Opinion ID: 2581604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Conviction for Lewd and Lascivious Conduct

Text: Defendant was convicted of rape, in violation of section 261, former subdivision (2) (now subd. (a)(2), as amended by Stats. 1993-1994, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 40, § 1), sodomy, in violation of section 286, former subdivision (c) (now subd. (c)(1), as amended by Stats.1998, ch. 936, § 4), and lewd and lascivious conduct, in violation of section 288, subdivision (a). He moved unsuccessfully for an acquittal of the charge of lewd conduct pursuant to section 1118.1, arguing that the only evidence was the same as that which supported the charges of rape and sodomy. Defendant did not receive multiple punishments for the rape, sodomy and lewd conduct convictions; on sentencing defendant to death, the court stayed the execution of sentence on all three sex crimes under section 654. Defendant now argues that he cannot be convicted of lewd or lascivious conduct under section 288 absent evidence separate from, and independent of, the evidence of rape and sodomy. Upon this premise he also argues that the prosecutor was required to elect the specific act upon which the lewd conduct charge was based; that in failing to make such an election, the prosecution misled the court; and that the jury's finding of guilt of the rape and sodomy charges necessarily precluded a finding of lewd conduct. In essence, he is arguing that the facts of the rape and sodomy alone do not establish lewd conduct. Defendant's basic premise is unsound. Unless one offense is necessarily included in the other ( People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d 595), multiple convictions can be based upon a single criminal act or an indivisible course of criminal conduct (§ 954). Lewd conduct with a child is not a necessarily included offense of either rape or sodomy, which require only general intent. ( People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1029-1030, 251 Cal.Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103.) Lewd conduct with a child is a distinct crime that requires an act upon or with the body of a child under the age of 14, with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or passions or sexual desire of either the perpetrator or the child (§ 288), and can be proven by circumstantial evidence including the nature of the act itself. ( People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 444-445, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 905, 903 P.2d 1037.) Rape and sodomy are inherently sexual acts  rape is defined in terms of sexual intercourse (§ 261), and sodomy is defined in terms of sexual penetration (§ 286)  and such definitions support an inference that in raping or sodomizing the victim, the perpetrator intended to sexually gratify himself or the victim. Under such circumstances, a conviction for lewd conduct with a child can be obtained at trial and upheld on appeal by the same evidence used to show the defendant raped and sodomized the child. Further, contrary to the defendant's assertions, there is evidence in the record in addition to the rape and sodomy that would support a conviction of lewd acts upon a child; in picking up, disrobing, removing the diaper from, and holding and placing Consuelo in a position that facilitated the rape and sodomy, defendant was touching Consuelo with the intent to sexually gratify himself. Even if defendant had stopped short of actually committing the rape and sodomy, the crime of lewd act upon a child would have been complete when defendant touched Consuelo with sexual intent. Defendant argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must unanimously decide which specific act supported the lewd conduct charge. Again, this claim lacks merit. We have observed that [t]he unanimity instruction is not required when the acts alleged are so closely connected as to form part of one transaction. ( People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 100, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23.) The criminal acts here took place within a very small window of time. The condition of Consuelo's body presented the strongest evidence in support of the crimes of rape and sodomy and of defendant's sexual intent. The jury was not presented with different or conflicting theories as to how the lewd act could have occurred. This was not a case where the jury would agree the defendant sexually assaulted the victim but disagree about which acts he committed. Thus, a unanimity instruction was not required. Further, because we conclude the lewd conduct charge can be based upon the same conduct as the rape and sodomy charges, defendant's argument that the prosecution failed to elect the specific act upon which the lewd conduct charge was based, and that a finding of guilt of the rape and sodomy charges would necessarily preclude a finding of guilt of the lewd conduct charge, has no merit. Finally, defendant argues that the lewd and lascivious conduct conviction was obtained in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Assuming the claim was properly preserved on appeal ( Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 117, 133, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166), defendant's constitutional claims fail on the merits because, as we have concluded, there was no error in the conviction for lewd conduct.