Opinion ID: 1960214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Determination of Discriminatory Intent

Text: Defendant argues that he proved discriminatory intent in the final six peremptory challenges made by the prosecutor, when the proffered race-neutral reasons are weighed against the totality of the circumstances discussed above. We review each juror individually. Stacy Thomas: Thomas was the prosecutor's fourth peremptory challenge and the fourth African-American excused by the prosecutor, who gave the following reasons: Regarding Ms. Thomas, she said, and I quote, I am not here to judge. She said that twice. And that's the main reason I'm excusing her. Also, she showed a lack of interest. You may have noted, your honor, that I stopped reading the second degree murder statute, and I did that to get her attention. Also, she has trouble returning the death penalty if someone is sorry. It seems to me like any person who is convicted of first degree murder would be sorry that he did it, and I'm very concerned about that. I think she was very weak on the death penalty, and I excused her for those reasons, but mainly her repeated statements that she is not here to judge because that's what jurors have to do is judge. The judge accepted Thomas' lack of attention, her inability to judge, and her weakness on the death penalty as race-neutral reasons for her dismissal. As noted above, the trial judge's determination of purposeful discrimination, resting largely on credibility evaluations, is entitled to great deference by the reviewing court, and we perceive no abuse of discretion. Lois Copeland: Copeland was the sixth person challenged peremptorily by the prosecutor. [6] In her voir dire responses, she elaborated that, even after sitting and listening to other prospective jurors: I still don't know how I feel about it.... You can tell, I'm confused right now. I don't know. I'm notI guess I'm maybe one of these people who sit back and hope that God will make all the right decisions for everybody, you know. But you're asking me right now, Lois Copeland, how do you feel about the death penalty, I can't answer it; I can't answer that question. I don't know.... I don't know; I don't know. I'm not for it, I'm not against it. I'm just in the middle. Much later, Copeland was still ambivalent about the death penalty: I hate that question. I mean, I don't know what to tell you. I don't know. I have searched my mind trying to think of maybeI'm Catholic, you've read that on theretrying to think of my religious beliefs. But there's nothing that stands out right now that can tell me that I can be impartial one way or the other about the death penalty at this point and time. So, I guess that's not an answer to your question, but that's all I have for you. If you ask me that question ten minutes from now, I will probably give you the same answer. When asked to articulate race-neutral reasons for striking Copeland, the prosecutor responded that this is an obviously intelligent person who was totally unable to explain her opinions on the death penalty. Based on Copeland's inability to explain her position on the death penalty, the trial judge properly accepted the prosecutor's justification for excusing her from service on a capital case. Tracy Moton: Moton, a twenty-two-year-old single mother of a seven-week-old infant, was the seventh juror excused peremptorily by the prosecutor. Although she did not raise her hand when her panel was asked whether anyone had an undue hardship, she was brought into the courtroom for questioning about hardship, outside the presence of the other prospective jurors. Initially, her voir dire responses suggested that jury service would pose a hardship for her because of her baby, but then her tone shifted to indicate that she would have no concerns about leaving her infant in the care of others while she served on a sequestered jury: Q. [by the court] Do you feel that because of this very young child that you have the lack of anyone to care for her, that this would pose an undue hardship or extreme inconvenience on both you and your child if you had to serve on this jury? A. No, not really; I don't think so. Q. That's a little different from what you were telling me. You were telling me earlier that it would cause a hardship? A. Yes, but I was saying that if I had to do the jury duty, I would try to find somebody to keep it. Q. All right. That's not what I heard you say earlier. Will somebody be able to keep this child for you if you are on the jury? A. My mother would try to get off work in time if she had to. That's what I'm saying, if she had to do it, she would get the people at work to let her off early enough so she could come home and keep him while my sister have him in the day time or something, a little while in the day. Q. So you're telling me you could make family arrangements? A. Yes. Q. To care for your child? A. Yes, because my mom, even though she doesn't have a certain time to get off, like last night she worked until like eight o'clock, she would push herself to get off earlier so she could come home. Q. And she could do that for a week or perhaps up to two weeks? A. Yes. Q. And you're not asking to be excused from this jury because of a hardship that it would cause you or your daughter or your son or your family? A. No. Q. Okay. And you could serve on this jury? A. Yes. The prosecutor then questioned Moton about whether she understood the ramifications of being on a sequestered jury: Q. I want to make sure you understand that if you're selected to serve on a jury what will happen. Once all the jurors are together that you won't be going home at all during that period. A. Right. Q. You would be able to call on the phone, to be monitored by a sheriff's deputy? A. Right. Q. But you're not going to be visiting with them, and they can't be visiting with you during that period. We can't be exactly sure how long it will last, but it could be in the neighborhood of a week? A. Right. Q. Do you think that your separation from your six week, seven week old child would cause you particular difficulty in listening to the evidence in connection with this case, or would you be concerned about the care of that particular infant. A. Well, this is my first, so I probably would be concerned because I'm new at this. This is my first time being a mom or whatever. But if I had to do it, I would. Q. We understand that. The question we have is, it's a hardship for anyone to serve upon a jury. We recognize that. And it's more of a hardship to serve upon a jury which is put in a hotel. Because of the child, that's why we brought you in. Is that a particular hardship for you, that separation for your child, and having other people care for a child at such a tender age? A. No. In justifying his exercise of a peremptory challenge to excuse Moton, the prosecutor explained: One of the things we do in criminal trials is hold people responsible for their own actions, whether it be in a murder trial or a burglary, an escape, a rape, whatever the case may be. And in doing that, especially in a first degree murder case, the juror's attitude towards responsibilities, in taking responsibilities for their own actions and what they do, is vitally important. In this case, we have an individual who is a single mother that apparently has no sense of responsibility to an infant child, which I think personally is shocking; that she is willing to let another family member, not the mother of the child who is only seven weeks old, care for the child, that she is willing to abandon the child and go stay in a hotel, locked up and sequestered. It's shocking. It shows an utter[] lack of any type of concern or responsibility toward an infant, a complete rejection of what I think is important, an important parenting skill, a responsibility that we assume when we have our own children. This inability to assume responsibility toward her own child is shocking in connection with this case. If she can't assume responsibility for her own child, how can I possibly believe she could hold this man responsible for his actions. Defendant argues that the explanation was patently racist (and sexist), as it calls forth the stereotype that young, single black mothers are poor, uncaring parents. Citing State v. Hobley, 98-2460, p. 20 (La.12/15/99), 752 So.2d 771, 783, defendant contends that a more exacting scrutiny is required when cultural classifications may serve as a proxy for an impermissible classification. Here, the prosecutor did not single out Moton's ethnicity as a basis for excusing her, but rather inquired strongly into the effect on her jury service of having a seven-week old child at home. There is no indication in the voir dire, as a whole, that race dictated the prosecutor's decision to strike Moton. [7] The judge did not abuse his discretion in accepting the prosecutor's explanation. Faye Thomas: Thomas, the eighth juror excused peremptorily by the prosecutor, expressed agreement with the death penalty. However, the factor that caused the prosecutor concern was that her husband had been employed for fourteen years as a corrections officer at a state institution. In excusing Thomas, the prosecutor explained: Your honor, every single juror I have asked about a couple of issues. I asked when this questionnaire was prepared that we add specifically some limited issues about, have you ever been arrested, ever had family members arrested, ever been to a jail, had contact with a jail. That was done for a particular reason, because I don't want to have people who have close contact, who visit jails often, who have that type of association. And in this case, we have her husband who works at LTI. And I don't want to have people who have that close contact with a prison environment serving upon this case because they bring with it necessarily knowledge about what prisons are like. They bring the lifestyle which can't be considered in argument by me. I can't even talk about it. I am seeking the death penalty here, not merely incarceration. And because of the involvement of her husband, I see that as a potential problem here because I want a death sentence. That's why I'm excusing her, because of her husband's involvement. Her husband has worked for fourteen years and never had a problem with any prisoner. That seems just kind of hard to believe also. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's stated reasons for striking Thomas, i.e., that he did not want people who have close contact with a prison environment, were pretextual. Defendant points out that the prosecutor did not challenge Mark Vignes, who worked at Hunt Correctional Center, and Z.C. Dunaway, who visited Angola and the prison at Jackson in connection with his Lion's Club affiliation and church-related activities. However, this court previously opined: [T]he fact that a prosecutor excuses one person with a particular characteristic... and not another similarly situated person does not in itself show that a prosecutor's explanation was a mere pretext for discrimination. The accepted juror may have exhibited traits which the prosecutor could have reasonably believed would make him desirable as a juror. State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 822 (La. 1989). Examining the voir dire as a whole, we note that Vignes's connection with the prison system was through his employment as a horticulturist, and Dunaway's connection was even more attenuated in that his visits were several years earlier through the Lions Club and his church. We conclude the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding the prosecutor's reasons non-pretextual. Fred R. Norwood, Jr.: The prosecutor used his ninth peremptory challenge to strike Norwood, a thirty-five-year old African-American male. On his questionnaire, Norwood stated that he believed in the death penalty unless the killing was in self-defense. Although many of Norwood's voir dire responses tended to indicate he might have been a juror favorable to the state, the prosecutor articulated the following reasons for excusing him: We are trying a murder case here, a homicide. This [juror] had a brother who has been convicted of murder really manslaughterand served a period of confinement. He visited him in parish prison and a state institution. This is not the kind of person I think would be leaning in favor of convicting an individual for another homicide. Clearly he leans, because of his prior contact with his brother, [in] favor of the defense. I think I am entitled to try to get jurors who lean in favor of the state, and that's why I'm excusing him. This court has considered the fact that a family member is a convicted criminal to be a race-neutral reason for excluding a prospective juror. See State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886 (La.1989). Thus, the trial judge properly ruled that the striking of Norwood was not based on discriminatory intent. Andrew Gilmore: The state used its tenth peremptory challenge to excuse Gilmore. When asked his feelings on the death penalty, he wrote: If you make your bed hard, lay in it. After responding that a murder occurring during an aggravated rape is one certain incident that I would feel that the death penalty should be carried out, he wavered and could not commit if the situation was a murder during an armed robbery: Q. Do you have any problem considering the returning of a death sentence for someone who killed during a robbery? A. That's a hard question to answer because of so many circumstances and so many things that happen. When the prosecutor was trying to make the point that the state's burden is to prove the elements of the crime, Gilmore again expressed confusion: Q. Do you understand I'm only required to prove those elements, nothing else? . . . A. That's a hard question to answer. Q. Why is it a hard question to answer? A. Because like as you were saying, you have the person who did the crime or who was in the area of the crime, so to speak. Q. They must be a principal, not just in the area? A. Right. He was a principal, if it was stated he was the actual one who did it, and all the facts, you have to have facts to judge, because he could have been the one in the getaway car, and the getaway car was just a car that dropped some people off, and he didn't know nothing about it. It's kind of hard to say. The prosecutor articulated the following reasons in response to the Batson objection: There are two main reasons I'm excluding him. One deals with the guilt phase, and one with the penalty phase. In response to defense questions, the potential juror said he wanted to know why the defendant shot in an armed robbery, that that was very important to him. This juror brought up the fact about whether there would be a struggle over the weapon. In this case, your honor, the facts of this case, there's going to be a shot, a struggle, and multiple shots. Based upon the particular facts of this case, and in view of what he said, it would be very important to him, I think in the penalty phase especially, he is very beneficial to the defense. Also, in the second area, that I think he is one of these people who no proof would ever be enough to convict someone of a crime. He repeatedly talked about facts, circumstances and giving a fair chance to the defendant. Even in response to questioning by me concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, when I said this is a given, that I prove beyond a reasonable doubt, he was still concerned about the facts of the case. He is an extremely defense oriented person in view of his responses. But again, most importantly, I'm concerned about the unique facts of this case, there's a shot, struggle, multiple shots. The prospective juror's voir dire responses as a whole reveal that the prosecutor correctly read Gilmore's demeanor for indefiniteness. In light of Gilmore's responses, the prosecutor was justified in exercising a peremptory strike.