Opinion ID: 290558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Existence of a Right to Sue Under Section 1981.

Text: 15 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (1968), the Supreme Court was asked to determine the scope and constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1982. 4 In its original form section 1982 was part of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 5 The Court held that section 1 and its derivative, section 1982, prohibit  all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property   . Jones, supra, at 413, 88 S.Ct., at 2189. The constitutionality of section 1982 was upheld on the basis of Congress' power to enact legislation to enforce the thirteenth amendment. 6 16 Plaintiffs argue by analogy to the Jones case that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 7 is also derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866; that it is a valid exercise of congressional power under the thirteenth amendment; and that it is intended to prohibit private racial discrimination in employment by companies and unions. We agree. 17 There can be little doubt that section 1981, as well as section 1982, is derived directly from section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. In this judgment we rest primarily on the views expressed by the Supreme Court in the Jones case. In footnote 78, the Court said that the right to contract for employment, [is] a right secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (   derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866   .). Jones, supra, at 442, 88 S.Ct., at 2204. This statement is buttressed by further mention of the derivation of section 1981 in footnote 28, Jones, supra, at 422, 88 S.Ct. 2186. 18 The Supreme Court's view of the genesis of section 1981 is also supported by our own analysis. In 1870 Congress reenacted section 1 of the 1866 Act as section 18 of the 1870 Civil Rights Act. As part of the 1870 Act Congress also adopted section 16 which is similar, although somewhat broader, than section 1 of the 1866 Act. For purposes of determining the derivation of section 1981 we believe the enactment of section 16 of the 1870 Act is superfluous since section 18 is sufficiently broad to include the provisions of section 1981. This conclusion is supported by the failure of defendants to present legislative history to demonstrate that Congress intended to narrow the scope of the right to make and enforce contracts provision of section 1 of the 1866 Act by the enactment of section 16. In fact, a contrary intent is more likely since Congress by enacting section 16 undoubtedly was attempting to insure that the right to make and enforce contracts without regard to race was supported by the fourteenth as well as the thirteenth amendment. 8 19 From the discussion in the Jones case, it is also evident that section 1981, as part of section 1 of the 1866 Act, was a valid exercise of Congress' power to enact legislation under the thirteenth amendment. We rest particularly upon the Supreme Court's analysis of Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 27 S.Ct. 6, 51 L.Ed. 65 (1906). In Hodges a group of white workers were prosecuted under section 1981 for terrorist activities conducted against Negro employees of a saw mill. The Supreme Court reversed the defendants' conviction, holding that section 1981 was not designed to prohibit private acts of discrimination. The Court in Jones examined the decision in Hodges and ruled: 20 The conclusion of the majority in Hodges rested upon a concept of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment irreconcilable with the position taken by every member of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases and incompatible with the history and purpose of the Amendment itself. Insofar as Hodges is inconsistent with our holding today, it is hereby overruled. Jones, supra, at 442-443, 88 S.Ct. at 2205 n. 78. 9 21 Every indicia of congressional intent points to the conclusion that section 1981 was designed to prohibit private job discrimination. The words of the statute, which are almost identical in relevant respects to section 1982, must be construed to extend beyond insuring the bare legal capacity of Negroes to enter into contracts. Thus Congress provided that: All persons    shall have the same right    to make and enforce contracts    as is enjoyed by white citizens. We are not persuaded that the failure of Congress to expressly mention employment contracts makes section 1981 distinguishable from section 1982. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history of the 1866 Act which demonstrates Congress' intent that section 1 apply to employment contracts. As the Supreme Court noted in Jones: 22 The congressional debates are replete with references to private injustices against Negroes — references to white employers who refused to pay their Negro workers, white planters who agreed among themselves not to hire freed slaves without the permission of their former masters. Jones, supra, at 427, 88 S.Ct., at 2197. 23 As an example of Congress' concern are the words of Representative Windom delivered on the floor of the House: 24 Its object is to secure to a poor, weak class of laborers the right to make contracts for their labor, the power to enforce the payment of their wages, and the means of holding and enjoying the proceeds of their toil. Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866). 25 This explanation of the purpose of section 1 of the 1866 Act demonstrates that Congress contemplated a prohibition of racial discrimination in employment which would extend beyond state action. 26 Racial discrimination in employment by unions as well as by employers is barred by section 1981. The relationship between an employee and a union is essentially one of contract. Accordingly, in the performance of its functions as agent for the employees a union cannot discriminate against some of its members on the basis of race. 10 Washington v. Baugh Construction Co., 313 F.Supp. 598 (W.D.Wash.1969); Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F.Supp. 413 (S.D.Ohio 1968). 27 Defendants make several arguments to refute the existence of a cause of action based on private racial discrimination in employment prior to the enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. These arguments merit only brief discussion. Defendants maintain that the Jones decision was foreshadowed by cases such as Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 S.Ct. 847, 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149 (1917), and that, since similar foreshadowing is not present under section 1981, the Supreme Court would not extend its ruling in Jones to private discrimination in employment contracts. If, by foreshadowing, the defendants mean that the state action concept has sometimes been employed in a flexible fashion to achieve just results, the cases upon which they rely foreshadow the demise of the requirement of state action under section 1981 as well. Furthermore, it is mistaken to suggest that courts have not used similar means to circumvent the requirement of state action in the area of employment contracts. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198-199, 65 S.Ct. 226 (1944). 28 Defendants also argue that the Jones case is distinguishable from the case at bar since property rights have traditionally been subject to greater governmental regulation than other private activity. We disagree. Labor contract relations are subject to governmental regulation nearly as extensive as property rights. Furthermore, we are unclear why defendants' assertion, even if it were true, is relevant in construing section 1981. Finally, defendants maintain that the Jones case should not be given retroactive application. This argument is sufficiently answered by the fact that the Supreme Court has already applied the Jones case retroactively in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969). 29