Opinion ID: 4448072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the superior court properly upheld

Text: ORIE’S RETRIAL The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause ordinarily bars retrials. But a retrial after a mistrial does not amount to double jeopardy when the mistrial was manifestly necessary. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). Though manifest necessity requires a “high degree of necessity,” making that judgment call is “reserved to the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010) (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). We scrutinize a mistrial more closely if the trial judge has not exercised his “sound discre- tion” or if the prosecutor appears to be “harass[ing]” or gaining a “tactical advantage over the accused.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 508, 510 n.28. But absent such prosecutorial misconduct, if a trial judge grants a mistrial to prevent a jury verdict from being tainted by other trial misconduct, that judgment “is entitled to special respect.” Id. at 510. We are even more deferential on federal habeas review. We look to the last reasoned state-court decision, which here is the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s affirmance on direct appeal. We do not ask whether the trial judge should have declared a mistrial, nor whether it abused its discretion by doing so. Rather, we ask only whether the state appellate court’s finding that there was no abuse of discretion was “an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined 9 by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); accord Renico, 559 U.S. at 772–73.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision more than satisfies our deferential standard of review. To begin, it reasonably set forth the federal principles governing appeals of a manifest-necessity finding. It explained that it was reviewing for abuse of discretion, deferring to the trial court’s superior ability to gauge potential bias and jury prejudice. 88 A.3d at 995–97; see Renico, 559 U.S. at 772–73 (standard of review); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 510 (deference). And it warned that trial courts should not declare mistrials too readily and should resolve any doubts in favor of the defendant. 88 A.3d at 996; see Renico, 559 U.S. at 772–74. Next, the Superior Court reasoned that the trial court had legal authority to grant a mistrial once it discovered that the exhibits were forged. It reasonably held that “[o]nce the trial judge realized forged documents had been admitted into evi- dence, he could not allow those documents to enter into the jury’s deliberation and verdict.” 88 A.3d at 998. No Supreme Court case suggests otherwise. On the contrary, in so holding, the Superior Court cited and reasonably interpreted the Supreme Court’s guidance. See id. (citing trial court’s opinion as in turn citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)); see also Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246 (“The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.”). 10 The Superior Court also reasonably upheld the trial court’s “initial factual determination that the documents were forgeries.” 88 A.3d at 998–99. In doing so, it made a series of reasonable observations: The jury did not have enough evidence to resolve that question. Id. at 998. Though the prosecution brought out Exhibit 101B’s defects on cross-examination of Orie, it did not discover Exhibit 110’s forgery until after the jury had started deliberating. Id. The jury was never instructed what to do if it found that documents were forged. Id. And because the defense did not let the prosecution inspect the documents until the second-to-last day of trial, the prosecution could not have discovered the forgeries earlier. So the prosecution could not introduce evidence to help the jury evaluate the exhibits. Id. at 998–99. The record amply supports each of these observations. Further, the Superior Court reasoned that the forged exhibits were material to the trial’s outcome. As it noted, Orie had argued “that Pavlot had the complete authority to direct the staffers and that Pavlot acted on her own initiative and against Orie’s directives that no improper political activity occur in the office.” Id. at 999. The forged documents supported that reading. Orie had introduced these documents to show that Pavlot had disobeyed Orie’s directives and let the staff do campaign work on legislative time. These and similar documents were the basis of Orie’s argument to the jury that Pavlot, not Orie, was responsible for the staffers’ actions. And when Pavlot could not remember any of the directives on cross-examination, the defense impugned her credibility. 11 Pavlot’s credibility was at the heart of the case. As Orie’s lawyer argued in closing, “[t]he Commonwealth’s case rises and falls on [Pavlot’s] truthfulness.” Tr. Pt. 7, 1st Trial (Mar. 2, 2011), p. 3180. So Pavlot’s forged signatures on those documents greatly inflated the force of Orie’s arguments and her cross-examination of Pavlot. Finally, the Superior Court emphasized that while the trial court had solicited and weighed alternative remedies, it had reasonably found that nothing short of a mistrial would counteract the fraud. 88 A.3d at 998–99. That reasoning is sound. The trial court repeatedly asked the parties what it should do about the forgeries, both before and after hearing from the handwriting expert. Twice, the prosecution suggested a curative instruction. But twice, the defense balked, insisting that “[b]efore you do that then declare a mistrial” and that giving an instruction “is absolutely not an option here.” App. 1557a, 1571a. Orie’s only proposed remedy, as the Superior Court noted, was to do nothing. See 88 A.3d at 999 & n.13; see also App. 1572a (“We are asking that [the jury’s] deliberations resume immediately, and we are opposed to a mistrial.”). Given the importance of the forged documents, the threat to the integrity of the verdict, and the lack of a good alternative remedy, the only solution was a mistrial. So we cannot say that the Superior Court’s decision to uphold the grant of a mistrial was unreasonable.
Orie challenges the decision upholding the mistrial on five grounds. Not one succeeds. 12 First, she criticizes the trial court’s decision to halt jury deliberations and seize the questioned exhibits after speaking only with the prosecution. But even if that is what happened, there is nothing wrong with that. When they learn of possible misconduct, judges often tell juries to stop deliberating without first telling counsel. E.g., United States v. Bristol-Mártir, 570 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2009). To resolve the forgery allegation here, the trial court needed the challenged exhibits, which the jury had. And there is no reason to think that asking for a pause caused incurable harm. The trial court told the jury only that “there is a legal matter before the Court” and warned the bailiff to retrieve the exhibits without talking to anyone. App. 1541a. Besides, there was no significant ex parte communication.