Opinion ID: 1831392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: forensic serologist's testimony and prosecutor's comment

Text: Anderson claims that two errors occurred at trial and that these errors had the cumulative effect of depriving him of the right to a fair trial. First, during the cross-examination testimony of Emily Booth, the FDLE forensic serologist who helped prepare blood evidence for DNA tests, Anderson's counsel asked Booth about the preparation of Anderson's clothing for testing. Booth had cut various pieces of blood-stained cloth from the clothing in order to test the stains. The line of Anderson's questioning went to why Booth had chosen particular stains to test and why she had taken partial cuttings from the clothing. One of the reasons she offered for leaving blood behind on the clothing was to give the defense the opportunity to test the stains. On redirect examination, Booth was asked if she had cut out the entire area of a particular stain, and she responded that she had left some of it. The State then asked Booth if she was a forensic serologist and what the term forensic meant. Booth responded: A. Forensic meansit's taking science and applying it to law and in the courtroom setting and I tried to preserve as much of the sample as possible so that additional testing could be done, if need be, by the Defense, if they wanted to hire their own laboratory and do further testing on it, they could. But as a forensic serologist, I'm trying to get the most information out of the stain, while yet preserving the stain. Q: In case a Defense expert would want to do an independent analysis? A: That's correct. Q: And in the forensic world does that happen occasionally, that an expert comes along and wants to analyze the evidence, they can't do that if you consume the entire thing, right? A: That's correct. And sometimes you have no choice, in the case of the red tee-shirt, it's a very small sample. At this point in the testimony, Anderson's counsel objected to the State's line of questioning, arguing that it implied that the defense had the responsibility to hire its own serology expert. Anderson requested a curative instruction, and then moved for mistrial, arguing that a curative instruction would not be sufficient. The court denied the motion for mistrial but gave the jury a curative instruction asking them to disregard any suggestion that the circumstance might arise where a defense expert might come in to examine evidence and reminding them that the defense is not required to prove anything. We find that the trial court's curative instruction was sufficient to correct any potential misconception that the jury had about the duty the defense had to rebut the serologist's testimony and the court's decision to deny Anderson's motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. Anderson's second claim of error is based on a statement made by the prosecutor during closing arguments: I've come to the conclusion that if I had to put this defense into a category that it doesn't fit in any of the standard categories, what I would call this defense is the National Enquire [sic] Defense. Inquiring minds want to know. Ladies and gentlemen, my job is not to satisfy the defendant's curiosity, or his attorneys' curiosity, or the Judge's curiosity, or even your curiosity about these details. I've got one job, one job here today. If you folks have questions that you just have to know the answer to, after this trial is over, my office is up on the fourth floor, you are welcome to come up there and ask me about any of these little details Anderson objected to the State's closing argument as an improper comment on Anderson's right to counsel, on the validity of his defense, and on matters that were not in evidence. The court overruled the objection but warned the State, I don't think you need to tell them to come up to your office and talk to you afterwards. I think that is improper. [22] We agree that the prosecutor's comment that Anderson's counsel was employing the National Enquire[r] Defense followed by the suggestion that the jurors come to his office after the trial if they had any questions was improper. See, e.g., Ruiz v. State, 743 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1999) (stating that prosecutor may not suggest that evidence which was not presented at trial provides additional grounds for finding defendant guilty); Henry v. State, 743 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (holding that it was improper to refer to defendant's version of events as the most ridiculous defense the prosecutor has ever heard); Izquierdo v. State, 724 So.2d 124, 125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (improper to refer to defense as a pathetic fantasy); Waters v. State, 486 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (improper to refer to defense counsel's closing arguments as misleading and as a smoke screen). However, although we agree that the comment was improper, Anderson is not entitled to relief. In order to require a new trial based on improper prosecutorial comments, the prosecutor's comments must either deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial, materially contribute to the conviction, be so harmful or fundamentally tainted as to require a new trial, or be so inflammatory that they might have influenced the jury to reach a more severe verdict than that it would have otherwise. Spencer v. State, 645 So.2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1994). The improper comment in this case does not approach the level of improper comments in cases where we have granted relief. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 905 (Fla.2000); Ruiz, 743 So.2d at 5. Therefore, Anderson is not entitled to relief on this claim.