Opinion ID: 844286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Regarding the Battered Woman Theory

Text: Defendant‘s first argument is convoluted and diffuse. She contends a variety of improprieties permitted the prosecutor to insinuate that defendant and Ivan had each agreed to blame the other for Genny‘s death. However, the actual claims she advances under this heading are more accurately characterized as challenges to various aspects of the prosecutor‘s rebuttal of defendant‘s claim that she suffered from battered woman syndrome. We address each claim separately, in the order defendant makes them.
Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct when cross-examining her regarding a letter in which Ivan tried to persuade her to fire her attorney. At the end of this letter, Ivan had drawn a diagram of a face labeled ―me‖ with a finger pointing to it, below the statement ―if it comes down to it.‖ Defendant maintained the position she had taken on direct examination, that the letter reflected Ivan‘s attempt to control her, and the diagram referred to his practice of using his finger for sexual purposes. The following exchange occurred: ―Q: Well, you knew that Ivan Gonzales claimed he was a battered man, didn‘t you? ―A : He never testified to that; no, I didn‘t. ―Q: He didn‘t testify to it, but he claimed that, didn‘t he?‖ Defense counsel objected, on the ground that the question had been asked and answered. The court sustained the objection ―on the grounds that we shouldn‘t go through with that line.‖ Nevertheless, the prosecutor proceeded to ask defendant, ―well, 27 were you aware that that was his defense?‖ Defense counsel objected and asked for a sidebar conference. The court agreed. Out of the jury‘s presence, the court noted that ―we‘ve tried to stay away from what happened at Ivan‘s trial altogether, and this is asking about what happened at Ivan‘s trial.‖ The court also pointed out that ―Ivan, as far as I know, didn‘t do anything but enter a plea of not guilty and deny the special circumstances. All the things that she might answer about are things his attorneys did . . . I‘m not so sure I see how relevant that is.‖ The prosecutor explained that he was trying to dispute defendant‘s claim that Ivan was manipulating her. The court noted that defendant‘s attempt to characterize the drawing as anything other than an invitation to cast blame on Ivan was weak, and did not justify drawing the jury‘s attention to what Ivan‘s position at his trial had been. It stated: ―I‘m inclined to sustain the objection and to find that we ought to stay away from anything about what happened at Ivan‘s trial.‖ Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor had created the impression that the battered spouse defense was ―bogus‖ because Ivan as well as defendant had asserted it. Counsel noted that Ivan in fact raised no such defense at his trial. If a mistrial were denied, counsel asked the court to permit him to introduce statements Ivan had made in his interviews with the police, admitting that he had put Genny in the bath. The court denied the motion for a mistrial, and agreed to consider remedial measures at a later time. It granted defense counsel‘s request for an admonition telling the jury not to consider counsel‘s questions as evidence, and in particular not to consider the question when an objection was sustained. At the next break in the proceedings, the court brought up the question of how the defense might respond to the prosecutor‘s questions, suggesting that perhaps on redirect the defendant could testify she was unaware of any attempt by Ivan to blame her for what happened to Genny. Defense counsel noted that Ivan‘s defense was indeed that defendant was responsible for what happened, although Ivan himself never directly 28 blamed her. In any event, counsel declined the court‘s invitation to explore defendant‘s knowledge on this subject, saying it would open ―more cans of worms.‖11 Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed intentional misconduct by questioning her about Ivan‘s battered spouse defense. ―The standards governing review of misconduct claims are settled. ‗A prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury commits misconduct, and such actions require reversal under the federal Constitution when they infect the trial with such ― ‗unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.‘ ‖ [Citations.] Under state law, a prosecutor who uses such methods commits misconduct even when those actions do not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.‘ [Citation.] ‗In order to preserve a claim of misconduct, a defendant must make a timely objection and request an admonition; only if an admonition would not have cured the harm is the claim of misconduct preserved for review.‘ [Citation.] When a claim of misconduct is based on the prosecutor‘s comments before the jury, ‗ ―the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.‖ ‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.) Here, defendant did not object on grounds of misconduct, and the court did admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor‘s questions. In any event, while it was improper for the prosecutor to persist with his line of questioning after the court sustained an objection, this conduct did not amount to the kind of ― ‗deceptive or reprehensible‘ ‖ tactic that rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. (People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 29.) On direct examination, defendant had offered her interpretation of Ivan‘s letter as an example of his continuing efforts to dominate and control her. A claim 11 Counsel pressed his argument that he should be allowed to present Ivan‘s incriminating statements, but the court declined to hear the argument at that time. Later in the trial, defense counsel reminded the court that it had not ruled on this point. The court heard from both sides, and decided that no door had been opened to bring in Ivan‘s statements. We discuss the admissibility of these statements post, in part II.A.1.d. 29 by Ivan that he was battered by defendant would have tended to rebut that theory. There was at least some factual basis for the prosecutor‘s suggestion. Defendant had been present in pretrial proceedings when Ivan‘s attorney announced his intent to employ a battered spouse defense, though ultimately he decided not to. While the question positing ―that was his defense‖ was misleading, there was no opportunity to clarify the issue because an objection was sustained. The jury was reminded that statements in the attorneys‘ questions were not evidence. Defense counsel did not ask the court to inform the jury that Ivan did not actually claim that he was a battered spouse. Defendant contends the court erred when it denied her request for a mistrial. We disagree. ―In reviewing rulings on motions for mistrial, we apply the deferential abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] ‗A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. [Citation.]‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1068.) Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that an admonition was sufficient to cure any prejudice stemming from the prosecutor‘s questions.
The matter of conflicting expert opinions on whether Ivan was a battered spouse first surfaced in a hypothetical question posed by the prosecutor when cross-examining Cynthia Bernee, defendant‘s expert on battered woman syndrome. During Bernee‘s initial testimony, before defendant took the stand, the prosecutor asked Bernee to assume that a husband and wife were both involved in a crime, both claimed to be a battered spouse, both had expert opinion supporting that claim, and the prosecution had experts saying that neither spouse suffered from the syndrome. He then asked, ―what‘s a jury supposed to do?‖ The court sustained a defense objection on the ground that the question was outside the witness‘s expertise. The prosecutor proceeded to ask, ―how would you 30 expect a jury to evaluate a situation like that?‖ The court again sustained a defense objection. The matter was squarely raised later, when the prosecutor sought permission to cross-examine defense experts about the existence of two reports, one by a Dr. Weinstein concluding that Ivan was a battered spouse, and one by Dr. Mills, the prosecution expert, concluding that he was not. The prosecutor proposed using these reports for two purposes: showing that expert opinion on this subject was unreliable, and showing that an expert believed Ivan was a battered man, which would rebut the defense position that any violence by defendant against Ivan was merely counter-violence consistent with her status as a battered woman. Defense counsel objected strenuously. Among other claims, counsel argued that the reports on Ivan were irrelevant, would bring in hearsay, and would prejudice the defense because it would be unable to meet the evidence by disputing the conclusion that Ivan was a battered man. Ivan was not available to defense experts for examination. The court observed that the scope of cross-examination of an expert is broad, and the critical issue was whether the reports were more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. The court noted that the prosecutor might use the reports to show that experts reach different conclusions on battered spouse syndrome; to show that the defense experts ignored the reports on Ivan, if that were the case; and to show that Ivan was not a batterer. However, the latter point depended on hearsay. On the other hand, the court reasoned that the reports on Ivan would distract the jurors from their focus on defendant; confuse them because the prosecutor did not contend that Ivan was a battered man; consume undue time if the substance of Dr. Weinstein‘s opinion were allowed in; and prejudice the defense due to its limited opportunity to challenge the conclusion that Ivan was a battered man. If the prosecutor were to cross-examine the defense experts with the substance of that conclusion, the court thought it would be hard for the jury to follow a limiting instruction telling them not to consider it. 31 The court proposed a middle ground, allowing the prosecutor to simply ask the defense experts if they were aware of the conflicting reports, one finding that Ivan was a battered man and the other that he was not, without including any details. The court would then instruct the jury that the reports could be considered only on the reliability of expert opinion in this area, not on the factual question of whether Ivan was either a battered man or a batterer. The prosecutor was amenable. The defense objected, and the matter was argued at length. Defense counsel agreed with the court that prejudice was the determinative issue under Evidence Code section 352. As to conflicting expert opinion, counsel noted there were already conflicting experts in this case, so the prosecutor did not need the reports on Ivan to make that point. It would be very difficult for the defense to rebut Dr. Weinstein‘s conclusion that Ivan was a battered man, or for the jury to put it aside and follow a limiting instruction. Indeed, allowing the prosecutor to tell the jury that experts reached different conclusions on Ivan‘s status was no middle ground at all, but exactly what the prosecution wanted, because it would both cast doubt on the defense experts and present the substance of Weinstein‘s report. Counsel argued that if Weinstein‘s opinion came before the jury, the defense was entitled to rebut it by bringing in statements by Ivan that Weinstein had considered. The court asked whether the prosecutor intended to argue that Ivan was a battered man. The prosecutor said he did not. His position was that it was simply a case of mutual violence between the spouses. The court, noting that it had devoted a significant amount of time to this issue, ruled that the prosecution could use the reports on Ivan for the limited purpose of showing that they differed on his status as a battered man. The court saw no prejudice to the defense, because neither party would be arguing that Ivan was a battered man, and a limiting instruction would tell the jury to consider the reports only on the question of the reliability of expert opinion on battered spouses, not as to whether Ivan actually was a battered spouse. Because of that limitation, the court refused to permit defense counsel to go into the basis for Dr. Weinstein‘s opinion. 32 During his cross-examination of Ryan, the defense psychologist, the prosecutor asked if Ryan was aware of conflicting opinions on Ivan, one that he was a battered man and one that he was not. Ryan said he was aware of them. The court instructed the jury: ―The doctor has testified to other opinions that he is aware of with regard to Ivan Gonzales. You are allowed to use that and consider that only for a limited purpose. You are allowed to consider it only for the limited purpose of considering the reliability of such expert testimony in this area in general. You are not to consider it on the question of whether Ivan Gonzales is or is not a battered person. I emphasize to you that you are to decide only Veronica Gonzales‘s issues in this case. It is her status, her case, that is before you. In this case, both sides will be arguing to you at the end of the case that Ivan Gonzales is not a battered man. So the reasons for your not considering it on that issue are obvious and, I think, clear to you.‖ Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in weighing the prejudicial and probative impacts of the reports, and violated her federal Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present a defense by precluding defense counsel from exploring the bases of Dr. Weinstein‘s opinion that Ivan was a battered spouse.12 The question is a close one, as the trial court recognized. The scope of cross-examination of an expert witness is especially broad. (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 105.) Evidence that is inadmissible on direct examination may be used to test an expert‘s credibility, though the court must exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to limit the evidence to its proper uses. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 833.) Experts who testify regarding a mental condition may be questioned regarding their awareness of other 12 Defendant also contends the hypothetical posed by the prosecutor to Bernee, regarding conflicting expert opinions, amounted to misconduct. However, defendant did not preserve this claim below; counsel argued only that the question ―border[ed] on misconduct.‖ Even if the objection had been made, the prosecutor‘s questions were not a deceptive tactic that injected incurable unfairness into the trial. (People v. Friend, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 29.) 33 inconsistent opinions by similar experts. (People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 923924.) Here, there is some merit in defendant‘s claims. The probative value of the opinion evidence was minimal. The fact that conflicting opinions had been obtained specifically on Ivan‘s status as a battered man carried little weight for the very limited purpose the court allowed, i.e., determining the general reliability of expert opinion on battered spouse syndrome. There were already conflicting opinions in defendant‘s case. Ryan readily conceded that experts could differ, even before the prosecutor questioned him about the opinions on Ivan. Moreover, the court permitted the jury to weigh the fact that an expert had deemed Ivan a battered spouse, yet barred defendant from exploring the bases for that opinion. Nevertheless, any error was plainly harmless. A trial court‘s determinations under Evidence Code section 352 do not ordinarily implicate the federal Constitution, and are reviewed under the ―reasonable probability‖ standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. Assuming defendant has a cognizable federal constitutional claim here, we would also find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard prescribed in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. Our reasons are several. First, the battered woman theory put forward by the defense was damaged far more seriously and directly by other evidence than by the conflicting expert opinions on Ivan‘s status. A number of witnesses, including those who knew the family well, like the Lunas and Lorena Peevler, testified that defendant was the dominant spouse in the relationship. The wife of the grocery store owner confirmed that impression with her testimony regarding the spouses‘ behavior in the store. Ivan, Jr., in testimony presented by the defense, said his mother was more likely than his father to get her way. Most tellingly, defendant‘s responses in the July 24 police interview were flatly inconsistent with the notion that she was intimidated by Ivan. When told that he had blamed her, defendant displayed anger and surprise, and promptly began implicating him, along with 34 herself, in the prolonged and varied course of abuse that led to Genny‘s death. She did not suggest she had been acting under Ivan‘s control, and her statements certainly did not reflect an effort to protect him. Although she indicated at times that Ivan had hit her, she more frequently described blows he inflicted on the children. At the end of the interview, she emphatically agreed that Ivan should be punished for what had happened to Genny. Defendant‘s statements and demeanor were quite incompatible with the defense theory that she was the cowed victim of a battering husband. The defense experts‘ attempts to explain away her performance during this videotaped interview were feeble. Compared to the powerful videotape evidence of defendant‘s interview, and the testimony of witnesses who knew the couple well, the impact of conflicting opinion evidence on whether Ivan was a battered spouse was minimal. Second, the prosecutor did not dwell on the opinion evidence. Even including his earlier unsuccessful attempts to bring up the idea that Ivan claimed to be a battered man, in the hypothetical posed to Bernee and the cross-examination of defendant on the letter she received from Ivan, no great emphasis was placed on this factor. In closing, the prosecutor mentioned it only as an example of the unreliability of expert opinion in the fields of psychology and psychiatry. Finally, the battered woman theory was not a defense to the crimes charged against defendant. The jury could have believed she was a battered spouse, yet also decided that her failure to protect Genny and her participation in severe acts of child abuse were criminally culpable. Indeed, the abuse of Genny was so horrific, and so much worse than any of the spousal abuse defendant claimed to have suffered, that the jury was highly likely to hold her responsible even if it accepted the battered woman theory. For all the above reasons, we have no doubt that the result of the trial would have been the same had the court refused to permit the prosecutor to impeach Ryan with the conflicting expert opinions on Ivan‘s status as a battered man. 35 c. Requiring Defendant to Submit to Interviews with Prosecution Experts Before trial the prosecutor moved for an order directing defendant to submit to a psychiatric evaluation by a prosecution expert, if she produced expert testimony of her own about her mental condition. The motion was based on People v. Danis (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 782 (Danis) and Evidence Code section 730, among other authorities. Defendant opposed the motion, claiming she was not presenting a defense based on her mental condition but instead offering battered woman syndrome as an explanation for certain of her actions, such as failing to protect Genny and lying to the police. The court issued a tentative ruling that the prosecution‘s request was proper under Danis. The parties argued the matter on several occasions. The prosecutor noted that the defense would be calling Bernee, a marriage and family therapist, as well as Ryan, a psychologist. He asked that two prosecution experts be allowed to examine defendant, Kaser-Boyd and Dr. Mills. He said Kaser-Boyd would testify on battered woman syndrome, and Mills on more general psychiatric issues. The prosecutor described Dr. Mills as a ―debunker.‖ The defense, in addition to maintaining that no examination should be permitted, objected to the idea of more than one examiner and particularly to an examination by Dr. Mills. Counsel argued that Dr. Mills had no expertise in battered woman syndrome, and that his views of defendant would be colored by his examination of Ivan before Ivan‘s trial. Moreover, the defense would be at a disadvantage because it had no opportunity for an expert to examine Ivan. The court granted the prosecutor‘s request. It saw no legal obstacle to examinations by two experts, and found it reasonable for one to examine defendant with regard to battered woman syndrome and one to determine more generally whether other mental conditions might explain her behavior. The court also saw no reason why Dr. Mills should not be one of the examiners, though it was inclined to exclude any statements Ivan had made to Mills.13 13 Defendant‘s writ petition challenging the court‘s order was denied. 36 Defendant was examined by Kaser-Boyd, but refused to submit to examination by Dr. Mills. The defense was aware that a consequence of that refusal was that the jury would be told it could consider her decision in its evaluation of the expert testimony. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the court advised the jury that it had ordered examinations by Kaser-Boyd and Mills, that defendant had refused to be examined by Dr. Mills, and that her refusal ―may be considered by you when weighing the opinions of the defense experts in this case. The weight to which this factor is entitled is a matter for you to decide.‖ Defendant raises a number of claims of error regarding the court‘s rulings. She contends (1) there was no authority for the court to order any examinations by prosecution experts; (2) in any event, it was improper to order examinations by more than one such expert; (3) it was improper to permit an examination by Dr. Mills in particular; and (4) Dr. Mills‘s testimony amounted to improper profile evidence. Defendant argues that the Danis holding, recognizing the trial courts‘ inherent power to authorize prosecution experts to examine defendants who place their mental state at issue, did not survive the enactment of the criminal discovery statutes in 1990. 14 (Danis, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 786; see § 1054, subd. (e) [―no discovery shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States‖].) After defendant‘s opening brief was filed, this court vindicated her argument in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106 (Verdin). The Attorney General concedes that the trial court‘s order was based on Danis, and therefore could not stand under Verdin. However, the Attorney 14 Defendant claims the order for examination by prosecution experts violated her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and the effective assistance of counsel in that counsel was not allowed to be present during the examinations. 37 General contends we should not apply Verdin retroactively, and alternatively claims the error did not prejudice defendant. The Attorney General‘s retroactivity argument is without merit. Our opinion in Verdin did not declare a new rule, but simply established the meaning of the discovery statutes as they then stood.15 Because Verdin ―only elucidate[d] and enforce[d] prior law, no question of retroactivity arises.‖ (Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 36; see Burris v. Superior Court (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1012, 1023; People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 394-395. See also People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1087 [applying Verdin].) Although we held in Verdin that the criminal discovery statutes had deprived trial courts of their inherent authority to require a criminal defendant to submit to a mental examination, we also made it clear that there was a separate statutory basis for appointing mental health experts. (Verdin, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1109.) Under Evidence Code section 730, ―[w]hen it appears to the court, at any time before or during the trial of an action, that expert evidence is or may be required by the court or by any party to the action, the court on its own motion or on motion of any party may appoint one or more experts to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or may be required.‖ In Verdin, the Court of Appeal had denied the defendant‘s pretrial petition for writ relief. We reversed, noting that the People had not requested the appointment of an expert under Evidence Code section 730, nor had the trial court made such an appointment. Thus, the People had forfeited reliance on that 15 The Legislature promptly responded to Verdin by enacting section 1054.3, subdivision (b), which authorizes courts to order examination by a mental health expert retained by the prosecution whenever a defendant places his or her mental state at issue through expert testimony. (Stats. 2009, ch. 297, § 1.) Whether the new statute would be applicable on a retrial is a question we need not consider. (See Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 288, 299-300; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 663-664; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 849.) 38 source of authority. (Verdin, at pp. 1109-1110.) Nevertheless, we noted that the People were free to seek an appointment under Evidence Code section 730 upon remand. (Verdin, at p. 1117.) Here, defendant did not argue in the trial court that the prosecutor‘s request was precluded by the discovery statutes.16 Had she done so, the court could and likely would have resorted to its power to appoint experts under Evidence Code section 730, which was invoked in the prosecutor‘s motion. 17 During arguments on the motion, the court twice mentioned its authority under Evidence Code section 730, although the Attorney General properly concedes that the court ultimately relied on its inherent authority under Danis. However, defendant‘s failure to object on the statutory grounds discussed in Verdin bars her from raising the error on appeal. A different rule would be unfair to the prosecution and the trial court, which could have avoided the error had it been brought to their attention. (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590; see also, e.g., In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 198.) In any event, even if defendant had not forfeited the claim, the Verdin error would be harmless. The court expressly recognized that the interests of ―fairness‖ and ―the ascertainment of truth‖ required the prosecutor to be able to meet the evidence of the defense experts. Its mistaken reliance on Danis was not prejudicial, given the alternate source of authority provided by Evidence Code section 730. 16 Defendant asserts she made such a claim, but the record shows otherwise. Defendant refers to a page of her opposition where she relied on her Fifth Amendment privilege and claimed that ―statements by a defendant are specifically omitted from the discovery provisions of the Penal Code (section 1054.3).‖ This claim did not alert the court to the idea that the prosecutor‘s request for examination was barred by the discovery statutes; rather, it argued that defendant‘s statements were exempt from discovery. That argument was incorrect, of course; statements made by defendant to her own experts and reflected in their reports were discoverable and were provided to the prosecution without objection below. 17 Defendant suggests the court was unlikely to appoint experts, because their fees would have been payable from the court‘s own budget. However, Evidence Code section 731, subdivision (a) specifies that fees fixed under Evidence Code section 730 are payable from the county treasury. 39 Defendant also argues, as she did below, that she did not raise her mental condition as a defense, and therefore did not waive her constitutional rights against selfincrimination and due process. This position is untenable. The centerpiece of the defense was defendant‘s assertion that her actions were explained by battered woman syndrome. Defendant squarely placed her mental state at issue, claiming she was a victim unable to overcome her fear of Ivan and protect the child she had taken into her care. The evidence she presented in support of that claim was subject to rebuttal. As the Attorney General points out, had the defense been content with evidence of battered woman syndrome in general, without presenting experts who had examined defendant, the prosecution would have had no ground for requesting an examination by its experts. But since the defense did present expert testimony based on interviews with defendant, the court properly found that fairness required giving the prosecution the opportunity to counter that testimony. It is settled that a defendant who makes an affirmative showing of his or her mental condition by way of expert testimony waives his or her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to object to examination by a prosecution expert. (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 412-413; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1190; Danis, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at p. 786.) 18 Defendant further claims that a rule exposing her to examination by prosecution experts on battered woman syndrome would open the door to compulsory examination of witnesses who are claimed to suffer from this syndrome, or from rape trauma syndrome. However, nothing in the Danis rule, now codified in section 1054.3, subdivision (b), implicates the situation of witnesses, who are not parties and do not choose to place their mental condition at issue as defendants may. Defendant contends the court erred by ordering her to submit to more than one interview, by instructing the jury that it could consider her refusal to be interviewed by 18 The same reasoning applies to defendant‘s claim that her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated. 40 Dr. Mills, and by preventing her from explaining the reasons for her refusal when she was on the witness stand.19 Defendant‘s briefs are devoid of legal authority in support of these arguments. We cannot say the court abused its discretion by deciding that two prosecution experts would be permitted to rebut the testimony of two defense experts. The jury instruction on defendant‘s refusal to be examined was similar to the instruction approved in People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 412-413. While the instruction was infected by the Verdin error in ordering the examinations (People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1087), defendant forfeited that claim and was not prejudiced in any event, as discussed above. Moreover, the court permitted her to explain that her refusal to be examined by Dr. Mills was based on the advice of counsel. Defendant claims she should have been able to tell the jury that her counsel believed Dr. Mills was not an expert in battered woman syndrome, and that Dr. Mills had an unfair advantage because he, unlike the defense experts, had interviewed Ivan. However, Dr. Mills did not testify about battered woman syndrome, and defense counsel established his lack of expertise in that area on cross-examination. It is unclear how defendant would have benefited had the jury learned of Dr. Mills‘s access to Ivan. In any event, hearsay conversations between defendant and her counsel regarding their legal strategy were clearly inadmissible. Defendant argues that it was an abuse of discretion to permit Dr. Mills to evaluate defendant over the defense‘s objections that he was biased by his prior evaluation of Ivan and lacked expertise in battered woman syndrome.20 Again, defendant provides no legal authority for her claim, and we find no merit in it. It is a matter of speculation what effect the doctor‘s interview with Ivan may have had, and the jury did not learn that he had evaluated Ivan. Nor did the prosecutor seek to use Dr. Mills as an expert on battered 19 Defendant asserts violation of her federal Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fundamentally fair trial, and her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. 20 She claims violation of her federal Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and her Eighth Amendment right to a reliable verdict. 41 woman syndrome. Instead, he offered the doctor‘s testimony for purposes of general psychiatric evaluation and the exploration of alternate explanations for defendant‘s mental state. Defendant fails to establish an abuse of discretion in the order allowing Dr. Mills to serve as one of the prosecution experts. Finally, defendant claims the court erred by allowing Dr. Mills to testify that defendant had an incentive to malinger because she faced the death penalty, and that her inconsistent statements on various subjects reflected malingering. She analogizes the doctor‘s testimony to improper profile evidence.21 Before Dr. Mills took the stand, defense counsel objected to any testimony that would invade the province of the jury by opining on defendant‘s credibility. The court agreed that it would be improper for the doctor to tell the jury what to think about defendant‘s credibility, but ruled that it would be proper for him to express a view on whether it was reasonable for another expert to form a professional opinion based on defendant‘s statements. The court noted that the issue ―somewhat straddl[es] the line between what a jury should believe and what a mental health expert should believe in forming an opinion.‖ It advised the prosecutor to ―draw your questions carefully and talk to the doctor carefully about not telling the jury what they should believe.‖ Regarding the significance of the fact that defendant was facing the death penalty, the court stated, ―we don‘t need an expert to opine that somebody facing the death penalty has a motive to generally lie.‖ The prosecutor said he had no intention of asking Dr. Mills about that, because he did not want to bring the subject of penalty into the guilt phase. However, when Dr. Mills took the stand the prosecutor made it clear that he intended to elicit an opinion that ―the incentive for malingering in a case like this is high.‖ Defense counsel‘s objection was overruled. Dr. Mills testified that the death penalty created a ―very high‖ incentive for ―embellishing or distorting.‖ In the remainder 21 Again, defendant refers to her federal Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and her Eighth Amendment right to a reliable verdict. 42 of his direct testimony, which was not prolonged, Dr. Mills described the nature of posttraumatic stress disorder, the problems experts have with unreliable data from those whose stakes in litigation give them reason to lie, and some of the inconsistencies in defendant‘s statements that led him to believe a reliable diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder was impossible. During a break, defense counsel expressed concern over the doctor‘s views on the death penalty as a motive for lying, given the court‘s earlier ruling. Counsel did not, however, ask for an admonition to the jury. The court did not share counsel‘s concern, noting that the jury was well aware of the stakes in the case and taking the view that the prosecutor‘s questions properly had to do with ―evaluating credibility and taking a history.‖ Counsel responded that if Dr. Mills‘s view on this point was not adding anything to what the jury already knew, it was more prejudicial than probative for the expert to ―keep highlighting it.‖ The court overruled the objection. The proper scope of expert testimony is limited to subjects ―sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.‖ (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); see People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 45.) Here, the court properly determined in advance of Dr. Mills‘s testimony that the doctor‘s view on the death penalty as an incentive to malinger was not necessary to assist the jury, and the prosecutor agreed not to explore the subject. However, the prosecutor proceeded to ask the doctor generally about defendant‘s incentive for malingering, and Dr. Mills immediately brought up the death penalty in his response. The court should have sustained defense counsel‘s objections, and an admonishment would have been proper. The possibility of prejudice, however, was minimal. As the court observed, it was ―not news to the jury‖ that it was a capital case, and the incentive described by Dr. Mills was an obvious one. Defense counsel effectively cross-examined Dr. Mills on this point, getting him to concede that the stakes were high for all concerned in the case, and that a defendant is not to be disbelieved simply because he or she is facing the death penalty. 43 Moreover, far more direct and damaging evidence of defendant‘s malingering was supplied by her own expert, Ryan, who told the jury that defendant‘s responses to the personality tests he gave her reflected a high degree of falsity, to such an extent that the results of one test were invalid. Defendant contends the court also erred by permitting the doctor to give his view on whether defendant‘s malingering, as reflected in the conflicts in her statements about various events, undermined the opinions given by her expert witnesses. We disagree. The defense relied heavily on expert testimony to explain the inconsistencies in defendant‘s statements. It was proper to allow the prosecution to rebut that testimony with Dr. Mills‘s opinion that the foundation for the defense experts‘ conclusions was unreliable. d. Exclusion of Statements by Ivan Defendant filed a pretrial motion seeking the admission of certain statements made by Ivan when he was questioned by detectives after Genny‘s death. Defendant summarized the statements as follows: ―[T]he defendant and the codefendant left the bathroom together after placing the decedent in the tub. The codefendant admits that only he came back into the bathroom after both had previously left. He admits that the decedent was still alive when he went back to the bathroom. The codefendant indicated that he did not think the water was hot. He said the decedent was making a noise but he thought it was because she didn‘t want to take a bath. He admits he set the water and if she had told him it was hot he would have taken her out and put cool water in. The codefendant admits that the child may have been too scared of him to say anything. He admits yelling at her to take a bath and not to come out.‖ Defendant contended these statements amounted to declarations against interest under the hearsay exception codified in Evidence Code section 1230. When the motion was heard, counsel argued that because Ivan knew he was under suspicion when he was interrogated, his statements tended to incriminate him and therefore were reliable enough 44 to be admitted. Counsel was unwilling, however, to concede that exculpatory statements by Ivan should be admitted, characterizing them as ―self-serving.‖ The court denied the motion, ruling that all of Ivan‘s statements were essentially exculpatory, not selfincriminating. The court reasoned that while certain statements taken out of context might be useful to defendant for casting blame on Ivan, those statements could not be characterized as admissions that no reasonable person would make unless they were true. After Ivan‘s trial concluded, defendant sought reconsideration. In this motion, she argued that the prosecutor had used Ivan‘s statements to prove his guilt, telling Ivan‘s jury that the statements contained ―kernels of truth.‖ If the statements were reliable enough to be used against Ivan, defendant asserted they should also be admitted at her trial. In arguing this motion, counsel told the court he now recognized that if defendant were allowed to introduce certain of Ivan‘s statements, the prosecutor could ―put on the whole tape if he wants to.‖ The court adhered to its previous ruling, finding that Ivan‘s statements were not declarations against interest but instead efforts to deny responsibility for Genny‘s death. Defendant again pressed the court to allow Ivan‘s statements into evidence after the prosecutor raised the issue of Ivan‘s attempt to use a battered spouse defense. (See pt. II.A.1.a., ante.) Counsel argued that Ivan‘s statements would ―set the record straight as to what Ivan actually did say as far as his involvement is concerned.‖ Counsel renewed this claim after the court permitted the prosecutor to inform the jury that an expert had deemed Ivan a battered spouse. The court ruled that the prosecutor‘s comments did not open the door to the admission of Ivan‘s statements to the police. In this court, defendant claims the court erred by ruling that Ivan‘s statements placing him in the bathroom with Genny at crucial times were inadmissible under the hearsay exception for declarations against interest. We disagree. Evidence Code section 1230 permits a hearsay statement to be admitted if it ―so far subjected [the declarant] to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not 45 have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.‖ ― ‗The focus of the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule is the basic trustworthiness of the declaration. [Citations.] In determining whether a statement is truly against interest within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant‘s relationship to the defendant.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 584 (Geier).)22 Here, the court accurately noted that Ivan‘s statements were attempts to excuse himself from liability. Some were plainly unbelievable, such as his claim that he would have done something if Genny had told him the water was hot. The court observed that a child being severely scalded would make it obvious to anyone that ―she was in mortal danger.‖ Defendant claims that Ivan incriminated himself merely by admitting he was in the bathroom around the time Genny was burned. However, ― ‗[e]ven when a hearsay statement runs generally against the declarant‘s penal interest and redaction has excised exculpatory portions, the statement may, in light of circumstances, lack sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to qualify for admission. . . .‘ [Citation.]‖ (Geier, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 584.) This is such a case. Defendant argues that even if Ivan‘s statements were false, they reflected consciousness of guilt. However, basic trustworthiness and factual truthfulness are required for a statement to qualify for admission under Evidence Code section 1230. (Geier, supra, at p. 584.) Defendant essentially concedes that Ivan‘s statements did not disclose the true circumstances of Genny‘s death. She goes so far as to contend that Ivan‘s statements were lies comparable to her own lies to the police, and thus were 22 We note that Ivan‘s statements were admissible at his trial as statements of a party under Evidence Code section 1220. A different analysis is required when a nonparty‘s statements are offered as declarations against interest under Evidence Code section 1230. 46 admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of showing that ―dependent spouses would lie to protect the other.‖ This unusual theory was not raised below. We do not address it here, except to note that it does not tend to support the conclusion that defendant was innocent. In any event, Ivan‘s consciousness of guilt was not at issue; both sides at defendant‘s trial took the position that he was knowingly guilty of Genny‘s murder. The court, with the agreement of counsel, informed the jury that Ivan had been convicted and sentenced to death. It advised the jury that this information was only relevant to its evaluation of the testimony of witnesses who were friends or family members of both defendant and Ivan, and reminded the jury that only defendant‘s guilt was at issue in the present trial. Thus, statements by Ivan reflecting his guilt were not relevant on any contested issue. Defendant also claims the trial court should have allowed her to bring in Ivan‘s statements to rebut the prosecutor‘s insinuations that Ivan had employed a battered spouse defense. The argument lacks logic. Ivan‘s statements to the police were not inconsistent with a battered spouse claim, nor did they tend to reflect the nature of the defense his attorneys presented. 2. The Evidence of Defendant’s History of Abuse as a Child Before trial, the prosecutor objected to the admission of evidence of the abuse defendant suffered as a child, noting that he would have to respond to it and time would be spent on collateral issues. The defense insisted the evidence was relevant because its expert psychologist, Ryan, believed defendant‘s experiences as a child had contributed to her battered woman syndrome, and were mirrored in the dynamics of her marriage. The court agreed that the defense was entitled to bring in this evidence. Defendant testified at length about her childhood abuse at the hands of her mother and stepfather. Ryan testified that the emotional and physical abuse defendant‘s mother inflicted on her, and the sexual abuse by her stepfather, which her mother refused to believe, contributed to her low self-esteem and to the development of a marital 47 relationship in which she became a battered woman. On cross-examination, Ryan agreed that batterers tend to come from violent homes, and that children tend to identify with and model their behavior after the parent of the same gender as the child. A girl, for instance, might ―learn domestic violence from her mother.‖ On redirect, Ryan said that about 75 percent of battered women come from a home where they observed domestic violence, and that defendant‘s experience of abuse as a child made it more likely that she would become a battered woman. She would submit to a battering relationship more readily than someone who had not had such experiences. Cynthia Bernee, the other defense expert on battered woman syndrome, also testified that childhood abuse is a significant factor in the syndrome. In defendant‘s case, her experiences had taught her that she lacked control over her environment and predisposed her to become a victim of domestic violence by Ivan. After the defense rested, the court and counsel engaged in an extended discussion on the scope of the prosecutor‘s rebuttal regarding the child abuse evidence. The prosecutor said his expert psychologist, Kaser-Boyd, would testify that victims of childhood abuse develop poor rage control mechanisms and tend to model the abusive behavior of their parents. He conceded that the evidence was similar to profile evidence, and could not have been presented as part of his case-in-chief, but claimed the defense had opened the subject by presenting evidence that defendant‘s childhood abuse set her up to become a victim of domestic abuse as an adult. The court expressed concern about testimony directly tying defendant‘s experiences as a child to her propensity for committing child abuse herself. It noted that the defense evidence of abuse and battered woman syndrome was limited to explaining defendant‘s failure to protect Genny. The defense responded that while it would not object to a prosecution expert testifying that defendant‘s experiences made her more likely to be a battering spouse, it did oppose testimony that she was more likely to be a child abuser. There was a good deal of discussion about whether, if the prosecutor introduced evidence that Ivan‘s 48 childhood home was not a violent one, the defense would be able to introduce Ivan‘s report to Dr. Weinstein that his brother and an uncle had molested him. The prosecutor ultimately decided that his rebuttal as to defendant‘s child abuse would be limited to two points: (1) that children model their parents‘ behavior and may learn from abuse to react with rage as adults; and (2) that child abuse can set a person up to be an abuser as easily as a victim. The court suggested that, as so limited, the proffered testimony was proper rebuttal. The defense objected that it had not tried to show that defendant‘s experience made her less likely to be a child abuser, and that the inference the prosecutor sought to draw went directly to an ultimate issue in the trial, unlike the defense‘s battered woman syndrome evidence. The court was not persuaded. The prosecutor questioned Kaser-Boyd about the concept of role modeling. She responded that children learn by imitation and parents are strong role models, so that children may imitate the behavior they see at home and subsequently reenact it. The prosecutor asked if poor emotional control was related to role modeling. Kaser-Boyd said: ―If one has had a role model with poor emotional control who acted out frustration in emotionally uncontrolled ways, let‘s say a parent who goes into a rage or a parent who is abusive in their actions, hits too hard, does things that make a child suffer, the child goes through terror, really, when they experience that. And the act of, or the experience of terror, we believe, causes changes in personality, and it also causes changes in the developing brain. [¶] Little people who feel terrified have more cortisol in their brains. They have often the frequent tapping of adrenalin and, over the long term, that damages parts of the brain that are required for good emotional control.‖ Kaser-Boyd explained that children do not necessarily reenact exactly the abuse they suffered. Asked whether the research showed that battered women could abuse children themselves, she responded that a leading study showed 28 percent of battered women admitted being abusive to their children. In her own practice, she did not have a 49 statistic but had found that ―it‘s definitely the case that some battered women are also physically abusive to their children.‖ The prosecutor proceeded to question Kaser-Boyd about her examination of defendant, but elicited no opinion as to whether defendant‘s experience of child abuse predisposed her to be a child abuser herself. Kaser-Boyd‘s testimony lasted for an entire day. The following day, the jury was excused and the court and counsel discussed instructions. On the next court day, before proceeding with the defendant‘s surrebuttal witnesses, the court gave the following instruction to the jury, which was repeated at the end of the guilt phase: ―It‘s important for you to understand the purpose for which certain evidence has been offered. The defense has offered defendant‘s testimony that she did not commit the crimes for which she‘s charged. They‘ve also offered extensive evidence regarding the battered woman‘s syndrome. The battered woman‘s syndrome evidence is not offered to show that someone suffering from the battered woman‘s syndrome could not or would not commit the crimes charged; rather, it is offered to prove a potentially innocent explanation for defendant‘s failure to protect Genny and failure to provide medical care for her as well as to provide a context for defendant‘s statements following Genny‘s death. ―Likewise, the people have offered evidence that a person‘s childhood physical abuse could result in that person growing up to be either a victim or an abuser. This is not offered to show that someone abused as a child is more likely to be an abuser as an adult; rather, it is offered to show that being a victim of physical abuse as a child is not inconsistent with commission of violent crimes as an adult. ―You must not consider this evidence for any purpose other than the purposes for which it was offered.‖ Defendant argues that Kaser-Boyd‘s testimony amounted to improper ―battering parent syndrome‖ evidence, of the kind disapproved in People v. Walkey (1986) 177 50 Cal.App.3d 268 (Walkey).23 In Walkey, a physician testified that the murder victim, a child, had been abused. The doctor described the profile of a child abuser, telling the jury that the most important single factor was being abused oneself as a child. After the defendant testified in his own behalf, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to crossexamine him about abuse he had suffered as a child. In closing, the prosecutor argued that the defendant fit the profile of a battering parent. (Id. at p. 277.) The Court of Appeal held it was error to permit what amounted to character evidence showing that the defendant was a typical battering parent. It noted, however, that if a defendant introduces evidence of his good character, cross-examination to counter that evidence would be proper. (Id. at pp. 278-279.) Here it was defendant who, over the prosecutor‘s objection, introduced the subject of her abuse as a child and the effect it had on her as an adult. The trial court properly allowed the prosecutor to respond to that evidence. This is not a case like Walkey, where the prosecution improperly sought to prove guilt on the basis of general characteristics. (See also People v. Robbie (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1086 [―Profile evidence is unfairly relied upon to affirmatively prove a defendant‘s guilt based on his match with the profile‖].) Defendant argues, as she did below, that her evidence was strictly limited to the impact of child abuse on the likelihood of becoming an abused spouse, so that proper rebuttal should have also been so limited. We disagree. ―The scope of rebuttal evidence is within the trial court‘s discretion, and on appeal its ruling will not be disturbed absent ‗ ― palpable abuse.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1088.) Defendant introduced evidence of her childhood abuse in an attempt to bolster her claim that she was an abused spouse. The purpose of this evidence was to explain her failure to protect Genny and her contradictory statements to the police, including admissions that 23 Defendant claims her rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to a fair trial and a reliable verdict were violated. 51 she participated in some of the abuse Genny suffered. The defense experts testified that a battered woman may take responsibility for acts of abuse perpetrated by the battering spouse. Certainly it was proper for the prosecutor to counter this testimony with expert opinion that an abused child may also grow up to be an abuser. The trial court instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which this testimony could be considered. No error appears. Defendant argues that the court should have permitted her to respond to the prosecutor‘s rebuttal by questioning Ivan‘s brother about his sodomization of Ivan as a child. However, not only did the brother not testify, but also the prosecutor made no attempt to show that Ivan had a good childhood. Defendant further claims she should have been able to call Dr. Weinstein and question him about Ivan‘s report that he had been sodomized. Defendant did not seek that opportunity below; the defense had rested by the time this point was discussed, and defense counsel never asked to call Dr. Weinstein for any purpose other than rebutting the notion that Ivan was not abused as a child. Defendant‘s argument on this point lacks any merit. It was her choice to bring her own childhood abuse before the jury. The court properly allowed the prosecutor to respond to defendant‘s evidence, but nothing in that response justified allowing defendant to explore Ivan‘s childhood experiences as well. 3. Instructional Issues Defendant complains that the jury instructions on the mental states required for murder and the special circumstances were incomprehensible.24 However, she fails to develop a legally coherent argument. She merely recites instructions, parses certain 24 The prosecutor advanced two theories of first degree murder: murder perpetrated by torture, and felony murder committed in the course of mayhem. (§ 189.) Two special circumstances were alleged: torture felony murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)) and mayhem felony murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(J)). 52 terms, and questions whether the jury could have understood them. 25 The Attorney General correctly notes that many of the instructions with which defendant now quibbles were not objected to below, or were requested by defense counsel. The doctrine of invited error bars defendant from challenging instructions she requested as a tactical choice. (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1293.) While defendant may raise a claim that her substantial rights were affected by instructions to which she did not object (§ 1229; People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 111), she falls well short of making such a showing. Defendant claims the instructions left the jury with the impression that mayhem felony murder must be first degree murder. That impression was accurate; mayhem felony murder is by statute murder in the first degree. (§ 189.) Defendant objects that the instructions on the elements of mayhem and the mayhem-murder special circumstance required no more than the intent to vex, annoy, or injure. That is incorrect; the instructions properly informed the jury that mayhem felony murder requires the specific intent to commit mayhem. (People v. Sears (1965) 62 Cal.2d 737, 744-745.) The fact that the instruction on the elements of mayhem mentioned only the intent to vex or annoy did not render the instructions confusing or circular, as defendant claims. (See People v. Hayes (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 796, 804-805.) Defendant asserts the instructions did not adequately distinguish between first degree murder by torture and second degree torture felony murder. However, the distinction was accurately noted by defense counsel when he pressed for the second degree torture felony murder instruction: the second degree offense does not require premeditation. This difference was plain on the face of the instructions, and defense 25 She claims her rights to due process and a jury trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were violated, as well as her right to a reliable factfinding process under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 53 counsel explained it to the jury as ―real simple‖ in his closing argument. There was no error here. Defendant next claims that CALJIC No. 8.34, explaining aiding and abetting liability for second degree torture felony murder, failed to distinguish between first and second degree murder by an aider and abettor. That distinction was beyond the scope of the instruction. CALJIC No. 8.27 explained aiding and abetting liability for first degree mayhem felony murder. Together, these two instructions covered the liability of an aider and abettor for felony murder in this case. Defendant complains that no instruction directly explained aiding and abetting liability for first degree murder by torture. However, the jury was instructed generally and properly on the liability of aiders and abettors, and those instructions were sufficient to guide the jury in determining whether defendant aided and abetted a first degree murder by torture. Defendant did not request a more specific instruction. (See People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 598.) Defendant notes that the definition of torture was presented to the jury as it related to torture as a lesser related offense. She contends the jury would not have understood that the definition also applied to the earlier instructions on first degree murder by torture and second degree torture felony murder. We are satisfied, however, that there is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have failed to make those connections. (See People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.) Defendant also claims the first degree murder by torture instruction, requiring the jury to find a ―willful, deliberate and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain,‖ was confusing when compared with the instruction on the crime of torture, requiring merely the ―intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering.‖ It was not. Defendant acknowledges that the distinctions between these intent requirements are explained in People v. Aguilar (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204-1206, but she contends they were too subtle for the jury. We are not so skeptical of the jurors‘ abilities. It is fundamental that jurors are presumed to be intelligent and capable of understanding and applying the court‘s instructions. (People v. Lewis (2001) 54 26 Cal.4th 334, 390.) The record reflects no confusion on the part of the jury, or requests for further guidance on these points. Defendant‘s final argument concerns a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.81.17, regarding the mayhem-murder special circumstance. At defense counsel‘s request, the court added the element of specific intent to commit mayhem. Over the prosecutor‘s objections and with defense counsel‘s agreement, the court also imported a version of the third paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.80, explaining the intent requirements should the jury find that defendant was an actual killer, on the one hand, or an aider and abettor, on the other. Defendant contends the instruction was ―hopelessly complicated.‖ We disagree; the instruction was approved by defense counsel and comprehensible by the jury.26 4. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Torture and Mayhem Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the criminal intent required for mayhem felony murder, murder by torture, and the mayhem and torture felony-murder special circumstances.27 The argument is meritless. As to the mayhem felony-murder special circumstance, the jury found that defendant specifically intended 26 Defendant particularly objects to the following paragraph, which the court derived from CALJIC 8.80: ―If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually killed a human being, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill in order to find the special circumstance to be true. However, if you find that the defendant was not the actual killer of a human being, or if you‘re unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual killer or an aider and abettor, you cannot find the mayhem special circumstance to be true as to the defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any act of the commission of murder in the first degree, or with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted in the commission of the crime of mayhem which resulted in the death of a human being.‖ Defendant does not argue that the instruction was legally incorrect, but merely claims it was confusing. We find no error. 27 She claims violation of her due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and her right to a reliable verdict under the Eighth Amendment. 55 to commit mayhem, in the course of which Genny was murdered, and that defendant was either the actual killer or an aider and abettor who acted with the intent to kill or with reckless indifference to human life. As to the torture felony-murder special circumstance, the jury found that the murder was intentional and that defendant meant to inflict extreme and cruel physical pain for a sadistic purpose. The evidence supporting these findings was more than adequate. ―The standard of appellate review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is settled. ‗ ―On appeal we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317–320.)‖ ‘ (People v. Abilez [(2007)] 41 Cal.4th [472,] 504.) ‗. . . We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support an enhancement using the same standard we apply to a conviction. (People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1382.) Thus, we presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence.‘ (People v. Carrasco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1058.)‖ (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 806.) Defendant contends there was no evidence she harbored a specific intent to maim Genny. She relies on cases holding that evidence showing no more than an indiscriminate attack on the victim does not support a mayhem felony-murder conviction. (People v. Sears, supra, 62 Cal.2d 737, 745; People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351, 359.) This is not such a case. Genny suffered discrete injuries over an extended period of time, including a serious burn wound on her head, multiple bruises, scars, abrasions, and lacerations all over her body, subdural and subarachnoid hematomas, and the severe scalding that ultimately caused her death. The scalding required the bathtub to be filled in advance with hot water, and Genny was deliberately held down in the water for long 56 enough to cause her skin and toenails to slough off. The jury had more than enough evidence of specific intent to maim. Direct evidence that defendant actually inflicted the fatal scalding was lacking, but powerful direct and circumstantial evidence supported the conclusion that she at least aided and abetted Ivan in inflicting the terminal injury. 28 Defendant admitted that she removed Genny from the bathtub, severely burned, and did not seek medical help. She also admitted that she used the blow dryer to blow air on Genny, and the jury could have inferred that defendant inflicted the scars on Genny‘s cheeks and elsewhere that matched the blow dryer‘s grill. A similar analysis applies to defendant‘s claim that the evidence failed to establish her deliberate intent to inflict the extreme and prolonged pain required for murder by torture. (See People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 546; Walkey, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at pp. 275-276.) The long course of painful abuse suffered by Genny suggested that defendant and Ivan habitually tortured her. Defendant‘s answers in the July 24 interview with detectives confirmed that she and Ivan acted together. On the day of Genny‘s death, one or both of them deliberately filled the tub with hot water and forced Genny into it. Both witnessed the extreme and prolonged pain that ensued as Genny lay dying, and did nothing to secure assistance until her body began to stiffen. Regarding the torture felonymurder special circumstance, defendant claims the evidence failed to establish her intent to kill. We disagree. Defendant admitted she thought Genny was dying when she pulled her from the bathtub, unconscious. By failing to get help, she ensured Genny‘s death. The evidence of intent to kill was sufficient. 28 In her reply brief, defendant relies on People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1164-1165, for the proposition that when the aider and abettor may have had a less culpable mental state than the perpetrator, it is error to instruct the jury that an aider and abettor is ―equally guilty.‖ Defendant‘s jury was similarly instructed. However, as defendant concedes, the Samaniego court deemed the instructional error harmless where a special circumstance alleging intent to kill was found true. (Id. at pp. 1165-1166.) Here, the jury returned such a true finding. Accordingly, Samaniego does not aid defendant. 57 5. Merger of Mayhem and Homicide Defendant contends a conviction of mayhem felony murder in this case would violate the ―merger doctrine‖ articulated in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, a second degree murder case, and extended to first degree felony murder in People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 441-442 (Wilson).29 In her reply brief, defendant notes that this court recently overruled Wilson and held, prospectively, that the merger doctrine has no application to first degree felony murder. (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1121-1122.) Although Farley does not apply here, the Attorney General correctly notes that our preexisting jurisprudence had limited Wilson to cases of burglary felony murder where the defendant‘s only felonious purpose was to assault or kill the victim. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1262; People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387-388.) Defendant relies on People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 806, a second degree murder case holding that felony child abuse, when it consists of a direct assault on a child resulting in death, comes within the merger doctrine. Smith has no application here. We have long restricted the merger doctrine in first degree murder cases to felony murder based on burglary, ―due to the unusual nature of burglary.‖ (People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 388.) In any event, the crime of mayhem felony murder has an ―independent felonious purpose‖ that distinguishes it from the felony child abuse discussed in Smith. (Burton, at p. 387.) The defendant must intend to permanently disfigure the victim, which goes well beyond the merely assaultive purpose the Smith court considered incompatible with the felony-murder rule. (Smith, at pp. 805-806; People v. Sears, supra, 62 Cal.2d at pp. 744-745.) The primary policy reason for the felony-murder doctrine was fully operative in the circumstances of this case. ―The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter those who commit the enumerated felonies from killing by holding them strictly responsible for 29 Defendant claims that allowing the jury to consider the felony-murder theory violated her rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 58 any killing committed by a cofelon, whether intentional, negligent, or accidental, during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the felony.‖ (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197.) Although defendant contends ―the felony-murder rule cannot be much of a deterrent to a person who has decided to assault a child with intent to maim,‖ the medical testimony here was that Genny could have survived had she been given prompt medical care, though the scalding would have scarred her for life. This mayhem need not have resulted in a murder. Thus, the merger doctrine has no logical application in this case. 6. Cumulative Guilt Phase Error Defendant argues that this was a close case, and that the errors during the guilt phase, even if not prejudicial in themselves, justify reversal when considered together. Neither proposition is supportable. The case presented at the guilt phase was quite strong, supported by graphic and telling physical evidence, both in the condition of Genny‘s body and the conditions found in defendant‘s apartment. Defendant‘s own statements were powerfully incriminating. The attempt by the defense to explain away those statements and minimize defendant‘s culpability, by presenting her as a battered woman controlled by her husband, was weak. (See pt. II.A.1.b., ante.) Any errors during the guilt phase were relatively insignificant. Assuming it was improper to allow the prosecutor to inform the jury that Ivan had been deemed a battered spouse by one expert, the effect on the determination of defendant‘s guilt was negligible. As we have noted, battered woman syndrome was not a defense to the charged crimes, and other evidence cast serious doubt on defendant‘s status as a battered woman. (Pt. II.A.1.b., ante.) The Verdin error discussed in part II.A.1.c., ante, was merely a technical one, given the alternate source of authority in Evidence Code section 730 for ordering defendant to submit to examination by mental health experts. The error in permitting Dr. Mills to opine that the death penalty was an incentive to malinger had minimal impact, as 59 also discussed in part II.A.1.c., ante. We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that these irregularities, considered together, did not affect the outcome of the guilt phase.