Opinion ID: 2823827
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â We now address whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of first-degree murder after deliberation under a complicity theory. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record de novo to determine whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof with respect to each element of the crime charged. Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005). We ask âwhether the relevant evidence, both direct andÂ circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.â People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (Colo. 1973). Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â In the instant case, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder after deliberation as a complicitor. Complicity liability allows the defendant to be held accountable for the victimâs murder, even though the co-defendant fired the fatal shot, if the prosecution proved that (1) the defendant had the culpable mental state required for first-degree murder after deliberation, and (2) he assisted or encouraged the co-defendant with the intent that his conduct promote or facilitate the murder. Â§Â§ 18-3-102(1)(a), 18-1-603, C.R.S. (2014). Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â The defendant argues that the only evidence of his involvement in the victimâs murder was his presence at the scene, which is insufficient to sustain his conviction. He points out that there were no eyewitnesses to the confrontation on Sayesvaâs porch, and everyone agrees that the co-defendant fired the shot that killed the victim. The defendant asserts that only indirect, circumstantial evidence indicates that he had the culpable mental state required for first-degree murder after deliberation. He therefore likens this case to People v. Duran, where the court of appeals stated that merely âbeing present [at the scene] and being associated with [the shooter] are insufficient to support a determination of complicity.â 272 P.3d 1084, 1092 (Colo. App. 2011). Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â The defendantâs case is distinguishable from Duran. As discussed above, there was considerable evidence that the defendant in this case had the culpable mental stateÂ required for first-degree murder after deliberation, and that he acted to facilitate the murder. Unlike Duran, where â[t]here was no evidence of defendantâs actions or any statement he made during the confrontation,â id. at 1092, evidence in this case indicated that the defendant participated in loading and reloading the gun used to kill the victim, dragged the crippled victim into the street, and taunted the victim before the co-defendant fired the fatal shot. In addition, the gun and the getaway car were on loan to the defendant from his girlfriend. These circumstances give rise to the âreasonable inference that the defendant had adequate time for the exercise of reflection and judgment concerning the fatal act.â People v. Dist. Court, 926 P.2d 567, 571 (Colo. 1996) (explaining that prosecutors generally do not have access to direct evidence of a defendantâs mental state and must present the jury with indirect evidence of deliberation). From this evidence, a reasonable mind could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant had the culpable mental state required for first-degree murder, and (2) he assisted the co-defendant with the intent to facilitate the murder. Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty as a complicitor of murdering the victim.