Opinion ID: 835779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) to Defendant's Penalty Trial

Text: Before the start of his penalty trial and again before the trial court instructed the jury, defendant objected to the application of the statutory jury instruction in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) to his penalty trial, because he had committed his crimes before its effective date. See Or Laws 1997, ch 784, § 1 (effective date of Oct 4, 1997). That statutory provision, set out post, requires the trial court to instruct the jury to consider any aggravating evidence and any victim-impact evidence, along with any mitigating evidence, in answering the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). The trial court overruled defendant's objections and instructed the jury pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997). In two assignments of error, defendant contends that the application of ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) to his penalty trial violated the prohibitions against ex post facto laws contained in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution and Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution. [8] This court previously resolved defendant's state and federal constitutional arguments relating to the retroactive application of the victim-impact evidence provision of ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) in the state's favor in State v. Guzek, 336 Or. 424, 86 P.3d 1106 (2004) ( Guzek III ). As explained below, in this case, we further reject defendant's constitutional arguments relating to the aggravating evidence provision of ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997), because the 1997 amendment to that statutory jury instruction did not alter the evidence admissible in an Oregon death-penalty sentencing proceeding. Before turning to defendant's arguments, we first provide background relating to the statutory framework at issue. ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) is the statutory jury instruction that accompanies the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), that is, [w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentence. The question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) was added to the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute in 1989 and was amended to its current wording in 1991. Or. Laws 1989, ch. 790, § 135b; Or. Laws 1991, ch. 885, § 2. [9] Unlike the three other statutory questions under ORS 163.150(1)(b), ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) frames a discretionary determination for the jury and is not subject to any burden of proof. See State v. Fanus, 336 Or. 63, 70, 79 P.3d 847 (2003), cert. den., ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2416, 158 L.Ed.2d 987 (2004) (noting same). Although a version of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) has been part of the Oregon death-penalty sentencing statute since 1989, the evidence relevant to the jury's consideration of that question has changed in recent years. In construing the 1989 version of the sentencing statute, a majority of this court concluded that the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) operated solely as a mechanism for the jury to consider mitigating circumstances in deciding whether a defendant should be sentenced to death. See State v. Guzek, 322 Or. 245, 263, 906 P.2d 272 (1995) (so holding as to ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989)) ( Guzek II ). Based upon that conclusion, this court held that only evidence relating to the existence of mitigating circumstances was relevant to the jury's determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989). Id. In 1995, however, the legislature amended ORS 163.150(1)(a) to provide explicitly that, in addition to evidence relating to mitigating circumstances, victim-impact evidence and aggravating evidence also may be relevant to the jury's determination of the question under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). See Fanus, 336 Or. at 70, 79 P.3d 847 (noting same). ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) provided, in part: In the [aggravated murder sentencing] proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the victim's family and any aggravating and mitigating evidence relevant to the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection [.] Or. Laws 1995, ch. 531, § 2 (emphasis added). [10] Defendant here committed his crimes in December 1995, after the effective date of that 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a). See Or. Laws 1995, ch. 531, § 2 (effective date of July 7, 1995). At the time when the 1995 Legislative Assembly amended ORS 163.150(1)(a), the jury instruction set out in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) did not direct the jury to consider either victim-impact evidence or aggravating evidence in answering ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). Instead, ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1995) provided: In determining [whether the defendant should receive a death sentence], the court shall instruct the jury to answer the question `no' if one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant's character or background, or any circumstances of the offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death. Subsequently, however, the 1997 Legislative Assembly amended the jury instruction in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) to reflect the 1995 changes to ORS 163.150(1)(a) respecting the admissibility of victim-impact evidence and aggravating evidence relevant to the jury's determination under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) provided: The court shall instruct the jury to answer the question in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection `no' if, after considering any aggravating evidence and any mitigating evidence concerning any aspect of the defendant's character or background, or any circumstances of the offense and any victim impact evidence as described in subsection (1)(a) of this section, one or more of the jurors believe that the defendant should not receive a death sentence. Or. Laws 1997, ch. 784, § 1 (emphasis added). Over defendant's objections, the trial court instructed the jury in defendant's penalty trial pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997), notwithstanding the fact that that statutory provision became effective after defendant had committed his crimes. With that background in mind, we turn to the merits of defendant's arguments. As briefly noted above, 338 Or. at 311-12, 108 P.3d at 1145-46, this court previously has held that retroactive application of the victim-impact provisions of both ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) and ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) is not prohibited by either the state or the federal constitutions. See Guzek III, 336 Or. at 439-47, 86 P.3d 1106 (so holding). [11] We therefore consider below only defendant's constitutional challenges to the application of the aggravating evidence provision of ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997). In Guzek III, this court observed that both the state and federal constitutions prohibit application of laws fitting within the fourth category of laws that Justice Chase had described in his opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386, 390-91, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)  that is, `[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offen[s]e, in order to convict the offender.' Guzek III, 336 Or. at 434, 445, 86 P.3d 1106. Despite that shared acceptance of Calder, however, this court has interpreted the Oregon Constitution as prohibiting a broader range of evidentiary changes than the United States Supreme Court had delineated for purposes of the United States Constitution. Specifically, this court has identified evidentiary changes triggering the state constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws as including any laws that alter the rules of evidence in a one-sided way that makes the conviction of the defendant more likely. Id. at 435, 86 P.3d 1106 (quoting State v. Fugate, 332 Or. 195, 213, 26 P.3d 802 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). By contrast, the Supreme Court has identified evidentiary changes triggering the federal constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws as including only evidentiary changes that alter[ ] the sufficiency-of-evidence standard or otherwise `reduc[e] the quantum of evidence necessary to meet the burden of proof' to convict. Id. at 445-46, 86 P.3d 1106 (quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 532-33, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000)). Finally, because it is analogous to a guilt-phase criminal trial, the court in Guzek III determined that both the state and the federal constitutional protections against such evidentiary changes extend to a death-penalty sentencing proceeding. Id. at 436, 436, 86 P.3d 1106 n. 11. In this case, defendant contends that, by instructing the jury to consider aggravating evidence in answering ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), the 1997 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) altered the rules of evidence in a one-sided way that made the imposition of a death sentence more likely. In Guzek III, this court held that Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution prohibited the retrospective application of the any aggravating evidence provisions of both ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) and ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) to the defendant's penalty trial for aggravated murders committed in June 1987. In reaching that conclusion, this court explained that, because the state previously had been limited to introducing only aggravating evidence relevant to the first three statutory questions under ORS 163.150(1)(b), ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1995) and ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997) expanded the scope of aggravating evidence admissible in a death-penalty sentencing proceeding by purportedly authorizing the state also to introduce aggravating evidence specifically relevant to ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). Because such a change in the law benefits only the state, this court unanimously concluded that it undoubtedly qualifies as a `one-sided' change that makes the imposition of a sentence of death more likely[.] Id. at 438, 86 P.3d 1106. By contrast to the defendant in Guzek III, however, defendant here committed his crimes after the effective date of the 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a). Thus, at the time when defendant committed his crimes, the legislature already had modified the sentencing statute to provide for the introduction of aggravating evidence relevant to ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). Contrary to defendant's assertions, nothing about the 1997 amendment to the jury instruction in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) either expanded the scope of aggravating evidence, or diminished the scope of the mitigating evidence, admissible under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D). Although it is true that ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1995) did not require the trial court to instruct the jury to consider aggravating evidence in deciding ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D), such an instruction would not have been impermissible at the time that defendant had committed his crimes. That is so because the 1997 amendment to the jury instruction in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) merely conformed that jury instruction to the evidentiary change that the 1995 Legislative Assembly already had made. See ORCP 59 B (In charging the jury, the court shall state to them all matters of law necessary for their information in giving their verdict.); see also ORS 136.330(1) (ORCP 59 B applies to criminal trials). In short, defendant's state and federal ex post facto arguments lack merit, because the 1997 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) did not alter the evidence admissible in an Oregon death-penalty sentencing proceeding so as to make imposition of a death sentence more likely or so as to reduce the quantum of proof necessary to impose such a sentence. The trial court therefore did not err in instructing the jury pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B) (1997). [12]