Opinion ID: 220242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Copyright Infringement and the Right to Make Use of Public Domain Materials

Text: The elements of copyright infringement are (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of original elements of the copyrighted work. Taylor, 403 F.3d at 962-63. As discussed above, Warner Bros. has established ownership of valid copyrights in the movies and animated shorts. Copying can be shown either by (1) direct evidence of copying, or (2) access to the copyrighted material and substantial similarity between the AVELA work and the copyrighted work. Id. at 964. There is no dispute that AVELA had access to the films in question, each of which has a long history of popularity. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F.Supp. 1287, 1297 (C.D.Cal.1995) ([T]he sheer worldwide popularity and distribution of the Bond films allows the Court to indulge a presumption of access.). In addition, there is no dispute that the images in the AVELA works are substantially similar to the images in the copyrighted films, as they are in fact images of the same people in the same costumes (or, in the case of Tom and Jerry, of the same cartoon characters). The only remaining question is whether AVELA has appropriated original elements of the films, see Taylor, 403 F.3d at 962-63, or solely elements that are in the public domain. Warner Bros. does not challenge the products that are exact reproductions of an entire item of publicity material. Instead, Warner Bros. contends that AVELA has extracted images from the public domain materials and used them in new ways that infringe the copyrights in the associated films. AVELA admits that it has used the images in new ways (and indeed has applied for its own copyrights for such derivative works), but it counters that there is no limitation on the public's right to modify or make new works from public domain materials. AVELA is correct that, as a general proposition, the public is not limited solely to making exact replicas of public domain materials, but rather is free to use public domain materials in new ways ( i.e., to make derivative works by adding to and recombining elements of the public domain materials). [W]here a work has gone into the public domain, it does in fact follow that any individual is entitled to develop this work in new ways. Pannonia Farms, Inc. v. USA Cable, 2004 WL 1276842, at  & n. 20 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2004) (rejecting the theory that the plaintiff's copyrights in nine original Sherlock Holmes stories gave the plaintiff the exclusive right to make derivative works featuring the Holmes and Dr. Watson characters because fifty-plus earlier stories already had reached the public domain). Nevertheless, this freedom to make new works based on public domain materials ends where the resulting derivative work comes into conflict with a valid copyright. For example, in Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.1989), a number of pre-1948 Amos `n' Andy radio scripts had entered the public domain. However, CBS held valid copyrights in a number of post-1948 radio scripts and, arguably, in a later television series. In 1981, Silverman began developing a Broadway musical version of Amos `n' Andy, and CBS alleged that his script infringed its copyrights. Like AVELA here, Silverman argued that because the pre-1948 Amos `n' Andy scripts were in the public domain, he was free to make any derivative work he wished featuring the Amos `n' Andy characters. The court disagreed, holding that derivative works based on the public domain scripts still would infringe to the extent they used any further delineation of the characters contained in the post-1948 radio scripts and the television scripts and programs, if it is ultimately determined that these last items remain protected by valid copyrights. Id. at 50; see also Pannonia Farms, 2004 WL 1276842, at  (noting that although the characters of Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson were in the public domain based on fifty-plus public domain original stories, a new work that incorporated character traits newly introduced by the nine later original stories still under copyright would infringe those copyrights). In other words, if material related to certain characters is in the public domain, but later works covered by copyright add new aspects to those characters, a work developed from the public domain material infringes the copyrights in the later works to the extent that it incorporates aspects of the characters developed solely in those later works. Therefore, we must determine (1) the apparent scope of the copyrights in the later works (here, the films), (2) the scope of the material dedicated to the public in the publicity materials, which correspondingly limits the scope of the film copyrights, and (3) the scope into which each of AVELA's images falls. If an AVELA work falls solely within the scope of the material dedicated to the public, there can be no infringement liability under the film copyrights. On the other hand, if some portion of an AVELA work falls outside the scope of the material dedicated to the public, but within the scope of the film copyrights, AVELA is liable for infringement.
It is clear that when cartoons or movies are copyrighted, a component of that copyright protection extends to the characters themselves, to the extent that such characters are sufficiently distinctive. See, e.g., Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 661 (7th Cir.2004) ([A] stock character, once he was drawn and named and given speech [in a comic book series] ... became sufficiently distinctive to be copyrightable.); Olson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that copyright protection may be afforded to characters visually depicted in a television series or in a movie for characters who are especially distinctive); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F.Supp. at 1296 (holding that plaintiffs' copyrighted James Bond films established a copyright in the character of James Bond). The district court thoroughly and accurately applied this principle to the instant case, and the parties do not contest the district court's analysis. We agree with the district court's conclusion that Dorothy, Tin Man, Cowardly Lion, and Scarecrow from The Wizard of Oz, Scarlett O'Hara and Rhett Butler from Gone with the Wind, and Tom and Jerry each exhibit consistent, widely identifiable traits in the films that are sufficiently distinctive to merit character protection under the respective film copyrights. See Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir.2003). AVELA correctly points out that the scope of copyright protection for the characters in the films The Wizard of Oz and Gone with the Wind is limited to the increments of character expression in the films that go beyond the character expression in the books on which they were based. See Silverman, 870 F.2d at 49 ([C]opyrights in derivative works secure protection only for the incremental additions of originality contributed by the authors of the derivative works.). While true, this has little practical effect in the instant case, as a book's description of a character generally anticipates very little of the expression of the character in film: The reason is the difference between literary and graphic expression. The description of a character in prose leaves much to the imagination, even when the description is detailedas in Dashiell Hammett's description of Sam Spade's physical appearance in the first paragraph of The Maltese Falcon. Samuel Spade's jaw was long and bony, his chin a jutting v under the more flexible v of his mouth. His nostrils curved back to make another, smaller, v. His yellow-grey eyes were horizontal. The v motif was picked up again by thickish brows rising outward from twin creases above a hooked nose, and his pale brown hair grew downfrom high flat templesin a point on his forehead. He looked rather pleasantly like a blond satan. Even after all this, one hardly knows what Sam Spade looked like. But everyone knows what Humphrey Bogart looked like. Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660-61. The film actors' portrayals of the characters at issue here appear to rely upon elements of expression far beyond the dialogue and descriptions in the books. AVELA has identified no instance in which the distinctive mannerisms, facial expressions, voice, or speech patterns of a film character are anticipated in the corresponding book by a literary description that evokes, to any significant extent, what the actor portrayed. Put more simply, there is no evidence that one would be able to visualize the distinctive details of, for example, Clark Gable's performance before watching the movie Gone with the Wind, even if one had read the book beforehand. At the very least, the scope of the film copyrights covers all visual depictions of the film characters at issue, except for any aspects of the characters that were injected into the public domain by the publicity materials.
AVELA contends that the injection of the publicity materials into the public domain simultaneously injected the film characters themselves into the public domain. To the extent that copyright-eligible aspects of a character are injected into the public domain, the character protection under the corresponding film copyrights must be limited accordingly. As an initial matter, we reject AVELA's contention that the publicity materials placed the entirety of the film characters at issue into the public domain. The isolated still images included in the publicity materials cannot anticipate the full range of distinctive speech, movement, demeanor, and other personality traits that combine to establish a copyrightable character. See, e.g., Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660 (holding that the character's age, obviously phony title (`Count'), what he knows and says, [and] his name combine with his visual appearance to create a distinctive character); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 900 F.Supp. at 1296 (citing various character traits that are specific to Bondi.e. his cold-bloodedness; his overt sexuality; his love of martinis `shaken, not stirred;' his marksmanship; his `license to kill' and use of guns; his physical strength; [and] his sophistication, rather than his visual appearance alone, as establishing the copyrightability of the character); cf. Walker v. Viacom Int'l, Inc., 2008 WL 2050964, at -6 (N.D.Cal. May 13, 2008) (holding that a copyrighted cartoon consisting of four small and largely uninformative black and white panels that conveyed little to no information about [the character's] personality or character traits was insufficient to establish copyright protection of the character). Nevertheless, the publicity materials could have placed some aspects of each character's visual appearance into the public domain. A situation somewhat similar to the one we face was presented in Siegel v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 542 F.Supp.2d 1098 (C.D.Cal.2008). The defendants owned the copyright in two promotional announcements for Superman comics, published before the first Superman comic book was issued. The black-and-white promotional announcements each included an image of the protagonist wearing some type of costume and holding aloft a car. Id. at 1126. The defendants argued that their copyright in the promotional announcements gave them rights over the entirety of the Superman character as later developed (and copyrighted separately) in the comic book. The court disagreed, stating: [N]othing concerning the Superman storyline (that is, the literary elements contained in Action Comics, Vol. 1) is on display in the ads; thus, Superman's name, his alter ego, his compatriots, his origins, his mission to serve as a champion of the oppressed, or his heroic abilities in general, do not remain within defendants sole possession to exploit. Instead the only copyrightable elements left [to defendants] arise from the pictorial illustration in the announcements, which is fairly limited. Id. (emphasis added). As a result, the scope of the promotional announcements encompassed only the limited character of a person with extraordinary strength who wears a black and white leotard and cape. Id. Despite the earlier publication of the promotional announcements, the copyright in the later comic book nevertheless encompassed the fully developed character with Superman's distinctive blue leotard (complete with its inverted triangular crest across the chest with a red `S' on a yellow background), a red cape and boots, and his superhuman ability to leap tall buildings, repel bullets, and run faster than a locomotive, none of which is apparent from the announcement. Id. Importantly, the scope of the character copyrighted through the promotional announcements was viewed on the strict basis of what was clearly visible in the announcements, not through the additional perspective of the later, more developed work. In the instant case, the only copyrightable elements in the publicity materials (albeit injected into the public domain, rather than registered for copyright) are even more limited than in Siegel. While the promotional announcements in Siegel at least showed proto-Superman holding a car over his head, establishing a distinguishing characteristic of extraordinary strength, the publicity materials here reveal nothing of each film character's signature traits or mannerisms. At most, the publicity materials could have injected some of the purely visual characteristics of each film character into the public domain, akin to the character in a black and white leotard and cape. Id. Because we must rely solely on visual characteristics, the individuals shown in the publicity materials establish characters for copyright purposes only if they display consistent, widely identifiable visual characteristics. See Rice, 330 F.3d at 1175. The Walker case is instructive in this regard. There, the plaintiff asserted his copyright in a comic strip entitled Mr. Bob Spongee, The Unemployed Sponge against the producers of the animated television series SpongeBob SquarePants. 2008 WL 2050964 at . The plaintiff had created sponge dolls based on his comic strip and placed advertisements in a newspaper. Id. Because these materials revealed little to no information about Mr. Bob Spongee's personality or character traits, id. at , the court could look only to his visual appearance for distinctiveness. The court held that in such a situation, a consistent visual appearance throughout the materials was a prerequisite for character protection. See id. at -6. Because of variations in the sponge's clothing, color, eye and nose shape, and hair among the comic strip, dolls, and advertisements, the plaintiff's copyright did not create any character protection. Id. at . [8] Therefore, we must determine if any individual is depicted with consistent, distinctive visual characteristics throughout the various publicity materials. If so, those consistent visual characteristics define the copyrightable elements of that film character, Siegel, 542 F.Supp.2d at 1126, which were injected into the public domain by the publicity materials. If not, then there are no visual aspects of the film character in the public domain, apart from the publicity material images themselves. With respect to the cartoon characters Tom and Jerry, we note that on the spectrum of character copyrightability, the category of cartoon characters often is cited as the paradigm of distinctiveness. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir.1983); 1-2 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.12. The record indicates that the Tom & Jerry publicity materials consist of just one public domain movie poster for each copyrighted short film, and the visual characteristics of Tom and Jerry in the first poster, for Puss Gets the Boot (released in 1940), are quite different from the characters popularly recognized as Tom and Jerry today. In addition, the first poster by itself reveals no distinctive character or visual traits, but only visual characteristics typical to cats and mice. As a result, the first poster is essentially a generic cat-and-mouse cartoon drawing that cannot establish independently copyrightable characters. Cf. Walker, 2008 WL 2050964 at -6 (finding a four-panel cartoon drawing featuring a personified sponge lacked the distinctiveness necessary to establish a copyrightable sponge character). Meanwhile, the copyrighted short film that immediately followed the first poster revealed Tom and Jerry's character traits and signature antagonistic relationship. With the benefit of these strong character traits, the first short film was sufficient to establish the copyrightable elements of the Tom and Jerry characters as depicted therein. See ante at 597-98. In such a situation, each subsequent movie poster could inject into the public domain only the increments of expression, if any, that the movie poster itself added to the already-copyrighted characters from previously released Tom & Jerry films. See Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir.1979) ([A]lthough the derivative work may enter the public domain, the matter contained therein which derives from a work still covered by statutory copyright is not dedicated to the public.); 1-3 Nimmer on Copyright § 3.07. Because they derive[ ] from a work still covered by statutory copyright, the underlying characters of Tom and Jerry are not in the public domain until the copyrights in the Tom & Jerry short films begin to expire. In contrast to Tom & Jerry, the record is clear that a veritable blitz of publicity materials for Gone with the Wind and The Wizard of Oz was distributed prior to the publication of each film. However, with respect to Gone with the Wind, the publicity material images are far from the cartoon-character end of the spectrum of character copyrightability. There is nothing consistent and distinctive about the publicity material images of Vivian Leigh as Scarlett O'Hara and Clark Gable as Rhett Butler. They certainly lack any cartoonishly unique physical attributes, and neither one is shown in a consistent, unique outfit and hairstyle. See Walker, 2008 WL 2050964 at ; cf. Siegel, 542 F.Supp.2d at 1126 (finding a black and white leotard and cape sufficiently distinctive to establish an element of character copyrightability). As a result, the district court correctly held that the publicity material images for Gone with the Wind are no more than pictures of the actors in costume. Indeed, if the publicity material images from Gone with the Wind were sufficient to inject all visual depictions of the characters Scarlett O'Hara and Rhett Butler into the public domain, then almost any image of Vivian Leigh or Clark Gable would be sufficient to do so as well. Therefore, the only images in the public domain are the precise images in the publicity materials for Gone with the Wind. The characters in The Wizard of Oz lie closer to the cartoon-character end of the spectrum. There are many stylized aspects to the visual appearances of Scarecrow, Tin Man, and Cowardly Lion, and they perhaps might be considered as live-action representations of cartoon characters. Dorothy, while not so thoroughly stylized, wears a somewhat distinctive costume and hairstyle. However, a close examination of the record reveals that these potentially distinctive visual features do not appear in a consistent fashion throughout the publicity materials. For example, in the publicity materials, Judy Garland as Dorothy sometimes wears a red dress and bow and black slippers, rather than the distinctive blue dress and bow and ruby slippers of the film, and her hairstyle also varies. From image to image, Scarecrow's costume color ranges from yellow to blue to black, Cowardly Lion's from light yellow to very dark brown, and Tin Man's from shiny silver to a dull blue-gray. [9] Moreover, there are publicity material images in which other stylized elements of the characters' costumes and faces are significantly different from the look used in the film. For example, in some images Tin Man's face appears metallic, and in others it appears flesh-colored. If the publicity material images for The Wizard of Oz were held to establish the visual elements of copyrightable characters, their scope would encompass almost any character who wears a scarecrow or lion costume, and a wide range of little girl and silver robotic costumes as well, creating an unacceptable result: If a drunken old bum were a copyrightable character, so would be a drunken suburban housewife, a gesticulating Frenchman, a fire-breathing dragon, a talking cat, a Prussian officer who wears a monocle and clicks his heels, a masked magician, Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175-76 (9th Cir.2003), and, in Learned Hand's memorable paraphrase of Twelfth Night, a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his mistress. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). It would be difficult to write successful works of fiction without negotiating for dozens or hundreds of copyright licenses, even though such stereotyped characters are the products not of the creative imagination but of simple observation of the human comedy. Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660. While the overly broad characters would be in the public domain rather than copyrighted in the instant case, the analysis of the copyrightability of a character must be the same in either case. See Silverman, 870 F.2d at 50. We conclude that the characters' visual appearances in the publicity materials for The Wizard of Oz do not present the requisite consistency to establish any copyrightable elements of the film characters' visual appearances. Therefore, once again, the only images in the public domain are the precise images in the publicity materials for The Wizard of Oz.
We held above that no visual aspects of the film characters in Gone with the Wind and The Wizard of Oz are in the public domain, apart from the images in the publicity materials themselves. Therefore, any visual representation that is recognizable as a copyrightable character from one of these films, other than a faithful copy of a public domain image, has copied original elements from the corresponding film. See Taylor, 403 F.3d at 962-63. We must examine the AVELA products based on The Wizard of Oz and Gone with the Wind to determine which ones display increments of expression, Silverman, 870 F.2d at 50, of the film characters beyond the pictures of the actors in costume in the publicity materials. The AVELA products in the record can be analyzed in three categories. The first category comprises AVELA products that each reproduce one image from an item of publicity material as an identical two-dimensional image. While Warner Bros. does not challenge the reproduction of movie posters as posters (or lobby cards as lobby cards), it does challenge the reproduction of a single image drawn from a movie poster or lobby card on T-shirts, lunch boxes, music box lids, or playing cards, for example. We read the district court's permanent injunction to follow Warner Bros.'s distinction, forbidding all uses except the reproduction of items of publicity material in their entirety. However, no reasonable jury could find that merely printing a public domain image on a new type of surface (such as a T-shirt or playing card), instead of the original surface (movie poster paper or lobby card paper), adds an increment of expression of the film character to the image. [10] Similarly, Warner Bros. presents no reasoned argument as to why the reproduction of one smaller contiguous portion of an image from an item of publicity material, rather than the entirety of the image from that item, would add an increment of expression of the film character. As a result, products that reproduce in two dimensions any one portion of an image from any one item of publicity material, without more, do not infringe Warner Bros.'s copyright. For products in this category, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Warner Bros. with respect to The Wizard of Oz and Gone with the Wind and direct the entry of summary judgment for AVELA. We also vacate the permanent injunction to the extent it applies to products in this category. The second category comprises AVELA products that each juxtapose an image extracted from an item of publicity material with another image extracted from elsewhere in the publicity materials, or with a printed phrase from the book underlying the subject film, to create a new composite work. Even if we assume that each composite work is composed entirely of faithful extracts from public domain materials, the new arrangement of the extracts in the composite work is a new increment of expression that evokes the film character in a way the individual items of public domain material did not. For example, the printed phrase There is no place like home from the book The Wizard of Oz and a publicity material image of Judy Garland as Dorothy, viewed side by side in uncombined form, are still two separate works, one literary and one a picture of an actor in costume. In contrast, a T-shirt printed with the phrase There's no place like home along with the same image of Judy Garland as Dorothy is a new single work that evokes the film character of Dorothy much more strongly than the two separate works. [11] Because the increments of expression added [to the public domain materials] by the films are protectable, one making a new work from public domain materials infringes if he copies these protectable increments. Silverman, 870 F.2d at 50. Like the juxtaposition of an image and a phrase, a composite work combining two or more separate public-domain images (such as Judy Garland as Dorothy combined with an image of the Emerald City) also adds a new increment of expression of the film character that was not present in the separate images. Accordingly, products combining extracts from the public domain materials in a new arrangement infringe the copyright in the corresponding film. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Warner Bros. with respect to The Wizard of Oz and Gone with the Wind and the permanent injunction for this category of products. [12] The third category comprises AVELA products that each extend an image extracted from an item of publicity material into three dimensions (such as statuettes inside water globes, figurines, action figures, and busts). Many of these products also include a juxtaposition of multiple extracts from the public domain materials, and such composite works infringe for the reasons explained in the preceding paragraph. Even where the product extends a single two-dimensional public domain image into three dimensions, a three-dimensional rendering must add new visual details regarding depth to the underlying two-dimensional image. (As a simple illustration, it is impossible to determine the length of someone's nose from a picture if they are looking directly at the camera.) Of course, even more visual details must be added if the two-dimensional image is transformed into a fully realized figure, as most three-dimensional AVELA products are. (Otherwise, for example, the back of each figurine character would be blank.) Much of this visual information is available in the feature-length films, where the characters are observable from a multitude of viewing angles. In depositions, the AVELA licensees who developed the action figures, figurines, water globes, and busts made no pretense that they were not guided by their knowledge of the films. Instead, they indicated that, while each three-dimensional design began with an image from the public domain photo stills and movie posters, the goal was to create a product recognizable as the film character. The only reasonable inference is that the details added to establish perspective and full realization were chosen to be consistent with the film characters. As a result, the addition of visual details to each two-dimensional public domain image to create the three-dimensional product makes impermissible use of the further delineation of the characters contained in the feature-length films. See Silverman, 870 F.2d at 50. Accordingly, we also affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Warner Bros. with respect to The Wizard of Oz and Gone with the Wind and the permanent injunction for this category of products. We also held above that the characters of Tom and Jerry are not in the public domain. In addition, because the characters achieved copyright protection through the short films before all but the first movie poster entered the public domain, and the later movie posters necessarily exhibit those characters, even the use of any movie poster but the first requires Warner Bros.'s authorization. See Russell, 612 F.2d at 1128 (Therefore, since exhibition of the film `Pygmalion' necessarily involves exhibition of parts of Shaw's play, which is still copyrighted, plaintiffs here may prevent defendants from renting the film for exhibition without their authorization.). Warner Bros. has granted such authorization to the extent it has averred that it will not challenge the reproduction of movie posters as posters (or lobby cards as lobby cards). Therefore, AVELA may use the first Tom & Jerry poster, for the short film Puss Gets the Boot, in the fashion described above for the publicity materials for Gone with the Wind and The Wizard of Oz. Accordingly, with respect to Tom & Jerry products based on the first publicity poster, we modify the district court's grant of summary judgment and the permanent injunction to be consistent with the three categories of products described above for Gone with the Wind and The Wizard of Oz. With respect to all later Tom & Jerry posters, AVELA is authorized to make faithful reproductions, but not to reproduce those movie poster images on other products or to make derivative works based on Tom and Jerry. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Warner Bros. and the permanent injunction crafted by the district court with respect to all other Tom & Jerry products.