Opinion ID: 1253350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: review of privileged documents

Text: ¶ 27 Lastly, Cardall contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in camera review of S.F.'s school psychological records to determine if the records contained any information which would be helpful to him at trial. He specifically sought access to an anxiety exam which was administered to S.F. by a school counselor. Cardall relies on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987), where the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant convicted of various sexual offenses against a child was entitled to have the trial court review his alleged victim's otherwise privileged Children and Youth Services file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contained evidence material to the defense. Id. at 1002. ¶ 28 The State asserts that S.F.'s school psychological records, including the anxiety exam, are privileged under Utah law. The State relies on rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which states in part that a patient has a privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the patient. Utah R. Evid. 506(b); see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-60-113, [2] -114. In addition, the State argues that even under Ritchie, Cardall has no right to an in camera review because he has failed to establish some basis for concluding that S.F.'s school psychological records contain evidence material to his defense. ¶ 29 The State errs in both of its assertions. While it is true that a therapist-patient privilege exists in Utah, this privilege is not absolute. Under our rule, no privilege exists where a communication relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense. Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1); see also Utah Code Ann. § 58-60-114(2)(b). This alone appears to give Cardall the right to review S.F.'s school psychological records because the focus of his defense was that S.F. is a habitual liar, that she fabricated her story about being raped, that she is mentally and emotionally unstable, and that the records show that on at least one previous occasion these psychological traits led her to lie about an attempted rape or sexual touching by the school janitor. However, we believe this exception to privilege is limited by Ritchie. ¶ 30 In Ritchie, the Supreme Court held that where an exception to privilege allows a defendant access to otherwise confidential records, the defendant does not have the right to examine all of the confidential information or to search through state files without supervision. 480 U.S. at 59, 107 S.Ct. 989 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). However, if a defendant can show with reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence exists which would be favorable to his defense, Ritchie gives him the right to have the otherwise confidential records reviewed by the trial court to determine if they contain material evidence. Id. at 60, 107 S.Ct. 989. Evidence is deemed material where `there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Id. at 57, 107 S.Ct. 989 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375). ¶ 31 Currently, it is impossible to say whether the information in S.F.'s school psychological records would have been material to Cardall's defense because the trial court refused to review the records. See id. We recognize that the State has a substantial interest in protecting the type of information Cardall seeks, but we do not believe this interest prevents disclosure of privileged information in all circumstances. Id. In this instance, our rule provides an exception to the privilege because S.F.'s mental and emotional state is an important element of Cardall's defense. See Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1). ¶ 32 In light of Ritchie, we take our analysis one step further. In cases where a defendant makes only a general request for information from otherwise privileged records, it is the State that decides which information must be disclosed. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59, 107 S.Ct. 989 (footnote omitted) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)), and [u]nless defense counsel becomes aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's attention, the prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 59, 107 S.Ct. 989 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)). A defendant has no constitutional right to conduct his own search of the State's files. Id. at 59, 107 S.Ct. 989. However, where a defendant is aware of specific information contained in the file ..., he is free to request it directly from the court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Id. at 60, 107 S.Ct. 989. ¶ 33 Here Cardall specifically requested that the trial court review S.F.'s school psychological records, including the anxiety exam, and he generally requested any information regarding S.F.'s allegations regarding an attempted rape by a school janitor. Cardall asserts that this evidence was and is material to his defense because the outcome of the trial depended entirely on S.F.'s credibility. Although we reject Cardall's claim that the case turned entirely on S.F.'s credibility, it is true that S.F.'s testimony was a critical element for both the prosecution and the defense. ¶ 34 If S.F.'s school psychological records indicate that S.F. has a high propensity to lie  as Cardall asserts  and if the records show that S.F. previously lied about an attempted rape by a school janitor, this is evidence which might have been material to Cardall's defense had it been disclosed. Cardall has made an adequate showing that the anxiety exam exists. We therefore hold that he is free to request it directly from the [trial] court, and argue in favor of its materiality. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60, 107 S.Ct. 989. In regard to the rest of S.F.'s school psychological records, we hold that Cardall is entitled to an in camera review by the trial court to determine whether the records contain information which might be material to his defense. ¶ 35 We therefore remand this case to the trial court with instructions to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion. If the trial court is persuaded that the anxiety exam or any other information in S.F.'s school psychological records constitute material evidence which, had it been disclosed, probably would have changed the outcome of Cardall's trial, then he must be given a new trial. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58, 107 S.Ct. 989. If the records do not contain material evidence, or if the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, id., the judgment and conviction will stand. ¶ 36 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice STEWART, Justice ZIMMERMAN, and Justice RUSSON concur in Chief Justice HOWE'S opinion.