Opinion ID: 471405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Suppress (White)

Text: 27 Five weeks before trial, White's attorney withdrew from the case. Two weeks later, a Notice of Appearance was filed by substitute counsel. Copies of the evidence that the government intended to use against White, including the inculpatory statements given to Tampa police, were turned over to substitute counsel by the first attorney three weeks before trial. Shortly after the trial began, three days after the jury was sworn, White moved to suppress the statements on the basis that they had been induced by certain promises and were therefore involuntary and inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. 28 The district court denied the motion as untimely at the outset of trial. White renewed his motion when the statements were offered in evidence through the testimony of one of the officers to whom the statements had been given. The district court allowed White to proffer his evidence in support of the motion to suppress outside the hearing of the jury. White testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined by the government. White's counsel indicated that he would have called additional witnesses to corroborate White's testimony had he known to be prepared for an evidentiary hearing, and government counsel similarly indicated it was unprepared for a full hearing on voluntariness. After hearing White's testimony, the district court reiterated that the motion was denied as untimely and added that it appeared the statements were voluntarily made. A redacted version of the statements was admitted in evidence. 29 On appeal, White challenges both grounds--untimeliness and voluntariness--for the denial of his motion to suppress. He does not deny that his motion was untimely under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3), which requires that a motion to suppress evidence be raised prior to trial. Rather, White argues that the district court abused the discretion placed in it by Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(f) to provide relief from the waiver effected by untimely filing where cause is shown. 30 We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion. While it may have been permissible for the district court to consider the motion despite its untimeliness, White has cited no case in which a district court was required to do so under similar circumstances. The cause offered by White's attorney--his appearance only three weeks before trial--hardly explains his failure timely to raise the motion to suppress. Surely three weeks is enough time to examine the documents that are to be used against one's client. Moreover, it is unlikely that substitute counsel stepped in without learning anything about the case from White's first attorney, especially about evidence so damaging as a confession to kidnapping. The assertion of cause appears even less convincing when it is considered in light of the fact that White's attorney announced he was ready for trial and urged that the jury be sworn on the first day of trial, although he was given the option to delay the swearing of the jury for several days. He did not then move to suppress the statements for another three days. We are hard pressed to find any cause in this set of facts, let alone cause so compelling that we must hold that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to overlook White's waiver under Rule 12(b)(3). 31 We are sympathetic to White's argument that a defendant should not be penalized for the inadvertence of his or her counsel but are at a loss to see how we can hold that a district court must entertain a suppression motion untimely filed due to inadvertence of counsel without completely eviscerating Rule 12(b)(3). Furthermore, competing considerations of prejudice to the government must be taken into account. Once a jury has been sworn and jeopardy attaches, the government loses its right to appeal an adverse ruling on suppression. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3731. The scope of a court's discretion to consider a suppression motion on the merits after jeopardy has attached is limited by this factor. See United States v. Barletta, 644 F.2d 50, 54-55, 59 (1st Cir.1981) (discussing circumstances under which district court may and may not defer ruling on timely motion until after jeopardy has attached); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal 2d Sec. 194 at 712 & n. 8 (1982 & Supp.1985). We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied White's motion to suppress as untimely. 32 Although the district court did not hold a full hearing or make clear findings of fact on the question of the voluntariness of the statements, we note that the district court properly exercised its discretion having tentatively concluded that the statements were voluntarily given. This conclusion is supported by the record. The law on this issue is simply stated: to be admissible, a confession must be free and voluntary ... not obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight. Shotwell Manufacturing Company v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 347, 83 S.Ct. 448, 453, 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963). 33 The district court was presented with the following facts, as revealed through White's testimony and the transcript of the conversation between White and Chief Assistant State Attorney Norman S. Cannella. Two weeks before White spoke with the police officers, he was told by Cannella that Cannella would recommend that a state court judge set aside White's fifteen-year sentence for a probation violation and would nolle prosequi pending state charges on the kidnapping if information provided by White was of sufficient degree to require those benefits and if White would agree, generally, to cooperate with certain investigations and, specifically, to testify against his co-defendants in the state prosecution of the beating and kidnapping. 34 However, before each conversation with state police officers, White signed a statement that provided in relevant part: 35 Any and all statements I make will be freely and voluntarily made. No promises, threats, or inducements of any kind or nature whatsoever have been promised to me in order to consent to this interview. 36 Moreover, at the taking of his deposition, White was asked about promises made to him, and he replied, under oath, as follows: 37 I don't need no immunity. I don't need nothing promised to me and whatever offense that I have committed I'm willing to serve my time and whatever debt to society that I owe.... I feel as a man I should serve it and no promises have been made to me. 38 These assertions of voluntariness notwithstanding, White testified before the district court that he would not have given the inculpatory statements had Cannella not made the inducements described above. It is not clear whether Cannella did take the actions on White's behalf that he had said he would. For some reason not found in our record, White was not prosecuted on the state charges. 39 Given this record, we agree that White gave the statements voluntarily. The discussion transcribed in the record indicates that Cannella did not bargain with White to make the particular admissions actually made. Rather he sought information from White to effectuate arrests, recover narcotics, to discover the burial place of any people that had been murdered, and with more specificity, to testify against some of his co-defendants in a trial that is set in the near future. More significant are White's assertions that his statements were voluntary and that no promises had been given. From these statements the district court could infer that the offer of leniency had been withdrawn prior to the taking of the statements. See, e.g., United States v. Hooten, 662 F.2d 628, 631 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004, 102 S.Ct. 1640, 71 L.Ed.2d 873 (1982), or that White would have given the statements even in the absence of any inducement. These considerations support the holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to entertain White's untimely motion to suppress. 4