Opinion ID: 786763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury's Total Disability Finding

Text: 25 [T]he question of what amounts to total disability is one of fact.... Erreca, 121 P.2d at 696. [W]e review the factual findings made by the jury under the substantial evidence test.... Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647, 651 (9th Cir.1982). 26 The jury's special verdict made the specific finding that at the date her benefits were terminated by Defendant, Plaintiff was unable to perform the substantial and material duties of her own occupation in the usual and customary way with reasonable continuity. Defendants argue that undisputed evidence demonstrates that Hangarter continued to manage her business profitably and engaged in a gainful occupation in violation of the precise terms of the policy. Given that the district court correctly applied California law in formulating its jury instruction for total disability, our relevant inquiry is only whether the jury's factual finding of total disability, pursuant to the jury instruction, was supported by substantial evidence. The fact that some evidence might demonstrate that Hangarter violated the precise terms of the policy is immaterial. 27 There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Hangarter was totally disabled. Though there is conflicting evidence in the record regarding Hangarter's medical condition, the jury's determination that before the date of termination Hangarter was physically unable to perform the substantial and material duties of her own occupation in the usual and customary way with reasonable continuity is supported by substantial evidence. Three doctors testified that Hangarter could not maintain a continuous, normal chiropractic occupation. While Defendants note that Hangarter made a handful of attempts to perform chiropractic adjustments, futile attempts to return to one's previous occupation are insufficient to reverse the jury's determination of total disability under California law. See Joyce, 21 Cal.Rptr. at 368 ([A] finding that the plaintiff was `wholly and continuously disabled' is not precluded by the fact that he made two futile attempts to return to his job. Such finding must be upheld since the evidence shows that on each occasion of his return to work, he was unable to perform the duties of his occupation ...). 28 Though Hangarter hired another chiropractor from 1997-1999 to treat her patients while she performed clerical tasks incidental to her primary occupation, this is insufficient to disqualify her from being totally disabled under California law. Hangarter had an occupational policy with Paul Revere, and was insured against losses stemming from her inability to perform her occupation as a chiropractor. Her occasional stints as an office manager do not constitute the occupational practice of chiropractic medicine. Under California law, the performance of tasks incidental to one's profession does not demonstrate that an individual is not totally disabled. See Culley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal.2d 187, 163 P.2d 698, 701 (1945) (Recovery is not precluded under a total disability provision because the insured is able to perform sporadic tasks, or give attention to simple or inconsequential details incident to the conduct of business (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 29 Similarly, the fact that Hangarter's enterprise possibly made a profit during this time period is also immaterial. As the California Supreme Court noted in Erreca: 30 The insurer also stresses the magnitude of the respondent's enterprise and his income therefrom. Such matters have no proper place in the determination of whether respondent is totally disabled from performing remunerative work. Disability insurance is designed to provide a substitute for earnings when, because of bodily injury or disease, the insured is deprived of the capacity to earn his living.... It does not insure against loss of income. The respondent receives his income from his ranches as an owner or lessor; his labor contributes nothing toward it. The contention of the insurer would lead to the strange conclusion that a bedridden merchant is not totally disabled from performing gainful work because he receives a substantial income from a business, the management of which he has been forced to abandon to others. 31 Erreca, 121 P.2d at 695-96 (emphasis added). 6 32 Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Hangarter was unable to perform the substantial and material duties of her occupation as a chiropractor in a normal and continuous way. The district court therefore did not err in declining to disturb the jury's finding that Hangarter was totally disabled.