Opinion ID: 1998744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Challenges to Eligibility Based Upon the Felony-Murder Aggravation Evidence

Text: Defendant argues that the jury's verdicts on eligibility based upon felony murder were legally insufficient because they omitted the mental elements of the underlying felonies. The section 9-1(b)(6) aggravating factor provides for eligibility in murder cases where the defendant was 18 years or older at the time of the offense (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1994)), and where the victim was killed in the course of another felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)); was killed by the defendant or was physically injured by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with the injuries that caused death (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(a) (West 1994)); the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b) (West 1994)); and the other felony was one of those enumerated in the statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(c) (West 1994)). Relying upon this court's decision in People v. Mack, 167 Ill.2d 525, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437 (1995), defendant contends that the verdict forms finding defendant eligible for the death penalty on the three felony-murder aggravating factors are legally insufficient because they omitted the requisite mental state language that defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)(b) (West 1994). Defendant is correct that the verdict forms on the felony murder eligibility factors were legally insufficient in that they failed to include defendant's mens rea. People v. Jackson, 182 Ill.2d at 68, 230 Ill.Dec. 901, 695 N.E.2d 391, citing People v. Mack, 167 Ill.2d 525, 538, 212 Ill.Dec. 955, 658 N.E.2d 437 (1995). Notwithstanding, the State argues that defendant has waived this claim of error, as defendant neither objected to these points at trial nor raised this claim in his post-trial motions. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill. Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. Defendant argues that the deficiency falls within the purview of the plain error rule, which permits a reviewing court to take notice of plain errors and defects affecting substantial rights in instances where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error affected the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. People v. Fields, 135 Ill.2d 18, 56, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791 (1990). We need not decide this question, because we have determined that defendant was properly found eligible for the death sentence under section 9-1(b)(11), specifically, that defendant committed the murder in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner. This court has repeatedly recognized that under the Illinois death penalty statute, special emphasis is not accorded to any aggravating factor and no added significance is given to multiple aggravating factors as opposed to a single factor. People v. Brown, 169 Ill.2d 132, 164, 214 Ill.Dec. 433, 661 N.E.2d 287 (1996). Therefore, in those instances where a defendant is eligible based upon two or more statutory aggravating factors, the fact that one of those factors may later be invalidated may not impair the eligibility finding as long as a separate, valid aggravating factor supported eligibility. Brown, 169 Ill.2d at 165, 214 Ill.Dec. 433, 661 N.E.2d 287 (citing People v. Page, 156 Ill.2d 258, 268, 189 Ill.Dec. 371, 620 N.E.2d 339 (1993), and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 880-90, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744-50, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 252-58 (1983)). Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair capital sentencing hearing because he was unduly prejudiced when the trial judge allowed the jury to hear that defendant had already been convicted of six counts of murder by the judge at the guilt phase of his trial. Defendant argues that pursuant to section 9-1(b), the only information an eligibility jury needs to know about findings at trial is that the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1994). Defendant therefore contends that the six murder counts should have been merged into one murder conviction, and only that conviction should have been introduced to the jury. Defendant maintains that the events here created a presumption of eligibility in spite of the fact that a defendant is presumed ineligible until proven eligible beyond a reasonable doubt. According to defendant, the introduction of findings of guilt of all the multiple forms of murder as evidence at the eligibility phase constitutes reversible error as it overwhelmed the jury and tainted the entire eligibility hearing, including the jury's determination as to the section 9-1(b)(11) aggravating factor. We need not address defendant's assertions concerning this issue because we have already determined that defendant was properly found eligible for the death penalty under the cold, calculated and premeditated aggravating factor. Even if we were to invalidate a finding of eligibility based upon the three felony-murder aggravating factors, defendant would still be eligible on the basis of the jury's verdict on the cold, calculated and premeditated aggravating factor. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 169 Ill.2d 132, 165, 214 Ill.Dec. 433, 661 N.E.2d 287 (1996) (citing People v. Page, 156 Ill.2d 258, 268, 189 Ill.Dec. 371, 620 N.E.2d 339 (1993), and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 880-90, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744-50, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 252-58 (1983)). We additionally reject defendant's assertion that the alleged error rendered the entire eligibility hearing unfair. The record discloses no support for the defendant's assertion that the jury was overwhelmed by the introduction of the court's findings of guilt.