Opinion ID: 167150
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Partial Verdict Instruction

Text: 76 In trials with multiple defendants, Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(b) permits a jury to return a verdict at any time during its deliberations as to any defendant about whom it has unanimously agreed. The Appellants argue that the supplemental instruction ordering the jurors to seal verdicts in envelopes improperly invaded the province of the jury regarding how it conducted deliberations. We review submission of supplemental jury instructions once the jury has retired for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Arias-Santos, 39 F.3d 1070, 1075 (10th Cir.1994). 77 The District Court, in giving its supplemental instruction, initially repeated the language of Instruction No. 29, but it then altered that language by ordering the jury to seal any unanimous verdicts it had already reached. In other words, unlike Instruction No. 29, which afforded the jury discretion as to whether or not to return any partial verdicts, the supplemental instruction effectively removed that discretion by directing the jury to return any partial verdicts that had been reached at that point. Thus, the supplemental instruction clearly had the potential to infringe on the jury's discretion to decide for itself what deliberative process to utilize and undoubtedly infringed on the jury's discretion to decide when, if at all, to report a partial verdict. See United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.1981) (discussing right of jury to return partial verdict in multi-defendant trial). We therefore hold that giving such an instruction was error. Nevertheless, we need not remand if we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Stiger, 413 F.3d at 1191 (potential error in verdict form did not warrant remand when any error did not affect the outcome of the trial). 78 The Appellants argue that the partial verdict instruction had the same effect as an Allen instruction, i.e., improperly coercing the jury to reach a verdict as to the charges still being deliberated at the time the District Court gave the supplemental instruction. We concluded above that this instruction did not coerce the jury's verdict. As such, we hold that the District Court's error in giving the supplemental instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.