Opinion ID: 1760726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Drug Recognition Testimony.

Text: On August 14, 2006, the day before trial, Burton's counsel received a fax from the Commonwealth stating that it intended to call Mr. Darrell Cook (Cook), a drug recognition instructor for the Department of Criminal Justice Training facility at Richmond, Kentucky. The fax stated that Cook will testify in regard to drug recognition and the physical signs which point to use of controlled substances. In this case particularly he will speak to blood pressure, dilated eyes, and other relevant factors. Burton filed an immediate written objection to Cook being allowed to testify on grounds that: (1) the Commonwealth's announcement of its intended use of the expert was too late; (2) its expert's opinion was not supported by a factual basis; (3) the opinion was thus irrelevant and inadmissible; and (4) the Commonwealth had not provided a curriculum vitae or summary of his report to allow the court or the defense to determine whether [Mr.] Cook is or is not an expert in his field. On August 15, 2006, the morning of trial, defense counsel again objected to the Commonwealth's last minute calling of Cook, stating that she had not seen his report and had just received the curriculum vitae the previous afternoon. The Commonwealth countered that it had not anticipated using an expert but had only received notice on August 9 that the defense intended to use a toxicologist along with his report. Thus, because the defense had an expert, the Commonwealth felt that it should have one too. While reserving the right to call him during its case in chief, the Commonwealth anticipated using Cook on rebuttal, which would give the defense more time to look at what he's got. Moreover, the Commonwealth informed the trial court that Cook was the primary drug recognition instructor at Richmond and that his testimony would be in regard to the information he could extract from the reports of the EMTs and troopers who observed Burton at the scene. In response, the trial court noted its feelings about expert witnesses, stating you both got one, you let them both in or neither one of them. The court further stated that it would review the respective motions which had been submitted on the matter and that it could be brought back up when the witness was called. When the Commonwealth called Cook to testify on August 16, the defense reiterated its objections to his testimony, which were overruled. Having considered Burton's written objection to Cook's testimony on the basis of his expertise and the factual basis for his opinions, the court's inclination (you both got [an expert], you let them both in or neither one of them), Burton's argument the morning of trial that it sounds like he's basing his opinion upon information that's not admissible, and Burton's reiteration of his objection when Cook was called at trial, we believe that Burton's objection to Cook's testimony was adequately preserved. Moreover, even though the written objections, arguments, and ruling were conducted without the benefit of a prior report of the witnesses' testimony, we believe the grounds argued by Burton were apparent from the context of the written objections, responses, and discussions with the court. Thus, [w]hile the objections were not sharply to the point we think they adequately alerted the trial judge to the proposition. Hardin v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Ky.1968). That being said, even [a] general objection is sufficient if the evidence is not competent for any purpose. Ross v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Ky.App. 1978). At trial, Cook testified that he was an instructor at the Department of Criminal Justice Training facility at Richmond, Kentucky, where he is the lead instructor of DUI enforcement training. He is also the state coordinator in Drug Recognition, a position which required two weeks of training. Cook testified that he had reviewed the ambulance report, that Burton's blood pressure of 148/78 was above normal, and that a pulse rate of 113 was high. He opined that the elevation in blood pressure and pulse could be indicative of cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, ecstasy, or LSD use. He also opined that the lowering of blood pressure thirty-five minutes later to 138/83 could indicate that the cocaine was wearing off. Referring to the paramedic's testimony, Cook stated that the fact that a person was wound up, not responding to commands, or resistant to medical treatment, was indicative of marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, or other drug use. However, the twelve-step Drug Recognition Protocol, [8] which he attempted, in part, to employ, requires an officer's personal observation, physical testing and examination of the subject. The protocol essentially consists of a twelve step systematic assessment of the defendant's vital signs and physical appearance, which in fact is the usual DUI investigation, including the standard field sobriety tests, plus a physical examination. The physical examination incorporates a narrow application of techniques borrowed from the medical field, and includes measuring pupil size and observing pupil reaction to light, taking blood pressure and pulse rate [three separate times], inspecting the oral and nasal cavities, and touching the arm to determine muscle tone. Williams v. State, 710 So.2d 24, 28 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1998). Thus, [p]olice officers and lay witnesses have long been permitted to testify as to their observations of a defendant's acts, conduct and appearance, and also to give an opinion on the defendant's state of impairment based upon those observations. Id. at 29. [9] Notably, Mr. Cook was neither a medical doctor nor a pharmacologist. He did not personally observe, examine, or test Burton. In fact, he acknowledged that Burton's elevated vital signs and behavior could simply be the result of having just been in a serious car accident and that he could not say definitively whether Burton was under the influence at the time. Such testimony was based solely upon his review of the ambulance report and thus violated the drug recognition protocol alleged to support his appearance. The only apparent basis then for the admission of his testimony was the trial court's philosophy on experts  you both got one; you let them both in, or neither one of them. We have long recognized the weight the jury puts on an expert's testimony because of the aura of special reliability and trustworthiness surrounding it. Hester v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Ky.1987). And, [t]here is virtual unanimity among courts and commentators that evidence perceived by jurors to be `scientific' in nature will have a particularly persuasive effect. John William Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 Or.L.Rev. 349, 367 n.81 (1992). The danger inherent in the use of scientific evidence is that the jury may accord it undue significance because it associates `science' with truth. State ex rel. Hamilton v. City Court of City of Mesa, 165 Ariz. 514, 799 P.2d 855, 859 (1990). Therefore, [t]he function of the court is to ensure that the persuasive appeal is legitimate. State v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285, 899 P.2d 663, 672 (1995). Trial courts should not overlook the overall effect that a technique's aura of scientific certainty will have on the jury Sampson, 6 P.3d at 551 (emphasis in original). The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 36 S.W.3d 368, 378 (Ky.2000); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577-78 (Ky. 2000). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principles. Id. at 581. In the present case, the trial court's ruling appears to have been based solely on the fact that because the defense had an expert, the Commonwealth could have one too. We cannot say that this reasoning is supported by sound legal principles. Further, Cook's unqualified testimony improperly invited the jury to speculate that Burton could have been under the influence of LSD, ecstasy, and methamphetamine  all illicit substances of which there was no evidence. Although we acknowledge that drug recognition testimony is admissible based upon personal observation, examination, and testing, see e.g., Williams, 710 So.2d at 34, we therefore caution the trial court to test this witness and his conclusions per KRE 702 at any retrial.