Opinion ID: 708223
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hardship: First Amendment Chill and Right to Work

Text: 52 As noted earlier, injury to First Amendment rights more readily justifies a finding of ripeness due to the chilling effect on protected expression which delay might produce. Planned Parenthood v. Kempiners, 700 F.2d 1115, 1122 (7th Cir.1983) (Cudahy, J. concurring) (noting that the statute in question forced a choice between exercising First Amendment rights to speak on the abortion issue and risking loss of eligibility for state benefits). Since the Government has targeted these aliens because of their association with the PFLP, the Notices of Intent to Deny had a palpable chilling effect. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-57, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2142-44, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (permitting a challenge to a licensing statute because it immediately intimidates parties into censoring their own speech); Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting a preenforcement challenge to a statute because of its immediate chilling effect on protected speech). We agree with the D.C. Circuit that irreparable injury to First Amendment rights results from the use of secret information about presumptively protected affiliations in INS proceedings, since an alien denied legalization faces loss of his right to work and to support his family, see HRC, 498 U.S. at 490-91, 111 S.Ct. at 895, not because of his illegitimate activities, but [because of] his legitimate activities as an outspoken critic of the Government's foreign policy. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 517. When weighed against the minimal benefit to judicial or administrative interests from further administrative proceedings, these injuries tip the scales against requiring exhaustion. Id. at 518. 53 We hold that the district court appropriately exercised jurisdiction over Barakat's and Sharif's claim that use of undisclosed classified information in the legalization process violates due process requirements because it is a collateral, procedural challenge to an INS practice that requires factfinding beyond the purview of the agency proceedings and does not challenge the INS' individual determination of a substantive eligibility criteria. See id. Therefore, it falls under the HRC rule in accord with our Naranjo decision that district courts have jurisdiction when the limited review scheme would be incapable of generating an administrative record adequate for effective judicial review. Naranjo-Aguilera, 30 F.3d at 1113.