Opinion ID: 2770181
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of photographs

Text: We next consider Ray’s argument that the district court should have admitted into evidence at trial certain defense photographs depicting the lot where the foot chase occurred and testimony of the defense investigator concerning the photographs. The government objected to admission of this evidence on multiple grounds: relevance; the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and the potential for the evidence to confuse the issues or mislead the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to exclude evidence. United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 660 (6th Cir. 2012). Generally, we will not disturb a court’s evidentiary ruling unless we reach a definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors or that the court improperly applied the law. Id. The district court compared Ray’s photographs to those already admitted into evidence and “identified as representative of the scene” due to the amount of trash and debris depicted on the lot. The court expressed concern that Ray’s photographs were taken in a different season of the year, showed fallen leaves about which no witness had testified, depicted less trash and debris on the lot, and overall depicted “a significantly different setting” and “different conditions” than were shown in the government’s exhibits. Because defense counsel did not present the photographs to any witness who could authenticate them as accurate representations of the scene of Ray’s arrest, the court excluded the photographs and testimony due to the strong potential of the evidence to mislead or confuse the jury. R. 53 Page ID 526–31. -11- No. 14-3502 United States v. Ray The Constitution allows a trial judge to exclude defense evidence under established court rules where the evidence is marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of prejudice or confusion of the issues. United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 753 (6th Cir. 2006). The court’s exclusion of Ray’s proffered exhibits and testimony fell well within Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 and did not deprive him of the right to present a defense. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s evidentiary ruling. Ray argues for the first time on appeal that the district court should not have admitted into evidence the government’s photographs, Exhibits 4 and 5. We will not address this argument because Ray waived it when his counsel expressly stated on the trial record that he had no objection to admission of the government’s exhibits. R. 53 Page ID 514. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (explaining that waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right and is different from forfeiture). C. Sufficiency of the evidence and post-trial motions Finally, we consider Ray’s remaining arguments together. He contends the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the handgun and magazine and consequently, the district court should have granted his motions for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 or, alternatively, for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. Ray preserved this issue by moving for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case in chief, again at the close of the defense case, and again in a post-trial motion in which he also moved for a new trial. R. 53 Page ID 518, 539; R. 57. We review de novo his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we consider whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the -12- No. 14-3502 United States v. Ray essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Fisher, 648 F.3d 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under Rule 29, we do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Id. A rational trier of fact could find that Ray possessed the handgun and magazine found on the empty lot following the foot chase. Officer Middaugh saw Ray holding the handgun in his waistband at the moment he turned around at his car door. When the chase was over, Officer Middaugh identified the handgun found on the lot as the one he saw Ray holding in his waistband. The jury was told that the firearm was covered in mud and did not operate normally. It was found ten feet from the magazine, which would not seat securely in the gun. Ray’s counsel argued to the jury that the handgun and magazine were nothing but trash left on the lot long before Ray ran across it. It was the jury’s province to hear all of the evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve the factual disputes. The jury chose to convict. Evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we are convinced that a “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fisher, 648 F.3d at 450. We are also persuaded that the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 592–93 (6th Cir. 2007). A new trial may be granted under Rule 33 if the extraordinary circumstance arises that the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. Id. at 593. The district judge may weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses in the role of a thirteenth juror. Id. Our appellate review is limited, however, to deciding whether the district court clearly and manifestly abused its -13- No. 14-3502 United States v. Ray discretion. Id. Having carefully examined the trial record and considered the district court’s opinion, R. 63, we find no clear and manifest abuse of discretion in the denial of Ray’s Rule 33 motion.