Opinion ID: 2582487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Allegations of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Penalty Phase

Text: ¶ 92 Yates claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in argument during the penalty phase. The prosecutor attacked the sincerity of Yates's religious conversion, a conversion that was the centerpiece of Yates's allocution. Observing that Yates's claimed conversion occurred after his arrest, [29] the prosecutor went on to question whether Yates's remorse had actually even show[n] up after his arrest. 77 VRP at 8222-23. In particular, the prosecutor argued that, had Yates been truly remorseful, he would not have withheld the location of Melody Murfin's body until the eve of his guilty plea in Spokane. Id. at 8223. The prosecutor argued that, in the course of talking with police, pastors, and his father or in the course of writing many, many letters, he would have offer[ed] up details of what he did: If he is remorseful, ladies and gentlemen, where are the guns that he used to kill his victims? Id. at 8224-26. ¶ 93 Specifically, Yates claims that in the following remarks the prosecutor improperly commented on Yates's Sixth Amendment right to counsel: Now, you've heard from . . . one of his pastors that he might have revealed this information [the location of Murfin's body] to his lawyers. The defendant said as much to you. That does not absolve him of the despicable decision . . . to hold onto that information until such time as it might work to his advantage. . . . Her location was not revealed until . . . six months after his arrest. Is that remorse on his part? Can he pass that off to his lawyers? No, he cannot. Id. at 8223-24. Yates does not explain how the jury could have construed the remarks as an implication that, because he had counsel, he was guilty, a fact not at issue in the penalty phase. When placed in the context of the prosecutor's general attack on the believability of Yates's conversion and remorse, the clear point of the prosecutor's comment was that, if, as Yates claimed, he had c[o]me back to the love of God in Jesus Christ, id. at 8198, he would not have made Murfin's family wait six months to reclaim her remains from his yard. The remark was not an improper comment on Yates's right to counsel. ¶ 94 Second, Yates contends that, by criticizing his refusal to reveal further information about his crimes, the prosecutor was improperly commenting on his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. However, as this court held in State v. Clark, 143 Wash.2d 731, 765, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001), [w]hen a defendant does not remain silent and instead talks to police, the state may comment on what he does not say. Here, in closing argument in the penalty phase, the prosecutor repeatedly directed the jury's attention to the claims made by Yates in his allocution, and the prosecutor juxtaposed Yates's statements of remorse and sympathy with what he [did] not say. Id. The unmistakable intent of the prosecutor's comments was to undermine the mitigation evidence that Yates provided in his allocution. The prosecutor did not improperly comment on Yates's right to remain silent. See State v. Jeffries, 105 Wash.2d 398, 415-16, 717 P.2d 722 (1986). ¶ 95 Yates also claims that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel by suggesting to jurors that the defense was playing the religion card. 77 VRP at 8230-31. The prosecutor argued that the defense wants [you to] believe that Mr. Yates is a Christian person, and [t]hey want [you to] think that the Almighty has forgiven the defendant and that any decent Christian person ought to likewise forgive him and show mercy. Id. at 8230. The prosecutor urged the jury to abide by their oath to follow the law and to resist the shameful . . . attempt to play upon spiritual beliefs. Id. at 8231. The trial court overruled the defense's objection to the prosecutor's argument and later explained that, while the remarks may be pushing the line somewhat, they did not amount to personal attacks regarding the ethics or integrity of defense counsel. Id. at 8248-49. Because Yates made his Christian commitment the cornerstone of his mitigation evidence, the trial court reasonably accorded the prosecutor some latitude to argue that the defense was attempting to appeal to the jurors' own religious beliefs. ¶ 96 Finally, Yates argues that the following comment made in the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument was improper and prejudicial: He was sentenced for the Spokane murders two years ago, 1998. . . . Assume that he lives 50 years beyond the time he was sentenced in 2000, so he lives to be 98 years old. In Spokane, he was sentenced for 13 murders and one attempted murder. Divide that number, 14 into 50. That's a little over three years for each murder. Is human life that cheap? Id. at 8300. The defense immediately objected, and the trial court sustained the objection: Sustained. That's improper argument. Jury is to disregard that argument. Id. Yates argues on appeal that the prosecutor's improper remark was designed to appeal to the passion and prejudice of the jury. Br. of Appellant at 197. We conclude that the trial court's unequivocal response to defense counsel's objection cured the improper remark. See Grisby, 97 Wash.2d at 499, 647 P.2d 6 (noting that [t]he jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the court). In any case, when the prosecutor's improper remarks are placed in the context of the entire special sentencing proceeding, it cannot be said that there was a substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the jury's verdict. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 561, 940 P.2d 546; see CP at 4481; RCW 10.95.060(4). ¶ 97 In sum, Yates has failed to show that the prosecutor committed misconduct in the guilt or penalty phases. Of the comments that the defense challenges, only the prosecutor's rhetorical question to defense witness Danelle Gorder  You are lucky to be alive, aren't you? 66 VRP at 7093  was clearly improper, but that remark's prejudicial effect, assessed in the context of the evidence in the case, is negligible. ¶ 98 11. Concurrent Sentences for Pierce County and Spokane County Crimes. Yates argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve the sentence imposed in the Pierce County case concurrently with the 408-year sentence imposed for the Spokane County convictions. Yates rests his argument on a provision in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW. The State argues that, if the SRA sentencing procedures apply to capital sentencing proceedings, Yates is relying on the wrong subsection of RCW 9.94A.589(1). ¶ 99 Yates contends that under RCW 9.94A.589, his sentence for the Pierce County crimes should run consecutively to his Spokane County sentence: (1)(a) Except as provided in (b) or (c) of this subsection, whenever a person is to be sentenced for two or more current offenses, the sentence range for each current offense shall be determined by using all other current and prior convictions as if they were prior convictions for the purpose of the offender score: PROVIDED, That if the court enters a finding that some or all of the current offenses encompass the same criminal conduct then those current offenses shall be counted as one crime. Sentences imposed under this subsection shall be served concurrently. Consecutive sentences may only be imposed under the exceptional sentence provisions of RCW 9.94A.535. Same criminal conduct, as used in this subsection, means two or more crimes that require the same criminal intent, are committed at the same time and place, and involve the same victim. This definition applies in cases involving vehicular assault or vehicular homicide even if the victims occupied the same vehicle. (b) Whenever a person is convicted of two or more serious violent offenses arising from separate and distinct criminal conduct, the standard sentence range for the offense with the highest seriousness level under RCW 9.94A.515 shall be determined using the offender's prior convictions and other current convictions that are not serious violent offenses in the offender score and the standard sentence range for other serious violent offenses shall be determined by using an offender score of zero. The standard sentence range for any offenses that are not serious violent offenses shall be determined according to (a) of this subsection. All sentences imposed under (b) of this subsection shall be served consecutively to each other and concurrently with sentences imposed under (a) of this subsection. (Emphasis added.) Subsection (1)(a) explains how a person is to be sentenced for two or more current offenses  offenses for which offender scores are being computed on the same date. RCW 9.94A.525(1). The general rule, as expressed in subsection (1)(a), is that, where a person is being sentenced on multiple counts on the same day, the sentences for those current offenses are to run concurrently with one another. Yates relies on RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b), an exception to subsection (1)(a). Subsection (1)(b) describes how the offender score is to be computed for a person whose multiple current offenses are serious violent offenses. Subsection (1)(b) requires the court to impose consecutive sentences for those current offenses that are serious violent offenses. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b) is inapplicable to Yates's sentencing proceeding in Pierce County. Plainly, his Pierce County and Spokane County convictions are not current offenses within the meaning of these SRA provisions. ¶ 100 The State argues (and the sentencing court agreed) that, if any SRA provisions are to apply to Yates's sentencing in Pierce County, the only provision that could apply is RCW 9.94A.589(3). While subsection (1) governs the calculation of an offender score for current offenses (again, those for which convictions are entered or sentences are imposed on the same date), subsections (2) and (3) define how the court is to sentence a person for a felony when that person is already under sentence for a different felony. Subsection (2)(a) requires that, where a person while under sentence for conviction of a felony commits another felony, the sentence for the second felony must run consecutively to the preexisting felony sentence. Because Yates did not commit the Pierce County felonies while under sentence for the Spokane County crimes, subsection (2) does not apply to Yates. ¶ 101 Under the State's theory, however, subsection (3) does fit Yates's situation: [w]henever a person is sentenced for a felony that was committed while the person was not under sentence for conviction of a felony, the sentence shall run concurrently with any felony sentence which has been imposed by any court in this or another state or by a federal court subsequent to the commission of the crime being sentenced unless the court pronouncing the current sentence expressly orders that they be served consecutively. RCW 9.94A.589(3) (emphasis added). Yates was being sentenced in Pierce County for crimes that were committed while [he] was not under sentence for conviction of the Spokane County crimes. Id. (emphasis added). If this provision applies, then it requires that the Pierce County sentence run concurrently with the Spokane County sentence unless the court pronouncing the current [i.e., Pierce County] sentence expressly orders that they be served consecutively. Here, the court concluded that, under RCW 9.94A.589(3), Yates's Pierce County sentence could run concurrently with the Spokane County sentence. ¶ 102 We reject Yates's argument that RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b) mandates consecutive Spokane County and Pierce County sentences. We reach this conclusion because the SRA provisions on concurrent and consecutive sentences (RCW 9.94A.589) cannot be sensibly applied when a jury in a special sentencing proceeding under chapter 10.95 RCW returns a verdict for a death sentence. The oddity underlying this sentencing issue is that, here, we have a defendant seeking a consecutive sentence, while the State argues for concurrent sentencing. Paradoxically, Yates seeks a more lenient punishment by invoking a provision intended to ensure a harsher sentence. Whereas RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b) requires those convicted of multiple serious violent offenses to serve a harsher sentence (consecutive terms) on those counts, Yates relies on that provision to lessen the severity of his sentence, effectively commuting his death sentence to life. Similarly, the State seeks the harsher sentence of death by relying on a provision that was intended to make the more lenient sentence the default. RCW 9.94A.589(3) makes the less harsh sentence (concurrent terms) the standard and permits the harsher sentence (consecutive terms) only as an exception that the sentencing court must expressly order[ ]. RCW 9.94A.589(3). In sum, both the defense and the State ignore that they are relying on provisions that were intended to have effects opposite to the ones they desire. Clearly, it is the uniqueness of the death penalty that skews the positions the defense and the State have taken on this sentencing issue. Accordingly, we reject the application of the SRA provisions on concurrent and consecutive sentences to the imposition of the death penalty. ¶ 103 Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in requiring that the Pierce County sentence be served concurrently with the Spokane County sentence.
¶ 104 RCW 10.95.100 requires this court to review every death sentence entered in this state. In the course of its mandatory review (consolidated with the defendant's appeal, if any), this court must make the following determinations: (a) Whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the affirmative finding to the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4); and (b) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. . . . ; (c) Whether the sentence of death was brought about through passion or prejudice; and (d) Whether the defendant was mentally retarded within the meaning of RCW 10.95.030(2). RCW 10.95.130(2). Because Yates made no claim that he was mentally retarded, the inquiry required in subsection (d) is inapplicable. Yates provided no argument regarding subsection (a) and made only minimal comment on subsection (c), but he raised a number of now familiar issues related to the proportionality review of subsection (b). ¶ 105 1. Insufficiency of Mitigating Circumstances to Merit Leniency. At Yates's special sentencing proceeding, the court instructed the jury that the State has the burden of proving . . . beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. CP at 4444, Jury Instruction 3 (Special Sentencing Hr'g). The court defined mitigating circumstance for the jury as a fact about either the offense or about the defendant which in fairness or in mercy may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or which justifies a sentence of less than death, although it does not justify or excuse the offense. Id. at 4446, Jury Instruction 5 (Special Sentencing Hr'g). Of the eight nonexclusive statutory factors that a jury may consider as mitigating circumstances, only one was specifically mentioned in jury instruction 5: Whether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to others in the future. Id.; RCW 10.95.070(8). The jury was instructed that it would receive a sentencing verdict form on which it would be required to record its answer to one yes-no question: Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency? CP at 4448, 4445, Jury Instructions 7, 4 (Special Sentencing Hr'g); RCW 10.95.060(4). The instruction stated that an affirmative response would result in a death sentence, and the sentencing verdict form included a similar explanatory note under the word yes: In which case the defendant shall be sentenced to death. CP at 4445, 4481. The jury at Yates's special sentencing proceeding unanimously answered yes. Id. at 4481. ¶ 106 RCW 10.95.130(2)(a) requires this court to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to warrant leniency. To make that determination, this court asks whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found sufficient evidence to justify that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 551, 940 P.2d 546. This court has held that [t]he mere presence of mitigating factors does not require that the jury grant leniency; rather, if a jury is convinced that the circumstances of the crime outweigh the mitigating factors, it may rationally conclude that leniency is not merited. State v. Dodd, 120 Wash.2d 1, 25, 838 P.2d 86 (1992). ¶ 107 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the Yates jury could have rationally found the mitigating circumstances insufficient to justify a grant of leniency. Yates's mitigation evidence consisted of the testimony of family members, friends, and former high school teachers and coaches. Correctional officers from the Spokane County and Pierce County jails testified regarding Yates's behavior in custody, and the jury also heard testimony from pastors and fellow inmates familiar with Yates's postarrest religiosity. Additionally, in his allocution, Yates apologized to the victims' families and described his religious conversion. The State presented additional evidence of Yates's criminal history, informing the jurors that Yates murdered Patrick Oliver and Susan Savage in 1975 and Stacy Hahn in 1988. The State also elicited testimony from relatives of Mercer and Ellis. The jurors could have reasonably been persuaded, as the State argued in rebuttal closing argument, that no leniency was merited for one whose upbringing had been idyllic but who had nevertheless killed 15 people and tried to kill a 16th. 77 VRP at 8292. The jurors may well have shared the State's viewpoint that Yates's postarrest conversion was self-serving and his allocution offensively self-indulgent. Id. at 8296-97. ¶ 108 We hold that there was sufficient evidence to justify the affirmative finding to the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4). RCW 10.95.130(2)(a). A rational jury could have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstances of the crime[s] outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors. Dodd, 120 Wash.2d at 25, 838 P.2d 86. ¶ 109 2. Passion or Prejudice. RCW 10.95.130(2)(c) requires this court to determine [w]hether the sentence of death was brought about through passion or prejudice. Yates contends that his previously discussed allegations of prosecutorial misconduct constituted an effort on the State's part to secure a death sentence based upon passion and prejudice. Br. of Appellant at 205-06; see supra issue A.10. But as the State points out, among Yates's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in the penalty phase, only one was characterized as an improper appeal to passion and prejudice. Br. of Resp't at 230. The court sustained the objection to that remark and instructed the jury to disregard it. 77 VRP at 8300. The claims of prosecutorial misconduct do not support the conclusion that the jury's verdict in the penalty phase was the product of passion or prejudice. We presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the jury heeded the trial court's explicit instructions: You should bear in mind that your verdict must be based upon reason and not upon emotion. Throughout your deliberations you must not be influenced by passion, prejudice or sympathy. CP at 4442, Jury Instruction 1 (Special Sentencing Hr'g); Grisby, 97 Wash.2d at 509, 647 P.2d 6. ¶ 110 We conclude that the jury's verdict in the special sentencing proceeding was not brought about through passion or prejudice. RCW 10.95.130(2)(c). ¶ 111 3. Proportionality. In its mandatory review of each case in which the death penalty is imposed, this court must determine [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) (emphasis added). By similar cases, [30] the subsection means other death eligible cases. State v. Cross, 156 Wash.2d 580, 630, 132 P.3d 80, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 559, 166 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006); Davis, 141 Wash.2d at 880, 10 P.3d 977. To conduct the statutory proportionality review, this court has adhered closely to the statutory directive to consider `both the crime and the defendant' and has thus subdivided the crime and the defendant into four factors. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 686, 904 P.2d 245. The court looks at the nature of the defendant's crime, the aggravating circumstances proved at trial, the defendant's prior convictions, and the defendant's personal history. Id.; Cross, 156 Wash.2d at 630-31, 132 P.3d 80. When this court engages in its statutory proportionality review, the court's touchstone is whether the penalty in a particular case is freakish and wanton or given for a forbidden reason. Cross, 156 Wash.2d at 632, 132 P.3d 80.
¶ 112 In the Cross opinion, which was filed just one year ago, this court followed the customary four-factor approach and concluded that Cross's death sentence was not disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). Consistent with the Cross court's analysis, this court likewise concludes that Yates's death sentence for the murders of Mercer and Ellis was not disproportionate under RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). ¶ 113 Regarding the first factor, the nature of the crime giving rise to the death sentence, Yates's crimes were similar to Cross's. First, while Cross murdered three women (his wife and two of her daughters), Yates murdered two, and as the Cross court pointed out, death sentences have previously been handed down in cases with fewer than three victims. 156 Wash.2d at 632, 132 P.3d 80 (citing State v. Woods, 143 Wash.2d 561, 616, 23 P.3d 1046 (2001); State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 759, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997); State v. Elledge, 144 Wash.2d 62, 66, 26 P.3d 271 (2001)). Second, the Cross court recognized that [t]here was a marked level of cruelty in the murders: At least one of Cross's victims was conscious and pleaded with him to either spare her life or kill her more quickly. Id. Yates's crimes were similarly cruel. For example, the evidence indicated that, after Yates shot Mercer three times with a .25 caliber weapon and tied four plastic grocery bags over her head, she survived long enough to chew through the two innermost bags and partially suck one bag into her mouth. 56 VRP at 5538-39; 57 VRP at 5626-28. Yates's crimes, in fact, reflected a more calculated cruelty than did Cross's crimes. The degree of planning in Yates's crimes was similar to that seen in the murders committed in Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d 628, 904 P.2d 245, and Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 892 P.2d 29, and Yates selected his victims from a particularly vulnerable class. Dodd, 120 Wash.2d 1, 838 P.2d 86. ¶ 114 The second factor in proportionality review, the aggravating circumstances proved at trial, is closely allied to the first factor, the nature of the crime. Cross's conviction for aggravated first degree murder was based on the common scheme or plan aggravator defined in RCW 10.95.020(10), see 156 Wash.2d at 633, 132 P.3d 80, and as the State points out in the present case, [p]revious cases have found the death penalty not disproportionate when based on a single aggravator. Br. of Resp't at 226 (citing Luvene Trial Judge Report (TJR) 135; Gentry TJR 119; Benn TJR 75; Harris TJR 29). The jury in the present case, however, found that the State had proved not only the common scheme or plan aggravating factor, but the additional in furtherance of . . . [r]obbery aggravator as well. As the Cross court pointed out, this court is not merely looking for the number of aggravators but, more importantly, at the nature of the aggravating circumstances. 156 Wash.2d at 633, 132 P.3d 80 (emphasis added). Here, the nature of the aggravating circumstances is disturbing, to say the least. Yates's plan required considerable planning and was carried out, not over a period of hours, but over a span of more than two years. In sum, although Cross's and Yates's death sentences arose from crimes involving a similar number of victims and a similar degree of cruelty, the nature and number of the aggravating factors in the present case mark Yates's crimes as surpassingly reprehensible. Considering the first two proportionality factors (the nature of Yates's crimes and the nature and number of the aggravating factors), we find no basis for declaring Yates's death sentence disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). ¶ 115 To satisfy the requirement in RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) that this court consider not only the crime but also the defendant, the court relies on the third and fourth proportionality factors, the defendant's criminal history (prior convictions) and personal history. Yates has an extensive criminal history. He has been convicted of 13 first degree murders and 1 attempted first degree murder, and those crimes were committed over a period of more than 20 years. As the State pointed out, Yates's prior murder convictions place him in a unique category, since among those defendants included in the trial judge reports, only 13 had a prior conviction for murder or manslaughter, and of those, only 1 had more than one such conviction. Br. of Resp't at 228. As to Yates's personal history, the testimony at his special sentencing proceeding depicted a stable, happy childhood. The State has aptly compared Yates and another defendant who received a death sentence: Stenson was not lacking in normal intelligence, was not youthful, and was not the victim of a tragic background. We have compared this case and all the circumstances of the Defendant and his crime with other first degree aggravated murders which have and have not received the death penalty. Given the brutal, calculated nature of the crimes, the motivation of financial gain, and the lack of mitigating circumstances, we conclude the sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate. Id. at 229, 132 P.3d 80 (quoting Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 760, 940 P.2d 1239). As with proportionality factors one and two, the consideration of factors three and four (Yates's criminal and personal history) does not suggest that his death sentence was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. RCW 10.95.130(2)(b).
¶ 116 Yates raises additional issues related to the proportionality review. First, Yates argues that chapter 10.95 RCW is unconstitutional because it grants county prosecutors too much discretion in determining when to seek the death penalty. This court has repeatedly rejected the argument that prosecutorial discretion violates equal protection. See Cross, 156 Wash.2d at 625, 132 P.3d 80 (citing State v. Rupe, 101 Wash.2d 664, 700, 683 P.2d 571 (1984); State v. Campbell, 103 Wash.2d 1, 26, 691 P.2d 929 (1984)). The prosecutorial discretion permitted in RCW 10.95.040 is not contrary to the United States Supreme Court's key decisions regarding the death penalty, [31] and the Cross court declined to extend the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000), beyond the narrow realm of election law. 156 Wash.2d at 626, 132 P.3d 80 (citing Bush, 531 U.S. at 109, 121 S.Ct. 525). We again reject the argument that RCW 10.95.040 vests too much authority in local prosecutors. ¶ 117 Second, Yates argues that Washington's death penalty statute is arbitrary and thus violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Dodd, this court recognized that [t]he sentencing scheme must not allow the death penalty to be wantonly or freakishly imposed, it must direct and limit jury discretion, to minimize the risk of arbitrary or capricious action, and it must allow particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each defendant, and the circumstances of the offense, before imposition of the sentence. 120 Wash.2d at 13 n. 2, 838 P.2d 86 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)). As recognized in Cross, this court has repeatedly held that our statutes meet this standard. 156 Wash.2d at 623, 132 P.3d 80. The Cross opinion sets forth eight statutory protections that, along with the statutorily mandated proportionality review, prevent[ ] arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty. Id. at 623-24, 132 P.3d 80. Because Yates cannot establish that chapter 10.95 RCW violates the Eighth Amendment, his claim that the statute violates article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution is unavailing. See Dodd, 120 Wash.2d at 22, 838 P.2d 86 (concluding that [t]he Gunwall [32] factors do not demand that we interpret Const. art. 1, § 14 more broadly than the Eighth Amendment). Similarly, Yates claims that chapter 10.95 RCW violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which provides that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life or subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, but Yates has not explained why the treaty's clauses should be read more broadly than the Eighth Amendment. ICCPR arts. 6(1), 7, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. ¶ 118 Third, pointing to his own sentence in Spokane County and to Gary Ridgway's sentence in King County, Yates argues that his death sentence in Pierce County was disproportionate, freakish, wanton, and random. This argument is a more specific version of the two preceding arguments. That Yates was permitted to avoid the death penalty in Spokane County by pleading guilty to 13 counts of first degree murder and 1 count of attempted first degree murder was the product of the Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney's exercise of discretion. Likewise, the King County prosecutor exercised his discretion and allowed Ridgway to avoid a death sentence by pleading guilty to 48 counts of aggravated first degree murder. The effect of the Ridgway plea agreement on this court's proportionality review was an issue squarely before the court in Cross. There, the majority rejected the view that one prosecutor's discretionary decision could render chapter 10.95 RCW unconstitutional: Ridgway's abhorrent killings, standing alone, do not render the death penalty unconstitutional or disproportionate. Our law is not so fragile. 156 Wash.2d at 624, 132 P.3d 80. ¶ 119 Finally, Yates argues that this court cannot meaningfully engage in the proportionality review mandated in RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) because of the incompleteness and inaccuracy of the trial judge reports. See RCW 10.95.120. In Yates's view, the defects in the set of reports result in a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument was punctured in this court's Cross opinion. There, describing the trial judge reports database as now overwhelmingly complete, the court rejected the claim that the state of the database precluded meaningful proportionality review: There is an ample amount of detail we can use to compare this case with the others collected, and we have no reason to think that the omitted reports would not be consistent with the completed ones. 156 Wash.2d at 638, 132 P.3d 80. ¶ 120 We conclude that Yates's death sentence was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). We also reject Yates's related constitutional arguments.