Opinion ID: 2176961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: Petitioner's claim of ineffective counsel rests upon several alleged errors. We are guided by well-settled rules in our review of this contention. An attorney is presumed to have rendered competent representation, and only a strong showing to the contrary will rebut that presumption. E.g., Robertson v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 562, 319 N.E.2d 833. We must look to the facts of each case in order to determine whether counsel has provided his client with effective representation. E.g., Roberts v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 72, 360 N.E.2d 825. We will not second-guess counsel's trial tactics or strategy. E.g., Loman v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 255, 354 N.E.2d 205. An isolated mistake or instance of poor strategy does not render representation ineffective or inadequate; and representation is deemed to be adequate, unless the record reflects that the trial was reduced to a mockery of justice. E.g., Merida v. State, (1979) Ind., 383 N.E.2d 1043. While at Gary police headquarters, shortly after the rapes and abduction, the victim was inadvertently led past the booking room, where she saw Robert and immediately identified him. Sometime after this brief encounter, she was shown a lot of photographs, and from them, she picked Robert's. At trial, she identified Robert and testified regarding both the encounter at the police station and the photographic display. Robert contends that there were no exigent circumstances justifying the one-on-one identification, that the photographic identification was tainted by the confrontation, and that the in-court identification was tainted by both. Thus, he argues that his counsel was ineffective inasmuch as he failed to seek suppression of all the identifications. It is clear from the evidence presented at trial that the confrontation at police headquarters was unintentional. The police had not requested that the victim look at Robert; her spontaneous identification did not result from police instigation or prompting. The confrontation, therefore, was not unduly suggestive. See, Johnson v. State, (1972) 257 Ind. 634, 277 N.E.2d 791; Grimes v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 257, 280 N.E.2d 575; Griffin v. State, (1976) Ind. Ct. App., 357 N.E.2d 917. Absent other suggestive factors, the victim's viewing of Robert, shortly before she made the photographic identification, did not render it inadmissible, there having been ample evidence of her source of an independent identification. Because the extra-judicial identifications were not improper, it follows that the in-court identification was not tainted. See Johnson, supra . Thus, it would have been useless to file a motion to suppress; and counsel's failure to perform a futile act cannot be considered as evidence of incompetence. There was testimony introduced at trial regarding a statement that Robert yelled at the victim when he saw her at the police station. Although counsel objected and argued against admission on Miranda grounds, Robert asserts that he failed to object that the statement was tainted evidence flowing from an improper identification. Because, as discussed above, there had been no improper identification, this allegation is without foundation. Robert's statement to the victim was to the effect that any sexual relations had been consensual. At trial, one witness testified that Robert had referred only to himself in the statement, while another testified that he had referred to us. Charles asserts that counsel had been ineffective when he failed to predicate his motion for severance specifically upon Robert's remark. Because the jury was aware that three assailants were involved, we do not believe that an isolated reference to us gave rise to an inference that Robert was referring to Charles. Therefore, we conclude that error, if any, was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Charles' guilt. See Carter v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 140, 361 N.E.2d 145. As we are unconvinced that Charles would have been entitled to severance pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-3.1-1-11(b), we cannot say with certainty that counsel erred when he failed to specify Robert's remark as a ground for severance. Charles contends that counsel failed to advise him that he would be implicating himself as an accomplice if he testified regarding his presence during the criminal events. He asserts that counsel's alleged failure deprived him of the ability to make an informed decision regarding his privilege not to testify. The record reveals that counsel stated to the trial court: Your Honor,    I would like to indicate to the Court that I talked to my clients and have explained to them the law pertaining to their rights to remain silent, and I have told them they need not take the stand in this matter. However, notwithstanding my recommendation, each of the defendants has requested that I call them and submit their testimony before the Court which I intend to do at this time   . So I would want to indicate for the record, that I am attempting to pursue their desires. As a result of that, I will call the defendants to the stand. Further, Charles testified at the hearing on his petition for post conviction relief that counsel had informed him that he would be incriminating himself if he testified. It is sufficient to note that we believe that the above indicates that counsel adequately advised Charles, and that Charles chose to testify with knowledge of the possible consequences. Charles next complains of counsel's failure to object to the trial prosecutor's cross-examination regarding his failure to inform police of exculpatory information. Because, as we previously determined in Issue I, the cross-examination was not improper, counsel's failure to object obviously cannot be said to evidence ineffectiveness. Finally, Charles and Robert contend that they were denied effective assistance of counsel because there was an actual conflict of interest in trial counsel's representation of both petitioners. They contend that the conflict is evidenced by the admission of Robert's statement to the victim and Charles' trial testimony. In Ross v. State, (1978) Ind., 377 N.E.2d 634, 636-37, we stated: Simultaneous representation of co-defendants is fraught with the potential for chaos at worst and frustration at best. It should be avoided as the plague   . Nevertheless, such representation is not per se evidence of ineffective representation. Martin v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 232, 314 N.E.2d 60   . An examination of the record reveals that Charles, in his testimony, denied that Robert was even present during the incidents. He did testify, however, that one of the men who had kidnapped the victim left the motel and went to Robert's home to seek his advice. Charles continued that Robert intervened and gave advice only in an attempt to convince the assailant to spare the victim's life. When considered in context, it is clear that Charles attempted to relieve Robert of any culpability. Because of the nature of Charles' testimony, and because we are unconvinced that Robert's out-of-court statement entitled Charles to a separate trial, we believe that there was no actual conflict and therefore, no error in counsel's joint representation. Petitioners have failed to show how they were prejudiced by what counsel did or failed to do. We do not find, from the evidence presented, that counsel's representation was so ineffective as to constitute a mockery of justice. It appears that counsel may have been faced with making some difficult choices. We cannot say that he may not, on one or more occasions, have made the wrong choice. We infer no opinion in this respect. Regardless, however, mistakes, standing alone, do not amount to ineffective counsel. Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686. We find no error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur. DeBRULER, J., concurs in result.