Opinion ID: 779517
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delay in Payment of Attorney's Fees

Text: 49 Plaintiffs' counsel contend that, in its May 2000 order determining the final award of attorney's fees, the district court should have awarded them the 8 percent interest that had accrued on their fees since the court's June 1997 order directing that 10 percent of the fund be withheld for attorney's fees. 50 Attorneys in common fund cases must be compensated for any delay in payment, Coordinated Pretrial, 109 F.3d at 609, and thus Plaintiffs' counsel are entitled to such compensation. Contrary to counsel's contention, however, they are not entitled to the 8 percent interest. Instead, the district court had discretion to compensate them either `(1) by applying the attorneys' current rates to all hours billed during the course of the litigation; or (2) by using the attorneys' historical rates and adding a prime rate enhancement.' Id. (quoting Washington Public, 19 F.3d at 1305). 51 The district court, however, chose neither method to compensate Plaintiffs' counsel for the delay in payment. The court explained that, after it had determined that all of the attorney's fees should be deducted from the initial settlement fund, it did not need to compensate counsel for the delay in payment because of the generous hourly rate they had received. The district court chose the generous rate in June 1997, however, more than two years before the court's September 1999 order determining the fee award. The generous rate is sufficient only if it reflects the September 1999 average rate for partners, associates, and paralegals at Plaintiffs' counsel's firm, 9 or reflects a prime enhancement. 52 Thus, we remand for the district court to determine whether the $300 hourly rate represents Plaintiffs' counsel's firm's September 1999 rates or includes a prime enhancement to account for any delay. If the rate does not reflect either of these requirements, then the court must adjust the fee award accordingly. 53 With respect to the eight-month delay from September 1999 until May 2000, while Plaintiffs' motion to amend the September 1999 order was pending, the district court may, in its discretion, compensate for this delay. In making its determination, the district court should consider the length of the delay as well as the amount of the fee award involved. See Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 502-03 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that the plaintiffs' counsel were not entitled to compensation for a seventeen-month delay in the payment of approximately $11,500 in attorney's fees in one matter and a fourteen-month delay in the payment of approximately $8,000 in fees in another matter, because the delay itself was not very long and the amount of fees not very high).