Opinion ID: 1690207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether sheriff gant owed a duty of care toward the plaintiff individually.

Text: ¶ 14. Maness asserts that Sheriff Gant had a duty to protect third parties from foreseeable injury at the hands of Thompson. She argues that Gant knew or should have known that Thompson had a propensity to drive under the influence of alcohol, that he was incarcerated to protect the public from his driving while intoxicated, and that his driving while intoxicated would pose a risk to other drivers. ¶ 15. Before an individual defendant may be found to be negligent, thereby entitling a plaintiff to recover from that defendant, the plaintiff must show the existence of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. J.C. Penney Co. v. Sumrall, 318 So.2d 829, 832 (Miss.1975). In Robinson v. Estate of Williams, 721 F.Supp. 806 (S.D.Miss.1989), the district court applied Mississippi law to determine whether a sheriff was subject to suit by the estate of an individual who had been murdered by inmates who had escaped from the county jail. The court held that the statutorily-imposed duties of a sheriff in Mississippi are duties owed to the public as a whole and are, therefore, not actionable by a specific plaintiff, absent a compelling showing of extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 808. The court stated: As far as the Court can determine, no Mississippi court has squarely addressed the duty issues presented herein. However, from the Mississippi authorities discussed, the Court finds it highly unlikely that the Mississippi courts would consider the sheriff to have owed a duty of care to plaintiff's decedent. The sole factor which distinguishes plaintiff's decedent from the populace of Clarke County is the harm he suffered allegedly as a result of the sheriffs negligence. This, according to longstanding Mississippi law, is clearly insufficient to establish a duty of care owing to him in particular: when the duty imposed upon an officer is one solely to the public, the failure to perform it, or an erroneous or negligent performance, is regarded as an injury to the public and not to an individual member of the public; and an individual harmed thereby may not have redress against the officer unless the individual had in it such a direct and distinctive interest as to set him apart from all others of the public in respect to it, and the fact of the injury does not in itself serve to make out the direct and distinctive interest which is essential. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Boyle v. Matthews, 196 Miss. 833, 18 So.2d 156, 158 (1944)). The Robinson court granted the sheriffs motion for summary judgment and held that even if the sheriff was negligent as alleged, he was nonetheless protected from liability. Id. ¶ 16. The facts of the case sub judice reveal that Maness is not within a category of persons setting her apart from members of the public as a whole with respect to Gant's duty as sheriff. Excerpts from her deposition (which, unlike Gant's, are found in the record) include her admissions that she did not know Thompson, had never met him before the accident, had never spoken with him in person or by telephone, had no knowledge of his criminal or court record, had never been in a court proceeding involving Thompson, and had never testified against him. Thus, Maness cannot establish such a direct and distinctive interest as to set [her] apart from all others of the public in respect to the sheriffs duty owed to the public as a whole. Id. Because Gant owed no duty to Maness as an individual, we find that he cannot be liable to her under the facts of this case.