Opinion ID: 579465
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Union's Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation

Text: 28 In order to establish a breach of the Union's duty of fair representation, there must be a showing that the Union's actions were arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 87 S.Ct. 903, 916, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). In addition, this circuit has required plaintiffs to prove intentional misconduct on the part of the Union. Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1197-98 (7th Cir.1990). 5 29 With the Supreme Court's recent decision in Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991), there may be reason to question the continued vitality of our intentional misconduct standard. In O'Neill, a unanimous Court held two things: first, that Vaca 's tripartite standard--arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith--applies to all union activity, including contract negotiation; and second, that a union's actions are arbitrary only if they fall outside a wide range of reasonableness. Id. 111 S.Ct. at 1130. In so holding, the Court considered and rejected the union's argument that the duty of fair representation prohibits only intentional misconduct: 30 ALPA suggests that a union need owe no enforceable duty of adequate representation because employees are protected from inadequate representation by the union political process. ALPA argues, as has the Seventh Circuit, that employees do not need ... protection against representation that is inept but not invidious because if a union does an incompetent job ... its members can vote in new officers who will do a better job or they can vote in another union. Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292, 295 (CA7 1983).... Even legislatures, however, are subject to some judicial review of the rationality of their actions. 31 ALPA relies heavily on language in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953).... In particular, ALPA stresses our comment in the case that [a] wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion. Id., at 338, 73 S.Ct., at 686. Unlike ALPA, we do not read this passage to limit review of a union's actions to good faith and honesty of purpose, but rather to recognize that a union's conduct must also be within [a] wide range of reasonableness. 32 O'Neill, 111 S.Ct. at 1134 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The Court proceeded to state that substantive review of a union's conduct must be highly deferential. Id. at 1135. But the Court's clear validation of substantive  review is certainly difficult to reconcile with this circuit's intentional misconduct requirement. Examination of actions for intentional misconduct is essentially a subjective inquiry, while examination for reasonableness--even a wide range of reasonableness--is an objective one. O'Neill says that a union's failure under the latter inquiry can be sufficient for a breach of the duty of fair representation. 33 We would have relatively little difficulty declaring the Union's actions in this case arbitrary and outside a wide range of reasonableness. Predictably, it is somewhat harder to find intentional misconduct. We conclude, however, that the district court's findings of bad faith and intentional misconduct on the Union's part are not clearly erroneous. And even if intentional misconduct were no longer necessary to prove a breach of a union's duty of fair representation, it remains sufficient. We therefore have no need at this juncture to decide whether this circuit's heightened standard of intentional misconduct survives O'Neill. The factfinder is entitled to considerable deference, particularly in matters of intent, and we do not disturb the court's finding that Bennett has met even this higher standard. 34 This case is a far cry from the cases in which we have found that plaintiffs failed to meet the standard of intentional misconduct--where the union simply forgot to perfect an employee's appeal, Hoffman, 658 F.2d at 523; Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 697 F.2d 771, 777-78 (7th Cir.1983), where the union considered the merits of a grievance and decided not to pursue it because it was nonmeritorious, Dahnke, 906 F.2d at 1197, and where the union's representation was inept or negligent, Dober v. Roadway Express, Inc., 707 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir.1983); Superczynski v. P.T.O. Services, Inc., 706 F.2d 200, 203 (7th Cir.1983). Here the district court found that the union acted not just negligently, but intentionally, in a deceitful scheme to deprive Bennett of her protected status under the collective bargaining agreement. The Union argues that there was no evidence of personal hostility toward Bennett or of any direct misrepresentation made to her, and therefore the district court clearly erred. We think the Union's conception of bad faith and intentional misconduct is too narrow. 35 In Graf, the court discussed Hoffman 's intentional misconduct standard at some length. Judge Posner wrote: 36 The standard is as follows. The union has a duty to represent every worker in the bargaining unit fairly but it breaches that duty only if it deliberately and unjustifiably refuses to represent the worker. Negligence, even gross negligence ... is not enough.... Although extreme recklessness is so close to intentional wrongdoing that the law treats it as the same thing, we need not worry about that refinement in this case.... 37 697 F.2d at 778-79 (citation omitted). We have used precisely the same formulation of the duty--the union deliberately and unjustifiably refuses to represent [the] worker--in Dober, 707 F.2d at 294, and Superczynski, 706 F.2d at 202. 38 Even more to the point, we have declared that a union's intent to deprive employees of their contractual rights is enough to support a breach of the duty of fair representation. Martin v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 911 F.2d 1239, 1248 (7th Cir.1990). As we wrote in Steffens v. Brotherhood of Ry. Employees, 797 F.2d 442 (7th Cir.1986): 39 The complaint alleges facts which, if true, would support a finding that the union had breached its duty of fair representation and that the union and employer had colluded to deprive plaintiffs of their rights under the collective bargaining agreement.... This is enough to state a claim for a hybrid duty of fair representation suit. 40 Id. at 445; see also Adams v. Budd Co., 846 F.2d 428, 434 n. 2 (7th Cir.1988) (Where a contract guarantees representation, an egregious and flat out refusal to represent has the effect of cancelling the contractual guarantee. Hoffman does not (and could not consistent with congressional policy) bar review of an egregious failure to represent contractual rights.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008, 109 S.Ct. 791, 102 L.Ed.2d 782 (1989). 41 Personal animosity, then, is not the sine qua non of a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. A union may not refuse to represent an employee for any improper reason, of which personal animosity is just one; the precise reason is unimportant. Dober, 707 F.2d at 295. When a union deliberately turns its back on an employee and sacrifices that employee's contractual rights, it has acted improperly. Intentionally acting to deprive an employee of her rights under the collective bargaining agreement--whether ultimately out of personal antipathy, political differences or merely to avoid work--constitutes acting for an improper reason, and is thus a breach of the union's duty. Such conduct is a deliberate and unjustifiable refusal to represent the worker under Graf, Dober and Superczynski. 42 The next question is whether there was adequate evidence supporting the findings of intentional misconduct and bad faith on the Union's part. 6 Intent is a slippery matter, and deference to the trier of fact is particularly important when it comes to findings involving scienter. See Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 45 (7th Cir.1980). The evidence in this case could plausibly give rise to (at least) two very different interpretations. The benign interpretation is that the Union representatives did not know what they were doing: they truly thought they could extend Bennett's probation under the agreement even though it had ended, and that such an extension was the product of legitimate negotiations; further, they had no idea that Bennett risked being fired four days later, and they considered their hands to be tied once Bennett's protected status had been altered. On this view, it would seem that the Union's conduct did not rise above some form of negligence. 7 But the other interpretation is not so benign: the Union representatives promised Bennett the protections of the Union and then, knowing that she was entitled to certain rights under the agreement, sacrificed her contractual rights and turned their backs on her at the May 19 meeting. Additionally, they knew the inevitable result of their action: she risked summary discharge and they would no longer have to represent her. 43 We think that both interpretations are permissible from the evidence. The district court, having weighed the evidence and made credibility determinations with the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses, chose to accept something closer to the latter view. The Union argues that there was absolutely no evidence of intentional misconduct or bad faith. We disagree. There may not have been any direct evidence of personal animosity toward Bennett. There was, however, significant evidence that Slater, the Union president, had knowledge of Bennett's contractual rights but nevertheless proceeded, along with other Union representatives, to give those rights way. First, there is the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement; we have already found the agreement to be unambiguous in conferring nonprobationary status that is not subject to revocation after the initial 30 days. Second, Ardath Drake warned the other Union representatives before and during the May 19 meeting that the Union had to take care of its members once the probationary period was over and they had been given their Union cards. Order at 6. 8 Third, Slater's issuance of the Union card on Bennett's 31st day of employment strongly suggests Slater's understanding that her probationary period had truly ended, and was not subject to reinstatement later. Order at 4. Fourth--and most persuasive--is Slater's specific denial to Bennett on May 15 that her probation would be extended: Williams has had thirty days to take care of that. Id. This statement directly supports Slater's knowledge that the agreement disallowed precisely what Slater agreed to four days later: a retroactive extension of the probationary period. Finally, the district court found that both Slater and Williams attempted to conceal the retroactive decision by fabricating a decision to extend probation before May 15. Id. at 11-12. Their story fell apart, but the fabrication is probative of their knowledge of wrongfulness. See McCormick on Evidence § 273, at 808-10 (3d ed. 1984); United States v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 601 F.Supp. 1554, 1565-66 (S.D.N.Y.1985), aff'd, 794 F.2d 781 (2d Cir.1986). 44 We also reject the Union's argument that there was no evidence that it engaged in deceitful conduct. First, under the cases cited earlier, including Steffens and Martin, a showing of specific misrepresentations or deceitful statements is not required for a union to breach its duty by depriving an employee of contractual rights. It is sufficient deceit for a union to turn its back on an employee deliberately and unjustifiably. See Graf, 697 F.2d at 778. Second, while there may not have been any direct misrepresentation by the Union to Bennett, there were acts of deceit: in essence, the Union told Bennett that she was nonprobationary and that it would represent her, it then agreed that she was probationary and refused to represent her and it then failed to inform her of her change in status. 45 We cannot say that the district court's findings of bad faith and intentional misconduct are clearly erroneous. We therefore agree with the district court that the Union breached its duty of fair representation.