Opinion ID: 1333537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's constitutional claim to due process

Text: In North v. Board of Regents, W.Va., 233 S.E.2d 411 (1977), we treated at some length the procedural safeguards required under Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution. We discussed the concept of liberty and property interests triggering due process requirements when affected by State action. North also demonstrated that in analyzing our State's constitutional due process standard, we are free to consider the applicable federal constitutional standards. Ultimately, however, we must be guided by our own principles in establishing our State standards, recognizing that so long as we do not fall short of the federal standard our determination is final. [4] To evaluate appellant's constitutional claim we employ a two-step analysis. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Initially, we determine whether appellant's interest rises to the level of a liberty or property interest. If the answer is no, the second step becomes unnecessary because appellant has no claim warranting constitutional protection. If, however, either a liberty or property interest is at stake, then we must weigh the competing interest of the appellant and the State agency to determine what procedural due process is constitutionally required. We turn first to determine whether appellant's claim involved an interest in liberty. Thereafter, we will consider whether a property interest is involved.
The concept of a liberty interest is grounded in the Due Process Clause of both our State and Federal Constitutions, which prohibit the deprivation of . . . life, liberty or property, without due process of law. United States Constitution, Amendment V; West Virginia Constitution, Article III, Section 10. The liberty interest concept developed in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra , is the interest an individual has in being free to move about, live and work at his chosen vocation without the burden of an unjustified label of infamy. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S.Ct. at 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d at 558. A liberty interest is implicated when the state makes a charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. Id. at 573, 92 S.Ct. at 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d at 558. The Roth Court stated that a charge of dishonesty or immorality would implicate an individual's liberty interests. We follow these principles and find that an accusation or label given the individual by his employer which belittles his worth and dignity as an individual and, as a consequence, is likely to have severe repercussions outside his work world, infringes one's liberty interest. Moreover, an individual has an interest in avoiding a stigma or other disability that forecloses future employment opportunities. See Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 574, 92 S.Ct. at 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d at 559. See also Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 633, 638, at nn. 3 & 11, 97 S.Ct. 882, 887, 889 at nn. 3 & 11, 51 L.Ed.2d 92, 100, 103 at nn. 3 & 11 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-575, 95 S.Ct. 729, 736-737, 42 L.Ed.2d 725, 735-736 (1975). In the present case, appellant's suspension was based on several infractions of hospital policy. We do not deem these charges reach the level of stigmatization which would foreclose future employment opportunities or seriously damage appellant's standing and associations in the community. [5] We, therefore, conclude that appellant has not suffered damage to her liberty interest.
Appellant alleges that her suspension by the hospital superintendent violated procedural due process because she was deprived of property without a right to a hearing and an opportunity to present evidence or otherwise contest the reasons given for such a suspension. It is clear from the Supreme Court decision in Roth, supra, that the Constitution protects property interests beyond the traditional concept of real or personal property. The Court indicated that a benefit which merits protection as a property interest must be one to which there is more than a unilateral expectation. 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d at 561. Rather, there must exist rules or understandings which allow the claimant's expectations to be characterized as a legitimate claim of entitlement to [the benefit]. Ibid. Appellant contends that her interest in continued uninterrupted employment meets the standards set out in Roth. However, the situation here is not akin to that of the teacher in Roth who argued that a hearing was necessary before the University could refuse to rehire him. Here, no question arises as to the right of appellant to her position. Appellant was suspended for ten days, after which she resumed her position. Thus, the question is whether appellant has a legitimate claim of entitlement to remain on her job and earn a salary, part of which was denied her by virtue of the suspension. Although there is no direct pronouncement by this Court concerning a public employee's claim of entitlement to continued uninterrupted employment, a property interest clearly can be found in appellant's acknowledged status as a permanent employee entitled to security of tenure. State ex rel. Karnes v. Dadisman, 153 W.Va. 771, 781, 172 S.E.2d 561, 568 (1970). [6] It should be emphasized that the finding of a property interest on behalf of a permanent or covered civil service employee does not mean that such employee can never be suspended from employment. The consequence is that the suspension must be accomplished under appropriate due process procedures. Having found that appellant's interest in uninterrupted employment to be a property interest, we must consider whether a ten-day suspension is so minimal that due process protection need not be afforded. The de minimis concept was specifically discussed in Goss v. Lopez, supra , and the Court held that a ten-day suspension from school was not such a minimal deprivation that no due process procedure need be afforded. In North v. Board of Regents, supra , we adopted the Goss rule in interpreting our State's Due Process Clause. There, we concluded, as did Goss, that the extent of the deprivation would be a relevant consideration in determining the extent of the due process procedures afforded. We conclude that a ten-day suspension is not so minimal a deprivation of appellant's property interest in continued uninterrupted employment to require no due process procedural protection.