Opinion ID: 2804139
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other-Acts Evidence Regarding

Text: Community Home Health Kolodesh argues that the District Court erred in not sua sponte excluding testimony by Pugman and Ganetsky that employees at Community Home Health engaged in certain uncharged acts of fraud. Pugman testified that he learned how to fraudulently alter charts in preparation for an audit while working at Community Home Health. He said that the director of nursing would instruct him to “fix[]” the charts, but if, for example, he refused to come in on the weekend to do so when he had other plans, he would get a call from Kolodesh urging him to come in and help. (App. at 1047.) 14 Kolodesh also claims that Pugman testified that Kolodesh “regularly came to [Home Care Hospice] to review the books.” (Opening Br. at 41.) But what Pugman actually said is that Kolodesh came to Home Care Hospice to review the company’s books “[o]n [an] as-needed basis.” (App. at 978.) Furthermore, Pugman provided no timeframe for that statement. 17 Similarly, Ganetsky testified that, when she was working at Community Home Health, Kolodesh instructed her “on several occasions” to fabricate records for his mother-in-law, indicating that she received services that were, in fact, never provided.15 (App. at 2605.) Ganetsky also testified that Kolodesh told Pugman that he had “several ghost employees” on the payroll at Community Home Health, and that the same kind of fraud should be undertaken at Home Care Hospice. (App. at 2507.) Evidence of uncharged acts is admissible if the following requirements are met: “First, the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b)[ of the Federal Rules of Evidence]; second, the evidence must be relevant under Rule 402; and third, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403.” United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 15 Kolodesh further complains of testimony that, on behalf of Home Care Hospice, Ganetsky entered into unlawful kickback arrangements with Community Home Health staff. That testimony, though, refers to illegal actions that are part of the crimes charged – the indictment specifically mentions the kickback scheme as a method of enrolling inappropriate hospice patients in Home Care Hospice. Such testimony does not, therefore, relate to evidence of uncharged wrongs, and, even if it did, it would be intrinsic to the charged offense. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 217 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Rule 404(b), which proscribes the admission of evidence of other crimes when offered to prove bad character, does not apply to evidence of uncharged offenses committed by a defendant when those acts are intrinsic to the proof of the charged offense.”). 18 728 (3d Cir. 2013). The District Court did not plainly err in admitting the testimony of Pugman’s and Ganetsky’s experiences at Community Home Health. The testimony was not offered as evidence of Kolodesh’s character as a defrauder in order to show that he acted in accordance with that character at Home Care Hospice. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Rather, it was offered as circumstantial evidence of Kolodesh’s knowledge of the fraudulent activity at Home Care Hospice. In his opening statement, defense counsel asserted that Kolodesh was unaware of the fraudulent practices at Home Care Hospice, and that the scheme was concocted and executed by Ganetsky and Pugman. Counsel asserted that, in contrast, Kolodesh ran Community Home Health as a legal, legitimate business. In light of the defense theory of the case, the relevance of the government’s evidence is clear: Kolodesh knew what fraudulent practices looked like – indeed, he taught them to Pugman and Ganetsky – and if Kolodesh was as intimately involved in Home Care Hospice as Pugman testified, he certainly would have known of the fraudulent conduct. Given the relevance of the complained-of evidence, we cannot say it was unfairly prejudicial, especially when seen through the lens of plainerror review. Kolodesh also argues that he should have been allowed to rebut that evidence by offering testimony about how he operated Community Home Health after Pugman left that company in 2001. At trial, Kolodesh sought to call three witnesses who worked at Community Home Health to counter the government’s evidence that he had instructed employees to fabricate records. The District Court allowed him to call the witnesses but limited their testimony to events “up to 2001,” when Pugman left to work full time at Home 19 Care Hospice, because the government’s evidence had been similarly limited. (App. at 4111.) The Court stated, however, that it would revisit its ruling if Kolodesh could demonstrate that the government’s evidence relative to Community Home Health went beyond 2001. Defense counsel responded that Ganetsky testified about her experience at Community Home Health up until about 2003 or 2004 , but he agreed to put on his witnesses and limit their testimony to 2001 and earlier, and then bring the witnesses back later “if [he felt] it’s that essential to bring them back.”16 (App. at 4114.) The witnesses then testified that, during the 1999-2001 time period, Kolodesh never instructed them to fabricate records. Defense counsel also followed up with the first of the three witnesses in a way that extended the testimony beyond 2001: Q And that was the whole time that you worked there, right? A Yes. Q And you still work there now, right? A Yes. (App. at 4141.) The government did not object, though it objected to a similarly broad question posed to the second witness. 16 Defense counsel also added, “[I]n reality, I don’t think it makes a whole lot of difference.” (App. at 4114.) However, it is unclear whether that statement was a concession as to the value of additional testimony or a reference to the logistical matter of whether to put witnesses on then or after having had an opportunity to review Pugman’s and Ganetsky’s testimony. 20 The District Court acted well within its discretion by allowing Kolodesh to rebut the government’s evidence while partially limiting the temporal scope of the testimony. To prevent the trial about fraudulent practices at Home Care Hospice from devolving into a side trial about fraudulent practices at Community Home Health, the Court’s ruling was entirely reasonable. But, even if we were to conclude that the District Court abused its discretion, its ruling was harmless. Kolodesh’s witnesses testified that he never asked them to doctor any charts, and one witness testified to that fact well beyond the 2001 limit. We are fully persuaded that the admission of additional testimony about Kolodesh’s practices at Community Home Health after 2001 would not have affected the outcome of the case. See Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1265 (setting forth test for harmless error).