Opinion ID: 2101210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of an Uncharged Crime

Text: Appellant argues that evidence of his subsequent criminal activity was erroneously admitted during the State's case in chief. He maintains that the State did not sustain its burden to show that the different criminal actions were so similarly conducted that the method of conduct can be considered akin to the accused's signature. The State sought admission of the controverted testimony either as evidence of a common scheme or plan or to show identity. Alonzo Bellmar was the victim of an uncharged crime which was committed on January 18, 1983. Bellmar returned home and was in his garage when someone exited the side window. Both entry and exit were made through this window. He saw a man running from his house and he proceeded to follow. This man was running toward a tan Mercury or Ford car which was parked at a restaurant located four houses away from the Bellmar residence. Having lost sight of the man, Bellmar returned to the car and wrote down the license plate number. The number was 99 T 8889 and, as it turned out, this plate was registered to a Jerry Henderson. Two days later Bellmar identified appellant from a police photographic array. He also positively identified Henderson in court as the man he chased from his residence on January 18, 1983. Trial testimony of the present charged crime indicates that entry was gained through a window and exit made by the front door, a gold car was parked two or three houses away from the victim's house, and the eyewitness recorded a license plate number of 99 H 8889. Evidence of crimes which are independent and distinct from the charged crime is generally inadmissible to prove either the propensity to commit crime or guilt of the charged crime. However, in appropriate cases such evidence is admissible to prove an accused's identity, knowledge, intent, motive, or to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. Malone v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1339. Evidence of the uncharged crime is admissible to establish a common scheme or plan when the means used to commit the charged crime and the uncharged crime were nearly identical. Generally, the manner of committing each crime must be so unusual or distinctive as to constitute a signature. Williams v. State (1985), Ind., 481 N.E.2d 1319. Evidence of the uncharged crime is also admissible under the identity exception when identity is an issue and the uncharged crime is connected with the crime charged in such a way that proof of them naturally tends to identify the defendant as the one who committed the charged crime. Cobbs v. State (1975), 264 Ind. 60, 338 N.E.2d 632, 634. Testimony pertaining to the uncharged crime must possess substantial probative value and must be so specifically and significantly related to the charged crime in time, place and circumstance as to be logically relevant to one of the acceptable purposes. Hobbs v. State (1984), Ind., 466 N.E.2d 729, 733. The evidence in this case does not establish a similarity in scheme or plan in the commission of the crimes which would set them apart from other burglary offenses. The mere repetition of crimes of the same nature is insufficient. Riddle v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 587, 348 N.E.2d 635. However, identity was at issue here, and the similarity of the license plate number which was recorded by each eyewitness is significantly and logically related to identification. The testimony of the uncharged crime was properly admitted.