Opinion ID: 2530425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Appearance of Impropriety Standard

Text: ¶ 35 John concedes in this court that he cannot establish actual prejudice. Moreover, he makes no argument that the probability of actual bias on the part of Judge Waldeck was too high to be constitutionally tolerable. He instead asks this court to formally recognize the lower appearance of impropriety standard to replace the prejudice standard noted above. He maintains that Illinois case law, including a decision from this court, holds that actual prejudice need not always be the basis for for-cause substitution. ¶ 36 John initially points to two decisions of the appellate court that he claims use the appearance of impropriety approach he advocates. The first, People v. Bradshaw, 171 Ill.App.3d 971, 121 Ill.Dec. 791, 525 N.E.2d 1098 (1988), concerned a criminal trial in which the trial judge had an ex parte communication with the mother of the victim. One of the defendants moved for substitution of the judge, and the motion was heard by a second judge. [5] The appellate court, relying on the Judicial Code's ex parte communication provisions and on Rule 17 of the Circuit Court of Cook County, held that the trial judge had an obligation to recuse himself whenever necessary to protect the right of an accused to a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 975, 121 Ill.Dec. 791, 525 N.E.2d 1098. The court specifically stated that there must be a concerned interest in ascertaining whether public impression will be favorable and the rights of an accused protected even though the judge is convinced of his own impartiality. Id. at 976, 121 Ill.Dec. 791, 525 N.E.2d 1098. ¶ 37 The problem with this analysis is that it fails to acknowledge that it was the second judge who, after a hearing, ruled specifically on the question of the trial judge's impartiality, not the trial judge himself. Indeed, the appellate court opinion interchanged the concepts of recusal and of substitution throughout its opinion, which indicates that the court construed the criminal substitution of judge statute (now codified at 725 ILCS 5/114-5, but not cited in the appellate court's opinion) in tandem with the Judicial Code. The court did this without citation to any legal authority. Bradshaw therefore does not completely answer the question of whether for-cause substitution includes the appearance of impropriety standard. ¶ 38 The second case, In re Marriage of Wheatley, 297 Ill.App.3d 854, 232 Ill.Dec. 196, 697 N.E.2d 938 (1998), did not even address substitution for cause so it is of limited help in this case. The issue there was an ex parte communication, this time made in the context of a divorce case in which the issue of child custody was contested. After the trial judge announced his ruling that custody was to be awarded to the wife, he disclosed that, just two days prior to the start of the trial, he had received a letter from someone purporting to be a retired United States congressman. The judge stated that he opened the letter and noticed that it was printed on the letterhead of a retired United States congressman and concerned a divorce case that was pending before him. The judge had not yet seen the file in the case and so he did not read the letter. He folded it up[,] replaced it in the envelope, and left it on his desk. Id. at 856, 232 Ill.Dec. 196, 697 N.E.2d 938. The judge stated he forgot about the letter until the day he rendered the decision. After preparing his order in the case, the judge rediscovered the letter. After reading the first line of the letter, the judge indicated to the parties that he folded the letter back up and did not read any further. Id. at 856, 232 Ill.Dec. 196, 697 N.E.2d 938. The judge insisted that he never read the letter and had no idea what it contained. The husband thereafter sought to vacate the judgment on the basis that the letter was an improper ex parte communication designed and intended by the sender to influence the court's decision. The motion further maintained that the judge had a duty to recuse himself so as to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. The trial court denied the motion. ¶ 39 The appellate court reversed, holding that it was not the mere receipt of the improper communication that creates the appearance of impropriety. The trial judge did not disclose the receipt of this improper communication but kept it in his office on his desk during the trial of the matter, during his deliberations on the case, and while drafting his judgment on the case. Id. at 858, 232 Ill.Dec. 196, 697 N.E.2d 938. Relying on Bradshaw, the court found it significant that the trial judge did not disclose the letter's existence to the parties until after the judgment was announced and that the sender of the letter (a former congressman) was the only person who advocated for the mother to be awarded custody. Id. Relevant for our discussion here, the case did not concern substitution for cause and did not cite to the provisions of the Judicial Code. As a result, Wheatley does not address the issue of whether a for-cause substitution includes the appearance of impropriety. ¶ 40 That brings us to Barth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 228 Ill.2d 163, 319 Ill.Dec. 852, 886 N.E.2d 976 (2008), a case in which John states that we recognized the use of the appearance of impropriety standard in the context of for-cause substitution of judge. A close reading of the case reveals that this court did no such thing. In Barth, the plaintiff filed a motion for substitution for cause under section 2-1003(a)(3) after the trial judge disclosed that he was insured by the defendant, State Farm. [6] The motion alleged that the economic relationship between the judge and State Farm created an appearance of impropriety. The trial judge referred the motion to another judge, and it was ultimately denied. Several months later, the trial judge filed an order to clarify that his prior referral of the motion for substitution was considered by him as a motion for recusal and that he intended to deny the motion by transferring it to a second judge. ¶ 41 In the appellate court, the plaintiff argued that the trial judge erred by not recusing himself because he had an ongoing economic relationship with State Farm as one of its insureds. The appellate court rejected the challenge for two reasons. First, the court noted that a different judge had heard the section 2-1001(a)(3) substitution motion and had denied it after a hearing. Barth v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 371 Ill.App.3d 498, 506, 311 Ill.Dec. 123, 867 N.E.2d 1109 (2007). However, because the transcript from the hearing was not a part of the record, and no bystander's report had been filed, the appellate court was unable to do more than summarily affirm the section 2-1001(a)(3) determination. Id. The appellate court then went on to consider the plaintiff's second contention, characterized by that court as appearing to be an argument that the original trial judge should have recused himself sua sponte under Supreme Court Rule 63(C)(1), which mandates disqualification where the judge has more than a de minimis economic interest in the proceedings. Id. In other words, the argument was whether the judge had an interest in the case based on his being an insured of the defendant. [7] The appellate court concluded the judge's economic interest was de minimis. Id. at 506-07, 311 Ill.Dec. 123, 867 N.E.2d 1109. ¶ 42 This court, reviewing the appellate court's conclusions, accepted the characterization of the motions as determined by both the trial court and the appellate court. Our opinion couched the issue as one of recusal. We acknowledged that the trial judge treated the motion for substitution as an independent motion to recuse and found no error in his decision to deny it. Barth, 228 Ill.2d at 175-76, 319 Ill.Dec. 852, 886 N.E.2d 976. We also summarily affirmed the second judge's denial of the plaintiff's for-cause motion. Id. at 176, 319 Ill.Dec. 852, 886 N.E.2d 976 (We cannot say    the motion judge erred by denying Barth's motion for substitution for cause.). Accordingly, Barth did not address, nor did the parties raise, any argument regarding the use of the Judicial Code's appearance of impropriety standard in for-cause substitution requests. ¶ 43 Addressing the issue squarely today, we reject John's invitation to replace the actual prejudice standard with the appearance of impropriety standard. To so hold would mean that the mere appearance of impropriety would be enough to force a judge's removal from a case. This is so because, as previously noted, Rule 63(C)(1)'s direction to judges to voluntarily recuse themselves where their impartiality might reasonably be questioned (Ill. S.Ct. R. 63(C)(1)) includes situations involving the appearance of impropriety. See, e.g., People v. Buck, 361 Ill.App.3d 923, 931, 297 Ill.Dec. 700, 838 N.E.2d 187 (2005); People v. McLain, 226 Ill.App.3d 892, 902, 168 Ill.Dec. 716, 589 N.E.2d 1116 (1992). This court has included that direction for recusal under the Code of Judicial Conduct, but as noted earlier, the General Assembly has never seen fit to include that lower, appearance of impropriety standard in providing for the substitution of a judge once a substantive ruling in a case has been made. [8] ¶ 44 Adopting John's position would doubtless mean more for-cause petitions arguing an appearance of impropriety, a much easier standard to meet than actual prejudice. An easier-to-meet standard would encourage the judge-shopping that our previous decisions carefully strove to avoid. And it is almost certain that judges in dissolution of marriage cases would see the greatest increase in judge-shopping since a cursory review of Illinois jurisprudence shows that, in civil cases, most for-cause substitution requests arise in divorce and custody cases. ¶ 45 Additionally, John's argument overlooks that recusal and substitution for cause are not the same thing. Kamelgard v. American College of Surgeons, 385 Ill. App.3d 675, 681, 324 Ill.Dec. 282, 895 N.E.2d 997 (2008); Deborah Goldberg, James Sample, & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 Washburn L.J. 503, 504 (2007). Whether a judge should recuse himself is a decision in Illinois that rests exclusively within the determination of the individual judge, pursuant to the canons of judicial ethics found in the Judicial Code. All judges in Illinois are expected to consider, sua sponte, whether recusal is warranted as a matter of ethics under the Judicial Code. The Judicial Code, which is a part of our rules, says nothing that would give the impression that its provisions could be used by a party or his lawyer as a means to force a judge to recuse himself, once the judge does not do so on his own. This point is, in fact, reinforced by the Preamble to the Judicial Code: the Judicial Code is designed to provide guidance to judges    and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies, and its purpose would be subverted if the Code were invoked by lawyers for mere tactical advantage. Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble. ¶ 46 On the other hand, substitution for cause petitions under the Code are brought by a party and are decided by another judge. The fact that a second judge will examine the for-cause allegations allows for an independent, neutral assessment of the allegations against the challenged judge that comports with due process concerns. This ensures that any substitution coming after a substantive ruling has been made is the result of a proven bias or high probability of the high risk for actual bias and is not a mere ploy for tactical advantage. Under the approach advocated by John, however, the second judge would also have to consider whether the appearance of impropriety warrants a for-cause substitution, a question that the Judicial Code assigns to a judge to decide on his or her own. Indeed, as noted earlier, the legislature, in section 2-1001(a)(1), has provided for only some of the Code's provisions to serve as a basis for substitution of judge in civil cases. ¶ 47 Finally, there is no need to engraft Rule 63(C)(3) standards onto section 2-1001(a)(3) in order to guard against a due process violation, as John maintains throughout his brief. The main reason why this is so is because John fails to put Caperton into perspective. The case did not involve the substitution of a trial judge. Rather, it concerned whether due process required that a state supreme court justice recuse himself from hearing an appeal involving a political backer who had contributed millions of dollars to that justice's election. As noted earlier, recusal and substitution for cause are not the same thing. One of the critical concerns in Caperton was that recusal motions are decided by the very person who is accused of bias. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2263 (acknowledging the need for adequate protections against a judge who simply misreads or misapprehends the real motives at work in deciding the case before him). The Court also explicitly stressed the need for due process protection in a case where the recusal question was raised on review, where there was no procedure for judicial factfinding and the sole trier of fact is the one accused of bias. Caperton, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2264. [9] These concerns are notably absent under the procedures established in the Code under section 2-1001(a)(3), which is applicable only to trial judges. Finally, the Court took great pains to stress that its decision was limited to an extraordinary situation where the Constitution requires recusal ( Caperton, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2265) in an exceptional case ( Caperton, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2263) comprised of extreme facts and thus [a]pplication of the constitutional standard implicated    will    be confined to rare instances. Caperton, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2267. ¶ 48 Caperton indicates that, at the least, an independent inquiry into a challenged judge or justice's refusal to recuse, complete with a procedure for judicial factfinding, may be necessary to satisfy due process. However, our legislature has provided for such an independent inquiry under section 2-1001(a)(3) of the Code given that a different judge rules on the petition after a hearing at which the challenged judge may testify. We note that Justice Karmeier, in his special concurrence, states that he is troubled    by the majority's implication that the availability of a neutral fact-finder under section 2-1001(a)(3) in some ways offsets the due process concerns highlighted in Caperton and that, if that is what we truly mean to say, we are mistaken. Infra ¶ 138 (Karmeier, J., specially concurring, joined by Kilbride, C.J.). Justice Karmeier's characterizations of our opinion are inaccurate, as we believe our opinion speaks for itself. We have acknowledged that recusal is constitutionally mandated under Caperton in instances where the facts reveal that there exists a high probability of the risk of actual bias on the part of the challenged judge and have alerted our trial judges to utilize Caperton's standard to guard against due process violations. Having done so, we need not adopt the standards contained in Rule 63(C)(1) for use in determining for-cause substitution petitions. ¶ 49 With respect to the petition for substitution for cause at issue here, Judge Starck correctly ruled that Judge Waldeck's substitution for cause was unwarranted. No prejudice or bias on the part of Judge Waldeck has been proven, and Judge Waldeck's participation does not offend any notions of due process contemplated in Caperton.