Opinion ID: 702372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Washington Law Against Discrimination

Text: 34 The Washington Law Against Discrimination provides that [i]t is an unfair practice for any employer ... [t]o discharge or bar any person from employment because of ... the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical handicap [now disability]. RCW 49.60.180. 6 The regulations accompanying the statute define those terms: 35 (a) A condition is a sensory, mental, or physical handicap if it is an abnormality and is a reason why the person having the condition did not get or keep the job in question.... In other words, for enforcement purposes a person will be considered to be handicapped by a sensory, mental, or physical condition if he or she is discriminated against because of the condition and the condition is abnormal. 36 (b) The presence of a sensory, mental, or physical handicap includes, but is not limited to, circumstances where a sensory, mental, or physical condition: 37 (i) Is medically cognizable or diagnosable; 38 (ii) Exists as a record or history; or 39 (iii) Is perceived to exist, whether or not it exists in fact. 40 WAC 162-22-040(1)(a), (b) (emphasis in original). The definition of handicap therefore requires factual findings of both (1) the presence of an abnormal condition, and (2) employer discrimination against the employee plaintiff because of that condition. Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash.2d 8, 846 P.2d 531, 536 (1993) (en banc) (emphasis in original). 41 In this case, the plaintiffs argue that they created a factual issue as to whether they were handicapped as defined by the Washington statute. They maintain that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Longview because the question whether they were handicapped must be determined by a jury. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cite Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wash.2d 903, 766 P.2d 1099, 1103 (1989) (en banc), in which the court stated that the inquiry under WAC 162-22-040(1)(a) as to whether a person is 'handicapped' [is] factual in nature and proper for submission to a jury. 42 The plaintiffs fail to acknowledge however that a trial court may decide a factual issue as a matter of law if there is only one conclusion that reasonable minds could reach. Michelsen v. Boeing Co., 63 Wash.App. 917, 826 P.2d 214, 216 (1991). Under Washington law, [a]lthough the question of whether a condition is a handicap is generally one for the jury, [the plaintiff] is still required to present credible evidence of that condition and that the handicap was the reason for the discharge. Simmerman v. U-Haul Co., 57 Wash.App. 682, 789 P.2d 763, 765 (1990). 43 Even assuming that the plaintiffs had a drug addiction problem and that it constituted an abnormal condition under the statute, the plaintiffs have not shown that they were discriminated against because of that condition. The plaintiffs admitted that they had engaged in drug-related misconduct at the workplace, and Longview maintained that their violation of company rules prohibiting such misconduct was the reason for their discharge. Therefore, the plaintiffs' discharge did not represent disability discrimination in violation of RCW 49.60.180. See Klein v. Boeing Co., 847 F.Supp. 838, 843 (W.D.Wash.1994) (plaintiff's claim under RCW 49.60.180 must fail as a matter of law because whether or not [he] can show that he suffered from an 'abnormal condition,' he has not presented any evidence which indicates that Boeing discharged him because of any abnormal condition). The [d]ischarge of an employee for violation of a workplace rule does not constitute discrimination based upon an employee's alleged disability. Id.; see also Doe, 846 P.2d at 536 (discharge of employee with gender dysphoria based not on her abnormal condition but on her refusal to conform with [employer] directives on acceptable attire does not constitute handicap discrimination under RCW 49.60.180). 44 As for those plaintiffs like Guy Yeager, Michael Shay, and Barry Reeves, who denied ever having committed the misconduct for which they were discharged, the analysis is the same as it was under the ADA. Once Longview asserted its nondiscriminatory reason for firing them, they had an obligation to present specific facts to suggest that Longview's explanations were mere pretext. See Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Union, 122 Wash.2d 483, 859 P.2d 26, 30 (1993) (en banc). If there is no evidence of pretext, the defendant is entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. If there is evidence of pretext, the case must go to the jury. Id. (citations omitted). 45 As indicated above, Yeager and Shay did not present facts to indicate that Longview discharged them solely because of an alleged disability, rather than because of misconduct. The speculations of Barry Reeves, who maintains that Longview erroneously perceived him as engaging in illegal drug use, are insufficient to create a triable disability discrimination claim. 46 In a similar case brought under RCW 49.60.180, an employee was terminated because he violated company rules prohibiting intoxication on the job. In his affidavit, the employee claimed that he never drank on the job and that he was never intoxicated at work. Brady v. Daily World, 105 Wash.2d 770, 718 P.2d 785, 786 (1986) (en banc). The employer's records indicated, however, that he appeared to be under the influence of alcohol a number of times while at work. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the employee's argument that he was discriminated against because the employer perceived that his alleged alcoholism was a disability. The court found that safety factors involving other co-workers made freedom from intoxication ... a bona fide occupational qualification. Id. 718 P.2d at 789. The court therefore held that the employee did not have a claim under the Washington statute: 47 Plaintiff's discharge resulted from the employer's belief that plaintiff violated the rule against intoxication on specific occasions. These isolated, specific incidents are not the equivalent of perceiving that plaintiff suffered the disease of alcoholism and that he was discharged for that perceived condition. Summary judgment on the claim was proper. 48 Id. 49 Likewise, in this case, Reeves' discharge resulted from Longview's belief that he violated company rules against drug-related misconduct on a number of occasions. There is no real indication that Longview actually perceived Reeves as suffering from a drug addiction disability and then terminated him because of that perception. Thus, Reeves has not satisfied his burden of producing specific facts to suggest pretext. Longview, therefore, is entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. See Kastanis, 859 P.2d at 30. 50 Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in granting Longview's summary judgment motion with respect to the plaintiffs' claims under Washington law.