Opinion ID: 1388611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Instructions on sympathy and mitigating evidence.

Text: (28) Defendant claims the trial court erred (1) by failing to countermand the standard antisympathy instruction given at the guilt trial and (2) by refusing defense instructions on character and background as mitigating evidence. No basis for reversal appears. The trial court instructed in the statutory language that the jury could consider [a]ny ... circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.... (§ 190.3, factor (k), italics added; CALJIC, former No. 8.84.1, factor (k).) At the defendants' request, the court added the phrase including but not limited to the defendant's character, background, mental condition and physical condition. In his argument, the prosecutor minimized the importance of defense evidence in mitigation but never suggested that any evidence proffered by the defense was legally irrelevant. Hence, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled about its constitutional and statutory duty to consider every aspect of `[the] defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878 & fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], quoting Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990, 98 S.Ct. 2954] [plur. opn.]; see Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 381-382 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329-330, 110 S.Ct. 1190]; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1225 & fn. 23 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) Defendant claims the court should have substituted mitigates for extenuates as he suggested. However, the words are synonyms, and defendant fails to show how use of the statutory term extenuates obscured the jury's understanding. The court did not err by refusing the proffered substitution. Defendant contends the court's failure to countermand the standard guilt phase antisympathy instruction (CALJIC No. 1.00) left the penalty jury insufficiently informed about its duty to `consider any sympathy factor raised by the evidence before it.' ( People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 876, quoting People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 58 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279].) On the contrary, the trial court gave a defense instruction that in weighing the sympathetic elements of the defendant's background, the jury may consider pity, sympathy and mercy.... Defendant's assertion, that the prosecutor argued sympathy was irrelevant, lacks merit. The prosecutor maintained that the evidence in mitigation was weak, and he invited the jury to accord defendant the same mercy defendant showed his victim. No suggestion was made, however, that consideration of sympathy would be legally improper. The jury cannot have been misled.