Opinion ID: 2402642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard for Establishing a First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Text: Anemone contends that he was subjected to adverse employment actions, culminating in his termination, in retaliation for his allegedly protected expressive activity exposing corruption in the MTA. He points to three instances of allegedly protected speech: (1) his (and Casale's) conversations with the Queens DA's office, culminating in the March 4, 2003, communication among Anemone, Casale, and Ryan regarding the Bauer/Plasser investigation; (2) his March 28, 2003 communication with New York Times reporters, which resulted in the Times article recounting Anemone's allegations that MTA officials were impeding corruption investigations and thereby undermin[ing] efforts to protect the transit system from terrorism, App. at 228; and (3) his April 11, 2003, appearance before the New York State Assembly Standing Committee on Corporations, Authorities and Commissions. This Court has previously outlined the standard for assessing when the speech of a public employee is protected from retaliation by the First Amendment. This standard entails two inquiries: (1) `whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern' and, if so, (2) `whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.' Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006)). To survive summary judgment on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public employee must bring forth evidence showing that he has engaged in protected First Amendment activity, he suffered an adverse employment action, and there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir.2007). In addition, when the plaintiff's protected conduct is a unitary event that could prompt either a permissible or an impermissible reason on the part of the defendant to act, ... claims of alleged retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional or statutory right require focusing precisely on whether the defendant acted for an impermissible reason, and not merely in response to the plaintiff's conduct. Greenwich Citizens Committee, Inc. v. Counties of Warren & Washington Indus. Dev. Agency, 77 F.3d 26, 33 (2d Cir.1996). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that an improper motive played a substantial part in defendant's action. Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 288 (2d Cir.2003). Even if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie retaliation claim, a government defendant may still receive summary judgment if it establishes its entitlement to a relevant defense. One such defense, articulated in Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, provides that even if there is evidence that the adverse employment action was motivated in part by protected speech, the government can avoid liability if it can show that it would have taken the same adverse action in the absence of the protected speech. Heil v. Santoro, 147 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.1998). The constitutional principle at stake[, i.e., freedom from retaliation for protected speech,] is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the [protected] conduct. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86, 97 S.Ct. 568. This principle prevents an employee who engages in unprotected conduct from escaping discipline for that conduct by the fact that it was related to protected conduct, Heil, 147 F.3d at 110, and ensures that an employee who makes an unprotected statement is not immunized from discipline by the fact that this statement is surrounded by protected statements, id. (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 681, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (internal quotation mark omitted)). We have noted that although the language in Mt. Healthy refers to the plaintiff's conduct, the [Supreme] Court's analysis, properly understood, attempts to weigh the impact of the defendant's impermissible reason on the defendant's decision to act, such that a defendant can avoid liability by showing that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible reason. Greenwich Citizens Comm., 77 F.3d at 32. The burden is on the government to make out the defense. Heil, 147 F.3d at 110. The government can also avoid liability under what is commonly referred to as the Pickering balancing test. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Under this defense, [a] government employer may take an adverse employment action against a public employee for speech on matters of public concern if: (1) the employer's prediction of the disruption that such speech will cause is reasonable; (2) the potential for disruption outweighs the value of the speech; and (3) the employer took the adverse employment action not in retaliation for the employee's speech, but because of the potential for disruption. Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir.2003). Thus, defendants may ... escape liability if they can demonstrate that ... the plaintiff's expression was likely to disrupt the government's activities and that the harm caused by the disruption outweighs the value of the plaintiff's expression. Skehan v. Village of Mamaroneck, 465 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir.2008). Again, the burden is on the defendants. Id.