Opinion ID: 186988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Booker Argument

Text: Lawson argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), by imposing a sentence higher than the maximum provided for by the Guidelines based on facts not found by the jury. His argument is flawed in at least two ways. First, Lawson argues that the district court could not lawfully impose a sentence higher than the maximum Guidelines sentence. This argument is plainly wrong. Under Booker, the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, see id. at 245, 125 S.Ct. 738 (excising the statutes that make the Guidelines mandatory). No Sixth Amendment issue is raised unless a sentence exceeds its statutory maximum. See id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000))). Second, Lawson argues that the district court could not lawfully enhance his sentence beyond the recommended maximum Guidelines sentence based on conduct for which he was not convictedin this case, possession of the larger amount of crack cocaine found in the console. [3] However, as we have discussed above, the district court determined that although the jury failed to convict Lawson of an intent to distribute the crack cocaine found in the console, the government nonetheless proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Lawson possessed all of the drugs found in the car (including the larger amount of crack cocaine and the ecstasy pills) with an intent to distribute, and took this finding into account in calculating his sentence. We have recently considered whether a sentence based on unconvicted conduct violates the Sixth Amendment. In United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the appellant was convicted of making a false statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation but was acquitted of two related conspiracy charges. See id. at 369. Although the recommended Guidelines range for the appellant's conviction was only 0-6 months, the district court, finding by a preponderance of evidence that the appellant was in fact involved in the conspiracies, sentenced him to 24 months. See id. Reading the Supreme Court's language in Booker as providing the sentencing court with discretion broad enough to allow consideration of acquitted conduct so long as the court `deems [it] relevant,' id. at 371 (alteration in original), we held that a sentencing court may base a sentence on acquitted conduct without offending the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Id. Thus, we held that consideration of acquitted conduct violated the Sixth Amendment only if the judge imposes a sentence that exceeds what the jury verdict authorizes. Id. at 371 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738). In affirming the appellant's sentence, we joined five other circuits that had considered this question. See id. If it is permissible for a sentencing court to build a sentence, at least in part, on conduct for which a defendant is charged but acquitted, we find no error in relying on conduct for which Lawson was charged but on which the jury deadlocked, provided, as here, the court determined by a preponderance of the evidence that he engaged in the conduct.