Opinion ID: 2082309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Truth-in-Lending Act

Text: Both parties on appeal challenge specific portions of the presiding justice's instructions regarding plaintiff's claim under the former Truth-in-Lending Act, P.L.1969, ch. 423, § 35, 9 M.R.S.A. §§ 3901 et seq. (repealed eff. June 12, 1975). Defendant Ford Credit contends that the presiding justice erred in stating as a matter of law that the parties had engaged in a consumer credit transaction within the coverage of the act, while plaintiff Vicnire argues that the presiding justice erred in limiting his damages to $1,000 regardless of the number of specific violations of the act found by the jury. We find merit in neither contention. First, defendant Ford Credit waived its right to challenge the presiding justice's instruction on appeal by failing to raise an objection below. Perry v. Butler, 142 Me. 154, 48 A.2d 631 (1946). But even if the point had been properly preserved, the record fully justifies the presiding justice's decision to rule as a matter of law that the parties engaged in a consumer credit transaction to which the provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Act applied. Former 9 M.R.S.A. § 3903 defined a consumer transaction as one in which the money, property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, while section 3904 excluded from the act [c]redit transactions involving extensions of credit for business or commercial purposes. . .. Vicnire's unrebutted testimony that the truck was the only family vehicle and his sole means of transportation to his regular job conclusively established that his use of the truck was primarily personal. Evidence presented by Ford Credit to show that Vicnire also used the truck to transport cattle that he sold as a sideline was clearly insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find in favor of Ford Credit. Nor could a reasonable juror have placed much weight on the fact that a clause of the purchase contract stated that the purchase was for Business or Commercial Use, in light of the admission of Ford Credit's former office manager that the clause was included in all contracts for the sale of trucks regardless of the intended use of the vehicle. Similarly, there is no error in the presiding justice's conclusion that former section 3922 of the Maine Truth-in-Lending Act limited plaintiff's damages to $1,000 regardless of the number of violations of the act by a defendant in a single transaction. Section 3922 provided: [A]ny creditor who fails in connection with any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person any information required under this chapter to be disclosed to that person is liable to that person in an amount equal to the sum of: A. Twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction, except that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000; . . . . (Emphasis added) The emphasized portions of this section evidence a clear legislative intent to place a $1,000 ceiling on damages for all violations of the statute that arose in any single credit transaction. Plaintiff urges us to depart from the plain meaning of section 3922 on the basis of a federal case. Thomas v. Myers-Dickson Furniture Co., 479 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1973), which interpreted a similar provision of the federal version of the truth-in-lending act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(1) (1969), to allow multiple recoveries, and a subsequent congressional amendment of the federal act to state expressly that multiple recoveries would not be allowed, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(g) (1974). We reject both arguments. The Thomas case is distinguishable from the instant case on its facts, [1] and the subsequent congressional amendment may well have reflected a clarification of Congress' original intent rather than an acknowledgment that the former section allowed multiple recoveries.