Opinion ID: 44626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Injunction Was An Appropriate Remedy

Text: 52 Apart from this case's constitutional and statutory merits, the RPT argues that the district court erred in granting the TDP injunctive relief. In addition to prevailing on the merits, a party requesting an injunction must establish that there is a substantial threat of irreparable injury, the threatened injury outweighs the potential injury to the opposing party, and the injunction will not disserve the public interest. ICEE Distribs. Inc. v. J&J Snack Foods Corp., 325 F.3d 586, 597 n. 34 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 392, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981)). 53
54 In its opening brief, the RPT ties its irreparable harm argument to its standing argument. It argues that the TDP cannot possibly show irreparable harm because it has shown no harm at all. The RPT's lack-of-harm arguments have been addressed above, see Part III.A., and found meritless. 55 For the first time in its reply brief, the RPT argues that the TDP has not shown irreparable harm because it has an adequate remedy at law. We need not consider this argument because the RPT effectively waived it by failing to raise it in its opening brief. See, e.g., Linbrugger v. Abercia, 363 F.3d 537, 541 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2004). In any event, the legal remedies proposed in the RPT's reply brief would not make the TDP whole. We therefore reject the RPT's irreparable-harm arguments. 56
57 The RPT's argument concerning the appropriateness of the injunction centers on the public interest element. In fact, it never makes on argument concerning the requirement that the TDP's threatened injury must outweigh any potential injury to the RPT. Given that it has failed to raise an argument on this element, it has certainly not proven that the district court abused its discretion by implicitly finding that the TDP would suffer greater harm. 58
59 The RPT and the TDP make conflicting public interest arguments. The RPT claims that the district court's injunction reduces voter choice, requiring that an ineligible or unwilling major-party candidate remain on the ballot and prohibiting his replacement with an eligible candidate who would be willing to serve if elected. The TDP responds that the injunction prevents the RPT from perpetrating, in the district court's phrase, a fraud on the voters. It is beyond dispute that the injunction serves the public interest in that it enforces the correct and constitutional application of Texas's duly-enacted election laws. 19 The RPT's arguments are not sufficiently persuasive to overcome this conclusion. The RPT has not shown that the injunction disserves the public interest and certainly has not proven that the district court abused its discretion. Therefore, the RPT has not met its burden. 60 E. We Will Not Consider Whether the District Court Erred by Enjoining the Secretary of State 61 As an amicus curiae in support of the RPT, Texas's Secretary of State complains that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin him because he is not a party to this suit. The RPT, however, does not challenge the scope of the district court's injunction, focusing instead on standing and the merits of the constitutional issue before the court. [A]n amicus curiae generally cannot expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues that have not been presented by the parties to the appeal. Garcia-Melendez v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 657, 663 n. 2 (5th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, we will not consider this issue.