Opinion ID: 37862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment

Text: 6 Odutayo challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the evidence was the fruit of a warrantless, unconstitutional search. We review de novo the district court's legal conclusions regarding a motion to suppress. See United States v. Washington, 340 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir.2003). Following the lead from the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977), this circuit has employed a two-step analysis for determining the constitutionality of a warrantless search or seizure. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1074 (5th Cir.1980). First, the government must establish some statutory or legal authority under which it acted. In the absence of such authority, a court must conclude, without any further consideration, that the search or seizure was unconstitutional. Id. In the presence of such authority, the Court must then determine whether the duly authorized search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir.1991) (detailing the two-part test). 7
8 Inspector Taylor acted under the authority of 22 U.S.C. § 401. In pertinent part, it reads: 9 Whenever an attempt is made to export or ship from or take out of the United States any arms or munitions of war or other articles in violation of law, or whenever it is known or there shall be probable cause to believe that any arms or munitions of war or other articles are intended to be or are being or have been exported or removed from the United States in violation of law, the Secretary of the Treasury, or any person duly authorized for the purpose by the President, may seize and detain such [articles].... 10 22 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1994). Section 401(a) thus provides that probable cause is necessary to seize and detain certain illegal articles. Although the provision does not explicitly speak to searches, this circuit has held that § 401(a) implicitly provides statutory authority for searches. Samora v. United States, 406 F.2d 1095, 1098 (5th Cir.1969). Odutayo concedes that § 401(a) provides governmental officials the power to perform searches, but he nevertheless contends that that power is subject to a probable cause limitation. 11 There is nothing in the statute that places such a restriction on searches, and we refuse to create one. 2 Section 401(a) is nearly identical to its predecessor, the Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. VI, 40 Stat. 223 (1917), which applied its probable cause requirement only to seizures, and not searches. See United States v. Ajlouny, 629 F.2d 830, 836 (2d Cir.1980). As the Second Circuit noted in Ajlouny, the Espionage Act was designed to protect innocent owners and claimants from the inconvenience and expense associated with unwarranted seizure and detention of their property. Id. (emphases added). We agree with the Second Circuit that [t]here is no indication ... that the law was also intended to protect persons against the less serious interference with property rights associated with a customs search.  Id. (emphasis added). Finally, placing such a stringent requirement onto border searches would tend to gut the ability of law enforcement to seize contraband, as probable cause for many seizures will be established only after a search of a package's contents. See, e.g., United States v. Marti, 321 F.Supp. 59, 63-64 (S.D.N.Y.1970) (An agent may not seize contraband until he confirms his belief that such material is, in fact, being exported or removed from the United States. Confirmation can usually come only from a preliminary search.). Accordingly, we hold that Inspector Taylor's search was authorized by § 401(a). 12
13 Because Inspector Taylor acted within his legal authority, his actions can only be unconstitutional if they were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides, [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Because of that textual requirement, searches or seizures performed without the authority of a warrant are per se unreasonable. United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir.1993). There are, however, a few narrowly defined exceptions, id., one of which is for routine searches at `the international border or its functional equivalent.' United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir.1998)) (emphases omitted). This longstanding, historical[ ] exception to the Fourth Amendment's general requirement of a warrant was based on rationales relating to incoming cargo. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 622, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977). 14 The district court determined that the search was routine, a finding that Odutayo does not challenge on appeal. Rather, he argues that even if the search was routine, the traditional border search exception should not be extended to outgoing searches. If he is right, then the evidence here must be suppressed because Inspector Taylor lacked the necessary probable cause. 15 The Supreme Court indicated in California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz that the border search exception might apply to outgoing searches, saying that those entering and leaving the country may be examined as to their belongings and effects, all without violating the Fourth Amendment. 416 U.S. 21, 63, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974). Although dicta, a number of our sister circuits—the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth—have extended the border exception to outgoing searches. See Ajlouny, 629 F.2d at 834; United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136, 143 (3d Cir.1991); United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1296-97 (4th Cir.1995); United States v. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d 414, 420-23 (6th Cir.2003); United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 838-40 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 977 (9th Cir.1982). 3 16 Although this circuit has not adopted the border search exception for outgoing searches in toto, it has viewed such an application favorably. See Roberts, 274 F.3d at 1013 (citing United States v. Salinas-Garza, 803 F.2d 834 (5th Cir.1986)) (discussing Salinas-Garza 's implicit recognition that the Constitution requires less than probable cause for outgoing border searches); Berisha, 925 F.2d at 795 (applying the border search exception to outgoing currency searches). In United States v. Berisha, this Court addressed the extension of the routine border search exception as applied to outgoing currency searches. 925 F.2d at 795. There, we noted that incoming and outgoing border searches have several features in common. Id. In both, the government is interested in protecting some interest of United States citizens, there is a likelihood of smuggling attempts at the border, and the individual is on notice that his privacy may be invaded when he crosses the border. Id. These considerations certainly apply in the context here: stemming the illegal exportation of weapons and other equipment implicates a strong national security interest for U.S. citizens and there is certainly a reduced expectation of privacy for passengers (whose luggage is, among other things, routinely x-rayed by airport security) on international flights. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d at 422-23. 17 We went on to say in Berisha that in the specific context of currency exchanges, the underlying purpose for the foreign transaction reporting requirements was to regulate the export of monetary instruments in order to prevent the use of international currency transactions to evade domestic criminal, tax, and regulatory laws. Berisha, 925 F.2d at 795. The interest in the regulation of the exportation of weapons, ammunition, and encryption technology, similar to the interest in the flow of currency, represents the fundamental power—indeed, responsibility—of every sovereign nation to maintain its national security. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d at 423 (From the sovereign's power to protect itself is derived its power to prohibit the export of its currency, national treasures, and other assets. ) (quoting Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1297) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, inherent in national sovereignty are the overarching rights of a nation ... to secure its territory and assets. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1296. Outgoing searches implicate these national security and territorial integrity interests. Therefore, today we join our sister circuits in holding that the border search exception applies for all outgoing searches at the border.