Opinion ID: 1257576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Pre-Trial Evaluation of Lindsey's Competence

Text: It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 171 (95 SC 896, 43 LE2d 103) (1975). [T]he failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial. Id. at 172 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375 (86 SC 836, 15 LE2d 815) (1966)). In this case, the original order for psychiatric examination contemplated a commitment to Central State Hospital in Milledgeville for observation and evaluation. For some reason not explained by the record before us, this order was not explicitly carried out; instead, an evaluating team [3] from the West Georgia Central Regional Hospital in Columbus visited Lindsey at the Crisp County jail. The defense contends that after the failure of the first attempt at evaluation, the court should have provided funds for an evaluation by a private psychiatrist. The state responds that since an opportunity for a psychiatric evaluation was provided to Lindsey which was unsuccessful because of his utter refusal to talk to the evaluation team, Lindsey is now bound by that choice, i.e., He can't have his cake and eat it, too. The difficulty with this contention is that it presumes either that Lindsey was competent or that he could be bound by a decision he made while incompetent. We are inclined to think that the court might well have considered some middle ground between giving up after one attempt at evaluation at the county jail and employing at no small expense a private psychiatrist. Compare Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1984). However, while it is questionable whether the right to further inquiry upon the issue of competence could be waived, it is nevertheless true that judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring issues into focus. Drope v. Missouri, supra at 176-177. In view of our disposition of the issue addressed in Division III, post, we need not determine whether, on the basis of what was known to the court about Lindsey's mental condition, the court was constitutionally required to explore alternative means of securing an evaluation not suggested by trial counsel. See Lingo v. State, 224 Ga. 333 (4b) (162 SE2d 1) (1968).