Opinion ID: 1542810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Penalties for Comparable Conduct

Text: We turn now to the third and final Gore guidepost which compares the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct. Gore, supra, 517 U.S. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589. This guidepost is the most difficult to apply, because the excessiveness inquiry must be carefully considered based on the specific facts of the case in question; thus it is hard to draw a comparison to fines imposed in other cases. See Cooper Indus., supra note 12, 532 U.S. at 435, 121 S.Ct. 1678. Although this guidepost is given less weight than the first two, [26] it reflects the Supreme Court's concern that punitive damages awards advance a State policy concern such as protection of the public by deterring the defendant or others from doing such wrong in the future. The existence of a criminal penalty [has a] bearing on the seriousness with which [the legislature] views the wrongful action, but the [] possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages award. State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at 428, 123 S.Ct. 1513. In articulating this guidepost, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that a reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive should `accord substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.' Gore, supra, 517 U.S. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. 2909 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also note 16, supra. This demonstrates the concern for ensuring that the punitive award is not arbitrary and is tied to a State's interest in protecting potential victims from defendants' reprehensible conduct. At the time the award was imposed, there was no statute imposing a fine for the specific conduct at issue. In a broader context, the most relevant civil penalty is found in § 3909(b) of the CPPA, which authorizes the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel to recover up to $1,000 for each violation of § 3904 of the CPPA, which covers unlawful trade practices. [27] Statutory civil and criminal penalties do not always account for the seriousness of the conduct in question. The CPPA does not limit allowable damages and specifically provides that the penalties are cumulative and that nothing in the CPPA shall prevent any person who is injured by a trade practice in violation of a law of the District of Columbia ... from exercising any right or seeking any remedy to which the person might be entitled.... D.C.Code § 28-3905(k)(2) (emphasis added); see also Breiner, supra, 711 A.2d at 102 (noting that the specific D.C. statute under which the defendant was found liable did not limit allowable damages, and upholding the award although it exceeded the maximum fine found in a comparable federal statute because of the need to deter future conduct). In addition to statutory fines, when applying the third guidepost, we also look to the awards in comparable cases involving similar conduct. See McCrae, supra, 839 A.2d at 700. We note that Byrd, supra, is the most factually similar case in this jurisdiction, although it does not specifically address the amount of the punitive damage award. There, we affirmed compensatory damages of $148,175 (representing the equity the victim lost in her home), the treble award of $315,026 (after subtracting a setoff of $129,500 from a settlement with a co-defendant), and additional punitive damages where the appellant violated the CPPA by advertising himself as a foreclosure specialist under a scheme to gain title to the [victim's] home for a `fraction of its value.' Byrd, supra, 902 A.2d at 782. Here, Wilson received $60,000 in compensatory damages, which is far less than the $106,000 of equity that she had in her home at the time of closing. [28] The punitive award comports with the third guidepost, notwithstanding that it is given less weight than the first two, since there was no statute imposing a civil fine addressing the conduct at issue or limit on the amount of punitive awards for the conduct at the time. Further, as we have noted, the award here satisfies the first two Gore guideposts. In light of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, discussed above, and the Gore guideposts, which reflect the Court's guiding principles, we conclude that the punitive damages awards entered against the appellants are not grossly excessive or violative of due process.