Opinion ID: 222750
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arkansas's Regulatory Interests

Text: Because we conclude that the burdens Arkansas imposes on the Green Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights are not severe, Arkansas's asserted regulatory interests need only be `sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation' imposed on the party's rights. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364 (quoting Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-289, 112 S.Ct. 698); see also Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 458, 128 S.Ct. 1184 (Because we have concluded that [the state law at issue] does not severely burden respondents, the State need not assert a compelling interest.); Clingman, 544 U.S. at 593, 125 S.Ct. 2029 (When a state electoral provision places no heavy burden on associational rights, `a State's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.' (quoting Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364)). Accordingly, we have repeatedly upheld reasonable, politically neutral regulations that have the effect of channeling expressive activity at the polls. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 452, 128 S.Ct. 1184 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992)). Arkansas identifies its goals of preventing ballot overcrowding, frivolous candidacies, and voter confusion as important regulatory interests that justify § 7-1-101(21)(C)'s decertification requirement in light of Arkansas's entire ballot access scheme. The Green Party responds that no evidence exists that Arkansas currently suffers from voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or frivolous candidacies, and thus the current ballot access scheme is unnecessary to maintain Arkansas's electoral integrity. However, the dictates of the Supreme Court have never required a State to make a particularized showing of the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies prior to the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access. Munro, 479 U.S. at 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533. Arkansas is not compelled to provide empirical evidence attempting to establish what may happen absent the disqualification provision found in § 7-1-101(21)(C). See id. at 195, 107 S.Ct. 533. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Munro, to require Arkansas to provide such empirical evidence by prov[ing] actual voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies as a predicate to the imposition of reasonable ballot access restrictions would invariably lead to endless court battles over the sufficiency of the `evidence' marshaled by a State to prove the predicate. Id. Arkansas need not allow itself to be harmed by such ills before enacting appropriate measures to prevent harm. See id. at 195-96, 107 S.Ct. 533 (Legislatures, we think, should be permitted to respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and does not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights.). Weighed against the burdens placed upon the Green Party, the regulatory interests of Arkansas are significant. We agree with Arkansas that § 7-1-101(21)(C) furthers Arkansas's interest in the stability of its political system, Storer, 415 U.S. at 736, 94 S.Ct. 1274, by preventing ballot overcrowding, frivolous candidacies, and voter confusion by ensuring that each political party given full access to the ballot maintains a modicum of support in each election cycle. Arkansas need not, as the Green Party advocates, provide automatic ballot access to any putative party that secures three percent or more of the vote in any statewide race. It is not unfair for Arkansas to tie the test for a political party's support to the races for governor and presidential electors, traditionally the two races in Arkansas that have garnered the most overall votes, thus furthering Arkansas's interests by providing the broadest basis on which to test a party's support. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983) (We have recognized that, `as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.' (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274)). This conclusion gains additional support in that far more burdensome ballot access schemes have been approved by the Supreme Court and the First, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits. See Jenness, 403 U.S. at 433, 91 S.Ct. 1970 (upholding Georgia ballot access laws that defined a political party as [a]ny political organization whose candidate received 20% or more of the vote at the most recent gubernatorial or presidential election, and required candidates who were not members of a defined political party to submit a nominating petition signed by a number of electors of not less than five per cent. [sic] of the total number of electors eligible to vote in the last election for the filling of the office the candidate is seeking); McLaughlin v. N.C. Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1219 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1104, 116 S.Ct. 1320, 134 L.Ed.2d 472 (1996) (upholding North Carolina ballot access scheme that decertified political parties that failed to poll 10% of the votes cast in election for governor or president, and provided opportunity for party to regain its right to nominate candidates as a new party by submitting petitions signed by registered voters numbering at least 2% of the total number of votes cast in the prior general gubernatorial election) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-97 (West)); Libertarian Party of Maine v. Diamond, 992 F.2d 365, 367 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 917, 114 S.Ct. 310, 126 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993) (upholding Maine law that allowed a group of voters to qualify as a new political party and secure ballot access by filing a petition signed by voters numbering at least 5% of the votes cast in the preceding gubernatorial election or by organizing around a prior candidate for the office of Governor or President that received more than 5% of the total Maine vote cast and was not affiliated with a registered party (citing Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. Tit. 21, §§ 302-303)); Rainbow Coal. v. Okla. State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 741-42 & n. 3 (10th Cir.1988) (upholding Oklahoma law under which a political body could become a political party by filing petitions with the signatures of registered voters equal to at least five percent (5%) of the total votes cast in the last General Election either for Governor or for electors for President and Vice President, but would be decertified if the party's nominee for Governor or its nominees for electors for President and Vice President fail to receive at least ten percent of the total votes cast in any general election (quotations omitted) (citing Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 26, § 1-108 (1983 & Supp. 1987), amended by 2011 Okla. Sess. Serv. Ch. 196)). In light of compelling Supreme Court precedent, the many alternative paths Arkansas provides to the ballot, and the Green Party's own success in achieving ballot access, we must conclude that while the burdens imposed on the Green Party's rights do exist, they are significantly outweighed by Arkansas's important regulatory interests.