Opinion ID: 2587723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Lesser Included Crime Instructions

Text: Engelhardt argues the district judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on unintentional second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of first-degree murder. At trial, Engelhardt objected to instructions on any of these lesser included offenses. Defense counsel also specifically objected unsuccessfully to the intentional second-degree murder instruction given by the district judge, requesting he add language to PIK Crim. 3d 56.03 to inform the jury that intentional second-degree murder does not include situations involving mere heat of passion or sudden quarrel. The district court must instruct the jury as to lesser included crimes where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction of some lesser included crime as provided in subsection (2) of K.S.A. 21-3107 and amendments thereto. K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3414(3). Lesser included crime instructions need not be given if the evidence would not permit a rational factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the lesser included offenses. State v. Deavers, 252 Kan. 149, 151, 843 P.2d 695 (1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 978 (1993); see also State v. Brice, 276 Kan. 758, 772-73, 80 P.3d 1113 (2003) (no obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses arises unless offense supported by enough evidence to reach jury). In addition, when a defendant does not object to the giving or failure to give lesser included crime instructions, stating distinctly the matter to which the defendant objects and the grounds of his or her objection, we will find reversible error only if the instructions or failure to give the instructions was clearly erroneous. See K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 22-3414(3); State v. Kesselring, 279 Kan. 671, 685-86, 112 P.3d 175, 187 (2005); State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 712, 101 P.3d 1218 (2004). When there is an absence of evidence to support a lesser included crime instruction, a failure to give it cannot, by definition, be held to be clearly erroneous. Unintentional second-degree murder is a killing committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-3402(b). Voluntary manslaughter requires a killing to be committed intentionally upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. K.S.A. 21-3403(a). It is well settled that voluntary manslaughter, like second-degree murder, is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. State v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. 104, 109, 865 P.2d 1021 (1993). Involuntary manslaughter, defined in K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-3404(a) to include a killing differing from reckless second-degree murder only in the degree of recklessness required to prove culpability, see State v. Davidson, 267 Kan. 667, Syl. ¶ 2, 987 P.2d 335 (1999), also is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. See State v. Hebert, 277 Kan. 61, 105-06, 82 P.3d 470 (2004); State v. Calderon, 270 Kan. 241, 255-56, 13 P.3d 871 (2000). Engelhardt, who clearly adopted an all-or-nothing strategy at trial, now contends that his jury should have had a chance to conclude the murder arose in the heat of passion or during a sudden quarrel, i.e., it amounted to no more than a voluntary manslaughter. In his view, the interrogation and torture of the victim occurred during a drunken rampage. Engelhardt also points to Brian's inconsistent statements concerning Engelhardt's level of involvement in the murder, asserting the jury could have concluded the attack was an aggravated battery gone awry. We view the evidence very differently. The victim's dozens of wounds, inflicted during a period of approximately 20 minutes, negate any claim that the stabbing and killing were unintentional. Further, heat of passion involves an emotional state of mind . . . of such a degree as would cause an ordinary man to act on impulse without reflection. State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. 791, 796, 696 P.2d 381 (1985). A sudden quarrel involves provocation sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose control of his or her actions and reason. Guebara, 236 Kan. at 796. The fact that a defendant's passion is easily aroused will not be considered in this connection. State v. Jackson, 226 Kan. 302, 307, 597 P.2d 255 (1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 952 (1980). Engelhardt fails to persuade us that a fear of getting caught while absconding on parole would cause an ordinary person to act in the way his behavior was described in this case. He further fails to show adequate provocation. There simply was insufficient evidence to support lesser included crime instructions for unintentional second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter. In such a situation, failure to give the lesser included crime instructions cannot amount to clear error. Moreover, the skip rule precludes reversal for the failure to give any of the lesser included crime instructions Engelhardt argues for on appeal. See State v. Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 43, 91 P.3d 517 (2004): `When a lesser included offense has been the subject of an instruction, and the jury convicts of the greater offense, error resulting from [a] failure to give an instruction on another still lesser included offense is cured. [Citations omitted.]' (commonly referred to as skip rule). Because the district judge instructed on second-degree intentional murder and the jury convicted Engelhardt on the greater offense of first-degree murder, there can be no reversal for the failure to instruct on the still lesser included offenses of unintentional second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.