Opinion ID: 745414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lindsey's Sufficiency Claims

Text: 3 The first four of Lindsey's claims are all based primarily on his argument that the witnesses testifying against him were incredible and biased. Indeed, many of the witnesses in Lindsey's trial were co-defendants who pleaded guilty (presumably in exchange for leniency) or drug addicts, and thus subject to heightened scrutiny. See United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428, 1435 (7th Cir.1994). However, the credibility of witnesses, even when there is strong reason to doubt it, remains uniquely within the province of the fact finder and absent clear error we will not reverse on credibility grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337, 358 (7th Cir.1990). Thus we think that there is no basis for setting aside Lindsey's conviction for conspiracy, his sentence enhancement for being a manager or supervisor, the court's calculations of his relevant conduct or his sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. 4 Lindsey argues that the government presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to distribute marijuana. His argument rests on three contentions: that the credibility of the witnesses against him is scant, that his connection to the conspiracy is purely speculative and that a search of his home turned up no indicia of drug dealing. Lindsey believes that both Timothy Mullin and Monroe Morris gave unreliable testimony. But Lindsey fails to specify any reasons apparent on the record for rejecting this evidence, relying instead on his characterization of the witnesses as unreliable due to their status as drug addicts and co-defendants-turned-state's-witnesses. He does not point to any troublesome inconsistencies, identify bias or otherwise indicate why the testimony of these two witnesses should be disregarded. Lindsey's appeal is only a request to reweigh the evidence. This we cannot do. 5 Lindsey's argument against the sentence enhancement he received for being a manager or supervisor must fail for the same reasons. Lindsey contends that the government did not show that he exercised control or supervision over other conspirators. The district court found that the evidence showed Lindsey had employed between 10 and 20 people to break down large quantities of marijuana into smaller units for sale. The district court then concluded that Lindsey was the manager or supervisor of, for want of a better term, a branch of the conspiracy which involved 5 or more participants and was otherwise extensive. The court's conclusion is not clearly erroneous. 6 Nor do we find the court's calculations of Lindsey's relevant conduct to be clearly erroneous. A convicted conspirator is responsible for the amount of [drugs] he actually distributed and the amount involved in transactions reasonably foreseeable to him. United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 775 (7th Cir.1993). Lindsey argues that the district court erroneously attributed amounts of marijuana to him without specifically linking him to the drug. This argument misses the point: the district court found that Lindsey[ ] was an integral part of the [Poe] conspiracy so that he was at a much higher level and enjoyed a closer relationship with Mr. Poe than most of the others, if not all of the other co-conspirators. Thus, reasonable estimates of marijuana foreseeably distributed by other members of the conspiracy are attributable as relevant conduct to Lindsey. 7 Lindsey also challenges the sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice on the grounds that the witnesses who testified against him were unreliable and incredible. Under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 a defendant who willfully obstructed or impeded ... the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense receives a two offense level increase. The government presented a good deal of evidence of Lindsey's efforts to obstruct the proceedings against him. This evidence included Lindsey's distribution of a wanted poster containing a picture of Monroe Morris and describing him as a snitch and Lindsey's offer of money to anyone who would beat up Morris. Lindsey also tried to convince Timothy Mullin not to testify. 8 Lindsey attempts to discredit this evidence by attacking the reliability of Morris as a witness, by noting that the wanted poster was never admitted into evidence and by arguing that the government did not prove that any of these obstructionist activities took place during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. But the testimony concerned behavior during and after the investigation, but before the prosecution. This is precisely the timing contemplated by § 3C1.1. Further, it is not our, but the district court's, prerogative to determine whether to credit a witness. Here the district court found the cumulative weight of the evidence persuasive. 9 The question of the wanted poster is vexing, however, since no such item was admitted into evidence. Only Morris testified to its existence, 1 and he is hardly a disinterested party. But, even if the poster did not exist, the enhancement is supported by other evidence. There were two witnesses other than Morris who testified to Lindsey's efforts to obstruct justice. Even without the poster, there was sufficient proof to support the obstruction of justice enhancement.