Opinion ID: 3039595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proof of Removability

Text: [1] The government has the burden to prove “by clear and convincing evidence” that an alien is removable. INA § 240(c)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). A determination of removability by an IJ or the BIA must be “based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.” Id. To determine whether a prior conviction supports a removal order, we first apply the “ ‘categorical’ approach, ‘looking only to the statutory definition[ ] of the prior offense.’ ” Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990)). If the statutory definition of the offense of conviction is broader than the definition of the relevant removal offense, we apply a “modified” categorical approach in an attempt to determine the conduct of which the defendant was actually convicted. Id. Under the modified categorical approach, we “look beyond the language of the statute to a narrow, specified set of documents that are part of the record of conviction” in order to determine the conduct for which the alien was convicted. Id. [2] It is undisputed that the two 1993 convictions for attempted aggravated assault are categorically crimes of “moral turpitude” within the meaning of §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204(A)(2). However, the categorical approach is not available for the 1997 conviction. The federal statute requires that there have been “child abuse,” § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and the Arizona statute under which Sinotes-Cruz was convicted covers abuse of both children and vulnerable adults. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3623. The government contends that it proved Sinotes-Cruz’s 1993 and 1997 convictions based on documents purportedly FAXed to the INS by an Arizona official connected to the SINOTES-CRUZ v. GONZALES 18721 Arizona court system. Sinotes-Cruz does not contend that the documents, if admissible as evidence, are insufficient to prove the crimes of moral turpitude under the categorical approach, or the crime of child abuse under the modified categorical approach. Rather, he contends, based on INA § 240(c)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(C), and on INS regulations, that the documents are inadmissible. Section 1229a(c)(3)(C) provides: (C) Electronic records In any proceeding under this chapter, any record of conviction or abstract that has been submitted by electronic means to the Service from a State or court shall be admissible as evidence to prove a criminal conviction if it is—
with the State’s repository of criminal justice records as an official record from its repository or by a court official from the court in which the conviction was entered as an official record from its repository, and
cial as having been received electroni- cally from the State’s record repository or the court’s record repository. A certification under clause (i) may be by means of a computer-generated signature and statement of authenticity. The corresponding regulation tracks the provision in almost exactly the same words as the statute. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.41(c) (2000) (renumbered at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41 (2003)). 18722 SINOTES-CRUZ v. GONZALES [3] It is uncontested that the electronically transmitted records of conviction did not fully comply with the terms of the statute and regulation. There is certification by an INS official, but there is no certification by a state official. Four separate records were transmitted, in two batches, by FAX to the INS. The INS placed stamps on the last page of each of the two batches. The first batch, transmitted on September 21, 2000, contained the judgments of conviction for the 1993 and 1997 crimes. The stamp was placed on the last page of the judgment of conviction for the 1997 crime. It reads: USINS I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing documents were received by me, Brian P. McCarthy, by elec- tronic transmission from the state of AZ record repository of the Court of record depos- itory. 9-21-00 [signature] IA date Signature/Title (Underlining indicates blanks where information was inserted in handwriting, or could have been inserted.) Upside-down at the bottom of each FAXed page is the notation “9-21-00 THU 13:03 FAX 7403251 LEGALRECORD,” followed by sequential page numbers. The second batch, transmitted on November 14, 2000, contained the indictment and the order of discharge from probation for the 1997 crime. The stamp was placed on the discharge from probation. It reads: USINS I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing documents were received by me, Brian P. McCarthy, by elec- SINOTES-CRUZ v. GONZALES 18723 tronic transmission from the state of AZ record repository of the Court of Pima County record depository. 11-14-00 [signature] IA date Signature/Title (Underlining indicates blanks where information was inserted in handwriting.) Upside-down at the bottom of each FAXed page is the notation “11-14-00 TUE 13:02 FAX 7403251 LEGALRECORD,” followed by sequential page numbers. Sinotes-Cruz contended before the BIA, and contends in this court, that the failure to comply fully with the terms of the statute and implementing regulation rendered the FAXed records of conviction inadmissible. The BIA held that the documents were admissible, writing only the following: “[C]ontrary to the respondent’s argument, the conviction records were properly certified by an immigration official[.]” (Emphasis added.) Unfortunately, the BIA did not respond to Sinotes-Cruz’s argument — which was that the records had not been properly certified by a state official. We do not feel justified in giving Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the statute in this circumstance, for the BIA did not address Sinotes-Cruz’s actual objection to the records’ admissibility under the statute. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). [4] Nonetheless, even without the assistance of Chevron deference, we hold that it was not error for the BIA to rely on the records. As we read § 1229a(c)(3)(C), it operates as a safe-harbor. It only tells us the conditions under which an electronically transmitted document must be admitted. See id. (any record of conviction . . . shall be admissible as evidence . . . if” (emphasis added)). That is, it establishes the maximum standard for authentication of electronically transmitted records of conviction, but it does not establish a minimum standard. The government has long been required to provide 18724 SINOTES-CRUZ v. GONZALES some authentication of records of conviction introduced in immigration proceedings. See Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857, 866-67 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding unauthenticated record inadmissible). But § 1229a(c)(3)(C), passed as part of IIRIRA, has done nothing to alter our normal rule that the documents may be authenticated under INS regulations, or by “any procedure that comports with common law rules of evidence.” Iran v. INS, 656 F.2d 469, 472 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981) (as amended). The guiding principle is that proper authentication requires some sort of proof that the document is what it purports to be. Id. at 473. [5] Here, the two INS stamps at the end of the records clearly indicate that the documents were received by an INS official on the dates specified, and the records on their face give every indication of being official Arizona court records. Further, the dates given in the upside-down FAX notations on the bottom of the pages indicate that the documents were FAXed on the same day they were stamped as received by the INS, and the term “LEGALRECORDS” in the same notations strongly suggests that the records were FAXed from an Arizona legal records depository. Finally, Sinotes-Cruz made no objection in the Immigration Court to the admission of the records. Under these circumstances, we do not hesitate in holding that the BIA was justified in relying on the records in concluding that Sinotes-Cruz was convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (either of the 1993 convictions and the 1997 conviction), one crime involving child abuse (the 1997 conviction), and one crime of moral turpitude committed within five years of admission (either of the 1993 convictions). We therefore uphold the BIA’s determination that Sinotes-Cruz was removable based on these convictions.