Opinion ID: 1630531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The lump-sum settlement was approved by the Workers' Compensation Court on December 4, 2008. The 30-day period in which the $10,000 payment had to be sent in order to avoid penalties, attorney fees, and interest commenced on December 5. [2] The final day of the 30-day period was therefore Saturday, January 3, 2009. It is undisputed that the payment was not sent until Monday, January 5. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the payment was timely under § 48-191, which extends the time period for an action with respect to a claim for compensation when the final day of the time period falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a day when the Workers' Compensation Court is otherwise legally closed. Familiar general principles guide our analysis in this case. Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning. [3] An appellate court will not read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of a statute. [4] A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless. [5] A court must place on a statute a reasonable construction which best achieves the statute's purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat that purpose. [6] In construing a statute, an appellate court looks to the statutory objective to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be served. [7] Based on these general principles, we conclude that the review panel correctly interpreted § 48-191. The statute is not ambiguous. The plain language any other action with respect to a claim for compensation is broad enough to include not only transactions between a party and the court, but also transactions between the parties. Except in circumstances not applicable here, § 48-125 directs that payments of workers' compensation benefits shall be sent directly to the person entitled to compensation or his or her designated representative. [8] Clearly, the mailing of a lump-sum settlement check to its intended recipient is an action with respect to a claim for compensation such that the time for mailing must be determined pursuant to § 48-191. Contrary to Herrington's argument, we perceive no inconsistency between §§ 48-125 and 48-191. The former provides a penalty for payments made more than 30 days after entry of a judgment; the latter simply directs how this time period, as well as others under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, is to be computed. Nor are we persuaded by the argument that application of § 48-191 would contravene the general purpose of § 48-125, which is to encourage prompt payment by making delay costly if the award has been finally established. [9] Section 48-191 simply provides a practical, uniform standard for computing time periods under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act.