Opinion ID: 1057701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the admission of mr. atilebawi's statement to officer jones as an excited utterance

Text: Mr. Banks asserts that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence statements made by Mr. Atilebawi to Officer Jones. Mr. Banks specifically takes issue with the following testimony: PROSECUTOR: Officer Jones, when you asked Mr. Atilebawi what happened, what did he tell you? OFFICER JONES: He told me that a person that he knew as Boo asked to use his phone. As he was talking on the phone he was acting very suspicious. And at that time he walked out. He felt a very sharp pain to his head and to his shoulder and heard a couple pops and he ran back inside the house. PROSECUTOR: ... Who ran back inside the house? OFFICER JONES: The ... suspect did.... They were outside talking because he walked back outside with the phone. And as they ran back inside the house, he felt anotherhe heard another pop and he felt a sharp pain to his shoulder. Mr. Banks objected at trial that this testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. The trial court, however, concluded that the testimony was admissible as an excited utterance and also stated it could possibly be admitted as a dying declaration. [12] The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err by admitting the statement as an excited utterance. Mr. Banks appeals from the Court of Criminal Appeals's conclusion. He contends that the statement does not fall within the excited utterance exception because (1) the statement was made in response to a question, (2) the statement was given several hours after Mr. Atilebawi was shot, and (3) Mr. Atilebawi was not still under the stress of a startling event. We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals's determination that the trial court did not err in admitting the statement as an excited utterance. Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are entrusted to the trial court's discretion. Thus, reviewing courts will not disturb these decisions on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn.2004); State v. James, 81 S.W.3d 751, 760 (Tenn.2002). Reviewing courts will find an abuse of discretion only when the trial court applied incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employed reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346, 358 (Tenn.2008). Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless permitted by the rules of evidence or otherwise by law. Tenn. R. Evid. 802. Tennessee law recognizes numerous exceptions to the bar on the admission of hearsay evidence. See generally Tenn. R. Evid. 803; Tenn. R. Evid. 804. Despite the significant number of exceptions, it would be a mistake to underestimate the force of the basic rule, which especially but by no means only in criminal trials, plainly excludes a substantial amount of otherwise relevant evidence. [13] Well-rooted among the myriad of exceptions to the general rule barring hearsay evidence are excited utterances. Excited utterances are statements relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Tenn. R. Evid. 803(2). To qualify as an excited utterance, three criteria must be met: (1) there must be a startling event or condition that causes the stress or excitement; (2) the statement must relate to the startling event or condition; and (3) the statement must be made while the declarant was under the stress or excitement caused by the startling event or condition. State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tenn.1997); State v. Samuel, 243 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Tenn.Crim.App.2007); see also Tennessee Law of Evidence § 8.07[3][b] to [3][d], at 8-75 to 8-78. Mr. Banks contends that Mr. Atilebawi's statements to Officer Jones cannot qualify as excited utterances because they were made in response to Officer Jones inquiring into what had happened. We find little merit in this argument because statements made in response to questions may still be admissible if the declarant is under the excitement or stress of the event. State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d at 820-21; see also State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Tenn.1993). Simply stated, [t]he fact that a question prompted the excited answer is a circumstance relevant to stress, but it does not automatically bar the statement's admission as an excited utterance. Tennessee Law of Evidence § 8.07[3][d], at 8-78. Mr. Banks also argues that the statements cannot qualify as excited utterances because they were made by Mr. Atilebawi to Officer Jones approximately four to six hours after the startling event. [14] We find little merit in this argument because the length of time between a startling event and the statement does not automatically preclude the statement's being admissible as an excited utterance. Williams v. State, No. W2006-00605-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 2120174, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. July 24, 2007). In fact, [t]he time interval is material only as a circumstance bearing on the issue of continuing stress. Tennessee Law of Evidence § 8.07[3][d], at 8-77. Finally, Mr. Banks argues that Mr. Atilebawi did not make his statement to Officer Jones while still under the stress of a startling event. As previously noted, if a statement is not made while the declarant is under the stress of a startling event, then it cannot qualify as an excited utterance. State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d at 820; State v. Samuel, 243 S.W.3d at 600; see also Tennessee Law of Evidence § 8.07[3][d], at 8-77 to 8-78. While the statements are not per se inadmissible because they were made several hours after the startling event in response to Officer Jones's questions, the facts that they were responses to questions and that they were made several hours after the shooting are relevant matters for the trial court to consider in assessing whether Mr. Atilebawi remained under the stress or excitement caused by his being shot four times by Mr. Banks. While not an exclusive list, other relevant factors include the nature and seriousness of the event or condition; the appearance, behavior, outlook, and circumstances of the declarant, including such characteristics as age and physical or mental condition; and the contents of the statement itself. State v. Gordon, 952 S.W.2d at 820; State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 574 (Tenn.1993); Tennessee Law of Evidence § 8.07[3][d], at 8-77. The trial court offered a detailed and persuasive analysis for its admission of Mr. Atilebawi's statements to Officer Jones as an excited utterance: I don't know how much more of a situation you could describe than to have been shot four or five times and have your Uncle in the other room shot, blood pouring out of your head and being asked who did this. I think it's still in the purview of all of the events that were transpiring, the spontaneity of it may certainly still be there. This is the first officer on the scene. He's going up to the guy saying what happened, who did this. This certainly [is an] excited utterance.... [I]f a person in good health has had 30 minutes to sit and ponder it, it may not be an excited utterance. But if an individual who has undergone this sort of traumatic event is asked by the first officer on the scene what happened, I think that the spontaneity and trustworthiness and reliability [are] there.... Although we conclude that the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule is not applicable, the trial court's analysis of the applicability of that exception bolsters its finding that this statement constituted an excited utterance. The trial court stated the following: [T]his guy had just been shot three times in the head. His Uncle had been shot execution style in the other room and he had blood gushing out of his head and he was undergoing all of this.... I think the injuries were so severe ... to the brain, to the head, ... and to the skull that it's entirely plausible ... that this person was giving this information to a law enforcement officer, contemplating [the] likelihood that he may not pull through. Officer Jones also offered the following testimony regarding Mr. Atilebawi's condition: When we actually got there, he was still on the couch and kind of in a dazed, confused state. And we saw all the blood and immediately we went ahead and started the paramedics to get over to treat him.... He was just in shock and ... just very, very disoriented and trying to tell us that his Uncle was still in the other room.... The determination of whether to admit the statements made by Mr. Atilebawi to Officer Jones is a discretionary one. Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding that particular inquiry. The nature of the event (being shot and left for dead while having a close associate shot and killed in one's home), the condition of the Mr. Atilebawi (in shock and requiring urgent medical attention), and the nature of the statement (answering an officer's inquiry about what had happened) all strongly support the conclusion that Mr. Atilebawi was still under the stress caused by the startling event. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Mr. Atilebawi's statements to Officer Jones under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.