Opinion ID: 1834220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Interim Between Rivet v. Battistella and Succession of Jenkins

Text: In Rivet v. Battistella, 167 La. 766, 120 So. 289 (1929) this court held that a testator's designation of an attorney to assist the executor in settling the estate was valid and binding on the executor and those who take under the will. The court reasoned that since the testator may impose on the donee any charges or conditions he pleases, provided they contain nothing contrary to law or good morals, citing R.C.C. 1527 and 1519, the designation of an attorney is enforceable because it does not offend public policy in these respects. The Rivet court did not expressly consider whether its holding was in conflict with the ruleonly jurisprudentially established at that timethat the client may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause. But the Rivet holding was later considered as having created an exception to the general rule. See Comment, Testamentary Designation of Probate Counsel, 51 Tul.L.Rev. 334, 342 n. 57 (1977); Comment, The Attorney-Client Relation in Louisiana, 18 La.L.Rev. 690, 702 (1958). With this decision Louisiana also became the only state that would enforce a testator's appointment of an attorney to handle the succession and provide a right of action to the designated attorney over the objection of the executor who had rejected his services as unsatisfactory. Comment, Testamentary Designation of Probate Counsel, supra; J. deFuria, Jr., A Matter of Ethics Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsman as Testamentary Fiduciary, 36 Kan.L.Rev. 275, 278 n. 16 (1988). In all other states, the designation of an attorney in the will was considered a precatory statement, merely the testator's advice or preference, and not binding on the executor. deFuria, Jr., supra at 278, n. 16.; In Re Estate of Deardoff, supra; Chancey v. West, 266 Ala. 314, 96 So.2d 457 (1957); In Re Estate of Smith, 131 Ariz. 190, 639 P.2d 380 (App. 1981); Highfield v. Bozio, 188 Cal. 727, 207 P. 242 (1922); In Re Estate of Marks, 83 So.2d 853 (Fla.1955); In Re Estate of Fresia, 390 So.2d 176 (Fla.App.1980); Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd. v. Hogan, 1 Hawaii App. 560, 623 P.2d 450 (1981); Conlan v. Sullivan, 280 Ill.App. 332 (1935); In Re Stahl's Estate, 113 Ind.App. 29, 44 N.E.2d 529 (1942); Drosos v. Drosos, 251 Iowa 777, 103 N.W.2d 167 (1960); In Re Kenney's Will, 213 Iowa 360, 239 N.W. 44 (1931); Robinson's Ex'rs v. Robinson, 297 Ky. 229, 179 S.W.2d 886 (1944); State, ex rel. v. Seifert, Johnson & Hand v. Smith, 260 Minn. 405, 110 N.W.2d 159 (1961); Conway v. Parker, 250 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1977); In Re Estate of Kelley, 126 N.J.Super. 376, 314 A.2d 614 (1974); Carton v. Bordon, 8 N.J. 352, 85 A.2d 257 (1951); In Re Sherman's Estate, 9 Misc.2d 731, 104 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1951); In Re Caldwell, 188 N.Y. 115, 80 N.E. 663 (1907); In Re Lackmund's Estate, 179 Or. 420, 170 P.2d 748 (1946); Young v. Alexander, 84 Tenn. 108 (1855); Mason & Mason v. Brown, 182 S.W.2d 729 (Tex.Civ.App. 1944); Comment, Testamentary Designation of Probate Counsel, supra. [2] The Rivet rule was a jurisprudential creation, there being no law expressly authorizing or prohibiting testamentary designation of an attorney for the estate. This decision and its progeny came under criticism from both ethical and legal standpoints. This court's willingness to enforce the designation over the objections of the executor, the widow and the heirs gave added incentive to attorneys who would seek to unethically influence their clients to name them as lawyers in testamentary instruments. See Comment, Testamentary Designation of Probate Counsel, supra at 351-353. Further, the Rivet jurisprudential rule had a questionable premise and created potentially serious problems conducive to further litigation: the lack of any effective grounds for ever discharging a designated attorney; the treatment of a designated attorney as a legatee, as some courts held; conflicts of interests between the attorney and other parties to the succession; the attorney's disqualification as witness, or notary to the will, thus possibly voiding the will. Id. at 343-346. Subsequently, in Succession of Jenkins, 481 So.2d 607 (La.1986), this court overruled Rivet v. Battistella , abolishing the Rivet rule that the designation of an attorney in a will is binding on the executor. But the process of overruling Rivet actually began earlier in Succession of Boyenga, 437 So.2d 260 (La. 1983), when the court held that a testator-designated attorney who had performed no work on a succession was not entitled to exact legal fees from the executrix because DR 2-106 and 2-110(A)(3) prohibit a lawyer from collecting an unearned fee and command him to refund promptly any unearned advance upon termination of employment. Thus, it is arguable that this court's decision in Boyenga foreordained our decision in both Succession of Jenkins and in the present case by indicating that a testator designated attorney has no effective recourse for a fee against an executor who is determined to prevent him from working on the succession and to employ other counsel for that purpose. See Mengis, Professional Responsibility, 47 La.L.Rev. 415, 417 (1986). In Succession of Jenkins, this court held that the designation of an attorney in a will is not binding because it infringes on the codal authority of the executor; it is not specifically authorized by law; it encourages solicitation and the appearance of impropriety on the part of attorneys; and it is contrary to general civilian principles. Succession of Jenkins, supra at 610. Additionally, Jenkins' majority and concurring opinions noted that there are serious ethical ramifications arising from the designation of an attorney-draftsman as attorney for the executor. When an attorney is permitted to name himself as the attorney for the executor in a will that he drafts, there are serious ethical problems centering around questions of improper solicitation, conflicts of interest and the client's ultimate freedom to discharge the attorney. See G. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning PracticesIs Good Business Bad Faith, 45 Ohio St.L.J. 57, 101 (1984). As Professor Johnson skillfully explains, even in the states where the designation of an attorney has never been binding, these appointments cause serious ethical concerns. Id. Any knowledgeable lawyer knows that there are instances in which attorneys have improperly solicited future business by suggesting such a designation to the testator who in many instances does not realize that he is involved in a solicitation or a business transaction with the attorney or that he is in effect making a testamentary gift to the attorney. In some instances the provision is simply inserted into the will without specifically discussing the designation with the testator. Of course, the actual facts in a particular situation are virtually impossible to ascertain because the testator is dead by the time the issue is raised and the attorney-draftsman is usually the only other witness to the transaction. Moreover, the lawyer's self-interest in securing lucrative positions under the will creates a disincentive to advise the client about alternative methods of wealth transfersuch as outright giftsthat do not require the additional expenses of executors, trustees, and lawyers. Most egregious is the fact that the executor-designee and members of the testator's family may be misled into believing that they must retain the services of the attorney named in the will. Thus, in the case in which the testator had no genuine preference in the matter, but simply acceded to the provision inserted by the drafting attorney in the belief that it was routine boilerplate, the attorney's will is the only one which is truly implemented. Consequently, the Jenkins court concluded that public policy considerations militate against making an attorney designation a binding condition in a will. Succession of Jenkins, supra at 609. See generally, Levine, Legal Ramifications of Unethical Planning Practices, 124 Trusts & Estates 47, 50 (Oct. 1984); Wolfram, supra at § 8.2.4, 488; 31 Am.Jur.2d 97, Executors & Administrators § 16.