Opinion ID: 507855
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Special Versus General Needs

Text: 30 The Secretary's third and final basis for reversing the Board's allowance of California's field trip expenditures was based on his interpretation of what would satisfy the regulations' requirements that Title I expenditures be focused on students' special educational needs. As described above, we give considerable deference to the Secretary's interpretation of his agency's regulations. See California, Dep't of Educ. v. Bennett, 833 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir.1987); McCoog v. Hegstrom, 690 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir.1982). Department regulations state that Title I funds shall be used only for projects that are designed to meet the special educational needs of the eligible children. 34 C.F.R. Sec. 200.52 (1981) (earlier version at 45 C.F.R. Sec. 116a.22(b)(4)(iii) (1980)). Title I funds may not be used for a project that has been designed to meet, or will have the effect of meeting, the general needs of--(1) a school; (2) the agency; (3) an entire grade; or (4) the student body at large in a school. Id. (earlier version at 45 C.F.R. Sec. 116a.22(b)(6) (1980)). 31 In the final audit, the Assistant Secretary disallowed the field trip expenses because California had not provided information that the field trips were designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children. The Assistant Secretary affirmed the findings of the Department's auditors, which were based on two District forms: one indicating the trip destination, and the other providing four lines for the teacher to indicate the trip's educational benefit. The auditors did not consider any needs assessment documents which identify the special needs of Title I students on which Title I monies should be focused. See 45 C.F.R. Sec. 116a.21 (1980); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 201.100, .102, .104 (1981); H.R. No. 95-1137, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1978), reprinted in 1978 United States Code Cong. & Admin.News 4971, 4993-94. 32 The prohibition on using Title I funds to satisfy the general needs of a class, grade or school does not prohibit California from identifying as special those educational needs that Title I and non-Title I children share. Title I students differ from students generally because they come from low-income families and have been identified by the District as those most in need of supplemental educational assistance. See 20 U.S.C. Secs. 2701, 2732(a)(1), 2733, 2734(b); 34 C.F.R. Secs. 201.70, .100-.105 (1981). As the Secretary admitted at oral argument, Title I children suffer from no unique educational handicap. 33 The Secretary's decision applied a definition of special educational need to the field trip expenditures that conflicts with the purpose and wording of Title I and other Department regulations. The Secretary's decision required California to show that the special educational needs of its Title I students were not shared by other students. This interpretation is inconsistent with the flexibility that Title I and the regulations offer local educational agencies such as the District to define special educational needs. See 20 U.S.C. Secs. 2733(a), 2734(b); 34 C.F.R. Sec. 201.70, .100-.105 (1981); see also Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 635, 105 S.Ct. 1555, 1557, 84 L.Ed.2d 572 (1985) (Congress left to local officials the development of particular programs to meet the needs of educationally disadvantaged children.); H.Rep. No. 95-1137, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) (one of the essential features of Title I is its flexibility at the local level), reprinted in 1978 United States Code Cong. & Admin.News 4971, 4974. His interpretation is also inconsistent with the language of the regulations on which he relies. We therefore do not extend the normal deference to the Secretary's interpretation, see McCoog v. Hegstrom, 690 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir.1982), and conclude that the Secretary's interpretation provides no support for the showing of good cause that he must make in order to set aside the Board's decision. 34 For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the Secretary did not show good cause in setting aside the Board's decision which allowed California's expenditure of Title I funds for the field trips.