Opinion ID: 2036430
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Search Conditions

Text: In Samson, the Court found that the reduced expectation of privacy a parolee has is further diminished by his acceptance of the clear and unambiguous terms of the search condition contained in his parole agreement. Samson, 547 U.S. at 851-52, 126 S.Ct. at 2199, 165 L.Ed.2d at 259. Defendant argues that, because his search condition differs from the search condition considered in Samson, his expectation of privacy should not be similarly diminished. Defendant's MSR agreement provides, [y]ou shall consent to a search of your person, property, or residence under your control [3] and If [the rules of the agreement] are violated, parole or mandatory supervised release may be revoked. [4] In comparison, the search condition of the petitioner in Samson mandated that he `shall agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.' Samson, 547 U.S. at 846, 126 S.Ct. at 2196, 165 L.Ed.2d at 255, quoting Cal.Penal Code § 3067(a) (West 2000). If the petitioner in Samson were to refuse to be subject to a search, he would violate his parole and be subject to a return to physical custody of the Department of Corrections. Cal.Penal Code § 3060 (West 2007). We recognize the distinct wording in each search condition, but hold that the differences are of form, and not substance. In each state, the parolee is obligated to comply with the search demands of law enforcement officers or face potential revocation of parole. Despite defendant's protestations to the contrary, the legal and practical effect of his search condition is no different from that of the search condition at issue in Samson. Defendant also maintains that, while California's search condition explicitly allowed for a search without cause by a police officer, his search condition does not and is, therefore, indicative of a greater expectation of privacy. In addressing this contention, we turn to Moss, where we considered a search condition identical to defendant's. In Moss, we held that the search condition puts the parolee on notice that law enforcement officials may ask his consent to search his `person, property, or residence   '    with or without reasonable suspicion. Moss, 217 Ill.2d at 528, 299 Ill.Dec. 662, 842 N.E.2d 699. We further explained that this search condition has no limitation on what government agent may perform that search or what purpose they may have. Moss, 217 Ill.2d at 532, 299 Ill.Dec. 662, 842 N.E.2d 699. As such, we find no merit in defendant's argument that his search condition was in any way less explicit than that considered in Samson.