Opinion ID: 31923
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intrajudicial Bias

Text: 46 Notwithstanding the obstacle that Liteky presents to recusal claims based upon a judge's expression of beliefs arising from intrajudicial sources, Appellants press eight events that occurred on the record during judicial proceedings and which, they argue, support the case for recusal. 47 These events are, in chronological order, as follows: 48 1. When issuing his sentencing findings in the criminal prosecution of some Davidians, Judge Smith declared that the defendants and other adult Davidians ambushed and conspir[ed] to cause the death of federal agents on February 28, 1993. Appellants argue that these findings, made with respect to convictions that were affirmed on appeal, 6 demonstrate his deep-seated antagonism toward the Davidians. 49 2. Judge Smith acquired over the course of the criminal proceedings a firm conviction that it was the Davidians who set fire to the living quarters at Mount Carmel on April 19, 1993, a belief he carried over to other cases tried before him, e.g. Risenhoover v. England, 936 F.Supp. 392 (W.D.Tex.1996), and to the case at bar. (Appellants did not, however, appeal his finding to that effect after this trial.) 50 3. Judge Smith's comments in Risenhoover — that the Davidians were soft as clay and easily manipulated, that their leader was a false prophet whose teachings focused on paramilitary training, and that their beliefs are fanaticism ... difficult for most people to understand — made fair judgment impossible. 51 4. On June 27, 2000, when Appellants attempted to introduce the deposition testimony of Livingstone Fagan, Judge Smith referred — in an off-the-record bench conference — to Fagan, a resident of Mount Carmel who had previously been criminally tried and acquitted by Judge Smith, as a crazy, murdering son-of-a-bitch; he subsequently issued an inept apology. 7 52 5. On July 13, when Appellants attempted to introduce expert-prepared transcripts of the government's surveillance tapes, Judge Smith referred to these transcripts — in an off-the-record bench conference — as bullcrap; he subsequently admitted them. 53 6. Judge Smith presented the respective transcripts of the surveillance tapes to the jury in unfair manner: Appellants' transcripts were described as the work of Appellants' attorneys, whereas the government's transcripts were presented as the product of professional expertise. This characterization was especially galling to Appellants, as Judge Smith had previously allowed the government's expert to produce his transcripts after the court-ordered deadline, stating that compliance was not important, as his work was non-expert. 54 7. On July 14, in charging the advisory jury, he allegedly gave an improper standard for determining liability, refused Appellants' submitted instruction, and failed to include any instructions regarding liability for foreseeable acts of third parties. That this inadequacy was intentional, Appellants allege, can be seen by comparing these instructions with the precision of his charge in Risenhoover, a case in which government agents injured or killed in the February 23, 1993 conflict brought suit against a reporter, certain media organizations, and an ambulance company that had alerted the Davidians, in violation of Texas law, to the impending assault. 55 8. On April 4, 2002, Judge Smith refused to certify Appellants' Statement of Proceedings, a document attempting to introduce into the record (pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 10(c)) several of Judge Smith's unrecorded comments during the trial. Appellants had submitted this memorialization in February 2002, over a year and a half after the alleged statements were made. They contend that Judge Smith's refusal to certify demonstrates his bias, as the government did not dispute the substance of the document. 56 The first six of these events represent the expression of opinions formed... on the basis of facts ... or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, and are the type of opinions/expressions that Liteky holds nearly exempt from causing recusal. Appellants contend that Liteky either does not apply or should not apply as rigorously when, as in this FTCA case, the judge is the factfinder. There is no support for this position legally or logically. Judges often find facts in performing their duties — in admitting evidence, in sentencing criminals, in ruling on motions, as well as in deciding bench-tried cases. Liteky draws no distinction based on the type of proceeding, and none is warranted. 57 The last two events are embodied in judicial actions that Appellants could have, but did not, appeal. Since one of these involves the irrelevant advisory jury and one a grievously late attempt to create a factual record for appeal, to allow the judge's demeanor or actions in the two events a significant influence on our recusal decision would be grossly disproportionate to the legal implications of his actions. 58 Appellants rightly contend, however, that apart from its broad statement, Liteky acknowledges that rarely, events in court may reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. Among the events cited above, only one — Judge Smith's ill-tempered references to Fagan — even arguably fall within that deplorable range. And those brief comments in the course of a decade of litigation refer only to one witness, not to the Davidians or Appellants in general or to the merits of their case. Moreover, Liteky states that expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance and even anger do not establish bias or partiality. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147.