Opinion ID: 505483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of equity

Text: 17 As noted above, a mistake in naming Colonel Sweeney as defendant would not have subjected Mondy's claim to the bar of Sec. 2000e-16(c) if he had straightforwardly pursued his error through the procedures of service. (Cf. The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom. W. Blake.) Instead he allowed service to be made by the district court, as 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915 entitled him to do. The caption of the complaint made it clear that he was suing a federal officer. If the marshal's office had simply followed the path laid out by Rule 4(d) within six days of Mondy's filing, Mondy would have been entitled to relation back under Rule 15(c). While the equities may not weigh in favor of a plaintiff who counts on same day service, Conforte v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 459 U.S. 1309, 1311, 103 S.Ct. 663, 664, 74 L.Ed.2d 588 (1983), Mondy's behavior did not set up any such photo-finish. The Army does not assert that it has been disadvantaged by its belated notice of appellant's claim. In these circumstances, fairness demands that the statutory time limit be tolled. 18 We note that the Seventh Circuit, which treats the 30-day deadline as a jurisdictional prerequisite, recently held that the time limit was tolled during the pendency of a petition to proceed in forma pauperis. Paulk v. United States, 830 F.2d 79, 83 (7th Cir.1987). 19