Opinion ID: 172538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: religious-discrimination claim

Text: Ms. DeFreitas also challenges the summary judgment in favor of Horizon [2] on her religious-discrimination claim. We reject the challenge. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Ms. DeFreitas's claim was that [a] factor motivating Horizon's termination of Plaintiff and others was their Catholic religious faith affiliation. Aplt.App., Vol. A at 11. To establish a prima facie unlawful discharge case, the plaintiff must show the following: (1) that [s]he was subjected to some adverse employment action; (2) that, at the time the employment action was taken, the employee's job performance was satisfactory; and (3) some additional evidence to support the inference that the employment actions were taken because of a discriminatory motive based upon the employee's failure to hold or follow his or her employer's religious beliefs. Fischer v. Forestwood Co., 525 F.3d 972, 978-79 (10th Cir.2008) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). [3] Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to discharge the plaintiff, and [i]f the defendant meets its burden of production by offering a legitimate rationale in support of its employment decision, the burden shifts back again to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 979. Defendants do not dispute on appeal that Ms. DeFreitas made out a prima facie case. In turn, she does not dispute that Horizon offered nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination. She does dispute, however, the district court's ruling that she failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a finding that Horizon's stated reasons were pretextual. On this point, we agree with Ms. DeFreitas. Our above discussion of Ms. DeFreitas's FMLA claim noted the credibility problems that could undermine Defendants' account of the reasons for termination. See Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir.2009) (A claim of pretext ... may be based on weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's claimed legitimate, non-discriminatory reason such that a rational trier of fact could find the reason unworthy of belief. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, we affirm the summary judgment on this claim. In the course of ruling that Ms. DeFreitas had failed to present sufficient evidence of pretext, a ruling with which we disagree, the district court also ruled that she had failed to present sufficient evidence of the intent necessary for religious discrimination. With that ruling we agree. [I]t is not always permissible for the factfinder to infer discrimination from evidence that the employer's explanation is unworthy of belief. Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1168 (10th Cir.2007). As the Supreme Court has stated, [T]here will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). For instance, it explained, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred. Id. Factors to be weighed include the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered. Id. at 148-49. Our opinion in Swackhammer is instructive. Swackhammer, a female vice president of Sprint, was terminated by the company's senior vice president, Castanon, after he received complaints that she had engaged in unethical behavior. See 493 F.3d at 1163-65. But another vice president, Winters, a male who was the subject of similar allegations, was not terminated. See id. at 1171. Swackhammer claimed gender discrimination. Sprint contended that the reason for the different treatment of Swackhammer and Winters was that her violations were more severe. See id. We acknowledged that there was a genuine issue of fact concerning the truth of this contention. But the only alternative explanation supported by the record was that Castanon treated Winters more leniently because the two were friends. See id. at 1172. Thus, either Swackhammer was treated more harshly than Winters because her misdeeds were worse or because Castanon favored a friend, which while perhaps unfair, was similarly nondiscriminatory. Id. We therefore affirmed summary judgment in favor of the company. Turning to this case, Ms. DeFreitas has argued that religious discrimination is shown by the following: (1) other Catholic staffers were fired; (2) Marina Palmer, who was promoted to regional manager despite her reputation for swearing at employees, was LDS; (3) religious discussion permeated the workplace; and (4) Mr. Terry (a) provided her with religious literature, (b) joked about converting her to the LDS Church, (c) commented that an employee was a good Mormon girl, when noting that she, unlike Ms. DeFreitas, did not return to the workplace after having a child, (d) often commented that former LDS missionaries made good salespeople, and (e) referenced Ecclesiastes 3 in her termination email. Although this evidence could suffice to demonstrate a prima facie case, most of it is quite weak. Ms. DeFreitas, for example, provides no evidence of the circumstances surrounding the firing of the other Catholic staffers. For all the record shows, they could have been terminated for cause. Nor has she provided any evidence to contradict Mr. Terry's statement that he promoted Palmer only after she stopped cursing. And she gives almost no specifics about religious discussion in the workplace (other than her conversations with Mr. Terry). The remaining evidence relates to Mr. Terry. Some is of questionable relevance. Ecclesiastes is a holy book to Catholics as well as to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. And even if Mr. Terry frequently discussed his religion with Ms. DeFreitas, she did not contradict his testimony that it was she who initiated religious conversations. But regardless of whether Mr. Terry's remarks can be interpreted as displaying partiality to members of his faith, it would not be reasonable to draw an inference that he fired Ms. DeFreitas because of her religion. The uncontradicted evidence is that her Catholicism was known throughout her tenure with Horizon, yet Mr. Terry had treated her well. In some 21 months he had given her two raisesthe second of which was more than a 1/3 increase in salaryand had given her praise as well as increasing responsibilities. Ms. DeFreitas points to nothing with religious overtones that occurred during her final months with Horizon that could account for any religious animosity by Mr. Terry toward her. In light of this history, it simply beggars the imagination to believe that she was fired on religious grounds. See Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp., 255 F.3d 359, 361-62 (7th Cir.2001) (age-discrimination claim rejected because it is eminently reasonable to doubt that ... a worker hired at an age well beyond that at which the protections of the age discrimination law click in and terminated within months, that is, before he is appreciably older, was a victim of age discrimination. A company that didn't want 54-year-olds on its payroll would be unlikely to hire one rather than to hire one and promptly fire him. (citations omitted)). The only plausible grounds are the reasons proffered by Defendants and her lengthy absence from work. Accordingly, her religious-discrimination cannot go forward.