Opinion ID: 2069959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Constitutionality of the (d)(14) Drug Activity Aggravator

Text: Johnson's penultimate argument is that the (d)(14) aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue at trial or on appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(14) includes as an aggravating circumstance that: At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been involved, associated or in competition with the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution or delivery of any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or similar law of any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States, and the defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa. C.S. § 306(c), and the killing resulted from or was related to that association, involvement or competition to promote the defendant's activities in selling, manufacturing, distributing or delivering controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances. Johnson posits that the words involved, associated, and competition are unconstitutionally vague and that the aggravating circumstance in toto is unconstitutionally overbroad because it could apply to any murder in a drug saturated urban setting in which the perpetrator or victim are involved with drugs. Brief of Johnson, page 88. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that, if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Part of a State's responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates `standardless [sentencing] discretion.' Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). The statute must channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death. Id. (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). An aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague if it fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as a result leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-362, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988).  Furman held that Georgia's then-standardless capital punishment statute was being applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner; there was no principled means provided to distinguish those that received the penalty from those that did not. Id. at 362, 108 S.Ct. 1853. In the context of a challenge to the breadth of an aggravator, to survive an Eighth Amendment challenge [a]n aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). The (d)(14) aggravating circumstance is not constitutionally void for vagueness. Johnson's vagueness challenge fails because the aggravator adequately informs the jury that they must find that the victim was or had been involved, associated, or in competition with the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution, or delivery of any controlled substance and that the killing occurred in relation to that involvement, association, or competition to promote the activities of the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution, or delivery of controlled substances. Involved, associated, and competition are words of common usage and meaning and do not require additional definition. This aggravator does not leave the jury with unfettered or open-ended discretion to arbitrarily impose the death penalty. Likewise, the (d)(14) aggravating circumstance is not overbroad. It clearly both genuinely narrow[s] the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and reasonably justif[ies] the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Zant, 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733. The aggravator requires a relationship between the defendant and the victim where they either act in concert or are competitors in the illicit drug market and that the killing occurred to promote the activities of the defendant over the victim in that market, whether the defendant was the actual killer or an accomplice. To consider this an aggravating circumstance that could, by itself, justify the imposition of a capital sentence, is consistent with the public policy of this Commonwealth, which reasonably seeks to reduce the harmful effects that drugs have on our society. Thus, Johnson has failed to meet his burden of proving that his claim that the (d)(14) aggravator is unconstitutional has arguable merit and, accordingly, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue.