Opinion ID: 1172684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Unequivocal Request

Text: As noted above, the majority did not reach the issue of whether Stenson's request was timely because it found his request was equivocal. The record shows Stenson made a conditional but unequivocal request to proceed pro se. The majority hopelessly confuses the two concepts and thus decides the issue wrongly. The majority relies heavily on Hamilton, but, as noted above, there are serious differences between that case and this. In Hamilton, the defendant had one public defender dismissed. He then moved to have another counsel appointed or to proceed pro se. The court, after receiving Hamilton's request, engaged the defendant in the following discussion: The Court: All right. Let me ask you, how serious are you about wanting to represent yourself? Hamilton: I am not very serious about wanting to represent myself, but I will do that instead of havingwith all respect to Mr. Childressinstead of having his assistance. I would rather represent myself. Hamilton, 28 F.3d at 861 (quoting Transcript on Appeal) (emphasis added). Hamilton also stated during the same colloquy that I am not asking to proceed pro se totally. Id. Stenson evidenced no such equivocation here. He was clear and forceful: if he could not substitute another attorney for Leatherman, he wanted to try his own case. This was not the situation in Hamilton where Hamilton merely wanted [] yet another public defender, rather than [] represent himself. Hamilton, 28 F.3d at 862. Adams v. Carroll is dispositive. There, the Ninth Circuit examined whether a request to proceed without counsel [is] unequivocal where the defendant consistently wishes to invoke the right only as an alternative to the appointment of a particular defense attorney. Adams, 875 F.2d at 1442. The United States Court of Appeals held it is not equivocal. There the court appointed public defender Carroll to represent Adams. Citing a lack of trust and communication with Carroll, Adams requested the court appointment of another attorney, and stated that if he could not have another lawyer, `I will have to go pro per.' Id. The court permitted Adams to represent himself but denied his request for a new attorney. After six weeks of representing himself in pretrial motions, Adams again requested appointment of counsel other than Carroll, and the trial court denied said motion. Three weeks later, Adams requested appointment of co-counsel and the request was denied. Thereafter in January 1994, Adams moved for appointment of new counsel once again, and this time the trial judge granted his motion and reappointed the Public Defender's office. Id. Notwithstanding Adams' continuing objection to Carroll and the fact that he had brought a malpractice suit against Carroll, the Public Defender's office reassigned Carroll to Adams' case. Id. at 1443. At four subsequent hearings Adams asked to represent himself, each time making it clear that although he did not consider himself competent to proceed without counsel, he would rather proceed pro se than continue with Carroll. The trial judge denied each request based on Adams' admission of incompetence and allowed the case to go to trial with Carroll as defense counsel. Adams, 875 F.2d at 1443. Not surprisingly, the jury convicted Adams, who appealed through the state court system and then to the Ninth Circuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals began by noting the reasons why courts require an unequivocal request to proceed pro se. First, [the requirement] acts as a backstop for the defendant's right to counsel, by ensuring that the defendant does not inadvertently waive that right through occasional musings on the benefits of self-representation.... Because a defendant normally gives up more than he gains when he elects self-representation, we must be reasonably certain that he in fact wishes to represent himself.... The requirement that a request for self-representation be unequivocal also serves an institutional purpose: It prevents a defendant from taking advantage of the mutual exclusivity of the rights to counsel and self-representation. A defendant who vacillates at trial between wishing to be represented by counsel and wishing to represent himself could place the trial court in a difficult position: If the court appoints counsel, the defendant could, on appeal, rely on his intermittent requests for self-representation in arguing that he had been denied the right to represent himself; if the court permits self-representation, the defendant could claim he had been denied the right to counsel. Adams, 875 F.2d at 1444. The court observed Adams made his preference known from the start; that is, if he could not get other counsel appointed he wished to represent himself. Although his two self-representation requests were sandwiched around a request for counsel, this was not evidence of vacillation. To the contrary, each of these requests stemmed from one consistent position.... While his requests no doubt were conditional, they were not equivocal. Adams, 875 F.2d at 1444-45. The court continued: This conclusion is reinforced when tested against the purposes underlying the unequivocality requirement. Adams was not seeking to waive his right to counsel in a thoughtless manner; the trial court engaged him in extensive discussion regarding the difficulties of proceeding in pro per. Adams nevertheless persisted, choosing to fend for himself rather than rely on counsel whom he mistrusted. Nor was his request a momentary caprice or the result of thinking out loud; he made the same request over and over again, at nearly every opportunity. Had the request been granted, an appeal based on the denial of the assistance of counsel would have been frivolous, in light of the earnestness and frequency of his requests to represent himself. None of the purposes served by the requirement would be furthered by treating a conditional request for self-representation as equivocal. . . . . Adams ... took one position and stuck to it: If the court would not order substitute counsel, he wished to represent himself. The sixth amendment, as interpreted in Faretta, required the trial court to honor this request. Adams, 875 F.2d at 1444-45. If we apply these considerations to this case, the record clearly shows Stenson's request was thoughtful, sustained, repeated and legitimate. The trial court engaged Stenson in a lengthy discussion about his wishes. Stenson was not thinking out loud or volunteering vague, capricious mumblings about wanting to represent himself. His request was clear: he wished to represent himself rather than rely upon counsel he mistrusted. As in Adams, had the court granted his request, an appeal on the basis of denial of assistance of counsel would have been frivolous. Denial of Stenson's request served no legitimate purpose. Most disturbing about the majority's rejection of Stenson's claim is the fact the majority cites nothing in the record upon which it could conceivably be argued Stenson equivocated in his request. The majority merely notes Stenson did not refute the trial court's conclusion he did not really wish to proceed without counsel, as if the trial court's conclusion stands as evidence of Stenson's state of mind. While Stenson's main objective in his motions was to remove Leatherman from his case, his desire in the event his motion for substitution was denied was clear: he wished to represent himself. A conditional request is not an equivocal one. The majority's decision, therefore, stands as the triumph of form over substance. The denial of the right to self-representation is not amenable to a harmless error analysis: The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984).