Opinion ID: 2280356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: This Court's Duty Independently to Review the Strength of Evidence

Text: The statute in effect in 1977, when Velda Rumfelt was murdered, did not require an independent review, but as amended in 1984, section 565.035 requires this Court to conduct an independent review of every case where the death penalty is imposed. In conducting its independent review, one of the responsibilities of the Court is to determine [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime, the strength of the evidence and the defendant. Section 565.035.3(3), RSMo 2000. The state, however, argues that this Court should not consider the strength of the evidence, because the strength of the evidence language was not a part of the statutory scheme at the time of the victim's murder. See section 565.014.3(3), RSMo Supp.1977 (requiring the Court to consider the crime and the defendant only). The state notes that section 565.001.2, RSMo 2000, provides that the provisions of the chapter shall not govern the construction or procedures for charging, trial, punishment or appellate review of any offense committed before the effective date of [the] chapter. The effective date of the chapter was October 1, 1984. The offense in this case occurred in June 1977. But while section 565.014.3(3), RSMo Supp.1977, requires the Court to consider the crime and the defendant, it does not prevent this Court from considering the strength of the evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that Bowman committed Rumfelt's murder. This Court has considered the strength of the evidence for offenses that occurred prior to 1984, even though the statute in effect at the time of the crimes did not require an independent review. In State v. Franklin, 969 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Mo. banc 1998), the Court found that the death penalty was neither excessive nor disproportionate in light of the crime and the strength of the evidence against him for a murder that occurred in 1977. Id. at 745. Similarly, in State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141, 143, 149 (Mo. banc 1984), the Court found that a sentence of death for the murder of the victim in 1982 was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering the crime, the defendant, and the strength of the evidence. This Court's duty to assess the strength of the evidence is an ongoing duty. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 550 (Mo. banc 2003) (Wolff, J., concurring); see id. at 547 (majority). See also id. at 552 (Price, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that determining whether the death penalty is excessive or is disproportionate considering, among other things, `the strength of the evidence' . . . is a continuing duty that must be addressed in light of new evidence). The reason the Court applies the current version of the statute is that the purpose of section 565.035.3 is to avoid wrongful convictions and executions. Id. at 547 (majority). Choosing not to review the strength of the evidence for offenses that occurred prior to 1984 may allow wrongful convictions to proceed and innocent persons to be executed. In addition, failure to review the strength of the evidence in these convictions would result in a review regimen that is arbitrary and capricious. Defendants accused of committing offenses prior to 1984 could be executed where the evidence is weak, while defendants who commit later offenses, where the evidence is similarly weak, would be spared from the death penalty by the application of the later statute. Such a statutory scheme would not survive an Eighth Amendment challenge. This Court undoubtedly has a duty to review the strength of the evidence against Bowman.