Opinion ID: 1398204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was the Insurance Company a Victim?

Text: The Act does not define the word victim, except for purposes of the specific section which permits victims to make statements at the time of a convicted person's sentencing, W.Va.Code, 61-11A-2 [1984]: (a) For the purposes of this section, victim means a person who is a victim of a felony, the fiduciary of a deceased victim's estate or a member of a deceased victim's immediate family. This definition is unenlightening, because it merely allows a deceased victim's representative to act in the victim's stead. [17] The appellant contends that Aetna was not the actual victim in this case, and that Mr. Warden, who held the mortgage on the burned grocery store, was the real victim. Aetna, says the appellant, is merely a company which compensated Mr. Warden for his loss. We disagree. Aetna is the entity from which the appellant intended to and did in fact obtain money and other benefit (the discharge of the appellant's indebtedness)by committing the criminal act of arson. We conclude that where a criminal defendant intends to and does obtain money or other benefit from an insurance company by committing a criminal act of arson, the insurance company is a direct victim of the crime and is eligible for restitution under the provisions of W.Va.Code, 61-11A-4(a) [1984]. See Commonwealth v. Layhue, 455 Pa.Super. 89, 91-95, 687 A.2d 382, 383-84 (1996) (deciding that when the insurance company is the intended victim of the crime, a restitution award in favor of the insurance company is permissible). This assignment of error is therefore also without merit.