Opinion ID: 2116413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the City immune from plaintiffs' claim based on the emergency response exception?

Text: The City contends that it is immune from liability concerning plaintiffs' claims under the emergency response exception to liability, see Iowa Code section 670.4(11). Specifically, the City asserts that it is immune from liability concerning plaintiffs' claims because its decision not to close the railroad opening was made in response to an emergency, the unprecedented flood. The City urges that a flood of this proportion could be nothing but an emergency and thus it is immune from liability for any decisions it made during its efforts in fighting the flood. It thus contends that the district court properly granted its motion for summary judgment in the Keystone case on this basis and erred in denying its motion in the Merchants case. Plaintiffs contend that the City is not immune from liability under the emergency response exception to liability. Plaintiffs assert that the emergency did not occur until the flood waters started coming through the railroad opening and that the City therefore could have closed the opening in the levee before the emergency occurred. Plaintiffs thus claim that the City was not responding to an emergency when it decided not to close the opening.
Iowa Code section 670.4(11) provides immunity to a municipality for: A claim based upon or arising out of an act or omission in connection with an emergency response including but not limited to acts or omissions in connection with emergency response communications services. By its language, section 670.4(11) gives a municipality immunity for claims concerning the action and reaction of its officers or employees in response to an emergency situation. Cf. City of Arlington v. Whitaker, 977 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex.Ct.App.1998) (interpreting Texas emergency exception in Texas Tort Claims Act and stating emergency exception by its language completely removes emergency action and reaction from the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity ). Therefore, if a municipality chooses not to act, and such decision is made during the course of an emergency, the municipality is immune from liability for any claims related to its inaction. The question we must therefore decide is whether it can be said as a matter of law that an emergency existed at the time the City decided not to close the railroad opening in the levee.
Upon our review, we conclude that there is a material issue of fact concerning whether the City's omission or failure to close the railroad opening was made in response to an emergency situation. We recognize that the flood during the time in question was an unprecedented flood. We also note that the record shows that the City made its decisions concerning how it would fight the flood based on information it received from the Weather Bureau regarding water levels of the river at particular locations. However, the record also contains evidence that other officials, besides Des Moines city officials, believed that the water levels were actually going to be higher than those predicted by the Weather Bureau. This information was conveyed to the City, but the City chose not to close the railroad opening. Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as we are required to do, we believe that a material issue of fact was generated concerning when an emergency occurred as a result of the flood waters and the time the City had for a response to oncoming flood waters. We therefore cannot say as a matter of law that the City was acting in response to an emergency when it decided not to close the railroad opening in the levee. Accordingly, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the City is immune from liability under the emergency response exception to the City's general waiver of immunity under Iowa Code section 670.4(11). Cf. Odello Bros. v. County of Monterey, 63 Cal.App.4th 778, 791, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 911 (Cal.App.1998) (county not immune from inverse condemnation claim under emergency exception because although county was responding to flood when it intentionally breached a levee, the emergency was due to inadequacy of another levee, of which city had knowledge, but took no action to repair). On this issue raised in the City's motions for summary judgment, the district court correctly overruled the motion in the Merchants case and erred in sustaining the motion in the Keystone case.