Opinion ID: 1030442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kennedy’s registration under Maryland law

Text: Under SORNA, “a sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student.” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a). Kennedy first argues that, because Maryland law does not provide a means for him to register as a sex offender because his offense occurred out of state prior to 1997, he cannot comply with SORNA. Allera responds that, regardless of Maryland law, SORNA 2 requires him to register. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Abuagla, 336 F.3d 277, 278 (4th Cir. 2003). Kennedy’s arguments are premised on the notion that Kennedy was not required to register as a sex offender under Maryland law. However, a review of Maryland law indicates that, regardless of the requirements of Maryland’s registry at the time Kennedy was released from prison, Kennedy is currently required to register as a sex offender under Maryland law. The Code of Maryland requires the registration of “sexually violent offenders.” Md. Code Ann., Crim. P. § 11-704(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2008). A sexually violent offender is defined, for purposes of the Maryland Code, as one who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense. Md. Code Ann., Crim. P. § 11-701(j)(1) (LexisNexis 2008). Among other definitions, the Code defines a sexually violent offense as a crime committed in another state that, if had been committed in Maryland, would constitute a crime specifically enumerated in the sex offender registration statute as one requiring registration. Md. Code Ann., Crim. P. § 11-701(k)(3). Kennedy was convicted of felony-murder and rape. See United States v. Kennedy, 714 F.2d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1983). One of the specifically enumerated offenses requiring registration is first degree rape, which the Maryland Code 3 defines as engaging in nonconsensual vaginal intercourse with another by force, and suffocating, strangling, or inflicting serious physical injury while doing so. Md. Code Ann., Crim. L. § 3-303 (LexisNexis 2002); Md. Code Ann., Crim. P. § 11-701(k). Though Kennedy was convicted of the federal equivalent of first degree rape prior to the enactment of laws requiring the registration of sexually violent offenders in Maryland, the Maryland statute has been made retroactive “to include a registrant convicted of an offense committed before July 1, 1997, and who is under the custody or supervision of a supervising authority on October 1, 2001.” Md. Code Ann., Crim. P. § 11-702.1(a) (LexisNexis 2008). Kennedy was convicted of rape prior to July 1, 1997, and was under parole supervision on October 1, 2001. Accordingly, because Kennedy is required to register as a sex offender under Maryland law, his first argument is without merit. Similarly, Kennedy’s argument that he was unable to “initially register” under SORNA is without merit, as he was required to do so under Maryland law. Under 42 U.S.C. § 16913(b), The sex offender shall initially register -- (1) before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement; or 4 (2) not later than 3 business days after being sentenced for that offense, if the sex offender is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Part (d) of § 16913 gave the Attorney General the authority to specify the applicability of the initial registration requirement to sex offenders convicted before SORNA’s implication. The Attorney General later issued a regulation retroactively applying SORNA’s registration requirements to individuals, like Kennedy, who were unable to initially register, as they were convicted before SORNA’s enactment. See 28 C.F.R. § 72.3. Though Kennedy asserts that this retroactive application still does not afford him a method by which to “initially register,” this argument is without merit, as he is presently required to register by Maryland law. As we found recently in United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 466-67 (4th Cir. 2009), “a sex offender is able to register under SORNA if he is able to register by means of an existing state registration facility, even if he was released before SORNA was enacted.” Therefore, this argument is without merit.