Opinion ID: 396356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: One Possession Count for Each Weapon

Text: 42 The district court dismissed Count II, the possession count involving the shotgun, because it concluded from its reading of the applicable case law that the government may not treat each of several firearms simultaneously possessed as a separate unit of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. Appendix § 1202(a) (1). 43 The government now alternatively argues that the district court should reinstate Count II because it reads the case law to provide authority for multiple convictions and sentences for simultaneous possession of weapons separately acquired. The government's third contention here presents a different issue from what is presented by its first two arguments. While the first two arguments were premised on principles of multiplicity involving multiple convictions and sentences under two statutes proscribing essentially the same conduct, the question presented by the government's third argument involves a determination, as a matter of law, of the appropriate unit of prosecution under one statute, § 1202(a)(1), of the simultaneous possession of more than one weapon. 44 The general rule, as stated in the cases relied upon by the district court below, is that only one offense is charged under terms of § 1202(a)(1) regardless of the number of firearms involved, absent a showing that the firearms were stored or acquired at different times and places. United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bullock, 615 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957, 101 S.Ct. 367, 66 L.Ed.2d 223 (1980); see also United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1975), and United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1975). The courts in each case concluded that § 1202(a)(1) was ambiguous as to the appropriate unit of prosecution and, under the principles of lenity expressed in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), they were compelled to find only one conviction for simultaneous possession of multiple weapons. 45 While stating the general rule of only one unit of prosecution for simultaneous possession, the district court below apparently overlooked the qualifying exception embodied in the phrase absent a showing that the firearms were stored or acquired at different times and places. The government argues on appeal that this exception applies to the facts of this case since the evidence demonstrates that Wiga purchased the two weapons at different times and in different places. We agree. Of the cases cited above which state the general rule of only one unit of prosecution for simultaneous possession, the only case to apply the exception-finding separate units of prosecution under § 1202(a)(1) for each weapon separately acquired-is United States v. Bullock, supra. In the other cases, the courts found only one violation because the facts did not demonstrate separate storage or acquisition. The Bullock court (Goldberg, J., dissenting) applied the exception since Bullock had received the weapons at different times and places. 46 We take our place in line with the other circuits in espousing the rule and its exception as stated in the cases cited above. We also note that Wiga's multiple transgressions dictate an even more compelling set of facts for the application of the exception than was present in Bullock. The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that the revolver was acquired (i. e., received and possessed) in Nebraska on December 18, 1978, and the shotgun was acquired in Iowa on April 14, 1978. The indictments allege the separate and distinct acts of acquisition in Nebraska and Iowa with particularity as to time and place. The jury was correctly and adequately instructed as to the essential elements of each offense in Counts I and II. Further, correct instructions were given defining possession, the interstate commerce requirement and the inferences that might be properly drawn from the uncontroverted sequence of events. Wiga does not quarrel with any of these instructions. The separate and distinct acquisitions were argued to the jury without interference or objection. The mere fact that these separately acquired weapons ended up simultaneously in the possession of Wiga in Nevada does not preclude separate prosecutions for possession. 47 We believe the court in Bullock correctly interpreted the intent of Congress in a statement that deserves reiteration here: 48 Common sense and logic, however, will not support a holding that the receipt of firearms at separate times must merge into one possession, thus, one offense. In addressing this evil, could Congress have intended to deter receipt as well as possession of firearms by convicted felons and yet design the statute to only allow one punishment no matter how many separate receipts and possessions occurred? We think not. Any other determination would allow convicted felons and terrorists to establish armories where all of their weapons would be kept. The person in custody of the armory would then be subject to only a single charge of possession, although thousands of illegal and dangerous weapons were received and stockpiled at different times. 49 615 F.2d at 1085-86.