Opinion ID: 1750723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The parties agree the motion presents a factual question.

Text: In support of their error relied on for reversal plaintiffs argue there had been no showing of any prejudice on the part of defendants; the schedule of plaintiffs' counsel was a reasonable excuse for failure to try the case in the October term up to December 6 and defendants' counsel had been guilty of negligence and delay in not taking the deposition of plaintiffs' doctors by either serving notice or merely contacting plaintiffs in regard thereto. They contend on December 6, 1965 the trial judge knew plaintiffs had requested a jury trial and on December 14 knew another judge had entered an order requiring the case be tried during that term. They assert the denial of their motion for continuance deprives them of a trial of their claim on the merits because the statute of limitations has run and the case cannot be filed anew. It appears from the record that the trial court at the hearing considered whether he had failed to do something or had some responsibility for the case not being tried during the two weeks in December after the December 14 telephone call. In this connection the trial court reviewed the record and noted the cause first came to his attention in June 1965 when defendants' counsel asked that his motion for dismissal be assigned for oral argument. He made an entry June 8 setting the hearing for June 15 but, as stated, the matter was not presented when it appeared the motion was premature. Late in August the trial judge received a telephone call from Mr. Fenton relative to a continuance, referred him to defendants' counsel and subsequently entered the August 27 order granting plaintiffs until August 30 to file motion for continuance and assigning it for oral argument before another judge September 3. The present trial judge had no further information about the case until the December 6 telephone call from Mr. Fenton. Because of settlements and changes in the assignment, there were no jury cases tried from the 13th to the 27th of December. Although the jury had been informed there would be a case December 27 they were dismissed December 14 when it was settled. That day the trial judge received a telephone call from present counsel asking for an early hearing on the motion for continuance. Since the try-or-dismiss order had been entered by another judge, the present trial judge suggested counsel contact that judge for a hearing date. That judge refused to hear the matter and in a day or two thereafter the trial judge again received a telephone call from present counsel advising him of the other judge's refusal to hear the matter. The trial judge then assigned the hearing for December 23 but because of illness was unable to hear it until December 28. Present counsel testified at the hearing he did not expect to be available during December because of the Chapman trial. It was only because of an unexpected settlement on December 21 after several days of trial that he was available. It would have been impossible for him to proceed with the trial of the present case December 14. Plaintiffs' counsel asserts he had planned to attend the trial assignment as he thought the Grove case set for that day in federal court would be settled. When it wasn't, he had no one in his office who could attend the assignment on his behalf. Under the circumstances here we do not believe it was the trial court's duty to place the case in the October assignment in the absence of attention from counsel indicating his availability for trial. IV. Plaintiffs allege counsel had exercised due diligence to prosecute the case. They contend that upon being notified December 13 the jury had been excused for the term, he immediately prepared and mailed the application for continuance, thus complying with rule 182(a), R.C.P., which provides: Motions for continuance shall be filed without delay after the grounds therefor become known to the party or his counsel   . December 14 he telephoned the trial judge in Vinton, asking if the motion for continuance could be assigned for an early hearing. Then the telephone calls referred to in the trial court's finding, supra, followed. From the schedule of plaintiffs' counsel attached to the motion and supplement thereto, it is apparent he was actively engaged in other legal matters which had already been assigned for trial from September 14 through December 21, 1965, and it would have been impossible for him to try the present matter until after this date. The record discloses: Of those cases which the witness [present counsel] alluded to in his affidavit, the Grove case in Federal Court was specially set and moved once, the Currie case was specially set and had been moved once, the case in the Circuit Court of Appeals in which the witness represented the plaintiff against one of Mr. Druker's partners was specially set and moved to the particular time in the Circuit, the Chapman case in Waterloo had been set three different times and moved to that specific date, and all of those cases had been assigned prior to the witness actually getting into this case in October. Were the grounds for continuance such that denial thereof amounted to an abuse of the court's discretion? In its conclusions the court stated,    Other than the fact that denying a continuance would, unhappily, deprive plaintiff a trial of her claim on the merits, because the period of the statute of limitations has run and the case cannot be filed anew, no grounds or reasons have been given which would justify sustaining the motion for continuance. Rule 183(a), R.C.P., provides: A continuance may be allowed for any cause not growing out of the fault or negligence of the applicant, which satisfies the Court that substantial justice will be more nearly obtained   . Under this rule the matter of a continuance is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the court. This power to grant or refuse a continuance presupposes exercise of a sound judicial discretion to the end that so far as possible no injustice will be done. Semler v. Oertwig, 234 Iowa 233, 253-254, 12 N.W.2d 265, 275.    This does not mean, and we have never said, such discretion, broad though it may be, is unlimited, that it can be arbitrarily exercised,   . Rather, the discretion so vested in the court is a power to be utilized fairly and impartially by the application of relevant legal and equitable principles to all the known or readily available facts of a given issue or cause, to the end justice may be more nearly effectuated. Cogley v. Hy Vee Food Stores, Inc., 257 Iowa 1381, 1386, 137 N. W.2d 310, 312, citing Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 810-816, 77 N.W.2d 23, 29-33, 60 A.L.R.2d 1354. It might well be argued that plaintiffs, not being present nor represented at the assignment of cases, in the exercise of due diligence should have filed their motion at the commencement of the October term. They were then aware of counsel's other commitments. Rule 181.3(b), R.C.P., provides: Of conflicting engagements and termination thereof. When a case assigned for trial is reached and an attorney of record therein is then actually engaged in a trial in another court, it shall be his duty to so inform the court who may hold the trial of such case in abeyance until the engagement is concluded. As soon as the attorney is free from such engagement it shall be his duty to notify the court immediately and stand ready to proceed with trial of the case. Although the case was not put in the assignment, the October term was the try-or-dismiss term. Plaintiffs' counsel did not contact either the court or opposing counsel until December 6th and 23rd respectively. The trial court's findings of fact state: At the time of said hearing on September 3, 1965 Mr. Fenton agreed with the court and defendants' counsel that the case would be disposed of during the October term, and if not so disposed of, it should stand dismissed at the end of this term. This finding is based on a statement contained in Judge Farber's ruling on the September 3 hearing which also noted it did not appear plaintiffs had used due diligence in bringing the case on for trial at the March 1965 term. As previously stated, Judge Farber found, However, in the interest of justice    the court believes the case should be continued   . The trial court was confronted with the grant of a continuance on September 9, in the interest of justice, to the October term with the stipulation of plaintiffs' counsel that the case would be then tried or disposed of or stand dismissed at the end of the term and a previous finding that plaintiffs had not used due diligence to bring the case on in the March term. No effort was made to dispose of the case during the October term until at least December 6 and then at a time when counsel was engaged in other legal matters. The allegation contained in paragraph three of the December 14 motion that plaintiff is ready to proceed with the trial of this case at this time cannot be sustained in view of counsel's other legal matters. We agree with the trial court's finding that the evidence failed to sustain plaintiffs' allegation that due diligence to prosecute the case had been exercised. V. The affidavit of plaintiffs' counsel with reference to the assignments of other legal matters, Division IV, supra, does not show that the date changes referred to were in an effort to try the present case. The statements do not contradict the trial court's finding the record entirely barren of any effort by counsel to postpone or shift other matters in order to attend to this case. VI. We do not agree with defendants' contention in support of the trial court's ruling, that he could not have reached a contrary result. Defendants contend in support of this ruling that since plaintiffs failed to take any steps to set aside the September 9 order and stipulation or to be relieved therefrom, they are conclusively bound thereby and, in effect, the court was without discretion to reach a contrary result. We believe the matter of granting a continuance under this record was still addressed to the court's sound legal discretion. However, defendants contend in the alternative that plaintiffs failed to present adequate grounds. The trial court concluded no basis had been shown to relieve plaintiffs of the stipulation and agreement of their counsel on September 3 or from the effect of the September 9 order based thereon. Defendants argue that this express order and stipulation greatly differ from one where a party properly moves for continuance under rule 182, R.C.P.; it is not a question of forcing a dismissal on plaintiffs because of denial of their motion for continuance but of enforcing the order and stipulation which required dismissal if the case was not tried or otherwise disposed of in the October term. We believe there is merit in this contention. Ordinarily, we prefer that controversies be determined on their merits, but from the record here we cannot say the grounds for continuance were such that enforcement of the September 9 order and stipulation amounted to an abuse of the court's discretion. VII. As previously noted, Mrs. English's deposition was taken October 8. There is some disagreement as to who was to make arrangements for the taking of her doctors' depositions after plaintiffs had determined from reading the transcript whom they would use in connection with the case. In any event, plaintiffs' counsel had not read Mrs. English's deposition at the time of hearing and had not definitely determined whether he wished to depose any doctors. Plaintiffs' final contention that defendants' counsel had been guilty of negligence and delay in not taking these depositions is without merit. Denial of the motion for continuance and dismissal of the case is Affirmed. All Justices concur, except THORNTON, J., not sitting.