Opinion ID: 4523191
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive or Disproportionate Sentences

Text: [¶33] Article I, section 9 of the Maine Constitution provides that “all penalties and punishments shall be proportioned to the offense.” We assess whether a sentence is constitutionally disproportionate using a two-part test. Stanislaw II, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 29, 65 A.3d 1242. First, we compare “the gravity of the offense with the severity of the sentence.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). If that comparison leads to “an inference of gross disproportionality we then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). Only in rare cases will the threshold comparison lead to an inference of gross disproportionality. See State v. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 20 n.5, 21 A.3d 1033 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010)). [¶34] As to the gravity of the offense, Hansen had unlawful, inappropriate, and repeated sexual contact with an extremely young child, 16 resulting in two convictions for Class B unlawful sexual contact. The court found that in committing those crimes he violated the trust of not only the victim but also the victim’s family, who had permitted him to act as a babysitter and supervise her. [¶35] We previously found an inference of gross disproportionality in Stanislaw II, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 33, 65 A.3d 1242. There, the defendant received three consecutive sentences of eight years’ imprisonment with no time suspended, resulting in an unsuspended term of twenty-four years on three counts of Class B unlawful sexual contact. Id. Although we found an inference of gross disproportionality, we found “no error in the court’s determination concerning the maximum sentence for each crime, nor in its determination that the sentences . . . should be imposed consecutively.” Id. However, we did take issue with the sentencing court’s “fail[ure] to suspend any portion of the three eight-year sentences imposed for the Class B convictions.”3 Id. [¶36] Here, although the court imposed two consecutive ten-year sentences, the court suspended the entire ten-year term of imprisonment on 3 In remanding that case for resentencing, we observed that “an unsuspended sentence of one-third to one-half of the current unsuspended sentence would comply with our constitutional and statutory proportionality requirements.” State v. Stanislaw, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 50, 65 A.3d 1242 (Stanislaw II). Applying that calculation to the Class B counts in Stanislaw II would yield an unsuspended term of eight to twelve years; Hansen’s sentence falls neatly in the middle of this range. 17 the second count. And despite Hansen’s efforts to analogize this case to Stanislaw II, the unsuspended term there was nearly two and a half times longer than the unsuspended term here. Moreover, the victim in this case is significantly younger than the victims in Stanislaw, who ranged in age from ten to fourteen years. Id. ¶ 2. We cannot find fault with the sentencing court’s determination that the victim’s age is “absolutely paramount in this case.” See 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(8)(A). [¶37] Comparing the gravity of the offenses committed with the severity of the sentences imposed, we conclude that no inference of gross disproportionality is warranted. See Stanislaw II, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 29, 65 A.3d 1242. Therefore, we do not proceed to step two of the disproportionality analysis. Id. The sentences are tailored to serve the purposes of sentencing, 17-A M.R.S. § 1151, and are not constitutionally disproportionate, Me. Const. art. I, § 9; cf. Stanislaw II, 2013 ME 43, ¶¶ 33, 49-50, 65 A.3d 1242. [¶38] Having determined that the sentences are not excessive or disproportionate, we finally consider whether the court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. 18