Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Insanity Plea

Text: We turn now to the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellant's request to file a plea of insanity. The request was made on April 25, 1984, the day before trial was scheduled to begin. The procedures governing the assertion of the insanity defense at the time of the Grandison trial were dictated by section 12-108 of the 1982 Health  General Article of the Maryland Code and former Maryland Rule 731. [6] The rule and the statute must be read in conjunction. Their combined provisions require the defense of insanity to be interposed in writing at the time the initial plea is made; the initial plea must be made within fifteen days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to former Md. Rule 723. This period is automatically extended if a motion, demand for particulars, or other paper requiring a ruling by the court or compliance by a party before entering a plea is filed. Former Md. Rule 731 b 2. Such a filing delays the deadline for entering a plea until fifteen days after the court has ruled on the motion. Id. Both the statute and the rule provide for an exception to these time constraints. The court may accept an insanity plea at any time before commencement of the trial upon a showing of good cause. Appellant posits two theories under which he contends the trial court should have accepted his insanity plea. First, he asserts that his plea was timely under former Rule 731 b 2, and the court was therefore without discretion to reject it. In the alternative, appellant argues that he made an adequate showing of good cause as required by § 12-108 and former Rule 731 b 2; hence he was entitled to plead insanity prior to the commencement of trial. Appellant's first argument fails since no motion, demand for particulars, or other paper ... requiring a ruling by the court or compliance by a party before entering a plea was ruled upon by the court in the fifteen day period preceding his attempted entry of the insanity plea. [7] Consequently, the automatic extension of former Rule 731 b 2 does not come into play. Since the defendant made his first Rule 723 appearance before the court on July 19, 1983, the fifteen day period during which he had a right to file the insanity plea had expired long before April 25, 1984. Thus, Grandison was entitled to enter a late plea of insanity only upon a showing of good cause. Maryland Code (1982), Health  General Article, § 12-108; former Md. Rule 731 b 2. Although not in the context of the insanity plea, we have previously held that a statutory requirement of good cause vests the trial court with wide discretion. See State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984) (discussing good cause in context of postponement of trial date); State v. Jones, 270 Md. 388, 312 A.2d 281 (1973) (analysis of good cause requirement to permit a requested withdrawal of an accused's jury trial waiver). We now hold that the good cause requirements of § 12-108 and former Rule 731 likewise endow the trial court with broad discretion. Thus the trial judge's determination is entitled to the utmost respect and should not be overturned unless there was a clear abuse of that discretion. Madore v. Baltimore County, 34 Md. App. 340, 346, 367 A.2d 54, 58 (1976). Because we feel that Judge Simpkins' ruling was not the result of an abuse of discretion, we refuse to disturb it. The only evidence proffered by the defense at the hearing to determine whether there was good cause warranting the acceptance of a late insanity plea was the appellant's unsubstantiated allegations that he had been committed to a mental hospital at age nine and that as late as 1980  the Court psychiatrist had determined [him] to be functioning on the borderline. The paucity of proof was a direct result of the appellant's refusal to submit to a court provided psychiatric examination which ironically had been initiated pursuant to appellant's April 25, 1984 request that the court arrange proper psychiatric examination. At the April 26, 1984 hearing, Judge Simpkins gave a first hand account of the events precipitated by Grandison's request for a mental evaluation: [I]t was filed by the defendant 19 hours before Court was to start. In order to save time and to comply with this, to get him the examination that he requested in the plea and to give him the hearing that he requested, and to give him the findings of the examination, I contacted a psychiatrist who is employed by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and asked him if he would arrange for a psychiatric examination. He was kind enough to arrange that examination after he got off work last night. He went to the Wicomico County Detention Center last night at 5:15 to meet with Mr. Grandison. He met with Mr. Grandison.... Mr. Grandison wouldn't talk with him.       Now, that put us in this position. This man wanted then, before we do anything else, before he would be interviewed by the doctor, as he had requested, he refused to talk to the doctor until he had a chance to talk to his standby counsel  not his counsel, because he was representing himself, but to his standby counsel  who was then some 35 miles away in another county, which would have meant we had to get hold of Crawford [stand-by counsel], get Crawford, find him, get him to the Detention Center in Salisbury, have the conversation, hoping the doctor  who was doing the Court a favor  would agree to stick around, have the examination, type up the findings sometime before 9:30 this morning, and have it all done in time for Court at 9:30, a ridiculous situation. In our view, the trial court afforded Grandison ample opportunity to adduce evidence of good cause for allowance of the late insanity plea. His failure to do so was the result of his unjustifiable refusal to cooperate with the court appointed psychiatrist. There is no constitutional right to have counsel present at a psychiatric examination to determine sanity. United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir.1984); United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S.Ct. 149, 50 L.Ed.2d 130 (1976); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 67 (7th Cir.1971); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 711 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005, 90 S.Ct. 559, 24 L.Ed.2d 497 (1970); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 726-27 (4th Cir.1968). A defendant is, however, entitled to the assistance of counsel in determining whether to submit to a psychiatric examination. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1877, 68 L.Ed.2d 359, 374 (1981). Since Grandison was acting as his own counsel, the only possible complaint he might have is that he was denied assistance of standby counsel in determining whether to undergo mental evaluation. However, the April 25, 1984 Plea itself reflects that this was not so. It requests that the court arrange proper psychiatric examination of Defendant and is signed by both the defendant and his standby counsel. Also, at the April 26th hearing, standby counsel, acting at the request of the defendant, stated that prior to the filing of this plea Mr. Grandison and I had a considerable discussion about the fine distinction between competency to stand trial and insanity at the time the crime was committed. Thus, it is clear that the decision to undergo psychiatric evaluation was made after consultation with standby counsel. Therefore, there was no excuse for appellant's subsequent refusal to proceed with the examination. He cannot now complain that he was not given an opportunity to demonstrate good cause or that the trial court's refusal of the insanity plea was in error. The defense did not demonstrate good cause for entry of the late plea. Thus, the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing to accept the insanity plea.