Opinion ID: 222406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Death Qualification of the Jury

Text: Gabrion argues that the District Court erred by engaging in a lopsided jury selection process in which prospective jurors who expressed pro-death penalty views were empaneled, while their anti-death penalty counterparts with equally strong opposing views were struck for cause. In essence, Gabrion's argument is that the District Court's systematically uneven treatment of prospective jurors violated his constitutional right to an unbiased jury under the Sixth Amendment. [12] A criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause. Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)). [A] juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the [statutory death-penalty] framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible. Id. (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). Although Uttecht, Witt, and Witherspoon involved challenges to anti-death penalty jurors, the rule of substantial impairment applies equally to prospective jurors whose attitudes rest at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) (applying Witt to reverse a death sentence due to the empaneling of a single pro-death penalty juror). If jurors who initially express some doubts about the death penalty are excused for cause but jurors who initially express a preference or inclination in favor of the death penalty in murder cases are accepted, as occurred in the instant case, the jury cannot be a representative cross-section of the community. The Supreme Court has recently made jury sentencing a constitutional requirement. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Juries have plenary power to choose between life and death in these cases. Thus the way the jury is selected may become the most important determinant of the sentencing outcome. Both the people who have no scruples about the use of the death penalty and those who have serious doubts are part of the people whose will the jury is designed to represent in our legal system. [A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little moreand must do nothing lessthan express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The community is deeply divided on the death penalty. See David Garland, Peculiar Institution: America's Death Penalty In An Age of Abolition, 36-55 (2010). If strenuously pro-death penalty jurors are going to be permitted, jurors who lean against the death penalty should not be removed for cause. Otherwise, such a lopsided jury can hardly express the will of the people. In light of these principles, Gabrion's argument has some force. In written responses to questionnaires and orally during voir dire, three prospective jurors expressed strong personal views in favor of death sentences for all convicted murderers, [13] and three prospective jurors expressed equally strong personal views against the death penalty. [14] All six prospective jurors made statements that unmistakably suggested that their deeply held personal viewseither for or against the death penalty, respectivelywould prevent them from faithfully applying the nuanced statutory system of weighing aggravators and mitigators during the penalty phase. But when pushed by the district judge or counsel, all six equivocated and stated that they could temporarily put aside their personal beliefs, listen to evidence, or weigh the statutory aggravators and mitigators. The responses of the six jurors presented near-perfect symmetry on both ends of the ideological spectrum: three pro death-penalty (but equivocating) jurors, and three anti-death penalty (but equivocating) jurors. But while the revealed attitudes of the prospective jurors were symmetrical, the District Court's treatment of them was not. The District Court struck all three of the anti-death penalty jurors for cause over Gabrion's objection, but it empaneled all three of the pro-death penalty jurors despite Gabrion's motion to strike for cause. The District Court reasoned that two of the anti-death penalty jurors equivocated, and that the other one was guilty of fuzzy thinking. Regarding their three pro-death penalty counterparts, the District Court was silent on the equivocation of one and attributed the inconsistent responses of the two others to their lack of a college education. We are troubled by the appearance of uneven treatment in how the District Court handled the pro-death penalty and anti-death penalty jurors during the jury selection process. [15] Of course, the determination of whether a prospective juror's attitude regarding the death penalty will substantially impair him from applying the statutory penalty-phase framework involves some inferences that cannot be made from a bare transcript alone. [T]he trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts. Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 9, 127 S.Ct. 2218. But when the transcript suggests systematically uneven treatment of equivocating pro-and anti-death penalty jurors, it is increasingly unlikely that the sole culprit is differences in the demeanor of those jurors. We need not definitively resolve the issue in this case, however, because any error affected only the penalty phase of the trial, [16] and we are already reversing the District Court and remanding for a new penalty phase on the independent ground of improperly excluding relevant mitigating evidence.