Opinion ID: 2310625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal to Grant a Mistrial

Text: In a pre-trial order, following this court's decision in Porter I, the trial court ruled that the government could introduce DNA evidence of the match between Porter's blood samples and the DNA evidence found on the fitted sheet and L.F.'s underwear that were evaluated in the FBI laboratory. The trial court ordered that DNA evidence consistent with the National Research Council (NRC) report could be admitted. The trial court also ruled that the NRC methodology would yield two different probabilities of a coincidental match in this case using two generally accepted DNA matching procedures, one in 469,000, or one in 58,000. Porter objected to the government expert, Dr. Deadman's, scope of testimony. At trial, Dr. Deadman testified that the probability of a coincidental match between Porter's blood samples and the DNA material found in the semen stains on the sheet and L.F.'s underpants were approximately one in 58,000, or one in 469,000, using a less conservative procedure. In response to the government's question whether the less conservative procedure was less accurate, Dr. Deadman responded that both numbers are accurate in the sense that they're not underestimating at all the frequency of Kevin Porter's DNA profiles. They are, in my opinion, overestimates, his DNA profile is more uncommon than either of these numbers. [6] Porter argues Dr. Deadman's testimony exceeded the scope set by the trial court's pre-trial order, and suggested that the possibility he committed the crime was greater than the actual probabilities presented. The government argues that Dr. Deadman did not testify outside of the parameters of the trial court's order. The trial court determined that the order did not limit Dr. Deadman's testimony to only the two fixed numbers, but rather that his testimony had to be based on the methodology accepted by the NRC. After the trial court's voir dire of Dr. Deadman, it concluded that his testimony that the statistical probability could be lower, was consistent with the methodology in the NRC report. A pertinent portion of the trial court's voir dire of Dr. Deadman was as follows: THE COURT: But in saying that the statistical probability could be, I guess in your terminology lower than the statistics that you give, is that in compliance with the recommendation that was made by the NRC? [DR. DEADMAN] Yes, I think everyone realized, or essentially everyone realized that the NRC recommendation was an overly conservative estimate, and it was designed to make sure that when there was a dispute about the frequency in a particular case, that the number that was used would not [be] bias[ed] against the defendant. Dr. Deadman also testified that the general science community recognized these recommendations as ... an estimate that was higher than the true frequency or the true probability, and that a member of the original committee that produced the NRC Report, as well as a subsequent NRC committee, had commented that the methodology used in the original report was over[ly] conservative. The decision to declare a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision in that regard will not be disturbed except `in extreme situations threatening a miscarriage of justice.' Goins v. United States, 617 A.2d 956, 958 (D.C.1992). A mistrial may be granted, if prejudicial circumstances arise. See Smith v. United States, 665 A.2d 962, 966 (D.C.1995). The burden of showing prejudice to support a motion for a mistrial is upon the movant[.] Hallman v. United States, 410 A.2d 215, 217 (D.C. 1979). It is true that the pre-trial order ultimately reached the decision that the two numbers, one in 58,000, or one in 469,000, were found to be generally accepted in the scientific community by the NRC and could be introduced at trial. The extensive pre-trial order also generally supports the approval of scientific information consistent with the NRC report. In addition, the order does not explicitly say that the testimony of the expert was limited only to the introduction of the two exact numbers. Indeed, the pre-trial order approved of the introduction of these specific probabilities, as opposed to the introduction of any other numbers that may have been reached by different scientific methods. Although we understand Porter's argument that the testimony that the numbers were underestimates suggests that some other numbers may exist that would link Porter more strongly to the crime, no other numbers were presented to the jury that were specifically disallowed by the pre-trial order. It does not appear that the pre-trial order was designed to preclude commentary on the nature of the methods used to reach the two particular probabilities, as long as Dr. Deadman's commentary was accurate and accepted by the NRC. Had Dr. Deadman given testimony suggesting that the use of other methodologies would yield a greater probability that Porter committed the crime, then the introduction of this scientific information, that had no basis on the NRC report, would be contrary to the pre-trial order. Here, the trial court ascertained that Dr. Deadman's testimony was consistent with the science approved of by the NRC, and thus, determined that Dr. Deadman's testimony was not outside of the scope set by the pre-trial order. Because the record provides some support for the trial court's ruling that Dr. Deadman's testimony was consistent with the approved methodology in the NRC report, we are constrained to say that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that his testimony did not exceed the boundaries of the pre-trial order. In any event, even assuming that the testimony was outside of the scope of the order, a mistrial based solely on this ground was not warranted. We have previously summarized the great strength of the government's evidence in this case. Thus, we cannot conclude on this record that Dr. Deadman's comment that the numbers were conservative figures constituted a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. So ordered.