Opinion ID: 2124512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: indigency and representation at public expense

Text: If a defendant is indigent, he is entitled to have an attorney appointed for him at public expense in the Supreme Court, as well as in other courts. Section 13 of the Constitution of North Dakota provides, in part: In criminal prosecutions in any court whatever, the party accused shall have the right . . . to appear and defend in person and with counsel. . . . Rule 44, North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, every indigent defendant shall be entitled to have counsel appointed at public expense to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before a magistrate through appeal in all felony cases. Absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, every indigent defendant shall be entitled to have counsel appointed at public expense to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before a magistrate through appeal in all nonfelony cases unless the magistrate has determined that sentence upon conviction will not include imprisonment. The court shall appoint counsel to represent a defendant at his expense if he is unable to secure the assistance of counsel and is not indigent. The question before us is whether Jensen is indigent within the meaning of Rule 44. For decisions in which we construed our pertinent statutes, prior to the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, see State v. Heasley, 180 N.W.2d 242 (N.D.1970), and State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599 (N.D.1954). For one view of standards for determination of eligibility for compensation of counsel from public funds, see ABA Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, Part VI. Once indigency is suggested, it is the duty of the court to ... go forward to determine whether or not the defendant is indigent ... State v. Heasley, supra, at 249. One can be indigent even though he is not a pauper. Anaya v. Baker, 427 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1970); Application of Trevithick, 260 F.Supp. 852 (D.S.D.1966). In the context of the criminal law, the term indigent has a meaning different from the standards used in determining eligibility for welfare services. See ABA Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services, Commentary to § 6.1. For standards to be followed hereafter in determination of eligibility for payment by the public for defense services, see Appendix to this opinion. Jensen's showing to support his claim of indigency consists of an affidavit of financial resources, a statement of the amounts due his attorney for services in the district court, a letter from the court reporter demanding $200 as a down-payment on fees for transcribing the testimony at the trial, and documentation furnished at our request after oral argument, consisting of a further affidavit, a list of monthly bills for April 1976, a copy of 1975 individual tax returns, and copies of deeds and option agreements relating to rental property owned by Jensen. Whether inadvertently or by intention, Jensen has given us no balance sheet and no list of assets other than the rental property. From these documents we draw some conclusions: 1. Jensen has a monthly income of $1,065 from the Veterans Administration, Social Security, and National Service Life Insurance, all of which is nontaxable. 2. He was the owner of three rental properties, two purchased in 1970 for $11,574 and $6,350, on which he owes $8,665.16 and $4,196, and one purchased in 1973 for $13,000 on which he owes $12,907.20. We assume that the value of these properties has increased, but we are given no current appraisal. 3. In order to raise money for cash bail bond of $10,000, Jensen conveyed these properties to acquaintances, who gave him in return options to repurchase the properties for the amount loaned plus 8½ percent interest. When bail was reduced to $5,000, the $5,000 received from the clerk of court was divided among Jensen and his lenders on the basis of the amount they had contributed toward the $10,000 cash bail. He has not exercised the options yet, but it is obvious that he has some substantial equity in the property. 4. As of March 24, 1976, Jensen expected to pay in April $722.86 in monthly payments on various accounts and installment debts totaling $19,407.11. Included in the monthly payments is a $100 payment on his attorney fees. The debts include $4,151.30 owed to the attorney who represented him at the trial. Based on these facts, we are unable to find Mr. Jensen to be indigent. We cannot hold that one who has a tax-free income of $1,065 per month, no dependents, and a moderate equity in three rental properties, and who is paying $100 per month on his attorney fees, is indigent within the meaning of Rule 44 and our prior holdings. [1] In the absence of a statement of assets, we can give little consideration to a statement of liabilities. Both motions are denied. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PEDERSON, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur.