Opinion ID: 456170
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Invalid Licenses

Text: 82 The district court found that Chief Mate Chan and Second Mate Kong 12 did not have valid Liberian licenses on the date of the allision because the Chinese licenses which had been presented in order to obtain their Liberian licenses could not be validated. A company official testified that the company took the Chinese licenses at face value. The district court found this position to be totally unreasonable and inexcusable for a company which operates ocean going vessels, regardless of the alleged competency of the unlicensed senior officers. 83 The appellant argues that there was no evidence that the underlying Chinese licenses were obtained by fraud and that the only evidence of invalidity was that the Liberian authorities were unable to validate the underlying Chinese licenses upon the strength of which the reciprocal Liberian licenses were granted. Appellant's principal contention is that there was no indication of any causal connection between the invalid Chinese licenses and the allision. Appellant also contends that the company had received from the Liberian government a list of suspect license numbers and the names of suspected licensees. The Chief Mate and Second Officer were not on this list and therefore appellant argues that it had no reason to suspect that these licenses were invalid. 84 However, the evidence shows that the shipowner had the capability of checking on the validity of the underlying Chinese licenses but failed to check with respect to the licenses of Chief Mate Chan or Second Mate Kong before or after hiring them. Moreover, prior to the allision on May 9, 1980, Hercules was aware of a continuing problem in its fleet with the use of counterfeit and fraudulent licenses. However, the company policy was that if a man had been employed by Wah Kwong for several years, the company accepted the license at face value. (TL 392-395). 85 The courts have noted that it is possible to estimate the competency of a vessel's crew by examining their licenses. See In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corporation, S.A., 513 F.Supp. 148, 159 (E.D.La.1981), aff'd, 728 F.2d 699 (5th Cir.1984). Licensing requirements are promulgated to insure that seamen are properly trained and will know their duties and responsibilities when aboard a vessel at sea. The district court in finding that Wah Kwong Company was negligent in not validating its officers' licenses did not relate this particular negligence to any specific fact contributing toward the accident. However, we find that the invalid license of Chief Mate Chan is further evidence that he was ill-equipped to perform the duties necessary for the safe navigation of the vessel. The incompetency of this unlicensed crew member was manifested by his failure to (1) inform the lookout as to his duties, (2) maintain his position on the bridge until a relief officer was present, (3) insure the navigation of the vessel by requiring compliance with the rules of the road in restricted visibility, and (4) seek clarification from or countermand Pilot Lerro when Chan thought the vessel should have been anchored at buoy 16 or before. 86 It is clear from the facts enumerated above that the district court was correct in finding that the crew on board the SUMMIT VENTURE was negligent and unseaworthy on the date of the allision with the Sunshine Skyway Bridge and that their negligence and unseaworthiness was a proximate cause of that allision.