Opinion ID: 839448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the constitutionality of mcl 213.70(2)

Text: Article 10, § 2 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution secures the right of property owners to just compensation when the government takes land for public use. At the time of the instant condemnation suit, Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2 provided: [6] Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law. Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record. This Court has held on a number of occasions that the just compensation provided in Const 1963, art 10, § 2 must put the party injured in as good position as he would have been if the injury had not occurred. State Hwy. Comm'r v. Eilender, 362 Mich. 697, 699, 108 N.W.2d 755 (1961). [7] In the instant case, plaintiff MDOT sought to directly take part of the defendants' property. In cases involving claims of partial taking, this Court has held that just compensation entitles the property owner to direct compensation for the value of the property taken, and consequential damages for the diminution in value of the remainder of the property owner's property. [8] [A]ny evidence that would tend to affect the market value of the property as of the date of condemnation is relevant. Dep't of Transportation v. VanElslander, 460 Mich. 127, 130, 594 N.W.2d 841 (1999). The determination of value is not a matter of formulas or artificial rules, but of sound judgment and discretion considering all the relevant facts in a particular case. [9] The UCPA prescribes the manner in which just compensation is first made or secured pursuant to Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2. Section 20(2) of the UCPA, MCL 213.70(2), precludes property owners from including the general effects of a taking in the calculation of just compensation. The statute provides: The general effects of a project for which property is taken, whether actual or anticipated, that in varying degrees are experienced by the general public or by property owners from whom no property is taken, shall not be considered in determining just compensation. A special effect of the project on the owner's property that, standing alone, would constitute a taking of private property under section 2 of article X of the state constitution of 1963 shall be considered in determining just compensation. To the extent that the detrimental effects of a project are considered to determine just compensation, they may be offset by consideration of the beneficial effects of the project. The Court of Appeals correctly held that MCL 213.70(2) violated Const. 1963, art. 10, § 2. Article 10, § 2 guarantees that a landowner will receive just compensation for a taking of that landowner's property. MCL 213.70(2), by partially limiting the compensation a landowner may receive in certain situations, decreases the amount of just compensation for landowners and, thus, it conflicts with the mandate of art. 10, § 2 that [c]ompensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record. The Legislature does not have the authority to take away, or limit, the right of just compensation that the Constitution has guaranteed to landowners. The majority errs by ruling that MCL 213.70(2) is constitutional. The majority does not cite any authority the Legislature has to limit just compensation. The majority states that acts of the Legislature are presumed constitutional. Instead of examining the text of the Constitution other than the words just compensation, the majority looks only to pre-1963 cases interpreting just compensation. By basing its opinion on the lack of precedent that would conflict with MCL 213.70(2), the majority ignores the language in the Constitution stating that the amount of compensation to be paid is a matter for the courts to decide. Furthermore, the majority disregards this Court's precedent stating that just compensation is designed to return landowners to the position they were in before the taking took place. With regard to the Court of Appeals remand order to the trial court to determine whether the Kenowa Avenue overpass was integral [to] and inseparable from the M-6 project, the Court of Appeals correctly decided the issue. The integral and inseparable method, adopted from the Connecticut Supreme Court's Andrews decision, [10] is a method of sound judgment and discretion that allows owners of land that was directly, but partially, taken to prove that their remaining property suffered diminution in value as a result of the taking. [11] In this case, the proper question in determining the amount of money required to return the defendants to their position before the taking is whether the project for which the defendants' land was taken contributed to the diminution of value of the remainder of the defendants' property. Accordingly, I vote to affirm the Court of Appeals decision remanding the case for trial, and I support the reasons for the Court of Appeals decision.