Opinion ID: 3010509
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Occupational Grade Levels

Text: The district court noted that the occupational grade levels of 45 and 43 for Riehle and Bray respectively meant that Ms. Riehle had attained the position of Assistant Director of Services at the New York Marquis Marriott while plaintiff had only risen to the level of Housekeeping Manager at the Park Ridge Marriott. Dist. Ct. Op. at 6 (emphasis added). The court repeatedly notes that Bray had only attained the level of 27 Housekeeping Manager at the Park Ridge while Riehle had earned the title of Assistant Director of Services at the New York Marquis Marriott. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 14, 15, 18. However, Nemetz testified in his deposition that there was no difference in these job classifications. It is based on the size of the hotel with bigger hotels calling the position Assistant Director of Services and smaller hotels calling it Housekeeping Manager. App. at 239a. Nemetz even conceded that Bray could not have held a higher position than the one she had without the promotion she was seeking as that was the only position above Housekeeping Manager at her hotel. Marriott is certainly entitled to give Riehle's job title greater weight than Bray's even if the only difference in titles is the size of the hotels where they were working. However, Marriott may not do so if racial bias colored how her grade level would be valued. We do not say that this is what happened here only that sufficient issues of fact exist to preclude the entry of summary judgment. We do not doubt that a reasonable factfinder could accept all of Marriott’s explanations and conclude that Riehle was promoted over Bray simply because Riehle was the superior candidate based upon all of the criteria Marriott says it used to make the decision. However, this record does not compel that result as a matter of law. The significance of such evidence is for a jury's determination, not a court's. Had these discrepancies been presented to a jury, it may have found defendants' explanations quite credible, and returned a verdict in their 28 favor. However, that is not the test that we employ, nor is it the test the district court should have employed. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, as we must, it is clear that they were entitled to have a jury decide whether or not the reasons proffered . . . were real or pretextual. Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dep't, 98 F.3d at, 115. Thus, we will reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment. IV. The allocation of the burden of proof and the role of plaintiff’s prima facie case as first set forth in Fuentes and more recently reaffirmed in Sheridan is equally applicable to a NJLAD claim. Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 665 A.2d 1139 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1995). Romano applies the Fuentes standard of review at summary judgment for Title VII cases to NJLAD claims. Id. at 1143-44. Thus, our discussion of Bray's Title VII claim also applies to her NJLAD claim, and, for the reasons provided above, we find that Bray's NJLAD claim should have survived summary judgment as well. V. For the above reasons, we will reverse the grant of summary judgment to Marriott on Bray's Title VII and NJLAD claims and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In granting summary judgment for defendant, the district court also dismissed Bray's related state law claims. Upon remand, the court will once again consider these 29 claims.