Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The First Renewed Motion to Sever (May 11, 1992)

Text: Defendant renewed her motion to sever before Judge Weisberg on May 11, 1992, arguing that since the time Judge Weisberg denied the first severance motion, the defense had learned of new evidence in the form of a recorded polygraph examination and interview with Phillip in which he stated he went to the victim‘s workplace in hopes of obtaining a loan; there he found the victim and defendant, defendant suddenly produced a gun and killed her husband, and then asked Phillip to dispose of the weapon. In light of the new evidence, defense counsel argued the case fell within ―the paradigm definition of antagonistic and mutually incompatible defenses where each defendant is accusing the other and lessens the prosecution‘s burden.‖ Further, according to counsel, ―the problem is that the two defendants find themselves in a position where to acquit one of them the jury must necessarily convict the other.‖ Judge Weisberg denied the renewed motion, explaining: ―[A]s I stated before, it is within the court‘s discretion, and I considered the matter of inconsistent defenses, and I am exercising my discretion and denying the motion to sever.‖ Although defendant does not provide any argument independently 41 challenging the denial of this renewed motion, we perceive no abuse of discretion; the new evidence does not materially change the adversarial nature of the codefendants‘ anticipated defenses, and the trial court was already aware that each would attempt to blame the other as the person who pulled the trigger. e. The Renewed Motion to Sever Before Judge Trammell (June 8, 1992) Defendant renewed her motion to sever once again after the case was transferred to Judge Trammell. Judge Trammell reviewed the previous written motions, which had leaned heavily on the argument that defendant and Phillip Sanders would present antagonistic defenses, and then heard argument on the renewed motion. Defense counsel again argued that severance was required because defendant and Phillip Sanders were expected to present antagonistic defenses. But when the prosecutor argued the defense could not identify ―one piece of evidence . . . that is going to be admitted in a joint trial that would be inadmissible in a separate trial,‖ defense counsel had no answer. Judge Trammell denied the renewed severance motion. He acknowledged he had discretion to reconsider the matter, suggested Judge Weisberg would not have abused her discretion had she granted severance and, indeed, said he likely would have granted the original motion, but explained: ―I feel it‘s discretionary and I choose to allow the prior rulings to remain.‖ Asked by defense counsel whether it would be helpful for the defense to file additional briefing on the court‘s authority to reconsider a ruling by a previous, different judge, Judge Trammell replied, ―I don‘t feel that . . . what I have before me is sufficient to cause me to override [Judge Weisberg‘s] decisions,‖ and that Judge Weisberg‘s decision denying severance was not an abuse of discretion. Defendant argues Judge Trammell misapprehended the scope of his discretion, arguing that no statute precluded reconsideration, and the judge had 42 jurisdiction for all purposes. Further, defendant points to Judge Trammell‘s use of the word ―override‖ to suggest the judge gave inappropriate deference to Judge Weisberg‘s initial ruling. The contention cannot be sustained. The record makes clear Judge Trammell understood he had discretion to reconsider the matter. For example, the judge stated specifically that he understood he was not sitting as an appellate court, and that a ―motion for renewed consideration per change in circumstance can always be made.‖ He simply found the evidence presented by the defense insufficiently substantial to convince him a change was justified. Indeed, the evidence of inconsistent or antagonistic defenses was only a little changed since the time Judge Weisberg had first denied severance. The decision to deny the renewed motion for severance was thus not arbitrary and capricious. There being no abuse of discretion, we will sustain it on appeal. (People v. Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 726.) We also conclude Judge Trammell‘s denial of the renewed severance motion did not result in such gross unfairness as to deprive defendant of a fair trial or due process of law. (Ibid.) f. The Fourth Pretrial Severance Motion (June 24, 1992) During jury selection on June 24, 1992, defendant once again moved to sever her case from that of codefendant Phillip Sanders. Defense counsel explained that he had become aware that on June 9, 1992, counsel for Phillip made an ex parte presentation to the trial court and that the evidence presented there ―might impact the court‘s decision on the issue of either separate juries for the two defendants or for severance.‖ Although counsel did not know the substance of the ex parte presentation, he cited this new development as the reason for his renewed motion for severance. In the alternative, he moved for the empanelment of dual juries. The trial court denied both motions, saying: ―I see no reason for either a severance or two juries to hear the case at the same time. In other words, nothing 43 was revealed in that [ex parte hearing] that would cause me to believe it would be necessary to do that.‖ As we explain in more detail, post, part I.B.3, Phillip‘s attorneys made an ex parte showing in chambers regarding letters he received from defendant while both were in pretrial detention. The letters urged Phillip to recant his story blaming defendant for the shooting in exchange for promised financial benefits. The prosecution agreed not to press for timely discovery of the letters (and of the authenticating witness, Jennifer Lee), thereby permitting Phillip and the prosecution to delay disclosing the letters to defendant. The trial court was aware of the content of the letters and expressly referred to them (i.e., ―nothing was revealed in that [ex parte hearing] that would cause me to believe‖ severance was required) when denying the renewed severance motion. We find no abuse of discretion. Subject to authentication, the letters would have been admissible against defendant whether or not she was tried jointly with Phillip. Although defendant suggests her lack of formal notice of the letters (and Lee‘s role in authenticating them) violated her right to due process, the letters could not have taken defendant by surprise because, having written them (and convinced Lee to recopy some of them), defendant was undoubtedly aware of their existence and contents. She has, moreover, not suggested how earlier disclosure of the letters would have made any difference to her defense. She claims the joint trial risked compromising a specific trial right, but does not identify what right that was. In short, the letters, although not considered by Judge Trammell when he denied the previous severance motion, did not much change the calculus of whether severance was necessary, as he so held. Even were we to find Judge Trammell abused his discretion, no prejudice could have occurred, as defendant was already aware of the letters. 44 When, much later in the trial, the existence of the letters was finally revealed, defendant moved for a continuance, renewed her motion for severance, and then moved for a mistrial, but all three motions were denied. To the extent she now contends the trial court should have granted severance at that time, we reject the claim for the same reason: the trial court acted within its broad discretion because the letters would have been admissible in a separate trial, and defendant was not prejudiced by their belated disclosure. g. Motion for Dual Juries (June 24, 1992) Defendant also claims Judge Trammell should have granted her alternative motion for the empanelment of dual juries based on Phillip‘s counsel‘s ex parte presentation to the court. This claim requires a somewhat different analysis. We know Judge Trammell was aware of the possibility of using dual juries as an alternative to separate trials because, when denying the prosecution‘s motion to reconsolidate trial of all four defendants, he stated: ―I don‘t like dual juries. I don‘t think anyone does, but I think in the interest of judicial economy there are times you have to use them.‖ But when he later denied defendant‘s motion for dual juries, Judge Trammell explained that ―nothing was revealed in that [ex parte hearing] that would cause me to believe it would be necessary to [order dual juries].‖ The law is settled. ―[W]e have upheld the use of separate juries for jointly tried defendants, as an alternative to outright severance. (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1287 . . . .) Cummings explained, however, that the decision to use dual juries is largely a discretionary one, and that ‗[w]hen the trial court‘s denial of severance and impanelment of dual juries is urged as error on appeal . . . the error is not a basis for reversal of the judgment in the absence of identifiable prejudice or ―gross unfairness . . . such as to deprive the defendant of a 45 fair trial or due process of law.‖ [Citations.]‘ (People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1287. . . .)‖ (People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1173–1174.) Defendant fails to demonstrate such gross unfairness. Although she contends ―[t]he record contains no evidence that Judge Trammell in fact exercised his discretion, ‗guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the matter at issue,‘ ‖ we disagree. Defendant‘s oral motion was based on the revelation that Phillip‘s counsel and the prosecution conducted an ex parte hearing, excluding defendant and her lawyers. Although defense counsel‘s motion was somewhat handicapped because he was not privy to the contents of that hearing, Judge Trammell presided over the hearing and expressly ruled that nothing revealed therein justified using dual juries. That ruling was well within the court‘s discretion and in the absence of a showing of identifiable prejudice or gross unfairness, the denial of separate juries did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or due process of law. (People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1287.) h. The Renewed Severance Motion (July 21, 1992) Just prior to the prosecution‘s opening statements on July 21, 1992, defendant moved to have the trial court exercise its discretion and order codefendant Phillip Sanders to present his defense first, i.e., after the prosecution rested its case. Counsel argued that if defendant were forced to put on her defense first, she would ―be caught between two prosecutors,‖ anticipating Phillip‘s defense would be that defendant was the actual shooter. Phillip‘s counsel objected, arguing that disadvantage would exist for whoever went first, and also citing the interest in ensuring the safety of witnesses. (The trial court undoubtedly understood that this was a reference to Jennifer Lee, Phillip‘s anticipated witness who would authenticate the letters defendant sent Phillip, and who felt threatened 46 by defendant.) The trial court denied the motion and directed defendant to present her defense before Phillip. In his opening statement, the prosecutor argued the evidence would show that Phillip Sanders was ―the shooter in this case. The person that actually carried out the assassination.‖ By contrast, Phillip‘s counsel argued that defendant was the shooter and had set up the murder so that Phillip was ―present when she does in fact shoot Melvin Thompson three times.‖ After Phillip‘s counsel concluded his opening statement but before defendant‘s counsel made his opening statement, defendant renewed her motion for severance, arguing that although the unfairness of the joint trial was previously just a theoretical matter, ―now that [Phillip] is on record in front of the jury [as] setting forth a theory untenable even by the prosecution, [defendant] is in the unenviable position [of] defending against not only the prosecution, but against her codefendant.‖ ―She simply cannot defend against these twin evils.‖ In the alternative, she asked for the empanelment of dual juries. The trial court denied both motions without comment. The trial court‘s denial of the renewed severance motion was not an abuse of discretion. The same motion had been denied several times before, and the assertions made during the opening statements added little, if anything, to what was previously known. Absent some critical new evidence, the trial court‘s decision to stand on its previous ruling was well within its discretion. Nor did the court abuse its discretion by denying defendant‘s motion to change the order of proof. ―[T]he order of proof in a criminal case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court‖ (People v. McDermand (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 770, 792; see § 1093 [specifying the order of proof but providing the trial court retains discretion to alter it]), and the court‘s concern for the safety of witness Lee provides ample support for its exercise of discretion. In any event, we see little that could be gained by forcing Phillip to present his evidence first because 47 defendant, having written the letters, must have been aware of their existence and contents. i. Additional Motions for Severance During the Guilt Phase Defendant unsuccessfully renewed her motion for severance three more times during the guilt phase of trial. Defendant did so first on August 7, 1992, during the prosecution‘s case-in-chief against Phillip Sanders, after the trial court sustained Phillip‘s claim of marital privilege (to keep his wife, Carolyn, from testifying that he had confessed he shot the victim). Defendant argues the court‘s ruling deprived her of the benefit of Carolyn‘s statements, which would have provided direct evidence that defendant was not the actual shooter, a key issue when the jury was to weigh the appropriateness of the death penalty at the penalty phase of the trial. Phillip‘s counsel said he would ―absolutely‖ claim the marital privilege whether or not defendant and Phillip were tried separately. Carolyn Sanders‘s attorney said he would advise her not to testify in a separate trial against defendant, citing her right against compelled self-incrimination, although defendant‘s attorney argued that because Carolyn had already waived her rights and given some testimony, she was no longer entitled to invoke her Fifth Amendment rights. Defense counsel then reiterated that ―we‘re entitled to severance to present this very important evidence [i.e., Carolyn‘s testimony that Phillip admitted being the shooter].‖ Although the trial court expressed concern about the complexity of the case and ensuring defendant‘s right to a fair trial, it ultimately denied severance. Second, on August 14, 1992, codefendant Phillip Sanders disclosed the four letters he had received from defendant. Defendant‘s counsel made clear he had just received the letters for the first time that morning at 8:15 a.m. Counsel moved for a mistrial and renewed his motion for severance, ―because it seems clear to me 48 that we are being asked to defend against material we have never seen and has not been provided to us,‖ and claimed the failure to earlier disclose the evidence violated defendant‘s right to due process of law. The court denied the motions. Later, however, when the court and attorneys discussed whether defendant‘s constitutional right to a fair trial might override Phillip‘s marital communications evidentiary privilege, Phillip moved for severance, apparently thinking he might still be able to assert his marital communication privilege in a separate trial. Given the complexities of the situation, the trial court admitted, ―I am now seriously considering severance and mistrial,‖ ―I don‘t think I‘ve any other choice. To [e]nsure Mrs. Thompson a fair trial, I don‘t have any other choice,‖ and ―I‘m leaning strongly toward a severance.‖ But despite voicing these misgivings, the court did not issue a ruling at that time. Next, on August 17, 1992, the court again took up the question of severance. Defense counsel argued that if defendant was unable to impeach Phillip with the statements he made to his wife, then ―the only alternative for the court is to grant severance.‖7 The prosecutor argued that severance was premature because it was not yet clear defendant would call Carolyn Sanders to the stand. After much back and forth, the trial court denied the renewed severance motion as premature. 7 The premise of the argument was that, were defendant tried separately, she could call Carolyn Sanders to the stand and have her repeat her evidence that Phillip told her he personally shot the victim. That premise is doubtful, as Evidence Code section 980, the statutory privilege for marital communications, provides that a ―spouse . . . whether or not a party, has a privilege . . . to prevent another from disclosing [a confidential marital communication].‖ (Italics added.) Thus, Phillip could prevent Carolyn from testifying even if he were not jointly tried with defendant. 49 After a 15-minute break, in what the court described as an ―unbelievable‖ twist, counsel for Phillip announced they had reached an agreement with the prosecution to waive the marital communication privilege (thereby permitting Carolyn Sanders to testify) in exchange for the prosecution‘s promise not to urge the jury to vote for the death penalty. The prosecution clarified that it intended to proceed to a penalty phase for both defendants, but that the prosecution would simply not urge a death verdict for Phillip. Defendant made her third midtrial severance motion on August 18, 1992. On that day, Phillip Sanders testified that he had received some letters from defendant and wrote back to her on the advice of his attorneys, who suggested that if he responded she might write more letters and further incriminate herself. Citing that testimony, defense counsel again moved for severance, arguing that he would like to call Phillip‘s attorneys as rebuttal witnesses but they would likely invoke attorney-client privilege. ―Therefore, I believe we have another instance of the inability of [defendant] to confront and cross-examine witnesses against [her].‖ The court denied the motion with no comment. Ultimately, Phillip testified he did not tell his wife, Carolyn, that he personally shot the victim. The prosecution declined to impeach him with his wife‘s testimony, so defendant called her to the stand in rebuttal, where she testified that on the night in question, Phillip came home and told her he shot someone at a transmission shop. Defendant does not argue the individual merits of the trial court‘s denials of her three midtrial severance motions, but argues that together those rulings deprived her of her constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as article I, 50 section 15 of the California Constitution.8 Although defendant reprises her earlier claims that the repeated denials of severance were an abuse of discretion, her specific constitutional claims are that failure to sever her trial from Phillip‘s deprived her of a fair trial and a reliable penalty determination because Phillip and his counsel acted as an extra prosecutor. This allowed Phillip, for example, to delay disclosure of defendant‘s prison letters and the existence of Jennifer Lee, the authenticating witness. Defendant also suggests that had she been granted a separate trial, Phillip would never have reached a deal with the prosecution, and so would not have testified at her separate trial due to concerns of self-incrimination, which in turn would have eliminated the need for her to call Carolyn Sanders to the stand to impeach him. In a separate trial, she suggests, if Phillip chose to testify, his credibility would have been compromised by having to admit he was an accomplice as a matter of law. None of these arguments convinces us that any of the trial court‘s rulings denying severance, either alone or in combination, resulted in a violation of defendant‘s state or federal constitutional rights. With regard to the delayed disclosure of the jail letters and Jennifer Lee‘s testimony, we have already explained that no harm came from the delay because defendant was undoubtedly aware of evidence of letters she herself had composed, despite the absence of formal discovery. Further, the trial court offered to recall Lee to the stand should defendant wish to conduct a further cross-examination of her, but defendant did not take advantage of this opportunity, suggesting that advance warning of Lee‘s 8 As pertinent here, article I, section 15 of the California Constitution states: ―The defendant in a criminal case has the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against the defendant,‖ and that ―[p]ersons may not . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.‖ 51 testimony would have made little or no difference to defendant‘s approach to the trial. Defendant suggests she was disadvantaged when the prosecution chose not to call Carolyn Sanders to testify because that decision forced defendant to call her to the stand to rebut Phillip‘s testimony that defendant shot the victim. Defendant exaggerates the deleterious effect of that decision because no matter who called Carolyn to the stand, her testimony provided strong evidence that Phillip, not defendant, was the actual killer. Moreover, although defendant suggests a severance would have better protected her rights, she would have fared no better had severance been granted. Even in a hypothetical separate trial, she would have attempted to shift the blame for the murder to Phillip and to this end would have tried to call Carolyn Sanders to testify. Had Phillip never reached a deal with the prosecution to waive his marital communication privilege, he could have prevented Carolyn from taking the stand in a hypothetical separate trial. But in that case, the prosecution would also never have agreed to refrain from calling Juanita Williams to the stand, something it did in order to preserve a joint trial. Williams would then have repeated Phillip‘s incriminating statements to her, statements which were clearly against his penal interests and thus admissible despite the hearsay rule. We thus cannot say defendant was disadvantaged by the denial of her severance motion. In any event, ―[s]imply because the prosecution‘s case will be stronger if defendants are tried together, or that one defense undermines another, does not render a joint trial unfair.‖ (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 379.) Regarding defendant‘s contention that failure to sever violated her right to a fair trial because joinder allowed Phillip to act as a second prosecutor, we have recently rejected that precise argument, reasoning that ―important concerns of public policy are served if a single jury is given a full and fair overview of the 52 defendants‘ joint conduct and the assertions they make to defend against ensuing charges.‖ (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 379.) Although the prosecution‘s cooperation with Phillip and his counsel was unusual, none of the agreements reached by the prosecution to maintain a joint trial rendered defendant‘s trial so unfair that we could conclude defendant‘s confrontation or fair trial rights were violated. j. Conclusion We thus conclude the denials of defendant‘s many severance motions, both alone and in combination, fell within the court‘s discretion and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Moreover, even were we to conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance, the evidence of defendant‘s guilt was overwhelming, including her many financial frauds indicating her motive, her lies about recycling and about the Rolex watch, her many telephone calls to Phillip leading up to the murder, her blurted-out statements indicating guilt (i.e., that she ―didn‘t mean for it to happen this way,‖ and that she ―didn‘t know Phil at all‖), and especially Christine Kuretich‘s testimony concerning the planning of the crime. Consequently, those rulings did not prejudice defendant or otherwise result in an unfair trial.