Opinion ID: 2527227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Option to Abandon the Condemnation Proceeding

Text: ¶ 57 We next consider two issues raised by defendants in their cross-appeal before this court. Defendants first argue that the appellate court erred in holding that on remand the District may choose to abandon this condemnation case, even though the District has already deposited funds pursuant to the trial court judgment but has not taken possession. 401 Ill. App.3d at 1005, 341 Ill.Dec. 267, 930 N.E.2d 477. Defendant points out that earlier in its opinion, the appellate court held that, for the purposes of the fifth amendment, we believe that for Illinois takings just as for federal takings, the date of the taking is the date on which the government actually acquires the property by paying for it. 401 Ill.App.3d at 990, 341 Ill.Dec. 267, 930 N.E.2d 477. The District deposited the jury's award of just compensation on December 20, 2007. Defendants argue that title to the property passed to the District on that date, and the District cannot now abandon that which it has already taken. Moreover, defendants contend that the date of valuation for any new trial must be December 20, 2007, and not, as the appellate court found, the date of any new trial. ¶ 58 The problem with defendants' argument is that it ignores that the trial court in entering judgment on the jury's award and allowing the District to make the deposit, specifically ordered that the District's right to acquire title to the property and possession had to await a future order from the court. The court did this to allow the District to perform due diligence with respect to some environmental concerns with the property and also because defendants were raising the Kirby issue and challenging the award as denying just compensation. The record does not reflect that the trial court ever rescinded its order deferring the right to acquire title and possession. Moreover, the appellate court has now vacated the jury's award of compensation (subject to reinstatement), and we therefore do not yet know if the amount deposited reflects payment of just compensation, which would effectuate a taking. We note that normally a taking does occur upon deposit of the judgment amount awarded by the jury. But under the special circumstances here that is not the case. The reason for the rule that the taking occurs upon payment is because that is normally when the condemning authority acquires title and the right to possession. See, e.g., West Suburban, 161 Ill.2d at 455-56, 204 Ill.Dec. 269, 641 N.E.2d 493; Dunlevy, 91 Ill. at 54. But because of the trial court's order deferring the rights to title and possession, which normally occur as a matter of law upon payment, we can only conclude that the taking has not yet been consummated. For that reason, the appellate court was correct to hold that the date of any new trial, rather than the December 2007 time of the [District's] deposit, will more closely approximate the `date of taking.' 401 Ill.App.3d at 1005, 341 Ill.Dec. 267, 930 N.E.2d 477. ¶ 59 We also believe that it follows logically that if a taking has not yet occurred, then the District is free to abandon the proceeding if it chooses. See West Suburban, 161 Ill.2d at 456, 204 Ill.Dec. 269, 641 N.E.2d 493. We also agree with the following statement of the appellate court setting forth equitable grounds for its finding that the District still had the option to abandon the condemnation proceeding if it wishes to choose that course: Although the [District] here properly deposited the amount of the jury verdict following the trial, it has not taken possession of the [p]roperty, due to the pendency of this appeal. Our ruling in this case    would cause prejudice to the [District] if the [District] were not given the opportunity to abandon the taking now that the cost of acquiring the [p]roperty might be substantially higher. Thus, in this case we hold that the [District] may abandon the taking if it wishes and withdraw its deposit of the amount of the jury's verdict. 401 Ill. App.3d at 1005, 341 Ill.Dec. 267, 930 N.E.2d 477.