Opinion ID: 2077339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Deviation Criteria

Text: The trial court explained its reasons for deviating from the guidelines as the [defendant's] substantial assets ... [and] superior earning capacity, the extraordinary disparity in parental income and the significant and essential needs of the [plaintiff] including, but not limited to, the need to provide a home for the children. As if to downplay the significance of the deviation, the court further noted that it had not considered the defendant's yearly noncash compensation, consisting of stock options and restricted stock in the amount of $530,000 for the year 2005. The court provided no other reasons, however, for its decision. We conclude that, although the court ostensibly applied the deviation criteria in awarding the plaintiff 20 percent, rather than 15.89 percent or less, of the defendant's annual net cash bonus, it did not understand and apply the criteria correctly, thus failing to preserve the allocation of resources between parents and children authorized by the legislature under the relevant statutes and established by the commission. See General Statutes §§ 46b-215a and 46b-215b. The deviation criteria are narrowly defined and require the court to make a finding on the record as to why the guidelines are inequitable or inappropriate. In the present case, the court did not make such a finding. The court also misconstrued the deviation criteria. The court's first reason for the large, open-ended award of bonus income was the defendant's substantial assets and superior earning capacity.... This rationale appears to have been drawn from the first criteria, which permits the court to consider [o]ther financial resources available to a parent [such as substantial assets and superior earning capacity] ... that are not included in the definition of net income, but could be used by the parent for the benefit of the child or for meeting the needs of the parent. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-3 (b)(1); see also id., at § 46b-215a-3 (b)(1)(A) and (B). The defendant's annual net cash bonus, however, is not another available financial resource under the first criteria because bonuses are included in the definition of net income. Id., at § 46b-215a-1(11)(A)(iii) and (17). Thus, the court was not permitted to consider the defendant's substantial assets and superior earning capacity to justify the additional child support award derived from his annual bonus. Furthermore, even if bonuses were not included in the guidelines' definition of net income and could have been considered another available financial resource, the court did not explain how an increase in the level of support of 15.89 percent or more of the defendant's bonus would have benefited the children or met the needs of the plaintiff, especially in light of yearly changes in bonus income unrelated to family circumstances. Indeed, it appears that the parties placed much of the defendant's extraordinary income during their marriage into savings and investment accounts that had little effect on their daily standard of living. See Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2005), preamble, § (e)(4)(A), p. iv (higher income families devote more income to savings, other nonconsumption expenditures and discretionary adult goods); Ford v. Ford, supra, 600 A.2d at 30 (higher income families spend less and less on `needs' and put more and more into savings or investments). Finally, the plaintiff's share of the property distribution award was considerably greater than the defendant's, particularly with respect to cash and other readily accessible liquid assets. Thus, to the extent that both parties were left with substantial assets after the property division, the defendant's assets could not have provided a sufficient ground for the court's departure from the guidelines. The court next referred to the extraordinary disparity in parental income.... The court apparently was relying on the sixth criteria, in which income disparity is one of several [s]pecial circumstances that permit a departure from the guidelines. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-3 (b)(6). Income disparity may be considered, however, only when the custodial parent has the higher income and deviation from the presumptive support amount would enhance the lower income [noncustodial] parent's ability to foster a relationship with the child.... Id., at § 46b-215a-3 (b)(6)(B)(i). This consideration is unambiguously intended to protect the noncustodial parent in circumstances where the income of the custodial parent far exceeds the income of the parent obligated to pay child support, which is not the case here. Thus, the court's consideration of income disparity under the sixth deviation criteria was improper. The court's third and final reason for departing from the guidelines was the significant and essential needs of the [plaintiff] including, but not limited to, the need to provide a home for the children. An award made to satisfy the essential needs of the [plaintiff] is improper, however, because child support awards, by definition, must benefit the children or foster their relationship to their parents. See General Statutes § 46b-84 (d). Any consideration of the plaintiff's needs thus must be restricted to the fashioning of an alimony award under General Statutes § 46b-82 [10] and cannot justify a deviation from the guidelines. In addition, the court made no specific finding regarding how an open-ended bonus award would foster the needs of the children, nor did the court explain why the plaintiff, to whom it had awarded significant assets in the form of a mortgage free house, approximately $7 million in liquid assets and 20 percent of the defendant's net cash bonus as alimony, required additional funds to provide a home for the children. [11] The court also apparently failed to consider that, because the defendant was awarded physical custody of the children approximately 40 percent of the time, the plaintiff's needs with respect to providing a home for the children would be correspondingly diminished. In addition, although the court stated that it had considered all of the statutory criteria, it failed to provide any explicit justification for the award of bonus income that was related to the financial or nonfinancial needs or characteristics of the children under General Statutes § 46b-84 (d), which requires consideration of the child's age, health, station, occupation, educational status and expectation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs.... In fact, there is no evidence that the court considered anything other than the defendant's income and earning capacity in making the child support award. Thus, absent a finding as to how the additional funds would be used for the benefit of the children and how the award was related to the factors identified in § 46b-84 (d), we conclude that the court exceeded its legitimate discretion. Indeed, we are at a loss to explain how approximately $360 to $840 every single day of the year, which is the amount the plaintiff would receive in income based child support if the defendant earned an annual net cash bonus of $490,000 to $1.368 million, can seriously be justified, especially when the costs of the children's education, health care and extracurricular activities will be paid solely by the defendant and not by the plaintiff out of the child support award. The dissent argues that the focus of the plurality is on the physical needs of the children and that this opinion ignores the `new wave' of cases that recognizes the significance of the standard of living of children of affluent parents. We disagree. We recognize that children in high income families are accustomed to a more affluent lifestyle that should be maintained to the extent reasonably possible. Indeed, § 46b-84 mandates that the court consider factors such as the occupation, station, earning capacity and amount and sources of income of the parents as well as the age, health, station, educational status, expectation, estate and needs of the child. Section 46b-215b (a), however, provides that the guideline principles must be considered in all determinations of child support amounts.... Accordingly, the trial court should not have unfettered discretion in high income cases to make lavish child support awards that appear to be unrelated both to the needs of the children, even after considering their station, and to the principles articulated in the guidelines, including the principle that an award based on bonus income should be generally consistent with the schedule. The dissent overlooks the trial court's failure to provide any justification relating to the characteristics and needs of the children when the court granted the award of bonus income. The court made no findings regarding how much of the family's disposable income before the divorce had been spent on the children to justify such an award and apparently did not consider that it already had (1) granted the defendant physical custody and responsibility for the children 40 percent of the time, (2) awarded the plaintiff the mortgage free $2.55 million marital home and more than $8 million in cash and investment accounts, and (3) ordered the defendant to pay all of the children's private school tuition, medical and dental insurance, unreimbursed medical, dental, orthodontia, optical and psychological expenses and all summer camp and extracurricular activity expenses. Thus, it is difficult to understand why the court made such a high net cash bonus award absent any findings or evidence in the record that it was needed by, or would be spent on, the children. The effect of unrestrained child support awards in high income cases is a potential windfall that transfers wealth from one spouse to another or from one spouse to the children under the guise of child support. In the present case, the award of 20 percent of the defendant's indeterminate annual bonus without any justification relating to the characteristics or needs of the children closely resembles the disguise[d] alimony this court disapproved of in Brown v. Brown, 190 Conn. 345, 349, 460 A.2d 1287 (1983). In Brown, the plaintiff's weekly household expenses amounted to $340.23. Id., at 348, 460 A.2d 1287. The trial court nonetheless ordered the defendant to pay $325 per week in child support, in addition to maintaining medical insurance and paying for 50 percent of the child's unreimbursed medical expenses. Id. On appeal, we concluded that the child support award was improper because it was grossly disproportionate to the child's needs. Id., at 349, 460 A.2d 1287. Recognizing that [c]hild support orders must be based on the statutory criteria enumerated in ... § 46b-84 of which the most important is the needs of the child, we held that support award[s] may not be used to disguise alimony awards to the custodial parent. Id.; see also Loughlin v. Loughlin, 280 Conn. 632, 655-56, 910 A.2d 963 (2006) (alimony and child support serve distinct purposes and one must not be used to disguise improper increased payment of other). Other courts have similarly noted that guidelines and percentages used without limitation are unrealistic and unfair when both parents have substantial incomes.... When a parent has an ability to pay a large amount of support, the determination of a child's needs can be generous, but all any parent should be required to pay, regardless of his or her ability, is a fair share of the amount actually necessary to maintain the child in a reasonable standard of living. Court-ordered support that is more than reasonably needed for the child becomes, in fact, [tax free] alimony. (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Kalter v. Kalter, 155 Mich.App. 99, 104, 399 N.W.2d 455 (1986), leave to appeal denied, 428 Mich. 862 (1987); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 834 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex.App.1992) ([a]n award of child support above the guidelines without regard to needs and solely because the obligor has great income would amount to de facto alimony), rev'd on other grounds, 860 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1993); accord Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 58, 134 S.E.2d 227 (1964) ([i]t is never the purpose of a support order to divide the [noncustodial parent's] wealth or to distribute his estate). Consequently, the trial court's discretion must be informed by careful consideration of guideline principles to lessen the risk of improper child support awards in high income cases. We therefore conclude that, when a family's combined net weekly income exceeds $4000, the court should treat the percentage set forth in the schedule at the highest income level as the presumptive ceiling on the child support obligation, subject to rebuttal by application of the deviation criteria enumerated in the guidelines, as well as the statutory factors described in § 46b-84 (d). Additionally, when there is a proven, routine consistency in annual bonus income, as when a bonus is based on an established percentage of a party's steady income, an additional award of child support that represents a percentage of the net cash bonus also may be appropriate if justified by the needs of the child. When there is a history of wildly fluctuating bonuses, however, or a reasonable expectation that future bonuses will vary substantially, as in the present case, an award based on a fixed percentage of the net cash bonus is impermissible unless it can be linked to the child's characteristics and demonstrated needs. In determining whether to supplement the basic child support obligation with bonus income, the court also must consider the property division and custody schedule as well as any additional support obligations imposed on the noncustodial parent for education, health care, recreation, insurance and other matters. In the present case, the court entered separate orders requiring the defendant to pay all of the children's medical and health related expenses as well as all expenses relating to the children's summer day camp and extracurricular activities, which presumably would cover many of the luxuries to which children of affluent families are accustomed and would expect to be maintained following a divorce. When not covered by separate orders, however, such expenses are not infinite, and thus are not likely to represent a uniform percentage of a defendant's variable bonus income, regardless of the income level in any given year. See Marriage of Edwards, 99 Wash.2d 913, 918-19, 665 P.2d 883 (1983) ([A]n open-ended percentage of income support award may not necessarily relate to the child's support needs. Thus, a limitation on the concept is needed. In fashioning such awards, the trial judge should determine a maximum amount of child support that would be reasonable and needed in the future and set that amount as a ceiling above which the support payments cannot rise.); see also Harmon v. Harmon, 173 A.D.2d 98, 111, 578 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1992) ([T]o apply blindly the statutory formula to the parties' aggregate income over [the maximum provided for in the guidelines] without any express findings or record evidence of the child's actual needs would constitute both an abdication of the judicial responsibility and a trespass upon the right of parents to make [lifestyle] choices for their children. Although entitled to support in accordance with the preseparation standard, a child is not a partner in the marital relationship, entitled to a `piece of the action.'). We emphasize that trial courts remain free to exercise their discretion in determining the appropriate child support award in light of the particular circumstances of each case. As one court has stated: When the [parties'] combined adjusted gross income exceeds the uppermost limit of the ... schedule, the amount of child support awarded must rationally relate to the reasonable and necessary needs of the child, taking into account the lifestyle to which the child was accustomed and the standard of living the child enjoyed before the divorce, and must reasonably relate to the obligor's ability to pay for those needs.... To avoid a finding of an abuse of discretion on appeal, a trial court's judgment of child support must satisfy both prongs. (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burgett v. Burgett, 995 So.2d 907, 913 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). Although we do not specifically endorse this approach as the standard to be applied in Connecticut, it has an intuitive appeal and is consistent with § 46b-84 (d) because it suggests that the total child support obligation must be capped at a sum bearing some rational relation to the estate and needs of the child. Relying on Battersby v. Battersby, 218 Conn. 467, 473, 590 A.2d 427 (1991), and the preamble to the guidelines, the plaintiff argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 20 percent of the defendant's net cash bonus as child support. She argues that the court's discretion is limited in high income cases only by the factors set forth in § 46b-84, and not by the guidelines, and that the award was justified in the present case as necessary to avoid a dramatic change in the children's standard of living that might result in their emotional and psychological harm. A thorough review of both Battersby and the preamble to the guidelines, however, indicates otherwise. Moreover, the court's other orders ensured that there would be little or no change in the children's standard of living. We first note that the plaintiff improperly conflates the guidelines and the schedule contained therein. To the extent that the parties' combined net weekly income exceeds $4000, the upper limit of the schedule, we agree with the plaintiff that the schedule cannot, and does not, apply, except insofar as the guidelines mandate a minimum child support payment. This does not mean, however, that the guideline principles that inform the schedule, including equity, consistency and uniformity in the treatment of persons in similar circumstances; Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2005), preamble, § (c)(1) and (2), p. ii.; do not continue to apply merely because the parties' income exceeds the schedule's upper limit. As previously discussed, § 46b-215b requires that the guidelines  shall be considered in all determinations of child support amounts; (emphasis added); which, according to the preamble, have been established in the schedule on the basis of the income shares model and reflect the principle that spending on children declines as a proportion of family income as income levels rise. Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2005), preamble, § (d), pp. ii-iii. Accordingly, the guidelines cannot be ignored when the combined net family income exceeds the upper limit of the schedule, but remain applicable to all determinations of child support. The plaintiff's reliance on Battersby is also misguided because she takes its language out of context. In that case, the plaintiff husband's weekly income exceeded the highest income level in the schedule. Battersby v. Battersby, supra, 218 Conn. at 468, 590 A.2d 427. The defendant wife, who was the custodial parent for the couple's two minor children, appealed from the trial court's downward departure from the schedule, arguing that the top percentage in the schedule, which at the time was 44 percent, should be applied to the plaintiff's higher income. Id., at 469, 472-73, 590 A.2d 427. We explained, however, that the trial court properly had declined to employ the maximum percentage because applying the [g]uidelines [schedule] to incomes in excess of [the maximum] would be inequitable because the statistical basis for the [schedule] loses its validity as the disposable income of the family increases; that is, the proportion of household income spent on children declines as household income increases. Id., at 473, 590 A.2d 427. We therefore endorsed the trial court's rationale, explaining that, while a family earning [the maximum combined net weekly income] may spend 44 percent of its income supporting two children, a family earning [a considerably greater weekly income than the maximum established in the schedule] ordinarily spends a lower percentage. Since the purpose of a child support order is to provide for the care and well-being of minor children, and not to equalize the available income of divorced parents, the trial court had the authority to reject the defendant's suggested extrapolation of the [g]uidelines' percentage as inappropriate and inequitable in the circumstances before it. (Emphasis added.) Id. We nonetheless did not endorse a completely ad hoc approach to higher income support awards, but noted with approval that the trial court had considered the [g]uidelines, found the [schedule] inapplicable for arriving at a presumptive support amount, and considered the statutory criteria and other [ g ] uideline factors in arriving at its decision. (Emphasis added.) Id., at 472, 590 A.2d 427. Accordingly, Battersby implicitly bars the use of percentages greater than the highest provided for in the schedule when determining appropriate child support obligations in higher income cases and instructs, first, that the plaintiff in the present case is incorrect in concluding that the guidelines are inapplicable to high income cases, and, second, that the application of a percentage greater than the maximum provided in the schedule is highly questionable and must at least be justified by other [g]uideline factors.... Id. In short, the plaintiff's argument misses the crucial point that Battersby actually contradicts her view that the award in the present case was proper. Our reasoning in Battersby was recently applied by the Appellate Court in Gentile v. Carneiro, supra, 107 Conn.App. at 630, 946 A.2d 871, which held, inter alia, that the trial court improperly had ordered the defendant to pay an excessive percentage of his future commissions as supplemental support. Id., at 644, 946 A.2d 871. In Gentile, the court first explained that a supplemental order mandating a payment based on a percentage of future lump sum income must be generally consistent with the guidelines' schedule; Child Support Arrearage Guidelines (2005), preamble, § (g)(6), p. ix; and that this occurs when [the payment] is of a percentage that, as a whole, is in harmony with the schedule; Gentile v. Carneiro, supra, at 644, 946 A.2d 871; and account[s] for a parent's declining percentage support obligation that accompanies an increase in income. Id., at 648, 946 A.2d 871. Recognizing that such future income may cause the obligor's income to exceed the range of the schedule, the court established a general principle based on the economic policy underlying the guidelines that a supplemental support order must account for the schedule's inverse relationship between a parent's net income and his weekly support obligation, while also accounting for those instances in which a future payment of unknown amount exceeds the range of the schedule. Id., at 649, 946 A.2d 871. The Appellate Court found that the supplemental award in Gentile excessively burdened the defendant ... [because] [n]o matter what the actual value of the defendant's future commission, he will always be obligated to pay as support a higher percentage than what the schedule mandates. Id., at 650, 946 A.2d 871. Thus, the case was remanded so that the trial court could craft a supplemental order that requires the defendant to pay a declining percentage of supplemental support as the future lump sum payment increases while also accounting for those instances in which the future lump sum payment exceeds the range of the schedule. The percentages in the court's order should be within the range utilized by the schedule. Id. The rationale articulated by the court in Gentile, which is no more than a restatement of the reasoning expressed in the guidelines, is applicable even in cases in which a family's net income exceeds the maximum established in the schedule. We therefore approve of the analysis in Battersby and Gentile and conclude that the guidelines' requirement of general consisten[cy] must be applied to all child support awards. Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2005), preamble, § (g)(6), p. ix. With respect to the plaintiff's concern that the children may suffer emotional harm because of a change in their standard of living, we reiterate that the court awarded the plaintiff $10.65 million, of which $8.1 million was in cash and investment accounts, the parties' mortgage free $2.55 million marital home and alimony in the amount of $1215 per week plus 20 percent of the defendant's annual net cash bonus and 20 percent of any future tax refund the defendant may receive. Additionally, the defendant was ordered to provide comprehensive medical insurance benefits for the plaintiff at his expense for the maximum period allowed by law and to obtain a life insurance policy in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $2 million. He also was ordered to pay 100 percent of the children's private school tuition until they complete high school and all work related day care expenses and summer day camp and extracurricular activities, and to maintain and pay for all medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the children ... [and] 100 percent of all unreimbursed medical, dental, orthodontia, optical and psychological expenses. The court also left the door open for a future order regarding payment of the children's college expenses. Accordingly, it does not appear that the court's financial orders will cause the children to suffer a significant change in their standard of living, and, as noted elsewhere in this opinion, the award would not survive review even if the only test applied was based on the factors set forth in § 46b-84 (d). As we have stated previously, the guidelines do not cease to apply and permit trial courts unlimited discretion in setting child support awards merely because the income of a particular family exceeds some talismanic number on a chart. Neither this court, nor the trial court, is at liberty, where a particular family enjoys a relatively high income, to disregard the significant progress that has been made in standardizing child support awards since the advent of the guidelines. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1988). Removing consideration of the guidelines from child support decisions deprives high income families of the fairness and consistency the guidelines require and leaves the trial and appellate courts adrift, unanchored to the core principles that guide support awards in cases falling within the guidelines' schedule. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff 20 percent of the defendant's annual net cash bonus in child support. In his concurrence, Justice Schaller claims that the plurality incorrectly elevates the child support guidelines to controlling authority in cases in which the parties' combined net weekly income exceeds the upper limit of the schedule, thus infringing on trial courts' broad discretion to determine child support awards in such cases on the basis of statutory authority alone, unfettered by the strict principles of the guidelines except as a factor to be considered. We disagree. The concurrence misconstrues our decision, which does not rely solely on the guidelines, but takes significant account of the applicable statutory authority on which the guidelines are based. The concurrence also fails to recognize that, in establishing a commission to promulgate and regularly update child support guidelines, subject to legislative approval, the legislature intended to limit the courts' traditionally broad judicial discretion in child support matters. Knowledge of the guidelines' legislative history is essential in understanding how and why they limit judicial discretion, a subject that we previously addressed in Favrow v. Vargas, 222 Conn. 699, 707-708, 610 A.2d 1267 (1992), but review again here. The legislature initially considered establishing guidelines to assist courts in dissolution proceedings in 1984, when it enacted Special Acts 1984, No. 84-74. Id., at 707, 610 A.2d 1267. The special act had two goals, the first being to establish pilot programs in two judicial districts for the mediation and conciliation of disputes arising in marriage dissolution proceedings, and the second being to appoint an inter-agency commission to develop family support guidelines for use by family relations counselors in the selected districts. Id. The guidelines developed at that time were not intended to limit judicial discretion in entering family support orders, but to be flexible and nondirective. Id., at 708, 610 A.2d 1267. To this end, the commission specifically recommended that they be used by family relations counselors as part of the mediation process. Id., at 710, 610 A.2d 1267. In an addendum to the commission's report, however, the mediators appointed under the special act recommended that the guidelines be formally incorporated as guidelines to be considered by judges in the adjudication of family support matters. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In 1985, the legislature revisited the issue and enacted Public Acts 1985, No. 85-548 (P.A. 85-548), entitled An Act Implementing the Federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984. Id. Section 8 of the act established a second commission to develop guidelines, not later than January 1, 1987, for child support award amounts within the state. Such guidelines shall be available but not binding upon judges and other officials who have the power to determine child support awards. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 710-11, 610 A.2d 1267. Thus, although P.A. 85-548 specified that the new guidelines would address child support awards and expanded their use from family relations counselors to the courts, the act also explained, consistent with past practice, that the guidelines were not intended to be binding. Id., at 711, 610 A.2d 1267. In 1989, the legislature considered the issue once again and enacted Public Acts 1989, No. 89-203, entitled, An Act Concerning Child Support Guidelines. Id. Section 1 of the act established a third commission to review the child support guidelines promulgated pursuant to [§ ] 8 of [P]ublic [A]ct 85-548 ... to establish criteria for the establishment of guidelines to ensure the appropriateness of child support awards and ... to issue updated guidelines not later than January 1, 1991 and every four years thereafter. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 711-12, 610 A.2d 1267. Section 1 of the act is now codified as § 46b-215a and §§ 2 and 3 are now codified as § 46b-215b. Id., at 712, 610 A.2d 1267. As we noted in Favrow, § 46b-215b (a) made four significant changes in the child support guidelines that had the effect of  displac [ ing ] the flexible and nondirective approach previously taken. (Emphasis added.) Id. These changes included requirements that (1) the guidelines `shall be considered in all determinations of child support amounts within the state'; (emphasis added) id.; (2) `there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the amount of such awards which resulted from the application of such guidelines is the amount of support to be ordered'; id.; (3) in order `to rebut the presumption in such case,' the court or magistrate must make a `specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be inequitable or inappropriate in a particular case'; id., at 712-13, 610 A.2d 1267; and (4) such a specific finding must be `determined under criteria established by the commission.' Id., at 713, 610 A.2d 1267. The commission subsequently promulgated new guidelines in response to the statutory mandate, describing the deviation criteria in more detail and expanding them to ensure that child support orders would be in the best interests of the child and financially equitable to the parties. Id. In summarizing this history, we observed in Favrow that the guidelines evolved from an experimental, intentionally nondirective and flexible approach to the imposition of standards that are presumptively binding on the court or magistrate, from which deviations would be permitted only in accordance with specific findings related to specific criteria established by the commission. Thus, in general, the 1989 legislation and the ensuing work of the commission substantially circumscribes the traditionally broad judicial discretion of the court in matters of child support. Id., at 715, 610 A.2d 1267. In light of the foregoing history, we no longer may view trial courts as having broad discretion to make child support awards in high income cases, unfettered by guideline principles that, according to Justice Schaller's concurrence, need only be considered. The legislature in very clear terms delegated authority to the commission to establish the guidelines for the purpose of ensuring that child support awards are appropriate; General Statutes § 46b-215a; and further directed that the guidelines  shall be considered in all determinations of child support amounts.... (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-215b (a). The statutory mandate to consider the guidelines cannot have a different meaning in the context of a high income family merely because the parties' joint income exceeds the upper limit of the schedule. The guidelines are not restricted to the schedule alone, but also include  the rules, principles ... and worksheet  contained therein. (Emphasis added.) Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1(5). Moreover, the guidelines define [c]hild support award as, inter alia, the entire payment obligation of the noncustodial parent, as determined under the ... guidelines .... (Emphasis added.) Id., at § 46b-215a-1 (6). Neither provision allows for an exception to be made in high income cases. Furthermore, to construe the word consider differently in high income cases would not make sense when the purpose of the guidelines is to limit judicial discretion in child support matters [t]o make awards more equitable by ensuring the consistent treatment of persons in similar circumstances. Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (2005), preamble, § (c)(2), p. ii. In its final report issued in January, 1991, the commission that promulgated the latest guidelines under the mandate of § 46b-215b noted that the guidelines have been working quite well.... The order establishment process has been expedited... and ... orders of support are generally more consistent. Generally, there is less litigation, and much more thought is being given to the reasons for deviation from the guidelines. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Favrow v. Vargas, supra, 222 Conn. at 713, 610 A.2d 1267. To permit courts unlimited discretion to make awards in high income cases would be contrary to the directives contained in the relevant statutes and guidelines, to the legislature's intent to circumscribe the authority of the courts in child support matters and to the legislature's stated goal of achieving equity and consistency in child support awards. In his concurrence, Justice Schaller also claims that applying the guidelines in high income cases constitutes an inappropriate expansion of regulatory authority. We disagree. The guidelines follow the statutory mandates closely and remain subject to legislative control through the statutory requirement that they be updated every four years and submitted to the standing legislative regulation review committee for approval and adoption. See General Statutes § 46b-215c. Insofar as Justice Schaller relies on Battersby, he takes the Battersby language out of context. Although the court in Battersby noted that the guidelines' schedule contained no provision for extrapolating the percentages and award amounts therein to higher income levels, it also observed that several other factors in the guidelines were relevant in determining the support amount. Battersby v. Battersby, supra, 218 Conn. at 471-72, 590 A.2d 427. The court thus concluded that, although the trial court had found the schedule inapplicable, it properly had considered other [g]uideline factors as well as the statutory criteria in arriving at its decision. Id., at 472, 590 A.2d 427. Furthermore, Favrow v. Vargas, supra, 222 Conn. at 699, 610 A.2d 1267, was decided after Battersby and, although the issue in Favrow did not involve a high income family, the Favrow court clarified that the guidelines were intended to substantially [circumscribe] the traditionally broad judicial discretion of the court in matters of child support. Id., at 715, 610 A.2d 1267. Finally, when the Favrow case returned to this court in 1994, we specifically referred to the authority of § (a)(1) of the guidelines, which provides that [t]he ... guidelines shall be considered in all determinations of child support amounts within the state and that the guidelines consist of the Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations as well as the principles and procedures set forth [ therein ]. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Favrow v. Vargas, 231 Conn. 1, 27, 647 A.2d 731 (1994). Justice Schaller's concurring opinion maintains that, having elevated the guidelines improperly to governing authority, the plurality consigns the relevant statutes to a minor role in its analysis. We do not agree. The governing statutes, principally §§ 46b-84 (d), 46b-215a and 46b-215b, have been addressed at length throughout our analysis and we regard them as the foundation for the guidelines, which merely satisfy the statutory mandate of assisting the courts in making appropriate child support awards. Accordingly, this assertion has no merit.