Opinion ID: 4556240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Mitchell

Text: The district court held that the first Graham factor, the severity of the crime being investigated by the officers, clearly militates towards finding that Officer Mitchell’s use of force was constitutional because he was intervening in a “severe crime.” R. 34, Dist. Ct. Order, PageID # 751. The court found that the crime was severe based on the officers’ uncontested testimony that Kapuscinski appeared to be strangling Christina with his thighs while repeating, “I’m gonna kill her.” Id. at 750. The district court noted that Christina told officers after the incident that Kapuscinski had been sexually violent with her earlier and that she did not consent to his actions. Id. Thus, the district court reasoned, “[w]hether Kapuscinski’s strangulation of Christina was attempted murder or sexual assault, it was a severe crime.” Id. at 751. On appeal, Plaintiff observes that the officers were on the scene to investigate a complaint of domestic violence. Plaintiff argues that the officers were investigating a misdemeanor because -7- Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. this was the first reported domestic violence complaint against Kapuscinski and the first instance of domestic violence is generally a misdemeanor. However, the officers arrived at the scene with no knowledge as to whether Kapuscinski was a first time offender. Therefore, Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 459 (6th Cir. 2016), offers little support for Plaintiff’s argument, where this Court found that driving without headlights on and failure to provide identification, both misdemeanors, were not “severe enough” to warrant the use of a taser. Even if Kapuscinski had only been committing a misdemeanor, the officers would not have known that when they were responding to the emergency call. Under state law, domestic violence can be a misdemeanor or felony offense, but that could not have been ascertained until Kapuscinski was identified and the incident was properly investigated. Regardless, upon entering the bedroom, the officers observed Kapuscinski committing a felonious assault. As Officer Mitchell testified, he believed Christina could not breathe or talk, that her life was in danger, and that he was witnessing an assault. It must also be noted that Christina stated in an interview with police following the incident that the “sex act” observed by the officers was not consensual and that Kapuscinski was harming her. Appellee Mitchell’s Br. at 20. However, Christina’s statements after the incident should arguably have had no bearing on whether the crime Mitchell witnessed when he entered the bedroom was sufficiently “severe,” because such information would have been unknown from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Nevertheless, her subsequent description of the events serve to confirm the observations of the police officers. And it is what Mitchell did perceive when he entered the room—a potentially deadly assault—that causes this factor to weigh decisively in Mitchell’s favor. Consequently, Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of fact disputing that Christina might have been in life-threatening danger when -8- Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. the officers entered the bedroom and saw her being strangled by Kapuscinski. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that the officers were only investigating misdemeanor domestic violence is entirely unpersuasive. That was not the crime at issue—Mitchell was responding to a violent assault. Whether Mitchell initially thought it was a “weird sex act” is irrelevant, because upon determining that Christina was having difficulty breathing and hearing Kapuscinski’s repeated threats to kill her, he realized the seriousness of the danger she was in. R. 30-9, Mitchell Depo., PageID # 577.
With respect to whether Kapuscinski posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, the district court held that Kapuscinski presented a threat to Mitchell’s physical safety because both officers testified that Kapuscinski “looked crazed and dangerous and appeared ready to attack them.” R. 34, Dist. Ct. Order, PageID # 751. Additionally, after taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and assuming that all of Robinson’s taser discharges were successful, the court acknowledged that because those discharges failed to stop Kapuscinski, “Mitchell still saw an active and energetic threat.” Id. In the district court’s view, Mitchell’s statement to Robinson during the incident that “you’ve only got one barb in him” further showed that a reasonable officer would have felt Kapuscinski remained a serious threat to his safety and that his taser discharge was justified. Id. On appeal, Plaintiff argues first that because both officers were at least fifty pounds heavier than Kapuscinski, “[n]othing prevented either officer from taking him down with a tackle maneuver if they truly felt threatened. They knew he was unarmed – he was naked.” Appellant’s Br. at 26–27. Plaintiff also emphasizes that Kapuscinski was lying on his back and “did not swing at or charge at the officers.” Id. at 27. While Plaintiff does concede that while Kapuscinski “may have been obstinate (or rendered insensate and unable to comply),” he argues that Kapuscinski’s -9- Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. body position and lack of weapons meant that he was no threat to the officers “towering above” him. Id. In response, Mitchell reported that despite being on his back and on the ground, “Kapuscinski was still kicking, being very aggressive . . . attempting to get up to come after us.” Appellee Mitchell’s Br. at 21. And as noted previously, the officers stated in their depositions in the present case that Kapuscinski moved into a kneeling or crouching position and appeared to be attempting to stand up, all while disobeying Robinson’s verbal commands to roll over. This Court has held tasing to be a reasonable response to a threat of immediate harm when a suspect disobeys police orders and may be armed, see, e.g., Watson v. City of Marysville, 518 F. App’x 390, 393 (6th Cir. 2013), or when a suspect is “particularly violent or physically resistant, so as to endanger responders,” Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 2016). For example, in Hagans v. Franklin County Sheriff’s Office, 695 F.3d 505, 511 (6th Cir. 2012), we found that the tasing of a suspect was justified because he was “out of control and continued forcefully to resist arrest.” Hagans repeatedly refused to be handcuffed, wrestled with officers who sought to subdue him, attempted to flee, and even tried to grab an officer’s taser while being stunned. Id. at 507. Conversely, in Kijowski v. City of Niles, 372 F. App’x 595, 600 (6th Cir. 2010), we held that “[a]bsent some compelling justification—such as the potential escape of a dangerous criminal or the threat of immediate harm—the use of [a taser] on a non-resistant person is unreasonable.” In outlining the contours of this rule, we favorably cited a decision from the Tenth Circuit approving of the use of a taser on a man who initiated a fight with police and was kicking and biting the officers who were wrestling him to the ground in an effort to subdue him. Id. (citing Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007)). We then held that the officer in Kijowski was not objectively reasonable in tasing the plaintiff twice, because the plaintiff - 10 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. was in no way resisting arrest and “a reasonable officer on the scene would not have perceived [the plaintiff] as presenting a risk of harm.” Id. Moreover, in Kent, we held that an individual did not pose an “immediate threat” to the safety of officers and paramedics on the scene because he was unarmed and there was no evidence that he “was violently thrashing about in an effort to avoid handcuffing or to flee police, such that he might have harmed the deputies and EMTs in the bedroom” or that he “attempted to hit officers or make a display of force.” 810 F.3d at 391. At the most, Kent was using “agitated hand gestures” towards the officers. Id. We contrasted the facts of the case with those in cases such as Watson and Hagans to hold that “Kent’s actions do not . . . amount to the same immediate threat to safety found to justify tasing under our case law.” Id. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable officer in Mitchell’s position would have been justified in perceiving that Kapuscinski posed a serious threat to the officers’ physical safety. Although the record indicates that Kapuscinski neither successfully stood up nor assaulted the officers, he refused to comply with their repeated verbal instructions throughout the incident and he behaved in an objectively threatening manner. Rather than obey Robinson’s order to roll over so he could be arrested, Kapuscinski kicked towards the officers and began to attempt to stand up in the small bedroom. It is impossible to say conclusively what Kapuscinski would have done had he completely stood up. However, “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, it was reasonable for Mitchell to perceive Kapuscinski’s actions as a physical threat. The officers had just seen him violently assault and threaten to kill Christina and he was refusing to comply with their instructions to roll over so that he could be safely apprehended. - 11 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. This conclusion becomes clear after taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and assuming that Robinson’s multiple taser discharges were successful in shocking Kapuscinski.3 That these discharges failed to immobilize Kapuscinski made it reasonable for officers to believe Kapuscinski was “out of control.” Hagans, 695 F.3d at 511. Unlike the suspect in Kijowski, who was peacefully sitting in his vehicle when officers seized him and tased him, 372 F. App’x at 599–600, Kapuscinski prompted the officers’ intervention in the present case by assaulting Christina and continuing to act in an aggressive manner towards the officers. Moreover, unlike the actions of the plaintiff in Kent, Kapuscinski was “violently thrashing about . . . such that he might have harmed the deputies,” and his kicking combined with his sustained disobedience constituted “a display of force.” 810 F.3d at 391. Finally, Kapuscinski did not have “his hands up and his back against the bedroom wall when he was tased.” Id. (“We have held that an individual poses little threat of harm when her hands are in the air indicating submission.”). Quite the opposite: Kapuscinski remained in an aggressive posture until Mitchell’s taser discharge incapacitated him. Therefore, from the perspective of a reasonable officer, the threat posed by Kapuscinski was sufficiently great that Mitchell’s defensive use of a taser was justified.
The third Graham factor considers whether the suspect “is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 490 U.S. at 396. We have held that “[i]f a suspect actively resists arrest and refuses to be handcuffed, officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by using 3 Plaintiff points out that his medical expert, Dr. Werner Spitz, examined Kapuscinski’s postmortem photos and concluded that there was evidence of more than two taser wounds, “which contradicts Defendants’ position they only tased Mr. Kapuscinski twice.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. That is, however, all Dr. Spitz contradicts. Plaintiff has not refuted the points in the officers’ testimony that are critical to assessing the threat he posed—that Kapuscinski was non-compliant with their verbal commands, that he refused to roll over and instead attempted to stand up, and that he appeared extremely belligerent. Plaintiff has provided no evidence, and has not identified anything in the officers’ depositions, that contradicts these aspects of their account. - 12 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. a taser to subdue him.” Hagans, 695 F.3d at 509. The district court found that Kapuscinski was actively resisting arrest because he “was certainly hostile, belligerent and thrashing.” R. 34, Dist. Ct. Order, PageID # 753. It noted that Kapuscinski’s violent assault of Christina and the officers’ testimony that he was “uncontrollable . . . within feet of them refusing arrest commands” justified this determination. Id. Additionally, the court reasoned, “[t]he capstone that marked his active resistance was his decision to stand up after eleven verbal commands to either roll over or remain on the ground.” Id. It found that officers are not required by the Fourth Amendment “to grapple hand-to-hand with a suspect who threatens their physical safety.” Id. This Court has identified active resistance where “some outward manifestation—either verbal or physical—on the part of the suspect had suggested volitional and conscious defiance.” Eldridge v. City of Warren, 533 F. App’x 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2013). In Hagans, the suspect evinced active resistance by refusing to allow himself to be handcuffed and wrestling with officers. 695 F.3d at 507, 510–11. In Foos v. City of Delaware, 492 F. App’x 582, 584–85, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2012), we held there was active resistance where a suspect who had crashed into a concrete pillar revved his engine rather than respond to an officer’s attempt to get his attention, reached into his backseat when back-up arrived as if to retrieve a weapon, and continued to thrash about violently after officers broke his car’s window with an axe. In Eldridge, this Court stated: If there is a common thread to be found in our caselaw on this issue, it is that noncompliance alone does not indicate active resistance; there must be something more. It can be a verbal showing of hostility . . . [i]t can also be a deliberate act of defiance using one’s own body, as in Hagans, or some other mechanism, such as the truck in Foos. 533 F. App’x at 535. We then held that a man who was driving erratically and had crashed into a concrete barricade and refused to obey officer commands to exit his vehicle until he was tased was - 13 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. not actively resisting arrest. Id. at 530–31; 535. The suspect remained in his vehicle and assured officers that he was fine. Id. at 530–31. He did not evince active resistance because he engaged in no aggressive or physical behavior. Id. at 535. Instead, “the only individuals conveying any sense of aggression were the two officers.” Id. It was later determined that the man was having a hypoglycemic episode. Id. at 531. Moreover, in Kent, this Court found no active resistance on the part of the plaintiff while he was being confronted by police in his home. 810 F.3d at 393–94. Paramedics and police officers were at Kent’s home because his father was unresponsive. Id. at 387. Kent grew increasingly agitated as the paramedics worked on his father because he knew that his father had a living will with a “do not resuscitate” order. However, because Kent could produce no proof of the will, the paramedics attempted to revive his father. Id. at 387–88. Officers at the scene ordered Kent to calm down but he refused. Id. at 388. When an officer told Kent that he would be tased if he did not control himself, Kent said—with his hands raised and his back to the wall—“Go ahead and Taze me, then.” Id. The officer did so, and Kent was handcuffed. Id. at 388–89. We held that under those circumstances, Kent was not actively resisting the officers when he was tased because was not attempting to flee from the officers and he never resisted handcuffing. Id. at 393–94. Ultimately, Kent did no more than fail to comply with an officer’s command. Id. In the present case, Kapuscinski resisted arrest by refusing to comply with the officers’ demands that he roll over and by physically attempting to stand up. These actions reflect a “deliberate act of defiance using one’s own body.” Eldridge, 533 F. App’x at 535; see also Hagans, 695 F.3d at 510–11 (finding active resistance where plaintiff wrestled with officers and refused to be handcuffed). Unlike the situation in Eldridge, Officer Mitchell was not the only one “conveying - 14 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. a[] sense of aggression.” 533 F. App’x at 535. In fact, it was Kapuscinski’s refusal to comply with officer instructions to release Christina that prompted the deployment of tasers in the first place. Moreover, while Foos involved a driver whose active resistance came in the form of revving his engine and appearing to reach for a weapon, 492 F. App’x at 584–85, 590–91, Kapuscinski similarly failed to respond to an officer’s attempt to get his attention and instead began to act belligerently. And wholly unlike Kent, Kapuscinski had no reasonable explanation for his hostility towards the officers, nor was Kapuscinski’s kicking akin to Kent’s “agitated hand gestures.” 810 F.3d at 391. Importantly, in that case, Kent ceased his hand movements prior to being tased and instead had his hands raised and his back against the wall—emphasizing his lack of active resistance to the officers. Id. at 391–92. Kapuscinski, conversely, did not cease attempting to stand up until Mitchell successfully incapacitated him. Therefore, Kapuscinski was actively resisting arrest.4 After considering the three Graham factors and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we conclude that Mitchell’s use of force was reasonable. Kapuscinski’s death is undeniably tragic; lethal force was not intended nor was it apparently deemed necessary by the responding officers. However, the law allows officers sufficient breathing room to respond adequately to threats to themselves and others, even when those responses have unintended fatal consequences. Mitchell’s taser use fits within that grant of discretion as articulated by the Supreme Court in Graham and expounded in numerous cases by this Court, including those cited above. 4 We have said that “[i]n determining whether officers used excessive force, courts have placed great weight on officers’ failure to warn a suspect before deploying a taser.” Gradisher v. City of Akron, 794 F.3d 574, 585 (6th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff does correctly note that Mitchell did not warn Kapuscinski before deploying his taser. However, it is unclear from the record what difference a warning would have made in the present case, or whether there appeared to be time to warn before Kapuscinski charged the officers. Robinson warned Kapuscinski before attempting to tase him a second time and it is clear that Kapuscinski refused to heed any of his commands. - 15 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. See, e.g., Hagans, 695 F.3d at 511 (finding that Hagans’ death, caused in part by taser shocks, did not change the fact that the use of a taser against him was reasonable). Thus, summary judgment was appropriately granted to Mitchell.