Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Error in Admitting Attempted Escape Evidence

Text: Defendant alleges the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his uncharged escape attempt to show consciousness of guilt. We disagree. On August 22, 1990, defendant was housed on the third floor of the San Diego jail. That morning, he was allowed to leave the third floor and walk up to the sixth floor dispensary. Approximately 11:00 a.m., when defendant was done, he was placed back in the stairwell and sent to the third floor. When he arrived at the third floor, Deputy Sheriff Barber was unable to open the door at that time and told defendant to wait. Approximately 30 minutes later, when Barber turned his attention to the stairwell, defendant was not there. A search ensued. Shortly afterwards, defendant was seen descending the stairwell to the third floor entrance. A subsequent search revealed defendant had hidden tan trusty clothing under his blue jail outfit. Such clothing was stored in the eighth floor laundry and occasionally left in a neighboring portion of the stairwell. Trusties were inmates who generally had greater privileges, including the ability to leave the jail on work assignments. Defendant was not a trusty, and was therefore not permitted to have such clothing. The trial court overruled defendant's relevance and Evidence Code section 352 objections to this evidence, finding it relevant and stating its greatest tendency would be to suggest that [the district attorney] lacks confidence in her circumstantial case and that she's grabbing.... Now, the real question that you're raising and that we ought not to ignore, even though we aren't trying it at this time, is the suggestion that the mention of the concept of escape is going to prejudice the jury on the question of penalty, if we come to that stage. I simply do not believe that jurors are entitled to that little credit, that the idea that somebody might escape would never occur to them; and given the quality of the evidence of this .... this flimsy escape is not going to terrify the jury that some madman may be afoot in the community, and therefore I do not find it unduly prejudicial under 352. The jury was instructed at the time the evidence was received that it was admissible for the limited purpose of what bearing as it may have in showing [defendant's] consciousness of guilt. In addition, it was instructed at the conclusion of the guilt phase, The attempted escape of a person after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. Whether or not the evidence shows an attempted escape or a consciousness of guilt, and the significance to be attached to such a circumstance, are matters for your consideration. The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the evidence, subject to appropriate limiting instruction. Evidence of a planned escape permits an inference of consciousness of guilt, even if the escape was not actually attempted. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 196, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949.) Here, the evidence showed both that defendant possessed contraband and one use for that contraband. While defendant is correct that defendant's intent in possessing the clothes was not clear and unambiguous, the jury was instructed this was an issue for it to decide. No error is evident. Nor could defendant have been prejudiced at the penalty phase. No reference to the incident was made at the penalty phase, and the jury was instructed as to the factors it could appropriately consider in determining penalty. (See People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1208-1209, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) We therefore reject defendant's claim that he was deprived of a fair and reliable penalty determination.