Opinion ID: 1774141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusive Means of Redress

Text: The first argument of Lakehouse and the Sponsors is based on the AIA Document, ¶¶ 4.3.2, 13.1.1, and 13.4.1. These three provisions, they contend, indicate that arbitration was not to be the exclusive means of redress. We disagree with that contention. First, ¶ 13.1.1. merely provides that [t]he Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the Project is located. However, the law in Alabama is that agreements to arbitrate are enforceable if they are part of a valid contract involving interstate commerce. Georgia Power Co. v. Partin, 727 So.2d 2, 5 (Ala. 1998) (applying the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ). Cf. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Jericho Management, Inc., 722 So.2d 740, 743 (Ala. 1998) (the phrase applicable law in a provision requiring arbitration unless arbitration would be `prohibited by applicable law' included both state and federal law and did not preclude enforcement of the arbitration provision) (opinion of three Justices, with two Justices concurring in the result). [3] Second, ¶ 13.4.1 states: Duties and obligations imposed by the Contract Documents and rights and remedies available thereunder shall be in addition to and not a limitation of duties, obligations, rights and remedies otherwise imposed or available by law. (Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs contend that [t]his provision allows the parties to choose rights and remedies they desire to choose such as the right to a jury trial through litigation. Brief of Appellees, at 15. In other words, they argue that the Construction Contract expressly allows the parties to choose the forum in which to seek redress, or, as they state it, that the contract indicates that either arbitration or litigation is appropriate. Id. (emphasis added). We do not understand how the contract could be implemented by the parties under this interpretation of ¶ 13.4.1. By definition, binding arbitration iscontrary to the terms of ¶ 13.4.1 as the plaintiffs interpret ita limitation on the right to litigate. In other words, one party cannot litigate while the other party arbitrates. Thus, the plaintiffs essentially argue that the parties included ¶¶ 4.5.1 to .7, which set forth in detail specific procedures to be followed in arbitration, only to negate in ¶ 13.4.1 those very provisions. We cannot construe the Construction Contract in such a manner. A court in construing contracts, which on their face are ambiguous, will look to the intention of the parties. Charles H. McCauley Assocs., Inc. v. Snook, 339 So.2d 1011, 1015 (Ala.1976). Courts cannot make contracts for parties, but must give such contracts as are made a reasonable construction and enforce them accordingly. Id. This is so, because `it is presumed that parties intend to make reasonable contracts.' Ex parte Bonds, 581 So.2d 484, 487 (Ala.1991) (quoting Weathers v. Weathers, 508 So.2d 272, 274 (Ala.Civ.App.1987)). To be sure, the parties mightin any dispute agree to litigate, and, in so doing, waive the right to compel arbitration. However, the same result would obtain in the absence of a contract, or if the contract was silent on the question of arbitration. Because the Construction Contract is not silent, the parties must have intended to limit the forum for redress. In this connection, Beaver contends: [Paragraph 13.4.1] does not address arbitration and in no way waives or alters Plaintiff's duty to arbitrate claims arising from or relating to the Contract. That [paragraph] merely preserves claims and remedies available at law, in addition to those in the contract. Plaintiffs may maintain those claims, rights, and remedies in arbitration. The fact that the claims will be resolved in arbitration will not change the duties and obligations under the contract nor will it change the rights and remedies available to the parties in arbitration. The only distinction will be the forum in which those rights and remedies are resolved. Reply Brief of Appellant, at 8 (emphasis added). We agree with Beaver's contentions. See Goodwin v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 970 F.Supp. 1007, 1014 (M.D.Ala.1997) ([A]rbitration is not a remedy, but a choice-of-forum in which to seek remedies (just as a jury trial is no more or less a remedy than a bench trial)....). Also under this heading, the plaintiffs argue that ¶ 4.3.2 contains the phrase arbitration or litigation (emphasis added), in order, they assert, to give the parties a choice. However, implementation of the Construction Contract under this interpretation would be unworkable, for the reasons just expressed. Because, as a practical matter, arbitration and litigation of the same subject matter are mutually exclusive, the plaintiffs' interpretation of the Construction Contract is unworkable. We next address the contention that the tort claims are not arbitrable.