Opinion ID: 351523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the student case

Text: 9 The government's first appeal contests the propriety of the district court's denial of its motion for the implementation of a new school desegregation plan. In denying the government's motion, the district court ruled that the government had failed to follow the procedural steps mandated by 20 U.S.C. § 1758, and, in the alternative, that further relief was unnecessary because the South Park Independent School District had become a unitary school system. 10 Initially, we shall discuss the court's holding that the SPISD is a unitary school system. This finding is critical because once it is made a federal court loses its power to remedy the lingering vestiges of past discrimination absent a showing that either the school authorities or the state had deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools. Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 32, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1284, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). 4 Even though the Supreme Court's decision in Swann was rendered subsequent to the 1970 desegregation plan, it nevertheless controls the disposition of this case. To understand fully why this is so, one must keep in mind that under the original 1970 order the district court retained jurisdiction over the South Park school system (this retention of jurisdiction was a normal and necessary procedure taken to insure the implementation of the plan and the achievement of the goal a unitary school system). At no time prior to the 1976 order presently under attack, had a finding been made by the district court as to the attainment of a unitary system by the SPISD. Thus, the case remained active under the district court's jurisdiction. Given these circumstances, the parties are bound by intervening opinions of the Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, and there have been many such opinions outlining new guidelines and requirements in certain situations. 11 The present posture of this case is that we must review the 1976 order and determine if it is in accord with the mandate of Swann. The Supreme Court said in Swann that the constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole. Id. at 24, 91 S.Ct. 1280. However, the Court was very careful to point out that situations justifying one-race schools are rare and must be carefully scrutinized. 12 (I)t should be clear that the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices segregation by law. The district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation and will thus necessarily be concerned with the elimination of one-race schools. No per se rule can adequately embrace all the difficulties of reconciling the competing interests involved; but in a system with a history of segregation the need for remedial criteria of sufficient specificity to assure a school authority's compliance with its constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially disproportionate in their racial composition. Where the school authority's proposed plan for conversion from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence of some schools that are all or predominantly of one race, they have the burden of showing that such school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory. The court should scrutinize such schools, and the burden upon the school authorities will be to satisfy the court that their racial composition is not the result of present or past discriminatory action on their part. 13 Id. at 26, 91 S.Ct. at 1281. 14 In allowing the existence of one-race schools in limited situations, the Swann opinion emphasized that findings should be made demonstrating that their existence is not the result of present or past discriminatory action. The district court's holding that the SPISD is a unitary school system is not detailed enough to show us whether or not the school system meets this Swann requirement. For this reason, it is necessary to remand this case to the district court for supplemental findings of fact in order to determine whether or not the SPISD is in fact a unitary school system. 15 The district court also denied the government's motion for implementation of a new desegregation plan because the government failed to follow the requirements of 20 U.S.C. § 1758. Section 1758 provides that before any court shall enter an order for the enforcement or modification of any court-approved desegregation plan, the local educational agency should be provided with notice of the details of the violation and given a reasonable opportunity to develop a remedial plan. We reject the district court's application of § 1758. The district court had previously assumed and retained jurisdiction over the school system. No judicial ruling had been made concerning the attainment of a unitary system. The case had not been closed. Under the facts of this case, the statute is not controlling; but, if it were, reversal would nevertheless be mandated because the government has complied with its basic requirements. In a letter dated April 15, 1976, the Department of Justice wrote to counsel for the school district advising that the Department felt additional steps were necessary to bring the district into compliance with federal law. (R. 103-106). The Department pointed out in this letter that the one-race, or predominately one-race, status of twelve of the district's schools was the primary concern of the government. The letter also explained that the Department of Justice felt that the particular feeder pattern of elementary to junior high to senior high schools used by the school district was the chief cause for these one-race schools. Furthermore, the letter explained that the Department was writing in order to state the reasons it felt the SPISD was not in compliance with federal law and to afford the Board of Education an opportunity to remedy the situation. A motion for supplemental relief was not filed until after the Department of Justice had received a response from the school district explaining that a significantly greater amount of time was needed to develop a new desegregation plan. We are unable to see how the government could have better complied with the notice provisions of the statute, and, therefore, the district court's denial of the government's motion on these grounds was error.