Opinion ID: 2538288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sentencing manipulation

Text: Again, under the theory of sentencing manipulation, as it is usually defined by the federal courts discussing the concept, a defendant's sentence should be reduced if law enforcement officials, for the purpose of increasing the defendant's sentence, engaged in conduct that was so outrageous or extraordinary as to violate the defendant's right to due process of law. (See, e.g., Montoya, supra, 62 F.3d at p. 4 [in the First Circuit, government's conduct must be viewed as `extraordinary misconduct']; United States v. Bala (2d Cir.2000) 236 F.3d 87, 93 [the status of sentencing manipulation is undecided in the Second Circuit, but would have to involve outrageous conduct]; Raven, supra, 39 F.3d at p. 438 [the theory of sentencing manipulation, which the court of appeals refers to as sentencing entrapment, has not yet been addressed by the Third Circuit, but has been defined by other courts as involving outrageous official conduct]; Jones, supra, 18 F.3d at p. 1154 [Fourth Circuit notes its skepticism as to whether the government could ever engage in conduct not outrageous enough ... to violate due process to an extent warranting a dismissal of the government's prosecution, yet outrageous enough to offend due process to an extent warranting a downward departure with respect to a defendant's sentencing]; United States v. Tremelling (5th Cir.1995) 43 F.3d 148, 151 ( Tremelling ) [the Fifth Circuit had previously addressed sentencing manipulation in the context of a due process claim, and the defendant failed to allege outrageous government misconduct in the case at bar]; United States v. Berg (8th Cir.1999) 178 F.3d 976, 984 ( Berg ) (dis. opn. of Bright, J.) [We properly test fact patterns for sentencing manipulation by examining the government conduct at issue to determine whether it served some legitimate law enforcement objective, or whether it was outrageous and aimed only at increasing the defendant's sentence]; United States v. Scull (10th Cir.2003) 321 F.3d 1270, 1276, fn. 3 [the Tenth Circuit addresses the issue of sentencing manipulation `under the appellation of outrageous governmental conduct'].) While several federal circuit courts have discussed sentencing manipulation in dicta, not a single case has been brought to our attention where a federal circuit court approved a downward departure from the federal sentencing guidelines on this basis. (See Sanchez, supra, 138 F.3d at p. 1414 [No court of appeals has overturned a conviction or departed downward on the basis of a sentencing manipulation claim].) At least four states have addressed the doctrine of sentencing manipulation. The Court of Appeals of New Mexico has apparently left the question open. ( State v. Rael (Ct.App.1999) 127 N.M. 347, 981 P.2d 280, 287 [under some circumstances continuing transactions may constitute unfair manipulation of a defendant's sentence, but no sentencing manipulation found in case at bar].) The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has adopted the doctrine of sentencing manipulation as defined by the outrageous conduct standard. ( Commonwealth v. Petzold (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) 701 A.2d 1363, 1366-1367 [sentence reduction an appropriate and just response to outrageous government conduct designed solely to increase a defendant's term of incarceration].) The District Court of Appeal of Florida has adopted the lesser standard of sentencing manipulation embraced by the Court of Appeal here. ( State v. Steadman (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002) 827 So.2d 1022, 1024-1025 [no legitimate law enforcement purpose given for undisputed sentencing manipulation].) The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee apparently accepts the doctrine of sentencing manipulation under the rubric of sentencing entrapment, but has not spelled out whether it adopts the outrageous conduct standard or some lesser standard. ( State v. Thornton (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) 10 S.W.3d 229, 244 [imposition of consecutive sentences for sale of narcotics may be inappropriate, `depending upon the number of specific buys the officers [choose] to conduct and the amounts purchased in each buy'].)
To reiterate, defendants were each sentenced to an additional term of 25 years for having attempted to transport more than 80 kilograms of cocaine, and they contend they should instead have received the 15-year additional terms applicable to more than 20 but less than 40 kilograms, because the undercover officer manipulated them into agreeing to steal more than 80 kilograms. Even assuming arguendo that we accepted the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, defendants' contention would fail for the simple reason that it lacks any factual basis. Sentencing manipulation, as we have said, focuses primarily on the objective conduct of the police. However, the conduct of the police does not occur in a vacuum, especially in a sting operation. The court's assessment of an officer's objective conduct will inevitably be colored by, for example, whether the defendant was from the start an enthusiastic proponent of the proposed crime or initially declined and was only gradually worn down. When initially approached by the informant, defendant Smith expressed nothing but enthusiasm at the prospect of robbing a home where she was told 200 kilograms of cocaine would be found. When the undercover officer himself first met with Smith, he told her the amount of cocaine involved would be 30 to 100 kilograms. Smith did not express any preference for a transaction at the lower end of that range. To the contrary, Smith sought to reassure the officer that she was up to the job as described, telling him she made her living that way, that she knew exactly what she was doing, and that she always used the same experienced three-person crew. Indeed, rather than expressing a concern about the large amount of cocaine potentially involved, Smith set out a fee schedule that actually gave the officer a discount for quantity: If the robbery yielded 30 kilograms of cocaine, Smith was to receive five kilograms for herself and nine more to divide among her crew, with the remainder of the cocaine, which would work out to 54 percent of it, for the officer. If more than 50 kilograms were involved, the officer's share, Smith said, would be 60 percent. In a subsequent conversation, the officer told Smith 85 kilograms of cocaine would be found at the designated location, and that was the sum actually found there. Again, there is no indication whatsoever that Smith expressed any qualms about the prospect of stealing 85 kilograms of cocaine, an amount that was well within the range that had been discussed from the outset. To borrow a phrase from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith was an experienced drug courier who demonstrated what can only be characterized as a yeoman's attitude towards this venture. ( Raven, supra, 39 F.3d at p. 438.) It is quite clear that none of the federal circuit courts that accept the doctrine would find sentencing manipulation on these facts. In Montoya, supra, 62 F.3d 1, the defendants purchased 10 kilograms of cocaine, but contended they should have been sentenced on the basis of only three or four kilograms because the undercover agent had reduced the down payment for the cocaine from $50,000 to $25,000 in order to subject them to longer sentences. The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the contention, holding that the defendants had failed to show the extraordinary misconduct required in that circuit for a successful sentencing manipulation claim. ( Id. at p. 4.) All that [the undercover agent] did was to reduce the down payment in the face of claims by [the defendants] that they were short of cash to make the full down payment originally proposed. This is so far from government misconduct, the court of appeals explained, that it would not have published its opinion, but for two considerations, one of which was to make very explicit the plain import of our previous cases: sentencing factor manipulation is a claim only for the extreme and unusual case. ( Ibid. ) In Tremelling, supra, 43 F.3d 148, the defendant contended that undercover agents had engaged in sentencing manipulation by producing 240 pounds of marijuana when the defendant had contracted to buy only 150 pounds. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had not previously addressed the viability of the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, but it had addressed similar contentions in the context of due process claims, and it found no due process violation in the case at bar. ( Id. at pp. 151-152.) Tremelling does not contend that he resisted taking the extra amount and that the government, through overbearing and outrageous conduct, overcame his resistance. [Citation.] He merely contends that the government brought the extra amount and offered it to him without requiring payment, which no drug dealer in his right mind would do. Tremelling's argument is not persuasive. `Fronting' is a recognized practice among drug dealers. ( Id. at p. 151.) The conduct ascribed to the government  producing the extra 90 pounds of marijuana and offering to front[ ] the cost of it  did not constitute sentencing manipulation, the court of appeals held. ( Ibid. ) In United States v. Sivils (6th Cir.1992) 960 F.2d 587, the defendant, in arranging to buy $15,000 worth of cocaine, revealed in his conversation with the undercover cooperating witness that he believed he would receive somewhat less than 500 grams for that sum. Instead, the police delivered one kilogram of cocaine to the defendant, subjecting him to a higher sentence. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said that if the defendant could demonstrate the government manipulated the dollar amount of cocaine to increase his sentence, such manipulation would certainly provide a fundamental fairness defense against the higher sentence. The record reveals, however, that Jordan ratified the amount of cocaine actually sold to the defendants. ( Id. at pp. 598-599, fn. omitted.) In United States v. Shephard (8th Cir.1993) 4 F.3d 647 ( Shephard ), in a drug sting that went on for eight months, the undercover officer purchased drugs from the defendant on 12 occasions, working her way up from an initial purchase of .2 grams of cocaine to a final purchase of 218.6 grams, and along the way, switching from paying for the drugs with cash to paying with food stamps. The defendant, convicted of 12 counts of selling cocaine, seven counts of accepting food stamps in payment for the drugs, and one count of conspiracy to distribute crack and cocaine, claimed he was a victim of sentencing manipulation, which he called sentencing entrapment. ( Id. at pp. 648-649.) The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished between sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation, and it found that neither was shown by the facts of the case. Of the defendant's sentencing manipulation claim, the court of appeals said: We recognize that there could be situations in which the government engages in continuing undercover or sting transactions for the sole purpose of ratcheting up a sentence under the guidelines. We are aware that a potential for abuse exists, but abuse is not present on the record before us. ( Id. at p. 649, fn. omitted.) The court of appeals added: Shephard essentially asks the judiciary to fashion a code of conduct for sting operations, deciding at what point leading on even a willing criminal becomes unfair to the point of being unconstitutional. Obviously, any transaction in a sting after the first violation of law, however minor, will be subject to such attacks. Yet, we have established that it is legitimate for police to continue to deal with someone with whom they have already engaged in illicit transactions in order to establish that person's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or to `probe the depth and extent of a criminal enterprise, to determine whether coconspirators exist, and to trace the drug deeper into the distribution hierarchy.' [Citation.] The course of the transactions in this case shows a legitimate pattern of increasing amounts of drugs culminating with the final 218 grams sale, which indicates that police did no more than persist in ascertaining what quantity Shephard was willing and able to deal. ( Ibid. ) In Lacey, supra, 86 F.3d 956, the defendant claimed that the government's confidential informant, after purchasing smaller amounts of cocaine from the defendant's distributor on several previous occasions, purchased another five kilograms for no reason other than to increase the quantity of drugs involved and thereby enhance the severity of his punishment. ( Id. at p. 964.) Rejecting the defendant's claim of sentencing manipulation, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no fault with the government's decision to seek a `bigger buy' from [the defendant's distributor]. We have previously held that it is not outrageous for the government to induce a defendant to continue criminal activity `or even to induce him to expand or extend previous criminal activity.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 965.) The defendants here were merely given an apparent opportunity to do what Smith so proudly proclaimed they did for a living. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendants were victims of sentencing manipulation because Smith had indicated that they would do the theft for 30 kilos. However, stings are permissible stratagems in the enforcement of criminal law ( Watson, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 223, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 990 P.2d 1031), and the purpose of a sting is to catch criminals at work, not to find out how cheaply they will work. (See Walls, supra, 70 F.3d at p. 1329 [Consider a defendant who agrees with an undercover agent to murder someone for a fee. Are we to suppose that if the defendant initially offered only to beat the person up, he should be sentenced as if that were his offense?].)
It is unnecessary for us to decide in this case whether we accept the doctrine of sentencing manipulation because the conduct of the police here was not overreaching by any reasonable standard. However, we reject the standard of sentencing manipulation adopted by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal stated: We do not believe a showing of `outrageous' conduct is required in order to establish sentence manipulation. As discussed ... [above], outrageous police conduct is a complete defense to the prosecution. Thus, in cases where outrageous conduct has occurred there would be no need to reach the issue of sentencing. Furthermore, we surely need not wait until we find the sentence-manipulation equivalent of forced stomach pumping before we declare a violation of due process has occurred. Rather, we believe defendants establish sentence manipulation for purposes of the quantity enhancement when they show the police selected the amount of drugs for no legitimate law enforcement purpose but solely to maximize the defendants' sentence.  The federal circuit courts that accept the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, as well as those that reject it, caution against the adoption of such a standard. The First Circuit Court of Appeals entertains claims of sentencing manipulation. However, [i]t is no accident, the First Circuit observed, that statements condemning sentencing factor manipulation are usually dicta. A defendant cannot make out a case of undue provocation simply by showing that the idea originated with the government or that the conduct was encouraged by it [citation], or that the crime was prolonged beyond the first criminal act [citation], or exceeded in degree or kind what the defendant had done before. [Citation.] What the defendant needs in order to require a reduction are elements like these carried to such a degree that the government's conduct must be viewed as `extraordinary misconduct.' [Citation.] [¶] The standard is high because we are talking about a reduction at sentencing, in the teeth of a statute or guideline approved by Congress, for a defendant who did not raise or did not prevail upon an entrapment defense at trial. The standard is general because it is designed for a vast range of circumstances and of incommensurable variables. [Citation.] ( Montoya, supra, 62 F.3d at pp. 3-4.) Because of the diversity of circumstances, the court of appeals continued, we have declined to create detailed rules as to what is or is not undue manipulation [citation], but we think it is useful now to be very candid in saying that garden variety manipulation claims are largely a waste of time. ( Id. at p. 4.) Another panel of the First Circuit Court of Appeals admonished: By their nature, sting operations are designed to tempt the criminally inclined, and a well-constructed sting is often sculpted to test the limits of the target's criminal inclinations. Courts should go very slowly before staking out rules that will deter government agents from the proper performance of their investigative duties. ( United States v. Connell (1st Cir.1992) 960 F.2d 191, 196.) The Fourth Circuit, which has not yet decided whether it accepts the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, reiterated this admonishment. ( Jones, supra, 18 F.3d at p. 1155.) The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals also appears to accept the doctrine of sentencing manipulation. However, it rejected the notion that governmental conduct should be subject `to a special brand of scrutiny when its effect is felt in sentence, as opposed to offense, determination.' [ United States v. ] Cotts [(7th Cir.1994)] 14 F.3d [300,] 306, [fn.]2.] Indeed, `[i]f we are willing to accept the assumption apparently approved by Congress that dealing in greater quantities of drugs is a greater evil, it is not clear to us what the precise legal objection to governmental behavior based on cognizance of relative penal consequences in this area could be (so long as it does not rise to the level of true entrapment or conduct so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes[)].' Id. (quoting United States v. Russell [(1973)] 411 U.S. 423, 431-[4]32 [93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366]). ( Tremelling, supra, 43 F.3d at p. 152.) In Shephard, supra, 4 F.3d 647, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, while accepting the doctrine of sentencing manipulation, declined the task effectively undertaken by the Court of Appeal here, that is, fashion[ing] a code of conduct for sting operations. ( Id. at p. 649.) In Lacey, supra, 86 F.3d 956, in the course of rejecting the defendant's claim of sentencing manipulation, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that although it recognized the viability of the outrageous conduct defense, it had never been presented with governmental conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant a dismissal. The strict nature of the outrageous conduct inquiry is due in primary part to the reluctance of the judiciary to second-guess the motives and tactics of law enforcement officials. [Citation.] Government involvement is essential in the context of sting operations, which are often the only effective way to detect and to develop proof of illegal drug activity. To be sure, there is a point at which excessive government zeal may warrant judicial intervention. However, prior to that point, the courts will not fine tune conduct of law enforcement officials that does not `offend the universal sense of justice.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 964.)