Opinion ID: 2747138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective juror Gonzalez

Text: During defense questioning, prospective juror Gonzalez agreed that the death penalty may be proper in some cases, but stated that she would want to know “the why’s and why not’s.” After the defense passed Gonzalez, the prosecutor asked her the following: “Q. Ms. Gonzalez, I notice in a lot of your answers, you make reference to counseling, you know, getting help for people. What does that mean to you when you think about a death penalty case? What are you thinking? 468 State v. McAnulty “A. Well, there’s a reason why it happened, and sometimes by going to counseling or seeing somebody to talk about why, there’s a reason behind that. And something could have happened in their past or in their situation. And so—and only that person that they talk with is going to know that. “Q. Hypothetically speaking, let’s say you do get that sort of information, why are you looking for that sort of information? Does that somehow reduce culpability in your mind? “A. Maybe. Maybe to justify it, maybe, in my mind. “Q. And conversely, what if you never hear why the defendant killed her daughter? You learn about what happened, but you’re never really satisfied about why or maybe the psychological or— “A. I don’t know. I would probably ask myself ques- tions, I guess. “Q. Would that impair your ability to decide whether her crime deserved the death penalty? “A. I’m not sure. “Q. If that itch was never scratched, you know, could you bear the responsibility of deciding whether the crime itself deserved— “A. Probably not. “Q. And so then you wouldn’t, of course, be able to consider the death penalty. “A. Correct.” The prosecutor moved that Gonzalez be removed for cause. Defense counsel then attempted to rehabilitate Gonzalez. On defense questioning, Gonzalez agreed that she was not categorically against the death penalty and would keep “an open mind.” Defense counsel then informed the court that the defense opposed the excusal of Gonzalez. The court provided a brief explanation of the death penalty sentencing process, after which the prosecutor resumed with the following questioning: “Q. And with regard to that, as the Court’s told you, you are not—you know, it’s not required that you hear why. Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 469 You may never hear why and it’s not one of the [four questions required to impose the death penalty]. And I’ll just restate my question. Then knowing that you’d have a possibility of, you know, [imposing a sentence of] life without parole after 30 years, would there be any circumstance under which you would consider whether the death penalty is appropriate? “A. I can’t—I don’t know. “Q. You had answered no before, and was there some- thing that changed? “A. (No response.) “Q. There’s no right or wrong answer. “A. I really can’t—I don’t know. I can’t say. I’m sorry. I don’t know the answer to that question. “Q. Okay.” The court then asked a question: “COURT: And it’s difficult. I mean I can’t imagine in any other place or any other moment in somebody’s life is there a discussion that takes place like this. We’re asking something very serious. One way to put it, thinking about this now, do you either favor or rule out any of the three [sentencing] options? “A. I don’t favor them and I don’t rule them out.” The prosecutor renewed the challenge, arguing that “the answer ‘I don’t know’ still doesn’t quite get us to what the juror would be required to do if she were to sit on the jury.” The trial court then excused Gonzalez for cause. Defendant asserts that Gonzalez’s statement that she would keep an open mind and consider all three sentencing possibilities demonstrated her qualifications, and that her difficulty with imposing the death penalty if the question “why the defendant killed her daughter” was not answered was merely Gonzalez’s acknowledgement of the gravity of the death penalty decision. That is one way of looking at the voir dire. However, our review of the transcript indicates that the trial court took great pains to outline for Gonzalez the four questions that the jurors would be required to answer and, immediately after having heard 470 State v. McAnulty that explanation, Gonzalez answered the question, “would there be any circumstances under which you would consider whether the death penalty is appropriate?” by saying “I can’t—I don’t know.” The trial court may well have concluded that Gonzalez was unable to make the weighty decision that would be required in a death penalty case and not that she was actually biased against or in favor of defendant or the state. Defendant alternatively suggests that the prosecutor’s question asking whether Gonzalez would need to know “why” defendant killed her daughter was improper for two reasons. First, defendant contends that the prosecutor’s question essentially asked Gonzalez to comment in advance how she would react to certain evidence. Defendant equates the “why” question here to the “improper” question posed in Montez where the prosecutor asked whether specific pieces of evidence—e.g., the victim being “hog-tied,” “sexually abused,” “strangled,” and “burned”—would make the prospective juror “angry.” 309 Or at 592. Second, defendant argues that the “why” question impermissibly asked Gonzalez to positively state whether she would vote for the death penalty. Defendant submits that the United States Supreme Court rejected that type of questioning in Adams, which held it improper to exclude jurors who “were unable positively to state whether or not their deliberations would in any way be affected” by the possibility of the death penalty. 448 US at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). The state responds that the prosecutor permissi- bly asked the “why” question because it tended to expose the risk that Gonzalez would not follow the court’s instructions if defendant’s motives were not explained at trial. In the state’s view, the “why” question at issue here is different from positing specific evidence and asking a juror to prejudge the case, which this court found improper in Montez. We do not think that the prosecutor’s question about a potential lack of evidence regarding defendant’s motive is improper. Unlike Montez, the question did not “ask[ ] the juror to comment in advance on how [she] would react to specific evidence.” Montez, 309 Or at 584. Rather, it generally referred to the potential lack of evidence relating to Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 471 defendant’s motive. The question was also unlike that posed in Adams because it did not tend to suggest that the possibility of the death penalty itself would affect Gonzalez’s deliberations. We therefore conclude that the trial court’s decision to excuse Gonzalez fell within the proper exercise of its discretion. Montez, 309 Or at 574-75.