Opinion ID: 186445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Violation Serious?

Text: 17 Next, Wal-Mart contends the ALJ erred in holding its violation was serious within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 666(k), which provides, clearly enough albeit inelegantly, that a serious violation shall be deemed to exist in a place of employment if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists ... in such place of employment. Wal-Mart argues the ALJ erred by ignoring the actual conditions at the store, including the [employees'] training, [and the] sprinkler system, fire extinguishers, other exits, and nearby fire department. Alternatively, Wal-Mart maintains that, because of the very attenuated relationship between the existence of the violation and the health and safety of the employees, the Court may find the violation de minimis. See 29 § U.S.C. 658(a). 18 We have previously held that a violation of a standard is serious if it could eventuate in serious physical harm upon other than a freakish or utterly implausible occurrence of circumstances. Brock v. L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1388 (1985). In holding Wal-Mart's violation was serious, the ALJ explained quite reasonably that in a fire or other emergency, [w]here every second counts, employees could be seriously injured by any delay. Wal-Mart Super Center, 2004 WL 334495, at  6. Accord Sec'y of Labor v. Tree of Life, Inc., 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1535, 2001 WL 1154451, at  (2001) (Clearly, burns, smoke inhalation, and other potential injuries caused by delays in exiting the workplace during an emergency fall within the meaning of `serious physical harm'). 19 Wal-Mart's complaint that the ALJ failed to consider the actual conditions at the store is beside the point. Wal-Mart does not gainsay the ALJ's reasoning that in an emergency employees could panic and forget their training; the sprinkler system might not be activated quickly enough and might not dissipate the smoke; and the fire department could be delayed. Wal-Mart Super Center, 2004 WL 334495, at . Nor does it argue that any of these contingencies should be deemed freakish or utterly implausible. Because the ALJ was free to consider any plausible circumstances that might eventuate in serious physical harm, we have no cause to disturb his conclusion that the violation was serious. L.R. Willson & Sons, 773 F.2d at 1388; see also Cal. Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC, 517 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir.1975) (seriousness turns upon probability of serious injury if accident occurs, not upon probability accident will occur). In any event, we agree with the Secretary that the factors to which Wal-Mart points, namely, the training of its employees, the presence of a sprinkler system, and the proximity of a fire department, are more properly considered (as they were) in assessing the gravity of the violation, and hence the appropriate fine, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 666(j). 20 We need not pause long over Wal-Mart's alternative argument that any violation of the standard was so attenuated in relation to the employees' safety and health as to be de minimis. As we have seen, Wal-Mart's violation cannot be said to have had no direct or immediate relationship to safety or health, which is what the statute requires for a violation to be deemed de minimis. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a); see also Conie Constr., Inc. v. Reich, 73 F.3d 382, 385 (D.C.Cir.1995) (even if Commission, rather than Secretary, has authority to determine whether violation is de minimis, determination is within its discretion). 21