Opinion ID: 454827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive Law of New York

Text: 6 The New York Wrongful Death Act is set out in Sec. 5-4.1 of the New York Estate Powers and Trust Law (McKinney, 1970): 7 The personal representative, duly appointed in this state or any other jurisdiction, of a decedent who is survived by distributees may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default which caused the decedent's death against a person who would have been liable to the decedent by reason of such wrongful conduct if death had not ensued. Such an action must be commenced within two years after the decedent's death. When the distributees do not participate in the administration of the decedent's estate under a will appointing an executor who refused to bring such action, the distributees are entitled to have an administrator appointed to prosecute the action for their benefit. (emphasis added). 8 The New York statute is patterned after the original Wrongful Death Act, Lord Campbell's Act, Stat. 9 and 10 Vict. Chap. 93, 1846, which allows recovery: 9 [w]hensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as would, (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages.... (emphasis added). 10 New York does not use the conditioning language is such as. Instead, New York defines the right to bring the action in terms of the liability of the tortfeasor-defendant. Thus, New York allows the decedent's representative a cause of action only in cases where the defendant would have been liable to the decedent. See generally 167 A.L.R. 894. The New York Court of Appeals has interpreted the state's wrongful death statute to mean that no action should be maintainable under it unless the decedent, at the time of his death, could have maintained an action. Kelliher v. New York Cent. and H.R.R. Co., 212 N.Y. 207, 105 N.E. 824, 825 (1914) (emphasis added). In Kelliher, the court held that the wrongful death claim brought by the decedent's personal representative was barred by the running of the statute of limitations on the decedent's underlying personal injury claim. Subsequent New York decisions have followed Kelliher in holding that the representative's ability to maintain an action depends upon a valid subsisting claim in the decedent's favor at the time of his death. See Myers v. City of Plattsburgh, 214 N.Y.S.2d 773, 13 A.D.2d 866 (1961) (not maintainable when decedent's personal injury action time-barred at death); Prink v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 911, 398 N.E.2d 517 (1979) (not maintainable when decedent's death caused by suicide); Johnson v. Stromberg-Carlson Telephone Mfg. Co., 276 N.Y. 621, 12 N.E.2d 607 (1937), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 645, 59 S.Ct. 150, 83 L.Ed. 416 (1938) (not maintainable when underlying personal injury claim time-barred at death); Emery v. Rochester Telephone Corp., 271 N.Y. 306, 3 N.E.2d 434 (1936) (not maintainable when no direct interference with decedent's person). These decisions clearly establish that New York views the liability of a defendant to a decedent at the time of his death as a statutory condition precedent to, and an essential element of, any representative's wrongful death claim. Indeed, New York holds that if any essential element of the cause of action is lacking--such as the right of the injured party to bring suit--there is a failure to state a claim for wrongful death. Emery, 3 N.E.2d at 434, 435-36. 11 Despite the long held and clearly established precedents of New York, on this appeal Mrs. Rosenberg maintains that the statute of limitations governing her husband's personal injury claim is not a substantive part of her cause of action for wrongful death. She argues that the bar of the statute of limitations is merely procedural. Accordingly, she contends that even though her remedy has been barred in the courts of New York, her right of action for wrongful death remains valid--provided she can find a jurisdiction which will recognize it. She contends that Texas is such a jurisdiction. However, the cases relied upon by Mrs. Rosenberg refer only to the necessity to bring a wrongful death action within two years of the decedent's death, as explicitly required by the New York Wrongful Death Act. None of her authorities address New York's statutory requirement that an action may be maintained only when the defendant would have been liable to the decedent if death had not ensued. Neither do they abrogate or overrule the clear New York authority that the lack of a valid claim at the time of the decedent's death acts as a bar to the right of the personal representative to bring a wrongful death action. 6 Since Celotex was not liable to Stanley Rosenberg at the time of his death under New York law, it follows that Barbara Rosenberg can make no claim under the New York wrongful death statute. 12 Admitting that she has no remedy in New York, Mrs. Rosenberg filed suit in Texas for her husband's wrongful death. She contends that Texas recognizes a cause of action for Mr. Rosenberg's wrongful death because she filed it within two years of his death. In effect, Mrs. Rosenberg asserts that even though New York bars her cause of action, Texas does not. She maintains that the Texas conflicts of laws rules would apply New York substantive law--where she claims she has a right to a wrongful death cause of action--and Texas procedural law. If Texas applies its own statute of limitations as procedural law she maintains her action must go forward.