Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective Juror B.E.

Text: On her juror questionnaire, B.E. answered no to questions whether she had feelings about the death penalty, and whether any religious or philosophical principle would affect her ability to vote for the death penalty in the instant case. She wrote that life without parole was a just punishment for very severe crimes, and indicated that if the death penalty were on the ballot, she would vote for it. During oral voir dire, in response to more specific questions, she expressed far more uncertainty and ambivalence. Early in the examination, she twice flatly stated that she could never vote to execute another human being. She also declared, when first confronted with the issue, that the death penalty would not be open to her in a case where the defendant committed a first degree murder by stabbing the female victim to death during a residential robbery and burglary. At a later point, she confirmed that she could not, as the jury foreperson, sign a death verdict. In other portions of her examination, B.E. appeared, albeit reluctantly, to soften and retreat from some of the absolute positions she had originally expressed. She acknowledged the death penalty was justified for heinous crimes, such as serial or child murders, and insisted she had no hard and fast reservations that would prevent her from voting to impose that penalty under certain circumstances if the crime involved was bad enough. When pressed by the court, and later by the prosecutor, B.E. protested that it was difficult to say what she could do in this case without knowing more about the facts. However, she indicated that, while inclined to life without parole on the facts she did know, she could consider both penalties. She explained that her initial flat refusal to consider the death penalty stemmed from a reservation about whether she was strong enough within herself and had a strong enough sense of herself with respect to this particular issue to undertake one of the heaviest decisions I would ever have to make in my life. On reflection, she said, she thought she had enough strength to make the right and proper decision on the facts. Defense counsel then sought to ascertain whether there was a distinction between B.E.'s philosophical ability to envision the death penalty in this case, and her personal ability actually to impose it. At length, counsel candidly asked if, despite her philosophical views, [y]ou're saying that personally you're not sure that you could impose the death penalty ... ? B.E. responded, That's probablythat's probably what I am saying. Based on ... my understanding of the crime, that's the only way I know how to express it. Pursuing this issue, the court said to B.E. that, philosophy aside, The question is when you get right down to it, is it something that you could do. That's all I want to know. B.E. answered, I think I could. I think I could. The court suggested to B.E. that her answers were inconsistent, at which point she protested, But had I not said that I can? At this point, the court cut off questioning and excused B.E. In doing so, it noted that it had observed [B.E.'s] demeanor, ... listened to her answers, her long pauses, her vacillation. This record amply supports the trial court's decision to excuse B.E. Though her answers were inconsistent and conflicting, they indicated that, even if she accepted capital punishment in the abstract for heinous crimes, she harbored very serious doubts whether, if seated on a capital jury, she could ever personally vote to impose the death penalty. `Those answers, in combination with the trial court's firsthand observations, could give rise to a definite impression that [B.E.'s] views on the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of [her] duties.' [Citation.] We thus defer to the court's ruling sustaining the prosecution's challenge[] for cause. ( DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th 1, 22, quoting People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1007 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775].) [22]