Opinion ID: 471405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance (King, Martin and Taylor)

Text: 19 Prior to trial King, Martin and Taylor filed motions for severance of their trials from those of their co-defendants, claiming they would be prejudiced in several respects by the joint trial. The district court denied these motions. Taylor renewed his motion just prior to the admission into evidence of a statement given by Willie Thomas that had been redacted to eliminate inculpatory references to co-defendants. As King's motion to adopt the motions of her co-defendants had previously been granted, her severance motion was also effectively renewed. The motions were again denied. King, Martin and Taylor present several reasons why we should hold that the district court abused its discretion in denying severance. 20 Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 allows a district court to grant severance of a defendant's trial if it appears that prejudice to the defendant will follow from a joint trial. A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed only if that discretion is abused. United States v. Pruitt, 763 F.2d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir.1985). The movant must show specific and compelling prejudice against which the district court was unable to afford protection. Id. 21 The three defendants argue that the admission of the statements of co-defendants White and Willie Thomas inculpated them and denied their right of confrontation, in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Prior to the introduction of each statement and again just prior to deliberations, the district court cautioned the jury to consider each statement only with respect to the defendant who gave it. The statements were edited (redacted) to ensure that they did not implicate co-defendants. Nonetheless, appellants deny that they were provided sufficient protection against prejudice. They maintain that the district court therefore abused its discretion in denying their motions for severance. 22 The defendants point out two ways they believe they were prejudiced by the introduction of White's statement. They first contend that White's description of the injuries suffered by Valerie Endsley as a result of the beatings was so shocking that his description of his own participation could not explain it. The jury must therefore have inferred that more than one person participated in the beating. Second, they note that White's statement revealed that he had taken Valerie across state lines, from Florida to Georgia, and so provided the jury with evidence of one element--interstate transportation--needed to convict all defendants of kidnapping under federal law. No specific prejudice arising from the admission of Willie Thomas' statement has been pointed out. 23 King, Martin and Taylor simply do not demonstrate the kind of specific and compelling prejudice that would require the district court to order separate trials. For Bruton to apply, a co-defendant's statement must be clearly inculpatory standing alone. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 849 (11th Cir.1984). Nothing in the redacted versions of the statements comes close to implicating any specific co-defendant in any element of the offenses charged. 2 In fact, for the most part, the statements do not reveal whether the defendants who gave them acted alone or with someone else. Even if the extent of the beating described by White supports the inference that others participated, the number and identity of the others were not disclosed, and inculpation in the beating would not amount to inculpation in the kidnapping. 24 In any case, all the information revealed by the statements and claimed by King, Martin and Taylor to be prejudicial, including the fact that White transported Endsley from Florida to Georgia, was brought to the attention of the jury through the testimony of James Thomas, which was properly admitted against these defendants. Furthermore, the jury was reminded several times to consider each statement only in deliberating over the verdict of the defendant who gave it. These cautionary instructions should have protected the co-defendants against any juror inclination to transfer guilt from one defendant to the others. 25 King, Martin and Taylor's argument that they were denied the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses by the fact that they were tried with White and Willie Thomas and could not call them to the stand is insufficient to compel severance. Bruton does not require severance every time a co-defendant's statement is admitted in evidence during a joint trial, even though joint trial may foreclose any opportunity to cross-examine the defendant who made the statement. We also reject Taylor's contention that the government referred to the statements during closing argument in a way that prejudiced the co-defendants. The record does not show that the government made any improper or prejudicial reference to the statements. For all these reasons, we hold that the district court did not commit any Bruton error in denying severance. 26 Martin argues that there was so little evidence against him as compared to that introduced against his co-defendants that he must have been prejudiced by a transference of guilt from the others to him. Even if less of the evidence was relevant to Martin's guilt, we will not hold that the district court abused its discretion to deny severance merely because there was less evidence against Martin than against the others. United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1003 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 47, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979). 3 Certainly there was sufficient evidence to sustain Martin's conviction. The mere disproportionality of the evidence provides no ground for holding the district court abused its discretion.