Opinion ID: 162316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: coverage trigger

Text: 20 In Colorado, a contract is interpreted according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its language. Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 750 (Colo.1990) (en banc). A court should enforce the insurance contract as written, unless an ambiguity exists. Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Colo.1993) (en banc). The meaning of the term occurrence as defined in this contract is at the heart of the coverage dispute. Lexington points out, correctly, that an occurrence must happen during the policy period for coverage to attach. Lexington argues, however, that before an occurrence can exist, property damage must also exist. Accordingly, Lexington submits that, since the Army and SACWSD suffered no property damage from the TCA plume during the policy period, the plume was not an occurrence that existed within the policy period. We disagree. 21 The definition of occurrence in the Lexington policy is an event, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which result [sic] in ... Property Damage. The definition, unlike that used in many policies, contains no express requirement that property damage be manifest within a certain time frame in order for the event to qualify as an occurrence. Cf. Browder v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 893 P.2d 132, 134 (Colo.1995) (en banc) (interpreting a policy which defined occurrence as an accident ... which results, during the policy period, in ... property damage (emphasis added)); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Bentley, 953 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Colo.Ct.App.1998) (same); Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law 595 (practitioner's ed. 1988) (discussing the definition of occurrence common in standard automobile insurance policy forms: an accident which results, during the policy period, in ... property damages (emphasis added)). Without such a temporal qualifier, the plain meaning of the definition is that an occurrence exists whenever an event happens that will result in property damage, regardless of when the property damage occurs. 22 Lexington argues that under Colorado law property damage within the policy period is a prerequisite to coverage. See Browder, 893 P.2d 132; Samuelson v. Chutich, 529 P.2d 631 (1974) (en banc). Contrary to Lexington's assertion, Browder and Chutich are not controlling. Both involve very different policy language than that at issue in this case. 23 In Browder, the policy defined occurrence as an accident ... which results, during the policy period, in ... property damage. 893 P.2d at 134 (emphasis added). Thus, unlike the policy at issue in this case, the Browder policy expressly required property damage to occur during the policy period. 24 The policy in Chutich read, This policy applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period. 529 P.2d at 633 (emphasis added). In deciding that coverage was triggered only if property damage happened during the policy period, the Colorado Supreme Court quoted with approval an Arizona case holding that the word accident clearly implies a misfortune with concomitant damage to a victim. Id. at 635 (quoting Century Mut. Ins. Co. v. S. Ariz. Aviation, Inc., 446 P.2d 490, 492 (1968)); see also Carroll v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 894 P.2d 746, 753 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (holding that [a]n unanticipated or unusual result flowing from a commonplace cause may be an accident (emphasis added)). Thus, unlike an occurrence or an event, an accident cannot exist without some form of damage. The broad term event in the occurrence definition of the Lexington policy does not appear to have been directly addressed in the Colorado cases. 1 The plain meaning of such a broad definition, coupled with the tendency of Colorado courts to interpret occurrence against the insurer, compel the conclusion that an event which eventually results in property damage should be deemed an occurrence under this contract. See, e.g., Bentley, 953 P.2d at 1301 (An `occurrence' is to be broadly construed against the insurer.). If that event happens during the policy period then coverage is triggered, regardless of when the property damage becomes manifest. 25 Thus, if contamination of the soil and groundwater in this case happened during the policy period, December 1, 1980 to December 1, 1981, coverage is triggered, regardless of when the TCA plume crossed the Army and SACWSD property. The district court concluded the only evidence presented demonstrated that contamination of the groundwater underneath Scott's facility began prior to 1980 and continued through the policy period. We agree that no genuine issue of fact exists as to release during the policy period. 26 Scott's offered the affidavits of two experts in support of its motion for partial summary judgment. One expert, Dr. Chirlin, stated in his affidavit that, according to his analysis of groundwater flow and velocity, the TCA plume passed the arsenal boundary by early 1981. Chirlin further opined that in order for the groundwater to have traveled the distance from Scott's facility to the Arsenal boundary by early 1981, it must have been contaminated by events at Scott's beginning prior to 1976. Chirlin also concluded that, based on the length of the plume, TCA had continued to leach into the groundwater beneath Scott's facility through at least 1991. The other expert, Mr. Folkes, stated in his affidavit that TCA more likely than not began to seep into the soil between 1971 and 1976, and was present in the soil through 1980-81, into later years. Contamination of the groundwater also occurred continuously during these years. 27 In opposition, Lexington offered excerpts from the depositions of Folkes and Chirlin in both this coverage case and the underlying suit brought by the Army against Scott's. In Chirlin's depositions, he stated that he did not actually know when contamination started at Scott's facility. In Folkes' deposition in the underlying case, he stated that I don't know when [TCA] first became located in the groundwater below the Scott's facility. Lexington contends these statements indicate that contamination could have occurred after the policy period and thus create a genuine issue of material fact. 28 In response to the specific question whether they actually knew the earliest date of contamination, both experts responded no. A thorough reading of Chirlin's and Folkes' deposition testimony, however, reveals that neither disclaimed having an opinion as to the date of contamination. Both experts used groundwater flow velocity estimates and the known date of contamination of other areas to infer the start of contamination at Scott's facility. Because these calculations involved estimates of groundwater flow velocity and numerous other variables, it would be impossible for each expert to know precisely the start date of contamination. Yet, the calculations did permit both experts to conclude that more likely than not the contamination began before and continued through the policy period. Lexington cites no evidence conflicting with these opinions or the underlying calculations. Thus, based on the evidence presented, a factfinder could only find for Scott's. Summary judgment for Scott's on the coverage issue is therefore proper.