Opinion ID: 2806256
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Representation Dispute

Text: The most important purpose of the RLA was “the avoidance of industrial strife, by conference between the authorized representatives of employer and employee.” Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 380 U.S. 650, 658 (1965). An “explosive problem” in its application is how to determine what labor organization represented employees. Switchmen’s Union, 320 U.S. at 303. “[W]hether one organization or another was the proper representative of a particular group of employees was one of the most controversial questions in connection with labor organization matters.” Id. at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 152, Ninth, establishes “the machinery for the selection of the representatives of employees.” Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 380 U.S. at 658. It provides for a “neutral tribunal” that can expediently determine employees’ bargaining representative and “get the matter settled.” Switchmen’s Union, 320 U.S. at 303. That section provides in relevant part: If any dispute shall arise among a carrier’s employees as to who are the representatives of such employees . . . it shall be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request of either party 12 INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR to the dispute, to investigate such dispute and to certify to both parties . . . the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier. . . . In such an investigation, the Mediation Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth. It further states that once the Board has investigated the dispute and certified a representative, “the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified.” Id. The Supreme Court has held that the Board has the sole power to certify a group or person as an employee representative. Switchmen’s Union, 320 U.S. at 300 (holding federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review the Board’s certification decision). Courts also lack jurisdiction to provide relief that is the functional equivalent of an RLA certification like, for instance, entering a declaratory judgment determining what group can bargain on the employees’ behalf. Gen. Comm. of Adjustment v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R. Co., 320 U.S. 323, 327 (1943) (holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to find “that the Engineers should be declared to be the sole representative of the locomotive engineers with the exclusive right to bargain for them”). INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR 13 Furthermore, courts decline to exercise jurisdiction when parties bring an otherwise justiciable claim that requires the court to examine whether a class of employees are represented, and if so, by whom. See United Transp. Union v. Gateway W. Ry. Co., 78 F.3d 1208, 1216 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding court lacked jurisdiction to determine if parent company’s union also represented subsidiary’s employees). Cases on which Allegiant relies similarly either require a court to determine the employees’ current representative or to compel a carrier to bargain in the face of competing representation claims. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Tex. Int’l Airlines, 717 F.2d 157, 161 (5th Cir. 1983) (declining jurisdiction to enforce a bargaining agreement that would “inescapably entail[] the continuance of the Union’s role as employee representative”); United Transp. Union v. United States, 987 F.2d 784, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (declining to determine which of two unions was the employees’ bargaining representative). Neither party cites any case in which the court determined the status of a past advocate rather than adjudicated a present dispute about what party represents labor. Our research has not revealed any such case. Resolving the issue as one of first impression, we find the district court correctly exercised jurisdiction. At the outset, we reiterate that federal courts have jurisdiction to enjoin changes to the status quo while parties complete mediation. The only issue is whether Section 152, Ninth, precludes that determination here. For several reasons, we do not think Section 152, Ninth, is applicable. That section gives the Board jurisdiction when “any dispute shall arise among a carrier’s employees as to who are the representatives of such employees.” 45 U.S.C. 14 INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR § 152, Ninth. Simply put, there is no dispute among the employees that the Teamsters are the pilots’ current bargaining representative. Indeed, the Board has already certified the Teamsters as the bargaining representative and no party challenges that certification. AAPAG’s position at the time it negotiated the Work Rules has no bearing on the Teamsters’ current status. Furthermore, Section 152, Ninth, provides that once the Board determines the bargaining representative, it must issue a certification, and the carrier must “treat with the representative so certified.” We are not issuing AAPAG a certificate or its equivalent. And there is no reason for the Board to issue a certificate to AAPAG on the basis of its past advocacy. Our resolution of AAPAG’s status when it negotiated the Work Rules will not require the carrier to treat with AAPAG now, or ever. In short, no competing unions vie for the right to bargain, and no employees seek to remain or become unaffiliated. All agree the Teamsters are the employees’ RLA representative, entitled to bargain with Allegiant. Accordingly, this case does not raise a representation dispute, and federal courts have jurisdiction to resolve it.