Opinion ID: 2977308
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence of Larceny

Text: The Michigan courts’ determination that sufficient evidence supported a conviction on the charge of larceny was not an unreasonable application of federal law. On habeas review, federal courts must assume that the jury “resolve[d] conflicts in the testimony,” “weigh[ed] the evidence,” and drew “reasonable inferences” therefrom. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). They then view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. Under this standard, sufficient evidence supported this charge. -8- No. 07-1046 Jacobs v. Sherman According to the jury instructions, larceny under Michigan law, involves (1) taking the property of another, (2) moving the property of another, (3) at the time of the taking, intending to deprive the owner permanently of the property, (4) taking the property without the consent of the owner, and (5) taking property that had some value. Cf. People v. Honer, 1996 WL 33362656,  (Mich. Ct. App. Jun. 18, 1996); People v. Pohl, 507 N.W.2d 819, 820 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). Jacobs does not dispute that there is sufficient evidence for all but the third element, and as to that element—specific intent—there is also sufficient evidence. Jacobs helped remove property from Armstrong’s home under suspicious circumstances, after breaking in. Almost immediately thereafter, he helped secure two loaded weapons from Armstrong’s bedroom. Jacobs shot Armstrong, then obtained his wallet. Jacobs and Alexander then took Armstrong’s car. From this evidence, the jury could reach several conclusions supporting intent, including: that Jacobs did not believe that all of the property he helped take actually belonged to Alexander, that Jacobs unreasonably believed that Alexander had a claim to all the property taken, or that before Jacobs pulled the trigger, he intended to kill Armstrong and take his property. Any of these three conclusions (all supported by inferences from the evidence) is sufficient to sustain a charge of larceny—each has the specific intent of trespassory deprivation. While the prosecution could have offered more proof on the element of specific intent, the prosecution offered enough to survive a sufficiency challenge. Moreover, the element of specific intent was not overlooked—the prosecution -9- No. 07-1046 Jacobs v. Sherman argued that Jacobs “had larceny in [his] heart[] when [he] got there.” Further, the jury instructions contained the required elements of larceny, including the specific intent element. Jacobs argues that the only direct evidence of Jacobs’s intent was his own (self-serving) testimony. However, the evidence discussed above supports inferences as to Jacobs’s intent, and this court must assume that the jury believed those inferences rather than Jacobs’s testimony. Specific intent, “like any other fact, may be proven indirectly by inference from the conduct of the accused and surrounding circumstances.” People v. Lawton, 492 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). Likewise, evidence that others believed that Alexander had a claim of right to some of the property taken does not overcome the jury’s finding that Jacobs himself had larcenous intent. The prosecution was not required to “dispute” whether the others’ beliefs were in good faith or not; it merely had to present evidence sufficient that a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jacobs had larcenous intent. Likewise, though the evidence supports an inference that Jacobs may have formed a larcenous intent after breaking in, or after shooting Armstrong, the jury actually found that the larcenous intent arose before the murder. Jacobs’s contention that the evidence supporting his claim that he was helping Alexander retrieve her belongings “outweighs” the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that he intended to commit larceny misstates the relevant test. This Court does not engage in a balancing of the evidence, but rather considers whether the decision of the Michigan courts finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict was unreasonable. Jacobs fails to show that the Michigan courts’ application of federal law on this point was unreasonable. Even if somehow this - 10 - No. 07-1046 Jacobs v. Sherman court were inclined to find, de novo, that sufficient evidence did not support the charge of larceny, this court, under AEDPA, may only grant habeas if the state court has made a decision contrary to, or unreasonably applied, federal law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-411 (2000).