Opinion ID: 2508462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Distinction Rested on Plain Language

Text: The legislature first criminalized vehicular homicide in 1937. [5] One alternative for committing vehicular homicide was the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner. LAWS OF 1937, ch. 189, § 120. Reckless driving, on the other hand, was criminalized by a different section, which provided: It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner over and along the public highways of this state. For the purpose of this section to operate in a reckless manner shall be construed to mean the operation of a vehicle upon the public highways of this state in such a manner as to indicate either a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Id. § 118 (emphasis added). The phrase [f]or the purpose of this section prompted this court to distinguish negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle and reckless driving in State v. Dickert, 194 Wash. 629, 79 P.2d 328 (1938). There we held the definition of reckless driving in section 118 (i.e., willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property) did not apply to vehicular homicide as defined in section 120. We declined to extend section 118's definition because it expressly provided that, for the purpose of this section,  to operate in a reckless manner means in such a manner as to indicate either a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. The willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is not one of the elements of negligent homicide, as that crime is defined in § 120. Id. at 632, 79 P.2d 328 (emphasis added). The rash or heedless standard first found its way into Washington jurisprudence in State v. Stevick, 23 Wash.2d 420, 161 P.2d 181 (1945), overruled on other grounds by State v. Partridge, 47 Wash.2d 640, 646, 289 P.2d 702 (1955), where we held a jury instruction defining `to operate in a reckless manner' as `in a heedless, careless or rash manner or in a manner indifferent to consequences' was not improper. Stevick, 23 Wash.2d at 426, 427, 161 P.2d 181. Partridge, though overruling Stevick on other grounds, [6] adopted the definition, but pronounced it [did] not wish to limit the trial courts in their definition of the term. Partridge, 47 Wash.2d at 645, 289 P.2d 702. Despite Partridge's proclamation, State v. Bowman, 57 Wash.2d 266, 356 P.2d 999 (1960), addressed a jury instruction which defined `reckless manner' as `heedless, careless or rash manner or in a manner indifferent to consequences.' Bowman, 57 Wash.2d at 270, 356 P.2d 999. We approved the instruction, holding it was `specifically approved' in Partridge. Id. However we cautioned against referencing carelessness in the definition as it could possibly be confused with ordinary negligence. Id. at 271, 356 P.2d 999. We concluded a more precise definition of the terms `to operate a motor vehicle in a reckless manner' would simply be driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.  Id. The majority relies on this statement to reject application of the reckless driving definition of RCW 46.61.500(1). See majority at 200-201. While the definition of reckless manner wavered slightly over the years from Stevick to Bowman, the underlying distinction of the reckless manner definition from the statutory reckless driving definition remains grounded in Dickert's reliance on the reckless driving statute's plain language restricting the willful or wanton standard to that statute alone. Dickert, 194 Wash. at 632, 79 P.2d 328. [7]