Opinion ID: 1141411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: statutory authority of the commission

Text: The adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1965, served as a general statutory grant of rule-making authority to administrative agencies to promulgate rules and regulations to effect the purposes of the specific acts they are required to administer. See Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 666, 791 P.2d 410, 416 (1990). In addition, the state legislature has, by statute, empowered the Commission to issue rules and regulations necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. I.C. § 72-508. The purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act, enacted under the broad canopy of the police power, is stated in I.C. § 72-201 to provide sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families.... Finally, I.C. § 72-803 grants the Commission the authority to approve claims for attorney fees. [2] Thus, it is apparent that the Commission has the authority to administer I.C. § 72-803, and to issue regulations necessary to bring about secure relief for injured workers and their families. [3] The Commission asserts that the regulation, issued pursuant to I.C. §§ 72-508 and 72-803, is reasonable in its design to protect the public welfare. Rhodes challenges the reasonableness of the Commission's interpretation of the scope of power conferred by § 72-803, complaining that the regulation exceeds any reasonable extension of the power to approve attorney fees, and unreasonably transgresses separation of powers. This Court has ruled that the Commission has original and exclusive jurisdiction over issues concerning attorney fees in workers' compensation cases. Brannon v. Pike, 112 Idaho 938, 939, 737 P.2d 459, 460 (1987). However, this ruling must be balanced against the principle that the judicial department of the government is uniquely imbued with the power to regulate the practice of law. Idaho State Bar Assoc. v. Idaho Pub. Util., 102 Idaho 672, 675, 637 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1981). Where the practice of law intersects with a social system such as the workers' compensation system, the judicial power does not merge, but remains plenary. Any authority exercised by the other departments of government that affects the practice of law must not conflict with judicial resolution. The authority granted to the Commission under § 72-803, to approve attorney fees, does not conflict with the judicial penumbra. The regulation under challenge, promulgated to foster ease, utility, and predictability in the application of I.C. § 72-803, in turn does not overstep the legislative bounds of I.C. § 72-803, read in pari materia with the entire Workers' Compensation Act. See Heese v. A & T Trucking, 102 Idaho 598, 600, 635 P.2d 962, 964 (1981) (various provisions of Workers' Compensation Act must be read in pari materia ). The regulation is not a fee schedule. It is a framework establishing uniform grounds for fee approval. The language of I.C. § 72-803 contemplates that the Commission will monitor the appropriateness of fees on behalf of claimants, and therefore the regulation provides a reasonable interpretation of the power vested by I.C. § 72-803. In this case, the operative word in I.C. § 72-803 is approve. [4] Rhodes argues that the word approve means simply that, to approve. It does not mean to regulate. Given the broad empowerment provided by I.C. § 72-508, coupled with the purpose underlying the Workers' Compensation Act, i.e., to provide sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families, I.C. § 72-201, we cannot agree with Rhodes' contention. The absence of the word regulate in I.C. § 72-803, is not legally significant and does not exact a reading that the legislature intended to confine the Commission's regulatory authority. The workers' compensation law is to be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and promote justice. Mayo v. Safeway Stores, 93 Idaho 161, 166, 457 P.2d 400, 405 (1969). Accordingly, we hold that the word approve is sufficient to establish the proper delegation of the power to regulate attorney fees.