Opinion ID: 1171467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Senate Districts 32 and 35

Text: The next objection is made to the boundaries of Senate Districts 32 and 35 in Denver. The Commission states that it was concerned about compactness as well in Denver, although it recognized that its Voting Rights Act obligations were superior to considerations of compactness. The Commission drew the three minority districts (districts 31, 33 and 34) and then divided the rest of Denver [between] districts 32 and 35 in the most compact way possible. According to the objectors, their alternate plan, the 1-11 Preliminary Denver Senate Plan, was rejected by the Commission for political reasons at the last minute, and the boundary between Districts 32 and 35 was drawn to avoid placing more than one incumbent senator in a senate district. In In re Reapportionment II, 647 P.2d at 213, we disapproved a portion of the 1982 reapportionment plan because extra-constitutional political considerations had entered into the Commission's deliberations. The districts that we disapproved in 1982 were, therefore, not drawn as compactly as possible and did not preserve communities of interest wherever possible, contrary to article V, section 47(1) and (3). Political considerations are not per se improper, however. It is only when partisan factors are allowed an importance equal to or greater than the proper constitutional criteria that a plan is defective. As we said in In re Reapportionment II: While it is not improper for the Commission to attempt to resolve political conflicts engendered by our disapproval of the election sequencing in the original plan, [p]roblems created by partisan politics cannot justify an apportionment which does not otherwise pass constitutional muster. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 1230, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969). In re Reapportionment II, 647 P.2d at 213. The objectors assert that [w]hile the 1-11 is not quite as compact in 32, it is much improved over the Final Plan's 35. Calculations under the Reock and Schwartzberg tests belie the objectors' assertion. The Final Plan's Reock and Schwartzberg factors for District 32 are 0.1951 and 3.2673, respectively. The 1-11 Plan's factors for District 32 are 0.1990 and 3.2909, respectively. Id. Thus, District 32 under the Final Plan is somewhat more compact than the 1-11 Plan according to the Schwartzberg Test, and somewhat less compact under the Reock Test. Under the Final Plan, Senate District 35 is a little more compact measured by the Reock Test (0.4803 as opposed to 0.4708 for the 1-11 Plan), and a little less compact measured by the Schwartzberg Test (2.4324 against 2.3110 for the 1-11 Plan). The objectors have also submitted a second alternate plan for Districts 32 and 35 called the Pascoe Plan. The Pascoe Plan's District 32 is slightly more compact than the Commission's District 35 under the Reock and Schwartzberg tests. On the other hand, under the Pascoe Plan, Senate District 32 is less compact under the same tests. Since the results of the objective tests for compactness are inconclusive between the Final Plan and either of the objectors' alternate plans, we determine that the Final Plan does not violate article V, section 47(1). The objectors also assert that while their Pascoe Plan is similar to the Final Plan with respect to population equalization and compactness, it is superior in preserving communities of interest within Denver. They contend that central Denver is much more aligned with east Denver and parts of southeast Denver than it is with southwest Denver, and that southeast Denver has more in common with the southwest than with central Denver. The Commission has responded that these claims are unsubstantiated and that the geographic distance between southeast and southwest Denver makes the objectors' community of interest claim untenable. Moreover, the Pascoe Plan's Senate District 32, which links southeast and southwest Denver, is less compact than the Final Plan's District 32. We conclude, after a comparison of the overall differences between the two plans, that the Final Plan does not violate article V, section 47(3), which in any event is subordinate to the compactness requirements of article V, section 47(1). Since the proposed Final Plan passes constitutional muster, political considerations that may have been involved in the final determination should not vitiate the plan.