Opinion ID: 1619960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guidant's automobile policy

Text: ¶ 14. As issuer of James Hingle's personal automobile policy number XXXXXX-XXX, [6] Guidant admits that it was a primary insurer; however, Guidant argues that INA was a coprimary insurer, given that INA insured Marshall County and its employees and volunteers under a business automobile liability policy, and given that at the time of the accident, James Hingle was responding to a call on behalf of the Slayden Mt. Pleasant Volunteer Fire Department. As such, Guidant urges that the trial court erred in finding that Guidant was the only primary insurer for all defendants on the Anderson claims in the Marshall County case. ¶ 15. Guidant's policy issued to Hingle included the following other-insurance clause: OTHER INSURANCE If there is other applicable liability insurance we will pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits.... ¶ 16. INA's business automobile liability policy issued to Marshall County and covering the fire department included the following other-insurance clause: B.5. OTHER INSURANCE a. For any covered auto you own, this Coverage Form provides primary insurance. For any covered auto you don't own, the insurance provided by this Coverage Form is excess over any other collectible insurance.... . . . . b. When this coverage form and any other coverage form or policy covers on the same basis, either excess or primary, we will pay only our share. Our share is the portion that the Limit of the Insurance of our Coverage Form bears to the total of the limits of all the coverage forms and policies covering on the same basis. ¶ 17. INA's business automobile liability policy included the following definition of an insured: Section IILiability Coverage is changed by adding the following: 1. WHO IS AN INSURED . . . . d. Any volunteer or employee of yours while using a covered Auto you don't own, hire or borrow in your business or your personal affairs. Insurance provided by this endorsement is excess over any other insurance available to any volunteer or employee. ¶ 18. Guidant is correct in its assertion that, when there is a conflict in the policies, and the two policies are indistinguishable in meaning and intent, they should be found mutually repugnant and must be disregarded. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 676 So.2d 271, 275 (Miss. 1996) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chappell, 246 So.2d 498, 504 (Miss.1971)). Where competing insurance policies each contain conflicting `other insurance' clauses or `excessive coverage' clauses, the clauses shall not be applied and benefits under the policies shall instead be pro rated according to the coverage limits of each policy. Id. (quoting Chappell, 246 So.2d at 504). Moreover, Guidant contends that coverage disputes of priority of primary and secondary coverage are resolved by determining the relative proximity the risk bears to the loss, and that there can be more than one primary insurer after a loss. ¶ 19. INA argues that, for automobiles the county did not own (referred to as nonowned vehicles), the coverage provided by INA was in excess over any other collectible insurance available to any volunteer or employee. Therefore, INA urges this Court to apply the plain language of the policy. INA cites the general rule that where a policy contains language that is unambiguous, the terms of the policy will be enforced. See, e.g., Miss. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walters, 908 So.2d 765, 769 (Miss.2005) (citing State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glover, 253 Miss. 477, 176 So.2d 256, 258 (1965)). INA contends that the other available insurance coverages available to Hingle were both the automobile and umbrella polices that Guidant had issued to Hingle. ¶ 20. The long-standing law in Mississippi is that the insurance policy issued to the owner of the vehicle is the primary policyboth parties concede as much. See Chappell, 246 So.2d at 505. In applying this rule to the priority-of-coverage dispute, the other collectible insurance in this case was the Guidant automobile policy issued to the owner of the vehicle, James Hingle. While it is clear that Marshall County's policy insured Marshall County's employees and volunteers, that coverage for vehicles not owned by Marshall County or the fire department was excess over any other insurance maintained by the county volunteers or employees on their personal vehicles. Therefore, the trial court committed no error in finding that Guidant was the primary insurer. ¶ 21. This holding is in keeping with this Court's precedent in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. John Deere Insurance Co., 830 So.2d 1145 (Miss.2002). In John Deere, an insured driver and passenger, both of whom owned car dealerships and were covered under commercial liability policies for their respective businesses, were involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist. Id. at 1146. The driver and passenger sued both insurance companies, John Deere, and USF & G, for uninsured motorist benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of John Deere on the basis that the two policies' other-insurance clauses were in conflict and mutually repugnant, and that the enforcement of these clauses would result in no coverage for the plaintiff. Id. at 1148. Both policies also contained identical prorata clauses which provided that benefits in such cases involving two policies should be prorated according to the coverage limits of each policy. Id. The ultimate issue before the Court was whether the payment of benefits should be prorated according to the coverage limits of each policy or whether the benefits should be paid out according to priority of coverage. Id. at 1146. This Court held: We find that the two policies should not be pro-rated because, under Mississippi law, the insurer for the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident is the primary insurer. Even though the other insurance clauses in the two policies are identical, they do not conflict. The other insurance clause simply establishes the order of priority of payments. The insurer of the vehicle is first in the paying line of uninsured motorist benefits. Id. This Court thus found that USF & G was liable only for any judgment in excess of John Deere's limits of coverage; however, the judgment did not exceed the limits of John Deere's primary policy. Id. at 1148. ¶ 22. Applying this long-held rule that the owner's policy is primary, we find no conflict in the two polices in this case. Guidant, as the issuer of the liability insurance policy to the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident, is the primary insurer. While the underlying premise of Guidant's position as to this policy is correct inasmuch as Guidant concedes it is a primary insurer, the notion that INA is a coprimary insurer suggests that INA has pro rata exposure for payments. This argument simply is not supported by Mississippi caselaw. However, it is equally true that INA is next in line for payment beyond the primary limits afforded by the Guidant automobile policy issued to Hingle.