Opinion ID: 852517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Mental Illness and Competency to be Executed

Text: Overstreet contends that his death sentence should be prohibited under the United States and Indiana Constitutions because he is a severely mentally ill man. Br. of Appellant at 73. A. Federal Constitutional Claim The Supreme Court has made clear that [t]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). What is less clear however is who falls within the Eighth Amendment's embrace. The Court did not define insanity, instead leaving to the states the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences. Id. at 416-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (plurality opinion). In a concurring opinion Justice Powell declared that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it. Id. at 422, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (Powell, J., concurring). More recently, in Panetti v. Quarterman, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) the Supreme Court again declined to attempt to set down a rule governing all competency determinations. Id. at 2862. However, the Court departed from the Justice Powell formulation and expanded upon the Eighth Amendment's reach for persons with mental illness. [18] It held that the lower court should have considered Panetti's submission that he suffers from a severe, documented mental illness that is the source of gross delusions preventing him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. Id. (rejecting the argument that a prisoner's awareness of the State's rationale for an execution is the same as a rational understanding of it). The Court noted that the goal of retribution is served only when the prisoner can recognize the severity of the offense and the objective of community vindication. Id. at 2861. This goal is called into question when the prisoner suffers from a form of mental illness that distorts his or her mental state to the point that the prisoner's awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole. Id. As we read Panetti, a prisoner is not competent to be executed within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment if (1) he or she suffers from a severe, documented mental illness; (2) the mental illness is the source of gross delusions; and (3) those gross delusions place the link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that it prevents the prisoner from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he [or she] has been sentenced. Id. at 2862. In this case, there is no doubt that Overstreet suffers from severe, documented mental illness. The record shows that three mental health professionals examined Overstreet shortly before his trial in 2000. Dr. Eric Engum diagnosed Overstreet with schizotypal personality disorder, Tr. at 5078-79, Dr. Robert Smith diagnosed Overstreet with alcohol dependence and schizoaffective disorder, P-Cr. at 510, and Dr. Philip Coons diagnosed alcohol abuse, schizotypal personality disorder and dissociative disorder not otherwise specified. Id. at 442. In 2004, in preparation for the post-conviction hearing, both Dr. Smith and Dr. Coons re-evaluated Overstreet. Dr. Smith concluded that Overstreet was now schizophrenic, stating, It's been documented for basically now over twenty years that [Overstreet] has a severe psychiatric illness that has grown progressively worse over time. Id. at 524. Dr. Coons diagnosed Overstreet with schizophrenia  paranoid type  as a principal diagnosis, along with dissociative disorder not otherwise specified, and a history of alcohol abuse. App. at 703. Also in advance of the post-conviction hearing, Dr. Edmond Charles Haskins, a clinical neuropsychologist, diagnosed Overstreet with paranoid schizophrenia, which the doctor agreed, reflects an extreme mental and emotional disturbance. P-Cr. at 612. Further, Dr. Smith, Dr. Haskins, and Dr. Coons all testified that Overstreet was not malingering. Id. at 453, 523, 603. The evidence presented to the post-conviction court demonstrates that Overstreet's mental illness manifests itself in a variety of ways including hallucinations and delusions which are associated with believing that demons and angels talk to him and tell him what to do. P-Cr. at 519, 599-600. He again acknowledged that his doctors have tried to tell him that the devils and demons are not real but he maintained that `they do not know the truth.' He explained that devils and demons have special powers and that they can disguise themselves as corrections officers, visitors, etc. App. at 686. Overstreet described several incidents of these paranoid delusions where he believed that the demons imitated his sister, his mother, his ex-wife, and prison guards. Id. at 673. Additionally he believes that bad things reported on television, his wife's asthma, and other accidents and injuries to his family members are caused by him slipping into negative thoughts. Id. at 672, 687. He discussed with Dr. Smith several experiences where he is uncertain if they were real or not. For example, [a]t one time, Mr. Overstreet believed that his ex-wife was hired at the Pendleton Correctional Facility and was harassing him by calling his name at night and during the day. Id. at 673. Overstreet has a long history of dissociative disorders including: depersonalization (out-of-body experiences), derealization (feelings of unreality), amnesia, fugue (amnesia plus wandering), and feeling split into different personality states. Id. at 706. It is clear that Overstreet suffers from a severe, documented mental illness and that the mental illness is a psychotic disorder that is the source of gross delusions. However, fatal to Overstreet's federal constitutional claim is that there was no evidence presented to the post-conviction court one way or the other on whether Overstreet is aware of the punishment he is about to suffer and why he is to suffer it  the Ford standard as articulated by Justice Powell. Nor was there any evidence presented to the post-conviction court one way or the other on whether Overstreet's psychotic delusions prevent[ ] him from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. Panetti, 127 S.Ct. at 2862. Indeed the scant evidence bearing on this question includes Overstreet's statement that [E]veryone tells me that I did it, but I cannot believe them. App. at 687. There was also evidence that Overstreet related that he sometimes has bad thoughts that his brother committed the offense, but his communication becomes vague and circular in reasoning, repeating over and over that he needs to have positive thoughts because his negative thoughts would otherwise result in harm to his family. Id. The record shows that although Overstreet continues to struggle with discerning what is `real,' there is no evidence that indicates he questions the reality of the crime occurring or the reality of his punishment by the State for the crime committed. Id. at 689. Thus, even under Panetti's more nuanced articulation of the Ford insanity test, Overstreet does not qualify as insane under current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In sum, Overstreet is entitled to no relief on his federal constitutional claim. B. State Constitutional Claim According to the majority Overstreet also is entitled to no relief on his state constitutional claim. This view is expressed in the separate opinions of Chief Justice Shepard (joined by Sullivan), Justice Dickson, and Justice Boehm. I respectfully disagree. Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution provides, Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense. The United States Constitution establishes a minimum level of protection to citizens of all states. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975). But a state is free as a matter of its own constitutional law to confer rights above the floor of constitutional safeguards found in the United States Constitution. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). As Justice Brennan wrote: [T]he decisions of the [United States Supreme] Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law. Accordingly, such decisions are not mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court judges and the members of the bar seriously err if they so treat them. Rather, state court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L.Rev. 489, 502 (1977) (footnote omitted). This Court has explained on more than one occasion that when examining constitutional issues, claims based upon the Indiana Constitution should be analyzed separately from claims based upon its federal constitutional counterparts. See Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996); Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ind.1994); see also Randall T. Shepard, Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 Ind. L.Rev. 575 (1989). I agree with this proposition. And in this area of jurisprudence in particular, I continue to believe that Indiana's constitution affords even greater protection than its federal counterpart. Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 503 (Ind.2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting) (expressing the belief that a sentence of death for a person suffering from severe mental illness violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provision of the Indiana Constitution). In this case, precedent from the United States Supreme Court, albeit in a slightly different context, informs my view on the question of whether certain mentally ill prisoners should be excluded from execution. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), the Court held that executions of the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment. Importantly the Court declared that the basis for this prohibition is the mentally retarded person's diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. Id. at 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242. Of course, Indiana's statutory prohibition on executing the mentally retarded predates Atkins by eight years. I.C. § 35-36-2-5(e) (1997 Supp.). [19] And there is no claim in this case that Overstreet is mentally retarded. But the logic and underlying rationale of Atkins applies with equal force here. See Corcoran, 774 N.E.2d at 502 (The underlying rationale for prohibiting executions of the mentally retarded is just as compelling for prohibiting executions of the seriously mentally ill.) (Rucker, J., dissenting). That is to say, if a person who is mentally ill suffers from the same diminished capacities as a person who is mentally retarded, then logic dictates it would be equally offensive to the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to execute that mentally ill person. As recounted in detail above, Overstreet suffers from a severe psychiatric illness that has grown progressively worse over time. P-Cr. at 524. He exhibits diminished capacities to understand and process information. Overstreet's mental illness is also reflected in his confused and disorganized thinking. Id. at 523. His communication often becomes vague and circular in reasoning. App. at 687. He does not understand the reaction of others who try to tell him his hallucinations are not real. Id. at 686 (He again acknowledged that his doctors have tried to tell him that the devils and demons are not real but he maintained that `they do not know the truth.'). Punishment is cruel and unusual under Article I, Section 16 if it makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment, but rather constitutes only purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering. Dunlop v. State, 724 N.E.2d 592, 597 (Ind.2000) (quotation omitted). Because I see no principled distinction between the diminished capacities exhibited by Overstreet and the diminished capacities that exempt the mentally retarded from execution, I would declare that executing Overstreet constitutes purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering thereby violating the Cruel and Unusual Punishment provision of the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, I would remand this cause to the post-conviction court with instructions to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In all other respects, I would affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.