Opinion ID: 1789402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Were there other reasons justifying relief from the default judgment?

Text: Rule 60(b)(6), from which the language above is derived, is described as a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case when relief is not warranted by the preceding clauses, or when it is uncertain that one or more of the preceding clauses afford relief. Moore's Federal Practice Vol. 7, § 60.27 p. 60-295 (1985). See also, Bryant, Inc. v. Walters, 493 So.2d at 939. Likewise, this Court recently described Rule 60(b)(6) as follows: Ascertaining the meaning of the provisions of Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) with any degree of precision simply may not be done for the language is hopelessly open textured. A consideration of the criteria of those rules together boils down almost to a balancing of the equities  in whose favor do they preponderate, the plaintiff or the defendant? Guaranty National Ins. Co., 501 So.2d at 388. This Court addressed the guidelines to be applied by a trial court in the exercise of its discretion as: (1) Whether there was a bona fide excuse for the failure to answer timely; (2) Whether the party in default had a colorable defense on the merits, thus indicating that a party is not indicating that the party seeking a delay; and (3) Whether prejudice would result to the non-offending party if the decree is set aside. International Paper Co. v. Basila, 460 So.2d 1202 (Miss. 1984). The record supports that the trial court attempted a balancing of equities following these guidelines. Considered were the factors that Pointer mailed the information to the proper company officers and that he heard nothing of the lawsuit until he discovered default judgment had been entered against him. Pointer contends default was unintentional and was the result of his complete reliance on his insurance carrier to take all necessary action. The trial judge pointed out that Pointer never took any follow-up action to determine whether the papers were received by the proper officials or whether an answer to the complaint had been filed; Pointer was a very astute businessman with years of experience dealing with insurance claims and litigation; Pointer was less than ten minutes away from the Sardis courthouse where the suit was filed; Pointer could have made a local telephone call to the Circuit Clerk of Panola County; and Pointer made no effort to seek local counsel or to ask for an extension of time which would have been routinely granted. Further, Pointer testified that if the default judgment was set aside, he would be ready to defend the case against him at the next term of court and would pay the reasonable costs associated with the default if the court set it aside to prevent prejudice to Huffman. Pointer also testified concerning his defense to Huffman's claim. The existence of a colorable defense on the merits is a factor which should often be sufficient to justify vacation of a judgment entered by default. Guaranty National Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 501 So.2d at 388. See also, Shannon v. Henson, 499 So.2d at 763 (Miss. 1986); Bryant, Inc. v. Walters, 493 So.2d at 937 (Miss. 1986); International Paper Co. v. Basila, 460 So.2d 1202, 1204 (Miss. 1984). The gist of Huffman's claim is the failure of Pointer to include worker's compensation coverage in an insurance package. However, the testimony of Pointer indicates there is an important factual issue which goes to the very heart of Huffman's claim. Mr. Pointer's testimony indicates a colorable defense in that Huffman voluntarily chose not to include worker's compensation insurance within his insurance package. The resolution of that factual issue in favor of Pointer would negate the presence of any basis of liability. To be sure, Monroe Pointer could have been more diligent in his actions to defend this suit. The trial court, in the exercise of his discretion, so held, and this Court finds no abuse of this discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as the liability determination, and the case is remanded for the hearing on inquiry as to damages. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED FOR A HEARING ON DAMAGES. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.