Opinion ID: 194928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Define Reasonable Doubt

Text: 151 Cassiere, Pezzullo, and Dolber challenge the court's denial of Dolber's request for an instruction defining reasonable doubt. In United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1739, 100 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988), we analyzed in detail the need for instructing the jury on the meaning of reasonable doubt. We explained that [m]ost efforts at clarification result in further obfuscation of the concept, id. at 645, and held that an instruction which uses the words reasonable doubt without further definition adequately apprises the jury of the proper burden of proof. This does not mean, of course, that the phrase can be buried as an aside in the [jury charge]. Id. at 646. In essence, we concluded that the district court was in the best position to determine whether, and if so how, to define reasonable doubt. See also Littlefield, 840 F.2d at 146; United States v. Rodriguez-Cardona, 924 F.2d 1148, 1160 (1st Cir.) (We have emphasized in the past, and do so again here, that reasonable doubt does not require definition.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 54, 116 L.Ed.2d 31 (1991). 152 There is no suggestion that the reference to reasonable doubt was buried as an aside in the court's charge to the jury. To the contrary, the court instructed the jury that should there be any reasonable doubt of any essential element which the government has to prove as to any of these specific 16 charges, then the person or persons so charged must have the benefit of that reasonable doubt and cannot be convicted on the charge or charges. In its instructions, the court mentioned reasonable doubt twenty-four more times. 153 The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to define reasonable doubt. 154 Relying upon Judge Torruella's concurring opinion in Littlefield in which he stated that I am of the opinion that the failure to grant an instruction explaining the term 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' is an error of constitutional dimension, striking at the very heart of the presumption of innocence, 840 F.2d at 151, the defendants urge this court to reconsider the issue en banc. In view of this court's settled precedent, however, this panel sees no occasion to suggest such reconsideration by the full court.