Opinion ID: 2997131
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The in extremis doctrine is inapplicable.

Text: Sometimes confused with the inevitable accident doctrine, the in extremis doctrine or “agony of the moment defense” applies when a ship is placed in sudden peril through no fault of its own and is forced to take “evasive maneuvers that may be a violation of a rule.” 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 14-2 n. 49 (4th ed. 2004). See, e.g., N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 324 F.2d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 1963) (applying in extremis doctrine to absolve a vessel from liability for striking a bridge when the bridge failed to open and failed to give advance warning to the vessel or tug of its inability to open); Monroe v. City of Chicago, 194 F. 936, 939-40 (7th Cir. 1912) (same). As explained in The Blue Jacket, 144 U.S. 371, 392 (1892) an example of such an occurrence is “where one ship has, by wrong maneuvers, placed another ship in a position of extreme danger, that other ship will not be held to blame if she has done something wrong, and has not been maneuvered with perfect skill and presence of mind.” The party relying on the in extremis doctrine must be completely free from fault prior to the emergency occurrence. Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1990). “It does not excuse a vessel making a wrong maneuver in extremis where the imminence of the peril was occasioned by the fault or negligence of those in charge of the vessel, or might have been avoided by earlier precautions which it was bound to take.” 70 Am. Jur. 2d Shipping § 619 (2003). Further, applicability of the doctrine does not prevent a finding of liability, it merely requires courts to judge a captain’s reac- tions more leniently because of the crisis situation. Grosse Ile Bridge Co. v. American Steamship Co., 302 F.3d 616, 625-26 (6th Cir. 2002). Whether to rebut the presumption or argue for its inapplicability, defendants incorrectly attempt to avail them20 No. 03-1789 selves of the in extremis doctrine equating it to the “inevitable accident” doctrine. Based on the district court’s findings, it is clear that the M/V Morgan was not operating in extremis. The dangerous situation was caused by a mechanical failure of the vessel itself; it was not placed in sudden peril by an outside force or party. Cf. Grosse Ile Bridge Co., 302 F.3d at 625-26 (finding in extremis applicable where bridge failed to timely open but reasoning that captain’s reaction to emergency situation was still negligent even under more lenient standard because his delay in dropping anchor to stop vessel’s forward movement was unreasonable); Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 897 F.2d at 6-7 (applying in extremis doctrine to shield a tug from liability for striking a pier after it was forced to cast off its lines to avoid a collision with a tanker). Moreover, the district court’s finding that the vessel had sufficient time to respond properly to the failure of the starboard winch brake negates the applicability of this doctrine as it was not in “sudden peril” and had sufficient time to prevent the allision. See Richard J. Nikas, Skimming the Surface: A Primer on the Law of Collision, 9 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 225, 240 (1996) (“Normally, the law of collision assumes there will be a reasonable opportunity for decision, however, this assumption is abandoned in cases of sudden peril.”). Defendants attempt to merge the two doctrines of “inevitable accident” and in extremis, however, we find the in extremis doctrine inapplicable to accidents caused by mechanical failures.