Opinion ID: 6499100
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims 1 and 2 – Sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Claims 1 and 2 alleged there was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Hamilton of the crimes charged. The controlling Supreme Court authority regarding sufficiency of the evidence is Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Under Jackson, the evidence is sufficient when a court determines, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. “Review of sufficiency of the evidence under AEDPA adds an additional degree of deference, and the question becomes whether the OCCA’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient constituted an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard.” Simpson v. Carpenter, 912 F.3d 542, 592 (10th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted); see also Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) (“Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference.”). After reviewing the evidence, the OCCA determined that [g]iven the distribution of obscene material originating from [Mr. Hamilton’s] IP address, the discovery of the same type of material on [his] computer, the suspicious log of Internet search queries on that computer, and [Mr. Hamilton’s] statements to police, a rational juror could conclude, beyond a 8 Appellate Case: 21-5027 Document: 010110708541 Date Filed: 07/11/2022 Page: 9 reasonable doubt, that [Mr. Hamilton] knowingly possessed the obscene material and willfully made it available online. Hamilton, 387 P.3d at 905. On § 2254 review, the district court summarized the evidence presented at trial and held that the OCCA’s decision was not contrary to Jackson. On appeal, Mr. Hamilton raises the same challenges to the OCCA’s decision that he raised in the district court. He attempts to identify weaknesses and infirmities in the evidence and suggests the possibility of jury confusion. But when the state courts have decided the evidence was sufficient, § 2254(d) limits federal habeas review to determining whether the state court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Jackson, § 2254(d)(1), or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, § 2254(d)(2). And Jackson calls for “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” to decide whether any reasonable jury could have convicted. 443 U.S. at 319. Mr. Hamilton’s arguments view the evidence in the light most favorable to him, rather than to the prosecution. After reviewing the evidence introduced at trial, the OCCA concluded that a reasonable jury could have found the elements of distribution of child pornography and aggravated possession of child pornography beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Hamilton fails to show that reasonable jurists would debate the district court’s conclusion that the OCCA’s decision was not contrary to Jackson. We deny a COA on Claims 1 and 2.