Opinion ID: 1365689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Salary Claims and Procedural Defenses

Text: All plaintiffs claim additional compensation that would make what they receive for part-time work proportionate to the amounts paid full-time employees as provided by section 13503.1. [8] (7) The plaintiffs employed after November 8, 1967, however, are not entitled to that section's benefits because of its express exclusion of any person classified as a temporary employee under Section 13337 and 13337.5. Since section 13337 and section 13337.5 each contains its own provisions for temporary classification, not dependent on those of any other section, we construe section 13503.1's exclusion to apply to employees such as plaintiffs who are classified under section 13337.5 alone. As to the plaintiffs employed before November 8, 1967, the Court of Appeal correctly resolved their claims of additional compensation and the procedural defenses raised by the district. We therefore adopt the following parts of Justice Devine's opinion covering these matters: (8-11) [Section 13503.1] requires pro rata pay for part-time regular or contract employees. Thus, apart from the defenses of the statute of limitations, laches and failure to seek administrative relief, the three pre-1967 plaintiffs are entitled to prorated wages as back pay. Against this conclusion, the district argues that section 13503.1 applies only to elementary and secondary schools and schools for the handicapped by its reference to sections 11003 to 11008, inclusive, and to 11052. But this reference merely points out the places where a minimum school day is defined. Section 13503.1 refers to `[ a ] ny person employed by a district.' (Italics added.) Further, the reference to 13337 and 13337.5, in excluding temporary employees classified under these sections, clearly implies that section 13503.1 does embrace community college districts in its positive part, otherwise the specific exclusion would be unnecessary. The district contends that the instructors are bound by the terms of their employment contracts. This is so when there is no statutory provision to the contrary. But it is not so in the face of statutory specification. ( Campbell v. Graham-Armstrong [1973] 9 Cal.3d 482, 486-487 [107 Cal. Rptr. 777, 509 P.2d 689].) In Campbell, the teachers had contracted to teach one session of kindergarten at part-time salary at a rate of pay below the minimum salary set by statute for full-time employees. On the issue of a contractual waiver, it was held that pursuant to section 13338.1, the teachers' contractual agreement did not preclude their entitlement to full-time salary. The part-time employee who has attained regular or contract status `generally serves under conditions comparable to those of his full-time counterpart.' ( Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist., supra, [11 Cal.3d] at p. 829.) The three regular teachers are entitled, under substantive law, section 13503.1, to pro rata pay.