Opinion ID: 2254901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The comity issue

Text: Whether the Cambodian adoption certificate of June 2004 should be given comity by the New York courtsi.e., whether being John Doe's father under Cambodian law made LMB his father under New York law alsois a question that received less attention below, but requires more discussion by us here. It seems from the Surrogate's opinion that ERJ opposed according comity to LMB's Cambodian adoption solely on the ground that New York State and Federal public policy precluded it. In support of this argument, ERJ pointed out that: (1) Cambodian law, unlike New York law and federal immigration regulations, did not require a pre-adoption investigation by a disinterested person or by an authorized agency (Domestic Relations Law § 112 [7]) or home study (8 CFR 204.3 [e]); and (2) Cambodia did not require approval of an international adoption by the receiving State, as does the Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (32 ILM 1134 [1993]). The Surrogate had little difficulty in disposing of these arguments. She rejected both of them on the ground that foreign adoptions should generally be accorded comity unless enforcement would result in the recognition of a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, or shocking to the prevailing moral sense (quoting Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d 368, 377 [1980] [internal quotation marks omitted]); and she rejected the second argument on the additional ground that the United States had not ratified the Hague Convention. Again, the reasoning of the Surrogate on these issues is convincing, and ERJ takes no issue with it on this appeal. ERJ apparently did not advance, and the Surrogate did not address, a perhaps better reason for denying comity to LMB's Cambodian adoption of John Doe: at the time of that adoption, John Doe and LMB were in New York, not Cambodia. It is true that the child was a Cambodian citizen, and that his presence in New York was theoretically temporary; he was here on a visa, originally granted for six months and extended for another six months, for the purpose of receiving medical treatment. On the other hand, it is a reasonable inference from the record that, as of June 2004, John Doe was highly unlikely ever to return to live in Cambodia. On these facts, it is not self-evident that New York should defer to Cambodia to decide the question of whether John Doe should be adopted, or by whom; arguably, as of June 2004, New York's interest in that subject was not less than Cambodia's ( cf. Barry E. v Ingraham, 43 NY2d 87 [1977]). Since ERJ has not made this argument, we need not accept or reject it, and our opinion should not be taken as expressing any view on it. We add, however, that even if the argument had been made and accepted, it might not have altered the outcome of this case. To say that a New York court would not automatically accord comity to the June 2004 Cambodian adoption is not to say that that adoption is necessarily a nullity. ERJ treated it as a nullity when she petitioned the Surrogate for the adoption of John Doe in January 2006. She gave no notice of the proceeding to LMB, and she apparently did not inform the Surrogate that the June 2004 adoption had ever happened. It would be no great stretch to say that Cambodia's determination, in June 2004, of the status of its own citizen was entitled to more respect than thisthat ERJ should not have been allowed to adopt John Doe without notice to the person who was John Doe's father under Cambodian law.