Opinion ID: 765284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Property Interests Creating a Procedural Due Process Violation

Text: 12 We first consider whether Dr. Draghi had a protectible property interest in either his local government employment or in his clinical privileges and if so, whether either of those property rights was denied without due process. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1. However, property, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by existing rules or understandings. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Property interests are not created by the Constitution, 'they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.' Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972)). 13 According to Illinois courts, [a] person has a property interest in his job where he has a legitimate expectation of continued employment . . . based on a legitimate claim of entitlement. Faustrum v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 608 N.E.2d 640, 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). To show a legitimate expectation of continued employment, a plaintiff must show a specific ordinance, state law, contract or understanding limiting the ability of the state or state entity to discharge him. Krecek v. Board of Police Comm'rs of La Grange Park, 646 N.E.2d 1314, 1318-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). A unilateral expectation of continued employment does not create an entitlement that the due process clause protects. Simpkins v. Sandwich Comm. Hosp., 854 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1988). Here, Dr. Draghi has offered no ordinance, contract or other understanding that created a legitimate expectation of employment. Dr. Draghi's mere status as a Hospital employee does not create a property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 842 (5th Cir. 1971) (A doctor has no constitutional right to practice medicine in a public hospital.). 14 We next look to the terms of Dr. Draghi's provisional appointment at the Hospital to determine whether his provisional appointee status created a property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Article III, sec. 3b of the Bylaws provides, in pertinent part: 15 PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT All initial appointments shall be provisional for six months. The Board, upon the recommendation of the [EMS], may extend a provisional appointment for one 6 month period. Provisional appointees shall be elevated to full appointment by the Board on recommendation of the [EMS] after six months of satisfactory service, but if not so recommended within one year of initial appointment, shall be terminated and shall be entitled to the procedural rights as provided in Article VIII [Hearing and Appeal Procedures]. 16 Dr. Draghi contends that the terms of this provision confer upon [him] a six month entitlement to privileges and employment, terminable only at the conclusion of the six month period, and then only for cause. We do not read this provision as conferring upon a provisional appointee within his first six month period (e.g., Dr. Draghi) any privileges or guarantees of employment. This Bylaw focuses upon the employment privileges and guarantees of a provisional appointee after his initial six month provisional appointment, not during the provisional appointment. The Bylaws governing Dr. Draghi's provisional appointment did not create a Fourteenth Amendment property interest. 17 We next address Dr. Draghi's contention that he had a property interest in his medical staff privileges at the Hospital. In resolving this issue, we apply the same standard that we did when reviewing Dr. Draghi's property interest claim in employment at the hospital--he must show a legitimate expectation of employment based on a specific ordinance, state law, contract or understanding limiting the ability of the state or state entity to discharge him. Krecek, 646 N.E.2d at 1318-19. 18 In support of his position, Dr. Draghi's brief cites numerous cases for the proposition that a physician may [ ] have a property interest in the continuation of his staff and medical privileges. (Emphasis supplied). Notwithstanding the ambiguous phraseology of the proposition that Dr. Draghi cites as supporting authority, we find these cases factually dissimilar to this case, as none of the cases Dr. Draghi cites involved clinical privileges similar to the provisional appointee privileges that Dr. Draghi held at the Hospital. Dr. Draghi does not offer this Court any Hospital Bylaw or any other evidence supporting his claim. Dr. Draghi has failed to show that he has a Fourteenth Amendment property interest in his medical staff privileges. 19