Opinion ID: 2621435
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the state of utah and juab county

Text: ¶ 12 The State and Juab County contend that we lack jurisdiction over plaintiffs' appeal of their dismissal because plaintiffs failed to serve them with a copy of their notice of appeal. We disagree, concluding that plaintiffs' failure to serve the State and Juab County with copies of their notice of appeal was not jurisdictionally fatal. ¶ 13 Notices of appeal are governed by rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appealing party must file a notice of appeal with the trial court and serve a copy of the notice on counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. Utah R.App. P. 3(a), (e). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is the act that vests the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, in cases where an appellant timely files notice but fails in some other respect to comply with rule 3, the appellate court may dismiss the appeal but is not required to do so. Subsection (a) of the rule provides: Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. Id. 3(a). ¶ 14 We have applied rule 3(a) to hold that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional requirement for appellate review. See, e.g., Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ¶ 19, 17 P.3d 1110 (It is clear from the plain language of rule 3(a) that the timely filing of the notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step.). Even where an appellant files a notice crippled with defects and fails to effectively serve the opposing party, the notice is jurisdictionally sufficient if it complies with the timeliness requirement. Harley Davidson of N. Utah v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2005 UT 38, ¶ 16, 116 P.3d 349. ¶ 15 In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiffs fulfilled this jurisdictional requirement by filing a timely notice of appeal. Therefore, while we have discretion to dismiss the appeal due to plaintiffs' failure to serve the notice on the State and Juab County, we are not required to do so. And we are disinclined to do so here where there is no evidence that plaintiffs' failure to serve the notice resulted in any actual prejudice to either the State or Juab County. Indeed, both the State and Juab County received actual notice of the appeal through their receipt of plaintiffs' brief, entered an appearance in these proceedings, and filed timely briefs addressing the substantive issues.
¶ 16 Having established our jurisdiction to review the district court's dismissal of the State and Juab County, we now consider the propriety of their dismissal. Whether a party was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim is a question of law, which we review for correctness. Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, ¶ 6, 20 P.3d 868. We turn first to the district court's dismissal of the State and then consider its dismissal of Juab County.
¶ 17 The State moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the State alleged that CUCC is not a state entity and that the State has no liability for the conduct of CUCC or its employees. The district court granted the State's motion. Plaintiffs argue that the dismissal was erroneous because CUCC is actually an office or instrumentality of the State of Utah Division of Mental Health. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that the State is estopped from contesting CUCC's status as a state agency because of plaintiffs' reliance on statements made by state employees, including Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham. We address each argument in turn.
¶ 18 Plaintiffs contend that CUCC is actually an office of the State Department of Human Services, Division of Mental Health. Plaintiffs point first to the statutory and operating relationship between CUCC and the Division of Mental Health. Under Utah Code section 17A-3-602(1) (1998), county governing bodies are local mental health authorities and must provide mental health services to persons within their respective counties. These local mental health authorities operate under the policy direction of the [Board of Mental Health] and the administrative direction of the [Division of Mental Health]. Id. In addition, local mental health authorities receive state funding and may enter into contracts with the Division. Id. § 17A-3-602. These local mental health authorities are expressly permitted to pool their resources and create interlocal agencies to provide mental health . . . services. Id. § 17A-3-602(1). ¶ 19 In accordance with this statutory scheme, six Utah counties formed CUCC in 1990. From 1997 to 2000, the Division contracted with CUCC as part of its statutory mandate to arrange for a comprehensive continuum of services. Id. § 62A-12-102(2)(g) (1997). According to plaintiffs, CUCC received eighty-five percent of its funding through these contracts. In addition to receiving this significant financial support, CUCC operated under the administrative and policy purview of the State pursuant to Utah Code section 17A-3-602(1). In plaintiffs' view, these financial and administrative links to the State render the State liable for CUCC's actions. ¶ 20 Plaintiffs also assert that CUCC's integration into the Department of Human Services is evidenced by representations found in Bryan Davis' medical records. For example, a Deceased Client or Employee Report for clients of the Department of Human Services was filled out for Davis. The report contained a handwritten notation listing Davis' service provider as CUCC, with the division and locale listed as Div. of MH/Div. of SA-CUCC, Nephi Office. The report also contained instructions stating that it was to be filled out upon the death of any client or employee of the Department of Human Services . . . and sent to the Office/Division Director. In plaintiffs' view, these references to the Department of Human Services evince the fact that CUCC is actually an instrumentality of the State. ¶ 21 While it is clear that there is a close statutory and operating relationship between the State and CUCC, this relationship does not render the State liable for CUCC's actions. As we discuss infra in Part II.A, CUCC is a properly formed interlocal agency; the State played no part in its creation. And the State does not operate CUCC. While the State exercises certain statutory policy-making and administrative control over CUCC (and other state-funded mental health programs), CUCC's operations are directed by its governing board. CUCC's bylaws expressly grant its governing board a wide range of powers, including the power to create, maintain and operate all of the facilities, services or programs operated by CUCC. We therefore reject plaintiffs' contention that CUCC is a state agency and hold that liability for the acts of CUCC's employees and officials lies with CUCC  not with the State.
¶ 22 Plaintiffs alternatively argue that dismissal of the State was improper because of representations made by state employees and information posted on the website maintained by the Department of Human Services. Plaintiffs focus especially on statements made by Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham, who allegedly instructed plaintiffs' counsel to direct plaintiffs' notice of claim to the State Attorney General's office. Stringham did so, however, only after plaintiffs' counsel told him that he had learned [that CUCC was] a state agency. Plaintiffs also allege that an unnamed employee of the Department of Human Services confirmed that CUCC was a state agency. And plaintiffs claim that they relied on the Department of Human Services' website, which listed CUCC among the Mental Health offices of the Department. ¶ 23 Plaintiffs contend that they were entitled to rely on these representations pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App.1995). They are incorrect. In Bischel, the then-controlling version of the Immunity Act was generally silent about how notice should be filed with the governing body of a governmental entity. Id. at 278. Because of this statutory ambiguity, the plaintiff, who had a claim against Salt Lake County, called the county commission for clarification. Id. at 276. The plaintiff was told to direct the notice to a person at the county attorney's office. Id. The plaintiff then called that person and received confirmation of the delivery instructions. Id. ¶ 24 After the notice was served, the county challenged its validity because it was directed to the county attorney's office rather than the county commission. Id. The court of appeals held that the notice was adequate, recognizing the statutory ambiguity and interpreting the notice requirements in a manner consistent with the overall purpose of the Immunity Act. Id. at 278 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court of appeals reasoned that the notice was consistent with the purpose of the Immunity Act because it served to notify the entity that actually investigated and settled claims against the county  the county attorney's office. Id. at 278-79. In the court's view, the plaintiff complied with the Immunity Act because she followed the instructions provided by the statute and the County Commission. Id. at 279. ¶ 25 This reasoning is simply not applicable here. At the time Bischel was decided, the Immunity Act contained a glaring ambiguity. Indeed, the version of the Act at issue in Bischel did not prescribe a specific manner or method for filing notice with the governing body of a governmental entity. Id. at 278. This significant gap in the statute was corrected in 1998. As a result, we rejected the Bischel court's rationale in Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2001 UT 109, ¶ 12, 37 P.3d 1156, where we stated: With the 1998 amendment [to the Immunity Act], the legislature has left little open to interpretation and has resolved any potential ambiguities as to whom the Notice must be delivered. . . . Where, as here, the statute is clear, readily available, and easily accessible by counsel, there is no reason to require anything less than strict compliance. Id. ¶ 14. ¶ 26 Furthermore, even if Bischel were controlling, it would be unavailing to plaintiffs here. In Bischel, the plaintiff received the erroneous delivery instructions from an agent of the entity that was allegedly liable for the plaintiff's injury. Here, however, plaintiffs are attempting to rely on erroneous advice given by employees of the State, an entity separate and distinct from the alleged tortfeasor, CUCC. We are aware of no authority supporting the proposition that the State can be held liable for the acts or omissions of a third-party entity solely on the basis of unauthorized oral representations made by state employees. Such representations by state employees cannot impose liability upon the State where there is none. We therefore affirm the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' claims against the State.
¶ 27 Plaintiffs also appeal the dismissal of Juab County. The basis for their appeal, however, is unclear. We agree with Juab County that plaintiffs have not adequately briefed their appeal of the district court's order dismissing Juab County. ¶ 28 An appellant's brief must comply with rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under rule 24, the brief must contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). We have on many occasions declined to address inadequately briefed arguments. See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (declining to address an issue on appeal where the appellant's brief lacked any reference to legal authority in support of his contention); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (declining to address an issue where the brief's analysis was so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court). ¶ 29 Plaintiffs' briefing on Juab County's dismissal does not comply with rule 24. Indeed, plaintiffs fail to articulate any reason why the district court erred in dismissing Juab County or any theory as to how Juab County could be liable for Davis' death. Although we have occasionally addressed inadequately briefed arguments, we see no reason to do so in this case. See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ¶ 8, 1 P.3d 1108 (addressing a criminal defendant's inadequately briefed argument in the interests of justice). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Juab County.