Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged Trial Court Error in Respect of Competency

Text: Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by failing to order a competency hearing on its own motion. Although not technically an IAC claim, for the same reasons that defendant argues defense counsel should have investigated his competency to stand trial, he makes the ancillary argument that the trial court was required to order a competency hearing on its own motion. Defendant notes, in fact, that before the penalty phase commenced and on learning of defendant's prior civil commitments, the trial court speculated that one might infer that defendant was mentally ill at the time of trial.
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5a authorizes a court, on its own motion, to appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant whenever a defendant's fitness to proceed appears questionable. See also Spivey, supra, 65 N.J. at 37, 319 A. 2d 461 (noting that trial court has power to order a competency hearing sua sponte ). The standard for reviewing a court's decision not to order such a hearing is a strict one. Ibid. (citing Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 37, 152 A. 2d 50). [W]hile the court has the power to order an inquiry in the defendant's mental qualifications to stand trial, failure to exercise the powers will not be reviewed on appeal, unless it clearly and convincingly appears that the defendant was incapable of standing trial. [ Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 73-74, 152 A. 2d 50 (emphasis added).] To meet the clear and convincing standard on appeal, a defendant must show a `bona fide doubt' as to [his] competence to stand trial. Spivey, supra, 65 N.J. at 37, 319 A. 2d 461 (citing Pate, supra, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S.Ct. at 842, 15 L.Ed. 2d at 822). The clear and convincing standard for reviewing a court's failure to order a competency hearing is consistent with the view that defense attorneys are in a better position to assess a defendant's competency; it is they who should bring such matters to the court's attention. It is to be ordinarily expected that defense counsel, who is in a far better position than the trial judge to assay the salient facts concerning the defendant's ability to stand trial and assist in his own defense, would originate the request that such an inquiry be conducted. [ Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 74, 152 A. 2d 50.] The United States Supreme Court approaches the question similarly, stating that judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring [these] issues into focus. Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at 176-77, 95 S.Ct. at 906, 43 L.Ed. 2d at 116. Thus, because defense attorneys are in a better position than the trial court to question a defendant's competency, Spivey, supra, 65 N.J. at 37, 319 A. 2d 461 (citing Lucas, supra, 30 N.J. at 73-73, 152 A. 2d 50), the fact that Call and Scully found no reason to question Harris's competency must be given substantial weight here. Moreover, we agree with the State when it says that the trial court never questioned defendant's competency. The trial court merely asked defense counsel if the childhood mitigating circumstances implicated Harris's current mental status, and defense counsel replied that they did not. At the time, the court was deciding whether to allow the State's psychiatric expert to conduct an examination of defendant's current mental status in order to assess the defense's childhood mitigating factor. The court found no reason to allow the State to examine Harris because there was no nexus between the childhood mitigating factor and his current mental status. Defendant does not provide clear and convincing evidence that raises a bona fide doubt that he failed to meet the competency standards set forth by N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4a. PCR counsel never stated specifically how Harris failed to meet any of the statutory criteria for competency and we view Harris's written correspondence and pre-sentencing soliloquy to the court as undermining defendant's claim. We reject, therefore, the argument that there was error in the trial court's failure to sua sponte order a competency hearing.