Opinion ID: 6329498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Initial Application

Text: The IJ found Barrera Arreguin’s testimony credible, recognized Arcenio’s immediate family as a cognizable social group, but found in a lengthy Decision and Orders that the past harm Barrera Arreguin and her children described “did not rise to the high level required of past persecution” or justify a well-founded fear of future persecution. Nor did Barrera Arreguin show the required nexus between the harm -3- they feared and a protected ground, either their membership in the family social group or Barrera Arreguin’s political opinion. The IJ also denied humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. The BIA affirmed and then dismissed her administrative appeal. Barrera Arreguin petitioned this court for review of this initial decision. We review the BIA’s decision and, “to the extent that the BIA adopted the findings or reasoning of the IJ, we also review the IJ’s decision as part of the final agency action.” Cano v. Barr, 956 F.3d 1034, 1038 (8th Cir. 2020). To be eligible for asylum, Barrera Arreguin must show that she is unwilling or unable to return to Mexico “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1101(a)(42). Though we review questions of law de novo, “the ultimate question of past persecution or wellfounded fear of future persecution, as well as the findings underlying that determination, are judicially reviewed under the substantial evidence standard that applies to agency findings of fact.” He v. Garland, 24 F.4th 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 2022) (Supreme Court citations omitted). “[T]o obtain judicial reversal of the BIA’s determination, [Barrera Arreguin] must show that the evidence [s]he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992); see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Barrera Arreguin argues the IJ and the BIA erred in finding that she and her children are not eligible for asylum. Applying the proper standard of review, the BIA upheld the IJ’s finding that Barrera Arreguin did not present evidence of past harm that rose to the level of past persecution. The BIA found that Barrera Arreguin and her children were never physically harmed in Mexico, the threats against them were isolated, and no one attempted to carry them out. Further, there is insufficient evidence tying Arcenio’s disappearance to any particular group -- Barrera Arreguin’s testimony that she saw a video in which Los Viagras took credit for killing Arcenio -4- “carried insufficient weight, without the video or further corroborating evidence, to establish [Arcenio] was killed by the group.” The applicants lived in Apatzingan for a year after the disappearance before receiving a threat to leave the area. Barrera Arreguin argues the BIA improperly required corroborating evidence of Arcenio’s death when her credible testimony should be taken at face value. We disagree. When the IJ determines that an applicant should provide evidence that corroborates credible testimony, this evidence “must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see Omondi v. Holder, 674 F.3d 793, 797 & n.1 (8th Cir. 2012). The statute requires that the applicant be afforded “an opportunity to explain [the] unavailability” of corroborating evidence. Uzodinma v. Barr, 951 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2020); see Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 521-22 (BIA 2015). Barrera Arreguin was afforded that opportunity when counsel for DHS asked her to explain why she did not provide the video. Her reply -- that she “didn’t think about it” -- was not a satisfactory explanation. We have repeatedly held that “persecution is an extreme concept.” Eusebio v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1088, 1090 (8th Cir. 2004). “Absent physical harm, [] incidents of harassment, unfulfilled threats of injury, and economic deprivation are not persecution.” Quomsieh v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 602, 606 (8th Cir. 2007). Though Barrera Arreguin was understandably frightened by threats before and after her husband’s disappearance, she and her children continued to live unharmed in Apatzingan and elsewhere in Mexico for a substantial period of time, and other members of her family remained in Mexico unharmed after she fled. On this record, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Barrera Arreguin failed to show past persecution. Having failed to establish past persecution, Barrera Arreguin and her children are not entitled to a presumption they have a well-founded fear of future persecution. -5- See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i). The BIA upheld the IJ’s findings that (i) Arcenio’s unresolved disappearance did not support an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution; (ii) her mother, her sisters, and Arcenio’s father and sister remaining in and near Apatzingan, unharmed, diminishes the reasonableness of her fear; and (iii) Barrera Arreguin failed to establish she could not avoid persecution by reasonably relocating within Mexico. Barrera Arreguin argues the BIA improperly considered the safety of her husband’s “extended family” instead of the proffered social group, his “nuclear family.” This contention is without merit. First, Barrera Arreguin’s application described the relevant social group as Arcenio’s “immediate family,” which is generally understood as a broader group than a person’s “nuclear family.” Compare Immediate Family, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), with Nuclear Family, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2007). At the hearing, counsel for Barrera Arreguin conflated the terms. Second, the continued lack of harm to members of Barrera Arreguin’s immediate and extended families was clearly relevant to her claim of a well-founded fear. “An alien’s fear of persecution is reduced when her family remains unharmed in her native country.” Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2005); see Rivas v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 537, 542 (8th Cir. 2018). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Barrera Arreguin did not establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Barrera Arreguin further argues the BIA erred in denying her application for humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Again, we disagree. Humanitarian asylum requires a showing of past persecution; “failure to prove persecution on a protected ground makes [Barrera Arreguin] ineligible for humanitarian asylum.” Kanagu v. Holder, 781 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2015). Withholding of removal requires a showing of a “clear probability” of persecution in Barrera Arreguin’s home country, Mexico. Cubillos v. Holder, 565 F.3d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 2009). This standard “is more rigorous than the ‘well-founded fear’ standard -6- for asylum.”1 Id. CAT relief requires a showing it is “more likely than not” that Barrera Arreguin will be tortured upon returning to Mexico. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Separate analysis of a CAT claim is required “only when there is evidence that the alien might be tortured for reasons unrelated to her claims for asylum and withholding of removal.” Alemu v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 572, 576 (8th Cir. 2005).