Opinion ID: 2709330
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Courts Need to Review Contested Images

Text: Eads first argues that the district court erred in failing to examine the pornographic pictures and videos for itself be‐ fore admitting the evidence. Neither party appears to have explicitly requested that the district court review the images charged in Counts 1 and 2 before trial, but the government directs us to the district court’s “Entry Following Pretrial Conference” in which the court stated that it had “reviewed the parties’ proposed exhibits.” Those exhibits included the pornographic images and videos the government sought to publish to the jury. However, the government conceded at oral argument that it is not certain whether the district court reviewed the images, or only reviewed the list of exhibits. Lacking any conclusive determination in the record as to whether the district court viewed the challenged images, we are once again compelled to reiterate that the better and “safest course … is for the court to review the contested evi‐ dence for itself” in evaluating whether the potential preju‐ dice to the defendant substantially outweighs any probative value, especially given the highly inflammatory nature of this type of evidence. See United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that relying on parties’ descriptions of highly disturbing evidence of child pornog‐ raphy is insufficient). No. 12‐2466 13 2. A Bare‐Bones Recitation of Rule 403 Is Not Suffi‐ cient In any event, we agree with Eads that the district court needed to provide a more robust explanation of how it bal‐ anced the factors under Rule 403 before it admitted the por‐ nographic images and videos. In overruling Eads’s objection to the admission of the hard copy images of child pornogra‐ phy, the court made no mention of having examined the ev‐ idence or of any effort to weigh its prejudicial impact. The court explained its decision only briefly: “The court is going to overrule your objection. These photographs are relevant to the elements that the government has to prove in this case beyond a reasonable doubt.” When Eads objected later at trial to the admission of the video clips, the court similarly stated: “Rule 403 prohibits evidence that is unreasonably prejudicial. The government is going to minimize the preju‐ dice of these exhibits by only playing short clips.” These are not sufficient explanations for admitting the contested evi‐ dence under Rule 403, as we have cautioned many times that “[a] pro‐forma recitation of the Rule 403 balancing test does not allow an appellate court to conduct a proper review of the district court’s analysis.” Loughry, 660 F.3d at 972. “To avoid this trap, a district court should carefully analyze the prejudicial effect [of the evidence], and provide a considered explanation of its reasons for admitting the evidence.” Unit‐ ed States v. Miller, 688 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Ciesiolka, 614 F.3d 347, 357 (7th Cir. 2010)) (“A perfunctory analysis or bare‐bones conclusion simply will not suffice.”). Whether the probative value of the challenged images and videos was substantially outweighed by the risk of un‐ 14 No. 12‐2466 fair prejudice to Eads is a closer call. Eads insists that the videos were only shown to inflame the minds of the jurors and the fact that some of them were crying after the videos were shown demonstrates their prejudicial effect. “Because all probative evidence is to some extent prejudicial, we have consistently emphasized that Rule 403 balancing turns on whether the prejudice is unfair.” United States v. McKibbins, 656 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). The gov‐ ernment maintains that it may publish portions of charged images of child pornography to a jury, even when a defend‐ ant has stipulated that the images contain child pornography and contends that stipulations cannot substitute for the gov‐ ernment’s chosen evidence. To the extent that a defendant who stipulates to the content of images then argues at trial that he did not know he was in possession of child pornog‐ raphy or did not understand the wrongfulness of receiving 3 these images, we agree. A stipulation about the content of charged images only goes so far if it is silent with respect to the defendant’s knowledge of the images in his possession. 3 At least two unpublished decisions from this circuit have suggested that “offers of stipulation are not persuasive in the context of child‐ pornographic prosecutions” where the defendant’s knowledge of pos‐ sessing the images was disputed. See United States v. Keith, 440 Fed. Appx. 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “evidence should not be excluded merely because it might be graphic or disturbing” and “the images were probative because they showed Keith’s possession of child pornography images and his knowledge of possession such images”); see also United States v. Hatfield, 358 Fed. Appx. 692, 694, 696 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding video clips of child pornography not unfairly prejudicial where the defendant tried “to imply that his computer equipment had been compromised by someone who downloaded the child pornography without his knowledge”). No. 12‐2466 15 This is why showing the images served a valid, non‐ cumulative, purpose in this case. Recall that even though Eads stipulated that the images contained child pornogra‐ phy, he insisted at trial that he had been unaware of the im‐ ages on his laptop and that they must have been download‐ ed by his houseguest, Nathan Asbury. This left the govern‐ ment with the burden to prove that Eads knew he was in possession of child pornography. To accomplish this task, the government proved that the images that were shared online matched up with Eads’s email address. For example, one file found on Eads’s computer containing an image of child pornography entitled, “Baby White Girl,” had accom‐ panying text stating: “I’m looking to rent a child for sex … . They must be under 10 years old … . I have been with a few kids before … . Please email me at childtopfan@yahoo.com.” Clearly, the government showed that the email listed on the image belonged to Eads. Moreover, we note that all of the images were derived from files charged in the indictment, so it is not as if the im‐ ages were unrelated to the crime charged or more disturbing than the ones found in his home. See United States v. Burt, 495 F.3d 733, 741 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding no unfair prejudice where defendant was prosecuted for exactly what a chal‐ lenged “chat log depict[ed]: creating, trading, and distrib‐ uting photos of children for the sexual satisfaction of himself and his online partners”); cf. Loughry, 660 F.3d at 974 (find‐ ing prejudice where disturbing content of videos made de‐ fendant appear “more despicable to the jury than the ‘lasciv‐ ious pornography’” the defendant was actually charged with distributing). But ultimately, we need not decide whether publishing the contested images and videos to the 16 No. 12‐2466 jury was error because the evidence at trial clearly estab‐ lished Eads’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 3. Admission of the Images Was Harmless Error As we have explained before, “[t]he test for harmless er‐ ror is whether, in the mind of the average juror, the prosecu‐ tion’s case would have been significantly less persuasive had the improper evidence been excluded.” United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133, 1151 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omit‐ ted). “An error is harmless if the untainted incriminating ev‐ idence is overwhelming.” Loughry, 660 F.3d at 975. The evi‐ dence presented against Eads at trial was quite significant. When detectives turned on his living room laptop computer, the file sharing software used to distribute child pornogra‐ phy automatically activated with twenty‐five videos in the queue for downloading. The file folder containing most of the child pornography was easily accessed through an icon on the desktop of his computer. The image described above offering to “rent” a child for sex was found on the computer. A video showing naked children had been played on the computer just eight hours before the detectives searched the home. Twelve days before that, a video file with the title, “Incest Mom 29 and Kiddy 8/9 year” was played. The government offered additional evidence connecting Eads to the living room computer and undermining his con‐ tention that it was used solely by houseguests. The computer name was input as “Chris,” the desktop background of the computer was a picture of Eads, and email accounts linked to Eads were created on the computer using the IP address from which Detective Odier downloaded the images charged in Count 1. Furthermore, the evidence showed that Eads used the computer for posting personal ads on No. 12‐2466 17 Craiglist with the childtopfan@yahoo.com email address. At trial, two women who responded to these ads identified Eads as the individual with whom they met, and one woman testified that he showed her pictures of his family on the liv‐ ing room computer in question. All of the facts above lead us to conclude that the evidence of Eads’s guilt was over‐ whelming and the court’s admission of the images did not 4 change the outcome of the trial. Therefore, Eads’s challenge to his convictions on Counts 1 and 2 must fail. C. Conviction for Witness Tampering Was Supported by the Evidence Eads also argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to show that he tried to persuade his wife to commit perjury. When considering a challenge to the suf‐ ficiency of the evidence at trial, a defendant faces an uphill battle on appeal because we must draw “all reasonable in‐ ferences in the prosecution’s favor” and affirm “if any ra‐ tional jury could have found the elements of the crime be‐ yond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wortman, 488 F.3d 752, 754 (7th Cir. 2007). To convict Eads of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), the government had to prove that: (1) Rachel was a witness or prospective witness; (2) Eads attempted to per‐ 4 To the extent that Eads also argues in his pro se brief that his convic‐ tions for possession and distributing child pornography were not sup‐ ported by the evidence, we must disagree given the extent of evidence recounted above. “[W]e will overturn a guilty verdict only when the rec‐ ord contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, upon which a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002). 18 No. 12‐2466 suade Rachel to provide false testimony, and (3) Eads acted knowingly and with intent to influence Rachel’s testimony. United States v. Holt, 460 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. LaShay, 417 F.3d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 2005)). The evidence on this charge—solely from Eads’s jailhouse con‐ versations with Rachel—is not overwhelming, but it is not so thin that the jury was obliged to acquit Eads of this charge. See Wortman, 488 F.3d at 754 (“We do not reverse a convic‐ tion if a reasonable jury could have acquitted a defendant, we only reverse if the jury was obliged to acquit the defendant.”) (emphasis added). To prove this charge at trial, the jury heard eight, fifteen‐ minute long recordings of phone calls between Eads and Ra‐ chel in the days following his arrest. Eads insists that he was only trying to convince Rachel to tell the truth on the calls in question, but our review of their conversations suggests oth‐ erwise. When heard in context, the calls evince a clear effort at manipulation, as Eads is heard tearfully pleading with Rachel to recant her previous statements to police and to “think of [their] family before saying anything [else] to the cops.” He specifically demands that she “make up some let‐ ters” to write to the trial court judge denying that she ever saw him on the living room computer or with a fake FBI badge, and begs her to state that Eads was out of town on October 26, 2011 (the day detectives downloaded the por‐ nography from his computer). For instance, he said: Rachel, if you love me, if you’ve ever loved me, that’s the only thing you’ve gotta do. It’s not rocket science, it’s not hard. Just have the courage. I mean you had the courage to sit there and say these things, now just take them all back and say you were, you were No. 12‐2466 19 scared, they were threatening to take you to jail, you didn’t know what you … were saying … . I mean, once you produce … the alibi that we weren’t even in f‐‐‐‐ing town on the 26th, the 25th or the 26th. We were out of town. You’re, I mean you’re giving me the f‐‐‐‐ ing alibi that I wasn’t nowhere near the computer. Eads further instructs his wife to say that Nathan Asbury set him up, and “even if it wasn’t Nathan, it’s somebody [else].” He promises Rachel that she “can make this right,” just as long as she doesn’t “say anything more [that is] hurt‐ ful.” When heard in context, the tenor of these statements il‐ lustrates a clear invitation for Rachel to lie for Eads. Eads points to the fact that he also said to Rachel several times, “you have to tell them the truth” and “I wouldn’t be in here if you hadn’t told them these things,” but our review of the calls leads us to believe these statements were either made with a wink and nod, or Eads was still trying to make Rachel believe his lies. See LaShay, 417 F.3d at 718–19 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a defendant may “corruptly persuade” a witness to testify falsely by telling “a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the wit‐ ness believe the story and testify to it,” or persuading “a witness to give a false account that tracked the defendant’s position,” in other words, “an unstated invitation to lie”). In any event, the jury was not required to believe Eads’s sug‐ gestion that he was trying to convince Rachel to tell the truth. See United States v. Millbrook, 553 F.3d 1057, 1066 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that defendant’s “spin on the conver‐ sation” between he and a potential witness “may be plausi‐ ble, but the jury was not required to accept it”), overruled on 20 No. 12‐2466 other grounds by United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Therefore, Eads’s challenge to his witness tampering conviction fails. D. New Trial Not Warranted Since No Newly Discov‐ ered Evidence In his pro se brief, Eads contends that the district court should have granted his motion for a new trial based on purported newly discovered evidence. In order to receive a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, defendants must demonstrate that the evidence “(1) came to their knowledge only after trial; (2) could not have been discov‐ ered sooner had due diligence been exercised; (3) is material and not merely impeaching or cumulative; and (4) would probably lead to an acquittal in the event of a retrial.” United States v. Ryan, 213 F.3d 347, 351 (7th Cir. 2000). As the re‐ viewing court, “we approach such motions with great cau‐ tion and are wary of second‐guessing the determinations of both judge and jury.” Id. As a result, we review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of dis‐ cretion. United States v. Farmer, 717 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2013). Eads’s scattershot motion contained a list of twenty‐four grounds for a new trial. We need not recount all of those claims here; suffice it to say that his evidence was less than convincing. He specifically claimed that his mother, Linda Eads, had alibi information suggesting that Eads was not at home on October 26, 2011. Yet he never explained the nature of this evidence, when he learned of it, or how such evidence would have resulted in an acquittal. As the district court ob‐ served, Eads called his mother as a witness at trial but never questioned her about his whereabouts on October 26. More‐ No. 12‐2466 21 over, he presented no affidavits or testimony from his moth‐ er that might tend to prove that he was innocent. And at the evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial, Eads called Asbury, Rachel, and his father—he did not offer any testimony from his mother. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Eads’s motion for a new trial. E. Discussion of § 3553(a) Factors Was Sufficient The last matter to address is sentencing. Eads claims that he was improperly sentenced on the witness tampering count because the district court did not sufficiently discuss the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) with respect to this charge as distinct from the child pornography charges. We review claims of procedural error at sentencing de novo. United States v. Schuster, 706 F.3d 800, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court initially sentenced Eads to serve 240 months on Count 1 (distributing child pornography), 240 months on Count 2 (possessing child pornography) to run consecutively, and a term of 36 months on Count 5 (witness tampering) to run concurrent to Counts 1 and 2. After being advised by the probation officer (off the record) that the maximum possible sentence for possession in Count 2 was 120 months, the district court immediately amended the rul‐ ing to reflect this change, but increased the sentence for the witness tampering in Count 5 to 120 months and stated that all three counts would run consecutively. The result was that the total number of months remained at 480 months’ impris‐ onment—ten years below the low‐end of the authorized Guidelines range of 50 years’ imprisonment. 22 No. 12‐2466 On appeal, Eads points to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b), which states that “[t]he court, in determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecu‐ tively, shall consider, as to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being imposed, the factors set forth in sec‐ tion § 3553(a).” Eads contends (without citation to any con‐ trolling authority) that the district court should have dis‐ cussed the § 3553(a) factors specifically with respect to the tampering charge when it sentenced him and when it lengthened his sentence on this charge. A sentence below the Guidelines range is presumed rea‐ sonable, see United States v. Rosen, No. 12‐2101, __F.3d__, 2013 WL 4081277, at  (7th Cir. August 14, 2013), and our review of the sentencing transcript belies any notion of error here. We have said before that “[a] district court need not discuss all of the § 3553(a) factors, but it must give them meaningful consideration.” United States v. Mantanes, 632 F.3d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the district court fully dis‐ cussed the sentencing factors under § 3553(a) over several transcript pages, explaining that it “considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s criminal history and characteristics, the need for the sentence to re‐ flect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment, and to provide an adequate deterrence to criminal conduct of this nature by others who might try to do similar things.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). To this end, the court recounted the particularly disturbing na‐ ture of the child pornography in question (including the im‐ age with text offering to “rent” a child for sex), the testimony at sentencing of at least one woman whom Eads brutally co‐ erced into sexual exploitation at the age of fifteen, Eads’s calls to his wife from jail in an effort to manipulate her, and No. 12‐2466 23 his “inordinate preoccupation” with law enforcement in light of the evidence that he impersonated police officers on more than one occasion. Though the court did not dwell on the witness tampering charge, the record demonstrates that the sentencing process was fair overall. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). As a result, we conclude that the district court clearly articulated the basis for its decision and the sentence was reasonable.