Opinion ID: 2745484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffectiveness in Plea Bargaining

Text: Turning to Mr. Adams’ issue concerning his counsel’s ineffectiveness in plea bargaining, Mr. Adams alleges the government offered him a plea bargain featuring a 20-year sentence. His evaluation of the risk of going to trial depended in part on the mandatory minimum sentence he faced if convicted. He believed he faced a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. But he also knew that if the government had filed a notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851 (the “851 notice”), his mandatory minimum would be doubled, to 20 years. Mr. Adams says he specifically asked his counsel whether an 851 notice had been filed, and counsel told him no. But in fact, the government filed an 851 notice on March 10, 2004. It is not clear, however, whether the government filed the notice before or after counsel conferred with Mr. Adams about the plea offer. Mr. Adams claims that but for his counsel’s alleged error, he would likely have accepted the plea. He also claims the district court would likely have approved the terms of the plea, because it was in line with those approved for his co-defendants, which the district court accepted. Finally, Mr. Adams contends that he was prejudiced because after trial he received a life sentence instead of 20 years. A defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012). The two-part Strickland test applies to challenges involving rejection of a plea offer resulting in a conviction at trial and a more severe sentence. Id. “The performance prong of - 10 - Strickland requires a defendant to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant must also demonstrate prejudice. To demonstrate prejudice in this context, the defendant must show three things: [(1)] that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), [(2)] that the court would have accepted its terms, and [(3)] that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed. Id. at 1385. As the government points out, there is significant need for further evidentiary development concerning this issue. Mr. Adams alleges basic facts that could show his entitlement to relief. But it is not clear when the government’s plea offer was made, how long it was good for, and when Mr. Adams discussed it with his attorney. If the offer was made, discussed, and rejected before the government filed its 851 notice, Mr. Leavitt did not advise Mr. Adams incorrectly about the existence of the notice, and he has therefore likely failed to establish deficient performance. Concerning prejudice, Mr. Adams must show that if correctly advised, there is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea. He has alleged that if correctly informed concerning the minimum sentence he faced if convicted after a trial, he would have viewed the government’s offer differently, and changed his mind concerning the value of the deal. Further factual development concerning his - 11 - willingness to accept the plea is required. The government also argues that a hearing is needed to determine whether the government would have withdrawn the offer and whether the district court would have accepted it. In sum, Mr. Adams has advanced a claim which, if believed, would entitle him to § 2255 relief. See Weeks, 653 F.3d at 1206. But an evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether his allegations are true. The district court abused its discretion by denying him an evidentiary hearing concerning this claim.