Opinion ID: 1772238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: should the manual on uniform traffic control devices (mutcd) be enforced as the standard of care?

Text: ¶ 12. Donaldson petitions the Court to extend the holding in Jones v. Panola County, 725 So.2d 774 (Miss.1998), and enforce the MUTCD as the minimum standard of care in the placement of signs. The county maintains that a strict enforcement of the MUTCD is unworkable and ignores the inherent particularities of Mississippi roadways. The county notes the utility of the MUTCD; however, it argues that ultimately it is the people charged with maintaining roadways who are best suited to determine the necessary signs. ¶ 13. Mississippi law requires the Commissioner of Public Safety to adopt a manual for uniform traffic control, which must generally conform with the system approved by the American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHTO). Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-301 (Rev.1996). [1] Local authorities may place and maintain traffic control devices as they deem necessary; however, the devices shall conform to the state manual. Id. § 63-3-305. [2] ¶ 14. Interpreting § 63-3-305, the Attorney General concluded that local authorities have a duty to determine the necessity of traffic control devices and post signs thereto conforming with state law. Miss. Att'y Gen. Opinion No.XXXX-XXXX (Sept. 29, 2000). However, to ensure uniformity, all such devices must meet the specifications set forth in the manual. Id. ¶ 15. This Court has considered the relationship between MUTCD and the standard of care and held that the MUTCD was admissible as nonconclusive proof of the standard of care. Jones v. Panola County, 725 So.2d 774 (Miss.1998). See also Leflore County v. Givens, 754 So.2d 1223 (Miss.2000). In Panola County, the plaintiff sued the county after his vehicle struck a gravel pile that was used to mark an out of service bridge. 725 So.2d at 775. The plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial court prohibiting him from offering the MUTCD as evidence of the applicable standard of care in the placement of warnings. Id. at 777. Reversing and remanding, this Court held that the relevant MUTCD provisions may properly be considered by a jury as evidence of negligence, albeit not as conclusive evidence thereof. Id. at 778 (footnote omitted). This Court stressed that a verdict favoring the plaintiff based solely on the MUTCD guidelines would be improper. Id. at 778-79. ¶ 16. In an unrelated case, we held that both counties and the Department of Transportation have a duty to warn motorists of a known dangerous condition. Jones v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 744 So.2d 256, 258 (Miss.1999). The case arose after the county reopened a road but failed to place a stop sign where the road intersected with another forming a T intersection. Id. at 258. In the decision, we recognized that, although Mississippi had not formally adopted a manual, the MUTCD was the manual to be used in conformity with the statutes. Id. at 262 (citing Jones v. Panola County, 725 So.2d at 777-78). ¶ 17. The Court finds that there is no majority view regarding the MUTCD. E.g., Donaldson v. Dep't of Transp., 236 Ga.App. 411, 511 S.E.2d 210 (1999)(since the MUTCD was not published by authority by the Secretary of State as state adopted regulations, it does not have the force of law); Brockie v. Omo Constr., Inc., 255 Mont. 495, 844 P.2d 61 (1992) (violation of MUTCD is not negligence per se but evidence of negligence); Fisher v. State, 268 A.D.2d 849, 702 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y.App.Div.2000)(MUTCD sets forth the standards for evaluating the reasonableness of the State's placement of road markings); Patton v. Cleveland, 95 Ohio App.3d 21, 641 N.E.2d 1126 (1994) (failure to meet requirements of MUTCD to post construction approach signs was negligence per se, not some evidence of negligence); City of Mission v. Cantu, 89 S.W.3d 795 (Tex.App.2002) (violations of the MUTCD are not negligence per se, as compliance with the MUTCD is not mandatory). ¶ 18. Donaldson cites Schaeffer v. Kansas Dep't of Transp., 227 Kan. 509, 608 P.2d 1309 (1980). In Schaeffer, a woman sued the Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT) alleging that, because there was an inadequate warning regarding the curve, there was a street defect, which led to her husband's inability to safely negotiate a curve. Id. at 1312. Quoting the opinion from the Kansas Supreme Court, which affirmed a decision holding the DOT 49% responsible to Schaeffer 51%, Donaldson argues: [It] appears obvious that both [statute and MUTCD] vest in the DOT the discretion and obligation to maintain adequate warning signs if, in fact, a hazard does exist. In our opinion the manual merely establishes minimum, not maximum, standards for safety. To hold otherwise would place form over substance and would negate the actual objectives of the statutes and manual of effecting uniform traffic control with a maximum amount of protection for the motoring public. Id. at 1316 (emphasis added). Upon review, we find Schaeffer unpersuasive. ¶ 19. Schaeffer was based on a since repealed statute that allowed a party to sue state entities based on a highway defect, in contrast to a suit based on common law negligence. Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 232 Kan. 11, 651 P.2d 585 (1982). Because the standard of liability differs between an action based on statutory liability for a highway defect and one based on common law negligence, the law pertaining statutory highway defects does not apply to an action based upon common law negligence theory. Schmeck, 651 P.2d at 594-95. Therefore, Donaldson's reliance on Schaeffer is misplaced. ¶ 20. Likewise, the MUTCD lends no support to Donaldson's argument. The manual states that it describes the application of control devices, but shall not be the legal requirement for the installation. Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices § 1A.09 (Millennium Ed. with Revision No. 1 changes Dec. 28, 2001). The decision to use a particular device at a particular location should be made on the basis of either an engineering study or the application of engineering judgement. Id. The manual should not be considered a substitute for engineering judgment. Id. ¶ 21. The Court declines to extend the holding in Jones v. Panola County or to more strictly enforce the provisions of the MUTCD. Previously, this Court has considered this issue and is not compelled to expand its prior holdings. Our decision is based on Donaldson's failure to cite other jurisdictions that employ the approach he urges the Court to adopt and the aforementioned provisions of the MUTCD. ¶ 22. To rule as Donaldson urges would substitute the MUTCD for engineering judgment. This Court declines to hold that the MUTCD is only factor in determining whether the county exercised ordinary care. Thus, this issue is without merit.