Opinion ID: 2823815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Language

Text: Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â The majority below found the plain language ambiguous: â[Q]uoting the statute simply begs the question: âwith any sentence being servedâ when?â Diaz, Â¶17 n.2. We disagree for several reasons. Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â First, we agree with Judge Russel, who in his dissent opined that âthis phrase means just what it saysââwith any sentences being served.ââ Diaz, Â¶23 (Russel, J., dissenting). The construction of the majority below requires us to add wordsâthat is, to read the phrase âat the time of the assaultâ into the statute. See People v. Benavidez, 222 P.3d 391, 394 (Colo. App. 2009) (interpreting section 18-3-203(1)(f) and rejecting a similar argument). âBut, in interpreting a statute, we must accept the General Assemblyâs choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not there.â Id. at 393â94. Like the court in Benavidez, we refuse the defendantâs invitation to venture into legislative territory. Accord Turbyne, 151 P.3d at 567 (âWe do not add words to the statute . . . .â); see also id. at 568 (â[W]e cannot supply the missing language and must respect the legislatureâs choice of language.â). Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Second, the phrase in question begins with a reference to imposition of sentence: âA sentence imposed pursuant to this paragraph (f) . . . .â This indicates that the time at issue is the time the sentence is imposed, not the time of assault. Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Third, it is illogical to require a consecutive sentence only if the offender is still serving the sentence for which he was imprisoned at the time of the assault because section 18-3-203(1)(f), by its terms, also prohibits assaults that occur before a sentence is even imposedâthat is, when an offender is âlawfully confined or in custody as a result of being charged with . . . a crime.â See Â§ 18-3-203(1)(f) (emphasis added); see also Benavidez, 222 P.3d at 394 (noting that the provision also encompasses those who have been charged with a crime and requiring a consecutive sentence in that situation). Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Last, had the legislature intended that the assault sentence at issue here be consecutive only to the sentence being served at the time of the assault, it could have said just that. It has certainly demonstrated the capacity to impose such a requirement in other provisions of the criminal code. See Benavidez, 222 P.3d at 394 (observing that the legislature could have added language under section 18-3-203(1)(f) similar to the language in the escape statute found at section 18-8-209(1), C.R.S. (2014), which states â[a]ny sentence imposed following conviction of an offense under [certain enumerated sections] shall run consecutively . . . with any sentence which the offender was serving at the time of the conduct prohibited by those sectionsâ). Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â The plain language of the statute makes clear that if, at the time of sentencing, the offender has âanyâ sentence to serve, the trial court âshallâ impose a consecutive sentence.