Opinion ID: 3036211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review the District Court’s failure to provide Soto with an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for abuse of discretion, and we conduct a de novo review of the District Court’s determination that Soto’s counsel was not ineffective. United States v. McCoy, 410 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 2005). Pursuant to Section 2255, the District Court “was required to grant an evidentiary hearing unless the record before it conclusively show[ed]” that Soto was not entitled to relief. Id. at 132 (internal quotation omitted). Under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to establish relief on his ineffective assistance claim, Soto must prove “(1) that his attorney’s performance was deficient, i.e., unreasonable under prevailing professional standards; and (2) that he was prejudiced by the attorney’s performance.” United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). The crux of Soto’s argument is that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the conspiracy count “because the count charged one single conspiracy, but evidence revealed multiple separate conspiracies.” Soto argues that the attempted robbery of the Loomis armored car “was separate from the master conspiracy alleging bank 4 robberies.” In fact, Soto’s trial counsel did argue that Count One reflected three separate conspiracies that should not have been grouped together. As such, Soto cannot demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this ground. Soto also argues in his petition that his trial counsel failed to challenge a variance between the indictment and the evidence produced at trial. He reiterates that the prosecution charged a single conspiracy whereas the proof adduced at trial showed multiple conspiracies. We agree with the District Court and the government that the evidence at trial supported a determination that there was only one, overarching conspiracy encompassing the bank robberies as well as the attempted armored car robbery. Reviewing the facts of this case, we find that no impermissible variance occurred. See United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1992). The evidence established a single, overarching conspiracy to obtain money by committing robberies and linked Soto to that scheme.2 The jury’s verdict, which resulted in an acquittal for Soto on the substantive bank robbery offenses and required consideration of each individual defendant’s liability for possession of a firearm as a felon, suggests that Soto was not prejudicially “tried en masse” for others’ offenses. 2 Soto suggests that, because he was acquitted of the bank robbery charges, there was “no evidence” that he had been involved in a conspiracy with respect to those robberies. To the extent that he is suggesting that his conviction on the conspiracy charge was inconsistent with his acquittal on the bank robbery charges, he is incorrect. The fact that Soto was acquitted of the substantive bank robbery offenses does not mean that he was not linked to the overall conspiracy, which was a distinct offense. 5 As such, we find no ineffectiveness of counsel based on the failure to challenge the alleged variance between the indictment and the evidence produced regarding the conspiracy. Accordingly, the District Court was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue.3 In his counseled brief, Soto also asserts that the District Court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his trial counsel’s failure to challenge the indictment as multiplicitous. “A multiplicious indictment charges the same offense in two or more counts and may lead to multiple sentences for a single violation, a result prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1992). The government argues that Soto did not present the multiplicity issue in his initial habeas petition and that the District Court did not consider the issue. We agree that Soto’s initial petition does not present this issue clearly, but he does argue that, due to counsel’s failure to object to the indictment, he “is subjected to be twice tried for the offense.” However, even if we apply the liberal pleading standards for pro se defendants to Soto’s habeas petition and construe it as presenting the multiplicity issue, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this issue. The charges included in Soto’s indictment reflect distinct statutory offenses. In addition, in 3 To the extent that Soto argues that there was an impermissible variance between the initial indictment and the superseding indictment, as the District Court noted, Soto has offered no explanation either of how they differ or how he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to challenge that difference. As such, we find no basis for concluding that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present this issue. 6 contrast to the substantive robbery offenses charged, conviction of conspiracy, as charged in Count One, requires proof of an agreement, but not proof of a completed or attempted robbery. We conclude that Soto’s indictment was not multiplicitous and that his counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the indictment on that ground. As a consequence, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in not conducting an evidentiary hearing on this issue.