Opinion ID: 732155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Strike Prior Convictions

Text: Smith alleges that the district court erred at resentencing by denying his motion to strike a 1987 state conviction because his guilty plea was involuntary. The court used this conviction in determining that Smith qualified for career offender status under section 4B1.1(A) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We review de novo whether a plea is voluntary and assess the related findings of fact for clear error. See United States v. Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1367 (1995). Smith claims that he plead guilty because two Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputies orchestrated beatings while he was in the county jail and threatened his life. Smith's claims are not completely implausible, as two of his convictions which occurred during the same time-period and involved the same officers were subsequently vacated. 1 However, Smith accepted his sentence and did not complain that he was coerced. See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir.1995) (acceptance of plea afforded great weight in establishing voluntariness). Even after he was transferred to state prison, out of the deputies' control, Smith failed to assert that his guilty plea was involuntary. 2 We also find the extensive delay relevant to Smith's claim of involuntariness. Here, Smith did not complain until 1995, when the district court used the prior plea to enhance his sentence. In addition, Smith's original attorney failed to inform any court of the allegations prior to the 1995 evidentiary hearing. 3 The district court correctly concluded that Smith failed to meet his burden of proof that his plea was involuntary; see Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d at 939 (defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a guilty plea is constitutionally invalid), and correctly included this conviction in its sentencing calculations.