Opinion ID: 1319180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: editorial our choice joe skeen.

Text: The issue involved on appeal under this point relates to the article entitled Editorial  Our Choice  Joe Skeen. The Journal had filed a motion to dismiss Marchiondo's cause of action based upon the above article on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court denied the Journal's motion. We reverse the trial court. The Journal contends that the editorial is privileged as a constitutionally protected opinion. We agree. Marchiondo asserts that the language contained in the editorial, [a]s a criminal attorney, Marchiondo thrives by having friends in key places, is defamatory. He alleges in his complaint that the article imputes to him a crime, unethical and unprofessional conduct, and lack of bona fide legal competence; that the language tends to render him contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation. The record reflects that the author of the editorial in question based his language on letters which Marchiondo had written to over 1,000 friends. The letters stated that, [i]t has been my experience that it is important to have a person in the governor's office who is understanding of the problems of my friends and clients. So, in a sense, Marchiondo was at least partially responsible for the language contained in the editorial. We have here an article which (1) appears in print as an editorial; (2) involves an expression on a political matter by the news media; and (3) comments upon a matter of public interest, the election of a governor. Whether a statement is privileged presents a question of law for the court to determine. Marchiondo v. Tribune, supra ; Gengler v. Phelps, 92 N.M. 465, 589 P.2d 1056 (Ct.App. 1978), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 353, 588 P.2d 554 (1979). The trial court has determined that the publication was not privileged. We disagree. On the question of constitutional protection of the publication of ideas and opinions, the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra , said: We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wideopen debate on public issues. [Footnote and citation omitted.] Id. at 339-40, 94 S.Ct. at 3006-007. This rule is not without its limitations. As Judge Donnelly wrote in Marchiondo v. Tribune, supra : Extension of constitutional protection under the First Amendment to opinions poses a new and novel difficulty in distinguishing between statements of fact and statements of opinion. Ideas and opinions, although incorrect or faulty in their premise, are protected by the United States Constitution. False statements of fact, whether intentionally or negligently published are unprotected. The problem inherent in distinguishing between opinions and statements of fact are discussed by Sack, supra, § IV.2 at 155-56: No task undertaken under the law of defamation is any more elusive than distinguishing between the two. Some statements are clearly statements of opinion: What ought to be done, the propriety or aesthetic or moral worth of some act or object. So, too, statements which explicitly assert that they are the writer's speculation rather than his knowledge, and which do not purport to set forth the facts underlying the speculation, may be statements of opinion.... But statements of opinion are often couched in factual terms. Predictions about the future, for example... . Conversely, statements [which expressly purport to be opinions] are often understood to be statements of fact. .... Debate about matters of public importance is itself of public importance. Freedom to comment, particularly in the arena of politics, is encouraged rather than suppressed as a matter of policy. Such protection is `indispensable to the exercise of freedom'. [Footnotes omitted.] What constitutes a statement of opinion as distinguished from a statement of fact must be determined in each case. In resolving the distinction, the following should be considered: (1) the entirety of the publication; (2) the extent that the truth or falsity may be determined without resort to speculation; and (3) whether reasonably prudent persons reading the publication would consider the statement as an expression of opinion or a statement of fact. The protection afforded political opinions in actions for defamation is addressed by R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § IV.2.5 at 160-161 (1980): One of the cardinal reasons for protecting expression is to assure proper operation of the political process. Courts have been particularly willing to read political invective as mere opinion, privileged under the circumstances. With the above considerations in mind, we conclude that the Joe Skeen editorial is a constitutionally protected opinion. The cause of action based upon this article failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For an exhaustive and scholarly discussion and citation of authorities on the question of constitutionally protected expression of opinion, see Marchiondo v. Tribune, supra .