Opinion ID: 1946280
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Statutory Provisions

Text: The permanent partial loss of use of plaintiff's eyes should be compensated for by an award based on the omnibus provision because this particular case does not fall under either the one eye or the both eyes provision. Accordingly, we will amend the award to allow, within the limits of our discretion, a reasonable and proportionate amount, viz., two-thirds of the average weekly wage for one hundred weeks. The case of a loss of use or impairment of both eyes does not come within the limits or scope of the provision for the loss of one eye. Literally, the section makes provision only for the loss of one eye. To find in it a legislative intention that the courts by analogy should compensate for the loss of both eyes by simply doubling the compensation allowed for the loss of one is to defy logic and experience. Total blindness is more than twice as devastating as losing sight in one eye. To suppose otherwise would be only slightly less unrealistic than to pretend that the loss of both lungs is only twice as serious as losing one. That the legislators intended to compensate for the synergetic effect of the loss or impairment of dual members is evident in the legislative history and scheme of the statute. [2] Before the statute's amendment in 1975, La.Acts 1975, No. 583, § 9, it provided the same number of weeks compensation for a schedule loss of both eyes as for permanent total disability. This was five times the number of weeks of compensation provided for in the case of the loss of one eye. La.Acts 1968, ex. sess., No. 25, § 1. When the limitation on weekly compensation payments for permanent total disability was removed by the 1975 amendments, the schedule was changed to provide that the loss of both eyes constitutes permanent total disability, except rarely when there is conclusive proof that total blindness is not totally disabling. The schedule provision for the loss of one eye, allowing one hundred weeks of compensation, was not changed. Thus, the legislative aim continued to take into account the transcendent difference between the loss of both eyes and the loss of one. Despite this constant legislative pattern, the lower courts interpreted the statute as disregarding the multiplier effect of dual eye injuries when the impairment to each eye is only partial. Under their view the 1975 amendments are seen as actually reducing an employee's recovery for permanent partial impairment of both eyes from that provided under former law by restricting him to compensation based on the one eye provision. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that this was intended. The language, history and purpose of the legislation, even without the liberal interpretation to which an employee is entitled, militate in favor of compensating employees who suffer dual eye injuries with at least correlative recovery under the provision concerning the loss of both eyes. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to twenty percent of permanent total disability compensation under the both eyes provision for the duration of his impairment. Although we agree that an employee who suffers partial loss of both eyes is presumptively entitled to recovery under this provision, we do not believe the legislature intended for his compensation to be based on a fractional reduction of permanent total disability payments. In adopting the 1975 amendments, the legislature defined disability as the inability to engage in a gainful occupation for wages. An employee is totally disabled if he is unable to engage in any gainful occupation for wages. If he can engage in gainful occupation for wages, even though one different from his previous job or for which he has no special training, he is partially disabled. The partial disability award is for a maximum of 450 weeks and only to the extent that the employee actually earns less than he was earning at the time of his injury. It is fixed at two-thirds of the difference between his former wage and the amount of his actual earnings in any subsequent week. La.R.S. 23:1221(1), (2) & (3) (Supp.1975); Malone & Johnson, 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers' Compensation (2d ed.), § 275, p. 615. The 1975 amendments, which changed and realigned the concepts of total and partial disability, were designed to restrict permanent total disability benefits by casting many compensation claims under the partial disability provisions which previously had been treated as total disability. Persons who had been entitled to permanent total disability benefits under former law merely because they could not return to precisely the same job and perform all the same tasks were relegated to partial disability benefits. Furthermore, the new partial disability sections provided, in effect, only a transition period for the injured worker. Unlike the permanent total disability award, the permanent partial disability award was restricted in duration and based upon wages the employee actually failed to earn. Malone & Johnson, supra. As a correlate to these changes, the legislature must have intended that an employee who suffers only partial impairment of both eyes, and not loss of both eyes, is entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in the absence of conclusive proof to the contrary. This construction parallels the provision of the schedule with regard to the full loss of both eyes, recognizes the synergetic effect of partial dual eye impairment, and yet is consistent with the new total-partial disability dichotomy crafted by the statute. The interpretation argued for by the plaintiff, on the other hand, would grant an employee partially and permanently impaired in both eyes an absolute right to receive compensation for an unlimited period even if the employer proves conclusively that he is not disabled or that he has continued to earn the same wages. This view would give such claimants advantages under the law not enjoyed by employees who have been partially disabled by nonschedule injuries or rendered totally blind by a work accident. There is nothing in the statute to imply that it should be read to reach such an anomalous result. We conclude, therefore, that to compensate employees suffering partial and permanent impairment of both eyes in proportion to employees sustaining total loss of both eyes requires that they be treated as if they were permanently partially disabled, in the absence of conclusive proof to the contrary. Applying the statute, as interpreted, to the facts of the present case, it is evident that plaintiff's case does not fall within the both eyes provision because there is conclusive proof that he is not partially disabled. His injury did not produce any disability to perform the duties in which he was customarily engaged when injured. La.R.S. 23:1221(3). Except for the brief period following his accident, he has fully performed his duties for the same wage as before his injury. Accordingly, this being a case not falling within any of the other provisions, and one in which the usefulness of a physical function is seriously permanently impaired, we are required by the omnibus provision to allow such compensation as is reasonable and in proportion to that provided for other cases by the schedule, not to exceed sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages for one hundred weeks. We allow the maximum compensation authorized by the omnibus provision. Considering that the former law would have allowed the employee 500 compensation weeks at the minimum rate, considering further that under the 1975 amendments a somewhat more serious eye injury partially disabling him would have authorized benefits of up to sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages for a maximum period of 450 weeks, we conclude that sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wage for 100 weeks is proportionate and reasonable under the circumstances. Although the condition of plaintiff's eyes presently does not prevent him from working, the evidence indicates that it could deteriorate and result in future total or partial disability. In this regard, La. R.S. 23:1331 provides that a compensation judgment may at the request of either party be modified at any time six months after its rendition on the ground that the incapacity of the employee has been subsequently diminished or increased or that the judgment was obtained through error, fraud or misrepresentation. This reopening provision fits within the entire compensation scheme which envisions that payments should be made during the entire period of disability so long as the maximum period is not exceeded, and contemplates that necessary adjustments should be made after judgment to that end. Thus, the employee is not permitted to relitigate his original condition but must show a change in his compensable condition, such as progression, deterioration, or aggravation of the condition, achievement of disabling character by a previously asymptomatic complaint, appearance of new and more serious features, or failure to recover within the time originally predicted. See Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 81.31(a). To enable our court-administered system to fulfill successfully a function performed elsewhere through a compensation commission with a continuing supervisory jurisdiction, the statute empowers the court to carry out the purpose of the statutecompensation so long as the worker is disabled, but no longer. Malone & Johnson, supra, § 284. Moreover, the court has authority to reopen and adjust an award for a loss of use or function as well as one for a partial or total disability, Harris v. Southern Carbon Co., 189 La. 992, 181 So. 469 (1938), and regardless of the size or duration of the award. Landreneau v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 309 So.2d 283 (La.1975).