Opinion ID: 2631902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court Authority to Regulate Attorney Misconduct

Text: ¶ 15 Atkin raises as an initial matter the question of whether the trial court exceeded its authority in finding he violated Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2. Specifically, Atkin argues that by giving defendants standing to enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct in the context of litigation, the court impermissibly allowed them to use the Rules as a tactical weapon. ¶ 16 Despite this argument, Atkin concedes on appeal that courts obviously can regulate what goes on in the practice. Indeed, we have long held that courts are endowed with the inherent authority to regulate attorney misconduct. As we noted nearly a century ago in In re Evans : It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among these are the power to punish for contempt, to make, modify, and enforce rules for the regulation of the business before the court . . ., to direct and control its officers, including attorneys as such, and to suspend, disbar, and reinstate attorneys. Such inherent powers of courts are necessary to the proper discharge of their duties. . . . [Absent legislative limitations], a constitutional court of general and superior jurisdiction may exercise such inherent powers and summary jurisdiction as the necessity of the case may require, and in manner comporting with a proper discharge of its duties in the premises. . . . . That jurisdiction is inherent, continuing, and plenary, and exists independently of statute or rules of equity, and ought to be assumed and exercised . . . not only to maintain and protect the integrity and dignity of the court . . ., but also to control and protect its officers, including attorneys. 42 Utah 282, 299-300, 130 P. 217, 224-25 (1913) (emphasis added). The inherent power of a court to regulate those practicing before it also encompasses the authority to enforce its regulation through appropriate means, such as by levying monetary sanctions, excluding evidence, or disqualifying counsel from a case. See, e.g., Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ¶ 14, 985 P.2d 255 (monetary sanctions for delay, inconvenience, and expenses caused by attorney's behavior); Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) (same); Margulies ex rel. Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1204-05 (Utah 1985) (disqualification for ethical violation); accord, e.g., Camden v. Maryland, 910 F.Supp. 1115, 1123 (D.Md.1996) (Faced with gains ill gotten because of impermissible contacts with employees, courts have suppressed the evidence. They have also, in more extreme circumstances, disqualified the attorney or firm that initiated the contact. (citations omitted)). We explained in Wassermann, A court's power to enforce its rules implies the existence of a mechanism for enforcement. That mechanism may take a variety of forms, one example of which is the assessment of attorney fees. Without sanctions, the power to enforce would be meaningless. 855 P.2d at 249; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5 (1996) (instilling in [e]very court the power to control . . . the conduct of all persons involved in a proceeding before it). ¶ 17 Moreover, because [t]rial courts are usually given broad discretion in controlling the conduct of attorneys in matters before the court, Margulies, 696 P.2d at 1199, a court's decision to employ this power operates independently of how the court learns of a potential ethical or other violation. Accordingly, trial courts may correct such violations on their own initiative or in response to the motion of a party. See 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 95, at 38 (1980) (The court, learning of professional misconduct of attorneys, may institute . . . proceedings, of its own motion, without waiting for a specific complaint, or it may direct some attorney to draw up the accusation and prosecute the case, or it may refer the matter to the appropriate. . . standing committee of the bar.). As we held in Margulies, trial courts may disqualify a law firm from a matter in which the firm has a conflict of interest, even if the conflict is brought to the trial court's attention by the opponent of the party represented by the firm. 696 P.2d at 1198, 1204. In fact, even when there are concerns that such disqualification motions are being misused for tactical advantage in litigation, those concerns may be outweighed by the appearance of impropriety . . . coupled with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility present in the case. Id. at 1204-05. ¶ 18 Applying these principles to the case at hand, it becomes clear that the trial court did not exceed its authority by addressing, in the context of litigation, whether Atkin violated rule 4.2. This court's case law unambiguously recognizes that trial courts possess the inherent authority not only to find violations of their rules or the ethics code, but also to impose appropriate remedies for the enforcement of those rules. See Griffith, 1999 UT at ¶ 14, 985 P.2d 255; Wassermann, 855 P.2d at 249; Margulies, 696 P.2d at 1204-05. Our decisions further dictate that a court's authority in this regard is unmitigated by challenges to the source of information on which the court ultimately acts; a trial court's exercise of its power to regulate those appearing before it is within the court's discretion, and it is irrelevant whether a trial court finds a violation on its own motion or on that of a party. See id. at 1198, 1204. As a result, Atkin's argument that the trial court exceeded its authority by making its finding in response to defendants' motion must fail. Indeed, to hold otherwise would reduce the Rules of Professional Conduct to near uselessness, for it would bind the inherent powers of judicial regulation by allowing attorneys who have violated the ethics code to hide behind the guise that only the state bar association may enforce the rules. Such a result would fly in the face of our repeated reminders that courts must maintain and protect the integrity and dignity of the profession, and we will not render it here. In re Evans, 42 Utah at 300, 130 P. at 225.