Opinion ID: 2585503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearsay Statements by Mark Bender

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and analogous state constitutional provisions by admitting Julie Bender's testimony that she heard her brother-in-law, Mark Bender, implicate defendant in the murder. As we explain, the trial court properly admitted the evidence under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule. At the time of the crime, Julie Bender was married to Perry Bender. She testified that one night she saw defendant in a red pickup truck. Around midnight that same night, Mark Bender, her brother-in-law, came into her house. Mark was upset and started crying. He shook his head back and forth, and his body was shaking. He then said: I know he shot her. I know she is hurt bad. When asked to whom he was referring, Mark replied, Bam. Bam is defendant's nickname. Just before Julie Bender testified on this point, defendant objected on hearsay grounds and the court held a lengthy hearing. The court eventually overruled defendant's hearsay objection, admitting the statement under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence Code section 1240 provides: Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception. Defendant first contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence because the declarant, Mark Bender, was no longer under the stress of excitement caused by witnessing defendant's crime. Defendant also contends that admission was improper because the declarant did not purport to be narrat[ing], describ[ing], or explaining] an act, condition, or event [he] perceived. Both of these arguments depend on a determination of preliminary facts by the trial court; such determinations will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 58, 991 P.2d 145.) When the statements in question were made and whether they were delivered directly or in response to a question are important factors to be considered on the issue of spontaneity. [Citations.] But as we emphasized in People v. Washington , 'Neither lapse of time between the event and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance.' ( People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 319, 246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082, quoting People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176, 81 Cal.Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259, italics added in Poggi.) The trial court noted the declarant, Mark Bender, was crying, shaking and visibly upset when he made the statement, explaining: He is still reacting to the events himself by objective manifestation. The court was well aware that the passage of time was relevant to the spontaneity of the statement, but nevertheless concluded the statement satisfied the statutory requirement of spontaneity. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling. Although Mark Bender's statement was made about two and one-half hours after the crime, that fact is not dispositive of the issue. (See People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 893-894, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712 [statement made 18 hours after event held spontaneous under Evid.Code, § 1240].) The crucial element in determining whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule is ... the mental state of the speaker. The nature of the utterance how long it was made after the startling incident and whether the speaker blurted it out, for examplemay be important, but solely as an indicator of the mental state of the declarant.... [Ultimately each fact pattern must be considered on its own merits, and the trial court is vested with reasonable discretion in the matter. ( People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903-904, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940, overruled on another point in People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, fn. 6, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) Here, the facts available to the trial court amply justify its conclusion that the declarant continued to labor mightily under the emotional influence of the disturbing events he perceived, so much so that he could not stop his body from shaking nor stem the flow of tears. We reach the same conclusion regarding defendant's argument that the declarant did not purport to be describing an event he personally witnessed. Evidence indicates Mark Bender was in the driver's seat of the car directly behind the victim's truck when defendant shot her. His view of the scene was as clear as any of the witnesses', and he no doubt saw what other witnesses reported: Defendant went up to the driver's side of the truck and pulled the victim out, her body hitting the street face first. Although Bender's statement (I know he shot her. I know she is hurt bad) does not unquestionably carry the inference that he spoke from personal knowledge of having actually seen defendant pull the trigger, neither does the statement purport to be a repetition of something Bender had heard from someone else. Although closer than the question of spontaneity, we conclude that, under the circumstances, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision that Bender purported to be describing events he had personally seen. Defendant also contends the trial court's ruling to admit the evidence violated his right to confrontation under the state and federal Constitutions because he was unable to cross-examine Mark Bender. Defendant's claim is meritless: The hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations is among those `firmly rooted' exceptions that carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. ( White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 355, fn. 8 [112 S.Ct. 736, 742, 116 L.Ed.2d 848] and accompanying text.) ( People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 529, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.)