Opinion ID: 491447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Juror Spriggs

Text: 43 The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972), five members of the Supreme Court interpreted this amendment to endow a federal criminal defendant with the right to a unanimous verdict. See 406 U.S. at 369-71, 92 S.Ct. at 1637 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 382, 92 S.Ct. at 1644 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 395, 92 S.Ct. at 1650 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 400, 92 S.Ct. at 1652 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 414, 92 S.Ct. at 1634 (Stewart, J., dissenting). This circuit has reiterated the Justices' constitutional interpretation. See United States v. Essex, 734 F.2d 832, 840-41 (D.C.Cir.1984). In addition, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure echo the constitutional requirement of unanimity: Rule 31(a) states simply that [t]he verdict shall be unanimous. 44 The appellants claim that the district court's decision to dismiss juror Spriggs from the jury violated their right to a unanimous verdict. They first aver that Spriggs requested dismissal not because he had principled objections to the RICO statute, but because he had doubts about the sufficiency of the government's evidence. According to the appellants, the dismissal of a juror for this reason violates a defendant's right to a unanimous verdict because the dismissal allows the prosecutor to gain a conviction even though he has failed to persuade all of the jurors that the defendant violated the law. The appellants next argue that even if Spriggs' discomfort with the case stemmed solely from a principled objection to applying the substantive law, the court could not constitutionally discharge him from the jury. In essence, the appellants contend that a juror will vote to convict a defendant only when the juror believes both that the defendant violated the law and that the jury should give effect to the law. In the appellants' view, the discharge of a juror for refusing to follow the law violates the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict because the discharge allows a conviction to occur even though not all members of the jury wish to apply the law to the defendant's conduct. The appellants recognize, in making these arguments, that Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the discharge of a juror after deliberations have commenced if ... necessary and for just cause. The appellants aver, however, that use of the Rule to discharge a juror either because he has doubts about the sufficiency of the government's evidence or because he refuses to apply the substantive law violates a defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous jury. 45 We agree with the appellants that a court may not dismiss a juror during deliberations if the request for discharge stems from doubts the juror harbors about the sufficiency of the government's evidence. Indeed, we think that this part of the appellants' argument is scarcely debatable. If a court could discharge a juror on the basis of such a request, then the right to a unanimous verdict would be illusory. A discharge of this kind would enable the government to obtain a conviction even though a member of the jury that began deliberations thought that the government had failed to prove its case. Such a result is unacceptable under the Constitution. Thus, when a request for dismissal stems from the juror's view of the sufficiency of the evidence that the government offered at trial, a judge may not discharge the juror: the judge must either declare a mistrial or send the juror back to deliberations with instructions that the jury continue to attempt to reach agreement. 46 We must, however, confront the problem that the reasons underlying a request for a dismissal will often be unclear. As the district court in this case aptly noted, a court may not delve deeply into a juror's motivations because it may not intrude on the secrecy of the jury's deliberations. Thus, unless the initial request for dismissal is transparent, the court will likely prove unable to establish conclusively the reasons underlying it. Given these circumstances, we must hold that if the record evidence discloses any possibility that the request to discharge stems from the juror's view of the sufficiency of the government's evidence, the court must deny the request. Cf. Essex, 734 F.2d at 843 (finding a violation of the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict because there was a possibilit[y] that the absent juror was a lone holdout for innocence in the face of a hostile pro-conviction majority and that the prosecution had not carried its burden of convincing the entire membership of the jury); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 832 (2d Cir.1985) (holding that the discharge of a juror to observe a religious holiday was proper when the record d[id] not present even the slightest basis to believe that Juror No. 10 [posed] an obstacle to reaching a unanimous verdict), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2285, 90 L.Ed.2d 726 (1986). Any other holding would fail to protect adequately a defendant's right to be convicted only by a unanimous jury. 47 The record evidence in this case indicates a substantial possibility that juror Spriggs requested to be discharged because he believed that the evidence offered at trial was inadequate to support a conviction. At the beginning of his colloquy with the judge, Spriggs stated that his difficulties with the case arose from the terms of the RICO statute--what the act said and how it runs. As the judge continued to question Spriggs, however, the juror began to speak of the evidence offered at the trial. Spriggs specifically stated that his difficulty was with the way [the act is] written and the way the evidence has been presented (emphasis added); he further noted that [i]f the evidence was presented in a fashion in which the law is written, then, maybe, I would be able to discharge my duties. These statements, at the very least, create an ambiguous record. The district court itself recognized as much. See VI J.A. at 7297-98, 7309, 7312, 7314. We may not be able to say for a certainty that Spriggs' desire to leave the jury stemmed from his view of the adequacy of the government's evidence. But we cannot say with any conviction that Spriggs' request to be dismissed stemmed from something other than this view. Given the possibility--which in this case we think a likelihood--that Spriggs' desire to quit deliberations stemmed from his belief that the evidence was inadequate to support a conviction, we must find that his dismissal violated the appellants' right to a unanimous jury verdict. 48 We note in conclusion, and in response to the government's primary argument on appeal, that the terms of Rule 23(b) in no way undermine our approach. As we have noted, Rule 23(b), under which the district court dismissed juror Spriggs, authorizes the discharge of a juror after deliberations have commenced if ... necessary and for just cause. The government argues that our holding will effectively read 23(b) out of the federal rules--[the Rule's] purpose is precisely to make available a remedy between the extremes of mistrial and doing nothing. Brief for Appellee at 87. This assertion, however, is invalid. First, to the extent that we limit the ability of courts to use Rule 23(b), we do so by command of the Constitution. When, as in this case, the Constitution precludes a particular application of a rule or statute, that is the end of the matter. Second, our holding cannot reasonably be said to erase Rule 23(b) from the federal books. Courts may use Rule 23(b) in many circumstances to discharge a juror. For example, other appellate courts have held that a district court may properly use Rule 23(b) to discharge a juror who has suffered serious injury, see United States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196, 204-05 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 668, 93 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986), who has viewed relevant materials not in evidence, see United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 946-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), and who has expressed a desire to observe a lengthy religious holiday, see Stratton, 779 F.2d at 831-32. These holdings are fully consistent with our own given that in none of these circumstances is there any reason to believe that the government has failed to persuade all of the jurors who began deliberations of the adequacy of the government's case. In addition, we specifically leave open the question that appellants raise of whether a court may constitutionally apply Rule 23(b) to discharge a juror for refusing to apply the relevant substantive law. We today hold only that Rule 23(b) is not available when the record evidence discloses a possibility that the juror believes that the government has failed to present sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Because the record evidence in this case discloses just such a possibility, we must reverse the convictions.