Opinion ID: 2331517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guilt PhaseProsecutor's Remarks Regarding Cooperating Co Conspirator

Text: Miller next contends that the prosecutor improperly bolstered the testimony of cooperating co-conspirator Blakeney during direct examination and on re-direct. Miller complains of the following testimony of Blakeney elicited by the prosecutor during direct examination: Question: And is it correct that you expect to receive a sentence in exchange for your truthful testimony here today: is that correct? Answer: Yes.    Question: So the total sentence you expect to receive in exchange for your truthful testimony is double life to run consecutive to one another plus 22 and a half to 45 years incarceration, that's life without parole, is that your understanding? Answer: Yes.    Question: I'd ask you to turn to Page 2, sir, Paragraph No. 3. Do you see at the bottom of Paragraph No. 3 it says as part of this agreement, Herbert Blakeney will neither attempt to protect any person or entity through omission or false information nor falsely implicate any person or entity. Is that correct, sir? Answer: Yes. Question: No. 4 where it says, Herbert Blakeney will testify truthfully, is that your understanding of the agreement, sir? Answer: Yes. (N.T. September 21, 1999, pp. 41-43) (emphasis added). Miller alleges that the prosecutor again impermissibly assured the jury of Blakeney's veracity on re-direct: Question: Do you remember being in my office about two weeks ago with homicide detectives for a session when we went over what you had said in each of the two statements and what you had said in the Preliminary Hearing under oath on September 3, 1998? Answer: Yes. Question: Do you remember being in my office about a week before that as well doing the same thing? Answer: Yes. Question: Do you remember what I said was the most important thing to say at all times when you were DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection. THE COURT: Excuse me, that will be sustained. (N.T. September 21, 1999, pp. 184-185). Miller argues that, even though the court sustained the objection of defense counsel on re-direct, it failed to give a curative instruction, which left the jury with the impression that the prosecutor vouched for Blakeney's testimony. Miller relies on Commonwealth v. Tann, 500 Pa. 593, 459 A.2d 322 (1983), in which the defendant was convicted of a racially-motivated murder. Two witnesses testifying against Tann did so pursuant to plea agreements; the attorneys for both witnesses testified at trial that their clients waived their privilege against self-incrimination and would tell the truth as part of their bargain with the prosecution. This Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the Commonwealth's tactic invited the inference that, if [Tann] had testified and had told the truth, his testimony would have confirmed his guilt. Id. at 328. We reasoned that the Commonwealth cannot: call to the attention of the jury the fact that a witness, who is associated with the accused in the activity giving rise to the criminal charges, has waived his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and is taking the witness stand to tell the truth. This tactic has the effect of emphasizing to the jury that the defendant, who is associated with the witness, has the same opportunity to waive his constitutional rights and tell the truth. The defendant is unduly prejudiced by this blatant invitation for the jury to draw an inference from the fact that the witness is foregoing his constitutional right against self-incrimination. This tends to spotlight the accused if he fails to do the same thing and clearly invites an improper prejudicial inference from the jury. Id. (emphasis in original; internal footnote omitted). In Commonwealth v. Bricker, 525 Pa. 362, 581 A.2d 147 (1990), the trial court allowed actual documents setting forth the terms and conditions of the deals reached between various Governmental authorities and [two cooperating co-conspirators to be] sent out with the jury during their deliberations. Id. at 154. One of the plea agreements stated that the co-conspirator would: (1) provide complete and truthful information to ... the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ... and testify... as required; (2) provide complete and truthful information concerning any and all illegal activities in which [he] participated; and (3) provide complete and truthful information about the deaths of the victims. Id. The agreement further provided that if at any time it is determined that [the co-conspirator] has not provided complete and truthful information as called for in this agreement ... or has at any time knowingly made a false statement under oath in connection with the terms of this agreement, [he] will be subjecting himself to a prosecution for perjury.... Id. The plea agreements were signed by the United States Attorney, the District Attorney for the county, the Attorney General for the Commonwealth, the co-conspirator, and the co-conspirator's lawyer. This Court reversed Bricker's conviction, finding that the decision of the trial court to allow these documents to go out with the jury was manifestly unreasonable. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Cappy reasoned that: [T]he introduction of the plea agreements served as silent witnesses, causing the same prejudice to [Bricker] as we held to be reversible error in [ Tann ]. With the agreements before them, the jurors could reasonably infer that [Bricker] had the same opportunity as [the cooperating co-conspirators] to cooperate with the investigation ..., and chose to remain silent. The fact that [Bricker] did not take the stand in his own defense further bolsters his claim that there is a reasonable possibility that this error might have contributed to the verdict.    It would have been appropriate for the Commonwealth to reveal the existence of the agreements, and the parameters thereof, through the testimony of the witnesses. If they still felt it necessary to enter the documents into evidence they simply could have redacted portions of the agreements to delete the prejudicial aspects, as requested by defense counsel, prior to submission of them to the jury. To allow the jurors to read these unredacted documents at their leisure during deliberations runs afoul of the Tann case and the requirements of fundamental fairness.    [B]y admitting into evidence these agreements that vouch for their credibility, the government was testifying sub silentio that  just this once  these lowlife witnesses should be believed; that  during this trial  they are crowned with the governmental halo of being on the right side and are therefore credible. The jury neither cautioned to look upon the testimony with disfavor nor to realize that the witnesses may falsely blame others because of some corrupt and wicked motive, were persuaded to believe that the witnesses were telling the truth because the government's own documents said so. This impermissible vouching for witnessesespecially witnesses of this caliberoffends our sense of decency and our notion of the fundamental fairness inherent in our judicial system. Bricker, 581 A.2d at 154-155. Thus, Bricker and Tann stand for the proposition that the Commonwealth can reveal the existence and terms of a plea agreement, but cannot take any further action that would indicate to the jury that the prosecutor vouches for the testimony, such as introducing the written plea agreement for the jury to peruse during deliberation, as in Bricker, or putting counsel for the co-conspirators on the stand to vouch for the veracity of their clients, as in Tann. Moreover, the trial court must give an instruction to the jury cautioning them to look upon the testimony with disfavor and realize that such witnesses may falsely blame others because of some corrupt and wicked motive. Bricker, 581 A.2d at 155. In reviewing a claim of improper prosecutorial comments, our scope of review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that the Commonwealth did not act improperly. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 541 Pa. 211, 662 A.2d 621, 638-639 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 116 S.Ct. 945, 133 L.Ed.2d 870 (1996). Generally, comments by a prosecutor do not constitute reversible error unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict. Id. at 639. In the case sub judice, the prosecutor's use of the word truthful in his direct examination of Blakeney is merely an articulation of the parameters of the plea agreement, that Blakeney would provide truthful testimony and a guilty plea, in exchange for life imprisonment (as opposed to death). Defense counsel spent most of his time on cross-examination attacking Blakeney's credibility. Thus, on re-direct, the prosecutor simply attempted to rehabilitate the credibility of Blakeney by showing that the cooperating co-conspirator had consistently told the same story. It is well settled that as long as a prosecutor does not assert his personal opinions, he or she may, within reasonable limits, comment on the credibility of a Commonwealth witness. This is especially true when the credibility of the witness has been previously attacked by the defense. Simmons, 662 A.2d at 639 (citing Commonwealth v. Barren, 501 Pa. 493, 462 A.2d 233 (1983)). The prosecutor in the present case did not assert his personal opinions. Accordingly, the concerns articulated by this Court in Tann and Bricker are not implicated here; in fact, this case conforms to the requisites of the dictum in Bricker. Moreover, the court warned the jury that Blakeney might not be telling the truth via the following instruction: I will now instruct you on the law regarding accomplice testimony. When a Commonwealth witness was so involved in the crime charged that he was an accomplice, his testimony has to be judged by special precautionary rules. Experience shows that an accomplice when caught will often try to place the blame falsely on someone else. He might testify falsely in the hope of obtaining favorable treatment or for some corrupt or wicked motive. On the other hand, an accomplice may be a perfectly truthful witness. The special rules that I shall give you are meant to help you distinguish between truthful and false accomplice testimony. An accomplice may be defined as a person who knowingly and voluntarily cooperates with or aids another in the commission of a crime. In view of the evidence of Mr. Herbert Blakeney's criminal involvement and convictions for the murders and robbery of Mr. Charles Love and Mr. Brian Barry, you must regard him as an accomplice in those crimes and apply the special rules to his testimony. These are the special rules that apply to accomplice testimony: Experience shows that after being caught in the commission of a crime a person may falsely blame others because of some corrupt and wicked motive. On the other hand sometimes such a person may tell the truth about how he and others committed the crime together. In deciding whether or not to believe Herbert Blakeney, you are to be guided by the following principles which apply specially to his testimony: First, the testimony of Herbert Blakeney should be looked upon with disfavor as coming from corrupt and polluted source; second, you should closely and separately examine the testimony of Herbert Blakeney and accept his testimony with caution and care; third, you should consider separately whether his testimony is supported in whole or in part by other evidence aside from his own testimony, for if it is supported by independent evidence, it is more dependable. (N.T. September 24, 1999, pp. 18-20) (emphasis added). As we have already noted, the law presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the court. Commonwealth v. Travers, supra, 768 A.2d at 847. Therefore, we hold that the questions asked by the prosecutor of Blakeney, during direct examination and on re-direct, did not impermissibly bolster the latter's testimony and did not run afoul of the ... requirements of fundamental fairness. [12] Bricker, 581 A.2d at 155.