Opinion ID: 1443906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Cruel and Unusual PunishmentDue Process

Text: Myers contends that the disclosure aspect of KSORA constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment (see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 8 L. Ed.2d 758, 82 S. Ct. 1417 [1962]), provides: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights prohibits infliction of cruel or unusual punishment. Myers also asserts that KSORA violates due process guarantees under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As the State points out, Myers raises these two constitutional issues for the first time on appeal. When constitutional grounds are asserted for the first time on appeal, they are not properly before us for review. State v. Kaesontae, 260 Kan. 386, 920 P.2d 959 (1996); State v. Steadman, 253 Kan. 297, 306, 855 P.2d 919 (1993). Myers concedes that his cruel and unusual punishment argument was not raised below, but asserts that it fits within the first two of the following exceptions to the general rule: (1) Cases where the newly asserted theory involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and which is finally determinative of the case; (2) Questions raised for the first time on appeal if consideration of the same is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights; and (3) That a judgment of a trial court may be upheld on appeal even though that court may have relied on the wrong ground or assigned a wrong reason for its decision. State v. Puckett, 230 Kan. 596, 598-99, 640 P.2d 1198 (1982). We do not agree. Our reversal based on the ex post facto application of KSORA's disclosure provision negates the substance of Myers' reliance on Puckett. Myers also contends that KSORA violates due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the term rehabilitation is unconstitutionally vague. K.S.A. 22-4908 provides for a hearing in which the sex offender may petition the court for relief from further registration upon a showing that offender is rehabilitated. Myers' argument is in the abstract, because he has not petitioned for relief under 22-4908. His claim is unripe. See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1242. Myers' due process claim is not within the Puckett exceptions. We refuse to consider this issue for the first time on appeal. No fundamental rights have been denied Myers under K.S.A. 22-4908.