Opinion ID: 3028829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Required Intent.

Text: Under Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 12 (1999), the intent requirement for armed carjacking is satisfied when “the Government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver’s automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car.” Thus, the evidence has to be sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson intended to seriously injure or kill if otherwise unable to gain control of the cars. Id. at 11-12. See also, United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1997). That intent may be established indirectly through his own actions, or through actions of his coconspirators. See United States v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding conditional intent “to seriously harm or kill” based on the actions of a coconspirator). The evidence here is clearly sufficient to prove that Johnson intended to inflict serious bodily injury or death if that became necessary to gaining control of the two cars. Johnson tried to steal the cars even though he believed those cars belonged to a violent drug dealer. A jury could certainly conclude that no one would attempt to steal cars supposedly containing very large amounts of cash from a drug dealer unless he intended to inflict serious bodily injury or death to accomplish that objective. Johnson refused to alter his plan when he learned that the FBI was towing the cars targeted for 3 carjacking. He entered the cab of one of the tow trucks in an attempt to commandeer it and the car it was towing. The jury could infer that Johnson would not have entered the cab of that tow truck to steal the towed cars unless he intended to do something more than ask if he could drive. The actions of Johnson’s conspirators were also relevant to his intent. See Augustin, supra. Not content with a mere show of force, Johnson’s confederates opened fire when the tow truck driver resisted Johnson’s attempts to gain control. Not surprisingly, a tow truck driver and a bystander were shot in the process. Though Johnson was apparently not armed himself, his confederates were. A reasonable jury could certainly consider that in assessing whether he was part of a conspiracy that intended to use deadly force to steal the two cars if that became necessary to get them. See Nicholas v. Saul Stone & Co., 224 F.3d 179, 189 (3d Cir. 2000) (establishing aider and abetter liability when defendant “(1) had knowledge of the principal’s . . . intent to commit a violation of the Act; (2) had the intent to further that violation; and (3) committed some act in furtherance of the principal’s objective”).2 Thus, the evidence is certainly sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson had the intent required under § 2119, and Johnson’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.