Opinion ID: 1742981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Iowa Civil Rights Act Retaliatory Discharge Claim

Text: Boyle also contends the district court erred in denying her ICRA retaliatory discharge claim without making any factual findings regarding the claim. When the district court decided the ICRA retaliatory discharge claim, it explicitly refrained from making any findings as to whether Boyle's discharge was in retaliation for her own complaint of harassment, because the court does not believe that it needs to resolve these fact questions to decide this part of the case. The court went on to make a conclusion of law that there [was] no claim or cause of action for retaliatory discharge in this context. The court's statement that it did not need to resolve these fact questions to decide this part of the case indicates it likely determined the retaliatory claim was moot because it found Boyle did not prove the hostile-work-environment claim. However, a retaliatory discharge claim under both the ICRA and Title VII requires that the plaintiff prove three elements, all of which are distinct from any claim for sexual harassment. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ICRA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she was engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) the employer took adverse employment action against him or her, and (3) there was a causal connection between his or her participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action taken. Estate of Harris v. Papa John's Pizza, 679 N.W.2d 673, 678 (Iowa 2004); Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 861-62 (Iowa 2001). Even though her hostile-work-environment claim failed in the original trial, Boyle still presented enough evidence to warrant a decision on her retaliatory discharge claim. First, Boyle exercised her right to complain about the instances of sexual harassment. See Channon, 629 N.W.2d at 865. Second, she suffered an adverse employment action when her superiors terminated her employment. Evidence supporting the third element, causal connection between the complaint and her discharge, was also tendered through circumstantial evidence  she was discharged for allegedly sexually harassing other employees one week after she complained that a coworker put his hand down her blouse. While mere coincidence of timing does not conclusively establish this element, the timing of the action, combined with all the other circumstances present in this case, entitles her to a ruling on her retaliatory discharge claim. See Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.1999) (Generally, more than a temporal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation.). Even though Boyle presented this evidence at trial, Alum-Line contends Boyle waived her claim for retaliatory discharge. In essence, because Boyle waived the Title VII retaliatory discharge claim by not objecting when the court presented her with proposed jury instructions not addressing the claim, Alum-Line contends this waiver carried over to the ICRA claim. We do not find Boyle waived her ICRA retaliatory discharge claim. Boyle clearly pled a retaliatory discharge claim under Title VII and the ICRA. She also presented evidence demonstrating she was eligible for relief for retaliatory discharge. When the district court held there was no claim or cause of action for damages under Iowa law for retaliatory discharge in this context, Boyle filed a rule 1.904(2) motion asking the court to enlarge or amend its findings and conclusions on this claim. [3] The court did not address this issue in its post-trial order, but the issue was still adequately preserved for review on appeal. [4] As aptly stated in Boyle's appellate brief: No matter how badly a plaintiff's counsel errs in the jury instruction phase of a Title VII case tried simultaneously with an ICRA case, a plaintiff should be entitled to a correct decision of her ICRA case by an independent trial judge correctly applying Iowa law and arriving at fact-findings based upon his [or her] own weighing of the evidence. Alum-Line also argues Boyle waived her ICRA retaliatory claim during the following discussion with the court: to the extent there are any matters related to the plaintiff's claim against the defendant that were not submitted to the jury that are required by Iowa law to be decided by the Trial Court without a jury, those matters will be submitted [tomorrow]. The next day the court said: The court is making an opportunity available now to present whatever trial may be necessary and argument that may be necessary to submit the nonjury issues under state law for the court for decision incorporating by reference the evidence presented to the jury and supplementing the record with whatever other documents or arguments or anything else that counsel believe is necessary. Boyle's attorneys indicated they did not wish to present any additional evidence or make any additional arguments, stating it was their belief the evidence and arguments presented to the jury were sufficient. Following Boyle's statements, Alum-Line made the following argument: To me the only issue to be tried under Iowa law contains the same elements to prove hostile environment, sexual harassment, and that's the only issue that has been raised by the  by the evidence. No other issue has been raised by the evidence. There isn't sufficient evidence to support any other type. There's no retaliatory discharge issue raised. (Emphasis added.) Boyle was given an opportunity to respond to this argument, but declined. Alum-Line contends this brief discussion sufficiently waived Boyle's retaliatory claim. We find no merit to Alum-Line's argument that Boyle waived her retaliatory claim by standing silent. Such a rule would require attorneys to waste precious court time repeating, ad nauseum, their entire case to the court whenever a judge asked is there anything else? Also, we find it plausible Boyle did not contradict Alum-Line's contention that there was no retaliatory discharge claim as she felt it was unnecessary because she had clearly pled the retaliation claim and presented evidence at trial to establish her case. [5] Also, it is clear, in context, that Alum-Line's statement that [t]here's no retaliatory discharge issue raised was an argument that the issue was not raised by the evidence. This was not a statement of issues for the court to rule upon that was agreed to by Boyle's non-response. The district court's conclusion of law that there was no claim or cause of action for damages under Iowa law for retaliatory discharge in this context was flawed. A court cannot determine there is no claim or cause of action for damages when it makes no findings concerning the elements of the plaintiff's case. See Falczynski, 533 N.W.2d at 234. This failure to apply a correct legal analysis to the claim is reversible error. See id. We therefore vacate the trial court's decision and remand for reconsideration so that the same district court judge can, on the existing trial record, make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on the ICRA retaliatory discharge claim. See id.