Opinion ID: 1520503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: underrepresentation of blacks in jury pools

Text: In the post-conviction court Calhoun asserted that blacks were underrepresented in jury pools in Montgomery County. In addressing the merits, the post-conviction judge said: Petitioner alleges that he has established a baseline or prima facie case that blacks were underrepresented in the jury pool. He points to the testimony of a statistical expert, Professor Richard Seltzer of Howard University, as establishing to a reasonable degree of statistical certainty that the relative or comparative disparity of blacks in the general population as compared to those in the jury pool was 41.6%. He claims he has established a systematic underrepresentation of blacks that results in a denial of equal protection of the law as well as a violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. He stresses the Sixth Amendment right because he maintains that lack of an intent to achieve underrepresentation is totally irrelevant to the inquiry. He suggests that the matter is one purely of statistical inquiry devoid of any considerations of constitutional balance or of consequences (either the statisticians are satisfied or they are not). While the petitioner cites many authorities, none go so far as to support petitioner's contentions based upon the facts in evidence here. The only suggestion made by petitioner for changing the present system of calling jurors using the voter rolls was to supplement the voter rolls with motor vehicle registration lists. Yet, there was no definitive showing as to how utilization of the motor vehicle registration lists would impact upon representation in the jury base. Of far greater importance, though, is the reasoning engaged in by Professor Seltzer in reaching his expressed opinion. The processing of jury questionnaires by the office of the Jury Commissioner for Montgomery County from 1979 through October 1983 disclosed that of 53,429 persons summonsed for jury service, 41,850 were white; 2,083 were `Negroid'; 615 were Oriental; 101 were Spanish American; 73 were American Indian; and 9,707 were `other' or did not reply to the race question. Solely by arbitrarily assuming that the 9,707 in the `other' category would divide numerically by percentage in a given way the jury response by blacks was determined to be 4.66%. Thus, it was concluded that 4.66% of the persons in the jury pool were black. Census data showed that of the 424,742 persons in Montgomery County over 18 years of age, 33,896 or 7.98% were black. No effort was made to determine how many of the 33,896 blacks living in Montgomery County, a bedroom community for the nation's capital, were foreign affiliated non-citizens and thus not eligible for jury service. The comparison of 4.66% to 7.98% was used to reach the conclusion of underrepresentation, the disparity being stated to be 41.6%. Because the 9,707 persons (18.17%) who either gave no response or who responded `other' is such a large and hence statistically significant number when compared with the other numbers used any substantial variation from the unsupported assumption relating to the racial breakdown of the 9,707 persons collapses the conclusion reached of underrepresentation as with a house of cards. Indeed, any substantial increase in the number of blacks in such group can achieve either full proportional representation or even overrepresentation statistically. The data fails to support the opinion given, and on the merits petitioner has failed to make out a prima facie case of underrepresentation. Claims of underrepresentation of distinctive groups in the jury selection process have been presented on equal protection grounds (14th Amendment), as in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972), and under the right to a fair cross-section of the community (guaranteed by the 6th Amendment) as in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), Justice White said for the Court: In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668, 58 L.Ed.2d at 586-87. In Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 103-07, 472 A.2d 953, 960-62, cert denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 226, 83 L.Ed.2d 155 (1984), we examined Code (1973, 1980 Repl. Vol., 1983 Cum. Supp.), §§ 8-201 to -208, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and its provision for random selection of jurors from voter registration lists in connection with an allegation that there was discrimination in the selection of Anne Arundel County juries. There was a contention there that the trial judge committed error by relying on our ruling in Wilkins v. State, 270 Md. 62, 310 A.2d 39 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 992, 94 S.Ct. 1592, 39 L.Ed.2d 889 (1974), that the selection of jurors from voter registration lists was constitutional. Judge Couch said for the Court: The use of voter registration lists is designed to produce an array which is a representative cross-section of the community. This official means of selecting prospective jurors is not unconstitutional even when it may have some racially disproportionate impact. See Castaneda v. Partida, [430 U.S. 482, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977)], and Swain v. Alabama, [380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965)]. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination the party asserting such must show that the use of those lists resulted in purposeful discrimination. 299 Md. at 106, 472 A.2d at 962. (Footnote omitted.) We concluded: Appellant has neither established an abuse in implementation of the selection system nor systematic exclusion. Without more it cannot be said that Negroes have been excluded from the venire to such a degree to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 299 Md. at 107, 472 A.2d at 962. We reiterated our holding in Colvin and refused again to reexamine the holding in Wilkins in Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 700-02, 490 A.2d 1228, 1232-33 (1985), vacated and remanded on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1452, 89 L.Ed.2d 711 (1986). We conclude that the post-conviction judge did not err when he concluded that Calhoun ha[d] failed to make out a prima facie case of underrepresentation.