Opinion ID: 1202382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Possible Double Counting of Factors (a) and (b)

Text: (31) As has been noted previously, this jury was instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.84.1 to consider as aggravating factors: [(a)] The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true and [(b)] The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence. Defendant finds in this the theoretical possibility that the jury may erroneously have believed it could consider the crime of which they had just convicted defendant not only under factor (a) but again as violent criminal activity under factor (b), a double counting of aggravating circumstances. Factor (b) as presented in section 190.3, paragraph six does not make it clear that double counting is not permitted. Paragraph one of the statute, however, does refer to the fact the jury may consider ... the presence or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use force or violence.... (Italics added.) We have recently held that double counting the circumstances of the crime under factors (a) and (b) is improper. (See Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 504-505; Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 787.) While, as noted ante, there were some problems with consideration of factor (b) evidence, the record indicates that a double counting of aggravating factors was not one of them. When the prosecutor reviewed the various statutory aggravating factors at the outset of his argument and came to factor (b), he stated: The only other evidence that we have presented in the guilt phase about other acts of violence would be the defendant's plans to kill anyone who got in his way or the testimony we've heard from Mr. Del Frate about the defendant's plan to kill the co-defendant, Mr. Leitch. (Italics added.) This construction of factor (b) to refer to other acts of violence was confirmed when the prosecutor later stated that really ... the single important aggravating factor present has to do, of course, with the nature of this crime. The plan to kill David Leitch would, to the extent it was utilized at all, appear to have been presented as other criminal activity, not a double counting of the offense of which defendant was convicted. [33] Defendant's threat to kill anyone who got in his way, however, had been introduced as relevant to his motive for the charged murder, and hence one may argue a double counting of factors occurred in again categorizing this under factor (b). Nevertheless, we conclude that in light of the record as a whole, including the arguments of counsel, the jury would not have been lead into a mechanical counting of factors in which double counting would make some sort of difference. Nor would the court's failure to instruct the jury more precisely on what might be considered under factor (b) have led it to reach a conclusion on penalty it might not otherwise have reached. The focus of the prosecutor's argument was clearly on the crime and its circumstances, not on other criminal activity, and instruction on the jury's power to weigh factors pretty much as they wished lead us to conclude no reversible error occurred.