Opinion ID: 2210281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Effects of Instream Appropriation

Text: This brings us to the complaining objectors' second constitutional challenge to the instream appropriation statutes. They argue that the statutes work to deprive them of their constitutional right to divert unappropriated water. They base their argument on Justice McFadden's dissent in State, Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974), and on the similarities between the relevant provisions of the Nebraska and Idaho Constitutions. The short and perhaps overly simplistic answer to that argument is that the Constitution only protects the right to divert unappropriated water, and once there has been an instream appropriation, that water is no longer unappropriated. The more complete answer is that Justice McFadden's approach is inapplicable to Nebraska law. The complaining objectors argue that the instream appropriation statutes permit the state to withdraw water from appropriation in violation of the command of § 6 that [t]he right to divert unappropriated waters... for beneficial use shall never be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public interest. They rely on the following language from Justice McFadden's dissent: I recognize that the state, acting in its proprietary capacity, may appropriate water without offending Article 15, section 3; but as in the case of private appropriators, the state's appropriative right depends upon the application of water to a beneficial use. In this case, however, the state agency is directed to hold unappropriated waters in trust for the people of the state for scenic beauty and recreational purposes. [Citation omitted.] If the state were to hold unappropriated waters in trust for these purposes, it certainly would not be acting in a proprietary capacity; it would be doing nothing more than it already had a duty to do in its sovereign capacity. [Citations omitted.] [T]he title to the public waters of the state is vested in the state for the use and benefit of all the citizens of the state   . This is not, however, an interest or title in the proprietary sense, but rather in the sovereign capacity as representative of all the people for the purpose of guaranteeing that the common rights of all shall be equally protected and that no one shall be denied his proper use and benefit of this common necessity. [Citation omitted.] ... In my view, the in-stream use of a natural stream for recreational purposes and for scenic beauty is a public beneficial use which inheres in the state's sovereign ownership of such water. Therefore, since the state already has the right to so use the water, it cannot acquire the right to appropriate the water for these purposes. ... To allow the state to in effect reserve water from appropriation in furtherance of non-proprietary, non-power purposeswhen the framers of the Constitution contemplated that private beneficial users could appropriate water being held by the state in its sovereign capacityamounts to nothing less than a denial of the constitutional right to appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream. In other words, the state cannot by legislative act authorize its own agency to monopolize or withdraw the very rights that section 3 of article 15 of the Constitution says `shall never be denied' the people of the state. [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis in original.) State, Dept. of Parks, supra at 452-53, 530 P.2d at 936-37. This reasoning is inapplicable to Nebraska law for several reasons. First, the cases supporting the propositions upon which Justice McFadden relies are all Idaho cases and are not precedent in Nebraska. The complaining objectors have failed to demonstrate that there are any analogous Nebraska precedents. Second, the statutory scheme before us does not provide for the holding of unappropriated waters `in trust for the people of the state' but, rather, authorizes an instream appropriation of the public water for particular beneficial uses. Third, and most important, Nebraska's Constitution expressly provides for a public interest exception to the right to divert. Justice McFadden's conclusion that the Idaho statute was unconstitutional was based on the fact that the Idaho Constitution, [u]nlike the constitutions of some other western states ... makes an exception [to the right to appropriate] only for power purposes not for the demands of the public interest .... (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 453, 530 P.2d at 937. Unlike that of Idaho, Nebraska's constitutional right to appropriate can and must be limited by the demands of the public interest. Neb. Const. art. XV, § 6. The instream flow appropriation statutes can be viewed as a mechanism for determining whether the public interest demands that the right to appropriate water from a given stream should be denied. This view is supported by the fact that the statutory scheme includes a legislative finding that the public interest demands the recognition of instream uses for fish, recreation, and wildlife, § 46-2,107, and requires the Director of Water Resources to find that the instream flow appropriation is in the public interest. §§ 46-2,115 and 46-2,116. Anticipating this conclusion, the complaining objectors argue that § 6 requires a new and independent weighing of the public interest each time a new appropriation is requested and does not permit the state to make a determination of the public interest which would bind future applicants for appropriations. They assert that the statutory scheme adopts a permanently fixed notion of the public interest contrary to Article XV, section 6 of the Nebraska Constitution. Reply brief for Zwiebel at 14. This notion of the public interest is not as permanently fixed as the complaining objectors seem to believe, nor do the instream appropriations granted under the statutes enjoy a permanent status, as they assert. Like any other appropriation, an instream appropriation can be canceled. See § 46-2,119 (subjecting instream appropriations to cancellation provisions of Neb. Rev.Stat. § 46-229.04 (Reissue 1988)). In addition, an instream flow appropriation can be modified in favor of water development projects which meet the criteria of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 2-15,114 (Reissue 1987), if the state's interest demands a modification. See § 46-2,117. Additionally, the complaining objectors fail to consider the possibility of the state's abandoning or relinquishing its right to a particular appropriation if the public interest so demands. They also seem to overlook that the instream appropriation is a statutory creature, and, as such, its attributes can be amended by statute. If the Legislature should one day determine that the public interest has changed and no longer requires instream appropriations, it can return to the individualized determinations championed by the complaining objectors. The view that § 6 demands individual, case-by-case determinations of the public interest for each new application is a narrow and parsimonious interpretation of the constitutional language and, as such, conflicts with the rule that constitutional provisions should receive a broad and liberal interpretation. Nebraska P.P. Dist. v. Hershey School Dist., 207 Neb. 412, 299 N.W.2d 514 (1980). The language of § 6 does not compel a continuing, case-by-case determination. The relevant clause of § 6 simply permits the state to deny appropriations based upon the dictates of the public interest. It does not prescribe the manner by which the public interest is to be determined nor the mechanisms by which it may be accomplished. The complaining objectors also claim that permitting instream appropriations conflicts with § 6 by granting large water appropriators the right to request modifications, while denying that right to smaller appropriators who would otherwise have a higher priority. Brief for Zwiebel at 17. However, they do not specify how this conflict is created. If they are attempting to raise an equal protection argument, the claim, since no suspect or quasi-suspect classification is involved, would be subject to rational basis review. The Legislature can rationally determine that the public interest in a project which will cost over $10 million and which seeks state funding (two of the criteria of § 2-15,114) is more likely to outweigh the public interest in an instream flow appropriation than would a smaller, private appropriator's use. Finally, the complaining objectors assert that the public interest test of § 46-2,116 fails to meet the level of necessity required by the Constitution. It does not do so, in their view, because it does not require that the economic, social, and environmental value of the instream use exceed that of the reasonably foreseeable out-of-stream uses forgone or afforded to junior appropriators, but merely requires that the director consider these factors. This argument is unpersuasive. First, the Legislature has already found that the public interest demands the recognition of instream uses for piscatorial and other purposes. § 46-2,107. The complaining objectors do not challenge this finding. Second, the director must consider other factors besides the relative value of the uses; he must also consider whether the application is consistent with state goals for water resources use. § 46-2,116(3). The complaining objectors' interpretation ignores this consideration, even though it is a valid factor in determining the weight of the public interest in the appropriation. For all the reasons set out above, the complaining objectors have failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating the questioned statutes to be unconstitutional, and, therefore, their constitutional challenges fail.