Opinion ID: 883222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misuse

Text: Did the District Court err by submitting the affirmative defense of misuse to the jury? I respectfully dissent on Issue one of the majority opinion. Section 27-1-719, MCA, states that the affirmative defense of unreasonable misuse can be used in products liability cases. Unreasonable misuse is defined as use of a product in a manner that is not reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. T. Traverse, 3d American Law of Products Liability, Foreseeability of Misuse, § 42.8, p. 18 (1987). This is consistent with the contention of National Crane as pointed out in the majority opinion. As further pointed out in the majority opinion, plaintiff contends that while unreasonable misuse is a recognized defense, reasonably foreseeable misuse is not recognized as a defense. Plaintiff contends that in light of the clear foreseeability, this Court should determine as a matter of law that the affirmative defense of misuse should not have been submitted to the jury. The majority opinion states that foreseeable misuse is reasonable misuse. I disagree with that conclusion. The result of the conclusion of the majority opinion is that even though misuse may by its very nature be classed as unreasonable, still if it was foreseeable, then it cannot be classed as unreasonable misuse. I believe that ignores the experience of modern society. The holding of the majority opinion on this issue is stated as follows: It being admitted that the alleged misuse of the crane through sideloading was reasonably foreseeable to National Crane, we hold that, as a matter of law, the affirmative defense of unreasonable misuse is unavailable to National Crane. (Emphasis added.) A leading treatise on Products Liability sets out the facts that the factfinder can consider when trying to determine reasonably foreseeable: In determining whether the seller should have reasonably anticipated the use to which the product was put, the factfinder may take into account the reasonable use or uses of the product, the ordinary user's awareness that the use of the product in a certain way is dangerous, the likelihood and probable nature of use of the product by persons of limited knowledge, and the normal environment for the use of the product and the foreseeable risk in such environment, as well as any other evidence that may or may not cause the seller to reasonably anticipate such use. (Emphasis added.) T. Traverse, 3d American Law of Products Liability, Foreseeability of Misuse, § 42.8, p. 20 (1987). The key aspect of the above quote is that the factfinder is required to sift through the facts and make the determination. I cannot agree with the elimination of the jury as the finder of fact on this critical issue. In substance the majority opinion concludes that if a defendant acknowledges the foreseeability of the misuse, regardless of how unreasonable such misuse may be, that party may not assert the defense of unreasonable misuse as a matter of law. I disagree with that analysis. The key aspect is that the trier of fact must consider all of the evidence and thereby determine whether or not the misuse was in fact reasonable or unreasonable under all of the circumstances. Perhaps an analogy will be of some assistance in this analysis. In my analogy, I assume that John Smith has purchased an American automobile which has a capacity to go 100 mph. I further assume that in driving the car at 90 mph he is involved in a high speed accident which results in his death. I next assume that the estate of John Smith brings an action against the automobile manufacturer in which the estate contends that because it was clearly foreseeable that a purchaser of the automobile might drive at the speed of 90 mph, it was negligent as a matter of law for the manufacturer to fail to install a governor which would prevent driving in excess of 75 mph. Would it be appropriate in this analogy for the estate of Smith to contend that the automobile manufacturer cannot use the affirmative defense of unreasonable misuse because the manufacturer could foresee the misuse of the automobile by driving at 90 mph. I would not agree that a district court could conclude as a matter of law that this knowledge bars the manufacturer from presenting the issue of unreasonable misuse to a jury. This analogy has more clearly emphasized to me the importance of allowing the trier of fact to consider all of the facts before reaching a conclusion. The majority holds that it has been admitted that the alleged misuse of the crane through sideloading was reasonably foreseeable to National Crane and that, as a matter of law, the affirmative defense of unreasonable misuse is unavailable to National Crane. In reaching such a conclusion, the majority has substituted this Court as trier of fact in place of the jury to which that obligation has been given. I would allow any additional evidence bearing upon unreasonable misuse which may be submitted by either party and would allow the jury to determine whether the facts demonstrated an unreasonable misuse on the part of Mr. Lutz. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.