Opinion ID: 2604155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The right/remedy dichotomy

Text: The common law recognizes two different time bars that are conceptually distinct: [1] an ordinary or true statute of limitations that regulates the time to bring an action and [2] a time limit that establishes a condition upon the right or constitutes a substantive element of the claim. [19] A legislative act that spells out the time in which an action must be brought is deemed to be an ordinary or true statute of limitations. It bars only the remedy  not the right  unless the prescribed time limit is so specifically attached to the substantive claim that it must be construed as an element of, or condition upon, the right. Ordinary limitations may be tolled and, unless affirmatively pleaded, the time bar is deemed waived. On the other hand, a time bar falling into the category of a condition upon the right is a substantive element of the claim and cannot be tolled. It differs vastly from a statute that regulates merely the time for the commencement of an action. This is so because it operates to extinguish the right as well as the remedy and in so doing it may also transfer an interest lost by time lapse. [20] Time bars in this category do not merely destroy the claim but also confer a new right on one who may invoke the benefit of the lapse. [21] Where applicable, the § 100 recommencement statute is but an extension of the statutorily established limitations period. It will not avail to resurrect a lost right but may serve solely to extend the time for the pursuit of a remedy that otherwise would have been barred. In short, § 100 does not extend the time to bring a post-probate will contest because the terms of § 67 do not merely provide and bar a remedy; rather, they extinguish the right to challenge a will after its probate.