Opinion ID: 168508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Jeremy Burnett

Text: M r. Saunders next argues that the district court erred by permitting M r. Burnett to testify about his conversations with the defendant. M r. Burnett’s testimony, the defendant contends, is inadmissible hearsay. W e disagree. M r. Burnett testified regarding both his ow n out-of-court statements to M r. Saunders and M r. Saunders’s out-of-court statements to him. These statements pose two distinct hearsay issues. See Fed. R. Evid. Rules 801(d)(2)(E), 801(d)(2)(A). The district court admitted M r. Burnett’s report of his ow n out-of-court statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which reads, “A statement is not hearsay if— [t]he statement is offered against a party and is a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” W e have held that a district court may admit as non-hearsay a co-conspirator’s out-of-court statements when it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed, that both the declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy, and that the statements were made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 1557 (10th Cir. 1992). W hile the district judge may consider the hearsay statement itself to determine whether a conspiracy existed, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987), we have required district courts to rely on some additional, reliable corroborating evidence to establish the existence of a conspiracy and link the -7- defendant to it. United States v. Rascon, 8 F.3d 1537, 1540-41 (10th Cir. 1993). W e review the district court’s findings of fact regarding the existence of a conspiracy for clear error, United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 1996), and its ultimate evidentiary decision for abuse of discretion, United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993). Here, the record contains a wealth of evidence establishing the existence of a conspiracy between M r. Saunders and M r. Burnett. To review a few of the more telling pieces of corroborating evidence: a search of M r. Saunders’s locker turned up clothing loaned to the defendant by M r. Burnett, highly similar to that worn by the perpetrator of the crime; agents also discovered M r. Burnett’s handgun in the defendant’s locker, a weapon that matched the description of the gun used in the robbery; the government presented evidence of the two men’s friendship stretching over a period of years; and it introduced multiple pieces of evidence establishing M r. Saunders’s poor financial health before the robbery, pointing to a motivation for the crime. In addition, M r. Burnett’s ow n in-court testimony, which was subject to cross-examination, tended to corroborate the existence of the conspiracy. The defendant argues that M r. Burnett never truly believed that M r. Saunders intended to rob a bank and consequently, no conspiracy existed. Indeed, he says M r. Burnett thought he w as joking right up to the point when he gave M r. Burnett his share of the loot. Neither M r. Burnett’s testimony nor his actions, -8- however, bear out this theory. W hile M r. Burnett claimed to have been initially skeptical about M r. Saunders’s scheme, by his own admission he decided to participate in the plan as his financial w oes mounted. And his actions certainly indicate he viewed the heist plot as real enough: he helped M r. Saunders case multiple banks, he contributed the clothing Saunders wore during the hold-up, and he provided the w eapon as w ell. From this information and M r. Burnett’s own statements, the district court could conclude that a conspiracy existed, that Burnett and Saunders were its principals, and that their conversations about robbing banks were made in furtherance of their plan. See Caro, 965 F.2d at 1557. The 801(d)(2)(E) exception for co-conspirators does not apply, however, to M r. Saunders’s out-of-court statements, for the simple reason that M r. Saunders is not a “coconspirator of a party,” he is the party. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). But M r. Saunders’s conversations w ith M r. Burnett do qualify as Rule 801(d)(2)(A ) statements by a party. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it “is offered against a party and is the party’s own statement.” The government did not explicitly argue for this exception below , but the district court noted when admitting the testimony encompassing M r. Saunders’s statements that “[p]resumably, [Saunders’s statements] also fit[] under 801(d)(2) as an admission against personal interest.” Appellees’ A pp. 379. The district court is correct. -9- W e hold the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of Jeremy Burnett.