Opinion ID: 4547352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agencies

Text: ¶147 While agencies are part of the executive branch once established, it is the legislature that creates agencies and grants them power as is necessary to carry into effect the general legislative purpose. Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶12, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600. An administrative agency has only those powers as are expressly conferred by the statutory provisions under which it operates.3 State ex rel. 2011 Wis. Act 21 affected the authority of agencies by 3 imposing an explicit authority requirement on agency 6 No. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr Castaneda v. Welch, 2007 WI 103, ¶26, 303 Wis. 2d 570, 735 N.W.2d 131 (quoting Brown Cty. v. DHSS, 103 Wis. 2d 37, 43, 307 N.W.2d 247 (1981)); see also Schmidt v. Dep't of Res. Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 56, 158 N.W.2d 306 (1968) (The very existence of the administrative agency or director is dependent upon the will of the legislature; its or his powers, duties and scope of authority are fixed and circumscribed by the legislature and subject to legislative change.); Gray Well Drilling Co. v. Wis. State Bd. of Health, 263 Wis. 417, 419, 58 N.W.2d 64 (1953) (explaining that administrative agencies are not required to follow rules governing judicial proceedings unless a statute requires otherwise because rules of procedure for administrative bodies are a function that belongs to the legislature); State ex rel. Wis. Inspector Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 508, 220 N.W. 929 (1928) ([A]dministrative agencies are the creatures of the legislature and are responsible to it. Consequently the legislature may withdraw authority. See generally Kirsten Koschnick, Comment, Making Explicit Authority Explicit: Deciphering Wis. Act 21's Prescriptions for Agency Rulemaking Authority, 2019 Wis. L. Rev. 993. This requirement is set out in Wis. Stat. § 227.10(2m), which provides: No agency may implement or enforce any standard, requirement, or threshold, . . . unless that standard, requirement, or threshold is explicitly required or explicitly permitted by statute or by a rule that has been promulgated in accordance with this subchapter[.] Section 227.10(2m) clearly limits agency authority from what courts had held in the past. Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 2020 WI 42, ¶52, 391 Wis. 2d 497, 942 N.W.2d 900. Justice Kelly never mentions the explicit authority requirement of § 227.10(2m). 7 No. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr powers which have been granted, prescribe the procedure through which granted powers are to be exercised, and if necessary wipe out the agency entirely.). ¶148 I agree that separation of powers is a doctrine that is firmly established under Wisconsin law. Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 696 n.8 (explaining that the Wisconsin Constitution art. IV., sec. 1 vests legislative power in the senate and assembly; art. V., sec. 1 vest[s] executive power in the governor and lieutenant governor; and art. VII, sec. 2 vest[s] judicial power in a unified court system); see also Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 360. However, administrative agencies have no constitutional core powers because they are not a branch of government in our tripartite system. Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 696 n.8. Stated otherwise, the core power of the executive resides with the governor and lieutenant governor; it does not reside with administrative agencies, which are merely creatures of statute. Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist. v. DNR, 2011 WI 54, ¶23, 335 Wis. 2d 47, 799 N.W.2d 73; see also Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶47 (R. Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (Article V, Section 1 'vest[s]' the 'executive power . . . in a governor' . . . . These constitutional 'grants are exclusive,' which has been understood to mean 'only the vested recipient of that power can perform it.' (alterations in the original) (internal citations omitted)). ¶149 Justice Kelly reasons that creating guidance documents is a core power of the executive because the power to create guidance documents does not come from the legislature: [A] 8 No. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr guidance document is something created by the executive branch employees through the exercise of executive authority native to that branch of government. Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶105. Justice Kelly asserts that unlike a rule, the executive branch needs no borrowed authority from the legislature to create a guidance document. Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶100. He asserts, This creative power is necessarily inherent to the executive because no other branch of government has even the theoretical ability to know the executive's mind with respect to the law he is to execute. Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶102. ¶150 He cites no authority for this change in the law, which has repeatedly held that administrative agencies are creations of the legislature and that they can exercise only those powers granted by the legislature. Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 697; see also Castaneda, 303 Wis. 2d 570, ¶26; Brown, 103 Wis. 2d at 43. As creatures of statute, the legislature may prescribe the procedure through which granted powers [of administrative agencies] are to be exercised. Whitman, 196 Wis. at 508. ¶151 Justice Kelly also ignores our decision in Unnamed Defendant where an acting district attorney concluded that he could not prove a sexual assault occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, and, therefore, decided not to commence criminal proceedings. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 356. Notably, his conclusion occurred outside the context of a judicial proceeding, as most charging decisions do. Nevertheless, the circuit court ordered the district attorney or his designee to 9 No. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr file charges pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3), which states a judge may permit the filing of a complaint in a John Doe proceeding if the judge finds there is probable cause to believe that the person to be charged has committed an offense after conducting a hearing. Id. at 357. We upheld the circuit court's decision. Id. at 367. In so doing, we authorized circuit courts to disregard prosecutors' statutory interpretations in light of the John Doe Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 968.02(3) and 968.26. Id. at 366. The interpretation of the acting district attorney would not have been overruled if interpretation of the law were a core power of the executive. ¶152 Justice Kelly ultimately concludes that the answer to whether the legislature can legislate in regard to guidance documents depends on whether the creation of guidance documents represents an exercise of the executive's core function, or merely a power shared with the legislature. Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶103. To address this concern, he creates his own definition core powers: A branch's core powers are those that define its essential attributes. Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶104. He acknowledges that if guidance documents fall within shared powers, the legislature may have the right to govern their content and dissemination. Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶104. However, he does not give a moment's pause to shared powers, but rather, he opines that all of his legal contentions are true because guidance documents merely explain statutes and rules, or provide guidance or advice about how the executive is likely to apply them. Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶106. 10 No. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr ¶153 To explain shared powers, and their relationship to core powers, it is neither possible nor practicable to categorize all governmental action as exclusively legislative, executive or judicial. Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 696 (quoting State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 825, 266 N.W.2d 597 (1978)). Therefore, separation of powers is transgressed only when one branch interferes with a constitutionally guaranteed 'exclusive zone' of authority vested in another branch, Martinez, 165 Wis. 2d at 697, i.e., a constitutional core power, or when a shared power is unduly burdened. Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 556, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998). ¶154 If explaining what the law means through guidance documents actually were a constitutional core power of the executive, courts could not strike down such an interpretation. Yet courts have done so when an agency oversteps the authority granted by the legislature in reliance on the agency's interpretation of what the law requires. Newcap, 383 Wis. 2d 515, ¶3; Papa v. DHS, 2020 WI __, ¶2, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. ¶155 Additionally, the legislature often interprets its own laws. In the case before us, members of the legislature would not have standing if the legislature had no power to interpret its laws. Yet Justice Kelly takes no issue with these members arguing before our court. ¶156 Justice Kelly also supports his legal conclusion with quotes from portions of Tetra Tech. For example, he says: The executive must certainly interpret and apply the law; it would be impossible to perform his duties if 11 No. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr he did not. . . . Our constitution not only does not forbid this, it requires it. Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶96 (citing Tetra Tech, 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶53 (lead)). However, this paragraph of Tetra Tech was joined by only one justice in addition to Justice Kelly who wrote the provision; it does not represent the opinion of the court. Id., ¶3 n.4. Indeed, Justice Ziegler wrote a concurrence, which I joined, in part to respond to this portion of the lead opinion in Tetra Tech. Id., ¶141 & n.10 (Ziegler, J., concurring). She explained that the power to interpret and apply the law is a shared power outside the context of a judicial proceeding. Id., ¶¶140–41. ¶157 That an executive would interpret a law as he executes it does not convert interpretation of the law into a constitutional core power. Interpretation of the law is a shared power that many governmental actors employ as they interpret what they must do in order to be in compliance with the law. See e.g., State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 644-45, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999) (discussing the shared power of administrative revocation of probation and the court's power to sentence); State v. Dums, 149 Wis. 2d 314, 323-24, 440 N.W.2d 814 (1989) (discussing the shared power to amend or dismiss a filed charge under the separation of powers doctrine). ¶158 A final note worth mentioning is the standard of review. Justice Kelly and I agree on the standard of review, although we apply it quite differently. He explains that, because this lawsuit is a facial challenge, we must uphold the 12 No. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.pdr statutes unless they cannot be enforced under any circumstances. Justice Kelly's majority op., ¶92. He later states: [The legislature] may not control [the Governor's] knowledge or intentions about those laws. Nor may it mute or modulate the communication of his knowledge or intentions to the public. Because there are no set of facts pursuant to which §§ 33 (to the extent it applies to guidance documents) and 38 would not impermissibly interfere with the executive's exercise of his core constitutional power, they are in that respect facially unconstitutional.