Opinion ID: 349540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: To go into the house.

Text: 26 Q. And, if you were refused permission, would you have went in anyway? 27 A. No, sir. 28 Q. And, why did you send a man to the back door? 29 A. If we'd been refused we would have to have gone for a warrant and would have went in. With permission we didn't need them so we walked in. 30 Transcript, Suppression Hearing 88-89 (emphasis added). 31 Concerning the arrest of defendant Brightwell in his home, Captain Steppke stated: 32 Q. When you saw Brightwell walking up the steps, you did not place him under arrest at that point, did you? 33 A. I didn't say he was walking up the steps. I said he was walking toward the platform leading to the steps. 34 Q. Did you place him under arrest at that point? 35 A. No. I told him to stand there and an officer followed me and I told him to keep him. 36 Q. When you first saw Brightwell, did you have grounds to place him under arrest? 37 A. The first time, no, I wouldn't say so. 38 Transcript, Suppression Hearing 91-92 (emphasis added). 39 The government argued before the trial court alternative theories to support the warrantless search of Brightwell's residence. First, it claimed that the officers received consent to enter the dwelling. The trial court did not rule upon this theory but noted that the government's case suffers from conflicting testimony on a critical point, namely, who gave the consent? Slip op. at 14 n. 20. 40 The second theory presented by the government was that probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the entrance based upon the hot pursuit doctrine, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), and that the discovery and seizure of evidence was justified by the plain view exception to the warrant requirements. Although Captain Steppke testified that when he first saw Brightwell, he had no grounds to place him under arrest and also if denied admission, he would have sought a search warrant, the trial court nonetheless found both probable cause and exigent circumstances. The court did note, though, that its decision was not reached without some difficulty. Slip op. at 16 n. 23. In my judgment, the degree of probable cause and the alleged urgent need for warrantless police action which existed in this case do not arise to the level required to justify a warrantless entrance under the hot pursuit doctrine.II. HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION 41 The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) quoting from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In particular, the sanctity of private dwellings is ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3084, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116, 1130 (1976); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948). The government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the need for a particular warrantless search, i. e., that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra 403 U.S. at 455, 91 S.Ct. at 2032, quoting from McDonald v. United States, supra 335 U.S. at 456, 69 S.Ct. 191. 42 The doctrine of hot pursuit, articulated initially in Warden v. Hayden, supra, is one exception to the warrant requirement. A careful analysis of Hayden and its progeny demonstrates that in order to qualify under this exception the government must show that before the police entered a premise to arrest a suspect: (1) there existed not merely the minimum of probable cause, that is requisite even when a warrant has been issued, but beyond that a clear showing of probable cause, including 'reasonably trustworthy information,' to believe that the suspect committed the crime involved, Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 320-321, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (1970); (2) there was strong reason to believe that the suspect was in the premises to be searched, Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909, 95 S.Ct. 829, 42 L.Ed.2d 839 (1975); Dorman v. United States, supra 140 U.S.App.D.C. at 321, 435 F.2d at 393; and (3) there was urgent need for immediate police action because the time delay incident to obtaining a warrant could not be tolerated without increasing the risk of harm to police and bystanders or increasing the risk of escape, Warden v. Hayden, supra 387 U.S. at 298, 87 S.Ct. 1642; Dorman v. United States, supra 140 U.S.App.D.C. at 319-323, 435 F.2d at 391-95. 3 43 A. Clear Probable Cause. 44 The requirement of clear probable cause to arrest the suspect (as opposed to minimum probable cause) is essential for two reasons: (1) it satisfies the usual condition for any government search or seizure, i. e., mere probable cause; and (2) it is a prerequisite to the analysis of urgent need because the risks of escape or violence which justify this exception are directly dependent upon the police's solidly founded belief that the individual being sought has committed a crime. In those cases recognizing the hot pursuit exception, the pursuing police had strong evidence that the suspect committed a crime, including: (1) eyewitness testimony that the particular suspect was involved in the crime, Warden v. Hayden, supra; Dorman v. United States, supra; (2) police pursuit of fleeing individuals following a high speed chase of a getaway car, Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974); (3) prior information that the suspect was planning a robbery, United States v. Holiday, 457 F.2d 912 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913, 93 S.Ct. 246, 34 L.Ed.2d 175 (1972); or (4) arrest warrant issued following a confession of co-conspirators, Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, supra. Where the police lacked evidence directly linking the suspect to the crime before the search, the court has rejected the hot pursuit theory. United States v. Lindsay, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 506 F.2d 166 (1974). Without strong evidence of criminal involvement, the dangers of violence or escape are too speculative to justify an exception to the clear constitutional mandate that a neutral and detached magistrate determine the need for a search of a premise. 45 Captain Steppke did not believe that even the ordinary quantum of probable cause existed. Whether the Captain was right or wrong in that conclusion, it is certainly true that the clear probable cause required for hot pursuit was lacking. 46 Brightwell and the other defendants were not identified as robbery suspects by anyone at the bank and there was no evidence directly linking these defendants to the scene of the crime. The sole connection of these defendants with the robbery was the report that Brightwell's car had been near the place where the getaway car was found. But no one had ever seen Brightwell in the car. 47 The stop and frisk of Winfield Jones added nothing to this evidence. The money discovered on Jones' person was never connected with the bank robbery. No inference could be drawn from the fact that the Jones money was wrapped in a stocking because the Chester Police did not have a report that the robbers were masked. 4 It would appear that when the police entered Brightwell's house, they were not only looking for Brightwell and other possible suspects, but also the officers were looking for evidence to link these defendants with the crime. The police knocked (or attempted to knock) at the Brightwell door and allegedly paused to converse with the first individual who came out. When Brightwell himself was later seen by officers who knew him, he was not immediately placed under arrest. Only after the police entered the house and viewed incriminating evidence were the occupants placed under arrest. 48 Finally, the statement of Captain Steppke belies the conclusion that the government had clear probable cause to arrest the occupants of the house before the search. The Captain explicitly stated at the suppression hearing that he did not believe that he had grounds to arrest Brightwell when he first saw him. Given this admission and the fact that the government has the burden of proof, the requirement of clear probable cause could only be met if the government could present particularly strong evidence of criminal involvement. That evidence simply does not exist. The facts known to the Chester Police at the time of the entrance in conjunction with Captain Steppke's statement only justifies the conclusion that the police were merely suspicious that Brightwell may have been involved in the robbery. This evidence fails to establish clear probable cause and therefore I conclude that, on this basis alone, the hot pursuit doctrine is inapplicable to this case. 49