Opinion ID: 2621432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct During Guilt Phase Closing Argument

Text: ś 136 Gregory contends that during closing argument, the prosecutors committed misconduct by improperly denigrating defense counsel, arguing facts not in evidence, and improperly shifting the burden to the defense. The defendant bears the burden of showing that the prosecutor's remarks were improper. State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 718, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 1193, 140 L.Ed.2d 523 (1998). Even if the defendant does so, the error does not require reversal unless the appellate court determines there is a substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the jury's verdict. Id. at 718-19, 940 P.2d 1239. A defendant's failure to object to a prosecutor's improper remark constitutes a waiver, unless the remark was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it evinces an enduring and resulting prejudice that could not have been cured by an instruction to the jury. Id. at 719, 940 P.2d 1239; see also Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 596, 888 P.2d 1105; Hoffman, 116 Wash.2d at 93, 804 P.2d 577. [39] Where the defendant objects and requests a curative instruction or moves for a mistrial, we give deference to the trial court's ruling because it is in the best position to evaluate whether the prosecutor's comment prejudiced the defendant. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 719, 940 P.2d 1239. Allegedly improper comments must be viewed in the context of the entire argument, and a prosecutor enjoys wide latitude in drawing and expressing reasonable inferences from the evidence. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 641, 888 P.2d 1105. ś 137 Comments Regarding Cross-Examination of Dr. Brown: Dr. Brown, formerly of the WSPCL, testified at Gregory's trial. In an earlier, unrelated case, Dr. Brown conducted an RFLP test and drafted a report for his coworker to review. The coworker noted a mistake, which Dr. Brown then corrected. When questioned during an interview with defense counsel in that case, Brown lied to cover up the mistake. During cross-examination here, Gregory's defense counsel focused, in part, on this incident and Brown's subsequent resignation. ś 138 In closing, the prosecutor remarked that the defense strategy in this case was to attack the scientists personally. MRP at 6724. The prosecutor argued: John Brown is the perfect example of how the defense tactic in DNA cases has changed, because John Brown suffered an unbelievable attack personally. It wasn't professional. It was personal. MRP at 6727. Defense counsel objected. The court sustained and ordered this argument to be stricken from the record. The prosecutor then argued: John Brown was questioned about every single thing except his work in this case. What does that tell you? Distract, deflect, divert, get your attention away from the work that John Brown did in this case so maybe you won't see how well it was done, so maybe you won't see how much it matches and how much the defendant committed this crime. MRP at 6727. There was no objection to this argument. ś 139 Where the defense failed to object, we must determine whether the argument was so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it resulted in an enduring prejudice that could not be obviated by a curative instruction. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 719, 940 P.2d 1239. [T]he prosecutor, as an advocate, is entitled to make a fair response to the arguments of defense counsel. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 87, 882 P.2d 747. In Russell, this court evaluated a prosecutor's statement that the defense had `attacked and vilified' a DNA expert. Id. at 92, 882 P.2d 747 (quoting Verbatim Report on Appeal at 7289). The Russell prosecutor argued that defense counsel would `stoop to any level' to call scientific evidence into question. Id. The Russell court found that the prosecutor's remarks appear to have been provoked by defense counsel and arguably constitute a fair response to attacks made by the defense on the deputy prosecutor, her witnesses, and the work of government agents. Id. at 93, 882 P.2d 747. The court held that [w]hile inflammatory, the remarks were not so prejudicial that a curative instruction would have been ineffective. Id. ś 140 We conclude that the prosecutor's remarks in this case were no worse than the prosecutor's remarks in Russell. The trial court struck from the record the characterization of the attack on Brown as personal. Gregory has not shown that the trial court abused it discretion in crafting a remedy, especially where no further curative instruction was requested. The prosecutor's other remarks, arguing that the defense was trying to divert the jury's attention away from the DNA evidence, seem to be a fair response to defense counsel's cross-examination of Brown. While Gregory points to various other cases in which courts have found due process violations, those cases are distinguishable in that they involve characterizations of defense counsel as liars. See Appellant's Opening Br. at 139-40 (listing cases). Prosecutors in this case simply did not go so far. ś 141 Facts not in Evidence: Gregory also argues that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence and misstated the evidence presented to the jury. Specifically, he contends that the prosecutor improperly referred to the population of the United States and the world, the prosecutor improperly argued that the results of the three DNA tests could be combined to create a single probability of a random match, and the prosecutor improperly listed nonforensic uses for DNA testing. Notably, the defense did not object to any of the above challenged statements during closing argument. Therefore, we must determine only whether the prosecutor's comments were so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an enduring prejudice resulted such that a curative instruction could not have been effective. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 719, 940 P.2d 1239. ś 142 Population Statistics: During closing argument, the prosecutor referred to testimony that the chance of a random match between the defendant and the DNA left at the scene under the RFLP test was 1 in 325 million, roughly the population of the United States. MRP at 6729. The prosecutor also repeated that the chances of a random match between Gregory and the crime scene DNA under the STR test was 1 in 180 billion people, which amounted to [r]oughly 30 times the population of the world. MRP at 6732. [40] The State acknowledges that there was no evidence presented at trial as to the populations of the United States or the world, but in argument, the parties are granted wide latitude in drawing inferences from the evidence, and Gregory does not show that the argument was flagrant and ill-intentioned. See Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 641, 888 P.2d 1105. The jury instruction explaining that the jury must not consider facts not in evidence would have cured any error. Therefore, these statements do not warrant reversal. ś 143 Additional Application of the Product Rule: During closing argument, the State combined the results of all three types of DNA testing by multiplying the results of each, using the product rule: What are the odds of a person having the six locations that match between Allen Gregory and the vaginal swabs using DQ-Alpha, the six locations between the defendant and the bedspread sperm RFLP, and the nine locations on all of the evidence and the defendant using STRs, 1 in 2,500, times 1 in 325 million, times 1 in 180 billion. It's a 5-digit number with 19 zeroes after it. That's the chance. That's the odds of somebody else besides this defendant raped and murdered [G.H.]. MRP at 6733. Gregory now argues that there was no evidence that the product rule can properly be applied across results obtained from different DNA tests. However, the State is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and again, Gregory has not shown that the argument was flagrant or ill-intentioned. Finally, there was evidence that the odds of a random match were at least 1 in 180 billion. The odds were already so high as to virtually eliminate the chances of a random match such that this argument would not have prejudiced the defense. ś 144 Other Uses for DNA Evidence: Finally, Gregory argues that the prosecutor improperly referred to other high stakes uses of DNA testing. Specifically, the prosecutor noted that DNA testing has been used in medical diagnosis and transplant procedures and identification of casualties of war, victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, and victims of plane crashes. The prosecutor then emphasized the trustworthiness of DNA testing. While Gregory argues that this comment was not supported by evidence at trial, one of the scientists testified, without objection, that PCR and RFLP testing have been used in medical research and diagnostic transplant, organ research, the identification of war dead, the identification of remains in the Oklahoma City bombing and plane crashes. MRP at 4714. Any minor departure from the actual testimony is not enough to warrant reversal here. ś 145 Comment on the Missing Witness: Gregory also asserts that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof by commenting that the defense failed to call Mike Barth, G.H.'s ex-boyfriend, whom the defense suggested had actually killed G.H. The prosecutor argued: Now the defense didn't call Mike Barth. They didn't call him and say, Did you kill her? The state didn't call him either. The state did one better. The state called in his biological evidence, confirmed it with the evidence at the murder scene, and there isn't any chance at all. MRP at 6723. [41] The missing witness doctrine allows a prosecutor to comment on the defendant's failure to call a witness in certain circumstances: Under this doctrine, where a party fails to call a witness to provide testimony that would properly be a part of the case and is within the control of the party in whose interest it would be natural to produce that testimony, and the party fails to do so, the jury may draw an inference that the testimony would be unfavorable to that party. Cheatam, 150 Wash.2d at 652, 81 P.3d 830. However, this court has held that the missing witness doctrine is limited; the inference is not available if the witness's testimony would necessarily be self-incriminatory if favorable to the party who could have called the witness. State v. Blair, 117 Wash.2d 479, 489-90, 816 P.2d 718 (1991). The missing witness doctrine would not apply here where, if Barth's testimony were favorable to Gregory, it would have incriminated Barth. ś 146 Even though the missing witness doctrine does not permit the argument in this case, Gregory has not shown how the prosecutor's comment was prejudicial. See Blair, 117 Wash.2d at 491, 816 P.2d 718. In fact, during closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the State's burden of proof. Defense counsel never requested a curative instruction, which could easily have reminded the jury of the proper burden of proof. The comment was not so flagrant and ill-intentioned that it would have resulted in enduring prejudice. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 718-19, 940 P.2d 1239. We conclude that none of the challenged closing arguments amount to misconduct.