Opinion ID: 2307984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Remedy of Reinstatement

Text: Given MPD's concession on appeal that Stanley and Smith retired involuntarily, we conclude that the administrative judge erred in dismissing all three appellees' review petitions for lack of jurisdiction. Ordinarily, upon arriving at such a conclusion, we would remand to the OEA for it to decide all remaining issues. But the jurisdictional question merges with the merits in this case, and MPD concedes that an order of reinstatement with back pay is appropriate in these circumstances. [26] Its sole contention is that Judge Rankin erred by directing that appellees be reinstated as commanders, becauseMPD arguesthe Chief of Police could and would have reduced appellees to the rank and pay of a captain (or, in Daniels's case, an inspector) had they not retired. [27] The factual premise of MPD's argument is open to question. At the administrative hearing, Chief Proctor testified that it wasn't clear what next steps would [have been] available had Stanley, Smith or Daniels refused to resign or accept a demotion, and that her only option in that event would have been to place them on administrative leave and consult with MPD's general counsel and the Control Board. Assistant Chief White testified that he, too, did not know what would have happened had the commanders rejected the offers he made to them. More importantly, even assuming they would have been demoted in rank, the administrative judge found that former commanders usually retained their salaries. The judge consequently found that Daniels's proposed demotion would not necessarily have involved any reduction in his pay. In contrast to its position now that appellees should be returned to lower-salaried positions, MPD defended that finding in Superior Court. In any event, we conclude that MPD waived its claim regarding the terms of the order of reinstatement. When Judge Rankin found that appellees' retirements were involuntary, he invited the parties to confer and submit a proposed remand order. In compliance with the court's request, appellees drafted an order and shared it with MPD for its comments. The draft order mandated, inter alia, that OEA direct MPD to return appellees to their former commander positions. MPD suggested changes in the language of the draft order, some of which appellees accepted. After appellees provided the revised draft order to the court, MPD filed a praecipe stating that in light of the proposed order Petitioners have submitted, the Department has elected not to submit an alternate proposed order. Although MPD preserved its objections to the court's finding that appellees' retirements were involuntary, MPD did not object to the reinstatement relief or other remedial provisions that appellees requested. MPD did not argue that appellees were entitled to be returned only to the lower ranks to which the Chief of Police would have reduced them. It is a well established principle of appellate review that arguments not made at trial may not be raised for the first time on appeal. [28] Perhaps even more to the pointsince, in Superior Court, MPD both disputed that Daniels's demotion would have affected his pay and acquiesced in the reinstatement proposal submitted to Judge Rankinwe have repeatedly held that a litigant may not take one position at trial and a contradictory position on appeal. [29] A court deviates from [these] principle[s] only in exceptional situations and when necessary to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice apparent from the record. [30] We see no such danger in the present case. [31] The order of the Superior Court reversing the Initial Decision of the OEA and remanding the case with instructions as set forth therein is affirmed.