Opinion ID: 725499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Firearm Adjustments.

Text: 11 Mancinas and Ortega argue that the district court should not have enhanced their respective offense levels pursuant to section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines because Mancinas' possession of the firearm occurred on and before March 16, 1992, prior to the May 1992 onset of the conspiracy for which defendants-appellants were convicted. Ortega further argues that he should not be held responsible for his coconspirator's possession of the firearm. 12 The applicability of a specific offense characteristic, such as section 2D1.1(b)(1), depends on whether the conduct at issue is 'relevant' to the offense of conviction. United States v. Pellegrini, 929 F.2d 55, 56 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam) (quoting USSG § 1B1.3). The Guidelines define relevant conduct as consisting of, inter alia: 13 (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and 14 (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, 15 that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense[.] 16 USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1). Additionally, with respect to offenses for which [the Guidelines] would require grouping of multiple counts, including the drug offenses in this case, see USSG § 3D1.2(d), relevant conduct includes all acts and omissions described [in section 1B1.3(a)(1) ] that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2); see also Pellegrini, 929 F.2d at 56; United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 682 (2d Cir.1990). 17 The government bears the burden of proving that specified conduct is relevant to the offense of conviction. See United States v. Vazzano, 906 F.2d 879, 883 (2d Cir.1990); see also United States v. Butler, 970 F.2d 1017, 1026 (2d Cir.) (In the context of sentencing, if the government seeks increased punishment, it has the burden of proving that the circumstances warrant such an increase. See, e.g., United States v. Font-Ramirez, 944 F.2d 42, 49 (1st Cir.1991) (burden on government to prove sufficient facts for enhancements for, e.g., ... possession of firearms), cert. denied, [502 U.S. 1065, 112 S.Ct. 954, 117 L.Ed.2d 122] (1992).), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 980, 113 S.Ct. 480, 121 L.Ed.2d 386 (1992). In the case of the section 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, [t]he adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3). 18 For the weapons enhancement to apply to Mancinas, there was no requirement that the gun possession had to be linked to the charged conspiracy that commenced in May 1992 as long as the weapon was possessed in connection with drug activity that was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction within the meaning of section 1B1.3(a)(2). United States v. Quintero, 937 F.2d 95, 97 (2d Cir.1991). As we explained in Quintero, which involved a defendant who pled guilty to an act of cocaine distribution on May 16, 1989: 19 Since, with respect to drug offenses, all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction are relevant conduct, [USSG] § 1B1.3(a)(2), the gun possessed on June 14[, 1989] may result in a weapons adjustment if the gun was possessed in connection with drug activity and if the drug activity on June 14 was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the May 16 sale. Plainly both conditions are met. The June 14 encounter was one of a series of meetings in which [the defendant] either arranged to sell or actually sold crack to undercover detectives following introductions by the same informant, and the weapon was possessed as a security measure. 20 937 F.2d at 97-98. 21 Additional findings are necessary to justify the application of section 2D1.1(b)(1) to Ortega. The possession of the firearm by Mancinas is not automatically attributable to his coconspirator, Ortega. Rather, Ortega may be held responsible for possession of the firearm only if: (1) Ortega himself constructively possessed the weapon by having dominion ... or control over the item itself, or dominion over the premises where the item [was] located, United States v. Snyder, 913 F.2d 300, 304 (6th Cir.1990) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1039, 111 S.Ct. 709, 112 L.Ed.2d 698 (1991); see also Pellegrini, 929 F.2d at 56 (enhancement warranted when weapons are present in same apartment where drugs are stored); cf. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (relevant conduct includes acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant), or (2) Mancinas'  'possession of the firearm was reasonably foreseeable to'  Ortega, United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1188 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Soto, 959 F.2d 1181, 1186 (2d Cir.1992)); accord: USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (relevant conduct includes all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity). 22 With these principles in mind, we turn to the district court's application of section 2D1.1(b)(1) in the instant case. The district court found that Mancinas had possessed a firearm on and before March 16, 1992. However, it did not find that defendants-appellants were involved in drug activity at that time, or that any drug activity in which they were then involved was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the later-occurring offense of conviction. Nor did the court make findings that would support the attribution of responsibility for the firearm to Ortega. Rather, the district court simply concluded that a dangerous weapon was possessed and it had not been shown [that] it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense. As explained above, however, it was necessary to make a prior determination that the asserted possession of a weapon occurred during conduct relevant to the offense of conviction before addressing the more particularized findings required by application note 3 to section 2D1.1 (regarding the presence of the weapon at the situs of the offense and the clear improbability of its connection to the offense) for the resolution of the possession issue. 23 We have repeatedly stressed that a sentencing court must make specific factual findings in support of any offense-role enhancement. United States v. Greenfield, 44 F.3d 1141, 1147 n. 4 (2d Cir.1995); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (The court ... shall state ... the reasons for its imposition of [a] particular sentence....). The district court's findings in this case are insufficient to enable us meaningfully to review the propriety of the firearm adjustments. Accordingly, we vacate defendants-appellants' sentences and remand for further proceedings. See United States v. Lanni, 970 F.2d 1092, 1094 (2d Cir.1992) (Because the record is unclear as to whether the court made [the necessary] findings ..., we vacate the sentences and remand for precise findings on the issue and resentencing.). On remand, the district court should apply section 2D1.1(b)(1) if it finds that Mancinas and/or Ortega possessed the firearm during relevant conduct. We express no view as to whether the record evidence would support such findings. 24