Opinion ID: 168344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: M otion to W ithdraw the Plea Agreement

Text: M r. Graham argues that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) governs the w ithdrawal of guilty pleas and states: A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere: 1 On April 10, 2006, M r. Graham’s attorney filed a brief on his client’s behalf. M r. Graham, believing that this brief did not adequately present his claims, filed a motion to supplement. We granted that motion and consider both the arguments presented in the initial brief and those in the pro se supplemental brief. -6- (1) before the court accepts the plea, for any reason or no reason; or (2) after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if: (A) the court rejects the plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(5); or (B) the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal. Because the district court accepted M r. Graham’s guilty plea at the August 23, 2005, hearing, his request falls under subdivision (d)(2)(B) of Rule 11. See United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 671 (1997). This Court determines whether a defendant can show “a fair and just reason” under this provision by reference to seven factors, and we review the district court’s denial of the motion to withdraw under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Since all factors cut against the Defendant, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 1. Whether the defendant has asserted his innocence. M r. Graham does not claim to be innocent of the distribution charge for w hich he was convicted. Rather, he argues that he has asserted innocence as to the erroneous relevant conduct stipulation in the PSR. The mistake in the PSR, however, is a separate issue. The question here is whether the Defendant claims innocence as to the charge to which he pleaded. He does not, and this factor thus weighs against allowing withdrawal. See, e.g., United States v. Siedlik, 231 F.3d 744, 749 (10th Cir. 2000). -7- 2. Whether withdrawal would prejudice the government. M r. Graham asserts that the government, at the sentencing hearing, “made no showing of any prejudice that would result” from granting his motion. Brief for DefendantAppellant at 5. W ithdrawal of the plea, however, would require the government to prepare and try anew a case it had substantially completed when M r. Graham entered his guilty plea. As such, this factor cuts against withdrawal. See Siedlik, 231 F.3d at 749 (“[W]ithdrawal likely would prejudice the government by forcing it to undergo much of the same process it already has completed.”); United States v. Jones, 168 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 420 (10th Cir. 1996). 3. Whether defendant delayed in filing his motion to withdraw, and if so, the reason for the delay. M r. Graham first signaled his desire to withdraw his plea on October 28, 2005, about two months after he entered the plea and three days before his sentencing hearing. He argues that this delay was attributable to the late-breaking discovery of M r. Daniels’s recantation and to the fact that he was incarcerated at some distance from his counsel. M r. Daniels, however, did not appear as a witness at trial. Accordingly, his recantation could have had little effect on M r. Graham’s prospects at trial, and thus does not furnish a sufficient reason for the delay. As for M r. Graham’s incarceration at a distance from his counsel, this is not an uncommon situation and is not one, absent further explanation, that excuses such a lengthy delay. It seems that the true reason for -8- M r. Graham’s motion is a change of heart about the sentence he faces under the bargain. Such a shift, while understandable, is not an excuse for delay. This factor w eighs against the defendant. See Siedlik, 231 at 749–50; Carr, 80 F.3d at 420 (“[I]f the defendant has long delayed his withdrawal motion, and has had the full benefit of competent counsel at all times, the reasons given to support withdrawal must have considerab[le] . . . force.”) (quoting United States v. Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435, 439–40 (10th Cir. 1990) (alterations and omissions in original). 4. Whether withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court. M r. Graham argues that because the August 2005 trial would have proceeded with or without him, and because he could be ready for a new trial on short notice, withdraw al of his plea w ould not cause great inconvenience to the court. If M r. Graham were allowed to withdraw his plea, however, the district court would have to set aside time for a new trial— an obvious inconvenience. See Siedlik, 231 F.3d at 750; Jones, 168 F.3d at 1220. The district court has already expended significant resources in trying this Defendant, and it was his choice to opt out of that process after assessing the near entirety of the case against him. This factor weighs against allowing withdrawal. 5. Whether close assistance of counsel was available to the Defendant. In the brief filed by his attorney, M r. Graham asserts that although he had assistance of counsel, he was surprised by his co-defendants’ plea bargains and had only a -9- few hours to decide whether to accept a plea bargain or continue with trial. Despite this short time period, M r. Graham’s lawyer advised him to plead guilty after having had the opportunity to test the government’s case throughout the trial. As the district court noted, when he made his plea, M r. Graham was in “probably the best position he would ever be in to make an assessment” of whether to plead guilty. R. Vol. XII, at 15–16. It thus appears that M r. Graham benefitted from the close and informed assistance of counsel before choosing his path. In his supplemental filing, M r. Graham argues that his attorney never advised him of the rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty. W hether or not this assertion is true, during the plea colloquy the district court very thoroughly catalogued the implications of entering a plea of guilty and M r. Graham stated that he understood the waivers attendant to such a plea. See R. Vol. XI, at 11–13. Thus, this factor also weighs against allowing withdrawal. 6. Whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. M r. Graham argues that the lack of a written plea agreement and the pressure of a last-minute plea deal by his codefendants affected the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea. As demonstrated by the confusion in this case, oral plea agreements are far from ideal; but they are valid. See e.g., United States v. Gardner, 417 F.3d 541, 544–45 (6th Cir. 2005); Brown v. Poole, 337 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003). And though he now professes contrary notions, M r. Graham participated in a Rule -10- 11 colloquy that leaves little doubt that his plea was knowing and voluntary. The court carefully explained the charges M r. Graham faced at trial, the terms of the proposed agreement, and the rights he would relinquish by entering the agreement. M r. Graham stated that he understood everything the court had explained to him. This factor thus weighs against allowing withdrawal. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1573 (10th Cir. 1993) (knowing and voluntary plea taken in compliance with Rule 11 weighs against motion to withdraw). 7. Whether the withdrawal would waste judicial resources. This factor triggers similar concerns as those raised under the “inconvenience to the court” factor and w eighs against allow ing withdrawal for the same reasons.