Opinion ID: 1160457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Instruction to View an Accomplice's Testimony With Distrust

Text: At the guilt phase, defendant and Ross each testified on his or her own behalf, denied guilt, and incriminated the other, at least to some extent. Moreover, each was an accomplice of the other, inasmuch as he or she was liable, and actually subject, to prosecution for the identical offense[s] charged against the other, specifically, the robbery and murder of Allen Birkman. (Pen. Code, § 1111.) In accordance with the pattern instruction set out as CALJIC No. 3.18 (1979 re-rev.) (4th ed. pocket pt.), as modified, the superior court told the jury: The testimony of an accomplice which tends to incriminate a co-defendant ought to be viewed with distrust. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care and caution and in light of all the evidence in the case. In its first sentence, the unmodified pattern instruction provided simply, [t]he testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust, and did not contain the relative clause, which tends to incriminate a co-defendant. The superior court stated that the purpose of its modification is to tell the jury they should view with caution that portion that incriminates the defendant, rather than cast a shadow over all of the testimony of a co-defendant.... (26) Defendant contends that the superior court erred by instructing that the testimony of an accomplice that tends to incriminate a codefendant ought to be viewed with distrust. He argues, in substance, that it was without authority to so instruct. Against a claim of this kind, which involves the determination of applicable legal principles, an appellate court reviews a trial court's instruction independently. After such review, we conclude that the superior court did not err. In People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 399 [85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961], we stated that when, as here, a defendant testifies on his own behalf, denies guilt, and incriminates his codefendant, a trial court has authority to instruct the jury that his testimony should be viewed with distrust as that of an accomplice. We believe our statement was sound, and now so hold. The superior court delivered such an instruction: the testimony of an accomplice-defendant that tends to incriminate his codefendant should be viewed with distrust. Its limitation  the accomplice-defendant's testimony should be viewed with distrust to the extent that it tends to incriminate his codefendant  was altogether proper. (Cf. People v. Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1313-1314 [implying that a trial court may instruct the jury that an accomplice's testimony should be viewed with distrust insofar as it tends to incriminate the defendant, but should not be so viewed insofar as it does not].) Strictly speaking, defendant does not complain of the instruction insofar as it benefits him as the incriminated codefendant. Understandably so. An accomplice who testifies against a defendant deserves close scrutiny. ( People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 775 [254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419].) For he has the motive, opportunity, and means to attempt to help himself at the other's expense. (See ibid. ; People v. Graham (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 736, 743 [149 Cal. Rptr. 6].) That remains true when the accomplice who testifies against a defendant is himself a defendant. Defendant does complain of the instruction, however, insofar as it burdens him as the incriminating accomplice-defendant. But without sufficient basis. If an accomplice who testifies against a defendant deserves close scrutiny  and he does  he deserves such scrutiny even if he is himself a defendant. Like any other accomplice, an accomplice-defendant has the motive, opportunity, and means to try to help himself at the other's expense. It is true that the testimony of a defendant ought not to be viewed with distrust simply because it is given by a defendant. Indeed, to such effect was the superior court's instruction on pity and prejudice. (See, ante, at p. 217.) It is also true, however, that the testimony of a defendant ought not to be viewed without distrust simply because it is given by a defendant. Under the law, a defendant is surely equal to all other witnesses. But, under that same law, he is superior to none. [23]