Opinion ID: 767966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michel's Right to Representation and Due Process Claims

Text: 12 Under the Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien is entitled to representation of his own choice at his own expense. See Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 1991); see also 8 U.S.C. 1362 (providing that in removal proceedings, the person concerned has the privilege of being represented, though at no expense to the Government). To that end, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4)(A) directs the Attorney General to adopt regulations to ensure that the alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien's choosing who is authorized to practice in such proceedings. And the regulations adopted by the Attorney General require the IJ to [a]dvise the respondent of his or her right to representation, at no expense to the government, by counsel of his or her own choice authorized to practice in the proceedings and require the respondent to state then and there whether he or she desires representation. 8 C.F.R. 240.10(a)(1) (1999). 13 We have interpreted this rule to allow a waiver of counsel to be found only where it was possible to make a specific finding that the alien indicated - through what he said to the immigration judge - that he wanted to proceed without counsel. Montilla, 926 F.2d at 169. For example, in Montilla, we found that the petitioner had not waived his right to counsel, because, although he was asked whether he wanted to be represented at the hearing, his answer was nonresponsive, demonstrat[ing his] complete ignorance on this subject. Id. In Hidalgo-Disla v. INS, 52 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 1995), however, we held that an immigration judge did not act improperly in proceeding, despite the absence of an express waiver of representation by the petitioner, after the judge had granted two adjournments and had warned the petitioner that he should be prepared to proceed on the third hearing date with or without a representative. As we reasoned there, [i]f an immigration judge could not proceed with a hearing, after two adjournments, without the alien's express waiver, an alien seeking to stave off deportation would be able to win an infinite number of adjournments, and would be better off appearing without a lawyer than with one. Id. at 447. 14 In this case, Michel argues that he was deprived of his right to counsel since, due to his limited access to the phone, he was unable to contact anyone on the list of lawyers he was given prior to his hearing. This argument is unpersuasive. The IJ offered to postpone Michel's hearing so that he might seek representation, and Michel clearly chose to continue the hearing and to represent himself, even after being warned that he could lose his case: 15 IJ: Now, do you want some time to try to find a representative, a lawyer, or do you want to speak for yourself and go ahead with your removal/deportation case today? 16 Michel: I would start myself. 17 IJ: You want to speak for yourself? 18 Michel: Yes. 19 IJ: Do you understand that you could lose your case today? That it's a possibility in other words? 20 Michel: Yes. 21 IJ: You do understand that? 22 Michel: Yes. 23 IJ: Okay. And you feel that you're able to go ahead and speak for yourself? 24 Michel: Yes. 25 R. at 58. Accordingly, there is no merit to this portion of Michel's claim of deprivation of his right to representation. 26 Michel also contends that he made repeated complaints regarding his inability to obtain counsel. These assertions are not borne out by the record. Contrary to Michel's claims, he requested representation only once, and that was after the IJ had determined that Michel could be removed and deported: IJ: Okay. So is there anything additional? I can't think of anything additional, to tell you the truth. Is there anything else you want to explain to me? 27 Michel: Well, I would like - I was - I was talking to you last week. I was telling you that I was going to wait to talk to Father Bob. 28 IJ: Well, if I thought it would serve some purpose, I could try to put your case off. It would be still another eight days before Father Bob comes here, and I don't see anything that he could do for you. What can he give you advice about that you haven't already answered yourself? 29 Michel: Well, maybe - maybe I will sit down with him and then have a little bit more understanding and - 30 IJ: Well, as far as I'm concerned, sir, no offense, but you had that chance in '93. Father Bob's office represented you then and I don't see that it's going to serve any purpose to put your case off again. You had the opportunity to call them or write them a letter long ago to get advice about your situation, okay? 31 Id. at 100. 32 This exchange might be troubling if it had been Michel's initial response to the IJ's question as to representation. But it took place, instead, at the very end of the proceeding, after the IJ had made his decision that Michel was eligible for removal, and long after the initial meeting at which Michel had waived his right to representation. We cannot require the IJ to postpone a proceeding every time a party believes that the hearing is going badly, and, as a result, seeks to re-think his or her decision to forego representation. See Hidalgo-Disla, 52 F.3d at 447. We therefore reject Michel's claim that he was deprived of his right to representation. 33 To the extent that Michel is also asserting that he was not afforded a full and fair hearing as required by the Due Process Clause, see Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1996) , we find his claim meritless. The IJ in this case went well out of his way to ensure that Michel knew what was happening at all times during the proceeding and never prevented Michel from presenting arguments or evidence in his favor. We note additionally that the IJ adjourned the hearing several times before making his decision to ensure that he had complete and accurate information. We conclude that the IJ acted, procedurally, exactly as we would hope that an IJ would, and that the hearing, far from being a procedural sham as Michel alleges, was instead fundamentally fair and was conducted in full compliance with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 34 III. Michel's Claim That His Crimes Did Not Arise Out of a Single Scheme of Criminal Misconduct Under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 35 Under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), an alien who is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, may be deported. Michel was convicted under New York Penal Law 165.40, which provides in relevant part that 36 [a] person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof. 37 N.Y. Penal Law 165.40 (McKinney 1999). The IJ found that Michel's two convictions under this statute constituted crimes involving moral turpitude that did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The BIA - by a divided vote - affirmed this decision, concluding that the crimes were in fact separate and distinct and that they were convictions involving moral turpitude because knowledge of the stolen nature of the goods is an element of the offense. R. at 4. In this part, we review the BIA's finding that the crimes did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. 38 The phrase single scheme of criminal misconduct in 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) is not defined by the statute or in its legislative history. See Akindemowo v. INS, 61 F.3d 282, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1995). In Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1968), this Court adopted an expansive definition of the phrase, permitting a specific, coherent plan of future action to constitute a single scheme of criminal misconduct. See id. at 227. Nason was decided before Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in which the Supreme Court held that deference to an agency's construction of a statute is appropriate where that agency is charged with the administration of the law and where the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction. Id. at 843. The INS, therefore, argues that, rather than follow our definition in Nason, we should now defer to the BIA's interpretation of single scheme of criminal misconduct, limiting this phrase to acts, which although separate crimes in and of themselves, were performed in furtherance of a single criminal episode, such as where one crime constitutes a lesser offense of another or where two crimes flow from and are the natural consequence of a single act of criminal misconduct. In re Adetiba, Interim Decision, 20 I. & N. Dec. 506, 511 (1992). 39 We have held, in post-Chevron cases, that the BIA is entitled to deference when interpreting other provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as long as those interpretations are reasonable. See, e.g., Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1995) (according deference to the BIA's interpretation of particularly serious crime). But, to date, we have not answered the specific question of whether we should engage in a Chevron analysis with respect to the phrase single scheme of criminal misconduct or whether, instead, we should continue to follow our definition in Nason. And we need not decide that issue today. 4 40 Under either definition - the broader one provided in Nason or the narrower one urged by the INS - Michel's crimes cannot be said to have arisen out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. Michel's argument boils down to a claim that he was convicted for the same offense on both occasions and therefore the convictions should be considered part of a single scheme. But even under the expansive view embraced in Nason, it is not enough that Michel's convictions are for identical conduct. As the Nason court explained, 41 [i]t is here, especially, that Nason's stress on the similarity between the two crimes misses the mark. It should be noted that the statute does not speak in terms of a common scheme or plan. The impropriety of such a test is readily apparent for it could be invoked to save an alien who repeated a successful crime already tried and had the good fortune to employ not only the same methods, but also to have chosen the same or a similar victim. Congress meant to give the alien a second chance, not to spare the recidivist. 42 Nason, 394 F.2d at 227. 43 Because Michel presented no evidence that his crimes - committed two months apart - were the result of a single plan he had devised to steal bus transfers, he cannot succeed on his claim under this Circuit's broad, pre-Chevron definition of the phrase. And he certainly cannot succeed under the BIA's narrower one. We therefore affirm the BIA's determination that Michel's two convictions did not arise out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).