Opinion ID: 882897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expert Opinion and Medical Journal Articles

Text: The scope of review for discretionary evidentiary rulings of the trial court is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Steer Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 475, 803 P.2d 601, 603-604. The Youngs argue that the trial court improperly admitted four medical journal articles concluding that the majority of patients forget that they gave informed consent to their doctors prior to surgery. The Youngs contend these articles are improper for three reasons: a. The articles lack probative value and are unfairly prejudicial. b. The expert testifying regarding the articles did not give his conclusion to a degree of medical certainty. c. The respondent violated discovery rules. a. The Youngs state that the issue of credibility is supposed to be decided by the jury  not by studies created by strangers which do not even fit the circumstances of the case. Respondent, however, contends that under Rule 702, M.R.Evid., expert testimony is permitted if scientific knowledge will assist the jury to understand the evidence to determine a fact in issue. We conclude that the medical articles and the related testimony were admissible. The trial court ruled that the expert could testify and refer to the medical articles but they could not go before the jury as exhibits. Further, they could be referred to as accepted studies but the expert was not to testify as to whether Young was advised of the risks of surgery; that would be a question for the jury. [The] determination of relevancy and of the admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. [W]e will not disturb the District Court's permission to admit the disputed... testimony unless the court abused its discretion. Dahlin v. Holmquist (1988), 235 Mont. 17, 20, 766 P.2d 239, 241. Here, the trial court carefully delineated what was admissible and what was inadmissible. The expert's testimony was based on four medical journal articles and his own experience as a doctor. He did not testify on the workings of her mind nor did he comment as to whether Young had given informed consent. He did testify as to memory of a specific experience with which he had knowledge and used learned treatises as the basis of his testimony. Testimony by experts is admissible if scientific knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Rule 702, M.R.Evid. Here, the trial court determined that this medical doctor had knowledge and experience to testify as to the authoritativeness of the medical journal articles and could assist the jury with information about surgical patients and their memory of informed consent. He could testify as to the conclusions of the medical studies and of his own experience, but not as to the ultimate fact of whether Young gave Horton informed consent. Mahan v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. (1989), 235 Mont. 410, 421-422, 768 P.2d 850, 857. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the four medical journal articles and expert testimony as to his experience with the subject matter. b. The Youngs argue that the medical expert did not render a conclusion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that these studies or the expert's opinion on them applied to [Young] and her memory. The Youngs' objection came after Horton's attorney asked the expert if his experience in his own practice was consistent with a study in which most patients forgot the possible risks of the surgery the doctor discussed with them. The Youngs' attorney stated, I would object, Your Honor, on the grounds that opinions have to be given with reasonable medical certainty. The doctor in this case was not asked to give an opinion, rather, to speak of his past experience. Under Rule 702, M.R.Evid., an expert may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise. His answer here was acceptable in its form. c. The Youngs also argue that the medical articles were inadmissible because they were unfairly surprised and Horton violated discovery rules. They further contend that they made several attempts during discovery to obtain this information, but it was not until after the pretrial conference that the articles and the expert's opinion were revealed. The Pretrial Order, Part VI states that [t]he parties shall exchange on or before November 27, 1991 any learned treatises, medical journal articles, or similar documentary proof that they may wish to use during the case in chief of the trial. On November 27, 1991, respondent's attorney sent two letters to appellants' attorney by telecopy. The first letter contained a list of medical journal articles the respondent planned to rely on during his case in chief. The second letter contains information regarding the issues about which the medical expert, Dr. Golding, would testify. These letters were provided within the schedule set out in the pretrial order of November 20, 1991. In addition, Part III, Defendant's contentions 8 in the pretrial order, states that: [s]urgical patients have a well-recognized tendency recall (sic) poorly the risks about which they were informed prior to the surgery. They tend to have greater recall of the information given to them before the surgery about the benefits of their operation. This contention provides sufficient notice that the memory of giving informed consent would be an issue for the respondent. The medical journal articles and the expert's testimony about patient recall about giving informed consent were properly admitted.