Opinion ID: 197023
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Delayed Disclosure of Condonation Evidence

Text: 60 Josleyn claims that he was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Cardiges and other prosecution witnesses due to the government's delayed disclosure of certain letters written to the government by Cecil Proulx, a former Honda executive, outlining his efforts in the late 1980s to bring the pervasive bribes and kickbacks to the attention of Honda's top Japanese executives. The government produced some of the Proulx materials before trial, including a summary of his FBI interview, but found and unseasonably produced additional material months later--upon learning that Josleyn intended to call Proulx as a witness--tending to show that Honda's Japanese managers had condoned the illegal activities in its sales division. Josleyn unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment on due process grounds. 61 Given the specific discovery request for condonation evidence, the government plainly had an obligation to furnish Josleyn with the Proulx materials in a more timely fashion. See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1178 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1223, 114 S.Ct. 2714, 129 L.Ed.2d 840 (1994); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(C) (discovery relating to documents material to defense); 16(c) (continuing duty to disclose). Since the government failed seasonably to disclose evidence material to guilt or punishment, United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 289 (1st Cir.1990) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)), which includes both exculpatory and impeachment evidence, we inquire whether as a consequence of the delayed disclosure defense counsel was unable to use the material effectively in preparing and presenting the defendant's case. Id. (quoting United States v. Ingraldi, 793 F.2d 408, 411-12 (1st Cir.1986)). Due to its greater familiarity with the dynamics of the case, we will not reverse a district court's ruling on delayed disclosure unless it amounts to a demonstrable abuse of discretion. Id. We discern no abuse of discretion. 62 First, a principal concern in delayed disclosure cases--whether the failure to supply the information in a seasonable fashion caused the defense to change its trial strategy, see id. at 290--is not significantly implicated in this case. Josleyn consistently pursued the same defense theory both before and after the Proulx materials were provided, by arguing that the Japanese managers at Honda had condoned the charged conduct. Secondly, even though the Proulx materials unquestionably provided additional support for the condonation defense, we are not persuaded that the delay in disclosure adversely affected the defense in any important respect. In fact, while Cardiges was on the witness stand, Josleyn's counsel observed that the government's file is like 100,000 pages or so. See also infra note 10. The defense took full advantage of the condonation evidence by using it in its own case, even before the tardily produced Proulx materials were made available, then featured the government's delayed disclosure in its closing argument. 10 63 On this record, we think the district court soundly concluded that the Proulx materials added little to the evidence previously produced by the government, and therefore its late disclosure had not impeded Josleyn's defense to a significant degree. See United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 227 (1st Cir.1995) (noting cumulativeness of impeachment materials); Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1179 (holding that failure to produce incremental information caused no prejudice). We note as well that Josleyn makes no claim that the prosecutor intentionally delayed disclosure. 64 Furthermore, and by no means least importantly, the only relief Josleyn requested was the outright dismissal of the indictment. The district court has broad discretion to redress discovery violations in light of their seriousness and any prejudice occasioned the defendant. Osorio, 929 F.2d at 762-63; see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d)(2) (authorizing district court to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing the evidence not disclosed, or ... enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances). On the other hand, the draconian relief demanded by Josleyn was grossly disproportionate both to the prosecution's nonfeasance and any prejudice to the defense. See Bello-Perez, 977 F.2d at 670 (favoring continuance over dismissal); accord Devin, 918 F.2d at 290-91. As Josleyn eschewed various alternative remedies more consonant with the government's culpability and any prejudice to the defense, see, e.g., Osorio, 929 F.2d at 762-63 (noting, as alternative remedies, recalling witness for additional cross-examination, affording defense greater leeway with witnesses, and instructing jury that government failed to meet discovery obligations), we find no abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the indictment.