Opinion ID: 3015048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wilson’s Batson Claim

Text: As the Supreme Court has held, “Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the administration of justice.” Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979). Thus, for well over a century, the Court has recognized the bedrock principle that “the State denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully excluded.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)). Such discrimination “not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.” Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court reaffirmed and strengthened this fundamental principle.12 Batson explicitly held that the prohibition on racial discrimination in jury selection Commonwealth relies on language in Wilson’s petition claiming that the tape, McMahon’s lifetime strike rate, and “what is known about Petitioner’s actual voir dire,” each “singularly or in combination, raise at least an inference of discrimination.” We decline to accept this argument. The tape is the centerpiece of Wilson’s Batson claim, and so his failure to develop the record on that claim before he knew of the tape’s existence should not bar him from a hearing now. Notwithstanding the assertions in Wilson’s habeas petition, we think it unlikely that he would prevail on a Batson claim without the tape as evidence, and we are unwilling to find that § 2254(e)(2) requires a defendant to pursue claims that are likely to be fruitless. Our conclusion is further buttressed by the “inherently covert nature of conduct constituting the underlying violation” and the fact that the tape’s existence was concealed from Wilson for nearly a decade. See Basemore, 744 A.2d at 733. 12 Batson was decided two years after Wilson’s trial; however his case was still on direct appeal when the decision came down. Therefore, he is entitled to the benefit of that decision. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102 (1974). 21 extends to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race.”). The decision recognized the difficulty defendants will often have in showing intentional discrimination, so it created a three-step framework for judges to employ in determining whether a prosecutor has violated the Equal Protection Clause: First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, “if a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2416 (2005) (footnotes and citations omitted) (alteration in original). The District Court applied this framework and concluded that Wilson had shown that McMahon engaged in purposeful discrimination. On appeal, the Commonwealth disputes several aspects of the District Court’s analysis.
The parties have stipulated that Wilson’s jury consisted of nine whites, two blacks, and one juror of unknown race.13 They also stipulated that McMahon used at least eight of his sixteen peremptory challenges against blacks. The District Court found that a ninth potential juror challenged by McMahon was black, although the Commonwealth challenges this conclusion on 13 Most of the transcript of Wilson’s voir dire has been lost, hence the factual record is incomplete. 22 appeal. Wilson submitted voter registration records for three more individuals he alleged were also struck by McMahon. The District Court, noting that the names were very common, refused to find that the three additional individuals struck by McMahon were those identified by Wilson. Thus, the District Court concluded that, of the sixteen people struck by McMahon, nine were black. The Commonwealth argues that the remaining individuals struck by McMahon were “non-African-American.” Wilson disputes this claim, arguing instead that they were all of unknown race. We see nothing in the record or in the District Court’s opinion supporting the Commonwealth’s claim, so we agree with Wilson that the race of the seven remaining individuals is unknown. Finally, the District Court found that McMahon noted the race and gender of eleven of the twelve jurors in Wilson’s panel. 314 F. Supp. 2d at 448. It concluded that the Commonwealth “offered no . . . legitimate rationale for Mr. McMahon's decision to make such notations,” given that Wilson’s trial predated Batson. Id. at 448.14
A defendant satisfies the first step of the Batson analysis “by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2417. Batson itself stressed the open-ended nature of the step one inquiry: In deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a “pattern” of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire 14 The District Court noted that Batson gives prosecutors an incentive to record the race of potential as well as actual jurors, as such information may “assist them in meeting their burden at Step Two.” Id. at 448 n.15. 23 examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. The District Court found that Wilson had established a prima facie Batson violation, relying primarily on McMahon’s statements in the videotape as well as what was known about McMahon’s conduct at Wilson’s jury selection. We agree. The evidence in the McMahon tape, coupled with the fact that every juror challenged peremptorily by McMahon whose race was determined by the District Court was black, provides extremely strong support for the conclusion that McMahon engaged in purposeful discrimination. There is no doubt that a judge, relying on this evidence, could easily “draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” We recently noted that, “in some circumstances, suspicious questioning, coupled with strikes that seem to implement the thrust of the questioning, may be enough” to satisfy step one. See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 723 (3d Cir. 2005). Certainly, then, an admission by the prosecutor that he uses peremptory strikes to keep certain categories of AfricanAmericans from serving, coupled with a limited record showing that he used many of his strikes on African-Americans in the case at issue, is sufficient. We therefore conclude that Wilson carried his burden under step one of Batson.15 15 McMahon’s own testimony at the evidentiary hearing further supports this conclusion. As the District Court found, McMahon was equivocal as to whether race was ever a factor in his decision-making: The Court: Did race ever play a factor in your determining who to challenge and who not to 24
Once the defendant has satisfied step one, “the ‘burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.” Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2416 (citation omitted). The District Court decided that, given that twenty years had elapsed since Wilson’s trial, it would be unreasonable to expect McMahon to remember why he struck certain individuals.16 Instead, it concluded that the various race-neutral reasons McMahon offers in the videotape for striking jurors—such as his recommendation that prosecutors strike lawyers and law students—were sufficient to carry the Commonwealth’s burden at step two. As Wilson notes, McMahon failed to offer a race-neutral explanation for all but one of the African-Americans he struck at trial. Still, in light of the passage of time, we agree with the District Court that it was appropriate to lessen the burden of the Commonwealth at step two. At all events, because we conclude that the District Court’s determination that Wilson showed challenge peremptorily? Mr. McMahon: I understand. Do you—that’s a tough question, Your Honor. I can’t say that it—because sometimes they’re intertwined. I would say that—was it ever a factor? In some ways, I guess, yes. In some ways I would think—in certain situations, maybe, but only because of its correlation to another factor, not because of the color of their skin. It was really other things and its because of other issues that would be the reason for a peremptory strike. I don't see race as being the reason. 314 F. Supp. 2d at 442. 16 McMahon testified that he struck one of the jurors, Darrell Lampkin, because his brother was in prison at the time of the trial. The District Court found that this explanation was not pretextual. See 314 F. Supp. 2d at 443. 25 intentional discrimination was amply supported by the evidence, we need not determine whether its finding at step two was correct. Even if the District Court erred in giving the Commonwealth the benefit of the doubt at step two, it nonetheless reached the correct result at step three, so any such error had no impact on its ultimate determination that Wilson was entitled to habeas relief.
At step three, the court must determine “whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.” Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2416. A determination that a petitioner has shown intentional discrimination is a factual finding that we may not upset unless it is shown to be clearly erroneous. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The District Court concluded that Wilson had shown purposeful discrimination with respect to “at least one of the peremptory strikes exercised against African-American jurors.” 314 F. Supp. 2d at 449. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that, given the breadth of the categories of black jurors whom McMahon recommends striking in the videotape, it would be difficult to accept that all of the black jurors struck by McMahon were struck for reasons that were race-neutral. In particular, the District Court noted that McMahon struck at least six black women, consistent with statements he made in the tape that “young” and “older” black women did not make prosecutionfriendly jurors. In addition, the Court noted that McMahon had recorded the races of the members of the jury. In challenging the District Court’s conclusion, the Commonwealth makes several arguments. First, it argues that the techniques McMahon discusses in the tape could have been developed after Wilson’s trial. Next, it argues that the record shows that McMahon used his strikes evenly against AfricanAmericans and others, and that he therefore did not engage in intentional discrimination. Finally, it argues that the District Court did not identify any individual juror who was struck because of his or her race, and that the court therefore erred in granting relief. 26 We see no merit to the Commonwealth’s suggestion that McMahon developed the techniques in the tape in the years after Wilsons’s trial. While the tape was made about two years after Wilson was convicted, McMahon leaves no doubt that he had developed the techniques he advocates over the course of his career: Now, I’m going to tell you things that I think over the years that have come to me of doing this . . . I’ve had fairly good success with these rules and I think if you stay to them, you’ll have fairly good success, too. McMahon had worked in the District Attorney’s office for six years prior to Wilson’s trial. It simply defies logic to suggest that all of the techniques which he so forcefully advocates in the tape suddenly came to him during the two years between Wilson’s trial and the training session at which the tape was made. Indeed, McMahon advises his audience to follow the same techniques in each trial, going so far as to compare picking a jury to following proper strategy in blackjack: But the key is, just as in playing blackjack, is to stay by the rules . . . And that’s all I can tell you when you talk to you [sic] about this, is to play by certain rules and don’t bend them and don’t change them. In light of these statements, we conclude that the District Court was justified in concluding that McMahon almost certainly followed the techniques he advocates in the tape during Wilson’s trial. Indeed, given that McMahon used at least nine of his peremptory strikes on African-Americans, we think it abundantly clear that McMahon made full use of the techniques he discusses in the tape in Wilson’s trial. The Commonwealth next contends that because McMahon used “an equal—or nearly equal—number of peremptory challenges on non-African-American jurors,” he used his peremptory challenges “in an evenhanded manner.” This argument is premised on the Commonwealth’s erroneous assertion that the seven individuals struck by McMahon whose race is not known were “non-African-American.” Again, we see 27 no evidence to support this conclusion. In fact, it appears that every juror challenged by McMahon whose race was determined by the District Court was black. Certainly this record cannot be called “evenhanded.” Finally, the Commonwealth argues that the District Court “cannot point to any particular juror who was struck because of his or her race.” Rather, the Commonwealth suggests that all of the black jurors in question could have been struck for any of the race-neutral explanations offered by McMahon in the videotape. It is certainly possible that one or more of the black jurors in question was struck for reasons having nothing to do with race. But the burden is not on Wilson to prove with certainty that McMahon engaged in intentional discrimination with respect to each juror in question. Rather, his burden is to show that it is more likely than not that McMahon did so with respect to at least one of the jurors he struck. See Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2417. We agree with the District Court that Wilson has carried this burden. Indeed, we think the evidence would support the conclusion that McMahon acted with the requisite discriminatory intent toward any one of the eight jurors in question. At all events, when we consider all of the relevant evidence, it is virtually impossible to conclude that McMahon did not strike at least one of the jurors for an impermissible reason. In light of the policy expressed in the tape, the fact that McMahon challenged a significant number of African-American members of the venire, and his equivocal statements to the District Court, we agree with the District Court’s ultimate conclusion that McMahon acted with the requisite discriminatory purpose.17 There can be no doubt that if McMahon practiced in Wilson’s trial what he preached in the tape, he violated Batson. Since what is known about Wilson’s voir dire suggests that he did, we have no hesitation in affirming the District Court on this 17 For this reason, we also reject the Commonwealth’s assertion that the District Court erred in its “mixed-motive” analysis. The evidence supports the conclusion that McMahon struck at least one potential juror because of his or her race, which is all the petitioner must show under Batson. 28 point.18