Opinion ID: 743054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: challenge to the 20% limit

Text: 14 It is established law that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Even assuming the facts asserted in the complaint are true, which we are required to do in reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs cannot prevail on their challenge to the 20% cap. 15 Congress established a bifurcated system for enforcing the ESA. Under Section 209, as added in 1971, Congress authorized the Attorney General to bring an action in the appropriate district court of the United States for violation of price controls established by order or regulation pursuant to the Act. This public cause of action is enforceable by injunction, as well as by a court order for restitution of moneys received in violation of any such order or regulation. The legislative history makes clear that Congress wanted courts to have the power to set things right by ordering restitution in appropriate cases. S.Rep. No. 92-507, at 9 (1971). 16 DOE acting under this authority has recovered large sums from companies that violated these price controls. See, e.g., Stripper Well ($1 billion); Final Consent Order with Occidental Petroleum Corp., 60 Fed.Reg. 43130 (Aug. 18, 1995) ($275 million); Final Consent Order with Murphy Oil Corp., 59 Fed.Reg. 47315 (Sept. 15, 1994) ($10.7 million); Final Consent Order with Salomon Inc., 55 Fed.Reg. 47374 (Nov. 13, 1990) ($83.75 million); Final Consent Order with Howell Corp., 54 Fed.Reg. 18138 (Apr. 27, 1989) ($19.375 million); Final Consent Order with Texaco, Inc., 53 Fed.Reg. 32929 (Aug. 29, 1988) ($1.25 billion); Final Consent Order with Enron Corp., 53 Fed.Reg. 28260 (July 27, 1988) ($48 million); Final Consent Order with Phillips Petroleum Co., 53 Fed.Reg. 10928 (Apr. 4, 1988) ($30 million); Final Consent Order with Exxon Corp., 51 Fed.Reg. 36052 (Oct. 8, 1986) ($36.9 million); Final Consent Order with Marathon Petroleum Co., 51 Fed.Reg. 3820 (Jan. 30, 1986) ($30 million); Final Consent Order with Atlantic Richfield Co.., 50 Fed.Reg. 26603 (June 24, 1985) ($65.7 million); Final Consent Order with Gulf Oil Corp., 50 Fed.Reg. 24929 (June 14, 1985) ($142 million); Final Consent Order with Mobil Oil Corp., 49 Fed.Reg. 30354 (July 30, 1984) ($27 million). 17 In addition to authorizing the Attorney General of the United States to pursue violators, Congress in the 1971 amendments also authorized individuals suffering legal wrong to bring an action against violators. Section 210 of the ESA authorizes: 18 Any person suffering legal wrong because of any act or practice arising out of this title, or any order or regulation issued pursuant thereto, may bring an action in district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy, for appropriate relief, including an action for a declaratory judgment, writ of injunction (subject to the limitations in section 211), and/or damages. 19 This section further vests district courts with the power to award treble damages and attorney's fees. See ESA § 210(b). Congress adopted this section so that it would serve not only to provide a means to recover losses, but [to] provide a strong deterrent to those who would willfully violate this Act. H. Rep. No. 92-714, at 8 (1971). Congress thereby created a powerful incentive for harmed individuals to vindicate their private rights under this section of the ESA, paralleling those in other statutory schemes. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (violation of antitrust laws); 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (1994) (violation of anti-kickback laws); 7 U.S.C. § 2570 (1994) (violation of plant variety protection laws). 20 In view of Congress' decision to separately structure public and private remedies under the ESA, the question emerges whether a private complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted when the complaint challenges the allocation of funds obtained under the public remedies section of the Act. Although the district court dismissed the present complaints for lack of standing, and it was that issue that was briefed by the parties before this court, we first must consider whether the action is maintainable, that is, whether plaintiffs have stated a valid cause of action, for it is only if such a right of action exists that we need consider whether the respondent had standing to bring the action.... National R.R. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456, 94 S.Ct. 690, 692, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974) (Amtrak ). 21 The Supreme Court has fashioned a four-factor test to determine whether a private cause of action should be implied from a statute not expressly providing one. 22 First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,--that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 23 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2087-88, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (internal citations omitted). Two of the four factors unquestionably support plaintiffs' position: plaintiffs are a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted and there are no comparable state statutes governing price controls. Subsequent cases, however, have made clear that the remaining two factors predominate. [U]nless this congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 94, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1582, 67 L.Ed.2d 750 (1981); Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145, 105 S.Ct. 3085, 3091-92, 87 L.Ed.2d 96 (1985); Amtrak, supra. 24 In Amtrak, the Court considered whether respondents had a private cause of action to challenge certain train discontinuances in light of § 307(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Amtrak Act), 84 Stat. 1327, codified at 45 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. That section vested the district courts with jurisdiction over violations of the Amtrak Act as well as created a public cause of action, maintainable by the Attorney General, to enforce the duties and responsibilities imposed by the Act. Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 457, 94 S.Ct. at 693. In addition, section 307(a) provided a private cause of action, as in the present case, but only under certain circumstances. 4 Id. at 460, 94 S.Ct. at 694. Respondents argued in that case that the court should imply a private cause of action because they are the intended beneficiaries of the Act. Id. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The court of appeals reversed and held that respondents, who represented railroad passengers, had standing and that § 307 did not bar a private suit. The Supreme Court reversed. 25 In reaching its decision, the Court was influenced by the existence of a carefully crafted remedial scheme that included both public and private, albeit limited, enforcement. The Court relied heavily on the frequently stated principle of statutory construction ... that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies. Amtrak, 414 U.S. at 458, 94 S.Ct. at 693 (citing Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289, 49 S.Ct. 129, 131-32, 73 L.Ed. 379 (1929)). 26 As noted, section 209 of the ESA creates a public cause of action to enforce price controls. Section 210 creates a private cause of action to enforce the same. In construing the statutory language, we are guided by our predecessor court's oft-cited warning against commingling of private and agency enforcement devices for which Congress has made separate provision.... Payne 22, Inc. v. United States, 762 F.2d 91, 93 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1985) (citation omitted). In light of this, we conclude that to stretch section 209 so as to encompass plaintiffs' private claims would be to expand the coverage of Section 209 to subsume those remedies explicitly provided in Section 210. 27 The legislative history does not alter our construction of Section 209. That history makes clear that Section 210 is the exclusive remedy for private litigants. This action [under Section 210] is intended to be brought by private persons against other private persons. The Government will not bring such action nor be the subject of one. S.Rep. No. 92-507, at 9 (1971); see Cities Service Co. v. Department of Energy, 715 F.2d 572, 573 (Temp.Emer.Ct.App.1983) (While sections 209 and 210 have a common purpose--the enforcement of DOE's regulations--they vindicate different rights.). If plaintiffs have been injured by overcharges, Congress created a generous remedy for private litigants in Section 210. In cases such as this, when Congress has provided a generous private remedy, we should be even more reluctant than the Court was in Amtrak to imply a private cause of action into a public one for fear of upsetting the delicate balance that Congress struck. See Massachusetts Mutual, 473 U.S. at 146, 105 S.Ct. at 3092 (The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the [ERISA] statute ... provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.). Thus we conclude, as did the trial court, that plaintiffs' complaint challenging the 20% limit should be dismissed. 5