Opinion ID: 795341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Law Antitrust Claim

Text: 56 After granting summary judgment on the federal antitrust claim for lack of evidence of a conspiracy, the district court considered Champagne's claim that the Established Distributors' conduct violated the § 203(A) of the Oklahoma Antitrust Act. 18 Correctly explaining that, unlike the federal antitrust statute, the state statute reaches purely unilateral acts that unreasonably restrain trade, see Green Country Food Mkt., Inc. v. Bottling Group, LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir.2004); Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1550 (10th Cir.1996), the district court ruled that the lack of evidence of a conspiracy did not preclude state antitrust liability. Even so, the district court ultimately granted summary judgment for the Established Distributors, finding no evidence that th[e] individual acts harmed competition. (Emphasis added). 57 Our earlier conclusion that Champagne might be able to survive summary judgment on its federal antitrust claim leads us to reverse, in part, the district court's ruling on Champagne's state antitrust claim as well. See generally Oakridge Invs., Inc. v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 719 P.2d 848, 850 (Okla.Civ.App.1986) (The Oklahoma antitrust statutes are similar to federal antitrust legislation.). On remand, the district court should consider whether the evidence is sufficient to allow this claim to go to the jury on a collective action theory. However, we agree with the district court's decision that the Established Distributors are entitled to summary judgment on Champagne's unilateral action theory; we therefore affirm the district court's ruling on this ground. 58 On appeal, Champagne makes three arguments in support of its claim that the district court erred by granting summary judgment as to its unilateral action theory: (1) the court erroneously reached the issue without adequate briefing; (2) the state law claim should have been subjected to per se treatment and thus harm to competition was irrelevant; and (3) even assuming harm to competition was relevant, the evidence in this case is stronger than that in Harolds Stores, in which we upheld the jury's verdict because, inter alia, there was evidence of unilateral action that injured competition and unreasonably restrained trade. We consider these issues in turn. 59 First, Champagne argues that the only issue presented to the district court in support of the Established Distributors' motion for summary judgment on the state antitrust claim was that a ruling in their favor on the federal claim ipso facto compelled a ruling in their favor on the state claim. In other words, Champagne claims that the district court erred in reaching an issue (whether there was injury to competition from unilateral conduct) that was not adequately briefed. The Established Distributors dispute this characterization of the record, and respond that the issue of injury to competition was briefed as relevant to both the federal and state antitrust claims. Regardless of the state of the record, however, we decline to find for Champagne on this ground, as Champagne makes no real argument (other than conclusory statements that the district court erred) and cites no legal authority in support of its position. See, e.g., Rios v. Ziglar, 398 F.3d 1201, 1206 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2005) (To make a sufficient argument on appeal, a party must advance a reasoned argument concerning each ground of the appeal, and it must support its argument with legal authority.) (citation omitted). 60 Champagne next argues that, because the state and federal antitrust laws are generally treated similarly, the district court should have subjected its state unilateral action claim to per se treatment and forgone its inquiry into whether these unilateral acts harmed competition. See I ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 43 (4th ed. 1997) (Under the per se rule, a restraint is conclusively presumed unreasonable without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm it has caused ....) (quotations, alterations omitted). However, even assuming Champagne's collective action claim merits per se treatment, 19 Champagne points to no case that suggests that unilateral conduct intended to exclude a competitor is properly placed in this category. 20 As applying a per se rule to particular conduct risks sweeping potentially procompetitive activity within a general condemnation and prohibits a defendant from justifying its conduct, courts are (and should be) wary of departing from the rule-of-reason standard without demonstrable economic effect. Id. at 46. We are not prepared to determine that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would hold this unilateral conduct to be a per se violation absent some guidance from that Court. 61 Finally, Champagne claims that, even if injury to competition is relevant, it put forth sufficient evidence of anticompetitive effect stemming from the unilateral actions of each Established Distributor. Specifically, Champagne compares its evidence with the plaintiff's evidence in Harolds Stores. In that case, the plaintiff's economist provided evidence that the defendant adversely impacted competition in general and unreasonably restrained trade. 82 F.3d at 1549. Specifically, the economist testified that the defendant's illegal infringement on the plaintiff's copyrights 62 d[id]n't just do damage to [the plaintiff], it sen[t] a signal to anybody else that wants to enter this market, that if you come in here, you're going to get squashed because this big company will exercise its power and take your copyrights. In that regard, in economics, we would say it raise[d] a barrier to entry. That itself is anti-competitive. That, in my judgment, is an unreasonable restraint of trade. 63 Id. (quotation, original alterations and emphasis omitted). 64 Champagne argues that, as in Harolds Stores, the harm to competition in the present case is the barrier to entry that the actions of each Established Distributor ( i.e., the threats against the mills) erected. Specifically, Champagne points to three pieces of evidence that it contends demonstrates harm to competition: (1) evidence that the Established Distributors were significant mill customers; (2) evidence that there has been very little entry into the aluminum service center market over the last twenty years; and (3) evidence that Champagne has not been able to compete on the same terms as the Established Distributors due to its inability to attain mill recognition. The glaring difference between this case and Harolds Stores, however, is that, here, Champagne points to no evidence of an actual barrier to entry created by the Established Distributors' unilateral conduct. The Established Distributors presented an economic expert who testified that there were no significant barriers to entry in the aluminum service center industry, and that any lack of entry stems from the industry's poor economic performance. On appeal, Champagne points to no evidence to counter this testimony. Thus, the evidence before us shows, at most, that (1) the Established Distributors individually have clout with the mills such that they could convince the mills to accede to threats not to sell to new entrants, (2) very few new service centers have entered the industry over the past twenty years, and (3) this lack of entry was due to the industry's lackluster performance. However, to show a unilateral unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of § 203(A), a plaintiff must show a barrier to entry—or some other harm to competition—caused by the defendant. See Harolds Stores, 82 F.3d at 1548. Without such evidence, Champagne has not shown that the unilateral conduct of the Established Distributors constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade. 21