Opinion ID: 1580181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ultra Vires Action

Text: Liberty Counsel further contends that the Bar committed an ultra vires act in approving the filing of the amicus brief because it violated its own standing board policies in doing so. It does not otherwise argue that the Bar lacks the authority to allow a voluntary section leave to file an amicus brief. The Bar adopts standing board policies, which are not subject to this Court's approval, that govern its internal administration and operation. As explained in bylaw 2-9.2 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar: The board of governors shall adopt standing board policies governing the internal administration and operation of The Florida Bar and the board of governors. The board of governors may adopt, amend, or rescind standing board policies by a majority vote of the membership of the board of governors provided any amendment to any standing board policy shall not be effective until 30 days after adoption. Such standing board policies may be adopted, rescinded, or amended by a majority vote of those present at any regular meeting of the board of governors provided advance written notice is given to the members of the board of governors of the proposed adoption, repeal, or amendment of any standing board policy. The provision of any standing board policy may be waived by a two-thirds vote of those present at any regular meeting of the board of governors. Standing Board Policy 8.10 governs amicus curiae filings by sections of the Bar. Sections 8.10(a)(1) and (a)(3) provide: (1) A section of The Florida Bar may adopt a position and submit an amicus curiae brief in pending litigation only when the issue is beyond the scope of permissible legislative or ideological activity of The Florida Bar, or the issue is within the permissible legislative or ideological activity of the bar and the proposed brief does not take a position that is inconsistent with an official position of the bar and the requirements of subdivision (3) are met. (3) Divisions, sections and committees may not adopt a position or submit an amicus curiae brief in pending litigation unless the issue involved is within the area of subject matter interest of the division, section or committee as described in its bylaws or official charge, and the issue is not one that carries the potential of deep philosophical or emotional division among a substantial segment of the membership of the bar. Specifically, Liberty Counsel argues that the Bar violated section (a)(3). Liberty Counsel asserts that by determining that the issue of adoption by homosexuals is not one that carries the potential of deep philosophical or emotional division among a substantial segment of the membership of the bar, the Bar violated section 8.10(a)(3)the violation of which constitutes an ultra vires act. [12] In deciding that the actions of the Bar do not constitute an ultra vires act such that the Liberty Counsel has established a clear legal right, we make the following observations. First, we reiterate that our prior case law has imposed restrictions on the activities of the Bar, but none of our prior cases have involved restrictions on the activities of the voluntary sections of the Bar. Although we suggested in Schwarz, that the Board exercise caution in the selection of subjects upon which to take a legislative position so as to avoid, to the extent possible, those issues which carry the potential of deep philosophical or emotional division among the membership of the Bar, 552 So.2d at 1097, we envisioned in Frankel that it would be the sections that would be the appropriate vehicles for lobbying on issues that do not fall within the Schwarz guidelines. Frankel, 581 So.2d at 1299. In fact, Standing Board Policy 8.10(a)(1) recognizes this balance between the role of the Bar and the role of the sections regarding both the scope of lobbying positions and the subject of the amicus briefs. Specifically, section 8.10(a)(1) authorizes a section of the Bar to submit an amicus brief in pending litigation only when the issue is beyond the scope of permissible legislative or ideological activity of the Florida Bar. (emphasis added). Second, as explained previously, the decision whether to allow an entity to file an amicus brief is ordinarily a decision made by the court in which permission is sought rather than a decision for this Court, in the exercise of our supervisory authority over the Bar. Third, we are presented with the Bar's standing policy related to amicus briefs, which is a standing policy that we have never approved or disapproved, which requires that the amicus brief not be submitted on an issue which carries the potential of deep philosophical or emotional division among a substantial segment of the membership of the bar. [13] With these three observations in mind, we consider the Bar's argument that we should deny injunctive relief in this case on the ground that the Board of Governors, which is comprised of the elected representatives of the entire membership, is in the best position to determine whether a particular issue is highly divisive within the membership as a whole. We agree that the Board's decision regarding whether a voluntary section should be able to file an amicus brief is entitled to deference. We also conclude that the Court will not interfere with or micromanage the activities of the Bar's sections, or the approval of those activities by the Bar, unless the Bar's actions regarding the scope of the activities of its voluntary sections are clearly outside the Bar's authority. Black's Law Dictionary defines an ultra vires act as one that is unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law. See Black's Law Dictionary 1559 (8th ed.2004). Although there is no case from this Court discussing the concept of ultra vires actions from the standpoint of the activities of the Bar or its sections, a 1940 case from this Court discussed the concept in terms of a corporation: Thompson on Corporations states that an act of a corporation is ultra vires when it is outside the objects for which the corporation was created as defined by the laws of its organization and limited by the statutes authorizing its existence. In other words, it is an unauthorized act. In its primary sense, an act is `ultra vires' the powers of a corporation when it is wholly outside of the scope of the purposes for which the corporation was formed or has its being, and which it has no authority to perform under any circumstances or in any mode. Knowles v. Magic City Grocery, 144 Fla. 78, 197 So. 843, 844 (1940). Further, Florida courts have held that a municipality, county, or town engages in an ultra vires act when it lacks the authority to take the action under statute or its own governing laws. See, e.g., Lykes Bros., Inc. v. City of Plant City, 354 So.2d 878, 880 (Fla.1978) (As to whether a city's tax exoneration contract is valid, our decisions uniformly hold that municipal contracts promising not to impose taxes, or granting tax exemptions, are ultra vires and void in the absence of specific legislative authority.); Town of Lauderdale-by-the -Sea v. Meretsky, 773 So.2d 1245, 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ([T]he Town Commission authorized an act contrary to its own ordinances and, therefore, its approval was ultra vires and void.). The Bar's approval of the filing of an amicus brief by the Family Law Section in the Third District was not an ultra vires act because in doing so, the Bar did not act contrary to any of its rules or policies, or rules promulgated by this Court. With regard to whether noncompliance with one of the Bar's own standing policies can constitute an ultra vires act requiring this Court to intervene by issuance of an injunction, we reject the argument that the approval of the filing of an amicus brief by a voluntary section is ultra vires. Our support for this view is buttressed by the fact that the Bar can waive any of its standing policies by a vote of two-thirds of the Board of Governors. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 2-9.2 (The provision of any standing board policy may be waived by a two-thirds vote of those present at any regular meeting of the board of governors.). Implicit in the Board's unanimous vote to approve the filing of the amicus brief is the notion that the Board waived by a two-thirds vote the requirement that it determine the divisiveness of the issue. Because the requirements of the standing board policies regarding the filing of amicus briefs by sections can be waived by the Board, the unanimous approval by the Board did not constitute an ultra vires action. And because there are no other legal or constitutional prohibitions against the actions of the Family Law Section, we cannot conclude that the actions of the Bar were unauthorized. We thus decline to reach a decision whether, under these circumstances, the Board reached the correct or incorrect conclusion on the divisiveness of the subject matter of the amicus brief supporting the trial court's decision on the constitutionality of the legislative prohibition against adoption by homosexuals. For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Liberty Counsel has not established a violation of a clear legal right and therefore deny Liberty Counsel's request for injunctive relief. It is so ordered. QUINCE, C.J., and LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. POLSTON, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANADY, J., concurs. POLSTON, J., dissenting. The Bar failed to comply with its policies, or waive them in the manner prescribed by its bylaws, when it approved the Family Law Section's request to file an amicus brief on homosexual adoption. Should The Florida Bar follow its own rules? The majority concludes that this decision is up to the Bar. See majority op. at 192. Because I agree with Liberty Counsel that this Court should require the Bar to comply with its own rules, I respectfully dissent. [14]
The Florida Bar's Standing Board Policy 8.10(a)(3) provides that sections of the Bar may not submit an amicus brief in pending litigation if the issue involved carries the potential of deep philosophical or emotional division among a substantial segment of the membership of the bar. The issue of homosexual adoption is undeniably divisive. The Florida Bar does not argue otherwise. The majority opinion does not hold otherwise. The Bar has consistently recognized the divisive nature of homosexual adoption in the past. In 2004, the Bar rejected the Family Law Section's request to lobby for the repeal of Florida's law specifically because it determined that the issue of homosexual adoption had the potential of creating a deep philosophical and emotional divide among members of the Florida Bar. See Alan B. Bookman, Our Legislative Role, Fla. B.J., Feb. 2006, at 8. Then, in 2005, the Bar again recognized the divisiveness of the issue when it denied the Family Law Section's request to lobby that some homosexual parents be permitted to adopt. See Jan Pudlow, Family Law Section to File Gay Adoption Case Amicus, The Florida Bar News, Feb. 15, 2009. In this case, based upon the meeting minutes from January 30, 2009, it is not at all clear that The Florida Bar made any determination regarding divisiveness or even that it recognized that Standing Board Policy 8.10(a)(3) required it to do so. The meeting minutes simply state: The board voted to not disallow the Family Law Section filing an amicus brief with the Third District Court of Appeal in the case, In the Matter of the Adoption of John Doe and James Doe, supporting the ruling of the trial court judge in that case. The judge ruled F.S. § 63.042(3) unconstitutional and allowed homosexual foster parents to adopt two brothers they had raised for four years. The Board of Governors' action does not constitute The Florida Bar's formal endorsement of the section's position. It acknowledges the subject matter is within the purview of the section's area of expertise and permits the sectioncomposed of and funded entirely by voluntary membersto go forward. No Bar membership fees will be expended to advocate the brief put forth by the section and the amicus will be written by a volunteer. Board member Larry Ringers recused himself from the vote. The Florida Bar Board of Governors, Regular Minutes (Jan. 30, 2009), at 5-6. These meeting minutes do not mention whether the Bar determined the divisiveness of homosexual adoption as its policy required. The only indication of any discussion by the Board of Governors comes from a Florida Bar News article cited by Liberty Counsel. See Pudlow, supra. The article indicates that some members of the Board of Governors considered the merits of homosexual adoption, not the divisiveness of the issue. For instance, one board member is reported as having been moved by the Holocaust and the movie, Judgment at Nuremburg, where the leaders did not do the right thing. Id. at 1. This board member is quoted as saying, [W]e are the leaders of the Bar and I think we should send a message to Floridians that we are here to uphold the law, and we are here to do the right thing. Id. Another board member is quoted as saying, To consider children are being prohibited from having the right to be adopted by appropriate and very caring individuals is completely wrong, and we should not let that go forth. Id. These comments, indicating support for the merits of the proposed amicus position, do not address the divisiveness issue at all and are contrary to the Board's minutes indicating there was no endorsement. Even though the issue is divisive, the Board of Governors could have voted to waive the application of its Standing Board Policy 8.10(a)(3) with a two-thirds vote, pursuant to its bylaws. [15] Yet it did not do so. Specifically, Bylaw 2-9.2 provides: The board of governors shall adopt standing board policies governing the internal administration and operation of The Florida Bar and the board of governors. The board of governors may adopt, amend, or rescind standing board policies by a majority vote of the membership of the board of governors provided any amendment to any standing board policy shall not be effective until 30 days after adoption. Such standing board policies may be adopted, rescinded, or amended by a majority vote of those present at any regular meeting of the board of governors provided advance written notice is given to the members of the board of governors of the proposed adoption, repeal, or amendment of any standing board policy. The provision of any standing board policy may be waived by a two-thirds vote of those present at any regular meeting of the board of governors. R. Regulating Fla. Bar, Bylaw 2-9.2 (emphasis added). Voting to waive the standing board policy is the only method by which the Bar may take contrary action, as approved by this Court. See Fla. Bar re Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 494 So.2d 977, 992-93 (Fla.1986) (adopting Bylaw 2-9.2); see also R. Regulating Fla. Bar 1-11.2, 1-11.3 (explaining that this Court reviews objections to proposed bylaws and may amend bylaws adopted by the Bar at any time). This Court is not micromanaging the affairs of the Bar by requiring it to comply with the bylaws approved by this Court. There are no provisions for an implicit waiver in any applicable standing board policy provisions or bylaws of the Bar. However, the majority holds that the unanimous vote by the Board implicitly waived the Bar's standing board policy. See majority op. at 192. Contrary to the majority's holding, Bylaw 2-9.2 expressly requires a two-thirds vote to waive such policies. And because Bylaw 2-9.2 expressly requires a waiver by a two-thirds vote, a two-thirds vote is the only possible method of waiving standing board policies. See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So.2d 392, 407 (Fla.2006) (defining the principle of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another, by explaining that when the manner of doing an act is prescribed, the manner prescribed is exclusive). Therefore, the Board's unanimous approval of the Family Law Section's amicus brief does not constitute a legally recognizable waiver of Standing Board Policy 8.10(a)(3). Significantly, the Bar must comply with Robert's Rules of Order when conducting its meetings, which do not permit an implicit waiver. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar, Bylaw 2-9.6 (The current edition of Robert's Rules of Order shall be the rules that govern the conduct of all meetings of The Florida Bar, its board of governors, its sections, divisions, and committees.). Robert's Rules states that rules contained in an organization's bylaws cannot be suspendedno matter how large the vote in favor of doing so or how inconvenient the rule in question may beunless the particular rule specifically provides for its own suspension, or unless the rule properly is in the nature of a rule of order. Henry M. Robert III et al., Robert's Rules of Order Newly Revised § 25, at 254 (10th ed.2000). The Bar's Bylaw 2-9.2, which provides for the waiver of standing board policies by a two-thirds vote, does not specifically provide for the suspension of Bylaw 2-9.2 itself and is not a rule of order. As a result, the particular manner for waiving standing board policies prescribed by Bylaw 2-9.2 cannot be suspended no matter how large the vote in favor of doing so or how inconvenient the rule in question may be. Id; see also id. § 25, at 257-58 (explaining that suspending a rule by unanimous consent, rather than by making a formal motion to suspend the rules, is accomplished prospectively by asking for unanimous consent and then asking if anyone objects). Therefore, under Robert's Rules of Order, a unanimous vote does not retroactively cure the Bar's failure to comply with Standing Board Policy 8.10(a)(3) or waive the policy in the manner prescribed by Bylaw 2-9.2. The majority's holding that there was an implicit waiver of Standing Board Policy 8.10(a)(3) is contrary to the Bar's specific bylaws regarding how a waiver may be obtained.
The Florida Bar is an official arm of the court. R. Regulating Fla. Bar, ch. 1, Intro. Indeed, the Board's actions are subject always to the direction and supervision of the Supreme Court of Florida. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 1-4.2(a). Therefore, as the administrative head of the Bar, this Court not only has the authority, but the duty, to require the Bar to follow its own bylaws and policies. Every day, the Bar holds attorneys accountable for their actions in compliance with the rules of The Florida Bar. See generally R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-3.1 (designating the Bar as an agency of this Court for the purpose of enforcing the rules of conduct for attorneys). When these rules are not complied with, there are disciplinary consequences to the lawyers. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1 (listing the disciplinary consequences to lawyers who are found guilty of violating the rules). It is not too much to ask for the Bar to comply with its own requirements when we expect lawyers to comply with the requirements of the Bar. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 1-11.1 (explaining that the Bar's bylaws govern the method and manner by which the requirements of the Bar's rules are met). The majority concludes that this Court should not require the Bar to comply with its own policies and bylaws because the Bar has the authority to act in regards to sections and, therefore, its actions are not ultra vires. See majority op. 191-92. I do not agree with this conclusion or the particular use of the terms authority and ultra vires that the majority employs to arrive at its conclusion. Authority is defined as [t]he power to command, enforce laws, exact obedience, determine, or judge. American Heritage Dictionary 142 (2d coll. ed.1991). And, as the majority notes, ultra vires is defined as unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law. Majority op. at 191 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1559 (8th ed.2004)). However, the majority's use of these terms does not acknowledge that certain requirements, such as compliance with rules, must be met for the exercise of authority to be legal and proper. For instance, a police officer has the authority to conduct searches but not before fulfilling the procedural requirement of obtaining a valid warrant. See generally Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979); see also Word of Life Ministry, Inc. v. Miller, 778 So.2d 360, 363 & n. 3 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (Even if those voting on May 24, 1978, had been authorized to elect directors, the elections were void for failure to observe restrictions imposed by the articles of incorporation which required directors to be members of the corporation; electing individuals as directors did not confer membership because of specific bylaw procedural requirements for membership). Therefore, unlike the majority, I conclude that the Bar only has the authority to approve a section's amicus brief when, in doing so, the Board complies with all applicable bylaws and standing board policies. [16] In particular, I respectfully disagree with the majority's statement that the Court will not interfere with or micromanage the activities of the Bar's sections, or the approval of those activities by the Bar, unless the Bar's actions regarding the scope of the activities of its voluntary sections are clearly outside the Bar's authority. Majority op. at 191. This statement is overly broad because there is nothing outside the Bar's authority, as the majority uses the term authority, when it comes to the activities of the sections. Sections are created or abolished by the Bar's Board as deemed necessary or desirable. R. Regulating Fla. Bar, Bylaw 2-7.3. The sections' bylaws, which define the scope and purpose of the sections, are approved by the Board. R. Regulating Fla. Bar, Bylaw 2-7.1. And the sections, which are integral parts of the Florida Bar, must work under the Board's supervision to accomplish their goals and purposes. R. Regulating Fla. Bar, Bylaw 2-7.2. But the majority's statement indicates that this Court will never act to supervise the Bar in its actions relating to sections. As the administrative head of the Florida Bar, we simply cannot abdicate our duty to supervise the Bar. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const. (The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913, 920-21 (1979) (explaining that the nondelegation doctrine prohibits the delegation of constitutional functions to others).
Because the Bar failed to comply with or waive its Standing Board Policy 8.10(a)(3), and this Court has the duty to supervise the Bar, I would grant Liberty Counsel's request for injunctive relief without prejudice to the requisite vote on whether to waive the standing board policy. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. CANADY, J., concurs.