Opinion ID: 1909895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Truth in Sentencing Act/Equal Protection

Text: Alternatively, Robinson contends that if the Truth in Sentencing Act only operates prospectively, it is unconstitutional. In particular, Robinson contends that it is a denial of his federal constitutional rights to equal protection of the law. According to Robinson, the United States Constitution prohibits a State from having two sentencing schemes for crimes by which two people convicted of the same crime are sentenced differently. When a state legislature creates two different sentencing schemes for the same crimes, there is a presumption that they acted constitutionally. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 962-3, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843-44, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982). The equal protection clause affords the States sufficient latitude to enact legislation which may appear to affect similarly situated people differently. Id. Under traditional equal protection principles, distinctions need only be drawn in such a manner as to bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end. Classifications are set aside only if they are based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State's goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them. Id. See also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1080-81, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). Although this Court has not yet addressed the ramifications of the Delaware Truth in Sentencing Act with respect to the repealed statutes, other jurisdictions have dealt with a similar issue. In Foster v. Wash. St. Bd. Of Prison Terms And Parole, 878 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir.1989), the petitioner was convicted in the State of Washington for rape and kidnapping two years prior to a change in the state penal laws. In 1981, that state enacted a Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), effective July 1, 1984, which would apply to anyone committing a crime on or after that date. Id. at 1234. The petitioner had been convicted in July of 1982. Id. The petitioner claimed that he was denied equal protection under the SRA because persons convicted of a crime before July 1, 1984 were treated differently than those who committed the same crime after July 1, 1984. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the petitioner's sentence when it applied the rational relationship test and found that improvements in sentencing was a rational government purpose. Id. at 1235. See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989); and Swinson v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 682 F.Supp. 29 (E.D. N.C.1988), aff'd, 849 F.2d 606 (4th Cir.1988) (enactment of the SRA in order to equalize prison sentences for prisoners similarly situated by eliminating discretionary aspects of parole is rationally related to this legitimate government purpose.) In an earlier case, Frazier v. Manson, 703 F.2d 30 (2nd Cir.1983), the Second Circuit upheld a Connecticut sentence reform statute which applied to prisoners sentenced on or after October 1, 1976. Id. at 32. The appellant in that case had been sentenced in 1973. Id. The Second Circuit found that the legislature's classification was constitutional. Id. at 35. There is no requirement that two persons convicted of the same offense receive identical sentences. A legislature may prospectively reduce the maximum penalty for a crime even though prisoners sentenced to the maximum penalty before the effective date of the act would serve a longer term of imprisonment than one sentenced to the maximum term thereafter. Id. at 36, citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 2023, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970). We find the foregoing authorities persuasive. We have concluded that although the Truth in Sentencing Act has the effect of creating a dual system of sentencing, in that prisoners convicted of the same crime will be sentenced differently depending on whether the crime was committed before or after June 30, 1990, there is a rational basis for the General Assembly's enactment of such legislation. Therefore, we hold that Robinson has no federal Constitutional right to a modification or reduction of his sentence, as a matter of equal protection.