Opinion ID: 76171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Validity of the Amending Ordinance

Text: 14 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court, and reviewing all facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 15 When we last reviewed this matter, we decided the Adult Ordinance facially violated the First Amendment because it did not guarantee the adult business owner the right to begin expressive activities within a brief, fixed time frame. Artistic Entm't, 223 F.3d at 1311. The Adult Ordinance, as readopted by the Amending Ordinance, now requires the City to act on an application within 45 days and provides that if the City fails to act within that time frame, the application will be automatically approved, and the applicant shall have the right to begin operating in the manner allowed by the license for which application was made. The additional language is consistent with our holding in Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1500-01 (11th Cir.1994), where we decided that a time limit of 45 days in which the government must act on a similar license application avoided any prior restraint problem only if provision is made to allow, within a reasonable time, the applicant to engage in the activity for which license is sought even absent action on the license application. 16 Artistic argues this court's previous holding rendered the entire Adult Ordinance void, so that the City could not cure the Adult Ordinance through adoption of the Amending Ordinance. Rather, Artistic contends the City's only option was to enact a new ordinance, complying with Georgia's Zoning Procedures Law and conducting a new evidentiary hearing. On the other hand, the City argues that the presence of a severability clause in the Adult Ordinance 12 saved the portion of the Adult Ordinance that was re-adopted through the Amending Ordinance. The City also contends the Georgia Zoning Procedures Law is inapplicable to the ordinances at issue, and that a new evidentiary hearing was not required.
17 We apply Georgia law to determine what portion of a Georgia statute, if any, survives due to a severability clause, when a portion of that statute is judicially invalidated. See Smith v. Butterworth, 866 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir.1989) (applying Florida law to determine the effect of a severability clause in a Florida statute). In Chambers v. Peach County, 268 Ga. 672, 492 S.E.2d 191, 193 (1997), the Georgia Supreme Court held that a severability clause in an unconstitutional county ordinance created a presumption that the county intended for invalid provisions not mutually dependent on other provisions to be severed, leaving the remainder of the ordinance intact. We must not, however, give to the statute an effect altogether different from that sought by it when considered as a whole. City Council of Augusta v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 254 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1979) (Hill, J., dissenting) (superseded by statute as noted in Nielubowicz v. Chatham County, 252 Ga. 330, 312 S.E.2d 802, 803 n. 1 (1984)). Accordingly, under Georgia law, we must determine whether the invalid provisions of the Adult Ordinance are mutually dependent upon any other portions of the Adult Ordinance, while at the same time preserving the original purpose of the ordinance. 18 An examination of the Adult Ordinance reveals that the entire ordinance is designed to regulate adult businesses through a licensing regime. The ordinance's substantive requirements are closely intertwined with the licensing procedure and the two cannot be separated without disrupting the obvious purpose of the ordinance. Therefore, although the Adult Ordinance contains a severability clause, we conclude that no part of the Adult Ordinance survived our decision in Artistic Entertainment, because the entire ordinance is dependent upon a valid licensing regime. 19 Because no part of the Adult Ordinance survived our previous decision, the Amending Ordinance is valid only if it stands as an entirely new ordinance. Artistic argues that the Amending Ordinance is not a valid new ordinance because it was not enacted in accordance with Georgia's Zoning Procedures Law and violates the procedural requirements of the First Amendment.
20 Artistic argues the Amending Ordinance constitutes a zoning ordinance requiring a proper hearing pursuant to the Georgia Zoning Procedures Law. Georgia's Zoning Procedures Law requires a local government to hold hearings when it proposes to take action that will result in a zoning decision. Ga.Code Ann. § 36-66-4 (2000). The Georgia Supreme Court has said the requirements of the Zoning Procedures Law apply to the entire process of enacting or amending a zoning ordinance. Little v. City of Lawrenceville, 272 Ga. 340, 528 S.E.2d 515, 517 (2000). 21 However, not every ordinance regulating the use of land constitutes a zoning ordinance. For instance, in Fairfax MK, Inc. v. City of Clarkston, 274 Ga. 520, 555 S.E.2d 722 (2001), the court decided that a Gasoline Service Station Ordinance was not a zoning ordinance even though the ordinance required a minimum distance of 500 feet between a gas station and a school or other place of public assembly. The court came to this conclusion because the definition of zoning ordinance under the Georgia Zoning Law 13 encompasses only regulation of uses and development by means of zones or districts. Id. at 724. Furthermore, the court stated: 22 The regulation of certain types of businesses due to their inherent character is not general and comprehensive like zoning.... The presence of lot size requirements or space restrictions does not transform a local licensing or regulatory ordinance into one governed by a zoning procedures statute where it is clear from a reading of the ordinance as a whole that it is intended to regulate a particular occupation, rather than to regulate the general uses of land. 23 Id. (citations omitted). Under Fairfax, the Adult Ordinance is not a zoning ordinance even though it does place certain limitations on locations available to an adult business and establishes certain minimum lot sizes and road frontages. Rather than regulating general uses of land, the Adult Ordinance regulates a particular type of activity — adult entertainment. As such, the Amending Ordinance, re-adopting the Adult Ordinance, is not a zoning ordinance and is not subject to the hearing requirements established under the Zoning Procedures Law, even if it was adopted as a new ordinance rather than as a true amendment.
24 Artistic also argues the Amending Ordinance fails as a new enactment because the City did not have a proper evidentiary basis for the ordinance as required by the First Amendment. We previously concluded that the Adult Ordinance was content neutral and subject to the O'Brien test. Artistic Entm't, 223 F.3d at 1308-09. Under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), content neutral restrictions on speech are valid if the government can show a reasonable basis for believing its policy will indeed further a substantial government interest and that the policy is the least restriction possible which would further that interest. See Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993 (11th Cir.1998). Previously, we decided that the City of Warner Robins, in enacting the original Adult Ordinance, had an adequate basis for concluding that proscribing the sale and consumption of alcohol would reduce the crime and other social costs associated with adult businesses. Artistic Entm't, 223 F.3d at 1309. Therefore, the question before us is whether the City could rely on the original evidentiary support for the Adult Ordinance in adopting the Amending Ordinance. 25 In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), the Supreme Court made it clear that it is entirely proper for a city to rely on the findings of other cities in creating legislation to combat the negative secondary effects associated with adult businesses. As long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses, such reliance is appropriate. Id. at 51-52. Here, the City adopted an ordinance almost identical to the original Adult Ordinance, making a slight adjustment designed and intended to correct the prior restraint problem found by this court. We cannot say that in enacting the Amending Ordinance the City's reliance on its own evidentiary basis compiled in support of the Adult Ordinance, which we specifically found adequate, was unreasonable. D. The Alcohol Ordinance 26 We did not invalidate the Alcohol Ordinance in the previous appeal. But Artistic argues that the Alcohol Ordinance is so intertwined with the void Adult Ordinance, the Alcohol Ordinance should be struck down as unacceptably vague. The portion of the Alcohol Ordinance that prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages at businesses for which a license is required pursuant to Warner Robins' [Adult Ordinance], became unenforceable when no valid Adult Ordinance existed. But, we reject — as did the district court — Artistic's contention that the City, pursuant to the amended Alcohol Ordinance, could not prohibit adult entertainment on the premises of establishments offering alcoholic beverages. 27 We look to Georgia law to determine whether the Alcohol Ordinance — divested of the licensing cross-reference — survived our decision invalidating the Adult Ordinance. 14 In Union City Board of Zoning Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 467 S.E.2d 875 (1996), the Georgia Supreme Court stated, When a statute cannot be sustained as a whole, the courts will uphold it in part when it is reasonably certain that to do so will correspond with the main purpose which the legislature sought to accomplish by its enactment, if, after the objectionable part is stricken, enough remains to accomplish that purpose. Id. at 884 (internal quotations and citation omitted). After striking the referenced licensing provisions, much remained of the amended Alcohol Ordinance that was consonant with the legislature's purpose, and enough remained to accomplish that purpose. 28 Artistic argues that the entire amended Alcohol Ordinance fails because portions of the Alcohol Ordinance adopt by reference certain definitions contained in the void Adult Ordinance. We disagree. 29 The Alcohol Ordinance incorporates by reference the definitions of specified sexual activity and specified anatomical areas contained in the Adult Ordinance. Incorporation by reference is a form of legislative shorthand; the effect of an incorporation by reference is the same as if the referenced material were set out verbatim in the referencing statute. A legislature — for example, a city council — may look to an infinite variety of sources to reference in crafting its law as long as the referenced material is both certain and readily available. 30 We are aware of no authority to the effect that a definition incorporated by reference into another otherwise valid ordinance (for example, the Alcohol Ordinance) ceases to be an operative definition just because it derives from a referenced ordinance (for example, the Adult Ordinance) that was declared unconstitutional for reasons having nothing to do with the definition. For incorporation purposes, as long as the referenced definition is certain and is readily available, it is valid: that the ordinance referenced has lapsed or has been repealed or has been invalidated (for reasons unrelated to the definition) is not important. See In re Heath, 144 U.S. 92, 12 S.Ct. 615, 616, 36 L.Ed. 358 (1892) (Prior acts may be incorporated in a subsequent one in terms or by relation, and when this is done the repeal of the former leaves the latter in force, unless also repealed expressly or by necessary implication). 31 Georgia law rejects the wholesale invalidation urged by Artistic. In Town of Douglasville v. Johns, 62 Ga. 423, 427 (Ga. 1879), the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that a legislative act granting a town charter was enforceable even though the charter incorporated by reference certain code sections declared to be unconstitutional: 32 The legislature might have taken them [the referenced code provisions] from an English book or from a newspaper, and engrafted them on the charter; when it did so, it became the law to this town and all its citizens. 33 Absent clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, when a statute adopts by reference a definition in another statute, the adopted definition becomes a part of the adopting statute and is not affected by later amendment or repeal of the referenced act containing the definition. See, Dismuke v. State, 142 Ga.App. 381, 236 S.E.2d 12, 14 (1977) (Does the deletion of the referenced statutes legally affect the existence or enforcement of the adoptive Act? We find that it does not.). 34 The provisions of the amended Alcohol Ordinance that regulated exposure of specified anatomical areas and prohibited specified sexual activity referenced the Adult Ordinance only for definition of the quoted terms; those definitions are certain, readily available, and their continued validity is in harmony with the intent of the legislature. The constitutional infirmity we found in the Adult Ordinance was unrelated to these referenced definitions. The Alcohol Ordinance remained valid and enforceable. 15 35 AFFIRMED.