Opinion ID: 4936
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Irreparable Loss

Text: Repsa's second argument is more easily dispensed with. In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), the Court summarized the four requirements for immediately appealable collateral orders originally articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949): [T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. at 2458 (footnote and citations omitted). The fourth part of this test requires that there be a risk of important and probably irreparabl[e] loss if an immediate appeal is not heard, Cohen, 337 U.S. at 547, 69 S.Ct. at 1226, or, in the words of the court in Neches Butane, some showing of extraordinary harm. 704 F.2d at 148 (emphasis in original); see also Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.1990). Repsa says that there was a possibility of irreparable loss in Stena, the first case in this circuit to allow appeals from the denial of FSIA immunity, but not here. The difference, Repsa argues, is that in Stena the plaintiff attempted to garnish the credits and effects of one defendant which were in Pemex's possession, while here the plaintiff seeks only a money judgment against the foreign entity. This is a distinction without a difference. As noted above, sovereign immunity is an immunity from the burdens of becoming involved in any part of the litigation process, from pre-trial wrangling to trial itself. Regardless of what the plaintiff seeks from the foreign defendant, the risk of harm from having to defend the lawsuit remains constant and is an irreparable loss within the fourth part of Cohen. This circuit in Stena has found that the purposes behind the collateral order doctrine amply support appeals 4 Even if there were an unresolved factual question, that would not, as Repsa suggests, divest us of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Rather, such a question would go to the merits of the appeal, and would probably require us to remand for further findings. See Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445 (6th Cir.1988) (remanding for further proceedings because of unresolved questions concerning applicability of commercial activity exception). from the denial of FSIA immunity, and we are not inclined to question that judgment today.