Opinion ID: 1273411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Both the local committee and the disciplinary board properly considered petitioner's prior record.

Text: In 1963, we found petitioner guilty of professional misconduct and placed him on probation for three years. ( Schullman v. State Bar (1963) 59 Cal.2d 590, 601 [30 Cal. Rptr. 834, 381 P.2d 658].) That proceeding involved a loan to petitioner from his clients, the Kaufmans. Petitioner induced them to accept false security for the loan, later arranged for an illegal income tax deduction for Mr. Kaufman as partial repayment, and finally misappropriated $8,000 worth of funds earmarked for the Kaufmans pursuant to the loan obligation. In 1971, we suspended petitioner from practice for six months. (Schullman v. State Bar, L.A. 29854 [minute order].) Petitioner had abandoned the interest of his client, a Mr. Hammer, in a civil appeal. After having received the funds from his client to pay for clerk's and reporter's transcripts on appeal, petitioner failed to file such transcripts on time. Petitioner converted the money to his own use and misled the appellate court by falsely representing that his client was unable to raise the transcript costs. While this prior conduct cannot establish culpability in the Miller, Stein and Ortiz matters, the local committee and the disciplinary board may consider petitioner's past disciplinary record in deciding the appropriate sanctions to be imposed in the instant case. ( Simmons v. State Bar, supra, 2 Cal.3d 719, 731; Eschwig v. State Bar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 8, 18; Herron v. State Bar, supra, 24 Cal.2d 53, 66; see Rules of Procedure, rule 29.1.) At the time of petitioner's hearing, rule 29.1 provided in part: The record in any prior disciplinary proceeding against the same respondent, or any pertinent part thereof, is admissible in evidence either (a) if, under the rules of relevancy, it tends to prove any fact at issue in the pending proceeding, other than degree of discipline; or (b) for the purpose of giving aid in determining the degree of discipline to be administered, in the event culpability be found when (1) such prior proceeding has resulted in the administration of discipline and has become final; or (2) such record contains findings of fact and recommendation for discipline made by a disciplinary board in a formal proceeding of which the respondent had notice, or at which he appeared. We have never held that this rule requires a bifurcated hearing  one which entails separate proceedings for the determination of culpability and discipline. We noted in Resner v. State Bar (1960) 53 Cal.2d 605, 613 [2 Cal. Rptr. 461, 349 P.2d 67]: As the ultimate purpose of a disciplinary proceeding is to determine the fitness of the attorney to practice law, rather than to punish for individual breaches of conduct ( In re Rothrock [1940] 16 Cal.2d 449, 454 [106 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226]), it would appear that a committee, or the Board of Governors, or this court might consider all matters properly before it, even though extrinsic to the instant record, in determining an attorney's fitness to practice. No denial of any inherent right of an attorney is suggested by such a procedure. [Citations.] In the instant case, however, the committee chose to postpone consideration of petitioner's prior record until after it had decided the question of present culpability. The examiner did refer vaguely to petitioner's prior record during the hearing in chief, but neither details nor elaboration of past offenses clouded the issues before the committee in the Miller, Stein and Ortiz matters. The examiner merely asked the committee when he could introduce records of the State Bar relating to a particular respondent. Although the reference to petitioner is obvious, the committee carefully took steps to prevent prejudice stemming from petitioner's past misconduct. Even though the committee is not required by rule 29.1 to bifurcate the hearing, the committee did, in essence, employ such a procedure. The committee stated that it would only admit prior records on the question of discipline, rather than on the question of culpability. (5) The examiner formally introduced petitioner's records on September 16, 1972, during the phase of the hearing devoted to the recommendation of discipline. The committee did not consider petitioner's prior misconduct until after reaching a decision in the instant case. Clearly, the committee's action did not prejudice the case, nor did the examiner's initial reference to the 1963 and 1971 records. Substantial evidence had already established the case against petitioner, and therefore it is doubtful that the brief reference to petitioner's prior record by the examiner had any cognizable effect upon the committee. (Cf. Walling v. Kimball (1941) 17 Cal.2d 364, 369-370 [110 P.2d 58]; Kalfus v. Fraze (1955) 136 Cal. App.2d 415, 423 [288 P.2d 967]; see 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, §§ 303, 305.) The committee's approach is consistent with our recent holding in People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 [99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1], in which we considered a related question  the admissibility of prior felony convictions for the purpose of impeaching a witness in a criminal trial. [7] The problem in Beagle, and in similar cases, is that prior convictions, while relevant to a witness's honesty or veracity (Evid. Code, § 788), at the same time may be unduly prejudicial (Evid. Code, § 352). In Beagle, we did not attempt to establish rigid standards for the admissibility of such evidence, but instead held that each instance must depend upon the sound exercise of judicial discretion. ( People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 453.) In the instant case, the local committee wisely postponed consideration of petitioner's prior record until after deciding culpability on the present charges. While such procedure may not have been required under rule 29.1, it assured petitioner of a fair hearing.