Opinion ID: 203380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Appellants Have Standing To Challenge the Decree

Text: We turn to the Consent Decree in this case, beginning with Citizens's argument that the appeal should be dismissed because the third and fourth parties lack standing to challenge the Decree. Citizens points to case law establishing that [a] nonsettling defendant does not ordinarily have standing to object to a court order approving a partial settlement since the nonsettling defendant is generally not affected by the settlement. In re Viatron Computer Sys. Corp. Litig., 614 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir.1980). That misses the point. Here, the third and fourth parties are potentially affected by the settlement. Citizens asserts, inter alia, that by virtue of the Decree alone, it has the right to collect from third parties under CERCLA section 113(f)(3)(B), which provides that an entity who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any person who is not a party to a settlement. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). Standing generally has two components: statutory and constitutional. We do not understand Citizens's objection to be a challenge to statutory standing. After all, our precedent under CERCLA has allowed a non-settling third party to challenge a consent decree entered into by a party that was seeking contribution from the third party. Davis, 261 F.3d at 17-18. Indeed, as described below, Citizens's position would undercut one of CERCLA's goals. The Article III constitutional requirements for standing are expressed in a familiar three-part algorithm: a would-be plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury in fact, a causal connection that permits tracing the claimed injury to the defendant's actions, and a likelihood that prevailing in the action will afford some redress for the injury. Me. People's Alliance & Natural Res. Def. Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 283 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). These components are easily satisfied on the facts here. The third and fourth parties assert that the entry of the Consent Decree injures them because it opens the door for Citizens to seek contribution from third parties. Moreover, it is well established that a non-settling defendant has standing to object to a partial settlement which purports to strip it of a legal claim or cause of action, an action for indemnity or contribution for example. Waller v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579, 583 (9th Cir.1987). [B]ecause approval of a consent decree under CERCLA results in contribution protection to the settling party, it also affects the rights of PRPs who are not parties to the decree. United States v. Charter Int'l Oil Co., 83 F.3d 510, 515 (1st Cir.1996). As Citizens acknowledges, the Consent Decree includes a provision that Citizens and the City are entitled to protection from all contribution actions or claims for the matters addressed in this decree. Further, as the third and fourth parties point out, the Decree does not extinguish Maine's claims against any party other than Citizens for natural resource damages, or for response costs that overrun prior estimates. Indeed, CERCLA's permitting broad contribution protection for settling parties is not a scrivener's accident; it can provide a valuable incentive for parties to settle early. United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir.1994). We reject the argument that appellants lack standing and get to the real issues.