Opinion ID: 2399906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Creating an Impression of Improper Influence

Text: The Ethics Committee found sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of a violation on the twenty-third count of its Statement of Charges which alleged a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) and (6), and DR 9-101(C). Specifically, the Committee found that respondent created the impression that he would or could improperly influence a federal judge in connection with the S.E.C. investigation of I.C.C. As noted previously, when the S.E.C. began to escalate its discovery efforts, I.C.C. filed a suit in the Federal District Court to restrict the scope of such efforts. Although respondent had not yet been retained as counsel by I.C.C., Vesco requested him to approach the federal judge assigned to the case to ameliorate any adverse impression which the judge might have about the suit. As respondent testified at the ethics hearing, Vesco was particularly concerned that the judge understand that Bob Vesco is not a bad guy because he is suing the United States Government. While Sears' response to this request, and his efforts to carry it out, are unclear, the Ethics Committee found no evidence which suggested that respondent actually communicated with the judge. Nonetheless, the Committee did receive a letter which respondent had sent to an I.C.C. vice-president in which he stated: When you talk to Bob [Vesco], will you please tell him that I have made contact re the above and have done all that I can properly be done [sic] under the circumstances. The Committee found that this letter referred to Vesco's request that respondent talk to the federal judge. Furthermore, it found that the letter furnished a sufficient basis for a DR 9-101(C) violation. In response, respondent characterizes the letter as merely rain-making  that is, an effort to mollify a client who had been pressuring him to undertake a specific action. At the ethics hearing, respondent described his motivation in writing the letter: Well, I didn't mean I made contact because I had contacted no one. It was simply a letter that I wrote to Dodd, as I recall it, knowing that Vesco was out of the country and he would be talking with him. And the last time I had talked with him he had, you know, pressed this point and, as I said, I had not firmly enough turned him off. And this was my method of closing the matter out so far as I was concerned without any further, without being bothered any further by it. While this statement may explain the reasons for sending the letter, it cannot justify the letter itself. As respondent concedes in his brief, applying the highest standards of ethics, whether the conduct is covered by the Rules or not, it was improper and unethical. In order to find a violation of Disciplinary Rule DR 9-101 (C), it is sufficient that the attorney merely state or imply that he could influence the judicial tribunal improperly. It is irrelevant whether he actually makes the attempt or accomplishes the objective. In re Caruso, 67 N.J. 44 (1975); In re Thompson, 67 N.J. 26 (1975). Aside from the obvious appearance of impropriety, such a statement creates an erroneous impression that the attorney occupies a peculiarly advantageous position in his association with the judge or government official. See A.B.A., Opinions on Professional Ethics (1967), Formal Opinion 184 (July 23, 1938) at 457. In the instant case, the Vesco request was aimed at influencing the I.C.C. suit and was highly improper. By fostering the impression that he had satisfied or could satisfy that request, respondent's conduct fell directly within the ambit of DR 9-101(C). Consequently, we conclude that the findings of the Ethics Committee in this regard were adequately supported. See In re Brady, 64 N.J. 100 (1973).