Opinion ID: 549039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meal Time Exclusion

Text: 14 The FLSA generally requires an employer to pay overtime compensation to employees for all hours worked over 40 in a work week; however, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 207(k) contains special requirements applicable only to public policemen and firefighters. Firefighters are not entitled to premium compensation until 212 hours worked accrue in a 28 day period. 11 The special provisions applicable to public firefighters under Sec. 207(k) follow from their special status as tour of duty employees. According to administrative regulations interpreting the FLSA the term tour of duty is a unique concept applicable only to public employees covered under Sec. 207(k). 12 A tour of duty is the period of time during which an employee is considered to be 'on duty' for the purposes of determining compensable hours. 13 15 Although the general rules on compensable hours of work set forth in 29 C.F.R. Part 785 are applicable to tour of duty employees, special rules for meal time apply in the case of firefighters. 14 The regulations establish a special overtime standard keyed to the tour of duty concept: In the case of ... firefighters who are on a tour of duty of more than 24 hours, meal time may be excluded from compensable hours provided that the tests in Secs. 785.19 and 785.22 of this title are met. 15 In its order issued December 31, 1988, the district court found that appellants' tour of duty consisted of a period in excess of 24 hours (24.2 hours). This finding is not questioned on appeal; so, the tests of Sec. 785.19, and, if necessary, Sec. 785.22, must be examined to determine if the firefighters' mealtimes are to be excluded from compensable hours. 16 Section 785.19 provides that bona fide meal periods are not worktime. 16 In order to be considered a bona fide meal period, however, the regulations require complete relief from duty: The employee is not relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while eating. 17 Thus, the essential consideration in determining whether a meal period is a bona fide meal period or a compensable rest period is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal. The district court ruled that the firefighters were not completely relieved of their duties during mealtimes and we find no error in this conclusion. 18 During meal times the firefighters were required to remain at the station and were subject to emergency calls. The record makes clear that the firefighters were subject to significant affirmative responsibilities during these periods. The mealtime restrictions benefit the county by ensuring maintenance of an available pool of competent firefighters for immediate response to emergency situations. The firefighters are subject to real limitations on their freedom during mealtime which inure to the benefit of the county; accordingly, the three mealtime periods are compensable under FLSA regulations for overtime purposes. 19 17 As noted above, Sec. 553.223(d) gives an employer the option of excluding meal times from compensable hours if the employees work a tour of duty in excess of 24 hours. However, the plain language of Sec. 553.223(d) makes the mealtime exclusion option available only if the rules of Sec. 785.19(a) are satisfied. The county argues that since the tour of duty is necessarily and by definition comprised entirely of on duty time, the application of Sec. 785.19(a) in effect takes away the mealtime exclusion option granted to the employer by Sec. 553.223(d). According to the county, the exception contained in Sec. 785 entirely swallows the rule of Sec. 553.223(d). We disagree. The tour of duty concept should not relieve the employer from its responsibility of compensating employees for worktime. It is undisputed that the county received substantial benefits from the firefighters' activities during the mealtime periods, and such activities create a right of compensation under the FLSA. The regulations set forth in Sec. 785.19(a) offer a useful and fair standard by which to determine whether a meal period should be considered worktime under the FLSA, and should not be disregarded in tour of duty work arrangements. 20 II. The Contract Claim
18 The first question to be resolved on this issue is whether Glynn County's motion for summary judgment on the contract claim was properly before the district court. On January 17, 1989 the County filed a proper motion for summary judgment on the FLSA issues. The motion included an extensive appendix and statement of facts as required by local rules, as well as an official notice to appellants that a summary judgment had been filed. After the case had been assigned to Judge Vining, the county filed a supplemental brief on February 21 in support of the original motion. In the brief the county asserted for the first time that it was entitled to summary judgment on the contractual claim based on an implied contract theory. The firefighters responded to the arguments in the supplemental brief and concluded the discussion on the contractual issue in the following manner: Summary judgment must be denied defendant on this issue. The county filed an additional supplemental brief on March 24 in which it contended for the first time that the contractual issue was controlled by the language of the county personnel ordinance. The firefighters responded to the legal arguments concerning the proper construction of the ordinance and asserted that they, not the county, were entitled to summary judgment on the contractual issue. After Judge Vining granted summary judgment to the county on the contractual issue, the firefighters immediately moved to amend the order on the ground that the county had never actually moved for summary judgment on the contractual issue and had failed to file the required statement of facts pertinent thereto. The county noted that appellants responded to each supplemental brief and asserted that its initial statement of facts submitted in the January 17 motion was sufficient to cover the contractual claim. The motion to amend was denied. 19 The firefighters question the propriety of the district court's action; but, after a careful examination of the record, we find no reversible error in the court's decision to render summary judgment on the contractual claim. As is true of motions generally, a motion for summary judgment should be in writing and specify clearly the grounds on which judgment is sought. 21 However, the court may enter judgment on a ground not mentioned in the motion if the parties have had an adequate opportunity to argue and present evidence on that point and summary judgment otherwise is appropriate. 22 The major concern in cases in which the court decides to enter summary judgment without a proper Rule 56 motion is whether the party against whom the judgment will be entered was given sufficient advance notice and an adequate opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be granted; if such conditions are complied with, no unfairness results from the court's decision to rule on the motion. 23 To conclude otherwise would result in unnecessary trials and would be inconsistent with the principal objective of Rule 56--to expedite the disposition of cases. 24 20 In the present case it is clear that the firefighters considered the county's supplemental briefs as documents presenting additional grounds for summary judgment. The firefighters responded to each argument presented in the supplemental briefs; in addition, their responses indicate awareness that the court would consider the contractual issue along with the FLSA issues under a summary judgment standard. The purpose of Rule 56 notification rules (both federal and local) is to ensure that the non-moving party will have an opportunity to marshall its resources and ... rebut the motion for summary judgment with every factual and legal argument available. 25 We are satisfied that the firefighters were given such an opportunity; no additional evidence has been presented on the contractual issue that was not before the district court at the time summary judgment was entered. The firefighters cannot be heard to attack the trial court for failure to give notice when their own documents demonstrate knowledge of the standard to be applied. 26 So, while it may have been error for the district court to deviate from the summary judgment notice requirements, under the present facts that error was harmless. 27
21 In its ruling on the contractual issue the district court found that an express contract existed between the county and the firefighters, with terms contained in the county personnel ordinance adopted by the Glynn County Board of Commissioners on July 1, 1977. 28 According to the court, the personnel ordinance establishes that the terms of employment for firefighters are governed by the Glynn County Personnel Policies manual, which sets forth the annual salary for each employee. The pay scale also breaks down the annual salary into an hourly wage based on the typical county employee's 40 hour work week. However, county firefighters work a 56 hour week, so when their total hours worked per year are divided into their annual salary, a lower hourly wage results than that paid to other county employees. The firefighters contend that this variance is a breach of contract. 22 The salary range allocations in the ordinance list an annual salary for each grade and an hourly wage figure derived therefrom in parentheses. The salary range figures are followed by a list of pay grade allocations which list the annual salary range for each position classification in the county workforce. Thus, the issue is one of contractual interpretation; specifically, according to the personnel ordinance, is the salary for the firefighters expressed in annual or hourly terms? 23 While the hourly rate calculations introduce some ambiguity into the salary figures, the personnel ordinance when interpreted as a whole indicates that the annual salary is the benchmark for computing compensation for all county employees. The use of an hourly, weekly, or monthly rate may be more convenient, but the starting point for calculating salaries is the annual figure. Nowhere does the contract contain a statement that the hourly wage listed, indeed any wage, is calculated on a 40 hour per week basis. 24 The firefighters also admit that their weekly pay is simply calculated by dividing the annual salary from the appropriate grade in the personnel ordinance by a factor of 52. Any such course of performance accepted or acquiesced in over a period of time by a party without objection must be given weight in the interpretation of any ambiguous terms in the ordinance. 29 So, in light of all circumstances, the district court correctly concluded that the county's practice of expressing annual salaries in hourly terms does not create a contractual obligation for the county to pay that specific hourly wage. 25 The firefighters next argue that the district court's construction of the contract violates the FLSA and so contravenes the public policy of the United States. This claim must fail, for nothing in the FLSA requires an employer to compensate employers on an hourly basis; their earnings may be determined on a salary basis under FLSA regulations. 30 The regulations only require that the overtime compensation due employees be computed on the basis of an hourly rate calculated with reference to the stipulated salary figure. 31 The county may have improperly calculated the hourly base rate for overtime compensation due under the FLSA, and the firefighters may be entitled to damages as a result of this error, but such oversight does not invalidate the personnel ordinance on public policy grounds. 26 Finally, the firefighters assert that genuine issues of material fact remain on the contractual issue, and claim that the district court erred by failing to draw all permissible inferences in their favor. This claim is not well taken, for under Georgia law the construction of a contract is a question of law for the court. 32 Even if the construction of the contract required the court to consider extraneous facts, it is clear from the record that those facts were undisputed by the parties. The district court's summary judgment ruling on the contractual issue was entirely proper. 33 27