Opinion ID: 1300630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to define first degree murder for the jury.

Text: Soon after the trial court responded to the jury's inquiry regarding the meaning of the term special circumstance, the jury requested the judge define the term first degree murder. After having the jurors returned to the courtroom, the trial judge opined that the jury is asking for the legal definition of first degree murder. I am not going to give that to you in that it is not really for you to decide whether this is first degree murder or not. It is and it has been so found, and you are just to accept that as a fact and proceed from there. As far as the facts of the event, you have heard that and that's before you, and you are to make your decision based upon all the evidence presented at the trial. After further deliberations, the jury sent the judge another note, stating We need a specific definition of what first degree murder is. Conferring with the prosecutor and defense counsel, the trial judge admitted he did not understand the message but was ready to provide the jury with the appropriate definitions. The prosecutor had no objection, but defense counsel vigorously opposed any additional murder instructions. After argument, the trial court decided to write the jury a note which said: You must accept as an established fact that defendant is guilty of first degree murder. As far as penalty is concerned, you have all of the instructions upon which you are to determine whether it is to be death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. I cannot instruct you further on this subject. The jury continued its deliberation and at one point asked to rehear Laufenberger's testimony. However, the jury did not indicate it could not reach a verdict without the definition of first degree murder. It made no further request for that definition. Two days after its last inquiry on the subject, the jury announced it had reached a verdict. (8) Defendant contends a penalty reversal is required because of the trial court's erroneous failure to define first degree murder for the jury. Of course, the trial court bears the responsibility of instructing the jury on all the general principles of law raised by the evidence which are necessary for the jury's proper understanding of the case. ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 323.) Moreover, [a]fter the jury have retired for deliberation, ... if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the case, ... the information required must be given.... (ง 1138; see also People v. Miller (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 233, 236 [174 Cal. Rptr. 479].) Defendant argues the jury's two inquiries demonstrated that it did not understand the very basic legal definitions and principles which governed the penalty phase deliberations. Defendant's claim must be rejected for two reasons. First, his trial counsel invited any error by explicitly opposing first degree murder instructions in response to the jury's request. The record indicates counsel did not act from ignorance or mistake, but for specific tactical reasons. ( People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228-229 [207 Cal. Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]; Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 330-335.) He feared that if the penalty jurors were reminded of the mental states necessary for first degree murder findings, his penalty phase argument that defendant acted in response to paranoid hallucinations would be undermined. The guilt jury was instructed on both premeditation and robbery-murder theories of first degree murder. The general verdict did not indicate which theory of conviction was chosen, but the evidence for either was adequate. ( Murtishaw I, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 749-752.) Thus, the guilt jury validly found that defendant killed with unlawful intent and premeditation, or in the course of a crime โ robbery โ requiring the specific intent to steal, or both. ( Ibid. ) Court and counsel were well aware of this fact while discussing the appropriate response to the penalty jury's inquiry. [9] In that context, defense counsel argued vigorously that the penalty jury should not be allowed to go back and second-guess the issue of defendant's guilt. As counsel explained, Actually we are getting into the guilt phase, and then they have to make a determination as to whether or not there was in fact premeditation, deliberation, malice of forethought [ sic ] intent to kill, whether there was an intent to rob, these kinds of things, which are totally foreign, I think, to the penalty phase, and we should not get into this.... (Italics added.) Later in the discussion, the court noted that the sentencing factor of extreme mental disturbance (ง 190.3, factor (d); former ง 190.3, factor (c)), on which the instant jury had been instructed, was related to some of the mental elements in first degree murder instructions, such as intent, malice, premeditation, self-defense, and so forth. So it seems to me I should not reinstruct them on first degree murder because they have already been instructed on the relevant parts. The following colloquy then occurred: [ถ] MR. LEDDY [the prosecutor]: I don't know. Defense counsel put a lot of witnesses on that said the defendant couldn't deliberate, premeditate, et cetera, and โ [ถ] MR. COOK [defense counsel]: I didn't say that in my argument, if that's โ [ถ] Q [apparently by Mr. Leddy]: But you did put witnesses on who were asked that question. [ถ] MR. COOK: Well, I don't think โ that's not an issue here. The fact is they were instructed as to mitigation and aggravation, and the definition of first degree murder and the elements of first degree murder are not a part of the factors in aggravation and mitigation. It's not a part of the penalty, phase, and to do so I think would โ [ถ] THE COURT: I agree. I think that anything โ [ถ] MR. COOK: โ cause a real problem. (Italics added.) It seems manifest that counsel wished to prevent the second penalty jury from learning that previously found elements of first degree murder were inconsistent with the mitigating factors counsel sought to establish. As noted, defendant's penalty case centered on the premise that he had acted from temporary mental derangement. The jury's understanding that the prior convictions implied a contrary finding might well have prejudiced his case. We are therefore satisfied that counsel opposed first degree murder instructions for plausible tactical reasons. Any error in their omission was thus invited, and defendant may not complain now. In any event, the trial court acted properly by declining to define first degree murder. The meaning of first degree murder was not a general principle of law necessary to the jury's proper understanding of the case. ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 323.) The only relevance of the guilt phase evidence was whether the jury might find factors in aggravation or mitigation from the circumstances of the crime. Since the jury was informed of such circumstances, we find no error in failing to instruct on first degree murder. Indeed, we had held under earlier death penalty statutes that such instructions were not required, despite our recognition that those laws provided no express penalty standards and allowed the sentencer to consider any fact in aggravation or mitigation, including lingering doubts about defendant's guilt. ( People v. Terry (1969) 70 Cal.2d 410, 419-420 [77 Cal. Rptr. 460, 454 P.2d 36]; People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, 451 [47 Cal. Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641]; People v. Clark (1965) 62 Cal.2d 870, 887-888 [44 Cal. Rptr. 784, 402 P.2d 856].) No different result is required under the 1977 statute, which provides more specific guidelines for exercise of the jury's penalty discretion. Defendant cites cases from California and other jurisdictions which he claims lead to a different result. All are inapposite, since they involve situations where the jury's request for clarifying instructions was pertinent to an issue the jury was directly required to decide. (E.g., Miller, supra, 120 Cal. App.3d 233 [defendant charged with assault causing great bodily injury; jury asked for clarifying instructions on meaning of term great bodily injury]; People v. Vela (1985) 172 Cal. App.3d 237 [218 Cal. Rptr. 161] [trial court incorrectly answered, then refused to re-answer, rape jury's requested clarification whether rape legally occurs when, after consensual penetration, woman changes mind but man continues with act of intercourse]; State v. Couch (Utah 1981) 635 P.2d 89 [sodomy prosecution; jury requested definition of genitals]; People v. Miller (1959) 6 N.Y.2d 152 [188 N.Y.S.2d 534, 160 N.E.2d 74] [homicide case; refusal to reinstruct on felony murder]; Commonwealth v. Smith (1908) 221 Pa. 552 [70 A. 850] [homicide case; refusal to reinstruct on premeditation].) (9) Defendant also claims section 1138 requires reversal. As stated above, section 1138 requires the trial court to instruct the jury, at its request, on any point of law arising in the case. Although defendant asserts the legal definition of first degree murder is eminently qualified as a point of law arising in the case, we disagree. Defendant's guilt of that crime having already been established, the jury need only know the circumstances of the crime in order to assist it in deciding on the appropriate penalty. Defendant cites four cases allegedly supporting his interpretation of section 1138, but they are not controlling inasmuch as none concern the trial court's duty to give clarifying instructions. Instead, all four involve the trial court's failure to have testimony reread to the jury. ( People v. Henderson (1935) 4 Cal.2d 188 [48 P.2d 17]; People v. Litteral (1978) 79 Cal. App.3d 790 [145 Cal. Rptr. 186]; People v. Butler (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 273 [120 Cal. Rptr. 647]; People v. York (1969) 272 Cal. App.2d 463 [77 Cal. Rptr. 441].) Of course, any testimony given at trial may be pertinent to the jury's decision. Since the definition of first degree murder was not a point of law arising in the case, it follows there was no violation of section 1138.