Opinion ID: 4551120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Control Factor

Text: As discussed, the determination of whether Lowman was free from control or direction over the performance of his driving services requires consideration of the facts concerning the actual working relationship between Lowman and Uber. Pursuant to Section 753(l)(2)(B), the freedom from control or direction must be both “under his contract of service and in fact ….” “Control … is not a matter of approving or directing the final work product so much as it is a matter of controlling the means of its accomplishment.” CE Credits OnLine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 946 A.2d 1162, 1169 (Pa. Commw. 2008). Based on our plenary review of the evidence, we conclude as a matter of law that Lowman was not free from Uber’s direction or control. While many cases have discussed and extracted indicia of control, we find the most weighty and thus dispositive factors in this case to include: the required application process; the inability to use a substitute to provide services; Uber’s monitoring, review and supervision of Lowman’s performance; pay structure; provision of tools and equipment.30 See, e.g., Stauffer, 74 A.3d at 404-05; Quality Care Options v. Review, 92 A.3d 844, 849 (Pa. Commw. 2014); Stauffer v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 74 A.3d 398, 407 (Pa. Commw. 2013); Stage Rd. Poultry Catchers v. Dep’t of Labor and lndus., 34 A.3d 876,892 (Pa. Commw. 2011); Gill v. Dep’t of Labor and Indus., 26 A.3d 567, 570 (Pa. Commw. 2011); Schneider v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 12 A.3d 754, 757-58 (Pa. Commw. 2010). 30 The learned Dissent takes exception to our conclusion that application of the control factor test results in the conclusion that Lowman was not free from Uber’s direction and control. Dissenting Op. at 2. However, the Dissenting Opinion makes no effort to suggest that the factors we find most weighty and dispositive are inappropriate in the context of the totality of the circumstances. Indeed, of the five factors we most heavily weighted, the Dissent selectively discounts only some of them. It singles out its perceived [J-73-2019] - 42 Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 57 A.3d 655, 660, 659 (Pa. Commw. 2012); CE Credits OnLine, 946 A.2d at 1169 (Pa. Commw. 2008); Beacon Flag, 910 A.2d at 108. Immediately after his separation from employment, Lowman opted to seek a source of income by tapping into a readily available opportunity to become a driver-forhire. To do so, by statute, he had to obtain access to a transportation network company. He chose Uber. Uber describes itself as “a technology company” with a “mobile app based marketplace that matches up transportation providers with individuals looking for rides,” N.T. (Referee Hearing), 10/29/2015, at 6. Translated into practice, Uber creates an inventory of passengers and it utilizes drivers, like Lowman, to service that inventory on demand. To access Uber’s passenger inventory, Lowman had to file an application for a license to use the Driver App. As part of the application process, Lowman had to undergo a background check and verify to Uber that he had a valid driver’s license, automobile liability insurance, a properly registered vehicle, and workers’ compensation insurance. Agreement, ¶¶ 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 8.1-8.4. Although Lowman provided his own vehicle and cellphone, which was necessary to access the Driver App, Uber required that Lowman’s personal vehicle and cell phone meet its criteria regarding age and condition to be authorized for use. Agreement, ¶¶ insignificance of the tools provided to Uber, specifically, Uber’s provision of access to Lowman of the Uber App. Id. at 2. As discussed, this is the essential tool for the provision of ride share services. It is the only way in which Lowman can gain access to the inventory of riders created by Uber. The Dissent also takes exception to the lack of weight given to the fact that Lowman received an IRS 1099 Form. Id. While we did not give weight to it, we did not ignore it. For the reasons discussed, unilaterally imposed categorization or description of the relationship is not conclusive in light of the totality of circumstances. [J-73-2019] - 43 1.16, 1.17, 2.6.23.1-23.3. While the vehicle and cell phone as specified were provided by Lowman, these “tools and equipment” were useless without the predicate tool necessary to provide driving services, Uber’s Driver App. This fundamental tool for the provision of the service was provided by Uber – without it, Lowman could provide no service. It was the sole means by which he connected, met, or interfaced with a passenger. Although the Driver App allows a driver to provide rides for remuneration, Uber generated the passenger leads, unilaterally determined the passenger fares and the driver’s percentage, collected the fares, retained its service fee, and then paid Lowman. Agreement, ¶¶ 4.1–4.8. Uber exercised total control over the provision of service because Lowman personally had to fulfill the passenger assignment. He could not hire a substitute driver to provide a ride to a passenger identified by Uber. Agreement, ¶ 5.2. In the virtual world in which Uber operates, it monitored and supervised Lowman’s provision of driving services. Although Lowman was not obligated to have the Driving App activated, while Lowman was using the Driver App, Uber could track his location through its geolocation services, remaining involved in real-time in the actual driving assignment– it knew his location at all times when he was logged in, including when he was providing a ride to the Uber passenger. Agreement, ¶ 2.7. The technology gave Uber real-time reporting on the progress of the service Lowman provided including the time it took for each ride. The GPS tracking was used by Uber to retroactively adjust a fare based upon a driver’s inefficient route. Agreement, ¶ 4.3. Nor could Lowman deviate [J-73-2019] - 44 from the destination provided by the passenger when requesting the ride service from Uber. Agreement, ¶ 2.3. Uber supervised Lowman’s work, using passenger ratings of his services. Although the reviews of Lowman were conducted by passengers, Uber relied on them to assess Lowman’s performance. Lowman was required to maintain an average rating that exceeded the minimum rating established by Uber. Agreement, ¶ 2.5.2. Contractually, Uber could deactivate the Driver App based on failure to maintain an “acceptable rating as determined by Uber.” Agreement, ¶ 2.5.2. This type of constant assessment of performance is a strong indicia of control by Uber. Cf., Beacon Flag, 910 A.2d at 108 (driver was free to complete assignment for client without supervision or monitoring by putative employer). Uber also retained the right to deactivate Lowman’s access to the network through the Driver App immediately and without notice if he did not qualify to provide driving services under applicable law or Uber’s standards and policies. Agreement, ¶ 12.2. As is true with its customers, Uber’s interaction with its drivers is through its technology. While there is no training in the more traditional mode of office or conference room meetings, regular emails and text messages advising on the manner in which rides and Lowman’s earnings (and by definition, Uber’s) could be maximized and approaches to providing positive experiences for customers were utilized by Uber in lieu of face-toface encounters in brick and mortar meeting rooms. N.T. (Referee Hearing), 10/29/2015, at 16, 24-25, 26, 38, Lowman Exhibits 6-9, 12, 15 (Uber emails to Lowman with suggestions). [J-73-2019] - 45 We have considered the totality of the evidence including the provisions of the Uber Agreement, and recognize that there are indicia of the absence of control by Uber over Lowman’s driving for hire services. For example, the Agreement identifies Lowman as an independent contractor and he received a 1099 tax form so that taxes were not withheld from his payments from Uber. Agreement, ¶ 4.1; N.T. (Referee Hearing), 10/29/2015, at 11, 33, 34; Board Decision, 4/22/2016, ¶ 13. Although sometimes relevant, we find them here to add little to the analysis. As in Danielle Viktor, where we found relevant that the limousine companies eschewed the notion that the drivers were not independent contractors, Danielle Viktor, 892 A.2d at 795, here Lowman considered himself an employee. Agreement, ¶ 13.1; N.T. (Referee Hearing), 10/29/2015, at 22, 35– 36. While we do not embrace the notion that such subjective intention can drive the outcome, it evidences the lack of conclusive weight such a designation carries. There is comfort in the conclusion Uber controlled and directed Lowman’s performance of driving-for-hire services. Uber, presenting itself as a transportation network company, invites a passenger without any personal contact with anyone, to request a ride from a driver (who will be a stranger). Vetting, monitoring and supervising the provision of services by its drivers is implicit in Uber’s services. Giving weight to all of the evidence, we conclude that Uber controlled and directed the performance of Lowman’s services as a driver-for-hire.