Opinion ID: 1634426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the imposition of a tax on appellant's right to broadcast the performances is prohibited by the constitution of the united states

Text: Appellant points out that the broadcast signal of its station which emanates from its transmitting tower near Fort Smith extends into a large portion of the State of Oklahoma and a small portion of the State of Missouri and, in fact 32% of the television homes in its market are located in Oklahoma. Appellant argues that to the extent that television broadcasting involves interstate commerce, it may not be burdened by state privilege taxes for if the levy is directly on commerce, it is prohibited. We agree with this statement, but do not agree that it is applicable here. In McLeod, Commissioner of Revenues v. Memphis Natural Gas Company, 207 Ark. 879, 183 S.W.2d 927, the appellee insisted that its net income in Arkansas was derived wholly from interstate commerce and that if the Arkansas income tax act was construed to apply to its income, said act was unconstitutional as being in violation of the commerce, due process, and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. This court, in disagreeing with this argument, and reversing the trial court, quoted from McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 60 S.Ct. 388, 84 L.Ed. 565 as follows: In imposing taxes for state purposes a state is not exercising any power which the Constitution has conferred upon Congress. It is only when the tax operates to regulate commerce between the states or with foreign nations to an extent which infringes the authority conferred upon Congress, that the tax can be said to exceed constitutional limitations. (Citing cases). Forms of state taxation whose tendency is to prohibit the commerce or place it at a disadvantage as compared or in competition with intrastate commerce and any state tax which discriminates against the commerce, are familiar examples of the exercise of state taxing power in an unconstitutional manner, because of its obvious regulatory effect upon commerce between the states. `But it was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce of their just share of state tax burdens, merely because an incidental or consequential effect of the tax is an increase in the cost of doing the business. (Citing cases). Not all state taxation is to be condemned because, in some manner, it has an effect upon commerce between the states, and there are many forms of tax whose burdens, when distributed through the play of economic forces, affect interstate commerce, which nevertheless fall short of the regulation of the commerce which the Constitution leaves to Congress.' See also State v. Tad Screen Advertising Co., 199 Ark. 205, 133 S.W.2d 1 and Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Commission, 162 N.W.2d 730, where the Iowa Supreme Court held likewise in dealing with a sales and use tax on advertising receipts from radio and television stations which disseminated their programs across state lines. We hold the contention to be without merit.