Opinion ID: 2519950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Was the Error Harmful?

Text: ¶ 46 Even were we to assume the error in jury instructions to be plain or obvious, Casey's argument would nevertheless fail because no harm resulted in this case. According to the last prong of the plain error test, we must determine whether the error was of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party. Verde, 770 P.2d at 122. In Powell, we indicated that such error must be harmful. See Powell, 872 P.2d at 1031. In other words, ... the appellant must show a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome below would have been more favorable. Verde, 770 P.2d at 122. Plain error undermines `our confidence in the verdict.' Powell, 872 P.2d at 1031 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208). ¶ 47 As we have stated previously, we recognize that there exists a narrow set of circumstances where a person may act knowingly without acting intentionally. These terms are not, however, mutually exclusive, and most knowing conduct also fits accurately within the statutory definition of intentional conduct. In this case, we see no rational basis upon which Casey's conduct could be considered knowing but not intentional in light of the evidence submitted at trial. [12] ¶ 48 It is well established that criminal intent is seldom proved by direct evidence but must be instead inferred from the circumstances of the given facts. State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983). We have also held that [a]ll the circumstances, when taken together, must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt to warrant conviction. Id. In this case, no reasonable jury could have found that Casey acted knowingly without also finding that he acted intentionally. ¶ 49 All of the circumstantial evidence clearly indicates that Casey acted intentionally. In the vehicle, before arriving at Ribe's house, Casey threatened to kill Franz. At Ribe's house, he pulled out a gun, pointed it at Franz's neck, and made further threatening remarks towards her. Finally, as they were leaving Ribe's property, Casey pointed his gun at Franz's head and pulled the trigger, but the gun misfired. After the misfire, Casey fired the gun successfully at Franz's feet. Then Casey pointed the gun once again at Franz's head. As Franz pushed the gun away and jumped out of the car, Casey fired the gun again. Thus, the evidence clearly shows that he not only threatened to kill Franz, but he also fired multiple shots at her. ¶ 50 From this evidence, there is no basis on which the jury could have concluded that Casey acted knowingly without also concluding that he acted intentionally. The evidence presented at trial allows no other hypothesis and shows that Casey not only was aware that his conduct [was] reasonably certain to cause Franz's death, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2), but that it [was] his conscious objective or desire to ... cause her death, id. § 76-2-103(1). Because the trial evidence substantially supported the jury's verdict that Casey intentionally attempted to murder Franz, we hold that the trial court's error in instructing the jury concerning attempted murder did not constitute plain error in this case.