Opinion ID: 1840211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the circuit court of itawamba county, mississippi, erred, in granting the motions to dismiss, filed by preferred risk and minga.

Text: ¶ 5. Rockwell's cause of action falls under the three-year general statute of limitations set out in Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (1995). All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1) (1995). The four wheeler accident occurred on August 1, 1992, so the deadline for Rockwell to file his personal injury lawsuit was August 1, 1995. Since Rockwell waited until October 23, 1995, to file his complaint, Judge Russell was correct in finding that Rockwell was eighty-three days past the deadline. ¶ 6. Mississippi's savings statute provides in pertinent part, If any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned shall, at the time at which the cause of action accrued, be under the disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, he may bring the actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after his disability shall be removed as provided by law. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995). The term `unsound mind,' when used in any statute in reference to persons, shall include idiots, lunatics, and persons non compos mentis. Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-57 (1972). ¶ 7. The main issue before us is whether unadjudicated unsoundness of mind is sufficient to trigger the savings statute. Minga and Preferred Risk argue that Judge Russell was correct in finding that the language of § 15-1-59 suggests that unsoundness of mind must be both established by law and removed by law, making unadjudicated incompetency insufficient to toll the statute of limitations. They rely heavily on the words after his disability shall be removed as provided by law  in the statute to support their position. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995) (emphasis added). We find that the legislature's intent was simply to have the savings statute remain in effect until the disabled party regains competency, not to require legal adjudication of unsoundness of mind. ¶ 8. Minga and Preferred Risk also point to Arender v. Smith County Hosp., 431 So.2d 491 (Miss. 1983), in which this Court stated, The savings of the statute are not to be as liberally construed as its effective provisions, because they are designed to put an end to strife and litigation, and tend to the security of all men. Arender, 431 So.2d at 494 ( quoting Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Sanders, 86 Ky. 259, 5 S.W. 563, 564-65 (1887)). However, our interpretation of the savings statute is not liberal, but is a plain reading of § 15-1-59. ¶ 9. Colorado case law supports Rockwell's position that legal adjudication of incompetency is not necessary to toll the statute of limitations if sufficient evidence exists to show that the victim was mentally incompetent at the time the cause of action accrued. Browne v. Smith, 119 Colo. 469, 205 P.2d 239, 240-41 (1949) ( citing Lantis v. Davidson, 60 Kan. 389, 56 P. 745, 747 (1899)). This view has been adopted by several other states. See Adkins v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 609 P.2d 15, 23 (Alaska 1980); Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 532 N.E.2d 1211, 1212-13 (1989); Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d 326, 329-30 (1983); Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100, 207 A.2d 513, 520-21 (1965); Lent v. Employment Sec. Comm'n of the State of N.M., 99 N.M. 407, 410-11, 658 P.2d 1134, 1137-38 (1982); Hurd v. County of Allegany, 39 A.D.2d 499, 336 N.Y.S.2d 952, 956-57 (1972); Roberts v. Drew, 105 Or. App. 251, 804 P.2d 503, 504-505 (1991). The general test is whether a person could know or understand his legal rights sufficiently well to manage his personal affairs. Adkins, 609 P.2d at 23. See also Gottesman v. Simon, 169 Cal. App.2d 494, 337 P.2d 906, 909 (1959); Pederson, supra ; Sacchi, supra ; Kyle, supra ; Lent, 658 P.2d at 1137; Hurd, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 956; Roberts, 804 P.2d at 505. ¶ 10. We have previously allowed trial courts to decide, without prior adjudication of incompetency, whether a party was incompetent so as to toll the statute of limitations for bringing a worker's compensation claim or to require dismissal of a default judgment. See Shippers Express v. Chapman, 364 So.2d 1097, 1099-1102 (Miss. 1978); Sartain v. White, 588 So.2d 204, 211 (Miss. 1991). The trial court may also determine whether a party is competent for purposes of executing a will or signing an option, where there was no previous legal adjudication of unsoundness of mind. See In re Estate of Briscoe, 293 So.2d 6, 7-8 (Miss. 1974); Alford v. Crocker, 221 So.2d 363, 363 (Miss. 1969). ¶ 11. The purpose of the savings statute is to protect the legal rights of those who are unable to assert their own rights due to disability. This is true for those who suffer from temporary incapacity as well as those who require a more permanent legal adjudication of unsoundness of mind. We therefore find that it is unnecessary for a party to show formal adjudication of incompetence in order to toll the running of the statute of limitations. Instead, trial courts must allow the party to present alternative evidence to prove that he lacked the requisite understanding for handling his legal affairs. ¶ 12. The trial court in this case did not make a ruling on whether Rockwell was incompetent so as to toll the statute of limitations. Instead, he incorrectly found that the language in § 15-1-59 required a formal adjudication of incompetency. Therefore, we remand this case for further findings on the issue of Rockwell's mental state during the three years after his accident.