Opinion ID: 1984918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Equality of Congressional District Populations One Person, One Vote

Text: Congressional redistricting becomes a judicial responsibility only when, as here, the state legislature has not acted after having had an adequate opportunity to do so. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 2354-55, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1394, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). In applying art. I, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has held, as noted above, that the goal is to make as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election . . . worth as much as another's. Wesberry. This requirement is the preeminent if not the sole, criterion for appraising the validity of redistricting plans. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 23, 95 S.Ct. 751, 764, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964). The United States Supreme Court has declined to adopt any particular deviation figure as the maximum deviation per se allowable. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 1228-29, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969). Population variances among districts must be justified. Id. That reluctance has fostered a wise constraint, as we can see by noting our advancing ability, in the last two decades, to perform mathematical manipulations by computer tools which can review in a short time great multitudes of variables which could not be examined by the machine-aided methods of the past within any feasible time period. However, a plan is not per se unconstitutional just because a smaller population deviation could be achieved. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983). Consider the various maximum total deviations  at times on this record called the maximum range of deviations  which have been accepted or rejected during recent years. The Supreme Court has defined maximum total deviation as the sum of the percentage by which . . . [the] most populous district . . . exceeds the ideal district population. . . and the percentage by which . . . the least populous. . . [is] below this ideal. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 700 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 1433, 1441 n. 7, 103 L.Ed.2d 717 (1989). In 1969, Kirkpatrick held that a 5.97% maximum deviation was bad. In 1973, White v. Weiser rejected a .284% maximum deviation (less than 3/10ths of 1 percent) in favor of a .149% maximum deviation. In 1982, the most recent Pennsylvania Congressional District Reapportionment Case, 567 F.Supp. 1507 (M.D.Pa. 1982), aff'd without opinion, sub nom., Simon v. Davis, 463 U.S. 1219, 103 S.Ct. 3564, 77 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1983), an opinion by Circuit Judge Weis, for a three-judge court, accepted a maximum deviation of .2354%, and, after further census revision, a maximum deviation of .399%, noting that the difference between those two figures  one-fourth of one percent v. four-tenths of one percent  could be statistically insignificant, particularly when our constantly moving population necessarily means that a census count is simply the snapshot of a particular moment in time. 567 F.Supp. at 1515. This present case has produced, in the Murtha-McDade Plan, the ultimate of equality with a maximum deviation of.0000017%, consisting of a difference of just one person out of 565,793. Departures from such mathematical perfection, according to the federal courts, are justified but only to advance the cause of equality realistically in the following respects:  avoiding fragmentation of local government territories and splitting of election precincts, Shayer v. Kirkpatrick, 541 F.Supp. 922, 933 (1982), aff'd sub nom., Schatzle v. Kirkpatrick, 456 U.S. 966, 102 S.Ct. 2228, 72 L.Ed.2d 841 (1982);  effectuating adequate representation of a minority community, Shayer, 541 F.Supp. at 930-31;  creating districts which are compact and contiguous, Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F.Supp. 68, 82-88 (1982);  maintaining relationships of shared community interests, Carstens, 543 F.Supp. at 82, 90-91; and  not unduly departing from the useful familiarity of existing districts, Dunnell v. Austin, 344 F.Supp. 210 (1972). All timely plans must be considered on the same footing, despite the Murtha-McDade Plans claim to be the only bipartisan one. It is, but, like all the plans, it is not disinterested, having been submitted on behalf of 11 incumbents.