Opinion ID: 2794092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Minimum Age Qualifications

Text: A qualified applicant who is at least fifteen years of age may obtain an FID card for possession of a firearm in the home or business premises but must be at least twenty-one years of age in order to obtain a license to publicly carry a firearm. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, §§ 129B(1)(v), 131(d). Powell contends -23- that this age-based distinction unlawfully effects [an] absolute prohibition of an entire class of law-abiding adults from bearing arms, namely, those who are eighteen-to-twenty years old, and, thus, runs contrary to his Second Amendment and Equal Protection rights. We, however, agree with the Commonwealth that these federal constitutional claims are barred by the procedural default rule. A federal court generally will not review a § 2254 habeas claim when the state court's decision for that claim rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315-16 (2012); see Hodge v. Mendonsa, 739 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2013). Grounded in comity and federalism, the procedural default rule bars § 2254 habeas relief when a state court declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991), limited in part by Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319; Rosenthal v. O'Brien, 713 F.3d 676, 683 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 434 (2013). In Massachusetts, [o]nly one whose rights are impaired by a statute can raise the question of its constitutionality, and he can object to the statute only as applied to him. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 242 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Mass. 1968); see Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 277 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Mass. 1972). A criminal defendant -24- who is charged with violating a licensing statute may challenge the underlying state legislation even in the absence of an application for a license, but the scope of that state judicial review has its limits. Gordon, 242 N.E.2d at 401. In such cases, the SJC restricts its attention to the particular statutory provisions that are actually implicated by the charged unlicensed activity and declines to address provisions that do not represent injury incurred by virtue of the particular conviction secured against that defendant. See id. 401-02. Here, the SJC in Powell's direct appeal followed this state norm when declining to review the merits of Powell's agebased claims. Powell's criminal convictions rested on his conduct of publicly carrying a loaded firearm without authorization, and his lack of licensure was presumed due to his failure to produce proof on that affirmative defense. When considering Powell's argument that his firearms convictions must be reversed because the minimum age qualification was unconstitutional, the SJC immediately noted that Powell had not applied for a firearms permit and had failed to demonstrate that he would have been denied licensure based solely on his age. See Powell, 946 N.E.2d at 129-30 (citing Jackson, 344 N.E.2d at 169-70 n.3). The state court ruled, therefore, that Powell's narrow constitutional challenge to his convictions was foreclosed. See id. -25- In so holding, the SJC recognized that even if the agebased claims had merit, Powell's firearms convictions would remain intact given the various eligibility requirements left unchallenged that might very well operate to legitimately deny him a license, such as being a suitable person. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131(d). In other words, the court essentially held that the purportedly unconstitutional minimum age requirement, standing alone, did not necessarily injure Powell by rendering the convictions themselves unconstitutional. We conclude that the SJC's decision declining to address the merits of the federal constitutional questions rested on an adequate and independent state law ground that bars our review of Powell's constitutional claims. Powell seeks to excuse his state court default by relying on the futility doctrine. See Hodge, 739 F.3d at 43 (federal court may excuse state court default where a petitioner shows cause and actual prejudice). His argument is misplaced, however. Although federal courts may apply the futility doctrine in narrow circumstances for the federal exhaustion requirement, see Allen v. Attorney General of State of Me., 80 F.3d 569, 573 (1st Cir. 1996), Powell provides no authority to establish that the doctrine has any bearing on the excuse inquiry. Indeed, not one of the cases that he cites involves a § 2254 habeas petition, and our own research casts significant doubt on his presumed legal position. See -26- Berkley v. Quarterman, 310 F. App'x 665, 672-73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 843 (2009) (declining to recognize a futility exception for the state procedural default rule). Powell's cursory argument on prejudice also fails. By leaving untouched the various eligibility requirements for securing a license to publicly carry a loaded weapon, a successful constitutional challenge to the state's minimum age qualification alone does not necessarily demonstrate illegal state confinement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Allen, 442 U.S. at 154-55 (for a § 2254 petition, [a] party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights).6 Accordingly, we are foreclosed from reaching the merits of Powell's constitutional attacks on the minimum age qualification for obtaining a license to publicly carry a firearm in Massachusetts.