Opinion ID: 3173550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: (Henry Chen) Like open his mouth and

Text: just looking at me. Q. Sorry? Open mouth, and what else? A. (Henry Chen) And staring at me. 3) When Li asked Liao immediately after the attack why he hit Chen, Liao repeatedly said, “Why did I do it?” His answer was that he had a dream someone was hitting him and he was fighting back. 4) Immediately after the attack, Liao assisted Li to tend to her son’s wounds. Q. What was [Liao] doing? LIAO V. JUNIOUS 31 A. (Li) Nothing. Walking back and forth. And also he was calling 911. .... Q. Was he helping you and your son that evening? A. Yes. Q. And how was he helping you and your son? A. He asked me to examine my son’s injury and to put something over the injury to stop the bleeding. Q. Did he seem concerned about your son and his injury? .... A. Yes. He was trembling all over at seeing my son’s bleeding. 5) Liao did not flee, he called the police and accompanied Li and Chen to the hospital. In other words, Dr. Erman and Dr. Guilleminault’s diagnosis would not have existed in a vacuum, but would have served to explain and to interpret Liao’s behavior that was not consistent with trying to murder Li’s son with premeditation. 32 LIAO V. JUNIOUS VI We conclude that the Superior Court’s fact-based decision that Liao suffered no prejudice from his counsel’s error was not just merely incorrect, but “objectively unreasonable.” Lett, 559 U.S. at 773; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 101–02. What is more, the Superior Court’s application of Strickland to the facts of this case was demonstrably unreasonable as that term has been construed in this context by the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, deference to the state’s decision is not applicable. Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2013). Thus, we look de novo at this issue. From this perspective, we note that our precedent recognizes that prejudice is established when, as Liao’s counsel argues, “counsel’s error left the defense with weaknesses that were exploited by the prosecution.” In Brown v. Myers, 137 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998), for example, counsel’s error was his failure to call available witnesses who could have corroborated his client’s alibi defense. We said, The district court concluded that the alibi witnesses would not have helped Melvin at trial because their testimony during the evidentiary hearing was vague with regard to time. Their testimony, however, was consistent with Melvin’s account that he arrived at Saunders’ house too early to have participated in the shooting. Because their testimony buttressed Melvin’s account on this crucial point, it creates a reasonable LIAO V. JUNIOUS 33 probability that the fact-finder would have entertained a reasonable doubt concerning guilt. As it was, without any corroborating witnesses, Melvin’s bare testimony left him without any effective defense. Id. at 1157–58 (citations omitted). We came to a similar conclusion in Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954 amended in 311 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002), another case involving a failure of trial counsel to call known alibi witnesses to corroborate his client’s testimony. Citing Brown, we determined that counsel’s error prejudiced Luna because without corroborating witnesses, his “bare testimony left him without any effective defense.” Luna, 306 F.3d at 961 (quoting Brown, 137 F.3d at 1158). The validity of our precedents as they relate to this appeal finds support in a recent Supreme Court case, Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014). The Court said that a defendant could well be prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to secure an expert witness on a scientific issue if “there is a reasonable probability that . . . [the] expert . . . would have instilled in the jury a reasonable doubt as to [his client’s] guilt . . . .” Id. at 1089. The Court could easily have been talking about Dr. Erman. The magistrate judge’s decision was similarly flawed. The decision erroneously labeled Dr. Erman’s testimony as well as the results of the sleep study “merely cumulative.” This label betrays a serious misunderstanding of the difference between direct and corroborating evidence, on one hand, and evidence that unnecessarily proves a point already sufficiently established, on the other. Black’s Law Dictionary 34 LIAO V. JUNIOUS defines cumulative evidence as “[a]dditional evidence that supports a fact established by the existing evidence (esp. that which does not need further support).” Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Corroborative evidence, on the other hand, is “[e]vidence that differs from but strengthens or confirms what other evidence shows (esp. that which needs support).” Id. Articulating these definitions exposes the fatal error in degrading Dr. Erman’s and Dr. Guilleminault’s input and the sleep study results to unnecessary surplusage. The heart of Liao’s defense was lack of intent caused by a sleep disorder. The Superior Court correctly articulated the importance of this issue, saying The evidence in this case centered upon the issue of consciousness. If Mr. Liao was, in fact, in an unconscious state, under the law, he would not be responsible for his act. An unconsciousness would preclude an express malice or the intent to kill. It would preclude deliberation and premeditation because, obviously, one cannot formulate an intent to kill or deliberate or premeditated [sic] in an unconscious state. Counsel’s error left Liao’s defense weak and pregnable. It would not have been so with the evidence the jury did not hear because of counsel’s mistake. VII Liao has served his time in prison and is currently on parole. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances under LIAO V. JUNIOUS 35 which the State would again take him before a jury. Nevertheless, as is our practice and authority, we reverse the decision of the District Court and remand with instructions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus ordering Liao’s release from all forms of custody unless the State of California elects within 90 days of the issuance of the mandate to retry him. Any such retrial shall commence within a reasonable time thereafter to be set by the District Court. REVERSED AND REMANDED.