Opinion ID: 2975947
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identifying the Applicable Level of Scrutiny

Text: To determine which level of scrutiny applies, we begin by asking whether the speech restriction in question is content-based or content-neutral. The Supreme Court faced a similar speech restriction in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000). There, the plaintiffs challenged a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring cable operators providing “channels ‘primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming’ either to ‘fully scramble or otherwise fully block’ those channels or to limit their transmission to” the hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Id. at 806 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III)). Because the statute “applie[d] only to channels primarily dedicated to ‘sexually explicit adult programming or other programming that is indecent,’” the Supreme Court observed that it “‘focuse[d] only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners.’” Id. at 811 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that such a restriction represented “the essence of contentbased regulation,” and thus the Court applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 812-13. Like the statute at issue in Playboy Entertainment Group, the Act involved here applies only to producers of certain types of content, namely, media containing “visual depictions . . . of actual sexually explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a)(1). Under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Playboy Entertainment Group, the Act’s restrictions on speech are clearly content-based. However, the prior panel concluded, in Connection I, that the Act is content-neutral and, in Connection II, that this conclusion represented the law of the case. Although I believe that this No. 06-3822 Connection Distributing Co., et al. v. Keisler Page 19 conclusion is incorrect,1 I recognize that it is the law of the case and that we are therefore bound by it. Accordingly, I apply intermediate scrutiny—the level applicable to content-neutral speech regulations—to the Act. Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2002); cf. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“municipal ordinances receive only intermediate scrutiny if they are content neutral”).