Opinion ID: 1398979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: procedural disposition

Text: Lovelace filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on May 17, 1988 under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1976), the diversity statute, seeking personal injury damages stemming from the clergical negligence of Father Keohane, and the two dioceses with which Father Keohane was affiliated during the alleged sexual misconduct: The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and The Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa. All defendants moved to dismiss Lovelace's suit under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendants contended that, as a matter of law, Lovelace's action was clearly barred by Oklahoma's statute of limitations. 12 O.S. § 95 (1981). The statute provides in pertinent part: Civil action, other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods, after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards:       Third. Within two (2) years: ...; an action for injury to the rights of another, not arising on contract, ... . Lovelace argued that her underlying mental incapacity and/or memory loss tolled the statute of limitations. However, in opposing defendants' motions to dismiss, Lovelace did not offer any documentation or verified affidavits from any of her therapists concerning her alleged psychological condition, or her alleged repression of memories of the acts of incest or of sexual abuse by Father Keohane. The federal district court began its analysis by observing that Lovelace's complaint, filed 20 years after the initial acts of alleged sexual abuse, was time-barred as a matter of law under Oklahoma jurisprudence. In its written order, the district court first opined that Lovelace did not suffer from a legal disability within the meaning of the tolling provisions of 12 O.S. § 96 (1981). This statute provides in pertinent part: If a person entitled to bring an action other than for the recovery of real property, except for a penalty or forfeiture, be, at the time the cause of action accrued, under any legal disability, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within one (1) year after such disability shall be removed, ... . Although the term, legal disability, had not been defined by this Supreme Court, the district court concluded that the nature of Lovelace's alleged condition did not rise to such a level, because Lovelace did not allege that she was unable to manage her business affairs or estate, or understand and comprehend the nature of her legal rights of liabilities. Robertson v. Robertson, 654 P.2d 600, 605-606 (Okla. 1982), quoting from Roberts v. Stith, 383 P.2d 14, 18 (Okla. 1963). Alternatively, the district court first reasoned this Supreme Court would not invoke the discovery rule (see Discussion, Part b, infra ) in this type of action which alleges memory loss resulting from psychological trauma. Upon reviewing relevant authority, the district court next observed that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has not yet adopted the discovery rule in a negligence action or one involving intentional infliction of emotional distress. Cf. Sloan v. Canadian Valley Animal Clinic, Inc., 719 P.2d 474, 475 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985) (discovery rule should be adopted in negligence actions.) The district court found the Sloan decision had persuasive but not precedential value, because it was not approved for publication by this Court. Rule 1.200(C)(B), Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, 12 O.S., Ch. 15, App. 2. See also, 20 O.S. § 30.5 (1971). In addressing the sufficiency of Lovelace's complaint, and her two-part argument as to legal disability and discovery of her injury the district court concluded this two-stage speculation is too tenuous a foundation upon which to permit the presentation of a twenty-year old claim. The district court supplemented its order by observing that: Neither party has asked this Court to certify the question to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Such a decision is discretionary with this Court, and certification is not to be routinely invoked whenever a federal court is presented with an unsettled question of state law. Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir.1988). Under the circumstances, this Court will not certify the question. Accordingly, the federal district court granted the motions of the defendants to dismiss Lovelace's complaint as time-barred under Oklahoma Law. Lovelace appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The federal appellate court, mindful of principles of comity and federalism, certified the issues to this Supreme Court. In resolving this certification, we must, as did the district court, accept the factual allegations, including Father Keohane's admission, pleaded in Lovelace's complaint as true. Walker v. Pacific Basin Trading Co., 536 F.2d 344, 346 (10th Cir.1976) (well-pleaded facts subjected to a sufficiency challenge under Rule 12(b)(6) accepted as true); Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1359 (10th Cir.1989) (same).