Opinion ID: 71470
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wallet-search

Text: Scroggins also asserts that DUSM Fomby impermissibly seized and searched his wallet, and thereby discovered his identity. Scroggins's counsel conceded at oral argument that the wallet-search bore no causal relationship to the discovery of the firearms, but proposed that the district court should have suppressed Scroggins's status as a felon, which came to light based on investigation of his identity as ascertained in the wallet-search. We conclude that the seizure of the wallet was permissible in connection with the frisk and protective sweep. DUSM Fomby testified that he removed all hard objects from Scroggins's pockets in the course of the frisk, and we discern no constitutional violation in his removal of the wallet along with the ammunition clips. The subsequent search of the wallet is a separate and more difficult issue, but we conclude that Scroggins failed to properly raise this argument on appeal and in the district court, and that it is subject to plain error review to the extent it is before us at all. Scroggins has not demonstrated plain error on this point. As an initial matter, Scroggins has not properly challenged the search of the wallet on appeal. A recent opinion summarized our authority on appellate briefing requirements as follows: A party that asserts an argument on appeal, but fails to adequately brief it, is deemed to have waived it. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 568 n. 63 (5th Cir.2009) (citing United States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1325 (5th Cir. 1989)). It is not enough to merely mention or allude to a legal theory. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Partridge, 540 F.3d 315, 325 n. 12 (5th Cir.2008) (McIntosh occasionally mentions an `equal protection' claim in conjunction with his due process claim, but this claim is inadequately briefed and is hence waived.). We have often stated that a party must press its claims. See, e.g., Davis v. Maggio, 706 F.2d 568, 571 (5th Cir.1983) (Claims not pressed on appeal are deemed abandoned.). At the very least, this means clearly identifying a theory as a proposed basis for deciding the casemerely intimat[ing] an argument is not the same as pressing it. Cf. FDIC. v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1326-27 (5th Cir.1994) (If a litigant desires to preserve an argument for appeal, the litigant must press and not merely intimate the argument during the proceedings before the district court.). In addition, among other requirements to properly raise an argument, a party must ordinarily identify the relevant legal standards and any relevant Fifth Circuit cases. Skilling, 554 F.3d at 568 n. 63; see also Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9) (stating that briefs must include contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities. . . on which the appellant relies.); Coury v. Moss, 529 F.3d 579, 587 (5th Cir.2008) (deeming estoppel argument waived where defendants cited cases but failed to explain how these cases constitute authority for their bare assertion that [plaintiff] is estopped to bring this litigation). We look to an appellant's initial brief to determine the adequately asserted bases for relief. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir.1994) (An appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal.). Knatt v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1 of E. Baton Rouge Parish, 327 Fed.Appx. 472, 483 (5th Cir.2009) (unpublished). [7] Scroggins fails to adequately raise the wallet-search issue under these standards. His initial brief focuses almost entirely on his arguments that the officers entered the house without consent, and that they lacked grounds to detain and frisk Scroggins. The wallet-search issue appears as an afterthought. It is mentioned in the questions presented and the summary of argument, but the body of the brief does not discuss it in any depth. The brief merely mentions it in conclusory sentences tacked to the end of paragraphs challenging other aspects of the frisk. See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 33 (The seizure of Scroggins' wallet and information contained in the contents of his wallet further should have been suppressed pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and its progeny.). There is no citation to or discussion of Terry's progeny, which includes thousands of casesmany concerning requests for identificationdecided over the last 40 years. The issue is accordingly not adequately presented. [8] Even if it were raised on appeal properly, Scroggins also did not properly raise the wallet-search issue in the district court. [9] Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C) requires that a motion to suppress evidence must be raised before trial, and Rule 12(e) states that [a] party waives any Rule 12(b)(3) defense, objection, request not raised by the deadline the court sets. . . . There is divided authority in the circuits as to whether arguments not raised in a motion to suppress are waived or are merely forfeited and subject to plain-error review. United States v. Baker, 538 F.3d 324, 328-29 (5th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 962, 173 L.Ed.2d 153 (2009). Our circuit follows the former view, holding that a defendant who fails to make a timely suppression motion cannot raise that claim for the first time on appeal, and also that failure to raise specific issues or arguments in pre-trial suppression proceedings operates as a waiver of those issues or arguments for appeal. United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 918-19 (5th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, our cases identifying such waiver have often proceeded to evaluate the issues under a plain error standard for good measure. See Baker, 538 F.3d at 329. Scroggins's original motion to suppress sought suppression of the evidence seized from the home and the statements made by Mr. Scroggins subsequent to his arrest, on the basis of the warrantless entry into Mr. Scroggins's home. At the hearing on this motion, the district court raised the permissibility of the protective sweep and frisk. The court thereafter ruled on the entry into the home as well as the sweep and detention, concluding that the officers discovered the firearms by lawful means. The wallet-search and the possibility of suppressing Scroggins's felon status were not at issue. With new, appointed counsel Scroggins later moved for rehearing of the motion to suppress, and for reconsideration when that motion was denied. [10] These motions presented additional suppression arguments that Scroggins intended to make in connection with a new hearingfor example, that Bell lacked the mental capacity to grant consent to enter, and that the frisk entailed a level of force and restriction beyond the scope of Terry. The motions concerned only the conduct leading to the discovery of the firearms. [11] They did not mention the wallet-search, and expressed no intention to move to suppress Scroggins's felon status. Finally, at the bench trial, Scroggins elicited extensive testimony from the officers concerning the entry into the home and the circumstances of the frisk, including brief testimony concerning the wallet-search. But during the trial and in its closing arguments, counsel focused on the entry into the house and the grounds (or lack there of) for detaining and frisking Scroggins. There was no argument that the wallet-search was a constitutional violation, or that any violation required suppression of Scroggins's felon status. The government first encountered these arguments on appeal. Under these circumstances, assuming arguendo that the issue is properly raised in the appellate briefs, we conclude it is appropriate to review the issue for plain error. The government has asked for plain error review rather than waiver, and our cases have analyzed issues under the plain error standard even after concluding they were waived. See Baker, 538 F.3d at 329. Furthermore, the distinctive procedural circumstances counsel in favor of treating the wallet-search issue as forfeited, rather than voluntarily waived. See generally United States v. Chavez-Valencia, 116 F.3d 127, 130 (5th Cir.1997). Under the plain error standard, we make three initial determinations: (1) whether the district court committed error; (2) whether the error is clear and obvious; and (3) whether the error affects substantial rights. United States v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir.2007). If these conditions are met, we have discretion to reverse the district court if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Scroggins fails to show plain error concerning the wallet-search, as it is far from clear and obvious that Scroggins's status as a felon can be suppressed at all. [12] The Supreme Court has stated that [t]he `body' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984); cf. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978) (holding that suppression of witness testimony was not required when the government learned the witness's identity by means of an illegal search). The proper interpretation of Lopez-Mendoza has bedeviled and divided [the] circuits, United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir.2007), and there is divided authority as to whether identity-related informationincluding information on file with the government concerning a defendant's legal statusis ever suppressible. [13] Our precedents concerning prosecution for illegal reentry hold on several grounds that immigration and deportation records are not suppressible, even if officers on the scene become aware of a defendant's immigration status by means of a constitutional violation. In United States v. Martinez, 512 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.1975), we held it unnecessary to determine whether a defendant should have been given Miranda warnings prior to confessing his immigration status, because the I.N.S. file on appellant . . . already existed, and it was located in the records of the same government agency and in the same city. Id. at 832. Accordingly, that information could not be considered derived from a constitutional violation. Id.; cf. United States v. Singh, 261 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir.2001) (Otherwise suppressible testimony or evidence should be admitted if it derives from an independent source, if the link to the illegally secured evidence is attenuated, or if it would inevitably have been discovered without the aid of the illegally obtained evidence.). We reached a similar holding on another ground in United States v. Pineda-Chinchilla, 712 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1983). When police discovered the defendant's status as a previously deported alien in the course of an allegedly illegal arrest, we held that he had no possessory or proprietary interest in the INS or the documentary information contained in that file, and therefore no legitimate expectation of privacy in the file [and] no standing to challenge its introduction into evidence. Id. at 943-44. In United States v. Roque-Villanueva, 175 F.3d 345 (5th Cir.1999), we followed Pineda-Chinchilla and read the Supreme Court's statement in Lopez-Mendoza broadly, holding that regardless of whether the defendant had been illegally stopped and questioned, neither his identity nor his INS file [were] suppressible. Id. at 346. This authority cuts against any finding of plain error regarding Scroggins's argument that the district court should have suppressed evidence of his felon status. We do not reach the question of whether there was error in the first instance, because we have not had the benefit of adversary briefing on it, and because this case potentially raises issues not present in the illegal reentry cases. But in light of our case law, we cannot conclude that failure to suppress Scroggins's felon status could constitute clear and obvious error. Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err by failing to suppress evidence of that status, and it is not necessary for us to decide whether the officers on the scene became aware of it by means of a constitutional violation. [14]