Opinion ID: 4535004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Parents’ Primary Argument

Text: The Parents’ argument that the Students’ new enrollment at iBRAIN did not constitute a change in the Students’ pendency placement is misplaced. In Concerned Parents v. New York City Board of Education, we concluded, albeit in a different context, that the City’s transfer of children with disabilities in special education classes at one school to substantially similar classes at other schools within the same school district did not result in a change to the students’ educational placement. 56 That conclusion, however, offers no solace to the Parents’ pendency claims here. Underlying the Parents’ primary argument is the assumption that because a school district can move a child to a new school that offers the same general level and type of services without violating the IDEA’s stay-put provision, a parent is likewise authorized to invoke the stay-put provision to require the school district to pay for a new school identified by the parent so long as the new school offers substantially similar educational services. Not so. 56See Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 756 (rejecting claim that there had been a change in the children’s educational placement that triggered prior notice and hearing requirements). 28 For the reasons stated below, it is the City, not the Parents, that is authorized to decide how (and where) the Students’ pendency services are to be provided.
We start by recognizing the well-settled principle that “[b]y and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of the state and local authorities.” 57 By choosing to accept federal funds under the IDEA, participating States do not relinquish their control over public education, including their authority to determine the educational programs of students. 58 Nor do States agree to the wholesale transfer of that authority to the parents of children with disabilities. Rather, by accepting federal funds, States primarily agree to establish procedures to ensure that a FAPE is provided to children 57 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). 58See Tilton v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1983) (“Congress did not compel, as the price for federal participation in the education for the handicapped, a wholesale transfer of authority over the allocation of educational resources from the duly elected or appointed state and local boards to the parents of individual handicapped children.”), cited with approval in Fallis v. Ambach, 710 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1983). 29 with disabilities. 59 One of those “procedural safeguards” 60 is the right to pendency services under the stay-put provision. 61 The stay-put provision therefore was enacted as a procedural safeguard in light of the school district’s broad authority to determine the educational program of its students. The provision limits that authority by, among other things, preventing the school district from unilaterally modifying a student’s educational program during the pendency of an IEP dispute. It does not eliminate, however, the school district’s preexisting and independent authority to determine how to provide the most-recently-agreed-upon educational program. As we have recognized, “[i]t is up to the school district,” not the parent, “to decide how to provide that educational program [until the IEP dispute is resolved], so long as the decision is made in good faith.” 62 If a parent disagrees with a school district’s decision on how to provide a child’s educational program, the parent has at least three options under the IDEA: (1) The parent can argue that the school 59 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) (“Any State educational agency, State agency, or local educational agency that receives assistance under this subchapter shall establish and maintain procedures in accordance with this section to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education by such agencies.”). 60 Id. § 1415 (entitled, “Procedural Safeguards”). 61 See id. § 1415(j). 62 T.M., 752 F.3d at 171 (citing Concerned Parents, 629 F.2d at 756). 30 district’s decision unilaterally modifies the student’s pendency placement and the parent could invoke the stay-put provision to prevent the school district from doing so; (2) The parent can determine that the agreed-upon educational program would be better provided somewhere else and thus seek to persuade the school district to pay for the program’s new services on a pendency basis; or (3) The parent can determine that the program would be better provided somewhere else, enroll the child in a new school, and then seek retroactive reimbursement from the school district after the IEP dispute is resolved. That said, what the parent cannot do is determine that the child’s pendency placement would be better provided somewhere else, enroll the child in a new school, and then invoke the stay-put provision to force the school district to pay for the new school’s services on a pendency basis. To hold otherwise would turn the stayput provision on its head, by effectively eliminating the school district’s authority to determine how pendency services should be provided. Here, the Parents’ pendency claims seek to do exactly that. The Parents and the City had agreed that the Students’ educational program would be provided at iHOPE. When apparently dissatisfied with unspecified changes to iHOPE’s “management” and “philosophy,” the Parents unilaterally decided that iBRAIN was a 31 better school for the Students. 63 The Parents are certainly entitled to make that decision for the benefit of their children, but in claiming that the City must continue to pay for iBRAIN’s services on a pendency basis, the Parents effectively “seek a ‘veto’ over school choice rather than ‘input’—a power the IDEA clearly does not grant them.” 64 Regardless of whether the educational program that the Students are receiving at iBRAIN is substantially similar to the one offered at iHOPE, when the Parents unilaterally enrolled the Students at iBRAIN for the 2018-2019 school year, they did so at their own financial risk. 65 63At oral argument, counsel for the Parents generally attributed the exodus of students from iHOPE to iBRAIN to “changes in the management” and “philosophy” of iHOPE. 64 T.Y., 584 F.3d at 420. 65 We do not consider here, much less resolve, any question presented where the school providing the child’s pendency services is no longer available and the school district either refuses or fails to provide pendency services to the child. Those circumstances are not present here. We note, however, that at least one of our sister Circuits has acknowledged that, under certain extraordinary circumstances not presented here, a parent may seek injunctive relief to modify a student’s placement pursuant to the equitable authority provided in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii). See Wagner v. Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cty., 335 F.3d 297, 302– 03 (4th Cir. 2003) (involving a situation in which the pendency placement was no longer available, and the school district had failed to propose an alternative, equivalent placement). 32
As a practical matter, it makes sense that it is the party generally responsible for paying a student’s agreed-upon educational program—here, the City—who determines how the pendency services are to be provided. That is so for two reasons: (i) public funding for pendency services can never be recouped; and (ii) the cost of educational services in schools can vary dramatically.
One can imagine circumstances in which a school district pays on a pendency basis for the educational services of a private school selected unilaterally by the parents, after which a court decides in the school district’s favor, by holding that the parents’ unilateral transfer modified the child’s pendency placement, or that the school district’s proposed IEP would have afforded the child a FAPE.66 In these circumstances, the school district would have no recourse under the 66 Cf. S.S., 2010 WL 983719, at  (rejecting claim by the City that it is entitled to be reimbursed for the payments made “to advance the child[’s] . . . private school tuition during hearing and appeal process” pursuant to the stay-put provision in light of the state review officer’s final decision that the IEP “proposed for the child would have afforded him a” FAPE for the relevant school year). 33 IDEA to recoup the sums it expended on the child. 67 By contrast, if the school district were found to have unilaterally modified the child’s placement, the parent could seek injunctive relief against the school district for violating the IDEA. 68
Dramatically different costs may be presented when parents unilaterally choose to enroll their child in a new school. Indeed, the cost of providing pendency services in the new school may be substantially higher than the cost of providing those services at the previous school. 69 Nothing in the statutory text or legislative history 67See ante, note 49. This did not happen here only because the District Court in Navarro Carrillo granted the City’s motion to stay the order granting the application for a preliminary injunction. 68 Cf. T.M., 752 F.3d at 172 (authorizing limited reimbursement to parents in light of, among other things, the fact that the school district refused to provide the child pendency services in the first instance); Mackey, 386 F.3d at 165–66 (authorizing reimbursement for pendency services even after parents lost their IEP dispute for the relevant school year). 69 In these cases, neither the City nor the Parents presented any evidence in the record about the cost of iBRAIN’s services and how they compare to the cost of similar services at iHOPE. At oral argument, however, counsel for the City informed us, without contradiction, that the cost of attending iBRAIN was significantly higher, and that the Parents had disavowed the City’s transportation arrangement at iHOPE in favor of a private transportation service arranged by iBRAIN. 34 of the IDEA, however, “implies a legislative intent to permit” the parents of children with disabilities “to utilize the [stay-put provision’s] automatic injunctive procedure . . . to frustrate the fiscal policies of participating states.” 70
The Parents’ pendency claims seek to upend the educational status quo that the stay-put provision was enacted to protect. Under the Parents’ theory, litigation at the outset of an IEP dispute seems inevitable. The parties will need to rush to court to obtain a ruling on an emergency basis on whether the new school selected by the parent offers a program that is substantially similar to the program offered at the prior agreed-upon school. A provision that guarantees the right of a child to stay put can hardly justify the uncertainty inherent in a race to the courthouse.