Opinion ID: 1763136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standards for Habeas Relief

Text: Habeas corpus is the last judicial inquiry into the validity of a criminal conviction and serves as `a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness.' State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. banc 2003) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982)). [A] writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government. Id. Habeas proceedings, authorized under Rule 91, are limited to determining the facial validity of a petitioner's confinement. State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo. banc 1993). Engel, as the habeas corpus petitioner, has the burden of proof to show that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 73 S.W.3d 623, 624 (Mo. banc 2002). Because Engel's arguments for habeas relief challenge the validity of his convictions and were cognizable in his direct appeal or post-conviction motion, he is afforded habeas review that is extremely limited in scope. See Simmons, 866 S.W.2d at 446 (explaining that prevention of duplicative and unending challenges to the finality of a judgment requires that habeas claims cognizable on direct appeal or in a post conviction motion be reviewed only if they present jurisdictional issues or circumstances so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice will result if review is not taken). The procedural bar to raising a habeas claim can be overcome by showings of manifest injustice, cause and prejudice, or a jurisdictional defect. See Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 546. Engel seeks to overcome the procedural bar to his habeas claims by showing cause and prejudice. Cause is established where there is a factor at issue external to the defense or beyond its responsibilities. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n. 24, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (noting that cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule (internal quotation omitted)). This Court will not undertake habeas review of Engel's claims unless he can establish that the grounds relied on were not `known to him' during his direct appeal or post-conviction case. Simmons, 866 S.W.2d at 446. The State suggests that Engel's claims for habeas relief mirror the claims he raised in his prior pro se habeas petition, wherein he alleged that the prosecution had failed to disclose impeachment evidence related to Mammolito, including that Mammolito was paid for his testimony. Engel's current claims for habeas relief, however, are distinct from his previous claims because they rest on a collection of new evidence developed in Manning's cases and unknown or unavailable when Engel previously sought relief. Justice requires that this Court consider all available evidence uncovered following Engel's trial that may impact his entitlement to habeas relief. See Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 545 (noting that habeas review must assess the totality of all of the evidence uncovered over the years between various judicial reviews to determine if a habeas petitioner established a claim of innocence); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (discussing that courts must consider the cumulative effect of excluded evidence in determining if a Brady violation occurred). Engel has established the cause needed to overcome the procedural bar to review of his habeas claims by showing that his arguments are based on evidence and information that was not revealed until Manning's federal lawsuits. Under the cause and prejudice standard, however, it is not enough that Engel's petition rests on newly discovered evidence. He also must establish that he is entitled to habeas review because this Court's failure to review his claims would prejudice him. In the context of whether Engel's Brady claims are barred procedurally from habeas review, prejudice is identical to this Court's assessment of prejudice undertaken in assessing Engel's Brady claims. Consequently, so long as Engel establishes the prejudice necessary to support his Brady claims, he will have shown the required prejudice to overcome the procedural bar for habeas relief.