Opinion ID: 445029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Survivors' Interests in Scheduled Awards

Text: 48 We now turn to the critical question before the court. Having established that Mr. Henry was entitled to a scheduled permanent partial disability award, that he could receive that award in addition to his temporary total disability benefits, and that the death benefit award is conceptually distinct, we must determine whether the scheduled award can pass to his survivors. Resolution of that issue involves the construction of section 8(d) of the LHWCA. We begin with the plain language of the statute, but we are aided in our interpretation by the structure of section 8(d), by the legislative history of the 1972 amendments and by the policies underlying the LHWCA. The Plain Language of the Statute Section 8(d) provides, in relevant part: 49 (1) If an employee who is receiving compensation for permanent partial disability pursuant to subsection (c)(1)-(20) of this section dies from causes other than the injury, the total amount of the award unpaid at the time of death shall be payable to or for the benefit of his survivors, as follows ... 50 .... 51 (2) Notwithstanding any other limitation in section 909 of this title, the total amount of any award for permanent partial disability pursuant to subsection (c)(1)-(20) of this section unpaid at time of death shall be payable in full in the appropriate distribution. 52 (3) If an employee who was receiving compensation for permanent partial disability pursuant to subdivision (c)(21) of this section dies from causes other than the injury, his survivors shall receive death benefits as provided in section 909(b)-(g) of this title .... 53 (4) An award for disability may be made after the death of the injured employee .... 54 33 U.S.C. Sec. 908(d)(1)-(4) (1982). In construing these provisions, the Board made the rather astonishing finding that, under the terms of the statute, section 8(d)(2) comes into play only where section 8(d)(1) benefits are warranted (i.e., where an employee dies from causes other than the injury). 35 However, there is absolutely nothing in sections 8(d)(1) or 8(d)(2) to even suggest such an interpretation of the statute. 55 The effect of the Board's construction is to read section 8(d)(2) out of the statute. According to the Board, the only function of section 8(d)(2) is to emphasize that in the case of a scheduled permanent partial disability qualifying under section 8(d)(1), the limitations of Sections 9(a)-(g) are inapplicable. 36 We find this analysis to be wholly untenable and a gross distortion of the plain meaning of section 8(d)(2). Section 8(d)(1) on its face does not apply to this case; it addresses situations where a decedent entitled to a scheduled award dies from causes unrelated to his injury. Section 8(d)(2), on the other hand, addresses situations, like Mr. Henry's, where the employee died from the compensable injury. 56 The plain language of section 8(d)(2) states that the total amount of any [scheduled] award ... unpaid at time of death shall be payable in full in the appropriate distribution. Since the section specifically refers to awards unpaid at time of death, this can only have meaning in connection with survivors' rights. This understanding is reinforced by section 8(d)(4) which unequivocally provides for disability awards to be made after death. See Muscella v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 8 B.R.B.S. 830, 831 (1978). Moreover, since the statute applies the section 8(d)(2) scheduled payment rule [n]otwithstanding any other limitation in section 909 of this title, and, since section 909 can only apply to decedents who die from a work-related injury, section 8(d)(2) can only refer to scheduled amounts to be paid to survivors of permanently partially disabled decedents who die from their injuries. The Structure of Section 8(d) 57 The structure of section 8(d) supports this construction. Section 8(d)(1) provides the payment rule for scheduled benefits to survivors whose decedent dies from unrelated causes. Section 8(d)(2) describes survivors' interests in scheduled awards where an employee dies of his injuries. Section 8(d)(3) provides for death benefits to accrue under section 9 to survivors of a decedent--on an unscheduled award for permanent partial disability--who dies from unrelated causes. The survivors of an employee who receives an unscheduled award but dies from related causes recover death benefits directly under section 9. Despite this orderly and logical structure of section 8(d), the Board concluded that section 8(d)(2) must apply to those who die from unrelated causes because of the limitation found in section 8(d)(1). This is a nonsensical reading of the statute and neither the Board nor Hyman has given a plausible reason to accept this proposition, nor have they cited any authority that supports it. Indeed, their contentions are belied by the plain language and structure of section 8(d). The legislature expressly limited the application of sections 8(d)(1) and 8(d)(3) to those who die from unrelated causes. Had it intended section 8(d)(2) to be limited as well, it surely would have so stated. 58 The Board's explanation--that section 8(d)(2) exists merely to ensure payment of section 8(d)(1)'s benefits to survivors in full without section 9's limitations--is erroneous. Section 8(d)(1) itself already provides that the total amount unpaid at death shall go to survivors. As shown above, section 9 only applies in circumstances where a permanently partially injured employee dies from his injuries; thus, its limitations can never apply to those eligible for section 8(d)(1) benefits, i.e., those who die from unrelated causes. The Board's explanation is a non sequitur. Legislative History 59 Although the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA does not address the issue here before the court, it is clear that expansion of survivors benefits was a principal purpose of the 1972 amendments. S.REP. NO. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1972). Prior to 1972, section 8(d) provided: 60 Any compensation to which any claimant would be entitled under subdivision (c) excepting subdivision (c-21) shall, notwithstanding death arising from causes other than the injury, be payable to and for the benefit of the following [survivors] .... 37 61 Under this provision, survivors of an employee with a permanent partial disability were entitled to survivors' benefits in a scheduled award, whether death arose from causes related to, or other than, the injury. Under the amended statute, Congress simply broke down the existing provision for scheduled awards into two parts--section 8(d)(1) to address unrelated death cases and section 8(d)(2) to provide for related death cases. Section 8(d)(3) was added to ensure death benefits for the survivors of those who had unscheduled disabilities and died from causes other than their injuries. Section 9, which previously provided death benefits only where an employee died from the injury, was amended to include benefits where a permanently totally disabled employee died from unrelated causes. Nothing was added to the statute, and nothing appears in the legislative history, even to suggest that survivors of employees who died from related causes were to be denied entitlement to scheduled benefits. Quite the contrary, Congress indicated that specific provision [was being] made for protecting immediate survivors and making sure that scheduled awards are still paid in full. 38 Policy Considerations 62 We find that the result we reach comports fully with the policies underlying the LHWCA. First, as indicated above, there is no case law or other authority which supports the Board's interpretation of section 8(d)(2). Second, we have shown that, consistent with general theories of workmen's compensation, scheduled benefits attach irrespective of the actual amount of lost earnings. Third, we reject the Board's unfounded suggestion that scheduled payments under the LHWCA should be made to survivors where a lost limb is attributable to work-related injuries and the worker dies from unrelated causes, but not where the worker dies from related causes. We can find no support, either in the statute or in the legislative history, for such an anomalous result. 63 We believe that it is perfectly rational for Congress to establish separate guidelines for death benefits which are intended to compensate surviving dependents for lost support, and for scheduled benefits, which are intended to replace damages for the employee or his estate. Compensation for the lost limb is always paid out to survivors under the statute, whether the employee dies from unrelated causes (under section 8(d)(1)), or related causes (under section 8(d)(2)). The fact that death benefits are not available to survivors of employees receiving scheduled benefits who die from unrelated causes in no sense compels the inverse conclusion that disability benefits are therefore unavailable to survivors who are eligible for death benefits because their decedent died from the compensable injury. 64 Accordingly, we reverse and remand that portion of the Board's order denying Mrs. Henry's section 8(d)(2) claim for a determination consistent with this opinion. 65 So ordered.