Opinion ID: 805977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Existence of Mental Retardation

Text: Mr. Hooks first asks us to find that he is mentally retarded and that his execution is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. An Oklahoma jury (hereinafter the “Atkins jury”) found that Mr. Hooks is not mentally retarded, and that determination was upheld by the OCCA on both direct appeal and collateral review. The essence of Mr. Hooks’s claim is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. He argues: The [Atkins] jury’s conclusion was based on insufficient evidence and [Mr. Hooks] separately asserts the trial evidence, coupled with the additional evidence appropriately presented in habeas, demonstrates he is so impaired [that] he falls within the range of mentally retarded offenders for which there is a national consensus against his execution. Aplt. Opening Br. at 20–21. The OCCA rejected this legal challenge, concluding that “a rational trier of fact could have found” that Mr. Hooks failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is mentally retarded. Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 641. As we will explain, the OCCA’s conclusion did not contravene clearly established -12- federal law. We first set forth Oklahoma’s standard for finding a person mentally retarded within the meaning of Atkins. We then explain our standard of review in the habeas context for the unique sort of sufficiency challenge that Mr. Hooks presents here. Finally, we analyze whether the OCCA contravened clearly established federal law in its decision to uphold the Atkins jury’s finding, and we conclude that it did not.
In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that in light of a national consensus and its own precedents, execution of mentally retarded criminal defendants violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.” See 536 U.S. at 311, 316–21 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court did not set forth a definition of mental retardation. Although it twice discussed clinical definitions of the term, see id. at 308 n.3, 318, it acknowledged that “[n]ot all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus,” id. at 317. The Court therefore left “to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416–17 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In response to Atkins, the OCCA in Murphy v. State promulgated the following definition of mental retardation for use in capital trials: A person is “mentally retarded”: (1) If he or she functions at a -13- significantly sub-average intellectual level that substantially limits his or her ability to understand and process information, to communicate, to learn from experience or mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others; (2) The mental retardation manifested itself before the age of eighteen (18); and (3) The mental retardation is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication; self-care; social/interpersonal skills; home living; self-direction; academics; health and safety; use of community resources; and work. It is the defendant’s burden to prove he or she is mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. Intelligence quotients are one of the many factors that may be considered, but are not alone determinative. However, no person shall be eligible to be considered mentally retarded unless he or she has an intelligence quotient of seventy or below, as reflected by at least one scientifically recognized, scientifically approved, and contemporary intelligent quotient test. 54 P.3d 556, 567–68 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (footnotes omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Blonner v. State, 127 P.3d 1135, 1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).4 Mr. Hooks does not challenge Murphy’s definition of mental retardation as 4 The OCCA’s decision in Murphy was a stopgap measure. The court adopted a judicial definition of mental retardation “only after the other branches of the government were unable to reach a meeting of the minds on the issue.” Murphy v. State, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 1192099, at  (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 5, 2012) (citing Murphy, 54 P.3d at 567). In 2006, the Oklahoma legislature adopted Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.10b, which sets forth a statutory definition of mental retardation and prescribes procedures for determining whether a defendant accused or convicted of capital murder is mentally retarded. See Smith v. State, 245 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) (“Section 701.10b governs the death penalty and mental retardation . . . .”). Because Mr. Hooks’s Atkins trial took place in 2004, it was governed by Murphy, not § 701.10b, and neither the State nor Mr. Hooks contends otherwise. See Murphy, 54 P.3d at 568 (“This standard shall be used at all future and pending capital trials, until such time as it may be replaced by a suitable legislative enactment.”); see also Lambert v. State, 71 P.3d 30, 31–32 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (setting forth procedures for postconviction mental-retardation determination because the state legislature had not yet addressed the issue), superseded by statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.10b. -14- inconsistent with Atkins. Indeed, Murphy’s definition closely tracks the AAMR (now AAIDD) definition discussed in Atkins. See 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 318.5 Rather, Mr. Hooks argues that the jury’s determination that he is not mentally retarded is based upon insufficient evidence, and that the OCCA’s decision to uphold that determination was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Atkins.
A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge in a habeas petition presents a mixed question of fact and law. Brown v. Sirmons, 515 F.3d 1072, 1089 (10th Cir. 2008). “We ask whether the facts are correct and whether the law was properly applied to the facts, ‘which is why we apply both 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) when reviewing sufficiency of the evidence on habeas.’” Id. (quoting Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 673 (10th Cir. 2006)). The typical sufficiency challenge in a habeas petition focuses on evidence of guilt for the crime charged. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), a pre-AEDPA decision, the Supreme Court held that such evidence is sufficient if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” In federal habeas proceedings, where a sufficiency challenge was resolved on the merits by the state 5 As the district court noted, “[t]he only significant difference between Oklahoma’s definition and the [AAIDD] definition is that the [AAIDD] includes a tenth possible deficit in the area of leisure.” Hooks Habeas II, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 n.4. -15- courts, we have held that AEDPA “adds an additional degree of deference,” and the question becomes whether “the OCCA’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient constituted an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard.” Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1267 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Patton v. Mullin, 425 F.3d 788, 796 (10th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2062 (per curiam). We call this standard of review “deference squared.” Young v. Sirmons, 486 F.3d 655, 666 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Torres v. Lytle, 461 F.3d 1303, 1313 (10th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In two respects, however, Mr. Hooks’s sufficiency challenge is somewhat atypical. First, the substantive law at the basis of his sufficiency challenge consists not of the “essential elements” of a state-law criminal offense, Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, but rather of the definition of mental retardation—a definition that, although dependent on state law (here, Murphy), ultimately has Eighth Amendment underpinnings pursuant to Atkins. See Ochoa v. Workman, 669 F.3d 1130, 1143 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case, the right of the mentally retarded to avoid execution, flows directly from the Eighth Amendment.”). Thus, Mr. Hooks’s sufficiency challenge inescapably requires that we consider the kinds of evidence that state courts may (or may not) rely upon in adjudicating an Atkins claim. Second, the jury in Mr. Hooks’s Atkins trial was required to determine, not whether he is guilty of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt (a question on which the State would have borne the burden of proof), but whether he is mentally retarded by a -16- preponderance of the evidence (a question on which Mr. Hooks bore the burden of proof). The different standard of proof requires us to tailor Jackson to fit this context. We hold that the relevant constitutional standard for the state appellate court was whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (the State), any rational trier of fact could have found Mr. Hooks not mentally retarded by a preponderance of the evidence. See Maynard, 468 F.3d at 674. If so, Mr. Hooks’s evidentiary challenge would fail. Put a different way, if any rational trier of fact could have found that Mr. Hooks failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is mentally retarded, then the jury verdict may be upheld.6 6 In Maynard, we faced a closely analogous sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. In that case, the OCCA upheld a jury verdict finding the habeas applicant competent to stand trial. 468 F.3d at 668. In our own review of the OCCA’s decision, we sought guidance from Jackson and held that “[u]nder AEDPA, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must establish that no ‘rational trier of fact’ could have found Maynard competent by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 674 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). In a footnote, we explained that “[i]n Jackson, the sufficiency of the evidence was ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ because that was the evidentiary burden for the issue at trial. Competency, as we have noted, is determined based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. at 674 n.6. That reasoning applies with equal force to this case. We recognize that the unusual nature of Mr. Hooks’s sufficiency challenge creates a semantic anomaly. In the typical case, a habeas applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to a question on which the other party—the prosecution—has the burden of proof at trial. The allegation is that the evidence was legally insufficient to meet the prosecution’s burden. In a case like this, by contrast, the party challenging the verdict and the party that had the burden of proof at trial are the same. Strictly speaking, the challenger’s allegation is not that the evidence of mental retardation was insufficient, but that the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law, such that no reasonable factfinder could have failed to find in the applicant’s favor (i.e., could have failed to find that the (continued...) -17- Of course, AEDPA adds a second layer of deference to this standard. We do not directly review the jury’s verdict. AEDPA limits our gaze to “the highest state court’s resolution of a particular claim.” Alverson v. Workman, 595 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2010). We therefore ask whether the OCCA correctly identified the governing legal principle from Jackson and reasonably applied it to the facts of Mr. Hooks’s case. See Matthews v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1175, 1183 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Because the OCCA applied the Jackson standard in deciding Mr. Matthews’s sufficiency claim on direct review, our task is limited by AEDPA to inquiring whether the OCCA’s application of Jackson was unreasonable.” (footnote omitted)). We reiterate that under both paragraphs (1) and (2) of § 2254(d), we are precluded from considering evidence not before the OCCA. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Based on the foregoing, we find that the OCCA’s decision, on its face, applied the 6 (...continued) applicant is mentally retarded). But in either case, the underlying inquiry for an appellate court is the same: In light of the facts in the record, the applicable law, and the standard of proof, was it reasonable for the factfinder to reach the conclusion it did? For this reason, our “tailoring” of Jackson’s standard to meet the context of this case does not hold the OCCA to something other than clearly established federal law. Jackson’s rational-trier-of-fact standard is clearly established federal law. See Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 3–4, 6 (2011) (per curiam). And Maynard is instructive on how that standard applies in this case. A necessary, if implicit, premise of our Maynard decision was that Jackson’s rational-trier-of-fact standard is clearly established federal law even when, as here, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence and the burden of proof at trial rested on the habeas applicant. -18- correct standard of appellate review. Reviewing Mr. Hooks’s sufficiency challenge, the OCCA concluded, “Taken in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, a rational trier of fact could have found that Hooks provided insufficient evidence to show he was mentally retarded.” Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 641. That is precisely what Jackson requires in order to uphold the jury’s determination in this context. See Maynard, 468 F.3d at 674. Accordingly, the OCCA’s decision was not “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Cone, 535 U.S. at 694 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). “Because the OCCA applied the correct legal standard, our inquiry is limited to whether its determination that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict was reasonable.” Young, 486 F.3d at 667. As noted, that inquiry also requires us to consider whether the OCCA, in upholding the jury’s verdict, reasonably applied Atkins to Mr. Hooks’s claim of mental retardation.
The parties agree that Mr. Hooks meets the second prong of Murphy’s standard for mental retardation (that the deficiencies manifested themselves before the age of eighteen). See Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 641. The dispute before the jury, before the OCCA, and before us centers on whether Mr. Hooks meets the first and third prongs of the Murphy test: viz., sub-average intellectual ability, and significant limitations in adaptive functioning. -19-
Under Murphy, a capital defendant’s IQ score is used both to establish eligibility for a mental-retardation determination and as evidence to support a finding of subaverage intellectual ability. Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 640. An IQ score of 70 or below meets the threshold requirement. See id. It is also strong evidence of sub-average intelligence. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5 (“[A]n IQ between 70 and 75 or lower . . . is typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition.”); id. at 316 (suggesting that “a national consensus has developed against” the execution of “offenders possessing a known IQ less than 70”); Murphy, 54 P.3d at 568 (“Intelligence quotients are one of the many factors that may be considered, but are not alone determinative.”). Mr. Hooks has been subjected to IQ testing throughout his life, and the Atkins jury was presented with nine of his IQ scores. These scores were obtained from tests administered over a thirty-four-year period, between 1970 and 2004, and they ranged from 53 to 80.7 On direct appeal of the jury verdict, the OCCA concluded: 7 The nine IQ scores presented to the jury and the OCCA on appeal were as follows (identified by year, the type of IQ test, and the score): 1970 SB score of 80, 1972 WISC score of 70, 1978 WAIS score of 61, 1979 WAIS score of 57, 1982 BETA-II score of 61, 1988 WAIS score of 80, 1994 WAIS-R score of 72, 2002 K-BIT score of 76, and 2004 WAIS-III score of 53. Mr. Hooks also points us to a WAIS-III score of 67, obtained in testing in 2006. However, because this evidence was not before the OCCA on direct appeal, we are barred from considering it. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The (continued...) -20- The experts agreed this range of scores put Hooks in a “gray area”. The tests of 70 and below all reflected some degree of lack of cooperation on Hooks’s part, from variable attention span to refusal to respond. Two of them were obtained after Hooks suffered the trauma of an accident and his father’s death, which could have caused him to test lower than his actual intellectual level. The expert witnesses agreed that the most reliable scores were those obtained by Dr. Gelbort and Dr. Cowardin, with results of 72 and 76. Neither of these scores meets the “seventy or below” requirement in Murphy, although Dr. Gelbort’s results are within that range using the standard error of measurement (a five-point range on either side). Given the other testimony, it was not unreasonable for jurors to determine that the most reliable IQ evidence offered did not fall within the first prong of the Murphy definition, functioning at a significantly sub-average intellectual level. A rational trier of fact could have found that Hooks failed to meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 640–41 (footnote omitted). Mr. Hooks assails this conclusion in two ways. First, he contends that four of his IQ scores (scores of 80, 80, 61 and 76) “are of limited value and lack reliability.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 25. We shall call this group of scores the “First Group.” Second, after tossing out the above four scores, Mr. Hooks contends that the remaining five (scores of 70, 61, 57, 72, and 538)—what we shall call the “Second Group”—must be adjusted downward for a statistical phenomenon known as the Flynn Effect. After adjustment, the 7 (...continued) OCCA did consider the 2006 score in collateral proceedings, but only in the context of Mr. Hooks’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the Atkins trial. See Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 8–9. (Specifically, Mr. Hooks claimed that Atkins counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a more updated score.) However, the 2006 score cannot enter into our calculus in assessing the OCCA’s decision to uphold the jury verdict. 8 As noted, Mr. Hooks also points to the additional IQ score of 67 obtained in 2006, but we do not consider it. See supra note 7. -21- five scores become 63, 54, 50, 67, and 50, respectively—all well below Murphy’s threshold of 70. On this view of the evidence, Mr. Hooks argues that the OCCA’s finding that he is in a “gray area” was unreasonable. We note that the First Group includes the K-BIT score of 76 and the Second Group includes the WAIS-R score of 72, both obtained by Mr. Hooks’s own experts (Dr. Nancy Cowardin and Dr. Michael Gelbort, respectively) and deemed by the OCCA, based on the opinions of experts from both sides, to be the “most reliable” of all the IQ scores. Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 640. Mr. Hooks does not contest that conclusion. With respect to the K-BIT score, he contends only that “caution” must be used in interpreting the score because Dr. Cowardin’s test was “not meant to substitute for a comprehensive intelligence test.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 26. But Dr. Cowardin was Mr. Hooks’s own expert, and her testing formed the basis for her conclusion that Mr. Hooks is mildly mentally retarded. See 4 M.R. at 116.9 Mr. Hooks’s other expert, Dr. Gelbort, relied on Dr. Cowardin’s report and his own evaluation to opine that Mr. Hooks is mildly mentally retarded, see 3 M.R. Tr. at 112–13, although even he admitted that Mr. Hooks fell into a “gray area,” id. at 95. Finally, the State’s expert, Dr. Terese Hall, thought the evaluations by Drs. Cowardin and Gelbort were “the best testing we have.” See 5 M.R. Tr. at 42. The OCCA found that many of the other scores, particularly those on the low end, posed reliability problems. That finding is presumed correct, and in any event, our independent 9 Throughout this opinion, we employ the abbreviation “[volume number] M.R. Tr.” to refer to a particular volume of the six-volume transcript of the Atkins trial. -22- review of the record confirms it. See 3 M.R. at 23, 44, 47–49 (Test. of Dr. Beck); id. at 86–88, 94–95, 174–75 (Test. of Dr. Gelbort); 4 M.R. at 111–12 (Test. of Dr. Cowardin); 5 M.R. at 19–20, 38–41 (Test. of Dr. Hall). Accordingly, it was not unreasonable for the OCCA to find the K-BIT and WAIS-R scores the “most reliable” and to accord them greater weight. Mr. Hooks asserts that the Second Group of scores, including the WAIS-R score of 72, must be downwardly adjusted for the Flynn Effect. The Flynn Effect is a phenomenon named for James R. Flynn, who discovered that the population’s mean IQ score rises over time, by approximately 0.3 points per year. Under his theory, if an individual’s test score is measured against a mean of a population sample from prior years, then his score will be inflated in varying degrees (depending on how long ago the sample was first employed) and will not provide an accurate picture of his IQ. See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 177 n.22 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“The premise of the ‘Flynn Effect’ is that IQ scores increase over time and that IQ tests that are not renormed to take into account rising IQ levels will overstate a testtaker’s IQ score.”); James. R. Flynn, Tethering the Elephant: Capital Cases, IQ, and the Flynn Effect, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 170, 172 (2006) [hereinafter Flynn, Tethering the Elephant] (“Naturally, judges want to know whether defendants were actually two standard deviations below their peers at the time they were tested and not how they rank against a group selected at some random date in the past.” (emphasis added)). See generally James R. Flynn, The Mean IQ of Americans: Massive Gains 1932 to 1978, 95 Psychol. Bull. 29 (1984). Flynn -23- posited that a downward adjustment to scores is necessary when a test without current norms is used. See Flynn, Tethering the Elephant, supra, at 174–75. However, neither Murphy nor its progeny requires an adjustment for the Flynn Effect, see Murphy, 54 P.3d at 567–68; see also Smith, 245 P.3d at 1237 n.6 (“[U]nder the Oklahoma statutory scheme, the Flynn Effect, whatever its validity, is not a relevant consideration in the mental retardation determination for capital defendants.”), and the OCCA did not address its relevance on direct appeal. It mentioned it briefly on collateral review, stating that “some experts noted Hooks’s reliable score of 72 could have been slightly inflated [due to the Flynn Effect].” Hooks Atkins Collateral, slip op. at 8–9. The only Flynn Effect evidence presented to the Atkins jury came from the testimony of Dr. Gelbort, who noted that the Flynn Effect is a “well-researched and published” phenomenon, 3 M.R. Tr. at 159, and suggested that “people who talk about the Flynn Effect would argue” that certain of Mr. Hooks’s IQ scores are “a little higher than [they] ought to be,” id. at 219–22, due to the non-current population samples that were used to normalize (i.e., derive a population mean for) his scores. Mr. Hooks argues that the OCCA’s failure to account for and apply the Flynn Effect was “contrary to Atkins because it fails to deal with the real [IQ] scores.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 7. The OCCA’s failure to account for and apply the Flynn Effect was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), because the threshold requirement—the existence of clearly established federal law—is not met here. See House, 527 F.3d at 1015. Atkins does not mandate an -24- adjustment for the Flynn Effect. Moreover, there is no scientific consensus on its validity. See Thomas v. Allen, 607 F.3d 749, 757 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Flynn effect is a statistically-proven phenomenon, although no medical association recognizes its validity.”); Frank M. Gresham & Daniel J. Reschly, Standard of Practice and Flynn Effect Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, 49 Intell. & Developmental Disabilities 131, 131, 136–37 (2011) (arguing that the Flynn Effect is “a well-established psychometric fact” that should be accounted for in IQ testing, but noting the lack of a consensus in the clinical community on its use). In addition, federal and state courts are divided over the use of the Flynn Effect, and “there is no uniform consensus regarding the application of the Flynn effect in determining a capital offender’s intellectual functioning.” Thomas, 607 F.3d at 757–58 (collecting cases); see also Maldonado v. Thaler, 625 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[N]either this court nor the [Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] has recognized the Flynn Effect as scientifically valid.”). Even if this Circuit were prepared to take a side in this debate and hold that, under Atkins, the Flynn Effect must be considered in determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded, we could not do so on habeas review. “No decision of th[e Supreme] Court . . . squarely addresses the issue . . . .” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (per curiam). “Because [the Court’s] cases give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in [Mr. Hooks’s] favor,” id. at 126, it cannot be said that the OCCA’s failure to consider and apply the Flynn Effect is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. -25- We are left, then, with a number of IQ scores, some below and some above a score of 70. We do not believe this set of scores unquestionably qualifies Mr. Hooks as significantly sub-average in intellect. Given the reliability problems associated with many of the scores and the strong reliability of the scores of 72 and 76 from Mr. Hooks’s own experts, we agree that Mr. Hooks falls into a “gray area.” Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 640 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.5 (“[A]n IQ between 70 and 75 or lower . . . is typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition.”). A rational trier of fact could conclude from this evidence that Mr. Hooks indeed functions at a sub-average intellectual level, but it could also rationally draw the conclusion that he does not. Cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). Accordingly, it was not an unreasonable application of Jackson for the OCCA to find that Mr. Hooks’s evidentiary burden was not met and to uphold the jury verdict.
As an alternative basis for its holding, the OCCA also rejected Mr. Hooks’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge under the third prong of Murphy, which required Mr. Hooks to show that he has “significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of [nine] skill areas.” Murphy, 54 P.3d at 567–68. After a summary of the evidence both for and against Mr. Hooks, the OCCA concluded that “a rational trier of fact could -26- have determined that this evidence did not show significant deficits in adaptive functioning” and that Mr. Hooks had “failed to meet his burden on this issue.” Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 641. Mr. Hooks argues that he satisfied Murphy’s third prong because of his deficiencies in two skills areas (communication and academics), and he assails the OCCA’s conclusion on two grounds. First, he faults the OCCA for focusing on his strengths rather than his limitations, which he contends was contrary to Atkins. Second and relatedly, he argues that a proper focus on his limitations, to the exclusion of his strengths, puts the existence of his mental retardation beyond dispute. We reject both arguments. Requiring the OCCA to focus only on Mr. Hooks’s limitations and to ignore his strengths is not clearly established federal law, and based on the evidence (limitations and strengths), a rational trier of fact could conclude that Mr. Hooks failed to satisfy the third prong of Murphy by a preponderance of the evidence.10 Mr. Hooks first argues that the OCCA’s focus on his strengths rather than his limitations was objectively unreasonable because it is contrary to the “holistic approach” recommended by the AAIDD, which “focuses on the individual’s limitations.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 44 (quoting AAIDD, Intellectual Disability: Definition, Classification, 10 Some of the evidence that Mr. Hooks highlights in his opening brief was not before the OCCA. This includes statements by Pat Prater, a counselor at Oklahoma State Penitentiary; statements by Walanzo Robinson and Paris Powell, fellow prisoners of Mr. Hooks; and the supplemental report of Dr. Cowardin. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 35–37, 41–42. We are barred from considering this evidence. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). -27- and Systems of Supports 94 (11th ed. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). He continues: “When the Atkins[] Court determined there was a national consensus that offenders meeting the clinical definition of mentally retarded could not be executed, it essentially adopted the clinical definition of the condition. Further, the focus is on deficits, not strengths, as clearly established within the clinical community and by Atkins.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 10. We are not persuaded. While Atkins is undoubtedly clearly established federal law, the precise contours of the definition of mental retardation are not. “The Supreme Court specifically left to the various states ‘the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction’ on the execution of mentally retarded criminals.” Ochoa, 669 F.3d at 1133 n.1 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317). Nothing in Atkins (or Oklahoma law for that matter) requires the OCCA to ignore a defendant’s strengths in determining whether in fact he exhibits significant functional limitations in certain skill areas. Mr. Hooks bases his argument to the contrary on language in the Atkins opinion such as the following: “[C]linical definitions of mental retardation require . . . significant limitations in adaptive skills.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added); see Aplt. Reply Br. at 10. This argument is unavailing. Murphy, too, requires a defendant to show “significant limitations in adaptive functioning.” 54 P.3d at 567 (emphasis added). But this is a legal standard, and whether it is satisfied depends upon the facts: What is a given defendant able and unable to do? Both strengths and deficiencies enter into this equation because they make up the universe of facts tending to establish that a defendant either has -28- “significant limitations” or does not. Not only does Murphy not require the OCCA to focus on deficiencies to the exclusion of strengths but—most relevant to our inquiry here—neither does Atkins. Furthermore, even if the AAIDD’s “holistic approach” requires a clinician to ignore functional strengths, as Mr. Hooks contends, the clinical standard is not a constitutional command. Section 2254(d)(1) refers to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” and as we have explained, “Supreme Court holdings” are “the exclusive touchstone for clearly established federal law.” House, 527 F.3d at 1015. The Supreme Court in Atkins could have adopted the clinical standard, but explicitly declined to do so. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317; Ochoa, 669 F.3d at 1133 n.1. We therefore conclude that the OCCA’s consideration of evidence of Mr. Hooks’s strengths was not “contrary to” or “an unreasonable application of” Atkins. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). That being so, Mr. Hooks’s second contention must fail. Having argued that evidence of his strengths should not be considered to support the Atkins jury’s conclusion, he selectively highlights those portions of the trial record that support his limitations in adaptive functioning. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 32–35, 39–41. But this was not the only evidence before the jury. For example: C Some experts found that Mr. Hooks communicated well and could express his thoughts and feelings clearly. 5 M.R. Tr. at 32–33, 55 (Test. of Dr. Hall). C Mr. Hooks read the Bible, 4 M.R. Tr. at 210 (Test. of Shanna Dinh); read -29- other books in prison, id. at 125–26 (Test. of Dr. Cowardin); and could use a dictionary, id. at 125. C Mr. Hooks wrote a number of letters in which he communicated his feelings forcefully and clearly. Id. at 126–32; see State’s Exs. 1–6 to M.R.11 C Mr. Hooks communicated with multiple landlords and filled out rental applications. 4 M.R. Tr. at 205 (Test. of Ms. Dinh); 5 M.R. Tr. at 31 (Test. of Dr. Hall); 5 M.R. Tr. at 167 (Test. of Eric Mullenix). He also negotiated with a car salesman to obtain the price he wanted on a vehicle. 4 M.R. Tr. at 206–07 (Test. of Ms. Dinh). C Mr. Hooks lived independently and traveled to see his mother often. 2 M.R. Tr. at 184–85 (Test. of Clara Hooks); 5 M.R. Tr. at 30 (Test. of Dr. Hall); 5 M.R. Tr. at 169 (Test. of Mr. Mullenix). He talked about running errands, shopping, and having a loose muffler repaired. 5 M.R. Tr. at 167 (Test. of Mr. Mullenix). C Mr. Hooks managed his money “just fine” and paid his bills. Id. at 31 (Test. of Dr. Hall). He frequently pawned items or sold food stamps to earn cash for groceries and items for his child. Id.; 4 M.R. Tr. at 211 (Test. of Ms. Dinh); 5 M.R. Tr. at 168 (Test. of Mr. Mullenix). 11 There is a dispute over whether Mr. Hooks had help writing these letters. None of the letters mentioned that Mr. Hooks had received help until after the evidentiary hearing on his Atkins claim, where Dr. Gelbort testified that the relevance of the letters to the question of mental retardation depended on whether Mr. Hooks wrote them himself. Following Dr. Gelbort’s testimony, Mr. Hooks’s next letter stated, “I’m having some help write [sic] this letter.” State’s Ex. 6 to M.R. There are two possible interpretations of this evidence. Under one interpretation, Mr. Hooks had in fact received writing assistance all along, and when it became apparent at the evidentiary hearing that this assistance was relevant, he or the individual helping him wanted to clarify that fact. Under a second interpretation, Mr. Hooks had never received writing assistance, but upon discovering that his writing abilities might hurt his case for mental retardation, he attempted to portray himself as less capable. The latter interpretation is what the State argued to the jury. See 3. M.R. Tr. at 195–96 (cross-examination of Dr. Gelbort). Before us, Mr. Hooks argues that he had help writing the letters and points to evidence that was not before the OCCA. Limiting our review, as we must, to the record in the state-court proceedings, and in light of two plausible interpretations of the evidence, a rational trier of fact could have doubted Mr. Hooks’s claim to have received assistance. -30- C Mr. Hooks ran a prostitution ring, rented apartments for prostitutes, paid their rent, and collected money from them. 4 M.R. Tr. at 198–205 (Test. of Ms. Dinh). The evidence concerning Mr. Hooks’s behavioral limitations was controverted, and resolving the limitations question “depended heavily on the factfinders’ appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor.” Bryan v. Gibson, 276 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc). A rational trier of fact could have found that Mr. Hooks failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has significant adaptive limitations, and accordingly, the OCCA’s decision to uphold the jury verdict was not an unreasonable application of Jackson.12 12 Before the district court, Mr. Hooks argued that he has adaptive behavioral limitations in four skill areas: communication, academics, health and safety, and selfdirection. See Hooks Habeas II, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. His opening brief to this court makes no argument concerning health and safety and self-direction, see Aplt. Opening Br. at 32 (“[T]he deficiency is so clear in two skill areas of communication and academics, Petitioner will focus on those two areas.”), and his reply brief mentions health and safety and self-direction in only cursory fashion, see Aplt. Reply Br. at 12. Ordinarily we would consider any argument concerning limitations in health and safety and self-direction to be abandoned. See Fairchild v. Workman, 579 F.3d 1134, 1146 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the State “forfeited” an argument because it had “effectively abandoned the argument by failing to make it in its appellate brief”); Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”). If we were to entertain the argument, however, it would not warrant a different result. As with communication and academics, a rational trier of fact could conclude, based on the record before it, that Mr. Hooks did not have significant limitations in health (continued...) -31-