Opinion ID: 2165153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: outten's appeal

Text: During the course of trial, Outten presented as a witness Lisa DeLude (DeLude), who testified that Gibbons confessed to DeLude that she had killed Mannon. On cross-examination of DeLude, the State attacked her credibility by, inter alia, questioning why she had not come forward earlier. DeLude claimed that she had tried to call an attorney to discuss the matter, but the attorney did not return her call. On redirect, Outten's counsel attempted to introduce evidence that DeLude, in fact, had placed a call to Nelson's attorney. The trial court accepted the State's argument that D.R.E. 608(b) excludes such evidence and disallowed the introduction of the evidence. Outten contends that Weber v. State, Del. Supr., 457 A.2d 674 (1983), requires admission in circumstances such as these, where the jury does not have sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness' possible motives for testifying in a certain manner. D.R.E. 608(b) provides that: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than the conviction of crime provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. D.R.E. 608(b) (emphasis added). D.R.E. 608(b) was designed, in part, to prevent time-consuming mini-trials into the acts of a witness and was meant to cover situations like the one presented here. See Weber, 457 A.2d at 680. Outten's reliance on Weber to remove this case from D.R.E. 608(b)'s scope is misplaced. The evidence that this Court held should have been admitted in Weber concerned the witness' bias, not the credibility of the witness' alleged acts. D.R.E. 608(b) prohibits the introduction of the evidence related to DeLude's phone call. The trial court did not err in excluding the extrinsic evidence regarding DeLude's phone call.