Opinion ID: 1830839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 36

Heading: Whether the imposition of the death sentence in disproportionate in this case to other death sentences upheld by the court and is cruel and inhuman punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitutions and Article III, Section 28 of the Mississippi Constitution (1890).

Text: ¶ 201. Hughes' final assignment of error mirrors the requirement under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105 (Supp.1998) that this Court review the imposition of the death penalty to ensure that its implementation is proportionate. This comparison is made from cases in which the death sentence was imposed and was reviewed on appeal by this Court. In making this individualized comparison, this Court considers the crime and the defendant. Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1087, 1113 (Miss.1997)( citing Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 350 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 202. Hughes' primary complaint is the fact that the State's case is circumstantial. Hughes contends this, a priori, renders the sentence of death disproportionate. Hughes urges this Court to remand the case for imposition of a life sentence in light of the circumstantial nature of the State's proof. ¶ 203. The circumstantial nature of the State's case has been addressed previously when Hughes challenged both its weight and legal sufficiency. On proportionality review, this Court necessarily considers the verdict of guilt in the lower court as valid, and inquires whether the sentence, assuming guilt, is disproportionate to the crime committed. ¶ 204. Otherwise, this Court would essentially be issuing a compromise verdict based on its own estimation of the State's proof. As explained previously, the State's evidence in this case is legally sufficient and not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Thus, the question becomes whether the sentence imposed by the jury is disproportionate to the crime, not whether the sentence is disproportionate to this Court's confidence in the State's case. Either the evidence sustains the verdict or it does not. Compromise verdicts on appeal based on this Court's estimation of the proof should not be entertained. ¶ 205. At least two courts have addressed this issue directly and found that a purely circumstantial case does not preclude the death penalty. In Commonwealth v. Yarns, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: First, it is asserted that the death penalty cannot be imposed in cases where a conviction for murder of the first degree rests upon circumstantial evidence. Specifically, appellant contends that circumstantial evidence in itself constitutes a overriding mitigating circumstance for purposes of the sentencing statute such that imposition of the death penalty is per se precluded. Such a contention is patently without basis, and finds no support in the sentencing statute..... Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513, 529(1988). Accord, Commonwealth v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 561 A.2d 719, 728 (1989). ¶ 206. Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized: The fact, however, that the evidence against appellant was all circumstantial is not to be considered as a mitigating factor. A conviction based on purely circumstantial evidence is no less sound than a conviction based upon direct evidence. Consideration of circumstantial evidence as a mitigating factor would inevitably lead to undercutting the underlying conviction itself by implying that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence is inherently less reliable than a conviction based on direct evidence. State v. Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 514 N.E.2d 394, 402 (1987). Accord, State v. Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 568 N.E.2d 674, 682 (1991). ¶ 207. In Wiggins v. State, the dissent, equated the quanta of the State's proof with the proportionality of the sentence: Under the present death penalty statute, this Court has never upheld a death sentence on evidence as weak as that introduced in this case. In the numerous cases where we have upheld the death sentence, there was little question that the defendant committed the murder as a principal in the first degree. Evidence which supported these findings included a confession by the defendant, eyewitness testimony to the incident, and fingerprints of the defendant at the scene coupled with the defendant's possession of the victim's property. Where the defendant's participation in the murder as a principal in the first degree is based upon a very weak case of circumstantial evidence, a sentence of death is disproportionate. Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 597 A.2d 1359, 1376-77 (1991)(Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). ¶ 208. Obviously, the determination as to whether the circumstantial nature of the State's case is properly considered as a mitigation element when considering the sentence on appeal is for this Court to decide. But, for the reasons previously stated, proportionality review should not include an inquiry into the nature of the proof. ¶ 209. Hughes also contends that the sentence is disproportionate in light of his reduced mental capacity. At best, Hughes' evidence of diminished capacity is that his intelligence quotient is below average. This Court has categorically stated that diminished capacity is no impediment to a death sentence. Blue v. State, 674 So.2d at 1235 ( citing Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1303 (Miss.1994)). ¶ 210. On January 9, 1996, Galloway was a healthy teenager with an apparently long future ahead of her. Now, all that remains of Galloway is the morbid detritus of her murder and her family's loss, grief and anger at her kidnapping and brutal rape and murder. Galloway's crime was breaking down on her way to school, and trusting in the apparent kindness of a random passer-by. ¶ 211. Galloway was beaten, raped, stabbed and strangled. Her chest was then set on fire after she was dead. This degradation culminated when her body was dumped in an abandoned house and left to rot. Examining the past death sentences imposed for the crime of kidnapping and rape, it is clear that the punishment fits the crime in this case. See Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613 (Miss.1997); Crawford v. State, 716 So.2d 1028 (Miss. 1998); Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581 (Miss.1995); Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179 (Miss.1996). ¶ 212. A jury of William Ray Hughes' peers properly weighed his crime against the mitigation offered and found that Hughes deserved to die. The facts and circumstances of his case are not so different from other capital murder cases so as to render the jury's verdict of death bizarre, inappropriate or an obvious product of passion or prejudice.