Opinion ID: 563786
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Warrantless Search of Bag

Text: 31 Defendant's second claim of error regarding the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress involves the warrantless search of the tan bag. Defendant argues the warrantless search was illegal as it was not incident to an arrest, nor was it properly an inventory search as the trial court found. The Government argues [t]he district court correctly upheld the search of the nylon gym bag on the grounds stated. The Government also argues, as it did before the trial court, that Morgan abandoned the gym bag and his right to challenge the search by throwing the bag prior to his arrest. 32 We first reiterate that in reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we must accept the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and must consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the Government. McAlpine, 919 F.2d at 1463; Neu, 879 F.2d at 807. And where findings are not made, this court must uphold the ruling of the trial court if there exists any reasonable view of the evidence to support it. Neu, 879 F.2d at 807. 33 Included in the trial court's factual findings were the following findings relating to the tan bag: (1) that Mr. Morgan threw the bag to the south side of the porch; and (2) that [t]he bag carried, and then thrown by the Defendant, was taken to the Tulsa Police Station and there searched. Upon review of the record, and viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we find these factual findings of the trial court were not clearly erroneous. 34 We also conclude Mr. Morgan abandoned the gym bag and any privacy interests he had in it. In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960), the Supreme Court held the warrantless seizure of abandoned property did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See also United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir.) ([A] warrantless search or seizure of abandoned property is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859, 104 S.Ct. 184, 78 L.Ed.2d 163 (1983). Although the trial court neglected to make findings on this issue, we find the record reveals an abandonment. Under Neu, 879 F.2d at 807, we must uphold the denial of the motion to suppress if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it. Id. (emphasis added). 35 In Jones, this court acknowledged that [w]hen individuals voluntarily abandon property, they forfeit any expectation of privacy in it that they might have had. 707 F.2d at 1172. Thus, determinations of abandonment are based on whether the individual has retained any reasonable expectation of privacy in the object. Id. The existence of such an expectation is a question of intent requiring us to examine words spoken, actions taken, and other objective facts involved. Id. 36 Here, we have the trial court's finding that Mr. Morgan threw the bag to the south side of the porch and then came back in the direction of Officer Eubanks. The record indicates Mr. Morgan then attempted to go by Officer Eubanks, disregarding the Officer's order to get down on the ground. No attempt was made by the Defendant to retrieve the bag nor did he request the officers or anyone else to retrieve it for him. 2 While an abandonment must be voluntary, [t]he existence of police pursuit or investigation at the time of abandonment does not of itself render the abandonment involuntary. Jones, 707 F.2d at 1172. See also Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, ----, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 1290, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (finding a citizen who attempts to protect his private property from inspection, after throwing it on a car to respond to a police officer's inquiry, clearly has not abandoned that property. (Emphasis added.)) In the instant case, no attempt was made to protect the bag or its contents from inspection, nor did we find any manifestations by Mr. Morgan, verbal or otherwise, to indicate he retained a reasonable privacy interest in the bag. The fact that Mr. Morgan was in the backyard of someone he knew or was acquainted with, at the time he threw the bag, is of little significance. The record reveals we do not have before us a case where the item was left to the care or responsibility of another, or where there is a delayed indication of an intent to retain an expectation of privacy in the item. See United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, 1048 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 936, 103 S.Ct. 2106, 77 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983). Mr. Morgan discarded the bag while he was in the backyard of the Reed residence. Dwight Reed, who resided on the premises, was handcuffed and taken to the police station along with Mr. Morgan. There is no indication that Mr. Morgan requested the assistance of anyone to help recover or protect the bag, and the record discloses no one else was present who could have provided such assistance. Moreover, the record indicates that the backyard of the Reed residence abutted an open field and wooded area. Thus, the bag would have been plainly visible to those passing by the yard via those open areas. As we noted in Jones: 37 When Jones discarded the satchel, he may have hoped that the police would not find it and that he could later retrieve it. However, his ability to recover the satchel depended entirely upon fate and the absence of inquisitive (and acquisitive) passers-by. 38 707 F.2d at 1172. We believe Mr. Morgan's ability to recover the bag, if left where it was thrown, was equally dependent upon fate. Indeed, the facts before us make the possibility of recovery of the bag even more attenuated since here, unlike Jones, no other person was present at the scene to provide protection of the bag or assist in its recovery. Therefore, we hold Mr. Morgan voluntarily abandoned the bag, forfeiting his claim to object to its warrantless search. 3 39 We also find the actions of Officer Eubanks regarding the bag and its contents, which included preparation of an indiscriminate and documented inventory list, and acquisition of a property receipt for the items, to be strong evidence that the inventory was conducted pursuant to standardized criteria or an established routine. Florida v. Wells, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). However, in light of our holding that Mr. Morgan abandoned his right to object to the search of the bag, we will not decide whether the record sufficiently supports the trial court's conclusion that the search of the bag was a proper inventory search.