Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Violent Criminal Conduct as Juvenile

Text: (50) Pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), [25] the prosecution presented evidence of two robbery incidents involving defendant when he was fifteen years old, including one in which he stole an automobile and engaged in a high-speed chase with police officers, which defendant contends was inadmissible because it did not relate to a statutory factor in aggravation. [26] Although perhaps not clear at the time of defendant's trial (but see People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 767), the law has since been settled that any criminal activity involving force or violence comes within the purview of section 190.3, factor (b), irrespective of the offender's age: [N]othing in the 1977 or 1978 laws indicates an intent to exclude violent criminal misconduct while a juvenile as an aggravating factor, simply on grounds the misconduct resulted in a juvenile wardship adjudication. ( People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 295, fn. omitted.) This determination raises no inconsistency with the language or intent of the Juvenile Court Law. The statutes provide, of course, that a juvenile adjudication `shall not be deemed conviction of a crime for any purpose....' (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203, italics added.) However, introduction of the underlying violent juvenile misconduct as `violent' criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b), does not violate that proscription. It is not the adjudication, but the conduct itself, which is relevant. ( People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 295, fn. 24; People v. Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 862.) Accordingly, while evidence of a wardship adjudication is inadmissible under section 190.3, factor (c), as a prior felony conviction, that bar does not preclude evidence of the underlying violent conduct under factor (b). [27] (See People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 295.) Defendant's reliance on section 15 is misplaced. That statute defines a crime or public offense by reference to the imposition of various forms of punishment; it does not purport to delineate criminal activity for purposes of section 190.3, factor (b). Nor does the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 815 [101 L.Ed.2d 702, 108 S.Ct. 2687], prohibiting the execution of any person who was a minor at the time of the offense, alter our analysis. Defendant was sentenced to death for crimes committed as an adult. The fact that the jury may have considered criminal activity he engaged in as a juvenile in determining the appropriate penalty does not implicate the Eighth Amendment as applied in Thompson. We also discern no other basis for finding constitutional error. Pursuant to statutory mandate (§ 190.3), the prosecution apprised the defense of its intent to submit these matters at the penalty phase. The court imposed no limitations on cross-examination of the victims and other percipient witnesses. [28] The jury was fully instructed on the requisite elements of the crimes involved (see People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423]) and properly directed not to consider the evidence unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the acts. (See People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1057.) (51) The use of such past conduct also does not implicate the proscription against double jeopardy: The critical consideration under factor (b) is the defendant's use or attempted use of force or violence, not any resultant adjudication. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) Furthermore, the penalty verdict is attributable to his current conduct, i.e., murder with a special circumstance finding, not his past criminal activity. (See § 1023; cf. People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 203, fn. 31 [no violation of section 654 by use of a prior crime on which defendant has been sentenced as an aggravating factor in a capital penalty trial. Any such rule would invalidate all statutory `habitual criminal' enhancements.].)