Opinion ID: 2519630
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Award of Post-Judgment Interest

Text: VEBAH claims that the circuit court erroneously awarded interest because: (1) HRS § 431:15-323 allows for only an injunctive, turnover order[] type of relief, not damages; and (2) the court's award of post-judgment interest constituted an illegal and excessive penalty. Initially, VEBAH's first argument is premised upon its unsupported proposition that [i]t is incorrect and improper to attach an interest charge to an injunction. In the absence of express statutory authority governing the payment of interest in a specific type of claim, HRS § 478-3, governing the payment of interest in civil judgments generally, applies. Sussel, 74 Haw. at 618, 851 P.2d at 320. HRS § 478-3 provides that [i]nterest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, shall be allowed on any judgment recovered before any court in the State, in any civil suit. The court's June 9, 1999 order, which is the basis for its December 27, 1999 final judgment, includes a judgment awarding the Commissioner $874,437.11. Nothing in the language of HRS § 478-3 precludes an award of interest upon this judgment, even if it resulted from an injunctive type of relief. Moreover, the reasoning for allowing post-judgment relief on a damages award applies with equal force to the type of relief proposed by VEBAH. As VEBAH itself notes: There is a well-established economic value for a delay in spending: it is called interest. If one foregoes the benefit of immediately spending a dollar, and simply delays spending that dollar until some future time, that delay is compensated by the payment of interest. In short, the interest on the deposited funds is, by definition, complete and total compensation for the lost opportunity of being able to spend the money sooner. Where a judgment results in an award of money, the prevailing party is ordinarily entitled to total compensation. Under these circumstances, HRS § 478-3 is applicable. Regarding its second claim that the award of interest amounted to an illegal and excessive penalty, VEBAH argues that, even if interest was appropriate, the statutory rate of ten per cent was unwarranted in the present case. However, VEBAH points to no evidence and cites no authority indicating that the circuit court abused its discretion by awarding post-judgment interest at the statutory rate of ten per cent. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not err in awarding post-judgment interest pursuant to HRS § 478-3.