Opinion ID: 1090165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Special Class of Defendants.

Text: ¶ 41. We have previously held that venue is a valuable right possessed by both plaintiff and defendant.  Forrest County Gen. Hosp. v. Conway, 700 So.2d 324, 326 (Miss.1997) (emphasis added). In the case at hand, the injury first occurred and the cause of action first accrued in Tunica County. But for the injury which was the cause of death, there would be no wrongful death action, nor would there have been any necessity for medical care. ¶ 42. Yet the majority, based upon a dictionary entry, creates a special class of medical defendants. This special class is judicially endowed with greater rights created solely by this Court, greater rights which are neither available to other persons or professions nor authorized by our state constitution. The special class of defendants has a venue veto power regardless of the nature of the action, the surrounding facts and circumstances, the extent to which the events in question actually occurred within a certain venue, or the degree of alleged culpability of the special class defendants versus other defendants. The majority reaches this conclusion regardless that the Bill of Rights of our Constitution of 1890 guarantees that [a]ll courts shall be open; and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay. Miss. Const., art. 3, § 24. Further, [n]o person shall be debarred from prosecuting or defending any civil cause for or against him or herself, before any tribunal in the state, by him or herself, or counsel, or both. Miss. Const. of 1890, art. III, § 25 (emphasis added). ¶ 43. The arguments proposed in the majority opinion reveal an aversion to these Constitutional rights and bedrock protections guaranteed to the citizens of the State of Mississippi, and are better suited for a political stump speech at the Neshoba County Fair. Despite repeated citations to the same provisions of the Constitution by the author of the dissent, the author of the majority opinion continues to ignore the Constitutional questions that are implicated by this case, which must be resolved. While the legislature generally has the power to enact any law it sees fit, nevertheless, it is restricted in its enactment of laws by the provisions of our State Constitution and cannot by statutory enactment alter or nullify a clear, unambiguous mandate of the Constitution,  because [s]uch a statute would be unconstitutional. Saxon v. Harvey, 223 So.2d 620, 624 (Miss.1969). Ultimately, no matter the rhetoric of the majority, [t]he wisdom of the drafters of our Constitution is not subject to question by this Court, and is to be modified or altered by amendment only. Id. at 624. If there exists an irreconcilable conflict . . . then the constitutional provisions must prevail. Id.; see also Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning v. Ray, 809 So.2d 627, 636 (Miss.2002) (The general principle followed when considering a possible conflict between the constitution and a statute is that the constitutional provision prevails). The approach should be no different in today's case. ¶ 44. While in this case the primary defendant, Goldstrike Casino, later supported the transfer of venue to DeSoto County, one may easily imagine a scenario where a primary defendant wishes to take advantage of the venue statutes that provide suit must be filed in its county of residence. Let us imagine a person is injured in Rankin County while hunting on private property, and that they are airlifted to Hinds County for treatment of injuries. While under treatment, the person receives a minute but compensable injury as a result of medical treatment. If this hypothetical plaintiff files suit against the Rankin County property owner, under the majority's rule, the suit must be transferred to Hinds County, regardless of the Rankin County property owner's wishes, and regardless of the fact that 95% of the injury occurred and accrued in Rankin County. This is a perverse result. ¶ 45. I certainly acknowledge that because of the ambiguity created by these statutes we must proceed to to discern and give effect to the legislative intent. City of Natchez, Miss. v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992). I further agree with the majority that lawmakers intended to ensure that cases that primarily center upon medical malpractice claims would only be brought in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred. Yet I remain far from convinced that in a case that does not primarily center on a medical malpractice claim the Legislature intended to achieve so harsh a result as the denial of venue rights to one group of defendants in favor of another. ¶ 46. Notwithstanding the majority's analysis, and in lack of a clear guidance from the Legislature, I would advance a test that would ascertain where the bulk of the action accrued or occurred. This approach to venue would balance the competing interests of venue with the intention of the Legislature.