Opinion ID: 167398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process — Vagueness

Text: 8 It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). [T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). The Constitution does not, however, impose impossible standards of specificity, and courts should remain ever mindful that general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning. United States v. Platte, 401 F.3d 1176, 1189 (10th Cir.2005) (quotations and citations omitted). 9 A statute can be void for vagueness not only on its face, but as applied, as a result of `an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language.' Id. (quotations omitted). Judicial review of a penal statute, however, is generally restricted to consideration of the statute as applied in a particular case, provided the statute does not threaten to chill the exercise of constitutional rights. Id. at 1189-90 (quotations omitted). 10 Sperry cannot claim, of course, that Kansas's first-degree murder statute chills constitutionally protected conduct. Thus, we examine the statute only as applied here. AEDPA's deferential standard of review controls our examination, as the Kansas Court of Appeals decided the vagueness issue on the merits, albeit in summary fashion, see Goss v. Nelson, 439 F.3d 621, 635-36 (10th Cir.2006) (In the context of applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), our focus is on whether the result reached by the state court contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly established federal law, not on the extent of the reasoning followed by the state court in reaching its decision.). 11 As noted above, whether an intentional killing statutorily qualifies as first-or second-degree murder depends on whether the killing was premeditated. Compare Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3401(a) (first-degree murder requires a premeditated, intentional killing) with id. § 21-3402(a) (second-degree murder requires an intentional killing). At trial, the jury was instructed that Sperry was guilty of first-degree murder if he intentionally killed Lonnie Mallicoat ... with premeditation. Twenty-Ninth Judicial District Court Case No. 95 CR 2246 at 91. Premeditation was defined as to have thought over the matter beforehand. Id. at 97. Intentionally was defined as conduct that is purposeful and willful and not accidental. Id. The jury was also instructed that Sperry could be found guilty of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder if, among other things, he intentionally killed Mallicoat. Id. at 93. 12 Sperry argues that defining premeditation as to have thought over the matter beforehand renders the first-degree murder statute indistinguishable from the second-degree murder statute. He reasons that such a definition makes premeditation synonymous with intentional because to intend to do something is to think about it beforehand. Aplt. Supp. Opening Br. at 16. Thus, the argument is that all intentional killings are necessarily premeditated killings. Two justices of the Kansas Supreme Court might agree. In a concurring opinion in State v. Saleem, 267 Kan. 100, 977 P.2d 921, 931 (1999) (Allegrucci, J., concurring), one justice asked, How does one intentionally kill another human being without thinking about it beforehand? Another justice adopted the same view in State v. Pabst, 273 Kan. 658, 44 P.3d 1230, 1237 (2002) (Lockett, J., concurring). Nevertheless, a majority of the Kansas justices remain convinced that to have thought over the matter beforehand `adequately conveys the concept that premeditation means something more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life. To have thought the matter over beforehand means to form a design or intent to kill before the act.' State v. Martis, 277 Kan. 267, 83 P.3d 1216, 1238 (2004) (quoting State v. Jamison, 269 Kan. 564, 7 P.3d 1204, 1212 (2000)). 13 Under AEDPA's standard of review, the Kansas Court of Appeals' rejection of Sperry's vagueness argument neither contravened nor unreasonably applied federal due process law. An ordinary person could discern a difference between a killing that is committed intentionally and a killing that is committed intentionally and with premeditation, if premeditation involves thinking a matter over beforehand and intentionally involves purposeful, willful and non-accidental conduct. Thinking something over indicates a quantum of reflection — premeditation — absent from the deliberative process necessary to act intentionally — to act purposefully, willfully and not by accident. Nor would an ordinary person be unable to distinguish between first- and second-degree murder in light of the evidence presented at Sperry's trial. Evidence that Sperry thought over the matter beforehand, rather than simply acted purposefully, willfully and not by accident, included that (1) Sperry had some involvement in drugs with Mallicoat, (2) Mallicoat owed Sperry money, (3) Sperry believed that Mallicoat had told Brown he intended to use the gun to kill Sperry, (4) Sperry possessed a shotgun shell engraved with Mallicoat's name, (5) Sperry and Mallicoat had been arguing about Brown immediately before the shooting, Tr. at 325, and (6) Mallicoat was trying to throw the car in reverse when he got shot, id. at 293. The first-degree murder statute, as applied here through the jury instructions to the evidence offered at trial, was sufficiently clear and understandable. For the same reasons, we reject Sperry's argument that the statute encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 14 Sperry next argues that the Kansas Court of Appeals acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied, due process law in light of the prosecutor's closing remark that premeditation can develop rapidly. Specifically, the prosecutor remarked: 15 If you'll notice, [the premeditation instruction] doesn't say you have to think it over a day or five hours beforehand. You just have to think about it beforehand. Think over the matter beforehand. And how long do you think it takes, Ladies and Gentlemen, that it takes for someone to think something over? You've already — as soon as I said that, you started thinking about what I said, didn't you? Which means you have already premeditated on what I said, because that's all it takes to form a thought process, to think something over. 16 Tr. at 429-30. Sperry argues that this remark allowed the jury to find him guilty simply because he thought it first. Aplt. Supp. Opening Br. at 14. But the prosecutor stopped short of conveying a message that premeditation can be virtually instantaneous, and therefore synonymous with intentionally. Cf. State v. Morton, 277 Kan. 575, 86 P.3d 535, 542 (2004) (holding that prosecutor's closing remark, One squeeze of a trigger is all it takes [to premeditate], violated due process). We find no misapplication of due process law based on these remarks. 17 Finally, we reject Sperry's argument that the jury equated premeditation with intentionally based on three notes sent to the judge during deliberations: What is a hung jury? Tr. at 449, What is reasonable doubt? id. at 451, and If there is disagreement between jury members as to the verdict of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree-intentional, is the jury directed to select the lesser offense, id. at 453. The notes could just as likely have been sent due to conflicting views of the evidence, rather than an inability to distinguish between premeditation and intentionally.