Opinion ID: 768185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Professor Lausier's Expert Testimony

Text: 8 Professor Lausier, Chang's only proffered expert witness, would have opinedthat the Certificate was genuine, and his testimony would have directly contradicted the government's contention that the Certificate was counterfeit. If Chang had been able to prove the Certificate's authenticity, he would have been acquitted on all charges; therefore, Lausier's testimony, if properly admitted, would have been a key element of Chang's defense. 9 We review the district court's exclusion of Lausier's testimony for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964, 971-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, _______ U.S. _______, 120 S. Ct. 176 (1999). 10 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that expert testimony should be admitted only if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed. R. Evid. 702. To qualify as an expert, a witness must have knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education relevant to such evidence or fact in issue. Id. Further, evidence that is otherwise admissible under Rule 702may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . confusion of the issues, . . . undue delay, [or] waste of time . . . . Fed. R. Evid. 403. We view [t]he admissibility of expert testimony [as] a subject peculiarly within the sound discretion of the trial judge, who alone must decide the qualifications of the expert on a given subject and the extent to which his opinions may be required.  Fineberg v. United States, 393 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1968). Thus, although Professor Lausier's testimony was a key element of Chang's defense, we accord a high degree of deference to the district court's findings regarding Professor Lausier's qualifications and the relevance of his proffered testimony to the issues presented at trial. 11  The district court heard testimony, outside the presence of the jury, to determine whether Professor Lausier was qualified to testify as an expert witness. Although Lausier admitted that he had no formal training in identification of counterfeit securities, Chang argued that Lausier was qualified to testify because he had expert knowledge regarding the history of, and purpose for, the issuance of obligations like the Certificate. The district court rejected Chang's argument, ruling that (1) the [only] fact in issue is the authenticity of [the Certificate]; (2) whether such things were ever in fact validly issued was not relevant; and (3) Professor Lausier's testimony would not be admitted because he was not qualified to opine as to the authenticity of the specific instrument at issue, the Certificate. The district court also ruled that Lausier's testimony would be a complete waste of the jury's time. 12 Chang contends the district court conceded that Professor Lausier was well-qualified to testify as to the underlying indicia of authenticity 2 but improperly excluded the testimony because Lausier was unable to opine on the ultimate question. Chang cites United States v. Rahm , 993 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1993), in which an expert's testimony was excluded, in part, because she was unable to form a conclusive opinion based on the facts presented to her. See id. at 1411-12. We reversed in Rahm, stating that trial courts may not seek -- or require -- conclusiveness in considering the strength of an expert's opinion. Id. at 1412. But Rahm is clearly distinguishable because Lausier intended to testify that the Certificate was authentic, so the district court could not have been concerned with the conclusiveness of his opinion. Rather, the district courtproperly rejected the qualifications upon which Professor Lausier was to base his conclusion, given that he had no experience in identifying counterfeit foreign securities. 13 Chang also cites Rahm for the proposition that it is reversible error to exclude expert testimony pertaining to a defendant's sole intended defense, id. at 1415, here the authenticity of the Certificate. This is not an accurate characterization of the defense's case. Chang's principal defense at trial was that he believed the Certificate to be genuine (thereby negating an intent to defraud), not that the Certificate was, in fact, genuine. Lausier's expert testimony was proffered only to support the latter defense. 3 14 In addition, Chang argues that (a) the district court should not have required specific knowledge regarding the identification of counterfeit securities and (b) Professor Lausier's practical experience in international finance was sufficient to qualify him as an expert. Lausier did not have the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education required by Rule 702; he did not testify as to any training or experience, practical or otherwise, detecting counterfeit securities. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to determine that Lausier's practical experience in international finance did not amount to practical experience determining whether a particular security is counterfeit, the fact at issue in this case. 15 Chang also argues that Professor Lausier's testimony was relevant to rebut the government's expert witness, United States Secret Service Special Agent Samuel A. Tong, who testified that he believed the Certificate to be counterfeit. In particular, Chang asserts that Lausier's testimony was necessary to rebut Tong's testimony regarding the Japanese government's standard practices relating to obligations analogous to the Certificate. In effect, Chang contends that, even if Lausier was not qualified to opine as to the authenticity of the Certificate, Lausier should have been allowed to testify as to the Japanese government's general practices in issuing obligations similar to the Certificate in order to rebut Tong's external testimony regarding the Certificate. But Tong's testimony focused on the particular aspects of the Certificate that supported his opinion that the Certificate was counterfeit, not the history and background of the issuance of securities like the Certificate. On redirect, Tong also testified that his area of expertise was printing and manufacturing and that he did not purport to be a finance expert or historian of Japanese securities, thereby further limiting the scope of his testimony. Lausier was not qualified to opine as to the particular aspects of the Certificate or to dispute the techniques used by Tong in evaluating the Certificate; therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Lausier's expert testimony offered for rebuttal purposes. 16 Finally, the district court stated as an additional, independent ground for its exclusion of Professor Lausier's expert testimony that Lausier was not picked as an initially neutral party, expressing concern that Professor Lausier had assisted Chang in his efforts to authenticate the Certificate prior to trial and was, in effect, a biased expert witness. Chang asserts that any such bias should go to weight rather than admissibility. In Hingson v. Pacific S.W. Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984), we held that testimony otherwise admissible under Rule 702 is not precluded simply because of a relationship between the witness and one of the parties. Id. at 1412. Because the district court properly found Professor Lausier's testimony inadmissible under Rule 702 on grounds independent of its bias concern,we do not find this aspect of the district court's ruling rises to the level of reversible error. B 17 Our conclusion that the district court properly excluded Professor Lausier's testimony is consistent with United States v. Blum, No. 97-50228, 1999 WL 801513 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1999) (unpublished disposition), in which we rejected Blum's appeal of this same issue. Our determination in Blum also governs as the law of this case. See, e.g., United States v. Melvin, 91 F.3d 1218, 1224 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 506 (9th Cir. 1991).