Opinion ID: 2310837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Awarding of Costs

Text: Following the trial, Varma filed a motion for allowance of costs totalling $38,528.11, including $26,082.47 in expert witness fees, $2,643.29 in deposition fees, and $6,351.29 for duplication, photocopying, photographs, and medical record service fees. [6] Varma submitted what he asserted was a fully delineated schedule of costs, which was actually comprised of lists of rather generic charge items coupled with dates and monetary amounts. [7] The parties submitted detailed memoranda in support of, and in opposition to, Varma's motion for allowance of costs. In their appeals both parties contend that the trial judge committed error in her award of costs to Varma pursuant to the provisions of Super.Ct.Civ.R. 54(d) and 54-I. [8] Neither party takes issue with the trial court's threshold determination that an award of costs to Varma is appropriate. However, Talley argues that the trial judge erred by not denying Varma's motion for allowance of costs, in its entirety, because Varma failed to provide sufficient detail as to each claimed expense and failed to specify why the claimed expenses were necessary for preparation or trial of the case. In the alternative, Talley argues that the court erred in its award with respect to certain items or categories of costs. [9] Varma contends that he is entitled to recover as costs all or nearly all of the expenses he requested. [10] The trial court issued an order taxing $3,659.29 in costs to Talley, including $255 in expert witness fees, $500 for copies and duplication fees, $260 for court filing fees, and the full amount, $2,643.29, that Varma requested for deposition fees. Because Varma did not provide any information about what was copied, how many pages were copied, the cost per page, or the reason the copies were necessary for trial, the trial court denied most of Varma's request for duplication and photocopying. However, the trial court allowed $500 in recognition that some copying was necessary to provide courtesy copies and to have exhibits for trial. The trial court declined to charge Talley with expert witness fees in excess of the statutory per diem allowed for witnesses by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 or with witness fees for witnesses who appeared for depositions, but ordered payment at the statutory rate for the six witnesses whose attendance at trial was certified as required by Super.Ct.Civ.R. 54-I(a). Finally, the trial court allowed all of Varma's requested deposition costs because it was satisfied that the depositions were necessary for preparation of the case. The award of costs to the prevailing party under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 54(d) is `within the trial court's discretion and may only be overturned upon our finding that the exercise of such discretion was an abuse.' Kleiman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 581 A.2d 1263, 1267 (D.C.1990) (quoting Ingber v. Ross, 479 A.2d 1256, 1265 (D.C.1984)). The trial court's discretion lies in whether or not to award as costs items specifically authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994) or by other statutes (or court rule). See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442-45, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 2497-99, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987) (interpreting FED.R.CIV.P. 54(d), the federal counterpart to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 54(d)). An appellant contesting an award of costs bears the burden of convincing this court on appeal that the trial court erred.... [and] the burden is even greater when the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Robinson v. Howard Univ., 455 A.2d 1363, 1370 (D.C.1983). The Superior Court Civil Rules do not explicitly define what constitutes costs, but we have stated that [c]osts [are understood in the law] ... to mean something less than a litigant's total expenses in connection with the suit. Court fees and witness fees ordinarily are recoverable but, absent unusual circumstances, the parties must bear their personal expenses.... The authority of a court to assess a particular item as costs is partly a matter of statute (or court rule), and partly a matter of custom, practice, and usage. Id. at 1368-69 (citations omitted). Costs which have been paid to the Clerk and entered on the docket are ordinarily allowed as a matter of course, but other costs, such as witness fees and costs of depositions must be taxed specially by the court. Id.; Panos v. Nefflen, 205 A.2d 600, 601-02 (D.C.1964). In a well-reasoned opinion, Burns v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., 119 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 1869 (D.C.Super.Ct. July 11, 1991), Judge Richard A. Levie of the Superior Court reviewed the District of Columbia rules, custom, practice and usage, as well as the federal statutes applicable to allowance of costs. Many of the same types of costs that were at issue in Burns are contested here by Talley and Varma: court fees and copying costs, witness fees, deposition costs, and expert witness fees. We adopt the substance of Judge Levie's opinion to the extent that it deals with the issues presented in this case.
Applying Burns and our existing precedent to the dispute before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's allowance of court filing fees, which are allowed as a matter of course. See Robinson, supra, 455 A.2d at 1368; Panos, supra, 205 A.2d at 601-02. We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's allowance of only $500 for duplication and copying costs. As Burns explains, the prevailing party may recover the cost of obtaining and copying records and other material necessary for case preparation and presentation. See 119 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1873. The trial court here denied most of the requests for copying expenses because Varma failed to establish that all of the copies were necessary. Although Talley argues that the court should not allow any costs for copying in the absence of proof that the copying was necessary, we think the trial court's limited allowance of costs is well within its discretion where, as the trial court found here, some copying was obviously necessary to provide courtesy copies to the court, see id.; see also Super.Ct.Civ.R. 5(c), and for trial exhibits.
The trial court taxed Talley for all of Varma's requested deposition costs. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 54-I(b) authorizes the discretionary taxing of such costs; our case law requires that the trial court find that the deposition was necessary for case preparation. See Kleiman, supra, 581 A.2d at 1267; Bennett v. Kiggins, 391 A.2d 236, 238 (D.C. 1978); Burns, supra 119 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1874. Talley objects to the imposition of depositions costs on three grounds: first, Talley argues that deposition fees should be denied because Varma did not allege the depositions were necessary; second, Talley argues that costs should not be awarded for the expedited transcript of Dr. Hoffer's second deposition because, she maintains, the court abused its discretion in allowing the mid-trial deposition; and third, Talley claims she cannot ascertain why each fee was incurred and claims that she has already paid for depositions of three of the listed deponents. With respect to Talley's first objection, the test is whether the deposition was necessary, not whether the requesting party alleges it was necessary. See Kleiman, supra, 581 A.2d at 1267; Burns, supra, 119 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1874. The trial judge here made the required finding of necessity, and in any case, Varma did at least generally allege that the depositions were necessary to his case. Second, the mid-trial deposition of Dr. Hoffer was ordered by the trial judge when Dr. Hoffer offered opinions at trial that differed from those expressed in his previous deposition. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the trial judge abused her discretion in ordering the deposition or allowing costs for the expedited deposition transcripts. Finally, absent a contrary showing by Talley, we assume the trial court fully considered the proposed costs for depositions. See Robinson, supra, 455 A.2d at 1370. Varma's itemization of deposition costs specifies the names of deponents and the dates that the depositions were taken. This should have been sufficient information to enable Talley to determine whether she had already paid these costs. Moreover, when Talley raised this issue in her opposition to Varma's motion for allowance of costs, she offered no proof that she had paid for the specific depositions she questions. Without an affirmative showing from Talley that error occurred, we cannot conclude that the trial judge abused her discretion. See id.
Varma contests both the number of witnesses for which fees were allowed and the amount of each fee award, contending that the trial judge should have awarded witness fees for deposition witnesses in addition to trial witnesses, and that he is entitled to expert witness fees in excess of the statutory amount. We disagree. The awarding of witness fees is controlled by Super.Ct.Civ.R. 54-I(a), which requires proof of the attendance of witnesses by certificate of the attorney of record. The certificate of witnesses' attendance filed by Varma's attorney listed only the six expert witnesses who appeared at trial. The trial judge allowed witness fees for each of those witnesses. The awarding of costs of depositions is provided for under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 54-I(b). The Rule makes no mention of expert witness fees for depositions, and we have been cited no case law in this jurisdiction awarding expert witness fees for depositions pursuant to Rule 54-I(b). Accord Burns, supra, 119 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1874 & n. 13. Because such fees are not specifically authorized by statute and there is no precedent in this jurisdiction for awarding such fees, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in declining to award them. Varma also argues that he is entitled to expert witness fees in excess of the statutory amount, citing cases from the federal courts that were decided prior to 1987. Varma correctly looks to the federal courts for guidance on this issue: as Judge Levie explained in Burns, supra, 119 Daily Wash. L.Rptr. at 1874, because we have not, until now, decided this issue, federal cases interpreting FED.R.CIV.P. 54 are persuasive when we interpret Super.Ct.Civ.R. 54. See, e.g., Ingber, supra, 479 A.2d at 1266 n. 13. In addition, various provisions of the D.C.Code dealing with witnesses incorporate 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920. See D.C.Code §§ 11-743, 11-946, 15-714(b) (1995 Repl.). However, Varma is mistaken in asserting that the federal cases require the result he seeks. In 1987, the Supreme Court held in Crawford Fitting Co., supra, 482 U.S. at 441, 107 S.Ct. at 2497, that 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) limits a court's authority to shift witness fees, as provided in 28 U.S.C. 1920(3), to the statutory amount in the absence of express legislation to the contrary. Id. at 439, 107 S.Ct. at 2496; see also West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1141, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991). We agree with Judge Levie that the federal statutory limit applies to expert witness fees provided for under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 54 and 54-I. See Burns, supra, 119 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1874 and n. 11. Therefore we hold that the trial court did not err in limiting the allowance for expert witness fees to the current federal statutory per diem amount. For the reasons stated, the judgments in all four appeals are Affirmed.