Opinion ID: 1177843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the equitable estoppel defense

Text: Committee maintains, however, that summary judgment in this case is nonetheless appropriate, because as a matter of law an estoppel defense is not available to Cheqer. We do not feel the record as it now stands supports this contention. Equitable estoppel has been characterized as comprising four elements: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the true facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting estoppel has the right to believe it was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; (4) he must have relied to his detriment on the conduct of the party to be estopped. Strong v. Santa Cruz County, 15 Cal.3d 720, 726, 125 Cal. Rptr. 896, 543 P.2d 264 (1975); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal.3d 462, 490, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423 (1970). Further, this court has noted that silence can raise an estoppel quite as effectively as can words. See e.g., Goldstein v. Hanna, 97 Nev. 559, 562, 635 P.2d 290 (1981). Whether these elements are present, so that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied, depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of a given case. From the limited record before us, however, we cannot say as a matter of law whether Committee's allowing union members to continue to work for Taylor, when it knew Taylor was delinquent in its fringe benefit contributions, gives rise to an estoppel defense. We note that the affidavit of Cheqer's Vice President alleges Cheqer was ignorant of the true facts, and that Cheqer relied to its detriment on Committee's permitting union members to continue to work for Taylor. Further, it seems clear from the record that Committee, having continual dealings with Taylor, was apprised of the fact that the subcontractor was delinquent on its fringe benefit contributions. However, whether Committee intended its conduct in allowing union members to continue to work for Taylor to be acted upon by Cheqer, or whether Cheqer had the right to believe it was so intended, is not established by the record before us. Material questions of fact therefore remain, and summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, the summary judgment against Cheqer, Inc., is reversed, and the case is remanded. MANOUKIAN, SPRINGER, MOWBRAY and STEFFEN, JJ., concur.