Opinion ID: 1100343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the special tribunal had jurisdiction to consider gnemi's petition for judicial review.

Text: ¶ 18. Waters argues that the special tribunal which convened to review this election contest lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to Gnemi's failure to meet jurisdictional prerequisites enumerated in our election statutes. Specifically, Waters alleges five separate procedural deficiencies. Waters alleges that Gnemi's petition filed with the HCDEC was unsworn; that Gnemi's petition for judicial review with attached documentation was not properly verified; that Gnemi failed to meet the express statutory requirement of obtaining proper certification from two practicing attorneys; that Gnemi did not properly submit the required cost bond, which must be posted in the amount of $300, and which must also be accompanied by two or more sufficient sureties conditioned to pay court costs in the event the contestant/petitioner does not prevail; and, that Gnemi's pleadings were insufficient to maintain an action with the special tribunal.
¶ 19. Waters alleges that Gnemi failed to file a sworn petition when contesting the primary election before the HCDEC. Waters is correct. However, Gnemi was not required to file a sworn petition with the HCDEC. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921 (Rev.2001) sets out the procedure to be followed when filing a protest with a county party executive committee. That statute states in pertinent part: [A] person desiring to contest the election of another person returned as the nominee of the party to any county or county district office, or as the nominee of a legislative district composed of one (1) county or less, may, within twenty (20) days after the primary election, file a petition with the secretary, or any member of the county executive committee in the county in which the election was held, setting forth the grounds upon which the primary election is contested. This statute does not state or imply a requirement that the written petition filed with the county executive committee must be sworn. Waters goes further and alleges that the applicable statute governing the filing of a circuit court petition for judicial review requires that not only must the petition for judicial review be sworn, but there must also be attached to this petition a sworn copy of the petition filed with the county executive committee. Waters is correct; however, she misinterprets the meaning of the phrase sworn copy of the petition. The applicable statute governing the filing of a petition for judicial review is Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927, which states in pertinent part: [T]he contestant shall have the right forthwith to file in the circuit court of the county wherein the irregularities are charged to have occurred .......a sworn copy of his said protest or complaint, together with a sworn petition, setting forth with particularity wherein the executive committee has wrongfully failed to act or to fully and promptly investigate or has wrongfully denied the relief prayed by said contest, with a prayer for a judicial review thereof. This statute specifically governs the circuit court action after a contestant has received no relief from the county executive committee. More than a procedural technicality, the requirement that the circuit court petition for judicial review be sworn insures a subsequent reviewing special tribunal that the matter before it is meritorious and reviewable, having been formerly and properly ruled upon by the county party executive committee. ¶ 20. In Miller v. Oktibbeha County Democratic Executive Committee, 377 So.2d 917 (Miss.1979), we examined the sworn contest requirement at issue in this case. In citing our earlier decisions in Robinson v. Briscoe, 326 So.2d 796 (Miss. 1976); and, Darnell v. Myres, 202 Miss. 767, 32 So.2d 684 (1947), we affirmed the special tribunal's dismissal of a primary election contest petition and stated that [t]he contest must be sworn as originally filed with the Executive Committee, the purpose of the statute being to guard against frivolous interruptions of the orderly progression of the primary election process. Miller, 377 So.2d at 918. We further stated in Miller that the contestant's failure to have the contest sworn as originally filed with the Executive Committee was a jurisdictional defect. ¶ 21. We can understand Waters's reliance on Miller, Robinson, and Darnell. Unfortunately, this Court, in Miller, relied on Robinson, which had misinterpreted Darnell. In a three-paragraph opinion, this Court, in Robinson, affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of an election contest due to the contestant's alleged failure to comply with the statute concerning the protest or complaint which is filed with the county party executive committee. Our opinion in Robinson states in pertinent part: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Marshall County which sustained a plea in bar of the appellee, Wayne Briscoe, and dismissed the case against him. The court found the appellant, Sam T. Robinson, had not complied with the requirements of Mississippi Code Annotated section 23-3-45 (1972) [15] wherein `the contestant shall have the right forthwith to file with the circuit court.... a sworn copy of his said protest or complaint, together with a sworn petition.....' The issue before the Court is whether the contestant in an election contest complies with the statute when he files a petition for judicial review and attaches to it an unsworn copy of the protest or complaint filed with the party executive committee. It is the opinion of the Court that all issues presented are controlled by Darnell v. Myres, 202 Miss. 767, 32 So.2d 684 (1947). The statute requires the protest or complaint to be sworn to. 326 So.2d at 796-97. ¶ 22. In Darnell, the winner of the primary election subsequently lost an election contest before the county party executive committee and sought judicial review. Upon commencing an action for judicial review by a special tribunal, the primary election winner failed to attach as an exhibit to his petition a copy of the answer which he had filed as the contestee before the party executive committee; therefore, the petition for judicial review was dismissed by the special tribunal. In upholding the dismissal, we discussed the procedural prerequisite concerning the filing of pleadings with the county executive committee: [W]hen the contestee [the original winner] would complain to the special judicial tribunal, he must show by exhibit with his complaint what he had placed before the executive committee, either by specific denials or by specific cross-complaint, and wherein the executive committee had wrongfully acted or failed to act on what he had thus placed before the committee for its determination and action. Darnell, 202 Miss. at 775, 32 So.2d at 686. The statute thus assures that the special judicial tribunal will not examine into matters not presented by the original contest or protest before the executive committee, save as to matters germane which happened during or since the hearing before the executive committee, and save as to matters merely explanatory or incidental. 202 Miss. at 773, 32 So.2d at 685 (citing Harris v. Stewart, 187 Miss. 489, 507, 193 So. 339 (1940)). Stated clearly, we reasoned: It is plain enough on a careful analysis of Sec. 15, Chap. 19, Laws, 1935, Ex. Sess., Sec. 3182, Code 1942 [now Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-927], that what the special tribunal created under that chapter is to hear and determine is in what respect or respects the party `executive committee has wrongfully    denied the relief prayed by said contest,' meaning of course the contest theretofore filed by the contestant with and before the executive committee under Sec. 3143, Code 1942 [now Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921]. So it is then that Sec. 15, Sec. 3182 [now Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927], requires that the petition for a judicial review shall exhibit as an essential part of the petition a sworn copy of his protest or complaint theretofore made before the executive committee, from which it follows that if the contestant made no protest or contest in writing before the executive committee, there can be no jurisdiction in the special tribunal to review the action of the executive committee, and further that unless a sworn copy of his said protest or contest before the executive committee is made a part of his petition for a judicial review, the said petition will present no cause of action for such a review. 32 So.2d at 685 (emphasis added). ¶ 23. It is thus abundantly clear that the Court in Robinson misinterpreted the above language from our decision in Darnell. All we said in Darnell was that the original contestee failed to file any written responsive pleadings before the party executive committee, and that since he failed to attach to his circuit court petition for judicial review a sworn copy of any pleadings he filed with the executive committee, the special tribunal had no jurisdiction to judicially review the action of the party executive committee. The Court in Robinson erroneously interpreted Darnell to require that a circuit court petition for judicial review must have attached a copy of the sworn petition filed with the party executive committee, as opposed to a sworn copy of the petition. ¶ 24. Thus, while we agree with Waters that Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 requires that a contestant file in circuit court a sworn petition for judicial review with certain attachments, including a sworn copy of his/her protest or petition which had been filed with the county executive committee, we part ways with Waters when she asserts that the protest or petition filed with the county executive committee must be sworn and that the subsequent filing of the petition for judicial review must have attached thereto a copy of the previously sworn petition filed with the county executive committee. Waters, like the Court in Robinson, misinterprets our decision in Darnell because she interprets Section 23-15-927 to require that there be attached to the petition for judicial review a copy of the sworn petition filed with the county executive committee. The statute does not require this. What is required to be attached to the petition for judicial review is  a sworn copy  of the petition filed with the county executive committee, not a  copy of the sworn petition  filed with the county executive committee. If we accepted Waters's interpretation of Section 23-15-927 and our case law, we would in essence judicially abrogate Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-921, which clearly does not require that a sworn petition be filed with the county executive committee. Further, Waters's interpretation of the statute would have us say that while Section 23-15-921 does not require that the petition filed with the county executive committee be sworn, that same petition has to be sworn when it is attached as an exhibit to the petition for judicial review which is subsequently filed in circuit court. This is an impossibility. ¶ 25. Here is what Gnemi quite appropriately did in today's case. He filed his petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court of Holmes County. There were numerous attachments to the petition for judicial review, including his handwritten note of August 21, 2003, asking for a re-count, the circuit clerk's handwritten note of August 22, 2003, signed by both Waters and Gnemi, confirming that Gnemi had requested an examination of the ballot boxes, and Gnemi's unsworn handwritten protest which he signed and filed with the HCDEC on August 25, 2003. Also attached to the circuit court petition for judicial review is a Verification which states, Personally came and appeared before me, the undersigned authority in and for the aforesaid jurisdiction, James `Danny' Gnemi, who being by me first duly sworn states on oath that the matters and things contained in the above and foregoing are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. This verification was signed by Gnemi before the Chancery Clerk of Leake County, Mississippi and notarized by a Leake County deputy chancery clerk. ¶ 26. In this case, we can thus state with confidence that Gnemi unquestionably complied with the provisions of Section 23-15-927, and our applicable case law, in that he attached to his circuit court petition for judicial review a sworn copy of the unsworn petition which he had filed with the HCDEC. By so doing, the special tribunal was empowered with jurisdiction to hear the case and was clearly informed of the issues which Gnemi wanted the special tribunal to review. ¶ 27. Accordingly, we today expressly overrule Robinson, and to the extent that Miller can be interpreted to have been decided based on Robinson, we likewise overrule Miller to that limited extent. ¶ 28. Thus, this assignment of error is wholly without merit.
¶ 29. Waters asserts that the oath attached to Gnemi's petition for judicial review was insufficient as filed. Specifically, Waters directs our attention to the Verification discussed supra, and argues: Gnemi further failed to swear to the petition for judicial review when filed. His attorney signed the complaint, as any other civil action, on September 23, 2003. A document purporting to be a Verification recited that James Gnemi on oath stated that the matters and things in the said petition were true and correct, upon information and belief  on September 22, 2003, by a separate document attached to the said petition, which was dated September 23, 2003. [16] ¶ 30. In support of this argument, Waters cites Fillingane v. Breland, 212 Miss. 423, 54 So.2d 747 (1951), a case where this Court addressed the verification of a primary election contest petition. In Fillingane, Breland and Fillingane ran in the Democratic primary for District Five Supervisor in Perry County. Breland received 171 votes and Fillingane received 170 votes. Fillingane promptly wrote the county executive committee requesting that the committee investigate certain irregularities and declare a new election. Fillingane then filed a sworn petition of protest with the county executive committee, [17] again asserting irregularities, including an incident where a ballot was allegedly marked with an ordinary lead pencil. On Breland's motion, the county executive committee dismissed Fillingane's petition, whereupon Fillingane then filed a sworn petition for judicial review, which petition carried forward the assertions contained in his initial petition filed with the county executive committee. Likewise, Fillingane attached to his sworn petition for judicial review, a certified copy of his original protest as well as the proceedings before the county executive committee. Fillingane's petition for judicial review contained an oath or verification similar to the verification in the case sub judice in that Fillingane signed an oath which, inter alia, stated that the matters and things set forth in this petition ......are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, belief and information. While the special tribunal made certain factual findings based on Fillingane's allegations, the tribunal dismissed the petition because it was not a sworn petition under Code 1942, Section 3182. [18] 212 Miss. at 435, 54 So.2d at 748-49. In reversing the special tribunal's dismissal, we quoted from Griffith's Chancery Practice, Section 175, and stated: The correct allegation must be not less positive than this: The complainant has been informed and believes, and upon such information and belief charges the facts to be, stating them as facts, or it may be stated thus. Complainant charges, as he is informed and believes, stating the facts charged. This section is documented by cases involving the Code section just referred to, and therefore states a rule more stringent than that which is applicable to the sufficiency of the oath considered apart from the statute. It will be seen that the affiant states that the allegations of the petition are true and correct. Its efficacy is not impaired by adding that the assurance of such truth is derived from belief or information as indeed are most assertions of fact. Our conclusion could, if necessary, take reinforcement from Section 3158 which requires an ordinary and reasonable construction    to accomplish its purposes. 212 Miss. at 436, 54 So.2d at 749. Finally in Fillingane, we stated the verification of the petition for judicial review could not well have been more definite and we hold that it need not have been. Id. ¶ 31. Thus, consistent with Fillingane, Gnemi's verification attached to his petition for judicial review was more than adequate and in compliance with the applicable provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 (Rev.2001). ¶ 32. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
¶ 33. Waters next claims that Gnemi's petition for judicial review lacked the proper accompanying certificates from two practicing attorneys. The applicable statute states in relevant part: [S]uch petition for judicial review shall not be filed unless it bear the certificate of two (2) practicing attorneys that they and each of them have fully made an independent investigation into the matters of fact and of law upon which the protest and petition are based and after such investigation they verily believe that the said protest and petition should be sustained and that the relief therein prayed should be granted.......... Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927. This statutory requirement furthers the goal contemplated by the legislature in its promulgation of Section 23-15-927. Accordingly, it provides yet another express obstacle to the initiation of frivolous partisan litigation. In Harris v. Stewart, 187 Miss. 489, 193 So. 339 (1940), this Court discussed this statutory requirement, stating: [T]he evident and material purpose of the requirement of the certificate of two independent practicing attorneys was to prevent, or at least to minimize, the bringing before the courts of captious or unsubstantial political contests of primary elections,  that such a certificate would dependably show that there was real merit from a substantial legal standpoint in the proposed contest, and would tend to forestall, in a large measure, spiteful partisan litigation which would needlessly cast doubt upon the future title of the successful candidate to the nomination for the public office involved. 193 So. at 343. ¶ 34. This two-practicing attorney requirement has been strictly construed and held to be jurisdictional. In Pearson v. Jordan, 186 Miss. 789, 192 So. 39 (1939) we cited our decision in Pittman v. Forbes, 186 Miss. 783, 191 So. 490 (1939) and once again stated, that the certificate should be signed by unbiased lawyers; and that `Such a purpose eliminates attorneys who represent a contestant at the time their investigation of the matter is made, or at the time his petition for a judicial review is filed.' Pearson, 192 So. at 40. In dismissing the petition for judicial review in Pearson, we held the statutory certificate of two disinterested practicing attorneys to be jurisdictional: It follows, therefore, that the special tribunal was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause; and that this Court is therefore without jurisdiction to hear it on appeal. The statute is mandatory, using as emphatic language as could be employed, under the circumstances           The right of a contestee to an office to some extent is tainted by the proceeding; and it is important that this independent investigation should be made by disinterested attorneys, having no connection with the case. The certificate of the two disinterested attorneys is just as important as the petition itself, and is jurisdictional. Id. ¶ 35. While Waters has submitted the issue and the appropriate rule for our review, she has failed to support her contention with any evidence of a failure on the part of Gnemi to meet the statutory mandate. Attached to Gnemi's petition are two separate certificates, each signed by a different attorney. Other than the name of the attorney, the attorney's Mississippi Bar number, and the attorney's mailing address, both certificates are identical. Each certificate states that the attorney is a licensed and practicing attorney in the state of Mississippi and that: 1. I have fully made an independent investigation into the matters of fact and of law upon which the foregoing protest and petition are based; and, 2. After such investigation, I verily believe that the protest and petition should be sustained and that the relief therein prayed should be granted. The language of paragraphs one and two of the attorneys' certificates is identical to the language of the statute. We are at a total loss as to what else Waters believes these two attorneys and Gnemi could have done, or should have done, to strictly comply with the pertinent provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-927 regarding the attorneys' certificates. Moreover, the record evidences not only that two attorney certificates were attached in support of Gnemi's petition but that such submissions were made by disinterested attorneys based on independent investigation. ¶ 36. We thus find this issue to be without merit.
¶ 37. Waters asserts that Gnemi's cost bonds fail to meet the statutory requirements. Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 states in pertinent part: [T]he petitioner shall give a cost bond in the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00), with two (2) or more sufficient sureties conditioned to pay all costs in case his petition be dismissed, and an additional bond may be required, by the judge or chancellor, if necessary, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. Waters's specific complaints are that none of [the cost bonds] bear the approval of the clerk, and all three bear dates different from the petition, the first being dated September 22, 2003, the third being dated September 19, 2003, and the second not being signed at all by Gnemi. Additionally, Waters asserts that Gnemi filed his cost bond in piecemeal fashion, with some of the pages being facsimile copies. Collective Exhibit 14 attached to the petition for judicial review consists of: First page  Cost Bond in the amount of $300.00, with the required statutory language, signed by Gnemi and Holt Smith as surety. The other signature line for a surety contains no signature but does have typed on the line See Attachment. This document is a facsimile copy and is dated September 22, 2003. Second page  Bond for Costs (in the amount of $300.00) setting out that Gnemi is the principal and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, Hartford, Connecticut, is the surety, and again there appears the statutory requirement concerning the conditions of the bond. There is a signature line for Gnemi, with a check mark, but no signature. On the signature line for an attorney-in-fact and Mississippi Resident Agent for Travelers appears the signature of Anita Johnson. The signature line for approval by a circuit judge is blank. This document is dated September 19, 2003. Third page  This is a facsimile copy of the second page, except that Gnemi's signature appears on this page. Again, the signature line for approval by a circuit judge is blank. Fourth and Fifth pages  Power of Attorney and Certificate of Authority of Attorney(s)-In-Fact. This document authorizes three individuals, including Anita Johnson, to bind Travelers in an amount not to exceed $500,000.00 by the execution of various instruments, including bonds. This document is signed under oath by George W. Thompson, Senior Vice President for Travelers, and contains four corporate seals of the Travelers entities, along with the signature, commission expiration date and seal of a notary public. This document was also certified as remaining in full force and not revoked, as indicated by the signature of Kori M. Johnson, Assistant Bond Secretary for Travelers, and again reflecting Travelers's four corporate seals. Johnson's certificate is dated September 19, 2003. ¶ 38. With this documentation before her, Waters asserts that Gnemi failed to comply with the cost bond requirements of the statute. Waters's sole citation to authority on this issue is a quote from Pearson that [t]he statute is mandatory, using as emphatic language as could be employed, under the circumstances. 192 So. at 40. In Pearson, this Court affirmed the special tribunal's dismissal of the petition for judicial review due to the contestant's failure to strictly comply with the statutory requirement of obtaining certificates from two disinterested attorneys. We agree with the assertion that Miss.Code Ann. § 23-15-927 is mandatory and must be strictly construed; however, Pearson offers nothing by way of discussion of the cost bond requirements of the statute, and thus does little to guide us in considering the issue of whether Gnemi's cost bond was somehow statutorily deficient. From the record before us, we unhesitatingly find that Gnemi complied with the statutory requirements concerning the cost bond. ¶ 39. As an aside, we also note from the record that the circuit clerk accepted and marked as filed Gnemi's petition for judicial review, with the attached fourteen exhibits, which included the cost bond. The record is silent as to any attack of the cost bond by anyone at the trial court level. We find nothing in the record which indicates that Judge Smith was ever called upon to rule on the sufficiency of the cost bond. We have been consistent in holding that we need not consider matters raised for the first time on the appeal, which practice would have the practical effect of depriving the trial court of the opportunity to first rule on the issue, so that we can then review such trial court ruling under the appropriate standard of review. See, e.g., Triplett v. Mayor & Aldermen of Vicksburg, 758 So.2d 399, 401 (Miss.2000) (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 603 So.2d 287, 292 (Miss.1992)). If we were to adopt such a practice of considering for the first time on appeal matters not raised before the trial court, such practice would have the chilling effect of depriving the trial court of the opportunity to first rule on the issue, which would then deprive this Court of the opportunity to perform our mandated appellate review by utilizing the appropriate standard of review of the trial court's ruling. ¶ 40. For all these reasons, we find this issue to be without merit.
¶ 41. Waters also challenges the ruling of the special tribunal by asserting that Gnemi's petition for judicial review exceeded the scope of the matters alleged in his original petition to the HCDEC. In Darnell, this Court recognized the scope of the issues authorized by statute for a special judicial tribunal to review: [T]he special judicial tribunal will have no authority to review or examine into matters not presented by the original contest or protest before the executive committee, save as to matters germane which happened during or since the hearing before the executive committee, and save as to matters merely explanatory or incidental as mentioned in Harris v. Stewart, 187 Miss. 489, 507, 193 So. 339. And we have consistently held that the protest before the executive committee must show specifically, and not by generalities, what wrong or wrongs or illegalities the contestant complains of, and that thereby a wrong was done him in declaring his opponent the party nominee. See for instance, Hickman v. Switzer, 186 Miss. 720, 191 So. 486. 202 Miss. at 773, 32 So.2d at 685. ¶ 42. This Court has expressly defined the guidelines for a contestant when appealing an executive committee determination to a special judicial tribunal and in Harris, we opined that while a petition may not assign additional causes of action, it may be both amendatory, as to the original causes of action and grounds for relief, and supplementary, as to all those material facts which happened during and since the hearing before the executive committee. 193 So. at 343. In Harris, we cited directly from precedent and stated that [w]hen the main facts are set out in the original pleading, and an amendment is made which merely elaborates upon those facts and sets forth additional incidental facts not changing the original picture presented, although those incidental facts may be necessary, in point of strict law, to the statement of a good cause of action, the amendment introduces no new cause. Id. at 344 (citing Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wales, 177 Miss. 875, 889, 171 So. 536, 539 (1937)). ¶ 43. In this case, Gnemi originally alleged in his written petition to the HCDEC that there were fundamental problems with the conduct of the primary election. Moreover, his original petition of August 25 not only placed the issue of ballot box security in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-911(1) squarely before the HCDEC, it also contested the election officials' failure to count approximately five absentee ballots which Gnemi claimed were valid. Furthermore, Gnemi complained of Roy Anderson's third party candidacy in the Holmes County, District 3 primary, asserting that he did not maintain residency there, and he likewise alleged that the HCDEC's cancellation of the second primary election, where Gnemi apparently prevailed, was invalid. ¶ 44. Tracking these initial complaints, Gnemi's circuit court petition for judicial review asserts the same fundamental causes of action. Moreover, Gnemi includes claims for ballot box irregularity, failure to count valid absentee ballots, improper cancellation of the second primary election held on August 26, 2003, and Roy Anderson's alleged non-residency in District 3. The only additional claims arise out of the same fact issues asserted in his petition to the HCDEC. Furthermore, the only additional facts included by Gnemi in his petition for judicial review were those regarding alleged election-day irregularities at the polls-an issue discarded by the special tribunal. ¶ 45. The dispositive issue in this case concerning control of the ballot boxes and their contents was asserted in both the HCDEC petition and the circuit court petition for judicial review, and, as such, was well within the scope of Judge Smith's review of the actions of the HCDEC. This issue is thus without merit. ¶ 46. In sum, we find that Gnemi's petition filed with the HCDEC did not have to be sworn and was otherwise in proper form; that Gnemi's petition for judicial review filed with the circuit court was properly sworn; that there were attached to Gnemi's petition for judicial review the certificates of two disinterested attorneys, in proper form; that Gnemi's petition for judicial review was accompanied with a proper cost bond; and, that Gnemi's pleadings via the petition for judicial review were more than sufficient to maintain his action before the special tribunal. Thus, for these reasons, we find that the special tribunal had jurisdiction to consider Gnemi's properly filed circuit court petition for judicial review; therefore, Issue I is without merit.