Opinion ID: 106864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conclusion

Text: In light of the history, policies and purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination, we now accept as correct the construction given the privilege by the English courts [17] and by Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Holmes. See United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, supra ; Ballmann v. Fagin, supra . We rejectas unsupported by history or policythe deviation from that construction only recently adopted by this Court in United States v. Murdock, supra , and Feldman v. United States, supra . We hold that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law. We must now decide what effect this holding has on existing state immunity legislation. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, this Court considered a federal statute which provided that no evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him . . . in any court of the United States . . . . Id., at 560. Notwithstanding this statute, appellant, claiming his privilege against self-incrimination, refused to answer certain questions before a federal grand jury. The Court said that legislation cannot abridge a constitutional privilege, and that it cannot replace or supply one, at least unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect. Id., at 585. Applying this principle to the facts of that case, the Court upheld appellant's refusal to answer on the ground that the statute: could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding in such court . . . , id., at 564, that it: could not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he could not possibly have been convicted . . . , ibid., and that it: affords no protection against that use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may supply other means of convicting the witness or party. Id., at 586. Applying the holding of that case to our holdings today that the privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness against federal prosecution, supra, at 77-78, and that the same standards must determine whether [a witness'] silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified, Malloy v. Hogan, ante, at 11, we hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement this constitutional rule and accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits. [18] This exclusionary rule, while permitting the States to secure information necessary for effective law enforcement, leaves the witness and the Federal Government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of immunity. It follows that petitioners here may now be compelled to answer the questions propounded to them. At the time they refused to answer, however, petitioners had a reasonable fear, based on this Court's decision in Feldman v. United States, supra , that the federal authorities might use the answers against them in connection with a federal prosecution. We have now overruled Feldman and held that the Federal Government may make no such use of the answers. Fairness dictates that petitioners should now be afforded an opportunity, in light of this development, to answer the questions. Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423. Accordingly, the judgment of the New Jersey courts ordering petitioners to answer the questions may remain undisturbed. But the judgment of contempt is vacated and the cause remanded to the New Jersey Supreme Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the judgment and opinion of the Court for the reasons stated in that opinion and for the reasons stated in Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 494 (dissenting opinion), as well as Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 68 (dissenting opinion); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 529 (concurring opinion); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121, 150 (dissenting opinion); and Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187, 201 (dissenting opinion).