Opinion ID: 2613117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: frates

Text: By agreeing to drive LeMay home, Frates became a volunteer. We rely on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965) to determine the nature of a volunteer's duty, and the extent of his liability for a negligent undertaking. [3] See, e.g., City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1313 n. 4 (Alaska 1985). This section states, in part: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm. Frates only agreed to deliver LeMay home. He and his wife performed this service, waiting until LeMay opened his front door before they left him. In so doing, Frates did all he could do; he completely and conscientiously discharged his duty. Since reasonable people could not differ on the nature and extent of this voluntarily undertaken duty, summary judgment was properly granted. Estate of Breitenfeld, 755 P.2d 1099, 1102-03 (Alaska 1988). [4] Contrary to Mulvihill's assertion, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Frates agreed to perform additional services. Specifically, Frates did not agree to insure that LeMay did not drink any more beer. Further, implying such a duty would be poor policy, as it would jeopardize the designated driver movement. If Frates were held liable for Mulvihill's injuries because he allowed LeMay to drink two beers before he drove LeMay home, then every designated driver who agreed to drive a friend home after a night of drinking would risk liability if that friend chose to drive after the designated driver left. Such a result would undermine society's well-founded desire to encourage sober people to volunteer to drive their intoxicated friends home. As one court has said, persons who otherwise have no liability should not be discouraged from making reasonable efforts to remove an obviously intoxicated driver from behind the wheel. Prelvitz v. Milsop, 831 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir.1987). AFFIRMED. MOORE, C.J., not participating.