Opinion ID: 1191793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The competing constructs

Text: The case law of certain jurisdictions contains language suggesting that, under certain circumstances, a series of distinct sexual assaults committed against a minor may constitute a single continuing offense. See, e.g., People v. Cooks, 446 Mich. 503, 521 N.W.2d 275, 286 (1994); Huddleston v. State, 695 P.2d 8, 10-11 (Okla.Crim.App.1985); Clark, 682 P.2d at 1344. In Cooks, the defendant was convicted of a single count of second degree criminal sexual conduct, notwithstanding that testimony elicited from the [ten-year-old] complainant at trial referred to three incidents of sexual penetration. 521 N.W.2d at 276. The Michigan Court of Appeals vacated the conviction because the trial court refused to instruct the jurors that unanimous agreement about a specific act of penetration [was] required for conviction. Id. See section III. C.2. of this opinion, infra. Because materially identical evidence was offered with respect to each of the alleged acts of penetration and there [was] no reason to believe the jury was confused or disagreed about the basis of [the] defendant's guilt, a majority of the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the trial court had not erred. 521 N.W.2d at 276. In the course of its analysis, the Cooks majority noted that the evidence offered in this case to support each of the alleged acts of penetration was materially identical, i.e., the complainant's equivocal testimony of an anal penetration, occurring in the same house over an unspecified three-day period ..., while only she and [the] defendant were in the room. Id. at 286 (footnote omitted). On this basis, the Cooks majority expressed the view that the multiple acts alleged by the prosecutor were tantamount to a continuous course of conduct. Id. By contrast, Justice Levin argued in dissent that [t]he continuous conduct exception only applies to those offense[s] where the statute defining the crime may be interpreted as applying to an offense that may be continuous in nature, such as failure to provide, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, driving under the influence, concealing stolen property, and criminal acts of possession. Multiple sex acts do not merge into a single continuing offense because the defendant can be convicted and punished for each separate act. Id. at 288 n. 4 (emphasis added). In support of his position, Justice Levin observed that, in People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 420-21, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790, 502 N.E.2d 577 (1986), [t]he New York Court of Appeals rejected the continuing conduct exception [as applied] to sexual abuse, because those crimes as defined in the Penal Law of New York `punish the performance of a single act.' Id. [13] In Huddleston, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that when a child of tender years is under the exclusive domination of one parent for a definite and certain period of time and submits to sexual acts at that parent's demand, the separate acts of abuse become one transaction[.] 695 P.2d at 10-11. The Huddleston court's view that the defendant's separate acts of sexual abuse became one transaction is puzzling, however, inasmuch as the defendant was charged with, and convicted of, three distinct counts of sexual assaultone count of first degree rape and two counts of oral sodomycommitted against his nine-year-old daughter. Id. at 9. In Clark, a majority of the Montana Supreme Court had the following to say: Both the original and the amended information set forth facts alleging a series of incidents of unlawful sexual contacts perpetrated by the step-father upon the child. Incestuous conduct is charged as a series of offenses of sexual intercourse without consent with the same minor victim. Incest generally involves a continuing course of sexual conduct between two family members within the family home. Incestuous conduct usually consists of a series of unlawful sexual contacts between an adult family member and a child. In these respects, sexual offenses committed against a minor by a parent or step-parent are distinguishable from rape cases involving adult victims and a single criminal event in unfamiliar surroundings. 682 P.2d at 1344. In our view, the foregoing language is both confusing and misleading. The defendant in Clark was charged with, and convicted of, eight counts of sexual intercourse without consent under Montana law. Insofar as the defendant was convicted of a series of offenses (plural), we fail to understand how, for charging purposes, he could be deemed to have engaged in a single continuing course of sexual conduct. In any event, the Clark majority's discussion merely sought to explain why [t]he defendant here had notice of the nature of the charges [plural] against him and [an] adequate opportunity to defend. Id. The propriety of amalgamating multiple offenses within a single count was obviously not at issue in the defendant's appeal. Had such an amalgamation been an option available to the prosecution, the Clark majority would, at the very least, have been confronted with the equal protection and due process issues addressed infra in section III. A.3. of this opinion. Other jurisdictions have held that repeated acts of sexual assault on a child cannot, by their very nature, be treated as a single continuing offense. A salient example is State v. Snook, 210 Conn. 244, 555 A.2d 390 (1989), in which the defendant was charged, inter alia, with two counts of risk of injury to a minor, in violation of a Connecticut criminal statute. [14] The first count alleged that between June 1979 and January 18, 1983, and between January 20, 1983 and January 11, 1984, the defendant committed acts likely to impair the health and morals of the victim (who was born on January 19, 1978). 555 A.2d at 392, 398. The second count alleged that, on January 19, 1983, the defendant also committed acts against the victim in violation of the statute. Id. at 398. The Snook court's description of the defendant's predicate conduct consisted of the following: In her videotaped testimony, the victim related two incidents in which the defendant engaged in various sexual activities with her while they had left the house to go for a walk and to fly a kite. The victim testified that on another occasion, the day of her birthday, while her mother was out shopping for a birthday present, the defendant brought her into a closet in their house, removed his pants and her pants, and rubbed her vagina. He then made her sit on his penis. This incident was interrupted when the defendant heard the mother's car door slam. The victim's mother testified that the last incident occurred on the victim's fifth birthday. Id. at 393. A jury convicted the defendant of both charged offenses, after which he moved the trial court for a judgment of acquittal as to the second count, claiming that a conviction on both counts ... violated his state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Id. at 398. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. Affirming the defendant's convictions, the Snook court ruled, inter alia, as follows: Double jeopardy prohibits not only multiple trials for the same offense, but also multiple punishments for the same offense. Before the double jeopardy prohibition is triggered, however, it must appear that the crimes arose out of the same act or transaction. If a violation of law is not continuous in its nature, separate indictments may be maintained for each violation. Thus, a distinct repetition of a prohibited act constitutes a second offense and subjects the offender to an additional penalty. In the present case, the separate counts alleging risk of injury to a minor arose out of separate acts. The . . . information makes clear that the defendant was charged with violating [the statute] as a result of at least two separate transactions: any acts occurring between June, 1979, through January 11, 1984, excepting January 19, 1983; and acts occurring on January 19, 1983. We disagree with the defendant that [the first count] alleged a violation of law continuous in nature, such that a separate count alleging a violation of [the statute] on a specific date was impermissible. The failure of the [prosecution] to obtain more specific information as to the date or dates of the acts alleged in [the first count] did not render the defendant's criminal conduct a violation of law continuous in nature. [The statute] as charged does not proscribe a continuing course of criminal conduct but proscribes acts directly perpetrated on the person of the minor and injurious to his moral or physical well-being.... As we stated in an analogous context, each separate act of forcible sexual intercourse constitutes a separate crime. A different view would allow a person who has committed one sexual assault upon a victim to commit with impunity many other such acts during the same encounter. If we adopted the defendant's reasoning, the commission of one act likely to impair the health and morals of a minor would insulate the perpetrator from further criminal liability for any additional acts of the same character perpetrated on the same minor in subsequent encounters. Such a result defies rationality. A distinct repetition of an act prohibited by [the statute] constitutes a second offense. Id. at 398-99 (citations and some quotation marks omitted) (some ellipsis points omitted and some added) (emphases added). See also Covington, 703 P.2d at 440 (holding that [s]exual abuse of a minor is not a `continuing offense'); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 683 P.2d 173, 177 (1984) (The [prosecution's] attempt to ... characteriz[e] the charge as a continuing offense is not persuasive. Under appropriate facts, a continuing course of conduct may form the basis of one charge in an information. But ` one continuing offense' must be distinguished from `several distinct acts,' each of which could be the basis for a criminal charge '. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.)).