Opinion ID: 546225
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructions Regarding Reasonable Doubt

Text: 253 During his closing statement, Joseph Grande's attorney, Willis W. Berry, Jr., Esq., purported to illustrate the degree of evidence needed to overcome a defendant's presumption of innocence by physically balancing a brick on a scale against a few coins. Tr. 11/15/88 at 34-37. He analogized the brick to the appellants' presumption of innocence and the coins to the government's case. He also stated that to find the appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury had to be convinced of guilt to a moral certainty, id. at 38, and that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of any doubt. Id. at 42. The court sustained the government's objections to these latter remarks on the ground that they misstated the law regarding reasonable doubt. 254 After Grande's attorney completed his summation, the district court sua sponte instructed the jury about the meaning of reasonable doubt. Following some preliminary remarks concerning the burden of proof in civil cases, the court stated: 255 In a civil case, we often refer to a scale and we say that in order to meet their burden of proof, the plaintiff in a civil case must present evidence of such a quality that the scales at least tip in their favor. That is not the standard in a criminal case. In fact, in a criminal case we make no reference to the scale whatsoever, any reference to the scale is improper, we don't use that. Instead, we use a different standard for what proof beyond a reasonable doubt is.... [R]easonable doubt is a doubt which would cause a reasonably careful and sensible person to hesitate before acting upon a matter of importance in their own affairs. That's what a reasonable doubt is, and that in order to convict, in order to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt, you must be firmly convinced of the guilt of someone. 256 Tr. 11/15/88 at 44. 257 In response to Scarfo's attorney's objection that the above instruction suggested that the burden of proof was greater in a civil case than in a criminal case, the court gave a supplemental instruction: 258 Just so there's no doubt I would read to you again the definition of reasonable doubt from the pattern charge. As I've said many times, the Government has the burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true, that is that the scales must tip in favor of the plaintiff. In criminal cases, the Government's proof must be more powerful than that, it must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 259 Id. at 49. 260 The court then reiterated its definition of reasonable doubt. 261 Although Grande does not allege that the district court's instructions were erroneous, he argues that the court abused its discretion in delivering the instructions immediately after his attorney's closing statement. In doing so, Grande alleges, the district court improperly led the jury to believe that his trial counsel had said something inaccurate during closing and that the closing was to be ignored. Brief for J. Grande at 15, 17. This claim is devoid of merit. 262 As the district court stated in its post-trial decision, Berry's closing argument grossly misstated the government's burden of proof. 711 F.Supp. at 1323 n. 9. 87 Berry's performance with the scale and his comments concerning reasonable doubt inaccurately conveyed to the jury that it could not deliver a guilty verdict if there was any possibility of innocence, however remote. The requirement in criminal trials of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean that the jury must rule out every trifling possibility of innocence. United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 842 (1st Cir.1989). Instead, reasonable doubt may be defined as doubt which would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in regard to some transaction of importance and seriousness. United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Colon, 835 F.2d 27, 31-32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 980, 108 S.Ct. 1279, 99 L.Ed.2d 490 (1987); United States v. Wosepka, 757 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 787 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir.1985). 263 Moreover, Berry's use of the scale was a blatant attempt to quantify reasonable doubt, a practice which has met with strong disapproval in federal courts. United States v. Anglada, 524 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir.1975) (while not reversible error, characterization of the standard as quantitative rather than qualitative ... might better have been omitted); United States v. Clay, 476 F.2d 1211, 1213-15 (9th Cir.1973) (disapproving of any reference to balancing test in reasonable doubt instruction). Cf. United States v. Link, 202 F.2d 592, 594 (3d Cir.1953) (jury instruction encouraging jury to balance the evidence and acquit if the evidence was as equally consistent with innocence as with guilt, improperly suggested a preponderance of the evidence standard). 264 The district court's prompt issuance of an instruction on reasonable doubt was an entirely appropriate remedial response to Berry's improper remarks in closing. We find no abuse of discretion. 265