Opinion ID: 1152592
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to challenge Juror Melba Thompson for cause.

Text: (32a) Defendant contends trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because they failed to challenge Juror Melba Thompson for cause. Defendant claims that the juror's views on capital punishment were so extreme that they would substantially impair her performance as an impartial juror. He also claims she disclosed she would be excessively deferential to the testimony of experts. He complains that instead of moving to excuse the juror, counsel in effect rehabilitated Ms. Thompson by getting her to change some of her answers. (33) Defendant was entitled to trial by an impartial jury, made up of jurors who will not automatically vote for the death penalty, but who will consider the mitigating evidence presented. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121; see Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at pp. 729, 735-736 [119 L.Ed.2d at pp. 502-303, 506-507].) Those eligible to serve, however, include those who may favor the death penalty. ( Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 173-177 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 147-150, 106 S.Ct. 1758] [federal Constitution]; Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 63 [168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301] [those who favor the death penalty, are indifferent to it or oppose it are eligible to serve in capital trial]; see also People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 956, fn. 2.) As we have noted above, a juror is subject to challenge for cause because of his or her views on the death penalty only if those views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852].) (32b) Defendant is unable to show reasonably competent trial counsel would have challenged Ms. Thompson for cause. Defendant asserts that Ms. Thompson indicated on the written jury questionnaire, filled out before voir dire, that she thought the death penalty should be enforced, that she believed in an eye for an eye, and that the death penalty should be imposed for every intentional killing or burglary felony murder. Nonetheless, she also stated she would hear and review all the circumstances before deciding whether the death penalty should be imposed. She also stated she would be able to put aside her personal feelings as to what the law should be and follow the law as the trial court explained it. She said she would not automatically vote for a death verdict. On voir dire, she explained she had made a mistake in stating on the jury questionnaire that she thought death should be automatic for intentional killings. In fact, she misunderstood the written question, and did not believe that the death penalty should be imposed for every intentional homicide. She said she considered life without possibility of parole to be an appropriate punishment. Considering these responses, counsel could competently conclude that the juror's views on the death penalty would not `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121.) Certainly, she did not express such an unalterable preference for the death penalty that her claims to be able to put her views aside and follow the court's instructions must be rejected as hypocrisy or self-deception. ( Id. at p. 123, cf. Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 735 [119 L.Ed.2d at pp. 506-507].) Defendant also fails to show that the record affirmatively discloses there was no rational tactical purpose for accepting Ms. Thompson on the jury despite her favorable views on the death penalty and her deferential regard for expert opinion. ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 658-659 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351] [defendant failed to demonstrate trial counsel's manner of conducting capital voir dire resulted from other than informed strategic decision].) [17] Defendant disparages counsel for rehabilitating the juror. Yet counsel's efforts suggest they had tactical reasons for wanting to retain the juror. She had moderated the uncritical views she expressed regarding the death penalty in her questionnaire, and this new thoughtfulness, in addition to counsel's observation of the juror's demeanor, may have persuaded them that the defense should accept her as a juror. (See People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 587 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142] [recognizing counsel may base tactics at voir dire on observation of prospective jurors' demeanor].) Defendant fails to demonstrate on this record that there was no rational basis for counsel's decision to accept Juror Thompson. Defendant also argues in summary terms that counsel were incompetent for failing to move to exclude eight other jurors for cause. We have already rejected the claim the court should have removed the jurors on its own motion, concluding there was little basis for concluding the jurors had expressed views that would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852].) Counsel, like the court, could competently conclude the jurors were not subject to exclusion for cause.