Opinion ID: 1363049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Remand is Unnecessary

Text: R-CALF argues that the district court improperly determined it was bound by our decision reversing the preliminary injunction, and therefore R-CALF requests that we remand to the district court for analysis of the record that was developed in support of the motion for summary judgment. R-CALF correctly points out that the ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction leaves open the final determination of the merits of the case. Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Labs., 207 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir.1953). This rule acknowledges that decisions on preliminary injunctions are just that  preliminary  and must often be made hastily and on less than a full record. S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the district court should abide by the general rule that our decisions at the preliminary injunction phase do not constitute the law of the case. See id.; see also City of Anaheim v. Duncan, 658 F.2d 1326, 1328 n. 2 (1981). Any of our conclusions on pure issues of law, however, are binding. See This That And The Other Gift And Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb County, 439 F.3d 1275, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2006); 18 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.5 (2002) (A fully considered appellate ruling on an issue of law made on a preliminary injunction appeal . . . become[s] the law of the case for further proceedings in the trial court on remand and in any subsequent appeal.). The district court must apply this law to the facts anew with consideration of the evidence presented in the merits phase. See Ross-Whitney, 207 F.2d at 199; accord Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472, 476 (9th Cir.1969). This administrative law case presents a thornier issue because this court has reviewed the administrative record for the purpose of the injunction, and, with some narrow exceptions, neither we nor the district court may consider any other evidence. See Asarco, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A., 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir.1980). For summary judgment, R-CALF has presented only new, extra-record evidence, of arguable relevance to this court's review. Still, technically, the district court was not bound by our earlier conclusions. Though the district court erroneously determined otherwise, remand is not the only option available at this stage of the litigation. Our review of a summary judgment order proceeds de novo, see The Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir.2005), and in administrative appeals, where the court reviews only the record before the agency, [t]he factfinding capacity of the district court is . . . typically unnecessary to judicial review of agency decisionmaking. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985). Simply put, this court's task on appeal is the same as the district court's task in the initial review: Both courts are to decide, on the basis of the record the agency provides, whether the action passes muster under the appropriate APA standard of review. Id. Because all of R-CALF's new evidence is outside the administrative record and of very limited use, and because we agree with amici that extension of this litigation will aid R-CALF in its attempt to create, on a rolling basis, a one-sided evidentiary record that supersedes USDA's administrative record, Brief of the Government of Canada at 15, we decide to reach the merits of this case.