Opinion ID: 532510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Appropriate Chevron Analysis

Text: 17 We begin by identifying the proper standard for our review of the single penalty. We determine first whether the regulation is consistent with the statute. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 1817, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). This involves an initial inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question in issue. State of Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). If the statute is clear and unambiguous 'that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.'  K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817 (quoting Board of Governors, FRS v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368, 106 S.Ct. 681, 685, 88 L.Ed.2d 691 (1986); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781). In other words, the regulation must incorporate the precise congressional intent, if it is ascertainable. Whether Congress' intent is clear and unambiguous depends, of course, not only on the particular statutory language at issue but also on the language and design of the statute as a whole. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817. If, after employing traditional tools of statutory construction, including text, structure, and legislative history, the court reaches the unmistakable conclusion that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, 'that intention is the law and must be given effect'  in the regulation. State of Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2781 n. 9). This is commonly referred to as a Chevron I  analysis. 18 If, however, the statute is ambiguous or silent on the specific issue addressed by the regulation, we proceed to a second inquiry directed at whether the agency's regulation is a permissible construction of the statute. K Mart, 108 S.Ct. at 1817. The court must defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it is reasonable, consistent with the statutory purpose, and not in conflict with the statute's plain language. Id.; State of Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441. This is our Chevron II  analysis. 19 We conclude that the Chevron II standard is applicable in this case because we find the Mine Act and its legislative history to be silent as to whether individualized consideration of each of the six criteria of Sec. 820(i) is necessary in the case of every civil penalty assessment, including the single penalty. While we believe that the Act plainly requires the Secretary, when assessing penalties, not to exclude any of these criteria--and, in particular, to consider an operator's history of previous violations--we do not read the statute on its face to mandate specific formulas or methodologies for taking account of the criteria. 20 Petitioners contend that the phrase appropriateness of such penalty, 30 U.S.C. Sec. 820(i) (emphasis added), and the description of the six penalty factors as those upon which the Secretary shall propose a civil penalty, S.Rep. No. 461, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1977) (emphasis added), reprinted in Subcomm. on Labor of Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 1336 (Comm.Print 1978) [hereinafter 1977 Legislative History ], indicate that Congress meant the criteria to be individually considered for each and every brand of penalty assessed. Pet.Reply Br. at 4. While we agree with petitioners that the cited language shows that Congress intended MSHA to base all of its penalties on consideration of all of the statutory factors, we do not find that this same language instructs the Secretary to devise a penalty scheme that adopts an individualized approach to all six penalty criteria. In the absence of a more precise statement of intent on the question, we are thrust into a Chevron II analysis, under which we defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the Mine Act, so long as that interpretation is reasonable.