Opinion ID: 3134316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: Citing Computer Teaching Corp. v. Courseware Applications, Inc. , 199 Ill. App. 3d 154 (1990), defendants contend that this matter is properly reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. Generally speaking, a trial court is afforded great latitude in rulings on discovery matters, and a court of review will not disturb such rulings absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See Maxwell v. Hobart Corp. , 216 Ill. App. 3d 108, 110 (1991). Specifically, however, the applicability of a statutory discovery privilege is a matter of law for the trial court to determine and, within that legal determination, factual questions may sometimes arise. See Niven v. Siqueira , 109 Ill. 2d 357, 368 (1985). It follows then that the applicability of a statutory exception to such a privilege is also a matter of law for the trial court to determine. In determining whether section 10(a)(1) applies to a given case, a trial court must first determine as a matter of law whether a recipient might have introduced his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense so as to waive the therapist-recipient privilege recognized under the Act. 740 ILCS 110/10(a)(1) (West 1994). Disclosure may be had provided, and only to the extent, the trial court secondarily finds that the information sought to be disclosed is relevant, probative, not unduly prejudicial, otherwise clearly admissible, that other satisfactory evidence is demonstrably unsatisfactory as evidence, and that disclosure is more important to the interests of substantial justice than protection from injury to the therapist-recipient relationship. 740 ILCS 110/10(a)(1) (West 1994); see Goldberg v. Davis , 151 Ill. 2d 267 (1992). This aspect of the inquiry expressly includes a balancing of competing important interests and a consideration of some factual matters, the very sort of determination traditionally residing within the discretion of a trial court. In the present case, we review the propriety of the appellate court's answer to the certified question before it. That question essentially asked whether the trial court's holding was legally correct concerning the threshold applicability of section 10(a)(1) to the case, and the secondary matter of disclosure pursuant to the provision. The trial court found that its disclosure order involved a question of law as to which there was a substantial difference of opinion and requested guidance. See Faier v. Ambrose & Cushing, P.C. , 154 Ill. 2d 384 (1993); Kerker v. Elbert , 261 Ill. App. 3d 924, 925 (1994). Given the posture of the case, yet recognizing the mixed nature of the issues presented, we nevertheless determine that this matter is one subject to de novo review. Cf . In re Lawrence M. , 172 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1996).