Opinion ID: 202208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Mistrial Based on The Trial Delay

Text: 21 Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in not granting their motion for mistrial. 22 On April 4, 2003, the day the plaintiffs rested, the district court authorized the jury forewoman to take a previously scheduled vacation from April 11 through April 27 and halted the trial pending her return. None of the parties objected to this continuance, despite having had the chance to do so both on April 4 and at sidebar on April 2. 23 On April 24, the district court announced a date for resumption of the trial, noting that it had two additional trials scheduled for May and that another juror had told the court he would be away from May 30 to June 22. The district court decided that the trial would not reconvene until June 23. Again, there were no objections. 24 On June 17, after the trial had already been on hold for two-and-a-half months and only a week before it was to resume, plaintiffs raised their first objection to the delay, moving for a mistrial. 6 The district court rejected the motion three days later. In a June 26 explanatory order, the court stated that 25 calendar exigencies and the unopposed absence of two jurors in this case were the only reasons for the interruption. . . . The adjournment was compelled under the circumstances since the Court could neither vacate the trial settings in the other cases nor did the plaintiffs in this case oppose the absence of the two jurors who took annual leave. 26 Review of denial of a motion for mistrial is for abuse of discretion. Rodriguez-Torres v. Caribbean Forms Mfr., Inc., 399 F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir.2005). We will not reverse if there is no showing of prejudice. See, e.g., Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2001); Clemente v. Carnicon-P.R. Mgmt. Assocs., 52 F.3d 383, 388 (1st Cir.1995) (finding no abuse of discretion in part because appellant did not demonstrate[] actual prejudice). Plaintiffs argue that prejudice may be presumed from a protracted delay after the close of plaintiffs' evidence. They cite supporting case law to this effect from other courts. See Young & Simon, Inc. v. Merritt Sav. & Loan, Inc., 672 F.2d 401 (4th Cir.1982); Citron v. Aro Corp., 377 F.2d 750 (3d Cir.1967). But whether prejudice may be presumed or not is not the point. 27 More important here is that plaintiffs did not offer any objection when consulted about the time off requested by the two jurors. As the district court pointed out in denying the mistrial request, plaintiffs had multiple opportunities to object to the initial three-week hiatus, and they did not do so. To the contrary, they explicitly told the district court they had no objection. Plaintiffs argue that their lack of objection may have stemmed from their concern that the vacationing juror . . . could have become indisposed with plaintiffs for ruining her leisure time. If that were so, then plaintiffs made a tactical choice with which they must live. It may not be so: the record makes clear that the district court offered plaintiffs the chance to object at sidebar, out of the jury's presence, and they declined. This was still a tactical choice. As to the second portion of the continuance, the plaintiffs did not object until June 17, one week before trial was scheduled to resume. 28 Plaintiffs did too little, too late. See Clemente, 52 F.3d at 388 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of a mistrial where appellant had not preserved her rights); id. at 388 n. 5 (noting that the time to complain . . . is at the outset and that plaintiff did not make a peep when the district court took the action which plaintiff later said warranted a mistrial). The cases plaintiffs rely on do not help them in the face of their failure to object. See Young & Simon, 672 F.2d at 402 n. 2 (ordering a new trial and repeatedly emphasizing that counsel timely and persistently objected to the [delay] when it was proposed, when it occurred, and after the trial ended); Citron, 377 F.2d at 753 (ordering a new trial despite a lack of objection to the delay, but emphasizing that the trial judge had told counsel that he was not going to cancel a planned trip for this case or any other case, thus making clear in advance that objection would be futile). The district court did not abuse its discretion. 29