Opinion ID: 2586281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aranda/Bruton Issues

Text: Defendant and Alvarado moved to sever the trial on the ground that the prosecution's proposed admission of the jailhouse informants' testimony would violate People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265 and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. Bruton and its progeny provide that if the prosecutor in a joint trial seeks to admit a nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial statement, either the statement must be redacted to avoid implicating the defendant or the court must sever the trials. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 43, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) As to the Flores statement, the prosecution resolved any potential Amnda/Bruton issues when it limited its evidence to defendant's admission that he had taken a gun from the victim. As to the Jimenez statement, the prosecutor offered several possible redactions to avoid violating Aranda/Bruton, all of which the court ultimately deemed inadequate. The prosecutor then elected to proceed with a joint trial at which he would not introduce the Jimenez statement in his case-in-chief, although the parties understood it might be used for impeachment purposes. The trial court's final order was that the prosecution would not use the Jimenez statement in its case-in-chief at the guilt or penalty phases. Section 1098 expresses a legislative preference for joint trials. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 40, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) A trial court's denial of a motion for severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, judged on the facts as they appeared at the time of the ruling. ( Id. at p. 41, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) But even if the ruling on a severance motion was correct when made, the reviewing court will reverse the decision if a defendant shows that joinder actually resulted in gross unfairness, amounting to a denial of due process. ( People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d at p. 576, 590, 253 Cal.Rptr. 710, 764 P.2d 1087.) Because the trial court decided the severance motion entirely on Aranda and Bruton grounds, and because defendant does not claim the trial court erred in that ruling, he appears to concede the trial court's denial of the severance motion was correct. Defendant contends, however, that the court committed prejudicial error when it left open the possibility that if Alvarado testified, Jimenez could be called to impeach him. Defendant claims that because the trial court did not bar Jimenez's testimony altogether, the denial of severance resulted in gross unfairness amounting to a violation of due process. But defendant's claim that the trial court erred in not barring Jimenez's testimony altogether on Aranda and Bruton grounds is not viable. A codefendant's extrajudicial statement implicating another defendant need not be excluded when the codefendant testifies and is available for cross-examination. [11] ( Nelson v. O'Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622, 629-30, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222; People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 562-63, 271 Cal.Rptr. 738.)