Opinion ID: 1227871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: cases involving employer's intentional infliction of emotional distress

Text: (6) (See fn. 7.), (1b) A number of Court of Appeal cases have addressed the question whether the exclusive remedy provisions of the compensation act prior to the 1982 amendment preclude an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. [7] Renteria v. County of Orange (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 833, 838 et seq. [147 Cal. Rptr. 447], held that an employee could maintain an action for intentional infliction against the employer where there was no physical injury or disability. The court pointed out that, unless an action at law were permitted in cases where there was no physical injury or disability, the employee would be left without any remedy whatsoever for the intentional tortious conduct. (82 Cal. App.3d at p. 839.) The court also reasoned that, like defamation, the action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is part of a class of civil wrongs outside the contemplation of the workers' compensation system and that the need to deter intentional wrongdoing was not met by the penalty provisions of section 4553 providing for a 50 percent surcharge because 50 percent of nothing is still nothing. (82 Cal. App.3d at p. 841.) The court stated that if the essence of the tort is nonphysical and injuries are of a nonphysical sort with physical harm being at most a make-weight the action should not be barred. (82 Cal. App.3d at p. 842.) A number of cases have followed Renteria in recognizing that an employee may maintain an action against the employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (E.g., Young v. Libby-Owens Ford Co. (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 1037 [214 Cal. Rptr. 400]; Iverson v. Atlas Pacific Engineering (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 219, 229-230 [191 Cal. Rptr. 696]; McGee v. McNally (1981) 119 Cal. App.3d 891, 895 [174 Cal. Rptr. 253]; Lagies v. Copley (1980) 110 Cal. App.3d 958, 970 et seq. [168 Cal. Rptr. 368].) However, the language of Renteria and the last cited group of cases recognize that the basis of liability in part is that the employee had no substantial remedy under the workers' compensation law and that an employer should not be permitted to engage in intentional tortious conduct with neither compensation nor damages to deter him. Three cases have refused to extend Renteria to cases where there was substantial physical injury and disability and have held that when the employee alleges physical injury and disability compensable under that law or recovers under it, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy of the employee. ( Hollywood Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal. App.3d 754, 757 et seq. [210 Cal. Rptr. 619]; Gates v. Trans Video Corp. (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 196, 204-206 [155 Cal. Rptr. 486]; Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 531, 535-536 [151 Cal. Rptr. 828].) We recognize that the distinction drawn by the foregoing cases presents an anomaly. Intentional infliction of emotional distress which results in physical injury and disability is ordinarily more reprehensible than intentional infliction of emotional distress which does not result in disability, but civil action is allowed only in the latter situation. Nevertheless, Renteria and the cases following it do not offer support for plaintiffs' position. Obviously, the cases permitting maintenance of an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are factually distinguishable because they do not involve substantial physical injury or disability. Because the reasoning of the cases in permitting the action is largely based on the absence of any other deterrent to intentional tortious conduct, their application where other deterrents exist, such as compensation and the additional recovery under section 4553, would be to permit the tail to wag the dog. An implied exception to a statute should not be applied where the reason for the exception is not applicable. On the other hand, the Hollywood Refrigeration, Ankeny and Gates cases, which denied a damage action because physical injury and disability were present, are not decisive in favor of defendant. They were primarily concerned with applying the rules and reasoning of Renteria, and did not extensively consider the possibility of other bases for permitting an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. [8] We proceed to consider alternative bases for an exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor Code. [9]