Opinion ID: 2995619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Downward Departure Based Upon Alien

Text: Status In its cross-appeal, the government contends that the district court abused its discretion in granting a four-level downward departure on Gallo-Vasquez’s sentence because of his status as a deportable alien. In making this argument, the government urges this court to overturn its decision in United States v. Farouil, 124 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1997), in which we allowed for a departure based upon a defendant’s status as an alien. We decline to overturn Farouil. However, we reverse and remand the district court’s decision on this matter because the district court failed to articulate any factors that would justify a downward departure. Therefore, the district court’s decision amounts to an abuse of discretion. Our decision in Farouil followed the Supreme Court’s opinion in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), which allows district courts, in deciding to grant downward departures, to consider unusual or exceptional circumstances not contemplated in the Sentencing Guidelines. In Farouil, we reversed a sentence imposed by the district court when the district court appear[ed] to have been under the impression that it lacked discretion to depart on the basis of status as a deportable alien . . . . Farouil, 124 F.3d at 847. According to our reasoning, reversal was warranted because the district court, in refusing to consider a characteristic of the defendant (namely, alienage), violated the dictates of Koon. Id. However, Farouil contains no language that mandates sentencing courts to enter downward departures every time a defendant is a deportable alien. Indeed, in cases subsequent to Farouil, we have found that, in considering a downward departure, a defendant’s status as a deportable alien is relevant only insofar as it may lead to conditions of confinement, or other incidents of punishment, that are substantially more onerous than the framers of the guidelines contemplated in fixing the punishment range for the defendant’s offense. United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). In the instant case, the district court made no finding that Gallo-Vasquez would suffer conditions more onerous than those contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines because of his status as an alien. Indeed, due to the nature of Gallo- Vasquez’s offense and the probability of his flight, it is unlikely that he would be entitled even to participate in the types of discretionary prison alternatives (e.g., a stay in halfway house) often available to citizen- defendants./3 Instead, in granting the downward departure, the district court categorically stated, I do know that because of [Gallo-Vasquez’s] citizenship status, he will have a worse situation than would other persons of U.S. citizenship convicted of the exact same thing with the exact same criminal history . . . . Sent. Tr. at 14. The district court did not expound on how the defendant’s conditions of confinement would differ as a result of his alienage and whether those differences would have made the defendant’s sentence more onerous than was contemplated by the framers of the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s departure on Gallo-Vasquez’s sentence and remand this case with instructions that the district court examine the actual effects that Gallo- Vasquez’s alien status will have upon his sentence and whether those effects will move Gallo-Vasquez’s sentence beyond the heartland of cases contemplated by the framers of the Sentencing Guidelines when they crafted proposed sentences for defendants convicted of similar crimes.