Opinion ID: 1171395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: placement of the gates

Text: The other action claimed to violate the SMA is defendant's placement of gates at each end of the 3-mile stretch of right of way involved in this case. This question was litigated at trial, with the trial court holding that placement of the gates did not violate the SMA. The State maintains that installation of the locked gates at the ends of the canyon constituted a placing of obstructions and therefore was a development within the meaning of RCW 90.58.030(3)(d). The State further argues that installation of the gates materially interfered with the normal public use of the Cowiche Creek shoreline, and therefore was a substantial development within the meaning of RCW 90.58.030(3)(e). It is, at the least, debatable whether the placing of the gates was a placing of obstructions in relation to the shoreline and Cowiche Creek, as opposed to the gates' relation to the right of way itself. We will assume, without deciding, that placement of the gates was a development. The questions then are (a) whether placement of the gates constituted a substantial development requiring a substantial development permit, or (b) whether placement of the gates violated the SMA pursuant to RCW 90.58.140(1). As to the first of these questions, whether placement of the gates constituted a substantial development: The argument is that the placement of the gates was a development which was a substantial development because it materially interfere[d] with the normal public use of Cowiche Creek and the shoreline. RCW 90.58.030(3)(e). The trial court found that the removal contractor believed he had control of the right of way and did not object to erection of the gates. Finding of fact 15. No error is assigned to this finding. The trial court held that the gates did not interfere with normal public access and therefore did not require a substantial development permit. We agree. It is obvious from the exhibits that one could simply walk around the gates and proceed on the right of way. Even if access on the right of way was required to preserve any normal public use of the water and shoreline of Cowiche Creek, such access was simply not barred by placement of the gates. There is absolutely no merit to the Department's claim that placement of the gates materially interfered with any normal public access. This would normally end the inquiry. However, the Department's argument is so untenable for another reason that we go further and explain the utter lack of a viable case on the Department's part. In order to fall within that part of RCW 90.58.030(3)(e) which defines as a substantial development a development which materially interferes with the normal public use of the water or shorelines of the state, it is plain that normal public use must be established. The trial court found that A few members of the public from time to time walked on the railroad right-of-way through the Cowiche Canyon but any such usage did not result in the right-of-way being a means of public access to the canyon or the shorelines of the state of Washington. Finding of fact 21. We note that the trial court further found that [t]here was no damage to the shorelines or any public property. Finding of fact 26. The Department does not assign error to the latter finding. [18] Findings of fact supported by substantial evidence are verities on appeal. Schmidt v. Cornerstone Invs., Inc., 115 Wn.2d 148, 169, 795 P.2d 1143 (1990). Substantial evidence is evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise. Robinson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 113 Wn.2d 154, 157, 776 P.2d 676 (1989) (quoting Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978)). [19] The Department does not mention the findings of fact in its argument, and does not argue that they are not supported by substantial evidence. Rather, the Department asserts that the public, for years, had used the right of way for access to the unique riparian shoreline of Cowiche Creek. Brief of Appellant (Department), at 3, 9, 14. In support of its statements, the Department cites three sources of evidence. First, it cites an entire 49-page deposition without reference to where relevant testimony might be found. It is not the function of the appellate court to search through an entire deposition to locate relevant testimony. RAP 10.3(a). Second is a reference to a map, exhibit 14, which discloses nothing about public access. Finally, the Department cites 36 pages of testimony  the entire testimony of two witnesses. Such shotgun references to the record are of little assistance and ill serve a party. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the cited testimony; it does not support the assertion that there was satisfactory proof of access. The weakness of the Department's claim is shown by the testimony of the first witness who testified as to her personal use: Q: How did you become familiar with those areas? A: Well, several years ago I used to walk through the canyon about once a year with a friend, like through it. In the last few years, I've been there several times. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 133. The other witness whose testimony is cited is president of the Conservancy. He had been on the trestles perhaps five or six times. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 156. On the issue of public use, he testified only as follows: Q: Do you know if members of the public had used those trestles? A: Yes, they have. Q: Do you know what they used them for? A: Used them for years to gain entry into Cowiche Canyon and for passage over the creek. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 156. The witness testified that use of the area by the public had been affected by destruction of the trestles. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 156. However, the Department's own enforcement coordinator testified that the absence of the trestles did not prevent one from getting to the stream at all. Deposition of Beery, at 39. Given the meager, conclusory testimony, utterly lacking in identification of time or place, the trial court was justified in finding that plaintiffs failed to prove there was any normal public access at all to the canyon or the shorelines. Finally, the Department never discusses the fact that the gates were on private property which Burlington Northern had posted against trespassing. In summary, the paltry showing of public use relied upon by the Department is plainly inadequate to show that the right of way was a route of normal public access to the shoreline. The placement of the gates therefore did not constitute a substantial development within the meaning of RCW 90.58.030(3)(e). The remaining question, insofar as the gates are concerned, is whether a violation of RCW 90.58.140(1) resulted from placement of the gates. As noted above, under this statute, even if not a substantial development, a development shall not be undertaken on the shorelines of the state if to do so would violate the policies of RCW 90.58. See Hunt v. Anderson, 30 Wn. App. 437, 439, 635 P.2d 156 (1981). The policy of the SMA is to provide for the management of the shorelines of the state by planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses. This policy is designed to insure the development of these shorelines in a manner which, while allowing for limited reduction of rights of the public in the navigable waters, will promote and enhance the public interest. This policy contemplates protecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the state and their aquatic life, while protecting generally public rights of navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto. .... In the implementation of this policy the public's opportunity to enjoy the physical and aesthetic qualities of natural shorelines of the state shall be preserved to the greatest extent feasible consistent with the overall best interest of the state and the people generally. RCW 90.58.020. The SMA emphasizes the need for a planned, rational, and concerted effort, jointly performed by federal, state, and local governments, to prevent the inherent harm in an uncoordinated and piecemeal development of the state's shorelines. RCW 90.58.020. Coordinated planning among levels of government is necessary in order to protect the public interest associated with the shorelines of the state while, at the same time, recognizing and protecting private property rights consistent with the public interest. RCW 90.58.020. These policies were not violated here. As noted, one could simply walk around the gates, if one wanted to trespass in the face of no trespass signs. There was testimony at trial that there was access to the shoreline independent of the right of way. The trial court found that there was no damage to the shorelines or to any public property  the Department does not challenge this finding. Unquestionably, the policies of the SMA were not violated. No violation of the SMA under RCW 90.58.140(1) resulted from placement of the gates. Lastly on this issue, we note that while the Department's claims advanced here are meritless, the Department's conduct in pursuing this action cannot diminish the importance of the policies of the SMA. In light of our disposition of the issues discussed above, we do not reach the trial court's holding that RCW 90.58.140(1) and (2) are unconstitutional as applied.