Opinion ID: 2636172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Application of harmless-error review

Text: Having concluded that Stromberg error is subject to harmless-error review, the appropriate standard is that articulated in Chapman whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. [53] We therefore must consider whether the instructional error in this case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike in Nay, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in this case is harmless. In Nay, the defendant was charged with one count of first-degree murder and one count of robbery, each with the use of a deadly weapon, for beating his roommate to death with a baseball bat, then taking his deceased friend's money, marijuana, and handgun. [54] Notably, Nay confessed to the killing but claimed to have acted in self-defense. [55] At trial, the State advanced two alternative theories of first-degree murderwillful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and felony murder based on robbery. With respect to the robbery count, the jury was properly instructed that Nay could have formed the required intent after the killing and still be guilty of that offense. [56] The district court, however, rejected Nay's proposed instruction that would have prevented the jury from basing a felony-murder finding on a robbery that was an afterthought to the killing. [57] Exploiting this void during closing argument, the prosecutor distilled the reasoning required of the jury to reach a first-degree felony-murder verdict to a simple if-then proposition: [i]f [the defendant] committed that robbery then he is guilty of felony murder. [58] Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict finding Nay guilty of first-degree murder. However, the verdict did not reveal whether the jury based its first-degree murder finding on a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder or a felony murder based on an afterthought robbery. [59] Applying the Chapman harmless-error standard, we concluded that it was not possible to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted Nay of first-degree murder if it had been properly instructed. [60] A similar pattern of events occurred in this case. As in Nay, the State charged Cortinas with first-degree murder and robbery, with respective deadly weapon enhancements. For purposes of robbery, the jury was properly instructed that the taking of the victim's property could occur as an afterthought to the use of force; the district court, however, rejected Cortinas' proposed instruction on felony murder that would have restricted the jury from using an afterthought robbery to reach a first-degree felony-murder verdict. [61] Taking advantage of the permissive space that resulted, during closing arguments, the prosecutor simplified the jury's felony-murder reasoning to the same if-then analysis urged by the prosecutor in Nay: The defendant takes his money back. He takes the earrings. He takes the car. It doesn't matter whether he said, you know, I want to kill her because I want to see what it's like ... to plunge a knife into somebody ... [o]r ... you know, I want to get my money back ... I want to get those earrings, and then during the use of that force or afterwards taking advantage of that killing he takes them back, and it's still a robbery, it's still a felony murder, and the defendant is guilty either way of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule. Thus, like the prosecutor's logic in Nay, the prosecutor's closing remarks in this case rested on a flawed premisethat for purposes of felony murder it is irrelevant whether the defendant intended to rob the victim before using the force that led to the victim's death. Consistent with our harmless-error review in Nay, we reiterate that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [62] More specifically, in reviewing Stromberg error for harmlessness, we are not confined to considering whether the jury actually determined guilt under a valid theory, but may look beyond what the jury actually found to what a rational jury would have found if properly instructed. [63] Thus, the evidence presented to the jury and the jury's other findings are relevant to our harmless-error review. The similarity between Nay and this case ends when we turn to the facts and evidence presented. Although Cortinas contended at trial that the murder was impulsive and thus not deliberate and premeditated, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the contrary. Cortinas confessed to the killing twiceand led authorities to Kercher's body. He admitted that he strangled Kercher for over an hour, relenting at times only to determine if she had finally stopped breathing. Failing to kill Kercher after an hour, he changed course and broke her neck. Then, after binding Kercher's head and wrists and transporting her to the desert, Cortinas further ensured her death by stabbing her in the back three times for the admitted purpose of flooding her lungs with blood. [64] Based on this evidence alone, we conclude that a rational jury would have found that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Nevertheless, the evidence also suggests that Cortinas had long contemplated strangling a victim and killed Kercher to satisfy his own morbid curiosity. Perhaps most notably, in contrast to Nay, Cortinas did not claim self-defense, let alone attempt to minimize his responsibility for this crime. Moreover, turning to the actual verdict in this case, the jury found that Cortinas had committed this killing with a deadly weapon, a ligature, which he held to Kercher's neck for over an hour before finally deciding to break her neck with his hands. As we have noted previously, the use of a ligature and the time required to strangle a person are legitimate circumstances from which to infer that a killing is willful, deliberate, and premeditated. [65] Based on the evidence, we can confidently say beyond a reasonable doubt that presenting the invalid felony-murder theory to the jury in this case was harmless.