Opinion ID: 1872239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue: Whether a Proper Revocation of Acceptance Occurred?

Text: North River contends that the statutorily-delineated elements of a proper revocation of acceptance are not evidenced in this case. Restated, if, after rejection, there is an exercise of ownership by the buyer, ... buyer is considered to have accepted goods if he does any act inconsistent with seller's ownership. The Bosarges counter that they met their burden of proof of showing effective revocation of acceptance. The Bosarges contend that they produced at trial both testimonial and documentary evidence of a proper revocation. And the fact that they continued to occupy the mobile home for nineteen months after mailing to North River the October 4 notification letter ( see Section I(C), supra ) does not mean that they waived any right to revoke acceptance.
As discussed, the Bosarges' complaint was based on various theories of recovery. The judge instructed on the theories of breach of implied warranty of merchantability [6] and fitness [7]  as well as revocation of acceptance. Thus, the jury presumably concluded from a preponderance of the evidence ... that [North River] breached its implied warranty of merchantability [and fitness] in connection with the mobile home [and that the Bosarges] afforded [North River] a reasonable opportunity to adjust or correct the defects in the mobile home ... prior to their [proper] revocation of acceptance. See Vol. III, at 452, 454 & 458 (quoting jury instructions P-3A, P-9A & D-1). When a consumer has accepted goods and subsequently discovers defects or a breach of implied merchantability, the consumer may invoke statutory and case law which conditions revocation of acceptance on: (1) a nonconformity [or defect] which substantially impairs the value of the lot or commercial unit; (2) an acceptance [8] (a) (with discovery of the defect) on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity [or defect] would be cured or (b) (without discovery) reasonably induced by the difficulty of the discovery or by the seller's assurances; (3) revocation within a reasonable time after the nonconformity [or defect] was discovered or should have been discovered; and (4) revocation before a substantial change occurs in the condition of the goods not caused by their own defects. Beck Enterprises v. Hester, 512 So.2d 672, 676 (Miss. 1987) (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-608 (1972); WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3, at 303 (2d ed. 1980); Rester v. Morrow, 491 So.2d 204, 210 (Miss. 1986)); see also Gast v. Rogers-Dingus Chevrolet, 585 So.2d 725, 728 (Miss. 1991). Once the consumer has properly notified [9] the seller of his or her intent to revoke acceptance, the seller has a right to attempt to cure the alleged defect. Guerdon Industries, Inc. v. Gentry, 531 So.2d 1202, 1207 (Miss. 1988); Rester, 491 So.2d at 210 (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-508 (1972)); see also Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac v. Smith, 523 So.2d 324, 328 (Miss. 1988) (holding that a car buyer's attempt to revoke acceptance without providing seller a reasonable opportunity to cure defects cannot succeed  i.e., [s]uch opportunity for cure was a legal requisite of [buyer's] right to recovery). This right is not unlimited; that is, Mississippi law does not permit a seller to postpone revocation in perpetuity by fixing everything that goes wrong with the good. There comes a time when enough is enough  when a consumer no longer must tolerate or endure a seller's repeated (though good faith) attempts to cure the defect. Gentry, 531 So.2d at 1208; Rester, 491 So.2d at 210. As aptly stated by a Florida Court of Appeals: The buyer ... is not bound to permit the seller to tinker with the article, indefinitely in the hope it may ultimately be made to comply with the warranty. At some point in time, if major problems continue . .., it must become obvious to all people that a particular [article] simply cannot be repaired or parts replaced so that the same is made free of defect. Orange Motors of Coral Gables v. Dade County Dairies, 258 So.2d 319, 321 (Fla. App. 1972) (citations omitted); see also Rester, 491 So.2d at 210 (citing several extra-jurisdictional cases). When the time has come, the consumer may revoke once and for all. Rester, 491 So.2d at 210.
To recap, the Bosarges purchased their home in August 1983. After discovering numerous and serious defects, they notified North River; North River then assured them that the defects would be repaired. But the defects weren't repaired. The Bosarges consequently decided to inform North River in November 1983 that they didn't want th[e] mobile home anymore. North River responded by reassuring them that the defects would be repaired. Repairmen repeatedly attempted, but failed, to repair the defects. So in June 1984, the Bosarges provided North River with an exhaustive written list of defects and demanded their repair. North River again assured the Bosarges that the defects would be repaired. And again, repairmen repeatedly attempted, but failed, to repair the defects. In October 1984, the Bosarges wrote a letter in which they notified North River of their consultation with an attorney, their frustration with a year's worth of repeatedly-breached assurances, and their decision to withhold future payments until the mobile home was repaired or replaced. North River's assurances, and the Bosarges' detrimental reliance, persisted  until the home was repossessed in May 1986. North River contends that the Bosarges' failure to move out of their mobile home after rejecting it constituted an exercise of ownership (or dominion) and waiver of their right to revoke acceptance. North River's contention is unpersuasive. The Bosarges did not move out of their home in November 1983 and in October 1984  the dates when they notified North River of their intention to revoke acceptance  because they were repeatedly assured that the defects would be repaired. Their mistaken belief that North River would fulfill its assurances to repair the defects is but one reason why the Bosarges did not move out of their home. Another reason is simple and understandable: When you tie up all your savings into purchasing a home, you cannot take it and park it somewhere[. Y]ou have got to live in it until you can get the people to clear your lot so you can put another one on it. It's just not like a car you can drive it on the lot and hand them the keys and say, it's yours. Vol. IV, at 136 (testimony of Martha Bosarge). North River's contention that the Bosarges should have moved out reflects ignorance of case law which requires a consumer, who expresses an intention to revoke acceptance, to provide a seller with a reasonable opportunity to attempt to cure the defect. Rester, 491 So.2d at 210 (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-508 (1972)). The evidence unequivocally shows that the Bosarges complied with this law; indeed, one could arguably contend that they complied to an unnecessary extent. But the Bosarges' great patience is not surprising in view of their financial inability to move elsewhere. The facts in this case are similar to another case which involved an automobile. Royal Lincoln-Mercury v. Wallace, 415 So.2d 1024 (Miss. 1982). In Wallace, Justice Patterson wrote: [The facts] reveal[] an intention to revoke by Wallace [the consumer] when he stated to Fargason [the seller] that he was dissatisfied with the car and offered to trade for a new one. When this effort failed, Wallace advised Fargason that he would contact his lawyer. Fargason replied that he would meet Wallace in court. Although the issue is clouded by subsequent use of the automobile and additional efforts to have the defects corrected, Wallace's prior intention of revocation was revitalized when he parked the automobile within the 12 months and 12,000 mile warranty period and filed suit. Again, the issue was factual and was resolved by the jury on conflicting evidence against [the seller]. We think, therefore, that the [consumer] effectively revoked acceptance of that automobile. 415 So.2d at 1028-29. Unlike Wallace, the Bosarges could not park their home. As aptly noted by the Bosarges, failure to surrender the [home] did not per se render ineffective [their] revocation. Appellee's Br. at 11 (quoting J.L. Teel Co. v. Houston United Sales, 491 So.2d 851, 860 (Miss. 1986) ( J.L. Teel Co. involved revocation of acceptance of a photocopier)); accord Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382 A.2d 954, 956 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 88 N.J. 277, 440 A.2d 1345 (1982); Lawrence v. Modern Mobile Homes, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Mo. App. 1978). The record is simply devoid of any evidence of the Bosarges' intention to exercise wrongful ownership or dominion over the home once they declared that enough is enough and that their revocation of acceptance would be final. [12] Any excessive or unreasonable use of the home by the Bosarges may be remedied through quantum meruit recovery  not through ineffectuation of revocation. J.L. Teel Co., 491 So.2d at 860-61 (We find several cases from our sister states suggesting  without an explicit statutory basis  a seller's entitlement to the reasonable value of the [consumer's] use after revocation of acceptance.) (emphasis in original) (citing extra-jurisdictional cases and WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-3 (2d ed. 1980)). The Bosarges alternatively contend that, because North River was not prejudiced, their alleged delay in vacating the home did not constitute a waiver of their revocation. According to the Bosarges, North River was not prejudiced because: (1) it did not have the legal right to repossess the [home], and (2) because Troy & Nichols (the lender/lienholder who settled prior to trial) advanced the total cost of the [home], [North River] did not have the right to any of the sale proceeds. Research revealed no published opinion in which this Court has explicitly held that revocation cannot be waived where no prejudice is evidenced. However, this Court did cite with approval the case of Lawrence v. Modern Mobile Homes , in which the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the consumer had not waived the right to revoke his acceptance by continued use of the mobile home because the seller failed to prove resultant prejudice. [13] 562 S.W.2d at 730, cited in J.L. Teel Co., 491 So.2d at 860. The court of appeals added that a seller may, nonetheless, be entitled to a set-off for the reasonable value of [a consumer's] continued use. Id. at 733. Whether proof of prejudice is necessary before revocation may be waived is an issue which need not be reached and, therefore, this Court declines to address it at this time. In sum, the Bosarges' continued use of the home did not constitute a waiver of their right to revoke acceptance. At most, their continued use would mean that North River may have a right to a set-off, which is an issue addressed in Section II(C), infra.