Opinion ID: 2387577
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appealing to passion and prejudice

Text: (17) Defendant contends the prosecutor sought to arouse the jurors' fear of crime by comparing crime to a deadly virus, and also sought to appeal to their gratitude to law enforcement for being the protectors of society. The prosecutor, while gesturing toward police officers in the courtroom, quoted at some length from a speech given at the dedication of a monument honoring officers killed in the line of duty that praised the valiant men and women who protect the citizenry from the marauders and the enemies. A prosecutor's argument, however, may draw upon common experience and knowledge, and reminding the jurors that society depends on law enforcement to ensure security and peace in the community is proper commentary about the role of law enforcement. (See, e.g., People v. Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 808; People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 399-400; People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 803-804.) Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor did not attempt to appeal to the jurors' sense of loyalty or patriotism, but rather rightly noted that the murder of a peace officer engaged in performing official duties is a particularly aggravated form of murder. Defendant also contends the prosecutor conflated the victim impact evidence with an appeal to jurors' solidarity with law enforcement, by discussing Officer Ganz's service as a police officer. Evidence of Officer Ganz's service was properly before the jury, and the prosecutor's remarks were reasonable comment on that evidence. Defendant further contends the prosecutor's argument left jurors with the impression they were duty bound by their oaths to vote for a death sentence. [19] The prosecutor argued to the jury: This is a case where society cries out for the death penalty. As jurors, you are ... the conscience of society. But the prosecutor's argument was nothing more than reasonable commentary on the evidence presented and a call to vote for death based on that evidence; she did not mislead the jury about its role. (See, e.g., People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1222 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487] [rejecting a challenge where the prosecutor urged the jury to impose the death penalty because it would be `good for society' and `teach' society a moral lesson]; People v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 131, 152 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 825, 96 P.3d 126] [prosecutor's argument that the defendant's conduct had `crossed the line' `where we as a society say enough' was proper argument based on reasonable inferences from the method of killing]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 211 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781] [prosecutor's argument that the jury was `obligated as members of this society ...' to return a death verdict if it found the aggravating evidence outweighed the mitigating evidence, in conjunction with the jury instructions, did not mislead the jury about the scope of its sentencing discretion].) Moreover, to refer to the jury as the conscience of society is not improper. (See People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 741 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657].) (18) Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor's use of the Bengal tiger metaphor (see People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 976 [281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131]) was a thinly veiled racist allusion to his Vietnamese heritage. As we noted in Duncan, likening a murderer to a wild animal does not necessarily invoke racial overtones. ( Id. at p. 977; cf. Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence (1997) 1 J. Gender Race & Just. 97, 136-138.) On the record before us, it appears the prosecutor's argument was intended merely to note that defendant's docile behavior in the courtroom was not irreconcilable with his violent conduct in less controlled circumstances. (See, e.g., People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 307 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 180 P.3d 351].)