Opinion ID: 2543849
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Judicial Review of Evaluations

Text: Three psychologists designated by the Director to evaluate Patrick Ghilotti concluded that, following nearly four years of treatment at Atascadero State Hospital, he no longer is a sexually violent predator (SVP) as defined in the Act. Despite these negative evaluations, the district attorney, at the request of the Director, filed a petition seeking Ghilotti's recommitment as an SVP. The negative evaluations were not attached to the petition. Instead, the petition was supported by declarations of the Director, staff psychiatrists at Atascadero State Hospital, and the Chief Counsel of the State Department of Mental Health. In his declaration and in a letter to the district attorney, the Director stated that he disagreed with the conclusions of the designated evaluators that Ghilotti was not an SVP. In the opinion of the Director, Ghilotti was an SVP because he was likely to reoffend if released without supervision. The petition notes that the designated evaluators had concluded Ghilotti was not an SVP and that the Director had rejected one of these evaluations as not meeting the necessary criteria and ordered a third evaluation. The petition did not allege that the remaining negative evaluation was improperly prepared or otherwise deficient, and the district attorney did not wait for the third evaluation to be completed before seeking recommitment. Rather, the petition alleged that the evaluations were unnecessary because the Director is empowered under subdivision (h) of section 6601 to seek a petition for recommitment even if the designated evaluators conclude that the person does not meet the statutory criteria. At the hearing on the recommitment petition, the deputy district attorney stated that the government was proceeding on a somewhat unusual basis of asserting the Director had the authority under section 6601, subdivision (h), to seek a petition in the absence of evaluators' reports. The deputy district attorney stated that copies of the negative evaluations had been given to Ghilotti's counsel, but had not been given to the court, adding: We have those available. Ghilotti's counsel observed that Peters v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 845, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 350 held that the State Department of Mental Health (the Department) cannot disregard an evaluator's report, and the court replied: Well, that may be so in the circumstances of that case, but does it apply to circumstances in which the Department simply finds the report to be incompetent? Ghilotti's counsel agreed that if an examiner turned out to be a total fraud the Department could disregard the evaluation, but argued that's not the facts before this court. The court then noted that it had not seen the evaluations, but had some suspicion that the evaluations might be incompetent because these evaluators may well be assuming some level of treatment or support network after release that would be entirely subject to Mr. Ghilotti's own choice and election once he's released. Ghilotti's counsel responded that all three evaluations agreed that Ghilotti was not an SVP. The court asked whether the evaluators give reasoning in the evaluations and whether they recite the criteria that they used in evaluating Ghilotti. At this point, the deputy district attorney interjected: Do you think it would be helpful to you to have those evaluations to review? The court responded: No, because I don't think that is really my province. What I am concerned about is whether the Department of Mental Health knows what the criteria are, has properly informed the people who are responsible for making the evaluations and whether they have done it appropriately. In response to the court's questions, counsel for the Department confirmed that the Department trains the evaluators and gives them a protocol handbook. Counsel acknowledged that regrettably sometimes the evaluations don't comport with that protocol. If it fails to comport, then under those circumstances, as the Court suggested, we would not accept that as an evaluation. The court asked whether the protocol addressed the concerns the court had expressed and counsel responded he had to plead ignorance. After restating his concerns about whether the evaluators applied the correct standards, the court acknowledged that it was pursuing an issue that really isn't before me and added: If I had a strong declaration from the Department of Mental Health here today indicating that they have made a good faith effort to do the evaluation and in fact had carefully scrutinized the evaluations they had and determined them to be incompetent and were setting about finding appropriate evaluations based upon correct criteria, I would be a little more comfortable about the possibility of starting the process in motion and perhaps even contemplating the detention of Mr. Ghilotti further; but based upon the record I have here right now, as [Ghilotti's counsel] amply points out, I don't think that's within my power. The court, however, invited the Department to take further action: If you want to go back and talk to your people and get back to me some time tomorrow with a better explanation of what is going on than I have now, I will give you time. The court rejected the Department's argument that the Director had the authority under section 6601, subdivision (h), to seek a petition without the concurrence of two designated evaluators, but observed that the Director has not only the discretion, but the responsibility to review the evaluations and make sure that they are competent. ... The following day, counsel for the Department did not appear and the deputy district attorney informed the court he had not received any additional materials and ha[d] no other legal authority to propose to the Court.... The court dismissed the petition. I find no basis for faulting the superior court. The superior court correctly rejected the government's sole argument in support of the petition that section 6601, subdivision (h), authorized the Director to seek a petition without the concurrence of two designated evaluators. Neither the district attorney nor the Department ever asked the court to review the negative evaluations or asserted that those evaluations were incompetent or deficient in any respect. Even after the court invited the Department to review the evaluations and recessed for the evening, the Department did not ask the court to review the evaluations and did not assert that the evaluations were incompetent or deficient. Accordingly, I see no basis for vacating the Court of Appeal's order denying mandamus. The issuance of a writ of mandate to compel a judicial act is appropriate only if the lower court has erred. ( Hurtado v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574, 579, 114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d 666 [The trial court is under a legal duty to apply the proper law and may be directed to perform that duty by writ of mandate]; 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Extraordinary Writs, § 99, p. 890 [`abuse of discretion' means only that the decision is wrong in law].) The superior court in the present case did not err. Because the superior court never was asked to review the negative evaluations, this case is a poor vehicle for deciding whether the court has the authority to do so. I prefer to await a case that involves a request for judicial review of a negative evaluation before addressing this issue.