Opinion ID: 2106359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process Liberty Interest.

Text: Mr. Ferguson contends that he has been deprived of a due process liberty interest because of the reasons that D.H.S.S. gave for dismissing him. Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 27 L. Ed.2d 515, 519, 91 S. Ct. 507 (1971). A due process liberty interest may be affected when a person loses their job and is charged with wrongdoing. For an employe to demonstrate such a loss of liberty, they must have: (1) suffered a stigma or other disability that forecloses their ability to take other employment, or (2) had their good name, reputation, honor or integrity impugned in such a way that it might seriously damage their standing and associations in the community. Roth, supra at 408 U.S. 573, 574; State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 72 Wis.2d 672, 678, 679, 242 N.W.2d 689 (1976). In Colaizzi v. Walker, 542 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1976), there was a denial of a liberty interest where the governor of Illinois dismissed public officials based on a charge that they had abused their positions by trying to force an employer to dismiss criminal charges against one of his employes. In Adams v. Walker, 492 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir. 1974), no denial of a liberty interest was found where an official was charged with incompetence, neglect of duty and malfeasance in office. These terms were used to satisfy the requirements of the Illinois Constitution for removal of officers. In Jeffries v. Turkey Run Consolidated School Dist., 492 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974), the court found no denial of a liberty interest where a teacher was charged with openly contradicting another teacher's directives to students and with refusing to follow a suggested revised instruction schedule. In Suckle v. Madison General Hospital, 499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974) a doctor was dismissed from his job under circumstances suggesting that he did not do his job well and that he was in need of further training. The court found no constitutionally protected liberty interest. In Shirck v. Thomas, 486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973) a teacher was discharged for failing to coordinate her teaching with another teacher and for making students feel that their learning difficulties were due to the inferior methods used by the other teacher. In failing to find a protected liberty interest the court stated that, The fact that nonretention has unquestionably made plaintiff less attractive to other employers does not amount to a constitutional deprivation of `liberty.' This much is plainly settled by Roth and Sindermann. In our opinion, the adverse impact of the nonrenewal decision was not aggravated either by the fact that defendants gave plaintiff a written statement of reasons for their action or by the content of that statement. Assuming, as the record indicates that those reasons were not published to persons who did not participate in the nonrenewal decision, they could create no greater stigma than if the action had not been explained at all. Shirck at 486 F.2d 693. (Footnotes omitted.) Moreover, public employers should not be discouraged from giving their reasons for dismissing an employe. This policy is codified in sec. 16.22 (1) (a), Stats., [4] which requires that the appointing authority give the director of the bureau of personnel and the employe reasons for dismissing the employe during the probationary period. [10] In this case the reasons for dismissal could be summarized as follows: (1) Failure to handle assignments at the level required; (2) Lack of initiative in learning the scope of the job; (3) Failure to follow directions or ask for clarification of assignments; and (4) Continued tardiness. These charges do not affect good name, honor or integrity in such a way that standing in the community is seriously damaged. Mr. Ferguson argues that these reasons given for dismissal could conceivably affect future employment opportunities. Roth at 408 U.S. 573, 574. However, the reasons are no more serious than those in Adams, supra, or Suckle, supra, where there was no deprivation of a liberty interest. D.H.S.S. was statutorily required to give the reason for the dismissal. The reasons given by D.H.S.S. for dismissing Ferguson do not foreclose future employment opportunities and do not affect any constitutionally protected liberty interest. By the Court. Order affirmed. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). The majority concludes that an employee with permanent status in class who transfers to a different department to serve a probationary period does not have any protections of the civil service statutes based on his prior position. [1] The majority states that it reaches this conclusion because the specific statutory mandate is unambiguous and more general policy considerations can not control. I respectfully dissent. Neither sec. 16.22 (1) (d), relied on by the majority, nor any of the other provisions of ch. 16, Stats., deals explicitly with the civil service protections afforded employees who make inter-departmental transfers. Therefore, we must rely upon more general policy considerations to discern the intent of the legislature. The cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is that the purpose of the act is to be sought and is favored over a consideration which will defeat the manifest object of the act. Student Asso., U of Wis. Milw. v. Baum, 74 Wis.2d 283, 294-5, 246 N.W.2d 622 (1976). Chapter 16 reveals the State's deep commitment to a strong, efficient merit system and to encouraging people to make state service their career. [2] Sec. 16.01 (1), Stats., explicitly sets forth the purpose of the civil service statutes: It is the purpose of this subchapter [entitled Civil Service] to provide state agencies and institutions of higher education with competent personnel which will furnish state services to its citizens as fairly, efficiently and effectively as possible. To achieve this goal, the legislature explicitly sets forth in sec. 16.01 (2), Stats., the state policy to maintain a strong coordinated state-wide personnel management program: (2) It is the policy of the state to maintain a strong coordinated personnel management program and to assure that positions in the classified service are filled through methods which apply the merit principle, with adequate civil service safeguards. To these ends the bureau of personnel with advice and quasi-judicial assistance by the personnel board shall develop, improve and protect a state-wide personnel management program which assures that the state hires the best qualified persons available and bases the treatment of its employes upon the relative value of each employe's services and his demonstrated competence and fitness. Thus the legislature views the civil service system as a state-wide system, not a department-by-department system. The legislature's expressed policy in the civil service statutes is to recruit on the broadest base consistent with sound personnel management practice, sec. 16.10; to hire the best qualified person available, sec. 16.01 (2); and to fill vacancies by competition limited to persons in the classified services if in the judgment of the Director of the Bureau of Personnel the group of applicants best able to meet the requirements of the position are available within the classified service, sec. 16.15. Requiring an employee to risk losing the security of his or her position in the classified service in order to advance within the classified civil service creates an obvious disincentive to the employee to accept a promotion and thus conflicts with the legislature's announced policies. The statutes clearly provide that had Ferguson been promoted or had a change in job status within his department, there would be no effect on his permanent status in class and rights. Sec. 16.22 (1) (d), Stats. The majority reasons from this provision that the legislature's silence as to the effect of an inter-departmental transfer means that an employee loses all rights in the civil service system in an inter-departmental transfer. I see no reason to construe the statutes to require that Ferguson lose all rights in the civil service system if he accepts a promotion in an agency across the hall. I conclude that Ferguson was properly dismissed from his higher position (Information Specialist 3) in which he was on probation. I further conclude that the statutes do not require that Ferguson be returned to his former position (Information Specialist 2) with either the University or the Department of Health & Social Services. I do, however, believe that the statutes require that Ferguson and persons similarly situated be given some protection under the civil service system, balancing the needs of the state and the need to assure the fair treatment of persons in the civil service system. [3] It is not appropriate for this court, as this case is presented to us, to determine the protections to which Ferguson is entitled. This determination is one which should be made by the appropriate entity to which the legislature has delegated the administration of the civil service statutes. [4] I would reverse the order of the circuit court and direct the circuit court to remand the cause to the Personnel Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.