Opinion ID: 2759934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brown’s Indigence

Text: ¶95. The State argues that Brown is not truly “indigent,” as he was able to gather the funds to post bond and to retain his own counsel. The State took this position in its Response to Brown’s Motion to Hire Expert, and the trial court appeared to agree.14 The trial judge cited Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704, 720-23 (Miss. 2003), as support for his conclusion that “no authority” existed to allow funds for an expert to a defendant with retained counsel. But Howell does not hold that the State may not provide expert funds for a defendant who has retained counsel – rather, Howell merely states that there is no authority requiring the State to do so. Id. at 721. 14 As mentioned above, there is no evidence in the record that the trial judge conducted a hearing on Brown’s motion. So we go forward with our analysis as though no indigency hearing was conducted. 36 ¶96. Brown swore in his affidavit attached to his motion that he was employed, but that he “[did] not earn enough to pay the estimated fee of $6,600 to hire and secure” an expert. He also swore that he had “no relatives or friends who [were] willing and or able to assist [him] with the funds necessary to hire an expert.” And on the first day of trial, when Brown renewed his motion, he testified that his family and friends had helped him pay for his defense counsel. He testified that he made $7.25 per hour at his job as a hotel houseperson at the Isle of Capri casino, and that he had been unable to raise any funds for an expert since his initial motion in 2004. And, of course, Brown has been in prison since the conclusion of his trial in 2006.15 ¶97. We do not find a prior opinion from this Court that addresses our situation exactly.16 But other courts have addressed the situation and held that the existence of retained counsel does not, in and of itself, bar a defendant from being indigent for purposes of a state-funded expert. In State v. Burns, for example, the Supreme Court of Utah held that “Burns was entitled to a hearing for a determination of whether she was indigent regardless of who was paying her attorney fees.” State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795, 803 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added). 15 We note that, upon consideration of Brown’s motion for out-of-time appeal, the circuit judge (who was not the judge who presided over the trial, but was the third circuit judge to participate in this case) found: “Attached to one of his previous filings, Brown included an affidavit of poverty. Although he had retained counsel at trial, Brown has now been incarcerated for six years. After questioning Brown at the hearing, this Court found that Brown is indigent and unable to pay the fees and costs of an appeal.” 16 The Court of Appeals recently held that a defendant with retained counsel was not entitled to an expert, but the reasoning focused more on the late nature of the request, coupled with the lack of need (neither of which is present here). Brandon v. State, 109 So. 3d 128, 132-134 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Also, the Court of Appeals specifically noted that “having private counsel does not in itself prohibit a defendant from being declared indigent.” Id. at 132. 37 ¶98. In Burns, the defendant was accused of murdering her six-month-old disabled son. Id. at 796. Her father was paying her attorneys’ fees, but the case was medically intensive and Burns requested a state-funded expert because her father could not afford that additional expense. Id. Rather than deciding if Burns was indigent, the trial court indicated that she could either keep her retained counsel (which would indicate she was not indigent), or she could have counsel appointed from the Legal Defenders Association, which would make funds for expert assistance available. Id. at 797. The Supreme Court of Utah determined this was error and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine if Burns was indigent and entitled to expert-witness funding, which would entitle her to a new trial.17 Id. at 803. State ex rel. Rojas v. Wilkes, 455 S.E. 2d 575 (W. Va. 1995) (financial assistance provided by third parties which allows a defendant to retain private counsel is not relevant to the defendant’s right to have expert assistance provided at public expense); see also Ex parte Sanders, 612 So. 2d 1199 (Ala. 1993) (having counsel retained by a third party did not prevent defendant from being provided state-funded expert if he could show need); State v. Vaughn, 279 S.W.3d 584 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 1993) (“A defendant’s status as an indigent is not automatically lost because a private attorney is retained.”). English v. Missildine, 311 N.W. 2d 292 (Iowa 1981) (“For indigents the right to effective counsel includes the right to public payment for reasonably necessary investigative services. The Constitution does not limit this right to defendants represented by appointed or assigned counsel. The determinative 17 The Utah court based much of its analysis on certain statutory rights granted to indigent defendants in Utah, but we note that those statutory rights mirror the rights granted to indigent Mississippi defendants via Mississippi caselaw. 38 question is the defendant’s indigency.”); Rojas, 455 S.E. 2d at (financial assistance provided by third parties which allows a defendant to retain private counsel is not relevant to the defendant’s right to have expert assistance provided at public expense.) ¶99. In sum, we find that the trial judge erred when he denied Brown’s request for expert assistance without conducting a hearing to determine whether Brown was indigent. Brown was “entitled to a hearing for a determination of whether [he] was indigent regardless of who was paying [his] attorney fees.” We also find that an expert is necessary here in order to make the trial “fundamentally fair.” The trial court’s failure to properly consider Brown’s request for expert funds requires that we reverse and remand for a new trial. V. The trial court improperly restricted Brown’s cross-examination. ¶100. Although we reverse and remand for a new trial on the expert issue, we also find that the trial judge improperly restricted Brown’s cross-examination of Dr. Wells and Dr. Hayne. “The right of confrontation and cross examination is not satisfied by a witness submitting himself to token interrogation but extends to and includes the right to fully cross-examine the witness on every material point relating to the issue to be determined that would have a bearing on the credibility of the witness and the weight and worth of his testimony.” Myers v. State, 296 So. 2d 695, 700 (Miss. 1974). ¶101. During his cross-examination of Dr. Wells, Brown asked her if she “kept up” with immunization studies, and whether she agreed that some of those studies have shown that immunizations “have often caused events in children that mimic Shaken Baby Syndrome.” Brown also asked Dr. Wells if “there are some symptoms that you may see in a Shaken Baby diagnosis that you may also see from the use of immunizations?” The State objected before 39 Dr. Wells was able to offer a complete answer to these questions, arguing that she had not “been declared an expert in the field of vaccinations and immunizations,” although the State offered no evidence of any such specialty. The State did stipulate that Dr. Wells was “a physician and [was] highly qualified.” After some discussion, the trial judge sustained the State’s objection. ¶102. We find that the trial court’s decision deprived Brown of the right to “fully crossexamine” Dr. Wells. Brown’s first inquiry was simply whether Dr. Wells was aware of any studies that discuss immunization side effects. Dr. Wells certainly could have discussed any studies that she was aware of without expressing an opinion, thus negating any need for her to have been declared an expert in the field. And Brown’s second inquiry appeared to be tailored specifically to Dr. Wells’s personal medical practice and experience: “[Y]ou are saying that there are some symptoms that you may see in a Shaken Baby diagnosis that you may also see from the use of immunizations?” (Emphasis added.) ¶103. The trial judge also erroneously limited Brown’s cross-examination of Dr. Hayne. Brown attempted to ask Dr. Hayne if he was “aware that during the medical intervention that the medical personnel was holding [Le’Anthony’s] head in order to intubate him?” The State objected, arguing that there was no basis in the record for that assertion. The trial judge agreed with the State and sustained its objection. After a thorough review of the transcript, we find that a sufficient evidentiary basis existed for Brown’s inquiry. Dr. Wells testified (prior to Dr. Hayne) that “someone . . . was definitely holding [Le’Anthony’s] head,” and that they had to hold Le’Anthony’s head and body because he had “fight about him.” 40 ¶104. Because we find that Brown is entitled to a new trial, we decline to address his remaining points of error – ineffective assistance of counsel and improper refusal of a proposed jury instruction – as those issues are now moot.