Opinion ID: 181837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality and standing

Text: Section 46110(a) of Title 49 provides this court jurisdiction to review orders issued by the FAA under the AAIA. Although the FAA does not contest jurisdiction, Broward County has intervened and objected to subject matter jurisdiction on two grounds: lack of finality and lack of standing. First, the county argues that the FAA's challenged actions under 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(B) and Executive Order 11,990 are not final orders, because they merely determine eligibility for federal funds, rather than actually approving a grant of funds. Because the Decision does not award a grant, the county says that the petitioners' objections are premature (with the exception of their § 4(f) claim). Second, the county objects to the petitioners' standing, saying that a favorable decision in this case would not redress their alleged injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision) (internal quotations omitted). The county contends that it has an approved airport layout plan (ALP) (approved in the Decision itself, see Decision at 91), and could and would make the proposed changes to the airport even without federal funding and thus, it argues, without the contested rulings under § 47106(c)(1)(B) or Executive Order 11,990. The county is adamant that if federal funding were denied, its intent and ability to proceed with its expansion plans would be just as firm as O'Hare's were shown to be in Village of Bensenville v. FAA, 457 F.3d 52, 70 (D.C.Cir.2006). It says that if the FAA approved the ALP under § 47107(a)(16), the challenged FAA determinations could only be reviewed in a final award of the grant, which the Decision clearly is not. See Decision at 89 (the Decision does not signify an FAA commitment to provide financial support, which is a separate future decision). We discuss the two objections to our subject matter jurisdictionthe lack of finality and redressabilityin reverse order. The county's understanding of § 47106(c)(1)(B) is mistaken. A number of paragraphs in § 47106 specifically state conditions for approval of project grant[s], including paragraphs (a), (b), (e) and (g); but paragraph (c) is in this respect far broader. It governs every application for an airport development project involving the location of an airport or runway or a major runway extension, regardless of the applicant's interest in federal funding. See Town of Stratford v. FAA, 285 F.3d 84, 90-91 (D.C.Cir.2002), Assuming the county proceeded without federal funding, its theory would be correct that it and the FAA would have had no need to jump through § 47106(c)(1)(B) hoops, but only if its proposed changes to the ALP were minor. Here the county proposes a major runway extension, defined in FAA regulations as one that causes a significant adverse environmental impact to any affected environmental resource. FAA Order 5050.4B ¶ 9.1(1). So, even if the county declined federal aid, its airport expansion could proceed only if the FAA approved a new ALP, which it could do only on a finding that the project complied with § 47106(c). Because the county cannot begin the airport expansion without an approved ALP, a determination by this court that the FAA violated § 47016(c)(1)(B) would redress the petitioners' injury by stopping the expansion in its tracks. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130; FAA Order 5050.4B, ¶ 202.c(2) (unconditional ALP approval signals that the FAA has authorized the airport sponsor to begin building the facilities or equipment depicted on the ALP). For the same reasons, the county's finality objection must fail. The Decision gave its approval to the new ALP, Decision at 91, a necessary condition for implementing Alternative B1b, and a sufficient one so far as FAA approvals are concerned. See United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 310, 47 S.Ct. 413, 71 L.Ed. 651 (1927) (holding that agency orders are final when they determine [a] right or obligation). See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 589 & n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1971). The county also poses finality and standing objections to our reaching petitioners' claims that the FAA violated the Executive Order. So far as we can determine, this challenge depends entirely on the county's claims, set out in its discussion of the AAIA context, that the Decision did not establish any right, and that its reversal would not remedy Dania Beach's prospective injury, because it was not a final grant of money. But as we have shown, the Decision did afford Broward County a right (the right to proceed with Alternative B1b), and its reversal would correspondingly relieve Dania Beach of the feared injury, namely the side effects of the airport expansion. The same points are equally true as to the FAA's ruling under the Executive Order.