Opinion ID: 6534115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Two-Part Fourth Amendment Test

Text: [¶62] It is well established that an exterior canine sniff of a car during a lawful traffic stop is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405 , 409, 125 S.Ct. 834 , 838, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) ; see also Engdahl v. State , 2014 WY 76 , ¶ 14, 327 P.3d 114 , 118 (Wyo. 2014). If, however, a drug dog enters a vehicle during an exterior sniff, that entry may implicate Fourth Amendment concerns because [p]eople have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of their automobiles. United States v. Lujan , 398 Fed. Appx. 347 , 350 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Stone , 866 F.2d 359 , 363 (10th Cir. 1989) ). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first court to address such a circumstance with its 1989 decision in Stone , and a number of other jurisdictions then followed suit. See, e.g. , United States v. Guidry , 817 F.3d 997 , 1006 (7th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Sharp , 689 F.3d 616 , 620 (6th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Mostowicz , 471 Fed. Appx. 887 , 890-91 (11th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Pierce , 622 F.3d 209 , 213-14 (3rd Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Lyons , 486 F.3d 367 , 373 (8th Cir. 2007) ; State v. Miller , 367 N.C. 702 , 766 S.E.2d 289 , 296 (2014) ; United States v. Hutchinson , 471 F.Supp.2d 497 , 506 (M.D. Pa. 2007). [¶63] In Stone , the defendant was stopped for speeding and denied the violation, insisting that he was being careful because he had already been cited that day for speeding. Stone , 866 F.2d at 361 . When the officer asked to see the earlier ticket, the defendant opened his hatchback to retrieve it. Id . While the hatchback was still open, another officer arrived with a drug dog and began an exterior sniff of the vehicle. Id . The dog circled the vehicle, showed interest under the rear of the car and at the passenger door, and then jumped in the open hatchback and keyed on a duffle bag. Id . Upon searching the bag, officers found 33,000 methaqualone tablets. Id . The court acknowledged the expectation of privacy an individual has in his vehicle's interior but nonetheless upheld the search. Id. at 363-64 . It explained: We agree with the district judge that the dog's instinctive actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. There is no evidence, nor does Stone contend, that the police asked Stone to open the hatchback so the dog could jump in. Nor is there any evidence the police handler encouraged the dog to jump in the car.... The judge asked the Officer in charge of the dog: So you didn't encourage him or discourage him from jumping into the back? And the Officer replied: That's correct. I just let his leash go and let him go where his nose would take him. ... In these circumstances, we think the police remained within the range of activities they may permissibly engage in when they have reasonable suspicion to believe an automobile contains narcotics. Stone , 866 F.2d at 364 . [¶64] Since Stone, the Tenth Circuit has further refined the test for determining the legality of a dog's entry into a vehicle during an exterior sniff and has upheld such sniffs when: (1) the dog's leap into the car was instinctual rather than orchestrated and (2) the officers did not ask the driver to open the point of entry, such as a hatchback or window, used by the dog. United States v. Vazquez , 555 F.3d 923 , 930 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Stone , 866 F.2d at 364 and United States v. Winningham , 140 F.3d 1328 , 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1998) ); see also  United States v. Moore , 795 F.3d 1224 , 1232 (10th Cir. 2015) ; Felders v. Malcom , 755 F.3d 870 , 880 (10th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Lujan , 398 Fed. Appx. 347 , 350 (10th Cir. 2010). [¶65] The two-part test is aimed at determining whether officers acted with an intent to facilitate an interior vehicle search. Winningham , 140 F.3d at 1331 . This focus makes sense because the Fourth Amendment addresses 'misuse of power,'    not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct. Brower v. Cty. of Inyo , 489 U.S. 593 , 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378 , 1381, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (quoting Byars v. United States , 273 U.S. 28 , 33, 47 S.Ct. 248 , 250, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) ). As the North Carolina Supreme Court explained: If a police dog is acting without assistance, facilitation, or other intentional action by its handler (in the words of Sharp, acting instinctively), it cannot be said that a State or governmental actor intends to do anything. In such a case, the dog is simply being a dog. If, however, police misconduct is present, or if the dog is acting at the direction or guidance of its handler, then it can be readily inferred from the dog's action that there is an intent to find something or to obtain information. See Winningham , 140 F.3d at 1330-31 (invalidating a search on such grounds). Miller , 766 S.E.2d at 296 .