Opinion ID: 2977202
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tangible Job Detriment

Text: While de minimis employment actions and “very temporary” actions are not materially adverse and, thus, not actionable under Title VII, Bowman, 220 F.3d at 462, those involving changes such as a termination or a suspension constitute adverse employment actions. Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008). We have also recognized that a “loss of pay or benefits” can constitute a tangible job detriment. See Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 2008). The record in this case is unclear as to whether Plaintiff lost any of her hourly wages when Kirk sent her home from work in either instance. Plaintiff, however, also earned wages through tips as a day-shift bartender. As a result, Plaintiff undoubtedly lost compensation in the form of unearned tips for the days she was not at work after Kirk sent her home. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has satisfied this element of her prima facie case. 6 Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot, after arguing in district court that she was terminated, assert that the suspension constituted the adverse employment action. This argument is without merit. Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment effectively informed Defendants and the district court that Plaintiff believed she experienced a tangible job detriment when Kirk told her to leave work, and that she believes he did so because of her refusal to have sex with him. Arguments raised in a district court filing offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are preserved for appeal. See Vencor, Inc. v. Standard Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 629, 642 n.11 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 522 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that an issue presented to a district court is preserved for appeal as long as the issue was presented to the district court in a manner which “places the opposing party and the court on notice that a new issue is being raised”). Defendants further argue that, had they understood Plaintiff’s filings in the district court to encompass a claim that she experienced a tangible work detriment other than firing, they would have conducted additional discovery and argued to the district court that Kirk had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for disciplining Plaintiff, thus entitling them to relief. See Defs.’ Br. 21–22. This defense, however, is viable regardless of whether Plaintiff was terminated or merely suspended. See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 461. 11