Opinion ID: 2977642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to suppress title iii interceptions

Text: Defendants moved to suppress the fruits of the government’s Title III wiretap. In support, they argued that the affidavit in support of the Title III application contained deliberate misstatements and omissions, the application failed to show the necessity of a wiretap, and the interception procedures were not properly minimized. A hearing on this motion was held before trial. FBI Special Agent David Morgan, who had given the affidavit supporting the Title III application, testified for the government. Defendants cross-examined Special Agent Morgan, but presented no evidence of their own. At the close of the hearing, the district court denied the motion from the bench. 4 A. Alleged Misstatements and Omissions in Title III Application To suppress Title III intercepts based on misstatements and/or omissions in the underlying affidavit, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the misstatements or omissions were deliberately or recklessly made, and (2) but for those misstatements or omissions, the affidavit would lack the requisite probable cause to sustain the warrant. See United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). After reviewing the pleadings before it and the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing, the district court found: There is nothing . . . no evidence whatsoever, zero, nothing to indicate that the agent intentionally misrepresented anything in the affidavit. In fact, it was just the opposite. When he was asked to explain different areas that at least were viewed by the defense listeners as something that may not quite have been a hundred percent accurate in the affidavit, he did thoroughly and completely explain it. Suppression Tr. at 135. Based on the testimony of Special Agent Morgan and the record before the court, this finding was not clearly erroneous. The only error in the affidavit is the mistaken identification of the surveillance targets (who are from Bangladesh) as Arab and not Asian — an error Special Agent Morgan attributed to his own ignorance. Even were it otherwise, the mistaken ethnic origin of the targets does not go to probable cause and thus was not grounds for suppression. B. Necessity Title III surveillance may be authorized only if (1) “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,” and (2) an application includes a “a full and complete statement” to this effect. 18 5 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c), (1)(c). Nevertheless, “the government is not required to prove that every other conceivable method has been tried and failed or that all avenues of investigation have been exhausted.” United States v. Giacalone, 853 F.2d 470, 480 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1988)). “All that is required is that the investigators give serious consideration to the non-wiretap techniques prior to applying for wiretap authority and that the court be informed of the reasons for the investigators’ belief that such non-wiretap techniques have been or will likely be inadequate.” Alfano, 838 F.2d at 163-64 (quotation omitted). After reviewing the pleadings, the affidavit in support of surveillance, and Special Agent Morgan’s testimony, the district court concluded that the surveillance was sufficiently necessary. Our independent review of the record confirms this result. The original affidavit and Special Agent Morgan’s testimony each detail that, at the time of the Title III application, traditional investigative techniques — confidential informants, pen registers, trap and trace devices, physical surveillance — had already been used and now ceased to yield results. Aside from electronic surveillance, those methods which remained — using undercover agents or a grand jury investigation — were unlikely to uncover the information the FBI was after and, moreover, risked tipping off the targets to the investigation. On these facts the district court properly concluded that the necessity requirement had been satisfied. C. Minimization Procedures Title III requires that surveillance “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5). To warrant suppression for want of proper minimization, defendants must show that “monitoring agents exhibited a high disregard for [defendants’] privacy rights or that they did not do all they reasonably 6 could to avoid unnecessary intrusions.” United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673, 679 (6th Cir. 1979). Special Agent Morgan testified that all persons involved in the instant surveillance read the original minimization order and attended a briefing where the minimization procedures were discussed. Additionally, two agents involved in the surveillance were charged with seeing that the procedures were followed. Although many unrelated foreign language calls were initially intercepted, this was required because the topic of the calls could only be determined by a translator after-the-fact. The district court concluded that defendants’ allegations about improper minimization were unfounded, a finding that we conclude, reviewing the record then before the court, was not clearly erroneous.