Opinion ID: 1418766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Exclusivity

Text: Appellees' contention that fishery regulation beyond traditional territorial waters is an exclusive federal domain derives principally from the federal government's authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce [16] and to manage foreign relations. [17] It is quite well established that the commerce clause of the federal constitution serves two distinct functions: to confer on the national government authority concurrent with the states over matters of interstate and foreign commerce, and, even in the absence of federal legislation, to prohibit state regulation in certain areas of commerce that are national in nature. The prohibitory force of the commerce clause was established in the great  Cooley compromise [18] and has been reaffirmed countless times since that historic decision. [19] Of course, it is today evident that not all that Congress can reach under the sweeping authority of the commerce clause is forbidden to the states. In delineating the smaller arena of exclusive federal concern, the Supreme Court has built upon the touchstone suggested in Cooley: Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulations, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. [20] The difficulty with the criterion has been in its application, for few aspects of commerce are inherently either wholly national or wholly local in character. Although it has used a variety of catchphrases and labels, [21] the Supreme Court in modern times has recognized that the issue is essentially a reconciliation of conflicting claims of state and national power, which can be attained only by an appraisal of the competing state and national interests at stake. [22] Absent congressional action, the familiar test is that of uniformity versus locality: if a case falls within an area in commerce thought to demand a uniform national rule, State action is struck down. If the activity is one of predominantly local interest, State action is sustained. More accurately, the question is whether the State interest is outweighed by a national interest in the unhampered operation of interstate commerce. [23] The national interest has consistently been held to predominate in two instances: when a state regulates in an area where nationally uniform regulations are truly necessary, [24] and when state regulations discriminate against out-of-state goods or manufacturers, threatening to provoke retaliatory restrictions inimical to national commerce. [25] Under these circumstances, the commerce clause invalidates the purported state legislation. The Supreme Court has expressly declined to distinguish between state regulations of interstate commerce and regulation dealing with foreign commerce. [26] In either case the prohibitory reach of the commerce clause is determined by the same analysis of competing state and federal claims. [27] Applying these principles, this court must decide whether the commerce clause renders the states powerless to regulate fisheries in waters beyond the three-mile limit. The potential national interest at stake appears multi-faceted. As to the need for national uniformity of regulation, it would appear doubtful that crabbing in the Bering Sea is of such a nature as to require such uniformity. In its brief as Amicus Curiae in this case, the United States government makes no claim for the exigency of federal regulation. Indeed, other federal documents indicate that local regulation might in fact be more efficacious. Specifically, a 1974 report commissioned and distributed by the Department of Commerce evaluates the prospect of federal regulation of fishing beyond state territorial waters. It concludes: A basic assumption about fisheries regulation is that the substantial differences in both the kinds of fish caught and the fishing effort itself among the several states render a uniform approach to fisheries regulation throughout the United States inadvisable and self-defeating... . ...... [A] single regulatory body with jurisdiction over the [territorial and extra-territorial seas] would provide the most efficient and effective regulation and management of the fisheries resources of the area. It is submitted that either the states or regional commissions, with their substantial experience in regulating coastal fishing in virtually all its aspects and with their superior knowledge of the problems peculiar to fisheries resources off their own coasts should be that single regulatory body. [28] The continued abstention from federal regulation of fishing in territorial waters, despite constitutional power to do so, [29] confirms the wisdom of the traditional approach of local, non-uniform management of fisheries resources. The Supreme Court has held that a problem may be national in scope if an attempted local solution will invite retaliation by sister states. [30] Moreover, a problem may be national if it directly and significantly affects more than one state. [31] While it is clear that Alaska is the state most directly affected by the conduct of Bering Sea fishermen, there are large numbers of Washington crab fishermen and processors, for example  like most of the appellees here  who depend on the resources of this area. It may consequently be recognized that at least some other states have an interest in that fishery. However, the mere fact that crabbing in the Bering Sea represents commerce among and between several states does not preclude Alaska from acting. It is clear that ... there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it... . [32] Moreover, there is absolutely nothing to suggest that these regulations are either by their terms or in their enforcement discriminatory against non-Alaskans. Assuming for the moment that the state does have jurisdiction over the entire crabbing field, there is no reason to think that exercise of this jurisdiction in a patently neutral fashion will provoke retaliatory restrictions by Alaska's sister states. Appellees also contend that the national interest in unfettered international commerce may be jeopardized by Alaska's regulations. On their face, these regulations apply to all fishermen, not just Americans. Thus, there is a potential for conflict with United States agreements with foreign nations concerning fishing practices on the high seas, for example the Soviet Bilateral agreements with the United States. The federal government is also currently concerned with the unilateral extension to 200 miles of maritime boundaries by nations such as Peru, thus restricting access by United States fishermen to traditional anchovy and tuna grounds. Enforcement of the Alaskan regulations against foreign nationals could be taken as just such a unilateral step by the United States, inviting reciprocal moves by other nations. The state's response is that these regulations, being aimed at United States fishermen, will not be enforced against foreign nationals. See Hjelle v. Brooks . [33] Indeed, to the extent these regulations are inconsistent with fishing rights granted to foreign nations pursuant to the treaty power, the Supremacy Clause dictates that they must yield. The state does not dispute this, but urges that no conflict is apparent or even probable in view of the fact that these regulations were promulgated at the urging of federal agencies to implement their treaties. [34] The possible ramifications of these regulations on international commerce appear extremely speculative at this point. We feel that, absent some further showing of impact, this aspect of the national interest should be given minimal weight. The threat of conflict with international agreements or foreign rights is ... so remote that it is hardly more than conceivable. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan. [35] The court turns next to a consideration of the state interest in regulating the harvesting of crab in the Bering Sea. Fishing now constitutes the largest single industry in Alaska and crabbing is a substantial portion of that activity. [36] Most of the services which support the crabbing fleet are provided in Alaskan harbors, and much of the processing and canning of the harvested resource is done in factories throughout the state. Exhaustion of this marine resource would have a devastating impact on employment in this state which still has a relatively narrow industrial base. Particularly crippled would be those villages along our shores whose sole livelihood comes from the sea. Moreover, Alaskan king crab is an important food source for the people of this state. The commerce clause has consistently been interpreted to permit state regulations which safeguard local food sources, for example, quarantine laws. [37] In sustaining a California regulation governing the harvesting of avocados, the Supreme Court said: Specifically, the supervision of the readying of foodstuffs for market has always been deemed a matter of peculiarly local concern. [38] This court concludes that these regulations deal with a problem particularly local in import and in a way fully compatible with the commerce clause. We derive support for this conclusion from the Supreme Court decision in Alaska v. Arctic Maid, [39] in which the court considered the constitutionality of an Alaskan occupation tax on freezer ships stationed beyond territorial waters but receiving catches taken within the three-mile limit. The issue there was whether the state was attempting to tax an integral link of interstate commerce, in violation of the implicit restrictions of the commerce clause. In holding that the territorial tax did not contravene the constitution, Justice Douglas spoke with language of continuing force: The process of gathering fish either through the catcher boats that are part of respondents' fleet or through independent operators is a local activity .. in a vivid sense of the term. Here ... the market for the product obtained locally is interstate, the taking being a step in a process leading to an interstate market... . [T]he local product is promptly loaded for interstate shipment. But ... there is a preliminary local business being conducted... an occupation made up of a series of local activities which the State can constitutionally reach. [40] We conclude that the commerce clause does not render regulation of fisheries in the Bering Sea the exclusive domain of the federal government. We turn next to the contention that the challenged fishery regulations represent state intrusion into the field of foreign affairs, an exclusive federal domain. The Constitution does not in so many words entrust to the national government the power to conduct external relations. Instead, it parcels out certain aspects of the foreign affairs power among the political departments and imposed certain prohibitions on the states. From these constitutional references and from the fundamental premises of our system of federalism flows one of our most basic principles of government. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. [41] A concomitant principle is that a state cannot enact legislation which constitutes ... an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress, and the Supreme Court has invalidated an Oregon statute on that ground. [42] However, the states in the management of their affairs must necessarily impinge on foreign relations in a myriad of ways; [43] the precise delineation of this arena of exclusive federal domain remains largely unexplored. In Zschernig v. Miller, [44] the Supreme Court gave great weight to the fact that the challenged statute had more than ... some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries...., it had ... great potential for disruption or embarrassment of our foreign policies. This suggests to us that an analysis not unlike that under the commerce clause is appropriate. Certain state infringements on foreign affairs are forbidden because national uniformity is required or because they discriminate against or unduly burden our foreign relations. Generally, the inquiry will balance the state's interest in the regulation against its impact on United States foreign relations. [45] Under this analysis the crabbing regulations at issue cannot be said to intrude upon the nation's foreign relations. Alaska does not seek to discriminate against foreign fishing fleets; indeed, if anything, it favors foreign nationals by refraining from enforcing the regulations against such parties. The potential conflict is at best only speculative and indirect at the present time. Our analysis of the state's jurisdiction, infra, suggests that the state may never possess authority over foreign fleets in the crabbing area, hence the threat of international imbroglio appears quite attenuated. For these reasons this court concludes that the crabbing regulations are not violative of the national government's exclusive prerogatives in the field of foreign affairs. Finally, in considering the issue of federal exclusivity, this court must consider the submerged land cases, [46] relied on by appellees Uri, et al., and Kaldestad. [47] The Supreme Court in United States v. California ( First California) [48] held that the submerged lands within the three-mile belt were an area of paramount federal authority. The decision was in large part based upon the rationale that concerns of national defense, foreign affairs, and international commerce required that result. The court observed that ... insofar as the nation asserts its rights under international law, whatever of value may be discovered in the seas next to its shores and within its protective belt, will most naturally be appropriated for its use. But whatever any nation does in the open sea, which detracts from its common usefulness to nations, or which another nation may charge detracts from it, is a question for consideration among nations as such, and not their separate governmental units. [49] In 1950, in response to a claim by Louisiana of territorial jurisdiction as far as 27 miles from shore, the Court in United States v. Louisiana held that First California controlled and noted that ... If, as we held in California's case, the three-mile belt is in the domain of the nation rather than that of the separate States, it follows a fortiori that the ocean beyond that limit also is. The ocean seaward of the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly related to the national defense, the conduct of foreign affairs, and world commerce than is the marginal sea. Certainly it is not less so. [50] As mentioned, the result in First California was negatived by the Submerged Lands Act, but that act did not purport to effect rights beyond the three-mile limit of the territorial sea. Consequently, the rationale of the First California and Louisiana cases is still valid as applied to areas seaward of the territorial belt. And while those decisions never explicitly refer to the living resources of the oceans (the motivation behind both cases lay in control of exploitation of mineral resources, particularly oil), appellees argue that the logic applies with equal force to the use of the surface and waters for fishing purposes as to use of the seabed and subsoil for mineral exploitation: in both instances, regulation by individual states could conflict with federal activities in the areas of national defense, foreign affairs, and international commerce. [51] The First California and Louisiana decisions therefore stand among other things for the principle that the federal government has paramount authority over the seas and submerged lands on both sides of the traditional three-mile limit; with this the state does not contest. However, these decisions do not establish that the federal government has exclusive authority in these seas. This much is made clear by Toomer v. Witsell, [52] wherein the court said that state regulation of fishing within territorial waters in the absence of conflicting federal legislation was valid so long as it comported with the applicable constitutional provisions. In Skiriotes v. Florida, [53] certain Florida regulations governing the taking of sponges beyond territorial waters were also upheld. Thus, it is clear that in the absence of an exercise of the federal government's paramount powers over fishing, the states enjoy some regulatory prerogatives. It is the question whether the federal government has in fact exercised those powers to which we next turn.