Opinion ID: 2533974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Faretta canvass

Text: Hymon contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a specific, penetrating and comprehensive Faretta canvass before granting Hymon the right to represent himself. Hymon argues that the district court failed to adequately inquire into four of the areas mentioned in SCR 253(3): Hymon's mental health, his understanding of the elements of the crimes, his understanding of the punishments and total possible sentence, and his understanding of the possible pleas and defenses available. The State counters that the district court conducted two complete and detailed Faretta canvasses, after which the district court found that Hymon was competent to stand trial and that he was waiving his right to counsel freely and voluntarily. The United States and Nevada Constitutions guarantee a defendant the right to self-representation. [29] Denial of that right is per se reversible error. [30] However, before allowing a defendant to waive counsel and represent himself, the trial court must ensure that the defendant is competent and that the waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. [31] The competency to stand trial is the same competency needed to waive the right to counsel. [32] Once a defendant is deemed competent, the next inquiry is whether the waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. [33] [W]hen a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted. [34] The court should conduct a Faretta canvass to apprise the defendant fully of the risks of self-representation and of the nature of the charged crime so that the defendant's decision is made with a `clear comprehension of the attendant risks.' [35] SCR 253(2) states that during the Faretta canvass the district court should inform the defendant of some of the dangers, disadvantages and consequences of self-representation and lists specific warnings that the district court should offer. SCR 253(3) states that the district court's canvass may include questions about the defendant personally and about the defendant's knowledge and understanding of the proceedings against him. Finally, SCR 253(4) states that the district court shall make findings on the record concerning the defendant's competency to waive counsel and whether the defendant is waiving his right freely, voluntarily and knowingly. This court has rejected the necessity of a mechanical performance of a Faretta canvass. Even the omission of a canvass is not reversible error if `it appears from the whole record that the defendant knew his rights and insisted upon representing himself.' [36] In Graves v. State , we explained: To the extent that any of our prior cases hint that specific matters should be part of a canvass that go beyond the general requirements of Faretta, we note that those specific matters are not constitutionally required for a valid waiver where it is apparent from the record that the defendant was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. [37] This court will give deference to the district court's decision to allow the defendant to waive his right to counsel. [38] Through face-to-face interaction in the courtroom, the trial judges are much more competent to judge a defendant's understanding than this court. The cold record is a poor substitute for demeanor observation. [39] First, Hymon contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Hymon to represent himself, knowing that: (1) it previously ordered Hymon to undergo a psychological evaluation, (2) Lake's Crossing diagnosed Hymon as having an antisocial personality disorder, and (3) Hymon was unable to maintain his decorum in the courtroom. The State contends that there was never any indication that Hymon was mentally incompetent. SCR 253(3)(c) states that the district court's canvass may include inquiry into the defendant's mental health history. A defendant may be denied the right to represent himself if a physical or mental impairment, even if not enough to render the defendant incompetent to stand trial, renders the defendant unable to abide by rules of procedure or protocol. [40] During the Faretta canvasses, the district court inquired into Hymon's mental health and Hymon responded that he was sane and had never been treated for any sort of mental illness. The record indicates that the district court ordered the psychological evaluation because Hymon was not cooperating with his counsel and refused to see the first psychologist. Lake's Crossing indicated that Hymon was in good mental health, despite having an antisocial personality disorder. The record shows that Hymon was capable of abiding by the rules of procedure and protocol and was able to use them to his advantage when appropriate. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court adequately inquired into Hymon's mental health when performing the Faretta canvass. Second, Hymon contends that while he answered that he knew the elements of the offenses that he was charged with, he could not have stated them upon further inquiry. SCR 253(3)(f) states that the district court's canvass may include an inquiry into the [d]efendant's understanding of the elements of each crime and lesser included or related offenses. Hymon told the district court that he had attended approximately eleven preliminary hearings and six trials, including one for robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and had done a lot of legal reading while in prison. We conclude that the record repeatedly demonstrates that Hymon had significant legal knowledge of the crimes with which he was charged and had significant similar criminal experience. The district court adequately inquired into Hymon's knowledge regarding the elements of the offenses. Third, Hymon argues that he did not understand that he could be sentenced as a habitual criminal and receive up to five life sentences. SCR 253(3)(g) states that the district court's canvass may include an inquiry into the [d]efendant's understanding of the possible penalties or punishments, and the total possible sentence the defendant could receive. The record indicates that the sentences were explained several times to Hymon, and he independently filed a motion for discovery under the habitual criminal act. Finally, Hymon contends that the district court failed to adequately inquire into his understanding of the possible defenses. Hymon indicated that he erroneously wished to base his defense on alleged violations of his constitutional rights, and he intended to do so by calling various court officials to testify regarding the relevant law. SCR 253(3)(h) states that the district court's canvass may include an inquiry into the [d]efendant's understanding of the pleas and defenses which may be available. The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. [41] The standard of competency for a defendant to choose his own defense is the same level of competency needed to stand trial. [42] The law requires that the defendant be competent and that the waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. We agree that the record seems to indicate that the district court was under the mistaken impression that if the defendant is competent to stand trial, then no further inquiry is required in regards to whether the waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. However, we conclude that the record indicates that Hymon understood his possible defenses. In an attempt to rebut the essential elements of the crimes, Hymon competently cross-examined the witnesses, presented jury instructions and argued that the State failed to establish its case. These maneuvers demonstrate that Hymon understood and was capable of pursuing his viable defenses. Accordingly, the record demonstrates that the district court conducted a specific, penetrating and comprehensive Faretta canvass. Furthermore, the record supports that Hymon was competent to waive his right to counsel and that his waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.