Opinion ID: 1346280
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Text of the Order of Settlement

Text: Plaintiffs first claim that the Order of Settlement explicitly exempted this case from the PLRA fee cap. For support, they point to the following language: (i) Plaintiffs expressly reserve the right to move [the District Court], pursuant to any state or federal statute or common law for payment of their respective attorneys fees and reimbursement of costs and expenses, (ii) Plaintiffs shall be permitted to file the appropriate motion for attorney's fees and costs with this Court as Plaintiffs deem fit and; (iii) County Defendants shall have an opportunity to oppose any such motion for attorney's fees and reimbursement of costs and expenses. By explicitly reserving to Plaintiffs the right to move for fees and not explicitly reserving to Defendants a PLRA fee cap defense, Plaintiffs argue, this language exempted their case from the fee cap. The language on which Plaintiffs rely, however, does not support this conclusion. It only reserves to Plaintiffs the right to move for fees pursuant to any state or federal statute or common law. That is, it only allows the Court to award such fees as are otherwise authorized by law  specifically, fees under § 1988, which are limited by the PLRA. [10] Rather than providing Plaintiffs with a new claim for fees, subject only to the District Court's discretion, the language simply preserves to Plaintiffs a right they already had (but might perhaps have been deemed to have relinquished, had the Order of Settlement been silent on the issue). Torres, upon which Plaintiffs rely, is not to the contrary. In Torres, as discussed supra n. 5, we found that plaintiffs were not prevailing parties because the district court had merely so ordered a stipulation of dismissal, and had not incorporated the terms of the settlement. Torres, 356 F.3d at 242-45. Accordingly, in Torres fees could not be awarded under § 1988. Because the PLRA fee cap affects only actions in which attorney's fees are authorized under [§ 1988], 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1), it had no application to Torres. The reference in the Torres order to allowing plaintiffs to obtain fees could only be interpreted as providing independent contractual authority for fee-shifting. Moreover, as we noted in Torres, the language of that stipulation plainly and unambiguously provided for the payment of Torres' reasonable attorneys' fees, to be determined by the District Court.  Torres, 356 F.3d at 245 (emphasis added). The instant settlement contains no similar language.