Opinion ID: 853980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Indiana Precedent on Waiver of Ineffective Assistance Claims

Text: Despite the frequency with which challenges to the effectiveness of trial representation appear in postconviction petitions in this State, this Court has not conclusively resolved whether waiver of this claim (1) always arises from a failure to raise it on direct appeal, or (2) never does, or (3) turns on whether there was or might have been a need for extrinsic evidence to assess either attorney competence or prejudice. It is well established as a general proposition that issues that were or could have been raised on direct appeal are not available in postconviction proceedings and that postconviction is not a super appeal. Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 916-17 (Ind.1993); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b) (providing that postconviction is not a substitute for a direct appeal). Rather, postconviction review supplements direct review by allowing the petitioner to raise issues not known at the time of the original trial and appeal or for some reason not available to the defendant at that time. Schiro v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1201, 1204 (Ind.1989). As this Court cautioned in one of the first cases to flesh out the postconviction rules: It was not our intent ... to provide a means whereby one convicted could repeatedly re-litigate claims of improper conviction, or could ... raise an untimely challenge directed at some aspect of the proceedings against him. Langley v. State, 256 Ind. 199, 203, 267 N.E.2d 538, 540 (1971). Consistent with the residual nature of postconviction proceedings, we have held that failure to raise a record ineffectiveness claim results in waiver of the issue. For example, in Johnson v. State, 502 N.E.2d 90 (Ind.1986), in an effort to show that the defendant was credible because he could admit past mistakes, trial counsel questioned the defendant on direct examination about problems in his childhood and delinquent behavior. The defendant contended in postconviction that this trial tactic prejudiced his assertion of self-defense by damaging his credibility. This Court held that the issue of trial counsel's effectiveness was waived because the single basis asserted was clearly known and available on direct appeal. Id. at 91. Accord Hall v. State, 646 N.E.2d 379 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (claim of trial ineffectiveness for failure to object to allegedly defective jury instruction was waived for failure to present the issue on direct appeal). These cases, although not framing the issue in terms of what was apparent from the trial record, support the proposition that a single matter knowable from the trial record is waived if not presented on direct appeal. Cf. State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829, 835 n. 10 (Ind.1997) (issues pertaining to trial or appellate counsel's effectiveness could not be litigated in second petition for postconviction relief because, among other reasons, the alleged errors were apparent on the record from the time of trial). Two cases are closer to presenting the issue of whether any need for record development allows an ineffectiveness claim to be presented for the first time in collateral proceedings. Hollonquest v. State, 432 N.E.2d 37 (Ind.1982) and Williams v. State, 464 N.E.2d 893 (Ind.1984) both involved an ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsel's failure to call an alibi witness. Like most failures to investigate, establishing this ground for ineffective assistance would require going beyond the trial record to show what the investigation, if undertaken, would have produced. This is necessary because success on the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim requires a showing of a reasonable probability of affecting the result. State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1528, 140 L.Ed.2d 678 (1998). Hollonquest and Williams held that the claim was waived, but for several reasons neither case controls the issue presented today. First, Hollonquest was decided before Strickland established the two-prong test for ineffective assistance, and Williams, though decided one month after Strickland, did not consider the effect of Strickland. Second, and more importantly, Hollonquest and Williams were decided before courts began giving much detailed consideration to the complexity of ineffectiveness claims. Both simply applied general waiver principles to the facts in a single paragraph. Neither case discussed the potential need for an evidentiary hearing to assess either the reasons for the alleged error or the likelihood that it affected the result. [10] We have noted in other contexts that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim may often require evidentiary development. For example, Hough v. State, 690 N.E.2d 267 (Ind.1997), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. July 23, 1998) (No. 98-5826), recently observed that a grant of summary judgment on the issue of trial counsel's effectiveness without an evidentiary hearing is a bit unusual because [t]ypically ... an ineffective assistance of counsel claim revolves around the unique facts of that case and many of those facts may exist outside of the record. Id. at 273. Indeed, some of our decisions suggest, without examining the question in any detail, that any challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel's representation may be raised for the first time in postconviction proceedings. Lane v. State, 521 N.E.2d 947 (Ind.1988) (ineffectiveness due to trial counsel's failure to call an alibi witness would have been available in postconviction, but defendant could not raise issue for first time on appeal through guise of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel). Others could be read to imply the contrary. Resnover v. State, 547 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind.1989) (Ineffective assistance of counsel as an issue is known and available to a party on his direct appeal....); Metcalf v. State, 451 N.E.2d 321 (Ind.1983) (holding several assertions of alleged ineffectiveness to be waived without distinguishing between record-based contentions and those requiring evidentiary development). Most recent Court of Appeals cases have held that ineffective assistance of trial counsel is generally known and available on direct appeal so long as the defendant is represented by different counsel on appeal. See, e.g., Haynes v. State, 695 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Ind.Ct.App.1998); Moore v. State, 649 N.E.2d 686, 690 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). At least one intermediate appellate decision distinguished record-based assertions of ineffectiveness from those requiring extrinsic evidence and held that the latter may be raised for the first time in postconviction proceedings. Wilson v. State, 565 N.E.2d 761 (Ind. Ct.App.1990). Finally, this Court recently held that if a claim of ineffectiveness is raised on direct appeal, it precludes raising in a postconviction proceeding additional issues to support a claim of ineffective assistance. Sawyer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1328 (Ind.1997); Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 200-01 (Ind.1997) (citing Sawyer ). In sum, the availability of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in postconviction proceedings where it was not asserted on direct appeal is unresolved as a matter of this Court's precedent.