Opinion ID: 149697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Remedy for Brady/Giglio Violations

Text: Finally, we turn to Struckman's contention that the exclusion of (1) all evidence attributed to Ted, (2) Dave Bowden as a witness at trial, (3) evidence taken from Struckman's car by Bowden and not disclosed at the time of the district court's order, and (4) evidence derived from the suppressed evidence was insufficient to cure the government's Brady/Giglio violations. We affirm the denial of dismissal as a remedy. [R]emedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). Because it is a drastic step, dismissing an indictment is a disfavored remedy. United States v. Rogers, 751 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (9th Cir.1985) (citing United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966)). Nonetheless, our circuit has recognized that dismissal with prejudice may be an appropriate remedy for a Brady or Giglio violation using a court's supervisory powers where prejudice to the defendant results and the prosecutorial misconduct is flagrant. See United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir.2008); Chapman, 524 F.3d at 1077, 1086. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's decision whether to dismiss the indictment to cure prejudice resulting from such misconduct. See Chapman, 524 F.3d at 1084. The pivotal question under Brady and Giglio is whether the evidence withheld from the jury is material, Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1163 (9th Cir.2009), i.e., whether there is a `reasonable probability of a different result,' id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)) (internal quotation omitted). Struckman did not order a trial transcript. It is, therefore, impossible for us to review the efficacy of the district court's suppression order to cure any trial prejudice to Struckman. See Syncom Capital Corp. v. Wade, 924 F.2d 167, 169 (9th Cir.1991) (dismissing an appeal for failure to provide a trial transcript because the petitioner's main contentions . . . depend[ed] for their resolution on an examination of the facts elicited at trial). Struckman concedes as much, stating in his brief that the principal problem was the use of illicitly-procured and falsely-attributed information . . . to obtain [his] indictment or personal jurisdiction. . . rather than for evidence at trial.  (Emphasis added.) But the animating purpose of Brady is to preserve the fairness of criminal trials. Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 742 (9th Cir.2006). Thus, a prosecutor's duty is to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Struckman's contentions with respect to his indictment and personal jurisdiction are, therefore, not properly characterized as Brady or Giglio violations. [11] We discussed above why Struckman's challenge to personal jurisdiction does not require or permit dismissal. Moreover, even assuming the indictment process was deficient for its reliance on unlawfully obtained evidence, that deficiency was cured when Struckman was convicted by a jury after trial that excluded all of the suppressed evidence. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986); United States v. Navarro, 608 F.3d 529, 539-40 (9th Cir.2010); United States v. Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1180 n. 1 (9th Cir.1999); People of the Territory of Guam v. Muna, 999 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir.1993).