Opinion ID: 1766093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: claim by linda gaylor as administratrix of rachel elizabeth gaylor

Text: It was apparently assumed at the instigation of this action that Rachel Elizabeth Gaylor lived a short while after birth, but it is now conceded that the child was stillborn. The original complaint was for personal injury to the child, but the Court of Appeals, in its opinion, seems to grant an amendment to permit an action for personal injury to a fetus. No cases were cited in which a claim for personal injury was allowed when the fetus was not born alive. However, under the circumstances of this case, we do not need to face this problem. Commencing with Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Brantley's Admr., 106 Ky. 849, 51 S.W. 585 (1899), this court has consistently held that . . . unless a personal representative shall qualify within one year from the injury, the action is barred. See also Wilson's Admr. v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. Ky., 92 S.W. 572 (1906); Totten v. Loventhal, Ky., 373 S.W.2d 421, 422 (1963). The law in Kentucky is well summarized in Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 6th Cir., 782 F.2d 638, 641, 642 (1986): It has been a longstanding requirement that the action must be filed by the personal representative of the estate within one year. Further, if no valid personal representative is appointed within one year of the date of death, any action for wrongful death dies. However, if a personal representative is appointed within one year of the date of death, he then is granted one year from the date of his appointment to file suit. If no suit is filed within that time, the action for wrongful death dies. Mrs. Gaylor further contends that KRS 413.190(2)  which statute tolls the statute of limitations in the event someone obstructs the prosecution of the action  applies. We concur with the Court of Appeals when they say: The evidence available to the trial court established that neither Dr. Dawson nor the hospital concealed any facts from [Linda Gaylor] nor misled her in any way. We reverse the Court of Appeals, and affirm the judgment of the Whitley Circuit Court. STEPHENS, C.J., and LAMBERT, LEIBSON, STEPHENSON and VANCE, JJ., concur. LEIBSON, J., files a separate concurring opinion in which LAMBERT, J., joins. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents and files a separate dissenting opinion.