Opinion ID: 455817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: 6 1. Did the district court err in concluding that the defendant's unauthorized reception of plaintiff's microwave transmission violated 47 U.S.C. Sec. 605? 7 2. Does the injunction violate the First Amendment rights of the defendant?
8 Section 605 of title 47, now recodified as section 705 of that title, 1 was enacted as part of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 and prohibits the unauthorized publication or use of radio communications. Enacted in 1934, section 605 was aimed at preventing the unauthorized use of radio signals by those authorized to transmit these signals as well as those not involved in authorized transmission. See Home Box Office v. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F.Supp. 14, 18-19 (S.D.N.Y.1981) (tracing legislative history of section 605 back to Radio Act of 1927 wherein protection against unauthorized use was extended beyond radio transmission personnel). 9 Section 605's proscriptions are set forth in four sentences, with a one-sentence proviso clarifying that these proscriptions do not apply to radio broadcasts for the use of the general public or amateur, distress or citizens band broadcasts. 2 As this circuit has held, liability under section 605 requires proof that a defendant has (1) intercepted or aided the interception of, and (2) divulged or published, or aided the divulging or publishing of, a communication transmitted by the plaintiff. National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir.1981). The primary thrust of the defendant's statutory argument is that his actions in pirating the plaintiff's microwave signal do not constitute the proscribed divulgement or publication of intercepted radio signals. 3 We disagree. 10 In National Subscription Television, we held that the act of viewing unauthorized subscription television programming with the aid of an unauthorized television signal decoder constituted divulgement or publication. 644 F.2d at 827. We found that the unauthorized viewing of intercepted television programming amounts to disclosure of the 'existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning' of the transmitter's signal. Id. Accordingly, the act of viewing a misappropriated radio signal falls within the statutory proscription against divulgement or publication. 11 Although the defendant has attempted to distinguish National Subscription Television as a case involving non-MDS technology in which a scrambling device was used to protect the transmitted signals, we find no substance to the distinction. The presence or absence of scrambling devices was correctly dismissed as irrelevant by the district court on both factual grounds--the technology was not available until after the defendant's misappropriation--and legal grounds. See Movie Systems v. Heller, 710 F.2d at 495 n. 7 (affirming injunction against MDS interception and holding that section 605 does not require scrambling as a precondition for protection); Hoosier Home Theater, Inc. v. Adkins, 595 F.Supp. 389, 396 (D.Ind.1984) (issuance of injunction against MDS intercept; scrambling unnecessary to acquire section 605 protections); American Television & Communications Corp. v. Western Techtronics, Inc., 529 F.Supp. 617, 621 (D.Colo.1982) (scrambling an expensive and futile act because of the availability of decoding devices); HBO v. Advanced Consumer Technology, 549 F.Supp. at 21. Stated simply, the defendant has not presented any case law which suggests that MDS communications should be treated any differently under section 605 from traditional subscription services over normal television frequencies. 12 Finally, the FCC, which licenses MDS common carriers, has also spoken on the subject of section 605's applicability to the unauthorized interception of MDS signals. According to the FCC, persons will be in violation of [section 605] if they divulge, publish, or use for their own benefit any MDS communications which they were not authorized to receive. F.C.C. Public Notice No. 11580 (January 24, 1979). Deference is due to the expressed opinions of the FCC on matters within their jurisdiction. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801-802, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965). 13 Perhaps in appreciation of his precarious legal position on the merits, the defendant has attempted to introduce Sony Corporation v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984), under an attenuated reasoning by analogy theory, to reinforce his position. He claims that the spirit of the Sony opinion requires this court to refrain from interpreting an old statute so as to intrude into the defendant's living room. Because his equipment is allegedly capable of other noninfringing uses, according to the defendant, Sony requires that he be permitted to use it. The short answer is that Sony dealt with the interpretation of copyright law, not the Federal Communications Act. Moreover, the Court's Sony opinion, like the district court's decision in the same case, expressly noted that the Sony case did not involve subscription broadcasting. Sony, 104 S.Ct. at 780. Finally, the district court in this case entered a finding that the defendant did not engage in any noninfringing uses with his equipment.
14 The final argument raised by the defendant on appeal is a First Amendment challenge to the district court's injunction. Citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1806, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969), the defendant contends that he has a First Amendment right of access to public radio signals which is infringed by the district court's injunction against the use of his equipment. In support of this contention, he urges this court to acknowledge that his equipment can also receive some nonsubscription educational programming. He argues that he has a First Amendment right to listen to this noninfringing communication. The plaintiff has countered with references to the record allegedly indicating that the defendant's equipment could not receive this educational programming (known as ITFS programming). The district court rejected the defendant's First Amendment claim and enjoined the defendant from further use of his rooftop equipment in violation of section 605. 15 Although the defendant's First Amendment argument may have some validity in the abstract, on the facts of this case we find it unpersuasive. Reception of the MDS signal depends on a direct line-of-sight placement of the equipment. Defendant's equipment was at all pertinent times directed to the plaintiff's transmitter. The district court specifically found that the sole and exclusive use to which the defendant has put his equipment is the unlawful pirating of plaintiff's signal. Defendant enjoys no right of access to this use. 16 We need not speculate on possible other uses for the defendant's equipment because the terms of the district court's affirmative injunction are carefully drawn so as to avoid any direct confrontation with any First Amendment right the defendant may enjoy as a result of possible multiple uses for his roof equipment. Specifically, the third paragraph of the injunction prohibits the defendant from: 17 Failing to keep removed from all buildings under his ownership, custody or control, any and all microwave antennae, down converters, and power supplies designed to intercept or receive plaintiff's microwave transmissions. 18 E.R. 26. Thus, the injunction appears to be limited in scope to a prohibition on infringing uses. Given the dearth of evidence on alternative noninfringing MDS broadcasts, the unequivocal finding by the court that the defendant's exclusive use of the equipment was in violation of section 605, and the limited scope of the injunction, the district court's judgment does not infringe on any First Amendment interests of the defendant.