Opinion ID: 1710263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to these Cases

Text: Venue, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is a legislative determination based upon the presumed convenience of the parties. Ingram v. Omelet Shoppe, Inc., 388 So.2d 190 (Ala.1980). In Alabama, the venue of actions is governed by statute, and only in the event of inconsistency in statutory provisions, by Rule 82. Ex parte Lashley, 596 So.2d 890, 891 (Ala.1992). [3] We do not find an inconsistency, but, even if we did, we would note the mandate of § 6.11 of the Judicial Article, which requires this Court to promulgate rules of procedure that shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive right of any party nor affect the jurisdiction of circuit and district courts or venue of actions therein. We find no inconsistency in the operation of §§ 6-3-5 and 6-3-7 that would require us to refer to procedural rules. Section 6-3-5 is specifically related to insurance companies. This specific statute would apply exclusively to these cases if it conflicted with § 6-3-7, the general corporate venue statute. See Crawford v. Springle, 631 So.2d 880 (Ala.1993) (where statutes in pari materia are general and specific, the more specific statute controls the more general statute). This Court finds no conflict between § 6-3-5 and § 6-3-7; accordingly, these corporate venue statutes should be read in pari materia. Cf. Ex parte New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 663 So.2d 952 (Ala.1995) (holding that § 6-3-5 does not exclusively govern contract actions against an insurance corporation and that § 6-3-7 does not exclusively govern personal injury actions against an insurance corporation); Opinion of the Justices No. 334, 599 So.2d 1166 (Ala.1992) (statutes must be construed together in light of their application to the same general subject matter); Associated Grocers of Alabama v. Graves Co., 272 Ala. 158, 130 So.2d 17 (1961) (construing predecessor of § 6-3-7 in pari materia with predecessor of § 6-3-2). This holding conforms with the legislative intent: in 1955, the legislature enacted § 6-3-5 and provided that inconsistent laws would be repealed; yet, § 6-3-7 remained unmodified and continues to be recodified. We conclude that the legislature intended these statutes to operate together, and not either to the exclusion of the other. Ex parte Jones Mfg. Co., 589 So.2d 208 (Ala.1991) (statutes should be construed together so as to harmonize provisions as far as practical). In construing these statutes together, this Court observes that fundamental to statutory analysis is the principle that each part of the statute be given effect. Michael v. Beasley, 583 So.2d 245 (Ala.1991). Amendment No. 473 changes the application of the corporate venue statutes. Each section, however, has some field of operation. See Ex parte Employees' Retirement System of Alabama, 644 So.2d 943 (Ala.1994) (in applying the clear meaning of a statute, a court must look at the entire statutory scheme rather than at isolated phrases or clauses); Robinson v. State, 361 So.2d 1113 (Ala.1978) (it cannot be presumed that the legislature used language without any meaning or application).