Opinion ID: 2184797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Disclose or Preserve Exculpatory Evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecution violated its constitutional obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny to disclose to the defense various evidence that defendant characterizes as exculpatory. Brady held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. Subsequently, however, the Court held that regardless of whether specifically requested by the defense, favorable evidence is material and its suppression by the State constitutes a constitutional violation if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 494 (1985), quoted in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 131 L.Ed.2d 490, 505 (1995). Moreover, the disclosure obligation applies to impeachment evidence as well as evidence bearing directly on guilt or innocence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490 (1985); see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 131 L.Ed.2d 490, 505 (1995).
Initially, defendant claims that the State had knowledge that another individual, Ronald Baker, had confessed to the murder of Jimmy Christian, but the State failed to disclose this information to defendant. Defendant's post-conviction petition includes the affidavit of a defense investigator who interviewed the Reverend Jerry Gibson. During the interview, Reverend Gibson related that he had spoken with Ronald Baker in connection with Baker's marital troubles and Baker acknowledged having at some point made the statement, Yes I killed Jimmy Christian, and I'll kill you too. Reverend Gibson believed that this statement had been addressed to Brian Diffy, and that Baker made the threat because he suspected that his wife and Diffy were having an affair. Reverend Gibson told the defense investigator that he had informed the police of Baker's statements and other information concerning the Jimmy Christian murder. Subsequent to the interview, Reverend Gibson informed the defense investigator that he did not want to become involved in the case again, but that he would testify pursuant to a subpoena. We note that defendant also submitted an affidavit by Brian Diffy which would appear to indicate that any threat by Baker against Diffy was not made directly to Diffy. In his affidavit, Diffy stated, About three or four months after Jimmy Christian's murder, I heard that Ronald Baker said he had killed Jimmy Christian and would kill me too if I didn't leave his wife alone. Defendant argues that the information that Ronald Baker had admitted to killing Jimmy Christian was essential to the defense and would have been devastating to the State's case. Defendant apparently assumes, without offering any analysis, that Ronald Baker's alleged confession would have been admissible into evidence had defense counsel known about it and sought to introduce it. The general rule, however, holds to the contrary. An extrajudicial declaration, not under oath, by the declarant that he, and not the defendant on trial, committed the crime is inadmissible as hearsay, though the declaration is against the declarant's penal interest. People v. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d 314, 342, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636 (1994); People v. House, 141 Ill.2d 323, 389-90, 152 Ill.Dec. 572, 566 N.E.2d 259 (1990); People v. Bowel, 111 Ill.2d 58, 66, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995 (1986); see People v. Rutherford, 274 Ill.App.3d 116, 123, 210 Ill.Dec. 599, 653 N.E.2d 794 (1995). Such a declaration will be admitted, however, when justice requires. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636. Where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, such out-of-court statements may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636; Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 66, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), the United States Supreme Court identified four factors present in that particular case underlying the Court's decision that the defendant was constitutionally entitled to introduce evidence of an extrajudicial third-party confession notwithstanding a common law rule of evidence barring the use of such confessions. The four factors in Chambers were: (1) the statement was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement was self-incriminating and against the declarant's interest; and (4) there was adequate opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-49, 35 L.Ed.2d at 311-12; see Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636. The Chambers factors are merely guidelines to admissibility rather than hard and fast requirements ( House, 141 Ill.2d at 390, 152 Ill.Dec. 572, 566 N.E.2d 259, citing Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 67, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995) and the presence of all four factors is not a condition of admissibility ( Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636). Ultimately, admissibility depends on whether the statement was made under circumstances that provide considerable assurance of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-49, 35 L.Ed.2d at 311-12; Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636; Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 67, 94 Ill. Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995. Consideration of the four specific Chambers criteria does not favor admissibility. While Ronald Baker's alleged statement was self-incriminating and against interest, defendant has failed to establish the other three factors. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill.2d 1, 29-30, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995) (statement would not have been admissible where only Chambers factor present was that statement was self-incriminating). First, it is not known when Baker made his statement, or whether he made the statement to a close acquaintance. Indeed, the identity of the person to whom the statement was addressed is unknown. Second, there appears to be no meaningful or substantial corroboration of any statements implicating Ronald Baker in the Jimmy Christian murder. Third, assuming that Baker made the self-incriminating statement that has been attributed to him, defendant has failed to establish that Baker would have been available for cross-examination with regard to the statement. Baker might very well have asserted his privilege against self-incrimination rather than answer questions pertaining to any self-incriminating statements. Cf. Keene, 169 Ill.2d at 30, 214 Ill. Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901. More generally, Baker's alleged statement was not made under circumstances that provide considerable assurance of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness. The statement admitting to the murder was coupled with a threat apparently born of jealousy. As such, the self-incriminating portion of the statement (I killed Jimmy Christian) may simply represent bravado designed to bolster the threat (and I'll kill you too). Because Ronald Baker's alleged self-incriminating statements would not have been admissible, there is no reasonable probability that disclosure of Reverend Gibson's report of the statement to police would have affected the outcome of defendant's trial. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that the allegedly undisclosed information was material giving rise to a constitutional obligation to disclose.
Defendant next contends that the State failed to disclose certain information that would have been valuable in impeaching prosecution witness Martha Jackson. The record contains police reports indicating that Jackson was arrested for soliciting the murder of her husband based on information provided by a confidential informant. While a police report indicates that Jackson confessed to the offense, she was released shortly after her arrest. Subsequently, Jackson apparently agreed to wear an electronic eavesdropping devicea wireand to engage defendant in conversations designed to elicit self-incriminating statements about the Jimmy Christian murder and the plot to kill Martha Jackson's husband. The police filed an application with the circuit court pursuant to section 108A-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108A-3 (West 1994)) for authorization to use an eavesdropping device to monitor conversations between Jackson and defendant or certain other individuals. The application was supported by an affidavit from Jackson in which she averred that she had entered into a written contract with defendant pursuant to which defendant agreed to kill Jackson's husband in exchange for $4,000. Defendant first argues that Martha Jackson's affidavit was not disclosed to the defense at trial, and consequently defendant was deprived of the ability to impeach her based on her sworn confession to soliciting the murder of her husband. The parties disagree as to whether the post-conviction petition sufficiently alleges that the affidavit was in fact withheld from defense counsel. However, defendant's argument is meritless in any event. A witness may be impeached by attacking his or her character with proof of a conviction of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment of one year or more or of a crime that involves dishonesty or false statements. People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510, 516-19, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971); In re A.M., 274 Ill.App.3d 702, 712, 210 Ill.Dec. 832, 653 N.E.2d 1294 (1995). However, only actual convictions may be used for this purpose: proof of arrests, indictments, charges or the actual commission of a crime are not admissible. People v. Franklin, 167 Ill.2d 1, 21, 212 Ill.Dec. 153, 656 N.E.2d 750 (1995); People v. Lucas, 151 Ill.2d 461, 491, 177 Ill.Dec. 390, 603 N.E.2d 460 (1992); In re A.M., 274 Ill.App.3d at 712. 210 Ill.Dec. 832, 653 N.E.2d 1294. Had Martha Jackson been convicted of soliciting the murder of her husband, evidence of the conviction would have been admissible for impeachment purposes. However, defendant was not entitled to impeach Jackson with independent proof that she committed that offense. Since Jackson's affidavit was inadmissible, it could not have affected the outcome of trial, and thus the confession was not material for purposes of Brady and its progeny. Defendant also contends that the State violated his right to due process by failing to disclose the identity of the confidential informant who originally implicated Martha Jackson in a plot to kill her husband. Defendant insists that [h]ad the defense been able to investigate Jackson's attempt on her husband's life, her fragile credibility may have come completely unraveled. Since Martha Jackson's possible participation in an unrelated crime which did not result in a conviction was not a proper basis for impeachment, the identity of the confidential informant was in no way material or relevant to this case. Defendant also surmises that in view of the circumstances of Martha Jackson's arrest and release, Jackson must have entered into an agreement with the authorities whereby, in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation of defendant, no charges would be filed against Jackson arising from the plot to kill her husband. Defendant contends that evidence of such an agreement would have discredited Jackson's trial testimony by showing a motive to testify in the State's favor. This issue was raised and rejected on direct appeal. In his pro se brief on direct appeal, defendant advanced the following argument: [T]he prosecution with-held [ sic ] vital impeachment evidence from the defendant., [ sic ] on the state's witness Martha Jackson it is a fact that through the reports of the police, and the special prosecutions office., [ sic ] that Martha Jackson was released from custody for her cooperation that charges for solicitation for murder was [ sic ] droped [ sic ], and that she was claiming that the defendant, was a codefendant in that case., [ sic ] the prosecutions [ sic ] failure to tender the deals made with the state's witness denied the defendant a fair trial. This court rejected the argument, finding, inter alia, that defendant did not show that the discovery material purportedly withheld from the defense would have been favorable to defendant or material to his guilt or punishment. People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill.2d 1, 20, 161 Ill.Dec. 296, 578 N.E.2d 942 (1991). The principles of res judicata bar relitigation of this issue. Even if the issue were properly before us, our decision would be no different. Assuming, arguendo, that the State actually promised Jackson leniency in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation, the nondisclosure of the agreement would not have impaired the defense in view of other information that was in fact disclosed. The record shows that defense counsel had knowledge from police reports of essentially the same information that defendant presently relies on as circumstantial evidence of an agreement or promise of leniency. Trial counsel's affidavit submitted in support of the post-conviction petition states: I had received police reports which related that the police had arrested Martha Jackson on suspicion of solicitation to murder her husband. Thereafter, she was released, and arrangements were made to secure her cooperation in attempting to prove John Pecoraro's complicity in the murder of Jimmy Christian. This included having her set up a meeting with John Pecoraro and `wiring' Martha Jackson when she met with John Pecoraro. If, as defendant argues, this information is presently sufficient to create an inference that Jackson had an agreement with the State, then there is no reason why defendant could not have relied on the same inference at trial to discredit Jackson's testimony. Armed with information regarding the circumstances of Jackson's involvement in the case, trial counsel was fully equipped to probe the witness' possible bias or motive to fabricate based on any explicit or implicit agreements or promises of leniency. However, counsel made a decision, presumably as a matter of strategy, not to pursue this approach. Granted, definitive proof at trial of an agreement would have been preferable to circumstantial proof. Even so, we regard it as highly unlikely that any nondisclosure affected either trial strategy or the ultimate outcome of trial.
In a related claim, defendant asserts that in addition to its disclosure obligations to the defense, the prosecution was constitutionally required to inform the jury of the circumstances of Martha Jackson's involvement in this case. In support of this argument, defendant relies, in part, on People v. Holmes, 238 Ill.App.3d 480, 179 Ill.Dec. 607, 606 N.E.2d 439 (1992). In Holmes, the court stated that [i]t is well settled that if a witness offers testimony in exchange for some beneficial treatment from the State, the State must disclose that information to the jury. Holmes, 238 Ill.App.3d at 490-91, 179 Ill.Dec. 607, 606 N.E.2d 439. The cases cited in Holmes-Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), and People v. Bolton, 10 Ill.App.3d 902, 295 N.E.2d 11 (1973)do not stand for this broad proposition. In Napue a witness at a murder trial falsely testified that he received no consideration from the State in exchange for his testimony. While the assistant State's Attorney was aware that the testimony was false, he took no action to correct it. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction. The Court noted that a conviction through the use of evidence known by the State to be false must be reversed, and the same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. The Court further noted that it was of no consequence that the false testimony bore upon the witness' credibility rather than directly upon guilt or innocence. Similarly, in Bolton, a State's witness also falsely denied the existence of an agreement with the State, and the State failed to correct the false testimony. In Giglio, the Court held that a promise made to a witness by one attorney for the government would be attributed to the prosecution. In Giglio, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction where a prosecution witness falsely denied that any promises of leniency had been made, even though the prosecutor appearing at trial was personally unaware of the falsity of the testimony. Accordingly, in each of these cases, the prosecution's obligation to reveal the existence of an agreement with a witness arose only because of the witness' false testimony on the subject. These cases merely impose an obligation to correct false evidence. Under our adversarial system, the State is not required in the first instance to impeach its own witnesses with all evidence bearing on their credibility. In addition to Holmes, defendant cites certain federal court decisions which also appear to suggest that the prosecution has an affirmative duty to inform the jury of any agreements or promises of leniency to its witnesses. See Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir.1979) (stating that Giglio held that the prosecution's failure to present all material evidence to the jury constituted a denial of due process); United States v. Pope, 529 F.2d 112, 114 (9th Cir.1976) (citing Giglio as holding that [i]t is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of a fair trial for the prosecuting attorney to fail to disclose to the court that a material prosecution witness has had the benefit of a plea bargain). To the extent these cases stand for this proposition, like Holmes, they reflect a misreading of the applicable United States Supreme Court decisions. Defendant does not contend that Martha Jackson testified falsely regarding any agreement with the State or the circumstances surrounding her involvement with this case. Accordingly, the State was not obligated to disclose this information to the jury.
As previously noted, Martha Jackson engaged in a conversation with defendant while wearing a wire in an attempt to elicit incriminating statements. The conversation was tape-recorded and defendant presently claims that the tape of the conversation was withheld from the defense. Apparently, the tape cannot be located and was unavailable during the post-conviction proceedings below. Defendant claims that the tape would have been useful to the defense because during the conversation Martha Jackson recited facts    which later found their way into [defendant's] alleged oral confession. The only information in the record regarding the content of the conversation appears in an affidavit executed by defendant. Having reviewed the affidavit, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that disclosure of the tape would have affected the outcome of defendant's trial. Even if defendant had been able to show that Martha Jackson had discussed the details of the murder with him, it is unlikely that the jury would have rejected defendant's confession on that basis. Accordingly, defendant has failed to show a constitutional violation.
Defendant next contends that constitutional error occurred because the State did not reveal to the defense that Ronald Baker and Martha Jackson failed lie detector tests administered in connection with the investigation of this case. The record reflects that polygraph examinations were administered to Baker and Jackson. With respect to the examination of Baker, the examiner concluded that Baker may have had some knowledge about the Jimmy Christian murder. With respect to the examination of Jackson, the examiner concluded that Jackson was untruthful in her answers to questions regarding her knowledge of a plot to kill her husband and knowledge of the Jimmy Christian murder. However, defendant's post-conviction petition, as amended and supplemented, contains no claim that the prosecution suppressed this information in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides that [a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1994). Considerations of waiver aside, defendant's claim is meritless. Evidence of polygraph results is inadmissible both at trial and at a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill.2d 472, 493, 215 Ill.Dec. 59, 662 N.E.2d 1199 (1996). Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the polygraph results, defendant argues in a conclusory manner that the information would have assisted defense counsel in his investigation of the case. Defendant's claim is based on pure speculation, which is insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been different. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 7, 133 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995). Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that the polygraph results were material for purposes of Brady and its progeny.
Defendant next contends that his right to due process was violated because the police failed to preserve evidence bearing on his physical and mental condition at the time he made incriminating statements to the authorities. Defendant argues that in view of his physical appearance and statements he made to police regarding recent drug use and lack of sleep, the police were obligated to create an objective record of his condition. According to defendant, the officers should have conducted or arranged blood or breath testing to determine the presence of drugs or alcohol, and should have videotaped defendant's conversations. Defendant maintains that such evidence would have assisted the defense in proving that defendant was unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534, 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 422 (1984), relied on by defendant, the United States Supreme Court stated: Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality [citation], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Trombetta held that when police conduct breath tests to determine the blood-alcohol level of a motorist suspected of driving while under the influence of alcohol, due process does not require preservation of the motorist's breath sample for use by the defense in verifying the accuracy of the breath test. Based on evidence showing that the breath-analysis equipment was highly accurate, the Court reasoned that the chances were extremely low that a preserved breath sample would be exculpatory, and a malfunction in the breath-analysis equipment could be demonstrated in other ways. Subsequently, in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289 (1988), the Court held that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process. In so holding, the Court distinguished the failure to preserve evidence from the failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence in the State's possession where the good or bad faith of the State is irrelevant. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57,109 S.Ct. at 337, 102 L.Ed.2d at 289. The Youngblood Court also explained that [t]he presence or absence of bad faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n. , 109 S.Ct. at 336 n. , 102 L.Ed.2d at 288 n. . Applying these principles from Trombetta and Youngblood, we conclude that defendant's claim is meritless. The record reveals that at the time defendant spoke with police, he informed them that he had used cocaine a few hours earlier. Defendant also related either that he had not slept in two days or that he had not slept the previous night. Nonetheless, at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress his statements, the police officers who observed defendant and the assistant State's Attorney who interviewed him each testified that defendant did not appear to be intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. The assistant State's Attorney specifically testified that although defendant's eyes appeared bloodshot, his walking was fine and his speech was fine. In view of this testimony, defendant cannot show that it was apparent that videotaping defendant's demeanor or conducting drug and alcohol testing would have produced exculpatory evidence. Likewise, defendant cannot show that the authorities acted in bad faith in failing to take these steps. Cf. United States v. Weise, 89 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir.1996) (failure by police to administer blood-alcohol test to defendant convicted of second degree murder did not violate due process where police officers testified that defendant appeared to be in control of his thoughts and actions at the time of his arrest). Defendant alternatively argues that even if the failure to preserve evidence of his condition did not violate the United States Constitution under Trombetta, this court is free to hold that failure violative of the due process clause of our state constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Defendant relies on Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673 (Alaska 1990), where, notwithstanding Trombetta, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that in a prosecution for driving while intoxicated, the failure to preserve breath samples for independent testing violated the due process clause of Alaska's constitution. We decline to apply Gundersen in the present setting and instead adhere to the well-reasoned principles set forth in Trombetta and Youngblood for purposes of our state due process clause.
In his pro se brief defendant advances many of the same arguments set forth in the brief submitted by counsel regarding nondisclosure of evidence. Defendant also complains that the State failed to disclose: (1) the order authorizing the use of an eavesdropping device to monitor his conversation with Martha Jackson; (2) a statement by the informant who implicated Martha Jackson in a plot to kill her husband; (3) that the victim's wallet had been recovered; (4) any crime laboratory reports regarding the wallet; and (5) a tape cartridge found in the victim's car. Defendant has failed to explain how any of the foregoing would be exculpatory. Defendant also complains that the State failed to disclose the identity of Tom Wolverton, whom defendant considers a possible suspect in the case. As will be seen in our discussion below of defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, available information regarding Tom Wolverton would not have affected the outcome of trial and therefore was not material under Brady and its progeny. Accordingly defendant's pro se arguments are meritless.