Opinion ID: 1188889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Equal protection challenge to Arizona's death penalty appeal statute

Text: Defendant contends that Arizona's automatic appeal statute for death penalty cases, A.R.S. § 13-4031, violates the equal protection provisions of the United States and Arizona Constitutions because defendants convicted of capital crimes may appeal only to this court, rather than having two levels of appeal as other criminal defendants potentially do. We recently rejected an identical argument. See State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 122, 871 P.2d 237, 243 (1994). We see no need to revisit the issue. SENTENCING ISSUES A. Court's failure to order the probation officer to try to meet with Defendant to prepare the presentence report After the jury verdicts were read, Defendant declared, Your Honor, I'd like the record to reflect I do not wish to meet with my presentence reporter. Because of this statement, the probation officer assigned to the case did not attempt to meet with or interview Defendant. The pre-sentence report recommended that the court impose the death penalty. Defendant argues that the court should have realized that anyone might make intemperate comments after a capital conviction and therefore should have ordered the probation officer to try to speak with Defendant, after he had time to cool down, to see if there was some basis for leniency. The court's failure to do so, Defendant contends, violated Ariz.R.Crim.P. 26.4, which requires a presentence preparation of a report. Although extending a second offer to a defendant may be appropriate in some cases, we cannot agree that failure to do so in this case requires the sentence to be vacated. A defendant has a constitutional right not to speak with a probation officer for sentencing purposes. State v. Kerekes, 138 Ariz. 235, 237, 673 P.2d 979, 981 (Ct.App. 1983). Defendant explicitly invoked that right and never retracted it, even though he later filed several other motions with the court. Furthermore, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 26.3(a) and 26.4(a) a defendant may entirely waive the right to have a presentence report prepared. What occurred here was less drastic than that because the probation officer prepared a report with the material available. In addition, the judge already knew a great deal about Defendant's background from trial testimony. This is an appropriate source for sentencing information. State v. Mincey, 130 Ariz. 389, 414, 636 P.2d 637, 662 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1003, 102 S.Ct. 1638, 71 L.Ed.2d 871 (1982). Moreover, Defendant's attorney [12] argued on his behalf at the sentencing hearing, giving the judge further perspective favorable to Defendant. Finally, there is no indication that Defendant would have said anything to the probation officer that the court did not already know. In fact Defendant's appellate counsel admits that it is un-likely [sic] that he would have charmed the probation officer into writing a glowing presentence report. Defendant has thus failed to show any prejudice in this regard. Defendant expressly declared in open court that he was unwilling to meet with the probation officer, and never withdrew that declaration. This might have been a mistake on his part, but the court's compliance with his wish was not error. B. Constitutional challenge to Arizona's death penalty statute on the grounds that it allows the court to conceal mitigating evidence A.R.S. § 13-703(C) requires a sentencing court to disclose to the defendant all information in the pre-sentence report except such material as the court determines is required to be withheld for the protection of human life. Defendant argues that [i]t makes no sense to kill one person to avoid endangering the life of another. At the very least, Defendant asserts, courts should be required to seal such information and file it for appellate review. The statute also provides that the court may not use such information in determining whether the statutory aggravating or mitigating factors exist. Defendant objects to the application of this provision to mitigating factors because it effectively prevents the judge from considering factors that cannot be disclosed, thereby depriving the defendant of his rights to due process and compulsory process and of the right to open justice guaranteed by Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 11. This court has rejected a similar argument in State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 508, 662 P.2d 1007, 1015 (1983), and declined to reconsider the issue in Ramirez, 178 Ariz. at 127, 871 P.2d at 248. Moreover, the court's special verdict in the present case specifically states: All material in the presentence report was disclosed to the defendant and to the prosecutor. Defendant's rights were therefore not violated. Id. at 127-28, 871 P.2d at 248-49. C. Reversal of the conviction that the trial court found to be an aggravating factor In a separate case, Defendant was charged with aggravated assault for the altercation that took place with Daphne's new boyfriend a few days before the killing. At the time of sentencing in the present case, Defendant had been convicted on that assault charge and sentenced to life imprisonment under A.R.S. § 13-604.02(A). In the present case, the trial court relied on that conviction as a statutory aggravating factor pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(1). [13] However, the conviction was subsequently reversed on appeal. State v. Cornell, 173 Ariz. 599, 845 P.2d 1094 (Ct.App. 1992). Defendant has now been retried and convicted of misdemeanor disorderly conduct, a lesser included offense. He submits, therefore, that his case must be remanded for resentencing. The state argues that even if the conviction can no longer be considered as an aggravating circumstance, this court should itself reweigh the remaining factors and affirm the death sentence. First, we agree with Defendant that reversal of the prior conviction requires the death sentence to be reweighed. Cf. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 71, 754 P.2d 1346 (1988) (constitutionally infirm conviction cannot be used to enhance charge or sentencing in later proceedings); State v. Steelman, 126 Ariz. 19, 612 P.2d 475 (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 287, 66 L.Ed.2d 141 (1980). Arizona's statute calls for a conviction, and the conviction the court relied on has been reversed. Therefore, the remaining factors must be reweighed. Bible, 175 Ariz. at 606, 858 P.2d at 1209. This brings us, of course, to the question of who should reweigh. The trial judge found two aggravating circumstances: the prior conviction and the fact that Defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the victim. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(3). The trial judge found as mitigating circumstances: Defendant's age (twenty-five years) and his remorse. We are thus presented with a case in which one of the two aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge can no longer be considered and in which the trial judge found more than de minimis mitigating circumstances. Where reweighing is necessary, we have stated: Therefore, in those cases in which the trial judge has erred in the sentencing process and there is mitigating evidence of more than de minimis weight, we will remand unless the state concedes that sentence reduction is preferable to remand. Bible, 175 Ariz. at 609, 858 P.2d at 1212. We reaffirm the continuing validity of this holding. The state has made no concession in this case that sentence reduction is preferable to remand. In other cases, however, the state has discussed the trauma caused to victims by remand for resentencing. It has frankly and commendably told this court that in many of those cases in which the court is unable to affirm the sentence of death for lack of sufficient record or because of doubt as to the inherent accuracy of the sentencing proceedings and in which the question of the sentence to be imposed is close, reduction and its consequent finality are preferable to remand. Obviously this means reduction will occur in some cases in which remand would possibly have resulted in reimposition of the death sentence, followed by a new appeal, a series of post-conviction proceedings, and ultimately resort to the federal court system. We believe that this case is one that fits within that category. First, we note that a child survives the relationship between Defendant and Daphne. The record indicates that child is being raised by Daphne's family. Given this fact, we believe the issue of punishment should be settled quickly and finally. Second, we do not believe it is possible for this court to affirm on the present state of the record. Not only has one of the aggravating factors been ruled out, but there is an additional circumstance that raises a substantial question in our minds whether the record contains all of the mitigating evidence that could or should have been presented to the court. This case, as noted earlier, is fraught with problems created by Defendant's decision to represent himself. After invoking and waving his right to counsel several times during the trial, he changed his mind again at the sentencing hearing and asked to have advisory counsel argue for him. When informed that he could have representation but that the hearing would proceed and he would not be allowed to waive counsel again, Defendant argued with the court but ultimately chose to be represented by counsel. Counsel then stated: I am at the point of being appointed and asked to proceed on a presentence hearing involving the most important issue in our society today, namely ... imposition or nonimposition of a death penalty. I am being asked to do so without having the opportunity to subpoena witnesses, the opportunity to ask my office to retain witnesses to do a psychological and physical examination of Mr. Cornell. I have not had an opportunity under these circumstances to do a life study of Mr. Cornell, nor to subpoena witnesses on his behalf to appear here to testify before this Court.       Under these circumstances, forcing me to go forward is simply unfair, unfair to me, unfair to Mr. Cornell, and perhaps more importantly, unfair to our society. Before our society imposes a death penalty, before we get close to that issue, society demands that we look at every facet of the individual and ensure that the death penalty is an appropriate penalty for the crime committed and for the individual who committed it. And if we rush into judgment like this, I think we are doing harm both to the system, as well as our society. And I would ask for a sixty day continuance. R.T. Feb. 8, 1991 at 23-24, 26. The court denied counsel's request for a continuance, reasoning that Defendant had two and one-half months to prepare for the hearing and it was Defendant, not the court, who put counsel in the position of unpreparedness for the hearing. We fault neither counsel nor the trial judge for his actions in this regard. However, we must conclude that we cannot reweigh with any confidence that the record contains all of the mitigating evidence and circumstances that a reasonable investigation and preparation might have enabled counsel to present to the court and that might properly have been part of the record. [14] Because of the need to reweigh due to the failure of one of the aggravating circumstances, given the presence of mitigating evidence found by the trial court and the balancing that is therefore required, and given the impossibility of concluding that the record before us is as complete as it should be, this court cannot affirm. Under Bible, we would therefore remand for resentencing. However, in light of the state's previously expressed position and the need for prompt resolution and finality because of the peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the best resolution is reduction of the sentence. [15] We therefore reduce the sentence of death to a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. The life sentence is to be served consecutively to each of the sentences imposed on Defendant pursuant to his convictions in his earlier cases as well as to the sentences the trial court imposed in this case, which are twenty-one years for attempted murder, [16] fifteen years for aggravated assault, and fifteen years for burglary. DISPOSITION We find that none of the issues Defendant raises on appeal warrants reversal of his convictions. We have also examined the record in this case for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035 and have found none. Defendant's death sentence, however, cannot stand because it was based on an aggravating factor that no longer exists. Accordingly, we affirm all of Defendant's convictions and sentences except the death sentence, which we reduce to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years, to be served consecutively to all other sentences imposed. MOELLER, V.C.J., and CORCORAN and ZLAKET, JJ., concur.