Opinion ID: 2974292
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unanimous-Life Instruction5

Text: The trial court’s instruction to the jury stating that any verdict recommending life would have to be unanimous did not violate the Eighth Amendment as set forth in Caldwell because it properly reflected Ohio law. In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court “held . . . that the jury must not be misled regarding the role it plays in the sentencing decision.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 8 (1994) (citing Caldwell, 420 U.S. at 341-42). “[The Supreme Court has] since read Caldwell as relevant only to certain types of comments – those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision. To establish a Caldwell violation, a petitioner necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly describe the role assigned the jury by local law.” Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted). The unanimous-life instruction did not violate Ohio law. Under Ohio law, a jury verdict recommending a sentence of life in a death penalty case must be unanimous. As this Court has recognized on numerous occasions, “[i]n Brooks, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed that the jury’s determination that a life sentence is appropriate must be unanimous and that a jury should be instructed of that fact.” Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 356 (6th Cir. 2001). The mere fact that a defendant, practically speaking, may receive a life sentence despite a jury’s inability to agree does not mean that a jury verdict imposing life need not be unanimous. As explained by the Ohio Supreme Court in Brooks, R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) facially seems to require the jury to recommend a life sentence even if only one juror finds the death penalty inappropriate. There is some dispute in the case law, however, as to how much power a solitary juror has to nullify a death sentence. In State v. Jenkins . . . this court held that in returning a sentence of life imprisonment under JR.C. 2929.03(D), the jury’s verdict must be unanimous. In State v. Springer, . . . this court held that “when a jury becomes irreconcilably deadlocked during its sentencing deliberations in the penalty phase of a capital murder trial and is unable to reach a unanimous verdict to recommend any sentence authorized by R.C. 2929.03(C)(2), the trial court is required to sentence the offender to life imprisonment. Thus, practically speaking a lone juror could prevent the imposition of the death penalty. Jenkins defines what the jury’s job is – to render a unanimous verdict. Springer simply explains what a trial court must do if a jury is deadlocked, that is when the jury does not properly do its job. We believe that Jenkins and Springer may be harmonized, and made consistent with the policy behind R.C. 2929.03(D), through a jury instruction which requires the jury, when it cannot unanimously agree on the 5 Unanimous-life claims must also be distinguished from unanimous -mitigating factor claims. A unanimous life claim is based on a jury instruction stating that a verdict imposing life must be unanimous. A unanimous-mitigating factor claim is based on a jury instruction stating that mitigating factors must be unanimously found in order to be considered. In case law, both are sometimes referred to as unanimity claims. Petitioner is not arguing that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that mitigating factors had to be unanimously found in order to be considered. Moreover, even if Petitioner made this argument, there would be no support in the record for sustaining it. The instructions did not state that mitigating factors had to be unanimously found. In this Circuit, failing to expressly state that mitigating factors need not be unanimously found does not improperly imply that mitigating factors must be unanimously found. Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 337-38 (6th Cir. 1998); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1121 (6th Cir. 1990). This will be discussed more, infra, IV.B. Nos. 04-3515/3585 Williams v. Anderson Page 16 death sentence, to move on in their deliberations to a consideration of which life sentence is appropriate, with that determination to be unanimous. Brooks, 661 N.E.2d at 1042. In other words, where the jury cannot unanimously recommend life or death, the trial court must sentence the petitioner to life without the benefit of any jury verdict. See Brooks, 661 N.E.2d at 1042; see also Buell, 274 F.3d at 356. Moreover, to the extent Petitioner is arguing that the jury instruction on unanimity was misleading because it failed to inform the jury of the consequences of deadlock – that practically speaking a lone juror can impose a sentence of life – this Court must reject Petitioner’s claim. The Supreme Court rejected just such a challenge to instructions under the Federal Death Penalty Act in Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999). In Jones, the petitioner argued that the Eighth Amendment required the trial court to instruct the jury on the consequences of deadlock. Id. at 382. In other words, the petitioner argued that the Eighth Amendment compelled the trial court to inform the jury that the petitioner would receive a life sentence if the jury could not agree. Id. The Supreme Court explained: The truth of the matter is that the proposed instruction has no bearing on the jury’s role in the sentencing process. Rather, it speaks to what happens in the event that the jury is unable to fulfill its role – when deliberations break down and the jury is unable to produce a unanimous sentence recommendation. Petitioner’s argument . . . appears to be that a death sentence is arbitrary within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment if the jury is not given any bit of information that might possibly influence an individual juror’s voting behavior. That contention has no merit. We have never suggested, for example, that the Eighth Amendment requires a jury to be instructed on the consequences of a breakdown in the deliberative process. On the contrary, we have long been of the view that the very object of a jury system is to secure unanimity by comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Buell, 274 F.3d at 357. Therefore, the instructions on unanimity in this case did not violate the Eighth Amendment.