Opinion ID: 1735196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Naughton's Other Arguments Against Joint and Several Liability.

Text: Naughton's argument that joint and several liability does not attach because we have not recognized the concept of joint drivers is misplaced. Whether joint and several liability applies in this case, as it relates to Naughton, depends upon whether he was acting in concert with Anderson. Naughton does not have to be a joint driver to be acting in concert. Under jury instruction No. 20, which contained all the elements of concerted action under an aiding and abetting theory, the jury found Naughton guilty. As such, he was acting in concert and joint and several liability applies to the concerted responsibility. Naughton's argument that the Restatement does not require joint and several liability is not only misplaced, but erroneous. Naughton bases his argument on section 17 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, but fails to realize that section 17 only applies to the independent tortious conduct of two or more persons. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 17, at 147. Concerted actors do not commit independent tortious conduct. IMT correctly points out in its brief that section 15 of the Restatement (Third) Torts: Apportionment of Liability requires joint and several liability when persons act in concert. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15 cmt. a, at 129 (The provision for joint and several liability for persons engaged in concerted action applies regardless of the rule regarding joint and several liability for independent negligent tortfeasors in the jurisdiction.). Finally, Naughton is correct the cases in which other states have recognized joint and several liability for concerted actors are somewhat distinguishable from the present case. Some, for example, dealt with intentional torts, see Kesmodel, 119 Cal.App.4th at 1128, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, and Iowa has explicitly stated the principles of comparative fault do not apply to intentional torts, see Tratchel, 452 N.W.2d at 180-81. Thus, the argument goes, if this were a case of an intentional tort it would be easy to apply joint and several liability because such is the case in intentional tortsIowa's CFA does not apply. The Restatement, however, makes no distinction between intentional and unintentional torts based on concerted action theories of recovery. The relevant inquiry is whether there is concerted action.