Opinion ID: 2123996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: nature of accusation

Text: In the second summarized assignment of error, the convict complains that the lack of clarity in the information charging him with murder violated his Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. As originally drawn, the information alleged that the convict killed the victim purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or during the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate a Robbery; however, at some juncture, the words purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice, or were stricken. The convict baldly asserts that the prosecutor struck those words during the course of Bowen I. He also argues that while the original information charged him with first degree murder with pre-meditated malice, the State succeeded in proving only that he conspired with [another] to rob or burglar the candy store and that he was thus only an accessory to a felony. Brief for appellant at 3. Not only could these arguments have been litigated in Bowen I, and thus are not properly available for consideration at this time, but the State correctly points out that this summarized assignment is nothing more than an impermissible effort to relitigate the sufficiency of the evidence by in effect claiming the evidence proved only some lesser-included offense upon which the jury was not instructed. However, again in the interest of completeness, we point out that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-303 (Reissue 1989) provides that one may commit first degree murder in a variety of ways, including by killing another purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice or in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony such as robbery. Thus, as originally drawn, the indictment charged first degree murder by virtue of killing either with the requisite mental statepurposeful murderor while in the course of committing a felony. The evidence at trial proved the convict to be guilty of felony murder and not of purposeful murder, but no authority is cited that charges could not be levied in the alternative. Indeed, in considering a statute which provided that one who, with the intent to rob or steal, `forcibly, and by violence, or by putting in fear, takes ... money or personal property,' Brown v. State, 107 Neb. 120, 123, 185 N.W. 344, 345 (1921), this court wrote: This section of the statute does not define two separate felonies, but defines one only, which may be committed by two methods, namely, by force and violence, or by putting in fear. It is a general rule of criminal procedure that, when under a statute an offense may be committed by several methods, the indictment or information may charge that it was committed by any or all such methods as are not inconsistent with, or repugnant to, each other. The averments in the information are not repugnant, but are perfectly consistent with each other, and therefore are not improperly joined. The principle here announced finds support in 2 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (10th ed.) sec. 1221. In State v. Montgomery, 109 Mo. 645 [19 S.W. 221], the indictment charged, as in this case, that the crime was committed by taking from the prosecuting witness by force and violence, and by putting him in fear. A similar objection was made as is made in this case. It was held: Where a crime may be committed by several methods, the indictment may charge that it was committed by all, provided they are not inconsistent with, or repugnant to, each other. Besides, section 9050, Rev.St.1913, provides: No indictment shall be deemed invalid, nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings be stayed, arrested or in any manner affected;    nor for any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits. Even if it be conceded that the information was bad for duplicity, there appears no basis to believe that such defects tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits. Brown v. State, 107 Neb. at 123-24, 185 N.W. at 345. In any event, as noted in State v. Laymon, 239 Neb. 80, 474 N.W.2d 458 (1991), an information or complaint is sufficient unless it is so defective that by no construction can it be said to charge the offense of which the accused was convicted. Furthermore, where an information alleges the commission of a crime using language of the statute defining that crime or terms equivalent to such statutory definition, the charge is sufficient. State v. Spiegel, 239 Neb. 233, 474 N.W.2d 873 (1991). Although here the proof at trial supports felony murder and not purposeful murder, the charge of purposeful murder would not have been inconsistent with or repugnant to a charge of felony murder. Thus, we cannot say that the information was defective, no matter what condition it was in when the case was tried.