Opinion ID: 764869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Weapon, Narcotics, and Forms of Identification

Text: 18 Boyd first asserts that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence obtained during an unconstitutional search. Boyd contends the weapon, narcotics, and forms of identification found by the marshals when they conducted their protective sweep, should have been suppressed because the marshals actually conducted an illegal search. Specifically, Boyd asserts that: (1) the marshals had no reasonable suspicion that there were persons in the house, other than the ones that were in plain sight, i.e., Boyd, Troupe and Matteen, and, thus, the marshals had no reason to conduct a protective sweep; (2) even if the marshals were entitled to a protective sweep, the sweep that they conducted was more than cursory; (3) even when the marshals saw the gun handle sticking out of a towel in the closet, they could not look inside the towel because there was no reasonable suspicion that a person could be inside the towel, and, further, because everyone else was downstairs, the gun did not pose a danger to the officers; and (4) the marshals had no basis to look inside the black bag because there was no reasonable suspicion that a person could be hiding in it. Boyd further asserts that once he had been arrested and taken downstairs the purpose of the officers being at Troupe's house was completed and the officers should have left the house without ever going back upstairs. 19 We review facts supporting the denial of a motion to suppress evidence for clear error and review the legal conclusions based on those facts de novo. See United States v. Beatty, 170 F.3d 811 (8th Cir.1999). Under Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990), a protective sweep is justified in connection with an in-home arrest if an officer reasonably believes that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those at the arrest scene. United States v. Cunningham, 133 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir .), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1823 (1998). The officer's belief must be based on specific and articuable facts. Id. 20 At the time of Boyd's arrest, the marshals knew Boyd was on parole for possession of narcotics with intent to distribute and possession of a machine gun. The marshals looked around the bedroom twice. First, Adler quickly glanced around the room before the officers took Boyd, who by then was handcuffed, downstairs. However, Adler's primary attention was divided between keeping an eye on the two individuals downstairs on the floor and covering Graue. Adler did not take time to look in all the places large enough to conceal a person. Second, Kuster looked around the master bedroom, under the bed, and looked into the closet. Clearly a sweep of this room was reasonable as Boyd was arrested as he came out of this room and a cursory visual inspection of the closet was appropriate as a person might have been hiding there. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327. 21 The fact that Boyd had already been handcuffed and taken to the downstairs area, and Adler had briefly glanced around the room before Kuster performed his visual inspection of the bedroom and closet, does not invalidate the protective sweep. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 (Officers are permitted to take steps to ensure their safety both after, and while making the arrest.). See also United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.1990) (While it is possible for a search incident to an arrest to be undertaken too long after the arrest and too far from the arrestee's person ... it does not make sense to prescribe a constitutional test that is entirely at odds with safe and sensible police procedures.). When the law enforcement officers entered the house ... they had no way of knowing how many people were there. United States v. Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 586 (8th Cir.1993). The search was quick and limited, Buie, 494 U.S. at 336, and initially confined to places large enough to conceal a person. We conclude the protective sweep was proper. 22 With respect to the black bag, Adler saw a scale he associated with illegal drug use protruding from it. When Kuster looked into the closet, he saw the handle of a gun. Next to the weapon, he observed an open black bag with a scale, some currency, and a clear plastic bag with white powder in it. Because the physical evidence was discovered in plain view during the course of a valid protective sweep, it was admissible at trial. See Buie, 494 U.S. at 330. See also United States v. Evans, 966 F.2d 398, 400 (8th Cir.1992) (holding the plain view doctrine permits seizure of items if police are lawfully in position to observe item and if its incriminating character is immediately apparent). 23 Further, even if we concluded the protective sweep was invalid, the physical evidence would have inevitably been discovered during the search of the house after Troupe's consent was obtained. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine: 24 [i]llegally seized evidence may be admitted if the Government proves by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there was a reasonable probability that the evidence would have been discovered by lawful means in the absence of police misconduct, and (2) that the government was actively pursuing a substantial, alternative line of investigation at the time of the constitutional violation. 25 United States v. Glenn, 152 F.3d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir.1997)). See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 & 448 (1984). Here, the Government met its burden of proof on both parts of this test. See Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 45 F.3d 1241, 1244 (8th Cir.1995) (We may affirm the judgment of the district court on any ground supported by the record.).