Opinion ID: 1935215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: admission of alleged cover up evidence

Text: The defendant next contends that the trial justice repeatedly erred by admitting evidence of an alleged cover up of defendant's involvement in the crime by certain members of the Woonsocket police department and defendant's relatives. According to defendant, this evidence was never connected to him, was only negligibly relevant, and as such was extremely and unfairly prejudicial to him. For the first time, defendant also argues that the evidence failed the more stringent balancing test applied to other-crimes evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. As a result of these admissions, defendant asserts that he was forced to try two cases: one for murder and the other for a much contrived, unindicted obstruction of justice case. This alleged cover-up evidence was brought out mainly through the prosecution's witnesses in its case in chief. During direct examination Detective Douglas Connell (Connell) of the Woonsocket police department testified that defendant's father, before retiring from the Woonsocket police department, had obtained the rank of Chief Inspector. The defendant objected on grounds of relevancy, prompting the following exchange between the trial justice and the prosecutor: THE COURT: Well, I don't know now the relevancy. He retired from the police department in '74. Is there going to be some tie in? PROSECUTOR: Yes, your Honor, I anticipate. THE COURT: All right. If you give me that assurance, fine. Otherwise I'll instruct the jury to disregard it. Go ahead. When questioning resumed, Connell testified that upon retiring, Ray, Sr., was appointed the high sheriff of Providence County. Following this answer, the prosecution asked Connell to explain what the special-squad unit of the Woonsocket police department was to which he was assigned in February 1982. Defense counsel objected, requesting a sidebar during which he argued: [T]his goes directly to the motion in limine regarding the state producing evidence of activities in the Woonsocket Police Department that were improper, illegal, or whatever, and I press my motion in limine. That's what's happening here this morning, Judge. It has no relevancy to this case. It is prejudicial to my client and I object to it and I press my motion in limine. The prosecutor responded that the evidence was very relevant to show what had happened at the crime scene and that it would eventually be tied in to defendant through the testimony of another witness. The trial justice eventually responded: Well, I think you better put the witness on first because I'm not going to let this thing get all blown out of proportion and then if it doesn't fit in, have to grant a motion to pass. The sidebar ended with the prosecution withdrawing the question that prompted defense counsel's motion to pass. Shortly after questioning resumed, defense counsel again objected, on the grounds of relevancy, to Connell's description of the crime scene as the bulkhead was still open. There were people literally all over the grounds and in and out of the house. During the ensuing colloquy with the prosecutor, the court asked [w]hat has [this evidence] got to do with this charge against this defendant, unless you are going to tie [it] in with this defendant. The prosecutor again promised the court that the evidence would be subsequently connected. The court responded: [w]hen you get it in then we'll build from there. We are not going to build down to it, then if we never get to it I have to strike all the evidence and perhaps consider a motion to pass. Consequently the objection was sustained. Another objection as to relevancy was also sustained in regard to the interview of Sherri Richards by police. During the ensuing sidebar, the court again admonished the prosecution, [W]e are not trying the Woonsocket Police Department. And unless there was some conduct here, cover-up, in connection with this defendant, then its totally irrelevant. The trial justice further explained: And the fact that somebody wasn't interviewed for a period of time, to me, and this is connected with the defendant, unless the defendant has some connection with it, I don't know what the relevancy is anymore than would be if Gordon burned any statements and said he never received them. You've got to tie it in and that's what I'm concerned about. Following this exchange, defendant moved to pass after Connell explained that the department had cooperated with the State Police in reviewing all the statements and information the department had gathered in an effort to eliminate possible suspects. Defense counsel objected and moved to pass, stating that the impression created for the jury was that the police went through a process of elimination and came up with defendant and that he therefore must be guilty. The court disagreed stating that there was no basis to pass the case at this point. However, the court again expressed concern that [t]his is not a case of a cover up, its not a case of how bad or negligent the Woonsocket Police Department was, it's a case where this defendant is charged with murder. And the State has to prove those elements and they can't do it by default, by showing that there is a default on the part of the Woonsocket Police Department. A few moments later defense counsel again moved to pass when Connell named the five members of the Woonsocket police department, including Gordon, interviewed by the State Police as part of their assistance with the ongoing investigation of the murder. At sidebar, defense counsel complained that the state was trying to paint [defendant] with the brush of this so-called negligence or cover-up with the Woonsocket Police Department. The trial justice denied the motion and reiterated his earlier warning that unless there is a connection made at the end of this case, I most certainly am going to grant the motion. Following Connell's testimony, the state called Vaz, who testified that two days after the murder he had a conversation with defendant during which defendant stated, `My father won't get me out of this one.' Vaz also stated that defendant gave a detailed description of his flight from the murder scene with Monteiro and Shaw. According to Vaz, defendant described how the three of them were screaming back and forth at each other in the car after leaving the murder scene when defendant stopped to call his father, Ray, Sr. After failing to reach his father, defendant called Gordon, who tracked their father down at the Gridiron Club along with Captain Francis J. Lynch (Lynch) of the Woonsocket police department. In the meantime, defendant had made contact with Gordon again, who informed defendant that Ray, Sr., and Lynch were on their way to the crime scene. Upon arriving at the crime scene, Ray, Sr., parked across the street while Lynch entered the house, ordering everybody to come out. According to Vaz, defendant explained that Lynch wanted Gordon to go down into the basement to wipe fingerprints off the pipe while Lynch spoke to the officers on the scene. However, Gordon was unable to find the pipe. Whereupon, he walked back across the street to inform Ray, Sr., of his failure. Ray, Sr., called defendant to find out where the pipe was, in turn relaying defendant's information to Gordon; Gordon went back down into the cellar. Upon finding the pipe, he wiped it clean and changed its location. In the days following the murder, according to the record, Gordon along with other Woonsocket police officers went back to the scene and retrieved the pipe. The state also called Terrence Gelinas (Gelinas), who first arrived at the crime scene when police and rescue vehicles appeared. Gelinas testified that he noticed Ray, Sr., across the street from the crime scene an hour to an hour and a half after the attack. He further stated that in 1991 he had a conversation with defendant in which defendant told him that [y]ou are going to wish you never got involved in this. The defendant continued, telling Gelinas that he was going to kill Pennington, who was heavily involved in the investigation, and that his father, Ray, Sr., was going to `take care of other people,' including the prosecutor in this case. He continued, stating, `I wouldn't want to be you. I wouldn't want anybody to talk. Moe (Jalette of the Woonsocket police department) and Gordy are just waiting.    If I get convicted, my father is taking care of you.' The defendant also asserts that following the testimony of Vaz and Gelinas, improper evidence was also brought out through Michael Asselin (Asselin) and Bousquet. Asselin was a locksmith who, along with Robert Bosclair (Bosclair), installed deadbolts on the back and hall doors of the apartment house the morning after the murder. Asselin testified that two police officers were present while he was changing the locks. He later identified one of the two as Gordon. Bosclair testified that he saw the officers holding a pipe wrapped in a piece of cloth. Four days after this incident patrolman detective Richard Flood (Flood) and Gordon were part of as police detail assigned to look for the murder weapon that the Woonsocket police department still had not found. According to Flood, Gordon pointed out the pipe to him as the two walked through the house. With reference to Bousquet, see discussion infra, defendant contends that testimony concerning the fact that Bousquet's taperecorded statement was altered after it had been turned over by the Blackstone police to the Woonsocket police department was irrelevant and as such prejudicial. However, Bousquet also told of a conversation she overheard defendant having with her boyfriend Guarino wherein defendant admitted killing Picard and also stated that `his father had paid off a large sum of money to make sure that Beaver's name was never mentioned about this.' According to Bousquet, defendant also stated that the murder weapon had been wiped clean and warned that `we [Guarino and Bousquet] better keep our mouths shut or we would be seriously injured.' Rivard was called by the state, see discussion infra. She described meeting defendant in January 1988 in a Blackstone bar. According to Rivard, the two consumed beer in the bar and snorted cocaine in the parking lot and then returned to Rivard's house where they continued snorting cocaine and drinking beer. During this time defendant unexpectedly asked Rivard, `Do you remember the girl that was killed in the basement in Woonsocket?' She replied that she had. He responded, `I killed her.' After a moment's pause he explained, `But I'll get away with it, I'm a Tempest, I'll slide.' At the close of the state's case in chief the trial justice denied defendant's motion to pass, stating: There was also a motion to pass the case because of a reference to a so-called cover up on the part of the Woonsocket Police Department. The defendant's position being that unless and until there was some connection made between the action of the Woonsocket Police Department, if it did amount to a cover up, that there had to be some connection between that action and the defendant. I'm satisfied that based on the evidence produced by the State that motion ought to and is denied and the defendant's objection to the Court's ruling is noted. It is well settled that the admission or exclusion of evidence on the grounds of relevancy is soundly committed to the discretion of the trial justice. State v. Neri, 593 A.2d 953, 956 (R.I. 1991). However, under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the trial justice may still exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. See State v. Pratt, 641 A.2d 732, 741 (R.I. 1994). This court will not reverse the trial justice's determination unless it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Cuddy v. Schiavonne, 568 A.2d 1387, 1389 (R.I. 1990). With these standards in mind, we hold that the trial justice did not commit an abuse of discretion in the instant case. We note that the trial justice went to great lengths to protect defendant from the admission of irrelevant and marginally relevant evidence, always mindful of its potential prejudicial effect. He frequently sustained defendant's objections, refusing to allow the prosecution to bring such evidence before the jury unless and until it was connected to defendant. We note that the record is replete with the trial justice's inquiries into the prosecution of how and when this evidence would be tied to defendant and the trial justice's subsequent admonitions that defendant's motion to pass would be granted if the evidence was not deemed relevant. It is significant that the state demonstrated through its witnesses not only that defendant had admitted his crimes but also how heavily he relied upon and actively participated in efforts by his father, brother, and their friends to conceal his involvement in the crime. Once defendant's reliance and willing participation was shown, evidence concerning witness intimidation, attempts to protect defendant from prosecution, and evidence tampering became highly probative despite being highly prejudicial. See State v. Grundy, 582 A.2d 1166, 1172 (R.I. 1990) (evidence was highly probative despite being highly prejudicial to defendant). Although we agree with defendant that the Woonsocket police were not on trial, we believe that the trial justice did a yeoman-like job in carefully sifting through the voluminous testimony of this case, encompassing almost 2,200 pages of transcript and sixteen days of trial, in an effort to separate evidence that was highly probative with respect to defendant from that having little or no relevance. Therefore, given the connection the state established between this evidence and defendant, we cannot say that the trial justice committed an abuse of discretion in denying defendant's motion to pass. Ware, 524 A.2d at 1112. With respect to defendant's assertion that the admitted evidence failed the more stringent balancing test contained in Rule 404(b), we hold that this argument cannot now be brought before this court. As we have often stated, arguments on appeal that have not been adequately presented to the trial justice for his or her determination cannot be properly brought before us. 632 Metacom Associates v. Pub Dennis of Warren, Inc., 591 A.2d 379, 381 (R.I. 1991). A thorough search of the record reveals no such presentation. Although defendant repeatedly objected to the evidence's admission on the grounds of relevance, he failed to bring any type of Rule 404(b) argument to the trial justice's attention for the justice's examination in connection with his objection.