Opinion ID: 1677653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: inference instruction

Text: Parks next contends that the trial court erred in giving its jury instruction No. 9 over his objection. That instruction provides that [p]ossession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reasonably draw the inference and find, in the light of the surrounding circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen. Parks argues that the words if not satisfactorily explained authorized the jury to disregard the presumption of Parks' innocence and relieved the State of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of Parks' knowledge that the Blazer in which he was found sitting had been stolen, and impermissibly shifted to him the burden of going forward with defensive evidence on that essential element of the crime. A jury instruction which shifts the burden of proof to a defendant on any essential element of a crime charged violates a defendant's due process right to a fair trial. See, State v. Jasper, 237 Neb. 754, 467 N.W.2d 855 (1991); State v. Kipf, 234 Neb. 227, 450 N.W.2d 397 (1990). In objecting to the court's instruction No. 9, Parks' counsel argued to the trial court that the instruction doesn't explain to the jury that they have [sic] the option of not drawing that inference .... (Emphasis supplied.) Counsel did not submit a proposed instruction which directed the jury that it had the option not to draw the inference included in the instruction. Instructions as to presumptions in criminal cases must conform to the requirements of Neb.Evid.R. 303(3), Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-303(3) (Reissue 1989), which states: Whenever the existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the judge shall give an instruction that the law declares that the jury may regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but does not require it to do so. In addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the judge shall instruct the jury that its existence must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied.) Because § 27-303 is entitled Presumptions in criminal cases and refers to presumed facts, while the challenged instruction is based on a common-law inference, it is necessary to first determine whether § 27-303 applies to inferences. Thus, it is instructive to review the nature of presumptions in criminal cases. A presumption is a fact inferred from another proved or established fact or facts. State v. Jasper, supra . `An inference is a conclusion as to the existence of a particular fact reached by considering other facts in the usual course of human reasoning.... An inference is ... a deduction the factfinder may in its discretion draw, but is not required to draw as a matter of law.' Id., 237 Neb. at 759, 467 N.W.2d at 859, quoting Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 301.7 at 103-04 (3d ed. 1991). Although frequent reference is made to presumptions in criminal cases, a presumption that relieves the State of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on any essential element of a crime violates a defendant's due process rights and is constitutionally impermissible. State v. Jasper, supra . In Jasper, again citing Graham, supra, we suggested that `[c]larity would be fostered by reference to criminal instructed inferences rather than criminal presumptions.' 237 Neb. at 758, 467 N.W.2d at 859. See, also, State v. Hruza, 223 Neb. 837, 394 N.W.2d 643 (1986) (stating that if a statutory presumption were treated as anything more than a permissible inference of fact, it would be unconstitutional). Because presumptions in criminal cases are constitutionally infirm, and because a presumption that would relieve the State of its burden of proof on any essential element of a crime must be treated as no more than an inference, we conclude that references to presumptions in § 27-303 necessarily include inferences as well. That being the case, we now turn to the plain language of the statute to determine whether the court properly instructed the jury. Section 27-303(3) is couched in mandatory terms. The instruction, as given in Parks' case, failed to inform the jury that it was not required to draw the stated inference. It also failed to instruct the jury that the fact of Parks' knowledge that the vehicle was stolen must on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by § 27-303(3). The trial court's failure to comply with the requirements of § 27-303(3) is grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction. See State v. Stalder, 231 Neb. 896, 438 N.W.2d 498 (1989). We find these omissions in the court's instruction No. 9 in Parks' case to be fatal to the constitutional validity of that instruction. We hold that when a trial court instructs a jury on an inference regarding a specific fact or set of facts, the instruction must include that the jury may regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the inferred fact, but that the jury is not required to do so and that, in any event, the existence of the inferred fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In Parks' case, the trial court's failure to include these requirements in its instruction No. 9 constitutes error entitling Parks to a reversal of his conviction.