Opinion ID: 4536379
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Coverup

Text: With the crisis growing undeniable, City and State officials attempted to cover it up. They lied to the public and to regulators, and they took no action to protect the people of Flint. Id. On February 26, 2015, Jennifer Crooks of the EPA followed up on a request from a Flint resident to test her water after she and her family became physically ill, developed rashes, and even experienced hair loss after drinking from the tap. Id. at 81, ¶ 240 (Page ID #17884); id. at 82–83, ¶ 244 (Page ID #17885–86). Crooks wrote to MDEQ and EPA officials that “the iron contamination was so high that the testing instrumentation could not measure it” and that the water tested for 104 parts per billion (“ppb”) of lead, well over the 15 ppb regulatory maximum. See id. at 82–83, ¶ 244 (Page ID #17885–86). Crooks further noted that, with two children under the age of three residing at the house, there were “[b]ig worries here.” Id. This prompted another EPA employee, Miguel Del Toral, to wonder whether the City of Flint was implementing optimized corrosion control, and whether the high lead levels were isolated to that one family’s neighborhood or were more widespread. See id. at 83, ¶ 245 (Page ID #17886). The EPA shared its concerns with the MDEQ. In response, MDEQ District Supervisor Stephen Busch lied and told Del Toral that the City was using corrosion control. Id. at 83, ¶ 246 (Page ID #17886). “Likewise, [City Utilities Administrator Daugherty] Johnson inhibited efforts by [GCHD] to obtain information about Flint’s water through the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).” Id. at 83–84, ¶ 248 (Page ID #17886–87). On January 27, 2015, GCHD requested water-testing information that would help it understand perceived water quality issues and the outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease. See id. A week later, Johnson responded that he had not received the FOIA request but would fulfill it as soon as possible. Id. Yet, “by March 2015, GCHD still had not received the information they requested by FOIA.” Id. The GCHD soon gathered that it was “being stonewalled.” Id. at 84, ¶ 250 (Page ID #17887). By March 2015, Governor Snyder and other State officials knew “that they had a massive public health emergency which probably included widespread lead poisoning on their hands and Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 13 began discussing distributing water filters to Flint water users.” Id. at 84, ¶ 249 (Page ID #17887). Nevertheless, “these public officials took no action to warn or otherwise protect Plaintiffs and the Class, and continued to conceal from them and the public the true nature, extent, and severity of the public health crisis.” Id. The Governor’s office’s talking points included false statements that the City was practicing corrosion control consistent with federal protocols and that Flint’s water was in compliance with federal lead and copper rules. Id. at 149–50, ¶ 419 (Page ID #17952–53). On March 10, 2015, the GCHD wrote to Croft, Prysby, Ambrose, the mayor, and other City officials that the threat of legionella was serious and tied to Flint River water. Id. at 138, ¶ 401 (Page ID #17941). The GCHD official noted that he had requested to meet with the water plant staff and MDEQ to discuss his concerns, but that the water plant staff did not respond and that the MDEQ declined. Id. On March 12, 2015, Shekter-Smith emailed MDEQ employees that, “[w]hile the change in source may have created water quality conditions that could provide additional organic nutrient source to support legionella growth, there is no evidence or confirmation of legionella coming directly from the Water Treatment Plant or in the community water supply distribution system at this time.” Id. at 85, ¶ 252 (Page ID #17888). The next day, Shekter-Smith approved a response from Busch to the GCHD that stated the following: • “conclusions that legionella is coming from the public water system without the presentations of any substantiating evidence from your epidemiologic investigations appears premature and prejudice toward that end; • “[i]t is highly unlikely that legionella would be present in treated water coming from the City of Flint water treatment plan[t] given the treatment plant’s use of ozone along with complete treatment and chlorine disinfect contact time to comply with federal surface water treatment rules for potable water;” and • “there is no direct correlation that can be made to the presence of legionella.” Id. at 85–86, ¶ 253 (Page ID #17888–89). “That same day, Wurfel wrote in an email to Snyder administration officials, ‘Political flank cover out of the City of Flint today regarding the spike in Legionnaire cases. . . . Also, area ministers put a shot over the bow last night . . . with a call for Snyder to declare a state of emergency there and somehow “fix” the water situation . . . .’” Id. at 86, ¶ 254 (Page ID #17889). Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 14 On March 25, 2015, the Flint City Council voted to re-connect to the DWSD. Id. at 86, ¶ 255 (Page ID #17889). Ambrose rejected their vote. Id. On April 24, 2015, MDEQ Water Treatment Specialist Patrick Cook admitted in an email to Miguel Del Toral of the EPA that “Flint is currently not practicing corrosion control at the [F]WTP.” Id. at 86–87, ¶ 257 (Page ID #17889–90). In the same email, however, Cook “misled the EPA regarding the necessity of using corrosion control in Flint after the switch,” id. at 83, ¶ 247 (Page ID #17886), touting distorted water quality test results that showed that the water was within the regulatory limit of 15 ppb for lead, R. 735-3 (Cook Email at 2) (Page ID #20343). On April 28, 2015, Governor Snyder’s chief of staff told Snyder and other staff members that “[t]he water issue continues to be a danger flag.” R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 87, ¶ 258) (Page ID #17890). On June 24, 2015, Del Toral released an EPA report (the “Del Toral Report”) warning of high lead levels in Flint water. Id. at 87, ¶ 259 (Page ID #17890). “On the following day, Del Toral wrote an internal email with respect to the elevated lead in Flint water at EPA stating: I understand that this is not a comfortable situation, but the State is complicit in this and the public has a right to know what they are doing because it is their children that are being harmed. Id. He “further warned that the failure to inform Flint water users of the elevated lead levels was ‘bordering on criminal neglect.’” Id. at 87, ¶ 260 (Page ID #17890). The Del Toral Report was shared with MDEQ officials Shekter-Smith, Cook, Busch, and Prysby. Id. at 87, ¶ 261 (Page ID #17890). State and City officials did nothing. Id. at 88, ¶ 262 (Page ID #17891). On July 9, 2015, City Utilities Administrator Michael Glasgow emailed MDEQ Water Quality Analyst Adam Rosenthal the following “Key Points” in all caps: 1) Flint has lots of lead pipe, no corrosion control treatment, and has had no legitimate LCR testing for at least a year. 2) Amongst low income infants, breast feeding rates are lower, and formula use is higher. Many Flint[] residents cannot afford to flush due to higher water rates. They cannot afford bottled water. This is an unprecedented situation and EPA needs to take this seriously. Now. Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 15 3) We have one child with an elevated blood lead already . . . In fact, that is the only reason we know about any of the above. 4) MDEQ is still publicly insisting Flint water has tested safe, is safe, and that [F]lint has no violations of any sort. Id. at 89, ¶ 267 (Page ID #17892). “On July 10, 2015, MDEQ [Director of Communications] Brad Wurfel, in an effort to conceal the public health crisis, appeared on public radio and advised listeners that Flint water was safe and that it was not causing ‘any broad problem’ with lead leaching into residential water.” Id. at 88, ¶ 265 (Page ID #17891). Wurfel knowingly lied and assured parents in particular that “anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking water can relax.” Id. On July 22, 2015, Governor Snyder’s Chief of Staff wrote to the Director of MDHHS that residents’ concerns were being “blown off” by the Defendants. Id. at 89, ¶ 268 (Page ID #17892). Around the same time, Snyder’s Director of Urban Initiatives spoke to Snyder directly and “advised him of the growing concerns among Flint residents that they were being exposed to toxic levels of lead.” Id. at 89, ¶ 269 (Page ID #17892). On July 24, 2015, Wurfel publicly stated that “residents of Flint do not need to worry about lead in their water supply, and DEQ’s recent sampling does not indicate an imminent health threat from lead or copper.” Id. at 89–90, ¶ 270 (Page ID #17892–93). But the sampling Wurfel referenced was “purposefully skewed . . . to minimize the crisis.” Id. at 90, ¶ 271 (Page ID #17893). Glasgow would later confess that the MDEQ altered water quality reports by removing the highest lead levels—“we threw out bottles everywhere just to collect as many as we can, just to hit our number.” Id.; see also id. at 91, ¶ 273 (Page ID #17894). Glasgow also “distort[ed] the City’s water test results by instructing residents to run their water—or ‘flush’ it—before testing, and fail[ed] to obtain water from certain houses.” Id. at 90–91, ¶ 272 (Page ID #17893–94). He claims that he skewed the samples at Busch’s and Prysby’s direction. Id. at 91, ¶ 273 (Page ID #17894). When a July 2015 water quality report was altered to exclude some high lead levels, Rosenthal forwarded it on. Id. Rosenthal was investigated for “willful participation in the Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 16 manipulation of lead testing results and falsely report[ing] that the 90th percentile of the results for lead water testing was below the federal action level.” Id. In August 2015, Professor Marc Edwards from Virginia Tech publicly announced that the City of Flint was experiencing a major public health emergency. Id. at 91, ¶ 274 (Page ID #17894). Wurfel countered his announcement by stating that Professor Edwards and his team “only just arrived in town and (have) quickly proven the theory they set out to prove, and while the state appreciates academic participation in this discussion, offering broad, dire public health advice based on some quick testing could be seen as fanning political flames irresponsibly.” Id. at 92, ¶ 275 (Page ID #17895). In the summer of 2015, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha published her own study to alert Flint residents to the dangers of drinking Flint River water. Id. at 93, ¶ 279 (Page ID #17896). Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s study showed a “spike in the percentage of Flint children with elevated blood lead levels from blood drawn in the second and third quarter of 2014.” Id. Although MDHHS had data of its own indicating a similar spike, id. at 92, ¶ 276 (Page ID #17895), Wurfel lied and stated on September 25, 2015, that “MDHHS officials have re-examined its blood lead level data and the MDHHS statistics do not show the same upward trend documented by Dr. HannaAttisha,” id. at 94, ¶ 283 (Page ID #17897). “On September 28, 2015, Wurfel stated publicly that the Flint water crisis was becoming ‘near-hysteria’ because of Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s report. He said that he wouldn’t call her reports ‘irresponsible. I would call them unfortunate.’ Wurfel finished his remarks that day by falsely stating that ‘Flint’s drinking water is safe in that it’s meeting state and federal standards.’” Id. at 94, ¶ 284 (Page ID #17897). Over a year into the crisis, on October 8, 2015, Governor Snyder finally ordered the City of Flint to reconnect with the DWSD. Id. at 95, ¶ 287 (Page ID #17898). The City made the switch on October 16, 2015. Id. at 95, ¶ 288 (Page ID #17898). On October 18, 2015, the Director of the MDEQ emailed Governor Snyder and admitted that failing to implement optimized corrosion control for an entire year while Flint residents were being poisoned was a mistake. Id. at 95–96, ¶ 290 (Page ID #17898–99). The Governor’s own task force on the crisis reported in March 2016 that the Governor’s office failed to act, or even to conduct a Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 17 comprehensive review of the water situation in Flint, in part because of cost. Id. at 150–51, ¶¶ 420–21 (Page ID #17953–54).