Opinion ID: 392158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the roles of the states and the secretary in

Text: ADMINISTERING THE SURFACE MINING ACT 10 Congress chose a special kind of regulatory structure for the Surface Mining Act, in which the federal government shares administrative responsibility with the states. Rather than reposing all decisionmaking power with the Secretary of the Interior, Congress afforded the states an opportunity to propose regulatory programs of their own, conforming to the requirements of the Act and to regulations promulgated by the Secretary. 6 Under a state program, the state makes decisions applying the national requirements of the Act to the particular local conditions of the state. The Secretary is initially to decide whether the proposed state program is capable of carrying out the provisions of the Act, but is not directly involved in local decisionmaking after the program has been approved. 11 The essence of appellant's arguments against the Secretary's claimed rulemaking power is that it does violence to the special allocation of decisionmaking power effected by the statute's structure. Because the state has the primary governmental responsibility under an approved state program, Act § 101(f), appellant urges that the Secretary has no power to decide what information the state should have before it makes its decisions. 12 The Secretary responds that this argument exaggerates the independence of the state's role in administering an approved program and slights the Secretary's responsibilities in approving and overseeing such a program. Appellant, according to the Secretary, would place an unjustified limitation on his approval role by denying his right to ask the states to seek more information in the permit application than explicitly required by the statute. 13
14 In an approved and properly enforced state program, the state has the primary responsibility for achieving the purposes of the Act. First, the state is the sole issuer of permits. In performing this centrally important duty, the state regulatory authority decides who will mine in what areas, how long they may conduct mining operations, and under what conditions the operations will take place. See Act §§ 506, 510. It decides whether a permittee's techniques for avoiding environmental degradation are sufficient and whether the proposed reclamation plan is acceptable. Act § 510(b). The state sets the amount of the bond to be posted by the operator, and inspects the mine to determine compliance. Act §§ 509, 517. When permit conditions are violated, the state is charged with imposing appropriate penalties. Act § 518(i). 15 Finally, it is with an approved state law and with state regulations consistent with the Secretary's that surface mine operators must comply. See Act § 503(a), 518(i). Administrative and judicial appeals of permit decisions are matters of state jurisdiction in which the Secretary plays no role. Act § 514. 7 16 As long as the state properly enforces its approved program, it is the exclusive on the scene regulatory authority. 8 It is, essentially, the entity that applies the general standards of the Act to the particular geographical and geological circumstances of the state. Congress cited the flexibility achieved in this allocation of regulatory functions as its reason for leaving primary governmental responsibility with the states. Act § 101(f). 17
18 Once the state has assumed all these functions, the Secretary's role is primarily one of oversight. The statute requires occasional federal on-site inspections to evaluate the administration of approved State programs. Act § 517(a). Interested persons may also report suspected violations of the Act or of state-imposed permit conditions to the Secretary, and if he has reason to believe the allegations he must notify the state regulatory authority. Act § 521(a). If the state fails to take appropriate action, the Secretary is to order a federal inspection of the mine site. Id. Violations that threaten imminent environmental harm are to be halted by a cessation order from the Secretary. Act § 521(a)(2). 19 The Secretary's oversight function is shared in part by the public, which is given the right to sue in federal court, to compel compliance with the state program and its permits. Act § 520. Both the Secretary and the public have access to a large body of information, including nonconfidential permit application information, to facilitate this enforcement role. Act §§ 507(e), 517(f); see 30 C.F.R. § 840.14 (1979). 20 The Secretary's ultimate power over lax state enforcement is set out in section 521(b) of the Act. When the Secretary determines that violations result from a state's lack of intent or capability to enforce the state program, he is to enforce permit conditions directly, and to take over the entire permit-issuing process himself. 21 Direct intervention by the Secretary in the operation of state regulatory programs is clearly intended as an extraordinary remedy. See H.R.Rep.No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 593, 661. The Secretary's primary means of guaranteeing effective state programs lies in his approval function at the beginning of the process. 22 A state wishing to take over regulatory responsibility for administering the Act within its borders must submit a proposed state program to the Secretary for his approval. Act § 503. The Secretary may only approve a program if he determines that the state has the capability of carrying out the provisions of this Act and meeting its purposes. Act § 503(a). The proposed state program must include a State law which provides for the effective implementatio(n), maintenance, and enforcement of a permit system, Act § 503(a)(4), and rules and regulations consistent with regulations issued by the Secretary pursuant to this Act, Act § 503(a)(7). The Secretary is required to hold a public hearing, to solicit the views of other federal agencies, and to obtain the written concurrence of the Environmental Protection Agency with respect to certain aspects of the state program. Act § 503(b). 23
24 A major premise of appellant's argument is that Congress deliberately minimized the federal role in administration of the Act out of deference to state prerogatives. Appellant denies that the statute is based primarily on environmental concerns, and insists that an even more fundamental purpose of the Act ... is to preserve the federal structure of our nation and to leave with the states primary responsibility for this land-use regulation. 9 Congress' special solicitude for the states' traditional role in controlling local land use, appellant claims, prevented Congress from delegating to the Secretary authority to dictate permit information requirements to the states. 25 Our own examination of the Act and its legislative history reveals a very different congressional assessment of the tradition of state surface mining regulation. The legislative history contains significant expressions of congressional dissatisfaction with state mining regulation practices: 26 (D)espite claims from some quarters that state reclamation laws have improved so significantly that Federal mining standards are no longer needed, the hearing record abounds with evidence that this is simply not the case. For a variety of reasons, including the reluctance of the State to impose stringent controls on its own industry, serious abuses continue. 27 H.R.Rep.No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 593, 596. Congress preferred to leave primary governmental responsibility with the states because of the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations, Act § 101(f), but skepticism about the states' willingness to implement the federal program justified the Secretary's continuing oversight role. 28 While it is confident that the delegation of primary regulatory authority to the States will result in adequate State enforcement, the committee is also of the belief that a limited Federal oversight role as well as increased opportunity for citizens to participate in the enforcement program are necessary to assure that the old patterns of minimal enforcement are not repeated. 29 H.R.Rep.No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 593, 661. 30 Congress announced its willingness, wherever necessary, (to) exercise the full reach of Federal constitutional powers to insure the protection of the public interest through effective control of surface coal mining operations. Act § 102(m). Nationwide standards were essential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their borders. Act § 101(g). 10 Congress' concern about the states' ability to withstand economic temptation extended to the very area of permit information with which we are dealing: 31 Experience has shown that without a thorough and comprehensive data base presented with the permit application, and absent analysis and review both by the agency and by other affected parties based upon adequate data, th(i)s judgment has often traditionally reflected the economic interest in expanding a State's mining industry. Valid environmental factors tend to receive short shrift. 32 H.R.Rep.No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 593, 627. 33 Thus, the legislative history of the Act, the declarations of congressional purpose it contains, and the allocation of authority it creates between the Secretary and the states confirm that Congress was not interested in perpetuating the existing tradition of state mining regulation, and that Congress saw the need for both federal standards and federal oversight to guarantee an effective change. Congress did not withhold powers that the Secretary might require in his efforts to safeguard federal interests. 11 34