Opinion ID: 2283054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hoskins Prerequisites

Text: This Court concludes that Appellant was not entitled to the writ because he has not satisfied either of the Hoskins prerequisites. Appellant has failed the first requirement of showing that there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise. Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 10. He argues that if the writ does not issue and the evidence turns out to be exculpatory, any conviction he might receive would be reversed on appeal, which would require retrial. Forcing this retrial on him, he argues, would produce the inept outcome criticized in Chamblee, 249 S.W.2d at 777, and Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 11. This argument, however, is based on an incorrect reading of both Chamblee and Hoskins. Avoiding the inept outcome was only used as a rationale for removing the no-remedy-by-appeal requirement from the class of jurisdictional writs. However, that requirement was kept for the second, or mere error, class of writs. See Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 239 S.W.3d 49, 53 (Ky.2007) (explaining in detail the distinction between the two classes and the test used for each). In fact, such allegedly inept outcomes are expressly allowed under the second class of writs because the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal is the one requirement that is set in stone and unavoidable. See Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801 (Our cases involving controversies in this second class, where it is alleged the lower court is acting or proceeding erroneously within its jurisdiction, have consistently (apparently without exception) required the petitioner to pass the first test; i.e., he must show he has no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise. (emphasis added)); id. (implying that requirement is an absolute prerequisite). Appellant argues that he nevertheless satisfies this requirement because an appeal would be inadequate to resolve his claim if the information he seeks would be merely helpful to his defense (and thus discoverable under RCr 7.24), rather than exculpatory. He argues that if he were forced to go to trial without this information and an appellate court found error in the trial court's failure to allow the discovery, it would likely be considered harmless. Thus, he claims, an appeal would be an inadequate tool to vindicate his right to the information. Yet, [w]e have consistently found the right of appeal to be an adequate remedy when the petition of a criminal defendant seeks only to correct procedural or trial errors. Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 19. If the information is merely helpful but not exculpatory, then the error would be exactly that: a procedural or trial error. That such an error might be found harmless does not render an appeal an inadequate remedy and is not grounds for granting a writ. And should the information actually turn out to be exculpatory, an appeal would adequately vindicate his constitutional right to the information. That Appellant has an adequate remedy by appeal is alone sufficient grounds to deny him the writ he seeks. However, this Court notes that he has also failed to show the second requirement that great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. Id. at 10. [1] Appellant argues that being forced to go through a trial without all of the available evidence is itself a great injustice. This might be the case if he could affirmatively show that the Commonwealth is withholding exculpatory evidence from him, but as the circuit court and Court of Appeals have explained, Appellant has not made such a showing. At most, he makes conclusory claims that the information might be useful to his defense or might be exculpatory without any explanation of how. This sort of raw speculation is woefully insufficient to show ruinous injury. Indeed, the lack of ruinous injury is clear because Appellant has other, more direct ways to get the information. Appellant does not have to get the information directly from New's sealed file or even through an order from the circuit judge in New's case. Instead, the informationif it is exculpatory or even material to his defensecan come directly from the Commonwealth, which has presumably retained copies (or perhaps the originals) of everything that was filed in New's case. The circuit court's seal order applies only to the court's file, not to the information or evidence (or copies of information or evidence) actually in the Commonwealth's possession. If any of that information is exculpatory, the Commonwealth, as noted by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, has a continuing duty to turn it over to Appellant. No court order is necessary. At this point, however, Appellant has not made a showing that the information might be exculpatory. Even if the information is merely material to the preparation of the defense, RCr 7.24(2), rather than exculpatory, Appellant can still get it directly from the Commonwealth. All he has to do is show the materiality of the information and that his request is reasonable. The first showing, materiality, should be relatively easy since the information in question appears to relate to a statement that Appellant himself made to police. Surely he has some knowledge of the contents of any such statement. The second showing, reasonableness of the request, should be similarly easy. A more targeted request would likely be considered reasonable. All Appellant has to do is make the necessary showings to the circuit judge in his case, rather than the one in New's case, and he would be entitled to the information he seeks. Consequently, denying Appellant's writ would not create great injustice and irreparable injury because he has other, more direct ways of getting any information that could be material to his defense.