Opinion ID: 4023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Penev’s Appellate Waiver

Text: Pursuant to his plea agreement, Penev waived his right to appeal his conviction and any sentence consisting of imprisonment of 192 months or less, a fine of up to $150,000, and a period of supervised release for life. His actual sentence of 192 months with supervised release for life and no fine plainly fits within this provision. This Court has made clear that “[i]n no circumstance . . . may a defendant, who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement.” United States v. Pearson, 570 F.3d 480, 485 (2d Cir. 2009).1 A defendant may only seek relief from an agreed-upon waiver if it can be shown that the plea itself was not knowing and voluntary, where sentencing was based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as bias, 1 The colloquy at Penev’s plea proceeding “adequately establishes that [Penev] understood the terms of his waiver in the plea agreement,” see United States v. DeJesus, 219 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam), and Penev’s argument that the waiver was not voluntary is without merit. See United States v. Oberoi, 547 F.3d 436, 459 (2d Cir. 2008) (declining to “disturb the district court’s finding that [the defendant’s] guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The plea allocution conformed to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The district court engaged [the defendant] in a lengthy dialogue to determine the factual predicate for the plea.”). 3 see United States v. Haynes, 412 F.3d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam), or where the government breaches the plea agreement, see United States v. Garcia, 166 F.3d 519, 521 (2d Cir. 1999). It is also well-established that “a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily enters a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings.” Lebowitz v. United States, 877 F.2d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1989). A defendant’s arguments are improper if aimed at avoiding the appeal waiver contained in his plea agreement. See Garcia, 166 F.3d at 521-22 (rejecting defendant’s claim that the district court violated due process by basing a factual finding on insufficient evidence as “a poorly disguised attack on the merits of her sentence” and enforcing the plea agreement waiver); United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s “effort to dress up his claim as a violation of the Sixth Amendment” in order to “challeng[e] the correctness of his sentence” and enforcing the appeal waiver in the plea agreement). Because we conclude that none of Penev’s claims amount to error, much less due process violations, Penev’s appeal waiver is valid and enforceable, and the appeal is, therefore, dismissed.