Opinion ID: 2058058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Equal Protection and Rational Basis Analysis

Text: [¶ 56] After Zelman, state payments for education that reach a religious school indirectly as the result of a free and independent choice of parents would not violate the Establishment Clause. This Court in Bagley and the First Circuit in Strout suggested that if the religious school exclusion were based on an erroneous understanding of the Establishment Clause, the statute could violate Equal Protection. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 32, 728 A.2d at 138; Strout, 178 F.3d at 64 n. 12. However, Locke and Eulitt have clarified that when performing the equal protection analysis in religious school funding cases, strict scrutiny applies only to the claim that the parents' fundamental right to the free exercise of religion is implicated; all other claims of religious discrimination are subject to rational basis scrutiny. Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307; Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 354. Because we have found no free exercise violation, we apply the rational basis test. That test requires only that a fairly conceivable set of facts establish a legitimate government interest that would support the challenged classification. Id. [¶ 57] The State proffers several justifications for section 2951(2), including Establishment Clause concerns not necessarily governed by Zelman, such as excessive entanglement between religion and state. Additional legitimate interests that the State offers include concerns about maintaining diversity within the public schools, and avoiding involvement in discrimination in admissions and hiring by religious schools. [¶ 58] The parents argue that the State is barred from offering additional, hypothetical rationales for the statute because the actual rationale is known, citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975). The Court stated in Wiesenfeld that a court need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation. Id. (emphasis added). This is a different proposition from stating that only the precise purposes articulated by members of the Legislature and recorded in the legislative record may be considered. Thus, we are not bound by the justification proffered by the State in support of the statute in Bagley, or offered in support of the legislation in 1981. The justifications for the statute asserted by the State now are not inconsistent with or contradictory to prior stated goals. Avoiding excessive entanglement between religion and state, a component of compliance with the Establishment Clause, was an original justification for the statute, and is asserted by the State in this litigation. [¶ 59] A court undertaking an excessive entanglement analysis ordinarily does so in the context of reviewing a state program that provides aid to religious institutions. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 67 n. 35, 728 A.2d at 146. Because we operate in terms of conceivable justifications, we can evaluate the hypothetical situation in which the State authorizes funding for tuition at sectarian schools. It remains conceivable, even after Zelman, that under some set of facts, funding tuition for sectarian schools would run afoul of the Establishment Clause on excessive entanglement grounds. Furthermore, we cannot be certain that twenty-four years later, any sectarian schools would wish to accept entanglements that might arise from state oversight. [17] [¶ 60] The record in this case is sparse as to the nature of the courses taught at the religious schools and their religious practices. Because the religious schools are not participating in this case, those issues are not central to our decision-making. However, it is possible to envision that there may be conflicts between state curriculum, record keeping and anti-discrimination requirements and religious teachings and religious practices in some schools. These conflicts could result in significant entanglement of State education officials in religious matters if religious schools were to begin to receive public tuition funds and the State moves to enforce its various compliance requirements on the religious schools. This concern to avoid excessive entanglements provides a rational basis to maintain the funding limitation in section 2951(2). Parental choice of the school does not sever the religion-state connection when payment is made by a public entity to the religious school and that payment subjects a school's educational and religious practices to state regulation.