Opinion ID: 2569354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Specific Intent Element of First Degree Murder

Text: The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that after deliberation is part of the culpable mental state element of first degree murder that could be negated by evidence of intoxication. The prosecution's burden of proof regarding intoxication, Harlan asserts, was improperly lowered, in violation of his right to require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the charged offense. The trial court refused to so instruct the jury because it held that after deliberation is not part of the specific intent element of first degree murder. We agree with the defendant that after deliberation is part of the culpable mental state of first degree murder. However, we find that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that after deliberation is part of the culpable mental state of first degree murder was harmless error. The trial court directed the jury to consider whether the defendant killed his victim after deliberating despite his intoxication. The jury therefore determined whether the prosecution proved all the elements of first degree murder, including after deliberation, in light of the intoxication evidence presented by the defendant.
First degree murder after deliberation is a specific intent offense. See People v. District Court (Henry), 926 P.2d 567, 570 (Colo.1996). In our view, section 18-3-101(3), 6 C.R.S. (1999), establishes that after deliberation is part of the specific intent element of first degree murder. [15] The statute reads in pertinent part: The term after deliberation means not only intentionally but also that the decision to commit the act has been made after the exercise of reflection and judgment concerning the act. Id. This statute clearly indicates that the mental state of after deliberation includes intent. [16] What makes the mental state required for first degree murder distinctive, therefore, is the context in which the intention is formed  namely, after the exercise of reflection and judgment. We consequently disagree with the holding in People v. Orona, 907 P.2d 659, 662 (Colo. App.1995). The court of appeals concluded that after deliberation is not part of the culpable mental state of first degree murder because under § 18-3-101(3) the term `after deliberation' is `separate from' and `in addition to' the requisite culpable mental state of `intentionally.' Id. at 663. The court of appeals also noted that section 18-3-102(1)(a) specifies that murder in the first degree is committed by a perpetrator who acts both `after deliberation and with intent to cause the death of a person.' Id. (emphasis in original). We do not find this reasoning persuasive for several reasons. First, this interpretation of section 18-3-102(1)(a) creates an unnecessary tension with section 18-3-101(3) because section 18-3-101(3) on its face includes intentionally as part of the mental state of after deliberation. Second, the court of appeals' construction effectively reads out of section 18-3-101(3) the phrase not only intentionally. This construction therefore violates the principle that a statute should be interpreted so as to give effect to it as a whole. See People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Colo.1994); see also § 2-4-201(1)(b), 1 C.R.S. (1999). Moreover, the conjunction and can function, not only to separate discrete items, but to join in a single concept two parts that might otherwise be considered separate. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 80 (1976). Thus and operates in section 18-3-102(1)(a) to emphasize that the relevant culpable mental state for first degree murder is the intent to cause the death of another person, formed as a decision made after the exercise of reflection and judgment. The phrase after deliberation and with intent does not establish that with intent is a distinct element from after deliberation, but rather that they are part of the same concept. The interpretation of section 18-3-102(1)(a) in Orona also has the inadvertent and unnecessary effect of creating an entirely new, unique, and undefined element of first degree murder. After deliberation cannot be part of the actus reus of the offense because it relates to the defendant's mental processes and not the physical acts causing the victim's death. Similarly, it is not an attendant circumstance as the concept is normally understood. See Wayne R. Lafave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 7 (1972). It cannot be a general intent mens rea element. See § 18-1-501(6), 6 C.R.S. (1999). Relying on section 18-3-101(3) to determine the specific intent element of first degree murder avoids this problem. For these reasons, we hold that after deliberation is part of the specific intent element of first degree murder. To the extent that Orona is inconsistent with this position it is disapproved. We now proceed to explain that the trial court's instructions, taken as a whole, do not constitute reversible error even though the court did not unambiguously inform the jury that after deliberation is part of the culpable mental state of first degree murder.
Harlan complains that the trial court failed to completely instruct the jury regarding the mental state elements of first degree murder that could be affected by intoxication. However, the trial court did instruct the jury to consider whether intoxication kept the defendant from deliberating before killing his victim. In Trial Phase Instruction No. 30 the court stated: You have heard evidence of Robert Harlan's use of crack cocaine and alcohol. You should consider this evidence in determining whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Harlan had the required culpable mental state for first degree murder (after deliberation). Unless the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert Harlan, if you find him to have been intoxicated, acted after deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of Rhonda Maloney, in causing her death, you must find him not guilty of first degree murder (after deliberation). (Emphasis added.) This instruction does not restrict the jury's consideration of the defendant's intoxication evidence to the issue of whether he intended to kill the victim. The plain meaning of the instruction is that the jury is to determine, in light of the intoxication evidence, whether the defendant deliberated before committing the murder. The last sentence of the instruction tells the jury that unless it finds the prosecution to have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Harlan deliberated and intended to kill the victim, it must find him not guilty. The trial court correctly instructed the jury to consider whether evidence of intoxication negated any part of the required culpable mental state element for first degree murder. The prosecution's burden to prove all the elements of first degree murder therefore was not lowered improperly. [17]