Opinion ID: 2335399
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Allow Confession as a Statement Against Penal Interest

Text: Appellant argues that having upheld Riley's Fifth Amendment privilege, the trial court should have allowed appellant to testify regarding statements that Riley made to him regarding his responsibility for the robbery and appellant's innocence. The trial court, relying on our decisions in Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190 (D.C. 1979) (en banc), and Lyons v. United States, 514 A.2d 423 (D.C.1986), did not allow appellant to introduce this testimony under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. The trial court ruled that although Riley was unavailable due to his assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, which satisfied one condition of that hearsay exception, the veracity of appellant, as the person reporting the statement, was highly suspect because he had an absolute total motive for fabrication, and there were no corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the trustworthiness of Riley's inculpatory statement. The trial court's conclusion that a statement is (or is not) against the declarant's penal interest is clearly a legal question that we review de novo. Ingram v. United States, 885 A.2d 257, 263 (D.C.2005). As the trial court recognized, whether a proffered declaration is admissible as a statement against penal interest requires a three-step inquiry: (1) whether the declarant, in fact, made a statement; (2) whether the declarant is unavailable; and (3) whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Laumer, 409 A.2d at 199. In determining whether the declarant in fact made the proffered statement, the trial court's focus is not on the truth of the declaration, but on the veracity of the witness who repeats the declaration. . . . Where appropriate, the trial court must also assess the general credibility of the witness and probe for interest, bias, and the possible motive for fabrication. Id. Here, the trial court found appellant's general lack of credibilityillustrated particularly by repeated diagnoses after psychiatric evaluations that he was a malingerer, discussed infra as well as his motive for fabrication cast doubt on whether the alleged statement was, in fact, made by Riley. This finding is well-supported by the record and was not clearly in error. The trial court's finding that the statement was not made under circumstances that corroborate its trustworthiness was also in accordance with governing law. In Laumer, we held that in making this determination, courts should (1) consider the timing of the declaration; [4] (2) to whom the statement was made; (3) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case; and (4) the extent to which the declaration is really against the declarant's penal interest. 409 A.2d at 200-03. The trial court conducted this analysis and found that appellant's testimony regarding Riley's purported statementsmade to appellant long after the offense (whereas Riley had told the police on the day of the offense that appellant was responsible), and without any corroborating evidencelacked trustworthiness. The hearsay statements, therefore, were properly excluded.