Opinion ID: 1608240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the trial court err when it denied McKee's motion for a directed verdict and j.n.o.v.?

Text: ¶ 14. When considering whether motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. have been properly denied, the standards of review are essentially the same as when considering whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. In considering a motion for directed verdict, the reviewing court must consider evidence introduced in light most favorable to State, accepting all evidence introduced by the State as true, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom; if there is sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict, motion for directed verdict must be overruled. Edwards v. State, 615 So.2d 590, 594 (Miss.1993). Likewise, this Court has stated: Where a defendant has moved for j.n.o.v., the trial court must consider all of the evidencenot just the evidence which supports the State's casein the light most favorable to the State. The State must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. If the facts and inferences so considered point in favor of the defendant with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, granting the motion is required. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion-that is, evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions-the motion should be denied. May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss. 1984). ¶ 15. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, this Court finds that, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, (1) McKee's motion for directed verdict was properly denied because there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a guilty verdict; and (2) McKee's motion for j.n.o.v. was properly denied because the evidence was not such that reasonable men could not find McKee guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.