Opinion ID: 709226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: El Rukn witnesses

Text: 16 According to the evidence introduced in other cases, William Hogan and the United States Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Illinois facilitated drug usage, sexual liaisons, and extensive personal phone calls, by cooperating witnesses from the El Rukn organization, including Hawkins and Kees. See, e.g., Boyd, 833 F.Supp. at 1296, 1324. This evidence of Hawkins' and Kees' post-incarceration criminal activity and receipt of benefits was not disclosed to the defense, nor was it fully testified to at trial. The district court, however, found that such evidence, even assuming it included false testimony and went beyond the realm of cumulative impeachment, was not material given the nature of Hawkins' and Kees' testimony. Because neither Hawkins nor Kees testified that they ever saw Swano pass the money along to Judge Maloney, or even his bagman, McGee, the El Rukn testimony was entirely consistent with the defense's rain-making theory. 17 Maloney responds that the suppressed evidence and borderline false testimony were significant in relation to Hawkins' testimony regarding what Swano told him about the return of the bribe and whether this conversation took place on the 19th or the 27th of June. 4 Under the prosecution's direct examination, Hawkins testified that Swano told him on June 19th that Judge Maloney had returned the bribe. The prosecution attempted to impeach this testimony with a prior inconsistent statement Hawkins made before trial. According to the government, Hawkins had told them earlier that Swano had merely stated on June 19th that the Judge wanted to give the money back, not that he already did. Maloney theorizes that if the jury had known how beholden Hawkins was to the prosecution, it would have inferred that his prior inconsistent statement that the bribe was returned on the 27th was an attempt to tell the prosecution what it wanted to hear. Under this argument, if the jury had discounted his prior inconsistent statement, it would have found the action to be time-barred. Maloney, however, makes a number of questionable assumptions in reaching this conclusion. 18 Initially, the argument assumes that the evidence of drug usage and government favors would have changed the impact of Hawkins' testimony in Maloney's favor. Hawkins' testimony on direct was that the bribe was returned on June 19th. Although the government impeached this testimony with a prior inconsistent statement that the money was returned on the 27th, the defense rehabilitated it on cross-examination and recross when Hawkins admitted that he had testified to the return being on the 19th in trials dating back to 1987 and he admitted that Swano told him the bribe was returned right before Anthony Sumner, a former El Rukn, testified, which was on the 19th. While it is possible the suppressed evidence would have bolstered Maloney's case, it is equally possible that Hawkins would have appeared to be a drug addict who could not be counted on to remember exact dates or conversations in any event. Maloney speculates that if Hawkins' testimony about the return being on the 27th was discredited, Swano's testimony would go uncorroborated and unbelieved on that and all other subjects. That ultimate result is a fairly substantial stretch; it is perhaps more likely that if Hawkins' memory of dates became discounted altogether, then there would have been no one left to support Maloney's basis for the statute of limitations defense. There is no reasonable probability that disclosure of the information would have resulted in Maloney's acquittal on statute of limitations grounds. 19 Even if the suppressed evidence would have caused the jury to believe the bribe was returned on June 19th, it is still not material unless Maloney either withdrew from the conspiracy when the bribe was returned, or his later acts of witness tampering are insufficient to extend the conspiracy for statute of limitations purposes. Given our resolution of these two issues below, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion or committed legal error by denying Maloney's motion for a new trial.