Opinion ID: 1692079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Schmidt v. Crusoe

Text: Before Schmidt filed his petition in the present case, he filed a petition in the case that ultimately resulted in the Court's decision in Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d 361 (Fla.2003). The relevant facts there were as follows: Schmidt is serving a criminal sentence and was disciplined for allegedly having lied to prison staff. As punishment, the Department of Corrections forfeited a portion of the gain time that Schmidt had already earned as a reduction to this sentence. Schmidt filed a mandamus petition in the circuit court contesting the forfeiture. The circuit court sought a filing fee or an affidavit of indigency and a printout of Schmidt's inmate account pursuant to the Prisoner Indigency Statute. See § 57.085, Fla. State. (2002). Schmidt responded that he was not subject to these requirements because his petition was not a civil lawsuit, but rather was a collateral criminal proceeding exempted under the statute. See § 57.085(10), Fla. Stat. (2002). When the circuit court rejected this contention, Schmidt sought review by a petition for writ of prohibition in the First District court of Appeal. The district court also invoked the statute and advised Schmidt that his case would be dismissed if compliance or a filing fee was not forthcoming. Schmidt then filed a petition in this Court, and we stayed proceedings pending consideration of the merits of his petition and the responses thereto. Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So.2d at 362. After reviewing both the comparable federal precedent and the legislative history of Florida's prisoner indigency statute, the Court concluded that the Florida statute was enacted to discourage the filing of frivolous civil lawsuits involving challenges to prison conditions, but not to prevent the filing of claims contesting the computation of criminal sentences. See Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 366. The Court held as follows: In the instant case, Schmidt's loss of gain time effectively lengthened his sentence, since by the Department of Corrections' action he now has to serve that additional time in prison. Therefore, we agree, in accord with the authorities discussed above, that his gain time challenge should be considered a collateral criminal proceeding, and the Prisoner Indigency Statute should not apply. To hold otherwise would result in an unlawful `chilling' of a criminal defendant's right to appeal or otherwise challenge the propriety or constitutionality of the conviction or sentence, Geffken v. Strickler, 778 So.2d 975, 977 n. 5 (Fla. 2001), and raise a serious issue as to criminal defendants' constitutional rights of access to the courts to challenge their sentences. Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 367 (footnote omitted).