Opinion ID: 1427083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: uniform operation

Text: Malan, supra, held the Automobile Guest Statute in violation of Utah Const. art. I, § 24, which guarantees uniform operation of the law. Because the Automobile Guest Statute was so shot-through with exceptions as to be incapable of reasonably furthering the statutory objectives, this Court held that it did not have uniform operation. Those exceptions were: (1) Liability insurance requirements allowed non-guests to have a greater recovery than previously. (2) No-fault insurance requirements allowed a limited remedy for all persons, impliedly superseding a significant part of the Automobile Guest Statute. (3) The Comparative Negligence Act may nullify a part of the guest statute immunity by allowing a guest to indirectly recover from his host by apportioning fault and liability among joint tortfeasors and establishing a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors according to their respective degrees of fault. (4) Utah Const. art. XVI, § 5, seems to compel the conclusion that guest statutes are unconstitutional insofar as they purport to bar the heirs of a guest killed as a result of a host's negligence from bringing a wrongful death action. (5) The Ridesharing Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 54-11-1, contemplates that passengers in both vanpools and carpools are entitled to the ordinary tort remedies for injuries suffered as a result of the negligence of the driver. (6) The Automobile Guest Statute itself establishes exceptions based on the driver's willful misconduct or intoxication, accidents on private land, legal incapacity to accept a ride (e.g., by a minor), joint enterprise of driver and passenger, and payment for the ride. Additionally, this Court found that a rational relationship between the Automobile Guest Statute and its objectives did not exist. Rewarding hospitality by insulating a host from his lack of ordinary care did not induce automobile drivers to give rides more freely. The argument by the insurance industry that collusive suits were eliminated by the statute lacked basis in fact. Collusion between host and guest made it possible to circumvent the bar of the statute, just as it made recovery possible before its passage. The lower insurance rates theory simply was not a valid justification for achieving the statutory objective. In deciding whether the Aircraft Guest Statute is valid under the Utah Constitution we must also determine whether it operates uniformly on the members of the class and whether the classification made by the statute is reasonable in light of the statute's purpose. As is the case with its sister statute, the Aircraft Guest Statute is also so permeated with exceptions that its uniform application as required under Utah Const. art. I, § 24, must be seriously questioned. Most of the exceptions found to be discriminatory in the Automobile Guest Statute also present difficulties for the Aircraft Guest Statute. They include: (1) Liability insurance is statutorily required for aircraft which have been granted permits to land on designated county roads. While this is not as broad a coverage as the liability insurance required of automobile drivers, it nevertheless causes many aircraft operators to carry liability insurance, especially those who operate in rural areas. (2) The Comparative Negligence Act's apportionment of fault and liability and establishment of the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors creates similar exceptions to both statutes. (3) As in Malan, supra, the Aircraft Guest Statute was not challenged on the basis of Utah Const. art. XVI, § 5. However, this constitutional provision seems to compel the conclusion that the Aircraft Guest Statute is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to bar the heirs of a guest killed as a result of the negligence of a pilot, crewman or owner from bringing a wrongful death action against any of them. This is a particularly serious exception in light of the much higher death rate in aircraft accidents. (4) When analogized to the Automobile Guest Statute, the Aircraft Guest Statute also establishes the same exceptions, including (a) the willful misconduct or the intoxication of the pilot or crewman, (b) the legal incapacity to accept a ride, (c) the participation in a joint enterprise with the pilot, crewman or owner, and (d) the payment of the full share of the cost of the ride. Other factors, unique to travel in small, privately owned aircraft, also cause irregularity in the application of the Aircraft Guest Statute. The high fatality rate in aircraft accidents extremely limits the opportunity for guests to testify of the willful misconduct or intoxication of the pilot or crewman. An aircraft passenger is much less able than an automobile passenger to stop an objectionable ride and get off. Likewise, an aircraft guest, unless experienced in aircraft operation, is less likely to recognize hazardous piloting until it is too late to do anything about it. While some of these exceptions are not identical to and do not create the same discrimination as in the Automobile Guest Statute, others create greater discrimination. They illustrate the crazy-quilt application of the Aircraft Guest Statute. These irregularities in the statute's application cause the statute to discriminate unreasonably and invidiously among aircraft guests in violation of art. I, § 24.