Opinion ID: 2103389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: other hearsay testimony

Text: In addition to the medical testimony hearsay discussed above, Appellant also complains of hearsay statements introduced at trial through J.W., the victims' uncle; G.W., the victims' mother; and Valleri Mason, a children's forensic interviewer. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that each of these witnesses was permitted to repeat statements made by the children identifying Appellant as the perpetrator, and that the statements were not subject to any hearsay exception.
Appellant argues the trial court erred by permitting testimony from the victims' uncle, J.W. The uncle, a prosecution witness, testified that he asked D.Y. what happened, who touched her, and D.Y. pointed to Appellant. Appellant objected, claiming the testimony was hearsay, but the trial court determined the uncle was being asked about what he said and saw, not what a third-party said, and allowed him to testify to his recollection. KRE 801 defines a statement as: (1) An oral or written assertion; or (2) Nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. (Emphasis added). We have no difficulty in concluding that D.Y.'s nonverbal conduct pointing at Appellant following J.W.'s question was the equivalent of a verbal assertion by D.Y. that Fred Colvard touched me. Thus, the nonverbal assertion falls under the normal hearsay rules for the admission of evidence. In support of the statement's admission, the Commonwealth cites us to KRE 801A(a)(3), Preston v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 398, 403 (Ky.1966), and our previous ruling in Owens v. Commonwealth, 950 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Ky.1997), to the effect that once a witness is allowed to testify that he made an identifying statement, further proof by other witnesses that he did in fact make it is just as relevant and competent as would be defensive proof to the effect that he did not make it. (internal citations omitted). KRE 801A(a)(3) provides as follows: Prior statements of witnesses. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is examined concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as required by KRE 613, and the statement is: . . . (3) One of identification of a person made after perceiving the person. (emphasis added). While D.Y. did testify at trial, the Commonwealth fails to cite us to D.Y.'s testimony wherein she was examined concerning the statement she made to her uncle, and our review of the testimony discloses no such examination of the child. Nor do we find compliance with the foundation requirements contained in KRE 613. Further, the uncle testified prior to D.Y. Accordingly, the elements for admissibility under the rule are not met, and the uncle's testimony relating the statement was admitted in error.
At trial, Appellant asked the children's mother on cross-examination whether she had asked the children Did he put his dick in you? The apparent purpose of the question was to impeach the mother by portraying her as vulgar. Appellant then had the mother read a report prepared by Polk that stated that the mother had, in fact, asked the children that question. On redirect, the Commonwealth attempted to ask the mother about a statement made by D.Y. to Polk to the effect that Appellant took his weenie out of his zipper and put it in her, but not all the way. The Commonwealth first attempted to argue that the statement was admissible as a statement made for medical diagnosis under KRE 804(a) as extended under Edwards . The trial court ultimately ruled that the question and answer could come in for the purpose of showing that the children used children's terminology as opposed to the vulgar terminology allegedly used by the mother. Appellant now claims that allowing the mother to so testify improperly bolstered the victims' testimony. We agree. While Appellant's inquiry of the mother about her question to the children opened the door to further inquiry regarding that event, and perhaps other conversations she had with the children, we fail to perceive how that would have opened the door for the mother to repeat D.Y.'s statement to Polk. Because D.Y. used children's terminology does not impeach the mother's denial that she asked the children a question using vulgar terminology. Moreover, the purported impeachment was impeachment on a collateral matter that permitted a hearsay statement not subject to an exception implicating Appellant as guilty of the charges to be heard by the jury. The mother's questioning of the children is too attenuated from D.Y.'s statement to Polk for questioning concerning the former to have opened the door to the latter. We discern no other hearsay exception which would have permitted the statement to be admitted, and accordingly conclude that it was admitted in error.
Lastly, Appellant objects to various statements made by Valleri Mason, a forensic interviewer for Family and Children First. [4] Mason, a self-described child interview specialist, interviewed D.Y. and D.J. the day after the reported assault and testified about that interview at trial. She testified that D.Y. and D.J. made disclosures of sexual abuse and that they circled anatomically correct drawings indicating where they had been violated. In addition, she testified to the following discussion she had with D.J.: You told me that Fred, that he put his peanuts [D.J.'s term for penis] in you. She said, Yeah. I said, well can you show me on here. Does this boy, does he have peanuts? She said, yes. . . . I asked her to circle where the peanuts are on that boy and she circled the penis. Though Mason's title is that of a forensic interviewer, she is, in effect, a social worker. It is well-settled that `[t]here is no recognized exception to the hearsay rule for social workers or the results of their investigations.' B.B., 226 S.W.3d at 51. It follows that there is no hearsay exception which would allow Mason to testify to the children's identification of Appellant as having sexually assaulted them. [5] As with the medical testimony, the above hearsay was prejudicial because the testimony served to bolster the children's testimony and the Commonwealth's theory of the case. As further discussed below, in combination with the medical hearsay statements admitted into evidence at trial, reversible error occurred.