Opinion ID: 1642582
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusable and Justifiable Homicide Instructions

Text: The second certified question posed by the Second District asks whether it was fundamental error for the trial court to omit instructions on excusable and justifiable homicide where the evidence did not support these defenses. [1] Pena was charged with both distribution of a controlled substance under section 983.03(1), Florida Statutes (1999), and first-degree murder under section 782.04, Florida Statutes (1999). The State asserted that Pena unlawfully distributed a controlled substance to Fernandes, that Fernandes used the controlled substance, and that the controlled substance was the proximate cause of Fernandes' death. The jury found Pena guilty as charged. There are no standard jury instructions for the crime of first-degree murder resulting from the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. Therefore, during the jury instruction conference, the judge invited the prosecutor and defense counsel to submit proposed instructions. Neither party proposed an instruction on excusable or justifiable homicide; nor was there any evidence presented at trial that would support such instructions. Furthermore, Pena made no objection to the instructions that were given. Pena now contends that the failure to give instructions on excusable and justifiable homicide constitutes fundamental error. In order to constitute fundamental error, the error must affect the validity of the trial to the extent that the verdict would not have been the same if the error had not occurred. See State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644-45 (Fla.1991). The general rule in homicide trials where manslaughter appears on the verdict form either as a charged or lesser offense is that the jury must be instructed on the definitions of justifiable and excusable homicide. See State v. Lucas, 645 So.2d 425 (Fla.1994). The instructions must be given because manslaughter is a residual offense that can only be fully defined by exclusion of the properly explained defenses of excusable and justifiable homicide. See id. We have held, however, that if the trial court errs in failing to give a proper instruction on a lesser offense, and the lesser offense is more than two steps removed from the offense for which the defendant is convicted, then the error is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Rojas v. State, 552 So.2d 914, 916 n. 1 (Fla.1989) (citing State v. Abreau, 363 So.2d 1063 (Fla.1978)). As this Court explained in Abreau, the significance of the two-steps-removed requirement is more than merely a matter of number or degree. A jury must be given a fair opportunity to exercise its inherent pardon power by returning a verdict of guilty as to the next lower crime. If the jury is not properly instructed on the next lower crime, then it is impossible to determine whether, having been properly instructed, it would have found the defendant guilty of the next lesser offense. However, when the trial court fails to properly instruct on a crime two or more degrees removed from the crime for which the defendant is convicted, the error is not per se reversible, but instead is subject to a harmless error analysis. In this case, Pena was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder. The jury verdict form also included the options of finding Pena guilty of second-degree murder, third-degree murder, or manslaughter. Beyond that, the jury could have found Pena guilty of a delivery charge or a possession charge or not guilty of any of the offenses listed. The lesser offense of manslaughter was three steps removed from the conviction of first-degree murder. Thus, because the lesser offense in this case was more than two steps removed from the conviction of first-degree murder, under Rojas and Abreau, the district court properly conducted a harmless error analysis. As the district court found, the offense described in section 782.04(1)(a)(3) is an unusual form of felony murder because the State does not need to prove that the defendant intended an act of homicide, that the defendant had knowledge of the drug overdose, or that the defendant was even present when the drug overdose occurred. Pena v. State, 829 So.2d 289, 294 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Thus, in the factual context of this case, justifiable homicide and excusable homicide were not material issues. We agree with the district court that in this case the jury would have found nothing useful in these instructions in its determination of whether Pena was guilty of first-degree murder or the next lesser offense of second-degree murder. Pena asserts that the error in this case was fundamental and that he is entitled to a new trial regardless of counsel's failure to object at trial and despite the fact that the justifiable and excusable homicide instructions in this case had no application. For this assertion, Pena relies on Hill v. State, 688 So.2d 901, 906 (Fla.1996) (holding that the standard jury instruction on excusable homicide and justifiable use of deadly force was required in order to fully instruct on the crimes comprising homicide), Van Loan v. State, 736 So.2d 803, 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (stating that the court's failure to read the definitions of excusable and justifiable homicide in all murder cases constitutes fundamental error unless defense counsel affirmatively agrees to the omission or the alteration of a jury instruction), Blandon v. State, 657 So.2d 1198, 1199 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (finding that the court must give standard jury instruction on justifiable and excusable homicide in all murder cases, even if there is no basis in fact for the charge and that the court's failure to do so constitutes fundamental error), and Tamayo v. State, 237 So.2d 251, 253 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (acknowledging that [t]he court [should] grant a new trial if ... [it] erroneously instructed the jury on a matter of law or refused to give a proper instruction requested by the defendant) (quoting Fla. R.Crim. P. 1.600(b)(7) (1967)). None of the cases upon which Pena relies alter the proposition of law under Abreau that requires a harmless error analysis only if the lesser offense is more than two steps removed from the offense for which the defendant is convicted. Furthermore, we find that the facts in this case and the unusual form of felony murder charged here distinguish this case from those cited by Pena. We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and hold that it is not fundamental error for a trial court to omit an instruction on excusable and justifiable homicide when the defendant is charged and convicted of first-degree murder by drug distribution under section 782.04(1)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1999), there has been no request for such an instruction or an objection to the instructions as given, and the factual circumstances do not support any jury argument relying upon the excusable or justifiable homicide instruction.