Opinion ID: 884966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Claim for Relief

Text: ¶ 11 Gollehon alleges that there were undisclosed pretrial agreements in exchange for Armstrong's testimony. Gollehon argues that the following agreements existed: 1. Witness Armstrong was promised by prison officials that he would be a trustee at the Powell County Jail; 2. Assistant Attorney General John Connor promised Armstrong he would not go back to Montana State Prison; and 3. Armstrong was promised that he would be housed in the Powell County Jail until he earned parole, prerelease, or discharge. ¶ 12 Gollehon further alleges that the State failed in its duty to disclose certain gratuitous benefits conferred upon Armstrong, post-trial, and in the absence of any pretrial agreement. ¶ 13 Gollehon asserts that the disclosure requirements under § 46-15-322(1)(e), MCA, and the prosecution's responsibilities set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), compel such disclosure. Gollehon further contends that under §§ 46-15-327 and 46-18-310, MCA, the State had a continuing duty to disclose any gratuitous benefits Armstrong received, post-trial, because such information would tend to reduce or mitigate his sentence. ¶ 14 The suppression by the prosecution of material evidence favorable to the accused violates the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 86, 83 S.Ct. at 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. This duty applies to impeachment evidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490 (1985). The prosecution may violate the principles set forth in Brady by failing to disclose agreements with a prosecution witness in exchange for testimony. Promises made to a witness in exchange for testimony go directly to the credibility of the witness. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108-09 (1972). The duty of disclosure is dependent, however, upon an agreement or understanding with tangible benefits. Where there is no agreement, there is no duty to disclose. See Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1555 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1061, 115 S.Ct. 673, 130 L.Ed.2d 606 (1994). ¶ 15 To establish a Brady violation, the petitioner must establish that: (1)the State possessed evidence, including impeachment evidence, favorable to the defense; (2) the petitioner did not possess the evidence nor could he have obtained it with reasonable diligence; (3) the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) had the evidence been disclosed, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. See Mills v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1014 (citation omitted) (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1214, 116 S.Ct. 1837, 134 L.Ed.2d 940 (1996). ¶ 16 Gollehon argues that the State made a deal with key witness Armstrong which was never disclosed. He argues that in exchange for Armstrong's testimony, the State reinstated his good time, and removed his dangerous offender status. Gollehon argues further that attorney Wendy Holton, contacted by Assistant Attorney General John Conner to assist Armstrong, and Conner assisted in getting Armstrong released by testifying on his behalf and writing letters to the Parole Board. He also claims that Warden McCormick aided by unilaterally overruling a prison committee recommendation that denied Armstrong's restoration of good time. ¶ 17 Petitioner relies, in part, on a letter dated December 31, 1991 from witness Armstrong to Connor. The Petitioner argues that Armstrong states in the letter that prison officials represented to him before trial that he would be a trustee at the Powell County Jail. ¶ 18 A complete review of the letter, however, discloses nothing about what was told to Armstrong. In fact, in one part of the letter Armstrong indicates that he did not believe that he had been promised trustee status in exchange for his testimony. In another part of the letter, he specifically states that he did not expect to receive any special treatment for anything that he had done. Although, Armstrong desired to be a trustee at the jail, he has failed to present any convincing evidence of an undisclosed deal of trustee status in exchange for his testimony, pretrial. ¶ 19 Holton testified in her deposition that she represented to the Parole Board in the clemency application, that Armstrong provided his testimony without requesting any benefit or consideration other than protection. ¶ 20 Gollehon relates to other documents, including a letter written by Armstrong to Warden McCormick, dated November 23, 1991. Armstrong was requesting that he be reclassified so that he could work as a trustee in the Powell County Jail. McCormick's response, however, indicates that his request to be reclassified was rejected. ¶ 21 The Petitioner also refers to a letter dated February 2, 1992 that Armstrong wrote Assistant Attorney General Connor after he was transferred back to Montana State Prison. In that letter, Armstrong asserts that Connor promised him that he would never go back to the prison. ¶ 22 The Petitioner, however, has not presented any evidence that Connor made the above statement to Armstrong prior to trial or in exchange for his testimony. Further, in the same letter, Armstrong states at two different times that Connor did not break any promise to him. ¶ 23 Gollehon also refers to a letter dated October 24, 1991 from Armstrong to an unnamed prison official where he asserts that he was promised things before trial. In his deposition, however, Armstrong explained that it probably related to a promise of guaranteed safety. Such a promise was disclosed to the jury during Armstrong's testimony at trial. ¶ 24 It is important to note that the jury which convicted Gollehon of this homicide was aware that Armstrong had been promised safety in return for his testimony. At trial, evidence was presented that Armstrong was receiving assurances of safety by the State in the event he testified. Gollehon had an opportunity to explore what these safety measures might entail during trial. On August 30, 1991, Armstrong voluntarily provided defense counsel an interview which was tape-recorded and transcribed. During this interview, Armstrong stated that he came forward with testimony because he felt that he should and not to get something in return. He also stated that the State assured him that his safety would be guaranteed but he did not know how that would be accomplished. During trial, Armstrong testified that he was not promised anything in return for his testimony other than a guarantee of his safety. He testified that every step would be taken to guarantee his safety, and further, no one assured him assistance in obtaining parole. ¶ 25 In summary, we conclude that the Petitioner has not established the existence of any undisclosed pretrial agreement between the State and Armstrong in exchange for his testimony. The Petitioner has established no more than what was presented to the jury during his trial; Armstrong was assured his personal safety if he testified. This was corroborated in Armstrong's deposition taken on August 18, 1998, when he testified that the only guarantee he received was for his safety by being housed in protective custody in the Powell County Jail in Deer Lodge. Although we concede that the State went to great lengths to assist Armstrong in his post-trial efforts for early release, we see nothing in the pretrial conduct of the prosecution that would constitute a Brady violation. ¶ 26 In regard to undisclosed post-trial benefits, Gollehon asserts that Connor contacted Holton after his trial to ask if she would assist Armstrong before the Parole Board. He then asserts that Connor wrote a letter to the Parole Board in support of Armstrong's application for clemency; and that when the Board denied the application, Connor and Warden McCormick went to great lengths to secure Armstrong's release, culminating in Governor Stephens' grant of clemency, which removed his dangerous designation and made him prematurely eligible for parole. Gollehon asserts that the failure to disclose the above events which occurred post-trial and in the absence of a pretrial agreement, violated his Brady due process rights. ¶ 27 In order for post-trial assistance to be relevant, there must have been an agreement for parole before trial in order to support a Brady violation. In the absence of evidence of a pretrial agreement, there can be no Brady violation because no evidence was suppressed from the jury. Armstrong testified at his deposition that, prior to trial, he was never promised restoration of any good time. He said the subject never came up. Again, any assistance that occurred after trial, must be as a result of a pretrial agreement to support a Brady violation. ¶ 28 Gollehon further argues that the State's failure to disclose Armstrong's premature release violates his constitutional rights because he could have argued to this Court and a sentencing court that the benefits cast doubt on Armstrong's credibility. He asserts that such evidence could have been established as a mitigating circumstance in terms of his sentence and could have been used to argue lingering doubt of his guilt. In support he cites Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988). ¶ 29 Mitigating evidence includes evidence that relates to a defendant's character, background, or the circumstances of the offense before the sentencing judge that militate against imposing the death penalty. See State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272, 1282 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 965, 118 S.Ct. 410, 139 L.Ed.2d 314 (1997). However, lingering doubt of the defendant's guilt is not an appropriate mitigating circumstance because it is not an aspect of the defendant's character, record, or the circumstance of the offense. In Franklin, 487 U.S. at 174, 108 S.Ct. at 2327, 101 L.Ed.2d at 166, the United States Supreme Court stated the sentencing judge may not be precluded from considering any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense. The Court noted, however, that capital juries, in the sentencing phase, were not mandated to reconsider their residual doubts over a defendant's guilt. Such doubts do not relate to the defendant's character, record, or a circumstance of the offense. See Franklin, 487 U.S. at 174, 108 S.Ct. at 2327, 101 L.Ed.2d at 166. ¶ 30 We further conclude that such evidence would not have been considered by this Court under our function dictated by § 46-18-310, MCA. We are required to determine pursuant to § 46-18-310(2), MCA, whether the evidence supports the sentencing judge's finding of the existence or nonexistence of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See Smith, 280 Mont. at 170, 931 P.2d at 1279. ¶ 31 The First Claim for Relief is denied.