Opinion ID: 2604113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hatton Incident

Text: (5) On February 10, 1983, petitioner presided over a proceeding involving Autry Lee Hatton, who, a year previously, had been convicted of vehicular manslaughter and sentenced by another judge to summary probation for two years on the condition that he complete five hundred hours of community service during the first year. Hatton, who was to account for his community service, attempted to explain to petitioner that he had a medical appointment and was in pain, but petitioner interrupted him, directing him to return in the afternoon with his attorney. He further warned the defendant that if he had to tell him one more time, he would find him in contempt. Hatton replied All right. I don't know why you are harassing me. Petitioner immediately held him in contempt of court for his utterance and remanded him right now. The matter was trailed into the afternoon, at which time counsel appeared on behalf of defendant Hatton. Counsel objected to petitioner's order that the matter be put over to the following day and requested him to set bail, arguing that the defendant was experiencing health problems and had a medical appointment for that day, that he was in any event eligible for release on his own recognizance, and that he had never failed to appear in the past. Petitioner set bail and ordered Hatton to remain in custody and to be medically examined at the county jail forthwith. The following day petitioner purged Hatton's contempt following an apology for the incident. He then observed that his sentence seemed very lenient in view of the seriousness of the crime, and he noted that Hatton had apparently performed only about half of the required 500 hours of community service. After his counsel described the defendant's medical condition, petitioner  on the recommendation of the deputy city attorney  summarily revoked probation and set a formal probation violation hearing for the following month. Petitioner presided over the probation hearing, which occurred despite defense counsel's objection that there was no written notice of the claimed violation. Although Hatton had a note from a doctor outlining his medical condition, petitioner chided him for his alleged failure to obey his earlier order to come in with something more than a perfunctory letter from the doctor and had him remanded to the county jail for 180 days. The appellate department of the superior court subsequently reversed the order revoking probation and the jail sentence, directing the municipal court to terminate all proceedings against Hatton. Petitioner was charged with wilful misconduct for abuse of the contempt power, denying the defendant his full right to be heard according to law, failure to conduct himself in court proceedings in a manner that promotes public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, and engaging in a vengeful and punitive pattern of conduct toward the defendant. He was also charged with prejudicial conduct in acting with unwarranted impatience, discourtesy, or hostility toward an unrepresented defendant. The masters made no finding on the charge of vengeful and punitive conduct or on the alleged denial of the defendant's right to be heard. They concluded that the charge of prejudicial conduct for impatience or hostility toward an unrepresented defendant was true. But considering the mere one or two months that petitioner had occupied his office at the time of the incident and his understandable reliance on the representations of an experienced prosecutor, they determined that his behavior in the remaining matters (abuse of the contempt power and failure to conduct himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary) was not sufficiently aggravated to constitute wilful misconduct, but was merely prejudicial conduct. Petitioner has stipulated to the material facts of this incident and does not contest that his actions were prejudicial to the administration of justice. In any event we are persuaded that clear and convincing evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact on the point. (6) We note, however, that there is considerable overlap in the three findings of prejudicial conduct. Obviously, actions such as these cannot be equated with the criminal law, in which each additional accusation exposes the defendant to increased punishment. Nonetheless, although there is no rigid formula for determining the proper outcome in a case alleging judicial impropriety, the number and quality of the charges found to be true assumes importance as one of the guidelines we apply in making the difficult decision of discipline. ( Wenger, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 653; see also Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 377.) Duplicative findings should for that reason be avoided. The charges of abuse of the contempt power, as well as impatience and hostility toward Hatton, are two related but conceptually distinct allegations of prejudicial conduct that have properly been found true. But the charge that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a manner promoting public confidence in the judiciary, although supported by the facts, appears to focus on the same misconduct that underlies the other two allegations, and we therefore dismiss it. [2]