Opinion ID: 206048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prosecutorial misconduct: shift of burden of proof

Text: During Schmitz's cross-examination, the prosecutor, on several occasions, asked Schmitz to provide the names of people who could corroborate the work that she performed for the CITY Program. During the Government's closing argument, the prosecutor commented that Schmitz could not corroborate her work performance and that she has the same subpoena power as the Government to produce witnesses and documents. Schmitz argues that the prosecutor's questions and comments impermissibly shifted the burden of proof from the Government to her. Because Schmitz's trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's cross-examination questions and closing-argument comments that purportedly shifted the burden of proof, we review this claim of prosecutorial misconduct, which involves a mixed question of law and fact, de novo. United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir.2008). To find prosecutorial misconduct, a two-element test must be met: (1) the questions or comments must be improper, and (2) the questions or comments must prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the defendant. See United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1301(11th Cir.1998). We find no impropriety in the prosecutor's questions and comments pertaining to Schmitz's inability to corroborate her work for the CITY Program because they tested the plausibility of Schmitz's account. United States v. Demarest, 570 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009). The Government produced substantial evidence that Schmitz was not completing work for the CITY Program. When Schmitz testified to the contrary, the Government tested the plausibility of her story by asking who could corroborate her testimony. That line of questioning did not shift the burden of proof. And, we have specifically held that the prosecution can note that the defendant has the same subpoena power as the Government. United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433, 1438-39 (11th Cir.1998). Moreover, even if some of the prosecutor's questions slightly suggested that Schmitz had the burden of proof, the district court cured any possibility of prejudice with its clear and repeated instructions on the prosecution's burden of proof. See United States v. Simon, 964 F.2d 1082, 1087 (11th Cir. 1992) (This court has held that the prejudice from the comments of a prosecutor which may result in a shifting of the burden of proof can be cured by a court's instruction regarding the burden of proof.). We accordingly reject Schmitz's contention that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by shifting the burden of proof.