Opinion ID: 900626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mary Brobjorg, Blem's sister

Text: [¶ 53.] Blem was having a telephone conversation with his sister, Mary, on July 3, 1998, the night Krueger burst into his home. She remained on the phone and heard what transpired between the two parties. She testified that she asked Blem why he was scared. At that point, the State objected to Mary's anticipated response on the grounds of hearsay. [¶ 54.] During Blem's offer of proof, Mary told the trial court that Blem told her that the men were threatening him, and terrorizing him. When she asked him are you being intimidated, he replied no, I am being terrorized. She described Blem as panicky, scared and breathing heavy. The trial court allowed her to testify that Blem told her that two bad dudes came in his house, but determined that the rest of her testimony was inadmissible because it was unrelated to the event. [¶ 55.] Blem argues that his response of being terrorized showed his fear of Krueger and Drafahl and was an excited utterance or a contemporaneous statement. Therefore, he claims that the statement was admissible under both SDCL 19-16-5 and 19-16-6. He also claims that the statement does not amount to hearsay under SDCL 19-16-2 because the declarant, Blem, testified, in court under oath, before Mary testified. [¶ 56.] To be admissible evidence under the excited utterance rule, the statement must (1) relate to a startling event or condition; and (2) be made by the declarant while under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. SDCL 19-16-6. Similarly, a statement is considered to be contemporaneously made and admissible if it describes or explains an event or condition and is made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. SDCL 19-16-5. [¶ 57.] Here, Mary possessed firsthand knowledge of what occurred that night. After Krueger and Drafahl left, Blem got back on the phone and was panicky, scared and breathing heavy. He told Mary that he was scared and that he was being terrorized. This statement is an excited utterance because it relates to the startling event of a man bursting into his home. This statement describes the condition of being terrorized and was made while Blem was perceiving the event, or immediately thereafter, therefore it was contemporaneously made. Thus, it was error to exclude this testimony. [¶ 58.] The State argues that the response is not a contemporaneous statement or an excited utterance because it is not a statement of fact and merely describes the history between the two parties. The application of the excited utterance or contemporaneous statement rules is not limited to ones of fact. See Lee v. Solem, 405 N.W.2d 56, 58 (S.D.1987) (stating that the testimony that $1,500 had to be taken to petitioner's home or else someone would be floating in the river may be admitted as an excited utterance); State v. Wolford, 318 N.W.2d 7, 10-11 (S.D.1982) (determining that the following statement was properly admitted as a contemporaneous statement: That _____ ____ stole a car. I am going to stay the hell away _____. (expletives omitted)). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in excluding portions of Mary's testimony. [¶ 59.] The State further claims that error, if any, was harmless because Mary testified that Blem was scared and any reference to Blem's being terrorized is merely cumulative. When the basis for claiming harmless error is that the evidence is cumulative, a court's inquiry must go beyond whether duplicative evidence exists: A court's inquiry as to harmlessness does not end with its determination that the erroneously admitted evidence duplicates the untainted evidence. Regardless of the duplicative nature of the erroneously admitted evidence, the record in the particular case might reveal that the admission of the evidence was or was not prejudicial. In some cases the jury may not have been persuaded of the defendant's guilt had it not been presented with the erroneously admitted duplicative evidence. Conversely, in other cases although the erroneously admitted evidence is not duplicative, it could be clear to the court that the evidence had no impact on the conviction. State v. Younger, 453 N.W.2d 834, 842 (S.D.1990) (Sabers, J., concurring specially) (quoting State v. Billings, 110 Wis.2d 661, 329 N.W.2d 192, 196 (1983)). In other words, the focus should be on the extent of the prejudice caused by the error, even if duplicative. However, because of our determination of reversible error on Issues 1 and 4, we need not reach this question. Once again, on retrial, this evidence should be admitted. [¶ 60.] 4. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO CROSS-EXAMINE BLEM ON HIS MENTAL ILLNESS AFTER GRANTING THE STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE PROHIBITING THAT EVIDENCE. [¶ 61.] Blem suffers from bipolar disorder. [4] On November 24, 1998, the State made a motion in limine to prohibit the defense from presenting any testimony or argument that [Blem] by virtue of his peculiar characteristics or sensibilities acted reasonably in killing [Drafahl]. The trial court granted the State's motion stating that the standard from which the Defendant's conduct is to be judged is a reasonable person ... standard[.] [¶ 62.] At trial, the defense complied with the ruling and offered no testimony or evidence of Blem's mental illness. However, the State questioned Blem about his mental illness during cross-examination. Despite the motion in limine and Blem's objections, the State elicited information about the type of illness he suffered, the type of medications he was taking, the affect his medications had on his ability to perceive events and whether the disorder or the medications caused violent mood swings. Blem's attorney was granted a continuing objection to this line of questioning. [¶ 63.] During an in-chambers hearing, the State argued that his inquiries were permissible because Blem repeatedly testified that he was afraid, afraid, afraid, afraid. The State declared that it was entitled, for impeachment purposes, ... [to inquire] whether or not his fears [were] exaggerated because of his mental illness. The trial court allowed the State to proceed. [¶ 64.] During closing arguments, the State further argued to the jury that Blem was not a credible witness because of [his] psychological makeup, [he] exaggerates and embellishes and, as I said, has different moods, violent moods, meaning violent in the sense I'm using extreme. Blem objected because he testified that he did not experience violent mood swings. The trial court noted his objection and the State continued arguing that Blem had a sick and exaggerated mind [and][h]is beliefs are unreasonable about any risk. He further stated: [I]f we allow the Jerry Blem's of this world, the people who are easily frightened, the high strung, the prone to exaggeration to have a license to kill because they believe that they were in danger, then many people, then the mentally ill, the cowards of the world are given ... a license to kill[.]    We have to impose upon these people rationality or we're all going to be at risk for the - for the violent conduct of irrational, unreasonable people if the defense is, well, they thought it was ok so its ok....    [Blem] recounted events in his mind that did not happen and exaggerated them, embellished them and worked himself up. A fear probably created by his psychological makeup. His personality. [¶ 65.] Blem argues that it was reversible error to allow the State to question Blem about his mental illness in direct violation of the State's motion in limine. He claims that it was also reversible error to allow the State, in its closing argument, to argue that his bipolar disorder affected his judgment. He claims that this evidence should have been excluded under Rule 404(b) because it was highly prejudicial and with little probative value and requests that this court reverse on the basis of plain error. [¶ 66.] The State claims that self-defense is judged by an objective reasonable person standard. Because Blem testified that he was afraid, which is a personal and subjective emotion, the State argues that it had to use Blem's mental illness to show that the subjective evidence of Blem being afraid was not objectively reasonable. [¶ 67.] Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of a court. SDCL 23A-44-15. In State v. Nelson, 1998 SD 124, ¶ 8, 587 N.W.2d 439, 443, we explained: Plain error requires (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and only then may we exercise our discretion to notice the error if (4) it `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We invoke our discretion under the plain error rule cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). Under plain error analysis, Blem bears the burden of proving that the error was prejudicial and must be corrected because a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Id. (citations omitted). [¶ 68.] Here, the State, in its brief in support of its motion in limine, argued that if Blem were allowed to present evidence concerning his peculiar characteristics or sensibilities: One would expect that various witnesses including a psychologist or counselor would be expected to testify that at least as to this Defendant and because of his peculiar sensibilities and mental illness he perceives danger differently; and, would respond differently th[a]n the average reasonable person. If that is to be the law, then the South Dakota Supreme Court should overrule their prior decisions and make the same clear. The present authority does not allow for this Court to allow for a `peculiar' standard based upon peculiar sensibilities of every individual. The reasonable objective person is still the standard in the State of South Dakota. [¶ 69.] Clearly, the State, during the pre-trial motions, argued that Blem was to abide by the objectively reasonable person standard and was prohibited from presenting evidence on his mental illness. During the trial, Blem testified that he was afraid, an emotion that the jury was ultimately instructed to evaluate under the objectively reasonable person standard. See Instructions 19, 28. However, the State determined it necessary to explain that Blem was unnecessarily afraid because of his mental illness, thereby requesting the jury to use a subjective standard. The State can not have it both ways. Blem was denied an opportunity to present expert testimony and evidence concerning the nature of his mental illness, the extent of Blem's mental illness at the time of the shooting; that is, whether he suffered from a manic episode and how his perceptions are affected, if at all. Essentially, Blem was ambushed by the State and denied his right to a fair trial. We conclude that the State's violation of its motion in limine and its conduct during closing argument constitutes prejudicial error resulting in an unfair trial. [¶ 70.] In summary, we conclude that the trial court erred on all four issues. The errors in Issues 1 and 4 were clearly prejudicial. Whether the errors in Issues 2 and 3 were sufficiently prejudicial by themselves to warrant reversal we need not decide as the entire case must be retried in any event. We reverse all issues. [¶ 71.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and AMUNDSON, KONENKAMP and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.