Opinion ID: 761768
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inculpatory Post-Arrest Statement

Text: 18 Appellants next contend that, Gillam not having taken the stand, the introduction of Gillam's post-arrest statement resulted in undue prejudice because it denied McGirt her Sixth Amendment right to confront an adverse witness. A redacted version of Gillam's post-arrest statement was introduced through the testimony of the arresting agent. The agent's testimony did not mention McGirt by name but did make three indirect references to her as someone who worked at FDA who was getting ready to retire. Appellants contend that severance was required because the statement implicitly referred to McGirt even after redaction. 19 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), held that a defendant is denied her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when a facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant. See id. at 127-28, 88 S.Ct. 1620. In Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), the Court held that a codefendant's redacted confession which replaced a defendant's proper name with an obvious indication of deletion, such as blank spaces or the word delete, is not sufficient to comply with Bruton's protective rule. See id. at 1157. Specifically, the Gray Court found the redaction, Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys, to be insufficient. See id. Following Gray, we recently held that a redaction replacing the defendant's name with person X is clearly impermissible, because 20 [t]he codefendant was pointing an accusatory finger at someone and it was not difficult for the jury to determine that that person was the other defendant on trial. 21 United States v. Peterson, 140 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir.1998). 22 The violation of Gray in this case is, if anything, more patent. Replacing McGirt's name with someone who worked at FDA ... who was getting ready to retire not only made it clear that Gillam was pointing an accusatory finger at someone else but also left little doubt for the jury that it was the codefendant, McGirt. 23 Once we find a Bruton error, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. In this case the testimony erroneously admitted was merely cumulative of other overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence properly admitted, including Guillen's detailed testimony describing McGirt's involvement and the recordings in which McGirt admitted her participation in the scheme. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973) (finding Bruton error harmless where erroneously admitted testimony was cumulative of other overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence). The impact of the indirect reference to McGirt was not so devastating that the jury could not be expected to follow the judge's admonition to consider the statement only against Gillam. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620 (It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases [where a Bruton error is found] the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information.); United States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir.1984) (finding Bruton violative admission not so devastating that the jury could not be expected to disregard it if the district court had instructed them to do so.). In light of the strength of the government's case against McGirt, we find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.