Opinion ID: 1547681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Liability of Heirs and Distributees of Estates of Deceased Stockholders.

Text: C. E. Gannon, a stockholder, held 130 shares of stock on November 26, 1929. He died December 4, 1934. His estate was probated and notice to creditors to present their claims was published June 18, 1935. Appellees did not file their claim against his estate. On February 29, 1936, a final decree of distribution was entered distributing the entire estate to his wife, Kate Gannon, and his two daughters, Florence Lovell and Ruth Munger. The distribution of this estate was prior to the date on which appellees obtained their judgment against the bank in the state district court. Kate Gannon died May 24, 1941, and her estate descended to her two daughters, Florence Lovell and Ruth Munger. Appellees failed to file their claim against the estate of Kate Gannon, and have abandoned their claim against her estate. Oklahoma adheres to the Minnesota rule, [19] which permits action by a creditor of a decedent against heirs, devisees or legatees of the estate who have received assets of the estate, to the extent of the value thereof. [20] Appellants contend, however, that appellees' claim is barred for failure to comply with 58 O.S.A. § 333. The first part of this section provides that all contracts heretofore made are forever barred if not presented against the estate within the time fixed in the notice for the presentation of claims. This portion of the statute provides that claims that are contingent or not due may be presented within one month after they become absolute. The latter part of the section deals with contracts thereafter made and provides that as to such contracts all claims thereunder, whether due, not due, or contingent, must be presented within the time fixed in the notice or they are barred. We have held that the American National Bank was insolvent after November 26, 1929. It must follow that appellees had a contingent claim against stockholders C. E. Gannon at least from the time they instituted their suit against the bank. Appellants in their appeal largely rely upon two decisions by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to sustain their position, Fluke v. Douglas, 158 Okl. 300, 13 P.2d 210, and Timmons v. Hanna Const. Co., 176 Okl. 180, 55 P.2d 110. Both of these cases involved express contracts. Here the liability arose by operation of law and creates a relationship in the nature of an implied contract. No decision by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is cited dealing with obligations or implied contracts arising by operation of law. A reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision would seem to indicate that it applies only to express contracts. In the absence of any aid from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, we so interpret the section. Furthermore, there is no showing in the record when this stock was purchased. No finding was requested and none was made. In this condition of the record, we cannot say that the decision of the trial court in this respect is erroneous. That part of the judgment against D. J. Oven, N. E. Crumpacker, C. F. Randolph and R. L. Sanford for $188,280 and interest, as directors, is reversed, and the actions are remanded with directions to dismiss the third cause of action against the directors with prejudice. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The costs of the appeal are equally divided between appellants and appellees.