Opinion ID: 1710697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prior Arrest and Bad Acts

Text: For his fourth point for reversal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing Agent Ray to testify concerning the 1994 drug transaction in Clark County and in allowing the State to cross-examine him about a prior arrest in Nevada County. The State argues that such evidence was admissible pursuant to A.R.E. Rule 404(b) because it was relevant to the issue of Appellant's identity. Rule 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Evidence offered under Rule 404(b) must be independently relevant, thus having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 123, 877 S.W.2d 570, 576 (1994) (quoting A.R.E. Rule 401). Evidence may be independently relevant if it shows the identity of the perpetrator. Carter v. State, 295 Ark. 218, 748 S.W.2d 127 (1988). Even if the evidence is relevant, however, it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.; A.R.E. Rule 403. As to the requirement that the probative value not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, we accord the trial judge wide discretion in balancing the conflicting interests. Carter, 295 Ark. 218, 748 S.W.2d 127. On appeal, we will not disturb the trial court's decision to admit or reject evidence submitted under Rule 404(b) absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. Larimore, 317 Ark. 111, 877 S.W.2d 570.
The record demonstrates that Appellant initially objected to the testimony concerning the 1994 drug transaction on the ground that it was irrelevant. The State responded that the testimony was relevant as to Agent Ray's identification of Appellant as the person from whom he had purchased drugs in 1993. The State indicated that the testimony was especially relevant because the defense had put the jury on notice that it challenged the agent's identification of Appellant. Appellant's counsel then responded by arguing that the testimony concerning what Krite actually purchased from Appellant was not relevant to the issue of identification. The trial court overruled the objection, and Agent Ray continued his testimony: Q: And what was given to you by Mr. Krite, Mr. Ray? A: Several rocks of crack cocaine. Q: Alright, now, after this transaction took Appellant counsel's then moved for a mistrial on the ground that the testimony was so prejudicial to Appellant's case that the jury could not possibly view the rest of the evidence against him fairly. The trial court denied the motion. We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of the 1994 drug transaction. An element that must be proved in every case is that the person who stands before the court in the position of the defendant is the one whom the information accuses and to whom the evidence relates. Green v. State, 310 Ark. 16, 832 S.W.2d 494 (1992). The identity of the person who sold the drugs to Agent Ray was a key issue, in light of Appellant's challenge to the agent's identification of him as the person who sold the drugs to the agent from Noland's residence in 1993. The relevance of the evidence therefore went to the issue of identification, as well as to Agent Ray's explanation as to why he did not arrest Appellant for over one year. Notwithstanding the fact that the testimony may have been prejudicial to Appellant, we cannot say that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The testimony was additionally relevant under Rule 404(b) to show Appellant's intent or lack or absence of mistake. In Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993), the appellant wanted the trial court to delete a portion of a taped interview, which referred to an informant's previous purchase of drugs from the appellant. This court held that because the appellant was charged with delivery of a controlled substance in exchange for money, the testimony was admissible to show his intent pursuant to Rule 404(b). Here, Appellant was likewise charged with delivery of a controlled substance and, as such, the testimony of the 1994 drug transaction was relevant to show Appellant's intent or lack of mistake as to the hand-to-hand delivery to Agent Ray in 1993. We are equally unpersuaded that the trial court erred in refusing to grant Appellant's motion for mistrial. Trial courts are granted wide latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial, and we will not reverse the court's decision absent an abuse of that discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party. Brown v. State, 320 Ark. 201, 895 S.W.2d 909 (1995). Among the factors we consider on appeal is whether the defendant requested a cautionary instruction or admonition to the jury. Id. The failure of the defense to request an admonition may negate the mistrial motion. Boyd v. State, 318 Ark. 799, 889 S.W.2d 20 (1994). It is also true that the failure to give an admonition or cautionary instruction is not error where none is requested. Id. The bottom line on mistrials is that the incident must be so prejudicial that the trial cannot, in fairness, continue. Id. at 804, 889 S.W.2d at 22. Based upon our conclusions above, as well as the fact that Appellant did not request a cautionary instruction to the jury, we cannot say that the admission of Agent Ray's testimony deprived Appellant of a fair trial.
On cross-examination, the State asked Appellant whether he had been arrested in Nevada County prior to March 1994. Appellant's counsel objected on the ground that the question was improper because Appellant had not been convicted as a result of the arrest. The trial court ruled that because Agent Ray had testified that he had viewed a photograph of Appellant, the testimony was admissible for that purpose. Appellant then confirmed that he had been arrested in Nevada County prior to March 1994, and that a photograph was taken of him at that time. The State did not inquire further into Appellant's prior arrest. We note at the outset that Appellant did not challenge the admission of this evidence pursuant to Rule 403. Hence, we do not attempt to balance the probative value of the evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice. Appellant argues on appeal that the testimony was inadmissible pursuant to A.R.E. Rule 609 and Rule 404(b). Rule 609 provides for the use of prior convictions as a means for impeaching the credibility of a witness, who places his credibility in issue by the act of taking the witness stand and giving testimony. Here, the evidence of Appellant's prior arrest was not used by the prosecution in an attempt to impeach Appellant's credibility and, thus, Rule 609 is inapplicable to this issue. Rule 404(b) is, however, applicable to this issue, albeit unfavorably to Appellant's position. As previously stated, the identity of the perpetrator in this case was a key issue. This became particularly evident after Appellant testified on direct examination that he had never seen Agent Ray before the day he was arrested in July 1994. The testimony of Appellant's prior arrest in Nevada County was relevant to the issue of Agent Ray's ability to have identified Appellant from a photograph provided by the Nevada County Sheriff's Office. For the reasons outlined above pertaining to the testimony of the 1994 drug transaction, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony of Appellant's prior arrest for the purpose of establishing Agent Ray's identification of Appellant as the person who sold drugs to him.