Opinion ID: 2068627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The punitive damages award shall stand.

Text: At the close of evidence, Brandriets moved to amend the complaint to request punitive damages for fraudulent misrepresentation. As the pleadings already demanded punitive damages concerning the emotional distress claim, and as the issue of fraud was pled and tried, Brandriets maintain that, pursuant to SDCL 15-6-15(b), the issue of punitive damages for fraud was tried by express or implied consent of the parties. We agree. Although the decision to allow an amendment to the pleadings is within the discretion of the trial court, the test for allowing an amendment is whether Norwest had a fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and could Norwest have offered any additional evidence had the case been tried with the punitive damage claim in mind. Beyer v. Cordell, 420 N.W.2d 767, 769 (S.D.1988); Bucher v. Staley, 297 N.W.2d 802, 806 (S.D.1980). When exemplary or punitive damages are involved, the test for amending the pleadings involves another step. SDCL 21-1-4.1 provides: In any claim alleging punitive or exemplary damages, before any discovery relating thereto may be commenced and before any such claim may be submitted to the finder of fact, the court shall find, after a hearing and based upon clear and convincing evidence, that there is a reasonable basis to believe that there has been willful, wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the party claimed against. In the normal course of events, a pretrial hearing would have been held on the issue of punitive damages. However, SDCL 21-1-4.1 does not require a pretrial hearing, nor was Norwest expecting one. According to the May 3, 1991 Motions Hearing, counsel for Norwest suggested waiting until after the evidence was presented at trial before determining the admissibility of the punitive damages on the emotional distress claim. It is undisputed that such a hearing was held, albeit punitive damages for emotional distress. Brandriets proposed that they be allowed to amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence. Previously holding that the Brandriets proved their claim of fraud, we hold that the judge's finding that there is a reasonable basis to believe that there has been willful, wanton or malicious conduct comports with the jury's determination that Norwest's conduct was willful, wanton or malicious. See SDCL 21-1-4.1. Thus, Norwest had a fair opportunity to try its case under the willful, wanton or malicious standard and had notice that Brandriets were seeking punitive damages. Under Vreugdenhil v. First Bank of S.D., 467 N.W.2d 756 (S.D.1991), Brandriet was only required to establish a prima facie case on punitive damages. Mission accomplished. With the elements of fraud and SDCL 21-1-4.1 overlapping, Norwest cannot be said to have been prejudiced or caught unaware by the punitive damages claim for fraud, especially when Norwest was already facing the other punitive damages claim. [T]o recover on a punitive damages claim ... a plaintiff must still demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is entitled to punitive damages. Dahl at 902. Our holding does not erode Dahl or Vreugdenhil; instead it stands alone because the elements and intent of SDCL 21-1-4.1 were clearly met by the parties. Finding that the Brandriets and the trial court have fulfilled their respective burdens, we affirm the exemplary damages award. Affirmed. MILLER, C.J., concurs. WUEST, J., concurs specially. SABERS, J., dissents in part and concurs in result in part. AMUNDSON, J., dissents.