Opinion ID: 1518484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Modification of the Order

Text: [¶ 28] Robert finally argues that the court erred in considering Tamara's motion to modify the parent-child contact schedule because she failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred since the original divorce order was entered. [¶ 29] Title 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(10) (1998) provides, in part, that [u]pon the petition of one or both of the parents, an order for parental rights and responsibilities with respect to a minor child may be modified or terminated as circumstances require. In Cloutier v. Lear, 1997 ME 35, ¶ 3, 691 A.2d 660, 662, we stated: The question that the court must first consider on a motion to modify a custody arrangement is whether there has occurred since the prior custody order a change in circumstances sufficiently substantial in its effect upon the best interests of the children as to justify a modification of the custody arrangement. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ehrlich v. Bloom, 585 A.2d 809, 812 (Me. 1991)). The trial court is vested with significant discretion in its review of the sensitive issues of child custody and visitation. See id. ¶ 4, 691 A.2d at 662. [¶ 30] The trial court properly found that there was a sufficient change in circumstances to modify the September 7, 2000, divorce judgment. Parental contact had not been occurring every weekend and Robert had not been picking up the girls as frequently as he was during the week. Tamara had enrolled at NMTC as a student and now would be working as an L.P.N. in one to two, twelve-hour weekend shifts per week. The parties were also unable to agree on drop-off times that would accommodate Tamara's schedule. This evidence supports the trial court's finding that there was a substantial change in circumstances. [¶ 31] Robert also argues that the court erred in its modification order because it used language that suggested mandatory contact between him and his daughters, one of whom often refused to participate in visitations or became ill during visits. However, Robert did not request additional findings or seek clarification of the court's order on this point. [¶ 32] The District Court's August 9, 2002, order altered the language of the original divorce judgment, which stated that Robert had the right to visit with and be visited by the children, to read that [t]he minor children shall ... have contact with [Robert] at the described times (emphasis added). Robert may be reading more into this change than intended by the court, and if his concern continues, it can be appropriately addressed by a request for clarification on remand. The entry is: Judgment is vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.