Opinion ID: 2784687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Roberts’s Prior Conviction

Text: Olson contends that the state trial court committed constitutional error when it excluded evidence of a state witness’s prior misdemeanor conviction for falsely reporting an incident. At trial, one of the state’s key witnesses was Richard Roberts, a 2002 cellmate of Crabtree’s while Crabtree was in custody on an unrelated matter. Roberts testified that Crabtree admitted to him that Crabtree and Dressman went to Snellen’s home at night and stabbed her numerous times. Roberts also testified that Crabtree was concerned that Dressman would reveal Crabtree’s role in the murder and that Crabtree solicited Roberts to kill Dressman when Roberts was released from detention. On cross-examination, Olson sought to impeach Roberts with a prior misdemeanor conviction for falsely reporting an incident to the police. Olson argued that the evidence was probative both as to bias and untruthfulness. The trial court excluded the evidence because it was inadmissible under Kentucky evidentiary rules. Olson argues that this violated her Confrontation Clause right to impeach a key witness. On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the trial court properly excluded the evidence under state evidentiary laws. See Olson, 2008 WL 746651, at –9. Under Kentucky law, a trial court must allow a party to impeach a witness with evidence that the witness has been convicted of a felony—but not a misdemeanor. Ky. R. Evid. 609(a); see Olson, 2008 WL 746651, at . The trial court may, in its discretion, allow a party to impeach by inquiring into specific instances of conduct—but not criminal convictions. Ky. R. Evid. 608(b); see Olson, 2008 WL 746651, at . The state supreme court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the misdemeanor criminal conviction. Olson, 2008 WL 746651, at . 4 The Kentucky Supreme Court did not directly address Olson’s Confrontation Clause argument, and so the parties dispute whether we should apply § 2254’s deferential standard of review. Here, the matter is potentially important “[b]ecause the requirements of § 2254(d) are difficult to meet.” Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue that “arises when a defendant convicted in state court attempts to raise a federal claim, either on direct appeal or in a collateral state proceeding, and a state court rules against the defendant and issues an opinion that addresses some issues but does not expressly address the federal claim in question.” Ibid. The Court held that federal courts must presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits by the state court. Ibid.
A criminal defendant “enjoy[s] the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right extends to state proceedings. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). The right to confront “means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974). Indeed, “‘a primary interest secured by’” the Confrontation Clause “‘is the right of cross-examination.’” Ibid. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). The Supreme Court has “recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Id. at 316–17.1 Thus, a defendant can 1 There are, essentially, two lines of Confrontation Clause cases. The first concerns the admission of out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The second concerns trial-court restrictions on the scope of cross-examination—at issue here. 5 establish a Confrontation Clause violation by “showing that [s]he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). But a defendant’s right to cross-examine is not unfettered. “[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). States may “impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. In this case, the limit imposed was Kentucky Rule of Evidence 609, which obligates the trial court to admit evidence only of prior felony convictions. Counsel may not, however, generally cross-examine about the specific kind of felony involved. Ky. R. Evid. 609(a). Olson observes that Federal Rule 609(a), in contrast to its Kentucky counterpart, requires a court to admit evidence of a witness’s prior conviction (whether a felony or a misdemeanor) “if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving . . . a dishonest act or false statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). There is little doubt that Roberts’s conviction falls within the federal 609(a)(2) category. The question, however, is whether it is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court to conclude that it is not unconstitutional for a state’s evidentiary rules to fail to track the federal rule and thus to disallow the admission of crimen falsi evidence.2 2 We use the term crimen falsi to refer to the category of crimes for which convictions must be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). See Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 6 1. There is No Uniform Approach to Prior-Conviction Evidence There are four general approaches to the admission of evidence of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The traditional rule is that counsel may cross-examine about felonies and crimen falsi. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). A discretionary approach allows counsel to cross-examine about prior convictions only if the probative value outweighs the prejudice. See, e.g., Ill. Evid. R. 609(a). A third approach allows for cross-examination only about crimen falsi. See, e.g., Alaska R. Evid. 609(a); Haw. R. Evid. 609(a); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-421. A fourth approach permits no cross-examination at all about prior convictions. See, e.g., Mont. R. Evid. 609. Kentucky’s rule is unusual in that it allows cross-examination about prior felonies but does not expressly permit crimen falsi evidence. The current federal approach—allowing courts to admit prior felony convictions, subject to a balancing test, and requiring courts to admit convictions for crimen falsi—has not always been the law. Congress has waffled significantly over the years about whether courts should or must admit crimen falsi convictions. An early Congressional approach, reflected in the District of Columbia Code, followed the discretionary method, allowing courts, in their discretion, to admit all prior convictions. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 513 (1989) (citing 14 D.C. Code Ann. § 14-305 (1961)). The Advisory Committee’s initial March 1969 draft of Rule 609 was similar to the current rule: it required courts to admit prior felonies and crimen falsi. See id. at 515. In a later draft, in March 1971, the Advisory Committee reversed course and recommended the discretionary approach. See id. at 515–16. In 1972, at Senator 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1087, 1090 (2000) (“To the modern American lawyer, crimen falsi is familiar . . . as a category of offenses recognized by Rule 609(a)(2) . . . .”). The Advisory Committee refers to crimen falsi offenses as those “which involve[] some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the [witness’s] propensity to testify truthfully.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) advisory committee’s note. 7 McClellan’s urging, the Advisory Committee reversed course again and submitted a proposed rule identical to the 1969 version. See id. at 516–17. A subcommittee of the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee amended the bill to require courts to admit crimen falsi evidence but to exercise discretion in admitting felonies. See id. at 517. The full Judiciary Committee altered the bill to allow for cross-examination only about crimen falsi. See id. at 517–18. The Senate Judiciary Committee, for its part, would have tolerated impeachment by crimen falsi evidence only for criminal defendants. As to other witnesses, the committee would have allowed courts to admit evidence of felonies in their discretion. See id. at 519. The full Senate, at Senator McClellan’s urging, returned to the Advisory Committee’s original 1969 proposal. See ibid. Congress eventually enacted a rule requiring courts to admit both prior felonies, after balancing probativeness and prejudice, and also crimen falsi evidence.3 See id. at 520. On one hand, the legislative history—though not indicative of the meaning of the present rule—illustrates the difficulty in determining what kinds of prior convictions a court should or must admit. On the other hand, it may be significant that every proposed version of Rule 609 either allowed or required courts to admit crimen falsi evidence. See Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2) and the Origins of Crimen Falsi, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1087, 1114 (2000) (“[W]hile there was extensive debate in 3 The current version of Rule 609 contains two different balancing tests that courts must employ to determine whether to admit prior felony convictions. If the witness is not a criminal defendant, the court must admit the evidence subject to Rule 403’s familiar balancing test, under which the court considers whether “probative value is substantially outweighed” by prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). If the witness is the defendant in a criminal case, however, the court must admit the evidence if the probative value outweighs the prejudicial impact. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B). Thus, if the witness is a defendant, a prior felony conviction that is 51% prejudicial and 49% probative may not be admitted. If the same conviction were at issue for a non-criminal-defendant witness, however, the evidence could be admitted. 8 Congress over the precise shape of Rule 609, there appears to have been virtually no discussion of the underlying premise that a person who has been convicted of either a crime of deceit or some other serious crime is unworthy of belief.”) (footnote omitted). 2. Kentucky Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 Kentucky’s evidentiary rules are unusual in that they do not provide a specific avenue for courts to admit a witness’s prior crimen falsi convictions. The Kentucky Supreme Court recently noted that its rules create an “inability to inquire in any way about misdemeanor convictions reflecting on dishonesty”—what the court called a “substantial hole in the present [evidentiary] regime.” Allen v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.3d 451, 463 (Ky. 2013). In Allen, the defendant sought to impeach a key witness with prior felony and misdemeanor convictions for crimes involving dishonesty. See id. at 461. On appeal, Allen argued that denying the right to crossexamine about those crimes violated her constitutional due-process right to present a defense. See ibid. In its opinion in Allen, the Kentucky Supreme Court discussed two separate aspects of Kentucky Rules of Evidence (“KRE”) 608 and 609: whether the rules allow only for inquiring about prior conduct or whether they allow extrinsic evidence to be introduced and also whether Rule 608 permits inquiring about conduct that resulted in a criminal conviction. First, the court explained that before 2003, Kentucky permitted counsel to attack the credibility of a witness only by introducing evidence about the witness’s general reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness in the community. See id. at 462. In 2003, Kentucky revised its Rule 608 to track the federal version, allowing counsel to inquire about specific acts of bad conduct, other than convictions of crime. See ibid. The Kentucky Supreme Court explained that KRE 608, however, “does not allow proof of specific instances of conduct by extrinsic evidence.” Ibid. Rather, the court explained, “counsel is limited to asking the witness about the specific instance 9 of conduct on cross-examination and is stuck with whatever answer is given.” Ibid. This does not answer, however, what kind of conduct counsel may inquire into. In Allen, the Kentucky Supreme Court also addressed a second feature of the Rules— whether Rule 608 permits inquiry into conduct that resulted in a criminal conviction. In 2010, in Childers v. Commonwealth, 332 S.W.3d 64 (Ky. 2010)—a case now abrogated by Allen—the Kentucky Supreme Court took the view that Rule 608 “permits impeachment only by specific instances of conduct that have not resulted in a conviction while evidence relating to impeachment by criminal conviction is governed solely by KRE 609.” Childers, 332 S.W.3d at 69 (emphases added). Under the Childers approach, if the prior bad conduct “in question result[ed] in a criminal conviction, [it was] admissible for character purposes only when KRE 609 allow[ed] it.” Allen, 395 S.W.3d at 463. This raises the question of what KRE 609 allows. KRE 609 allows a witness to be impeached by the fact that he has been convicted of a felony. The Allen court explained that “[u]nlike the federal rule, KRE 609 does not allow proof that the witness was convicted of a non-felony (usually a misdemeanor) involving dishonesty or reflecting on character for dishonesty.” Ibid. Kentucky’s Rule 609 makes it a “mere-fact” state, where “a witness may be impeached with the ‘mere fact’ of a prior felony conviction, without the felony being identified, without mention of the witness’s sentence, and without any evidence of the conduct that gave rise to the conviction.” Id. at 471 (Minton, C.J., concurring in result only). This is a “substantial departure” from the equivalent federal rule, and KRE 609 “appears to be the only one in the country that expressly disallows any identification of the underlying crime.” Id. at 472. Thus, even if a witness had been convicted of a felony involving dishonesty, only the “mere fact” that a felony conviction existed would be admissible. 10 Under the Childers approach, the Kentucky rules gave rise to “the absurd result that misdemeanor-level dishonest conduct is admissible under KRE 608(b) if a person were simply lucky enough not to have been convicted . . . but that a person who has actually been convicted of a misdemeanor involving a crime of dishonesty could avoid impeachment.” Id. at 463 (majority opinion). In Allen, the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that it was “simply unfair” that its rules categorically excluded evidence of criminal dishonesty that resulted in a conviction. Ibid. The court observed that its current rules did “not offer a complete system for addressing dishonest conduct and what it says about a witness’s character for truthfulness.” Id. at 465. The Kentucky Supreme Court, therefore, reversed course and held that KRE 608 allowed inquiry into all prior bad conduct, even if the conduct resulted in a conviction. Id. at 463. Reasoning that “the Kentucky rules have a hole in them,” the court reinterpreted its rules to allow counsel, under KRE 608(b), to inquire on cross-examination into dishonest conduct that led to the conviction—but not to introduce evidence of the conviction itself. See id. at 465–66. Two Justices concurred in the result only, agreeing that the defendant should have been allowed to cross-examine about the witness’s prior dishonest conduct but disagreeing that the Kentucky Rules of Evidence could be construed to permit this result. See id. at 471–76 (Minton, C.J.). Chief Justice Minton argued that “the failure of . . . KRE 609 . . . to make any distinction between crimes of dishonesty and other crimes . . . can have the ironic effect of significantly hampering the very defendant the rule’s strict simplicity was designed to protect.” Id. at 474. Chief Justice Minton, joined by Justice Abramson, would have held that the defendant’s federal constitutional due-process rights abrogated the state evidentiary rules and required admitting the crimen falsi evidence. See id. at 475–76. 11 3. Purposes Served by KRE 608 and 609 In drafting rules that limit cross-examination, Kentucky has multiple interests to consider. In a related context, we have noted that such interests may include: the prevention of minitrials on collateral issues . . . ; the probative or material value of the evidence toward the issues at trial; the prejudicial or inflammatory nature of the evidence sought to be introduced . . . ; [and] whether the trial court offered a cautionary instruction and/or limited the scope of cross-examination, as well as the extent to which the defendant was able to cross-examine the witness. Jordan v. Warden, 675 F.3d 586, 595 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). The Kentucky Supreme Court has itself identified similar purposes underlying the evidentiary rules at issue. The current version of KRE 608 was drafted “to track the federal version of the rule.” Allen, 395 S.W.3d at 462. Kentucky has an interest in “avoid[ing] what amounts to a mini-trial within the trial about whether the person actually committed the dishonest act.” Id. at 465. The rules thus serve to “avoid over-collateralizing trials,” ibid., and afford the trial court discretion to “handl[e] . . . evidence in a fair and truthful manner.” Id. at 466. Additionally, Kentucky has an interest in drafting, interpreting, and amending its own evidentiary rules as it sees fit. Cf. Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.”). The Kentucky rules, though perhaps not without their flaws, were “deliberately chosen.” Allen, 395 S.W.3d at 471 (Minton, C.J., concurring in result only). Affording a state autonomy over its own evidentiary rules “allow[s] for the airing of complexities and divergent points of view.” Ibid. We are loath to instruct a state about which rules of evidence are optimal, unless the Constitution so requires. A state rule’s mere nonconformity with its federal analogue should not be per se troublesome. Both “the contentious 12 history of the federal rules” and “the wide diversity of state approaches” underscore this point. Id. at 474; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (“[T]he States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”). 4. Olson’s Interests in Admitting Roberts’s Prior Conviction Olson argues that her interests in cross-examining Roberts about his prior conviction are twofold: first, that the evidence would demonstrate to the jury that Roberts had a motive to testify consistently with his prior statement or risk another conviction for false reporting; second, that the evidence reveals Roberts’s untruthful character. Under Olson’s first theory, Roberts, a cellmate of Crabtree’s, knew that Crabtree was a suspect in Snellen’s murder. In order to curry favor with law enforcement and thereby increase his chances of receiving shock probation, Roberts provided the police with a statement in which he implicated Crabtree. Roberts did not receive the shock probation, but Olson contends that he persisted in his story at trial for fear of prosecution for falsely reporting an incident and returning to prison. Olson maintains that her inability to offer this theory was all the more troubling because the prosecution, in its closing, emphasized that Roberts stayed true to his story even after not receiving probation. The prosecutor argued: “Did [Roberts] change his story[?] [N]o, it stayed the same. If he thought he was going to get a deal, he learned he didn’t get a deal, and he still stayed true to the story.” Olson argues that she, therefore, should have been allowed to argue that Roberts stuck with his story because “he knew from hard personal experience that were he to testify that his prior statement was a fabrication, he would be returned to custody and face up to a year in jail.” Appellant Br. 24. 13 The district court suggested that admitting Roberts’s prior conviction for falsely reporting an incident would not necessarily expose a motive to lie but could have shown that he was more likely to be truthful. The district court supposed that “having already been convicted of false reporting, [Roberts] would be less likely to give another false statement to the police within such a short time frame.” Olson, 2012 WL 2970487, at . We think this goes too far. If the district court’s theory were true, every felon would introduce his own prior convictions in order to show that, having already been convicted of a crime once, he has learned his lesson and is unlikely to commit the same act again. But we agree that Olson’s theory that Roberts stuck with a false story out of fear of re-prosecution for falsely reporting an incident is not airtight: the risk of a subsequent false-reporting conviction, if Roberts recanted, was balanced by the risk of conviction for perjury if Roberts stuck with a false story. Olson’s second theory is that Roberts’s prior misdemeanor conviction evinces his general character for untruthfulness. This is the theory under which the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly require courts to admit crimen falsi convictions. See Fed. R. Evid. 609 advisory committee’s note. It is far from clear, however, whether there is a constitutional right to impeach with evidence of a crimen falsi conviction. We have recognized a distinction between crossexamination as to bias, motive, or prejudice and cross-examination as to general credibility, and we have held that the first category is constitutionally protected whereas the second category is not. Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 737–38 (6th Cir. 2000). We noted that the Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska distinguished between a “general attack on the credibility of the witness”—in which the cross-examiner “intends to afford the jury a basis to infer that the witness’ character is such that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in his 14 testimony”—and a “more particular attack on the witness’ credibility . . . directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 316; see Boggs, 226 F.3d at 736.4 Although the Davis Court did not expressly exclude general credibility crossexamination from constitutional protection, it held only that cross-examination as to bias is protected. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316–17. Justice Stewart “emphasize[d] that the Court neither holds nor suggests that the Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness through cross-examination about his past . . . criminal convictions.” Id. at 321 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, the Supreme Court has not clearly established that the Confrontation Clause guarantees a right to cross-examine a witness with a crimen falsi conviction. 5. Analysis of the Rules Because this case is not before us on direct review from the Kentucky Supreme Court, we do not decide in the first instance whether the Kentucky rules run afoul of the Confrontation Clause. Rather, even though the Kentucky Supreme Court “reject[ed] [Olson’s] federal claim without expressly addressing that claim,” a “federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits.” Johnson, 133 S. Ct. at 1096. That is, we presume that the 4 While we have “cast considerable doubt” on the continued vitality of our distinction in Boggs between cross-examination as to bias and general credibility, see Hargrave v. McKee, 248 F. App’x 718, 727 (6th Cir. 2007), Boggs remains the law of this circuit. Moreover, Boggs did not break new ground so much as simply recognize a distinction explicit in Davis itself. See Boggs, 226 F.3d at 736–37. In Hargrave, the panel concluded that the defendant had a constitutional right to cross-examine a witness not about credibility but about competency—about “mental limitations affecting her ability accurately to perceive and recall the events at issue.” Hargrave, 258 F. App’x at 727. Even there, however, the panel recognized that the case would be different if the cross-examiner simply sought to show that the witness “might be a person who was more willing to lie under oath than the average person.” Ibid. Absent clearly established Supreme Court law to the contrary, we continue to adhere to Boggs. See Jordan, 675 F.3d at 596–97 (recognizing the Boggs distinction), cited approvingly by Jackson, 133 S. Ct. at 1994. 15 Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that its rules did not deprive Olson of her confrontation rights. Our only concern is whether that conclusion is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See § 2254(d). We conclude that it is not. On direct review, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that Roberts’s prior misdemeanor conviction was properly excluded because KRE 608 and 609—as interpreted at the time of Olson’s conviction—prohibited the admission of both a witness’s prior misdemeanor convictions as well as specific instances of conduct that resulted in a conviction. See Olson, 2008 WL 746651, at . The district court noted that the Kentucky Supreme Court confirmed the principle underlying this holding in its decision in Childers, 332 S.W.3d at 71–72. But, as discussed above, Childers has since been abrogated by Allen, in which the court reinterpreted KRE 608 and 609. Were Olson tried in Kentucky today, it appears that a trial court, in its discretion, could allow Olson to ask Roberts whether he had ever falsely reported an incident—but could not allow Olson either to ask whether Roberts had ever been convicted of falsely reporting an incident or to introduce the conviction itself. And were Olson tried in federal court, the trial judge would be required to admit Roberts’s prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). We are not concerned with the logic or correct application of Kentucky’s own rules of evidence. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.”). And because this case is not before us on direct review from the Kentucky Supreme Court, neither are we concerned with whether the Constitution requires states to admit evidence of crimen falsi 16 convictions.5 Our concern, rather, is whether the state court’s presumptive conclusion that state rules may constitutionally disallow the admission of crimen falsi evidence is contrary to or an 5 That is a substantially different question. Although we have not found a case or scholarly article that addresses the issue, research indicates that Kentucky is not the only state with rules of evidence that would exclude crimen falsi convictions. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia expressly require trial courts to admit convictions of crimes involving dishonesty in order to impeach the credibility of a witness. See Ala. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Ariz. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Ark. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Del. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); D.C. Code § 14-305(b)(1)(B); Ga. Code. Ann. § 24-6-609(a)(2); Ind. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Iowa Ct. R. 5.609(a)(2); Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Miss. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-609(1)(b); N.H. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); N.M. R. Evid. 11-609(A)(2); N.D. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2609(A)(2); Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.355(1)(b); Pa. R. Evid. 609(a); S.C. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Wash. R. Evid. 609(a); W. Va. R. Evid. 609(a)(2)(B); Wyo. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). Twelve states expressly allow trial courts to admit such convictions. See Alaska R. Evid. 609(a) (subject to balancing); Fla. Stat. § 90.610(1); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 626-1, R. 609(a); Ill. Evid. R. 609(a) (subject to balancing); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-421; Md. R. 5-609 (making admissible convictions “relevant to the witness’s credibility,” subject to balancing); Me. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) (subject to balancing); Mich. R. Evid. 609(a)(1); Ohio Evid. R. 609(A)(3) (subject to balancing); S.D. Codified Laws § 19-14-12 (subject to balancing); Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Vt. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) (subject to balancing). Another eight states do not expressly address crimes involving dishonesty but have a rule broad enough to permit the introduction of crimen falsi convictions. See La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 609.1(A) (“In a criminal case, every witness by testifying subjects himself to examination relative to his criminal convictions . . . .”); Mass. R. Evid. 609(a) (making admissible any conviction, subject to limitations); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491.050 (“[A]ny prior criminal conviction may be proved to affect [a witness’s] credibility . . . .”); N.J. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) (making admissible any conviction, subject to balancing); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.40(1) (making admissible “any previous conviction,” if witness denies conviction); N.C. R. Evid. 609(a) (requiring trial court to admit convictions of a “felony, or of a Class A1, Class 1, or Class 2 misdemeanor”); R.I. R. Evid. 609(a)–(b) (subject to balancing); Wis. Stat. § 906.09(1)–(2) (making admissible any conviction, subject to balancing). In total, forty-one states and the District of Columbia statutorily permit the introduction of prior misdemeanor crimen falsi convictions for impeachment purposes. Nine states constitute a small minority that does not statutorily allow the introduction of such evidence: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, Texas, and Virginia. Of these, six states expressly provide that only prior felony convictions may be used to impeach. See Cal. Evid. Code § 788; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-101; Conn. Evid. Code § 6-7; Idaho R. Evid. 609(a); Ky. R. Evid. 609(a); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 50.095. Two states allow for prior felony convictions and convictions for crimes of moral turpitude. See Tex. R. Evid. 609(a); Va. Sup. Ct. R. 2:609(a)–(b). Montana is unique in prohibiting all prior-conviction evidence to impeach a witness. See Mont. R. Evid. 609 & cmt. (“The Commission does not accept as valid 17 unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.6 Thus, our only inquiry is whether the application of those rules violated Olson’s constitutional right to confront the witness as already established by the Supreme Court. the theory that a person’s willingness to break the law can automatically be translated into willingness to give false testimony.”). Each of these nine states, however, has judicially mitigated the strictness of its rule. Texas and Virginia have suggested that crimes of moral turpitude encompass traditional crimen falsi offenses. See Lape v. State, 893 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (“Lying to a police officer or an officer of the court involves moral turpitude . . . because it involves dishonesty.”); Christman v. Commonwealth, 348 S.E.2d 399, 403, 405 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (“[I]t is well settled in this state that the character of a witness for veracity cannot be impeached by proof of a prior conviction of crime, unless the crime be one which involved the character of the witness for veracity. If the crime be a misdemeanor the right to inquire is limited to those that involve moral turpitude.” (internal citations omitted) The court suggested that the latter category includes crimes involving “deception, trickery, forgery, lying, cheating or stealing.”). The other seven states have either expressly created or have suggested the existence of a loophole that would allow cross-examination about the conduct underlying a prior misdemeanor conviction for a crime involving dishonesty—but would not allow the conviction itself to be admissible. See People v. Chatman, 133 P.3d 534, 556 (Cal. 2006) (“Misdemeanor convictions themselves are not admissible for impeachment, although evidence of the underlying conduct may be admissible subject to the court’s exercise of discretion.”); People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1246 (Colo. 1988) (allowing for “the circumstances surrounding a misdemeanor conviction” to be disclosed to impeach a witness for untruthfulness); State v. Hall, 991 A.2d 598, 604 (Conn. 2010) (allowing misdemeanor convictions if defendant “open[s] the door to the admission of the evidence”); State v. Bergerud, Nos. 39284, 39286, 2013 WL 5716821, at  (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2013) (allowing “inquiries into specific instances of the witness’s conduct during cross-examination of that witness if the conduct is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness” but barring “evidence of the misdemeanor conviction itself”); Allen v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.3d 451, 463–64 (Ky. 2013) (allowing “simple inquiry” about the conduct involved in a misdemeanor conviction, “so long as a proponent does not attempt to prove the conduct involved . . . by extrinsic evidence”); State v. Martin, 926 P.2d 1380, 1389 (Mont. 1996) (holding that cross-examination about whether witness previously provided false information “clearly was admissible” “as probative of [the witness’s] veracity”); Butler v. State, 102 P.3d 71, 80 (Nev. 2004) (concluding that cross-examination by “merely ask[ing] [witness] questions about the prior [forgery] conviction” was proper because “[a]ttempted forgery is a crime involving dishonesty and conduct that goes to . . . truthfulness as a witness” and because there was “no indication that the State attempted to impeach [witness] by introducing extrinsic evidence”). 6 Because Allen’s holding rested on statutory construction—not constitutional principles—it does not alter the state court’s presumptive conclusion that the application of KRE 608 and 609 did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 18 The district court, relying on Boggs, 226 F.3d at 743, applied the “arbitrary or disproportionate” standard set forth in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998), to determine whether Kentucky’s evidentiary rules violated Olson’s constitutional right to crossexamine with a crimen falsi conviction. See Olson, 2012 WL 2970487, at –11. Under this approach, state evidentiary rules would not unconstitutionally impair a defendant’s right to confront a witness “so long as they are not ‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). On appeal, Olson argues that Scheffer is inapposite to a pure cross-examination claim under the Confrontation Clause. She contends that the “arbitrary or disproportionate” standard only applies to a criminal defendant’s claim under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), that her Fourteenth Amendment due-process right to present a complete defense has been violated. Appellant Br. 30–33. We note that the Supreme Court has suggested that the right of cross-examination and the right to present a complete defense are in fact closely linked. In Holmes v. South Carolina, the Court observed that “[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Moreover, in Chambers itself, the Supreme Court did not specifically confine its analysis to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, recognizing that “[t]he right of cross-examination is . . . implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation.” 410 U.S. at 295. We need not determine the applicability of the Scheffer balancing test, however, because Olson’s claim fails under either standard. The Supreme Court has not held that the 19 Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant be permitted to cross-examine using a crimen falsi conviction. Nor has Olson shown, in light of the above analysis, that the Kentucky court’s presumptive conclusion that the rules are not “arbitrary” or “disproportionate” to their purposes is unreasonable. Further, we note that even a pure Confrontation Clause violation is subject to harmlesserror analysis. See, e.g., Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 (“[W]e hold that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant’s opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to . . . harmless-error analysis.”). Here, Olson had an opportunity to impeach Roberts on other grounds. “The trial court ruled that [Olson] could ask if Roberts had been convicted of a felony, what his sentence was, if he had filed a motion for shock probation, if he had a deal with the [prosecutors], and whether he hoped to receive favorable treatment from the [prosecutors] in exchange for his testimony.” Olson, 2008 WL 746651, at . The trial court’s ruling did not restrict Olson’s ability to pursue the theory that Roberts provided a statement in the expectation of receiving some benefit. It is unlikely that further impeachment of Roberts would have changed the outcome of Olson’s trial.