Opinion ID: 223279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence Showed Multiple Conspiracies

Text: In determining whether the evidence supports the existence of a single conspiracy, we ultimately look at the totality of the evidence. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 421. There are three factors this court has found particularly helpful in evaluating the evidence: `(1) the existence of a common goal, (2) interdependence among participants, and (3) overlap among the participants.' Id. (quoting United States v. Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 953, 173 L.Ed.2d 148 (2009)). The first factor, common goal, is given `wide breadth.' Id. (quoting Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d at 29). For example, [a] goal of selling cocaine for profit or furthering the distribution of cocaine may be sufficient evidence of a common goal. Id. (quoting United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 (1st Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The second factor, interdependence, concerns whether `the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or advantageous to the success of another aspect of the scheme.' Id. at 422 (quoting Portela, 167 F.3d at 695). More specifically, `Each individual must think the aspects of the venture interdependent, and each defendant's state of mind, and not his mere participation in some branch of the venture, is key.' Id. (quoting Portela, 167 F.3d at 695). We have explained the significance of this factor: [K]nown interdependence . . . makes it reasonable to speak of a tacit understanding between the distributor and others upon whose unlawful acts the distributor knows his own success likely depends. When such interdependence is missing, when the distributor is indifferent to the purposes of others in the enterprisesay, other distributorsthe tacit understanding does not exist. Glenn, 828 F.2d at 857-58 (internal citation omitted); see also Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d at 29. Finally, the third factor, overlap among the participants, is satisfied by the pervasive involvement of a single core conspirator, or hub character. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted). In considering these three factors, we must remember that the existence of a single conspiracy does not require the participants to know of all the other participants, understand all the details of the conspiracy, or participate in each aspect of the conspiracy. Id.; Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d at 29. In Sánchez-Badillo, we applied these three factors in rejecting the contention of two co-defendants that they were not part of a single conspiracy. 540 F.3d 24. In that case, the co-defendants were convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana. Id. at 27. One defendant managed heroin and marijuana sales from the lower point in a public housing project, and the other defendant managed cocaine and marijuana sales from the upper point in the same housing project. Id. at 28. Both locations, however, were owned by a boss, to whom both defendants paid rent. Id. at 27-28. This court affirmed the convictions. First, the evidence showed a common goal of serving [the boss'] illicit interests. Id. at 29. Second, a reasonable jury could have found interdependence from the following: the boss' iron-fisted control over the housing project suggested that the defendants tacitly agreed to join the boss' organization, the boss' representative worked at the lower point, two dealers worked at both locations, one of the defendants served as an enforcer for the boss, and on one occasion participants in the two points were arrested together and aided by participants in the lower point. Id. at 29-30. Third, the evidence demonstrated an overlap among the participants, as the boss was a hub. Id. at 30-31. In Glenn, on the other hand, we reversed a defendant's conviction based on our conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had joined the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. 828 F.2d 855. Glenn involved a defendant convicted of conspiring to import and possess marijuana and hashish. Id. at 857. The evidence showed that a group of core conspirators met repeatedly to develop plans to smuggle marijuana from Thailand and hashish from Pakistan, fraudulently borrowed $10 million to finance the operation, bought a boat for hashish smuggling but used it for the marijuana smuggling, and purchased a landing area where eight tons of marijuana were unloaded. Id. at 858. The evidence also showed that both the core conspirators and the defendant thought of the defendant as a subsidiary figure, the defendant's duties only involved hashish, and the defendant was generally only present at meetings about hashish. Id. Although the defendant was aware of the marijuana smuggling and present at a few meetings in which marijuana was discussed, we concluded that the record did not support a conclusion that the defendant thought the two ventures interdependent, in the sense that the success of the one might have facilitated completion of the other. Id. at 859. Consequently, the evidence was insufficient to show that [the defendant] expressly or tacitly agreed to do more than to import and possess Pakistani hashish. [11] Id. In the instant case, looking at the totality of the evidence, we conclude there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of a single conspiracy. Rather, the evidence pointed to at least two distinct conspiracies: (1) the Massachusetts-based Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and (2) the Maine-based Sanborn-centered conspiracy to distribute both cocaine and marijuana (whose participants included, inter alia, Robert L. Sanborn, Lara Sanborn and Walter D. Towle, Jr.). [12] First, the two conspiracies had materially different goals, at least in part. Although they both sought to sell the cocaine that traveled through the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt-Sanborn supply chain, the Sanborn-centered conspiracy included a second, equally important objective that the other conspiracy lacked: the distribution of marijuana. Nor did the ventures share the objective of serving a particular organization or boss. Cf. Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d at 29. Second, even assuming without deciding that Dellosantos and Szpyt knew of Sanborn's marijuana distribution operation (a fact contested by the Defendants), [13] we find that the two conspiracies lacked sufficient interdependence, particularly considering that the participants' states of mind are the key to this inquiry. See Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 422. In this regard, although the evidence showed that Szpyt and Dellosantos participated in some branch (supplying cocaine) of the Sanborn-centered operation, cf. id., nothing was presented to the jury to suggest that either of them believed that the success of their cocaine distribution operation likely depended on Sanborn's marijuana distribution venture. See Glenn, 828 F.2d at 857-58. For example, the evidence did not establish a situation where an individual or group had an iron-fisted control over the two distribution schemes. Cf. Sánchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d at 30. In addition, Sanborn used different suppliers for his marijuana distribution (namely, Demarco and Chase), and there was no evidence that either Szpyt or Dellosantos relied upon the success of Sanborn's marijuana distribution in order to sell their cocaine. Cf. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d at 422. Rather, as discussed below, the record indicates that the Defendants were indifferent to Sanborn's marijuana distribution scheme. See Glenn, 828 F.2d at 858 (noting that a tacit understanding does not exist when the distributor is indifferent to the purposes of others in the enterprise). In fact, there was little evidence to suggest that Dellosantos even knew about the marijuana operation until Szpyt told him of Sanborn's arrest. The government presented at trial a plethora of evidence providing detailed descriptions of Szpyt's relationship with Sanborn and the latter's marijuana distribution emporium. This evidence established, inter alia, that Szpyt and Sanborn communicated constantly, as the two were fellow Iron Horsemen who spent much time together (both in Massachusetts and Maine) at Iron Horsemen parties and handling cocaine distribution. Yet, there was no evidence suggesting that the two ever discussed Sanborn's marijuana distribution operation. Thus, the evidence strongly suggested that Szpyt was only interested in his own unlawful ends (i.e., distributing cocaine) and was indifferent with regards to Sanborn's other unlawful activities. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947) (noting that separate conspiracies may be found when defendants have distinct ends, when they have no interest in others' unlawful activities and when they do not aid others in conducting those activities). The success of Szpyt's and Dellosantos' cocaine distribution operation was no more dependent on the success of Sanborn's marijuana distribution operation than it was on the success of Sanborn's garage or any other (legal or illegal) income-producing venture devised by Sanborn that might have enabled him to pay off his cocaine debt to Szpyt. No evidence was presented suggesting that either Szpyt or Dellosantos understood the relationship differently. This weakness in the government's case is highlighted by its heavy reliance on Call 2026the conversation between Dellosantos and Szpyt about Sanborn's arrestas [p]erhaps the most damning evidence that Defendants understood their cocaine distribution operation to have been interdependent with Sanborn's marijuana distribution. Even viewing this conversation in the light most favorable to the verdict, Szpyt was merely informing Dellosantos about a fellow Iron Horsemen (and cocaine customer) who was caught committing a serious crime. It was expected for both Szpyt and Dellosantos to have been very interested in this story, since, although Sanborn was caught doing a weed deal, a search of his home and an investigation of his other activities (e.g., cocaine distribution) might lead law enforcement officials to the Defendants. However, this concern over Sanborn's ability to avoid detection, by itself, does not suggest that the Defendants believed that they had an interest in every income-producing unlawful venture that Sanborn might have gotten himself into (in this case, marijuana distribution). We cannot see how this conversation suggests that either Szpyt or Dellosantos believed that their cocaine distribution was interdependent with Sanborn's marijuana operation. In fact, a recording of the transcript of Call 2026 ( see ante at pp. 114-15) shows the opposite of what the government claims, for Szpyt is complaining that he did not know about Sanborn's marijuana trafficking: I didn't know. I can only police my fucking guys so much. . . . I got no control. Third and finally, any evidence of overlap between the two conspiracies was insufficient to outweigh the lack of interdependence. To be sure, controlled substances that were distributed in both conspiracies traveled through Sanborn. However, there was no evidence Sanborn had any interactions with Dellosantos or Vizcaíno or was even aware of their existence, aside from his general knowledge that Szpyt obtained cocaine from a few suppliers, one of whom Sanborn believed to be Hispanic. Nor was there any evidence that Dellosantos specifically knew he supplied Sanborn with cocaine. In short, Sanborn was not the type of hub character that frequently exists in cases where this court has found significant overlap and an overarching conspiracy. Perhaps this case is best understood if we think of Sanborn as a drug supermarket owner, who sold different products, cocaine and marijuana, rather than bananas and tomatoes, from different distributors: cocaine from the Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt chain and marijuana from the Demarco and Boivin-Chase suppliers. Were we actually considering such fruit distribution chains in the context of an actual supermarket, we would be hard put to argue that the intersection of those two separate fruit product distribution chains would be of any legal significance as far as somehow making the members of the two separate chains overall business partners. Neither would it be reasonable to argue that merely distributing tomatoes to the supermarket, by itself, would make the tomato distributor a partner in the supermarket's overall business of selling bananas and other foods. When we transfer this bucolic scenario to the present case, we can perceive no legally significant difference in the outcome. The Vizcaíno-Dellosantos-Szpyt criminal conspiracy to distribute cocaine was a different criminal enterprise than the Boivin-Chase-Sanborn-Jordan marijuana enterprise, with different products, a different source of supply, different goals, and a different history. Similarly, distributing cocaine (rather than tomatoes) to Sanborn's drug supermarket does not, by itself, make Vizcaíno, Dellosantos and Szpyt partners in Sanborn's drug supermarket business of distributing cocaine and marijuana. In sum, we conclude that the evidence did not support a finding of a single over-arching conspiracy covering all the relevant drug dealing. With this conclusion in mind, we turn to whether the evidence sufficed to prove that the Defendants joined either of the two conspiracies that were actually proven by the government and, if so, we then determine whether the variance (between the conspiracy charged and the conspiracy for which there was sufficient evidence that the Defendants actually joined) unfairly prejudiced the Defendants.