Opinion ID: 855071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “making a wager”

Text: The claims of the asserted patents describe a network of gaming machines, “each of said gaming machines being 18 ARISTOCRAT TECH v. INTL GAME TECH capable of accepting different wager amounts made by a player.” ’603 patent col. 8 ll. 8-10; see also ’215 patent col. 8 ll. 47-49, col. 9 ll. 28-30. As interpreted by the district court, this claim language “indicates that gaming machines accept wagers, while players make wagers.” Aristocrat, 714 F. Supp. 2d 991, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (emphasis in original). Thus, the district court construed “‘making a wager’ to mean betting, which is an act performed by the player.” Id. at 1000. Aristocrat contends that the district court improperly added the limitation that the act is performed by the player and that “making a wager” is merely carrying out a bet. Under Aristocrat’s proposed construction, all of the steps would have been performed by a single actor during normal play. Aristocrat argues on appeal that the district court failed to recognize that when the claims require that a step be performed by the player—namely the “activating step” of the ’215 patent—the claim explicitly states “by the player” and that claim 4 of the ’215 patent—the method of claim 2 wherein the step of making a wager includes betting a plurality of credits—confirms that the gaming machine itself carries out a bet. Aristocrat’s contentions are inconsistent with the specification, however. For example, when describing the algorithm used by the gaming machine, the Abstract makes clear that credits are bet by the player: Prior to each game, the gaming machine (10) se- lects a random number from a range of numbers and during each game, the machine allocates the first n numbers in the range, where n is the num- ber of credits bet by the player in that game. ’215 patent at [57]. In addition, when describing prior art machines, the specification speaks in terms of the player as the actor doing the betting: With some prior art combination based trigger ar- rangements there is a serious disadvantage in ARISTOCRAT TECH v. INTL GAME TECH 19 that the player betting a single token per line, is just as likely to achieve a jackpot as the player playing multiple tokens per line. This has the ef- fect of encouraging players playing for the bonus jackpot to bet in single tokens, rather than betting multiple tokens per game. Id. col. 1 ll. 42-48 (emphasis added). The specification also appears to use “playing” and “betting” synonymously, referring, in both cases, to actions of the player: Typically, it would be expected that the game re- turn (RTP) is independent of the number of coins bet per line. With conventional progressive jackpot games though, increasing the credits bet per line creates a relative disadvantage as far as RTP is concerned. Lets [sic] say the start-up amount for a feature jackpot is $10000. A player who is playing 1 credit per line has a chance for $10000 for each credit played, whereas a player playing 5 credits per line only has a chance for $2000 for each credit played. This creates a scale of dimin- ishing returns. The smart player who gambles for the feature jackpot only, will always cover all playlines, but will only bet 1 credit per line be- cause the prize paid for the feature jackpot is the same irrespective of the bet. Id. col. 2 ll. 3-16 (emphasis added). The above passages show that: (1) “betting” is an action performed by the player; and (2) contrary to Aristocrat’s contention, the term “credits bet” refers to credits that were bet by the player. Nor does the prosecution history support Aristo- crat’s position that the machine itself makes the bet. As originally drafted, the “making a wager” step made clear that “betting” is performed by the player and that the machine “allows” such betting: “allowing the player to bet a plurality of credits for a single play at a gaming ma20 ARISTOCRAT TECH v. INTL GAME TECH chine in the bank of gaming machines.” J.A. 575 (emphasis added). Through an amendment, Aristocrat modified the above language as follows, resulting in the language that issued as the “making a wager” step: “allowing the player to bet a plurality of credits for a single play making a wager at a particular gaming machine in the bank network of gaming machines.” J.A. 629 (emphasis and strikethrough in original). By removing the reference to the actor that “allows” the betting, Aristocrat, at best, introduced ambiguity into the claim. The amendment did not clearly limit the claim to activity by the machine as opposed to the player. Aristocrat further argues that the district court erroneously treated “wager”—as it appears in the phrase “making a wager”—and “wager amount”—as it appears in the preamble of claim 2 of the ’215 patent—as synonymous. According to Aristocrat, this error led the court to conclude that, because the preamble states that “wager amounts” are made by a player, “wagers” must also be made by a player. In doing so, Aristocrat contends, “the district court improperly rendered meaningless the term ‘amount’ in the preamble, and read the limitation ‘by a player’ into the phrase ‘making a wager.’” Appellant’s Br. at 45. In Aristocrat’s view, the player identifies a “wager amount” while the gambling machine “carrie[s] out” a “‘wager’ (or bet).” Id. Aristocrat’s arguments lack merit. As the district court found, the use of “amounts” is necessary in the preamble passage but not in the “making a wager” step. An asserted purpose of the patented invention was to overcome a disadvantage in the prior art in which a player had no incentive to bet more than a single credit per game because the odds of winning the bonus were the same regardless of the number of credits bet. The patentee overcame this disadvantage by tying the odds of winning the bonus to the number of “credits bet,” i.e., the wager amount, made by the player. Thus, for the invenARISTOCRAT TECH v. INTL GAME TECH 21 tion to work, the gaming machine must be “capable of accepting different wager amounts made by the player,” as the preamble recites; if a gaming machine could accept only one wager amount, e.g., a single credit, the machine could not perform the asserted purpose of the invention, i.e., varying the probability of the appearance of the feature game based on the number of credits bet. ’603 patent col. 8 ll. 9-10, ’215 patent col. 8 l. 48. Similarly, the “causing a second game trigger condition” step discusses the “amount of the wager” because, as in the preamble, the inclusion of “amount” was necessary to explain the relationship between the value of the wager and the probability of the feature game appearing. ’215 patent col. 8 ll. 59-64; col. 8 ll. 22-25 (“causing a second game trigger condition to occur . . . said second game trigger condition occurring randomly and having a probability of occurrence dependent on the amount of the wager made at said gaming machine . . .”) (emphasis added). In the “making a wager” step it is unnecessary to refer to “amounts” because the step does not discuss tying the odds of the feature game’s appearance to the amount of the wager. Thus, contrary to Aristocrat’s contention, the district court did not treat “wager” as synonymous with “wager amounts.” Rather, it recognized that “wager amount” referred to the amount (or value) of the wager— i.e., the number of credits bet—whereas, standing alone, “wager” simply referred to a bet. The preamble makes clear that the player chooses “different wager amounts” and, absent contrary evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the same actor that chooses “wager amounts” also makes “wagers.” Aristocrat also claims that the district court “improperly disregarded” its expert’s declaration as conclusory. We agree with the district court’s characterization of Mr. Crevelt’s declaration and see nothing improper in discounting conclusory statements as “not useful.” See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (“[E]xtrinsic evidence in the 22 ARISTOCRAT TECH v. INTL GAME TECH form of expert testimony can be useful to a court for,” inter alia, the purpose of “establish[ing] that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the pertinent field. However, conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.”) (citations omitted). While Crevelt’s declaration explains, at length, how a gambling machine’s software “carr[ies] out or implement[s] a bet by executing computer code,” it fails to explain whether the patent’s use of “making a wager” refers to: (1) the steps performed by the gaming machine when it implements a bet; or (2) to the antecedent acts performed by the player when she places a bet. See J.A. 442-43. Instead, Crevelt’s declaration “assumes that ‘making wager’ means processing a bet” and then explains how the machine performs the processing. The district court explained the circularity of Crevelt’s reasoning as follows: Crevelt explains that microprocessors have been used to control gaming machines since the early 1980s, and whenever a bet is placed, microproces- sors must carry out a sequence of programming steps, in particular, the step of transferring credits from the credit meter to the bet meter. Crevelt Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11. Since microprocessor involvement is required to process a bet, Crevelt concludes that “making a wager” necessarily refers to the proce- dure by which microprocessors transfer credits from the credit meter to the bet meter. See id. at ¶ 6 (“IGT's proposed construction, in effect, would divest the gaming machine of any function related to processing a wager amount.”). This reasoning, however, begs the question since it assumes that “making a wager” means processing a bet. If “making a wager” refers to processing a bet, one may infer that “making a wager” describes this microprocessor step. On the other hand, if “mak- ing a wager” refers to the act of betting, then it ARISTOCRAT TECH v. INTL GAME TECH 23 would describe an act by the player rather than the microprocessor. Aristocrat, 714 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (footnote omitted). Aristocrat urges us to find that Phillips requires only that an expert explain “how” a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term, but that an expert need not explain “why” a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand a term in a particular manner. This argument ignores Phillips’s teaching that “conclusory, unsupported assertions by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.” 415 F.3d at 1318 (emphasis added). By failing to explain why a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand “making a wager” to describe the steps performed by the microprocessor in processing the bet, Crevelt failed to support his assertion that “making a wager,” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in art, “means transfer of credits from the credit meter to the bet meter by the game software.” J.A. 443. We find that the district court properly applied Phillips when it discounted Crevelt’s declaration. 1 1 In its reply brief, Aristocrat attempts to bolster Crevelt’s declaration by citing, for the first time, a Pennsylvania gambling regulation that describes a gaming machine configured to wager credits: A slot machine approved for use in a licensed facility must be configured to wager credits available for play in the following order: (1) Noncashable credits. (2) Cashable credits. 58 Pa. Code § 461a.7(x) (2010). This extrinsic evidence of industry-specific usage was not part of the record before the District Court, and Aristocrat cannot raise it for the first time on appeal—let alone in reply. See, e.g., 24 ARISTOCRAT TECH v. INTL GAME TECH For the reasons stated above, we agree with the district court that the term “making a wager” should be construed to mean “betting, which is an act performed by the player.”