Opinion ID: 831187
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: application of the common-law

Text: On the basis of the following considerations, I believe that the common law in our state should be clarified to hold that parental preinjury waivers are enforceable: (1) statutes and caselaw that have enhanced the legal autonomy of minors, (2) statutes and caselaw that have recognized parents' authority to undertake important decisions regarding their children, (3) decisions of the United States Supreme Court that have `constitutionalized' the rights of fit parents to undertake important decisions regarding their children, (4) statutes and caselaw that have granted protections to recreational providers, (5) freedom of contract principles, (6) evolution of the litigative environment in recent decades, and (7) persuasive decisions from other jurisdictions.
The lead opinion acknowledges six statutory exceptions to the rule that a minor lacks the capacity to contract. Ante at 5 n. 14. Despite this list, however, the justices in the majority give no apparent weight to these exceptions. In reality, there are a far greater number of statutory exceptions to the two common-law rules that form the basis of the decision here, namely that (1) a child cannot bind himself or herself by contract and (2) a parent cannot bind a child by contract. Concerning the common-law rule that a child cannot bind himself or herself by contract, the lead opinion acknowledges the common-law exception that a child can do so by a contract for necessaries. [21] It also notes a statutory exception, MCL 600.1403, that provides that an infancy defense will not be recognized for breach of contract if a minor willfully misrepresented his or her age when entering into a contract. Under the common law, a child was not considered an adult until age 21, but our Legislature reduced this age to 18 in 1971, [22] and for criminal matters, the effective age of majority is now 17. [23] The common-law rule that a child is incompetent to enter into a contract has other exceptions. As a result of legislation, [24] minors can now enter into enforceable contracts in these additional situations: (1) upon being emancipated by the family division of circuit court, [25] (2) upon getting married, [26] (3) upon entering into active duty with the United States military, [27] (4) in order to open a savings account, [28] (5) in order to receive substance abuse treatment, [29] (6) in order to receive treatment for a venereal disease or HIV, [30] (7) in order to receive pregnancy-related services, [31] (8) in order to receive mental health services, [32] and (9) in order to purchase certain insurance policies. [33] All but one of these statutory exceptions were adopted between 1956 and 1980. Thus, there is a clear trend in Michigan public policy toward giving increased weight to the significant life decisions of minors by allowing them a limited measure of legal autonomy and responsibility. Indeed, minors are also considered competent to waive a variety of rights when charged with a crime. See, e.g., People v. Simpson, 35 Mich.App. 1, 192 N.W.2d 118 (1971), which indicates that minors are competent to waive even constitutional rights when charged with a crime. [34] The common-law rule that minors are incompetent to enter into contracts was predicated on the idea that minors must be protected from their own contractual follies and exploitation by adults. Holmes v. Rice, 45 Mich. 142, 7 N.W. 772 (1881); Frye v. Yasi, 327 Mass. 724, 728, 101 N.E.2d 128 (1951). These purposes comport with common sense and experience, but neither would be undermined by permitting a child's parents to exercise their own prudence and judgment on behalf of their minor children in prospectively waiving negligence claims in order to allow their children to participate in recreational activities. As explained in Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979), there is a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and the capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. Thus, it is not incompatible with the common-law rule concerning the limited ability of a minor to enter into legal contracts to allow the parent the right to permit or deny a child's participation in sporting or recreational activities and to weigh the risks and benefits of that participation.
Concerning the common-law rule that a parent cannot bind a child by contract, the courts and the Legislature have found it increasingly appropriate to allow parents to provide consent to their children's participation in numerous significant activities. As explained in Parham, 442 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493: Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.... The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. More recently, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the right of a parent to decide how a child will be raised is one of the oldest and most fundamental rights emanating from the liberty interest of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (opinion by O'Connor, J.). In Troxel, a plurality cited the Court's long history of recognizing that the family is a unit within which parents possess `broad ... authority over minor children.' [35] Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493. Troxel also indicated that courts may not overturn decisions by a fit custodial parent solely on [the basis of] the judge's determination of the child's best interests. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Rather, courts must give some special weight to the parents' determination of their children's best interests. Id. Indeed, in Hunter v. Hunter, 484 Mich. 247, 258 n. 16, 262, 771 N.W.2d 694 (2009), this Court recognized that Troxel included forceful language describing the significance of parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children before proceeding to hold that  Troxel established a floor or minimum protection against state intrusion into the parenting decisions of fit parents. Considering the breadth and significance of the constitutional right of a fit parent to raise a child as that parent deems appropriate, I would clarify that parental preinjury waivers are enforceable, in part on the basis of this constitutional development. There is also Michigan caselaw indicating that parents can consent to a variety of actions having serious consequences for their children. In re Rosebush, 195 Mich. App. 675, 682-683, 491 N.W.2d 633 (1992), for example, held that parents are empowered to make decisions regarding withdrawal or withholding of lifesaving or life-prolonging measures on behalf of their children because the right of the parent to speak for the minor child is embedded within our common law. To put it starkly, then, although the common law allows a parent to unilaterally deny or withdraw even life-prolonging medical care for his or her child if the child is seriously injured while participating in a recreational or sporting activity, a majority of justices would deny the same parent the right to prospectively waive a negligence claim that would allow the same child to participate in a `Bounce Party,' or some other sporting or recreational activity, in the first place. And in People v. Goforth, 222 Mich.App. 306, 564 N.W.2d 526 (1997), the Court of Appeals held that parents may consent to a police search of their child's bedroom even though such consent could have serious consequences if contraband or other evidence of criminal activity were found in the minor's room. Moreover, in People v. Givans, 227 Mich.App. 113, 116, 123-124, 575 N.W.2d 84 (1997), the Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction in a case in which the parent consented to have her child interrogated by the police out of her presenceeven though the questioning produced a confession to the crime. In the face of the broad authority parents have regarding the raising of their children, our Legislature has enacted a long list of statutes related to that authority. For example, as a result of legislation, parents can (1) consent to allow their minor daughter obtain an abortion, [36] (2) consent to their minor child's release of his or her child for adoption, [37] (3) consent to their minor child's receiving a tattoo, brand, or body piercing, [38] (4) consent to their minor child's petition for a name change, [39] (5) consent to their minor child's participation in an undercover operation by purchasing or receiving alcoholic liquor under the supervision of a law enforcement agency, [40] (6) consent to their 16- or 17-year-old child's marriage, [41] (7) file a petition for court approval of a kidney donation by their minor child to a close relative if the child is at least 14 years old, [42] (8) consent to electroconvulsive therapy or a procedure intended to produce convulsions or a coma for their minor child, [43] (9) consent to the issuance of a level 1 graduated driver's license to their minor child if the child is 14 years and 9 months old or older, [44] (10) consent to their minor child's employment as a golf caddy or as a youth athletic program referee or umpire if the child is at least 11 years old, [45] (11) delegate to another person for up to six months most of the parent's powers regarding care, custody, or property of the minor child by signing a power of attorney, [46] (12) consent to a pawnbroker's purchase of an item from their minor child, [47] (13) consent to allow a merchant to furnish or sell their minor child bulk gunpowder, dynamite, blasting caps, or nitroglycerine, [48] and (14) consent to the sale of a motor vehicle to their minor child. [49] Similarly, as a result of federal legislation, parents can (15) consent to their 17-year-old child's enlisting in the United States military [50] and (16) consent to their minor child's participation as a subject in certain kinds of medical research. [51] Third parties cannot consent to have someone else's child do or receive these things; only the child's parents can provide such consent. This is because, contrary to the assertion of the lead opinion, a parent is not merely tantamount to a third party with regard to his or her child. There is a clear trend in Michigan public policy toward according parents authority to consent to let their children engage in, or experience, a variety of significant activities. These consent statutes recognize the liberty interest of parents to make important decisions that affect the well-being of their children and acknowledge the constitutional principle that fit parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their children in making those decisions. As these examples illustrate, current Michigan public policygenuine public policy rooted in the statutory and decisional law of this statefully recognizes that parents may make important, even life-altering, decisions on behalf of their children. While the lead opinion cites statutes and common-law doctrines showing the law's general solicitude toward minors [52] and who could disagree with such a proposition?the statutes and cases cited here are in no way inconsistent with those cited by the lead opinion and are fully compatible with a clarification of our common law allowing parents to sign preinjury waivers of negligence claims so their children can participate in recreational and sporting opportunities. [53] Such clarification would be consistent with, and no more than a logical extension of, existing Michigan public policy based on the trends identified in this section.
The Legislature has also determined that there is a place in society for recreational activities that occasionally produce injuries by enacting standards of care that preclude claims for injuries to participants, regardless of the injured person's age, resulting from the inherent risks of such activities. As this Court indicated in Neal v. Wilkes, 470 Mich. 661, 685 N.W.2d 648 (2004), the Legislature enacted Michigan's recreational land use statute, MCL 324.73301, to provide immunity for landowners from personal-injury lawsuits by persons using their property recreationally, regardless of age, i.e., even when minors are injured. [54] As we discussed in Anderson v. Pine Knob Ski Resort, Inc., 469 Mich. 20, 664 N.W.2d 756 (2003), the Legislature enacted Michigan's Ski Area Safety Act, MCL 408.321 et seq., to provide immunity for ski-area operators from personal-injury suits by injured skiers, regardless of the age of the skier. [55] And as was further mentioned in Dale v. Beta-C, Inc., 227 Mich.App. 57, 574 N.W.2d 697 (1997), the Legislature enacted Michigan's Roller Skating Safety Act, MCL 445.1721 et seq., to provide some immunity for roller-skating rink operators from personal-injury suits by injured skaters, again regardless of the skater's age. [56] See also the Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA), MCL 691.1661 et seq., which proscribes general claims for ordinary negligence, regardless of the injured person's age. In particular, the EALA proscribes liability for injuries resulting from the inherent risks of equine activity. [57] We should give significant weight to the Legislature's expression of the public policy that such activities are worthy of protection, even in light of their risks, and that providers of such activities are entitled to receive some measure of protection from lawsuits in the absence of gross negligence, even when the participants are minors. Similarly, our state's caselaw evidences that Michigan public policy recognizes that there are benefits to recreational activity. In Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 246 Mich.App. 645, 657-658, 635 N.W.2d 219 (2001), in which a minor was injured by a flying bat fragment, the Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict and dismissed the injured minor's claim after adopting the limited duty doctrine as a matter of Michigan law. [58] See also Moning, 400 Mich. at 458, 254 N.W.2d 759, in which this Court said: [B]aseball equipment and bicycles ... are viewed by society essentially as are automobiles in that although children are injured and killed riding bicycles and playing baseball, the utility of such activity is regarded by society and all reasonable persons as outweighing the risk of harm created by their manufacture for and marketing to children. Indeed, in Ritchie-Gamester v. City of Berkley, 461 Mich. at 73, 92 n. 13, 597 N.W.2d 517 (1999), this Court described recreational activities as valuable and important social activities. We should take cognizance of and give weight to these judicial decisions when assessing whether there is a public policy favoring parental preinjury waivers as a condition to allowing minors to participate in sporting and recreational activities and how this ought to be reflected in our state's common law.
The common-law default position is that contracts are enforced. Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich. 56, 71, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002). [59] This freedom of contract is deeply entrenched in the common law of Michigan. Id. at 71 n. 19, 648 N.W.2d 602. The lead opinion, however, states that the issue is whether a minor can be bound by a contract signed on his behalf by a third party. Ante at 5. I respectfully disagree with how the lead opinion frames this issue. [60] It errs in characterizing a parent as a third party with respect to his or her own child. The better, and more precisely, crafted question is whether a parent a person who in the course of caring for his or her child might take actions pertaining to such matters as the location and establishment of a home, schooling, health care, diet and nutrition, discipline, social and family relationships, lifestyle, hobbies, clothing, religion, instruction in values, vacations, and, yes, even recreational activities, to name a fewmay prospectively waive the child's future negligence claim so that the child can participate in a sporting or recreational activity. That is, the relevant question in this case pertains to the rights of a parent, not those of a third-party. The common-law rule that parents are empowered to make important decisions regarding their children was recognized in In re Rosebush, 195 Mich.App. at 682-683, 491 N.W.2d 633. See also In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 445, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (The right of the parent to speak for the minor child is ... imbedded in our tradition and common law....). Moreover, as previously indicated, caselaw holds that parents are presumed to act in the best interests of their children and are entitled to make judgments and decisions concerning risks to their children. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493. The lead opinion discounts this presumption as overbroad, noting that it is not limited to preinjury waivers and could be cited to justify a parent being able to bind a child to any contract. Ante at 12. I agree this presumption does not justify allowing a parent to enter into any contract that would be binding on a child. But this presumption, now of constitutional dimension, does support making parental preinjury waivers of negligence claims enforceable. Assuming that the release actually waived the child's claim in this case, a parent made the decision that the benefits to his child flowing from the waiver outweighed the risks of a broken leg, as was suffered here, or an even more serious injury. Although plaintiff now seeks to avoid his obligations under the waiver on the grounds that it is unenforceable, the father's waiver was nonetheless entered into voluntarily and knowingly. This Court should not disturb that decision, out of regard for the parent's rights to undertake such decisions for the child, as well as out of regard for traditional `freedom of contract' principles. A majority of the justices forbid parents under all circumstances to undertake even a perfectly rational decision to assess the risks and benefits when determining what is in the best interests of their children. Instead, such decision-making will now be monopolized by judges, and the answer will always be the same: No. The parent cannot be permitted to make such a determination. That is, no matter how compelling the child's interest in participating in a sporting or recreational activity, and no matter how slight the risk of a serious injury, the answer will always remain the same. There can be no parental preinjury waiver; there can be no assessment of the risks and benefits by the person who is constitutionally presumed to be, and who in reality is, more concerned than anyone else in the world about the well-being of that child; and there can be no contract freely entered into by adults, both of whom may be exercising entirely reasonable and sound judgments. The justices in the majority refuse to enforce the preinjury waiver contract, noting that postinjury waivers are not enforced. But I would not extend our common-law rule against postinjury parental waivers to preinjury parental waivers. These situations are quite different. As Judge BANDSTRA stated in his concurrence in the Court of Appeals: `The concerns underlying the judiciary's reluctance to allow parents to dispose of a child's existing claim do not arise in the situation where a parent waives a child's future claim. A parent dealing with an existing claim is simultaneously coping with an injured child; such a situation creates a potential for parental action contrary to that child's ultimate best interests. `A parent who signs a release before her child participates in a recreational activity, however, faces an entirely different situation. First, such a parent has no financial motivation to sign the release. To the contrary, because a parent must pay for medical care, she risks her financial interests by signing away the right to recover damages. Thus, the parent would better serve her financial interests by refusing to sign the release. `A parent who dishonestly or maliciously signs a preinjury release in deliberate derogation of his child's best interests also seems unlikely. Presumably parents sign future releases to enable their children to participate in activities that the parents and children believe will be fun or educational. Common sense suggests that while a parent might misjudge or act carelessly in signing a release, he would have no reason to sign with malice aforethought. `Moreover, parents are less vulnerable to coercion and fraud in a preinjury setting. A parent who contemplates signing a release as a prerequisite to her child's participation in some activity faces none of the emotional trauma and financial pressures that may arise with an existing claim. That parent has time to examine the release, consider its terms, and explore possible alternatives. A parent signing a future release is thus more able to reasonably assess the possible consequences of waiving the right to sue.' [ Woodman, 280 Mich.App. at 158-159, 760 N.W.2d 641 (BANDSTRA, P.J., concurring) (citations omitted).] I agree with Judge BANDSTRA'S observations and have no difficulty concluding that the policy considerations underlying the rule limiting postinjury waivers absent judicial approval are sharply distinct from those at issue with respect to the preinjury rule. In particular, the traditional freedom of contract enjoyed by parents with regard to their children argues in favor of allowing enforcement of parental preinjury waivers.
There can also be little denying Judge BANDSTRA'S observation that [a]s this case amply demonstrates, ours is an extremely and increasingly litigious society. [61] Id. at 160, 760 N.W.2d 641. Children have routinely jumped off playground slides for generations; lawsuits seeking to impose damages on someone else for resulting injuries are only a recent phenomenon. Id. at 160 n. 2, 760 N.W.2d 641. As a result of trends toward increasing litigation in modern society, 48 jurisdictions adopted tort reform legislation between 1985 and 1988. Sanders & Joyce, Off to the races: The 1980s tort crisis and the law reform process, 27 Hous. L. R. 207, 220-222 (1990). Even in 1992 it was stated: Few would dispute the proposition that America has become a litigious society and that the preferred method for resolving disputes and achieving social reform is to file lawsuits. In 1989, close to eighteen million new civil cases were filed in state and federal courts, amounting to one lawsuit for every ten adults. In the federal courts alone, the number of lawsuits filed each year has more than quadrupled in the last thirty years from approximately 51,000 in 1960 to almost 218,000 in 1990. [Quayle, Civil justice reform, 41 Am. U. L. R. 559, 560 (1992).] [62] Indeed, this Court has previously expressed concern over the effect of increased litigation on recreational activities and identified clear evidence that litigation can exact a toll on what most would consider valuable social activities. Ritchie-Gamester, 461 Mich. at 92 n. 13, 597 N.W.2d 517. I agree with Ritchie-Gamester that our duty is to adopt common-law rules that do not create destructive levels of litigation that will inhibit important social activity. Id. at 93 n. 13, 597 N.W.2d 517. [63] Unfortunately, the concern expressed in Ritchie-Gamester is not shared by a majority of justices here. Indeed, their decision to expressly preclude the enforceability of parental preinjury waivers should be seen for what it is: an anti-tort-reform measure that will exact a heavy toll upon valuable social activities. Their decision will encourage the kind of modern litigation that has led to the closing of playgrounds for fear of a child being injured and a lawsuit being filed. See, e.g., Messina v. Dist. of Columbia, 663 A.2d 535, 538 (D.C., 1995) (holding that expert testimony was necessary to establish the standard of care for installation of cushioning under the monkey bars on a playground). [64] The more litigious our society becomes, the more each injured child becomes a potential plaintiff in a lawsuit and the more sports and recreational providers see the need to obtain waivers in order to avoid lawsuits and remain in business. Thus, I believe that our society's overall increase in litigiousness over recent generations constitutes a substantial change in society's customary practice that supplies an additional reason for this Court to clarify that our common law allows for the enforceability of parental preinjury waivers. A society in which monkey bars and other traditional playground equipment disappear, and in which sports such as dodge ball attract the scrutiny of the bench and bar, may be a society in which there is less risk of injury, but it is also a society in which the nature of childhood, and the responsibilities of parenthood, are defined very differently than they have by past generations of Americans. Because I see no evidence that community views have altered in this regard, I would maintain the genuine common law in this stateone in which parental preinjury waivers are an ordinary part of the family experiencenot the distorted common law articulated by a majority here.
The question whether to enforce parental preinjury waivers of negligence claims so that minors may participate in elective recreational activities has arisen in other states. [65] Numerous out-of-state cases have decided that parental preinjury waivers should be enforced in a wide variety of situations, notwithstanding the common law's obvious solicitude toward children. It is generally seen as being entirely compatible with that solicitude that parents be allowed to undertake certain decisions on behalf of their children, the consequences of which may not be entirely foreseeable. Who normally would be more concerned about, caring toward, and solicitous of the interests of a child than that child's parents? In Hohe v. San Diego Unified School Dist, 224 Cal. App.3d 1559, 274 Cal.Rptr. 647 (1990), a 15-year-old girl was injured when she volunteered to participate in a hypnotism show sponsored by her school's parent-teacher-student association. Although the minor and her father had signed a waiver form as a condition to her participation in the show, the plaintiff still attempted to hold the school, the association, and the school district liable for her injuries. The appellate court ruled that the release was not void as against public policy. [66] In Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998), Pamela Zivich registered her seven-year-old son for soccer. The soccer club required Mrs. Zivich to sign a release form for her son as a part of the registration process. The child was injured at practice, and his parents filed a lawsuit. The court held that a parent can bind a minor child to an exculpatory agreement in favor of volunteers and sponsors of nonprofit sport activities when the cause of action sounds in negligence. The court concluded that no public policy was violated by enforcing the release, stating: It cannot be disputed that volunteers in community recreational activities serve an important function. Organized recreational activities offer children the opportunity to learn valuable life skills. It is here that many children learn how to work as a team and how to operate within an organizational structure. Children also are given the chance to exercise and develop coordination skills. Due in great part to the assistance of volunteers, nonprofit organizations are able to offer these activities at minimal cost....    [A]lthough Bryan, like many children before him, gave up his right to sue for the negligent acts of others, the public as a whole received the benefit of these exculpatory agreements. Because of this agreement, the Club was able to offer affordable recreation and to continue to do so without the risks and overwhelming costs of litigation. Bryan's parents agreed to shoulder the risk. Public policy does not forbid such an agreement. In fact, public policy supports it. See Hohe v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990), 224 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1564, 274 Cal.Rptr. 647, 649. Accordingly, we believe that public policy justifies giving parents authority to enter into these types of binding agreements on behalf of their minor children. We also believe that the enforcement of these agreements may well promote more active involvement by participants and their families, which, in turn, promotes the overall quality and safety of these activities....    [W]e hold that parents have the authority to bind their minor children to exculpatory agreements in favor of volunteers and sponsors of nonprofit sport activities where the cause of action sounds in negligence. These agreements may not be disaffirmed by the child on whose behalf they were executed. [ Id. at 371-374, 696 N.E.2d 201.] In Sharon v. City of Newton, 437 Mass. 99, 769 N.E.2d 738 (2002), the Court upheld a release relating to a voluntary high school cheerleading program on the basis of public policy. The Court stated: In the instant case, Merav's father signed the release in his capacity as parent because he wanted his child to benefit from participating in cheerleading, as she had done for four previous seasons. He made an important family decision cognizant of the risk of physical injury to his child and the financial risk to the family as a whole. In the circumstance of a voluntary, nonessential activity, we will not disturb this parental judgment. This comports with the fundamental liberty interest of parents in the rearing of their children, and is not inconsistent with the purpose behind our public policy permitting minors to void their contracts. ... Our views with respect to the permissibility of requiring releases as a condition of voluntary participation in extracurricular sports activities, and the enforceability of releases signed by parents on behalf of their children for those purposes, are also consistent with and further the public policy of encouraging athletic programs for the Commonwealth's youth. [ Id. at 108-109, 769 N.E.2d 738.] [67] I acknowledge that some out-of-state cases have refused to enforce parental preinjury waivers. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1237 (Colo., 2002); [68] Scott v. Pacific West Mt. Resort, 119 Wash.2d 484, 834 P.2d 6 (1992); Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah, 2001); Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 375 N.J.Super. 568, 868 A.2d 1087 (2005). However, in my judgment, these decisions rely on the same kind of arguments set forth in the lead opinion and those of Justice HATHAWAY and Chief Justice KELLY and fail to recognize the superior authority of parents, now recognized by the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause, to make decisions of the present sort on behalf of their children. I find the out-of-state cases allowing parental preinjury waivers of negligence claims far more persuasively reasoned and considerably more in line with the constitutional presumption that parents act in their children's best interests, as well as with Michigan's public policy favoring recreational activities and affording some measure of legal protection to providers of such recreational activities. Finally, it is at least noteworthy that many legal commentators have come down on the side of the enforceability of parental preinjury waivers. Professor Joseph King, Jr., for example, states, [Negative] judicial attitudes toward exculpatory agreements signed by parents on behalf of their minor children seem inconsistent with the powers conferred on parents respecting other important life choices. King, Exculpatory agreements for volunteers in youth activitiesThe alternative to Nerf® tiddlywinks, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 683, 716 (1992). [69]