Opinion ID: 160854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rodriguez's Motion

Text: 13 Rodriguez argues the memorandum IBP filed on May 10, 1999, did not constitute a Rule 4(a)(4) motion and, accordingly, did not toll the time to appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (providing that time to file appeal runs from entry of order disposing of motion under Rules 50 and 59 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). He argues the district court treated IBP's memorandum as a post-trial motion in order to circumvent the clear language of Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (prohibiting an extension of time for taking action under Rules 50(b) and 59(b)). 14 This court has the authority to construe a motion for extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. See United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 733, 736 (1999). In determining whether to treat the motion as a notice of appeal, we examine whether the moving party intended to seek appellate review and whether it provided sufficient notice to the parties and courts. See id. at 735. It follows, by analogy, that the district court may treat IBP's Memorandum in Support of Its Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Its Alternative Motion for a New Trial as motions under Rules 50(b) and 59(b) if each accomplishes the same end as would a motion itself. 15 IBP's memorandum plainly indicates IBP's intent to file post-trial motions. Further, the memorandum complies with the requirements regarding the proper form of a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b). The memorandum renewed IBP's request for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, a new trial. See id. 50(b), 59(b). It specifies the judgment sought and articulates the law and facts on which IBP seeks relief. See id. 50(a)(2). It states with particularity the ground for IBP's motion and sets forth its requested relief. See id. 7(b). This court concludes the district court's treatment of IBP's memorandum of support as a timely filed motion for post-trial relief was proper. 16 Rodriguez further challenges this court's jurisdiction over IBP's appeal by claiming IBP failed to comply with the required contents of a memorandum under the local rules. See D. Kan. R. 7.6(a). He claims IBP's post-trial memorandum did not contain a statement of the nature of the matter before the court, a statement of the facts supported by references to the record, or a statement of the questions presented. Rodriguez does not indicate, however, how the district court abused its discretion in accepting IBP's memorandum despite its deficiencies under the local rules, nor does he indicate how a district court's misapplication of local rules deprives this court of appellate jurisdiction. This court will not make arguments for Rodriguez that he did not make himself. Cf. Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding this court need not consider a party's claim that is unsupported by legal argument and authority). Thus, Rodriguez's argument fails. 17 Because IBP's memorandum was filed within the time set forth in Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the time to file a notice of appeal was tolled. IBP's subsequent motion in the district court to extend the time to file an appeal and its subsequent appeal to this court were timely. Accordingly, Rodriguez's jurisdictional challenge is without merit.