Opinion ID: 849259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: false communications

Text: When analyzing whether a judicial candidate has violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d), it is necessary that the communication be false. [6] Chmura I, supra at 541, 608 N.W.2d 31. However, before a judicial candidate's public communication is tested for falsity, the communication at issue must involve objectively factual matters. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). Speech that can reasonably be interpreted as communicating rhetorical hyperbole, parody, or vigorous epithet is constitutionally protected. Id. at 17, 110 S.Ct. 2695. Similarly, a statement of opinion is protected as long as the opinion does not contain a provably false factual connotation .... Id. at 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695. We are mindful that in protecting hyperbole, parody, epithet, and expressions of opinion, some judicial candidates may inevitably engage in vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. New York Times Co, supra at 270, 84 S.Ct. 710. As a result of these attacks, political speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable consequences. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 357, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995). Indeed, as is arguably true in the present case, even potentially misleading or distorting statements may be protected. [7] However, we believe that these rules are necessary in light of our profound national commitment to the principle that debate [by judicial candidates] on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... New York Times Co, supra at 270, 84 S.Ct. 710. [8] Once it has been determined that a communication contains objectively factual matters, those matters must then be tested to determine whether they are true or false. The concept of falsity was discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991). See also Milkovich, supra . The common law of libel takes but one approach to the question of falsity, regardless of the form of the communication.... It overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth. Masson, supra at 516, 111 S.Ct. 2419, citing Restatement Torts, 2d, § 563, at 163, comment C (1977); Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 111, at 776. As long as the substance, the gist, the sting of the communication is true, minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity. Masson, supra at 517, 111 S.Ct. 2419. In other words, the communication is not considered false unless it would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced. Id. This test has been commonly referred to as the substantial truth doctrine. Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek Michigan (After Remand), 440 Mich. 238, 260, 487 N.W.2d 205 (1992). This Court applied this doctrine in Rouch, asserting that the constitutional requirement for testing falsity mirrors Michigan's common law. Id. As the Court held, The common law has never required defendants to prove that a publication is literally and absolutely accurate in every minute detail. Id. at 258, 487 N.W.2d 205. The substantial truth doctrine has in substance, if not in name, been applied to cases in which the defendant gets the details or particulars correct but conveys a potentially false communication. See, e.g., Locricchio v. Evening News Ass'n, 438 Mich. 84, 123-127, 476 N.W.2d 112 (1991) (discussing defamation by implication); Hawkins v. Mercy Health Services, Inc, 230 Mich.App. 315, 583 N.W.2d 725 (1998); see also Prosser, Torts (5th ed), § 116, at 117 (1988 supp). However, we believe that because a judicial candidate's communication could be interpreted in numerous, nuanced ways, a great deal of uncertainty would arise as to the message conveyed. See, e.g., Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 67 F.3d 816, 822 (C.A.9, 1995) (discussing uncertainty that can arise regarding messages conveyed by broadcast media). This type of uncertainty would often make it difficult for judicial candidates to predict whether their communications would be encompassed within the proscriptions of Canon 7(B)(1)(d). Such uncertainty, as we have discussed earlier in this opinion, raises the spectre of a chilling effect on speech. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that in analyzing whether a judicial candidate has violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d), the public communication must be analyzed to determine whether the statements communicated are literally true. If so, the judicial candidate will not be in violation of Canon 7(B)(1)(d). However, if the communication conveys an inaccuracy, the communication as a whole must be analyzed to determine whether the the substance, the gist, the sting of the communication is true despite the inaccuracy. In other words, we must decide whether the communication is substantially true. If so, the judicial candidate will not be in violation of the canon. However, if the substance, the gist, the sting of the communication is false, then it can be said that the judicial candidate used or participated in the use of a false communication. Once this has been determined, the inquiry then turns to whether a judicial candidate's communication was made knowingly or with reckless disregard. Chmura I, supra at 544, 608 N.W.2d 31. If it was, the candidate has acted in violation of Canon 7(B)(1)(d).