Opinion ID: 172601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The pattern-or-practice framework has been widely applied to ADEA cases.

Text: The federal statutes barring discrimination in employment contain only a brief reference to the pattern-or-practice framework at issue here. A section of Title VII authorizes the Attorney General to file a civil action against any person or group of persons whom he or she has reasonable cause to believe is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter, and that the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (emphasis added). Unlike Title VII, the ADEA contains no express reference to pattern-or-practice claims. The ADEA does adopt the opt-in class mechanism of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which authorizes class actions when the complaining employees are similarly-situated. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (providing that the provisions of the ADEA shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in [specified sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act,] including the Fair Labor Standards Act provision regarding class actions, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). However, that class action statute does not use the term pattern-or-practice. See generally Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1102-08 (discussing ADEA class actions). In the absence of specific statutory provisions, the details of the pattern-or-practice framework have developed in Supreme Court decisions in which the plaintiffs alleged that employers had violated Title VII by engaging in a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 357-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843; Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772-73, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). In those cases, the Court has concluded that trial proceedings involving pattern-or-practice claims should occur in a series of specific stages. It has also allocated the burdens of proof on various issues in a manner that differ[s] dramatically from a case involving only individual claims of discrimination. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1106. (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 357-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843). The Court has applied this framework both in cases filed by the government, see Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328, 97 S.Ct. 1843, and in cases filed by private parties, see Franks, 424 U.S. at 772, 96 S.Ct. 1251. In a pattern-or-practice case, the Court concluded, the trier of fact should first determine whether the allegedly discriminatory pattern or practice actually existed. In contrast to cases alleging solely individual discrimination, the initial focus of a pattern-or-practice case is upon the defendant employer's standard operating procedure. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843. The plaintiff must first show that unlawful discrimination has been a regular procedure or policy followed by an employer or a group of employers. Id. at 360, 97 S.Ct. 1843. If the factfinder is not persuaded, then the pattern-or-practice phase concludes. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1106 n. 8 (adding that [i]f the plaintiffs do not prevail during the first stage of a pattern-or-practice trial, they are nevertheless entitled to proceed on their individual claims of discrimination). On the other hand, if the plaintiff proves that a discriminatory pattern or practice existed, the court may award prospective equitable relief. See id. at 1106. The Teamsters Court explained that [s]uch relief might take the form of an injunctive order against continuation of the discriminatory practice, an order that the employer keep records of its future employment decisions and file periodic reports with the court, or any other order necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights protected by Title VII. 431 U.S. at 361, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (internal quotation marks omitted). After this initial phase of a pattern-or-practice case, the inquiry shifts. The factfinder must proceed to determine whether any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that [pattern or practice]. Id. at 362, 97 S.Ct. 1843. Importantly, by having prevailed in the first stage of trial, the individual plaintiffs reap a significant advantage for purposes of the second stage: they are entitled to a presumption that the employer has discriminated against them. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1106. As a result, at this stage, the defendant employer has the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer did not unlawfully discriminate against the individual plaintiff. That burden is justified because the finding of a pattern or practice changed the position of the employer to that of a proven wrongdoer. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 359 n. 45, 97 S.Ct. 1843. This circuit has applied the pattern-or-practice framework in ADEA actions. For example, in Thiessen, the plaintiffs had alleged that their employer had adopted a blocker policy under which management began referring to the older [executive] employees as `blockers,' because in their view these employees were `blocking' the advancement of younger, newly recruited employees, and then taking adverse employment actions against the older employees. 267 F.3d at 1100. According to the district court in Thiessen, [The lead plaintiff, Mr. Thiessen] has not simply averred the existence of a discriminatory policy or merely argued that circumstantially one should infer its existence by virtue of numerous people in the protected category having incurred adverse employment actions. Instead, he has come forward with direct evidence of an overall policy of purported age discrimination. Id. at 1101 (quoting Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 996 F.Supp. 1071, 1083 (D.Kan. 1998)). Despite that evidence, the district court subsequently concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to make a significant showing of a specific link between defendants' alleged blocker policy and each of the adverse employment actions at issue in this case. Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 13 F.Supp.2d 1131, 1137 (D.Kan. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the district court granted the defendant employer's motion to decertify the case as a class action. In ruling that the district court had erred in decertifying the class, we explained that the plaintiffs were asserting a pattern-or-practice claim modeled on [ Teamsters ] and that the district court had failed to recognize that the plaintiffs' trial plan was consistent with the framework outlined in Teamsters for pattern-or-practice claims. Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1107. We held that [w]hen an ADEA plaintiff relies upon a `pattern or practice' theory and comes forward with legitimate evidence to support that theory, the district court must take into account the framework for pattern-or-practice cases outlined by the Supreme Court in [ Teamsters ]. Id. at 1108. See also Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d at 623 (concluding that the district court properly applied the pattern-or-practice framework in an ADEA case). That holding is echoed by several of our sister circuits. See Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1227 (11th Cir.2001) (analyzing the plaintiffs' evidence under the pattern-or-practice framework); King v. Gen. Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, 624 (7th Cir.1992) (stating that the ADEA has no parallel provision [to Title VII's 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)], but courts nevertheless have adopted the pattern-or-practice terminology and the shifting burden of persuasion to ADEA actions); Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1984) (As in race discrimination cases, a plaintiff [in an ADEA case] may through statistical evidence establish a pattern or practice of discharging or failing to promote older employees, from which an inference of age discrimination may be drawn.); EEOC v. W. Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1016 (4th Cir.1983) (applying the Teamsters pattern-or-practice procedural framework to an ADEA claim); Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331, 1336 n. 2 (5th Cir.1979) (same). Scholarly commentary is in accord. See 8 Lex K. Larson, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 137.02, at 137-16 (2d ed. 2008) (Although there is no ADEA counterpart to the `pattern or practice' provision of Title VII, both the government and private classes of plaintiffs have been permitted to bring what amounts to age-based pattern-or practice suits.); 2 Howard C. Eglit, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 7:40, at 7-387 to 7-388. (2d ed.1994) (stating that generally, the pattern or practice method of proof is almost exclusively used in class actions and that [g]enerally, ADEA courts have looked to cases decided under Title VII... for guidance and they have embraced the pattern or practice precedents developed in the Title VII context).