Opinion ID: 805994
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: who—

Text: ... (V) is an employee in the legislative branch or legislative body of that State, political subdivision, or agency and is not employed by the legislative library of such State, political subdivision, or agency. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (emphasis added). Although this case provides us with the first opportunity to interpret and apply the “legislative employee” exclusion, the statutory language is unambiguous. The exclusion has three conjunctive elements: (1) the individual must be employed by a state or a political subdivision thereof; (2) he or she must not be subject to the civil service laws of the State or political subdivision; and (3) he or she must be employed by the legislative branch or body of a State or political subdivision but not by a legislative library. When these elements are satisfied, a plaintiff No. 11-3700 Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, et al. Page 7 does not fall within the coverage of the FLSA and may not maintain a claim under the Act. Ellington does not contest the district court’s conclusion that the first two elements of the exclusion are satisfied in this case. As to the first element, the district court observed that both sides, despite disagreeing as to who Ellington’s ultimate employer was, acknowledged that Ellington was employed by a political subdivision of the state. Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, No. 10-CV-311, 2011 WL 2149364, at  (N.D. Ohio May 31, 2011) (unpublished). Nor is it disputed that the civil service laws of Ohio and the City of East Cleveland do not apply to Ellington’s position as Deputy Clerk. The district court, after examining Ohio law and the City of East Cleveland’s Charter, found that “[Ellington’s] employment is an ‘unclassified’ position under the Charter, and [Ellington] has not offered any evidence to rebut case law and Defendants’ evidence that the civil service laws do not govern ‘unclassified’ employees in Ohio.” Id. Ellington argues that the district court erroneously found the third element of the exclusion satisfied by ignoring the holding in Birch, a case he contends is binding precedent and precludes a finding that he is a legislative employee. Birch, however, is not controlling in this case, as it only addressed the scope of the “personal staff” and “policymaking” exclusions of the FLSA. It does not discuss, nor even cite, the FLSA’s “legislative employee” exclusion. See Birch, 392 F.3d at 158–61. Ellington’s entire argument that the district court applied the wrong analysis is premised on conflating the FLSA’s “legislative employee” exclusion with its “personal staff” exclusion. Were we to accept Ellington’s contention that Birch’s “personal staff” analysis applies equally to the determination of whether an individual is a legislative employee, the “legislative employee” exclusion would become mere surplusage in the FLSA, a result we must avoid if at all possible when interpreting statutory provisions. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loans Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991) (“[W]e construe statutes, where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof.”); Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“It is the duty of the court to give effect, if possible, No. 11-3700 Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, et al. Page 8 to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.”). Thus, Birch is not binding precedent in this case. Because the City Council is undoubtedly the legislative body of the City of East Cleveland, see City of East Cleveland Charter § 98 (“The legislative power of the City, except as limited by this Charter, shall be vested in a Council consisting of five members.”), the exclusive inquiry with respect to the third element is whether an employment relationship existed between Ellington and the City Council. This inquiry is no different than the one courts make when determining generally whether a defendant is an “employer” of a plaintiff so as to permit recovery under the FLSA against the defendant. The FLSA defines “employer” to include “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). “‘The remedial purposes of the FLSA require the courts to define “employer” more broadly than the term would be interpreted in traditional common law applications.’” Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.2d 875, 877 (5th Cir.1989) (per curiam)). In other words, the employment relationship determination “is not fixed by labels that parties may attach to their relationship nor by common law categories nor by classifications under other statutes.” Powell, 339 U.S. at 528. Instead, the “economic reality” of the relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant “determines whether their relationship is one of employment.” Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch. Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Alamo, 471 U.S. at 301). This “economic reality” standard, however, is not a precise test susceptible to formulaic application. See Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984). It prescribes a case-by-case approach, whereby the court considers the “circumstances of the whole business activity,” id.; see Dunlop v. Dr. Pepper-Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Dyersburg, Tenn., 529 F.2d 298, 301 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that in applying the economic reality standard, “the authoritative decisions require that the courts consider No. 11-3700 Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, et al. Page 9 the total relationship rather than isolated factors”). Relevant factors to consider may include whether the plaintiff is an integral part of the operations of the putative employer, Dr. Pepper-Pepsi Cola, 529 F.2d at 301; the extent of the plaintiff’s economic dependence on the defendant, id.; the defendant’s “substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work” of the plaintiff, Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973); the defendant’s authority to hire or fire the plaintiff, Braddock v. Madison Cnty., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (citing Barfield v. Madison Cnty., 984 F. Supp. 491, 497 (S.D. Miss. 1997)); and whether the defendant maintains the plaintiff’s employment records and establishes the rate and method of payment, id. Consistent with the case-bycase approach prescribed by Donovan, these factors are not exhaustive and “‘[n]o one factor is dispositive; rather, it is incumbent upon the courts to transcend traditional concepts of the employer-employee relationship and assess the economic realities presented by the facts of each case.’” Dole, 942 F.2d at 966 (quoting Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1983)). Here, the economic realities of Ellington and the City Council’s relationship overwhelmingly support a finding that an employment relationship existed. First, the City Council had substantial authority to hire and fire Ellington. The City Council interviewed Ellington, offered him the position of Deputy Clerk, and tirelessly worked to ensure that he was compensated for his services. Plenary authority to remove Ellington from the position was also vested in the City Council: “The Deputy Clerk shall hold office at the pleasure of Council and shall be removable from office at any time by vote of a majority of the members of the Council with or without cause, and no reason need be given for discharge.” (Deputy Clerk of Council Job Posting.) Second, as Deputy Clerk, Ellington’s duties and work assignments directly corresponded to the activities of the City Council. Ellington received his work assignments from individual members of the City Council and the Clerk of Council, and the Deputy Clerk’s duties, as set forth in the position’s job posting, included: (1) serving all members of the City Council equally; (2) being informed of all matters concerning the City Council so that in the absence of the Clerk of Council, the Deputy Clerk may effectively administer the City Council’s affairs; and (3) preparing periodic reports for the City Council. Only one No. 11-3700 Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, et al. Page 10 conclusion can be drawn from these facts: Ellington was an employee of the City Council. Ellington, relying on the factors addressed in Birch’s analysis of the “personal staff” and “policymaker” exclusions under the FLSA and Title VII, see Birch, 392 F.3d at 158–61, argues that, as Deputy Clerk, he was not a legislative employee because the City Council’s power to hire him was not absolute, his professional relationship with the City Council was not intimate, he did not represent the City Council in the eyes or the public, his job duties were entirely administrative and clerical in nature, and he did not formulate policy or draft legislation. In the first instance, contrary to Ellington’s contentions, the record suggests that his working relationship with the City Council was, in fact, intimate. Ellington received assignments directly from council members and was responsible for administering the affairs of the City Council when the Clerk of Council was absent. Moreover, although the City Council may not have had “plenary” control of his hiring, the record clearly reflects the City Council’s substantial involvement in his hiring. Additionally, unlike the “policymaker” exclusion, Ellington’s lack of involvement in the development of legislation is immaterial to determining whether the City Council was his employer. Nor does the purported administrative and clerical nature of his duties affect the employment relationship determination. The language of the “legislative employee” exclusion is categorical: where an individual is employed by the legislative branch or body of a state or political subdivision and is not subject to the civil service laws of that State or political subdivision, he is excluded from FLSA coverage, irrespective of the fact that the individual may not be a policymaker or on the personal staff of an elected official. The district court’s conclusion that Ellington was employed by the City Council, and thus not an “employee” as that term is defined by the FLSA, was correct. No. 11-3700 Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, et al. Page 11