Opinion ID: 2527149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Criminal Contempt Conviction

Text: [¶ 12] Swain mounts several challenges to the validity of his conviction for indirect criminal contempt. However, our focus is on a procedural error in the contempt proceeding, which we conclude requires reversal of that conviction. [¶ 13] The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of general jurisdiction in Wyoming. Skinner v. State, 838 P.2d 715, 723 (Wyo.1992); Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 343 (Wyo.1989); Horn v. District Court, Ninth Judicial District, 647 P.2d 1368, 1374-75 (Wyo.1982). Contempts of court are classified as either civil or criminal in nature and, within each classification, either as direct (committed in the court's presence) or indirect contempt (committed outside of the hearing or view of the judge). A civil contempt is remedial; the penalty serves to enforce compliance with a court order or to compensate an injured party. Horn, 647 P.2d at 1372-73. In essence, the contemnor carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket, and can obtain release by complying with the order of the court that sent him there. Connors, 769 P.2d at 343. A criminal contempt, on the other hand, is punitive in character; the penalty serves to vindicate the authority of the court and does not terminate upon compliance with a court order. Horn, 647 P.2d at 1373. While a judgment of civil contempt is conditional and may be lifted when the disobedience ends, punishment for criminal contempt is unconditional and fixed. In essence, criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect, and a conviction for criminal contempt is indistinguishable from an ordinary criminal conviction. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1481-82, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968); Skinner, 838 P.2d at 722 n. 5. [¶ 14] The nature of the contempt charged governs the conduct of, and the procedures to be followed in, a contempt proceeding. Nearly a century ago, the United States Supreme Court addressed the differences between a proceeding instituted and tried as a criminal contempt and a proceeding for civil contempt in Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). In Gompers, two significant principles of law emerged: (1) proceedings in civil contempt are between the original parties and are merely a facet of the original cause of action  they are instituted, tried and treated as a part of the main case; and (2) a criminal contempt prosecution is between the public and the contemnor and is a separate and independent proceeding from, and is not a part of, the original case in which the contempt arose  it is instituted, tried and treated as a distinct criminal action. Id. at 444-51, 31 S.Ct. at 499-502. The Gompers independent and separate proceeding rule for indirect criminal contempts has been universally followed over the intervening years. See Bray v. United States, 423 U.S. 73, 75, 96 S.Ct. 307, 309, 46 L.Ed.2d 215 (1975); Matter of Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503, 1509-10 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Peterson, 456 F.2d 1135, 1139 (10th Cir.1972); In Re Mowery, 141 Wash. App. 263, 169 P.3d 835, 841 (Div. 1 2007); Bryant v. Howard Cty. Dep't of Social Services ex rel. Costley, 387 Md. 30, 874 A.2d 457, 466-67 (2005); People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill.App.3d 433, 266 Ill.Dec. 713, 775 N.E.2d 275, 280-81 (4 Dist.2002); State v. Roberts, 212 N.J.Super. 476, 515 A.2d 799, 803-04 (App.Div.1986); see also 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 145 (2004); 7A Federal Procedure Lawyers Ed. Contempt § 17:9 (2005); 17 F.R.D. 167, 171-72 (1955). [¶ 15] This Court endorsed the independent and separate proceeding rule in Garber v. United Mine Workers of America, 524 P.2d 578, 579-80 (Wyo.1974). In Garber, we set aside for lack of jurisdiction a criminal contempt order issued against several subpoenaed witnesses who had failed to appear for a hearing on an employer's complaint for a temporary injunction against a union arising out of a labor dispute. The order to show cause issued to the nonappearing witnesses was filed in and bore the same caption as the original action seeking the injunctive relief. Five of the alleged contemnors were served a copy of the show cause order and appeared at the contempt hearing without an attorney. Although the district court queried them about their understanding of the nature of the proceedings, no response was solicited or received, and they were not advised of the nature of the charges against them. The district court questioned them and found each guilty of contempt. Each were fined $50.00 and sentenced to thirty days in the county jail, with both the fine and jail sentence suspended on the condition that they obey the law and orders, mandates, and subpoenas issued by any court of general jurisdiction for one year. In the course of setting aside the contempt order, we noted that the alleged contemnors would have been informed of the criminal nature of the action through the title of the cause had the contempt matter been properly pursued as an independent action. We observed: As was said in 1911 in Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., [221 U.S. 418, 446, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797], the matter should show the court or the public as a party. This is more than a mere matter of form, it advises the defendant that it is a charge and not a suit.... Proceedings in criminal contempts are independent criminal actions and should be conducted accordingly. Id. at 579. [¶ 16] In United Mine Workers of America Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1283-84 (Wyo.1989), this Court held the criminal contempt orders issued against two unions and ninety union members for violating a permanent injunction null and void for want of jurisdiction because the contempt matter was not instituted and conducted as an independent action apart from the original cause in which the preliminary injunction issued and the contempt arose. We stated: Our analysis of W.R.Cr.P. 41(b) [2] [predecessor to W.R.Cr.P. 42] and [the cases of Garber and Tracy, Green & Co. v. Warner, 704 P.2d 1306 (Wyo.1985) [3] ] leads us to conclude the district court failed to follow the necessary procedure in issuing the contempt citations to the individual contemnors and the union contemnors. This was, as we have found, a criminal contempt proceeding and should have been conducted as an independent criminal action. It was not, and the district court, therefore, never obtained jurisdiction to proceed. We hold the contempt orders against the individuals and the unions null and void. Id. at 1284. We reiterated this holding three years later in Crites v. Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1072 (Wyo.1992). [¶ 17] Over the intervening years, we have not overruled or limited the separate and independent proceeding requirement espoused in these cases for indirect criminal contempt actions. That requirement leads to the problem in this case. Here, the criminal contempt against Swain was not pursued as an independent criminal action. From the filing of the order to show cause to the entry of the order of contempt against Swain, the criminal contempt action proceeded as an aspect of the underlying criminal case in which the contempt arose, bearing the same docket number as that case. This procedural misstep under existing law mandates a conclusion that the jurisdiction of the district court to proceed on the contempt action was never properly invoked. Accordingly, we must declare the contempt order against Swain null and void. [4] UMWA Local 1972, 774 P.2d at 1284. Having concluded the order of contempt cannot stand, we find it unnecessary to address Swain's asserted errors. [5] [¶ 18] As a final matter, we would be remiss in not noting the days Swain served in the Laramie County Detention Center on the criminal contempt action. Because this matter is being remanded, we simply reiterate for the district court's consideration what we said in Renfro v. State, 785 P.2d 491, 498 n. 10 (Wyo.1990), concerning sentencing credit: [W]e would follow generally the standard developed by III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice ... 18.307-08 [(2d ed.1980)]: Standard 18-4.7. Credit for pretrial confinement (a) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. This should specifically include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, pending the resolution of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the institution to which the defendant has been committed. (b) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody under a prior sentence if the defendant is later reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense or for another offense based on the same conduct. In the case of such a reprosecution, this should include credit in accordance with paragraph (a) for all time spent in custody as a result of both the original charge and any subsequent charge for the same offense or for another offense based on the same conduct. (c) If a defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of the sentences is set aside as the result of direct or collateral attack, credit against the maximum term and any minimum term of the remaining sentences should be given for all time served since the commission of the offenses on which the sentences were based. (d) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prosecuted on another charge growing out of conduct which occurred prior to arrest, credit against the maximum term and any minimum term of any sentence resulting from such prosecution should be given for all time spent in custody under the former charge which has not been credited against another sentence.