Opinion ID: 1387454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Appeal of Motion to Reopen and Reconsider

Text: Guled also appeals the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen and reconsider.
We review the BIA's decision denying a motion to reopen and reconsider for an abuse of discretion. Habchy v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir.2006). The BIA's discretion in deciding such motions is broad, since motions to reopen are disfavored because they undermine the government's legitimate interest in finality, which is heightened in removal proceedings where, as a general matter, every delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992). The BIA abuses its discretion where it gives no rational explanation for its decision, departs from its established policies without explanation, relies on impermissible factors or legal error, or ignores or distorts the record evidence. See Habchy, 471 F.3d at 861-62; Miranda v. INS, 51 F.3d 767, 768-69 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (holding no abuse of discretion where findings were a reasonable interpretation of record and did not ignore or distort evidence).
Guled argues it was an error of law for the BIA to rule he did not meet his burden to show the proceedings should be reopened. He submitted additional documentary evidence, which offered new material facts which were not available at the prior hearing, to show he was a member of the Madhiban clan. This evidence included affidavits from his family and a letter from a Somali organization supporting his claims. He explains this evidence was not previously available because he was not afforded an opportunity to supplement the record after the IJ and BIA determined the evidence he first offered was insufficient. A motion to reopen must present new facts that are material to the outcome of the proceeding and were neither available nor discoverable at the prior hearing. Fongwo v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 944, 947 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3)). Motions to reopen should only be granted if the new evidence presented could not by the exercise of due diligence have been discovered earlier. Fongwo, 430 F.3d at 947 (quoting Krougliak v. INS, 289 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir.2002)) (finding petitioner's failure to provide certain evidence at the prior hearing because of his attorney's advice did not render the evidence new, unavailable, and undiscoverable). The law expects the applicant will present the strongest evidence at the outset and does not give him another chance to bolster the record with evidence available earlier, but which he decided to hold back. See Hailemichael v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 878, 883-84 (8th Cir.2006) (stating evidence that could have been gathered before the initial hearing does not meet the regulation's requirement that a motion to reopen be supported with evidence that was `not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.') (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3)); Eta-Ndu v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 977, 987 (8th Cir.2005) (affirming BIA's denial of motion to reopen because petitioner did not present new evidence and rejecting petitioner's explanation that he did not present the new evidence earlier because he did not realize the current evidence was insufficient until the IJ issued his decision). Guled's additional evidence did not meet the regulation's requirement because it was available to him earlier and could have been presented at the initial hearing. The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it ruled he had not presented any new material evidence to warrant reopening the proceedings.