Opinion ID: 1801948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged error in admitting Deputy Rascoe's testimony about Michael H.'s statement

Text: During the prosecution's penalty phase case-in-chief, Betty Jean Abney testified that in 1993 she lived next door to defendant and Brenda H. On April 9 of that year, Abney was across the street at a friend's house when suddenly she saw defendant lift Brenda's young son, Robert, by the hair and throw him to the ground. Abney told her friend to call the police, then crossed the street and yelled at defendant to stop. The police came and arrested defendant. Brenda H. testified for the defense that in April 1993 her son Robert and some other boys had been jumping onto moving cars. The boys ignored Brenda H.'s order to stop, so she asked defendant to go get them. Brenda H. went into the house, then heard hollering. When she went back outside, her next-door neighbor Betty was yelling and had called the police. Robert had no bruises, scrapes, stiff neck or other problems, but he was upset because the police had taken defendant to jail. Robert H., who was 12 years old at the time of trial, testified that on the day in question he had tripped over a tree stump while running in the yard, and that defendant had picked him up by the hand and then got my chin. Defendant did not hurt Robert. Robert also said he had been jumping on a moving van. [34] Ten-year-old Michael H. testified that he called defendant Dad and that defendant treated the children with respect and was not mean. Defendant took them camping and fishing and to the fair. Defendant never hurt Michael, but spanked him if he sassed his mom. When he was arrested, defendant was making a guitar for Michael and teaching him how to play guitar. Michael said that he loved defendant and would feel sad if he were killed. [35] In rebuttal, Kern County Deputy Sheriff Michael Rascoe testified that on April 9, 1993, he went to Brenda H.'s house and spoke with Robert, who was about eight or nine years old at the time. Robert told Rascoe that he had been playing with some other children in the front yard, and they had been told to stay off of a van parked outside. Defendant emerged from the house, angry because he thought Robert had been playing on the van. Robert said that defendant grabbed him by the hair, shook him and pushed him backwards to the ground. Rascoe examined Robert but found no injuries, although Robert said his neck hurt. Over defendant's objection, Rascoe further testified that he also spoke with Michael H., who said that defendant had grabbed Robert by the hair, picked him up off the ground, and thrown him backward causing Robert to fall on his back. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Deputy Rascoe's testimony recounting Michael H.'s hearsay statement. He asserts the statement was not admissible under the hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements because it was not inconsistent with any part of Michael's trial testimony. [36] As previously explained, under Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770, a hearsay statement of a witness that is inconsistent with his or her trial testimony is admissible to establish the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1219.) A statement is inconsistent for this purpose if it has `a tendency to contradict or disprove the [witness's trial] testimony or any inference to be deduced from it.' ( People v. Spencer (1969) 71 Cal.2d 933, 942 [80 Cal.Rptr. 99, 458 P.2d 43].) Further, `[i]nconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in express terms, is the test for admitting a witness'[s] prior statement....' ( People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1008 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 299, 189 P.3d 300].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion (see People v. Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1007-1008) in admitting the evidence. The trial court reasonably could have concluded that Michael's statement to Rascoe that defendant had grabbed Robert by the hair, lifted him off the ground, and thrown him backward was inconsistent with Michael's trial testimony that defendant was kind and not mean and treated all of us kids with respect. A reasonable inference arising from Michael's testimony was that defendant did not mistreat the children. His statement to Rascoe tended to contradict or disprove that broad assertion by showing that defendant had mistreated Robert on at least one occasion. Although Michael was not asked, and did not testify, about the incident on April 9, 1993, or about defendant's treatment of Robert in particular, it is enough that Michael's statement to Rascoe served to dispel the broad inference from Michael's testimony that defendant was kind and respectful and not mean to the children. Defendant contends nonetheless that the admission of Michael's hearsay statement violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Assuming this claim is preserved for review (see People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 433-439; People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 117), it lacks merit. As explained, the confrontation clause does not prohibit the admission into evidence of testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant if the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial. ( Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59 & fn. 9.) Here, Michael could have been recalled and cross-examined about his statement to Deputy Rascoe. Moreover, even assuming error, it was harmless under either the state reasonable possibility standard for penalty phase error (see People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 446-448), or the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard for federal constitutional error (see Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24). Michael H.'s statement to Rascoe was largely cumulative of Robert's statement, and because Robert was the alleged victim, the jury likely assigned more weight to his statement than to Michael's. Furthermore, although the defense disputed Abney's account of the incident, Brenda H.'s testimony revealed that she did not actually see the alleged abuse, and the jury may have been skeptical of Robert's exculpatory testimony, given his relationship to defendant. Although we cannot know whether any juror or jurors concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had abused Robert, we find no realistic possibility that any juror would have been less inclined to do so absent Rascoe's testimony about Michael's statement. Furthermore, even if the jurors did not believe defendant had abused Robert, the aggravating evidenceincluding the brutal nature of the Merck murders and the undisputed evidence of defendant's burglary of Foster's home and robbery of Foster and Cruzwas still strong in comparison with the mitigating evidence. For all of these reasons, there is no reasonable possibility of a different result absent the admission of Michael H.'s statement to Rascoe, and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.