Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged vouching

Text: As noted above, Alexandra M. testified at trial, as at the Phillips hearing, that defendant's sexual assault included sodomy and oral copulation as well as rape, that he gagged her with a bandanna, and that he threatened to kill members of her family, and then her, if she told anyone about the incident. She acknowledged the unsent letter to Margaret Yen, in which she wrote that she enjoyed the sex and mentioned no force or threats. Smudges on the letter, she said, were from my crying. She admitted she did not disclose the incident to anybody other than [her] mother and some people close to [her], friends, and did not report it to any law enforcement officer until 1988, when she mentioned it to an FBI agent. As in the Phillips hearing, defense counsel cross-examined Alexandra at some length about details of her trial testimony that were not included in the Offer of Proof. Counsel particularly sought to determine what details she had told the prosecutor, and when. She indicated she spoke to the prosecutor by phone in July 1992 and several times thereafter, that he just asked ... what had basically happened, and that she told him the basic facts corresponding to her testimony. She agreed the Offer of Proof capture[d] the essence of what she told the prosecutor, though she insisted she did tell him, in July 1992, of defendant's threats against her and her family. She also agreed she had told the prosecutor like two weeks ago about the bandanna used as a gag. As a defense witness, Yen testified to her conversation with Alexandra M. shortly after the assault. In this conversation, Yen recounted, Alexandra did not seem upset, characterized the encounter as consensual, and described it as the seduction of a young girl by an older man. In a stipulation later read to the jury, the parties agreed as follows: The prosecutor first spoke to Alexandra M. in July 1992. Then, and in subsequent conversations, she mentioned only a rape, not sodomy or oral copulation. Only on April 29, 1993 (the day of the Phillips hearing) did she mention threats by defendant against herself and her family. The prosecutor did not believe he asked her any questions beyond whether she was raped, as was his practice in sexual assault cases. In his closing penalty argument, the prosecutor anticipated defense comments about the discrepancies between the Offer of Proof and Alexandra M.'s trial testimony. He asked the jury not to be concerned about the legal document I'm sure [defense] counsel will talk about in which the [Alexandra M.] sexual assault was described [only] as a rape. When I spoke with her on the phone, I didn't go into detail with her and ask her questions about each individual detail of the incident. I didn't think it was necessary; and I didn't think it was proper to do that to a woman who was traumatized the way she had, to make her discuss those details on the phone to a stranger. [¶] It is common for women to refer to a rape to cover all the incidents of a sexual assault. If you want to blame someone for the lack of details in that document, blame me. Don't blame Alexandra. The prosecutor also hypothesized why Alexandra M. wrote that she enjoyed the sex, told Yen it was consensual, and did not report the incident to the authorities sooner. Citing both Alexandra's tearstained airplane letter and her later statement, in a second conversation with Yen, that defendant took advantage of her because she was worthless, the prosecutor said, It's very common for a woman or a girl in this case to have feelings of guilt and shame even though she's done nothing wrong. ... [¶] And it may very well be that Alexandra was so traumatized by what happened to her that she couldn't admit at first what happened, so it took her time to be able to say, to admit and realize what her uncle had done to her. Defendant raised no objection. On appeal, defendant contends this argument constituted improper vouching for Alexandra M.'s credibility. The prosecutor, defendant claims, wrongly bolstered her testimony with his personal knowledge and assurances when he alluded to his telephone contact with Alexandra, stated why he did or did not discuss certain things with her, and asked the jury to blame him, not her, for any discrepancies. Furthermore, defendant insists, the prosecutor gave unqualified expert opinion, not supported by trial evidence, about the common effects of rape trauma on the victim's ability to understand, accept, and report what happened to her. As a result, defendant urges, he suffered violations of his federal constitutional rights to due process, confrontation, fair trial, impartial jury, adequate legal representation, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) At the outset, defendant's failure to raise a vouching objection at trial forfeits the claim on appeal. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 ( Frye ); People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 756-757, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2 ( Medina ).) The claim also fails on the merits. Impermissible vouching occurs where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness's veracity or suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 211, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302 ( Fierro ).) But so long as a prosecutor's assurances ... are based on the `facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief,' [his] comments cannot be characterized as improper vouching. ( Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 971, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; see also Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th 694, 757, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Such is the case here. The prosecutor's references to his telephone contact with Alexandra M., and his stated reasons for not questioning her about the details of the assault, are amply supported either directly, or by reasonable inference, from the trial evidence. The stipulation read to the jury indicated that the prosecutor first spoke to Alexandra in July 1992, one month before filing the Offer of Proof, that in this and subsequent conversations she mentioned only a rape, and that it was his practice not to subject sexual assault victims to detailed questioning. Alexandra confirmed that she first spoke with the prosecutor on the phone in July 1992, and told him the basic facts of the incident at that time. Jurors could readily infer that the prosecutor's restrained questioning practice in sex assault cases stemmed from his sensitivity to the victim's traumatized state. Nor was the prosecutor obliged to present a rape trauma expert before suggesting that feelings of confusion and unwarranted shame might have caused Alexandra M. to be uncertain about whether the sexual encounter with defendant was consensual, and to delay reporting the incident. There was substantial evidence that she was confused and ashamed as a result of the assault. She testified she was hysterically crying immediately after the incident, even though defendant told her she had enjoyed the experience, and she knew no better. Alexandra further testified that she remained hysterical as she boarded the plane home, and that she cried during the flight as she drafted a letter about the episode to Margaret Yen. In this letter, which was admitted in evidence, Alexandra said she enjoyed the sex, but also that she hate[d] [her]self, that Yen would probably want nothing more to do with her now that I have shamed myself and my family, and that I can never look at my aunt or my cousins again. According to Alexandra, she was a basket case during the three months between the assault and the discovery of her pregnancy. Only then did she tell her mother, without go[ing] into detail, and she still kept the matter secret from other family members. Yen, testifying as a defense witness, recounted Alexandra's statement, months after the incident, that it must have been caused by her own worthlessness. Yen could tell from the conversation that Alexandra was feeling some shame. Six years after the assault, when the FBI contacted her family in connection with defendant's fugitive status, Alexandra still had told only close family and friends. Alexandra stated that, even recently, she was reluctant to testify about the assault because of the effect it would have on her grandfather, who was ill. This evidence readily permitted an inference that Alexandra M. was traumatized, confused, and unjustifiably ashamed about defendant's assault, and that this might have influenced her reluctance to report the matter. No improper vouching occurred. [36]