Opinion ID: 1946872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Does Maryland recognize a cause of action for the wrongful death of a 19-20 week old fetus born alive?

Text: GHA contends that there can be no cause of action for the wrongful death of a live born child if the child sustained the actionable injuries prior to viability. We reject that contention, finding that the concept of viability has no role in a case, such as this, where the child is born alive. One of the first cases permitting recovery for prenatal injuries prior to viability to a child subsequently born alive was Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Company, 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956). There, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated ( id. at 504-505): If a child born after an injury sustained at any period of its prenatal life can prove the effect on it of a tort, it would have a right to recover.    `It would be contrary to every principle of right and justice, which are the very essence of law, to deny such rights to the injured child.' In Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in permitting recovery, specifically addressed the viability distinction contended for by GHA. The court could not discern any logical basis for distinguishing the rights of a fetus non-viable at the time of injury later born alive from those of a fetus viable when injured. 101 N.H. at 484. The court stated that it is being oblivious to reality to say that the mother alone was injured by the tortious act and not the child. Id. at 485. Similar results were reached by the Alabama, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island Supreme Courts. Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So.2d 758 (1973); Green v. Smith, 71 Ill.2d 501, 377 N.E.2d 37 (1978); Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966). Two of the above-cited cases are particularly in point. Torigian v. Watertown News Co., supra, 352 Mass. 446, concerned injuries to a non-viable fetus causing its premature birth and death two and one-half hours later due to its prematurity, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the complaint stated a cause of action for the wrongful death of the child. The court considered the arguments against recovery: lack of precedent, the avoidance of speculation or conjecture, and the encouragement of fictitious claims. 352 Mass. 448. The court noted the modern trend towards allowing recovery and stated that [t]here is no longer a lack of precedent. Id. It discounted the problems of proof and possibility of fraudulent claims by referring to the fact that neither problem is present to any greater extent than in the usual tort claim. Id. at 448-449. Wolfe v. Isbell, supra, 280 So.2d 758, also involved a wrongful death action where the child died shortly after live birth. In holding that the deceased child's father had stated a cause of action, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the viability distinction, stating ( id. at 764): To say now that a child will be recognized as alive and capable of inheriting, and later taking possession of property when born alive, but not recognized as alive for the purpose of sustaining injuries for which suit might be brought if they wrongfully cause its death is an incongruous result. GHA urges us not to join the modern trend of recognizing a cause of action for non-viable fetuses born alive. GHA argues that not only would recognition be inappropriate in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), but that the cases permitting recovery, having been decided before Roe are no longer good law. We disagree. Roe v. Wade concerned abortion. The decision held, as GHA states (brief at 38), that the state's interest in prenatal life does not become compelling until viability has been attained, and that, therefore, the state cannot unduly restrict a woman's access to an abortion during the first two trimesters of pregnancy. Recognition of a cause of action for the wrongful death of a non-viable fetus born alive does not impinge on the Court's decision in Roe. Whether or not Mrs. Blumenthal could have aborted her child at the time the child was born alive does not lessen the alleged negligence leading to the child's premature birth. [8] Agreeing with the decisions in Torigian and Wolfe, we conclude that a cause of action lies for the wrongful death of a child born alive who dies as a result of injuries sustained while en ventre sa mere. Questions answered as herein set forth. One third of the costs to be paid by the defendant GHA and two thirds of the costs to be paid by the plaintiffs.