Opinion ID: 167974
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the district court erred

Text: 27 Fairfield contends that the emails were admissible 1) under Fed. R. of Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) as prior consistent statements, 2) as nonhearsay, 3) under Fed.R.Evid. 803's state of mind exception, or 4) under the Best Evidence Rule. 28
29 Fed. R. of Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay if: 30 The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. 31 The Supreme Court has held that this rule permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) (emphasis added). Under this requirement, then, Turolla's prior consistent statements are inadmissable hearsay unless he made them before his improper motive arose. See United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1482 (10th Cir.1996). 32 According to McInnis, Turolla's improper motive arose in September 2000, immediately after the telephone call between her and Thull and once Thull again became Turolla's direct boss. Prior to that conversation, McInnis had no documented performance issues. The record indicates that, after that telephone call and upon Thull's return to Pagosa Springs, Turolla informed McInnis that he had spoken with Thull about her and Turolla's attitude toward her changed abruptly after that conversation. The emails offered by Fairfield are dated October 17, October 31, and November 4, 2000. Thus, the premotive requirement for prior consistent statements was not met because the emails were written after the conflict between Turolla and McInnis arose. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit the emails as prior-consistent statements. 33 b. Nonhearsay because not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but merely to show Fairfield's state of mind 34 Fairfield alternatively argues that the emails were admissible as nonhearsay to show its agents' states of mind in making the decision to discharge McInnis and not to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the emails. We have previously held that out-of-court statements may properly be admitted to show an employer's state of mind in making employment decisions. See Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1434-35 (10th Cir.1993) (holding admissible certain out-of-court statements which were offered to establish [defendant's] state of mind in making its hiring decisions and [were] not offered for the truth of the matter asserted); see also Staniewicz v. Beecham, Inc., 687 F.2d 526, 530-31 (1st Cir.1982) (permitting, in an age discrimination case, the supervisor to testify as to conversations with third parties about plaintiff because they were offered to show [the supervisor's] intent in calling the meeting with [the plaintiff] which ultimately resulted in the resignation of [plaintiff]); Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1456 (9th Cir.1983) (permitting, in an age and national origin discrimination case, management witnesses to testify about complaints received about plaintiff because the testimony was relevant in demonstrating [the employer's] non-discriminatory intent in its employment practices). Turolla's emails, however, were only sent to Thull or Mikula or both. Neither of these men made the decision to termination McInnis. As a result, the statements were inadmissible to show Fairfield's state of mind in discharging McInnis because there is no evidence the decision-maker responsible for McInnis's termination—Gray—ever read or learned of the contents of the emails. 35 c. Rule 803(3) state of mind exception 36 Fairfield also argues that the emails were admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(3), the state of mind exception to the general hearsay rule. 12 That Rule expressly excludes from the exception a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. Fed. R.Evid. 803(3). Based on this limitation to the exception, we have held that 803(3) does not permit the witness to relate any of the declarant's statements as to why [the declarant] held the particular state of mind, or what [the declarant] might have believed that would have induced the state of mind. United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1493 (10th Cir.1993). 37 Turolla's emails contain hearsay statements expressing his then existing state of mind ( i.e., I hate to be in this predicament; I am at my wits end; I am concerned for the future) as well as assertions of why Turolla had these feelings ( i.e., descriptions of conversations, interactions, incidents, and problems he was allegedly having with McInnis). The statements explaining why Turolla had these feelings are expressly outside the state-of-mind exception. 13 See Joe, 8 F.3d at 1493 (holding that victim's hearsay statement that she was afraid sometimes was admissible under Rule 803(3) but that remainder of statement indicating  why she was afraid was clearly a statement of memory or belief and was not admissible under Rule 803(3)) (emphasis in original); United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1453-54 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that a child's statements that she did not want to return to her father because my father gets drunk and he thinks I'm his wife were not a state-of-mind expression because the first statement was not an expression of fear and the second was a statement of memory to prove the fact remembered); see also Fed.R.Evid. 803(3) advisory committee's note (The exclusion of `statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed' is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event which produced the state of mind.). 38 Fairfield does not argue, nor does the evidence suggest, that Fairfield offered to redact the inadmissible portion of the emails. Nevertheless, to the extent that the court abused its discretion by not admitting the emails in redacted form, any error did not prejudice Fairfield for the reasons described more fully below. 39 d. Best Evidence Rule 40 Finally, Fairfield argues that the exclusion of Turolla's emails prevented it from presenting the best evidence of his true motive. Fed.R.Evid. 1002, known as the best evidence rule, states that [t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress. The best evidence rule is not an exception to the general rule excluding the admission of hearsay. Instead, 41 [w]hile Rule 1002 limits the admissibility of evidence offered to prove the contents of a writing . . . satisfying Rule 1002 does not mean that the evidence in question is necessarily admissible. The evidence remains subject to other admissibility objections under the Evidence Rules and the Constitution. Specifically, the evidence frequently also raises admissibility issues under the rules regulating hearsay and authentication. 42 31 Charles A. Wright and Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 7183 (2000) (footnotes omitted). Therefore, Fairfield's claim that the emails are the best evidence of Turolla's motivation does not support its argument that the district court abused its discretion by excluding that evidence as hearsay.