Opinion ID: 1043976
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory History in Tennessee

Text: In 1858, the General Assembly codified the writ as applicable to civil cases.8 The original language of the statute described its purpose as the “correction of a material error of fact, where the applicant has had no notice of the proceedings, or was prevented from making defenses by surprise, accident, mistake or fraud, without fault on his part.” Dinsmore v. Boyd, 74 Tenn. 689, 696 (1881) (citing Code §§ 3110, 3116). Years later, in Green, this Court specifically addressed whether the statutory “writ of error coram nobis . . . lie[s] in criminal cases.” Green, 216 S.W.2d at 306. The State argued, and the Court agreed, that “[a]ll of these Code sections . . . obviously undertake to regulate civil proceedings only [and that t]here is nothing in any of them which could have application to a criminal case.” Id. Without referencing or distinguishing Andrews, this Court observed that there was “no judicial history [in this state] that [the writ of error coram nobis] ha[d] ever been used or allowed in a criminal case.” Green, 216 S.W.2d at 307. In 1955, the General Assembly created a statutory version of the writ of error coram nobis also applicable to criminal proceedings9 but limited its use to the direct challenge of a conviction. In 1978, the General Assembly broadened the scope of the statute to permit collateral challenges to a final judgment in a criminal case based on newly discovered 7 The actual body of the opinion, however, refers only to the “petition” without specifically identifying its nature. There were factual and evidentiary issues asserted in the claim, and the ultimate disposition of the case resulted in a new trial, supporting the publisher’s reference to the petition as a writ of error coram nobis. 8 The statute was enacted under Title I, “of Civil Actions,” Part III, “of the Redress of Civil Injuries.” Code of Tennessee §§ 3110 to 3118 (Return J. Meigs & William F. Cooper eds., E.G. Eastman & Co. 1858). The general statutes governing writs of error coram nobis are now codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 27-7-101 to -108 (2000). 9 Act of Mar. 8, 1955, ch. 166, § 1, 1955 Tenn. Pub. Acts 639-40 (codified as amended at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105). -7- evidence.10 Accordingly, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b) now provides as follows: The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors dehors the record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on the trial of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the nature of a writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial. (Emphasis added). In Mixon, this Court described the writ of error coram nobis, as codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b), as an extraordinary procedural remedy which rarely produces results favorable to a petitioner. See Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 673. Nevertheless, its statutory terms provide an alternative procedural remedy when all other post-judgment remedies fail. “‘[K]nown more for its denial than its approval,’” Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 666), the procedure survives as the lone means by which a court might rectify a recognized wrong when all other possible remedies are no longer available. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 672; see also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954). The burden of proof on a petitioner for the grant of coram nobis relief is indeed heavy. The statute confines review to errors outside of the record and not previously litigated. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105(b). Trial courts are required to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence only if (1) the trial court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by the material witness was false and the new testimony is true; (2) the defendant was reasonably diligent in discovering the new evidence, or was surprised by the false testimony, or was unable to know the falsity of the testimony until after the trial; and (3) the jury might have reached a different conclusion had the truth been told. 10 Act of Mar. 22, 1978, ch. 738, § 1, 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts 658-59 (codified as amended at Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105(b)). -8- Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 673 n.17; Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 104 (Tenn. 2001); see also Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 525-26. [T]he trial judge must first consider the newly discovered evidence and be “reasonably well satisfied” with its veracity. If the [Petitioner] is “without fault” in the sense that the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have led to a timely discovery of the new information, the trial judge must then consider both the evidence at trial and that offered at the coram nobis proceeding in order to determine whether the new evidence may have led to a different result. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 527. Finally, as a general rule, newly discovered evidence which is merely cumulative or “serves no other purpose than to contradict or impeach” does not warrant the issuance of a writ. State v. Hart, 911 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Of further note, the statute of limitations for a petition seeking a writ of error coram nobis is one year from the final judgment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105(a); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103. In Workman, this Court ruled that constitutional due process requires the tolling of a limitations period when a petitioner would otherwise be denied “an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” 41 S.W.3d at 102 (quoting Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992)); see also Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 465 (Tenn. 2001); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000).11 With the adoption of Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, which superseded coram nobis actions in civil cases,12 the “anomalous result is that the writ of error coram nobis continues to be an available remedy in criminal actions” while, as observed in Mixon, “the civil writ of error coram nobis . . . has been abolished for [four decades].” Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 668. 11 The due process analysis requires a consideration of the governmental interests versus the private interests at issue. The governmental interest is “the prevention of stale and groundless claims,” while the private interest is that the newly discovered evidence may have produced a different result. Workman, 41 S.W.3d at 103. 12 See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, Advisory Comm’n Comments (“This rule supersedes chapter 7 of Title 27, T.C.A., dealing with the writ of error coram nobis . . . .”). -9-