Opinion ID: 575260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ill Rev.Stat. ch. 48, p 138.1(a)(4).

Text: 2 The deposition of Robert Lawhon, an engineer with PPG, further supports a finding of authority A: They would come to us in the morning as individuals without a supervisor, and we would tell them what to do for that period of time, whether it would be a few hours or for the whole day. In some cases, we supplied the tools and equipment that they used. In other cases they supplied some of their own from Perry's tool boxes. Q: Was it your understanding and agreement with [Perry] that once these individuals were delivered to you or to the other PPG supervisory personnel to whom they might be directed to report that they would be under their exclusive direction and control for whatever period of time you wanted them? A: Yes. Q: Would it be fair to say that in terms of the depth temperature measurements that any employee supplied there would be under the direction and control of the [PPG] personnel involved in those tests? A: Yes. Lawhon Deposition at 19-20. Additionally, Perry's president, Ivan Perry, Jr., stated that Russell was under the direction and training of PPG personnel while working on the furnace testing project. Perry Deposition at 10. 3 Although no formal written agreement was in place, PPG previously had exercised a right to reject individuals working on the furnace project. Lawhon Deposition at 32. Perry's president also stated that PPG had the power to refuse any employees on the project and send them back to Perry. Perry Deposition at 15 4 We find no merit in Russell's claim that the District Court's grant of summary judgment was sua sponte and therefore improper. See Macon v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 698 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir.1983) (district courts lack power to enter summary judgment sua sponte only when party against whom summary judgment was entered did not have adequate notice and a fair opportunity to present evidence in opposition to the entry of summary judgment.) 5 The exclusivity provisions of the IWCA do not bar a common-law cause of action against an employer for injuries which the employer intentionally inflicts upon an employee, or which were commanded or expressly authorized by the employer. See Meerbrey v. Marshall Field and Co., 139 Ill.2d 455, 151 Ill.Dec. 560, 564, 564 N.E.2d 1222, 1226 (1990); see also Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 81 Ill.2d 229, 41 Ill.Dec. 776, 408 N.E.2d 198 (1980) 6 Indeed, commentators have stressed the closed nature of the summary jury trial. See, e.g., Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U.Cin.L.Rev. 829, 831 (1986) (neither the jury findings nor any statement of counsel during the summary jury trial are admissible on the trial on the merits or may be construed as judicial admissions.); Tillotson, Note, Summary Jury Trials: Should the Public Have Access?, 16 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 1069, 1073-74 (1989) (It is viewed solely as a technique for facilitating settlement. Thus, neither the jury findings nor any statement by counsel made during the summary jury trial are admissible in a future trial on the merits.)