Opinion ID: 475335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the oral request

Text: 56 Bowen's argument that he need only satisfy the Agurs test governing situations where a specific request was made rests on his assertion that his counsel made such a request orally. The State disagrees. Thus, we must first address whether defense counsel before trial made an oral 4 request for a list of other suspects. Such a request would be a specific request because it gives the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desired, Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399, and is formulated in terms as precise as possible under the circumstances, see Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090, 105 S.Ct. 601, 83 L.Ed.2d 710 (1985). 57 Judge Brett made the following finding of fact concerning the oral request:13. There was no written motion, either general or specific, for exculpatory evidence filed by or on behalf of the petitioner before or during the trial. At the hearing before the undersigned, it was conceded by the parties that approximately a month to six weeks before the jury trial, petitioner's counsel orally requested of the prosecutors (the District Attorney and his assistants assigned to the case) to be provided with the names of 'all other suspects.' The prosecutors advised that at the time of the request there was only one suspect and that was Clifford Henry Bowen. On the day of trial, petitioner's counsel served a subpoena duces tecum on the Oklahoma City Police Department to produce its entire investigation file concerning the Guest House Motel murders. The information hereafter discussed concerning Leonard Lee Crowe was not produced by the Oklahoma City Police Department pursuant to the subpoena duces tecum. 58 Rec., vol. I, fed. habeas, doc. no. 39, at 10-11 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 5 59 The State contends Judge Naifeh found that no oral request had been made and that this finding must be presumed correct under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) (1982). The State further contends Judge Brett erroneously found that in the federal hearing the State conceded a request had been made, 6 and that he failed to articulate his reasons for overriding the state determination as required by Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). Bowen argues that the state findings do not preclude the possibility of an oral request and that, even if they do, the state record does not fairly support such a finding. He maintains further that the State's concession at the federal hearing establishes the error of the alleged state factual determination and that we must accept the federal district court's finding of a concession unless it is clearly erroneous. Bowen makes no attempt to deal with the requirements of Sumner.
60 Judge Naifeh made the following findings which relate to a request by the defense for a list of other suspects: 61 1. That no motion for discovery of exculpatory evidence was filed by trial defense counsel on behalf of the Defendant. 62 .... 63 28. That the information regarding Crowe could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence as the defendant could have requested a list of all suspects prior to trial but failed to do so. 64 .... 65 36. That Frank Wright, an attorney for the Defendant, testified he orally asked the District Attorney if there were any other suspects and was told that none existed. 66 .... 67 41. That the District Attorney's office considered the hypnosis of one witness, plus the arrest of a suspect named Simmons, to possibly be exculpatory evidence and that this information was provided to counsel for the Co-Defendant, Harold Behrens, pursuant to a Brady motion, but not given to Raymond Burger, trial counsel for the Defendant, because Mr. Burger made no request and apparently discovered this information before trial. 68 Rec., vol. I, fed. habeas, doc. no. 35, at 1, 5, 6, 8 app. The parties dispute whether these findings preclude the possibility that an oral, informal request was made by Mr. Wright. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that: 69 Appellant alleges in his appeal and in his second motion for new trial that reversible error occurred when the prosecution failed to deliver exculpatory evidence to defense counsel. However, the record does not reveal that defense counsel made a formal request for exculpatory evidence, though trial counsel contends he made an oral pretrial inquiry as to the existence of other suspects to which the prosecution answered in the negative. 70 .... 71 Appellant asserts the suppression of the allegedly exculpatory evidence regarding these suspects denied him due process of law under the authority of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). However, as appellant recognizes, no request was made for exculpatory evidence prior to trial. 72 Bowen, 715 P.2d at 1098 (emphasis added). 73 It is unclear whether either the state trial court or the Court of Criminal Appeals implicitly decided that no informal, oral request had been made or rather did not reach the issue because they believed that an oral request was not legally equivalent to a motion or written request. 7 If either court did find that no request of any kind had been made, this would be a finding of historical fact, see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 745, 755 n. 6, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963) (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506, 73 S.Ct. 397, 445, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)), entitled to a presumption of correctness by federal courts under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d).
74 At the federal hearings several members of the defense team testified on the subject of oral requests. Trial counsel Burger stated that in early 1981 he had asked for exculpatory material generally and was shown a thin file which did not contain any such material. See rec., vol. VII, fed. habeas, at 15, 79-81. Co-counsel Frank Wright testified that in early 1981 he had made a direct oral inquiry of the district attorney regarding the existence of other suspects and was told that there were none. See rec., vol. VI, fed. habeas, at 114-16, 125, 132, 151-52; see also id. at 78-79 (testimony of Mike Evett); id. at 159 (testimony of Clifford Henry Bowen). 75 In the closing arguments, the following colloquy took place between Judge Brett and Jack Zimmermann, Bowen's lawyer on appeal: 76 THE COURT: Of course, we've also got a problem in this case that is somewhat troublesome to me. I take it the record shows clearly that, first, there was no discovery motion, particularly Brady motion, prior to trial, right? 77 MR. ZIMMERMANN: There was no written motion prior to trial. That's what the record shows, yes, Your Honor. 78 THE COURT: Does our record show that--at least, there is no dispute in the record that I've heard here, and from what [District Attorney] Macy said I take it he doesn't dispute it--that most probably sometime either in January of '81 or early February of '81 Mr. Macy, probably in the presence of one of his assistants where Mr. Frank Wright was present and probably also Mr. Burger was present, there was an oral request for information concerning any other suspects. Is this record clear here that that oral request was made and there is no dispute about that? 79 MR. ZIMMERMANN: Yes, sir. If I may, here is what I believe there is no dispute about. 80 THE COURT: All right. 81 MR. ZIMMERMANN: There is no dispute there was any written Brady motion. There is no dispute--written by either Frank Wright or Raymond Burger. There is no dispute that there was only one specific request made orally, and that was for a list of suspects. There was no specific request for any other information, and we acknowledge that, we concede that. 82 But the evidence is clear from the second motion for a new trial that Frank Wright specifically asked Bob Macy--Bob Macy had the opportunity to cross-examine and his only cross-examination question was to inquire as to the date that that meeting occurred. I think Mr. Macy also acknowledged today that there was a request for suspects. Mr. Burger's uncontested testimony here, sponsored by the State, was that there was a specific request for suspects. 83 THE COURT: All right. Well, I take it in your mind ... a request for other suspects, if made by Mr. Bowen's counsel, would in effect be a request for other suspects other than my client. 84 MR. ZIMMERMANN: Yes, Your Honor, and I think it was clear it was in that context. 85 Rec., vol. IX, fed. habeas, at 22-24. Robert Nance, representing the State, voiced no objections to these assertions by defense counsel and the court. During his closing argument Nance and the court had the following exchange: 86 THE COURT: Mr. Nance, do you agree that the state of our record here is essentially that an oral request was made by Mr. Frank Wright and/or Mr. Raymond Burger before Mr. Macy and/or one of his prosecutors on the prosecution team in the January, 1981 or early February '81 time frame for a list of all other suspects or all suspects? Does our record reflect that? 87 MR. NANCE: Our record reflects and my notes--well, I don't recall exactly what I wrote, but yes, Mr. Wright asked the question. Mr. Macy, as I recall, didn't remember it. 88 THE COURT: Well, my recollection is Mr. Wright stated it emphatically occurred. Mr. Burger stated it emphatically occurred. Both of them stated that the prosecutor replied there are no other suspects other than Clifford Henry Bowen. And Mr. Macy today said, 'I don't recall the conversation, but if they say it took place I assume it did.' 89 MR. NANCE: I think that's correct. 90 THE COURT. So, is the state of our record here that that's undisputed? 91 MR. NANCE: I'd say so in this proceeding. 92 Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added). Later in his argument Nance appeared to contradict these concessions when he stated that [o]ur view is and continues to be at this point that there was no request. Id. at 51. 93 From a review of the cold record, we can ascribe no other meaning to these statements than a concession, as Judge Brett found. The proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which the State submitted to the federal court confirm that it did not dispute the existence of an oral request but argued instead that the request was legally insufficient: 94 [T]he Court doubts that a casual question, sometime early in 1981, was sufficient to alert the prosecution that defense counsel wanted exculpatory material under Brady. It appears from the testimony that a casual question was asked and honestly answered. Mr. Wright evidently did not make any follow-up in order to clarify that his request was for exculpatory evidence within the meaning of Brady. At the evidentiary hearing conducted in the present case, Mr. Macy did not even recall the question being asked. If the desired information regarding other suspects was important enough to the defense to matter in trial, it is not unreasonable to require the defense to file a written motion for exculpatory evidence under Brady.... The Court believes that a casual question, whether asked in the office, in the hallway, or outside the courtroom, does rise [sic] to the dignity of a request under Brady unless it firmly and unquestionably puts the prosecution on notice that the defense is inquiring about the exculpatory evidence. 95 Mr. Wright's question fell far short of this standard. He did not ask regarding rejected investigative leads or other persons who were suspects at other times. He only asked if there were someone else who might have committed the crime. For reasons more fully set out below, the Lee Crowe material did not fit within that question. Therefore, there was no improper failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. 96 The Court is reluctant to overturn a final criminal conviction, for the most serious of crimes, on collateral attack based upon a dimly remembered question asked years before.... The Court notes that both Judge Naifeh and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals considered this alleged oral request to be insufficient under Brady.... The Court concludes that overturning this conviction based upon a single oral question, never followed by formal motion, would unduly interfere with the finality of legitimate state criminal judgments.... The Court simply does not believe that the question asked by Mr. Wright rose to the dignity of any request whatsoever under Brady v. Maryland, supra, and refuses to treat it as such. 97 Rec., vol. I, fed. habeas, doc. no. 35, at 34-36 (excerpt from State's proposed conclusions of law) (emphasis added). 98 The State now attempts to elude the finding of a concession. It first contends that its persistent avowed reliance on the state court findings is inconsistent with a concession that those findings are wrong. This argument not only assumes that the state court findings are complete and unambiguous but also fails to explain how a concession would not undermine those findings. Second, the State argues that Macy's lack of recollection precluded it from unequivocally asserting that no request had been made and that its silence on the issue does not constitute an affirmative concession. Unfortunately for the State, we cannot require the district courts to observe such semantic niceties. For the reasons set out below, we conclude that the finding of an oral request for other suspects is supported by both the federal and state court records and is not clearly erroneous. See rec., vol. III, 1st motion trans., at 905, 973; id. vol. II, 2d motion trans., at 12-13. It remains to be determined, however, what effect the presumption of correctness accorded state court findings by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) has on the district court's finding that the State conceded an oral request was made. 99
100 As we have stated, if the state court did find that no request of any kind had been made, federal courts must presume this finding correct unless one of the seven conditions specified in section 2254(d) applies. 8 If none of these conditions applies, or unless the habeas court concludes that the state court finding is not fairly supported by the record, the petitioner has the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that the state court finding is erroneous. See Sumner, 449 U.S. at 550, 101 S.Ct. at 770. The State's concession establishes that the facts material to the question of a specific, oral request were not adequately developed at the state court hearing. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(3); cf. rec., vol. III, 1st motion trans., at 905, 973. Moreover, to the extent the state court findings can be construed to imply that the defense made no specific, oral request for a list of other suspects, the concession convincingly establishes the error of that determination. Bowen therefore has amply met his burden under section 2254(d). 101 Remaining for our consideration is Sumner's requirement that a habeas court include in its opinion granting the writ the reasoning which led it to conclude that one of the first seven factors was present, or the reasoning which led it to conclude that the state finding was not fairly supported by the record. See Sumner, 449 U.S. at 551, 101 S.Ct. at 771. The Supreme Court has stated that: 102 Such a statement tying the generalities of Sec. 2254(d) to the particular facts of the case at hand ... will have the obvious value of enabling courts of appeal and this Court to satisfy themselves that the congressional mandate has been complied with. No court reviewing the grant of an application for habeas corpus should be left to guess as to the habeas court's reasons for granting relief notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 2254(d). 103 Id. at 551-52, 101 S.Ct. at 771. Accordingly, we must decide whether Sumner applies and, to the extent it does, whether its requirements were met in this instance. 104 At the outset, it is unclear whether Sumner is on all fours with the issue of the oral request. In Sumner the Ninth Circuit reversed the conclusion of both the federal district court and the state courts by finding that a pretrial photographic identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive. The Ninth Circuit made this determination based on the identical record considered by the federal district and state courts and used the same constitutional standard. See id. at 543, 101 S.Ct. at 767. The Supreme Court noted that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the presumption of correctness and did not even refer to section 2254(d) in its opinion. See id. at 547, 101 S.Ct. at 769. The Court criticized this apparent abrogation of the congressional mandate, noting that: 105 When Congress provided in Sec. 2254(d) that a habeas court could not dispense with the 'presumption of correctness' embodied therein unless it concluded that the factual determinations were not supported by the record, it contemplated at least some reasoned written references to Sec. 2254(d) and the state-court findings. 106 Id. at 549, 101 S.Ct. at 770 (emphasis in original); cf. S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3663, 3663-66. 107 Here, the federal district judge did not base his determination solely on the record considered by the state court but had the benefit of the concession, evidence not before the state judge. The district judge, moreover, repeatedly indicated his acute awareness of the presumption of correctness under section 2254(d). See rec., vol. I, fed. habeas, doc. no. 6, at 3; id., doc. no. 39, at 24. Although the court's discussion of section 2254 appears to be linked more to the question of exculpatory evidence than to the oral request issue, the court did refer to the state court determination when it found the concession. 9 Apparently the district court did not deem it necessary to tie section 2254(d) to the oral request issue because it believed that the concession rendered the fact question moot. 10 108 In our view, the district court adequately complied with the requirements of Sumner and section 2254(d). The concession constitutes the State's admission that the state court determination was erroneous to the extent it can be interpreted to mean that no oral request was made. This state of affairs is analogous to a stipulation of a given set of facts. The district court has explained the basis of its finding to our satisfaction and with due deference to the state court proceedings.IV. THE WITHHELD EVIDENCE 109 Before we review the evidence to determine if a Brady violation occurred, we note that the question of materiality and the possible effect of the withheld evidence on the verdicts is a mixed question of fact and law. The state court's ultimate conclusion under Brady therefore is not entitled to a presumption of correctness under section 2254(d) and is open to review by federal courts. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1344-46. 110 Bowen argues that the Lee Crowe material is exculpatory within the meaning of Brady because it could be used to impeach the identification witnesses and because it casts doubt upon his guilt. We will examine each of these contentions according to both of the Agurs tests as well as the Bagley test. 111 A. The Lee Crowe Material as Impeachment Evidence 112 Impeachment evidence merits the same constitutional treatment as exculpatory evidence. Suppression of material which could be used to impeach witnesses violates the Constitution if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. E.g., Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3380-81 (evidence of bias); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (same). The case against Bowen stands or falls upon the testimony of the two identification witnesses. One of the assistant district attorneys who prosecuted Bowen agreed that in this case identification is a key issue. See rec., vol. II, 2d motion trans., at 223 (testimony of David Hardwicke). As the district attorney himself conceded, the evidence to convict would have been insufficient without the testimony of the two witnesses. He stated under cross examination: 113 Q. If you take out the testimony of Mary Chilton, who had misidentified someone else earlier, and Carrie Pitchford, there is no case against Henry Bowen, is there? 114 A. There is not a total case. There is a partial case. 115 Q. Could you have gotten a conviction on the evidence that you had, subtracting Mary Chilton and Carrie Pitchford? 116 A. No. 117 .... 118 Q. Now, Mr. Macy, let me ask you this question. If the testimony of Mary Chilton and Carrie Pitchford had been impeached at trial significantly or their identification in court had been significantly attacked or impeached, is there a reasonable probability that Mr. Bowen would be free today? 119 A. There was a serious attempt to impeach it. 120 Q. That wasn't my question, Mr. Macy. Had they been impeached, because their testimony was the heart of the case, isn't there a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been not guilty? 121 A. That's true. 122 Rec., vol. VIII, fed. habeas, at 68 (testimony of Robert H. Macy). Thus, evidence impeaching these witnesses would take out the heart of the State's case and greatly undermine the guilty verdicts. 123 Had the defense team known about Lee Crowe, it could have made adroit use of his marked resemblance to the description of the suspect. Like the described suspect, Crowe was a white man, six feet tall, 225 pounds, with salt and pepper hair, a beer belly, pale complexion, and no eyeglasses. Crowe was in his late thirties, although Mae Margraves had described him as in his late forties, and the suspect was originally described as between thirty-five and fifty years old. Crowe was known to wear a baseball cap and in fact was wearing a cap when he and Patsy Peters visited Mae Margraves in Madill, Oklahoma just a short time before the shootings. Crowe also may not have had a mustache at the time of the murders because the evidence showed he had shaved his sometime between July 1 and July 8. The fact that Mae Margraves' description of Crowe did not mention a mustache makes it likely that the mustache was gone before July 6. 124 The State understandably makes much of the fact that the two witnesses chose Bowen and not Crowe from the photo arrays, and Bowen in a live lineup. Had the Lee Crowe material been made available to the defense, however, the frailties of these identification procedures would not have been difficult to demonstrate. As we have noted, Oklahoma City police used a picture of Crowe with a mustache although the described suspect had none and they knew that Crowe had shaved his mustache around the time of the murders. As we have also noted, the photo array featuring Crowe contained three of five men with mustaches, and the array featuring Bowen contained no men with mustaches. The picture of Bowen, moreover, showed him without the horn-rimmed eyeglasses he normally wore and which Detective McBride remembered so well, see supra p. 597. Although both Crowe and Bowen appear somewhat pale-complexioned in the photographs, an Oklahoma City detective testified that Crowe's picture appears paler than Bowen's. See rec., vol. II, 2d motion trans., at 160 (testimony of William L. Cook). In July 1980 South Carolina law enforcement agents described Crowe to Oklahoma City detectives as pale-complexioned, while the defense introduced testimony at trial that Bowen was suntanned at the time of the murders. When the State attempted to counter this evidence, it produced testimony only that Bowen was pale at the time of his arrest in late August. Judge Brett viewed Bowen in person and found that his complexion is medium and capable of tanning. When this finding was made, Bowen had been on death row for over four years and likely had had little exposure to the sun. The man seen loitering at the Guest House, moreover, wore a baseball cap, which may have obscured his features. Finally, although the witnesses did pick Bowen out of a live lineup, they were never given the chance to view Crowe in person. If the defense had known about Lee Crowe at trial, the reliability of the identification procedures could have been undermined and the witnesses impeached. 125 The State urges that Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706, is analogous. In Moore the Court found no Brady violation in the prosecution's failure to disclose certain statements of a witness named Sanders, who testified that the defendant had boasted in a bar called the Ponderosa Tap that he had shot a bartender in a nearby city. Although Sanders identified Moore at trial as the boaster, he previously had told police that the man was Slick, who was a different person from the defendant. The Court stated: 126 We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case. Here, the elusive 'Slick' was an early lead the police abandoned when eyewitnesses to the killing and witnesses to Moore's presence at the Ponderosa were found. 127 Id. at 795, 92 S.Ct. at 2568. Thus, the Court emphasized that two eyewitnesses had identified the defendant as a participant in the shooting and that two other witnesses besides Sanders had identified the defendant as the boaster. In contrast, the only identification evidence against Bowen was significantly impeachable with the withheld material. Additionally, there was no evidence that Slick, unlike Crowe, had motive, opportunity, and ability to kill the bartender. See infra Part IV(B). We are not persuaded, therefore, that Moore controls our consideration of this appeal. 128 The testimony of Chilton and Pitchford as presented at trial may have supported the verdict, but, like much identification testimony, it was not flawless. Chilton's credibility is undermined by her hypnosis, and her possible misidentification of William Wayne Simmons in a photo array and a police detective in a lineup. Pitchford had viewed the suspect from a window eighty-five feet away. She said he wore a white T-shirt while Chilton said he wore a medium blue long-sleeved work shirt. Had the Lee Crowe material been disclosed to the defense, the backbone of the State's case might well have been irretrievably broken.B. The Lee Crowe Material Casts Doubt Upon Bowen's Guilt 129 As the State has reminded us, a Brady inquiry is grounded in an overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2401. On the state of the evidence, the Lee Crowe material creates reasonable doubt that Bowen committed the Guest House murders. Additionally, in the hands of the defense, it could have been used to uncover other leads and defense theories and to discredit the police investigation of the murders. 130 The only supportable motive Bowen could have had to commit the murders was money. The State proceeded on a theory of killing for hire, although it never proved that Bowen had been paid. In seeking the death penalty, the State initially charged that Bowen committed the murders for remuneration, but subsequently abandoned this allegation because it concededly had no proof of payment. 131 Lee Crowe, in contrast, could have been motivated by several factors. First, his fiancee Patsy had been married to one of the victims, Ray Peters, who had threatened and struck her just prior to his death. Deana Burris could have testified that Patsy wanted Ray dead and that Crowe was willing to kill him. Although the Burris testimony was not known to the prosecution at trial and therefore is not exculpatory within the meaning of Brady, an investigation of Crowe and Patsy might well have led to their former roommate. See Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3384 (incomplete response to specific request may effectively represent to defense that evidence does not exist and cause defense to abandon lines of independent investigation). Second, Crowe's ties with the Charleston, South Carolina organized crime syndicate and its connection with Ray Peters, see supra pp. 600-601, support a hypothesis that Crowe killed Peters. While this information was not in the prosecution's file, an investigation of Crowe undoubtedly would have led to the South Carolina authorities who had been investigating him for over a year. Third, Crowe could have committed the murders for money alone, just as easily as Bowen. Cf. Moore, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562 (no evidence that misidentified suspect had motive). 132 The State vigorously contends that no one placed Crowe at the scene of the murders although two witnesses put Bowen there. We find unpersuasive this reliance on testimony which could have been impeached with the Lee Crowe material. Crowe had a distinct opportunity to commit the murders. By all accounts he and Patsy Peters were staying at the home of the Forgusons in Mannsville, Oklahoma. When Oklahoma City detectives interviewed Margie Forguson, she told them she was away on July 5 and 6 and believed that Crowe stayed home with her husband and Patsy on the night of July 5. An Oklahoma City detective testified that, when police finally interviewed Mr. C.B. Forguson in 1983, he stated that Crowe had stayed at the house that night. Aside from Mr. Forguson's possible bias and disingenuousness, we are left to wonder what time he retired that evening and whether Crowe still could have traveled the 130 miles to Oklahoma City by 2:00 a.m. In the six year history of this litigation, no one has ever sworn to being with Crowe on the night of the murders. These facts differ widely from the situation in Moore, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, where Slick was never placed near the crime scene and the withheld evidence about him provided insignificant impeachment use, particularly in light of other identification witnesses. 133 Bowen, in contrast, offered twelve alibi witnesses who testified that he was at a rodeo in Tyler, Texas, 300 miles from the crime scene, until midnight to 1:00 a.m. The prosecution's attempt to rebut this testimony with the jet airplane theory is at best speculation and at worst fantasy. While it surely was the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of Bowen's alibi, the jury was never given the chance to learn about Lee Crowe. We believe that had that opportunity been given, Bowen's alibi would have been viewed in a different light. Cf. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1350-51 (withheld evidence would not have affected murder convictions where strong circumstantial evidence existed showing participation at least as aider and abettor). 134 Lastly, Crowe had the ability to commit the murders. He habitually carried the same kind of gun as the murder weapon and used the same unusual and expensive ammunition. 11 South Carolina law enforcement authorities believed he was capable of killing anyone for money. 135 The withheld evidence also raises serious questions about the manner, quality, and thoroughness of the investigation that led to Bowen's arrest and trial. A common trial tactic of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge the defendant, and we may consider such use in assessing a possible Brady violation. See Lindsey v. King, 769 F.2d 1034, 1042 (5th Cir.1985). 136 If the Lee Crowe material had been disclosed, the defense could have pointed out that Bowen was charged even though he had a confirmed alibi and Crowe did not. Crowe was eliminated as a suspect based on Mrs. Forguson's hearsay statement that she believed Crowe had stayed in Mannsville the night of the murders. Police did not substantiate or corroborate her statement of belief. Crowe was eliminated as a suspect even though police knew that he had ample motivation to kill Ray Peters. Also questionable were the identification procedures used to eliminate Crowe and to charge Bowen. The defense could have cross-examined the detectives about their decision to use the photograph of Crowe with a mustache when they knew that the described suspect had none and that Crowe had shaved his around the time of the murders. Why Crowe was never put in a live lineup is also troubling. With this material, a defense lawyer of less than heroic skill could have theorized that the State found it easier to charge an admitted gambler and ne'er-do-well rather than a police officer, even an allegedly corrupt one. 137 C. The Duty to Disclose Existed Either With or Without a Request 138 Because we hold that the defense made a specific request for a list of other suspects, the standard of materiality for judging the suppressed evidence is whether it might have affected the outcome of the trial. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 2397. We need not take judicial notice of the vagaries of eyewitness accounts to state with assurance that the Lee Crowe material meets this standard. Alternatively, even if no request had been made, the withheld material creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist and therefore meets the test where a general or no request has been made. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2402. Where, as here, identity is in issue, a creditable alibi defense is presented, and no physical evidence ties the defendant to the crime, material showing that someone resembling the defendant had motive, opportunity, and ability to commit the crime is sufficient to undermine [our] confidence in the outcome of the trial. The Crowe material also meets the Bagley requirement of a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3384.