Opinion ID: 886072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Improper Vouching for a Prosecution Witness

Text: ¶ 47 Hagen's trial counsel elicited the following testimony of Deputy Jonathan Hansen on cross examination: Q: While you had encountered them in the bar and some talk about a shooting, did you feel Punky Cobeen was the kind of person who would keep them out of trouble later in the evening? A: I have never known him to be violent. I've known him to drink, but I've never known him to be a criminal or be violent. Hagen contends that no competent, experienced defense attorney would deliberately introduce evidence of a police officer's personal opinion regarding the character of a key prosecution witness. That attorney error, Hagen contends, was prejudicial to his defense, and should have been raised on appeal. Because it was not, Hagen asserts his appellate counsel was ineffective. The State contends that Hagen's charge is meritless because Officer Hansen's statement that Cobeen was neither violent nor a criminal was not indicative of Cobeen's truthfulness. According to the State, it was not vouching testimony. The District Court found that Deputy Hansen did not comment on Cobeen's credibility. ¶ 48 While this Court has warned against the introduction of improper vouching testimony, particularly by the prosecution, we conclude that the above-cited testimony does not constitute vouching testimony. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, introducing bolstering evidence is not the same as vouching for the witness;.... United States v. Meling (9th Cir.1995), 47 F.3d 1546, 1558. The testimony cited above was more an example of character-bolstering evidence, not vouching. Furthermore, there was only one instance cited and we simply cannot conclude based on that isolated instance that Hagen's trial counsel was ineffective or that Hagen was prejudiced by the remark. Accordingly, we conclude that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal.
¶ 49 Hagen asserts that his appellate counsel erred when he failed to raise his trial counsel's comments during closing argument which purportedly misinformed the jury that the burden of proof had shifted to the defense. During closing argument, Hagen's trial counsel stated: I know that the State is going to say, Hey, you look at the elements of these crimes charged. We don't need to prove motive. We don't need to prove motive at all, and which is true. Motive is not an element of either of the crimes charged. As a matter of fact, we have to prove motive. We have to prove that the motive was self-defense. Well, so be it. If it wasn't self-defense, what was it? Based on the above statement, Hagen contends the jury was erroneously led to believe that the defense had the burden of proof and, in effect, had to disprove the State's allegations. The State, on the other hand, asserts Hagen's trial counsel was correct in noting that when self-defense is raised as an affirmative defense, the defendant does assume the burden of showing that the self-defense was justified and reasonable. ¶ 50 In State v. Daniels (1984), 210 Mont. 1, 16, 682 P.2d 173, 181, we stated the general rule with regard to burden-shifting as a result of a defendant raising an affirmative defense: The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, or any lesser-included crime within such charge; the defendant if he raises the affirmative defense [such as self-defense] has the burden of producing sufficient evidence on the issue to raise reasonable doubt of his guilt,.... Therefore, in this case, the burden did shift to Hagen to produce sufficient evidence to raise reasonable doubt of his guilt based on his justifiable use of force defense. Hagen's trial counsel's comments were consistent with that shift of the burden. Furthermore, we presume that the jury follows the law as it is given, and in Jury Instruction No. 21, the jury was correctly instructed: The defendant has pleaded justification in the use of force in this case. The defendant has the burden of producing sufficient evidence of justification in the use of force to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. You are to consider the following requirements of the law in determining whether the use of force claimed by defendant was justified: .... [Lists five requirements.] .... You are further advised that even if you determine the use of force by defendant was not justified, the state still has the duty to prove each of the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on the foregoing, we presume that the jury was correctly informed of the law, and further conclude that Hagen's trial counsel was not ineffective based on the comments he made during closing argument. Therefore, we conclude that Hagen's appellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising the issue on direct appeal.
¶ 51 Hagen next contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for raising his trial counsel's failure to request a lesser included offense instruction on direct appeal rather than by postconviction relief. Appellate counsel, according to Hagen, should have recognized that an evidentiary hearing was necessary, and, therefore, should have raised the issue by way of a postconviction proceeding. While Hagen contends that evidence in support of his claim would have been presented at a postconviction hearing, he failed to establish what that evidence would have shown. Furthermore, claims which can reasonably be raised on direct appeal may not be raised, considered, or decided in a postconviction relief proceeding. § 46-21-105(2), MCA. Had Hagen's appellate counsel not raised the claim, Hagen would have, in all likelihood, been procedurally barred from raising it by postconviction relief. Therefore, we conclude that he was not ineffective for raising it on appeal.
¶ 52 Finally, Hagen contends that the cumulative effect of appellate counsel's alleged errors caused him prejudice, even if any of the errors standing alone would not be sufficiently prejudicial. However, having analyzed each of Hagen's allegations separately, we have concluded that in each situation, counsel either acted reasonably or his omission did not undermine confidence in the outcome. We also conclude that the combined effect of all the acts or omissions complained of did not undermine confidence in the outcome of Hagen's trial. ¶ 53 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. We Concur: PATRICIA COTTER, JAMES C. NELSON, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, and JIM RICE, JJ.