Opinion ID: 215844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Clearly established federal law applicable to the issue

Text: Selsor contends, citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), that [w]hen a state court unforeseeably changes the scope of a criminal law, and applies that change retroactively, to a defendant's detriment, it violates the Due Process Clause. [5] Aplt. Br. at 32 (emphasis in original). Bouie arose out of a `sit-in' demonstration at Eckerd's Drug Store in Columbia, South Carolina, on March 14, 1960. 378 U.S. at 348, 84 S.Ct. 1697. The petitioners, two Negro college students, took seats in a booth in the restaurant department at Eckerd's, which was reserved for whites, and waited to be served. Id. After they were seated, an employee of the store put up a chain with a `no trespassing' sign attached. Id. After refusing to leave, petitioners were eventually arrested and charged with breach of the peace, resisting arrest, and criminal trespass. Petitioners were subsequently acquitted of breach of the peace, but convicted of resisting arrest and criminal trespass. On direct appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the resisting arrest charges due to insufficient evidence, but affirmed the criminal trespass convictions. Petitioners subsequently sought and were granted certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, petitioners argued, in pertinent part, that they were denied due process of law . . . because the [trespass] statute failed to afford fair warning that the conduct for which they [were] convicted had been made a crime. Id. at 349, 84 S.Ct. 1697. In support, petitioners noted that although the statute of conviction prohibited entry upon the lands of another . . . after notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry, id., the South Carolina Supreme Court, in affirming their convictions, had construed the statute to cover not only the act of entry on the premises of another after receiving notice not to enter, but also the act of remaining on the premises of another after receiving notice to leave, id. at 350, 84 S.Ct. 1697. Petitioners argued that by applying such a construction of the statute to affirm their convictions . . ., the State . . . punished them for conduct that was not criminal at the time they committed it, and hence . . . violated the requirement of the Due Process Clause that a criminal statute give fair warning of the conduct which it prohibits. Id. In addressing petitioners' argument, the Supreme Court began by acknowledging [t]he basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime. . . . Id. In turn, the Court held [t]here can be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language. Id. at 352, 84 S.Ct. 1697. Indeed, the Court noted, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids. Id. at 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697 (italics in original). And, the Court emphasized, [i]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing [an ex post facto] law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction. Id. at 353-54, 84 S.Ct. 1697 (italics in original). Thus, the Court held, [w]hen a[n] . . . unforeseeable state-court construction of a criminal statute is applied retroactively to subject a person to criminal liability for past conduct, the effect is to deprive him of due process of law in the sense of fair warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime. Id. at 354-55, 84 S.Ct. 1697. Finally, applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court agree[d] with petitioners that the statute of conviction did not give them fair warning, at the time of their conduct . . ., that the act for which they . . . st[oo]d convicted was rendered criminal by the statute. Id. at 355, 84 S.Ct. 1697. Selsor also suggests that Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991), is relevant to, and supportive of, his due process claim. [6] The petitioner in Lankford, an Idaho state criminal defendant, was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and advised by the trial judge at the time of arraignment that the maximum punishment on either charge was life imprisonment or death. The petitioner was subsequently convicted by a jury of both counts. In response to a presentencing order issued by the trial judge, the prosecution advised petitioner and the trial judge that it would not be seeking the death penalty. Consequently, at the sentencing hearing, neither side discussed the death penalty as a possible sentence. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, however, the trial judge concluded that the petitioner's crimes warranted punishment more severe than that recommended by the prosecution, and sentenced petitioner to death on the basis of five aggravating circumstances. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim that the trial judge violated the Due Process Clause by failing to give notice of his intention to consider imposing the death sentence despite the prosecution's notice that it was not seeking that penalty. In so ruling, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the trial judge's express advisement at the time of arraignment, combined with the terms of the Idaho Code, provided sufficient notice that the death penalty might be imposed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the sentencing process followed in th[e] . . . case satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 111, 111 S.Ct. 1723. At the outset of its opinion, the Court emphasized two undisputed facts: first, that the character of the sentencing proceeding did not provide petitioner with any indication that the trial judge contemplated death as a sentence, id. at 119, 111 S.Ct. 1723; and second, that [t]he presentencing order entered by the trial court requiring the [prosecution] to advise whether it sought the death penalty, and if so, requiring the parties to specify the aggravating and mitigating circumstances on which they intended to rely, was comparable to a pretrial order limiting the issues to be tried, id. at 120, 111 S.Ct. 1723. The Court also presumed that [i]f defense counsel had been notified that the trial judge was contemplating a death sentence based on five specific aggravating circumstances, . . . she would have advanced arguments that addressed these circumstances. . . . Id. at 122, 111 S.Ct. 1723. Based upon these facts and this presumption, the Court concluded that the trial judge's silence following the [prosecution]'s response to the presentencing order had the practical effect of concealing from the parties the principal issue to be decided at the hearing. Id. at 126, 111 S.Ct. 1723. Notice of issues to be resolved by the adversary process, the Court emphasized, is a fundamental characteristic of fair procedure. Id. In sum, the Court held, [p]etitioner's lack of adequate notice that the judge was contemplating the imposition of the death sentence created an impermissible risk that the adversary process may have malfunctioned in th[e] case. Id. at 127, 111 S.Ct. 1723. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 128, 111 S.Ct. 1723.