Opinion ID: 788225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 34 On appeal, defendants do not challenge the District Court's findings of fact, nor do they contest the legal conclusions regarding the substantive issues of liability that follow from those findings. Instead, they put forward an array of challenges to the District Court's jurisdiction over this case and the parties to it. Specifically, they argue that the District Court (a) erred in denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration; (b) lost jurisdiction to proceed after defendants filed a notice of appeal from the District Court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration; (c) abused its discretion when it exercised supplemental jurisdiction over exclusively non-federal claims based on considerations of efficiency and fairness to litigants; (d) erred when it concluded that plaintiffs' claims were ripe for adjudication under Illinois law; and (e) lacked personal jurisdiction over most of the various defendants. For the reasons stated below, we reject each of these arguments.
35 Defendants claim that the District Court erred in denying their motion to compel arbitration. Reviewing this claim de novo, see Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir.1987), we conclude that the District Court correctly held that defendants, who were not parties to any agreement to arbitrate with plaintiffs, could not compel plaintiffs to arbitrate. 36 Defendants sought to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 206, part of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Chapter 2 of the FAA, which implements the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (the New York Convention), applies to an arbitration agreement, like the Agreements at issue here, that is commercial and that is not entirely between citizens of the United States. 9 U.S.C. § 202. Section 206 provides that [a] court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided for.... 9 U.S.C. § 206. To determine whether to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 206, courts inquire whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and, if so, whether the scope of that agreement encompasses the asserted claims. David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir.1991). 37 In this case, the parties did not agree to arbitrate. Defendants invoke the arbitration clauses in the Motorola Agreements and the Nokia Agreements, to which Telsim and Rumeli—but not any of the defendants—were signatories. Defendants seek to compel arbitration under two theories. First, they contend that the doctrine of estoppel prevents plaintiffs from resisting arbitration. See, e.g., Choctaw Generation Ltd. P'ship v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403, 404 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that a signatory to an arbitration agreement was estopped from avoiding arbitration with a non-signatory `when the issues the nonsignatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed' (quoting Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir.1999))). Second, they argue that a party that signs an arbitration agreement with a corporation is also bound to arbitrate with that corporation's agents. See Campaniello Imports, Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia, S.p.A., 117 F.3d 655, 668 (2d Cir.1997) (`Courts in this and other circuits consistently have held that employees or disclosed agents of an entity that is a party to an arbitration agreement are protected by that agreement.' (quoting Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir.1993))). 38 Defendants did not raise in the District Court their second argument, based on Campaniello Imports, and so that Court only addressed their estoppel argument. The Court held that estoppel did not apply here because the very allegations of the Complaint, let alone the overwhelming evidence now adduced in their support show that this is not a case of trying to plead-around an agreement to arbitrate but rather of directly suing the real culprits, the Uzans, who simply used Telsim as a front to commit the instant fraud. Uzan II, 274 F.Supp.2d at 505. The Court also held that estoppel, an equitable doctrine, was unavailable to defendants based on their misconduct both prior to and during the litigation, which left them with unclean hands. See id. Finally, Judge Rakoff observed that the agreements at issue contained Swiss choice-of-law clauses, and that Swiss law strictly enforces privity of contract and generally prohibits nonparties from seeking to invoke contractual terms on their behalf. Id. at 506. Without addressing whether the choice-of-law clauses were an independent basis for denying arbitration, he stated that those clauses reinforce[d] the appropriateness of denying equitable relief to defendants. 8 Id. 39 Plaintiffs argue that we need not address the federal-law theories advanced by defendants under which a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement may compel a signatory to arbitrate. They assert that Swiss law governs the issue of whether defendants may invoke the arbitration clauses and that, under Swiss law, defendants may not. Defendants respond that federal law controls issues of arbitrability, and that in any event, Swiss law would permit them to obtain arbitration.
40 Defendants moved to compel arbitration under Section 206, which permits a court to order that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 206. The agreements at issue here recite that they will be governed by Swiss law. See Uzan II, 274 F.Supp.2d at 506. 41 We have applied a choice-of-law clause to determine which laws govern the validity of an agreement to arbitrate. See Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 263 F.3d 26, 32 n. 3 (2d Cir.2001). In Sphere Drake, we applied New York and New Jersey choice-of-law clauses to one party's claim that it was not bound by an arbitration agreement that its agent had signed while purportedly acting outside the scope of agency. See id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 218 (1971) (providing that the rules of conflicts of law apply to [t]he validity of an arbitration agreement, and the rights created thereby). More generally, a choice-of-law clause in a contract will apply to disputes about the existence or validity of that contract. See, e.g., Int'l Minerals & Res., S.A. v. Pappas, 96 F.3d 586, 592 (2d Cir.1996) (applying an English choice-of-law clause to an issue of contract formation). 42 Defendants claim that a choice-of-law clause does not govern questions of contract validity where the ultimate issue is one of arbitrability. They rely principally on decisions that apply federal law to the question of arbitrability despite the presence of a choice-of-law clause designating another forum's laws. See, e.g., Campaniello Imports, 117 F.3d at 659, 668-69 (applying federal law to an arbitration clause in a contract containing an Italian choice-of-law clause, without discussing Italian law). However, these authorities do not hold that a court must set aside a choice-of-law clause in determining arbitrability; instead, they appear to be cases where neither party raised the choice-of-law issue. See, e.g., Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship v. Smith Congeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir.1999) (While the language [of the agreement] might justify looking to Texas law ..., neither party argued that it applied. Thus, we will apply the body of federal law under the FAA.). 43 Defendants also argue that applying federal law to the interpretation of arbitration agreements is required to further the purposes of the FAA and to create a uniform body of federal law on arbitrability. Their uniformity argument has some force where the parties have not selected the governing law. But where the parties have chosen the governing body of law, honoring their choice is necessary to ensure uniform interpretation and enforcement of that agreement and to avoid forum shopping. This is especially true of contracts between transnational parties, where applying the parties' choice of law is the only way to ensure uniform application of arbitration clauses within the numerous countries that have signed the New York Convention. Furthermore, respecting the parties' choice of law is fully consistent with the purposes of the FAA. Cf. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by [California] rules of arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA ....). 44 In short, if defendants wish to invoke the arbitration clauses in the agreements at issue, they must also accept the Swiss choice-of-law clauses that govern those agreements.
45 After oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing from the parties on various points of Swiss law and invited the parties to submit statements from experts. Plaintiffs submitted a Joint Declaration of Dr. Pierre Karrer, Dr. Franz Kellerhals, and Dr. Beat Denzler (the Karrer Declaration), while defendants submitted an Affidavit of Dr. Phillipe Schweizer (the Schweizer Affidavit). All of these experts are highly credentialed Swiss lawyers who have substantial experience with arbitration law. 46 Having reviewed these statements and their supporting authorities, we conclude that under Swiss law, defendants, as nonsignatories to the agreements, may not invoke the arbitration clauses contained in those agreements. 47 The Karrer Declaration, submitted by plaintiffs, concludes that under Swiss law, a director, shareholder or employee of Telsim, or any other third party, would not be permitted to invoke the arbitration clause in the Finance Agreements. Karrer Decl. ¶ 16. Plaintiffs' experts admit that there are exceptions to this doctrine: where the nonsignatory is a successor in interest to a signatory, id. ¶¶ 18-20, or where the nonsignatory is willing to arbitrate. Id. ¶ 21. They cite a decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (the highest court in Switzerland), which provides, in relevant part: [I]n principle an arbitration clause is binding only on those parties which have entered into a contractual agreement to submit to arbitration, whether directly or indirectly through their representatives. Exceptions to this rule arise in cases of legal succession, retroactive approval of an arbitration clause or attempts to pierce the corporate veil of a legal entity in the case of abusive objections to the clause. 48 See Swiss Federal Tribunal, decision of May 19, 2003, 4C.40/2003, No. 4.1, appended to Karrer Declaration. 9 49 Plaintiffs' experts state that [t]here is no Swiss authority where a Non-Signatory has even tried to compel/invoke arbitration against a Signatory .... Karrer Decl. ¶ 26. Defendants' expert, Dr. Phillipe Schweizer, does not reach any contrary conclusion. He reviews five decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, each of which addresses attempts by a signatory to invoke an arbitration clause against a nonsignatory. Schweizer Aff. 3-5. The rule that emerges from these cases, and the declarations offered by the experts of both sides, is that a nonsignatory may be required to arbitrate in certain circumstances where it acts in bad faith. As Schweizer summarizes, [a] person who adopts a certain mode of behavior, which clearly reflects his objective intentions, recognizable as such by his contractual partners and by third parties, may not, as a rule, subsequently avail himself of the fact that the perceptions he has created do not correspond to his true intentions .... Id. at 6. Schweizer describes this as the principle of good faith. 10 Id. 50 Schweizer has offered no authority in which a nonsignatory has attempted to invoke an arbitration clause, much less succeeded in doing so. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Schweizer does not directly conclude that defendants could invoke the arbitration clauses in this case. He concludes, referring to the non-signatory natural and legal persons here—that is, defendants—that it is difficult to imagine an arbitral tribunal convened in Switzerland, declining jurisdiction with regard to these same persons, supposing that they challenged the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal over them. Schweizer Aff. 5-6. In other words, a Swiss arbitral tribunal would not decline jurisdiction over defendants, if defendants were to challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction in an arbitration brought by plaintiffs. 51 Defendants argue that the decisions cited by Schweizer—which address whether a signatory can invoke an arbitration clause against a nonsignatory—imply that a nonsignatory can likewise invoke an arbitration clause against a signatory. See Defs.' Supp. Br. at 22-23 (referring to the issue of whether a signatory could compel a nonsignatory to arbitrate as a more difficult issue than that presented here). These decisions, however, do not support defendants' conclusion. First, and rather conspicuously, defendants' expert does not draw such a conclusion about Swiss law. Second, the rationale underlying the decisions—which Schweizer describes as the principle of good faith—does not require plaintiffs to arbitrate in the instant case. There is no evidence that plaintiffs acted in bad faith or in any way manifested an intent to enter into a contract with the Uzans as individuals. In contrast, the District Court's opinion is replete with findings that defendants repeatedly acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Uzan II, 274 F.Supp.2d at 505 (applying the doctrine of unclean hands to bar defendants from equitable relief). In these circumstances, defendants have no basis for invoking a principle of good faith. 52 In sum, even accepting Schweizer's affidavit at face value, it does not materially advance defendants' position. 53 We therefore conclude that under Swiss law, which governs the agreements at issue, defendants, as nonsignatories, have no right to invoke those agreements. We accordingly affirm the District Court's denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration. 11 54
55 Defendants next argue that their filing of a notice of appeal from the District Court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to proceed. The District Court refused to stay the proceedings, finding that defendants' appeal was frivolous. We hold that, although defendants' appeal was not frivolous, the District Court did have jurisdiction to continue with the case in the absence of a stay from this Court. 56 The Supreme Court has stated that [t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982); see also New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1350 (2d Cir.1989) ([T]he filing of a notice of appeal only divests the district court of jurisdiction respecting the questions raised and decided in the order that is on appeal.). The issue, therefore, is whether the trial of a case on the merits is involved in an appeal of an order denying arbitration. 57 The only authority in this Circuit strongly suggests that it is not. In In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders' Derivative Litigation, 68 F.3d 554, 556 (2d Cir.1995), deciding an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, we refused to stay the proceedings below, and we affirm[ed] the decision [of the district court] to proceed to trial. In re Salomon involved a shareholders' derivative suit brought on behalf of Salomon Brothers against several former employees, arising from a Treasury Bill auction scandal. See id. at 555. The defendant employees sought to compel arbitration under the FAA, based on agreements they had signed with Salomon Brothers providing for arbitration of any disputes arising out of their employment. See id. The district court initially granted the motion and referred the matter to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the arbitral forum designated in the arbitration agreements. See id. The NYSE, however, declined to arbitrate the dispute, and the defendants went back to the district court, seeking an order compelling arbitration, staying trial pending arbitration, and appointing substitute arbitrators under Section 5 of the FAA. See id. at 555-56. The district court denied that motion, and the defendants appealed. 58 We ultimately affirmed the district court's order denying arbitration, holding that [b]ecause the parties had contractually agreed that only the NYSE could arbitrate any disputes between them, Judge Patterson properly declined to appoint substitute arbitrators and compel arbitration in another forum. Id. at 559. Prior to our decision, however, the defendants on two occasions asked this Court for a stay of the trial pending appeal, and each time we refused. Id. at 557. We concluded that we would not disturb Judge Patterson's decision to proceed to trial. Id. at 561. 59 Our decision in In re Salomon plainly contemplated that a district court has jurisdiction to proceed with a case despite the pendency of an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. We approved Judge Patterson's decision to deny the defendants a stay pending appeal, and we twice denied the same relief to defendants when they moved in this Court for a stay. 60 Other circuits are divided on this question. The Ninth Circuit has held that an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over other proceedings in the case. See Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir.1990). The Court observed that either the district court or the court of appeals may—but is not required to—stay the proceedings upon determining that the appeal presents a substantial question. Id. at 1412 & n. 8. In contrast, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have held that a district court may not proceed after the filing of a nonfrivolous appeal from an order denying arbitration. See Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.2004) (Upon motion, proceedings in the district court ... should be stayed pending resolution of a non-frivolous appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration.); Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir.1997). Notably, in both Blinco and Bradford-Scott the Courts of Appeals granted a stay of the district court proceedings pending appeal. In no case has a Court of Appeals granted the relief that defendants now seek—undoing a trial because the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed after an appeal from an order denying arbitration. 61 We now follow In re Salomon Brothers and explicitly adopt the Ninth Circuit's position that further district court proceedings in a case are not involved in the appeal of an order refusing arbitration, and that a district court therefore has jurisdiction to proceed with a case absent a stay from this Court. 12
62 Defendants argue next that the District Court could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state-law claims because it had no subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' federal claims. They argue further that, even if the Court had jurisdiction over the RICO claims, the Court abused its discretion when it exercised supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state-law claims after both the RICO claims and the other federal claims in the complaint had been dismissed. 63 Defendants' first argument can be swiftly rejected. When our Court directed the District Court to dismiss plaintiffs' RICO claims on the ground that they were not ripe for adjudication, we stated specifically that plaintiffs lacked statutory standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), rather than constitutional standing under Article III. See Uzan I, 322 F.3d at 135 (Plaintiffs lack statutory standing under RICO. (emphasis added)). 13 In doing so, we dismissed Motorola's RICO claim on the merits rather than for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 129-30 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that lack of statutory standing under RICO is not jurisdictional in nature ... but is rather an element of the merits addressed under a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim). We then remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), Uzan I, 322 F.3d at 137, a step which would have been unnecessary had we believed that the plaintiffs have not suffered the injury-in-fact necessary for Article III standing. 64 In any event, it is readily apparent that defendants' dilution and eventual destruction of plaintiffs' collateral amounts to the requisite injury-in-fact for Article III purposes, even if that injury is not sufficiently definite for RICO purposes. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir.2003) (explaining that under Article III, a plaintiff need demonstrate only an actual or imminent injury). Here, the injury to Motorola and Nokia was not contingent on any future event, even if the damages stemming from that injury could not be identified with precision at the pleading stage. 65 Defendants' alternative argument—namely, that the District Court abused its discretion when it exercised supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' Illinois claims even after dismissing all the federal claims in the complaint—is more substantial, but it too does not persuade us that the District Court was obligated to decline jurisdiction in these circumstances. The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, provides in relevant part that 66 (c) [t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 67 Under § 1367(c)(3), it is indisputable that Judge Rakoff could have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after we directed him to dismiss plaintiffs' RICO claims and after he dismissed plaintiffs' other federal claims. The issue is whether he was obligated to do so. We review the District Court's decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims for abuse of discretion. Marcus v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 138 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir.1998). When, as in this case, a federal court dismisses all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, it must reassess its jurisdiction over the case by considering several related factors—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1191 (2d Cir.1996). 68 Applying these factors, our Court has held, as a general proposition, that if [all] federal claims are dismissed before trial ..., the state claims should be dismissed as well. Castellano v. Bd. of Trustees, 937 F.2d 752, 758 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)) (emphasis added); accord Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir.2001). However, we have also held that when the dismissal of the federal claim occurs `late in the action, after there has been substantial expenditure in time, effort, and money in preparing the dependent claims, knocking them down with a belated rejection of supplemental jurisdiction may not be fair. Nor is it by any means necessary.' Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367, Practice Commentary (1993) at 835). 69 The District Court concluded that this is a particularly strong case for retaining jurisdiction because the Court has not only spent considerable time dealing with the legal issues and becoming fully conversant with the facts but also has conducted a trial on the merits. Uzan II, 274 F.Supp.2d at 497 (emphasis added). We agree. Considering the significant (and probably non-duplicable) judicial resources that the District Court expended to evaluate the enormous record, to craft findings of fact, and to impose remedies, it would have `stood judicial economy on its head' not to proceed with the state claims after our remand. Enercomp, Inc. v. McCorhill Publ'g, Inc., 873 F.2d 536, 546 (2d Cir.1989). 14 Indeed, based on reasoning similar to the District Court's, our Court has upheld the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in situations where far fewer resources were expended before the dismissal of federal claims. See Ametex Fabrics, Inc. v. Just In Materials, Inc., 140 F.3d 101, 105-06 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in maintaining jurisdiction after discovery and a settlement conference had taken place). 70 Additionally, where, as in the instant case, defendants take affirmative steps to frustrate any potential enforcement of a judgment against them, we perceive a strong fairness to litigants argument in favor of maintaining jurisdiction. Cf. Correspondent Servs. Corp. v. First Equities Corp., 338 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir.2003) (recognizing fairness to litigants as an important consideration under 28 U.S.C. § 1367). The District Court in the instant case found that, in addition to diluting and then cancelling plaintiffs' collateral, defendants have, inter alia, failed to comply with orders to release their foreign bank records, failed to submit proper asset disclosures to an English Court, failed to appear for depositions, and initiated foreign proceedings for the sole purpose of impeding and evading the orders of the District Court. The District Court found also that defendants did not comply with its orders to suspend and then to reverse the process by which plaintiffs' collateral was diluted. Although a district court must, of course, adhere to the requirement that it have original jurisdiction over a federal claim before it asserts supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (providing supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that are part of the same case or controversy as claims within [the district court's] original jurisdiction), it would hardly be fair to litigants for district courts to close their eyes to a plaintiff's dwindling prospects of enforcing a judgment because of a defendant's egregious and obstructive conduct. Here, in light of what the District Court found to be defendants' pattern of concealing and diverting assets, there is every reason to believe that defendants would have exploited any delay associated with the transfer of this case to Illinois. The District Court in no way abused its discretion by preventing defendants from doing so. 71 In response to the District Court's reliance on judicial economy and fairness, defendants claim that the District Court failed adequately to weigh comity. Specifically, according to defendants, the Court improperly reached out to decide the novel state law question whether [Motorola's] Illinois fraud claim is ripe. For the reasons stated in the next section, we do not accept the view that the ripeness question is somehow novel. Therefore, we reject defendants' contention that the District Court was required to decline jurisdiction based on considerations of comity.
72 The defendants assert that, under Illinois law, Motorola's fraud claims are unripe for the same reasons that the RICO claims were deemed unripe by this Court in Uzan I. See Uzan I, 322 F.3d at 136-37 (directing dismissal of RICO claims because damages were not yet clear and definite for purposes of RICO standing). Specifically, according to defendants, the Illinois fraud claims, like the RICO claims, are not ripe because the damages suffered by the plaintiffs will not be clear and definite until Telsim defaults on its obligations. We disagree. 73 Under Illinois law, as established by an intermediate appellate court of that state, absolute certainty concerning the amount of damage is not necessary to justify a recovery where the existence of damage is established. In re Application of Busse, 124 Ill.App.3d 433, 79 Ill.Dec. 747, 464 N.E.2d 651, 655 (1984). 15 By the same token, when such damage is established, the evidence need only tend to show a basis for the computation of damages with a fair degree of probability. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in Busse, which involved an action by vendors of land against a purchaser who fraudulently altered a subordination clause in a mortgage agreement, the Appellate Court of Illinois concluded that the plaintiff had a viable fraud claim based only on the willful impairment of collateral. Id. at 657; cf. Hummer v. R.C. Huffman Constr. Co., 63 F.2d 372, 374-75 (7th Cir.1933) (holding that, under Illinois law, a mortgagee need not foreclose the mortgage before bringing a tort action for harm done to the mortgaged property). In the absence of any persuasive data that the Illinois Supreme Court would disagree with Busse 's holding that the willful impairment of collateral is sufficient to support a fraud claim even without absolute certainty regarding the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff, we defer to the Busse Court's interpretation of Illinois law. See West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940) (Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its considered judgment upon the rule of law which it announces, ... [it] is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.); see also Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967) (citing West ). 74 In an attempt to graft the heightened RICO standing requirements that we applied in Uzan I onto Illinois law, defendants claim that Illinois law requires Motorola to exhaust their remedies by foreclosing on the collateral that once secured Motorola's loans. This argument, which is merely a variation on the argument that damages must be clear and definite before they are cognizable, is rejected by Busse and Hummer. In Busse, the Court stated outright that there is no reason or authority which would make a foreclosure or a foreclosure and sale on a deficiency judgment conditions precedent to maintaining such action, particularly as here, where the [fraudulent] acts were deliberately committed by defendants .... 79 Ill.Dec. 747, 464 N.E.2d at 657. In Hummer, moreover, the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law, held that a lender's cause of action accrued at the time the defendant injured its collateral, regardless of the status of any foreclosure proceeding. See 63 F.2d at 375 ([A] foreclosure proceeding might have been instituted, but under the greater weight of authority we think that fact can make no difference.). These decisions of an Illinois appellate court and of the Seventh Circuit are straightforward, and remain the best available readings of state law. 75 Defendants' reliance on City of Chicago v. Michigan Beach Housing Coop., 297 Ill.App.3d 317, 231 Ill.Dec. 508, 696 N.E.2d 804 (1998), is misplaced. In Michigan Beach, a lender sued a debtor for fraud when it discovered that the debtor had misrepresented the number of units pre-sold in a housing project. See id. at 807. The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove damage because, among other things, the loan was not due for 42 years. Id. at 810. The alleged injury in Michigan Beach was wholly speculat[ive]; in the instant case, by contrast, defendants have already injured the plaintiffs by destroying the plaintiffs' collateral. Michigan Beach, therefore, serves only to highlight the difference between the type of wholly speculative injury that cannot serve as the basis for a fraud claim, on the one hand, and a claim based on the destruction of collateral and the immediate threat of a pecuniary harm, on the other hand. This case falls squarely in the second category. 76 Because considerations of fairness and efficiency weigh in favor of the District Court's decision, and because the Court did not decide a novel question of Illinois law, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the District Court's decision to maintain jurisdiction over the state-law claims in this case. See Mauro v. S. New England Telecomm., Inc., 208 F.3d 384, 388 (2d Cir.2000) (affirming district court's decision to assert jurisdiction over state-law claims where abstention would have furthered neither fairness nor judicial efficiency, nor did those [claims] require the district court to resolve any novel or unsettled issues of state law). 16 Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court had the requisite authority to decide plaintiffs' fraud and constructive trust claims.
77 Finally, for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, see Uzan II, 274 F.Supp.2d at 517-34, 574-77, we hold that the District Court had personal jurisdiction over each of the defendants.