Opinion ID: 1841238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Issue of Wantonness

Text: In addition to the analysis by which the main opinion concludes that Randall's conduct falls within one of the categories of immunized conduct prescribed in Cranman, the main opinion goes the further step of discussing one of the two exceptions to immunity also articulated in Cranman, see 792 So.2d at 405. Specifically, the main opinion concludes that Randall's conduct would not fall within the exception stated for acts committed willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond [the State agent's] authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. Id. This is so, according to the main opinion, because Randall's conduct is consistent only with negligent or wanton behavior. 971 So.2d at 664. The main opinion refers to wanton behavior as an aggravated form of negligence and cites this Court's 2003 decision in Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So.2d 1046 (Ala.2003), for the proposition that such behavior does not deprive a State agent of immunity. Neither the parents' complaint nor their briefs to this court assert wantonness as a ground for their wrongful-death claim. Nor has Randall discussed the issue of wantonness. Moreover, given the definition of wantonness, see discussion infra, it is not apparent that Randall's acts rise to that level. Nonetheless, because the main opinion addresses the issue, I likewise will comment on it. According to Sellers v. Thompson, 452 So.2d 460, 462 n. 3 (Ala.1984), [i]n Deal v. Tannehill Furnace & Foundry Comm'n, 443 So.2d 1213 (Ala. 1983), we expanded the scope of discretionary function immunity to include allegations of wantonness on the part of State officials sued in their individual capacities where . . . there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the officials. (Emphasis added.) Neither Deal v. Tannehill Furnace & Foundry Comm'n, 443 So.2d 1213 (Ala.1983), nor Sellers, however, discusses by what authority this Court was compelled, or should have been persuaded, to expand the scope of discretionary-function immunity so as to exclude wantonness claims. Moreover, on its facts Deal appears to involve only negligence on the part of the individual defendants. There is no suggestion in the facts that those defendants acted wantonly, as that term has come to be understood, i.e., involving acts committed willfully with a conscious realization that injury likely or probably will result. See discussion, infra. Furthermore, the context in which Deal uses the terms wantonness and good faith, see 443 So.2d at 1215 and 1218, and Sellers uses the term bad faith, see 452 So.2d at 462 n. 3, suggest that those cases were attempting merely to distinguish between acts of mere inadvertence, or negligence, on the one hand, and acts committed in bad faith in the sense of a conscious disregard for the safety of others. Compare Stiebitz v. Mahoney, 144 Conn. 443, 448, 134 A.2d 71, 74 (1957) (noting that the law clothed [the State agent] with immunity from liability for his official acts, performed in the use of a delegated discretion, as long as they were done ` in good faith, in the exercise of an honest judgment, and not in abuse of . . . discretion, or maliciously or wantonly. ' Wadsworth v. Town of Middletown, 94 Conn. 435, 439, 109 A. 246, 248 [ (1920)]. (emphasis added)). This Court has recognized that wantonness is qualitatively different from, and is more than an aggravated form of, negligence. Lynn Strickland Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So.2d 142, 145-46 (Ala.1987). `Wantonness' has been defined by this Court as the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.  Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So.2d 1250, 1256 (Ala.1998) (emphasis added); see also Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20 (defining wantonness as [c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others (emphasis added)). Given this definition, I question whether wanton conduct is, and should be treated for immunity purposes as, more akin to acts committed willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law, than to mere negligence. This Court itself has grouped wantonness with both willfulness and recklessness. Indeed, given a proper understanding of the concept of willfulness and its relation to the meaning of wantonness, it may be that the Cranman exception for willful actions should be construed as including wanton conduct. [19] In Lynn Strickland, this Court explained: Wantonness is not merely a higher degree of culpability than negligence. Negligence and wantonness, plainly and simply, are qualitatively different tort concepts of actionable culpability. Implicit in wanton, willful, or reckless misconduct is an acting, with knowledge of danger, or with consciousness, that the doing or not doing of some act will likely result in injury. . . . As the Court stated in Smith v. Roland, 243 Ala. 400, 403, 10 So.2d 367, 369 (1942), quoting 5 Mayfield's Digest, p. 711, § 6: `Gross negligence is negligence, not wantonness. Before one can be convicted of wantonness, the facts must show that he was conscious of his conduct and conscious from his knowledge of existing conditions that injury would likely or probably result from his conduct, [and] that with reckless indifference to consequences, he consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty which produced the injury.' Negligence is usually characterized as an inattention, thoughtlessness, or heedlessness, a lack of due care; whereas wantonness is characterized as an act which cannot exist without a purpose or design, a conscious or intentional act.  510 So.2d at 145 (emphasis added). Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), cited with approval in Lynn Strickland, explained that `[negligence] is characterized chiefly by inadvertence, thoughtlessness, inattention and the like, while wantonness or recklessness is characterized by willfulness.' 510 So.2d at 146. [20] It may be considered ironic that we would judicially immunize wanton conduct by State officials while our legislature has reaffirmed that wantonness is the very type of conduct for which our civil law reserves the potentially heavy sanction of punitive damages. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20. Moreover, in so doing, the legislature grouped wanton conduct with, and considered it as meriting the same treatment as, acts committed maliciously and fraudulently. Id. Further, in several contexts our legislature has specifically refused to extend qualified immunity as a defense to claims alleging wanton conduct. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-663 (volunteer medical professionals); Ala.Code 1975, § 10-11-3 (noncompensated officers of nonprofit corporations); Ala.Code 1975, § 11-89C-8(d) (individuals acting on behalf of certain public corporations); Ala. Code 1975, § 25-4-113 (certain persons associated with the Department of Industrial Relations). In short, I have serious doubts about whether, in order to protect executive discretion, it is necessary to protect the conduct of State officials who, with knowledge that injury or death likely or probably will result from their actions, act with a conscious disregard for the safety of others. Compare, e.g., Stiebitz, supra; Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752, 452 S.E.2d 476, 482 (1994) (The doctrine of official immunity, developed primarily in Georgia through case law, provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are willful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority.  (emphasis added)); Neal v. Donahue, 611 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Okla.1980) (Although officers and employees of governmental agencies, including the State, are protected from tort liability while performing discretionary functions, such protection does not render such employees immune from liability for willful and wanton negligence.  (footnotes omitted; emphasis added)); Bryant v. Duval County Hosp. Auth., 459 So.2d 1154 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) (construing a Florida statute as not immunizing actions performed in bad faith, with malice, or with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of others); Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 288, 595 N.E.2d 862, 866 (1992) (to like effect).