Opinion ID: 1781968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the trial court's and the prosecutor's use of ambiguous language during the death qualification of the venire was in violation of the sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution and resulted in a jury predisposed towards infliction of the death penalty.

Text: Foster contends duplicative questioning by the prosecution and the trial judge led to the removal for cause of several jurors who were not predisposed against the imposition of the death penalty, but who had merely expressed general reservations on capital punishment. Foster asserts that the questioning left jurors operating under the mistaken impression that the law, in some instances, required the jury to return a vote for death. Finally, Foster contends that neither the trial court nor the prosecution explained that the law would never mandate that a jury impose the death penalty, thereby leaving their erroneous beliefs uncorrected. The standard for excluding jurors based on their views on the death penalty was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851 (1984), and recognized by this Court in Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1985). This Court stated: That rule, succinctly stated, is that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. (cite omitted). The juror must be able to consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law. Id. at 53-54. Foster raises no objection to the voir dire of any particular juror, but objects to the questioning by the prosecution and the trial court in general. A review of the proceedings before the venire indicates the prosecution clearly informed the venire that the death penalty was not required in the event of a conviction. The prosecution received no response when he asked of the venire, Do you also all understand that just because you find this man guilty of capital murder that does not mean that automatically he gets the death penalty ... Do you all understand that? Jurors who expressed general reservations against capital punishment were subjected to individual voir dire so that their specific views could be more fully explained. As Foster all but acknowledges in his brief to this Court, such in-depth questioning is necessary since a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2231. Accord Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 672-73 (Miss. 1991). A closer examination of the type of questions asked of jurors by the State upon individual voir dire fails to support Foster's argument. Each juror was asked some variation of the questions propounded Juror # 74, for instance, who was questioned as follows: BY THE STATE: Now if you're selected on a capital case, and you're in that guilt phase, in the portion of the trial where you're deciding whether or not he's guilty or innocent, and you know that if you vote guilty then you're fixing to have to decide whether or not he should live or die, is that going to affect your decision on whether or not he's guilty or not? In other words, is that going to impair your judgment on that guilt phase? JUROR # 74: No. BY THE STATE: Okay. Now that's the  that's the first level. Here's the second level. The second level is now you're at the sentencing part of the trial, and the judge gives you an instruction, and the judge says, You're to weigh the bad stuff or what we call the aggravating circumstances against the good stuff or what we call the mitigating circumstances, and if the bad outweighs the good, then you can return a verdict of death. Now my question is, can you follow that instruction? JUROR # 74: Yes. We disagree that the questions directed to jurors who had expressed reservations against or whose opinions were left uncertain regarding the death penalty were misleading or otherwise problematic. They were certainly permissible as designed to identify those jurors whose views would substantially impair their ability to serve as jurors. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851 (1984). This Court, in keeping with Wainwright, has previously upheld the removal of jurors who gave inconsistent answers with regard to their ability to return a death sentence. Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 345 (Miss. 1988). This Court has determined a trial court did not err in removing those jurors whose position on the death penalty was not unmistakably clear. Id. at 344. Only through an adequate voir dire can either the State or the defense determine a juror's position on the death penalty. We find the questioning of these jurors was acceptable. This assignment is rejected as being without merit.