Opinion ID: 706827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Totality-of-the-Circumstances Approach

Text: 56 Based on our review of the literature and the caselaw, we conclude that the district court was correct to reject a per se rule of admissibility or inadmissibility. A per se rule of exclusion or inclusion is too blunt a tool with which to address the concerns regarding the reliability of post-hypnotic testimony or the concerns that people who have been sexually abused may lose an opportunity to bring suit against their abusers. 57 To be sure, the exclusion of such testimony in every case avoids the problems of unreliability, but it ignores Federal Rule of Evidence 601, which abolished almost all grounds for witness disqualification based on new assumptions that took a more optimistic view of witness reliability and jury perceptiveness. Federal Practice, supra, Sec. 6011, at 124, 129. In addition, we believe that it risks the elimination of reliable testimony. See State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 624, 682 P.2d 571, 577 (1984). 58 On the other hand, to admit all such testimony without pause, even if the jury is informed of the risks of the potential problems of hypnotically-enhanced testimony, creates the danger of having a lay jury speculate as to the effects of the hypnosis in the case before it. As a result, such an approach seems to us inadequate to protect defendants from unfounded charges in either criminal or civil suits. See Federal Practice, supra, Sec. 6011, at 127-28. While we appreciate the care and sensitivity with which the district court chose its methodology, we nevertheless find its approach too rigid and restrictive and prefer a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. First, we believe that to treat the presence or absence of safeguards as the sole criteria of admissibility may not always mitigate the problems associated with hypnotically-refreshed memory, and it may give hypnosis an aura of reliability which misleads the jury into disregarding the remaining dangers. Federal Practice, supra, Sec. 6011, at 169-70. 59 Second, like the Fourth Circuit, we are reluctant to treat the presence of safeguards as a litmus test for determining the reliability of pre-trial hypnosis, since even though the safeguards are relevant to the inquiry, a court cannot necessarily rest solely on the reliability vel non of the hypnosis procedures in ruling on the admissibility of the proffered testimony. McQueen, 814 F.2d at 958. Conversely, the absence of safeguards does not compel the conclusion in every case that post-hypnotic testimony is unreliable: [E]ven if the hypnosis procedures are flawed, a trial or appellate court might discern that a witness' testimony was nonetheless independent of the dangers associated with hypnosis. Id.; see also Iwakiri, 106 Idaho at 625, 682 P.2d at 578 ([M]erely because one of the safeguards was not followed should not result in the automatic exclusion of the entire testimony.). 60 Thus, we believe that the rule of admissibility should be more flexible than the one suggested by the district court and we therefore find preferable the approaches taken by the Eighth Circuit in Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1112, and the Fourth Circuit in McQueen, 814 F.2d at 951. In Sprynczynatyk, the Eighth Circuit required pretrial hearings to assess the procedures used in hypnosis to determine in view of all the circumstances, whether the testimony was sufficiently reliable and whether its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. 771 F.2d at 1122. 61 In McQueen, the Fourth Circuit required the trial court to 62 conduct a balanced inquiry to determine if the testimony had a basis that was independent of the dangers associated with hypnosis--in other words, a balanced inquiry to determine whether a witness' memory and ability to testify from it was distorted by the earlier hypnosis. The balanced inquiry ... cannot be circumscribed by narrow considerations, and ... must be determined by a detailed factual analysis on a case-by-case basis. 63 814 F.2d at 958. Despite flawed hypnosis procedures, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the hypnotically-enhanced testimony of a witness to a murder was admissible because considerable circumstantial evidence corroborated [the] testimony, id. at 959, her testimony exhibited the characteristics normally expected from a witness recalling details of facts five years after their occurrence, and there was no indication of a memory unshakably frozen by hypnosis, id. at 961. 64 In conducting a case-by-case analysis, the district court should consider the following non-exclusive list of factors. First, it should evaluate the purpose of the hypnosis: whether it was to refresh a witness's memory of an accident or crime or whether it was conducted as part of therapy. In the former instance, the subject may feel pressured to remember details, to aid the criminal investigation, whereas when the subject has undergone therapy to explore the sources of her psychological ailments, she may be less inclined to confabulate or describe a complete coherent story. In the latter case, however, the court should be mindful of the possibility that the subject may have received subtle suggestions from her therapist that abuse or other traumas could be at the root of her problems. Thus, a second important consideration is whether the witness received any suggestions from the hypnotist or others prior to or during hypnosis such as a theory of the cause of the subject's ailments or key information relevant to the investigation for which she underwent hypnosis. A third and related factor is the presence or absence of a permanent record, which can help the court ascertain whether suggestive procedures were used. Ideally, the session should be videotaped or audiotaped. Fourth, a court should consider whether the hypnotist was appropriately qualified by training in psychology or psychiatry. A fifth factor is whether corroborating evidence exists to support the reliability of the hypnotically-refreshed memories. Sixth, evidence of the subject's hypnotizability may also be relevant. A highly hypnotizable subject may be more prone to confabulate and more susceptible to suggestion. Seventh, the court should consider any expert evidence offered by the parties as to the reliability of the procedures used in the case. Finally, a pretrial evidentiary hearing is highly desirable to enable the parties to present expert evidence and to test credibility through cross-examination. 65 After consideration of all of the relevant circumstances, the trial court should weigh the factors in favor and against the reliability of the hypnosis procedure in the exercise of its discretion whether to admit the post-hypnotic testimony. Finally, we add that the party attempting to admit the hypnotically-enhanced testimony bears the burden of persuading the district court that the balance tips in favor of admissibility. Hurd, 432 A.2d at 97. 66