Opinion ID: 1967178
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: does article 64 contravene the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the united states constitution?

Text: The plaintiffs contend that the Legislature in promulgating article 64 retroactively deprived them of a vested right in contravention of their due process rights under the Federal Constitution. We find no such violation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional analysis that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. S & S Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Pastore, 497 A.2d 729, 734 (R.I. 1985). A party challenging the constitutional validity of an act carries the burden of persuading the court that the act violates an identifiable aspect of the State or Federal Constitution. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 92 (R.I. 1983). In addition, we have stated with regard to retroactive legislation that it, like prospective legislation, must meet the test of due process. Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864, 869 (R.I. 1987). Earlier this term in Lawrence, we were asked to determine whether the Legislature's retroactive imposition of liability under the 1979 revised Rhode Island Dram Shop Act constituted a due process violation. We examined the act using the approach suggested by Charles B. Hochman in his article, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692 (1960), and first adopted by this court in Raymond v. Jenard, 120 R.I. 634, 638, 390 A.2d 358, 360 (1978). After having reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions on the topic of retrospective legislation, Hochman concluded that the factor most often appearing in these cases is the extent to which the parties have laid reasonable reliance on the law existing at the time of the conduct whose legal consequences the retroactive statute would alter.    [T]he two major factors to be weighed in determining the validity of a retroactive statute are the strength of the public interest it serves and the unfairness created by its retroactive operation, and the reliance of the parties on preexisting law is perhaps the most accurate gauge of the latter. 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 727. We noted in Lawrence that recent Supreme Court decisions continued to support Hochman's balancing test. 523 A.2d at 870. The Court in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976), sustained the retroactive effects of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 as amended by the Black Lung Act of 1972 that required coal-mine operators to compensate former employees disabled by pneumoconiosis, even though those employees had terminated their work in the industry before the statute was enacted. Because the mine operators had known of the existence of the dangers posed by pneumoconiosis for twenty years, and because there was no evidence that they would have altered their conduct had the law imposed liability on them from the outset, the Court concluded that the act was justified as a rational means to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor   . 428 U.S. at 18, 96 S.Ct. at 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d at 768. In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984), the Court's latest case on retroactive legislation, the Congress had created a governmentallyrun retirement plan termination insurance program to ensure that employees would not be deprived of anticipated benefits if their plans terminated prior to the accumulation of sufficient funds. Under the act, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) would collect premiums from covered-pension plans and provide benefits to employees in those plans if their plan terminated with insufficient assets to support guaranteed benefits. In addition, a subsequent amendment to the statute imposed on employers participating in private multiemployer retirement plans, and who withdrew from such plans, liability to PBGC for the employer's proportionate share of that plan's unfunded vested benefits. Such liability was given a retroactive effective date. Although the Court in Pension Benefit did not explicitly articulate its reliance on the earlier balancing test of Turner Elkhorn, it nevertheless stated that the retrospective aspects of legislation would meet the test of due process if the retroactive application of the act was justified by a rational legislative purpose. 467 U.S. at 730, 104 S.Ct. at 2718, 81 L.Ed.2d at 611. And since the employers affected by the retroactive liability in Pension Benefit had advance notice that liability might be imposed and, therefore, had the opportunity to conform to the requirements of the act, no due-process violation existed. Id. at 732, 104 S.Ct. at 2719, 81 L.Ed.2d at 613. Applying the Hochman balancing test in Lawrence, we determined that the tavern, although cognizant of the dangers of serving intoxicated persons, most likely would have altered its conduct had it known of its potential liability for damages because unlike the mine operators in Turner Elkhorn, whose economic survival depended upon the miners' working in the mine and who could have altered the conditions causing pneumoconiosis only at great expense and with little hope of success, the tavern did not face extinction, or even the radical diminution of its business, by refusing to serve liquor to an intoxicated person; thus it could have done so with little difficulty. Lawrence, 523 A.2d at 871. In light of this reliance by the tavern and the consequential unfairness of applying retroactive liability, we found the countervailing public interest, although certainly significant, to be less weighty. Id. at 871. Although it is true that the cases of Turner Elkhorn, Pension Benefit, and Lawrence all involved retrospective imposition of liability, we believe their balancing approach to be no less applicable to the extinguishing of seniority benefits under article 64. Article 64 comports with due process if the Legislature's retroactive repeal of § 30-21-3 is rational and not arbitrary in nature, Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. at 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d at 766, or so long as it is not particularly harsh and oppressive. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. at 733, 104 S.Ct. at 2720, 81 L.Ed.2d at 613, (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147, 59 S.Ct. 121, 126, 83 L.Ed. 87, 93 (1938)). Retroactive legislation is deemed to be rationally based and therefore constitutional if, by examining its explicit and implicit purposes and justifications, it can be concluded that the public interest in retroactivity outweighs the unfairness of retroactivity, the latter being measured best by the party's reliance on the preexisting state of the law. 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 727. In this particular case, the degree of unfairness to plaintiffs is negligible because they never relied upon § 30-21-3 when they applied for and accepted municipal employment. And there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that they would have foregone municipal employment had they been aware that no seniority benefits would be credited. Against this we must balance the public interest. Obviously the public interest in retroactive repeal of § 30-21-3 is to avoid the unanticipated potential for financial calamity that would beset the state and municipalities, as well as private employers within the state, if they were now required to credit plaintiffs with seniority benefits for prior military service. While plaintiffs have argued that such potential liability is as yet speculative at best and therefore not a proper factor to be considered by this court, it takes no mathematical wizardry to realize the potential financial burden that a viable § 30-21-3 would impose on the public and private employers within the state if they were burdened with retroactive salary adjustments, vacation leave, longevity benefits and other advancements for their eligible employees. Under these circumstances, we find the public interest to greatly outweigh the minimal degree of unfairness to plaintiffs. Consequently, article 64 is justified by a rational legislative purpose and comports with substantive due process requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment.