Opinion ID: 2271216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Faretta Hearing Considerations.

Text: Because we reverse on other grounds, we decline to resolve whether, as St. Clair argues, the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Faretta [26] hearing while at the same time effectively allowing St. Clair to act as co-counsel. We gather from the record that there was confusion at times concerning the role that St. Clair wished for himself and his attorneys to play. At one point, he asked the trial court to designate him as lead counsel and referred to himself as pro se lead counsel in pleadings submitted to the trial court. He later withdrew the motion to be designated lead counsel. But despite his stating to the trial court that he wished to continue to be represented at trial by appointed counsel, St. Clair continued to file what he termed pro se motions. And St. Clair was even allowed to argue some pro se motions to the trial court, although he never questioned witnesses or made arguments to the jury. In response to the Commonwealth's inquiries about whether St. Clair might wish to proceed pro se or with hybrid representation, St. Clair stated that he did not want to represent himself and that he wished to remain represented by counsel. But he apparently never directly stated whether or not he desired hybrid representation, which would entail his making a limited waiver of counsel and accepting representation only as to certain matters in the case. [27] Whether St. Clair chooses to elect hybrid representation can be more clearly ascertained by the trial court upon remand. In any event, upon remand, we would remind the trial court and the parties that should St. Clair make an unequivocal request to proceed pro se or with hybrid representationin other words, to make either a full or a limited waiver of his right to counselunder our precedent, a Faretta hearing is required.