Opinion ID: 2353606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional C.R.C.P. 23 Requirements

Text: Whether Plaintiffs have a class-wide method of establishing the causation and injury elements of their CCPA claims influences other aspects of the trial court's certification decision. Due to the need for individual inquiries into whether Medved's deceptive sales documents caused an injury to Plaintiffs, Medved argues that Plaintiffs failed to define a readily identifiable class, establish C.R.C.P. 23(a)'s numerosity or typicality requirements, or establish that the class mechanism is superior to other available methods of litigation as required by C.R.C.P. 23(b)(3). [8] Because we agree with the court of appeals that the trial court failed to rigorously analyze the individual evidence presented by Medved and consider whether it refuted Plaintiffs' class-wide theories of proof, we affirm the court of appeals' order remanding the case to the trial court to determine not only whether common issues predominate over individual issues, but also whether both classes were identifiable and whether Plaintiffs can satisfy C.R.C.P. 23's superiority, numerosity, and typicality requirements. We also affirm the court of appeals' determination that named Plaintiff Garcia cannot serve as a representative of Class II. Garcia, 240 P.3d at 381-82. [A] class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). Class II was defined to include those consumers who were charged for dealer-added products that were installed but not disclosed in writing. Garcia, however, alleges that she paid for dealer-added products that were never installed. Given that she suffered a distinct injury from Class II members, she cannot serve as a representative for Class II.