Opinion ID: 394820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Limits of McDonnell Douglas

Text: 23 The District Court apparently interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas as stating necessary conditions for establishment of a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII. The court seems to have accepted the conclusion that appellant's supervisor, Bednar, had issued reports reflect(ing) an improper consideration of appellant's EEO duties. 49 Nonetheless, while recognizing the wrong, for which destruction of the appraisals (was) the appropriate remedy, 50 the court considered itself bound to hold that not even a prima facie case had been stated under Title VII, because the record indicates that even if his supervisory appraisals were free from improper consideration of his EEO activities, plaintiff would not have been among the best qualified for the positions sought. 51 24 We believe the District Court misconstrued McDonnell Douglas. Read in isolation certain portions of that decision might suggest that the Supreme Court intended to establish uniform guidelines for pleading and proof in Title VII cases. But the Court stated explicitly that the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations. 52 A plaintiff, it said, may establish a prima facie case 53 by citing the four McDonnell Douglas factors. But the Court made clear that a plaintiff would not be required to do so in all cases. 54 We find this to be a case in which the McDonnell Douglas test would not be appropriate. 25 The McDonnell Douglas standard links the questions of statutory wrong and statutory remedy. 55 To state a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must make a showing that he would have got a job or promotion but for an illegal act of discrimination. If he does so, he shifts to the employer the burden, not only of articulating a defense against the charge of discriminatory treatment, but of rebutting the prima facie case of entitlement to one or more of a particular set of remedies back pay, reinstatement, or preferential hiring or promotion. 56 The linkage of the questions of legal wrong and legal remedy is entirely appropriate in view of the facts of McDonnell Douglas and of similar cases typically cases in which a plaintiff claims that he was rejected for an employment vacancy on grounds of race or reprisal, that the harm he suffered was denial of the particular job sought, and that the appropriate remedy is back pay plus preferential hiring or promotion. 26 It is obvious, however, that a plaintiff may suffer harms from discrimination that fall short of demonstrable loss of a job or a promotion. An unfavorable employee assessment, placed in a personnel file to be reviewed in connection with future decisions concerning pay and promotion, could both prejudice the employee's superiors and materially diminish his chances for advancement. 57 27 Despite the linkage established in McDonnell Douglas, this court has recognized that the questions of statutory violation and appropriate statutory remedy are conceptually distinct. See Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1084-1085 (D.C.Cir.1976) (per curiam ). An illegal act of discrimination whether based on race or some other factor such as a motive of reprisal is a wrong in itself under Title VII, regardless of whether that wrong would warrant an award of back pay or preferential hiring. 58 The goal of the statute is to bar all employer actions based on impermissible factors. In a case such as this the question must therefore be whether appellant has suffered an act of discrimination made unlawful under Title VII.