Opinion ID: 767661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miller's Retaliation Claim

Text: 36 Title VII protects persons not just from certain forms of job discrimination, but from retaliation for complaining about the types of discrimination it prohibits. Dey v. Colt Const. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-3(a)). Miller also argues that American Family violated Title VII by firing her in retaliation for complaining about alleged pregnancy discrimination. She does not have direct evidence that it did so, so she proceeds under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting variant applicable to claims of retaliation. See Dey, 28 F.3d at 1457. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under it, Miller must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression by complaining about discrimination that Title VII covers; (2) she suffered an adverse action by her employer; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse job action. Id. If Miller establishes these elements, then American Family has the burden to produce a legitimate (non- discriminatory) reason for firing her. Id. If it succeeds in doing so, then Miller has the burden to prove that American Family's proffered reasons were not true--that they were a mere pretext for retaliating against her. Id. 37
38 The district court concluded that Miller did not engage in protected expression during her June 1996 meeting with Knapstein and King. The court noted two occasions when Miller did ostensibly discuss pregnancy discrimination--her January 1995 query to Knapstein and King's alleged comment to her in April 1996. The court concluded these events were not sufficiently connected to her termination; they would not support a reasonable inference that American Family fired her after the June meeting because Knapstein and King knew she was complaining about pregnancy discrimination at that meeting. Before us, Miller points to these two instances, as well as other events (so called background facts), and contends the district court impermissibly made credibility determinations by believing King and Knapstein that they did not know Miller was complaining about pregnancy discrimination at that meeting, while not believing her that they did know. Given these background facts, Miller contends, a jury could reasonably infer that her supervisors really knew that her complaints at that meeting centered around her belief of pregnancy discrimination. 39 An employee, of course, need not use the words pregnancy discrimination to bring her speech within Title VII's retaliation protections. See Drake v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 882, 885 (7th Cir. 1998). But she hasto at least say something to indicate her pregnancy is an issue. An employee can honestly believe she is the object of discrimination, but if she never mentions it, a claim of retaliation is not implicated, for an employer cannot retaliate when it is unaware of any complaints. Cf. Dey, 28 F.3d at 1458 (We agree that there generally can be no causal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action if the employer remained unaware of the protected activity.). 40 Here, the district court did not err in holding that Miller did not engage in protected expression at the June 1996 meeting. She said nothing to indicate that pregnancy discrimination was an issue. Her own copious notes (which she testified are a complete and accurate account of that meeting) plainly show that she did not mention pregnancy or even related topics such as children or maternity leave. Her complaints instead concerned a general displeasure with being paid less than her co-workers given her longer tenure and the fact that she had trained some of them. She also complained that a co- worker who was the subject of dozens of complaints was the highest-paid person in the unit. By complaining about matters other than her pregnancies, Miller, if anything, implied that pregnancy was not a factor in American Family's decisions. 41 Miller's background facts include things like her taking maternity leave in 1989, 1991, 1994, and 1995. That is accurate history but has nothing to do with the June meeting with King and Knapstein. Miller has not produced evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that [her employer] more likely than not knew she was concerned about pregnancy discrimination. Senner v. Northcentral Technical College, 113 F.3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original); see also Dey, 28 F.3d at 1459 n. 12. Indeed, as the district court noted, [i]t is undisputed that [Miller] did not engage in statutorily protected expression at any time before or after January 1995, a year and a half prior to her termination. [And] [f]ollowing her remarks to Knapstein in 1995 she worked for a year and a half in apparent harmony with her supervisors and was given the largest [raise] in her department. 42 In sum, the district court did not invade the jury's province to assess credibility. Rather, it correctly concluded that Miller had failed to produce evidence from which a jury could reasonably and more likely than not infer knowledge on the part of her supervisors. See id. at 758; Dey, 28 F.3d at 1459 n. 12. 9 43
44 Even if Miller had established her prima facie case of retaliation, American Family would still be entitled to summary judgment because it presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing her, and Miller did not meet her burden of showing that these reasons were pretextual. See Richter v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 142 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 1998) (when employer articulates legitimate reasons for terminating employee, burden shifts to employee to establish that the proffered reasons were phony). Pretext is more than a mistake on the part of the employer; pretext 'means a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action.' Id. at 1030 (quoting Wolf v. Buss (America) Inc., 77 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996)). Thus, [t]he issue of pretext does not address the correctness or desirability of [the] reasons offered for employment decisions. Rather, it addresses the issue of whether the employerhonestly believes in the reasons it offers. Id. at 1029. 45 American Family's reasons for firing Miller were (1) her raise-or-quit ultimatum was inappropriate; (2) its concern that Miller would not be a team player in the future, given her views about her supervisors' competence and her file on a co-worker; (3) its fear that Miller lacked commitment to the company, given her statements about leaving; and (4) its belief that Miller was unhappy because she was not getting paid what she felt she deserved and would leave soon anyway on her own terms. 46 Miller argues her raise or quit ultimatum was not inappropriate. According to her, this is not simply a threat to leave; rather, it is a threat to leave if you do not stop discriminating against me. Of course, Miller never said (or even implied) that American Family was engaging in pregnancy discrimination. Instead she called her immediate supervisor incompetent and a political hack, and called his supervisor incompetent. Miller had a right to engage in protected conduct without fear of retaliation, but when she says something obviously inappropriate and unprotected, she is not insulated from being fired. Because she did not prove some pretext, American Family's inappropriate ultimatum reason easily holds up. Gleason, 118 F.3d at 1143 (In the summary judgment context, the ultimate burden is on the plaintiff to show that there is some genuine issue of fact as to whether the stated reasons form a pretext for . . . discrimination.). 47 Nor did Miller overcome American Family's other reasons--that she would not be able to be a team player in the future, that she projected a lack of commitment, and that she would be unhappy working with her supervisors and co-workers. True, her work had been good in the past and her supervisors were not concerned with her ability to continue to produce quality work. But someone who keeps a file on a co-worker and trashes her supervisors can reasonably be labeled something other than a team player. As to her lack of commitment, Miller thrice threatened to leave the company. And her second threat was really a promise--then I will be leaving the company . . . . Her third threat only partly retracted (but still confirmed) this promise: Miller clarified that she would not be leaving in the near future. As the district court noted, it is not discriminatory for an employer to take preemptive action against an employee who has announced her intention to leave at the first opportunity. Lastly, based on Miller's repeated threats to quit, it is reasonable to conclude that American Family sincerely believed she was unhappy at the company, and therefore it was in its best interest to terminate her before she left on her own terms. Gleason, 118 F.3d at 1142 (employer is entitled to make reasoned business judgment about whether to continue to employ plaintiff). 10