Opinion ID: 1351466
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Prior Florida Felony Convictions

Text: Defendant was convicted in Florida of three felonies of breaking and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, and one felony escape. The four prior felony convictions were among those introduced by the prosecution as aggravating factors under section 190.3, factor (c). Defendant objects to their admission on several grounds.
(35) Defendant contends the least adjudicated elements test of People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623, 632-634 [190 Cal. Rptr. 165, 660 P.2d 389], devised to construe the meaning of prior foreign convictions under section 667.5, subdivision (f), applies as well to the meaning of the term prior felony conviction in section 190.3, factor (c). He then argues on various grounds that the crimes of which he was convicted in Florida would not have been felonies in California at the time, and hence those convictions should have been excluded from his penalty phase under the least-adjudicated-elements test. However, we rejected the application of the least-adjudicated-elements test to section 190.3, factor (c), in People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1038-1039 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]. We concluded in that case, In the absence of limitation, a reference to `prior felony convictions' is deemed to include any prior conviction which was a felony under the laws of the convicting jurisdiction. ( Ibid. ) Defendant's claim is therefore meritless. [6]
(36) Defendant contends that our holding in People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pages 1038-1039, i.e., that a prior conviction that was a felony under the law of the convicting jurisdiction is ipso facto admissible under section 190.3, factor (c), makes the use of such convictions unconstitutional. Although his argument is unclear, he appears to advance two separate theories. He first asserts that the use of such convictions violates equal protection of the laws because they would not have been admissible under section 190.3, factor (c), if they had arisen in California. To that extent, however, a defendant against whom they are admitted is not situated similarly to a defendant with prior California felony convictions. To use defendant's own example, such a defendant has no greater cause for complaint than a defendant against whom is admitted a prior felony conviction arising from conduct that might have been charged as  or bargained down to  a lesser offense in a different county of this state. Nor is any resulting discrimination invidious when, as in the case at bar, the defendant's conduct in the convicting state would in any event have been criminal to some degree in California. Defendant next claims the use of such convictions violates the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution because it results in arbitrary and unreliable sentencing. He appears to argue, without citation of authority, that a California jury does not have enough information to make a rational sentencing decision when it does not know the facts underlying an out-of-state conviction but merely the artificial label of the conviction itself. The argument is unpersuasive. A California jury does not know much more, if anything, about a conviction suffered in California. In any event, the fact that certain conduct is characterized as felonious by another state of this Union is more than a mere label; it represents the considered judgment of the people of that state that the conduct is so far below the norms of civilized behavior and morality that it deserves strong condemnation and significant punishment. For a California jury to give weight to such a felony conviction does not make its sentencing decision capricious and arbitrary within the meaning of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Defendant was pardoned for his first breaking and entering offense by the State of Florida. (37) Defendant now argues that under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, California must give full effect to this pardon, which would preclude use of the prior conviction in any manner in a new criminal proceeding (citing People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 147-148 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381]). Defense counsel did not raise this issue below, however, and it is deemed waived on appeal. Moreover, even if we found deficient performance by trial counsel for failure to raise this issue, there is no reasonable probability that excluding one of the three breaking and entering convictions would have affected the verdict. Therefore, defendant cannot make out a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this basis.