Opinion ID: 2154919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty to pursue plea negotiations

Text: The petitioner argues that under the A.B.A. Standards, defense counsel had an independent and absolute duty to pursue plea negotiations and that the failure to do so was a denial of the effective assistance of counsel. This duty, she argues, was set forth in A.B.A. Standards, First Edition, 1971, as follows: 6.1(b) When the lawyer concludes, on the basis of full investigation and study, that under controlling law and evidence a conviction is probable, he should so advise the accused and seek his consent to engage in plea discussions with the prosecutor, if such appears desirable. 6.1(c) Ordinarily the lawyer should secure the client's consent before engaging in plea discussions with the prosecutor. These sections of the First Edition, 1971, were not approved for the Second Edition, approved February 12, 1979. The Second Edition contains the following provision: Standard 4-6.1(b) A lawyer may engage in plea discussions with the prosecutor, although ordinarily the client's consent to engage in such discussions should be obtained in advance. Under no circumstances should a lawyer recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless a full investigation and study of the case has been completed, including an analysis of controlling law and the evidence likely to be introduced at trial. Neither the earlier version of the standard, nor the standard as revised and approved, imposes an absolute duty to attempt plea negotiations, as the petitioner argues. The language of both versions unequivocally treats the duty as one arising only after the lawyer has evaluated the strength of the State's case. Indeed, the commentary on the First Edition stated that Plea discussions should be considered to be the norm and failure to seek such discussion an exception unless defense counsel concluded that sound reasons exist for not doing so. In some cases the factual or legal situations or considerations of strategy may dictate that no overtures to the prosecution be made. Defense counsel testified that he discussed the subject of plea negotiation with petitioner and concluded that he would not engage in plea negotiations without first receiving a more firm proposal from the prosecution. That stance was justified here. The victim was a police officer and counsel may well have believed that the prosecution desired a full presentation of evidence at trial and would not be entirely dissatisfied with the outcome so long as it was a conviction at some level. The only possible motivation, therefore, for acceptance of a plea from petitioner to a lesser charge would stem from the fear of total acquittal on self-defense. Defense counsel may further have believed that a first expression of eagerness to engage in plea negotiations by him would have immediately dispelled any fear of acquittal, thereby foreclosing all possibility of successful negotiations. Viewing the posture of the case in this light, defense counsel was warranted in taking a wait-and-see stance in hopes that the self-defense claim, of its own weight, would precipitate a first firm proposal from the prosecution. The petitioner also attacks the post-conviction relief hearing court's finding that there is no direct evidence that the defendant was fully apprised of a plea of guilty as to any lesser or included offenses, but the court finds it would not have affected the result of this cause as the Prosecutor would not have accepted a plea to a lesser included offense. The petitioner argues that even though the prosecutor indicated at the hearing that while the case might have been questionable, it should be tried, this statement cannot be interpreted to mean that if an offer had been made and recommendation of acceptance been put forward by trial counsel, no agreement could have been reached. The prosecutor testified that my stand on this particular case was that there was no  nothing could be done and that it had to be tried. Thus there was evidence supporting the judge's finding, and the petitioner does not satisfy the burden of showing that the evidence led unerringly and unmistakably to the opposite conclusion. The decision of the trial court is affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER, PRENTICE and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur.