Opinion ID: 769467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Extradition Scheme

Text: 11 Extradition from the United States is governed by 18 U.S.C. S 3184 (2000), which confers jurisdiction on any justice or judge of the United States or any authorized magistrate to conduct an extradition hearing under the relevant extradition treaty between the United States and the requesting nation. A statute or extradition treaty is a prerequisite to extradition. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 1986). The requesting nation must demonstrate that there is probable cause that the fugitive committed the charged offense. See id. at 782-783. 12 Extradition is ordinarily initiated by a request from the foreign state to the Department of State. See R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW S 478 (1986). The Department of State determines whether the request is within the relevant treaty, and if so, forwards the request to the Department of Justice for a similar screening; once this is complete, the request is forwarded to the United States Attorney for the judicial district where the person sought is located. See id. The US Attorney then files a complaint with the appropriate district judge or magistrate, seeking an arrest warrant for the person sought. See id. While the foreign state can apply directly to a judge or magistrate, this is rarely done. See id. The purpose of the hearing before the magistrate or judge is to determine whether (1) the crime is extraditable 4 ; and (2) there is probable cause to sustain the charge. See Quinn, 783 F.2d at 787. If these two requirements are met, the judicial officer must certify the individual as extraditable to the Secretary of State. 18 U.S.C. S 3184 (2000). This decision is not subject to direct appeal, but collateral review of the magistrate or judge's order is available through habeas corpus review. 5 See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1920). 13 On habeas, the district court's review has been limited to the following: (1) whether the extradition judge had jurisdictionto conduct the proceeding; (2) whether the extradition court had jurisdiction over the individual sought; (3) whether the extradition treaty was in force; (4) whether the crime fell within the treaty's terms; (5) whether there was probable cause that the individual sought committed the crime, see Emami v. U.S. District Court, 834 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1987); and (6) whether the crime was within the political offense exception, see Quinn, 783 F.2d at 786-787. 14 Courts in many jurisdictions, including the Ninth Circuit, have discussed the possibility of a humanitarian exception to extradition, tracing the idea to the influential Second Circuit case Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960) (noting in dicta that [w]e can imagine situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamination  of the rule that the extradition court may not inquire into those conditions in making its decision). See, e.g., Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing in dicta possibility of humanitarian exception); Emami, 834 F.2d at 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that a humanitarian exception to extradition might someday be articulated by the Ninth Circuit), Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). Our research failed to identify any case in which this theoretical exception has been applied, however, and because we base our decision on legislation implementing the Torture Convention, we need not consider the exception's viability here. See Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that to date no court has ever denied extradition based on a fugitive's anticipated treatment in the requesting country). 15 Once a magistrate has certified to the Secretary of State that the individual is extraditable and any habeas review has concluded, the Secretary acts in her discretion to determine whether the person will be surrendered, via extradition warrant, to the custody of the requesting state. 18 U.S.C. S 3186 (2000). The Secretary's decision has been treated as discretionary: until recently, according to the government, there has been no statute or published regulation applicable to the Secretary's decision-making process in determining whether to sign an extradition warrant or whether to impose conditions on an extradition. Letter Brief of the U.S. Attorney dated February 10, 1998, originally submitted in connection with In the Matter of the Extradition of Chee Fan Chen, No. 9715609. The Secretary may place conditions on the extradition of an individual, or may determine that the individual should not be turned over at all. Id. 16 Recent regulations promulgated after Congress passed legislation to implement the Torture Convention, discussed below, appear to be the only regulations governing the Secretary's extradition decisions. Before the implementing regulations were adopted, we held that no judicial review of the Secretary's decision was available. See Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Secretary's final decision concerning whether to extradite is a matter exclusively within the discretion of the executive branch and not subject to judicial review.).