths of a foot one way and about two-tenths the other way. Q. Alright, let me point to you on your plat a figure there that is the one-fourth mile line in this survey and has a figure 1366.03, is that correct? A. That's right. Q. Did you perform any calculations to determine the correctness as far as boundaries of this section with that figure? A. Now, I don't understand that. Say that again. Q. Alright, did you perform any calculations to determine the correctness of that figure as far as the true boundary line of the section? A. No.       Q. You cannot say, then that your survey, this survey, would correctly establish the boundary lines for this section? A. No, the survey that I made would not establish the true boundary of the section, it couldn't do that. Thus, the Hollis survey, as well as plaintiff's Exhibit 17, are subject to the same criticism as the Rice survey: that they did not determine the boundary by metes and bounds. Consequently, the trial court's decree, if based solely upon the Hollis survey, must be reversed. However, additional evidence was presented to support the decree. There was conflicting evidence that the road was considered the boundary line. Furthermore, there was a great deal of discussion of the location of monuments or even whether some of the markers were indeed monuments. The Hollis survey determined a concrete monument on the northern interior quarter line to be approximately 30 feet south of the center of the road. There was, however, testimony that such a set-off was not unusual. The Brown survey, relied upon by Sandlin, on the other hand, determined a concrete monument near the NE and SE corner of the SE ¼ of Section 31 to be located 35 feet too far south. While the above is not exhaustive of the testimony at trial, it does illustrate the conflict in evidence and interpretations of the surveyors. It is the province and duty of the court to locate the disputed boundary line by finding and locating the true line. If this cannot be done with absolute certainty, the court should consider all the physical indications, reputation, general treatment of the parties, monuments, if any, and courses and distances. McLaurine v. Knowles, 257 Ala. 8, 10, 57 So.2d 543 (1952). W. T. Smith Lumber Co. v. Bryan, 272 Ala. 303, 130 So.2d 15 (1960). We opine that the evidence of the reputation of the road as the boundary and the conflicting conclusions regarding the significance of the location of the monuments and purported monuments are sufficient evidence to justify the trial court's decree establishing the boundary at the center of the road. Because the trial court made no findings of adverse possession of the disputed strip of woodland, we decline to comment on the sufficiency of Sanders' alleged adverse possession.