Opinion ID: 745288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: claims against the ncua

Text: 9 Bruns' complaint alleges that the NCUA conspired with the other defendants to suspend and constructively terminate him. The complaint alleges that, in furtherance of this conspiracy, the NCUA caused other HAFCU directors to resign, caused co-conspirators to be elected to the HAFCU board, and caused the board to suspend and terminate Bruns. These acts were in violation of the provisions of HAFCU By-Laws and applicable statutes. The conspiracy was retaliatory against Bruns and violated his civil rights. Bruns also alleges that the NCUA wrongfully terminated him in retaliation for pursuing a bond claim and tortiously interfered with his employment contract with HAFCU, causing him severe emotional distress. The complaint does not state the legal foundation for these latter causes of action. 10 In his response to the district court's first OSC, Bruns explained that this action arises under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and under 12 USC [sic] Sections 1789(a)(27) and 1790b(b). In responding to the second OSC, Bruns directed the district court's attention to his prior response. Bruns now claims that the applicable statutes under which he is suing the NCUA are 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786, 1789(a)(27), and 1790b(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1986. 2
11 Bruns argues that the applicable statutes to which he refers in paragraphs 9 and 30 of the complaint include 12 U.S.C. §§ 1789(a)(2), 1790b(b), and 1786. Section 1789(a)(2) contains the NCUA's sue and be sued clause. Section 1790b(b) provides protection to whistleblowers. Section 1786 establishes procedures for the NCUA's removal of a credit union officer or employee. Bruns has no claim against the NCUA under any of these provisions. Section 1789(a)(2) The FCUA provides that the NCUA may 12 sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law or equity, State or Federal. All suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which the Board shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and the United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction thereof, without regard to the amount in controversy. 13 12 U.S.C. § 1789(a)(2). The government removed Bruns' state court action to the district court under this section. 14 However, the FCUA's sue and be sued clause is constrained by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which provides the exclusive remedy for suits against a federal agency based on claims which are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). Section 1346(b) grants the federal courts jurisdiction over claims 15 against the United States, for money damages, ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 16 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Bruns seeks money damages for wrongful acts by the NCUA and its employees which allegedly resulted in loss of property (his job and benefits) and personal injury (emotional distress); Bruns does not allege that the NCUA or its employees acted outside the scope of their authority. His tort claims therefore are cognizable under section 1346(b), and the FTCA provides Bruns' exclusive avenue for pursuing those claims against the NCUA. 17 Bruns has not exhausted his administrative remedies, a jurisdictional prerequisite to an FTCA suit in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Meridian Int'l Logistics, Inc. v. United States, 939 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1991). The FTCA therefore does not provide a jurisdictional basis for Bruns' claims against the NCUA. 3 Section 1790b(b) 18 The FCUA protects credit union employees against discrimination or discharge because the employee ... provided information to the [NCUA] Board or the Attorney General regarding any possible violation of any law or regulation by the credit union or any director, officer, or employee of the credit union. 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(a). Any employee or former employee who believes he has been discharged ... in violation of subsection (a) ... may file a civil action in the appropriate United States district court. Id. § 1790b(b). Bruns claims he was suspended and terminated in retaliation for pursuing a bond claim against certain HAFCU officers and directors. However, Bruns has styled his claims of retaliation as (a) conspiracy and (b) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. He does not allege that he provided any information to the NCUA or to the Attorney General regarding illegal conduct by HAFCU or its directors, officers, or employees. While we construe Bruns' complaint liberally, we find no a claim under section 1790b. 4 Section 1786 19 Section 1786(g) establishes an administrative process for the NCUA to follow in removing a federal credit union officer. Nowhere in Bruns' complaint does he allege that the NCUA suspended and terminated him without affording him the procedural guarantees of section 1786(g). He claims instead that HAFCU suspended and terminated him pursuant to a conspiracy with the NCUA and others. 20 Even if Bruns' claims do arise under § 1786(g), several courts have concluded that no private right of action exists under that section. E.g., Ridenour v. Andrews Fed. Credit Union, 897 F.2d 715, 720-21 (4th Cir.1990); Heller v. CACL Fed. Credit Union, 775 F.Supp. 839, 842 (E.D.Pa.1991); Montford v. Robins Fed. Credit Union, 691 F.Supp. 347, 351 (M.D.Ga.1988); National Temple Non-Profit Corp. v. National Temple Community Fed. Credit Union, 603 F.Supp. 807, 808-09 (E.D.Pa.1985). We see no reason to hold otherwise. 21 Bruns stated in response to the district court's first OSC that he was not seeking to enforce the FCUA, and that his claim therefore was distinguishable from the above-cited cases. He now claims, however, that he has been deprived of his statutory rights, including notice and direct access to the circuit courts for judicial review. We reject this argument. If Bruns' claim arises as a result of some action taken by the NCUA to terminate him, he must proceed under the FCUA by first exhausting his administrative remedies and then seeking judicial review as provided under section 1786(j). Bruns cannot base his claims on the NCUA's failure to follow the statutory procedures, because no private right of action exists for such a claim. Section 1786 does not support Bruns' claims against the NCUA.
22 Bruns' complaint does not allege that any of his causes of action arise under any provision of the United States Constitution. Nor does Bruns' complaint allege that the NCUA deprived him of any liberty or property interest without due process. As pled, Bruns' claims sound in tort and contract. 23 Bruns now argues that the NCUA's actions violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The Supreme Court has found an implied private right of action against federal officials for tortious deprivations of constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Bruns correctly states that the FTCA does not exclude a Bivens claim, since a constitutional tort is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1001, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). However, Bruns may not sue the NCUA directly for a constitutional tort under Bivens. In FDIC v. Meyer, the Supreme Court held that an individual may not bring a Bivens claim for damages directly against a federal agency, even if the agency has waived sovereign immunity through a sue and be sued clause. 510 U.S. at 486, 114 S.Ct. at 1005. Bruns therefore has no Bivens claim against the NCUA.
24 Bruns argues that his cause of action against the NCUA for conspiring to suspend and terminate him arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. He did not raise this argument below. 25 Section 1985 prohibits conspiracies to prevent a federal officer from performing her duties, to obstruct justice, or to deprive a person or class of equal protection, equal privileges and immunities, or the right to vote. 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section 1985 provides a cause of action for damages for personal or property injury only in relation to the enumerated conspiracies. Id. § 1985(c). Also, the Supreme Court has held that section 1985(3) applies only to conspiracies based on racial bias and does not reach conspiracies motivated by economic considerations. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3360, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) ([W]e find no convincing support ... for the proposition that [§ 1985] was intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of their economic views, status, or activities.). Even the most generous reading of Bruns' complaint fails to elucidate a claim under section 1985.