Opinion ID: 779089
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the FRCD to Survival Claims

Text: 132 The scope of the FRCD is set in subsection (a)(1) of § 9658; by its terms, the section applies to  any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance ... released into the environment from a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection (a)(1) does not use the term plaintiff. Nor does it specify by whom such personal injury actions must have been brought or state any limitation as to the persons on whose behalf the actions may have been brought. The absence of any such limiting provisions suggests that the scope of the section is sufficiently broad to encompass not only a suit brought by the person injured, but as well a suit brought by a person who has the right to represent the person injured, such as his guardian or the executor of his estate. Absent any such qualifications of the phrase any action brought, which on its face is all-encompassing, the implication of subsection (a)(1) is that § 9658 is meant to apply to any personal injury or property damage claim asserted by any person on whom state law confers standing to assert it. 133 Nor do we see in the language of subsection (b)(4)(A), which does use the word plaintiff in defining the FRCD in terms of the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) the cause of the injury, id. § 9658(b)(4)(A), any intimation whatever that the plaintiff must be the person who suffered the injury or that the person who suffered the injury must be the person who discovered its cause. Had Congress intended to limit the scope of the FRCD in this way, it could more simply have drafted this subsection to refer to `the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that his or her personal injury ... was caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance.' Instead, subsection (b)(4)(A) refers to knowledge of the plaintiff that the hazardous substance caused the personal injury ... referred to in subsection (a)(1).  Id. § 9658(b)(4)(A) (emphasis added). Given subsection (a)(1)'s broad scope, encompassing any [personal injury] action brought, we think it plain that Congress meant the FRCD to have potential application whenever a claim for personal injury is brought by any person who, under state law, has standing to bring such a claim. 134 Defendants' contention that this interpretation is impermissible because it allows for an open-ended limitations period, hinging on the fortuity of when the cause of injury is discovered, is wide of the mark. The Federal Commencement Date is not wholly subjective, for it is defined not only as the time at which the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the cause, but also as the time at which the plaintiff reasonably should have had that knowledge. The latter sets an objective standard, and if the two dates differ, § 9658(b)(4)(A) implicitly makes the FRCD the earlier. 135 Defendants also argue that reading the term plaintiff to mean the person who brings the suit will facilitate abuse by allowing a decedent's heirs to have the suit instituted by one who only recently learned the cause of the decedent's injuries, in order to make the suit timely despite the fact that a myriad of others (including the decedent) may have discovered it much earlier. (Defendants-Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants' brief on appeal at 88-89.) This contention is likewise unpersuasive, as § 9658(b)(4)(A)'s objective standard for accrual will apply if there was sufficient information that a plaintiff reasonably should have known the cause of the injury earlier than he actually knew. In any event, defendants' speculative policy concerns cannot override the clear provisions of the statute. 136 In sum, we conclude that the district court did not err in ruling that survival claims are within the scope of § 9658. 137