Opinion ID: 2091215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consolidation of Cases concerning N.R. and P.L.

Text: We first address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly consolidated the cases of N.R. and P.L. for trial. General Statutes § 54-57 provides: Whenever two or more cases are pending at the same time against the same party in the same court for offenses of the same character, counts for such offenses may be joined in one information unless the court orders otherwise. See also Practice Book § 41-19 ([t]he judicial authority may, upon its own motion or the motion of any party, order that two or more informations, whether against the same defendant or different defendants, be tried together). In deciding whether to sever informations joined for trial, the trial court enjoys broad discretion, which, in the absence of manifest abuse, an appellate court may not disturb. . . . The defendant bears a heavy burden of showing that the denial of severance resulted in substantial injustice, and that any resulting prejudice was beyond the curative power of the court's instructions. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Herring, 210 Conn. 78, 94-95, 554 A.2d 686, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912, 109 S.Ct. 3230, 106 L.Ed.2d 579 (1989). Where evidence of one incident can be admitted at the trial of the other, separate trials would provide the defendant no significant benefit. It is clear that, under such circumstances, the defendant would not ordinarily be substantially prejudiced by joinder of the offenses for a single trial. State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 61, 68, 530 A.2d 155 (1987) (trial court properly consolidated cases because evidence of defendant's uncharged misconduct would have been admissible to prove identity in separate trials); see also State v. Greene, 209 Conn. 458, 464, 551 A.2d 1231 (1988) ([t]he trial court properly joined the two cases for trial because, in the event of separate trials, evidence relating to each of the cases would have been admissible in the other); State v. Marsala, 43 Conn. App. 527, 533, 684 A.2d 1199 (1996) (joinder of the twenty-five claims was proper because evidence relating to each count could have been used in a trial of each of the other counts to prove the identity of the defendant, the intent of the defendant, and to demonstrate a common scheme), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 957, 688 A.2d 329 (1997). Substantial prejudice does not necessarily result from a denial of severance even where evidence of one offense would not have been admissible at a separate trial involving the second offense. State v. Pollitt, supra, 205 Conn. at 68, 530 A.2d 155. Consolidation under such circumstances, however, may expose the defendant to potential prejudice for three reasons: First, when several charges have been made against the defendant, the jury may consider that a person charged with doing so many things is a bad [person] who must have done something, and may cumulate evidence against him. . . . Second, the jury may have used the evidence of one case to convict the defendant in another case even though that evidence would have been inadmissible at a separate trial. . . . [Third] joinder of cases that are factually similar but legally unconnected . . . present[s] the . . . danger that a defendant will be subjected to the omnipresent risk . . . that although so much [of the evidence] as would be admissible upon any one of the charges might not [persuade the jury] of the accused's guilt, the sum of it will convince them as to all. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ellis, 270 Conn. 337, 374-75, 852 A.2d 676 (2004). Despite the existence of these risks, this court consistently has recognized a clear presumption in favor of joinder and against severance . . . and, therefore, absent an abuse of discretion . . . will not second guess the considered judgment of the trial court as to the joinder or severance of two or more charges. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 375, 852 A.2d 676. Accordingly, we first address whether the trial court properly concluded that, if the cases of N.R. and P.L. had been tried separately, evidence of the defendant's uncharged sexual misconduct with one victim would have been admissible to establish a common scheme or plan in the case of the other. As a general rule, evidence of prior misconduct is inadmissible to prove that a criminal defendant is guilty of the crime of which the defendant is accused. . . . Such evidence cannot be used to suggest that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity for criminal behavior. . . . On the other hand, evidence of crimes so connected with the principal crime by circumstance, motive, design, or innate peculiarity, that the commission of the collateral crime tends directly to prove the commission of the principal crime, is admissible. The rules of policy have no application whatever to evidence of any crime which directly tends to prove that the accused is guilty of the specific offense for which he is on trial. . . . We have developed a two part test to determine the admissibility of such evidence. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. . . . Second, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect. . . . When evidence of other offenses is offered to show a common plan or design the marks which the uncharged and the charged offenses have in common must be such that it may be logically inferred that if the defendant is guilty of one he must be guilty of the other. . . . To guide this analysis, we have held that [e]vidence of prior sex offenses committed with persons other than the prosecuting witness is admissible to show a common design or plan where the prior offenses (1) are not too remote in time; (2) are similar to the offense charged; and (3) are committed upon persons similar to the prosecuting witness. . . . We are more liberal in admitting evidence of other criminal acts to show a common scheme or pattern in sex related crimes than other crimes. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aaron L., 272 Conn. 798, 820-21, 865 A.2d 1135 (2005). The defendant concedes that both the first and third factors are satisfied in the present case because the defendant's sexual misconduct with N.R. and P.L. occurred during the same relevant time period and both victims were similar in age and circumstance. The defendant contends, however, that the second factor is not satisfied because the charged and uncharged offenses are not similar in character. He points out that his sexual misconduct with P.L. was more extreme and far more frequent than [his sexual] activity involving [N.R.]. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of this claim, the defendant relies on State v. Ellis, supra, 270 Conn. at 352-68, 852 A.2d 676, wherein we concluded that the trial court improperly had denied the defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct involving three victims, Julia S., Kristin C. and Kaitlyn M., in the case of a fourth victim, Sarah S., because Sarah S.'s relationship with the defendant differed in several important respects from his relationship with the other girls and because there were few similarities between [the defendant's] abuse of Sarah S. and his abuse of the other girls. Id., at 358, 852 A.2d 676. We conclude that the defendant's reliance on Ellis is misplaced. In Ellis, the defendant, a softball coach, was charged, inter alia, with ten counts of sexual misconduct with Sarah S., the younger sister of a softball player whom the defendant had coached. Id., at 339-40, 346, 852 A.2d 676. The trial court denied the defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct involving Julia S., Kristin C. and Kaitlyn M., all of whom were players on the defendant's softball team. Id., at 354, 361, 852 A.2d 676. We concluded that the trial court improperly had denied the motion because, the defendant's relationship with Sarah S. differed in several key respects from his relationships with the other girls. Id., at 360, 852 A.2d 676. Specifically, Sarah S., unlike the other girls, was not a member of [the defendant's] softball team, did not have frequent and continuous contact with the defendant as a player, did not take weekly private lessons with the defendant over a period of several years, did not develop a close personal relationship with the defendant and did not regard him as a confidant. Even more significantly, she did not feel compelled, as did the other girls, to cultivate or continue a relationship with the defendant following the abuse because of his ability to assist her in obtaining a college softball scholarship. Id., at 361, 852 A.2d 676. Moreover, the defendant's sexual misconduct with Sarah S. was far more frequent and severe than was his sexual misconduct with the other three victims. The defendant's sexual abuse of Sarah S. consisted of a wide range of misconduct, including: (1) `talking dirty' on the telephone and attempted phone sex; (2) multiple incidents of touching her breasts, thighs and in between her legs; (3) masturbating and ejaculating in her presence; (4) attempting to force her to perform oral sex; (5) attempting to force his tongue into her mouth; (6) digital penetration; (7) attempting to climb on top of her while she was lying in bed; and (8) repeated requests that she `pleasure' him. Id., at 359, 852 A.2d 676. By contrast, there only was one incident of sexual abuse involving Julia S., two involving Kristin C., and one involving Kaitlyn M. Id. In the cases of Julia S. and Kristin C., the defendant grabbed and fondled the victims' breasts. In the case of Kaitlyn M., the defendant made sexual comments, touched her leg and kissed her. He also attempted to force his tongue into her mouth and told her that he loved her in ways that she could not understand. Id., at 359-60, 852 A.2d 676. Although the defendant's abuse of Julia S., Kristin C. and Kaitlyn M. bore some similarities, it had very little in common with his [frequent and severe] abuse of Sarah S. Id., at 360, 852 A.2d 676. The defendant concedes that, unlike the victims at issue in Ellis, both victims in the present case shared a similar relationship with the defendant. At the time of the misconduct, both N.R. and P.L. were sixteen year old female students enrolled in Career School who had developed a personal, confidential and sexual relationship with the defendant. The defendant claims, however, that, pursuant to State v. Ellis, supra, 270 Conn. at 352-68, 852 A.2d 676, his sexual misconduct with N.R. and P.L. lacked sufficient similarity to be admissible under the common scheme or plan exception because his sexual misconduct with P.L. was far more frequent and severe than his sexual misconduct with N.R. We disagree. The defendant's sexual relationships with both N.R. and P.L. began at Career School with intimate sexual embraces. The defendant first kissed N.R. in the late spring of her junior year while she and the defendant were in the library of Career School. Likewise, the defendant first kissed P.L. in the late spring of her junior year while she and the defendant were in an empty classroom in Career School. The defendant had sexual intercourse with N.R. in a car parked in East Rock Park, and in a car parked outside of Foote School, by penetrating her vagina digitally. Similarly, the defendant had sexual intercourse with P.L. in a car parked in East Rock Park, and in a car parked outside of P.L.'s home, by means of digital and penile vaginal penetration. The defendant performed oral sex on N.R. in a secluded corner on the second floor of the Fairfield University Library. Similarly, the defendant performed oral sex on P.L., and had penile-vaginal sexual intercourse with P.L., in a secluded corner on the second floor of the Fairfield University Library. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the defendant's sexual misconduct with N.R. and P.L. was sufficiently similar to permit the jury to infer that, if he was guilty of the offenses involving one victim, then he also was guilty of the offenses involving the other. See State v. Morowitz, 200 Conn. 440, 443, 512 A.2d 175 (1986) ([w]hen evidence of prior misconduct is offered to show a common plan or design, the marks which the [charged] and the [uncharged] offenses have in common must be such that it may be logically inferred that if the defendant is guilty of one he must be guilty of the other [internal quotation marks omitted]). We recognize that the defendant's sexual misconduct with P.L. was more frequent than his sexual misconduct with N.R. Specifically, N.R. testified that she had had sexual intercourse with the defendant on three separate occasions, whereas P.L. testified that she had had sexual intercourse with the defendant on numerous occasions. In light of the striking qualitative similarity between the defendant's misconduct with the two victims, we conclude that this quantitative distinction, standing alone, is insufficient to support the defendant's claim that the offenses were not similar in character. See, e.g., State v. James G., 268 Conn. 382, 394, 844 A.2d 810 (2004) (although uncharged misconduct was more frequent and severe than charged misconduct, trial court properly admitted evidence to establish defendant's common scheme or plan to abuse his daughters sexually); State v. Hauck, 172 Conn. 140, 146-47, 374 A.2d 150 (1976) (although uncharged misconduct was less frequent and severe than charged misconduct, trial court properly admitted evidence to establish defendant's common scheme or plan to extort sexual favors from female students in exchange for passing grades). Moreover, given the marked similarity between the defendant's behavior with both N.R. and P.L., we further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. See State v. Merriam, 264 Conn. 617, 664, 835 A.2d 895 (2003) ([i]n light of the marked similarities between the charged and uncharged misconduct, the probative value of the latter was significant in regard to the issue of common plan or scheme); State v. George B., 258 Conn. 779, 793, 785 A.2d 573 (2001) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that probative value of uncharged sexual misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, even though charged conduct involved greater degree of force). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that, if the cases of N.R. and P.L. had been tried separately, evidence of the defendant's sexual misconduct with each victim would have been admissible to establish a common scheme or plan in the case of the other. Consequently, because the defendant was not substantially prejudiced by joinder of the cases for trial, we conclude that the trial court properly consolidated the cases of N.R. and P.L. for trial.