Opinion ID: 1782680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the conduct here amounts to a transfer within the statute.

Text: ¶ 10. Meek was indicted for transferring the marijuana to Hemby when he handed the shaving kit containing the marijuana through the car window following the accident. The trial court concluded that to transfer means to pass from one hand to the other. Meek argues that his actions did not amount to a transfer within the meaning of the relevant statute. We disagree. ¶ 11. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139 (Supp.2001) provides in part: (a) Except as authorized by this article, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To sell, barter, transfer, manufacture, distribute, dispense or possess with intent to sell, barter, transfer, manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled substance.... A definition of transfer is not statutorily provided. However, there are two words defined in the act that aid in the understanding of what transfer means. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-105 (Supp.2001) provides in part: (h) Deliver or delivery means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one (1) person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship.    ( l ) Distribute means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance. ¶ 12. These terms are virtually interchangeable. We have analyzed the broad language contained in these definitions as being intended to relieve the state of the task, oftentimes difficult if not impossible, of proving the consideration paid for the contraband, its intentions being to thwart the exchange or transfer of the substance whether accompanied by consideration or not. Wilkins v. State, 273 So.2d 177 (Miss.1973). As the Court of Appeals plurality explained, the definitions indicate that the exchange of consideration, the intent to place the contraband in commerce, and even the success of the transfer are irrelevant to a factual determination of transfer or delivery. (Slip op. at ¶ 22). ¶ 13. Meek argues that his actions did not constitute a transfer because he did not intend to place the contraband in commerce nor intend to distribute the substance for economic gain. However, we have held that distributing a controlled substance as defined in the statute includes transactions which are sales as well as transactions which may not be considered sales. Rogers v. State, 599 So.2d 930, 934 (Miss.1992). The intent of the deliver and transfer of narcotics statute is to thwart the exchange or transfer of the substance whether accompanied by consideration or not. Wilkins v. State, 273 So.2d 177 (Miss.1973). ¶ 14. A transfer is a change of possession from one person to another. See Commonwealth v. McCue, 338 Pa.Super. 117, 487 A.2d 880, 883 (1985). Also, a transfer is any act by which the holder of an object delivers it to another with the intent of passing whatever rights he has in the latter. See United States v. Nutter, 13 M.J. 803, 803-04 (A.F.C.M.R.1981). The word deliver has been defined by this Court to be the equivalent of the word transfer. Evans v. State, 460 So.2d 824, 828 (Miss.1984). In applying the term deliver to the facts of this case, it is clear from this term's definition that Meek actually, constructively, or attempted to transfer his bag from himself to Hemby, who was immediately aware that the shaving kit contained marijuana. The shaving kit clearly passed from Meek's hands to another's, while Meek had the requisite intent to get this item out of his possession. There is no logical conclusion other than that Meek knew what was in the shaving kit, and he intended to conceal it by getting it out of his hands into the hands of another. Hemby kicked it into the side of the road in order to make law enforcement officers aware of the contents being marijuana. ¶ 15. The Court of Appeals correctly held that to prove a transfer there is no need to show an intent to sell, as is necessary under an indictment for possession with intent to sell. (Slip op. at 9). We find that the only intent necessary is an intent to relinquish possession and control. The intent of the recipient is immaterial. All that is required is that Meek, the transferor, have knowledge of the character and presence of the controlled substance and that he intentionally transfer it to another with the intent to part with possession and control. That is exactly what occurred here. ¶ 16. Meek also argues that because Hemby never took the marijuana but immediately handed it back to Meek, the transfer was frustrated and never occurred. We have stated that [p]ossession, no matter how fleeting, is sufficient to sustain a conviction [for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver]. Berry v. State, 652 So.2d 745, 751 (Miss.1995). Likewise, the fact that the handling by Hemby was momentary should not be a factor in determining whether there was a transfer in fact.