Opinion ID: 1917514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether this court should change well settled mississippi premises liability law.

Text: ¶ 29. Corley urges this Court to adopt the California Rule of premises liability regarding third party conduct. Also, Judge Evans very eloquently conveyed his firm convictions in his Opinion and Order Granting Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. In what he understandably described as an unpleasant decision, Judge Evans, stated, in part: [Scott Corley's] injuries are tragic, severe, and permanent. His life has been forever changed. If the jury's verdict were collected, occupational therapy might be afforded and his life made easier. Instead, in addition to the injustice of the first tragedy, this young Plaintiff must now suffer a second. And this one at the hands of our State's common law. In his opinion and order, Judge Evans likewise requested this Court to consider adoption of the California Rule as to premises liability regarding third party conduct, which is a totality of the circumstances standard as opposed to a cause to anticipate standard. [9] ¶ 30. The California Rule states: ... in determining the existence of a landowner's duty to protect invitees from the wrongful conduct of third persons, foreseeability is measured by all of the circumstances including the nature, condition and location of the defendant's premises and defendant's prior experience, bearing in mind that what is required to be foreseeable is the general nature of the event or harm, not its precise nature or manner of occurrence. Onciano v. Golden Palace Restaurant, Inc., 219 Cal.App.3d 385, 394, 268 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Cal.Ct.App.1990) (citing Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 129, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 (1985)). Onciano and our reference to Onciano in our decision in Crain are the bases for the trial court's plea to this Court to revisit our premises liability law as to third party conduct. However, subsequent to the California Supreme Court's decision in Isaacs and a state district court of appeal decision in Onciano, the California Supreme Court revisited the issue of third party conduct premises liability in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal.4th 666, 678, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 145, 863 P.2d 207, 215 (1993), [10] and in doing so, admitted that certain broad language in Isaacs had caused confusion in that there was at least an inference that analyzing foreseeability to determine duty by a premises owner was normally a question of fact to be determined by a jury, and that any such interpretation of Isaacs was error. The Ann M. court went on to hold that [f]oreseeability, when analyzed to determine the existence or scope of a duty, is a question of law to be decided by the court. 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d at 215. Recently, another California district court of appeal questioned the holdings in Isaacs and Onciano. In Eric J. v. Betty M., 76 Cal.App.4th 715, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 549, 554 (Cal.Ct.App.1999), that court stated: The viability of the holding in Onciano is questionable in light of the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal.4th 666, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207 (1993). Onciano relied on Isaacs, 38 Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653 to reject the idea that a lack of prior criminal activity was not dispositive in the landowner's favor, a fact which Justice Fred Woods would find troubling in a separate concurring opinion, where he lamented Isaacs' broad brush dicta. .......Liability in the face of the absence of notice of prior criminal activity, however, was dispositive in favor of the landowner in Ann M., a rationale which Justice Mosk, in his dissent in Ann M. criticized as being inconsistent with Isaacs......... Accordingly, it appears that the California courts have at least partially retreated from the Isaacs/Onciano pronouncements. In the end, we see no reason to endure the somewhat disjointed California experience and abandon our well-established premises liability law concerning third-party conduct. ¶ 31. Returning to the case before us today, the record does not support a finding that the Evanses should have reasonably foreseen the third-party conduct of a drunken Harden who accidently shot his friend, Scott Corley. The third-party assault by Harden upon his friend, Scott Corley, was not foreseeable because the requisite cause to anticipate did not arise since Stacy had no actual or constructive knowledge of Harden's violent nature, or actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence existed on her land at the crawfish boil. ¶ 32. We conclude that no liability was imposed upon Stacy or James under our well-settled premises liability law. We decline to adopt the California Rule in Mississippi, because that experience reveals that such a rule could ultimately create strict liability for property owners, causing them to become insurers of an invitee's safety.