Opinion ID: 2546657
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the state's law enforcement allocation system is traceable to a prior de jure discriminatory system

Text: Invoking United States v. Fordice , [32] plaintiffs contend that the state's present system of allocating law enforcement services is traceable to a prior de jure discriminatory system. [33] The parties refer to this as plaintiffs' Fordice claim. Fordice offers significant litigation benefits to a plaintiff who shows that present policies are traceable to a prior de jure system, because it relieves the plaintiff of having to prove that a discriminatory purpose can be attributed to the defendant's actions. [34] After trial, the superior court found that the State of Alaska, when creating its law enforcement system after statehood, did not adopt an allegedly de jure discriminatory pre-statehood law enforcement system (i.e., the former Indian Police program operated by the federal government or any other pre-statehood program). The court also found that the state did not establish its own de jure discriminatory system. The court therefore rejected plaintiffs' equal protection theory that the state's law enforcement system is traceable to a prior de jure discriminatory system.
In Fordice, the United States Supreme Court considered whether Mississippi had satisfied its obligation under Brown v. Board of Education [35] to dismantle de jure segregation in its public university system. [36] Mississippi acknowledged that its laws formerly mandated a segregated, dual educational system, but argued that it had reached full compliance with the law and had eliminated its prior de jure system. [37] The Court determined that merely dismantling a de jure segregated admissions policy was insufficient to eliminate a prior de jure segregated dual educational system. [38] The Court explained: [A] State does not discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and practices traceable to its prior de jure system that continue to foster segregation. Thus we have consistently asked whether existing racial identifiability is attributable to the State ... and examined a wide range of factors to determine whether the State has perpetuated its formerly de jure segregation in any facet of its institutional system. [39] Fordice does not require a showing of present intent to discriminate if a claimant can show that the current system is traceable to a prior de jure system. [40] Given the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, [41] this benefit may be important in a given case. As the Court noted, if challenged policies are not rooted in the prior dual system, the question becomes whether the fact of racial separation establishes a new violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under traditional principles. [42]
In weighing the state's argument that Fordice does not apply to this case, we first consider whether it matters that there was a genuine factual dispute about whether there was a de jure race-based system of law enforcement in Alaska before statehood. It was undisputed in Fordice that Mississippi previously had officially operated a racially segregated university system. The dispute in Fordice was whether Mississippi had dismantled its prior system. But here there was no prior determination that law enforcement in the decades before Alaska statehood was de jure race-based, [43] and the evidence is not so one-sided that we must hold as a matter of law that the federal government or the Territory of Alaska operated de jure race-based law enforcement programs in Alaska in the years before statehood. The plaintiffs contend on appeal that evidence of a race-based dual system of law enforcement is undisputed. To the contrary, we think the evidence is in dispute and that the plaintiffs overstate their case. The burden-shifting discussed in Fordice does not apply if the predecessor program was not de jure discriminatory. There is a second impediment to applying Fordice here. The State of Alaska did not operate the pre-statehood programs to which plaintiffs would trace the origins of the state's present system. Plaintiffs have not persuaded us that pre-statehood programs conducted by the federal or territorial governments should be treated as though the State of Alaska operated them. These are distinct governmental entities. The text of Fordice repeatedly refers to the State of Mississippi's prior system, [44] implying that tracing requires that the present government have purposefully discriminated in the past. This would be a logical requirement, because de jure discrimination requires an intent to discriminate. [45] The analytical benefit Fordice confers makes sense in context of a state program challenged on the theory it is traceable to the state's prior, intentionally discriminatory program. In effect, Fordice shifts the burden to the state to prove that the discriminatory intent it previously held no longer exists. But placing that burden on a government is unwarranted if it was a different government that previously harbored the discriminatory intent. [46] We do not read Fordice to reach so far. Another Supreme Court decision implies that this burden-shifting is justified by the state's ability to explain that its actions were not motivated by segregative intent. [47] This rationale would not apply to intentions previously motivating a different government. There is a third problem with applying Fordice here. Fordice concerned a state's educational system. As one court has noted, Fordice has not been applied outside the context of education. [48] We cannot say whether the Supreme Court would distinguish between educational programs and law enforcement services per se. But we perceive legally significant differences between programs that are ineluctably shaped by the physical realities of transportation, time, distance, and weather, and programs that can be readily and subtly molded by political choice hiding discriminatory intentions. The Court in Fordice seemed to acknowledge that student attendance could be affected by many factors other than state policies; the Court seemed to distinguish between race-neutral factors and factors that might still be affected by the state's policy choices. [49] It also required that policies traceable to the de jure system must be reformed to the extent practicable and consistent with sound educational practices. [50] The majority opinion noted that if traceable policies are without sound educational justification and can be practicably eliminated, the state has not proved that it dismantled its prior system. [51] These passages remind us that factors that are inherently race-neutral are distinguishable from factors more easily influenced by policy. We think that decisions to post Alaska State Troopers in places that are on the road system or in places that are transportation hubs are materially different in character from those made by Mississippi in operating its post-secondary education system. We conclude that the Fordice traceability analysis does not apply here, and that a violation of federal equal protection can only be shown under traditional principles. [52] Because the trooper allocation statutes and regulations are facially race-neutral, these traditional principles dictate that, in order to succeed on that claim, plaintiffs must show a government intent to discriminate. [53]