Opinion ID: 6348829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineﬀective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Text: We first review whether Westray is entitled to habeas relief for his claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineﬀective by failing to investigate and present additional mitigating ev‐ idence regarding his abusive childhood. We review “a district court’s denial of a petition for habeas corpus de novo and find‐ ings of fact for clear error.” Felton v. Bartow, 926 F.3d 451, 464 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). 2 We thank Westray’s court‐appointed counsel J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Noel J. Francisco, and Brett J. Wierenga of Jones Day for their excellent advocacy on his behalf. No. 20‐3260 13
Under the Antiterrorism and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court owes substantial deference to a state court’s decision on a state prisoner’s federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). Our court will not set the state court’s decision aside unless it “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court pro‐ ceeding.” Id.; see Hartsfield v. Dorethy, 949 F.3d 307, 312 (7th Cir. 2020). A threshold question for us is whether the district court correctly applied AEDPA’s deferential standard. This bench‐ mark “is deliberately difficult, setting a high bar for relief; the prisoner must demonstrate that the state court’s ruling was ‘so lacking in justification that there was an error well under‐ stood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possi‐ bility for fairminded disagreement.’” Adorno v. Melvin, 876 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). It “demands that state‐court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt,” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam); see Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). And the petitioner bears the burden of proof. Pin‐ holster, 563 U.S. at 181. Importantly, AEDPA deference applies only to claims that were “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Minnick v. Win‐ kleski, 15 F.4th 460, 467 (7th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, No. 21‐1042 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2022) (citation omitted). Otherwise, our review is de novo. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009); Adorno, 876 F.3d at 921. 14 No. 20‐3260 The Supreme Court has instructed that “[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court ad‐ judicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indica‐ tion or state‐law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99. Additionally, when a “state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a federal habeas court must presume” the same. John‐ son v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 301 (2013). This is known as the Harrington presumption, under which a federal court will pre‐ sume a state court adjudicated a claim on its merits in the ab‐ sence of an indication to the contrary, or when the claim has not expressly been addressed. This presumption “can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.” Id. For example, “[w]hen the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state court, § 2254(d) entitles the prisoner to an unencumbered opportunity to make his case before a federal judge.” Id. at 303. So, the question is whether a state court adjudicated Westray’s claim that Broeking provided ineﬀective assistance of counsel during sentencing on the merits. On federal habeas review, the district court applied AEDPA deference after it concluded the claim was raised in Westray’s amended mo‐ tion. That motion made two claims: (1) Westray’s guilty plea was neither knowing, nor voluntary; and (2) Westray was de‐ nied the eﬀective assistance of trial counsel. This second claim, the district court reasoned, referred to Broeking’s per‐ formance at sentencing. Because the state trial court denied the amended motion without comment, the district court pre‐ sumed, under Harrington, that the claim was adjudicated on its merits. Westray submits the district court erred because his No. 20‐3260 15 ineﬀective assistance claim referred solely to Broeking’s per‐ formance during plea proceedings, not during sentencing. We agree with the district court’s analysis and characteri‐ zation of the amended motion for several reasons. First, the text of the amended motion states that Westray’s second claim challenged the eﬀectiveness of trial counsel during sentenc‐ ing: 2. The Defendant, JAMES L. WESTRAY, was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, because trial counsel failed to conduct a reason‐ able investigation into mitigation evidence and circumstances of the Defendant. The phrase “reasonable investigation into mitigation evi‐ dence” regularly refers to the mitigation‐and‐aggravation stage of a sentencing proceeding. That expression rarely de‐ scribes the pleading stage of a trial. Therefore, based on the plain text of his amended motion, Westray has raised his in‐ eﬀective assistance of counsel claim before a state court. Second, Westray’s arguments on federal habeas review support this understanding. Before our court, Westray argues he is entitled to habeas relief because, among other things, trial counsel: said mitigation would not make a diﬀerence; he passed oﬀ his duty to investigate [a potential witness]; he brought a grand total of one wit‐ ness to sentencing; he refused to obtain readily available records and to interview witnesses flagged for him; and in a costly move, he put [Beth Ann] Kern on the stand even though he had never interviewed her. 16 No. 20‐3260 In other words, Westray argues before this court that his trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into mit‐ igation evidence for sentencing. This argument matches the language used in the amended motion. Westray has not pro‐ vided an alternative explanation for the meaning of this text. Third, courts within our circuit have consistently used the phrase “mitigation evidence” to refer to sentencing proceed‐ ings, not plea proceedings. A review of 155 criminal and ha‐ beas cases from this circuit dating back to 1996 shows that all but one of them used the phrase “mitigation evidence” to re‐ fer to sentencing or sentencing proceedings. On the other hand, in only two unreported orders did a court use “mitiga‐ tion evidence” to refer to the stage of the proceeding adjudi‐ cating guilt or innocence.3 Importantly, both of these cases had distinguishing circumstances—one used the phrase in reference to an insanity defense, and the other used it to describe inculpatory evidence that later overlapped with sen‐ tencing evidence. Even more to the point, of the cases re‐ viewed, every case from the Southern District of Illinois used “mitigation evidence” exclusively in the sentencing context. This review is not necessarily exhaustive, but it is representa‐ tive.4 Judges overwhelmingly use and understand the phrase 3The unpublished orders are United States v. Christensen, No. 17‐cr‐ 20037, 2019 WL 1569348 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2019), and Ballard v. Pierce, No. 06 C 711, 2006 WL 1519580 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2006). For purposes of our research, the second case is counted twice, once for sentencing and once for guilt. 4 The review was limited to the phrase “mitigation evidence” in the criminal and habeas corpus context. It did not account for variations of the word “mitigation” or its use in the civil context, for example. No. 20‐3260 17 “mitigation evidence” to refer to sentencing rather than plea proceedings. Fourth, the judiciary’s use of “mitigation evidence” aligns with the ordinary use of that phrase. For example, as a legal term, “mitigation” is defined as “[t]he portrayal of a crime, mistake or misjudgment as being less than complete, as by pointing to other contributory causes or to the person’s own background of adversity as a factor.” Mitigation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019);5 see BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 584 (3d ed. 2011) (“mitigate” means “to make less severe or intense”). Outside of law, “mit‐ igation” means “the action of reducing the severity, serious‐ ness, or painfulness of something.” Mitigation, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010) (the phrase “in mitiga‐ tion” is used to “make something esp[ecially] a crime, appear less serious and thus be punished more leniently”); see Miti‐ gate, MERRIAM‐WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (“to make less severe or painful”). Each definition indi‐ cates that “mitigation evidence” would be used to lessen the portrayed severity of a crime, not to adjudicate an individ‐ ual’s culpability. That is, in a trial, “mitigation” better de‐ scribes the sentencing stage than the guilt stage. Westray has failed to rebut this usage or present an explanation of how the phrase could be used to describe plea proceedings. Fifth, the Supreme Court’s case law presumes that a claim was adjudicated on its merits if it was properly raised before a state court. Johnson, 568 U.S. at 301. So, if a claim is presented 5 Black’s Law Dictionary also defines “mitigation” as “[a] reduction in how harmful, unpleasant, or seriously bad a situation is; a lessening in severity or intensity.” Id. 18 No. 20‐3260 before a state court and dismissed without explanation, the dismissal is still entitled to AEDPA deference on federal ha‐ beas review, provided that evidence does not clearly indicate the claim was overlooked by the state court. Id. at 303. Here, Westray does not claim the state court overlooked the amended motion’s second claim, nor does he present any ev‐ idence to rebut the Harrington presumption. Instead, Westray argues only that the ineﬀective assistance claim must have re‐ ferred to his guilty plea because that is what the amended mo‐ tion sought to withdraw. For the reasons stated above, we do not agree with Westray’s cramped interpretation of the amended motion. It would be perfectly reasonable for counsel to submit a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that includes an alternative claim regarding sentencing. The text of the motion, the common usage of the phrase “mitigation evidence,” and Westray’s arguments in support of habeas relief confirm this understanding. Supreme Court precedent generally instructs federal courts to aﬀord state courts deference. That is because the “AEDPA recognizes a foundational principle of our federal system: State courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013); see Min‐ nick, 15 F.4th at 468 (“AEDPA’s strictness is grounded in com‐ ity.”) Federal courts “reviewing state criminal convictions on collateral review” are “required to aﬀord state courts due re‐ spect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.” Woods v. Don‐ ald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (per curiam). The presumption that state courts know and follow the law is “particularly true when state courts adjudicate ineﬀective assistance of counsel claims.” Minnick, 15 F.4th at 468 (citing Titlow, 571 U.S. at 19). Considering this precedent and the record before us, the No. 20‐3260 19 district court correctly concluded that when the state court de‐ nied Westray’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the state court adjudicated Westray’s ineﬀective assistance of trial counsel claim on the merits. This ineﬀective assistance claim referred to trial counsel’s performance during sentencing. It is not our role to “second‐guess” the state court’s reasoning after the fact. Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 896 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). For these reasons, we conclude that the ineﬀective assis‐ tance of trial counsel claim was presented to the Illinois trial court in Westray’s amended motion. The state court then de‐ nied the amended motion without comment. It is therefore presumed that the claim was adjudicated on its merits and AEDPA deference applies. As a result, the state court’s deci‐ sion is not set aside unless it “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed‐ ing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
Next, we consider the proper legal framework under which to consider Westray’s claim of ineﬀective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, we examine how the commutation of Westray’s sentence from death to life imprisonment aﬀects how we apply the legal standard. To prevail on an ineﬀective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show both deficient performance and result‐ ing prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A petitioner needs to demonstrate that: (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 20 No. 20‐3260 reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.” Id. at 687–88, 694. “A petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if he satisfies both of Strickland’s prongs.” Karr v. Sevier, 29 F.4th 873, 880 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Thill v. Richardson, 996 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2021)). Importantly, “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineﬀective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insuﬃcient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. In keeping with this precedent, we assess whether Westray can satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong. Before that, though, we must understand how the commutation of his sentence impacts the applicable legal standard. In a death penalty case, prejudice occurred if “there is a reasonable prob‐ ability that, but for [the] counsel’s ineﬀectiveness, the jury would have made a diﬀerent judgment about whether [the petitioner] deserved the death penalty as opposed to a lesser sentence.” Andrus v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1875, 1885–86 (2020) (ci‐ tations omitted). The question for us then is whether a commutation alters the prejudice inquiry. The State argues that when a “death sentence is subsequently commuted to life imprisonment,” a petitioner “must show not only a reasonable probability that the jury would not have found death to be the appropriate sentence, but also a reasonable probability that the judge would have then sentenced him to a term more favorable than life imprisonment.” To do so the State relies on pair of cases from this court: Richardson v. Lemke, 745 F.3d 258 (7th Cir. 2014), and Mertz v. Williams, 771 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2014). No. 20‐3260 21 Westray, on the other hand, argues that under the prejudice prong he need show only that “but for counsel’s unprofes‐ sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. He relies on an earlier case from this court, Griﬃn v. Pierce, 622 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2010), to argue that despite the commutation, he needs to show only that but for his counsel’s ineﬀective assistance, he would have been sentenced to less than death. In Griﬃn, this court considered a petitioner’s claim that “his counsel was ineﬀective for failing to investigate and pre‐ sent” several pieces of “mitigation evidence” at sentencing. Id. at 838. The petitioner was sentenced to death after being con‐ victed for murder, solicitation to commit murder, and con‐ spiracy to commit murder. Id. at 833. But his sentence was later commuted to life imprisonment. Id. at 837. The court ruled that the commutation did “not moot the habeas peti‐ tion” because the petitioner still could have sought “a lower sentence.” Id. How the commutation aﬀects the prejudice analysis was never squarely presented to the court in Griﬃn. When evalu‐ ating prejudice, Griﬃn determined that the Illinois Supreme Court had unreasonably applied Strickland because “[t]he question is not whether a particular judge would have im‐ posed a diﬀerent sentence, but rather whether there was a ‘reasonable probability’ that the sentence would have been diﬀerent.” Id. at 845–46. After identifying several errors—in‐ cluding counsel’s failure to investigate and to proﬀer evi‐ dence, and the Illinois Supreme Court’s failure to properly evaluate the totality of the mitigation evidence—the court re‐ versed the district court’s denial of the habeas petition. Id. at 844–46. 22 No. 20‐3260 Four years later in Richardson, this court addressed the question more directly. There, a petitioner appealed, among other things, the “district court’s denial of his claim that he received ineﬀective assistance of counsel during the sentenc‐ ing phase.” Richardson, 745 F.3d at 276. As in Griﬃn, the peti‐ tioner’s sentence had been commuted to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Id. This court noted that the commu‐ tation did not necessarily render the petitioner’s claim moot because the petitioner was still “entitled to relief if adequate representation would have resulted in a sentence to a term of years.” Id. The court aﬃrmed the “denial of [the petitioner’s] claim because a reasonable jurist could certainly conclude, as did the Illinois Supreme Court, that the introduction of the evi‐ dence [the petitioner] sought would not have changed the sentence handed down by the trial court.” Id. at 277 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Griﬃn, 622 F.3d at 844). In doing so, the court noted that “due to the commuting of his sentence, [the petitioner] would not be entitled to relief unless the trial court would have handed down a sentence to a term of years.” Id. at 277 n.9. Under Strickland’s prejudice prong, the court reasoned, the petitioner would need to show he would have received less than life imprisonment had his counsel ef‐ fectively assisted him. See id. Later that year in Mertz, this court considered another Strickland claim from an Illinois prisoner whose sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 771 F.3d at 1037. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the habeas claim because the petitioner “could not show the necessary prejudice” under Strickland. Id. Relying on the recent decision in Richardson, this court No. 20‐3260 23 decided that the “district court correctly used a term of years sentence as the benchmark for Strickland prejudice in Mertz’s case.” Id. at 1044. Once again, the court applied Strickland’s prejudice prong in this commutation context to require that a petitioner show he would have received a sentence of less than life imprisonment but for the ineﬀectiveness of his coun‐ sel. Richardson and Mertz provide the proper framework to ap‐ ply the prejudice analysis following a commutation. These cases are more recent than Griffin and they directly address the question at hand. Westray contends the State’s position fails as a matter of constitutional first principles and that Grif‐ fin is binding precedent that “displace[s]” our more recent case law. Although Griffin focused on Strickland’s prejudice prong, it never expressly considered the effect a commutation might have on the prejudice evaluation. At best, Griffin can be read to imply that any sentence other than death satisfies the prejudice prong. Richardson and Mertz, on the other hand, ex‐ pressly considered the effect of a commuted death penalty. Together, those cases hold that to establish prejudice, the pe‐ titioner must prove there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the petitioner would have received less than the commuted sentence. We reaffirm that rule today. A defendant whose death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment must show not only a reasonable probability that the jury would not have found death to be the appropriate sentence, but also a reason‐ able probability that the judge would have sentenced him to a term more favorable than life imprisonment. 24 No. 20‐3260
AEDPA deference applies, and we have clarified the proper prejudice inquiry after a commutation. We turn now to the merits of Westray’s Strickland claim, and first evaluate whether he was prejudiced by the alleged ineﬀectiveness of his trial counsel. Specifically, the question is whether Westray would have been sentenced to a term of years, rather than life imprisonment, but for his trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. As stated above, our decision is subject to AEDPA defer‐ ence. When applying that deference to an ineﬀective assis‐ tance of counsel claim such as this, “[t]he federal courts as a whole engage in ‘doubly deferential’ review.” Wilborn v. Jones, 964 F.3d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Knowles v. Mirza‐ yance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)). “Deference is layered upon deference in these cases because federal courts must give ‘both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.’” Minnick, 15 F.4th at 468 (quoting Titlow, 571 U.S. at 15). Strickland’s prejudice prong requires that a petitioner show “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been diﬀerent.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable probability is a probability suﬃcient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Courts assess this probability by evaluat‐ ing “the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh[ing] it against the evidence in ag‐ gravation.” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (per cu‐ riam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397–98 (2000)). No. 20‐3260 25 This standard “does not require a showing that counsel’s actions ‘more likely than not altered the outcome,’” but the diﬀerence between the “reasonable probability” standard and the “more‐probable‐than‐not” standard “is slight and matters ‘only in the rarest case.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111–12 (quot‐ ing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 697). A decision is unreasonable and warrants a writ of habeas corpus only if it “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair‐ minded disagreement.” Id. at 103. Westray believes that with eﬀective assistance of trial counsel, at least one juror could have been convinced not to impose the death penalty. Yet as discussed above, that is not the proper question in a commutation case. Instead, Westray must demonstrate that, but for Broeking’s allegedly deficient performance, he would have received a sentence less than life imprisonment. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Mertz, 771 F.3d at 1044–45. Westray fails to prove prejudice for several reasons. To start, Westray’s codefendant Cook received a sentence of life in prison, despite entering into a negotiated plea with a sig‐ nificantly less egregious criminal history. This is a strong in‐ dication that a jury would have sentenced Westray to life in prison as well, regardless of Broeking’s performance during the sentencing phase. Given Westray’s extensive criminal his‐ tory, his equal if not greater involvement in Opatt’s murder, and his less favorable plea, it is diﬃcult to conceive how Westray would have received a lighter sentence than Cook. While Cook’s life sentence is not dispositive, it is strong evi‐ dence against a finding of prejudice on Westray’s claim. It is thus highly unlikely, even with additional mitigating 26 No. 20‐3260 evidence, that Westray would have been sentenced to a term of years. Further, the quantity and nature of the aggravation evi‐ dence was overwhelming. The State presented nine witnesses during the aggravation‐and‐mitigation phase, most of whom focused on Westray’s extensive criminal history. They testi‐ fied to Westray committing multiple burglaries in his youth, as well as an attempted armed robbery that resulted in the shooting of a man and the injury of a woman. This evidence included that Westray committed two armed robberies in the two‐year period before the murder of Opatt, and that Westray was planning to commit a fourth robbery afterward, for which he stated he would be willing to use lethal force. Evi‐ dence was also presented that Westray failed to comply when confronted by police, he attempted to escape from jail after his arrest, and he generally showed no remorse. Given the extent and nature of this aggravation evidence, it is very unlikely that a jury would have sentenced Westray to a term of years, even if it had heard the mitigation evidence from which Westray now seeks to benefit. Finally, the mitigation evidence Westray says the jury should have heard was redundant. Westray contends his trial counsel should have obtained school, medical, and legal rec‐ ords detailing his stepfather’s abuse. He further argues that trial counsel should have interviewed more family and friends, and better prepared Kern (Westray’s high school friend) before putting her on the stand. Some of these alleged facts—such as trial counsel’s lack of eﬀort to investigate miti‐ gation evidence, and his willingness to put a witness on the stand despite only being “barely acquainted” with her—are troubling. But our review at this point is confined to No. 20‐3260 27 Strickland’s prejudice prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Westray’s trial counsel placed three witnesses on the stand, all of whom testified about the abuse Westray suﬀered as a child. There is no indication that the jury did not credit this evi‐ dence. Indeed, the State did not even cross‐examine these wit‐ nesses. Reports from school counselors, family friends, and legal documents corroborating the abuse of Westray may have bolstered his mitigation argument but would not have materially strengthened it. Instead, such evidence risked in‐ troducing inconsistencies, which could have undermined his witnesses’ credibility. As to Kern’s testimony, it is not apparent how better prep‐ aration would have changed Westray’s sentence. Among other things, Kern testified about Westray’s abusive child‐ hood and the reforms he made by becoming more involved in the drama ministry at their church. When asked if Westray had an “aptitude” for the drama ministry, she responded that he “was called to do that by God. That is his—that’s what he’s to be doing, is to reach people for Christ.” The State asserted in its closing argument that Westray’s signs of remorse were nothing more than an act. While preparation may have given the State less quotable lines, Kern’s testimony was still favor‐ able. Kern provided the jury with evidence of how Westray had reformed his life through his faith. It is unlikely that the State’s argument would have materially changed, regardless of Kern’s testimony. And even if the State’s closing argument did change, it is unlikely to have resulted in Westray receiving a sentence of less than life in prison. Westray has not shown that but for his trial counsel’s al‐ legedly deficient performance, he would have been sentenced to a term of years. As a result, Westray cannot prove prejudice, 28 No. 20‐3260 and his claim for ineﬀective assistance of trial counsel fails. We need not also consider whether his trial counsel’s perfor‐ mance was deficient, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, and we aﬃrm the district court’s denial of this claim.