Opinion ID: 165463
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Advisory O pinion

Text: As stated in Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975): [A] federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them. Its judgments must resolve a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[t]he real value of the judicial pronouncement— what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a ‘case or controversy’ rather than an advisory opinion— is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.” Hewitt v. H elm s, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987) (emphasis omitted). In denying Appellants’ petitions the district court invoked Article III and stated that “the petitions now before this court and the procedures suggested do -19- not enable this court to go forward to adjudicate and balance the competing interests of grand jury secrecy and the interests of petitioners in public disclosure,” and that were the court to do so, “the ultimate result would be nothing more than an advisory opinion of general conclusions and insufficient particularity to protect the petitioners from possible sanctions in criminal or civil proceedings.” Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 373 (Order on Sealed Petitions at 4, M arch 12, 2004). It is not clear to us why the district court felt that resolution of A ppellants’ petitions would require an advisory opinion. Aside from attorney fees, which are derivative of the other claims, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (“An interest in attorney’s fees is insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim.” (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)), the Turley Appellants requested six categories of relief: (1) release of the proffer and transcript from the 1997 hearings; (2) release of the legal arguments and filings from this case; (3) release of identified portions of the grand jury report and transcript relevant to the proffer; (4) findings from the court regarding the allegations of wrongdoing made by Appellants, and possible referral for further investigation; (5) permission for Appellants to discuss their concerns “within the boundaries of the public record,” Aplt. App. Vol. 2 at 287 (Petitioners’ Statement of Relief at 15, June 23, 2003); and (6) preservation of all grand jury material for -20- possible future investigations. W ith respect to categories (1) through (3), the Turley Appellants also proposed procedures whereby the court could determine, after appropriate motions and responses from each side, whether portions of these materials should be redacted before release. Appellant Peck likewise requested (1) release from the secrecy obligation, and (2) disclosure of (a) an unredacted version of the grand jury report, (b) his testimony before the magistrate judge, and (c) an affidavit attached to his petition which gives details about certain occurrences before the grand jury. There would be nothing advisory about a decision either granting or denying the requested relief. Either way, the ruling would relate not to a hypothetical set of facts, but to a concrete dispute concerning the parties before it. The district court’s view appears to have been based, at least in part, on a concern that the relief sought was not specific enough, because, for example, Appellants did not state precisely what portions of the report should remain redacted. But Appellants have sought release of specified documents. Their recognition that the government may pose objections and that the court may grant only partial relief hardly makes the case a hypothetical one. W e have been directed to no authority, nor are we aware of any, stating that a claim seeks an advisory opinion unless it predicts how the court will rule on the claim. Such authority would surprise us. -21- Perhaps the request for findings by the district court regarding A ppellants’ allegations of w rongdoing amounts to a request for an advisory opinion, because it is not apparent how such nonbinding findings or recommendations would affect anyone’s rights or duties under the law. See Preiser, 422 U.S. at 401 (federal court lacks power “to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The ultimate decision whether to charge a defendant, and what charges to file . . . , rests solely with state and federal prosecutors.”). Appellants suggest that “[f]ederal courts routinely refer such matters for investigation once a cognizable basis for suspicion of criminal or unethical conduct has been brought to its attention.” A plt. Br. at 20. But we are unaware of, and have not been cited to, any instances in which courts have recognized a cause of action that merely seeks such a referral. The only authority cited by Appellants is M uskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911), and Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792). Neither opinion, however, supports their contention. Neither case involved a request for a referral for prosecution (or anything similar), and both held that there was no jurisdiction. Nevertheless, Appellants’ request for findings regarding their allegations of wrongdoing are a collateral matter, representing only a fraction of the relief sought, the bulk of which certainly does not seek an advisory opinion; and that particular request can be clarified, and perhaps rejected as beyond the court’s jurisdiction, on remand. -22-