Opinion ID: 352420
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the imposition of the detention

Text: 50 All agree that by the time appellant was arrested, Officer Franck had derived probable cause therefor from developments following their return to the bank. And, among the members of the court, it is common ground that probable cause for appellant's arrest did not accrue until after they had left the sidewalk. 8 But, as Terry made clear, the reach of the Fourth Amendment is not limited to constraints rising to the stature of formal arrests; even a relatively brief street-stop may fall within its compass, 9 and accordingly must be adequately justified. 10 The threshold questions here are whether there was a constitutionally cognizable detention on the sidewalk and, if so, at just what point it occurred.
51 In Terry the Court observed, (s)treet encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity. 11 A factor often contributing to variegation and one invariably separating the constitutionally permissible from what may be constitutionally forbidden is the degree of impediment to the citizen's freedom of action. Obviously, the Court declared, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred. 12 So long as the citizen is free to disregard or terminate the contact and go his way as he pleases, the Fourth Amendment interposes no obstacle to a policeman's mere effort at conversation. 13 And as we ourselves have observed, 52 (e)ncounters vary in the degree of intrusion; plainly there is a difference between an order to stop and give identification and a command to remain in a certain place for questioning for as long as twenty minutes. 14 And although some degree of restraint and constraint may be present whenever police officers confront citizens to ask questions, 15 . . . such encounters differ in their potential for intimidation and abrasion. Delineation of the Fourth Amendment limitations on police investigative activity must proceed with sensitivity to these differences. 16 53 Ofttimes the boundary between voluntary and involuntary on-street colloquy with police officers is elusive. 17 Many people at bottom will think twice before spurning an importuning policeman. This is not to suggest that that circumstance alone makes one inexorably a captive, 18 for if it did no police-citizen investigative contact would ever withstand scrutiny. It is to say that the line of demarcation lies at the point of some different and larger restraint. 54 In the quest for greater precision in this regard, we may profitably take a page from history. Bodily detention within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment has traditionally been viewed as a consequence not simply of particular police conduct but also of its expectable impact upon the mind of the detainee. 19 And as we have heretofore proclaimed,  'the test must not be what the (detainee) himself . . . thought, but what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the (detainee's) shoes.'  20 That declaration was made in the context of a skirmish culminating in what was alleged to be an arrest, but logic dictates its applicability for purposes of determining whether a detention of potentially less magnitude has taken place. Indeed, that is the criterion by which the local police themselves abide. 21 B. The Imposition Here 55 With these considerations in mind, I approach the confrontation of appellant by Officer Franck on the sidewalk outside the bank. For a while, it lacked any significant indicium of duress other than whatever may be inherent in any face-to-face meeting between a citizen and a police officer. Certainly the officer's opening inquiry Sir, may I talk to you for a moment? 22 did not on its face suggest that appellant was compelled to do so. Nor did appellant's spontaneous response Okay 23 indicate anything other than a willingness to cooperate. During most of the ensuing conversation, there was no exertion of official authority, no hint of force, and no frisk or other encroachment upon bodily integrity. So long as these circumstances endured, there was little or no likelihood that one innocent of crime would reasonably have felt unable to walk away whenever he chose. 56 There did, however, come a time at which the prevailing conditions changed radically. That was when Officer Franck asked appellant to return to the bank. (W)ould you mind coming back inside the bank with me?, 24 the officer put it; there we will talk to the manager, and if everything is okay ( ) you can go. 25 Like my colleagues, 26 I think it clear that, against the backdrop of the interrogation proceeding it, an innocent person in that situation would reasonably have taken the officer's utterance not as a mere supplication, but as a command. 27 And the officer's proposition, as framed, unmistakably implied that appellant's liberty of movement was no longer unencumbered, but had become dependent upon such resolution of the officer's suspicions as might be made inside the bank. 28 From that point onward appellant was under restraint, 29 and justification therefor became imperative. 57