Opinion ID: 2057541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Words as Provocation

Text: Perigo argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his objection and denied his motion in limine to the prosecution's closing argument on the law of provocation. The prosecutor had quoted from Vasseur v. State (1982), Ind., 430 N.E.2d 1157. He then said to the jury: our Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Indiana, has approved a statement of law that words alone are not sufficient provocation to reduce an offense from murder to manslaughter. At that point Perigo's attorney objected, by saying that the law is that tauntings of the nature we've talked about, of a sexual nature, confessions of illicit sex are sufficient provocation for a voluntary manslaughter verdict. The court overruled this objection. The trial court then excused the jury, and Perigo's attorney moved in limine that the prosecutor be ordered not to argue that Indiana law provides that confession of illicit sex by a fiance is insufficient provocation as a matter of law to warrant a manslaughter verdict. I believe it is the law that insulting words alone are insufficient  are insufficient provocation. But it is also the law that a confession of a wife or fiance of illicit sex is sufficient provocation to  to warrant a manslaughter verdict. Perigo asserts in his brief that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the prosecution's closing argument because: All that is required to reduce a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter is sufficient provocation to excite in the mind of the defendant such emotions as either anger, rage, sudden resentment or terror as may be sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary man, and to prevent deliberation and premeditation, to exclude malice, and to render the defendant incapable of cool reflection. Love v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 302, 369 N.E.2d 1073. See also, Russell v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 679, 419 N.E.2d 973, and Bryan v. State (1983), Ind., 450 N.E.2d 53. From the above-noted cases and the description of the facts in this particular case [it] is clear that words alone can be sufficient provocation if those words are in fact sufficient to meet the standard of Love as set forth above. Perigo also refers to Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 [1] (Burns 1985 Repl.) as support for his argument. The State argues that a motion in limine does not serve to obtain a final ruling on the admissibility of evidence, citing e.g., Johnson v. State (1985), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 892; Green v. State (1984), Ind., 469 N.E.2d 1169. While this is true, Perigo adequately preserved this issue by objecting to the prosecutor's argument at the time. The trial court properly overruled Perigo's objection and correctly denied his motion in limine. Words alone are not sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter. Vasseur, 430 N.E.2d 1157; New v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 307, 259 N.E.2d 696, 702; Boyle v. State (1886), 105 Ind. 469, 480, 5 N.E. 203, 210 (The court did not err in directing the jury that mere words do not constitute such a provocation as will reduce an unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter.); Murphy v. State (1869) 31 Ind. 511, 514 (But it should be remembered that words only  however abusive and insulting they may be  cannot constitute a sufficient provocation ... and reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter.) These precedents inform our interpretation of Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3 (Burns 1985 Repl.), which we take to be consistent with a century of caselaw. In some circumstances, words may be combined with actions engendering sufficient provocation to reduce an offense from murder to manslaughter. That is the very point in the rule that words alone are not sufficient provocation to reduce an offense from murder to manslaughter. Even the highly emotional words in the case at bar are still just that  words.