Opinion ID: 2630189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Existence of Sufficient, Independent Grounds for Revocation

Text: Next, we consider whether the court of appeals erred by reversing the revocation despite the existence of additional, non-hearsay evidence demonstrating that Loveall violated a condition of his SOISP. We hold that reversal was proper under the circumstances. Where one or more bases for revoking probation are set aside on appeal, the revocation remains valid provided at least one violation is sustained. See People v. Howell, 64 P.3d 894, 897 (Colo.App.2002) (upholding revocation after finding that evidence independent of hearsay testimony given by probation officer supported revocation of SOISP); cf. People v. Broga, 750 P.2d 59, 62 (Colo.1988) (upholding aggravated sentence, reasoning that [w]here the sentencing court finds several factors justifying a sentence in the aggravated range, only one of those factors need be legitimate to support the sentencing court's decision). Thus, it is undeniably true that any single probation violation could justify a district court's decision to revoke; however, it is substantially less clear whether the probation officer would exercise his or her discretion to seek revocationor, for that matter, whether the district court would remain willing to revokebased solely on the remaining violation. See State v. Ojeda, 159 Ariz. 560, 769 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1989). The Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged the infirmities inherent in the rigid approach espoused by the People. The [rigid rule], although supportable in a purely technical sense, ignores the realities of the probation process. If some of the alleged violations do not hold up on appeal and the revocation is affirmed without remand, a significant chance exists that the defendant's probation may be revoked for a violation that, by itself, would not have caused the probation officer to petition for revocation or the judge to revoke. Id. The Ojeda court recognized that, when a probation officer petitions for revocation, he or she generally will include every alleged violation, whether serious or merely technical. Id. Where a serious violation falls through, the probation officer is left only with technical violations that he or she may have decided against presenting separately. Id. Thus, the Ojeda court reasoned: We should affirm without remand only where the record clearly shows the trial court would have reached the same result even without consideration of the improper factors. Id. at 1008. [12] We adopt the Ojeda rule and apply it here. Loveall admitted that he was unemployed at the time of the revocation hearing. Thus, while it is clear that Loveall violated the conditions of his SOISP by failing to secure employment, it is substantially less clear whether Ryan would have petitioned for revocation based on the unemployment violation alone. Ryan petitioned for revocation three times. Each petition included allegations that Loveall violated the conditions of his SOISP by failing to secure employment, enroll in an offense-specific treatment program, and, on the final occasion, avoid contact with children. The filing of all three petitions corresponded with his termination from treatmentnot the deadline imposed for finding employment. On cross-examination, Ryan described a conversation she had with Loveall's courtesy probation officer regarding his probation. Q: Did [the probation officer] ever say she was going to revoke his probation for not finding a job? A: She expressed concern to me about it, yes, because it was part of the court order when he was reinstated to probation that he find employment. Q: Right. But she also indicated he was seeking employment but found none in Cañon City. A: Correct. Q: Based on that, she wanted him to expand his search. A: Correct. Q: Never did say to you though that he had not tried to find a job. A: No. Q: Even though he was unemployed, he was current in his fees, costs, and restitution; is that correct? A: That's correct. Based on the foregoing, we are unable to conclude that the record clearly shows the trial court would have reached the same result even without consideration of the improper factors. Ojeda, 769 P.2d at 1008. Accordingly, we hold that the prosecutor's decision to withhold the names of the declarants until shortly before trial failed to accord Loveall the minimum due process rights owed him under Morrissey. Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment below and remand to the court of appeals with instructions to remand to the district court for a new hearing [13] to be conducted consistent with this opinion.