Opinion ID: 2428106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: denial of instruction on extreme emotional disturbance

Text: Foster was not entitled to an instruction on first-degree manslaughter as a result of her purported defense of extreme emotional disturbance. Cf. Holbrook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 811 (1991); Smith, supra . The trial court refused to give a separate instruction but did include extreme emotional disturbance in the penalty phase instructions as a mitigating circumstance. Part of Foster's defense (and mitigation) was that she was raised in a dysfunctional family where she was physically and emotionally abused. Her past drug and alcohol abuse were also presented as explaining why she often lost her temper and directed her rage towards people around her. A psychologist, Dr. Noelker, testified that Foster was an extremely emotionally disturbed child, was an extremely emotionally disturbed adolescent; she is an extremely emotionally disturbed and drug dependent adult. Despite this evidence, Foster failed to prove that the killings were caused by a triggering event. Since the adoption of the penal code, we have undertaken to set out what evidence is required to support an instruction on extreme emotional disturbance. We have explained in prior opinions that the event which triggers the explosion of violence on the part of the criminal defendant must be sudden and uninterrupted. Smith, supra ; McClellan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 935, 93 L.Ed.2d 986 (1987). It is not a mental disease or illness. Wellman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 696, 697 (1985). It is also not equivalent to duress as Powell urges us to believe. Id. Thus, it is wholly insufficient for the accused defendant to claim the defense of extreme emotional disturbance based on a gradual victimization from his or her environment, unless the additional proof of a triggering event is sufficiently shown. Based on our review of the record as a whole, we find that it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that there was not any evidence to support that these killings were done under extreme emotional disturbance. Smith, supra . The trial court also did not abuse its discretion when it refused to reopen the case so that Foster's expert could testify on the definition of extreme emotional disturbance.