Opinion ID: 2582685
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prong One: duty violation, mental state, injury

Text: The hearing committee found that Ford by knowingly disobeying a court order violated the duty imposed by Conduct Rule 3.4(c). [18] The disciplinary board reviewed the record and adopted the committee's findings and conclusions. For reasons explained above, it is clear that Ford violated Conduct Rule 3.4(c). As to his mental state, the hearing committee found that Ford knowingly disobeyed the court order when he returned the funds to the lender, in compliance with the instructions from his client, but in violation of the court order. Ford does not contest that he knowingly violated the order. Rather he claims that he was caught between two conflicting duties. He maintains that the choice he made was required by his fiduciary duty to his client which he could not ignore because of his professional responsibility to that client under the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.1 [Competence], 1.2 [Scope of Representation] and 1.15 [Safekeeping Property]. We do not question Ford's sincerity in believing that the code of professional conduct required him to return the check. Even so, such a belief does not seem reasonable. Conduct Rule 1.15, governing safeguarding of client property, is the rule most on point. Yet the comment to Conduct Rule 1.15 declares that: Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds and other property in a lawyer's custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third party claims against wrongful interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. Ford's contention that he did not act willfully but only out of a sense of obligation to his client might be more powerful if the ethical conflict had been as strong as he suggests. But given the statement of the comment to Conduct Rule 1.15 that a lawyer may refuse to surrender the property to a client and given the duty to protect third parties that was at least potentially at stake, Ford should have realized that he was required to follow the court order, or at least could not act unilaterally to prevent it from being obeyed. We do not regard Ford's ethical dilemma as significantly mitigating his knowing violation of Conduct Rule 3.4(c). With respect to injury, the hearing committee noted that [r]esisting court orders can interfere with the efficient operation of the court system. The Bar Association properly noted that Ford's defiance of the legal process was the sort of conduct that by its nature promotes public disrespect for the legal profession. [19] It is not desirable for lawyers to decide when to comply with court orders outside the confines of the exception provided in Conduct Rule 3.4(c).