Opinion ID: 821509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Penalty Phase Issues and Miscellaneous Claims

Text: 1. Asserted error in denying defendant’s motion to strike the notice of aggravation On October 17, 1995, before the start of jury selection, the prosecution filed a notice of aggravation pursuant to section 190.3, identifying evidence it intended to introduce and rely upon at the penalty phase. Among other things, the notice stated the prosecution would introduce ―documentary and necessary testimonial evidence‖ regarding five prior felony convictions (see § 190.3, factor (c)), and identified the date and county of each conviction and the offense involved. The notice also stated the prosecution would introduce evidence of seven prior instances of ―criminal activity by the defendant involving the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied use of force or violence‖ (see § 190.3, factor (b)), and identified the approximate date and location of each incident, the type of criminal activity involved, and the names of potential witnesses. The noticed incidents included all of the incidents actually presented in aggravation at the penalty phase. (See ante, at p. 19.) Two days later, defendant moved to strike the notice of aggravation. Defendant argued the notice was deficient because the prosecution had not provided discovery of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incidents described in the notice and because ―[t]he notice does not list the addresses of witnesses the prosecution intends to call.‖ He argued that because the notice did not provide sufficient knowledge of what defendant had to defend against and imposed no limits on the prosecution, it was inadequate to enable him to prepare his case. Defendant asked the court to strike the notice and order the prosecution to provide him with timely notice of the ―actual evidence‖ to be presented in 89 aggravation. Around the same time, defendant also filed a motion seeking discovery under section 1054, in which he requested, inter alia, ―[t]he names, addresses and telephone numbers of all witnesses that are known to the prosecution and/or investigating authorities, including penalty phase witnesses.‖28 The prosecution opposed the motion to strike, but did not oppose defendant‘s request for discovery of the names, addresses and telephone numbers of witnesses. At the hearing on these motions, defense counsel acknowledged the motion to strike the notice of aggravation was intertwined with the discovery issues in the case. He argued nonetheless the notice was deficient because it did not specifically identify which witnesses the prosecution intended to call, and ―under [section] 1054 we haven‘t been provided with any addresses or any other way of following up an investigation.‖ The prosecutor responded that he had provided the defense with the addresses of witnesses to the extent he had them, and had provided police reports as to several of the listed convictions and incidents of 28 Contemporaneously, defendant also filed a motion to strike his 1971 and 1976 robbery convictions based on the failure of the presiding trial courts to properly advise him of his federal constitutional rights before accepting his guilty pleas. (See Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-133.) The trial court denied this motion. Although defendant includes this motion in the heading to the present argument and mentions it in the text of his opening brief, he provides no argument or authority supporting his contention that the motion was wrongly denied. Accordingly, the issue is forfeited. (See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Similarly, defendant appears to contend the court erroneously denied his motion to have the jury make special findings on aggravating and mitigating factors. Although there is no record of any corresponding written motion in the clerk‘s transcript, such a motion was discussed and denied at the hearing. Again, however, defendant provides no argument or authority supporting his contention that the denial of the motion was in error. This issue is forfeited as well. 90 criminal activity. He further noted that although some of the addresses listed in the police reports were 20 or more years old, the prosecution was trying to track down current addresses, and ―as soon as we have addresses [the defense] will have addresses.‖ He finally explained that to the extent the notice was overinclusive, he intended to narrow it as more information became available. The court denied the motion to strike. Noting the prosecutor was still in the process of preparing for trial, the court ―assume[d]‖ he would provide witnesses‘ addresses and telephone numbers to the defense as soon as he was able to locate them, and commented, ―I think that‘s appropriate.‖ The court further ordered the prosecution to ―continue to comply with discovery statutes and or any other discoverable items of the court.‖ Defendant contends the court erred under state law by denying his motion to strike the notice of aggravation. He asserts the notice was insufficient to enable him to prepare his defense, in that it failed to provide the locations and addresses of witnesses so that his investigator could interview them. He further asserts the notice failed to adequately describe the facts and circumstances of the prior convictions and other alleged criminal activity, which hampered his ability to conduct voir dire of potential jurors. Defendant is mistaken. Section 190.3 provides that except for rebuttal evidence and evidence in proof of the capital offense or special circumstances that subject the defendant to the death penalty, ―no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial.‖ ―The purpose of the notice required by section 190.3 is to advise the accused of the evidence against him so that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense at the penalty phase. [Citation.] ‗A capital defendant is entitled to notice of other violent crimes or prior felony convictions 91 offered in the prosecution‘s penalty case-in-chief before the cause is called to trial or as soon thereafter as the prosecution learns the evidence exists. [Citations.] However, the prosecutor is not prevented from introducing all the circumstances of a duly noticed incident or transaction simply because each and every circumstantial fact was not recited therein. [Citations.] The notice is sufficient if it gives defendant ―a reasonable opportunity‖ to prepare a defense to the allegations. [Citation.]‘ ‖ (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 639.) The notice of aggravation that defendant received satisfied the requirements of section 190.3. The notice identified the alleged prior convictions by date, county of conviction, and type of offense. It also identified the alleged other criminal activity by date or approximate date, location, and type of offense, and included the names of potential witnesses as well as other possible evidence. We repeatedly have held this form of notice is sufficient (e.g., People v. Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 638-639; see also People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1051; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 733-734; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 108-109; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 258-259), particularly when, as apparently was the case here, the notice is supplemented by pertinent police reports (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1028-1029). Defendant was not entitled under section 190.3 to a summation of the witnesses‘ expected testimony (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 421; People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 330); nor was the prosecution required, under that section, to identify which among the noticed incidents of other criminal activity it would actually present evidence concerning, or which among the many potential witnesses listed it would actually call to testify. (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 525 [§ 190.3 does not require the prosecution to ―present evidence on all matters as to which pretrial notice was given‖].) Defendant‘s argument that the lack of specificity in the notice deprived him of the 92 opportunity to voir dire prospective jurors is misplaced. ― ‗The purpose behind the notice requirement . . . is to permit the defendant to prepare a defense at the penalty trial, not to question prospective jurors about every bit of evidence they might hear.‘ ‖ (People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1016.) Finally, defendant cites no authority for the proposition that he was entitled, under section 190.3, to the addresses of potential witnesses. Because the notice contained sufficient information to give defendant a ―reasonable opportunity‖ to prepare his penalty phase defense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant‘s motion to strike it. (People v. Hart, supra, at p. 639.) To the extent defendant means to contend there was some error involving discovery, he points to nothing in the record suggesting the prosecution failed to comply with its discovery obligations. Indeed, at the hearing on defendant‘s motions the trial court found no evidence that the prosecutor was ―hiding the ball.‖ Accordingly, defendant‘s claim fails. 2. Asserted prosecutorial misconduct Defendant points to two instances of asserted prosecutorial misconduct occurring during the penalty phase. Because defendant failed to object to the asserted misconduct on the specified (or any) grounds, and makes no claim that objections would have been futile, his claims are forfeited for purposes of appeal. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 960.) On the merits, we reject the claims, as follows. a. Assertedly improper comment on defendant’s right to remain silent During closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor argued that ―[e]vidence of defendant‘s remorse which is nonexistent‖ constituted ―another aggravating factor.‖ Defendant asserts the comment indirectly touched on his right under the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution to remain silent. We 93 repeatedly have held, however, that the prosecution may comment upon the defendant‘s lack of remorse, as long as in doing so it does not refer to the defendant‘s failure to testify. (People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1346; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 453-454.) Here, after the prosecutor made the challenged remark, he went on to explain, ―You‘ve got a couple of things here. In the same conversation in which John Richie was told by the defendant that I told the old man to get right with God, I‘ll be back in a minute and when I came back I shot him. [¶] In that same conversation John Richie says, ‗How can you do such a thing?‘ and the defendant‘s response to him is, ‗It was nothing. Nothing.‘ And how do you know that‘s true? ‗Cause within two hours he‘s having sex with Melissa Fader. Within two hours he‘s over having murdered a bound, helpless 67 year old man in his own home and is ready for sex.‖ Accordingly, the jury would have understood the challenged remark as referring not to defendant‘s failure to testify, but rather to his statements and conduct during and after the crime, which were not remorseful. (People v. Castaneda, supra, at p. 1346; People v. Boyette, supra, at p. 455.) Alternatively, the jury might have understood the remark as referring to defendant‘s failure to produce evidence of his remorse from friends and family. (People v. Castaneda, supra, at pp. 13461347; People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 585.) The prosecutor‘s comment did not amount to misconduct. b. Assertedly improper counting and double-counting of aggravating factors Section 190.3, factor (a), permits the jury determining penalty to consider, as an aggravating circumstance, ―[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true . . . .‖ During his penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor discussed that factor as follows: ―Last, ‗the circumstances of the 94 crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true but don‘t count it twice.‘ So you had the existence of this happened during a robbery. [¶] You also have each of the other circumstances around the crime. These include facts about Sherman Robbins. [¶] An aggravating factor is the fact that Sherman Robbins was a 67 year old man. [¶] An aggravating factor is the fact that at the time he was murdered, Sherman Robbins was a diabetic. [¶] An aggravating factor at the time he was murdered, Sherman Robbins had a useless left hand. He could not even draw his own insulin for his diabetes. [¶] . . . [¶] Sherman Robbins was in a residence, not his residence but a family residence, his brother‘s residence. The robbery, okay, you can‘t count that twice but the fact that the robbery occurred inside of a person‘s home rather than out on the street, that‘s an aggravating factor. . . . [¶] A circumstance in this case is all that Sherman Robbins was trying to do at the time that he was murdered, all he was doing was he was giving a place to stay to two women who told him their car had broken down someplace nearby . . . . [¶] That‘s the circumstance in this case. Sherman Robbins was trying to help folks out. Just like Sharon Robbins said he usually did. [¶] . . . [¶] You may consider as a factor in aggravation the fact that Sherman‘s hands were tied behind his back at the time that he was murdered and that he was helpless on that account. [¶] You may consider what the last 10 or 15 minutes of that man‘s life was like. . . . [¶] As far as we know, the last thing he ever heard was ‗Get right with God. I‘ll be back in a minute,‘ and then his longest minute started. That‘s an aggravating factor. [¶] Here‘s another aggravating factor. Evidence of defendant‘s remorse which is nonexistent. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Here‘s another circumstance of the offense that you can consider as you go through the weighing process. You can consider the impact of this crime not just on Sherman Robbins ‗cause Sherman Robbins had himself a really ugly last 10 or 15 minutes of his life and with luck has gone to 95 a better world. But you may also consider the impact on his family. [¶] You may consider the impact on his brother, Bill Robbins, and his wife Alvina. [¶] You many consider the impact on Sharon Robbins and her husband[,] Sherman‘s nephew Gary. [¶] So let‘s talk about those fundamentally decent people for a little bit. [¶] . . . [¶] That experience for those people mopping up his blood off of the floor, off of the couch, off of wherever it splattered in that room, that‘s a factor in aggravation. [¶] And there‘s a factor in aggravation for Sharon Robbins. Sharon Robbins, on the morning of the 22d of March 1994, . . . walks in and she sees that he‘s lying dead on the couch. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I‘m asking you to go into the jury deliberation room, weigh the factors in mitigation, which are nearly nonexistent, against the factors in aggravation, and bring back the appropriate verdict.‖ Defendant argues that the form of the prosecutor‘s argument encouraged the jury to double-count aggravating factors, and that the argument improperly relied on unconstitutionally vague aggravating factors as well as aggravating factors that duplicated elements of the offense. We disagree. Defendant first claims the prosecutor‘s argument was improper because it encouraged the jury to double-count various circumstances of the offense as aggravating circumstances. He explains the prosecutor‘s argument, which ―specifically labeled‖ each of the identified circumstances of the offense as a separate aggravating factor, ―virtually demanded‖ that the jury consider each circumstance separately and keep a ―running numerical tally‖ of the factors. He argues the consideration of such duplicative and cumulative factors skewed the weighing process and created a risk the sentence would be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. (Cf. United States v. McCullah (10th Cir. 1996) 76 F.3d 1087, 11111112 [under a weighing scheme, the use of duplicative aggravating factors creates 96 an unconstitutional skewing of the weighing process, which necessitates a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors].) We find nothing improper in the prosecutor‘s argument. All the prosecutor did was point out various aspects of the offense that the jury reasonably might have considered aggravating — that is, circumstances ―attending the commission of the crime which increase[ed] its guilt or enormity or add[ed] to its injurious consequences.‖ (CALJIC No. 8.88.) This was permissible, as section 190.3, factor (a), specifically enumerates the ―circumstances of the crime‖ as an aggravating factor. Defendant‘s reliance on cases involving the jury‘s consideration of invalid or duplicative aggravating circumstances pursuant to erroneous instructions (e.g., United States v. McCullah, supra, 76 F.3d at pp. 1111-1112; see also Stringer v. Black (1992) 503 U.S. 222, 232) is misplaced. Defendant‘s argument here is not that the jury instructions themselves created a risk that the jury might improperly double-count factors or weigh invalid factors in its penalty determination. Rather, he contends the prosecutor‘s argument created such a risk. We are not convinced. Of course, it is misconduct for a prosecutor, during argument, to misstate the law (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 829), or to invite or encourage the jury to do what the law prohibits (e.g., People v. Love (1961) 56 Cal.2d 720, 730 [a prosecutor may not use evidence offered for a limited purpose to argue inferences for which the evidence is inadmissible], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 637, fn. 2; People v. Morales (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 917, 928 [it is improper to urge a jury to render a verdict based on public opinion or to protect the community]). Here, however, we conclude the prosecutor‘s argument was not designed — and would not have been understood by the jury — as an invitation to consider each of the various circumstances of the offense as a separate aggravating factor, and then to determine whether the aggravating factors 97 simply outnumbered the mitigating factors. The prosecutor expressly disavowed any such purpose, explaining to the jury in introductory remarks at the outset of his argument, ―Oh, one other thing. [¶] The mitigating and aggravating factors. You don’t count them, okay. You weigh them. And the judge already instructed you that any mitigating factors might outweigh all of the aggravating factors, okay. He also instructed you that what you are to do in the final analysis is to weigh the totality of the mitigating circumstances against the totality of the aggravating circumstances. And it‘s okay if there is one mitigating circumstance, just one mitigating circumstance and the totality of that one mitigating circumstance outweighs the aggravating circumstances in their totality, then the proper sentence is life without possibility of parole.‖ Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, the trial court properly instructed the jury that it was not to ―double weigh any circumstances of the offense which are also special circumstances‖; nor was it to double weigh ―any prior conviction‖ it had already considered as ―criminal activity by the defendant . . . which involve[d] the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.‖ Finally, the trial court gave the jury the standard instructions explaining the weighing process (see CALJIC No. 8.88), including the admonishment that ―[t]he weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale or the arbitrary assignments of weight to any of them. You are free to assign whatever mor[al] or sympathetic value you [deem] appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider.‖ Considering the prosecutor‘s argument and the jury instructions as a whole, we conclude there was no risk that the jury was misled as to how it was to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence. 98 Defendant‘s claim that the prosecutor‘s argument created the risk that the jury would rely on unconstitutionally vague aggravating factors, or factors that duplicated elements of the offense, likewise fails. Although to survive a vagueness challenge statutory factors used in sentence selection must have ―a commonsense core of meaning that criminal juries should be capable of understanding‖ (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 168, citing Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975), the prosecutor here was not purporting to define the section 190.3 statutory sentence selection factors, but to point out ―circumstances of the offense‖ the jury might consider aggravating under section 190.3, factor (a). Similarly, any constitutional requirement that aggravating factors not duplicate elements of the offense applies only to the factors used by a state to determine who is eligible for the death penalty. (See Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231.) In California, that death-eligibility function is performed by the special circumstances outlined in section 190.2. (People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 468.) Defendant cites no case holding that the sentence selection factors outlined in section 190.3 are subject to similar limitations, and in any event, as we have explained, the prosecutor‘s argument did not purport to define the sentence selection factors, but rather pointed to various aggravating aspects of the offense. Accordingly, the prosecutor‘s argument did not encourage the jury to misapply the law, and defendant‘s claim fails. c. Cumulative prejudice Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the prosecutor‘s asserted misconduct at the jury selection, guilt and penalty phases infected the trial with unfairness and deprived him of a fair trial. Because we have found no misconduct, there is no prejudice to cumulate. 99 3. Asserted jury instruction error Defendant raises several challenges to California‘s death penalty statutes governing the penalty selection process, and to the corresponding standard jury instructions given in his case, CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88, arguing they violated his rights to a fundamentally fair trial, to due process of law, to equal protection of the laws, to protection from double jeopardy, to trial by a fair and impartial jury, to the assistance of counsel, to presentation of a defense, and to a reliable and nonarbitrary sentencing determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution. Defendant also raises several challenges to the specific instructions given in his case. As defendant acknowledges, we have rejected most of his standard contentions; because defendant provides no persuasive reason to revisit our conclusions, we likewise reject them here. We also reject defendant‘s claims that are specific to his case. Our analysis follows.
Before final arguments commenced, and pursuant to section 190.3 and a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85 proposed by defendant, with further modifications by the court, the court instructed the jury regarding its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus, the court informed the jurors that in determining the penalty, they were to consider all of the evidence received in the case except as they might be instructed later, and that they were to consider, take into account, and be guided by ―the following factors if applicable.‖ The court then listed the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in section 190.3, informing the jurors that as to factor (a), they were not to ―double weigh‖ any circumstances of the offense that were also special circumstances, and that as to factor (c), they were not to ―double weigh‖ any prior conviction that they had also considered as other criminal activity under factor (b). Pursuant to a modification 100 proposed by defendant, the court also informed the jurors that only section 190.3, factors (a) through (c) could be considered aggravating.29 29 ―In determining which penalty is to be imposed upon the defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case except as you may be hereafter instructed. You may consider and take into account and be guided by the following factors if applicable: [¶] A, The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true. [¶] However, you may not double weigh any circumstances of the offense which are also special circumstances. That is, you may not weigh the special circumstances more than once in your sentencing determination. [¶] B, The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant other than the crime for which the defendant has been tried in these present proceedings which involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. [¶] C, [T]he presence or absence of any prior felony conviction other than the crimes for which the defendant has been tried in the present proceedings. [¶] Again you may not [double weigh] any prior conviction which may also be a circumstance which you have considered under (b) above. [¶] The factors in the above list which you determine to be aggravating circumstances are the only ones that the law permits you to consider. You‘re not allowed to consider any other fact or circumstance as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be appropriate punishment in this case. [¶] The list of circumstances which you may consider in penalties [sic] continues as follows: [¶] In determining penalties continuing [sic] as follows: [¶] D[,] Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, [¶] E[,] Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant‘s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act. [¶] F[,] Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. [¶] G[,] Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or the substantial domination of another person. [¶] H[,] Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects of intoxication. [¶] I[,] The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. [¶] J[,] Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor. [¶] K[,] Any other circumstances which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant‘s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence (footnote continued on next page) 101 Immediately after this instruction, the court gave the following additional instruction proposed by defendant, as modified by the court: ―Mitigating circumstances that I have read to you for your consideration are given merely as examples of some of the factors that a juror may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose a death sentence in this case. A juror should pay careful attention to each of these factors. Any one of them may be sufficient, standing alone, to support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case, but a juror should not limit his or her consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors. [¶] A juror may also consider any other circumstances relating to the case or the defendant as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death penalty. [¶] If the mitigating evidence gives rise to compassion or sympathy for the defendant, the jury may, based upon such sympathy or compassion alone, reject that as a penalty.‖ This instruction was based in part on an instruction given in People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522. (See id. at p. 600, fn. 23.) Defendant now contends the trial court erred in several respects in giving these instructions. We examine each of these contentions below.
Defendant first contends the section 190.3, factor (a) instruction to consider ―[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be (footnote continued from previous page) less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this [principle].‖ 102 true,‖ as applied in his case, was unconstitutional because it did not provide an objective standard to channel the jury‘s discretion and allowed each juror to impose the death penalty based on his or her ―idiosyncratic assessment‖ of the offensive aspects of the crime. We disagree. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 703; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 68.) To the extent defendant contends the prosecutor‘s argument exploited the instruction‘s ambiguity by enumerating ―virtually unlimited‖ aggravating factors, he has forfeited the claim and it lacks merit in any event. (See ante, pt. II.C.2.b.) Defendant further contends the instruction‘s reference to special circumstances unfairly ―weighted‖ the jury‘s decision in favor of death. We have rejected this claim as well. (People v. Cain, supra, at pp. 68-69.) Defendant further contends this instruction was misleading in that it suggested the jury could consider the fact of defendant‘s first degree murder conviction with special circumstances as an aggravating circumstance of the crime. He asserts the trial court had a duty, on its own motion, to instruct that the jury‘s finding of first degree murder with special circumstances was not itself an aggravating circumstance, and that the jury could examine only the facts and circumstances of defendant‘s criminal conduct, not the conviction and special circumstances findings themselves. He contends such an instruction was necessary to avoid erroneous inflation of the case in aggravation, and that the prosecutor‘s argument (see ante, pt. II.C.2.b.) exploited the ambiguity in the instructions. Although defendant essentially contends the instruction was ambiguous, he did not request a clarifying instruction at trial. Accordingly, he has forfeited his claim for purposes of appeal. ―A trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a request from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct instruction 103 forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal . . . .‖ (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638.) Here, the instruction was based on CALJIC No. 8.85, which tracks the language of section 190.3, factor (a). As such, the instruction accurately stated the law. If defendant believed the instruction required elaboration or clarification, he was obliged to request such elaboration or clarification in the trial court. (People v. Lee, supra, at p. 638.) Defendant argues we can review the merits of this issue notwithstanding his failure to object or request clarification, because the claim presents a pure question of law based on undisputed facts and involves important issues of public policy as well as constitutional error that fundamentally affected the judgment. (See Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394.) Even were we inclined to agree, we would find defendant‘s claim lacks merit. We repeatedly have rejected claims that an instruction such as defendant proposes should have been given, even upon request, because: (1) other standard instructions adequately convey that the jury is required to consider not merely the existence of the conviction and special circumstances findings, but also the facts underlying them, and (2) the proposed instruction is misleading to the extent it contradicts instructions directing the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances found true. (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 812; People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1131-1132; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1132-1133.) Finally, we note this case involved none of the risk of double counting that we highlighted in People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713. In Melton, we acknowledged the language of section 190.3, factor (a), which tells the jury to consider both the ―circumstances‖ of the crime and the ―special circumstances‖ found true, presented a ―theoretical problem‖ and that a jury given no clarifying instructions might conceivably double-count any circumstances that were also 104 special circumstances. We held that, upon defendant‘s request, a trial court should instruct the jury not to do so. (People v. Melton, supra, at p. 768.) Here, defendant requested and received an instruction that the jury not ―double weigh any circumstances of the offense which are also special circumstances. That is, you may not weigh the special circumstance more than once in your sentencing determination.‖ Accordingly, there was no theoretical problem for the prosecutor to exploit.
Defendant next contends the section 190.3, factor (b) instruction to consider ―[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant other than the crime for which the defendant has been tried in these present proceedings which involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence‖ was unconstitutional because it allowed the prosecution to present evidence of convictions that were years — sometimes decades — old. We disagree. (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 185-186.) Nor did the instruction fail to provide a reliable, nonarbitrary, nonvague, objective standard to guide the jury‘s discretion. (People v. Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 56; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 701; People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 69-70.) Defendant contends reliance on factor (b) was unconstitutional in the absence of instructions identifying the relevant criminal conduct, defining the elements of the relevant crimes, advising the jury to consider only conduct violating a Penal Code provision, and defining ―force‖ and ―violence.‖ Defendant overlooks that the instructions did identify the relevant 105 criminal conduct,30 and advised that ―before a juror may consider any of such criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance in this case a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact commit such criminal acts. A juror may not consider any evidence of any other criminal act as an aggravating circumstance.‖ These instructions were adequate. Further, absent a request from defendant, the trial court was not required to define the elements of the relevant crimes (People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 704); there was no requirement at all that the court define ―force‖ or ―violence‖ (cf. People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 922 [no requirement to define ― ‗express or implied threat to use force or violence‘ ‖]); and defendant points to no authority requiring the court to instruct, either on its own motion or upon request, that only conduct violating a penal statute may be considered.
Defendant asserts the court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding which of the listed circumstances were aggravating and which mitigating. Although no such instruction was required (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 532; People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 897), defendant‘s contention has no application to this case, because the instruction given did state that the first three factors were the only ―aggravating circumstances . . . the law permits you to consider,‖ and that the jury was not allowed to consider any other circumstance 30 Thus, the court instructed, ―[e]vidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant has committed the following criminal acts: Robbery in Tulare County on or about December 20, 1970, assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer in Tulare County on or about December 20, 1970, robbery in Los Angeles County on or about November 4, 1975. And attempted robbery in Stanislaus County on or about may 26th, 1988 which involved the express or implied use of force of violence or the threat to use force or violence.‖ 106 ―as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be appropriate punishment in this case.‖ The instruction then listed the remaining factors, immediately followed by the paragraph based on People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d 522, beginning ―[the] [m]itigating circumstances that I have read to you for your consideration are given merely as examples . . . .‖ (See ante, p. 102.) The jurors thus would have understood that section 190.3, factors (d) through (k) were ―the mitigating circumstances‖ and that they could be considered solely in mitigation. Even if the jurors would not have so understood, defendant has no cause to complain. Defendant proposed the modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85 that was given. During discussion of jury instructions, defense counsel explained that he had inserted a paragraph in the instruction between factors (c) and (d) ―designed to delineate between circumstances in aggravation and circumstances in mitigation.‖ In response, the court remarked, ―But there‘s nothing in there that says, ‗And now these are the circumstances in mitigation.‘ ‖ Defense counsel simply responded ―No,‖ without proposing any additional modification. Defendant therefore has forfeited his claim. (People v. Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 638.) Defendant next complains that the modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85, as read to the jurors, was confusing because the court inserted the sentence ―the list of circumstances you may consider in penalties continues as follows‖ between factors (c) and (d). This sentence was not in the written instruction defendant proposed. Defendant argues the language ―in penalties,‖ coupled with the lack of a contemporaneous definition of mitigation, would have suggested that the jurors could consider the mitigating circumstances as aggravating. We disagree. As noted below, the court did define mitigation later on, with the final concluding instructions, after closing arguments and immediately before the jury retired to deliberate. Because defendant consented to giving the instructions in this order, he forfeited the issue for appeal. In any event, in the context of the instructions as a 107 whole, including the admonition that factors (a) through (c) were the only aggravating factors the jury could consider, the jury could not have been misled. Defendant next argues the court erred by omitting three paragraphs of his proposed instruction based on People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d 522. We cannot determine the content of the three omitted paragraphs, however, because they are blacked out in the version of the instruction included in the clerk‘s transcript. Pointing to defense counsel‘s comment during the jury instruction discussions, defendant asserts the three paragraphs were intended to ―delineate between circumstances in aggravation and circumstances in mitigation.‖ As the analysis above makes clear, however, defense counsel‘s remark referred to the modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85, not the instruction based on Wharton. Because defendant has not supplied a record adequate to review this claim, it fails. (People v. Carter (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, 531, fn. 6 [it is appellant‘s burden to present a record adequate for review and to affirmatively demonstrate error], citing Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) Defendant next contends the court erred by failing to give an additional instruction he proposed regarding aggravating and mitigating factors, which read as follows: ―The permissible aggravating factors which you may consider are limited to those aggravating factors upon which you have been specifically instructed. Therefore, the evidence which has been presented to you regarding defendant‘s background which does not fall into one of the limited aggravating factors may only be considered by you as mitigating evidence.‖ The court did not err, because the requested instruction was ―largely duplicative.‖ (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1230.) We also reject defendant‘s assertion the court violated his right to due process of law under the federal Constitution by failing to give his proposed instruction that the jury ―may consider the fact that defendant‘s accomplices 108 received a more lenient sentence as a mitigating factor.‖ We have consistently rejected the contention that a jury must be directed to consider the relative severity of an accomplice‘s sentence as a mitigating factor. (E.g., People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1141-1143; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 11881189; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 225, overruled on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1.) Defendant‘s remaining arguments regarding these instructions also lack merit. The trial court was not required to delete seemingly inapplicable factors from the instruction. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 733; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 532.) Nor was it required to instruct on its own motion that the only aggravating factors the jury could consider were those specified in section 190.3 (People v. Lewis, supra, at p. 532), although in this case, as we have explained, the instructions given adequately conveyed that concept. Defendant‘s claim that the trial court was required to define ―circumstances‖ and ―criminal activity‖ lacks merit. A trial court is not required to define ―commonly understood‖ terms (People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 55) such as these. The use of the terms ―extreme,‖ ―substantial,‖ and ―at the time of the offense‖ in section 190.3, factors (d), (g) and (h) did not unconstitutionally restrict the jury‘s consideration of relevant mitigating evidence, render the factors impermissibly vague, or otherwise result in an arbitrary or capricious penalty determination. (People v. Fuiava, supra, at p. 732; People v. Lewis, supra, at p. 532.) ―Additionally, ‗the statutory instruction to the jury to consider ―whether or not‖ certain mitigating factors were present did not unconstitutionally suggest that the absence of such factors amounted to aggravation.‘ ‖ (People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 87; see People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 509.) Defendant contends that, in light of the instructions, it is reasonably likely the jurors considered his methamphetamine use as aggravating. (See People v. 109 Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1140 [― ‗ ―reasonable likelihood‖ ‘ ‖ test applies to ambiguous instructions].) We disagree. As explained, the instructions expressly told the jury that only section 190.3, factors (a) through (c) could be considered aggravating, and no one — least of all the prosecutor — ever suggested defendant‘s drug use was an aggravating ―circumstance of the crime.‖ To the contrary, the prosecutor discussed defendant‘s methamphetamine use only in conjunction with his discussion of section 190.3, factor (h) (whether or not at the time of the offense the defendant‘s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform it to the law was impaired by the effects of intoxication), and simply emphasized there was no evidence regarding ―how intoxicated [defendant] was‖ or whether his intoxication ―put [defendant] in such a state of mind that he could not appreciate the nature of his conduct.‖ Moreover, the prosecutor clearly explained ―you can‘t have aggravation‖ based on section 190.3, factors (d) through (k). We find no reasonable likelihood the jurors were misled. Finally, ―[h]aving admonished the penalty jury to consider ‗any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant‘s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial,‘ and to ‗disregard any [conflicting] instruction [from] the guilt or innocence phase of this trial,‘ the court was not required to instruct the jury further to consider all sympathetic mitigating factors . . . and nonstatutory mitigating factors, nor was it required to caution expressly that the ‗anti-sympathy‘ instruction given only at the guilt phase (CALJIC No. 1.00) did not apply at the penalty phase.‖ (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 486487.) Although the court subsequently erred by repeating the instruction to ―not 110 be influenced by mere . . . sympathy‖ in its oral instructions31 (People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 876), the error was harmless under any standard. (Cf. People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1176 [error in giving jury written copy of anti-sympathy instruction during penalty deliberations did not prejudice defendant].) The other instructions informed the jury that it could consider sympathy in the penalty determination, and no one suggested in argument that sympathy was not an appropriate basis upon which to impose a sentence less than death.32
After the penalty phase closing arguments had concluded, the court instructed the jury regarding the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.88.33 Defendant contends the court 31 It appears the court misspoke, because the word ―sympathy‖ is crossed out in the written version of the instruction. 32 As defendant points out, the court also misspoke when giving his additional sympathy instruction based on People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d 522. The written instruction read in pertinent part, ―If the mitigating evidence gives rise to compassion or sympathy for the defendant, the jury may, based upon such sympathy or compassion alone, reject death as a penalty.‖ In the oral instructions, the court substituted the word ―that‖ for ―death,‖ stating ―If the mitigating evidence . . . the jury may . . . reject that as a penalty.‖ In context, we think the jury would have understood the ―that‖ referred to ―the death penalty,‖ which was mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. 33 ―It‘s now [your] duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be imposed upon the defendant. After having heard all of the evidence and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigation circumstances upon which you have been instructed. [¶] An aggravating factor is any fact, condition or event [at]tending the commission of the crime which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious consequences which is (footnote continued on next page) 111 erred by failing to give the instruction before closing arguments, at the same time it instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85. He asserts this failure prejudiced him because the jury was not warned against ―mechanical counting‖ of the factors until after the prosecutor‘s assertedly prejudicial closing argument. (See ante, pt. II.C.2.b.) Defendant, however, consented to this sequence of events; he therefore has forfeited the issue for purposes of appeal. In any event, we fail to discern any prejudice. It is equally likely defendant benefitted from the jury hearing the admonishment against mechanical counting of factors immediately before it retired to deliberate. Defendant next contends the trial court erred by failing to define the terms ―aggravating‖ and ―mitigating‖ for the jury. He contends the terms have technical meaning and in the absence of instructional definitions, the jury might fail to recognize that a fact is not aggravating unless it renders a murder more deserving of punishment than an ―ordinary‖ murder. (footnote continued from previous page) beyond the elements of the crime itself. [¶] A mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which []as such does not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question but may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. [¶] The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale or the arbitrary assignments of weight to any of them. You are free to assign whatever mor[al] or sympathetic value you [deem] appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. [¶] . . . In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. [¶] To return a judgment of death each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without possibility of parole.‖ 112 Although we repeatedly have held that the terms ―aggravating‖ and ―mitigating‖ are commonly understood and need not be defined for the jury (e.g., People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 267), here the trial court did provide standard definitions pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.88. (See ante, fn. 33.) These instructions adequately defined the terms (see People v. Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 652; People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 304), and we presume the jurors understood and followed them. (People v. Lee, supra, at p. 652.) Defendant further contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on its own motion that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant that defendant would never be considered for parole. We repeatedly have held, however, that trial courts are not required — either upon request, or on the court‘s own motion — to instruct that a sentence of life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out, because such an instruction would be an incorrect statement of the law. (See, e.g., People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 203-204 [collecting cases]; People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 688689 [instruction advising jury that a defendant sentenced to life without possibility of parole could never be released on parole would be erroneous].) We likewise have rejected the suggestion that Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, and its progeny mandate such an instruction. (People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, at p. 207; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 172-173.) Defendant provides no persuasive reason to revisit these conclusions. Even were we to assume error, we would find it harmless under any standard. Question No. 28 on the voir dire questionnaire specifically asked whether each prospective juror, if selected to serve on this case, would ―agree to accept the court's representation that life without the possibility of parole means exactly that, that the sentence would be life without the possibility of parole?‖ Those prospective jurors whose responses raised concerns were questioned on the 113 topic; among those questioned, those who could not assure the court that the possibility that defendant would be released on parole would not enter into their penalty deliberations were excused for cause. Tellingly, none of the sitting jurors answered ―no‖ to question No. 28, and the subject came up only once during the oral voir dire of the jurors. Upon questioning, Juror C.P. assured the court and counsel she had ―no problem‖ accepting that ―life without parole means life without parole.‖ Further, during closing argument, defense counsel explained, ―life without possibility of parole doesn‘t condone or doesn‘t excuse [defendant] for this horrible crime. But when he leaves this county to go to state prison sentenced to life without possibility of parole, it‘s as though they put a big sign over the prison door just as Dante said, ‗Abandon hope all ye who enter here.‘ Because life without possibility of parole is a sentence without hope. There is no hope for ever seeing the outside of the prison.‖ Finally, ―[t]here was no evidence of jury confusion or concern in the present case, nor do we accept defendant[‘s] arguments that ‗empirical studies‘ establish that jurors typically are confused or concerned with these questions even when they do not expressly bring up the issue.‖ (People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 207.) Defendant‘s remaining complaints about this instruction also lack merit. The court was not required to instruct the jury that: (1) it could return a verdict of life imprisonment without possibility of parole even if the circumstances in aggravation outweighed those in mitigation; (2) it was required to return a verdict of life without possibility of parole if it found that the aggravating factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors or that death was not the appropriate punishment; or (3) it could return a verdict of life without possibility of parole even in the complete absence of mitigating evidence. (People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 733; People v. Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 652; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 533.) The term ―so substantial‖ as used in CALJIC No. 8.88 is not 114 unconstitutionally vague (People v. Lewis, supra, at p. 533) and does not improperly direct a verdict in favor of death if the jury finds aggravation outweighs mitigation (cf. People v. Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1226 [― ‗so substantial‘ ‖ language does not create unconstitutional presumption in favor of death]). Defendant complains the instruction ―deprived [him] of an important procedural protection that California law affords noncapital defendants‖ in violation of due process of law, but his claim fails because he does not identify any assertedly analogous noncapital procedural protection. Finally, we have rejected claims that the ―multiple use and counting‖ of various facts and circumstances of the murder — for example, the circumstance that it was committed during a robbery — as a theory of first degree murder, a basis for the special circumstance, and an aggravating factor pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a), ―artificially inflate[s] the statutory factors favoring death‖ (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 405; see People v. Taylor, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1183), or otherwise violates federal constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy and the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 455-456.) In any event, as noted above here the jury was repeatedly admonished in both instructions and argument not to ―double weigh‖ the various facts and circumstances. 4. Asserted unconstitutionality of the death penalty statute Defendant raises a number of challenges to the constitutionality of California‘s death penalty scheme, based on the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. As he acknowledges, we have consistently rejected these contentions in prior cases. Presented with no reason compelling reconsideration, we adhere to those decisions, as follows. 115 Section 190.2 — setting out the special circumstances that, if found true, render a defendant eligible for the death penalty — adequately narrows the category of death-eligible defendants and is not impermissibly overbroad, thus conforming to the requirements of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. (People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 85; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 752.) Section 190.3, factor (a) — designating the circumstances of the crime as a factor the jury may consider in assessing the appropriate penalty — is not impermissibly vague on its face and does not allow for arbitrary and capricious sentencing in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. (People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 85; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp.752-753; see also Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. 967 [factor (a) not unconstitutionally vague on its face].) There is no requirement under either the Sixth Amendment‘s jury trial guarantee, or the Eighth Amendment‘s proscription against cruel and unusual punishments, or the Fourteenth Amendment‘s due process clause, that the jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors or that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors or that death is the appropriate penalty. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1007; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753.) Neither those constitutional provisions, nor Evidence Code section 520, require in the alternative that the jury be instructed to employ the ―preponderance of the evidence‖ standard of proof. (People v. Castaneda, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1355; see also People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 509.) The federal Constitution does not compel that the jury be instructed, for purposes of ―tie-breaking,‖ that the prosecution bears the burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase, or that neither party bears the burden of proof. (People v. Castaneda, supra, at p. 1355; People v. Cowan, supra, at 116 p. 509.) The failure of the statute to require that the jury provide written findings as to the existence of aggravating factors or a written statement of its reasons for imposing the death penalty does not render it defective under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 533534; People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 893.) Nothing in the United States Supreme Court‘s recent jurisprudence interpreting the Sixth Amendment‘s jury trial guarantee — from Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, through Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 — alters these conclusions. (People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 732; People v. Cowan, supra, at p. 509.) Further, there is no violation of equal protection of the laws due to the statutes‘ failure to afford capital defendants some of the procedural safeguards guaranteed to noncapital defendants. (People v. Fuiava, supra, at p. 732; People v. Clark, supra, at p. 1008.) ―The jury‘s reliance on unadjudicated criminal activity as a factor in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), without unanimously agreeing on its existence beyond a reasonable doubt, does not deprive a defendant of any rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, including the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.‖ (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1007; accord, People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753.) Contrary to defendant‘s contention, intercase proportionality review is not required by the due process, equal protection, fair trial, or cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the federal Constitution. (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 894; see also People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1008.) ―On the other hand, a capital defendant is entitled under the California Constitution to intracase proportionality review to determine whether the penalty of death is disproportionate to the defendant‘s culpability.‖ (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 894.) To the extent defendant contends his sentence was 117 disproportionate in this sense, we disagree. ―To determine whether defendant‘s sentence is disproportionate to his individual culpability, we examine the circumstances of the offense, including its motive, the extent of defendant‘s involvement, the manner in which the crime was committed, the consequences of defendant‘s acts, and defendant‘s personal characteristics including age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities.‖ (Id. at p. 895.) Here, the jury determined that defendant participated with his two accomplices in a scheme to enter the residence of his elderly victim by ruse for the purpose of stealing property therein. Once inside, defendant directed his accomplices to restrain the helpless victim — who had been trying only to help the accomplices — and then shot him to death. Although defendant did not instigate the burglary that led to the murder, the jury could have found that he willingly and actively participated in it and at some point assumed control over the actions of his accomplices, in part by the use of threats and intimidation. The jury further could have concluded that defendant alone intended to and did kill the victim, doing so because he believed the victim could identify him as a perpetrator of the burglary and robbery, crimes which in the end netted defendant and his cohorts less than an ―eight-ball‖ of methamphetamine and a few other items of little apparent value. Based on the above facts, the jury reasonably could have determined that defendant was more culpable than his accomplices who did not receive the death penalty. Further, defendant was a mature man in his 40‘s at the time of the crimes with a long criminal record who, as a result of his prior crimes, had spent the bulk of his adult life in a locked facility. There was no evidence defendant was mentally incapacitated or severely intoxicated at the time of the offenses. These facts do not demonstrate disproportionality. (See ibid.) Finally, because ―California does not employ the death penalty as a ‗ ―regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes,‖ ‘ ‖ its imposition does 118 not violate international norms of decency rendering it violative of the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1008; accord, People v. Castaneda, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1356.) Nor does imposition of the death penalty violate the federal Constitution ― ‗inasmuch as international law is part of our law.‘ ‖ (People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 754-755.) Neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights nor any other provision of international law prohibits a death sentence rendered — as was defendant‘s sentence — in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements. (People v. Castaneda, supra, at p. 1356; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 538.) 5. Cumulative error Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the errors that occurred at the guilt and penalty phases of his trial denied him due process of law, equal protection of the laws, and a fundamentally fair and reliable trial in violation of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution, requiring reversal of the guilt and penalty judgments. We have found only one error: the trial court‘s repeating, during penalty phase instructions, the directive that the jury ―not be influenced by mere . . . sympathy.‖ We have concluded, however, that the error was harmless under any standard. (See ante, at p. 111.) Because there were no additional errors to cumulate, this claim fails. 119