Opinion ID: 2684238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Packard’s Additional Claimed Errors

Text: Packard claims the district court committed four additional errors. First, in its order, the district court “use[d] the term ‘Intersection’ to refer to the intersection between U.S. Highway 73 and South 703 Loop” and “use[d] the term ‘Entrance’ to refer to the intersection between South 703 Loop and the Property.” The district court then concluded the accident was “alleged to have occurred at the Intersection . . . , not at the Entrance.” Packard complains that by making this “unilaterally created distinction,”5 the district court did not “accept as true where [Packard] stated the accident occurred, which was at the entrance gate to the Event.” But Packard’s complaint does not allege the accident happened at the entrance to the event—it alleges the entrance was Darveau’s intended destination. Packard plainly indicates the accident took place in the northbound lane of Highway 73: While turning left onto eastbound South 703 Loop, Darveau failed to observe [Edward Packard] traveling northbound on U.S. Highway 73, failed to maintain control of the Vehicle and failed to yield to oncoming traffic, striking the Motorcycle such that the Motorcycle struck the passenger-side of the Vehicle and caused a collision between the Vehicle and the Motorcycle operated by [Edward Packard], fatally injuring [Edward Packard]. We find no error in the district court’s analysis of the location of the accident. Second, Packard proposes the district court made false assumptions about the traffic on Highway 73 when it found, Snethen and [the Jaycees] could not control traffic on U.S. Highway 73. They had no control over the volume of traffic using the highway, they could not control the direction of the traffic, and they could not control 5 At the same time, in her reply brief, Packard states, “It must be noted the closest Intersection and the Entrance of the Event are two different locations, and as pled, the accident occurred at the Entrance.” (Emphasis added). -11- whether a driver might attempt to turn left across traffic on U.S. Highway 73 in order to drive on South 703 Loop. Nor could they control the fact that traffic had been diverted onto U.S. Highway 73 from other highways. More particularly, they had no control over the movements of either Darveau or Mr. Packard at the time of the collision. Packard claims the district court’s consideration of “evidence” outside the pleadings effectively required the district court to treat the parties’ motions as motions for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). But the district court did not consider additional evidence. It merely applied common sense and universal experience—a private entity generally does not control the traffic on a public highway, does not control river flooding or bridge closures, and does not control the actions of members of the general public, i.e., Darveau and Edward Packard. The district court committed no error. Third, Packard charges that the district court improperly dismissed Packard’s complaint without additional discovery. While Packard frames this as a separate issue, she is basically repeating her contention that her complaint did not fail to state a claim for relief as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Once the district court found Packard had failed to state a claim, it is axiomatic the district court would then dismiss the complaint without further discovery. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (“Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”). Finally, in response to Carico Farms’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, Packard submitted an index of evidence along with her brief, but the district court declined to consider the additional evidence. “A court has wide discretion in electing to consider matters outside the pleadings.” Skyberg v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 5 F.3d 297, 302 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993). The district court did not abuse its discretion here. Additional evidence would not change the district court’s prediction that the Nebraska Supreme Court, under the allegations of this case, would -12- determine, as a matter of law, that a private citizen has no legal duty to control traffic on Nebraska highways.