Opinion ID: 1160457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Instruction on Causation as to the Crime of Murder

Text: In accordance with the pattern instruction set out as CALJIC No. 8.10 (5th ed. 1988), the superior court told the jury that, in order to be guilty of the crime of murder, a person must unlawfully kill[] a human being with malice aforethought or during the commission or attempted commission of an enumerated felony, here robbery. (Certain brackets omitted.) It defined murder of the first degree under the theory of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. It also defined murder of the first degree under the theory of felony-murder robbery or attempted robbery. Specifically, in conformity with the pattern instruction of CALJIC No. 8.21 (5th ed. 1988), it stated that the unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of an enumerated felony, here robbery, is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such felony. (Brackets omitted.) (28) Defendant contends, in substance, that the superior court erred by assertedly failing to instruct on causation as to the crime of murder. Against a claim of this kind, which involves the determination of applicable legal principles, an appellate court reviews a trial court's instruction independently. There was no error. The superior court did not fail to instruct on causation as to the crime of murder. It did indeed instruct thereon. Moreover, it did so adequately. It did not allow guilt to turn on the perpetrator's unrelated act and the victim's unrelated death. Rather, by requiring the perpetrator to kill the victim, it required the act to cause the death. [26] In part, defendant argues to the effect that the superior court should have amplified its instructions: In defining murder pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.10, he says, it should have referred to, and explained, proximate cause. Had he desired such an amplification, he should have requested it of the superior court. He made no request of this sort. Indeed, defense counsel stated, I'm not gonna make any issue out of the proximate cause.... Because defendant did not request amplification of the otherwise adequate instructions below, he may not complain here. (E.g., People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 533 [46 Cal. Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420].) [27] In other part, defendant argues to the effect that the superior court should have clarified its instructions: In defining murder of the first degree under the theory of felony-murder robbery or attempted robbery pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.21, he says, it should have referred not to an unlawful killing occurring during the commission or attempted commission of ... [a] robbery, but rather to one occurring as a direct causal result thereof. Had he desired such a clarification, he should have requested it of the superior court. He made no request of this sort. Indeed, defense counsel acquiesced in the unclarified instruction containing the during-the-commission language instead of the as-a-direct-causal-result alternative. The reasons are plain. The first is legal. An unlawful killing is deemed to occur during the commission or attempted commission of an enumerated felony so long as the fatal blow is struck in its course, even if death does not then result. (2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986) Felony Murder, § 7.5(f), p. 223, fn. 88.) Even though Allen Birkman did not die until the next day, he was fatally stabbed during the commission or attempted commission of a robbery. The second reason is factual. Since Birkman died the day after he was fatally stabbed, the during-the-commission language was more favorable than the as-a-direct-causal-result alternative: the jury would readily find that Birkman was killed as a direct causal result of the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, but might hesitate to find that he was killed  during [its] commission or attempted commission. (Italics added.) Because defendant did not request clarification of the otherwise adequate instructions below, he may not complain here. (E.g., People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 533.) [28]