Opinion ID: 6327563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pro Se Litigant

Text: Finally, Barrio argues that the district court did not give him the leeway normally afforded to pro se litigants because it required him to fully exhaust his administrative remedies. Aplt. Br. at 13–14. Barrio’s argument fails for two reasons. First, exhaustion is required by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and a litigant’s pro se status does not relieve him of the burden of exhaustion. See, e.g., D’Addabbo v. United States, 316 F. App’x 722, 725 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that the court affords pro se filings the degree of leeway they are due but pro se litigants still are bound by the applicable exhaustion rules). Second, on the one issue that the district court found had not been exhausted (COVID-19), the district court determined that its “analysis would not change” even if Barrio had exhausted his remedies because he had been fully vaccinated. ROA, Vol. 1 at 262 n.2. Because the district court would have reached the same result even if it had 16 Appellate Case: 21-6103 Document: 010110663352 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 17 waived exhaustion based on Barrio’s pro se status, Barrio cannot show any error in the district court’s treatment of him as a pro se litigant.