Opinion ID: 1957359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Father's Employment in the Merchant Marine

Text: Mr. McDermott is a graduate of the United States Merchant Marine Academy and a licensed ship Captain in the Merchant Marine. Many of his previous jobs have involved maritime work. Prior to his marriage he worked aboard ships but upon his marriage he ceased ocean-going and worked primarily in the Port of Baltimore. Following his divorce from Ms. Dougherty, petitioner accepted periodic jobs which took him to sea for several months at a time. Such is the nature of much maritime work, and the attendant required time commitments also are not uncommon in other lines of work including military deployments, ground transportation of goods, natural gas and oil production, offshore commercial fishing, sport fishing, etc. [45] Mr. McDermott's job duties do not involve work that is illegal, untoward, or otherwise injurious. Nor is there evidence in this case of any illegal conduct on his part. While his required absences from Maryland for consecutive months at sea may occasion interruptions in his relationship with Patrick and may be less than ideal, such work is the employment especially available to him and for which he has particularized training. This Court recognizes Maryland's tradition as a maritime State wherein any number of our residents engage in various activities at sea and beyond and going to sea is but one of many occupations which require the worker to depart the State and absent himself or herself for months at a time. We would be loathe to reach a holding that jeopardizes a fit parent's right to custody of his child, by the change of custody to third parties, simply because the source of what is his livelihood and his means to support himself and his family takes him from the State for months' long periods of time. Although casting its decision in the light of Mr. McDermott's having voluntarily gone to sea, the circuit court actually penalized Mr. McDermott for the absences occasioned by the essential terms and very nature of his employment. It is difficult, if not impossible, to work as a seaman without going to sea. At one hearing, the circuit court was incredulous of Mr. McDermott's explanation at trial that he had resigned from his position as a merchant marine, but maintained his membership in the union of merchant mariners in order to sustain Patrick's health insurance. Instead, the court chose to believe that Mr. McDermott's ongoing membership was for the purpose of keeping open the possibility that he might re-engage in maritime work at some future date, even if he had sole custody of Patrick. [46] The Doughertys urged their selection as the stable custodians, contending that the father's lifestyle as a merchant seaman presented a challenge to the [c]ourt in terms of his ability to care for his child on a consistent basis ... and he has left the state of Maryland for various lengths of time during the course of this case (alteration added). The Doughertys' argument implies that Mr. McDermott's absences from the State, which were occasioned solely by the dictates of his employment, would be the only obstacle to his otherwise deserving full custody of Patrick. Thus, according to respondents' reasoning, Mr. McDermott's parenting rights are contingent on his employment. The Doughertys maintain that the circuit court's finding was not dependent on the specific type of employment held by Mr. McDermott, but rather it was the accumulation, timing, and voluntariness of his employment-related absences that made the circumstances exceptional. The circuit court echoed this position, stating, In the past whenever Mr. McDermott faced adverse circumstances, he left the State for protracted periods of time for sea duty, seemingly without concern for how his leaving would affect Patrick. The circuit court was not able to find that Mr. McDermott was an unfit parent, but rather declined to grant him custody based on exceptional circumstances occasioned by the absences inherent in his position as a merchant mariner. Accordingly, it was Mr. McDermott's employment that persuaded the circuit court of the presence of exceptional circumstances. The absences inherent to Mr. McDermott's merchant marine work are not unlike those required of military personnel or others in occupations mandating periods of service away from one's home. Custody issues should be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Barnard v. Barnard, 157 Md. 264, 267-68, 145 A. 614, 616 (1929) stating the proposition that [t]here can be no binding, and very little helpful, precedent found in the decisions of the courts on this subject, because essentially each case must depend upon its peculiar circumstances (alteration added). It is noted that other courts also generally have been reluctant to establish a definitive standard governing child custody when a fit parent is called away for an extended period for work. For example, the case of In re Marriage of Rayman, 273 Kan. 996, 47 P.3d 413 (2002), discusses the Supreme Court of Kansas' rejection of a mother's request for a bright line rule that a parent with residential custody of his or her children loses that custody when required to be away from his or her children for an extended period of time such as a twelve-month military tour overseas. Id. at 1001, 47 P.3d at 416. In re Rayman involved a non-residential custodian fit mother who invoked the parental preference doctrine ( i.e., fit parents are a child's preferred custodians) contending that it was less disruptive to her children to place them in her temporary residential custody in Kansas and later Tennessee, than to allow them to remain with their stepmother, and near her ailing parents in Texas, while the children's residential custodian father completed a twelve-month military hardship tour in Korea before returning to Texas. Id. at 999, 47 P.3d at 416. In rejecting the mother's petition, the Kansas high court observed: Each situation involving military families has distinct differences, as do the facts of temporary changes which relate to nonmilitary custodial relationships. The temporary transfer of the parent with residential custody must not automatically trigger a custody change.... Custody is an issue to be determined on a case-by-case basis.... Id. at 1001, 47 P.3d at 416-17. In a somewhat analogous and presently unreported decision involving a soldier's Family Care Plan, i.e., a compulsory document providing for care of the family in the soldier's absence, which provided that the paternal grandmother would care for the children during the custodian soldier-father's deployment, the Court of Appeals of Iowa, that state's intermediate appellate court, adopted the holding of the In re Rayman court, stating, We further decline to adopt a bright line rule divesting a parent of physical care whenever the parent is required to be away from the children for an extended period. In re Marriage of Grantham, 2004 WL 2579567, at  (Iowa App., Nov.15, 2004). Similarly, in In re Marriage of Hruby, 304 Or. 500, 748 P.2d 57 (1987), a divorced legal custodian father, who had served in the Navy since the child's birth and had placed the child in the care of the child's aunt given the parents' inability to provide care, sought to regain custody of his child with whom he had maintained regular contact and support. Id. at 503, 748 P.2d at 58. The child's care-giver aunt disputed a parental custodial preference and intervened in the heated custody action asserting that the child had developed a close relationship with the aunt and uncle. Id. at 502-503, 748 P.2d at 58. In awarding custody of the six-year-old child to the father, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that Oregon law supports a fit parent's right to custody of his minor children unless there are compelling reasons for depriving him of that custody Id. at 508 n. 5, 748 P.2d at 62 n. 5 (emphasis omitted), and because the father was not a stranger to his child, there was no showing that the child would not receive adequate care and love from the father or that the child would be otherwise unduly harmed, physically or psychologically, by giving custody to him. Id. at 517, 748 P.2d at 67. Thus, the In re Hruby court found no compelling reasons to deny custody to the father. In non-military circumstances [47] courts have reached similar results in favor of a fit parent who is temporarily gone for extended periods and who desires custody of his or her children. The Louisiana intermediate appellate court declined to maintain custody in the maternal grandparents, who had assumed custody after their daughter abandoned her husband and minor children, when the father later sought custody of the children. Similar to the present case, the father, a tugboat captain, initially had consented to the grandparent custodial arrangement because he was away from home on a regular basis. Jones v. Jones, 415 So.2d 300, 301 (La.Ct.App.1982). In approving of custody with the father, who had paid child support on a regular basis and had a new wife who desired to have the children and care for them, the court stated: It is not proper to merely compare the parent's circumstances and situation with that of the non-parent and award custody on the basis of best interests of the child. The `best interest' comparison is the proper basis for custody contests between parents; it is not properly applied to a contest between a parent and a non-parent because the parent enjoys the paramount right to custody. ... [T]he trial court did not find, and the record does not support a finding, that appellant has forfeited his right to parenthood; is unfit to care for his children; or is unable to provide a home for them. Although the [maternal grandparents] have cared for these children for a considerable period of time, we do not consider this to be a compelling reason to leave the children with them particularly in light of [the father's] remarriage, stable lifestyle, and close, loving relationship with his children. Likewise, [the father's] absences from home in connection with his employment do not constitute a compelling reason to deprive him of the custody of his children.  Id. at 302 (alterations added) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Some may discern from these cases a theme that suggests that grandparents are convenient surrogates for parents who encounter difficulties  whether economic, emotional or logistic  in raising their children. Grandparents' contributions do not go unnoticed and their efforts likely accrue to the benefit of the grandchildren. A quote from a case before the Supreme Court of Iowa supports this proposition, but with an especially relevant caveat: Our cases have emphasized that parents should be encouraged in time of need to look for help in caring for their children without risking loss of custody. The presumption preferring parental custody is not overcome by a mere showing that such assistance was obtained. Nor is it overcome by showing that those who provided the assistance love the children and would provide them with a good home. These circumstances are not alone sufficient to overcome the preference for parental custody. In re Guardianship of Sams, 256 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 1977) (emphasis added). Although the Doughertys did not maintain Patrick in their home and raise the child from infancy, the relative regularity of their contribution as well as the positive contribution of all grandparents must be acknowledged. Nevertheless, their efforts on Patrick's behalf under the circumstances of this case cannot overcome the fundamental constitutional right of a fit parent to exercise care and custody of his child and the circuit court, clearly impressed with the grandparents' care, cannot invoke absences occasioned by the parent's proper employment in support of placing the child with the grandparents due to exceptional circumstances.