Opinion ID: 4540558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defining Wages

Text: The harder issue is which of the various amounts owed to Mr. Sivaraman qualify as wages, as the treble damages provision applies only to “the amount of unpaid wages,” D.C. Code § 32-1308(a)(1)(A)(ii). We review this question of statutory interpretation de novo. See Eaglin v. District of Columbia, 123 A.3d 953, 955 (D.C. 2015). The unlawfully withheld amounts fall into three categories: (1) 8 In relevant part, D.C. Code § 36-603(d) (1967) provided: If an employer fails to pay an employee wages earned as required under subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section, such employer shall pay, or be additionally liable to, the employee, as liquidated damages, 10 per centum of the unpaid wages for each working day during which such failure shall continue after the day upon which payment is hereunder required: or an amount equal to the unpaid wages, whichever is smaller . . . . 12 $4,999.93 of salary, (2) a $2,000 moving stipend, and (3) $2,044.28 in unreimbursed expenses. The trial court found that only the first category qualified as wages, whereas Mr. Sivaraman and his amicus argue that all three satisfy the statutory definition of wages. The WPCL defines “wages” as: [A]ll monetary compensation after lawful deductions, owed by an employer, whether the amount owed is determined on a time, task, piece, commission, or other basis of calculation. The term “wages” includes a: (A) Bonus; (B) Commission; (C) Fringe benefits paid in cash; (D) Overtime premium; and (E) Other remuneration promised or owed: (i) Pursuant to a contract for employment, whether written or oral; (ii) Pursuant to a contract between an employer and another person or entity; or (iii) Pursuant to District or federal law. D.C. Code § 32-1301(3). There is no question that the $4,999.93 of withheld salary qualifies as wages under this definition, as that is indisputably “monetary compensation . . . owed by an employer.” In finding that the moving stipend and unreimbursed expenses did not satisfy this statutory definition of wages, however, the trial court reasoned that remuneration, and therefore wages, meant “money paid for work or a service,” and that neither the stipend nor reimbursements satisfied that 13 definition. We disagree, in part, and conclude that the moving stipend constitutes wages under the WPCL but that the expense reimbursements do not.
We start with the moving stipend. This was a $2,000 lump sum promised to Mr. Sivaraman as an enticement to accept Mr. Guizzetti’s offer of employment. While it was ostensibly offered to defray the costs of moving, the amount was not dependent upon any expenses actually being incurred; that is, Mr. Sivaraman could have spent no money whatsoever to relocate, and he still would have been entitled to this $2,000 lump sum simply for accepting the offer of employment and starting his job. For that reason, the stipend might just as easily be referred to as a signing bonus, and bonuses are expressly contemplated as wages under the WPCL, D.C. Code § 32-1301(3) (“The term ‘wages’ includes a . . . Bonus[.]”). It could also be fairly categorized as a fringe benefit, another type of compensation which is expressly contemplated as wages under the act (at least when it is to be paid in cash, as here), D.C. Code § 32-1301(3)(C). See also Jensen v. Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 58 P.3d 322, 330 n.3 (Wyo. 2002) (“We have held that relocation benefits that are promised to an employee as a fringe benefit qualify as wages.” (citing NL Indus., Inc. v. Dill, 769 P.2d 920 (Wyo. 1989))). 14 Even if the terms “bonus” and “fringe benefit” were interpreted more narrowly, the moving stipend would nonetheless fit within the statute’s residual clause providing that “[o]ther remuneration promised or owed” also constitutes wages. See D.C. Code § 32-1301(3)(E). “Where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Edwards v. United States, 583 A.2d 661, 664 (D.C. 1990) (footnote omitted) (discussing ejusdem generis canon). The $2,000 moving stipend is, at the very least, similar in nature to a bonus or a fringe benefit paid in cash: they are each net monetary benefits conferred on an employee by reason of her employment. We can thus comfortably say the moving stipend fits within this residual clause. In concluding otherwise, the trial court, focusing on the same “[o]ther remuneration” residual clause, D.C. Code § 32-1301(3)(E), relied upon one particular dictionary definition of remuneration, taken from an unspecified internet source, which provided that remuneration “is money paid for work or a service.” That may well be one particularly narrow definition of the word, but it is just as susceptible to more sweeping definitions that would include the moving stipend (or, for that matter, expense reimbursements). See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1921 (2002) (defining “remunerate” as “to pay an 15 equivalent to (a person) for a service, loss, or expense” (emphasis added)). The word remuneration—like the word compensation, which also appears in the statutory definition of wages—neither plainly includes nor excludes the moving stipend here. A survey of dictionaries does not advance the ball in either direction. A recent amendment to D.C. Code § 32-1301, however, makes clear that the D.C. Council has discarded the narrow interpretation advanced by the trial court. Until recently, the WPCL had defined wages in the same manner as the trial court, as “monetary compensation after lawful deductions, owed by an employer for labor or services rendered, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission, or other basis of calculation.” D.C. Code § 32-1301(3) (2012 Repl.) (emphasis added). In 2013, mere months before the start of Mr. Sivaraman’s employment at G&A, the D.C. Council jettisoned this once-restrictive definition when it passed the Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act of 2013, 60 D.C. Reg. 12472, §§ 2061-64. That Act altered the definition of wages by deleting the restrictive “for labor or services rendered” language and replacing it with a host of monetary benefits that are, at least sometimes, not directly tied to labor or services 16 rendered, including the “[o]ther remuneration” residual clause.9 Id. at § 2062 (codified as amended at D.C. Code § 32-1301(3) (2019 Repl.)) (including “[b]onus,” “[c]ommission,” “[f]ringe benefits,” and “[o]ther remuneration”).10 Where the legislature “amends or reenacts a provision, a significant change in language is presumed to entail a change in meaning.” Arangure v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 341 (6th Cir. 2018). The trial court’s interpretation of wages is incompatible with these 2013 amendments supplanting the “for labor or services rendered” restriction with broader categories of wages that fall outside those bounds. Based on the text and enactment history of this provision, we conclude that the moving stipend qualifies as wages. 9 The 2013 amendment also added the word “all” before “monetary compensation,” further indicating a broadening of the definition of wages to include things beyond traditional salary. 10 Bonuses frequently are not tied to any labor or services rendered, but instead to some other benchmark, like signing a contract of employment. See, e.g., Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2018) (describing bonuses awarded under a “Gainsharing program” to “store employees whose departments came in under budget”). 17
We reach the opposite conclusion with regard to the $2,044.28 in unreimbursed business expenses. Unlike the moving stipend and the various examples of wages provided in § 32-1301(3)(A)–(E), reimbursements for specific expenses confer no monetary benefit or enrichment on an employee, but serve only to make her whole. As explained above, the statutory terms compensation and remuneration neither obviously include nor exclude expense reimbursements. Dictionary definitions cut in both directions. Compare WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra, at 1921 (including, as one meaning of “remunerate,” “to pay an equivalent . . . for a[n] . . . expense”), with COLLINS ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/remuneration https://perma.cc/EZ7G-EAKR (last visited June 6, 2020) (“Someone’s remuneration is the amount of money that they are paid for the work that they do.” (emphasis added)).11 The surrounding context of the WPCL, however, convinces us that wages do not include expense reimbursements. 11 See generally 1618 Twenty-First Street Tenants’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Phillips Collection, 829 A.2d 201, 203 (D.C. 2003) (“In finding the ordinary meaning, ‘[t]he use of dictionary definitions is appropriate . . . .’” (quoting West End Tenants Ass’n v. George Washington Univ., 640 A.2d 718, 727 (D.C. 1994))). 18 Pulling back from the particular statutory definition of wages, we stress that the word being defined is itself a critical part of the interpretive calculus: “[T]he word being defined is the most significant element of the definition’s context.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 232 (2012). While it is possible for a statutory definition to deviate from the normal meaning of a word, there is a strong presumption against it because “counterintuitive definitions are a bane.” Id. The word wages ordinarily refers to one’s salary and other employment-related earnings, rather than mere repayments for expenses incurred. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra, at 2568 (defining “wage” as “a pledge or payment . . . esp. for labor or services usu. according to contract and on an hourly, daily, or piecework basis and often including bonuses, commissions, and amounts paid by the employer for insurance, pension, hospitalization, and other benefits”). It would be bizarre if a person, upon being asked what wage they made the prior year, included various expenses they were reimbursed for during that time. It would be just as strange to say that they had earned those reimbursements, though the WPCL repeatedly refers to “wages” as amounts “earned” throughout its statutory text. See, e.g., D.C. Code § 32-1302 (“An employer shall pay all wages earned to his or her employees on regular paydays . . . .”); § 32-1303 (using the term “wages earned” four times). Both 19 the ordinary meaning of wages and the repeated references to wages as earned strongly suggest that expense reimbursements are not wages.12 The ejusdem generis canon already employed above, and its companion noscitur a sociis canon,13 point to the same conclusion. While a moving stipend unconditioned on any particular incurred expenses is at least similar to, if not indistinguishable from, a signing bonus, the same cannot be said of expense reimbursements. Unlike bonuses, commissions, overtime premiums, and fringe benefits paid in cash, D.C. Code § 32-1301(3)(A)–(D), dollar-for-dollar 12 We do not equate earned wages with wages rendered for “work or services,” or for “labor or services.” Although the latter wages are a kind of the former, the two are not synonymous. As explained supra, there are several monetary benefits not directly tied to labor or services included in the definition of wages, see D.C. Code § 32-1301(3), which the WPCL implicitly recognizes as being earned, see §§ 32-1302 to -1303, and which would fit readily within the description of amounts earned. 13 These canons are often applied in tandem because the ejusdem generis canon is a particular application of the noscitur a sociis canon. The latter invokes the general proposition that “a word [or phrase] is known by the company it keeps,” Burke v. Groover, Christie & Merritt, P.C., 26 A.3d 292, 302 n.8 (D.C. 2011), whereas the former, as discussed above, applies to the particular circumstance we have here, where a series of specific terms are followed by a more generic catchall term, like “[o]ther remuneration.” 20 reimbursements merely neutralize a specific loss, rather than enriching the employee.14 Interpreting wages to include expense reimbursements would also sow inconsistencies between the WPCL and the Minimum Wage Act, D.C. Code §§ 321001 to -1015 (2019 Repl.), which is another point against that interpretation. “The comparison of statutes in pari materia is an aid in determining legislative intent when the language of a statute is ambiguous.” Holt v. United States, 565 A.2d 970, 975 (D.C. 1989). Sometimes referred to as the related-statutes canon, the doctrine of in pari materia simply means “laws dealing with the same subject . . . should if possible be interpreted harmoniously.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra, at 252.15 The Minimum Wage Act, among other things, sets minimum base wages for hourly 14 That is part of the reason why the Supreme Court, albeit in a different context, concluded that wages did not include “lunch reimbursements.” See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 29 (1978) (describing wages as meaning something “narrower” than income); see also Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 254 (1981) (“‘[W]ages’ is a narrower concept than ‘income . . . .”). 15 Of course, “statutory sections should not be read with reference to each other . . . if their respective subject matters and purposes are different.” District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 630 (D.C. 1991). But that is not the case here. The WPCL and the Minimum Wage Act both address and enforce the payment of wages in the District of Columbia, and counsel for Mr. Sivaraman agreed at oral argument that we ought to harmonize the meaning of wages between the statutes to the extent possible. 21 employees. D.C. Code § 32-1003(5)(A). It would be perverse if an employer’s reimbursement of expenses counted toward satisfying their obligation to pay “the minimum hourly wage required.” See id. The District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, charged with implementing the Minimum Wage Act, see D.C. Code § 32-1006; 7 DCMR § 900 (2020), treats expense reimbursements as falling outside the definition of wages, and we give “significant deference” to its interpretation, District of Columbia Office of Tax & Revenue v. BAE Sys. Enter. Sys. Inc., 56 A.3d 477, 481 (D.C. 2012). In its “Wage-Hour Rules,” 7 DCMR §§ 900–17 (2020), DOES has promulgated a series of regulations governing how wages are calculated in certain circumstances. See, e.g., 7 DCMR § 906.1 (requiring employers to pay an employee “for one additional hour at the minimum wage” for any “split shift”). The Wage-Hour Rules also provide, as pertinent here: “In addition to the wages required by this Chapter, the employer shall pay the cost of travel expenses incurred by the employee in performance of the business of the employer.” 7 DCMR § 909.1. The same “in addition to” language is present in other sections of the Wage-Hour Rules obligating employers to pay for certain work-related expenses. See 7 DCMR § 908.1 (requiring employers to pay for employees’ uniforms and protective clothing); § 910.1 (requiring employers to pay for employees’ work tools). Contrary to Mr. Sivaraman 22 and his amicus’s arguments, these regulations treat expense reimbursements not as wages, but as something separate. If these sections’ prefatory language was “included in the wages required by this Chapter” or “as part of” them, that would help Mr. Sivaraman’s case. But they do just the opposite. That expense reimbursements are in addition to wages indicates that they are something apart from, rather than of a piece with, wages. Finally, Mr. Sivaraman and his amicus press the policy argument that it makes little sense to treat withheld expense reimbursements differently from withheld salary. After all, if an employee is out money owed to her, it hardly matters from a practical perspective whether the amount would confer a net benefit or simply offset a loss. It is a forceful point but not one that can bear the weight Mr. Sivaraman places on it. The WPCL places all manner of restrictions on how and when wages are paid.16 While it might make practical sense to apply its enforcement provisions across the board to any moneys owed,17 there is no indication that the legislature 16 For example, consider the statutory requirement that “all wages” be paid on “paydays designated in advance by the employer,” D.C. Code § 32-1302. If an employer reimburses expenses immediately, and outside of those designated paydays, they would be in violation of this provision if, contrary to our view, expense reimbursements were in fact wages. 17 Should an unpaid money judgment that an employee has against an employer also be treated as wages and subject to treble damages? What about a 23 contemplated that application or meant for the universe of other restrictions on wage payments and collections to apply to expense reimbursements. If it had intended that result, we would expect a clearer indication that it meant to deviate from the standard definition of wages than what we have here.