Opinion ID: 589992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: defamation/libel claim against ford

Text: 13 The jury found that defendant Juanita Ford libeled both plaintiffs, but it assigned no monetary award because the libel [was not] the proximate cause of any damage to [either] plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiffs make four arguments for reversal despite the finding of no proximate cause on libel/defamation: 14 1) erroneous jury instructions in failure to instruct on punitive damages; 3 15 2) erroneous evidentiary rulings by the district court precluding cross-examination of defendants' witnesses on promotions and increased salaries received after Wayne's reorganization in 1986 (relating to plaintiffs' claim of loss of earnings); 16 3) erroneous instruction on definition of libel (a defamation need not be 'malicious' ); 17 4) erroneous instruction and question to require proximate cause for damages (libel per se and presumed damages except as to claims for wages lost--actual malice). 4 18 Ford's response was that plaintiffs presented no proof whatsoever that their reputation had been in any way tarnished or hurt by Ford's letter. As to claimed loss of earnings, Ford responded to plaintiffs' argument for per se or presumed damages by claiming that neither individual had mitigated their damages, and there was no reduction in pay (no loss of earnings). 5 In short, Ford asserted that neither plaintiff demonstrated economic or non-economic damage. Further, Ford contends that plaintiffs did not preserve a claim of error ... regarding libel and libel damages. 19 The district court's instruction on libel and slander required plaintiffs to show actual damage and that the letter was written with actual malice. There was no specific objection to this instruction. Plaintiffs had requested a libel instruction which included the requirement that the libelous statement had a tendency to harm the plaintiffs' reputation, 6 and this instruction was given. The plaintiffs also requested an instruction that as a result of the libel, the plaintiffs suffered some damage, 7 with the burden in this respect concededly on plaintiffs. The district court, in effect, defined libel as false and malicious defamation and imposed upon plaintiffs the burden of showing damage to reputation and actual damages which [they] suffered, rather than some damage, a change from the instruction proposed by plaintiffs and defendants. (Emphasis in instruction added). 20 It does not appear that plaintiffs, in a prompt and timely manner, objected to the instructions, or lack thereof, which they now contend to be erroneous with respect to their libel claim, particularly with respect to presumed damages arising from publication of a false and malicious statement charging plaintiffs with being racists and also guilty of sexist conduct. The district court emphasized that to find Ford guilty of libel, plaintiffs were required to show that she had acted with knowledge that the statement was false or that she acted with reckless disregard as to whether the statement was false. Furthermore, the jury was instructed that plaintiffs had to prove, in order to prevail, that Ford was not merely giving a statement of her opinion, that she was not acting with legislative or executive authority, and that the issuance of the letter was not a discretionary act. There was no objection to this instruction. 21 In the absence of an express objection, we look to whether the instruction in question, in proper context, and considering the instructions in their entirety, constituted clear and prejudicial error. Plaintiffs did not request an instruction on presumed or nominal damages. Under such circumstances and in light of Fed.R.Civ.P. 51, we may consider any such error not objected to as waived, except where there is plain error or it required action by the reviewing court 'in the interests of justice.'  Batesole v. Stratford, 505 F.2d 804, 808 (6th Cir.1974) (quoting O'Brien v. Willys Motors, Inc., 385 F.2d 163 (6th Cir.1967)). See also Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955 (6th Cir.1987). There is a question, moreover, whether we consider even obvious and prejudicial error in a jury instruction in the absence of procedural steps, timely objections, a motion for a new trial, or any other post-judgment motion addressing this issue. See Murphy v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 779 F.2d 340, 346 (6th Cir.1985); Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir.1983). 22 We believe, however, that we should consider whether it was plain and prejudicial error for the court not to instruct the jury to presume or to find at least nominal damages for plaintiffs after it had first found, as interrogatory number one was framed and defined, that Ford had intentionally uttered and published a false and malicious statement accusing defendants of racism and sexism thereby causing some harm or a tendency to harm plaintiffs' reputation. Put another way, was it legal error for the district court under such circumstances not to find, as a matter of law, that at least nominal damages were due plaintiffs? In the interests of justice, we are persuaded in this case that we should consider the libel instruction issue. We must also decide whether Michigan law presumes some damage, even if only nominal, in such a situation involving malicious and intentional libel/defamation. 23 Justice Potter Stewart, formerly a judge of this court, stated that a person's right to protect his good name and reputation: 24 reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being--a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 [86 S.Ct. 669, 679, 15 L.Ed.2d 597] (1966) (concurring opinion). 25 Quoted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). In Gertz, the Supreme Court discussed libel/defamation involving the requirement of actual malice, as a substantial abridgement of the state law right to compensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation.... Id. at 343, 94 S.Ct. at 3008. The Court noted that one might have viewed today's decision allowing recovery under any standard save strict liability as a more generous accommodation of the state interest in comprehensive reputational injury to private individuals than the law presently affords. Id. at 348 n. 10, 94 S.Ct. at 3011 n. 10. At the same time, Gertz held that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least, when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. The jury in this case found Ford's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, despite her First Amendment claim, and that she was not merely stating her opinion; and defamed plaintiffs despite her claims of immunity, privilege, and performance of a discretionary duty. 26 The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred. 27 Id. This common law rule has persisted in cases where the plaintiff's suit is actionable per se and the plaintiff can show actual malice. 28 We are persuaded that it was plain error to tie the jury's finding of libel, as the district court defined it, to a need also to find proximate cause for there to be any award of damages to the plaintiffs. 29 A defamatory publication tends to harm the reputation of another by lowering that person's estimation within the community or by deterring third persons from associating or dealing with him. Nuyen v. Slater, 372 Mich. 654, 662, 127 N.W.2d 369 (1964); Heritage Optical Center, Inc. v. Levine, 137 Mich.App. 793, 797, 359 N.W.2d 210 (1984). 30 Michigan Microtech v. Federated Publications, Inc., 187 Mich.App. 178, 466 N.W.2d 717, 720 (1991) (emphasis added). 31 As in Michigan Microtech, we find the defamatory potential of the statement found to be libelous in this case to be obvious. Id. 466 N.W.2d at 721. On the facts of this case, we find the plaintiffs' suit to be defamation per se because it relates to their business and professional reputations. As determined in Michigan Microtech, presumed damages are recoverable where malice is shown. Id., 466 N.W.2d at 722. While special or economic damages may not have been shown, presumed or at least nominal damages should be awarded for malicious libel. See id. Compare Nisbet v. KVP-Sutherland Paper Co., 373 Mich. 159, 128 N.W.2d 549, 550 (1964), with Wilkerson v. Carlo, 101 Mich.App. 629, 300 N.W.2d 658, 659 (1980) (defamatory statements are those which tend to harm an individual's reputation in the community. Unlike an action for tortious interference with economic relations, a defamation claim will lie even where there is no proof of any damage to the individual's business relationships or expectancies.). 32 We think the rule of damage is succinctly stated in 3 Restatement, Torts, § 621: 33 One who is liable for a libel or for a slander actionable per se is liable for harm caused thereby to the reputation of the person defamed or in the absence of proof of such harm, for the harm which normally results from such a defamation.    General damages are a form of compensatory damages. They are imposed for the purpose of compensating the plaintiff for the harm which the defamatory publication is proved, or, in the absence of proof, is assumed to have caused to his reputation. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove any specific harm to his reputation or any other loss caused thereby. Indeed, in many cases the effect of defamatory statements is so subtle and indirect that it is impossible directly to trace the effects thereof in loss to the person defamed. 34 Sias v. General Motors Corporation, 372 Mich. 542, 127 N.W.2d 357, 362 (1964) (emphasis added). 35 Ford has claimed a qualified privilege or immunity. Again, Michigan courts have spoken to this issue: 36 Assuming all the copies sent were privileged, that status is lost if Parsell abused the privilege by acting with common-law malice, ill will or bad faith. The Restatement of Torts (2d) suggests that, if a plaintiff proves the required constitutional actual malice necessary to have a cause of action when a public official is involved, he has, by that very action, proved that any possible qualified privilege was abused. 3 Restatement Torts, 2d § 592A, p. 259-260. The Restatement's position is logically and legally correct. Therefore, in this case, if plaintiffs proved the defendants acted with constitutional actual malice, the common-law defense of privilege would be useless. 37 Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich.App. 608, 325 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1982). Postill goes on to hold that any common-law privilege would be destroyed if the jury found defendants acted with actual malice. Id. 325 N.W.2d at 518. The same rationale applies to Ford's claim of qualified immunity. 38 There was no instruction given by the district court with respect to allowable damages for harm to feelings, mental anguish, ridicule, humiliation, fear and the like. Postill indicates that such an instruction under the circumstances of this case would have been appropriate. Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 421 Mich. 125, 364 N.W.2d 600 (1984), indicates that under Michigan law actual damages include damages suffered in respect to feelings. Id. 364 N.W.2d at 603. In the libel context, actual damages for injured feelings are comparable to those attributable to the kick by the cow, i.e., the plaintiff is compensated for injured feelings attributable simply to the fact and effect of the libel. Id. 364 N.W.2d at 605. See also 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 188 (1987). 39 In summary, we conclude that it was plain and prejudicial error to require plaintiffs to establish a proximate cause connection for allowance of at least nominal damages to their feelings and reputation by reason of what the jury determined, based on adequate evidence, was malicious libel/defamation by Ford. Michigan law, common-law, and Restatement of Torts are in agreement on that principle. We, therefore, in the interests of justice, and despite plaintiffs' failure to object or call this law to the district court's attention in a timely manner, REVERSE the judgment for defendant Ford in this respect and award each plaintiff the nominal sum of $1.00 each against the defendant Ford for libel/defamation. 40 We hold, as a matter of law, that it was erroneous to condition any recovery of damages to plaintiffs for malicious libel upon a proximate cause requirement of proving consequential damages. There was a failure to instruct the jury on a finding of malicious libel as to injury to reputation, mental distress, as well as feelings, humiliation and fear. Insofar as the jury held that the libel was not a proximate cause of specific economic damages or punitive damages, however, we do not disturb this determination. 41