Opinion ID: 2632907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Defendant's Statements to Sheriffs Detectives and to Defendant's Father

Text: Before defendant was arrested, he was taken to the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department headquarters, where he made several damaging admissions. Later that evening, after he was placed under arrest, he made additional admissions to his father, who was permitted to have a recorded conversation with defendant in an interview room. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress these statements. Defendant now challenges that denial. These are the pertinent facts: On June 5, 1991 Lieutenant Raymond Biondi and Detective Stanley Reed went to defendant's home and asked him to come to the sheriffs department to give fingerprints and answer some questions about the murders. Defendant said he was busy, but he agreed to come the next day. Because defendant was unable to drive as a result of his epilepsy, Reed and Biondi picked him up the next day and drove him to the sheriffs station. Defendant, who was not handcuffed, sat in the back of the car. Defendant was fingerprinted and led to an interview room, where he was seated. The room contained a partially concealed video camera. Detective Reed then conducted a videotaped interview with defendant that lasted three and a half hours, during parts of which Lieutenant Biondi was also present. At the beginning of the interview, Detective Reed told defendant he was not under arrest, he did not have to answer any questions, and he was free to leave at any time. Reed then asked defendant to take a lie detector test. Defendant said he would not do so without consulting an attorney, but he agreed to answer questions. Reed questioned defendant extensively about his activities on the two nights on which the murders occurred, and then asked permission to search defendant's apartment. Defendant refused, saying he would not do so without speaking to an attorney. Reed then asked him about his familiarity with and use of firearms. After initially denying that he had a gun or bullets, defendant said he had bought ammunition for a friend before a camping trip. He refused to name the friend, and asked to make a telephone call. He was allowed to do so. After the telephone call, defendant told Biondi and Reed that the person he had spoken to had advised him to leave, but that he wanted to get it over with. Defendant then asked if he could make another telephone call. Detective Reed permitted him to do so and left the interview room. Defendant called his father, Douglas Leonard, and told him that the bullets used in the murders were the same kind as those used in his father's gun, and that defendant had bought some bullets and had put them in his father's ammunition box. After defendant completed the call, Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed came back into the interview room, and defendant made a second telephone call to his father. This time, Lieutenant Biondi spoke to defendant's father and confirmed that the father owned a gun. Defendant then told Biondi and Reed that the bullets he had bought were the same kind of bullets as those used in the murders. Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed dropped defendant off at his home, where they took possession of his trench coat, a pair of shoes, and a box of bullets. They then went to his father's home, where another deputy, Detective Fancher, took possession of the father's gun. That evening, Biondi and Reed learned that ballistics tests established the gun as the murder weapon, and they returned to the father's house, where they arrested defendant. The father told Biondi and Reed that defendant had told him that he had committed the murders. Biondi and Reed transported defendant back to the sheriffs department, where they placed him in the same interview room as before. At Detective Reed's request, defendant's father also came to the station. He asked to speak to defendant, explaining that he believed that someone else had masterminded the murders, and he wanted to see if defendant would tell him who it was. Detective Reed told the father he could talk to defendant but the conversation would be recorded. As the father entered the room where defendant was, Detective Reed told the two men that he and Lieutenant Biondi would be monitoring the conversation, and the father then told defendant their conversation would be taped. In the ensuing conversation, the father repeatedly asked defendant whether anyone else was involved in the murders, and defendant said no one else was. At the evidence suppression hearing, the videotaped conversations were played, and Detective Reed testified to the events set forth above. The defense called Dr. William Lynch, the neuropsychologist who also testified at the competency hearing and at the guilt phase of trial. He described defendant's mental limitations and concluded, after viewing the videotape of the interrogation, that the environment of the interrogation room was coercive and defendant did not know he was free to leave, and that defendant had a seizure near the end of the questioning by Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed.
Defendant contends his statements in the initial interrogation conducted by Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed were illegally obtained because they did not advise him of his Miranda rights. Before being subjected to `custodial interrogation,' a suspect `must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.' ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 732, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485, quoting Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) Here, it is undisputed that at the time of the interrogation defendant was a suspect: Detective Reed so testified at the hearing on defendant's suppression motion. The trial court found, however, that there was no need to advise defendant of his Miranda rights because he was not subjected to custodial interrogation. Defendant challenges that ruling. An interrogation is custodial when a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) Whether a person is in custody is an objective test; the pertinent inquiry, is whether there was `a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.` ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact. ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 401, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) When reviewing a trial court's determination that a defendant did not undergo custodial interrogation, an appellate court must apply a deferential substantial evidence standard ( id at p. 402, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442) to the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and it must independently decide whether, given those circumstances, a reasonable person in [the] defendant's position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave ( ibid.). Defendant asserts that to determine whether a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave, we must decide whether a reasonable person with defendant's age, low intelligence, and developmental disability would have felt free to leave. Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has decided whether these factors should be considered in deciding whether a suspect is in custody (see generally Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 666-668, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938), but we will assume for the sake of argument that these factors may be considered. Defendant also points out that the interrogation was initiated by the deputies, that he was fingerprinted before being questioned; that the interrogation was relatively long (three and a half hours) and took place, in an interrogation room in the sheriffs department; that the door to the interrogation room was closed and Detective Reed sat between defendant and the door; and that when, on one occasion, defendant tried to go down the hall to the bathroom, Detective Reed escorted him back to the interrogation room, asking him to wait in the interrogation room and not to wander around. Notwithstanding the facts cited by defendant, we agree with the trial court that he was not subjected to custodial interrogation. Detective Reed repeatedly told defendant that he was not under arrest and he was free to end the questioning at any time and leave. Indeed, at the end of the interrogation the deputies did not arrest him; instead they took him home. When defendant asked to use the telephone, he was permitted to do so. (See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602 [Miranda warnings are designed to protect suspects who are cut off from the outside world and subjected to incommunicado interrogation.].) The door to the interrogation room was not locked, and when defendant was left alone to make his telephone calls, he left the room to use the bathroom. Significantly, after using the telephone, defendant told Detective Reed that the person he had spoken to had advised him to leave, but he preferred to remain and answer questions, and he later told his father on the telephone that he was free to go. Although the ... determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by ... the person being questioned ( Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293), defendant's comments reinforce our view that a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave.
Defendant contends the trial court should have suppressed his videotaped conversation with his father, held in an interrogation room at the sheriffs' department, because Miranda warnings did not precede that conversation. (See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) Unlike defendant's initial conversation with Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed, there is no dispute that defendant was in custody when the conversation with his father occurred, because it came after his arrest for the murders. But the trial court, noting that Miranda warnings are required only before a custodial interrogation, ruled that no Miranda warnings were required because defendant's conversation with his father was not an interrogation. Defendant challenges that ruling. He relies on Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, which states that interrogation includes a practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect. According to defendant, allowing his father to have a recorded conversation with him in an interrogation room was a form of interrogation because the deputies knew the conversation was reasonably likely to invoke an incriminating response. The United States Supreme Court rejected a similar claim in Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 481 U.S. 520, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 ( Mauro) . There, the high court held that police officers did not violate the defendant's Miranda rights by granting the defendant's wife's request to talk to him in the presence of an officer, after the defendant had invoked his right to counsel. The court stressed that the purpose of Miranda is to prevent[ ] government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment ( id. at pp. 529-530, 107 S.Ct. 1931) and that in Mauro the officers did not implicate this purpose ( id. at p. 530, 107 S.Ct. 1931) by allowing the defendant's wife to talk to him. Defendant claims this case is distinguishable from Mauro because Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed, unlike the officers in Mauro, allowed defendant's videotaped conversation with his father for the sole purpose of obtaining incriminating evidence; and Biondi and Reed, unlike the officers in Mauro, had good reason to believe the conversation would elicit such evidence. These distinctions, however, are not significant. Officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will incriminate himself. ( Mauro, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 529, 107 S.Ct. 1931.) A defendant's conversations with his own visitors are not the constitutional equivalent of police interrogation. ( People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 170, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169; see also People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 758, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) In short, [p]loys ... that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda's concerns. ( Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 297, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243.) Here, Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed did not compel or coerce defendant to talk to his father. Thus there was no need for Miranda warnings before the conversation.
Defendant asserts that the trial court should have suppressed both his initial statement to the police and his later conversation with his father because they were involuntarily obtained. It long has been held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution makes inadmissible any involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion. [Citations.] A statement is involuntary [citation] when, among other circumstances, it was `extracted by any sort of threats ..., [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight....'` [Citations.] Voluntariness does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently significant, but rather on the `totality of [the] circumstances.' [Citations.] ( People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79, 1 Cal. Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) On appeal, we uphold the trial court's findings of historical fact, but we independently review its determination that defendant's statements were voluntary. ( People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 121, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164; People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 80, 1 Cal. Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) In arguing that his statements were involuntary, defendant stresses his limited intelligence and developmental disability; his lack of experience with law enforcement (only one prior arrest for shoplifting); the circumstance that the statements were made in a small, windowless interrogation room; the length of the interrogation (three and a half hours); and defendant's dependence on Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed for a ride home after the interrogation was complete. But a statement is voluntary unless there, is coercive police activity. ( Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473; see also People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 502, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 245, 150 P.3d 1224; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.) Here Biondi and Reed did not coerce defendant. During the initial interrogation they repeatedly told him he was free to leave at any time, and during defendant's conversation with his father they were not even present. At no time did they say or do anything to imply that defendant was required to talk. We therefore independently conclude that, as the trial court ruled, defendant's statements were voluntary.
Defendant asserts the videotaping of his end of his telephone call to his father from the interrogation room violated the federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, the California Constitution's right to privacy, and title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. He may not rely on the latter two grounds, however, because he did not raise them at trial. ( People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 845, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) In any event, the claim lacks merit. The trial court found that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he knew he was being videotaped when he made the call. Detective Reed's testimony that defendant noticed the videocamera provides substantial evidence to support this finding. Defendant also contends Lieutenant Biondi and Detective Reed violated the federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, the California Constitution's right to privacy, and title III of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by audiotaping a conversation between his father and other family members, as well as a conversation between his father and Detective Reed. He may not raise this claim because he failed to raise it at trial. ( People v. Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 845, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) In any event, defendant's own privacy rights were not violated because he was not a participant in these conversations.