Opinion ID: 2114832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Factual Disparity

Text: Even assuming that the doctrine of chances is the law in this jurisdiction, a matter we have never specifically addressed and do not now address, the facts of the instant case do not satisfy the doctrine's requirements. See, State v. Sullivan, supra (holding that two acts were not sufficiently similar when one consisted of verbal threats and other resulted in physical violence); People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1990). In People v. Spoto, supra , the Colorado Supreme Court addressed a similar set of facts. The defendant was found by a jury to be guilty of first degree murder. It was undisputed that the victim's death was caused by a bullet fired from the defendant's pistol when the muzzle of the gun was in contact with the victim's neck. At trial, the defendant testified that the victim had a gun, a struggle ensued, the defendant pulled his pistol, and his pistol accidentally discharged in the course of the continuing struggle. The defendant asserted that he acted in self-defense and that the killing was accidental rather than intentional. The prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant had brandished his pistol on another occasion, which evidence was offered to rebut the defendant's claimed lack of intent. Only a few weeks prior to the killing, the defendant had accused his roommate of theft. The roommate denied the theft, so the defendant pointed his pistol at the roommate and asked,  `swear to God?' Id. at 1317. The incident ended when the parties heard noises from another part of the house and went to investigate, discovering a burglar in the process of escaping. The sole issue on appeal was the admissibility of the incident concerning the defendant's roommate. The court acknowledged that the evidence was logically relevant, since [a]t minimum, the incident suggests that [the defendant] is the type of person who would pull a gun on someone when it is not necessary for self-defense. Id. at 1319. However, the court also recognized that this inference, although logically relevant, was based on improper propensity reasoning. The court noted that [t]o be admissible, the prosecution must articulate a precise evidential hypothesis by which a material fact can be permissibly inferred from the prior act independent of the use forbidden by [rule 404(2) ]. Id. The Spoto court analyzed whether the doctrine of chances was sufficient to render the incident independently relevant. The court held that the application of the doctrine of chances was inappropriate for two reasons. Id. First, the court stated that the roommate incident was not similar enough to the charged incident to make the objective statistical inference [because the roommate] was not shot and [the defendant] did not claim that he accidentally placed his gun to [the roommate]'s head. Id. at 1319-20. The doctrine of chances applies only when each of the other bad acts is similar to the charged offense and the defendant has been involved in such incidents more frequently than the typical person. People v. Crawford, 458 Mich. 376, 582 N.W.2d 785 (1998). Dissimilar prior acts are not probative under the doctrine of chances. People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Colo.1990). Although there is generally no similarity of conduct requirement concerning other bad acts evidence, similarity is crucial when the theory of logical relevance is the doctrine of chances. Id. Second, the court noted that there was only one prior incident. People v. Spoto, supra . Generally, courts hold that the number of similar events that are necessary to satisfy the doctrine of chances depends upon the complexity, degree of similarity, and relative frequency of the event rather than on the total number of occurrences. See, State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis.2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); State v. Sadowski, 247 Mont. 63, 805 P.2d 537 (1991). In People v. Spoto, supra , the court concluded that one similar instance was clearly insufficient given the lack of similarity between the two events. The facts in the instant case are nearly identical to those in Spoto. First, although McManus allegedly held a pistol to Sherri's head, he did not pull the trigger, nor did he further threaten Sherri once she took the pistol from his hand. In contrast, the gun was fired in the incident involving Geiser, and Geiser was killed. Thus, the acts are distinctly lacking in similarity under the doctrine of chances. Indeed, one could argue that the fact that McManus did not pull the trigger when he put the pistol to Sherri's head bolsters his testimony that the killing of Geiser was accidental. Second, as in Spoto, only one prior incident was presented to the jury, and neither incident was particularly unusual or complex. See State v. Sullivan, supra . Thus, even if this court were to adopt the doctrine of chances, the bad act evidence in the instant case was insufficient to support the required inference of objective improbability. We conclude that the other bad act evidence was not offered for a proper purpose under rule 404(2) and, therefore, was erroneously admitted by the trial court.