Opinion ID: 1859628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Board's Authority to Remove Walker

Text: The Board's final argument is that it was acting within its authority when it removed Walker. We first note that the passage of time has rendered moot the issue of the Board's authority to remove Walker from the remainder of her 1999 term. [I]t is not within the province of this court to decide abstract or hypothetical questions, which are disconnected from the gravity of actual relief, or from the determination of which no practical result can follow. Breaux v. Bailey, 789 So.2d 204, 207 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Spence v. Baldwin County Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 533 So.2d 192, 193 (Ala.1988) (Maddox, J., concurring specially) (quoting Caldwell v. Loveless, 17 Ala. App. 381, 382, 85 So. 307 (1920))). Thus, the only issue properly before us is whether the 1999 Board had the authority to bar Walker from serving on the Board for her 2000-2002 term. It is well established that a court is a proper forum for a challenge to such an action by a board of directors. This Court has held that [j]udicial review of an organization's actions is available to a member of the organization who challenges such action[s] on the grounds that [they do] not conform to the organization's constitution or [bylaws]. Mitchell v. Concerned Citizens of the CVEC, Inc., 486 So.2d 1283, 1287 (Ala.1986) (citing Weatherly v. Medical & Surgical Soc'y, 76 Ala. 567 (1884)). Also, [t]his Court has recognized that the constitution and [bylaws] of both incorporated and unincorporated societies and associations are binding on the organization and members thereof if not in contravention of law or public policy. Mitchell, 486 at 1286 (citing Wells v. Mobile County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 387 So.2d 140 (Ala.1980); Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553 (Ala.1979); and Weatherly v. Medical & Surgical Soc'y, supra). Section 10-3A-35(d), Ala.Code 1975, discusses the removal of directors of nonprofit corporations, and that Code section applies to the EVRC. That statute states that [a] director may be removed from office pursuant to any procedure therefor provided in the articles of incorporation. The only clause pertaining to removal of an EVRC director is found in the EVRC's bylaws. Article V, § 7 of those bylaws states: Whenever a vacancy in the membership of the Board of Directors occurs, the member receiving the next highest vote at the last election of Directors shall be appointed to serve the unexpired term. If a Director does not perform duties he/she was elected to perform (such as attending Board meetings) the other Directors have an obligation to remove that Director and may do so by a majority vote of the remaining Directors. In relation to the binding effect of bylaws, this Court has stated: It is well established that the constitution, bylaws, rules and regulations of a voluntary association constitute a contract between the association's members, which is binding upon each member so long as the bylaws, etc., remain in effect. Medical Society of Mobile County v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321 (1944). Any dispute between a voluntary association and one of its members concerning the construction or validity of the association's constitution, bylaws, rules and regulations constitutes a dispute as to the construction or validity of a written contract. Wells v. Mobile County Bd. of Realtors, 387 So.2d 140, 142 (Ala.1980). Because Article V, § 7, is the only bylaws provision that addresses the removal of a director, we conclude that it specifies the only basis for removing a director of the EVRC. Our first rule governing the interpretation of the bylaws as contracts is to follow the plain language of the agreement: General contract law requires a court to enforce an unambiguous, lawful contract, as it is written. P & S Business, Inc. v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 466 So.2d 928, 931 (Ala.1985). See also McDonald v. U.S. Die Casting & Development Co., 541 So.2d 1064 (Ala. 1989). A court may not make a new contract for the parties or rewrite their contract under the guise of construing it. Estes v. Monk, 464 So.2d 103 (Ala.Civ. App.1985).... . . . . When interpreting a contract, a court should give the terms of the agreement their clear and plain meaning and should presume that the parties intended what the terms of the agreement clearly state. Pacific Enterprises Oil Co. (USA) v. Howell Petroleum Corp., 614 So.2d 409 (Ala.1993). Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So.2d 33, 35-36 (Ala.1998). This language of Article V, § 7, plainly envisions that a director can be removed from his or her present service as a director. It does not mention, nor can one infer from its terms, that a director can be excluded from serving in a future term. Because Walker's three-year term of membership on the Board had not yet begun, she could not, in a literal sense, be removed from it. We see no basis for construing the language of the EVRC bylaws to give the Board the power to removeor barfuture directors. This Court has held: Contracts will not be construed so as to render them oppressive or inequitable as to either party or so as to place one of the parties at the mercy of the other.... G.F.A. Peanut Ass'n v. W.F. Covington Planter Co., 238 Ala. 562, 566, 192 So. 502, 506 (1939) (citing Little Cahaba Coal Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 192 Ala. 42, 68 So. 317 (1915)). We refuse to give an oppressive or inequitable construction to the bylaws now before us. We make no judgment as to whether cause actually existed for Walker to be removed from the term she was then serving, but to allow a sitting Board the power to bar members from serving future terms would be both oppressive and inequitable, especially in the absence of specific language investing the Board with such power. The trial judge properly held that Walker's prospective removal from the Board was invalid. The order of the trial court declaring the action of the Board invalid and ordering that Walker be restored to the Board is affirmed. AFFIRMED. MOORE, C.J., and SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., concur.