Opinion ID: 6340580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State v. Scott

Text: ¶18 Several years after being convicted, Andre Scott sought to pursue postconviction relief. Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶5. Defense counsel requested a competency evaluation, and the circuit court held a competency hearing. Thereafter, the court ordered that the defendant be involuntarily medicated to competency for purposes of participating in postconviction proceedings. Id., ¶6. We reviewed the circuit court's order for involuntary medication to enable participation in postconviction proceedings. The circuit court had found that Scott was not competent to proceed with his postconviction motion for relief and was not competent to refuse medication and treatment. Id. 9 No. 2020AP298-CR ¶19 We granted bypass and reversed the circuit court's involuntary medication order because it had not followed the procedures we set forth in State v. Debra A.E.7 Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶8. Although the circuit court's decision in Scott was reversed based on its failure to follow those procedures, we posed and answered an additional question: Should involuntary medication or treatment orders be automatically stayed pending appeal? Id., ¶10. ¶20 In invoking our constitutional superintending authority, we concluded that involuntary medication orders are subject to an automatic stay pending appeal. Id., ¶43. Our reasoning for the decision was simple, if involuntary medication orders are not automatically stayed pending appeal, the defendant's 'significant' constitutionally protected 'liberty interest' in 'avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs' is rendered a nullity. Id., ¶44 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 177). ¶21 Furthermore, in order to give the State the opportunity to lift the stay, we modified the legal standard set forth in State v. Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995). Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶45. On a motion to lift an automatic stay pending appeal of an involuntary medication order, we concluded that the State: (1) make a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal; (2) show that the defendant will not suffer irreparable harm if the stay is lifted; 7 State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994). 10 No. 2020AP298-CR (3) show that no substantial harm will come to other interested parties if the stay is lifted; and (4) show that lifting the stay will do no harm to the public interest. Id., ¶47. This presents a discretionary decision for the court of appeals; therefore, we concluded that the court of appeals was required to explain the reasoning underlying its decision. Id., ¶48. ¶22 In the years following our decision in Scott, experiences with its employment at differing points in criminal proceedings require that we revisit our exercise of discretion in regard to automatically staying involuntary medication orders during an appeal of such orders. In our further discussion, we examine whether our reasoning that supported Scott's automatic stay pending appeal applies to appeals of involuntary medication orders issued in a pretrial context. ¶23 We begin with Debra A.E. where we set out procedures for managing postconviction relief of allegedly incompetent defendants.8 The process established by Debra A.E. requires: [D]efense counsel should proceed with postconviction relief on a defendant's behalf, even if the defendant is incompetent, when issues rest on the trial court record and involve no risk to the defendant.[9] In Debra A.E., we concluded that Wis. Stat. § 971.14(1)(a) 8 (1991-92) did not apply to post-sentencing proceedings. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 128 n.14. We note that § 971.14(1)(a) has been repealed and replaced with § 971.14(1r). The parties do not challenge whether competency determinations apply to postconviction proceedings. Accordingly, we do not address the statutory change further. 9 Id. at 130. 11 No. 2020AP298-CR [A]fter sentencing, if state or defense counsel has a good faith doubt about a defendant's competency to seek postconviction relief, counsel should advise the appropriate court of this doubt on the record and move for a ruling on competency.[10] Based on the tasks that may be required of defendants seeking postconviction relief, we conclude that a defendant is incompetent to pursue postconviction relief under sec 809.30 . . . when he or she is unable to assist counsel or to make decisions committed by law to the defendant with a reasonable degree of understanding.[11] [If the defendant's assistance is needed for decisionmaking,] defense counsel can seek appointment of a temporary guardian when an incompetent defendant is incapable of making a decision that the law requires the defendant to make.[12] In Scott, we endorsed those procedures set out in Debra A.E. Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶25. ¶24 We explained that our purpose in creating those procedures was to fashion a process through which circuit courts and counsel can manage the postconviction relief of alleged incompetent defendants while effectively administering the judicial system. State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 129, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994). Further, because many postconviction defendant-opportunities can be proceeded upon independently by counsel, we concluded that postconviction proceedings do not ordinarily need to include a court order for treatment to restore 10 Id. at 131. 11 Id. at 126. 12 Id. at 130. 12 No. 2020AP298-CR competency. Meaningful postconviction relief can be provided even though a defendant is incompetent. Id. at 130. ¶25 When taken together, Debra A.E.'s procedures, affirmed in Scott, show that competence has a different effect on a defendant's interests at the postconviction stage of criminal proceedings than competence has pretrial. Postconviction, a defendant's liberty interest in refusing involuntary medication remains high. Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶44. However, the State's interest in involuntarily medicating a defendant is significantly less at the postconviction stage when compared to pretrial. This is so, in part, because, although victim and community interests remain considerable at the postconviction stage, the State has already employed a significant portion of the criminal justice process to try to achieve justice for victims and the community as a whole. Furthermore, the State's dual interest in protecting a defendant's right to appeal and promoting the finality of the conviction can be accomplished despite an incompetent defendant. Id. 13 No. 2020AP298-CR
¶26 Pretrial, the effects of a defendant's lack of competence are quite different. Under our common law system, it has long been accepted that [u]nless a defendant is competent, the State cannot put him on trial. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 223, 395 N.W.2d 176, 184 (1986) (We start with the proposition that an incompetent [defendant] may not be subjected to a trial.). ¶27 The prohibition against trying the incompetent defendant was well established by the time Hale and Blackstone wrote their famous commentaries. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356 (1996) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries  (If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence . . . and if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how can he make his defence?)). In short, the requirement that the defendant be competent to stand trial is rudimentary, Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and fundamental to an adversary system of justice. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). ¶28 Regarding involuntary medication administered solely to bring a defendant to competency for trial, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is 14 No. 2020AP298-CR a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). ¶29 In Sell, the Supreme Court set forth criteria for determining when the government may be allowed to involuntarily medicate a defendant for the purpose of making the defendant competent to stand trial. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81. In short summation, a court must find that: (1) there are important government interests at stake, including bringing a defendant to trial for a serious crime; (2) involuntary medication will significantly further those state interests; (3) involuntary medication is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial; and (4) administration of the drugs is in the patient's best medical interest in light of his medical condition. Id. However, postconviction circumstances that call for governmental involuntary medication are rare. Id. at 180. ¶30 As with Debra A.E.'s concerns in a postconviction context, significant, competing interests underlie our consideration of the involuntary administration of medication in a pretrial context. The defendant holds the same substantial liberty interest in refusing involuntary medication, regardless of the stage of proceedings. Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶44. Once a defendant is subject to involuntary medication, irreparable harm could be done. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177. ¶31 On the other hand, the State has a significant interest in bringing a defendant to trial. Id. at 180. The State's power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and peace. 15 No. 2020AP298-CR Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). Further, unlike postconviction proceedings, in pretrial proceedings, the State has yet to employ a significant portion of the criminal justice process to try to achieve justice and uphold the considerable victim and community interests at stake. For example, victims are guaranteed a right to justice and due process, as well as a timely disposition of the case, free from unreasonable delay. Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(2)(d). And while treatment to competency is not always necessary for postconviction proceedings, see Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 131, the State is required to bring a defendant to competency before a defendant can be tried. Wis. Stat. § 971.13(1). ¶32 Pretrial proceedings fall under the auspice of Wis. Stat. §§ 971.13 and 971.14. The terms of § 971.14(5)(a)1. limit the treatment time for an incompetent defendant to a period not to exceed 12 months, or the maximum sentence specified for the most serious offense with which the defendant is charged, whichever is less. As soon as a defendant is in custody for treatment, the statutory time during which he or she may be held before trial begins. § 971.14(5)(a)1.; see also Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (explaining due process concerns). ¶33 Stated otherwise, while Debra A.E. allows defense counsel to enlarge time periods for continuances in postconviction competency proceedings, Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d at 134, statutory and constitutional law principles reject unlimited continuances in pretrial proceedings. If the State is unsuccessful at restoring competency for trial, the likelihood of which is increased if 16 No. 2020AP298-CR treatment is prevented by the automatic stay of Scott, a defendant must be discharged from commitment and released unless civil commitment proceedings are commenced pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 51. See Wis. Stat. § 971.14(6)(a)−(b). ¶34 Since our decision in Scott, the State has been trapped on both ends of the pretrial competency process. On one hand, Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)1. permits a defendant to be held for 12 months to be brought to competence. On the other hand, Scott's automatic stay of the involuntary medication order keeps the State from starting the treatment that has been ordered by a court. While the State was given some leeway in the form of a modified Gudenschwager test, see Scott, 382 Wis. 2d 476, ¶47, this is a high burden, and when employed, can use up the entire 12-month maximum commitment period that is permitted for treatment. And, if the State is not able to satisfy this Gudenschwager test and the time during which treatment can be required expires, the State is without recourse for prosecution. This is an unexpected consequence of the automatic stay that we created in Scott. ¶35 Accordingly, even though the defendant has a constant liberty interest in refusing involuntary medication, the State cannot prosecute an incompetent defendant. Wis. Stat. § 971.13(1). The State also has a constitutional duty to provide timely justice to crime victims by bringing competent defendants to trial. Wis. Const. art. I, § 9m(2)(d). Those State interests currently are being frustrated by Scott's requirement to impose an automatic stay on treatment during appeals of treatment orders. Accordingly, we conclude that the balance of interests weighs in 17 No. 2020AP298-CR favor of concluding that Scott's automatic stay of involuntary medication orders does not apply to pretrial proceedings. ¶36 We so conclude because in pretrial proceedings, Scott's automatic stay of involuntary medication orders pending appeal is unsound in principle and unworkable in practice. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 2003 WI 108, ¶99, 264 Wis. 2d 60, 665 N.W.2d 257 (citing Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Tax'n, 504 U.S. 768, 783 (1992)). Accordingly, we conclude that the automatic stay created in Scott shall not be applied during pretrial proceedings.13