Opinion ID: 1570872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

Text: ¶ 19. Johnson also argues that his status as a habitual offender is a fact that the jury should determine, and as such, Section 99-18-91 violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In Jones v. U.S ., the United States Supreme Court set forth the rule that under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact ( other than a prior conviction ) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reiterated this rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey , and found that [t]he Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in [a] case involving a state statute. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Furthermore, this Court has held that a defendant has no constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of habitual-offender status. Keyes v. State, 549 So.2d 949, 951 (Miss. 1989). Therefore, we find this issue has no merit.

¶ 20. This Court has adopted the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to analyze a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Payton v. State, 708 So.2d 559, 560 (Miss. 1998). To prevail under Strickland, Johnson must show that (1) his counsel's performance was deficient, and that (2) the deficiency prejudiced him. Leatherwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964, 968 (Miss.1985). Additionally, there is a strong but rebuttable presumption that his counsel's decisions were sound trial strategy. Id. at 968-69. The United States Supreme Court has reasoned that a court must indulge a `strong presumption' that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). To overcome that presumption, Johnson must show that, but for his counsel's deficiency, a different result would have occurred. Leatherwood, 473 So.2d at 968-69. ¶ 21. With new appellate counsel, Johnson argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to: (1) request a change of venue; (2) request jury sequestration; (3) recognize that one of the jurors was legally deaf; (4) submit a jury instruction of self-defense; (5) submit a jury instruction of circumstantial evidence; (6) request the judge apply a proportionality review under Clowers; (7) object to the district attorney's reference to Johnson as a habitual offender; (8) object to the gun being admitted into evidence; (9) object to leading questions; (10) question a witness about his alcohol consumption; (11) request that the court sever the charges; and (12) object to surprise testimony of Johnson possessing two guns. Johnson also argues that his counsel was ineffective by introducing evidence of a prior bad act. ¶ 22. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) provides in relevant part that [i]ssues which may be raised in post-conviction proceedings may also be raised on direct appeal if such issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record. Miss. R.App. P. 22(b). The official comment to Rule 22(b) provides that: [I]ssues such as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to evidence offered by the state or to argument by the state must be raised on direct appeal. Other post-conviction issues which cannot be raised at the time of appeal because they involve actions or inaction outside the record are not waived since they cannot practically be raised without further development or investigation. Miss. R.App. P. 22(b) cmt. Therefore, this Court must determine whether the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are better addressed in this direct appeal or in post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings. Neal v. State, 15 So.3d 388, 405-06 (Miss. 2009). ¶ 23. This Court finds that several of Johnson's arguments under this issue are inappropriate for this Court to decide on direct appeal. We find that matters outside the trial record would need to be analyzed to determine whether Johnson's trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to request a change of venue; (2) failing to request jury sequestration; and (3) failing to recognize that one of the jurors was legally deaf. Therefore, we decline to address these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, finding that they would be more appropriately addressed by way of post-conviction relief. We will address the remaining claims of ineffective assistance raised by Johnson. ¶ 24. Johnson alleges that his counsel was ineffective by failing to submit a jury instruction on self-defense. In order for self-defense to constitute a valid defense, the defendant must act in response to an urgent actual threat or on a reasonable belief that such threat is actual or imminent. Carter v. State, 858 So.2d 212, 215 (Miss.Ct.App.2003). We fail to see how a self-defense instruction is applicable to a charge of robbery, a specific-intent crime. Croft v. State, 992 So.2d 1151, 1157 (Miss.2008). Therefore, we find that counsel was not ineffective in failing to submit a self-defense instruction. ¶ 25. Johnson also argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to submit an instruction on the heightened burden of proof required for a case based on circumstantial evidence. This Court has explicitly defined circumstantial evidence as evidence which, without going directly to prove the existence of a fact, gives rise to a logical inference that such fact does exist. Conversely, eye witness testimony is thought of as direct evidence.  State v. Rogers, 847 So.2d 858, 863 (Miss.2003) (emphasis added). The victims, witnesses, and Johnson, testified as to the events that occurred at the HCC. This not a case that warrants a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence. Therefore, we find that Johnson's counsel was not ineffective in failing to submit a circumstantial-evidence instruction. ¶ 26. Johnson argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to inform the judge a proportionality test could be used to exercise discretion. Based on our discussion supra regarding proportionality, we find this argument to be without merit. ¶ 27. Johnson argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the district attorney's reference to Johnson as a habitual offender during a chambers conference. After reviewing the record, we find the district attorney merely informed the court that Johnson was charged as a habitual offender. More importantly, the discussion took place in the judge's chambers, not in front of the jury. We find that Johnson's argument as to this issue to be without merit. ¶ 28. Johnson further alleges that his counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the foundation for admitting the gun into evidence. Specifically, Johnson alleges that the gun was improperly admitted as evidence, due to the witnesses' confusing references to multiple guns. We find the gun was appropriately identified through the testimony of Kendrick Green and Deputy Nealy. Kendrick Green testified that he had obtained the gun from Johnson and brought it directly to Deputy Nealy, who at trial, identified the gun as the one he received from Kendrick Green. We find that the proper foundation was laid for introduction of the gun, and any discrepancies in testimony were issues to be resolved by the jury. Therefore, we find that counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the foundation of admitting the gun into evidence. ¶ 29. Johnson next argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to leading questions, and in failing to question the witnesses about their alcohol and drug consumption on the night of the robbery. [6] While counsel failed to object to some leading questions, we do not find that such a failure amounts to deficient performance. Furthermore, Johnson has failed to provide this Court with any argument or evidence that these failures prejudiced him. This issue has no merit. ¶ 30. Johnson also argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to move the court to sever the three charges. Section 99-7-2 of the Mississippi Code governs multiple offenses in a single indictment. That statute provides: (1) Two (2) or more offenses which are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment with a separate count for each offense if: (a) the offenses are based on the same act or transaction; or (b) the offenses are based on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-7-2 (Rev.2007). When the defendant requests severance of a multi-count indictment, the trial court should conduct a hearing. Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 772 (Miss.1991). The State bears the burden of making a prima facie case that the alleged offenses do indeed arise out of the same transaction or are parts of a common scheme. Id. The defense may rebut this showing. Id. In ruling upon the motion to sever, the trial court must consider the time period between the offenses, whether evidence proving each offense would be admissible to prove the other counts, and whether the offenses are interwoven. Id. ¶ 31. The indictment at issue provided that the robberies were part of a continuing series of acts connected together and constituting one with the other parts of a common design, scheme and plan. After reviewing the transcript, we find that the robberies were a continuation of acts that were connected by the same parties, at the same place, and at the same time. Johnson has failed to provide any argument that the robberies were in fact separate and distinct acts. We find this argument has no merit. ¶ 32. Johnson also argues that his counsel was ineffective in introducing evidence of a prior bad act. At trial, Johnson's counsel questioned McKee about filing the same charges in 2006 against Johnson. McKee testified the charges were dropped, and that he had mistakenly identified Johnson as the assailant in 2006. Johnson's counsel questioned McKee about the 2006 charges, implying that McKee had falsely accused Johnson for a second time. Clearly, this constituted trial strategy and falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance of counsel. We find this issue has no merit. ¶ 33. Johnson further alleges that testimony regarding his having two guns was a surprise that affected his attorney's ability to provide reasonably adequate representation, to which his counsel should have objected. Contrary to these arguments, the record reveals Johnson's counsel adequately addressed the issue, asking each witness to review his previous statement (in which each witness reported only one gun). Johnson's counsel properly cross-examined and impeached the testimony of each witness. Johnson has shown no prejudice resulting from the alleged surprise testimony that there were two guns. We find this issue to be without merit.
¶ 34. Johnson analyzes the same above-referenced errors under U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), for the proposition that his counsel failed to subject the trial to meaningful adversarial testing. In Cronic, the U.S. Supreme Court found that [t]here are ... circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. Id. at 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The Court in Cronic set forth three situations in which prejudice was presumed: (1) when counsel is completely denied; (2) when counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; (3) and when counsel is called upon to render assistance under circumstances where competent counsel very likely could not. Id. at 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The Supreme Court has also held that a correct analysis falls under Strickland, not Cronic, when respondent's argument is not that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the sentencing proceeding as a whole, but that his counsel failed to do so at specific points. For purposes of distinguishing between the rule in Strickland and that of Cronic, this difference is not of degree but of kind. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (emphasis added). The case sub judice is properly analyzed under Strickland, as Johnson argues specific failures of his counsel, not failure as a whole. Therefore, we find Johnson's argument of error under Cronic to be without merit.