Opinion ID: 615991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: TMI's Claims Against LEPCO

Text: In this diversity suit, we apply Illinois law to TMI's common law claims. See Business Sys. Eng'g, 547 F.3d at 886. [3] To establish a tortious interference with a contract claim under Illinois law, a plaintiff has the burden of proving the following elements: (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant's awareness of the contract; (3) defendant's intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach; (4) defendant's wrongful conduct caused a subsequent breach of the contract by the third party; and (5) damages. Purmal v. Robert N. Wadington & Associates, 354 Ill.App.3d 715, 289 Ill.Dec. 578, 820 N.E.2d 86, 98 (2004); La Preferida, Inc. v. Cerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C.V., 914 F.2d 900, 905 (7th Cir.1990). The district court entered summary judgment in LEPCO's favor on TMI's tortious interference claim on the ground that TMI failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the third and fourth elements. We affirm. On appeal, TMI maintains that LEPCO wrongfully interfered with its Distributor Agreement by making a pitch to Echo on September 30, 2008, in which it proposed taking over TMI's territory for Echo. LEPCO presented evidence in support of its summary judgment motion including the testimony of Echo president Daniel Obringer, Echo VP of Sales Michael Best, and LEPCO president Jeffrey Clarkthat LEPCO made the September 30 presentation at Echo's request, and that Echo only contacted LEPCO after making the decision to terminate TMI in late August 2008. TMI attempts to create a genuine issue of fact as to when the termination decision was made by noting that the presentation included a slide showing that LEPCO outperformed TMI. TMI argues that LEPCO would not have included such information had Echo already agreed to terminate its relationship with TMI. Even construing in TMI's favor, such evidence does not create a genuine issue of fact. The purpose of the presentation was to convince Echo that LEPCO could take over the territory; while Echo had decided to terminate TMI, it had not yet awarded the business to LEPCO. TMI also tries to create a fact issue by suggesting that LEPCO built a new 225,000 square foot warehouse, which TMI notes was much larger than LEPCO needed at the time, in an effort to win TMI's Echo territory. It is undisputed that LEPCO purchased the land for that warehouse in June 2004, and opened it in January 2007. TMI's argument simply makes no sense, as TMI did not even become an Echo distributor until August 2004. Because TMI failed to create a genuine issue of fact as to unjustified inducement by LEPCO or causation, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in LEPCO's favor on TMI's tortious interference claim.
The basis of TMI's Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) claim against LEPCO is its tortious interference claim. Because we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the tortious interference claim, we likewise affirm the grant of summary judgment in LEPCO's favor on TMI's CUTPA claim.
TMI asserts two bases for its unjust enrichment claim against LEPCO. It first relies on its tortious interference claim. For the reasons stated above, that basis does not support an unjust enrichment claim. TMI also contends that LEPCO was unjustly enriched when Echo mistakenly gave LEPCO the business that previously belonged to TMI in violation of the Distribution Agreement. That second contention turns on the outcome of TMI's Connecticut Franchise Act claim against Echo. As noted above, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Echo on TMI's Connecticut Franchise Act claim. Consequently, the second basis for TMI's unjust enrichment claim fails. We affirm the grant of summary judgment in LEPCO's favor on TMI's unjust enrichment claim.