Opinion ID: 844235
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Merit of Defendant's Jury Selection Issues

Text: Defendant cannot prove the merit of her challenges to the preliminary jury screening procedure. On the present record, defendant cannot show that she was improperly denied a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, [9] that the jury commissioner excused jurors for unauthorized reasons, [10] that she was denied counsel or the right to be present during a critical stage of the proceedings, that she was denied the right to a public trial, or that the challenged language in the summons notices impermissibly altered the composition of the venire. However, on the present record, we are able to address defendant's claim that the provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 203 that permits the excusal of prospective jurors with insufficient knowledge of the English language is unconstitutionally vague and violates both the due process and equal protection principles as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We find this third challenge to the pretrial jury screening lacking in merit. (2) As discussed above, persons cannot serve as prospective jurors in California unless they are possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language. (Code Civ. Proc., § 203, subd. (a)(6).) We conclude the challenged phrase is not unconstitutionally vague. Our state trials are conducted entirely in English, with translation into English provided only for those defendants and witnesses who do not speak English. There can be no doubt that, in context of deciding who is eligible and qualified to be a prospective juror within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 203, subdivision (a)(6), the phrase possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language means sufficient knowledge of the English language to understand the legal proceedings and the evidence upon which a juror would base his or her decision in any given case. Defendant's speculative claim to the contrary, there is nothing in the record that suggests that individuals who received a jury summons in defendant's case improperly determined that they possessed insufficient knowledge of the English language to sit as jurors in a trial conducted in English. (3) We find meritless defendant's claim that section 203, subdivision (a)(6) of the Code of Civil Procedure violated her right to equal protection by excluding Hispanics from the jury selection process. Limiting jury service to those who are possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language (Code Civ. Proc., § 203, subd. (a)(6)) is a permissible racially neutral selection criteri[on] ( Alexander v. Louisiana (1972) 405 U.S. 625, 632 [31 L.Ed.2d 536, 92 S.Ct. 1221]) that serves a significant state interest ( Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 367 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 99 S.Ct. 664]) in ensuring the uniform and efficient administration of the justice system and avoiding possible translation distortions. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Benmuhar (1st Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 14, 18-20 [English proficiency requirement for jury qualification advances a significant state interest in a national language].) For the same reason, we find meritless defendant's claim the challenged language requirement violates defendant's right to equal protection of the law because courts will provide accommodations for the hearing [or sight] impaired but not for jurors who need assistance with English. The People correctly argue that the requirement of knowing the English language is a neutral factor. (See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 631-632 [permissible racially neutral selection criterion does not violate equal protection guarantees].) Defendant additionally claims that publication to potential jurors of this vague standard reasonably explains the low Hispanic turnout because it provided an excuse for Hispanic people to ignore the summons. Defendant has presented no evidence to support this claim, and [e]rrant speculation of impropriety does not meet defendant's burden of proof on this issue. ( Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1157.) In summary, we conclude defendant is not entitled to a reversal of the guilt or penalty verdict in her case based on her preliminary jury screening claims.