Opinion ID: 894886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Penley's Professional-Negligence Claim

Text: We conclude that the secular confidentiality interest Penley's professional-negligence claim advances fails to override the strong constitutional presumption that favors preserving the church's interest in managing its affairs. Penley voluntarily became a member of the church body and agreed to abide by the church constitution; indeed, she expressed that she did so willingly. That constitution outlined the disciplinary process that would be followed if a member engaged in conduct that the church considered inappropriate. As CrossLand's and Penley's pastor, Westbrook assumed an obligation to Penley and to the congregation to follow the church's constitution. Although Penley contends pastoral counseling is not at issue because she did not receive marital counseling from Westbrook in his capacity as a member of the clergy, the publication about which Penley complains was made in the course of the church disciplinary process and communicated by Westbrook pursuant to the requirements of that process. And even though Penley's suit is now against Westbrook and no longer the church, it is well-settled that [t]he interaction between the church and its pastor is an integral part of church government, Simpson, 494 F.2d at 493, and [t]he relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558. Even if Westbrook's dual roles as Penley's secular counselor and her pastor could be distinguished, which is doubtful, Westbrook could not adhere to the standards of one without violating the requirements of the other. Any civil liability that might attach for Westbrook's violation of a secular duty of confidentiality in this context would in effect impose a fine for his decision to follow the religious disciplinary procedures that his role as pastor required and have a concomitant chilling effect on churches' autonomy to manage their own affairs. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y., 819 F.2d at 881 (stating the burden of tort damages is direct . . . [w]ere we to permit recovery, `the pressure to . . . forego that practice [would be] unmistakeable') (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981)). The result would be interference by the civil courts in the relationship among CrossLand, its pastor, and the church members, which the First Amendment prohibits. See, e.g., Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 717, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (stating questions of church discipline and composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern). We do not doubt that preserving client confidences revealed in the context of a professional counseling relationship serves an important public interest, as the duty the Legislature has imposed on such professionals reflects. See 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 681.41(x). Maintaining patient confidentiality ensures that individuals receive effective and competent counseling when they need it. See Abrams v. Jones, 35 S.W.3d 620, 626 (Tex.2000) (citing R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex.1994) (stating that the basis for the privilege is twofold: to encourage the full communication necessary for effective treatment and to prevent unnecessary disclosure of highly personal information)). But however highly we might rate the importance of that interest, it is by no means absolute when impingement on free-exercise rights results. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). The values that underlie the constitutional interest in prohibiting judicial encroachment upon a church's ability to manage its affairs and discipline its members, who have voluntarily united themselves to the church body and impliedly consented to be bound by its standards, have been zealously protected. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733-34; see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214, 92 S.Ct. 1526. When presented with conflicting interests like these, courts have generally held that a spirit of freedom for religious organizations prevails, Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, even if that freedom comes at the expense of other interests of high social importance. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214, 92 S.Ct. 1526; see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d at 883 (finding the practice of shunning not to constitute a sufficient threat to the peace, safety, or morality of the community as to warrant state intervention, and stating [i]ntangible or emotional harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of action against a church for its practices  or against its members.); Simpson, 494 F.2d at 493 (stating [o]nly on rare occasions where there existed a compelling governmental interest in the regulation of public health, safety, and general welfare have the courts ventured into this protected area.); Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (stating the preservation of the free exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle it overshadows the inequities which may result from its liberal application). Penley, citing Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, contends members of the clergy enjoy no constitutional protection for misconduct as professional marriage counselors simply because they may occasionally discuss scripture within the context of that relationship. In principle, we agree. See Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 677. But Sanders involved an intentional tort that formed no part of the pastor's or his church's religious beliefs or practices. 134 F.3d at 336-37. In that case, Robyn Sanders and Lisa Mullanix sued Shelby Baucum, a minister at Casa View Baptist Church, for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties as a marriage counselor by, among other things, encouraging and consummating a sexual relationship with each of them. Id. at 333. Baucum argued that his secular misconduct was not actionable because it occurred within two inherently ecclesiastical, rather than purely secular, counseling relationships. Id. at 335. The court noted that the First Amendment does not categorically insulate religious relationships from judicial scrutiny because to do so would impermissibly extend constitutional protection to the secular components of these relationships and place religious leaders in a preferred position in our society. Id. at 335-36. The court held that the First Amendment does not require a minister's relationship with a parishioner to be purely secular in order for a court to review the propriety of the conduct that occurs within that relationship; rather, the First Amendment protects religious relationships between a minister and parishioner primarily by preventing the judicial resolution of ecclesiastical disputes that turn on matters of religious doctrine or practice. Id. at 336. The court stated that to invoke constitutional protection for conduct that occurred within the counseling relationship, Baucum must assert that the specific conduct allegedly constituting a breach of his professional and fiduciary duties was rooted in religious belief. Id. at 338. Noting the obvious truth that Baucum's actions could not be rooted in the church's religious beliefs and practices, the court held that Baucum could not hide behind First Amendment protections. Id. In Destefano v. Grabrian , the Supreme Court of Colorado was similarly presented with conduct that occurred in the context of a counseling relationship between a member of the clergy and a congregant. 763 P.2d at 278. Robert and Edna Destefano sought marriage counseling from Grabrian, a Catholic priest for their diocese. Id. During the course of their counseling relationship, Grabrian developed a sexual relationship with Edna. Id. When the Destefanos filed suit for damages resulting from the sexual relationship Grabrian allegedly induced Edna into, Grabrian and the diocese contended the claims were constitutionally barred because a priest's performance of pastoral duties, including sacramental counseling of parishioners, is a matter of ecclesiastical concern. Id. at 283. The court noted that, [i]f the alleged conduct of Grabrian was dictated by his sincerely held religious beliefs or was consistent with the practice of his religion, we would have to resolve a difficult first amendment issue. Id. at 284. But the court held that the conduct in issue clearly fell outside of the beliefs and doctrine of Grabrian's religion and was not entitled to constitutional protection. Id. In the present case, Penley does not question that Westbrook's decision to reveal what she considered confidential information to the church elders was mandated by church doctrine and motivated by Westbrook's religious beliefs. Neither was his revelation an intentional tort that endangered Penley's or the public's health or safety. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d at 883 (stating the intangible or emotional harms that plaintiff suffered as a result of her shunning are clearly not of the type that would justify the imposition of tort liability for religious conduct. No physical assault or battery occurred). Accordingly, Penley's claims are distinguishable from those asserted in Sanders and other cases that involve sexual assault of parishioners occurring in the context of what purports to be pastoral counseling. See also Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1238 (Ohio 1988) (plaintiff alleged his minister engaged in sexual relations with his wife in the course of providing the couple with marriage counseling); F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 696 A.2d 697, 699 (N.J.1997) (parishioner sued for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of sexual contact in a pastoral-counseling relationship with her rector). Penley's petition implies that her resignation from the church after she revealed confidences to Westbrook precludes any argument that Westbrook was performing a pastoral function in disseminating confidential information to the church. But clearly Westbrook's actions were grounded in religious doctrine. Westbrook's report to the church elders was an integral part of the church's three-step disciplinary process as described in CrossLand's letter to the congregation: If the one in sin `refuses to listen' . . . then the instructions are to `tell it to the church.' The letter itself was disseminated to the congregation as the final step in the process: Through their continuing sin, they forfeit their membership in the church, and the members of the church are to break fellowship with them. Penley's voluntary forfeiture of her membership did not, in CrossLand's or Westbrook's view, forestall the church's duty under its constitution to tell it to the church and admonish church members to break fellowship with [Penley]. Their decision to so proceed was based on their interpretation of Matthew 18:15-20, an inherently ecclesiastical matter. We hold that court interference with that decision through imposition of tort liability in this case would impinge upon matters of church governance in violation of the First Amendment. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that an inquiry into whether the church complied with church laws and regulations is prohibited by the First Amendment); see also United Methodist Church, Baltimore Annual Conference. v. White, 571 A.2d 790, 794 (D.C.1990) (stating secular evaluation of the procedures that ecclesiastical or cannon law requires the church to follow is precisely the type of inquiry the First Amendment prohibits); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1358-59 (holding civil courts lack jurisdiction to interpret provisions of the United Methodist Church's Book of Discipline governing pastoral appointments); Hafner, 616 F.Supp. at 737-39 (dismissing pastor's suit for alleged denial of benefits based on interpretation of the church synod constitution).