Opinion ID: 1626048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the voir dire resulted in a jury skewed in favor of sentencing the defendant to death, in violation of the sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments.

Text: Jordan contends that (1) four jurors removed for cause did not make it unmistakeably clear that they would automatically vote against the death penalty without regard to the evidence and instruction of the court, (2) that the State followed a systematic practice of peremptorily excusing jurors who expressed qualified reservations against the death penalty, and (3) that the death qualification of the jury had the effect of creating a hanging jury. Juror Jones, Juror Belvin, Juror Lyons and Juror Osswald, were all excused for cause. All of those veniremen, except Juror Jones, stated without equivocation that they were opposed under the circumstances to the imposition of the death penalty. Juror Jones equivocated in her responses, but ultimately stated, and, from the totality of her responses, it was reflected that she absolutely opposed the infliction of the death penalty. The landmark case on this question is Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), where the United States Supreme Court held: [A] sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. 391 U.S. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d at 784-85. In Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir.1982), the Court said: By means of this appeal, petitioner asks this Court to narrow further the stiff requirements of Witherspoon and its progeny and, in this Court's opinion, thereby infringes the State's right to an impartial jury that is willing to consider all penalties provided by law. According to petitioner's analysis, exclusion of a venireman is impermissible unless he states in response to all questions that he absolutely refuses to consider the death penalty. An equivalent response framed in any other reasonable manner is judged to demonstrate that the individual's position is not firm. We reject such a rigid, unthinking interpretation of Witherspoon. Form will not be placed over substance. 679 F.2d at 386. See also Porter v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.1983). After carefully scrutinizing the voir dire examination of the jurors, we are of the opinion that the jury was lawfully and properly selected and impaneled, and we reject the contentions of the appellant on this assignment. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965); Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir.1983); Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir.1981) reh. and reh. en banc den. 662 F.2d 1116 (1981); United States v. Carlton, 456 F.2d 207 (5th Cir.1972).