Opinion ID: 766107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Gilmer and the FAA

Text: 19 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Act) added a provision on arbitration to Title VII stating that [w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of . . . arbitration[] is encouraged to resolve Title VII claims. Pub. L. No. 102-166, §118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (§ 118), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §1981 app. at 509 (1994). We agree with the view of the majority of circuits that the phrase to the extent authorized by law is on its face a clear and unambiguous reference to current law. See, e.g., Seus, 146 F.3d at 183. Hence, as current law, both Gilmer and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) apply to our analysis of §118. 20 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Duffield suggested that the phrase to the extent authorized by law refers not to current law as stated in Gilmer and the FAA, but instead refers to a previously relevant case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), that was severely narrowed by Gilmer. See Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1194-95. This argument relies on passages from the legislative history, which reflect the fact that at the time that §118 was being drafted, Gardner-Denver was widely interpreted as prohibiting any form of compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. See id.; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Gilmer later limited Gardner-Denver to its facts, concerning collective bargaining, a subject not implicated by Desiderio's appeal. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. 21 Because we find the text clear on its face, we do not reach these arguments based on legislative history. Where the text of a statute is unambiguous, we need not look at the legislative history. See Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949). As a consequence, we do not find Duffield's analysis persuasive with respect to the applicability of Gardner-Denver.