Opinion ID: 1723757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to vouching by the prosecution.

Text: ¶ 48. In this one issue under the complaint of vouching, Chase appears to combine two issues which were considered by this Court in the direct appeal. This Court first stated: Chase also argues that the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal opinion as to his guilt in voir dire and during closing arguments. Once again, there was no objection raised to any of these statements and any argument is now procedurally barred. ... . The comments by the prosecutor were based on matters in evidence. During closing argument, the prosecutor, as well as defense counsel, may comment on facts in evidence and may draw proper deductions from those facts. Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 391 (Miss. 1982). In Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1100 (Miss. 1987) this Court warned prosecutors to refrain from interjecting personal beliefs into presentation of their cases. Hard blows are permissible; foul blows are not. Id. As was the case in Nixon, the comments by the prosecutor in this current case are neither hard nor foul. Even if there had been an objection raised, the comments were within permissible bounds. Chase, 645 So.2d at 854-55. In making this ruling the Court mentioned all the instances cited by Chase except the prosecutor's comment concerning the belief that the killer of Elmer Hart was wearing a certain pair of jeans and the comment, during closing arguments in the guilt phase, that he had never seen a more compelling case of guilt than this case. ¶ 49. In addition, this Court made the following ruling concerning comments made by the prosecutor made concerning certain State witnesses: Chase's next argument is that the prosecution bolstered the testimony of witnesses and elicited the evidence concerning the polygraph taken by Robert Washington. There was no objection to any of this alleged bolstering and the argument is procedurally barred. ... . Washington's testimony that he had taken a polygraph came during questioning by the prosecution, but his testimony and apparently the polygraph are concerning an unrelated killing of which Washington was accused. This questioning was a follow up on questioning by defense counsel. Asking the additional question of where the testing occurred does not particularly bolster Washington's testimony. ... . As previously discussed, the prosecutor is allowed some leeway in discussion of the evidence in closing argument. Looking at Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 935-936 (Miss. 1986), this does not amount to improper vouching in this case. Chase, 645 So.2d at 855. ¶ 50. Chase cites numerous cases from the federal courts and other jurisdictions that hold that the prosecutor may not state his opinion that the defendant is guilty or the evidence shows guilt. Even if these cases were applicable, in only two did the respective court find error so serious as to be reversible. In Quinlivan v. State, 579 So.2d 1386, 1387 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991), a manslaughter conviction was reversed where the prosecutor argued that he didn't have to try every case that was brought to him, just the guilty ones. In Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir.1989), the prosecutor went far beyond anything presented in this case as to a personal belief as to the propriety of the death penalty and several other areas. We specifically rejected any error here on the merits even if an objection had been raised, and find that failure to object did amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶ 51. As for the testimony concerning the polygraph test and the argument concerning Mrs. Hart and Terry Washington, Chase cites Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928 (Miss. 1986), which this Court cited in finding no reversible error in prosecutor's argument on the merits; United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.1980), where the Ninth Circuit reversed where the prosecution stated that a policeman could corroborate a witness's testimony and was in the courtroom monitoring the testimony for fidelity to the witness's plea agreement; Mattox v. State, 240 Miss. 544, 128 So.2d 368 (1961), where this Court reversed where the principal prosecution witness stated that she had taken and passed a polygraph test; and Commonwealth v. Smith, 389 Pa.Super. 626, 567 A.2d 1080 (1989), where the court reversed where an expert in a child abuse case gave an opinion concerning the seven year-old victim's character for telling the truth. Despite these cases, this Court, after consideration of this testimony, found no improper vouching. There was no deficient performance by failure to object and no violation under Strickland v. Washington.