Opinion ID: 2066066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Vincent's Impairment Substantially Limited the Major Life Activity of Working to Constitute a Disability Under the ICRA

Text: Our prior cases provide us with helpful guidelines for interpreting our statutes and regulations in determining whether a person suffers from a disability. A disability substantially limits a major life activity if the person is (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 919 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)). The following factors should be considered in making this assessment: (i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.' Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)). In Bearshield, we noted that [a] person is substantially limited in his or her ability to work when the person is significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. Id. at 920 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). We further noted that `[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.' Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). In Probasco, we noted that the phrase `substantially limits' must be interpreted to mean the degree to which the impairment affects an individual's employability. Probasco, 420 N.W.2d at 436. We set forth the following factors to be considered in this calculus: The degree to which an impairment substantially limits an individual's employment potential must be determined with reference to a number of factors: the number and type of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified, the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access, and the individual's job training, experience and expectations. Id.; accord Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 920 (listing similar factors) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)). We further noted in Probasco: An impairment that interferes with an individual's ability to do a particular job but does not significantly decrease that individual's ability to obtain satisfactory employment otherwise is not substantially limiting within our statute. Id. We have rejected any implication from our holding in Probasco, however, that one must be almost unemployable because of one's impairment to be considered disabled. Henkel Corp. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 471 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Iowa 1991). Based on these standards and the evidence adduced at trial, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Vincent was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working because his physical condition was not so debilitating that he would have been prevented from obtaining other satisfactory employment (i.e. jobs not requiring driving a vehicle or working around dangerous machinery). At the time Four M refused to return Vincent to his position as machine tender, he was only halfway through a six-month recuperation period following a major surgical procedure. Although Vincent did initially receive a medical release to return to work in December 1993, that release was obtained without his physician knowing what physical requirements his job entailed. Once informed of those requirements, Vincent's physician promptly rescinded the medical release. Following his telephone conversation with Dr. Howard, Vincent told O'Brien that Howard was concerned about him being around heavy equipment and moving machinery. When we examine the factors set forth in Bearshield and Probasco, we find substantial evidence exists to support the district court's conclusion that Vincent was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Testimony at trial supports the district court's conclusion that Vincent was prohibited by his physician from working on or around heavy equipment and dangerous machinery. While this did preclude Vincent from working at his former position of machine tender, this rather narrow limitation did not significantly curtail Vincent's ability to obtain other employment not involving heavy equipment or dangerous machinery. Cf. Probasco, 420 N.W.2d at 436 (concluding fact that plaintiff's condition rendered it inadvisable that she work around particular set of environmental circumstances, particularly intense chemical fumes, dust and poor ventilation, was insufficient to qualify her as a disabled person); see also Hollinrake v. Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, 452 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Iowa 1990) (finding plaintiff who suffered from poor vision was not disabled under the ICRA because he was not disqualified from a wide range of other available jobs, but only restricted from jobs requiring stringent visual acuity). The number and type of jobs from which Vincent was disqualified because of his impairment was fairly limited. In addition, Vincent failed to present substantial evidence that his impairment precluded him from performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as required to establish the existence of a substantial limitation on his ability to work. Moreover, Vincent's condition, although serious, was only temporary and not expected to have a long term impact on his work capabilities. We find the district court's conclusion that Vincent's impairment did not constitute a disability because it did not substantially limit him in the major life activity of working is supported by substantial evidence.