Opinion ID: 1706950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: further of the state's argumentguilt phase

Text: ¶ 38. Bell maintains that the prosecutor misused closing argument by improperly arguing the good character of the victim, threats made by Bell to James, lack of remorse, personal opinion and facts not in evidence. Unless any such improper argument is so egregious as to rise to the level of a fundamental denial of a constitutionally-mandated fair trial, and we do not so find, the arguments are all procedurally barred, for at no time did Bell make a contemporaneous objection to any of them. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 854 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995). Nevertheless, we will review the specific claims.
¶ 39. The prosecutor said that Sparks' Stop-and-Go was: a place he [Bert] intended, according to James Sparks, to buy from James Sparks' and take that store over one day. That would be his store. Apparently, an industrious young man, 21 years of age, thinking that maybe he was going to be able to own his own store. I commend him for that. Also, he said: Bert Bell's life is now reduced to approximately 50 exhibits. That's what his life is all about today.... And, Bert Bell didn't have a prayer. He did not have a prayer. He was going to die that day. There's no doubt about it. He didn't have a chance. ¶ 40. An impassioned argument is not in itself an improper argument. Furthermore, the prosecutor, as any other counsel, is free to recall and comment on testimony offered in evidence and to draw inferences. [The prosecutor] may comment upon any facts introduced into evidence. He may draw whatever deductions seem to him proper from these facts, so long as he does not use violent and abusive language, and even in many cases invectives may be justified and even called for, as pointed out by Chief Justice Whitfield in Gray v. State, 90 Miss. 235, 43 So. 289 [1907]. Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 656 (Miss. 1996)( quoting Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 900 (Miss.1989), rev. on other grounds 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), and Nelms & Blum Co. v. Fink, 159 Miss. 372, 131 So. 817 (1930)). This liberty is, of course, not without limitation. An appeal to emotion or for sympathy for a victim can reach a point at which it is prejudicial. In Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 679 (Miss. 1991), we disapproved blatant comparisons of the value of the victim's life and that of the defendant. However, such was not done here, and we do not find that the prosecutor's comments transgressed the limits of fair argument.
¶ 41. The prosecutor also commented on the evidence of Bell's threats upon the life of Robert James. That evidence, as observed above, was appropriate in the present factual context, and it is sufficient here to say that the comments and conclusion of the prosecutor were not inappropriate. They described Bell's behavior immediately following the crime and his fear of being caught and prosecuted.
¶ 42. Referring to the testimony of Buster Graham, an officer who interviewed Bell following his arrest, the prosecutor said: [a]nd to me, the most illogical thing about this whole case, and I think it shows his attitude, I don't know any human being that's going to be placed in jail and told they're charged with capital murder that's going to sit up and laugh at the officer. [3] Laugh at him. We're talking about two mean people. Doss isn't even as bad as Bell. Additionally, he said that this person laughs when you talk to him about being charged with murder, and alluded to the same day that he laughed at Bruce Partridge and Buster Graham. ¶ 43. Bell argues that this is impermissible commentary on his lack of remorse and presents authority which he says prohibits such references to remorse when the defendant does not testify, as in the present case. However, those authorities are misapplied by Bell. In Reed v. State, 197 So.2d 811 (Miss. 1967), the district attorney asked the jury to look at the defendant as he sat mute in the courtroom exhibiting no emotion whatever. We held that such argument was an impermissible comment on his failure to testify. In Knox v. State, 502 So.2d 672 (Miss.1987), we again found that comment on the courtroom demeanor of the defendant who chose not to testify was improper. Bell, on the other hand, did testify and testified that he laughed at the suggestion in his interview with officer Graham that he killed Bert. It was perfectly proper for the prosecutor to comment on this interview and Bell's testimony.
¶ 44. Arguing that the prosecuting attorney unfairly presented his personal opinion and argued facts not in evidence, Bell points to the following from the State's summation. I don't doubt that Frederick Bell knew the name of that road. I don't doubt that at all. I don't doubt that he didn't know that was Sparks' Stop-and-Go. I do doubt that he knew he was in Grenada County, because that wasn't important to him. He and Anthony Doss could just as easily have stopped in Yalobousha County, gone over to Carroll County. It didn't make any difference. Their objective was not where they were, but what they had to do. Anything they could do to get enough money to get them to Memphis, for whatever reason, that's whatthat's the only thing they cared about. He also points again to statements made in that argument that Doss and Bell were mean people, and observations that Coffey was not seeking anything from the State, but rather was testifying to the truth. Whether Doss and Bell were mean people is something to be concluded from the facts proved, and is, within the limits of the argument here, a fair deduction to be drawn in final argument. Of course, Coffey was cross-examined by Bell's attorney on his veracity and any deal he had made. In response, he testified that he was telling the truth. The statements by the prosecutor were based on that testimony and were far from the personal vouching for witnesses which we have condemned. ¶ 45. Bell also complains of the argument by the State that certain details of James' testimony indicate that Bell and Doss told him of the shooting because the investigators had not shown James any pictures of the scene. A review of the record does not indicate any testimonial basis for this argument, and it was, therefore, improper. However, it does not, standing alone or read with the rest of the argument, constitute reversible error.