Opinion ID: 2974154
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Character Assault

Text: Only two of the prosecution’s comments concerning Slagle’s character were improper. First, the prosecution’s inquiry as to whether Slagle sold drugs to children was not improper. See JA 636. The prosecution began his questioning by asking Slagle how he made money. This question was No. 04-3490 Slagle v. Bagley Page 10 relevant because it was probative of whether Slagle had any motive to commit aggravated burglary and robbery. In response, Slagle informed the court that, when he was not working, he sold drugs to “anybody that wanted to buy it.” The State then inquired whether Slagle sold drugs to children or teenagers. By denying that he sold drugs to children and affirming that he would sell to teenagers, Slagle was able to demonstrate that he sold only to teenagers and adults. The prosecution’s question was a relevant follow-up question to Slagle’s response regarding how he made money, and allowed Slagle to rehabilitate his testimony. See Ohio R. Evid. 611(B) (crossexamination is “permitted on all relevant matters and matters affecting credibility”). The question concerning whether Slagle sold drugs to children, therefore, was not improper. In his brief, Slagle mischaracterizes the nature of the prosecution’s inquiry. He states that “[t]here is no implication that drug dealings were related to . . . Pope’s murder. Rather, this information was offered to demonstrate that Slagle was a bad person . . . .” Petitioner’s Br. 13. The prosecution did not offer any evidence; instead, it elicited Slagle’s confession to selling drugs without even posing a permissible leading question. See JA 636 (“When you weren’t working how did you get money?”). Slagle cannot complain that the question was irrelevant because the prosecution’s question concerned Slagle’s economic condition, which was undoubtedly relevant to whether he had a motive or the intent to commit aggravated burglary and robbery. Slagle’s objection instead must rest with the answer that he gave. Slagle next challenges the prosecution’s inquiry on cross-examination as to whether Slagle had “ever [broken] into a house to get money[,]” JA 636, but such an inquiry was permissible under Ohio evidence law. The state supreme court held that the State’s question was proper under Ohio Rule of Evidence 404(B) because it concerned a live issue at Slagle’s trial: whether Slagle had the motive or intent to commit the crimes with which he was charged. See Slagle, 605 N.E.2d at 926. The only way this court could find that the prosecution acted improperly is by determining that the state supreme court misunderstood Ohio evidence law. Because we are “bound by the state court’s determination of its own law[,]” the comment was not improper. Davis v. Straub, 430 F.3d 281, 291 (6th Cir. 2005). The prosecution also did not act improperly by asking whether Slagle ever contributed to his family. See JA 638-39. Slagle’s precise challenge on appeal to this inquiry is unclear. See Petitioner’s Br. at 19. The inquiry arose from the prosecution’s questions concerning how Slagle spent the money from his thefts and whether life was “one big party” to him. JA 638. The inquiry concerned Slagle’s mental state during the time of his admitted thefts and was thus relevant to whether Slagle had a similar mental state during the burglary at issue. The prosecution’s inquiry into whether Slagle prayed and liked prayer was not improper. See JA 642-43. Lisa Bloxham, one of the children staying at Pope’s house, testified that Slagle responded to Pope’s prayer by saying, “Shut up because I don’t like to hear your prayers.” JA 414. The Supreme Court of Ohio stated in its opinion that Slagle had objected to the questions concerning his religious beliefs, but that court never directly addressed whether the inquiry was proper. Slagle, 605 N.E.2d at 925. These questions were not improper despite their focus on religion because these questions concerned whether the statement concerning prayer was made, not Slagle’s general truthfulness. Not all religious inquiries are forbidden. Ohio Rule of Evidence 610 states, “Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature his credibility is impaired or enhanced.” Although this rule proscribes use of religion to impugn the “witness’s propensity towards truthfulness[,]” Redman v. Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc. of Penn., 630 N.E.2d 676, 678 (Ohio 1994), Ohio law permits questions concerning religion to show bias and motive, see Redman, 630 N.E.2d at 677-78; State v. Roper, No. 94CA34, 1996 WL 140250, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 1996). Whether Slagle prays or dislikes prayer is No. 04-3490 Slagle v. Bagley Page 11 at least slightly probative of whether he would tell someone to “shut up because I don’t like to hear your prayers[,]” and, as with bias and motive, there is nothing in the Ohio rule that precludes the prosecution from asking questions concerning religion to determine the probability of a statement being made. The State did not suggest that Slagle’s religious beliefs would cause him to testify untruthfully or, as in Redman, that Slagle’s “religious beliefs were paramount to the oath taken prior to testifying.” Redman, 630 N.E.2d at 678. The prosecution’s inquiry was not improper. More troubling is the prosecution’s statement during its closing argument that Slagle “had the nerve to tell [the jury] ‘I pray. I pray.’” JA 670. This statement is improper. Because the prosecution implied without any evidence that Slagle does not pray, the purpose of the comment appears to have been to inflame the passions of the jury. Slagle also challenges the prosecution’s question as to whether Slagle would have stabbed the police officer in the back if he had had the chance, JA 652, and whether Slagle “didn’t want anyone to be able to tell the story of what you did that night[,]” JA 655. As the state court of appeals held, “The questions . . . were designed to elicit inculpatory answers on issues of material fact.” Slagle, 605 N.E.2d at 926. The questions were relevant to whether Slagle had formed the intent to murder Pope, the children, or the officers that night. These questions were not improper. The prosecution, however, did act improperly by asking Slagle whether Slagle took the scissors from the bedroom after the murder so that he could “use them in [his] next—[,]” JA 656. This question was inflammatory and, because there was no issue concerning whether Slagle would kill again, did not concern an issue of material fact in this case. Finally, the prosecutor asked Slagle whether he “was living the lie of [his] life when [he] tried to hide[.]” JA 652. This question, although perplexing, was not improper. Slagle asked the prosecutor to clarify what he meant, and the prosecutor answered that “your life is one big lie . . . .” JA 652. Slagle answered negatively. What the prosecutor meant is unclear, but he appears to have asked whether Slagle was attempting to escape responsibility for his crime. Contrary to Slagle’s contention, the prosecutor was not stating any personal opinion. See Petitioner’s Br. at 17. There is nothing improper about this puzzling inquiry. Thus, after considering all of the alleged character assaults, only the statements made during the closing argument of the guilt phase concerning1 whether Slagle prays and whether he would have used the scissors in another crime were improper.