Opinion ID: 2998119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Isbell’s ERISA claim.

Text: Isbell claims that Allstate violated § 510 of ERISA when it eliminated her position because it did so, according to Isbell, for the purpose of preventing her from taking advantage of vested health benefits. Section 510 makes it “unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. The loss of benefits to an employee as a result of an employer’s action is not, by itself, sufficient to prove a violation of § 510. The employer must have the specific intent to deprive an employee of his plan rights. Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 141 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 1998). No violation will arise where the deprivation was simply the consequence of a decision that had the incidental effect of affecting an employee’s benefits. Id. (quoting Meredith v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 935 F.2d 124, 127 (7th Cir. 1991)). “[T]he plaintiff must ultimately show that a desire to frustrate attainment or enjoyment of benefit rights contributed toward the employer’s decision and can avoid summary judgment only if the materials properly before the district court, construed sympathetically, allow for such a conclusion.” Teumer v. General Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 550 (7th Cir. 1994). As above, a plaintiff can show a violation of § 510 pursuant to the direct or indirect method. Isbell has no direct or circumstantial evidence that Allstate eliminated the emNos. 04-2310 & 04-2365 13 ployee-agent position for the purpose of depriving her (and the other employee agents) of her pension and health care benefits. She must proceed, therefore, under the indirect method. Such method utilizes the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. A plaintiff makes out a prima facie under § 510 where she can show “that [she] (1) belongs to the protected class; (2) was qualified for [her] job position; and (3) was discharged or denied employment under circumstances that provide some basis for believing that the prohibited intent to retaliate” or to prevent the use of benefits was present. Grottkau v. Sky Climber, Inc., 79 F.3d 70, 73 (7th Cir. 1996); Lindemann, 141 F.3d at 295. In a § 510 case, however, this court need not “determine whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case where a defendant has advanced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Id. at 296. In this case Allstate has offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for eliminating the employee-agent position and moving to an all-independent contractor agent force. Chief among these was the higher productivity of independent contractors (and, notably, the even higher productivity for former employee agents who had voluntarily converted to independent contractors). The independent contractors were paid higher commissions than employee agents and no doubt, like many companies, Allstate believed that paying its sales force primarily through commissions spurs the salesmen to sell more. This is a legitimate business reason for Allstate’s decision. Allstate was entitled to summary judgment.