Opinion ID: 4527258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other provisions of sentence

Text: Mr. Davalos raises two additional challenges to his sentence, arguing that (1) the district court committed reversible plain error because it misstated the applicable standard in its Statement of Reasons; and (2) the case should be remanded because the district court’s oral pronouncement of sentence conflicts with its written judgment. While we find Mr. Davalos’s first argument unpersuasive, we agree that this case should be remanded so that the district court can amend the written judgment.
When the spread of an applicable guideline sentencing range exceeds 24 months, federal law requires the district court to state—in open court and at the time of sentencing—its “reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). Here, the spreads of the applicable guideline sentencing ranges were 52 months for Count Three and 30 months for Count Five.2 However, the district judge filed a Statement of Reasons incorrectly stating that Mr. Davalos’s sentence was within an advisory guideline range that “does not exceed 24 months.” Mr. Davalos therefore argues that this court should vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. Because Mr. Davalos did not raise an objection regarding this issue below, this court’s review is for plain error. We therefore consider whether the district court committed plain error that affected Mr. Davalos’s substantial rights. See Gomez, 905 F.3d at 353. We conclude that it did not. “While the sentencing court is required to state ‘the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence,’ a full explanation of the sentencing 2 The district court determined that Mr. Davalos was subject to a guideline sentence of 210–262 months for Count Three and 210–240 months for Count Five. 9 Case: 18-50784 Document: 00515388946 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/20/2020 No. 18-50784 factors is not required in every case.” United States v. Duke, 788 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). Indeed, when the district court imposes a within-guidelines sentence, “‘little explanation’ is required” to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). Id. (citing United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005)). Rather, “[t]he sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [s]he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising h[er] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, the district court’s oral statement of reasons for the imposition of Mr. Davalos’s particular sentence was sufficient to meet the mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). See, e.g., Rita, 551 U.S. at 359 (“Where a matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.”); Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 (“When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so, little explanation is required.”). The district court made a statement immediately before announcing Mr. Davalos’s particular sentence, noting that it was taking into account “the advisory guidelines, as well as the policy statements of those guidelines, together with other sentencing factors such as the nature and circumstances of the offense, the seriousness of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the offense, [and] the need to deter future criminal conduct and to protect the public.” The court also advised that it was taking into account “the allocution of the parties, as well as the factual information contained within the presentence report.” This court’s opinion in Ramos is a useful analogue. There, the district court orally imposed a 144-month term of imprisonment and the written 10 Case: 18-50784 Document: 00515388946 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/20/2020 No. 18-50784 judgment reflected the same 144-month term, but the Statement of Reasons stated that the term of imprisonment was 135 months. United States v. Ramos, 33 F. App’x 704,  (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished). A panel of this court noted that the district court “stated orally the reasons for imposing the particular sentence,” concluding that “[t]he only logical conclusion for the discrepancy . . . is that the numeral ‘135’ in the ‘Statement of Reasons’ section of the written judgment is merely a clerical error.” Id. The panel found that “such a clerical error does not create doubts as to the period of incarceration the district court intended to impose” and “did not affect [the defendant’s] substantial rights.” Id. Here, we conclude the same. Because the district court orally stated its reasons for imposing the particular sentence it did, the dictates of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) were satisfied. The clerical error in the subsequent Statement of Reasons did not affect Mr. Davalos’s substantive rights.
Both parties acknowledge that, with respect to several special conditions associated with Mr. Davalos’s term of supervised release, there is conflict between the district court’s written judgment and oral pronouncement. During the district court’s oral pronouncement of sentence, it said to Mr. Davalos: “one of your standard conditions is that you’re not supposed to associate with known felons.” But the district court went on to state that Mr. Davalos had “the Court’s permission to associate with” his son, brothers, and nephew, listing six individuals who were specifically exempted from the condition. That amendment to the standard condition does not appear in the written judgment. There is additional conflict between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding where Mr. Davalos may live after his release from prison. During sentencing, the district court said: 11 Case: 18-50784 Document: 00515388946 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/20/2020 No. 18-50784 Now, this next condition, I’m – I’m imposing it right now in case something goes haywire in terms of the – the valid place for Mr. Davalos to live. Mr. Davalos, I don’t know yet what’s going to happen with the forfeiture on your house, so I’m imposing this out of an abundance of caution. If, when you get out, you’ve got a place to live, probation will file a motion with me, [and] I’ll remit this next condition. Okay? That the first six months of your term of supervised release or your terms of supervised release, you shall reside at a residential reentry center for a term of six months, and you shall follow the rules and regulations of the center; that once employed, you shall pay 25 percent of your weekly gross income, so long as that amount does not exceed the daily contract rate. While the written judgment reflects the imposition of a condition requiring Mr. Davalos to reside in a residential reentry center for a term of six months, it does not provide that this condition will be “remitted” if Mr. Davalos “has a valid residence to go to” when he is released from prison. If a written judgement “broadens the restrictions of requirements of supervised release from an oral pronouncement,” the “appropriate remedy is remand to the district court to amend the written judgment to conform to the oral sentence.” United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006). We therefore conclude that this case should be remanded to the district court so that, with respect to the two issues discussed in this section, it may conform the written judgment to its oral pronouncement.