Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charge of firearm possession with a prior felony conviction

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to sever count V, in violation of his state law rights and of his federal constitutional rights, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to due process of law and to a fair and impartial jury. In count V, defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. (ง 12021, subd. (a).) Following the Hovey voir dire and prior to the selection of the jury panel, the trial court read the charges, including that count, to the prospective jurors. Following selection of the jury and prior to presentation of testimony, defendant moved to have count V tried separately from the other counts, suggesting that that count be tried to the court. The prosecutor declined to waive jury trial on that count. Defendant indicated he would stipulate to having suffered the prior felony conviction of assault, within the meaning of the allegation in count V, although without specifying the nature of the felony. Accordingly, at the close of the prosecution's case and in the jury's presence, the prosecutor inquired of defendant whether he would stipulate that on August 6, 1976, he had been convicted of a prior felony. The defense requested a bench conference, at which it pointed out that defendant had been convicted of second degree murder, not assault, on that date. In the presence of the jury the prosecution corrected the date to January 30, 1981, and defense counsel stipulated that defendant had suffered a prior felony on that date. Defendant moved for a mistrial based upon that exchange. The motion was denied. We have recognized that if the jury is permitted to learn of a defendant's prior conviction, it may be disposed to lean toward a determination of guilt in the current proceedings. ( People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 75, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83.) Accordingly, the trial of an allegation concerning a defendant's prior conviction generally is bifurcated from that of other current charges. ( Id. at pp. 75-76, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83.) Perhaps the most common situation in which bifurcation of the determination of the truth of a prior conviction allegation is not required arises when, even if bifurcation were ordered, the jury still would learn of the existence of the prior conviction before returning a verdict of guilty. For example, when the existence of the defendant's prior offense otherwise is admissible to prove the defendant committed the charged offenseโbecause the earlier violation is an element of the current offense [citations].... ( Id. at p. 78, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83.) This court decided in People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 153-157, 167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826 that when a prior conviction is pertinent only to ex-felon status as an element of a currently charged offense, and the defendant stipulates that he or she is an ex-felon, the jury may not learn either the fact of or the nature of the prior conviction. In People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 173, 228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913, however, we held that Hall had been abrogated by California Constitution, article I, section 28, subdivision (f), which provides: When a prior felony conviction is an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court. We concluded that although the jury was not entitled to learn the nature of the prior conviction, it must be advised that defendant is an ex-felon where that is an element of a current charge. ( People v. Valentine, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 173, 228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913; People v. Calderon, supra, 9 Cal.4th 69, 78, fn. 4, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 333, 885 P.2d 83; see People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 476-477, 279 Cal.Rptr. 847, 807 P.2d 1076.) In the present case, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a mistrial. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 985-986, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) The jury did not learn the nature of the prior offense. The circumstance that the prosecution referred to the incorrect date of the prior offense, to which defendant had stipulated, did not necessarily alert the jury that there was more than one prior conviction. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever count V. [7] Although defendant initially moved to sever, he subsequently agreed to stipulate to his ex-felon status as to that count, from which we may presume he intended to withdraw the motion for severance. Even if defendant did not so intend, his failure to press for a ruling waives the issue on appeal. (See People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 931, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) In any event, the trial court would not have erred in denying the motion. Section 954 provides that an accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission. The firearm used to commit the offenses was the same, and joinder was proper pursuant to that statute. Whether offenses properly are joined pursuant to section 954 is a question of law and is subject to independent review on appeal; the decision whether separate proceedings are required in the interests of justice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Atorez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 188, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365; see People v. Gomez (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 22, 27, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 94 [standard of review, in cases joining counts involving current offense in which firearm is used with offense in which that firearm is possessed by individual previously convicted of a felony, is whether there has been an abuse of discretion].) In People v. Valentine, supra, 42 Cal.3d 170, 179-180, 228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913, footnote 3, we noted that [w]hen the joinder statute (ง 954) would otherwise permit consolidation of charges, a trial court should, if requested, carefully exercise its discretion whether to try an exfelon count separately `in the interests of justice.' Insofar as the particular facts are known pretrial, the court must balance the legitimate benefits, judicial and prosecutorial, of a consolidated trial against the likelihood that disclosure of ex-felon status in a joint trial will affect the jury's verdict on charges to which that status is irrelevant. Nonetheless, the burden is on the party seeking severance to establish clearly that a substantial danger of prejudice exists requiring that the charges be tried separately. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Denial of a severance may be an abuse of discretion where (1) evidence related to the crimes to be tried jointly would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a weak case has been joined with a strong case; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty. ( Bradford, at p. 1315, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 721, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 849-850, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305; Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 452-454, 204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699.) The first criterion is most significant because, if evidence on each of the joined charges would have been admissible in a separate trial on the other, `any inference of prejudice is dispelled.' ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1315-1316, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 171-172, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480; see People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 721, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Because complete cross-admissibility is not necessary to justify the joinder of counts ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1284, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1), in the present case the cross-admissible evidence concerning the gun would justify such joinder. ( People v. Gomez, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th 22, 27-28, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 94.) The count alleging that defendant possessed a firearm as an exfelon is not unusually inflammatory or prejudicial. (See People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 573, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418.) Nor did the joinder append a weak case to a strong one, or combine two noncapital cases into a capital case. (See People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th 786, 850, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305; Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d 441, 452-54, 204 Cal.Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not severing count V. In addition, we note that pursuant to defendant's special instructions, the jury specifically was instructed not to consider defendant's status as a felon in considering the evidence of the other charges against him, and not to speculate as to the type of felony he had incurred. Any possible error was harmless.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting him to stipulate to having suffered a prior felony conviction without the court's obtaining a prior waiver of defendant's constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449. We recently addressed the identical argument in People v. Newman (1999) 21 Cal.4th 413, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 981 P.2d 98. In that decision, we relied upon the rationale that when a defendant has asserted and has been afforded his or her right to trial, has waived none of his or her constitutional rights, but has elected to stipulate to one but not all of the evidentiary facts necessary to a conviction of an offense or to a finding that an enhancement allegation is true, the concerns of voluntariness prompting the Boykin holding are not present. We concluded that the trial court was not required to provide the Boykin-Tahl advisements before permitting defendant, through his counsel, to stipulate during his trial for possession of a firearm by a felon that he previously had been convicted of a felony. [Citations.] ( People v. Newman, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 422, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 981 P.2d 98, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, in the present case, the trial court did not err in not giving the Boykin-Tahl advisements prior to defendant's stipulation that he previously had been convicted of a felony.