Opinion ID: 478063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wargo

Text: 30 Patel contends that Wargo, by virtue of his status as President, director and a principal stockholder of Pine Wood, is an employer within the meaning of the FLSA. An employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 203(d). The overwhelming weight of authority is that a corporate officer with operational control of a corporation's covered enterprise is an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable under the FLSA for unpaid wages. Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir.1983) (citing cases). Accord Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2654, 86 L.Ed.2d 272 (1985). 31 In the instant case, the district court found that the operator and the manager of [Pine Wood] was Frank Babowicz, who arranged the contract, who worked out the details with the plaintiff in this case. Record, vol. 2 at 158. The district court also found that Dr. Wargo indicated, when he was aware of the suggestion of the contract [sic], that he found that a ridiculous utterance. Id. The district court concluded that although Wargo was the president of both corporations, he did not take such an active role as to be held personally responsible. Id. at 158-59. 32 The district court was not clearly erroneous in its fact-finding in this regard. For example, Patel himself acknowledged that Babowicz was in charge of the day-to-day operation of the facility. Record, vol. 2 at 62-63. Nor was the district court clearly erroneous in finding that Wargo had not become personally involved in the day-to-day operations of the facility. 33 In Donovan v. Agnew, the First Circuit found that corporate officers with a significant ownership interest who had operational control of significant aspects of the corporation's day to day functions, including compensation of employees, and who personally made decisions to continue operations despite financial adversity during the period of nonpayment were employers within the meaning of the FLSA. Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1514. In contrast to the Agnew case, the facts in this case indicate that Wargo did not have operational control of significant aspects of Pine Wood's day-to-day functions, including compensation of employees or other matters in relation to an employee. 34 Most cases finding corporate officers liable for FLSA violations have involved company-wide underpayment of large numbers of workers, see, e.g., Donovan v. Grim Hotel, 747 F.2d at 972 (177 employees); Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d at 1510 (99 employees); Donovan v. Janitorial Services, Inc., 672 F.2d at 1529-31 (the employees of three corporations). To be personally liable, an officer must either be involved in the day-to-day operation or have some direct responsibility for the supervision of the employee. In this case, the district court found that Wargo was neither responsible for Patel's contract nor involved in the day-to-day operation of the facility. Although as president of Pine Wood, Wargo might have played a greater role, the district court found that he had not. In light of these findings, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that Wargo lacked the operational control necessary for the imposition of liability as an employer under the FLSA.