Opinion ID: 1177986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: in the district court of the first judicial district of the state of idaho, in and for the county of shoshone

Text: ----------------- THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) CASE NO. 12613 ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) MEMORANDUM DECISION ) AND ORDER ON MOTION ERNEST GENE LaMERE, ) TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT ) Defendant. ) ----------------- On October 23rd, 1978, at 5:05 a.m., Kellogg Police Officer Wadsworth arrested the defendant for questioning in regards to a rape. He was transported to the police station and booked, during which time the defendant made certain voluntary statements not in response to any questioning by the police officer. Later on in the morning the defendant was read his Miranda Rights by the Chief of Police and Officer Wadsworth, but said Miranda Warning was not set forth in writing or otherwise recorded. At that time the officers questioned the defendant. Defendant was then placed in a cell and at about 4:35 p.m. again was brought out by Officer Yon and Officer Crawford. At that time the officers made a tape recording, which included, at the outset, the Miranda Warning and the acknowledgment by the defendant that he understood his Miranda rights. A statement was then taken from the defendant on the tape recorder, and defendant then was transported from Kellogg to Wallace, Idaho, a Complaint was laid before the Magistrate and he was arraigned at 5:05 p.m., on October 23rd, 1978. The officers testified that they had other duties to perform during the daytime hours, including transporting the victim to Coeur d'Alene for a physical examination and other routine matters. Defendant contends that the failure to comply with I.C. 19-853(e) invalidates the statements made by the defendant while in police custody on October 23rd, 1978, and furthermore, the delay in taking the defendant before a Magistrate in violation of Idaho Code Section 19-615 and Idaho Criminal Rule 5(a) deprive such statements of the necessary voluntariness required by the constitution and statutes of the United States and this state. The State, on the other hand, contends that the delay in arraignment was reasonable, that the requirements of I.C. 19-853 only pertain to questioning after the Court had determined the defendant was a needy person, but that in any event the recording of the Miranda Warning and statement complied with the requirement of said statute. When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer or a private person the person arrested must, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest is made, and an information, stating the charge against the person must be laid before such magistrate. I.C. 19-615. As to the requirements of notifying the defendant of his right to counsel, Idaho Code Section 19-853 provides in part as follows: If a person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer, or who is under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a conviction of a serious crime, is not represented by an attorney under conditions in which a person having his own counsel would be entitled to be so represented, the law enforcement officers concerned, upon commencement of detention, or the court, upon formal charge, as the case may be shall: (1) clearly inform him of his right to counsel and of the right of a needy person to be represented by an attorney at public expense; and (2) if the person detained or charged does not have an attorney, notify the public defender or trial court concerned, as the case may be, that he is not so represented... .       (e) Information given to a person under this section is effective only if: (1) it is in writing or otherwise recorded; (2) he records his acknowledgment of receipt and time of receipt, or, if he refuses to make this acknowledgment, the person giving the information records that he gave the information and that the person informed refused to acknowledge it; and (3) the material so recorded under (1) and (2) is filed with the court next concerned. Contrary to the State's contention I.C. 19-853 clearly pertains to any defendant, whether needy or not, and is one of the warnings mandated by Miranda. The Idaho statute adds an additional requirement to the Miranda case and was designed to ensure the fact that the warning could be proved as well as the acknowledgment and understanding by the defendant. At any time that a person is arrested or in custody and is questioned prior to arraignment before the Court, it is absolutely imperative that the police officers comply with Subsection (e) of I.C. 19-853. As to the statement taken from the defendant at or about 4:35 p.m., on October 23rd, 1978, it is apparent that the Miranda Warning and acknowledgment of the warning was contained on the taped statement and that the tape of such statement was filed with the Court next concerned at the time of the suppression hearing. However, it certainly would be more preferable for a written Miranda Warning to be acknowledged in accordance with the statute to further support the voluntariness of such statement. The original interview by the Chief of Police and Officer Wadsworth, of course, did not comply with the statutory requirement in any fashion, and as a result, such statement must be suppressed. The next serious question involves the delay between the arrest and presenting the matter to a Magistrate for arraignment. The voluntary character of a confession obtained prior to arraignment is placed in doubt when there is an unreasonable delay between arrest and arraignment, however, the confession is not per se inadmissible. State v. Wyman, 97 Idaho 486 [547 P.2d 531] As to the delay in arraignment, it is the Court's opinion that there was no reasonable excuse nor was the delay itself reasonable. If the police officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant, he also had sufficient probable cause to present the facts to a Magistrate for the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to permit the Magistrate to fix bond, if appropriate. Therefore, the excuse that the officers were too busy or were gathering additional evidence and therefore could not take the defendant before the Magistrate, is not credible. If further evidence needed to be secured, the arrest should not have been accomplished. This lends credence to the defendant's argument that the delay was for the purpose of obtaining a statement more than for any other reason, and cannot be condoned by the Court as a clear violation of the duty of a police officer to present an accused before a neutral and detached Magistrate forthwith. The day in question was a Monday and the Court was open and available. The Court therefore concludes that any statement volunteered by the defendant at the time of the initial booking would not be suppressed, but the violation of I.C. 19-853 would invalidate the subsequent interrogation of the defendant by the Chief of Police and Officer Wadsworth, and the delay in taking the defendant before a Magistrate would dictate a finding that the taped interview at 4:35 p.m. was not voluntary on the part of the defendant, and hence, may not be used at the time of the trial. BE IT SO ORDERED. DATED at Wallace, Idaho, this 21st day of February, 1979. s/James G. Towles JAMES G. TOWLES District Judge