Opinion ID: 526161
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dissemination of the charges.

Text: 58 The City claims that any alleged damage to Mr. Melton's reputation arising from the dissemination in the news media of the perjury charges did not implicate any liberty interest because the damage must be proximately connected with the termination of the employment. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Therefore, the damage, if any, must stem from dissemination of the reasons for dismissal, and not merely the dissemination of the original charges alone. The City argues that the sole reason for Mr. Melton's dismissal was violation of the Police Code of Ethics. Since the Review Board never addressed the perjury charge, the argument goes, that charge was not a reason for dismissal. Therefore, the City did not impair Mr. Melton's liberty interest. 59 The crucial focus of any liberty interest inquiry must be the stigmatization which results from the publication of false and damaging information, regardless of whether it involves dissemination of charges or reasons for dismissal. It is disingenuous to argue that one can stigmatize by publishing charges of this nature and then dismiss the employee on other grounds and claim no impairment to the liberty interest because charges are not reasons for dismissal. In either case, the plaintiff's liberty interest in his good name and reputation has been impaired. We hold that where all other elements are met, the publication of charges which stigmatize can give rise to a claim that plaintiff's liberty interest has been impaired. 60 Despite the language in some of our opinions concerning the dissemination of the reasons for dismissal as an element of the liberty interest claim, see e.g., Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir.1983), we believe our holding today is not inconsistent with the premise which underlies our previous opinions on this subject--that is, concern with protecting the good name and reputation of individuals from unlawful action which impairs an established right to employment. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 708-09, 96 S.Ct. at 1164. In McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639 (10th Cir.1981), we demonstrated our concern with and focus on actual stigmatization. In McGhee, the employer circulated charges of immorality but never formally charged the employee with these incidents. Under the circumstances of that case, we stated: 61 The requirement of Paul v. Davis that reputational harm be entangled with some more tangible interests is thus met when a terminated or non-renewed Sec. 1983 plaintiff can show that the termination at least aggravated his stigmatization. We do not mean to imply that this is a heavy burden for a plaintiff. Any termination occurring in an atmosphere where the plaintiff's reputation is at issue should be sufficient to meet Paul 's entanglement requirement. It should be the state's burden to show that termination in such a context is so removed from plaintiff's reputational concern that it in no way impacted upon it. 62 Id. at 643 n. 2 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the circulation of the charges, coupled with the discharge, was sufficient to establish a liberty interest. See also McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir.1977). We conclude that in this case, as in McGhee, the dissemination of the charges coupled with dismissal was enough to establish a liberty interest which could not be deprived without due process of law. Therefore, the court's instruction in this regard was not erroneous. 63