Opinion ID: 2265985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the december 21, 1990 charges

Text: Applying the foregoing standards to the charges of December 21, 1990, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's request for the identity of the confidential informant. The confidential informer was the only eyewitness to the entire transaction other than Detective Kacsuta. [7] Thus, the possible significance of the confidential informant's testimony cannot be underestimated in this case. This clearly weighs in favor of disclosure. Payne, supra, Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 427 Pa. 261, 234 A.2d 423 (1967), Carter supra, and Commonwealth v. Lee, 254 Pa.Super. 495, 386 A.2d 59 (1978). Moreover, the fact that the only eyewitness to the entire transaction other than the confidential informant was a police officer militates in favor of disclosure. In Carter, 427 Pa. at 61, 233 A.2d at 288, we noted that: [e]lemental to our concept of fairness, as well as that embodied in the federal constitution, is the awareness that the testimonial perspective of police officers is conditioned by the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. [citations omitted] This awareness make us reluctant to permit the establishment of facts crucial to criminal guilt solely by police testimony based on a single observation where testimony from a more disinterested source is available. [8] Accord Payne, supra, and Lloyd, supra . On the other side of the equation, a court should weigh, inter alia, the public's interest in maintaining the flow of information to the police and the safety of the confidential informant. We note in this regard that there was no evidence whatsoever presented that disclosure would jeopardize the safety of the confidential informant or compromise any ongoing investigation. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing considerations which weigh in favor of disclosure and the fact that there has been no showing by the Commonwealth of any countervailing considerations, [9] the trial court clearly abused its discretion in failing to compel disclosure of the confidential informant's identity. Accordingly, we vacate the judgement of sentence arising out of the December 21, 1990 charges and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.