Opinion ID: 5648768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issue #8: prosecutor’s statements

Text: Cunningham argues that the prosecutor made five improper statements. Cunningham defaulted his claims about three of the statements, so we cannot consider them. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision about the remaining two statements, moreover, involved no unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. We thus reject Cunningham’s final argument. Cunningham takes issue with five of the prosecutor’s statements—three from the prosecutor’s closing argument at the guilt phase and two from his closing argument at the sentencing phase. The first statement arose from a back-and-forth about bullets at the closing of the guilt phase. Defense counsel conveyed that the physical evidence showed that just one gun Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 48 was used and that Jackson—not Cunningham—fired that weapon. R. 194-2 (Trial Tr. at 1440) (Page ID #10650). The prosecutor responded by speculating that Cunningham could have fired bullets that were lost in the blood at the crime scene or disintegrated when they hit a wall. Id. at 1441–43 (Page ID #10651–53). Second, the prosecutor stated during the guilt phase that Grant, the three-year-old murder victim, never received a chance for justice. Id. at 1448 (Page ID #10658). Third, the prosecutor commented at the guilt phase that the killings were “absolutely the most cold-blooded calculated inhumane murder that anyone could ever imagine.” Id. at 1449 (Page ID #10658). Fourth, the prosecutor mentioned that Cunningham made an unsworn statement during the penalty phase that was not subject to cross-examination, which did not “lessen his moral culpability” or “diminish the appropriateness of the death sentence.” Id. at 116 (Page ID #10849). Fifth, the prosecutor conveyed during the penalty phase that Cunningham’s unsworn statement; malingering, antisocial-personality, and psychopathic-personality diagnoses; comprehension of right and wrong; and lack of progress in treatment should not mitigate Cunningham’s sentence. Id. at 116–17 (Page ID #10849–50). Cunningham frames these statements as the prosecutor’s impermissibly listing out nonstatutory aggravating factors. See Appellant’s Br. #1 at 85. Cunningham argued on direct appeal that these five statements were improper. Highlighting that Cunningham’s trial counsel had objected at trial to the third and fourth statements but not to the first, second, and fifth statements, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed for plain error the latter trio of comments. The state high court rejected Cunningham’s argument on the merits, concluding that none of the five statements were improper. Cunningham II, 824 N.E.2d at 523–24. Cunningham preserved all five subarguments in his federal habeas petition. R. 19-7 (Habeas Pet. at 68) (Page ID #111). We cannot review the first, second, and fifth statements because they have been procedurally defaulted. The Ohio courts’ enforcement of the contemporaneous-objection rule is an independent and adequate ground that bars habeas relief. See Hand v. Houk, 871 F.3d 390, 417 (6th Cir. 2017). That the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the merits of three of Cunningham’s allegations for plain error does not waive Ohio’s procedural-default rules. See id. So we cannot review these three statements unless the default is excused. See id. Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 49 Cunningham argues that his trial counsel’s ineffective performance served as cause and prejudice to excuse his defaulting this trifecta of statements. Appellant’s Br. #1 at 85–86. But Cunningham has not established prejudice. The first statement—the speculation about the unfound bullets—was not prejudicial. The jury heard that one bullet was dug out of a wall and a bullet fragment was discovered in a pool of blood. R. 194-2 (Trial Tr. at 966–71) (Page ID #10155–60). A police officer also testified that law enforcement recovered a tooth and jewelry while fishing through pools of blood with a pen. Id. at 957–58 (Page ID #10146–47). Again, Coron Liles spat out an unrecovered bullet in the streets; another bullet remains lodged in Tomeaka Grant’s arm. Id. at 1133, 1226 (Page ID #10329, 10422); Cunningham I, 2004 WL 2496525, at . Put another way, other evidence indicated that bullets fired from Cunningham’s weapon may have fragmented, been overlooked in blood pools, or otherwise been lost. So the prosecutor’s speculations were not prejudicial. No doubt, the prosecutor’s second statement— that Grant never received a chance at justice—wrongfully inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury. See Wogenstahl, 668 F.3d at 333. But this comment was isolated and therefore harmless. See id. at 333–34. As for Cunningham’s fifth allegation, we are not convinced that the prosecutor’s description of the mitigating evidence constituted a list of nonstatutory aggravating factors. Either way, the Constitution allows juries to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors. See LaMar v. Houk, 798 F.3d 405, 431 (6th Cir. 2015). Because this troika of statements did not prejudice Cunningham, his procedural default is unexcused. We cannot address the merits of these claims. We can, however, review the merits of the two nondefaulted subclaims; we apply § 2254(d)(1) deference to the Ohio Supreme Court’s consideration of the prosecutor’s third and fourth statements. The prosecutor’s third statement—that this was “absolutely the most coldblooded calculated inhumane murder that anyone could ever imagine,” R. 194-2 (Trial Tr. at 1449) (Page ID #10658)—was improperly designed to inflame the jury’s passion, see Gumm v. Mitchell, 775 F.3d 345, 377 (6th Cir. 2014). If we were directly reviewing Cunningham’s case, he may be entitled to relief. See id. But this is a habeas case. To attain habeas relief, Cunningham must show that the prosecutor’s statements were “so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial or so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant”—a high standard to surpass. Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 367 (6th Cir. 2007) Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 50 (quoting Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2000)). In deciding that the third statement was harmless, the Ohio Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. The prosecutor’s fourth statement—that Cunningham testified sans oath—violated Ohio law. See Bedford v. Collins, 567 F.3d 225, 236 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that Ohio law provides that the prosecution may not disparage a defendant’s decision not to testify under oath). But the Supreme Court has never addressed whether the Constitution is implicated when a statelaw right to supply unsworn testimony is violated. Absent such precedent, the Ohio Supreme Court’s single-sentence postcard denial—“[w]e reject this argument,” Cunningham II, 824 N.E.2d at 524—involved no unreasonable application of Supreme Court caselaw. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 98 (“Where a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.”). In short, Cunningham’s argument that the prosecutor made improper statements is partially defaulted and partially meritless. We thus reject this argument.