Opinion ID: 1296847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Factor 4 Preexisting State Law

Text: Russell contends that Washington courts have historically held that in the absence of Miranda warnings a statement is necessarily coerced. As support, he cites State v. Lavaris, 99 Wn.2d 851, 664 P.2d 1234 (1983), where this court stated that [a]ny form of custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. Therefore, any confession obtained in the absence of proper Miranda warnings is by definition coerced  regardless of how friendly the actual interrogation. (Citations omitted.) Lavaris, at 857. The Defendant also cites two Court of Appeals cases holding that the fruits of un-Mirandized statements must be suppressed. State v. Markovich, 17 Wn. App. 809, 814-15, 565 P.2d 440 (1977) (holding that a gun found as a result of the defendant's un-Mirandized statement should have been suppressed), review denied, 89 Wn.2d 1015 (1978); State v. Galloway, 14 Wn. App. 200, 202, 540 P.2d 444 (holding that amphetamines found as a result of the defendant's un-Mirandized statement should have been suppressed), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1006 (1975). We also note an earlier decision of this court holding that a finding of voluntariness is precluded if Miranda warnings are not given. State v. Creach, 77 Wn.2d 194, 199, 461 P.2d 329 (1969). We acknowledge this preexisting law, but we are persuaded by some important countervailing considerations. The cases Russell cites have all involved interpretation of Miranda, a federal judicial decision, and we have never held that Miranda warnings are independently required under the state constitution. [12] Thus, the state law cited by Russell is to a large degree based on federal law. An additional consideration is that the holdings upon which Russell relies have been around only since 1969 and were supplanted by Wethered in 1988; they do not represent longheld principles of law. 4