Opinion ID: 1974115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Standards for Determining Moral Turpitude

Text: The Court's opinion in Colson recognized that the question whether a crime inherently involves moral turpitude is very difficult and that the term `moral turpitude' has less than a finite definition. 412 A.2d at 1165 n. 10 and 1167. It was for this reason that the Court set out a model to assist the Board in disposing of those cases where [an evidentiary] ... hearing is necessary as a result of the Board's initial determination that the attorney's crime did not involve moral turpitude per se. The legal standards of Colson are general guidelines that focus the full evidentiary hearing on such issues as whether the act denounced by the [criminal] statute offends the generally accepted code of mankind, or whether the criminal act is one of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, or whether the act is contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. 412 A.2d at 1168. Since these guidelines for a full evidentiary hearing are general in nature, the Board accordingly will want to err on the side of admitting evidence that goes to the moral implications of the particular respondent's acts to determine whether his particular offense involved moral turpitude, even if the crime cannot be said per se to do so. Id. at 1165, n. 10. Respondent stresses the Colson language quoted above to support the contention that this case should be referred to a Hearing Committee for a full evidentiary hearing to develop all of the circumstances of the alleged criminal offense and Respondent's guilty plea. It is clear, however, that these broad and general guidelines of Colson apply only where the Board's initial determination discloses no moral turpitude per se. Such guidelines have no application in a case, such as this one, where the attorney's criminal offense has already been determined by the Court to be one involving moral turpitude. This case is governed by the Court's decision in In re Willcher, 447 A.2d 1198 (D.C.1982), and its progeny. The attorney in Willcher was convicted ... of unlawful solicitation of money from an indigent whom he had been appointed to represent under the CJA, a misdemeanor for which the attorney was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and fined $700. The prison sentence was suspended and probation of 15 months was imposed. In rejecting the Board's conclusion that the conviction in Willcher did not involve moral turpitude, the Court quoted and adopted the rule in California: Although the problem of defining moral turpitude is not without difficulty, it is settled that whatever else it may mean, it includes fraud and that a crime in which an intent to defraud is an essential element is a crime involving moral turpitude. 412 A.2d at 1200, quoting Justice Traynor's opinion in In re Hallihan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768, 771 (1954), appeal after remand, 48 Cal.2d 52, 307 P.2d 1 (1957). Although the criminal convictions in Willcher and Hallihan were concerned with an offense involving both fraud and intentional dishonesty for personal gain, the Willcher court held that fraud alone is sufficient to constitute moral turpitude under § 11-2503(a). As stated by the court, the criminal conviction in Willcher always [requires] a fraud on the client ... and on the judicial system, and we hold that [it]... falls squarely within the definition of an offense inherently involving moral turpitude. 447 A.2d at 1200-01. In the wake of Willcher, both the Court and the Board have held, without deviation, that conviction of a crime which necessarily required proof of intent to defraud ... inherently involves moral turpitude. In re Meisnere, 471 A.2d 269, 270-71 (D.C. 1984); accord, In re Anderson, 474 A.2d 145, 146 (D.C.1984). As stated in the court's most recent decision on the question: As for Respondent's other conviction [conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371], the court has held that statutory crimes with the element of fraudulent intent involve moral turpitude. Accordingly, there was no need for a factual determination as to the specific conduct involved in respondent's convictions for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. In re Vogel, No. 88-73, Slip Op. at 1-2 (May 31, 1989).