Opinion ID: 1014453
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Colaprete’s Stolen Watch Claim

Text: We next consider Colaprete’s claim that Appellants violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they failed to return a watch that he kept inside a safe that was seized from his home. We hold that the theft of Colaprete’s watch violated his Fourth Amendment rights but that those rights were not clearly established when the theft allegedly occurred. We note at the outset that no Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process claim will lie here because adequate mechanisms exist for Colaprete to recover the value of his watch. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) ([A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.). As for the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, such claims ordinarily are not ripe until the government has denied compensation. See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985). In any event, Colaprete does not argue that the alleged theft constituted a taking, let alone that the applicability of the Takings Clause in this situation is clearly established. The Fourth Amendment, however, does protect against conduct of this nature. A seizure of property within the meaning of the Fourth MOM’S, INC. v. WILLMAN 15 Amendment occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). The Fourth Amendment regulates all such interference, and not merely the initial acquisition of possession. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706, 709-10 (1983) (holding that the initial seizure of a suitcase was valid but that the ninety-minute detention of the suitcase violated the Fourth Amendment). Because theft by a police officer extends a seizure beyond its lawful duration, such theft violates the Fourth Amendment. See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151 (7th Cir. 1994). The remaining question is whether Colaprete’s Fourth Amendment right against having his property converted following a search was clearly established when the alleged conversion occurred. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence of this right is [s]o obvious . . . that we do not think the absence of case law can establish a defense of immunity. Id. We respectfully disagree. This court has never applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner, and Supreme Court precedent tilts slightly against the existence of any constitutional right against theft during the course of a search. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when post-deprivation remedy exists). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply in this context, at least when the search preceding the theft was lawful. See Wagner v. Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 190 (6th Cir. 1985). [Q]ualified immunity exists to protect those officers who reasonably believe that their actions do not violate federal law. Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 453 (4th Cir. 2000). If either Appellant stole Colaprete’s watch, he or she should have recognized that this was a tort, a crime, and even a sin, but he had no clear notice that this action Contrary to Willman’s arguments, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Hudson does not state that the Fourth Amendment has no application here. Justice O’Connor wrote that the Fourth Amendment governs the seizure and continuing detention of property but not the handling of seized property while it is lawfully in government custody. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 538-39 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Conversion of seized property, however, renders the continuing detention unlawful. Moreover, Colaprete alleges that even the initial seizure here was unlawful. 16 MOM’S, INC. v. WILLMAN violated the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.