Opinion ID: 2979005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reduction of the Judgment Amount

Text: Tyson next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the submission of the punitive damages issue to the jury. Review of a district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law is de novo. Tinsdale v. Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 531 (6th Cir. 2005). We find no error. Title VII allows a jury to award punitive damages “if the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. In Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526 (1999), the Supreme Court held that “[t]he very structure of § 1981a suggests a congressional intent to authorize punitive awards in only a subset of cases involving intentional discrimination.” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534. The Court provided a three-part inquiry for determining whether punitive damages are proper under Title VII: First, the plaintiff must show that the individuals perpetrating the discrimination acted with malice or reckless disregard as to whether the plaintiff's federally protected rights were being violated. To meet this standard, those individuals must - 21 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its [sic] actions will violate federal law. Second, in order to impute liability to the employer, common[-]law rules of agency apply . . . . [T]he principal-employer is liable[] only if the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment . . . . Last, even if the plaintiff is successful in proving the first two inquiries, the defendant can nonetheless avoid liability for punitive damages if it can show that it engaged in good faith efforts to comply with Title VII. This modification of the common law agency rules is necessary in order to support and reward employers who are instituting one of the main goals of Title VII: prevention of work-place discrimination. With this in mind, courts interpreting this criteria since Kolstad have focused both on whether the defendant employer had a written sexual harassment policy and whether the employer effectively publicized and enforced its policy. Parker v. General Extrusions, Inc., 491 F.3d 596, 602-03 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536-46) (internal citations, brackets and ellipses omitted). Under the first prong of the analysis, “a plaintiff may demonstrate the requisite mental state by showing that the relevant individuals knew of or were familiar with the anti-discrimination laws and the employer’s practices for implementing those laws” or “by showing the defendant’s employees lied, either to the plaintiff or to the jury, in order to cover up their discriminatory actions.” Hall v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 337 F.3d 669, 675 (6th Cir. 2003). This analysis “does not require that an employer know for sure that it acted in violation of federal law in order to be liable for punitive damages under Title VII. Rather, Kolstad holds that punitive damages are warranted when the employer engages in conduct that carries with it a ‘perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law.’” EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 513 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536). “In general, courts have found this element met where the plaintiff shows the supervisors involved in the decision at issue had anti-discrimination training or - 22 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. even very general knowledge about anti-discrimination laws or an employer’s anti-discrimination policies.” Sackett v. ITC Deltacom, Inc., 374 F.Supp.2d 602, 612 (E.D. Tenn. 2005) (collecting cases). The district court found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that this prong was satisfied because the jury could have believed that Parks’ failure to report West’s complaint to HR was done in the face of a perceived risk that his inaction would violate federal law. We agree. There was ample evidence that both Parks and Guizar were aware of Tyson’s sexualharassment policy, yet both failed to conduct an investigation, as the policy requires, although both promised West they would do so. There was also evidence, such as Tyson’s claims in its report that it conducted an investigation immediately following West’s exit interview, indicating that Tyson may have attempted to mislead the EEOC in its response to the charge. And, given that competing accounts of various events were given during trial, and viewing the facts most favorably to West, the jury could have considered some of Tyson’s opposing accounts untruthful. See Sackett, 374 F.Supp.2d at 611 (“[D]iametrically opposed testimony from the parties’ witnesses provides support for the conclusion that the defendant’s employees were not truthful in their actions.” (citing Hall, 337 F.3d at 675)). We thus conclude that the district court properly submitted the issue to the jury, and the jury reasonably could have found the requisite mental state. Regarding the second prong, Tyson did not contest that Parks or Guizar were manageriallevel employees, and so we review the district court’s determination for plain error. Given that Parks - 23 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. was listed as a proper contact under Tyson’s policy,8 the district court cannot be said to have committed plain error in concluding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Parks was a managerial employee for purposes of awarding punitive damages. Even if both prongs are satisfied, however, an employer will not be subject to punitive damages if it can show good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. An employer will not be shielded simply by having an anti-discrimination policy. It must demonstrate that it engaged in good-faith efforts to implement that policy. Hall, 337 F.3d at 675. “While an employer’s institution of a written policy against discrimination may go a long way toward dispelling any claim about the employer’s reckless or malicious state of mind . . . such a policy is not automatically a bar to the imposition of punitive damages.” Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d at 514 (quoting Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 446 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal brackets omitted)). The trend among the Circuits is to “focus[] on the implementation, rather than the mere existence, of any antidiscrimination policy.” Sackett, 374 F.Supp.2d at 616. Here, although there was evidence that Tyson communicated its policy to its employees with some frequency, there was also substantial evidence that the policy was disregarded in its implementation and enforcement. There was evidence of widespread disregard of the policy by employees in engaging in harassment, by supervisors in not reporting to HR incidents of harassment or failing to conduct follow-up investigations, by co-workers in not reporting incidents of harassment, and by HR managers in not investigating reports of harassment. Further, the 8 Guizar, Penick and Walker’s positions were also listed by Tyson under the harassment policy’s “Notification Roster.” - 24 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. investigation, when it did take place, was, as the district court stated, “notably flawed.” Tyson’s complete failure to follow through, twice, on complaints of harassment by West, followed by a deficient investigation in response to the EEOC’s inquiry, does not fulfill “Title VII’s objective of motivating employers to detect and deter Title VII violations.” Kostad, 527 U.S. at 546. Therefore, the court properly submitted the question of Tyson’s good-faith efforts to the jury. We affirm the district court’s denial of Tyson’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law on the issue of punitive damages.

Tyson argues that there was insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, for the jury to find that West was constructively discharged, and that therefore the awards of front and back pay must be overturned. This Court reviews a district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law on the issue of constructive discharge de novo, “examining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict when reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” Moore v. Kuka Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir. 1999). A claim of constructive discharge requires a determination that “working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982). “To determine if there is a constructive discharge, both the employer’s intent and the employee’s objective feelings must be examined.” Logan v. Denny’s Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001). An employer’s intent can be shown if the employee quitting is a foreseeable consequence of the employer’s actions. - 25 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. Id. at 573. An employee who quits has “an obligation not to assume the worst, and not to jump to conclusions too fast.” Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 515 (6th Cir. 1991). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to West, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that West was constructively discharged. One factor that this Circuit has held to be relevant to the first prong of this analysis is whether the employer tolerated “badgering, harassment, or humiliation.” Logan, 259 F.3d at 569 (quoting Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000)). Further, “harassment so intolerable as to cause a resignation may be effected through coworker conduct.” Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004). As discussed supra, Tyson, through Parks, and possibly Penick, was aware of numerous incidents of harassment against West and failed to adequately address them. The jury could have reasonably found that this evidenced a deliberate choice to allow intolerable working conditions. See Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 1999) (“An employer is liable if it knew or should have known of the charged sexual harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.”). The analysis then turns to whether West’s leaving her employment due to the harassment was intentional or foreseeable. See Logan, 259 F.3d at 573 (equating employer intention with foreseeability) (citing Moore, 171 F.3d at 1080 (intention found where employment circumstances “would lead [an employee] to believe that he was no longer wanted.”)). Again, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that West’s resignation was foreseeable and even to be anticipated. It is foreseeable that, after weeks of continuous physical and verbal harassment that goes unaddressed, an employee in West’s position would choose to resign. Further, it cannot be said that West “assumed the worst” or “jumped to conclusions.” She waited beyond the two-week period - 26 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. from her initial complaint to Parks within which Tyson policy assured her an investigation would be completed, and an employee subject to continuous verbal and physical harassment is not “jumping to conclusions” when she resigns under those conditions.9
Tyson next claims that the front-pay award must be vacated because it is too speculative, arguing (1) West’s work history prior and subsequent to her employment at Tyson shows that she was unlikely to be a long-time employee there, (2) because the Tyson Robards plant had a high turnover rate, it is unlikely statistically that West would have stayed at Tyson eight years, and (3) because West was only 1.5 points shy of the 3.5 absentee point limit for the probationary period, exclusive of the points she amassed once she quit, she would likely not have stayed through the probationary period. “Front pay has been defined as an affirmative order designed to compensate the plaintiff for economic losses that have not occurred as of the date of the court decree, but that may occur as the plaintiff works toward his or her rightful place.” Shore v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 777 F.2d 1155, 1158 (6th Cir. 1985). “The back pay award is limited by the date judgment is entered in a case. Thus, without a front pay award or reinstatement, the plaintiff is uncompensated for the time between the date of judgment and the date the plaintiff attains the position he or she would have occupied but for the discrimination. Front pay is therefore simply compensation for the post-judgment effects of past discrimination.” Id. at 1158. “While the determination of the precise amount of an award of front 9 Tyson also makes a vague claim to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense discussed in Suders, 542 U.S. at 148-49. Tyson did not raise this defense in the district court and so waived it. - 27 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. pay is a jury question, the initial determination of the propriety of an award of front pay is a matter for the court.” Arban v. West Pub. Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 406 (6th Cir. 2003). A district court’s award of front pay damages is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Madden v. Chattanooga City Wide Serv. Dept., 549 F.3d 666, 679 (6th Cir. 2008). “Abuse of discretion is defined as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment. A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Betts v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 558 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Tompkin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 362 F.3d 882, 891 (6th Cir. 2004)). “[W]e have long held that ‘because future damages are often speculative, flexibility and wide discretion are especially important when a court's remedies for a Title VII violation include front pay.’” Shore, 42 F.3d at 378. Nevertheless, some basis must appear in the record for such an award. Shore, 777 F.2d at 1160. The jury awarded West front pay in the amount of $64,545, which the district court later reduced to its present value of $63,322.87. In the jury instructions, the district court capped the front pay award at five years. We find no error. West presented evidence of her attempts at mitigation through seeking and obtaining other jobs, and the suitability, availability and comparability of those jobs, including the pay and overtime differences. Further, the district court, in its ruling on Tyson’s argument, and in its initial decision to cap any front pay at five years, cited sufficient factual support and provided adequate reasons for allowing front pay. - 28 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. The only argument that the district court did not address, because Tyson raises it here for the first time, is that the turnover rate at the Tyson Robards plant supports its position that the front pay award was speculative. Even if Tyson had not forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below, it would be rebutted by the same evidence the district court looked to in deciding that West had a fair probability of surviving the probationary period, i.e., West’s testimony that the job was “ideal” because it gave her an opportunity to earn overtime and to alternate child care duties with her husband thereby avoiding child care costs, Penick’s testimony that West was a “good worker,” and Phillips’ testimony that once an employee survives the probationary period, Tyson is “probably going to have a career employee.” We therefore hold that the front pay award was not speculative and affirm the district court.
Tyson claims the district court erred by not remitting the compensatory damages award because: (a) it was greater than the amount requested by West and (b) was the result of prejudice and bias by the jury against Tyson for employing Hispanics. This court reviews a district court’s denial of remittitur under a highly deferential standard. We undertake a highly deferential review of the district court, which itself is sharply limited in its ability to remit a jury verdict. A jury verdict should not be remitted by a court unless it is beyond the maximum damages that the jury reasonably could find to be compensatory for a party's loss. Our remittitur standard favors maintaining the award, unless the award is (1) beyond the range supportable by proof or (2) so excessive as to shock the conscience, ... or (3) the result of a mistake. A trial court is within its discretion in remitting a verdict only when, after reviewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the awardee, it is convinced that the verdict is clearly excessive, resulted from passion, bias or prejudice; or is so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial conscience of the court. - 29 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 905 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Ardingo v. Local 951, United Food and Commercial Workers Union, No. 08-1078, 2009 WL 1528505 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The defendant's arguments in favor of remittitur do little more than emphasize the uncertain and speculative nature of [plaintiff]'s damages, a fact that is almost certainly present to some degree in any case where front pay damages are available. Those arguments simply do not overcome the high degree of deference that is owed to the trial court's ruling, and therefore, this court will not second guess the trial court's conclusion that the jury award is not shocking to the conscience.”). At trial, West requested that the jury award up to $500,000 in compensatory damages; the jury awarded $750,000—$500,000 in compensatory damages for West’s past emotional distress and $250,000 for her ongoing emotional distress. As it did in the district court, Tyson cites Denhof v. City of Grand Rapids, 494 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2007), in support of its position that an award of compensatory damages award beyond that requested by the plaintiff must be remitted. The district court held that “Denhof cannot be read as standing for the proposition Defendant advances, i.e., that an award above counsel’s request must be remitted.” We, too, find that Denhof does not control here. Although Denhof does provide some support for Tyson’s position, (“[p]resumably, the plaintiffs' attorneys requested the amount of damages they believed were supported by the evidence,” id. at 547), the amount requested by the attorneys is only one factor to be considered in assessing whether a jury verdict should be remitted on the basis that “it is beyond the maximum damages that the jury reasonably could find to be compensatory for a party’s loss.” Id. - 30 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. In Denhof, this Court affirmed the district court’s grant of remittitur. In concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the award, this Court noted that the jury’s award of $1 million to each plaintiff was in excess of the amount requested. The court did not hold that any award in excess of that requested by a plaintiff must be remitted. Further, in Denhof the Court observed that the plaintiff had presented no evidence of “long-lasting mental injuries,” while West did present evidence of on-going mental consequences of the harassment. See Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996) (A plaintiff is only required to present competent evidence that the defendant's unlawful actions caused emotional distress, and may do so through her own testimony.). Tyson also claims that the jury’s compensatory damages verdict was influenced by prejudice against Hispanics. While it is true that during the trial there was much mention of the ethnicity of some of West’s co-workers and harassers, it is pure conjecture to surmise that this affected the jury’s verdict, or that the jury was biased in any way. Tyson also argues that the compensatory damages award here is anomalous in the context of compensatory damage awards in other, “similar,” cases. “[A]n appellate court should not attempt to reconcile widely varied past awards for analogous injuries which in the abbreviated appellate discussion of them seem somewhat similar.” Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc., 915 F.2d 201, 211 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted); see also Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 905 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Endeavoring to compare awards is difficult and often unfruitful, because the factual circumstances of each case differ so widely and because it places reviewing courts in the position of making awkward assessments of pain and suffering better left to - 31 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. a jury.”). Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tyson’s motion for remittitur. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court. - 32 -