Opinion ID: 437224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Substantive Standards

Text: 55 The next question is whether state substantive standards which guarantee a higher level of educational quality and benefits for disabled children than the federal minimum will be given effect in federal courts. The Rowley Court, in interpreting the federal Act, found it generates no additional requirement that the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child's potential 'commensurate with the opportunities provided other children.'  Rowley at 198, 102 S.Ct. at 3046. But the Court also held the Act to contain a federal minimum standard, a basic floor, of beneficial education. Rowley at 201, 102 S.Ct. at 3048. 16 While the Court did not articulate one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act, Rowley at 202, 102 S.Ct. at 3049, it did identify some basic guidelines. It construed the federal standard to require, inter alia, personalized instruction based on a determination of the unique needs of the disabled child with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction. It also found that the plan must be reasonably calculated to enable the [specific] child to receive educational benefits, id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. It seems clear that Sec. 1401(16), which states  'special education' means specially designed instruction ... to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, and Sec. 1401(18), which specifies the formal requirements of a free appropriate public education, require that all of a child's special needs must be addressed in the educational plan. The objective of the federal floor, then, is the achievement of effective results--demonstrable improvement in the educational and personal skills identified as special needs--as a consequence of implementing the proposed IEP. See 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(19)(E). Cf. Helms v. McDaniel, 657 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir.1981); Kruelle v. New Castle County Schools, 642 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir.1981). 56 While the federal Act establishes a basic floor of education, it may provide a lesser standard of educational services and procedural protection than state law mandates. 17 See, e.g., Cothern v. Mallory, 565 F.Supp. 701, 706-08 (W.D.Mo.1983) (state statute requires special education to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities of the disabled child); Isgur v. School Committee of Newton, 9 Mass.App. 290, 400 N.E.2d at 1298 (state statute directs reassignment if, after subsequent evaluation, another program may benefit the child more, and if program does not benefit child to the maximum extent feasible). The federal Act also specifies that a federal free appropriate public education must meet the standards of the State educational agency, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(18)(B); see also Rowley 458 U.S. at 203, 102 S.Ct. at 3049. We hold, therefore, that the Act incorporates by reference state standards, be they substantive or procedural, that exceed the federal basic floor of meaningful, beneficial educational opportunity. 18 Thus a district court's inquiry must include a determination whether the state substantive standard exceeds the protection and services required by the federal Act. If it does, the state standard will operate to determine what an appropriate education requires for a particular child in a given state. 19 57 Here, the district court disposed of the hearing officer's decision summarily: 58 The hearing officer's decision was greatly influenced by her finding that the Town had failed to comply with educational and procedural mandates and her further finding of substantive and continuing procedural irregularity. These violations of state regulations, even if they were substantial, cannot, however, affect the determination under federal law of what the appropriate placement was. 59 This ruling ignores the requirement of Sec. 1401(18), which specifies that a disabled child's education must meet the standards of the State educational agency. 60 Application of the Rowley principles reveals two additional problems with the district court's decision. First, the hearing officer provided considerably more content to John's unique needs than the district court acknowledged in its opinion. She found that John did not work well independently, was painfully aware of his learning deficits, and had lost self-esteem because his reading skills had not allowed him to keep pace with his peers. In the Town's proposed placement, John's reading skills would have been lower than those of five of the six students and he would have been one of the older students in the class. The hearing officer was concerned that insufficient group work was possible in the class for John's needs, and that the skill variance among students might have the effect of increasing [John's] frustration. I am additionally concerned that a highly individualized program may not be appropriate for a student who does not work well independently. In its opinion, the district court did not discuss these findings at all. Instead, the court appears to have taken as its point of reference a learning disabled child generally and how the Town's placement would provide a beneficial education. 61 Nor did the district court address the hearing officer's findings that the Town exceeded the maximum thirty-six months chronological age span in the classroom proposed for John and failed to request a waiver from the department for this deficiency, and that the proposed school day was shortened by fifteen to twenty minutes without state approval. In reviewing the administrative decision, the court simply concluded that the proposed IEP complied with the definitional checklist of an appropriate education and met the state's educational standards. The court, in effect, ignored the state's substantive standards. This was error.