Opinion ID: 362200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Post-Arrest Statement

Text: 24 Prior to and during the course of the trial, defense counsel moved to suppress post-arrest statements made by appellant. There was a lengthy hearing on the motion, outside the presence of the jury, and, at its conclusion, the court ruled the Court orders that These post-arrest admissions by this defendant Tarr be suppressed as evidence. (emphasis added) There was no discussion during the suppression hearing of the specific statement to which Agent Ledwith testified. 25 The offending statement, which was made immediately following the suppression hearing, came into evidence in the following way. Agent Ledwith testified that a computer search of the Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles license plate identification number was made to determine the registration of the Datsun that appellant had driven to the Yacht Club and that this search showed that the car was registered to appellant. Ledwith then volunteered the information that the records showed that the car was listed as a 1976 yellow Datsun sedan. Evidently, this was an error and the prosecutor, in an attempt to clarify the situation, asked: Since causing that search to be conducted, sir, have you subsequently learned that the Datsun sedan was other than a 1976? This question was objected to and excluded because it was leading. The prosecutor then asked, Since causing that original search on the 24th of January, sir, have you obtained any other information with respect to the registration? Ledwith responded, Yes, sir, I have. The court then cautioned the witness to have the hearsay rule in mind. The next question was: From what source did you receive this additional information, sir? Then came the answer which appellant claims requires a new trial: From two sources, sir. From the Registry of Motor Vehicles computer and from Mr. Tarr. That was an objection, which was sustained, based on the fact that this was a post-arrest statement that had been suppressed. The court then promptly instructed the jury as follows: 26 THE COURT: The Court strikes the last response of the witness, and orders the jury to disregard it and to let the reference to the defendant Tarr play no part whatever in you (Sic ) deliberations. 27 The Court will permit, because it is admissible, testimony by this witness with respect to what he may have learned from the Registry of Motor Vehicles Law Enforcement Automobile Processing System, that computerized system, which the witness referred to in a previous answer, but any reference to the defendant Tarr as being a source of this information is contrary to previous explicit, detailed rulings of the Court made in the jury's absence. 28 That evidence has been ruled to be inadmissible on grounds stated at great length, and it is important that the jury recall the Court's instructions to you from the very beginning of the case that the case must be decided on the basis of admissible evidence received in open court. The volunteered reference to the defendant in this witness's answer is not such evidence, and it must be disregarded by you jurors, and the trial of this case will continue only on the basis of this Court's directions to you that striking the reference to Mr. Tarr means that it must play no role in your deliberations in the case or in your considering the evidence in the case. 29 With that instruction, which I hope is a curative instruction, curative in the sense of curing an error which should not have been made, we will now resume the case, and you, please, Mr. O'Neil, direct the question to what was learned from the automatic data processing system. 30 Recognizing, perhaps, the obviously innocuous character of the testimony, appellant links the statement with the court's instructions and prior voir dire hearings to argue that his fifth and sixth amendment rights were violated. As we understand it, and it is difficult to follow, appellant's argument is that the statement by the witness triggered an instruction by the court that somehow alerted the jury to the fact that other admissions by the appellant had been suppressed and since the appellant did not testify, not only was he denied a fair trial, but his privilege against self-incrimination was violated. This is building a mountain out of a mole hill. 31 Appellant maintains that the rule of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), has been violated because it brought the existence and contents of inadmissible incriminatory admissions before the jury, patently subverting a procedure for determining admissibility constitutionally mandated since Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). In Jackson, the Court held the New York practice of submitting the question of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury was unconstitutional because it violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court further held: 32 It is both practical and desirable that in cases to be tried hereafter a proper determination of voluntariness be made prior to the admission of the confession to the jury which is adjudicating guilt or innocence. 33 Id. at 395, 84 S.Ct. at 1791. 34 The relevance of Jackson to the instant case is so remote as to be imperceptible. Jackson involved a confession. Here, we have an admission 4 whose relevancy was attenuated. Both undercover agents identified appellant as being present during the sale and Ledwith testified that he drove the car to the parking lot, took the machine gun out of it and handed it to the man in the plaid shirt. The evidence as to ownership of the car would be corroborative at best. 5 Even without a curative instruction, we think this single statement was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Harrigan, 586 F.2d 860, 863 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Christian, 571 F.2d 64, 69-70 (1st Cir. 1978). In order to convict, the jury had to believe Ledwith's testimony as to what he observed transpired in the parking lot. The statement as to ownership of the car had no bearing on that except as it might be reasonably inferred that the owner of a car would probably be driving it. The instruction by the court promptly cured any possible error. It was given promptly, it was complete, and it was clear, and we find nothing in it from which the jury might infer that appellant had made other admissions which had been suppressed. 35 Appellant has inundated his brief with cases (pages 17-21) holding that, if improperly admitted testimony has an irremedial prejudicial effect on the jury, withdrawal of the evidence is not sufficient to cure the harm done. We do not quarrel with the holdings of this formidable list of cases; we simply find that they are inapplicable because, under the circumstances here, there was no irremedial prejudicial effect on the jury.