Opinion ID: 1591016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Where the return of a juvenile to the family home is contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare, and it appears from the evidence that a return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time, as viewed from the juvenile's perspective, DHS may move to terminate the parental rights of a child for whom the agency is attempting to clear permanent placement. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a) (Supp.1999). We have held that when the issue is one involving the termination of parental rights, there is a heavy burden placed upon the party seeking to terminate the relationship. J.T. v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997). Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Wade v. Arkansas Dep't. of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999). Parental rights, however, will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Id. The facts warranting termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In reviewing the trial court's evaluation of the evidence, we will not reverse unless the court's finding of clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Baker v. Arkansas Dep't. of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 42, 8 S.W.3d 499 (2000). Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof which will produce in the factfinder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established. Id. In resolving the clearly erroneous question, we must give due regard to the opportunity of the chancery court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Additionally, we have noted that in matters involving the welfare of young children, we will give great weight to the trial judge's personal observations. Id. Ullom v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 615, 621, 12 S.W.3d 204 (2000). An order forever terminating parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence that the termination is in the best interests of the child, taking into consideration the likelihood that the child will be adopted and the potential harm caused by continuing contact with the parent. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). In addition to determining the best interests of the child, the court must find clear and convincing evidence that circumstances exist that, according to the statute, justify terminating parental rights. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). One such set of circumstances that may support the termination of parental rights is that the child has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued out of the home for twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a). It is not necessary that the twelve-month period out of the home be consecutive. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(b). There is no dispute that Devin and Peppermint were adjudicated dependent-neglected on March 13, 1998, that they continued out of the home for more than twelve months, and that the conditions causing their removal from the home had not been remedied at the time of termination. Ms. Bearden argues on appeal, however, that the trial court erred because (1) there was insufficient evidence presented at the termination hearing to support the initial removal of the children from her home; (2) there was insufficient evidence that DHS made a meaningful effort to rehabilitate Ms. Bearden's home and correct the conditions that caused the removal; and (3) there was insufficient evidence that reunification was not in the best interests of the children. In support of her argument that the State should have presented sufficient evidence at the termination hearing to support the initial decision to remove the children from her custody, Ms. Bearden argues that the state is required to present its entire case against the parent in the final termination hearing. However, the case of Briscoe v. State, 323 Ark. 4, 912 S.W.2d 425 (1996), upon which Ms. Bearden relies, does not stand for this proposition. Briscoe only states that it was harmless error for a trial court to conduct hearings in violation of the parent's right to counsel because the parent was represented by counsel at the final termination hearing, and all of the evidence that had been presented at the hearings without counsel was again introduced and was subject to cross-examination by counsel at the final hearing. This holding is peculiar to the facts of the Briscoe case and does not stand for the proposition that, in all termination hearings, the evidence presented at all prior hearings in the case must be reintroduced at the final hearing. To the contrary, the proceedings and orders pertaining to a termination-of-parental-rights case are a continuation of the dependency-neglect case and the evidence adduced at the dependency-neglect proceedings may be considered by the court during termination proceedings. Wade v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 361, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999). A review of the evidence set out above clearly demonstrates grounds for adjudicating the children dependent-neglected and removing them from the care of their mother. In any event, section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) does not require a second dependency-neglect adjudication at the final hearing. It simply requires DHS to prove that the children have been adjudicated dependent-neglected. Ms. Bearden next argues that there was insufficient evidence that DHS took meaningful efforts to rehabilitate her home and correct the conditions that caused removal. We disagree. According to testimony, DHS workers provided Ms. Bearden with transportation, referrals to psychiatric treatment, drug abuse treatment, and parenting classes. They transported her children to visit her when she was in treatment or in jail, and contacted HUD regarding her eligibility for public housing. Unfortunately, Ms. Bearden failed to take advantage of any of the forms of assistance she was offered. Despite DHS's attempts to provide drug treatment for Ms. Bearden, which they repeatedly stated was the primary objective in advancing the case plan, Ms. Bearden withdrew herself from all treatment programs, failed to attend Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous programs with any consistency, and repeatedly tested positive for cocaine use. DHS even made it possible for Ms. Bearden to enter a residential program with her children, but she failed to conform to the standards of the center and was asked to leave the program, resulting in DHS again placing the children in foster care. Ms. Bearden's argument that DHS failed to prove that it made a meaningful effort to assist her in reunification is without merit. Finally, Ms. Bearden argues that there was insufficient evidence that reunification was not in the best interests of the children. Again, we disagree. Evidence was presented that the foster family with whom the children were living wanted to adopt them. The children had been out of their mother's care for nearly two full years, and for Peppermint the separation began at birth. Ms. Bearden was incarcerated for drug abuse at the time of termination and would not be released on parole until she was able to obtain stable housing, a feat she had been unable to accomplish in the two years pending termination of her parental rights. She had been unable to maintain steady employment when not incarcerated, continued to test positive for drugs, and refused to obtain treatment. Finally, case workers testified that they were concerned about the potential harm to the children that could occur by having to live in continued uncertainty. The children existed in a constant state of anticipation, waiting for visitations with their mother from week to week for which Ms. Bearden frequently did not appear or at which she did not interact with the children. According to the caseworkers, Devin and Peppermint were in need of permanency after two years of uncertainty. This is the objective of the termination procedure, and cannot be lightly discounted. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a). For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of Ms. Bearden's parental rights with regard to Devin and Peppermint. Affirmed.