Opinion ID: 362441
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Key

Text: 43 Having arrested appellant for possession of the hashish found in the locked suitcase, Agent Drinan seized the Blazer under the authority of the forfeiture statutes, 21 U.S.C. §§ 878(4) & 881(b)(1)(4). The Blazer was then immediately searched. We think that the key found in the Blazer was appropriately seized as evidence revealed during an inventory search. 44 In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of the authorities to search the interior of a seized vehicle in order to secure personal property contained therein. Such a search protects both the owner and the police. If such a search reveals evidence, the police may seize it. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968); United States v. McCambridge, supra, 551 F.2d at 870-71. Appellant objects, however, that the seizure of the key transmutes the inventory search into an investigatory search. 14 Appellant reasons that because the key was not obviously criminal evidence and became evidence only when the officers found that it fit the door to the main house at Mill Isle ten days later, the use of the key was investigatory and therefore exceeded the bounds of the caretaking function countenanced by South Dakota v. Opperman, supra. 45 In our view, appellant is quibbling with Agent Drinan's decision that the key might be relevant to prove the charge for which appellant was arrested possession and transportation of drugs. We think Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967), is dispositive of this claim. In Cooper, the defendant was arrested for selling heroin and his car forfeited for transporting contraband. A warrantless search of the glove compartment of the seized auto revealed a scrap of brown paper similar to, but larger than, scraps used to wrap heroin allegedly sold by the defendant. The Supreme Court approved the seizure of the paper as reasonably related to the arrest and the purpose of the forfeiture. In other words, the scrap of paper could be probative of the charge against the defendant and the vehicle. 46 In a similar vein, appellant in this case was arrested for possession and his two vehicles seized for transporting contraband. Unlike the paper in Cooper, the key may not have been obviously evidence when agent Drinan first took it into custody. Nevertheless, it became obvious evidence before the reasonable process of an inventory search was completed. Pursuant to DEA regulations, Drinan removed all personal property not a part of the seized vehicle. Long before he had an opportunity to write out an inventory of the vehicle's contents and return them, the discovery of the cache at Mill Isle made it highly likely that the key was evidence. Marijuana debris on the floor of the seized vehicle indicated a likelihood that appellant had carried more contraband than was found in the Blazer. The vacuum cleaner and the tire tracks indicated that appellant and the Blazer were associated with Mill Isle. Even before the discovery of the cache, Drinan learned that appellant was not living at his stated address. If a man falsely states his address and other evidence indicates he is living at the scene of a crime for which he has been arrested, his house key is obviously evidence. Were the law to require that officers, legitimately in possession and legitimately made aware of the evidentiary value of such an item, go through the motions of obtaining a warrant, it would, we think, be a purely ritualistic deference to formality. We see no increased protection which would thereby be assured a suspect's rights. We therefore hold that the key was properly seized as evidence discovered during an inventory search. D. The Warrantless Search of Mill Isle 47 With appellant securely ensconced in a cell in the Sagadahoc County Sheriff's Office, Agent Drinan and Deputies Brawn and Setlar drove to appellant's Woolwich address. They found an empty house and neighbors who told them that Jackie had moved out several weeks earlier. Recalling the course marked on the chart found on the COLD DUCK, the officers then proceeded to Mill Isle to question the inhabitants about any suspicious activities they might have observed. The officers went first to a chalet, the smaller and more remote of two dwellings on the island, and observed marijuana debris covering the dock adjacent to the chalet. After finding no one in at the chalet, the officers then proceeded via a dirt road across the island toward the main house. On the way, they observed tire tracks leading off the road toward a tarpaulin. Twist ties for plastic bags and marijuana debris surrounded the tarpaulin. Under it was a bale of marijuana. 48 Appellant's attack upon the warrantless seizures involved here is based upon an assertion that a privacy expectation surrounded the entire Mill Isle property and that the authorities violated that interest by going to the farthest reaches of the property to search. Our first problem with this argument is that not only was the property not posted, but the trial court expressly found that the officers entered the property to inquire of the residents about the COLD DUCK, not to search. This finding was based upon uncontroverted testimony. Given the trial court's unique opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, we cannot upset the finding of the intent of the officers. 49 Where an owner has not attempted to secure open fields and woods from invasion by a casual, or an official visitor, a police officer may cross private land in order to question the inhabitants of dwellings thereon. United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1008, 93 S.Ct. 442, 34 L.Ed.2d 301 (1972); United States v. Knight, 451 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1971); See Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1972) (no privacy interest in unposted target range behind farm). The land involved here was not posted; there was no fence or chain to impede visitors; the officers approached openly in broad daylight. Thus, the entry was permissible. See United States v. Hersh, supra; United States v. Brown, 457 F.2d 731, 733 (1st Cir. 1972) (entry upon land to investigate reports of abandoned vehicles in woods and to inquire of inhabitants permissible). The cases cited by appellant to the contrary all involved an impermissible initial intent to search. E. g., United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1975). 50 The trial court also credited testimony and physical evidence showing that the approach to the chalet put the dock in plain view and that the discovery of the marijuana debris on the dock was inadvertent. We have no basis to overturn these findings. The trial court also found that despite the officers' attempts to look in the windows of the chalet, the officers' continued observations did not become a search. Although as an original matter we might be quite suspicious of continued wanderings that revealed more evidence in plain view (Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra ), there is ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that the officers crossed the island solely to inquire at the main house. 51 Assuming, as we must, that the trip across the island was permissible, the bale of marijuana discovered in plain view beside the road was properly seized. As in Patler v. Slayton, supra, (spent bullets dug out of target range in open field), the appellant could not reasonably expect privacy when he left a bale of marijuana in the open, even under a tarpaulin. If no expectation of privacy was reasonably involved, there was no search. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 94 S.Ct. 2114, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 (1974); United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied sub nom. Gangadean v. United States, 430 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 1645, 52 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977) (stack of cartons containing marijuana under tarpaulin in plain view from airfield; no search); United States v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972). In Pruitt, the appellants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in marijuana stuffed in duffel bags and hidden under bushes. The court noted: Any casual passerby would feel perfectly free to ascertain what it was that he had found. The only justified expectation of those who had secreted the marijuana was that the cache would remain secure against intrusion only so long as it remained undiscovered. Id. at 496. Pruitt did not involve a private road across private land. Nevertheless, because the appellant made no attempt to secure his open land from unwanted visitors, we find that the same analysis applies to these facts where the marijuana lay beside a road, a quarter mile from any habitation, and surrounded by twist ties and marijuana debris. 15 Admission of Appellant's Statements 52 Appellant objects to the admission of two statements as violative of his Fifth Amendment rights. 16 He first objects to the admission of his colloquy with Agent Drinan during the drive from Bath to Portland. The trial court found a number of facts supporting its conclusion that appellant's admissions were voluntary. Such facts stand unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Jobin, 535 F.2d 154, 156 (1st Cir. 1976). Appellant had been advised of his right to remain silent three times before he made incriminating statements. He had indicated his understanding of those rights. Although appellant refused to sign the printed waiver form, there are no facts tending to show that he had the misimpression that failure to sign immunized his statements. Thus, the concerns we expressed in United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278 (1st Cir. 1970), are not present here. 53 Appellant argues that his statements could not have been voluntary because he was repeatedly questioned. We note from the record, however, that Agent Drinan ceased questioning whenever appellant indicated he did not want to answer. Moreover, Drinan renewed his questioning only when new evidence revealed that there was a large scale operation afoot and that appellant was the key to that operation. Such is good police practice, not impermissible coercion. The trial court found on an ample record that appellant never asked that all questions cease or that he be represented by counsel. Rather, he picked those questions he wanted to answer and declined others. Such evidence not only demonstrates a knowledge of the right to remain silent but also the intelligence and will to vindicate that right. Appellant was not subjected to physical abuse or deprivation of food or nourishment. Indeed, it was just after a light meal that appellant himself initiated the conversation in which he incriminated himself. There was no error in the trial court's finding of voluntary waiver. 54 Appellant next objects to the use at trial of his statement at his bail hearing that his residence was Mill Isle. Appellant's theory is that he was forced to make an unconstitutional choice between two fundamental rights, the right to remain silent when admission of any connection with Mill Isle would incriminate him and the Eighth Amendment right to release on bail under reasonable conditions. Our answer is threefold. First, appellant did not have an unconditional constitutional right to release on bail. United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), Cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 85, 58 L.Ed.2d 112 (1978). Thus, the right he places in balance here is different from the Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights held in balance in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) (Fifth Amendment requires exclusion of testimony at suppression hearing to establish standing to raise Fourth Amendment challenge). Second, the appellant has not shown us that exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights at the bail hearing would have resulted in denial of release. 17 The length of residence in the community is only one of many factors taken into consideration in establishing the terms of release in the discretion of the magistrate. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b). 55 Finally, (t)he criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring 'the making of difficult judgments' as to which course to follow. . . .  McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). Given the limited nature of the Eighth Amendment right the appellant feared he might lose by remaining silent, we can say, as we have said on very similar facts: the right not to speak embodied in the Fifth Amendment is not equivalent to a right to volunteer information to the government under a grant of immunity. Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1974). See Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1967), Rev'd on other grounds, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) (no exclusion of bail-hearing testimony on residence even though information on residence both essential to bail and incriminating). Other Crimes Evidence 56 Appellant lists under this general heading three separate challenges to the admission of evidence and prosecutorial argument based thereon. The only challenge fully preserved by objections in the district court is to the admission of testimony about his purchase of another yacht, the HARVARD, four days before his arrest. Appellant claims such testimony was impermissible other crimes evidence. F.R.Evid. 404(b). The government argues that appellant's purchase of the HARVARD, a boat admittedly not involved in importing marijuana found at Mill Isle, was probative of his Modus operandi and therefore of his identity as the smuggler at work at Mill Isle. We are not convinced that buying boats is a sufficiently unique act to counterbalance the prejudice arising from the government's inference that appellant was in the business of smuggling, a crime with which he was not charged. See United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1977) (analyzing the uniqueness and similarity of uncharged offenses necessary to make them probative of the identity of the perpetrator of the act charged); United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603, 611 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 248 (1st Cir. 1976). Although the balancing of prejudice and probative value is primarily the task of the trial court, United States v. Eatherton, supra, 519 F.2d at 611, we would be sorely pressed if the HARVARD were relevant only to method of operation. Such is not the case. A receipt for the HARVARD, showing appellant's name along with two others as purchasers, was found at Mill Isle. Given the proximity in time of the purchase and the importation (a few days apart at most) and given the necessity of marshalling evidence to link appellant with Mill Isle, See United States v. Byrd, 352 F.2d 570, 574 (2nd Cir. 1965), the trial court did not abuse its discretion. 57 Appellant next challenges the admission of evidence of the street value of the marijuana seized at Mill Isle. We note that street value is relevant to prove intent to distribute. United States v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197, 202 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hollman, 541 F.2d 196, 200 (8th Cir. 1976). Appellant's argument that such proof was unnecessary given the tonnage involved and was therefore excludable because of its prejudicial impact (See United States v. Hollman, supra ) might stir us if appellant had given the trial court an opportunity to balance prejudice and probative value. F.R.Evid. 403. Appellant's stated objection, however, was to the relevance of street value and the hearsay nature of Agent Drinan's testimony on the subject. Appellant did not assert that any potential probative value of street value evidence might be outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Moreover, having failed to alert the trial court to the task at hand, appellant now declines to favor us with an argument concerning plain error. We see no plain error and reject this challenge. 58 Appellant's final evidentiary challenge, to prosecutorial argument based upon evidence of appellant's financial transactions prior to his arrest, merits even less consideration. Although appellant made one objection to other crimes inferences in the government's opening statement, he did not object to the admission of the evidence nor did he request a curative charge. Again, appellant's counsel knows that we must apply a plain error standard here, but argues as if his present position had been fully preserved below. There is no plain error. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Importation 59 We have recently restated the law and the authorities relating to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict in a criminal case. We evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, with all inferences that may legitimately be drawn; the evidence need not not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gabriner, 571 F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1978). We think the prosecution has met this standard. 60 Appellant argues at length that three decisions overturning jury verdicts on importation charges require that we reverse. The cases, United States v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1974), United States v. Carrion,457 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1972), and United States v. Meyer, 432 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1970), clearly stand for the proposition that mere possession of imported contraband is not sufficient to support a conviction for importation. Indeed, in Carrion the court held that a pilot who lands in Los Angeles with a plane load of marijuana in packages marked with Spanish writing cannot be convicted of importation, even though he had burned enough fuel for a round trip to Mexico and had a matchbook from a Mexican restaurant in his pocket. Without commenting on the severity of this review of a jury's findings, we hold that Carrion and the other cases cited by appellant are distinguishable. In none of the cited cases did the defendant confess to importation. In the case at bar, appellant admitted that the marijuana at Mill Isle represented his first run and that what he had run was high quality marijuana from Colombia. Moreover, appellant was found in possession of Colombian-packaged marijuana on the coast of Maine, unlike the southwesterners found in possession of foreign items common within their area of the United States. Finally, the government presented evidence of long range planning in the form of boat and land purchases by the defendant. These facts, together with the size of the operation at Mill Isle and appellant's admission that the cache at Mill Isle was only part of his run permit a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Charge on Reasonable Doubt 61 Fueled by our recent decision in Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978), appellant vigorously challenges the trial court's explanation of the concept of reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, appellant failed to include any mention of this portion of the charge when raising a plethora of exceptions before the trial court. Given the marginal merit of appellant's challenges to specific language drawn out of context and the correctness of the charge taken as a whole, we have no difficulty concluding there is no plain error here. Sentencing 62 Appellant's last claim is that the trial court based its decision to impose maximum sentences on all counts upon legally impermissible considerations. The court was candid about its reasoning, which we set out in full in the margin. 18 63 Appellant concedes that as a general rule sentencing decisions are within the exclusive discretion of the trial court. Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583, 586 (1st Cir. 1967). There are, however, two established exceptions to this rule, where the trial court employs impermissible considerations in fixing sentence (See id., LeBlanc v. United States, 391 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1968)) and where the trial court refuses to individualize the sentence, basing it instead upon mechanistic application of rules unrelated to the defendant's character. See United States v. Wardlaw,576 F.2d 932 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 527 (1st Cir. 1974). Appellant claims that the trial court's focus upon his failure to confess and cooperate in apprehending his confederates placed an impermissible price tag upon his exercise of his rights not to incriminate himself and to appeal his conviction. See United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079, 1084 (5th Cir. 1974). We do not agree. 64 As an initial matter, we recognize that there is a difference of opinion amongst the circuits concerning the extent to which a trial court may rely upon a defendant's failure to repent and sing when fixing sentence. Compare United States v. Rogers, supra, and United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1976), And Scott v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 377, 419 F.2d 264 (1969), With United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76 (2nd Cir. 1970), And United States v. Chaidez-Castro, 430 F.2d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 1970), And Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir. 1970). We note, however, that many of the cases aligned on either side of the divide involved a sentencing court's attempt to bargain with the defendant, expressly conditioning a reduced sentence upon confession or cooperation. See, e. g. United States v. Rogers, supra; United States v. Chaidez-Castro, supra. We need not and do not reach the question of the permissibility of such open bargaining. 65 We have, however, recognized that open bargaining with the defendant may indicate that the trial court is punishing the defendant for failing to confess his misdeeds and have found such punishment grounds to vacate sentence. See LeBlanc v. United States, supra. Moreover, we have expressed concern in another context that a defendant's utilization of his right to appeal and retrial cannot carry the price tag of the risk of increased sentence based upon a reevaluation of the culpability of his acts. Marano v. United States, supra, 374 F.2d at 585. We perceive a distinction, however, between punishing a defendant for maintaining his innocence and preserving his right to appeal whether that punishment be expressly or subtly imposed and merely considering a defendant's failure to recant when evaluating his prospects for rehabilitation without incarceration. The trial court in the case at bar expressly recognized the appellant's right to remain silent and framed its remarks about appellant's failure to confess in the context of evaluating his prospects for rehabilitation. We think the consideration of defendant's attitude was permissible (see Gollaher v. United States, supra) and represented the sort of individual consideration we found lacking in United States v. Wardlaw, supra. 66 We recognize that it may be difficult if not impossible in some cases to distinguish between permissible evaluation of the defendant's character and impermissible punishment for failure to confess. In United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978), the Supreme Court faced a similar dilemma, whether to allow a sentencing judge to consider a defendant's prevarication at trial when that consideration might disguise an impermissible punishment for the uncharged crime of perjury. The Court decided that the trial judge's need and responsibility to consider the defendant's whole person and personality at sentencing should prevail. Id. We think the same consideration applies here. 67 Appellant's challenge to consideration of his failure to cooperate follows from and falls with the confession issue. Consideration of failure to cooperate with authorities is certainly germane to an evaluation of a defendant's attitude toward society. It is only objectionable insofar as cooperation entails admitting the crime charged. As with the confession issue, we think the sentencing court in the case at bar permissibly considered failure to cooperate as an element of character and was not punishing defendant for exercising his Fifth Amendment rights. 68 In addition to the general context of the allegedly objectionable statements, I. e., the prospects for rehabilitation, two aspects of the trial court's statement support our conclusion that there was no impermissible encroachment upon Fifth Amendment rights here. First, the court specifically mentioned the magnitude of the offense and the defendant's prior criminal record as influencing its decision. These considerations were first mentioned in the context of the Youth Corrections Act but in language that strongly suggests the court applied the same considerations in determining sentence as an adult. Indeed, the court thought it had already discussed the prior criminal record. Moreover, the trial court was convinced that appellant had played an important role in a massive violation of the law. A court is unquestionably free to consider the magnitude of the violation charged and the defendant's role in the violation when imposing sentence. The articulation of these additional reasons for maximum sentencing allays any fears we might have that the sentencing decision was tainted by impermissible considerations. 69 Finally, the trial court's discussion of appellant's failure to cooperate in bringing to justice the members of a continuing smuggling operation immediately followed the government's persuasive plea for a stiff sentence as a general deterrent to a growing problem. Although general deterrence is much criticized and cannot justify mechanistic imposition of stiff sentences (See United States v. Foss, supra, 501 F.2d at 527), general deterrence is a permissible consideration at sentencing. Id. We perceive such a purpose running as a strong undercurrent throughout the trial court's discourse. We cannot say that considering general deterrence in this situation was an abuse of discretion. 70 We reiterate in closing that we do not decide today that failure to confess and cooperate may always be permissible bases for sentencing. Rather, in light of the entire context of the sentencing statement, we find that the trial court permissibly considered such behavior as reflecting upon the likelihood of rehabilitation. 71 Affirmed.