Opinion ID: 654190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: CMI's Appeal

Text: Cedarapids is the assignee of two patents issued in the name of one of its engineers, Philip J. Schlarmann--United States Patents No. 4,165,184 (the '184 patent), an apparatus patent, and 4,318,619 (the '619 patent), a method patent. Schlarmann's inventions are directed to combining virgin aggregate and RAP in a double drum mixer. Schlarmann recognized that the burning of smaller asphalt particles (fines) in the RAP was the primary contributor to blue smoke. His method and apparatus are improvements on the devices and methods of parallel flow drum mixers where virgin aggregate is first introduced and heated and RAP is introduced later into the hot gas stream at a cooler point in the process. As described in the Schlarmann specifications, the RAP is not introduced directly into the hot gas stream, but is shielded upon entry by an inner sleeve or drum through which virgin aggregate is moving and being heated. As RAP slides down the hot surface of the inner drum, the fines are plasticized and adhere to larger recycle particles before entering the gas stream. Thus, fine particles, which otherwise would quickly incinerate and create blue smoke emissions, are eliminated or reduced. CMI was found to have directly infringed all claims of the '619 method patent and claims 1-4 and 6-23 of the '184 apparatus patent. We will treat claim 1 of the '184 apparatus patent as representative of the claims found to be infringed by CMI. 19 On appeal CMI contends that: 1 its apparatus does not satisfy the preheat limitation required by all claims found to be infringed; 2 its apparatus has one drum, not two; 3 there is no evidence that it directly infringes the '619 method; and 4 it has been deprived of its property without due process of law The district court denied CMI's motion for judgment despite the verdicts. We address each of CMI's contentions seriatim. A. The Preheat Limitation All of the claims of both Schlarmann patents contain a limitation that RAP must be heated to a temperature less than the destructive temperature of the asphalt but sufficient to at least begin rejuvenation before it is mixed with fresh aggregate and asphalt. There is no dispute that this preheat limitation is met in the accused device if given a straightforward reading. CMI contends, however, that its device does not preheat the RAP to a temperature as high as in a prior art reference, the Jakob's patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,075,710), and that during prosecution Cedarapids distinguished Jakob on the ground of inadequate heating of the RAP. Therefore, per CMI, the preheating requirement of both Schlarmann patents must be interpreted to mean something more than Jakob, and when so interpreted CMI cannot infringe either Schlarmann patent. We cannot accept CMI's convoluted argument. Claim interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Senmed, 888 F.2d at 818, 12 USPQ2d at 1511. We give the terms of the claims in issue their ordinary meaning, unless it is established that the inventor used them differently. Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759, 221 USPQ 473, 477 (Fed.Cir.1984). CMI argues that the patent's prosecution history shows a different usage is intended, citing ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1580, 6 USPQ2d 1557, 1560-61 (Fed.Cir.1988). We disagree. The isolated comments contained in multi-paragraph remarks distinguishing the Jakob reference, which neither mention nor relate to the specific claim language, provide no guidance here to interpretation. The question here is simply whether there is substantial evidence that RAP in the CMI drum mixers is heated to a temperature less than the destructive temperature of its old asphalt but sufficient to at least begin its rejuvenation, and the evidence is more than sufficient to support that necessary finding. A Cedarapids engineer testified that RAP contacted the CMI deflector ring (and an identical structure in the Cedarapids drum mixer) for one or two seconds. Schlarmann testified that this time was sufficient to rejuvenate, i.e., plasticize, the fine asphalt particles, causing them to adhere to the larger RAP particles before the RAP is introduced into the hot gas stream. CMI's promotional literature touted the effectiveness of its deflector ring in protecting [RAP] from hot gas stream, reducing blue smoke problems--the very problem addressed and solved by the invention of the Schlarmann patents. There is substantial evidence that the pre-heat limitation is satisfied. B. The Two Drum Limitation The CMI structure is illustrated below: NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE 12 CMI contends that this structure does not infringe the claims because it has only a deflector ring in a single drum and does not satisfy the limitations requiring the presence of a first drum into which a portion of a second drum extends. CMI characterizes the invention as requiring a drum within a drum. 13 Cedarapids' expert testified that the structure on the left up to where it surrounds the deflector ring is the first drum and the structure on the right including the deflector is the second drum which extends into the first drum. There is no limitation in the claim respecting how much of the second drum must be extended into the first drum. The testimony of CMI's president recognized a functional distinction between these two sections of the CMI mixer, distinguishing between its mixing section (left side) and drier section (right side). There is no dispute that RAP is introduced into the space between the upstream and downstream portions of these two sections, as is required by claim 1. Further, independent claim 21 and its dependent claims substitute the requirement of mixing chambers for claim 1's requirement of drums. In view of this evidence, we cannot hold that the jury could not reasonably find that the accused structure meets all limitations of the claims. C. Infringement Of The Method Patent 14 The district court's judgment states that CMI has directly infringed all claims of the '619 method patent, and that it has not actively induced infringement of any claim of either Schlarmann patent. This judgment was entered on the jury's special verdicts respecting direct infringement and inducement. Apparently there was no issue as to CMI's liability as a contributory infringer. CMI argues that because it is merely a manufacturer of asphalt plant equipment, and does not itself make asphalt, the judgment that it has directly infringed the method patent is based on a jury verdict unsupported by substantial evidence. 15 The '619 patent claims a method for recycling RAP in the production of HMA. The manufacture and sale of a drum mixer cannot directly infringe this method patent; it is directly infringed only when such drum mixers are used in the United States to make HMA by the claimed method. Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374, 21 USPQ2d 1321, 1332 (Fed.Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 60, 121 L.Ed.2d 28 (1992). Although the manufacturer of a drum mixer may be liable for inducement of infringement under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 271(b) (1988), Cedarapids has not challenged in its cross-appeal the judgment that CMI is not liable on this theory. The only question before us is whether the evidence of record is legally sufficient to prove CMI has directly infringed the '619 method patent. 16 The record shows that CMI annually staged open houses for its customers. It admits that at some of these events it used its mixers for demonstration purposes to make HMA. However, it would have to be inferred that it did so after the patent issued as there is no testimony directly on the point. We cannot hold that the jury could not reasonably make that inference. Accordingly, we must affirm the judgment that CMI has directly infringed the asserted method claims. D. Due Process 17 CMI argues that given the complexity and length of the trial and the confusion and inconsistency manifested by the verdicts, the judgment entered on the jury's verdicts has deprived the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. To the extent that CMI contends that it has been deprived of its property right in the '904 and '905 patents without due process, that contention is disposed of by our holding in Part III(D). CMI points to no confusion or internal inconsistencies involving the verdicts on the Schlarmann patents on which it was held liable.