Opinion ID: 848667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Commission's Recommendation

Text: In making its recommendation, the JTC applied the factors enunciated in In re Brown, 461 Mich. 1291, 1292-1293, 625 N.W.2d 744 (2000). It listed each factor, relating it to the circumstances of the case. It explained how it weighed each factor for or against respondent. Furthermore, the JTC considered the fact that respondent has extensive prior involvement with the judicial disciplinary system, having been admonished on various occasions for failing to timely complete court work. The JTC concluded that respondent's failure to be truthful regarding the automobile accident and its aftermath justifies his removal from office. It found that respondent misled the police and later provided inconsistent accounts of the events. Also, it found that he failed to offer credible testimony when under oath in the public hearing. Furthermore, the JTC indicated that docket delays caused by respondent had a deleterious effect on the administration of justice in St. Joseph County. The JTC acknowledged that a number of attorneys testified in respondent's favor. But it noted that their testimony did not alter the fact that the court docket and the public suffered because of respondent's conduct. The JTC concluded that respondent is guilty of repeated serious misconduct that requires his removal from office. [3]
The power to discipline a judge resides exclusively in this Court, but it is exercised on recommendation of the JTC. Const 1963, art 6, § 30. Respondent's complaints with regard to the master's factual findings amount to a disagreement about the weight and credibility that should be afforded to the various witnesses. The master, as trier of fact, was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Our power of review de novo does not prevent us from according proper deference to the master's ability to observe the witnesses' demeanor and comment on their credibility. In re Loyd, supra at 535, 384 N.W.2d 9. On review of the entire record, we agree with the master's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent left the scene of an automobile accident. Eyewitnesses testified that respondent appeared intoxicated at the time of the accident. As a former prosecutor and a judge, respondent knew that he should have stayed at the scene of the accident. It is not credible that, after being made aware that the police were on their way to question him about his accident, he consumed alcohol. We conclude that respondent was under the influence of alcohol when he ran his car into the store. We conclude that he attempted to deceive the police about this fact because he was motivated by a desire to avoid criminal prosecution. We conclude that he continued to misrepresent the cause of the accident to the JTC and the master, motivated in addition by a desire to avoid professional discipline. [4] The preponderance of the evidence justifies a finding that respondent was guilty of judicial misconduct, notwithstanding the exculpatory evidence on which he relies. Nothing in the record suggests that Judge Fields erred in his findings and conclusions in any manner that would change the outcome of the proceedings. To the contrary, we believe that Judge Fields fairly and objectively presided over this case. Therefore, we agree with the JTC that respondent's significant misrepresentations of the truth made in testimony and to the public warrant disciplinary action.
Respondent argues that the examiner's expert, Harvey Ager, M.D., was not qualified to testify. Dr. Ager is a psychiatrist who testified about the conduct typical of an alcoholic. MRE 702 provides the rule for expert testimony: If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Respondent argues that Dr. Ager's failure to publish, present, or conduct peer review on the topic of alcoholism in the recent past disqualifies him from testifying as an expert. He is mistaken. The master noted that, although Dr. Ager had not recently published or made presentations on the topic, there was evidence that he is a graduate of Wayne State University. That he is a board certified psychiatrist. That he is a former codirector of the alcoholism unit at Detroit Memorial Hospital.... [T]hat he has treated hundreds of individuals with respect to alcoholism.... I do find that his experience in this area in addition to his general medical training is such that he is qualified as an expert to testify and render an opinion regarding conduct consistent with alcoholism. The master ruled that Dr. Ager could testify as long as his testimony conformed with the requirements of MRE 702. He noted that there has been nothing here to suggest that this sort of testimony would not be based upon reliable principals [sic] and methods. Dr. Ager's testimony conformed with the requirements of MRE 702. On the basis of his experience, he testified about what conduct is consistent with that of an alcoholic. He also testified about his personal interaction with respondent in a ninety-minute interview. Contrary to respondent's assertions, Dr. Ager did not testify outside the bounds of his knowledge. He did not state that respondent's alcoholism caused his docket delays. He testified simply about the behavior one could expect from an alcoholic. Dr. Ager did not view respondent's work product and did not comment on the quality of respondent's work. Nor was Dr. Ager introduced to testify regarding respondent's work product. The fact that Dr. Ager was unfamiliar with the work of respondent and the extent of Dr. Ager's experience with alcoholics go to the weight to be given his testimony. They are not determinative of whether his testimony conformed with the requirements of MRE 702. We find that Dr. Ager qualified as an expert witness. His testimony complied with MRE 702 and, therefore, was admissible.