Opinion ID: 501759
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discussion of Coleman's Personal History

Text: 112 Coleman argues that even if the trial court considered all of the evidence presented and found it insufficient to justify leniency, the due process clause nevertheless requires the sentencing authority to specifically discuss this evidence in its findings. We disagree. 113 The Supreme Court has emphasized that death, in its finality, is qualitatively different from any other punishment. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977). The Court has recognized that although sentencing will often involve the exercise of discretion, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (citation omitted); see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964 (state death penalty statute may not preclude sentencing authority from considering defendant's character). In Lockett, the Court held violative of due process an Ohio statute which only permitted consideration of three mitigating circumstances. The Court reasoned that the sentencer must not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), the Court overturned a death sentence because the trial judge held it was precluded under Oklahoma law from considering the petitioner's violent background as a mitigating circumstance. Id. at 109, 102 S.Ct. at 873-74. The Court concluded it was clear that the trial judge did not evaluate the evidence in mitigation and find it wanting as a matter of fact; rather he found that as a matter of law he was unable even to consider the evidence. Id. at 113, 102 S.Ct. at 876 (emphasis in original). The Court noted that the Oklahoma death penalty statute permits the defendant to present evidence 'as to any mitigating circumstances'.... Lockett requires the sentencer to listen. Id. at 115 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. at 877 n. 10 (citation omitted). See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1670-71, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). 114 While Lockett and Eddings hold that the sentencing authority may not impose restrictions, as a matter of law, on the evidence presented by the defendant in mitigation, [n]either of these cases establishes the weight which must be given to any particular mitigating evidence, or the manner in which it must be considered; they simply condemn any procedure in which such evidence has no weight at all. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 961 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3430-31 n. 2, 77 L.Ed.2d 134 (1983) (Stephens and Powell, J. concurring); Johnson, 778 F.2d at 629; Raulerson, 732 F.2d at 805-08; Palmes, 725 F.2d at 1523. The Court in Eddings emphasized that the error in that case was the trial court's self-imposed legal restrictions on the consideration of evidence presented in mitigation. 455 U.S. at 113-15, 102 S.Ct. at 876-77. The Court carefully noted, however, that once the state courts admit evidence presented in mitigation, the sentencer, and the [state court of appeals] on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. Id. at 114-15, 102 S.Ct. at 876-77. The due process clause only precludes these courts from giv[ing] it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration. Id. at 115, 102 S.Ct. at 877. See also Skipper, 106 S.Ct. at 1670-71; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467, 104 S.Ct. at 3166 (federal court does not ask whether it agrees with state courts, only whether decision is irrational or arbitrary); Raulerson, 732 F.2d at 806-08. 9 115 The Court's approval of various death penalty statutes demonstrates that the due process clause does not impose the requirement that Coleman would have us adopt. In Jurek, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929, the Court upheld a Texas statute which required the jury to answer three general questions regarding mitigating and aggravating circumstances; 10 if the jury was unanimous, it could simply answer yes or no to these inquiries. Id. at 269 & n. 5, 96 S.Ct. at 2955 & n. 5. The statute imposed no requirement that the jury provide findings discussing mitigating factors which it had rejected. See Martin v. Maggio, 711 F.2d 1273, 1286-87 (5th Cir.1983) (affirming, Martin v. Blackburn, 521 F.Supp. 685, 715 (E.D.La.1981)), reh'g denied, 739 F.2d 184 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 447, 83 L.Ed.2d 373 (1984). The Court emphasized that the Texas statute provided for prompt judicial review, and was constitutional because it assured that sentences of death will not be 'wantonly' or 'freakishly' imposed.... Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276, 96 S.Ct. at 2958 (citation omitted). Similarly, in Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, the Georgia statute required the sentencing authority to consider the list of aggravating circumstances provided in the statute and to consider any mitigating evidence presented by the defendant; if the verdict was death, the judge or jury was required to specify the aggravating circumstances found. Id. at 166, 197, 96 S.Ct. at 2922, 2936. The statute imposed no obligation on the sentencing authority to discuss mitigating factors presented but found insufficient to justify leniency. See id. at 163-67 & nn. 4-10, 96 S.Ct. at 2920-22 & nn. 4-10 (quoting Georgia statute); id. at 197, 96 S.Ct. at 2936. The Court noted that the possibility of arbitrariness was reduced by requiring the state appellate court to examine whether the sentence was excessive and whether the evidence supported the jury's or judge's findings. Id. at 166-67, 206-07, 96 S.Ct. at 2922, 2940-41. The Court has approved other sentences in which the trial judge has made findings but not discussed factors dealing with a defendant's personal history considered by the judge but rejected. See Baldwin, 105 S.Ct. at 2731; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 466-67, 104 S.Ct. at 3165-66 (involving Florida statute, which, like Montana's, required judge to list findings); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247, 250, 253, 96 S.Ct. at 2964, 2965, 2967 (same, noting state appellate review). 116 The record in this case does not indicate that the trial court imposed any restrictions on the introduction or consideration of evidence in mitigation. Rather, as noted, the court considered the evidence and materials presented and concluded that the factors in mitigation did not outweigh the seriousness of Coleman's offense. On appeal, the Montana supreme court found that the trial court had followed the Montana death penalty statute, Spaziano, 448 U.S. at 467, 104 S.Ct. at 3166, and evaluated the record to determine whether the evidence supported the trial court's Findings. Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 95-2206.13. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207, 96 S.Ct. at 2941. The Montana supreme court weighed the evidence and found no error: 117 [The pre-sentence] report indicated the defendant had no record of criminal activity and had been an accepted member of the community where he lived prior to July 4, 1974, the date of the commission of this crime. The evidence in this case supporting the finding of the aggravating circumstance established that the defendant had been a deliberate, voluntary participant in the kidnapping and subsequent rape and murder of the victim. The evidence further established that the death of the victim occurred after a sexual assault, not in a moment of passion, but over a period of time with the defendant first bludgeoning, then attempting to strangle, then finally drowning the victim in an effort to effectuate a deliberate decision to kill Peggy Harstad. Against the record of this brutal crime, we cannot say that the defendant's lack of prior criminal activity of record is a factor sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. 118 Coleman II, 185 Mont. 299, 605 P.2d at 1019. 119 Due process requires that the state trial and appellate courts listen. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. at 877 n. 10. The Montana courts have listened and rendered their judgment. Whether or not 'reasonable people' could differ over the results here, we see nothing irrational or arbitrary about the imposition of the death penalty in this case. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467, 104 S.Ct. at 3166.