Opinion ID: 4200822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Need for a Competency Hearing

Text: Even if Anderson’s appeal was timely, we would deny his claim—that the district court should have sua sponte ordered a competency hearing prior to accepting Anderson’s guilty plea—on the merits.2 The Due Process Clause gives every defendant the right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent. United States v. Wingo, 789 F.3d 1226, 1235 (11th Cir. 2015). “Competence to proceed to trial or to enter a guilty plea requires the defendant to possess the capacity to understand the nature and object of the 2 “This Court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision not to order a competency hearing prior to trial.” United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2015). 11 Case: 15-14131 Date Filed: 09/01/2017 Page: 12 of 15 proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.” Id. at 1234–35 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241, the district court has the obligation to sua sponte order a competency hearing if there is “reasonable cause” to believe that the defendant is not competent to enter a guilty plea. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); Wingo, 789 F.3d at 1236. Specifically, § 4241(a) states that the district court “shall” on its own motion order “a hearing to determine the mental competency” of a defendant, “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (emphasis added). Prior to such a competency hearing, the district court may order a psychiatric or psychological evaluation of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). This Court has identified three factors for determining whether the district court failed to hold a sua sponte competency hearing: (1) evidence of the defendant’s irrational behavior; (2) the defendant’s demeanor before the court; and (3) prior medical opinion regarding the defendant’s competence to stand trial or enter a guilty plea. See Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 576 (11th Cir. 1990). This analysis “focuses on what the trial court did in light of what it knew at the time of the trial or plea hearing.” Id. 12 Case: 15-14131 Date Filed: 09/01/2017 Page: 13 of 15 The district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) finding that Anderson was competent to enter a guilty plea and (2) not sua sponte ordering a competency hearing. All three Tiller factors support this conclusion, and no factor establishes reasonable cause to believe that Anderson was incompetent to enter a guilty plea. First, Anderson cannot point to any evidence of irrational behavior. Anderson points to his schizophrenia, but there is no indication in the record that his schizophrenia is not reasonably controlled by his medication. Nor is there any evidence suggesting that his schizophrenia inhibited Anderson’s ability either to assist his attorney or to understand the plea agreement, its consequences, and the charges against him. Indeed, at the plea hearing, Anderson discussed his schizophrenia diagnosis with the district court and assured the district court that neither his schizophrenia nor his medication prevented him from understanding the court proceeding. What is more, Anderson’s attorney agreed that Anderson understood both what was going on with his plea agreement and the charges against him. Similarly, the PSI noted Anderson’s mental health condition but provided no evidence of ongoing irrational behavior. The only evidence of irrational behavior mentioned in the PSI was that Anderson began hearing voices at age 20, which would have been in the early nineties, 20 years before the district court sentenced Anderson in this case and ten years before Anderson was 13 Case: 15-14131 Date Filed: 09/01/2017 Page: 14 of 15 prescribed anti-psychotic medication. No evidence suggested that Anderson continued hearing voices in 2013. Second, Anderson behaved normally and properly during the entire plea hearing. Anderson answered all of the district court’s questions directly and succinctly. Anderson did not act out or disrupt the proceedings in any way. Indeed, the district court allowed Anderson to stay out on bond pending his sentencing hearing, and Anderson continued to cooperate with the government. Third, there was no prior medical opinion stating that Anderson was incompetent to enter a guilty plea. The probation office even had a doctor examine Anderson, and that doctor returned no such finding. Instead, the doctor recommended that Anderson attend monthly psychiatric medication management therapy sessions. Anderson complied with that recommendation and attended such a session prior to the plea hearing. Based on these three factors, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not sua sponte order a competency hearing or evaluation of Anderson. This Court’s decision in United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2011), does not help Anderson. In Diaz, this Court affirmed a district court’s order allowing the government to involuntarily medicate defendant Michael Diaz in order to restore him to competency to stand trial. Id. at 1335-36. Diaz was psychotic and substantially impaired and had at various times been diagnosed with 14 Case: 15-14131 Date Filed: 09/01/2017 Page: 15 of 15 undifferentiated schizophrenia, paranoid schizophrenia, and chronic paranoid schizophrenia. Id. at 1317-29. Diaz refused to cooperate with the medical staff, participate in therapy sessions, take medication, or undergo any other type of treatment. Id. at 1320. In stark contrast, Anderson has never been diagnosed as psychotic or substantially impaired; he cooperated with the probation office’s doctor and attended a therapy session; and he voluntarily takes his anti-psychotic medication. Diaz does not stand for the proposition that anyone with schizophrenia is incompetent to stand trial or enter a guilty plea. To the contrary, this Court in Diaz concluded that, based on the medical evidence presented in that case, antipsychotic medication could render a defendant with schizophrenia competent to stand trial or enter a guilty plea. Id. at 1332-33. Diaz thus does not support Anderson’s claim.