Opinion ID: 203972
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: As each defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, we review the sufficiency claims de novo. See United States v. Jiménez-Torres, 435 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2006). We view the evidence, both direct and circumstantial  and including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom  in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Fenton, 367 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir.2004). Additionally, we bear in mind that [c]redibility issues must be resolved in favor of the verdict. United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2003). The appellants were charged with conspiracy to distribute drugs. To establish that a conspiracy existed, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed with others to commit a particular crime. See Cruz-Rodríguez, 541 F.3d at 26. Such an agreement may be express or tacit, that is, represented by words or actions, and may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. See United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 733-34 (1st Cir.1991); see also United States v. Barnes, 244 F.3d 172, 175 (1st Cir.2001). Where, as here, the government has charged multiple defendants with participation in a single conspiracy, an issue often arises over whether the evidence established that the defendants were participants in the single conspiracy charged or instead established that the defendants were involved in a conspiracy or conspiracies other than the one charged. See United States v. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir.2003). In the event of a variance in proof, a conviction will be reversed if there has been prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights  that is, when lack of notice regarding the charges deprives the defendant of his ability to prepare an effective defense and to avoid surprise at trial. Id. at 27. Although all of the appellants argue that the evidence was insufficient to establish their involvement in the single charged conspiracy, at least two present arguments sounding in variance, suggesting that the evidence, at best, supports the existence of multiple, independent drug trafficking conspiracies different from the one charged. When such arguments are advanced, the inquiry ordinarily is, again, one of evidentiary sufficiency. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7; United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 696 (1st Cir.1999) ([W]hether a given body of evidence is indicative of a single conspiracy, multiple conspiracies, or no conspiracy at all is ordinarily a matter of fact; a jury's determination in that regard is subject to review only for evidentiary sufficiency.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we must ask whether a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that each defendant joined a single conspiracy. Portela, 167 F.3d at 696 (emphasis added).
In determining whether the proof suffices to establish the single conspiracy charged, we ultimately look at the totality of the evidence. United States v. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d 411, 421 (1st Cir.2009) (citation omitted). Factors to be considered in assessing the totality of the evidence include: (1) the existence of a common purpose, e.g., the distribution of drugs; (2) interdependence of various elements in the overall plan; and (3) overlap among the participants. United States v. Escobar-Figueroa, 454 F.3d 40, 48 (1st Cir.2006). After reviewing the evidence, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have convicted each of the appellants of the single conspiracy charged. The government introduced evidence, predominately testimonial, that each of the appellants was a member of a large drug distribution network that had the common purpose of selling drugs for profit. The government's two cooperating witnesses, Rodriguez and Santiago, identified Pomales, Rosario, Calderón and Torres as members of the conspiracy. These witnesses testified that all of the appellants were point owners and that two of them, Rosario and Torres, performed other roles in the conspiracy as well. There was also substantial evidence of the distribution scheme's interdependence. Interdependence exists where the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 422 (citations omitted). Here, there was evidence that the successful operation of the network depended in part on agreements reached, and concerted actions taken by, the drug point owners and their employees. For example, there was evidence that point owners worked together to maximize profits. One way they accomplished this goal, both cooperating witnesses testified, was by setting prices at meetings. Point owners also maximized profits in another manner  by influencing competition within the project. Rodriguez testified that the point owners had power over point owner membership, observing that before a person could operate a drug point within the housing project, the prospective owner had to obtain authorization from the existing point owners. Corroborating Rodriguez's testimony with an example, Santiago testified that Rosario acquired a cocaine and crack point after receiving permission from the other point owners. Operating a drug point without clearance, Santiago also testified, could cost [a person] his life. This system influenced how much competition each point owner faced for his particular brand of drug and thereby allowed participants of the conspiracy oligarchical freedom from competition. There was also evidence that the participants acted interdependently with respect to security at the drug points. In addition to holding meetings to discuss, inter alia, the protection of the drug points from hold-ups, there was testimony that the point owners actively worked with each other to protect the drug points from threats. For example, Santiago testified that after one Wilfredo Sierra-Rosa (Sierra) threatened to take over Santiago's, Torres' and Rosario's drug points, Santiago and Rosario confronted Sierra, and Rosario killed him. See Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7 (concluding that there was no cognizable variance where evidence showed that the appellant accompanied a self-confessed member of the conspiracy during a murder committed to further the interests of the conspiracy). Also with respect to security, there was testimony that point owners and their enforcers stored weapons together inside the project. Santiago testified that Torres, in his role as an enforcer, stored weapons for Pomales in various places, including in automobiles which Pomales and Torres had purchased together. Similarly, Santiago testified that he and Rosario purchased rifles together to use for security purposes. Santiago further testified that he and Rosario stored guns and drugs in a Ford Windstar that Santiago and Torres had purchased and had customized for the purpose of secreting weapons and drugs. Interdependency was also demonstrated by the various rules established by the participants in the conspiracy. Santiago testified that, to avoid attracting police attention, the point owners agreed to prohibit people from stealing drugs within the project and from bringing stolen cars into the housing project. Point owners agreed on rules about what types of packaging could be used for the drugs. Those who failed to follow these rules could be disciplined. Rodriguez testified that point owners agreed to discipline out-of-line participants by beating them with a wooden board or rod. And Santiago testified that if a person was not in agreement with the other participants in the network and did something that was incorrect, he could get shot or his head bashed in. Both Rodriguez and Santiago testified that a point owner named Armando Valdes Medina (Valdes) was told at a meeting not to sell drugs in a particular type of packaging because that type of packaging was used by another point owner. After Valdes failed to follow this directive, Rosario and others murdered Valdes. Finally, as to overlap among the participants of the conspiracy, Santiago testified that Torres cooked crack for Pomales, Rosario and Rodriguez. Santiago further testified that Torres stored weapons for Pomales, and also stored weapons with Rosario and Santiago himself.
Each appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his involvement in the single charged conspiracy. In addition to a common assertion that the drug points were operated independently, three of the appellants also attack specific purported weaknesses in the proof. Rosario presses the argument that there was insufficient evidence of interdependency. He emphasizes that the government failed to show that the participants explicitly set prices; shared a source of supply and proceeds; extended credit to each other; or set or controlled working hours. Torres, Rosario and Calderón argue that the government failed to produce sufficient evidence of overlap: Torres says that the government failed to tie him to all of the drug points; Rosario claims that there was no evidence of a connection between him and Pomales or between him and Calderón; and Calderón asserts that the government failed to tie him to any of the other appellants. None of these arguments is compelling enough to upset the jury's finding of a single conspiracy. With respect to Rosario's interdependency challenge, the government may establish interdependency without proving that the point owners reached a consensus on all facets of their drug distribution network or that they organized their network for maximum operating efficiency. As described above, there was enough evidence of interdependency to allow a rational jury to conclude that a single conspiracy was operating out of the housing project. [1] With respect to the ties between the appellants, as we have said in the past, each coconspirator need not know of or have contact with all other members [of the conspiracy], nor must they know all of the details of the conspiracy or participate in every act in furtherance of it. United States v. Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir.2002). This rule dispatches both Torres' and Rosario's claims, which amount to requests that the evidence must establish a direct connection between them and all of the other participants. As for Calderón's claim that there was insufficient proof of a tie between him and any of the other conspirators, there was evidence of connections to at least three other participants. First, Calderón and Rosario employed a common seller, an individual named Cheo. Second, the government introduced a videotape of Calderón, Torres and Santiago together at a drug point, where Calderón and Santiago were counting money. Additionally, the jury reasonably could have relied on other evidence to link Calderón to the other appellants and to the conspiracy. Santiago testified that no one could operate a point within the housing project without first obtaining the blessing of the other point owners, and that those who tried to operate a drug point without this approval could be killed. Consistent with this tight control, Santiago stated that Sierra was murdered when he attempted to gain control of drug points without approval. Moreover, point owners were subject to certain rules. Santiago testified that if a point owner or other participant was not in agreement with the others, or violated certain rules, he could suffer fatal consequences; as Santiago and Rodriguez both testified, Valdes met that end. Based on this testimony, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Calderón, who successfully operated a busy marijuana point within the project for at least three years, was part of the single conspiracy charged. Rosario, Torres, and, to an extent, Calderon, appear to argue that rather than establishing interdependency and participant overlap, the evidence established merely that each of them was the master of his own domain, that each was involved in a separate, uncharged conspiracy  with his own runners, sellers, and enforcers  to sell a particular brand of drug. In support of this argument, Rosario in particular notes that Santiago testified that the points were always in competition. It is argued that this testimony suggests that the drug enterprises operating within the housing project were at odds with each other rather than unified. Certainly, the proof would have failed had the evidence established only that each defendant presided over a cloistered drug distribution unit that intersected only casually with other similarly-cloistered units. But, as described above, the government presented evidence implicating each of the appellants in a drug distribution network that was greater than the sum of its parts. Witnesses testified that a drug point could be operated within the housing project only with the approval of the other point owners and that people operating a point without approval could be and were in fact killed; point owners and their underlings had to follow certain rules, and a failure to abide by these rules could and did in fact result in corporal punishment or death; and participants pooled their efforts with respect to drug pricing, security and discipline. Because the government introduced evidence that each of the appellants successfully operated a point within the housing project, a reasonable jury could have concluded that they were guilty of the single conspiracy charged. See Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7 (holding that no variance occurred because there was sufficient evidence that appellant's drug point was part and parcel of the master conspiracy). As for Santiago's remark about competition, even if there was some competition between the points for individual customers, that alone does not detract from the various ways the appellants conspired together. [2] See United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 16, 19-20 (1st Cir.2001) (finding the evidence sufficient to convict the defendant for his involvement in a conspiracy even though the defendant competed with fellow conspirators for individual customers). In sum, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants were guilty of participating in the charged conspiracy.