Opinion ID: 2463589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ruiz has standing under NRS 289.120 to seek judicial relief

Text: Ruiz's final argument is that the Peace Officer Bill of Rights statutorily grants individual peace officers standing to challenge an arbitration decision that determines whether violations of those rights occurred. Specifically, he points to NRS 289.120, which governs judicial relief regarding Peace Officer Rights violations: Any peace officer aggrieved by an action of the employer of the peace officer in violation of [the Peace Officer Bill of Rights] may, after exhausting any applicable internal grievance procedures, grievance procedures negotiated pursuant to [collective bargaining] and other administrative remedies, apply to the district court for judicial relief. If the court determines that the employer has violated a provision of this chapter, the court shall order appropriate injunctive or other extraordinary relief to prevent the further occurrence of the violation and the taking of any reprisal or retaliatory action by the employer against the peace officer. Ruiz contends that NRS 289.120 grants him standing to individually challenge the arbitration decision because the decision upheld his termination that was based upon information allegedly obtained in violation of his Peace Officer Rights. We agree. Assuming that Ruiz exhausted any applicable internal or CBA-negotiated grievance procedures, NRS 289.120's plain language grants Ruiz the right to challenge the arbitration decision in district court. The City contends, however, that Ruiz has not exhausted the CBA-negotiated grievance procedures. Based on the fact that the only question presented to the arbitrator was whether Ruiz had been terminated without just cause, the City maintains that any ancillary questions that might form the basis for this main question were not sufficiently grieved through each of the CBA's grievance steps. In granting the City's motion to dismiss Ruiz's petition, the district court agreed with the City's rationale, reject[ing] Ruiz's assertion that the fact that his firing was grieved de facto encompassed all of his grievable issues, including alleged violations of NRS Chapter 289. We disagree with the district court's conclusion that a grievance that generically alleges an employee's wrongful termination cannot also encompass specific grievable issues related to the employee's Peace Officer Rights. In its initial grievance, the Union alleged four specific violations of Ruiz's Peace Officer Rights, the most notable of which was the allegation that Ruiz was not provided with any notice that he was going to be questioned about the alleged robbery. [7] Upon submitting the grievance to the arbitrator, the Union again made clear that improper reliance on information obtained in violation of Ruiz's rights contributed to NLVPD's decision to terminate Ruiz's employment. At both stages in the grievance process, the Union's argument rested upon the alleged Peace Officer Bill of Rights violations. We reject the City's argument that Ruiz did not grieve these particular issues simply because NLVPD and the arbitrator failed to give them ample consideration throughout the grievance process. Moreover, we note that an aggrieved peace officer would rarely, if ever, have occasion to complain that his or her rights were violated when such violation did not result in some sort of significant discipline. In many cases, if the rights violation never leads to further disciplinary action, the peace officer would have little motivation to request that his or her union seek arbitration. Most CBAs have a screening process to prevent grievances with no risk of disciplinary action from reaching the arbitration stage. [8] With this in mind, we consider it unlikely that a Peace Officer Bill of Rights violation, grieved in the abstract, would reach the arbitration stage on its own. Accordingly, we conclude that Ruiz has exhausted the applicable internal grievance procedures required by NRS 289.120 and that he therefore has standing to challenge the arbitration decision in district court. [9] We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the provisions of NRS 289.120. We concur: DOUGLAS, C.J., and PICKERING, J.