Opinion ID: 3134244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel During

Text: Guilt-Innocence Phase The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 122--1 et seq.) provides a remedy to criminal defendants who claim that substantial violations of constitutional rights occurred in their trial. A proceeding under the Act is not an appeal, but a collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence. People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1995). The purpose of the proceeding is to permit inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction that have not already been adjudicated or could have been. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d at 370. Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment at trial. Petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide his experts with corroborating data to support their opinions at trial. During his deposition at the post-conviction stage, Jim Pappas, one of petitioner's trial attorneys, testified that trial counsel knew prior to trial about the importance and necessity of providing corroborative documentation to buttress expert witnesses' testimony. Pappas testified that both he and Mike Vonnahmen, petitioner's other trial attorney, believed that it was doubtful that the insanity instruction would be given by the trial court because Fryans' opinion was based solely upon petitioner's statements. Pappas could not recall, but he believed that Vonnahmen had subpoenaed any available records. Pappas also believed that Vonnahmen had talked to petitioner's relatives and investigated any past problems that petitioner had. During his deposition, Vonnahmen confirmed Pappas' recollection. Vonnahmen testified that he conducted no investigation to locate information that would corroborate expert opinion that petitioner suffered from a disorder. Vonnahmen acknowledged that, although he knew petitioner had a prior criminal record and had been incarcerated, he did not subpoena any related documents or any hospital, psychiatric or psychological records. Vonnahmen also acknowledged that he did not obtain the following specific documentation which was included with the post-conviction petition: (a) a police report and hospital admission report dated May 30, 1980, stating that petitioner was found on a highway suffering from an apparent drug overdose from glue, possibly speed and other controlled substances; (b) a hospital report dated August 2, 1980, which indicated that petitioner consumed various drugs; (c) court records from an unrelated 1980 case, indicating that pursuant to court order, petitioner was evaluated by Treatment Alternatives to Street Crimes (T.A.S.C.) to determine whether he was a drug addict, that he had a history of substance abuse, and was subsequently determined to be a drug addict displaying a [c]lassic poly-drug abuse pattern [sic] anything and everything; (d) additional records, indicating that petitioner received probation conditioned upon successful completion of a T.A.S.C. residential drug treatment program; (e) T.A.S.C. records indicating that petitioner suffered from family and living situation problems, had lost self-respect, felt insecure and relied on drugs for support; (f) Department of Corrections records indicating that between November 1, 1982, and June 7, 1983, petitioner underwent five psychiatric evaluations, and stating, in September 1985, that he had [m]ental/[p]syche problems and was suicidal from 1979 to 1984. Dr. Fryans was shown these documents during his deposition. Fryans testified that if the documents had been provided to him by trial counsel before petitioner's trial in 1985, he would have relied on the documents to support his opinion that petitioner suffered from substance abuse and borderline personality disorders at the time of the crimes. The State responds initially that this claim is waived for failure to raise it on direct appeal. According to the State, the trial court's ruling, precluding the experts' opinion testimony at trial, was based on the lack of any independent bases for their opinions, which was apparent at trial. The State additionally argues that the evidentiary basis for the claim was not only available, but was, in part, before this court on direct appeal. The State directs attention to this court's statement on direct appeal that one of petitioner's experts had not reviewed documentation memorializing petitioner's drug rehabilitation history. See Britz, 123 Ill. 2d at 459, 461-62. The State contends that Britz also referred to petitioner's taped statements to police, his treatment in a drug rehabilitation center, and the observations and statements of petitioner's friends and family, including that of his sister, who testified at trial that petitioner used alcohol and marijuana everyday for at least a year prior to the crimes. See Britz, 123 Ill. 2d at 455-56, 459-62. According to the State, the legal and evidentiary bases for the claim were thus apparent at the time of the direct appeal. It is well established that determinations of the reviewing court on direct appeal are res judicata as to issues actually decided and issues that could have been presented on the direct appeal, but were not, are deemed waived. See People v. Albanese, 125 Ill. 2d 100, 105 (1988); Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d at 365; People v. French, 46 Ill. 2d 104 (1970). Application of the waiver rule is relaxed, however, in instances where the facts relating to the claim do not appear on the face of the original appellate record and could not have been supplemented to that record under Supreme Court Rule 329. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d at 372. As a matter of clarification, it is not so much that such a claim could not have been presented or raised on direct appeal, but rather that such a claim was incapable of being considered by the reviewing court because the claim's evidentiary basis was de hors the record. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d at 372. The exception recognizes that the rule of waiver ought not preclude such claims. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d at 372. The trial record was not made a part of the record in this post-conviction appeal. However, according to the trial court's order dismissing the second-amended post-conviction petition, the following testimony was presented during the mitigation phase at sentencing. Petitioner's mother testified that when petitioner was a teenager she noticed that he was developing a problem with alcohol and drugs. According to petitioner's mother, at that time, his main problem was glue sniffing. She testified that she had taken him to three different drug treatment facilities--T.A.S.C., Ryerson Center, and Gateway Foundation-- where he resided for several weeks. She also testified that five years earlier, petitioner had been hospitalized for attempting to commit suicide by smoking marijuana and taking pills. She further related that the main drug petitioner used at the age of 13 was marijuana. Petitioner's mother additionally testified that petitioner acted fine when he was not on drugs, but acted very, very strange when he was on drugs. Petitioner's sister testified also at sentencing that she was aware that her family had sought professional help for petitioner when he was a teenager and that they had taken him to Phoenix 7 (an out-patient facility), T.A.S.C., and Gateway. She testified that petitioner was aggressive when on drugs and calm when he was not. Based on our review of the record, it is clear that the claim that trial counsel failed to provide corroborative data to support the experts' opinions at trial was one which could have been presented and considered on direct appeal. First, the direct appeal opinion reflects that the alleged deficiency, itself, was clearly apparent at that time. Second, the trial court record includes evidence of several available independent corroborative bases on which the experts could have relied. Petitioner's mother and sister both testified at sentencing, indicating that they, themselves, were aware that petitioner had a significant history of substance abuse and drug rehabilitation treatment. Petitioner's mother and sister also testified to petitioner's very strange and aggressive behavior while under the influence of drugs, and apparently normal behavior when not. Moreover, they both testified, naming several known drug treatment facilities where petitioner had been previously taken. Indeed, on direct appeal, this court noted several possible corroborative bases, which were not relied on by the experts, namely police reports, witness reports, reports from the rehabilitative center or centers at which petitioner allegedly received treatment, and discussions with petitioner's friends and family. Britz, 123 Ill. 2d at 461-62. Petitioner's claim that trial counsel failed to provide corroboration of the experts' opinions that he suffered from a substance abuse disorder, a borderline personality disorder and was chemically dependent does not depend on the documentation that he included with his post-conviction petition. Such claim rather depends on evidence that there were independent corroborative bases on which the experts could have relied had trial counsel so provided. Such evidence appeared within the record on direct appeal and therefore could have supported the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide corroborative bases. This is not a different or more meritorious ineffectiveness claim because of information showing that there were additional or stronger corroborative bases on which the experts could have relied. Admissibility of the experts' opinion at trial turned on whether there was any basis supporting those opinions besides petitioner's statements. This is not a case like People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 158 (1995), where the additional information impacted on the merits of the claim. Nor is this a case like People v. Holman, 164 Ill. 2d 356 (1995), where an argument different from that raised on direct appeal was presented with supporting mitigation evidence which was not part of the record on direct appeal. Neither is this case like People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 528 (1991), where the same claim was made on direct appeal, but depended on evidence not found within the trial record. We do not mean to suggest that conjectural information regarding any independent corroborative bases would have sufficed on direct appeal. On the record here, however, it is shown that there were independent corroborative bases on which the experts could have relied so that their opinions could have been admitted if trial counsel had provided those bases. We conclude that trial counsel's failure in this regard was apparent from the trial record and the issue could have been considered on direct appeal. The claim was therefore waived.