Opinion ID: 1846260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: WHETHER THE PROSECUTION VIOLATED BATSON v. KENTUCKY IN ITS STRIKING OF JURORS.

Text: ¶ 160. Kolberg tells us reversal is warranted here because the State gave pretextual reasons for striking black jurors and because the trial judge did not make on-the-record determinations that the State's Batson strikes are race neutral. ¶ 161. Realizing the importance of credibility and first-hand observation, this Court has adopted a standard of review for Batson claims that accords `great deference' to a trial judge's factual findings, reversing only where the finding of the lower court was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Kolberg I, 704 So.2d at 1312. The burden is on the defendant to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 1312-13. Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the prosecution must supply racially-neutral reasons. Id. at 1313. The degree of justification required does not rise to the level required for challenges for cause. Id. The defendant may then rebut the reasons offered by the prosecution. Id. ¶ 162. Kolberg's assignment of error relates to three individuals. The record reflects Kolberg did object to all three. The State offered race-neutral reasons for all three. With respect to juror Seaton, the State asserted it challenged her because she hid the fact during voir dire that her brother's son had been charged with a crime. The State asserted it knew for a fact that a relative had been charged with a crime because we have been arresting the Stamps for the 25 years I've been D.A. Accordingly, the State felt that she was intentionally keeping this information from them. With respect to juror Leonard, the State challenged her because she could not rely on circumstantial evidence in a criminal case and because she was nodding at defense counsel. Lastly, the State challenged juror Martin because he said that he thought that death was not an appropriate punishment in a child killing case, and it should be life. The State also asserted Martin kept from them the fact that he was close friends with a person who had been charged with multiple homicides. It was then up to Kolberg to rebut the reasons offered by the State, and his counsel attempted to do so. In the end, the trial judge accepted the State's reasons for exercising peremptory challenges on these jurors as being race-neutral reasons; however, Kolberg complains that the trial judge did not make sufficient on-the-record determinations that the State's Batson claims were sufficiently race-neutral. Kolberg cites Hatten v. State, 628 So.2d 294, 298 (Miss.1993), wherein we stated: [I]t [is] necessary that trial courts make an on-the-record, factual determination, of the merits of the reasons cited by the State for its use of peremptory challenges against potential jurors. Kolberg tells us the trial judge failed to do so in this case and reversal is warranted. The State responds by stating that the trial judge accomplished this task. We do not believe this Court has ever required an exhaustive finding by a trial court in this regard, only a finding. Only in one instance was there an actual factual dispute as to the grounds for the challenge, and the court resolved this by a specific finding. There simply is not a Batson violation. Hatten concluded with the admonition: in determining which explanations are sufficiently race-neutral and which are not, (the trial judge) should give an equally `clear and reasonably specific' explanation for his ruling. Id. at 299. ¶ 163. Moreover, this Court said in Hatten, We place our trust in the trial judges to determine whether or not a discriminatory motive underlies the prosecutor's articulated reasons. Id. at 299 citing Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1352 (Miss.1987). A review of the record reveals the totality of the responses given by these particular jurors during voir dire, the State's reasons for striking the jurors, Kolberg's responses to the State's reasons, and the trial judge's findings, which referenced the State's reasons. Keeping in mind the great deference we afford to trial judges concerning Batson claims, the trial judge's findings that sufficient race-neutral reasons had been offered by the State in striking these jurors were not clearly erroneous nor against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 164. Kolberg and the State both challenged the composition of the jury pool; however, the challenges were overruled. Kolberg now tells us that this is reversible error because the jury pool was not representative of the county. Notwithstanding this argument, this Court, in Simon v. State, 688 So.2d 791 (Miss.1997), stated: [I]n Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473 (Miss.1988) this Court outlined the elements necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement for an impartial jury: 1) the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; 2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 3) this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. Simon, 688 So.2d at 806 (citing Lanier, 533 So.2d at 477)(quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979)). ¶ 165. The State correctly argues that there was no establishment of a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, because there was no attempt to prove element number three of the Duren test. Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit.