Opinion ID: 792807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Supervision Claim

Text: 13 On habeas review, we lack jurisdiction to evaluate questions of federal law decided by a state court where the state court judgment `rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.' Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 294 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). We review de novo the issue of whether the procedural ground is adequate to support the judgment. See Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 239 (2d Cir.2003) (`[T]he question of when and how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude . . . consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question.' (quoting Garcia v. Lewis, 188 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir.1999) (alteration in original))); see also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375, 122 S.Ct. 877, 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002) ([T]he adequacy of state procedural bars to the assertion of federal questions. . . is not within the State's prerogative finally to decide; rather adequacy is itself a federal question. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 14 A claimed procedural bar is adequate only if state courts have applied the rule evenhandedly to all similar claims. Cotto, 331 F.3d at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, 15 [a] procedural bar will be deemed adequate only if it is based on a rule that is firmly established and regularly followed by the state in question. When a federal court finds that the rule is inadequate under this test[,] the rule should not operate to bar federal review. Nonetheless, the principles of comity that drive the doctrine counsel that a federal court that deems a state procedural rule inadequate should not reach that conclusion lightly or without clear support in state law. 16 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 We examine whether application of the procedural rule is firmly established and regularly followed in consideration of the specific circumstances presented in a case. See id. at 240 ([T]he adequacy of a state procedural bar is determined with reference to the `particular application' of the rule. (quoting Lee, 534 U.S. at 387, 122 S.Ct. 877)). Though a rule in general terms might be considered firmly established and regularly followed, such a rule considered in the specific circumstances of a case might be inadequate to preclude federal habeas review. See Lee, 534 U.S. at 376, 122 S.Ct. 877 (noting that there are exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question); see also id. at 387, 122 S.Ct. 877 (emphasizing the need to look at the particular application of the state procedural rule and rejecting dissent's theory that would focus simply on whether the rule generally serves a legitimate state interest); Cotto, 331 F.3d at 240-41. 18 In Lee, counsel for the petitioner had made an oral motion for continuance in the state trial court after learning that three defense witnesses had left the building and could not be located. 534 U.S. at 369, 122 S.Ct. 877. The trial court denied the motion, on the basis that the witnesses had abandoned Lee and because the trial court could not reschedule the trial for the following day. Id. at 370, 122 S.Ct. 877. Lee was convicted and appealed his case, in part on the basis that the motion for continuance was wrongfully denied. The state court of appeals and supreme court affirmed the conviction, holding that Lee's continuance motion was oral and therefore did not comply with a state rule that the motions be written and accompanied by an affidavit. Id. at 372, 122 S.Ct. 877. Lee's federal habeas petition was denied by the district court on procedural grounds, but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the procedural bar was inadequate because (1) the state trial court denied the continuance motion on grounds that could not have been countered by a perfect motion for continuance, id. at 381, 122 S.Ct. 877, (2) state case law did not direct flawless compliance with the procedural rules requiring written motions, id. at 382, 122 S.Ct. 877, and (3) Lee substantially complied with the relevant procedural rules when he orally made the motion and explained why a continuance was necessary, id. at 382, 122 S.Ct. 877. 19 Following Lee, we held in Cotto, that, in determining whether application of the procedural rule is firmly established and regularly followed, we must examine: 20 (1) whether the alleged procedural violation was actually relied on in the trial court, and whether perfect compliance with the state rule would have changed the trial court's decision; (2) whether state caselaw indicated that compliance with the rule was demanded in the specific circumstances presented; and (3) whether petitioner had substantially complied with the rule given the realities of trial, and, therefore, whether demanding perfect compliance with the rule would serve a legitimate governmental interest. 21 Cotto, 331 F.3d at 240 (quoting Lee, 534 U.S. at 382, 122 S.Ct. 877). Although these three factors were not presented as a `test' for determining adequacy, we use them as guideposts in `evaluat[ing] the state interest in a procedural rule against the circumstances of a particular case.' Id. (emphasis added and alteration in original) (quoting Lee, 534 U.S. at 386-87, 122 S.Ct. 877). 22 Here, as to the first consideration — whether the procedural ground was relied on by the trial court — we noted in Cotto that this factor is not very relevant in cases where we are reviewing application of the contemporaneous objection rule. That is, the lack of objection by a party would not, almost by definition, be mentioned by the trial court. Id. at 242. In the instant case, however, the trial court ceased its practice of allowing jurors to examine evidence outside its presence after defense counsel made his objection known; therefore, it is likely that perfect compliance with the state rule would have changed the trial court's decision. Accordingly, this factor weighs against Monroe. Cf. Lee, 534 U.S. at 381, 122 S.Ct. 877 (noting that perfect compliance would not have changed the outcome and thus, that this factor weighed in favor of the habeas petitioner). 23 As to the second consideration, state case law indicates that compliance with the contemporaneous objection rule is not demanded in the specific circumstances presented. Certainly, if a rule requiring compliance does exist, it is not firmly established. In People v. Silver, a state appellate decision dating back to 1934, the court held that a defendant could not waive a judicial supervision claim where the judge was absent during part of the prosecutor's summation. 240 A.D. 259, 269 N.Y.S. 765 (1st Dept. 1934). The court held that it was irrelevant under the circumstances that an objection was not made, id. at 262, 269 N.Y.S. 765, 24 d[id] not need to consider any question of prejudice to the defendant, for the difficulty here lies deeper than the violation of a mere procedural right. It affects the very organization of the court by which the defendant has been tried. It is not sufficient that he was tried within a court room; he was entitled to a trial before a duly constituted court. Such a trial could not be had except under the direction and superintendence of a judge. To such a trial the defendant was entitled, not intermittently, but from the beginning to the very end. 25 Id. at 261, 269 N.Y.S. 765,. The court emphasized that the rule which requires the presence of the judge applies not only to the taking of evidence, but to all the proceedings on the trial, including the arguments of counsel. Id. at 263-64, 259 N.Y.S. at 770. The problem, the court explained, was that [i]f any misconduct took place in the court room during such absence there would be no judge present to whom defendant's counsel could make complaint, or to determine what occurred in his absence. Id. at 265, 259 N.Y.S. at 771. The court further emphasized, in stark terms, the significance of the failure of judicial supervision: 26 [T]he presiding judge may at no time relinquish control of the proceedings without producing a dissolution of the court. No one would assert that the trial could proceed in the absence, no matter how brief, of a juror in the case. In our opinion the absence of the judge is as important and as fatal to the judgment. . . . The serious consequences of any relaxation of the rule must be self-evident. The trial of a felony case, in whole or in part, in the absence of a judge, especially against the defendant's objection, is repugnant to the conception of trial by jury as that term has always been understood and applied. If prejudice is required to be shown in such a case, then we dispense entirely with the necessity for the presence of the trial judge, for prejudice occurring even in his presence would be ground for the reversal of the judgment. Shall we then say that the same consequences follow where the trial is conducted without, as when it is conducted with, a judge? If, as we agree, a defendant has the right to a trial before a properly constituted court, then his rights are violated when, without his consent, any part of the trial is conducted before a body not constituted as required by law. 27 Id. at 268-69, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 775 (citation omitted). 28 In People v. Ahmed, 66 N.Y.2d 307, 487 N.E.2d 894, 496 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1985), the New York Court of Appeals held that even a defendant's consent could not overcome the right to judicial supervision during jury deliberations. The court stated: 29 We find that the absence of the trial judge, and the delegation of some of his duties to his law secretary during a part of the jury's deliberations, deprived the defendant of his right to a trial by jury, an integral component of which is the supervision of a judge. That defense counsel consented to this arrangement does not constitute either a failure to preserve a question of law for our review or a waiver. Generally, a defendant may not present a question of law to this court unless he has preserved it for review by timely objection in the trial court. However, we have long recognized that certain errors need not be preserved, and, even if consented to, they may still present a question of law. More recently, such errors have been classified as those that would affect the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law. 30 Id. at 310, 487 N.E.2d at 895, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 985 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 31 In People v. Lumpkin, 173 A.D.2d 738, 570 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't 1991), the court noted that consent would not waive a judicial supervision claim concerning a trial judge's absence during the reading back of testimony during jury deliberations. The court stated: 32 [A] Judge's absence from the court room during the reading back of testimony, with or without consent, is improper, and we strongly disapprove of it. It does not comport with the Judge's supervisory role, or with the established expectations and conventions that underlie the judicial function. 33 Id. at 740-41, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 622 (internal citation omitted). 34 In People v. Bayes, 78 N.Y.2d 546, 584 N.E.2d 643, 577 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1991), the New York Court of Appeals similarly held that a judicial supervision claim pertaining to a trial judge's delegation to a law secretary of the task of supervising a deliberating jury, including rereading instructions and responding to jury notes, deprives a defendant of the right to trial by jury because an integral part of that right is the supervision of a Judge. Id. at 551, 584 N.E.2d at 645, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 587. The Court of Appeals further explained 35 that the Judge's failure to retain control of the jury deliberations, because of its impact on the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, implicated the organization of the court or mode of proceedings prescribed by law, and therefore presented a question of law even absent timely objection. 36 Id. (emphasis added). 37 In People v. Pinkney, 272 A.D.2d 52, 709 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dept. 2000), the court held that the absence of a trial judge during part of the jury's voir dire required a new trial, regardless of the defendant's explicit waiver of any objection. The court began by emphasizing that 38 [t]he presence of and supervision by a Judge constitutes an integral component of the right to a jury trial . . . Since the selection of the jury is part of the criminal trial . . . a defendant has a fundamental right to have a Judge preside over and supervise the voir dire proceedings while prospective jurors are being questioned regarding their qualifications. A Judge who relinquishes control over the proceedings or delegates the duty to supervise deprives a defendant of the right to a trial by jury, requiring reversal . . . Here, the Judge's absence from portions of the actual voir dire examination of jurors by counsel violated these fundamental precepts. In the end, it is the Judge who is the ultimate arbiter of a prospective juror's fitness to serve. 39 Id. at 52-53, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). The court recognized that the defense consented to the trial Judge's absence, but it nonetheless found that the error constitutes a defect in the organization of the court or the mode of proceedings which, even if consented to, still presents a question of law. Id. at 53, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 12 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 40 These cases make clear that New York state courts do not typically require judicial supervision claims be preserved. Indeed, the only case that holds to the contrary is People v. Hernandez, 94 N.Y.2d 552, 708 N.Y.S.2d 34, 729 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y.2000), which relies entirely on the state court's decision in the instant case, People v. Monroe, 90 N.Y.2d 982, 688 N.E.2d 491, 665 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1997), for support. That decision, however, was three years after Monroe's case was decided by the Court of Appeals. Within federal constitutional limits, New York certainly may alter its rules of criminal procedure to require contemporaneous objections by defendants to preserve particular grounds for appeal. The point here, however, is at the time Monroe was tried, it was clear that New York did not have such a requirement as to claims of judicial supervision. Certainly, there is no firmly established rule requiring contemporaneous objection in this circumstance, and there is no even-handed application of the rule to all judicial supervision claims. Accordingly, the second factor of Lee weighs heavily in favor of petitioner. Cf. Lee, 534 U.S. at 382, 122 S.Ct. 877 (noting that no published Missouri decision directs flawless compliance with [the relevant procedural rules] in the unique circumstances this case presents); Cotto, 331 F.3d at 247 (holding that the [state] law does not require [a party] to make repeated pointless protests after the court has ruled. At a minimum, such a practice is not firmly established and regularly followed in the circumstances presented in this case. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 41 The final factor concerns whether Monroe substantially complied with the contemporaneous objection rule. We must keep in mind the asserted state interest behind the contemporaneous objection rule-to ensure that the parties draw the trial court's attention to any potential error while there is still an opportunity to address it. Cotto, 331 F.3d at 245. The Supreme Court has recognized that contemporaneous objection rules of this kind serve legitimate state interests in ensuring that judges are promptly alerted to errors at trial . . . . Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). In Lee, 534 U.S. at 382-83, 122 S.Ct. 877, the Supreme Court found that the petitioner substantially complied with the rule requiring a written motion for continuance when he made an oral motion for continuance, and in Cotto, 331 F.3d at 245-47, we held that the petitioner substantially complied with the rule requiring a contemporaneous objection where the petitioner made his objection clear to the state trial court prior to the asserted error. 42 Here, Monroe did not contemporaneously object to the jury's initial ex parte viewings. Since the judge announced that such viewings were taking place, Monroe's counsel should have known of them. Compliance with the state's procedural rule given the realities of trial would have been uncomplicated and straightforward — Monroe would simply have to voice an objection at the time to preserve the issue. Thus, nothing complex was required of Monroe to follow the state's legitimate rule, unlike the circumstances of Lee or Cotto. Therefore, the third Cotto factor counsels against Monroe. 43 Despite the first and third Cotto factors going against Monroe, the fact that at the time of his trial the state was not usually requiring a contemporaneous objection — the second Cotto factor — predominates. Therefore, Monroe's failure to object contemporaneously is not an adequate and independent bar to our review. 44 Neither the New York Court of Appeals, on direct appeal, nor the District Court, on habeas review, reached the merits of Monroe's judicial supervision claim as an alternative holding. We thus remand to the District Court to address the merits of the claim in the first instance. In doing so, the District Court should also address the appropriate standard of review. That is, it must be determined whether, because the intermediate appellate court reached the merits of Monroe's judicial supervision claim, federal courts review the intermediate appellate court's decision using AEDPA deference, or whether, in light of the state supreme court's erroneous holding as to a procedural bar, we consider Monroe's claim de novo.