Opinion ID: 867978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mixed-Motive Discrimination

Text: - 31 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. Megivern argues that even if she has not demonstrated pretext, she has presented enough evidence to demonstrate a mixed-motive claim of pregnancy discrimination. Under Title VII, an “unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating favor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). In White v. Baxter, this court held that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework does not apply to the summary judgment analysis for Title VII mixed-motive claims. 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff asserting a mixed-motive claim “need only produce evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This burden of producing some evidence in support of a mixed-motive claim is not onerous and should preclude sending the case to the jury only where the record is devoid of evidence that could reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff’s claim.” Id. This lenient summary judgment standard “is counterbalanced by potential restrictions on a plaintiff’s recovery for a mixed-motive claim.” Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 390 (6th Cir. 2010). Under a mixed-motive theory of discrimination, Megivern can only recover declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees and costs directly attributable to the mixed-motive claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). - 32 - No. 12-1330 Megivern v. Glacier Hills, Inc. The district court granted summary judgment to Glacier Hills on Megivern’s mixedmotive claim, reasoning that although Megivern argued that other LECs who were behind in their paperwork were not disciplined or fired, Megivern was fired for more than just her failure to complete initial assessments. Aside from the temporal proximity of the termination of Megivern’s employment to the announcement of her pregnancy, Megivern has not presented any evidence that the termination of her employment was motivated in part by discriminatory animus. Megivern’s 2009 review suggested that her attitude at work was a problem. Further, she admits that she began having trouble completing her workload as soon as she was assigned to the Two South unit, months before she became pregnant. Thompson testified that Megivern’s entire work history, including her argumentative and insubordinate behavior, was taken into account as part of the decision to terminate her. Despite the lenient summary judgment standard for mixed-motive claims, Megivern has not provided evidence that her termination was based in part on her pregnancy. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.