Opinion ID: 900066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Ramos' life sentence unconstitutional?

Text: [¶ 6] Ramos argues his life sentence is unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment because it is either manifestly disproportionate to the crime or shocks the conscience. The maximum sentence for first degree manslaughter is life imprisonment. SDCL 22-6-1; See SDCL 22-16-15. On appeal, we first determine whether the sentence `shocks the conscience' or is so disproportionate to the crime that it activates the Eight Amendment `within and without jurisdiction' proportionality tests. It is settled law in this state that absent a sentence which is so excessive in duration that it shocks the conscience of the court, a sentence that is within statutory limits is not reviewable on appeal. This court has developed a two-fold test to determine whether the sentence is so constitutionally offensive as to shock the conscience: First, is the punishment so excessive or so cruel, `as to meet the disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally.' And second, whether the punishment is so excessive or cruel as to shock the collective conscience of this court. State v. Kaiser, 526 N.W.2d 722, 726 (S.D. 1995) (citations omitted). [¶ 7] The first test is whether Ramos' sentence meets the disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally. Ramos argues other states do not allow life sentences for voluntary manslaughter and presents statutes from outside this jurisdiction to show that only in South Dakota and Oklahoma is it statutorily possible to receive a life sentence for voluntary manslaughter. [1] The State claims there is no uniformity among the other states in possible manslaughter sentences. The State also argues the legislature has designated only six felonies for which a maximum of life imprisonment is allowed, and points out Ramos' crime involved a killing, a firearm and mortal endangerment of the lives of all present. [¶ 8] Public intent is reflected in the legislative acts defining the permissible punishment for specific crimes. State v. Pack, 516 N.W.2d 665, 668 (S.D.1994) (quoting State v. Phipps, 318 N.W.2d 128, 132 (S.D.1982) appeal dismissed, 406 N.W.2d 146 (S.D.1987)). The South Dakota legislature allows a sentence of life imprisonment for voluntary manslaughter. SDCL 22-6-1. This is within their legislative prerogative. A minority position among state legislatures does not necessarily mean an un constitutional or even an un acceptable position. For these and the reasons stated hereafter, Ramos' sentence does not meet the disapproval and condemnation of the conscience and reason of men generally. [¶ 9] The second test is whether the punishment is so excessive or cruel as to shock the collective conscience of this court. In developing an appropriate sentence, the sentencing court should `acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and history of the man before it.' This study should examine a defendant's general moral character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record. State v. Chase in Winter, 534 N.W.2d 350, 354 (S.D.1995) (quoting Pack, 516 N.W.2d at 667-68 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted)). [¶ 10] The trial court heard testimony and read letters from several parties before sentencing. [2] The trial court also read a psychiatric evaluation in which the doctor found Ramos oriented, alert and responsive. He was tearful in discussing Debbie's death and preoccupied with her loss. Ramos showed symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. He was also experiencing guilt related to causing the death of an innocent person he loved, but the doctor felt it was guilt appropriate to the situation. The psychiatric evaluation reveals Ramos attempted an overdose of a prescribed drug while in jail. [¶ 11] The trial court stated it considered all the testimony, but focused on the issue of Ramos' need for control: When one drops back and focuses on your life as a whole, however, we come to the point where there is an element of control, a need to control, a desire to control that you cannot control. [¶ 12] The trial court considered Ramos' past relationships and determined that, when they have been good, [they] have been very, very good. When they are bad, they are very, very bad. [3] The trial court called attention to the danger side of Ramos' personality which surfaced ... when Debbie Jo Martines died. [¶ 13] The trial court noted Ramos' prior offenses have been misdemeanors. It stated, When one looks at the nature of the offenses, however, they all have some degree of violence associated with them, Mr. Ramos, violence largely centered around those individuals that you supposedly hold near and dear and, ... involve women. The trial court pointed out, [t]he instances in which you lose control have become more frequent. [¶ 14] Ramos claims his life sentence should shock the conscience of this court because a life sentence differs from a term of years sentence. State v. Holloway, 482 N.W.2d 306, 311 (S.D.1992); State v. Weiker, 366 N.W.2d 823, 825 (S.D.1985) ( Weiker II ). This court discussed life sentences (imposed on habitual offenders) in State v. Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7 (S.D.1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct. 1422, 79 L.Ed.2d 747 ( Weiker I ). The purposes of sentencing are retribution, deterrence, both individual and general, and rehabilitation. Weiker I, 342 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). This court has also recognized incapacitation as a valid sentencing goal. State v. Gehrke, 491 N.W.2d 421, 425 (S.D.1992) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2704, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 868 (1991)). One purpose is not preeminent over any of the others. [T]here is nothing in the Constitution that says that `rehabilitation' is the sole permissible goal of incarceration[.] Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1314, 101 S.Ct. 829, 830, 66 L.Ed.2d 785, 788 (1981) (per Chief Justice Rehnquist as Circuit Justice). There is no constitutional principle that prefers rehabilitation over deterrence as a sentencing goal. Fielding v. LeFevre, 548 F.2d 1102, 1108 (2d Cir. 1977). [¶ 15] The following observation regarding retribution as a sentencing goal was made by Justice Potter Stewart: I cannot agree that retribution is a constitutionally impermissible ingredient in the imposition of punishment. The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, then there are sown the seeds of anarchyof self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2761, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 389 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). [¶ 16] However, this court has stated, [n]o matter how much one may desire to prevent recurrence of criminal behavior in our crime-ridden society, a sentencing court must individually evaluate each offender in light of the required sentencing factors, including rehabilitation. State v. Bult, 529 N.W.2d 197, 200 (S.D.1995) ( Bult III ) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859). [¶ 17] A life sentence completely eschews the goal of rehabilitation. Bult II, 507 N.W.2d at 327 (citing Weiker I, 342 N.W.2d 7). [A] term of years allows for rehabilitation and allows [defendant] hope. State v. Ferguson, 519 N.W.2d 50, 54 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted). In Bult II, this court stated that a life sentence should only be imposed when a trial court: can determine from the facts of the principal offense and the previous convictions that rehabilitation is so unlikely as to be removed from consideration in sentencing; that the interests of society demand that the convict be kept off the streets for the rest of his life; and that society, speaking through the legislature, has clearly mandated that the offense or offenses involved are so malignant that a lifetime of incarceration is the only adequate retribution. Bult II, 507 N.W.2d at 327-28 (quoting Weiker I, 342 N.W.2d at 12). (Italics ours. See text infra. ). [¶ 18] When discussing Ramos' principal offense, the trial court stated, I understand that you aren't here as a murderer. You are here for an offense of first degree manslaughter, and I have tried to examine this sentence in that light. The trial court noted this was Ramos' first felony conviction and addressed the issue of rehabilitation: I think, until it reaches a point in time that you are able to control those emotions, control your desire to control those people around you, that the interest of rehabilitation cannot be addressed, and it appears to me that the goal of rehabilitation in this case cannot be achieved for a very, very long time, and that you must forfeit your right to be free in society for a substantial period of time in order to protect society. [¶ 19] Whether Ramos is capable of rehabilitation was a fact question to be decided by the trial court. Weiker II, 366 N.W.2d at 825 (citing U.S. v. Hollis, 718 F.2d 277, 279-80 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1036, 104 S.Ct. 1309, 79 L.Ed.2d 707 (1984)). There was no expert testimony or solid evidence that Ramos was capable of rehabilitation. The trial court found Ramos incapable of rehabilitation until he could control his desire to control the people around him. Essentially, this appears to be a conclusion that rehabilitation is so remote or improbable that a life sentence is warranted. In view of this evidence or lack thereof, we cannot say the trial court erred. [¶ 20] The trial court considered Ramos' danger to society as the next factor, stating, I think the danger that you represent to society is epitomized by the manner in which you handle your relationships with people. The court noted: That night, in my mind, is a control issue... The control issue only had to rise to a certain point with you in your relationships with a spouse or a loved one because you had power and authority over them. You didn't have that related to ... Mr. Jibben and you thought you needed to get a gun, and that, Mr. Ramos, in my mind, is the distinction in this case. Although these statements are not a detailed finding that the interests of society demand Ramos be kept off the streets for the rest of his life, they are sufficient to support the sentence. [¶ 21] Although the italicized sentence in the Bult II paragraph quoted above provides that society mandate a life sentence as the only adequate retribution, we find the provision excessive and in error. Since life imprisonment is the maximum punishment for a Class 1 felony under SDCL 22-6-1 and no minimum is provided, numerous options are available and a life sentence need not be the only adequate retribution. It is only necessary that the sentence not constitute excessive retribution. Therefore, we modify the italicized sentence of the Bult II paragraph quoted above to provide: and that the life sentence not constitute excessive retribution. We conclude that it has not been shown that this life sentence constitutes excessive retribution. [¶ 22] Additionally, we have reviewed the arguments and authorities concerning proportionality and have determined they are not sufficiently persuasive to shock our conscience under these circumstances. [¶ 23] In view of all of the above, this life sentence does not shock the conscience of this court under these circumstances. We affirm on this issue.