Opinion ID: 2366364
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entering Judgment Against Whittle As A Discovery Sanction

Text: Alaska Civil Rule 37 affords trial courts broad power to enforce discovery orders by the use of sanctions. [23] In relevant part, Civil Rule 37(b)(2) provides: If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, . . . the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following: . . . . (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party[.] We have cautioned, however, that only extreme circumstances warrant use of litigation-ending sanctions: [S]ince the law disfavors litigation ending sanctions, the superior court has the discretion to impose such sanctions only in extreme circumstances. We have held that a party should not be barred from his or her day in court where an alternative remedy would suffice to make the adverse party whole.[ [24] ] To order litigation-ending sanctions for discovery violations, a trial court must find that (1) the noncompliant party willfully violated the order at issue, (2) nondisclosure of that information will prejudice the opposing party, and (3) the dismissal is sufficiently related to the violation at issue. [25] In addition, before a trial court may impose litigation-ending sanctions for discovery violations, the record must clearly indicate a reasonable exploration of possible and meaningful alternatives to dismissal. [26] In its final judgment, the superior court concluded that Whittle's open court refusal to allow [Weber] or his experts to enter upon his property is willful. The superior court also stated that Whittle has been given every opportunity to correct this refusal, but fails and refuses to do so. Whittle maintains on appeal that he complied with the superior court's original written order and that the superior court itself acknowledged this by declining to find him in contempt. He also argues that if the superior court had ordered the inspection during the hearing, he would [have] had to comply. He insists that he could not voluntarily agree to Weber's inspection of his property, however, because he believes an inspection would violate his constitutional rights; therefore, asking [him] to agree to it would be asking him to lie to the court. To address whether sanctions were appropriate here, we must initially determine whether Whittle willfully failed to obey a discovery order. Deciding whether Whittle failed to comply requires us to examine two orders, one written and one oral, regarding the inspection of Whittle's property.
The written order, which was dated July 30, 2008 but not mailed until August 5, directed Whittle to provide a mutually agreeable date for the conducting of an inspection within 30 days from the date of this order. On August 19 Whittle filed a motion for reconsideration. On September 2, before the superior court had ruled on that motion, Whittle agreed to an inspection of his property, informing Weber that he would allow the inspection on November 14th through November 25th 2008 (excluding weekends & holidays), for one day and requesting that Weber provide the date, time period, name of [the expert who would be coming], & the certification of that expert. The question before us, then, is whether Whittle complied with the superior court's order by providing within 30 days of the court's written order acceptable dates for the inspection or whether the order required him to schedule the inspection for a date that fell within the 30-day period. In his opposition to Weber's motion to hold him in contempt, Whittle asserted that he has tried to provide a mutually agreeable date for the conducting of an inspection, & it has been done within the 30 days specified in the court's order. He argued that [i]f the court would have meant to have the inspection within the 30 days period of time, then it would surely have said just that. During the contempt hearing, Whittle repeated that he understood within 30 days to refer to the act of providing a date for the inspection and further explained, I [have] done it way  exactly the way that I understood it. Weber's lawyer explained that he understood within 30 days to refer to the date of the inspection itself and argued that his was the only interpretation consistent with the September 29 deadline for expert reports. As Weber acknowledged in a previous court filing, however, the language of the order, on its face, permits both Whittle's and Weber's interpretations. The superior court declined to hold Whittle in contempt, presumably because it was persuaded that Whittle had an honest, alternative interpretation of the order. Thus, Whittle did not willfully fail to comply with the superior court's written order.
The superior court also issued an oral order at the contempt hearing. Early in the hearing, Whittle expressed his view that the United States Constitution and the Alaska Constitution protected him against inspections and that and seizures and searches of his property without evidence of some inappropriate activity. The superior court tried to explain that Whittle has those protections only against the government, not against a private individual, and then returned to Whittle's previous statement that he would allow an inspection in November. Whittle reminded the superior court that he had withdrawn that offer when Weber moved to hold him in contempt. Then, after declining to hold Whittle in contempt for violating discovery, the superior court had the following exchange with Whittle: C: Mr. Whittle, what I am going to order is that you make your property available for the inspection and . . . if it doesn't get done within two weeks, you make it available. I don't care if you have anybody there, but you have to let their expert on. . . if you don't and you stand on your right to refuse to let that happen, then I will say that they automatically win that claim. Because that's the way  that is going to be sanction. . . . . W: Anyway, I'm going to stand on my constitutional rights. C: Okay. W: And if you have the authority to write a search and seizure warrant without my permission, then I have no control over that. But I will not agree to let them on my property, so . . . C: Okay. With that  if that's your position, then, I am going to enter the order that Mr. Weber has won that issue. (Emphasis added.) We consider two points as to whether Whittle's response to the superior court's oral order rises to the level of willful noncompliance with a discovery order. First, Whittle argued at the contempt hearing and maintains on appeal that he believed the superior court did not have the authority to order an inspection of his property without first having some proof of inappropriate activity, and that he believed agreeing to an inspection would allow the court to circumvent that constitutional requirement. Consistent with this belief, after Weber moved to hold Whittle in contempt, Whittle wanted Weber to present proof of inappropriate activity and withdrew his agreement to the inspection of his property. But Whittle's remarks seemed to recognize that if the trial court had the authority to write a search and seizure warrant without [Whittle's] permission, then [Whittle had] no control over that. Although Whittle maintained that he could not agree to let Weber on his property, the exchange, read as a whole, is certainly susceptible of more than one interpretation. Taken as a whole, Whittle's actions could be interpreted as indicating that he would only allow the inspection if ordered by the court to do so over his objection. When Whittle indicated to the superior court during the contempt hearing that he would not allow an inspection of his property, the court interpreted this statement to mean that Whittle would not comply with any further discovery orders and assumed that Whittle would not change his mind. We have upheld findings of willful noncompliance where the plaintiff made no effort to comply with the superior court's discovery orders and had demonstrated no intention of ever complying with the court's orders. [27] In this case, by contrast, Whittle did make an initial effort to comply with the superior court's written order by proposing inspection dates. Moreover, it does not seem clear from the contempt hearing exchange that Whittle had no intention of complying with the court's order; in fact, Whittle seemed to be waiting for the superior court to order the inspection over his objection. In any event, it was incumbent on the superior court to clarify whether Whittle would comply with the court's inspection order if entered over his objection before imposing any sanctions, much less litigation-ending sanctions. We therefore reverse the sanction and vacate the judgment entered against Whittle.