Opinion ID: 848649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the nature of the grantee's right-of-way

Text: Although we have determined that the 1873 deed conveyed an easement rather than a fee estate, our inquiry into the scope of the interest conveyed to Mineral Range Railroad, plaintiff's predecessor in interest, is not yet complete. An easement is, by nature, a limited property interest. It is a right to  use the land burdened by the easement rather than a right to occupy and possess [the land] as does an estate owner. [39] Accordingly, an easement, whether appurtenant [40] or in gross, [41] is generally confined to a specific purpose. [42] In order to determine whether the easement at issue here is limited to a specific purpose, we must discern the parties' intent as shown by the plain language of the deed. [43] Here, the parties conveyed a right-of-way for the railroad of the original grantee. This language shows quite clearly that the parties intended to convey an easement for a railroad. Even the paragraph reserving the grantor's rights to extract minerals from the strip of land at issue states that such extraction must be performed in such manner as not to interfere with the construction or operation of said railroad.  Finally, the deed's habendum clause expressly states that the right-of-way is the grantee's to have and to hold ... for the purpose and uses above stated and subject to the reservations aforesaid .... The only purpose and use mentioned in the instrument is the construction and operation of a railroad. We conclude, therefore, that the easement conveyed by the 1873 deed is limited to railroad purposes. [44] Plaintiff maintains that the interest conveyed by the 1873 deed is not limited to railroad purposes, referring us to Quinn, supra, as support for its argument. In Quinn, we held that the landowners had conveyed a fee simple (rather than an easement) to the defendant railway company and, thus, that the defendant was entitled to drill for oil and gas in the subject property. Justice Fead, writing for the Court, reasoned, Where the land itself is conveyed, although for railroad purposes only, without specific designation of a right of way, the conveyance is in fee and not of an easement. [45] He then rejected the proposition that the fee was limited to a specific use: Had the grant contained a reverter clause the title would have been a determinable fee upon condition subsequent. [46] Plaintiff argues, therefore, that the lack of a defeasance clause in the 1873 deed indicates, as shown by Quinn, that the interest conveyed was not intended to be limited to railroad purposes. Plaintiff's reliance on Quinn is misplaced, for that case is distinguishable in an important sense from the case at bar. At issue in Quinn was a fee simple-an estate in land. Here, we are concerned with the scope of an easement-an interest in land. [47] Fee simple estates revert to the grantor only if they contain language providing for reversion. Easements, on the other hand, are inherently limited estates in land. [48] Thus, the principles applicable to the fee simple in Quinn do not translate to the easement under consideration in this case. We conclude, therefore, that the plain language of the 1873 deed limited the easement conveyed to the original grantee to railroad purposes.