Opinion ID: 2978134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clark’s Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: Clark next asserts that the prosecutor’s closing remarks about Clark’s failure to testify constituted flagrant prosecutorial misconduct, denying him the right to a fair proceeding. Specifically, Clark complains of the following portion of the prosecutor’s closing arguments: Nonetheless, the defendant has admitted to Count 10, which was simple possession of the marijuana. He’s never gotten up here and told you. He didn’t tell you that he was guilty of the second count, which is the distribution of crack cocaine. He didn’t tell you that he was guilty of even the simple possession of marijuana where it’s found in his pocket–I don’t know what his excuse for that is. Whether the Government’s closing argument constitutes prosecutorial misconduct is a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo. United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 40304 (6th Cir. 2001). In our review, we determine first whether the statements were improper. United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1177 (6th Cir. 1986). If they appear improper, we decide if they were flagrant and warrant reversal. United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1389 (6th Cir. 1994). To determine flagrancy, we consider: 1) whether the statements tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; 2) whether the statements were isolated or among a series of improper statements; 3) whether the statements were deliberately or accidentally before the jury; and 4) the -8- total strength of the evidence against the accused. United States v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 511 (6th Cir. 2002). It was improper for the prosecutor to comment on Clark’s decision not to testify. United States v. Drake, 885 F.2d 323, 323 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)). However, the improper comments do not breach our threshold for flagrancy. While the prosecutor’s comments may have been deliberate, they were isolated to this one instance and were not part of a series of improper statements. See United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 633 (6th Cir. 2003) (improper comment during closing argument was not flagrant, inter alia, because the comment was isolated to the one instance). The comments also did not mislead the jury because, upon Clark’s immediate objection, the district court instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s statements. A jury is presumed to follow the district court’s curative instructions. United States v. Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 368 (6th Cir. 1991). Clark’s attorney further repeated several times in his closing argument that Clark is presumed innocent until proven otherwise and has no obligation to testify. And the record reveals that evidence of guilt was overwhelming. See Galloway, 316 F.3d at 633 (holding that the defendant was not entitled to reversal based on prosecutor’s improper remark during closing argument because, inter alia, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming). Clark, therefore, is not entitled to relief on this claim.