Opinion ID: 1060912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Juror Pool

Text: Finally, the appellant contends that the jury selection process in Dyer County did not afford the appellant a jury representative of a fair cross-section of the community. [23] Specifically, the appellant claims that the use of a list of registered drivers as the pool from which to draw prospective jurors essentially denies African-Americans the opportunity to serve on a jury. The appellant neither offers legal authority nor cites to any proof in the record which would support his argument. The United States Supreme Court set forth a three-pronged test in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), for determining whether a jury was properly selected from a fair cross-section of the community pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; [24] (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; (3) that this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren, 439 U.S. at 363, 99 S.Ct. at 668. The Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted this test. State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 610 (Tenn. 1984). See also Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal dismissed, (Tenn. 1995); State v. Blunt, 708 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1993). T.J. Jones, the Circuit Court Clerk for Dyer County, outlined to the trial court the method by which his office selects the jury venire in Dyer County. He testified that his office selects the jury venire from a list of licensed drivers in the county. Out of the total county population of 38,000 people, there are 28,000 licensed drivers. Members of Jones' office calculate the number of jurors required for a two year period, which in this case was approximately 3,000. They then divide the number of licensed drivers by the number of jurors needed. The quotient determines the number of names they will skip when they count down the alphabetical list of 28,000 licensed drivers to obtain 3,000 jurors. Mr. Jones further testified that, of the 150 jurors available for the selection of the appellant's jury, twelve or thirteen were African-Americans. Consequently, African-Americans constituted approximately eight percent of the prospective jurors. Finally, Jones testified that approximately seven percent of the population of Dyer County is African-American. Accordingly, the record reveals no disparity between the size of the cognizable group in the community and its representation in the appellant's jury venire. Nor does the record contain evidence that the use of driver's license rolls has resulted in the systematic exclusion of African-Americans in the jury selection process. Indeed, our supreme court has approved the use of voter registration lists to select potential jurors. See State v. Caruthers, 676 S.W.2d 935, 939 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1197, 105 S.Ct. 981, 83 L.Ed.2d 982 (1985). Although no court in this state has addressed the use of driver's license rolls in selecting jury venires, we can see no material difference between the use of a list of registered voters and the use of a list of registered drivers. [25] The appellant has failed to establish a prima facie case under either the state or federal constitution. Having completely reviewed the record, we do not find any error in the selection of the jury in this case. This issue is without merit.
The appellant claims that the use of extreme and substantial as modifiers in describing the mitigating circumstances set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-204(j)(2), (8) (1991) created a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood them to prohibit consideration of the appellant's mental disturbance unless it exceeded some undefined threshold. Accordingly, the appellant asserts, the jury was prevented from considering as mitigation any aspect of [the appellant's] character or record. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Our supreme court has repeatedly rejected this argument. See Smith, 893 S.W.2d at 920; Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 268; State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 16-17 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 996, 114 S.Ct. 561, 126 L.Ed.2d 461 (1993), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040, 114 S.Ct. 682, 126 L.Ed.2d 650 (1994). Therefore, this issue is without merit.
The appellant claims that the imposition of the death penalty in this case violates substantive due process and equal protection principles. The appellant contends that the State has no compelling interest in executing the appellant because it offered the appellant a life sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. [26] The Tennessee Supreme Court has consistently found that the death penalty is constitutional and does not impermissibly infringe upon the right to life. See, e.g., Smith, 893 S.W.2d at 926; Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 253; Smith, 857 S.W.2d at 1; Black, 815 S.W.2d at 166; State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074, 111 S.Ct. 800, 112 L.Ed.2d 861 (1991); State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. 1990); Thompson, 768 S.W.2d at 239. This issue is without merit.
The appellant acknowledges that the constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty statute has been upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court, but raises the following issues in order to preserve them for subsequent proceedings. The appellant argues that (1) the death penalty statute fails to meaningfully narrow the class of eligible defendants; (2) the prosecution has unlimited discretion in seeking the death penalty; (3) the death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner based upon economics, race, geography, and sex; (4) there are no uniform standards for jury selection; (5) the juries tend to be prone to returning guilty verdicts; (6) the defendant is denied the opportunity to address the jury's popular misconceptions about parole eligibility, cost of incarceration, deterrence, and method of execution; (7) the jury is instructed it must unanimously agree to a life sentence, and is prevented from being told the effect of a non-unanimous verdict; (8) the courts fail to instruct the juries on the meaning and function of mitigating circumstances; (9) the jury is deprived of making the final decision about the death penalty; (10) the defendant is denied the final argument during the sentencing phase; (11) electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment; and (12) the appellate review process in death penalty cases is constitutionally inadequate. These issues have repeatedly been rejected by the Tennessee courts. See Smith, 893 S.W.2d at 908; State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1020, 115 S.Ct. 585, 130 L.Ed.2d 499 (1994); Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 253; Smith, 857 S.W.2d at 1; Black, 815 S.W.2d at 166; Boyd, 797 S.W.2d at 589; Teel, 793 S.W.2d at 236; Thompson, 768 S.W.2d at 239.