Opinion ID: 1949793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Number Thirteen (13)

Text: I charge you that the mere fact that Samuel Dumas gave information and directions to Jimmy Bayles as to the details of the work or the manner of doing it does not make Jimmy Bayles the servant or employee of Samuel Dumas. Number Fourteen (14) I charge you that if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that Dumas Brothers Manufacturing Company, Inc., had the authoritative direction and control of Jimmy Bayles on the occasion concerned, and if you are further reasonably satisfied from the evidence that Samuel Dumas merely suggested to Jimmy Bayles the details or the necessary cooperation for the performance of the work furnished, then Jimmy Bayles was the employee of Dumas Brothers Manufacturing Company on such occasion and was not the employee of Samuel Dumas so as to hold Samuel Dumas liable for any negligence on the part of Jimmy Bayles. In the court's oral charge we find:    who was Jimmy Bayles acting for as agent on that occasion? Was he acting for the plaintiff, Dumas Brothers Manufacturing Company, or was he acting for the defendant, Samuel T. Dumas, Jr.? And also, if he was acting for either of them, was he acting within the line and scope of his employment or agency, or acting as agent, servant, or employee of his principal. Now, in connection with agency, the Court charges you an agent is a person who by agreement with another, called the principal, acts for the principal and is subject to his control. This agreement may be oral or written or implied from the conduct of the parties, and may be with or without compensation.             Now, mind you, either one could be acting through their agents, servants, or employees on that occasion, the defendant or the plaintiff, and the plaintiff or the defendant, if you find that this witness, Jimmy Bayles, was an agent then you would have to say who he was acting for.    The specific omissions which result in written charges of Dumas Brothers being incurable erroneous statements of law, according to Dumas, is the failure to qualify the word control by the words reserved right of and the failure to include the word consensual in describing the necessary consent, agreement or acquiescence of Bayles to be a loaned servant of Samuel Dumas. Admittedly these charges may not be the most carefully drafted, complete and precise statements of the factors to be considered by the jury in deciding whether, on the occasion, Bayles was a loaned servant of Dumas. On the other hand when one looks at the totality of the instructions by which the jury was guided in its resolution of this issue then the claimed defects in them assume Lilliputian proportions. Lucas is not apt, rather is Rule 51, ARCP. Taylor v. Owen, 294 Ala. 543, 319 So.2d 672. The totality of the jury instruction, oral and written was legally sufficient and the evidence adequate to authorize the jury to conclude that Bayles was the loaned servant of Dumas. The ultimate test is whose work was the servant doing at the time the complained of act was committed and under whose control was he doing it? Martin v. Anniston Foundry Co., 259 Ala. 633, 68 So.2d 323. Plaintiff's and defendant's given requested charges taken together and in conjunction with the whole of the court's oral charge does not, therefore, constitute reversible error. Error, if any, is error without injury since the charges viewed as an entity did not injuriously affect the substantial rights of Dumas. ARAP 45.
Dumas contends the trial court erred in not hearing and recording the testimony of a juror offered to impeach the verdict. He relies on Rule 43(c), ARCP in that part:    the court upon request shall take and report the evidence in full, unless it clearly appears that the evidence is not admissible on any ground    This gives Dumas the opportunity to place in the record what he was not allowed to adduce at the hearing of the post judgment motion unless    it clearly appears that the evidence is not admissible on any ground   . The court allowed Dumas to make a showing of what he expected to prove by the juror's testimony. After making that offer by reading the affidavit, counsel for Dumas asked the juror: When you went into the jury room what was the topic of discussion, and what statements did you hear made in the jury room? Dumas Brothers immediately objected and the court correctly sustained that objection. Such testimony is clearly not admissible on any ground. Weekley v. Horn, supra . AFFIRMED. HEFLIN, C.J., and BLOODWORTH, FAULKNER and ALMON, JJ., concur.