Opinion ID: 2024227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Partial Preclusion of Tenth Claim.

Text: Weishaar's tenth claim, which was for cumulative injuries from 1982 until she was laid off on December 29, 1988, survived Snap-On's res judicata argument. As to the tenth claim, the commissioner ruled that Weishaar had suffered no industrial disability after the March 21, 1989 hearing, and the district court affirmed. Weishaar claims in her cross-appeal that no substantial evidence supports the commissioner's conclusion that [t]he evidence in the record of this case is substantially the same as the evidence that existed at the time of the prior hearing. Weishaar acknowledges that her physical condition is substantially the same as it was at the time of the prior hearing, but that does not foreclose the possibility of increased industrial disability, as to which her physical condition is only one factor. Weishaar points to events after the first hearing that would support her claim that her industrial disability has increased, but it is not clear whether the commissioner considered this evidence. In fact, the ruling appears to have considered only the claimant's functional disability, which is only part of the picture. The ruling said: A review of the record in this case shows that little, if anything, is different now than it was at the time of the prior hearing. There is no evidence from any physician which indicates that the claimant's physical condition has worsened or changed. A functional capacity evaluation conducted on July 5, 1989 shows no substantial difference in activity restrictions from those which existed at the time of the previous hearing.... Claimant was laid off due to her restrictions at the time of the prior hearing and was again laid off due to those restrictions at the time of the recent hearing. The evidence in the record of this case is substantially the same as the evidence that existed at the time of the prior hearing. Accordingly, the claimant has failed to carry her burden of proof to show that any disability was proximately caused by injurious exposures occurring since December 29, 1988. Weishaar contends that the commissioner should have considered other factors that changed the picture between the two hearings. Weishaar points out that, at the time of the March 21, 1989 hearing, she had been laid off but not terminated and that in fact she returned to work at Snap-On on July 17, 1989. She was, however, laid off on January 18, 1991, and not recalled within two years and therefore lost her collective bargaining rights. At the time of the first hearing, she was being trained to become an alcohol counselor, but by her final termination on January 18, 1993, she had discovered that any such job would be at a seventy-five percent reduction in earnings and that she faced a prospect of severely decreased earnings. The commissioner's ruling does not discuss this evidence. We cannot say that the limited evidence discussed in the commissioner's ruling supports the conclusion that Weishaar had not suffered additional industrial disability following the first hearing. We remand for a determination by the commissioner, based on the evidence already in the record, including the evidence just discussed, to determine the merits of Weishaar's industrial disability claim under her tenth petition.