Opinion ID: 2003518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Natural Life Instruction

Text: Because of defendant's multiple murder convictions, the only sentencing alternative to the death penalty was natural life imprisonment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1).) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing his tendered instruction informing the jury that if the death penalty were not imposed, he would receive a mandatory natural life sentence. Instead, the jury was simply instructed that if defendant were not sentenced to death the trial court would sentence him to a term of imprisonment. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7A.01 (2d ed. 1981). This court addressed the same issue in defendant's direct appeal. ( People v. Coleman (1989), 129 Ill.2d 321, 348-49, 135 Ill. Dec. 834, 544 N.E.2d 330.) The court noted that in People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146, a prospective rule was announced requiring jurors to be informed of the mandatory natural life sentence for offenders convicted of multiple murders who do not receive the death penalty. However, because defendant's sentencing occurred prior to the decision in Gacho, it did not apply to his case. ( Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 348, 135 Ill.Dec. 834, 544 N.E.2d 330.) This court further held that the Gacho rule was not of constitutional dimension, and thus rejected the argument that under the principles of Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, Gacho applied retroactively to cases pending on direct review when it was announced. ( Coleman, 129 Ill.2d at 349, 135 Ill.Dec. 834, 544 N.E.2d 330.) Defendant currently attempts to offer slightly different rationales for applying Gacho retroactively. However, because the issue has already been decided, the doctrine of res judicata precludes reconsideration of the issue. See People v. Franklin (1995), 167 Ill.2d 1, 23, 212 Ill.Dec. 153, 656 N.E.2d 750. Defendant also cites the United States Supreme Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina (1994), 512 U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, in support of his claim that the jury should have been instructed on mandatory natural life imprisonment for multiple murders. In Simmons, the Court held that if the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue and under State law the only sentencing alternative to the death penalty is life imprisonment without parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be accurately informed of that alternative. This court has yet to decide whether Simmons applies retroactively in post-conviction proceedings where the defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct review before Simmons was decided. (See Franklin, 167 Ill.2d at 24-25, 212 Ill.Dec. 153, 656 N.E.2d 750.) Assuming for the sake of argument that Simmons does apply retroactively, defendant's reliance on Simmons is misplaced. In Simmons, the prosecution specifically raised the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness during closing argument by asking the jury what to do with [the defendant] now that he is in our midst and by stating that a death sentence would be a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense. ( Simmons, 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2190-91, 129 L.Ed.2d at 139.) The Court held, in essence, that due process entitled the defendant to inform the jury that if sentenced to life imprisonment he would never be released on parole in order to rebut the prosecution's argument that, if not executed, defendant would pose a threat to society. ( Simmons, 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2193, 129 L.Ed.2d at 142 (plurality opinion); Simmons, 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2201, 129 L.Ed.2d at 151 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.).) We note that no majority opinion was delivered in Simmons. The reasoning of the plurality opinion might arguably apply in situations where the State does not argue future dangerousness. However, only a more limited rule applicable where the prosecution specifically argues future dangerousness received the support of a majority of the members of the Court. (See Note, Simmons v. South Carolina: Safeguarding a Capital Defendant's Right to Fair Sentencing, 26 Loy.U.Chi.L.J. 511, 539-40 (1995).) Here, unlike Simmons, the State did not rely on future dangerousness in its argument to the jury as a reason for imposition of the death penalty. Thus Simmons does not apply. Defendant appears to acknowledge that the prosecution did not raise the issue of future dangerousness. However, defendant maintains that the pre- Gacho instruction given here itself raises the issue of future dangerousness. We disagree. While the instruction may not dispel concerns of future dangerousness as effectively as a Gacho instruction, neither does the instruction raise the issue of future dangerousness in the sense contemplated by Simmons. Defendant also contends that the State in effect misled the jury about sentencing alternatives. During his closing argument at the aggravation/mitigation stage of sentencing, defendant intimated that if the death penalty was not imposed, he would receive a life sentence. The trial court sustained the State's objection to these remarks. Even if the State's objection could somehow be viewed as misleading, defendant's argument would fail. Citing a footnote in the plurality opinion, defendant contends that Simmons embraces a general principle that the prosecutor may not mislead the jury. In context, the comments in the footnote to which defendant refers are clearly limited to cases where the prosecution has placed future dangerousness at issue. ( Simmons, 512 U.S. at ____ n. 5, 114 S.Ct. at 2194 n. 5, 129 L.Ed.2d at 143 n. 5 ([T]he State may not mislead the jury by concealing accurate information about the defendant's parole ineligibility. The Due Process Clause will not tolerate placing a capital defendant in a straitjacket by barring him from rebutting the prosecution's arguments of future dangerousness with the fact that he is ineligible for parole under state law).) Thus Simmons does not support defendant's claim that he was constitutionally entitled to have the jury instructed on the mandatory natural life sentence for multiple murder convictions.