Opinion ID: 2242138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Closing Argument: State

Text: Fourth, defendant contends that the State, during its rebuttal argument, improperly equated the defense request for mercy as a request for the jury to ignore the law and violate its oath. Defendant specifically complains of four remarks, three of which his trial counsel failed to object to at trial. Therefore, any complaint regarding these counts is waived. See Moore, 171 Ill.2d at 118, 215 Ill.Dec. 75, 662 N.E.2d 1215; People v. Peeples, 155 Ill.2d 422, 495-96, 186 Ill.Dec. 341, 616 N.E.2d 294 (1993). Defendant invokes the plain error exception to the waiver rule. However, before considering the plain error doctrine, we determine whether any error occurred at all. People v. Sims, 192 Ill.2d 592, 621, 249 Ill.Dec. 610, 736 N.E.2d 1048 (2000); People v. Precup, 73 Ill.2d 7, 17, 21 Ill.Dec. 863, 382 N.E.2d 227 (1978). During the State's rebuttal argument, a prosecutor made the following remarks: Counsel asks you to ignore your duty and your oath that you have taken [Defense counsel]: Objection. THE COURT: Argue the evidence   . [Prosecutor]: Do not be fooled by the psychology of asking for mercy, in referring to the defendant as being born into a situation where he was basically a piece of garbage. Keep your common sense. So you do bring that with you to this phase too, your common sense and your life experiences.    The defendant asks you for mercy through his counsel. That is something he did not show to Debra, Samantha or Joshua. Mercy is a blessing that is an act of divine favor and compassion. It's a compassionate treatment of those in stress. Mercy in a courtroom has to be earned. Do not feel guilty and do not feel guilt for refusing to afford this defendant mercy. Because by his choices, he has forgone the opportunity to receive mercy from him [ sic ] by his actions and by his conduct. Do not feel guilt for fulfilling your obligations under the law. You as jurors took an oath to follow the law that this court gives you. You want to follow that law without being swayed by sympathy or prejudice. The law in this defendant[`]s horrific conduct and actions do [ sic ] not allow you to show him any mercy. Show this defendant the same mercy he showed Joshua Evans. This defendant stands before you, through his counsel, and asks for the minimum sentence. There are two choices in this case. He asks you for the minimum sentence. Mercy cannot let him avoid his appropriate measure of justice in this case. The defendant, by his actions, has not earned a minimum sentence, based on mercy. But based on the law, the defendant's conduct in the law [ sic ] requires you to return a verdict of sentencing this defendant to death. Prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument, and a prosecutor's comments in closing argument will result in reversible error only when they engender substantial prejudice against a defendant to the extent that it is impossible to determine whether the jury's verdict was caused by the comments or the evidence. Closing arguments must be reviewed in their entirety, and the challenged remarks must be viewed in context. People v. Macri, 185 Ill.2d 1, 62, 235 Ill. Dec. 589, 705 N.E.2d 772 (1998) (and cases cited therein). Since mercy is a relevant mitigating factor, a prosecutor's argument suggesting that the jury could not consider mercy as a mitigating factor, or that mercy differed from other mitigating factors, constitutes error. Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 244-45, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1. Examining the challenged remarks in context, we determine that they do not constitute reversible error. We previously quoted from defendant's closing argument. Defendant's trial counsel essentially argued to the jury that mercy had nothing to do with mitigation evidence, and that the jury should dispense mercy with no regard to the facts of the case. The prosecutor responded to defendant's closing argument with the challenged remarks. If the State's argument suggested that the jury could not consider mercy as a mitigating factor, it would be erroneous. See Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 244-45, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1. However, the prosecutor did not argue that mercy was not a mitigating factor, or that mercy differed from other mitigating factors. Rather, the prosecutor properly argued that the jury was to dispense mercy based on the aggravation and mitigation evidence, and that mitigation evidence was absent in this case. During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor may contest the significance and weight of the defendant's mitigating evidence, and is not required to agree that the evidence offered in mitigation by defendant is indeed mitigating. Macri, 185 Ill.2d at 63, 235 Ill.Dec. 589, 705 N.E.2d 772. Indeed, the fact that defendant's trial counsel argued that the jury could appropriately consider mercy as a mitigating factor, and the fact that the State argued in rebuttal that defendant did not deserve mercy, indicated to the jury that it had the power to factor mercy into its sentencing determination. See Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 245, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1. Because we find that the challenged prosecutorial remarks do not constitute reversible error, we also find no plain error. See Keene, 169 Ill.2d at 17, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (all plain errors are reversible errors). We note that even if these prosecutorial remarks are viewed as erroneous, we cannot say that they constituted plain error. The jury was instructed that mitigating factors are [a]ny reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death and that any statement or argument made by the attorneys which is not based on the evidence should be disregarded. See Hope, 168 Ill.2d at 26-27, 212 Ill.Dec. 909, 658 N.E.2d 391. In the context of the parties' arguments as a whole and these instructions, we find that the State's remarks did not deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing. See Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 245, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1. Defendant alternatively asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to most of the challenged remarks. We disagree. We have concluded that the challenged remarks did not constitute reversible error. The trial court would have rightfully overruled any defense objection thereto. Consequently, had defense counsel objected, the result would have been no different from the effect of his failure to object. Thus, defendant was not prejudiced in terms of Strickland. See, e.g., Kuntu, 196 Ill.2d at 129-30, 256 Ill.Dec. 500, 752 N.E.2d 380; Shaw, 186 Ill.2d at 332, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161.