Opinion ID: 2779689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: juror removal/attorney misconduct

Text: Four defendants, Alexander, Roberts, Dr. Kushner, and Jorge Macli, argue that the district court abused its discretion by failing to remove a juror and denying 35 Case: 12-16056 Date Filed: 02/17/2015 Page: 36 of 85 their motion for mistrial 10 after an episode occurring during defense counsel for defendant Alexander’s cross-examination of therapist Barbara Morales.11 During his cross-examination of therapist Barbara Morales about her practice of copying and pasting group therapy notes, defendant Alexander’s attorney discussed one effect of such copying and pasting, which was that pronouns were often incorrect with respect to the sex of the patient subject of the therapy note. In discussing this phenomenon, which illustrated the copying and pasting of notes, defendant Alexander’s attorney made the following remark, highlighted in the exchange below: Q. Using, let’s say, Jacqueline Moran and John Jackson, if they were two patients and you took John Jackson’s report and you put it on Jacqueline Moran, all of a sudden, she would become a he because you cut and pasted sections?
Q. If you did it in reverse and you took a section of Jacqueline Moran’s evaluation and put it on John Jackson, he would then become a she? A. Yes. 10 While the motion for mistrial was made by defendant Dr. Kushner’s counsel, the other named defendants adopted the motion at trial. Further, they have adopted the issue on appeal and in their appellate briefs. Thus we consider the issue as to all four of these defendants. 11 Defendant Alexander claims ineffective assistance of counsel arising from the same set of facts. This claim fails too. While this Court ordinarily decides claims of ineffective counsel through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, we may consider such claims on direct appeal if the record is sufficiently developed, as it is here. See United States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010). To prevail on an ineffective counsel claim in a criminal case, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct 2052, 2064 (1984). Here, leaving undecided the question of performance, we find no showing of prejudice for the reasons discussed below. 36 Case: 12-16056 Date Filed: 02/17/2015 Page: 37 of 85 Q. Which he probably wouldn’t mind anyway. A. Copy and paste. The government immediately objected to the attorney’s remark, and the district court sustained the objection. Defendant Alexander’s attorney immediately apologized to the district court, witness, and jury. At the next recess, the district court upbraided the attorney. During the same recess, the district court received a note from Juror 13 stating the following: “I want a written transcript for today’s cross-examination by the lawyer who made the comment about John Jackson being gay, that he/she comment at around 2:40 p.m. I intend to take it to Gay Services (GLADD).” When the jury returned, the district court advised the jury that it had “sternly admonished” defendant Alexander’s attorney outside of the jury’s presence, and that when the trial was over, anyone could get a copy of the transcript and take whatever action he or she felt was appropriate. The district court then asked the jury if it could be fair as to each defendant and make its decision only on the evidence, stating the following: But there are nine defendants on trial and I want to make sure and we all want to make sure that the fact that something out of place occurred, and hopefully it will be isolated and nothing of its kind will infect the rest of this trial, we all want to make sure that your decision as to each of the defendant’s cases is made on the merits of the case and not on whether an attorney did something that they shouldn’t have done. 37 Case: 12-16056 Date Filed: 02/17/2015 Page: 38 of 85 So I need some assurances from all of you. I hope all of you share the concern that that kind of comment shouldn’t be made, but I also need assurances from you, if you can give them to me, that you will be able to set that aside and to make your decision only on the evidence and the law as I instruct you; that you will consider each individual defendant’s case and decide whether or not the Government has proven the case or not proven the case and not let this isolated incident affect you. I am not ordering you to do that, but I need to find out now if I can do that going forward. So can you all agree that you can do that? Is there anybody that has any concerns about not being able to do that? Raise your hand now. Okay. All right. So we’re going to go forward. No juror then indicated that he or she would not be able to proceed according to the district court’s instruction. Defendant Alexander’s attorney again apologized in the presence of the jury. Defendant Dr. Kushner then moved for a mistrial on the basis of the preceding events. The district court denied the motion for mistrial. The following day, the defendants moved to remove Juror 13. The district court denied the motion to discharge the juror. The district court questioned Juror 13 and also questioned each of the other jurors individually and outside the presence of the full jury. Each juror, including Juror 13, unequivocally stated that defendant Alexander’s attorney’s comment had no effect on his or her ability to weigh the evidence and to be fair to all parties. 38 Case: 12-16056 Date Filed: 02/17/2015 Page: 39 of 85 Just cause exists to discharge a juror where the district court finds evidence that the juror cannot decide the issues fairly. Register, 182 F.3d at 840. The district court has substantial discretion in ferreting out and determining juror misconduct or bias. See id. And that discretion will not be disturbed absent a showing of bias or prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Fajardo, 787 F.2d 1523, 1525 (11th Cir. 1986). Just cause cannot be shown on this record. Juror 13 assured the district court that he was able to be fair and decide the case based on the evidence, explaining that when he sent the note, “it wasn’t so much myself that was offended by it or felt uncomfortable. It was some of the other jurors.” Asked by the district court whether he could look at each of the defendants and at the prosecutors and tell them that the incident was “not even going to be any part of my thought process or discussion,” Juror 13 replied: “Exactly. That’s exactly how I feel. It won’t be part of my emotions or discussions and it won’t come up again.” Juror 13 was properly forthright in raising a concern about the comment and in answering the district court’s questions. The district court was thorough in questioning the jury as a group and each juror individually. The refusal to remove Juror 13 was not an abuse of discretion. Nor was the district court’s denial of the motion for a mistrial. The district court made a determination well within its 39 Case: 12-16056 Date Filed: 02/17/2015 Page: 40 of 85 discretion that bias had not affected the jury such that a mistrial, an extreme remedy, was warranted.