Opinion ID: 2634399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Properly Allowed Evidence of Bias to Be Admitted Against Kristi Daffron on the Issue of Her Credibility

Text: The defense presented the testimony of Kristi Daffron, Dustin's former girlfriend and the mother of their son. Daffron testified concerning several of Dustin's attributes, including his dishonesty, racism, and drug abuse, as well as his physical and emotional abuse of her. In calling Daffron, the defense not only sought to diminish Dustin's credibility in the eyes of the jury, but also sought to blame him for his participation in the crimes. Thus, Daffron testified that Dustin admitted to her on several occasions that he smashed Gonzalez's head and had used a tire jack and a tire rim to accomplish the beating. She testified that she repeatedly. had complained to Steven Polacek, defendant's original prosecutor, regarding Dustin's incriminating statements and abusive treatment of her, but that Polacek did not respond. On cross-examination, the prosecution sought to establish that Daffron harbored a bias against the prosecution based upon Polacek's alleged insensitivity toward her concerns and the circumstance that the Fresno County District Attorney's Office successfully had prosecuted Daffron's husband, Ronald, leading to his incarceration for various crimes. Responding to defense objection, the prosecutor explained to the court that the evidence was relevant to explain Daffron's demeanor on the witness stand, noting it was pretty clear how she feels about the People's representative in this case. And I think that has something to do with the fact that it was my very same office that sent her current husband to state prison. Defense counsel disagreed, claiming the question called for inadmissible character evidence in an attempt to taint her with a brush of slime because she happens to be married to somebody who is in state prison and I would remind the Court thatโwhich is abundantly clear that she made these complaints to Mr. Polacek [concerning Dustin's mistreatment of her] before she ever met her current husband. The trial court responded that the evidence reflecting that the local district attorney's office had prosecuted Daffron's husband might constitute inadmissible character evidence if Ronald Daffron had been the witness, but did not constitute such evidence when the issue was Kristi Daffron's credibilityโspecifically, her bias against the prosecution. The trial court permitted the prosecution to elicit evidence establishing that Daffron's husband then resided in state prison, having been convicted of three offenses when the Fresno County District Attorney's Office prosecuted him some two or three years after Daffron's contact with Polacek. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to impeach Kristi Daffron's credibility with her husband's felony convictions. He asserts that the prosecution sought the introduction of such irrelevant evidence for no higher purpose than to smear Kristi's character in the eyes of the jurors; that is, to impeach her testimony by suggesting it should not be credited because of her husband's status as a felon. First, he asserts Kristi's bias was no longer in dispute. Second, defendant claims the evidence was not relevant to bias, because of the interval of two and one-half years between Daffron's contact with the prosecutor and the purported source of the bias, namely, her current husband's incarceration. Finally, he denies the evidence had any tendency to demonstrate her bias against the prosecution. According to defendant, the trial court's ruling in this regard violated defendant's rights to due process of law, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination. As we shall explain, defendant's position is without merit. Subject to certain limitations inapplicable to the present discussion, all relevant evidence is admissible (Evid.Code, ง 351; see also Cal. Const., art. I, ง 28, subd. (d)), and relevant evidence is defined as evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid.Code, ง210.) Evidence is relevant if it tends `logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference' to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive. [Citations.] ( People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. ( People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 177, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664; see People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 1166-1167, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476.) The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive on the part of a witness ordinarily is relevant to the truthfulness of the witness's testimony (Evid.Code, ง 780, subd. (f)), and `[t]he credibility of an adverse witness may be assailed by proof that he cherishes a feeling of hostility towards the party against whom he is called....' (3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Presentation at Trial, ง 277, p. 349.) Contrary to defendant's contention, the issue of Daffron's bias was far from conceded; rather, it was the focus of the prosecutor's cross-examination of the witness. Defendant claims the jury already had heard evidence that Daffron harbored a bias against the prosecution, but that circumstance did not render the evidence irrelevant. The circumstance that the Fresno County District Attorney's Office (whose representative was examining Daffron as a witness) prosecuted the witness's husband, leading to his incarceration in state prison at the time of trial, had an obvious tendency in reason to bias Kristi Daffron against that office and explain her hostile demeanor on the witness stand toward the prosecutor. Such a tendency is apparent even though the husband's prosecution occurred some years subsequent to Daffron's contact with Polacek, in view of the circumstance that the result of the husband's prosecution (his incarceration) persisted at the time of trial. Defendant's reference to Evidence Code section 1101 is unavailing. That provision establishes a general rule, subject to exceptions defined by statute, that evidence of character is inadmissible to prove the witness's conduct on a specific occasion. The challenged evidence did not constitute character evidence concerning the witness, however. Defendant's assertion that the circumstance Daffron's husband was in prison would have been understood as constituting shameful evidence of the witness's character is farfetched and speculative. Nor do we find that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352. Under that statute, the trial court retains broad discretion to assess whether the probative value of certain evidence is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (Evid.Code, ง 352; see People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1124, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) A trial court's discretionary ruling under this statute `must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]' ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1124-1125, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1, italics omitted.) Under this standard, we perceive no flaw in the court's reasoning. Kristi Daffron's testimony regarding her husband was brief and presented no risk of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. As Daffron herself made clear during the prosecution's cross-examination of her: [W]hat my husband did is what my husband did and it has nothing to do with this case. My husband knows nothing about this case. As we have noted, the principal focus of the defense case was to discredit Kenny Dustin's testimony; toward this end, Kristi Daffron was merely one of several witnesses who portrayed Dustin in a decidedly negative light. Even if Daffron's testimony were understood by the jury in the sense claimed by defendant, there would be no prejudice. The jury was made aware of Daffron's deep disapproval of Polacek through other evidence, illustrating her bias against the prosecution and rendering negligible the impact of the challenged evidence. In addition, any error in permitting the question and answer could not have detracted meaningfully from the impeachment of Kenny Dustin's testimony that the defense elicited through the testimony of other witnesses.