Opinion ID: 1926802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defendant's Pro Se Motion of August 1995

Text: Defendant next claims that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by refusing to consider a motion filed by defendant pro se. As we have recognized, `[a] criminal defendant does not have an absolute right to both self-representation and the assistance of counsel.' State v. Sims, 158 Vt. 173, 185, 608 A.2d 1149, 1156 (1991) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir.1981)). Defendant concedes, however, that the trial court has complete discretion in managing hybrid representation. As a court has the discretionary right to deny hybrid representation, it has the corollary discretionary right to control any hybrid representation it does permit. Id. (citing United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1121 (1st Cir.1989)). The record reveals that the court considered the fact that hybrid representation is generally not allowed, and considered the specific circumstances in this case. The court noted: [h]ere, the Defendant is represented by counsel. He has not waived his right to counsel nor has he requested to proceed pro se. He may not therefore initiate proceedings without following standard court procedure. In this case, court procedure mandates that all motions and pleadings be submitted by his attorney. The trial court weighed the issues at stake in hybrid representation and made a decision based on the specific facts of the case. There was no abuse or withholding of discretion.