Opinion ID: 185165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lee

Text: 20 Lee challenges his conviction, claiming that the district court improperly admitted evidence at trial. 14 We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 2000 WL 665562, at  (D.C. Cir. 2000). The improper admission of evidence is harmless unless the reviewing court determines that the defendant was substantially prejudiced thereby. See United States v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1996). First, Lee contends that the district court improperly admitted into evidence the handgun he possessed on July 17, 1996 because it later determined at sentencing that there was no evidence this gun was carried by Lee for the purpose of furthering the ends of the drug conspiracy. Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 72. The district court's determination at sentencing, however, does not automatically equate to inadmissibility at trial because the two rulings apply different standards. The court admitted Lee's handgun at trial under the relevant evidence standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See supra n.8. Relevant evidence need only tend to make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable. The standard applicable to the court's ruling at sentencing, however, is preponderance of the evidence, that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.... '[P]reponderance' means something more than 'weight'; it denotes a superiority of weight, or outweighing. United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1255 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted).Lee's possession of the handgun, although not directly furthering the Mathis-Castro conspiracy, may have nonetheless constituted relevant evidence. See In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (guns are common tools of the trade for drug dealers) (quotation omitted). In United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986), the court held that the defendant's gun seized at the time and place of a drug transaction was admissible as drug paraphernalia. See Payne, 805 F.2d at 1066 n.5. Although Lee's gun was not found at the time drugs were bought or sold, it was found during the existence of the Mathis-Castro conspiracy. In addition, the government did not mention Lee's handgun in closing, thus mitigating any negative effect. Furthermore, the government introduced a videotape of Lee selling drugs as part of the Mathis-Castro conspiracy. In view of this uncontroverted evidence of Lee's involvement in the conspiracy, we conclude that the district court's admission of Lee's handgun, if error, was nevertheless harmless. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993) (non-prejudicial harmless error not grounds for reversal). 21 Lee's contention that the district court improperly admitted into evidence certain legal documents related to his case similarly lacks merit. The documents, which included redacted copies of the criminal complaints filed against Lee, see Government Exhibits 610R, 611R, 612R & 613R, bore Lee's name, were found in Smith's apartment and showed that Lee maintained a continuing connection with Eddie Mathis even after his (Lee's) arrest. Trial Tr. 5/13/98 (p.m.) at 14. Although at sentencing the court found that Lee's participation ended with his arrest on August 20, 1997, Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 72, it did not abuse its discretion in admitting these documents at trial because they were relevant to show Lee's continued connection with Eddie Mathis. Even if the court did err in admitting the redacted documents, the documents contained no substantially prejudicial information and therefore any error was harmless. 22 Finally, Lee challenges the district court's application of the Guidelines, claiming that it erroneously failed to apply section 5C1.2's safety valve provision. 15 Lee bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to safety valve relief. See United States v. White, 1 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (defendant properly bears the burden of proof under those sections of the Guidelines that define mitigating factors) (internal quotation marks and quotation omitted). Only the last of section 5C1.2's five criteria is pertinent here, requiring that: 23 (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement. 24 See also 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(5). Lee argued below that he satisfied section 5C1.2(5) notwithstanding he had no useful information to provide the government. Lee, however, did not proffer any information, useful or not. On appeal, Lee claims that a proffer would have been futile because the government stated at sentencing that at this point, post trial, it certainly wouldn't be a productive debriefing. Sentencing Tr. 1/6/99 at 68. Nevertheless, Lee cannot avoid his affirmative disclosure obligation merely because the government suggests a debriefing would be unproductive. See United States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1996) ([D]efendants seeking to avail themselves of downward departures under 3553(f) bear the burden of affirmatively acting.).Because Lee failed to proffer information of any kind to the government, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by not applying section 5C1.2. 25 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions of Eddie Mathis, Walter Mathis and Maurice Lee. In addition we affirm the sentences imposed on Eddie Mathis and Maurice Lee but remand to the district court to resentence Walter Mathis in accordance with this opinion. 26 So ordered.