Opinion ID: 199886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Teague's Responsibility

Text: 33 We also examine the record for evidence that Teague (Bell's Director of Human Resources), or an employee in her department acting on her behalf, should have determined if the returned offer letter had been modified. Teague had participated in the negotiations with McGurn. She stated at her deposition that Bill Murphy and I worked together on all of these offer letters, and Donald Bell testified that he consult[ed] with Linda [Teague] during the drafting of the letter. 4 The July 3 offer letter from Bell to McGurn was signed by Teague, and indicated that McGurn should return the countersigned copy to her. Under these circumstances, a jury might conclude that McGurn could reasonably have expected Teague (or Murphy) to inspect the document upon its return. Moreover, the offer set out in Bell's letter was not a mere reduction to writing of a previous oral agreement; it was a step in a negotiation which Bell had no reason to assume had been concluded. Although Teague requested that McGurn simply sign and return the letter unamended, the evidence supports the inference that she had no basis for assuming he would do so. Instead, she should have checked the document to ensure that he had not made further changes. 34 Although an inference that Teague should have examined the returned offer letter with greater care would be permissible based on the evidence in the record, the evidence, again, does not compel such an inference. Bell disputes the notion that Teague (or her subordinates) had any reason to check the returned offer letter for unauthorized modifications, and a factfinder might conclude that Teague had no reason to inspect the letter absent any indication from McGurn that he had revised a material term. 5 35 We have stated that [o]rdinarily the question of whether a contract has been made ... is for the jury, Ismert & Assocs., Inc. v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 536, 541 (1st Cir.1986), except where [t]he words and actions that allegedly formed a contract [are] so clear themselves that reasonable people could not differ over their meaning, Bourque v. FDIC, 42 F.3d 704, 708 (1st Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). When, as is the case here, the facts support plausible but conflicting inferences on a pivotal issue in the case, the judge may not choose between those inferences at the summary judgment stage. Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53 F.3d 454, 460 (1st Cir.1995); accord 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2725 at 433-37 (3d ed. 1998) ([I]f the evidence presented on [a] motion [for summary judgment] is subject to conflicting interpretations, or reasonable people might differ as to its significance, summary judgment is improper.) (footnotes omitted).