Opinion ID: 2013848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: May 28, 1993, to February 28, 1994

Text: Following the reversal of defendant's convictions, the State appealed, first to this court and then to the United States Supreme Court. Nine months were consumed by these appellate proceedings. The appellate court, when ruling on defendant's speedy-trial claim, found this period of delay fully justified. We agree. In United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312, 106 S.Ct. 648, 654, 88 L.Ed.2d 640, 652 (1986), the United States Supreme Court considered, in a constitutional speedy-trial context, how to weigh the delay occasioned by an interlocutory appeal when the defendant is subject to indictment or restraint. The Loud Hawk Court held: Given the important public interests in appellate review [citation] it hardly need be said that an interlocutory appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that justifies delay. In assessing the purpose and reasonableness of such an appeal, courts may consider several factors. These include the strength of the Government's position on the appealed issue, the importance of the issue in the posture of the case, andin some casesthe seriousness of the crime. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315, 106 S.Ct. at 656, 88 L.Ed.2d at 654. Although Loud Hawk discussed interlocutory appeals, the Court observed, generally: [T]here are important public interests in the process of appellate review. The assurance that motions to suppress evidence or to dismiss an indictment are correctly decided through orderly appellate review safeguards both the rights of defendants and the `rights of public justice.' Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 313, 106 S.Ct. at 655, 88 L.Ed.2d at 653, quoting Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87, 25 S.Ct. 573, 576, 49 L.Ed. 950, 954 (1905). We find the reasoning in Loud Hawk applicable here. Applying its rationale, we find the nine-month delay in the matter at bar was justified. In this case, defendant's murder and arson convictions were reversed after the appellate court, contrary to the trial court, found the State failed to establish probable cause for defendant's arrest and suppressed defendant's confession. A confession is a vital piece of evidence and its suppression could compromise the State's prosecution. Consequently, it was reasonable for the State to seek review before proceeding to a new trial on this serious offense. Despite the State's lack of success, we do not find the appeal to have been frivolous or pursued in bad faith. Further, we do not find the nine-month delay to be unduly long. We conclude, therefore, that this period of delay was justified and should be given no effective weight towards defendant's speedy-trial claim. As additional support for this determination, we note that, under Illinois law, the State has an absolute right to appeal from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in    quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence and that [t]he time during which an appeal by the State is pending is not counted for the purpose of determining whether an accused is entitled to discharge under section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. 145 Ill.2d Rs. 604(a)(1), (a)(4). Although Rule 604(a) is not directly implicated in cases where, as here, defendant invokes his constitutional speedy-trial rights, the rule provides support for the notion that an appeal by the State is a valid reason which justifies delay. If the State reasonably exercises its right to pursue an appeal, it should not have to risk that the delay will be grounds for dismissal of the charges it seeks to enforce.