Opinion ID: 2637971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: state tort claims immunity

Text: When the legislature enacted the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq., liability became the rule for negligent or tortious conduct, and immunity the exception. Hopkins v. State, 237 Kan. 601, 609, 702 P.2d 311 (1985). The burden of showing immunity under the KTCA is placed upon the governmental entity or employee to establish entitlement to any of the exceptions set forth in K.S.A. 75-6104. 237 Kan. at 609. Two types of immunity could apply to a case of this nature. The first is qualified immunity and the second is discretionary immunity. Discretionary immunity is defined within the KTCA by K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 75-6104(e): A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment shall not be liable for damages resulting from: (e) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless of the discretion involved. Here, Long challenges the Court of Appeals' finding that [i]n executing the [probable cause] affidavit, Long acted outside her duties as a prosecutor and is not afforded immunity under the KTCA. 28 Kan. App.2d at 752. Long avers that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 139 L. Ed.2d 471, 118 S. Ct. 502 (1997), and misapplied it to the tort claims act issue. Long claims she was required and expected to execute probable cause affidavits as part of her duties as a prosecutor; thus, the KTCA exception should apply to shield her discretionary decision to file an affidavit from liability from tort actions. Amicus curiae Kansas County and District Attorneys Association (KCDAA) joins in Long's argument that the Court of Appeals misapplied Kalina when it suggested that she was afforded no immunity at all. The KCDAA convincingly argues that nowhere in Kalina does the Supreme Court suggest that a prosecutor should be afforded less protection than a law enforcement officer in swearing out an affidavit. The KCDAA posits that the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that under K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 75-6104(e), Long's execution of the probable cause affidavit fell outside her duties and, therefore, she would not be afforded immunity under the KTCA. The Court of Appeals did not misinterpret the message in Kalina that testifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer. 522 U.S. at 130. However, in the concurrence to Kalina written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia noted that a prosecutor swearing out an affidavit performs essentially the same function as police officers, and that while a prosecutor is absolutely immune from any suit challenging her decision to prosecute or seek an arrest warrant, [she] can be sued if she changes `functional categories' by providing personal testimony to the Court. 522 U.S. at 131, 135. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia stated: That conclusion accords with the common law's treatment of private prosecutors, who once commonly performed the `function' now delegated to public officials like petitioner. A private citizen who initiated or procured a criminal prosecution could (and can still) be sued for the tort of malicious prosecution but only if he acted maliciously and without probable cause, and the prosecution ultimately terminated in the defendant's favor. Thus, although these private prosecutors (sometimes called `complaining witnesses'), since they were not public servants, were not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, there was a kind of qualified immunity built into the elements of the tort. 522 U.S. at 132-133. In support of the idea that she should be afforded immunity from state tort law claims, Long cites the case of Howard v. United States, 2000 WL 1272590 (E.D. Pa. 2000), where the court held no federal tort claims liability was triggered where a DEA agent allegedly misrepresented and omitted facts in application for a search warrant. In Howard, unlike here, the plaintiffs claims against individual DEA agents were dismissed due to plaintiffs failure to follow the rules of federal procedure. There, the court considered the sole issue of the liability of the United States government in relation to the claim, evaluated the facts presented, and determined that the function of identifying what evidence to submit to a judicial tribunal by a police officer or drug agent is a discretionary one even if evidence has been concealed and distorted. 2000 WL 1272590 at . The Court of Appeals cited Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 243 Kan. 315, 322, 757 P.2d 272 (1988), where this court stated that the discretionary function exception is not applicable in those situations where a legal duty exits, either by case law or by statute, which the governmental agency is required to follow. Because prosecutors are not only allowed to file affidavits but are expected to do so in offices across the state, and because no law prohibits prosecutors from doings so, Long contends that her action of swearing out the affidavit must fall within the discretionary function exception. In Dougan, we stated: `[I]t is clear that if a duty is not mandatory or not clearly specified then it is discretionary.' 243 Kan. at 323-24. Long argues that because prosecutors are neither required nor prohibited by law from swearing out a probable cause affidavit, this is exactly the sort of nonmandatory activity that fits within the definition of a discretionary function. It is important to note, however, that Dougan held that the discretionary function exception did not apply in that case because under the KTCA, a governmental agency does not have a discretionary right to violate a legal duty and avoid liability. 243 Kan. at 325. McCormick contends that, under Hopkins, the malicious acts of government employees fall outside the protection of the KTCA. The exceptions to liability of a governmental entity or employee set out in 75-6104 are not without limitations. Only negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of employees are excepted from liability by 75-6104, while acts or omissions involving more than the lack of ordinary care and diligence are not. Hopkins, 237 Kan. at 611. As the Court of Appeals noted, Kalina leaves no doubt that clearly established law prohibits the swearing to and filing of a false affidavit to procure an arrest warrant, and Long was charged with knowledge that such an act is unreasonable. See 28 Kan. App.2d at 751. Here, this court is presented with a fine distinction between granting Long KTCA immunity for unauthorized conduct within the scope of employment and denying KTCA immunity for unauthorized conduct outside the scope of employment. Subject to the limitations of the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq., each governmental entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable under the laws of the state. Woodruff v. City of Ottawa, 263 Kan. 557, Syl. ¶ 5, 951 P.2d 953 (1997). While tort liability would not be precluded for Long's tortious conduct outside the scope of her employment, K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 75-6104(e) precludes tort liability in conjunction with the performance of a discretionary function within the scope of employment. In Robertson v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 358, 362, 644 P.2d 458 (1982), this court held that the proper test for applying the discretionary function exception looked to the nature and quality of the discretion exercised. Under this test, the court focuses on whether the act in question is one the legislature intended to shield from liability. Therefore, this court must ultimately decide if the legislature intended to impose upon law enforcement officers the affirmative obligation of ascertaining the truth of all facts contained in summarized statements when swearing out a probable cause affidavit. Because we find that the function Long performed in summarizing police reports in the form of a probable cause affidavit was a discretionary duty within the scope of her employment, we hold that Long is entitled to discretionary function immunity under the KTCA. McCormick fails to provide specific, nonconclusory allegations allowing a court to make a meaningful determination of whether he claims he is entitled to relief based on Long's alleged commission of any intentional torts outside the scope of her employment. Although the district court case caption named Cynthia J. Long as a Private Individual, the claims in the body of the petition allege claims arising from Long's actions as an agent of Shawnee County. While McCormick alleges in his petition that he repeatedly informed the [Shawnee County District Attorney's Office], and other agents of government, that the reports filed by [Y.H.] were thoroughly and completely delusional, and that plaintiff had a plethora of evidence that would utterly refute and disprove the `reports' filed, McCormick's allegations tie Long's actions to her employment and do not relate to claims against her individually. `In considering a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim for relief, a court must accept the plaintiff's description of that which occurred, along with any inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom. However, this does not mean the court is required to accept conclusory allegations on the legal effects of events the plaintiff has set out if these allegations do not reasonably follow from the description of what happened, or if these allegations are contradicted by the description itself.' Colombel v. Milan, 24 Kan. App.2d 728, 729, 952 P.2d 941 (1998) (quoting Ripley v. Tolbert, 260 Kan. 491, Syl. ¶ 2, 921 P.2d 1210 [1996]). K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 60-208(a)(1) requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. However, traditional causes of action and rules for pleading causes of action still occupy an important position in law. Notice pleading did not do away with the traditional causes of action or the need to at least present the `bare bones' of the cause of action in the petition in a concise and understandable manner. The claim is to be provided by the petitioner and not by the supposition of the court. Meyer Land & Cattle Co. v. Lincoln County Conservation Dist., 29 Kan. App.2d 747, Syl. ¶ 7, 31 P.3d 970 (2001). Under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6), a defendant may move for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Procedurally, such a motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in K.S.A. 60-256 and amendments thereto.... In the absence of an understandable statement by McCormick that Long's actions were outside the scope of her employment, we hold that Long is entitled to dismissal of the state tort law claims under the discretionary function exception to the KTCA.