Opinion ID: 2831583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court’s order on remand

Text: On remand, the trial court answered the first and second inquiries by explaining that appellant was required to file a separate petition for a compensation review pursuant to D.C. Code § 20-753 (a), and that appellant’s objections to the 8 First and Final Accounts were not a sufficient substitute. 9 The process for reviewing an account, the trial court explained, does not include a review of the reasonableness of compensation paid from the estate. Rather, it is an auditing process in which the Probate Division’s auditing staff ensures that the account balances and is supported by documentation and, if so, submits the account to the court for review and approval. The Probate Division’s auditing staff has no authority to decide an issue or make recommendations to the court in response to an interested party’s objection to the account. On the other hand, the trial court explained that a petition for a compensation review filed pursuant to § 20-753 (a) is meant to put all parties on notice that compensation paid from the estate is disputed and provides “a forum where both parties can submit evidence and a record can be established for the court’s consideration of the review petition.” Because appellant never filed this petition, and because his objections to the First and Final Accounts were not a sufficient alternative, the trial court stated that the parties and the court were “entitled to proceed with the estate administration with the understanding that the 9 Specifically, the trial court stated that appellant must file a “§ 20-753 (b) petition,” referring to the process for requesting a review of the employment and compensation of personal representatives and employees of the estate described in § 20-753 (a). Section 20-753 (b) provides factors for the court to consider in its review. 9 reasonableness of Mr. Toulouse’s attorney fees w[as] not at issue.” The trial court found that appellant had ample opportunity to file a petition in compliance with this statute, and concluded that appellant’s failure to do so constituted waiver of this right. As to the third inquiry on remand, regarding appellant’s objections to the proposed distribution of the estate, the trial court determined that appellant was required to follow the procedure set forth in D.C. Code § 20-1102 (d) and object to the proposed distribution “within 30 days after mailing or delivery of the proposal.” Id. The trial court explained that this procedure promotes efficient estate administration by allowing the parties to address objections to a proposed distribution before the proposed distribution plan is implemented, a concern that is particularly relevant where a hostile heir is involved. Because Mr. Waugh did not object to the proposed distribution within thirty days and instead challenged it in his objection to Final Account –– filed more than two months later –– the trial court concluded that Mr. Waugh had forfeited his right to do so and that his claim was time barred.10 This appeal followed. 10 The trial court also concluded that, in any event, the proposed distribution was fair, as it allocated the estate’s assets in-kind between appellant and Ms. Barber, who took assets valued at $214,620 and $212,700, respectively. 10