Opinion ID: 3050521
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal by a defendant. A defendant may file a

Text: notice of appeal in the district court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the sentence —

rect application of the sentencing guide- lines; or
in the applicable guideline range to the extent that the sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the maximum established in the guideline range . . . ; or
there is no sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Garcia asserts that we may review his sentence for guidelines calculation error under either § 3742(a)(1) or (2), whereas Plascencia-Alvarado relies only on § 3742(a)(1) to argue that we have jurisdiction to determine whether his sentence is unreasonable.7 We conclude that 7 There was some discussion at oral argument regarding the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(c), which provides that “[i]n the case of a plea agreeUNITED STATES v. GARCIA 15003 we are without jurisdiction to entertain either Garcia’s or Plascencia-Alvarado’s appeal. [2] Section 3742(a)(1) allows us to review a sentence “imposed in violation of law.” We have held that where a defendant is given the minimum sentence permitted by the statute of conviction, see United States v. Littlefield, 105 F.3d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1997), or a sentence within the statutory maximum, see United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843-44 (9th Cir. 1996), such a sentence is not illegal, and therefore does not violate the law. In this case, our jurisdiction is not established under § 3742(a)(1) because both Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado received sentences well within the statutory maximums. Therefore their sentences were not “imposed in violation of law.” [3] More recently, we held that § 3742(a)(1) confers jurisdiction to review sentences imposed within the advisory guidelines range if the defendant challenges the sentence as unreasonable under the § 3553(a) factors, because unreasonable sentences are “imposed in violation of law.” United States v. Plouffe, 445 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A sentence that is within the Guidelines range . . . may be unreasonable and thus imposed in violation of law pursuant to § 3742(a)(1).”). Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado invoke Plouffe to argue that jurisdiction properly lies because their sentences failed to satisfy § 3553(a) either because the guidelines range was improperly computed, see § 3553(a)(4), or ment that includes a specific sentence under rule [11(c)(1)(C)] of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure — (1) a defendant may not file a notice of appeal under paragraph (3) or (4) of [18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)] unless the sentence imposed is greater than the sentence set forth in such agreement.” Because neither Garcia nor Plascencia-Alvarado asserts that § 3742(a)(3) or (4) applies, we need not explore whether § 3742(c), which by its terms refers only to a plea agreement providing for a specific sentence, applies to cases such as this where the plea agreement provides for a specific sentencing range. 15004 UNITED STATES v. GARCIA because the other factors were not properly weighed. However, Plouffe is inapplicable to the sentences in this case. Plouffe considered only appeals of sentences imposed within and pursuant to the applicable advisory guidelines range. Plouffe, 445 F.3d at 1129-30. In reasoning that we have jurisdiction to review even within-guidelines sentences for reasonableness, Plouffe relied on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which held that the reasonableness (and therefore legality) of a sentence must be evaluated in light of all of the § 3553(a) factors, not just the guidelines calculation. Plouffe, 445 F.3d at 1130 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46). [4] Unlike Plouffe, Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado were not sentenced pursuant to the guidelines. Their sentences were within the range they agreed to in their Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements, and although each agreement contemplated that the district court would calculate the guidelines range, it did not condition the sentence on a properly calculated range. We have already held that such stipulated sentences need not comport with the guidelines, as they are “not based on the [g]uidelines.”8 United States v. Pacheco-Navarette, 432 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We conclude that, where a defendant was sentenced after pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that included a specific sentence stipulation that did not exceed the statutory maximum and was not contingent upon the Guidelines, remand is not required to comport with Booker and [United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)].”); see also United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A sentence imposed under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea arises directly from the agreement itself, not from the Guidelines, even though the court can and should consult the Guidelines in deciding whether to accept the plea. As Booker is concerned with sentences arising under 8 Because Garcia’s Rule 11(c)(1)(C) stipulated sentence was not conditioned by a requirement that it comport with the guidelines, and was not contingent upon them, his argument that we have jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(2) must also fail. UNITED STATES v. GARCIA 15005 the Guidelines, it is inapplicable in this situation.” (internal citation omitted)). Consequently, we hold that we do not have jurisdiction to review a sentence that was imposed pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and was not contingent on the guidelines, where the defendant claims only that there was some error in the district court’s calculation of the guidelines or application of Booker.9 See United States v. Silva, 413 F.3d 1283, 1284 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Silva’s only plausible argument [that the court has jurisdiction] is that his sentence was imposed in violation of law because it was given under a mandatory sentencing scheme. But this argument fails for the simple and obvious reason that Silva received the specific sentence he bargained for as part of his guilty plea.”). We therefore dismiss Garcia and Plascencia-Alvarado’s appeals of their sentences.