Opinion ID: 585672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of the Informant's Testimony

Text: 20 At trial, informant Plancarte testified that during his negotiations with Flores there was a discussion about where the heroin would be obtained and that Flores twice told Plancarte that Mungia was the source of the heroin. Mungia contends that the district court erred in admitting this testimony under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), because there was not sufficient independent evidence of a conspiracy and because the statement was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
21 Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides in relevant part that [a] statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Before the court may admit testimony under this rule, the government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence (1) the existence of a conspiracy, and (2) that the proffered statement was made during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the objectives of the conspiracy. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987); United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 1573, 1578 (9th Cir.1990). Although the trial court may consider the hearsay statement in determining whether a conspiracy existed, the court must find some independent proof of the existence of the conspiracy. Smith, 893 F.2d at 1578; accord United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397, 1402 (9th Cir.1988).
22 Prior to Bourjaily, this circuit reviewed de novo the district court's preliminary determination that a conspiracy existed involving the defendant. See United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir.1986). Bourjaily suggests, however, that this court should now review such findings only for clear error. See 483 U.S. at 181 (observing that [w]e have no reason to believe that the District Court's factfinding of this point was clearly erroneous). In Mungia's case, the result would be the same under either standard. The trial court's finding that the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Zavala-Serra, 853 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir.1988).
23 Mungia argues that the only independent evidence of a conspiracy is the fact that the three defendants were arrested in the same vehicle where heroin and firearms were found and that this evidence is insufficient under United States v. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir.1991). Mungia's reliance on Sanchez-Mata is misplaced. 24 In Sanchez-Mata, this court held that there was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of conspiracy to possess marijuana where the defendant was merely a passenger in the car where the drugs were found and had no prior connection to the car or the other conspirators. See id. at 1167-68. In Mungia's case, however, Mungia met Flores at the pre-arranged location for the heroin sale, walked directly to the vehicle containing the heroin, and got in on the driver's side. He indicated to Agent Walsh that he was the driver of the vehicle and responsible for it. In addition, Flores earlier had introduced Plancarte to Mungia by telephone while arranging the final heroin transaction and Mungia had discussed the sale with Plancarte. 25 Mungia also maintains that the government failed to prove that Flores' statement to Plancarte was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. For a statement to be considered in furtherance of a conspiracy, it must in some way advance the objectives of the conspiracy. United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 620 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 (1984). Mere narrative declarations and casual admissions of culpability are not statements in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 583-85 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103 (1985). 26 Mungia argues that the information that he was the source of the heroin was superfluous to Plancarte's belief that Flores would sell him heroin because Flores had sold Plancarte heroin in the past. In United States v. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.1985), amended, 791 F.2d 707 (9th Cir.1986), we held that a co-conspirator's statement concerning future plans to obtain drugs from Thailand was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See 778 F.2d at 1382. In the instant case, Plancarte's testimony concerning Flores' statements about Mungia indicates that they were more than casual comments. Flores made the statements in the course of negotiating with a customer over a large sale of heroin. Plancarte testified that while discussing the second heroin sale he inquired where the heroin would come from and Flores replied that Mungia was the source. Flores telephoned Mungia in Plancarte's presence and allowed Plancarte to speak with Mungia concerning the sale. This evidence is sufficient to support an inference that Flores informed Plancarte about the source of the heroin in order to facilitate the second heroin sale by reassuring his customer that he in fact had a reliable supplier. The district court's finding was not clearly erroneous. 27 AFFIRMED.