Opinion ID: 2072173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Nature of the Injuries

Text: Perry advances a more fundamental argument in support of his contention that his case may be adjudicated in the trial court. He argues that because his injuries engendered no work-related disability, the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act do not apply. In particular, he contends that neither the embarrassment and humiliation nor the injury to character and reputation that he allegedly sustained constitute personal injury or death as those terms are comprehended by the act. We agree. Although we have not had occasion to give formal definition to the term personal injury, case law makes clear that its scope includes both physical injury and the somewhat different notions of disability and impairment. E.g., Hansen v. Von Duprin, Inc. (1987), Ind., 507 N.E.2d 573; [4] Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Cummings (1974), 160 Ind. App. 160, 162, 310 N.E.2d 565, 567. Impairment is a term of art for purposes of workers compensation that denotes an injured employee's loss of physical functions. Talas v. Correct Piping Co. (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 22; Perez v. United States Steel Corp. (1977), 172 Ind. App. 242, 359 N.E.2d 925. Disability refers to an injured employee's inability to work. Talas, 435 N.E.2d at 26. The extent of a disability is determined by a worker's physical and mental fitness for various employment opportunities. Rork v. Szabo Foods (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 1338. In the instant case, Perry alleges he has been injured by various affronts and slanderous racial slurs. He asserts that he has suffered embarrassment, humiliation, stress and paranoia, and that his character and reputation have been damaged. Both parties concede, however, that he has not sustained any physical injury or loss of physical function. Likewise, the evidence indicates that, but for his termination, Perry was both able and willing to continue to perform his duties at Stitzer. In sum, the injuries at the heart of Perry's complaint were not physical, nor was there any impairment or disability as those terms are comprehended by the act. Accordingly, we hold that Perry's claims are not barred by the exclusive remedy clause of the Worker's Compensation Act because, alone, they present no injuries covered by the act.