Opinion ID: 1809082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merger Decision.

Text: The defendant was found guilty by a jury of two crimes: (1) second-degree sexual abuse, see id. § 709.3(1); and (2) first-degree burglary, see id. § 713.3. These offenses were based on the same incident occurring on June 25, 1999. Both crimes are class B felonies, for which the penalty is an indeterminate twenty-five-year term of incarceration. See id. §§ 709.3(1), 713.3, 902.3, 902.9. At sentencing, the court, over the State's objection, ruled that the defendant's convictions should be merged pursuant to Iowa Code section 701.9. The district court concluded that second-degree sexual abuse was a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary. Therefore, no judgment was entered on the sexual-abuse conviction. Rather, the court sentenced the defendant to a twenty-five-year indeterminate term on the burglary conviction. The State claims on appeal that merger of the defendant's convictions was illegal and not authorized by section 701.9. We review challenges to the legality of a district court's merger decision for correction of errors at law. See State v. Anderson, 565 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1997). Iowa Code section 701.9 provides: No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is necessarily included in another public offense of which the person is convicted. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one offense and such verdict conflicts with this section, the court shall enter judgment of guilty of the greater of the offenses only. We have held that this statute codifies the double jeopardy protection against cumulative punishment. State v. Gallup, 500 N.W.2d 437, 445 (Iowa 1993). Thus, we look to legislative intent to determine whether merger is required under section 701.9. See id. Legislative intent is indicated, in part, by whether the crimes at issue meet the legal elements test for lesser-included offenses. See State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Iowa 1995). See generally Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932) (applying legal-elements test to determine whether one act constituted two offenses). Even though a crime may meet the so-called Blockburger test for lesser-included offenses, it may still be separately punished if legislative intent for multiple punishments is otherwise indicated. See Haitiburton, 539 N.W.2d at 344. The defendant contends that we should rethink our interpretation of section 701.9 and hold that it merely codifies the Blockburger legal elements test for lesser-included offenses. Under this interpretation of the statute, all included offenses must be merged into the greater offense. See State v. Daniels, 588 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1998) (Carter, J., concurring specially). No further exploration for legislative intent is necessary because the statute itself indicates legislative intent that lesser-included offenses be merged. See id. We find no need to decide whether the interpretation of section 701.9 adopted in Gallup should be revisited. That is because the crime of second-degree sexual abuse does not meet the Blockburger test for a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary. Therefore, even under the more restricted test advocated by the defendant, merger is not authorized. We turn now to a comparison of the elements of first-degree burglary and second-degree sexual abuse. The defendant was charged with and convicted of the following alternative of burglary in the first degree: A person commits burglary in the first degree if, while perpetrating a burglary in or upon an occupied structure in which one or more persons are present, any of the following circumstances apply: . . . . d. The person performs or participates in a sex act with any person which would constitute sexual abuse under section 709.1. Iowa Code § 713.3(1)( d ). The defendant's second-degree sexual abuse offense is defined as follows: A person commits sexual abuse in the second degree when the person commits sexual abuse under any of the following circumstances: 1. During the commission of sexual abuse the person displays in a threatening manner a dangerous weapon, or uses or threatens to use force creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury to any person. Id. § 709.3(1). The defendant claims that the elements of second-degree sexual abuse are subsumed in the aggravating circumstance contained in subparagraph ( d ) of the first-degree burglary definition. Compare id. § 713.3(1)( d ), with id. § 709.3(1). In other words, he claims that he could not have committed first-degree burglary without also committing second-degree sexual abuse. See generally State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 730 (Iowa 1988) (`To be necessarily included in the greater offense the lesser must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser.' (Citation omitted.)). We disagree. The aggravating element that raises a simple burglary to first-degree burglary is the commission of sexual abuse under section 709.1.  Iowa Code § 713.3(1)( d ) (emphasis added). Section 709.1 defines sexual abuse as [a]ny sex act when [t]he act is done by force or against the will of the other. Id. § 709.1(1). [1] Notably absent from this definition is any requirement that the person committing sexual abuse display a dangerous weapon during commission of the sex act, or that the person use or threaten to use force creating a substantial risk of death or serious injury to any person. See id. § 709.3(1). Proof of one of these circumstances is, however, required for a conviction of second-degree sexual abuse under the alternative charged here. See id. As this comparison of the elements of first-degree burglary and second-degree sexual abuse shows, each crime contains an element or elements not present in the other offense. Therefore, it is possible to commit first-degree burglary under the sexual-abuse alternative without also committing second-degree sexual abuse. [2] Accordingly, sexual abuse in the second degree does not meet the legal elements test for a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary. See Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d at 730 (If the lesser offense contains an element that is not part of the greater offense, the lesser cannot be included in the greater.). This conclusion is not inconsistent with our cases holding that first-degree sexual abuse and second-degree sexual abuse are lesser-included offenses of first-degree kidnapping. See State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603, 611 (Iowa 1997) (first-degree sexual abuse); State v. Whitfield, 315 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Iowa 1982) (second-degree sexual abuse). The greater offense in those casesfirst-degree kidnappingincludes as an element of the crime that the person kidnapped `is intentionally subjected to ... sexual abuse.' Morgan, 559 N.W.2d at 611 (quoting Iowa Code § 710.2 (1993)). We have interpreted the statutory language, sexual abuse, broadly to refer to any crime of sexual abuse as defined in chapter 709. See Morgan, 559 N.W.2d at 611; Whitfield, 315 N.W.2d at 755. This interpretation of the first-degree kidnapping statute is consistent with the basic definition of kidnapping set forth in chapter 710: A person commits kidnapping when he or she either confines a person or removes a person from one place to another, knowing that he or she has neither the authority nor the consent of the other to do so; provided, that to constitute kidnapping the act must be accompanied by one or more of the following: 3. The intent to inflict serious injury upon such person, or to subject the person to a sexual abuse. Iowa Code § 710.1(3) (1979) (emphasis added). As this court has noted, the word a is often used in the sense of any. See Voss v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 2001). Thus, by including as an element any sexual abuse, the legislature did not distinguish between degrees of sexual abuse in defining the crime of kidnapping. In contrast, the legislature clearly limited the sexual abuse requirement in the first-degree burglary statute to sexual abuse as defined in section 709.1. See Iowa Code § 713.3(1)( d ) (requiring sexual abuse under section 709.1). Section 709.1 contains the basic definition of sexual abuse and does not include any of the aggravating circumstances that are necessary to elevate the crime to sexual abuse in the second degree. This court is not at liberty to broaden the sexual abuse element of the burglary offense, which the legislature has expressly defined in a narrow manner, to include any sexual abuse crime in chapter 709. It follows, therefore, that the burglary statute is not susceptible to the broad interpretation of the kidnapping statute adopted in the Morgan and Whitfield cases. In summary, the crime of second-degree sexual abuse is not a lesser-included offense of the crime of burglary in the first degree. Therefore, the trial court erred in holding that these crimes met the test for merger under section 701.9. [3]