Opinion ID: 1185970
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ordinary Purchaser Exercising Due Care

Text: As to the necessary degree of care, we agree with appellant's contention that purchasers of tires tend to be more casual customers than persons taking care of financial matters in a bank. As the record indicates, consumers do not purchase tires every month, but on the average every two or three years. As stated in 3 Callman, supra, § 81.2, at p. 577: `The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the public  that vast multitude, which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearances and general impressions.' The general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the normally prevalent conditions of the market and giving the attention such purchasers usually give in buying that class of goods, is the touchstone.  (Emphasis added.) In Wyoming National Bank, supra, 572 P.2d at 1126, this court stated that [t]he burden cannot be placed upon the business community to lead a member of the public by the hand to the business of his choice. This may be particularly true when consumers are dealing with financial institutions... . The distinction is then between the casual and discriminating purchaser. And, as noted in Wyoming National Bank, bank customers have been held to a higher standard of care than customers of other types of establishments. As 3 Callman, supra, § 81.2(a) at p. 587 puts it, [p]articipants in financial transactions are, of course, likely to be careful and discriminating. The record indicates that customers of these two businesses are casual and the confusion cannot be attributed to an extraordinary circumstance. The ordinary customer's general impression is that these two businesses are one and the same. The use of the names Plains Tire and Battery Company and Plains A to Z Tire Company in appellant's trading area has created confusion among the ordinary customers who are exercising due care because these two names convey the same idea. Standard Oil Company, supra, 252 F.2d at 74.
Appellee contends that appellant was required to show a fraudulent purpose on the part of appellee. Once again, we cannot agree. In Wyoming National Bank, supra, 572 P.2d at 1125-1126, this court concluded that if there is a finding of confusion, fraud will be presumed. As this court stated: We are not unmindful of the policy that should confusion and deception result from the use of a particular name, fraud will be presumed regardless of intent and that alone may shape the basis for equitable relief. Bernstein v. Friedman, supra, at 230 [62 Wyo. 16, 160 P.2d 227 (1945)]. In 3 Callman, supra, § 86.1(a), at pp. 1052-1053, the general rule governing the necessity of bad faith in an infringement action has been set forth as follows: It is a well established principle at common law that, in a case involving a technical trademark, it is not a condition precedent to the proof of an infringement that the plaintiff show wrongful intent, or facts supporting the inference of such, on the part of the defendant. A trademark infringement does not stand or fall upon the state of mind of the infringer. It is the objective fact of the infringement that is important... . 3 Callman, supra, at § 82.2(b)(1), pp. 782-788, also provides: Absence of malicious intent or bad faith furnishes no defense to a trademark infringement action...       Yet some court decisions improperly assume there is no infringement if proof of an intent to deceive is lacking. Although it is conceivable that a competitor might, in all innocence, make the unhappy choice of an infringing trademark, he should at least be subject to injunctive action. It would appear the better doctrine that where the objective danger of confusion is evident beyond a reasonable doubt, the court should not concern itself with the defendant's subjective intent... . In Weiss v. Stork & Gift Shop, 137 N.J. Eq. 475, 45 A.2d 688, 692 (1946), a case cited in Callman, supra, the court stated: It is not necessary that one using a trade name or slogan which interferes with another's prior right thereto, should have adopted such name with intent to deceive the public or to injure that other to move the court to enjoin; the consequences of the defendant's acts and not the motive for them, determine whether this court should interfere... . In the case at bar, there was no need to prove an actual intent to defraud because appellant has shown actual confusion.
Appellee's final contention is that it has a better claim to the right to use the word `Plains.' To support this argument, appellee relies upon the fact that Plains A to Z Tire Company, Inc., registered its corporate name on March 26, 1952, whereas Plains Tire and Battery Company, Inc., did not register its corporate name until October 31, 1977. And the stipulation of the parties shows that Appellee traces its ancestry back to the original `Store No. 1' whereas the Appellant's lineage goes back to `Store No. 2'. [5] In Oliver Gintel, Inc. v. Koslow's, Inc., D.C.Tex., 355 F. Supp. 236, 239 (1973), the court held that the fact that a defendant and/or his affiliates may have had prior rights in a trade name would not necessarily preclude their being guilty of unfair competition. Here, the fact that appellee registered its corporate name some twenty-seven years before appellant does not in and of itself prevent a finding of trade-name infringement. The name Plains Tire and Battery Company has been continually used in appellant's trading area since 1945 and this trade name has acquired a secondary meaning within that trading area. Therefore we cannot agree that appellee has a superior claim to the word Plains within appellant's trading area. The conclusion reached by the trial judge is not supported by the evidence and we find that the trial judge erred in denying appellant injunctive relief. Appellant is entitled to have an injunction restraining appellee from using the name Plains A to Z Tire Company, Inc., within appellant's territory.