Opinion ID: 2061453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Carroll's Appeal.

Text: Carroll mounts four challenges on appeal. First he claims the evidence in the record is insufficient to sustain his convictions for either robbery or assault. Second he cites error in the court's denial of his request for substitute counsel. Third he insists the court erred when it instructed the jury on a theory of joint criminal conduct. Finally he cites errors by trial counsel which he believes should be reserved for postconviction relief. We shall consider the arguments in turn, combining our discussion on sufficiency of the proof with Carroll's argument concerning joint criminal conduct. A. Sufficiency of Evidence; Joint Criminal Conduct. At trial, Carroll's defense counsel joined in the introduction of his admissions to paramedics and police, evidently hoping the jury would view him as no more than an innocent bystander. The strategy succeeded, in part, inasmuch as Carroll escaped conviction for attempted murder. On appeal Carroll claims the statements must be viewed with suspicion, a confused mixture of fact and fiction planting doubt that he was even present at the Kum & Go at the time of the shooting. We find no merit in this contention. Carroll's recitation of events surrounding the robbery was substantially corroborated by eyewitnesses who heard gunshots, saw two black men fleeing the store, and observed a getaway car matching the one abandoned in a corn field near the ditch where Carroll was found unconscious. Carroll contends that even if it is assumed he was at the scene of the crime, the evidentiary record was insufficient to support his conviction for robbery. The State concedes he could not be convicted under this record as a principal. But it asserts the record amply supports his conviction as an aider and abettor. We agree. To sustain a conviction on the theory of aiding and abetting, the record must contain substantial evidence that the accused assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by active participation in it or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission. State v. Lewis, 514 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1994) (quoting State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Iowa 1977)). An accused's participation in a crime may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed. Id. (quoting State v. Miles, 346 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Iowa 1984)). By Carroll's own account he arrived at the Kum & Go with the person who committed the robbery. His claim that he believed they were only stopping for directions is belied by proof of the remote and inconvenient place they parked, behind the store. Carroll admitted he saw the other man pull out a gun, demand money, and force November toward a back room. Having seen this, Carroll neither left, intervened, nor protested. Instead he accompanied the gunman and November to the hallway behind the counter. According to November, when the gun misfired the gunman turned to his accomplice for assistance, an act supporting the inference that Carroll actually owned or furnished the pistol. Again, by Carroll's own account and the testimony of witnesses, the two left the scene together. Given this proof of Carroll's presence, countenance, and conduct before and after the robbery, a reasonable jury could find Carroll guilty of robbery under Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.2 as an aider and abettor. The record is equally convincing, and appropriate, on the jury's verdict finding Carroll guilty of simple assault. See Iowa Code § 708.1 (defining assault); State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979) (assault is a lesser-included offense of attempted murder). Carroll insists, again, that he could not be convicted of assault as a principal. The evidence was however sufficient to support his conviction under a theory of joint criminal conduct submitted by the court over Carroll's objection. Iowa Code section 703.2 provides: When two or more persons, acting in concert, knowingly participate in a public offense, each is responsible for the acts of the other done in furtherance of the commission of the offense or escape therefrom, and each person's guilt will be the same as that of the person so acting, unless the act was one which the person could not reasonably expect to be done in the furtherance of the commission of the offense. The elements for imposing joint criminal liability are: 1. Defendant must be acting in concert with another. 2. Defendant must knowingly be participating in a public offense. 3. A different crime must be committed by another participant in furtherance of defendant's offense. 4. The commission of the different crime must be reasonably foreseen. State v. Hohle, 510 N.W.2d 847, 848 (Iowa 1994). `[I]n furtherance of' is not limited to acts done to promote or advance the underlying crime, but includes acts done `while furthering' that offense. State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 844 (Iowa 1994). In Satern we distinguished joint criminal conduct from aiding and abetting as follows: Under section 703.1, the aider and abettor is held liable for the same crime which he or she has knowingly aided the principal in committing, either by act of participation in it or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission. Joint criminal conduct, on the other hand, takes the enterprise a step further. It contemplates two actsthe crime the joint actor has knowingly participated in, and a second or resulting crime that is unplanned but could reasonably be expected to occur in furtherance of the first one. Depending on the case, it may be appropriate for the court to instruct on both doctrines. Id. at 843 (citations and internal punctuation omitted). Here a reasonable jury could find Carroll knowingly aided and abetted an armed assault for the purpose of committing a theft at the Kum & Go. This would constitute first-degree robbery under the instructions given by the court. See Iowa Code §§ 711.1, .2. A reasonable jury could also conclude that when the gunman shot at November in furtherance of the jointly planned and executed robbery, a separate assault was committed which Carroll did not plan and in which he did not personally participate, but which could reasonably be expected under the circumstances. This second act would support a verdict for the different crime of simple assault. It was arguably rational for the jurors to acquit Carroll of the higher charges of attempted murder and assault with intent to inflict serious injury on the theory that the State had not proven that Carroll could reasonably expect the gunman to actually attempt to kill or seriously injure the store clerk. No ground for reversal appears. B. Substitute Counsel. On the fifth day of trial Carroll moved for substitute counsel. He cites error in the court's denial of his request, claiming the court erroneously focused on the competency of appointed counsel, rather than the communication breakdown he alleged. The State counters that error has not been preserved because Carroll's complaint to the court came in the form of a letter alleging ethical violations for failure of zealous representation. Neither party has it quite right. A fair interpretation of the record reveals that the court reasonably considered Carroll's request and applied the proper standard in its ruling. Turning first to the State's preservation argument, we note the general rule that issues must be presented to and passed upon by the district court before they can be raised and decided on appeal. State v. Eames, 565 N.W.2d 323, 326 (Iowa 1997). Defendant clearly alerted the trial court that he wanted to fire his defense counsel and have him replaced with another. Carroll's own words succinctly summed up the matter: I want me a new lawyer. Although Carroll presented his request as an ethics complaint, the court kept him on track with the real issue of effective representation as shown by the following colloquy: MR. CARROLL: Is it going to be possible for me to get another lawyer, that's what I'm asking? THE COURT: Pardon me? MR. CARROLL: Is my ethics complaint form able to go through or what? THE COURT: Well, what I'm determining right now, Mr. Carroll, is whether I'm going to permit or grant your request to have Mr. Powers withdraw from this case. I haven't decided that yet, sir. That's what I'm deciding right now. You have asked that Mr. Powers be terminated as your lawyer. DEFENDANT CARROLL: Yes, that's correct. THE COURT: Well, that's the question I have to answer. That's the question, Mr. Carroll, that has been put before me. That is a request that you've made, and I have to decide whether to grant it or not. The trial court's subsequent analysis of Carroll's request employed the standards recently articulated by this court in State v. Brooks, 540 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1995). There we summarized the proof necessary to sustain a defendant's request for new counsel: A defendant must demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant the appointment of substitute counsel. State v. Webb, 516 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa 1994). . . . Sufficient reasons include a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict with the client, or a complete breakdown in communications between the attorney and the client. Webb, 516 N.W.2d at 828. A defendant must ordinarily show prejudice, unless he has been denied counsel or counsel has a conflict of interest. Williams v. Nix, 751 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir.1985). In the present case, [defendant] must show prejudice because he does not claim either of the last two Williams grounds. Brooks, 540 N.W.2d at 272. Here, the court made two observations in denying Carroll's request. First, by responding to his allegation that he was not being zealously represented, the court reassured Carroll that he had competent counsel who was experienced in criminal defense. The colloquy above shows that the judge was in no way attempting to make an ethics ruling. The second observation, pertinent to the issue on appeal, addressed the quality of communications between the two, which is one of the criteria to be considered. See id. On that point, the court noted that while there clearly was friction between Carroll and his attorney, such friction between a client and a lawyer is not uncommon. The court explained to Carroll that the client and lawyer may not always be perfectly in sync but evidence of an exchange of differing opinions does indicate that there is an open discourse between the two. Implicitly the court found no breakdown in communications. Id. Without unduly lengthening this opinion by citing the many exchanges between counsel and defendant on the record, we conclude the record amply supports the court's finding that Carroll and his attorney were, in fact, communicating. It is also clear from the record that the court recognized Carroll's frustration with the criminal trial in which he was embroiled. When asked to provide specific reasons in support of his request, Carroll told the court that he and his attorney had quarreled over counsel's supposed bad reputation of convicting people, concluding that I feel I need somebody that's going to represent me correctly with some sense not negative. You know I'm sitting up in this jail stressing. I can't be with my family and got to deal with this mess. Rather than hinting of irreconcilable conflict, this record reveals Carroll's frustration with the proceedings, a matter which the court aptly recognized naturally attends this type of proceeding and the circumstances [defendant was] in. As for the remaining justification for new counsel under Brooks conflict of interest Carroll asserts no claim. Thus he has provided no basis for relief under any of the three justifications outlined in Brooks. The court was, of course, mindful that Carroll's request for new counsel came five days into the trial. Granting Carroll's request would have meant declaring a mistrial so that a new lawyer could be assigned. Disruption to the judicial process was a valid factor relied on by the trial court. Cf. State v. Webb, 516 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa 1994) (finding that requests for substitute counsel should not be used as delay tactic). We conclude that no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Carroll's request for new counsel has been shown. C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Finally, Carroll alleges ineffective assistance of counsel on three grounds: (1) failure of counsel to advise him adequately regarding character witnesses; (2) failure of counsel to present a full defense, that is, that he acted under the influence of drugs and alcohol; and (3) failure to adequately challenge the jury instruction on joint criminal conduct. Based on our discussion in division III. A., we conclude his third allegation is meritless. Both parties agree that the other two allegations cannot be adjudicated on the present record. Accordingly, we preserve for postconviction review the question of whether Carroll received effective assistance of counsel concerning character witnesses and in presenting an adequate defense. See State v. Baker, 560 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Iowa 1997).