Opinion ID: 858308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prison Term and Supervised Release

Text: Next, Brown challenges his sentence. Among other things, the district court sentenced Brown to a 329-day prison term followed by two years of supervised release including six months in a halfway house. Brown argues his sentence was substantively unreasonable and that the district court extended his prison term for impermissible reasons. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over Brown’s challenges. Pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts have authority to hear only live cases and controversies. Hernandez v. Wainwright, 796 F.2d 389, 390 (11th Cir. 1986). A dispute is no longer live 5 Case: 12-12708 Date Filed: 04/17/2013 Page: 6 of 12 when it becomes moot—that is, when the Court can no longer provide meaningful relief to the claimant. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). Completion of a prison term moots a challenge to the term of confinement, United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991), unless a claimant shows the completed term has collateral legal consequences, Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–14 (1998). In this case, Brown’s challenges to the 329-day prison term are moot. Brown completed that prison term in June 2012 and has not identified any collateral legal consequences that would flow from it. Although Brown was subsequently sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating the supervised release, Brown has pursued no remedy in relation to the 329-day prison term that would impact his current or future circumstances. Even vacating Brown’s completed prison term would not vacate or reduce the supervised release he violated, nor would it vacate or reduce the term of confinement he is currently serving. Because federal courts are not “in the business of pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable continuing effect were right or wrong,” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18, this Court cannot grant Brown meaningful relief as to his completed 329-day prison term. Brown’s challenges to that component of his sentence are therefore dismissed as moot. This Court retains jurisdiction, however, over Brown’s claim that a two-year 6 Case: 12-12708 Date Filed: 04/17/2013 Page: 7 of 12 period of supervised release was substantively unreasonable. See Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 886 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995). This Court reviews substantive unreasonableness claims for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). To prevail, Brown must establish unreasonableness, United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008), based on the factors enumerated under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, see Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2387 (2011). Remand is warranted only when, based on a totality of the circumstances pertinent to sentencing, we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191. Brown has not shown his sentence is substantively unreasonable or that the district court abused its discretion in imposing supervised release. In imposing the term of supervised release, the district court appropriately weighed the § 3553(a) factors, concluding Brown needed treatment and rehabilitation. Brown’s history is dotted with violent, threatening, and recalcitrant behavior: two convictions for bank robbery involving threats of mass casualties; failure to attend court-ordered mental health treatment; termination from mental health treatment after threatening a counselor; and an arrest for physically attacking his mother. The district court 7 Case: 12-12708 Date Filed: 04/17/2013 Page: 8 of 12 did not abuse its discretion in considering such rehabilitative concerns when imposing supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c); see also United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (“Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.”). Accordingly, we dismiss as moot Brown’s challenge to his completed prison term and affirm Brown’s sentence as to supervised release.