Opinion ID: 2979507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Implicit Vouching or Bolstering

Text: Balark alleges that the district court plainly erred by failing to provide cautionary instructions regarding the prosecution’s use of witness plea agreements, proffers, immunity grants, and the expectation of future 5K1.1 or Rule 35 motions. Balark does not appeal on grounds of improper vouching, but rather argues that repeated references to the requirement that witnesses “testify truthfully” required, at a minimum, a cautionary instruction that the jury—and not the government—determines the credibility of each witness. As the Sixth Circuit recognized in United States v. Trujillo,“[i]mproper vouching occurs when a prosecutor supports the credibility of a witness by indicating a personal belief in the witness’ credibility thereby placing the prestige of the office of the United States Attorney behind that witness.” 376 F.3d 593, 607 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 253 F.3d 251, 253–54). Improper vouching includes both “blunt comments [and] comments that imply that the prosecutor has special knowledge of facts not in front of the jury.” Id. at 607–608. Similarly, “bolstering occurs where the prosecutor implies that the witness’ testimony is corroborated by 11 evidence known to the government but not known to the jury.” Id. at 608 (quoting Martinez, 253 F.3d at 253–54). The government has the right to inform the jury of agreements made with the witnesses and their obligations under such agreements. E.g., United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 162–63 (6th Cir. 1986). Referring to such agreements in appropriate circumstances allows the prosecutor to deflect defendant’s use of a plea agreement to attack the witness’s credibility. United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 416–17 (6th Cir. 2000). Although the government may present evidence about its witnesses’ plea agreements, including the agreements themselves and the quid pro quo that testimony be truthful, the government may not make “unnecessarily repetitive references to truthfulness.” United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 252 (7th Cir. 1999). In Thornton, the Seventh Circuit expressed concern about the duplicative admission of proffer letters and plea agreements where those documents contained repeated references to the requirement of truthfulness. Id. The court warned prosecutors to “avoid unnecessarily repetitive references to truthfulness,” noting “[t]here may come a day in another case when we find excessive the admission of proffer letters.” Id. Excessive references to a witness’s agreement to tell the truth—particularly where the consequences of lying are highlighted—can have the same harmful effects as a prosecutor’s personal observation or opinion of credibility or implication of corroborating evidence. The implication of such references to truthfulness is clear: the witness testifying has not lost the benefit of the bargain, so the prosecutor would not allow the testimony if she did not believe he was telling the truth. Cross-examination cannot effectively dispel this implication, as pointing out the benefits to show motive to lie simply confirms the fact that the witness is still receiving the benefit of the bargain. 12 Repeating, as with a drumbeat of increasing intensity, the truthfulness provision witness by witness by witness, and also introducing plea agreements, proffers, and Rule 35 motions, might drown out other evidence. But this was not a case in which the prosecutor, in effect, played Ravel’s Bolero. The prosecutor featured the truthfulness provisions of plea agreements during direct examination of two of the witnesses, Hooks and Jones. In closing, the prosecutor did not refer to witnesses’ agreements to cooperate truthfully, but instead emphasized that it was the jury’s role to judge the credibility of the witnesses. In Trujillo, in contrast, the prosecutor not only elicited testimony from witnesses regarding their agreements to tell the truth, but also stated in her closing that those same witnesses “promised to be truthful and provide complete information.” 376 F.3d at 608. One of the witnesses volunteered that she would be willing to take a polygraph test to prove her truthfulness. The prosecutor in Trujillo came far closer to making excessive reference to truthfulness than the prosecutor here. Even so, the court in Trujillo, reviewing, as we do, for plain error, found no improper vouching or bolstering. 197 F.3d at 252. The prosecutor’s references to truthfulness in this case were not so repetitive as to constitute improper vouching. Plea agreements cut both ways and can offer useful opportunities for impugning witnesses who have signed them. See United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1986). The prosecutor’s remarks and exhibits here served only to maintain the balance.2 2 Defense counsel suggested at oral argument that juries be instructed that “the government has no special knowledge of the witness’s truthfulness” where plea agreements with truth provisions have been introduced into evidence. In such cases, it is good practice for a district judge to deliver such a cautionary instruction, explaining that “truthful testimony” provisions in plea agreements are not proof and should not be considered as proof that a witness is in fact testifying truthfully in whole 13 The district court’s instructions clearly conveyed that the determination of witness credibility belongs to the jury alone. Nothing in the trial record indicates error, let alone a plain error affecting the defendant’s substantive rights or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process.