Opinion ID: 2817942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Different people in the community would tell me

Text: things that were being said about my competency and my -- what’s the word? I hate to say that they just called me a liar, but my -- Q. Well, tell me specifically what those people told you. And give me the first person first. A. The first person? Q. Yes. A. And we’re talking which employee? Q. You’re talking -- we’re talking about Ms. Fitzpatrick right now. A. Okay. Q. Did anybody in the community say anything about her being disloyal or disrespectful about you? A. No. Q. Okay. So that’s only going to be Ms. Foster, is that correct? A. Uh-huh (Indicating yes). Ms. Foster. This testimony is inconsistent with Moorman’s non-discriminatory justification of “disloyalty” as to Fitzpatrick. Another example Moorman gives of purported disloyalty was that an elected official, Van McWhirter, told him “just to be careful cause everybody wasn’t [Moorman’s] friend” and “[t]hat everybody wasn’t on [Moorman’s] side.” McWhirter apparently did not specify who wasn’t on Moorman’s “side.” Though Moorman, in his deposition, pointed to further reasons he felt his staff was disloyal, his descriptions of the offending behavior are general and devoid of particulars. Moorman admitted that the only negative statement about him of which he was aware was Foster’s comment to Lisa Baggett about his not being a man of his word and being incompetent. The lack of specific examples of “disloyalty,” aside from the one incident on the part of Foster, undermines Moorman’s purported nondiscriminatory justification, especially as to the other four deputy clerks. Those infirmities are compounded by the circumstances of Moorman’s discussion of retirement with Appellants. Moorman suggested retirement to 8 Case: 14-60629 Document: 00513118629 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 No. 14-60629 Fitzpatrick and Foster before Foster made—and Moorman heard—the comment about his not being a man of his word. 4 Given that this was the only specific incident suggesting disloyalty that Moorman could point to on the part of any of his clerks, a jury could potentially infer from this chronology that Moorman wanted to get rid of Appellants before he was aware of this comment. If Moorman had resolved to end Appellants’ employment before he had heard about Foster’s statement, a jury could infer that his proffered nondiscriminatory justification was a mere post-hoc rationalization. Moorman also stated in his affidavit that none of the retirement discussions “had anything to do with my decision to terminate the employment of the deputy clerks in my office.” The suggestion that it is merely coincidental that Moorman offered retirement to three deputy clerks four days before he fired them could be taken by a jury to further erode Moorman’s veracity. Further, Lipsey’s deposition testimony lends some additional support to Appellants’ showing of pretext. During Lipsey’s deposition, she testified as to an exchange with Moorman: Q. Did you ever hear Mr. Moorman make any comments about wanting to get rid of or replace the older employees and keep the younger ones there? A. Yes. Q. Tell me what you heard him say. A. It was actually the day that Mr. Moorman called me in the office to fire me, just me, and he told me that I was actually his best employee, and he couldn’t understand why I wasn’t doing the job. And he said, what I want to do is keep you and Carla, but I would like to, you know, get my own people in here. And he said, keep you and Carla and get rid of the other ones. Q. So he wanted to get rid of the three older ones? A. Yes. 4In fact, it was his suggestion of retirement that prompted Foster to make that comment, given his campaign promise to retain all five deputy clerks. 9 Case: 14-60629 Document: 00513118629 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 No. 14-60629 Given the paucity of evidence supporting any sort of “disloyalty” on the part of Purdon or Lipsey, a reasonable jury could potentially infer that they were fired as a cover for unlawful age discrimination against Appellants. 5 The evidence in this case is undoubtedly thin on both sides. Yet at the summary judgment stage, the defendant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Given the weaknesses in the evidence supporting Pontotoc County’s purported non-discriminatory justification, Appellants’ evidence suggesting pretext, combined with their prima facie case, is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Resolution of this case will largely turn on credibility determinations, with regard to both Pontotoc County’s and Appellants’ witnesses. The district court, in granting summary judgment, appears to have drawn several of those conclusions as to credibility itself. While a jury may ultimately reach those same conclusions, assessments of 5 Pontotoc County also argues that the “same actor” inference should apply in its favor. “The ‘same actor’ inference arises when the individual who allegedly discriminated against the plaintiff was the same individual who hired the plaintiff and gives rise to an inference that discrimination was not the motive behind plaintiff’s termination.” Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 228 n.16 (5th Cir. 2000). The inference arises because “[c]laims that employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem irrational” as it “hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes . . . only to fire them once they are on the job.” Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991)), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves, 530 U.S. 133. The same actor inference likely does not apply on the facts of this case. First, Pontotoc County cites no case in which the decision to retain an employee—rather than a decision to hire him—is sufficient to trigger the inference. But cf. Sreeram v. La. State Med. Ctr.-Shreveport, 188 F.3d 314, 321 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying the inference and affirming summary judgment where a decision-maker rejected a committee’s recommendation that he terminate the plaintiff). Second, there is a plausible explanation for the inconsistency that the jury could accept, namely, Moorman’s campaign promise to retain and work with the then-employed deputy clerks. See Russell, 235 F.3d at 228 n.16 (“Further, we also note that the ‘same actor’ inference does ‘not rule out the possibility that an individual could prove a case of discrimination.’” (quoting Brown, 82 F.3d at 658)). 10 Case: 14-60629 Document: 00513118629 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 No. 14-60629 credibility are not appropriately drawn by the court at the summary judgment stage. 6