Opinion ID: 2216325
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Heading: alford pleas in wisconsin

Text: [1] An Alford plea is a guilty plea in which the defendant pleads guilty while either maintaining his innocence or not admitting having committed the crime. The court of appeals held Alford pleas to be acceptable in State v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d 657, 661-63, 314 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1981). However, although this Court has cited North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), with approval, [2] the issue of the appropriateness of Alford pleas has never been directly presented to this Court. This case presents the question, and we now hold that the circuit courts of Wisconsin may, in their discretion, accept Alford pleas. Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered they can benefit all concerned. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978). The benefit created is a mutuality of advantage whereby both prosecutors and defendants have incentives to avoid trial. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). The defendant's motives are to limit his exposure to punishment or avoid the stress of trial and the State's motive is to avoid exhausting scarce resources. Id. A defendant may wish to plead guilty yet publicly maintain his innocence to avoid ridicule or embarrassment, such as where the charge is sexual assault of children. See State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 120-21, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990). Other times he might plead guilty while protesting his innocence because he does not think the jury will believe his claim of self-defense or accident. See People v. Wolff, 208 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Mich. 1973). Whether or not the defendant's motive can be ascertained by outside observers, the Alford plea gives the defendant a valuable option. Garcia's position would deny to a defendant who protests his innocence or does not admit having committed the crime the right to make a choice at the bargaining table. Instead, Garcia argues in effect that the State should not have allowed him this choice but should have insisted on proving him guilty [of the more serious offense]. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38-39. [2] The Alford plea is not inconsistent with this Court's decision in Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969), which held that there must be a factual basis for the charge in order for a circuit court to accept a guilty plea. Id. at 673, overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986). As the Court of Appeals explained in Johnson the plea is acceptable where the trial court determines that strong proof of guilt has been shown: We conclude that in Wisconsin a trial court can accept an Alford plea of guilty without violating the factual basis rule of Ernst v. State where, despite defendant's protestations of innocence, the trial court determines that the prosecutor's summary of the evidence the state would offer at trial is strong proof of guilt. Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d at 663. [3] Garcia also argues that Alford pleas are so inherently contradictory that they oftentimes confuse defendants to the extent that they do not understand they are entering a guilty plea. But, [d]efendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363. Competent counsel can easily explain the Alford plea. Moreover, defendants in Wisconsin are protected by procedural safeguards of sec. 971.08, Stats., [3] and by materials developed for the circuit courts by the Wisconsin Jury Instructions Committee specifically for Alford pleas. Wis. JICriminal SM-32A at 9-14 (1985). For example, circuit courts have a mandatory duty to personally determine on the record the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge. Section 971.08, Stats. Further, the Committee materials direct circuit judges to ask defense counsel on the record whether counsel has discussed the consequences of the plea with the defendant, and if so, whether the defendant has expressed his understanding of those consequences. Wis. JICriminal SM-32A at 12. [4] Garcia's next argument is that Alford pleas should be eliminated because they deny the public a moral foundation for the conviction. This same problem exists with the nolo contendere or no contest plea, which Garcia argues would be left as a valid alternative to an Alford plea if this Court were to find Alford pleas to be unacceptable. For the reason argued by Garcia, as well as others, both pleas are subject to the approval of the circuit court. The circuit court may reject the plea if it concludes that the plea is contrary to the public interest or the interests of justice. See Wis. JICriminal SM-32A at 8, 14. [5] Finally, Garcia argues that the Alford plea has been rejected in several other jurisdictions. [4] However, the far more common holding is that Alford pleas are acceptable where there is strong evidence of actual guilt and where the plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. [5] We conclude that where an adequate record of the strong proof of guilt behind the Alford plea has been made, Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d at 663, the procedural safeguards in sec. 971.08, Stats., with applicable review if the statute is not followed, are sufficient to assure that an Alford plea is entered in a constitutionally acceptable manner. [6] To facilitate the making of an adequate record, we encourage trial judges to use the Wisconsin Jury Instructions when accepting Alford pleas, however, the use of the Instructions is not mandatory.