Opinion ID: 378132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiff Barnes' Loss of Earning Capacity

Text: 52 Defendants urge that the award of $60,000 to plaintiff Barnes for impairment of earning capacity was unsupported by the evidence as there was no proof of any lost earnings and no loss of capacity to earn since Barnes is still working at his previous job. 53 Tennessee compensates a personal injury victim not for the actual lost earnings but for the loss of the capacity to earn. A plaintiff may recover for lost capacity to earn even though there has been no actual loss of earnings, see Dixie Feed, supra, 376 S.W.2d at 750; Southern Coach Lines, Inc., v. Wilson, 31 Tenn.App. 240, 214 S.W.2d 55, cert. denied, Tenn.S.Ct. (1948), or the plaintiff made more money after the accident than before, see Tullos v. Corley, 337 F.2d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1964). Thus, that Barnes did not prove loss of earnings is not fatal to his recovery. 54 The District Judge found that Barnes was a 65-year-old partner in a stock brokerage firm with an income in excess of $150,000 per year who was unable to resume full-time duties until approximately January 1, 1976. Barnes testified that he supervised all the branch offices of the firm which are spread throughout the United States and that he was required to travel to these offices as part of his duties. The District Judge found that Barnes was unable to travel, had an assistant to relieve him of some of his duties, and lost about two months of work. Since Barnes could have worked as long as he was physically and mentally able, the District Court found that his capacity to earn was greatly impaired. 55 Wilson v. Cook Manufacturing Co., 56 Tenn.App. 129, 405 S.W.2d 584, cert. denied, Tenn.S.Ct. (1966), cited by defendants, is distinguishable. There, plaintiff was not allowed to recover for loss of earnings capacity but plaintiff's doctor testified plaintiff had a normal and complete recovery. Plaintiff himself admitted the only pain he had felt had gone away and he had resumed his former job. Here, Barnes is permanently disabled and has had to curtail his former duties. Plaintiff is entitled to his past loss of earning capacity as well as his future. See Southern Coach Lines v. Wilson, supra, 214 S.W.2d at 57. 56 This Court cannot say that the District Court erred in awarding $60,000 to Barnes for loss of earning capacity. Two months' salary for someone earning $150,000 per year would be $25,000. (For someone earning $200,000 per year, as Barnes testified his earnings were, two months' salary would be about $33,000.) When one adds the inability to now perform all his duties and that he can work as long as he is able to perform his duties, $60,000 is not unreasonably high.D. Plaintiff Mr. Backs' Loss of Consortium 57 Defendants claim the award of $25,000 to Mr. Backs for the loss of consortium of his wife was erroneous because there was no evidence of the monetary value of the lost services Mrs. Backs performed around the house and because there was no evidence pertaining to any lost conjugal relations. 58 In Martin v. Southern R. Co., supra, the court refused to consider as an element of damages the amount for the full-time help the plaintiff would need as the probable cost of this element of damages was not presented in the evidence. But that case did not involve a loss of consortium which is not as easy to value as the cost of hired help. In Lamb v. Jones Wholesale Co., Inc., 454 F.Supp. 129 (E.D.Tenn.1978), the court remitted the award where the wife had not proved a loss of consortium but only a loss of her husband's services mowing the grass, gardening, and driving the car. There was no proof of monetary value of these services, but the court did not require proof. It merely held it did not think these services were worth $15,000 and suggested a remittitur of $12,000. The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that a father need not prove the loss of services resulting from his son's injury by an exact calculation in order to recover for such a loss. Central Manufacturing Co. v. Cotton, 108 Tenn. 63, 67, 65 S.W. 403 (1901). The Tennessee Appellate Court has held a husband need not prove loss of his wife's consortium with exactness. See All v. John Gerber Co., 36 Tenn.App. 134, 143, 252 S.W.2d 138, cert. denied, Tenn.S.Ct. (1952). Thus, Mr. Backs should not be barred from recovering even though he did not prove the monetary value of his wife's services which he has lost. 7 59 Mrs. Backs testified that she cannot do her household chores, cannot cook, cannot drive, and needs help getting out of the tub. 60 Mr. Backs testified that they now eat out most of the time since his wife cannot cook. He now must do all the housework, whereas before he did none of it. He further testified that her physical and emotional condition has changed dramatically since the accident. 61 Consortium has been defined as not only loss of support of services, (but also) such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, solace and more. See Rodriquez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal.Rptr. 765 (1974) (quoting Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308, 239 N.E.2d 897 (1968)); All, supra, 36 Tenn.App. at 141, 252 S.W.2d 138. 62 The District Court found that Mr. Backs has been required to alter his usual business habits and practices to care and assist his wife. He is deprived of her affection, society, companionship and consortium and will have to expend sums of money in the future to pay for the services she would have performed had she not been injured. 63 While $25,000 may seem high for the loss of household services and companionship that was established in the record, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. If this Court were to order a remittitur, it could only order a remittitur to such an amount as would not seem palpably excessive, giving to the trial court the latitude in fixing the amount to which it is entitled. See Dixie Feed, supra, 376 S.W.2d at 754; Olson v. Sharpe, 36 Tenn.App. 557, 259 S.W.2d 867, 875, cert. denied, Tenn.S.Ct. (1953). Since the award as it stands does not appear palpably excessive, this Court affirms the award to plaintiff Mr. Backs. E. Excessiveness of the Awards 64 Defendants object to the awards to plaintiffs Barnes, Mr. Backs, Mrs. Backs, and Darle as being excessive, much higher than awards previously granted in Tennessee. Plaintiffs claim the cases defendants point to are not truly comparable and that the court must consider the effects of the high inflation this country has recently experienced. 65 The amount of a damage award in a personal injury action is for the jury or, in a non-jury case, the trial judge who heard the evidence. Absent a showing of bias, passion, or corruption, the excessiveness of a verdict is left to the trial court's discretion. The appellate court will only consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting an award so large as to shock the judicial conscience. See Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 118, 97 S.Ct. 514, 50 L.Ed.2d 269 (1976); Kroger Co. v. Rawlings, 251 F.2d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 1958); Olson v. Sharpe, 36 Tenn.App. 557, 259 S.W.2d 867, cert. denied, Tenn.S.Ct. (1953); Yellow Cab Co. v. Pewitt, 44 Tenn.App. 572, 316 S.W.2d 17, 22, cert. denied, Tenn.S.Ct. (1958); Clinchfield R. Co. v. Forbes, 57 Tenn.App. 174, 417 S.W.2d 210, 217 (1966), cert. denied, Tenn.S.Ct. (1967). 66 When considering whether an award is excessive, the Court will consider other awards in other cases, see Martin v. Southern R. Co., supra, 225 Tenn. at 82, 463 S.W.2d 690; France v. Newman, 35 Tenn.App. 486, 248 S.W.2d 392 (1951), cert. denied, Tenn.S.Ct. (1952), as well as the nature and extent of the injuries, suffering, expenses, diminution of earning capacity, inflation and high cost of living, age and expectancy of life, see Olson v. Sharpe, supra, 259 S.W.2d at 875. 8 But the cases involving similar injuries are in no sense controlling. See Petition of U. S. Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 489, 501 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859, 94 S.Ct. 71, 38 L.Ed.2d 110 (1973). 67 Defendants compare the back injuries of Barnes to several cases involving back injuries and the leg injuries of Darle and Mrs. Backs to cases involving leg injuries. However, a number of these cases are ten years old or more, did not involve plaintiffs with comparable occupations and earning capacities, or apparently did not involve permanent injuries like those of the plaintiffs in this case. The District Court stated what factors he considered in making the awards and supported his awards by findings with respect to the plaintiff's conditions and the future pain and limitations they are likely to suffer. Although the awards may be high, they do not shock this Court's conscience. Considering the present deflated value of the dollar and that personal injury damages are unliquidated without any fixed measure of mathematical certainty, see Kroger v. Rawlings, 251 F.2d 943, 945 (6th Cir. 1958), these awards are not excessive. 68 The District Court's judgments with respect to all plaintiffs save plaintiff Thompson are affirmed. The judgment in favor of plaintiff Thompson is reversed. 69