Opinion ID: 3027755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Explanation for the Failure to Introduce

Text: Hugh’s counsel did not offer an explicit justification for his failure to put exhibit D-1-A in evidence, as the majority notes. See Maj. Op. at 6. But even a cursory examination of the trial transcript tells why: Hugh’s counsel did not understand that simply marking an exhibit for identification does not make it part of the evidentiary record. See Appellant’s App. at 528 (“[THE COURT]: [Exhibit D-1-A was] not moved into evidence. So [it] will not go out. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I labeled [it] as [a] defendant’s exhibit and gave [it] a number. THE COURT: Well, that doesn’t mean [it is] in evidence.”). Though this mistake was elementary, it was honest. It also 14 It is important to bear in mind that a court’s proper concern is not the added weight a jury may attach to a given piece of evidence in the abstract, but rather whether such added weight would be “undue.” The evil to be avoided in sending exhibits to the jury is the possibility that the jurors will believe that the judge deems a certain piece of evidence to be particularly significant—an evaluation that is instead within the jury’s sole purview. The valid concern present when courts usually decide whether to send an exhibit to the jury, therefore, is absent when the jury itself requests to see it. Here, had the District Court simply admitted exhibit D-1-A and sent it back to the jury at the beginning of deliberations along with all the other exhibits, there would have been no possibility that the statement could have been given “undue” weight. Moreover, even if there were such a possibility, a cautionary instruction could have allayed most concerns in that regard. See Larson, 596 F.2d at 779 (reversing the defendant’s conviction based on the district court’s decision not to reopen the record for additional testimony, noting that “even assuming that the testimony might have derived undue emphasis from its appearance subsequent to all parties resting, a cautionary instruction by the trial judge might have remedied that potential problem”); see also Parker, 73 F.3d at 54 (“It is clear to us that, with the proper cautionary instruction, the jury could have adequately weighed the additional testimony.”). 25 presents a paradigm case for the proper use of a motion to reopen. See Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 740 (noting that reopening the record is often used to admit evidence “overlooked by inadvertence”); cf. Parker, 73 F.3d at 54 (“[T]he excuse given, that defense counsel simply made a mistake, seems reasonable and does not appear to be a subterfuge for seeking delay or unfair advantage.”); Carter, 569 F2d at 803 (finding no abuse of discretion where the court allowed the Government to reopen the record and present evidence “inadvertently omitted from the case in chief”). Just as the Government can be permitted to reopen the record and introduce evidence necessary to support a conviction that was mistakenly not presented in its case-in-chief, see Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 740 (referring to evidence needed to establish proper venue), so too should the defendant be allowed to do the same when inadvertence has caused him to omit a document significant to his defense.