Opinion ID: 884529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Implied Easement from Existing Use

Text: ¶ 22 The second type of implied easement, an easement implied from existing use, arises only if, prior to the time the title or tract is divided, a use exists on the servient part that is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant part, and a court determines that the parties intended the use to continue after division of the property. See Graham, 216 Mont. at 174, 699 P.2d at 596; see also Woods v. Houle (1988), 235 Mont. 158, 162, 766 P.2d 250, 253. This type of easement is sometimes called a quasi-easement before the tract is divided because an owner cannot hold an easement on his own land. See Pioneer Mining Co. v. Bannack Gold Mining Co. (1921), 60 Mont. 254, 263, 198 P. 748, 751. ¶ 23 For a use to give rise to an implied easement from existing use, it must be apparent and continuous at the time the tract is divided. See Graham, 216 Mont. at 174, 699 P.2d at 596. We have applied different standards to determine what is considered an apparent and continuous use. In Ruana v. Grigonis (1996), 275 Mont. 441, 453, 913 P.2d 1247, 1255, we agreed with the appellant's argument that the respondents were required to produce evidence that showed manifest, obvious, or permanent use of the purported easement. In Godfrey v. Pilon (1974), 165 Mont. 439, 446, 529 P.2d 1372, 1375, however, we held that an easement is apparent when an easement, path, `roadway of sorts,' trail or `primitive road' over the land may be discovered upon reasonable inspection. While both definitions are accurate, we conclude that the requirement set forth in Godfrey that an easement is apparent when it may be discovered upon reasonable inspection is the minimum standard that must be met. Godfrey, 165 Mont. at 446, 529 P.2d at 1375. ¶ 24 Following our reasoning in Godfrey, an apparent easement need not be so formal as to be an improved, paved, or even graveled two-way road. As we stated in Godfrey, an apparent and continuous easement may be as simple as a path, roadway of sorts, trail, or primitive road. It is evident from Hoyem Trust's own description that prior to the severance and simultaneous conveyance of the parcels of land to the three brothers, a quasi-easement across Morris's parcel existed for Albert's parcel. According to Hoyem Trust, Morris and Albert's father, Andrew Hoyem, the owner of the Hoyem Ranch Company, used this road as the only access to his land. Once the property was severed and conveyed to Morris and Albert, the brothers memorialized the easement by placing a gate in the fence between their property exactly where the road used to access Albert's property ran. In Godfrey, we held that [t]he parties are presumed to contract with reference to the condition of the property at the time of the sale, provided the marks are open and visible. Godfrey, 165 Mont. at 445, 529 P.2d at 1375. The fact that Morris and Albert placed a gate across the easement indicates that they were aware of the existence of the easement and contracted with reference to the condition of the property at the time of the conveyance. This apparent and continuous use at the time the tract was divided distinguishes this case from our decision in Kelly v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co. (1996), 279 Mont. 238, 927 P.2d 4. Since the time of that conveyance, the easement has been regularly used by the Hoyem family. ¶ 25 In addition to the requirement that the use be apparent and continuous at the time the tract is divided, an implied easement from existing use must also have a use that is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant parcel. See Graham, 216 Mont. at 174, 699 P.2d at 596. Reasonable necessity, in this case, is established by the affidavit testimony of abstractor, James M. Johnson, premised upon his examination of the records of Meagher County, that the public record indicates that at the time of severance of the Hoyem Ranch Company properties, all property adjacent thereto was held or owned by third parties who were strangers in title to the common owner, Hoyem Ranch Company. Therefore, the only access to the public road from the property conveyed to Albert Hoyem, Hoyem Trust's predecessor-in-interest, was by way of the easement across the property conveyed to Morris Hoyem, Galts' predecessor-in-interest. Section 1-3-213, MCA, requires that [o]ne who grants a thing is presumed to grant also whatever is essential to its use. ¶ 26 An easement implied from existing use passes to all future owners of the property pursuant to the requirement in § 70-20-308, MCA, that a transfer of real property passes all easements attached thereto and creates in favor thereof an easement to use other real property of the person whose estate is transferred in the same manner and to the same extent as such property was obviously and permanently used. ¶ 27 In Michaelson v. Wardell (1980), 186 Mont. 278, 607 P.2d 100, we upheld an implied easement from existing use pursuant to § 70-20-308, MCA, based on facts similar to those presented here. In that case we held: The facts in this case, as found by the District Court, reveal such an implied grant of easement. Appellant was the owner in common of his present property and respondents' present property. Before selling any of his property, appellant built the access road to serve the residence now owned by respondents. That road was continuously used by respondents and their predecessors to serve the residence. The road was and still is the only means of access used by respondents and their predecessors. When appellant conveyed the property to the first grantees, the Fourniers, he created under the above statute a permanent easement for use of the roadway as an access to respondents' residence. The roadway is being used for the same benefit to respondents as it was to the original owner. Michaelson, 186 Mont. at 281, 607 P.2d at 101. ¶ 28 Based on the foregoing facts supported by the public record and the admissions of the parties, Montana law regarding implied easements establishes conclusively that an easement implied from existing use, not an implied easement by necessity, exists in favor of Hoyem Trust over and across Galts' property. We agree with Galts that the easement by necessity requirement of strict necessity did not exist at the time the property was severed in 1944 because a road existed which provided practical access to a public road for ingress and egress. ¶ 29 The presence of an implied easement from existing use necessarily defeats the strict necessity requirement of an easement by necessity. The critical distinction between the two types of implied easements, the existence of an apparent and continuous use of an easement which allows for ingress and egress at the time the tract is divided, is present in this case. Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not err when it determined that Hoyem Trust holds an implied easement from existing use, rather than an implied easement by necessity.