Opinion ID: 505922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The warrant is facially overbroad.

Text: 36 The Kleinberg warrant suffers from three flaws. First, it authorizes a general search in conjunction with a federal crime and is overbroad on its face. In Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402 (10th Cir.1985), we invalidated a similar warrant. The warrant in Voss authorized government agents to seize documents and records [a]ll of which are evidence of violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. Id. at 405. We concluded that [e]ven if the reference to Section 371 [the federal conspiracy statute] is construed as a limitation, it does not constitute a constitutionally adequate particularization of the items to be seized. Id. 14 37 The government argues that Voss does not apply here because the export statutes describe a much narrower range of criminal activity. We disagree. While some federal statutes may be narrow enough to meet the fourth amendment's requirement, the two statutes cited by the Kleinberg warrant cover a broad range of activity and the reference to those statutes does not sufficiently limit the scope of the warrant. 15 38 Moreover, a series of decisions from other circuits have held that reference to a broad federal statute is not a sufficient limitation on a search warrant. For example, in Roche v. United States, 614 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir.1980) the warrant authorized the seizure of books, records and documents which are evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the violation of Title 18, United States Code Section 1341 [mail fraud]. The court found this limitation to be no limitation at all. Id. at 8. The Ninth Circuit has consistently applied the same rule. In United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir.1982), [t]he only limitation on the search and seizure of appellants' business papers was the requirement that they be the instrumentality or evidence of violation of the general tax evasion statute, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7201. That is not enough. The court's reasoning in Cardwell is equally applicable here: 39  '[L]imiting' the search to only records that are evidence of the violation of a certain statute is generally not enough.... If items that are illegal, fraudulent, or evidence of illegality are sought, the warrant must contain some guidelines to aid the determination of what may or may not be seized. 40 Id. at 78. Where the warrant provides no such guidelines, it is impermissibly overbroad on its face. See also Rickert v. Sweeney, 813 F.2d 907, 909 (8th Cir.1987) (warrant limited only by references to the general conspiracy statute and general tax evasion statute did not limit the search in any substantive manner); United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir.1986) (effort to limit discretion solely by reference to criminal statutes was inadequate); United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 542-43 (1st Cir.1980) (warrant limited only by reference to records and federal fraud statute is overbroad); In re Lafayette Academy, 610 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1979) (overbroad warrant allowed seizure of most every sort of book or paper ... limited only by the qualification that the seized item be evidence of violations of ... '18 U.S.C. 286, 287, 371, 1001 and 1014.' ). 41 We agree with the reasoning of these courts. As an irreducible minimum, a proper warrant must allow the executing officers to distinguish between items that may and may not be seized. 16 See 2 LaFave, Sec. 4.6(a), at 235-36. The Kleinberg warrant does not provide that guidance. An unadorned reference to a broad federal statute does not sufficiently limit the scope of a search warrant. Absent other limiting factors, such a warrant does not comply with the requirements of the fourth amendment. 17 See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480-82, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2748-49, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). 42 Nor did the list of business records to be seized provide any meaningful limitation on the Kleinberg search. The warrant encompassed virtually every document that one might expect to find in a modern export company's office. Again, the fourth amendment requires more. See Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Young), 716 F.2d 493, 498 (8th Cir.1983) (laundry list of various type of records is insufficient to save the search warrant); Roberts v. United States, 656 F.Supp. 929, 934 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (By listing every type of record that could conceivably be found in an office, the warrant effectively authorized the inspectors to cart away anything that they could find on the premises.); cf. Cardwell, 680 F.2d at 78; Abrams, 615 F.2d at 543; Roche, 614 F.2d at 7; Lafayette Academy, 610 F.2d at 5. 43 We recognize that some lower courts have found similar warrants to be sufficiently particular. The government relies on United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F.Supp. 550, 557 (D.Mass.1983) where the district court found a warrant seeking records which are required under the Export Administration Act, 15 C.F.R. Sec. 387.13, by all businesses sending electronic equipment outside the United States to be sufficiently particular. The district court in United States v. Gregg, 629 F.Supp. 958, 966-67 (W.D.No.1986), aff'd 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir.1987), approved a similar warrant. We are unpersuaded by these decisions. Neither court clearly explained why the warrant in question is sufficient; the analysis is brief and conclusory. 18 Moreover, there are distinguishing features that limit the value of these decisions in our present inquiry. 19 44 The government also argues that the facial overbreadth of the warrant is not fatal because any doubts about what was to be seized could be resolved by resort to the affidavit which was a part of the warrant and which the agents had with them at the location of the search. Brief of Appellant at 38. We disagree. It is true that the particularity of an affidavit may cure an overbroad warrant, but only where the affidavit and the search warrant ... can be reasonably said to constitute one document. Two requirements must be satisfied to reach this result: first, the affidavit and search warrant must be physically connected so that they constitute one document; and second, the search warrant must expressly refer to the affidavit and incorporate it by reference using suitable words of reference. 2 LaFave, Sec. 4.6(a), at 241 (quoting Bloom v. State, 283 So.2d 134 (Fla.App.1973)); see Id. cases cited at n. 28; 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 670, at 723 (2d ed. 1982); United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 410 n. 1 (10th Cir.1986) (When an affidavit is attached to a warrant and incorporated by reference into the warrant, it can be used to cure a lack of particularity.); 20 United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1354 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1289, 94 L.Ed.2d 146 (1987) (affidavits did not accompany warrant); United States v. Strand, 761 F.2d 449, 453 (8th Cir.1985) (affidavit accompanied warrant but was not incorporated). 45 The Kleinberg warrant did not incorporate the affidavit; there is no reference to the affidavit on the face of the warrant. In addition, there is no clear evidence in the record to support the government's assertion that the affidavit was a part of the warrant. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the search itself was not limited by the affidavit. If the affidavit was available to the agents searching the Kleinberg offices, it certainly was not used to limit the search. 21 The agents seized documents related to transactions, countries and commodities not mentioned in the affidavit. In fact, the agents seized documents unrelated to Kleinberg's export business. 22 Even if the technical requirements for incorporation were met, it would be improper to allow the affidavit to cure the lack of particularity in the warrant where the government agents relied on the breadth of the warrant, not the specificity of the affidavit, to define the scope of the search. Cf. United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 967 (9th Cir.1986) (government's argument that the agents were somehow constructively guided by the affidavit in executing the warrants is unpersuasive); Lafayette Academy, 610 F.2d at 5 ([S]elf-restraint on the part of the ... executing officers does not erase the fact that under the broadly worded warrant appellees were subject to a greater exercise of power than that which may have actually transpired and for which probable cause had been established. The particularity requirement is a check to just this sort of risk. (citations omitted)). 46