Opinion ID: 886781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Search Warrant Application.

Text: ¶ 15 A judge shall issue a search warrant to a person upon application, in writing or by telephone, made under oath or affirmation, that (1) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed; (2) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that evidence, contraband, or persons connected with the offense may be found; (3) particularly describes the place, object, or persons to be searched; and (4) particularly describes who or what is to be seized. Section 46-5-221, MCA. ¶ 16 Meyer correctly points out that the District Court misquoted this statute in its conclusions of law; however, this harmless error was not a misstatement of the law, but rather a paraphrasing of the statute's requirements. ¶ 17 The search warrant application alleged Meyer violated § 45-8-335, MCA, which provides: Possession of explosives. (1) A person commits the offense of possession of explosives if he possesses, manufactures, transports, buys, or sells an explosive compound, flammable material, or timing, detonating, or similar device for use with an explosive compound or incendiary device and: (a) has the purpose to use such explosive, material, or device to commit an offense; or (b) knows that another has the purpose to use such explosive, material, or device to commit an offense. ¶ 18 Meyer asserts the application when viewed on its four corners did not state facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause that the offense of possession of explosives had been committed. Meyer's reasoning is that this offense requires both possession of explosives and the purpose to use them or the knowledge someone else will use them. Meyer asserts that since no facts were alleged in the search warrant application showing purpose or knowledge, the issuing judge's determination that probable cause existed was incorrect. ¶ 19 In denying Meyer's motion, the District Court relied on an evidentiary statute, § 45-8-337, MCA, which provides that possession of a bomb or similar device charged or filled with one or more explosives is prima facie evidence of a purpose to use the same to commit an offense. Meyer argues this statute should have been in the search warrant application and since it was not, the application was not sufficient. Meyer argues further that C4 does not qualify as a bomb or similar device. ¶ 20 The State's position is the warrant application need only state facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe the C4 was delivered to and still located at Meyer's residence. The State argues the mental state element of an offense need not be proven before the issuance of a search warrant because the law does not require that the occupant be guilty of any offense and need only be supported by probable cause to believe that the items sought will be found in the place to be searched and that these are seizable by being adequately connected with criminal behavior. State v. Sundberg (1988), 235 Mont. 115, 119, 765 P.2d 736, 739. The State asserts the warrant application gave the District Court a substantial basis to believe Meyer had an unlawful purpose for possessing the C4. ¶ 21 In order for a search warrant to be issued, facts sufficient to show probable cause must be stated in the application. In determining whether probable cause exists, this Court follows the totality of the circumstances test set forth in Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527. Under this test, to determine whether a search warrant should be issued, the judge evaluates the facts asserted within the four corners of the application and makes a practical, commonsense decision as to whether there is a fair probability that incriminating items will be found in the place to which entry is sought. Reesman, ¶ 24 (citations omitted). ¶ 22 While we have adopted the totality of the circumstances test, it is clear that probable cause must exist for the search of the particular location for which the search warrant is obtained. State v. Kaluza (1995), 272 Mont. 404, 406-407, 901 P.2d 107, 109 ( Kaluza II ) (citing State v. Kaluza (1993), 262 Mont. 360, 362, 865 P.2d 263, 264 ( Kaluza I )). It is well-settled that the evidence sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant is significantly less than that required to support a conviction. All that need be shown is a probability of criminal conduct. State v. Kelly (1983), 205 Mont. 417, 431, 668 P.2d 1032, 1040 (citation omitted). Further, probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed by a suspect is a separate question from whether probable cause exists to search the suspect's residence. Kaluza II, 272 Mont. at 407, 901 P.2d at 109 (citation omitted). ¶ 23 Meyer's argument misstates the probable cause necessary to search a residence. Meyer's claim is, in essence, that every element of an offense be alleged in order to support a finding of probable cause; this is not so. It is sufficient that a fair probability exists that incriminating items will be found in the place to which entry is sought. Kelly, 205 Mont. at 440, 668 P.2d at 1044. The State's search warrant application stated facts supporting probable cause to believe contraband connected with the offense of illegal possession of explosives would be found at the residence. Specifically, the application included the informant's observation of Speed's delivery of the suspected C4 to Meyer's residence. The application also described with particularity the place to be searched and what was to be seized. This is all that is necessary to meet the requirements under § 46-5-221, MCA, to establish probable cause to support a search of Meyer's residence. ¶ 24 Meyer's next argument is that since the application failed to state when McCarvel received the information from the informant and failed to provide a specific enough time frame when the alleged offense took place, the warrant is invalid. The State argues continuing offenses, such as possession, may require extended time frames and the time frame given in this case was adequate to support a finding of probable cause. ¶ 25 An affidavit must set forth facts sufficient to show that a law is being violated at the time the warrant is issued. State ex rel. Townsend v. District Court (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 362, 543 P.2d 193, 196. While no reference to the time of the alleged offense will render an affidavit ineffective, a specific date is not required. See Kelly, 205 Mont. at 433, 668 P.2d at 1041. When a criminal activity is continuing in nature, however, more time may elapse between the observation of the activity and the application for the search warrant without negating probable cause. State v. Rinehart (1993), 262 Mont. 204, 214, 864 P.2d 1219, 1225 (upholding warrant based on information received two months prior to issuance). ¶ 26 Meyer's argument is without merit. The search warrant application in this case did make mention of a specific time frame when the alleged offense occurredsometime between August 14, 2002, and September 9, 2002which was 40-66 days prior to the issuance of the search warrant. It is not necessary that the application state the date on which McCarvel received the information; it is sufficient to allege the specific time frame related by the informant. ¶ 27 Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the search warrant application was sufficient when viewed on its four corners to support a finding of probable cause.