Opinion ID: 1187510
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Character Evidence Before the Grand Jury.

Text: Frink initially objected to all testimony by Karen Check, Carol Krizan and Bill Hodgson about threats Frink had made. The state argued that this evidence was not character evidence but competent evidence indicating the defendant's motive to murder Hillier, that is, Frink's jealousy of people who were the object of Karen Check's affection. Frink's reply brief withdraws all objections to evidence of defendant's threats against persons in the class of persons who shared Karen Check's affections. Thus, we are left with one allegation of inadmissible character evidence by the defendant. Before the grand jury, Karen Check testified as follows: Q. In your acquaintanceship with Mr. Frink, did you find him to be a violent man? A. He was very violent. Q. Of your own personal knowledge, what examples do you have of that? A. From my  I know that he has hurt many people in his life, physically. With me he has hit me, things like this. He has a very violent temper, extremely so; over small things he gets extremely upset. Defendant admits that the proper remedy for the introduction of hearsay evidence is to evaluate the strength of the remaining testimony and the likely importance of the hearsay testimony to the grand jury. [4] Defendant argues, however, that here the prosecutor purposefully elicited inadmissible character evidence and that we should automatically dismiss the indictment, rather than evaluate the probable importance of the inadmissible evidence to the grand jury. We reject the approach proffered by defendant. Frink offers no case support for his position, [5] and it makes no sense to dismiss an indictment without evaluating the probable significance of the inadmissible testimony. [6] A rule of automatic dismissal would be especially unfair in an area involving a defendant's past threats and acts of violence which are admissible in certain limited contexts.