Opinion ID: 40560
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count Two, Excessive Force

Text: 25 Gonzales was convicted on count two of the indictment, which charged that he: 26 while acting under the color of law, did assault Serafin Carrera by spraying him with Oleoresin Capsicum pepper spray, resulting in bodily injury to Serafin Carrera and did thereby willfully deprive him of the rights . . . protected by the Constitution . . . to be secure in his person and to be free from the use of unreasonable force by one acting under color of law. 27 Contrary to Gonzales's contention, we hold that there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gonzales willfully sprayed Carrera. Gonzales's theory at trial was that the pepper spray accidentally discharged in Carrera's face while Gonzales was carrying him onto the bus through a narrow safety cage doorway. 28 Because the bus had tinted windows, no one outside of it witnessed the discharge. However, Frank Gonzalez, an INS detention officer from the San Antonio office, testified that while Gonzales was carrying Carrera to the bus, he said Let's Mace the fucker and see if he budges. Two other San Antonio detention officers, Gilbert Rodriguez and Rene Cruz, remembered a similar statement. Rene Cruz testified that when Gonzalez, Reyna, and Gomez exited the bus, Gonzales was coughing, smirking sarcastically, and claiming that there had been an accidental discharge. At the time, neither Gilbert Rodriguez nor Rene Cruz believed him. They both suspected that the accidental-discharge story was a cover-up. 29 Gonzales presented evidence that these testifying officers had given inconsistent accounts of the Carrera incident. From initial statements given to agency investigators to later testimony before the grand jury, their stories had evolved. The testifying officers admitted that they had lied to investigators. They explained that they had stonewalled investigators, motivated by fear of reprisal and a misplaced sense of honor, in order to protect their colleagues. At trial, the officers insisted, they were telling the truth. We do not second guess the jury's credibility determination here. 30 The only substantive countervailing evidence presented by Gonzales was that accidental discharges had previously occurred with some pepper spray holders and that, on the day of the Carrera incident, Gonzales had pepper spray on his shirt. There was no testimony that the discharge was accidental. 31 We conclude that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the discharge was intentional. 32 Gonzales also asserts that the government failed to prove, as required by the second clause of section 242, that this deprivation of Carrera's rights actually resulted in bodily injury. 33 There are, in fact, two relevant bodily injury requirements. First, an excessive-force claim, like the one here, requires a showing of some bodily injury to establish a constitutional violation. Harper v. Harris County, Texas, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994). Second, once an underlying constitutional violation is established and the prosecution invokes the second clause of section 242, it must prove resulting bodily injury in order to sustain punishment of more than one year. 18 U.S.C. § 242. Gonzales challenges only the government's evidence with respect to this second bodily injury requirement; however, the definition of bodily injury from excessive-force cases is still relevant here because this court has borrowed that definition for use in a section 242 prosecution also predicated on excessive force. Brugman, 364 F.3d at 618. 34 In constitutional excessive force cases we have applied a some injury which is more than `de minimis injury' standard. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir.1999). The injury necessary to satisfy this requirement, and thus to establish an excessive-force claim, is related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible in the context in which the injury occurs. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434-35. (5th Cir.1996). For example, in Williams v. Bramer, supra, this court faced the question whether the injury alleged, dizziness and shortness of breath, was sufficient to satisfy the some injury requirement. We held that the injury was insufficient for the first choking incident, which occurred during a physical search, but was sufficient for the second choking incident, which occurred after the victim threatened to report the officer. For the second choking, dizziness and shortness of breath satisfied the some injury requirement because the officer was motivated entirely by malice. Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d at 704. In contrast, the first incident occurred during a search, where physical confrontation inevitably results. Id. 35 There is sufficient evidence here to support a rational jury finding of bodily injury. Carrera's mouth was foaming, he complained of stinging pain, and his eyes were swollen shut for at least three hours. The government introduced evidence that pepper spray causes intense pain. 7 The force that caused this pain, the pepper spray, was applied in a context not too different from the second choking incident in Bramer. Carrera was no longer a threat to Gonzales. He was paralyzed, handcuffed, and lying on the floor of the bus. Accordingly, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, Gonzales's excessive-force conviction. Cf. Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 903 (6th Cir.2004) ([I]t is clearly established that the Officers' use of pepper spray against Champion after he was handcuffed and hobbled was excessive.). 8 36 Nor do we find any merit in Gonzales's contention, made only in passing (and partially on evidence not introduced before the jury but only at sentencing), that the evidence is insufficient because, even if it shows he intentionally pepper sprayed Carrera, it is not adequate to show that he knew the effects of the pepper spraying would be sufficiently severe to constitute bodily injury. We conclude, however, that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer any requisite knowledge and intent on Gonzales's part. 9 37