Opinion ID: 668237
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Summary Judgment Order Dismissing Defendants Tadlock and Allen

Text: 50 Tadlock and Allen were private citizens who signed a citizen's complaint in order to get police assistance in removing Sloman from the Auto Fair. The district court granted their summary judgment motion and dismissed all claims against them. 14 Order of September 18, 1989. Summary judgment orders are reviewed de novo to determine whether genuine issues of material fact existed. Jones v. Union Pacific R.R., 968 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir.1992). 51 A police report written by Hale stated that Tadlock and Allen contacted him and Rein at the fair to see if there was any way to remove Sloman, because of the alleged disturbance he was creating. The officers told Tadlock and Allen that one of the booth holders at the fair would have to ask Sloman to leave, and then, if he continued to cause a disturbance, he could be arrested for trespassing. After talking with Sloman again and asking him to leave, Tadlock and Allen signed a citizen's complaint form. 52 Sloman cites Tadlock's deposition testimony that one of the reasons he initially asked Sloman to leave the fair was more than likely that Tadlock was opposed to the political sentiment conveyed by a sign Sloman was carrying at the time. Appellee's Opening Brief at 46. Sloman also characterizes the discussions between Officers Rein and Hale and citizens Tadlock and Allen as a process of conceiving of a crime for which [Sloman] could be arrested. Appellee's Reply Brief at 5. Sloman also asserts that except for the testimony of Tadlock and Allen, there was no evidence that Sloman was causing any sort of disturbance. 53 With regard to Allen, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate because Sloman presented no direct or circumstantial evidence that Allen participated in the arrest process because of Sloman's political beliefs. Tadlock's deposition testimony, however, is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was motivated to sign the citizen's complaint because of Sloman's political beliefs. Moreover, Sloman has succeeded in raising a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was probable cause to arrest him. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561-62 (9th Cir.1986) (lack of probable cause required to make out a claim of malicious prosecution under California law). He has also raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Tadlock was engaged in joint action with Hale and Rein, thus satisfying the state action requirement of his claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. See Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 865, 107 L.Ed.2d 949 (1990). 54 We conclude that the grant of summary judgment in Tadlock's favor was erroneous. 55 B. The District Court's Summary Judgment Finding that the Ventura County District Attorney's Office Exercised Independent Judgment in Prosecuting Sloman for Trespass 56 At trial, Sloman sought to put into evidence the attorneys' fees he spent defending the criminal trespass prosecution which grew out of his citizen's arrest at the auto fair. Attorneys' fees expended in defending a criminal prosecution are not recoverable from the arresting officers in a related Sec. 1983 action if the prosecutor exercised independent judgment in deciding to prosecute. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2995, 120 L.Ed.2d 872 (1992); Borunda, 885 F.2d at 1390. However, the prosecutor's judgment will be deemed not independent, and fees will thus be recoverable, if the prosecutor was misled by material omissions or false information given by the arresting officers. Barlow, 943 F.2d at 1136; Borunda, 885 F.2d at 1390. 57 The prosecutors who filed the case against Sloman, Jay Orr and David Doyle, both submitted affidavits stating that they had exercised independent judgment in filing the case. They admitted, however, that they based their judgment exclusively on the police reports submitted by Officers Hale and Sliester. The district court made a summary judgment finding that Orr and Doyle had exercised independent judgment in deciding to prosecute Sloman. Order of August 1, 1989, at 2. The court did not expressly consider Sloman's allegations that the police reports on which the prosecutors based their decision to prosecute were fabricated by Officers Hale and Rein, and thus that the prosecutors were incapable of exercising independent judgment. 58 Sloman did not and does not point to any evidence of such fabrication, other than the fact that the officers' reports were inconsistent with Sloman's own account of the incidents leading to his arrest. Such conclusory allegations, standing alone, are insufficient to prevent summary judgment. In Barlow and Borunda, by way of contrast, the police reports on which the prosecutors relied contained demonstrable omissions, were contradicted by other police reports, and, most importantly, were contradicted by independent witnesses who corroborated the plaintiff's version of events. Barlow, 943 F.2d at 1137; Borunda, 885 F.2d at 1390. 59 While it is true that the jury's verdict against Hale, which we today affirm, might lend support to Sloman's allegations, we have no proof that the verdict necessarily rested on findings that Hale lied about events at the Auto Fair. Indeed, Sloman's Auto Fair allegations are a relatively minor part of his case, and were not essential to his Sec. 1983 charges against officer Hale. Regarding the sign-waiving and walk-button-pushing incidents, Sloman has supporting testimony from a number of witnesses; here, however, he has only his own word. 60 We conclude that Sloman has not succeeded in demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of fact with regard to whether the prosecutors exercised independent judgment, and therefore affirm the district court's holding. C. Attorneys' Fees 61 After the jury returned a verdict for Sloman on the Sec. 1983 claims against Hale and Simi Valley, the district court granted his motion for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. 15 The court calculated the fees using a method submitted by defendants in their memorandum opposing Sloman's fees motion. Sloman cross-appeals the fee award, arguing it is too small. We review for abuse of discretion. Oviatt, 954 F.2d at 1481. 62 The method of fee-calculation suggested in defendants' brief and adopted by the district court involved two main steps: reducing the number of hours actually spent by Sloman's attorneys to a reasonable figure, and reducing the fee claimed by Sloman's attorney to a reasonable rate. The former was done to account for the fact that many of Sloman's claims were neither successful nor closely related to those upon which he prevailed. The latter was done on the basis of affidavits of other attorneys in the area describing their level of experience and the fees they usually charge. The district court also considered other factors such as the complexity of the case. 63 These procedures were in accord with the law and within the district court's discretion. The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). In determining what is reasonable in both parts of the lodestar calculation, the court may reduce the hours actually spent or the hourly rate actually charged in order to account for factors such as those considered by the district court in this case. Cabrales, 864 F.2d at 1464-66; Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1726, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976). 64 We express no opinion as to whether our vacation of the judgment against the City and our reversal of the dismissal of Tadlock at the summary judgment stage should affect the amount of Sloman's fee award. We recognize, however, that the district court might no longer consider the amount of its fee award appropriate. We therefore vacate the fee award and remand to allow the district court the opportunity to redetermine the fee award, if in its discretion it decides that would be the proper course.