Opinion ID: 891692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interstitial Approach and Preservation

Text: {10} Because both the United States and the New Mexico Constitutions provide overlapping protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, we apply our interstitial approach. State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 12, 144 N.M. 371, 188 P.3d 95 (citing State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19-23, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1). The interstitial approach requires that we first consider whether the right being asserted is protected under the federal constitution. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. If the right is protected by the federal constitution, then the state constitutional claim is not reached. Id. If not, we next consider whether the New Mexico Constitution provides broader protection, and we may diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1. As we recently explained in State v. Leyva, a defendant must properly preserve his argument under the state constitution in order for us to consider it on appeal. 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 36, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. Thus, as an initial matter, we must determine whether our analysis is confined to the Fourth Amendment or whether Defendant properly preserved his argument under Article II, Section 10. {11} Varying preservation requirements apply, depending on whether the state constitutional provision has previously been interpreted more expansively than its federal counterpart. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 49, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. Where the state constitutional provision has already been interpreted to provide broader protection than its federal counterpart, trial counsel must develop the necessary factual base and raise the applicable constitutional provision in trial court. Id. However, where the state constitutional provision has not been determined to offer broader protection, more stringent preservation requirements apply. See id. (Where the provision has never before been addressed under our interstitial analysis, trial counsel additionally must argue that the state constitutional provision should provide greater protection, and suggest reasons as to why....). Our precedents have clearly established that Article II, Section 10 offers broader protection than the Fourth Amendment. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 50, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. Thus, we apply the general requirements of Rule 12-216(A) to determine whether Defendant develop[ed] the necessary factual base and raise[d] the applicable constitutional provision at the trial level. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 49, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. {12} In Leyva, we determined that the defendant had preserved his argument under the state constitution by pleading both the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 in his motion to suppress and developing a factual record in his motion and at the suppression hearing. Id. ¶ 50. Here, Defendant plead both the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10 in his motion to suppress; moreover, Defendant developed a factual record in his motion and at the hearing. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 27, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (concluding that argument under the state constitution was preserved where testimony at the suppression hearing discussed the circumstances of the search). Accordingly, Defendant's Article II, Section 10 argument was preserved. {13} We also address an additional preservation issue. In his motion to suppress, Defendant challenged only the officers' decision to remove the handgun from the vehicle after they had observed it. He did not challenge the propriety of the traffic stop, nor could he, because the stop was lawful; Officer Blevins pulled over the vehicle in which Defendant rode as a passenger because its tags were expired. See NMSA 1978, § 66-3-18(C) (2007) (requiring display of valid vehicle registration); see also Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109, 98 S.Ct. 330 (holding there was a lawful reason to conduct a traffic stop where vehicle tags were expired, in violation of state law). Moreover, Defendant did not challenge the officers' subsequent actions, namely running the weapon through a registry to determine whether it was stolen and running the background check that ultimately determined that Defendant was a felon. Thus, we do not reach the issue of whether officers may conduct further investigation when they temporarily remove a firearm from a vehicle as a safety precaution. See generally Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (holding that the officer, performing an exigent circumstances search of a residence in response to a shooting, violated the Fourth Amendment by moving stereo equipment observed during the search in order to reveal its serial number). Rather, our sole focus is the propriety of the officers' removal of the gun from the vehicle. Thus, pursuant to our interstitial approach, we first address the Fourth Amendment and then turn to Article II, Section 10. State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 13, 147 N.M. 134, 217 P.3d 1032; Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1.