Opinion ID: 1116091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: effect of worker's compensation

Text: Section 1-1-110(a), W.S. 1977, provides that, where two (2) or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them   . Cities Service, however, may not recover from Northern Production by way of contribution its pro rata share of the judgment because the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act result in the employer being liable not in tort for negligence or fault as required by § 1-1-110, supra, but by operation of law under the Worker's Compensation Act. Heckart v. Viking Exploration, Inc., 673 F.2d 309 (10th Cir.1982). Thus, it is said: The great majority of jurisdictions have held that the employer whose concurring negligence contributed to the employee's injury cannot be sued or be joined by the third party as a joint tortfeasor, whether under contribution statutes or at common law. The ground is a simple one: the employer is not jointly liable to the employee in tort. (Footnotes omitted.) 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 76.20. See, Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1226 (1982); Heckart v. Viking Exploration, Inc., supra. Although a third party may not recover an employer's pro rata share by way of contribution, the right of indemnity is preserved in § 1-1-110(f), W.S. 1977, which provides: W.S. 1-1-110 through 1-1-113 do not impair any right of indemnity under the existing law. Where one (1) tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation. Here there was a written contract between Cities Service and Northern Production providing for indemnity. With respect to contracts between the parties providing for indemnity, it is stated that: The clearest exception to the exclusive-liability clause [in worker's compensation] is the third party's right to enforce an express contract in which the employer agrees to indemnify the third party for the very kind of loss that the third party has been made to pay to the employee. 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 76.42. See also, Shields v. Bechtel Power Corp., 439 F. Supp. 192 (1977). Thus, it is said that an employer, though otherwise protected by worker's compensation statutes against a claim resulting from injury of its employee, can nevertheless contract away that protection and agree to indemnify a third party against the claim. Such indemnification is held valid in every jurisdiction with similar statutes. City of Artesia v. Carter, 94 N.M. 311, 610 P.2d 198 (1980). At this point we must distinguish between cases in which a third party sued by an employee seeks indemnity against his employer upon an agreement that pertains to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any mineral and one that does not so pertain. Where the indemnity agreement does not concern a well for oil, gas or water or mine for mineral, there is no statute declaring an agreement which indemnifies against one's own negligence to be void. Thus, where the agreement, in clear and unambiguous language and beyond peradventure when strictly construed, provides indemnification against one's own negligence, it will be upheld. Wyoming Johnson, Inc. v. Stag Industries, Inc., supra. The indemnity agreement involved in this case, however, does pertain to a well for oil or gas and therefore is governed by § 30-1-131, W.S. 1977, which provides as follows: (a) All agreements, covenants or promises contained in, collateral to or affecting any agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any mineral, which purport to indemnify the indemnitee against loss or liability for damages for: (i) Death or bodily injury to persons; (ii) Injury to property; or (iii) Any other loss, damage, or expense arising under either (i) or (ii) from: (A) The sole or concurrent negligence of the indemnitee or the agents or employees of the indemnitee or any independent contractor who is directly responsible to such indemnitee; or (B) From any accident which occurs in operations carried on at the direction or under the supervision of the indemnitee or an employee or representative of the indemnitee or in accordance with methods and means specified by the indemnitee or employees or representatives of the indemnitee, are against public policy and are void and unenforceable to the extent that such contract of indemnity by its terms purports to relieve the indemnitee from loss or liability for his own negligence. This provision shall not affect the validity of any insurance contract or any benefit conferred by the Worker's Compensation Law [§§ 27-12-101 to XX-XX-XXX] of this state. (Emphasis supplied.) By enactment of this statute the legislature has declared it to be against public policy to provide indemnity against loss or liability resulting from one's own negligence in an agreement pertaining to wells for oil, gas or water, or mines for mineral. It is undisputed that the agreement between Cities Service and Northern Production did pertain to wells for oil [or] gas. We must determine whether (a) the parties' indemnity agreement provides for indemnity against Cities Service's own negligence and is, therefore, void, or whether it provides indemnity only for the negligence of Northern Production in its work under the agreement and is, therefore, valid and enforceable, and (b) whether the agreement, in any event under the provisions of § 30-1-131, supra, is void in its entirety.