Opinion ID: 1711569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appealability of October 30, 1996 Order

Text: The second cardinal issue before this Court is whether, on the one hand, MS Life's June 17, 1998 motion to reconsider the trial judge's October 30, 1996 order reconsidering and denying the motion to compel arbitration empowered the trial court to reconsider the motion a second time and to grant it or whether, on the other hand, MS Life lost its right to both a second reconsideration and an appeal by failing to file a motion to reconsider the October 30, 1996 order within 30 days after that date or a notice of appeal within 42 days after that date. See, A.G. Edwards & Sons, supra . MS Life contends that an order denying arbitration is nonfinal absent the losing party's desire to appeal the denial. Thus, argues MS Life, the trial court had the authority, even at that late date, to reconsider the motion to compel arbitration a second time and to grant it. A.G. Edwards & Sons, supra, holds, however, that the 42-day time limit [imposed by Rule 4, Ala. R.App. P.] for an appeal is applicable to appeals from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 15. 558 So.2d at 361. A case with an analogous procedural history is McCormack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., [Ms. 1971025, March 12, 1999] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.1999), involving an order denying class certification, interlocutory, yet final for purposes of appeal. McCormack sued AmSouth Bank, seeking damages based on claims relating to alleged mismanagement by AmSouth of trust affairs. Summary judgment was entered in favor of AmSouth. McCormack appealed. One of the issues on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying class certification. AmSouth argued any appeal of that issue was untimely because the order denying class certification was a final order and McCormack did not file a notice of appeal from that order within 42 days allowed for an appeal from a final judgment. This Court concluded that McCormack's failure to appeal the order denying class certification within the period of time allowed for an appeal divested the appellate court of jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court erred in denying certification: [A]n order denying class certification does not fit neatly within the categories of `interlocutory' and `final' orders, but this Court's determination as to the nature of such an order is clear. It is a `final' order and may be appealed, as this Court held in Butler [v. Audio/Video Affiliates, Inc., 611 So.2d 330 (Ala. 1992) ]. The failure to file an appeal within the period allowed divests an appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the issue that is the subject of the untimely appeal. McCormack v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., ___ So.2d at ___. (Citation omitted.) While the denial of a motion to compel arbitration similarly may not fit neatly within the categories of interlocutory and final orders, this Court has held, as we have already observed, that such an order is appealable, but only within the 42-day time limit. In this case, the motion to compel arbitration was originally granted and then, on October 30, 1996, pursuant to Roberson's motion to reconsider, was denied. That ruling constituted a denial of a motion to compel arbitration. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cobb, 717 So.2d 355 (Ala. 1998), this Court dismissed an appeal from the trial court's second denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to alter, to amend, or to vacate the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The trial court had set aside its first denial and then had reentered a denial as an accommodation to save the appellant's right to appeal. The Merrill Lynch Court held that the 42-day period for appeal runs from the date a motion to compel arbitration is denied; that a motion to alter, to amend, or to vacate the denial pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., suspends the running of the 42-day period pending the trial court's ruling on that motion (see Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P.; Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 430 So.2d 426, 428 (Ala.1983)); but that the Merrill Lynch appellants had only 42 days following the first denial of their Rule 59(e) motion in which to appeal: It was the defendants' duty to stay abreast of any action taken in this case, and they had 42 days in which to appeal to this Court. They did not appeal within that period. This appeal is, therefore, dismissed. 717 So.2d at 356-57. The Merrill Lynch language that the running of the 42-day appeal period was suspended pending the trial court's ruling (717 So.2d at 356, emphasis added) on the Rule 59(e) motion is significant. Obviously the 42 days had begun running upon the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The right to appeal did not wait in limbo until the proponent of arbitration filed the Rule 59(e) motion or otherwise conceived a desire for review, as MS Life would have us hold in the case before us. The 42 days allowed for MS Life to appeal the October 30, 1996 denial of the motion to compel arbitration had long expired by the time MS Life filed its June 17, 1998 motion to reconsider. In a 1998 decision, Ex parte Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co., [Ms. 1970424, May 22, 1998] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.1998), this Court holds that an appealable order entered by a trial court is a judgment. Justice Houston, writing for the Court, held that Mutual Savings could appeal the grant of a new trial and stated that Rule 54(a) ... defines a `judgment' as including `a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.' ___ So.2d at ___. In Mutual Savings, the Court holds that, because § 12-22-10, Ala.Code 1975, provides for the right to appeal from a circuit court's order granting or denying a motion for new trial, such an order constitutes a judgment, and a timely filed motion to reconsider (construed as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter, to amend, or to vacate) tolls the time for appeal. In this case, the October 30, 1996 order denying the motion to arbitrate was not signed or initialed. Rule 58, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, in pertinent part: (b) Sufficiency of Judgment, Order, or Minute Entry Thereof. A judgment or order, or the minute entry thereof, need not be phrased in formal language nor bear particular words of adjudication. The judgment or order, or the minute entry thereof, will be sufficient if it is signed or initialed by the judge ... and indicates an intention to adjudicate, considering the whole record, and if it indicates the substance of the adjudication. (Emphasis added.) Two of the three elements of Rule 58(b) are present in this case: (1) the intention to adjudicate and (2) the substance of the adjudication, i.e., the denial of the motion to compel arbitration. However, the third element, the signature or initials of the trial judge, is not present. According to the Committee Comments to Rule 58, the rule was amended effective March 1, 1984, to require that a judgment, order, or minute entry be signed or initialed by the judge. The rationale, as explained by the Committee in its Comments to the March 1, 1984, amendment, is: Under Rule 58(b) there have developed some problems in determining whether an order of the court is intended to serve as a judgment dispositive of the lawsuit or as an order of lesser proportions.... This amendment requires the judge to add his signature or initials to the place in the record where the notation of the fact of the judgment appears. While this amendment does not alter the standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the phraseology, it does require, in the form of a signing or initialing, a direct judicial intervention in the process of making up the judgment, order, or minute entry. This mandate of direct involvement by the court should result in a greater concern for the necessity for clarity in a judgment or order. (Citations omitted.) The entry of an order, signed or initialed by the trial judge, evidences the trial court's intention to adjudicate. See, Cochran v. Wood, 504 So.2d 297 (Ala.Civ.App.1986). Thus, the requirement of a judge's signature is to provide evidence of direct judicial intervention. In this case, there is an unsigned, dated entry on the case action summary. Additionally, there is an unsigned, undated handwritten note purportedly made by the trial judge. With two criteria of Rule 58(b) present, how should this Court treat the order? The long-standing policy of this Court, applicable when we receive a record in which the entry of the judgment or order appealed is unsigned, has been to remand the cause to the trial judge for Rule 58(b) compliance. If the trial judge has failed to respond to the remand within 10 days from the date of the remand order, this Court has dismissed the appeal as not being from a final and appealable judgment. Thus, had MS Life timely appealed the October 30, 1996 order, this Court would have remanded the case for Rule 58(b) compliance. That policy alone, however, is not enough for this Court to determine that the October 30, 1996 order was an appealable order. Because Rule 58(b) requires the judge's signature for the purpose of providing evidence of direct judicial intervention, we consider the record to determine how the order was treated by the parties and the trial court. MS Life's June 17, 1998 motion is entitled Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings. Exhibit G to Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandamus (emphasis added). MS Life thereby moved the trial court to reconsider its Order denying MS Life's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to stay these proceedings pending a determination of arbitrability.  Exhibit G, supra (emphasis added). On July 1, 1998, the trial court purported to grant MS Life's motion to reconsider. Thus, the parties and the trial court treated the unsigned October 30, 1996 order as an effective order of the trial court. They thereby constituted it the law of the case. MS Life has, by its actions, recognized the trial court's intent to adjudicate the issue. Thus, MS Life cannot avoid the consequences of the October 30, 1996 order by referring to it merely as an unappealable interlocutory order. As we have explained, MS Life and Roberson did not agree to submit their dispute to arbitration in the first place, and MS Life did not timely invoke its right to any review of the trial court's October 30, 1996 denial of MS Life's motion to compel arbitration. For both reasons, the July 1, 1998 order granting MS Life's June 17, 1998 motion to reconsider is invalid. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is granted. The writ shall direct the trial court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and its order staying the proceedings below. WRIT GRANTED. MADDOX, COOK, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur. LYONS, J., concurs as to the section entitled Agreement to Arbitrate and concurs in the result as to all other sections. HOOPER, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, and BROWN, JJ., concur in the result.