Opinion ID: 853740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sixth Amendment Right to Cross-Examine to Establish Bias

Text: [A] primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses is nevertheless subject to reasonable limitations placed at the discretion of the trial court to address concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion or interrogation on issues only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Standifer argues that his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when the trial court limited his ability to cross-examine Worman and Larry on matters that established their bias in favor of the State and would have impaired their credibility. Standifer correctly points out that [t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Thornton v. State, 712 N.E.2d 960, 963-64 (Ind.1999) (defendant must be afforded opportunity to conduct cross-examination of the State's witnesses to test their believability). The trial court did not permit Standifer to cross-examine Worman about becoming an informant for the police sometime after Boehm died. Standifer argues that Worman's status as an informant and his resulting bias in favor of the State was relevant to the jury's assessment of Worman's credibility. Indiana courts have agreed that without knowing the witness' status as an informant, the jury did not have the necessary information from which to make a meaningful evaluation of [the witness'] credibility. Janner v. State, 521 N.E.2d 709, 716 (Ind.Ct.App.1988). Similarly, the trial court prevented Standifer from cross-examining Larry about the amount of time remaining on a sentence he had served for possession of crystal methamphetamine. Larry was on parole at the time of Boehm's death and Standifer's trial. Standifer argued that the amount of time remaining on Larry's sentence was a motivating factor in his cooperation with the State that would affect the jury's assessment of his credibility. Although there was no evidence of a deal between the State and Larry based on his cooperation, Standifer is correct that the extent of a benefit offered to a witness is relevant to the jury's determination of the weight and credibility of a witness' testimony. Jarrett v. State, 498 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Ind.1986); Pfefferkorn v. State, 413 N.E.2d 1088, 1089 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980) (A witness's bias, prejudice or ulterior motives are always relevant in that they may discredit him [or her] or affect the weight of [the] testimony.). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that by cutting off all questioning about an event that ... a jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony, the court's ruling violated respondent's rights secured by the Confrontation Clause. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (State dismissed witness' drunkenness charge after speaking with authorities about the defendant's case). We agree that the trial court erred in limiting Standifer's opportunity to cross-examine Worman and Larry about their incentives to testify favorably for the State. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination). Although Standifer was denied the opportunity to fully cross-examine Worman and Larry about their bias in favor of the State, his convictions will not be reversed if the State can demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); accord Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis). Whether the trial court's error is harmless depends on several factors including the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Id.; accord Munn v. State, 505 N.E.2d 782, 786 (Ind.1987); Andrews v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (Ind. Ct.App.1992) (error in limiting the testimony of witness was harmless because the jury was under no illusion concerning the informant's credibility or character given the testimony elicited from the informant on cross-examination that included the informant's prior criminal history, his relationship with the police concerning other controlled drug buys, his present unemployment, and the fact that he was a drug dealer). Standifer argues that his self-defense claim was undermined by Worman's testimony that he saw Standifer hit Boehm with the bottle without provocation and that Boehm did not attack Standifer. Standifer argues that if Worman's bias in favor of the State were known to the jury, it would have discredited Worman's account and accepted Standifer's self-defense claim. He also argues that Larry's bias in favor of the State based on the time remaining on his possession sentence would have discredited his testimony that he heard Standifer threaten to cut Boehm's throat. Even if Standifer had been permitted to expose the incentive of Worman and Larry to cooperate with the State and the jury had been persuaded that their testimony was entirely lacking in credit, ample evidence was introduced to support the convictions. Gloria testified that while on the phone with Standifer, Standifer told her that he tied up a man. She also heard someone being hit and heard Standifer threaten to cut the man's throat. Moreover, Standifer admitted that he hit Boehm repeatedly with a bottle, plate, and fireplace iron or shovel, and that he kicked him. These admissions, together with the autopsy report describing twenty to twenty-five blunt force injuries to the head that could not have been made by a fist, conclusively refute Standifer's self-defense claim. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.