Opinion ID: 1956866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Requests for Admissions

Text: Appellant claims that the District's failure to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect renders erroneous the trial judge's decision to permit the District to withdraw its admissions by default and file actual responses to his second set of requests for admissions. We disagree. Superior Court Civil Rule 36(b) permits the court to allow withdrawal or amendment [of admissions] when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. The rule does not impose a good cause or excusable neglect burden upon the moving party; rather, it focuses on the lack of prejudice to the opposing party and on the policy for furthering just and complete resolution of the merits. See Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc., Civil §§ 2257, 2264 (1970) (interpreting the identical federal rule). Accordingly, unless a party demonstrates prejudice by reliance upon previous admissions, the trial court can and should extend permission to withdraw or amend. Id. See French v. United States, 416 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1969); Williams v. Krieger, 61 F.D.R. 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y.1973); Pleasant Hill Bank v. United States, 60 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.Mo.1973). We cannot fault the trial court's decision to exercise its discretion in favor of the District. Although the judge found that the District's delay in answering was not excusable (based as it was on the hope that a pending motion to dismiss would be resolved in its favor and thus render the requests moot), he concluded, nonetheless, that Mr. Marshall would suffer no prejudice if the deemed admissions were withdrawn and the actual responses filed. He further found that the confusion inherent in the plethora of pleadings in the suit required Mr. Marshall to share the blame for any delay consequent upon such confusion. The trial court also extended to Mr. Marshall an opportunity for a continuance, in the event that he believed his case would be hampered by this late development. In light of all the evidence and this latter accommodation by the trial judge, we cannot say the court abused its discretion.