Opinion ID: 2808717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Functional Claiming

Text: The majority switches course from its prior decision, Williamson I, and now affirms the district court’s conclusion that the term “distributed learning control module” is governed by § 112 para. 6 and is indefinite under § 112 para. 2 because the specification of the ’840 patent fails to disclose corresponding structure. The majority goes on to explicitly “overrule the characterization of th[e] presumption [that § 112 para. 6 does not apply when the term “means” is not used] as ‘strong.’” Maj. Op. at 15–16. While I agree with that conclusion, we stop short of addressing other equally fundamental concerns about functional claiming. Our use of § 112, para. 6 presumptions relies on a rigid framework, where a flexible one is arguably more apt. A “presumption” is a procedural tool that shifts the burden of proof on a substantive issue: if a basic fact is established, a court accepts a conclusion on the issue unless the presumption is rebutted with evidence that meets the presumption’s associated standard of proof. 1-301 Wein- 6 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC stein’s Federal Evidence § 301.02 (2015). 2 Our § 112 para. 6 presumptions come from the notion that, all else being equal, it is more likely that a party is covered by a statute when it uses the words of the statute. The use of formal presumptions, the argument goes, takes this concept to the extreme, supplying one substantive test for a claim that recites “means” and another for a claim that recites other non-structural terms like “module.” The statute admits no such variation, supplying only one test: is the element “expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.” What arguably changes is the weight we attach to different recitations in meeting this test: “means” weighs heavily, non-structural terms like “module” weigh a little less, and, at the other end of the spectrum, purely structural terms weigh heavily in the opposite direction. A related concern is, assuming that a presumption is the right tool to analyze the statute, should a presumption arise based on the word “means.” Almost twenty years ago, this court adopted a presumption that a claim term that recites “means” invokes § 112, para. 6. York 2 One familiar presumption is the presumption of patent validity. Under this presumption, a court accepts the conclusion that an issued patent is valid absent clear and convincing evidence negating that presumption, i.e., evidence showing that the patent is invalid. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011); Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., No. 13-896, slip op. at 10–11 (U.S. May 26, 2015). I note that the majority opinion does not provide an associated standard of proof for the § 112 para. 6 presumptions. Indeed, I remain unconvinced that this court has applied a different standard of proof dependent on how the presumption is labeled or characterized. WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC 7 Products, Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Center, 99 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Greenberg v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Appellees’ petition for rehearing en banc argues that § 112 para. 6 provides no basis for adopting a presumption that a claim term is governed by this statute when the term “means” is used. Appellees argue that “[w]hat started out as a straightforward issue of substance. . . has morphed into an issue of form.” Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 6. Appellees argue that “the text of [§ 112 para. 6], the Supreme Court authority leading to it, and its legislative history universally confirm that [the statute] applies to all claims that do not recite sufficient structure for performing the recited function—regardless of whether the word ‘means’ is used.” Id. at 11. Moreover, the fact that the statute uses both terms—“means” and “step”— would suggest that any presumption should apply to the use of either word. Yet, it is arguably not clear to what extent this court attaches a presumption to the word “step.” Finally, it is generally accepted that § 112, para. 6 was passed in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946). See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 (1997) (collecting cases); Technitrol, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 550 F.2d 992, 998 n. 5 (4th Cir. 1977). In Halliburton, the Supreme Court made the following observations in holding certain claims that recite “means” language invalid: The language of the claim . . . describes this . . . element in the ‘new’ combination in terms of what it will do rather than in terms of its own physical characteristics or its arrangement in the new combination apparatus. We have held that a claim with such a description of a product is invalid . . . . Id. at 8. 8 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC Arguably, this rationale applies to functional claiming generally, not just to claims that recite “means.” Indeed, the Halliburton Court relied on precedent invalidating functional claims that did not recite the term “means.” Id. at 9 (citing Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256–57 (1928).) The continued viability of this rationale, and its impact on how this Court applies § 112, para. 6 merits attention. In sum, my view is that perhaps we need to revisit our judicially-created § 112, para. 6 presumptions. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ RICHARD A. WILLIAMSON, Trustee for At Home Bondholders Liquidating Trust, Plaintiff-Appellant v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC, CITRIX SYSTEMS, INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants-Appellee WEBEX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., CISCO WEBEX, LLC, CISCO SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants-Appellees INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee ______________________ 2013-1130 ______________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California in No. 11-CV-2409, Judge A. Howard Matz. ______________________ 2 WILLIAMSON v. CITRIX ONLINE, LLC