Opinion ID: 155038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty to Protect from Foreseeable Harm

Text: 14 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When applying this standard, we examine the record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaul, 83 F.3d at 1212. 15 There is no genuine factual dispute, and summary judgment may be granted, if there is a mere scintilla of evidence or if the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative. Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir.1993) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250-51 (1986)). [T]he relevant inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Bingaman v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 1 F.3d 976, 980 (10th Cir.1993) (quotation omitted). 16 Ms. Wilson contends that she established the existence of material issues of fact that Wal-Mart owed her a duty to provide adequate security on its premises during the store's business hours and to warn her of a dangerous condition existing on its premises. Appellant's Br. at 5. More specifically, Ms. Wilson contends that Wal-Mart had a duty to provide a security officer during all business hours, to train its personnel regarding store patron security, and conduct security evaluations of the premises. 17 Under New Mexico law, a business proprietor is not and cannot be an insurer of a guest or patron against personal injuries inflicted by another person on the premises, other than his servants or agents. Coca v. Arceo, 376 P.2d 970, 973 (N.M.1962). However, a business proprietor is liable to patrons who are injured by the harmful acts of third persons if, by the exercise of reasonable care, the proprietor could have discovered that such acts were being done or about to be done, and could have protected against the injury by controlling the conduct of the other patron. Reichert v. Atler, 875 P.2d 384, 387 (N.M.Ct.App.1992) (quoting Valdez v. Warner, 742 P.2d 517, 519 (N.M.Ct.App.1987)), aff'd in part, 875 P.2d 379, 382 (N.M.1994). A business proprietor has a duty to protect patrons from the harm foreseeably inflicted by [a] third party. Reichert v. Atler, 875 P.2d 379, 381 (N.M.1994). A business proprietor's duty to protect visitors arises from the likelihood that a third party will injure a visitor and, as the risk of danger increases, the amount of care to be exercised by the [owner] [operator] also increases. Id. at 382; see also N.M. Uniform Jury Instructions 13-1320 (Supp.1996). 18 Construing the facts in favor of Ms. Wilson, we conclude that no reasonable jury 2 could find that the attack on Ms. Wilson was reasonably foreseeable such that Wal-Mart was charged with a duty to provide greater security than it had been providing. First, there is no evidence of any prior violent incidents at Wal-Mart. The store manager at the time of the incident testified that there were numerous shoplifting incidents in 1994 and that there may have been a few automobile vandalism incidents. However, there is no evidence of any strong arm incidents at the store other than the attack on Ms. Wilson. 19 Second, there is no evidence that Wal-Mart was located in a known high crime area. The only evidence regarding the level of crime in the area is the Wilsons' testimony that they believed the neighborhood was safe. Cf. Reichert, 875 P.2d at 387 (upholding trial court's finding that bar had inadequate security in light of its reputation as a dangerous bar and the scene of numerous murders, stabbings, shootings, assaults, and riots). 20 Finally, the only other evidence Ms. Wilson relies on as proof of foreseeability is (1) the fact that Wal-Mart hired a guard to provide security from 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., and (2) the affidavit of her expert witness. Ms. Wilson argues that the fact that Wal-Mart hired an off-duty officer to guard its premises proves Wal-Mart's ability to foresee criminal activity. Appellant's Br. at 9. We disagree. If we were to adopt Ms. Wilson's view, business proprietors would be discouraged from providing security from fear that such a step would be proof of foreseeability. We think it is unlikely that such a result would comport with New Mexico's public policy. In any event, even if security measures are some proof of security concerns, the fact that Wal-Mart hired a security guard is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact in the absence of other evidence of foreseeability. 21 As for the affidavit from Ms. Wilson's expert witness, the opinion contained in that affidavit is wholly deficient. Louis Lehner's affidavit contains the conclusory statement that Defendant Knew or had reason to know that a criminal act, including an act such as that suffered by Plaintiff, would occur on its premises and it had a duty to its patrons, including Plaintiff, to use ordinary and reasonable care to make its premises safe. Appellant's App. at 192. The affidavit does not attempt to address any facts proving foreseeability and provides no support for Ms. Wilson's case. See Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir.1985) ([A] party may not avoid summary judgment solely on the basis of an expert's opinion that fails to provide specific facts from the record to support its conclusory allegations.). 22 The only further argument Ms. Wilson makes is that, regardless of foreseeability, [o]nce Wal-Mart assumed its duty of protection by providing a 'security guard' on its premises, it was further obliged to perform that duty with reasonable and due care for Wilson's safety. Appellant's Br. at 9. Ms. Wilson does not cite any New Mexico law to support her claim that a business proprietor may assume a duty of security in the absence of foreseeability. Ms. Wilson does, however, cite a case from another jurisdiction, Harris v. Pizza Hut of Louisiana, Inc., 455 So.2d 1364 (La.1984). Harris involved an armed robbery that occurred while a security guard was on duty, and that resulted in the shooting death of one customer. Id. at 1364. The court held that a duty of protection which has been voluntarily assumed must be performed with due care. Id. at 1369. Thus, the court concluded that a business which undertakes to hire a security guard to protect itself and its patrons is liable for physical harm which occurs because of negligence on the part of that guard. Id. However, even if New Mexico were to adopt a similar approach, it is undisputed that Wal-Mart did not provide a security guard before 11:00 a.m. and, thus, it did not assume a duty at that time and there is no allegation that a security guard was negligent. 3 23 In short, we conclude that there is not sufficient disagreement to submit to the jury regarding whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Wal-Mart customers had a risk of harm from violent attacks in the parking lot. The evidence is so one-sided that Wal-Mart must prevail as a matter of law.