Opinion ID: 1281413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Extreme Duress or Substantial Domination

Text: Section 190.3, factor (g), sets forth as a mitigating circumstance: Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. (Italics added.) (58) Defendant contends that, under the instruction in the statutory language of factor (g), the jury was precluded from considering lesser degrees of duress or domination of another person. We have concluded, however, in an analogous context, that [factor] (k), by allowing consideration of all `extenuating' circumstances, permits the jury to decide that less pronounced forms of mental or emotional disturbance mitigate the seriousness of the capital offense [under factor (d), which states, `Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance']. ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 776.) ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 519 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081].) We hold that the reasoning of Ghent and Keenan applies with equal force to defendant's identical argument here under factor ( g ). There is no basis in the record to conclude that the jury failed to give proper mitigating weight to any evidence, under defendant's theory, that he acted under duress or the domination of his accomplices Annette Tillery and Howard Love.