Opinion ID: 2510259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Factual Basis for the Plea

Text: Next, Edgar argues that her guilty plea must be set aside because the trial court failed to inquire of her regarding the factual basis for her plea in this case. Pursuant to K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3210(a)(4), the court may accept a plea when the court is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. To make this determination, the trial court must establish that all elements of the crime charged are present. Bey, 270 Kan. at 546. According to Edgar, these requirements were not satisfied in this case. First, Edgar argues she never admitted guilt. She points to the transcript of the in camera hearing where she declined to comment when her counsel asked if she was guilty. Edgar also notes that the trial court did not inquire of her regarding the factual basis for the plea other than to ask her if she agreed that the State could present the evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing. She submits that this stipulation was not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3210(a)(4). To support her argument, Edgar cites State v. Snyder, 10 Kan. App. 2d 450, 456, 701 P.2d 969 (1985), which held that the parties' stipulation to the factual basis for a plea was insufficient where the court had not satisfied itself that there was a factual basis for the plea. As the State points out, there is no requirement that a defendant provide the factual basis for the plea by admitting guilt. Rather, as stated in State v. Shaw, 259 Kan. 3, Syl. ¶ 6, 910 P.2d 809 (1996): A factual basis for a plea may be satisfied by a complaint or information given or read to the defendant which sets forth the factual details and essential elements of the particular crime charged, by the evidence presented to the court by the prosecutor, by a statement of facts made by the defendant at the hearing, or if the judge accepting the defendant's plea conducted the defendant's preliminary examination.  (Emphasis added.) In this case, the same judge who accepted Edgar's plea presided over her preliminary hearing. That judge concluded that, if the State presented the same evidence at trial as it presented at the preliminary hearing, the evidence would be sufficient to support Edgar's conviction on all three charges. Edgar agreed that the State had such evidence. Thus, the trial court properly found there was a factual basis for the plea. See State v. Wright, 7 Kan. App. 2d 631, 637, 646 P.2d 1128 (1982) (trial judge present at preliminary hearing and satisfied there was factual basis for plea). Edgar also argues that the trial court may accept a guilty plea from a defendant claiming innocence, but only if there is strong evidence of actual guilt. See Clinkingbeard v. State, 6 Kan. App. 2d 716, 719, 634 P.2d 159 (1981) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. 160 [1970]). Again, we reject Edgar's argument. The requirement that a trial court must satisfy itself that a sufficient factual basis supports the guilty plea is imposed by K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3210(a)(4). The requirement is not constitutionally imposed. See United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1995); Higgason v. Clark, 984 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 508 U.S. 977 (1993). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected the same argument made here by Edgar, concluding there was no requirement that there be strong evidence of guilt even when a defendant either (1) affirmatively protests his innocence or (2) refuses to admit to acts constituting a crime; that is, either of the two possible Alford -type guilty pleas. Tunning, 69 F.3d at 111. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is in accord. See United States v. Morrow, 914 F.2d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that [i]f a defendant enters a guilty plea while continuing to assert his innocence, the district court may accept [the guilty plea] if there is `a strong factual basis.' (Emphasis added.) United States v. Alber, 56 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Alford, 400 U.S. at 37-38). This requirement of strong evidence enables a court to determine that the defendant's guilty plea is voluntary and therefore not constitutionally infirm. See Higgason, 984 F.2d at 207-08. Since there is not a constitutionally imposed standard for the weight of the evidence, the standard is that set in K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3210(a)(4), which requires the court accepting the plea to be satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. The statute leaves it to the court's determination whether the evidence is sufficient to establish the elements of the crime and satisfy the court that the plea is voluntary. If a defendant is continuing to protest innocence, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, may not consider the plea voluntary if the evidence is not strong. That judgment is left to the court's discretion and our standard of review is abuse of discretion. See State v. Sanchez-Cazares, 276 Kan. 451, 454-56, 78 P.3d 55 (2003). In this case, during the in camera hearing Edgar refused to state whether she was guilty. However, she did not assert her innocence. She merely noted, There's other cases going on that's tied to this case. At the plea hearing, she entered a plea of guilty and made no indication of innocence. Additionally, the evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing established the elements of the crimes upon which she was convicted and the crimes were supported by strong evidence of Edgar's guilt. Edgar's oldest child, Christon, testified that Edgar participated in taping Brian on the night he died. A detective testified that Christina told him that Boyd had tied her and her brothers with plastic ties at the direction of their mother. Another witness testified that she had previously heard Edgar tell Boyd to tie up the children and had seen the children in restraints. Brian, Martez, and Christina all bore physical scars from having been restrained. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected Edgar's argument that there was not a factual basis for the plea.