Opinion ID: 362223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ebeling's right of confrontation claim

Text: 20 Appellant Ebeling contends that the admission into evidence of a statement made by his codefendant Cifarelli and the admission into evidence of a part of Cifarelli's grand jury testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under the teaching of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Cifarelli did not testify at the trial, and therefore Ebeling had no opportunity to cross-examine him as to the matters referred to in the two statements. 21 During an interview with Cifarelli conducted by an FBI agent, Cifarelli admitted acting as a participant in arranging a loan for $12,500 at an interest rate of 1040 percent per annum between Melnick and people whom Cifarelli declined to identify other than by describing them as violence prone individuals who loaned money to high risk clients. He further stated that because of Melnick's failure to pay off the loan, he had taken over Melnick's business to put the appropriate pressure on Melnick to repay the loan. During the same interview he stated that he would kill Melnick unless the latter repaid the loan. 1 Counsel moved to sever Ebeling's case or in the alternative for a mistrial. He declined to request a special instruction to the jury to the effect that whatever Cifarelli had said was evidence only against him and not Ebeling. These motions were based upon the Supreme Court's Bruton decision. That case dealt with the question whether a careful and accurate charge to the jury to disregard a codefendant's extrajudicial statement except as to him alone, could adequately protect the interest of the party against whom the statement was pure hearsay. In dealing with the question, the Court was considering whether it should overrule Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1957), in which it held that it is reasonably possible for the jury to follow sufficiently clear instructions to disregard the confessor's extra-judicial statement that his codefendants participated with him in committing the crime. 352 U.S. at 239, 77 S.Ct. at 299. The Court's opinion in Bruton quoted from the Solicitor General's statement agreeing that the judgment below should be reversed, in which it was said: the other evidence against (petitioner) is not strong. 391 U.S. 126, 88 S.Ct. 1622. The Court then said: 22 (It) is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information. Nevertheless, as was recognized in Jackson v. Denno (378 U.S. 368, 84 L.Ed. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908) Supra, there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. (citations omitted) Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. 23 391 U.S. 135, 136, 88 S.Ct. 1627, 1628. 24 Although nothing in Cifarelli's statement implicated Ebeling by name, appellant contends that other evidence introduced at trial, shows clearly that he was the person who supplied the $12,500 loan and that he was thus identified as clearly as if his name had been used. 25 We assume that this was sufficient identification of Ebeling to bring into play the Bruton rule, if in fact this can be a powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statement(s) which was deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial and unless the record here demonstrates that the admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 26 We have stated substantially the nature of the very damning evidence, much of it out of the mouths of the appellants themselves, which indisputably establishes the existence of the crime and the participation of the two appellants in it. Nothing was stated in this extrajudicial comment by Cifarelli that was not fully treated by other witnesses at the trial. This raises the question, first, whether under these circumstances, the Cifarelli statement is in fact powerfully incriminating, especially since its identification with Ebeling is somewhat attenuated. The clearer basis, however, for rejecting the Bruton claim by appellant is our determination that on the record before us, the introduction of this statement under circumstances that made it impossible for Ebeling to cross-examine the declarant, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We fully recognize the danger of too readily ignoring error, especially of constitutional dimensions, as harmless, but we find that the Supreme Court in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1968) has led the way in a case dealing with a Bruton violation. As did the Court in Harrington, we note that our decision is based on the evidence in this record. The case against (Ebeling) was not woven from circumstantial evidence. It is so overwhelming that unless we say that no violation of Bruton can constitute harmless error, we must leave this (federal) conviction undisturbed. 395 U.S. 254, 89 S.Ct. 1729.