Opinion ID: 710265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Yahweh Beliefs and Practices.

Text: 70 Appellants argue that the government obtained the convictions in this case by condemning a religion. The district court ruled that evidence of Yahweh teachings was admissible when relevant to the charges in the indictment, but that testimony regarding general teachings of the Yahweh faith was not relevant. The evidence admitted was highly relevant to the jury's understanding of the existence, motives, and objectives of the RICO conspiracy and the means by which it was conducted. Yahweh used the religion as a means of exhorting followers to commit the racketeering acts, and appellants cannot hide behind the general principle that religion is normally inadmissible in court under both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the First Amendment. Although evidence of Yahweh beliefs and practices was damaging to the defense, it was not unfairly prejudicial. 71 A person's beliefs, superstitions, or affiliation with a religious group is properly admissible where probative of an issue in a criminal prosecution. United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1233 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80 L.Ed.2d 818 (1984); see also United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1159-60 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1104, 105 S.Ct. 2334, 85 L.Ed.2d 850 (1985); United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1243, 104 S.Ct. 3517, 82 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984). 72 It seems clear from the record that the Yahweh religion was not on trial. The evidence regarding the religion was relevant, because religious teachings were used to justify, rationalize, and promote crime. Appellants argue strenuously that the contested evidence violated Federal Rule of Evidence 610, which prohibits using religion to impeach a witness's credibility. The appellants' argument is misguided. The government agrees that it would have been improper to attack witnesses' credibility with their religious beliefs by suggesting that, because of those beliefs, their testimony was untrustworthy. See United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 666 (D.C.Cir.1980). However, in this case, the government inquired into Yahweh practices and beliefs in an effort to show the background of the RICO enterprise, which the defendants used to carry out acts of murder and arson. The evidence was relevant to show how Yahweh exerted influence and control over the members and how he used his preachings to justify heinous crimes. It is also important to our analysis that Yahweh himself sought to interject religion into his cross-examination by responding to numerous questions with a religious/Biblical response. On direct examination, defense counsel asked Yahweh about his practices and life style, as well as about general Yahweh beliefs. For those reasons, the admission of all of this evidence was not unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Relevant evidence is properly excluded only by a finding that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues or misleading the jury.... Fed.R.Evid. 403; see also United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1117, 1119 (11th Cir.1990). 73 Finally, it is apparent to us that the Yahweh religion was not on trial, in violation of the First Amendment. The government did not indict the Yahweh religion, but only named it as the racketeering enterprise. The First Amendment's protection of beliefs and associations does not preclude such evidence where relevant to a trial issue. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52-53 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. 465, 469 n. 2, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). See also Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1097-98, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992). 74