Opinion ID: 199357
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Transaction between Negron and Rivera

Text: 19 Rivera claims that Negron's uncorroborated testimony regarding the single transaction between them is unreliable because Negron agreed to cooperate with the government. However, credibility determinations are uniquely within the province of the jury, and we do not evaluate those judgments on appeal. See Woodward, 149 F.3d at 56. Moreover, Rivera's trial counsel subjected Negron to lengthy cross-examination about his cooperation with the government and his other drug transactions. Despite these efforts to impeach Negron, the jury could have rationally concluded that Negron was telling the truth about his sale of cocaine to Rivera. 20 Rivera also attempted to contradict this testimony by offering the testimony of his ex-wife, Malave, that his residence was occupied by a tenant at the time of the alleged transaction. However, the jury could reasonably have found Negron's testimony to be more credible than Malave's. Malave's recollection of the relevant dates was uncertain, especially on cross-examination, and Rivera's attorney even conceded in his closing argument that Malave's testimony had been all over the place. 21 Rivera further contends that, even if the jury found credible Negron's uncorroborated testimony that Negron sold cocaine to him, this single transaction cannot, as a matter of law, establish his guilt of the crime of conspiracy. We agree that a single drug transaction for the personal use of the purchaser, without prearrangement or other factors indicative of conspiratorial intent, does not establish a conspiracy. SeeUnited States v. Moran, 984 F.2d 1299, 1304 (1st Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, we have found, under certain circumstances, that one drug transaction may provide sufficient evidence for a jury to find the existence of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. See, e.g., Portela, 167 F.3d at 698 (The evidence . . . was thus sufficient to have led a reasonable jury to conclude that [the defendant] was a party to a tacit agreement relating to [the seller's] entire continuing enterprise, despite the fact that there was only a single transaction between them.); Moran, 984 F.2d at 1303 (Even a single sale for resale, embroidered with evidence suggesting a joint undertaking between buyer and seller, could suffice.); United States v. Carbone, 798 F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1986). Drawing on the body of conspiracy law we have just described, we evaluate the circumstances that support the conspiracy conviction. 22