Opinion ID: 2936310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Florence

Text: In Florence, the petitioner was arrested on an outstanding bench warrant after a traffic stop. He was subjected to a strip search upon admission to jail where he was required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough while squatting. The petitioner was released the next day after the charges against him were dismissed. Following this incident, petitioner sued the governmental entities that operated the jail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, maintaining that people arrested for minor offenses “could not be required to remove their clothing and expose the most private areas of their bodies to close visual inspection as a routine part of the intake process.”9 The Supreme Court disagreed. At the outset, the Supreme Court held that “[c]orrectional officials have a legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by reason of what new detainees may carry in on their bodies. Facility personnel, other inmates, and the new detainee himself or herself may be in danger if these threats are introduced into the jail population.”10 Referring to jail “in a broad sense to include prisons and other detention facilities,”11 the Supreme Court held that (quoting Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754 (3d Cir. 1974)). 9 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514-15. 10 Id. at 1513. 11 Id. 7 “[c]orrectional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process.”12 The Court identified three main risks justifying a blanket strip search policy in such facilities: (1) the danger of introducing contagious infections and diseases; (2) the increasing number of gang members who go through the intake process; and (3) the detection of contraband, i.e., any unauthorized item, concealed by new detainees.13 The necessity of a strip search to detect contraband is clear. The Supreme Court clarified, however, that a strip search is also necessary to detect diseases and wounds and identify potential gang members. With respect to diseases and wounds, the Court explained that “[p]ersons just arrested may have wounds or other injuries requiring immediate medical attention. It may be difficult to identify and treat these problems until detainees remove their clothes for a visual inspection.”14 Similarly, identifying potential gang affiliations is critical before a detainee enters the general population, where “[f]ights among feuding gangs can be deadly, and the officers who must maintain order are put in harm’s way.”15 Thus, a strip search allows corrections officers to inspect for certain tattoos and other signs of gang affiliation, which facilitates “[t]he identification and isolation of gang members before they are admitted.”16 As a result of 12 Id. at 1518. 13 Id. at 1518-19. 14 Id. at 1518. 15 Id. at 1518-19. 16 Id. at 1519. 8 these risks, the Court held that “[i]t is not surprising that correctional officials have sought to perform thorough searches at intake . . . . Jails are often crowded, unsanitary, and dangerous places. There is a substantial interest in preventing any new inmate . . . from putting all who live or work at these institutions at even greater risk when he is admitted.”17 While conceding that correctional officials must be allowed to conduct an effective search during the intake process, the petitioner in Florence asserted that an invasive strip search was not necessary where the detainee had not been arrested for a serious crime or for any offense involving a weapon or drugs. The Supreme Court rejected this argument holding that the petitioner’s standard would be unworkable given the realities of prison administration. Stating that “jails can be even more dangerous than prisons because officials there know so little about the people they admit at the outset,” the Supreme Court explained that officers responsible for the intake process often lack access to criminal history records, and even those records can be inaccurate or incomplete.18 Such an individualized inquiry may also lead to discriminatory application by officers who “would not be well equipped to make any of these legal determinations during the pressures of the intake process.”19 Thus, the Supreme Court explained that “[i]n addressing this type of constitutional claim courts must defer 17 Id. at 1520. 18 Id. at 1521. 19 Id. at 1522. 9 to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security.”20 Emphasizing prison officials’ need for discretion, the Court stated that “[m]aintaining safety and order at these institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.”21 Further, the Court emphasized the deference owed to correctional officers and stated “a regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld ‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”22 Strip searches of all detainees prior to admission to the general population of a jail serves such penological interests. The majority opinion, however, left open the possibility of exceptions to this holding. For example, the majority acknowledged that this case did not require it to rule on the types of searches that would be reasonable where a detainee would be held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees.23 In such a situation, “[t]he accommodations . . . may diminish the need to conduct some aspects of the searches at issue.”24 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts wrote 20 Id. at 1513-14. 21 Id. at 1515. 22 Id. (quoting Turner, 107 S. Ct. 2254). 23 Id. at 1522. 24 Id. at 1523. 10 separately in a concurrence to emphasize that “the Court does not foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it announces.”25 Because “factual nuances [did not] play a significant role” in Florence, Chief Justice Roberts admonished that “[t]he Court is nonetheless wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions, to ensure that we ‘not embarrass the future.’”26 In another concurrence, Justice Alito echoed Chief Justice Roberts’s sentiments, stating “[i]t is important to note, however, that the Court does not hold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population.”27 Relying on the importance of deference to correctional officials, Florence permitted strip searches of all detainees admitted to the general population of a detention facility. On balance, the Court held that the institutional security risks outweighed any constitutional right of detainees to be free from such strip searches.