Opinion ID: 1196921
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Must Taranto Prove Actual Malice in Her Defamation Claim Against the Borough?

Text: The superior court granted summary judgment to the borough on Taranto's defamation claim, reasoning that actual malice is the standard for determining whether the borough abused, and lost, its conditional right to speak. The court found no genuine issues of material fact under that standard. Taranto argues on appeal that the First Amendment does not protect defamatory governmental speech, and that it was therefore error for the superior court to apply an actual malice requirement and to grant summary judgment to the borough. The borough argues that the First Amendment protects governmental speech, subject to an actual malice standard, and that moreover, it had a conditional privilege to speak on matters of public interest. Some courts have held that the First Amendment does not protect government speech. [10] Indeed, Justice Stewart observed that [t]he First Amendment protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the Government. [11] We need not decide here whether the United States or Alaska constitutions protect government speech, because this court has held that the common law confers a conditional privilege on speech addressing matters of public health and safety. [12] We do not need to consider whether a constitutional privilege applies if we conclude that a common law privilege applies. Undoubtedly the speech attributed to the borough here dealt with matters of public health and safety. Does a common law privilege apply? Our decisions point to two different analytical models potentially applicable here. We considered an equivalent claim in Urethane Specialties, Inc. v. City of Valdez. [13] There, the City of Valdez published partly false warnings about the safety of urethane foam installation, prompting an installer to sue. [14] We recognized that the common law provides for privileges in various situations in which public policy requires that a speaker be accorded immunity for the making of defamatory statements.... `Each such privilege is conditional upon the existence of a state of facts which make it in the public interest to protect the person speaking or writing....' [15] This court then adopted, for situations like the one under consideration, [16] the privilege described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598A: An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if an inferior administrative officer of a state or any of its subdivisions makes a defamatory communication required or permitted in the performance of his official duties. [17] But this privilege can be lost. We held that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600 determines whether the conditional privilege accorded certain government speech is lost through abuse. [18] The standard set out in § 600 is the equivalent of the actual malice standard. Applying the Urethane Specialties analysis to this case would require us to affirm the borough's summary judgment. There are no genuine factual disputes about whether the petition concerned matters of public interest, whether the borough acted without actual malice, and whether the persons whose conduct is attributed to the borough acted with authority or permission. Although applying that approach would require affirmance here, in many cases it may raise questions about the speaker's authority and permission. [19] Our decisions discuss an alternative approach that applies broadly to speech on matters of public concern. We think that this alternative analysis encompasses cases of allegedly defamatory governmental speech. It also avoids the issue, inherent in Restatement § 598A, of the speaker's authority or permission. This alternative is discussed in two cases cited by the borough. The borough invokes Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco [20] to support its argument that government speech is protected, and Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co. [21] to support its argument that a plaintiff must prove actual malice in all defamation suits involving speech on matters of public concern. In Francisco, a discharged firefighter sued a Fairbanks newspaper for printing a letter by the city manager that outlined the alleged details surrounding his firing. [22] Although the defendant was a newspaper, this court went out of its way to recognize that judicial officers, attorneys, witnesses, jurors, legislators, government executive officers and others are accorded the absolute privilege of publishing false and defamatory matter within certain limitations ... whenever it is necessary for the protection of one's own interest, the interest of third persons, or the interests of the public. [23] This dictum acknowledged that the common law privilege could extend to government speakers, while leaving unresolved what those certain limitations on the privilege might be. In Pearson, we emphasized that for matters of public interest, the actual malice standard from New York Times v. Sullivan should apply. [24] There, a syndicated newspaper columnist charged that a Fairbanks newspaper editorial libeled him. [25] The court declined to consider the constitutional dimensions of the case, and instead held that if a plaintiff could show actual malice, then the privilege that otherwise would be enjoyed in discussion and debate on public questions and issues would be lost. [26] While the court adopted the United States Supreme Court's definition of actual malice, it carefully avoided grounding its opinion in any constitutional rights to free speech, focusing instead on the common law conditional privilege. [27] We read Francisco and Pearson to stand for the core proposition that speech on matters of public safety is privileged, but that this privilege is conditional and can be lost if the plaintiff proves that the speaker uttered untruths with actual malice. [28] Thus, these cases cloak speakers addressing matters of public health and safety with the actual malice conditional privilege. This protection will necessarily extend to a speaker's employer who is alleged to be vicariously liable for its employee's defamatory speech.