Opinion ID: 612147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Original Defendants

Text: 7 The plaintiff's proposed amended complaint removed the Attorney General as a defendant and added damages claims against the three remaining original defendants: the State of Indiana, the Indiana Department of Corrections, and Superintendent Richards in his official capacity. In the absence of the state's consent or a valid Congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a suit in federal court in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). See also Kroll v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 377, 116 L.Ed.2d 329 (1991). This bar remains in effect when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3107, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90, 102 S.Ct. 2325, 2328, 72 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)). See also Meadows v. State of Indiana, 854 F.2d 1068, 1069 (7th Cir.1988). As the State of Indiana has not consented to this suit and Congress did not override this immunity through the enactment of § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1145, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction with regard to any damage claims against the State of Indiana, the Indiana Department of Corrections, and Superintendent Richards in his official capacity. 8 The proposed amended complaint seeks to add a separate claim for damages against Superintendent Richards in his individual capacity, an action outside the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nonetheless, a valid § 1983 claim for damages against a state supervisory official in his individual capacity requires a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action. Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983). In other words, an individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. See also Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 273-74 (7th Cir.1986) (§ 1983 liability requires the supervisory official knowingly, willfully, or at least recklessly [cause] the alleged deprivation by his action or failure to act). The plaintiff has not directed us in either his brief or at oral argument to any allegation in the proposed amended complaint that involves Superintendent Richard's participation in or direct responsibility for a constitutional deprivation. 1 Hence, even accepting the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, no set of facts consistent with those allegations would impose liability upon Superintendent Richards in his individual capacity, as required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir.1991).