Opinion ID: 31970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Shackled and Handcuffed in the Jury's Presence

Text: 98 Bigby next contends that the trial court erred by shackling him during the trial and allowing the jury to see him handcuffed. While a defendant is entitled to the physical indicia of innocence, a court is justified in ordering him handcuffed and shackled during trial [when] there is danger of escape or injury to the jury, counsel, or other trial participants. Wilkerson v. Whitley, 16 F.3d 64, 67 (5th Cir.1994); see also Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1346, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986)(stating that shackling is permissible only when justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)(opining that trial judges must be given sufficient discretion to ensure the dignity, order, and decorum ... of all court proceedings and concluding that binding and gagging an obstreperous defendant is constitutionally acceptable in some situations). After Bigby assaulted Judge Leonard, it was incontrovertible that he posed a real danger to all assembled in the trial court. Judge Leonard, therefore, was not beyond the bounds of his ample discretion to decide whether a defendant should be restrained when he ordered Bigby shackled and handcuffed. See Lockhart v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 54, 57 (5th Cir.1997)(The decision to restrain an obstreperous defendant with visible restraints lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge.)(citing Allen, 397 U.S. at 343-44, 90 S.Ct. 1057). Accordingly, a COA should not issue on this point.