Opinion ID: 1621560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Statutory 6-Month Period

Text: Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 1995) requires discharge of a defendant whose case has not been tried within 6 months after the filing of the information, unless the 6 months are extended by any period to be excluded in computing the time for trial. State v. Washington, 269 Neb. 728, 695 N.W.2d 438 (2005). Sims concedes that under § 29-1207, 149 days should be excluded from the 6-month period as attributable to his plea in abatement. Twelve days are excluded for his motions requesting new counsel, and 36 days are excluded for his April 6, 1998, motion to continue. The State does not assert any excluded periods attributable to State motions or to the trial court. According to Sims, excluding these periods attributable to his motions, he should have been brought to trial by May 23, 1998. Sims' alleged speedy trial violation stems from his assertion that the delay from May 23 and the actual trial on August 24 is not an excluded time period under § 29-1207. The postconviction court found that trial counsel requested a second continuance on or before the May 12, 1998, trial date after learning of Winefeldt's plea agreement to testify against Sims. On appeal from a proceeding for postconviction relief, the trial court's findings of fact will be upheld unless such findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Ortiz, 266 Neb. 959, 670 N.W.2d 788 (2003). Sims spends a great deal of time pointing out evidence that suggest[s] trial counsel did not make a motion to continue on or about May 12. Brief for appellant at 14. We conclude, based on a full review of the record, that the postconviction court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that a motion to continue was made by Sims' trial counsel on approximately May 12. We have explained that [w]hen a delay in trial is attributable to a defense motion for a continuance filed within the statutory period, defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss. State v. McHenry, 268 Neb. 219, 230-31, 682 N.W.2d 212, 224 (2004). Sims asserts that even if trial counsel made a motion on May 12, 1998, to continue trial, the entire period of the delay until the August 24 trial is not attributable to the motion. Section 29-1207(4)(b) provides that a period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant or his counsel is excluded from the speedy trial calculation. Sims, in effect, argues that the entirety of the delay after the May 12, 1998, continuance was not resulting from that motion. In State v. Petty, 269 Neb. 205, 211, 691 N.W.2d 101, 106 (2005), we considered the meaning of resulting from in the context of what must be shown in order to exclude from the 6-month speedy trial calculation the period of time specified by § 29-1207(4)(d), the period 'resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant.' We held that where a defendant fails to appear for a timely scheduled trial, the resulting delay from such absence or unavailability does not end immediately upon the defendant's reappearance. Instead, further delay inevitably results from the fact that the court, prosecutors, witnesses, and all others involved with the case must adjust their schedules. Id. Indeed, other criminal cases will invariably have been set for trial and will be required in some cases to proceed to trial to meet their own speedy trial constraints prior to the trial of the reappearing defendant. See id. We also clarified in Petty that in order for a period of delay resulting from the defendant's absence to be excludable from the 6-month speedy trial period, no showing of good cause, under § 29-1207(4)(f), need be made. Section 29-1207(4)(f) sets forth as excludable [o]ther periods of delay not specifically enumerated herein, but only if the court finds that they are for good cause. We recognized that under State v. Letscher, 234 Neb. 858, 861, 452 N.W.2d 767, 769 (1990), the excludable period under § 29-1207(4)(d) was limited to the period of time from the defendant's later availability to the next reasonably available trial date. We held that in determining whether time is excludable for speedy trial purposes under § 29-1207(4)(d), a trial date that is scheduled within 6 months after the defendant's reappearance will be presumed to be the next reasonably available trial date without the State's being required to present further evidence to justify the setting. State v. Petty, supra . [4] The reasoning of Petty is applicable here. In determining whether a period of delay is attributable to defense counsel's motion to continue, we need not inquire as to what extent there was good cause for the delay. Trial counsel's testimony at the postconviction hearing indicated that the August 24, 1998, trial date was the earliest practicable date given his and the judge's schedules that had been established well before the unexpected motion. As reflected in Petty, we recognize the complexity of that which can properly be considered resulting from a sudden change in a scheduled trial date. [5] We note that in arguing that the entire delay was not resulting from trial counsel's motion to continue, Sims sought to prove that already scheduled civil trials took precedence over the rescheduling of his criminal trial. We find this of no consequence to our resolution of Sims' ineffectiveness of counsel claim. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1205 (Reissue 1995) states that [t]o effectuate the right of the accused to a speedy trial . . . insofar as is practicable: (1) The trial of criminal cases shall be given preference over civil cases . . . . As we stated in State v. Watkins, 190 Neb. 450, 452, 209 N.W.2d 184, 185 (1973), the provision of § 29-1205 to give preference of criminal over civil trials is obviously directory. To demand that all scheduled civil trials must accommodate the rescheduling of a criminal trial as a result of a defense motion to continue is hardly practicable. There is nothing in the language of § 29-1207 which would demand an inquiry into whether civil trials took place between May 12 and August 24, 1998. Sims also asserts that State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281, 202 N.W.2d 604 (1972), was not followed. Brief for appellant at 15. In Alvarez, we addressed the good cause catchall provision of § 29-1207(4)(f) and held that in order to facilitate review, a general finding of a trial court that good cause existed under § 29-1207(4)(f) would no longer suffice. Rather, the trial court would be required to make specific findings as to the cause or causes of such extensions and the period of extension attributable to such causes. State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. at 292, 202 N.W.2d at 611. Recognizing that the case was one of the first cases to reach this court involving Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1205 to 29-1209 (Reissue 1995), we explained that [w]e now deem it advisable to recommend the following for procedural uniformity.  (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. at 293, 202 N.W.2d at 611. We then set forth the following: When the district court sets a date for trial, which date is later than the statutory time allowed by section 29-1207, R. S. Supp., 1971, the court shall: (1) Advise the defendant of his statutory right to a speedy trial and the effect of his consent to a period of delay, and (2) Ascertain of record whether the defendant does or does not waive his right to a speedy trial and consent to the trial date set. Id. We do not find Alvarez to be applicable to the case at bar. As we have explained, no showing of good cause is required in this case because the period of delay was a result of a continuance requested by Sims' counsel. Alvarez concerned a period of delay under § 29-1207(4)(f) and not an excludable period, as presented here, under § 29-1207(4)(b). In State v. McHenry, 268 Neb. 219, 682 N.W.2d 212 (2004), we held that the statutory right to a speedy trial is not a personal right that can we waived only by a defendant, and a defendant is therefore bound by counsel's motion for a continuance even if the defendant is opposed to the motion. A defendant can only be deemed not so bound in the event that counsel is a ''farce and a sham.' . . .' Id. at 232, 682 N.W.2d at 225. Sims does not argue that trial counsel was such a farce and a sham that he should not properly be considered his counsel for these purposes. Inasmuch as the procedural recommendations set forth in Alvarez could be deemed applicable to an excludable period under § 29-1207(4)(b), Sims fails to make any argument as to how the failure to follow such procedure violated his speedy trial rights where trial counsel waived that right on his behalf. We conclude that the entirety of the period of delay from May 12 to August 24, 1998, is excludable under § 27-1207(4)(b), and, therefore, we find that Sims had no right to absolute discharge under the speedy trial act. Since the motion for discharge under the act would be unsuccessful, no prejudice can be shown by trial counsel's failure to make it. Trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to motion for discharge on the ground that Sims' statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated.