Opinion ID: 1101314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the trial court committed several reversible errors which require a new trial

Text: ¶ 41. GMAC also argues that the trial court committed a number of errors which require a new trial. We agree. The trial judge below allowed irrelevant and inflammatory testimony and evidence to be introduced to the jury. As a result, GMAC was irreparably prejudiced such that a reversal is required and a new trial necessary based on the errors below.
¶ 42. GMAC first alleges that Baymon proffered irrelevant and prejudicial testimony implying that GMAC's CPI program disproportionately impacted racial minorities. GMAC claims that Baymon's counsel made an obvious effort to inflame the emotions of the jury, ten (10) of whose members were African-American. Baymon contends that the statements about the impact of the GMAC program on African-Americans is not a per se appeal to racial prejudice, especially where the evidence supports the reference. ¶ 43. Mississippi Rules of Evidence 402 and 403 address the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence respectively. Rule 402 says in part that [e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible. M.R.E. 402. Rule 403 states that: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. M.R.E. 403. In Shell Oil Co. v. Pou, 204 So.2d 155, 157 (Miss. 1967), we stated that, [a]ppeals to passion and prejudice are always improper and should never be allowed. See also Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hall, 252 Miss. 863, 877, 174 So.2d 488, 493-94 (1965) (condemning the use of inflammatory language calculated to mislead the jury and which has no relation to the issues of fact which are being presented to the jury for determination.). ¶ 44. The court allowed one of Baymon's experts, Mr. Sibbring, to testify that during his years selling CPI policies in Ohio, he observed that CPI was disproportionately placed on racial minorities. Baymon's counsel, Don Barrett, emphasized this testimony in his summation, stating that, [h]e [Sibbring] told you who the obvious targets were ... ¶ 45. Barrett went on to insinuate that Defendant Sharron Mitchell, an African-American, had been subject to racial discrimination as an employee of GMAC: Ms. Mitchell, she's obviously a very smart lady. She got her Masters, I believe. It sort of struck me that they never gave her any more responsibility than she had. I wonder about that, but they didn't. In his rebuttal argument, Barrett wondered aloud, what is she doing after 20 years, this lady this capable, this smart, with a master's degree ... why do they have her in practically a clerical job? Why isn't she in management? ¶ 46. GMAC moved for a mistrial, but the trial court denied GMAC's motion and refused to admonish counsel against continuing to make racially inflammatory arguments. Finally, in his argument to the jury on punitive damages, Barrett claimed openly that [t]he uncontradicted evidence in this case is that GMAC's victims are working people on the economic edge, struggling, predominately ... African-Americans. ¶ 47. This Court finds that the trial court erred in allowing Baymon to use irrelevant, prejudicial and inflammatory statements to prove that GMAC discriminated against African-Americans. Baymon introduced no proof of such actions by GMAC, save the unsupported declarations of her expert and counsel. Baymon's trial counsel blatantly played the race card before the jury which was over 90% African-American. Such unfounded declarations of racial bias irreparably infected the proceeding below. As such, the trial court was in error when it permitted the introduction of the statements and when it refused to grant GMAC's motion for a mistrial.
¶ 48. GMAC contends that Baymon's experts were improperly allowed to testify concerning matters outside their areas of expertise. Baymon's contention that GMAC's conduct in obtaining CPI for her vehicle was wrongful rested almost entirely on the testimony of two witnesses who appeared as experts on her behalfDonald Sibbring and Thomas Myers. ¶ 49. A witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify and offer opinions if his scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. M.R.E. 702. However, this Court will limit an expert's testimony to matters within his demonstrated area of expertise. Seal v. Miller, 605 So.2d 240, 247 (Miss. 1992). ¶ 50. This Court finds that these experts were improperly allowed by the trial judge to testify to areas outside of their stated fields of expertise. ¶ 51. Thomas Myers was admitted as an expert in the area of lending practices. However, he professed no expertise regarding the insurance industry generally or CPI in particular. Nevertheless, Myers was permitted, over GMAC's objections, to present testimony and opinions regarding MIC's premiums and profits. For example, Myers was permitted to testify that MIC earned $28 million in profits on CPI in one year, and that MIC's profits for that year had exceeded the amounts predicted in state rate filings. ¶ 52. Baymon's second expert, Donald Sibbring, was accepted as an expert on CPI over GMAC's objections. Sibbring's claim to expertise was based on his experience selling and servicing CPI policies to ten (10) to twelve (12) companies. Sibbring had not sold CPI policies since 1984, and had never sold CPI in Mississippi. Sibbring was allowed to testify that GMAC grossly overcharged Baymon for insurance, should not have received any commission and should have recovered the costs of tracking its finance charges from all customers. ¶ 53. This assignment of error is proper. The court allowed Baymon's experts to testify far outside their fields of expertise and as such committed reversible error.