Opinion ID: 6320445
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: By the Plaintiff.

Text: (A) Without a Court Order. Subject to Rules 23(e), 23.1(c), 23.2, and 66 and any applicable federal statute, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing: (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared. (B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. The text of the rule contains no duty to disclose, and Hunter’s argument that such a duty should be read into the rule is cursory and unpersuasive. Further, in a lawsuit involving allegations of fraud on the court, we previously rejected the argument that a party has a duty to disclose to the court a settlement agreement’s terms prior to seeking a consent judgment. Gen. Med., P.C. v. Horizon/CMS Health Care Corp., 475 F. App’x 65, 73–74 (6th Cir. 2012). Although this case is 9 No. 21-1496, Hunter v. Sterling Mortg. and Inv. Co. et al. different (it involves disclosure to another party, not to the court, and a voluntary stipulation of dismissal, not a consent judgment), the logic indicates a similar lack of a duty to disclose in this case. Even if Rule 41 did impose a duty to disclose, the failure to disclose here would not rise to the level of fraud required for an independent action under Rule 60(d)(1). The only fact that Hunter plausibly alleges in relation to fraud is that the IRS did not disclose the settlement agreement. R. 1 (Compl. ¶¶ 33, 40) (Page ID #9, 11). Hunter does not allege that the government took any steps to deceive him or that he ever asked whether the voluntary dismissal came with any conditions. His allegations, therefore, cannot meet the high standard required in cases brought pursuant to Rule 60(d)(1). See Giasson, 872 F.3d at 340. Hunter also attacks the settlement agreement itself. He claims that the settlement agreement is unenforceable, shocks the conscience, is unjust, and involves unlawful “selective depletion.”8 Appellant Br. at 15–22. None of these arguments is relevant. Hunter seeks relief from the stipulation of dismissal, not from the settlement agreement. R. 1 (Compl. at 17) (Page ID #17). The ground upon which he seeks that relief is the IRS’s and Sterling’s failure to disclose the settlement agreement. There is no connection between the validity of the settlement agreement and Hunter’s claims in this case.