Opinion ID: 75555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Doubt Standard

Text: 84 Hansen and Randall maintain that the district judge misstated the essential basis of the convictions by instructing that the government did not have to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In his introduction to the jury instructions, the district judge advised the jury that he would read them the jury charge and would provide them each a copy of the charge for them to refer to it at any time you think is appropriate when they were sent out to deliberate. R22-172. The district judge then orally instructed the jury on reasonable doubt as follows: 85 So the Government always has the burden of proving a Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If it fails to do so, under your oath, you would have to find that Defendant not guilty. 86 But while the Government's burden is a heavy burden, it is not necessary that the Defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, because that is generally impossible. The law does not require a mathematical certainty, only the exclusion of any reasonable doubt concerning that Defendant's guilt. 87 In that regard, a reasonable doubt is defined as a real doubt, based upon reason and common sense after a careful and impartial consideration of the entire evidence in this case, or the lack of evidence. 88 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, in other words, is proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely or act upon it without hesitation in a decision involving the most important of your affairs. But you take a common sense view. . . . 89 You may not find a Defendant guilty unless you find that the inferences you draw from the evidence are consistent with the theory of his guilt and inconsistent with reasonable theories of innocence. If you are convinced that a Defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, say so with a verdict of guilty. On the contrary, if you have reasonable doubt, then under your oath, you would have to find that Defendant not guilty. 90 R22-174-75 (emphasis added). No objection was made as to this instruction. R22-206-09. 37 91 The passage, as provided to the jury in the written charge, read: 92 Thus, while the Government's burden of proof is a strict or heavy burden, it is not necessary that a Defendant's guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt. It is only required that the Government's proof exclude any reasonable doubt concerning a Defendant's guilt. 93 R6-133-2. 94 [W]e consider [a reasonable doubt] instruction as a whole to determine if the instruction misleads the jury as to the government's burden of proof. Harvell v. Nagle, 58 F.3d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir. 1995). The jury must be instructed that defendant's guilt must be proved by the government beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of the charged offense, but the trial court is not required to define reasonable doubt. Id. If the trial court defines reasonable doubt, the standard must be explained correctly. Id. A district court's failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury, including an erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt, is a structural error which defies the harmless-error analysis. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468-69, 117 S. Ct. 1544 at 1549-50. Although we have held that an inadequate reasonable doubt instruction cannot be cured by other circumstances at trial, Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154, 1158 (11th Cir. 1994) (reversing a conviction in which the instruction defined reasonable doubt using the phrase substantial doubt), [j]ury instructions are not considered in isolation; rather we view them in the context of the entire . . . proceeding. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995). 95 Here, the improper passage is immediately prefaced and followed by a correct instruction, and the correct instruction was included in the written copy provided to each juror. The judge stated the correct instruction numerous times, including each element of each offense to be proven. See R22-172, 173, 182, 185, 187,189, 193-94, 199-201. The instruction, as written and as provided to the jury, was not inadequate and presented the correct reasonable doubt standard. Viewing this instruction as a whole and in the context of the entire proceeding, we find that it did not mislead the jury as to the reasonable doubt standard. See United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 243 (2nd Cir. 1990) (rejecting a challenge to the language used in one sentence of a reasonable doubt standard where a correct instruction was provided immediately after the challenged language and provided at least five times in the instructions in general and as to the specific offenses); but see Bloomer v. United States, 162 F.3d 187, 189, 194 (2nd Cir. 1998) (finding an improper reasonable doubt instruction constitutionally deficient despite at least 17 proper instructions where there was no curative instruction to alert the jury to disregard the incorrect instruction.)