Opinion ID: 1421686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pursuit versus Response Activities

Text: In my view, the majority's analysis has no colorable basis and, likewise, fails to comport with basic tenets of statutory interpretation. The General Assembly, in enacting N.C.G.S. § 20-145, set out those governmental officers and the specific activities to which speed limitations shall not apply: (1) during law enforcement officers' chase or apprehension of law violators, both actual and suspected; and (2) when a fire department or fire patrol travel[s] in response to a fire alarm are codified examples. N.C.G.S. § 20-145 (2003) (emphasis added). Clearly, if the legislature intended law enforcement officers' routine response activities, as in the instant case, to be insulated under N.C.G.S. § 20-145, they would not have limited the statute's scope solely to chase or apprehension in the pursuit of suspects. The legal maxim, Expressio unius est exclusio alteriusthe expression of one thing implies the exclusion of the othercompels this construction of the statute. Black's Law Dictionary 602 (7th ed. 1999). The General Assembly did address response situations in the statute, but they did so only with regards to fire departments, which by their very function and responsibility respond to calls for fire services. The majority's construction of the statutory languagewhen traveling in emergencies ... in the performances of their dutieshangs off the precipice of reason in that the quoted language is contained in a clause associated with public or private ambulances and rescue squad emergency service vehicles, not law enforcement vehicles. The majority's rewriting of our statute directly contradicts the original legislative intent and organization of the statutory language. Further, the North Carolina Court of Appeals case cited by the majority as support for holding N.C.G.S. § 20-145 applies to law enforcement officers acting in emergency response situations, State v. Flaherty, 55 N.C.App. 14, 284 S.E.2d 565 (1981), concerns an officer's liability while engaged in a pursuit activity, and is inapplicable to this Court's analysis with regards to emergency response situations. Each time this Court has applied the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 20-145, the law enforcement conduct in question consisted of actual pursuit of a fleeing, known suspect or violator and not a response activity. See Parish v. Hill, 350 N.C. 231, 513 S.E.2d 547 (1999); Young v. Woodall, 343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580, 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988); Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128, 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959), overruled by Young v. Woodall, 343 N.C. 459, 471 S.E.2d 357 (1996). Thus, the majority's reliance on the pursuit scenario is flawed and the instant case is clearly distinguishable on its facts. Officer Kelly was not chasing or attempting to apprehend a suspect; instead, he, along with eight other officers, was independently responding to another officer's call for backup. Sergeant Willy Long, Officer Kelly's supervisor on 15 September 2000, admitted during deposition Officer Kelly was not engaged in a pursuit activity, but was engaged in a response activity. Officer Kelly had absolutely no information regarding the factual circumstances facing Officer Fox, nor was he aware of the nature or circumstances of the call to which Officer Fox had initially responded. In reality, Officer Kelly was blindly responding to a routine call for backup. He was not cognizant of any suspects, the presence of danger or a volatile situation, or any information to make a knowing, intelligent decision about the urgency of the response needed. To Officer Kelly, or any other responding officer that morning, Officer Fox's call was simply a precautionary, prudent call for backup. Without clarification or specific information, Officer Kelly's actions cannot be construed as a pursuit, nor was he engaged in the apprehension of a suspect; there was not even a substantiated emergency presented. The majority's reliance on such clearly distinguishable precedent is unwarranted. The difference between pursuit and response is not merely a legal distinction, but is well-rooted in the law enforcement community and is set out in law enforcement policy and procedure guidelines. The City of Durham Police Department's General Orders, which mandate its officers' conduct by establishing non-discretionary policies and procedures, set out different criteria for response priorities, vehicle pursuits, and emergency vehicle operation. Durham Police Dep't, Gen. Orders 4001 (Dec. 15, 1995), 4019 R-2 (Nov. 1, 1998), 4051 (Dec. 15, 1995). The General Orders allow vehicular pursuits only when the necessity of immediate apprehension outweighs the degree of danger created by the pursuit[,] and also list an extensive number of factors to consider when participating in a pursuit, thereby limiting an individual officer's discretion. Id. 4019 R-2, at 1, 4-5, 7-9. However, when an officer merely responds to a call for assistance, the Police Department's primary stated concern is for its officers to arrive safely on the scene of the call; the second objective is to arrive as soon as possible. Id. 4051, at 1. The list of factors for consideration during an emergency situation is not nearly as extensive as the factors listed regarding pursuit activities. Id. at 2-3; compare id. with Durham Police Dep't, Gen. Order 4019 R-2, at 4-5, 7-9. It is abundantly clear that the Durham Police Department, as well as the General Assembly, distinguishes law enforcement pursuit from routine response activities. The majority's opinion fails to recognize this well established distinction in the law enforcement community. As an example, the North Carolina State Highway Patrol distinguishes Chase Procedures from Emergency Response. N.C. State Highway Patrol, Pol'y Manual, Directive B.2 §§ IV., VI. (Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Highway Patrol]. The Highway Patrol defines chase as [a]n active attempt by one or more officers in authorized Patrol vehicles to apprehend a suspect or violator of the law operating a motor vehicle, while that person is attempting to avoid capture by using high-speed driving or other tactics. Id. § II., at 2. In contrast, the Highway Patrol defines emergency response as [t]he act of one or more officers operating authorized Patrol vehicles for the purpose of responding to a situation requiring immediate Police [action] due to a clear and present danger to public or officer safety, a need for immediate apprehension of a violator, or a serious crime in progress. Id. at 2-3. Life-threatening situations should be treated as a high priority that justifies an emergency response[,] Highway Patrol § III.A.3.a., while pursuits of a continuing moving violator present a substantial continuing hazard to the public [and] are of a higher priority[,] id. § III.A.1.c. (emphasis added). Further, the North Carolina Justice Academy's Basic Law Enforcement Training Manual (Student), cited by the majority and required to be used in all BLET courses in the State of North Carolina as mandated by the North Carolina Administrative Code, 12 NCAC 9B.0205(c) (June 2004), also distinguishes between emergency response considerations and pursuit driving considerations. N.C. Justice Acad., Basic Law Enforcement Training: Student § 18F, at 49, 59 (Jan. 2006). This distinction is not limited to North Carolina; rather, it is a nationwide doctrine in the law enforcement community. The International Association of Chiefs of Police recognizes this distinction between vehicular pursuit and response. Int'l Ass'n of Chiefs of Police, Manual of Police Traffic Services Policies and Procedures §§ 1.1 (June 1, 2004), 1.27 (July 1, 2004), available at http://www.theiacp .org/div_sec_com/ committees/Highway _Safety.htm [hereinafter IACP]. The IACP defines vehicular pursuit as [a]n active attempt by an officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend a fleeing suspect who actively is attempting to elude the police. Id. § 1.1, III.A. The IACP generally defines a response situation as any call for service. Id. § 1.27, III. In the instant case, what the majority fails to acknowledge is the fact that Officer Kelly was engaged in simply a response situation and nothing more. The plain language of N.C.G.S. § 20-145 addresses law enforcement personnel engaged in the chase or apprehension of law violators or suspects. The majority's attempt to force square pegs into round holes is incorrect, and its construction of this statute to cover both law enforcement officers' chase or apprehension of law violators and their response activities is simply judicial activism. The proper role of the Court is to interpret the law, rather than to legislate. Unlike the majority, I cannot in good conscience apply pursuit and apprehension law to a simple, routine response situation.