Opinion ID: 403761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Segregation Duty

Text: 13 The primary question presented in this case concerns the extent to which an agency is required to employ its computer capabilities in fulfilling its duty to segregate and release nonexempt material. It cannot be gainsaid that computers have become an integral part of the functioning of our society. Both private and government entities use the storage, processing, and retrieval capabilities of computers to improve organizational efficiency. The DEA has developed sophisticated computer software in order to increase the efficient use of the vast amount of information gathered by its agents, provided by informants and witnesses, and obtained from other sources. 13 14 Although it is clear that Congress was aware of problems that could arise in the application of the FOIA to computer-stored records, 14 the Act itself makes no distinction between records maintained in manual and computer storage systems. The Senate Report on the 1974 amendments, in the sole reference to computer-stored records, noted that (w)ith respect to agency records maintained in computerized form, the term 'search' would include services functionally analogous to searches for records maintained in conventional form. S.Rep. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974); reprinted in House Committee on Government Operations and Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974: Source Book, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (Joint Committee Print 1975) (hereinafter Source Book). It is thus clear that computer-stored records, whether stored in the central processing unit, on magnetic tape or in some other form, are still records for purposes of the FOIA. See Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 1851, 64 L.Ed.2d 271 (1980). Although accessing information from computers may involve a somewhat different process than locating and retrieving manually-stored records, these differences may not be used to circumvent the full disclosure policies of the FOIA. The type of storage system in which the agency has chosen to maintain its records cannot diminish the duties imposed by the FOIA. 15 It is well settled that an agency is not required by FOIA to create a document that does not exist in order to satisfy a request. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 1521-22, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975). A requester is entitled only to records that an agency has in fact chosen to create and retain. Thus, although an agency is entitled to possess a record, it need not obtain or regain possession of a record in order to satisfy a FOIA request. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 186, 100 S.Ct. 978, 987, 63 L.Ed.2d 293 (1980); Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152, 100 S.Ct. 960, 969, 63 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980). 16 The argument that a document with some information deleted is a new document, and therefore not subject to disclosure, has been flatly rejected. Long, 596 F.2d at 366. This is true even if all but one or two items of information have been deleted. Disabled Officers' Association v. Rumsfeld, 428 F.Supp. 454, 457 (D.D.C.1977). Agencies are not, however, required to commit to paper information that does not exist in some form as an agency record. Thus, they need not write an opinion or add explanatory material to a document. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 161-62, 95 S.Ct. at 1521-22. 17 The case law in this area, however, is not dispositive of the issues we address in this case. We confront neither an agency claim that merely deleting exempt information results in a new document nor a request that the DEA, as an original matter, commit to paper an opinion or explanatory material. We have before us, rather, a hybrid of both concepts. The DEA has compiled and retained the records containing the information requested. The form in which the information currently exists in the records, however, renders it exempt; Yeager argues that the FOIA requires the DEA to modify that form. 18 Yeager has requested the substantive content of the entire NADDIS computer system-over one million records on suspects, drug offenders, informants and witnesses. 15 It is not contested that each record within the system is an investigatory record( ) compiled for law enforcement purposes. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976). The sole focus of the initial inquiry is whether the material is exempt or nonexempt. If it appears that the record contains nonexempt portions, only then is it subject to the further determination of whether it is reasonably segregable. 16 Most FOIA cases deal with the often difficult question whether withheld material falls within the scope of the claimed exemption. 19 On appeal, Yeager does not dispute the exempt status of the contested soft-core identifiers as they now appear in the records; rather, he argues that the withheld information should be viewed as it would exist if compacted. If so viewed, Yeager contends, the information is nonexempt, must be segregated from exempt data, and released under the FOIA. Under Yeager's reasoning, compacting is simply another method of deletion and is therefore required by the FOIA. In some sense, of course, if exempt information is altered in such a way that it no longer falls within a specific exemption, then the quality that made the information exempt has been deleted. We are unwilling, however, to engage in the kind of conceptual gerrymandering of the boundaries of agency duty that such a result would require. 20 The FOIA does not contemplate imposing a greater segregation duty upon agencies that choose to store records in computers than upon agencies that employ manual retrieval systems. 17 The legislative history indicates that the reasonably segregable provision was enacted to remedy the situation in which an agency seeks to withhold an entire record because a portion of it contains exempt information. 18 This is, of course, a situation far different from the one presented by this record. The legislative history of the segregation provision, therefore, provides no support whatsoever to Yeager's unique interpretation. 21 The interpretation suggested by Yeager may be desirable in terms of full disclosure policy and it may be feasible in terms of computer technology; these factors notwithstanding, however, we are not persuaded that Congress intended any manipulation or restructuring of the substantive content of a record when it commanded agencies to delete exempt information. We need not decide whether the government's interest in confidentiality is as well served by compacting as by deleting information; Congress has already determined that deletion of (exempt) information would provide full protection for the purposes to be served by the exemption. S.Rep. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32; Source Book at 184 (emphasis added). The fact that the public is deprived of information that might otherwise have been available cannot be the basis for the imposition of greater duties than those required by the Act itself. Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 152, 100 S.Ct. at 969; Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 192, 95 S.Ct. 1491, 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 57 (1975); Sears, 421 U.S. at 161-62, 95 S.Ct. at 1521-22. The Act deals with 'agency records,' not information in the abstract. Forsham, 445 U.S. at 185, 100 S.Ct. at 987. A requester must take the agency records as he finds them. 22 Accordingly, we decline Yeager's invitation to view the availability of disclosure-avoidance techniques as simply defining with more clarity the manner in which microdata information might be released. Brief for Appellant at 53. This invitation should be extended to Congress rather than to this court. Grumman Aircraft, 421 U.S. at 192, 95 S.Ct. at 1504.