Opinion ID: 196319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Claims against Attorney Fennel and Law Firm.

Text: 17 The district court granted motions to dismiss by William Fennel, Pandey's court appointed attorney in his criminal case, and by Fennel's law firm. A private attorney who is sued for actions allegedly taken as court-appointed counsel does not act under color of state law [for purposes of Sec. 1983]. Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 710 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986). Similarly, a federal court-appointed attorney is also shielded from claims of constitutional violations since a Bivens-type suit requires federal action in the same manner as Sec. 1983 requires state action. Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924 n. 1 (2d Cir.1979). Pandey's wholly conclusory allegations of conspiracy between Fennell and the United States Attorney are not sufficient to convert the private attorney's actions into federal action for purposes of the Bivens claims. See Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567, 570 (1st Cir.1973). 18 With respect to the state-based claims of attorney malpractice and negligence, they are essentially repetitions of the issues raised in Pandey's motion in the district court to have his attorney Fennell removed from representing him in the criminal case. They were specifically determined by the district court, and affirmed by this court, in the antecedent criminal case. Therefore, collateral estoppel precludes Pandey from again raising the issue of the adequacy of Fennell's representation in this civil case. The principle that collateral estoppel precludes raising issues in a civil case already decided in a prior criminal trial has been long established. Glantz v. United States, 837 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir.1988) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not err in allowing Fennell's motion to dismiss. 19 The claim against Fennell's law firm was also properly dismissed. Although named as a defendant in the caption, the law firm is not mentioned in the body of the complaint. Therefore, the district court did not err in ruling that Pandey had failed to state a claim against the law firm. 20 On appeal, Pandey claims that the district court erred in denying his motions for default judgments against Fennell and his law firm for failure to timely file an answer. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2) provides that upon motion made after the expiration of [a] specified [time] period, [the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion] permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect ...  The reason given by the defendant lawyer and law firm for moving for an extension was the voluminous length and scope of the complaint. The district court is afforded great leeway in granting or refusing enlargements ... and its decisions are reviewable only for abuse of that discretion. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 583-84 (1st Cir.1994). Given the length and scope of the complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the failure to timely file a response was excusable neglect. 21