Opinion ID: 768474
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Decontextualization

Text: 211 Defendants, at oral argument, defined the meaning of the words of the motto as follows: 212 [they] endor[se] the notion that Ohio has a bright future, that their citizens do, that people ought to be optimistic and hopeful about the future. 213 This meaning is consistent with the meaning the district court found in the words of the motto. See supra Part I.D. This meaning, of course, can be justified only if the words are removed from the context in which they are found - and were found by the Cincinnati schoolboy when he first suggested they stand as the State of Ohio's official motto. See supra Part I.E. 214 The meaning argued by the State, and accepted by the district court, is significantly different than the meaning intended by Jesus when, as reported by Matthew, he spoke to his disciples, and certainly different than the meaning to the disciples when they heard Jesus say it to them. The State and district judge's meaning of Jesus' words is different than their meaning to a reader of the New Testament acquainted with its text, and is also certainly different than the meaning a lectionary would ascribe to them when it suggests they be read as the text on a particular Sunday. 215 Lastly, the meaning of the words of the motto is certainly different than the meaning that would be ascribed to them by persons engaged in biblical discourse or debating a point of scripture.
216 The Supreme Court, more than once, has dealt with efforts to read words or phrases out of context. The predicate ruling for these efforts is Judge Learned Hand's observation in NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) that: 217 Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used, of which the relation between the speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most important part. 218 In Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990), the question was the meaning of the words false made in an anti-counterfeiting statute. Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court, observed that the meaning of language is inherently contextual, 498 U.S. at 108. Justice Scalia, in his dissent, quoted Justice Felix Frankfurter saying: 219 . . . as Justice Frankfurter more poetically put it: [I]f a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether common law or other legislation, it brings its soil with it. 498 U.S. at 121 (citations omitted). 220 In Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993), Justice Scalia, writing for the Supreme Court, in interpreting the word conviction in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) said: 221 . . . [a] fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) [is] that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used. 508 U.S. at 132. 222 In Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), the Supreme Court dealt with the meaning of the words use of a firearm in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, observed, Language, of course, cannot be interpreted apart from context. 508 U.S. at 229. JusticeScalia, in his dissent, agreed with Justice O'Connor, repeating what he stated in Deal, supra. 508 U.S. at 241. 223 Lastly, in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), again dealing with the meaning of the word use in 28 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), Justice O'Connor writing for the Supreme Court said: [T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context. 516 U.S. at 145. 15 224 We believe that we are required to view the words of the motto as part of the text in which they are found and give to them, as reasonable observers, the meaning intended by Jesus when he addressed his disciples as reported by Matthew in the New Testament of the Christian Bible.