Opinion ID: 507763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Congress' Authority to Enact HCPA Sec. 5

Text: 16 Defendants argue that the HCPA was enacted solely under Congress' Spending clause powers and that under Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981), HCPA Sec. 5's provision for retroactive applications for attorney's fees constitutes an abuse of those powers. We conclude both that defendants misread Pennhurst's holding as to the Spending clause and that, in any event, Pennhurst does not apply because Congress enacted the EHA and HCPA under its powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its Spending clause powers under U.S. Const. art. 1, Sec. 8, cl. 1. 17 Assuming, arguendo, that HCPA was passed solely pursuant to Congress' Spending clause powers, the HCPA's provision for retroactive attorney's fees does not run afoul of the Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst. In Pennhurst, the Court considered what it termed a question of statutory construction, 451 U.S. at 15, 101 S.Ct. at 1538: whether a provision in a federal-state funding statute, enacted to assist participating states in caring for the developmentally disabled, could be constitutionally interpreted, after the participating states had accepted funding, as imposing enforceable obligations on those states. 18 In determining this issue, the Pennhurst court examined the possible sources of Congress' power to impose such conditions on the receipt of federal funds. After rejecting the argument that the statute in question was enacted pursuant to Congress' powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 451 U.S. at 15-17, 101 S.Ct. at 1538-1540, the Court examined the scope of Congress' Spending clause powers. The Court explained that as to 19 Congress' power to legislate pursuant to the spending power, our cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States. Unlike legislation enacted under Sec. 5, however, legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract. There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. 20 Id. at 17, 101 S.Ct. at 1539-1540 (citations omitted). 21 Hence, the Court established a rule of statutory construction that Congress must express clearly its intent to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether or not to accept these funds. 451 U.S. at 24, 101 S.Ct. at 1543. Applying this principle to the legislation before it, the Pennhurst Court concluded that there was no indication in the language of the funding statute or its legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to impose enforceable obligations on participating states. 22 The Connecticut defendants, relying on language in Pennhurst that Congress' power to legislate under the spending power does not include surprising participating States with postacceptance or 'retroactive' conditions, 451 U.S. at 25, 101 S.Ct. at 1544, argue that, under Pennhurst, the HCPA's provision for retroactive fee applications pursuant to the EHA is unconstitutional because it operates as a retroactive condition on the grant of EHA funds of which the states were unaware at the time they accepted these funds. However, Pennhurst's holding is not so broad. 23 Most important, the Pennhurst Court was not presented with and did not address the question of the constitutional limits on Congress' Spending clause power to impose an unambiguous retroactive condition on the receipt of federal funds. Rather, the Pennhurst Court considered a question of congressional intent: whether ambiguous language in a funding statute could be interpreted, after acceptance of funding by the states, as evidence of congressional intent to impose obligations on the states. While the Pennhurst Court noted that [t]here are limits on the power of Congress to impose conditions on the States pursuant to its spending power, it expressly stated that [t]hat issue ... is not now before us. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 n. 13, 101 S.Ct. at 1540 n. 13. Instead, the Court focussed on the requirement that if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. Id. at 17, 101 S.Ct. at 1540; cf. South Dakota v. Dole, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 2796, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987) (reading Pennhurst as articulating one of several general restrictions on Congress' spending power: that if Congress desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it must do so unambiguously). 3 24 Hence, Pennhurst cannot be read as broadly prohibiting amendments which add retroactive conditions to funding statutes: at most, Pennhurst simply requires a clear indication of congressional intent to impose such conditions. In amending the EHA by enacting the HCPA, Congress explicitly provided that attorney's fees would be available for successful EHA plaintiffs and specified expressly its intent that this condition should apply retroactively to the identifiable two-year period during which awards of EHA attorney's fees had been precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. Pennhurst does not bar such an amendment. 4 25 Defendants' reliance on Pennhurst is further misplaced because Pennhurst applies to legislation enacted solely pursuant to Congress' spending powers, and we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Congress enacted and amended the EHA pursuant to its enforcement powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as its Spending clause powers. 5 In order to establish that legislation has been brought under Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, the court must 26 be able to discern some legislative purpose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of that power. That does not mean, however, that Congress need anywhere recite the words section 5 or Fourteenth Amendment or equal protection. 27 EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 1064 n. 18, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983) (citations omitted). Although we bear in mind Pennhurst's warning that we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 451 U.S. at 16, 101 S.Ct. at 1539, the EHA's legislative history makes clear that the EHA has Fourteenth Amendment underpinnings. 28 While the Pennhurst Court concluded that nothing in the language of the statute under consideration or its legislative history suggested that Congress intended the Act to be something other than a typical funding statute, Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 22, 101 S.Ct. at 1542, expressing at most a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment, id. at 19, 101 S.Ct. at 1541, the language and legislative history of the EHA demonstrate otherwise. The EHA on its face makes a congressional finding that 29 it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in order to assure equal protection of the law. 30 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1400(b)(9). Furthermore, views were stated in both Houses of Congress that the EHA was designed to implement the Equal Protection Clause. 6 31 In interpreting this legislative history, the Supreme Court has affirmed several times that in enacting the EHA, 32 Congress did not content itself with passage of a simple funding statute. Rather, the EHA confers upon disabled students an enforceable substantive right to public education in participating States and conditions federal financial assistance upon a State's compliance with the substantive and procedural goals of the Act. 33 Honig v. Doe, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 592, 597, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) (citations omitted); accord Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1010, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3467, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984); Hendrick Hudson Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3047, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 750-51 (2d Cir.1987). Hence we conclude, in accordance with the other courts which have considered the question, that the EHA and the HCPA, which amended it, were enacted pursuant to Congress' powers under Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as under its spending powers. See Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028, 1036-38 (5th Cir.1983); David D. v. Dartmouth School Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 421 n. 7 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1140, 106 S.Ct. 1790, 90 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986); Unified School Dist. No. 259 v. Newton, 673 F.Supp. 418, 423-24 (D.Kan.1987); Yaris v. Special School Dist., 661 F.Supp. 996, 1001 (E.D.Mo.1987); Tonya K. v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 81 Civ. 580, slip op. at 3-4 (E.D.Ill. July 20, 1987); St. Louis Dev'l Disabilities Treatment Center Parents' Assoc. v. Mallory, 591 F.Supp. 1416, 1473-74 (W.D.Mo.1984), aff'd, 767 F.2d 518 (8th Cir.1985). 34 In sum, we reject defendants' argument that the HCPA's provision for retroactive availability of attorney's fees was an abuse of Congress' authority under Pennhurst, both because Congress made clear its intent to allow attorney's fees retroactively and because Congress acted pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers.