Opinion ID: 1708933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Taking of Collateral

Text: In addition to paying a $55 fee, plaintiff Cartwright pledged $250 in collateral with the defendants. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants violate MCL 750.167b(3); MSA 28.364(2)(3) when they require collateral security which either taken alone or together with the fee exceeds 10% of the face value of the bond. For convenience, we repeat the pertinent statutory language: It shall be lawful to charge for executing any bond in a criminal case, but no person engaged in the bonding business    shall charge, accept or receive any sum of money or property, other than the regular prevailing fee for bonding, which shall not exceed 10% of the face value of the bond for a 12 month period. (Emphasis added.) This statute authorizes a fee for executing a bond in a criminal case and limits the amount of such a fee. The statute does not specifically provide that giving the bondsman a security interest in collateral is included within the 10% fee. We must, therefore, analyze the statutory language to determine the legislative intent. To do so, it is appropriate to look to the language and interpretation of analogous statutes. See 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 53.03, p 346. The defendants cite to us several analogous statutes where language similar to that of the instant statute is used and the language has not been interpreted to prohibit the taking of collateral. For instance, MCL 493.13(4); MSA 23.667(13)(4), which is part of legislation regulating small loans by consumer finance companies in Michigan, provides in pertinent part: In addition to the charges provided for in this act, a further or other amount shall not be directly or indirectly charged, contracted for, or received except the lawful fees, if any, actually necessarily paid out by the licensee to a public officer, for filing, or recording, or releasing in a public office a financing statement, an instrument securing the loan, or both, and for noting or releasing a lien or transferring a certificate of title under Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended. (Emphasis added.) MCL 492.118(a); MSA 23.628(18)(a), part of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, limits the finance charges by an installment seller of an automobile as follows: A seller licensed under the provisions of this act may charge, contract for, receive, or collect a finance charge, as defined in this act, on any installment sale contract covering the retail sale of a motor vehicle in this state which shall not exceed the rates indicated. (Emphasis added.) The limiting language in these statutes has not been applied to prevent the seller or lender from taking a security interest in collateral to secure the loan. The statute regulating pawnbrokers and limiting their rates, MCL 446.209; MSA 19.589, also uses the terms charge and receive and contemplates the taking of collateral in addition to the rates charged. No pawnbroker or agent or employee thereof shall make a loan upon any deposit, pawn or pledge at a rate of interest and charge or receive therefor in excess of the amounts provided for in this act. (Emphasis added.) After reviewing the above statutes, we are satisfied that the Legislature did not intend to prohibit bondsmen from taking a security interest in collateral in addition to the 10% fee. Posting a bond for a fee is similar to loaning money and charging interest. Statutes regulating the latter contain limiting language similar to the language found in the statute limiting bondsmen's fees, and they do not prohibit the taking of collateral. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point. The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified in part, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. We remand to the Wayne Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.