Opinion ID: 360504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manifest Intention to Comment.

Text: 62 In Rochan, the court stated our policy not to find that the prosecutor manifestly intended to comment on the defendant's failure to testify if some other explanation is equally plausible. Faced with a remark quite similar to the one here, the court in Samuels v. United States, 398 F.2d 964, 968 (5th Cir. 1968), declined to reverse because it was found to be very possible that the prosecutor's statement was merely inadvertent and that his intent was to use the defense counsel's name rather than that of the defendant. See also United States v. Wilson, 500 F.2d 715, 721 (5th Cir. 1974). In United States v. Ward, 552 F.2d 1080, 1083 (5th Cir. 1977), the court concluded that the prosecutor's remarks did not require reversal when they were more likely intended for a proper purpose to refer to the defendants' failure to produce evidence of any kind . . . to rebut the inference of knowledge that naturally follows from the possession of recently stolen property than to comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand. 63 In the instant case, the prosecutor's statement does not make logical sense as transcribed. The prosecutor could not have Asked  Wayne Cole anything because Cole did not take the stand. Further, if we assume that the court reporter quite reasonably transcribed ask as asked, the statement still lacks meaning since it was made during the prosecutor's closing argument, when the government could no longer ask questions to any witnesses. Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of the remark is to find that the prosecutor inadvertently used the defendant's name when he intended to call on the defendant's counsel to explain in his closing argument this uncontradicted evidence. This was, in fact, the explanation given by the prosecutor immediately after the remark was made. This appropriate motivation seems at least as likely as a manifest intention to comment. 64