Opinion ID: 1988537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: suppression of prior statements

Text: The defendant argues that the state's use of his self-inculpatory prior statements during his trial violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his art. I, sec. 13, rights under the Rhode Island Constitution. The defendant claims that he was willing to testify only in reliance on the promises made to him by the state and that once the bargain was revoked, the statements should have been ruled inadmissible as having been obtained involuntarily by improper influences. Admissions of a defendant must be voluntary in order to be admissible against him or her at trial. [T]he state must show by clear and convincing evidence that the admissions were the product of a free and rational choice and not the result of coercion of any type. State v. Crowhurst, 470 A.2d 1138, 1142 (R.I. 1984). In determining whether an inducement of a recommendation of a reduced sentence by the state makes an admission involuntary, we look to the leading case in this jurisdiction on voluntariness. In State v. Pacheco, 481 A.2d 1009 (R.I. 1984), the state promised the defendant that the charges against his companion would be dismissed and that he would receive a recommendation that his prison term be in an out-of-state facility. Applying a totality of circumstances test, we found the defendant's subsequent incriminating statements voluntary. Id. at 1027. The repeated admonitions of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, as well as Pacheco's responses to such admonitions and his assertions concerning his understanding thereof to the police, were more than enough to dispel any inferences of    subtle, coercive pressures   . Id. at 1026-27. Similarly, in this case Malone was repeatedly read his Miranda rights, and he signed the rights form. Also he was represented by counsel when giving his statements. There were no subtle or coercive pressures placed on defendant. The defendant initiated an interest to bargain with the state. The defendant accepted the terms of the agreement with the state and later breached those terms. The defendant knew that he was to testify truthfully against his codefendants. He knew that the state's sentence recommendation was contingent on his fulfillment of the terms of the agreement. Admissions made pursuant to a good-faith contingent plea agreement, as in the instant case, are voluntary when the defendant is fully informed of his rights prior to his testifying, when there exists no evidence that the state falsely induced the statements, and when the defendant makes a free and rational choice to speak. A defendant takes the risk that statements will be used against him or her in the event that he or she later breaches the agreement. The trial judge correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress defendant's statements.