Opinion ID: 670739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure To Instruct The Jury On An Element Of The Crime Charged

Text: 22 Knapp first asserts the district judge plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury on a required element of conspiracy to defraud. Section 371 provides that if two or more persons conspire ... to defraud the United States ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall [have committed a crime against the United States]. Knapp contends the district judge plainly erred by failing to specifically instruct the jury on the definition of the words to defraud. In this regard, Knapp argues that the district judge should have instructed the jury that it could convict him of conspiracy only if he agreed to impede or obstruct the IRS by deceitful or dishonest means. Knapp claims that by not including this definition, the district judge effectively read the fraud element out of the proof necessary to support his conviction. Knapp cites Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 44 S.Ct. 511, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924), and United States v. Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.1993), in support of his argument. 23 In the present case, it is readily apparent that the jury was instructed that the government must prove Knapp defrauded the United States. Knapp's argument on appeal focuses simply on whether the term defraud should have been defined. Whether the failure to do so constitutes a clear or obvious error in this context is of no consequence, however, as any such error did not, under these circumstances, affect Knapp's substantial rights. 24 As required under the Constitution, the jury was instructed on all essential elements of the crime. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 384, 106 S.Ct. 689, 696, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986). Such instruction included the reading of Count I of the indictment, which specifically described the charged conspiracy as one to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing and obstructing the IRS. Section 371, which was also read to the jury, does the same. Absent any indication in the record that the jury was led to believe that defraud meant anything other than its commonly understood definition, Knapp was not denied a substantial right by the district judge's failure to further define the term defraud in this context. Furthermore, the failure to define defraud can hardly be said to seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the trial in light of the instructions given and the proofs at trial. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046-47, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (when addressing plain error, a reviewing court cannot properly evaluate a case except by viewing such a claim against the entire record). Accordingly, failure to specifically define the phrase to defraud to the jury in this case was not plain error. 25 In so holding, we consider Knapp's reliance on Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 44 S.Ct. 511, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924), and United States v. Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir.1993), to be misplaced. Both of those cases merely stand for the proposition that a defendant cannot be found guilty of defrauding the United States without some showing of fraud. That, however, is a different question than whether the term fraud need be defined to the jury, particularly where a defendant has failed to challenge the lack of such instruction.