Opinion ID: 2048879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: He said, you don't have to talk, he said, unless you want to. He said something else, you have a right to have a lawyer.

Text: However, at the second Walker hearing the defendant testified that he did not understand what the officer said (the Miranda warnings) and did not know if he had to answer questions. Importantly, after the alleged statement of defendant while sitting in the car and sometime during the drive to the police station, defendant said that he wanted an attorney. If defendant did not understand his rights, how is it that he later invoked them? See United States v Hayes, 385 F2d 375 (CA 4, 1967). [1] Consideration of the defendant's testimony at the second Walker hearing and at the second trial is irrelevant as to the soundness of the finding of the first Walker hearing. There is no indication that defendant lacked understanding or otherwise made an involuntary statement in this trial. Because the Walker hearing in the second trial is discussed in McGillen #1, it is also discussed here. On the face of the transcript of the second trial, there is a conflict of testimony to be resolved by the triers of fact  the judge in the Walker hearing and the jury during trial. I find no inconsistency in the statements of Officer Haustein in the two trials although different questions were asked of him. I believe criticism of the officer's testimony to be totally unwarranted. In response to the question propounded in the opinion of T.M. KAVANAGH, C.J., who is this Court to believe?, I suggest that the question is properly for the triers of fact. By no stretch of interpretation of the transcript could I form a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed by the trial court [2] and, therefore, I would find the waiver of Miranda rights to have been voluntarily made. There also were intimations in the majority opinion regarding the consequences of Miranda violations. Because they were not directly involved in the conclusion reached, I reserve judgment as to that dicta. ISSUE II Did the rebuttal testimony of Ronald McGillen (and others) properly belong in the case in chief? The testimony which was allowed into evidence was proper rebuttal. In People v Utter, 217 Mich 74, 83; 185 NW 830 (1921), the Court said: [I]t is a general rule that whether evidence which could have been offered before resting may be given in rebuttal is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Wilson, 55 Mich. 506 [21 NW 905 (1885)]; Chase v. Lee, 59 Mich. 237 [26 NW 483 (1886)]; People v. Maunausau, 60 Mich. 15 [26 NW 797 (1886)]; Meade v. Bowles, 123 Mich. 696 [82 NW 658 (1900)]; 12 Cyc. p. 557, and cases there cited. This continues to be the rule. See People v Delano, 318 Mich 557; 28 NW2d 909 (1947) and People v Daleo, 43 Mich App 386; 204 NW2d 315 (1972). I find no abuse of discretion in this case. Defendant was charged with forcible rape [3] and the proof of resistance was therefore relevant as was Barbara's cause to fear defendant. Barbara McGillen testified in the case in chief that defendant had on many occasions struck her. She also testified that he had struck the other children and that she was afraid of him. This the defendant denied. He denied that he spanked any of his children. Barbara also testified that when she entered the kitchen after the incident, her mother, brother Ronald and a sister were there. She showed her mother the skirt and said, see what he's done now. The mother denied this. Ronald's testimony is relevant and goes to the credibility of the witnesses. The rebuttal testimony was properly confined to matters brought forth in the case in chief. (The judge refused to allow Ronald to testify as to whatever occurred in the bathroom, because it did not connect to the case in chief.) The connective link is apparent. (The same is true of the testimony of other rebuttal witnesses who testified as to spankings.) I cannot agree that the rebuttal testimony was improper in any way or that the judge abused his discretion in allowing the excised testimony to come before the jury. I further find that the precedent cited is not applicable to these facts. Remaining Issue(s) The majority opinion finds that the jury instruction in McGillen #1 more appropriately defined the offense of assault with intent to rape rather than the charged forcible rape. With much attention to form over substance, it finds the failure to instruct using the word penetration reversible. The following excerpts are relevant: The statute in this case made and provided, insofar as it is immediately material to this action before you reads as follows: `Any person who shall ravish and carnally know any female by force and against her will, shall be guilty in violation of the law.'