Opinion ID: 1521506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statement in the Car at the Scene

Text: We do not consider it unreasonable for police officers to ask a material witness to a homicide to remain briefly at the scene so that officers may obtain whatever information he or she possesses regarding the incident. In this case, although the motions court ruled appellee was detained involuntarily, we cannot ignore the undisputed fact that he presented himself to the police and identified himself as the driver of the cab. In these circumstances, it was not inappropriate to ask appellee to wait in the back seat of a police cruiser (appellee's own vehicle was severely damaged). The fact that the cruiser was constructed so that one sitting in the rear seat could not exit on his own initiative does not shed light on whether or not appellee was being held there against his will. There are obvious practical reasons for incorporating such a design feature: some occupants of the back seat of a police cruiser are not supposed to exit at will. Simply because the police car was built to accommodate persons police will not allow to leave in no way mandates a conclusion that appellee was not free to go if he so desired. Furthermore, appellee's initial statement to Detective Donald was not given in response to questioning, but was entirely spontaneous and unprompted by police. Therefore, it was error to order it suppressed. See Calaway v. United States, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 1220, 1225 (1979). While appellee was not criminally allied with Bruce Griffith (although there are indications the police were not certain of that at all times), he participated in the episode in which Griffith was killed. We decline the invitation to apply Dunaway in this context to prohibit the police from talking with a material witness who presents himself to authorities at the scene of a shooting, [5] simply because the conversation took place in the back of a police vehicle. More is required to show an unlawful detention than a police request that an individual wait in the back seat of a police car on the scene, particularly during the month of February. We note that our conclusion, that Dunaway does not require exclusion of the statement made in the police car, is the same as that reached by a New York court under very similar facts. People v. Vese, 100 Misc.2d 8, 417 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (Sup.Ct.1979). In that case, police were investigating an apartment fire which had resulted in the death of a man. Knowing only that the defendant shared the apartment with the deceased, an officer who encountered her on the street asked her to enter a police car to answer some questions. When asked some basic pedigree information the defendant made exculpatory statements which she later moved to have suppressed. The court pointed to the factors that led to the questioning in the police car: that it was a bitter cold night, and defendant's apartment had just suffered a fire. The court concluded that the defendant was not questioned in a custodial setting, that Miranda warnings were not required, and that the motion to suppress the statements should be denied. [6] Considering the circumstances at the scene in this case, the police were entirely reasonable in asking appellee to wait in one of their cars so that they could interview him. We hold, as a matter of law, that appellee's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated on this score. Michigan v. Summers, supra ; Dunaway v. New York, supra .