Opinion ID: 1925832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lay Practice Before D.C. Agencies

Text: Since 1979, Brookens has appeared on behalf of clients at hearings before the Rental Accommodations Office. The Committee urges that these appearances constitute the practice of law, and because Brookens is not a member of the District of Columbia Bar, these appearances constitute the unauthorized practice of law as defined in D.C.App.R. 49(b). Following a hearing on the issue, the judge held: Respondent's activities before the Rental Accommodations office must be considered in a different light. Because Rule 49 does not deal with representation of others before administrative agencies, and because in this instance respondent's activities before the Rental Accommodations Office were authorized under the rules of that agency, the court concludes that respondent has not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and has not violated Rule 49, by representing persons other than himself before the Rental Accommodations Office. Memorandum Opinion, supra, at 9. The Committee advances two main arguments designed to establish that the court's ruling is erroneous. First, the Committee argues that any District of Columbia agency regulation that purports to permit anyone other than an attorney licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia to appear on behalf of clients is invalid because it exceeds the scope of the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act. D.C.Code §§ 1-1501 et seq. (1981). D.C. Code § 1-1509(b) provides in part that [e]very party [in a contested case] shall have the right to present in person or by counsel his case or defense.... The Committee argues that D.C.Code § 1-1509(b) should be interpreted to limit a litigant in an agency proceeding to one of two choices: representing himself or hiring an active member of the District of Columbia Bar to act as counsel. Accordingly, the Committee asks this court to find that the agency rule at issue in this case, 14 DCMR § 3202.1 (1986), is ultra vires this part of the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act. Second, the Committee argues that this court, pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-2501(a) (1981), has the inherent and exclusive authority to define and regulate the practice of law in the District of Columbia. [13] The Committee asks us to find that our statutory authority to promulgate rules with respect to the practice of law in the District, D.C.Code § 11-2501, supersedes a local agency's statutory authority to adopt procedures governing the qualifications of those persons who represent parties in proceedings before the agency. D.C.Code § 1-1503 (1981). The great weight of authority renders it almost universally accepted that the highest court in the jurisdiction is imbued with the inherent authority to define, regulate, and control the practice of law in that jurisdiction. See, e.g., Attorney General of Maryland v. Waldron, 426 A.2d 929, 934-35, 289 Md. 683, 692-93 (1981); Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 735-36, 96 Wash.2d 443, 451-53, (1981) ( en banc ); Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Bar Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 434 A.2d 1327, 1331, 62 Pa.Commw. 88, 96-97 (1981), aff'd, 498 Pa. 589, 450 A.2d 613 (Pa.1982); Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System Commission, 619 P.2d 1036, 1039, 127 Ariz. 259, 262, reh'g denied (Ariz.1980) ( en banc ) and cases cited therein; Lukas v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, Maryland, Inc., 371 A.2d 669, 35 Md.App. 442 (1977) (power to define and regulate practice of law vested solely in judiciary and legislation purporting to do likewise is a mere aid to the courts). See also VA. CONST. ART. 6, § 1 Intro. (1986). In some states, the highest court, while refusing to relinquish this inherent power, has recognized that the power is not exclusive or has as a matter of comity deferred to legislative regulation as a declaration of public policy. Comment, Control of Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial Power, 28 U.CHI.L.REV. 162, 169 (1960). See also Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo and Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938, 190 Conn. 510 (1983) (power to regulate attorney conduct and discipline is inherent but not necessarily exclusive); Hustedt v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 636 P.2d 1139, 1143, 178 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805, 30 Cal.3d 329 (1981) ( en banc ) (although judiciary has inherent power to regulate practice of law, court has respected legislative exercise, pursuant to the police power, of reasonable degree of regulation and control over the profession and practice of law). In the specific area of lay representation before administrative agencies, we observe that the question has attracted national interest. See On Letting the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and Unauthorized Practice Rules, 132 U.PA.L.REV. 1515 (July 1984); Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN.L.REV. 1 (1981). We note, for example, that the Virginia Supreme Court, rejecting bar recommendations, has empowered state agencies to allow lay representation in limited circumstances. Forty Second Annual Report of the Virginia Bar at 74. Maryland, however, has taken a different approach. A Maryland administrative agency may not grant the right to practice law to an individual who is not authorized to practice law. MD.CODE, State Government, § 10-204(a)(2)(i). In the instant case, the judge found, and the Committee does not contest, the District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Office through its regulations authorizes lay representation. [14] These regulations were adopted pursuant to D.C.Code § 1-1503. [15] The Committee urges that the agency rule, 14 DCMR 3202.1, is ultra vires D.C.Code § 1-1509(b) which provides that [e]very party [in a contested case] shall have the right to present in person or by counsel his case or defense. The Committee argues that because the regulation is ultra vires the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, it is invalid. We disagree. On its face, D.C.Code § 1-1509(b) articulates the rights of a party to representation in contested cases before administrative agencies of the District of Columbia. Since the provision lists a party's minimum entitlements  pro se appearance or representation by counsel  it leaves open the possibility that an agency might wish to expand those rights to include, perhaps, lay representation. Compare MD.CODE, State Government, § 10-204 (expressly restricting such agency action). Nothing in the legislative history of this D.C.Code provision suggests otherwise. Pub.L. No. 90-614, § 10, 82 Stat. 1208 (Oct. 21, 1968); H.R.REP. No. 202, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S.REP. No. 1581, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Indeed, the only reference to the statutorily provided breadth of representation due parties in contested cases is to be found in the Senate's summary of the Bill's provisions. The bill itself affords no right to a hearing, but where such right exists it requires that the parties have full and timely notice, and that they be afforded the opportunity to present evidence and argument. The burden of proof is placed on the proponent of an order or rule. The right to counsel is specifically guaranteed.  S.REP. No. 1581, supra, pt. 2, at 7 (emphasis added). We hold, therefore, that the regulations of the Rental Accommodations Office authorizing lay representation of a party at an agency proceedings are not ultra vires D.C.Code § 1-1509(b). Accordingly, the only remaining question is whether, in light of this court's inherent power to define and regulate the practice of law, a particular agency has the authority to adopt regulations permitting lay representation. In 1985, the Committee transmitted to this court its Report of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law Concerning Unauthorized Practice before Administrative Agencies of the District of Columbia (hereinafter cited as the Report ) in which it reviewed the current status of D.C. agency regulations permitting non-attorneys to practice before the various agencies and made recommendations on the subject. [16] Again in 1987, a revised version of the proposed amendments was circulated to the court, and finally as recently as March 4, 1987, the Committee submitted a response to the comments generated by members of this court regarding the Report and the proposed amendments. In short, the issue is and has been the object of ongoing inquiry and study by this court. While it is clear that this court is empowered to define the practice of law so that it either excludes or includes lay representation before agencies, it is also true that such an undertaking implicates important public policy questions. Administrative review of D.C.App.R. 49 is currently and formally underway by this court, the affected agencies, and the Committee. Progress has been made, and such an administrative approach is the appropriate mechanism under these circumstances. In addition, because the Committee places before us an issue broader in scope than that litigated here, we are inclined not to interrupt the progress that has already been made in solving the apparent conflict between the rules of this court and the regulations of some District of Columbia agencies. Rather, we conclude, in the circumstances presented here, to affirm the ruling of the presiding judge, reserving the larger questions in this regard to the full court in its administrative capacity. Accordingly, the judgment and order in this matter in all respects is Affirmed.