Opinion ID: 1453508
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructional and Constitutional Contentions

Text: Before the jury could decide the special circumstance question, it had to find defendant guilty of first degree murder. The only theory of first degree murder on which the court instructed was a premeditated and deliberate killing with malice. The court instructed on lying in wait as follows: The term `lying in wait' is defined as a waiting and watching the victim for an opportune time to act, together with the concealment by ambush or some other secret design to take the victim by surprise. The lying in wait need not continue for any particular period of time, provided that its duration is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, one, the elements of waiting, watching and concealment or other secret design to take the victim unawares and by surprise; and two, that during the period of lying in wait the defendant had the intention to kill the victim....[ [5] ] If the murder is done suddenly, without a period of waiting, watching and concealment, the special circumstance of lying in wait is not present. [¶] The term `lying in wait' does not require a showing that the defendant was in a position of lying down. He may be shown to be sitting or standing, and he may be stationary or in motion. The requirement of concealment does not require that the defendant be not visible to the victim, nor that the victim be totally unaware of the physical presence of the defendant. Concealment may be shown by either an ambush or by the defendant's intentional creation [6] of a situation where the victim is taken unawares and by surprise, even though the victim sees the defendant. In order to find the special circumstance of lying in wait to be true, you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the lying in wait continued up to the moment of the killing, without interruption of time between lying in wait and the act of killing. When the court reinstructed the jury during deliberations, it added at defense request: Before you may find that a murder was committed while lying in wait, the prosecution is required to prove something more than just ... first degree murder. (22) In People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 557, we held that an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage, presents a factual matrix sufficiently distinct from `ordinary' premeditated murder to justify treating it as a special circumstance. We upheld a lying-in-wait finding against a defendant who, in plain view, sat behind his intended victim in an automobile and waited until the car was in a more deserted location before attempting to strangle her and eventually bludgeoning her to death. (23a) Defendant asserts the instructions of this case were deficient under Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527. As we explain, the actual instructions fulfill all of the legal requirements even though the words are not always precisely the same as we used in Morales (which is not surprising since the trial predated that opinion). Defendant first claims that the instructions erroneously require only a mere concealment of purpose to establish lying in wait. He focuses, however, on only one of the instructional requirements. The instructions also required waiting and watching for an opportune time to act, an intent to kill, and no interruption of time between lying in wait and the killing. Defendant next contends the instructions do not require, in the words of Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 557, a position of advantage. That precise phrase is not found in the instructions, but the meaning is. An ambush or a situation where the victim is taken unawares and by surprise, combined with an intent to kill, necessarily places the intended killer in a position of advantage. We did not require any particular phraseology in Morales, only the substance. Defendant next contends the instructions do not require a substantial period of waiting and watching. Again, the specific word substantial was not used. However, the jury was told that the lying in wait must be of sufficient duration to establish the elements of waiting, watching and concealment or other secret design to take the victim unawares and by surprise, and that a murder done suddenly without such waiting, watching and concealment is not murder by lying in wait. These requirements necessarily include a substantial temporal element. We have never required a certain minimum period of time, only a period not insubstantial. The instructions sufficiently convey this meaning. (24) Defendant also reiterates some contentions rejected in Morales. As explained in that decision, concealment of physical presence is not a requirement of lying in wait. (48 Cal.3d at pp. 554-556.) We also held that the lying-in-wait special circumstance, as interpreted in that and prior decisions, is constitutional. ( Id. at pp. 557-558; accord People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1].) We decline defendant's invitation to reconsider these decisions. Defendant makes additional contentions not specifically addressed in Morales. He claims the lying-in-wait special circumstance impermissibly duplicates the special circumstances involving murder by explosive devices and by poison. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(4), (6) & (19); see People v. Montiel (1985) 39 Cal.3d 910, 927 [218 Cal. Rptr. 572, 705 P.2d 1248].) However, under the instructions, a murder by explosive device or poison would also be by lying in wait only if the actual use of the explosive device or poison was contemporaneously with, or immediately following, the lying in wait. There is no substantial overlap among these special circumstances, and certainly not so much as to invalidate any of them. Defendant claims the special circumstance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide notice, guidance or any principled method to identify a class of murderers that are more deserving of death. On the contrary, as interpreted in Morales and prior decisions, it has specific and clear requirements which sufficiently distinguish a lying-in-wait murder from other first degree murders to justify treating it as a special circumstance. ( People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 557; People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1023.) Defendant also contends that Morales changed the law, and that applying it to this case would violate ex post facto principles. On the contrary, Morales merely applied established law. ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448, fn 21 [285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].) (23b) Defendant next argues that the court was required sua sponte to instruct the jury under CALJIC No. 17.01 that it had to agree unanimously which acts constituted the lying in wait. We disagree. (25) A requirement of jury unanimity typically applies to acts that could have been charged as separate offenses. ( People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 92 [279 Cal. Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].) A jury may convict a defendant of first degree murder, however, without making a unanimous choice of one or more of several theories proposed by the prosecution, e.g., that the murder was deliberate and premeditated or that it was committed in the course of a felony. ( Ibid. ) `[I]t is sufficient that each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder as that offense is defined by the statute.' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Milan (1973) 9 Cal.3d 185, 195 [107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 507 P.2d 956].) This rule passes federal constitutional muster. ( Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. ___, ___-___, ___-___ [115 L.Ed.2d 555, 564-574 (plur. opn.), 576-578 (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.), 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2496-2504, 2505-2507].) (23c) The same rationale applies to the special circumstance of lying in wait. A unanimity instruction is not required. [7] Defendant also claims that because there was no evidence that he physically concealed his presence, the court was required sua sponte to delete from the instructions all reference to concealment of presence. However, full and correct instructions on the elements of lying in wait were appropriate, and could not have misled the jury. No one suggested there was physical concealment, only that it was one way, but not the only way, to establish lying in wait. [8]