Opinion ID: 3055099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amended Judgment Reducing Fawcett’s Sentence

Text: In a June 30, 2011 order, the district court: (1) granted the Rule 35(b) motion; (2) observed that a two-level reduction in Fawcett’s offense level resulted in a new guidelines range of 27 to 33 months; and (3) directed the clerk to enter an amended judgment reducing Fawcett’s sentence to 30 months’ imprisonment. The next day (July 1, 2011), and prior to the entry of an amendment to the judgment, the district court realized that the government’s proposed guidelines range of 27 to 33 months was incorrect, and that in actuality, a two-level reduction produced a guidelines range of 33 to 41 months.3 Accordingly, in a July 1, 2011 2 A corrected judgment was entered on May 6, 2010, to reflect certain restitution amounts determined after Fawcett’s sentencing. 3 This guidelines range resulted from a total offense level of 20 (a two-level reduction from Fawcett’s original total offense level of 22) and a criminal history category of I. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table. 4 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 5 of 19 order, the district court sua sponte vacated its June 30, 2011 order, explaining that it had relied upon the incorrect guidelines range provided in the government’s Rule 35(b) motion. Using the correct guidelines range of 33 to 41 months, the district court granted the Rule 35(b) motion and imposed a sentence of 35 months’ imprisonment. On July 11, 2011, the district court signed and entered an amended judgment, reflecting Fawcett’s new 35-month sentence. D. Fawcett’s July 19 Motion for Reconsideration or Correction of Sentence On July 19, 2011, Fawcett, with counsel, filed a “Motion for Reconsideration or Correction of Sentence.” Fawcett’s motion argued that on July 1 the district court lacked jurisdiction to increase Fawcett’s sentence. Fawcett contended that once the district court granted the government’s Rule 35(b) motion and imposed the 30-month imprisonment sentence on June 30, 2011, even pursuant to an erroneous guidelines range, the district court “was without power or authority to increase [Fawcett’s] previously reduced sentence from 30 to 35 months” on July 1. Although conceding that Rule 35(a) permits a district court to correct a sentence that “resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error,” Fawcett argued that a district court’s consideration of an incorrect sentencing guidelines range is not such an error. Fawcett’s July 19 motion asked the district court to “reinstat[e] the 30 month incarceration” sentence. 5 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 6 of 19 E. District Court’s July 26 Order In a July 26, 2011 order, the district court granted in part and denied in part Fawcett’s Motion for Reconsideration or Correction of Sentence. As to jurisdiction, the district court granted reconsideration but then concluded that, on July 1, 2011, it had jurisdiction to correct Fawcett’s sentence from 30 to 35 months. The district court observed that “[t]he government’s motion was factually and technically incorrect when it asserted that a two level departure would result in a new Sentencing Guidelines range of 27-33 months,” and “[d]efense counsel failed to correct this factual error.” In light of the government’s sentencing table error, the district court noted that: (1) under Rule 35(a), a court has jurisdiction to correct a sentence that resulted from “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days after sentencing; 4 and (2) under Rule 36, a court may correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission. 5 Concluding that it had jurisdiction to change Fawcett’s sentence from 30 to 35 months, the district court denied Fawcett’s motion to correct his sentence. F. Fawcett’s Notice of Appeal and Motion to Extend Time 4 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) states that “[w]ithin 14 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” 5 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 provides that “[a]fter giving any notice it considers appropriate, the court may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” 6 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 7 of 19 On August 26, 2011 (and 31 days after the district court’s July 26 order), Fawcett, pro se, moved to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from “the [July 26] Order denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration o[r] Correction of Sentence.” Fawcett’s motion argued that he had shown good cause for the extension because: (1) while he was so far unsuccessful in obtaining new counsel, he hoped to obtain counsel soon; (2) he was unaware of the 14-day time limit for filing the appeal; and (3) the extension would cause no prejudice or inconvenience. Fawcett also enclosed a notice of appeal, which stated his intent to appeal “from the Order denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration o[r] Correction of Sentence, entered in this action on the 26th day of July, 2011.” A copy of the district court’s July 26, 2011 order was attached to Fawcett’s notice of appeal. On August 30, 2011, the district court granted Fawcett’s motion and accepted his August 26 notice of appeal as “timely filed.” The district court observed that a notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed within 14 days of the entry of either the judgment or order being appealed, but a district court may “[u]pon a finding of excusable neglect or good cause,” “extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from” the time otherwise provided in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b). Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). The district court granted Fawcett’s motion for an extension and deemed his August 26 notice of appeal as timely filed. The district court gave two reasons: (1) 7 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 8 of 19 the motion for an extension of time was filed within the requisite 30 days; 6 and (2) good cause was “shown in light of defendant’s pro se status.” II. GOVERNMENT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF APPEAL In this Court, the government moved for a partial dismissal of Fawcett’s appeal because Fawcett’s notice of appeal did not reference the district court’s July 1 order and July 11 amended judgment “correcting” Fawcett’s sentence and was otherwise untimely as to that order and judgment. The government argues Fawcett’s appeal can proceed only as to the July 26 order denying his Motion for Reconsideration or Correction of Sentence. In response, Fawcett urges us to construe his pro se notice of appeal as encompassing the district court’s: (1) July 26 order; (2) July 1 order granting the Rule 35(b) motion and resentencing Fawcett to 35 months’ imprisonment; and (3) July 11 amended judgment imposing that 35-month sentence.7 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B), a notice of appeal must designate the judgment or order being appealed. “Although we generally construe a notice of appeal liberally, we will not expand it to include judgments and orders not specified unless the overriding intent to appeal these 6 This is incorrect. Fawcett’s motion to extend was filed August 26, 2011, 31 days after the district court entered the July 26, 2011 order. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1). 7 We must resolve jurisdictional issues before addressing the merits of the underlying claims, and we review all questions of jurisdiction de novo. United States v. Cartwright, 413 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005). 8 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 9 of 19 orders is readily apparent on the face of the notice.” Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, when an appellant designates an order denying a post-judgment motion in the notice of appeal, the scope of appeal may extend to the underlying judgment or order. See Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 738–39 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980).8 In Kicklighter, a panel of the Fifth Circuit held that an appeal from the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict encompassed an appeal of the judgment itself and observed that “an appeal is not lost if a mistake is made in designating the judgment appealed from where it is clear that the overriding intent was effectively to appeal.” Id. at 738–39 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it was Fawcett’s overriding intent to appeal the district court’s underlying July 1 order changing Fawcett’s sentence to 35 months and the July 11 amended judgment imposing it. Any analysis of whether the district court’s July 26 order correctly denied Fawcett’s July 19 Motion for Reconsideration or Correction of Sentence would necessarily require an analysis of whether the district court acted properly on July 1 to “correct” the sentence to 35 months in the first place and on July 11 to enter the amended judgment. The government argues that White v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 664 8 All decisions of the former Fifth Circuit announced prior to October 1, 1981 are binding precedent in this circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 9 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 10 of 19 F.3d 860 (11th Cir. 2011), controls the question here, but that civil case is materially distinguishable. In White, the plaintiff’s notice of appeal referenced only the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for reconsideration. In that order, the district court reconsidered its analysis of the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on that claim. Id. at 864. The district court did not address or reconsider the portions of its prior order dismissing the plaintiff’s bad faith or fraud claims. Consequently, this Court had no jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the district court’s decisions on the plaintiff’s bad faith and fraud claims. Id. In contrast here, Fawcett’s motion for reconsideration addressed the only issue and judgment possible: the 35-month sentence. Importantly, appellate consideration of the district court’s underlying July 1 and 11 rulings will not prejudice the government. It was clear from Fawcett’s appellate brief that he wished to appeal the district court’s corrected 35-month sentence, and both parties fully briefed the issues Fawcett seeks to raise in this appeal. See, e.g., KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 465 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that appellant clearly intended to appeal district court order, despite appellant’s failure to include that order in the notice of appeal; appellant’s brief addressed only the issues in that order and because both parties fully briefed the issues, the appellee suffered no prejudice if the notice of appeal 10 Case: 11-14051 Date Filed: 06/24/2013 Page: 11 of 19 were construed to include the order); Campbell v. Wainwright, 726 F.2d 702, 704 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that this Court will liberally construe the notice of appeal in favor of the appellant “where the intent to appeal an unmentioned or mislabeled ruling is apparent and there is no prejudice to the adverse party”). Accordingly, we construe Fawcett’s pro se August 26 notice of appeal to include the district court’s underlying July 1 order and the July 11 amended judgment imposing Fawcett’s 35-month sentence. The closer question is whether Fawcett’s appeal—construed to include the July 1 order and July 11 amended judgment—is timely.