Opinion ID: 2773003
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gravamen: Complaint or Claim?

Text: It is oft-recited law in this State that to determine the governing statute of limitations, a court must ascertain the “‘gravamen of the complaint.’” Whaley, 197 S.W.3d at 670 (quoting Gunter, 121 S.W.3d at 638); see also Mike v. Po Group, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tenn. 1996); Alexander v. Third Nat’l Bank, 915 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tenn. 1996); Vance v. Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tenn. 1977). However, defining what this principle means has proven difficult over time. Many Tennessee decisions have explained that ascertaining the gravamen requires a court to determine the basis for which damages are sought. Mike, 937 S.W.2d at 793; Vance, 547 S.W.2d at 931; Swauger v. Haury & Smith Contractors, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 261, 262-63 (Tenn. 1974); Bland v. Smith, 277 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tenn. 1955); Taylor v. Trans. Aero Corp., 924 S.W.2d 109, 112-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). However, early decisions of this Court focused exclusively upon the type of injuries for which damages were sought and described the legal basis of the action as “immaterial.” Williams v. Thompson, 443 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tenn. 1969); see also Bland, 277 S.W.2d at 380; Bodne v. Austin, 2 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Tenn. 1928), overruled on other grounds by Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974). In Williams, the defendants contracted to sell the plaintiffs a lot and to build the plaintiffs a home on it. 443 S.W.2d at 449. The defendants performed the contract, but after the plaintiffs moved into the home on January 25, 1963, they noticed “cracks in the walls, window and door frames out of alignment, settling of the foundation and sinking of the house into the ground.” Id. at 448. The plaintiffs filed suit on July 19, 1968, “alleging a breach of an implied warranty in the contract of sale, dated July 23, 1962, in that defendants did not construct the residence in a good and workmanlike manner.” Id. at 449. This Court held that the action was governed by the three-year statute of limitations because the complaint alleged an injury to real property, even though the legal basis of the claim was an alleged breach of an implied warranty in the sale contract. Id. at 449.8 8 Were Williams decided today, subsequently enacted statutes of limitations applicable to actions alleging construction defects would apply. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-3-202, -203 (2000). -10- Even when more than one cause of action was alleged in a single complaint, language in prior decisions of this Court seemed to suggest that the complaint should be distilled to a single “gravaman” based on the type of damages requested. See, e.g., Whaley, 197 S.W.3d at 670 (“The ‘applicable statute of limitations . . . will be determined according to the gravamen of the complaint.’” (quoting Gunter, 121 S.W.3d at 638)); Vance, 547 S.W.2d at 931 (same). More recently we have observed that “gravamen of the complaint” is a “rather elliptical phrase” which “refers to the substantial point, the real purpose, or the object” of an action. Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 457 (Tenn. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have also said that gravamen is not dependent upon the “designation” or “form” litigants ascribe to an action. Id. (quoting Pera v. Kroger Co., 674 S.W.2d 715, 719 (Tenn. 1984); Callaway v. McMillian, 58 Tenn. 557, 559 (1872)). But our prior decisions have not specifically discussed the reality that, at least since the adoption of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, parties may assert alternative claims and defenses and request alternative relief in a single complaint, regardless of the consistency of the claims and defenses. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01, 8.05, 18.01, 18.02; see also Barnes v. Barnes, 193 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. 2006) (“[A]lternative pleadings are expressly permitted, regardless of consistency . . . .”); Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 2 S.W.3d 901, 909 (Tenn. 1999) (explaining that alternative pleadings are permitted). Such alternative claims may well be subject to differing statutes of limitations. An analysis such as that employed in Williams and early decisions would, in fact, be unworkable as it would require a court to identify a single gravamen from a complaint that alleges alternative, and potentially inconsistent, claims. We agree with the Court of Appeals that, in choosing the applicable statute of limitations, courts must ascertain the gravamen of each claim, not the gravamen of the complaint in its entirety. Black v. Sussman, No. M2010-01810-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2410237, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2011); Bluff Springs Apartments, Ltd. v. Peoples Bank of the South, No. E2009-01435-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 2106210, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2010); Mid–South Indus., Inc. v. Martin Mach. & Tool, Inc., 342 S.W.3d 19, 31-32 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); Craighead v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., No. M200701697-COA-R10-CV, 2008 WL 3069320, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2008); Lewis v. Caputo, No. E1999-01182-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 502833, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2000); Taylor, 924 S.W.2d at 113.