Opinion ID: 198787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: triangle's status

Text: 15 We agree with the appellant that our examination does not end with the fact that the contract between the parties is entitled a Sales Agency Agreement, see 10 L.P.R.A. § 278(b), but it certainly is a point from which to begin, particularly as the undisputed evidence shows that Triangle identified itself as a commissionist for tax purposes. Although we find some support in the record for Triangle's contention that it developed a market for Robroy and made a financial investment, those facts alone are not determinative as they apply to any sales agent or middleman. See Gonzalez, 628 F. Supp. at 440; see also Roberco, 122 D.P.R. at 132 (No single factor is conclusive by itself and none has more weight or importance than the others.). Instead, we are swayed by the facts which demonstrate a lack of the requisite control of the distribution chain. 16 In Roberco, the plaintiff obtained purchase orders in Puerto Rico and forwarded them to the defendant on a commission basis. The commissions were based exclusively on sales, regardless of whether the orders were billed later. The plaintiff did not buy the defendant's merchandise to resell it or keep an inventory of the merchandise, and it was therefore not responsible for delivering the merchandise. The plaintiff's contribution to defendant's advertising was minimal, and in fact most ads placed by Roberco were for the company itself. The plaintiff had no discretion to extend credit to its customers, nor did the plaintiff handle the billing. See Roberco, 122 D.P.R. at 119-21. Similarly, EBI involved a sales representative that ma[de] no investment in promotion, inventories, or facilities; [and] ha[d] no responsibilities for credit, collections, shipment or deliveries. . . . EBI, 807 F.2d at 4; see also Gonzalez, 628 F. Supp. at 437-38, 441 (holding that plaintiff who hired no employees, carried no inventory, rented no warehouse, and did no advertising, is not an Act 75 dealer). 17 Triangle more closely resembles the plaintiffs in Franceschini and Kolthoff, who arguably invested in the development of a market and promotion of the suppliers' product, but 'assumed neither the risks nor the responsibilities that go with an Act 75 dealership.' Gonzalez, 628 F. Supp. at 441 (quoting Franceschini, 591 F. Supp. at 420). The plaintiff in Franceschini, like Triangle, invested in the business by hiring employees and advertising the product, but did not have authority to approve or reject orders, fix prices, or extend credit. In addition, it did not bill the customers or handle deliveries. See Franceschini, 591 F. Supp. at 414-15. Kolthoff was not a dealer because he could not close deals, determine prices, or grant discounts or credit. Likewise, he did not purchase products for resale and assumed no credit risk. See Kolthoff, 1996 WL 288486, at . The distinctive fact that Triangle actually had a warehouse where it would hold Robroy's products is insignificant once one accounts for the contractual requirement that Robroy pay Triangle for this service. 18 Based on the record, we are compelled to conclude that Triangle is indistinguishable from route or area salesmen who, without making any investment or commitment or taking any risk other than the value of their own time, are permitted to take orders and are paid commissions on orders finally accepted by the principal. EBI, 807 F.2d at 3. We concur with the district court that, as a matter of law, Triangle is not a dealer and does not qualify for protection under Act 75. 19 Affirmed.