Opinion ID: 779515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Esplanade's Takings Claim

Text: 22 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking private property ... for public use, without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. This clause prohibits Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960)). In addition to instances of physical invasion or confiscation, the Supreme Court has long held that if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). 23 Courts have had little success in devising any set formula for determining when government regulation of private property amounts to a regulatory taking, Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 771-72 (9th Cir.2000), affirmed by Tahoe-Sierra Preserv. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (2002). However, it is clear that under the categorical takings doctrine articulated in Lucas, when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001). Where a regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land, the multi-factor analysis established in Penn Central is not applied, and a compensable taking has occurred unless the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027, 112 S.Ct. 2886. In other words, for a government entity to avoid liability, any law or decree depriving the property owner of all economically beneficial use of her property must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. Id. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. 2886. 24 Here, the district court found no taking of plaintiff's property for two reasons. First, the court found that the City's interpretation of the SSMP and its ultimate cancellation of Esplanade's development applications were not the proximate cause of Esplanade's alleged damages. Second, the court found that the background principles of Washington law, specifically the public trust doctrine, burdened plaintiff's property and precluded Esplanade from prevailing in a takings action against the City. 25 We agree with the district court that under both federal and state law a plaintiff must make a showing of causation between the government action and the alleged deprivation. See Tahoe-Sierra (9th Cir.2000), 216 F.3d at 783 & n. 33 (discussing requirement that plaintiff [in takings claim] must establish both causation-in-fact and proximate causation, and noting that while true that there is little discussion of a `causation' requirement in any of the case law involving regulatory takings, despite a passing reference to proximate cause in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, this is due to nothing more than the fact that, in most regulatory takings cases, there is no doubt whatsoever about whether the government's action was the cause of the alleged taking.); Ventures N.W. Ltd. P'ship v. State, 81 Wash.App. 353, 914 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1996) (An owner claiming loss of the economically viable use of property must show that the challenged government regulation proximately caused the loss of all such use.) (citing Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash.2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1176, 114 S.Ct. 1216, 127 L.Ed.2d 563 (1994); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash.2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 1996, 100 L.Ed.2d 227 (1988)). However, because we find that the background principles of Washington state law would have precluded development of the proposed project, and therefore that plaintiff's claimed property right never existed, we do not address the question of causation. 26
27 As discussed above, a deprivation by the government of all beneficial uses of one's property results in a taking unless, inter alia, the background principles of state law already serve to deprive the property owner of such uses. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. 2886. In Lucas, subsequent to plaintiff's purchase of two residential lots of shoreline property, the state of South Carolina passed a statute having the direct effect of barring petitioner from erecting any permanent structures on his two parcels, rendering them valueless. 505 U.S. at 1007, 112 S.Ct. 2886. In response, the plaintiff sued, alleging that the government effected a complete deprivation of his property. The Court held that [a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership, and remanded for a determination of whether such background principles would have prevented the proposed use of plaintiff's property. Id., 505 U.S. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. 2886. 28 In this case, the restrictions that background principles of Washington law place upon such ownership are found in the public trust doctrine. As the Washington Supreme Court recently explained, the state's ownership of tidelands and shorelands is comprised of two distinct aspects — the jus privatum and the jus publicum. State v. Longshore, 141 Wash.2d 414, 5 P.3d 1256, 1262 (2000). Relevant here, the jus publicum, or public trust doctrine, is the right `of navigation, together with its incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational purposes generally regarded as corollary to the right of navigation and the use of public waters.' Id. (quoting Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash.2d 662, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The doctrine reserves a public property interest, the jus publicum, in tidelands and the waters flowing over them, despite the sale of these lands into private ownership. Weden v. San Juan County, 135 Wash.2d 678, 958 P.2d 273, 283 (1998), (citing Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State, 67 Wash. L.Rev. 521, 524 (1992)). The state can no more convey or give away this jus publicum interest than it can `abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.' Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 994 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892)). Instead, the state may only divest itself of interests in the state's waters in a manner that does not substantially impair the public interest. Id. at 993-95. 29 It is beyond cavil that a public trust doctrine has always existed in Washington. Orion Corp., 747 P.2d at 1072(citing Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 994). The doctrine is partially encapsulated in the language of [Washington's] constitution which reserves state ownership in `the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state.' Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 122 Wash.2d 219, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (1993) (quoting Wash. Const. art. 17, § 1). The doctrine is also reflected in Washington's Shoreline Management Act (SMA), adopted in 1971. RCW §§ 90.58.010-.930. 8 Following a long history favoring the sale of tidelands and shorelands, resulting in the privatization of approximately 60 percent of the tidelands and 30 percent of the shorelands originally owned by the state, Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 996, the Washington legislature found that the SMA was necessary because unrestricted construction on the privately owned or public owned shorelines ... is not in the best public interest. RCW 90.58.020. 30 The public trust doctrine, reflected in part in the SMA, unquestionably burdens Esplanade's property. 31 We agree with the district court that the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Orion controls the outcome of this case, and that Washington's public trust doctrine ran with the title to the tideland properties and alone precluded the shoreline residential development proposed by Esplanade. 32 In Orion, the plaintiff corporation, prior to the enactment of the SMA, purchased tideland property in Padilla Bay, the most diverse, least disturbed, and most biologically productive of all major estuaries on Puget Sound. Id., 747 P.2d at 1065. Orion Corp. proposed dredging and filling of the Bay to create a significant residential community. Id. In addressing plaintiff's challenge to subsequent local and state environmental regulations, 9 which it alleged combined to completely deprive it of all economically viable use of its property, the court decided that the tidelands of the Bay were burdened by the public trust doctrine prior to the enactment of the SMA. Id. at 1072. At the time of Orion's purchase, Orion could make no use of the tidelands which would substantially impair the [public] trust. Id. at 1073. Specifically, Orion never had the right to dredge and fill its tidelands, either for a residential community or farmlands [s]ince a property right must exist before it can be taken, neither the SMA nor the SCSMMP effected a taking ... Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 33 We find that the development proposed by Esplanade would suffer the same fate under the public trust doctrine as the project proposed by Orion Corp. 34 Esplanade's argument that Orion lacks authority, following the Court's decision in Lucas, is without merit. Lucas, while articulating an expansive concept of what constitutes a regulatory taking, effectively recognized the public trust doctrine: 35 Any [regulation that prohibits all economically beneficial use of land] ... must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts — by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.... The principal otherwise that we have in mind is litigation absolving the State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of others. 36 505 U.S. at 1029 & n. 16, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (internal citations omitted). Lucas does nothing to disturb Orion 's application of Washington's public trust doctrine. 37 Esplanade's contention that the proposed development was consistent with the SMA at the time his project vested in 1992 is similarly without merit. As the City concedes, at the time of the purchase, the SMA, theoretically, permitted single-family dwellings to be constructed on the property. As the district court noted, however, [t]here are numerous limitations that the SMA places on developments of shorelines, even if those developments, like Esplanade's, are not categorically prohibited. (citing, e.g., RCW 90.58.020(2)(requiring that shoreline developments [p]reserve the natural character of the shoreline), and RCW 90.58.020(4) (requiring that [p]rojects protect the resources and ecology of the shoreline)). In this case, because Esplanade's tideland property is navigable for the purpose of public recreation (used for fishing and general recreation, including by Tribes), and located just 700 feet from Discovery Park, the development would have interfered with those uses, and thus would have been inconsistent with the public trust doctrine. Therefore, Esplanade's development plans never constituted a legally permissible use. 38 As the district court correctly noted, Esplanade ... took the risk, when it purchased this large tract of tidelands in 1991 for only $40,000, that, despite extensive federal, state, and local regulations restricting shoreline development, it could nonetheless overcome those numerous hurdles to complete its project and realize a substantial return on its limited initial investment. Now, having failed ..., it seeks indemnity from the City. The takings doctrine does not supply plaintiff with such a right to indemnification.