Opinion ID: 1841753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: legislature intended to pass a constitutional law

Text: That the legislature intended to pass a death penalty law is not open to serious question. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Gregg v. Georgia, supra , listed Alabama as one of the states which had enacted a death penalty statute after Furman. See, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at p. 179, 96 S.Ct. at p. 2928. The Supreme Court of the United States, as a matter of fact, seemingly recognized, in this case, that the problem with the Alabama statute was that the Alabama Legislature had, in adopting the preclusion clause, misread Furman. We conclude that the Alabama Legislature did, in fact, misread Furman, but that it was in good company! As the Supreme Court of the United States states in Beck, 100 S.Ct. at p. 2390: ... In response to Furman, several states enacted statutes that purported to withdraw any and all discretion from the jury with respect to the punishment decision by making the death penalty automatic on a finding of guilt.... Some legal writers who examined Furman, without the benefit of the later cases, concluded that a mandatory death statute was a viable alternative. See, Vance, The Death Penalty After Furman, 48 Notre Dame Law. 850 (1973); Comment, Furman v. Georgia; A Post Mortem on the Death Penalty, 18 Villanova L.Rev. 678 (1973); Comment, The Death PenaltyThe Alternatives Left After Furman v. Georgia, 37 Albany L.Rev. 344 (1973). The setting in which the Alabama Death Penalty Statute was enacted must be considered. Furman had invalidated Alabama's pre-Furman statute, and the legislature did not have the benefit of the belated wisdom of the post-Furman capital punishment decisions. The Alabama legislature had only the Furman decision as guidance, and the confusion caused by the Furman decision is legendary. As the Supreme Court of the United States itself noted: Predictably, the variety of opinions supporting the judgment in Furman engendered confusion as to what was required in order to impose the death penalty in accord with the Eighth Amendment. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 599, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2962, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted); accord, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 317, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2997, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, remarked that for state legislatures to respond to the concerns of Furman was not an easy task considering the glossolalial manner in which those concerns were expressed); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 461, 92 S.Ct. at 2839 (Powell, J., dissenting, referred to the cloudily outlined views of three Justices whose views were essential to that decision). The Supreme Court was forced to admit when it held unconstitutional a provision of the Ohio capital punishment statute which had been enacted to comply with Furman, that: The signals of this Court have not, however, always been easy to decipher. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 602, 98 S.Ct. at 2963 (plurality opinion); accord, id., at 599 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. at 2962 n. 7. Justice Rehnquist stated the problem this way: ... [T]he Court has gone from pillar to post, with the result that the sort of reasonable predictability upon which legislatures, trial courts, and appellate courts must of necessity rely has been all but completely sacrificed. 438 U.S. at 629, 98 S.Ct. at 2973 (dissenting opinion). None of the nine opinions in Furman offered any specific guidance on how a state legislature could enact a capital punishment statute that met constitutional requirements, but the opinion of the Chief Justice, at least, implied that preclusion of lesser included offenses might be necessary. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 401, 92 S.Ct. at 2809 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). It is also interesting to note that the three statutes upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976 were all attacked as unconstitutional because they did not preclude lesser included offenses. See, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2937, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2967, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2957, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (plurality opinion). As it turned out, the Florida, Georgia and Texas legislatures guessed right, and the Alabama legislature guessed wrong. Alabama's was not the only legislature to guess wrong on the preclusion issue. The Mississippi legislature also enacted a post-Furman statute which precluded lesser included offenses. See, Beck v. Alabama, 100 S.Ct. at 2388 n. 10; Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1255 (Miss.1976) (striking and severing the preclusion clause from the remainder of the capital punishment statute). The remainder of the Alabama Capital Punishment Statute is complete within itself, sensible, and capable of execution after the preclusion clause is stricken. Absent the fourteen words which constitute the preclusion clause, the long established Alabama statutory and common law rule will apply so that juries in capital cases will be instructed on any lesser included offenses supported by the evidence. That rule applies in every state in this country, see, Beck v. Alabama, 100 S.Ct. at 2388-2389 n. 12; it was the rule in every case tried in Alabama for more than a hundred years before Furman ; it is still the rule in non-capital cases tried in Alabama, see, Beck v. Alabama, 100 S.Ct. at 2385 n. 5, 2388-2389; and it would unquestionably have been the rule in Alabama's post-Furman capital cases had the Alabama legislature not misinterpreted Furman. Because of the setting within which the legislature was acting, it is only reasonable to conclude that the only reason the legislature put the preclusion clause in the statute was the erroneous belief that the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted in Furman, required it. It is obvious to us that had the legislature perceived that the preclusion clause would be held unconstitutional, it would not have adopted the clause. In any event, the legislature added a severance provision to the act. [7] The guiding star in severability cases is legislative intent. In A. Bertolla & Sons v. State, 247 Ala. 269, 271, 24 So.2d 23 (1945), this Court stated: One of the tests used to determine whether an act is or is not severable, so that a portion may be rejected, is that it ought not to be held wholly void unless the invalid portion is so important to the general plan and operation of the law in its entirety as reasonably to lead to the conclusion that it would not have been adopted if the legislature had perceived the invalidity of the part so held to be unconstitutional. Where the valid and invalid parts are so bound together that the invalid part is a material inducement to the valid portion, the whole is invalid. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Blan, 229 Ala. 180, 155 So. 612, and cases cited; 6 Ruling Case Law page 125, section 123. [Emphasis added.] Another principle of severability is stated in Wilkins v. Woolf, 281 Ala. 693, 697, 208 So.2d 74 (1968), as follows: Another guiding principle of paramount importance is that courts seek to sustain, and not strike down, the enactments of a coordinate department of government. Every legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and every intendment is in favor of its validity. Tucker v. State, 231 Ala. 350, 165 So. 249; Gray v. Johnson, supra [235 Ala. 405, 179 So. 221]. Although a statute may be invalid or unconstitutional in part, the part that is valid will be sustained where it can be separated from that part which is void. State ex rel . Farmer v. Haas, 239 Ala. 16, 194 So. 395. If after the deletion of the invalid part, the remaining portions of an Act are complete within themselves, sensible, and capable of execution, the Act will stand notwithstanding its partial invalidity. Springer v. State ex rel. Williams, 229 Ala. 339, 157 So. 219. Certainly the existence of a severability clause in the Act itself cannot but strengthen this principle. The presence of a severability clause in the death penalty statute has some significance. As Mr. Justice Beatty stated for a unanimous court in Comer v. City of Mobile, 337 So.2d 742 (Ala.1976): ... Such a clause is persuasive authority that the Legislature intended the valid portion to survive. Mitchell v. Mobile County, 294 Ala. 130, 313 So.2d 172 (1975). In Opinion of the Justices, 284 Ala. 626, 628-629, 227 So.2d 396 (1969), this Court held that: It is a well-established rule in this State that a severability clause should be given effect where possible in order to save a legislative enactment. Allen v. Walker County, 281 Ala. 156, 199 So.2d 854; Wilkins v. Woolf, 281 Ala. 693, 208 So.2d 74; San Ann Tobacco Co. v. Hamm, 283 Ala. 397, 217 So.2d 803. Such a clause or provision in an act is to be given its full scope and effect. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed. of Jefferson County, Alabama [D.C.], 162 F.Supp. 372, affirmed 358 U.S. 101, 79 S.Ct. 221, 3 L.Ed.2d 145. Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that severance of the preclusion clause will not leave the remainder of the statute meaningless, because without preclusion, the Alabama rule concerning lesser included offenses will apply so that juries in capital cases will be instructed on each lesser included offense which has any basis in the evidence. As we noted previously, that is the rule which applies in every state in this country and in the federal courts, and will henceforth be the rule in Alabama in capital cases.