Opinion ID: 201338
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Availability of eventual judicial review

Text: 31 The district court found that Esso had not shown irreparable harm because the EQB may yet adjudicate the case fairly. In addition, Esso is not without recourse. It still can resort to the state judicial review process and vindicate any rights it understands are violated by the administrative process. Esso contends that these factors do not ameliorate the constitutional injury it will suffer in being forced to continue proceedings before a biased adjudicator. We agree. 32 The district court's conclusion rested in part on Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986). In that case, a private school asked the federal court to enjoin employment discrimination proceedings that allegedly violated the First Amendment. The school argued that under Ohio law, it could not present its constitutional claim regarding the investigation and potential sanction during the administrative proceedings and that the opportunity to do so during subsequent review by a state court was inadequate. The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that it is sufficient ... that constitutional claims may be raised in state-court judicial review of the administrative proceeding. 477 U.S. at 629, 106 S.Ct. 2718. 33 The Court's reliance on the eventual availability of judicial review related specifically to the school's claim that any fine imposed on it would violate the First Amendment. 7 Eventual judicial review of the fine would adequately address the school's constitutional claims. In the present case, by contrast, Esso asserts that the proceedings themselves violate its constitutional rights. It emphasizes that submission to a biased adjudicator constitutes an ongoing, independent injury that requires immediate judicial relief. United Church, 689 F.2d at 701; see also Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62, 93 S.Ct. 80 (Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.). Under these circumstances, Gibson itself indicates that the federal court need not abstain even if judicial review, de novo or otherwise, would be forthcoming at the conclusion of the administrative proceedings. 411 U.S. at 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689. 34 The district court's irreparable harm analysis may also reflect its misinterpretation of our recent decision in Maymo-Melendez. That case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of proceedings charging Maymo, a horse trainer, with two violations of the Puerto Rico Horse Racing Industry and Sport Administration's controlled medication program. 364 F.3d at 29. First, the Racing Board administrator concluded on November 3, 2000, after a series of hearings, that Maymo had improperly administered the drug Clenbuterol and suspended Maymo's license to train horses for five years. Id. at 30. Maymo appealed the decision to Puerto Rico's Circuit Court of Appeals, which stayed the penalty pending resolution of the appeal but ultimately affirmed the decision on June 21, 2002. Id. The penalty was reimposed when the stay expired on July 11, 2002, and the Puerto Rico Supreme Court declined to review the case. Id. at 31 and n. 2. 35 While the Clenbuterol case was under review in state court, the Board administrator also initiated hearings on whether Maymo had improperly administered another drug, Tramadol. Id. at 30. The administrator ruled against Maymo on June 26, 2002 and imposed a five-year license suspension to run consecutively with the pending Clenbuterol suspension. Id. Maymo then filed a suit in federal district court seeking to enjoin both license suspensions on due process grounds, alleging that the Racing Board officials who conducted the hearings and imposed the suspensions were biased. Id. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that Younger did not dictate abstention because neither proceeding was ongoing. 8 Id. at 32. 36 We reversed. With regard to the Clenbuterol case, we held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibited the collateral attack on a state court decision. 9 Id. at 34. As to the Tramadol case, we concluded that Younger mandated abstention because Maymo's failure to exhaust his state judicial remedies meant that the state proceedings were ongoing. We rejected Maymo's claim that abstention was inappropriate under Gibson, reasoning that even if Maymo's allegations were true, there was no constitutional urgency to his claims that required federal intervention. We explained that [s]o far as the Younger exceptions are concerned with the impact of the state proceeding independent of any final remedy ( e.g., to harass), the suspension order has already been entered.... Id. at 38, 91 S.Ct. 746. In other words, because the hearings had concluded and Maymo was no longer appearing before the allegedly biased adjudicator, he was not suffering an ongoing injury. In those circumstances, state judicial review was sufficient to protect his constitutional rights. 37 In the present case, by contrast, Esso is still engaged in proceedings before the Board that the district court has already characterized as not measur[ing] up to what an impartial adjudicator should be in accordance with Due Process. This circumstance constitutes an ongoing injury and raises a concern independent of any final remedy that is at the heart of the Younger exceptions. 10 Id. Thus, in the circumstances of this case, the availability of judicial review of a final agency decision is insufficient to avoid the irreparable harm that inheres in the biased administrative proceeding itself. 38