Opinion ID: 1435973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Waiver of Ex Post Facto Challenges in Sentencing

Text: On August 22, 2000, six months before the penalty-phase proceedings in this case, the Legislature enacted a law that allowed a sentence of life without parole in certain capital cases. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4) provides that whenever a jury in a capital case finds the presence of one or more aggravating factors, but does not return a death verdict, the defendant shall be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. The statute also provides that: [t]his act shall take effect immediately. L. 2000, c. 88. As of the time of the Padilla murder, a capital defendant faced a thirty-year to life sentence with a minimum thirty-year parole disqualifier if the jury found at least one aggravating factor but did not return a death verdict. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(1). Before the penalty phase began in this case, defendant announced that he would subject himself to the life-without-parole alternative and asked the court to instruct the jury in accordance with the newly-enacted provision. Defendant undoubtedly believed that if the jury were instructed on the life-without-parole option, it might be less inclined to return a death verdict. Such reasoning not only has roots in our common intuition, but empirical support from statistical surveys. The United States Supreme Court, in Simmons v. South Carolina, noted a survey conducted by the University of South Carolina's Institute for Public Affairs in which more than seventy-five percent of those questioned indicated that if they were called upon to make a capital sentencing decision as jurors, the amount of time the convicted murderer actually would have to spend in prison would be an `extremely important' or a `very important' factor in choosing between life and death. 512 U.S. 154, 159, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2191, 129 L.Ed. 2d 133, 140 (1994); see also Taylor v. State, 672 So. 2d 1246, 1273 (Miss.) (reversing death sentence because jury might have opted for life sentence had it been told that defendant faced life without parole), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 994, 117 S.Ct. 486, 136 L.Ed. 2d 379 (1996); William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 605, 650, 671 (1999) (finding most jurors are more likely to vote for death because of belief that convicted killers will serve prison terms below mandatory minimum for parole and will get out of prison far too soon). No one disputed that the life-without-parole provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4) imposes a more severe sentence than the previous law of life with a minimum parole disqualifier of thirty years. The State and defendant agreed that the Ex Post Facto Clause barred the application of the life-without-parole provision unless waived by defendant. Defendant informed the court that he would waive any ex post facto challenge to the application of the new provision. The State, however, declined to consent to defendant's application. The trial court ruled that defendant could not waive an ex post facto objection to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4) and, therefore, refused to instruct the jury in accordance with the new statute. The trial court never squarely addressed whether the Legislature intended N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4) to apply to defendant's penalty-phase proceedings. At a hearing prior to the penalty-phase trial, the court recognize[d] the tactical advantage to [defendant] to present to a jury ... that at the minimum he is going to serve a life imprisonment with no possibility of parole. The court denied defendant the benefit of the new statute for two reasons. First, the court stated that despite defendant's willingness to waive application of the Ex Post Facto Clause and to waive the right to any appeal arising from giving a life-without-parole instruction to the jury, future appellate counsel might not abide by defendant's decision. Second, the trial court voiced apprehension that the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections might not carry out the jury's mandate of a life-without-parole sentence if the Commissioner disagreed with the court's decision to permit waiver of the protections of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Despite defendant's willingness to subject himself to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole, the court instructed the jury that defendant potentially could be released from prison in thirty years. [7] In deciding whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion, we must determine whether the Legislature intended N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4) to extend only to those capital murders committed after the statute went into effect or to all capital murders reaching the penalty phase after its effective date. If the statute was not intended to apply to capital murders that occurred before the enactment, then the inquiry ends. On the other hand, if the statute was intended to apply to that category of cases, its reach would be limited to those in which the defendant waived the constitutional protection of the Ex Post Facto Clause. That raises the additional question of whether the defendant is empowered, without the consent of the State or the court, to waive that constitutional right. We first examine whether N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4), after its effective date, applies to all penalty-phase trials, including those capital murder defendants willing to waive protection of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Whenever interpreting legislation, we begin by looking at the statutory language to divine its meaning. Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 231, 708 A. 2d 401, 407 (1998). Here, the language of the statute does not provide an answer because the legislative direction that the act shall take effect immediately is insolubly ambiguous. Because the words of the statute are susceptible to different interpretations, we must look to other aids of statutory construction that shed light on legislative intent, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and statutory context. Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170, 733 A. 2d 1159, 1166 (1999). The legislative history is scant and does not provide much insight into the meaning of the statute. However, in this case, the policy considerations that gave rise to the statute inform our interpretation of the Legislature's intent. We recognize that applying the statute to murders that occurred both before and after the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4), with due regard to the right of defendants to invoke or waive protection of the Ex Post Facto Clause, would give the most wide-ranging effect to the legislative mandate. The State counters that the Legislature was aware of the Ex Post Facto Clause in passing N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4) and would not have intended the statute to apply to cases beyond its constitutional reach by leaving to individual defendants the opportunity to opt in by waiving the clause. If the statute were not intended to apply to defendant's case, then the Ex Post Facto Clause would not come into play and the issue of waiver would be moot. We conclude that the policy objectives of the legislation clearly support the most far-reaching application of the statute. That means the statute embraces all capital murder cases proceeding to the penalty phase after the legislation's effective date, provided that, in cases in which the murder preceded the effective date, the defendant must be willing to waive the protection of the Ex Post Facto Clause. We reach this result for several reasons. One of the obvious statutory objectives was to eliminate recidivism for those who commit society's most abhorrent crimes. In those cases in which the penalty-phase jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt an aggravating factor but does not return a death verdict, the Legislature upgraded the punishment from thirty years to life with a thirty-year parole disqualifier to life without parole, thus removing any chance of the convicted murderer's release. We cannot discern any reason why the Legislature would not have wanted to extend that punishment to the greatest number of cases constitutionally permissible. Additionally, assuming that the odds of a death verdict increase if the jury does not have the option of a life-without-parole sentence, we cannot discern any reason why the Legislature would have wanted to divide the fates of defendants, who had yet to proceed to the penalty phase, between those whose crimes occurred before and after enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4). The legislative goal of proportionality in capital sentencing favors similar treatment for similarly situated defendants, to the extent possible. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(e). Applying N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4) to the greatest number of cases constitutionally permissible furthers the goal of proportionate sentencing. We also are mindful that when a criminal statute is at issue, we are guided by the rule of lenity and interpret ambiguous language in favor of a criminal defendant. State v. Livingston, 172 N.J. 209, 218, 797 A. 2d 153, 158 (2002). In light of the purpose of the new law, in cases such as this one, we cannot find a legislative intent to have a jury return a death verdict only because it did not have the option of returning a life-without-parole sentence. We next address whether the defendant can waive the protection of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The United States and New Jersey Constitutions prohibit ex post facto legislation. [8] The Ex Post Facto Clause was intended to interdict the retroactive application of criminal laws that harm the accused. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed. 2d 351, 359-60 (1987) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed. 2d 17, 23 (1981)); State v. T.P.M., 189 N.J.Super. 360, 366-67, 460 A. 2d 167, 170-71 (App.Div.1983). The drafters of that clause understood that it would be unjust to prosecute a person for a crime or to impose a harsher sentence based on a law that was not on the books at the time of the commission of the act covered by the subsequent legislation. The Ex Post Facto Clause provides assurance that federal and state legislatures [are] restrained from enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation. Miller, supra, 482 U.S. at 429, 107 S.Ct. at 2451, 96 L.Ed. 2d at 359. It also ensures that legislative enactments give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed. State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 56, 678 A. 2d 164, 181 (1996) (quoting Weaver, supra, 450 U.S. at 28-29, 101 S.Ct. at 964, 67 L.Ed. 2d at 23). It is well established that a defendant may waive a constitutional right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938); see also Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572, 107 S.Ct. 851, 856, 93 L.Ed. 2d 954, 965 (1987) (noting that a suspect may waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 290, 50 S.Ct. 253, 255, 74 L.Ed. 854, 859 (1930) (holding that a person charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of years may, consistent[] with the [C]onstitution[ ] ..., waive trial by a jury); State v. Crisafi, 128 N.J. 499, 509, 608 A. 2d 317, 323 (1992) (Defendants possess not only the right to counsel, but the right to dispense with counsel and to proceed pro se. ); State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 173, 557 A. 2d 322, 323-24 (1989) (noting that defendant can waive constitutional protection against search and seizure through consent). In a capital case, the defendant is permitted to waive his right to a bifurcated jury, State v. Parker, 256 N.J.Super. 336, 341, 606 A. 2d 1154, 1157 (Law Div.1992), and may plead guilty to capital murder, see, e.g., State v. Simon, 161 N.J. 416, 433-34, 737 A. 2d 1, 9-10 (1999); State v. Nelson, 155 N.J. 487, 494, 715 A. 2d 281, 284 (1998) ( Nelson I ). We cannot accept the trial court's reasons for not honoring defendant's willingness to waive the protection of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Defendant was represented by two attorneys, one a private practitioner and the other a Deputy Public Defender, both of whom were certified criminal trial attorneys. They represented to the court that defendant wished to waive application of the Ex Post Facto Clause and, in response to the court's concerns, to waive his right to appeal that issue. Not satisfied with defendant's proffer, the court made inquiry through a representative of the Administrative Office of the Courts with a high level administrator of the Office of the Public Defender to learn whether that Office would honor defendant's waiver on appeal. The Public Defender administrator responded that his office gives free rein to its appellate counsel to raise all appropriate issues. Without a guarantee that its decision would be free from appellate review, the court declined to give the life-without-parole instruction to the jury. We disapprove of the inquiry made by the court. Defendant was represented by counsel who were responsible for his case. All inquiries should have been directed to them. The court should have gone no further. Instead, the court sought and received information from an administrator with no connection to the case and then charted a course based on that irrelevant information. The decision whether to waive a constitutional right is personal to the defendant; it belongs to him, not the attorney, and certainly not to an administrative officer of the Office of the Public Defender. See State v. Dunne, 124 N.J. 303, 312, 590 A.2d 1144, 1148 (1991) (stating that New Jersey's consistent tradition has been that every right and privilege secured by our State Constitution belongs to each citizen, `as a personal right') (quoting State v. Stevens, 84 N.J.L. 561, 563, 87 A. 118, 119 (Sup.Ct. 1913)); see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708-10, 97 L.Ed. 2d 37, 46-47 (1987) (holding that constitutional right to testify on one's own behalf belongs to defendant personally); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed. 2d 562, 572 (1975) (noting that Sixth Amendment grants accused personal right to waive constitutional right to counsel in favor of self-representation). Indeed, an attorney is ethically bound to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2003). There was no need for the court to extract from defendant a waiver of a right to appeal from his waiver of the ex post facto bar. So long as the waiver procedure demonstrates that a defendant's decision was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the waiver is impervious to challenge on appeal. Koedatich II, supra, 112 N.J. at 328-29, 548 A. 2d at 992-93. A waiver is valid and binding on a defendant whenever, under the totality of the circumstances, it is given freely and with full knowledge of the nature of the right abandoned and the consequences of abandoning it. Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at 571-75, 107 S.Ct. at 856-58, 93 L.Ed. 2d at 964-66; Koedatich II, supra, 112 N.J. at 328-29, 548 A. 2d at 992-93. If the ex post facto waiver procedure were not constitutionally permissible, then even a waiver of the right of appeal likely would have had little validity. Additionally, the court should not have been concerned with whether the Commissioner of Corrections would have abided by the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence. The Commissioner cannot defy a sentence that is lawfully imposed. The court should have been concerned only with a proper interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4) and with following the appropriate constitutional principles. New Jersey trial courts have accepted a capital defendant's offer to waive his ex post facto right to challenge statutes mandating life imprisonment without parole. See, e.g., Timmendequas I, supra, 161 N.J. at 637, 737 A. 2d at 121-22 (noting capital defendant waived ex post facto challenge to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(3), which mandates life without parole for defendants convicted of murdering child less than fourteen-years-old in course of sexual assault); State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 433-34, 482, 803 A. 2d 1, 10 (2002) ( Nelson II ) (illustrating defendant's waiver of ex post facto challenge to application of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(2), which mandates life without parole for conviction of murdering police officer). Other jurisdictions also have allowed defendants to waive ex post facto challenges to the application of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole sentencing options that took effect after the commission of a capital murder. See, e.g., Furnish v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W. 3d 34, 50-51 (Ky.2002) (holding reversible error not to instruct jury of sentencing option of life without parole in case of defendant `willing to make a knowing, intelligent and voluntar[]y waiver of any right to attack this statute as a violation of the ex post facto prohibition of the U.S. and Kentucky Constitutions') (citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 115, 157 L.Ed. 2d 80, 72 U.S.L.W. 3238 (2003); Willie v. State, 738 So. 2d 217, 220 (Miss.1999) (holding that on remand for resentencing jury should be instructed on all three options available under the amended statute and if defendant agrees to a sentence of life in prison without parole, the trial judge should take care to ascertain that [defendant] has validly waived his ex post facto rights before accepting the plea agreement); Wade v. State, 825 P. 2d 1357, 1363 (Okla.Crim.App.1992) (reversing death sentence because trial court erred in refusing defendant's request to instruct jury based on sentencing scheme enacted subsequent to commission of underlying offense and after he waived ex post facto challenges); State v. McDonnell, 329 Or. 375, 987 P. 2d 486, 494-96 (1999) (holding that life-without-parole provision was effective as of date of enactment in capital case and defendants convicted of murder could waive ex post facto challenge). We understand that the issues confronting the trial court were difficult and somewhat novel and did not lend themselves to easy resolution. On remand, in any new penalty-phase trial, the court must give defendant the option of a life-without-parole jury instruction consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3b(4), provided defendant is willing to give a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause.