Opinion ID: 2258806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants Seized the Children

Text: Counts XXV through XXVII accuse defendant Dunigan of abusing her authority as an SRS worker to prevent plaintiff Jeffrey Billado from obtaining custody of his children. The time period alleged is June 1990 through November 1991. Counts XXVIII through XXX add that in that period defendant Dunigan arrested, seized and took into custody the minor children.... Counts XXXII through XXXIV state that in November 1991 defendants Dunigan and Appel seized the minor children, who are plaintiffs on these claims, and falsely imprisoned them. The allegations of the complaint are difficult to reconcile with the undisputed facts. [5] We infer that all these counts relate to the actions that occurred on October 29, 1990, after the second CHINS petition was dismissed. Plaintiffs' version of the events of that day are contained in an affidavit of Jeffrey Billado submitted in response to defendants' motion for summary judgment: In September 1990 the protection service order was concluded. I obtained a relief from abuse order again granting me custody to the children. I went to the foster home with a sheriff. The foster parents informed us that Melanie and the SRS worker had already picked up the children. We found Melanie's trailer in St. Albans and when the sheriff was serving Melanie with the relief from abuse order, Melanie told the sheriff she wasn't going to let me take my children and that she was calling SRS. A short time later Janet Dunigan and Kelly [Woodward] arrived. .... Janet Dunigan and Kelly [Woodward] put the kids and Melanie in their car and drove to the State Police Barracks. The sheriff drove me to the State Police Barracks where I was served with a temporary relief from abuse order giving Melanie custody of the children. Not surprisingly, defendants' versions are quite different. Defendant Woodward, in her affidavit, denies having any involvement in the events of October 29th. Defendant Dunigan, in her affidavit, states that (1) she accompanied Melanie to the foster home on October 29th and drove Melanie and the children to Melanie's home, (2) she saw no sheriff or law enforcement officer at Melanie's home, and (3) she left Melanie's home and thereafter was called to the state police barracks where Melanie and the children were present with an advocate to prepare a relief-from-abuse petition. An affidavit of Melanie supports the statements of Dunigan and Woodward. It is not our place to resolve the factual disputes on summary judgment. However, plaintiffs' arguments have not clarified what constitutional rights are alleged to have been violated by defendants' actions. At most, plaintiffs have alleged that defendants improperly aided Melanie to defeat one abuse prevention order and obtain an inconsistent order in her favor, all subject to a full hearing the next day to resolve the custody dispute. We cannot see how the facts, even as alleged by plaintiffs, make out an arrest or seizure of the children since they were at all times in the custody of Melanie. Even where child protection workers have intervened to take temporary custody of children without court order, most courts have held that their actions are protected by qualified immunity. We find this case closer to Stem v. Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1990), where child protection workers investigated a mother's allegation that the father had sexually abused their minor children, found that such abuse had occurred, and helped the mother obtain custody in a proceeding between the parents. In holding that the workers' actions violated no clearly established rights of the father, the court reasoned: [Plaintiff] ignores the fact that his parental rights were impinged only after a judicial hearing at which he was fully heard. [The workers] never physically removed [plaintiff's] child from him or otherwise altered his parental rights under the law, although [one worker] did testify in court concerning his investigatory conclusions and did advise the mother to keep the daughter away from the plaintiff. However, offering adverse judicial testimony at a child-custody hearing does not implicate due process concerns and, further, it constitutes witness testimony that is absolutely immune from section 1983 liability. Id. at 6. Even under plaintiffs' version of the facts, defendants' actions were similar to those in Stem. Having concluded that Jeffrey Billado had sexually abused Brandi, and Vincelette had not, defendants aided Melanie in retaining custody through an abuse prevention order issued by a family court judge. The purpose and effect was to bring the matter before the family court for a contested hearing, which occurred the next day. We see no clearly established constitutional right that was violated by defendants' actions.