Opinion ID: 821098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence—Count III

Text: Villarreal argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, new trial, on Count III based on insufficiency of the evidence. According to Villarreal, although the district court correctly found that he could not be found guilty of the principal offense of sexual abuse of an incapacitated person because the victim was awake at the time digital penetration occurred and knew it was Villarreal, the court incorrectly sustained Villarreal's conviction on the alternative charged theory of attempt. Villarreal maintains that partially pulling down the victim's pants was [not] a substantial step toward committing the offense. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) provides that the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept as established all reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. United States v. Augustine, 663 F.3d 367, 373 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted). We review[ ] de novo [the] district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal; however, we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence deferentially and affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). United States v. Vega, 676 F.3d 708, 721 (8th Cir. 2012) (alterations in original). We review the district court's denial of Villarreal's motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 722. Count III charged Villarreal with sexual abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2). As explained supra, been charged. -23- [§] 2242(2) make[s] it unlawful for an Indian in Indian country knowingly to engage, or attempt to engage, in a sexual act with another person who is incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct, or physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act. United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)). Therefore, to convict Villarreal of sexual abuse, the government was required to prove the following: (1) on or about March 10, 2010, Villarreal knowingly engaged in a or attempted to engage in a sexual act with Marissa; (2) at the time of the offense, Marissa was incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct or was physically incapable of declining participation in or communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual act; (3) Villarreal is an Indian person; and (4) the offense took place in Indian country. [T]he term 'sexual act' [includes] . . . the penetration, however slight, of the . . . genital opening of another by a . . . finger . . . with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(C). A jury may convict [a] defendant [under § 2242(2)] under any one of four theories: (1) that the defendant engaged in sexual abuse; (2) that the defendant attempted to engage in sexual abuse; (3) that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of sexual abuse; or (4) that the defendant aided and abetted the commission of attempted sexual abuse. Because the jury returned a general verdict of guilty in the case of [the] defendant, we do not know which theory or theories the jury found that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We will therefore uphold the jury's verdict[] if the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant['s] conviction[] under any one of the alternative theories. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S. Ct. 642, 24 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1970). The -24- evidence is sufficient if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). Papakee, 573 F.3d at 574. [O]ur cases have held that performing a sexual act upon a person who is sleeping meets the requirements of § 2242(2)(B). United States v. Lowry, 595 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163, 1169 (8th Cir. 2007) (A reasonable jury may conclude that a person who is asleep when a sexual act begins is physically unable to decline participation in that act.); United States v. Barrett, 937 F.2d 1346, 1348 (8th Cir. 1991) (describing evidence sufficient to show a state of incapacity within the meaning of § 2242(2)(B))). In the present case, the district court concluded that although insufficient evidence existed that Villarreal engaged in sexual abuse, sufficient evidence existed that Villarreal attempted to engage in sexual abuse. According to the district court, Marissa's testimony [showed that] she clearly was awake when the sexual act, that is, the penetration of her genital opening by Mr. Villarreal's finger, occurred. Villarreal, 2012 WL 683356, at . Nor was she intoxicated so as to affect her ability to ascertain the nature of the sexual act or to decline participation in, or communicate unwillingness to engage in, the sexual act. Id. Therefore, the district court concluded that Villarreal did not engage in sexual abuse under § 2242(2)(B). But the court concluded that sufficient evidence supported an attempt theory. First, the court found that [a] reasonable jury viewing the evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt the pulling down of [Marissa's] pants and underwear by Mr. Villarreal while she was asleep followed by the swift completion of the sexual act demonstrated Mr. Villarreal's intent to sexually abuse -25- [Marissa] while she was asleep, that is, while she was incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct or was physically incapable of declining participation in or communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual act. Id. at . Second, the court concluded that Villarreal's act of pulling down [Marissa's] pants and underwear . . . while she was asleep was a substantial step toward the commission of sexual abuse as charged in Count III. Id. We agree with the district court that sufficient evidence supports the theory that Villarreal attempted to engage in sexual abuse. An attempt requires (1) an intent to engage in criminal conduct, and (2) conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the substantive offense which strongly corroborates the actor's criminal intent. United States v. Robertson, 606 F.3d 943, 953 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotations and citations omitted). A substantial step goes beyond 'mere preparation' but may be less than the 'last act necessary' before commission of the substantive crime. United States v. DeMarce, 564 F.3d 989, 998 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Mims, 812 F.2d 1068, 1077 (8th Cir. 1987)). The chief purpose of the substantial step requirement is to corroborate the actor's specific intent to commit the crime. United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62, 66 (8th Cir. 1991) (quotations and citation omitted). As a result, the act must be of such an unequivocal nature that it is calculated to bring the desired result to fruition. Id. (quotations and citation omitted). [T]he determination whether a defendant's conduct amounts to a 'substantial step' is necessarily dependent on the particular factual circumstances in the case at hand. United States v. Mazzella, 768 F.2d 235, 240 (8th Cir. 1985). Villarreal does not challenge the intent element of attempted sexual abuse; instead, he argues that [t]he question . . . is whether Villarreal's act of pulling down [Marissa's] pants was a substantial step toward committing the charged conduct. Only evidence of Villarreal's actions before [Marissa] woke up, before the actual act of penetration occurred, is relevant to this question. -26- Here, Marissa testified that she woke up to Villarreal pulling [her] pants down. This awakened Marissa pretty quickly. When asked where Villarreal's hands were when she awoke, Marissa testified, They were touching my vagina and rubbing his hand, his finger back and forth. When asked [w]hat else happened with his hand, Marissa testified that Villarreal put his finger inside [her] vagina. As the district court noted, [a] reasonable inference from [Marissa's] testimony is this sequence of acts progressed quickly. Villarreal, 2012 WL 683356, at . Marissa's testimony establishes that Villarreal took a substantial step toward committing sexual abuse. Prior to Marissa waking up, there was nothing more for Villarreal to do but insert his finger into Marissa's vagina. Robertson, 606 F.3d at 954 (In fact, it is difficult to understand what further act the defendant could have performed toward the goal of forced penetration, short of actual completion of the substantive offense. (quotation, alterations, and citation omitted)). In essence, Marissa thwarted [Villarreal's] efforts to penetrate her vagina with his finger while she was still asleep by waking up. United States v. Plenty Chief, 561 F.3d 846, 854 (8th Cir. 2009) (T.Q. testified that, in 2005, Plenty Chief once again entered her bedroom and began rubbing her thighs; she thwarted his efforts to penetrate her vagina with his finger, as he had done in 2004, by rolling away from him several times during the incident.). Based on the circumstances of the present case, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Villarreal's conviction under § 2242(2)(B) for attempted sexual abuse.