Opinion ID: 1375796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of evidence of Mesa sexual assault

Text: The trial judge rejected Defendant's offer of evidence of another sexual assault with some similarities to the assaults charged in this case. Although police eliminated him as a suspect, Defendant argued that the perpetrator of the other sexual assault could have been the perpetrator in this case. The judge found that because of substantial differences between the two crimes, there was not enough evidence with an inherent tendency to connect the other person with the actual commission of the [charged] crime. Hummert, 183 Ariz. at 493-94, 905 P.2d at 502-03, citing State v. Oliver, 169 Ariz. 589, 590-91, 821 P.2d 250, 251-52 (App. 1991). Moreover, the judge held, on the basis of Rule 403, that the danger of confusing and misleading the jury outweighed the probative value of the evidence. See Ariz. R.Evid. 403. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that under Rule 404(b) (evidence of other acts admissible, inter alia, to show identity) the jury should have been allowed to hear the evidence and decide whether Defendant's exculpation in the other case was relevant to the issue of identity in this case. Hummert, 183 Ariz. at 495, 905 P.2d at 504. We do not believe the problem is grounds for reversal. Although this issue was not raised in the petition for review, we assume, arguendo, that the other act evidence was marginally relevant. Thus it was within the trial judge's discretion to determine its admissibility under Rule 403. We see no abuse of discretion. Furthermore, given the overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt, including the DNA evidence, any error in rejecting the other act evidence was, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless.