Opinion ID: 622422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Decision Partially Granting Motion to Dismiss

Text: Jean-Laurent first challenges the District Court’s decisions dismissing his claims against Warden Patrick Walsh and Officers Terry Fowler and Deidra Colds. “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, 2 This case was originally assigned to Southern District Judge Victor Marrero, who ruled on the motions that are the subject of the appeal, before being transferred to Judge Hittner prior to trial. 2 accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Although factual allegations in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. With respect to Jean-Laurent’s claims against Warden Patrick Walsh, we affirm the District Court’s decision of July 6, 2006, dismissing these claims substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court. See Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). We decline to address Jean-Laurent’s argument that his First Amended Complaint should have been liberally construed to allege that Warden Walsh implemented an unconstitutional policy related to the use of excessive force, as he raises this argument for the first time on appeal. See In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (“It is a well-established general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.”) (alteration omitted). To the extent that Jean-Laurent has reiterated his argument that Warden Walsh was aware of, yet failed to prevent, the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates, the District Court correctly determined that Jean-Laurent’s pleadings contained no specific factual allegations suggesting that this may have been the case. We also affirm, substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court, its judgment dismissing Jean-Laurent’s claims against Officers Terry Fowler and Deidra Colds, for failing to intercede on his behalf. “A law enforcement officer has an affirmative duty to intercede on the behalf of a citizen whose constitutional rights are being violated in his presence by other officers.” O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1988). “Failure to intercede results in liability where an officer observes excessive force is being used or has reason to know that it will be.” Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001). However, “[i]n order for liability to attach, there must have been a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, Jean-Laurent did not allege in his First Amended Complaint that Fowler or Colds observed, or had reason to know of, the second alleged violation of his rights, during which he was 3 allegedly taken to a stairwell, ordered to strip, and struck in the face. Rather, he alleged only that they were present during the first alleged violation of his rights, when he “was stood to his feet by the collar of his shirt by officer Wilkinson and slammed against the wall as officer Wilkinson got in plaintiff’s face and continued to verbalize him and as ADW Jorgensen, Cpt. Burrows, Matos, C.O. Fowler, and Colds stood by and watched.” The District Court properly concluded that the First Amended Complaint failed to allege facts showing that Fowler and Colds had a reasonable opportunity to intercede to stop the first alleged violation and that they observed, or had reason to know of, the second violation, in the stairwell. Although Jean-Laurent argued in papers opposing the motion to dismiss that Fowler and Colds should have known that his rights would be violated in the stairwell because they allegedly had witnessed the first assault, were nearby and had heard another inmate scream from the vicinity of the stairwell, and had observed Jean-Laurent being escorted to the stairwell, the District Court was required only to address the sufficiency of the allegations actually made in the First Amended Complaint. In the absence of allegations in the First Amended Complaint that would plausibly support the inference that Fowler and Colds observed, or had reason to know, that Jean-Laurent’s rights were being violated, and had an opportunity to intercede, the District Court properly dismissed these claims. II. Decision Partially Granting Summary Judgment Next, Jean-Laurent challenges the District Court’s decision, on summary judgment, dismissing Jean-Laurent’s claims alleging supervisory liability on the part of Commissioner Horn and municipal liability on the part of the City of New York. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, and ask whether the District Court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to a particular claim and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002). Here, substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its Decision and Order of March 24, 2008, see Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), we affirm the District Court’s decision to grant the defendants’ summary judgment motion with respect to the claim against Commissioner Horn and any arguable claim that he had raised against the City under Monell v. Department of Social Services., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The moving party is entitled to summary 4 judgment where “the plaintiff has failed to come forth with evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to return a verdict in his or her favor” on an essential element of a claim on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 2010). In the circumstances presented here, Jean-Laurent had the burden of establishing the existence of a municipal policy or custom that caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights, whether implemented by Commissioner Horn or otherwise. See Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2008) (“To prevail against a municipality on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate both an injury to a constitutionally protected right and that the injury was caused by a policy or custom of the municipality or by a municipal official responsible for establishing final policy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that a plaintiff must offer “proof of . . . a [municipal] custom or policy in order to permit recovery on claims against individual municipal employees in their official capacities, since such claims are tantamount to claims against the municipality itself”), overruled on other grounds by Leatherman v. Terrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993). Jean-Laurent did not carry this burden, inasmuch as he offered no relevant or admissible evidence in support of his assertion that the City of New York had established a policy or custom of “use of excessive and brutal physical force against inmates/detainees by correctional officers,” and he did not establish that the deprivation of his constitutional rights was caused by any such policy. Jean-Laurent’s citation to various lawsuits involving inmate claims for the excessive use of force is not probative of the existence of an underlying policy that could be relevant here. Similarly, purported inadequacies in the investigations of complaints against DOC officers are not probative of the existence of a policy under which Jean-Laurent was deprived of a constitutional right. III. Religious Rights Claims Under §§ 1983 and 2000cc-1 Jean-Laurent next argues that the District Court erroneously precluded him from proceeding to trial on his claims for violation of his religious rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1, et seq. It is true that the District Court did not address these purported claims in its order on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but this appears to be because the Second Amended Complaint states no such claims. To be sure, the District Court had previously held, with respect to the First Amended Complaint, that Jean-Laurent had sufficiently stated claims under the First Amendment and § 2000cc-1, Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F. Supp. 2d 318, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), but the operative complaint at the time the District Court ruled on defendants’ motion for summary judgment was the Second Amended Complaint. See Dluhos v. Floating & Abandoned Vessel Known as “New York”, 162 5 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original, and renders it of no legal effect.”). Indeed, the District Court stated, at a pretrial conference, that it did “not have any understanding that this trial was going to be about that religious claim.” As the Court explained, “[t]he summary judgment ruling that the court issued on 24 March 2008 addresses all of the issues that the court understood were in the case at that point. Those all derived from the amended complaint that [Magistrate] Judge Eaton allowed.” Based on our review, the Second Amended Complaint contains no allegations relating to Jean-Laurent’s religious beliefs nor any facts from which one might infer an allegation of infringement on his religious liberty. Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it prevented Jean-Laurent from trying claims before a jury that were not stated in the Second Amended Complaint.