Opinion ID: 696193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Ferrara as Proxy for the State of New Mexico

Text: 40 As an alternative to its contention that there were sufficient contacts between Ms. Ferrara and the District of Columbia to establish jurisdiction, the Government argues that due process considerations are inappropriate in this instance. This claim rests on two assertions: First, it is not necessary to show the existence of minimum contacts in order to obtain jurisdiction over the State of New Mexico because the Supreme Court held, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24, 86 S.Ct. 803, 816, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966), that a State is not a person under the Due Process Clause and thus is not entitled to its protection. Second, because Ms. Ferrara is being sued in her official capacity, she should be treated as if she were the State for purposes of due process considerations. Given these premises, the Government maintains that the existence of minimum contacts is not relevant to the question of jurisdiction in this case. 41 We need not determine whether a State official sued in his official capacity should be treated as if he were the State for jurisdictional purposes because the United States could not have established jurisdiction over the State of New Mexico in the District of Columbia regardless of whether due process considerations are relevant to the inquiry. The District's long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction over a non-resident person who transacts business there. D.C.Code Ann. Sec. 13-423(a)(1). Therefore, in order to establish jurisdiction over New Mexico under the Government's alternative theory, the State must qualify as a person within the meaning of the statute despite the Government's contention that it is not a person under the Due Process Clause. 42 The Supreme Court has counseled that, in common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2308, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (finding that State not a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 because application to States not clearly indicated) (internal brackets omitted). The D.C. long-arm statute defines person to includean individual, his executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association, or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of the District of Columbia and whether or not organized under the laws of the District of Columbia. 43 D.C.Code Ann. Sec. 13-421 (1981). Although a State could plausibly fall within the term legal or commercial entity, such a reading would be awkward and, at best, is not clearly indicated. Furthermore, because a State could not under any circumstances be domiciled in the District or organized under its laws, the statute's text affirmatively implies that a State is not a person for its purpose. 44 The Government itself does not appear to have any great confidence in its alternative basis for claiming jurisdiction. It chose to name Ms. Ferrara rather than the State of New Mexico as the defendant, its briefs fail to address the problem of the D.C. long-arm statute's application to States, and it conceded at oral argument that it must establish personal jurisdiction over Ms. Ferrara in order to maintain its suit. We also find it instructive that our research has failed to discover a single case in which the United States has named a State as the defendant in a suit brought by it in the District of Columbia. The United States, of course, has agents in all fifty States; and we doubt that its inability to sue a State in this forum will work any real hardship on the Federal Government or hinder its ability to administer justice.