Opinion ID: 3049140
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the extent to which a judgment rendered in the

Text: person’s absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective provisions in the judgment; (B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for non-joinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). These factors are “not intended to exclude other considerations”; “pragmatic considerations” play a key role in our determination. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee’s notes. 16 It is in this sense that “indispensibility” is akin to prejudice. 24 Consideration (1) does not aid Oscar Sr. He claims prejudice because “he will be held liable on a contract of which there is no evidence that he had any part in the formation, based on the alleged acts of two individuals, also allegedly parties to the contract, which were never properly before the court.” This argument is non-responsive to the inquiry. The advisory committee notes suggest that the prejudice involved relates to the judgment itself; “[w]ould any party be exposed to a fresh action by the absentee [party], and if so, how serious is the threat?” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee’s notes. Oscar Sr. will not be required to breach any duties to Carlos or Oscar Jr. by paying money damages to Molinos. Considerations (2) and (3) also weigh against dismissal. These provisions come into play when—unlike this case—litigants seek specific relief such as an injunction. In that context, if a party ultimately responsible for the plaintiff’s woes is not present, the court cannot direct that party to change its behavior. See, e.g., Wymbs v. Republican State Exec. Comm. of Fla., 719 F.2d 1072, 1080 (11th Cir. 1983). Money damages lack these concerns. Money is fungible; the recipient cares not from whence it came. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 advisory committee’s notes (stating that money damages in lieu of specific relief would alleviate adequacy concerns). 25 Adequate remedies, consideration (4), is contested by the parties. We need not address this issue, however, because yet another practical consideration weighs against dismissal. The federal courts have invested significant resources in this matter: fifteen months of proceedings in the district court and a full jury trial. This concern for conserving judicial resources, along with the above analysis, demonstrates that “equity and good conscience” do not require that we find Oscar Jr. and Carlos to be indispensable parties. We also cannot find a tactical advantage gained here. Tactical advantages include access to otherwise unavailable discovery materials only because of the presence of the improper party. See Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 838, 109 S. Ct. at 2225–26. Oscar Sr. has not pointed to any discovery Molinos would not have otherwise received or witnesses it could not have called; he concedes that Oscar Jr. and Carlos were within the court’s subpoena power. Oscar Sr. contends that, because Carlos and Oscar Jr. were forced to testify on their own behalf, Molinos gained an advantage by questioning them on cross-examination rather than on direct examination. This concern is irrelevant; he does not claim that Carlos and Oscar Jr. would testify to different facts in this counterfactual. Oscar Sr. also complains that he was prejudiced because most of the evidence at trial dealt with the conduct of Oscar Jr. and Carlos. This concern is 26 similarly irrelevant. The jury found Oscar Sr. liable for breaching the contract with Molinos. Were he tried separately, Molinos would present the same facts to the jury; Oscar Sr. has not pointed to any evidence that would be inadmissible or otherwise unavailable at this hypothetical trial. We cannot assume a different outcome without different facts. We further note that, even if Oscar Sr. did suffer a tactical disadvantage, he had the power to remedy that issue. He, Oscar Jr., and Carlos were represented by the same counsel, who could have discovered that Oscar Jr. and Carlos were Dominican citizens. What is more, Oscar Sr. must have known his sons’ immigration statuses. Had Oscar Sr. raised these jurisdiction concerns earlier in the district court—or even at all—we might be sympathetic; as he did not, we are not. See Ingram v. CSX Transp., Inc., 146 F.3d 858, 862–63 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[Prejudice concerns] might be persuasive where a litigant raises the jurisdictional issue at an earlier stage in the proceedings. [The litigant], however, waited until her oral argument presentation on appeal—long after the district court’s adverse ruling on the merits of her case. We decline to reward such delay.”). 27 Oscar Sr. will face no prejudice as the sole defendant in this case. We therefore use our Rule 21 power to dismiss Carlos and Oscar Jr. from this case and retain Oscar Sr.