Opinion ID: 4544374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Parnell argues that the district court erred in determining that all of his claims are procedurally barred, because his motion raises ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims and postconviction is his first opportunity to raise such claims. The State does not contest this point, but argues that based on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel allegations raised in the motion, Parnell is entitled to no relief. 3 State v. Hessler, ante p. 451, 940 N.W.2d 836 (2020). 4 State v. Mata, 304 Neb. 326, 934 N.W.2d 475 (2019). - 942 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. PARNELL Cite as 305 Neb. 932 [3,4] Under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, 5 a prisoner in custody may file a motion for relief on the ground that there was a denial or infringement of the prisoner’s constitutional rights that would render the judgment void or voidable. Postconviction relief is a very narrow category of relief. 6 A motion for postconviction relief cannot be used to secure review of issues which were or could have been litigated on direct appeal. 7 [5,6] In a postconviction proceeding, an evidentiary hearing is not required (1) when the motion does not contain factual allegations which, if proved, constitute an infringement of the movant’s constitutional rights; (2) when the motion alleges only conclusions of fact or law; or (3) when the records and files affirmatively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief. 8 In a motion for postconviction relief, the defend­ ant must allege facts which, if proved, constitute a denial or violation of his or her rights under the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution. 9 In the absence of alleged facts that would render the judgment void or voidable, the proper course is to overrule a motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 10 Claims Procedurally Barred Parnell contends that his claims of prosecutorial misconduct were not procedurally barred. However, we agree with the State that this portion of Parnell’s motion asserts in a conclusory fashion, without factual support, that he was denied ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. An evidentiary hearing is not required when a motion for postconviction 5 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004 (Reissue 2016). 6 State v. Beehn, 303 Neb. 172, 927 N.W.2d 793 (2019). 7 Mata, supra note 4. 8 State v. Newman, 300 Neb. 770, 916 N.W.2d 393 (2018). 9 Id. 10 State v. Allen, 301 Neb. 560, 919 N.W.2d 500 (2018). - 943 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. PARNELL Cite as 305 Neb. 932 relief alleges only conclusions of fact or law without supporting facts. 11 Upon review of the allegations supporting Parnell’s prosecutorial misconduct claims, it is clear that he did not allege that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the alleged prosecutorial misconduct with respect to Shute’s testimony. Additionally, he did not allege how inclusion of the issue would have changed the outcome of his direct appeal. Because Parnell’s prosecutorial misconduct claims do not include factual allegations concerning the effectiveness of appellate counsel, we do not view these claims as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims, and as a result, the district court did not err when it determined these claims were procedurally barred. Claim Not Procedurally Barred While we agree with the district court’s observation that Parnell’s motion mainly discusses claims that either were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal, upon de novo review of Parnell’s postconviction motion, and in consideration of the errors assigned by Parnell in this appeal, we find that Parnell has raised one ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim which is not procedurally barred and must be analyzed under Strickland v. Washington. 12 [7] In the instant case, Parnell was represented by different counsel on direct appeal than at trial. Ordinarily, when a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his or her counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise on direct appeal any issue of trial counsel’s ineffective performance which is known to the defendant or is apparent from the record. 13 11 Id. 12 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 13 Parnell, supra note 1. - 944 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. PARNELL Cite as 305 Neb. 932 Otherwise, the issue will be procedurally barred. 14 A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel which could not have been raised on direct appeal may be raised on postconviction review. 15 Parnell’s counsel on direct appeal argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call O’Kelly as a witness. For reasons previously discussed herein, we rejected Parnell’s argument, because O’Kelly’s testimony tended to incriminate Parnell and had O’Kelly testified, the outcome of trial would have been the same. In his motion for postconviction relief, Parnell asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s failure to “submit the e-mails by [the OPD detective, the deputy county attorney,] and O’Kelly, concerning their meeting about O’Kelly’s data being more reliable than Shute’s data.” [8] When a person seeking postconviction relief has different counsel on appeal than at trial, the motion for postconviction relief is procedurally barred if the person seeking relief (1) knew of the issues assigned in the postconviction motion at the time of the direct appeal, (2) failed to assign those issues on direct appeal, and (3) did not assign as error the failure of appellate counsel on direct appeal to raise the issues assigned in the postconviction motion. 16 Here, the record reflects that at the time of his direct appeal, Parnell was aware of the factual basis for his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “submit the e-mails.” While trial counsel did offer the emails in support of Parnell’s renewed motion to exclude Shute’s testimony or continue trial, the emails were not offered into evidence during trial for the jury’s consideration. Parnell’s appellate counsel did not assert this issue on direct appeal. Because Parnell alleged in his motion for postconviction relief that appellate counsel was ineffective in not doing so, the issue 14 Id. 15 State v. Vela, 297 Neb. 227, 900 N.W.2d 8 (2017). 16 State v. Bishop, 263 Neb. 266, 639 N.W.2d 409 (2002). - 945 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. PARNELL Cite as 305 Neb. 932 was presented at Parnell’s first opportunity and is not procedurally barred. 17 Because we conclude that Parnell has raised an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim that is not procedurally barred, we do not reach Parnell’s alternative assignment of error that the court erred in determining that any of his claims are procedurally barred because it was unclear as to whether he was represented by the same lawyers during trial and direct appeal. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. 18 Moreover, it is clear from the discussion on this issue in our opinion on direct appeal that Parnell’s counsel on appeal was different than his counsel at trial. Appellate Counsel Not Ineffective Although we find that Parnell’s motion raises a discrete issue that is not procedurally barred, given that we concluded on direct appeal that Parnell was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to call O’Kelly as a witness, we similarly conclude that Parnell failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to submit the emails by the OPD detective, the deputy county attorney, and O’Kelly into evidence at trial. [9] A proper ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleges a violation of the fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial. 19 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the defendant must show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense. 20 To show prejudice under the prejudice component of the Strickland test, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but 17 See id. 18 State v. Goynes, 303 Neb. 129, 927 N.W.2d 346 (2019). 19 Vela, supra note 15. 20 Id. - 946 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. PARNELL Cite as 305 Neb. 932 for his or her counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 21 A reasonable probability does not require that it be more likely than not that the deficient performance altered the outcome of the case; rather, the defendant must show a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 22 [10,11] When a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is based on the failure to raise a claim on appeal of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (a layered claim of ineffective assistance of counsel), an appellate court will look at whether trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland test. 23 If trial counsel was not ineffective, then the defendant was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue. 24 Much like claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the defendant must show that but for counsel’s failure to raise the claim, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. 25 In determining whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient, courts give counsel’s acts a strong presumption of reasonableness. 26 In analyzing Parnell’s claim, we focus on the allegations in his postconviction motion. 27 Here, on the issue of prejudice, Parnell alleged that had his trial counsel submitted the emails into evidence, “[t]his would have proved that the State knew that there existed exculpatorial [sic] material evidence that [Parnell] was possibly in another area of town when the 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 State v. Foster, 300 Neb. 883, 916 N.W.2d 562 (2018), disapproved on other grounds, Allen, supra note 10. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 See State v. Haynes, 299 Neb. 249, 908 N.W.2d 40 (2018), disapproved on other grounds, Allen, supra note 10 (appellate court will not consider factual allegations made for first time on appeal). - 947 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. PARNELL Cite as 305 Neb. 932 murder was committed.” Based on the record, we find no support for Parnell’s claim that counsel’s introduction of the emails would have created a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome at trial. This is because, as stressed by this court in its opinion on direct appeal, the testimony of Johnson and Nero provided powerful and compelling evidence of Parnell’s guilt, which significantly reduced the importance of the expert testimony concerning the location of Parnell’s cell phone. 28 Johnson testified that Parnell had threatened her 2 days before the shooting and that the shooter was driving a blue Nissan Altima with a damaged bumper. Nero testified that Parnell drove her Altima on the night of the shooting, and she admitted to lying to police about the Altima in order to help Parnell. When police found the Altima, the car’s front bumper was damaged and an item inside the car contained Parnell’s thumbprint. Because these witnesses directly incriminated Parnell in several respects, even if the emails were introduced into evidence and effectively used to rebut aspects of Shute’s testimony, the likelihood of acquittal is low. This conclusion is reinforced when the actual content of the emails are considered. Had the jury been presented with the emails, it would have merely learned that O’Kelly met with the prosecution to discuss his report and findings and that the prosecution ultimately had Shute testify as an expert rather than O’Kelly. While Parnell’s claim about the emails does not refer to calling O’Kelly as a witness, his motion does state that the emails concern the prosecution’s “meeting about O’Kelly’s data being more reliable than Shute’s data.” Parnell’s claim of ineffectiveness therefore includes a comparison between the findings of the two experts. In evaluating this claim, we assume for the sake of argument only that Parnell’s trial counsel would have introduced the emails through O’Kelly as a witness and that the jury would then have learned O’Kelly’s opinions. We 28 See Parnell, supra note 1. - 948 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. PARNELL Cite as 305 Neb. 932 explained on direct appeal that, although he was not as precise as Shute, O’Kelly’s testimony incriminated Parnell, because O’Kelly placed Parnell in the general vicinity of the crime scene at the time of the shooting. We must therefore conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective, because it is clear that trial counsel’s strategic decision not to call O’Kelly as a witness and introduce the emails through him benefited Parnell, because O’Kelly would have incriminated Parnell. Because Parnell’s trial counsel was not ineffective, Parnell’s appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise this issue, and Parnell suffered no prejudice as a result of the actions of appellate counsel. Postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing is properly denied when the files and records affirmatively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. 29