Opinion ID: 1951964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: schedule a sample media publicity

Text: STEIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. The majority opinion accurately describes the judiciary's responsibility to guarantee a fair trial despite the exercise by the press of its constitutional right to circulate inherently prejudicial publicity before and during a trial. In an ideal world a free press would seek to foster fair trial rights by not circulating inherently prejudicial publicity at least during a time of trial. If this cannot be so, courts must guarantee the preservation of fair trial rights without any restraint of the editorial freedom of the press. [ Ante at 147, 716 A. 2d at 470-71 (citation omitted).] I fully agree with Justice Handler's conclusion that the trial court's refusal to take adequate preventative measures to address the prejudicial effects of the midtrial publicity compromised defendant's right to a fair trial. In my view, however, the prejudicial effect of the trial court's inaction undermined only the penalty phase of the trial. I therefore join part IC of Justice Handler's opinion, but only to the extent that it concludes that defendant's death sentence be vacated. Accordingly, I would vacate defendant's death sentence and remand for a new penalty trial. I join the majority opinion in all other respects, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with my conclusion concerning defendant's death sentence. HANDLER, J., dissenting. In an atmosphere of saturating, vicious publicity, a Burlington County jury convicted defendant Ambrose Harris in Mercer County for the carjacking, kidnapping, rape, and murder of Kristin Huggins. The same jury sentenced him to die. At trial defendant actively contested his guilt, particularly his status as triggerman and, hence, his eligibility for the death sentence. Defendant directly appeals as of right his convictions. The primary issue that defendant raises in this appeal relates to the massive, inflammatory pretrial and midtrial publicity about the case and its impact on his trial, his conviction, and his death sentence. Defendant also raises substantial claims concerning the adequacy of the jury voir dire as related to jury selection and jury taint, the failure to bifurcate the jury for the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, the trial court's failure in the penalty-phase of the trial to exclude or neutralize inadmissible evidence introduced at the guilt phase, and the failure to inform the jury that in the event defendant were not sentenced to die, he would receive lengthy consecutive sentences for the robbery, kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault convictions. I conclude that defendant's principal claims of error are valid and that their prejudicial impacts thwarted a fair trial. The Court should reverse defendant's convictions and vacate his death sentence. I, therefore, dissent.