Opinion ID: 1561186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Timeliness of the Petition

Text: Rule 21(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P., provides that a petition for a writ of mandamus shall be filed within a reasonable time. Rule 21(a)(3) further provides: The presumptively reasonable time for filing a petition seeking review of an order of a trial court or of a lower appellate court shall be the same as the time for taking an appeal. If a petition is filed outside this presumptively reasonable time, it shall include a statement of circumstances constituting good cause for the appellate court to consider the petition, notwithstanding that it was filed beyond the presumptively reasonable time. Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P., provides that appeals permitted by law as of right must be taken within 42 days from the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. The City contends that its petition to the Court of Civil Appeals was timely because the circuit court entered the order denying its motion to reconsider and confirming the ruling on McCardle's petition on July 30, 2008. The City filed its petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Civil Appeals 36 days later, on September 4, 2008. McCardle contends that the City's petition is untimely because, he says, the City's motion to reconsider was denied not by order of the court, but by operation of law pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. That rule provides: No postjudgment motion filed pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55, or 59 shall remain pending in the trial court for more than ninety (90) days .... A failure by the trial court to dispose of any pending post-judgment motion within the time permitted hereunder, or any extension thereof, shall constitute a denial of such motion as of the date of the expiration of the period. McCardle argues first that the City's motion to reconsider is, in fact, a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment under Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., and second, that the 90-day period of Rule 59.1 began to run on April 15, 2008, the date the City filed its motion to reconsider. Assuming, without deciding, that Rule 59.1 applied to the City's motion to reconsider, [2] that motion was not pending within the meaning of Rule 59.1 for the entire 106-day period from the April 15, 2008, filing of the motion to the circuit court's July 30, 2008, ruling on the motion. The motion was pending for two days before the circuit court denied it on April 17, 2008. The circuit court then set aside that ruling and reinstated the motion on April 30, 2008. During the intervening 13 days between the denial and the order setting aside the denial, the motion to reconsider did not remain pending. However, the circuit court's April 30, 2008, order setting aside its denial of the motion and scheduling a hearing on it revived the motion, and it was again pending on that date. The motion to reconsider was denied by operation of law on July 29, 2008, 90 days from April 30, 2008, and before the circuit court purported to rule on it on July 30, 2008. The City filed its petition for a writ of mandamus 37 days later, on September 4, 2008, within the presumptively reasonable period established by Rules 4(a)(1) and 21(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P. Accordingly, even if Rule 59.1 applied to the City's motion to reconsider, the City's petition for a writ of mandamus was timely filed.