Opinion ID: 2054194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: altered or abrogated clause

Text: The second paragraph of Const. 1963, art. 12, § 2 provides, in part, [11] that the proposal and any existing provisions of the constitution which would be altered or abrogated thereby ... shall be published in full as required by law. [12] The publication of Proposal B included no existing provision of the constitution. Plaintiffs argue that Proposal B had the effect of altering Const. 1963, art. 4, § 7. [13] Plaintiffs argue, in effect, that art. 4, § 7 sets forth the exclusive list of qualifications of legislators. By creating a new condition for election, art. 4, § 54 alters art. 4, § 7 by making § 7 no longer an exclusive list of qualifications. Plaintiffs' argument fails both on its premise that art. 4, § 7 is an exclusive list of qualifications and on its premise that adding an additional qualification elsewhere in the constitution would alter art. 4, § 7 within the meaning of the alter or abrogate clause of art. 12, § 2, ¶ 2. Plaintiffs' implicit argument that art. 4, § 54 alters art. 4 § 7 by depriving it of its exclusivity fails because art. 4, § 7 does not purport to be the exclusive list of qualifications for legislative office. The language of art. 4, § 7 does not state it is the exclusive list of candidate qualifications. Moreover, the very next provision of the constitution, art. 4, § 8, [14] states what can only be viewed as a qualification for legislative office in addition to those stated in art. 4, § 7. Plaintiffs also miss the point of the line of cases in which this Court has defined the meaning of altered or abrogated in Const. 1963 art. 12, § 2, and its predecessor, Const. 1908, art. 17, § 3. [15] Pontiac School Dist. v. Pontiac, 262 Mich. 338, 247 N.W. 474 (1933), City of Jackson, supra ; Graham v. Miller, 348 Mich. 684, 84 N.W.2d 46 (1957), and Ferency v. Secretary of State, 409 Mich. 569, 297 N.W.2d 544 (1980). The purpose of the provision is to definitely advise the elector as to the purpose of the proposed amendment and what provision of the constitutional law it modified or supplanted. Pontiac School Dist., supra at 344, 247 N.W. 474: But the ordinary elector, not being a constitutional lawyer, would be confused rather than helped by a publication of all the other constitutional provisions which were or might be directly or only remotely, and possibly only contingently, affected by the proposed amendment. We think the requirement in substance is this: That in case a proposed constitutional provision amends or replaces (alters or abrogates) a specific provision of the Constitution, that such provision should be published along with the proposed amendment; that other provisions which are still operative, though possibly they may need thereafter to be construed in conjunction with the amending provision, need not necessarily be published. When the test set out above did not halt arguments that a proposal altered or abrogated an existing provision by implication, this Court restated the test in Ferency : [16] An existing constitutional provision is altered or abrogated if the proposed amendment would add to, delete from, or change the existing wording of the provision, or would render it wholly inoperative. [409 Mich. at 597, 297 N.W.2d 544.] The phrase the existing wording should be taken literally. An example of a proposal which would alter an existing constitutional provision by adding to its existing wording is found in Carman, supra, in which the proposal added a new paragraph to an existing constitutional provision, Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2. Applying the Ferency test to this case is, as it should be, simple. Article 4, § 54 does not add, delete, or change the wording of art. 4, § 7. It does not render it wholly inoperative. Quite the contrary, all the qualifications of art. 4, § 7 remain in effect. The circuit court correctly dismissed this claim.