Opinion ID: 789507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Crawford Issue.

Text: 10 At trial, Ferguson's friend Michael Thompson testified that, after Hall's disappearance, Ousley asked Thompson whether he knew where to get either money or cocaine for two of Hall's rings. When Thompson asked Ousley where the rings came from, Ousley responded that him [Ousley] and Jeff [Ferguson] did a job in St. Charles and that Jeff had a third ring. The trial court overruled Ferguson's objection that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Citing only state cases, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld that ruling on the ground that Thompson's testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception for conspirator statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. 20 S.W.3d at 496-97. In the district court, Ferguson argued that this ruling violated his Confrontation Clause rights as construed in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), and its progeny. The district court ruled that Ousley's hearsay statements bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, one test under Roberts, and alternatively that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 11 While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), which overruled Roberts, at least in part. Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444 (8th Cir.2004). Ferguson now argues that Ousley's out-of-court statements were testimonial and therefore barred by Crawford 's new categorical rule. In Crawford, the Court gave examples of testimonial hearsay but declined to articulate a comprehensive definition of the term. See 541 U.S. at 54 & n. 10, 124 S.Ct. 1354. 12 We then expanded Ferguson's certificate of appealability to include the Sixth Amendment confrontation issue in light of. . . Crawford.  However, in a subsequent decision, we held that co-conspirator statements are nontestimonial. United States v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536, 540 n. 4 (8th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2926, 159 L.Ed.2d 826 (2004). Ferguson argues that Reyes does not bar his Crawford claim because Ousley's statements to Thompson were not in furtherance of the conspiracy. That assertion is contrary to the facts as found by the Supreme Court of Missouri. It is also irrelevant to the question whether Ousley's private statements to Thompson were testimonial in nature. See Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir.2004); United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n. 1 (8th Cir.2004). Accordingly, even if applied retroactively to this habeas case, 3 the categorical rule in Crawford does not govern this case because Ousley's statements were not testimonial. 13 Applying the Supreme Court's pre- Crawford decisions to this nontestimonial hearsay issue, we reject Ferguson's Confrontation Clause claim for the reasons stated by the Supreme Court of Missouri and by the district court. The Supreme Court's discussion in Crawford raises some doubt whether the Roberts reliability analysis remains good law when applying the Confrontation Clause to nontestimonial hearsay. See 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law.). But eliminating Roberts reliability review altogether would not entitle Ferguson to federal habeas relief, so we need not decide the issue. 14 The judgment of the district court is affirmed.