Opinion ID: 1299067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Requested instructions on religious use of marijuana.

Text: The third issue we consider likely to recur on retrial concerns the trial court's refusal to submit to the jury the issue of the constitutional protection accorded to Olsen's use of marijuana as part of the practice of his religion. This guarantee applies to state action through the incorporation of its principles into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1217-18 (1940); Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Iowa 1976). The issue Olsen raises is whether the State's prohibition against the possession of marijuana unconstitutionally infringes upon his use of the drug for religious purposes: The free exercise clause prohibits the making of a law which in any way interferes with the free exercise of religion. The prohibition extends to unorthodox as well as orthodox religious beliefs and practices. It extends to religious organizations and individuals. It denies the government any power to proscribe, regulate, favor directly or indirectly any particular religious beliefs or doctrines (though not necessarily the acts which citizens may feel called upon to perform in compliance with their religious views). Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d at 128. According to Olsen's testimony, he was a priest in the Ethiopian Zioncoptic Church, and had been a member for three years. The church's only sacrament is marijuana, or ganja, and is combined with tobacco and smoked continually all day, through church services, through everything that we do. The drug is used both on a communal and an individual basis. This usage is consistent with Olsen's, and apparently the church's, interpretation of the Bible: [O]n the first page . . . God gave the commandment that every green herb bearing seed was to be used for meat and the healing of nations, and it didn't make any distinction. Although Olsen admits he had marijuana in his possession at the time of his arrest, he contends it was only for use in the church. He thus argues it was error for the trial court to refuse his requested instructions on the religious use of marijuana. In order to sustain a claim under the free exercise clause there must be a substantial interference by the state with the exercise of a sincerely held central religious belief. If there is a sufficiently compelling state interest at stake which outweighs the effect of the state's interference, the claim will not be sustained. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 972 (1963); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 360-62 (8th Cir. 1976). A broad definition of religion for purposes of the free exercise clause has been advocated by our court, e.g., Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W.2d at 128 (free exercise clause extends to unorthodox as well as orthodox religious beliefs and practices) and by other authorities: Clearly, the notion of religion in the Free Exercise clause must be expanded beyond limits of theism to account for the multiplying forms of recognizably legitimate religious exercise.       [A]ll that is arguably religious should be considered in a free exercise analysis.      [W]hen free exercise issues are raised, religious claims are to be examined not in terms of the majority's concept of religion but in terms of the social function of the group, or in terms of the role the beliefs assume in the individual's life. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14.6, at 827, 828, 831 (1978) (footnote deleted); accord, Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70, 73 S.Ct. 526, 527, 97 L.Ed. 828, 830-31 (1953) (it is no business of the courts to say what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment); see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-17, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533-34, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 25-26 (1972); Remmers v. Brewer, 494 F.2d 1277, 1278 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 332, 42 L.Ed.2d 286 (1974). We assume, without deciding, that the religion practiced by Olsen is one which is protected by the free exercise clause and that Olsen's belief in the marijuana sacrament is sincere and central to the religion. Tribe, supra § 14.11, at 859-61. Once these requisites are met, and a person has demonstrated that state action has interfered with the exercise of the religious belief, [2] the State bears the burden of proving that interest is outweighed by a compelling state interest. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236, 92 S.Ct. at 1543, 32 L.Ed.2d at 37. The state board of pharmacy examiners, the agency which administers the regulatory provisions of chapter 204, by its recommendations to the legislature has determined that marijuana has a potential for abuse. See § 204.401(1), (2), The Code. In January, 1971, the Iowa Drug Abuse Study Committee submitted its final report to the legislature. The Committee was established to study the subject of drug abuse and related matters in order that proper legislative steps may be taken to limit the improper use of drugs and other substances for depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic purposes. Drug Abuse Study Committee Final Report, 64th G.A. 1 (1971). In recommending that the legislature adopt in essence the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the Committee said in part: Use of marijuana may in some ways be considered to present one of the most difficult aspects of the current drug abuse problem. It is perhaps the drug most readily accessible to and widely used by young people. Courts considering the issue appear to have uniformly refused to sustain a free exercise claim with regard to marijuana use. E.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F.Supp. 439 (D.C.Cir.1968); Town v. Florida, 377 So.2d 648 (Fla.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 803, 101 S.Ct. 48, 66 L.Ed.2d 7 (1980) (compelling state interest in prohibiting distribution of marijuana by general public and in protecting public from church members driving under the influence); Lewellyn v. State, 592 P.2d 538 (Okla.Crim. App.1979) (compelling state interest in prohibiting distribution of marijuana to general public); People v. Mullins, 50 Cal.App.3d 61, 123 Cal.Rptr. 201 (1975) (marijuana usage not essential to practice of the Universal Life Church of Christ Light); State v. Soto, 21 Or.App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975) (compelling state interest in health and safety of general public), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955, 96 S.Ct. 1431, 47 L.Ed.2d 361 (1976); People v. Crawford, 69 Misc.2d 500, 328 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1972); State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917, 87 S.Ct. 876, 17 L.Ed.2d 789 (1967); State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926). A compelling state interest sufficient to override Olsen's free exercise clause argument is demonstrated in this case. The trial court did not err in refusing to submit the requested instructions. We reverse under the issue discussed in Division I and remand. REVERSED AND REMANDED.