Opinion ID: 783790
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Heading: Blood Extraction Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search

Text: 9 The DNA Act simply states that [t]he probation office responsible for the supervision under Federal law of an individual on probation, parole, or supervised release shall collect a DNA sample from each such individual who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2). It does not prescribe any particular method for collecting the samples. Collection, however, is accomplished pursuant to a nationwide policy of compulsory blood extractions. 11 The DNA Collection Letter of Instruction, sent by the Central District of California Probation Office to Kincade, states that [t]he Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) requires that DNA be obtained from blood samples. 12 See also Gregoire, supra, at 31 (describing FBI requirement of blood sampling); Reynard, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1146 (describing procedures to collect and identify blood samples). Thus, Kincade challenges the Act on the basis of its standard method of implementation. 10 Blood extractions are searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and are subject to the normal Fourth Amendment requirements. 13 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (We have long recognized that a `compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood' ... must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) ([Blood] testing procedures plainly constitute searches of `persons' ... within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment ); United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir.2000) (Intrusions into the human body, including the taking of blood, are searches subject to the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.). 14 In virtually every culture around the world, human blood possesses great symbolic power, and its spillage — whether in a drop or in a torrent — has carried enormous cultural significance. Throughout history, we have waged war, organized societies and religions, and created myths based upon the substance. See Dorothy Nelkin, Cultural Perspectives on Blood, in BLOOD FEUDS: AIDS, BLOOD, AND THE POLITICS OF MEDICAL DISASTER 273 (Eric A. Feldman & Ronald Bayer eds., 1999). The formal policy, pursuant to the DNA Act, that all those covered by the legislation must submit to the compulsory extraction of blood samples unquestionably calls for a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 11 The government contends, however, that compulsory blood extraction under the Act is permissible because the method of data collection employed — the taking of blood — is no more intrusive than fingerprinting. We reject this false analogy. 15 12 First, the elision of two very different kinds of evidence obscures the constitutional difference between invasive procedures of the body that necessitate penetrating the skin, and an examination or recording of physical attributes that are generally exposed to public view. An individual cannot hold the same expectation of privacy for this latter category of information that he does for his internal properties, including blood. Cf. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-6, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973) (It has long been held that the compelled display of identifiable physical characteristics infringes no interest protected by the privilege against compulsory self incrimination.). Although, as Pudd'nhead Wilson remarked, 16 fingerprints do contain unique identifying information, they, like the human voice and the features of the face, are external to the individual. To obtain this identifying information requires no intrusive invasion of bodily privacy. By contrast, while DNA, like fingerprints, identifies an individual, DNA identification results from a forced intrusion into an individual's body. 17 Fingerprinting, involving aspects of an individual's identity routinely exposed to public view, represents a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of searches and detentions. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 814, 105 S.Ct. 1643, 84 L.Ed.2d 705 (1985). 13 Second, we note that even fingerprinting is not entirely free from the kind of Fourth Amendment concerns at stake here. Fingerprints taken pursuant to an arrest are part of so-called booking procedures, designed to ensure that the person who is arrested is in fact the person law enforcement officials believe they have in custody. 18 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C.Cir.1963) ([I]t is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing and fingerprinting as part of routine identification processes. (internal citations omitted)); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965) (stating that taking of fingerprints upon admission to bail is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights). This administrative procedure affirms that law enforcement has the right person in its custody. When law enforcement officials detain individuals for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints in furtherance of a criminal investigation, however, that detention violates the Fourth Amendment unless supported by probable cause or a warrant. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 815, 105 S.Ct. 1643. The Supreme Court so held even while acknowledging that fingerprints involve[] neither repeated harassment nor any of the probing into private life and thoughts that often marks interrogation and search. Id. at 814, 105 S.Ct. 1643 (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969) (holding detention for sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints without probable cause or warrant violates Fourth Amendment)). Here, of course, law enforcement does not question Kincade's true identity; it merely seeks to obtain evidence for future criminal investigations. 14 Thus, there can be no question that taking blood from a parolee against his will constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. We next turn to the question whether such a search, when conducted upon the body of a parolee, requires individualized suspicion. 15