Opinion ID: 1059037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: To prove arson, as with any criminal charge, the Commonwealth must establish beyond a reasonable doubt both the corpus delicti and criminal agency. Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 431, 309 S.E.2d 325, 328 (1983) (citing Jones v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 1012, 1021, 49 S.E. 663, 666 (1905)). The corpus delicti of arson must consist of proof that the fire was of incendiary, rather than of accidental origin. Id. Here, Riner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only with regard to the corpus delicti, i.e. whether the fire was of incendiary origin. Notably, Riner does not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's determination that he was the criminal agent. In other words, Riner implicitly agrees that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that, if the fire was of incendiary origin, he was the criminal agent who started the fire. With regard to the corpus delicti, a defendant has the benefit of a presumption that the fire was caused by accident. Id. (citing Simmons v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 778, 782, 160 S.E.2d 569, 572-73 (1968)). That presumption is, however, rebuttable. Knight v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 85, 89, 300 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1983). Whether the origin of a fire was accidental or incendiary is a question of fact, and resolution of that question may, and often must, turn upon the weight of circumstantial evidence. Id. Such is the present case. The Commonwealth's evidence regarding the incendiary origin of the fire came primarily from two individuals, Clark D. Davenport and John D. Walker, both of whom testified as experts in the field of investigating the origin and cause of fires. Davenport and Walker each inspected the Riner home after the fire and concluded that the fire was of incendiary origin. Specifically, Walker opined that the fire started at the south end of the home where the living room and master bedroom were located, and that it was caused by an intentional human act meaning it was an incendiary or an arson fire. In his opinion, the fact that the floor of the front porch and the uprights in the porch were completely consumed by the fire was unusual and indicated a tremendous amount of fire at the whole front end of that home. Because of the extent of burning on the floor of the Riner house and the burn patterns there, Walker further opined that liquid accelerant had been poured on the fire and that the liquid ignited and burned the floor first before everything else fell down on top of the floor. Walker testified that he eliminated any potential accidental cause of the fire and found no indication that the fire started in the electrical panel box because there was no evidence of arcing there. Even though an analysis of debris samples that Walker had collected from the fire scene contained no evidence of liquid accelerant residue, Walker did not alter his conclusions. Similarly, Davenport opined that deep seated charring of burn patterns in areas on the floor of the master bedroom were caused by burning of an ignitable liquid that had been poured on the floor. During his investigation of the fire, Davenport found evidence of newspaper strips in several areas of the house, including the floor in the master bedroom where Denise's body was found. Davenport opined that the newspapers were used as an accelerant to spread the fire. He stated that the newspapers in conjunction with an ignitable liquid were spread throughout the first floor of the dwelling in the areas where [he] determined that a flammable liquid or ignitable liquid patterns were discovered. Davenport further testified that he found no evidence that would cause him to conclude that the origin of the fire could not be determined or was accidental. He also discounted a theory advanced by one of the defense's expert witnesses that the fire had been caused by a short circuit in a baseboard heater. In Davenport's opinion, the evidence of short-circuiting that he found in the wiring that remained in the house was the result of the fire and not the cause of it. When asked what kind of analysis he performed to eliminate other possible sources of ignition, Davenport responded, In conjunction with Mr. Riner's statements to me, as far as the condition of the house, smoking habits, electrical problems, coupled with what I observed at the scene, I was able to eliminate the natural or accidental fire causes verses [sic] what I saw; glaring evidence of an ignitable liquid poured and burned. It is true, as Riner argues, that other expert witnesses who investigated the fire, some of whom testified on behalf of the Commonwealth, opined that the origin of the fire could not be determined. It is also true that Riner introduced evidence showing that the fire had been caused by a short circuit in a baseboard heater. But, as Riner conceded during oral argument, the conflicting evidence created a credibility battle among the experts. `Conflicting expert opinions constitute a question of fact ....' Mercer, 259 Va. at 242, 523 S.E.2d at 217 (quoting McCaskey v. Patrick Henry Hospital, 225 Va. 413, 415, 304 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1983)). In that situation, it is within the province of the finder of fact, in this case the jury, `to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the probative value to be given their testimony.' Id. (quoting Richardson v. Richardson, 242 Va. 242, 246, 409 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1991)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must since it was the prevailing party in the trial court, see Higginbotham, 216 Va. at 352, 218 S.E.2d at 537, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that the fire was incendiary in origin. When a fact-finder has accepted the testimony of a qualified expert witness, which negates every reasonable possibility that a fire was of accidental origin, we cannot hold the evidence insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a finding that the fire was of incendiary origin. Cook, 226 Va. at 432, 309 S.E.2d at 328. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding the evidence of arson sufficient to support the jury verdict.