Opinion ID: 801836
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitation on Accessories

Text: [26] Plaintiffs challenge DLNR’s limitation on accessories. With certain exceptions, the limitation prohibits “accessories” from being “placed on or within the right-of-entry area.” Given the purpose of DLNR’s regulation of activities on public beaches under its jurisdiction, the limitation on accessories furthers a significant governmental interest. DLNR seeks to allow commercial beach weddings, but, at the same time, not to allow such weddings to interfere unduly with the activities 6338 KAAHUMANU v. STATE OF HAWAII of other beachgoers. To that end, DLNR places various limits on commercial weddings, including limits on the physical objects that wedding participants may bring onto the beaches. On the assumption that the unencumbered state beaches are traditional public forums, we apply the three-part test appropriate to that forum. We have already described DLNR’s significant interest in regulating land uses of state beaches and the ample alternative channels for beach weddings. We also hold that DLNR’s limitation on accessories is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. DLNR faces a classic line-drawing problem and it has chosen to draw the line in a manner that substantially limits the adverse impact of commercial weddings on other users’ enjoyment of Hawai’i’s public beaches. DLNR limits a commercial wedding to the area reserved in the permit, limits the ability of wedding participants to displace other users from favored places on the beaches, limits the duration of a wedding, limits the type (and thereby the volume) of musical instruments, and limits accessories. But DLNR allows unamplified musical instruments, allows loose flowers, allows chairs for elderly or disabled attendees, allows a cake stand or podium, and allows “non-obtrusive hand-carried wedding accessories.” We construe the limitation on accessories narrowly. As we have noted earlier in our opinion, the Terms and Conditions provide: No accessories [nor] structures . . . shall be placed on or within the right-of-entry area or premises, including but not limited to the following: arches; bowers; alters [sic]; tables; chairs; kahilis; tents or tarps; event signage of any type including banners, sandwich boards; kiosks or carts; stanchions, posts, ropes or similar equipment for the purpose of demarKAAHUMANU v. STATE OF HAWAII 6339 cation of the right-of-entry area; and surfboards, kayaks or other ocean recreation equipment[.] The use of the verb “placed,” combined with the illustrative list of prohibited accessories, strongly suggest that the limitation applies only to things that are placed on the beach without being held or carried by anyone. The Terms and Conditions expressly allow “non-obtrusive hand-carried wedding accessories.” Plaintiffs have not identified any instance in which DLNR prohibited the use of hand-held religious objects such as hand-held chuppas, chalices, and small, handheld kahilis. We therefore construe the Terms and Conditions as not prohibiting these objects. Cf. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1998) (construing statute narrowly to allow for First Amendment activities). We see nothing in the First Amendment that requires DLNR to allow more than what is thus permitted by the Terms and Conditions. The limitation on accessories is also content-neutral. Plaintiffs contend that the limitation impermissibly shows a “clear preference for nonliturgical religions” and “target[s] people of Catholic, Orthodox or Jewish faiths.” We disagree. When determining the content neutrality of a restriction, we do not “make a searching inquiry of hidden motive” but “look at the literal command of the restraint.” Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1129. The text of the limitation on accessories, which makes no reference to religion, belies Plaintiffs’ contention. That the limitation may have an incidental effect on the use of specific religious implements or physical symbols does not render it impermissible. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”); cf. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (denying religious exemption from “valid and neutral law of general applicability” based on Free Exercise challenge). 6340 KAAHUMANU v. STATE OF HAWAII iii. Insurance and Indemnification/Hold-Harmless Requirements [27] Plaintiffs also contend that DLNR’s insurance and indemnification/hold-harmless requirements are impermissible. We disagree. Paragraph 3 of Terms and Conditions provides: Applicant shall procure at Applicant’s own expense, and maintain during the entire period of the . . . permit . . . a policy or policies of comprehensive public liability insurance in an amount of at least $300,000 per incident and $500,000 aggregate insuring the State of Hawaii against all claims for personal injury, death, and property damage. The applicant must submit a certificate naming Hawai’i as an additional insured on his or her policy. Paragraph 4 requires the applicant to indemnify, defend, and hold [DLNR] harmless from and against any claim . . . arising out of or resulting from: (a) any act or omission on the part of Appli- cant relating to Applicant’s use . . . of the right-ofentry area or premises; (b) any failure on the part of Applicant to maintain the right-of-entry area or premises and areas adjacent thereto in Applicant’s use and control . . . ; and (c) from and against all . . . claims by whomsoever brought or made by reason of Applicant’s [failure to follow] the terms . . . [of the permit] or [federal and state law]. The insurance and the indemnification/hold-harmless requirements serve a significant governmental interest. These requirements compensate third parties and DLNR for injury KAAHUMANU v. STATE OF HAWAII 6341 or property damage caused by the permittee. They also protect DLNR from liability to third parties caused by the permittee. The requirements are narrowly tailored to this interest. Evidence in the record shows that the cost of insurance does not pose a substantial burden on Plaintiffs. Reverend Eve Hogan declares that she has been quoted a price of “upwards of $500 a year” for the insurance required to satisfy DLNR’s permitting requirement for a commercial wedding. She states that insurance for a wedding “coordinator” would be approximately $250 a year. Reverend Hogan says that she “only do[es] a few weddings a month.” Id. Assuming that “a few” means three, Reverend Hogan’s insurance cost attributable to DLNR’s permitting requirement is about $14 per wedding. The indemnification/hold-harmless requirement is not overly broad. We invalidated an indemnification/holdharmless requirement in Long Beach, 574 F.3d at 1040, but in that case the indemnification/hold-harmless clause was extremely broad. It required permittees to indemnify and hold the city harmless not only for harm caused by third parties reacting to the expressive activity of the permittees, but also for harm caused by the city to the permittees, and harm “caused by the conduct of the event” to third parties, when “conduct” included actions by the city or other parties unrelated to the permittees. Id. In contrast to Long Beach, the indemnification/holdharmless clause in this case does not require a permittee to hold the state harmless for all consequences of the event, including those caused by the state’s own actions. The clause here is much narrower, requiring a permittee to indemnify and hold Hawai’i harmless only for “any act or omission on the part of [the] Applicant,” “any failure on the part of [the] Applicant” to maintain the premises, and all “claims . . . made by reason of Applicant’s” failure to follow the permit Terms and Conditions. 6342 KAAHUMANU v. STATE OF HAWAII The insurance and indemnification/hold-harmless requirements are also content-neutral. See Food Not Bombs. See 450 F.3d at 1056 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring, writing for the majority) (holding insurance and indemnification/hold-harmless requirements to be viewpoint neutral). Nothing in the requirements at issue in this case turns on the type of wedding involved, its religious content, or indeed any content-based discrimination. Nor does the amount of insurance, or the price to be paid for it, vary depending on the type of commercial wedding or the content of what might be said at the wedding. Compare id. at 1052 (Berzon, J., dissenting). iv. Conclusion In sum, we hold that DLNR’s regulation requiring a person to obtain a permit for commercial weddings on unencumbered state beaches is narrowly tailored to a significant governmental interest, is content-neutral, leaves ample alternative spaces for hosting a wedding, and does not vest too much discretion in the government official when issuing the permits. We hold that the limitation on accessories, insurance requirement, and the indemnification/hold-harmless clause also satisfy the traditional public forum standard. However, we hold invalid the grant of discretion to DLNR to revoke, or add terms to, a permit under the least exacting standard of review for a nonpublic forum.