Opinion ID: 184408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Delegation Was Governed by an Intelligible Principle

Text: 28 Where the power at issue is a delegable power, Congress may provide discretionary authority to a coordinate branch of government [s]o long as Congress 'lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform.'  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372, 109 S.Ct. at 655 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 48 S.Ct. 348, 351, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928) (second alteration in original)). Applying this general rule over the last several decades, the Supreme Court has upheld, without deviation, Congress' ability to delegate power under broad standards, id. at 373, 109 S.Ct. at 655, including delegations authorizing the Executive to take action upon finding that it would be in the public interest to do so. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1013-14, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943) (upholding delegation to FCC to regulate broadcast licensing in the public interest); New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24, 53 S.Ct. 45, 48, 77 L.Ed. 138 (1932) (upholding delegation to ICC to authorize the consolidation of carriers where it finds that such consolidation would be in the public interest); see also Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425, 64 S.Ct. at 667-68 (It is no objection [under the delegation doctrine] that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for [the delegated agent's] judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework.) (citations omitted). 29 The compelling public interest in the Compact region standard falls well within established intelligible principle parameters. Indeed, Appellant's arguments in support of its APA claim convincingly demonstrate that the compelling public interest standard is discernible and demanding. In advancing this argument, Appellant has no difficulty--nor do we--in defining the scope of the compelling public interest standard. 30