Opinion ID: 1195424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Text and Context

Text: [T]he main task of any tribunal which is asked to apply or construe or interpret a treaty is to give[ ] effect to the expressed intention of the parties, that is, their intention as expressed in the words used by them in the light of the surrounding circumstances.  Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties 365 (1961). It is thus a well-established principle that a court interpreting a treaty begin[s] with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used. United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256, 263 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The text of Article 36 certainly requires that the authorities of a receiving State (that is, the detaining State) take certain actions with respect to the nationals of a sending State (that is, the detainee's home State). For example, paragraph 1(b) of Article 36 provides that if a detained individual of foreign citizenship so requests, the detaining authorities must alert the individual's home consulate of the detention, see Art. 36(1)(b)(first); moreover, the authorities must inform the detained individual that he can contact his home consulate, see Art. 36(1)(b) (third). 21 U.S.T. at 101. And at least some of these requirements are explicitly referred to as rights of the individual foreign nationals. Paragraph 1(b) instructs the detaining authorities to inform the foreign national without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph, Art. 36(1)(b)(third), and paragraph 2 contains instructions for the implementation of the rights referred to in paragraph 1. 21 U.S.T. at 101. It is notable, however, that the critical requirement at issue in the instant casea receiving State's obligation to inform a detained foreign national of his rights under paragraph 1(b)is never itself expressly referred to as a right. Moreover, the text of the Convention is entirely silent as to whether private individuals can seek redress for violations of this obligationor any other obligation set forth in Article 36in the domestic courts of States-parties. Of course, whether an individual right exists and how that right may be enforced by the individual are different questions. Nevertheless, we think that the lack of any mention in the text of Article 36(1)(b) as to whether or how detained foreign nationals might vindicate their asserted rights at least suggests that the drafters of the Convention did not intend to confer rights directly upon individuals. Cf. page 25-26 post (noting treaties that expressly provide for individual judicial remedies). [17] The language of Article 36 is set forth in a document that is primarily a compact between independent nations, although it  may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon individuals, Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598, 5 S.Ct. 247 (emphasis added). But [n]othing in [the treaty's] text explicitly provides for judicial enforcement of [its] consular access provisions at the behest of private litigants, Li, 206 F.3d at 66 (Selya & Boudin, JJ., concurring), or, for that matter, creates a right to be informed of the prospect of consular access and notification that can be privately vindicated directly under the Vienna Convention or pursuant to § 1983. Moreover, we have observed that the vocabulary of individual rights may be used to refer to certain potential benefits provided by treaty that do not actually create rights enforceable by the individuals benefitted. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.1975). As Judges Selya and Boudin explained in their concurring opinion in Li: Of course, there are references in the [Convention] to a right of access, but these references are easily explainable. The contracting States are granting each other rights, and telling future detainees that they have a right to communicate with their consul is a means of implementing the treaty obligations as between States. Li, 206 F.3d at 66 (Selya & Boudin, JJ., concurring) (emphasis in original). Indeed, even with respect to statutes, the Supreme Court has on several occasions rejected the argument that references to the rights of persons potentially benefitted by legislation (appearing both in text and legislative history) necessarily support the view that the legislation creates rights in individuals that can be enforced by those individuals through mechanisms such as a § 1983 action or an implied private right of action. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 289 n. 7, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18-20, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). Similarly, the isolated language of Article 36(1)(b) is at most ambiguous as to the existence of rights that can be privately vindicated in court in the manner sought by plaintiff. Thus, in accordance with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, as well as Judges Selya and Boudin of the First Circuit, we conclude that the requirement that an alien be informed of consular notification and access in Article 36(1)(b)(third), even taken in conjunction with the several references to rights, does not establish a right in the alien that can be vindicated in a damages action for failure to inform the alien of the obligation. See Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 391-94; Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 196-98; Li, 206 F.3d at 66-68 (Selya & Boudin, JJ., concurring). Several additional textual and contextual considerations militate against construing Article 36's obligation to inform an alien of the prospect of consular notification and access as creating individual rights that, when violated, can be vindicated through private litigation brought directly under the Convention or pursuant to § 1983. For example, the first clause of paragraph 1 of Article 36 begins with the following statement of purpose: [w]ith a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State. 21 U.S.T. at 100. Plaintiff argues that individual enforcement of the Vienna Convention may aid sending States in the exercise of their consular functions. However, the introductory language of Article 36 emphasizes the exercise of these functions, rather than an individual's ability to benefit from these functionsgiving rise to ambiguity as to whether the provisions that follow create entirely independent individual rights that may be vindicated by lawsuits in our courts. The Preamble to the Convention also favors defendants' position. [18] It bears underscoring that a preamble is not without meaning under international law. It provides valuable context for understanding the terms of a treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(2), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 (providing that [t]he context for ... purpose[s] of ... interpret[ing] ... a treaty shall comprise... the text, including its preamble and annexes, as well as other related agreements (emphasis added)). [19] The parties focus on the language in paragraph five of the Preamble stating that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States. Defendants and amicus the United States argue that this language is evidence that the Convention is not meant to confer rights on individuals. Defs.' Br. 7; Amicus's Br. 7-8. Plaintiff, pointing out that the preceding clause in paragraph four of the Preamble specifies that the privileges and immunities mentioned are consular, argues that paragraph 5's language has no bearing on the existence of rights assertedly granted to private individuals by specific articles of the treaties, but rather refers to benefits attaching to consular or diplomatic officers as a result of their status as officials representatives of a foreign State. Pl.'s Supp. Reply Br. 2. In other words, according to plaintiff, the Preamble merely set[s] forth the long-standing principle that the intent of granting privileges and immunities to oficial representatives of foreign States is not to benefit those individuals personally, but rather to further the amicable relations between the receiving State and the sending State.... Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Even if the Preamble cannot be read as explicitly or categorically rejecting the creation of rights in private individuals, it certainly reflects the broader principle that the Convention is concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with establishing relationships and rights as between States and State officials. [20] By referring only to consular relations, privileges and immunities, the Preamble suggests that any relations, privileges, or immunities the Convention creates are strictly those of consular officials. [21] Moreover, the Preamble declares that the overarching aim of the Convention is to contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations.  21 U.S.T at 79 (emphasis added). The motivating principles of the Convention as stated in the Preamble are clearly principles governing the relations of States inter se concern for the sovereign equality of States, the maintenance of international peace and security, and the promotion of friendly relations among nations. Id. These passages suggest that the rights created by the Convention similarly belong to, and should generally be enforced by, the States-parties to the Convention and their official representatives. The Optional Protocol likewise reinforces the view that Article 36(1)(b) (third) does not create rights in an individual that can be vindicated through an action for damages. Although expressly designed to implement the terms of the Convention, it makes no mention of private actions by detained individuals. Rather, Article I of the Protocol provides that [d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the [ICJ] and may accordingly be brought before the [ICJ] by an application made by any [State-]party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol. 21 U.S.T. at 326. The lack of individual rights that can be vindicated through a private action for damages does not deprive Article 36 of force for at least four reasons. First, states-parties can safeguard the rights in the Convention (and protect their nationals) through negotiations and reclamations. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598, 5 S.Ct. 247. Second, the reciprocal nature of the Vienna Convention provides receiving states with a natural incentive to comply with its terms. [22] For instance, the United States, in an action brought by the federal government, can sue state and local governments to ensure compliance. See Amicus's May 11, 2007 Supp. Letter Br. at 10 ([T]he federal government is empowered to require that state or local law enforcement officials who detain foreign nationals do so in accordance with the substantive restrictions set out in the Convention.); see also Brief for United States, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 165 L.Ed.2d 557 (2006), 2006 WL 271823, at  (Under longstanding principles, the United States could bring an action in court to enforce compliance with a treaty obligation.) (citing Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26, 45 S.Ct. 176, 69 L.Ed. 352 (1925) (Holmes, J.)). Third, the lack of any privately enforceable right to damages for a violation of Article 36(1)(b)(third) may not foreclose the possibility that a domestic court, having established that an arrested alien is a foreign national, might inquire whether he has been informed that he may contact his consulate and fulfill the obligation to inform him. Fourth, a detained alien may be able to petition officials of a detaining authority, including where appropriate the courts, to comply with the obligations set forth in Article 36. These mechanisms might not always result in outcomes fully satisfactory to the offended State, but failure to secure optimal compliance or relief does not deprive a treaty provision of meaning any more than, for example, a judgment for nominal damages makes a statute meaningless. We also reject the argument that plaintiff's inability to recover damages for the alleged violation of Article 36(1)(b)(third) is incompatible with paragraph 2 of Article 36, which requires that the laws and regulations of States-parties enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended. 21 U.S.T. at 102. In Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court, assuming arguendo the existence of individual rights under Article 36, considered the claim that applying procedural default rules to such rights would deny Article 36 full effect. [23] The Court explained its rejection of this claim as follows: Sanchez-Llamas argues that the language of the Convention implicitly requires a judicial remedy because it states that the laws and regulations governing the exercise of Article 36 rights must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights ... are intended, Art. 36(2), 21 U.S.T., at 101 (emphasis added). In his view, although full effect may not automatically require an exclusionary rule, it does require an appropriate judicial remedy of some kind. There is reason to doubt this interpretation. In particular, there is little indication that other parties to the Convention have interpreted Article 36 to require a judicial remedy in the context of criminal prosecutions.... Of course, diplomatic avenuesthe primary means of enforcing the Conventionalso remain open. Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. at 2680-82 (emphasis in orginal). For similar reasons, we do not regard the Convention's full effect provision as requiring a damages claim for a failure to inform an alien of the consular access and notification requirements. In addition to the remedies normally available to States-parties to a treaty, courts may themselves take actions to comply with the Convention that, in effect, correct violations of the treaty by law enforcement authorities. A court's compliance with Article 36, perhaps in response to a request by our national government for treaty compliance addressed to the thousands of law enforcement authorities in our federal system, see note 22 ante, is not the same as individual enforcement of alleged Article 36 rights in a private civil lawsuit for damages; this independent responsibility or ability on the part of a court to abide by the Convention has nothing to do with the existence vel non of rights enforceable in a private action by an individual. [24] We reject any suggestion by plaintiff that Article 36 is rendered meaningless in the absence of a cause of action for damages by individual foreign nationals to vindicate an alleged violation of its notification provisions.