Opinion ID: 2124187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Lack of Effective Representation in This Case

Text: In the instant matter, as previously noted, defendant was represented by counsel at all times during the trial. While represented by counsel, defendant had ultimate responsibility over certain fundamental decisions; however, he necessarily delegated certain case management, strategic and tactical decisions to defense counsel ( see Faretta v California, 422 US at 820-821 [where the United States Supreme Court noted that law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas.. . . This allocation can only be justified, however, by the defendant's consent, at the outset, to accept counsel as his representative (internal citations omitted)]). This division of responsibility isclear given the cited case law and professional standards. However, the trial court, by ensuring that defense counsel followed defendant's instructions prohibiting defense counsel from exercising his decision-making authority regarding case strategy and tactics, mistakenly increased defendant's rights at trial while at the same time limiting defense counsel's decision-making authority. This mistake was compounded when the trial court sought to determine whether defendant understood that he was waiving certain decisions pertaining to case strategy and tactics, e.g., to make an opening statement, to make objections and to cross-examine witnesses. Former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Burger noted that [s]ince trial decisions are of necessity entrusted to the accused's attorney, the . . . standard of `knowing and intelligent waiver' is simply inapplicable ( Wainwright, 433 US at 94 [concurring op]). Since defendant here was represented by counsel and did not have the privilege to make decisions regarding trial strategies and tactics, he could not waive them. Thus, the trial court's inquiry, regarding whether defendant understood the trial rights he was waiving based on his instructions to defense counsel, was improper. By making strategic and tactical decisions in defense of one accused of a crime, an attorney renders effective representation and ensures that the adversarial process works to produce a just result. However, where, as in the instant case, the trial court allows defense counsel to follow defendant's instructions not to make the strategic and tactical decisions required in order to make the trial an adversarial proceeding, defendant is deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial. The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is fundamental to our criminal justice system because it affects a defendant's ability to assert any other rights he may have ( see United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 653-654 [1984]). The primary purpose of the right to effective counsel is to assure assistance by counsel at trial when the accused [is] confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor ( Cronic, 466 US at 654). If no actual assistance at trial is provided, then the constitutional guarantee has been violated ( id. ) The premise underlying our adversary system of criminal justice is the idea that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free ( Cronic, 466 US at 655). Keeping this premise in mind, it is clear that the right to effective assistance of counsel requires the accused's counsel to act as an advocate and that this right `is meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process.' . . . Unless the accused receives the effective assistance of counsel, `a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself' ( Cronic, 466 US at 656 [internal citations omitted]). Accordingly, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is the right of the accused, through his attorney, to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing ( see id. ). Further, the accused's attorney is responsible for ensuring that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing [the] decision ( Strickland v Washington, 466 US at 687). This means that even if there is no defense available to defendant at trial, defense counsel must hold the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt ( Cronic, 466 US at 657 n 19). When a criminal trial is adversarial, the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred ( Cronic, 466 US at 656). However, where the trial is not an adversarial proceeding, the accused has been deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel ( see Cronic, 466 US at 656-657). In other words, counsel has rendered ineffective assistance to the accused. When evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, courts consider whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result ( Strickland, 466 US at 686). To make out an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Federal Constitution, defendant must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, that the deficient performance prejudiced defendant and thereby deprived defendant of a fair trial and reliable result, and that counsel acted unreasonably under the prevailing professional norms ( see Strickland v Washington, 466 US at 686-694). Prejudice is established if [t]he defendant . . . show[s] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome ( Strickland, 466 US at 694). In New York, however, courts evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims will consider whether the evidence, the law and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation to defendant ( People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Henry, 95 NY2d 563, 565 [2000]). Accordingly, the standard for effective assistance of counsel in New York is whether the defendant was afforded meaningful representation ( see Benevento, 91 NY2d at 712; People v Berroa, 99 NY2d 134, 138 [2002]; People v Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 283 [2004]). In resolving ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the attorney's performance should be evaluated to determine whether it is consistent with the performance of a reasonably competent attorney ( see Benevento, 91 NY2d at 712). One major difference between the New York standard and the standard announced in Strickland v Washington is the way that prejudice is analyzed ( see Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d at 284). This Court indicated that under the New York standard, the prejudice test of Strickland need not be fully satisfied and that while a defendant's showing of prejudice is important, it is not an indispens[a]ble element in assessing meaningful representation ( Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d at 284). Further, this Court noted that [o]ur focus is on the fairness of the proceedings as a whole ( see id. ; see also Benevento, 91 NY2d at 714). Here, defense counsel, an officer of the court, was appointed to represent defendant; as such, he was bound to render service to defendant ( see e.g. Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 73 [1932]). Moreover, it is undisputed that defense counsel was defendant's legal representative throughout the trial. As defendant's legal representative at trial, defense counsel's role was very important because he was to be defendant's advocate ( see Cronic, 466 US at 656) [1] and act in defendant's best interests. [2] Further, he was to subject the People's case to meaningful adversarial testing and thereby ensure that defendant received a fair trial ( see id. ; Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688 [1984]). Defense counsel did not do any of those things because of his mistaken belief that he had to follow defendant's instructions to do nothing on defendant's behalf and the trial court's enforcement of defendant's instructions. It should be noted that defense counsel was under no duty to execute defendant's directive to do nothing because the directive resulted in a trial that did not comport with the law, i.e., a trial devoid of fairness, in direct contravention to prevailing professional standards ( see ABA Standard 4-1.2 [3d ed 1993]). [3] Moreover, defense counsel's failure to ensure that meaningful adversarial testing occurred deprived defendant of his right to counsel, resulted in a presumptively unfair and unreliable trial, and amounted to a complete denial of counsel ( see United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 659 [1984]). Thus, based on the fundamental importance of the right to counsel and the fact that defense counsel did not render any assistance, under either the federal standard or the New York standard, defense counsel's assistance was ineffective and consequently, the trial itself was unfair. Additionally, the trial court facilitated the deprivation of defendant's rights. The United States Supreme Court has noted that [t]he presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial ( Cronic, 466 US at 659). The Supreme Court has found violations of the right to effective assistance of counsel without any showing of prejudice when counsel was . . . prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding ( Cronic, 466 US at 659 n 25). Further, a trial court can violate the right to effective assistance when it interferes . . . with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense ( Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 686 [1984]). Here, the trial court, by enforcing defendant's instructions, prevented defense counsel from assisting defendant and interfered with defense counsel's ability to make independent decisions regarding how to conduct the defense. Although the trial court repeatedly asked defendant to let defense counsel put forth a defense, it also gave defendant unfettered discretion to restrict defense counsel's activities regarding the defense. As defendant exercised control over defense counsel, the trial devolved into a nonadversarial proceeding that, under the Federal and New York Constitutions, was presumptively unfair because defense counsel failed to subject the People's case to meaningful adversarial testing. This means that only the People's side of the case was presented and that it was presented unchallenged. It also means that defense counsel could not hold the People to their heavy burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by challenging the veracity of adverse witnesses or performing any of the other functions defense counsel must necessarily perform in order to make a trial an adversarial proceeding under the law. The argument that since the evidence against defendant was overwhelming, his counsel's ineffective assistance would not have changed the outcome of the trial is unavailing. Once it is determined that a defendant is going to trial, he is presumed innocent until proven guilty and his counsel is obliged to hold the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by engaging in meaningful adversarial testing. Additionally, the argument that defendant received the type of trial he wanted grants defendant too much power over the trial and affords defendant the opportunity to whittle away at the integrity of the trial process. Here, for example, the trial court allowed defendant to give instructions which eventually led to a trial that did not comport with the Federal and New York State Constitutions because it was fundamentally unfair.