Opinion ID: 2342088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deficient breath sample test result

Text: The State agrees with the Court of Appeals' holding that the independent testing provisions of K.S.A. 8-1004 were not directly applicable in this case. We likewise concur in that decision. By its plain language, K.S.A. 8-1004 clearly differentiates between testing administered pursuant to K.S.A. 8-1001 (the officer-requested test) and an additional test by a physician of the person's own choosing (an independent test). As the Court of Appeals explained,  Chastain and Drake do not guarantee suspected drunk drivers the right to have police perform additional tests conducted by the police themselves, but only to `allow an accused an opportunity to secure independent testing in order to rebut the results of police testing, which may be used by the State upon trial.' Chastain, 265 Kan. at 20, 960 P.2d 756. May, 2009 WL 5206248, at . Nevertheless, the suppression sanction set forth in K.S.A. 8-1004 may be useful as an analog in our later discussion of the appropriate remedy for denying a person's right of test refusal rescission. Pointing to the analysis in the Court of Appeals' dissent, the State argues that the admission of May's deficient sample breath test result of .156 was statutorily authorized. The dissent concluded that in a DUI prosecution under K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1567(a)(3), based on the driver being under the influence to a degree that rendered the driver incapable of safely operating a vehicle, the State is permitted to use all other competent evidence, as defined in K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1013(f). That definition of other competent evidence includes, under subsection (2), readings obtained from a partial alcohol concentration test on a breath testing machine. Accordingly, the dissent opined that the district court erred in refusing to admit the deficient sample test result as other competent evidence. May, 2009 WL 5206248, at . We need not dissect the dissent's statutory interpretation or ruminate on whether a test result that is, by definition, deficient and inaccurate can nevertheless be deemed competent evidence. Whether the State could have proffered the deficient sample test result in an ordinary case, i.e., where the driver's right of test refusal rescission was not violated by the arresting officer, is not the question before us. The question is whether the sanction for a law enforcement officer's denial of a driver's right to cure an initial test refusal includes the suppression of the deficient sample test result. The Court of Appeals' majority was persuaded by our prior decision in Gray that the appropriate sanction in this case included a suppression of the numerical test result from May's deficient sample. May, 2009 WL 5206248, at . Gray found that the trial court had correctly ruled that Standish required a holding that Gray rescinded his refusal to take a breathalyzer test. 270 Kan. at 802, 18 P.3d 962. The difficult issue for the Gray court was whether the denial of the right to take the breathalyzer test should have resulted in a dismissal of the DUI charge. 270 Kan. at 799, 18 P.3d 962. In arriving at the appropriate sanction, Gray looked at two Court of Appeals decisions, Ostmeyer v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 16 Kan.App.2d 639, 644, 827 P.2d 780, rev. denied 250 Kan. 806 (1992), and State v. Kelly, 14 Kan.App.2d 182, 786 P.2d 623 (1990). In Kelly, the defendant had invoked but was denied his right to consult with his attorney in violation of K.S.A. 8-1001(f)(1)(E). 270 Kan. at 801, 18 P.3d 962. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals used the independent testing scenario as a favorable analogy in determining the appropriate sanction to apply for a K.S.A. 8-1001(f)(1)(E) violation. The Kelly panel concluded that `a new trial with suppression of the breath test and any evidence obtained following defendant's request for counsel after the breath test is the proper remedy.' Gray, 270 Kan. at 801, 18 P.3d 962 (quoting Kelly, 14 Kan. App.2d at 191, 786 P.2d 623). The Gray court then opined that the Supreme Court had approved and applied the ruling of Kelly  in State v. Luft, 248 Kan. 911, 913, 811 P.2d 873 (1991). 270 Kan. at 801, 18 P.3d 962. In Luft, the court found that suppression of the test results was the proper remedy for an officer's failure to give the statutory warnings regarding independent testing. 248 Kan. at 912-13, 811 P.2d 873. Shortly thereafter, in Ostmeyer, where the defendant was denied a posttest consultation with an attorney, the Court of Appeals found the appropriate remedy to be `[s]uppression of the test results and any evidence obtained following a request for counsel.' Gray, 270 Kan. at 802, 18 P.3d 962 (quoting Ostmeyer, 16 Kan.App.2d 639, 827 P.2d 780, Syl.). Ultimately, the Gray court determined that it was hard pressed to see why a different rule should be applied to the facts we face in the instant case than was applied in Kelly and Ostmeyer and previously approved by our court in Luft.  270 Kan. at 802, 18 P.3d 962. The court found that, although the trial court erroneously dismissed the DUI charge, the motion to suppress or motion in limine should have been granted, precluding any reference to the breathalyzer testing proceedings.  (Emphasis added.) 270 Kan. at 802-03, 18 P.3d 962. Gray did not have to address the admissibility of the number generated by an Intoxilyzer machine after the tested person provided an inadequate breath sample. But one cannot logically extricate or separate the numerical result of testing from the breathalyzer testing proceedings, which Gray found to be strictly off-limits. The relevance of the .156 reading is distorted, if not destroyed, without referring to the fact that it was the product of an inadequate breath sample. Evidence of the inadequacy of the breath sample falls within Gray 's proscription against any reference to the breathalyzer testing proceedings. 270 Kan. at 802-03, 18 P.3d 962. Accordingly, the numerical reading must also be suppressed. In sum, we find that the district court was incorrect in suggesting that a request to retake the trooper-requested Intoxilyzer 8000 breath test was a request for independent testing under K.S.A. 8-1004. Nevertheless, the sanction for refusing an independent test provides a favorable analog for determining the sanction for refusing to give a test to one who has cured an initial refusal through a valid rescission. Moreover, our prior decision in Gray leads to the conclusion that the district court was correct in suppressing the test result from the deficient breath sample. See KPERS v. Reimer & Koger Assocs., Inc., 262 Kan. 110, 118, 936 P.2d 714 (1997) (trial court's reason for ruling immaterial if ruling correct for any reason). The district court and the Court of Appeals majority are affirmed. Affirmed.