Opinion ID: 76527
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Purpose and Drafters' Intent

Text: 104 We also do not share the Croll majority's concern that if a ne exeat clause alone conferred rights of custody upon a parent, a court could be compelled to return a child to a parent who lacks the right or responsibility to give care or to decide who should give it, or even to a parent with access who has been found unfit to have custody. Id. at 141. The custody order in Croll placed all burdens of care and custody on Mrs. Croll, and the Croll majority feared that an order returning Christina to Mr. Croll would effectively transfer custody of Christina to a parent with no corresponding duty to provide for her. Id. The Croll majority stressed that the Convention's goal is to enforce custody rights — not to alter them by ordering return of a child to a non-custodial parent. Id. On that basis, the majority concluded that a rule requiring return for violation of a ne exeat clause would make the Convention unworkable and could not accurately reflect the intent of the drafters. Id. at 140-41. 16 105 We are unpersuaded by this analysis as well. First, this feared result can be avoided by allowing a parent, such as Mrs. Croll, to return the child to her habitual residence as opposed to relinquishing the child to Mr. Croll for return. Once back in Hong Kong, Mrs. Croll then could petition the court there to remove the ne exeat restriction in the custody agreement. Accordingly, our construction of the ne exeat right does not alter the terms of the custody agreement. Rather, it simply would inconvenience Mrs. Croll as the custodial parent by requiring that she comply with its terms. The Convention's purpose is to prevent the international abduction of children and is thwarted, not satisfied, by the Croll majority's construction of the ne exeat right. 106 In any event, the particular fears expressed by the Croll majority — that a child could be returned to a parent with no duty or ability to care for the child — are missing from this case. Plaintiff Furnes has ongoing duties under § 30 of the Children Act, among others, to provide care and consideration to Jessica. Indeed, the Bergen City Court determined that Furnes was better able than Reeves to provide for and care for Jessica. The Croll majority's fears are at best unique to the particular facts in that case and not present here. 107 Further, the Hague Convention requires return of the child to a parent who possesses a single right of custody — even a joint right — that is violated by the child's removal. 17 The necessary implication of the Convention's terms is that a child may sometimes be returned to a parent who has not previously possessed primary physical custody. 18 We also note that the Convention provides an exception to the mandatory-return rule where return would be particularly damaging for any reason, including, presumably, the malfeasance or nonfeasance of the parent seeking return. See Convention, Art. 13(b). Article 13(b) provides that a court is not bound to order return of a child where there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 19 Id. Thus, the Croll majority's concern is already taken into account by Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention. There is no need to diminish the nature of the ne exeat right. 108