Opinion ID: 2101773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Reddick

Text: Our conclusion that Reddick applies retroactively does not by itself dictate that the defendants' murder convictions be reversed. As a preliminary matter, we reject the defendants' contention that the Reddick court's description of the errors identified in that decision as grave (see Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 198, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141) mandates automatic reversal of convictions arising from trials in which the defective jury instructions were used. Reddick itself counseled that the entire record must be examined in determining whether the jury was properly instructed. ( Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 198, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141.) Moreover, our subsequent decisions have recognized that the errors identified in Reddick may indeed be harmless in appropriate cases. See People v. Austin (1989), 133 Ill.2d 118, 123-24, 139 Ill.Dec. 819, 549 N.E.2d 331; People v. Harris (1989), 132 Ill.2d 366, 395, 138 Ill. Dec. 620, 547 N.E.2d 1241. Our refusal to adopt a rule of automatic reversal in this context is consistent with the standard principles informing appellate review of instructional error at trial. As a general matter, in determining the effect of faulty jury instructions on the validity of a defendant's conviction, the instructions should not be judged in artificial isolation but must instead be considered in light of the record as a whole, including the evidence and arguments presented to the jury. ( Cupp v. Naughten (1973), 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368, 373.) Thus not only is the challenged instruction but one of many such instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several components of the trial which may result in the judgment of conviction. ( Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147, 94 S.Ct. at 400, 38 L.Ed.2d at 373.) Accordingly, we reject the defendants' contention that, under Reddick, reversal is invariably required in these circumstances. In each of the present cases, the defendant failed to object to the jury instructions, to offer instructions that correctly stated the law, and to raise the issue in a post-trial motion. Generally, those procedural defaults will result in waiver of the alleged error for purposes of appeal. ( People v. Fierer (1988), 124 Ill.2d 176, 186, 124 Ill.Dec. 855, 529 N.E.2d 972; Reddick, 123 Ill.2d at 198, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141; People v. Thurman (1984), 104 Ill.2d 326, 329, 84 Ill.Dec. 454, 472 N.E.2d 414.) The waiver rule is not absolute, however. On appeal, [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. (134 Ill.2d R. 615(a); see also 134 Ill.2d R. 451(c) (substantial defects [in jury instructions] are not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto if the interests of justice require).) The plain error doctrine is appropriately invoked when the evidence of guilt is closely balanced, or when the error denied the defendant a fair trial. Thurman, 104 Ill.2d at 330, 84 Ill.Dec. 454, 472 N.E.2d 414; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 575-77, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233. Constitutional errors may be deemed harmless if it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11; Fierer, 124 Ill.2d at 187, 124 Ill.Dec. 855, 529 N.E.2d 972.) Cases involving allegations of Reddick violations have used the Chapman harmless error test in determining whether retrial has been necessary in those instances. (See People v. Harris (1989), 132 Ill.2d 366, 395, 138 Ill.Dec. 620, 547 N.E.2d 1241; People v. Green (1991), 209 Ill.App.3d 233, 240, 154 Ill.Dec. 92, 568 N.E.2d 92; People v. Sargent (1990), 207 Ill.App.3d 631, 635-36, 152 Ill.Dec. 631, 566 N.E.2d 318.) We now apply these same principles of review to the particular circumstances of the four causes consolidated here. In cause No. 68566, the jury found the defendant, Edward Shields, guilty of murder for the August 16, 1986, shooting death of Richard Benage. Shields was 51 years old and disabled: he had one wooden leg and could bend the other leg only 50 degrees. At the time of the offense, Shields was driving a taxicab and Benage was a passenger in an automobile being driven by Karen Goodiron. Goodiron's car was ahead of Shields' cab in the same lane of traffic. Goodiron and Shields had honked their car horns at one another several times and exchanged obscene gestures. When both automobiles were stopped at an intersection, Benage left Goodiron's car and approached Shields' taxicab. According to the parties' stipulation, Benage's blood-alcohol level at the time was 0.239%. Goodiron testified that as Benage approached the taxicab, Shields bent down. Goodiron testified that she was looking away from the cab when she heard a gunshot. Another eyewitness, John Yun, testified that he saw Benage utter something and reach through the open window, and that Shields then leaned to his right. Yun also was looking away when the shot was fired. Both witnesses testified that Benage grabbed his chest after the shot was fired, and that Benage's hands were then empty. Defendant Shields testified that the other vehicle had been straddling two lanes of traffic and that he feared that the driver was drunk. Shields testified that Benage approached the cab and threatened to kill him. Benage then grabbed Shields' shirt pocket, where the defendant kept money, and attempted to punch Shields in the eye. Shields testified that when he reached for his gun, he believed that Benage was pointing a gun at him as well. Shields testified that he froze or panicked for an instant and then fired one shot at Benage's shoulder. The jury was instructed on murder and on the unreasonable belief form of voluntary manslaughter, and returned a verdict finding Shields guilty of murder. On appeal, Shields argued that the jury instructions used at his trial were defective under Reddick. The appellate court agreed, and, without considering whether the error was harmless under the circumstances of the case, reversed the defendant's murder conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. Shields, 181 Ill.App.3d at 265, 129 Ill.Dec. 949, 536 N.E.2d 999. From our review of the record as a whole, we conclude that the use of the pattern jury instructions in this case constituted plain error. The evidence presented at trial was closely balanced. The defense offered extensive testimony in support of Shields' assertion that he believed, however unreasonably, that he was justified in shooting Benage. This evidence included Shields' fear that the driver of the other vehicle was intoxicated; his testimony that Benage threatened to kill him, reached into his cab, grabbed his shirt pocket, which contained dollar bills, and attempted to punch him; and his belief that Benage pointed a gun at him. Prosecution witnesses corroborated Shields' testimony that the victim reached into the cab. Although a weapon was never found, a properly instructed jury might have concluded, in light of the defendant's physical disability and the other testimony presented at trial, that Shields feared for his safety and believed that use of force was necessary to prevent death or serious harm to himself. We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous instructions did not affect the jury's deliberations. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause for a new trial. In cause No. 68603, a jury convicted the defendant, Jozsef Fercsi, of murder for beating to death Tiberiu Paretei following an argument between the two men. At the time of the offense, Fercsi was drinking with Paretei and another man, Robert Flowers, in Flowers' room. Paretei made sexual comments about Flowers' daughter, and Fercsi and Paretei then began to argue. Flowers left the room and returned a short time later. Paretei was then lying on the floor outside of Flowers' room. Flowers testified that he saw Fercsi standing over Paretei, hitting him over the head with a hammer. Defendant Fercsi testified that he had gone to his own room after Flowers left, that Paretei had kicked in the door to Fercsi's room, and that, in response, Fercsi hit Paretei first in the stomach and then on the head with a lead pipe. Fercsi testified that he then struck Paretei on the head several times with a hammer. Investigating officers did not discover any damage to Fercsi's door but found blood in the hallway leading to Flowers' room, where Paretei was lying. The jury was instructed on murder and on the unreasonable belief form of voluntary manslaughter and found Fercsi guilty of murder. The appellate court agreed with Fercsi's contention that the jury instructions used at his trial were defective under Reddick. Without considering whether the error was harmless, the court reversed the defendant's murder conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. Fercsi, 182 Ill.App.3d at 17, 130 Ill.Dec. 583, 537 N.E.2d 912. From our examination of the record, we conclude that the error in this case did not constitute plain error but rather was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no evidence beyond Fercsi's own testimony to support his theory of the case, and the defendant's own testimony is discredited in large measure by his prior statements, as well as the physical evidence. Investigating officers found that Fercsi's door was undamaged, contrary to his testimony that the victim had kicked it in. At the time of his arrest, and in subsequent questioning, Fercsi admitted to the police that, in an effort to buttress his claim of self-defense, he placed a knife in the victim's hand after the victim was dead. Moreover, at trial Fercsi testified that after striking the victim in the stomach and over the head with a lead pipe, he crossed the room to his bag of tools and retrieved a hammer. Fercsi said that he then returned to the victim and resumed beating him on the head, then using the hammer. On this record, we find that the evidence in support of the murder conviction is so clear and convincing that the jury's verdict would not have been different had correct instructions been used. (See People v. Austin (1989), 133 Ill.2d 118, 124, 139 Ill. Dec. 819, 549 N.E.2d 331; see also People v. Moore (1983), 95 Ill.2d 404, 410, 69 Ill. Dec. 640, 447 N.E.2d 1327.) We therefore conclude that the Reddick error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and would not have affected the verdict. See People v. Fierer (1988), 124 Ill.2d 176, 187, 124 Ill.Dec. 855, 529 N.E.2d 972. In cause No. 68739, the jury found the defendant, Priscilla Evans, guilty of murder in the shooting death of her husband, Joe Evans. Priscilla and other witnesses testified that Joe had physically abused Priscilla and her children in the past and that Joe had verbally and physically abused Priscilla at a gathering the couple had attended the evening of the killing. Evidence was presented indicating that Joe had ingested large amounts of alcohol, marijuana, and PCP throughout the day of the shooting. Witnesses testified that when Priscilla and Joe returned home, Joe smashed Priscilla's head into a brick wall outside the Evanses' home. Priscilla testified that inside the house, Joe used a meat cleaver to break into their bedroom and then put the cleaver away and verbally threatened her and two of her children. As Joe approached Priscilla, she shot him. Most of Priscilla's testimony was unrebutted by the State. The trial judge instructed the jury on murder and on both the provocation and unreasonable belief forms of voluntary manslaughter. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder. The appellate court agreed with the defendant's contention that the instructions were erroneous under Reddick. Without determining whether the error could be harmless under the facts of the case, the court reversed Priscilla's murder conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. Evans, 182 Ill.App.3d at 878, 131 Ill.Dec. 351, 538 N.E.2d 726. From our review of the record as a whole, we conclude that the erroneous instructions were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather constituted plain error. The defendant presented extensive evidence in support of her assertions that Joe Evans provoked her to sudden and intense passion and that she believed that she was justified in shooting Joe. The evidence demonstrated that Joe had physically abused and threatened Priscilla, both in the past and immediately preceding the shooting. The physical evidence corroborated Priscilla's statement that Joe attempted to force open the bedroom door with a meat cleaver. The children testified that they had suffered many violent beatings from Joe over the years, and that on the night of the shooting, the intensity of his rage surpassed any they had seen before. They testified that Joe moved toward their mother and motioned as if to hit her. Immediately before the shooting, Joe admitted raping one of the daughters and said that he would do so again. As Joe took a step toward Priscilla and threatened her, she fired the gun, killing him. There was ample evidence from which a properly instructed jury could have concluded that Joe's physical assault upon Priscilla provoked her to shoot him or that Priscilla believed she needed to use force to defend herself, even if her belief was unreasonable. Because the evidence was closely balanced, we consider that the error could have affected the outcome of the trial. (See People v. Thurman (1984), 104 Ill.2d 326, 330, 84 Ill.Dec. 454, 472 N.E.2d 414; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 575-77, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233.) We therefore affirm the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause for a new trial. In cause No. 69054, the jury found the defendant, Vincent Thomas, guilty of murder for the shooting death of James Jones. At trial, an eyewitness, Eric Archie, testified that he had broken up three fistfights between the defendant and Jones the evening before the shooting. Archie testified that on the day of the shooting, the defendant got out of a car and approached Archie and Jones as they stood near Jones' car. Archie testified that Jones asked the defendant if he had come back to finish the fight, and that the defendant replied, No, I[`ve] come to kill you. Jones stepped back, and the defendant then pulled a gun from his waistband and walked toward Archie, asking him where the stuff was. When Archie said that he did not know what the defendant was talking about, the defendant swung his gun at Archie's head, and the gun fired, hitting Archie in the foot. Archie testified that as he and Jones ran in opposite directions, he heard two more shots being fired. Another eyewitness, Felbert Morris, testified that when the defendant got out of Morris' car, the defendant asked, What are you going to do now? and walked up and swung at one of the two men, neither of whom Morris recognized. Morris testified that a shot was fired and he saw a gun in the defendant's hand, and that the defendant fired twice at the other men as they ran away. At trial, defendant Thomas testified that while he was in Morris' car, Morris pointed out the two men who had jumped him the night before. Morris warned him that one of the men had then had a gun, and at Morris' urging the defendant took a gun from under the driver's seat. The defendant testified that he walked up to Archie and Jones, and that Archie swung at him with an object; the defendant could not tell what the object was. The defendant testified that he fell against a parked car, and his gun, which was pointing down, then went off. The defendant heard shots coming from Jones' direction, and he turned and shot back at Jones twice. Medical evidence showed that Jones suffered one bullet wound, through the center of his back. Police detectives did not find any evidence that Jones had a gun or any other weapon. With respect to the Jones homicide, the jury received instructions on murder and on both the provocation and unreasonable belief forms of voluntary manslaughter. The jury found the defendant guilty of murder. The appellate court found that the instructions were erroneous under Reddick and, without considering whether the error was harmless, reversed the murder conviction. Thomas, 185 Ill.App.3d at 1054, 134 Ill.Dec. 100, 542 N.E.2d 100. Reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that any error in the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The record contains no evidence that either Archie or Jones threatened or injured the defendant. The only evidence suggesting that the victims may have been armed was the defendant's testimony that, before he fired at Archie, he believed Archie had swung an object at him. There was no other evidence that Archie swung an object at Thomas or that Jones shot at him. Jones was shot squarely in the back, indicating that Jones was fleeing from the defendant when the fatal shot was fired. In addition, other witnesses stated that they did not hear any more shots than the number the defendant admitted firing himself. By the same token, there was no evidence that the defendant was acting from a sudden and intense passion caused by the previous fight with Jones or in response to an unprovoked assault by Jones. See People v. Thompson (1977), 55 Ill. App.3d 561, 563, 13 Ill.Dec. 550, 371 N.E.2d 267. Our review of the record as a whole shows that the instructional error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the incorrect instructions could not have affected the jury's verdict. ( People v. Fierer (1988), 124 Ill.2d 176, 187, 124 Ill.Dec. 855, 529 N.E.2d 972; People v. Moore (1983), 95 Ill.2d 404, 410, 69 Ill.Dec. 640, 447 N.E.2d 1327.) We believe that the evidence supporting Thomas' murder conviction was so clear and convincing that the jury's verdict would not have been different had proper instructions been given. ( People v. Austin (1989), 133 Ill.2d 118, 124, 139 Ill.Dec. 819, 549 N.E.2d 331; see also People v. Moore (1983), 95 Ill.2d 404, 410, 69 Ill.Dec. 640, 447 N.E.2d 1327.) Accordingly, we find that the use of the instructions in this case constituted only harmless error. We reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgments of the appellate court in cause No. 68566 and cause No. 68739. In cause No. 68603, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, affirm the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the cause to the appellate court for disposition of a remaining issue not addressed in this appeal. Finally, in cause No. 69054, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. No. 68566 Judgment affirmed. No. 68603 Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed; cause remanded. No. 68739 Judgment affirmed. No. 69054 Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed. Justices BILANDIC and HEIPLE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.