Opinion ID: 1057791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of the Right to Testify

Text: The Defendant contends that the waiver of his right to testify was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. He argues that in a capital sentencing hearing, the trial court has the obligation to inform defendants that if they limit their testimony on direct examination to mitigating circumstances, they cannot be questioned about the circumstances of the murder. See Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 266. In Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn.1999), we held that the right of the defendant to testify is fundamental and can only be waived in person and there must be evidence in the record demonstrating an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege by the Defendant. Id. at 161-62 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). After concluding that a silent record was not enough, we then outlined specific procedures for ensuring that a waiver is properly recorded. The defense should request and the trial judge should permit a hearing out of the presence of the jury to establish on the record that the defendant has personally made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. The trial court must determine that (1) the defendant has the right not to testify, and if the defendant does not testify, then the jury (or court) may not draw any inferences from the defendant's failure to testify; (2) the defendant has the right to testify and that if the defendant wishes to exercise that right, no one can prevent the defendant from testifying; (3) the defendant has consulted with his or her counsel in making the decision whether or not to testify; that the defendant has been advised of the advantages and disadvantages of testifying; and that the defendant has voluntarily and personally waived the right to testify. Id. at 162. The defense counsel should ask the defendant these questions and, under ordinary circumstances, the trial judge should play no role in this procedure. Id. We observed that this approach limits judicial interference, striking an appropriate balance between safeguarding a precious right and preserving the confidential relationship between an attorney and his client. Id. [4] This procedural requirement represents an effort to protect the fundamental right of the accused to testify in a criminal trial and to ensure that any waiver of that right was personal, knowing, and voluntary. . . . State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 304 (Tenn. 2007). The Defendant concedes that the trial court conducted a hearing out of the presence of the jury under the guise of Momon . During questioning by his counsel, the Defendant acknowledged that he had been informed of his right to testify in the sentencing hearing and that he had personally made the decision not to do so. In this appeal, however, he contends that his right to testify was not properly waived because his counsel did not inform him about the limits to cross-examination in capital cases. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 266. In Cazes , this Court held that a defendant does not waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by testifying to mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the murder. Id. The State conceded that Cazes should not have been subjected to cross-examination except as to the mitigating circumstances and this Court agreed. Id. at 264-266; see also Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968) (a defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives. . . .). Here, the Defendant contends that if his counsel had informed him of the Cazes ruling, he would have chosen to testify instead of insisting upon his right to remain silent. The discrete question presented is whether a defendant must be informed of his ability to testify to collateral mitigating factors in a death penalty sentencing hearing without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination. That is, must a defendant be informed of the ruling in Cazes as part of a Momon hearing in capital sentencing cases? We say no. Other jurisdictions have a similar colloquy requirement, for obtaining a valid waiver of the right to testify, as that found in Momon . See, e.g., LaVigne v. State, 812 P.2d 217, 222 (Alaska 1991); People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514-15 (Colo.1984); Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai'i 226, 900 P.2d 1293, 1303-04 (Haw.1995); State v. Neuman, 179 W.Va. 580, 371 S.E.2d 77, 81-82 (1988). However, the Defendant has not cited, and we have not found, a case from any other jurisdiction that requires a defendant to acknowledge his awareness of a limited cross-examination rule. Likewise, we are apprehensive to expand the Momon inquiry to include specifics of the advice given by defense counsel. The three general inquiries laid out in Momon are sufficient to ensure a personal waiver of the right to testify in a sentencing hearing. See People v. York, 897 P.2d 848, 851 (Colo.Ct.App.1994) (We are not aware of any authority indicating that the trial court is required to advise a defendant about every strategic consequence of testifying, or about the consequences of testifying to specific facts.) (emphasis omitted). In Momon , this Court specifically acknowledged the need to protect the relationship and confidences between defense counsel and his or her client. Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 162. The procedures are prophylactic measures which are not themselves constitutionally required. Id. at 163. Any additional procedural mandates must not cross the line of propriety. In our view, an expanded Momon proceeding, requiring a defendant and his counsel to place on the record the advantages and disadvantages of testifying in open court, would infringe upon the attorney-client privilege. In general, courts should guard against overreaching intrusions into the specifics of the defense strategy. The right is to the effective assistance of counsel. A corresponding admonishment is against too much judicial interference with the attorney-client relationship. Id. The record reflects that the Defendant, professing complete awareness of his right to testify, acknowledged that his decision not to do so was his personal desire. Rimmer II, 2006 WL 3731206, at . He also admitted that he had discussed his right to testify throughout the trial with his two attorneys and had made his choice by the time of his sentencing hearing: Yes, sir. I have made that decision. . . . The burden of proof is on the State, it is not on me, so therefore I am not going to take the stand. . . . The trial judge then confirmed that the decision was an individual one, to which the Defendant responded, [T]his is of my own free will and accord. These facts make the Defendant's case clearly distinguishable from the situation we addressed in Momon . In Momon , the defense counsel unilaterally decided that his client would not testify. He first informed Momon of that fact as they were entering the courtroom for trial. Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 163. There was no indication that counsel had spent any time explaining to Momon the advantages and disadvantages of testifying. Id. That was not the case here. The Defendant's only complaint is that his counsel did not explain on the record our ruling in Cazes , which recognized the right of a defendant to testify to mitigating factors without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination. That alone is not sufficient to prove that the Defendant's waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. That the Defendant acknowledged his awareness of the advantages and pitfalls of testifying is sufficient to satisfy Momon . Informing defendants of our ruling in Cazes may be a good practice for defense attorneys, but a communication of that nature falls within the attorney-client privilege. We are unwilling to hold that failure to explain this evidentiary rule on the record invalidates the waiver of the right to testify.