Opinion ID: 2654897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maximum Lot Occupancy

Text: During the first-stage PUD application, Hoffman-Struever requested relief from the 60% maximum lot occupancy provided for in an R-5-B district.1 The developer anticipated improving 73% of the lot, explaining that this was necessary to reduce the height of the church and the residential building and to allow abovegrade, screened parking. Petitioners countered that their quality of life would be severely compromised if this degree of flexibility were approved because it would decrease their light and air as well as their views of the water. The Commission approved the stage-one PUD application, noting that the requested incentives “accommodate the competing interests of moderate-density development against the need to provide an appropriate transition to existing stable neighborhoods.” Petitioners did not challenge this order. 1 “Percentage of lot occupancy–– a figure that expresses that portion of a lot lying within lot lines and building lines that is occupied or that may be occupied under the provisions of this title as building area . . . .” 11 DCMR § 199.1 (2013). 5 In its second-stage PUD application, Hoffman-Struever increased its request, asking for a maximum lot occupancy of 86% for parcel 11. Although the footprint of the proposed building had actually decreased in size, this request was necessitated by a decrease in the overall size of the lot.2 Petitioners claimed that this significant increase in lot occupancy was inconsistent with the first-stage approval and again argued that their quality of life would be severely compromised. The Commission found that a maximum lot occupancy of 86% was “[c]onsistent with [its] finding in the Stage 1 application,” and “suitable under the circumstances.” “[T]he increased lot coverage on Parcel 11 is designed principally to accommodate parking on the ground floor rather than increased living spaces.” Although the lot occupancy previously approved could be achieved by eliminating the roof from the building‟s covered parking or by extending the boundaries of the 2 As proposed, Parcel 11 will become “one lot of record and consist of current Lots 83 and 814 in Square 473, as well as portions of Water Street and M Place, S.W.” Lots 83 and 814 are owned by the Vestry of St. Augustine‟s Church, while the District of Columbia owns the surrounding roadways. Initial plans proposed including large portions of the surrounding roadways in Parcel 11, but the current proposal has reduced the amount of land taken from the roadways, in order to allow for greater traffic flow and more parking on Water Street and M Place, S.W. 6 lot, the Commission explained that these actions would be “an unnecessary exercise in zoning technicalities.” Not only would uncovering the parking provide no real benefit to petitioners, it would be a detriment to residents of the PUD who would lose a central courtyard. Moreover, the Commission noted that the minimal impact of this requested incentive was offset by several benefits provided by the PUD, “including the provision of exceptional open spaces and public parks, most notably Waterfront Park[,] . . . [a] beautifully designed park . . . located immediately south of the residential building and diagonally across from the Sixth Street Neighbors[‟] residences.” The Commission found “the Stage 2 PUD application to be in accordance with the intent and purpose of the Zoning Regulations, the PUD process, and the first-stage approval,” and ordered that “[t]he Parcel 11 Building may be constructed to a maximum lot occupancy of 86%.” Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but they “did not offer any new evidence or allegation of legal error but simply re-stated their disagreement with the Commission‟s decision.” Having previously “fully vetted the lot occupancy controversy,” the Commission found “no reason to disturb its finding on this issue.” Petitioners now challenge this order. 7 An R-5 zoning designation allows “flexibility of design” and encourages “all types of urban residential development if they conform to the height, density, and area requirements.” 11 DCMR § 350.1 (2013). R-5-B districts are “generally consistent with the Medium Density designation.” 10-A DCMR § 225.5 (2013). “This designation is used to define neighborhoods or areas where mid-rise (4-7 stories) apartment buildings are the predominant use.” Id. Under traditional zoning, no structure in an R-5-B district may occupy more than 60% of its lot. 11 DCMR § 403.2 (2013). When considering a PUD, “[h]owever, the Commission shall have the option to approve a lot occupancy greater or lesser than the normal requirement, depending upon the exact circumstances of the particular project.” 11 DCMR § 2405.4 (2013). Here, petitioners argue that “the Commission‟s zoning flexibility should be presumptively capped at the 75% maximum lot occupancy permitted for the highest density residential zones.” There is no support for this presumptive limitation on the Commission‟s authority, and such a cap is inconsistent with some existing zoning regulations. For example, inclusionary zoning regulations allow “bonus density” for projects that provide affordable housing, including permitting projects in the highest density residential zone to occupy 90% of their lot. 11 DCMR § 2604.2 (2013). Another regulation permits a lot occupancy of 100% 8 for a specific structure in a designated R-5 district. 11 DCMR § 1804.6 (2013). Because the regulations envision residential zones with buildings occupying 90% or more of their lot, we decline to impose the presumptive cap espoused by petitioners. Petitioners also contend that the decision to allow increased lot occupancy was not supported by substantial evidence. In particular, they claim that the Commission failed to make findings supporting a higher percentage of lot occupancy and ignored the negative impact this density would have on their properties. Petitioners are mistaken. Although the Commission commented that “lot occupancy limitations are in place to protect the light and air of the individual lot, not necessarily an adjoining lot[,]” it also found that “the higher lot occupancy has no effect on [petitioners].” This was true in part because the petitioners are “separated [from parcel 11] by a 38-foot cartway, plus sidewalks and planting strips with street trees on either side, which allow for additional light and air at their own properties.” Moreover, the Commission found that “[i]f the Applicant were to reduce the lot occupancy to 60%, the building‟s interior courtyard area might increase or the lot area might simply get larger. Neither would change the height nor street 9 elevations of the residential building, nor otherwise affect how [petitioners] experience the building.” 3 The Commission therefore concluded that the increased lot occupancy “is warranted in this instance and can be granted without negatively affecting the light and air of residents of the building or adjoining property owners.” The impact of this incentive was “counterbalanced by open spaces spread throughout the project” and the Commission found that “the project benefits and amenities are reasonable trade-offs for the requested development flexibility.” Because the Commission‟s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, and is not contrary to law, we will not disturb it.4 3 Additionally, an exhibit from the record compares “by-right” development under the previous R-3 requirements with the residential building proposed as part of the PUD. It demonstrates that row houses constructed along Sixth Street without any zoning flexibility would have a substantially similar impact on petitioners‟ views and their light and air. 4 Petitioners claim for the first time in their reply brief, and without having raised the issue below, that there was a “major flaw in the calculation of lot occupancy in the Stage 2 PUD” because “additional land . . . from . . . the north 30 feet of M Place S.W.” was erroneously included in measuring the size of the lot. “Our consideration of a claim raised for the first time on appeal deprives the administrative agency of its right to consider the matter, make a ruling, and state the reasons for its action . . . .” Hill v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 717 A.2d 909, 912 (D.C. 1998). Moreover, “[i]t is the longstanding policy of this court not to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 913, 916 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Stockard v. Moss, 706 A.2d 561, 566 (D.C. 1997)). Because petitioners failed to raise this issue during the contested case below, in their motion for reconsideration, or in their initial brief, we will not consider it. 10