Opinion ID: 2339636
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Duty to accurately inform and consult about the right to appeal

Text: We have held that trial counsel does not have a constitutional duty to always inform his client of, or consult with his client about, the right to a direct appeal when the client has been convicted pursuant to a guilty plea. [2] Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 150, 979 P.2d 222, 223 (1999); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479-80, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). That duty arises in the guilty-plea context only when the defendant inquires about the right to appeal or in circumstances where the defendant may benefit from receiving advice about the right to a direct appeal, such as the existence of a direct appeal claim that has reasonable likelihood of success. Thomas, 115 Nev. at 150, 979 P.2d at 223. In those limited circumstances, trial counsel has a constitutional duty to inform a client who has pleaded guilty about a direct appeal and consult with the client about the procedures for and advantages and disadvantages of an appeal, and counsel's failure to do so is deficient performance for purposes of proving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477-81, 120 S.Ct. 1029; Thomas, 115 Nev. at 150, 979 P.2d at 223; Davis v. State, 115 Nev. 17, 20, 974 P.2d 658, 659-60 (1999). In this case, Toston did not claim that counsel had a duty to inform him of his right to appeal and failed to do so; instead, he indicated that counsel misinformed him about his appeal rights. Specifically, Toston claimed that trial counsel informed him that he was not permitted to file a direct appeal because his conviction stemmed from a guilty plea. That information is not correct: a defendant who has pleaded guilty has a right to appeal from the judgment of conviction, NRS 177.015(4); see also Franklin v. State, 110 Nev. 750, 751-52, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Thomas, 115 Nev. at 150, 979 P.2d at 223-24, unless he knowingly and voluntarily waives that right, Cruzado v. State, 110 Nev. 745, 879 P.2d 1195 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Lee v. State, 115 Nev. 207, 985 P.2d 164 (1999). Although the appeal is limited in scope to reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or other grounds that challenge the legality of the proceedings, see NRS 177.015(4), and those grounds reserved in writing pursuant to NRS 174.035(3), it is still available despite the guilty plea. Thus, if counsel informed Toston that he had no appeal rights as alleged in the petition, he affirmatively misinformed Toston regarding those rights. The question then is whether the alleged affirmative misinformation falls below an objective standard of reasonableness such that counsel's performance was deficient. We conclude that it does. We explained in Lozada v. State the impact that the failure to inform a client of the client's appeal rights has on the exercise of the right to appeal and the right to effective counsel on appeal. 110 Nev. at 355-56, 871 P.2d at 947-48. Similarly, misinformation about the client's appeal rights may render the right to appeal and to counsel on appeal meaningless by deterring a client from requesting a direct appeal, inquiring into the procedures for a direct appeal, or filing an appeal. Here, Toston alleges that trial counsel told him that he had no right to appeal because he had pleaded guilty. Although Toston was correctly informed of his limited right to a direct appeal in the written guilty plea agreement, see Davis, 115 Nev. at 19, 974 P.2d at 659, the record is not sufficient to belie his allegation that he did not pursue an appeal due to the alleged misinformation from counsel. Because Toston's allegations are not belied by the record on appeal and, if true, it would entitle him to relief because prejudice would be presumed under Lozada, we cannot affirm the decision of the district court denying Toston's claim in the absence of an evidentiary hearing.