Opinion ID: 1394852
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Intimidation of Charles Riley

Text: (9) Petitioner claims that the referee's determinations relating to prosecutorial interference with his constitutional right to present the testimony of Charles Riley at trial are supported by the law and the evidence. He relies on the portion of the report summarized below. Following Aguilar's arrest, petitioner's trial counsel informed the court that Riley had been subpoenaed and was prepared to take the stand and completely corroborate Aguilar's testimony. The court decided that Riley should speak to a lawyer before testifying, and had Matthew Lees appointed to represent him. Lees testified that prosecutor Pippin told him if Riley testified he would file charges against him. Lees believed Pippin did not want Riley to testify and would arrest Riley if he did. He did not, however, tell the court of Pippin's comments. Pippin asserted he merely told Lees that he was blanketly refusing to grant immunity of any kind to any witness in this trial, and that if Riley testified and implicated himself in any crime and could be prosecuted he would be prosecuted. He said he would have given this same admonition to any attorney for any defense witness in this case. Riley told Lees that he did not know what the gun was going to be used for when he lent it to Aguilar; he expressed at least half a dozen times his fears about the threat of prosecution and arrest if he testified. At the reference hearing, the report continues, Riley testified that shortly after entering the courtroom he was asked to accompany prosecution investigator Wilson down the hallway for an interview. Riley stated he felt pressured because Wilson was in his face and appeared angry and upset. Wilson told him that if he testified as Aguilar had, the same thing that happened to Aguilar would happen to him. Riley informed Wilson he had lent the handgun to Aguilar. His conversation with Wilson caused him to be apprehensive about testifying. He was told by Lees that the prosecution did not want him to testify and would pursue him if he did. He was also told that the choice whether to testify was his. He factored into his decision Wilson's threatening remarks and Pippin's remarks to his counsel. Because he did not want to be arrested, he chose not to testify. Wilson's story was different. He stated that Riley said he lent the gun to Aguilar and threw it away after receiving it back. Wilson informed him that he should have an attorney because he could be charged as an accessory to murder. The portion of the report summarized above concludes as follows. The testimony of prosecutor Pippin and investigator Wilson, even when examined in isolation, establish[es] witness intimidation. It is clearly coercive for a prosecutor to warn a witness he will be prosecuted, or is likely to be prosecuted, as a result of his testimony. Warning only defense witnesses they will be prosecuted for any crimes they reveal if they take the stand is clearly the type of admonition which destroys the willingness of an individual to risk testifying on behalf of a defendant. According to Mr. Pippin, he told Lees if Riley testified and implicated himself in any crime he would be prosecuted if at all possible. Mr. Pippin gave this admonition to several representatives of defense witnesses, but did not make a similar admonition to any prosecution witness.... Additionally, investigator Wilson's admission he told Riley he could be charged as an accessory to murder, coming the day after Mr. Aguilar's arrest, was blatantly intimidating. No reasonable person would testify for another after hearing a prosecution representative predict the testimony would earn the witness a murder charge. When the testimony of Mr. Lees and Riley are also factored, the case for witness intimidation becomes overwhelming. According to attorney Lees, he was told by Pippin Riley would be arrested if he testified; Riley testified he was told the same by Wilson. Both witnesses were credible; they corroborated one another and were not effectively impeached. Petitioner has met his burden of proof. Charles Riley was intimidated. Petitioner thus lost Riley's important testimony which would have corroborated Mr. Aguilar. His testimony would have shown Powell lied when he said Martin was the source of the gun used to beat the victim to death. It would also have corroborated Eugene Wallace's potential testimony which described the falsity of Powell's testimony against petitioner. The Attorney General raises several objections to the referee's determinations. He first claims that the determination that Wilson engaged in misconduct toward Riley must be rejected. Specifically, he argues that there is insufficient evidence to believe Riley's version of the encounter  which he impliedly concedes establishes misconduct  and to disbelieve Wilson's. The argument is unpersuasive. To begin with, the Attorney General urges that Riley is not a credible witness. In support he offers several points. First, he correctly notes that at the reference hearing Riley claimed he never received the murder weapon back from Aguilar, but earlier had admitted he had done so. It does not follow, however, that Riley's inconsistency on this single issue is fatal to his credibility, especially in light of the consistency with which he admitted that he had provided Aguilar with the gun and then directed him to see to its disposal. The Attorney General next asserts that at the reference hearing Riley admitted Wilson did not touch him during the encounter, but earlier had stated Wilson pushed me up against a wall and used physically abusive tactics. But Riley presented an explanation of the apparent inconsistency that the referee could credit  to the effect that Wilson took a position about 12 inches from his face and crowded him into the wall. Riley's explanation was corroborated by defense investigator Dale June, who testified that during the encounter Wilson stood closer to Riley than one usually stands in polite conversation and kept punctuating his speech with his right index finger, which he moved back and forth about four or five inches from Riley's face. The Attorney General then maintains that Riley testified he saw Aguilar's arrest on television, and that this statement was false because he asserts the arrest was not broadcast. Read in its context, however, Riley's testimony is only to the effect that he heard of Aguilar's arrest on the television news. Indeed, he specifically denied that he saw the arrest itself. Finally, the Attorney General states that Riley is not to be believed because he is of poor character. It is true that a person who would lend a weapon as Riley did is evidently not unworthy of blame. But it is precisely a person of this kind who would in fact have done such a deed. In any event, such a person's testimony cannot be rejected out of hand  as the Attorney General himself admits when it comes to the testimony of Andrew Powell. The Attorney General next urges that Wilson is as credible a witness as Riley is not. Specifically, he argues as follows: Wilson would have to be very stupid to threaten Riley with arrest and then assist in getting Riley a lawyer who would be informed of these threats and act accordingly. The report never characterizes Wilson as `stupid.' Assuming for purposes of discussion that Wilson is not very stupid, it does not follow, as the Attorney General implies, that Wilson's action is otherwise inexplicable. Quite the contrary: Wilson could have acted as he did with the intent of depriving petitioner of Riley's evidence by threatening Riley with prosecution on the basis of his expected testimony and then advising him to seek the assistance of counsel  who would undoubtedly inform him of his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Riley, of course, refused to give substantive testimony on petitioner's behalf, resting on his privilege against self-incrimination. The Attorney General also argues that the absence from the trial record of any contemporaneous complaint about Wilson's behavior establishes that no misconduct occurred. Like a similar argument presented above, this too must be rejected. The Attorney General also claims in substance that the determination that Wilson's statement that Riley could be charged as an accessory to murder amounted to misconduct must be rejected on the ground that it was a constitutionally permissible mere warning. ( United States v. Risken (8th Cir.1986) 788 F.2d 1361, 1371; see, e.g., United States v. Blackwell, supra, 694 F.2d at pp. 1335-1336.) The point lacks merit. Seen by itself and in the abstract, the statement may appear to be such a mere warning. Seen in light of the facts of this case, however, the statement appears to be simply an aspect of Wilson's threat that if Riley testified he would suffer the same fate as Aguilar. In conclusion, we hold that the referee's determination that Wilson engaged in misconduct toward Riley must be accepted. The referee's finding that Wilson threatened Riley with the same fate as Aguilar is entitled to great weight, depending in substantial part as it does on the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, and is in fact amply supported by the evidence. Moreover, the conclusion that such behavior amounts to misconduct is compelled. (E.g., United States v. Thomas, supra, 488 F.2d at pp. 335-336 [holding that a United States Secret Service Agent committed misconduct when he told a potential defense witness he would be prosecuted for the crime his testimony was expected to reveal]; cf. United States v. Hammond, supra, 598 F.2d at pp. 1012-1013 [holding that an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation committed misconduct when he told a defense witness he would have `nothing but trouble' in another matter pending against him if he continued to give testimony on the defendant's behalf].) (10) The Attorney General next claims that the determination that prosecutor Pippin engaged in misconduct toward Riley must be rejected. Specifically, he denies that Pippin told Matthew Lees, Riley's counsel, that Riley would be arrested and prosecuted if he testified. He asserts that the following occurred: in response to a request for immunity made by Lees, Pippin said immunity was not going to be given to anyone; if the witness testified and implicated himself in a crime that could be proved at trial, he would be prosecuted; if the witness got on the stand and committed perjury, the witness would be prosecuted for perjury. The Attorney General further asserts that this statement does not amount to misconduct. As we shall explain, the point is without merit. We are hesitant to reject the referee's finding crediting Lees's version of his encounter with Pippin. The finding, of course, depends in substantial part on the referee's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and hence is entitled to great weight. Moreover, contrary to the Attorney General's argument, the evidence appears to provide the necessary support. Be that as it may, the statement that the Attorney General claims Pippin made  to the effect that Riley would be prosecuted for any crime he revealed or committed in the course of his testimony  amounts to misconduct under the circumstances of this case. ( People v. Warren, supra, 161 Cal. App.3d at pp. 973-974; People v. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at pp. 589-593; People v. Robinson, supra, 144 Cal. App.3d at pp. 967-970; United States v. Blackwell, supra, 694 F.2d at pp. 1336-1337; United States v. MacCloskey, supra, 682 F.2d at p. 476, fn. 16, 479; United States v. Morrison, supra, 535 F.2d at pp. 226-228; United States v. Thomas, supra, 488 F.2d at pp. 335-336; United States v. Smith, supra, 478 F.2d at pp. 978-979.) That the statement that the Attorney General claims Pippin made amounts to something less than an absolutely unqualified commitment to prosecute does not remove it from the category of misconduct. (See People v. Warren, supra, at pp. 968-970 973-974.) [7] The Attorney General unpersuasively argues that the cases supporting the conclusion that Pippin's statement amounts to misconduct are distinguishable on the ground they all involve statements made directly to the witness and not to his attorney alone. First, it is not true that all the cases involve statements made directly to the witness. (See United States v. MacCloskey, supra, 682 F.2d at pp. 476, 479.) Second, it is generally immaterial how such a statement is communicated to the witness: its potentially intimidating effect depends ultimately on its content and its original source, not on the identity of the person who delivers it to the witness. Certainly, the point may not legitimately be disputed when, as here, the prosecutor admits he expected and indeed hoped the witness's attorney would communicate the statement to the witness. [8] In conclusion, we hold that the referee's determination that Pippin engaged in misconduct toward Riley must be accepted: the governing law is clear, and the facts that establish misconduct under the law are admitted. Finally, the Attorney General claims that the determination that prosecutorial misconduct was causally linked to Riley's refusal to give testimony on petitioner's behalf must be rejected. He first argues that the arrest of Aguilar could not have contributed to the refusal on the part of any witness, including Riley, to give testimony on petitioner's behalf at trial. Specifically, he relies on the absence of evidence in the trial record showing the requisite causal link. Although the absence of such evidence is not insignificant, it certainly does not establish that no causal link existed. This is especially so because the absence of such evidence may have been caused at least in part by Riley's decision to refrain from complaining about the prosecution's action  and thereby to attempt to avoid becoming its target. The Attorney General also relies on the fact that at the reference hearing the trial judge expressly stated he did not believe any of the witnesses who asserted their privilege against self-incrimination did so as a result of Aguilar's arrest. The judge, however, made no such statement. In response to the question, When the other defense witnesses came in the courtroom and took the Fifth Amendment, did it cross your mind ... that perhaps these witnesses were taking the Fifth because of what had happened to the first defense witness as that witness left the trial action? the judge merely said, Well, at least  no, it didn't. Next, the Attorney General makes a perfunctory argument to the effect that Riley's refusal to testify on petitioner's behalf was not causally linked to his encounter with Wilson or to the statement made by Pippin. Contrary to this argument, we find the conclusion that the requisite causation existed to be inescapable. Such a causal link is established when the misconduct under challenge is a substantial cause of the witness's refusal to testify. (See People v. Bryant, supra, 157 Cal. App.3d at p. 590; Berg v. Morris, supra, 483 F. Supp. at p. 184.) At the hearing, Riley stated his decision not to testify resulted from the encounter with Wilson and the statement of Pippin. Thus to our mind, the misconduct here amounts to such cause. We also conclude that petitioner has sustained his burden of demonstrating the materiality of Riley's testimony under both federal and state standards. Specifically, he has plainly shown how [the] testimony [of Riley] would have been both material and favorable to his defense ( United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 867)  i.e., it would have squarely contradicted the testimony of Andrew Powell, the crucial prosecution witness. He has also shown  a fortiori  at least a reasonable possibility that Riley could have given testimony that would have been both material and favorable. ( Cordova v. Superior Court, supra, 148 Cal. App.3d at pp. 181-185, citing cases.) After independent review, we hold that the referee's determination that the prosecution interfered with petitioner's constitutional right to present the testimony of Charles Riley at trial was correct and accordingly adopt it as our own.