Opinion ID: 173907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Branin's Counterclaims

Text: Branin asserted four counterclaims in the district court: breach of contract with respect to his position at Bessemer, breach of contract as to his bonus, quantum meruit, and promissory estoppel based on the sale of the business and his offer of employment by Bessemer. On appeal, Branin alleges error only with respect to the district court's grant of summary judgment on his breach of contract claims. The quantum meruit and promissory estoppel arguments are therefore waived. See Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir.1998). And we find no error in the district court's rejection of Branin's remaining breach of contract claims.
Exhibit D to the Purchase Agreement sets out the criteria by which Branin's cash bonus was to be determined. Specifically, that exhibit provides that while Branin is eligible for participation in the Incentive Cash Bonus Plan[, t]he amount of the bonus is at the discretion of the Salary Committee, and at this time has a range of 0% to 250% of base pay. Purchase Agreement, Ex. D, at 1. Branin alleges that at the end of 2001, the other former Brundage principals received bonuses amounting to between ninety-two and more than one-hundred percent of the maximum bonuses provided for in Exhibit D to the Purchase Agreement. He asserts that he received instead only twenty percent of his potential bonus (slightly more than fifty percent of his base salary). He alleges that this constitutes a breach of Exhibit D. The district court rejected this claim on the ground that the same agreement expressly allows for a discretionary bonus range between 0% and 250% of his salary, Bessemer II, 498 F.Supp.2d at 638, and Branin's bonus, at more than fifty percent of his salary, was within this range, id. Branin concedes that under New York law the insertion of the word discretion into a bonus arrangement signals the end to any possible challenge to a bonus determination, Appellant's Br. at 60, but argues that the allowance for discretion does not settle the matter here. He asserts that the Purchase Agreement included a detailed written bonus plan incorporating explicit objective criteria and procedures. Id. Branin provides no persuasive authority to support his theory. In Valentine v. Carlisle Leasing Int'l Co., No. 97 Civ. 1406, 1998 WL 690877, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15581 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998), on which Branin relies as support for his argument, the court reached precisely the opposite result from that which Branin seeks here. The court considered an offer letter that clearly stated that the employer would retain absolute discretion to determine both whether [the plaintiff] would receive a bonus and, if so, how much he would receive. Id., 1998 WL 690877, at , 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15581, at . In light of this explicitly conferred discretion, the court held that the plaintiff had no right to have the bonus terms enforced. Id. To be sure, in reaching this conclusion, the Valentine court noted in dicta that the employee's letter conferring employment indicated only generally that [the employee's] entitlement to a bonus would depend on his performance and that of the company but did not set forth objective criteria on which [the employer] would base its decision. Id. Branin attempts to seize on this language in Valentine to argue that where, as here, objective criteria are present, the failure to provide a bonus that meets those criteria is actionable despite the fact that discretion to provide a bonus was explicitly reserved by the employer. But, Valentine does not stand for the proposition offered. The dicta relied on by Branin did nothing more than explain the many ways in which the employer reserved discretion for itself. Exhibit D to the Purchase Agreement that Branin seeks to enforce here expressly states that its terms do not and are not intended to create either an expressed or implied employment contract. Purchase Agreement, Ex. D at 2. Exhibit D expressly states that any bonus to be awarded is at the discretion of the Salary Committee. Id. We find no error in the district court's reading of these clauses as dispositive of Branin's claim: They reserve to the Salary Committee the decision to award or not to award a bonus, and in what amount.
The Purchase Agreement required that Branin be given a position at Bessemer generally comparable to his former position at Brundage. Purchase Agreement, § 7.01(vii). The parties agreed upon what that position would be, the title of Managing Director, the base salary and bonus range, the terms of vacation time, and the form and scope of other benefits. Branin does not dispute that he received all that was agreed upon in this respect. Branin nonetheless continued to argue to the district court, and continues to argue here, that he suffered diminished responsibilities, exclusion from meetings, and effective demotion throughout his time at Bessemer. Bessemer II, 498 F.Supp.2d at 635. Because of these alleged diminished responsibilities, Branin maintains that questions of fact exist as to whether there was a material diminution in Mr. Branin's duties and responsibilities subsequent to the closing. Appellant's Br. at 63. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that even had Branin suffered the demotion and other grievances he alleges, Bessemer would not have breached any term of the Purchase Agreement or offer letter by doing so. Bessemer II, 498 F.Supp.2d at 635-36. We agree. Branin characterizes the Purchase Agreement's requirement that he be provided with a role that was generally comparable to the role he had at Brundage as a commitment that so long as Mr. Branin remained in Bessemer's employ, he would function in a comparable position with commensurate authority. Appellant's Br. at 64. But that is not what the contract says. Rather, the contract provides as a condition precedent to closing that the Brundage principals, Branin among them, accept in writing the terms of employment offered by Bessemer for a generally comparable position prior to the closing date. There is no allegation that this condition was not fulfilled. And Branin seems to concede as much in his admission that his employment at Bessemer was not subject to a definite duration. Id. Branin was thus essentially an at-will employee whose duties were subject to change or termination based on the needs and desires of his employer. Cf., e.g., Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1294-95 (2d Cir.1996) (noting that, with limited exceptions not relevant here, under New York law, an employee serving purely at will, by definition, has no contractual right to avoid dismissal). If he could be dismissed at will by Bessemer, it seems to us, the lesser action of changing his role at the firm, subject of course to his choosing to depart at his option instead, was permissible too.