Opinion ID: 1138281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Combs and EDC

Text: To some extent Combs and EDC may be viewed as the bookends of appellate certiorari review, one pointing out an overly strict standard, while the other quashes the use of an overly broad standard. However, both decisions mandate a narrow standard of review and emphasize that certiorari should not be utilized to provide a second appeal. In Combs we held that a district court's review of an appellate circuit court decision should determine whether there was a departure from the essential requirements of law. We emphasized that there must be a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice. On the other hand, EDC held that a district court's review of an appellate circuit court's decision which reviewed an administrative agency decision should consider whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law. Accordingly, the question becomes whether these two standards are different, and, if so, whether a difference is justified. [13] Vaillant illustrates the relationship of these standards. In Vaillant, we agreed with the decision and rationale of the Fourth District which reviewed the case before it came to us. 419 So.2d at 626. The district court had determined that procedural due process was afforded and that essential requirements of the law were observed. We actually held, however, that a district court, upon review of a circuit court's judgment, determines whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law. Id. (emphasis added). When the above two standards are juxtaposed, we conclude that applied the correct law is synonymous with observing the essential requirements of law. See, e.g., Manatee County v. Kuehnel, 542 So.2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 2d DCA) (holding that when district court reviews decision of circuit appellate court standard of review is whether court afforded procedural due process and observed essential requirements of law), review denied, 548 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1989). Therefore, when the Combs and EDC standards are reduced to their core, they appear to be the same. Moreover, we can see no justifiable reason for adopting different standards for district court review in such cases. Common-law certiorari has been made available to review quasi-judicial orders of local agencies and boards not made subject to the Administrative Procedure Act when no other method of review is provided. See De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla. 1957). If the administrative action was initially reviewable by certiorari to the circuit court, the district court then has jurisdiction to review the circuit court's decision by a second petition for writ of certiorari. Phillip J. Padovano, Florida Appellate Practice § 3.7 (1988) (citing Tomeu v. Palm Beach County, 430 So.2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)). However, certiorari in circuit court to review local administrative action under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3) is not truly discretionary common-law certiorari, because the review is of right. Vaillant, 419 So.2d at 625-26; see also EDC, 541 So.2d at 108. In other words, in such review the circuit court functions as an appellate court, and, among other things, is not entitled to reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. See EDC, 541 So.2d at 108. As a case travels up the judicial ladder, review should consistently become narrower, not broader. We have held that circuit court review of an administrative agency decision, under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(c)(3), is governed by a three-part standard of review: (1) whether procedural due process is accorded; (2) whether the essential requirements of law have been observed; and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence. Vaillant, 419 So.2d at 626. The standard of review for certiorari in the district court effectively eliminates the substantial competent evidence component. The inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law. As explained above, these two components are merely expressions of ways in which the circuit court decision may have departed from the essential requirements of the law. In short, we have the same standard of review as a case which begins in the county court. See William A. Haddad, Writ of Certiorari in Florida, in The Florida Bar, Florida Appellate Practice § 18.3 (3d ed. 1993). This standard, while narrow, also contains a degree of flexibility and discretion. [14] For example, a reviewing court is drawing new lines and setting judicial policy as it individually determines those errors sufficiently egregious or fundamental to merit the extra review and safeguard provided by certiorari. This may not always be easy since the errors in question must be viewed in the context of the individual case. It may also be true that review of administrative decisions may be more difficult, since care must be exercised to determine the nature of the administrative proceeding under review, and to distinguish between quasi-judicial proceedings and those legislative in nature. There is no complete catalog that the court can turn to in resolving a particular case.