Opinion ID: 2089336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Required Degree of Volitional Impairment.

Text: In arguing he could not be found to be a sexually violent predator absent a showing that he lacks complete volitional control over his predatory behavior, respondent seizes upon specific language contained in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). The Court noted in that case that states have implemented statutes comparable to the Kansas act for the purpose of detaining a narrow class of individuals who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357, 117 S.Ct. at 2079, 138 L.Ed.2d at 512. The Court further observed: A finding of dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment. We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a mental illness or mental abnormality. These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impair-ment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. The Kansas Act is plainly of a kind with these other civil commitment statutes: It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. Id. at 358, 117 S.Ct. at 2080, 138 L.Ed.2d at 512-13 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Respondent urges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the language in Hendricks, which we have italicized, requires proof of a complete lack of volitional control before an alleged sexual predator can be involuntarily confined. We cannot agree with that contention. The essential conclusion to be derived from Hendricks is that a state's sexually violent predator statute does not violate substantive due process if it requires proof of a mental abnormality that results in an inability to control sexually dangerous behavior. Iowa Code section 229A.2(4) requires such proof as did the Kansas statute upheld in Hendricks. [1] But, we do not read section 229A.2(4) as requiring that the necessary mental abnormality involved a total lack of volitional control. Nor do we interpret the language from Hendricks, upon which respondent relies, as requiring that such an extreme lack of volition be shown to exist in order for a confinement to satisfy substantive due process. Our rejection of defendant's contention concerning the volitional requirement of section 229A.2(4) finds support in In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1049, 120 S.Ct. 587, 145 L.Ed.2d 488 (1999). In that case, the court found that Hendricks requires a showing of a degree of volitional impairment that results in a lack of control over one's own dangerousness, but does not require a showing of a complete lack of volitional control. Linehan, 594 N.W.2d at 875. Similarly, a Washington appellate court in In re Brooks, 94 Wash. App. 716, 973 P.2d 486 (1999), concluded that a defendant's pedophilia was a mental abnormality under Washington's sexually violent predator statute and rejected the defendant's argument that Hendricks requires a showing of a complete lack of volitional control. Brooks, 973 P.2d at 492. We agree with these holdings.