Opinion ID: 2337065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ethics advisory panel opinion 92-1

Text: Our analysis of the Rules of Professional Conduct begins with Rule 8.3(a), which requires [a] lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects to inform the proper authorities. In this case none of the parties disputes the suggestion that attorney X's embezzlement of client funds is a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding attorney X's fitness to practice law. In addition, it is clear that on the basis of the admission by attorney X, the inquiring attorney had knowledge of the violation as required by Rule 8.3. Thus, absent a confidentiality issue, it is clear that the inquiring attorney would be under an ethical obligation to report the embezzlement and indeed would be subject to discipline if the inquiring attorney failed to report the embezzlement. Rule 8.3(c), however, expressly exempts Rule 1.6 confidences from disclosure. Pursuant to Rule 1.6, an attorney shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized. The official comment to Rule 1.6 helps define the phrase shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client. The comment states: The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.  (Emphasis added.) Rule 1.6 permits but does not require disclosure of otherwise confidential information in two limited circumstances: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm or (2) in controversies between the lawyer and the client or when the lawyer needs the information to establish a defense to a criminal or a civil charge involving the lawyer's representation of the client. Applying these rules, the Ethics Advisory Panel concluded that the inquiring attorney's knowledge of attorney X's embezzlement was confidential information because the inquiring attorney learned of the embezzlement during the course of his representation of a client. Moreover, the panel noted that neither of the two exceptions to Rule 1.6 applied, and accordingly Rule 1.6 required the inquiring attorney to keep his or her knowledge of the embezzlement confidential. The disciplinary counsel maintains that the Ethics Advisory Panel interpreted Rule 1.6 too broadly. The disciplinary counsel asserts that we are not bound by the comment to Rule 1.6 and that in order to give strength to the reporting requirement under Rule 8.3, we should find that the inquiring attorney's knowledge of the embezzlement falls outside the scope of Rule 1.6. The disciplinary counsel also suggests that because the admission by attorney X was not a privileged communication pursuant to the rules regarding the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, the admission was not a protected communication pursuant to Rule 1.6. In support of this argument, the disciplinary counsel cites In re Himmel, 125 Ill.2d 531, 127 Ill.Dec. 708, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988). In Himmel the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted Rule 1-103(a) of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, which states: `A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of Rule 1-102(a)(3) or (4) shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation'. Himmel, 125 Ill.2d at 540, 127 Ill.Dec. 708, 533 N.E.2d at 793. The Himmel court concluded that attorney Himmel did have knowledge of a communication that fell outside the attorney-client privilege. The fact that the communication was not privileged, combined with the court's finding that Himmel stood to gain financially from the nondisclosure of the violation led the Illinois Supreme Court to discipline Himmel for failing to comply with the reporting requirements. Himmel, 125 Ill.2d at 542, 545, 127 Ill.Dec. 708, 533 N.E.2d at 794-96. The disciplinary counsel's reliance on Himmel in this case is misplaced. Unlike Illinois' rule, Rule 1.6 of the Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct protects from disclosure a broader range of information than would be protected under the attorney-client privilege. [1] Even though the attorney-client evidentiary privilege may not protect this information, Rule 1.6 prevents the inquiring attorney from disclosing it because it relates to the representation of a client. Turning to the disciplinary counsel's suggestion that in order to strengthen Rule 8.3, we should limit the scope of Rule 1.6, we note that this is not a situation in which the intent of the drafters of the Rules of Professional Conduct is unclear or ambiguous. Attorney X's admission falls within the scope of the broad definition of confidential communication under Rule 1.6 because the admission was related to his or her representation of his or her client. This broad confidentiality rule reflects the drafter's belief that confidentiality is central to the attorney-client relationship because it encourages clients to seek early legal assistance and facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client. Comment to Rule 1.6; see also 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering, § 1.6 at 127-33 (2d ed. 1992 Supp.) (discussing the drafting of Rule 1.6 by the American Bar Association). In addition Rule 8.3 expressly exempts from the reporting requirement confidential information under Rule 1.6. The drafters of the rules anticipated this conflict between Rule 1.6 and Rule 8.3 and concluded that a lawyer's duty of confidentiality owed his or her client supersedes a lawyer's obligation to report attorney misconduct. The text of the Rules of Professional Conduct clearly supports the opinion of the Ethics Advisory Panel. This is not to say that we are not concerned with the ramifications of this decision. In this case a lawyer has engaged in criminal conduct as well as violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The failure of the Rules of Professional Conduct to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of attorney X is correspondingly a failure of the legal profession to regulate itself effectively. This failure fuels the perception that under a cloak of confidentiality, the legal profession is engaged in a coverup of attorney misconduct. See David C. Olsson, Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service To Ethical Standards Is Not Enough, 31 Ariz. L.Rev. 657, 658, 675 (1989). Our research in this area, as guided by the briefs of the parties and the briefs filed by amicus curiae, reveals that some states have promulgated a confidentiality rule that allows disclosure of information in a broader set of circumstances than would be allowed under Rule 1.6 of Rhode Island's Rules of Professional Conduct. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, §§ AP4:103-AP4:105 at 1259-1266 (outlining the manner in which states have adopted variations of Rule 1.6). The Minnesota rules, for example, would allow an attorney to report to disciplinary authorities the misconduct of another attorney even without client consent, in a limited set of circumstances. See Rule 1.6(b)(6) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. In addition some states have expanded the future crimes exception to Rule 1.6 in order to permit an attorney to disclose a client's intention to commit any crime. 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, § AP4:103 at 1261. We believe these amendments to Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct are worth considering. We therefore request the Supreme Court Committee to Study the Rules of Professional Conduct to canvass other jurisdictions' versions of the confidentiality principle, consider amending Rhode Island's version of Rule 1.6, and report the committee's findings to this court. [2] However, as the rules currently exist, we conclude that Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion 92-1 must stand. We wish to thank Pamelee M. McFarland on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, Rhode Island Affiliate; Lauren E. Jones on behalf of the Rhode Island Bar Association; and Stephen A. Rodio on behalf of the Committee to Study the Rules of Professional Conduct for their excellent amicus briefs. Their work contributed greatly to a meaningful discussion of these ethical issues and assisted this court in fulfilling its obligation to supervise the legal profession in Rhode Island and to foster public trust in its operation. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we deny the petition for review and affirm the opinion of the Ethics Advisory Panel. LEDERBERG, J., did not participate.