Opinion ID: 734913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appellant ehrlich

Text: 7 Ehrlich here appeals only the sentence imposed on him subsequent to his guilty plea. 8
9 Ehrlich first challenges the constitutionality of the enhanced penalty he received for drug trafficking in a school zone, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 860, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995). We review a determination on the constitutionality of a statute de novo. U.S. v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir.1992); U.S. v. Litteral, 910 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.1990). Appellant's position is without merit. Section 860 regulates an activity, drug trafficking, that substantially affects interstate commerce. U.S. v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463 (9th Cir.1996); U.S. v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir.1995). Congress has the power to regulate this activity regardless of where it takes place, and has no less power to do so simply because it takes place in a school zone. See U.S. v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991). Thus, the statute is constitutional. See U.S. v. Clark, 67 F.3d 1154 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1432 (1996) (finding Section 860 constitutional after Lopez ); U.S. v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135 (6th Cir.1996) (same). 10
11 Ehrlich also takes issue with the calculation of his offense level at sentencing, which was based on quantities of drugs which were not known to the government at the time of entering Ehrlich's plea, but which were revealed through the testimony of co-conspirators at trial. In the Presentence Report (PSR) submitted to the district court prior to Ehrlich's sentencing, the Probation Officer indicated that the quantities mentioned by the co-conspirators would not be used in calculating the offense level. The government, however, argued that such quantities should be included. 1 The district court agreed. 12 Ehrlich first argues that the sentencing violated his agreement with the government granting him immunity for his trial testimony. Generally, under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing court has broad discretion to consider any information which is sufficiently reliable. U.S. v. Notrangelo, 909 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.1990). On the other hand, United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 1B1.8 prohibits the court from sentencing the defendant by using testimony which is covered by a grant of immunity to that defendant. U.S. v. Abanatha, 999 F.2d 1246, 1249 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1035, 114 S.Ct. 1549 (1994). Appellant argues that both he and the testifying co-conspirators were given immunity, and thus Section 1B1.8 prohibits the use of either's testimony. Appellant's argument is without merit. While Section 1B1.8 protects a defendant from the use of his own testimony, the guideline does not extend immunity to the use of a co-conspirators' testimony. 13 Appellant also argues that use of this testimony deprived him of his right to cross-examination, as he was not represented at the trial where this testimony was elicited. Again, appellant's argument is unavailing. Although the Eleventh Circuit has expressed disfavor with the use of such testimony, U.S. v. Castellanos, 882 F.2d 474 (11th Cir.1989), revised, 904 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir.1990), both this Court and the Tenth Circuit have found that the use of a co-defendant's testimony is proper, even if offered at a separate trial where defendant has no opportunity for cross-examination. U.S. v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990); Notrangelo, 909 F.2d at 365. The sentencing court must only ensure that such testimony  'has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.'  Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, comment). We find that the district court's decision to consider this testimony was appropriate. 14 Finally, appellant argues that he was given insufficient notice of the potential use of this testimony and was therefore deprived of his right to rebut it. U.S. v. Wise, 881 F.2d 970, 972 (11th Cir.1989); U.S. v. Blackwell, 49 F.3d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir.1995). The record, however, reveals that the government served and filed a notice of objection to the PSR in which it indicated that it would request a higher base offense level calculation derived, in part, from information contained in the co-conspirator's trial testimony. Thus, Ehrlich had prior notice of the potential use of this testimony and had an opportunity to prepare a rebuttal. The district court's decision to rely on these facts will not be disturbed.