Opinion ID: 3049904
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fourth Amendment Rights

Text: The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ policies and practices subject Plaintiffs to unreasonable searches, seizures, and unnecessary use of force. According to the Plaintiffs, they are subjected to public strip searches, retaliatory searches of their possessions, and arbitrary seizures of their personal belongings upon arrival at Atascadero. SVPs are also shackled during transport to Atascadero and during visits with family and friends. When they refuse to participate in treatment, SVPs are subjected to “red light alarms” even when they do not pose any physical risk.10 Moreover, SVPs are force-medicated as a means of intimidation and punishment, and for the convenience of staff. Accepting these allegations as true, the Plaintiffs may be able to state a “clearly established” violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, and thus, the claims are not appropriate for dismissal at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. The watchword of the Fourth Amendment in every context is “reasonableness.” As this court held in Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997), “the Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures ‘extends to incarcerated prisoners.’ ” Id. at 699 (quoting Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 10 As explained in the complaint, a “red light alarm” is when ten to twenty staff members surround and restrain the patient. 10940 HYDRICK v. HUNTER F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thus, this protection certainly extends to SVPs. [16] Of course, “the reasonableness of a particular search [or seizure] is determined by reference to the [detention] context.” Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332. There are concerns that mirror those that arise in the prison context: e.g., “the safety and security of guards and others in the facility, order within the facility and the efficiency of the facility’s operations.” Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001). But even so, qualified immunity does not protect a search or seizure that is arbitrary, retaliatory, or clearly exceeds the legitimate purpose of detention. [17] Under this framework, we cannot dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims. The “reasonableness” of a search or seizures is a fact-intensive inquiry that cannot be determined at this stage. See, e.g., Thompson, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997). It is impossible to make such a fact-specific determination when the precise circumstances of the searches or seizures are not before the court and when the Defendants have not yet had a chance to justify the alleged searches or seizures. We cannot say, then, that the Plaintiffs cannot possibly state a “clearly established violation” based on any facts consistent with their pleadings.11 Therefore, Defendants do not have a right to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on qualified immunity.