Opinion ID: 883011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying Rogers' motion for a new trial?

Text: Rogers argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of irregularity in the proceedings. According to Rogers, the court ruled on who was entitled to possession of the property during the November 28, 1989 hearing, before Rogers had an opportunity to present his case. According to Rogers, the trial judge went into court thinking he had already ruled on who was entitled to permanent possession. The Sages argue that no irregularities occurred either at the hearing in November of 1989 or the court trial of September 11, 1991. A new trial will be granted when there is an: irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial; ... Section 25-11-102(1), MCA. The District Court denied Rogers' motion for a new trial. We will not reverse a district court's grant or denial of a new trial absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Tappan v. Higgins (1989), 240 Mont. 158, 783 P.2d 396. Rogers' petition for a new trial centers on the court's decision of November 28, that the Sages could file their ejectment action again on December 1, 1989. In its ruling, the court determined that the October 3, 1989 notice was insufficient to terminate the tenancy as of November 1, 1989, but, as a matter of law, was sufficient to terminate a monthly tenancy on December 1, 1989. Therefore, the court instructed the Sages that they must file their ejectment action again on December 1, 1989 because the court could not consider any action during the period that Rogers had to vacate. The court's direction was a legal one and determined only the sufficiency of the notice to terminate the tenancy on November 1, 1989. The court did not decide on November 28, 1989, who had eventual right to possession or what the actual term of the original agreement was. We conclude that Rogers mischaracterizes the court's statements and actions during the November 28, 1989 hearing. By issuing the hearing order, the court did not create irregularities in the proceedings at trial nor did it fail to permit Rogers a chance to present his case. Reversal of the November 28 decision is not warranted. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rogers' motion for a new trial.