Opinion ID: 775611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the Asserted Taking

Text: 24 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has recognized that the government may take private property by either physical invasion or regulation. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-15 (1992); Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 25 As discussed above, the plaintiffs in this case allege regulatory takings by the federal government. It is axiomatic that only persons with a valid property interest at the time of the taking are entitled to compensation. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973); Pro-Eco, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Jay County, Indiana, 57 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1995); Cavin v. United States, 956 F.2d 1131, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, OSM denied the permit in a final action on April 13, 1994. However, EMI voluntarily chose not to renew its leasehold interest in August of 1990. Thus, as of February 28, 1991, EMI possessed no valid property interest from which it could assert a takings claim. 26 EMI attempts to sidestep this critical requirement by arguing that the government action constituting the taking occurred in 1990, before the April 13, 1994 final action. In other words, EMI argues that government delay prior to February 28, 1991 amounted to a permanent taking of its leasehold interest to mine the Cane property. Indeed, the trial court reasoned that [i]f a permit had been granted before August 1990, [EMI] would have extended the lease for as long as necessary to mine all the merchantable coal in the ground. E. Minerals, 39 Fed. Cl. at 626. The trial court excused EMI's decision to relinquish its leasehold interest because it determined that the permit application, and thus the lease renewal, would have been futile. However, such speculatory reasoning belies the bedrock requirement that the existence of a valid property interest is necessary in all takings claims. See U.S. Const. amend. V. It is true that the futility exception may sometimes excuse a property owner from submitting multiple applications when the manner in which the first application was rejected makes it clear that no project will be approved. Heck v. United States, 134 F.3d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998). However, the futility exception can never excuse the prerequisite that there exist a valid property interest for all takings cases. 27 The fact remains that EMI chose to relinquish its leasehold interest well before OSM's final decision. If EMI had renewed its lease, it may have been able to assert a permanent taking of its leasehold interest to mine the Cane property. However, we cannot allow the voluntary relinquishment of a property interest to transform a temporary taking into a permanent taking. 6 Moreover, although EMI continued to pursue the permit application, it never informed OSM that it had relinquished its leasehold interest. Had OSM been aware of this fact, it would have been required to deny immediately the permit application because EMI no longer had a right of access to mine the property. See 30 C.F.R. 778.15 (2001). For this reason, EMI cannot legally assert a permanent takings claim subsequent to February 28, 1991, and moreover, for the reasons discussed below, we find that there has been no compensable taking prior to February 28, 1991.