Opinion ID: 1447881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: penalty phase discussion

Text: (20a) The prosecutor challenged prospective juror Gary Kosmatka for cause, and the trial court excluded him. Defendant contends Kosmatka's exclusion compels reversal of the judgment of death. We reject the contention. (21) When the prosecution seeks to exclude a prospective juror for cause because of the juror's views on capital punishment, under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, the trial court must determine whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 851].) `Under Witt, therefore, our duty is to examine the context surrounding [the juror's] exclusion to determine whether the trial court's decision that [the juror's] beliefs would `substantially impair the performance of his duties ...' was fairly supported by the record.' ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 587 [280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 129 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].) (20b) Here, the trial court's determination that prospective juror Kosmatka's beliefs would substantially impair his performance as a juror is fairly supported by the record; thus the juror was properly excused for cause. During voir dire, Kosmatka was extensively questioned by the trial court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel. The court asked Kosmatka whether, if he believed the special circumstance of robbery-kidnapping to be true, he would vote not true in order to avoid the death penalty issue. Kosmatka replied he was a Catholic, explaining, I do not know if I can reconcile a death penalty along with my faith. In response to a question by the court regarding a hypothetical premeditated murder of a nun to eliminate her as a witness, Kosmatka said he did not think he could vote for the death penalty in that case. In later questioning, Kosmatka said he could possibly vote for the death penalty in a case that was outrageous and involved the murder of a member of his family or a close friend, but that would involve violating his beliefs. Finally, the trial court asked Kosmatka: [Y]ou are saying `Judge, I am telling you I have charged my conscience and I know at this point that I would not vote for the death penalty in this case. Period, end of report.' Are you telling me that? Kosmatka answered, Yes. In this instance, we perceive no violation of the standards of Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. [6]
The complaint charging defendant with capital murder was filed on December 5, 1984. On December 11, 1984, Deputy Dieter Gerlach of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department interrogated defendant about four robberies committed before the murder of Maxine Brown. Before Gerlach began his questioning, defendant orally and in writing indicated he wanted to talk about the robberies and did not want a lawyer. On February 13, 1985, defendant was arraigned on the capital charge, and counsel was appointed for him the next day. The complaint in the capital case was later amended to charge defendant with the four robberies. At the penalty phase of defendant's trial, Deputy Gerlach testified to the statements defendant had made to him admitting involvement in the four robberies. (22) Defendant now contends that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by Gerlach's interrogation of him after the capital charge was filed, and that the admission at the penalty phase of defendant's statements to Gerlach was prejudicial error. This issue is not properly before us. Because defendant failed to object to the admission of his statements to Gerlach either before trial or at the time of Gerlach's penalty phase testimony, the issue was not preserved for our review. (Evid. Code, ง 353; see, e.g., People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 777 [251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].) (23) Defendant alternatively contends that his trial counsel's failure to raise this Sixth Amendment issue deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. Even if defendant's counsel had raised this issue, the trial court would not have been required to exclude Deputy Gerlach's testimony. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when adversary judicial criminal proceedings with respect to a particular offense have been initiated. ( McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, 501 U.S. at p. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 166, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2207]; accord, People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 657 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) Here, such proceedings in the capital case had been initiated before Detective Gerlach's interrogation. But the Sixth Amendment does not prohibit all police interrogations on related matters after adversary proceedings have been initiated. Rather, the high court has made clear that once this right to counsel has attached and has been invoked, any subsequent waiver during a police-initiated custodial interview is ineffective. ( McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, 501 U.S. at p. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 166, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2207], italics added.) Although in this case the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached in the capital case at the time of the interview, defendant fails to demonstrate that it had been invoked. The record does not show that defendant asked for a lawyer to represent him in the capital case at or before his interview with Gerlach. Accordingly, no Sixth Amendment violation has been demonstrated. [7]
The parties stipulated that in July 1972 defendant had pleaded guilty to violations of section 261, subdivision (a)(2) (rape by force) and section 245 (assault with a deadly weapon or assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury) against Antoinette R., and that the victim was unavailable to testify at trial. As mentioned earlier, the victim's mother, Marilyn G., testified regarding her daughter's physical appearance before and after the rape. At trial, she identified a photograph of her daughter taken five to seven days after she had undergone reconstructive facial surgery as a result of injuries sustained in the course of the rape. This photograph was admitted into evidence over defendant's objection. (24) Defendant contends the trial court's admission of the photograph was in error, because the photograph was not relevant and was, in any event, more prejudicial than probative. We disagree. Generally, photographs that show the manner in which a victim was wounded are relevant to the determination of malice, aggravation and penalty. ( People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 247 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669]; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 914 [8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712].) Here, the photograph was relevant to the prosecution's penalty phase case under factor (b) of section 190.3, as it tended to show criminal activity by the defendant that involved the use of force or violence. The evidence was particularly relevant to show the extreme violence defendant used on the 14-year-old rape victim. ( People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 568 [250 Cal. Rptr. 530, 758 P.2d 1060].) The trial court properly determined that the fact that the photograph was taken following the victim's reconstructive surgery went to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the photographic evidence. Moreover, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling that the photograph was not substantially more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. The photograph, which we have examined, is not unduly gruesome. ( People v. Milner, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 247; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 666 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) Although it is true that the photograph itself could not reveal to what extent the victim's facial swelling and discoloration directly resulted from defendant's attack and not from the victim's later surgery necessitated by the attack, defendant's counsel was free to cross-examine the victim's mother on this point, and counsel did suggest to the jury that it should take this uncertainty into consideration. In any event, the victim's mother testified that, after the attack but apparently before the victim's surgery, the victim's mouth and cheekbones were severely swollen, and her right eye was swollen shut. This testimony enabled the jury to evaluate to what extent the photograph in question reflected the trauma of the assault rather than the effects of the surgery. Defendant had originally been charged with a violation of the 1970 version of section 264 (rape with commission of great bodily injury) for his attack on Antoinette R., but this charge was dismissed as part of a plea bargain. Defendant contends that exhibit 31 and all of the testimony given by Marilyn G., the mother of rape victim Antoinette R., were inadmissible because use of the facts underlying the dismissed charge was a breach of the plea bargain and a violation of double jeopardy principles. We have repeatedly rejected virtually identical double jeopardy claims (see, e.g., People v. McDowell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 568; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 756, fn. 17 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]), and we decline to revisit this issue. We have also rejected the argument that the use at a penalty phase of facts underlying a charge dismissed as part of a plea bargain is precluded by the plea bargain agreement ( People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 728-729 [274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215]; see People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 257 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643]), and defendant offers no compelling reason to reconsider the question. Defendant additionally argues that this court's holding in People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 754, that the use of facts underlying a prior conviction as aggravating evidence at a capital case penalty trial is permissible conflicts with People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355 [243 Cal. Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150], in which this court held that the facts underlying a prior conviction could not be relitigated in the context of enhancements under section 667. We have previously rejected a similar contention ( People v. McDowell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 568; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1242-1243 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]), and decline to reconsider the issue. [8]
As noted earlier, the four robbery counts with which defendant had originally been charged were severed before the guilt phase trial began. (25) At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence regarding those robberies. Defendant contends this unconstitutionally forced him to choose between testifying about four charged but severed robbery counts or remaining silent at the penalty phase. In People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1056 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680], we rejected a virtually identical contention, relying on McGautha v. California (1971) 402 U.S. 183 [28 L.Ed.2d 711, 91 S.Ct. 1454]. Defendant seeks to distinguish Caro on the basis that, unlike the defendant in Caro who faced no pending charges on the crimes as to which he contended he was forced to testify, here defendant was actually facing pending charges on the robbery counts. The defendant in Caro challenged the introduction of evidence of killings for which he might at some future date be tried.... ( People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1055.) The possible consequences of defendant's choice to testify or not are identical here. Moreover, if defendant had testified at the penalty phase, but not testified about the robberies on direct examination at the penalty phase, any attempt to cross-examine him on that subject would not have survived a timely objection as to scope. ( Id. at pp. 1056-1057.)
In conformance with Penal Code section 190.3 and the standard penalty phase jury instruction, CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (1986 rev.) (4th ed. 1987 pocket pt., pp. 135-136), the trial court instructed the jury that, in determining the penalty, it must consider and be guided by 11 factors, if applicable. The trial court added: The factors which I have just listed for you may be considered by you, if applicable, as either aggravating factors or mitigating factors. [ถ] If you find any of these factors to be aggravating, and to have been established by the evidence, you may consider them in determining the penalty you will impose in this case. (26a) Defendant contends this instruction was erroneous. He is correct. A majority of the 11 statutory factors can only be mitigating. (See, e.g., People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 200 [276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169] [ง 190.3, factors (e), (f), (g) and (j)]; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 654 [274 Cal. Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849] [ง 190.3, factors (d), (e), (f), (h) and (k)]; but see People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 553 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100] [whether ง 190.3, factor (j) can only be mitigating is undecided].) The Attorney General, however, argues that, because the two-paragraph instruction (quoted in the preceding paragraph) was requested by the defense, any error was invited and cannot be raised on appeal under the doctrine of invited error. When a defense attorney makes a conscious, deliberate tactical choice to forego a particular instruction, the invited error doctrine bars an argument on appeal that the instruction was omitted in error. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 831 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865]; People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 970.) When defense counsel makes an equally conscious and deliberate tactical choice to request a particular instruction โ such as the instruction defense counsel specifically requested here โ there is no reason to apply a different rule. Accordingly, we conclude the error was invited, and defendant cannot raise it on appeal. (27) Even a deliberate tactical choice by counsel, however, may be an incompetent one. Thus, we have also recognized that a defendant who is barred from raising instructional error by the invited error doctrine may always claim he received ineffective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 831.) Defendant does so here. (26b) To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, the defendant must show that there was no rational tactical purpose for counsel's act or omission, and that it is reasonably probable that, absent counsel's deficiencies, a more favorable result would have been obtained. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 695, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 945, 950; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1057-1058 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277].) Although no tactical purpose for requesting the instruction on aggravating and mitigating factors appears on the face of the record, we cannot determine on the record alone whether counsel could have had no rational tactical purpose for requesting this instruction. Accordingly, based on this record, we must reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Section 190.3 requires the jury at the penalty phase to take into account evidence on a number of factors, including (k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. (28) Defendant contends that the prosecutor in her penalty phase closing argument wrongly argued that the evidence defendant had presented under factor (k) โ that he was capable of selfless acts to help vulnerable people โ showed the death penalty was appropriate because defendant had demonstrated he was capable of living a constructive life but had chosen not to do so. We express no view as to whether this argument by the prosecutor was improper ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1033 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]; see People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 792, fn. 24 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]), because defendant failed to object at trial to the asserted misconduct. We have held that if a timely objection and admonition would have cured any misconduct, then a failure to object precludes examination of the assertedly objectionable argument on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1248 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163]; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.) Here, even if we assume for the purpose of analysis that the prosecutor's argument was improper, an objection by defendant's counsel and an admonition by the trial court to the jury, explaining that defendant's background and history of positive character traits and selfless acts could not be considered as aggravating, would have cured any harm resulting from the prosecutor's argument. Thus, the failure to object precludes defendant from now raising this issue. [9]
Defendant submitted this jury instruction at the penalty phase: Aggravating factors are facts attending the commission of a crime which increase its guilt or enormity or add to its injurious consequences, but which are above and beyond the essential constituents of the crime itself. [ถ] Mitigating factors are circumstances which do not constitute a justification or excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. (29) The trial court refused to give the requested instruction. Defendant contends this was error. Such an instruction may well have assisted the jury in evaluating the statutory circumstances in aggravation and mitigation. ( People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1, 54-55.) Nevertheless, the trial court did not err in refusing to give this instruction. The instruction defined the terms aggravating and mitigating. As we explained in Malone : `Aggravation' and `mitigation' are commonly understood terms. A trial court is not required to instruct on the meaning of terms that are commonly understood. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 55.)
At the start of her argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor told the jury that there were several goals of sentencing: to protect society, to punish, and to rehabilitate. She described rehabilitation as one of the least important [goals] now because it has been relegated to the lower standard, at least a lower level because of problems in the past, adding, rehabilitating is not really an issue here because of the two considerations we're talking about. (30) Defendant now contends that this comment was prosecutorial misconduct because it told the jurors they were to ignore the evidence of defendant's potential for rehabilitation in prison. There was, however, no objection to this brief comment by the prosecutor. Even assuming that this comment amounted to misconduct, a timely objection by the defense and an admonition by the trial court informing the jury that it could consider defendant's performance in prison and the prospect of his rehabilitation there would have cured any harm. Accordingly, the issue is not properly before us. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.) If the issue had been preserved, we would find any misconduct harmless on this record.