Opinion ID: 1760806
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 1992 Enactment of Section 144.041

Text: Further evidence that the legislature treats games as a separate category is found in section 144.041, which refers solely to games. The legislature enacted section 144.041 in 1992 in order to exempt admissions to the 1994 World Cup Soccer Tournament games. S.B. 533, 1992 Mo. Laws 578. Section 144.041 refers solely to charges for admissions, as defined in section 144.010, to any of the games. Thus, the legislature created an exemption for games and did not mention recreation and athletic events. The General Assembly in section 144.041 recognized that admissions to games alone were normally taxable. II. Legislative Adoption of Settled Judicial Interpretation In Part II, the principal opinion claims that a long line of this Court's cases indicates the tendency to mix and match the terms of subdivision 144.020.1(2). Rather, these caseswhich treat places of amusement, entertainment or recreation as a separate category from games and athletic events reflect a settled judicial construction of the statute. More than twenty years ago, this Court held: [T]he statute [144.020.1(2) ] plainly provides for a sales tax on receipts from amounts paid for admission to places of amusement, entertainment or recreation, as well as to games and athletic events. Blue Springs Bowl v. Spradling, 551 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo. banc 1977) (emphasis added). This Court could not have been clearer that places of amusement, entertainment or recreation were a different category from games and athletic events. This Court then followed this distinction in at least the six cases cited by the principal opinion: Moon Shadow, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 945 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Mo. banc 1997); High Adventure Game Ranch, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 824 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Mo. banc 1992); Fostaire Harbor, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 679 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Mo. banc 1984); L & R Distrib. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 648 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Mo. banc 1983); Spudich v. Director of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Mo. banc 1988); Blue Springs Bowl, 551 S.W.2d at 599. Since subdivision 144.020.1(2) was originally enacted, this Court has consistently interpreted it as providing alternative categories. Construction of a statute by this Court becomes part of the statute as if it had been amended by the legislature. Dow Chemical, 834 S.W.2d at 745. Where the legislature, after a statute has received settled judicial construction by the courts of last resort, reenacts the statute, or carries it over without change, it will be presumed that the legislature knew of and adopted the construction. Blue Springs Bowl, 551 S.W.2d at 600-01; Dow Chemical, 834 S.W.2d at 742; Roy F. Stamm Elec. Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 350 Mo. 1178, 171 S.W.2d 580, 583 (1943). In this case there is more than a presumption that the legislature adopted the judicial construction. As outlined in section I.B above, the legislature in 1985 enacted the category amusement, entertainment or recreation without mentioning games and athletic events. See section 144.020.1(8). The principal opinion seeks to change the accepted judicial construction of the statute by requiring that fees to or in a recreational business are taxable only if it also has games and athletic events. This Court cannot change the uniformly followed and legislatively adopted judicial construction of a statute. However we might construe these sections if they were now before us on first impression, it is sufficient to say that they are not incapable of the construction then judicially given them and legislatorially adopted. If at the time the law was enacted there was any room for doubt as to the legislative intent, it has long since disappeared in view of the legislative sanction given this construction under which the law has proved workable. If this sanction is removed, it should be by legislative rather than judicial intervention. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Ranson, 328 Mo. 524, 41 S.W.2d 169 (1931). III. Grammar and Conjunctions In view of the statute's history and the accepted judicial construction, it is no mystery that this Court has never focused on the manner in which conjunctions and commas are used in this statute. at 812. Courts in this state are reluctant to construe the intent of the legislature based solely on punctuation and grammatical construction. Abrams v. Ohio Pac. Exp., 819 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1991). Even examined from a grammatical point of view, the statute does not read as the principal opinion suggests. In Part II, the principal opinion would rigidly restrict the word and in order to cluster recreation with games and athletic events. The legislature occasionally uses and and or interchangeably. [I]t is certain `or' is often interpreted to mean `and' and vice versa, if the context shows that meaning was intended, or when, as said, an absurd consequence, or frustration of the object of the enactment, would otherwise follow. Hurley v. Eidson, 258 S.W.2d 607, 608-09 (Mo. banc 1953). The context of subdivision 144.020.1(2) and 144.020.1(8) is clear from the statutory history and settled judicial interpretation. Thus, the and separating games from athletic events means that the terms are alternatives in a series. The very next subsection of section 144.020 also provides context and demonstrates the absurd results of the principal opinion's interpretation of and. Subdivision 144.020.1(3) imposes: A tax ... on all sales of electricity or electrical current, water and gas, natural or artificial ... Under the principal opinion's proposed strict reading of conjunctions, sales of electricity are subject to sales tax, but sales of electrical current are notunless the sale also includes water and gas. Clearly, the legislature intended these terms as alternatives, each subject to sales tax, just as it did in the preceding subdivision 144.020.1(2). The principal opinion claims that placement of commas within the clause is critical, without explaining the effect on the meaning of the statute. The comma placement in this statute, in fact, supports the accepted construction of the statute: it contains a series within a series. The series entertainment, amusement or recreation is contained within the series of places of ..., games and athletic events. In both series, the legislature omitted a comma before the conjunction, which indicates that the three terms following places of are part of a single series. IV. For all these reasons, I disagree with the principal opinion's conclusion in Part II. The plain language of the statute and the precedent of this Court demonstrate that subdivision 144.020.1(2) provides alternative taxable categories, and the issue in this case is whether Columbia Athletic Club is in one or more of them. Blue Springs Bowl, 551 S.W.2d at 596. Contrary to Part III of the principal opinion, I would hold that exercise is recreation, that CAC is a place of recreation, and thus that fees paid to it are taxable.