Opinion ID: 354127
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 1972 Immunity Discussions

Text: 23 The 1972 immunity discussions between Walter Cox and the Government were cut short when Cox withdrew from further negotiations after receiving an anonymous threat on the life of his son. 5 These initial discussions, then, did not result in any promise, agreement or understanding of any kind; and it was not until 1974 that the Government formally tendered the grant of immunity under which Cox was eventually to testify at trial. 6 24 The appellant nevertheless argues that the Government violated its constitutional duty of disclosure by failing to reveal that Cox had previously negotiated for full immunity. 7 In particular, citing language from the Supreme Court's opinion in Agurs the failure to make any response (to a specific and relevant request) is seldom, if ever, excusable 8 Weidman claims that this information was specifically requested, that its nondisclosure was thus a constitutional error, and that a new trial is therefore required. 25 However, even if the 1972 discussions did fall within the scope of Weidman's request, 9 it does not follow as a matter of course that a new trial is warranted. It is true, of course, that the nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within (the Brady ) rule. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1971). But under Brady as well as Agurs, the specifically requested but undisclosed information must still meet some standard of materiality, however defined, to justify a new trial. Brady, supra, 373 U.S., at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; Agurs, supra 427 U.S., at 106, 96 S.Ct. 2392. 26 Whatever that standard may be, it was not met here, for the 1972 discussions simply cannot be viewed as material in any meaningful sense of the word. It appears from the record that the Government's effort to implicate Weidman in the Burns Harbor fraud was based largely on the testimony of witnesses other than Cox. 10 More importantly, however, Cox was ultimately given immunity and the terms of the agreement were fully disclosed to the accused; indeed, Cox was thoroughly impeached on these grounds at trial. It seems clear, then, that the mere fact of an earlier, aborted immunity discussion could not serve any significant purpose that was not already served (and more effectively) by the disclosed information on the actual immunity grant. Therefore, it is our conclusion that there is only a remote possibility that the undisclosed information could have affected the outcome of the proceedings below; and this possibility is not, by any standard, sufficient to establish materiality in the constitutional sense.