Opinion ID: 2682729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Warrant Was Sufficiently Particular

Text: ¶36 In addition to his probable cause argument, Mr. Fuller asks us to invalidate the warrant because it violates the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. He contends that the warrant was overbroad and allowed for an exploratory search because it did not identify the specific computer(s) that were used to store and share child pornography. Specifically, he claims that federal agents could have ascertained more than just the IP address for their search—that they could have discovered the specific computer involved in downloading child pornography using a MAC address or LimeWire UsernameID. But as discussed below, including these more specific identifiers in the warrant application would not necessarily have narrowed the scope of probable cause to the specific computer, as Mr. Fuller argues. Rather, including these identifiers very well may have strengthened the State‘s case for probable cause, thereby permitting the magistrate to issue a warrant that was broader in scope. ¶37 In addition to the probable cause requirement, the Fourth Amendment requires warrants to describe with particularity both the ―place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.‖39 In order to accurately describe the ―things to be seized,‖ a warrant 38See, e.g., United States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 377–79 (6th Cir. 2009) (sixteen months); Hay, 231 F.3d at 636 (six months); United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745–46 (9th Cir. 1997) (ten months). 39 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 15 STATE v. FULLER Opinion of the Court must achieve two objectives: first, it must ―suppl[y] adequate information to guide officers in selecting what items to seize‖; and second, ―the category of items specified in the warrant [cannot be] too broad [so that] it includes articles that should not be seized.‖40 In other words, the description must be limited to the scope of probable cause established in the warrant application. That said, how particular the warrant must be necessarily depends on ―the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation.‖41 ¶38 As computers, smartphones, and other devices can now be used to store millions of files and other data—both personal and business-related—law enforcement must be increasingly cautious with respect to the particularity requirement because access to ―a huge array of one‘s personal papers in a single place increases law enforcement‘s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search into a person‘s private affairs.‖42 Judges must be careful in drafting the scope of the warrant, especially in determining whether the device is considered contraband, and thus subject to seizure,43 or whether only particular information on the device is properly subject to seizure.44 ¶39 In ―cases involving contraband, such as drugs,‖ more generic descriptions are allowed.45 This is especially true where a more particular description cannot be given or where the evidence establishes that the contraband sought is ―likely to be part of a 40United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 651–52 (6th Cir. 2012); accord State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985). 41 Evers, 669 F.3d at 652 (internal quotation marks omitted). 42 United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009). 43United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (warrant sufficiently particular where ―[i]t authorized the agents to seize computer equipment which may be, or [is] used to visually depict child pornography, [or] child erotica‖ (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 44United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275–76 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring a more specific designation of the files sought on defendant‘s computer related to child pornography, where original warrant granted access to search for evidence of an unrelated crime). 45 Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Cite as: 2014 UT 29 Opinion of the Court larger collection of similar contraband located at the premises to be searched.‖46 Where the warrant authorizes officers to search for child pornography, the computers or other devices used to store child pornography may be considered contraband47 or an instrumentality of the crime.48 Additionally, thorough searches of multiple devices may be required in these cases since ―criminals can—and often do—hide, mislabel, or manipulate files to conceal criminal activity.‖49 Because of the competing concerns here— between individual data privacy and the concern over concealed information—federal courts have required that ―warrants for computer searches . . . affirmatively limit the search to evidence of specific federal crimes or specific types of material.‖50 ¶40 The warrant in this case permitted law enforcement to search and seize a wide range of items, including computer hardware, software, passwords, documentation, and multiple types of digital storage devices. But the warrant also included two important limitations. First, these items could only be searched and seized if they ―contain[ed] evidence related to‖ the alleged criminal activity—the enticement of a minor and/or distribution and possession of child pornography. Second, the warrant set forth a specific ―search procedure‖ to prevent the officers from searching unrelated files and other information on Mr. Fuller‘s digital devices. Taken together, the warrant here was sufficiently particular, especially since the affidavit supporting the warrant described how child pornographers keep collections of illegal images and videos, which are often concealed, and that they do so often for prolonged periods of time. 46 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 47Hay, 231 F.3dat 637 (permitting seizure of computer as contraband). 48United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441, 462 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (―[T]he computer may very well be an instrumentality of the crime, if it were the one being utilized to send and receive the image files of child pornography over AOL.‖). 49United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 538 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 50Unites States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 996–97 (7th Cir. 1998). 17 STATE v. FULLER Opinion of the Court ¶41 Despite the above, Mr. Fuller argues that the officers could have done more by including the MAC address or UsernameID in the warrant application. If they had, he argues, the resulting warrant ―would have allowed a more limited search.‖ In other words, Mr. Fuller argues that these identifiers would have narrowed the scope of probable cause and thus restricted the magistrate to issuing a warrant that permitted a search of only the offending computer, rather than other computers or electronic devices in the home. But this is simply not the case. Speaking generally, where an officer discovers that child pornography is being transmitted over a resident‘s IP address, it is likely to give rise to probable cause to search the residence, particularly where the officer supports the affidavit with additional information indicating that child pornography is likely to be discovered in the home. If the officer also includes information about the offending MAC address and UsernameID in the affidavit, it would confirm in greater detail to the magistrate that child pornography was likely present in the home, thereby strengthening the probable cause determination, rather than weakening it. ¶42 If these identifiers had been included here, as Mr. Fuller contends they should have been, it would have more concretely confirmed the presence of child pornography in the Fullers‘ home and thus strengthened the probable cause determination. As a result, the magistrate could still have issued a warrant identical to the warrant in this case that authorized the search of a wide range of devices and records that were likely to contain child pornography. Given the above, we affirm the trial court‘s Order denying Mr. Fuller‘s Motion to Suppress. II. Mr. Fuller Was Not Denied His Miranda Rights, Because He Was Never in Custody ¶43 Mr. Fuller‘s final argument to suppress the evidence recovered from his computer is that Officer Brower‘s questioning violated his rights under both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Specifically, Mr. Fuller appeals the trial court‘s ruling that he was not in custody at the time of questioning. We affirm. ¶44 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, safeguard an individual‘s right against self-incrimination. To protect this right, suspects who are in ―custodial interrogation‖ must be read 18 Cite as: 2014 UT 29 Opinion of the Court their Miranda rights before questioning.51 Whether an individual is in ―custody‖ is an objective analysis that is informed by a reasonableness inquiry52—namely, whether or not a reasonable person in the suspect‘s position would have felt ―free to leave.‖53 We have previously identified four factors (the Carner factors) that inform this analysis: ―(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation.‖54 ¶45 In applying the Carner factors, the site of the interrogation is more likely to indicate that the suspect was in custody when the location is ―confined or isolated,‖55 or is ―intimidating or coercive.‖56 Although ―questioning in a patrol car may suggest a lack of freedom on the part of the defendant,‖ the fact that the interrogation took place in a police car is not dispositive of the custody issue and must be weighed against the defendant‘s voluntary choice to enter the car.57 Under the second factor, we ask whether the ―police investigation has concentrated upon the individual being questioned‖58 and whether the officers have ―indicated that they had identified the defendant as a likely criminal culprit.‖59 Under the third factor, the ―objective indicia of arrest,‖ we look to ―whether handcuffs, drawn guns, locked doors, threats, or coercion are present.‖60 Finally, under the fourth factor, the ―length and form‖ of the interrogation, we examine the ―words 51 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 52 State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 35, 144 P.3d 1096. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (internal quotation 53 marks omitted). 54 Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). 55 Id. ¶ 39. 56 State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 1993). 57Id. (holding that the site of the questioning, a patrol car, does not compel a finding that the defendant was in custody, especially since he ―apparently entered the patrol car willingly‖). 58 State v. Benson, 712 P.2d 256, 259 (Utah 1985). 59 Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 39. 60 Id. 19 STATE v. FULLER Opinion of the Court or actions‖ of the officers, ―their meaning, and their likely impact‖61 and ask if the form of the interrogation evidenced a ―clear coercive intent‖ on the part of the officer.62 These factors should be reviewed under the totality of the circumstances,63 with a view to ―how a reasonable man in the suspect‘s position would have understood his situation.‖64 ¶46 The facts in this case are not in dispute: after entering Mr. Fuller‘s room, officers commanded Mr. Fuller to stop using his computer, and they escorted Mr. Fuller out of the house. As they left the residence, Mr. Fuller was told that the officers were searching for the presence of child pornography. In response, Mr. Fuller openly admitted that they would find ―inappropriate‖ material on his computer. Officer Brower then asked if Mr. Fuller would be willing to speak with him, to which Mr. Fuller agreed. ¶47 Officer Brower then led Mr. Fuller into his unmarked, unlocked police cruiser, which was parked in front of the residence. He specifically advised Mr. Fuller that he was not under arrest, that he was free to leave at any time, and that he did not have to speak if he did not want to. Mr. Fuller was not read his Miranda rights, but he was questioned about the suspected existence of child pornography on his computer. Although Officer Brower was armed, there is no record of the use of handcuffs or of Officer Brower ever drawing his firearm. ¶48 Given the facts above, we conclude that Mr. Fuller was not in custody and affirm the ruling of the trial court. Although the site of the interrogation was a police cruiser, the situation was not coercive. The vehicle was unlocked and Mr. Fuller was specifically told that he was free to leave at any time. Second, Mr. Fuller was not the initial focus of the investigation, as officers learned that Mr. Fuller may have been involved only after he openly admitted to possessing ―inappropriate‖ material. Third, there were no ―objective indicia of arrest‖ here. Though Officer Brower did have a weapon, our Levin decision refers to ―handcuffs, drawn guns, 61 Id. 62 State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah 1996). 63 Wood, 868 P.2d at 83. 64 Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Cite as: 2014 UT 29 Opinion of the Court locked doors, threats, or coercion.‖65 No handcuffs were used, no guns were drawn, the doors to the car were unlocked, and Mr. Fuller voluntarily spoke with officers. ¶49 Fourth, as to the words and actions of the officers, there is little evidence of any restraint, and Mr. Fuller was specifically told that he could leave at any time. In fact, even after divulging incriminating information, he was not placed under arrest. Finally, we note that this analysis is an objective one—though Mr. Fuller testified later that he did not feel free to leave, the question is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances. Under the circumstances at issue here, we conclude that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave and affirm the trial court‘s ruling that Mr. Fuller was not in custody. III. We Decline to Review Mr. Fuller‘s State Constitutional Claim Because It Is Inadequately Briefed ¶50 Mr. Fuller‘s final claim is that he should be afforded greater constitutional protections under the Utah Constitution than under the United States Constitution, but his claim is inadequately briefed. ―[A] brief is inadequate if it merely contains bald citations to authority [without] development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority.‖66 In support of his claim, Mr. Fuller cites only general statements regarding the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. He fails to adequately brief how the protections afforded under the Utah Constitution impact his specific Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims and includes only bare analysis of how our state constitution affords, in certain instances, greater protections than the federal constitution. Accordingly, we decline to review this claim.