Opinion ID: 1981334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the trial court abused its discretion in separating jennifer from her half sister, stacie, without compelling reasons

Text: It is universally recognized that in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, the best interest of siblings require that they be raised together whenever possible. [3] Albright v. Com. ex rel. Fetters, 491 Pa. 320, 421 A.2d 157, 160 (1980). Jennifer was born just two years after Stacie, and she lived her entire life with Stacie. Until separated by the court, the relationship of these half sisters was that of full sisters. Stacie is Jennifer's only big sister. They share the bonds of a common childhood. It is crucial to Jennifer's best interests that this sibling relationship remain intact, so that the girls may be reared as sisters. [W]hile brothers and sisters may not have a legal right to remain together, to share each others lives, and to grow up together, certainly they have a natural right to do so. Arons v. Arons, 94 So.2d 849, 853 (Fla.1957). Despite the absence of the exceptional circumstances required for split custody, the trial court chose to destroy Jennifer's opportunity to experience this unique bond. In Ketron v. Aguirre, 15 Ark.App. 325, 692 S.W.2d 261 (1985), the father sought a change of custody four years after custody of the minor child, Chad, was awarded to the mother pursuant to divorce. At the time of the dissolution in 1979, Chad was eight years old. Id. at 262. The court noted that the child had a good relationship with both his parents, and was doing well physically, emotionally, and in his school work. Id. at 263. In refusing to modify the custody award, the court adopted the trial court's reasoning which found one of the most compelling reasons for continuing custody in the mother was its reluctance to separate Chad from his younger half brother, Toby. Id. at 264. The court stated: On this point, the trial court's reasoning is consistent with settled case law reflecting that, unless exceptional circumstances are involved, young children should not be separated from each other by dividing custody. Id. See also: In Re Marriage of Orte, 389 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1986). In Arons, supra, custody of the couple's three children was split upon divorce. The trial court awarded custody of the two younger children to the mother, and custody of the oldest child, Jackie, to the father. At the time of the proceedings, Jackie was eight years of age. The decree also provided that when the father was required to be out of state for extended periods of time on business, Jackie was permitted to remain at the home of his paternal grandmother. The mother appealed this decision. 94 So.2d at 850-851. In reversing and awarding her custody, the court stated, We are of the view that the children in a family should not be separated from each other and distributed about in different homes, except for the most compelling cause. Id. at 853. Although the trial court found that the grandmother was a fit and proper person to have custody of the child, and in fact found that Jackie would be better off in his grandmother's care, the appellate court was not so persuaded. Id. at 851-852. The court wrote: While there is little doubt that if [the father] has the custody of Jackie, the child will, through [the paternal grandmother], receive more of the material things of life than if he is in the custody of his mother, this factor does not of itself mean that the child's total welfare will be best promoted thereby. Nor does it, of itself, justify the taking of a child from a parent who is a fit person to care for it. Id. at 852. After stating the general rule that siblings should remain together unless compelling reasons dictate otherwise, the Albright court further stated that this principle is in no way diluted by the fact that one child is a half sibling. 421 A.2d at 161. Here, there are no compelling reasons [4] nor exceptional circumstances present to overcome Jennifer's interest in remaining with Stacie. Jennifer's interest in remaining with Frederick does not constitute a compelling reason, in and of itself, where the record reveals virtually no superior parenting abilities on his part. No doubt the trial court counted on Mrs. Bollack to furnish continuous assistance in raising Jennifer. Moreover, the record shows that Mrs. Bollack is deeply concerned about Jennifer's welfare and has demonstrated a real interest in improving and helping her. However, these are not the compelling reasons that the cases require. The evidence shows that the trial court gave no consideration to the profound effects of ending Jennifer's valuable relationship with her sister. Nor did it provide any persuasive rationale for splitting them up. Justice requires that society exercise its moral duty to insure that children in a family enjoy the right to remain together, to share each others lives, and to grow up together, until such time as necessity and the welfare of the children, itself, requires their separation. Arons, 94 So.2d at 853. Such necessity does not exist here. For the trial court to conclude that it was in Jennifer's best interest to award custody to Frederick without adequate findings regarding such a crucial consequence of the custody arrangement, requires reversal. Jasper v. Jasper, 351 N.W.2d 114, 117 (S.D. 1984).