Opinion ID: 2552553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Restricting Cross-examination of Prosecution Witness

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sustaining prosecution objections to evidence he wished to develop. Defendant also claims that the result deprived him of his right to confront the witnesses against him under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Because he did not raise this claim before the trial court, he has forfeited it. ( People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 186, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) In any event, we see no reversible error. As noted, eyewitness testimony suggested that about a mile from the pet store O'Sullivan was in the passenger seat of her vehicle, struggling with defendant. The witness to the struggle, Margaret Spalding, saw the vehicle swerving on the road as the two occupants, whom she could see but could not later identify, fought. The male occupant struck the female several times in her midriff as he tried to maintain control of the vehicle. The male appeared angry, the female frightened. Defendant refers to three occasions on which the trial court sustained prosecution objections to questions defense counsel had asked of Spalding: (1) In the course of a lengthy cross-examination of the witness, defendant tested Spalding's recollection. Defendant attempted to show that her recollection was clouded by other preoccupations in her life and the numerous errands she was running on the day she witnessed the altercation in the nearby vehicle. Spalding testified that composing a letter was one of the distractions on the day she witnessed the altercation. Later, counsel asked, Was this a letter to your son's therapist? The prosecutor objected on relevance grounds and the trial court sustained the objection. Over defense argument that it wished to introduce evidence that Spalding was distracted by family problems at the time of the incident, the court ruled, It's not the kind of thing that's going to [affect] recollection or perception.... The lady is entitled to her private life. The court also sustained an objection on relevance and asked-and-answered grounds a later question from defense counsel whether other things were troubling the witness on the day of the incident. (2) Defense counsel asked Spalding if she once told the prosecutor's investigator that on the day of the incident she was making some trips to and from Home Depot. The prosecution objected on grounds of hearsay not within any exception, and the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel did not dispute the ruling, but rephrased the question, asking the witness whether she remembered doing various activities on the day in question, and she replied that she did. (3) Defense counsel asked Spalding if it appeared from the vehicle occupants' behavior that they knew each other. The prosecutor objected to the question as calling for speculation, and the trial court sustained the objection. Turning to the specific objections made and sustained: (1) In arguing that the trial court erred in excluding the nature of the letter Spalding was writing on the day she witnessed the struggle in O'Sullivan's vehicle, defendant relies on Evidence Code section 780, which provides, Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court or jury may consider in determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, including.... [ķ] ... [ķ] (c) The extent of his capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to communicate any matter about which he testifies. Evidence Code section 780, however, does not say that all evidence of a collateral nature offered to attack the credibility of a witness would be admissible. Under Section 352, the court has substantial discretion to exclude collateral evidence. The effect of Section 780, therefore, is to change the present somewhat inflexible rule of exclusion to a rule of discretion to be exercised by the trial judge. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B West's Ann. Evid.Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 780, p. 587; see People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 544-545, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137.) We review the court's ruling under the deferential standard of abuse of discretion. ( People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 90, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the inquiry into the nature of the letter Spalding was composing would have been of marginal relevance at best (cf. Evid.Code, § 350). ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618.) (2) As for counsel's inquiry whether Spalding told an investigator about trips to Home Depot, the People argue that this inquiry about her out-of-court statement plainly called for inadmissible hearsay, i.e., for evidence of a statement ... made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and ... offered to prove the truth of the matter stated (Evid.Code, § 1200, subd. (a)) and the objection was properly sustained. Defendant argues that he was merely attempting to refresh the witness's recollection. Even if hearsay, the reference was admissible to refresh [Spalding's] recollection ( People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 623, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472; see id. at p. 622, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472) and the trial court should have overruled the objection. Nevertheless, there was no reversible error. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) The case did not come close to hinging on the witness's ability to answer the question, and certainly there was no reasonable probability that if the witness had been able to answer it, the outcome would have differed. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 271, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682,1 P.3d 3.) (3) Defendant argues that counsel's inquiry about the vehicle's occupants called for an admissible lay opinion (Evid.Code, § 800). The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection on the basis that the question called for a speculative answer. We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling that a question calls for speculation from a witness. ( People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 152, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825, 96 P.3d 126.) Under that deferential standard, we cannot second-guess the court's ruling that asking the witness whether she thought the two vehicle occupants were acting as if they knew each other was speculative. The court was implicitly ruling that the question called for a conjectural lay opinion. Such evidence would not be [h]elpful to a clear understanding of [Spalding's] testimony. (Evid.Code, § 800, subd. (b).) The court's ruling did not fall outside the bounds of reason. In sum, no reversible error occurred.