Opinion ID: 1923817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did trial court commit reversible error in overruling defendant's objection to a question whether a public officer had any conversation with him following his arrest?

Text: Special agent Wilbur participated in the third cocaine sale in Ames and the related arrests. He heard another officer give defendant the Miranda warning. Wilbur then drove defendant to Nevada in defendant's car. On Wilbur's direct examination the following testimony occurred: Q. And did you have any conversation with [defendant] during the transportation to Nevada, or upon your arrival? MR. GROVE: Objection, Your Honor. I object to any conversation with the defendant from Ames to Nevada for the reason that the defendant had not been afforded the right to contact counsel at that point. THE COURT: Overruled on the record made. A. I asked Mr. Gibb questions. However, he exercised his right to remain silent. The above question was asked in developing the circumstances surrounding defendant's producing two more packets of cocaine in response to Wilbur's question whether defendant had any other controlled substance in the vehicle, a matter we take up in division VII. The same question had been asked and almost the same answer elicited as part of a prior in-chambers proffer, without comment or objection by defendant. Defendant neither moved to strike the answer nor moved for mistrial. On appeal defendant argues the question impermissibly penalized him for exercising his fifth amendment right to remain silent, citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625 n.37, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 720 n.37 (1966), and State v. Porter, 283 N.W.2d 351, 352-53 (Iowa 1979). That ground was first asserted in defendant's motion in arrest of judgment and application for new trial. Proper preservation of alleged errors committed by trial court in the introduction of evidence at trial ordinarily requires timely objections, raised at the earliest time the error becomes apparent. State v. Reese, 259 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Iowa 1977); State v. Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1972); see State v. Steltzer, 288 N.W.2d 557, 558 (Iowa 1980). A motion to strike is not a useless gesture because it aids trial court in understanding the nature of the error claimed and provides an opportunity for the court to correct any error committed. Reese, 259 N.W.2d at 775. Generally, a mistrial motion must be made when the grounds therefor first become apparent. State v. Gilmore, 259 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Iowa 1977); State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Iowa 1973). We hold this alleged error was not preserved. See State v. Matlock, 289 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Iowa 1980); State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Iowa 1978).