Opinion ID: 2176137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: sentencing phase instructions to jury

Text: Henry's final contention is that the trial judge committed reversible error by refusing to submit several proposed instructions to the sentencing jury. Whether defense counsel's general objection to the court's failure to propound all of his instructions to the jury preserved the issue for appeal need not be decided, as failure to give the requested instructions did not constitute reversible error. [9] The first two proposed instructions that we will discuss read as follows: Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 14A If, after consideration of the facts and circumstances, you are not convinced that the aggravating circumstances found to exist are sufficient in and of themselves to require the penalty of death, you must, in Section III and Section IV of the form, note your conclusions in this regard as a mitigating circumstance which outweighs the aggravating circumstances. Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 9G You must remember that this is a weighing process and not a mere tallying of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. You may well find that a single mitigating circumstance is sufficient to justify a life sentence even if you find more than one aggravating circumstance. For support Henry cites Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 474-75, 499 A.2d 1236, 1254 (1985), reconsidered at 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326, cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986). Henry asserts that the insufficiency of the aggravating factors to justify a death sentence may itself constitute a mitigating factor and mandate a life sentence, and therefore, the court was required to present these instructions to the jury. A similar issue was before us in Hunt, where Hunt argued that his proposed instruction was necessary to avoid a mandatory imposition of a death sentence. We stated, `[A] trial judge must give a requested instruction that correctly states the applicable law and that has not been fairly covered in instructions actually given.       In deciding whether the trial court was required to give such an instruction, we must determine whether the requested instruction constitutes a correct statement of the law; whether it is applicable under the facts and circumstances of this case; and whether it has been fairly covered in the instructions actually given.' Hunt, 321 Md. at 442-43, 583 A.2d at 245 (quoting Mack v. State, 300 Md. at 592, 479 A.2d at 1348). The instructions given by the court in the instant case fairly covered the substance of Henry's proposed instruction 14A. The trial judge stated, Assuming you find that he was the trigger man and you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the trigger man, you go in Section II, and Section II requires the State to prove that what we call in the eyes of the law there are aggravating circumstances that make this murder different from any other murder in which the death penalty is not asked, and there are two aggravating circumstances for you to consider in this case, and you have to deliberate as a jury on each of these two and have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that one of these aggravating circumstances came about in this case. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that either one of these were committed beyond a reasonable doubt, then you mark them not proven, and you put life down. You go to the back and you put life in prison.       If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that either one of these aggravating circumstances has been proven, then go to the back and mark life imprisonment with or without parole. If one of them or either one of them have been proven, then go to Section III. In Section III we are talking about mitigating circumstances. The legislature has said that there are certain things that exist or that you should take into consideration in deciding whether or not the imposition of the death penalty should come about, and they have listed by statute seven specific mitigating circumstances, and added number eight which you as an individual juror can find would be a mitigating circumstance, and when we use the term mitigating circumstance, and I am going to repeat this to you because that is the crux of what the legislature intended when it passed this death statute, a mitigating circumstance is anything about the defendant or the facts of this case that in fairness or in mercy may make the death sentence an inappropriate penalty for this sentence for the defendant. That is for Mr. Henry. I am going to repeat that again. A mitigating circumstance is anything about the defendant or about the facts of this case that in fairness or in mercy may make the death sentence an inappropriate penalty for this defendant. Similarly, the trial judge did not err by refusing to submit proposed instruction 9G to the jury. He quite thoroughly addressed the substance of the requested instruction in what he actually said: After you have made your determination on the mitigating circumstances, you go to the next section of the sentencing form which is Section IV. What you have to do in Section IV is make a determination as to whether or not you are convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. That is, you have to be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating circumstances weigh more than the mitigating circumstances, and you are to do that by a preponderance of the evidence. So what you would do again in this case is put on one side of the scales of justice the aggravating circumstances then you put on the other side of the scales of justice the mitigating circumstances. There is a question that you have to answer, and in order for you to answer ... question ... four yes, that scale has to tip in favor of the aggravating circumstances. If the scale tips in favor of the mitigating circumstances, then you answer question four no.       In arriving at your decision in this case, you are to consider all the evidence that has been presented to you by both sides and give it whatever weight you think that it deserves or whatever you think is appropriate. The evidence consists of the testimony that you have heard from witnesses on the witness stand and any other evidence that I have admitted or have been stipulated between the parties.       You are to consider at this point all the evidence that has been presented by both sides in regards to this phase of the trial, give it whatever weight you think it deserves and as it relates to the sentence or the appropriate sentence in this case. It is your function as jurors in this phase of this trial in this search for the truth to weigh the evidence, give whatever credence you want to anything that you have heard for the past two days and last month and to render a fair and an impartial verdict. The jury was properly instructed on the law and how the aggravating and mitigating factors may be weighed. In fact, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and three mitigating circumstances, yet decided that the severity of the aggravating circumstances supported the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, proposed instruction 9G could not have had any significant effect on the deliberations. First, as the jury did not ultimately conclude that there were fewer mitigating circumstances than aggravating ones, the concept in proposed instruction 9G was by its terms inapplicable. Second, the jury demonstrated that it understood in any event that mere numbers of opposing circumstances did not govern the weighing process, as it found that the death penalty was justified despite the lesser number of aggravating circumstances. The trial judge gave instructions that fairly covered both requested instructions 14A and 9G. Henry also contends that the trial judge erroneously refused to utilize his proposed instructions 2 and 11. Those instructions are: Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 2 You must approach your deliberation with the firm understanding that I cannot overrule your decision. Therefore, you are instructed that if you determine that Ian Henry shall be sentenced to death, he will be executed in the manner prescribed by law. Similarly, if you determine that Ian Henry is to be sentenced to life imprisonment, he will spend the balance of his natural life in a penal institution. You are instructed not to make any other presumptions or assumptions with regard to the sentence, other than, again, if the sentence is death it will be carried out in the manner provided by law, and if the sentence is life, that he will serve the balance of his life in a penal institution. Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 11 The responsibility for determining whether the death penalty should be imposed rests with you and you alone, and you must act with due regard for the consequences of your decision. Henry claims that the aforementioned two instructions were designed to forcefully convey to the jurors that their decision was final.... He wanted to emphasize to the jury the critical importance of the impending decision and the serious consequences that would inherently result. A trial judge, when requested, should correctly instruct the jury on every essential point of the law. See Collins, 318 Md. at 290, 568 A.2d at 11, where the trial judge properly refused to give jury instructions that were not an accurate statement of the law. To support his argument, Henry cites Poole v. State, 290 Md. 114, 125, 428 A.2d 434, 440 (1981). The import of Poole, however, was that counsel should not comment to the jury during summation about possible appellate review of a death sentence. This circumstance did not arise in the instant case. The trial judge adequately emphasized the serious nature of the task before the jurors by stating [Henry] will either receive death or life imprisonment based on your answering these questions in regard to this sentencing proceeding. Lastly, Henry maintains that the judge was in error when he denied the following requested instructions: Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 9 C. This burden of proof as to the weighing of circumstances operates with respect to each juror individually, and therefore so long as any one of you [perceives] any factor relating to the crime or the defendant which you regard as a mitigating factor that is not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, you may not return a sentence of death.       E. If after your careful consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you find them to be evenly balanced, the sentence must be life imprisonment. The trial judge instructed the jury that a death sentence could only be imposed upon a unanimous finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances; if unanimity could not be reached, then a life sentence was required. As to proposed instruction 9E, the judge told the jury, If the scale comes out even ... then the State hasn't met its burden of proof, and you mark no. Therefore, we find that the substance of 9C and 9E were fairly covered in the actual instructions given by the judge. Finally, Henry does not raise the issue, but we are required by Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 414(e)(4) to determine, whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant. We conclude that the death penalty is neither excessive nor disproportionate for these brutal drug related murders. See Huffington v. State, 304 Md. 559, 500 A.2d 272 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1023, 106 S.Ct. 3315, 92 L.Ed.2d 745 (1986), where the death penalty was found neither excessive nor disproportionate for a defendant who murdered two people and stole money and drugs from the victims. We further conclude that Henry's death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. Art. 27, § 414(e)(1). JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, EXCEPT THE SENTENCE FOR CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ROBBERY IS VACATED.