Opinion ID: 609824
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Challenges To Convictions And Sentences On Other Counts

Text: 222
223 Count Two of the indictment charged Chandler with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of Section 848(a) by committing a series of violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 843(b) and 846. Chandler argues that the district court's instruction erroneously suggested that district court had already determined Chandler's guilt on these charges. Upon review of the district court's charge, we disagree and find that the district court properly instructed the jury as to Count Two.
224 Chandler argues, and the government concedes, that his conspiracy conviction should be vacated. When a defendant is convicted and sentenced on a Section 846 conspiracy count and a Section 848 continuing criminal enterprise count, the two offenses are merged by vacating the conviction and sentence of the lesser included Section 846 conspiracy. United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 908 (11th Cir.1990). We have sustained Chandler's continuing criminal enterprise conviction and, therefore, vacate Chandler's conspiracy conviction and sentence.
225 Count Four charged Chandler with aiding and abetting the use or carrying of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Chandler argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict. Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law subject to de novo review. United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391 (11th Cir.1989) (per curiam). This court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and determine whether a reasonable jury could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir.1990). 226 To prove a 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violation, possession of the firearm must be an integral part of, and facilitate the commission of, the drug trafficking offense. Poole, 878 F.2d at 1393. At trial the government introduced evidence that Chandler recruited Raymond Pointer to transport marijuana from Piedmont, Alabama, to Anniston, Alabama, and provided Pointer with a car for that purpose. Pointer made three or four trips to Anniston. The prosecution then engaged in the following examination: 227 Q. Okay. And did you after you picked up this Oldsmobile, did you make any runs from Piedmont to Anniston with this Oldsmobile? 228 A. Yes, sir. 229 Q. Okay. Now, did you have an occasion on these runs to receive anything else from Ronald Chandler to keep with you on these runs? 230 A. Just that gun. 231 Q. Did he give you a gun? 232 A. Yes, sir. 233 Q. When did he give you a gun, as best you can recall? 234 A. I think it was two, maybe three days after he give me the car. 235 RVII-71-72. 236 Considering the testimony in its context, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the Chandler's conviction on the firearm charge. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the government, shows that Chandler gave Pointer a gun when Pointer was given the marijuana to transport to Anniston. A reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession of the firearm was an integral part of, and facilitated, the drug trafficking, particularly in the context of other, substantial testimony at trial regarding the on-going criminal enterprise.
237 Chandler challenges the district court's instruction to the jury on Count Seven and seeks the reversal of his conviction. Count Seven charged Chandler with money laundering through the purchase of real estate in Cleburne County, Alabama. Count Eight charged Chandler with money laundering through the purchase of real estate in Calhoun County, Alabama. Chandler argues that the court charged the jury twice on Count Eight and did not charge the jury on Count Seven. 238 During the jury instructions, the district court incorrectly stated that the property charged in Count Seven was located in Calhoun County, Alabama. Shortly thereafter, the court correctly stated that the property was located in Cleburne County. The district court also instructed the jury that Count Eight was an identical-type offense as Count Seven except that the date was different and the property in Count Eight was in Calhoun County rather than Cleburne County. Significantly, the district court gave the jury a copy of the indictment, which accurately identified the property locations. 239 Chandler failed to object to the district court's instruction. Hence, the district court's error is reviewed for plain error. Given the district court's subsequent correct statement of the property's location and the fact that the jury received a copy of the indictment, the district court's instruction was not erroneous.
240 Chandler contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the money laundering charges in Counts Eight and Nine. Counts Eight and Nine charged Chandler with money laundering through the purchases of two pieces of real estate. Both convictions are reviewed for sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set forth above. 241 The evidence at trial showed that Chandler's parents held the titles to both parcels. With respect to Count Eight, the government introduced evidence that Chandler paid taxes on the property and discussed drainage problems with municipal officials concerning the land. With respect to Count Nine, the government introduced evidence that, although his father paid the money to the sellers and received title to the land, Chandler stated that he had purchased the 120 acres. The evidence also showed that Chandler exercised control over the two properties by growing and cultivating marijuana on the properties and by having others guard the tracts. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Chandler laundered money by purchasing the two real estate parcels.
242 Chandler first argues that we must remand the case to the district court for resentencing because the district court failed to afford him a sufficient opportunity to object to the sentence as required under United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102-03 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 275, 112 L.Ed.2d 230 (1990). However, after imposing the sentences, the district court specifically asked counsel if there were any objections other than those that had been raised during the sentencing hearing. Chandler's claim is without merit. 243 Chandler also argues that the district court improperly calculated his offense level on the conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise counts. Since we have vacated Chandler's conviction on the conspiracy count, we address only the challenge to the criminal enterprise sentence. At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence report's recommendation for the offense level on the continuing criminal enterprise counts. The report noted that the offense level for these counts is 38. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.5. However, the report stated that the offense level should be adjusted to take into account relevant conduct with respect to the enterprise pursuant to Section 1B1.3. The relevant conduct was the murder of Shuler. Thus, as Section 2A1.1(a) assigns an offense level of 43 to first degree murder, Chandler's offense level was fixed at 43, resulting in a life sentence. 244 Chandler contends that the district court's computation resulted in the double counting of Shuler's murder, once in the continuing criminal enterprise count and again as the basis for the death sentence under the Section 848(e) count, Count Three. Under the circumstances of this case, we do not reach the merits of Chandler's claim. He faces a sentence of death on Count Three, and the life sentence on Count Two adds no further punishment. 245 Finally, Chandler argues that the district court erred in holding that the drug activity encompassed in the conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise counts included more than 3,000 but less than 10,000 marijuana plants. We review the district court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Howard, 923 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir.1991). During the trial, witnesses testified that Chandler planted several thousand marijuana plants. A notebook seized from a co-conspirator and Chandler's own statement also supported the finding that Chandler planted more than 3,000 marijuana plants. Thus, the district court's finding that Chandler cultivated more than 3,000 marijuana plants was not clearly erroneous.