Opinion ID: 520049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to establish pretext

Text: 25 Once a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissal is put forward by the employer, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove by significantly probative evidence that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Young, 840 F.2d at 829. A plaintiff may do so either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Goldstein, 758 F.2d at 1445 (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). Carter contends that she met that burden by showing that her personnel file was devoid of a record of insubordination. Robert Clark, chief deputy city attorney, testified, however, that disruptive behavior was not as a rule entered in an employee's personnel file. 26 While Carter did not attempt formally to establish statistical evidence of discrimination, she did argue that discriminatory intent could be inferred from Pedrosa's personnel actions. 17 However, the record compels the opposite conclusion. Of the six attorneys fired by Pedrosa in his tenure, only Carter was in the protected age group. 18 Neither does the record support Carter's claim that three female employees in the protected class were fired. Rather, of all employees fired by Pedrosa, only Carter and the secretary described by her attorney as incompetent were in the protected class. 19 The third woman in the protected class voluntarily retired in lieu of returning to secretarial work. Despite Carter's contention that Pedrosa intended to fire older employees in order to cut costs, no older males were fired. 20 Carter's subjective conclusion that Pedrosa harassed her and created any problems he had with her, without supporting evidence, was insufficient to establish pretext. [C]onclusory allegations of discrimination, without more, are not sufficient to raise an inference of pretext or intentional discrimination where [an employer] has offered ... extensive evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions. Young, 840 F.2d at 830. 27 We find that there was not sufficient evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the reasons articulated by Appellant were merely a pretext for discrimination or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer.