Opinion ID: 290857
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preston Hancock

Text: 15 On October 4, 1961, two Baltimore City Judges, sitting without a jury, convicted Preston Hancock of rape, assault with intent to murder, and burglary and sentenced him to death. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed his conviction because the court reporter in attendance at his trial died, and there was, as a result, no transcript to review. At his second trial a single judge sitting without a jury again convicted Hancock of all three charges. This time he was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape and concurrent ten year sentences for the assault and burglary offenses. He noted an appeal, but withdrew it within a month after he was sentenced. 16 On February 15, 1965, Hancock filed a petition under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, alleging seven grounds for relief. Among these grounds was the contention that his attorney had induced him to abandon his appeal by promising to get him into a hospital. With reference to this point Hancock's attorney testified, in part, as follows: 17 Q. Mr. Hancock filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals in proper person, and then he withdrew it, and he states, or he stated on the stand that the reason he withdrew it was because you induced him to withdraw it by promising him that he would get into a hospital, or you would attempt to get him into a hospital. Is this true? 18 A. I don't have any notes. I remember when we tried the case, that I told Preston that I felt that he was very lucky as a result of the facts of this case that he was not sentenced to death, as he had been originally; that with a life sentence he now had an opportunity at some future date to be released from the hospital, that I felt-- from the Maryland Penitentiary; that I felt that he was in need of psychiatric treatment and that he should-- and that I would try to help him get psychiatric treatment. I asked him why he was appealing his case, and-- well, this then becomes almost a confidential communication-- nevertheless, after talking to Preston, I think he agreed that he should abandon the appeal because I did explain to him that if he was successful, which I doubt anyway, that he would be faced with another trial, and could possibly be sentenced to death. 19 Q. Well, Mr. Weisgal, as a matter of fact, didn't your discussions concerning his abandoning his appeal border on the fact that he could get, in fact, a death sentence if he was retried again? 20 A. I brought that up to him. I explained that to him. 21 Q. And whose decision was it to abandon his appeal? 22 A. It was his decision. 23 Record, State Post Conv. Hear. (Hancock) at 55-57 (September 30, 1965). The state court denied Hancock's petition, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals denied him leave to appeal. 24 Thereafter, on November 14, 1967, Hancock sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court. In his petition he raised ten grounds for relief, including the ground that he was induced to abandon his appeal by his attorney's promise to have him admitted to a hospital. The district court, after concluding that the state court hearing satisfied the requirements of Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), and 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d) (Supp. IV. 1965-68), denied the petition. Regarding Hancock's abandonment of his state appeal the district court stated: 25 After the conviction, Mr. Weisgal explained to petitioner that if an appeal was taken, and if the appeal was successful, petitioner at the third trial could receive the death sentence if convicted. According to Mr. Weisgal, petitioner thereupon decided to abandon his appeal and in fact wrote a letter so stating.    Having been sentenced to death following his first trial and having received a life sentence after his second trial, petitioner was well advised not to prosecute a further appeal, particularly in view of the convincing evidence produced against him by the State. At a third trial, a conviction by a jury or by still another judge might have again resulted in the imposition of the death sentence. The record clearly shows that after filing an appeal after his second conviction, he knowingly abandoned the appeal for good and sufficient reasons. 26 Memorandum & Order of Harvey, J. at 7-8 (May 9, 1968). Hancock now appeals from the unfavorable order of the district court. On appeal he complains for the first time that he was unconstitutionally coerced into forgoing his statutory right to appeal by fear of receiving greater punishment at a subsequent trial.