Opinion ID: 1895684
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the conditional use and special exception

Text: It is to be noted that under the provisions of Section 40-65 (f), as at the time of application for use of the Boyer farm as a sanitary landfill, the use sought was designated as a `conditional use.' By the amendment to the zoning regulations adopted by the County Commissioners on July 28, 1968, and filed with the Clerk of the Court on September 17, 1968, the proposed use under Section 40-143, is under the heading, `Conditional Uses and Special Exceptions.' This difference in drafting technique and in wording is not deemed to be important to a decision of this case because the law applicable is the same no matter what the use is labeled. The authority of the courts on appeals from decisions of zoning boards is strictly limited. Where an issue before such a Board of Appeals is shown by the record to be fairly debatable, its action on that issue cannot be disturbed and a court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of the Board. Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279. This principle is so firmly established that no further citation of authority is necessary. The rule applies with full force as to special exceptions. For instance, in Finney v. Halle, 241 Md. 224, a circuit court had reversed the decision of a Board of Zoning Appeals granting a special exception. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, saying at page 241, `In considering the special exception, the Board acts as a body of zoning experts and the area of judicial review is quite limited. As Judge Delaplaine, for the Court, aptly stated in Oursler ...: The function of a zoning board is to exercise the discretion of experts, and the court on appeal will not disturb the board's finding where it has complied with the legal requirements of notice and hearing, and the record shows substantial evidence to sustain the finding. (Page 405 of 204 Md.; page 572 of 104 A.2d).' There was ample evidence in this case before the Board of Appeals to justify the granting of this conditional use and special exception. There was testimony by the county planner of the great need of the county for the disposition of waste and garbage. A study of the county divided it into zones for this purpose and the Boyer farm was found to be most appropriate from a location standpoint. Its ability to handle traffic and its terrain made is especially suitable. Under projections for future county development, this particular area was found to be less likely to develop in the reasonably foreseeable future for residential purposes because other areas would probably be sooner served with either public sewer, water or both. It is true that this testimony was vigorously contested by the protestants but this court cannot say that the action of the Board of Appeals was clearly wrong in giving more weight to the testimony presented by the applicant. Thus, the issue before the Board was fairly debatable and this court is without authority to reverse it. It should be added that some of the protestants seem to have been under a misapprehension as to the nature of the requested use. One of the protestants stated, `I kinda feel it is a breach of trust to go into a residential area like this and pick out a nice site and use it for an industrial use. To answer your question, I think it would be detrimental.' It should be remembered that this area was not zoned residential but agricultural. It also should be remembered that the use applied for was not an industrial use but a conditional use or special exception permitted under definite restrictions in agricultural zones. The distinction between rezoning and conditional use or special exception was clearly defined by the Court of Appeals in Cadem v. Nanna, 243 Md. 536, 543. `The words special exception are well known in zoning law. They refer to a grant by the zoning administrative body pursuant to the existing provisions of the zoning law and subject to certain guides and standards, of a special use permitted under the provisions of the existing zoning law. (Citing authorities.) Rezoning or reclassification is, of course, a change in the existing law itself, so far as the subject property is concerned. This type of change in the zoning law is governed by quite different provisions of law from those governing the granting of special exceptions.' The guidelines for determination by the Board of Appeals in applications for conditional uses and special exceptions are set forth in Sections 40-140 and 40-143 and the record discloses that the Board in reaching its decision gave consideration to these guidelines. THE VARIANCE The appellants contend that the Board of Appeals had no authority to grant any variance because Section 40-133 provides that applications in cases in which the Board of Appeals has original jurisdiction, `shall be filed with the zoning administrator, who shall transmit same to the Board.' Admittedly, no such application for a variance has been filed with the zoning administrator and, consequently it could not have been transmitted by him to the Board of Appeals. Clearly, however, under the terms of the remand from this Court to the Board of Appeals, the question of a variance was to be considered and decided by the Board. In addition, at the first hearing after remand, counsel for the protestants addressed one of his clients as follows, `You, of course, are aware that the Board of Appeals is here being asked to grant a variance from the existing zoning regulations, which is the pink strip to be a variance, and once granted, it would pave the way for the location of a landfill on the Boyer farm.' The answer was, `Yes.' Obviously all concerned were fully apprised of the nature of the hearings and that the county was seeking an area variance. Counsel for the protestants made no objection to the absence of a formal variance application and the hearings on this question, subsequent to remand, were conducted without protest on this point. Had any such objecton been made before the Board, the defect could have been promptly remedied. It is my opinion under these circumstances that there has been substantial compliance with the zoning regulations and that the protestants have had ample notice and an opportunity to be heard on the variance question. The Court of Appeals has stated, `We have already pointed out that, generally, administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of evidence and all the procedures afforded in a trial in a court of law, provided such agencies observe the basic rules of fairness to parties appearing before them.' Hyson v. Montgomery County, 242 Md. 55. Appellants make the further contention that where one purchases realty intending to apply for a variance from zoning restrictions, he cannot contend that such restrictions cause him the undue hardships that would entitle him to such variance, citing Gleason v. Keswick Improvement Association, 197 Md. 46. This same rule has been relaxed where there has been an application for area variance such as here, as distinguished from a use variance as in Keswick, the Court of Appeals pointing out that a use variance is customarily concerned with unusual hardship where the land cannot yield a reasonable return without a variance whereas an area variance is primarily concerned with practical difficulties. Loyola Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Buschman, 227 Md. 243. Section 40-145 permits a variance where practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship is present. Since this is an application for an area variance and since there was testimony of practical difficulty in the absence of the grant of a variance, the rule announced in Keswick does not apply. Moreover, in Stacy v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 189, an area variance was approved by the Court of Appeals where a party had purchased a property intending to apply for a special exception. The need for an area variance was not determined until after the special exception had been granted. That is substantially what happened in the present case and Stacy is further authority for holding that the rule in Keswick does not here apply. Appellants further contend that the Board was without authority to grant a variance because at the hearing on September 16, 1968, the amendment to the zoning regulations had not at that time been filed with the clerk of the court. Assuming that this rendered the amendment inoperative as at that date, it was duly filed the next day. A further hearing was subsequently held, and, as previously stated, counsel for both parties appear to have agreed that all testimony whether taken before or after remand, should be considered in any new finding and order of the Board of Appeals. The `report' of the Board filed in this court on October 16, 1968, and the minutes of October 22, 1968, make it appear that the Board in reaching its findings and order considered itself governed by the amendment. This is in accordance with the rule that where a zoning ordinance is amended, after the filing of an application but before decision, the law applicable is the ordinance as amended which is in existence when the Board makes its decision. See Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 1967 Cumulative Supplement to Vol. I, Sec. 4, page 327. The mere amendment of the zoning ordinance did not nullify testimony taken before filing of the amendment with the clerk. The Board had authority under the terms of the remand from this court to take further testimony and if the amendment was without force on September 16, 1968, the Board had authority to take testimony under the regulations before amendment. I cannot agree with the contention of the appellants in this respect.   . Instead of affirming the Board of Appeal's decision at this point, Judge Clapp remanded the case to clarify one final aspect of the record. This was done because the Board's minutes did not reflect that the facts and conditions necessary to sustain a variance had been found beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by § 40-145 (b) of the Frederick County Zoning Regulations. The Board made this clarification and upon return of the case to the Circuit Court, its decision was affirmed on the basis of the quoted memorandum. Because of the unusual requirement that a county agency find that variance prerequisites exist beyond a reasonable doubt, we think a brief comment is in order. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is but an increase in degree when compared with proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Perceiving no difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal or civil matter, we accept the conclusion of the cases which discuss the phrase that this higher standard of proof is addressed to the judgment and conscience of the inquiring authority. The phrase is largely self-defining and needs little amplification. As used here it calls for a higher degree of conviction than that demanded by the preponderance of the evidence rule before the Board can conclude the requirements of § 40-145 (b) have been satisfied. Berry v. State, 202 Md. 62, 67-68, 95 A.2d 319 (1953), see generally 36 Words and Phrases, Reasonable Doubt 483-544. The appellants make one additional point. Coupled with their attack on the variance, they argue that the entire proceeding before the Board of Appeals was invalid because the Board of County Commissioners had not specifically authorized its president to apply for a conditional use permit or a special exception. We reject this contention. The record discloses that the Board did authorize him to acquire an option on the Boyer farm and to determine if the site could be utilized as a landfill. We think this not only permitted the explicitly mentioned soil and engineering feasibility tests but also any other preliminary determinations which would enable them to decide if the option should be exercised. To purchase this property for $45,000 without the knowledge that the farm could be legally utilized for a landfill would have been the height of imprudence. Requiring the Board to pass an additional resolution to perform a ministerial task necessary to carry out its original objective, which had already been approved, would be redundantly burdensome and not required by law. Johns Hopkins Bldg. Co. v. Balto., 130 Md. 282, 283, 100 A. 298 (1917). Order affirmed. Costs to be paid by the appellants.