Opinion ID: 198767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Effect of 28 U.S.C. 1447

Text: This court has not previously addressed the issue of whether review is available when the remand was based on a forumselection clause; other circuits have concluded that there is appellate jurisdiction because a forum-selection clause is not a ground stated in 1447(c) as to which review is precluded. See Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1255-56 nn.8 & 15 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing cases). At oral argument, PREPA's able counsel conceded that we would have jurisdiction to review the remand order unless the 1996 amendment to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) altered the prior analysis in the case law. He also admitted that there would be jurisdiction if this court accepted the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Snapper. We briefly explain what is at issue. The question is whether to apply here the bar to review of certain remand orders contained in 1447(d): [a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise. In 1976, the Supreme Court held that the prohibition in 1447(d) applies only to remand orders based on the grounds specified in 1447(c). See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346 (1976). In 1988, the text of 1447(c) was revised. It no longer spoke of remands for cases improvidently removed or without jurisdiction, the language interpreted by Thermtron. Instead, the new language spoke of remands on the basis of any defect in removal procedure or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In 1996, the statute was amended again. It now provides: A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). Commentators have suggested a possible reading of the amendments to the effect that 1447(c) now covers all remand orders. See David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision of Section 1447(c), 28 U.S.C.A. 1447 (West Supp. 1999) (the new language is like a residuary clause); see also Thomas R. Hrdlick, Appellate Review of Remand Orders in Removed Cases: Are They Losing a Certain Appeal?, 82 Marq. L. Rev. 535, 561-69 (1999). The basic issue, since there is no question of lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, is whether the term defect, as used in the statute, encompasses a remand order that is based on an interpretation of a forum clause in a contract. We think not, for two reasons. First, the text of the statute provides a reasonable meaning for the term defect, a meaning that refers to the failure to comply with the various requirements for a successful removal, as set forth in 1446(a) and (b). Much less plausible would be a reading of the term defect that encompassed a remand based on a forum-selection clause. There is a second consideration. If Congress had truly desired to overrule Thermtron and its progeny, we think it would have chosen less oblique means. The Eleventh Circuit's welldocumented analysis of the context and history of the legislative revisions to the statute convince us that Congress had no such intent. See Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1254-59; see also Hrdlick, supra, at 576 (arguing that the legislative history suggests Congress did not intend a radical alteration of . . . the appellate bar). We join the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion in Snapper that 1447(d) is not a bar to review of a remand order based on a forum-selection clause.