Opinion ID: 1984560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: iii(a standard of review

Text: Cases involving challenges to eligibility decisions made by voluntary athletic associations such as the Kentucky High School Athletic Association (KHSAA) or, as in this case, the NCAA, pose special difficulties for our circuit courts. Such cases are invariably time-sensitive as they are typically filed in the midst of an athletic season, often on the cusp of postseason competition. Because athletic seasons are usually completed before either a final decision on the merits by the trial court or appellate review, a circuit court's ruling granting or denying a temporary injunction will typically, as a practical matter, decide the issue of whether a student-athlete competes. In KHSAA v. Hopkins Co. Board of Education, [6] the Court of Appeals recognized the inherent limitations courts face in such determinations: This case demonstrates that courts are a very poor place in which to conduct interscholastic athletic events, especially since this type of litigation is most likely to arise at playoff or tournament time. If an injunction or restraining order is granted erroneously, it will be practically impossible to unscramble the tournament results to reflect the ultimate outcome of the case. [7] Since, by definition, temporary injunctions attempt to place the parties in a position most likely to minimize harm before the court can finally decide the issues raised in a complaint, trial courts are asked to make significant decisions with less-than-complete information. As such, these determinations differ from most decisions reached by trial courts. There are no drive-through windows on courthouses for a good reasonjudicial decisionmaking demands thought and deliberation of all relevant evidence. The problem is further magnified by the fact that challenges to a voluntary athletic association's eligibility decision typically present issues which require considerable reflection. In general, the members of such associations should be allowed to paddle their own canoe without unwarranted interference from the courts. [8] Nonetheless, relief from our judicial system should be available if voluntary athletic associations act arbitrarily and capriciously toward student-athletes. [9] Thus, cases involving challenges to a voluntary athletic association's eligibility decisions involve difficult assessments of a plaintiff's probability of succeeding on his or her claim and complex balancing of competing interests. Because the values a trial court assigns to these competing interests will depend, in part, upon the trial court's assessment of the probability that the athletic association's determination was correct, a circuit court's ruling as to temporary injunctive relief largely hinges upon its preliminary determination of the merits of the plaintiff's claim. Claimants will generally demonstrate potential injuries which justify injunctive relief only when they can show a substantial probability that the athletic association's ruling was arbitrary and capricious. [10] Longshot claims which have little hope of prevailing when the buzzer sounds will not justify injunctive relief. The deferential standard under which appellate courts reviewtechnically interlocutory but pragmatically finalcircuit court determinations as to temporary injunctive relief in these cases only heightens the importance of sound decisionmaking at the circuit court level. Under CR 65.07, the Court of Appeals may reverse such determinations only where it appears that the circuit court has made clearly erroneous findings unsupported by substantial evidence. [11] Interlocutory relief in this Court is appropriate only where we find that it is warranted by extraordinary cause. Although circuit courts exercise a great deal of discretion in these cases, we provide for interlocutory review of circuit court orders granting or denying interlocutory relief to ensure that the trial courts consider all relevant factors in their decisions. While additional review by this Court is limited to those cases which demonstrate extraordinary cause, [12] abuses of discretion by the courts below can supply such cause. In Commonwealth of Kentucky Revenue Cabinet v. Picklesimer, [13] this Court addressed the Revenue Cabinet's CR 65.09 motion seeking dissolution of a temporary injunction which prohibited it from preventing Picklesimer from re-taking elected office despite ongoing removal proceedings from a prior term. [14] The Court accepted the Cabinet's argument that CR 65.09 relief could be justified if a trial court's findings were clearly erroneous, but denied relief because it found the trial court's findings supported by substantial evidence. [15] In this case, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) substituting its judgment for that of the NCAA on the question of Lasege's intent to professionalize; (2) finding that the NCAA has no interest in this case which weighs against injunctive relief; and (3) declaring NCAA Bylaw 19.8 invalid. This combination of clearly erroneous conclusions constitutes extraordinary cause warranting CR 65.09 relief.