Opinion ID: 848628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: retaliation based on opposition to sexual harassment

Text: Plaintiff's first theory is that defendant retaliated against her because she opposed Habkirk's sexual harassment. At around the same time that plaintiff allegedly observed sexually harassing behavior by Habkirk toward female employees, she felt someone touch her on the back, near her shoulder, while she was walking near Habkirk's office. [1] Plaintiff testified that I felt somebody's hand touching me, and I turned around and hit the person. She noted further that it was a very automatic reaction on my part. I felt somebody touching me, and I just turned around and swung at him. We conclude there is insufficient evidence for a juror reasonably to conclude that by striking Habkirk under these circumstances plaintiff was opposing sexual harassment, i.e., engaging in a protected activity under the Civil Rights Act. First, plaintiff acknowledged that Habkirk was not sexually harassing her at the time she hit him so that it is difficult to view her conduct as responsive to protected activity. This is underscored by plaintiff's acknowledgment that Habkirk had never sexually harassed her. Second, there is no evidence that, before this lawsuit, plaintiff ever sought to cast her conduct in hitting Habkirk in terms of opposing sexual harassment at defendant's workplace. Such a message was never communicated to the alleged victims of Habkirk's sexual harassment or to fellow employees, much less to Habkirk, management, union representatives, or public agencies. Third, plaintiff testified that she did not even know it was Habkirk who touched her shoulder until after she struck him. That is, because plaintiff in her automatic response to the touching could just as likely have struck out at any one of her coworkers as at Habkirk, it is difficult to conclude that her action was somehow intended to communicate a principled opposition to prior incidents of supervisory misconduct. That is, there is simply no connection here between causethe alleged sexual harassmentand effectplaintiff's striking Habkirk. [2] Moreover, although it is not necessary to our analysis in this case, even if plaintiff were indisputably responding to past sexual harassment by hitting Habkirk, we are not prepared to conclude that any response to conduct prohibited by the Civil Rights Act, no matter how excessive or inappropriate the response, including assaultive behavior, falls within the act's protections. An employee is not immunized for any type of responsive conduct, no matter how outrageous or disproportionate, simply because it is connected with opposition to discrimination. Obviously, no employee would be protected under the act from all retaliation by an employer for criminal, or sabotaging, or destructive activities simply because these occurred in response to perceived employer discrimination. For purposes of analysis under § 701(a), consideration must be given to separating the motivation underlying an employee's conduct and the means by which such motivation is translated into conduct. Under these circumstances, we conclude that no juror could have reasonably concluded that defendant was engaged in a protected activity by opposing sexual harassment when she hit Habkirk. Even if the jury here were persuaded that plaintiff was engaged in a protected activity by striking Habkirk, she has failed to show that defendant knew that she was engaged in such activity. Absent such a showing, there could be no retaliation on the employer's part to anything within the protection of the Civil Rights Act. While Habkirk obviously would have been aware that plaintiff had struck him, there was nothing inherent in this conduct that would have apprised him that plaintiff was thereby opposing sexual harassment. There is no evidence that Habkirk touched plaintiff at that time (or any other time) in a way that was inappropriate; there is no evidence that plaintiff herself perceived that Habkirk touched her in a way that was inappropriate; there is no evidence that Habkirk reasonably could have discerned from the nature of plaintiff's response to his touching that she was communicating any message of opposition to sexual harassment; and there is no evidence that plaintiff at any time explained the significance of her behavior to Habkirk. Nor is there anything else on the part of plaintiff following this incident that would communicate to anyone how she had been opposing sexual harassment by striking Habkirk. To the extent that she failed to communicate this supposed purpose to alleged victims of Habkirk's previous conduct, to coemployees, to management, to union representatives, to public authorities, or to Habkirk himself, [3] it is difficult to understand how defendant could have been sufficiently aware that plaintiff was engaged in protected activity so as to be able to retaliate against her for such conduct. Under these circumstances, we conclude that no juror could reasonably have concluded that defendant was aware that plaintiff had been engaged in protected activity by opposing sexual harassment when she hit Habkirk. Therefore, on the basis either that there is insufficient evidence that plaintiff was engaged in protected activity [4] or that defendant could have been aware of such activity, plaintiff has failed to establish a claim under the Civil Rights Act. To the extent that she has failed to present sufficient evidence that she was engaged in protected activity, she has failed to satisfy the threshold requirement for coverage under § 701(a); to the extent that she has failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant could have been aware of such activity, she could not have been the object of retaliation under § 701(a). [5]