Opinion ID: 792091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Accuracy of Hillandale Committee's Self-Description

Text: 27 We have serious concerns about whether Hillandale Committee is, in fact, what it claims to be. Hillandale Committee argues that as the duly authorized committee for a referendum opposing the rezoning of certain properties, it has an interest in protecting the vote of the people and the results of the election against its destruction and nullification through a Settlement Agreement or Consent Judgment destroying the vote of the people and the results of the election. (Hillandale Committee Br. at 15.) Hillandale Committee similarly described itself in its motion to intervene as the duly authorized committee which circulated the referendum petitions. (J.A. at 119.) 28 However, Hillandale Committee has presented very little evidence establishing that it is, in fact, the the duly authorized committee which circulated the referendum petitions. The referendum petitions requiring Euclid to place the zoning code ordinances on the ballot were submitted on March 1, 2004. Hillandale Committee was not incorporated until October 20, 2004. All of the campaign literature opposing the re-zoning which Hillandale Committee attached to submissions before the district court bears not the name of Hillandale Committee, Ltd., but instead, that of the Euclid Awareness Committee. The website of the Euclid Awareness Committee claims the credit for gathering and submitting the signatures on the referendum petition. 29 Hillandale Committee's only attempt to explain what appears to be a major obstacle to its intervention attempts in this case is the submission of an affidavit from one Rebecca Conway, who avers that she has been actively involved in the campaign for a referendum on the rezoning ordinances, and that there was and is a referendum committee composed of six (6) members for the Rezoning Ordinances who represents the Hillandale Committee which initially was an unincorporated association of individuals, but who later formed the Hillandale Committee Ltd. (J.A. at 327.) Conway does not identify any of the six members by name, nor does she explain what part they played in the campaign for a referendum on the rezoning. 30 In its reply brief, Hillandale Committee asserts that there was an unincorporated Hillandale Committee that the law recognizes. . . as the legal entity responsible for the filing of the referendum petition. Reply Br. at 13. Hillandale Committee does not offer any documentation to support this claim, however. Hillandale Committee asserts that it is the successor to this unincorporated group, and has the same legal interests in this action. 31 In short, there is a serious question as to whether Hillandale Committee is, in fact, the duly authorized committee which circulated the referendum petitions. If it is not, it has no basis from which to claim a substantial legal interest in protecting the results of the referendum. Therefore, if we were inclined to reverse the district court's denial of Hillandale Committee's motion to intervene and the entry of the consent judgment, the case would first have to be remanded for further factual findings related to Hillandale Committee's identity. However, because, for the reasons that follow, we would not conclude that Hillandale Committee had a substantial legal interest in the litigation between Providence and Euclid even if it were perfectly clear that Hillandale Committee is what it claims to be, no such remand is necessary. 32 D. Hillandale Does Not Have a Substantial Legal Interest in Protecting the Results of the November 2, 2004 Referendum 33 The district court determined that Hillandale Committee's motion to intervene was mooted by the November 2, 2004 general election because the zoning ordinances at issue here were included on the ballot in that election. . . . Because the zoning ordinances appeared on the general election's ballot, the voters clearly exercised their referendum rights. (J.A. at 208.) The district court concluded that Hillandale Committee had no cognizable legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation between Providence and Euclid. 34 We agree. Hillandale Committee argues that the district court erred in failing to recognize its interest in protecting the vote of the people and the results of the election. However, it is Hillandale Committee which errs in failing to recognize that any interest it had in this case sufficient to permit intervention ended when the election took place on November 2, 2004. 35 We will assume for purposes of this issue that Hillandale Committee is what it claims to be: the duly authorized committee which circulated the referendum petitions. The referendum petition took no position on the merits of the referendum; rather, it simply asked that the ordinance rezoning Providence's land be submitted to the electors for their approval or rejection. As such, Hillandale Committee had no interest in the outcome of the election or in any negotiations between Euclid and Providence after the election was held. In contrast to the cases cited by Hillandale Committee in its brief, this case raises no issue as to the validity of the election. Cf. State ex rel. Comm. for the Referendum of Ordinance No. 77-01 v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 96 Ohio St.3d 308, 774 N.E.2d 239 (Ohio 2002) (referendum petition committee permitted to intervene as a respondent in case challenging validity of signatures on referendum petition); State ex rel. Ryant Commt. v. Lorain City Bd. of Elections, 86 Ohio St.3d 107, 712 N.E.2d 696 (1999) (intervention permitted in case challenging validity of petition signatures). 36 The referendum at issue in this case took place and was certified without incident. Any substantial legal interest held by the duly authorized committee for a referendum which circulated the referendum petitions was terminated when the referendum was held and the results certified. Hillandale Committee's alleged advocacy in getting the zoning ordinance on the November 2004 ballot does not suffice to make it a real party in interest in the transaction which is the subject of the proceeding — the negotiated settlement between Providence and Euclid. Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1246 (6th Cir.1997). Rather, its interest in the negotiated settlement is so generalized it will not support a claim for intervention of right. Athens Lumber Co., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir.1982). 37 In any event, even if Hillandale Committee was a real party in interest, it could not intervene to challenge the negotiated settlement because concerns for state autonomy . . . deny private individuals the right to compel a state to enforce its laws. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (rejecting an individual's attempt to intervene in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of an Illinois abortion regulation, where the state acquiesced in the court's ruling of unconstitutionality). We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Hillandale's motion to intervene. 38 III. Hillandale's Lack of Standing to Appeal the Entry of the Consent Judgment 39 We decide this issue because our March 15, 2005 order clearly stated that this panel would decide whether the appellant's interest in the litigation equates to Article III standing for the purposes of pursuing an appeal of the consent judgment or whether the appeal is moot because no effective relief can be granted. However, we note our dissatisfaction with Hillandale Committee's failure to address this issue except for a passing reference in its reply brief. 40 The Supreme Court has held that for an intervenor to continue litigation by pursuing an appeal when the party on whose side it has intervened has not appealed, the intervenor must have standing in its own right. Diamond, 476 U.S. 54, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986). See also Perry, 16 F.3d at 690. If Hillandale Committee does not have standing to appeal the consent judgment, then this appeal would be moot even if we had determined that Hillandale should have been permitted to intervene, because without standing to appeal the final judgment there is no effective relief available to Hillandale. See Nat'l Post Office Mailhandlers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 843 (6th Cir.1985). 41 As we noted in our order of March 15, 2005, the issue of whether Hillandale Committee has standing to appeal from the entry of the consent judgment is closely related to the question of whether it should have been permitted to intervene. However, there is not perfect overlap between the requirements for intervention under Rule 24(a) and the requirements for Article III standing; indeed, the requisite showing for Article III standing is more rigid in certain of its requirements. At a minimum, a party seeking to establish Article III standing must show: 1) `an injury in fact' — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) `actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,' 2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and 3) a likelihood of redressability by a favorable judgment. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Logitrans, Inc., 297 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Kardules v. City of Columbus, 95 F.3d 1335, 1346 (6th Cir.1996)). 42 It is possible to have standing to intervene in a lawsuit, but not have Article III standing to bring an independent appeal. Perry, 16 F.3d at 690. This is so because the injury in fact requirement is stricter than the substantial interest inquiry. The `injury in fact' requirement mandates that the party allege `such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 43 As Hillandale Committee's interest in protecting the results of the referendum is not sufficiently particularized to satisfy the requirement of a substantial interest for intervention purposes, then it is clear that the alleged injury in fact is not of such a personal stake as to permit a finding that Hillandale Committee has standing to challenge the entry of the consent judgment See id. We therefore hold that Hillandale Committee does not have standing to challenge the consent judgment. This holding also provides an additional ground for affirming the district court's denial of the motion to intervene, because it leaves Hillandale Committee with no effective relief as an intervenor. 44 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of the motion to intervene and DISMISS Hillandale Committee's appeal from the entry of the consent judgment for lack of standing.