Opinion ID: 2604574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: State Attorney Advocatory Immunity in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; and Pre-Proceeding Qualified Immunity

Text: The court of appeals determined that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to Baker's investigative activities prior to the commencement of the Board's quasi-adjudicatory proceeding and her advocatory activities therein: at this stage of the proceeding, there exists a genuine issue of fact as to whether Baker participated in the investigatory stage of the proceedings. Thus, summary judgment was granted prematurely on this issue. Stjernholm III, No. 94CA0917, slip op. at 9. We disagree and uphold the trial court's determination that Stjernholm failed to allege sufficient facts that Baker engaged in any investigatory misconduct, outside of her absolute immunity status, in violation of section 1983. State attorneys acting in quasi-adjudicatory proceedings enjoy absolute immunity in the same manner as prosecutors when `intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' Higgs, 713 P.2d at 851 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). We follow the federal courts in using a functional analysis to determine whether a prosecutorial or advocatory activities are absolutely immune. See Higgs, 713 P.2d at 852-53. In making this determination, we distinguish between those functions that are adjudicatory in nature, and those that are investigative or administrative in nature. See id. at 853. Adjudicatory functions are typically closely related to the judicial process itself, and are absolutely immune; investigative and administrative functions enjoy only qualified immunity. See id. Three factors are utilized in determining whether absolute or qualified immunity applies: (1) whether the challenged conduct occurred prior to or subsequent to the filing of formal criminal charges against the individual seeking redress; (2) whether safeguards existed that could deter or mitigate prosecutorial abuse thus lessening the need for a civil action to redress the violation of constitutional rights; and (3) whether the challenged conduct more closely resembles police conduct rather than prosecutorial conduct. See id. Baker is entitled to absolute immunity for actions she took after the Board referred the quasi-adjudicatory case to her on December 6, 1990, including the preparation of the Order of Summary Suspension, Notice of Informal Prehearing Conference, Notice of Hearing, Notice of Charges, and subsequent proceedings regarding the temporary license suspension or permanent license revocation. In its May 18, 1994 Order granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that plaintiff failed to come forward with sufficient specific facts to prove that Baker engaged in such [investigative] activity as to warrant the Court setting aside Baker's absolute prosecutorial immunity in this case. We agree. The term investigation, for which only qualified immunity exists, connotes witness interviews and other evidence-gathering activity preceding the filing of formal charges against an individual. Once formal charges have been filed, the role of the state's attorney changes from investigative to prosecutorial or advocatory, invoking absolute immunity. See Higgs, 713 P.2d at 854. [13] The Board, on December 6, 1990, commenced adjudicatory proceedings and referred the case to Baker to prepare the summary suspension order and take other advocatory action therein. Prior thereto, Mary Gorham and others, not Assistant Attorney General Baker, acted as the Board's investigator for the case. In the course of that investigation, Gorham contacted Baker on November 17, 1989, requesting any names Baker might have pertinent to Gorham's investigation. In response, Baker sent a handwritten memorandum to Gorham listing persons and entities, including two doctors, an association of claims adjusters, and the Wyoming Board of Chiropractic Examiners. In her affidavit in this case, Baker swore that at no time prior to December 6, 1990, did she personally investigate any of the allegations against Dr. Stjernholm or interview any witnesses. All conversations with patients, insurance companies and doctors referenced in [her] deposition occurred after the December 6, 1990 meeting and were necessary for [her] preparation of the Order of Summary Suspension, Notice to Set an Informal Prehearing Conference, Notice of Hearing and Notice of Charges signed by the Board on February 8, 1991. Stjernholm made no factual showing controverting this affidavit. Stjernholm contends that there are numerous examples in Baker's deposition that she was intimately involved in this investigatory process of the case against Dr. Stjernholm. But the record does not support the existence of any facts tending to show that Baker personally interviewed any of the persons or entities listed or committed misconduct, which might provide the basis for section 1983 liability. Stjernholm relies on Baker's deposition; however, upon review of that testimony, we are satisfied that Baker's investigation occurred after the Board referred the case to her on December 6, 1990, and that such activities were part of her quasi-judicial role. Stjernholm, pro se, deposed Baker. During the deposition, Stjernholm repeatedly asked questions of Baker regarding interviews in connection with the Order of Summary Suspension, which was issued on February 8, 1991. None of Baker's answers implicates investigation by her prior to the Board's meeting on December 6, 1990. [14] We agree with the district court that Stjernholm made no colorable showing of Baker's allegedly improper involvement in the investigation. Supplying pertinent names to an investigator is not sufficient evidence of misconduct; rather, such conduct is expected of public officials who are contacted by law enforcement personnel. It is well settled that the burden of establishing the unreasonableness of an exercise of state police power is upon the party attacking that exercise. 4-D Bros., Inc. v. Heckers, 33 Colo.App. 421, 424, 522 P.2d 749, 751 (1974). Even if Baker had engaged in the investigation which preceded commencement of the adjudicatory proceedings, she would be entitled to qualified immunity from suit. To withstand a motion for summary judgment in the qualified immunity context, violation of a clearly established constitutional right [15] and material facts of misconduct must be pleaded. See Brace, 919 P.2d at 243; see also United States v. Lanier, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1227, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (In the civil sphere, we have explained that qualified immunity seeks to ensure that defendants `reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability,' by attaching liability only if `[t]he contours of the right [violated are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.') (citations omitted) (alteration in original). In County of Adams v. Hibbard, 918 P.2d 212 (Colo.1996), where a county attorney ordered the destruction of plaintiff's residence and personal property which had not been the subject of the ALJ's order, we stated that [a] public official who knowingly and capriciously acts outside the authority of government to deprive a citizen of property rightfully that of the citizen should not be able to escape liability by donning the cloak of government action as an aid to his or her defense. Id. at 221. Deliberately abusive, fraudulent, oppressive, or harsh conduct in violation of a federal constitutional right is what section 1983 is intended to remedy. See Hibbard, 918 P.2d at 218, 220. In Crouse v. City of Colorado Springs, 766 P.2d 655, 660 (Colo. 1988), we noted that not all intentional misconduct by state officials is subject to relief under section 1983. [E]xcessive force or other outrageous abuse of government authority directed against citizens is precisely the type of misconduct which the remedies created by Congress in § 1983 were designed to deter. Id. The court of appeals erroneously concluded that there existed a genuine issue of fact with respect to Baker's participation in investigatory activities prior to initiation of the quasi-judicial proceeding, which might constitute a violation of section 1983 sufficient to withstand summary judgment. [16]