Opinion ID: 739344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aiding and Abetting the Section 924(c)

Text: Violation
22 Bancalari next challenges the jury instructions on the ground that they did not properly set forth the requisite mens rea for aiding and abetting the § 924(c) violation. Whether the jury instructions correctly sets forth the elements of a crime is reviewed de novo. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 771 (9th Cir.1995). 23 Section 924(c) provides in part [w]hoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence ... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Bancalari was convicted as an aider and abettor of his accomplice's use of the firearm in the initial abduction of Muniz; he was not charged with a § 924(c) violation for his own use of the firearm against Muniz once the Mexican border had been crossed. 24 Any person who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of a crime is punishable as a principal. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). To be convicted of aiding and abetting, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the principals in each essential element of the crime. United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir.1994). Thus, in order to be convicted of aiding and abetting his accomplice's § 924(c) violation, Bancalari must have knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the use or carrying of the firearm during and in relation to the crime of kidnapping. The instructions given by the trial court would have permitted the jury to convict Bancalari simply if they found that he knew that a firearm was being used or carried during and in relation to the kidnapping; the jury was not required to find that Bancalari intentionally aided and abetted the use or carrying of the firearm. 1 25 Bancalari argues that this was error. He argues that simply knowing that a firearm was being used in the underlying offense is insufficient to be convicted for aiding and abetting the use of the firearm because § 924(c) requires proof that he directly facilitated or encouraged the use or carrying of a firearm. United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 45 (2nd Cir.1994) (mere knowledge that a firearm is to be used in a robbery is insufficient to create aiding and abetting liability under § 924(c), even where the defendant performs some further act to facilitate or encourage the robbery). 26 We agree with the Second Circuit's formulation in Medina that to be guilty of aiding and abetting under § 924(c), the defendant must have directly facilitated or encouraged the use of the firearm and not simply be aware of its use. Id. Aiding and abetting is a specific intent crime. United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552, 555 (9th Cir.1996). To sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting, the evidence must show that the defendant specifically intended to facilitate the commission of [the principal's] crimes; mere presence at the scene of the crime and knowledge that the crime is being committed is not enough. Id. The evidence must also show that the defendant aided and abetted in each essential element of the crime. Dinkane, 17 F.3d at 1196. It is the firearm crime that Bancalari is charged with aiding and abetting, not the kidnapping crime. In the instant case, the jury was not required to find an essential element of the crime--that Bancalari knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the principal's use of the firearm. Because the jury was not so instructed, we hold that the instructions were erroneous.
27 In a direct appeal of a conviction for a federal crime, a jury instruction that eliminates or misstates an element of the crime can be harmless only if it can be shown that the jury necessarily made the omitted finding. United States v. Lopez, 100 F.3d 98, 103 (9th Cir.1996). 2 The Government contends that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, necessarily required the jury to find that Bancalari intentionally facilitated or encouraged the use of the firearm, thus the error was harmless. The Government argues that because the jury was required to find both that Bancalari acted willingly in the act of kidnapping and that he was acting in concert with his accomplice, the jury necessarily must have found that Bancalari knew about the firearm and thus facilitated the use of firearm by driving his accomplice to the site of the abduction. We do not agree. The Second Circuit in Medina stated 28 Contrary to the government's contention, Medina cannot be convicted as an aider and abettor under § 924(c) merely because he knew that a firearm would be used or carried and, with that knowledge, performed an act to facilitate or encourage the robbery itself. Rather, the language of the statute requires proof that he performed some act that directly facilitated or encouraged the use or carrying of a firearm. 29 Medina, 32 F.3d at 45. The opinion noted that it is this specific [firearm] crime that [the defendant] must have consciously and affirmatively assisted if his conviction on that charge is to be upheld. Id. 30 This highlights the finding that the jury is required to have made. Under the instructions that were given there is no way we can say that Bancalari consciously and intentionally assisted his accomplice in using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to the kidnapping, even though he knew at some point that his accomplice did use the firearm during the actual kidnapping. There was ample evidence that the accomplice's chasing Pittman off with a gun was part of the kidnapping crime and that the accomplice violated § 924(c), however there is no finding that Bancalari intentionally assisted or facilitated the accomplice's use or carrying of the gun in doing so. The error is not harmless because we cannot determine that the jury necessarily found this element of the crime. We therefore reverse the firearm conviction.