Opinion ID: 483256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The resentencing proceeding

Text: 7 We are satisfied that Judge Lowe complied with this court's direction to reconsider and explain Golomb's lengthy sentence. Although Golomb contends that the resentencing proceeding was merely a replay of the original, Judge Lowe in fact did much more than repeat her reasons for imposing the various individual sentences. Following Judge Newman's suggestion, she explained her imposition of so many consecutive terms by reference to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a). In particular, Judge Lowe observed: 8 [T]he defendant was convicted of multiple, serious, independent felonies that victimized every element in our society, including federal and state governments, charitable and business institutions and private citizens ... Mr. Golomb has preyed on society for years and now seeks to avoid responsibility for his antisocial conduct by arguing that all of the independent acts he committed were part of a single conspiracy. 9 In response to this court's caution that there is a difference between recidivists and first offenders like Golomb, Judge Lowe emphasized that Golomb was a first offender in name only. His attitude and behavior were far more similar to those of the typical repeat offender. For example, on various occasions when law enforcement officials seemed to be on his trail, Golomb concocted elaborate schemes to evade detection and then redoubled his criminal efforts. Judge Lowe thus concluded: 10 The simple fact that this defendant was able to continue his victimizing of other persons without interruption by either the police or the court, causing him to effectively convert a way of crime into a business of crime, should not inure to his benefit. His repeated criminal conduct has shown his total contempt of the rules by which we govern ourselves. 11 Golomb also argues that Judge Lowe improperly based his sentence in part on two prior arrests which had resulted in acquittals. One was a 1969 arrest for failing to report for induction; the second was a 1979 arrest for receipt of stolen property. Judge Lowe did observe that these arrests may be considered on sentencing, but the resentencing transcript does not support Golomb's contention that his sentence was in any way based on these two arrests. Judge Lowe mentioned them more for the sake of providing a complete background history before stating, of more material import, however, is that at sentencing, the government informed this court that in addition to the stolen property that was taken during the seven New Jersey home burglaries, this defendant purchased stolen property from a series of burglaries in New York. 12 A sentencing judge may rely on evidence of crimes of which a defendant has been acquitted. See United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d Cir.1984); cf. United States v. Ortiz, 742 F.2d 712, 714 n. 3 (2d Cir.) (sentencing judge may consider prior arrest that led to dismissal as evidence of defendant's background), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075, 105 S.Ct. 573, 83 L.Ed.2d 513 (1984). Any error which Judge Lowe might have committed by stating that arrests alone could be considered on sentencing must be viewed as harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Golomb's extensive criminal activities. 13 In its prior opinion, this court did not reach Golomb's claim that the sentence violated the eighth amendment because it was grossly disproportionate to the offense and to sentences imposed in equivalent cases. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Golomb now renews this claim. 14 First of all, it should be noted that all the individual sentences were well within--and in most cases much less than--the statutory maximums. Indeed, if the maximum sentences were aggregated, Golomb could have received a 105 year sentence, compared to the 24 years he actually received. Lengthy consecutive sentences have been upheld as constitutional in several previous cases. Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 430-31 (2d Cir.1978) (Oakes, J., dissenting) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091, 99 S.Ct. 874, 59 L.Ed.2d 58 (1979); see also United States v. Bonnet, 769 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir.1985). As Judge Newman pointed out in the first Golomb opinion, it would take an extraordinary set of circumstances to demonstrate that the cumulation of valid sentences for distinct offenses constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 754 F.2d at 90. 15 No such extraordinary circumstances are present in this case. Golomb was found to have engaged in a series of independent criminal ventures, and to have procured the assistance of many other individuals for his enterprises. Judge Lowe further noted that Golomb was unrepentant and was likely to continue in his ways unless he was incarcerated for a substantial period. Moreover, even though the actual sentence is quite long, Golomb may well be released on parole after serving only a third of it. A reviewing court may take parole expectations into account when evaluating the severity of a sentence, see Ortiz, supra, 742 F.2d at 715. For all these reasons, Golomb's claim that his sentence is so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment must fail. 16 Finally, Golomb challenges the restitution order which directed him to compensate several of the burglary victims in the amount of approximately $20,000, and to pay the Mariners' Family Home $80,909, the exact amount of the three stolen Mariners' checks which were cashed by Golomb. He argues that in ordering such restitution, Judge Lowe failed to consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3580(a), and failed to account for the possibility of third-party reimbursement to the Mariners' Family Home, as required by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3579(e)(1). Section 3580(a) provides: 17 The court, in determining whether to order restitution under section 3579 of this title and the amount of such restitution, shall consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate. 18 The court is not required to make explicit findings on the record with respect to each of these factors. United States v. Atkinson, 788 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir.1986). In Atkinson, this court vacated a restitution order because the district judge had expressly declined to consider reducing the amount of restitution in light of the defendant's indigency. In the present case, by contrast, there is no indication that Judge Lowe failed to consider the statutory factors. Indeed, the fact that she did not order full restitution to all of Golomb's victims suggests that she considered factors other than the amount of victim loss in fixing the amount of compensation. 19 Golomb also contends that he cannot be required to compensate the Mariners' Family Home because Chemical Bank is likely to reimburse it for its losses. The topic of third-party reimbursement is addressed in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3579(e)(1) which provides, in part: 20 The court shall not impose restitution with respect to a loss for which the victim has received or is to receive compensation, except that the court may, in the interest of justice, order restitution to any person who has compensated the victim for such loss to the extent that such person paid the compensation. 21 During the resentencing proceeding, Judge Lowe acknowledged the possibility that the Mariners' Home would soon be reimbursed by Chemical Bank, but she neglected to account for this contingency in the final order of judgment. This oversight does not, as Golomb urges, require us to overturn the restitution order. Rather, the restitution order should be modified to provide that if the Mariners' Home has been compensated in full or in part by Chemical Bank, then Golomb shall pay Chemical Bank the amount Chemical paid the Mariners' Home (not to exceed $80,909). 22