Opinion ID: 2998798
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Heading: M.I.L., the driver either drives away or

Text: attempts to drive away. No. 04-3527 7 C. If a second citation is issued to the same driver by the same officer during the same tour of duty. 6.2 If the vehicle is towed, an Offense Report, and a Vehicle Inventory and Tow Report are required. Gen. Order 17-18, “Illinois Mandatory Insurance Law,” §§ 5, 6 (2003). The district court read General Order 17-3 to require an inventory search when a police officer causes a car to be towed, and in turn relied on General Order 17-18 to provide officers the authority to order the tow of Cherry’s car (because without proof of insurance Cherry could not move his car to a legal parking place). We cannot say that the district court committed clear error in finding that the Joliet police officers followed standard procedure in conducting the inventory search of Cherry’s car. General Order 17-18 prevented Cherry from driving his car after the police discovered he lacked proof of insurance. And, because the car was located alongside the interstate—where it presented a public safety hazard—the police were authorized to order it towed to a safe location.1 Their authority to order such a tow in the interest of public 1 Cherry does not argue that police engineered the initial traffic stop in this case as a “subterfuge for criminal investigations.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371 n.5 (1976). Regardless, our interpretation of the Joliet policy would not, as the dissent posits, allow police to “use the policy on inventory searches to authorize illegal investigatory searches,” post, at 17, by simply arranging to stop any motorist alongside the interstate. The police’s authority to search Cherry’s car rested on his inability to produce proof of insurance. Had he been able to drive his car after the routine traffic stop, and had police not pursued the alternate justification that they smelled burning marijuana, it is unlikely that the inventory search could have occurred. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998). 8 No. 04-3527 safety is unassailable. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (“The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.”); see, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2001) (truck towed from alongside road because driver’s license suspended). Moreover, a third written policy introduced by the government, General Order 17-4, provided unambiguous authority for the police to tow Cherry’s car. See Gen. Order 17-4, “Illegally Parked, Abandoned and Inoperable Vehicles,” § 2.4 (2003). The policy states that “ANY VEHICLE THAT PRESENTS AN IMMEDIATE HAZARD TO PUBLIC SAFETY WILL BE TOWED” and defines “immediate hazard” to include a vehicle that “creates or constitutes a traffic hazard which impedes the efficient movement of traffic” or “obstructs or may obstruct the movement of any emergency vehicle.” Id. at §§ 2.4, 1 (capitalization in the original). As the officers testified, without challenge from Cherry, a car parked alongside an interstate highway meets this definition. Cherry urges a different interpretation of the policies, principally arguing that § 6.1 of General Order 17-18 is exhaustive as to the circumstances under which a tow is authorized. That contention, however, ignores that Cherry’s car was towed not only because he lacked proof of insurance but also because the car could not be left alongside the interstate without creating a hazard—a circumstance not addressed in General Order 17-18. General Order 17-4, which Cherry does not confront, explicitly addresses parked vehicles that present a hazard and provided unambiguous authority to tow Cherry’s car. And, though he may disagree with the reading given General Order 17-18 by the police witnesses and the district court, we do not understand why General Order 17-4 is not dispositive. The officers’ testimony at the suppression hearing, moreover, confirms the district court’s view of police policy. No. 04-3527 9 See Lomeli, 76 F.3d at 149 (relying in part on officer’s understanding of police policy). Officers Batis and Harris both testified that the police department’s “common practice” is to tow illegally parked cars after an officer discovers the driver lacks insurance. Harris did acknowledge an alternate reading of the written policy when cross-examined by Cherry’s attorney, but Batis testified without challenge that Cherry’s car had to be towed (after an inventory search) because it was parked illegally. The officers’ testimony strengthens our view that the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.2 Nor was the search unreasonable. “Warrantless inventory searches of cars in police custody are also proper as long as the police lawfully have custody of the vehicles.” United States v. Jensen, 169 F.3d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, again relying on General Order 17-18, Cherry argues that it was unnecessary for the police to take custody of his car and trigger an inventory search because, in his view, he had the option of requesting a towing company (and presumably specifying the destination of the car). See Gen. Order 17-18, at § 5.2(B). But, putting aside that Cherry never did say that he wanted to arrange for a tow himself, the answer is the same: General Order 17-4, not General Order 17-18, covers parked vehicles that present a hazard, and General Order 17-4 directed the police to tow the car. That directive 2 The dissent observes that police “conduct cannot fill a gap in the policy” because, in this case, the police searched Cherry’s car “because they were looking for marijuana.” Post, at 18. The officers, though, testified to the department’s “established routine” for such stops. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); United States v. Lozano, 171 F.3d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 350-51 (7th Cir. 1996). Their testimony—that cars like Cherry’s are towed as a matter of practice—is consistent with our interpretation of Joliet policy. 10 No. 04-3527 does not compel the officers at the scene to invite or accept input from the motorist as to the appropriate disposition of his vehicle, nor does the Fourth Amendment demand that police offer a motorist an alternative means of removing his vehicle that will avoid the need to tow it and conduct an inventory search.3 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1987) (police need not give motorist “an opportunity to make alternative arrangements” that avoid impoundment); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (“The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.”); Privett, 68 F.3d at 104 (finding search within inventory exception to Fourth Amendment, even though vehicle could have been towed to motorist’s home rather than impound lot); United States v. Skillern, 947 F.2d 1268, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1991) (police not required to offer motorist alternative to impoundment); cf. United States v. Penn, 233 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2000) (absent policy requiring consent of owner for search, police need not allow motorist to remove property from car prior to routine inventory search). Thus, even if events conspired to deprive Cherry of the opportunity to request a specific towing company, no Fourth Amendment violation has occurred; the police were free to tow his hazardously parked car pursuant to their standard policy, in furtherance of their “community caretaking” function. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); see Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375-76; Lomeli, 76 F.3d at 148 (7th Cir. 1996). AFFIRMED. 3 We decline to reach the hypothetical suggested by the dissent, post, at 19. The record does not show that Cherry requested that a specific company tow his car to his home, or elsewhere. Colorado v. Bertine does not require the police to offer that alternative, see 479 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1987), and thus we need not decide whether police would have a valid interest in conducting an inventory search of a car under those circumstances. No. 04-3527 11