Opinion ID: 2744103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unauthorized Disclosure (Charge 2)

Text: Charge 2 alleged that Mr. Wrocklage copied Ms. Berglund on an email having the TECS report as an attachment. It noted that the TECS report contained Mr. Miller’s protected personal information and stated that WROCKLAGE v. DHS 5 Mr. Wrocklage was “not authorized to disclose this information to Ms. Berglund.” During an oral reply to the Agency regarding the proposed removal, Mr. Wrocklage’s Union representative stated that “the Union does not dispute that the Agency will likely be able to prove the charges of improper possession of TECs information and unauthorized disclosure of TECs information.” J.A. 45. The deciding official at the Agency found that “there is no factual dispute regarding either charge 1 or charge 2.” J.A. 56. Mr. Wrocklage appealed his removal to the Board. The AJ sustained Charge 2 indicating that the parties had “stipulated to the factual accuracy of this charge.” J.A. 119. As the Board explained, Mr. Wrocklage argued that “the administrative judge erroneously treated his stipulation to the underlying facts regarding his disclosure as a stipulation to the legal conclusion that his actions were unauthorized.” J.A. 9. The Board nonetheless found that when Mr. Wrocklage “stipulated to the factual circumstances as stated in charges one and two,” the charges could be sustained. J.A. 9. We do not agree. As an initial matter, neither the statute nor the regulations governing appeals to the Board limit the defenses that an employee can raise to only those raised before the Agency. Thus, Mr. Wrocklage is free to argue his interpretation of “disclosure” to the Board regardless of whether he made this argument to the Agency during its determination of what action to take against him. It is not waived when presented for the first time to the Board. On appeal, the government argues that Mr. Wrock- lage conceded Charge 2 and that therefore the agency did not need to demonstrate that any disclosure actually occurred. Resp. Br. 11. The government points to two purported concessions. First, the government relies upon a statement in a status conference with the administrative judge that “the parties stipulated to the factual accuracy of this charge.” Resp. Br. at 10. We do not interpret this as a concession that Charge 2 has been 6 WROCKLAGE v. DHS established. It is correct that parties in a Merit Systems Protection Board proceeding “may stipulate to any matter of fact.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.63. Mr. Wrocklage stipulated to the facts of Charge 2 – that he sent the email with the TECS report attached. However, stipulating to the underlying facts does not satisfy the Agency’s burden where, as in this case, Mr. Wrocklage was contesting whether those facts gave rise to a violation. In his Brief in Support of Appellant’s Defense filed with the Board, Mr. Wrocklage argued that “TECS information was never disclosed . . . the information in question must be imparted before a disclosure can be complete. . . . Since Ms. Berglund did not view the attachments, the information contained therein was never imparted and there was never the disclosure necessary to trigger the Privacy Act.” J.A. 116. Stipulating to the facts is not a concession to the charge that the conduct constituted an unauthorized disclosure, which requires a legal analysis. The Board’s finding of “unauthorized disclosure” in this case depends on whether the conduct constituted a disclosure under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). The second “concession,” according to the government, came during Mr. Wrocklage’s deposition when he characterized what his Union representative had said at the oral hearing before the Agency prior to the initiation of the Board appeal. Resp. Br. at 10. We agree with Mr. Wrocklage that his deposition testimony is not a concession that his conduct constituted an unauthorized disclosure. Mr. Wrocklage’s testimony was not that he was conceding Charge 2 before the Board, but rather his interpretation of what his Union representative had stated to the Agency before it had even decided to remove him. This is not a concession which prevents him from disputing Charge 2 in his Board appeal. WROCKLAGE v. DHS 7
The Board also found that on the merits the Agency had proven Charge 2 because Mr. Wrocklage’s transmission of the TECS report constituted an unauthorized disclosure. It found that Mr. Wrocklage’s transmission of the TECS report to Ms. Berglund constituted a “disclosure” in violation of the Privacy Act despite the fact that Ms. Berglund did not view the TECS report and deleted it from her possession. J.A. 4. The Board defined disclosure as the act of sending, “[T]he disclosure, or violation, occurred when the appellant sent the e-mail message to Bergland [sic].” J.A. 4. The government argues that the Board correctly found Mr. Wrocklage’s transmission of the TECS report to Ms. Berglund constitutes a “disclosure.” It argues that a “transfer” of a record containing protected information constitutes a prohibited “disclosure,” and that the act of emailing the TECS report is therefore a “disclosure.” Resp. Br. 11–12 (citing Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-108, Privacy Act Implementation: Guidelines and Responsibilities, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,953 (July 9, 1975) (“A disclosure may be either the transfer of a record or the granting of access to a record.”)). It also relies upon 5 C.F.R. § 297.102 defining “disclosure” to mean “providing personal review of a record, or a copy thereof, to someone other than the data subject or the data subject’s authorized representative” and argues that the term “providing” means “to make [something] available: to supply.” Resp. Br. 12. The government further asserts that concluding that a “disclosure” did not occur in this case would cause a “host of problems.” Id. at 14. Specifically, it asserts that such a holding would effectively allow transmission of documents containing protected information so long as the recipient only views those portions free of protected information, and would encourage more widespread transmission of documents containing protected information. Id. 8 WROCKLAGE v. DHS We do not agree. Mr. Wrocklage’s transmission of the TECS report to Ms. Berglund does not constitute a “disclosure” because the undisputed facts of this case are that Ms. Berglund never viewed the TECS report. The Privacy Act does not define the term “disclosure.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a). However, other courts have interpreted this language in a persuasive manner. In Luster v. Vilsack, the Tenth Circuit adopted the definition of disclosure requiring “personal review” by an unauthorized recipient as set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 297.102 to reject a Privacy Act violation claim. 667 F.3d 1089, 1098 (10th Cir. 2011). There, the court concluded that no “disclosure” occurred where a document containing protected information was transmitted to a fax machine but there was no evidence that any unauthorized person actually viewed it. Id. Similarly, in Schmidt v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, the court defined the term “disclose” as “the placing into the view of another information which was previously unknown” and concluded that there was no Privacy Act violation where there was no evidence that anyone actually viewed the protected information. 218 F.R.D. 619, 630–31 (E.D. Wis. 2003). Most recently, in In re Science Applications International Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litigation, the court adopted from Privacy Act authorities what is a “common-sense intuition: If no one has viewed your private information (or is about to view it imminently), then your privacy has not been violated.” -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2014 WL 1858458, at  (D.D.C. May 9, 2014). On that basis, the court denied standing to most of the plaintiffs where a thief had acquired tapes containing protected data but there was no allegation, and it was entirely speculative, that the thief had actually viewed their information. Id. We are persuaded that these cases articulate the correct interpretation of disclose or disclosure as requiring not just transmission, but actual viewWROCKLAGE v. DHS 9 ing or imminent viewing by another. 1 Of course the fact that the record was viewed, like other facts, only needs to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. This would not seem to require identifying a specific viewer. It would be enough to show that someone more likely than not viewed the material. The undisputed facts of this case, however, are that the record went to one person and was not viewed. It is undisputed that the recipient deleted the email and it is therefore not imminently viewable. While it is true that Mr. Wrocklage transmitted the TECS report to Ms. Berglund and she received it, it is undisputed that she never viewed it. There was therefore no “disclosure.” 2 We conclude that Charge 2 is not supported by substantial evidence.