Opinion ID: 563773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doe's Subsection (g)(1)(A) Claim Seeking Amendment

Text: 22 Subsection (d), the provision of the Act requiring agencies, inter alia, to entertain and evaluate amendment requests, is one of the provisions from which certain systems of records may be exempted pursuant to subsections (j) and (k). Citing investigative and administrative interests, the FBI has promulgated a rule in accordance with the procedural requirements of subsections (j) and (k) that exempts its CRS to the fullest permissible extent from the requirements of subsection (d). See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 16.96(a)(1) (1990). The FBI argues that this rule relieves the agency of any obligation to update and correct records in its investigative files, and that the District Court's judgment ordering it to expunge some of these records must therefore be reversed. With regard to all but one of the challenged records, we agree. 23
24 We first consider whether the FBI may be held liable for violating the amendment provisions of the Act where it has exempted its records from those provisions. The District Court answered this question in the affirmative, finding that, while an agency could invoke the exemption to refuse a request for expungement, it could not do so if the requestor later brought suit and demonstrated that expungement was warranted. 718 F.Supp. at 95 n. 4. Because we conclude that the District Court's narrow construction of the scope of subsection (j) and (k) exemptions cannot be reconciled with the structure and language of the Act, we reverse its holding. 25 The Privacy Act expressly premises judicial review of amendment claims on agency action either under, or in violation of, subsection (d)(3), the provision of the Act requiring agencies to grant administrative review of their denials of amendment requests. Thus, subsection (g)(1)(A) authorizes civil actions only when an agency makes a determination under subsection (d)(3) ... not to amend an individual's record in accordance with his request, or fails to make such review in conformity with that subsection. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(g)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added). It necessarily follows from this language that an agency's refusal to amend a record that it properly has exempted from subsection (d) cannot give rise to a subsection (g)(1)(A) claim--the administrative review provisions forming the predicate to such a claim simply do not pertain to the disputed record as a result of the agency's exemption. 26 The District Court nonetheless found de novo consideration of Doe's amendment claim to be appropriate under our decision in Tijerina v. Walters, 821 F.2d 789 (D.C.Cir.1987). In Tijerina, the appellant sued the Veterans Administration (VA) for violating provisions of the Act that restrict agencies' authority to disclose personal information. The VA argued that it could not be held liable for its actions because it had exempted the system of records containing the disclosed information from the civil remedies provisions of subsection (g). 27 The court refused to give effect to the VA's purported exemption from liability. The court observed that the Act specifically forbids the agency from exempting records from the Act's many constraints and obligations governing disclosure of personal information, including those alleged to have been breached in the case before it. Id. at 796. 7 Consequently, the court noted, a determination that the VA could exempt itself from civil liability for violating these obligations would defang completely the strict limitations on disclosure that Congress intended to impose, requiring the court to embrace the anomalous notion that at the same time ... [Congress] forbade agencies to exempt systems of records from disclosure requirements, ... [it] intended them to be able to elude civil liability at their caprice. Id. at 797. Finding such a result to be inconsistent with both the language of the Act and the purposes underlying its exemption provisions, the court flatly rejected the agency's efforts to elude civil liability for violations of statutory duties which cannot be shirked under the Act. Id. at 795. 28 The District Court erred in finding judicial review in this case to be justified by Tijerina. As the quoted language illustrates, Tijerina merely held that an agency cannot escape liability for violating non-exemptible Privacy Act obligations simply by exempting itself from the Act's remedial provisions. Our decision in Tijerina recognized that such purported exemptions would frustrate Congress' intent that some of the Act's requirements constrain all agency record-keeping activity equally. 29 Considerations of legislative intent dictate a completely different outcome in this case, where the obligation at issue is one from which Congress expressly authorized agencies to exempt some systems of records. Thus, a determination that a civil claim for expungement may be foreclosed by an agency's exemption rule is not only consistent with, but necessary to effectuate, Congress' intent that certain records systems may truly be sheltered from the Act's amendment procedures; an agency exemption from subsection (d) would serve little purpose, after all, if the agency were still fully answerable in court for not complying with the demands of that subsection. In sum, as both Tijerina and our decision today recognize, the touchstone for an agency's liability to suit under the Act is the substantive obligation underlying the plaintiff's claim. 30 Accordingly, we reverse the District Court and hold that a cause of action under subsection (g)(1)(A) for an agency's denial of an amendment request cannot lie with regard to records that the agency has properly exempted from the Act's amendment requirements. 31
32 Having concluded that an agency is not liable under subsection (g)(1)(A) for rejecting amendment requests concerning records exempted from subsection (d), we next consider whether the FBI's exemption applies to the particular records at issue in this case. 33 The Privacy Act authorizes agencies to exempt from its access and amendment provisions all systems of records consisting of investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes. Subsection (j)(2) empowers law enforcement agencies to exempt from subsection (d) certain types of criminal records systems, including those consisting of information compiled for the purpose of a criminal investigation ... and associated with an identifiable individual, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(j)(2)(B) (1988), while subsection (k)(2) permits any agency to exempt from subsection (d) any other records system containing investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(k)(2) (1988). 8 34 Although both subsections (j) and (k) refer to systems of records, we have previously held that 28 C.F.R. Sec. 16.96 (1990), the FBI exemption regulation respecting its CRS, does not remove that entire filing system from the requirements of the Act; rather, CRS documents qualify for exemption only if they constitute law enforcement records within the meaning of the statute. Vymetalik v. FBI, 785 F.2d 1090, 1095 (D.C.Cir.1986). Accordingly, the FBI bears the burden of demonstrating a law enforcement purpose for each record as to which it has claimed exemption in this case. 35 The District Court never purported to decide whether the records challenged by Doe qualify as law enforcement records; having erroneously ruled that the FBI's exemption regulation could not preclude it from considering the merits of Doe's amendment claim de novo, the court had no occasion to consider the possible application of that regulation to the records in this case. With regard to all but one of the challenged records, however, the record is complete and there are no material facts in dispute; we are therefore free to determine the applicability of the FBI's regulation to these documents. See Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 789-91 (D.C.Cir.1980) (appeal of summary judgment decision where, although district court had not decided issue, appellate court made legal conclusion on basis of undisputed facts that certain documents came within FOIA exemption). 36 In making this determination, we shall borrow the test for law enforcement purpose that we devised in Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420-21 (D.C.Cir.1982), to evaluate the applicability of Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7) (1988), to law enforcement agency records. The Pratt test adapts well to the Privacy Act context because the language of subsection (k)(2), the more inclusive of the Act's two exemption provisions, is virtually identical to that of FOIA Exemption 7: subsection (k)(2) applies to systems of records containing investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, while Exemption 7 encompasses investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes. See Vymetalik, 785 F.2d at 1098 (instructing District Court on remand to apply Pratt definition of law enforcement records in determining whether disputed FBI records qualified for Privacy Act exemption). 37 Under the Pratt test, records kept by a law enforcement agency must meet two criteria in order to qualify as law enforcement records. First, the agency's investigatory activities that give rise to the documents sought must be related to the enforcement of federal laws or to the maintenance of national security. Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420 (emphasis removed). An agency does not satisfy this requirement when merely engaging in a general monitoring of private individuals' activities; rather, the agency must demonstrate a connection between its investigation and the existence of a possible security risk or violation of federal law. Id.; cf. Shaw v. FBI, 749 F.2d 58, 64-65 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Scalia, J.) (exemption extends to investigation, conducted for federally authorized purpose, of non-federal crime). 38 Second, the nexus between the investigation and one of the agency's law enforcement duties must be based on information sufficient to support at least 'a colorable claim' of its rationality. Id. at 421 (emphasis removed). This second requirement is deferential to the particular problems of a criminal law enforcement agency; while it is not met where the agency offers a pretextual or wholly unbelievable basis for a claim that its investigation was rationally related to its law enforcement duty, a reviewing court should be hesitant to second-guess a law enforcement agency's decision to investigate if there is a plausible basis for its decision. Id. 39 When an agency meets both prongs of the Pratt test, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence that the asserted law enforcement rationale for an investigation was in fact pretextual. See Shaw, 749 F.2d at 63-64. If the plaintiff fails to rebut the showing of law enforcement purpose, the agency is entitled to summary judgment. See King v. United States Department of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 231-32 (D.C.Cir.1987). We shall divide the FBI records at issue in this case into three categories for purposes of our analysis: the investigatory records compiled after Doe's arrest in 1973 on the explosives charge; those compiled prior to that arrest; and the LHM prepared pursuant to OPM's name check request. 40
41 The records compiled after Doe's arrest, which include the records of his arrest and conviction and a document in the FBI's files describing his address book as containing the names of approximately 1,000 alleged radicals, clearly constitute law enforcement records for purposes of the Act. These documents were placed in the CRS pursuant to a FBI investigation of Doe's unauthorized possession of an explosive device. As Doe concedes, his commission of ... [this] crime was a legitimate impetus for an investigation of [his] ... possible involvement with [the federal crimes of] insurrection, seditious conspiracy and the possession of explosives. 9 Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 26-27. Thus, the post-arrest records meet the first prong of the Pratt test, because the investigatory activities that gave rise to the documents were related to the enforcement of federal laws. Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420. 42 In addition, we find that the FBI possessed a colorable claim of rationality for its investigation, thereby satisfying Pratt 's second prong. Certain materials seized from Doe's residence following his arrest resembled those used in recent unsolved bombing incidents in Michigan and neighboring states. Although FBI investigators ultimately concluded that no association could be made between the materials found at Doe's residence and those involved in these bombings, Doe's unlawful possession of explosives clearly justified the agency's investigation of possible further criminal involvement on his part, including the inquiry into his contacts and acquaintances that led to the agency record describing Doe's address book. As Doe has failed to point to any evidence that would suggest that the FBI was motivated by anything other than legitimate investigatory concerns, we conclude that the FBI's actions leading to the post-arrest records were reasonably related to a law enforcement purpose. Consequently, the FBI's exemption applies and Doe cannot maintain a subsection (g)(1)(A) action seeking the expungement of these records. 43
44 The records pertaining to Doe that were compiled prior to his explosives arrest, including references to his attendance at the SDS/MDS-sponsored meeting and the hearsay statement that Doe had admitted to being a Communist who advocated overthrow of the Government by whatever means necessary, were collected pursuant to the FBI's Administrative Index (ADEX), described by the agency as a program for identifying individuals who might pose a danger to national security. 10 One of the functions of this highly controversial and now-defunct program was to safeguard the national security from attempts forcibly to overthrow the Government. While the FBI's use of the ADEX program in the late 1960s to target those individuals whose political orientation the agency deemed radical was misguided,, there can be no denying that the national security interests underlying the ADEX program were within the scope of the FBI's law enforcement mission. See Pratt, 673 F.2d at 422 (whatever we may think of the FBI's methods, we cannot conclude therefrom that ... [its] activities ... lacked any law enforcement purpose). Accordingly, the FBI's investigation of Doe satisfies the first prong of the Pratt test, since the investigatory activities leading to the creation of the relevant records were directly linked to the maintenance of national security. 11 45 We also conclude that the FBI's investigatory activities had a colorable claim of rationality. The FBI's attention was drawn to Doe when it received reports of his disturbing a speech by a presidential candidate and of his advocating violent overthrow of the Government on radio. The FBI then instituted a limited investigation of Doe, aimed solely at determining whether his activities warranted more serious investigation as a potential threat to national security. This investigation revealed, among other things, that Doe had been arrested at a rally sponsored by the MDS/SDS organizations. The FBI concluded, however, that Doe posed no genuine security risk and terminated its investigation. 46 As we recognized in Pratt, a law enforcement agency often must act upon unverified tips and suspicions based upon mere tidbits of information. 673 F.2d at 421. Although the evidence prompting the FBI's investigation of Doe was sketchy at best, Doe has not cited any tangible evidence to indicate that, at the time the FBI included the pre-arrest records in the CRS, its investigation was motivated by anything other than a genuine concern about the national security. Given Pratt 's deferential standard, we cannot deem the relationship between the investigatory activities leading up to these records and legitimate security concerns to be so tenuous as to render pretextual the FBI's assertion of law enforcement purpose. Accordingly, we find that these records are also exempted from subsection (d) pursuant to the FBI's exemption regulation, and that Doe may not seek their expungement under subsection (g)(1)(A). 47
48 The final record is the LHM that the FBI prepared for OPM. This document was not created pursuant to a law enforcement investigation; rather, it was prepared to assist the Government in assessing Doe's employment application. Doe accordingly argues that the LHM was not compiled for law enforcement purposes and is thus subject to the amendment provisions of the Act. Doe claims that such a result is compelled by our holding in Vymetalik that records generated solely as part of routine FBI security checks of federal employment applicants would not qualify for exemption under subsection (k)(2). 49 Despite Doe's assertions, Vymetalik does not resolve the question before us. In that case, the record indicated that the information in the disputed documents had been gathered exclusively for the employment review and not for reasons of law enforcement. The court thus found that the only exemption that appeared applicable to the challenged records was that created by subsection (k)(5), which refers to systems of records consisting of investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal ... employment. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(k)(5) (1988) (emphasis added). 12 In remanding the case for additional factual findings, however, the court recognized that, [s]hould the FBI come forward with evidence suggesting a law enforcement purpose other than mere background investigation, the District Court remains free to conclude that the records constitute law enforcement records. 785 F.2d at 1098. 50 While the LHM was created solely for employment review, the investigatory material it contained was originally gathered for law enforcement, not employment, purposes. The critical question, then, is whether the FBI's investigatory information on Doe lost its exempt status when it was subsequently used, in altered form, for a non-law enforcement purpose. 51 The Supreme Court confronted a similar issue in the context of a FOIA Exemption 7 claim in FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982). In Abramson, the Court held that information contained in records originally compiled for law enforcement purposes does not lose its exempt status under Exemption 7 when later summarized in records compiled for non-law enforcement purposes. To hold otherwise, the Court stated, would be to treat the originally compiled record and the derivative summary ... completely differently although the content of the information is the same and although the reasons for maintaining its confidentiality remain equally strong. Id. at 625, 102 S.Ct. at 2061. The Court deemed it unnecessary to reach this anomalous result, finding the statutory language of FOIA Exemption 7 reasonably construable to protect that part of an otherwise non-exempt compilation which essentially reproduces and is substantially the equivalent of all or part of an earlier record made for law enforcement uses. Id. This interpretation, the Court stated, more accurately reflects the intention of Congress, is more consistent with the structure of the Act, and more fully serves the purposes of the statute. Id. 52 Abramson, however, did not involve a Privacy Act exemption claim; therefore, it does not directly control our disposition of this case. Nonetheless, as we have already noted, law enforcement records under the Privacy Act are defined in essentially identical terms as under FOIA: both statutes permit exemption of investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes. 13 Given this congruence of the relevant statutory language, we believe that the Court's holding in Abramson cannot be ignored in the Privacy Act context. We recognize that a FOIA exemption protects against the disclosure of information, while a Privacy Act exemption of the sort here in issue protects against the amendment or expungement of information that has been disclosed. Thus, the precise concerns motivating the Court's decision in Abramson are not present in a Privacy Act case like this one. Nonetheless, in both contexts, there is a threshhold inquiry as to whether disputed material is properly characterized as compiled for law enforcement purposes. The Court in Abramson said that recompilation does not change the nature of the material, and we do not see how we can avoid this definitional principle in this case. Accordingly, we hold that information contained in a document qualifying for subsection (j) or (k) exemption as a law enforcement record does not lose its exempt status when recompiled in a non-law enforcement record if the purposes underlying the exemption of the original document pertain to the recompilation as well. 53 Our next task, then, is to determine whether shielding the LHM from the Privacy Act's amendment provisions would serve the interests underlying the agency's exemption of its law enforcement records from those provisions. In Abramson, this inquiry was subsumed within the determination of whether the documents came within the ambit of Exemption 7, because Congress expressly restricted the coverage of FOIA's law enforcement record exemption to those records whose disclosure would have specific adverse effects. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7) (1988) (listing the six types of disclosure-related harms justifying exemption of law enforcement records). As a result, the treatment of recompiled records under FOIA is fairly straightforward: [o]nce it is established that information was compiled pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement investigation and that disclosure of such information would lead to one of the listed harms, the information is exempt. Abramson, 456 U.S. at 631, 102 S.Ct. at 2064. 54 In contrast, the proper analysis of recompiled records under the Privacy Act requires an additional layer of analysis. In creating subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act, Congress did not delineate the agency interests justifying exemption as it had in FOIA. Instead, with one exception, 14 Congress granted agencies broad discretion to exempt all law enforcement records systems from the Act's access and amendment provisions, provided that the agencies promulgate their exemption rules in accordance with the rulemaking provisions of the APA, and provide in those rules statements of the reasons for the exemptions. Thus, in determining whether treatment of the LHM as a law enforcement record would promote the purposes underlying the law enforcement exemption, we must look to the reasons that the FBI itself has given for promulgating that exemption. 55 The FBI's exemption regulation provides two justifications for immunizing the CRS from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d). The first, mirroring Exemption 7 of FOIA, recites the adverse effects that disclosure of investigative records would have upon law enforcement. See 28 C.F.R. Sec. 16.96(b)(2)(i) & (ii) (1990). The FBI concedes that these access-related concerns do not apply where, as here, the agency refuses to expunge information that has already been disclosed to the person seeking expungement. 56 The FBI's second reason for exemption applies specifically to the Act's amendment provision, subsection (d)(2), and states that exemption from that subsection is appropriate 57 because to require the FBI to amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant or untimely, because of the nature of the information collected and the essential length of time it is maintained, would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to continuously retrograde its investigations attempting to resolve questions of accuracy, etc. 58 28 C.F.R. Sec. 16.96(b)(2)(iii) (1990). 59 It is quite probable that, given the unsubstantiated nature of the information providing the grist for most law enforcement investigations and the lengthy periods of time that such investigations may cover, subjecting the entire CRS to the amendment requirements of the Act would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden for the FBI. 15 However,, our present inquiry involves the proper treatment of only one discrete subset of the FBI's files--non-law enforcement records that contain information originally compiled for law enforcement purposes. 60 Subjecting these particular records to the Act's amendment requirements is not as clearly necessary to effectuate the purposes behind the agency's exemption from these requirements. The District Court noted, see 718 F.Supp. at 108, and the FBI reiterated at oral argument, that the FBI received approximately 2.3 million name check requests in 1985. It appears, however, that only a small fraction of these requests were submitted for non-law enforcement purposes. The Annual Report of the Attorney General for 1985 indicates that the FBI performed only 4,171 employment background checks, and 615 expanded name checks, for other agencies; 16 the other 2.295 million name checks presumably were conducted for genuine law enforcement purposes, and hence would qualify for subsection (j) or (k) exemption on their own terms. 61 Accordingly, we cannot conclude on the present record that employment-related FBI name checks should be accorded exempt status under the Privacy Act in order to further the interests underlying the FBI's exemption from subsection (d)(2). Instead, we remand this portion of the case to the District Court for further development of the record and a determination as to whether the likely burden to the FBI from processing amendment requests involving non-law enforcement records containing law enforcement information is sufficient to justify exempting such documents from the Act's amendment provisions. In other words, the trial court must assess whether exempting these records is justified by the asserted interests underlying the FBI's exemption regulations. 17 Relevant to this inquiry would be recent statistics on the number of non-law enforcement records containing law enforcement information that the FBI creates for other agencies, as well as the number of amendment requests that the agency receives with regard to such records. 62 Finally, we reject Doe's broader contention that exemption from subsection (d)(2) would be appropriate only if the FBI could demonstrate that complying with the Act's amendment procedures with regard to the particular records at issue in this case would impose an impossible administrative and investigative burden. The FBI's exemption regulation clearly refers to the cumulative burden that the FBI would face were it required to undergo a thorough review of the merits of every amendment request that it received, and to amend each of those records that it determined to be inaccurate or outdated. No single amendment request is ever likely to pose an impossible administrative and investigatory burden; rather, it is the processing of a myriad of such requests that might prove onerous and that arguably provides the justification for the agency's exemption regulation. 18 Accordingly, the District Court should consider upon remand whether the cumulative burden that the FBI would face from having to evaluate and respond to amendment requests involving records in its files compiled for non-law enforcement purposes justifies the exemption of such records as a class from the Act's amendment provisions. 19 63