Opinion ID: 2594455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Quitclaim Deed

Text: [¶9] Appellants claim that John became a certificate holder of the Trust upon Ms. Sherard's execution of the Transfer Document. The Amended Complaint alleges that [t]he effect of the purported Quitclaim Deed, if valid, would be to deprive John of property that . . . John would be entitled to as owner of the fifty (50) Certificate Units assigned to John by Hazel on April 24, 2001. [4] As support for their position, Appellants point to Section C, ¶ 35 of the Trust, requiring that Trust assets be distributed proportionately among the certificate holders of the Trust upon its termination, unless contrary instructions are contained within the minutes. [5] They assert that the Quitclaim Deed violated ¶ 35 of the Trust and, as a result, the deed is void. [¶10] Appellees dispute that John is a certificate holder of the Trust. They contend that because John failed to surrender the assignment to the trustees and obtain a new certificate in accordance with provisions of the Trust, no transfer occurred. Appellees further contend that no transfer occurred because Ms. Sherard did not own Certificate 50; she owned Certificate 1. They claim that there is no evidence that Certificate 50 ever existed. [¶11] The parties' arguments center on the interpretation of the Trust document. [6] The meaning of a trust instrument is determined by the same rules that govern the interpretation of contracts. Woods v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2004 WY 61, ¶ 42, 90 P.3d 724, 736 (Wyo. 2004). The intent is determined from the trust document itself. Id. [T]he interpretation of the language of a trust instrument constitutes a question of law. The `appellate court claims for itself plenary independent and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings' de novo.  Rock Springs Land and Timber, Inc., v. Lore, 2003 WY 100, ¶ 12, 75 P.3d 614, 619 (Wyo. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Where the language used in the trust is unambiguous, the plain provisions of the trust determine its construction and interpretation does not require consideration of evidence. Id., ¶ 12, 75 P.3d at 620; Woods, ¶ 42, 90 P.3d at 736. [¶12] Upon our review, we find that the district court properly rejected John's claim that he is a certificate holder of fifty units of the Trust. Paragraph 33 of Section C of the Trust provides: ¶ 33: The Certificates shall be transferable by an appropriate assignment in writing and by surrender to the Trustees or to the person or agency designated by them, but no transfer shall be of any effect as against the Trustees even with actual or constructive notice until a new Certificate has been duly recorded upon the books of the [Trust] kept for that purpose. (Emphasis added.) The rule regarding effectuation of transfers of certificates of interest in a business trust is that, where the declaration of trust prescribes the manner in which shares or certificates of interest shall be transferred, there must be a compliance therewith. Peoples Bank v. D'Lo Royalties, Inc., 235 So.2d 257, 265 (Miss. 1970) (citing 13 Am.Jur.2d Business Trusts § 28 (1964); 12 C.J.S. Business Trusts § 17 (1938)). Trust instruments often require that transfers of shares be entered in the books of the trust. Such provisions are binding upon all persons, shareholders, transferees, and trustees. Id. at 266 (quoting 156 A.L.R. 22 (1945)). Pursuant to Section C, ¶ 33 of the Trust, a transfer is effective only when a new certificate is issued and recorded. It is undisputed that this procedure was not followed in this case. As a result, John did not become a certificate holder of the Trust. [¶13] Appellants' challenge concerning the validity of the Quitclaim Deed is premised upon John's perceived rights as a certificate holder to the property of the Trust. Having determined that the Transfer Document was invalid and that John is not a certificate holder of the Trust, we conclude that the district court did not err in confirming the validity of the deed.