Opinion ID: 1318031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Point III:

Text: III. The circumstances surrounding plaintiff's injuries following hospitalization create an inference of defendants' negligence sufficient to warrant the invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Appellant says in his brief in support of Point III: On the basis of the pleadings and affidavits on file herein, summary judgment could not properly be granted on the issue of defendants' negligence because of the inference of negligence created by the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's postoperative development of a putrid and gangrenous condition. Although no expert medical testimony was introduced, the court should properly have taken judicial notice of the fact that when a person is under continuous medical care and supervision for the treatment of a leg fracture, his leg does not ordinarily become putrid and gangrenous in the absence of medical negligence. Whether defendants herein are liable for such negligence is therefore a material issue of fact. [Emphasis supplied] In other words, it is the appellant's contention that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be invoked in a medical malpractice action by reason of the court's alleged duty to take judicial notice of unexplained scientific facts even though no supporting medical evidence is offered and, thereupon, draw an inference of negligence sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. This is not the law in Wyoming. We said in Govin v. Hunter, Wyo., 374 P.2d 421, 422 (1962): ... [I]n order to sustain a claim for damages based upon malpractice or negligence on the part of a physician, the rule in this jurisdiction and in other jurisdictions generally has heretofore been that it is necessary for a plaintiff to prove by the evidence of competent experts that the injury complained of was caused by negligence. Phifer v. Baker, 34 Wyo. 415, 244 P. 637, 649. See also Newman v. Zinn, 3 Cir., 164 F.2d 558, 560; Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P.2d 791, 794; Simone v. Sabo, 37 Cal.2d 253, 231 P.2d 19, 22; and DiFilippo v. Preston , Del. [53 Del. (3 Storey) 539], 173 A.2d 333, 336. In McCoy v. Clegg, 36 Wyo. 473, 257 P. 484, 499 (1927), we held, in an action against a doctor for malpractice in treating a broken collar bone, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable. In Stundon v. Stadnik, Wyo., 469 P.2d 16 (1970), the patient-plaintiff sued the doctor for the loss of an eye which he contended was caused by the physician's negligent care and treatment commencing with a cataract operation. The trial court granted a motion for a directed verdict which was affirmed here. In Stundon we held: We believe that the trial court was correct in granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff failed to show any causal connection between defendant's alleged negligent acts and the plaintiff's injury. Proof of proximate causation is upon the plaintiff. Lemos v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 794; Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74, 83; Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520, 522. Id., at 19-20. The inference-of-negligence argument was made in Stundon, supra, and in rejecting the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, where no causal connection is made, we quoted with approval from Ewing v. Goode, S.D.Ohio, 78 F. 442, 443, to the following effect: `   The naked facts that defendant performed operations upon her eye, and that pain followed, and that subsequently the eye was in such a bad condition that it had to be extracted, establish neither the neglect and unskillfulness of the treatment, nor the causal connection between it and the unfortunate event. A physician is not a warrantor of cures. If the maxim, Res ipsa loquitur, were applicable to a case like this, and a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of negligence on the part of the physician or surgeon causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough to practice the healing art, for they would have to assume financial liability for nearly all the ills that flesh is heir to.' Id., at 22. This is not to say that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is never applicable in a medical malpractice case. We said in Stundon: The application of the doctrine is allowed where the act or admission was negligent within the common knowledge of man, but the doctrine will not be applied where the determination of the alleged negligence is not within the common knowledge of man, and the plaintiff must then establish and prove the lack of requisite care and skill by expert testimony. Schofield v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 90 Idaho 186, 409 P.2d 107, 109. Id., at 22. [6] We further said: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in malpractice actions in which the only proof is the fact that the treatment of the patient terminated with poor results. DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del. (3 Storey) 539, 173 A.2d 333, 339. The doctrine cannot be applied in a malpractice action arising out of surgery in absence of a causal nexus between an unfortunate result and the act of surgery... . Id., at 22. In the instant matter, we have only these facts which may be considered in this appeal: (1) the fact of the injury; (2) the treatment by the doctors and the care of the hospital; and (3) the fact of the loss of the leg. There is no competent, acceptable or admissible medical material factual showing that the treatment and care caused the loss of the limb. The problem is not of a nature which lends itself to solving through nonprofessional inquiry. For all we know, the leg would have been lost no matter what kind of care the patient received. We cannot guess about such matters. [7] We are not doctors. We know that a fractured right femur does not ordinarily result in the loss of a leg, but evidently it sometimes does. It did here  and we do not know why. It was the plaintiff's duty to point  with competent affidavit or discovery testimony  to the facts of negligence upon which he relied. He did not do this. The plaintiff did nothing to establish the causal connection between the care and the treatment and the loss of the leg and we cannot be expected to speculate about it. For all of the same reasons that res ipsa loquitur cannot raise an inference of negligence when a cataract operation results in the loss of an eye, an inference of negligence will not be raised from the naked fact that a crushed leg resulted in its loss.