Opinion ID: 1813384
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Award of Hughes.

Text: Chapman and Stamper both argue that the court erred in awarding to Hughes $2,018.27 of the $6,000.00 which Chapman paid into court. In their bill of complaint, Chapman avers that they have paid the $6,000.00 into court and pray that the respondents be required to litigate between themselves their rights to the money. Chapman is in the position of a stakeholder who is not claiming a right to any of the stake. It may be questioned whether a stakeholder has a right to object to the decree awarding the money to one respondent instead of another. Stamper, however, is a respondent claiming all of the stake and does have the right to question the correctness of the decree awarding part of the fund to Hughes instead of Stamper. Stamper has cross-assigned as error the award of part of the fund to Hughes and we consider Stamper's cross-assignment No. 1. Stamper began work on the tower on or about March 18, 1966, and completed the job April 8, 1966. Hughes' writ of garnishment was served on Chapman on March 31, 1966. Stamper served notice of its claim on Chapman on April 15, 1966, and filed claim of lien in office of judge of probate on April 26, 1966, as required by statute. Title 33, §§ 42, 46. As to priority of liens, the case is practically identical with Le Grand v. Hubbard, 216 Ala. 164, 112 So. 826, where the question on appeal was the priority of liens between a garnishing creditor of a contractor and materialmen furnishing material to the contractor for the erection of a building. An admitted balance due from the owner was paid into court. The lien of the garnishment attached prior to the giving of the notice to the owner required of persons furnishing material or labor to the contractor. The trial court decreed that the materialmen had priority over the garnishing creditor with respect to the right to payment from the fund which the owner had paid into court. On appeal, this court affirmed, saying that Commencement of work on the building. . . . is fixed as the event and the time when third persons are charged with notice that, on compliance with the terms of the statute, liens will accrue against the building in favor of those whose labor and material bring it into being. (216 Ala. at 165, 166, 112 So. at 828) The court said further: That the owner is free to carry out his contract with his contractor and make payments to him, or on his order pursuant thereto, until the statutory notice is given, does not strike out or render nugatory the other provisions giving a potential lien, which, upon notice to the owner, dates back to the commencement of work as against outside liens and incumbrances. (216 Ala. at 167, 112 So. at 829) In the instant case, when Stamper gave notice to the owner, Stamper's claim to the balance due from the owner to the contractor dated back to the commencement of the work as against outside liens and encumbrances such as Hughes' judgment and garnishment. Until the amount due Stamper, a subcontractor furnishing labor, is paid in full, Hughes, a garnishing creditor of the contractor, has no right to the balance which is due from the owner to the contractor, that is, the $6,000.00 which Chapman paid into court. Hughes does not question the correctness of the foregoing argument and conclusion, which are supported also by Peavy Lumber Co. v. Murchison, 272 Ala. 251, 130 So.2d 338, and Friday Lumber Co. v. Johnston, 278 Ala. 661, 180 So.2d 259. Hughes does say that, with respect to the $6,000.00, Stamper is not entitled to priority over Hughes for three reasons. First, Hughes says that in its cross-assignment No. 1, Stamper does not cite any particular ruling of the trial court for this Court to review, and therefore has not complied with Supreme Court Rule 1 which provides that, in assigning error, it shall be sufficient to state concisely, in writing, in what the error consists. The converse of this provision is, of course, that an assignment is not sufficient where the assignor does not state concisely in what the error consists. In the final decree, on transcript page 235, the court decreed that Hughes be paid from the money in court its claim to $2,018.27. In cross-assignment No. 1, Stamper says the court erred in ordering in the final decree that the claim of Hughes be allowed and paid from the money deposited in court, and cites page 235 of the record. We think Stamper has sufficiently specified a particular ruling of the trial court for this court to review. Second, Hughes says: Because the parties raised no point . . . . of priority of liens in the trial court, they cannot now be allowed to insist on a ruling on those questions. We do find that in its answer to the bill of complaint, at transcript page 21, Stamper specifically denies that Chapman's obligation to Stamper is limited to Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) and denies that (Rivers) . . . . or. . . . (Hughes) . . . . are entitled to any monies belonging to respondent. In the light of Stamper's claim to more than $6,000.00 and Stamper's denial of Hughes' right to any money belonging to Stamper, we think the record shows that Stamper did claim priority over Hughes as to the fund in court. Third, Hughes says Stamper's claim cannot take priority over Hughes' lien because Stamper was and is a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in Alabama and the issue whether Stamper was qualified in this state was raised at the trial level, and testimony was given by the president of Stamper showing that Stamper was not qualified, as follows: Q (BY MR. HENDON:) Has your company ever been qualified to do business in the State of Alabama? MR. JENKINS: We object to that. The same objection; not the best evidence and not the proper way to prove it. THE COURT: I will overrule. I will let him state what he thinks about it. It is a legal conclusion. It is a conclusion I am going to have to draw from all the evidence. I will hear what he had got to say about it. THE WITNESS: Will you repeat the question? Q (BY MR. HENDON:) Is your company, Stamper Construction Company, qualified to do business in Alabama? MR. JENKINS: I would like to add another objection before he answers that question. It is not shown this witness has knowledge as to what qualifies him to do business. THE COURT: As I have stated, that is a legal conclusion. It is an invasion of the province of the Court. I am going to permit him to answer. When I permit him to answer it, I am also going to permit you gentlemen to cross-interrogate him as to his qualifications. A I will put it this way: To my knowledge, I would have to have subcontractors licensed in the State of Alabama. I was under that impression. Q (BY MR. HENDON:) You were under the impression you did not have to be qualified to do this job? A Right. Q It was on that assumption you did this job? A Correct. Stamper responds to Hughes' argument by saying in brief that, although Rivers did, by answer and cross bill, aver that Stamper was a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in Alabama, There is no . . . . allegation in the record, filed by . . . . Hughes . . . . asserting that Stamper's claim should be denied because they were not qualified to do business in Alabama. There is no proof or evidence in the record to this effect either. We think Stamper is correct in saying that Hughes filed no pleading asserting that Stamper's claim should be denied because it was not qualified in this state. In a suit to foreclose a mortgage, the court held the bill of complaint not demurrable for failure to show that the complainant foreign corporation was qualified to do business in Alabama. The court said: . . . . Unless the disability of the plaintiff to maintain the bill is apparent upon the face of the bill, it is not the subject of a demurrer, but of a plea. Story, Eq.Pl., §§ 493, 494, 722. Nelms v. Edinburg-American Land Mortgage Co., 92 Ala. 157, 162, 9 So. 141, 143. In subsequent cases, the court said: . . . . If the incapacity to sue, arising from infancy or other cause, does not appear, however, on the face of the bill, the defendant must take advantage of it by plea; but, if the incapacity appears on the face of it, he may demur. [Story Eq.Pl.] §§ 493, 494, 722; Nelms v. [Edinburg-American L.] Mortgage Co., 92 Ala. 162, 9 South. 141. . . . . Liddell & Co. v. Carson et al., 122 Ala. 518, 528, 26 So. 133, 136. 3. It will be presumed that a foreign corporation doing business in this state has complied with its laws. Nelms v. [Edinburg-American] L. M. Co., 92 Ala. 157, 9 South. 141. The bill here shows nothing to the contrary. . . . . Certainly strangers cannot raise the question in any case. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 202 Ala. 542, 548, 81 So. 44, 50. Because Hughes did not raise the issue of Stamper's lack of qualification by affirmative pleading, Hughes cannot raise the issue on appeal. We are not to be understood as holding that, even if Hughes had affirmatively pleaded Stamper's lack of qualification, the proof in the instant case would be sufficient to require or permit the trial court or this court to find that Stamper was not qualified. Accordingly, we hold that the court erred in ordering that Hughes be paid $2,018.27 out of the $6,000.00 paid into court.