Opinion ID: 166442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claim 5: Alleged Presumption in Malice Aforethought Instruction

Text: 67 Next, Mr. Patton challenges jury instruction 30, which concerns the intent necessary to establish first-degree murder under Oklahoma law. That instruction states that 68 [a] design to effect death is inferred from the fact of killing, unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed. 69 Rec. vol. III, at 537. The instruction mirrors the language of a state statute. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 702. 3 70 According to Mr. Patton, this instruction improperly relieved the prosecution of its burden of proving that he possessed the required intent. He contends that the instruction established a presumption that, because Mr. Patton killed Mrs. Kauer, he intended to do so. 71 In rejecting this argument, the OCCA considered the instructions as a whole and concluded that the jury was instructed on the elements of first degree murder, that each element must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, and that `malice aforethought' means `a deliberate intent to take away the life of a human being.' Patton, 973 P.2d at 289. The OCCA cited state court decisions rejecting the same improper presumption argument now raised by Mr. Patton. See id. (citing Davis v. State, 665 P.2d 1186, 1195 (Okla.Crim.App.1983) and Hall v. State, 635 P.2d 618, 620-21 (Okla.Crim.App.1981)). Those state court decisions apply the same principles as our federal precedent, requiring the trial court to instruct the jury that the prosecution must prove all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt and holding that the jury may not be allowed to presume the existence of any particular element. Compare Davis, 665 P.2d at 1195, and Hall, 635 P.2d at 620-21 with Wiley v. Rayl, 767 F.2d 679, 681 (10th Cir.1985). Accordingly, we view the OCCA's decision on this issue as an application of federal law. See Torres, 317 F.3d at 1151. Under the AEDPA, we must determine whether that application was unreasonable. Williams 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495. 72 Mr. Patton's challenge to this jury instruction is based upon the bedrock, axiomatic, and elementary principle that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which a defendant is charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). This principle, incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, bars a state from establishing through a jury instruction an evidentiary presumption that relieves the prosecution of proving the elements of the charged offense. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 312-13, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). 73 In analyzing this issue, we must determine whether the challenged instruction establishes a prohibited presumption or, in the alternative, merely allows a permissive inference. A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts. Id. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1965. Such a presumption violates the Due Process Clause if it relieves the state of its burden of persuasion on an element of the offense. Id. In contrast, a permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion. Id. Because the prosecution is still required to convince the jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred based upon the predicate facts proved, a permissive inference does not relieve the state of its burden of persuasion. Thus, a permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury. Id. at 314-15, 105 S.Ct. 1965. 74 We begin with the language of the challenged instruction. If the instruction could have been reasonably understood by the jury as creating an impermissible presumption, we consider the instructions as a whole. Id. at 315, 105 S.Ct. 1965. Other instructions [may] explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption. Id. 75 Applying these standards, the Supreme Court has found an impermissible mandatory presumption in a jury instruction stating that [t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 513, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). That instruction, the Court concluded, could have been read by the jury as relieving the prosecution of its burden of proving that the defendant purposefully or knowingly caused the death of the victim. A reasonable jury could have interpreted the presumption as conclusive—an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of facts triggering the presumption. Id. at 517, 99 S.Ct. 2450. Alternatively, the jury may have read the instruction as a directive to find intent, unless the defendant proved the contrary by some evidence, thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent. Id. 76 In Franklin, 471 U.S. at 313, 105 S.Ct. 1965, the Court struck down another instruction regarding the proof of intent in a malice murder prosecution. There, the challenged instruction stated that [t]he acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person's will, but the presumption may be rebutted. The Court reasoned that [the] statement that the presumption `may be rebutted' could have indicated to a reasonable juror that the defendant bore an affirmative burden of persuasion once the State proved the underlying act giving rise to the presumption. Id. at 318, 105 S.Ct. 1965. 77 This circuit has applied these principles to several similar instructions. For example, in Wiley, 767 F.2d at 681, the trial judge instructed the jury that [t]here is the presumption that a person intends all of the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts. As in Franklin, the trial judge added that [t]his presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true. Id. We concluded that this instruction violated the defendant's due process rights by establishing an improper presumption. The instruction effectively told [the jury] to presume a criminal intention by the defendant once the state has established that he acted voluntarily and inform[ed] the jury that the defendant may rebut the presumption by contrary evidence. Id. Even though other instructions informed the jury that the defendant was presumed innocent and that the state was required to prove intent, a reasonable juror still could have read the instructions as a whole as shifting the burden of persuasion. Id. 78 In contrast, in Davis v. Maynard, 869 F.2d 1401, 1405-06 (10th Cir.1989), vacated on other grounds by Saffle v. Davis, 494 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 1516, 108 L.Ed.2d 756 (1990), we considered a challenge to an instruction in a malice murder case stating that [a] design to effect death may be inferred from the fact of the killing when that killing is done by the use of a dangerous weapon in such a manner as naturally and probably to cause death unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such a design existed. We characterized this instruction as stating an entirely permissive inference. Under this instruction, we reasoned, the jury could properly find a `design to effect death' based upon the circumstances surrounding the killings. Id. However, the jury was equally free to reject the inference if it found that the predicate facts proved by the State did not justify the suggested conclusion. Thus, the burden of proof did not shift to [the defendant]. Id. 79 The instruction challenged by Mr. Patton differs from those at issue in Sandstrom, Franklin, Wiley, and Davis. Unlike the instructions struck down in the first three of those cases, the instruction before us contains language suggesting that the alleged presumption or inference—that the defendant had a design to effect death—is not applicable if the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed. Moreover, unlike the instructions struck down in Franklin and Wiley, the instruction challenged here does not contain language expressly indicating that the defendant has the burden of rebutting the presumption. See Franklin, 471 U.S. at 311 (stating that the presumption may be rebutted); Wiley, 767 F.2d at 681 (stating that [t]his presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true). 80 Nevertheless, the instruction here also differs from the one upheld in Davis as an entirely permissive inference or presumption. 869 F.2d at 1405. The Davis instruction informed the jury that a design to effect death may be inferred from the fact of the killing by the use of a dangerous weapon, id., while Mr. Patton's instruction states that [a] design to effect death is inferred from those circumstances. (emphasis in original) 81 The use of the phrase is inferred is troubling. Read in isolation, it suggests a mandatory presumption—that the jury is required to infer an intent to kill from the fact of the killing. As Mr. Patton notes, that concern is shared by the OCCA Committee for Preparation of Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions, which has warned that [t]he mandatory connotation of the language `is inferred' [in instructions based on OKLA STAT. TIT. 21 § 702] may prove confusing to jurors because it suggests a conclusion that the jury is required to draw where they find that the defendant killed the deceased, unless reasonable doubt is raised by the circumstances. Therefore, this language should be avoided. OKLAHOMA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL, § 4-63, at 149(2d ed.1996). 4 82 Nevertheless, although the Oklahoma Committee's advice is sound and should be heeded, we conclude for several reasons that this instruction did not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Patton intended to kill Mrs. Kauer. Most importantly, as we have noted, the crucial principle of reasonable doubt is incorporated into the instruction. Under instruction 30, a design to effect death is not inferred if the jury has a reasonable doubt about the existence of such design. 83 We acknowledge that, if instruction 30 indicated that it was Mr. Patton's burden to establish reasonable doubt, then the instruction might well create a constitutionally invalid presumption analogous to those struck down in Sandstrom, Franklin, and Wiley. However, the instruction is silent as to which party has the burden as to reasonable doubt. As a result, we must examine the instructions as a whole to determine whether a reasonable juror could have read instruction number 30 to create an invalid presumption. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 315, 105 S.Ct. 1965. 84 The other instructions given to the jury convince us that the OCCA's resolution of this issue was not unreasonable. As we have explained, Mr. Patton's defense focused on his contention that his cocaine intoxication prevented him from forming an intent to kill Mrs. Kauer. The jury was instructed that Mr. Patton was entitled to that defense if he was incapable of forming the specific criminal intent because [of] his intoxication, Rec. vol. III, at 530 (inst.23), and that: 85 [i]t is the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the specific criminal intent of the crimes of, Murder In the First Degree and Burglary In The First Degree in the information. If you find that the State has failed to sustain that burden, by reason of the defendant['s] intoxication, then the defendant must be found not guilty of that particular crime. 86 Id. at 531 (instr.24). 87 Moreover, other instructions also informed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court's general instruction on the presumption of innocence informed the jury that [t]he defendant must be found not guilty unless the State produces evidence which convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime. Id. at 512 (instr.5). The court's instruction on circumstantial evidence reminded the jury of that burden. See id. at 520 (instr.13) (stating that [i]n order to warrant conviction of a crime upon circumstantial evidence, each fact necessary to prove the guilt of the defendant must be established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt). Similarly, the instruction on the elements of first-degree murder stated that the prosecution was required to prove each element, including the element that the death was caused with malice aforethought, beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 533 (instr.26). Finally, the court's instruction on returning a verdict reminded the jury that [i]f you find that the State has failed to prove each element of Murder In The First Degree beyond a reasonable doubt, you shall return a verdict of not guilty. Id. at 548 (instr.41). 88 These instructions combined with the reasonable doubt limitation incorporated into instruction 30 itself, convince us that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting Mr. Patton's due process claim. We agree with the OCCA Committee for Preparation of Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions that the statement that design to effect death is inferred from the fact of killing presents the risk that a jury might discern a mandatory presumption of intent. However instruction 30's own reasonable doubt limitation, and the other instructions concerning the proof of intent, adequately clarify that the burden remained with the prosecution to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 The instructions struck down in Sandstrom, Franklin, and Wiley differ significantly from the one at issue here in that they do not incorporate the concept of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Mr. Patton is not entitled to relief on this claim.