Opinion ID: 1160930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.

Text: Currently is potentially ambiguous, in that it could refer to 1984, the time of its use in section 19(e), or to the time at which prohibited casinos are purportedly authorized. We adopt the former view. To declare, The Legislature has no power to authorize ... casinos of the type ... operating in Nevada and New Jersey in 1984, addresses an evil that was knowable and, in fact, known at the time the anticasino provision was added, that is, the kind of casino then existing in those states. By contrast, to declare, The Legislature has no power to authorize ... casinos of the type ... operating in Nevada and New Jersey from time to time, addresses an evil, if evil it be, that is altogether unknown and unknowable. That the amendment drafters or the voters intended only such an attenuated effect is unlikely. The sense of the other words in this phrase within section 19(e) requires more effort to discern. What was meant by the type of casino operating in Nevada and New Jersey in 1984? Section 19(e) contains no definition of this phrase. Logic and reference to legislative history, however, allow us to see with reasonable clarity what the drafters and voters intended to prohibit in 1984. The 1984 constitutional amenders must have had in mind a type of gambling house unique to or particularly associated with Nevada and New Jersey, since they chose to define the prohibited institution by reference to those states. On this logic, the type of casino referred to must be an establishment that offers gaming activities including banked table games and gaming devices, i.e., slot machines, for in 1984 that type of casino was legal only in Nevada and New Jersey and, hence, was particularly associated with those states. (See Rose, Gambling and the Law, supra, at p. 4 [of the states, only Nevada and New Jersey allow [c]asinos offering the full range of gambling games]; id. at pp. 6-7 [detailing gaming operations of the average Atlantic City casino in 1984]; Com. on the Review of the Nat. Policy Toward Gambling, Final Rep., Gambling in America (1976) pp. 88-89 [detailing gaming operations of Nevada casinos].) Similarly, the type of casino operating in Nevada and New Jersey presumably refers to a gambling facility that did not legally operate in California; something other, that is, than the type of casino operating in California. The type of casino then operating in California is what has commonly been called a card room (see, e.g., Bristow v. Morelli (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 894, 897, 76 Cal.Rptr. 203) or card club (see, e.g., Wynn v. Monterey Club (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 789, 793, 168 Cal.Rptr. 878), a type that did not offer gaming activities including banking games and gaming devices. (See Rose, Gambling and the Law, supra, at pp. 3-4.) A California card room or card club was not permitted to offer gaming activities in the form of: (1) lotteries; (2) banking games, whether or not played with cards; (3) percentage games, whether or not played with cards; (4) slot machines; or (5) games proscribed by name, including twenty-oneall of which were prohibited at least by statute. (See pt. I.A., ante. ) Thus, a casino of the type ... operating in Nevada and New Jersey may be understood, with reasonable specificity, as one or more buildings, rooms, or facilities, whether separate or connected, that offer gambling activities including those statutorily prohibited in California, especially banked table games and slot machines. Real Parties object to this approach as rendering section 19(e) merely an elevation of statutory prohibitions on certain activities to the constitutional level. But the available legislative history suggests section 19(e) was designed, precisely, to elevate statutory prohibitions on a set of gambling activities to a constitutional level. (See Ballot Pamp., Analysis by Legis. Analyst of Proposition 37 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1984) p. 46 [in addition to establishing state lottery, Proposition 37 would amend the Constitution to prohibit in California gambling casinos of the type that exist in Nevada and New Jersey. (Casino gambling currently is prohibited within the state by a statute, but not by the Constitution.)]; Ballot Pamp., argument in favor of Prop. 37 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1984) p. 48 [Prop. 37 adds a new CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST CASINO GAMBLING].) Voters on the 1984 initiative would thus have understood the constitutional provision they added, section 19(e), as focusing on a set of statutorily prohibited activities, i.e. casino gambling, and as endowing the existing statutory bars on that set of activities with a new, constitutional status. From the interpretation of section 19(e), we turn to determining the effect of Proposition 5. As stated, Proposition 5, including its model tribal/state compact, authorizes tribal gaming facilities and authorizes in such facilities the operation of tribal gaming terminals, grandfathered class III card games, lotteries, and off-track parimutuel horse race wagering under specified terms and conditions. As shown below, Proposition 5, including its model tribal/state compact, authorizes what would amount to prohibited casinos. With their tribal gaming terminals and grandfathered class III card games, tribal gaming facilities authorized under the measure would constitute facilities that offer gambling activities including those statutorily prohibited to card clubs in California in 1984, especially banked table games and slot machines. According to Real Parties, who rely on the players' pool prize system of Proposition 5, the grandfathered class III card games, specifically including blackjack, are lotteries. According to the Union and Cortez, they are banking games. We conclude the card games in question are not lotteries, but banking games. Here, unlike in lotteries, the Indian tribe does not distribute to a winner or winners ( Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 485, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651), with no interest in the outcome of the play ( id. at p. 488, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651), a prize or prizes ( id. at p. 485, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651) that are invariable because they are either fixed in advance or determined by the total amount of fees paid ( id. at p. 489, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651). Rather, as in other banking games, the tribe, through the prize pool, simply pays off all winning wagers and keeps all losing wagers, ( id. at p. 485, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651) which are variable because the amount of money it will have to pay out, or be able depends upon whether each of the individual bets is won or lost ( id. at p. 488, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651). That the tribe must pay[] all winners, and collect[] from all losers ( Sullivan v. Fox, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 678, 235 Cal.Rptr. 5) through a fund that is styled a players' pool is immaterial: the players' pool is a bank in nature if not in name. It is a ` fund against which everybody has a right to bet, the bank ... taking all that is won, and paying out all that is lost.`  ( Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 487, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651.) Theoretically, an extraordinary run of good luck by one or more gamblers in a short period could exhaust the players' pool, thus breaking the bank, a course of events that cannot occur even theoretically in a lottery. ( Id. at p. 488, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651.) True, the players' pool is limited in what it pays but not in what it collectsin that the tribe is prohibited from lending the pool money to pay prizes previously won ([Gov.Code, § 98004, model compact § 2.16]; accord, id., § 98006, subd. (a)). But, as we explained in Western Telcon, the fact that payouts on wagers must be made from a limited fund of money does not transform a banking game into a lottery. ( Western Telcon, supra, at pp. 493-494, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651.) Such a banker simply finds itself in the enviable position of a gambler who has, by law, an upper limit to his losses. ( Id at p. 494, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651.) That Proposition 5 does not limit tribal casinos to card games operated as lotteries is especially clear if one focuses on the manner in which payouts are calculated under the players' pool system. Although this fund is the only permitted source of payouts, nothing in Proposition 5 or its model compact requires that payouts be calculated as shares of the pool. (See Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 492, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651 [California State Lottery's Keno a banking game rather than a lottery because payouts are fixed rather than calculated as shares of a `prize pool.'].) Of course, a lottery may use fixed prizes rather than a parimutuel system. In a fixed-prize lottery, however, the total prize amount must be fixed in advance of the draw. If fixed prizes are offered, in other words, the number of such prizes must also be determined in advance of the draw. ( Id. at p. 490, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651, italics in original.) Again, nothing in Proposition 5 or its model compact requires that the number of fixed payouts for a given game be determined in advance of the game. [3] Real Parties argue the games allowed under Proposition 5 are not house banked because the casino's tribal owner/operator cannot profit from surpluses in the players' pool, which is dedicated to payment of prizes. Even if true, this limitation would not make the games lotteries rather than banking games, since a banking game, within the meaning of Penal Code section 330's prohibition, may be banked by someone other than the owner of the gambling facility. ( Oliver v. County of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1407-1409, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 641.) [4] In any event, that the tribal operator does not profit from the prize pool's winnings is not strictly true. The tribe retains an interest in the outcome of play ( Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 488, 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651) even if it neither has nor can acquire any interest in the players' pool itself, which is irrevocably dedicated to the prospective award of prizes in authorized gaming activities (Gov.Code, § 98004, model compact § 2.16; accord, id., § 98006, subd. (a)). The more the players' pool collects from losers and the less it pays to winners, the lower the tribal operator's coststhe less likely it will be compelled to lend seed money to the players' pool in the future, the more likely it will be able to obtain repayment of seed money lent to the pool in the past. Conversely, the less the pool collects and the more it pays, the higher the operator's costs. Of necessity, moreover, the operator of a casino authorized under Proposition 5 must be concerned with maintaining ample funds in the players' pool or pools, since depletion of those funds will require lower payouts, hence worse odds on players' bets, hence less action to generate fee revenue for the operator. Even under Proposition 5's players' pool prize system, therefore, the house retains an interest in the outcome of play. As to the Tribal gaming terminals (Gov.Code, § 98004, model compact §§ 2.21, 4.1(a)) or gaming or gambling device[s] ( id., § 98006, subd. (b)) authorized by Proposition 5, Real Parties contend they differ from the slot machines found in Nevada and New Jersey casinos in two respects: first, they are not house banked, but rather operate as lotteries, because they must be conducted according to the players' pool prize system, and second, they do not dispense coins or currency and are not activated by handles (Gov. Code, § 98006, subd. (b); accord, id., § 98004, model compact § 2.21). The first assertion, as we have just seen, is incorrect. The player's pool prize system does not convert a game or device into a lottery; tribal gaming devices are not lottery terminals, rather than slot machines, merely because a player's winnings must come from, and his or her losses go into, a particular fund. The second assertion, while true, is immaterial. A slot machine is no less machine under California law because it dispenses a credit, allowance or thing of value, rather than money (Pen.Code, § 330b, subd. (2)), or because it is caused to operate by one means rather than another ( ibid.). Nor would the voters on the 1984 constitutional amendment likely have understood section 19(e) to permit casinos so long as the slot machines therein were activated by buttons rather than levers, and dispensed chips or electronic credits rather than coins. [5] Real Parties point to several other respects in which tribal casinos authorized by Proposition 5 will presumably differ from the archetypical 1984 Nevada or New Jersey casino: tribal casinos will not be clustered together in an urban strip; tribal casinos, assertedly, may not serve free alcohol; tribal casinos will not be able to offer banked noncard games such as craps and roulette; and tribal casinos will be owned by tribes and the revenues used for tribal purposes. These asserted characteristics, however, fail meaningfully to distinguish casinos authorized under Proposition 5 from those prohibited by section 19(e). We think it highly unlikely that the 1984 constitutional amenders, who were told the measure before them would constitutionalize California's statutory prohibitions on casino gambling, were concerned with such secondary nongambling features of casinos as their mutual proximity or service of free alcohol. As to banked noncard games, we cannot agree that a casino offering activities including banked card games and slot machines differs in fundamental type from one offering, in addition, roulette and craps. Finally, because private ownership and forprofit operation were not unique to Nevada and New Jersey gambling facilities in 1984, and, indeed, characterized permitted California facilities such as card clubs and horse racing tracks, private ownership and for-profit operation could not logically have been the characteristics to which the constitutional amenders intended to refer in prohibiting casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey. In concluding as we do, we do not overlook the finding made in Proposition 5 that casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey are materially different from ... tribal gaming facilities... in that the casinos in those states (1) commonly offer their patrons a broad spectrum of house-banked games, including but not limited to house-banked card games, roulette, dice games, and slot machines that dispense coins or currency, none of which games are authorized under the measure, including its model tribal/state compact; and (2) are owned by private companies, individuals, or others that are not restricted on how their profits may be expended, whereas tribal governments must be the primary beneficiaries of the gaming facilities ..., and are limited to using their gaming revenues for various tribal purposes, including tribal government services and programs such as those that address reservation housing, elderly care, education, economic development, health care, and other tribal programs and needs, in conformity with federal law. (Gov.Code, § 98001, subd. (c).) As a general rule, `[i]t is not the judiciary's function ... to reweigh the [findings of] legislative facts underlying a legislative enactment.' ( American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 348, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 210, 940 P.2d 797 (plur. opn. of George, C.J.).) To the extent the quoted findings actually state legislative facts, we follow the general rule of deference here. Thus we may take it is as given, for example, that the tribal facilities authorized by Proposition 5 would use their net revenues for tribal purposes, and that in this respect they differ from privately owned Nevada and New Jersey casinos. As just discussed, however, private ownership and for-profit operation did not distinguish Nevada and New Jersey casinos from California card clubs in 1984 and, therefore, these were almost certainly not the characteristics to which the drafters and voters intended to refer when barring authorization of casinos of the type currently operated in Nevada and New Jersey. To the extent the quoted findings do not consist of legislative fact, but of statutory or constitutional interpretation interpretation of section 19(e) or of California statutory law regarding lotteries and banking gamesthe general rule of deference is not implicated. The finding to the effect that the games and devices authorized under Proposition 5 are not banked card games and slot machines, for example, is a pure statement of law that we must independently evaluate (and, having done so, have found incorrect). Most importantly, the general statement that casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey are materially different from the tribal gaming facilities authorized under this chapter (Gov.Code, § 98001, subd. (c)) is not a finding of legislative fact or indeed of any other kind of fact. Rather, it is a construction of the anticasino provision of section 19(e). As such, it commands no deference on our part, because we construe the provisions of the California Constitution independently. ( Nougties v. Douglass, supra, 7 Cal. at p. 70 [It would be idle to make the Constitution the supreme law, and then require the judges to take the oath to support it, and after all that, require the Courts to take the legislative construction as correct.]; see also Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 354, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077.) Against the conclusion that Proposition 5 is invalid as inconsistent with the anticasino provision of section 19(e), Real Parties argue that IGRA preempts the anticasino provision itself. More particularly, they argue that under IGRA states may not regulate the manner in which permitted class III games are played or, indeed, impose any regulation except to prohibit specific games, by any means other than a tribal/state compact. Because section 19(e) is not a prohibition on particular gaming activities, but on conducting them in a Nevada- or New Jersey-style casino, Real Parties argue, IGRA preempts its application to tribal gaming. Real Parties' preemption argument fails because neither of the premises upon which it rests is true. First, contrary to their representation, IGRA does not exempt gambling on Indian lands from state regulatory laws. Indeed, section 23 of IGRA provides that for purposes of Federal law, all State laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling ... shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State. (18 U.S.C. § 1166(a).) Subsection (c) of the same section recognizes an exception to that rule for class III gaming conducted under a tribal/state compact but, as we further explain below, such a compact may not go into effect unless it is validly entered into under state law, which the model compact in Proposition 5 could not be, because its approval would violate section 19(e). In the absence of a valid tribal/state compact, therefore, California law regulating class III gaming activities does apply to such gaming on Indian lands, although the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute violations of that law criminally. (18 U.S.C. § 1166(d); see U.S. v. E.C. Investments, Inc. (9th Cir.1996) 77 F.3d 327, 330-331 [in absence of compact, prohibition of slot machines in Penal Code section 330b applies to operation of such devices on Indian reservation, although only the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute a violation].) Second, the argument incorrectly characterizes section 19(e): that provision does, in substantial part, prohibit specific gambling activities, including slot machines, banked card games and other banking games, when conducted in a casino setting. More generally, Real Parties' reliance on IGRA is misplaced because IGRA legalizes only gaming conducted pursuant to a compact validly entered into by both the state and the tribe. In section 11(d)(1), IGRA declares that [c]lass III gaming activities are lawful ... only if such activities are ... conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State ... that is in effect. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1).) To be entered into by the state and the tribe means to be entered into validly in accordance with state (and tribal) law. (See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly (10th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 1546, 1555 [concluding the `entered into' language imposes an independent requirement and the compact must be validly entered into by a state before it can go into effect, via Secretarial approval, under IGRA (fn.omitted)]; id. at pp. 1550-1551, 1557-1559 [agreeing with New Mexico Supreme Court that compact was invalid under the law of that state because the Governor did not have authority, without legislative enactment, to bind state to compact authorizing casino gambling otherwise prohibited by state law]; Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt (D.D.C.1993) 827 F.Supp. 37, 44-46, reversed on other grounds sub nom. Kickapoo Tribe of Indians in Kansas v. Babbitt (D.C.Cir.1995) 43 F.3d 1491 [same as to compact invalidly signed by Governor of Kansas]; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida (1996) 517 U.S. 44, 47, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 [observing that IGRA provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain gaming activities only in conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State (italics added)].) With respect to a tribal/state compact, IGRA balances the interests of the state and the tribe. Its balancing is predicated on a recognition that the state and the tribe are sovereigns, albeit sovereigns subordinate to the federal union. That fact is implied in its provisions and is express in its legislative history, which presents the use of compacts between tribes and states as the best mechanism to assure that the interests of both sovereign entities are met.... (Sen.Rep. No. 100-446, 2d Sess., p. 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, at p. 3083.) To recognize that the state and the tribe are sovereigns entails an acknowledgment that the law of each operates in its proper sphere and, therefore, that the law of each governs the validity of its own entry into a compact. IGRA would not make lawful particular gaming activities included in a compact if the compact itself were not validly entered into under the law of both the state and the Indian tribe in question. Such is the case here for the model tribal/state compact set forth in Proposition 5: entry into such a compact is beyond the legislative power under the law of California, conflicting as it would with the anticasino provision of section 19(e).
We therefore conclude Proposition 5 is inconsistent with the anticasino provision of section 19(e), insofar as it authorizes what would amount to proscribed casinos. Of course, a statute that is invalid as inconsistent with the California Constitution is not ineffective and inoperative to the extent that its invalid parts can be severed from any valid ones. (See, e.g., Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 821-822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) An invalid part can be severed if, and only if, it is grammatically, functionally and volitionally separable. ( Id at p. 821, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) It is grammatically separable if it is distinct and separate and, hence, can be removed as a whole without affecting the wording of any of the measure's other provisions. ( Id at p. 822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) It is functionally separable if it is not necessary to the measure's operation and purpose. (See id. at pp. 821, 822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) And it is volitionally separable if it was not of critical importance to the measure's enactment. ( Id. at p. 822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247.) Although Proposition 5 and its model tribal/state compact both contain severability clauses (Gov.Code, § 98004, model compact § 14.0; id., § 98007), and although Proposition 5's invalid parts authorizing what would amount to proscribed casinos are grammatically separable, the invalid provisions are not functionally or volitionally separable from the remainder of the model compact or from Proposition 5 as a whole. First, the model compact as a whole is inseparable, both functionally and volitionally, from the compact's authorization of casino gambling. Without the provisions authorizing the operation of tribal gaming terminals and grandfathered class III card games, tribal gaming facilities would remain authorizedbut without resolution of the chief conflicts over class III Indian gaming that prompted the measure's circulation and passage. By the measure's own declaration, its authorization of gaming, including that authorized in the model tribal/state compact, was intended to be comprehensive, that is, to resolve the uncertainties regarding class III gaming, including tribal gaming terminals and class III card games, in an efficient and cost-effective way. (Gov.Code, § 98001, subd. (b).) It would not be such if it should prove to resolve nothing about these gaming activities. Nor can the compact as a whole be considered volitionally separate from its authorization of casino gambling. The scope of authorized gambling was of critical importance to the enactment of the measure, including its offer of a model compact ( Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 822, 258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247), because the scope of gambling was of critical importance to the measure itself. Even apart from Government Code section 98004, which sets forth the model compact, and Government Code section 98006, which separately but in parallel fashion authorizes tribes to operate casinos prohibited by section 19(e), almost all of the measure's remaining provisions are functionally dependent on the existence of a model compact and the authorization of casino gambling. Setting aside the title (Gov.Code, § 98000), findings ( id., § 98001), severability clause ( id., § 98007), grant of gubernatorial signing authority ( id., § 98008), guide to construction ( id., § 98010) and amendability clause ( id., § 98012), none of which could function separate from the measure as a whole, all the remaining sections of the measure except section 98005 concern the model compact or the gambling authorized under the compact and Government Code section 98006. ( Id., §§ 98002, 98003, 98004, 98006, 98009, 98011.) The first sentence of Government Code section 98005, as well, concerns the model compact. The second, and final, sentence of section 98005, however, deals with a functionally separate subjectthe State's waiver of immunity from suit in disputes arising out of negotiations for new or amended tribal/state compacts other than the measure's model compact. It provides as follows: Without limiting the foregoing, the State of California also submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in any action brought against the state by any federally recognized California Indian tribe asserting any cause of action arising from the state's refusal to enter into negotiations with that tribe for the purpose of entering into a different Tribal-State compact pursuant to IGRA or to conduct those negotiations in good faith, the state's refusal to enter into negotiations concerning the amendment of a Tribal-State compact to which the state is a party, or to negotiate in good faith concerning that amendment, or the state's violation of the terms of any Tribal-State compact to which the state is or may become a party. (Gov.Code, § 98005.) The consent to suit contained in the final sentence of Government Code section 98005 is functionally separable from the measure's authorization of casino gambling and its model compact. It concerns neither the scope of gambling permitted to tribes nor the implementation of the model compact but, rather, the resolution of future disputes concerning the negotiation, amendment and performance of compacts different from Proposition 5's model compact. In significant part, it would affect the resolution of any dispute arising out of the course of future negotiations for compacts tribes may seek in lieu of the compact invalidly offered in Proposition 5. The final sentence of section 98005 is also volitionally separable from Proposition 5's authorization of casino gambling and its model compact. The enactors of Proposition 5 sought, among other things, to expedite and remove obstacles from the process of reaching tribal/state agreements on class III gaming. (Gov.Code, § 98001, subd. (b).) They sought to do so within the framework of IGRA. ( Id., subd. (a).) As part of its framework for negotiating class III gaming compacts, IGRA provides for a tribal action in United States District Court against a state that has refused to negotiate for a compact or has failed to do so in good faith. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).) The tribal remedy provided by Congress lost its effectiveness, however, with the United States Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, supra, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252, to the effect that state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits in federal district court by Indian tribes against states to enforce legislation enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause and, hence, that, in the absence of a state's consent to suit, the Eleventh Amendment renders invalid IGRA's purported grant to such court of jurisdiction. The final sentence of section 98005, in providing the state's consent to such a suit, is obviously intended to restore to California tribes the remedy provided in IGRA. Because doing so will tend to effectuate and expedite IGRA's process for achieving class III Indian gaming compacts, one of the express goals of Proposition 5, we are confident the enactors of Proposition 5 would have approved this portion of the measure even if they had known the remainder could not constitutionally be given effect. The final sentence of Government Code section 98005 also survives the other challenges petitioners make to Proposition 5's validity: It is not beyond the people's initiative power as failing to enact a statute; subject to constitutional limitations, a statute may define the scope of the government's immunity to suit. (See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 [Federal Tort Claims Act]; Gov.Code, §§ 810-997.6 [California Tort Claims Act].) It does not impermissibly infringe on the Governor's executive power, as waiver of immunity is not an exclusively executive function. (See ibid. ) It is not preempted by IGRA, as it is consistent with and furthers the purposes of IGRA. (Because all other provisions of Proposition 5 are invalid under section 19(e) or are inseparable from such invalid provisions, we need not address petitioners' remaining challenges as they concern Proposition 5 in general.)