Opinion ID: 2231508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prima Facie Showing of a Chilling Effect on an Association Right.

Text: Courts typically require that a party asserting the need for a protective order first show that its First Amendment association right may be chilled before a protective order may be issued. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Agric., 239 F.Supp.2d at 1236-37; Snedigar v. Hoddersen, 114 Wash.2d 153, 786 P.2d 781, 783 (1990); Lassa v. Rongstad, 294 Wis.2d 187, 718 N.W.2d 673, 689 (2006). In Patterson, the Supreme Court concluded that the NAACP had shown that compelled disclosure of its membership list was likely to adversely affect its association right. 357 U.S. at 462-63, 78 S.Ct. 1163. The NAACP showed that on past occasions, the revelation of some members' identities exposed those members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Id. at 462, 78 S.Ct. 1163. The Court concluded that compelled disclosure of the NAACP's membership list would likely affect the organization and its members' ability to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs, and would also likely induce members to withdraw, and dissuade others from joining. Id. at 462-63, 78 S.Ct. 1163. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court further discussed association rights, this time in the context of required disclosures of financial contributors to political parties. 424 U.S. 1, 64, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). The Court concluded that before considering a disclosure exemption for a particular party, the party must show a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties. Id. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Court noted that the showing could include specific evidence of past or present harassment against members due to their associational ties or evidence of harassment against the party itself. Id. Courts have generally followed Buckley, requiring that a party asserting the need for protective relief show a reasonable probability of a chill on its First Amendment association right. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., 239 F.Supp.2d at 1237; Lassa, 718 N.W.2d at 689; see also Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1268 (requiring a showing of some probability); Snedigar, 786 P.2d at 783 (same). The chilling effect may be demonstrated by the potential for the withdrawal of active members or the dissuasion of prospective members from joining because of a fear that exposure of their beliefs will result in threats, harassment, or reprisal, which may not only affect physical well-being, but also political activities or economic interests. [9] See Brock v. Local 375, Plumbers Int'l Union, 860 F.2d 346, 349-50 (9th Cir.1988); U.S. Dep't of Agric., 239 F.Supp.2d at 1237. The evidentiary showing required to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a chill on an association right is more than subjective assertions of a fear of reprisal. See McLaughlin v. Serv. Employees Union, AFL-CIO, Local 280, 880 F.2d 170, 175 (9th Cir.1989) (Bare allegations of possible first amendment violations are insufficient to justify judicial intervention into a pending investigation.); Duke Energy Corp., 218 F.R.D. at 473 (concluding that organization's self-serving declarations were conclusory in nature and showed no evidence that current members might withdraw). But a party need not prove to a certainty that its First Amendment rights will be chilled. Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1267-68; Snedigar, 786 P.2d at 783. Instead, the party asserting the right must demonstrate objective and articulable facts that disclosure of information may chill association rights. See McLaughlin, 880 F.2d at 175; Lassa, 718 N.W.2d at 690. To illustrate, specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties or harassment directed against the organization itself demonstrate a reasonable probability of a chill on association rights. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 612. We conclude, in the context of this case, that before a protective order may be issued to prevent disclosure of documents or materials to prevent a chilling effect on a party's association right, a party must make a prima facie showing by demonstrating a reasonable probability that the disclosure will cause active members to withdraw or dissuade others from joining because of an objective and articulable fear of threats, harassment, or reprisal to the individual or organization.