Opinion ID: 72627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Before turning to the merits of this appeal, we briefly address the issue of this court’s jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. We earlier requested the parties to brief the jurisdictional question; after receiving the parties’ responses, we ruled that the issue would be carried with the case. Upon further consideration we find that this court has jurisdiction over the appeal. While it is true that the district court could not determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law,7 that conclusion alone does not preclude interlocutory appellate review of the denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The Supreme Court clarified this issue in Behrens v. Pelletier, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996) (limiting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995)), rejecting the contention that the existence of material issues of fact in itself bars 7 Again, we are unsure why the district court made this determination. See supra note 6. 12 interlocutory review of accompanying issues of law. See id. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 842 . We reiterated this point in Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1996), stating, “[A]s clarified by Behrens, Johnson [v. Jones] does not affect our interlocutory jurisdiction in qualified immunity cases where the denial is based even in part on a disputed issue of law.” Id. at 1485. In addition to finding that issues of material fact existed, the district court found that GJR’s complaint alleged the violation of a clearly established “right to be treated equally in its application for a development permit.” (R.2-83 at 10.) This is an issue of law disputed by the parties on appeal, and we therefore have jurisdiction to review the district court’s ruling on this issue under Behrens and Cottrell. Cf. Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532 (11th Cir. 1990) (petitioner failed as a matter of law to sufficiently allege a constitutional violation, therefore existence of disputed issues of material fact does not affect interlocutory jurisdiction). However, our appellate jurisdiction in matters such as this extends only to the legal issues surrounding the district court’s denial of defendants’ motions to dismiss, i.e., issues concerning whether GJR’s complaint sufficiently alleged the violation of a clearly established right. See Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 791 n.15, 792 n.16 (11th Cir. 1988). 13