Opinion ID: 2546552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are the Exceptional Sentence Provisions of the SRA Facially Unconstitutional in Light of Blakely?

Text: ¶ 17 There can be no doubt that Blakely undermined the validity of Washington's procedure for issuing exceptional sentences. Whether it actually invalidated portions of the SRA as unconstitutional, however, is a separate question. ¶ 18 A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 769-70, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). To fulfill that burden, one must show that no set of circumstances exists in which the statute, as currently written, can be constitutionally applied. Moore, 151 Wash.2d at 669, 91 P.3d 875. Where a statute is found facially unconstitutional, the appropriate remedy is declaring that statute inoperative or void. Id. ¶ 19 In contrast, alleging a statute is unconstitutional as-applied requires showing only that application of the statute to the party's specific actions is unconstitutional. Id. at 668-69, 91 P.3d 875. Holding a statute unconstitutional as-applied prohibits future application of the statute in a similar context, but the statute is not totally invalidated. Id. at 669, 91 P.3d 875. ¶ 20 In this case, to prove that the exceptional sentencing provisions of the SRA are facially unconstitutional, petitioners must show that there is no set of circumstances in which the exceptional sentencing provisions can be applied constitutionally. [3] In deciding Blakely, the United States Supreme Court declared the exceptional sentence procedure at issue in that casea judge independently finding deliberate cruelty and issuing an exceptional sentence based on that findingunconstitutional. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2535-38. But the Court also recognized ways in which an exceptional sentence could constitutionally be imposed. Specifically, the Court held that a jury need not find the aggravating facts at issue if the defendant stipulated to them or waived his Apprendi rights: [N]othing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). If appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty. Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well be in his interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him at trial. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2541. RCW 9.94A.535(2)(f), listing sexual motivation as an aggravating factor, also is still valid because RCW 9.94A.835 requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that sexual motivation was present. Blakely also did not affect the constitutionality of judicial findings supporting exceptional sentences below the standard sentence range. The entire first half of RCW 9.94A.535 regarding mitigating circumstances, therefore, is not affected. ¶ 21 Because there is at least one way in which RCW 9.94A.535 can be applied constitutionally, it cannot be declared facially unconstitutional. Similarly, RCW 9.94A.530(2) is facially valid because facts can be proved by stipulation or waiver. We hold that the exceptional sentence provisions of the SRA are still facially constitutional following Blakely.