Opinion ID: 711627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the defamation instruction

Text: 2 In Count VIII of her Third Amended Complaint, Mann alleged that Barnard and O'Hara had defamed Mann by making false statements about her job performance and competence as an attorney to her superiors within the Law Department; Mann also alleged that Barnard made additional defamatory statements to prospective employers outside the Law Department. The parties agree that because Barnard and O'Hara made any such statements in fulfillment of their duties as employees of the City, they enjoyed a qualified privilege and can only be held liable if Mann proved that the defendants made a defamatory statement or statements with actual malice. See Krasinski v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 530 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ill.1988); Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 645 N.E.2d 250, 258-59 (Ill.App.1994), appeal allowed, 652 N.E.2d 338 (1995); Davis v. John Crane, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 929, 937-38 (Ill.App.1994); Muthuswamy v. Burke, 646 N.E.2d 616, 620 (Ill.App.1993). At issue here is an instruction concerning the malice element of the defamation claim. With the parties' agreement, the district court advised the jury that a statement is made with actual malice if the defendant made the statement despite knowing that it was false or despite a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity or entertaining serious doubts as to its truth. R. 406. However, over Mann's objection, the court went on to instruct the jury that [a] defendant's mere failure to conduct a proper investigation into the truth of a statement before making it to another does not constitute the actual malice required for plaintiff to prevail on her defamation claim. Id. (Defendant's Proposed Instruction 4-B.) Mann argues that the additional instruction conflicted with the court's explanation of actual malice and erroneously suggested to the jury that a defendant might not act with actual malice if he makes a statement without first investigating its veracity, even if he entertains serious doubts on that subject. We agree. 3 It is, in one sense, correct to say that the failure to investigate the truth of a statement does not, in and of itself, establish a defendant's actual malice in making the statement. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325 (1968); Troman v. Wood, 340 N.E.2d 292, 295 (Ill.1975); Jones v. Britt Airways, Inc., 622 F.Supp. 389, 393 (N.D.Ill.1985); Fopay v. Noveroske, 334 N.E.2d 79, 88 (Ill.App.1975); Bloomfield v. Retail Credit Co., 302 N.E.2d 88, 96 (Ill.App.1973); see also Beauvoir v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 484 N.E.2d 841, 844 (Ill.App.1985). But this is merely another way of emphasizing that when a defamatory statement is qualifiedly privileged, ordinary negligence will not suffice to establish liability; at a minimum, the plaintiff will have to show that the defendant acted with reckless disregard of its truth. Durso v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 337 N.E.2d 443, 446 (Ill.App.1975); Bloomfield, 302 N.E.2d at 95. 4 [R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice. 5 St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. at 1325. Thus, when the cases reiterate that the failure to investigate is not alone enough to establish actual malice, they mean simply that additional proof concerning the defendant's mental state is required. A defendant who repeats information without first checking into its accuracy is not reckless so long as he harbors no serious doubts on that score; on the other hand, a defendant who has serious reservations as to the veracity of the information may well be reckless if he repeats the information without investigating. Fopay, 334 N.E.2d at 88-90. The failure to investigate thus remains a very important consideration in assessing the defendant's culpability. Fopay, 334 N.E.2d at 90. 6 The instruction which the district court gave here is misleading in the sense that it suggests that the element of actual malice requires the defendant to have done, or omitted to do, more than simply failing to look into the truth of the statement he made. In fact, so long as the defendant doubted the veracity of the statement, his failure to investigate may well be enough to establish liability. One who suspects that a statement is inaccurate but decides to make it anyway without attempting to establish its truth evinces an indifference that amounts to actual malice. The instruction was misleading in another, more fundamental sense as well. It focused the jury's attention upon a single circumstance which, albeit highly relevant, ultimately is collateral to the central question in a defamation case--the defendant's regard for the accuracy of the complained of statement. For just this reason, the Illinois Supreme Court in Reed v. Northwestern Pub. Co., 530 N.E.2d 474, 487 (Ill.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067, 109 S.Ct. 1344 (1989), upheld the trial court's refusal to give an instruction which advised the jury that it could infer actual malice from a grossly inadequate investigation, emphasizing the court's history of disapproving jury instructions which give undue prominence to particular facts. The instruction should likewise have been refused here. 7 The balance of the instructions given upon defamation did nothing to correct the misguided focus that the mere failure to investigate instruction gave the jury. We must therefore conclude that the jury deliberated with an incorrect impression of the law and that Mann was prejudiced by the mistaken instruction. See generally DePaepe v. General Motors Corp., 33 F.3d 737, 743-44 (7th Cir.1994). Mann is therefore entitled to a new trial on her defamation claim. 8