Opinion ID: 219211
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of the Witnesses' Testimonies

Text: To convict Locke, the government needed to prove that the inaccuracies in her loan applications and real estate transaction documents were material. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999); United States v. Powell, 576 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir.2009). Locke's representations were material if they could have influenced the victims' decisions. United States v. Roberts, 534 F.3d 560, 571 (7th Cir.2008). Lay opinion testimony, which provides the jury with a more complete picture than would be provided by a recitation of each component fact, United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir.2002), could shed light on the materiality of Locke's falsehoods. The witnesses were officers or employees of the mortgage brokerages or lenders involved in the Locke transactions. As shown by the sequence of questions and responses recounted above, the government introduced each witness to testify as to the prevalence of the false information in the loan documents and the significance of the falsehoods under the lenders' guidelines. We easily conclude that their opinions about the falsehoods' influence on the loan decisions would have helped the jury reach a conclusion regarding the materiality element of the wire fraud charges. Having found that the testimony could have been helpful, we consider whether the testimony impermissibly communicated that the facts in Locke's case met the elements of wire fraudthat is, whether the challenged testimony merely told the jury what conclusion to reach. Had the prosecutors deliberately elicited testimony about whether Locke knowingly made a material misrepresentation to deprive the lenders of money, their questions would have required an answer in the form of a legal conclusion that would have been unhelpful opinion testimony. United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 945 (7th Cir.1998). We are not convinced that the witnesses' testimonies can be classified as legal conclusions, let alone such directive ones. Locke asserts that the mere use of the words fraud and misrepresentation conveyed the witnesses' unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury. Torres v. Cnty. of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1985). But the testimony Locke challenges is far afield from the unhelpful, bare-legal-conclusion testimonies in Noel and Torres. Witnesses in both cases opined on the application of the exact statutory elements involved in the case. Noel, 581 F.3d at 497 (She, in essence, told the jury nothing more than, `I am familiar with the definition of child pornography, and this meets that definition....'); Torres, 758 F.2d at 151 ([T]he question tracks almost verbatim the language of the applicable statute.). Accord United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 (2d Cir.1988) (same). By distinct contrast, the prosecutors' questions here did not invoke any of the wire fraud statute's language, [4] and they did not call for opinions on whether its elements were fulfilled. The witnesses' responses likewise neither approached the statutory language nor commented on Locke's specific intent in any way. Rather, each witness explained why the loan in question would have been disapproved by using fraud or misrepresentation in a colloquial sense, employing the vernacular of their financial professions. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351 (9th Cir.1977) (testimony not objectionable when average laymen would understand the terms used and ascribe them the same basic meaning intended by the witness). The jurors could hardly confuse the words what we call funny business or misrepresentation with commentary on the elements of wire fraud. Neither did the prosecutors' questions or the witnesses responses call the jurors' attention to Locke's intentthough even if they had, such testimony is not necessarily inappropriate. See Bogan, 267 F.3d at 619-20; Bohannon, 652 F.2d at 732. The witnesses were commenting on how their companies react to false information on applications, not on Locke's mens rea. See United States v. Owens, 301 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir.2002) (witness's use of phrase misleading and fraudulent to describe reports did not comment on defendant's state of mind); United States v. Liner, 435 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir.2006) (implication that program was fraudulent did not directly address defendant's intent to defraud). The witnesses' wordsread within the context of the questions and the full responsesmust be stretched beyond their capacity for us to conclude that the district court allowed multiple witnesses to testify that Locke intended to deceive the lenders and thus committed wire fraud. Had Locke properly preserved this issue for review, see Fed.R.Evid. 103, we might have determined that the district court abused its discretion by not striking the testimony at Locke's request. See United States v. Wantuch, 525 F.3d 505, 514 (7th Cir.2008). Alternatively, the district court might have admonished the prosecutors and witnesses to avoid words that can be construed to have legal baggage. See United States v. Espino, 32 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir.1994) (A more appropriately phrased question ... could have avoided the problem of compelling the defendant to offer testimony requiring a legal conclusion.). But the bottom line is that Locke never objected to the testimony, let alone alerted the district court to her underlying concerns. Under the circumstances, we certainly cannot conclude that any error in the district court's failure to strike the testimony sua sponte was clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute, as the plain error doctrine requires. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). Accordingly, we reject Locke's contention that the witnesses should not have been allowed to testify regarding their opinions because they reached legal conclusions and spoke of her intent. Locke's second contentionthat the challenged testimony misled jurors by giving them de facto instructions on the lawachieves little more traction. We can imagine that the witnesses' use of fraud and misrepresentation may have confused the jury as to wire fraud's elements, at least initially. See United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 478 (7th Cir.1980). But any such confusion was extinguished when the district court appropriately instructed the jury regarding wire fraud. It expounded on specific intent, explaining both that Locke must have intended to deceive or cheat the victims to gain money or property and also that good faith would be inconsistent with guilt. The district court made clear that, to convict, the jury had to find that Locke realized what she was doing, was aware of the nature of her conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake or accident. Locke does not argue that the jury was unable to follow the district court's instructions, so we presume its verdict comported with those instructions. See United States v. Ochoa-Zarate, 540 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2008). Any ephemeral de facto instruction was displaced by the district court's expansive instructions, so Locke was not prejudiced. Finally, we do not find that Locke's substantial rights could have been affected by any error in failing to strike the testimony. The evidence against her was diverse and robust, including proof of multiple forgeries, falsified account balances and incomes, and use of phony businesses and addresses. Locke's good-faith defense required the jury to disbelieve her family members' testimony about forgeries and faxing a document on Locke's behalf; to blame mortgage brokers for falsified residential leases, inaccurate income and account balance reporting in loan applications, and fake addresses on documents; and to disregard fake invoices from Locke's purported vendors. We conclude that Locke would not have been acquitted had the district court struck the sporadic, repeated use of two words with potential legal baggage in the course of otherwise appropriate questioning and testimony. See United States v. Avila, 557 F.3d 809, 821 (7th Cir.2009). In summary, we do not find that the district court plainly erred in failing to strike the witnesses' challenged testimony sua sponte. The testimony was helpful to the jury, as it shed light on the materiality element of wire fraud. The testimony neither told the jury what conclusion to reach nor instructed the jury that wire fraud is a strict liability crime. Further, the overwhelming evidence in the case would have led to Locke's conviction even in the absence of this testimony. Accordingly, her convictions must stand.