Opinion ID: 1199062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Torture Special Circumstance Instruction

Text: Defendant contends that the torture special circumstance finding must be reversed because the trial court did not instruct the jury on the element of intent to torture. The trial court gave the standard instruction on deliberate and premeditated murder (CALJIC No. 8.20 (4th ed. 1979 rev.)), and also gave an instruction on first degree torture murder. The latter included this language on intent to torture: [T]he defendant must commit such act or acts with the intent to cause cruel pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose. (CALJIC No. 8.24 (4th ed. 1979).) In addition, the court instructed the jury that first degree torture murder was murder committed with a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain. On the torture special circumstance, the jury received this instruction: To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder involving infliction of torture, is true, each of the following facts must be proved: [¶] 1. That the murder was intentional, and [¶] 2. That the murder involved the infliction of torture. [¶] To prove the infliction of torture, the infliction of extreme physical pain must be proved no matter how long its duration. [¶] Awareness of pain by the deceased is not a necessary element of torture. (CALJIC No. 8.81.18 (4th ed. 1979).) In his closing argument, the prosecutor used two charts. One of the charts outlined the elements of first degree torture murder and the torture special circumstance. [11] The prosecutor also argued, our facts are so broad and so directly on point, I believe there's no difference for purposes of these two definitions of torture. During deliberations, the jury asked for a reading of the transcript concerning [the prosecutor's] chart used in summation concerning definitions of intent. The court reporter then read to the jury the language of the chart (see fn. 11, ante ). (27) Although the torture special circumstance instruction did not explicitly state that the infliction of torture element of the special circumstance included a requirement of an intent to inflict cruel pain, we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury in this case understood the instruction as not requiring it to find intent to torture. ( Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. ___, ___ [116 L.Ed.2d 385, 399, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482]; Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198]; People v. Wade, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 994.) The torture special circumstance instruction required the jury to find that the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. As this court observed in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 271, the word torture necessarily implies an intent to torture. Here, the intent-to-torture requirement was explicitly set forth in the instruction on first degree torture murder and reiterated in the prosecutor's chart; also, in his closing argument the prosecutor told the jury, correctly, that the definition of torture for purposes of first degree torture murder was the same as its definition for purposes of the torture special circumstance ( People v. Wade, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 994-995). Furthermore, the jury's request for a reading of the transcripts concerning [the prosecution's] chart on the definition of intent in first degree torture murder and with regard to the torture special circumstance indicates that the jury's focus was on murder by torture, not premeditation and deliberation. In this case, as in People v. Wade, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 994, the commonsense understanding and import of the term torture, which implies an intent to torture, was affirmatively reinforced to the jury. (Compare People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1254-1255 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899].) (28) We also reject defendant's argument that the torture special circumstance should not apply when the first degree murder is a torture murder, or when the victim is a child whom the accused could lawfully discipline. As discussed earlier, we have construed the torture special circumstance to satisfy the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. ( People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 265-271.) A further narrowing or limiting of this special circumstance, as defendant has suggested, is not constitutionally mandated, and must be accomplished, if at all, by legislative action.