Opinion ID: 1312074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Uninsured Motorist Statute Issue

Text: The circuit court's first certified question to this Court is framed as follows: Whether the physical contact requirement of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(e)(iii) is satisfied so that uninsured motorist coverage is available to Stacey Hamric, who was injured as a pedestrian while avoiding being struck by a vehicle driven by an unknown driver. W.Va.Code § 33-6-31 provides a mechanism by which insureds may recover uninsured motorist coverage benefits for bodily injury or property damage caused by an uninsured motor vehicle whose driver or operator is unknown. The statute encompasses the definition of a hit and run motor vehicle. W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(e)(iii) (1995) states in pertinent part: (e) If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, the insured, or someone in his behalf, in order for the insured to recover under the uninsured motorist endorsement or provision, shall: (iii) Upon trial establish that the motor vehicle, which caused the bodily injury or property damage, whose operator is unknown, was a hit and run motor vehicle, meaning a motor vehicle which causes damage to the property of the insured arising out of physical contact of such motor vehicle therewith, or which causes bodily injury to the insured arising out of physical contact of such motor vehicle with the insured or with a motor vehicle which the insured was occupying at the time of the accident. If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle causing bodily injury or property damage be unknown, an action may be instituted against the unknown defendant as John Doe, in the county in which the accident took place or in any other county in which such action would be proper under the provisions of article one [§ 56-1-1 et seq.], chapter fifty-six of this code[.] (Emphasis added). The State Farm policies issued to Mr. Hamric state that an [u]ninsured [m]otor [v]ehicle means ... a `hit-and-run' motor vehicle whose owner or driver remains unknown and which strikes: a. the insured, b. the vehicle the insured is occupying, or c. other property of the insured and causes bodily injury to the insured or property damage. The parties agree the State Farm policies conform to the statutory requirements. The question we must answer is whether uninsured motorist coverage is available to Stacey Hamric under the particular set of facts presented in this case; in other words, we must determine the meaning of physical contact and strikes under West Virginia law. To begin with, we reiterate that `[t]he uninsured motorist statute, West Virginia Code § 33-6-31 (Supp.1986), is remedial in nature and, therefore, must be construed liberally in order to effect its purpose.' Syllabus point 7, Perkins v. Doe, 177 W.Va. 84, 350 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1986). Syllabus Point 1, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Norman, 191 W.Va. 498, 446 S.E.2d 720 (1994). In the Perkins case, the Perkins, who were West Virginia residents, were traveling in Virginia when an oncoming unknown motorist crossed left of center and into the Perkins' lane, thereby causing Mr. Perkins to swerve to avoid the oncoming vehicle. The Perkins' vehicle struck an embankment and Mr. Perkins was rendered a quadriplegic. Unlike West Virginia, Virginia had no statutory physical contact requirement. This Court was asked to determine whether to apply Virginia or West Virginia law. This Court was also asked to determine whether any public policy or legal doctrine of West Virginia would operate to bar the Perkins' uninsured motorist claim. This Court concluded the law of Virginia applied and that no public policy or legal doctrine operate[d] to bar the Perkins' claim on the uninsured motorist endorsement. Perkins, 177 W.Va. at 87, 350 S.E.2d at 715 (footnote omitted). More recently, in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Norman, 191 W.Va. 498, 446 S.E.2d 720 (1994), this Court was asked to determine [w]hether uninsured motorist coverage [was] available pursuant to W.Va. Code § 33-6-31 (1988) and State Farm policies of insurance for the death of an insured driver whose vehicle struck a tire of unknown origin lying on a public highway[.] Norman, 191 W.Va. at 500, 446 S.E.2d at 722. In Norman, Ms. Barnett struck a large tire which was located on the edge of the left-hand lane of the interstate. She lost control of her vehicle, which then ran into a rock embankment. Ms. Barnett was thrown from the car and died as a result of the injuries she received. This Court concluded that the insertion of a physical contact requirement in the uninsured motorist statute was a matter of legislative choice. Id., 191 W.Va. at 507, 446 S.E.2d at 729. Nonetheless, the Norman Court went on to hold in syllabus point 2 that [a]bsent specific coverage provisions to the contrary, uninsured motorist coverage is not available where an insured vehicle strikes a tire or other type of immobile object or debris which may be lying on a highway. In order to satisfy the `physical contact' requirement set forth in W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(e)(iii), it is necessary to establish a close and substantial physical nexus between an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle and the insured vehicle. (Emphasis added). Inasmuch as Norman did not discuss the specific meaning of the phrase close and substantial physical nexus, we now revisit this area in order to put flesh on the skeletal bones of Norman, to take the next step and define what is meant by a close and substantial physical nexus. We must do so by accord[ing] every liberal extension to the remedial statute [without] judicially removing the meaning and frustrating the purpose of limiting language deliberately inserted into the statute. Norman, 191 W.Va. at 506, 446 S.E.2d at 728 (quoting Smith v. Great American Insurance Co., 29 N.Y.2d 116, 324 N.Y.S.2d 15, 19, 272 N.E.2d 528, 531 (1971)). This Court previously acknowledged that the purpose of the physical contact requirement is the prevention of fraud or collusion. Perkins, 177 W.Va. at 87 n. 4, 350 S.E.2d at 714 n. 4. We remain strongly committed to the underlying policy of preventing fraud even though we are mindful that abandoning an objective standard in favor of a more subjective one increases the potential for fraud or collusion. Ohio was faced with a situation similar to the one facing us today, but in a slightly different context. An insured was injured when she lost control of her car and it overturned after an unidentified vehicle swerved into her lane of traffic. The insured sought uninsured motorist coverage from her automobile insurer. The insurer denied coverage based on its determination that there was no physical contact between the vehicles. [1] The insured brought a declaratory judgment action against her insurer, asking that the physical contact requirement be declared invalid and unenforceable. The Ohio Supreme Court found the physical contact requirement to be contrary to public policy and stated further: We are persuaded that some of the rationale underlying the physical contact requirement is unjustified and that this absolute standard for recovery should be abandoned. Instead, we hold that the test that ought to be applied in cases where an unidentified driver's negligence causes injury is the corroborative evidence test, which allows the claim to go forward if there is independent third-party testimony that the negligence of an unidentified vehicle was a proximate cause of the accident. Girgis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 75 Ohio St.3d 302, 305, 662 N.E.2d 280, 282 (1996). [2] We agree with the Ohio Supreme Court that absolute enforcement of the physical contact requirement is contrary to public policy. We believe the physical contact requirement should not bar recovery when there is sufficient independent third-party evidence to conclusively establish that the sequence of events leading to an injury was initially set in motion by an unknown hit-and-run driver or vehicle. We therefore hold that a close and substantial physical nexus exists between an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle and the insured for uninsured motorist insurance coverage under W.Va.Code § 33-6-31(e)(iii) (1995) when an insured can establish by independent third-party evidence to the satisfaction of the trial judge and the jury, that but for the immediate evasive action of the insured, direct physical contact would have occurred between the unknown vehicle and the victim. The requirement now is that physical contact with an unknown vehicle be immediate and imminent and the danger is avoided only by the urgent evasive action of the insured. In the literature of this developing area of law, this is commonly referred to as the but for test. While this phrase might not have an intellectual ring, it certainly is accurate and descriptive and provides a practical, shorthand way to identify the rule. The but for test is satisfied and the uninsured motorist claim can go forward only if the injured insured presents independent third-party testimony by disinterested individuals which clearly shows the negligence of an unidentified vehicle was a proximate cause of the accident. This is commonly called the corroborative evidence test. It would be impossible to say in advance what might constitute sufficient corroborative evidence in a given case, and while it is difficult to spell out what is independent third-party evidence, we believe we must be very clear about what is not adequate independent third-party testimony. Testimony by close family members, close personal friends, by those who might share in the award or have a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, and all others similarly situated is not testimony which is sufficient to allow the claim to proceed. Evidence from these witnesses standing alone is not adequate to meet the corroborative evidence test. This is not to suggest that family members would routinely perjure themselves; we believe most would not. However, if we are going to have a truly effective bright line rule which genuinely eliminates the very real potential for fraud, clear and simple guidelines must be established. We realize that to avoid fraud, the evidence needs to be free of taint or suspicion and be strong and reliable. Accordingly, to insure that this Court is not opening the door to fraud, the corroborative witnesses or other evidence must be absolutely and totally independent and reliable. Blind adherence to the physical contact requirement wrongfully deprives insured individuals of any recovery under uninsured motorist coverage even when reliable, independent third-party testimony is available. We believe proper use of the independent corroborative evidence test should assist in preventing the filing of fraudulent claims, while at the same time the test should help avoid the injustice of prohibiting clearly legitimate claims where no physical contact has occurred. To the extent that our prior cases allowed recovery only after an insured proved at trial that his or her injuries were the result of actual physical contact with a hit-and-run vehicle, they are overruled. [3] In the case at bar, Stacey Hamric's accident was witnessed by four adults, all of whom were clearly disinterested and independent. In fact, the parties stipulated that Stacey would have been struck by the unknown vehicle had she not moved out of the vehicle's path. This ameliorates the potential for fraud. We find the evidence in the case at bar satisfies both the but for test and the independent corroborative evidence test. Accordingly, we answer the first certified question affirmatively.