Opinion ID: 2353269
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maintaining a Crack House

Text: Appellants were convicted of maintaining a crack house, as the offense colloquially is known, in violation of (former) D.C.Code § 33-542(a)(5). [7] In pertinent part, the statute makes it unlawful for any person [k]nowingly to keep or maintain any . . . dwelling, . . . or other structure or place, . . . which is used for keeping or selling [controlled substances] in violation of this chapter. [8] Appellants argue that there was insufficient evidence to show that the Holbrook Street apartment was a place of common resort for keeping or selling drugs. Additionally, Moore argues that the evidence did not establish that he controlled or managed the premises, and Durant asserts (more broadly) that no evidence showed that he knew or intended that the apartment would be used as a crack house. As to appellants' first contention, the trial court used the term common resort in its instructions, without objection from either side, in explaining that a single act of keeping or selling crack cocaine in a certain place, even by the person who maintains that place, is not enough to make the place a crack house. Rather, the court stated, the dwelling or structure or place must be a common resort for the purpose of selling or keeping crack cocaine. [9] However, by thus incorporating the reference to a common resort, the court gave an instruction that was more favorable to the appellants than it needed to be. While common resort evidence would be probative, it is not necessary; § 33-542(a)(5) requires proof only that the defendant kept or maintained the premises in question knowing that those premises were being used for keeping or selling controlled substances. The premises need not be a common resort for that purpose. Although D.C.Code § 33-542(a)(5) had a statutory precursor with parallel if not identical language in former D.C.Code § 33-416 (1973), [10] the law under which appellants were prosecuted was enacted as part of D.C. Law 4-29, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1981 (the DC-CSA). We have recognized that the DC-CSA was intended to bring the law of the District of Columbia in conformity with the Federal Controlled Substances Act (US-CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. See Thomas v. United States, 650 A.2d 183, 195 (D.C.1994). The counterpart of D.C.Code § 33-542(a)(5) in the US-CSA is 21 U.S.C. § 856, commonly known as the Crack House Act. Section 856 was added to the US-CSA in 1986 and substantially amended in 2003. [11] While its language is not identical to that of our local statute, from its inception the federal Crack House Act has made it unlawful to, among other things, knowingly . . . maintain any place . . . for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using any controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). Even though § 856 was enacted after § 33-542(a)(5), we think it appropriate, given the similarity in language, to look for guidance in construing our law to federal case law interpreting the federal statute. The present appeals raise two questions regarding the interpretation of D.C.Code § 33-542(a)(5). First, what does it mean to keep or maintain a place for illegal drug activity? Second, what kind or level of illicit activity is encompassed by the statutory requirement that the premises in question knowingly be used for keeping or selling controlled substances? As to the first question, D.C.Code § 33-542(a)(5) is not directed at casual visitors, and keeping and maintaining means more than merely residing in the subject premises. Moreover, engaging in the specified illegal activity at the premises-selling drugs there, for example  is not the same thing as keeping or maintaining the premises for such activity. United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir.1992). In our case, the trial court instructed the jury, inter alia, that a person may be found to have maintained a place as a crack house, if he or she controlled or managed the dwelling or place. The government need not prove that the defendant owned or had legal control over the dwelling or the place.    It is not necessary that the defendant be shown to have himself or herself engaged in storing, keeping or selling crack cocaine. A person may be guilty of the offense of maintaining such a house or premises, even though his conduct or her conduct is otherwise unobjectionable. It's not necessary that the person who maintains the dwelling or the place promote the specified purposes, if he or she knowingly permits the premises to be used for those purposes. We are satisfied that these instructions were sound. As the trial court recognized, one may knowingly maintain premises without being an owner, renter, or even a resident thereof. A person who exercises dominion and control over a house maintains the house. United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 296 (10th Cir.1995). Acts evidencing such matters as control, duration, acquisition of the site, renting or furnishing the site, repairing the site, supervising, protecting, supplying food to those at the site, and continuity are . . . evidence of knowingly maintaining the place considered alone or in combination with evidence of distributing from that place. Clavis, 956 F.2d at 1091; accord, Verners, 53 F.3d at 296. Regarding the second interpretive question  how to construe the statutory requirement that the premises be used for keeping or selling controlled substances  the trial court instructed the jury that a single act of keeping or selling crack cocaine in a certain place, even by the person who maintains that place, is not enough to make the place a crack house. The government apparently agreed with that proposition in this case. [12] Construing the analogous purpose requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), the federal courts have held that illegal drug activity need not be the sole purpose for which the premises are used, see, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 220 (5th Cir.1990), but that it must be a significant purpose, United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d 340, 346 n. 4 (5th Cir.1997), if not, at least in the residential context, . . . one of the primary or principal uses to which the house is put. Verners, 53 F.3d at 296 (stating also that drug activity must be more than a mere collateral purpose of the residence). Ultimately, adjectives such as significant and principal may not be too helpful, but there are two ends of the spectrum that can be identified. On the one hand, it is fair to say that our statute, like its federal counterpart, was designed to punish those who use their property to run drug businesses  hence, the more characteristics of a business that are present, the more likely it is that the property is being used in violation of the statute. Id. at 296-97. On the other hand, D.C.Code § 33-542(a)(5), like 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), cannot reasonably be construed to proscribe simple possession and personal consumption of drugs in one's residence. United States v. Lancaster, 296 U.S.App.D.C. 379, 382, 968 F.2d 1250, 1253 (1992). The `casual' drug user does not run afoul of [the statutory] prohibition because he does not maintain his house for the purpose of using drugs but rather for the purpose of residence, the consumption of drugs therein being merely incidental to that purpose. Id. In this case, there was ample evidence  some of it from the defendants themselves, especially Christina Durant  that Apartment 204 was not maintained primarily for residential purposes. The jury readily could infer that after Mrs. Durant moved out, the apartment was kept and used mainly for what it appeared to be when the police executed the search warrant  a drug storage and distribution situs. As we have discussed, there also was sufficient evidence to link appellants with the drugs found during the search. Finally, though it was Mrs. Durant who paid the rent, the evidence that appellants had possessed keys to the unit, had kept their personal belongings there, and had been using and occupying the premises for some time, demonstrated that appellants were far from being casual visitors. From all the circumstances, the jury fairly could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that each appellant shared dominion and control over the apartment (along with Mrs. Durant). We therefore conclude that sufficient evidence was introduced at trial to prove each appellant guilty of knowingly keeping or maintaining an apartment used for keeping and selling crack cocaine.