Opinion ID: 819728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Smith’s Claim

Text: Smith complains that he suffered a false arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when Detective Matos submitted a misleading warrant affidavit to the judge to secure the warrant authorizing Smith’s arrest. Ordinarily, “[a] warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Constitution and provides a basis for a [§] 1983 claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest constitutes an absolute bar to a [§] 1983 action for false arrest.” Case, 555 F.3d at 1326–27 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Further, where, as here, a judge or grand jury issues a warrant or indictment prior to an arrest, such intervening acts “br[eak] the chain of causation for the detention from the alleged false arrest.” Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999); see Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 170 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“It is well settled that if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.”); see also Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 1989). Pursuant to Franks, however, the existence of a warrant will not shield an officer from liability where the warrant was secured based upon an affidavit that contained 9 Case: 12-10478 Date Filed: 02/05/2013 Page: 10 of 15 misstatements made either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. W. Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 959 (11th Cir. 1982). A corollary of the above-stated rule is that “a warrant affidavit violates the Fourth Amendment when it contains omissions made intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit.” Madiwale v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 1997) (emphasis supplied) (internal quotation marks omitted). Omissions that are negligent rather than reckless are of no constitutional magnitude and will not invalidate a warrant. Id. at 1327. Further, “even intentional or reckless omissions will invalidate a warrant only if inclusion of the omitted facts would have prevented a finding of probable cause.” Id. “Doubtless it will often be difficult for an accused to prove that an omission was made intentionally or with reckless disregard rather than negligently unless he has somehow gained independent evidence that the affiant had acted from bad motive or recklessly in conducting his investigation and making the affidavit.” United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 329 (5th Cir. 1980).4 Where a plaintiff lacks direct evidence that the affiant has intentionally or recklessly omitted information from an affidavit, however, he can raise an inference of recklessness by pointing to “facts omitted from the affidavit [that] are clearly critical to a 4 Pursuant to Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit announced prior to October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in this circuit. 10 Case: 12-10478 Date Filed: 02/05/2013 Page: 11 of 15 finding of probable cause.” Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327; see also Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he warrant is valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause.”). Here, it is plain that Smith has adduced no direct evidence that Detective Matos omitted material information from the arrest affidavit either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. Thus, to overcome summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, Smith must identify certain facts omitted from the affidavit that “were so clearly material that every reasonable law officer would have known that their omission would lead to a search [or seizure] in violation of federal law.” Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). That he cannot do. Probable cause is “a standard well short of absolute certainty.” L.A. County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 615, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1993 (2007). “Th[e] standard is met when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion, but does not require convincing proof.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th 11 Case: 12-10478 Date Filed: 02/05/2013 Page: 12 of 15 Cir. 1998). The probable cause analysis is undertaken in light of the totality of the circumstances, and the standard “must be judged not with clinical detachment, but with a common sense view to the realities of normal life.” Craig v. Singletary, 127 F.3d 1030, 1042 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 1985)). Smith argues that the following factual inconsistencies, in addition to other minor details Detective Matos omitted from the warrant affidavit, would have defeated probable cause had they been disclosed to the judge who signed the warrant for Smith’s arrest: (1) Maynard’s initial description of both of his attackers as white males; (2) the color of the assailants’ pants, bandanas, and shirts; and (3) the fact that Palmer had smoked marijuana prior to the incident, which could have impaired his recollection. The district court thought these inconsistencies, in addition to certain credibility issues relating to Palmer, were clearly critical to a finding of probable cause. We cannot agree. We have previously stated that an informant’s tip is entitled to substantial weight in the probable cause calculus if it contains “an explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Detective Matos acted upon a voluntary statement made by Palmer, a witness who, though in custody, was 12 Case: 12-10478 Date Filed: 02/05/2013 Page: 13 of 15 promised nothing in return for his testimony. Palmer accurately described the exact time and location of the robbery (around 4 a.m. on Sigsbee Road in Orange Park, Florida), the number of suspects involved in the robbery (two), that both attackers were wearing bandanas to cover their faces, that a bicycle was stolen during the robbery, and that the bicycle was a shiny blue beach cruiser. Palmer also indicated that he had known Smith for over a year and confirmed Smith’s identity via his driver’s license photograph. Detective Matos had no reason to question Palmer’s veracity. In our view, the exhaustive detail of Palmer’s vivid—and largely accurate— description of the offense augurs strongly in favor of a finding of probable cause. See id. That is especially so given that Detective Matos corroborated Palmer’s statement by running a background check on Smith, which revealed that Smith had previously been arrested for accessory to armed robbery—an offense strikingly similar to the charged offense in the case at bar. See Case, 555 F.3d at 1327 (explaining that corroboration of an informant’s statement adds significantly to a finding of probable cause). In sum, armed with all of the facts at our command, we simply cannot say that Detective Matos omitted facts that “were so clearly material that every reasonable law officer would have known that their omission would lead to a search [or seizure] in violation of federal law.” Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327 13 Case: 12-10478 Date Filed: 02/05/2013 Page: 14 of 15 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Accordingly, the shroud of qualified immunity protects him. Further, and with regard to Palmer’s credibility, we note that courts around the country regularly sustain convictions based upon the testimony of witnesses with far less credibility than Palmer, so it would be passing strange to now declare that the credibility issues presented here, in light of the totality of the circumstances in this case and the detailed nature of Palmer’s statement, necessarily defeat probable cause such that no reasonable officer could have thought probable cause existed for Smith’s arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (explaining the standard required to overturn a conviction for lack of witness credibility); see also United States v. Hoskins, 628 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1980) (“A federal conviction . . . can be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness.”). To be sure, we do not condone Detective Matos’s failure to engage in further police work before pursuing a warrant for Smith’s arrest, and we are troubled by the omissions of certain facts from the affidavit eventually used to secure a warrant for Smith’s arrest. At the same time, however, we are reticent to judge the acts of police officers, undertaken in real time and on the front lines, through the finely wrought lens of 20/20 hindsight. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007). In a perfect world, Detective Matos would have included the 14 Case: 12-10478 Date Filed: 02/05/2013 Page: 15 of 15 alleged inconsistencies in the warrant affidavit. But perfection is not the standard by which his conduct is judged. Nor is negligence, for that matter. See Madiwale, 117 F.3d at 1327 (noting that the negligent omission of facts from an affidavit will not invalidate a warrant). Rather, qualified immunity protects officers in all cases except those in which the conduct at issue was “so obviously wrong, in the light of pre-existing law, that only a plainly incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing.” Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Detective Matos’s conduct was neither plainly incompetent nor a knowing violation of the law, and he is therefore shielded by the aegis of qualified immunity. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of Detective Matos. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 15