Opinion ID: 2975094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Cook’s Sentence

Text: Finally, Cook challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. This Court reviews a district court’s legal interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1161 (6th Cir. 1997). It reviews factual findings for clear error. United States v. Winston, 37 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory, this Court reviews final sentences for reasonableness. United States v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2005). A sentence within the applicable Guidelines advisory range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). Here, regardless of whether the district court sentenced Cook with the allegedly problematic two-level firearm enhancement, Cook received a sentence within the Guidelines range.1 Therefore, his sentence is entitled to a presumption of 1 Application of the two-level firearm enhancement yields an advisory range of 121-151 months’ imprisonment. Because, however, even the lowest end of this range is greater than the statutory maximum for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), Cook’s applicable guideline “range” -7- No. 05-2731 United States v. Cook reasonableness. In reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, however, the fact that a sentence is within the Guidelines advisory range does not necessarily render it reasonable absent evidence that the district court imposed a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” of sentencing as defined by the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Once the appropriate advisory Guideline range is calculated, the district court throws this ingredient into the section 3553(a) mix.”). “A sentence within the Guidelines carries with it no implication that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors if it is not clear from the record.” Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644. This Court has split reasonableness review into two inquiries: procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir. 2006).
“A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if ‘the district judge fails to “consider” the applicable Guidelines range or neglects to “consider” the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instead simply selects what the judge deems an appropriate sentence without such required consideration.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, the district court, in its resentencing order, first properly calculated the Guidelines is simply 120 months’ imprisonment, the statutory maximum. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) (“Where the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline range.”). -8- No. 05-2731 United States v. Cook range, acknowledging its advisory nature. The court then went on to “throw[] this ingredient into the section 3553(a) mix.” See McBride, 434 F.3d at 476. In doing so, the court independently considered and faithfully applied the § 3553(a) factors: In making this determination, the court notes that Defendant has numerous arrests and convictions, and that his previous punishments have not deterred him from committing additional crimes. In this case, the circumstances surrounding his current conviction are sufficiently serious to justify imposition of the statutory maximum. Wearing a bullet proof vest in connection with the presence of a loaded handgun and over seventeen grams of cocaine base in a secret compartment of a car seem to the court indicative of a serious criminal state of mind. Moreover, Defendant’s flight from trial also bears consideration in connection with his sentencing. Simply put, this is not the run of the mill felon possession case. In order to protect the public from future offenses of this Defendant and to specifically deter Defendant from continuing his life as a career criminal, the court finds a significant penalty to be necessary. The court finds this sentence to be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” and reasonable under the particular facts of this case. In consideration of Defendant’s request for substance abuse treatment, the court will recommend to the Bureau of Prisons that Defendant be placed at a facility offering a Comprehensive Drug Treatment Program. Cook, 2005 WL 3447866, at  (footnote and citation omitted). Indeed, the district court specifically set forth its treatment of substantially all the § 3553(a) factors. The district court discussed the need to deter Cook and to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). The district court noted the nature and circumstances of the offense and Cook’s history and characteristics. See id. § 3553(a)(1). In discussing the circumstances attendant to the conviction (i.e., bullet-proof vest, cocaine, handgun), the district court addressed the seriousness of the offense, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), and the likelihood that Cook would commit future crimes, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Finally, the district court discussed the need to provide correctional treatment for Cook in the most effective manner by placing him in a facility offering a comprehensive drug- -9- No. 05-2731 United States v. Cook treatment program. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). For procedural reasonableness, this is all that this Court requires. See United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that a sentence “satisfies each of [the] procedural requirements and indeed can fairly be described as a thorough application of the § 3553(a) factors” where the judge used the appropriate version of the Guidelines and correctly calculated the Guidelines range, considered the availability of Guidelines departures, and independently considered and faithfully applied each of the § 3553(a) factors); Collington, 461 F.3d at 809 (deeming a sentence procedurally reasonable even though the district court did not explicitly name each of the § 3553(a) factors it used to arrive at the sentence). We therefore hold that the district court imposed a procedurally reasonable sentence.
“A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court ‘select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.’” Collington, 461 F.3d at 808 (quoting Webb, 403 F.3d at 385). Here, there is nothing to indicate that the district court imposed an arbitrary sentence, based the sentence on impermissible factors, failed to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, or gave an unreasonable amount of weight to one factor. To the contrary, the district court carefully reviewed and weighed all relevant information provided by Cook, the Government, and the Probation Officer before arriving at Cook’s sentence. The district court’s final sentence was not random, but a reflection of its consideration of the Guidelines range and the § 3353(a) factors. See, e.g., id. at 810; - 10 - No. 05-2731 United States v. Cook United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jackson, 466 F.3d 537, 540 (6th Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, Cook argues that his sentence is unreasonable in light of his post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, which included voluntary completion of a drug-treatment program and various education courses available through the Bureau of Prisons. Cook’s argument, however, is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Worley, 453 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2006). In Worley, we held that a defendant’s post-sentencing efforts at rehabilitation while incarcerated were not relevant to rebut the presumption that his sentence, which fell within the proper Guidelines range, met the reasonableness standard. Id. at 710-11. We therefore hold that Cook’s sentence was also substantively reasonable.