Opinion ID: 2217907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Contribution Claim Against the State.

Text: In seeking to overturn the adverse judgment on its contribution claim against the State, Allied acknowledges that, because a workers' compensation claim was Lund's sole remedy against her employer, the common liability to Lund required for contribution is lacking. It urges us to find, however, that the common liability requirement is unjust or, in the alternative, that it is a violation of equal protection of the law under both state and federal constitutions. We decline to eliminate or modify the common liability criterion for contribution claims. That requirement, originally prescribed as a rule of common law, has now attained statutory recognition. See Schreier v. Sonderleiter, 420 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Iowa 1988). It is provided in Iowa Code section 668.5(1) (1989) that [a] right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury, death, or harm. It is not necessary, however, that the common liability rest on the same legal theory. Schreier, 420 N.W.2d at 824. It is not our role to alter this legislative determination of the grounds for a contribution claim. We declined to do so in Rees v. Dallas County, 372 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Iowa 1985), and Speck v. Unit Handling Division of Litton Systems, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 543, 547-48 (Iowa 1985), both decided after the enactment of section 668.5(1). We maintain a similar posture in the present litigation. Allied's contention that the common liability requirement denies it equal protection of the law is premised on the idea that this rule gives unequal protection to employers who are primarily or vicariously at fault as opposed to other persons whose fault produces tort liability. We believe that there are two flaws in Allied's equal protection claims. First, we have recognized that the equal protection clause is not violated if the challenged law operates equally upon those persons or classes of persons intended to be affected by the legislative or judge-made rule in similar situations. Train Unlimited Corp. v. Iowa Ry. Fin. Auth., 362 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1985); Richards v. City of Muscatine, 237 N.W.2d 48, 60 (Iowa 1975). To sustain an equal protection challenge on behalf of a claimant, it is necessary to show that the rule being challenged treats different categories of claimants disparately as to the same type of claim. It does not suffice for this purpose merely to show that alleged tortfeasors against whom claims are being made enjoy a different legal status than other persons would have enjoyed if subjected to similar tort claims. That circumstance reflects differing treatment of tortfeasors rather than of claimants. Second, it is significant that the common liability requirement is not peculiar to workers' compensation situations. It applies to an unlimited variety of liability claims in which workers' compensation is not involved. [2] The court did not err in denying Allied's contribution claim against the State as a result of the Lund settlement.