Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Effectiveness of Counsel at Penalty Phase

Text: Defendant next contends that, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial. Specifically, defendant contends his counsel: (1) failed to prepare for and defend against the prosecution's aggravating evidence respecting the Cakewalk shooting; (2) failed in the same manner respecting the Green Meadow Park shooting; (3) failed to object to cumulative and unduly prejudicial photographic evidence; (4) failed to prepare mitigation witnesses; and (5) delivered an inadequate closing argument. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, defendant must show deficient performance under a standard of professional reasonableness, and prejudice under a test of reasonable probability. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688 [104 S.Ct. at pp. 2064-2065]; People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 57-58.) (54) First, defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to prepare for and defend against the prosecution's aggravating evidence respecting defendant's participation in the Cakewalk shooting incident. As defendant acknowledges, counsel moved to exclude the testimony of several witnesses on the ground the prosecution had given insufficient notice of its intention to present the testimony. In support of the motion, defense counsel noted that the prosecution had provided only the police reports related to the Cakewalk incident, and had not specifically identified which potential witnesses mentioned in the reports would actually be called. The court denied the defense motion and admitted the evidence. Defendant suggests his trial counsel erroneously believed the prosecution would rely solely on the police reports as aggravating evidence and would not present actual witnesses to the Cakewalk incident at the penalty phase. According to defendant, his counsel did not understand that the police reports had been provided only as notice of the names of potential penalty phase witnesses, and that the prosecution would present actual testimony at the penalty phase. Moreover, defendant suggests, defense counsel relied on the insupportable expectation that the police reports would be excluded as containing only hearsay and because there had been no previous probable cause determination respecting the Cakewalk incident. Consequently, defendant argues, his trial counsel neither mounted an independent investigation of the Cakewalk incident, nor prepared to cross-examine the prosecution's penalty phase witnesses regarding it. The record does not support defendant's suggestions. In arguing for his motion to exclude, defense counsel complained that the prosecution doesn't give us the statement of any of the people who are going to testify, and the mere statement that he is going to bring them in is not a statement ... that is sufficient to bring these charges which are obviously so serious before the penalty phase of a jury. Counsel also stated: We always asked the People to give us the witnesses they intended to use. They refused. They always said it is in the police reports. There are hundreds of names in the police reports. It is apparent from the foregoing that defense counsel anticipated the prosecution would present witnesses to the Cakewalk incident. Defendant also argues that no reasonably competent counsel would have believed the prosecution's evidence respecting the Cakewalk incident to be inadmissible as a matter of law. Defendant cites In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 955-956 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222] for the proposition that counsel's failure to prepare a defense as a result of ignorance or misunderstanding of our clear precedent, rather than because of an informed tactical decision, constitutes representation falling below the standard of competence demanded of criminal defense attorneys. The People suggest that our decision in People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423], decided in the weeks immediately preceding counsel's argument, lent itself to defense counsel's honest but incorrect interpretation that evidence respecting the Cakewalk incident would not be admitted in aggravation because no preliminary hearing had been held prior to dismissal of the charges originally filed against defendant in connection with that incident. The record suggests counsel may have had Phillips in mind when arguing for exclusion of the Cakewalk evidence. In Phillips, we stated that in many cases it may be advisable for the trial court to conduct a preliminary inquiry before the penalty phase to determine whether there is substantial evidence to prove each element of the other criminal activity. This determination ... can be routinely made based on the pretrial notice by the prosecution of the evidence it intends to introduce in aggravation.... ( People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 72, fn. 25.) In light of this language, the People suggest defense counsel took a tenable, if incorrect, position, when moving to exclude evidence respecting the Cakewalk incident on the ground no previous substantial evidence determination had been made. We agree with defendant that, by its terms, the Phillips footnote would have supported, at most, the trial court's having required the prosecution preliminarily to demonstrate that substantial evidence established each element of any crimes comprised by the Cakewalk evidence, but would not have supported the court's excluding the evidence altogether. Trial counsel's invocation of Phillips, however, was not beyond the bounds of reason. In attempting to fit the facts of his case within arguably applicable dictum from this court, counsel did not evince ignorance or misunderstanding of the holding of clearly applicable precedent ( In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 955). Therefore, trial counsel was not incompetent insofar as he may have harbored some reasonable hope of succeeding on his exclusion motion. Defendant argues, further, however, that competent counsel would not have relied on the anticipated success of a motion to exclude the Cakewalk evidence without also preparing for the opposite consequence, even if the law appeared to support the exclusion. For purposes of argument, we assume without deciding that defense counsel, having received the police report on the Cakewalk incident approximately two years previously, exhibited less than reasonable competence in failing to interview in advance of trial persons named therein as potential witnesses. (Cf. In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 552, 567 [54 Cal. Rptr.2d 52, 917 P.2d 1175] [reasonably competent defense counsel, having been placed on notice that a witness in a capital case had contacted the police prior to commission of the charged offense, offering information that was pertinent to the special circumstance ultimately charged against the defendant, would have attempted to locate such a witness].) Nevertheless, defendant was not prejudiced. For one thing, the Cakewalk incident was not the only prior criminal activity offered in aggravation. As defendant acknowledges, the jury also was permitted to consider aggravating evidence respecting the shooting incident at Green Meadow Park in Los Angeles, in connection with which defendant was convicted of attempted murder and murder. Moreover, defendant concedes, the trial court granted defense counsel an opportunity to interview the Cakewalk incident witnesses whom the prosecution planned to call. The trial court also gave defense counsel an opportunity to request additional interview time. Defendant points to nothing in the record suggesting that counsel's decision not to request a continuance for additional time to interview the prosecution's witnesses was other than tactical. Under similar circumstances, we recently observed [c]ounsel may have had tactical reasons for not seeking a delay of trial; indeed, counsel may not have needed additional time to prepare for trial. Moreover, in light of the additional aggravating evidence properly presented by the People, it is not reasonably probable that any omissions regarding notice were prejudicial. ( People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 772.) As evidence he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to conduct pretrial interviews of the Cakewalk witnesses, defendant suggests counsel's cross-examination of these witnesses was cursory and not successful. Defendant fails to demonstrate his trial counsel's cross-examination was deficient under constitutional standards. As the People point out, Karry Island, Thelma Turner, Mary Nixon, Barbara Nixon, Michael Hardwick and Deontray Turner were all cross-examined by defense counsel, and numerous inconsistencies and other deficiencies in their testimony were thereby revealed. As to whether certain witnesses should have been more rigorously cross-examined, such matters are normally left to counsel's discretion and rarely implicate inadequacy of representation. ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 662.) (55) Second, defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing sufficiently to defend against the prosecution's aggravating evidence respecting the Green Meadow Park shooting, in connection with which defendant was convicted of murdering Donald Billingsley. Defendant complains counsel failed to cross-examine all of the prosecution's witnesses, inadequately cross-examined others and presented no alibi or defense witnesses. He also complains counsel made two remarks in closing argument that prejudiced him: first, that counsel was confused by the prosecution's evidence respecting the Billingsley murder; and, second, that defendant has admitted killing Don Billingsley. We agree with the People that defense counsel's truncated response to the prosecution's evidence respecting the Green Meadow Park shooting appears the result of an unsurprising tactical decision not to relitigate, and thereby emphasize for the jury, murder charges that defendant had litigated and lost before a previous jury. Counsel in the present case had represented defendant at the previous trial as well, and thus assuredly was familiar with weaknesses in the defense evidence respecting events at Green Meadow Park. Although counsel did not cross-examine all of the prosecution's witnesses to the Green Meadow Park shooting, counsel did, as defendant concedes, cross-examine the investigating officer about a knife found under the victim's body. He also cross-examined a witness who had testified to seeing a car drive away from the shooting about a mistaken identification the witness had previously made. Moreover, trial counsel interposed meritorious objections to other witnesses' testimony about the shooting. Again, we normally leave to counsel's discretion the decision of how rigorously to cross-examine particular witnesses. ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 662.) Defense counsel may indeed have misspoken when, in explaining the abbreviated defense response to the prosecution's evidence, he stated, Mr. Williams has admitted killing Don Billingsley, murder of the first degree. As noted, defendant had not, in so many words, admitted killing Billingsley. He had admitted, however, that he had previously been convicted of murder of Donald Billingsley, that that murder was murder in the first degree and the date of the conviction. Counsel's failure, in a brief remark of this sort, to maintain the distinction could not, with any reasonable probability, have prejudiced the outcome of defendant's penalty trial. Counsel's remark that he was willing to admit that [he] was confused by all the detail and all the witnesses and the other evidence that the D.A. introduced on the Billingsley murder would appear to have been calculated to suggest to the jury that this evidence was, indeed, confusing, and, therefore, not to be greatly credited. The suggestion would be consistent with an overall tactical decision to deemphasize that evidence by declining to litigate extensively against it. Thus, defendant fails to demonstrate his trial counsel was ineffective either for presenting a truncated defense to the prosecution's aggravating evidence respecting the Green Meadow Park shooting or for his closing remarks about that evidence. (56) Third, defendant argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain photographic evidence. Specifically, defendant complains that counsel failed to object, on the grounds either of undue prejudice or cumulativeness, when the prosecution, in the course of examining investigating Officer Tom Lange, introduced into evidence eight photographs of the Green Meadow Park crime scene. The photographs showed the location of the victim's body in relation to the victim's location when shot and, from several angles, a trail of blood. Defendant contends his counsel should have objected to the crime scene photographs on Evidence Code section 352 grounds because they were gruesome, especially in conjunction with Officer Lange's repeated references to the trail of blood they showed. The People suggest blood, by itself, is not necessarily gruesome and point out that the photos didn't actually show wounds or bodies. The record does not affirmatively disclose that counsel acted from ignorance or mistake in failing to object to the photos, and there are plausible reasons why competent counsel might not oppose their admission. (Cf. People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 706 [268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887] [failure to object to admission of videotape depicting crime scene and victim's body and related autopsy photos of wounds, not ineffective assistance].) As discussed, defense counsel's overall strategy with respect to the Green Meadow Park shooting may well have been, by protesting little, to deemphasize it. Defendant also argues counsel should have objected on the ground that photographs of the blood trail were cumulative of Officer Lange's testimony. That the photos may have been somewhat cumulative is not determinative: `[w]e repeatedly have rejected the argument photographs of a murder victim should be excluded as cumulative if the photographs are offered to prove facts established by testimony.' ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 450.) (57) Fourth, defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing adequately to prepare the mitigation witnesses. According to defendant, each mitigation witness gave similar damaging answers to certain questions, compelling the conclusion that counsel inadequately prepared them. Defendant complains, specifically, of testimony by his aunt, Lena Bridges (who cared for defendant after he was abandoned by his mother) that if [Barry]'s not guilty, I don't feel that he deserves to be put to death. According to defendant, Bridges's answer essentially meant that she believed if he was guilty he deserved to be put to death. Defendant also complains that counsel, by asking Bridges whether she had ever felt her children should not associate with defendant, opened the door for her to be cross-examined about her children's gang affiliations, despite the topic's prejudicial effect. Finally, defendant complains that Reverend Thomas, Margaret Smith and Reverend Prothro, each called as a mitigation witness, apparently had not been told in advance about defendant's two murder convictions. Defendant argues that, had they been told, they might have better prepared for cross-examination on that topic. Defendant exaggerates the negativity contained in the mitigation witnesses' testimony. Lena Bridges, as noted, did not testify she thought defendant should be sentenced to death. Reverend Thomas did not testify to a negative view of defendant's character upon learning of defendant's convictions; he testified, rather, that such knowledge did not change his opinion. Similarly, Reverend Prothro did not unequivocally testify that he would have had a negative opinion of defendant had he known of defendant's convictions. Reverend Prothro was only asked if his opinion would be different. In response, he said: I don't think so, not  unless I knew for a fact, you know. That the mitigation witnesses' answers on cross-examination were not entirely favorable, moreover, does not establish counsel's ineffectiveness. For one thing, no amount of preparation can make human witnesses impervious to effective cross-examination. As defendant concedes, negative portions of Lena Bridges's testimony might have been a witness's unfortunate spontaneous response rather than a consequence of poor preparation by trial counsel. Moreover, counsel must sometimes take a calculated risk that a witness will say something damaging on cross-examination in order to obtain that witness's favorable testimony on direct. [O]n this record we cannot ascertain that counsel knew or did not know what [Bridges, Thomas, Smith and Prothro] might say on the witness stand. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that there could be no satisfactory explanation for any tactic counsel might have chosen. ( People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 701 [claim of ineffective witness preparation].) Defendant himself points out that each mitigation witness testified positively about defendant's character  specifically, that he was obedient and respectful. Counsel might have had the tactical aim of suggesting to the jury that defendant, being obedient and respectful, was a good candidate for successfully serving out a prison sentence. Even assuming trial counsel did not fully prepare every witness, the record does not suggest that any witness's assessment of defendant's character (in light of his convictions) would have been different had that witness been earlier informed about the convictions. (58) Finally, defendant argues his trial counsel presented an inadequate and prejudicial closing argument. Specifically, defendant claims that counsel, in closing, made several remarks that were inconsistent with the duty to provide zealous representation. First, contrasting defendant's insistence that he didn't do it (i.e., the Cakewalk shooting), counsel mentioned, in passing, that Barry Williams admitted the two murders [i.e., the Billingsley and Dunn murders].... As discussed, defendant's actual admissions were to convictions, not, in so many words, to actual guilt. Nevertheless, [i]t is within the permissible range of tactics for defense counsel to candidly recognize the weaknesses in the defense in the closing argument. ( People v. Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1150.) We cannot conclude defendant, with any reasonable probability, was prejudiced by his counsel's technical inaccuracy when tactically conceding this point. Defendant suggests the remark that defendant admitted the two murders suggested to the jury that defendant had, at some other time, confessed to defense counsel. That seems unlikely. Rather, considered within the context of the entire argument, the jury is more likely to have understood defense counsel's phrase admitted the two murders as shorthand for defendant's actual concession. In fact, in the same portion of his penalty argument respecting the Billingsley murder, defense counsel correctly stated, Mr. Williams admitted he was convicted of first degree murder on that case. Defendant also suggests that trial counsel's phrasing suggested to the jury that defendant had lied both to [defense] psychologist [Margaret Bennett] and [to the jury] on the stand. We do not agree. For one thing, the jury could not validly have concluded that defendant lied to them regarding the two murders, even if they understood counsel's remark as defendant suggests they may have understood it. Defendant did not testify at the guilt phase; at the penalty phase, as defendant acknowledges, he did not testify at all about the two murders. Psychologist Bennett testified she had told the prosecutor, in a hallway conversation prior to taking the stand, that defendant had denied participation in the two murders when she interviewed him. Even assuming the jury interpreted counsel's misstatement of defendant's admission to conflict with Bennett's testimony, however, we do not think there is a reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different penalty determination had counsel's remark been accurately stated. In short, counsel's misstatements do not amount to ineffective assistance. (59a) Second, defendant argues that counsel conceded, in closing argument, that defendant was guilty of the Cakewalk shooting, which concession conflicted with defendant's own assertion of innocence. (60) Defendant cites People v. Moore (1988) 201 Cal. App.3d 51, 57 [248 Cal. Rptr. 31], wherein the Court of Appeal noted [r]eversals for ineffective assistance of counsel during closing argument rarely occur; when they do, it is due to an argument against the client which concedes guilt, withdraws a crucial defense, or relies on an illegal defense. (59b) Defendant mischaracterizes counsel's argument. The portion of the record defendant relies on reveals that his counsel argued only that, assuming defendant actually did the Cakewalk shooting, he ought not to be held 100 percent responsible for subsequent offenses he committed during the period of time he would likely have been incarcerated therefor, had the authorities properly tried and convicted him. In fact, counsel emphasized the conditional nature of this portion of his argument, repeating three times the words, [l]et's assume.... In hindsight, the argument may appear weak (if not a bit bizarre), but it certainly falls short of conceding defendant's guilt of the Cakewalk shooting. Counsel's having made the argument does not amount to ineffective assistance. (61) Third, defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for arguing that whatever happened that was bad to Barry Williams happened as a result of his gang association. Defendant points out that he had testified he possessed, as protection against rival gang members, a homemade weapon while he was incarcerated in county jail, thereby suggesting to the jury, defendant argues, that gangs and gang activity exist in prison. Coupled with this suggestion, defendant argues, counsel's statement that gang associations caused bad things to happen with defendant, gave the jury a reason for sentencing him to death, rather than sending him to prison. We disagree. A juror might believe defendant felt he needed protection from hostile gang members in jail without necessarily concluding defendant would form new gang associations if sent to prison. Defense counsel logically could argue that gangs were to blame for defendant's past criminality without necessarily implying that defendant would inevitably become involved with similar criminal gang activity in prison. Counsel was not ineffective for arguing that gangs were responsible for defendant's going astray. (62) Fourth, defendant argues his trial counsel made the devastating admission that he did not see any good qualities in his own client when he asked the jury rhetorically: Don't you think there must be some qualities in Barry that I don't see or I am sure you can't see with the short association that I had or you've had[?] The question neither carries the admission defendant sees in it, nor was likely to have had much negative impact on the jury  even if it could be so interpreted. Counsel, in asking this rhetorical question, evidently sought to suggest only that the jury should not presume it had heard every possible good fact about defendant. Defendant demonstrates neither incompetence nor prejudice. Defendant also asserts that [t]he ineptness of defense counsel was demonstrated again in his mistaken presentation of the facts about the shooting of Mrs. Lewis' house. Defendant neither elaborates nor provides record references or citation to authority, thus failing properly to raise a claim. ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 985, fn. 15.) (63) Defendant also points out that counsel misstated certain facts surrounding the murder conviction of Charles Manson. Addressing the prosecutor's rhetorical question whether the jury could think of anything more heinous or a more horrible crime than defendant's, counsel listed several possible examples, including that of Manson. Counsel stated: Manson when he was convicted, we didn't have a death penalty in those days so he got straight life.... Defendant complains this was incorrect, insofar as Manson did receive the death penalty, but it was commuted to a life sentence following our 1972 decision in People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628 [100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880]. Defendant argues counsel's misstatements respecting the Manson sentence gave the jurors reason to take advantage of having a death penalty. We are not persuaded. Counsel carefully noted for the jury that the law under which Charles Manson was sentenced doesn't exist anymore. The statute under which Mr. Williams was convicted with special circumstances says it is life without the possibility of parole. So that the Manson situation, as far as parole is concerned, does not exist with Mr. Williams. As defendant acknowledges, counsel used the Manson example (with others) to argue that defendant's crimes did not deserve the death penalty  which should be reserved for crimes of the extreme seriousness of Charles Manson's. Defendant asserts that counsel could have argued more successfully had he known the correct facts concerning Manson's penalty. Perhaps so, but such speculation does not establish that defendant received ineffective assistance. In sum, while defendant has identified some imperfections in defense counsel's penalty phase argument, these do not, either individually or collectively, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.