Opinion ID: 1951916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Information on Michael Mills's Suicide

Text: Defendant argues that the repeated mention of Michael Mills's suicide denied him a fair trial. As noted, Mills killed himself on June 18, 1994. Before trial began, defendant moved to preclude the State from telling the jury that Mills had committed suicide, as opposed to informing the jury simply that he had died. The prosecutor's position was that the information was necessary to provide context, so that the jury would not be shocked if the truth was revealed later. Asked to identify the prejudice defendant would suffer if the jury was told of Mills's suicide, defense counsel balked: I think that if it is irrelevant, prejudice is not significant. If the Court is asking for prejudice, there is practically none if all they offer is that he committed suicide, period. But if anyone then wishes to go into the facts surrounding the suicide, it sounds to me like a back door attempt to put in statements [Mills] made about my client, which they can't do. Because defense counsel elected not to pursue the matter further, the court never explicitly ruled on the issue. During the State's opening argument, the prosecutor noted that [y]ou're not going to hear from Michael Mills. Michael Mills is not going to testify because in June of [19]94 Michael Mills committed suicide. Similarly, the State's redirect of Daniel Kaighn placed Mills's suicide before the jury: Q: And then there was a question about whether you had spoken to Mr. Mills orby the way, Mr. Mills is no longer with us, is that correct? A: Yes. Q: And what happened to him? A: He was found hanged on his front porch. Q: Suicide? A: So they say. Kevin Wrigley also testified to Mills's suicide during the State's direct examination: Q: Did he give you any names of anybody else who had been involved in that? A: Yeah, this guy Mike. Q: And did he tell you anything about A: He says he was a witness and his dad had him taken care of. He thought that he committed suicide or something like that. Q: This is what Mr. Feaster's saying? A: Yeah. Q: And that's in relation to a guy named Mike? A: Yeah. Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's opening comment or the testimony provided by Kaighn and Wrigley, nor did defense counsel request a limiting instruction. In fact, defense counsel emphasized Mills's suicide during summation to further its argument that Mills rather than defendant was the shooter: The [S]tate made a better case against Michael Mills than they have against [defendant]. It couldn't be more clear. Who borrowed the car? Michael Mills. Who stopped on the [W]hite [B]ridge? Although we are not privy to the conversations that occurred, the shotgun is pulled from the water. Who? Michael Mills. Who moved the bag out of Shiplee's car? Michael Mills. .... Who committed suicide? The prosecutor introduced to you in his opening statement, Michael Mills isn't here because he committed suicide. The prosecutor objected to the insinuation that Mills's suicide reflected his consciousness of guilt. The court then provided a limiting instruction, over defendant's objection, that the jury should not draw any inferences as to Mr. Mills'[s] suicide or the reasons that may have existed for him to have committed suicide. After the death sentence, defendant's motion for a new trial was based partially on the information heard by the jury relating to Mills's suicide. Finding that the information was necessary to adequately inform the jury, the court rejected the argument. Defendant first argues that Mills's suicide was irrelevant. Defendant also submits that testimony concerning Mills's suicide prejudiced him by unfairly raising the specter of defendant's consciousness of guilt, suggesting that because the jury may have believed the suicide reflected Mills's consciousness of guilt, that consciousness was transferred to defendant by association. Next, defendant claims that the information improperly allowed the jury to infer that Mills's suicide resulted from his fear of defendant, thereby prejudicing the jury against defendant. In support of that contention, defendant points to Kaighn's response of so they say when asked whether Mills's death was due to suicide, and Wrigley's characterization of defendant's statement that his father had [Mills] taken care of. Lastly, defendant submits that even if the information was relevant, its probative value was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice under N.J.R.E. 403. We find Mills's suicide to be relevant information properly presented to the jury. In State v. Mann, 132 N.J. 410, 421-23, 625 A. 2d 1102 (1993), we observed that a defendant's attempted suicide is generally admitted into evidence. See, e.g., Aldridge v. State, 229 Ga.App. 544, 494 S.E. 2d 368, 370-71 (1997); State v. Mitchell, 450 N.W. 2d 828, 831-32 (Iowa 1990). We stated that before admitting such evidence, a trial court should normally hold an admissibility hearing to determine whether evidence of the attempt is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the suicide attempt was prompted by a desire to avoid prosecution and punishment or was otherwise evidence of consciousness of guilt. Mann, supra, 132 N.J. at 423, 625 A. 2d 1102. We noted that a court also should consider alternative explanations offered by the defendant, any possible prejudice that might attend such evidence, and in the event of the admission of the evidence, should provide an instruction on its proper use. Id. at 424, 625 A. 2d 1102. Unlike Mann, this case implicates the suicide of an alleged accomplice and not a defendant's attempt at suicide. The State notes that Mills was not being charged with any crime at the time of his death. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that Mann 's conclusion that a defendant's attempted suicide may be relevant in some circumstances is applicable in this context. See Commonwealth v. Gibson, 547 Pa. 71, 688 A. 2d 1152, 1166 n. 30 (1997)(validating prosecutor's mention of co-defendant's suicide, because evidence establishing that suicide had been presented), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 364, 139 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1997). The relevance of Mills's suicide is best understood in the context of Wrigley's testimony. The credibility of Wrigley's testimony was under severe attack by the defense. The State convincingly demonstrated the value of his testimony by providing Wrigley's detailed account of defendant's statements, including the mention of a suicide by an accomplice named Mike. The idiosyncratic nature of Wrigley's knowledge directly buttressed his credibility and, necessarily, the State's case against defendant. See N.J.R.E. 401 (defining relevant evidence as that having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action). Similarly, the prosecutor's opening comment provided context for what would come later, and Kaighn's testimony provided direct evidence of Mills's suicide. Having determined that evidence of Mills's suicide was relevant, we also conclude that the information did not unduly prejudice defendant. Under N.J.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded in the trial court's discretion if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. Defendant argues that the suicide, because it may have indicated Mills's guilty conscience, unfairly tarnished defendant in view of the likelihood that the jury would transfer that consciousness of guilt to him. We recognize the plausibility of that inference. However, an equally plausible inference to be drawn from Mills's suicide is that Mills's role in the murder was more significant than the State suggested, thereby lessening the culpability of defendant. Thus, two inferences, one prejudicial to defendant and the other beneficial, could have been drawn from the evidence of Mills's suicide. In view of the substantial evidence presented at trial linking defendant to the crime, we perceive that any prejudice occasioned by the negative inference was minimal. Therefore, taking into account the obvious relevance of the testimony concerning Mills's suicide, we are unable to conclude that the probative value of that evidence substantially was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. We also note the court's clear instruction at the end of the guilt phase admonishing the jury not to draw any inferences from the evidence of Mills's suicide. Nor are we persuaded that the manner in which the information was presented unduly prejudiced defendant. Kaighn stated [s]o they say in response to the prosecutor's inquiry of whether Mills committed suicide. Although that statement may be perceived as indicating Kaighn's belief that Mills's death was not actually a suicide, the reference was fleeting. Moreover, the prejudicial effect of the statement was minimized in view of the prosecutor's acknowledgment that the death was a suicide. Similarly, Wrigley's testimony that defendant's father had taken care of Mills was an isolated reference that the prosecutor declined to explore. Defense counsel did not object to any of those statements. Moreover, in view of the testimony's relevance, we are convinced that any foreseeable prejudice to defendant could not have outweighed its probative value. Recognizing that defense counsel attempted to capitalize on Mills's suicide during summation supports our conclusion. As noted, the reality is that Mills's suicide, with its attendant suggestion of Mills's consciousness of guilt, inured to defendant's benefit as it raised at least a permissible inference that Mills, not defendant, may have killed Donaghy. Defense counsel's summation clearly encouraged the jury to draw that inference, which the trial court discouraged by directing the jury to draw no inferences from Mills's suicide.