Opinion ID: 484327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Incident to Service

Text: 17 Despite the fact that [t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules and that each case must be examined in light of the [Federal Tort Claims Act] as it has been construed, Shearer, 105 S.Ct. at 3043, this circuit has adopted a three-part test for determining whether the activity of a serviceman is incident to service. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013-15. See Flowers v. United States, 764 F.2d 759, 760-61 (11th Cir.1985); Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1537. 4 The factors to be considered include (1) the duty status of the service member, (2) the place where the injury occurred, and (3) the activity the serviceman was engaged in at the time of the injury. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013. After evaluating the relative weight of these factors, a court should determine whether an activity is incident to service based on the totality of the circumstances. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013.
18 The United States stresses the fact that Pierce was a member of the armed forces assigned to active duty the day of the accident and therefore, subject to recall. Reviewing courts, however, have refused to treat that fact as dispositive of the duty status issue. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014 n. 10. A serviceman on furlough may bring an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949). Nevertheless, a serviceman on furlough is also subject to recall. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014 n. 10. 19 Here, the salient facts are that Pierce requested and obtained permission from his supervising officer to leave the base during regular duty hours to conduct some personal business. It is conceded that he was technically neither on furlough nor on leave; nevertheless, Pierce received more than a mere release from the day's duties. 5 Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. When a serviceman requests and receives authorization to leave the base and exercise the right to be absent from regular duty, the serviceman attains a status much akin to being on furlough. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. Just as a serviceman on furlough may bring an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a soldier exercising his rights under a pass may maintain an action. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 49, 69 S.Ct. at 918; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1015. Because Pierce received a discretionary time off privilege granted by [his] supervising officer, he arguably left the base on a pass. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013 n. 9, 1014.
20 Although subject matter jurisdiction of actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act has never turned on whether the alleged harm occurred on or off the military reservation, the situs of the injury is an important factor in determining whether the activity is incident to service. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. As stated by the court in Parker, [i]f the injury occurs on the base, it is more likely that the injured service member was engaged in activity incident to service. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. In this case, the motor vehicle collision occurred on a public highway within the city limits of Hinesville. 6 As the court in Parker observed, [w]hen soldiers are returning to the base, but have not yet reached the premises line when the collision occurs, [Federal Tort Claims Act] actions are permitted. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014 (citations omitted).
21 In this case, Pierce was driving a civilian vehicle off the base in a highly congested area. He had eaten lunch at a fast food restaurant, visited a pawn shop, and was returning to the base to unpack his personal belongings. The government alleges that these activities are proximately related to military duties because they are part of the life of a soldier. We disagree. 22 Pierce, similar to the claimant in Parker, was not directly subject to military control; he was not under the compulsion of military orders; he was not performing any military mission. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. We do not view pawning a camera, eating lunch, operating a motor vehicle, or unpacking personal property when relieved of assigned tasks as activity materially related to military service. 23 As the court in Parker acknowledged, [i]n some cosmic sense 'all human events depend upon what has already transpired.'  Parker, 611 F.2d at 1011 (quoting Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52, 69 S.Ct. at 920). Servicemen have to live somewhere. The mere fact that he was stationed at Fort Stewart does not mean that everything Pierce did in connection with his personal life can legitimately be considered activity proximately related to military service. To accept the government's contention would be to construe any conceivable personal activity as incident to service because that activity happened to be performed by a member of the armed forces. We refuse to accept such a construction, for to do so would preclude the class of servicemen from bringing an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act merely by virtue of the fact that the claimants are wearing a United States uniform. 24 Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that Pierce's injuries were incurred from activities incident to service. Pierce was on pass, the accident occurred off the base, and the activities involved were not proximately related to military service. Thus, the district court erroneously concluded that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Pierce's claims. 25