Opinion ID: 2584286
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Guilt Phase

Text: ¶ 31 Elmore first claims that counsel's performance in the guilt phase fell short of the accepted standard of reasonableness for counsel in a capital case. He says that his attorneys failed to conduct a competent investigation into his mental deficiencies prior to advising him to plead guilty, failed to negotiate with the prosecutor regarding the death penalty, and wrongly advised him to plead guilty. 1. Failure to Conduct a Competent Investigation into Petitioner's Mental Deficiencies Before Entering a Guilty Plea. ¶ 32 Under Strickland, counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel `must show in the record the absence of legitimate strategic or tactical reasons supporting the challenged conduct by counsel.' In re Pers. Restraint of Hutchinson, 147 Wash.2d 197, 206, 53 P.3d 17 (2002) (quoting State v. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d 322, 336, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995)). In any ineffectiveness claim, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness, giving great deference to counsel's judgments. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions. Id. ¶ 33 In Davis, this court has clearly explained the standard for reasonable investigation by defense counsel: Defense counsel must, `at a minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling [counsel] to make informed decisions about how best to represent [the] client.' This includes investigating all reasonable lines of defense, especially the defendant's `most important defense.' Counsel's failure to consider alternate defenses constitutes deficient performance when the attorney `neither conduct[s] a reasonable investigation nor ma[kes] a showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so.' Once counsel reasonably selects a defense, however, it is not deficient performance to fail to pursue alternative defenses. An attorney's action or inaction must be examined according to what was known and reasonable at the time the attorney made his choices and `ineffective assistance claims based on a duty to investigate must be considered in light of the strength of the government's case.' Davis, 152 Wash.2d at 721-22, 101 P.3d 1 (alterations in original) (footnotes and citations omitted). ¶ 34 Elmore argues that counsel's failure to have him evaluated by mental health experts prior to the guilty plea fell below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms as part of the duty to investigate. We disagree. First, this is not a case where counsel failed to perform any investigation. Mr. Komorowski's team did an in-depth investigation in preparation of a mitigation report that it submitted to the prosecutor's office before the decision to seek the death penalty was made. While the report did not include the opinions of experts, it did chronicle the petitioner's medical history and the abuse suffered by petitioner. Further, there is no indication that Elmore was incompetent, insane at the time of the commission of the crime, or under the influence of any condition that would have diminished his capacity to form the requisite intent to commit the crimes charged. ¶ 35 It is also significant that, from the time he surrendered to authorities, Elmore was determined to take responsibility for his actions and plead guilty. At his first appearance Elmore attempted to enter pleas of guilty without assistance of counsel. The record suggests that he never wavered in his desire to plead guilty. Mr. Elmore gave a 74-page confession describing, as Mr. Komorowki noted, a logical and goal-oriented action that resulted in the death of his girl-friend's daughter and included the fact that he had thought about killing Kristy many times before. FOF at 33. ¶ 36 Based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the absence of legal defenses, counsel's strategy was to rely on Elmore's remorse and willingness to take responsibility, a strategy that counsel reasonably could have concluded would have been undermined by an attempt to diminish Elmore's culpability through presentation of mental health experts. Weighed against these considerations, counsel's failure to investigate Elmore's mental health prior to advising him to plead guilty did not fall below the reasonableness standard of Strickland. 2. Failure to Negotiate a Plea Bargain with the Prosecutor. ¶ 37 The Supreme Court has held that the Strickland standard is applicable in the plea process. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). A criminal defendant is entitled to effective counsel in plea negotiations. State v. Swindell, 93 Wash.2d 192, 198, 607 P.2d 852 (1980). In satisfying the Strickland test, as applied to the plea process, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. In re Pers. Restraint of Riley, 122 Wash.2d 772, 780-81, 863 P.2d 554 (1993) (citing Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 57-59, 106 S.Ct. 366). A bare allegation that a petitioner would not have pleaded guilty if he had known all of the consequences of the plea is not sufficient to establish prejudice under the Strickland test. Riley, 122 Wash.2d at 782, 863 P.2d 554. ¶ 38 Mr. Komorowski testified that he could not recall plea bargaining for a life sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. Moreover, he did not think about plea bargaining for fewer aggravators in anticipation of a proportionality review in the event of a death sentence. This court considers the number of aggravators in assessing proportionality of a death sentence. Elmore, 139 Wash.2d at 309, 985 P.2d 289; State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 759, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997). ¶ 39 As noted earlier, Elmore's defense team submitted a very detailed and well prepared mitigation statement. Such a statement is specifically intended to dissuade the prosecutor from seeking the death penalty. Additionally, the State submitted an affidavit from the county prosecutor, David McEachran, stating that he informed counsel that he would not consider plea bargaining with the death penalty. Although there is no specific mention of a plea discussion regarding the number of aggravating circumstances, Mr. McEachran's affidavit strongly suggests that he would not have negotiated on this point either. ¶ 40 While Mr. Komoroski's failure to initiate negotiations on the number of aggravating factors may not have been a strategic decision, on this record Elmore fails to carry his burden of establishing that, but for counsel's failure to negotiate on this point, there is a reasonable probability that the prosecutor would have agreed to a reduction in the number of aggravators or that he would not have pleaded guilty and insisted on going to trial. 3. Advice to Plead Guilty. ¶ 41 Elmore also claims that counsel's advice to plead guilty fell below the accepted standard for counsel in a death penalty case. Based on the experts' affidavits, he argues that there was no advantage to him in pleading guilty and that his attorney was advised to proceed to trial but unreasonably ignored that advice. For example, Elmore's affidavit from Dennis Balske states that, by conducting a trial on guilt, the jury can begin to discharge its emotional reactions to the crime and begin concentrating on the defendant as a human being. Balske also stated that Elmore's attorneys missed the opportunity to begin presenting the mitigation case to the jury by introducing mental health evidence and social history during the guilt phase. Pers. Restraint Pet. & Br. in Supp., attach. 1 (Decl. of Dennis Balske). Elmore also submitted his own affidavit that he would not have pleaded guilty if counsel had advised him that his plea might have an adverse impact on the penalty determination. ¶ 42 As the record demonstrates, Elmore attempted to plead guilty at his first appearance. At all times thereafter he expressed a desire to spare his family from the publicity associated with a trial and a desire to take responsibility for his actions. Mr. Komorowski testified that his strategy was built around the dual themes of remorse and taking responsibility. He did not want to do anything to detract from that strategy. As mentioned, Elmore gave a full, detailed confession and Mr. Komowski testified that he did not want the focus to be on the circumstances of the crime. Considering there was no viable defense to the charges, his defense theme, and his client's desire to plead guilty, we conclude that Mr. Komorowski's advice to plead guilty was based upon reasonable trial strategy.