Opinion ID: 852820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Lambert's Claim

Text: Lambert's sole claim relates to the appropriate remedy when evidence is erroneously admitted in the penalty phase of a capital trial. This is an issue he has raised in one form or another, and lost, in each of his prior proceedings. On rehearing in the direct appeal, we agreed with Lambert that the jury should not have heard the victim impact evidence during the penalty phase of the trial, and we agreed with him that the error was not harmless. See Lambert v. State, 675 N.E.2d at 1064-65 (Because the majority of the victim impact testimony given was irrelevant to the charged aggravator, it was improper and should not have been admitted.). We reached a conclusion different than Lambert advocated, however, on the proper remedy for the error. As we explained, where we find an irregularity in a death sentence, we may (1) remand to the trial court for a new sentencing determination, (2) affirm the death sentence if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) use our appellate authority to independently reweigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id. at 1065 (citing Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 957 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1077, 116 S.Ct. 783, 133 L.Ed.2d 734 (1996). In Lambert's case, we selected the third option. We reviewed the properly admitted evidence concerning the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, concluded the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating ones, and affirmed the trial court's death sentence. See Lambert, 675 N.E.2d at 1065-66. Lambert claims that our appellate reweighing either did not cure the error or is not a valid remedy, see Tender at ¶ 5, but he cites no authority for either proposition and his claim has been rejected throughout the review process. In the post-conviction appeal, we specifically addressed and rejected Lambert's arguments with respect to our state's constitution, and noted the procedure had been employed in other capital cases. Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d at 727 (citing Matheney v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883, 909-10 (Ind.1997); cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1148, 119 S.Ct. 1046, 143 L.Ed.2d 53 (1999); Bivins, 642 N.E.2d at 957)). We also considered and rejected Lambert's arguments with respect to the federal Constitution. Lambert, 743 N.E.2d at 727. Similarly, the federal courts found no error under the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Lambert v. McBride, 365 F.3d at 561-63. Lambert now argues that our resentencing conflicts with Saylor v. State, 808 N.E.2d 646 (Ind.2004), a case we decided after his. The circumstances in the two cases are different, however, and we are not persuaded Saylor establishes any reasonable possibility that Lambert is entitled to relief. Saylor had been sentenced to death for a 1992 murder despite his jury's unanimous recommendation against a death sentence. Then in 2002, Indiana's death penalty statute was amended and no longer allows a person to be sentenced to death if the jury unanimously recommended against it. See I.C. § 35-50-2-9(e) (2004). We revised Saylor's death sentence to a term of years after concluding it was not appropriate to execute a person who was convicted and sentenced through a procedure that has now been substantially revised so the same trial today would no longer render the defendant eligible for the death penalty. 808 N.E.2d at 647. The circumstances for Lambert are different. His is not a situation where the jury unanimously recommended against the death sentence. There is no suggestion the aggravating circumstanceOfficer Winters was acting in the course of duty when Lambert shot himwas not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, which, in any event, we infer from the jury's unanimous recommendation. State v. Barker, 809 N.E.2d 312, 316 n. 2 (Ind.2004) (citing Saylor v. State, 765 N.E.2d 535, 574 (Ind. 2002) (Sullivan, J., concurring and dissenting) ([W]hen a jury recommends a sentence of death or life without parole, it has by definition made the predicate determination of death eligibility required by Apprendi. )). As such, Lambert would be eligible for the death penalty today. Id. Finally, neither Saylor nor the 2002 amendments to the death penalty statute affect, in any way relevant to Lambert's case, our constitutional authority to review or revise sentences or the appropriate remedies for erroneous admission of evidence.