Opinion ID: 780165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The state discrimination claim

Text: 24 In its 1999 Opinion, the district court dismissed Treglia's federal discrimination claim on the merits because he did not allege that his disability substantially limited a major life activity and did not show that the Town perceived him to be incapable of working in a broad range of jobs as required under the ADA. As noted above, Treglia does not appeal from that dismissal. However, he argues that the district court erred in the portion of the 1999 Opinion dismissing his state discrimination claim. As to this claim, the district court held, 25 Because New York courts apply the same analysis for perceived disability and retaliation claims as are applied in federal employment cases, plaintiff's state claims here were discussed previously in tandem with his federal claims. Suffice it to say that the court will retain jurisdiction over plaintiff's retaliation claim, and decline to do so over his perceived disability claim. 26 Treglia argues that this was a dismissal on the merits of his state discrimination claim and was improper because the NYHRL defines disability differently than does the ADA. The Town argues that the district court did not dismiss the state discrimination claim on the merits, but simply declined to exercise its pendent jurisdiction over that claim in light of its dismissal of the federal discrimination claim. 27 It is unclear from the district court's opinion whether the court simply declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state discrimination claim or whether it dismissed that state claim on the merits. However, dismissal of the state claim on the record before us was erroneous in either case. Supplemental jurisdiction in this case is proper because Treglia's state discrimination claim arises out of approximately the same set of events as his federal retaliation claim. Moreover, we have held that the discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction is available only if founded upon an enumerated category of [28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)]. Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir.1998). 6 None of the § 1367(c) categories are available in the instant case. Treglia's state discrimination claim does not raise a novel or complex issue of state law, does not predominate over the federal retaliation claim over which the district court retained jurisdiction, and does not raise other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. The district court therefore should retain jurisdiction over the state discrimination claim. 28 As to the merits of the state discrimination claim, New York and Second Circuit cases make clear that the New York disability statute defines disability more broadly than does the ADA. The New York Court of Appeals has held that in New York, the term `disability' is more broadly defined [than in typical disability statutes].... Fairly read, the statute covers a range of conditions varying in degree from those involving the loss of a bodily function to those which are merely diagnosable medical anomalies which impair bodily integrity and thus may lead to more serious conditions in the future. New York Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 213, 218-19, 491 N.Y.S.2d 106, 480 N.E.2d 695 (1985). More recently, we applied this broad reading of the New York statute, pointing out that unlike the federal statute, the state statute does not require [plaintiffs] to identify a major life activity that is substantially limited by [their] impairment. Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir.1998). Therefore, the district court could not have properly dismissed the state discrimination claim based solely on the definition of disability it applied to the federal discrimination claim. Accordingly, we remand the state discrimination claim for further consideration. 7 In doing so, we express no view on the merits of that claim under the broader New York statute.