Opinion ID: 885077
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Inadmissible Evidence

Text: ¶ 33 Southern claims that he was unfairly prejudiced because the joint trial caused the jury to use evidence of guilt on some counts to convict him of other counts even though the evidence which the jury considered would have been inadmissible at a separate trial on the other counts. More specifically, Southern argues that the evidence relating to each victim would have been inadmissible at trials relating to the other victims under Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid., and our decision in State v. Matt (1991), 249 Mont. 136, 814 P.2d 52. The State, however, asserts that, even if there had been four trials, the evidence of the crimes committed against the other victims would have been admissible in each trial. ¶ 34 In Matt, we modified the requirements for admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts that we had set out in State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957. Based on Rules 403 and 404(b), M.R.Evid., we established the following criteria to determine the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs or acts: (1) The other crimes, wrongs or acts must be similar; (2) The other crimes, wrongs or acts must not be too remote in time; (3) The evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that they acted in conformity with such character; but may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident; (4) Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading of the jury, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Matt, 249 Mont. at 142, 814 P.2d at 56. These criteria have come to be known as the Modified Just Rule. [1] ¶ 35 Southern concedes that the evidence of the other crimes was not too remote in time to be admissible and that it was admissible under the third part of the Modified Just Rule. Nevertheless, Southern asserts that the evidence of the other crimes would have been inadmissible at separate trials because the other crimes were not similar and because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the other crimes evidence. We will address these issues in turn. ¶ 36 Southern first argues that the other crimes were not similar and, therefore, that the evidence of other crimes would not have been admissible at separate trials. However, as we stated in Issue I. A., although the crimes against each victim were not identical, they were sufficiently similar to be joined in the Amended Information pursuant to § 46-11-404(1), MCA. Likewise, and for the same reasons which we outlined in Issue I. A., the four incidents at issue in the instant case are sufficiently similar to satisfy the first part of the Modified Just Rule, and thus would have been admissible at separate trials on this basis. ¶ 37 Southern next argues that the prejudicial effect of the other crimes evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. Therefore, Southern claims that the evidence of other crimes would not have been admissible in separate trials. ¶ 38 It is inevitable that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts will have some prejudicial effect on a criminal defendant. State v. Whitlow (1997), 285 Mont. 430, 439, 949 P.2d 239, 245 (citing State v. Brooks (1993), 260 Mont. 79, 857 P.2d 734, 737). Consequently, relevant evidence will be inadmissible under the fourth part of the Modified Just Rule only when its probity is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  Martin, 279 Mont. at 195-96, 926 P.2d at 1387 (citing Matt, 814 P.2d at 56). ¶ 39 The prejudicial effect of relevant evidence will substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence when the evidence will prompt the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. State v. Huether (1997), 284 Mont. 259, 265, 943 P.2d 1291, 1295 (citation omitted). Thus, evidence is inadmissable under the fourth part of the Modified Just Rule if it arouses the jury's sympathy for one side without regard to its probative value, if it confuses or misleads the jury, or if it distracts the jury from the main issues in the case. Huether, 284 Mont. at 265, 943 P.2d at 1295 (citation omitted). ¶ 40 In the instant case, although the evidence of the other crimes would have been prejudicial to Southern, it was not the type of evidence which would arouse the jury's sympathy nor would it have confused, misled, or distracted the jury from the main issues in the case. Thus, we hold that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ¶ 41 Moreover, prejudice arising from use of inadmissible evidence will not be found where the evidence is simple and distinct. Martin, 279 Mont. at 193, 926 P.2d at 1385 (citing Richards, 906 P.2d at 227). The policy underlying this rule is that there is no reason to assume the jury will be confused and cannot keep the relevant evidence separate when the charges are few and the evidence straight forward. Martin, 279 Mont. at 193, 926 P.2d at 1385 (citing State v. Campbell (1980), 189 Mont. 107, 615 P.2d 190, 199). ¶ 42 Here, although the State charged Southern with nine counts, the evidence pertaining to each count was simple, distinct and straight forward. There were four discrete victims, specific crimes committed against each victim, and the evidence clearly applied only to the specific crimes committed against each victim. Thus, after reviewing the record, we conclude that there is nothing that suggests that the jury could not (and did not)keep the relevant evidence separate. Moreover, the District Court instructed the jury that each charged count was a distinct offense and that the jury was to decide each count separately. Consequently, since the evidence of the other crimes, wrongs or acts would have been admissible at separate trials and since the evidence was simple and distinct, we hold that Southern did not establish that the jury used evidence of guilt on one charge to convict him of other charges on his theory that the evidence would have been inadmissible in the trials on the other charges.