Opinion ID: 1392599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Relation to Legislative Purpose

Text: We first must determine the legislative purpose sought to be affected through the enactment of Section 33-55-210. Legislative intent is best determined by examining the language of the statute itself. Samson , 368 S.E. (2d) at 667. (Citing Gambrell v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 280 S.C. 69, 310 S.E. (2d) 814 (1983)). The language of Section 33-55-210 indicates a clear legislative purpose to encourage the formation of charitable organizations, to promote charitable organizations. Furthermore, we held previously in Talley v. South Carolina Higher Education Tuition Grants Committee , 289 S.C. 483, 347 S.E. (2d) 99, 100 (1986) that it was rational for a government to make distinctions between those in business for profit and those who have eleemosynary motives. We, therefore, hold that the limitation of liability in Section 33-55-210 bears a rational relationship to the legislative goal. Doe argues that the legislative purpose of Section 33-55-210 is not rational because of this court's decision in Fitzer v. Greater Greenville, South Carolina, Young Men's Christian Association , 277 S.C. 1, 282 S.E. (2d) 230 (1981). In Fitzer , however, this court did not address the constitutionality of the charitable immunity doctrine. There, this court abrogated South Carolina's common law charitable immunity doctrine without considering the applicability of the equal protection clause. Doe's counsel conceded at oral argument that Fitzer was not dispositive of the equal protection argument. Since Fitzer is distinguishable from the case at bar, we find that it is not controlling of whether or not the legislative purpose of Section 33-55-210 is reasonable.