Opinion ID: 624771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Galindo’s Appeal

Text: Galindo’s VICAR, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), and witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), convictions are based on the murder of Marcelino Rodriguez. Galindo challenges his convictions on various sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds.8
Marcelino Rodriguez (nicknamed “Mars”), a Texas Syndicate member, began cooperating with the Government as a confidential informant sometime around May of 2003. On July 8, 2007, shortly after the first indictment was returned, Mars was killed. At trial, associates of codefendant Fidel Valle, a drug supplier for the Texas Syndicate, testified that they discovered that Mars was a federal informant. Alfredo Sanchez (“Sanchez”), a Texas Syndicate member, testified that these associates passed this information on to members of the Texas Syndicate, who decided to act on this information. According to Sanchez, a meeting was held where it was ordered that codefendant Arturo Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), a Texas Syndicate prospect, and Galindo would kill Mars. Sanchez also testified that Galindo “wanted to do it [i.e., the murder] himself . . . . [b]ecause [Mars] was an informant and [Galindo] wanted the top seat [in the local branch of the Texas Syndicate].” Alfredo Sanchez also testified that Galindo later admitted to him that he had shot Mars. The Government called Arturo Rodriguez to testify about Mars’s murder. Rodriguez testified that Galindo asked him to help him kill Mars. Rodriguez 8 Galindo also argues that the Government’s use of wiretap evidence without an opportunity to cross-examine the speakers on the recording violated his confrontation rights. His claim is meritless because these recordings were not testimonial and thus not within the Confrontation Clause’s protections. See United States v. King, 541 F.3d 1143, 1146 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Davis, 270 F. App’x 236, 247 n.9 (4th Cir. 2008). 24 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 25 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 testified that on the day of the murder he and Galindo went out to lunch with Mars. Rodriguez then testified that after leaving the restaurant, he drove the trio out to an isolated field with Mars next to him in the passenger’s seat. They were followed in a different car by codefendant Cristobal Hernandez (“Hernandez”), another Texas Syndicate prospect and Galindo’s second accomplice. Shortly after arriving at the field, Rodriguez heard two gunshots and then saw that Galindo had shot and killed Mars. Shortly after the shooting, Galindo then exited the vehicle and got into Hernandez’s car. Rodriguez drove the car deeper into the field, parked it, doused the car in gasoline, and burned it with Mars’s body inside. Hernandez confirmed this sequence of events. He said that “[Galindo] planned to kill [Mars] because [Mars] had become a snitch and was going to testify on a lot of other Texas Syndicate [members].” Hernandez testified that after the trio had finished lunch, he followed their car to the field. He saw Galindo by the entry to the field and picked him up. He then drove further into the field to find the first car on fire. Rodriguez then boarded Hernandez’s truck and all three drove away. Hernandez said that shortly after they had left the scene of the murder, Galindo remarked that “snitch got what he deserved, [I] took him to his last meal.”
Galindo appeals his convictions on grounds that the Government failed to produce sufficient evidence to convict him under VICAR, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a), and witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), in connection with the July 8, 2007murder of Marcelino Rodriguez. As we observed before, sufficiency-of-theevidence challenges are reviewed de novo and in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, focusing on whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Diaz, 637 F.3d at 602. 25 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 26 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 i. The Government Proved the Elements of a VICAR Violation Galindo contends that the Government failed to establish that he participated in an enterprise for purposes of his VICAR conviction. He makes two claims in this regard. First, Galindo argues that the Government did not prove that he murdered Rodriguez for the purposes of furthering the Texas Syndicate’s racketeering activities and thus failed to establish one of the three structural features necessary to prove an enterprise under VICAR. To support this argument, Galindo contends that testimony from various Texas Syndicate members supported multiple theories for why he murdered Rodriguez, ranging from the elimination of an informant to the prevention of a “war” with another gang. These theories and the evidence supporting them, Galindo asserts, are insufficient to show that he committed the murder for the specific purpose of furthering his membership in the gang and its racketeering activities. Second, Galindo argues that the Government failed to prove that his “longevity” with the Texas Syndicate was “sufficient to permit [him] to pursue the enterprise’s purposes.” See Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009). To this end, Galindo posits that the Government failed to adduce evidence of his rank, length of participation, how he obtained membership in the Texas Syndicate, or his role in the decision to kill Mars. Essentially, Galindo argues that other than testimony from other Texas Syndicate members that he carried out Rodriguez’s murder, the Government produced no evidence that he participated in the gang’s core criminal enterprise activities of dealing drugs and committing other violent crimes. VICAR provides that “[w]hoever . . . for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity . . . murders . . . any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States . . . shall be punished . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). There are four elements to a VICAR conviction: 26 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 27 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 (1) that [a] criminal organization exists; (2) that th[is] organization is a racketeering enterprise; (3) that the defendant committed a violent crime; and (4) that the defendant acted for the purpose of promoting his position in a racketeering enterprise. United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). A VICAR enterprise is a “partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2).9 “From the terms of [the statute], it is apparent that an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: [1] a purpose, [2] relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and [3] longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2244. Galindo has confused the structural elements that the Government must prove to establish that the Texas Syndicate is a VICAR enterprise, with the evidence that the Government must provide to demonstrate that Galindo murdered Rodriguez to further his position in the Texas Syndicate. The Government is not required to show that Galindo’s participation in the murder of Rodriguez and his time with the Texas Syndicate would be sufficient, considered alone, to establish an association-in-fact enterprise. Rather, the individual defendant, as well as his particular acts, and the enterprise, including its structural elements, are distinct elements of proof, such that the latter is not required to be wholly defined by the former. Here, the Government has proven 9 Courts treat this definition as identical to that in RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”); see, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 343 F. App’x 830, 831 (3d Cir. 2009) (using RICO caselaw to define VICAR enterprise). Thus, a RICO “‘enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact’ and that [definition] reaches ‘a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.’” Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2243 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 583 (1981)). 27 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 28 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 both that Galindo murdered Rodriguez to further his position in the Texas Syndicate and the existence of an enterprise. First, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that Galindo murdered Rodriguez for the purposes of either maintaining or increasing his position in the Texas Syndicate. As noted above, there was substantial evidence that Galindo killed Mars to further his position in the Texas Syndicate. In determining whether a murder was carried out “for the purpose of . . . maintaining or increasing position in a[] [racketeering] enterprise,” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a), “[s]elf-promotion need not be the defendant’s sole or primary concern; rather, Congress intended to proscribe violent acts committed ‘as an integral aspect of membership in such enterprises.’” United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1078 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992)), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256, 257 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998). As noted above, numerous witness testified against Galindo and as to the purpose of the murder. The jury was free to weigh the credibility of all these witnesses and find that the Galindo carried out the killing as an integral aspect of his membership in the Texas Syndicate. Indeed, Galindo’s decision to murder Mars, a confidential informant, was consistent with furthering the ends of the Texas Syndicate as a criminal enterprise. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that Galindo sought to further his position in, as well as the overall goals of, the Texas Syndicate when he murdered Rodriguez. The Government also proved that the Texas Syndicate met the VICAR definition of an association-in-fact enterprise. The Government showed that the gang has been in existence since at least 1989, and that it has a clear organizational hierarchy, including a president and vice president, as well as local chapters run by a chairman, a lieutenant, and other officers. The Texas Syndicate also has rules and procedures which govern its conduct, including the 28 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 29 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 induction of new members and the carrying out of assassinations. Finally, the various murders and drug trafficking offenses charged within the indictment constituted racketeering activity for the purposes of VICAR. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(1) (adopting RICO’s definition of racketeering activity, which includes murder chargeable under state law). This evidence shows that the Texas Syndicate had a purpose, relationships among its members, and longevity sufficient to meet the requirements of VICAR. Such a conclusion finds support in the holdings of sister circuits. See, e.g., Stinson, 647 F.3d at 1203–05 (affirming VICAR conviction of gang member involved in criminal organization similar to the Texas Syndicate); United States v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 992–94 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that prison gang was a RICO enterprise). ii. The Government Proved the Elements of Witness Tampering Galindo also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his witness tampering conviction. Galindo’s argument appears to be that because there was “conflicting” testimony as to why Galindo murdered Rodriguez, this “establishes there was no clear basis as to Mr. Galindo’s intent for murdering Mr. Rodriguez,” and so the evidence presented was insufficient to show that Galindo killed Rodriguez to prevent him from testifying against the Texas Syndicate, negativing the intent requirement for a witness tampering conviction. The witness tampering statute penalizes the “kill[ing] [of] or [an] attempt[] to kill another person with intent to . . . prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an official proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This intent need not be shown by direct evidence. Cf. United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Determining whether specific intent to commit promotion money laundering has been proven is necessarily a fact-bound inquiry frequently turning upon circumstantial evidence.”); see also United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that proof 29 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 30 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 of intent can be shown “by inference from all of the facts and circumstances surrounding [the criminal acts]”). Here, the circumstantial evidence strongly indicates that Galindo killed Mars to prevent him from testifying. Shortly after the original indictment in this case was returned on March 27, 2007, the Texas Syndicate discovered that Mars had been cooperating with the Government as an informant. On July 8, 2007, Galindo killed Mars. Repeated testimony at trial confirmed that Galindo committed the murder with the specific intent to prevent Rodriguez from testifying against the Texas Syndicate.
Galindo has not shown that the Government failed to adduce sufficient evidence to justify his VICAR and witness tampering convictions. Consequently, we reject his appeal on these grounds.10