Opinion ID: 1453499
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Heading: Multiple Punishment Analysis

Text: As previously noted, the double jeopardy clause forbids multiple punishment for the same offense. Grady, 495 U.S. at 516-517, 110 S.Ct. at 2090. The government may, however, impose both a criminal and civil penalty for the same act or omission. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938). If the government imposes a criminal and civil sanction in a single proceeding, the court's role is limited to determining that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451, 109 S.Ct. at 1903 (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69, 103 S.Ct. 673, 679, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983)). Halper, however, holds that a disproportionately large civil sanction imposed in a subsequent civil proceeding can, under certain, limited circumstances, constitute punishment within double jeopardy's multiple punishment prohibition. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. The defendant contends that he was punished when default judgments were entered against him for failure to appear on the unsafe lane change and speeding charges and, therefore, under Halper, the state cannot now punish him a second time without violating the double jeopardy clause's multiple punishment proscription. He argues that civil sanctions for traffic violations are punishment because they are meant to deter such conduct. The court of appeals agreed. Even under Halper, however, we conclude that defendant was not punished within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause for the speeding and unsafe lane change violations. In Halper, the respondent submitted sixty-five false Medicare claims, each overcharging the government by $9, and cumulatively overbilling the government $585. 490 U.S. at 437-38, 109 S.Ct. at 1895-96. Halper was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to two years' imprisonment and fined $5,000 for submitting the false claims. Id. at 438, 109 S.Ct. at 1896. Following Halper's criminal prosecution, the government brought a civil suit based on the same sixty-five false Medicare claims. The civil False Claims Act provided for a civil penalty of $2,000 for each violation, plus two times the government's actual damages, and court costs, subjecting Halper to a civil sanction of more than $130,000. Id. at 438, 109 S.Ct. at 1896 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729). The district court concluded that imposing such a sanction would violate the double jeopardy clause's bar against multiple punishment. Id. at 440, 109 S.Ct. at 1897. The district court allowed only the recovery of double damages, or $1,170, and the court costs of the civil action. Id. The United States Supreme Court stated that the sole question presented was whether the statutory penalty authorized by the civil False Claims Act, under which Halper is subject to liability of $130,000 for false claims amounting to $585, constitutes a second `punishment' for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 441, 109 S.Ct. at 1898. The Court concluded that: [U]nder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Thus, even if a proceeding does not qualify as a prosecution for purposes of double jeopardy's multiple prosecution protection, the sanction imposed in a non-prosecution may constitute a second punishment for the same offense, thereby violating double jeopardy's multiple punishment prohibition. As applied here, if defendant was punished for speeding and making an unsafe turn, the double jeopardy clause would bar a second punishment for the same conduct. Preliminarily, we note that Halper involved a criminal prosecution followed by a civil proceeding. Defendant, on the other hand, seeks to prevent a criminal prosecution following a civil proceeding. We do not, however, read Halper to be limited to cases where civil proceedings follow criminal proceedings. We do not believe the order of the proceedings is significant. Halper does, however, contain several significant limitations. First and most importantly, Halper teaches that punishment is not measured from the defendant's perspective: This is not to say that whether a sanction constitutes punishment must be determined from the defendant's perspective. On the contrary, our cases have acknowledged that for the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment. Id. at 1901 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1901 n. 7 (emphasis added). Thus, the effect of the fine from defendant's perspective is irrelevant for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. Second, a civil sanction will rarely constitute punishment within the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902 (we announce ... a rule for the rare case ... where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused) (emphasis added). The Court discussed several cases holding that large civil sanctions did not constitute punishment protected by the double jeopardy clause. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938) (assessment of fifty percent civil administrative sanction for tax evasion, amounting to $364,354.92, was not barred by acquittal of defendant for criminal violation of revenue code); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (conviction for criminal conspiracy to defraud the United States government did not bar subsequent civil suit resulting in $315,000 in fines; remedy does not lose the quality of a civil sanction because more than the precise amount of so-called actual damage is recovered); Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 76 S.Ct. 219, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956) (imposition of civil damages for fraudulent purchases in violation of federal Surplus Property Act not barred by prior criminal conviction based on same transactions); and One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972) (civil forfeiture proceeding not barred by prior acquittal of defendant on criminal smuggling charges involving goods subject to forfeiture). The Halper court, considering these cases and United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980), concluded that they taught only that the government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as reasonable liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double damages, without being deemed to have imposed a second punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. Id. 490 U.S. at 445, 109 S.Ct. at 1900 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that a trial court has discretion to order an accounting from the government only where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss.... Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. We believe the defendant advancing a Halper claim must bear the burden of demonstrating to the trial court that a previous civil sanction constituted punishment within the double jeopardy clause. Here, defendant has not demonstrated that he was punished for speeding and making an unsafe turn. The record shows only that the city court entered default judgments against him when he failed to appear at a pretrial conference. The record does not indicate the amount of these judgments, or if defendant ever paid them or ever will pay them. The maximum sanction defendant could have received for each ticket is $250. A.R.S. § 28-1076(E). Additionally, defendant claims his license was suspended. The record does not support this assertion, but we note that A.R.S. § 28-1058 directs traffic complaints to warn drivers that their license will be suspended if they fail to appear. It does not authorize suspension only for speeding or lane change violations. Moreover, defendant's bald assertion that sanctions for civil traffic violations are commonly understood as serving deterrent purposes, and are, therefore, punitive for double jeopardy purposes, is unpersuasive. We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion in Walker, and conclude as a matter of law that the sanctions which could be imposed for the civil traffic violations in this case are remedial in nature, and therefore do not constitute punishment within the double jeopardy clause's multiple punishment prohibition. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902 (defendant may not be subjected to civil sanction to the extent sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial....). Because defendant has not previously been punished within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause, his trial for aggravated assault and criminal damage will not subject him to a prohibited second punishment. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION For double jeopardy purposes, defendant's trial for aggravated assault and criminal damage is not a second prosecution nor can it result in a second punishment. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss those charges and vacate that portion of the court of appeals' opinion entitled Denial of Motion to Dismiss. The case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion and the unvacated portion of the court of appeals' opinion. GORDON, C.J., FELDMAN, V.C.J., and CAMERON and CORCORAN, JJ., concur.