Opinion ID: 4526737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: due process at original parole-grant hearings

Text: ¶18 The Utah Constitution gives to the Parole Board power to “grant parole . . . subject to regulations as provided by statute.” UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 12(2)(a). In general, “[d]ecisions of the board in cases involving paroles . . . are final and are not subject to judicial review.” UTAH CODE § 77-27-5(3). This court has consistently held, however, that article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,” applies to original parole-grant hearings. Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 23, 416 P.3d 663; Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911 (Utah 1993); see also Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994) (explaining that courts “review the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing function, but [they] do not sit as a panel of review on the result, absent some other constitutional claim, such as cruel and unusual punishment”). That is because Utah uses an indeterminate sentencing scheme. Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 23. Under that scheme, the district court “impos[es] the statutorily prescribed range of years for the offense of conviction.” Id. But then the Parole Board, using its “unfettered discretion,” fixes the term of imprisonment within that range. Id. (quoting Labrum, 870 P.2d at 908). And because of that unfettered discretion, original parole-grant hearings are “analogous to sentencing hearings,” requiring “due process to the extent that the analogy holds.” Id. (quoting Labrum, 870 P.2d at 908). ¶19 Of course, due process does not require every procedural protection for every original parole-grant hearing. See Labrum, 870 P.2d at 911. Indeed, we have recognized that procedural rights in the parole-hearing context are “not unlimited.” Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 62; Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103 (Utah 1994) (“Just as the requirements of due process are limited in sentencing proceedings, so they are in parole hearings at which an inmate’s predicted term of incarceration may be set.”). Whether due process calls for the Parole Board to bolster an original parolegrant hearing with more procedural protections “depend[s] on the demands of the particular situation.” Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 24; Labrum, 870 P.2d at 911 (“The extent to which additional due process protections must be afforded inmates in this and other 8 Cite as: 2020 UT 16 Opinion of the Court proceedings in the parole system will require case-by-case review. Due process is flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given situation demands.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And “[p]recisely what due process requires of the board of pardons cannot be determined in the abstract, but must be determined only after the facts concerning the procedures followed by the board have been [fleshed] out.” Neel, 886 P.2d at 1102 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶20 “[T]he touchstone of due process in the context of parole hearings is whether the proposed procedural due process requirement substantially furthers the accuracy and reliability of the Board’s fact-finding process.” Id. at 1103 (emphasis added). But we recognize that other factors play into the due process analysis as well. So, to help us decide what procedures the Parole Board must follow in each situation, “we balance the goals of (1) minimizing errors in the Parole Board’s sentencing process and (2) promoting the perception of fairness with (3) ensuring the effective administration of Utah’s prison and parole systems.” Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 53; see also Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909 (“At least two critical functions related to fundamental fairness are implicated by a petitioner’s request for timely disclosure of information: minimizing error and preserving the integrity of the process itself.”). We also strive to “promot[e] uniformity in sentences, reduc[e] the need for trials by encouraging rational plea bargains, and provid[e] incentives for good behavior in prison.” Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 24 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶21 Our opinions in Neese and Labrum provide examples of the procedural protections required in particular situations. In Labrum, the Parole Board withheld from an inmate notice of the “information used against him at the parole determination hearing.” 870 P.2d at 904. We held that “due process requires (1) that an inmate receive adequate notice to prepare for a parole release hearing, and (2) that an inmate receive copies or a summary of the information in the Board’s file on which the Board will rely.” Id. ¶22 The procedure in Labrum—adequate notice of a hearing and the opportunity to review the Parole Board’s information— substantially minimized errors and increased the perception of fairness in the decision-making process by allowing the inmate to 9 BLANKE v. BOARD OF PARDONS Opinion of the Court “point out errors” that the Parole Board might have otherwise relied on. Id. at 909 (citation omitted). ¶23 We required procedural protections in our Neese decision beyond those required in Labrum. We considered “what procedural protections the Parole Board must respect before it determines that someone who has never before been adjudicated a sex offender is one and effectively conditions his early release on his participation in sex offender treatment.” Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 25. The inmate in that case “ha[d] never been convicted of a sex offense or adjudicated a sex offender in a disciplinary, juvenile, or any other proceeding.” Id. ¶ 32. And he “steadfastly maintained that he was innocent of sexual misconduct.” Id. We held that due process required the Parole Board to give the inmate more procedural protections—advance written notice, the ability to call witnesses and present evidence (unless the safe administration of the prison system requires otherwise), and a written statement— before it could consider him a sex offender for the purposes of sex-offender-treatment parole conditions. Id. ¶ 43. ¶24 The Neese procedures substantially “reduce the risk of error and promote the perception of fairness” in three ways: First, they “allow[] inmates to meaningfully present evidence in a situation where they’ve never before had the opportunity to do so.” Id. ¶ 44. Second, they “ensur[e] that the Parole Board has carefully considered the evidence.” Id. ¶ 46. Third, they “creat[e] a record of the Parole Board’s adjudication that allows for meaningful due process review.” Id.