Opinion ID: 1260692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count TWO: Conspiracy to harm business.

Text: The second count of the amended motion for judgment, which alleged conspiracy, was directed against Holbert but not against Rawlings. To recover in an action for conspiracy to harm a business, the plaintiff must prove (1) a combination of two or more persons for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring plaintiff in his business, and (2) resulting damage to plaintiff. Code §§ 18.X-XXX-XXX; see Gallop v. Sharp, 179 Va. 335, 338, 19 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1942). Holbert argues that Allen's alleged loss did not result from any actions in concert by Holbert and Kunzman, because ultimately the sale was made to others. Nevertheless, Allen alleged that it would not have sold its property for the price obtained if it had known of the Authority's offers, and that there was resulting specified damage. The conspiracy to suppress the offers, therefore, whether taking the form of agreement between Holbert and Kunzman, or Holbert and Roberts, or all three, could have been the proximate cause of damage to Allen. The allegation of conspiracy was sufficient to withstand a demurrer, and the trial court erred in ruling to the contrary. 4. Count THREE: Tortious interference with Allen's contractual relations. We have not decided any cases based upon interference with a prospective contract, but courts in other jurisdictions have recognized such a cause of action. See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 195 (1981). The cause of action arises from an intentional, improper interference with another's contractual relations, and this interference must (1) induce or otherwise cause a third party not to enter into a prospective contract with the plaintiff, or (2) prevent the plaintiff from entering into a contract. Id. at 201. See Fairmont Foods Co. v. Manganello, 301 F.Supp. 832, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The third count of Allen's motion for judgment sufficiently alleged that Holbert interfered with Allen's prospective contractual relations by preventing Allen from entering into a contract with the Authority. Consequently, it was sufficient to withstand demurrers by Holbert and Rawlings. As we have previously stated, the fact that the sale of Allen's realty was made to innocent third parties does not necessarily insulate Holbert from liability, and the liability of Rawlings was based upon its having placed Holbert in a position to victimize Allen. 5. Count FOUR: Deceit. Allen made a sufficient allegation of deceit against Holbert and Rawlings. Concealment of a material fact by one who knows that the other party is acting upon the assumption that the fact does not exist constitutes actionable fraud. Clay v. Butler, 132 Va. 464, 474, 112 S.E. 697, 700 (1922). In the present case, the amended motion for judgment alleged that Holbert caused the Authority's offers to be concealed from Allen. Since these offers were for the purchase of Allen's assets, they were material to Holbert's dealings with Allen, and the amended motion for judgment alleged that Allen would not have sold its property to Wilkins and Winn for the price obtained had it known about the Authority's offers. Thus Allen sufficiently alleged deceit by claiming that Holbert concealed a material factthe Authority's offers knowing that Allen was acting on the assumption that this fact did not exist. This alleged deceit could have damaged Allen, even though Allen sold its realty to innocent third parties. The allegation of deceit was also sufficient with respect to Rawlings, for as we have noted earlier, Rawlings put its agent, Holbert, in a position to withhold information concerning the Authority's offers. We hold that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers as to Allen's allegation of deceit.