Opinion ID: 2637623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Distinguish Between Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Text: In listing all the factors relevant to the penalty phase determination, the trial court did not distinguish between the aggravating and mitigating factors. As defendant acknowledges, we have previously held that courts need not do so. (See, e.g., People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 673, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) Defendant, however, contends our previous holdings are erroneous, because Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, [122 S.Ct. 2428], now requires the jury to find each aggravating factorbut not each mitigating factorbeyond a reasonable doubt. (See also Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 490-491, fn. 16, 120 S.Ct. 2348 [noting the distinction the Court has often recognized [citation] between facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation].) We disagree. As explained earlier, Ring does not apply to California's penalty phase proceedings. (See ante, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 46-7, 66 P.3d at pp. 1146-1148.) Accordingly, the trial court had no constitutional duty to distinguish between the aggravating and mitigating factors.
Defendant contends the trial court's refusal to question jurors regarding a newspaper article containing statements made by the prosecution in violation of a gag order constitutes reversible error. We disagree.
The day after Quinones testified about the gun incident involving defendant, a newspaper published an article stating that a witness had received threats but that [n]o details about the threats were available. The article further stated that the witness's name was [being] withheld at the request of the District Attorney's Office. Defendant promptly called the article to the trial court's attention and claimed that the prosecutor had violated the gag order and committed misconduct. Defendant then asked the court to question jurors individually regarding whether they had read the article, moved for a mistrial, and suggested that the court consider sanctions. The prosecutor admitted that her investigator had spoken to the reporter but claimed that he only did so because Quinones had requested that her name be omitted from any newspaper articles. The prosecutor also denied any intention to get this information published. Although the court admonished counsel, it denied the motion for a mistrial and declined to question the jurors about the article.
Although a juror who read[s] newspaper articles about the case he or she is deciding commits misconduct, raising a presumption of prejudice [citation] and triggering a duty of the trial court to make appropriate inquiry, nothing in the record, aside from defense counsel's speculation, suggests that any juror did so. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 864, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280.) Throughout the trial, the court admonished the jurors to avoid reading articles about the case. [I]n the absence of evidence to the contrary we must presume they followed the court's admonition. ( Ibid. ) Although the prudent course may have been to question the jurors (see People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 253, 253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906), we will not presume prejudice absent a threshold showing that some jurors had, in fact, seen the newspaper article ( Marshall, at p. 864, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280). Because there was no such showing, the court was put on no duty of inquiry. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, the court did not err by refusing to question the jurors.
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to investigate allegations of juror misconduct in a timely manner. This contention lacks merit.
After the jury had reached a verdict, but before the trial court had announced it, defendant advised the court that he had just learned about some improper communications between jurors and a spectator at the trial, Laura Simmons. After defendant requested additional time to investigate further, the court recessed the matter to the afternoon. In the afternoon, defendant indicated that Simmons was available to testify and asked the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing before announcing the verdict. The court refused to conduct a hearing at that time but told defendant he could bring the juror misconduct issue to the court in a proper fashion. The court then announced the verdict and discharged the jury. At the hearing on the motion to modify the verdict pursuant to section 190.4, defendant submitted a request for posttrial discovery regarding the jurors. The court denied the request because defendant presented no supporting documents and did not provide adequate notice of the request to the prosecution. A few days later, the prosecution moved to preclude defendant from contacting jurors without a court order because several jurors were upset that defendant had access to their addresses. The court denied the motion, but strongly recommended that defendant avoid contacting jurors who had expressed a desire they not be contacted. Almost three months after the verdict, defendant filed a motion for new trial based on juror misconduct. In support, defendant submitted a declaration from Simmons averring that: (1) a juror told her about the juror's expectation that witnesses present at the abduction would testify after the prosecution rested; (2) a juror asked her who the spectators at trial were; and (3) a juror asked her opinion on the verdicts. Defendant also claimed that the prosecution had improperly dissuaded jurors from speaking to the defense. In opposition, the prosecution submitted declarations from 11 of the 12 jurors denying that they had talked to Simmons or any other spectator about the trial. An alternate juror also declared that she had spoken briefly to Simmons. During the conversation, she had mentioned two spectators and said, as an afterthought, I wonder who they are? Simmons then told her that she could not tell her. The prosecution also submitted declarations averring that it had never dissuaded any juror from contacting the defense and that it had only informed jurors they were not obligated to speak to the prosecution. After a hearing, the trial court found that the declarations failed to establish any improper contact between jurors and spectators or any prejudice to defendant and denied the motion.
As an initial matter, we note that defendant does not contend the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial. Indeed, the evidence in the record amply supports the court's conclusion that the jurors had no improper contacts with nonjurors. Thus, the court did not commit a manifest and unmistakable abuse of its discretion in refusing to grant the motion. ( People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1260-1261, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) Instead of challenging the denial of his motion, defendant contends the court abused its discretion by failing to investigate the alleged juror misconduct before announcing the verdict and discharging the jury. According to defendant, the court's failure to conduct a timely investigation precluded him from obtaining access to the jurors. As explained below, we disagree. When a trial court is aware of possible juror misconduct, the court `must make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary' to resolve the matter. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1255, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) Although courts should promptly investigate allegations of juror misconduct to nip the problem in the bud ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081), they have considerable discretion in determining how to conduct the investigation. The court's discretion in deciding whether to discharge a juror encompasses the discretion to decide what specific procedures to employ including whether to conduct a hearing or detailed inquiry. ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) In this case, the court acted well within its discretion in delaying its inquiry until after the announcement of the verdict. When defendant alerted the court to the alleged misconduct, the court was just about to receive the verdict from the jury. At that time, defendant had not fully investigated the matter and could only provide the court with vague and unsubstantiated allegations. In light of these vague, last-minute allegations, the court could properly have declined to investigate the allegations at that time and could have received the verdict immediately. (See People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 989, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) The court's decision to do so a few hours later, even though a witness was available to testify as to the misconduct, did not transform its refusal to delay the verdict into an abuse of discretion. In any event, defendant can show no prejudice. Presumably, defendant presented all the evidence he would have presented at a preverdict hearing in support of his motion. The court considered this evidence and properly rejected defendant's claim of juror misconduct, and defendant presents nothing to suggest that the court would have found juror misconduct if it had conducted the hearing before receiving the verdict. Although defendant contends the prosecution prevented him from speaking to jurors after the verdict, nothing in the record supports his claim. Indeed, the prosecution submitted declarations denying any effort to limit defendant's contact with jurors, and the court expressly refused to limit defendant's ability to do so. Defendant's claim that he could have obtained more evidence of juror misconduct if the court had conducted a hearing before taking the verdict is wholly speculative. Accordingly, we find no reversible error.
Defendant contends we must reconsider many of our rulings upholding the constitutionality of California's death penalty law in light of Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584 [122 S.Ct. 2428]. According to defendant, Ring undermines our previous rulings that: (1) the jury need not find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the jury need not find each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) juror unanimity on the aggravating factors is not necessary; and (4) written findings are not required. (See, e.g., People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 462, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) As explained earlier, the penalty phase determination in California is normative, not factual. It is therefore analogous to a sentencing court's traditionally discretionary decision to impose one prison sentence rather than another. (See ante, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 46-47, 66 P.3d at pp. 1146-1148.) Accordingly, Ring does not undermine our previous rulings upholding the constitutionality of California's death penalty law, and we reaffirm our rejection of defendant's contentions. (See ibid. )
Defendant contends California's death penalty law is unconstitutional on numerous grounds. We have, however, rejected these grounds in the past. For example, we have held that the death penalty law adequately narrows the class of deatheligible offenders. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 884, 884, fn. 7, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) We have also held that: (1) the trial court need not instruct that the absence of mitigating factors is not itself aggravating ( People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 639, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081, overruled on other grounds by Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618); (2) the absence of intercase proportionality review does not make the imposition of death sentences arbitrary or discriminatory or violate the equal protection and due process clauses ( People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 394-395, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34); (3) the consideration of defendant's unadjudicated criminal activity in the penalty phase is permissible ( ibid. ); and (4) the use of certain adjectivesi.e., `extreme' and `substantial'in the list of mitigating factors does not render the statute unconstitutional ( ibid. ). Finally, we have held that section 190.3, factor (a)which permits consideration of the circumstances of the crime as an aggravating factoris not impermissibly vague and provides adequate guidance to a jury in sentencing. ( Lewis, at p. 394.) Accordingly, these contentions fail.

In count 15, the information charged defendant with possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of section 12021, subdivision (a). The information further alleged that, as to count 15, defendant was convicted of a serious felony in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2), within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a). The jury found defendant guilty on count 15 and found true the prior serious felony conviction. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a five-year term for the prior serious felony enhancement on count 15. Defendant contends, and the People concede, that the imposition of the enhancement as to count 15 was improper because a violation of section 12021, subdivision (a) is not a serious felony as defined in section 1192.7, subdivision (c), and is therefore not subject to section 667, subdivision (a). We agree and strike the serious felony enhancement as to count 15.
The jury found defendant guilty of violating section 209, subdivision (b) in counts 5, 6 and 7. Because the maximum sentence for that offense is life with the possibility of parole (see § 209, subd. (b)), defendant contends the abstract of judgment erroneously imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole as to those counts. The People concede the error and note that the trial court only intended to impose the penalty of life or the term of life on these counts. Accordingly, we order that the abstract of judgment be amended to reflect a sentence of life with the possibility of parole as to counts 5, 6, and 7.
Defendant contends the trial court, in ruling on his automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), improperly considered certain factors in aggravation. Contrary to defendant's contention, the court did not have to `employ the same type of analysis the jury would have done [ sic ] under the instructions.' ( People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 245, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365). Thus, the court's consideration of defendant's willful possession of jail-made weapons while he was in custody was proper under section 190.3, factor (b). Likewise, the court's reliance on the random selection of the victims and evidence indicating defendant's intent that all of the victims should die was proper under section 190.3, factor (a). (See People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 177, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Finally, the court's comprehensive statement of the reasons for its ruling demonstrates that the court fulfilled its statutory duty by independently [reweighing] the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and ... determin[ing] whether, in its independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supported] the jury's verdict. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 150, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.)