Opinion ID: 623364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Mr. McGehee also contends that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict him of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crimethat is, of the crime charged in Count Two of the indictment. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence and denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, this court reviews the record de novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Irvin, 656 F.3d 1151, 1162 (10th Cir.2011). In conducting this inquiry, the court may not `weigh conflicting evidence.' Id. (quoting United States v. Evans, 318 F.3d 1011, 1018 (10th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, in making its determination, the court considers the entire record, including both direct and circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it. United States v. Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir.2008). A conviction under [18 U.S.C.] § 924(c)(1)(A) requires more than just possession of a firearm; it also requires that such possession be `in furtherance' of ... a drug trafficking crime. United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646, 655 (10th Cir.2011). As a preliminary matter, Mr. McGehee does not appear to argue that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessedor constructively possessedthe firearm in question. He argues only that the evidence could not satisfy the in furtherance element of § 924(c)(1)(A). We have previously held that `possession in furtherance[] requires the government to show that the weapon furthered, promoted or advanced a drug trafficking crime.' United States v. Luke-Sanchez, 483 F.3d 703, 706 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 435 F.3d 1244, 1251 (10th Cir.2006)). In that sense, the government [must] establish some nexus between the firearms and the underlying drug trafficking crime. Id. The intent to possess the weapon to further [a] drug trafficking crime is generally proven through circumstantial evidence, King, 632 F.3d at 655 (quoting United States v. Rogers, 556 F.3d 1130, 1140 (10th Cir.2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and in that respect, [w]e have identified a nonexclusive list of factors that are relevant when assessing whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the firearm and the drug-trafficking offense, id. These factors include: the type of drug activity being conducted, the accessibility of the firearm, the type of firearm, the legal status of the firearm, whether the firearm is loaded, the proximity of the firearm to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm is found. United States v. Trotter, 483 F.3d 694, 701 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted), judgment vacated on other grounds by 552 U.S. 1090, 128 S.Ct. 864, 169 L.Ed.2d 713 (2008), and 552 U.S. 1091, 128 S.Ct. 870, 169 L.Ed.2d 713 (2008). Applying the Trotter factors, we easily conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. First, as for the type of drug activity, Mr. McGehee's underlying conviction in Count One involved distribution of cocaine base (i.e., crack). Specifically, when Mr. McGehee was arrested, Officer Holloway found on his person individually packaged crack cocaine, which was consistent with intended distribution. Aplee. Br. at 16. Moreover, in the jail calls introduced at trial, Mr. McGehee referenced his work; in the context of his conversations, as Detective Patrick Greeno testified, this suggested that Mr. McGehee was distributing cocaine for sale ... [or] business when he was caught. R., Vol. 2, at 232-33. As for the type of firearm, the gun was a Ruger pistol, that is, a large caliber semi-automatic which could [be] easily concealed. Aplee. Br. at 16; see R., Vol. 2, at 127 (It was a Ruger .40 caliber handgun....). In fact, as noted, the evidence showed that Mr. McGehee almost successfully concealed it while the driver, Mr. Cofield, was being arrested. Our cases suggest that such handguns are frequently used in similar drug-trafficking crimes, where the offender needs protection because of the high-stakes, dangerous nature of the offense. See, e.g., Rogers, 556 F.3d at 1140 (finding sufficient evidence to prove [that] firearms were possessed in furtherance of a conspiracy to distribute narcotics where the firearmsa loaded.40 caliber Glock semi-automatic pistol and a .22 caliber revolverwere seemingly possessed for protection). More generally, as we have stated on numerous occasions, [i]n the context of drug-trafficking crimes, firearms are frequently `tools of the trade.' King, 632 F.3d at 655 (quoting United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295, 1304 (10th Cir.2007)). Detective Greeno offered testimony concerning the nexus between firearms and the drug trade, which the jury could permissibly credit. See R., Vol. 2, at 216 (We have a lot of people getting injured over this stuff, and it is very common to see people that traffic drugs with firearms.). The remaining Trotter factors, moreover, collectively suggest that there was more than enough evidence to sustain the conviction. First, the firearm was fully loaded with a round in the chamber and clearly accessible to Mr. McGehee. A loaded firearm is obviously better suited to serve as protection for illegal drugs that a defendant intends to distribute. King, 632 F.3d at 656. Second, while the firearm was not stolen, it was nonetheless illegally possessed: Mr. McGehee was a convicted felon and had no right to possess it. Moreover, the gun was found in close proximity to the narcotics discovered on Mr. McGehee's person. See R., Vol. 1, at 131; cf. King, 632 F.3d at 656 (The firearm was located in the trunk right next to the marijuana, meaning that it was immediately reachable when the drugs were being accessed.). While [t]he mere possession of a firearm in proximity to drugs or drug proceeds would not require a finding that [the] weapon was possessed in furtherance of drug trafficking, [it] could be considered by the jury along with other evidence in arriving at a decision as to intent. Basham, 268 F.3d at 1208 (emphasis added). On balance, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Irvin, 656 F.3d at 1162. Thus, Mr. McGehee's arguments must be rejected. [4]