Opinion ID: 2101401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged statutory violations.

Text: Defendant was convicted of aiding and advising a crime under Minn.Stat. § 609.05 (1982). Subdivision 1 provides that [a] person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if he intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime. Under subdivision 2 that person is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by him as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended. The crime that defendant has been convicted of is found at Minn.Stat. § 609.595, subd. 1 (1982), which reads: Whoever intentionally causes damage to physical property of another without the latter's consent may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or both, if: (1) The damage to the property caused a reasonably foreseeable risk of bodily harm. Since the property damage inflicted caused the death of the victim, defendant was found guilty of felony murder under Minn.Stat. § 609.19(2) (1982): Whoever does either of the following is guilty of murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years:       (2) Causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence. The 1981 amendment revised the felony murder section to apply to all offenses committed after May 20, 1981, except criminal sexual conduct. See Act of May 19, 1981, ch. 227, § 10, 1981 Minn.Laws 1010 (amending Minn.Stat. § 609.19 (1980)). Shortly before amendment we decided, in State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752 (Minn. 1980), that even under the old felony murder rule (Minn.Stat. § 609.195(2) (1980)), the purpose of the statute was to isolate for special treatment those felonies that involve some special danger to human life. Id. at 753. Accordingly, the Nunn court held that a burglary of a dwelling should not be deemed a purely property offense because    such an offense always carries with it the possibility of violence and therefore some special risks to human life. Id. at 754. This rationale is even more compelling when the offense involves the shooting of a rifle into a dwelling place.