Opinion ID: 678277
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Binding Nature of Sec. 7B1.3(f)

Text: 11 Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Violations of Probation and Supervised Release, contains policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 12 Erving acknowledges that Sec. 7B1.3 appears to require a consecutive sentence in his situation. This court has held that Chapter 7 policy statements are binding on courts. United States v. Lewis, 998 F.2d 497, 499 (7th Cir.1993). We felt compelled by a statement in Stinson v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1917 (1993). Other courts, however, have distinguished Stinson and reached the opposite view. 1 13 The government argues that Erving waived the arguments he presents to this court because he failed to raise them below. As a general proposition, a defendant who fails to raise an objection at sentencing waives such objection on appeal. United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir.1994). If that is the case, we will only reverse the district court's ruling if it was plain error. Id.; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 14 Both Stinson and Lewis had been decided before sentencing in this case. Although Judge McDade did not refer to them by name, it seems clear that he had one or both cases in mind in his reference to recent case law. Erving did not address these cases at the time. He did not cite either Stinson or Lewis in his main brief to this court. The government in its brief relied on both. Only in Erving's reply brief did he point to decisions in other circuits which have held that Chapter 7 policy statements are not binding but advisory. Even there he failed to ask that Lewis be overruled. We deem the argument waived. 15 Erving maintains that if Sec. 7B1.3, which requires a consecutive sentence in Erving's situation, is binding on courts, it conflicts with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3584(a), which grants a district judge discretion to impose either a consecutive or concurrent sentence. 2 16 A number of other courts have dealt with an analogous claim of conflict. Section 5G1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines calls for a consecutive sentence in specified situations, and to that extent there is a similar apparent inconsistency between Sec. 5G1.3 and Sec. 3584(a). 17 Erving relies on United States v. Wills, 881 F.2d 823, 826-827 (9th Cir.1989) and United States v. Nottingham, 898 F.2d 390, 393-395 (3d Cir.1990). Both cases hold that Sec. 5G1.3 conflicts with Sec. 3584(a), and that the statute, providing for discretion, must control. 18 The majority of circuits, however, resolve the issue in a different way. Where Sec. 5G1.3 compels a consecutive sentence, those circuits hold there is no collision with the provision of the statute permitting a concurrent sentence as an exercise of discretion because the judge has power to depart from the Guideline result. United States v. Flowers, 995 F.2d 315, 316-317 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Gullickson, 981 F.2d 344, 349 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 884 (1992); United States v. Stewart, 917 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Miller, 903 F.2d 341, 349 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Rogers, 897 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Fossett, 881 F.2d 976, 980 (11th Cir.1989). 19 Our circuit has not decided the issue. See United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir.1990). The Second Circuit has also discussed, but not decided, the issue. United States v. Vega, 11 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir.1993). The Ninth Circuit, without questioning Wills, nevertheless now requires that when a district court elects to use its statutory discretion to diverge from the Guideline it must follow the usual departure procedures. United States v. Pedrioli, 931 F.2d 31, 32 (9th Cir.1991). 20 We find the view expressed by the majority to be appropriate and to apply by analogy to any apparent conflict between Sec. 7B1.3 and Sec. 3584(a). 21