Opinion ID: 2632408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony Regarding Absent Defense Witness

Text: Just prior to testifying at defendant's trial, Joseph was placed in a holding cell next to defendant. At trial, Joseph testified that while they were in the holding cells, defendant told him that he planned to bring forward a witness that would say that Joseph had admitted killing Dorsey and Martin. When Joseph expressed confusion, defendant purportedly told him that a witness named Alfred would be testifying at trial. No witness named Alfred testified at trial, and Joseph testified that he never told anyone that he killed Dorsey and Martin. At a sidebar conference, defense counsel objected to the introduction of testimony about Alfred, noting that it would be improper for the prosecution to elicit information identifying which witnesses defendant intended to call later during the trial. In particular, defense counsel was concerned that the testimony would make the defendant look bad in the eyes of the jury if counsel failed to call Alfred. The trial court overruled the objection. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing Joseph to testify about defendant's holding cell statement, because: 1) the testimony violated the work product privilege, and thus violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel; 2) the trial court failed to conduct a hearing sua sponte pursuant to Evidence Code section 402; and 3) no limiting instruction was given to the jury as to the purpose of the statement. Defendant contends that these errors violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The work product privilege bars the use of statutory discovery procedures to obtain [a] writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030, subd. (a)), and bars discovery of [t]he work product of an attorney, other than a writing, unless denial of discovery would unfairly prejudice a party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030, subd. (b).) This privilege reflects the policy of the state to ... [¶] (a) [p]reserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of those cases[; and] [¶] (b) [p]revent attorneys from taking undue advantage of their adversary's industry and efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.020.) Assuming that Alfred existed and was a witness that defendant thought would be called at his trial, the disputed testimony does not come within the purview of the work product privilege. The information was not a written product, nor does defendant's statement qualify as an aspect of defense counsel's impressions, opinions, legal research or theories other than a writing. (See Dowden v. Superior Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 126, 135, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 180.) Further, as defense counsel did not confirm at sidebar that Alfred existed, or verify whether defendant planned to call him as a witness, it was possible that defendant's statement to Joseph did not encompass any information known by defense counsel, let alone counsel's work product. Indeed, defendant now contends that Alfred did not exist and that Joseph fabricated defendant's statement. It is difficult to imagine how an allegedly fabricated statement by Joseph regarding a nonexistent witness could be considered to be protected work product.
Defendant also argues that the trial court should have held a preliminary fact hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 to determine whether Joseph had fabricated his testimony regarding Alfred. Evidence Code section 402 provides that [w]hen the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, its existence or nonexistence shall be determined as provided in this article. (Evid.Code, § 402, subd. (a).) Defendant asserts that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to conduct a preliminary fact hearing to determine whether the statement had actually ever been made. He contends that it is not clear whether defendant and Joseph had, in fact, been placed in holding cells next to each other and, if so, why this occurred. Issues regarding a witness's credibility are properly left to the jury, and are not a proper subject of an Evidence Code section 402 hearing. Whether a statement had actually ever been made was for the jury to determine. In any event, defendant did not dispute that he and Joseph had been in adjacent holding cells at trial and provides no authority supporting his contention that the trial court has a sua sponte duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine a preliminary fact.
Finally, defendant maintains that the trial court should have instructed the jury sua sponte that [defendant's] alleged statement to [Joseph] was offered for a limited purpose and that they could only rely on the statement if the fact was corroborated. Even assuming that defendant is correct in noting that the evidence should only have been admitted for a limited purpose, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction. When evidence is admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. (Evid.Code, § 355.) However, as this court has noted, absent a request by defendant, the trial court has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction. ( People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739, 746, fn. 3, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 659, 941 P.2d 838; see also People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 154, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.)