Opinion ID: 168407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Underlying Proceedings.

Text: 16 In his decision denying plaintiff's application for disability benefits, the ALJ made the following step-five findings with regard to the hearing testimony of the VE: 17 The Administrative Law Judge called upon the vocational expert to name jobs a hypothetical person with the claimant's residual functional capacity and vocational factors described above could perform. The vocational expert testified that such a person would be able to perform work as a call-out operator (DOT 237.367-014; 840 jobs in Colorado and 46,150 nationally) and a surveillance system monitor (DOT 379.367-010; 175 jobs in Colorado and 10,000 nationally). 18 The vocational expert acknowledged these opinions do not directly correspond with information provided in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and adjustments to the numbers of jobs were made on the following basis. At the hearing, the vocational expert testified that to the extent opinions do not correspond to the DOT, reliance was being placed on education, experience and observations of the jobs as actually performed in the economy. . . . No contrary evidence was presented. The opinions are therefore accepted as an accurate description of the occupations listed above. 19 Aplt.App., Vol. 3 at 34. 20 Plaintiff challenged the ALJ's step-five rulings in her subsequent appeal to the district court, arguing that [t]he ALJ's determination that Mrs. Hackett could perform the jobs of surveillance system monitor and call out operator is unsupported by any substantial evidence, and is contrary to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.  Id., Vol. 1 at 35. In addition, plaintiff explained to the district court that the ALJ had mischaracterized the hearing testimony of the VE: 21 At page 34 of the Administrative Record, the ALJ states that the vocational expert testified that his opinion did not correspond directly with the information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles but that he relied on his education, experience, and observation of the jobs as actually performed in the national economy. In fact, the vocational expert was never asked any questions on this point and did not make these statements in his testimony. 22 Id. 23 Relying on arguments that the Commissioner set forth in the brief she submitted to the district court, id. at 87-89, the district court rejected plaintiff's challenge, as it concluded, contrary to the finding of the ALJ, that there was no conflict between the VE's hearing testimony and the DOT: 24 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff could perform the jobs identified by [the VE] was in error because there are discrepancies between [the VE's] characterization of these jobs and the descriptions set forth in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ had a duty to inquire as to the reasons for these discrepancies before accepting [the VE's] opinions. 25 An ALJ does have a duty to investigate and obtain a reasonable explanation for any conflict between the DOT and expert testimony before the ALJ may rely on the expert testimony as substantial evidence. Haddock v. [Apfel], 196 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir.1999). Here, however, no such conflict exists. Although the ALJ stated in his decision that [the VE] had acknowledged that his opinion regarding the jobs Plaintiff could perform do not directly correspond with the DOT, the record is devoid of any such testimony by [the VE].... The record is equally devoid of testimony from [the VE] to support the ALJ's determination that these discrepancies could be explained by his education, experience, and observation of the jobs as performed in the national economy.... These statements by the VE may therefore be in error. This error is, however, harmless upon analysis of the applicable DOT provisions. 26 Id. at 127-28. 27 Plaintiff's next step was to file an appeal in this court. In that appeal, plaintiff succeeded in convincing another panel of this court to reverse the district court in part, as the panel agreed with plaintiff that the ALJ misstated the testimony of the VE and failed to reconcile the VE's actual testimony with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), contrary to this court's decision in Haddock . . . and Social Security Ruling 00-4p. Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1174-75. The panel explained its holding as follows: 28 In his decision the ALJ said that the VE had admitted at the hearing that his opinions about the jobs Plaintiff could do did not directly correspond with information in the DOT. The ALJ then asserted that the VE explained this discrepancy by relying on his own education, experience and observations of the jobs as actually performed in the economy. Aplt.App., Vol. II at 34. As Plaintiff and the district court have pointed out, however, there is no indication in the record that the VE expressly acknowledged a conflict with the DOT or that he offered any explanation for the conflict. The district court nevertheless ruled that the ALJ's assertion about the VE's explanation was unnecessary because there was no conflict between the VE's testimony and the DOT. We agree with respect to the people function of the designated jobs, but disagree with respect to the required reasoning level. 29 .... 30 We therefore must reverse [that] portion of the ALJ's decision and remand to allow the ALJ to address the apparent conflict between Plaintiff's inability to perform more than simple and repetitive tasks and the level-three reasoning required by the jobs identified as appropriate for her by the VE. 31 Id. at 1175, 1176. 32 Following our remand to the district court and the latter's remand to the Commissioner, plaintiff filed her EAJA application in the district court. As noted above, while plaintiff referred to the ALJ's error in her EAJA application, she did not explicitly argue for an award of EAJA fees based on the ALJ's error. Instead, plaintiff focused exclusively on the legal theory advanced by the Commissioner in the district court proceedings. Aplt.App., Vol. 2 at 154. The district court denied plaintiff's EAJA application, concluding that the legal argument advanced by the Commissioner, and the underlying rationale and reasoning, although admittedly complex, is not without basis in the law. Id. at 206. 33