Opinion ID: 4538778
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Arrest Warrant

Text: For largely the same reasons, the Complaint fails plausibly to challenge the validity of the Arrest Warrant. Under both Connecticut and federal law, “probable cause to arrest exists when police officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Arrest Warrant application—corrected to reflect the Siddiqui’s harassing intent therefore violated neither Siddiqui’s First nor Fourth Amendment rights. 6 same alleged omissions as the Search Warrant application, see Escalera, 361 F.3d at 743 (applying the corrected affidavit analysis to an arrest warrant application)—is sufficient to impart a reasonable belief that Siddiqui made at least one phone call with harassing intent. In addition to the evidence discussed above, the arrest warrant application stated that Siddiqui’s phone records revealed that he placed the Traced Call to Randhawa’s phone and multiple calls to the private investigator who called Randhawa’s employer. The Arrest Warrant’s validity is fatal to Siddiqui’s claims for false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Even assuming arguendo that Siddiqui is entitled to bring a false arrest claim prior to any detention, a false arrest claim under Connecticut law “cannot lie when the challenged arrest was supported by probable cause.” Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2007). By the same token, a plaintiff has no claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress premised on an arrest for which there was probable cause. See Washington v. Blackmore, 119 Conn. App. 218, 224 (2010); see also Appleton v. Bd. of Ed. Of Town of Stonington, 254 Conn. 205, 210 (2000) (explaining that “[l]iability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have considered Siddiqui’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and DENY the pending motions. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 7