Opinion ID: 185156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express Delegation of Authority to Native American Nations

Text: 25 It is undisputed that Native American nations retain significant sovereign power. Native American nations have inherent power to determine forms of tribal government, to determine tribal membership, to make substantive criminal and civil laws governing internal matters, to administer tribal judicial systems, to exclude others from tribal lands, and, to some extent, to exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, including non-Indians. See Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, at 247-53; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). It is this last category of power that is at issue in the instant case, because petitioners claim that the 1990 Amendments to the Act do not authorize tribes to administer the Act over fee land within a reservation that is owned by nonmembers. As the Supreme Court has held, 26 exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation. 27 Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. 28 There is no doubt that tribes hold inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. Id. at 565. For instance, if the behavior of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe, the tribe may regulate that activity. Id. at 566. To satisfy this standard, however, a tribe must show, on a case-by-case basis, that the disputed activity constitutes a demonstrably serious impact that imperil[s] the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of theYakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989) (plurality opinion). EPA suggests, not implausibly, that inherent sovereign power may apply to tribal regulation under the Act of fee lands within a reservation, see Proposed Tribal Authority Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,598 n.5, but the Agency does not press this argument on appeal. Rather, EPA contends that the 1990 Amendments constitute an express congressional delegation to the tribes of the authority to regulate air quality on fee lands located within the exterior boundaries of a reservation. 29 There are few examples of congressional delegation of authority to tribes. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, at 253. However, as is the case in any situation in which we are called upon to find congressional intent in construing a contested statute, we start with traditional sources of statutory interpretation, including the statute's text, structure, purpose, and legislative history. See, e.g., Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984) (Whether and to what extent a particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.). Our review of the CAA indicates that EPA's interpretation comports with congressional intent. 30 Section 7601(d), in pertinent part, authorizes EPA to treat otherwise eligible tribes as states if the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and protection of air resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction.42 U.S.C. S 7601(d)(2)(B). The statute's clear distinction between areas within the exterior boundaries of the reservation and other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction carries with it the implication that Congress considered the areas within the exterior boundaries of a tribe's reservation to be per se within the tribe's jurisdiction. Thus, EPA correctly interpreted S 7601(d) to express congressional intent to grant tribal jurisdiction over nonmember owned fee land within a reservation without the need to determine, on a case-specific basis, whether a tribe possesses inherent sovereign power under Montana. 31 Petitioners do not dispute that an important purpose of the Act is to ensure effective enforcement of clean air standards. Obviously, this is best done by allowing states and tribes to establish uniform standards within their boundaries. As EPA explained in its proposed rule, 32 [a]ir pollutants disperse over areas several and some-times even hundreds of miles from their source of origin, as dictated by the physical and chemical properties of the pollutants at issue and the prevailing winds and othermeteorological conditions. The high mobility of air pollutants, resulting area wide effects and the seriousness of such impacts, underscores the undesirability of fragmented air quality management within reservations. 33 Proposed Tribal Authority Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,959. 34 Accepting petitioners' interpretation of the 1990 Amendments would result in a checkerboard pattern of regulation within a reservation's boundaries that would be inconsistent with the purpose and provisions of the Act. Indeed, the Supreme Court has condemned such an approach. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 479 (1976) (rejecting checkerboard approach in interpreting S 6 of the General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. S 349); Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) (terming impractical a pattern of checkerboard jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 1151). 35 Finally, we note that the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments supports EPA's interpretation. As originally introduced, 42 U.S.C. S 7601(d) differed in significant respect from the final adopted version. The original S 7601(d)(2)(B) provided that treatment of tribes as states was authorized if the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe are within the area of the tribal government's jurisdiction. S. 1630, 101st Cong. S 113(a) (1990), reprinted in Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 103d Cong., Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 4283 (1993) (emphasis added); see also H.R. 2323, 101st Cong. S 604 (1989), reprinted in Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 4101. The statute as finally enacted, however, treats tribes and states as equivalent if the tribe is to exercise functions within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. S 7601(d)(2)(B). 36 Thus, Congress moved from authorizing tribal regulation over the areas within the tribal government's jurisdiction (an admittedly general category) to a bifurcated classification of all areas within the exterior boundaries of the reservation and other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction. This change strongly suggests that Congress viewed all areas within the exterior boundaries of the reservation to be within the area of the tribal government's jurisdiction. The change also indicates that Congress knew how to draft the 1990 Amendments to support petitioners' interpretation. The fact that Congress specifically rejected language favorable to petitioners' position and enacted instead language that is consistent with EPA's interpretation only strengthens our conclusion that the Agency has correctly ascertained Congress' intent in passing the 1990 Amendments. 37 The dissent's contrary contentions regarding the meaning of the 1990 Amendments do not cause us to question this conclusion. The dissent's argument that Congress would not use a never-before-attempted formulation to accomplish an express delegation when it could use the formulaic 'notwithstanding' proviso [used in S 7410(o)]--the gold standard for such delegations, cannot carry much weight. Dissent Op. at 5-6. That a provision uses a new formulation is not dispositive of the question as to whether it constitutes an express delegation. Indeed, it is noteworthy that, in construing 33 U.S.C. S 1337(h)(1), which uses the dissent's so-called gold standard, EPA has declined to find an express delegation in such language. We can assume that Congress was aware of EPA's contemporaneous interpretation of the Clean Water Act, first proposed in 1989 (while Congress contemplated the 1990 Amendments). See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulations That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,098, 39,101 (1989) (proposed Sept. 22, 1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (EPA may treat an Indian Tribe as a State ... only where the Tribe already possesses and can adequately demonstrate authority to manage and protect water resources within the borders of the reservation. The Clean Water Act ... does not grant additional authority to Tribes.). Thus, Congress' failure to use the same language in § 7601(d) does not at all imply that it meant to avoid delegation to the tribes; rather, it may suggest just the opposite. 38 The dissent's argument resting on Congress' omission of a literal delegation to tribes is seductive, but, ultimately, also unconvincing. It is true that, as originally introduced, the bills in the Senate and the House contained language providing that the Administrator ... may delegate to [ ] tribes [that the Administrator is authorized to treat as States] primary responsibility for assuring air quality and enforcement of air pollution control. H.R. 2323, 101st Cong. S 604 (1989), reprinted in Legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, at 4101. The absenceof this language from the final bill, however, does not compel the dissent's conclusion that Congress specifically rejected language favorable to EPA's position. Neither the majority nor the dissent can call upon determinative legislative history to illuminate the motivations behind this unexplained change to the provisions at issue. We suggest, however, that there are at least two other explanations that account for the absence of the cited language from the final bill. First, Congress simply may have deemed the language to be redundant and confusing in light of S 7601(d)(2)(B). It would have been redundant because S 7601(d)(2)(B) already accomplishes an express delegation. It would have been confusing because the omitted language can be read to apply to areas both outside and inside the boundaries of the reservation, and, as we hold, Congress intended to expressly delegate only with respect to areas within the boundaries of a reservation. 39 Second, the language contained in the original bills hardly represents, as the dissent declares ipse dixit, a literal delegation. Providing that the Administrator ... may delegate authority to tribes reads less like an express delegation from Congress to the tribes than a permissive instruction to the Administrator. Moreover, the omitted language did not expressly expand tribal jurisdiction to include those areas within the boundaries of a reservation owned by nonmembers--which is what is necessary for express delegation--as does the language in the adopted S 7601(d)(2)(B).In other words, the language used in the progenitors to S 7601(d) that the dissent claims is a literal delegation is not easily manipulated to fit the contours of the traditional express delegation inquiry. We also note, as an aside, that by treating the original bills' language as an express delegation, our colleague seemingly abandons the gold standard that he claims Congress consistently has utilized expressly to delegate authority to Indian tribes. In short, we take more from the language used in the adopted S 7601(d)(2)(B) than from the language omitted. 40 What little precedent there is addressing express delegations of authority to Native American nations in other contexts supports our interpretation of § 7601(d). In United States v. Mazurie, the Supreme Court reviewed 18 U.S.C. S 1161 and concluded that the statute was an express delegation to tribes of the authority to regulate alcohol transactions.419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975). The Court reaffirmed this holding almost a decade later. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 728-29 (1983). Section 1161 provides in pertinent part that various federal liquor laws applicable to transactions within Indian country shall not apply 41 within any area of Indian country provided such act or transaction is in conformity both with the laws of the State in which such act or transaction occurs and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country, certified by the Secretary of the Interior, and published in the Federal Register. 42 18 U.S.C. S 1161 (1994). The Court read this language to make 43 clear that Congress contemplated that its absolute but not exclusive power to regulate Indian liquor transactions would be delegated to the tribes themselves, and to the States, which historically shared concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government in this area. 44 Rehner, 463 U.S. at 728-29. 45 The decisions in Mazurie and Rehner are significant because the Court found an express delegation despite the absence of any we hereby delegate language in the statute.The Court did not find any precise language of delegation in the disputed statute, but, rather, rested on the implication inherent in recognizing the power of tribes to adopt an ordinance pertinent to liquor transactions on Indian country. See Rehner, 463 U.S. at 730-31.Similarly, in this case, we find an express congressional delegation from the implication inherent in the distinction between areas within the exterior boundaries of the reservation and other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction. 46 Petitioners claim that the 1990 Amendments delegate authority to EPA to approve state or tribal air quality programs for federal enforcement, not authority to tribes to adopt regulatory programs that the tribes could not adopt under tribal and federal Indian law prior to the 1990 Amendments. Br. for Petitioners National Ass'n of Mfrs. (NAM) at 23.Petitioners' claim misses a crucial point, however, that there are two different powers at issue here: (1) the authority to regulate and (2) the derivative authority to enforce specific provisions of the Act. Petitioners focus on the derivative authority. Of course the 1990 Amendments do not constitute an express delegation to the tribes to enact regulatory provisions absent any federal oversight or approval. Rather, the 1990 Amendments simply establish the palette with which tribes are permitted to paint their regulatory picture. 47 Petitioners additionally argue that although states are authorized under 42 U.S.C. S 7407(a) to enact programs within the entire geographic area comprising such State, EPA has never interpreted this provision as allowing states to promulgate air quality regulations applicable to Native American reservations located within a state's geographic area. In other words, petitioners claim that because states may not promulgate regulations affecting Native American reservations, tribes may not promulgate regulations covering lands held in fee by persons other than tribal members. This argument is obviously flawed, because it fails to recognize that the relationship between fee holders and tribes is quite different from the relationship between tribes and states. As the Supreme Court noted in Mazurie, Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory; they are a separate people possessing the power of regulating their internal and social relations.... 48 419 U.S. at 557 (citations omitted). And there is no doubt that Congress may delegate authority to tribes even though the lands [are] held in fee by non-Indians, and even though the persons regulated [are] non-Indians. Id. at 554. 49 Finally, petitioners note that the Agency declined to find an express delegation of power to regulate fee lands under SS 518(e) and (h) of the Clean Water Act; this is noteworthy to petitioners, because they can glean no difference between the cited provisions under the Clean Water Act and the disputed provisions in this case under the Clean Air Act. We find no merit in this argument. The Clean Water Act states that [t]he Administrator is authorized to treat an Indian tribe as a State ... if ... the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and protection of water resources which are held by an Indian tribe ... within the borders of an Indian reservation. 33 U.S.C. S 1377(e)(2) (1994). Reservation is defined as all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way running through the reservation. Id. S 1377(h)(1). In construing these provisions, EPA concluded that because the legislative history was ambiguous and inconclusive, it would not find that the Clean Water Act expanded or limited the scope of tribal authority beyond that inherent in the tribe. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,880 (1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131). 50 The situation here is quite different from what EPA found with respect to the lean Water Act. Although the disputed language in the Clean Air Act and theClean Water Act is somewhat similar, it is far from identical. As noted above, EPA correctly relied on the CAA's clear distinction between areas within the exterior boundaries of the reservation and other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction to find a congressional intention to define the areas within the exterior boundaries of a tribe's reservation to be per se within the tribe's jurisdiction. Furthermore, as we have already indicated, the legislative history of the 1990 Amendments plainly supports EPA's interpretation. Thus, the legislative history underlying the Clean Air Act is not ambiguous and inconclusive, as was found to be the case with respect to the Clean Water Act. 51 It is also of some significance that EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act never has been subject to judicial review on the question of the presence or absence of an express delegation to tribes to regulate fee lands within the bounds of reservations. One federal court has observed, in dicta, that the statutory language [in the Clean Water Act] seems to indicate plainly that Congress did intend to delegate ... authority to tribes. State of Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945, 951 (D. Mont. 1996). The court noted, however, that in construing the provisions of the Clean Water Act, EPA determined that it would take the more cautious view, that Congress did not expressly delegate jurisdiction to tribes over non-Indians and that tribes would have to prove on a case-by-case basis that they possess such jurisdiction. Id. at 952. There was no reason for EPA to take a similarly cautious view with respect to the Clean Air Act, because the language and legislative history of the 1990 Amendments differ from that of the Clean Water Act. 52