Opinion ID: 1231631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: authority to regulate traffic

Text: (4) Berkeley contends that its barriers implement a traffic control plan and therefore are authorized as a means of controlling traffic. [9] Apart from closure of streets (§ 21101, subd. (a), supra ), the statutes do permit local governments to regulate traffic in certain ways. We conclude, however, that the barriers are not included within that power since they are official traffic control devices that do not conform to uniform standards and specifications of the Department of Transportation. The principal grant of local authority over traffic control is contained in section 21100, which provides among other things that cities may regulat[e] traffic by means of semaphores or other official traffic control devices. (Subd. (d).) [10] Section 21351 gives the right to install traffic control devices necessary to warn or guide traffic. Other statutes grant even more-explicit powers, including the right to erect stop signs (§§ 21351.5, 21354, 21355) and yield right-of-way signs (§ 21356), and to designate all or any portion of a street for one-way traffic (§ 21657). However, [o]nly those official traffic control devices that conform to the uniform standards and specifications promulgated by the Department of Transportation shall be placed upon a street or highway. (§ 21401.) Section 440 defines official traffic control device. Prior to 1980 the definition included any sign, signal, marking or device not inconsistent with this code, placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic. Section 21400 provides that the Department of Transportation shall, after consultation with local agencies and public hearings, adopt rules and regulations prescribing uniform standards and specifications for all official traffic control devices placed pursuant to the provisions of this code ... Those standards and specifications are set out in California Administrative Code, title 21, sections 1409.11409.9. The trial court ruled that the Berkeley barriers are traffic control devices as defined in section 440 but noted that they are not mentioned in regulations 1409.1-1409.9. [11] Hence, it concluded, they must be removed because they do not conform to standards and specifications mandated by section 21400. The City and interveners first contend that the barriers are not devices contemplated by section 440. That section, they argue, is limited to signs, signals, and other devices that communicate by symbol. As plaintiffs point out, the contention seems self-defeating, for to conclude that barriers are not official traffic control devices removes the only arguable authority for installing them, namely, the delegation of authority to regulate by official traffic control devices. (§§ 21100, 21401.) Further, section 21400 states that it applies to all official traffic control devices placed pursuant to the provisions of this code, including, but not limited to, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, [and] speed restriction signs.... Finally, whatever questions may have existed as to the applicability of the requirements to all traffic devices were resolved by 1980 amendments to sections 440 and 21100. Section 440 now defines an official traffic control device as any sign ... or device, consistent with Section 21400 that is placed for the purpose of traffic control. And subdivision (d) of section 21100 now permits regulating traffic by means of official traffic control devices meeting the requirements of section 21400. The City and interveners suggest that if official traffic control devices are not limited to signs and signals they necessarily include not only barriers but other diverters such as median strips, pedestrian islands, sidewalk curbs, road shoulders, traffic circles, and the like. Those methods of traffic control, like barriers, require no uniformity, it is urged, since their meaning is direct rather than symbolic; traditionally they have been deemed within charter cities' power over municipal affairs. The dilemma is more apparent than real. As we have seen, the statutes and cases distinguish between cities' broad powers to construct and maintain streets (e.g., Gov. Code, § 40401, supra; Sts. & Hy. Code, § 5101; Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach, supra, 65 Cal.2d 13, 22; City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira (1957) 47 Cal.2d 804, 812 [306 P.2d 453]) and their lack of authority to regulate traffic on streets in use, except by authorized traffic control devices. Relatively permanent, physical changes in the width or alignment of roadways that are effected by islands, strips, shoulders, and curbs clearly are within the construction and maintenance power ( Walnut Creek, supra ) though of course they may alter patterns of traffic. The Berkeley barriers, however, make no basic structural changes. Like signs and signals they leave existing surfaces in use; their only effect is to control the circumstances of use. They are not part of the street itself; they are rather devices... placed upon a street (§ 21401; italics added)  for the purpose of regulating, warning, or guiding traffic (§ 440; italics added). Thus it appears that they are traffic control devices permissible only if they conform to the uniform standards and specifications promulgated by the Department of Transportation. (§ 21401.) The sole issue that remains is whether the department has promulgated uniform standards and specifications respecting barriers used for traffic control. We can find no standards or specifications among the department's regulations. Indeed, no one suggests that barriers are covered by regulations 1409.1 through 1409.8. Interveners, putting aside their allegation that the department has not undertaken to provide explicit standards, suggest that blanket approval is contained in regulation 1409.9. We do not agree. Regulation 1409.9 provides: All official traffic control devices placed or erected after November 10, 1969, which are not specifically covered by these regulations, and all official traffic control devices placed or erected prior to November 10, 1969, shall conform to the statutory requirements, if any, in effect at the time of their installation. The precise meaning and purpose of the regulation are not readily apparent from reading it. Interveners suggest that except as provided in regulations 1409.1 to 1409.8, the department intended to approve all devices not prohibited by statute when they were installed. Even so the regulation does not validate the barriers. The department must adopt rules and regulations prescribing uniform standards and specifications for all official traffic control devices (§ 21400; italics added), and only the devices that meet those standards and specifications may be erected (§ 21401). Regulation 1409.9 does not set uniform standards and specifications for devices of the type Berkeley has placed on its streets. Nor does it incorporate standards and specifications by reference. There were no statutory requirements concerning barriers at the time Berkeley installed them (see reg. 1409.9), and there are none now. Regulatory interpretation of statutes is entitled to weight but cannot contravene legislative intent. (See Woods v. Superior Court (1981) 28 Cal.3d 668, 679 [170 Cal. Rptr. 484, 620 P.2d 1032]; Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 679 [94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231].) To the extent regulation 1409.9 purports to authorize traffic control devices not subject to specific standards adopted by the department, it violates sections 21400 and 21401. Therefore, it cannot empower the City to place nonconforming barriers for the purpose of regulating traffic. Interveners foretell chaos if we rule that diverters are not lawfully placed on streets because they do not comply with the regulations. They argue that other, commonly used devices are likewise not the subject of regulations. That fact does not persuade us to hold the barriers lawful. First we stress that the legality of devices other than barriers is not before us. Second we note that certain devices in common use but not covered by regulations in the Administrative Code appear nonetheless to have been installed in accordance with standards and specifications set forth in the department's traffic manual. [12] We need not decide here the manual's legal effect or the propriety of its use to satisfy the requirements of section 21400. For our purposes the critical fact is that the manual, like the code, contains no standards or specifications for diverters of the kind used by Berkeley. [13] The Berkeley barriers may not be justified as an exercise of the authority to close streets (§ 21101, subd. (a)) or to install traffic control devices (§ 21100, subd. (d)). We therefore affirm the judgment that orders their removal.