Opinion ID: 186689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Duty to Ensure Collective Bargaining

Text: 109 In a vain effort to defend the Final Rule's construction of a purported structure for collective bargaining, the Government points to § 9701(a), which says that the Department is authorized to promulgate a HR system [n]otwithstanding any other provision of this part, and § 9701(b)(3), which says that any such system shall-. . . (3) not waive, modify, or otherwise affect [certain existing statutory provisions relating to, inter alia, merit hiring, equal pay, whistleblowing, and prohibited personnel practices]. The Government appears to argue that, read together, these two provisions authorize DHS to waive any provision relating to employee relations, save those specifically listed in § 9701(b)(3), and then to do entirely as it pleases in establishing a HR system. This argument is completely unconvincing. When § 9701 is read in its entirely, it is absolutely clear that DHS does not have a free hand to construct a HR system entirely as it prefers. The HSA does not require the Department to adopt any existing human resources management system, but it does specify system requirements that DHS must follow in promulgating a HR system. See id. § 9701(b). Thus, the system must be flexible and contemporary, id. § 9701(b)(1)-(2); it must comply with certain provisions of law, id. § 9701(b)(3); and, it must include several substantive features, including ensur[ing] that employees may . . . bargain collectively, id. § 9701(b)(4). In other words, DHS's discretion to establish a human resources management system for some or all of the organizational units of the Department of Homeland Security, id. § 9701(a), is limited by all of the requirements listed in § 9701(b). Most importantly, at least with respect to the issues in this case, when Congress added the substantive requirement in the HSA guaranteeing DHS employees the right to bargain collectively, it obviously intended for this requirement to be construed reasonably and applied fully. 110 Although the HSA requires the Department to ensure that their employees may bargain collectively, the Act does not define collective bargaining. Fortunately, this is not a term without meaning. Indeed, collective bargaining is a term of art in the federal sector that has been defined by Congress in the FSLMS: 111 [C]ollective bargaining means the performance of the mutual obligation of the representative of an agency and the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit in the agency to meet at reasonable times and to consult and bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the conditions of employment affecting such employees and to execute, if requested by either party, a written document incorporating any collective bargaining agreement reached, but the obligation referred to in this paragraph does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or to make a concession. 112 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12) (2000). The Government's incantation of the truism that collective bargaining is not a static concept with a fixed meaning in all circumstances, DHS's Br. at 32, is thus beside the point. In the context of federal sector labor-relations, collective bargaining is a term of art with a well-established statutory meaning. The Department presumably understood this, because its Final Rule adopts essentially the same definition as the one in the FSLMS: 113 Collective bargaining means the performance of the mutual obligation of a management representative of the Department and an exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit in the Department to meet at reasonable times and to consult and bargain in a good faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the conditions of employment affecting such employees and to execute, if requested by either party, a written document incorporating any collective bargaining agreement reached, but the obligation referred to in this paragraph does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or to make a concession. 114 5 C.F.R. § 9701.504 (2006). And collective bargaining agreement is defined in nearly identical terms in the FSLMS and under the Final Rule, as an agreement entered into as a result of collective bargaining pursuant to the provisions of this subpart. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(8) (2000), with 5 C.F.R. § 9701.504 (2006). 115 There is a presumption that Congress uses the same term consistently in different statutes. See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 233, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005) (emphasizing the premise that when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes); see also Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 254, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994); cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1513, 164 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006) ([W]hen `judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well.') (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998)) (ellipsis in original). Given the parallel provisions in the FSLMS, the HSA, and the Final Rule, it is clear that collective bargaining under the HSA gains meaning from the application of that same term under Chapter 71. Indeed, these parallel provisions give a strong indication that the common term should be construed consistently under each statute. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 105 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); see also Kooritzky v. Herman, 178 F.3d 1315 (D.C.Cir.1999) (similar language in two different statutes is strong indication that the language is to be interpreted alike). 116 The Government argues that the Department was free to modify the collective bargaining provisions of Chapter 71 in promulgating a new HR system pursuant to the HSA. DHS's Br. at 31. This is undoubtedly correct. But nothing in the HSA suggests that the meaning of collective bargaining under Chapter 71 could be disregarded by the Department in its promulgation of the HR system. There are many provisions relating to collective bargaining in Chapter 71 — e.g., resort to FLRA, determination of appropriate units, handling of refusal-to-bargain complaints, exceptions to arbitral awards, and use of an impasses panel — that the Department was free to ignore in its Final Rule. The core meaning of collective bargaining itself, however, could not be ignored or supplanted. Why? Because the HSA states explicitly that, in establishing a new HR system, the Department shall 117 ensure that employees may organize, bargain collectively, and participate through labor organizations of their own choosing in decisions which affect them, subject to any exclusion from coverage or limitation on negotiability established by law. 118 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(4) (Supp. II 2002). This statutory obligation is mandatory, not optional. And if, as shown above, collective bargaining means the same thing under both the HSA and the FSLMS, then application of the term under the latter statute cannot possibly be irrelevant to an understanding of how the term applies under the former. 119 With these considerations in mind, we now review the provisions of the Final Rule to determine whether the Department's regulations ensure that employees may . . . bargain collectively, as the HSA requires. The obvious problem with the HR system is that very few conditions of employment are subject to meaningful bargaining, and the few conditions over which the parties can negotiate may be unilaterally abrogated by management. A system of this sort does not even give an illusion of collective bargaining. 120
121 The most extraordinary feature of the Final Rule is that it reserves to the Department the right to unilaterally abrogate lawfully negotiated and executed agreements. This is plainly impermissible under the HSA. If the Department could unilaterally abrogate lawful contracts, this would nullify the statute's specific guarantee of collective bargaining rights, because DHS cannot ensure collective bargaining without affording employees the right to negotiate binding agreements. The District Court's decision on this point is exactly right: 122 The Regulations fail because any collective bargaining negotiations pursuant to its terms are illusory: the Secretary retains numerous avenues by which s/he can unilaterally declare contract terms null and void, without prior notice to the Unions or employees and without bargaining or recourse. 123 Chertoff I, 385 F. Supp 2d at 25. 124 There can be no doubt that the Final Rule authorizes DHS to unilaterally abrogate any collective bargaining agreement that is negotiated under the HR system, not just those in existence when the Final Rule was promulgated. Indeed, the Government conceded this point, before the District Court, in its briefs to this court, and during oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 6-9 (Government counsel explicitly affirmed his understanding of the provisions in Subpart E as permitting DHS to override any collectively bargained agreement it enters, not just those extant when the regulations take effect.). We `give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.' Castlewood Prods., L.L.C. v. Norton, 365 F.3d 1076, 1082 (D.C.Cir.2004) (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994)). Accordingly, `the agency's interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' Id. (quoting Shalala, 512 U.S. at 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381). 125 As the District Court found, the Government's proffered interpretation of the regulations is consistent with the language employed in key provisions of Subpart E. An agreement negotiated pursuant to the HR system will not take effect if found by DHS officials to be inconsistent with Department rules or regulations. Id. § 9701.515(d)(1)-(2). Even if not explicitly disapproved, an agreement takes effect only if it comports with, inter alia, the Department's implementing directives and other policies and regulations. Id. at § 9701.515(d)(3). Most significantly, the regulations give DHS ongoing authority to render collective bargaining agreements unenforceable if an authorized agency official determines that they are contrary to. . . Departmental implementing directives. . . and other policies and regulations. Id. § 9701.515(d)(5). Moreover, in elaborating the list of management rights, the regulations state that nothing in [Subpart E of the regulations] may affect the authority of any management official or supervisor of the Department . . . to take whatever . . . actions may be necessary to carry out the Department's mission. Id. § 9701.511(a), (a)(2). Read together, these provisions permit unilateral abrogation of collectively bargained contracts. 126 In the Government's view, the provisions at issue represent a reasonable, and therefore permissible, understanding of collective bargaining. Congress required DHS to craft a HR system that is flexible and contemporary, 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 2002), and the Government insists that DHS deserves deference in weighing those objectives in its efforts to ensure collective bargaining. The Government's arguments on this point are completely unconvincing, because they ignore Congress' explicit command that any HR system ensure that employees may . . . bargain collectively, 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(4) (Supp. II 2002). A system that gives the Department a free hand to selectively vitiate collectively bargained agreements does not obey that command. 127 As noted above, collective bargaining is a term of art, defined in other statutory schemes, and DHS was not free to treat it as an empty linguistic vessel. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. 1536. None of the major statutory frameworks for collective bargaining allows a party to unilaterally abrogate a lawfully executed agreement. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7102(2), 7103(a)(12) (2000) (federal sector bargaining); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3) & (d) (2000) (private sector bargaining); 39 U.S.C. § 1206 (2000) (U.S. Postal Service); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth) (2000) (common carriers). Indeed, no statutorily mandated collective bargaining system that we are aware of dispenses with the premise that negotiated agreements bind both parties — no matter what the scope of bargaining was ex ante. Indeed, when pressed at oral argument, the Government could provide no counterexample. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 9-10. 128 The HR system embodied in the Final Rule has no antecedent, because it undermines the very idea of collective bargaining. Structuring collective bargaining so that labor and management meet to negotiate terms until they reach an accord or an impasse only makes sense on the assumption that each side's evolving bargaining position will reflect a series of tradeoffs that move the parties toward a mutually satisfactory end point. It is therefore dispositive that the HSA refers to collective bargaining — not merely consultation or notification — in describing the Department's obligations under § 9701(b)(4). When Congress intended to deny collective bargaining rights and provide only advisory roles to employee representatives, it used different language. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(4) (Supp. II 2002) (bargain collectively), with id. § 9701(e) (collaboration or consultation through meet and confer process), and 5 U.S.C. § 7113 (2000) (national consultation rights). 129 Finally, the Government's position not only defies the well-understood meaning of collective bargaining, it also defies common sense. As noted above, collective bargaining is a method of structuring the formation of labor contracts, and the notion of mutual obligation is inherent in contract law. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 3 (1979) (An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons. A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances.). To imagine that a system might ensure collective bargaining without imposing mutual obligations is simply bizarre. 130 We emphasize that our holding relates only to DHS's power to abrogate collectively bargained contracts executed pursuant to the HR system. The Unions do not contest the Department's authority to supersede labor contracts inherited from the previously independent agencies that now constitute DHS. See 5 C.F.R. § 9701.506(a) (2006). Our holding does nothing to undercut the Department's authority to exercise that power.
131 The right to negotiate collective bargaining agreements that are equally binding on both parties is of little moment if the parties have virtually nothing to negotiate over. That is the result of the Final Rule adopted by DHS. The scope of bargaining under the HR system is virtually nil, especially when measured against the meaning of collective bargaining under Chapter 71. And this is saying a lot, because the scope of bargaining under Chapter 71 is extraordinarily narrow. This was made clear in NTEU v. FLRA, 910 F.2d 964 (D.C.Cir. 1990) (en banc), where we pointed out 132 the unique structure of the federal sector labor relations statute, which, because of the special requirements and needs of the Government, 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b), excludes from negotiations a host of subjects that employers would be obliged to bargain about in the private sector. For instance, section 7106(a), the management rights provision of the statute, ensures that agencies need not bargain over the number of employees, their hiring, assignment, and discharge, the right to contract out work, and the authority to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission during emergencies. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a). 133 Id. at 968. There is no doubt that the restricted scope of bargaining under Chapter 71 gives federal agencies great flexibility in collective bargaining, of the sort contemplated by 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(1) (Supp. II 2002). 134 Having reviewed the Final Rule with care, we find that the limited scope of bargaining under the proposed HR system violates the Act, and on this point we reverse the District Court. In upholding the narrow scope of bargaining permitted under the HR system, the District Court rested its analysis primarily on the HSA's enumeration of certain nonwaivable provisions of law. Since Congress gave the [Department] the authority to ignore the provisions of Chapter 71 and to establish new metes and bounds for collective bargaining at DHS, the court felt compelled to defer to DHS's new framework. Chertoff I, 385 F.Supp.2d at 28-29. This line of reasoning fails. 135 The problem with the District Court's analysis and with the Government's arguments in the same vein is that they elevate one provision of the HSA over another: the Department's authority to modify the provisions of Chapter 71 is given precedence over § 9701(b)(4)'s command to ensure collective bargaining. If DHS enjoys unlimited discretion to define the metes and bounds of collective bargaining under the HSA, it can whittle the scope of bargaining so drastically as to render collective bargaining meaningless. Under the District Court's view, there is no stopping point—the court recognizes nothing inherent in federal sector collective bargaining that fixes the scope of bargaining in the absence of Chapter 71. 136 This reasoning is fatally flawed, because, as noted above, nothing in the HSA suggests that the meaning of collective bargaining under Chapter 71 can be disregarded by the Department in its promulgation of the HR system. If, as we have shown, collective bargaining in the HSA derives its meaning from the same term in the FSLMRA, then application of the term under the latter statute must guide our understanding of how the term applies under the former. We cannot assume that Congress deployed a term of art, with a long history of legal usage, while contemplating that DHS could completely drain that term of significance. 137 A core element of collective bargaining is a requirement that labor and management bargain in good faith over conditions of employment for purposes of reaching an agreement. Indeed, the Final Rule purports to adopt this understanding of collective bargaining in its definition of the term. See 5 C.F.R. § 9701.504 (2006). The scope of bargaining under the Final Rule, however, does not come close to reaching this core element. As the District Court found, [t]he HR System essentially reduces collective bargaining to employee-specific terms affecting discipline, discharge and promotion. Chertoff I, 385 F.Supp.2d at 29. This is so far short of the meaning of collective bargaining under Chapter 71 that we are constrained to hold that the Final Rule does not meet the HSA's requirement of bargaining in good faith over conditions of employment for purposes of reaching an agreement. 138 It is readily apparent that the Final Rule reflects a flagrant departure from the norms of collective bargaining underlying Chapter 71. In fact, the Government acknowledges the striking disparity between the FSLMS framework and the system established for DHS. See DHS's Reply Br. at 13. Even a quick glance at the Final Rule confirms what the Government acknowledges, i.e., that the HR system shrinks the scope of bargaining well below what Chapter 71 provides. For example, permissive areas of bargaining under Chapter 71 are off limits for negotiation at DHS. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1) (2000), with 5 C.F.R. § 9701.511(a)(2) & (b) (2006). This distinction is critical. Procedures for exercising rights affecting issues like work assignments and deployments are negotiable under Chapter 71, but not under the HR system. And, under the HR system, when management exercises one of its rights, it need not provide notice to labor representatives in advance. 5 C.F.R. § 9701.511(d) (2006). Moreover, the proposed HR system gives DHS broad new authority to take whatever other actions may be necessary to carry out the Department's mission. Id. § 9701.511(a)(2) (2006). Presumably, this provision empowers DHS to take any matter off the bargaining table at any time, regardless of what concessions have already been made by union representatives. No analogous power exists anywhere in Chapter 71. Most strikingly, DHS management is prohibited from negotiating over the procedures it will observe in exercising the authority laid out in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the management rights provision. Id. § 9701.511(b). Instead, management must merely confer with labor representatives about the procedures it will use. Id. § 9701.511(c). These provisions stand in sharp contrast to Chapter 71's obligation to bargain over the procedures used to exercise management rights. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2) (2000). 139 Finally, Chapter 71 requires agencies to bargain over appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of a management right. Id. § 7106(b)(3). The HR system shrinks such bargaining considerably. For the operational matters committed to management discretion under § 9701.511(a)(1)(a)(2), DHS must negotiate appropriate arrangements only when the effects of [management's exercise of a right] have a significant and substantial impact on the bargaining unit, or on those employees in that part of the bargaining unit affected by the action or event, and are expected to exceed or have exceeded 60 days. Id. § 9701.511(e)(2)(i). Even under these narrow circumstances, appropriate arrangement proposals must be limited to such matters as personal hardships and safety measures, or reimbursements for out-of-pocket expenses. Id. § 9701.511(e)(2)(i)(A)-(B). The Final Rule thus effectively strips the term collective bargaining of any real meaning in limiting the scope of bargaining. 140 Our decision in Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l, AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 767 F.2d 939 (D.C.Cir.1985) ( ATU ), although not controlling here, is instructive. The Urban Mass Transportation Act allowed formerly private transit companies that had been transferred to public ownership to receive federal funds if the Secretary of Labor certified that the transit authority had forged a fair and equitable labor protective agreement with its union that included, inter alia, provisions ensuring employees of the continuation of collective bargaining rights. See id. at 940 (explicating 49 U.S.C.App. § 1609(c) (1982)). We found that collective bargaining had accumulated significance through its history of usage. The ATU court rejected the Secretary's invitation to measure the right to collective bargaining by reference to state law: 141 Congress neither imposed upon the states the precise definition of collective bargaining established by the [National Labor Relations Act] and the case law that has developed under that Act, nor did it employ a term of art devoid of all meaning, leaving the states free to interpret and define it as they saw fit. Instead, Congress used the phrase generically, incorporating within the statute the commonly understood meaning of collective bargaining. The 1964 Congress was not writing on a clean slate. Then as now, collective bargaining was universally understood to require, at a minimum, good faith negotiations, to a point of impasse, if necessary, over wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. 142 Id. at 949. We noted that those principles have long been the bedrock of collective bargaining in the federally-regulated private sector and that they had also provided the common denominator of the public sector collective bargaining schemes enacted by the states. Id. Accordingly, we acknowledged that the statute attempted a delicate balance by conditioning federal transportation aid on collective bargaining rights while not incorporating the NLRA wholesale, but we deemed it clear that federal labor policy would dictate the substantive meaning of collective bargaining for purposes of section 13(c). Id. at 950. 143 A similar analysis applies here, because Congress was not writing on a clean slate when it enacted the HSA. The Government would have us impute to Congress the expectation that, as used in the HSA, collective bargaining has no particular content, thus leaving DHS wholly unconstrained to define the term as it wishes. Because we have no evidence to indicate that Congress chose to employ a term of art devoid of all meaning, we conclude that Chapter 71 must inform the substantive meaning of collective bargaining for purposes of § 9701(b)(4). Accordingly, the scope of bargaining under HSA must be guided by the federal labor policy underlying the permissible scope of bargaining in the federal sector. The parameters of the scope of collective bargaining under the FSLMS are narrow and flexible, so Chapter 71 gives appropriate guidance to DHS in how to ensure collective bargaining for its employees. See, e.g., FLRA v. OPM, 778 F.2d 844, 845 (D.C.Cir.1985) ([T]he scope of collective bargaining is far narrower in the federal sector than in the private sector.) (citing H. ROBINSON, NEGOTIABILITY IN THE FEDERAL SECTOR 189 (1981)). For example, Chapter 71's enumeration of management rights places a number of substantive topics off limits for bargaining, 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) (2000), but it also requires that agencies negotiate over the impact and implementation of those rights, id. § 7106(b). See FLRA v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 994 F.2d 868, 871-72 (D.C.Cir.1993). This general framework must be followed by DHS to ensure collective bargaining for its employees, as required by the HSA. 144 Using Chapter 71 to give content to the HSA's collective bargaining requirement is perfectly consistent with the Act's authorization to proceed notwithstanding many sources of law. Chapter 71 has numerous provisions that do not directly inform the definition of collective bargaining; many would impede DHS's flexibility if it lacked the freedom to waive them. Most conspicuously, Chapter 71 envisions a significant role for FLRA: it establishes that the Authority shall provide leadership in establishing policies and guidance relating to matters under this chapter and that, with specified exceptions, it should be responsible for carrying out the purpose of this chapter. 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(1) (2000). It also gives the Authority extensive power to investigate, adjudicate, and enforce labor practices in the federal sector. Id. § 7105(a)(2) & (g). Yet, it is beyond dispute that the HSA permits DHS to bypass the Authority altogether in setting up a HR system. Similarly, Chapter 71 establishes a process for the resolution of bargaining impasses, id. § 7119, which DHS chose not to incorporate into its HR system. Chapter 71 also proscribes numerous unfair labor practices. See id. § 7116. The ability to selectively waive or modify § 7116 clearly comports with the HSA's stated imperatives of flexibility and contemporaneity. 145 Furthermore, it must be recalled that the duty to bargain does not require agreement, only a good faith effort by the parties to reach agreement. Id. §§ 7103(a)(12), 7114(a)(4) & (b). Additionally, employees in the federal sector are forbidden from striking, Prof'l Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 550 (D.C.Cir.1982), so they can add no economic leverage to their bargaining demands as can employees in the private sector. And, most importantly, employees covered by DHS's HR system will not have the advantage of an impasses panel— which can impose conditions of employment if the parties' negotiations reach an impasse, see 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(5)(B)(iii) (2000)—as do employees who are covered by Chapter 71. In other words, if the Department follows the core notion of collective bargaining in the federal sector in defining the scope of bargaining under the HR system, as the Act requires, DHS will have extraordinary flexibility to achieve the goals of the statute and, at the same time, ensure that the limited benefits flowing from a contemporary program of collective bargaining in the federal sector are made available to its employees. The Act mandates no less. 146 3. The Final Rule Fails to Ensure Collective Bargaining for DHS Employees in Two Critical Respects—Therefore No Deference is Due the Department's Interpretation of the HSA 147 The foregoing discussion makes it clear that, insofar as the Final Rule permits the Department to abrogate final agreements and narrowly limits the scope of bargaining to employee-specific terms, the regulations fail to ensure collective bargaining for DHS employees. In these circumstances, we owe no deference to DHS's interpretation of the HSA. 148 As we explain above, Chevron analysis typically is focused on discerning the boundaries of Congress' delegation of authority to the agency; and as long as the agency stays within that delegation, it is free to make policy choices in interpreting the statute, and such interpretations are entitled to deference. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans v. United States Postal Serv., 321 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C.Cir.2003) (citation and inner quotation marks omitted). An agency construction of a statute cannot survive judicial review, however, if a contested regulation reflects an action that is inconsistent with the agency's authority. It does not matter whether the unlawful action arises because the disputed regulation defies the plain language of a statute or because the agency's construction is utterly unreasonable and thus impermissible. Am. Library Ass'n, 406 F.3d at 699 (citing Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 321 F.3d at 1174). 149 In this case, as we have shown, DHS's Final Rule defies the plain language of the Act, because it renders collective bargaining meaningless; and it is utterly unreasonable and thus impermissible, because it makes no sense on its own terms. The Government's argument is premised on a view that DHS's authority to modify the provisions of Chapter 71 takes precedence over § 9701(b)(4)'s command to ensure collective bargaining. As we have explained, this is simply wrong. The agency's policy preferences cannot trump the words of the statute.