Opinion ID: 1188723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the meaning of kidnaping

Text: Defendant argues that his act of detaining prosecutrix was merely incidental to the crime of aggravated sexual assault and in effect a lesser included offense that should not be the basis for a separate conviction. [1] Because kidnaping statutes typically do not specify the duration of time or the circumstances under which the victim must be detained or how far the victim must be transported for a kidnap to occur, a literal application of such statutes could transform virtually every rape and robbery into a kidnaping as well. A defendant convicted of both kidnaping and what can be termed a host crime would in many cases receive a significantly heavier sentence than if only the host crime had been charged. Mindful of this result, many courts have reassessed kidnaping statutes during the past two decades. Some jurisdictions have adhered to the traditional view that any detention or asportation, however slight or however closely related to another crime, is sufficient to support a kidnaping conviction. [2] Other courts have limited the application of kidnaping statutes to instances of true kidnaping, where the kidnaping is not merely incidental or subsidiary to another crime but has independent significance. [3] In contrast to some broader kidnaping statutes that have invited extensive judicial pruning, our Utah statute expressly limits the circumstances under which a detention will constitute kidnaping. Section 76-5-301 states in pertinent part: (1) A person commits kidnaping when he intentionally or knowingly and without authority of law and against the will of the victim: (a) Detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or (b) Detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury; ... [Emphasis added.] Subject to statutory exceptions not applicable here, this narrowly drafted statute limits the scope of the crime of kidnaping by permitting a conviction only if at least one of two conditions is satisfied. [4] The first condition is that the detention be for a substantial period. Although this term can be defined only by reference to a specific fact situation, it apparently requires a period of detention longer than the minimum inherent in the commission of a rape or a robbery. Otherwise, this statute would merely provide a cumulative penalty for the commission of these crimes and any others that involve detention or restraint. The second condition is that the detention be in circumstances exposing the victim to risk of serious bodily injury. While no circumstance incident to crime is entirely free from risk, this provision seems to require some circumstances of risk in addition to those inherent in the commission of crimes incidentally involving detention or restraint. On the facts of this case, the jury could have based its guilty verdict on either condition of this statute. A kidnaping begins when the detention begins to be against the will of the victim. In the instant case, the detention began to be against prosecutrix's will at the point where defendant continued to drive her car despite her expressed desire that he not do so, and continued at least until the sexual assault had been committed. The duration of this detention was clearly a substantial period within the meaning of subsection (1)(a). In addition, the circumstances in which defendant detained prosecutrix exposed her to risk of serious bodily injury within the meaning of subsection (b). Forcibly removing a person a substantial distance from her normal surroundings and natural sources of aid to an isolated area where she is entirely at the mercy of her assailant necessarily involves the risk of serious bodily harm identified in the statute. In either case, the kidnaping was not merely incidental or subsidiary to some other crime, but was an independent, separately punishable offense. Defendant's conviction for kidnaping is therefore affirmed.