Opinion ID: 1979794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Doctor Latina's Testimony of a Subjective Standard of Care

Text: Doctor Latina also faults the trial justice for dismissing his own testimony that the standard of care required that the surgeon be certain  but only in his own mind  that the anatomical structure he was cutting was the cystic duct. In her decision on the motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial justice explained that the evidence was discounted because it was not elicited to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as is required of expert medical testimony. The plaintiff also argues that Dr. Latina was not disclosed as an expert witness and thus was not in a position to give expert testimony at trial. Rule 26(b)(4) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure [15] requires a party to disclose any and all expert witnesses he wishes to call when requested to do so by interrogatory of the opposing party. [16] While it is true that we have said that talismanic incantations have been eschewed by this Court, the expert witness must testify that the opinions offered rise to the level of reasonable medical certainty, that is, some degree of positiveness or probability and not possibility. Riley v. Stone, 900 A.2d 1087, 1092 (R.I.2006). Additionally, a trial justice, when deciding to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law, is not required to find that no evidence whatsoever exists in opposition to the result sought by the moving party, but rather that the evidence, taken as a whole, does not raise a legally sufficient question of fact to be decided by the jury. Hanson v. Singsen, 898 A.2d 1244, 1248 (R.I.2006). When Dr. Latina testified that he believed that the standard of care required only that the surgeon be certain, in his own mind, that he had identified the cystic duct, plaintiff immediately questioned him as to whether he was aware of any scholarly article or medical textbook that espoused that theory of the standard of care for laparoscopic cholecystectomies. Doctor Latina candidly answered that he knew of none. The plaintiff also repeatedly pressed Dr. Latina about whether he was truthful when he previously testified under oath that the standard of care was not to do what you did in this case, which is to think that you were there at the cystic duct, but to do whatever it takes to do to know that what you think is the cystic duct, is the cystic duct, and Dr. Latina said that he was being truthful then as well as now. We conclude that it was not necessary for the trial justice to weigh the evidence to find that Dr. Latina's opinion with regard to the standard of care was inadequate to raise a legally sufficient factual dispute about what the standard of care was for a laparoscopic cholecystectomy. The lack of any foundation for his opinion means that his testimony falls short of the standard that expert medical opinion be stated to a reasonable medical certainty. Riley, 900 A.2d at 1092. Thus, we hold that the trial justice did not run afoul of the standard for deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law when she found that Dr. Latina's testimony did not present a question of fact for the jury. 3