Opinion ID: 3012208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The acquisition of Biotek by Ventana was of

Text: critical strategic importance as Ventana embarks on its strategy of automating IHC testing in laboratories; 18 2. The synergy value of the Merger was between $32 million to $50 million; and 3. The strategic, financial and synergistic benefits of  the Merger are compelling. This information, the plaintiffs submit, shows not only that Biotek could have negotiated a more favorable merger deal from Ventana, but also establishes the bounds of how much more Ventana would have been willing to pay (for the purposes of damage calculations). We disagree. The plaintiffs would have the court reconstruct the negotiations as if Biotek had perfect information about Ventana’s underlying financial situation and how much Ventana valued Biotek and Ventana had no information regarding Biotek’s finances or how much it valued the Ventana merger. This is a highly unrealistic way to recreate a potential merger negotiation. Even if the plaintiffs had all of the information regarding the compensation package that they allege they should have been given, they still would not have known any of the information about the rate at which Ventana valued Biotek that they now cite as evidence for the proposition that they would have secured more favorable merger terms. This evidence is especially unconvincing in light of the evidence that Biotek attempted to secure a more favorable share exchange rate and failed to do so. The highly speculative chain of events that the plaintiffs ask us to infer from the evidence they have presented -- in particular, that Biotek would have rejected the Ventana offer and could have negotiated a more favorable merger deal -- appears to be what Gould was referring to when it stated that we should not apply the lost opportunity theory of causation in a situation where the loss iswholly speculative. Gould, 535 F.2d at 781. We think that unlike Gould, where the fact of some uncertain amount of loss was clearly established because some shareholders received a more favorable share exchange rate than other similarly place shareholders, the very fact of loss in this case is wholly speculative.4 _________________________________________________________________ 4. The fact of loss was also much more certain in Rudinger v. Ins. Data Proc., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1991), in which the court allowed 19 The plaintiffs also make the alternative argument that damages could be calculated based on a disgorgement theory, that is, damages could be calculated by requiring Patience and Schuler to disgorge the profits they have received from their compensation package. We fail to see how this argument makes any less speculative the fact of loss. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims based on S 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 on the ground that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiffs have established causation.5 As there is no triable issue of fact with respect to the causation element of the plaintiffs’ 10b-5 claim, we need not reach the issue of scienter. Our ruling moots the defendants’ cross-appeal, which addresses only theS 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.