Opinion ID: 773633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suspensions of More than a Week

Text: 20 The City argues that the district court improperly counted the suspensions of four employees who were suspended for more than a week. The City argues that it is only suspensions of less than a week that are problematic under the regulations. 21 The district court dismissed this argument as without merit, relying on the provision in the salary basis regulation which indicates that a salaried employee must receive his full salary for any week in which he performs any work, without regard to the number of days or hours worked. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.118(a). Under the district court's interpretation, if an employee were suspended from Monday to Friday of one week and Monday and Tuesday of the next week, the employee would perform work on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday of the second week and be entitled to full salary for the second week as a result. 22 Although we have never explicitly addressed the propriety of disciplinary suspensions of more than a week, we have suggested that only even-week suspensions comply with the salary basis test. See Stanley, 120 F.3d at 184 (describing suspensions in full-week increments as consistent with salaried status); see also Paresi, 182 F.3d at 667 n.1 (noting that two supposedly improper suspensions were actuallyweek long Monday-to-Friday suspensions); Childers , 120 F.3d at 945 n.1 (salaried employees may be suspended without pay for the period of a week but must be compensated where they are suspended for a period of less than a week). In light of these precedents, we agree that the district court correctly surmised the effect of section 541.118(a). This interpretation also appears to be consistent with the Secretary's viewpoint as set forth in its amicus brief in Auer: 23 The Secretary does not consider unpaid disciplinary suspensions of a full-week pay period to violate the salary basis rule, because the Secretary has adopted a general policy, reflected in 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.118(a), not to question the salaried status of an employee who receives no pay in a week in which the employee performs no work. 24 1996 WL 595843 at  n.5 (emphasis added) (theAmicus Brief). We agree with the district court that it is the partial-week aspect of the suspensions that creates a problem under the salary basis regulations, whether they are for more or less than full week increments. 25 On the other hand, it is also easy to see where the City's confusion might arise. Until now, no case has specifically addressed disciplinary suspensions of more than a full week. The cases which have addressed partial-week suspensions tout the problem of suspensions of less than a week, which could create a negative implication that suspensions of a week or more are acceptable. Cf. Childers, 120 F.3d at 946 n.1. Likewise, in her Amicus Brief, the Secretary constantly refers to suspensions of less than a week as problematic. 1996 WL 595843 at  (an employee suspended without pay for less than one week . . . would be classified as nonsalaried); id. at  ([t]he rule against disciplinary deductions of less than one week's pay is an integral component of the test); id. at -15 (showing of actual deductions unnecessary if employer communicates that deductions will be made for disciplinary suspensions of less than one week); and id. at  (penalties can be imposed without running afoul of the prohibition against disciplinary deductions of less than one week). 26 The Secretary may have chosen suspensions of less than a week simply as an illustrative example to contrast against full-week suspensions. But it may also be that only those suspensions of less than a week are troubling to the Secretary. There are no other regulations pertaining to this issue; indeed, the entire actual practice concept has been developed by caselaw and aided by the briefing of the Secretary. See, e.g., Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (relying on amicus brief of Secretary of Labor); Klem, 208 F.3d at 1091 (same); Yourman, 229 F.3d at 130 (same). Thus, the Auer Amicus Brief is likely an informative source for practitioners struggling with the contours of the salary basis regulations. 27 Although we agree with the district court that suspensions of more than a week run afoul of the salary basis test, we do not find the City's position as wholly unreasonable as the district court believed it to be. It appears that the City believed these suspensions to be permissible under the FLSA, 1 and that the law was not altogether clear on the subject at the time. 28 If there were, as the district court concluded, only eight improper suspensions over six years, with fully half of those occurring as the result of an erroneous but not absurd interpretation of the law, we would be hesitant to agree with the district court that the employees were entitled to summary judgment on this issue. In fact, other circuits have upheld summary judgment in favor of the employer in somewhat similar circumstances. DiGiore, 172 F.3d at 464-64 (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer despite five improper suspensions because suspensions were infrequent and under unusual circumstances); cf. Davis v. City of Hollywood, 120 F.3d 1178, 1180 (11th Cir. 1997) (four suspensions for less than a week did not prevent employer from availing itself of window of correction). 29 The employees, however, contend that it was error for the district court to have considered the Menkus declaration, and that if the declaration were disregarded, the remaining stipulated facts would provide an alternative ground for affirming the grant of summary judgment in their favor. We therefore turn to the merits of their evidentiary objection to the declaration.