Opinion ID: 1356679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The verdict's propriety.

Text: Appellant argues that the indictment was sufficiently plain and concise thereby meeting the commands of NRS 173.075(1), but that, even assuming a material variance occurred, respondent was not misled to his prejudice. NRS 173.075(3). The error here, however, is that the indictment charged respondent with a sale of narcotics to Officer Jolley when in fact the sale was made to the informant, Scheri. That a variance occurred is without dispute. But, we must go beyond that fact and decide what standard to adopt in determining whether, on facts such as those now before us, the trial is to be aborted. The United States Supreme Court has held that reversible error exists only where the variance between the charge and proof was such as to affect the substantial rights of the accused. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). The reason for this is that (1) the accused must be definitely informed as to the charges against him so that he can prepare for trial and will not be surprised by evidence produced, and (2) the accused must be protected against double jeopardy  another charge for the same offense. See also Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). This court is in agreement with this standard and has added that the indictment should be sufficiently definite to prevent the prosecutor from changing the theory of the case. Adler v. Sheriff, 92 Nev. 436, 440, 552 P.2d 334, 336 (1976); Simpson v. District Court, 88 Nev. 654, 660-61, 503 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1972). Also, we have looked to determine whether the challenge to the indictment was brought before trial or after trial and have said that reduced standards apply to the sufficiency of indictments challenged after trial in contrast to pre-trial challenges. Compare Brimmage v. State, 93 Nev. 434, 567 P.2d 54 (1977); Warden v. Shuff, 91 Nev. 719, 541 P.2d 1105 (1975); Vincze v. State, 86 Nev. 546, 472 P.2d 936 (1970); and Logan v. Warden, 86 Nev. 511, 471 P.2d 249 (1970) with State v. Johnston, 93 Nev. 279, 563 P.2d 1147 (1977) and Simpson v. District Court, 88 Nev. 654, 503 P.2d 1225 (1972). In the instant case then, it necessarily follows that we must determine whether respondent was substantially prejudiced by not having the proper opportunity to prepare and whether respondent's objection was timely. First, regarding the timeliness issue, respondent initially challenged the variance after all the evidence had been adduced. It is true that NRS 174.105(1) requires that pre-trial objections to defects in the institution of the prosecution only include those defenses and objections then available to the defendant and that respondent under other circumstances may have been justified in believing that the state would prove a sale to Officer Jolley. Nevertheless, this eleventh hour challenge, after the close of all evidence, belies any claim of prejudice and we glean from the record no evidence of any prejudice. Indeed, the record here shows that respondent, well in advance of trial, was made aware that the sale in question was consummated with the third party informant and not Jolley. The grand jury transcript, a copy of which was made available to respondent shortly after the return of the indictment, contained the testimony of the officers involved and does not indicate that Officer Jolley was actually participating in the transaction. During the grand jury proceeding, the transcript shows that Jolley testified that the informant told him of respondent selling heroin to [the informant] and that the officers would observe the sale. Respondent also acknowledged that the officers had testified not from personal knowledge but rather from what someone had told them. [1] This court has held that it will review the original indictment and the grand jury transcript in determining whether adequate notice was provided, Logan v. Warden, 86 Nev. at 513, 471 P.2d at 251, particularly where the challenge is belated or untimely. [2] Simpson v. District Court, 88 Nev. 654, 503 P.2d 1225 (1972); Logan v. Warden, 86 Nev. 511, 471 P.2d 249 (1970). Moreover, although entertaining some doubt, the court below initially believed that there had been sufficient notice when it said that it would have allowed an amendment to conform to the proof had this been a civil case. Second, we must determine whether the instant variance precluded respondent from preparing his defense. See Brimmage v. State, 93 Nev. at 440-41, 567 P.2d at 58. With federal courts the crucial question is whether the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the variance. For example, one court held that no prejudice was shown where the wrong date as to the illegal possession of a check was alleged. United States v. Reece, 547 F.2d 432, 434-35 (8th Cir.1977). Significantly, although the lower court seemed to believe that a murder charge naming the wrong victim would also be a fatal defect, one federal court decided otherwise when a John Doe, Jr. was named instead of John Doe, Sr. United States v. Good Shield, 515 F.2d 1, 2 (8th Cir.1975). Additionally, the proof of multiple conspiracies has been deemed not to be a fatal variance from the charge of a single offense. United States v. Wayman, 510 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (5th Cir.1975). [3] It is clear from the grand jury and trial transcripts that respondent sold to the informer and not indirectly to Officer Jolley. Here, the indictment properly identifies the defendant, crime alleged, and date and place of the alleged sale. Considering the indictment coupled with the grand jury transcript, it is apparent that respondent was sufficiently informed of the nature of the offense so as adequately to prepare his defense. Logan v. Warden, 86 Nev. at 514, 471 P.2d at 251. Cf. United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d 305, 311 (2d Cir.1978) (difference between heroin and cocaine in indictment was not fatal under federal statute). The sufficiency of the indictment was challenged only after all the evidence was presented at trial. Additionally, a state statute provides: Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. NRS 178.598. These factors indicate the application of a reduced standard toward the sufficiency of the indictment and, as such, we find that the variance between the crime charged and the proof adduced was immaterial. It did not affect the substantial rights of the respondent because it did not impair his ability to prepare his case and defend himself against the charge. See United States v. Eaton, 501 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir.1974), citing United States v. Schrenzel, 462 F.2d 765 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 325, 34 L.Ed.2d 248 (1972); United States v. Lewis, 426 F.2d 266 (9th Cir.1970). Moreover, at this point the prosecutor cannot change the theory of his case from what was shown at the grand jury proceedings. See Simpson v. District Court, 88 Nev. at 660-61, 503 P.2d at 1230. [4] Finally, we do not perceive double jeopardy as an issue because respondent cannot be prosecuted again for the single transaction. We believe that [t]he indictment and the trial record provide ample protection to [respondent] from the danger of double jeopardy. McDowell v. United States, 330 F.2d 920, 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1006, 84 S.Ct. 1944, 12 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1964). Accord, Mora v. People, 172 Colo. 261, 472 P.2d 142, 144 (1970).