Opinion ID: 1759461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: countervailing evidence

Text: Because we have found that the plaintiff carried her initial burden of proof in this case, the burden shifted to the candidate to present countervailing evidence to overcome the plaintiff's proof. In this case, we have already found that the plaintiff's objective evidence was sufficient to prove that Mr. Richmond's domicile in fact changed on or before December 12, 1997, when he filed his first sworn Notice of Candidacy listing 4809 Eastview Drive as his domicile address. That being the case, we have already implicitly rejected Mr. Richmond's primary claim that his domicile never changed from his domicile of origin at his family home located at 8701 Lomond Road. However, we construe Mr. Richmond's arguments and evidence to assert, alternatively, that, even if he did change his domicile to 4809 Eastview Drive at some point in the past, he changed his domicile back to his family home at 8701 Lomond Road in early 2003, more than two years immediately preceding the scheduled election for City Council District D on April 2, 2005. As we have already said, Louisiana law recognizes a legal presumption against change of domicile, and thus requires that a party seeking to show that domicile has been changed to overcome that presumption by presenting positive and satisfactory proof of establishment of domicile as a matter of fact with the intention of remaining in the new place and of abandoning the former domicile. Becker, 03-2493 at 11, 854 So.2d at 871; Russell, 00-2595 at 5, 780 So.2d at 1051. At this point in our analysis, the burden of showing the change of domicile back to 8701 Lomond Road falls on Mr. Richmond. We must therefore consider whether the countervailing evidence presented by Mr. Richmond qualifies as positive and satisfactory proof of establishment of domicile as a matter of fact at 8701 Lomond Road on or before April 2, 2003, two years immediately preceding to the scheduled election in this case. The record contains testimony from the candidate, his mother (Ms. Gaines), and his brother (Sidney Richmond), all of whom stated that he moved back into his mother's house in either January or February 2003, in order to assist his mother in caring for his ailing stepfather. At that time, the witnesses stated, Sidney Richmond and his fiancé (later wife) started living alone in the house at 4809 Eastview Drive, at least for a short time, after which other family members and tenants allegedly occupied that address. The candidate claims that, from the day in January or February 2003 that he moved back until the present, he has always lived at 8701 Lomond Road. According to the testimony, Ms. Gaines moved to another location in June 2004, after the death of her second husband, and the candidate thereupon lived alone in the family home at 8701 Lomond Road. The candidate and his witnesses also testified concerning his long-standing committed relationship to the community where he grew up, including his mentoring activities and his involvement with programs at the community park located across the street from his family home, where he coached Little League baseball, among other things. According to the witnesses, from the date of his father's death in 1980 until he donated his interest to his mother in 2001 to help her refinance the home, the candidate had an ownership interest in the house at 8701 Lomond Road obtained through inheritance from his father. The testimony also indicates that the candidate has always had a telephone number at 8701 Lomond Road, that he has always received mail at that address, and that he has always had unlimited access to the house. The witnesses said that Mr. Richmond has always had his own room at 8701 Lomond Street, where he keeps clothing and toiletries, and that he has always entertained there. Finally, as the district court noted, Mr. Richmond unequivocally stated that his intent has always been for his domicile to remain at the Lomond Street address. In support of his arguments, Mr. Richmond submitted the following documentary evidence: (1) Bank One Money Market Savings Account statement, addressed to Mr. Richmond at 8701 Lomond Road, dated December 31, 2004; (2) GE Interest Plus Summary of Investments, Interest, and Redemptions, addressed to Mr. Richmond at 8701 Lomond Road, for the period, February 26, 2004 through March 25, 2004; (3) excerpted pages from the Greater New Orleans telephone book white pages for 1986, 1988, 1990, 1999, 2000, and 2002, listing a number for Children's Telephone or for Sidney and Cedric Richmond at 8701 Lomond Road; (4) Amended Offer from GE Medical Systems to Sidney Richmond for the position of regional sales manager located in New Orleans, dated March 27, 2003 [17] ; (5) Bank One statements addressed to Sidney Richmond at 4809 Eastview Drive, for June 11 through August 23, 2003 and August 13 through September 11, 2003 [18] ; (6) copy of Mr. Richmond's Louisiana Personal Driver's License, listing his address as 8701 Lomond Road, issued November 17, 2004; (7) Liberty Bank statements addressed to Residents for Cedric L. Richmond at 8701 Lomond Road for each month of 2002, 2003, and 2004; (8) series of checks from Mr. Richmond to his mother, Ms. Gaines, for various amounts, the earliest of which is dated November 2, 2000, and the latest of which is dated December 5, 2001 [19] ; (9) Petition to be Placed in Possession of Estate filed by the candidate's mother on February 10, 1982 [20] ; (10) affidavit of Mr. Richmond's uncle, James E. Jackson, swearing that he resided at 4809 Eastview Drive from August 2003 until May 2004, and that he resided there at the time of the May 20, 2004 burglary [21] ; (11) affidavit of Jennifer White that she lived at 4809 Eastview Drive in New Orleans from 1997 through 1999 [22] ; and (12) Eustis Guillmet's Voter Registration Records. [23] Weighed against the relevant documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff, the above evidence does not qualify as positive and satisfactory proof of establishment of domicile as a matter of fact with the intention of remaining in the new place as required by Louisiana case law for proving a change of domicile. Becker, 03-2493 at 11, 854 So.2d at 871; Russell, 00-2595 at 5, 780 So.2d at 1051. Mr. Richmond has failed to prove that he changed his domicile back to his family home at 8701 Lomond Road in early 2003, more than two years immediately preceding to the April 2, 2005, scheduled election. The district court judgment in this case is based on its decision to credit the candidate's uncontroverted testimony, and the majority opinion of the court of appeal affirms the district court's judgment, at least in part because it did not find manifest error in the district court's credibility call. Longstanding case law from this court demands that courts of appeal give great deference to a trier of fact's factual findings based on credibility judgments. See Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 845 (La.1989). See also Stobart v. State, Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). The principles set forth in Rosell have been uniformly affirmed in numerous cases since it was issued. However, even in Rosell, we stated that [w]here documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Id. Recently, we clarified that principle, stating as follows: There is no legitimate conflict in testimony where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story presented by the witness is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact-finder could not give credence to the witness's testimony. Faced with such circumstances, the court of appeal may find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. Henderson v. Nissan Motor Corp., 2003-606 (La.2/6/04), 869 So.2d 62, 68-69 (internal citations to Stobart, 617 So.2d 880, 882, omitted). The objective, documentary evidence in this case clearly contradicts Mr. Richmond's testimony that he changed his domicile back to his family home at 8701 Lomond Road in early 2003 (not just took up residence partially from January 2003 through April 2005), and this is so regardless of whether he lived alternately in two residences. This finding is based principally on two matters. First, records submitted in evidence indicate that Mr. Richmond continued to claim a Louisiana Homestead Exemption on 4809 Eastview Drive through the end of 2004. According to La.Rev. Stat. 47:1703(B), the status of real property in Orleans Parish for homestead exemption purposes on the first day of August of each year shall determine its ... exemption from taxation for the following calendar year. That being the case, Mr. Richmond's act of signing the 2004 Homestead Exemption Application form is strong evidence that he continued to consider 4809 Eastview Drive his domicile at least through August 1, 2003. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, Mr. Richmond certified in his sworn, notarized Notice of Candidacy for election to the office of State Representative, 101st Representative District, filed on September 19, 2003, that his domicile address was 4809 Eastview Drive. Mr. Richmond's September 19, 2003, statement under oath is positive proof of his intent concerning domicile on that date. Those two pieces of evidence clearly show that Mr. Richmond continued to consider the 4809 Eastview Drive address as his principal establishment at least through September 9, 2003. In the past decade, this court has considered four somewhat relevant cases in which the holdings favored candidates- Becker v. Dean, 03-2493, 854 So.2d 864; Russell v. Goldsby, 00-2595, 780 So.2d 1048, Dixon v. Hughes, 587 So.2d 679; and Pattan v. Fields, 95-2375, 661 So.2d 1320. In all four of those cases, the major difference was that the challengers had weaker cases and this court found that they failed to carry their outset burdens of proof. In the case involving the candidate, Yvonne Hughes, which was one of the cases relied on by the court of appeal in this case, the notice of candidacy was filed outside of the relevant time period, whereas in this case the September 19, 2003, form falls within the relevant two-year period immediately preceding the election. See Hughes, 587 So.2d 679. As previously stated, any doubt concerning the qualifications of a candidate should be resolved in favor of allowing the candidate to run for public office. However, the record evidence in this case leaves no doubt that Mr. Richmond was not qualified to run for New Orleans City Council District D because he was not domiciled in the district at least two years immediately preceding the April 2, 2005, election, as required by Home Rule Charter, City of New Orleans, § 3-104. The well-documented policy set forth in numerous Louisiana cases favoring candidacy cannot prevail in the face of so much evidence that the candidate does not meet the qualifications of the office he seeks. The law as applied to the facts governs our disposition in this case.