Opinion ID: 457774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Redacted Portions of Government Counsels' Memoranda

Text: 56 The government also furnished appellants with memoranda of interviews with four government witnesses, portions of which had been excised. By motion in limine, appellants asked the court to order the remaining portions produced or to suppress the testimony of the witness. The government represented to the trial court that the excised portions represented only counsels' notes and thoughts regarding strategies for further interviews. Counsel asserted that the excised portions of these memoranda were work products, and did not constitute statements of a witness covered by the Jencks Act. The district court denied appellants' motion. 57 Memoranda containing summaries of witness interviews are, like any other statements, potentially producible only if adopted by the witness or if they contain a substantially verbatim recital of the witness's oral statement. Ogden, 303 F.2d at 734-35. Reports which contain only a government agent's epitomization, interpretation, or impression of an interview are not statements covered by the Jencks Act. Id. at 735 (citing Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-53, 358-60, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 1224-25, 1227-28, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959)). The district court apparently concluded that the memoranda contained no statements, relying exclusively upon government counsel's representation that they contained work product. 58 The district court erred in refusing to examine the unredacted memoranda in camera. In Ogden, we cautioned that it is inappropriate for a court to allow the government unilaterally to determine whether a writing is substantially verbatim or signed, or otherwise adopted or approved by the witness. 303 F.2d at 737; see also Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 98, 96 S.Ct. 1338, 1342, 47 L.Ed.2d 603 (1976) (rejecting blanket exception to Jencks Act for attorney work product). 59 We have reviewed the redacted portions of the memoranda to determine whether they contain a notation of any words spoken by a witness. The redacted portions contain only notations by government counsel regarding strategies for future interviews of other witnesses, work product impressions, and cross-references to other memoranda. Because these materials are plainly not statements covered by the Jencks Act, the district court's error in failing to review the material in camera was harmless. VI ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS 60 Appellants assert that the district court erred in admitting portions of the testimony of six government witnesses which contained hearsay statements. Appellants claim that (1) the admission of these statements as co-conspirator statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) was improper because an inadequate foundation was laid, and (2) their admission violated appellants' Sixth Amendment confrontation rights because there was no showing that the declarants were unavailable to testify. 6 61 A trial court's determination whether evidence is supported by a proper foundation is reviewable for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1377 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934, 101 S.Ct. 1399, 67 L.Ed.2d 369 (1981). Statements made by co-conspirators are admissible if there is sufficient evidence to support the inference that the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy while the conspiracy was in existence. United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548, 555 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1423, 79 L.Ed.2d 748 (1984). We will not disturb the trial court's finding on this question unless the judge could not reasonably have come to that conclusion. United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 620 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 156, 83 L.Ed.2d 93 (1984) and --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 164, 83 L.Ed.2d 100 (1984). The trial court's finding that a statement was made in furtherance of a conspiracy is entitled to deference. Layton, 720 F.2d at 556 n. 4. 62 We next examine the testimony of each of the six witnesses to determine if error occurred in the admission of the extrajudicial statements. A. Critser Testimony 63 Raymon Critser leased an Amoco Station from Leese Oil, a company owned by two of the co-conspirators (James Leese, Jr. and James Leese, Sr.), but had independent pricing authority. Critser testified to statements by the Leeses warning him that he should keep his prices higher than those at a nearby Continental Station and not start a price war, and to their assertion that Continental's low prices were only temporary.
64 We need not consider whether Critser's testimony was admissible as a co-conspirator statement or whether it violated appellants' confrontation rights because Critser's testimony was not hearsay. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted  (emphasis added). This testimony was evidently offered to prove the existence of a conspiracy between the Leeses and Continental. The truth of the statements made by the Leeses to Critser is not at issue; their significance lies solely in the fact that the Leeses made them. Thus, Critser's testimony was non-hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the Leeses' statements.
65 Appellants next argue that Critser's testimony concerning statements made to him by Bleisner during a telephone call initiated by Bleisner was inadmissible because this evidence was not properly authenticated under Fed.R.Evid. 901. Rule 901 imposes a requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility. This requirement is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). 66 Although self-identification by a caller does not provide sufficient evidence of identity under Rule 901, the Advisory Committee Notes make clear that additional evidence of ... identity may be introduced to furnish the requisite foundation. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 901(b)(6). The Notes state that the additional evidence need not fall in any set pattern (id.), and may include such evidence as contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances. Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(4). The Notes also indicate that a ... telephone conversation may be shown to have emanated from a particular person by virtue of its disclosing knowledge of facts known peculiarly to him. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 901(b)(4). 67 The fact that Critser received a call from James Leese, Jr. ten minutes later, during which Leese made reference to Bleisner's earlier call, provides sufficient authentication of Bleisner's identity to sustain the trial court's ruling. See United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 172 (4th Cir.) (identity of caller established by evidence that he made a reply or response in a manner expected to be evoked by an earlier communication made to him by the witness), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 841, 102 S.Ct. 153, 70 L.Ed.2d 125 (1981); United States v. John, 518 F.2d 705, 709-10 (7th Cir.1975) (context and timing of telephone call provided sufficient authenticating foundation for its admission); United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (9th Cir.1971) (evidence of conduct by a defendant or by others so tied to the telephone calls may establish discernible pattern by which identity of caller is revealed), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945, 92 S.Ct. 2040, 32 L.Ed.2d 331 (1972). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the government established an adequate foundation for Bleisner's identity as the caller.
68 Finally, appellants assert that Critser's compound hearsay testimony regarding his conversation with Rick Gerdes violated Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and the confrontation clause. Critser testified that Gerdes told him that Continental had requested (through co-conspirator George Frost) that Gerdes persuade Critser to raise his gasoline prices. Appellants assert that even assuming that Frost's statement to Gerdes was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Gerdes was not a co-conspirator and therefore his statements to Critser do not fall within Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 69 We disagree. The testimony to which appellants object was elicited on cross-examination by counsel for the Leeses, who continued his cross-examination of Critser by agreement of all defense counsel after James Leese, Jr. had pled nolo contendre and James Leese, Sr. had been dismissed. Appellants may not seek reversal on the basis of their own evidentiary errors. See Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152, 154, 84 S.Ct. 1157, 1159, 12 L.Ed.2d 206 (1964) (admission of hearsay evidence not a deprivation of substantial justice where counsel for respondent did not object to evidence but in fact elicited same evidence in his examination of the witness); Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 834 (9th Cir.1984) (attorney may waive client's right to raise error on appeal by eliciting inadmissible evidence himself). Appellants' confrontation clause argument is similarly flawed; Gerdes was killed prior to trial and the Critser testimony was elicited by defense counsel. Counsel for appellants conceded at oral argument that there is no dispute that Gerdes was dead at the time, and that Gerdes' death was a matter of record. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Critser's testimony regarding his conversation with Gerdes. B. Martinez Testimony 70 Peter Martinez, who worked for Miller and acted as his agent in working the market, testified to statements made during conversations with six service station operators. Martinez testified that he asked the operators to raise their gasoline prices, and that some operators agreed to do so, while others refused. Appellants argue that because the declarant service station operators were not members of the conspiracy, the statements were improperly admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The government contends that these statements were not hearsay because they were not offered for their truth, but simply to clarify Martinez's own conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy and to establish the declarants' state of mind. 71 The trial court did not err in admitting these statements. Martinez's testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the statements made to him by the service station operators. The significance of these statements is to prove Martinez's own conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, Martinez's testimony was not hearsay and we need not consider whether the statements were admissible as co-conspirator statements. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). 72 Martinez also testified that Howard Miller told David Miller and Martinez that he would not be involved with them in any price-fixing. The government contends that the context of Miller's statement indicates that it was in fact an approval of their price-fixing activities, and therefore furthered the conspiracy. We disagree. We are satisfied, however, that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the weight of the evidence of guilt properly considered by the jury. C. Irwin Testimony 73 Tim Irwin, part owner of a wholesale gasoline supplier, testified that James Leese, Jr. had asked him to persuade Wayne Davis, an independent service station owner, to raise his prices. Appellants contend that James Leese, Jr. was available to testify and therefore admission of the hearsay testimony was not necessary. Necessity is demonstrated by a showing of unavailability. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538-2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). 74 Admission of Irwin's testimony did not violate appellants' confrontation rights. James Leese, Jr.'s status as a codefendant rendered him unavailable to the prosecution. United States v. O'Connor, 737 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1198, 84 L.Ed.2d 343 (1985). Although Leese had entered a plea of nolo contendre, he had not yet been sentenced; he retained his Fifth Amendment rights while awaiting sentencing. United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005, 99 S.Ct. 618, 58 L.Ed.2d 682 (1978); United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113, 95 S.Ct. 791, 42 L.Ed.2d 811 (1975). Because the record demonstrated that Leese was unavailable as a witness for the government at the time of trial, the trial court did not err in admitting Irwin's testimony. 7