Opinion ID: 2237971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Probate Court Err in Appointing a Guardian?

Text: The Marion Superior Court appointed a temporary limited guardian for Sue Ann Lawrance under Indiana Code § 29-3-3-4 (West Supp. 1990), an emergency appointment provision of the code's article on guardianship. The Lawrances appeal this as a cross error, in accordance with Ind. Trial Rule 59(G). At least four statutory requirements must be met before a court can make such an appointment. The trial court must find that: (1) a guardian has not been appointed for an incapacitated person or minor; (2) an emergency exists; (3) the welfare of the incapacitated person or minor requires immediate action; and (4) no other person appears to have authority to act in the circumstances... . Ind. Code § 29-3-3-4(a)(1) to -4(a)(4). In appointing Patti Mullins as temporary limited guardian, Judge Deiter found that all four conditions were met. At least with respect to the fourth condition, this finding was clearly erroneous. Because the HCCA applied to the decision about whether to remove Sue Ann's gastric tube, Sue Ann's family clearly appear[ed] to have authority to act in the circumstances under Judge Barr's order. Ind. Code § 29-3-3-4(a)(4). Furthermore, the fourth requirement of the emergency guardianship statute would have failed in this case even without the Hamilton court proceedings. Acting without court intervention under HCCA § 16-8-12-4(a)(2), the Lawrance family as Sue Ann's spouse, parent[s], adult child, or adult sibling[s], still would have had the requisite authority to act for the purposes of § 29-3-3-4(a)(4). Because we expect that a collateral attack of an HCCA decision under the emergency guardianship statute should always fail to meet § 29-3-3-4(a)(4), we have no occasion to consider whether any of the other three conditions were satisfied in the case at bar. The appointment of Patti Mullins as temporary limited guardian, and her replacement by Daniel Avila, were invalid. Although the emergency guardianship statute cannot be used to challenge an HCCA decision collaterally, Indiana Code § 16-8-12-7 does provide a mechanism for challenging health care decisions. That Indiana Code § 16-8-12-7 could have been used to challenge the Lawrances' decision, however, does not mean that Mr. Avila could have successfully petitioned the Marion Superior Court had he properly used the HCCA instead of the emergency guardianship statute. Two factors suggest that such a petition by Mullins or Avila would not have been entertained. First, the HCCA requires such petitioners be a health care provider or any interested individual. Ind. Code § 16-8-12-7(a). There is no evidence that Mullins or Avila were providing health care to Sue Ann Lawrance, or were interested individuals, or that they even knew her. They were interested in her only in the generic sense that any person who makes the effort to go to court is interested. If the General Assembly intended to permit strangers to litigate family decisions, it could have said a challenge may be mounted by any individual. The use of the word interested suggests that strangers need not apply. [10] Second, a challenging petition under § 16-8-12-7 must be made to the court having jurisdiction under IC 29-3-2 in the county where the individual is present for purposes of receiving health care. Ind. Code § 16-8-12-7(a). The relevant venue requirement can be found at Indiana Code § 29-3-2-2 (West Supp. 1990). Even if we assume that the patient had moved to Marion County at the time of the Marion County proceeding, the code dictates that [i]f proceedings are commenced in more than one (1) county, they shall be stayed except in the county where first commenced until final determination of the proper venue by the court in the county where first commenced. Ind. Code § 29-3-2-2(b). Because proceedings had already begun in Hamilton County, any proceedings in Marion County should have been stayed until Judge Barr determined whether transfer of the case to Marion County was proper under Indiana Code § 29-3-2-2(c).