Opinion ID: 2593527
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Filing of Suggestion of Death

Text: ¶ 7 As support for plaintiff's argument that the suggestion of death did not trigger the ninety-day time period because it was filed by the deceased defendant's law firm, plaintiff cites several federal cases: [2] Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C.Cir.1969); Hilsabeck v. Lane Co., 168 F.R.D. 313 (D.Kan.1996); Smith v. Planas, 151 F.R.D. 547 (S.D.N.Y.1993); Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 757 F.Supp. 206 (W.D.N.Y.1990). The federal courts in these cases, interpreting federal rule 25, held that a suggestion of death filed by the decedent's law firm does not trigger the ninety-day time period for a motion for substitution because a suggestion of death must be filed by a party or the successors or representatives of the deceased party. This interpretation of rule 25, advanced in Rende, 415 F.2d at 983, has been followed by several federal courts. See e.g., Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 (4th Cir.1985); Hilsabeck, 168 F.R.D. at 314; see also Boggs v. Dravo Corp., 532 F.2d 897, 900 (3d Cir.1976); Smith, 151 F.R.D. at 549-50; Al-Jundi v. Rockefeller, 88 F.R.D. 244, 246 (W.D.N.Y.1980). But see Unicorn Tales, Inc. v. Banerjee, 138 F.3d 467 (2d Cir.1998) (rejecting the notion that federal rule 25 requires a suggestion of death be filed by a party or the successors or representatives of the deceased party). ¶ 8 In Rende, the court read federal rule 25 to state that a suggestion of death must be filed by one of the same persons who may file a motion for substitution, i.e., a party or the successors or representatives of the deceased party. See Rende, 415 F.2d at 985-86. While this additional requirement seems to serve a valid purpose, it is not found in the language of rule 25. ¶ 9 The express language of rule 25 is silent about who may file a suggestion of death. The rule simply says that once death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of death, a motion for substitution must be made within ninety days or the action will be dismissed as to the deceased party. Utah R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). Contrary to the way many federal courts have interpreted their rule 25, our rule 25's language allowing a motion for substitution to be filed by a party or the successors or representatives of the deceased party does not prescribe or limit persons who may file a suggestion of death. We decline to adopt the federal courts' interpretation, and instead hold that the suggestion of death may be filed by the deceased defendant's law firm. Doing so in this case was sufficient to trigger the ninety-day time period within which plaintiff had to file his motion for substitution. ¶ 10 This interpretation of our rule is consistent with the rule's purpose, which is to prevent undue delay in a lawsuit. The ninety-day time limitation for a party to file a motion for substitution ensures that the lawsuit will either continue forward or will be dismissed as to the deceased party. To accomplish this end, it is not necessary that a suggestion of death be filed only by a party or the successors or representatives of the deceased party. A suggestion of death may be filed by an attorney for the deceased party. ¶ 11 Furthermore, this interpretation is also consistent with the ethical obligations imposed on attorneys, including those whose client dies. An attorney has an ethical obligation to take the necessary steps to protect a deceased client's interests immediately following the client's death, as suggested in the comment to rule 1.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Unless the relationship is terminated as provided in Rule 1.14, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. ¶ 12 Plaintiff in this case argues that because an attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship, and the agency terminates upon the principal's death, the law firm's filing of the suggestion of death was without authority and was not sufficient to trigger the ninety-day time limitation under rule 25. However, this argument overlooks the ethical duties imposed on attorneys. An attorney's professional obligation survives sufficiently to require an attorney to inform the court of the client's death. [3]