Opinion ID: 1571490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guilt-Phase Ineffectiveness

Text: Lynch first alleges that trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of his capital proceeding. With regard to such ineffectiveness claims, we employ a mixed standard of review, through which we defer to the circuit court's factual findings so long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but review its legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 771-72 (Fla.2004). Under this standard, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel performed effectively. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Therefore, the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional standards and was not a matter of sound trial strategy. State v. Williams, 797 So.2d 1235, 1238 (Fla.2001) (citing Jones v. State, 732 So.2d 313, 319 (Fla.1999)). We explained the standard for guilt-phase ineffectiveness claims with regard to pleas in Grosvenor v. State, 874 So.2d 1176 (Fla.2004). First, the defendant must specifically identify acts or omissions of counsel that were manifestly outside the wide range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional norms. See id. at 1179 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)). Second, [a] defendant who has pleaded guilty who claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to advise of an available defense establishes Strickland's prejudice prong by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Grosvenor, 874 So.2d at 1181. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Under the second prong of this test, [i]t is not necessary for the defendant to show that he actually would have prevailed at trial, although the strength of the government's case against the defendant should be considered in evaluating whether the defendant really would have gone to trial if he had received adequate advice from his counsel. Grosvenor, 874 So.2d at 1181 (quoting Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1069 (10th Cir.2001)). We will consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea, including such factors as whether a particular defense was likely to succeed at trial, the colloquy between the defendant and the trial court at the time of the plea, and the difference between the sentence imposed under the plea and the maximum possible sentence the defendant faced at a trial. Grosvenor, 874 So.2d at 1181-82. Having established the applicable standards, we address each of Lynch's guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaims below. We find that in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, trial counsel made the reasonable strategic determination that this was purely a penalty-phase case and that the soundest means of avoiding the imposition of a death sentence was to concentrate on presenting compelling mitigation evidence.
Lynch contends that his trial counsel did not properly research and inform him of the elements of, and defenses to, armed burglary, kidnapping, and first-degree murder and that, but for these errors, he would not have pled guilty. We disagree and, instead, find that trial counsel properly advised Lynch. Based on the nature of the crimes Lynch committed, and the fact that he confessed on at least three occasions, trial counsel believed that this was purely a sentencing case. Therefore, lead trial counsel, James E. Figgatt, in conjunction with co-counsel, Timothy Caudill, made a strategic decision to recommend that Lynch plead guilty and concentrate on mitigating his culpability for these offenses during the ensuing penalty phase. Counsel were particularly concerned with exposing Lynch to a jury because this case involved a thoroughly planned double murder of a mother and her thirteen-year-old minor daughter (although the murder of the daughter was an unintended, felony murder). During the postconviction hearing, Mr. Figgatt testified that he reviewed the indictment for defects and that he discussed possible defenses with Lynch before he pled guilty. Second-chair trial counsel, Mr. Caudill, did not believe that the facts of this case reasonably supported any theoretical defenses because Lynch had confessed to his actions during (1) a thirty- to forty-minute recorded conversation with a 911 dispatcher, (2) a discussion with a police negotiator, and (3) a videotaped confession (although Lynch characterized the murders as accidental). In Caudill's mind, the facts of this case were wholly inconsistent with accidental discharge, Lynch's actions supported a kidnapping charge, and the testimony of a neighborwho lived directly across the hall from the victimswas extremely damaging to any burglary defense. As we stated on direct appeal, the neighbor testified that she looked out of the peephole in her door after hearing the initial shots and saw Lynch dragging Morgan by the hands into Morgan's apartment. She further testified that Lynch knocked on the door to Morgan's apartment and said, Hurry up, open the door, your mom is hurt.  The neighbor testified that Morgan was screaming and was bloody from her waist down. Morgan's neighbor further testified that the door was opened, then after entering with Morgan, Lynch closed the door and approximately five minutes later she heard the sound of three more gunshots. Lynch, 841 So.2d at 367 (emphasis supplied). Lynch hinges this guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim on his reading of the factual proffer Mr. Figgatt presented to the trial court during Lynch's plea colloquy. In relevant part, Mr. Figgatt stated that Lynch went to [Roseanna Morgan's] new home..., he approached her daughter [Leah Caday] who was coming home from school, he gained entry voluntarily into the home at that point in time [(i.e., his initial entry) ]. Subsequently removed from a bag that he had, one of two or three firearms. And at that point in time the kidnapping ensues, as well as what we contend or what the State contends and we admit was, in essence, a burglary, because whatever consent he had to be there was gone. Subsequently, Ms. Morgan, ... arrived at her apartment, her home. She was met at the door, ... she had a heated discussion with [Lynch], and refused to come into the apartment with him there.... [Ms. Morgan] was shot on her front stoop or porch area in front of the apartment, and then pulled inside.... [Lynch] shot [Morgan] with more than one of the guns that he brought. ... Ms. Caday either went to her mother or attempted to leave and got in the way of the shooting and she was shot one time and she died.... While [Lynch] was there he called the Sanford Police Department or 911 and got the Sanford Police Department dispatcher, who remained on the line with him from thirty-five to forty-five minutes. There is no issue of fact. (Emphasis supplied.) Based on his reading of the proffer, Lynch contends that counsel and the trial court failed to comply with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(a), which states that [b]efore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the trial judge shall determine that the plea is voluntarily entered and that a factual basis for the plea exists. Counsel for the prosecution and the defense shall assist the trial judge in this function. (Emphasis supplied.) Lynch asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because the factual proffer did not legally support his convictions for first-degree murder, armed burglary, or kidnapping, and that this deficient performance constitutes fundamental error.
We find no deficiency with regard to the factual proffer as it addresses Lynch's two first-degree murder convictions. The proffer, upon which the trial court relied in accepting Lynch's plea, provided sufficient factual support for each first-degree murder conviction. Cf. Williams v. State, 316 So.2d 267, 271-73 (Fla.1975); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.172(a). According to the proffer, Lynch arrived at the victims' apartment, held the daughter-victim (Leah Caday) hostage, and then subsequently shot and killed both victims after the mother-victim (Roseanna Morgan) arrived at the apartment. There was no deficiency. Lynch's killing of Morgan was an intentional, premeditated first-degree murder, and his killing of Caday was both first-degree felony murder and first-degree murder under the doctrine of transferred intent. See § 782.04(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (1999) (premeditated murder); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2 (defining premeditation and transferred intent); § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (felony murder committed while engaged in the murder or attempted murder of another); Johnson v. State, 969 So.2d 938, 951 (Fla.2007) (Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as `the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted.' (quoting Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1993))), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2056, 170 L.Ed.2d 799 (2008); Lee v. State, 141 So.2d 257, 259 (Fla.1962) (explaining our adherence to the doctrine of transferred intent). However, even if we were to conclude that counsel performed deficiently with regard to the proffer, Lynch cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this deficiency because both he and counsel were well aware that the State possessed the necessary evidence to prove his commission of these murders. The State submitted a competing written factual proffer, which was more explicit in describing the offenses Lynch committed on March 5, 1999. Trial counsel offered their factual proffer in the hope of softening some or all of the facts for purposes of the penalty phase. As Mr. Figgatt recognized during the postconviction hearing, this was a sentencing case, this always was a sentencing case. When Mr. Lynch finished his thirty to forty-five minute conversation with the [911] dispatcher and the acts that were done were done, this was a sentencing case.... This was not a trial in the sense of guilt or innocence. (Emphasis supplied.) The evidence and testimony presented during the penalty phase more than adequately support the two first-degree murder convictions. Lynch thoroughly planned and executed the murder portion of his murder-suicide plot (i.e., the murder of Roseanna Morgan). As we determined on direct appeal: (1) Lynch drafted a murder-suicide letter in which he disclosed his plan to kill Roseanna Morgan and then commit suicide; (2) Lynch packed a bag with three loaded firearms and brought them with him to the victims' apartment; (3) Lynch concealed his vehicle to prevent the victims from seeing it; (4) Lynch held Leah Caday hostage for thirty to forty minutes while he waited for her mother; (5) Lynch shot Morgan five times (four times with the Glock G30 and once with another weapon); and (6) Lynch shot Caday while in the process of murdering Morgan. Lynch, 841 So.2d at 366-79. Additionally, the facts established during the penalty phase clearly demonstrated that Lynch had not only exhibited a premeditated intent to murder Morgan, but had also exhibited the heightened premeditation necessary to support the CCP statutory aggravator as we held on direct appeal. See id. at 373. The facts also support Lynch's conviction for the first-degree murder of Caday. The sentencing court found that Lynch did not intend to kill Caday; however, the court also recognized that intent is not an issue where one kills another in the course of committing an enumerated felony. See § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(e)-(f), (o), Fla. Stat. (1999) (to kill another while engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, e. Burglary, f. Kidnapping, o. Murder of another human being, is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 (emphasis supplied)). Thus, the unintentional killing of Caday during the intentional, premeditated killing of Morgan renders the killing of Caday a murder in the first degree and a capital felony. Lynch's armed-burglary and kidnapping felonies also render the killing of Caday first-degree felony murder. Furthermore, the doctrine of transferred intent converts the unintentional killing of Caday into a first-degree capital murder. This Court held in Lee v. State that one who kills a person through mistaken identity or accident, with a premeditated design to kill another is guilty of murder in the first degree. ... The law transfers the felonious intent in such a case to the actual object of his assault, and the homicide so committed is murder in the first degree. 141 So.2d at 259 (emphasis supplied). The indictment alleges that Lynch possessed a premeditated design to murder both Morgan and Caday. [7] The sentencing court found that Lynch only possessed an intent to murder Morgan. Competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Lynch did not intend to kill Caday. These facts are not defenses to first-degree murder because the felony-murder rule and the doctrine of transferred intent apply under these circumstances. In sum, the factual proffer was adequate to support each first-degree murder conviction. Further, even assuming that counsel were deficient in this regard (which they were not), the facts of this case reveal that any hypothetical prejudice Lynch may have suffered from his counsel's off-the-cuff factual proffer was de minimis and would not have altered his decision to plead guilty. Counsel and Lynch were well aware of the wealth of evidence supporting the allegations that Lynch committed two first-degree murders on March 5, 1999. Moreover, the trial court was exceptionally thorough in its colloquy with Lynch before it allowed him to enter his guilty pleas, and trial counsel only submitted Lynch's competing factual proffer to soften the facts for purposes of the penalty phase. Lynch has thus not satisfied his burden under Grosvenor, 874 So.2d at 1179-80.
Lynch next contends that our decisions in Delgado v. State, 776 So.2d 233 (Fla.2000), and State v. Ruiz, 863 So.2d 1205 (Fla.2003), compel the conclusion that he did not commit a burglary on March 5, 1999, and that he would not have pled guilty had counsel informed him of this case law. He premises this contention on the following portion of his guilt-phase factual proffer: [H]e gained entry voluntarily into the home at that point in time [ (i.e., his initial entry) ]. Subsequently removed from a bag that he had, one of two or three firearms. And at that point in time the kidnapping ensues, as well as what we contend or what the State contends and we admit was, in essence, a burglary, because whatever consent he had to be there was gone. (Emphasis supplied.) The 1999 version of section 810.02, Florida Statutes, which applies to Lynch's armed burglary, states: Burglary means entering or remaining in a dwelling ... with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain. (Emphasis supplied.) In Delgado, we held that the rule of lenity (codified in section 775.021(1), Florida Statutes) required that the remaining in element of burglary be limited to situations where the defendant surreptitiously remains after having received consent to enter; otherwise, the State could charge that a burglary had occurred in any situation in which an individual entered a dwelling with consent and later committed an offense therein. In Ruiz, we stated: [T]he essence of Delgado is that evidence of a crime committed inside the dwelling, structure, or conveyance of another cannot, in and of itself, establish the crime of burglary. Stated differently, the State cannot use the criminal act to prove both intent and revocation of the consent to enter. 863 So.2d at 1211 (quoting Delgado, 776 So.2d at 238). Delgado applies to burglaries committed before February 1, 2000, which had not been finally adjudicated at the time this Court issued its opinion in that case (i.e., August 24, 2000). See Ruiz, 863 So.2d at 1212. Lynch committed this armed burglary on March, 5, 1999, and his direct appeal was not finalized until January 9, 2003. See Lynch, 841 So.2d at 362. [8] Consequently, Delgado applies to Lynch's armed-burglary offense. Lynch is correct that during his guilt-phase proceeding trial counsel misapprehended the then-existing nature of burglary. The facts counsel proffered during the plea colloquy would not support a burglary conviction under Delgado because counsel stated Lynch entered the victims' apartment with the consent of Leah Caday. The State could not have used the kidnapping of Caday and the murders of Caday and Morgan to prove the burglary elements of (1) lack of consent or revocation of consent and (2) intent to commit an offense within the dwelling. See Ruiz, 863 So.2d at 1211. However, any deficiency in this regard did not prejudice Lynch because trial counsel and Lynch were well aware that he exited the apartment and thereafter sought a non-consensual reentry after having wounded Morgan with three shots from the Glock G30. Lynch knocked on the door to Morgan's apartment and said [to Caday], `Hurry up, open the door, your mom is hurt.'  Lynch, 841 So.2d at 371 (emphasis supplied). Consent to enter induced through fraud or deceit is illusory as a matter of law, and we conclude that the same rationale applies to consent induced through coercion or implied threat of force. Cf., e.g., Andrews v. State, 973 So.2d 1280, 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that consent obtained through fraud or deceit (i.e., false pretense) is a legal nullity). Lynch compelled a minor to open the door of her apartment by shooting her mother and then using her mother's injuries to gain access to the dwelling with the intent to commit an offense therein (i.e., the murder of Roseanna Morgan). This is not a consensual entry. Lynch and his trial counsel knew that the State possessed facts sufficient to establish burglary. Therefore, the facts of this case reveal that any prejudice Lynch alleges that he may have suffered from his counsel's off-the-cuff factual proffer would not have altered his decision to plead guilty to the offense of armed burglary.
In the final portion of this guiltphase ineffectiveness subclaim, Lynch contends that the factual proffer is legally insufficient to support a kidnapping conviction under our decisions in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla.1983), and Berry v. State, 668 So.2d 967 (Fla.1996). Lynch cannot demonstrate prejudice and, for this reason, we need not address whether the performance of counsel was deficient. See Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986) (A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied.). In Faison, we recognized that the plain text of section 787.01, Florida Statutes, could lead to potentially absurd results. To limit the scope of this statute, and to prevent any crime that involves some level of confinement or detention from also constituting a kidnapping, we adopted the three-part test articulated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720 (1976): [I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or confinement: (a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; (b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and (c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. Faison, 426 So.2d at 965 (quoting Buggs, 547 P.2d at 731) (emphasis supplied). We also explained that we had previously adopted the view that subsection 787.01(1)(a)2 did not apply to unlawful confinements or movements that were merely incidental to other felonies, but [had] recognized an exception in the case of hostages.  426 So.2d at 966 (emphasis supplied) (explaining the holding of Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031, 1036-37 (Fla.1982)). In Berry, we reaffirmed our adherence to the Faison/Buggs test and stated that the inquiry into whether a kidnapping has occurred does not end with an examination of the statute. ... [T]here can be no kidnapping where the only confinement involved is the sort that, though not necessary to the underlying felony, is likely to naturally accompany it. Berry 668 So.2d at 969 (emphasis supplied). Here, Lynch maintains that his confinement of Caday was wholly incidental to the murders of Caday and Morgan. This assertion is inconsistent with the facts of this case. Lynch approached Caday and lured her into her apartment by stating that he wished to speak with her mother. Once inside, Lynch withdrew a number of firearms from his bag, and he has subsequently admitted that (1) Caday was aware of the firearms, (2) he technically held Caday hostage, (3) she was terrified, and (4) she only complied with his demands based on fear. Under the three-part Faison test and the hostage exception from Mobley, Lynch committed a kidnapping on March 5, 1999. First, his movement of Caday was not inconsequential. He wanted access to Caday's apartment to kill her mother, Roseanna Morgan, and he lured Caday there by stating that he wanted to speak to Morgan. Second, Lynch's kidnapping and confinement of Caday was not inherent in his intentional murder of Morgan and his erstwhile unintentional killing of Caday. Lynch could have killed Morgan without ever holding Caday hostage, as evidenced by his frequent trips to Morgan's place of business prior to the events of March 5, 1999, and Lynch did not intend to kill Caday. Third and finally, Lynch's kidnapping of Caday made his murder of Morgan substantially easier ... [and] substantially lessen[ed] the risk of detection, because Caday otherwise could have warned her mother or notified neighbors and law enforcement that an armed man was stationed in her apartment waiting for her mother to return home. Faison, 426 So.2d at 965; Berry, 668 So.2d at 969. Trial counsel and Lynch were well aware that the facts of this case supported a kidnapping charge and conviction. Therefore, any prejudice Lynch allegedly suffered from his counsel's factual proffer was de minimis and would not have altered his decision to plead guilty to the offense of kidnapping. Trial counsel's verbal factual proffer in response to the State's written proffer was not deficient with regard to the first-degree murder charges. With regard to the remaining charges, the proffer did not materially prejudice Lynch because counsel and Lynch knew that the facts of this case clearly supported convictions for both offenses. Furthermore, as stated above, the trial court was exceptionally thorough in its colloquy with Lynch, and trial counsel only submitted a competing factual proffer to soften the facts for purposes of the penalty phase. Consequently, we deny relief with regard to this guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim.
In his second guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim, Lynch contends that trial counsel were ineffective by failing to advise him with regard to the confidential marital-communications privilege codified in section 90.504, Florida Statutes (2000). Lynch claims that had counsel adequately researched this privilege and informed him of its application, he would not have pled guilty. Specifically, Lynch states that the timely assertion of this privilege would have allowed him to suppress (1) the murder-suicide letter he wrote to his wife, Virginia Lynch, on March 3, 1999, and (2) the phone calls he placed to her on March 5, 1999. Without these central pieces of evidence, Lynch claims that it would have been much easier for counsel to establish the defense theory that these killings were purely accidental and that, as a result, he would have proceeded to trial. We disagree because Lynch cannot demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as the result of this alleged deficiency. Lead trial counsel, Mr. Figgatt, testified during the postconviction proceeding that he elected not to file a motion to suppress the murder-suicide letter based on his belief that the letter was a nonprivileged communication. Counsel testified that he consulted a Florida evidence treatise and spoke to an appellate-division public defender concerning the potential suppression of the letter. [The treatise] basically told me that if the communication was intended to be distributed to third parties, I was sort of stuck.... [Mr. Lynch] directed [his wife] to send this information that he was providing in the letter to the parents of his estranged girlfriend, Miss Morgan. Figgatt's co-counsel, Mr. Caudill, testified that he and Figgatt believed that they lacked any valid privilege-based legal argument to suppress the letter, but could not recall whether they reviewed any specific cases. Based on the content of the letter, counsel may have possessed a nonfrivolous basis to contend that Lynch did not intend to disclose all of the information he related to his wife and did not intend that his wife distribute the letter itself. See, e.g., Bolin v. State, 793 So.2d 894, 896 (Fla.2001) (If... the trial court determines from the circumstances in which the letter was sent and from the content of the letter itself that the letter constituted a voluntary consent to such disclosure, then the marital privilege would be waived pursuant to section 90.507. ... If the court determines, however, that the circumstances together with the content of the letter do not indicate that [the defendant] voluntarily consented to disclosure ..., then there was not a waiver. (footnote omitted)) (quoting and reaffirming the totality-based test articulated in Bolin v. State, 650 So.2d 19, 21 (Fla.1995)). In relevant part, Lynch's March 3, 1999, murder-suicide letter stated: [Y]ou will find copy of a letter she gave me Jan 11, and a card she gave me Feb 2, a week before it ended. You can see how [unreadable] we were and how animalistic she was sexually in card. She loved [Lynch's son] Steven too, [unreadable] fed him bottle, changed his diaper, gave him banana. Make copies of the letter and card for me and copies of photos, just print them out on printer, don't have to be full page just 4 X 6 or so. I want you to send copies of letter + card and pictures to her family, Mom + dad in Hawaii, address is [statement of address]. [Repetition of address in ALL-CAPS text]  her SS#was [  - -   ] born 4/1/68. I want them to have a sense of why it happened, some decent closure, a reason and understanding, they are good parents like yours. I want them to know what she did, the pain she caused, that it was not just a random act of violence. (Emphasis supplied.) Mr. Figgatt conceded during the postconviction proceeding that one reading of the letter could support the interpretation that Lynch only wanted his wife to make copies of the January 11 and February 2 correspondence from Roseanna Morgan, along with copies of the nude photographs he had taken of Morgan, and to send these materials to Morgan's family in Hawai'i. Notwithstanding this very debatable interpretation of the murder-suicide letter, the postconviction court correctly interpreted the letter, and its more persuasive interpretation is supported by competent, substantial evidence: The Court has carefully read the three exhibits in question and concludes that mere disclosure of Exhibits 24 and 25 [Roseanna Morgan's correspondence dated January 11, 1999, and February 2, 1999] would not have accomplished Lynch's stated purpose of providing the victim's parents and Virginia Lynch's parents [with] a sense of why it happened, some decent closure, a reason and understanding. ... I want them to know what she did, the pain she caused, that it was not just a random act of violence.... Those two exhibits contain expressions of affection and ... a sense of frustration over the break up of the relationship with Roseanna Morgan, but they do not provide a reason and understanding of why it happened. Nor do they explain the pain she caused. Only the disclosure of the contents of the murder-suicide letter, Exhibit 11, would accomplish that purpose. For that reason, the Court concludes that Lynch intended for the contents of Exhibit 11 to be disclosed. ... (Emphasis supplied.) (The postconviction court based its analysis on section 90.507, Florida Statutes.) [9] The postconviction court's reasoning focused upon waiver under section 90.507, Florida Statutes (2000), and there is a threshold issue with regard to the murder-suicide letter: Based on the totality of circumstances, did Lynch ever intend that the letter constitute a confidential communication? Section 90.504(1), Florida Statutes (2000), the subsection codifying the confidential marital-communications privilege, states: A spouse has a privilege during and after the marital relationship to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, communications which were intended to be made in confidence between the spouses while they were husband and wife. (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, despite the fact that we broadly construe this privilege to protect spousal confidences, [10] the confidential marital-communications privilege only applies to communications that were originally intended to be confidential. Here, the letter itself represented Lynch's entreaty to his wife that she disclose all of this information to the victims' family in Hawai'i. Therefore, Lynch never intended for this message to constitute a confidential marital communication. With regard to Lynch's phone calls to his wife during the commission of these offenses, at least one of these conversations occurred in the presence of Leah Caday. We found on direct appeal: During the course of these events on March 5, 1999, appellant telephoned his wife three times from the apartment. His wife testified that during the first call she could hear a woman screaming in the background [Leah Caday]. Appellant's wife further testified that the screaming woman sounded very, very upset.  When Lynch called a second time, he admitted to having just shot someone. Lynch, 841 So.2d at 366 (emphasis supplied). At a minimum, Caday was alive during Lynch's first phone call and may have been bleeding to death during Lynch's second and third phone calls. Therefore, competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction court's finding and reasoning that the first conversation was nonprivileged because it occurred in the presence of a third person (Leah Caday) and was not intended to be privileged. See § 90.507, Fla. Stat. (2000) (A person who has a privilege against the disclosure of a confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person ... makes the communication when he or she does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy .... (emphasis supplied)); see also Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 27 n. 30 (Fla.2003) (noting in persuasive dicta that [a]s a general rule, when third party eavesdroppers hear otherwise privileged communications, the communications are not privileged unless the communicating parties had a reasonable expectation of privacy  (emphasis supplied)). As to the subsequent phone conversations, the postconviction court found that Lynch repeated his statements to Joyce Fagan, the 911 dispatcher; therefore, Lynch apparently did not intend it to be privileged since he repeated it, but even if it was intended to be privileged, it was cumulative to his later statement and not prejudicial. In Koon v. State, 463 So.2d 201, 204 (1985), we held that a defendant who confessed to his wife concerning a murderand repeated this statement to his son and mother-in-lawhad not waived the confidential marital-communications privilege. Thus, repetition (in and of itself) does not automatically indicate that the privilege-holder consents to his or her spouse (as opposed to a third party) revealing the contents of the repeated marital communication. Nevertheless, Virginia Lynch stated during a sworn statement on March 16, 1999, that her sister Juliette participated in the third phone call with Richard Lynch. Therefore, the record contains evidence that the third phone call was not a confidential marital communication because it occurred in the presence of a third party who actually participated in the conversation. See § 90.507, Fla. Stat. (2000); Taylor, 855 So.2d at 27 n. 30. Conversely, assuming that Caday and Morgan were dead during the second phone call, this call may have been a confidential marital communication. Trial counsel thus could have objected to Virginia Lynch's penalty-phase testimony concerning her second phone conversation with Lynch. Despite this arguable contention, competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction court's finding that the subsequent phone calls were cumulative to Lynch's 911 phone conversation with Joyce Fagan. During the 911 call, Lynch stated: (1) that he had shot two people, that he did not intend to do it, and that they had begun to scream; (2) that he accidentally shot Caday; (3) that the Glock accidentally discharged; (4) that he planned to commit suicide; (5) that he shot Morgan with two different firearms and that he put her out of her misery ; (6) that he wanted Morgan to repay his $6,000 credit-card debt; (7) that Morgan drove me to it ; (8) that he brought three loaded firearms to the victims' apartment; (9) that Morgan was still breathing when he executed her and that this is not cold blooded, this was not a thing of if I can't have her no one else will ; (10) that this was a moment of rage; (11) that he planned to leave his wife; (12) that Morgan had endured some body hits before he shot her in the back of the head, and that he had dragged her into the apartment to speak with her; (13) that Caday was terrified throughout this ordeal; (14) that he intentionally parked his vehicle in a concealed location to prevent the victims from seeing it and panicking; (15) that he was not a cold-blooded executioner; and (16) that this was just one of these lover things, you know ; and (17) that he wanted to speak with a police negotiator to arrange his surrender. (Emphasis supplied.) Lynch also repeated many of these statements to Stephanie Ryan, the Sanford Police negotiator, and Kristin Ziegler, an investigator with the Sanford Police Department. Therefore, the material substance of Lynch's phone conversations with his wife would have been placed in evidence through the testimony of other witnesses, and Lynch has suffered no prejudice in this regard. We deny relief on this subclaim.
Lynch's third guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim is that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the items seized from his home on March 5, 9 and 17, 1999. We deny this claim because Lynch cannot demonstrate that he has suffered any prejudice. Cf. e.g., Maxwell, 490 So.2d at 932 (explaining that the Court need not address Strickland' s deficient-performance prong if the defendant-appellant cannot satisfy the prejudice prong). As a preliminary matter, Lynch's warrant-overbreadth ineffectiveness subclaim fails to the extent that he challenges evidence which the police seized but which the State never presented during his trial. See, e.g., Doorbal v. State, 983 So.2d 464, 500 (Fla.2008) (holding that defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of certain statements was without merit because the State ultimately did not introduce the statements into evidence). Further, the majority of the allegedly objectionable items did not directly relate to Lynch's guilt (e.g., additional correspondence between Lynch and the victims, photos, credit-card statements and receipts, a computer, media-storage devices (CDs, diskettes, etc.), a grey lockbox, Lynch's firearms collection, Lynch's firearms-periodical collection, Lynch's cameras and photography collection, and Lynch's pornography collection). On at least three separate occasions, Lynch had previously admitted that he killed the victims: (1) a recorded conversation with a 911 dispatcher, (2) a conversation with a police negotiator, and (3) a videotaped interrogation with police investigators. Therefore, it is improbable that any knowledge of the hypothetical ability to suppress these items would have altered Lynch's decision to plead guilty. Second, with regard to trial counsel's supposed failure to seek suppression of the murder-suicide letter, we need not address whether counsel rendered deficient performance because the letter was plainly admissible under established Fourth Amendment precedent, viz., decisions outlining the plain-view doctrine. As this Court has explained: [A] warrantless seizure of evidence found in plain view is admissible if at the time of the search: (1) the seizing officer was legitimately in a place where the object could be plainly viewed; (2) the incriminating nature of the seized object was immediately apparent to the police officer; and (3) the seizing officer had a lawful right of access to the object itself. See Horton [ v. California ], 496 U.S. [128,] at 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301 [110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)]. With regard to the third requirement, the [High] Court explained that the seizing officer may lawfully seize an incriminating object if the officer has probable cause prior to the seizure and it was discovered within the parameters of a validly executed search warrant or one of the exceptions to the [Fourth Amendment's general] warrant [requirement]. See id. at 138, 110 S.Ct. 2301; accord Jones v. State, 648 So.2d 669, 676 (Fla. 1994). Indeed, seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) ( quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). Rimmer v. State, 825 So.2d 304, 313 (Fla. 2002). In this case, Mrs. Lynch provided sworn deposition testimony disclosing that (1) police officers were present in the Lynch home on a consensual basis [11] shortly following the March 5, 1999, murders of Roseanna Morgan and Leah Caday; (2) the police officers were already independently aware of the murder-suicide letter; and (3) Mrs. Lynch was in the process of reading this letter in the officers' presence. Based upon our independent review, it is abundantly clear from the record that these officers requested Mrs. Lynch relinquish the letter because of its evident connection to these murders. Therefore, we conclude that the police officers  who were then present in the Lynch home on a consensual basis  possessed probable cause to seize the murder-suicide letter, which Mrs. Lynch was reading in plain view. Cf., e.g., Brown, 460 U.S. at 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535 ([P]robable cause is a flexible, commonsense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,' that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such belief be correct or more likely true than false. A `practical, nontechnical' probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. (citation omitted)( citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925))). Lynch has thus suffered no prejudice because the murdersuicide letter was plainly admissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution. The nonexistent ability to suppress this evidence could not have affected Lynch's decision to plead guilty. Accordingly, we deny relief on this subclaim.
In his fourth and final guilt-phase ineffectiveness subclaim, Lynch alleges that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate an accidental-discharge defense and that he would have proceeded to trial had he been aware of this defense. We disagree. The evidence presented during both the penalty phase and postconviction proceedings is clearly inconsistent with an accidental-discharge defense. Consequently, as a matter of sound strategy, trial counsel elected not to waste finite time and resources preparing such a defense. [T]rial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise an issue that, as illustrated in the evidentiary hearing testimony, is clearly unsupported by the record.  Power v. State, 886 So.2d 952, 959 (Fla.2004) (emphasis supplied). Competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction court's analysis of this issue: The Glock in question is a large semiautomatic handgun. It is inconceivable that a person could accidentally fire such a weapon seven times for a number of reasons. First, this weapon makes a lot of noise when it is fired. The noise would alert a person who accidentally pulls the trigger once and the person would not continue to pull the trigger a number of times. Second, because this weapon is a semi-automatic pistol, the trigger must be pulled each time the weapon is fired. Third, large caliber semi-automatic pistols deliver a recoil kick when fired that tends to throw the barrel upwards and away from the target. It is necessary to re-aim this type of weapon towards the general direction of the target each time the trigger is pulled unless the weapon is being fired in a totally random manner. The evidence in this case does not support random firing. Fourth, there is no mistaking when the firearm is discharging a round. The noise, the recoil, the smoke, and the smell of gunpowder immediately brings to the shooter's attention the fact that a round has been discharged. Fifth, it stretches the imagination to think that a person could accidentally discharge a semi-automatic weapon seven times and accidentally hit the same person four of the seven times. In such a situation, the person is a target and not the unintended victim of an accidental discharge. Sixth, the Court took the time to inspect the weapon in chambers, and the trigger pull is not even close to being a hair trigger. Seventh, it is undisputed that Lynch carried several firearms to Roseanna Morgan's apartment and fired a 9mm Luger in addition to the Glock. There was considerable ballistics testimony about the Glock pistol during the penalty phase hearing. Officer Doug Bottalico testified he found several projectiles at the crime scene. One projectile was located in the living room. Another projectile was located in the inside of the front door frame. There was also a bullet hole in the wall of the foyer. Thus, in order to find Mr. Ruel's [Lynch's postconviction firearms expert] testimony credible, the Court would have to believe Lynch accidentally discharged the firearm while he was positioned at different locations throughout the apartment and then accidentally shot Leah Caday in the back. Moreover, Nanette Rudolph, who is employed with the firearms department of the Orlando Regional Crime Lab for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, testified during the penalty phase. Ms. Rudolph testified that she completed a two-year formal training program in firearms identification. She explained that her training and work experience included examination of projectiles to match them with weapons. Ms. Rudolph testified that she tested the Glock, and the Glock was operating correctly and that the trigger pull was within normal specifications. She also explained that the Glock was a semi-automatic weapon which requires an individual to release the trigger each time before firing the next shot. She testified that a semiautomatic will fire only once if a person tenses up and pulls the trigger without releasing it. Automatic weapons will continue to fire as long as the trigger is pulled or until the weapon runs out of ammunition. Additionally, during the penalty phase, Dr. Seiber, the medical examiner, testified that the projectile that caused injury to Roseanna Morgan's eye, entered her eye and exited from her neck, and not the other way around as Mr. Ruel testified. . . . . The Court concludes that calling a ballistics expert to testify about the murder weapon would not have benefited the defendant at trial. (Record references omitted.) The only evidence contained in the record supporting an accidental-discharge claim consisted of (1) Lynch's self-serving rationalization that he accidentally shot Roseanna Morgan four times, accidentally shot Leah Caday in the back, and then switched weapons to put [Morgan] out of her misery by intentionally shooting her in the back of the head; and (2) Roy Ruel's unsubstantiated assertion during the postconviction proceeding that one can unintentionally discharge a properly functioning Glock G30 seven separate times, while striking an unintended target with nearly sixty-percent accuracy (Lynch fired seven shots from the Glock and struck Morgan four times). Trial counsel made a strategic decision not to assert a baseless defense, and [c]ounsel's strategic decisions will not be second-guessed on collateral attack. Johnson v. State, 769 So.2d 990, 1001 (Fla.2000) (citing Remeta v. Dugger, 622 So.2d 452 (Fla.1993)). The strategic decision of trial counsel not to pursue an accidental-discharge defense did not affect Lynch's election to plead guilty because the facts of this case are simply inconsistent with accidental discharge. Moreover, this analysis applies with equal force to Lynch's penalty-phase accidental-discharge claim.