Opinion ID: 737483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exemption 2 and Law Enforcement Materials

Text: 8 We conclude that the government has failed to demonstrate how the nest sites of northern goshawks relate solely, or even predominantly, to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency as required by the provisions of exemption 2. The Forest Service argues initially that the creation of nest-site location information relates to an agency practice because (1) the creation of such information itself constitutes a practice, and (2) the practice of creating the information also 'casts light' on other 'practices' of the Forest Service, including the inventorying of goshawk populations and use of that information in management of [Forest Service] lands. Brief for Appellees at 24-25. The Forest Service's analysis in itself provides a fairly compelling demonstration that the relationship of northern goshawk nest sites to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Forest Service is, at best, remote. Under the approach taken by the Service, almost all information collected or created by the government would be exempt from disclosure. The government's position in the case before us justifies the concerns expressed by Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit over twenty years ago: 9 In some attenuated sense, virtually everything that goes on in the Federal Government, and much that goes on outside of it, could be said to be related through some chain of circumstances to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency. The potentially all-encompassing sweep of a broad exemption of this type undercuts the vitality of any such approach. 10 Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1150 (D.C.Cir.1975) (Leventhal, J., concurring). We categorically reject the government's approach. 11 Our task is made even simpler by the fact that the Tenth Circuit has already rejected the identical arguments in a case involving the same questions and the same parties, although the bird at issue before the Tenth Circuit was the Mexican spotted owl rather than the northern goshawk. In Audubon Society v. United States Forest Service, 104 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir.1997), the Tenth Circuit held that even under the broadest available interpretation, the statutory language of exemption 2 simply does not encompass maps that identify the locations of birds. See id. at 1203-05. Observing that virtually all written material that the Forest Service publishes would at least to some extent assist its employees in their work, the District Court for the District of New Mexico had rejected the argument that the maps relate predominantly to the Forest Service's internal personnel rules and practices simply because personnel use the maps in fulfilling their responsibilities of protecting the owl. Maricopa Audubon Society v. United States Forest Serv., 923 F.Supp. 1436, 1440-41 (D.N.M.1995) (citing Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 796). The Tenth Circuit agreed and emphasized that in order to fall within the terms of exemption 2, materials must relate not simply to agency practices, but to personnel practices in particular. Audubon Society, 104 F.3d 1201, 1203 (emphasis in original). The court relied not only on the text of the exemption, but also on the fact that Congress had enacted exemption 2 for the very purpose of narrowing an earlier internal management exemption that had allowed the withholding of any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964)); see also Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 362-70, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1599-1603, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976) (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 1002 and the legislative history of exemption 2). The Tenth Circuit also echoed the concern expressed by Judge Leventhal that the potentially all-encompassing approach taken by the agency would permit the withholding of virtually everything that goes on in the Federal Government. Audubon Society, 104 F.3d 1201, 1204 (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d at 1150 (Leventhal, J., concurring)). 12 The Tenth Circuit is not alone in rejecting the sweeping interpretation of exemption 2 urged by the government in this and other cases. In Schwaner v. Department of the Air Force, 898 F.2d 793 (D.C.Cir.1990), the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that a roster containing the names and military duty addresses of low-ranking Air Force personnel fell within the language of exemption 2. The government argued in that case that the personnel data at issue was exclusively derived from, and thus ... 'related solely to,' the Air Force's 'practice' of extracting selected personnel data for compilation in a computerized database. Id. at 795. The court aptly observed that such an interpretation of exemption 2 would enable an agency to withhold practically all of the information that it ever gathers: 13 The argument itself makes clear that the only 'practice' to which the material is related is the practice of collecting the data. As bureaucracy is nothing if not a creature of habit, the sweep of the claim is broad indeed, excluding only ... information collected on an official frolic. 14 Id. at 795-96. The D.C. Circuit proceeded to observe that information cannot fall within the language of exemption 2 unless it sheds at least significant light on a personnel rule or practice. Id. at 797. 15 We are persuaded by the reasoning of the other circuits, and by the plain language of exemption 2, that information identifying the nest sites of northern goshawks bears no meaningful relationship to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Forest Service. To find goshawk nest-site information  'related' through some chain of circumstances to the 'internal personnel rules and practices of an agency'  would indeed render exemption 2 potentially all-encompassing, Audubon Society, 104 F.3d 1201, 1204 (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d at 1150 (Leventhal, J., concurring)). Moreover, it would stretch the language of exemption 2 in such a manner as to flout the unmistakable intent of Congress that FOIA's exemptions are to be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 150-51, 109 S.Ct. at 2850-52; Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361, 96 S.Ct. at 1599. 16 Finally, the Forest Service attempts to bring the goshawk nest-site information within the provisions of exemption 2 by citing our court's holding that law enforcement materials, the disclosure of which may risk circumvention of agency regulation, are covered by that exemption. Hardy, 631 F.2d at 656; Dirksen v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 1456, 1458 (9th Cir.1986). In Hardy, we held that exemption 2 covered a training manual for federal agents on how to conduct raids and searches, Hardy, 631 F.2d at 657, and in Dirksen, we applied exemption 2 to Medicare claims-processing guidelines that could have been used by health care providers to avoid audits. Dirksen, 803 F.2d at 1458-59. In Hardy, we said that [m]aterials instructing law enforcement agents on how to investigate violations concern internal personnel practices, Hardy, 631 F.2d at 656, while in Dirksen, we expressed our concern that disclosure of the guidelines could hinder investigations and enable violators to avoid detection. Dirksen, 803 F.2d at 1458 (quoting Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 587 F.2d 544, 545 (2d Cir.1978)). Nothing in our prior decisions, and certainly no common-sense definition of the term, suggests that goshawk nest-site information can be deemed law enforcement material. The requested information does not tell the Forest Service how to catch lawbreakers; nor does it tell lawbreakers how to avoid the Forest Service's enforcement efforts. In sum, we hold that goshawk nest-site information does not constitute law enforcement material, or any other kind of material that may be withheld under exemption 2.