Opinion ID: 2108083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Elevator Maintenance is a Ministerial Activity

Text: Seeking to establish that it made a discretionary decision, DCHA cites Chandler v. District of Columbia, 404 A.2d 964 (D.C.1979), for the proposition that we consider[ ] financial factors as valid evidence of policy/discretionary decision-making. That case is readily distinguishable, however. In Chandler, a mother sued the District after her two children died in a fire. Prior to that time the District, for financial reasons, had instituted a program closing a number of fire stations on a random, rotating basis. Appellant alleged that on the day of the fire the station nearest her home was closed pursuant to this program; that this closure constituted negligence on the part of the District, its agents and instrumentalities; and, that the closure was the direct and proximate cause of the deaths of the two children. Id. at 965. The plaintiff admitted, however, that the action she allege[d] to have been negligent, viz., the decision regarding the fire station closure program, was `discretionary.' Id. In other words, she concede[d] that the station closure program was an action taken by government decision-makers who were prompted by policy considerations. . . . Id. at 966. Under these circumstances, we held, in accordance with settled case law, that the District was protected by sovereign immunity. [7] Here, by contrast, appellee vigorously asserts that the decisions made by DCHA were not discretionary in nature, and that assessment is certainly supported by this record. DCHA's statutory mandate requires it to be responsible for providing decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings, and related facilities, for persons and families of low-and moderate-income in the District. D.C.Code § 6-202(b) (2008 repl. vol.). This no doubt is a challenging mission in the face of budgetary constraints, and we understand why DCHA did not want to make expensive capital improvements in a building that soon would be demolished. But if DCHA could not afford to replace the elevators, and could not make them safe through less costly measures, it had the options to shut them down or relocate the residents. Nevertheless, DCHA did not opt to place an out of order sign on the door of Elevator Number 2, leaving the residents to rely upon the other two elevators. By providing elevator service for the residents of the Capper Center, DCHA assumed a duty to use reasonable care. We held in Wagshal v. District of Columbia that [t]he District need not have put up the [stop] sign, but once it did, it had a duty to maintain it properly in order to keep the intersection reasonably safe for motorists. 216 A.2d 172, 174 (D.C.1966). Similarly here, having decided to keep Elevator Number 2 in service, DCHA had a duty to keep it operating in a reasonably safe manner. The cost and burden of making repairs remained relevant to the issue of negligence, [8] but the budgetary constraints cited here did not, without more, entitle DCHA to sovereign immunity. Perhaps the most convincing point in appellee's favor is DCHA's failure to prove that it actually made a policy decision based on budgetary constraints. The testimony demonstrated that the DCHA authorities charged with making budgetary decisions in 2001 were not even aware that the Capper Center elevators were chronically malfunctioning and trapping elderly residents between floors. Appellant's own witnesses, officials responsible for establishing DCHA's budget, testified that if they had known that the elevators were unsafe, DCHA would have allocated money for repairs to keep the premises safe for its residents. Given the record before us, we agree with the trial court that the maintenance of elevators in a residence facility over which [the governmental entity] has responsibility is not a discretionary function that qualifies for sovereign immunity. To paraphrase the decision in Elgin, we are not persuaded . . . that the function of repairing [elevators] imposes upon [DCHA] determinations of such delicacy and difficulty that its ability to furnish public [housing] will be ponderably impaired by liability for neglect in failing to make such repairs. Elgin, 119 U.S.App.D.C. at 120-21, 337 F.2d at 156-57.