Opinion ID: 2221692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Harmless Error Doctrine

Text: The error in this case was an egregious denial of the defendant's fundamental right to due process of law. Despite the majority's claim that the overwhelming weight of the evidence was in the prosecution's favor, I would hold that it nonetheless failed to carry the burden required by Anderson, supra . There is a distinct, reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. That defendant promised to visit Margo DeVita daily to persuade her to leave his house and that that explains his frequent presence at her apartment does not defy common sense. Defendant is essentially alleging that Margo was obsessive and dependent on him for money and would not leave without assurances of his continued presence and her continued financial security. Margo testified that someone kicked open her front door from outside. Yet, the only damage to the front door is consistent with someone inside trying to get out. The majority makes much of defendant's testimony that he heard Cherry say John kill Steve, an inaccurate statement to the extent that Steve remained alive for hours after being wounded. However, the statement's inaccuracy does not discredit defendant's testimony. According to defendant, Cherry witnessed Steve being shot in the face and bleeding profusely. In such a circumstance, any witness might exclaim that the person had been killed. The majority is skeptical of defendant's testimony that he struggled with men near Margo's house, broke away, got into his car parked next door at John's house, and drove off. However, according to defendant, Margo had told him that John had his car, correcting her earlier story. Defendant likely knew that John lived next door to Margo, and so it is quite plausible that he would find his car there and use it to effect his escape. Finally, the majority finds unbelievable defendant's testimony that he engaged in routine behavior after escaping, rather than calling the police. But, defendant easily could have avoided calling the authorities out of fear of repercussions from the real killers because of shock or mental imbalance or because he distrusted the police. I refute the majority's interpretation of defendant's unsolicited statement: They count five. They say I killed five people. I only kill one. Why do they count five now? This does not necessarily amount to admission of the crime. The statement could be interpreted in an innocuous manner, especially given defendant's poor command of the English language. The outburst could have been an expression of his incredulity that he could be charged with three counts of murder and two counts of assault with intent to commit murder when only one man died. [18] A forensic examiner is a professional, likely a coherent and persuasive witness. For such a witness to testify that a defendant, in interviews before trial, contradicted his testimony in front of the jury would be greatly destructive of the defendant's credibility. [19] This is particularly true here, because defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel, his theory of the case having been presented in a vague and confusing manner. Allowing the forensic examiner's testimony more likely than not resulted in the jury largely disbelieving defendant's testimony. As the jury was, in essence, presented only with the prosecutor's proofs, it is inevitable that the evidence of defendant's guilt would seem overwhelming. Even so, the jury did not convict defendant on the two counts of assault with intent to murder and the felony-firearm counts supported by those assaults. See, supra note 5. If the evidence of guilt was truly overwhelming, it is curious that the jury failed to convict on all charged counts. It was defendant's testimony alone that rebutted the prosecution's case. On the basis of the jury's two-and-a-half days of deliberation, one could reason that the jury was reluctant to convict. Therefore, it is questionable whether the error in admitting the forensic examiner's testimony could have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to raise a defense. U.S. Const., Ams. VI, XIV; Const. 1963, art. 1, §§ 13, 17, 20. Yet, access to the defense of insanity is chilled if, in asserting it, defendants expose themselves to impeachment for every inconsistency between their trial testimony and their forensic interviews. The Court of Appeals correctly reversed defendant's convictions on this ground.