Opinion ID: 443049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Feasibility Issues

Text: 47 Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(b)(5) (1982), states in pertinent part: 48 The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard over the period of his working life. 49 (emphasis added). The section requires that an OSHA standard be both technologically and economically feasible. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1264. See also Donovan v. Castle & Cooke Foods, 692 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir.1982) (reviewing noise standard promulgated under Sec. 6(a) of the Act). Feasible is defined as capable of being done, American Textile, 452 U.S. at 508-09, 101 S.Ct. at 2490; Castle & Cooke, 692 F.2d at 648. We review the Secretary's feasibility determinations for substantial evidence. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 694 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir.1982); Castle & Cooke, 692 F.2d at 647 n. 8.
50 In finding that a standard is technologically feasible, the Secretary is not restricted to the state of the art in the regulated industry. Boise Cascade, 694 F.2d at 589. The Act is designed to be technology-forcing. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1264. Hence, [s]o long as [the Secretary] presents substantial evidence that companies acting vigorously and in good faith can develop the technology, OSHA can require industry to meet [standards] never attained anywhere. Boise Cascade, 694 F.2d at 589-90 (quoting United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1264) (emphasis added). In fact, for our purposes here--reviewing OSHA's general rulemaking for the purpose of protecting worker health--all OSHA need demonstrate is that modern technology has at least conceived some industrial strategies or devices which are likely to be capable of meeting the PEL and which the industries are generally capable of adopting. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1266. Thus all OSHA need demonstrate is a general presumption of feasibility for an industry. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1269 (original emphasis). 26 51 We find that substantial evidence supports the Secretary's finding that the 10 ug/m 3 PEL is technologically feasible. 52
53 The Secretary found that the standard is technologically feasible through engineering and work practice controls for most of the affected industry. 43 Fed.Reg. 19601. For the rest of the industry, 54 The final standard requires that engineering controls and work practices be used to control employee exposure to inorganic arsenic, except to the extent that the employer can show they are not feasible. If all feasible engineering and work practice controls do not succeed in reducing exposures below the permissible exposure limit, they must be supplemented by respiratory protection. 55 43 Fed.Reg. at 19616. See 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.1018(g). In high-exposure areas of some plants, the standard would have to be met through the supplemental use of respirators. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19601, 19617. The Secretary also specifically found that respirators alone were not an adequate substitute for engineering and work practice controls. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19616-19619. 27 Because conditions at each plant may vary significantly, see 43 Fed.Reg. at 19601-02; see also supra note 9, the Secretary provided that the standard would be met through the development of individual compliance plans. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19601. The Secretary found that this approach would provide maximum protection without heavy respirator use. Id. 56
57 ASARCO and Kennecott argue petitioners' challenges to the regulations on both technological and economic feasibility grounds. Their challenges on technological grounds fall into three categories--(1) the use of respirators, (2) allegations that OSHA has impermissibly deferred its feasibility findings to the compliance stage, and (3) the alleged vagueness of the standard. Koppers, et al. (amicus curiae) challenge the feasibility of the standard as applied to the arsenical chemicals industry. We briefly address these challenges below. 58 (1) Use of respirators. Petitioners claim that the standard is admittedly infeasible because OSHA found that the five domestic smelters with the highest arsenic intake could not meet the standard through engineering and work practice controls alone and that supplemental respirator use would be required in high exposure areas in those plants. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19600. These smelters comprise 39% of the nation's smelting capacity. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19602 (Table I). Kennecott contends that the two other high-intake smelters should be added to this list, bringing the total number of smelters in which respirators would be used up to half of the country's smelting capacity. 59 OSHA demonstrates, however, that engineering and work practice controls, within the industry's present grasp, actually can achieve compliance for 11 of the 16 smelters with engineering and work practices and only very limited use of respirators. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19603. At the other smelters, the evidence shows that compliance is possible with only limited to moderate respirator use. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19603. 28 60 Petitioners argue that what OSHA terms limited-to-moderate use really means that respirators will be used extensively in the production areas, the heart of the smelting operation, and not used outside the production areas. Thus, they argue that the standard actually requires extensive respirator use in all areas central to the smelting process. Because the standard requires such use of respirators, petitioners argue that the engineering and work practice controls must therefore be infeasible. Petitioners greatly overstate the use of respirators. See 43 Fed.Reg. at 19600-04. We find the respirator use envisioned in the arsenic standard to be merely supplemental to engineering and work practice controls. The limited respirator use that the standard requires does not in any way render the standard infeasible, let alone admittedly infeasible. Cf. American Textile, 452 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (where Court approved OSHA standard that relied on heavy respirator use until engineering and work practice controls would be technologically feasible); 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.1043(e)(1) (cotton dust standard). 61 Petitioners also challenge the standard's inclusion of respirators on statutory grounds. Petitioners offer some unpersuasive contentions concerning the interaction of Sec. 3(8) and Sec. 6(b)(5) of the Act. Section 3(8) of the Act defines an OSHA standard. An OSHA standard is one which requires adoption or use of one or more practices ... reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment.... 29 U.S.C. Sec. 652(8). Petitioners' argument here is that although feasibility for Sec. 6(b)(5) purposes may mean capable of being done, Sec. 3(8) limits the means of compliance to those that are reasonably necessary or appropriate. ASARCO claims that the standard, as applied to the five high-intake smelters is redundant, and hence not reasonably necessary or appropriate because it requires engineering and work practice controls even though only respirators will be able to reduce worker exposure to the required 10 ug/m. 3 In support of this argument, ASARCO cites American Textile, 452 U.S. at 513-14 n. 32, 101 S.Ct. at 2492-93 n. 32, where the Supreme Court generally reserved the question of the applicability of Sec. 3(8) in Sec. 6(b)(5) feasibility determinations. 62 We reject petitioners' contention that the limited supplemental use of respirators renders the standard unreasonable or inappropriate. Their argument rests on the notion that respirator use is redundant and somehow unreasonably superfluous. As we have already explained, see supra note 27, the many problems associated with exclusive respirator use render respirators woefully inadequate, standing alone, to protect worker health. Hence it is incorrect to characterize them as redundant rather than as supplemental. Cf. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d 1189, 1269 (where supplemental respirator use did not render standard unreasonable). 63 Moreover, petitioners misconstrue the extent of Sec. 3(8)'s modification of Sec. 6(b)(5) as set forth in American Textile. There, the Court noted that in IUD v. API it had used Sec. 3(8)'s reasonably necessary language to support the requirement that the Secretary find a significant risk before he could regulate a toxin. The Court also noted that a standard that required the use of five respirators where one would suffice could conceivably be redundant and hence not reasonably necessary or appropriate. The situation here is completely different from the situation noted by the Court--respirator use under the arsenic standard is merely supplemental, and not redundant because respirators alone are inadequate. See supra note 27. Furthermore, the Court in American Textile rather clearly rejected an argument that Sec. 3(8) had the kind of impact that petitioners suggest. In rejecting an argument that Sec. 3(8)'s reasonably necessary language required the Secretary to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of any proposed standard, the Court indicated that although Sec. 3(8) might modify Sec. 6(b)(5), the former section was not intended to supplant the latter. 452 U.S. at 513, 101 S.Ct. at 2492; cf. Castle & Cooke, 692 F.2d at 648. 64 Petitioners also contend that Sec. 3(8)'s language requires OSHA to set conditions and requirements more specific than those set forth in the arsenic standard. Petitioners focus on that part of the new standard which requires the high-intake smelters to use work practice and engineering controls as much as possible and then to rely on respirators. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1910.1018(g)(1)(ii). OSHA's standard requires the smelters to devise their own compliance programs which OSHA will then review. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19616-19617. Petitioners argue that the standard is not reasonable or appropriate because OSHA has not told them specifically what technology to employ. They assert that requiring them to devise their own compliance plans is unreasonable, thereby violating Sec. 3(8). 65 Petitioners' specificity contention lacks merit largely because Sec. 6(b)(5) states that performance desired and objective criteria are required only whenever practicable. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 655(b)(5). Because of the individualized operations of most smelters, OSHA's explanation that such specificity is not practicable here is reasonable. See 43 Fed.Reg. at 19601-19604. OSHA's approach has been accepted by other courts and we also accept it. See United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1274-77; AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C.Cir.1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981) (cotton dust); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir.1978), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 38, 65 L.Ed.2d 1180 (1980) (coke oven emissions); Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1310 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1998, 44 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975) (vinyl chloride); cf. Industrial Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C.Cir.1974) (asbestos). 66 Thus, we find that OSHA easily satisfies the test for general feasibility: OSHA must prove a reasonable possibility that the typical firm will be able to develop and install engineering and work practice controls that can meet the PEL in most of its operations. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1272 (technological feasibility not found). 29 See also id. at 1269-70 (explaining how OSHA general feasibility requirement may be met). 67 (2) Deferral to Compliance Stage. Petitioners make two related contentions with regard to OSHA's approach that we have just approved. They argue that by requiring industries to adopt all compliance measures that are feasible through consultation with the Secretary: (1) OSHA has impermissibly deferred its rulemaking duty to the compliance stage, and (2) by so doing, OSHA has impermissibly shifted the burden of proving feasibility to the industry. Both contentions are unpersuasive. 68 ASARCO supports these contentions by citing an apparent conflict between Boise Cascade in this circuit and United Steelworkers in the D.C. Circuit. Boise Cascade requires the Secretary to bear the initial burden of proof as to feasibility in both rulemaking (pre-enforcement) and compliance (enforcement) proceedings. 694 F.2d at 589. United Steelworkers indicates that, once the presumption of general feasibility has been proved in rulemaking proceedings, the burden of proof shifts to the industry in enforcement proceedings. 647 F.2d at 1269-70. 69 We need not concern ourselves with the potential intercircuit conflict as to the burden of proof in enforcement proceedings because neither this case nor United Steelworkers concerns a review of an enforcement proceeding. United Steelworkers is a rulemaking feasibility case. Boise Cascade is an enforcement case. We here only adopt the United Steelworkers rule that only general feasibility need be proved in rulemaking/pre-enforcement proceedings. This does not conflict in any way with Boise Cascade. See Boise Cascade, 694 F.2d at 590 (nature of burden at enforcement stage is different from burden at rulemaking stage). 30 70 (3) Vagueness. ASARCO's contention that the standard is unconstitutionally vague is without merit. We have rejected a similar challenge against a noise standard of virtually identical specificity. See Plum Creek Lumber Co. v. Hutton, 608 F.2d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir.1979). 31 71 (4) Arsenical chemical industry challenges. Amici allege that the Secretary has not found the 10 ug/m 3 PEL technologically feasible for their industry. See United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1277 (where court reviewed Secretary's feasibility findings for each affected industry challenging the standard). Their only support for this contention is a statement by one of OSHA's experts that the arsenical chemicals industry could not reduce the PEL to 4 ug/m 3 through engineering and work practices alone. OSHA's experts, however, actually found that even a 4 ug/m 3 PEL could be reached by the glass and desiccant manufacturing industries without respirator use, but that herbicide, pesticide, wood preservative, and lead arsenical manufacturers would require some respirator use to reach 4 ug/m 3 . OSHA determined that those industries' manufacturing processes could be enclosed and that engineering and work practice controls alone could indeed meet the higher 10 ug/m 3 PEL. Only the lead arsenicals industry would require limited respirator use. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19604. OSHA then found that the standard was feasible for the arsenical chemicals industry. OSHA's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 32
72 A standard is not economically infeasible because it is financially burdensome or even if it threatens the survival of some companies within an industry. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1265 (citation omitted). Similarly, [a] standard is feasible if it does not threaten 'massive dislocation' to, ... or imperil the existence of ... the industry. Id. (citations omitted). See also American Textile, 452 U.S. at 514, 101 S.Ct. at 2493 (Congress was aware that the Act would impose real and substantial costs of compliance on industry). We review the Secretary's economic feasibility findings for substantial evidence. Boise Cascade, 694 F.2d at 589. 73
74 OSHA's economic feasibility findings, although open to criticism, are supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, OSHA's methodology complies with the guidelines for proving economic feasibility set out in United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1266-67: [T]he agency must ... provide a reasonable assessment of the likely range of costs of its standard, and the likely effects of those costs on the industry. Id. at 1266. We adopt those guidelines. 75 In making its economic feasibility finding, OSHA relied on four studies by consultants, one of which projected $32 million in annualized costs of compliance. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19604. Giving specific reasons, OSHA adjusted industry projections of $94.7 million down to derive a $37-63 million range for annualized compliance costs (low estimate/high estimate). 43 Fed.Reg. at 19605-06. OSHA then estimated the industry's ability to pay by averaging annual pretax profits in the years 1966-75. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19606. That amount totaled $525 million. Id. OSHA determined that $30 million of the costs could be passed back to the industry's customers, the copper mines. Id. OSHA estimated that the passback could account for all of the low-estimate costs, and half of the high estimate. Id. OSHA then estimated the cost of compliance with the standard (using the high estimate) as 6% of the industry's average pretax profits. Id. 76
77 Petitioners challenge OSHA's economic feasibility findings on several grounds, including: (1) OSHA did not assess the impact on the competitive stability of the industry should ASARCO's Tacoma plant close due to high costs of compliance with the arsenic standard, (2) OSHA did not take into consideration regulatory costs imposed by other statutes such as the Clean Air Act, (3) OSHA incorrectly assumed that industry could passback costs to the mines, and (4) OSHA should have assessed profits solely from smelting operations and not from an entire company's profits. We address these arguments in turn. 78 Tacoma. Compliance with the arsenic standard would indisputably fall most heavily on ASARCO's Tacoma smelter. ASARCO's arguments centering on the Tacoma smelter, however, are now moot. After briefing in this case, ASARCO informed us that it planned to cease copper smelting operations at its Tacoma plant by June 30, 1985. The Tacoma plant will remain open to continue processing smelting by-products from ASARCO's other plants. There is no indication that ASARCO decided to cease copper smelting operations as a result of the OSHA arsenic standard. In its letter to the court, ASARCO cited the depressed state of the copper smelting industry, the shortage of copper ore concentrates that can be profitably processed at Tacoma, and other environmental regulations whose costs were many times higher than those envisioned in the occupational arsenic standard. 33 We therefore need no longer consider ASARCO's economic feasibility challenges as they pertain to the Tacoma plant. 79 Other Regulatory Costs. Petitioners contend that OSHA's economic cost estimates are skewed because OSHA failed to take into account the substantial costs associated with regulations promulgated under other health and pollution laws, such as the Clean Air Act (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (1982). Petitioners contend, and OSHA agrees, that these costs were not felt until after OSHA made its feasibility findings. Petitioners expect these non-OSHA-imposed costs to reach $389.3 million per year by 1987--86% of the industry's annual pretax profits. 34 80 Petitioners' argument fails here largely because OSHA is not required to be prescient. OSHA is only required to use the best evidence available at the time it reaches its decision. United Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1267. OSHA's estimates of pretax profits reflect all regulatory costs for the years considered. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19606. Petitioners' contention here is relevant, not to the adequacy of OSHA's initial feasibility finding, but instead to the reasonableness of OSHA's refusal to reopen the record on feasibility. We consider this argument infra, 746 F.2d at pp. 501 - 502. 81 Passback. ASARCO also contends that OSHA's passback plan is not supported by substantial evidence. Petitioners argue that because of the structure of the smelting industry, a passback may drive business to foreign smelters. It appears, oddly enough, that OSHA relied on an ASARCO annual report to support its findings. 43 Fed.Reg. at 19606. Moreover, petitioners again rely primarily on evidence collected after OSHA's determination was completed. See infra, 746 F.2d at pp. 501 - 502. Given conflicting evidence and OSHA's use of industry-supplied evidence, we defer to OSHA on this point. 82 Profits. ASARCO contends that OSHA's profit estimates for ASARCO should have been drawn solely from ASARCO's smelting business, rather than from the entire company. OSHA counters with evidence that ASARCO's operations are highly integrated. (Ex. 111-7, Appendix B). Relatedly, ASARCO argues that OSHA failed to consider adequately the industry's debt capability. OSHA points to evidence to rebut that contention. (Ex. 135A, p. V-13). ASARCO points to contrary evidence (Ex. 202-7H, p. 2-35). We find the evidence to be comparable. On both points we defer to agency expertise. See American Textile, 452 U.S. at 523, 101 S.Ct. at 2497. 83 In sum, OSHA's economic feasibility determinations are supported by substantial evidence. OSHA is not required to write an economic treatise on the smelting industry. See American Textile, 452 U.S. at 530 n. 55, 101 S.Ct. at 2501 n. 55. It need only show that the long-term profitability and competitiveness of the industry will not be threatened by the standard. Id. We find that OSHA's calculations were reasonably made and were based on the best available evidence. We also note that the Steelworkers support imposition of the standards. See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 665 (D.C.Cir.1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub. nom., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981). The Steelworkers' support suggests that continued existence of the industry is not imperiled. Id.