Opinion ID: 1967510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Actual Malice Must Be Supported by Clear and Convincing Evidence

Text: This Court's holding in Zenobia left no question as to what level of proof is required for a plaintiff to establish actual malice in support of a claim for punitive damages. A party seeking punitive damages must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. 325 Md. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657. As we stated in Zenobia: Use of a clear and convincing standard of proof will help to insure that punitive damages are properly awarded. We hold that this heightened standard is appropriate in the assessment of punitive damages because of their penal nature and potential for debilitating harm. Consequently, in any tort case a plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence the basis for an award of punitive damages. Id. In the case now before us, after holding that the evidence in this case was legally sufficient to support a finding of actual malice, the Court of Special Appeals deviated from the central issues. It expressed the view that the clear and convincing standard of proof has no bearing on a court's determination of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting actual malice. Stated somewhat differently, it held that a trial judge should not consider the heightened standard in deciding whether a plaintiff had met the burden of production on the issue of actual malice, which, if met, would allow the question of actual malice to reach the jury. In the intermediate appellate court's view, clear and convincing evidence relates only to the burden of persuasionthe level of certainty at which the jury must be convinced that actual malice motivated the tort. Darcars argues that this holding contradicts precedent from both this Court and the United States Supreme Court. We agree. The Supreme Court case of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), speaks most directly to this issue. Anderson involved a libel suit of the variety described in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), under which liability is established only upon a finding of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. The inquiry before the Anderson Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the heightened evidentiary requirements that apply to proof of actual malice in this New York Times case need not be considered for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. at 2509, 91 L.Ed.2d at 211. The Court discussed the analogous scenario of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case, where the beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard applies and ... the trial judge asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512, 91 L.Ed 2d at 214. Comparing this to a decision to allow the question of actual malice to go to the jury, the Court stated that a trial judge should consider whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude ... that the plaintiff had shown actual malice with convincing clarity. Id. (emphasis added). The Court explained: Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. This conclusion is mandated by the nature of the determination. The question here is whether a jury could reasonably find either that the plaintiff proved his case by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the governing law or that he did not. Whether a jury could reasonably find for either party, however, cannot be defined except by the criteria governing what evidence would enable the jury to find for either the plaintiff or the defendant: It makes no sense to say that a jury could reasonably find for either party without some benchmark as to what standards govern its deliberations and within what boundaries its ultimate decision must fall, and these standards and boundaries are in fact provided by the applicable evidentiary standards. Id. at 254-55, 106 S.Ct. at 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d at 215-16. The Court also stated that the trial court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden at both the directed verdict and summary judgment stages. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d at 216. In summary, the Court stated: [A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must be guided by the New York Times clear and convincing evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice existsthat is, whether the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been shown with convincing clarity. Id. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514-15, 91 L.Ed.2d at 217. Our cases support a conclusion consistent with Anderson. Recently, in White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 767 A.2d 855 (2001), we considered the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for cocaine possession in light of the beyond-a-reasonabledoubt standard of proof. The function in reviewing evidentiary sufficiency, we explained, is to determine whether the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant's guilt of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 162, 767 A.2d at 862. Furthermore, [a]lthough a conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence alone, a conviction may not be sustained on proof amounting only to strong suspicion or mere probability.... [The evidence] must do more than raise the possibility or even the probability of guilt. It must afford the basis for an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 162-63, 767 A.2d at 862 (citations omitted). Based on these principles after reviewing the requirements for the crime of possession of cocaine, we reversed White's conviction because the circumstantial evidence upon which the State's case rested was insufficient as a matter of law to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [White] exercised dominion or control over the cocaine.... Although [the evidence] might form the basis for a strong suspicion as to [White's] culpability, the evidence, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, does not reach the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 167, 767 A.2d at 864. The test for sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases, itself, demonstrates that the heightened standard of proof plays a part in the outcome of this legal determination. The test, as recited in Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 620 A.2d 295 (1993), is whether the evidence either shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts to be proved, from which a trier of fact could be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt of the offense charged. Id. at 376, 620 A.2d at 297 (quoting Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 564, 276 A.2d 214 (1971)). It appears from this formulation that more facts are needed for a judge to find evidentiary sufficiency under this test than where a claimant needs proof merely by a preponderance of the evidence to show, for instance, civil negligence. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, the burden of production fluctuates depending on the burden of persuasion in a given case. Because meeting the burden of production requires different quanta of evidence depending on the burden of persuasion, a judge must account for and consider the appropriate burden of persuasion in deciding whether to allow the jury to decide an issue. A judge must not let the jury decide a criminal defendant's guilt if the evidence could not establish that the elements have been met beyond a reasonable doubt. A judge must grant a civil defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law if the plaintiff failed to present evidence that could persuade the jury of the elements of the tort by a preponderance of the evidence. Likewise, a judge must not allow the jury to consider the issue of actual malice unless the evidence could establish actual malice clearly and convincingly. When discussing punitive damages, this Court has taken the position that a determination of evidentiary sufficiency of actual malice requires consideration of the clear and convincing standard. In ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 388, 390, 667 A.2d 116, 142-43 (1995), we affirmed the trial court's determination that plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence of actual malice to allow the jury to consider the issue. The plaintiffs, victims of asbestos-related disease, had prevailed in their personal injury and wrongful death claims for compensatory damages against ACandS, Inc., an insulation contractor. Id. at 345, 667 A.2d at 121. The plaintiffs argued that punitive damages were warranted because the defendant acted with actual malice by marketing products containing asbestos in bad faith. Id. at 387, 667 A.2d at 141-42. Following our review of the evidence of bad faith, we stated that the variety of inferences drawn from that evidence prevents [it] from rising to the clear and convincing standard of required for a finding of bad faith marketing. Id. at 388, 667 A.2d at 142. Clearly considering the heightened burden of persuasion required for proving actual malice, we concluded that [t]here is a want of clear and convincing evidence that ACandS marketed asbestos products in bad faith, knowing of the danger to bystanders, and in conscious or deliberate disregard of the threat to the safety of bystanders. Id. at 390, 667 A.2d at 143. In a related asbestos case, ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250 (1996), we again relied on the clear and convincing standard in rejecting the plaintiffs' claims of punitive-damage liability. In Asner, we reviewed the trial judge's decision to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Id. at 161, 686 A.2d at 253. Because most of the evidence presented in Asner was exactly the same as that which the Court reviewed in Godwin, we held that it was insufficient to send to the jury. Id. at 182, 686 A.2d at 263. The additional punitive-damage evidence presented did not substantially assist the plaintiffs in reaching the clear and convincing standard for actual malice. Id. at 184, 686 A.2d at 264. Moreover, the plaintiffs' analysis of the evidence had no merit because it ignore[d] the requirement that actual malice be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 186, 686 A.2d at 265. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 537-51, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161-68 (1996), provided us with another occasion to review whether certain evidence was sufficient to allow the plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages to reach the jury. Like in Godwin and Asner, the clear and convincing burden of persuasion guided our determination that the question of actual malice should not have reached the jury. We stated: On the record before us, ... we cannot say that the evidence of actual malice was legally sufficient under a clear and convincing evidentiary standard to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury. Id. at 551, 682 A.2d at 1168. These punitive-damage cases are consistent with this Court's review of the evidentiary sufficiency in fraud cases, where liability must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation Corp., 350 Md. 693, 715 A.2d 188 (1998). In VF Corp., we held: Our review of the record convinces us, particularly in light of the `clear and convincing' standard of proof, that there was insufficient evidence of either the knowledge element or the intent to deceive element for the tort count to have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 706, 715 A.2d at 194. The heightened standard of proof, therefore, affected our legal determination of evidentiary sufficiency. Our conclusion that the clear and convincing standard influences the determination of the evidentiary sufficiency of actual malice should not be construed to minimize the role of the jury. As the Supreme Court stated in Anderson: Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. [We do not] suggest that the trial courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial. 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d at 216 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, when called upon to decide the sufficiency of the evidence in support of an award of punitive damages, judges must consider that the claimant must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Notwithstanding our disagreement with the Court of Special Appeals on this issue, we do concur with that court's judgment, as we discussed in Part A, supra, that the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to support a finding of actual malice.