Opinion ID: 2524706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentencing Under Both the Three Strikes Law and Section 667.71 Is Proper

Text: Defendant also contends that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial court could determine his sentence by applying both the Three Strikes law and section 667.71. Primarily, he argues that section 654 is applicable in this circumstance to limit the trial court to one sentencing scheme. Section 654, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part: An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Defendant asserts that applying both section 667.71 and the Three Strikes law violates this provision. Defendant's claim fails under People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232 ( Coronado ). There, we held in part that Penal Code section 654 did not prohibit use of a prior conviction and resulting prior prison term both to elevate a driving under the influence charge to a felony under Vehicle Code former section 23175 and to trigger a one-year sentence enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), for service of a prior prison term. ( Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 149, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232.) In reaching this result, we first explained that [b]y its own terms, section 654 applies only to an `act or omission' made punishable in different ways by different statutes. ( Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 156, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232.) We then discussed People v. Rodriguez (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 517, 253 Cal.Rptr. 633 ( Rodriguez ), which [i]n a closely analogous context ... reasoned that prior prison term enhancements are not imposed for `acts or omissions' within the meaning of [section 654]: ... `Both sections 666 and 667.5 apply to facts, not acts; they relate to the status of the recidivist offender engaging in criminal conduct, not to the conduct itself.' [Citations.] ( Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 157, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232.) Finding this reasoning persuasive, we explained: [P]rior prison term enhancements are attributable to the defendant's status as a repeat offender [citations]; they are not attributable to the underlying criminal conduct which gave rise to the defendant's prior and current convictions. Because the repeat offender (recidivist) enhancement imposed here does not implicate multiple punishment of an act or omission, section 654 is inapplicable. ( Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 158, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232; see also DeSimone, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 700, 73 Cal. Rptr.2d 73 [penalty provision which relates solely to a defendant's status as a repeat offender does not punish an `act or omission' and is not subject to section 654].) Similarly, as defendant points out, the purpose of section 667.71 is not to punish especially aggravated instances of a particular crime, but to serve[ ] the same purpose as the `Three Strikes' law, which is to punish recidivism. Thus, both the Three Strikes law and section 667.71 apply to the fact of defendant's recidivism, not to an act or omission within the meaning of section 654. (See People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 34, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, 954 P.2d 557 [unlike § 654, which is concerned with the appropriate punishment for `[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways,' the Three Strikes law has, as its central focus, the status of the defendant as a repeat felon].) Accordingly, under Coronado, application of both does not implicate section 654. We reject defendant's assertion that a different analysis applies here because the issue in this case is not an `enhancement' of [his] sentence, but the applicability of two separate and distinct methods by which [his] minimum indeterminate term could be calculated. As we have explained, in Coronado we quoted and endorsed Rodriguez, which found section 654 inapplicable to section 666 because the latter section applies to the fact of a defendant's recidivist status, not to an act or omission within the meaning of section 654. ( Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 157, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232; Rodriguez, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 519, 253 Cal. Rptr. 633.) In Coronado, we also cited People v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1277, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 263, which similarly held that section 654 does not apply to section 666. ( Coronado, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 157, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232.) Section 666 operates like the Three Strikes law and section 667.71; it does not establish an enhancement, but establishes an alternate and elevated penalty for a petty theft conviction when a recidivist defendant has served a prior term in a penal institution for a listed offense. ( People v. White Eagle (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517-1518, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 749 ( White Eagle ); see also People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 556, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56 [§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A), does not establish an enhancement, but prescribes a method by which defendant's minimum indeterminate life term is calculated]; People v. Martin (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 656, 667, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 [§ 667, subd. (e)(1) does not establish an enhancement, but defines the term for the crime itself], disapproved on another ground in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 600, fn. 10, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945; cf. People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441 [explaining the difference between an enhancement and a statute establishing an alternate penalty for the underlying felony when the defendant has satisfied specified conditions].) The salient point is that imposition of the increased penalties these statutes prescribe depends on a factthe defendant's status as a repeat offendernot on an act or omission within the meaning of section 654. (See In re Foss (1974) 10 Cal.3d 910, 922, 112 Cal.Rptr. 649, 519 P.2d 1073 [increased penalties under habitual offender statutes are attributable to the defendant's status as a repeat offender], overruled on another ground in People v. White (1976) 16 Cal.3d 791, 796-797, fn. 3, 129 Cal.Rptr. 769, 549 P.2d 537.) Section 654 therefore does not apply. (See White Eagle, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1519, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 749 [finding § 654 inapplicable to sentencing under both Three Strikes law and § 666]; People v. Sipe (1995) 36 Cal. App.4th 468, 488, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 266 [because application of Three Strikes law depends on defendant's status as a recidivist offender, § 654 does not apply].) The cases defendant cites do not hold to the contrary. In People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1144-1152, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 857 P.2d 1163 ( Jones ), we held that in enacting what is now subdivision (a) of section 667, the voters did not intend that a defendant's sentence would be enhanced for both a prior conviction (under the new statute) and the resulting prison term (under §667.5). Because we based this conclusion on the relevant statutory language, we expressly declined to discuss section 654's impact. ( Jones, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1152, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 857 P.2d 1163.) In People v. Flournoy (1994) 26 Cal. App.4th 1695, 1697-1701, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 188 ( Flournoy ), the court applied Jones 's analysis to hold that multiple enhancements for a single prior rape conviction are not permissible under both section 667.6, subdivision (a), and section 667, subdivision (a). As we did in Jones, the Flournoy court reached its conclusion by interpreting the statutes in light of the voters' intent and therefore expressly declined to discuss section 654's effect. ( Flournoy, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1699, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 188.) Thus, neither of these decisions supports defendant's section 654 argument. We also reject defendant's related claim, based on section 1170, subdivision (b), and California Rules of Court, former rule 420(c) (renumbered rule 4.420, eff. Jan. 1, 2001), that sentencing under both the Three Strikes law and section 667.71 violates the various proscriptions against dual use of facts for sentencing purposes. Defendant forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the Court of Appeal. ( Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 379, 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 654, 981 P.2d 499.) Moreover, it fails on its merits. Where the governing statute specifies an upper, middle, and lower term for a crime, section 1170, subdivision (b), prohibits a court from imposing the upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which sentence is imposed.... California Rules of Court, former rule 420(c) (present rule 4.420) also relates to the use of a fact charged and found as an enhancement as a basis for imposing the upper term.... Neither provision applies in this case, which involves calculation of defendant's term under the Three Strikes law and section 667.71, not the imposition of an upper term instead of a lower or middle term. (See Jenkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 252, fn. 10, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224.) Defendant also contends that application of both the Three Strikes law and section 667.71 is contrary to the Legislature's intent. In his view, the Three Strikes law and section 667.71 establish entirely separate and alternative sentencing schemes that serve[ ] the same purpose ..., which is to punish recidivism. Defendant argues that if someone is subject to sentencing as a `habitual sexual offender' [under section 667.71], it is almost certain he will also be subject to sentencing under the Three Strikes law. Had the Legislature intended that a habitual sexual offender's sentence be doubled or tripled in every case under the Three Strikes law, it would have so provided. Thus, defendant asserts, it is clear that section 667.71 and the Three Strikes law were intended to operate independently of one another. Because the Legislature, in enacting the Three Strikes law, intended for [it] to operate in lieu of section 667.71, a defendant may be sentenced under either of the two sentencing schemes, but not both. Unlike defendant, we find that the statutes disclose a legislative intent that the Three Strikes law apply in addition to section 667.71. Subdivision (f)(1) of section 667 provides that [notwithstanding any other law, the Three Strikes law shall be applied in every case in which a defendant has a prior felony conviction as defined in subdivision (d). (Italics added.) Moreover, subdivision (e) of section 667 provides that in addition to any other enhancement or punishment provisions which may apply, the sentencing provisions of the Three Strikes law shall apply where a defendant has a prior felony conviction. (Italics added.) Through this section, the Three Strikes law declares itself to `apply' not exclusively, but rather 'in addition to any other ... punishment provisions which may apply' [citations] ( People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 247, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Thus, the Legislature has expressly indicated that where a defendant has a qualifying prior felony conviction, the sentencing provisions of the Three Strikes law not only must be applied, they must be applied in addition to any other punishment provisions. `It is difficult to interpret the language of the statute in any other manner.' [Citations.] ( People v. Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 554, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56; see also White Eagle, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1517-1518, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 749 [single prior conviction requires both alternate sentencing under § 666 for petty theft with a prior and doubling under Three Strikes law].) Defendant cites nothing in either the Three Strikes law or section 667.71 that indicates the Legislature intended to exclude the latter statute from the mandatory terms of the former. In this regard, until its amendment in 1998, section 667.71 expressly specified the sentencing provisions that were exclusive alternatives to section 667.71. As originally enacted in 1993, before the Legislature passed the Three Strikes law, section 667.71 provided: At the request of the prosecutor and in lieu of the punishment specified in [this section], the court shall order that the defendant be punished pursuant to Section 1170.1, 667.6, or 667.7, if applicable. (Stats. 1993, ch. 590, § 2, p. 3097 [former § 667.71, subd. (d)].) The Legislature amended this provision in September 1994, after the Three Strikes law took effect, by adding a reference only to the newly enacted section 667.61; it did not also add a reference to the new Three Strikes law. (Stats.1994, ch. 447, § 2, p. 2414 and Stats. 1994, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 14, § 2, p. 8572; see fn. 5, ante. ) This provision was completely deleted in 1998. (Stats. 1998, ch. 925, § 3.) Nevertheless, the Three Strikes law's omission from the repealed provision that expressly specified the punishment alternatives to section 667.71 fully supports our conclusion that the Legislature intended the Three Strikes law to operate in addition to, not to the exclusion of, section 667.71. [8] Under the guise of legislative intent, in his reply brief defendant argues for the first time that the Court of Appeal did not perform the correct sentence calculation under the provisions of the Three Strikes law. The Court of Appeal held that section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i), requires tripling of the sentence section 667.71 prescribes, so that defendant should receive a sentence of 75 years to life for each of his current offenses. Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i), sets the minimum term of a third strike defendant's indeterminate life sentence under the Three Strikes law at [t]hree times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions. Defendant now contests the Court of Appeal's calculation, arguing that it fail[s] to consider that the term to be tripled is the term otherwise provided for the current felony conviction subsequent to the prior convictions. In other words, defendant asserts, the term to be tripled ... is the term to which [he] otherwise would have been sentenced without consideration of his prior convictions, i.e., the principal term referred to in section 1170.1, without reference to the prior convictions. Thus, defendant argues that for his current convictions under section 288, subdivision (a), only the eight-year aggravated term under that section should be tripled. By including the prior convictions in the calculation of [his] sentence under section 667.71 and then tripling that term under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(A)(i), ... the Court of Appeal misread the legislative intent. [9] Although we need not address this untimely argument (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1)), we reject it for its lack of merit. First, the plain language of the statute does not support defendant's statutory construction. As commonly understood, the statutory language in questionsubsequent to the two or more prior felony convictionssimply identifies the relevant convictions whose terms are to be tripled and distinguishes them from the two or more prior felony convictions that trigger application of the third strike sentencing provision. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i).) It does not, as defendant suggests, direct that the punishment for the identified convictions be determined without consideration of or reference to the prior convictions. Indeed, in other sentencing statutes, the Legislature has shown that when it wants a sentence calculated without consideration of some circumstance, it knows how to use language clearly expressing that intent. (See § 1170.2 [length of imprisonment for certain inmates shall be determined without consideration of good-time credit].) The Three Strikes law's far different language suggests a different legislative intent. Second, defendant's argument is inconsistent with our decision in People v. Nguyen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 197, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 980 P.2d 905. There, we stated that [t]he common and ordinary meaning of the statutory phrase, `the term otherwise provided as punishment,' is the term that would be imposed in the absence of the Three Strikes law. ( Id. at p. 205, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 980 P.2d 905.) Here, of course, the term that would be imposed absent the Three Strikes law is the term section 667.71 prescribes. Thus, the Court of Appeal's calculation was correct. We therefore conclude that the Court of Appeal did not err in holding that the trial court could apply both the Three Strikes law and section 667.71 in sentencing defendant. At oral argument, the Attorney General asserted that the Three Strikes law mandates consecutive sentencing for defendant's new crimes because he sustained in this proceeding a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts .... (§ 667, subd. (c)(6).) We leave it to the trial court to consider this question on remand in conjunction with other sentencing matters the Court of Appeal identified, including defendant's request that one or both of his prior convictions be struck under section 1385 in furtherance of justice. (See People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.)