Opinion ID: 1181110
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Channel 40 Movies.

Text: One of the mental disorders defendant sought to prove in support of his defenses of diminished capacity and insanity was PTSD. [2] Psychologist Dr. Joan Blunt testified that, based on her psychological testing of defendant, her review of Tobey Hospital records of a head injury he received from a bicycle accident at age 12, and his behavioral history, she believed that defendant has both functional and organic brain damage. As a result of brain damage, defendant would have decreased stress tolerance, making it difficult for him to function in an environment that did not take his impairment into account. With this personality, defendant was at a higher than usual risk of developing pathology as a result of exposure to severe combat in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, Dr. Blunt related, defendant sustained additional head trauma. In order to cope with the stress, he began taking more drugs and alcohol, which compounded his stress. On his return from Vietnam, defendant reportedly manifested symptoms characteristic of the PTSD suffered by the returning Vietnam War veteran. These included increased use of drugs and alcohol, a personality shift, hostility, explosive behavior, bar fights, suicide attempts, sleep disorder, a hyperalert state, a strong tendency to dissociate, and an upset reaction to symbols of Vietnam, such as green garbage bags, which reminded him of body bags, and certain music or words on the radio that reminded him of Vietnam. An individual suffering PTSD, Dr. Blunt stated, typically would seek avoidance of ideas or symbols that would trigger memory of the traumatic event. According to the report of Theresa Babbitt, defendant's former common law wife, defendant manifested symbol avoidance behavior in that he was upset by the sight of any kind of green garbage bag, and when he heard music on the radio that reminded him of Vietnam, he would get up and turn it off. (1a) The evidence showed that Leah Schendel's apartment was on the way of one route from the Stix Bar to defendant's home and that because of her emphysema Ms. Schendel often kept the regular door of her apartment open, leaving only the screen door closed and locked. Relying on Dr. Blunt's testimony concerning defendant's likely adverse reaction to symbols of Vietnam, and evidence that when Ms. Schendel's body was found her television set was turned on to channel 40, with the sound off, defense counsel sought to introduce evidence of the movies shown on channel 40 the night of Ms. Schendel's murder in an effort to prove that the movies, containing sounds of gunfire and Asian appearing people in evil roles, [3] may have drawn defendant to Ms. Schendel's apartment and triggered his violent attack. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's relevance objection. Defendant argues that this ruling was error. Except as otherwise provided by statute, no evidence is admissible except relevant evidence. (Evid. Code, ง 350.) Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact.... ( Id., ง 210.) (2a) The trial court is vested with wide discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 19 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) The court, however, has no discretion to admit irrelevant evidence. ( People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 321 [208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669].) Speculative inferences that are derived from evidence cannot be deemed to be relevant to establish the speculatively inferred fact in light of Evidence Code section 210, which requires that evidence offered to prove or disprove a disputed fact must have a tendency in reason for such purpose. ( People v. De La Plane (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 223, 244 [151 Cal. Rptr. 843], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 39, fn. 25.) (1b) In the instant case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence of the violent movies shown on channel 40 the night of Leah Schendel's murder. There is no evidence that the television set was turned on before defendant attacked Ms. Schendel, or that defendant heard or saw either of the movies before he cut open Ms. Schendel's screen door and entered her apartment. The evidence is to the contrary. [4] Consequently, the program content of channel 40 would have no tendency in reason to prove or disprove defendant's mental state at the time of the offenses. (2b) The inference which defendant sought to have drawn from the [proffered evidence] is clearly speculative, and evidence which produces only speculative inferences is irrelevant evidence. ( People v. De La Plane, supra, 88 Cal. App.3d at p. 242, italics in original.) Defendant cites People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251] and People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 [226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99] for the proposition that the evidence was admissible notwithstanding the absence of any proof that he actually heard or saw the television before he forcibly entered Ms. Schendel's apartment or before he attacked her. The cases are distinguishable. In Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d 505, we upheld the trial court's admission, over defendant's objection, of evidence that a substance on his shoes tested positive for blood (although it could have been some other substance), stating that the evidence certainly has some tendency in reason to prove that [defendant] might have been present at the scene of a bloody shooting.... ( Id. at p. 527, italics in original; see Evid. Code, ง 210.) The case is merely consistent with the principle that the trial court has broad discretion to determine the relevance of evidence ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 19), a discretion patently not abused under the facts. In Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, we rejected the principle that third-party-culpability evidence is admissible only on a preliminary showing of a `substantial probability' of third-party guilt and reaffirmed the admissibility of any relevant evidence that raises a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt.... (41 Cal.3d at p. 829.) Rejecting defendant's contention that his constitutional right to present a defense precludes any application of Evidence Code section 352 to third-party-culpability evidence because even remote evidence of motive could raise a reasonable doubt of guilt, this court stated: As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's right to present a defense. Courts retain, moreover, a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 834.) (1c) In the instant case the excluded channel 40 program schedule would at most have provided a link in an incomplete chain of speculative inferences. Exclusion of the evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
(3a) During the sanity phase of trial, defendant again sought to prove the contents of the channel 40 films and to demonstrate their potential connection with his actions. Defense counsel's offer of proof was made by way of cross-examination of Dr. Elmer F. Galioni, the court-appointed psychiatrist. The trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. Defendant maintains that this ruling was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his due process right to present relevant defense evidence. On direct examination by the prosecutor, Dr. Galioni testified that his diagnosis of defendant was that he had a passive-aggressive personality disorder. He described the condition as a character disorder where an individual rebels against society's expectations, and when confronted with the need to maintain responsibility, he becomes aggressive and may lash out openly aggressively. In Dr. Galioni's opinion, defendant's asserted amnesia about the offenses was either a functional amnesia that was developed after the fact to eliminate or blot out unpleasant memories, or a feigned amnesia. On cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr. Galioni testified that although some of defendant' reported behavior was consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD, he did not make that diagnosis because some elements did not fit, particularly the fact that defendant's behavior was not always avoidant. When an individual who suffers from PTSD encounters a stimulus that reminds him of the traumatic event, his natural reaction and instinct is to try to get away from it rather than going towards it. [5] Defense counsel then sought to examine Dr. Galioni about defense exhibit T, a certified copy of the channel 40 program log. At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Dr. Galioni testified that without further information โ how defendant got to Ms. Schendel's apartment, the circumstances of his entry, whether he heard the television, more evidence about defendant's disorder โ it would be speculative for him to attach any significance to the program content of channel 40 in evaluating defendant's behavior the night of the Schendel offenses. The trial court ruled that the consumption of time required for proof of the channel 40 program content and its connection to defendant's behavior outweighed the probative value of the evidence, especially in view of [Dr. Galioni's] ultimate position in this matter. This ruling was not error. In his offer of proof, defendant was unable to demonstrate that the inference concerning his state of mind sought to be drawn from the channel 40 program log was anything more than speculative. As previously stated, exclusion of evidence that produces only speculative inferences is not an abuse of discretion. ( People v. De La Plane, supra, 88 Cal. App.3d at p. 242; People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 321; see Evid. Code, ง 350.) Relying on Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 [18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1920] and its progeny, defendant asserts that the trial court's authority under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude relevant evidence must yield to his constitutional right to present a defense. The principle applies, however, only to relevant and material evidence. ( Washington v. Texas, supra, at p. 23 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1025]; see Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302 [18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1920] [critical evidence].) (4) As the court correctly stated in People v. Reeder (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 543 [147 Cal. Rptr. 275]: Evidence Code section 352 must bow to the due process right of a defendant to a fair trial and to his right to present all relevant evidence of significant probative value to his defense. In Chambers v. Mississippi [ supra, 410 U.S. 284], it was held that the exclusion of evidence, vital to a defendant's defense, constituted a denial of a fair trial in violation of constitutional due process requirements. [ถ] We do not mean to imply, however, that a defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant evidence in his favor, no matter how limited in probative value such evidence will be so as to preclude the trial court from using Evidence Code section 352. ( Id. at p. 553, italics in original; see People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, 834; see also Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 689 [90 L.Ed.2d 636, 644, 106 S.Ct. 2142] [recognizing trial court's `wide latitude' in making ordinary evidentiary rulings].) (3b) Here, because defendant's evidence failed to meet the threshold requirement of relevance, its exclusion pursuant to section 352 did not implicate any due process concerns. (See People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826; People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 588 [217 Cal. Rptr. 212, 703 P.2d 1106].)