Opinion ID: 2639442
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of Hamilton's Conviction for Criminal Trespass

Text: ¶ 36 Finally, Hamilton argues that even if the trial court did not err in submitting the criminal trespass charge to the jury as a question of fact or in denying his equitable estoppel claim, we should overturn his criminal trespass conviction because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict. We disagree. ¶ 37 As discussed in Part II.A.2 above, the State produced six pieces of evidence supporting Ranger Enterprises' ownership of Vance Springs and Hamilton's unlawful presence thereon. Hamilton nevertheless attempts to argue that this evidence was insufficient to support a jury verdict. He asserts that the fact that the 1994 tax deed cited an erroneous statute clouds title to Vance Springs sufficiently to create a reasonable doubt about whether he was unlawfully on the property. ¶ 38 In reviewing a jury verdict, we accord high deference to the fact-finder at trial. [W]e do not `weigh conflicting evidence,'  Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61, ¶ 16, 52 P.3d 1168 (quoting State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977)), nor do we `substitute [our] judgment for that of the fact-finder,' id. (quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)). Viewing the evidence in this light, we conclude that there was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of [criminal trespass] had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted); State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 13, 20 P.3d 300. We thus affirm Hamilton's conviction for criminal trespass.