Opinion ID: 768289
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Analogies

Text: 52 GD also argues that the Sena settlement was under the exclusive jurisdiction of Judge Brewster. If GD allegedly committed fraud in inducing the appellants not to join the settlement, GD contends that the appellants should have gone to Judge Brewster and asked him to reopen the settlement agreement. GD supports this argument with a securities case in which California plaintiffs who were part of a class action lawsuit were barred from filing a lawsuit in California court for fraud and misrepresentation based on the allegation that the defendant encouraged them not to opt-out of the class action. See In re VMS Sec. Litig., 103 F.3d 1317, 1320 (7th Cir. 1996). The Seventh Circuit held that the exclusive remedy in that case was for the California plaintiffs to return to the district court. See id. at 1323. 53 As a procedural matter, GD makes this exclusive jurisdiction argument for the first time on appeal. Even if the argument is not waived, it is substantively flawed. In securities cases such as the one cited by GD, the plaintiffs had the opportunity to opt-out of the class and were therefore subject to the court's jurisdiction. The appellants in this case, however, were never under the exclusive jurisdiction of Judge Brewster. They were never parties to the Sena settlement. They only had the opportunity to opt-in to the settlement. Furthermore, the appellants (along with 136 GD employees) asked GD to reopen the Sena settlement just three weeks after learning the Convair Division was closing. GD's attorneys denied their requests, testifying to this fact during the Argo litigation. We therefore deny GD's request to take judicial notice of documents from Sena and reject GD's argument that Judge Brewster had exclusive jurisdiction over the appellants' claims. 54 Better analogies appear in the preemption cases involving the field of nuclear energy regulation. In a 1990 preemption case, the Supreme Court held that the anti-retaliation provision of the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) did not preempt a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See English, 496 U.S. at 90. English said: [W]e think the District Court failed to follow this Court's teaching that `[o]rdinarily, state causes of action are not pre-empted solely because they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law.'  Id. at 89 (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 105 (1989)). Furthermore, English said: 55 [W]e find no `clear and manifest' intent on the part of Congress . . . to pre-empt all state tort laws that traditionally have been available to those persons who, like petitioner, allege outrageous conduct at the hands of an employer . . . . [That] would require us to conclude that Congress has displaced not only state tort law, which is at issue in this case, but also state criminal law, to the extent that such criminal law is applied to retaliatory conduct at the site of a nuclear employer. 56 Id. at 83. English is instructive not only because it is a recent Supreme Court precedent on preemption but also because Lambert used the ERA's anti-retaliation provision as an analog for interpreting the scope of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. See Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1005 n.3 (citing MacKowiak v. University Nuclear Sys., Inc., 735 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1984) and its interpretation of the ERA's anti-retaliation provision). 57 Finally, there is a simpler way to look at the preemption issues in this case. The appellants' career fraud claims are nothing more than fraud claims about a plant closing. We have typically allowed state fraud claims when companies allegedly lie or misrepresent the status of a plant closing. See Milne Employees Ass'n v. Sun Carriers, Inc., 960 F.2d 1401, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that the employees' claims of fraud, misrepresentation of facts, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were not preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act). This case is about whether GD is guilty of fraud and misrepresentation because of its statements about the appellants' career jobs and about not closing the Convair Division. The Sena settlement of the FLSA claims was merely an impetus for this alleged fraud and may factor into the amount of damages to which the appellants are due. 58 The preemption issues in this case have important federalism concerns, and we are reluctant to allow a plaintiff to circumvent the FLSA's comprehensive statutory remedies. Preemption issues, however, must be decided on a case-bycase basis. In this case, the appellants' career fraud claims are not categorically preempted because the appellants never complained or instituted any proceedings under the antiretaliation provision; the career fraud claims also are not contrary to the FLSA's purpose of protecting employees. Thus, after conducting a thorough preemption analysis and consulting analogous legal precedents, we reverse the district court's finding of federal preemption as to the career fraud claims.