Opinion ID: 2982089
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legality of the Initial Traffic Stop

Text: The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures; this protection extends to brief investigatory stops of vehicles that fall short of a traditional arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). A stop and frisk is constitutionally permissible if there is a proper basis for the stop and if the officer reasonably believes that the person stopped is armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326–27 (2009). We first consider the reasonableness of the traffic stop and then determine whether Delaney had reasonable suspicion to frisk Tillman. This court has consistently held that if an “officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resulting stop is not unlawful and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993); see United States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding stop for failure to wear seatbelts constitutional); -5- No. 12-6436 USA v. Rico Tillman United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 267 (6th Cir.1999) (holding stop for failing to signal lane change constitutional); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (finding it reasonable for an officer to stop a vehicle whose driver has just committed a traffic violation). In the present case, there was a legitimate basis for the stop because Delaney observed Tillman not wearing a seatbelt, in violation of K.R.S. § 189.125. Indeed, Tillman does not challenge that violating a traffic law can provide the basis for a lawful stop. His sole argument attacking the validity of the stop is that it was a pretext for a narcotics or weapons search. There is no question in Tillman’s mind that Delaney was suspicions because Tillman is a “black man with tattoos on his face.” Delaney testified that he did not recognize Tillman and presumed that he was affiliated with a gang or served time in prison. But an officer’s “actual subjective motivations in effectuating the stop are irrelevant to the validity of the stop.” United States v. Shank, 543 F.3d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 2008). While the Constitution precludes selective enforcement based on factors such as race, the cause of action for that violation is grounded in the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Id. Tillman has not raised an Equal Protection claim, and he cannot take refuge in the Fourth Amendment to support his argument that the stop was pretextual.