Opinion ID: 1165241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Promoting gambling.

Text: The other offense of which defendant was convicted is defined as follows in ORS 167.122: (1) A person commits the crime of promoting gambling in the second degree if he knowingly promotes or profits from unlawful gambling. By moving for acquittal, by excepting to instructions given and to failure to give a requested instruction, defendant asserted that in order to convict him of promoting or profiting from unlawful gambling, the state must show that he knew whatever gambling occurred to be unlawful. This contention, too, was rejected by the Court of Appeals in State v. Wright, supra , and not reexamined in this case. The state relies on ORS 161.115(4), on the strength of which the Wright opinion summarily rejected a defense based on the statutory requirement of a culpable mental state. [5] The court wrote: On the other hand, ORS 161.115(4) is dispositive of defendant's contention. It provides: `Knowledge that conduct constitutes an offense, or knowledge of the existence, meaning or application of the statute defining an offense, is not an element of an offense unless the statute clearly so provides.' Accordingly, it was not necessary that defendant have actual knowledge that what he did was illegal to sustain the conviction. 21 Or. App. at 663, 537 P.2d 130. No doubt it was not necessary that defendant knew that his own conduct was illegal. It does not follow that he need not know that unlawful gambling was going on. ORS 167.122 might have been written so as to make one guilty of a crime if he knowingly promotes or profits from gambling. It was not so written. The statute forbids only the promotion of unlawful gambling; the statute does not address whether one may promote and profit from gambling that is not unlawful. The unlawfulness of the gambling is an essential element in the guilt of the promoter. We see no reason why this statute should be read to impose strict liability on anyone who materially aids any form of gambling, ORS 167.117(10), including one who has no financial interest in or profit from the activity, if without his knowledge the gambling takes an unlawful form. That might reach persons who conduct bridge tournaments or make available the paraphernalia for other games played with cards or dice if the players choose to stake something of value on the outcome of their games. ORS 167.117(3) and (4). The state's view would impose that liability. But certainly ORS 167.122 does not say in so many words that knowledge of a key element, the unlawfulness of the gambling, is immaterial. The statute on which the state relies, ORS 161.115, provides to the contrary in its first subsection: (1) If a statute defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state but does not specify the element to which it applies, the prescribed culpable mental state applies to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state. This carries out the policy of the criminal code to limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault. ORS 161.025(1)(d). We conclude that ORS 167.122 requires more than knowledge that one is promoting gambling even when, unknown to the promoter, the gambling satisfies the conditions that make it unlawful gambling. The state and the Court of Appeals are right that guilt does not depend on defendant's knowledge of the law. ORS 161.115(4). It does, however, require knowledge of those facts and conditions that, under the law, make the gambling unlawful, rather than merely knowledge of the gambling itself. As noted, supra, defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on the ground that there was not sufficient proof of the knowledge of the illegality of the act for conviction. In his motion, he urged that there has to be proof of the illegality of the unlawful gambling. Denial of that motion was not error, for there was ample evidence from which a jury could find that defendant knew that he and his employees were unlawfully paying patrons who won free plays on the machines. That there was evidence to take the case to the jury does not dispose of the issues as to the correctness of the court's charge to the jury. It was up to the jury to decide what the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to do so under proper instructions as to the law. From the outset of the trial, the defendant consistently informed the court that his theory was that he could not be guilty of this crime unless it be proven that he knew his conduct was illegal. Just before the presentation of evidence was to commence, a colloquy occurred as to the admissibility of certain evidence, and defendant there advanced that theory: THE COURT: Well, part of your theory of the case is if he didn't know the conduct that he engaged in was unlawful, he's not guilty? MR. JENSEN: That is only to Count I. At the close of the state's case, defendant, in arguing his motion for judgment of acquittal, returned to that same theme: MR. JENSEN: May it please the Court and counsel. At this time the defendant would move the Court for a Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal on the following grounds: First, as to Count I, Your Honor, Count I, the charge of Promoting Gambling in the Second Degree. It has been the defendant's position in his Trial Memorandum as well as the case of State vs. Wright , that there has to be proof of knowledge of the illegality of the act. That is, the illegality of the unlawful gambling. THE COURT: Do you mean the dissenting opinion? MR. JENSEN: Yes. When I say State vs. Wright , I may jump to the conclusion. I'm arguing from the dissent.    In the first Count and majority opinion, I think the dissent agrees that knowledge of the illegality of the gambling that is being promoted is not part of the offense, but I'm arguing and urging the Court that the Court should reverse that position and accept that as the doctrine. On the first ground, it would be there is not sufficient proof of the knowledge of the illegality of the act to convict the defendant in this case. We believe it to be fair that the defendant throughout was arguing that he could not be convicted unless he were shown to know the law as well as the facts. We have rejected that theory as set forth earlier in this opinion, but defendant's theory must be kept in mind in considering his claim of error with respect to the charge to the jury. The trial court instructed the jury on this issue as follows: Turning to the first Count in the Indictment, a person commits the crime of Promoting Gambling in the Second Degree, if he knowingly promotes or profits from unlawful gambling. In order to establish the crime of Promoting Gambling in the Second Degree, it is necessary for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:    Next, that the defendant either promoted or profited from unlawful gambling.    If you find the State has proven that the defendant promoted illegal gambling or profited from illegal gambling, either one would be sufficient.    I instruct you that it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant knew that the gambling he promoted was illegal if you find he promoted gambling. Knowledge or appreciation that the conduct in question was illegal is not an element of the offense of promoting unlawful gambling. [6] Defendant took the following exception: The last and final exception we'd have would be the Court's giving the instruction, I don't believe the State requested it, and I ask for just the one that knowledge on the part of the defendant in the promotion charge is not an element of the offense, and we feel that it is. I think the Court gave that specific instruction. THE COURT: Was it State's 8? MR. JENSEN: Oh, it is. It is State's exhibit (sic) 8, Your Honor.[ [7] ] We except to that based on our position that the knowledge is a material element of the offense, so that's all our exceptions. Other than the matter discussed in footnote 6, supra, the trial court correctly told the jury that the state did not have to prove that the defendant knew or appreciated that his conduct was illegal. The defendant's exception did no more than to refer to his iterative contention that the state did have to prove that knowledge or appreciation. There was no error in this respect. Finally, the defendant has assigned as error the trial court's failure to give a requested instruction: You are instructed that the State of Oregon must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the Defendant had knowledge that his conduct constituted the offense of promoting gambling and was an illegal act. Defendant, in his brief, has summarized his position with respect to the failure to give the instruction as follows: In other words, it is Defendant's position in this case that the State must prove that the Defendant had actual knowledge that which he did was illegal to sustain a conviction. This is the same point which defendant has raised with respect to his motion for judgment of acquittal and the exception to the charge given to the jury. We have held to the contrary. Defendant must be shown to have knowledge of the facts which make the conduct illegal; it need not be shown that he knows or appreciates the law. [8] In dissent from our conclusion concerning the adequacy of the defendant's exception to a portion of the trial court's charge to the jury, Justice Linde correctly asserts the proposition that the exception is capable of a construction that defendant objected to the instruction on the ground that it did not tell the jury that defendant must be shown to have knowledge that gambling either by himself or by others was of a character that made it illegal. That is certainly not the issue defendant intended to raise by his exception. In his brief in the Court of Appeals, he summarized his objection to the instruction given, as well as his exception for failure to give his requested instruction, as quoted above; in other words, he meant to convey to the trial judge his repeated contention that he must realize or appreciate the legal conclusion that the gambling was illegal. The purpose of exceptions to the charge is to give the trial judge the chance to correct error before the cause is submitted and decided. The dissent would turn the matter into an intellectual game in which the trial judge would have to detect a hidden contention from the language of the exception where the defendant never intended to convey that contention and, in fact, did not even advance it later on appeal. We believe this asks too much of the trial judge. The trial judge, in these circumstances, justifiably must have thought that the defendant was protecting his record for appeal on the same legal issue which defendant had joined throughout the cause. We can find no reversible error in these circumstances. Defendant's conviction on Count I is affirmed. Defendant's conviction on Count II is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings with respect to sentencing in accord herewith and in accord with the Court of Appeals remand.