Opinion ID: 580722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Give Requested Jury Instruction

Text: 24 Stone and Sienhausen's fourth point of error is that the district court erred in refusing to give to the jury their proposed instruction setting out their theory of the case. The instruction read: 25 It is the Defendant's theory that they did not unite to commit a crime. That is to say, while they stated they were planning on manufacturing methamphetamine, their statements were not an accurate reflection of their true intent. The Defendants contend that they had no agreement with each other to manufacture methamphetamine. In determining the kind of agreement or understanding that existed as to each Defendant, unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the agreement or understanding reached by a Defendant actually contemplated manufacturing methamphetamine, you will find that Defendant not guilty. 26 Relying on United States v. Kim, 884 F.2d 189, 193 (5th Cir.1989), they argue that a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on a theory of the defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence. 27 Initially, we observe that, as this Court clarified in its opinion denying rehearing in United States v. Stowell, 947 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.1991), reh'g denied, 953 F.2d 188 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1269, 117 L.Ed.2d 497 (1992), the defendants' contention is not a completely accurate statement of the law; in order for a defendant to be entitled to an instruction, any evidence in support of a defensive theory must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to rule in favor of the defendant on that theory. 953 F.2d at 189. 28 However, defendants' argument fails here for the separate reason that their theory amounts to little more than suggesting the nonexistence of one of the essential elements of the offense (criminal intent underlying their agreement). 2 The refusal to give a requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error if the instruction (1) was substantially correct, (2) was not substantially covered in the charge given to the jury, and (3) concerned an important issue so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present a given defense. United States v. Allison, 953 F.2d 870, 876 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir.1988). Here, the jury instructions fully set forth the requirements that Stone and Sienhausen must have genuinely reached an agreement or understanding, and that that agreement must have contemplated commission of the offense charged in the indictment. 3 The jury was also cautioned that mere presence at the scene of a transaction and mere similarity of conduct would not necessarily constitute proof of a conspiracy. Because the elements of agreement and intent--as well as the legal defenses based on lack of agreement--were substantially covered in the charge given to the jury, a theory of the defense that merely recounted the facts without those elements was not required. See United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1184-85 (5th Cir.1988); United States v. Barham, 595 F.2d 231, 244-45 (5th Cir.1979). 29 V. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Convictions for Aiding and Abetting an Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine 30 Stone and Sienhausen next challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions for attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, aided and abetted by each other. To be convicted of attempt under 21 U.S.C. § 846, a defendant must have been acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime which he is charged with attempting, and must have engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime, i.e., conduct strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent. United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114, 95 S.Ct. 792, 42 L.Ed.2d 812 (1975). To have aided and abetted a crime within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2, a defendant must have (1) associated with the criminal venture, (2) participated in the venture, and (3) sought by action to make the venture succeed. United States v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir.1991). 31 Sienhausen argues that, because Rogers admitted that he never saw any evidence of a manufacturing lab at her parents' house, and because there was no testimony as to what happened to the ephedrine after Rogers left the house, no rational trier of fact could have convicted Stone and her of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. Stone argues more particularly that, viewed objectively, his conduct cannot amount to a substantial step. We disagree. Stone's purchase of a precursor chemical from a purported black market salesman, while declaring a plan to use the chemical to manufacture methamphetamine and furnishing the salesman an accurate explanation of how to do so, was an act which, without any reliance on the accompanying mens rea, mark[s] the defendant's conduct as criminal in nature. United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1976). Although there may be some ambiguity over what precisely Stone and Sienhausen intended to do--i.e., whether they actually had a laboratory set up in Sienhausen's parents' house and sincerely intended to allow Rogers to observe, or whether they had an operation elsewhere and never intended to include Rogers--the purchase of the ephedrine was clearly a significant enough step toward that end to corroborate the firmness of their intent to carry out their plan, and (as discussed supra in Parts I and III) it was permissible for the jury to conclude that their objective was that described in the indictment. Moreover, a jury could rationally conclude that by making her parents' house available for the manufacturing operations themselves, or even merely for the dealings with Rogers that led to procurement of the ephedrine, Sienhausen participated in the venture and sought by action to make it succeed. 32