Opinion ID: 2226822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Means Employed to Promote the Permissible State Interest

Text: Having found that the state must show a compelling interest to justify First Amendment intrusion we must look to the appropriate means which the state may employ to achieve its compelling interest. Where the intrusive limitation on association directly affects the First Amendment right of expression (here political expression), as where a statute precludes voting in one party's primary within 23 months after voting in another party's primary, Kusper v Pontikes, 414 US 51, 58-59; 94 S Ct 303; 38 L Ed 2d 260 (1973), or where not belonging to a particular political party results in discharge from a government job, Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347, 363; 96 S Ct 2673; 49 L Ed 2d 547 (1976) (plurality), the Court has adopted the strict, least intrusive means test. [13] In contrast, where the intrusive limitation on association indirectly affects the First Amendment right of expression, as where employees, though free to express their own views without limitation, are required to belong, and pay dues, to a union which may hold views different from the employees, Abood v Detroit Board of Education, 431 US 209, 225-226; 97 S Ct 1782; 52 L Ed 2d 261 (1977), the Supreme Court has applied the less restrictive germane test. [14] The most recent case in which the Supreme Court has taken a constitutional stand on the right of association is Abood. The Court upheld against First Amendment attack MCL 423.211; MSA 17.455(11) authorizing the use of agency shop clauses in collective bargaining agreements covering government employees, Abood, supra, 222, but overturned the use of mandatory dues for political purposes and for advancing ideological causes unrelated to collective bargaining. Abood, supra, 235-236. We note that the Court did not use the strict least intrusive means test in analyzing Abood's associational rights in either instance. Rather, the Court used the germane test and found that the Michigan Legislature had an important governmental interest in avoiding confusion which could arise from conflicting demands of rival teacher's unions; promoting labor peace; and preventing free riders from obtaining labor contract benefits without supporting bargaining expenses. Abood, supra, 224-225. The Court similarly found that the expenditure of mandatory union dues for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane to its duties as collective bargaining representative violated the First Amendment right of union members who do not support such views, candidates or ideologies. Thus the Court's test in Abood was whether the expenditures were germane to [the union's] duties as collective-bargaining representative. [15] Therefore we believe that the appropriate test to analyze petitioner's constitutional challenges is whether the state has a compelling interest involved, and if so, whether the Bar's complained-of activities are germane to that interest. [16]