Opinion ID: 1988339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Criminal conversation.

Text: The action which may be maintained for an isolated instance of criminal conversation presents a different situation. We are not concerned here with the right of action which accrues when the wrongdoer, for the purpose of disrupting the marriage relation, induces one spouse to separate from the other or not to return after a separation from him or her. As we observed in Giltner v. Stark, supra, 219 N.W.2d at 704-705, the gist of the action of criminal conversation is adultery. The right protected is the exclusive right of one spouse to sexual intercourse with the other. The tort has been handed down from early common law intact. Defenses which would seem applicable in terms of today's sense of fairness are nonexistent: At common law and in other jurisdictions where a cause of action [for criminal conversation] is recognized in favor of the husband under these circumstances, consent of the wife is no defense. The fact that the wrongdoer did not know the wife was married but believed her to be single is not a defense. The fact that the wife represented herself as single is not a defense. The fact that the wife was the aggressor is not a defense. The fact that she has been neglected or mistreated by her husband is not a defense. The fact that she and her husband were separated through his fault is not a defense. When the case comes on for trial, moreover, the number of occasions on which the wife has had sexual relations with the defendant and with others is a highly relevant inquiry on the issue of damages.  Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex.1973) (Steakley, J., dissenting) See Antonelli v. Xenakis, 363 Pa. 375, 378, 69 A.2d 102, 103 (1949). At a later date the Pennsylvania supreme court observed: [I]n today's society it is unreasonable to impose upon a defendant such harsh results without affording any real opportunity to interject logically valid defenses on the merits such as the role of the plaintiff's spouse in the adulterous relationship or the quality of the plaintiff's marriage prior to the occurrence of the acts constituting the tort.  Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 280-281, 365 A.2d 147, 151 (1976) A fundamental flaw in the criminal conversation remedy, as opposed to alienation of affections remedy, is its insensitive imposition without regard to the viability of the marriage relationship, or to the fact, in a given instance, that relationship may not have been affected adversely. In short, recovery may be allowed where stability of the marriage survives unimpaired. On the other hand, where a continuous course of adultery has undermined the marital relationship the alienation of affections remedy, left standing, would apply: It is still true of course that adultery will undermine most marriages. Injuries to the marital relationship resulting from the sexual indiscretion could however still be recoverable in a suit for    alienation of affections    . The real impact of abolishing the adultery action therefore is merely to increase the plaintiff's burden of proof by making him [or her] demonstrate either abandonment or a loss of affections objectively manifested by conduct other than the adulterous act itself. This in effect takes away from a complaining husband or wife the benefit of a presumption that no longer appears warranted and has in the past worked a hardship on defendants. By channeling plaintiffs into an alienation    action the way would be clear for a defendant to escape liability by proving his [or her] ignorance of the marriage. Note, 48 Notre Dame L.Rev., supra, at 434. The enactment of the new criminal code bears on the continued viability of the tort of criminal conversation. Although it is a common-law tort, the right to maintain a civil action for adultery previously was assured by our statute making adultery a crime. See § 702.1, The Code, 1975. Civil causes of action are available to obtain damages for injuries sustained by reason of crimes in Iowa. Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, 252 N.W.2d at 423-424. However, chapter 702 of the 1975 Code was repealed by the new criminal code, Acts 66 G.A. Ch. 1245, Ch. 4, § 526. Therefore, no statutory inhibition against eliminating the common-law tort of criminal conversation existed as of January 1, 1978. We abolish the tort of criminal conversation in Iowa for conduct occurring after January 1, 1978. But because plaintiff's petition in this case is based on conduct alleged to have occurred prior to that date, we hold trial court was right in overruling defendant's motion to dismiss. We affirm the ruling appealed from. AFFIRMED. MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND, REES and UHLENHOPP, JJ., concur. RAWLINGS, J., concurs specially. MASON, McCORMICK, and HARRIS, JJ., dissent.