Opinion ID: 2516695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Appeal to Supreme Court within Ten Days

Text: ¶ 16 Initially, Monticello City argues that Utah Code section 20A-7-607(4)(a) bars any challenge to the city's refusal to hold a referendum because Low did not apply to the Utah Supreme Court to obtain an extraordinary writ to compel a referendum within ten days after the city clerk informed the city residents petitioning the city for a referendum that such referendum would not be held. Section 20A-7-607(4)(a) provides: If the local clerk refuses to accept and file any referendum petition, any voter may apply to the Supreme Court for an extraordinary writ to compel him [or her] to do so within ten days after the refusal. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-607(4)(a) (1998) (emphasis added); cf. id. §§ 20A-7-608(4), -610(4). The plain language of the statute specifically states that any voter may apply to this court for an extraordinary writ, and if the voter does so, the voter must apply within ten days. See id. § 20A-7-607(4)(a); see also Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, ¶ 25, 48 P.3d 895 (noting that use of word may indicates that individual is permitted 54 P.3d 1153 (2002) to act in particular manner). The statute does not limit either the remedies that can be sought or the court in which those remedies can be pursued, but rather provides for a particular remedy and the limitations to which that remedy is subject. ¶ 17 Moreover, the referendum issue in this case was presented to the trial court within the ten-day limitation period set forth in the statute, although brought by Monticello City in its counterclaim. [1] Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. . . . When the period of time prescribed or allowed . . . is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a). In addition, rule 6(e) provides: Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act . . . within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated in subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in the computation of any 3-day period under this subsection. . . . Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e). ¶ 18 In a letter dated June 29, 2000, the city notified the sponsors of the referendum petition by mail that the petition would be denied. Assuming that the denial letter was mailed on Thursday, June 29, 2000, the ten-day statutory limitation period would have expired on Friday, July 14, 2000, after five days are excluded from the computation according to rule 6(a): July 4 should be excluded as a legal holiday, and July 1, 2, 8, and 9 should be excluded as Saturdays and Sundays. Once three days are added under rule 6(e) to the end of the prescribed period as computed, any challenge could have been filed until and including July 17, 2000. Monticello City raised the referendum issue in its answer and counterclaim that was filed on July 12, 2000, before the expiration of the limitation period. Therefore, section 20A-7-607(4)(a) does not time-bar any challenge to the city's refusal to hold a referendum.