Opinion ID: 1244833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction on Mercy or Sympathy

Text: Defendant first objects to the trial court's refusal to give his proffered instructions concerning the use of mercy or sympathy in reaching the jury's verdict. Defendant submitted proposed instruction number 5, which would have instructed the jury that mercy or sympathy could guide their decision in the penalty phase. [186] The trial court refused to give this instruction and instead gave one requiring the jury to make its decision based upon the evidence produced in the penalty phase, without resort to sympathy or emotion. Defendant claims that the combination of the judge's instruction regarding antisympathy and his refusal to give the requested sympathy instruction caused the jury to disregard the evidence produced in mitigation during the penalty phase. Defendant claims that this violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Defendant bases his claim on Penry v. Lynaugh, [187] Lockett v. Ohio, [188] and Eddings v. Oklahoma, [189] all of which vacated the death penalty sentences of the respective defendants because the sentencing procedures used did not allow the sentencing bodies to hear and fully consider the mitigating evidence offered. Defendant argues that these cases require a jury to consider sympathy for the defendant during the penalty phase and to consider any mercy or sympathy arising from the mitigating evidence in reaching their verdict. Defendant's reliance on these cases is misplaced. The United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected the argument that these cases require a jury to consider sympathy in reaching its verdict. In Saffle v. Parks , [190] the Court explained that these decisions did not require mercy and did not prohibit an antisympathy instruction during the penalty phase. [191] Because Saffle arose on a petition for habeas corpus, the Court declined to create a new rule concerning sympathy that was not present in the former cases. [192] The Court further rejected petitioner Park's reasoning that an antisympathy instruction violated his rights because it barred the jurors from considering his mitigating evidence. It distinguished between allowing a jury to consider mitigating evidence and guiding jurors as to how they should consider the evidence. The Court upheld an antisympathy instruction because reliable, accurate, and nonarbitrary sentencing necessarily requires a `moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, and not an emotional response to the mitigating evidence.' [193] We follow the reasoning and holding of Saffle and hold that the federal constitution does not prohibit an antisympathy instruction, nor does it require an instruction that the jurors may be guided by mercy or sympathy. Defendant also argues that the Utah Constitution requires the trial court to instruct the jury that it may be swayed by mercy or sympathy. He argues that the instruction is required by our holdings in State v. Wood [194] and State v. Holland. [195] These cases require a jury to impose a life sentence unless the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that death is justified and appropriate under all the circumstances. [196] Defendant claims that the emphasis placed on human dignity and the high value of human life in the Holland and Wood opinions requires an instruction promoting mercy or sympathy in capital sentencing proceedings. Nothing in the Wood or Holland opinion or in Utah law requires the instruction proposed by defendant. The right of a defendant to present and have the jurors consider mitigating evidence does not entitle the defendant to make a general appeal to the jury's sympathy or emotions. [197] The purpose of the capital sentencing proceeding is to channel the jury's discretion regarding the sentence to avoid arbitrary and capricious results in application of the death penalty. [198] An instruction that asks the jury to determine the sentence based upon emotions or sympathy encourages arbitrary application of the death penalty, not the channeled discretion contemplated by the death-sentencing procedure. [199] The careful effort in the sentencing proceeding to focus on evidence concerning the defendant's background, character, circumstances, and the nature of the crime committed is wasted if the jury is instructed to make a purely emotional decision instead of a reasoned response to the evidence presented. [200] Consideration of a defendant's mitigating evidence does not require the application of emotions or prejudice. We have previously disapproved of attempts to appeal to a jury's raw emotions rather than focusing on the evidence in a capital case. [201] We continue to adhere to the principle that the capital sentencing determination is not the place for an arbitrary decision based on emotion or prejudice. Moreover, the instructions given did not prohibit the jury from considering defendant's mitigating evidence. The instructions as a whole requested the jury to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence and to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime and defendant's character. The antisympathy instruction told the jurors to base their decision on the evidence presented and not on mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling. This instruction accurately channeled the jury's discretion to the aggravating and the mitigating evidence presented to it and ensured that it would base its decision on that evidence, not on emotion or caprice.