Opinion ID: 1239182
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of the Jury Waiver

Text: Defendant contends that his jury waiver was invalid. We disagree.
The court accepted the waiver a few months before trial actually began. During the waiver proceeding, the prosecutor stated to defendant his understanding that it is your intention to waive the right to have a jury in this matter as to all phases of this case and proceed with the understanding that Judge Grignon, this department, would hear the case sitting alone as to all aspects. Defendant agreed that that was his intention. The prosecutor explained what a jury trial was and that the jury would have to agree unanimously on guilt, special circumstances, and penalty. He explained the charges, including the special circumstance allegations, and their significance, and that, if defendant waived a jury trial, the judge alone could find defendant guilty, find the special circumstances true, and impose the death penalty, with no need for anyone else to agree. He also explained the nature of a penalty trial. Defendant repeatedly said he understood. Defendant stated that no one had made any threats or promises to induce him to waive a jury. One time defendant requested and was given an opportunity to consult with his attorney. He then said he was waiving a jury as to all phases freely and voluntarily because he consider[ed] it to be the best available strategy and in [his] own best interests. Defense counsel stated that he and defendant had discussed the matter, and both agreed that the waiver was in defendant's best interests in terms of trial tactics. Defendant personally stated he agreed. When the court noted that defendant had hesitated slightly at one point, defendant reiterated his desire to waive a jury. He said he had had enough time to talk to his attorney and felt comfortable with his decision. The court accepted defendant's jury waiver, finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived a jury as to guilt, special circumstances, and penalty. Defense counsel and the prosecutor joined in the waiver. The prosecutor clarified one point about the nature of the penalty phase, and both defendant and defense counsel reiterated that defendant still wished to enter the waiver. The case was called for trial in April 1989. The court stated it had reviewed a transcript of defendant's jury waiver and wanted to discuss it further. The court explained that if, after a jury trial, the jurors returned a verdict of death, the court could still independently decide that death was not appropriate and impose a life sentence, but that with a court trial there won't be any different person deciding that issue for the second time. Defendant indicated he understood and still desired to waive a jury with respect to the penalty portion of the case. Defense counsel again joined. The court also explained that it would apply the same standards and law that the jury would have applied. Defendant indicated no one had suggested anything different.
A jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the defendant and the defendant's counsel. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; see People v. Ernst (1994) 8 Cal.4th 441, 445 [34 Cal. Rptr.2d 238, 881 P.2d 298].) (7) Here defendant and defense counsel expressly, knowingly, and voluntarily waived a jury trial as to all phases, and both parties consented. That being the case, the court was required to accept the waiver. ( People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 378 [85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961] [The judge does not have to give his consent to a nonjury trial, nor can he overrule the consent of the defendant and prosecutor.].) Defendant claims, Nothing in the record indicates that [he] was aware he could contest all elements of the capital charges, including intent to murder, despite his prior entry of the guilty plea to rape and attempted murder, and that the record does not even show that [he] was aware his pleas had been disclosed before he gave up his jury trial right.... However, nothing suggested he was not aware that he could contest all elements of the charge. He waived a jury trial, not a trial at all. He did receive a contested trial. Moreover, the prosecutor explained to defendant that, even in a court trial, he would have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to testify on his own behalf. The court's awareness of defendant's plea to the noncapital charges was not relevant to the validity of his jury waiver. In addition, defendant heard his attorney inform the court of the plea and gave no hint he wanted to change his mind despite ample opportunity to do so. Defendant also argues that he hesitated whether to waive a jury. The court gave defendant all the opportunity he desired to consult with his attorney. After this consultation, he waived a jury without hesitation. Defendant also argues that he neither agreed nor was aware that his guilty plea to the noncapital crimes would be used against him in the capital case. However, as explained ( post, pt. II.A.6.), that plea was not used against him. Defendant claims he never affirmatively stated that he desired to waive [a] jury.... The record shows otherwise. He also argues he did not personally offer any reasons for such a decision but his counsel made clear his own opinion that a jury waiver was `tactically ... the best thing to do.' The law, however, does not impose on the trial court an obligation to explore a defendant's reasons for giving up the right to a jury. ( People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 571 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171].) That the defendant discussed the decision with counsel and relied on counsel's advice strengthens, not weakens, the waiver's validity. ( Ibid. ) The advisement in this case was more detailed than the required minimum. ( People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1105 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020] [There is no constitutional requirement that appellant understand `all the ins and outs' of a jury trial in order to waive his right to one.]; People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 38 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109] [court need not inform [defendant] that it would automatically review any verdict of death returned by a jury].) The record shows that defendant understood he had a right to a jury trial as to guilt, special circumstances, and penalty, and that he voluntarily and knowingly waived that right as to each. The court properly accepted that waiver. ( People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 571.)