Opinion ID: 3040111
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 892 (1975). Reviewing Appellant's

Text: arguments in light of the previously espoused standard, we are convinced the suppression court was correct in ruling that Appellant's statements were admissible. Our review of the conflicting testimony illustrates that Appellant, in fact, was informed of the charges against him, advised of 57 the nature of the questioning, and cognizant of his constitutional rights. Fahy 1, 516 A.2d at 309–11. On direct appeal, as the District Court recognized, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not cite to any United States Supreme Court precedent or use “totality of the circumstances” language in reviewing the merits of Fahy’s confession claim. Instead, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania appropriately relied on its own state court cases, which articulated the proper standard.30 30 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 322 A.2d 119, 124 (Pa. 1974) (“The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that there is no simple litmus paper test for determining whether a confession is involuntary. Instead, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. The burden is on the Commonwealth to demonstrate that the accused’s will was not overborne, either through physical or mental pressure and that the statement issued from free choice.”) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Kichline, 361 A.2d 282, 290 (Pa. 1976) (“All attending circumstances surrounding the confession must be considered in this determination. These include: the duration and methods of the interrogation; the length of delay between arrest and arraignment; the conditions of detainment; the attitudes of the police toward defendant; defendant’s physical and psychological state; and all other conditions present which may serve to drain one’s power of resistance to suggestion or to undermine one’s self58 Because the state court applied the correct rule, Fahy’s entitlement to relief depends on whether application of that rule was contrary to established federal law or an unreasonable application of that law. Based on the principles already articulated, we conclude that the state court’s decision complies with the Supreme Court’s mandate to consider the totality of the circumstances and is therefore not “contrary to” the applicable body of Supreme Court law existing at the time. The decision was also not an “unreasonable application” of that precedent. The suppression court was entitled to make the credibility determination that it did in the face of conflicting testimony, and it applied the correct law to its findings of fact and came to a reasonable conclusion. On review, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the proper standard and was reasonable in affirming the suppression court’s legal conclusions in light of the evidence presented and the applicable law. 2. Ineffective Assistance determination.”); Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 333 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa. 1975) (“Further, in determining the voluntariness of the waiver, all attending factors and circumstances must be considered and evaluated: [T]he duration, and the methods of interrogation; the conditions of detention, the manifest attitude of the police toward the defendant, the defendant’s physical and psychological state and all other conditions present which may serve to drain one’s powers of resistance to suggestion and undermine his self-determination.”). 59 Fahy argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mental health evidence in support of the motion to suppress his confession. We infer that Fahy believes we should review this claim de novo, as he asserts there was no “adjudication on the merits” of this claim in state court. We disagree. Fahy first raised this claim in PCRA #3, and we agree with the District Court that there was an adjudication on the merits by the PCRA court in Judge Sabo’s October 25, 1995, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“1995 Opinion”).31 Fahy argues that the ineffective assistance claim presented in PCRA #4 and on review in this habeas petition is distinct from the claim presented in PCRA #3 and decided upon 31 In the 1995 Opinion, Judge Sabo concluded: Trial counsel was effective in litigating defendant’s motion to suppress and could not have advanced his claim with expert psychiatric testimony . . . . Trial counsel did present evidence that defendant had mental problems, but the thrust of his motion was that the police tricked defendant into signing a blank form on which the police wrote the confession. Defendant’s supposed mental problems had little, if anything, to do with the alleged ruse. Defendant’s motion was incredible, with or without, expert testimony, and this Court properly rejected it. 60 by Judge Sabo. His actual claim, he alleges, is that effective counsel would have presented mental health evidence to support the contention that his confession was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent. This claim, he argues, is different from that which Judge Sabo decided—whether effective counsel would have presented mental health evidence to support the claim that he was tricked into making the statement. In the context of Fahy’s testimony at the suppression hearing, we are convinced that this is a distinction without a difference. Fahy testified that he never confessed to the murder of Nicky Caserta. His contention during the entirety of the suppression hearing was that at no point during the interrogation did he ever admit to having anything to do with her death. He testified that he never signed a confession and that he consistently denied all involvement to the detectives. We fail to see how mental health testimony during this hearing would have brought anything to bear on whether his confession was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Fahy does not contend that he was psychologically coerced into giving a confession, or that the detectives intimidated or tricked him into giving a confession, or even that he was unable to understand and comprehend the situation due to mental health deficiencies;32 rather, he testified that he made no confession at all. 32 During the suppression hearing, Fahy admitted that he was “very aware of what was going on . . . [j]ust uncomfortable and wanted to get out of there.” 61 Thus, we agree with the District Court that there was an “adjudication on the merits” in state court when Judge Sabo held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to present expert psychiatric testimony. Therefore, in order for Fahy to succeed on this claim, he must convince this Court that the state court’s determination was “contrary to” clearly established federal law, or reflected an unreasonable application of that law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, Fahy must show that the state court’s decision is either contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Thus, to prevail, Fahy must show that his counsel failed to perform adequately33 and that actual prejudice occurred as a result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94. “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Alternatively, Fahy must show that the state court applied Strickland unreasonably to the facts of his case. 33 “This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94. 62 As previously stated, Fahy testified at the suppression hearing and at trial that he did not give the police a detailed confession; he argued that he signed blank forms. At no point does he contend that he would have given the completely contradictory testimony of admitting to making the confession if trial counsel had investigated and raised issues of his mental health with respect to the voluntariness of the confession. Moreover, Fahy admitted at the suppression hearing that he was aware of what was occurring at the time he was questioned. Even assuming that Fahy’s counsel introduced mental health reports, we fail to see how the result would have been different. While Fahy points to conclusions from psychiatric reports before and after trial, he does not explain how the conclusions in those reports would make him more susceptible to coercion, much less bear on his denial of making any confession at all. Thus, trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to introduce such evidence. Further, given the facts, we can only conclude that the state court’s finding—that trial counsel could not have advanced his claim with expert psychiatric testimony such that his failure to introduce such testimony did not constitute deficient performance—was reasonable. Finally, we agree with the District Court that Fahy has not presented evidence of a reasonable probability that, despite the strength of the other evidence (including his admission at trial that he told the police, his mother, and his girlfriend that he 63 had killed Nicky Caserta), the exclusion of the confession would have altered the results of the trial. See Fahy v. Horn, 2003 WL 22017231, . Fahy is not entitled to relief on this claim. D. Prosecutorial Misconduct Fahy asserts four instances of prosecutorial misconduct which he contends were so prejudicial as to entitle him to relief from his conviction. In evaluating such claims, we consider “whether the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court further instructs that, for due process to have been offended, “the prosecutorial misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.’” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976))). See also Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that our review of a prosecutor’s conduct in a state trial in a federal habeas proceeding is limited to determining whether the prosecution’s conduct “so infect[ed] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” (quoting Greer, 483 U.S. at 765)). This determination requires us “to distinguish between ordinary trial error and that sort of egregious misconduct which amounts to a denial of constitutional due process.” Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1239 (quoting United States ex rel. Perry v. Mulligan, 544 F.2d 64 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1976)). Because we are satisfied that the prosecutor’s comments, considered both individually and cumulatively, did not amount to a denial of due process, we reject Fahy’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Fahy alleges that the prosecutor suggested in her closing argument that he had an incestuous relationship with Nicky Caserta. Fahy raised this claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in PCRA #3 and it was rejected. The District Court was correct in concluding that the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” and entitled to § 2254(d) deference. Fahy contends that his case had nothing to do with incest and that the prosecutor’s comments were simply an attempt to inflame the passions of the jury. The PCRA court concluded that the prosecutor did not suggest that Fahy himself committed incest but was instead responding to the defense’s argument that Fahy could not have raped and murdered the victim because he loved her. According to the PCRA court, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert a baseless objection. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that this decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Again, the PCRA court did not cite 65 to Supreme Court precedent; however, it appropriately relied on its own state court cases, which articulate the proper standard.34 A significant part of Fahy’s defense strategy was to persuade the jury that he had a close, loving relationship with Nicky Caserta, and therefore, could not have killed her. In her closing argument, the prosecutor noted that the only witness 34 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Green, 581 A.2d 544, 561–62 (Pa. 1990) (citing with approbation observations made by Chief Justice Burger in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10 (1985): [Our] standards reflect a consensus of the profession that the courts must not lose sight of the reality that [a] criminal trial does not unfold like a play with actors following a script. It should come as no surprise that in the heat of argument, counsel do occasionally make remarks that are not justified by the testimony, and which are, or may be, prejudicial to the accused. Nevertheless, a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments standing alone, for the statement or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 66 who testified to a close relationship between Fahy and his victim was Fahy himself. The prosecutor argued that [n]ot one other person that took that stand, except the defendant, ever said that Nicky used to come over and kiss the defendant. Was that part of their little scenario to have you believe that they were so close and loving? And ladies and gentlemen, even if they were close, which the evidence would not indicate, it would simply indicate that she knew him because he was her aunt’s boyfriend. She saw him because he lived with [her] aunt when she went to visit [her young cousin]. But, ladies and gentlemen, you’ve heard of incest. And incest occurs even when it’s your natural child, unfortunately, in this society and other societies. In this case, it’s not a natural relationship, it was not a blood relationship. So the fact that she knew the defendant is only one more little piece of the puzzle. The prosecutor’s argument was simply this: if sexual abuse can occur in a blood relationship, then a fortiori, it can occur in a non-blood relationship, albeit a “loving” one. This argument was proper and logical when responding to the defense’s argument that Fahy could not have raped and murdered Nicky Caserta because he loved her. Therefore, such a comment did not render Fahy’s trial fundamentally unfair, and the state court’s decision that Fahy’s right to due process had not been violated was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 67 clearly established federal law.
The second allegation is that the prosecutor intentionally and improperly elicited testimony of a prior incarceration from Fahy. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that Fahy’s answer was unsolicited and promptly stricken. Fahy 1, 516 A.2d at 697. It further observed that the answer did not indicate that he was convicted of a crime or the nature of the crime, and the comment was not exploited later in the trial or during closing arguments. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that the “single, unintentional reference did not inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury to the extent that Appellant was denied a fair trial.” Id. The District Court concluded that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. We agree. The questioning by the prosecutor proceeded as follows: Q. Mr. Fahy[,] approximately how long did you live at 2063 East Rush Street? A. For about two years. Q. And how often did you during that two year period did you live there? A. Very often. Q. For approximately how many months in the year of 68 1980 did you live there? A. Months? Q. Yes. How many of the months in 1980 did you live there? A. As far as I know, all of them. Q. You were never living anywhere else besides 2063 in 1980? A. Not that I can remember; no. Q. In 1979, how many months did you live there? A. ‘79 (There was a long extended pause.) I’m not sure. I think I was-(Pause) I think I could have been locked up for- Mr. Greene: Objection. THE COURT: Strike from the record the witness’ last answer to that question as not being responsive. Mr. Fahy, would you please answer specific questions? Don’t volunteer, or go into- THE WITNESS: I’m trying to, Your Honor. 69 THE COURT: The question was, how many months and you can tell us how many months. Now, you can’t— THE WITNESS: Well, I am— I believe that me and Cookie [Fahy’s then-girlfriend] got in a few arguments and I was away from the house-oh, for maybe about a day or two, at my mother’s or different places until Cookie cooled down. But, I don’t believe I was ever away from the house in ‘79 for any month at all. Fahy argues that “the prosecutor knew or should have known that probing repeatedly into Mr. Fahy’s whereabouts at the time in question would likely lead to his prior incarceration being revealed. In fact, that was the manifest purpose of the line of questioning.” The record fails to support this argument. As the District Court pointed out, the question posed called for no more than a simple numerical answer. The prosecutor asked Fahy directly how many months during 1979 he lived across the street from Nicky Caserta. As for any wrongful purpose behind the question, the prosecutor clarified at side-bar that Fahy lied on direct examination when he said that he lived at the house across the street from the victim for two years, because for most of those years he was in and out of jail. It was permissible, therefore, for the prosecutor to ask a question designed to place the defendant’s credibility in question, and to undermine his contention that he had a close relationship with his victim. This claim provides no basis for a finding of prosecutorial misconduct. And assuming, arguendo, that there was improper conduct on the part of the prosecutor, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court correctly identified that the 70 applicable test is ultimately whether that conduct denied the defendant a fair trial. Fahy 1, 516 A.2d at 697. That Court’s conclusion that Fahy was not denied a fair trial is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent.
Fahy alleges that the prosecutor improperly referred to Fahy as a “representative of Satan.” He raised this claim in PCRA #4, which was dismissed as untimely without a review of the merits. We review this claim de novo. In his closing argument, defense counsel suggested to the jury that whoever killed Nicky Caserta was “some representative of Lucifer or Satan,” a “reprobate” and a “profligate.” In response, the prosecutor used defense counsel’s own words to argue that the evidence demonstrated that Fahy committed the killing, and thus, Fahy was the “representative of Satan.” Specifically, at the start of her closing argument, the prosecutor stated: And if there is a reprobate, profligate, and a representative of Satan who committed this act, the evidence in this case indicates that the representative of Satan in this case is seated right over there. (Indicating to the Defendant.) And, it is the defendant in this case because all of the evidence in this case so indicates. 71 Fahy argues that the prosecutor’s response was “unmistakably a religious argument, which asserted that Mr. Fahy must be convicted and put to death because he was literally the devil.” We disagree. We do not condone the characterization of Fahy as demonic, nor consider it a proper form of argument. However, the objectionable content was invited by or was responsive to the closing summation of the defense. See Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 182. The Supreme Court in United States v. Young explained that the idea of “invited response” is used not to excuse improper comments, but to determine their effect on the trial as a whole. 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). Specifically, the Supreme Court has instructed that [i]nappropriate prosecutorial comments, standing alone, would not justify a reviewing court to reverse a criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding. Instead . . . the remarks must be examined within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor’s behavior amounted to prejudicial error. In other words, the Court must consider the probable effect the prosecutor’s response would have on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly. In this context, defense counsel’s conduct, as well as the nature of the prosecutor’s response, is relevant. Young, 470 U.S. at 11–12 (citing Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958)). 72 To put it another way, the fact that a prosecutor’s comment was invited may have a mitigating effect on the impact that comment might otherwise have on the jury. Here, it is not enough that the prosecutor’s comments were inadvisable or even objectionable. See id. Rather, the appropriate standard of review for such a habeas claim is “the narrow one of due process” to determine whether the prosecutor’s comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642–43 (1974). In light of defense counsel’s closing comments, which first introduced the notion of Satan’s criminal responsibility into the proceedings, we are confident that the jury could not have believed that the prosecutor was arguing that Fahy was literally the devil—only that the evidence indicated that he committed the murder, and thus was the “representative of Satan” that defense counsel had initially referred to. Thus, we reject Fahy’s contention that this comment so tainted the trial that he was denied due process.
Fahy argues that the prosecutor repeatedly expressed her personal opinion that Fahy had testified falsely. He raised this claim in PCRA #3 and it was rejected. 35 Despite this, the 35 The PCRA court concluded that: [Defense] counsel argued in closing that the 73 District Court concluded that there was no “adjudication on the defendant told the truth on the stand in denying his guilt and that the Commonwealth witnesses, particularly the police officers who recorded defendant’s confession, had lied. The prosecutor could respond to trial counsel’s argument about the credibility of his client, especially where she told the jury that she was not expressing her personal opinions, but was commenting on the evidence. The PCRA court’s opinion spent a page discussing the claim and indicated how it reached the decision: The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in commenting on the credibility of the defendant. Pennsylvania courts have allowed prosecutors great leeway in presenting argument based on the evidence of record concerning the credibility of defense witnesses, especially where, as here, the defendant makes credibility an issue. . . . Here trial counsel argued in closing that defendant told the truth on the stand in denying his guilt and that the Commonwealth witnesses, particularly the police officers who recorded defendant’s confession, had lied. The prosecutor could respond to trial counsel’s argument about the credibility of his client, especially where she told the jury that she was not expressing her personal opinion. 74 merits” under Chadwick v. Jenecka, 312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002), and therefore, it is not entitled to deference. We disagree with the District Court and conclude that the state court decision is entitled to § 2254(d) deference. In Chadwick, this Court noted that “the Supreme Court clearly held that the § 2254(d) standards apply when a state supreme court rejects a claim without giving any indication of how it reached its decision.” Id. (citing Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 237 (2000) (affirming state supreme court’s rejection of a claim without explanation, concluding that the adjudication was neither “contrary to,” nor involved an “unreasonable application of,” any of its decisions)).36 At all events, we agree with the District Court with regard to the merits of the claim. The first allegedly improper statement occurred while the prosecutor was cross-examining Fahy: Q: Didn’t you just say that you were seeing her? A: I was seeing—I said I used to. I was seeing no one at the time. I was with Cookie. I went with Cookie for 36 While we realize that the state supreme court never reached the merits of Fahy’s third petition because of his waiver, we believe that deference still applies to the PCRA court’s decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . .”) (emphases added)). 75 good, so if you want to try to get a few things into my mind and get them twisted, you know, it’s up to you. Q: Why don’t you just answer questions? A: I’m trying to answer the question as best I can. You want me to tell you what you want. Q: All I want from you, Mr. Fahy, is the truth, if you know what that is. Defense counsel objected to this last statement and asked for a mistrial. The trial court denied the request but instructed the jury to disregard the remark. Defense counsel later objected to statements made during the prosecution’s closing argument. The prosecutor, in discussing Fahy’s testimony and credibility, stated: [Defense counsel] said that there is a scenario that was presented. Well, from the evidence in this case, the scenario that was the defendant’s version of what happened was a well-orchestrated scenario. Mr. Fahy would have you believe that he only talked to his lawyer about his testimony once or twice. Is that believeable? The way [defense counsel] prepared this case, that he only talked to his client once or twice? Mr. Fahy took the stand and went through an entire day, minute by minute, practically. He told you exactly where he placed battery cables 76 and what he did. But, when it came to cross- examination, he couldn’t remember the lies he told on direct examination. And all of a sudden, he gives a completely different answer from the morning to the afternoon session. He couldn’t remember which lies he was supposed to tell. Defense counsel objected to the use of the word “lies” and the trial court instructed the prosecutor to rephrase her statement. The prosecutor then pointed to a specific instance of Fahy’s inconsistent testimony. Fahy argues that the prosecutor’s comments in the above instances were improper statements of her personal belief about his credibility and thereby prejudiced the jury. If a defendant testifies on his own behalf, as occurred here, a prosecutor may attack his credibility to the same extent as any other witness. See Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900). This does not mean, however, that a prosecutor may express his personal belief in the credibility of a witness or the guilt of a defendant. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). When the claim is that a prosecutor’s remark at trial so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process, we must examine the comment in light of the entire proceedings. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 643. We do not think that the state court’s decision here is an unreasonable application of this law. See supra note 35. Here, the prosecutor explained to the jury at the beginning of her closing argument that she could not give her personal opinion of Fahy’s guilt. She then proceeded during her 77 closing to point out the inconsistencies in Fahy’s testimony. Her comments on Fahy’s preparation for his testimony served as a suggestion that the jury consider the detailed nature of his testimony in contrast to his claims that he had discussed it only “once or twice” with his counsel. The record supports this argument, in that Fahy’s testimony regarding his whereabouts on the day of the murder was given in considerable detail. While the prosecutor’s conclusory use of the word “lies” was unfortunate, it did not infect the proceedings with unfairness. Fahy attempts to argue that while the record supported the assertion that he made inconsistent statements, it did not support an inference that both statements were lies. This is sophistry. Either Fahy signed his Miranda warnings or he did not; only one statement could be true. Because the prosecutor made it clear that she was not expressing her personal opinion but was relying on the facts in the case, we do not believe that her use of the word “lies” or her comment about Fahy’s credibility made the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Therefore, we reject Fahy’s claim.
Fahy argues that cumulatively these comments had a substantial prejudicial effect on the defense. As noted above, the comments Fahy recites were either not improper, or if they were improper, not prejudicial. Taken together, their cumulative effect could not have deprived Fahy of a fair trial. E. All Prior Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance 78 In catch-all fashion, Fahy asserts that, to the extent that prior trial and direct appeal counsel failed to properly investigate and failed to make certain objections at trial, as alleged throughout his brief, he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. He raised this issue for the first time in PCRA #4, and we therefore review the claim de novo. We “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). That is to say, the “defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Indulging this presumption after reviewing each of counsel’s claims, we are satisfied that prior trial and direct appeal counsel (here, the same counsel in both instances) provided reasonable professional assistance. Even assuming error by counsel, Fahy has failed to show that any alleged deficient performance actually prejudiced his defense. Berryman, 100 F.3d at 1094. That would require a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, i.e., a trial the result of which is reliable. Id. Fahy has failed to convince us that he was deprived of a fair trial, and we deny this claim. F. Cumulative Effect of All Errors Fahy also argues that the cumulative effect of all of the errors at trial entitle him to relief. Individual errors that do not 79 entitle a petitioner to relief may do so when combined, if cumulatively the prejudice resulting from them undermined the fundamental fairness of his trial and denied him his constitutional right to due process. Albrecht v. Horn, 471 F.3d 435, 468 (3d Cir. 2006). “Cumulative errors are not harmless if they had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, which means that a habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief based on cumulative errors unless he can establish ‘actual prejudice.’” Id. (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). We have already concluded that the admission of Fahy’s confession was not error, and that at least two out of the four challenged prosecutorial remarks were proper comment. However, even if we were to combine all of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper remarks with the admission of Fahy’s detailed confession, there is still weighty evidence of Fahy’s guilt in the record. The testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses established that the person who killed Nicky Caserta entered the house between 7:15 a.m., when the child’s mother left, and 7:30 a.m. when the child was supposed to meet a schoolmate. The door was locked, so it was unlikely the victim would have let anyone in the house whom she did not know. Fahy had told a coworker at 6:45 a.m. that he would pick him up in five minutes, but then arrived over an hour later looking pale. Fahy later took a bath and washed his long underwear. Fahy’s girlfriend testified that he confessed to her, and Fahy himself testified that he confessed to the killing when speaking with his mother. The verdict was not, therefore, unreliable.