Opinion ID: 1997684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Continuance

Text: Secrest argues that the trial court abused its discretion, whether or not the State violated Rule 16, by denying his request for a continuance in order to secure the testimony of his accident reconstruction expert. Requests for continuances are left to the discretion of a trial judge whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling is clearly unreasonable or capricious. Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 521 A.2d 1069, 1088 (1987). This Court has not elaborated precise standards for assessing a request for a continuance, but has stated generally: There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 997, 1018 n. 27 (1985) ( quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 850, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)); Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1088. Other jurisdictions have articulated more precise standards for assessing continuance requests. There is uniform agreement that trial judges enjoy wide discretion to decide requests for a continuance. United States v. Saccoccia, 1st Cir., 58 F.3d 754, 770 (1995). This deference supports [an] important public interest in the efficient operation of the judicial system and in the orderly management of crowded dockets.... The ... [trial] judge is at the helm, sensitive to the tides that ebb and flow during a prolonged trial and knowledgeable about systemic demands. [The trial judge] ... is, therefore, the person best equipped to balance the competing considerations. United States v. Devin, 1st Cir., 918 F.2d 280, 291 (1990). This discretion should be limited, however, by the recognition that a rigid insistence by the court upon expedition of trial in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend an empty formality. Kimes v. United States, D.C.App., 569 A.2d 104, 114 (1989) ( quoting O'Connor v. United States, D.C.App., 399 A.2d 21, 28 (1979)). Appellate courts generally require the defendant to show: (1) an abuse of discretion in applying the applicable standards, and (2) serious prejudice. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 770; State v. Damon, 214 Conn. 146, 570 A.2d 700, 708 (1990) (substantially impaired the defendant's ability to defend himself); Kimes, 569 A.2d at 114; accord United States v. Ross, 5th Cir., 58 F.3d 154, 159 (1995) (seriously prejudiced by the denial); United States v. Verderame, 11th Cir., 51 F.3d 249, 251 (1995) (specific substantial prejudice); United States v. Robertson, 9th Cir., 15 F.3d 862, 873 (1994) (actual prejudice). While courts may differ on the specific language, the factors to be considered exhibit a degree of uniformity. The Maine Supreme Court has stated, for example: The party seeking the continuance has the burden of establishing [1] that the evidence sought will be relevant and competent, [2] that a continuance will make its procurement likely, [3] that due diligence was used to obtain the evidence before the commencement of trial, and [4] that the length of the continuance sought is reasonable. State v. Dechaine, Me.Supr., 572 A.2d 130, 132-133 (1990); accord Smith v. State, 103 Md.App. 310, 653 A.2d 526, 532 (1995); Kimes, 569 A.2d at 114. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a somewhat different four-part test: We do not find an abuse of discretion unless the denial is arbitrary and unreasonable given the following four factors: (1) the extent of the defendant's diligence in readying the defense; (2) the likelihood that the continuance would have satisfied the defendant's need; (3) the inconvenience to the court, opposing party, and witnesses; and (4) the extent to which the defendant may have been harmed. United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d at 873. The Eleventh Circuit has a four-part test which looks to similar factors: (1) diligence, (2) probability of obtaining testimony within a reasonable time, (3) specificity with which the defendant articulated the proposed testimony, and (4) the favorable degree of the testimony. United States v. Cross, 11th Cir., 928 F.2d 1030, 1048 (1991). In this case, Secrest argues that he was sandbagged, or surprised, by the State's introduction in rebuttal of expert testimony regarding occupant kinematics. This is different from a case where a defendant requests a continuance during his or her case-in-chief. Secrest had no reason to present inconclusive expert testimony during his case-in-chief since the State had not presented expert testimony during its case. The record does not reflect that Secrest asked specifically for a one-day continuance. Defense counsel maintains that he mentioned to the trial judge in the hallway that he would be seeking a one-day continuance. The trial judge and the prosecutor, however, have no recollection of such a statement. The record reflects, therefore, that defense counsel requested a continuance of undefined duration in order to present the surrebuttal testimony of his expert witness. As an offer of proof, he stated the conclusions that his witness had reached. The record also reflects that the expert had completed his work and was prepared to testify as soon as his schedule permitted. The offer of proof reflects that Dr. Govatos reached a conclusion before trial. Even without a specific time-frame, it is apparent from the record that the request could not have necessitated a lengthy continuance. This was not a request which would involve an indefinite delay so that defense counsel could retain an expert, have him perform an analysis and reach conclusions. Compare State v. Chambers, Me.Supr., 624 A.2d 473, 474 (1993) (defendant must show more than a whimsical hope that more time to investigate might produce additional exculpatory evidence). We are particularly concerned here that the trial record relating to the request for a continuance is unclear. We reiterate our concern that office conferences and sidebars be reported. See Matter of Butler, Del. Supr., 609 A.2d 1080, 1082 n. 3 (1992). Since the judgment here must be reversed because of the admission of the testimony protected by the physician-patient privilege, we need not decide whether the denial of the continuance, standing alone, would have constituted error, or if so, whether that error was harmless. For the future guidance of the trial courts and the Bar, we set forth the following standards to be applied where a continuance is sought under similar circumstances: First, the party seeking the continuance has the burden of establishing a clear record of the relevant facts relating to the criteria for a continuance, including the length of the requested continuance. Second, the party seeking the continuance must show: (a) that it was diligent in preparing for the presentation of the testimony; (b) that the continuance will be likely to satisfy the need to present the testimony; and (c) that the inconvenience to the Court, opposing parties, witnesses and jurors is insubstantial in relation to the likely prejudice which would result from the denial of the continuance.