Opinion ID: 417717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Collateral Estoppel Issue

Text: 35 The party, the defendant in this case, seeking to collaterally estop the litigation of an issue bears the burden of satisfying two separate, though related, requirements. First, the defendant must plead estoppel affirmatively as a defense to satisfy its procedural burden. Second, the defendant must demonstrate the propriety of its application to satisfy its substantive burden. The substantive component of collateral estoppel embodies three requirements: (a) the issue to be concluded in the present action must be identical to that involved in the prior action; (b) the identical issue in the prior action must have been actually litigated; and (c) the determination made of the identical issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment. A. Procedural Requirement 36 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 8(c) requires that [i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... estoppel ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. In the instant case appellant failed to plead collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense in its answer to appellee's original complaint. Nor did appellant subsequently amend its pleadings to include the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. Finally, appellant failed to articulate the theory of collateral estoppel in its motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's case in the court below. 37 The majority concludes that apparently Rule 15(b) 1 allows this court to collaterally estop appellee's false imprisonment claim. Majority Opinion at 7. Rules 8(c) and 15(b) 2 read together suggest that an affirmative defense not pleaded is waived unless the parties by their express or implied consent agree to litigate that particular affirmative defense. 38 The majority's conclusion demonstrates, however, that in considering Rules 8(c) and 15(b) together it either misread the evidence or read the evidence only in a manner consistent with its conclusion. In considering Rule 15(b)'s application to the instant case the majority concludes:Here the facts on which the defense of collateral estoppel rests were pleaded in the answer. They were introduced in evidence without objection. They were called to the court's attention in a motion for directed verdict, which was renewed at the end of the entire case. They were the subject of a timely request for charge. Prinz does not suggest that he has any evidence which might have been offered to overcome the collateral estoppel effect of his guilty plea. In this totality of circumstances Rule 15(c) [sic] rather than Rule 8(c) provides the appropriate frame of reference. (emphasis added) Majority Opinion at 694-695. 3 39 The majority misconstrues Rules 8(c) and 15(b). Mistakenly they assume that these rules allow a party to plead facts without articulating the particular defense(s) relied on as a substitute for the more than twenty affirmative defenses enumerated in Rule 8(c). 40 Estoppel is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Rule 8(c) states: 41 Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. (emphasis added). 42 Rule 8(c) does allow courts to permit parties to amend incorrect pleadings. It recognizes that a party could mistakenly [designate] a defense as a counterclaim.... 43 The defendant's failure to plead the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel in this case is a paradigm example of a pleading that is glaringly defective. Indeed, not once in defendant's answer does it use the word estoppel or the words collateral estoppel. Instead, defendant's counsel filed an answer which was clouded with error, imprecision and ambiguity. The only paragraph in defendant's answer which defendant claims or could possibly be construed to have alerted appellee that defendant was relying on collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense demonstrates this error, imprecision and ambiguity. 44 DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 45