Opinion ID: 1801948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Alleged failure to adequately investigate potential juror misconduct

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to adequately investigate potential juror misconduct, and that the error requires reversal of the penalty judgment. We conclude defendant is not entitled to relief. The jury began its penalty phase deliberations at 3:35 p.m. on June 12, 1996, and continued deliberating through the day on June 13, 1996. Shortly after the jury resumed deliberations following the readback of Dr. Dollinger's testimony on the morning of June 14, 1996, the jury foreman sent a note indicating that Juror No. 040149 wished to speak with the court. Juror No. 040149 was summoned to the courtroom at 9:30 a.m. With defendant, defense counsel and the prosecutor present, Juror No. 040149 related the following: I wanted the court to be aware of something that has been eating at me. We have a juror that in the conviction part of it . . . was very adamant in her decisions in all three verdicts and, you know, which is fine, everybody is. Now she is adamant in her verdict now, but she is claiming that she has some kind of second thoughts about her original verdict in the two convictions, and Iyesterday, I don't know exactly when it was, it was on return back to the courthouse, she was sitting right next to two of [defendant's] relatives, his aunt and then anotheranother person. All I could see is the back of her head. I don't know if she was conversing with them. I did note that they were talking and it was maybe purse room between the three. I don't know if maybe she heard something that she is now, you know, holding up or trying to recant or whatever. I just feel that that needs to be brought to the court's attention. The court stated that it appreciated you bringing that to the court's attention and asked Juror No. 040149 if there was anything else he wished to say. When Juror No. 040149 responded in the negative, the court sent him back to the jury room. After ascertaining that the accused juror was Juror No. 045829, the court inquired whether counsel had any suggestions. The prosecutor responded in the negative, and defense counsel said I think that we just have to play it out and see what happens. Very shortly thereafter, the court received a second note stating that Jurors Nos. 045829 and 024178 wished to speak with the court. Juror No. 045829 was summoned, and the following exchange took place: Juror No. 045829: Well, the other juror said I was talking, he thought I was talking to the The court: He didn't say that. He didn't say that. He said that hehe saw you sitting in the hallway, sitting next to some members of the defendant's family. He did not indicate that he saw you talking to anyone, [Juror No. 045829]. Juror No. 045829: That is what he said in there. The court: I don't know what was said in there. I don't want to know what was said in there. I can only tell you that the Court wasn't going to take any further action as a result of anything that was told or spoken to the Court by that juror because there wasn't anything indicated by that juror that would have suggested any impropriety on your part. [¶] Is there anything else that you wanted to speak with the Court about? Juror No. 045829: No. After the court sent Juror No. 045829 back to the jury room, Juror No. 024178 was summoned, and the following colloquy occurred: Juror No. 024178: Now I justno, I am fine. The court: You're fine? Juror No. 024178: Yes. The court then told Juror No. 024178 that it was available to speak with her if there was a problem, and sent her back to the jury room. After Juror No. 024178 had left, the court queried counsel as to whether there were any comments or objections or anything that you want to put on the record. Defense counsel responded in the negative. About four and one-half hours later, at 2:10 p.m., the jury returned its verdicts of death for the murder of Alma Merck and life without possibility of parole for the murder of Clifford Merck. (38) Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to conduct an investigation adequate to determine if Juror No. 045829 had been speaking with defendant's family members or had overheard anything connected with the trial. We recently summarized the law applicable to claims of this type: Section 1089 provides in part: `If at any time . . . a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged . . . .' In construing this statute, we have held that `[o]nce a trial court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist, it is the court's duty `to make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary' to determine whether the juror should be discharged.' [Citations.] ( People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 941-942 [105 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 224 P.3d 877].) However, `not every incident involving a juror's conduct requires or warrants further investigation. The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconductlike the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a jurorrests within the sound discretion of the trial court.' ( People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225], quoting People v. Ray[, supra,] 13 Cal.4th [at p.] 343 . . . .) `[A] hearing is required only where the court possesses information which, if proven to be true, would constitute `good cause' to doubt a juror's ability to perform his duties and would justify his removal from the case.' ( Ibid. ) ( People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 942.) The Attorney General asserts defendant forfeited his claim by failing to request additional inquiry. We disagree. The duty to conduct an investigation when the court possesses information that might constitute good cause to remove a juror rests with the trial court whether or not the defense requests an inquiry, and indeed exists even if the defendant objects to such an inquiry. For example, in People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 519 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1], we held that the trial court had erred by failing to conduct an investigation after a juror brought it to the court's attention that another juror appeared to be intoxicated during deliberations, even though defense counsel objected to questioning the accused juror or other jurors. We stated that an inquiry sufficient to determine the facts is required whenever the court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist. ( Ibid., italics added; see also id. at p. 520 [once the court is put on notice of the possibility a juror is subject to improper influences it is the court's duty to make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary to determine if the juror should be discharged ... (italics added)].) Other cases are in accord. ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 253 [253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906] [cases place the ultimate responsibility upon the court to make [an] inquiry when the trial court is alerted to facts suggestive of potential misconduct]; see also People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, 342-344 [addressing the merits of a claim that the trial court had erred by failing to investigate a juror's relationship with the victim's daughter, even though the defendant had objected to any inquiry]; People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 694 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278]; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 532 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081] [when a trial court learns during deliberations of a jury-room problem which, if unattended, might later require the granting of a mistrial or new trial motion, the court may and should intervene promptly to nip the problem in the bud].) Accordingly, because defendant's claim is that the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to conduct an adequate inquiry, no trial court action by the defense was required to preserve the claim. (Cf. People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 446, fn. 6.) (39) Accordingly, we turn to the merits. A juror's unauthorized contact with a witness is improper. ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 175; see also § 1122, subd. (a) [jurors should not converse with anyone on any subject connected to the trial].) However, contact between a juror and a witness or between a juror and the defendant's family may be nonprejudicial if the contact was de minimis ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 175) or if there is no showing that the contact related to the trial (cf. People v. Cobb (1955) 45 Cal.2d 158, 161 [287 P.2d 752] [mere showing that juror had communicated with defendant's relative did not raise a presumption that juror was improperly influenced]; People v. Woods (1950) 35 Cal.2d 504, 512 [218 P.2d 981] [mere fact that juror conversed with a witness is insufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice]; but cf. People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1175 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965] [juror's out-of-court comment to two witnesses regarding their testimony was clearly misconduct]; People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 207-209 [155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91] [where juror discussed state of the evidence and prosecutor's tactics with police officer witness, reversal was required]). Further, a juror's receipt of information about a party or the case that was not part of the evidence received at trial also is misconduct that raises a presumption of prejudice ( People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 578 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87]), even if that receipt was passive or involuntary ( In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294-295 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600]). Here, the trial court acted within its discretion when it declined to inquire further into Juror No. 045829's alleged contact with defendant's family members who also were witnesses. At best, the trial court possessed ambiguous information suggesting that Juror No. 045829 may or may not have been talking to defendant's relatives who also were witnesses at the penalty phase. Critically, Juror No. 040149 told the court, I don't know if she was conversing with them [(defendant's aunt and another person)] but then immediately said I did note that they were talking . . . . (Italics added.) Under the circumstances, the court reasonably could have construed the they in Juror No. 040149's second remark as referring only to defendant's relatives, not to Juror No. 045829. This is especially so since Juror No. 040149 followed that remark with the comment that Juror No. 045829 might have overheard something that influenced her. Juror No. 045829's own comments seem to suggest that she was about to deny speaking with the witnesses. Although Juror No. 045829 probably should not have been sitting near defendant's relatives who also were witnesses, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that there were no grounds for believing that Juror No. 045829 had actually been engaged in a conversation with them. Moreover, there was no suggestion, other than Juror No. 040149's speculation, that anything that Juror No. 045829 said or heard had anything to do with the trial. Accordingly, the court reasonably could have concluded that there were no grounds for believing good cause to excuse Juror No. 045829 might exist. (See People v. Cobb, supra, 45 Cal.2d at p. 161 [trial court did not abuse discretion in failing to investigate communication between juror and defendant's relative, where it did not appear that the communication related to the trial].) (40) Defendant further argues the court should have conducted an inquiry into whether other jurors were coercing Juror No. 045829 into voting for the death penalty. He contends the circumstances, including Juror No. 040149's apparent frustration with Juror No. 045829's holding up or trying to recant or whatever, suggest other jurors may have been berating Juror No. 045829 in order to coerce her to change her vote. But defendant's assertions about possible coercion are speculative. Further, jurors can be expected to disagree, even vehemently, and to attempt to persuade disagreeing fellow jurors by strenuous and sometimes heated means. To probe as defendant suggests, in the absence of considerably more cogent evidence of coercion, would `deprive the jury room of its inherent quality of free expression.' [Citation.] . . . Moreover, any such inquiry could in itself have risked pressuring the dissenting juror to conform her vote to that of the majority. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1255.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declining to inquire about possible coercion.