Opinion ID: 171234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Kelley's Cross-Appeal

Text: Ms. Kelley's cross-appeal raises only one issue: whether the district court properly held that Mr. Chavez and Mr. White were entitled to qualified immunity because Ms. Kelley failed to establish that the City violated the Equal Protection Clause. Reviewing Ms. Kelley's challenge to the grant of summary judgment based upon qualified immunity de novo, see Arredondo v. Locklear, 462 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2006), we affirm, although on different grounds than those relied on by the district court. The district court found that Mr. Chavez and Mr. White were entitled to qualified immunity on Ms. Kelley's Equal Protection claim because she failed to present evidence providing the necessary detail on other employees to establish they are similarly situated to Kelley. Aplt.App. at 238. As such, the district court concluded she could not establish an essential prerequisite of her class-of-one claim: that she was treated differently than others in a similar position and that there was no rational basis for this difference in treatment. In other words, she failed to prove a constitutional violation, which she was required to do when the City raised a qualified immunity defense. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (stating that when a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense, the court must first determine whether the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right and then, only if they do show such a violation, whether that right was clearly established). Although we agree with the district court that Ms. Kelley did not prove a constitutional violation, we reach that conclusion for different reasons. There is a fundamental problem with Ms. Kelley's claim: the class-of-one theory is not legally cognizable where, as here, a public employee claims that she has been treated differently than other employees. The Supreme Court has never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in the specific circumstance where, as here, government employers are alleged to have made an individualized, subjective personnel decision in a seemingly arbitrary or irrational manner. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2155, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). And, more to the point, the Court recently held that the class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. [18] Id. at 2151. Given the Supreme Court's recent holding, we need not address Ms. Kelley's argument that she raised a genuine issue of fact by showing that she was the only non-department head attorney fired by Mr. Chavez and was the only attorney known to have had a case against him. Ms. Kelley's entire class-of-one claim is foreclosed by the Court's decision in Engquist. See Pignanelli v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 540 F.3d 1213, 2008 WL 4149656, at  (10th Cir.2008) (noting that Engquist bars public employee plaintiff's equal protection claim as it unequivocally h[eld] that the class-of-one equal protection theory, whatever its contours, `does not apply in the public employment context' (quoting Engquist, 128 S.Ct. at 2151)); Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam) (Recently, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to a public employee asserting a violation of the Clause under a `class of one' theory. As this theory served as the only basis for the equal protection analysis underlying the District Court's grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of Appel, we reverse the order of the District Court. (citation omitted)). Because Ms. Kelley did not have a legally cognizable class-of-one claim, she could not demonstrate a constitutional violation. Thus, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Mr. Chavez and Mr. White.