Opinion ID: 57472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Drug Trafficking Enhancements

Text: Under the Guidelines, the offense level for unlawfully entering the United States is increased by sixteen levels if the defendant was previously deported after being convicted of a drug trafficking offense that resulted in a sentence of thirteen or more months of imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). A “drug trafficking offense” is defined as “an offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iv) (emphasis added). We review a district court’s conclusion that a prior state conviction constitutes a drug trafficking offense de novo. United States v. Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405 F.3d 352, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2005). To determine whether a prior conviction is a predicate offense under the Guidelines, we generally apply the “categorical approach” set forth in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 273-74 (5th Cir. 2005); Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405 F.3d at 356-57. We look to the statutory definition of the underlying crime, rather than the facts supporting the conviction, and ask whether that offense necessarily fits within the definition of the enhancement. See Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d at 273. “In a ‘narrow range of cases,’ however, . . . [we] may look beyond the elements of the offense when making such a contends that the Supreme Court would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), but properly concedes that we have rejected this argument and only appeals the issue to preserve it for further review. 3 No. 06-41637 determination.” Id. (citation omitted). The determination of whether a prior offense constitutes a drug trafficking offense under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) falls into that narrow range. Id. (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Duberney, 326 F.3d 613, 616-17 (5th Cir. 2003)). We are not, therefore, free to consider any and all facts, but we “may consider the statutory definition of the predicate offense, the charging paper, and the jury instructions.” Id. (citations omitted); GutierrezRamirez, 405 F.3d at 356-57 (stating that courts do not have carte blanche authority to look beyond the indictment and jury instructions to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies for a sentencing enhancement). In the instant case, Lopez-Salas’s sentence cannot be upheld based on the statutory elements of his crime. The underlying North Carolina statute punishes anyone who “sells, manufacturers, delivers, transports, or possesses [a certain quantity] of marijuana . . . .” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(h)(1) (1993). But we have previously held that a drug trafficking enhancement could not be supported by a conviction for transporting a controlled substance unless the predicate statute included as an element an intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d at 274-75. Nor is there any extrinsic evidence that provides the requisite element of intent. The district court relied on the indictment, which charged Lopez-Salas with conspiring “to commit the felony of trafficking by transporting 100 pounds or more but less than 2000 pounds of marijuana.” Yet the indictment merely tracks the statutory language. A charging document that is no more specific than the statute of conviction adds nothing to our analysis. Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405 F.3d at 359 (holding that the indictment did not justify the enhancement because it merely recited the language of the overly broad statute). 4 No. 06-41637 Nevertheless, the Government argues that Lopez-Salas’s conviction constitutes a drug trafficking offense because North Carolina presumes that anyone convicted for transporting marijuana under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(h) intends to distribute the drugs to others. The Government asserts that the presumption can be inferred because the North Carolina statute requires the transportation of large quantities of marijuana. In further support, the Government directs us to North Carolina case law stating that “[i]n creating this offense, [North Carolina’s] legislature determined that certain amounts of controlled substances indicate an intent to distribute on a large scale.” State v. McCoy, 414 S.E.2d 392, 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted); see also State v. Carmon, 576 S.E.2d 730, 736 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted) (stating that a § 90-95 trafficking crime involves the large scale distribution of controlled substances). In response, Lopez-Salas relies on unpublished cases from this court holding that a conviction under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(h) does not constitute a drug trafficking offense. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 182 F. App’x 355 (5th Cir. May 30, 2006); United States v. Meabe-Morales, 165 F. App’x 347 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 2006). None of those cases addresses whether a state’s presumption of intent can create a drug trafficking offense under the Guidelines, however, which is both an issue of first impression in this court and the subject of a circuit split.