Opinion ID: 772056
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court's interpretation of layer and interlayer

Text: 41 The trial court noted that the patentee did not set forth an explicit definition of layer in the patent, and thus the court sought to construe layer according to its ordinary meaning. To do so, the court selected the definition of the term layer appearing in Webster's Third New International Dictionary: one thickness, course, or fold laid or lying over another.... From the same dictionary, the trial court adopted the following definition of interlayer: a layer placed between other layers. The trial court appears to have retreated from adopting these definitions as a final claim construction, for it stated that these definitions were merely a starting point. The court went on to quote our statement that [i]ndiscriminate reliance on definitions found in dictionaries can often produce absurd results . . . . One need not arbitrarily pick and choose from the various accepted definitions of a word to decide which meaning was intended as the word is used in a given claim. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250, 48 USPQ2d 1117, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Nonetheless, the trial court offered no other construction for these disputed claim terms. It appears from the remainder of the court's order that it departed from the definitions set forth in the dictionary it quoted, but we cannot discern exactly what interpretation of layer and interlayer the court settled upon. It is critical for trial courts to set forth an express construction of the material claim terms in dispute, in part because the claim construction becomes the basis of the jury instructions, should the case go to trial. SeeIPPV Enters., LLC v. Echostar Communications Corp., 106 F. Supp.2d 595, 601 (D. Del. 2000). It is also the necessary foundation of meaningful appellate review. 42 This court has repeatedly cautioned against using non-scientific dictionaries for defining technical words. See Anderson v. Int'l Eng'g & Mfg., Inc., 160 F.3d 1345, 1348-49, 48 USPQ2d 1631, 1634 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ([D]ictionary definitions of ordinary words are rarely dispositive of their meanings in a technological context. A word describing patented technology takes its definition from the context in which it was used by the inventor.); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems., Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1580, 38 USPQ2d 1126, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ([A] general definition is secondary to the specific meaning of a technical term as it is used and understood in a particular technical field.). This case provides a good example of why definitions from general usage dictionaries may fail to provide satisfactory constructions of technical claim terms in dispute. 43 First, the dictionary definitions apparently adopted by the trial court erase the distinction set forth in the written description of the patent between layer and interlayer. The written description clearly states that interlayers have different physical attributes than layers, because, being relatively thin, they do not substantially affect the optical properties of the other layers. This statement in the written description, along with the remainder of the specification, provides the scientific and technical context for interpreting the meaning of the terms layer and interlayer. A trial court, when construing a term of art, must define the term in a manner consistent with the scientific and technical context in which it is used in the patent. Only when the context is unclear, or it appears that the term is not being used in a technical manner, should the trial court rely upon a general purpose dictionary for construing the term. In the present case, the dictionary definition adopted for the term interlayer (i.e., a layer placed between other layers) contradicts the meaning of the term interlayer as it is used in the technological context of the patent, as the dictionary definition does not account for the insignificant optical effect of the interlayers. 44 Second, the dictionary definitions adopted by the trial court are inconsistent with essentially undisputed testimony during the Markman hearing as to how persons of ordinary skill in the art would interpret the terms layer and interlayer. As described above, AFG presented deposition testimony of Mr. O'Shaughnessy during the Markmanhearing, who referred to a description of a Cardinal coating set forth in internal product literature. When asked whether the product also contained barrier layers in addition to the explicitly recited layers, O'Shaughnessy replied: Absolutely. We can't run this product without barrier layers. I mean, it just goes whacko. He continued, stating that because we can't run without [the barrier layer], we just always know it's there, so internally everybody just assumes the barrier is there. This testimony shows that a person of ordinary skill would understand that there is a substantive difference between layers and interlayers or barrier layers, and that the claim construction in this case should reflect this distinction. This distinction is highlighted in other testimony elicited from O'Shaughnessy noted above. 45 Arguably, the brevity of the description of interlayers set forth in the patent may have created some ambiguity as to whether the construction of the term layer should reflect a distinction between layers and interlayers. However, the testimony during the Markman hearing by persons of ordinary skill in the art, such as O'Shaughnessy, serves to clarify that this distinction is material, and that it should be reflected in the construction of the term layer. 46 The facts of this case are essentially the inverse of those we discussed inVitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 39 USPQ2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In Vitronics, the district court construed the claim term solder reflow temperature to mean liquidus temperature, based in part on testimony that persons of ordinary skill in the art would so define the claim term. On appeal, we determined that the patent specification established with reasonable clarity that the claim term solder reflow temperature should be defined to be the peak reflow temperature recited in the written description, rather than the liquidus temperature. In light of our conclusion that the patent specification itself had sufficiently defined the term solder reflow temperature, we ruled that the district court erred in relying upon expert testimony that contradicted the intrinsic evidence. Expert testimony, we stated, may not be used to vary or contradict the claim language. Id. at 1584, 39 USPQ2d at 1577. Whereas inVitronics, the expert testimony contradicted the meaning of solder reflow temperature set forth in the specification, in the present case, O'Shaughnessy's testimony explains, corroborates, and reinforces the distinction recited in the written description between layer and interlayer. 47 As we explained in Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1999), it is entirely appropriate, perhaps even preferable, for a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in the pertinent technical field. Moreover, we are reminded of the potential value of scientific testimony during claim construction hearings by the early statement of the Supreme Court that where the claims or specification contain technical terms or terms of art the court may hear the testimony of scientific witnesses to aid the court in coming to a correct conclusion. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S 516, 546 (1870). The Court continued, stating that the testimony of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of the meaning of disputed claim terms, and that it would undoubtedly be error in the court to reject the testimony. Id. 48 This case presents a good example of how extrinsic evidence can and should be used to inform a court's claim construction, and how failure to take into account the testimony of persons of ordinary skill in the art may constitute reversible error. O'Shaughnessy's essentially undisputed testimony appears to represent trustworthy and clearly expressed, plainly apposite evidence that persons of ordinary skill in the art do distinguish between layers and interlayers. Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1309, 51 USPQ2d at 1168. This testimony reinforces the distinction drawn in the written description of the '532 patent between these two terms. 49 We conclude that the trial court erred by adopting a claim construction that does not distinguish between layers and interlayers. The primary error in the trial court's claim construction is that it eliminates the distinction between these terms that is set forth in the written description of the patent itself. It is also significant that the court's claim construction failed to take into account the testimony of O'Shaughnessy and other witnesses at the Markman hearing that further reinforced the distinction between layers and interlayers. To the extent that the brief statement in the specification of the '532 patent may have been vague or ambiguous as to whether the claim term layer should be defined differently than interlayers, the trial court should have considered the testimony presented in the Markman hearing and set forth a definition of layer that distinguishes between layers and interlayers. 50