Opinion ID: 200114
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The events leading to litigation, and the proceedings in the District Court

Text: 3 Appellant Eugene E. Wigginton served in the Marines from 1967 to 1970 and was then honorably discharged. In 1979 Wigginton was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the United States Army Reserve and, concomitantly, in the Rhode Island Army National Guard (RIANG). He received regular promotions, and by 1996 — the year in which the event triggering this litigation took place — Wigginton, by then forty-six years old, had almost twenty years of aggregate service in the Marines and RIANG and had attained the rank of major. In January of 1996 Wigginton was advised that in May of that year his status would be considered by a Selective Retention Board, pursuant to National Guard Regulation (NGR) 635-102. The stated purpose of NGR 635-102 was to [e]nsur[e] that only the most capable officers are retained beyond 20 years of qualifying service for assignment to the comparatively few higher level command and staff positions. Of the ten RIANG officers whose status was considered at the May 1996 session of the Selective Retention Board, four — of whom Wigginton was one — were recommended for non-retention. Pursuant to the Board's recommendation, Brigadier General Reginald E. Centracchio, Adjutant General of Rhode Island, then notified Wigginton that he was to be separated from RIANG as of July 13, 1996; separation followed on that date. 4 In September of 1996 Wigginton filed a two-count § 1983 (42 U.S.C. § 1983) suit against Centracchio and the State of Rhode Island in the Superior Court for Providence County. The first of the two § 1983 counts charged that termination of Wigginton's RIANG commission constituted deprivation without due process of law of a constitutionally protected property right to continue as a commissioned officer until age sixty — a substantive right assertedly embodied in § 30-3-13 of Rhode Island General Laws. That statutory provision, part of the Rhode Island military code enacted by the Rhode Island Legislature in 1956, is as follows: 5 All commissioned officers of the staff corps and departments, hereafter appointed, shall have had previous military experience, except chaplains, officers of the judge advocate general's corps, and medical corps officers. They shall hold their positions until they shall have reached the age of sixty (60) years, unless retired prior to that time by reason of resignation or disability, or for cause to be determined by an efficiency board or a court-martial legally convened for that purpose. Vacancies among these officers shall be filled by appointment from the commissioned officer of the national guard or from such other civilians as may be specifically qualified for duty therein. 6 R.I. Gen. Laws § 30-3-13. 7 The second § 1983 count, sounding in procedural due process, contained two elements. One element was a claim that the criteria prescribed by NGR 635-102 as governing the retention/non-retention decision had not been followed in Wigginton's case. The other element was a claim that the absence of any explanation of the grounds for the non-retention decision constituted a fatal due process flaw.
8 Centracchio removed the case to the District Court and then filed a motion to dismiss. The Magistrate Judge to whom the case had been referred recommended to the District Judge that the motion to dismiss be granted on the ground that claims arising in the military service were non-justiciable. The District Court, disagreeing with the Magistrate Judge, denied the motion to dismiss. The District Judge ruled that damage actions arising from military service were not justiciable, but that an equitable action — such as Wigginton's, seeking reinstatement in commissioned status — could be entertained by an Article III court. The District Court then authorized the parties to engage in discovery addressed to the meaning of R.I. Gen. Laws § 30-3-13, the Rhode Island statute relied on by Wigginton in the first count of his complaint, with a view to determining whether Wigginton had been a commissioned officer[ ] of the staff corps and departments within the meaning of the statute. At the close of discovery, Centracchio and Wigginton both filed motions for summary judgment. 9 The District Court granted Centracchio's motion for summary judgment. With respect to Wigginton's first count, the District Court found that neither Wigginton nor Centracchio had presented evidence that gave the statutory phrase staff corps and departments any cognizable meaning. The District Court then ruled that, since Wigginton as plaintiff had the burden of establishing the legal groundwork for his substantive due process claim, his inability to demonstrate that he was an officer[] of the staff corps and departments meant that the claim presented in the first count of the complaint must fail. The District Court then went on to address Wigginton's procedural due process claims — the claims presented in the second count — and found them without merit. 10 Wigginton appealed to this court from the order of the District Court granting summary judgment and dismissing his complaint.