Opinion ID: 1903009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Testimony of Keith Tate

Text: A related argument is that the trial court erred when it excluded the testimony of Keith Tate, appellant's brother. Defense counsel proffered Tate would testify that, although he had no personal knowledge of the shooting, he had told Moore that if appellant had committed the shooting, it must have been in self-defense. Appellant's theory was that Tate's testimony would have shown that the idea that appellant committed the shooting in self-defense may have been planted in Moore's mind by Tate, and did not originate in appellant's purported confession during a telephone conversation. [6] Defense counsel's proffer as to the relevance of Tate's testimony to Moore's credibility suffers from the same infirmity as the proposed questioning of Moore's gossip-mongering: counsel proffered no facts to support the theory that Tate had planted the idea in Moore's mind. Although Tate could testify as to what he had told Moore, he had no way of knowing what the source of Moore's testimony was, and it was pure speculation to imply that it was his statement to hereven if the jury believed he made itthat caused her to testify at trial that appellant had confessed to shooting Murray in self-defense during a telephone call from jail. The attorney must proffer facts sufficient to permit the trial judge to evaluate whether the proposed question is probative of bias. Guzman, 769 A.2d at 790 (citing Brown, 683 A.2d at 124-25). The trial court in this case was not provided with any facts to support that Tate's testimony would serve to show that Moore had fabricated appellant's confession. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Tate's testimony.