Opinion ID: 2635349
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Signature on a telephonic warrant

Text: This case presents the question of whether a telephonic warrant is valid if signed by a prosecuting attorney at the direction of a magistrate judge. Idaho Code section 19-4406 governs the issuance of a telephonic warrant. That section provides: If the magistrate is thereupon satisfied of the existence of the grounds of the application, or that there is probable cause to believe their existence, he must issue a search warrant, signed by him with his name of office, to a peace officer in his county, commanding him forthwith to search the person or place named, for the property specified, and to bring it before the magistrate. If the affidavit for the warrant is related to the court telephonically, the magistrate may verbally authorize a peace officer to sign the magistrate's name on a duplicate original warrant, which verbal authorization shall be recorded and transcribed. After service of the warrant, this duplicate original warrant must be returned to the magistrate who authorized the signing of his name on it. The magistrate shall then endorse his name and enter the date on the warrant when it is returned to him. Any failure of the magistrate to make such an endorsement does not in itself invalidate the warrant. Originally, the State challenged Zueger's motion to suppress by arguing that, for the purposes of I.C. § 19-4406, a prosecutor qualifies as a peace officer. On appeal, the State raised the alternate argument that I.C. § 19-4406 authorizes a magistrate judge to designate anyone, including a prosecutor, to sign a telephonic warrant on his or her behalf. Admittedly, the State did not raise this argument before the district court and raises it only now on appeal. However, the arguments raised regarding the validity of the warrant were premised on the validity of the prosecutor's signature on the warrant, and fairly encompass the additional argument the State now raises. It is not necessary for us to accept the State's expansive reading of I.C. § 19-4406 to reach the conclusion that the evidence seized from Zueger's home was improperly suppressed. While that statute limits those who may sign a magistrate judge's name to a warrant to the magistrate herself or an authorized peace officer, the procedural defect that results from a magistrate judge authorizing a prosecutor to sign the magistrate's name to a warrant does not result in a constitutional violation in this instance. In order to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, there must be a defect which calls into question the Constitution's requirement of a finding of probable cause to justify issuance of the warrant. Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue without a finding of probable cause. . . . In the instant case, nothing was presented to the district court which raised an issue about the magistrate judge's determination that probable cause had been presented to her which supported the issuance of a search warrant. [1] Moreover, it appears clear that the magistrate judge intended that a search warrant issue and that her name be placed on the face of the warrant, which was in fact done. In State v. Bicknell, 140 Idaho 201, 91 P.3d 1105 (2004), we concluded that [t]he exclusionary rule was not created as a remedy for errors in following procedures, whether imposed by rule or statute, that were not designed to implement or protect constitutional rights. Id. at 205, 91 P.3d at 1109. This case is similar in the sense that a mere procedural error, which does not implicate the defendant's constitutionally protected rights, should not serve to invalidate the otherwise properly issued warrant. The Court's finding in State v. Mathews, 129 Idaho 865, 934 P.2d 931 (1997), that an unsigned warrant was invalid is inapposite to this case. Our holding in Mathews was premised on the substantive rights of citizens to require a valid warrant where an officer deceived a citizen to proceed with a search after she had questioned the validity of an unsigned warrant. Id. at 869, 934 P.2d at 935 (emphasis added). The Court in Mathews held that [f]ailure to supply the signature once it [a warrant] is challenged will vitiate any further search under the warrant. Id. at 870, 934 P.2d at 936. In contrast, Zueger does not allege that she or anyone challenged the validity of the warrant at the time of the search. In the present case, the magistrate stated on the record her finding of probable cause, clearly indicated that she intended to issue a warrant, and specifically directed the prosecuting attorney to sign the warrant on her behalf. Zueger has alleged no due process violation arising from the prosecutor's signature on the warrant, and the Court finds none.