Opinion ID: 1134970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The refund cases

Text: The third category comprises a substantial number of recent cases from our sister states affirming larceny convictions on facts identical or closely similar to those of the case at bar: in each, the defendant took an item of merchandise from a store display, carried it to a sales counter, claimed to own it, and asked for a refund of cash or credit. Although the cases are thus factually in point, the reasoning of their opinions is, ironically, of less assistance than the sale or reward cases in our search for a satisfactory rationale on the issue of the intent to permanently deprive. This is so for three reasons. First, many of the opinions in the refund cases offer no rationale at all on the issue of intent. Instead, in each case the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction of larceny, and the appellate court simply reviews the facts and concludes otherwise without further analysis. (E.g., Gunn v. State (Ala.Crim.App.1980) 387 So.2d 280, 282; Warsham v. State (Ga.Ct. App.1991) 200 Ga.App. 322, 408 S.E.2d 122, 123; Marshall v. State (Ga.Ct.App.1991) 199 Ga.App. 678, 405 S.E.2d 893, 894; State v. Manus (Ohio Ct.App. Aug. 6, 1982, No. C.A. H-82-9) 1982 WL 9177, p. ; see also State v. Cravanas (Ohio Ct.App. Mar. 20, 1996, No. 17398) 1996 WL 122016, p.  [theft by deception]; State v. Gibson (Ohio Ct.App. Oct. 22, 1986, No. C.A. 12621) 1986 WL 11923 [same].) [9] Second, in other cases in this category the opinion either states (e.g., State v. Brookover (Ohio Ct.App. Feb. 22, 1983, No. 82 X 19) 1983 WL 3129, p. ; Moore v. State (Tex. App.1983) 659 S.W.2d 445, 447) or implies (e.g., State v. Webster (Mo.Ct.App.1994) 870 S.W.2d 450, 453; State v. Wynn (Mo.Ct.App. 1990) 794 S.W.2d 312, 315; Lewis v. State (Tex.App. Apr. 27-41989, No. 01-88-00079-CR) 1989 WL 40710, pp. -) that the defendant was charged with theft of the cash obtained as a refund, rather than theft of the property taken from the display counter. We are concerned with the latter: as noted at the outset, defendant in the case at bar was charged with theft of personal property of Mervyn's, i.e., the shirt. [10] Third, the remaining opinions in this category are statute-specific, i.e., each turns on the wording of the larceny statute in force in that particular jurisdiction. As noted above (fn.1, ante, ) the California statute making larceny a crime is declaratory of the common law and is therefore to be construed by application of common law principles. By contrast, the cases now under discussion arise in jurisdictions that have modernized their larceny statutes by adopting, or enacting variations on, the provisions of the Model Penal Code governing theft. ( Id., §§ 223.0-223.9.) [11] Accordingly, to the extent these opinions provide any legal analysis at all, they do so in terms of the wording of their governing statutes rather than the common law. For example, in State v. Martin, supra, 1996 WL 761215, the defendant took four shirts from a display in a department store, carried them to a sales counter and asked for a refund, saying they had been gifts to her sons; the clerk gave the defendant a receipt for a refund; and a store security agent who had observed the defendant's course of conduct detained her before she left the store. The defendant was convicted of violating an Ohio statute declaring guilty of theft whoever shall knowingly obtain or exercise control over the property of another, without consent and with purpose to deprive the owner of the property. (Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2913.02, subd. (A).) [12] On appeal, the reviewing court held the defendant's conduct came within the terms of the statute: the court reasoned that By claiming she had ownership of the shirts, [defendant] exercised control over the shirts in a manner which was contrary to the store's ownership. In effect, there was a verbal concealment and exertion of control by [defendant]. (1996 WL 761215 at p. .) Turning to the issue of the defendant's intent to deprive, the court stressed that the Ohio statutory definition of that term included the act of withholding property with purpose to restore it only upon payment of a reward or other consideration (Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2913.01, subd. (C)(1)). [13] The court reasoned, Under the foregoing definition, if the defendant takes the property of another and does not intend to give it back until consideration is paid, the defendant has `deprived' the victim first, of the property, and second, of the consideration. ( State v. Martin, supra, 1996 WL 761215 at p. .) Weaving these two themes together, the court concluded: By telling the sales associate that the shirts had been given to her sons as gifts, [defendant] exercised verbal control and concealment, thus, exerting control over the shirts for the purpose of obtaining consideration from the store. ( State v. Martin, supra, 1996 WL 761215, p. .) We have set forth the Ohio court's reasoning in order to show how closely it follows the wording of the local statuteand, by the same token, how far it has moved away from the common law of larceny. The same is true, moreover, of the other cases in this category: their reasoning is often more conclusory than that of the Ohio case just discussed, but the statutes on which they rely are equally remote from the common law, and hence from the question before us. (E.g., Jones v. State (TexApp. Nov. 29, 1995, No. 04-95-00334-CR) 1995 WL 699987 [construing Tex. Penal Code, § 31.03, subds. (a) & (b) (theft is committed by one who unlawfully appropriates property of another without the owner's effective consent and with intent to deprive); § 31.01, subd. (2)(B) (deprive means to restore property only upon payment of reward or other compensation); and § 31.01, subd. (3)(D) (effective consent does not include consent given solely to detect the commission of an offense)]; accord, Ashby v. State (Tex.Crim. App.1980) 604 S.W.2d 897, 900-901 (plur. opn.).)