Opinion ID: 1274318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Quantum of specific evidence.

Text: In this case, the administrative search warrant stands or falls on the first showing: specific evidence of an existing violation. Although Barlow's made clear that an administrative search warrant could issue upon such a showing, the Court did not specify the quantum of specific evidence that must be presented to establish the reasonableness of the inspection. However, in fashioning a proper test, one court has recognized two important considerations underlying the reasonableness standard that provide guidance. West Point-Pepperell, Inc., v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 957 (11th Cir.1982). First, administrative searches involve less of an intrusion on privacy than criminal searches. Accordingly, administrative search warrants may be obtained upon a lesser showing of probable cause than is required for criminal search warrants, for which the affiant need show the probability and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. Id. at 957-58 (quoting United States v. Melancon, 462 F.2d 82, 89 (5th Cir.1972)) (citations omitted). The second consideration is that a showing of administrative probable cause must satisfy the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. Id. at 958 (quoting Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 312, 98 S.Ct. at 1820, 56 L.Ed.2d at 311). As applied to administrative searches, this principle requires that persons not be subject to the unbridled discretion of `executive and administrative officers, particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search.' Id. (quoting Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. at 1826, 56 L.Ed.2d at 317-18). Therefore, the evidence of a specific violation necessary to establish administrative probable cause, while less than that needed to show a probability of a violation, must at least show that the proposed inspection is based upon a reasonable belief that a violation has been or is being committed and not upon a desire to harass the target of the inspection. This requirement is met by a showing of specific evidence sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation. Id.; accord Matter of Inspection of Workplace Located at 526 Catalan Street, St. Louis, Missouri, 741 F.2d 172, 174-75 (8th Cir.1984). More specifically, there must be some plausible basis for believing that a violation is likely to be found. Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 102 (10th Cir.1981). We have recognized in the criminal context that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show criminal probable cause. State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 626 (Iowa 2001) (holding that information provided during cellular telephone call by anonymous citizen informant was sufficiently reliable and provided police officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct Terry stop of defendant's automobile). The question then becomes: How much and what kind of specific evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation in this case? The answer centers on the statutory provision authorizing inspections of worksites by the labor commissioner or his representatives. It provides in relevant part: 5. Special inspections. Any employees or authorized employee representative who believes that a violation of a safety or health standard exists that threatens physical harm, or that an imminent danger exists, may request an inspection by giving notice to the commissioner or the commissioner's authorized representative of such violation or danger. Any such notice shall be reduced to writing, shall set forth with reasonable particularity the grounds for the notice, and shall be signed by the employees or authorized employee representative, and a copy shall be provided the employer or the employer's agent no later than at the time of inspection, except that upon the request of the person giving such notice the person's name and the names of individual employees referred to therein shall not appear in such copy or on any record published, released, or made available pursuant to this section. If, upon receipt of such notification, the commissioner determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger exists, the commissioner shall make a special inspection in accordance with the provisions of this section as soon as practicable, to determine if such violation or danger exists. If the commissioner determines that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that a violation or danger exists, the commissioner shall notify the employees or authorized employee representative in writing of such determination. Iowa Code § 88.6(5); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 875  3.7 (implementing section 88.6). Thus, before applying for an administrative warrant to inspect, the commissioner must receive a request for an inspection from an employee or authorized employee representative. The complainant must believe that a violation of a safety or health standard that threatens physical harm exists, or that an imminent danger exists. The notice must be in writing and signed, and must set forth with reasonable particularity the grounds for the notice. Upon receiving the notice, the commissioner shall proceed to inspect if he or she determines there are reasonable grounds to believe that such violation or danger exists. We think affidavits in support of an application for an administrative search warrant to inspect should contain information showing substantial compliance with these requirements. The information before the district court at the time it issued the inspection warrant included the following: (1) the application; (2) the affidavit of Mary Bryant, IOSHA administrator; and (3) the affidavit of Joe Sawyer, IOSHA compliance safety and health officer. The application signed by the deputy labor commissioner stated, among other things, the following: The division of labor received a complaint on March 19, 1999, meeting the requirements of Iowa Code section 88.6(5). The complaint was from John A. Peno, representative of Titan employees. The signed complaint alleged that at the time of filing, the hazards alleged in the complaint existed at the Titan plant. Mary L. Bryant, IOSHA administrator, determined there were reasonable grounds to believe that a violation or violations of safety and health standards may exist at the Titan plant, which threaten physical harm to the employees. Management at Titan denied Joe Sawyer, compliance safety and health officer for the division of labor, admission to the plant to conduct a safety inspection pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 88. The application for a safety inspection warrant was being made pursuant to Iowa Code sections 88.6 and 808.14, and Barlow's. Bryant's affidavit, attached to the application, stated essentially the same thing as the application. In addition, Bryant attached a copy of the complaint to her affidavit and incorporated it by reference. Bryant stated that she assigned Joe Sawyer to conduct a safety inspection at the Titan plant during regular working hours. The complaint attached to Bryant's affidavit was entitled Notice of Alleged Safety or Health Hazards. It was dated March 19, 1999, and gave the complainant's name as John A. Peno, an authorized representative of employees affected by the complaint. The complaint indicated that Peno believes that a violation of an Occupational Safety or Health standard exists which is a job safety or health hazard at the [Titan plant]. Nineteen violations were listed. Some dealt with absence of electrical guards on electrical equipment. Others dealt with absence of guards on machinery. Additionally, the complaint alleged that a list of safety items needing correction has been given to the Safety Director, but was `shelved' with no action being taken. Sawyer's affidavit, also attached to the application, stated that he went to the Titan plant during regular working hours to conduct an inspection but was denied admission by management. The Eleventh Circuit described the appropriate standards for reviewing a magistrate's finding of probable cause: The standards for reviewing a magistrate's finding of probable cause are the same for both administrative and criminal warrants. In passing on the validity of a warrant, the role of the reviewing court is limited. A magistrate's probable cause determination is entitled to great deference, and is conclusive in the absence of arbitrariness. Moreover, judicial review of the sufficiency of an affidavit for the issuance of a warrant must be strictly confined to the information brought to the magistrate's attention. Except in those situations [where a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) is warranted], a reviewing court should not conduct a probable cause hearing in which it considers evidence not presented to the magistrate. West Point-Pepperell, 689 F.2d at 959 (citations omitted). Other federal courts also indicate that the review of an administrative search warrant should be confined to the four corners of the application, in the absence of intentional or grossly negligent false statements made to the issuing magistrate. Donovan v. Hackney, Inc., 583 F.Supp. 773, 776 (W.D.Okla.1984); accord Martin v. Int'l Matex Tank Terminals  Bayonne, 928 F.2d 614, 620 (3d Cir.1991) (Subject to a narrow exception not at issue here, the reviewing court may consider only evidence within the four corners of the warrant application to the magistrate.); Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d at 104 (In ruling on the validity of a search warrant, the reviewing court may only consider the information provided the issuing magistrate or judge.); see also State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997) (review of probable cause determination for criminal search warrant is limited to consideration of only that information, reduced to writing, which was actually presented to the judge at the time the application for warrant was made). We agree with those federal authorities which hold that the standards of review for criminal search warrants apply to administrative search warrants. Because the standards of review for criminal probable cause and administrative probable cause are the same, our review of the district court's determination regarding the statutory sufficiency of the search warrant is for correction of errors at law. State v. Myers, 570 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Iowa 1997). Our review of the district court's ruling regarding probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant is de novo because the probable cause determination is a constitutional issue. Id.; State v. Green, 540 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 1995) (review of probable-cause-to-search finding is de novo). A judge issuing the warrant is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, probable cause exists. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 363 (citations omitted). In making that decision, the judge may rely on reasonable, common sense inferences from the information presented. Id. In reviewing that decision, the affidavit of probable cause is to be interpreted in a common sense rather than a hypertechnical manner. Id. at 364. In addition, we draw all reasonable inferences to support the judge's finding of probable cause. Id. We decide close cases in favor of upholding the validity of the warrant. Id. With these principles in mind, we review the application and affidavits to determine whether they were sufficient to support a finding of administrative probable cause. For reasons that follow we think they were. The application here is not unrelieved boilerplate. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 378 (7th Cir.1979). Nor is it merely a conclusory statement ... that employee complaints have been received by OSHA, without more.... Burkart Randall, 625 F.2d at 1319. Bryant, the IOSHA administrator, attached Peno's complaint to her affidavit. She averred the alleged hazards existed at the time Peno, an authorized representative of Titan employees, filed his complaint. The complaint supports Bryant's statement because it too states that the alleged hazards existed at the time the complaint was filed. See Matter of Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335, 1340 (7th Cir.1979) (The district judge could correctly assume, therefore, that the information contained [in the warrant application, which incorporated the sworn affidavit of an OSHA compliance officer] was true and correct.). Bryant's affidavit and the attached list of nineteen hazards submitted by Peno to IOSHA supports a reasonable suspicion of a violation. In reaching our conclusion, we reject Titan's insistence that Bryant's affidavit was deficient because it did not indicate whether IOSHA performed a sufficient investigation to confirm the validity of the complaint and the reasonableness of the warrant request. Neither the federal statute nor the Iowa statute explicitly requires such an investigation. We are concerned as to whether the information was sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of a violation, a much lesser standard than a criminal probable cause determination. As mentioned, the application supported by the affidavits with the attached complaint was sufficient to raise such suspicion. These documents clearly informed Judge Huscher of the substance of the complaint, thus allowing him to make an independent determination as to whether the inspection was justified based on the complaint.