Opinion ID: 187075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review on appellant's facial challenge to the nps regulations

Text: As a threshold matter, the parties disagree over the applicable standard of review covering appellant's claim that the NPS regulations are facially unconstitutional. The Government argues that the plain error standard under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) applies, because appellant forfeited her claim by not raising it with sufficient specificity at trial. Appellant contends that the issue is subject to de novo review by this court, because it was raised and preserved below. No procedural principle is more familiar . . . than that a . . . right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944). When an appellant fails to clearly raise an issue at trial, the District Court Judge is deprived of the opportunity to consider it. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 896 F.2d 589, 591 (D.C.Cir.1990). [Objections] should be timely, specific, and renewed, when the court's initial ruling, correct when made, is proved erroneous in the light of subsequent evidence. The rationale for these requirements includes importantly the need for a record, developed by adversary processes, on which appellate consideration and resolution can safely proceed. United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146, 1152 (D.C.Cir.1970) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted); see also Graham v. Davis, 880 F.2d 1414, 1419-20 (D.C.Cir.1989). Whether an issue has been properly raised and preserved is a matter of judgment, however, and it may require the exercise of discretion by the appellate court. For example, as the Supreme Court noted in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), when an appellant's legal position in the District Court . . . was consistent with the legal standard that it . . . advocates on appeal, the reviewing court may consider the issue even though appellant's arguments in the District Court were much less detailed than the arguments advanced on appeal. Id. at 120, 108 S.Ct. 915. During the trial in this case, in answer to a question raised by the Magistrate Judge, defense counsel indicated that appellant meant to raise, a facial challenge to the NPS regulations: Mr. Norris [trial counsel for Ms. Sheehan]: It's clear, Your Honor, first off, there's a constitutional First Amendment right both to freedom of speech, to assemble, and to be able to address the government for grievances. So there is a First Amendment constitutional right to protest, to speak out, to speak out at the White House. It's a public area. The. Court: So you're challenging the constitutionality of the Code of Federal Regulation. Mr. Norris: Yes. Trial Tr. (11/16/05 PM) at 29. The Magistrate Judge then suggested that the facial validity of the regulations had already been decided by the court of appeals. The Judge indicated, however, that appellant could raise the issue on appeal: The Court: As I read [ United States v. Cinca, 56 F.3d 1409 (D.C.Cir.1995)], certainly our circuit appears to have not found that particular section of the [NPS regulation] wanting in terms of constitutionality, but on the other hand, you will certainly be able to make your record on that and state the record and the Court will rule on it. And if the Court were to rule against you and it seems to me I have no choice in view of the circuit decision, that you can then take it up to the Court of Appeals. Id. at 30. The foregoing record excerpts indicate that the Magistrate Judge understood that appellant meant to raise a facial challenge to the NPS regulations. Although appellant's counsel said nothing more on the matter following his exchange with the Magistrate Judge, he also did nothing to suggest that he meant, to abandon or waive appellant's facial challenge to the NPS regulations. And, more importantly, the matter was fully briefed by both parties in appellant's appeal to the District Court. In these circumstances, there is no good reason why this court should not address the issue. In Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193 (D.C.Cir.1981), aff'd in part and vacated in part, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983), this court was faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute that made it unlawful to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court building or grounds. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We rejected the District Court's dismissal of the case on grounds of exhaustion and then addressed the constitutional issue even though the District Court had not ruled on it. We noted that: Both parties have addressed fully the constitutionality of [the statute], both in this court and in the District Court. This is not a case, therefore, where resolution of an issue for the first time on appeal would cause undue surprise or prejudice. In addition, since appellants challenge the constitutionality of [the statute] on its face, the resolution of this issue is purely one of law, appropriate for appellate review. For these reasons, we believe that a remand to the District Court, which inevitably would result in a future appeal to this court, would be a waste of judicial resources. 665 F.2d at 1197 n. 9 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd in part and vacated in part, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 175 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 1702 (assuming without deciding that the court of appeals acted properly in deciding the constitutional issue). As we noted in Grace v. Burger , `[t]he matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.' 665 F.2d at 1197 n. 9 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976)). It follows, a fortiori, that if this court has the discretion to resolve an issue that was not addressed by the trial court, we surely may address an issue that was raised by appellant before the Magistrate Judge, briefed and argued by the parties during the course of appellant's appeal to the District. Court, and decided by the District Court in an extensive written opinion. We do so here. In the end, for the reasons discussed below, we affirm the District Court's decision that the NPS regulations do not impermissibly impose strict liability for protected First Amendment activities.