Opinion ID: 1758839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Limit Sentencing Range

Text: The appellants asked the court to limit the sentencing range to the term of years received in the first trial: twenty-five years on the manufacturing and possession with intent to deliver counts and ten years on the possession of paraphernalia count. They also proffered verdict forms on the manufacturing and possession with intent to deliver counts which reflected that range of sentences. The trial court allowed the jury to consider the full range of punishment available on all offenses. As a result, the appellants received greater sentences on retrial than they had in the first proceeding. The imposition of a harsher sentence upon retrial is not, in and of itself, constitutionally offensive. When appellants are retried by a jury, a greater sentence is not prohibited so long as there is a properly controlled retrial in which the jury is not informed of the prior sentences. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973). The appellants point to the voir dire portion of the trial and note that there were at least two instances when the panel, through the responses of venirepersons, was informed that a previous trial had occurred. However, the record is bereft of any evidence that the jury was informed of the result of the previous trial. The Court recognized in Stynchcombe that, while the jury might be aware of a prior trial, it does not follow that the jury will be aware of its result. In the absence of any evidence that the jury was informed of the outcome of the appellants' first trial, there is no need to delve further into this issue. See Smith v. State, 286 Ark. 247, 691 S.W.2d 154 (1985).